

# **Cutting off the King's Head:**

## **Using Alternative Theories of Power to Analyze Processes of Authorization in Emergent Forms of Global Climate Governance**

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Cities are the invisible gorillas of international studies. They are fundamental components of global governance in the 21<sup>st</sup> century, they influence the dynamics of our (global) political scenario, and yet, international analysts cannot see them because they are entrusted with looking at players the discipline has traditionally assumed crucial.... Integrating cities in international theorisations can redress some of the blinding 'embedded statism' bias...that is nowadays critically challenged by processes of globalisation.

– Michele Acuto, in *Global Cities, Governance and Diplomacy*

What we need, however, is a political philosophy that isn't erected around the problem of sovereignty, nor therefore around the problems of law and prohibition. We need to cut off the King's head: in political theory that has still to be done.

– Michel Foucault, in *Power/Knowledge*

## Table of Contents

<b>Abstract.....</b>	<b>3</b>
<b>List of Acronyms and Abbreviations .....</b>	<b>4</b>
<b>Introduction.....</b>	<b>5</b>
<b>Chapter One: Governing the climate .....</b>	<b>8</b>
Conventional responses and conceptualizations .....	8
The transnationalization of climate governance.....	10
The rise of the city.....	13
The emergence of transnational municipal networks for climate change .....	16
<b>Chapter Two: The C40 Cities Climate Leadership Group.....</b>	<b>19</b>
Background .....	19
Structure .....	21
Operation.....	23
Partnerships .....	25
<b>Chapter Three: Conceptualizing authority .....</b>	<b>27</b>
Why authority? .....	27
Power.....	28
Authority .....	30
Modalities of authorization framework.....	32
<b>Chapter Four: Modalities of authorization in the C40 Cities Climate Leadership Group ..</b>	<b>39</b>
Generating consent .....	39
Forging consensus .....	46
Constructing concord .....	52
<b>Concluding Remarks .....</b>	<b>59</b>
<b>Bibliography .....</b>	<b>61</b>
<b>Appendix.....</b>	<b>65</b>

## **Abstract**

For many, global climate change is the defining issue of our time. Capable of devastating levels of destruction, the effects of which are indiscriminate across sectors and levels of society, climate change is at once capable of jeopardizing the global food supply and upending domestic infrastructure, to mention only two potential ramifications. However, global attempts at both adaptation and mitigation have largely proved inadequate, especially given unrelenting greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions. Within this context, new forms of global climate governance have emerged, involving unconventional actors hoping to position themselves as innovative as progressive leaders in the face of global deadlock. Among these novel governance arrangements are transnational municipal networks (TMNs), of which the C40 Cities Climate Leadership Group is one example.

Seeking to bolster understandings of global climate governance, this paper uncovers the emergence of transnational climate governance within the context of a morphing global landscape. Importantly, it explores through an analysis of the C40 Cities Climate Leadership Group the particular ways in which governance operates within a novel form of climate governance. At the conceptual core of this paper is the belief that authority is crucial to governance processes, and consequently, that indispensable to thorough analyses of such processes is an alternative understanding of power, which breaks traditional associations with sovereignty, territory, and rule of law, conceptualizing it as constitutive of social relations, rather than as a resource capacity. By means of a ‘modalities of authorization’ framework, this paper exposes and analyzes the ways in which authority is enacted toward instrumental, associational, and governmental purposes within the C40 network, ultimately contributing a more nuanced account of global climate governance, useful to academics and practitioners alike.

## List of Acronyms and Abbreviations

<b>APP</b>	Asia-Pacific Partnership on Clean Development and Climate
<b>CDC</b>	Connecting Delta Cities
<b>CDP</b>	Carbon Disclosure Project
<b>CCP</b>	Cities for Climate Protection
<b>CCI</b>	Clinton Climate Initiative
<b>CoP</b>	Conference of the Parties
<b>EPA</b>	Environmental Protection Agency
<b>ESCO</b>	energy service company
<b>EU</b>	European Union
<b>GDP</b>	gross domestic product
<b>GHG</b>	greenhouse gas
<b>GLA</b>	Greater London Authority
<b>ICLEI</b>	International Council for Local Environmental Initiatives
<b>IPCC</b>	International Panel on Climate Change
<b>NGO</b>	nongovernmental organization
<b>PPP</b>	public-private partnership
<b>TMN</b>	transnational municipal network
<b>UN</b>	United Nations
<b>UNFCCC</b>	United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change

## Introduction

For many, climate change has already begun to significantly alter life on Earth. Whether in the form of morphing landscapes, growing instances of drought and flooding, more violent storms, higher temperatures, distressed ecosystems, or rising seas, the immediate effects of a changing climate represent collectively what some would contend is *the* global issue of our time. Accordingly, governments have branded climate change a major security issue, while nations have gathered consistently at international summits to negotiate conventions and protocols geared toward reducing worldwide greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions. Yet, for all the discussion of climate change and its associated impacts, emissions levels continue to rise, while international efforts remain trapped in a state of paralysis.

Given the shortcomings of the most conventional and highly publicized responses to global climate change, actors of various pedigrees have sought to formulate alternative solutions to mounting GHG levels. Among them are assemblages of cities – transnational municipal networks (TMNs) – that seek to connect local authorities struggling to implement climate change policies within the context of national inaction or opposition. Though much of the scholarship focused on global climate governance exhibits a tendency to conduct state-centric analyses, and to concern itself chiefly with national governments and their interactions, recently emergent within the discipline is an increased engagement with alternative forms of governance, including examinations of cities (and the networks they comprise) as sites of proactive and pragmatic governance. However, less prevalent within such accounts, it seems, is a consideration of the fundamental questions that inform the operation of TMNs: how they govern, whom they govern, and to what end.

Accordingly, this paper explores in greater profundity processes of governance within a specific transnational municipal network: the C40 Cities Climate Leadership Group<sup>1</sup>. In particular, it indicates an attempt to engage critically with the manifold processes through which the C40 network, as a form of authoritative governance ‘beyond the state’, constitutes, deploys, and perpetuates authority. Vitaly, at the theoretical heart of this paper is the belief that traditional logics of power, sovereignty, territory, and legitimacy are insufficient for analyses that strive to explain processes of authorization in a globalized, networked society.

The nature of this paper is thus expository: employing alternative theories of power, it describes and analyses the manifold ways in which the C40 Cities Climate Leadership Group conducts climate governance at the international level through an exploration of processes of authorization. In doing so, the paper signifies an effort to contribute to both academic and policy-oriented debates regarding the shifting nature of climate governance in the twenty-first century. At once, it both supplements attempts to fill a gap in the current academic literature and bolsters in-depth illustrations of novel governance processes, the comprehension of which is integral if one wishes to formulate effective policy.

The first chapter of this paper opens with an exploration of conventional forms of global climate governance, as well as the academic efforts to describe and analyse them. Next, I provide an overview of recent shifts in the global (climate) governance landscape in discussing the transnationalization of climate governance; in engaging with global governance, global city, and network society theory; and in introducing transnational municipal networks for climate change.

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<sup>1</sup> Hereafter, referred to as the C40 Cities Climate Leadership Group, the C40 network, the C40, or the Group.

In Chapter Two, I deliver a descriptive overview of the C40 Cities Climate Leadership Group, providing background information on the network, and explaining its structure, operation, and key partnerships. Chapter Three begins by justifying the importance of authority to governance processes. After presenting the alternative theories of power and authority that inform my analysis, I introduce and explain in depth Harriet Bulkeley's modalities of authorization framework, which serves as the paper's analytical basis. Finally, Chapter Four applies Bulkeley's framework to the case of the C40 network, unveiling the ways in which authority is enacted in fulfillment of three purposes: instrumental, associational, and governmental. Overall, this comprehensive analysis seeks to contribute to understandings of the C40 in particular, and transnational climate governance in general.

## Chapter One: Governing the climate

### *Conventional responses and conceptualizations*

Operating through the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) process, the ‘global deal approach’<sup>2</sup> – what Matthew Hoffmann describes as a “megamultilateral approach whereby all (or most) of the world’s nation-states convene to negotiate a legally binding treaty that shapes the domestic actions of individual nation-states”<sup>3</sup> – has served as the predominant mechanism by which to govern the climate. As a framework convention, the UNFCCC facilitates the negotiation and adoption of specific protocols related to its objective of “stabiliz[ing] greenhouse gas concentrations in the atmosphere at a level that would prevent dangerous anthropogenic interference with the climate system.”<sup>4</sup> In fact, it is through this process that countries adopted the Kyoto Protocol in 1997 and drafted the Copenhagen Accord in 2009. Until quite recently, scholarship focused on global environmental politics reflected this trend in its domination by attempts to describe and analyze the multilateral agreements negotiated by national governments using institutional or regime-based accounts.<sup>5</sup>

Despite the predominance of the UNFCCC approach, it is, in reality, a stagnant and largely symbolic process, which has struggled to generate results and drive the reduction of global greenhouse gas emissions. Consequently, scholarship limited by such a simplistic understanding of global climate governance fails to encapsulate fully the myriad forces, actors, and strategies at

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<sup>2</sup> Michele Acuto, *Global Cities, Governance and Diplomacy: The urban link* (London: Routledge, 2013) 31.

<sup>3</sup> Matthew J. Hoffmann, *Climate Governance at the Crossroads: Experimenting with a Global Response after Kyoto* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2011) 5.

<sup>4</sup> United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change, New York, 9 May 1992, *United Nations Treaty Series*, vol. 1771, No. 30822, p. 169, <https://treaties.un.org/doc/Publication/UNTS/Volume%201771/v1771.pdf>.

<sup>5</sup> Liliana B. Andonova, Michele M. Betsill, and Harriet Bulkeley, “Transnational Climate Governance,” *Global Environmental Politics* 9, no. 2 (2009): 52; Chukwumerije Okereke, Harriet Bulkeley, and Heike Schroeder, “Conceptualizing Climate Governance Beyond the International Regime,” *Global Environmental Politics* 9, no. 1 (2009): 59.

work in the governing of the climate on a global scale. To begin with, restricting oneself to a state-centric conceptualization of governance is indicative of, as noted by David Harvey, the adoption of a purely territorial logic of power (and thus, international relations), which carries with it a “tendency to perpetuate the state and to see it as a natural thing.”<sup>6</sup> Put another way, it is imperative that one “resist the reification of the state”<sup>7</sup> in order to be able to question more thoroughly the multitude of forces at work within, outside of, and alongside the state, only some of which manifest themselves in terms of the national interest.

In addition, to view such phenomena through a purely institutional or state-centric lens is to ignore the complexity that characterizes the global climate regime, as well as climate change as a policy problem. Today, an array of actors governs the climate at the global level, representative of a multitude of interests, working within and across both the public and private spheres. Public actors at the international, supranational/regional, national, and sub-national levels have embraced roles as significant players in the global climate game, just as non-governmental organizations (NGOs), corporations, and markets have emerged as legitimate entities capable of contributing in a novel way. Moreover – given the sources of GHG emissions, the processes that generate them, and the sites and types of social and political intervention put in place to reduce them, all of which are multifarious and overlapping – addressing climate change as a policy problem requires an engagement with more than national governments and the supranational institutions that they comprise. Theoretical attempts to describe and analyze global

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<sup>6</sup> Peer Schouten, “Theory Talk #20: David Harvey on the Geography of Capitalism, Understanding Cities as Politics and Shifting Imperialisms,” Theory Talks, accessed June 18, 2-14. <http://www.theory-talks.org/2008/10/theory-talk-20-david-harvey.html>.

<sup>7</sup> Saskia Sassen, “Globalization or Denationalization?” *Review of International Political Economy* 10, no. 1 (2003): 1-22, cited in Acuto, *Global Cities, Governance and Diplomacy*, 23.

environmental governance ought to reflect these changes; an evolving world requires that one also modify the framework through which it is conceptualized.

