Exploring the Role of Bureaucrats in Municipal Immigration Settlement, Integration and Multiculturalism Policies

Elizaveta Cheryachukina (300177910)

Major Research Paper submitted in partial fulfillment of
the requirements for the degree of Master of Arts in
Public Administration

School of Political Studies
University of Ottawa

Supervisor: Professor Christopher Cooper
Second Reader: Professor Anne Mévellec

March 11, 2022

Abstract: Using a most similar case study design of six municipalities within the Greater Toronto Area, this major research paper assesses whether bureaucrats influence the adoption of municipal immigration settlement, integration, and multiculturalism policies. Findings show it is unlikely that bureaucrats played a role in the adoption of municipal immigration settlement, integration, and multiculturalism policies. This fills in a gap within the literature on the main drivers of municipal immigration settlement, integration, and multiculturalism policies. Furthermore, my research methods contribute a new, innovative proxy measure of administrative politicisation in municipal governments.

Table of Contents

List of Tables

I. Introduction

Since immigrants overwhelmingly settle in cities, Canadian municipalities have increasingly taken a more active role in formulating and implementing policy that focuses on the settlement and integration of immigrants, as well as multiculturalism. But the mere presence of immigrants does not account for why some municipalities have immigration settlement, integration, and multiculturalism policies while others do not (Wallace & Frisken, 2000). The literature studying immigration settlement, integration, and multiculturalism policies has examined exogenous, institutional, ideational, and actor-based explanations for immigration and multiculturalism appearing on the agendas of municipal governments but has failed to consider the potential role of municipal bureaucrats as policy entrepreneurs. Using a most similar case study design of six municipalities within the Greater Toronto Area, I investigated the following question: do municipal bureaucrats influence the adoption of municipal immigration settlement, integration, and multiculturalism policies? I drew on the work of Paquet (2015), who found that *provincial* bureaucrats acted as policy entrepreneurs in the domain of immigration policy due to high bureaucratic autonomy and low politicisation.

Findings show it is unlikely that municipal bureaucrats influenced the adoption of municipal immigration settlement, integration, and multiculturalism policies because the opportunity for bureaucratic autonomy and potential for politicisation varied across all six municipalities and had no correlation with the presence or absence of immigration settlement, integration, and multiculturalism policies.

This research paper makes two key contributions. First, it fills in a gap within the literature on the main drivers of municipal immigration settlement, integration, and multiculturalism policies by studying the potential role of bureaucrats. Second, it creates an

innovative proxy measure for the potential of administrative politicisation. To my knowledge, this is the first examination of administrative politicisation at the municipal level of government.

The remainder of this research paper contains four sections. The first section begins with a review of the empirical literature on why municipalities adopt immigration settlement, integration, and multiculturalism policies. Thus far, the literature has identified exogenous, institutional, ideational, and actor-based explanations for the existence of municipal immigration integration, settlement, and multiculturalism. After identifying the gap of the role of bureaucrats in the literature, the theoretical frameworks most relevant for answering the research question – policy entrepreneurs, bureaucratic autonomy, and politicisation – are discussed. The second section is an overview of my research design and methods. The third section outlines my findings and provides a discussion to contextualize the results. Finally, the fourth section is the conclusion, which summarizes my findings and contributions to the literature.

II. Literature Review

In Canada, immigration is a shared power between the federal and provincial governments under the Constitution. As a result, the Canadian literature on immigration policy - including integration, settlement, and multiculturalism - focused on the federal and provincial levels of government until the 1990s, when scholars started to examine municipal or local immigration policy (Abu-Laban, 1997; Good, 2019; Fourot, 2015; Tate & Quesnel, 1995). Since immigration is a largely urban phenomenon, municipalities were recognized as having de facto jurisdiction over immigration (Fourot, 2015; Tossuti, 2012). After all, over half of recent immigrants in 2016 settled in either Toronto, Vancouver, or Montreal (Statistics Canada, 2017a). It is municipalities that end up providing essential settlement services for immigrants, from housing to language acquisition, and some municipalities have expanded their policy domain to

include multiculturalism, employment equity, and preventing racial discrimination and profiling (Fourot, 2015). Nevertheless, immigration settlement, integration, and multiculturalism policies exist not only in major Canadian cities, but also in suburbs and smaller to mid-sized cities (Good, 2019; Wiginton, 2013). For instance, smaller to mid-sized municipalities have a growing interest in the attraction, retainment, and settlement of immigrants (Tossutti & Esses, 2013; Wiginton, 2013). Overall, immigration is increasingly appearing on the agendas of a growing number of (smaller) municipal governments.

Settlement, integration, and multiculturalism policies target different stages of the immigrant experience. Settlement policy focuses on newly arrived immigrants who require assistance finding housing and jobs, enrolling their children in school, and other vital settlement needs (Tossutti, 2012; Young & Tolley, 2011). Integration is when "an immigrant becomes a member of the receiving society" (Tossutti, 2012, p. 610), thus policy focuses on the social, economic, and political integration of immigrants into Canadian life, such as participating in Canadian institutions and civic activities. Multiculturalism is a specific approach to immigration integration, officially adopted by the federal government of Canada, which rejects assimilation policy in favour of celebrating ethnocultural differences and addressing the systemic barriers faced by immigrants (Good, 2009). Multiculturalism policy is a response to the ethnocultural diversity brought on by immigrants. Though multiculturalism policy started out at the federal level, it can now be found at the provincial and municipal levels in Canada. This paper adopts Good's (2009, p. 51) definition of multiculturalism policy: "any policy, initiative, or practice that addresses ethnocultural barriers to equitable access to social, economic, or political institutions."

Yet municipal adoption of immigration settlement, integration, and multiculturalism policies vary. Scholars have developed different typologies of municipal immigration settlement,

integration, and multiculturalism policies. Some distinguish between 'proactive' or 'reactive' policy styles (Tate & Quesnel, 1995), others adding another category of 'inactive' (Wallace & Frisken, 2000), whereas others categorize responsiveness along a continuum of responsive, somewhat responsive, and unresponsive (Good, 2009). Additionally, some municipalities do not have any immigration settlement, integration, and multiculturalism policies. Naturally, this raises the puzzle of why some municipalities within the same Canadian province adopt such policies while others do not.

Ontario perfectly illustrates this puzzle. The Canada-Ontario Immigration Agreement (COIA) was signed by the federal government of Canada and provincial government of Ontario on November 24, 2017, to establish a partnership with respect to immigration (Government of Canada, 2017). The COIA included an agreement to cooperate with municipalities on immigration issues and allow municipalities to pursue opportunities related to immigration (ibid.). Furthermore, the Ontario Immigration Act, passed in 2015, committed the province to collaborate with municipalities to "address the short-term and long-term labour market needs of Ontario… enable immigrants to settle in Ontario and to integrate quickly into and to participate fully in Ontario society… [and] to attract, welcome and integrate immigrants" (Ontario Immigration Act, 2015, para. 2). In short, municipalities in Ontario have the same institutional environment: one that supports municipal policy response on immigration and encourages municipalities to collaborate with the provincial and federal governments. Given this supportive institutional environment, it is curious why some municipalities pursue immigration settlement, integration, and multiculturalism policies while others do not.

I focus on six Ontarian municipalities within the Greater Toronto Area (GTA): Toronto, Mississauga, Brampton, Markham, Vaughan, and Richmond Hill. The GTA is home to the

majority of Ontarian immigrants. In 2018, 77% of immigrants in Ontario settled in the GTA (The Conference Board of Canada, 2019). In fact, most immigrants settled in one of the six GTA municipalities I am studying. According to the 2016 census, the GTA municipality with the highest immigrant population is Markham (58.7%), followed by Richmond Hill (57.4%), Mississauga (53.4%), Brampton (52.3%), Toronto (47%), and Vaughan (46.3%) (Statistics Canada, 2017b). Thus, in addition to the same institutional environment, these six municipalities have similar demographics and are close geographically. Despite these similarities, municipal policies vary. For instance, Vaughan and Richmond Hill have none, or next to no, policies relating to immigration settlement, integration, or multiculturalism while the other four municipalities do.

This research paper is particularly interested in the agenda setting stage of the policy cycle. For municipal immigration settlement, integration, and multiculturalism policies to exist, they must first be viewed as policy problems in need of policy solutions and placed on the governmental agenda (Kingdon, 2003). Agenda is defined as "a contextual list of actionable government priorities" (Zahariadis, 2016, p. 5). This definition highlights that attention and resources in government are scarce, thus items compete to appear on government agendas (Kingdon, 2003; Zahariadis, 2016). Agenda setting, in short, "create(s) political winners and losers" (Zahariadis, 2016, p. 3). Therefore, understanding the agenda setting process reveals insights on successful (and unsuccessful) strategies to place items on government agendas and achieve policy adoption.

Given the increased municipal interest in immigration settlement, integration, and multiculturalism policies and the differences in municipal adoption of such policies, it is important to examine the main drivers behind municipal immigration settlement, integration, and

multiculturalism policies. Broadly speaking, the literature has examined exogenous, institutional, ideational, and actor-based explanations for pushing immigration integration, settlement, and multiculturalism on municipal agendas.[1] It is to these extant explanations that I now turn to review.

Exogenous Drivers

One common explanation for policy adoption is 'critical junctures' or 'triggering events', in which policies are enacted in response to external events or circumstances (Hall & Taylor, 1996). For municipalities, an interest in immigrant settlement, integration, and multiculturalism may stem from changing demographics due to increased immigration or visible minorities. One case study of the municipalities in the Greater Vancouver Area determined that municipalities adopted immigration settlement and multiculturalism policies when around 25 to 30 percent of their total population were visible minorities (Edgington & Hutton, 2001). Similarly, Tate and Quesnel (1995) found that Toronto and Montreal both had visible minority populations and immigration settlement policies in place. Interestingly, these studies suggest that it is not necessarily increased immigration that leads to municipal immigration settlement policies, but specifically an increase in immigrants who are visible minorities.

Good (2009), however, examined municipalities in the Greater Toronto and Greater Vancouver Areas with similar immigration and visible minority rates, and still found variation in the adoption of immigration settlement, integration, and multiculturalism policies – some municipalities had no such policies, while others had fairly extensive policies. Furthermore, Wallace and Frisken (2000) found no correlation between the presence of municipal immigration settlement, integration, and multiculturalism policies in the Greater Toronto Area and their

[1] A list of the municipalities mentioned in this literature review can be found in Annex A.

immigration population, but this may be because they examined immigrants rather than visible minorities. Even research that found a correlation between municipal immigration settlement, integration, and multiculturalism policies and the proportion of visible minorities mention other explanatory factors (Edgington & Hutton, 2001; Tate & Quesnel, 1995). In other words, a significant visible minority population is not by itself sufficient to initiate a municipal policy response. The mere existence of conditions is not enough to make them problems worthy of being on governmental agendas (Kingdon, 2003).

A crisis or another significant external event is one way that issues appear on a government's political agenda (Kingdon, 2003). For instance, Toronto started to develop immigration settlement policy when it found itself overwhelmed by a sudden influx of Vietnamese immigrants (Wallace & Frisken, 2000). Incidents of racial violence in Toronto and Montreal spurred the creation of municipal policies on racial discrimination and multiculturalism (Fourot, 2015; Wallace & Frisken, 2000). But overall, the literature on external events is limited. Moreover, this approach assumes that municipal policy is always reactive and ignores the possibility of initiative policy. In fact, certain institutional characteristics encourage municipal immigration settlement, integration, and multiculturalism policies.

Institutional Drivers

Broadly defined as the formal and informal rules, procedures, and norms (Hall and Taylor, 1996), institutions either encourage or constrain the opportunity for municipal immigration settlement, integration, and multiculturalism policymaking. This is evident in intergovernmental relations between municipalities and provinces, and municipal amalgamation. Simply put, intergovernmental relations "drive or impede municipal policies" (Fourot, 2015, p. 420). The 2005 Canada-Ontario Immigration Agreement (COIA) involved municipalities

alongside the federal and provincial governments in the planning of immigration settlement and integration policy and provided funding for municipal initiatives (Tossutti & Esses, 2013; Young & Tolley, 2011). The structure of COIA spurred municipal interest in immigration in Ontario (ibid.). Similarly, the availability of provincial funding in Quebec caused municipalities to put immigration on their agenda (Young & Tolley, 2011). To sum up, provincial-municipal intergovernmental structures supported local immigration settlement, integration, and multiculturalism policymaking by providing funding and including municipalities in intergovernmental immigration policy planning and discussions. In the Quebec city of Laval, however, municipal immigration policy was more difficult to implement because Laval and the province of Quebec disagreed on the policy approach; Quebec wanted an interculturalism policy approach to immigration while Laval did not (Fourot, 2015). Although Laval ultimately passed the policy it wanted (Fourot, 2015; Good, 2019), this example illustrates how provinces can hinder local immigration policy.

