

Increasing Military Presence in Mexico: Felipe Calderon's Gamble on Citizen Security

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Introduction

Introducing the Drug Conflict in Mexico

Mexico has been battling with drug trafficking activities since the early 20th century. During this period, law enforcement began prohibiting the production, distribution and consumption of hallucinogenic and psychotropic substances within the country.¹ As the years passed, Mexican criminal groups began specializing in the production of cannabis within state boundaries and trafficking to the United States, where the market for drugs was increasing faster than any other country in the world.

By the 1980's Mexican criminal groups expanded their operations by transporting cocaine into the United States for the Columbian drug cartels in exchange for their own supply of cocaine.² With skyrocketing earnings, and ever increasing demand, these criminal groups slowly came to symbolize drug trafficking organizations (DTOs), described by the U.S. Justice System as “complex organizations with highly defined command-and-control structures that produce, transport, and/or distribute large quantities of one or more illicit drugs”.³ Up until 2006, it was widely believed that there were four main DTOs that controlled the drug trade in Mexico; however, it is widely speculated that as many as 20 key DTOs may presently exist.⁴

The expansion of DTOs in Mexico is believed to be related to fragmentation that has occurred within the ranks of these largest organizations. One of the facilitators of this fragmentation has been the change in government ruling parties and security policies over the

¹Astorga, Luis and David A. Shirk., “Drug Trafficking Organizations and Counter-Drug Strategies in the U.S.-Mexican Context”, Center for U.S.-Mexican Studies (San Diego), the Mexico Institute of the Woodrow Wilson Center (Washington DC), El Colegio de la Frontera Norte (Tijuana), and El Colegio de Mexico (Mexico City), January 2010, pp. 4, <http://www.escholarship.org/uc/item/8j647429>

²Beittel, June S., “Mexico’s Drug Trafficking Organizations: Source and Scope of the Violence”, Congressional Research Service, pp.8.,www.fas.org/sgp/crs/row/R41576.pdf

³ U.S. Department of Justice, “Drug Trafficking Organizations”, National Drug Intelligence Center – National Drug Assessment Threat 2010, February 2010, <http://www.justice.gov/archive/ndic/pubs38/38661/dtos.htm>

⁴Beittel, June S., pp.9-10.

last decade. The Institutional Revolution Party (PRI), which presided over the Mexican government from 1929-2000, was widely speculated to have “established strong ties with many drug cartels, allowing them unhindered territorial control as long as they kept the violence to a tolerable level”.⁵ This agreement between government and DTOs was solidified through “substantial payoff to government officials”, which then produced a “substantial trickle-down effect, creating a blanket of impunity that offered considerable protections to those organized crime groups that could afford it”.⁶

However, as the violence from Mexican DTOs increased, it became increasingly clear that the government needed to regulate and assert its control over the state through supplemental policing initiatives. Due to the widespread corruption within the Mexican police force, the government would eventually choose to implement a strategy that would see the Mexican military monitor and control domestic matters relating to the DTOs. Although initiated in the early 2000s, this strategy came into broad implementation when Felipe Calderon, representing the National Action Party (PAN), was elected president in 2006. One of the first executive orders from President Calderon was to substantially increase the military presence in Mexico, anticipating that the strengthened force would penetrate and neutralize areas overrun by DTOs. This initiative did not produce the desired results, as the confrontation with DTOs created a vast increase in violence within Mexico. Prior to the introduction of the augmented military force, the criminal organizations resorted to violence to “protect and promote their market share”, and fight over “strategic routes and warehouses where drugs are consolidated” to ultimately raise their power and influence within the state.⁷ However in addition to fighting each other, the DTOs have

⁵Pedigo, David., “The Drug War and State Failure in Mexico”, Beloit College, pg.114., <http://research.monm.edu/mjur/files/2012/2012-7.pdf>

⁶Astorga, Luis and David A. Shirk., pp 8.

⁷Beittel, June S., pp.8.

now become engaged in a perpetual war with military forces, while Mexican citizens are forced to endure the brunt of the conflict.