### ***The transnationalization of climate governance***

#### Global governance

Scholars working recently within the global governance field have been successful in conceptualizing the aforementioned changes in the global climate governance landscape. An emergent trend in global governance scholarship, which recognizes the inadequacies of traditional, state-centric frameworks, is an engagement with processes of transnational governance, wherein cooperation occurs between and among sub-national governments, regions, NGOs, corporations, and government agencies in order to achieve public goals.<sup>8</sup>

However, before considering transnational climate governance directly, it is helpful to consider the broader notion of global governance within which it is situated. For James Rosenau, global governance is indicative of a phenomenon that extends beyond the conventional international structure of institutions and organizations that manages international affairs.<sup>9</sup> In fact, it “encompasses the activities of governments, but also includes the many other channels through which ‘commands’ flow in the form of goals framed, directives issued, and policies pursued.”<sup>10</sup>

John Ruggie supplements this understanding noting that, “governance...refers to conducting the public’s business – to the constellation of authoritative rules, institutions, and practices by means of which any collectivity manages its affairs.”<sup>11</sup>

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<sup>8</sup> Andonova, Betsill, and Bulkeley, “Transnational Climate Governance,” 53-54.

<sup>9</sup> James Rosenau, “Governance in the Twenty-first Century,” *Global Governance* 1 (1995): 13.

<sup>10</sup> *Ibid*, 14.

<sup>11</sup> John Ruggie, “Reconstituting the global public domain – issues, actors and practices,” *European Journal of International Relations* 10, no. 4 (2004): 504, cited in Harriet Bulkeley, “Governance and the geography of authority: modalities of authorization and the transnational governing of climate change,” *Environment and Planning A* 44, no. 10 (2012): 2429.

### Transnational climate governance

Transnational relations signify patterns of “regular interactions across national boundaries when at least one actor is a nonstate agent or does not operate on behalf of a national government or an international organization.”<sup>12</sup> Positioning their discussion of transnational climate governance within the more expansive global governance framework, Andonova, Betstill, and Bulkeley contend that, “transnational governance occurs when networks operating in the transnational sphere authoritatively steer constituents towards public goals.”<sup>13</sup> Considering these definitions in tandem, transnational governance connotes instances in which non-state actors engage across national borders in such a way that the resulting assemblage or network fulfills the following criteria: (1) its goals are public in nature; (2) its activities are ordered and intentional; and (3) it is authoritative.<sup>14</sup>

Climate governance occurs transnationally in various configurations (public-private partnerships (PPPs), transnational advocacy networks, private regulatory regimes, and capacity building alliances), involves the participation of a variety of actors both public and private (business, government, NGOs, civil society), and requires that authority is generated in a multitude of ways. Examples of the myriad formulations of transnational climate governance include the Carbon Disclosure Project (CDP), the Asia-Pacific Partnership on Clean Development and

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<sup>12</sup> Thomas Risse-Kappen, “Bringing transnational relations back in: introduction,” in *Bringing Transnational Relations Back In: Non-state Actors, Domestic Structures and International Institutions* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1995) 3, cited in Harriet Bulkeley et al., “Governing climate change transnationally: assessing the evidence from a database of sixty initiatives,” *Environment and Planning C: Government and Policy* 30 (2012): 593.

<sup>13</sup> Andonova, Betsill, and Bulkeley, “Transnational Climate Governance,” 56.

<sup>14</sup> *Ibid*, 56.

Climate (APP), International Council for Local Environmental Initiatives (ICLEI): Cities for Climate Protection (CCP), and the Gold Standard, to mention only a few.<sup>15</sup>

Vitality, the emergence of transnational governance as a way to tackle climate change globally is not merely a response to the inadequacies of more traditional approaches. In fact, transnational governance is a method especially conducive to combating climate change, given a multitude of features that are inherent to it as a policy problem. Outlined by Andonova, Betsill, and Bulkeley, the emergence of the climate problem has paired well with the transnationalization trend for the following reasons:<sup>16</sup>

1. Climate change is a policy area already populated heavily by actors whose interests defy traditional borders and scales (corporations, advocates, scientists etc.);
2. Climate governance is inherently interdisciplinary, implicating diverse actors and interests, and necessitating coordination vertically, horizontally, and across sectors;
3. The endorsement of market authority and the championing of market mechanisms as policy tools by the Kyoto Protocol facilitates and encourages transnational governance; and
4. A shifting political landscape at the international level favours the establishment of ‘coalitions of the willing’ among, for example, sub-national actors who seek to bypass reluctant national governments.

In some cases, scholars have sought to develop explanatory frameworks through which to reconceptualize climate governance, and better understand its various iterations. These

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<sup>15</sup> For an analysis of sixty transnational climate governance initiatives, see Bulkeley et al., “Governing climate change transnationally.”

<sup>16</sup> Andonova, Betsill, and Bulkeley, “Transnational Climate Governance,” 57-58.

typologies may place focus on the function of the assemblage (information sharing, capacity building, rule setting) and the type of actors involved (whether they are public, private, or hybrid),<sup>17</sup> or they may analyze forms of transnational climate governance by identifying modes of governance (hierarchical, market, networks), and types of authority (public, private, hybrid).<sup>18</sup> However, it is necessary to note that generally lacking in the transnational climate governance literature is a rigorous and nuanced engagement with the more fundamental questions that underpin governance processes, including the ways in which climate governance arrangements are able to constitute, deploy, and perpetuate authority – the question with which this paper seeks to engage.<sup>19</sup>

### *The rise of the city*

In exploring novel forms of global climate governance, this paper analyzes the nature and operation of authority within the C40 Cities Climate Leadership Group. Importantly, in addition to representing a form of transnational governance, the C40 can be categorized more specifically as a transnational municipal network. Over the past several years, TMNs focused on combating climate change have proliferated, a phenomenon attributable to a range of factors, many of which are highlighted above. However, central to this occurrence is the rise of the city in an increasingly globalized and networked society. Accordingly, an understanding of the ideas articulated in global city and network theory aids in contextualizing the emergence of transnational municipal networks.

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<sup>17</sup> Ibid, 60.

<sup>18</sup> Philip Pattberg and Johannes Stripple, “Beyond the public and private divide: remapping transnational climate governance in the 21<sup>st</sup> century,” *International Environmental Agreements: Politics, Law & Economics* 8, no. 4 (2008).

<sup>19</sup> Bulkeley, “Governance and the geography of authority.”

For Saskia Sassen, globalization is largely characterized by “an enormous variety of micro-processes that begin to denationalize what had been constructed as national – whether policies, capital, political subjectivities, urban spaces, temporal frames, or any other variety of dynamics and domains.”<sup>20</sup> To a certain degree, this denationalization involves a weakening of the authority of the state, allowing for the emergence of new actors and spaces in political processes, among them sub and transnational actors such as cities.<sup>21</sup> Concurrently, policymakers have conceived of the twenty-first century as the “urban millennium,”<sup>22</sup> while scholars have referred to the “centrality of urban politics in a global era.”<sup>23</sup> The rise of the urban is reflected in the 2009 UN Report on Urban and Rural Areas, which indicates that more than fifty percent of the world’s population – 3.42 billion people – live in urban areas – a number that is projected to increase by 84 percent – to 6.3 billion – by 2050.<sup>24</sup> In addition, the number of megacities<sup>25</sup> is on the rise, now counting twenty-two worldwide, and expected to number more than thirty by 2025.<sup>26</sup>

For the past fifteen to twenty years, the rise of the city has enjoyed a prominent position in globalization literature, the majority of which analyzes the metropolis in the context of economic globalization, identifying global megacities as strategic and organizational nodes in networks

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<sup>20</sup> Saskia Sassen, “Chapter One: Introduction,” in *Territory, Authority, Rights: From Medieval to Global Assemblages* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2006) 1.

<sup>21</sup> Saskia Sassen, “Local Actors in Global Politics,” *Current Sociology* 52, no. 4 (2004).

<sup>22</sup> Sofie Bouteligier, *Cities, Networks, and Global Environmental Governance: Spaces of Innovation, Places of Leadership* (London: Routledge, 2013) 4.

<sup>23</sup> Julie-Anne Boudreau, “The Centrality of Urban Politics in a Global Era” (paper presented at the annual meeting of the American Political Science Association, Chicago, Illinois, August 31-September 1, 2007), cited in Noah Toly, “Transnational Municipal Networks in Climate Politics: From Global Governance to Global Politics,” *Globalizations* 5, no. 3 (2008): 343.

<sup>24</sup> United Nations Department of Economic and Social Affairs – Population Division, *Urban and Rural Areas 2009* (New York: United Nations, 2010), [www.un.org/en/development/desa/population/publications/urbanization/urban-rural.shtml](http://www.un.org/en/development/desa/population/publications/urbanization/urban-rural.shtml).

<sup>25</sup> A megacity is an urban agglomeration with more than 10 million inhabitants.

<sup>26</sup> Neal Lineback and Mandy Lineback, “Geography in the News: The Growth of Megacities,” *National Geographic*, February, 2014, <http://newswatch.nationalgeographic.com/2014/02/17/geography-in-the-news-the-growth-of-megacities/> (accessed June 20, 2014).

supporting economic and financial processes.<sup>27</sup> However, this emphasis on economic processes does not negate the significance of other forces. For example, Noah Toly posits that in the context of globalization, cities exhibit the potential to become significant norm entrepreneurs capable of contributing to the larger global climate discourse, which makes manifest their political and cultural importance at the global level.<sup>28</sup> Accordingly, one ought to interpret the moniker of global city more broadly as identifying municipalities that represent sites of “global interconnectedness,” and which represent “strategic hinges of globalization” within the larger milieu of international relations.<sup>29</sup> In this sense, cities are “conceptualized in non-territorial terms, as nodes in networks that receive meaning from network interactions.”<sup>30</sup>

Within this context, municipalities have emerged as key actors in the governing of global climate change, not least due to the level of CO<sub>2</sub> emissions that they produce; “the tight links between urbanization, economic productivity, and greenhouse gas emissions underpin claims regarding the centrality of cities”<sup>31</sup> in combating climate change. In fact, both the International Energy Agency (IEA) and the Stern Review hold cities accountable for 75% of worldwide anthropogenic CO<sub>2</sub> emissions.<sup>32</sup> Moreover, urban areas are highly vulnerable to several consequences of climate change, including rises in sea level and growing instances of violent weather. However, additional factors contribute to the significance of cities within the climate

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<sup>27</sup> See, for example, Saskia Sassen, *The Global City: New York, London, Tokyo* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2001) updated 2d ed., original 1991, and John Friedmann, “The World City Hypothesis,” *Development and Change* 17, no. 1 (1986), 69-83.

<sup>28</sup> Noah Toly, “Transnational Municipal Networks in Climate Politics.”

<sup>29</sup> Acuto, *Global Cities, Governance and Diplomacy*, 4.

<sup>30</sup> Ash Amin, “Spatialities of globalization,” *Environment and Planning A* 34, no. 3 (2002): 391, cited in Bouteligier, *Cities, Networks, and Global Environmental Governance*, 43.

<sup>31</sup> David Gordon, “Between local innovation and global impact: cities, networks, and the governance of climate change,” *Canadian Foreign Policy Journal* 19, no. 3 (2013): 289.

<sup>32</sup> Harriet Bulkeley, “Cities and the Governing of Climate Change,” *Annual Review of Environment and Resources*, 35 (2010): 230.

governance framework, among them the fact that local governments exert influence over the various municipal programs and processes that control consumption and waste production, while displaying the ability to enable action by engaging stakeholders, developing partnerships, and stimulating public participation.<sup>33</sup>

It then follows that municipalities are increasingly places of innovation and action, especially given the dithering nature of national and global responses – “while intergovernmental climate change negotiations have been locked in a tug-of-war..., cities have increasingly demonstrated leadership on global climate change governance.”<sup>34</sup> Certainly, cities and their local governments possess the jurisdiction and accompanying powers,<sup>35</sup> as well as the flexibility and political neutrality<sup>36</sup> to facilitate the implementation of influential emissions reduction strategies

### ***The emergence of transnational municipal networks (TMNs) for climate change***

The proliferation of transnational networks of subnational (city) governments over the past twenty years signifies a key growth in the global climate governance landscape<sup>37</sup>, indicative of the increased strategic importance of cities as sites of globalization. In fact, since the early 1990s transnational municipal networks have quietly assumed the role of vanguards in the fight to combat global climate change. Together, ICLEI’s CCP, the Climate Alliance, and Energie-Cités

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<sup>33</sup> Michele M. Betsill and Harriet Bulkeley, “Cities and the Multilevel Governance of Global Climate Change,” *Global Governance*, 12, no. 2 (2006): 143.