Another significant institutional factor is amalgamation, which changes the structure of municipalities. In 1998, Ontario forced the amalgamation of Toronto despite local resistance (Good, 2009; Young & Tolley, 2011). This unpopular move caused both citizens and leaders in Toronto to push for greater urban autonomy and the increased population and budget of Toronto created the political will to successfully do so (Good, 2009). Thus, Toronto's desire for independence led to the expansion of the municipal agenda vis-à-vis the province – including immigration settlement, integration, and multiculturalism (Good, 2009; Young & Tolley, 2011). The de-amalgamation of Montreal, on the other hand, led to the creation of new municipalities that were determined to take local control of policy (Fourot, 2015). The result was a high variety of local immigration settlement and integration policies in the greater Montreal area (ibid.). In

this way, the structuring – or rather, restructuring – of municipalities increased local autonomy and thus, encouraged the creation of municipal immigration settlement, integration, and multiculturalism policy.

But again, institutional factors are not enough on their own. The case of Laval demonstrates that municipalities can achieve immigration settlement, integration, and multiculturalism policy in the face of institutional barriers (Fourot, 2015). What is crucial in putting immigration settlement and integration on the municipal agenda is the ideational framing. After all, for immigration settlement and integration to appear on the municipal agenda, the idea that it is a municipal responsibility must first be accepted.

Ideational Drivers

The discourse and ideas surrounding immigration and the role of municipalities are significant determinants of whether municipalities adopt immigration settlement, integration, and multiculturalism policies at all. For instance, city councillors in Toronto deemed municipal immigration settlement, integration, and multiculturalism policies a "necessity" (Good, 2009, p. 97) and argued that the municipal agenda was broad enough to include immigration (Good, 2009; Good, 2019). In British Columbia, municipal policymakers were convinced to pass immigration settlement, integration, and multiculturalism policies when it was framed in terms of promoting the economy and preventing social problems (Young & Tolley, 2011). This framing made municipal immigration settlement, integration, and multiculturalism policies seem appropriate and necessary. Emphasizing the link between immigration settlement, integration, and multiculturalism policies and the economic and social wellbeing of cities was crucial for agenda placement. Since municipalities have limited budgets that rely mostly on property taxes and user fees, they tend to have a strong interest in policy action that focuses on economic

development (Good, 2008; Hachard, 2020). As Kristin R. Good (2008, p. 6), a noted scholar on Canadian municipalities puts it, "policy agendas make it onto the local agenda only when they either support growth or address issues that threaten a city's ability to grow." In sum, framing municipal immigration settlement, integration, and multiculturalism policy in terms of economic development played to the interests of municipalities and thus made it seem like a policy area worthy of municipal action.

On the contrary, elected officials in Mississauga put off immigration settlement, integration, and multiculturalism policies by stressing that it was a federal and provincial responsibility (Good, 2009). Thus, framing immigration settlement, integration, and multiculturalism as policy areas outside of the scope of municipalities effectively kept them off the municipal agenda. Indeed, policy inaction due to jurisdictional disputes has occurred in Canada as a result of its federal system (Hachard, 2020). While the Constitution delineates powers and responsibilities for the federal and provincial governments (including immigration as a shared responsibility), it does not outline the powers and responsibilities for municipalities (Slack & Bird, 2006). Furthermore, municipalities have increasingly had "authority over broader, and more flexible, spheres of jurisdiction" (Hachard, 2020, p. 4). Consequently, there has been some confusion and challenges over responsibility for certain policy areas between the federal, provincial, and municipal orders of government which has, in certain instances, led to policy inaction (ibid.). Thus, municipal policy action or inaction were strongly influenced by the framing of the issue. Agenda placement occurred when immigration settlement, integration, and multiculturalism policies were framed as necessary for municipal economic development. Agenda placement did not occur when immigration settlement, integration, and multiculturalism polices were framed as a policy area that was beyond the jurisdiction of municipalities.

But it is not just ideas that are important. It is also necessary to consider *whose* ideas are influencing agenda setting and *who* is taking action. Understanding this reveals the powerful actors within municipal policy formulation. Ultimately, ideas do not act; rather, it is up to humans to act on ideas.

Actors as Drivers

To account for municipal immigration settlement, integration, and multiculturalism agenda setting, the literature has examined the role of elected officials, community organizations, and businesses. The opinions and actions of elected officials play a great role in municipal immigration settlement, integration, and multiculturalism policies (Good, 2009; Wallace & Frisken, 2000; Young & Tolley, 2011). After all, they have much power in setting the agenda. In the case of former Mississauga Mayor Hazel McCallion, her negative opinion on immigration explains municipal inaction in the face of increased immigration (Good, 2009; Young & Tolley, 2011). In contrast, mayors in Ottawa, Rimouski, Sherbrooke, Toronto, and Truro (Young & Tolley, 2011), as well as Brampton and Markham (Wallace & Frisken, 2000) initiated immigration settlement, integration, and multiculturalism policy efforts due to their interest. It should be noted that these studies rely on interviews with these actors (Good, 2009; Wallace & Frisken, 2000; Young and Tolley, 2011), hence it is possible that they are overemphasizing their own importance in initiating policy. One validity threat to research that relies on interviews is that self-reporting may be biased, such as for instance interviewees exaggerating their role or omitting the roles of others, and it is often difficult to verify the truthfulness of interviewee's answers (Berry, 2002; Kendall, 2008). Nevertheless, it is evident that elected officials are instrumental in agenda setting.

In fact, the importance of elected officials in agenda setting was recognized by other actors. Immigration settlement organizations in Mississauga knew of the mayor's negative opinion on immigrants and chose not to lobby for immigration settlement, integration, or multiculturalism policies in fear of losing municipal funding (Young & Tolley, 2011). This demonstrates the mayor's power over the agenda, which is a barrier to outside groups advocating for change. The "receptivity and cooperation" of elected officials is crucial to the success of community advocates (Wallace & Frisken, 2000, p. 33). Still, community organizations that work firsthand with immigrants are aware of the issues they face and mobilize to push for municipal policy (Fourot, 2015; Good, 2009). For instance, a coalition of immigrant settlement organizations in Toronto formed the Elections Equity Coalition in 2003 "to ensure that issues of concern to immigrants and ethnocultural minorities were on the agenda of the various candidates for municipal office" (Good, 2009, p. 118). Although barriers exist, community organizations try to initiate immigration settlement, integration, and multiculturalism policies.

In contrast, businesses are not active in pushing for immigration settlement and integration policies on the municipal agenda (Wiginton, 2013; Young & Tolley, 2011). Considering that immigration in Canada is largely a response to employer demands and economic growth (Young & Tolley, 2011), this is surprising. But local businesses successfully recruit immigrants on their own or through federal or provincial programs (Wiginton, 2013). In fact, businesses take part in immigration policymaking at the federal and provincial levels, such as pushing for certain kinds of employees to be targeted in immigration policy (Young & Tolley, 2011). Thus, the municipal government is simply not a useful lobbying setting for businesses. Businesses seem to be more concerned with attracting immigrants, rather than the settlement or integration of immigrants. In short, businesses are not actively involved at the municipal level of

policy, whereas community organizations try to initiate municipal immigration settlement and integration policies. The interests of municipal politicians on immigration also seem to be important due to their agenda setting power.

The Gap: Bureaucrats as Policy Entrepreneurs

Within the literature seeking to explain the appearance of immigration settlement, integration, and multiculturalism policies on municipal agendas, one gap is the role of bureaucrats. While municipal bureaucrats have been studied as actors that implement immigration settlement, integration, and multiculturalism policies (Frisken & Wallace, 2003; Good, 2009), their potential role in agenda setting and policy formulation at the municipal level of government has been ignored. This is surprising given that Paquet (2015) found that *provincial* bureaucrats in Canada acted as policy entrepreneurs that helped set immigration policy on the agendas of provincial governments. It is interesting to consider if a similar phenomenon exists at the municipal level. Thus, a research question emerges: do municipal bureaucrats influence the adoption of municipal immigration settlement, integration, and multiculturalism policies?

The potential for a municipal bureaucrat acting as an immigration settlement, integration, and multiculturalism policy entrepreneur appears strong. A policy entrepreneur is defined as an individual who invests time, money, knowledge, and energy in advocating for an addition to the policy agenda (Cohen, 2016; Kingdon, 2003). Policy entrepreneurs influence agenda setting by linking their preferred policy to an emerging problem that needs a policy solution at a time when decision-makers are willing to undertake a new policy (Kingdon, 2003). The emphasis is on the actions, rather than the position held by policy entrepreneurs, because policy entrepreneurs can come from the public, private, or non-governmental sectors (Cohen, 2016; Gunn, 2017;

Kingdon, 2003). But certain positions do make it easier to influence the agenda because of the power they hold, such as policy entrepreneurs who work closely with decision makers (Gunn, 2017). By nature of their job, bureaucrats have access to politicians and thus, can more easily influence them. Bureaucrats also naturally have many of the skills and strategies that policy entrepreneurs use in agenda setting.

Kingdon (2003, p. 180) emphasized three key qualities of a policy entrepreneur: their "claim to a hearing" meaning their expertise or ability to make decisions, their political connections, and their persistence. While persistence is an individual characteristic, career bureaucrats have a greater opportunity to stay persistent due to the permanency of their jobs. Furthermore, bureaucrats have decision-making abilities and political connections through their jobs. Of course, bureaucrats' decision-making ability may be limited by political forces. For instance, former Mississauga Mayor McCallion believed that municipal decision-making should be driven by politicians rather than bureaucrats (Good, 2009). Nevertheless, the position of bureaucrats allows them to initiate policy with less effort than other types of policy entrepreneurs. For example, actors within government have greater knowledge of policy and government processes than regular citizens, which gives them greater influence and power as policy entrepreneurs (Crow, 2010).

Other skills and strategies of policy entrepreneurs include forming coalitions, recognizing and acting on opportunities to initiate policy, and knowledge of the policy process (Cohen, 2016; Gunn, 2017; Kingdon, 2003; Mintrom & Norman, 2009). Again, the nature of career bureaucrats' jobs makes these skills and strategies come more naturally to them. For instance, it is easier to set the agenda when policy entrepreneurs understand how the policy process works and thus, how to best manipulate it to their advantage (Gunn, 2017). Career bureaucrats have

first-hand knowledge of the bureaucratic and legislative steps involved in enacting policy. This also makes it easier for them to recognize potential opportunities for initiating policy. As an example, new policies often align with the budget cycle (Kingdon, 2003). Bureaucrats' proximity to politicians and understanding of the policy process enables them to act as effective policy entrepreneurs. Additionally, developing a coalition helps in agenda setting because it demonstrates strong support for the policy (Cohen, 2016; Gunn, 2017; Mintrom & Norman, 2009). To form a coalition, policy entrepreneurs rely on their professional and personal networks (Mintrom & Norman, 2009). Bureaucrats are in good standing to form a coalition due to their links to elected officials and community groups. For example, bureaucrats often work with, or are at least aware of, groups that advocate and provide services for immigrants (Good, 2009). Thus, bureaucrats have a useful professional network for immigration settlement, integration, and multiculturalism policy coalition building.

Furthermore, policy entrepreneurs are often motivated by self-interest (Cohen, 2016). In the case of bureaucrats, they can increase their status and power through agenda setting (Cohen, 2016; Kingdon, 2003). To illustrate, Paquet's (2015) typology of provincial government bureaucratic policy entrepreneurs identified the 'classical entrepreneur' as motivated by career advancement while the 'policy puzzler' sought to gain legitimacy within the public service through policy entrepreneurship. In sum, municipal bureaucrats have both the ability and the motivation to be policy entrepreneurs.

The municipal setting also allows the possibility of bureaucrats as policy entrepreneurs. Paquet (2015, p. 1830) identified three structural features that enable bureaucrats to act as policy entrepreneurs: "a large bureaucratic autonomy, limited legislative oversight and low levels of politicisation of the bureaucracy." This research paper seeks to analyze whether the structural

features Paquet identified at the provincial level are also found at the municipal level. Of these three characteristics, municipalities have limited legislative oversight. Municipalities have successfully achieved greater autonomy and local control of policy. Despite jurisdictional constraints and the traditional view of municipalities as mere "service providers", municipalities have gained a "sufficient policy capacity" (Andrew, Graham, & Phillips, 2002, p. 12). Constitutionally, municipalities are considered "creatures of the provinces" but in actuality, municipalities within the same province have very different immigration settlement, integration, and multiculturalism policies (Good, 2019, p. 224). Thus, in the face of legislative restrictions, municipalities have developed local agendas tailored to their interests, including multiculturalism and immigration settlement and integration. Further, the COIA and Ontario Immigration Act are pieces of legislation that encourage Ontario municipalities to act in the field of immigration settlement, integration, and multiculturalism policy. As such, there may be space for municipal bureaucrats to act as policy entrepreneurs.

The degree of bureaucratic autonomy and politicisation in municipalities is unclear, however. Broadly, politicisation is defined as "any intrusion of politics into administration" (Cooper, 2021, p. 565). In the public administration literature, politicisation is most commonly studied through the conceptualization of "the substitution of political criteria for merit-based criteria in the selection, retention, promotion, rewards, and disciplining of members of the public service" (Peters & Pierre, 2004, p. 2). In Canada, at the municipal level, politicisation is somewhat limited because political parties do not exist municipally – with the exceptions of British Columbia and Quebec (Chiasson et al., 2014). While this may limit partisan bureaucratic appointments, municipal elected officials can still influence the bureaucracy in other ways (Ebinger et al., 2019). As previously mentioned, elected officials hold an enormous amount of

agenda setting power and therefore, can constrain the decision-making power of bureaucrats (Good, 2009).