Impacts of Increased Military Presence in Mexico

The strategy to increase the Mexican military's presence has produced a variety of different impacts for Mexico. This paper will analyze whether the decision of President Calderon to fight off the Mexican DTOs by increasing the military presence within Mexico was prudent decision-making or imprudent use of executive powers. This will be determined by whether the 'desired' impacts of the increased military presence outweigh the 'undesired' impacts to citizen security. The desired impacts are defined as those in which the Mexican Government was hoping to achieve for the betterment of the state; while the 'undesired' impacts are unintended consequences of the drug war. For the purposes of this paper, the desired impacts will include the dissolution of the Mexican DTOs, reduction of drug-related violence and reduction of drug trafficking; while the 'undesired' impacts include the deteriorating citizen security, and increasing DTO influence in Mexico. This paper will argue that using an enforcement strategy, such as increasing the military presence in Mexico to fight off the Mexican DTOs, is misguided and has resulted in grave contradictory effects to citizen security. This paper will also demonstrate that the desired impacts have either not been met or have failed to prevail over the undesired impacts, thus making the Mexican Government use of increased military as a policy instrument to remove the DTOs unacceptable.

The first section will begin by introducing the different Mexican DTOs that have and currently exist in Mexico, while the second section will introduce and clarify the military's expanded role in fighting the Mexican DTOs. The third section will analyze and assess the different desired and undesired impacts that have affected the Mexican state since the introduction of the greater military presence, while the fourth section will specify possible issues

with Calderon's strategy, and will reveal possible alternative steps needed for the Mexican government to pursue in the drug war.

Section 1 – Mexican Drug Trafficking Organizations

Origins of the Drug Trafficking Organizations in Mexico

Many security analysts, such as Sylvia Longmire, consider the Guadalajara cartel to be the first legitimate DTO to exist in Mexico.⁸ Led by Miguel Angel Felix Gallardo or 'El Padrino', the former police officer morphed the Guadalajara cartel into the largest DTO during the 1980s because of an agreement to secure and mule large amounts of marijuana, cocaine and heroin through Mexico and into the United States for the Colombian Cartels.⁹ This agreement increased the profits and established a reliable source of fresh and modern drugs for the DTO, as 50% of the payment was prearranged to be delivered as cocaine instead of cash.¹⁰ The Guadalajara Cartel continued to expand its operations to different 'plazas' (drug trafficking routes) in Mexico, located in areas such as Baja California, Sonora, Chihuahua and Tamaulipas. The power and influence of the Guadalajara Cartel continued to grow until the late 1980s when 'El Padrino', along with co-founders Ernesto Carrillo and Rafael Quintero, were arrested by Mexican authorities in 1989 on charges of murder, drug trafficking and bribery of state officials.¹¹ Following their incarceration, the most lucrative plazas were divided among trusted associates of the DTO. The Arellano Felix family would gain control of the Tijuana plaza, while the Carrillo Fuentes family and the Quintero family would inherit the Juarez and Sonora plazas;

⁸ Longmire, Sylvia. "Cartel", Palgrave MacMillan Publishing, New York, 2011, pp.13.

⁹ Longmire, Sylvia. "Cartel", Palgrave MacMillan Publishing, New York, 2011, pp.14.

¹⁰ Keefe, Patrick., "Cocaine Incorporated", New York Times, June 2012, <http://www.nytimes.com/2012/06/17/magazine/how-a-mexican-drug-cartel-makes-its-billions.html?pagewanted=all& r=0>

¹¹ Keefe, Patrick. 2012.

lieutenants such as Joaquin ‘El Chapo’ Guzman and Juan García Abrego would become heirs to the Sinaloa and Tamaulipas plazas.¹²