<sup>34</sup> Taedong Lee, “Global Cities and Transnational Climate Change Networks,” *Global Environmental Politics* 13, no. 1 (2013): 108.

<sup>35</sup> The various editions of the C40 Cities “Climate Action in Megacities” report, produced in partnership with Arup, outline the range of powers relevant to GHG reduction policies possessed by mayors in C40 cities.

<sup>36</sup> Toly, “Transnational Municipal Networks in Climate Politics,” 347.

<sup>37</sup> Michele M. Betsill and Harriet Bulkeley, “Transnational Networks and Global Environmental Governance: The Cities for Climate Protection Program,” *International Studies Quarterly* 48, no. 2 (2004): 477.

represent the pioneering generation of municipal efforts to reduce greenhouse gas emissions.<sup>38</sup> ICLEI's CCP began as the Urban CO<sub>2</sub> Reduction Project, funded by the United States Environmental Protection Agency (EPA), the City of Toronto, and various private foundations, with the goal of developing city-level emissions reduction strategies and tools.<sup>39</sup> Eventually expanding into the CCP, this network now comprises over 1,000 municipalities in 86 countries, a large proportion of which are small to medium-sized cities.<sup>40</sup> The Climate Alliance (of European Cities with Indigenous Rainforest Peoples), by contrast, was established in 1990 as a networked alliance between European cities and indigenous rainforest peoples of the Amazon Basin. The ultimate objective of the network, which now counts more than 1,600 cities, is to develop and implement strategies for the reduction of greenhouse gas emissions, particularly in the energy and transport sectors.<sup>41</sup> In addition, the network seeks to raise public awareness for the protection of the Amazon rainforest. Energy Cities (previously Energie-Cités), also founded in 1990 by six European localities as part of a European Union (EU) project, has now developed into the European association of local authorities in energy transition, connecting more than 1,000 towns and cities across 30 countries.<sup>42</sup>

As suggested by Bulkeley et al., transnational networks fulfill numerous functions, among them “agenda setting; information sharing; capacity building; soft and hard forms of regulation; and integration across different global environmental governance arenas.”<sup>43</sup> For their urban

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<sup>38</sup> Harriet Bulkeley et al., “Cities and Climate Change: The role of institutions, governance and urban planning,” report prepared for the 2009 World Bank Urban Symposium on Climate Change, 2009, 6, <http://siteresources.worldbank.org/INTURBANDEVELOPMENT/Resources/336387-1256566800920/6505269-1268260567624/Bulkeley.pdf> (accessed on June 20, 2014).

<sup>39</sup> Bulkeley, “Cities and the Governing of Climate Change,” 232.

<sup>40</sup> ICLEI, Web site, <http://www.iclei.org/> (accessed on June 20, 2014).

<sup>41</sup> Climate Alliance, Web site, [http://www.klimabuendnis.org/our\\_profile0.0.html](http://www.klimabuendnis.org/our_profile0.0.html) (accessed on June 20, 2014).

<sup>42</sup> Energy Cities, Web site, <http://www.energy-cities.eu/-Association,8> (Accessed on June 21, 2014).

<sup>43</sup> Bulkeley et al., “Governing climate change transnationally,” 595.

constituents, TMNs forge connections and establish relationships among the like-minded, enabling the sharing of knowledge, best practices, and experience. Moreover, TMNs link cities to external funding sources through procurement partnerships, helping local authorities overcome financial obstacles to the adoption and implementation of climate-friendly programs. In doing so, such networks serve a latent need among cities that, taken alone, suffer limitations in their ability and effectiveness; "...city networks offer a potential means of bridging the local and global and creating pathways between local experimentation and aggregate effect."<sup>44</sup> More recently, new assemblages have emerged, some of which are focusing more on acquiring the membership of specific cities than on continually expanding involvement (as in the case of the C40 Cities Climate Leadership Group), and in doing so creating exclusive 'clubs.'<sup>45</sup>

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<sup>44</sup> Gordon, "Between local innovation and global impact," 289.

<sup>45</sup> Bulkeley et al., "Cities and Climate Change: Institutions, governance and urban planning," 26.

## Chapter Two: The C40 Cities Climate Leadership Group

### *Background*

The C40 Cities Climate Leadership Group is a network of sixty-nine global megacities, the central objective of which is to address climate change both globally and locally, especially through the development and implementation of city-level GHG reduction programs.<sup>46</sup> First established in October 2005, the network emerged out of an invite-only meeting of eighteen cities initiated by former Mayor of London Ken Livingstone at the World Cities Leadership and Climate Summit in London. Much of the impetus for the meeting consisted in showcasing cities as both the source and solution for climate change, and in demonstrating the merits of practical action by local governments ‘on the ground’.<sup>47</sup> Serving as a communication venue for the invited cities, the Summit facilitated initial discussions regarding the collaborative governance of climate change, and allowed cities to share best practices on the subjects of public transport, energy supply, and waste management, to name only a few issue areas.

Upon conclusion of the Summit, the eighteen cities formed the C20 Partnership chaired by the Greater London Authority (GLA), and issued a joint Communiqué that included as one of its six actions to meet again in 18 months to measure progress and report back to the United Nations.<sup>48</sup> Establishing this initial connection with the UN allowed the C40 to situate itself more resolutely within the global political structure, rendering it not merely a network capable of connecting cities, but a global actor in and of itself. Among the additional action items penned at the Summit, of particular significance was the establishment of “procurement policies and alliances

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<sup>46</sup> C40 Cities Climate Leadership Group, Web site,” <http://www.c40.org> (accessed June 24, 2014).

<sup>47</sup> Acuto, *Global Cities, Governance and Diplomacy*, 100.

<sup>48</sup> C20 Large World Cities, *C20 Climate Change Summit Communiqué* (London: World Cities Climate Change Summit, 1995), <http://openpolitics.ca/tiki-index.php?page=C20%20Climate%20Change%20Summit%20Communique%2C%202005-10-05&refresh=1> (accessed May 27, 2014).

to accelerate the uptake of climate-friendly technologies and influence the market place.”<sup>49</sup> This has remained a key function of the C40, due to the funding challenges that cities often face, especially in financing ambitious and innovative projects. Following the London Summit, according to Acuto, “the C20 was set to establish itself both as a space of engagement for global cities, gathered to exchange resources and expertise on climate change, as well as a potential collective actor capable of mediating these cities’ broader links with contexts other than the urban.”<sup>50</sup>

Quickly, the network grew to comprise 40 members, taking on the name C40 in 2006. Under the leadership of then C40 Chair Ken Livingstone, the group installed a London-based Secretariat, appointed a Steering Committee, and introduced an issue-specific workshop program.<sup>51</sup> In the same year, the C40 Secretariat invited the Clinton Climate Initiative (CCI) to join the network as its primary delivery partner. In 2007, the Group began to develop a set of issue-based networks in order to facilitate dialogue and collaboration between cities with more particular commonalities, among them Delta Cities and Adaptation, and Electric Vehicles.<sup>52</sup> Also in 2007, the C40 held its first biennial summit in New York. Toronto Mayor David Miller overtook Ken Livingstone as network Chair the following year, representing the C40 at the 2009 Copenhagen Climate Summit for Mayors, which was organized in parallel to the UN Copenhagen Climate Change Conference (CoP 15). Under the leadership of Chair and former Mayor of New York Michael Bloomberg, the CCI and the C40 were integrated fully in 2011 through the formal

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<sup>49</sup> C40 Cities Climate Leadership Group.

<sup>50</sup> Acuto, *Global Cities, Governance and Diplomacy*, 101.

<sup>51</sup> Global Solution Networks, “C40 Cities Climate Leadership Group: Cities Confronting Climate Change – Lighthouse Case Study,” <http://gsnetworks.org/wp-content/uploads/C40-Cities.pdf> (accessed June 15, 2014).

<sup>52</sup> Gordon, “Between local innovation and global impact,” 294.

merging of the two entities into a common Secretariat, and with the establishment of the CCI as the C40's executive arm.

Since 2011, the C40 has entered into additional strategic partnerships with entities such as the World Bank, ICLEI, the Carbon Disclosure Project, Arup (a global engineering firm), and the World Green Building Council, in order to bolster the network's legitimacy.<sup>53</sup> Collaboration with organisations like Arup and CDP has allowed C40 to highlight key initiatives and the emissions reduction progress of its members in joint reports. Recent initiatives make manifest the willingness and desire of the C40 to increase the involvement of its constituents, both in urging cities to disclose emissions reduction progress through annual reporting, and in creating and managing additional sub-networks to encourage collaboration. In December 2013, Rio De Janeiro Mayor Eduardo Paes became chair of the C40 network.

### ***Structure***

The C40 network is comprised of sixty-nine cities spanning six continents and representing thirty-two nations. A comprehensive list of C40 member cities is located in Appendix I. Membership in the network is contingent upon a city's ability to meet a set of criteria, which also organizes members into three separate categories: Megacities, Innovator Cities, and Observer Cities.<sup>54</sup> Pictured on page 21, Figure 1 outlines these criteria in more depth.

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<sup>53</sup> Ibid.

<sup>54</sup> C40 Cities Climate Leadership Group, "C40 Announces New Guidelines for Membership Categories," October 3, 2012, [http://c40.org/press\\_releases/press-release-c40-announces-new-guidelines-for-membership-categories](http://c40.org/press_releases/press-release-c40-announces-new-guidelines-for-membership-categories) (accessed June 16, 2014).

**Figure 1: C40 Cities Climate Leadership Group Membership Classifications**

<b>Membership Category</b>	<b>Criteria</b>
<b>Megacity</b>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• City population <math>\geq</math> 3 million; and/or</li> <li>• Metropolitan area population <math>\geq</math> 10 million; or</li> <li>• Considered a top 25 global city in terms of current GDP output</li> </ul>
<b>Innovator City</b>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Does not meet the criteria to qualify as a megacity; but</li> <li>• Is internationally recognized for leadership and contributions to climate change and sustainability policy</li> </ul>
<b>Observer City</b>	<p><u>Short term:</u></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• All cities applying for Megacity or Innovator membership are placed in this category until one-year participation requirements are attained</li> </ul> <p><u>Long term:</u></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Meets the criteria for either Megacity or Innovator membership, but cannot approve participation due to regulatory or procedural constraints</li> </ul>

The C40 leadership structure consists of a rotating Chair<sup>55</sup>, a Secretariat, a Steering Committee, and a Board of Directors. Created in 2007, the Steering Committee works alongside the Chair to set the agenda, review the membership, and oversee the operation of the C40 network.<sup>56</sup> At present, the Committee comprises ten members, spanning each of the seven regions recognized by the C40. Most recently, in May 2014, the C40 elected Copenhagen to the Committee as a representative of the nineteen Innovator cities. Among the official responsibilities of the Steering Committee are: final decision-making authority on most issues; appointment of members to the Board of Directors; review of the annual work plan; involvement in discussions and approval

<sup>55</sup> The elected C40 Chairperson is a mayor of a current C40 City. The current Chair is Mayor of Rio de Janeiro Eduardo Paes. Previous Chairs include Ken Livingstone (London, 2005-2008), David Miller (Toronto, 2008-2010), and Michael Bloomberg (New York, 2010-2013).

<sup>56</sup> Bouteligier, *Cities, Networks and Global Environmental Governance*, 35.

processes regarding the network's strategic direction; and communication of the network's objectives and vision to constituents within the seven regions.<sup>57</sup>

Based in London, the Secretariat supports the work of the Chair and Steering Committee through its coordination and management responsibilities. One way in which this is accomplished is by promoting relations and partnerships between and among cities with common problems and mutual benefits.<sup>58</sup> The C40 Website serves as an additional communication channel for the Secretariat, delivering news on policies, sub-networks, and events, while highlighting exemplary projects through in depth case studies and by visually tracking emissions reduction progress of each member on city-specific pages. As mentioned, the Clinton Climate Initiative formally merged with the Secretariat in 2011 to form a joint executive. This move has resulted in a doubling of both the network's budget and its staff.<sup>59</sup> However, according to Gordon, the permanent Secretariat has been somewhat marginalized due to the creation of several formal leadership positions outside of London, such as Executive Director, City Directors, and Directors of Research.<sup>60</sup> The establishment of a Board of Directors, with former New York Mayor Michael Bloomberg at the helm as President, has also contributed to this marginalization.