Bureaucratic autonomy is related to politicisation and is thus another important consideration in understanding bureaucrats' potential influence as policy entrepreneurs. Essentially, bureaucratic autonomy is the ability of bureaucrats to act how they wish without external constraints (Maggetti & Verhoest, 2014). Elected officials can only oppose autonomous bureaucrats' policy ideas "at great cost" and thus, "usually defer" to their policies (Carpenter, 2002, p. 113). It may be difficult for elected officials to oppose autonomous bureaucrats because bureaucrats have a reputation of "efficiency and neutrality" that gives them legitimacy, as well as a coalition to support their policies (ibid.). This deference to autonomous bureaucrats suggests that politicisation is low since elected officials do not attempt to block bureaucrats' policy ideas. In sum, the potential for bureaucratic autonomy is greater when politicisation is low.

There are two significant parallels between autonomous bureaucrats and policy entrepreneurs. First, they both have recognized legitimacy within policymaking. Just as policy entrepreneurs need expertise or decision-making power in order to be heard and influence the policy agenda (Kingdon, 2003), bureaucratic autonomy is dependent on legitimacy (Carpenter, 2002). Legitimacy is conceptualized as "a reputation for expertise or efficiency" and support from a variety of sources, such as the media, organizations, and politicians (Malay & Fairholm, 2020, p. 377). Second, coalitions are an important source of power for both autonomous bureaucrats and policy entrepreneurs. Coalitions contribute to the legitimacy and therefore, autonomy of bureaucrats (Malay & Fairholm, 2020), while policy entrepreneurs also rely on coalitions to legitimatize and push their policy ideas onto the agenda (Cohen, 2016; Gunn, 2017;

Mintrom & Norman, 2009). These similarities illustrate the importance of bureaucratic autonomy in enabling bureaucrats to act as policy entrepreneurs.

It is possible that bureaucrats may have autonomy and thus, it is worth considering their role as potential policy entrepreneurs in the adoption of municipal immigration settlement, integration, and multiculturalism policies. While Paquet (2015) demonstrated how bureaucrats acted as policy entrepreneurs in provincial immigration policy, scholarship across different policy areas shows that bureaucrats often have a key role in the policy process, including policy adoption. Daniel Carpenter's seminal work *The Forging of Bureaucratic Autonomy: Reputations, Networks, and Policy Innovation in Executive Agencies, 1862-1928* (2001) argued that bureaucrats have the ability to initiate policy when they are autonomous, which occurs when bureaucrats create legitimacy through a unique, positive reputation and build coalitions from their networks. Politicians are unable to control these coalitions and therefore, bureaucrats are able to secure their preferred policies despite politicians' opposition or apathy (Carpenter, 2001).

Carpenter proved his argument through various case studies, including an examination of the United States Department of Agriculture (USDA). For instance, despite political opposition, the USDA successfully advocated for a federal pure food law (ibid.). This case study demonstrates that bureaucratic autonomy tends to occur when politicisation is low. The USDA was able to establish bureaucratic autonomy only after the Pendleton Act of 1883 changed the selection of civil servants from a partisan appointment system to a merit-based system (ibid.). After the Pendleton Act was passed, the USDA recruited mostly from the best agriculture colleges in the US (ibid.). As a result, the USDA developed a reputation for high-quality research and scientific capacity, which gave them legitimacy when advocating for a pure food law (ibid.). Again, this emphasizes the link between politicisation and bureaucratic autonomy. It was only

after the hiring system was no longer under the control of politicians that bureaucrats were able to have and exercise autonomy. Furthermore, the USDA's efforts were successful because they were supported by a coalition of different organizations, including women's health groups and the American Medical Association (ibid.). In summary, the USDA was able to overcome political opposition to a federal pure food law due to their legitimacy as a scientific agency and powerful coalitions. But their scientific legitimacy was only gained when politicisation was eliminated, and the USDA was able to hire purely on merit. Thus, lack of politicisation increases the potential for bureaucratic autonomy.

Another example of bureaucrats acting as policy entrepreneurs occurred in Australia in the early 1990s, when bureaucrats played a role in the adoption of income support reforms (Howard, 2001). While elected officials were not interested in income support policy, bureaucrats within the Department of Social Services were and successfully advanced income support reforms as a government policy (ibid.). This case illustrates that bureaucrats "may not compete with elected representatives for influence so much as *attempt to compensate for a lack of interest in or awareness of issues in the political executive*" (ibid., p. 63). The fact that bureaucrats successfully acted as policy entrepreneurs despite general disinterest from politicians is evidence of a high degree of bureaucratic autonomy. In fact, it perfectly matches Carpenter's (2001) definition of bureaucratic autonomy as bureaucrats' ability to "change the agendas and preferences of politicians and the organized public" (Carpenter, 2001, p. 15). Bureaucrats were autonomous because they were able to develop their own policy preferences (Howard, 2001). They proactively noticed the issue of income support, conducted research, and developed policy proposals on the issue (ibid.). Furthermore, they were able to convince politicians to advance with their policy preferences by relying on a supportive coalition of the welfare lobby and

academics (ibid.). Thus, bureaucrats utilized their legitimacy and coalition for successful reform of income support policy.

In the case of municipal bureaucrats, it is possible that they may have autonomy and exist in an environment of low politicisation. In terms of politicisation, municipal bureaucrats are generally seen as being hired based on merit (Fenn & Siegal, 2017). This creates the opportunity for municipal bureaucrats to build expertise and legitimacy, which may lead to bureaucratic autonomy. Moreover, bureaucrats are in a likely position to build coalitions that may contribute to bureaucratic autonomy and agenda setting. After all, "it is the convenor and networking capacity of local governments that determines their policy capacity" (Poirier, 2004, p. 205). Municipal bureaucrats have most likely heard of, and perhaps even worked with, local immigration settlement organizations (Good, 2009). Therefore, it is possible for municipal bureaucrats to use their networks to develop policy preferences on municipal immigration settlement, integration, and multiculturalism policies and advance it to the agenda with the assistance of their coalition. In short, it is possible that municipal bureaucrats are policy entrepreneurs in the adoption of municipal immigration settlement, integration, and multiculturalism policies.

Of course, municipal bureaucrats may *not* be policy entrepreneurs if there are high levels of politicisation and limited bureaucratic autonomy. Since the literature establishes the significant decision-making power of elected officials, they may override bureaucrats in municipal agenda setting. Moreover, bureaucrats may be discouraged from even attempting to influence the agenda. Just as community organizations in Mississauga did not want to lobby resistant elected officials for immigration settlement policy in fear of losing funding (Good, 2009), bureaucrats may fear repercussions if they try to push for adoption of municipal

immigration settlement, integration, and multiculturalism policies. Overall, it is possible that the role of bureaucrats in municipal agenda setting is insignificant.

Nevertheless, it is an oversight of the literature to not consider municipal bureaucrats. Thus, it is worth studying what role, if any, bureaucrats play in the adoption of municipal immigration settlement, integration, and multiculturalism policies.

III. Research Design and Methods

The research question to be answered is whether bureaucrats influence the adoption of municipal immigration settlement, integration, and multiculturalism policies. To address this, I use a most similar systems design of six municipalities within the Greater Toronto Area: Toronto, Mississauga, Brampton, Markham, Vaughan, and Richmond Hill. These municipalities were selected due to the availability of data. I focus on the time frame of up to 2019, again due to the availability of data.

A most similar systems design examines cases that are as similar as possible except for the phenomenon that is being studied (Anckar, 2008; Seawright & Gerry, 2008). The idea is that studying similar cases will allow to see if variation in the independent variable is tied to the presence or absence of the dependent variable (ibid.). In this case, the dependent variable is the presence or absence of municipal immigration settlement, integration, and multiculturalism policies. Based on the literature bureaucratic autonomy likely correlates with limited politicisation and thus each of these constitute the independent variables of this study. In sum, I expect that bureaucratic autonomy and low politicisation will correlate with the presence of municipal immigration settlement, integration, and multiculturalism policies.

Since all municipalities are from a specific geographical region of the same province, they share similar characteristics. Most notably, the Greater Toronto Area (GTA) has the same

institutional environment of the Canada-Ontario Immigration Agreement and the Ontario Immigration Act, which acknowledges that municipalities have a key role in the settlement and integration of immigrants and encourages intergovernmental cooperation on this policy file. Moreover, the GTA is home to the majority of Ontarian immigrants. In 2018, 77% of immigrants in Ontario settled in the GTA (The Conference Board of Canada, 2019). Despite these similarities, not all GTA municipalities have adopted immigration settlement, integration, and multiculturalism policies. Thus, I will examine whether municipal bureaucrats play a role in the decision to adopt immigration settlement, integration, and multiculturalism policies in the GTA.

It is necessary to note one limitation of my research design: I will not be conducting interviews with bureaucrats due to time and resource constraints. Most of the scholarly work on bureaucrats tends to rely heavily on interviews, in large part because interviews allow for a more thorough understanding of the role of bureaucrats. However, this research method also has drawbacks. The biggest drawback is "the tendency of research participants to anticipate the goals of the researcher and attempt to satisfy those goals," which is called demand characteristics (Kendall, 2008, p. 134). The types of questions asked in interviews, as well as the way the questions are phrased, can reveal the researcher's opinions and therefore, influence the interviewee's answer (ibid.). Given these limitations, I will turn to other research methods instead.

If bureaucrats do influence the adoption of municipal immigration settlement, integration, and multiculturalism policies, I expect to see evidence of bureaucratic autonomy and low levels of politicisation. As discussed in the previous section, bureaucratic autonomy and lack of politicisation create the opportunity for bureaucrats to be policy entrepreneurs. Limited politicisation means that elected officials' influence over the bureaucracy is relatively limited

(Cooper, 2021; Ebinger et al., 2019). As a result, bureaucrats may develop autonomy and initiate policy. Bureaucratic autonomy occurs when bureaucrats are able to enact their policy preferences, even if politicians are opposed or apathetic (Carpenter, 2001). Autonomous bureaucrats are viewed as legitimate actors and may create supportive coalitions, two key factors that allow policy entrepreneurs to be successful (Carpenter, 2001; Cohen, 2016; Gunn, 2017; Kingdon, 2003; Mintrom & Norman, 2009). Thus, limited politicisation and bureaucratic autonomy create conditions in which bureaucrats may be influential and successfully advance policy, such as municipal immigration settlement, integration, and multiculturalism policies.

To determine whether municipalities have adopted immigration settlement, integration, and multiculturalism policies, I use four indicators:

1. Municipal policies on 'immigrants', 'newcomers', 'immigration settlement', 'immigration integration', 'multiculturalism', 'diversity' and/or 'anti-racism' that have been adopted or approved by city council;
2. Municipal strategic plans containing those key terms;
3. Departments dedicated to immigrants or multiculturalism; and
4. Committees or working groups on those topics.

First, I scanned each municipality's official website and their online database of city council and committee meetings and agendas for key terms such as 'immigrant', 'newcomer', 'immigration settlement', 'immigration integration', 'multiculturalism', 'diversity' and 'anti-racism' to find policies related to these key terms. I am defining policy as official motions adopted or approved by city council that have a clear goal and actionable steps to supporting immigration settlement, integration, and multiculturalism. This will reveal the extent to which municipalities support immigrants, as well as what stages of the newcomer experience municipal

policies target. Anti-racism policies are included because most Canadian immigrants are visible minorities and thus, anti-racism policies are important for supporting immigration integration and multiculturalism. According to the 2016 census, the majority of recent immigrants hailed from Asia (including the Middle East) and Africa (Statistics Canada, 2017c). However, I am only counting anti-racism policies if those policies specifically mention immigrants or newcomers as a targeted group.

Second, I searched each municipality's website for their strategic/official plans and vision statements, and checked whether there is any of mention of immigrants, settlement, integration, multiculturalism, and/or diversity. This will show whether municipalities try to cultivate an image of diversity and support for multiculturalism and immigrants. Third, I checked each municipality's website for the existence of departments, divisions, or offices related to immigration integration, settlement, and/or multiculturalism. The existence of such a department would indicate there is municipal policy and programming in place to support immigrants. Fourth, I checked each municipality's website for the existence of any committees or working groups related to immigration integration, settlement, multiculturalism, and/or diversity. Such groups would provide evidence that municipalities have a platform for listening to immigrants and ethno-cultural minorities and thus, an opportunity for them to influence policy. In short, I use a binary level of measurement for the dependent variable: the municipalities either have these four indicators or they do not.