Up until the early 1990s, the five Mexican DTOs would co-exist in relative peace. During these years, it was common for arrangements to be made amongst the DTOs to either split profits from shared plazas or introduce ceasefires to bring down the level of violence in an effort to avoid the involvement of authorities.¹³ However by the mid to late 1990s, rivalries amongst the DTOs began to develop as the value of drug trafficking routes continued to ascend. Moreover, with the detainment of the leader of the Sinaloa DTO ‘El Chapo’ Guzman in 1993 and the death of the leader of the Juarez DTO Amado Carrillo Fuentes in 1997, violence amongst the DTOs erupted. These two occurrences created a large void in power, and the weakness in leadership coaxed both the Gulf and Tijuana DTOs to expand their control of drug trafficking routes in Mexico.¹⁴ The initiation of the drug trafficking turf wars in Mexico led to a large increase in violence within the late 1990s and early 2000s. This was further perpetuated by election of the National Action Party (PAN) in 2000, as public officials were no longer “able to ensure the impunity of drug traffickers to the same degree and to regulate competition among Mexican DTOs for drug trafficking routes, or *plazas*.”¹⁵

At the beginning of the 21st century, the Mexican DTOs were fully engaged in a strategy to expand their operations into plazas owned by rival DTOs to increase their wealth and power in the drug industry. The Sinaloa DTO in particular would expand their drug trafficking operations to include shipments from air, land and sea after DTO leader ‘El Chapo’ escaped from a Juarez

¹² Longmire, pp.16.

¹³ Longmire, pp.16.

¹⁴ Longmire, pp.16.

¹⁵Beittel, June S., pp.7.

prison in 2001.¹⁶ With increasing profits, the Sinaloa DTO slowly encroached on territory owned by the Gulf and Tijuana DTOs, which compelled the two DTOs to form an alliance of survival. To ensure their continued existence, the Gulf DTO was able to attract the services of 100-200 Mexican military officers comprised of ‘elite airborne special force members’ as assassins (later known as Los Zetas), to hunt down key Sinaloa DTO leaders.¹⁷ In response the Sinaloa DTO allied itself with the Juarez and emergent Beltrán-Leyva DTO to form ‘The Federation’, which together would control all west coast operations in Mexico until 2008. After the election of Felipe Calderon, and the deployment of thousands of military units within Mexico in late-2006, fragmentation amongst the DTOs began to spread. First the Beltrán-Leyva DTO would disband from ‘The Federation’ in 2008, while the La Familia Michoacán and Los Zetas would grow too large and ambitious, and breakaway from the Gulf DTO in 2010.



Figure 1 - Map of DTO Areas of Dominant Influence in Mexico by DEA¹⁸

¹⁶ Guerrero-Gutiérrez, Eduardo, “Security, Drugs and Violence in Mexico: A Survey”, 7th North American Forum Washington DC, 2011, pg.31., [http://iis-db.stanford.edu/evnts/6716/NAF_2011_EG_\(Final\).pdf](http://iis-db.stanford.edu/evnts/6716/NAF_2011_EG_(Final).pdf)

¹⁷ Grayson, George. “Los Zetas: Ruthless Army Spawned By A Mexican Drug Cartel”, Foreign Policy Research Institute, May 2008, <http://www.fpri.org/enotes/200805.grayson.loszetas.html>

¹⁸ Beittel, June S., pp.14. From: Drug Enforcement Agency, 2012.

Within the last couple of years, greater fragmentation has taken place amongst the different DTOs, but the Sinaloa, Zetas, Gulf, Tijuana, Juarez, Beltrán-Leyva and La Familia Michoacán organizations have remained the most influential drug trafficking syndicates of the 21st century.