### ***Operation***

The preferred policy approach of the C40 is characterized by information exchange and public-private partnership facilitation.<sup>61</sup> Accordingly, the C40 operates largely through inter-city

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<sup>57</sup> Future Melbourne (Eco City) Committee, *City of Melbourne Report: Membership of C40 Steering Committee*, Melbourne: City of Melbourne, 2012, <http://www.melbourne.vic.gov.au/AboutCouncil/Meetings/Lists/CouncilMeetingAgendaItems/Attachments/10401/5.1a%20Membership%20of%20C40%20Streeting%20Committee.pdf>.

<sup>58</sup> Bouteligier, *Cities, Networks and Global Environmental Governance*, 92.

<sup>59</sup> Acuto, *Global Cities, Governance and Diplomacy*, 114.

<sup>60</sup> Gordon, "Between local innovation and global impact," 294.

<sup>61</sup> Acuto, *Global Cities, Governance and Diplomacy*, 105.

partnerships for the exchange of best practices, as well as through the provision of technical expertise and procurement options intended to ease the implementation of local policies.

Establishing and maintaining connections between and among municipalities is thus a primary objective of the C40, typically achieved through the issue-based sub-networks. Chaired by a member city and supported by C40 staff, C40 sub-networks represent active working groups of cities with common goals, priorities, challenges, and opportunities. These arrangements act as venues for knowledge transfer and peer-to-peer exchange, often done through workshops, while also providing direct support to cities, through managed partnerships as they work to develop and implement policies and programs.<sup>62</sup> Each network also supports virtual exchange of knowledge, especially in enabling access to a range of resources (research, analytical tools, funding, technical expertise etc.). The thirteen networks are classified according to the broader initiative area within which they fit.<sup>63</sup>

Finally, fulfilling a political capacity, the C40 participates as a unified entity within the UN climate change structure. In doing so, the C40 regularly presents communiqués at the annual CoPs that support the UNFCCC process. In particular, the C40 drafted an official letter to Rio+20 to explain the role of cities in climate change action. Additionally, the C40 partook in the Climate Summit for Mayors, arranged in parallel to the CoP 15 in Copenhagen.

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<sup>62</sup> C40 Cities Climate Leadership Group.

<sup>63</sup> The seven C40 Initiative areas are as follows: Adaptation and Water, Energy, Finance and Economic Development, Measurement and Planning, Solid Waste Management, Sustainable Communities, and Transportation.

### *Partnerships*

Integral to the operation of the C40 are the partnerships that the network has established with key private actors and international entities, among them the CCI, the World Bank, the CDP, and Arup. In particular, these partnerships connect C40 cities with outside funding partners and expert knowledge. The C40 first formalized its collaboration with the CCI in 2006 by establishing the group as its delivery partner. As such, the CCI initially delivered mainly economic support, especially in terms of procurement. Outlined at the time of the initial agreement, the CCI performs three primary functions that extend the reach of the C40 network beyond the public realm.<sup>64</sup> First, the CCI works to combine the purchasing power of the cities in the network and connect with major energy service providers (or ESCOs), in order to penetrate the global market and lower the prices of energy efficient and sustainable technologies. Second, the CCI utilizes its connections with the private sector to mobilize expertise and provide technical assistance to the network. Third, the CCI develops technical networks and communications systems among cities.

In June 2011, C40 established a formal partnership with ICLEI – Local Governments for Sustainability. The partnership created a global standard for accounting and reporting greenhouse gas emissions, which will streamline and simplify reporting processes for municipalities. Building on this, the World Resources Institute has also contributed in a three-way effort to develop the Global Protocol for Community-Scale GHG Emissions (GPC) Pilot – the first internationally accepted framework for city-level GHG inventories.

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<sup>64</sup> Acuto, *Global Cities, Governance and Diplomacy*, 102-103.

In addition, C40 has collaborated with Arup – an independent professional services consortium and global engineering firm – since 2010, delivering a series of workshops under the banner “C40 Urban Life.” Geared toward the development of carbon reduction programs, these workshops target the needs and unique situations of particular cities using a Sustainable Integrated Development approach.<sup>65</sup> The partnership with the World Bank, initiated in 2011 at the C40 Mayor’s Summit in Sao Paulo, further bolsters efforts at consistency in planning, measurement, and reporting. Moreover, the partnership allows C40 cities direct access to World Bank resources, such as capacity building programs and climate finance initiatives.

Also supporting emissions reporting efforts, the partnership between the CDP and C40 has resulted in the development of a number of comprehensive reports providing emissions reductions data from the majority of C40 cities. The partnership with Arup has also produced a report entitled *Climate Action in Megacities*, which delivers a full account of climate policy and emissions reduction efforts undertaken by C40 megacities.

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<sup>65</sup> Sustainable Integrated Development is an approach that recognizes the intrinsic connections that exist among land use, energy, waste, water, transport, agriculture, buildings, economics, and sociology.

## Chapter Three: Conceptualizing authority

### *Why authority?*

As contended earlier, a transnational network is constitutive of a form of governance if it is authoritative. Following this logic, to govern is to “bring together a sufficient marriage of power and legitimacy to establish, operationalize, apply, enforce, interpret, or vitiate...behavioural rules.”<sup>66</sup> Thus, an understanding of authority – what it is, how it comes about, where it is found, and by whom is it held – is integral to uncovering the various ways in which governance occurs, both locally and globally. Moreover, analyzing authority in this context raises significant questions about legitimacy and the generation of authority, given the proliferation of non-state actors that now seek to engage in governance, as well as the blurring of the line between public and private that has ensued. The C40 network is an excellent example of these myriad forces at work within a novel form of climate change governance.

The numerous attempts made in recent years by scholars to engage with emerging forms and conceptualizations of authority are demonstrative of the position of centrality occupied by authority within processes of governance. Taking into consideration the involvement of non-state actors in global climate governance, academics have demonstrated the extent to which scientific, corporate, civil society, networks, PPPs, and non-governmental actors have been successful in influencing governance at all levels. However, as Bulkeley contends, such efforts have typically focused on the ‘where and by whom’ aspects of authority, leaving the more fundamental

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<sup>66</sup> Ken Conca, “Old states in new bottles? The hybridization of authority in global environmental governance,” in John Barry and Robyn Eckersley, eds., *The State and the Global Ecological Crisis* (Cambridge, MA: The MIT Press, 2005): 190, cited in Bulkeley et al., “Governing climate change transnationally,” 594.

questions of ‘how and to what end’ unexplored.<sup>67</sup> John Allen does well to articulate this problem in mentioning that, “for all this talk of a redistribution or shift in capabilities between the different levels of governance...the vocabulary of power is still one of capabilities ‘held’ and the dispersion or distribution of powers between various levels and sites of authority.”<sup>68</sup>

Accordingly, this paper seeks to engage more rigorously with the manifold ways in which a novel form of transnational climate governance – the C40 Cities Climate Leadership Group – constitutes, deploys, and perpetuates authority. Imperative to this analysis is an understanding of power (and thus, authority as a form of power) that goes beyond classic conceptualizations in at least the following three ways. First, power is more complex than indicated by its typical representation as a resource capacity held over others. Second, authority, as a form of power, is not merely an effect of the territorially based nation-state. Third, authority is not simply coercive or demanding of concession.

### *Power*

Traditional conceptions exhibit a tendency to depict power as a resource or a capacity with a discernable location – as tangible, found ‘out there’, accessible to and possessed by some and not others. This is symptomatic of what Bruno Latour terms a ‘centred’ perception, wherein the exercise and distribution of power (as a resource capability) can be attributed to a central source.<sup>69</sup> Instead, contends John Allen, one ought to disentangle power from resources, and in so doing, consider it as a social relational effect rather than a ‘thing’ possessed by an individual or

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<sup>67</sup> Bulkeley, “Governance and the geography of authority,” 2428.

<sup>68</sup> John Allen, “The Whereabouts of Power: Politics, Government and Space,” *Geografiska Annale; Series B, Human Geography* 86, no. 1 (2004): 22, cited in Bulkeley, “Governance and the geography of authority,” 2431.

<sup>69</sup> John Allen, *Lost Geographies of Power* (Oxford: Blackwell Publishing Ltd., 2003), 15.

an entity.<sup>70</sup> Thus, power is not merely a capacity, nor is it simply a substance. Power is the result of a relationship, which works by “bring[ing] into play relations between individuals (or between groups),”<sup>71</sup> and exists only when exercised through action<sup>72</sup>

Philosophies that regard power as either facilitative or constitutive challenge traditional assumptions, and reflect an understanding of its social relational character.<sup>73</sup> Barnett and Duvall argue that in the context of international relations, any analysis of power must engage with the way in which structures and processes generate varying social capacities, which then enable actors in defining and advancing their interests.<sup>74</sup> In this sense, power is facilitative – it has an enabling effect; it is not a resource, but must be generated through the application of resources and skills across tracts of space and time.<sup>75</sup> Acting through social relations, power produces effects that shape the capacities of actors to determine the conditions of their existence. Constitutive accounts understand the exercise of power as a mode of action that does not act directly on others, but instead, acts upon their actions. In this sense, power is innate, or “inseparable from its effects.”<sup>76</sup> Power is productive or constitutive of subjectivities; it is “an action upon an action – on existing actions or on those which may arise in the present or the future.”<sup>77</sup> In this sense, argues Foucault, power “incites, it induces, it seduces, it makes easier or more difficult; in the extreme it constrains or forbids absolutely.”<sup>78</sup>

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<sup>70</sup> Ibid, 5.

<sup>71</sup> Michel Foucault, “The Subject and Power,” *Critical Inquiry* 8, no. 4 (1982): 786.

<sup>72</sup> Ibid, 788.

<sup>73</sup> Bulkeley, “Governance and the geography of authority,” 2431.

<sup>74</sup> Michael Barnett and Raymond Duvall, “Power in international politics,” *International Organization* 59, no. 1 (2005): 41-42.

<sup>75</sup> John Allen, “Powerful city networks: more than connections, less than domination and control,” *Urban Studies* 47, no. 13 (2010): 2900, cited in Bulkeley, “Governance and the geography of authority,” 2431.

<sup>76</sup> Allen, *Lost Geographies of Power*, 65, cited in Ibid.

<sup>77</sup> Foucault, “The Subject and Power,” 789.

<sup>78</sup> Ibid.

John Allen, in *Lost Geographies of Power*, contends that power is by nature spatial, and concomitantly, that spatiality is infused with power.<sup>79</sup> Theories that describe power as a social relational effect (rather than in terms of capabilities held), produced through the application of resources over tracts of space and time, recognize power's inherent spatial nature. Moreover, "governing," as an authoritative act, "is fundamentally spatial because it is about acting at a distance, creating particular sites as containers of power and authority, coordinating diverse locale, linking center with periphery, metropole with colony."<sup>80</sup> Such an understanding of governance, and the power through which it is achieved, is integral to comprehending fully its operation in city networks, which are characterized by their particular spatiality, especially given the "dynamic nature of networks, their frequently shifting pattern of relationships... [and] the varied extent of their reach."<sup>81</sup> Thus, to examine the manner in which networks generate and utilise power (with its spatial nature in mind), one must engage with the manifold ways in which "actors and institutions make their leverage and presence felt through certain practices of proximity and reach."<sup>82</sup>

### ***Authority***

Following Max Weber and Hannah Arendt, John Allen emphasizes that power is never simply power in general – it is always of a certain form, whether it be domination, authority, manipulation etc..<sup>83</sup> Consequently, authority as a particular sort of power – and a concept that is

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<sup>79</sup> Allen, *Lost Geographies of Power*, 3.

<sup>80</sup> Mitchell Dean and Paul Henman, "Governing Society Today: Editor's Introduction," *Alternatives: Global, Local, Political* 29, no. 5 (2004): 490.

<sup>81</sup> Allen, "Powerful City Networks," 2896.

<sup>82</sup> John Allen, "Topological twists: power's shifting geographies," *Dialogues in Human Geography* 1, no. 3 (2011): 284, cited in Bulkeley, "Governance and the geography of authority," 2439.