Generally, scholarship has assessed bureaucratic autonomy through interviews (e.g., Orihuela et al., 2021; Tan, 2019) or surveys (e.g., Egeberg & Trondal, 2009; Yesilkagit & Thiel, 2008) of bureaucrats in which they evaluate their own autonomy. As previously mentioned, however, I am unable to conduct interviews or surveys. I have already acknowledged that

interviews may lead to biased results (Kendall, 2008). Additionally, surveys on bureaucratic autonomy have been noted as "particularly problematic … because the very concept of autonomy has been poorly specified, and it is not clear exactly what it is that experts are being asked to judge" (Fukuyama, 2013, p. 359). Rather, I will use other measurements for bureaucratic autonomy.

To operationalize bureaucratic autonomy, I borrow from the work of Park and Sapotichne (2019), who studied bureaucratic autonomy within U.S. municipalities. Since we are both studying the same variable at the same level of government, it is apt to rely on their work. Park and Sapotichne (2019) measured bureaucratic autonomy by reviewing the responsibilities and authorities of city managers or chief administrative officers (CAOs), as outlined in city charters. Since none of the GTA municipalities have city charters, I used municipal by-laws to collect information on the responsibilities and authorities of city manager or CAOs.

City managers or CAOs are essentially the "chief operating officers of their communities" and hold the top bureaucratic position in municipal government (Teske & Schneider, 1994, p. 332). This position first emerged in the U.S. in the early 20th century as a solution to corrupt and inefficient municipal governments (Frederickson et al., 2004). Since then, city managers or CAOs have been widely adopted across municipalities in both the U.S. and Canada (Fenn & Siegal, 2017). City managers and CAOs are thought to "restrain politically motivated, thus sometimes ill-designed policy will of the mayoral office" since a bureaucrat is in charge of key public administrative duties (Park & Sapotichne, 2019, p. 902). The underlying belief of having city managers or CAOs was that bureaucrats are efficient and professional, thus they would reduce municipal inefficiencies that occur as a result of political disputes between municipal elected officials (ibid.).

Reviewing the authorities that city managers or CAOs have provides a more accurate assessment of the opportunity for bureaucratic autonomy. When city managers or CAOs have greater authorities, they tend to have greater influence and greater autonomy (Park & Sapotichne, 2019). For instance, Park and Sapotichne (2019, p. 910) found that city charters across Michigan specified different responsibilities for city managers or CAOs, with the most autonomous bureaucrats having more responsibilities, such as "appointment power over department heads and staff" and "budgetary authority." Hence, I operationalize bureaucratic autonomy by reviewing the responsibilities and authorities of city managers or CAOs stipulated in municipal by-laws. Specifically, I examine whether CAOs have the following powers: the authority to make appointments of municipal employees, to make financial decisions and manage fiscal resources, to add or approve items on the agenda of city council, and to develop and implement policies. The more of these authorities that CAOs have, the greater the opportunity for bureaucratic autonomy there exists. This variable is measured as an ordinal variable, categorized as high, medium, and low levels of opportunity for bureaucratic autonomy due to many, some, and little to no authorities for CAOs, respectively.

The literature on politicisation of the bureaucracy is largely focused on the federal and provincial levels of government (e.g., Cooper, 2020; Cooper, 2021; Eichbaum & Shaw, 2008; Halligan, 2021; Hustedt & Salomonsen, 2017), which presents a challenge in operationalizing politicisation at the municipal level. For instance, politicisation has mostly been studied in scholarship through political appointments in the bureaucracy, particularly the appointment of ministers, or the influence of partisan advisors (e.g., Cooper, 2020; Cooper, 2021; Craft & Howlett, 2012; Fuenzalida & Riccucci, 2019; Eichbaum & Shaw, 2008; Hustedt & Salomonsen, 2017). However, municipal political parties do not exist in Ontario, nor does the municipal

government structure have ministers, thus it is difficult to determine political positions in a municipal bureaucracy.

Instead, I measure politicisation as a proxy measure through the resources given to municipal elected officials, such as the council budget, the number of staff allocated to councillors, and the staff salary budget, to capture the amount of political control that municipal elected officials have. In this way, this research paper contributes to the politicisation literature with a new, innovative proxy measure of politicisation that allows for a better understanding of politicisation at the municipal level in Ontario. After all, the essence of politicisation is that elected political authorities are able to exert control over the bureaucracy (Cooper, 2021; Fuenzalida & Riccucci, 2019; Hustedt & Salomonsen, 2014). If municipal elected officials have a significant amount of resources given to them, it may be easier for them to have the means to control the bureaucracy.

In a study of ministerial bureaucracies in Western Europe, Hustedt and Salomonsen (2014) identified three different mechanisms of politicisation: formal, functional, and administrative politicisation. Formal politicisation is the "formal rules" on the recruitment of certain civil service positions that allow them to be hired not on merit but on party affiliation or the personal preference of ministers (Hustedt & Salomonsen, 2014, p. 749). Functional politicisation is when "the civil service performs politically responsive bureaucratic behaviour" (ibid., p. 750). In other words, career bureaucrats may anticipate the political desires and realities of those in power as they do their work. Finally, administrative politicisation refers to the relationship between career bureaucrats and political advisers and the extent to which political advisers can 'politicise' career bureaucrats by either constraining their access to ministers or adding partisan considerations to the advice offered by bureaucrats (ibid.).

My proxy measure of politicisation captures an element of administrative politicisation. If municipal elected officials have a large budget for staff salaries, it is an indicator of the potential for administrative politicisation. The assumption is that a greater budget for staff salaries allows for more staff to be hired and thus, allows for staff to have a greater influence on the advice and work of career bureaucrats.

The staff of municipal councillors differ from municipal career bureaucrats. In fact, councillors' staff can be viewed as a kind of political adviser at the municipal level. The job description of some staff positions makes it evident that much like political advisers can 'politicise' the advice of career bureaucrats (Hustedt & Salomonsen, 2014), councillors' staff also may have the ability to 'politicise' the advice of municipal career bureaucrats. For instance, the executive assistant of a Toronto city councillor is responsible for "review[ing], analys[ing], and mak[ing] recommendations to Councillor on content and appropriateness of reports by City staff" (City of Toronto, n.d.-a, para. 5). This creates an opportunity for what Eichbaum and Shaw (2008, p. 343) call the "procedural dimension of … administrative politicization," that is, when councillors' staff conduct their jobs in a way that is "intended to or has the effect of constraining the capacity of public servants to furnish [councillors] with advice in a free, frank, and fearless manner" (Eichbaum & Shaw, 2008, p. 343). The staff of councillors may influence councillors' receptiveness to policy advice from career bureaucrats since they are responsible for first reviewing and analysing work from career bureaucrats. Additionally, the executive assistant "undertakes research and analysis for the Councillor with respect to policy matters" (City of Toronto, n.d.-a, para. 6), which may further contribute to staff developing different policy views and intervening in the policy work done by bureaucrats.

Another example of procedural administrative politicisation is staff interfering with bureaucrats' access to ministers, which makes it difficult for bureaucrats to provide "free, frank, and fearless advice" (Eichbaum & Shaw, 2008, p. 343). This may include staff not passing on information from bureaucrats to ministers or staff, rather than ministers, telling bureaucrats what to do in terms of policy direction (ibid.). This type of administrative politicisation is also possible at the municipal level. Some councillor staff positions communicate directly with bureaucrats by "provid[ing] advice and comment to City staff on matters of interest to the Councillor and their constituents" (City of Toronto, n.d.-a, para. 9) and "liais[ing] between the Councillor… and various senior City staff, directors, managers and other City staff" (ibid., para. 10). In short, the freedom that councillors' staff have in interacting with municipal bureaucrats may give them the ability to stand in between bureaucrats and elected officials, which results in administrative politicisation.

It is important to note my proxy measure of politicisation measures the *potential* for politicisation. Councillors having a large number of staff or staff salary does not necessarily mean that their staff acts in a way that politicises or interferes with the work of municipal bureaucrats; rather, it shows the potential for administrative politicisation. Moreover, not all councillor staff positions involve conducting policy research, reviewing the reports made by career bureaucrats, or communicating with bureaucrats. Indeed, some staff are responsible for more general tasks, such as managing the councillors' office (City of Toronto, n.d.-a). However, if councillors have a large budget for staff salary, this is an indication they can hire more staff and thus, have both policy and non-policy staff working for them. Hence, this presents evidence for a high potential of administrative politicisation. The proxy measure of politicisation is an

ordinal variable, with categories of high, medium, and low potential for politicisation dependent on councillors' staff and budget.

After collecting data on politicisation, bureaucratic autonomy, and the absence or presence of immigration policy within GTA municipalities, it can be determined whether bureaucrats influenced municipal immigration policy agenda setting. If politicisation is low, there is evidence for bureaucratic autonomy, and municipal immigration settlement, integration, and multiculturalism policies exist, it can be concluded that bureaucrats likely played a role in the adoption of municipal immigration settlement, integration, and multiculturalism policies. The next section will outline my empirical results and provide a discussion.

IV. Results and Discussion

This section begins with the empirical results for the independent variable of bureaucratic autonomy and politicisation. Then, it will show the results for the dependent variable of the presence or absence of municipal immigration settlement, integration, and multiculturalism policies. Finally, there will be a discussion on the overall empirical findings.

Bureaucratic Autonomy and Politicisation

Bureaucratic Autonomy

The *Municipal Act, 2001* is the main statute on the governance and administration of municipalities in Ontario. According to it,

> A municipality may appoint a chief administrative officer who shall be responsible for,
> (a) exercising general control and management of the affairs of the municipality for the purpose of ensuring the efficient and effective operation of the municipality; and
> (b) performing such other duties as are assigned by the municipality. (Municipal Act, 2001, S.O. 2001, c. 25, s. 229)

There are two things worth highlighting. First, the appointment of a CAO is not mandatory. The decision to appoint a CAO, thus, shows that municipal elected officials believe having a CAO is

valuable for municipal administration. Second, each municipality has the power to give CAOs specific responsibilities *beyond* the "general control and management… of the municipality" (ibid.). In other words, CAOs across different Ontario municipalities may have different authorities and duties. Those with greater authorities and duties likely have a greater opportunity for bureaucratic autonomy.

Indeed, across the six municipalities, there are varying amounts of information on the role of the CAO. Markham and Vaughan, for instance, both have specific by-laws outlining the duties and responsibilities of the CAO (Town of Markham, 2000; City of Vaughan, 2013). The Toronto Municipal Code also details the role and responsibilities of the city manager (City of Toronto, Toronto Municipal Code, chapter 169). Furthermore, Richmond Hill's procedural by-law defines the responsibilities of the city manager (City of Richmond Hill, 2012), as does Brampton's by-law on administrative authority (City of Brampton, 2017). Finally, Mississauga's procedural by-law references the city manager and some of the powers they hold but does not explain the general role and duties of the city manager (City of Mississauga, 2013).

I assessed CAO responsibilities using four indicators: the authority to make appointments of municipal employees, to make financial decisions and manage fiscal resources, to add or approve items on the agenda of city council, and to develop and implement policies. Table 1 provides an overview of this assessment.

It should be noted that I only considered authorities that are always available to the CAO. For instance, in Mississauga, the city manager has the authority to make certain financial decisions when the city council is in summer or election recess (City of Mississauga, 2013). However, I did not count this as a financial authority for the city manager of Mississauga because it is only available during certain times. Furthermore, this financial authority is not

specific for the city manager as the council may also choose someone else to exercise this power during summer or election recess (ibid.).

Table 1: Bureaucratic Autonomy as measured by CAO Authorities

	Toronto	Mississauga	Brampton	Markham	Vaughan	Richmond Hill
Authority to make appointments	X				X	
Authority over fiscal resources and financial decisions	X			X	X	
Authority to add or approve items on the Council agenda	X				X	X
Authority to develop and implement policies	X		X	X	X	X

As evident in Table 1, the city manager of Toronto and the city manager of Vaughan hold the most authorities. For both municipalities, the city manager is able to appoint, promote, demote, suspend and dismiss nearly all municipal employees, with a few exceptions (City of Toronto, Toronto Municipal Code, chapter 169; City of Vaughan, 2013). In terms of financial authority, the city manager of Vaughan has "financial control over all corporate operations" (City of Vaughan, 2013, 3.3, p. 3) and can direct municipal purchasing (ibid.), while the city manager of Toronto is responsible for managing the city's fiscal resources (City of Toronto, Toronto Municipal Code). Furthermore, in Toronto, the city manager "may add new business to a Council meeting agenda without first submitting the matter to the relevant Council Committee"

(City of Toronto, Toronto Municipal Code, § 27-8.1, p. 43). In Vaughan, the city manager is also responsible for approving items on the agenda (City of Vaughan, 2013). Finally, the CAOs of both municipalities are responsible for the development and implementation of policies (City of Vaughan, 2013; City of Toronto, Toronto Municipal Code).

The CAOs of Markham and Richmond Hill can be characterized as having medium authorities. Of the four authorities, they each had two, albeit different ones. Markham's CAO has "financial control over all corporate operations" (Town of Markham, 2000, 5b, p. 7), as well as the ability to develop and implement policies (ibid.), but is not able to make employee appointments or influence the council agenda. The city manager of Richmond Hill does not have financial or appointment powers; however, they are able to approve items for the agenda and develop and implement policies (City of Richmond Hill, 2012).