Classifying the DTOs in Mexico

According to Eduardo Guerrero-Gutiérrez, a policy analyst from the University of Chicago, each DTO falls under a typology that explains the role they currently encompass within the drug trafficking realm. The typology defines the DTOs as: national cartels, ‘toll-collector’ cartels, regional cartels and local organizations. The Sinaloa and Zetas, and to a lesser extent the Gulf DTOs, have been classified as national cartels by Gutierrez, mainly because:

“The cartels control or maintain presence along routes of several drugs. They also operate important international routes to and from Mexico. These cartels keep control of drug points of entry and exit in the country. However, they are interested in expanding their control towards new points of exit along the northern border, and this is why the currently sustain disputes with other cartels to control these border localities. These DTOs have presence in broad areas of the country and have sought to increase their profits they receive from drug trafficking through diversifying their illegal activities towards human smuggling, and oil and fuel theft.”¹⁹

The Tijuana and Juarez DTOs have been classified as ‘Toll-Collector’ DTOs because:

“These are the cartels whose main income comes from toll fees received from the cartels that cross drug shipments through their controlled municipalities along the northern border. They receive smaller proportion of profits from drug trading compared with the cartels. Given that these cartels are largely confined into some border municipalities, they cannot diversify their illegal activities as the national cartels. If these cartels eventually lose control of their respective border areas they will either intensify their diversification efforts to other business (such as extortion or kidnapping) or they will disappear.”²⁰

The La Familia Michoacán and Beltrán-Leyva DTOs have been classified as the regional cartels because “these DTOs keep limited control over segments of drug trafficking routes that pass

¹⁹ Guerrero-Gutiérrez, Eduardo, pg.28.

²⁰ Guerrero-Gutiérrez, pg.28.

along their territory. Like the toll collectors, the regional cartels play a secondary role in the drug trading business and receive small profits from it and have limited capabilities to diversify.”²¹

The remaining DTOs which represent the remnants of cells that separated from larger DTOs are classified as ‘Local Organizations’. These drug syndicates work to control drug trafficking activities within different municipalities but are constantly in war with other DTOs for control of operations within different municipalities. DTOs within this classification include: La Resistance, Jalisco Cartel-Nueva Generacion, Cartel del Charro, La Empresa, Cartel Independiente de Acapulco, etc.²²




Figure 2 - Drug Trafficking Routes in Mexico²³

Section 2 – Proliferation of Military in Mexico

The Issue with the Mexican Police Forces

During an interview with the New York Times, President Calderon articulated the neutralization of DTOs and the cleansing and strengthening of security institutions as the two

²¹ Guerrero-Gutiérrez, pg.28.

²² Guerrero-Gutiérrez, pg.28.

²³ The Economist, “Mexican Drug War: Waves of Violence”, November 2012, <http://www.economist.com/blogs/graphicdetail/2012/11/mexican-drug-war>

more pressing initiatives needed by the government to decrease the level of violence and increase the level of security in Mexico. Specifically, Calderon indicated that the weakness of municipal and state institutions, as well as the level of corruption within the police forces at all levels made it difficult for the Mexican government to develop a reliable anti-crime approach.²⁴ Despite being trained for public security assignments, which involves “interacting with community members, gathering evidence, and supporting prosecutors”, the Mexican Police Force does not possess the training or capacity to rival the power and muscle of the DTOs.²⁵ As policy analyst Robert Leiken points out, the police forces “represent a disparate collection of individual institutions rather than a cohesive national force. Their decentralized structure means less coordination, fewer resources, and smaller unit size”.²⁶ As of 2010 there were a total of 2,139 independent police agencies in Mexico, of which nearly 480,000 were composed of state and municipal officers.²⁷

The diminutive budget assigned to these institutions also leaves the police forces lacking the vital equipment necessary to sufficiently battle the DTOs. Modern assault rifles, bulletproof vests and night vision goggles are too expensive for the police departments to procure, so the local and state policemen are forced to utilize their outdated handguns to combat DTO members wielding fully-automatic assault rifles such as AK-47’s, whose rate of fire is 600 rounds/min.²⁸ As one police officer asserted, “by the time we are able to get one shot off, the DTO members have the ability to massacre us”.²⁹ This disparity in capacity has discouraged law enforcement from challenging DTO members, and the level of violence has even forced police officers to

²⁴ New York Times, “The Complete Interview With President Felipe Calderón in Spanish (La Entrevista Completa en Español)”, October 2011, <http://www.nytimes.com/2011/10/24/world/americas/calderon-transcript-in-spanish.html?pagewanted=all&r=0>

²⁵ Leiken, Robert., “Mexico’s Drug War”, Centre for the National Interest, July 2012, pg.16., http://www.cftni.org/42460_CNI_web.pdf

²⁶ Leiken, pg.16.