<sup>83</sup> Allen, *Lost Geographies of Power*, 2.

integral to an understanding of governance – is distinguishable from alternative types given its recognition as legitimate rule. However, it is not enough to state that power can assume several shapes. In fact, “although much of what we understand of power stems from its relational effects, its basic configuration...is drawn from the *manner in which*<sup>84</sup> resources are mobilized and deployed over variable spans of space and time.”<sup>85</sup> Succinctly, integral to an understanding of power is not merely its form, but also the purpose that it serves, and therefore the way in which it operates.<sup>86</sup>

Returning to the idea that power is inherently social-relational, it follows that authority, as legitimate rule is always contingent upon recognition. For Allen, “recognition holds the key to authority as a mode of power, and others comply because of acknowledged expertise or competence...”<sup>87</sup> Accordingly, that governance is always authoritative rests on its recognition as such. As alluded to by Weber in his designation of legitimations of domination<sup>88</sup>, discerning the basis upon which the legitimacy of power is determined is vital to understanding the manifold ways in which authority operates. Indeed, such bases of legitimacy ought not to be limited to those associated with the democratic nation-state; “transparency, efficiency, expertise, accountability, and popularity are as much foundations of legitimacy as are rationality and democratic process.”<sup>89</sup> This notion is of particular relevance to those concerned with emergent forms of governance and the assemblages through which it occurs. Such arrangements – of

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<sup>84</sup> Emphasis mine.

<sup>85</sup> Ibid, 96.

<sup>86</sup> Bulkeley, “Governance and the geography of authority,” 2432.

<sup>87</sup> Allen, *Lost Geographies of Power*, 119.

<sup>88</sup> In *Politics as a Vocation*, Max Weber delineates three ideal-types of authority, or ‘legitimations of domination’ – traditional, charismatic, and legal-rational.

<sup>89</sup> John Agnew, “Sovereignty regimes: territoriality and state authority in contemporary world politics,” *Annals of the Association of American Geographers* 95, no. 2 (2005): 442, cited in Bulkeley, “Governance and the geography of authority,” 2430.

which the C40 is only one configuration – comprise a range of new or atypical actors, and blur the traditionally rigid and distinct line between public and private, thus bringing into play unconventional processes of authorization.

### *Modalities of authorization framework*

**Figure 2: Ideal-typical characteristics of different modes of authority**

	<b>Consent</b>	<b>Consensus</b>	<b>Concord</b>
<b>Purpose</b>	Instrumental	Associational	Governmental
<b>Recognition</b>	Concessional	Mutual	Habitual
<b>Compliance</b>	Exclusion	Compromise	Normalization
<b>Spatiality</b>	Connection	Proximity	Presence

*Source: Bulkeley, "Governance and the geography of authority."*

Drawing on the theories of power, authority, and legitimacy outlined above, Harriet Bulkeley has constructed a theoretical scheme through which to explore more critically the workings of authority in transnational climate-change governance arrangements. Bulkeley's 'modalities of authorization' framework contends that authority, as one form of power, operates in pursuit of three purposes (instrumental, associational, and governmental), and through three ideal-type modalities (consent, consensus, and concord).<sup>90</sup> Further informing her framework is an understanding of authority as inherently spatial, as well as dependent upon processes of recognition and compliance; each modality of authority is "constituted through the purposes for

<sup>90</sup> Bulkeley, "Governance and the geography of authority."

which power is deployed, the nature of recognition and compliance, and distinct forms of sociospatial relations.”<sup>91</sup> Figure 2 summarises these processes for each modality of authorization.

Due to the relational nature of authority, a comprehension of processes of recognition is vital to understanding the way authority functions in general. In order to function authoritatively, it is imperative that power is “worthy of acceptance”<sup>92</sup> (or legitimate), and this acceptance is always contingent upon the relationship between authority and relevant actor(s). As discussed, legitimacy is dependent upon several variables, and is most often associated with the nation-state, its institutions, and its rulers. However, ideas of legitimacy have shifted historically, remaining fluid and unfixed. Subsequently, and in response to a rise in forms of governance beyond the state, scholarship has outlined the various ways in which other characteristics – such as market potential and scientific prowess – have gained recognition as guarantors of legitimacy. Most common conceptions of authority note that it is through concession that actors recognize the authority to which legitimacy lends itself. However, conceiving of power in an alternative sense opens up the possibility of differences in the way in which recognition is established. Thus, it is possible for the recognition of authority to be derived mutually through the establishment of consensus among different actors, or exist implicitly or habitually (be taken for granted), as in the cases of associational and governmental authority respectively.

As recognition varies, so do the processes of compliance that sustain obligations. Quite clearly, authority as consent attains compliance through processes of exclusion (punishing bad practice, naming and shaming etc.). Less obvious, however, are the ways in which authority achieves

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<sup>91</sup> Ibid, 2434.

<sup>92</sup> Maarten Hajer, *Authoritative Governance: Policy-making in the Age of Mediatization* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2009), 22, cited in Ibid, 2435.

compliance when it operates through consensus and concord. When authority operates through consensus, compliance is achieved through compromise; it is constantly mediated socially as constituents act in concert, establish common goals, and cast aside differences and critiques. According to Bulkeley, “goals are not reached, but principles hold; constituents may not deliver on specific outcomes, but continually justify their intentions to do so in order to remain party to the consensus at hand.”<sup>93</sup> Practiced through concord, authority generates compliance through the conduct of conduct, in the Foucauldian sense. In this case, certain practices, actions, and behaviours are normalised, which then act upon the actions of self-governing subjects.

Just as alternative conceptions of power alter the way in which authority is recognized and compliance achieved, they too influence the nature of spatial relations. Operating through consent, authority put to an instrumental purpose is characterized spatially by connection, indicative of the ability to “stretch or compress ties”<sup>94</sup> that connect network and constituent. In the context of authority practised as consensus, spatiality is about proximity – authority is generated through tools of approximation, which render adjacent entities that are otherwise distant and unlike. Finally, as the third and final modality of authorization, concord is distinguished by spatial relations of presence – “by being explicitly ‘on hand’; operating as a backdrop for the activities of others; or by normalising particular ways of saying and doing climate governance.”<sup>95</sup>

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<sup>93</sup> Bulkeley, “Governance and the geography of authority,” 2438.

<sup>94</sup> Ibid, 2436.

<sup>95</sup> Ibid, 2440.

### Authority through consent

Perhaps the most familiar conception of authority is one wherein an entity possesses the ability to engender the compliance or submission of another. Following Weber, authority that is put to an instrumental purpose rests in a both a desire and capability to ‘bend the will’ of others.<sup>96</sup> In fact, it is from this capacity to enlist agreement in terms of what another proposes – an ability to “make others act in ways that they otherwise would not have done”<sup>97</sup> – that authority gains its instrumentality. Recognition in such cases is contingent upon the willingness (shown through compliance, for example) of an entity to be bound by authority, in one way or another, based on a range of attributes that render such concession legitimate or rightful. Hajer further elaborates on such criteria, asserting that they must provide a “set of rationalities and practices through which their rightfulness can be accepted... [as well as] continually demonstrated and achieved.”<sup>98</sup> In such situations, Bulkeley argues that compliance is secured through exclusion or marginalization, whether through overt processes of exclusion, such as naming and shaming, or more subtle techniques such as incentivizing participation and achievement. Spatially, authority as consent operates through the establishment of connection. Accordingly, assemblages may expand or shorten linkages in order to distance themselves from constituents, or draw them closer, depending on the objective. In this sense, connections (and the relationships they represent) are constantly in a state of flux, as networks seek to both maintain legitimacy and achieve set objectives.

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<sup>96</sup> Allen, *Lost Geographies of Power*, 118.

<sup>97</sup> *Ibid*, 117.

<sup>98</sup> Hajer, *Authoritative Governance*, 22, cited in Bulkeley, “Governance and the geography of authority,” 2436.

### Authority through consensus

An exploration of consensus is critical to an understanding of “transverse relationships of power.”<sup>99</sup> Issue areas that cut across or transcend traditional lines and practices – such as climate and the environment – require that otherwise distinct and perhaps disconnected sectors and actors come together to establish common ground. For Hannah Arendt, “power springs up whenever people get together and act in concert, but it derives its legitimacy from the initial getting together.”<sup>100</sup> Accordingly, authority is practised associatively when a multitude of actors gather in political association and cast aside their differences in order to act as one, or as an “integrated we.”<sup>101</sup> What reconstitutes or reaffirms this authority is the continual act of getting together, and in turn, the manifestation of this act taken in unity, which is done, for example, through the medium of speech. Therefore, recognition in this sense is mutual: achieved or performed among constituents as a cohesive entity. Members gain legitimacy based on their participation in the group, and outside actors see the group as worthy of acceptance given its heterogeneous composition, as well as the consensus through which decisions are taken.

In order to secure and perpetuate agreement, authority practised as consensus is contingent upon the development of various techniques and tools. Frequently, these strategies take the form of best practices and common baselines, in order to solidify to some extent that which the group has established mutually as reflective of common will and consensus. Moreover, the development and legitimation of best practices and common positions is integral in structuring the subsequent actions of group members, so that the network is able to engender compliance on a continual basis.

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<sup>99</sup> Allen, *Lost Geographies of Power*, 58, cited in Ibid, 2437.

<sup>100</sup> Hannah Arendt, *Crises of the Republic* (New York: Harcourt Brace Jovanovich, 1972), 151.

<sup>101</sup> Allen, *Lost Geographies of Power*, 123-124.

Spatial relations of proximity characterize authority as generated through consensus. The establishment of consensus among actors with diverse interests requires that constituents identify a uniting idea or goal, which serves the purpose of bringing together, or rendering proximate the otherwise distant. Vitality, this distance is not merely geographical; it too represents (among others) political, ideological, cultural divides.

### Authority through concord

As the third and final mode of authorization identified in Bulkeley's framework, authority practised as concord fulfils a governmental purpose. In this case, power is put towards the conduct of conduct, and is dispersed, omnipresent, and facilitative, rather than centralized, occasional, and repressive.<sup>102</sup> Rooted in a Foucauldian understanding of governmentality, this is accomplished by acting and handling matters in way that is accepted discursively and informed by particular logics, wherein power operates through ways of constructing, ordering, and speaking about the world. It is about the way in which objectives are achieved by encouraging specific ways of thinking, often through programs and technologies of government.

Authority as concord arises, and becomes recognized as such, when diverse actors and elements are assembled in such a way that they, as a collective, are established as given, natural, or taken for granted in terms of their authority to shape conduct.<sup>103</sup> Succinctly, it "emerges as the result both of the strategic normalisation of particular discourses....and of the mundane practices through which networks operate, and the artefacts which they put in place to hold networks

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<sup>102</sup> Dean and Henman, "Governing Society Today," 485.

<sup>103</sup> Bulkeley, "Governance and the geography of authority," 2439.

together.”<sup>104</sup> Compliance in such cases is achieved by creating what Foucault refers to as self-governing subjects. Ultimately, compliance is not forced or incentivized, it is an active choice undertaken by free actors based on what has been normalized or constituted as habitual. Articulated by Bulkeley, “compliance works through creating...’normal’ expectations [and] actions,”<sup>105</sup> which are then internalized by actors as viable options among a range of possibilities. When authority is practised as concord, it is mediated spatially through presence. Given that authority operates, in this sense, through the normalization of particular behaviours and logics, and is recognized when it becomes taken for granted, spatial relations are thus characterized by the ability to be present, or “explicitly on hand,”<sup>106</sup> as governance processes unfold. When effective, this presence is normalized as inherent to the functioning of governance, both for constituents, and those observing from outside.

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<sup>104</sup> Ibid.

<sup>105</sup> Ibid, 2440.

<sup>106</sup> Ibid.

## **CHAPTER FOUR: MODALITIES OF AUTHORIZATION IN THE C40 CLIMATE LEADERSHIP GROUP**

### *Generating consent*

Authority as consent involves both a desire and a capacity to bend the will of others, or to engender compliance or submission regarding that which another wishes or suggests. Indications of this mode of authorization are present within the C40 Cities Climate Leadership Group, most evidently when considering the standard setting and emissions reporting mechanisms it has established. Though this only represents one dimension of C40's activities and purpose, it denotes a significant instance of the way in which instrumental power operates within a transnational municipal assemblage.