Mississauga is the only municipality whose CAO does not have any of the specified authorities. The city manager of Brampton can "develop, approve and implement administrative policies, procedures and practices" (City of Brampton, 2017, p. 5) but does not have any other powers. For that reason, the CAOs of Mississauga and Brampton can be characterized as having low authorities.

The data shows that the duties and authorities of CAOs in Toronto, Mississauga, Brampton, Markham, Vaughan, and Richmond Hill vary. As a result, the opportunity for bureaucratic autonomy varies (summarized in Table 2). The opportunity for bureaucratic autonomy is high in municipalities where CAOs have many authorities (such as Toronto and Vaughan) and low where CAOs have little to no authorities (such as Brampton and Mississauga). The CAOs of Markham and Richmond Hill have some authorities and thus, a medium level of opportunity for bureaucratic autonomy.

Table 2: Opportunity for Bureaucratic Autonomy

High level of opportunity for bureaucratic autonomy (many authorities for CAOs)	Medium level of opportunity for bureaucratic autonomy (some authorities for CAOs)	Low level of opportunity for bureaucratic autonomy (little to no authorities for CAOs)
Toronto Vaughan	Markham Richmond Hill	Brampton Mississauga

Politicisation

In addition to understanding the opportunity for bureaucratic autonomy in the six GTA municipalities, it is also vital to assess the potential for politicisation. After all, Paquet (2015) found that in order for bureaucrats to be policy entrepreneurs, both high levels of bureaucratic autonomy and low levels of politicisation are required. To determine politicisation, I use the proxy measure of the budget and staff allocated to the city council in the 2019 municipal operating budget. The 2019 budget was chosen because it was the earliest available budget for all municipalities. The presupposition is that there is a greater potential for politicisation when elected officials have a large budget and number of staff.

It should be noted that council budget includes the budget for both the mayor's office and council since municipal budget documents grouped the two together. It should also be noted that the council staff budget includes the staff budget for both the mayor and councillors. In Toronto and Brampton, there was a notable difference in the support staff budget given to the mayor in comparison to the councillors, likely because the mayor has more staff due to the existence of the mayor's office.

Municipal budgets vary, as they are financed in large part by each municipality's own revenues (Meloche & Vaillancourt, 2021). Municipal revenue is generated mostly from property tax and user fees (ibid.). That is why there exist large discrepancies in municipal budgets, such as

the city of Toronto having an operating budget of $13.47 billion in 2019 (City of Toronto, 2019a), compared to Richmond Hill's budget of $180 million in the same year (City of Richmond Hill, 2019). Of course, the overall municipal budget affects the money that is given to city council. For a fair comparison between the six municipalities, I calculated what percentage of the municipal budget was given to city council (shown in Table 3).

Table 3: Council Budget and Staff, 2019

	Toronto	Mississauga	Brampton	Markham	Vaughan	Richmond Hill
Council Budget	$21.58 M	$5.0 M	$4.21 M	$3.03 M	$1.77 M	$2.87 M
Council Budget as % of Municipal Budget[2]	0.16%	0.90%	0.59%	0.58%	0.82%	1.59%
Council Staff (excluding elected officials)	Unknown	41.2	Unknown	3	15.2	12
Council Staff Budget	$474,916 (average per councillor)	$259,757 (estimated average per councillor)	$162,649 (average per councillor)	$96,467 (estimated average per councillor)	$148,889 (estimated average per councillor)	$142,000 (staff budget per councillor)

The municipality that gave city council the highest percentage of its budget was Richmond Hill. Ranked in descending order (that is, from highest to lowest percentage of municipal budget given to city council), it is: Richmond Hill, Mississauga, Vaughan, Brampton, Markham, and Toronto. In other words, based on council budget alone, Richmond Hill has the greatest potential for politicisation.

[2] For better decipherment, the percentages in the table have been multiplied by 100.

Additionally, I examined the number of staff that were given to municipal elected officials. Unfortunately, this information was not found for Brampton and Toronto. The city council of Mississauga had the most staff by far (41.2), followed by Vaughan (15.2), Richmond Hill (12), and Markham (3). While the exact number of staff working for Toronto councillors in 2019 is unknown, the 2022 staff directory lists 164 staff working for councillors, excluding the mayor (City of Toronto, 2022a). The addition of the mayor's office staff makes it 183 staff (City of Toronto, 2022b). Given that the staff salary budget envelope of $482,000 per councillor stayed the same from 2019 to 2022, it is likely that the number of staff working for council in 2019 was very similar to the number of staff working for council in 2022. Thus, it is likely that Toronto elected officials have the most staff out of all the municipalities, although the exact number of staff in 2019 is unknown.

While information on the number of staff allocated to councillors in Brampton and Toronto was not available, there is known information about the salary of councillors' staff. In Toronto, councillors had a staff salary budget envelope of $482,000 per councillor (Toronto City Council, 2018). Councillors are able to hire any number of staff as long as the total staff salaries remain within the budget envelope. In 2019, Toronto councillors spent an average of $474,916 on their staff's salaries (City of Toronto, 2019b). However, it should be noted this average includes the mayor's staff, who had a total salary of $1,932,035 (ibid.). It is likely this amount exceeds the councillor staff salary budget envelope because it includes the salaries of those working for the mayor's office. In Brampton, councillors spent an average of $162,649 on their staff's salaries (City of Brampton, 2019a). Again, the mayor had a noticeably larger staff salary budget in comparison to other councillors. The mayor spent $571,998.30 on staff salary while the councillor with the biggest staff salary budget spent $145,193.98 (ibid.). Furthermore, in

Richmond Hill, councillors had a staff budget envelope of $142,000 in 2019 (City of Richmond Hill, 2019).

The staff budget for Mississauga, Markham, and Vaughan are unknown. However, for the sake of comparison, I calculated an estimated staff budget. To do this, I took the labour costs from the council budget, subtracted the salaries of councillors from the total labour cost, and then divided the answer by the number of councillors to get an estimated average staff budget per councillor. Of course, this is not as exact as the known staff budgets for the other municipalities, but it still results in a fairly accurate *estimate* of staff budget that is useful for comparing the six municipalities. According to my calculations, Mississauga councillors spent an estimated average of $259,757 on staff salary, Markham councillors spent an estimated average of $96,467 on staff salary, and Vaughan councillors spent an estimated average of $148,889 on staff salary.

Ranked in descending order based on the staff salary of councillors, it is: Toronto ($474,916), Mississauga ($259,757), Brampton ($162,649), Vaughan ($148,889), Richmond Hill ($142,000), and Markham ($96,467).

Based on this data, I developed a typology of the potential for politicisation (shown in Table 4). High potential for politicisation means that municipal elected officials have a large budget for staff salary, such as Toronto and Mississauga. Brampton, Vaughan, and Richmond Hill have medium potential for politicisation because the budget for staff salary is significantly lower than Toronto and Mississauga. Further, these three municipalities have very similar averages for staff salary (ranging from $162,649 to $142,000). Finally, Markham has a low potential for politicisation because it has the smallest average for staff salary and only three staff dedicated for council.

Table 4: Potential for Politicisation

High potential for politicisation	Medium potential for politicisation	Low potential for politicisation
Toronto Mississauga	Brampton Vaughan Richmond Hill	Markham

Table 5 combines the results from Table 2 and Table 4.

Table 5: Bureaucratic Autonomy and Politicisation

	Low level of opportunity for bureaucratic autonomy	Medium level of opportunity for bureaucratic autonomy	High level of opportunity for bureaucratic autonomy
Low potential for politicisation		Markham	
Medium potential for politicisation	Brampton	Richmond Hill	Vaughan
High potential for politicisation	Mississauga		Toronto

Municipal Immigration Settlement, Integration, and Multiculturalism Policies

After having established the opportunity for bureaucratic autonomy and the potential for politicisation in the municipalities of Toronto, Mississauga, Brampton, Markham, Vaughan, and Richmond Hill, it is time to determine whether these municipalities have adopted immigration settlement, integration, and multiculturalism policies. To do this, I used four indicators:

5. Municipal policies on ‘immigrants’, ‘newcomers’, ‘immigration settlement’, ‘immigration integration’, ‘multiculturalism’, ‘diversity’ and/or ‘anti-racism’ that have been adopted or approved by city council;
6. Municipal strategic plans containing those key terms;
7. Departments dedicated to immigrants or multiculturalism; and

8. Committees or working groups on those topics.

Just as with the data for politicisation, I limited my search to information that is relevant as of 2019. Table 6 summarizes my findings, and a more thorough discussion of each indicator follows.

Table 6: Adoption of Immigration Settlement, Integration, and Multiculturalism Policies

	Toronto	Mississauga	Brampton	Markham	Vaughan	Richmond Hill
Municipal immigration settlement, integration, and multiculturalism policies	X	X	X	X		
Strategic plans mention immigration settlement, integration and/or multiculturalism	X	X	X	X	X	
Departments on immigration settlement, integration and/or multiculturalism	X					
Committees or working groups on immigration settlement, integration and/or multiculturalism	X	X		X		

Policies on Immigration Settlement, Integration, and/or Multiculturalism

My review of immigration settlement, integration, and multiculturalism policies found a wide range of municipal response. Notably, Toronto was the only municipality with policies

addressing immigration settlement. However, the municipalities of Toronto, Mississauga, Brampton, and Markham all had multiculturalism policies – the former three had a policy on municipal workforce diversity and inclusion while the latter had a Diversity Action Plan of policy initiatives to support immigrants in their integration. Finally, Vaughan and Richmond Hill stood out since neither had any municipal immigration settlement, integration, or multiculturalism policies.

In Toronto, city council approved of the Toronto Newcomer Strategy (TNS) in 2013, which aims to "advance the successful settlement and integration of all newcomers to Toronto through a seamless, responsive and accountable human services system" (City of Toronto, 2013, p. 3). The TNS has four strategic pillars which help achieve the successful settlement and integration of immigrants: Advancing Labour Market Outcomes, Promoting and Supporting Good Health, Improving Access to Municipal Supports, and Supporting Civic Engagement and Community Capacity (ibid.). As part of the TNS, Toronto became the first municipality outside of Europe to sign the Integrating Cities Charter on December 18, 2014 (City of Toronto, n.d.-b). The Charter outlines the municipality's responsibilities as a policy maker, service provider, employer, and buyer of goods and services to help integrate immigrants (ibid.).

Toronto city council also adopted Access to City Services for Undocumented Torontonians (Access T.O.) in 2013 (City of Toronto, n.d.-c). This initiative ensures that immigrants without full documents can access municipal services without fear of being asked for proof of status. Moreover, the Refugee Resettlement Program was approved by council in 2015 (City of Toronto, n.d.-d). Under this program, the city of Toronto helps coordinate municipal services with community-based settlement services to ensure that refugees are supported and successfully integrated upon their arrival in Toronto.

In 2017, city council approved the Toronto Action Plan to Confront Anti-Black Racism, a five-year plan that aims to address systemic barriers facing Toronto's Black community (City of Toronto, 2017). The Plan clearly fits Good's (2009, p. 51) definition of a multiculturalism policy that "addresses ethnocultural barriers to equitable access to social, economic, or political institutions." Furthermore, it includes initiatives that specifically address the needs of Black newcomers and immigrants, such as "increase[ing] settlement sector knowledge of programs and services for Black newcomers" and "ensur[ing] Black newcomers are represented in the Toronto Newcomer Strategy and the Integrating Cities Charter" (City of Toronto, 2017, p. 26).

In 2018, the Canada-Ontario-Toronto Memorandum of Understanding on Immigration and Settlement (MOU) was signed and established a partnership between the federal government, the provincial government of Ontario, and the municipal government of Toronto to collaborate on issues related to immigration settlement and integration (Government of Canada, 2018). The MOU explicitly recognizes that the city of Toronto plays a role in immigration settlement, integration, and multiculturalism by "supporting the successful settlement and integration of immigrants and in ensuring the community is welcoming and inclusive" (ibid., 1.3).

Finally, in 2019, city council unanimously adopted the Workforce Equity and Inclusion Plan (City of Toronto, n.d.-e). The Plan focuses on increasing diversity and inclusion in the city's workforce, with a particular focus on Indigenous, Black, and equity-seeking groups.

Similarly, the city of Mississauga adopted a Workforce Diversity and Inclusion Strategy in 2017 (City of Mississauga, 2017). The Strategy recognizes the changing demographics of both the city's citizens and workforce, and aims to ensure the municipal workforce is diverse, inclusive, and free from discrimination and other barriers (ibid). Furthermore, Brampton created

a Workforce Diversity and Inclusion Strategy and Work Plan in 2019, outlining the following four priorities: "grow a diverse workforce reflective of the community the City of Brampton serves; foster a more inclusive environment where individuals say, stay, and strive; develop awareness and ability of all employees for diversity and inclusion to thrive; and celebrate our uniqueness and shared successes by upholding the City's values of trust, integrity, courage and compassion" (City of Brampton, 2019b).

In 2010, Markham launched its Diversity Action Plan, outlining policy and programming recommendations to be completed from 2010 to 2019 (Town of Markham, 2010). The Plan focuses on four priority groups: youth, seniors, persons with disabilities, and newcomers and visible minorities. Some of the recommendations concerning newcomers and visible minorities include improving translation services and providing cultural sensitivity training to municipal staff.