²⁷ Guerrero-Gutiérrez, pg.20.

²⁸ Leiken, pg.16.

²⁹ Leiken, pg.16.

relinquish their command and renounce their positions. One such example occurred in the small town of Ascension in northern Chihuahua, where the entire local law enforcement team resigned after DTO members targeted and killed the police chief and five officers in a three month period.³⁰

Another byproduct of the DTOs power is the vast shadow of corruption held over the police forces. Mexico's Secretary of Public Security, Genaro Garcia Luna emphasized that the local law enforcement was a major hindrance to the Mexican government's security initiative against the DTOs, and made it clear that local law enforcement strategy had been abandoned due to the lack of trust in the policing institution.³¹ One major incentive for corruption is the low wages earned by the local law enforcement, as policemen on average earn approximately \$350 USD per month. This compels local officers to collaborate with DTOs members operating within their area and gives them the ability to earn nearly \$5,000 MXN (\$400 USD) per day for every operation they leverage.³² It is estimated that nearly \$100 million USD is exchanged through bribes to Mexican police forces and public officials,³³ and it is this display of power and influence that has led to the large desertion of police officers to pursue more lucrative earnings working in conjunction with the DTOs.

The Military's Role in the Mexican Drug War

Due to the unreliability of the policing institutions, Felipe Calderon settled on augmenting the military's presence in Mexico to implement the governments' national security

³⁰ The Guardian, "Mexico town's entire police force quits after officers gunned down", Guardian News, August 2011, <http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2011/aug/05/mexico-town-police-force-quits>

³¹ Kurtz-Phelan, Daniel. "The Long War of Genaro García Luna", New York Times, July 2008, <http://www.nytimes.com/2008/07/13/magazine/13officer-t.html?pagewanted=all&r=1&>

³² The Economist (b), "Organised Crime in Mexico: Under the Volcano", The Economist, October 2010, <http://www.economist.com/node/17249102>

³³ Leiken, pg.17.

strategy of neutralizing the DTOs presence within Mexico.³⁴ The advantages of using the military are evident, as the institution is the only law enforcement agency that can match the DTOs in size, power and sheer fighting force. Composed of two separate institutions, the Mexican military has the ability to coordinate its efforts due to the centralization of its command structures.³⁵ Moreover, the arduous training regimens and warfare-ready equipment available to the Army, Air Force and Marine institutions gives military officers the ability to develop and enforce plans of assault, with the capability to counter and impede DTO operations within Mexico.³⁶ During the first two years of President Calderon's administration, 50,000 to 60,000 new military troops were assigned to anti-drug trafficking tasks. This represented a 133% increase in military presence in Mexico from Vicente Fox's tenure (2000 to 2005);³⁷ at its height, the Mexican military forces deployed in Mexico to fight the DTOs neared 100,000 officers.³⁸ The escalating use of the military increased the overall number of military forces from over 194,000 in 2006 to 206,000 in 2011, which increased Mexico's defense expenditures from \$37 million USD in 2006 to \$74 million USD in 2011.³⁹

Adopting a similar approach used in Colombia to fight off the Cali and Medellín drug cartels⁴⁰, these additional troops were tasked by President Calderon to enter most troubled areas in Mexico, identified as Chihuahua, Michoacán, Veracruz, Nuevo León, Baja California, Guerrero and Tabasco, and eliminate the financial and hierarchical structure of the DTOs by “eradicating illicit crops, gathering intelligence, interrogating suspects, conducting raids and

³⁴ Moyano, Inigo Guevara., “Adapting, Transforming and Modernizing Under Fire: The Mexican Military 2006-2011”, Strategic Studies Institute, U.S. Army War College, pg.2., http://www.seguridadcondemocracia.org/administrador_de_carpetas/novedades_editoriales/pdf/Mexican_Army_ISS.pdf

³⁵ Leiken, pg.10.