Among the six initial action items established by the C20 group in October 2005, the first committed members to set ambitious GHG emissions reduction goals.<sup>107</sup> This emphasis on voluntary target setting and emissions measurement, manifest from the network's inception, is evidence of authority as consent at work. When cities agree or volunteer to contribute annual reports highlighting emissions reductions (or lack thereof), they acquiesce to the authority of the C40 and its adopted standards. By submitting annual updates on the progress and results of emissions reductions activities, and by providing data for use in comprehensive reports, cities concede to be bound by the authority of the network.

However, before examining the aforementioned practices of standard setting and reporting in greater depth, it is vital to note that the C40 obtains the consent of its members on a voluntary basis; consent relies on the existence of some form of legitimacy, rather than being contingent

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<sup>107</sup> C20 Large World Cities, *C20 Climate Change Summit Communiqué*.

upon coercion or persuasion. For Weber, legitimacy of rule is often associated with legal-rational principles, and accordingly, the apparatus of the liberal or bureaucratic state. Evidently, the C40 network enjoys at least a minor degree of legitimacy derived from the legal authority of the local governments of its members. However, in this instance of governance beyond the state, it is possible to discern several less obvious avenues through which actors gain the consent of the governed, among them expertise and competence.

How then does the C40 generate alternative forms of worthy acceptance? In considering the network in its broadest sense, it is apparent that the C40 does so in at least the following four ways:

1. By engaging and partnering with a heterogeneous group of actors spanning different interests and sectors, and by creating a forum through which the forging of connections among these actors is made possible;
2. By serving as an expert in terms of its knowledge of the intersection of sustainability, planning, and development;
3. By fulfilling a demand among cities in offering ambitious and proactive municipalities the opportunity of increased visibility, especially at the international level; and
4. By seizing opportunistically on a prevalent discourse of nation state inaction and incompetency and presenting itself as a viable alternative.

However, the ways in which the C40 network generates consent requires a more nuanced interrogation when asking the same question with reference to the established standard setting and reporting schemes in particular. In other words, that several incentives exist which

rationalize for a city the merits of becoming a C40 member is quite evident. That member cities are willing to concede to the authority of the C40 by following standard setting procedures and by voluntarily reporting on GHG emissions reductions requires a deeper level of analysis, so that the myriad ways in which authority operates in and through this instance may be uncovered.

In recent years, the C40 has undertaken several reforms targeted at strengthening the network and boosting levels of commitment and action amongst member cities.<sup>108</sup> In 2010, C40 joined forces with the Carbon Disclosure Project to establish the CDP Cities program – a standardized reporting platform developed by the likes of Microsoft and Autodesk to be used by cities in order to report GHG emissions, track progress, and share critical data. Upon announcement of the partnership, then Mayor of Toronto and C40 Chair David Miller urged all member cities to use the CDP tool to disclose their emissions.<sup>109</sup> What was most surprising, according to Special Adviser to the C40 Chair Dr. Rohit Aggarwal, is that over three quarters of C40 cities complied. “We – in fact I – was blown away, we were hoping for 50 percent. We got 76 percent of the C40 participating. [...] So we actually, for the first time, have data that spans across all C40 cities.”<sup>110</sup> In 2013, C40’s third year of partnership with CDP, 84% of members (53 of 63 invited cities) participated by disclosing climate change data.<sup>111</sup>

To supplement this work, C40 has established, under the Measurement and Planning initiative area, two networks that engage directly with these data gathering and reporting activities: Global

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<sup>108</sup> Gordon, “Between local innovation and global impact,” 294.

<sup>109</sup> Dr. Rohit Aggarwala, Special Adviser to the Chair of C40 Cities, interview by Monica Trauzzi, *OnPoint*, E&ETV, July 27, 2011, <http://www.eenews.net/tv/videos/1373>.

<sup>110</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>111</sup> CDP and C40 Cities, *CDP Cities 2013: Summary report on 110 global cities*, [http://c40-production-images.s3.amazonaws.com/researches/images/10\\_CDP\\_20Cities\\_202013\\_summary\\_20report\\_Wealthier\\_20Healthier\\_20Cities.original.pdf?1388095745](http://c40-production-images.s3.amazonaws.com/researches/images/10_CDP_20Cities_202013_summary_20report_Wealthier_20Healthier_20Cities.original.pdf?1388095745) (accessed May 29, 2014).

Standards, and Measurement and Reporting. The Measurement and Reporting Network helps to simplify and improve the data gathering and reporting process for cities by providing them with tools, best practices, and support mechanisms. Building on this, the Global Standards Network focuses on streamlining emissions measurement techniques in order to achieve consistency in terms of methodology and measurement of greenhouse gas emissions across all cities. Interesting, while also demonstrative of the authority of C40, is the fact that at least one city from every region of the world reports an emissions inventory through their participation in these networks.

In cases such as those discussed above, “authority is not pre-given but, rather, generated in the relation between standard setting/monitoring networks and the constituents who require, accept, and embody the new rules of the climate game.”<sup>112</sup> Accordingly, the C40 generates authority by forging ties with other entities like the CDP, in order to create emissions reporting/data collection platforms. These tools serve a latent need or demand among member cities, who then accept the new standards and way of operation by making annual submissions and by offering to display progress to the world.

In 2010, Michael Bloomberg, then Mayor of New York City, justified cities taking such actions in noting that the “C40’s partnership with CDP will ensure that all member cities have a reliable platform to report emissions.”<sup>113</sup> He added that “we will never meet the ambitious goals we set as an organization without solid data to measure our progress; as I’ve always said: if you can’t

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<sup>112</sup> Bulkeley, “Governance and the geography of authority,” 2436.

<sup>113</sup> Autodesk, “Carbon Disclosure Project Paves Way for Cities to Report Carbon Emissions,” November 1, 2010, <http://news.autodesk.com/press-release/carbon-disclosure-project-paves-way-cities-report-carbon-emissions> (accessed May 23, 2014).

measure it, you can't manage it.”<sup>114</sup> Put another way, C40 cities rely on the vast data sets and comprehensive reports generated by the information that they report in order to better measure their progress, justify ambitious goals, and in a sense, legitimize their claims as actors at the forefront of addressing climate change. Moreover, the logics that underlie and comprise these practices, tools, and networks contain what Hajer refers to as the potential for reasoned elaboration.<sup>115</sup> Succinctly, C40 members are capable of rationalizing concession (willingly reporting emissions data) to the network, not only at the time of reporting, but also on a continual basis.

Processes of exclusion, both subtle and overt, sustain and bolster this form of compliance within the C40 network. Member cities participating in the Global Standards and Measurement and Reporting networks consent to the visual representation of their CO<sub>2</sub> emissions levels (measured in million tonnes per year), as well as their progress toward their 2025 emissions reduction goal on the C40 website. This pictorial broadcasting of progress renders participating cities accountable, to not only other C40 members and the Steering Committee, but also to the global public, governments, and international organizations who are capable of accessing such data with the mere click of a computer mouse. Cities who fail to make progress in terms of emissions reductions in general, or towards their 2025 targets in particular, cannot easily hide their shortcomings, thus creating a subtle instance of ‘naming and shaming.’ Further reinforcing this process is the multitude of reports issued by the C40 containing data and project information/updates, all of which are publicly accessible via the C40 website. Since the advent of the CDP/C40 pact, the two groups have together released several joint reports, among them

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<sup>114</sup> Ibid.

<sup>115</sup> Hajer, *Authoritative Governance*.

*Measurement for Management: CDP Cities 2012 Global Report; Wealthier, Healthier Cities: How climate change action is giving us wealthier, healthier cities; and CDP Cities 2013.* In addition, C40 has contributed reports in partnership with Arup presenting comprehensive data on C40 cities' powers, current actions, and plans across nine sectors of activity.

The naming and shaming process is more overt when considering the various ways in which the C40 highlights and rewards 'good' behaviour, practices, and progress. Extant within the network structure are several 'perks of doing well,' the desirability of which works to perpetuate the best practices and standards established and upheld by the network. The C40 network recognizes cities that carry out innovative projects in line with particular initiatives, areas of focus, and best practices by showcasing their projects on the C40 website, in reports, and at workshops and international conferences. The visibility that such cities gain by following prescribed practices, and conversely the lack of exposure that afflicts those who fail to do so represents a particular method of naming and shaming. In addition, the Group awards those cities who continually exhibit initiative, resolve, and leadership with spots on the Steering Committee, or by naming them leader of a network. In order to receive a spot on the Steering Committee following a vacancy, a city must first nominate itself by submitting a letter of interest to the C40 Chair.<sup>116</sup> The members of the Steering Committee then vote to fill the vacant spot.<sup>117</sup> The following statements made by Lord Mayor of Copenhagen Frank Jensen regarding his city's recent election to the Steering Committee make manifest the degree of achievement associated with a city's ability to secure a spot on the Steering Committee:

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<sup>116</sup> Future Melbourne (Eco City) Committee, *Report: Membership of C40 Steering Committee*.

<sup>117</sup> *Ibid.*

“It is a big recognition of Copenhagen’s efforts to minimize CO2 emissions and develop sustainable urban solutions that we are now represented in the C40 Steering Committee. Copenhagen is very keen to take its involvement in the C40 to the next level.”<sup>118</sup>

Finally, the City Climate Leadership Awards – an annual awards competition born out of the collaboration between C40 Cities and Siemens – further reinforces climate positive behaviour of C40 member cities. Started in 2013, the competition “provide[s] recognition for cities that are demonstrating leadership through the implementation of scalable solutions that lower emissions and address issues cities are facing as a result of global climate change.”<sup>119</sup> Five of the ten award categories are open exclusively to C40 Cities: Urban Transportation, Solid Waste Management, Finance & Economic Development, Carbon Measurement & Planning, and Sustainable Communities. Interestingly, out of the awards presented in these five categories, three went to current Steering Committee members Copenhagen, Rio de Janeiro, and Tokyo. This instance supports critiques that depict novel climate initiatives as merely self-selecting clubs, ultimately raising the question as to whether such arrangements simply highlight the actions of cities already proactive in the uptake of climate positive solutions, or merely represent “networks of pioneers for pioneers.”<sup>120</sup>

Spatially, authority as consent operates through connection. Through the creation and implementation of measurement and reporting tools, the C40 is able to “reach into and form part

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<sup>118</sup> Københavns Kommune, “Lord Mayor Frank Jensen Elected to C40 Steering Committee,” May 9, 2014, [http://subsite.kk.dk/Nyheder/2014/Maj/OKF\\_C40.aspx](http://subsite.kk.dk/Nyheder/2014/Maj/OKF_C40.aspx) (accessed May 29, 2014).

<sup>119</sup> City Climate Leadership Awards, Web site, <http://cityclimateleadershipawards.com>.

<sup>120</sup> Kristine Kern and Harriet Bulkeley, “Cities, Europeanization and Multi-level Governance: Governing Climate Change through Transnational Municipal Networks,” *Journal of Common Market Studies* 47, no. 2 (2009): 309. (2008).

of the activities of constituents,”<sup>121</sup> while members are also drawn within reach of the network when case studies, visual depictions of progress, and annual reports are made available to the public. However, as Bulkeley notes, the existence of a connection does not suggest consistency of form; in fact, ties may be stretched or compressed, rendering the nature of connection fluid and unfixed.<sup>122</sup> In the case of measurement and reporting tools, the C40 exhibits the ability to establish a connection with its member cities instrumentally. However, the network also possesses the ability to draw certain members within closer proximity based on instances of progress or success regarding their emissions reduction targets. In this way, the network does reward cities for their compliance through increased visibility in reports, case studies, and at summits and conferences, but more importantly, by establishing stronger associations with complying cities.

### *Forging consensus*

When power is effected associatively, that is in order to bring together diverse actors and interests around a common objective, the forging of consensus that results contributes to the constitution and perpetuation of an entity’s legitimacy. The C40 Cities Climate Leadership Group exercises authority by establishing consensus surrounding the problem of climate change and the role of major cities in addressing it. At its most fundamental level, the C40 has sought to secure members around the vision that cities exhibit the potential to be a leading force for global action on climate change, especially within a context of unproductive international negotiations and of a general failure by national governments to create reforms at the domestic and global

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<sup>121</sup> John Allen and Allan Cochrane, “Assemblages of State Power: Topological Shifts in the Organization of Government and Politics,” 42, no. 5 (2010): 1071-1089, cited in Bulkeley, “Governance and the geography of authority,” 2436.