Vaughan and Richmond Hill were the only municipalities that did not have any policies on immigration settlement, integration, or multiculturalism.

Strategic Plans

Strategic plans outline the municipality's vision and key priorities to serve its residents. Reviewing each municipality's strategic plan reveals how much (or how little) emphasis municipalities place on immigrants and multiculturalism. For instance, Toronto's strategic plan frequently mentions how diverse the city is, as well as how diversity is valued and celebrated in the city (City of Toronto, 2019c). In fact, Toronto's motto is "Diversity Our Strength" (ibid., p. 5). Moreover, the strategic plan notes that the Toronto Newcomer Strategy is one initiative being implemented to support the city's strategic priority of "invest[ing] in people and

neighbourhoods" (ibid., p. 17). Overall, Toronto's strategic plan conveys that diversity and multiculturalism is vital to the city's civic identity and accordingly, there are municipal policies to support immigrants.

Similarly, Mississauga's strategic plan has a vision of "celebrat[ing] the rich diversity of our cultures" (City of Mississauga, 2009, p. 2). One of its five Strategic Pillars for Change is "ensuring that youth, older adults and *new immigrants* thrive" (ibid., p. 3, emphasis my own). It is specifically mentioned that "immigrants are welcomed" in Mississauga and "their cultures become a visible part of the city's fabric" (ibid., p. 36). In support of that goal, the strategic plan mentions celebrating diversity through multicultural events and places for religious assembly (ibid.).

Much like Toronto and Mississauga, Brampton's strategic plan is centred around diversity and multiculturalism. The city released a vision for 2040 in which Brampton is "a mosaic" and supports its multiculturalism (City of Brampton, 2018, p. 1). The plan includes actions to achieve this vision, including creating the Institute for Brampton Cultural Diversity to "bring diverse groups together" as well as "help each group express itself fully, anchor itself within the community at large, celebrate its uniqueness, and deal with its unique problems" (ibid., p. 78). In doing so, the Institute "will provide a delicate balance between efforts for integration and coexistence and efforts for free expression" (ibid.).

One of the four goals in Markham's strategic plan was to be an "engaged, diverse and thriving city" by being welcoming and inclusive to all cultures (City of Markham, 2015, p. 4). To achieve that goal, the municipality plans to implement its Diversity Action Plan (ibid.). In Vaughan, their vision mentions promoting diversity and fostering inclusivity (City of Vaughan,

2019). One of its strategic goals is focused on "active, safe and diverse communities," which the city plans to achieve by promoting multicultural community events and art (ibid., p. 34).

In contrast, the priorities outlined in Richmond Hill's strategic plan do not include immigration settlement, integration, or multiculturalism at all (City of Richmond Hill, 2018). While diversity is mentioned a few times in the plan, it is not a central feature of the city's vision or areas of focus (ibid.). Thus, out of the six municipalities, Richmond Hill is the only one that does *not* have a strategic plan focusing on immigrants and multiculturalism.

Departments

The city of Toronto was the only municipality with a specific department for immigration settlement and integration. The Toronto Newcomer Office (TNO) is part of Social Development, Finance and Administration Division. As of January 2022, the TNO has four Community Development Officers and is led by one manager (City of Toronto, 2022c). The TNO "was established to provide strategic leadership on newcomer and immigration-related issues" for the city of Toronto (City of Toronto, 2018, p. 142). This office is responsible for developing and implementing municipal immigration settlement and integration policies, such as the Toronto Newcomer Strategy (ibid.).

Committees and Working Groups

Mississauga and Markham were the only municipalities with committees relating to multiculturalism. In Mississauga, the Diversity and Inclusion Advisory Committee is responsible for advising city council on how municipal policies can remove barriers for diverse community groups, including immigrants (City of Mississauga, 2019). Similarly, Markham has a committee to advise city council on municipal policies that will "enhance race relations and ethnocultural

equity" (City of Markham, n.d., p. 1). In both municipalities, the committee members consist of a mixture of city councillors, citizens, and representatives from relevant stakeholder groups (City of Mississauga, 2019; City of Markham, n.d.).

Toronto has a range of working groups for immigration-related matters. For instance, as part of the Toronto Newcomer Strategy, the Newcomer Leadership Table (NLT) was established to bring together officials from the city of Toronto, as well as stakeholders from community organizations and the provincial and federal governments, to take action on issues relating to the settlement and integration of immigrants in Toronto (City of Toronto, 2016). The TNO co-chairs the NLT and also helps facilitate other working groups on newcomers, including the Inter-Divisional Newcomer Workgroup, the Welfare of Immigrant Children Workgroup, the Toronto Inter-LIP Network, and the Toronto Settlement Collaborative (ibid.). All of these working groups include participation from a variety of sectors that work with newcomers in order to effectively address immigration settlement and integration (ibid.).

Discussion

Having collected data on bureaucratic autonomy, politicisation, and municipal immigration settlement, integration, and multiculturalism policies in the municipalities of Toronto, Mississauga, Brampton, Markham, Vaughan, and Richmond Hill, it is now possible to address this paper's research question. To reiterate, the research question is: do municipal bureaucrats influence the adoption of municipal immigration settlement, integration, and multiculturalism policies? Table 7 compares the results across the dependent variables and independent variables.

Table 7: Bureaucratic Autonomy, Politicisation, and Adoption of Immigration Settlement, Integration, and Multiculturalism Policies

	Toronto	Mississauga	Brampton	Markham	Vaughan	Richmond Hill
Opportunity for Bureaucratic Autonomy	High	Low	Low	Medium	High	Medium
Potential for Politicisation	High	High	Medium	Low	Medium	Medium
Municipal Immigration Settlement, Integration, and Multiculturalism policies exist	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	No	No
Strategic plans mention immigration settlement, integration and/or multiculturalism	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	No
Departments on immigration settlement, integration and/or multiculturalism	Yes	No	No	No	No	No
Committees or working groups on immigration settlement, integration and/or multiculturalism	Yes	Yes	No	Yes	No	No

The results show that none of the six municipalities fit Paquet's (2015) definition of an environment that allows bureaucrats to act as policy entrepreneurs: high bureaucratic autonomy and low politicisation. Most significantly, the results show that the opportunity for bureaucratic autonomy and potential for politicisation varied across all six municipalities and had no

correlation with the presence or absence of immigration settlement, integration, and multiculturalism policies. Therefore, according to the logic of the most similar system design, it is unlikely that bureaucrats played a role in the adoption of immigration settlement, integration, and multiculturalism policies in Toronto, Mississauga, Brampton, Markham, Vaughan, and Richmond Hill.

Toronto has a high opportunity for bureaucratic autonomy *and* a high potential for politicisation. This is an interesting result because it differs from the general observation that bureaucratic autonomy tends to occur when politicisation is low (e.g., Carpenter, 2001). Consequently, this presents a puzzle: with both a high opportunity for bureaucratic autonomy and a high potential for politicisation, does Toronto city council or bureaucrats drive municipal policymaking? A recent study examined over 900 Toronto city council decisions made from December 2018 to March 2020, in which council considered reports made by municipal bureaucrats on policy (Owen et al., 2021). Their findings reveal that council never voted against reports made by bureaucrats (ibid.). In fact, the majority of the time, reports were approved without any amendments by council (ibid.). One explanation may be that while there is high potential for politicisation in Toronto, this potential is not acted on. Instead, bureaucrats have high autonomy and thus, are significant in municipal policymaking.

Another explanation is that "policy discussions occur behind the scenes," meaning that "council's will is reflected in the drafting of, rather than through the debate on, staff reports" (ibid., para. 23). This is possible, given that Toronto has a high potential for politicisation. Specifically, my proxy measure of politicisation captures an understanding of administrative politicisation. Out of the six municipalities, Toronto by far has the largest budget for councillors' staff and thus, likely has several staff members working for councillors. Furthermore, some of

the councillors' staff are responsible for reviewing reports made by bureaucrats and making recommendations to councillors, conducting policy research, and liaising between councillors and career bureaucrats (City of Toronto, n.d.-a). Considering Toronto's large budget for staff salary allows them to hire more staff to carry out such duties, it is possible that councillors' staff are indeed communicating with municipal bureaucrats on policy matters "behind the scenes." In this case, municipal bureaucrats are not fully autonomous in policy matters but are somewhat constrained by councillors and their staff. Future research could use other research methods, such as interviews, to more thoroughly examine the dynamics between councillors, councillors' staff, and career bureaucrats in policymaking in Toronto.

Mississauga, on the other hand, has the opposite of Paquet's (2015) identified characteristics: a low opportunity for bureaucratic autonomy and a high potential for politicisation. Yet the city also has immigration settlement, integration, and multiculturalism policies. This indicates that bureaucrats likely did *not* influence the adoption of Mississauga's immigration settlement, integration, and multiculturalism policies.

Vaughan and Richmond Hill were the only municipalities without existing municipal immigration settlement, integration, and multiculturalism policies. However, it is unlikely that the absence of such policies is linked to the role of bureaucrats. If that was the case, I would expect to see a low opportunity for bureaucratic autonomy and a high potential for politicisation in both municipalities; that is to say, I would expect to see conditions that make it very difficult for bureaucrats to act as policy entrepreneurs. However, Vaughan has a high opportunity for bureaucratic autonomy and a medium potential for politicisation. Richmond Hill has both a medium opportunity for bureaucratic autonomy and a medium potential for politicisation. Thus, it appears that bureaucrats in these municipalities have some opportunity for autonomy and are

not heavily constrained by politicisation. The lack of policy in Vaughan and Richmond Hill, in short, does not seem to be linked to bureaucrats.

Similarly, it appears that bureaucrats do not have a significant role in the adoption of immigration settlement, integration, and multiculturalism policies in Markham and Brampton. Markham has a medium level of opportunity for bureaucratic autonomy and a low potential for politicisation. In contrast, Brampton has a low opportunity for bureaucratic autonomy and a medium level of potential for politicisation.

Overall, the results indicate that it is unlikely that bureaucrats played a role in the adoption of municipal immigration settlement, integration, and multiculturalism policies. The opportunity for bureaucratic autonomy and potential for politicisation varied across all six municipalities and had no correlation with the presence or absence of immigration settlement, integration, and multiculturalism policies. Unlike Paquet's (2015) findings at the provincial level, the high opportunity for bureaucratic autonomy and low potential for politicisation did not correlate as expected with the presence of municipal immigration settlement, integration, and multiculturalism policies. Thus, according to the logic of the most similar system design, it is unlikely that bureaucrats played a role in the adoption of immigration settlement, integration, and multiculturalism policies.

This research paper contributes a new, innovative proxy measure of politicisation. By examining the number of staff and the staff salary budget allocated to councillors, the potential for administrative politicisation is measured. As previously mentioned, administrative politicisation in ministerial bureaucracies is defined as political advisers "constraining the capacity of public servants to furnish ministers with advice in a free, frank, and fearless manner" (Eichbaum & Shaw, 2008, p. 343). Adapted to the municipal context, administrative

politicisation can be measured as the ability of councillors' staff to constrain the policy advice provided by municipal bureaucrats. This is possible because some councillor staff positions are similar to the position of political advisers in providing advice to councillors, reviewing the reports made by career bureaucrats, and conducting policy research.

Councillors with large staff salary budgets are able to hire more staff, including staff with responsibilities that include policy advice. Thus, a large councillor staff salary budget indicates a high potential for administrative politicisation. My findings reveal that Toronto and Mississauga both have a high potential for administrative politicisation, the municipalities of Brampton, Vaughan, and Richmond Hill have medium potentials for administrative politicisation, and Markham has a low potential for administrative politicisation.

Of course, this finding is merely the *potential* for politicisation and does not measure actual administrative politicisation. However, to my knowledge, administrative politicisation at the municipal level in Canada has not been studied. In fact, most of the literature on politicisation focuses on the federal or provincial levels of government, thus this research paper expands the politicisation of the bureaucracy literature by examining Canadian municipalities. Future research could continue this work by interviewing councillors, councillors' staff, and municipal bureaucrats to get a better understanding of administrative politicisation in municipalities and see how my proxy measure of the potential for administrative politicisation compares to actual administrative politicisation.

V. Conclusion

While immigration in Canada is a shared federal-provincial responsibility, most immigrants settle in cities and thus, many Canadian municipalities have adopted immigration settlement, integration, and multiculturalism policies. In the province of Ontario, the Canada-

Ontario Immigration Agreement and the Ontario Immigration Act acknowledge the importance of municipalities in facilitating immigration settlement and integration and encourage collaboration between all three levels of government on immigration. Yet not all Ontarian municipalities have existing immigration settlement, integration, and multiculturalism policies.

Since the 1990s, there has been a growing body of research on why some Canadian municipalities have enacted immigration settlement, integration, and multiculturalism policies while others have not (Abu-Laban, 1997; Good, 2019; Fourot, 2015; Tate & Quesnel, 1995). The literature has examined exogenous, institutional, ideational, and actor-based explanations. To date, however, little research has focused on the potential role that municipal bureaucrats play in the adoption of municipal immigration settlement, integration, and multiculturalism policies.