<sup>122</sup> Bulkeley, “Governance and the geography of authority,” 2436 – 2437.

levels. As articulated by former C40 Chair and current President Michael Bloomberg at the 2012 Rio+C40 Earth Summit, “even as progress at the national and international levels has faltered, it’s fair to say that world cities have forged ahead. Megacity mayors are indeed taking action on climate change.”<sup>123</sup>

If considered in light of Arendt’s account of power, which informs Bulkeley’s designation of consensus as one modality of authorization, C40 members first established consensus at the 2005 Climate Change Summit in London. This initial account of joining otherwise disconnected entities through their similarities (their identities as large, global cities), to solve a common problem (climate change and the inaction of national governments), represents an integral point in the practise of authority by the network: the identification of a common goal. The resulting Communiqué, released as the product of the Summit discussion, serves as the first iteration of the Group’s common understanding of what constitutes “good” climate governance. Among the six actions were “commit[ing] to work together to set ambitious collective and individual targets for reducing greenhouse gas emissions,” and “to develop, exchange, and implement best practices and strategies on emissions reductions and climate adaptation.”<sup>124</sup> Accordingly, the Summit represents not only the moment at which members of the C20 group established themselves as such, but also the key point at which a common notion of how their collectively established problem would be tackled: collaboratively, and through the setting of measureable reduction targets, the exchange of best practices, and the reporting of quantifiable progress.

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<sup>123</sup> “Rio+C40,” YouTube video, 2:48, posted by “C40CitiesLive,” January 8, 2013, <http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=pSQnERTLUOQ>.

<sup>124</sup> C20 Large World Cities, *C20 Climate Change Summit Communiqué*.

This forging of consensus, not merely among cities, but also among a multitude of stakeholders such as industry, business, environmental organizations, government, and city planners, represents an additional way in which C40 employs consensus as a mode of authority. The Group accomplishes this by uniting actors across sectors but around a common position in order to deliver projects locally. To this end, C40 has collaborated with various other entities and funders, including the CCI, ICLEI, the Carbon Disclosure Project, Siemens, and the World Resources Institute, resulting in C40's expansion into a truly multi-stakeholder network. These partners and funders work with specific C40 networks, mayors and other urban leaders in order to develop strategies and deliver projects. Thus, the legitimacy of the C40 achieved through acting in concert goes beyond the initial decision of large cities to establish a network to facilitate the exchange of information and best practices; it is perpetuated through the way in which the C40 works on a daily basis to manage and deliver the projects it champions.

Indeed, the C40 facilitates the establishment of common positions both at the network level, and at the municipal level through the implementation of projects and best practices. The multiplicity of actors present in the implementation of local policies, all of whom are willing to case aside their differences in order to unite in pursuit of a common goal, serves to reinforce the legitimacy of the network. That the C40 is capable of enabling consensus at the local level, amongst various stakeholders, serves to bolster its claim as an effective and legitimate institution.

C40 sub-networks, and the cities that comprise them, connect with and receive support from partners through the development of procurement policies and funding alliances. The aim of these partnerships is ultimately to accelerate the adoption of sustainable technologies and to

influence markets. In this instance, numerous actors forge consensus around the notion that the adoption of green initiatives and the uptake of sustainable technologies is not only beneficial from an environmental perspective, but is also sound economics. Former President of the United States Bill Clinton shares this viewpoint, the pervasiveness of which is clear within the C40 network. In his address at the 2011 C40 Mayor's Summit in Sao Paulo, Brazil Clinton described C40s partnership with both the Clinton Climate Initiative and the World Bank as providing the C40 "a chance to actually finance things that by any rational analysis have always been good economics, but have never had a system to support them."<sup>125</sup> It is further reiterated in C40 publications, such as the 2013 report developed in partnership with the Carbon Disclosure Project entitled *Wealthier, Healthier Cities: How climate change action is giving us wealthier, healthier cities*.

Authority practised as consensus requires that techniques and tools be developed, through which agreement among actors may be continually established and thus secured. Perhaps the most immediately obvious example of this within C40 is the development and dissemination of best practices. Indeed, a key function of the C40 is to promote learning and information sharing in this way.<sup>126</sup> The Group carries out this role at workshops, summits, and through webinars, which connect cities with one another, allowing for the sharing of ideas, the discussion of concepts, and the development of common strategies with the ultimate goal of providing a targeted, urban response to climate change. Specifically, the C40 holds a biennial mayor's summit hosted by a member city, as well as an annual awards ceremony and conference – The City Climate Leadership Awards Ceremony and Conference – organized in partnership with Siemens. By

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<sup>125</sup> "About Us: The C40 Cities Climate Leadership Group," YouTube video, 5:15, posted by "C40CitiesLive," September 19, 2011. <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=db-shDF0YO8>.

<sup>126</sup> Boutleligier, *Cities, Networks, and Global Environmental Governance*, 92.

making collective statements at these events, by developing and releasing comprehensive reports, and by making official submissions to, for example, the United Nations, C40 makes public its jointly achieved notion of what constitutes good climate governance.

C40 has better arranged this exchange of best practices by establishing various issue-specific networks, each of which fits within one of seven broader initiative areas. A C40 city chairs each of the thirteen networks with support from designated C40 staff. These networks allow cities to collaborate to address specific problems and opportunities by establishing lines for ongoing communication and exchange, while providing access to integral resources such as research, expertise, and funding.<sup>127</sup> Operating according to the same logics as the C40 network in general, the highly-specialized sub-networks function through the establishment of a shared problem, the construction of consensus through the development of best practices for addressing the problem, and the reiteration of this consensus in ‘practical’ and highly visible terms through the publishing of reports and case studies.

The ability of networks to spur the establishment, sharing, and adoption of best practices concerning a specific urban issue related to climate change is well illustrated by the Connecting Delta Cities (CDC) network. Initiated in 2008 and chaired by the City of Rotterdam, Netherlands, CDC is a network within C40’s Water and Adaptation Initiative that unites the cities of Rotterdam, Tokyo, Jakarta, Hong Kong, New York, New Orleans, London, Ho Chi Minh City, Copenhagen, and Melbourne in order to “exchange knowledge on climate adaptation and share best practices that can support cities in developing their adaptation strategies.”<sup>128</sup> The

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<sup>127</sup> C40 Cities Climate Leadership Group.

<sup>128</sup> Connecting Delta Cities, Web site, <http://www.deltacities.com/>.

majority of the actions taken by the network involve efforts to facilitate knowledge exchange amongst CDC cities through meetings, conferences, and workshops that allow not only for the sharing of ideas and practices, but also for the establishment of both physical and ideological proximity among members. For example, in 2009 and 2010, CDC organized numerous expert workshops, participated in conferences, published a book, and financed a documentary entitled “Connecting Delta Cities.”<sup>129</sup>

Accordingly, the spatial relations that characterise authority as developed through consensus are not simply rooted in connection; instead, they involve the establishment of proximity, in this case, through the recognition of commonalities. In this case, sub-networks not only connect cities as members of a common group, but also place them in proximity of or alongside one another to achieve common and particular objectives. Thus, according to Bulkeley, “constituents become adjacent, so that, for example, officials in Melbourne can argue that they hold more ‘in common’ with London or New York than with other Australian cities.”<sup>130</sup>

When CDC connects its members through joint research projects based on similar climate-related problems and port-specific issues, it links cities locally at a policy level through Memorandums of Understanding and Letters of Intent. These activities mediate spatial relations by establishing proximity amongst the CDC cities so that, for example, Rotterdam plays a larger role in the development of New York City’s climate adaptation plan than do other American

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<sup>129</sup> Rotterdam Climate Initiative, *Connecting Delta Cities: Sharing Knowledge and Working on Adaptation to Climate Change*, <http://www.rotterdamclimateinitiative.nl/documents/RCP/English/CDC-Book-II.pdf> (accessed May 28, 2014).

<sup>130</sup> Bulkeley, “Governance and the geography of authority.”

cities. In a blog post written following a 2013 visit to New York<sup>131</sup>, Rotterdam's Climate Proof Programme Manager Arnoud Molenaar describes the relationships forged between Rotterdam and New York City as the New York Mayor's Office attempts to develop a climate adaptation plan in the aftermath of Hurricane Sandy. Summarizing a presentation he delivered at a symposium geared to inform the creation of the adaptation strategy, Molenaar makes evident the information-sharing role of CDC, and ultimately C40. When representatives share Rotterdam's experience in creating its own climate adaptation plan, best practices are exchanged, consensus around what constitutes good climate governance is reaffirmed, and the cities of New York and Rotterdam become adjacent.

### *Constructing concord*

Authority practised as concord fulfils a governmental purpose, arising when diverse actors and elements are assembled in such a way that others view them as given, natural, or taken for granted in terms of their authority to shape conduct.<sup>132</sup> Succinctly, authority “emerges as the result both of the strategic normalisation of particular discourses concerning, in this case, the climate problem, and of the mundane practices through which networks operate, and the artefacts which they put in place to hold networks together.”<sup>133</sup> Evaluating the functioning of C40 through this lens clarifies the manifold ways in which truth is produced and the field of possibilities shaped within a novel form of transnational climate governance.

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<sup>131</sup> Arnoud Molenaar, “New York business trip after Sandy,” Connecting Delta Cities (blog), *Connecting Delta Cities*, December 4, 2013, [http://www.deltacities.com/blog/new-york-business-trip-after-sandy,-blog-entry-by-arnoud-molenaar-?blog\\_id=2](http://www.deltacities.com/blog/new-york-business-trip-after-sandy,-blog-entry-by-arnoud-molenaar-?blog_id=2).

<sup>132</sup> Bulkeley, “Governance and the geography of authority,” 2349.

<sup>133</sup> *Ibid.*

As mentioned above, through the practise of authority as concord, power is put to a governmental purpose. But what does governmental signify in this case? According to Mitchell Dean, Foucault understands government as an attempt to respond to a particular problem facing a population, and in addressing the identified problem, to improve the condition of the population.<sup>134</sup> Foucault labels this instance, in which the question of ‘how to rule’ emerges and at which the conduct of conduct is directed, a problematization. For C40, the problematization of climate change is three-fold:

1. An incessant and worsening increase of greenhouse gas emissions on a global level, responsible at least in part for a collection of negative consequences broadly referred to as climate change, but apparent particularly in growing instances of volatile weather, an increase in climate extremes, glacier retreat, and sea level rise, among others;
2. A large amount of greenhouse gas production and other environmentally detrimental activity taking place in cities, especially the biggest megacities, coupled with an emerging understanding that these communities are particularly vulnerable; and
3. Years of discouragement and failure to reach agreement and deliver solutions at the national and international levels.

This particular problematization both characterizes the context within which Ken Livingstone initiated the C40 network, and sustains the role of the C40 within the international climate governance structure. The following statements from former Deputy Mayor of London Nicky Gavron and former C40 Chair and current President Michael Bloomberg illustrate this point:

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<sup>134</sup> Mitchell Dean, *Governmentality: Power and Rule in Modern Society*, 2<sup>nd</sup> ed (Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage Publications Ltd, 2010), 38.

“Leadership from national governments is crucial in tackling climate change, but when it comes to practical action on the ground cities are centre stage. Cities have a special responsibility to cut emissions because they are huge consumers of energy and uniquely vulnerable to the impacts of climate change.”<sup>135</sup>

“When it comes to confronting a challenge of this magnitude, nations have long talked about comprehensive approaches, but it has been up to cities to act. After all, cities are most directly responsible for our residents’ health and well-being.”<sup>136</sup>

Thus, the conduct of conduct operates through the mobilization and normalization of particular discourses regarding the nature of the policy problem, as well as specific rationalities that inform the response to the question of ‘how to rule.’ In examining C40 in depth, these discourses and rationalities become apparent.

Interestingly, and by virtue of its dual purpose, C40 seems to mobilize two separate discourses as it engages as a network along political and technical tracts.<sup>137</sup> On one hand, C40 has defined itself as an alternative to the stagnant global climate change process, capable of working at the highly technical city level in order to bypass the rhetoric of national action plans and international negotiations, and generate measureable results. In fact, as suggested by Acuto, “the city versus the international phrase has almost achieved a state of truism in the C40 internal workings.”<sup>138</sup> However, as an assemblage seeking global legitimacy (as well as funding), C40 translates its objectives, capacities, and accomplishments – often through Communiqués issued to the UN or participation at annual CoP meetings – into the language and rhetoric of the same global process from which it seeks to distinguish itself. At once, the C40 seeks to establish itself

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<sup>135</sup> Acuto, *Global Cities, Governance and Diplomacy*, 100.