Using a most similar case study design of six municipalities within the Greater Toronto Area (Toronto, Mississauga, Brampton, Markham, Vaughan, and Richmond Hill), I investigated the following research question: do municipal bureaucrats influence the adoption of municipal immigration settlement, integration, and multiculturalism policies? I drew on the work of Paquet (2015), who found that bureaucrats at the provincial level in Canada acted as policy entrepreneurs and initiated provincial immigration policy, enabled by high bureaucratic autonomy, limited legislative oversight, and low politicisation. Based on this, my presupposition was that there would be evidence of high bureaucratic autonomy and low politicisation in municipalities and the existence of policies if bureaucrats played a role in the adoption of municipal immigration settlement, integration, and multiculturalism policies.

The findings showed that the opportunity for bureaucratic autonomy and potential for politicisation varied across all six municipalities and had no correlation with the presence or absence of immigration settlement, integration, and multiculturalism policies. In other words,

unlike Paquet's (2015) findings at the provincial level of immigration policymaking, the high opportunity for bureaucratic autonomy and low potential for politicisation did not correlate as expected with the presence of municipal immigration settlement, integration, and multiculturalism policies. In fact, the city of Mississauga had a low opportunity for bureaucratic autonomy and a high potential for politicisation, yet municipal policies related to immigration existed. Vaughan and Richmond Hill, in contrast, did not have such policies, although Vaughan had a high opportunity for bureaucratic autonomy and a medium potential for politicisation while Richmond Hill had both a medium opportunity for bureaucratic autonomy and a medium potential for politicisation. Thus, it is unlikely that bureaucrats influenced the adoption of municipal immigration settlement, integration, and multiculturalism policies.

In sum, this research paper expands the literature on the drivers behind municipal immigration settlement, integration, and multiculturalism policies by examining the role of municipal bureaucrats. Furthermore, this research paper makes an important contribution to the politicisation literature with an innovative proxy measure for the potential of administrative politicisation, which measures the staff salary budget for councillors' staff. A greater staff salary budget is evidence that councillors can hire more staff, including staff that provide policy advice to councillors and may intervene in the policy advice offered by career bureaucrats. My findings reveal that Toronto and Mississauga both have a high potential for administrative politicisation, the municipalities of Brampton, Vaughan, and Richmond Hill have medium potentials for administrative politicisation, and Markham has a low potential for administrative politicisation.

Future research can build on the findings and contributions of this research paper. For instance, interviews with councillors' staff and municipal bureaucrats can go beyond the *potential* for administrative politicisation and more accurately measure administrative

politicisation in municipalities. Moreover, future research can further examine the case of Toronto, which is notable for having both a high opportunity for bureaucratic autonomy and a high potential for politicisation. Scholars can conduct research to determine how municipal policymaking is divided up among councillors, councillors' staff, and municipal bureaucrats.

Annex A: Municipal Case Studies in the Literature Review

Location	Study
Municipalities in the Greater Vancouver Area, British Columbia including Vancouver, Richmond, Burnaby, New Westminster, Lions Bay, West Vancouver, North Vancouver DM, North Vancouver City, Port Moody, Coquitlam, Port Coquitlam, Delta, Surrey, White Rock, Anmor, Belcarra, Pitt Meadows, Maple Ridge, Mission, Langley City, Langley DM, and Abbotsford	Edgington & Hutton, 2001
Toronto, Ontario and Montreal, Quebec	Tate and Quesnel, 1995
Municipalities in the Greater Toronto Area, Ontario including Toronto, Mississauga, Brampton, and Markham; municipalities in the Greater Vancouver Area, British Columbia including Vancouver, Richmond, Surrey, and Coquitlam	Good, 2009
Toronto, Ontario; Vaughan, Ontario; Markham, Ontario; Mississauga, Ontario; Brampton, Ontario; York, Ontario	Wallace and Frisken, 2000
Toronto, Ontario; Ottawa, Ontario; Peel Region, Ontario; Niagara Region, Ontario; Waterloo Region, Ontario; Montreal, Quebec; Quebec City, Quebec; Sherbrooke, Quebec; Rimouski, Quebec; Vancouver, British Columbia; Surrey, British Columbia; Kelowna, British Columbia; Victoria, British Columbia; and Alberni-Clayoquot, British Columbia	Young & Tolley, 2011
Laval, Quebec; Montreal, Quebec; and Toronto, Ontario	Fourot, 2015
Morris and Area, Manitoba; Deep River, Ontario; The County of Elgin, Ontario; Banff, Alberta; Whistler and the Squamish-Pemberton Corridor, British Columbia; and Merritt, British Columbia	Wiginton, 2013
Municipalities in the Greater Toronto Area, Ontario including Toronto, Ajax, Pickering, Whitby, Burlington, Oakville, Brampton, Mississauga, Markham, Richmond Hill, and Vaughan	Frisken & Wallace, 2003
Barrie, Ontario; Brantford, Ontario; Durham Region, Ontario; Guelph, Ontario; Hamilton, Ontario; Kingston, Ontario; London, Ontario; North Bay, Ontario; Ottawa, Ontario;	Tossutti & Esses, 2013

Peterborough, Ontario; St. Catharines-Niagara, Ontario; Sudbury, Ontario; Thunder Bay, Ontario; Waterloo, Ontario; and Windsor, Ontario	
Vancouver, British Columbia	Abu-Laban, 1997

References

Abu-Laban, Y. (1997). Ethnic Politics in a Globalizing Metropolis: The Case of Vancouver. In *The Politics of the City: A Canadian Perspective*, ed. T. L. Thomas. Toronto: ITP Nelson.

Anckar, C. (2008). On the Applicability of the Most Similar Systems Design and the Most Different Systems Design in Comparative Research. *International Journal of Social Research Methodology 11* (5): 389–401.

Andrew, C., Graham, K.A., & Phillips, S.D. (2002). *Urban Affairs Back on the Policy Agenda*. Montreal, Que: McGill-Queen's University Press.

Berry, J. M. (2002). Validity and Reliability Issues in Elite Interviewing. *Political Science & Politics 35* (4): 679–682.

Carpenter, D. (2001). *The Forging of Bureaucratic Autonomy: Reputations, Networks, and Policy Innovation in Executive Agencies, 1862-1928*. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.

Carpenter, D. (2002). The political foundations of bureaucratic autonomy: A response to Kernell. *Studies in American Political Development 15*(1): 113–122.

Chiasson, G., Gauthier, M., & Andrew, C. (2014). Municipal political parties and politicization: the case of the 2013 Gatineau elections. *Canadian Journal of Urban Research*, *23*(2), 79+. https://link.gale.com/apps/doc/A422777199/AONE?u=otta77973&sid=AONE&xid=9c4b811e

City of Brampton. (2017). By-law 216-2017. Administrative Authority By-law to delegate certain powers and duties under the Municipal Act, 2001, S.O. 2001 c.25, the Planning Act, R.S.O. 1990 c. P. 13 and other Acts, and to repeal By-law 191-2011. https://www.brampton.ca/EN/City-Hall/Bylaws/All%20Bylaws/Administrative%20Authority.pdf

City of Brampton. (2018). Living the Mosaic: Brampton 2040 Vision. https://www.brampton.ca/EN/City-Hall/Documents/Brampton2040Vision/brampton2040Vision.pdf

City of Brampton. (2019). Mayor and Councillor Statement of Remuneration and Expense. https://www.brampton.ca/EN/City-Hall/Council%20Expense%20Statements/2019/2019_Dec_SOR%20-%20Appendix%20A.pdf

City of Brampton. (2019). City creates new Workplace Diversity and Inclusion Strategy and Work Plan. https://www.brampton.ca/EN/City-Hall/News/Pages/Media-Release.aspx/670

City of Markham. (n.d). Race Relations Committee. http://www2.markham.ca/markham/ccbs/indexfile/Agendas/Board%20and%20Committee%20Policy/Terms%20of%20References/Race%20Relations%20Committee.pdf

City of Markham. (2015). Building Markham's Future Together: 2015-2019 Strategic Plan. https://www.markham.ca/wps/wcm/connect/markham/95d139de-b0fb-479f-bc4b-

bdc3d1baa2cf/BMFT-Strategic-Plan.pdf?MOD=AJPERES&CONVERT_TO=url&CACHEID=ROOTWORKSPACE.Z18_2QD4H901OGV160QC8BLCRJ1001-95d139de-b0fb-479f-bc4b-bdc3d1baa2cf-mrPYjZ9

City of Mississauga. (2009). Strategic Plan: Our Future Mississauga. https://www.mississauga.ca/file/COM/StrategicPlan_Web_04_22_2009.pdf

City of Mississauga. (2013). By-law 0139-2013. Council Procedure. https://www.mississauga.ca/wp-content/uploads/2018/12/30095019/Council-Procedure-By-law-0139-2013.pdf

City of Mississauga. (2017). Workforce Diversity and Inclusion Strategy. https://www.mississauga.ca/wp-content/uploads/2021/04/27095710/Workforce_Diversity_and_Inclusion_Strategy.pdf

City of Mississauga. (2019). Terms of Reference for Diversity and Inclusion Advisory Committee. https://www.mississauga.ca/wp-content/uploads/2021/02/23151705/Terms-of-Reference-for-Diversity-and-Inclusion-Advisory-Committee.pdf

City of Richmond Hill. (2012). By-Law No. 74-2012. A By-law to Govern the Proceedings of Council of The Corporation of the City of Richmond Hill. https://www.richmondhill.ca/en/shared-content/resources/documents/Procedure-By-law-74-12-Consolidated.pdf

City of Richmond Hill. (2018). Strategic Plan Annual Report 2018. https://pub-richmondhill.escribemeetings.com/filestream.ashx?DocumentId=15203

City of Richmond Hill. (2019). 2019 Draft Operating Budget. https://www.richmondhill.ca/en/shared-content/resources/documents/Budgets/2019-CFS-operating-budget.pdf

City of Toronto. City of Toronto Municipal Code. Available at https://www.toronto.ca/legdocs/bylaws/lawmcode.htm

City of Toronto. (n.d.). Councillor Office Staff Positions. https://www.toronto.ca/city-government/council/policies-and-guidelines/councillor-office-staff-positions/

City of Toronto. (n.d.). Toronto Newcomer Strategy. https://www.toronto.ca/city-government/accountability-operations-customer-service/long-term-vision-plans-and-strategies/toronto-newcomer-strategy/

City of Toronto. (n.d.). Access to City Services for Undocumented Torontonians. https://www.toronto.ca/city-government/accountability-operations-customer-service/long-term-vision-plans-and-strategies/access-to-city-services-for-undocumented-torontonians/

City of Toronto. (n.d.). Refugee Resettlement Program. https://www.toronto.ca/community-people/moving-to-toronto/refugee-resettlement-program/

City of Toronto. (n.d.). Workforce Equity & Inclusion Plan. https://www.toronto.ca/city-government/accessibility-human-rights/equity-diversity-inclusion/workforce-equity-inclusion-plan/

City of Toronto. (2013). Toronto Newcomer Strategy: Helping Newcomers Thrive and Prosper. https://www.toronto.ca/legdocs/mmis/2013/cd/bgrd/backgroundfile-55333.pdf

City of Toronto. (2016). Toronto Newcomer Strategy – Progress Report. https://www.toronto.ca/legdocs/mmis/2016/cd/bgrd/backgroundfile-97073.pdf

City of Toronto. (2017). Toronto Action Plan to Confront Anti-Black Racism. https://www.toronto.ca/legdocs/mmis/2017/ex/bgrd/backgroundfile-109127.pdf

City of Toronto. (2018). City Council Issue Notes, 2018-2022. https://www.toronto.ca/wp-content/uploads/2018/12/9598-City-Council-Issue-Notes-2018-2022.pdf

City of Toronto. (2019). 2019 City of Toronto Budget Summary. https://www.toronto.ca/wp-content/uploads/2019/09/968e-2019-Toronto-Budget-Public-Book.pdf

City of Toronto. (2019). Summary of Remuneration and Expenses for Members of Council for the Year Ended December 31, 2019. https://www.toronto.ca/legdocs/mmis/2020/ex/bgrd/backgroundfile-148615.pdf

City of Toronto. (2019). Corporate Strategic Plan. https://www.toronto.ca/wp-content/uploads/2019/10/9886-DS-19-0438-Corporate-Strategic-Plan-V4-MG1.pdf

City of Toronto. (2022). City Council Phone Directory. https://www.toronto.ca/wp-content/uploads/2017/12/957f-council_offices.pdf

City of Toronto. (2022). Office of the Mayor Telephone Directory. https://www.toronto.ca/wp-content/uploads/2017/12/954d-mayor.pdf

City of Toronto. (2022). Social Development, Finance & Administration Community and Social Services Telephone Directory. https://www.toronto.ca/wp-content/uploads/2017/12/8db6-social-dev_finance-admin.pdf

City of Vaughan. (2013). By-Law 012-2013. A By-Law to amend By-Law 403-203 that defines the general duties, roles and responsibilities of the City Manager. https://pub-vaughan.escribemeetings.com/filestream.ashx?DocumentId=51587

City of Vaughan. (2019). 2018-2022 Term of Council Service Excellence Strategic Plan - Year 1 Key Results. https://www.vaughan.ca/serviceexcellence/General%20Documents/Strat%20Plan%20Update_Year%20one.pdf

Cohen, N. (2016). Policy entrepreneurs and agenda setting. In Zahariadis, N. Ed. *Handbook of Public Policy Agenda Setting*. Edward Elgar Publishing. pp. 180–199.

Conference Board of Canada, The. (2019). *Immigration Beyond the GTA: Towards an Ontario Immigration Strategy.* National Immigration Centre. https://www.conferenceboard.ca/temp/4deba9f5-f480-4e66-9f95-143815a63f17/10342_ImmigrationBeyondtheGTA-RPT.pdf

Cooper, C.A. (2020). *At the Pleasure of the Crown: The Politics of Bureaucratic Appointments*. UBC Press.

Cooper, C.A. (2021). Politicization of the Bureaucracy across and within Administrative Traditions. *International Journal of Public Administration, 44*(7), 564-577.

Craft, J., & Howlett, M. (2012). Policy formulation, governance shifts and policy influence: Location and content in policy advisory systems. *Journal of Public Policy, 32*(2), 79-98.

Crow, D. A. (2010). Policy Entrepreneurs, Issue Experts, and Water Rights Policy Change in Colorado. *The Review of Policy Research, 27*(3), 299–315.

Ebinger, F., Veit, S., & Fromm, N. (2019). The partisan–professional dichotomy revisited: Politicization and decision-making of senior civil servants. *Public Admin*. 97: 861– 876. https://doi-org.proxy.bib.uottawa.ca/10.1111/padm.12613

Edgington, D. & Hutton, T. (2001). Multiculturalism and Local Government in Greater Vancouver. *Hommes et terres du Nord 3*(1): 147–158.

Egeberg, M., & Trondal, J. (2009). Political Leadership and Bureaucratic Autonomy: Effects of Agencification. *Governance (Oxford),* 22(4), 673–688.

Eichbaum, C., & Shaw, R. (2008). Revisiting politicization: Political advisers and public servants in Westminster systems. *Governance,* 21, 337-363.

Fenn, M., & Siegal, D. (2017). The Evolving Role of City Managers and Chief Administrative Officers. IMFG Perspectives, *Institute on Municipal Finance and Governance* (37): 1-30.

Fourot, A-C. (2015). "Bringing cities back in" to Canadian political science: municipal public policy and immigration. *Canadian Journal of Political Science, 48*(2), pp. 413–33.

Frisken, F. & Wallace, M. (2003). Governing the multicultural city-region. *Canadian Public Administration, 46*(2), pp. 153–77.

Fuenzalida, J., & Riccucci, N. M. (2019). The Effects of Politicization on Performance: The Mediating Role of HRM Practices. *Review of Public Personnel Administration, 39*(4), 544–569.

Fukuyama, F. (2013). What Is Governance? *Governance, 26*(3), 347–368.

Good, K. R. (2008). Cities of and for Pluralism: The Role of Canadian Municipalities in Multiculturalism Initiatives. Global Centre for Pluralism: 1-15. https://www.pluralism.ca/wp-content/uploads/2017/10/good_paper_pp7.pdf

Good, K.R. (2009). *Municipalities and multiculturalism: the politics of immigration in Toronto and Vancouver*. Toronto: University of Toronto Press.

Good, K.R. (2019). Municipal Immigration Policymaking in Canadian Cities: The State of the Art. In Caponio, T., Scholten, P. and Zapata-Barrero, R. Eds. *The Routledge Handbook of the Governance of Migration and Diversity in Cities*. Abington, UK: Routledge, pp. 216-227.

Government of Canada. (2017). Canada-Ontario Immigration Agreement – General Provisions 2017. https://www.canada.ca/en/immigration-refugees-citizenship/corporate/mandate/policies-operational-instructions-agreements/agreements/federal-provincial-territorial/ontario/immigration-agreement-2017.html

Government of Canada. (2018). Canada-Ontario-Toronto Memorandum of Understanding on Immigration. https://www.canada.ca/en/immigration-refugees-citizenship/corporate/mandate/policies-operational-instructions-agreements/agreements/federal-provincial-territorial/ontario/canada-ontario-toronto-immigration.html

Graham, K.A. & Phillips, S.D. (2007). Another Fine Balance: Managing Diversity in Canadian Cities. In *Diversity, Recognition and Shared Citizenship in Canada*, ed. Keith Banting, Thomas Courchene and F. Leslie Seidle. Montreal: IRPP.

Gunn, A. (2017). Policy entrepreneurs and policy formulation. In Howlett, M. and Mukherjee, I. *Handbook of Policy Formulation*. Edward Elgar Publishing. pp. 265–282.

Hachard, T. (2020). It Takes Three: Making Space for Cities in Canadian Federalism. IMFG Perspectives, *Institute on Municipal Finance and Governance* (31): 1-18. https://tspace.library.utoronto.ca/bitstream/1807/103012/3/IMFG_%20No.31%20Perspectives_Hachard_Nov2020.pdf

Hall, P. & Taylor, R.T. (1996). Political Science and the Three New Institutionalisms. *Political Studies 44*, 5: 936-957.

Halligan, J. (2021). Politicization of Public Services in Comparative Perspective. *Oxford Research Encyclopedia of Politics.* https://oxfordre.com/politics/view/10.1093/acrefore/9780190228637.001.0001/acrefore-9780190228637-e-1372.

Howard, C. (2001). Bureaucrats in the Social Policy Process: Administrative Policy Entrepreneurs and the Case of Working Nation. *Australian Journal of Public Administration, 60*(3), 56–65.

Hustedt, T., & Salomonsen, H. H. (2017). Political control of coordination? the roles of ministerial advisers in government coordination in Denmark and Sweden. *Public Administration, 95*(2), 393-406.

Kendall, L. (2008). The Conduct of Qualitative Interviews: Research Questions, Methodological Issues, and Researching Online. In Coiro, J., Knobel, M., Lankshear, C., and Leu, D.J. Eds. *Handbook of Research on New Literacies*. Routledge Taylor & Francis Group: New York and London, pp. 133-151.

Kingdon, J. (2003) *Agendas, Alternatives, and Public Policies*. Second Edition. New York: Longman.

Maggetti, M., & Verhoest, K. (2014). Unexplored aspects of bureaucratic autonomy: a state of the field and ways forward. *International Review of Administrative Sciences, 80*(2), 239–256. https://doi.org/10.1177/0020852314524680

Malay, J., & Fairholm, M. R. (2020). How Ideological Divides Serve to Limit Bureaucratic Autonomy: A Case Study of the BLM. *The American Review of Public Administration*, 50(4–5), 375–386. https://doi.org/10.1177/0275074020911783

Mayntz, R. & Derlien, H.U. (1989) Party patronage and politicisation of the West German administrative elite 1970–1987 – Toward hybridization? *Governance 2*(4): 384–404.

Meloche, J.P. & Vaillancourt, F. (2021). Municipal Financing Opportunities in Canada: How Do Cities Use Their Fiscal Space? *IMFG Papers on Municipal Finance and Governance no. 52*. Toronto: Institute on Municipal Finance and Governance, University of Toronto.

Mintrom, M. & Norman, P. (2009). Policy Entrepreneurship and Policy Change. *Policy Studies Journal 37*(4), 649–667.

Municipal Act, 2001, S.O. 2001, c. 25. (2001). https://www.ontario.ca/laws/statute/01m25#BK279

Ontario Immigration Act, 2015, S.O. 2015, c. 8. (2015). https://www.ontario.ca/laws/statute/15o08

Orihuela, J. C., Mendieta, A., Pérez, C., & Ramírez, T. (2021). From paper institutions to bureaucratic autonomy: Institutional change as a resource curse remedy. *World Development*, 143, 105463.

Owen, G., Green, M., & Belyea, S. (2021). The numbers tell us who's in charge at Toronto city hall. *Policy Options*, Institute for Research on Public Policy. https://policyoptions.irpp.org/magazines/may-2021/the-numbers-tell-us-whos-in-charge-at-toronto-city-hall/

Paquet, M. (2015). Bureaucrats as Immigration Policy-makers: The Case of Subnational Immigration Activism in Canada, 1990-2010. *Journal of ethnic and migration studies 41* (11), 1815–1835.

Park, A.Y.S. & Sapotichne, J. (2019). Punctuated Equilibrium and Bureaucratic Autonomy in American City Governments. *Policy Studies Journal*, *48*(4), 896–925. https://doi.org/10.1111/psj.12333

Peters, B. G., & Pierre, J. (Eds.). (2004). *Politicization of the civil service in comparative perspective*. New York, NY: Routledge.

Poirier, C. (2006). Ethnocultural Diversity, Democracy, and Intergovernmental Relations in Canadian Cities. In *Canada: The State of the Federation 2004: Municipal-Federal-Provincial Relations in Canada*, R. Young & C. Leuprecht (Eds.). Montreal & Kingston: McGill-Queen's University Press. 201-220.

Seawright, J., & Gerring, J. (2008). Case Selection Techniques in Case Study Research: A Menu of Qualitative and Quantitative Options. *Political Research Quarterly 61* (2): 294–30.

Slack, E., & Bird, R. (2006). Cities in Canadian federalism. *Policy Options 29* (1): 72–77.

Statistics Canada. (2017). Immigration and Ethnocultural Diversity Highlight Tables, 2016 Census.

Statistics Canada. (2017). Focus on Geography Series, 2016 Census. https://www12.statcan.gc.ca/census-recensement/2016/as-sa/fogs-spg/Facts-cma-eng.cfm?LANG=Eng&GK=CMA&GC=535&TOPIC=7

Statistics Canada. (2017). Immigration and ethnocultural diversity: Key results from the 2016 Census. The Daily. https://www150.statcan.gc.ca/n1/daily-quotidien/171025/dq171025b-eng.htm?indid=14428-1&indgeo=0

Tan, S. Y. (2019). Bureaucratic autonomy and policy capacity in the implementation of capitation payment systems in primary healthcare: comparative case studies of three districts in Central Java, Indonesia. *Journal of Asian Public Policy, 12*(3), 330–350.

Tate, E. & Quesnel, L. (1995). Accessibility of municipal services for ethnocultural populations in Toronto and Montreal. *Canadian Public Administration, 38*(3), 325–51.

Teske, P., & Schneider, M. (1994). The Bureaucratic Entrepreneur: The Case of City Managers. *Public Administration Review*, *54*(4), 331–340.

Toronto City Council. (2018). CC1.1 Recalibrating City Council's Governance System for 26 Members. http://app.toronto.ca/tmmis/viewAgendaItemHistory.do?item=2019.CC1.1#

Tossutti, L.S. (2012). Municipal roles in immigrant settlement, integration and cultural diversity. *Canadian Journal of Political Science, 45*(3), pp. 607–33.

Tossutti, L.S. & Esses, V. M. (2013). *Local perspectives on immigration and diversity in 15 Ontario municipalities*. London, Ont: Welcoming Communities Initiative.

Town of Markham. (2000). By-Law 4-2000. A By-Law To Appoint a Chief Administrative Officer. https://www.markham.ca/wps/wcm/connect/markham/68b0cbe8-da2a-4f34-97d3-911d8f3524b3/Bylaw-4-2000-Consolidated.pdf?MOD=AJPERES&CONVERT_TO=url&CACHEID=ROOTWORKSPACE.Z18_2QD4H901OGV160QC8BLCRJ1001-68b0cbe8-da2a-4f34-97d3-911d8f3524b3-mBJIAmS

Town of Markham. (2010). Everyone Welcome: Markham Diversity Action Plan. https://www.markham.ca/wps/wcm/connect/markham/d9def2b1-32f9-4ed2-984e-a39d5482455e/Markham-DAP-FINAL.pdf?MOD=AJPERES&CONVERT_TO=url&CACHEID=ROOTWORKSPACE.Z18_2QD4H901OGV160QC8BLCRJ1001-d9def2b1-32f9-4ed2-984e-a39d5482455e-msYKPSY

Wallace, M. & Frisken, F. (2000). City–suburban differences in government responses to immigration in the Greater Toronto Area. Research paper 197, Centre for Urban and Community Studies, University of Toronto.

Wiginton, Lindsay. (2013). *Canada's Decentralised Immigration Policy through a Local Lens: How Small Communities Are Attracting and Welcoming Immigrants*. Brandon: Rural Development Institute.

Yesilkagit, K., & Thiel, S. (2008). Political Influence and Bureaucratic Autonomy. *Public Organization Review, 8*(2), 137–153. https://doi.org/10.1007/s11115-008-0054-7

Young, R. & Tolley, E. (2011). *Immigrant settlement policy in Canadian municipalities*. Montreal & Kingston: McGill-Queen's University Press.

Zahariadis, N. (2016). Setting the agenda on agenda setting: definitions, concepts, and controversies. In *Handbook of Public Policy Agenda Setting*. Cheltenham, UK: Edward Elgar Publishing.