<sup>136</sup> Jonathan Andrews, “Interview: Michael Bloomberg, outgoing Chair and current President C40 Cities,” *Cities Today*, February 18, 2014, <http://cities-today.com/2014/02/interview-michael-bloomberg-outgoing-chair-current-president-board-c40-cities/> (accessed May 29, 2014).

<sup>137</sup> Acuto, *Global Cities, Governance and Diplomacy*, 109-112.

<sup>138</sup> *Ibid*, 110.

as an important and justifiable alternative to the deteriorating and state-centric international climate scheme, while solidifying the importance of such a structure through its constant recognition as legitimate and essential. The technical and political functions of the network parallel this dichotomy, in that the C40 must “mediate continuously between its need to depoliticise climate change policymaking (to acquire room for manoeuvre) and its need to speak the language of international affairs.”<sup>139</sup> Simply put, the C40 has done just enough to distinguish itself from the ailing global climate process, while making sure to maintain close enough proximity to ensure its legitimacy.

Accordingly, the C40 generally perpetuates a traditional understanding of how climate change ought to be governed, best articulated as a “model of liberal environmentalism [in which] ecological preservation is intertwined with the ongoing pursuit of economic growth as well as an underlying faith in sustainability primarily achieved through technological innovation.”<sup>140</sup> As highlighted by Bouteligier, C40 favours a neoliberal environmentalist approach, dominated by market-based logics and an emphasis on the importance of partnerships with private actors.<sup>141</sup> Likewise, Acuto notes, “C40’s PPPs approach and its common gain mentality accepts the pre-existence of global political-economic structures and is disposed to align to private interests.”<sup>142</sup> The compendium of measurement practices favoured by C40 rooted in the belief that ‘if you can’t measure it, you can’t manage it,’ as well the deeply institutionalized alliance with the Clinton Climate Initiative, reinforce these rationalities.

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<sup>139</sup> Ibid, 123.

<sup>140</sup> Gordon, “Between local innovation and global impact,” 296.

<sup>141</sup> Bouteligier, *Cities, Networks and Global Environmental Governance*, 99.

<sup>142</sup> Acuto, *Global Cities, Governance and Diplomacy*, 135.

In addition, the practise of authority as concord is apparent in the everyday practices through which the C40 network operates, including the tools and techniques that the C40 leadership employs in order to sustain it. According to Bulkeley, “the relatively mundane nature of much of the work of concord means that it can also be considered as routine, receiving little explicit attention and regarded as just what networks do.”<sup>143</sup> Thus, recognition is habitual when authority as concord is at work; the C40 gains and maintains a position of authority by achieving a level of ‘taken for granted-ness,’ as a part of the greater structure through which climate change ought to be governed. While the holding of workshops for the sharing of best practices, the facilitation of procurement alliances between cities and outside funders such as the World Bank, and the encouragement of annual reporting through the network’s partnership with the CDP are seen as relatively routine practices key to the operation of the network, they also represent mundane instances in which rationalities are maintained, the authority of the network is perpetuated, and the conduct of conduct is ultimately achieved. When viewed through a governmentality lens, what can easily be overlooked as entirely neutral practices become venues for norm contestation. As Bulkeley posits, the “transfer of policy techniques and lessons,” as is encouraged through the establishment of networks and workshops to share best practices, “is not a simple matter of exchange of knowledge or information, but, rather, is deeply entangled with competing governmental rationalities about the nature of the policy problem and the legitimate means through which it should be addressed.”<sup>144</sup>

Compliance in such cases is achieved by creating what Foucault refers to as self-governing subjects. Articulated by Bulkeley, “compliance works through creating...’normal’ expectations

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<sup>143</sup> Bulkeley, “Governance and the geography of authority,” 2440.

<sup>144</sup> Bulkeley, “Governance and the geography of authority.”

[and] actions.”<sup>145</sup> For example, if a city wishes to be ‘wealthier and healthier,’ it is thus important that it adopt certain programs and act in a certain way. The following remarks made by Michael Bloomberg regarding C40’s role in the dissemination of best practices exemplify processes of compliance at work: “We do not prescribe what a city should do. The C40 works to empower cities to connect with each other and share technical expertise on best practices.”<sup>146</sup> By labelling a practice as ‘best,’ it is implied that other ways of dealing with a particular problem are therefore ‘worse.’ Thus, value is attributed to certain practices over others, which contributes to their normalization, therefore influencing self-governing actors’ desire to adopt them. In adopting such practices, cities also accept the more fundamental rationalities upon which the C40 premises its structure and mode of operation. Ultimately, discourses are solidified as legitimate, and the network’s authority is perpetuated.

The spatial relations that characterize the working of authority as concord are those of presence. This can be illustrated in two ways: first, through the network’s relationships with constituent members specifically, and second through the network’s association with the global climate structure more generally. As Bulkeley states, presence is exerted when the network “operat[es] as a backdrop for the activities of others.”<sup>147</sup> By establishing a variety of focused networks under a series of broader initiative areas, C40 establishes itself as an integral aspect of the structure through which relations among cities are forged, and best practices are shared. This allows the C40 to “broker relations between their constituents in such a manner as to become taken for granted as a part of the way in which governing climate change is accomplished.”<sup>148</sup>

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<sup>145</sup> Ibid, 2440.

<sup>146</sup> Andrews, “Interview: Michael Bloomberg, outgoing Chair and current President C40 Cities.”

<sup>147</sup> Bulkeley, “Governance and the geography of authority,” 2440.

<sup>148</sup> Ibid.

In addition, the annual reports compiled by the C40, the press releases and media statements showcased on the C40 website, the frequent submissions made to the UN, the highly publicized mayor's summit held biennially, and the yearly awards ceremony organized collaboratively with Siemens, are all examples of an attempt to establish presence within the global climate change structure. Such activities represent the adoption of traditional tactics (press conferences, reports, summits) with the intention of solidifying firmly the place of the network within the conventional international climate scheme.

## Concluding Remarks

In *Climate Change 2014: Mitigation of Climate Change*, the third and final contribution to its Fifth Assessment Report, the International Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) contends that in order to keep warming levels below the 2°C target, GHG emissions in 2050 will have to be 40 to 70 percent lower than they were in 2010.<sup>149</sup> In the same document, the Panel notes that emissions have grown by an unprecedented 2.2 percent per year over the past decade.<sup>150</sup> Presented in April 2014 – nearly twenty years after the signing of the Kyoto Protocol, and five years following the drafting of the Copenhagen Accord – the harshness of these figures only fortifies the narrative of inaction and looming devastation that depicts conventional attempts to combat climate change globally, and to which networks such as the C40 seek to develop a response.

The central ideas expounded upon in this paper grew out of a general premise regarding the governance of climate change within the context highlighted above. This premise contends that attempts to combat climate change globally have: (1) largely been a failure, and that (2) not all of its configurations – much to the detriment of policy – are taken seriously or given adequate attention, both theoretically and practically. Taking this as a starting point, this paper has outlined emerging trends in global climate governance, eventually honing in on transnational municipal networks, and focusing on the C40 Climate Leadership Group in particular. However, at the core of this paper conceptually is a belief that an understanding of governance processes necessitates an engagement with the nature and operation of power, and that theories of power must break traditional associations with sovereignty, territory, and rule of law. Thus, in studying the C40 in depth, – and in so doing, revealing the manifold ways in which governance is

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<sup>149</sup> International Panel on Climate Change, *Climate Change 2014: Mitigation of Climate Change*, Working Group III Contribution to the IPCC 5<sup>th</sup> Assessment Report, <http://www.ipcc.ch/report/ar5/wg3> (accessed July 20, 2014).

<sup>150</sup> Ibid.

accomplished within a transnational municipal network – this paper illuminates the various avenues through which authority, as a form of power, is constituted, deployed, and perpetuated. A consideration of these processes of authorization is integral if one is to understand fully *how* governance occurs beyond the inter-state regime. Moreover, if this form of governance is truly indicative of a legitimate and effective alternative to stalled national and international responses, as it claims to be, it is imperative that we continue to engage in such analyses, both academically and within the context of public and international policy. Taking these steps will facilitate the successful integration of novel forms of governance into the global climate structure, while helping more traditional sources of authority (such as national governments) to involve marginalised or less conventional actors in policy solutions. With the highly anticipated and momentous 2015 United Nations Climate Change Conference (CoP 21) fast approaching, the overarching objective of which is to establish a legally binding and universally applicable climate agreement, it is crucial that those involved keep in mind analyses such as this.

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## Appendix I: C40 Membership (as of June 2014)

Region	City	Country	Membership Type
Africa	Addis Ababa	Ethiopia	Megacity
	Cairo	Egypt	Megacity
	Cape Town	South Africa	Observer City
	Dar es Salaam	Tanzania	Observer City
	<b>Johannesburg</b>	<b>South Africa</b>	<b>Steering Committee</b>
	Lagos	Nigeria	Megacity
	Nairobi	Kenya	Observer City
East Asia	Beijing	China	Observer City
	Changwon	Republic of Korea	Innovator City
	<b>Hong Kong</b>	<b>China</b>	<b>Steering Committee</b>
	<b>Seoul</b>	<b>Republic of Korea</b>	<b>Steering Committee</b>
	Shanghai	China	Observer City
	Shenzhen	China	Megacity
	<b>Tokyo</b>	<b>Japan</b>	<b>Steering Committee</b>
	Wuhan	China	Observer City
Yokohama	Japan	Megacity	
Europe	Amsterdam	The Netherlands	Innovator City
	Athens	Greece	Megacity
	Barcelona	Spain	Innovator City
	Basel	Switzerland	Innovator City
	<b>Berlin</b>	<b>Germany</b>	<b>Steering Committee</b>
	<b>Copenhagen</b>	<b>Denmark</b>	<b>Steering Committee</b>
	Heidelberg	Germany	Innovator City
	Istanbul	Turkey	Megacity
	<b>London</b>	<b>United Kingdom</b>	<b>Steering Committee</b>
	Madrid	Spain	Megacity
	Milan	Italy	Innovator City
	Moscow	Russia	Megacity
	Oslo	Norway	Innovator City
	Paris	France	Megacity
	Rome	Italy	Megacity
	Rotterdam	The Netherlands	Innovator City
Stockholm	Sweden	Innovator City	
Venice	Italy	Innovator City	
Warsaw	Poland	Megacity	
Latin America	Bogotá	Colombia	Megacity
	<b>Buenos Aires</b>	<b>Argentina</b>	<b>Steering Committee</b>
	Caracas	Venezuela	Megacity
	Curitiba	Brazil	Innovator City
	Lima	Peru	Megacity
	Mexico City	Mexico	Megacity
	<b>Rio de Janeiro</b>	<b>Brazil</b>	<b>Steering Committee</b>
	Santiago	Chile	Innovator City
Sao Paulo	Brazil	Megacity	
North America	Austin	United States	Innovator City
	Boston	United States	Megacity
	Chicago	United States	Megacity
	Houston	United States	Steering Committee

## C40 Membership continued

Region	City	Country	Membership Type
<b>North America</b>	<b>Los Angeles</b>	<b>United States</b>	<b>Steering Committee</b>
	New Orleans	United States	Innovator City
	New York	United States	Megacity
	Philadelphia	United States	Megacity
	Portland	United States	Innovator City
	San Francisco	United States	Innovator City
	Seattle	United States	Innovator City
	Toronto	Canada	Megacity
	Vancouver	Canada	Innovator City
Washington D.C.	United States	Megacity	
<b>South &amp; West Asia</b>	Delhi NCT	India	Megacity
	Dhaka	Bangladesh	Megacity
	Karachi	Pakistan	Megacity
	Mumbai	India	Megacity
<b>Southeast Asia &amp; Oceania</b>	Bangkok	Thailand	Megacity
	Hanoi	Vietnam	Megacity
	Ho Chi Minh City	Vietnam	Megacity
	<b>Jakarta</b>	<b>Indonesia</b>	<b>Steering Committee</b>
	Melbourne	Australia	Megacity
	Singapore	Singapore	Observer City
Sydney	Australia	Megacity	

Source: C40.org/cities