³⁶ Leiken, pg.10.

³⁷ Camp, Roderic. “Armed Forces and Drugs: Public Perceptions and Institutional Challenges”, Wilson Center, 2010, pg.292., <http://www.wilsoncenter.org/sites/default/files/Chapter%2010-Armed%20Forces%20and%20Drugs,%20Public%20Perceptions%20and%20Institutional%20Challeges.pdf>

³⁸ Beittel, pg.4.

³⁹ Moyano, pg.4.

⁴⁰ Leiken, pg.10.

confiscating contraband.”⁴¹ Over the course of President Calderon’s tenure, these types of military deployments became customary with relative success. The Michoacán military-directed operation for instance, which took place from August 2009 to July 2010, led to: “the arrest of 419 people, and the recovery of 249 vehicles, 286 firearms, 577 magazines, 30, 907 rounds of ammunition, 48 grenades, over \$1 million pesos and nearly \$310,000 U.S.”⁴² The public news release of these operations has contributed to the positive public perception of the military’s role in the Mexican drug war. When Mexican citizens were asked in November 2011 of their confidence in the Mexican Army, Navy, Federal, State and Municipal Police institutions, 42% of respondents indicated they were very confident in both the Mexican Army and Navy to combat the DTOs, while only 14%, 7% and 5% indicated they were confident in the Federal, State and Municipal Police institutions to combat the DTOs.⁴³

Section 3 – Impacts of Mexican Militarization

Desired Impacts

Dissolution of Mexican DTOs

One of the main objectives of President Calderon’s strategy to substantially increase the military presence in Mexico was to engage the DTOs with a force that would overwhelm them into eventual decline, submission and defeat over time. Many security experts agreed with this approach, as one expert illustrated the situation as “the Mexican military trying to break down powerful drug cartels into smaller and more manageable drug gangs, like breaking down

⁴¹ Meyer, Maureen, “At a Crossroads: Drug Trafficking, Violence and the Mexican State”, Washington Office on Latin America (WOLA), Briefing Paper 13, November 2007, pp.6.

⁴² Secretaría de Seguridad Pública, “Cuarto Informe de Labores”, Bicentenario Independencia, Mexico 2010, pg.16., <http://www.ssp.gob.mx/portalWebApp/ShowBinary?nodeId=/BEA%20Repository/1152052//archivo>

⁴³ Buendía y Laredo (b), pg.7.

boulders into pebbles...It might be bloody, it might be ugly, but it has to be done."⁴⁴ The success of President Calderon's strategy to disband and eliminate the Mexican DTOs will be assessed through two different approaches. The first method will assess the Mexican government's attempts to target and eliminate the DTO leadership, while the second method will assess the presence and growth of Mexican DTOs throughout Mexico over time.

Targeting of DTO leadership

Despite clarifying that one of the key components to its strategy was to hunt the leaders of the Mexican DTOs, the Mexican Government did not actively pursue this approach until the election of President Calderon. According to President Calderon, it was up to the government to confront and destabilize the DTOs operating in Mexico and to do this, it was necessary to capture the leaders of the criminal groups by any means necessary.⁴⁵ Little information is available regarding the success of the Mexican Government's operations prior to 2009; however, in March 2009, the Mexican Attorney General's Office of Mexico (Procuradaria General De La Republica - PGR) issued a public warrant and announced that the government would "reward person or persons who provide relevant and useful information for the effective whereabouts and arrest of the persons listed".⁴⁶ The government offered \$30 million MXN to individuals with knowledge of the whereabouts to key Mexican DTO leaders and lieutenants, while \$15 million MXN was offered for commanders of influence within the Mexican DTOs.⁴⁷ Despite just releasing this list in March 2009, the Mexican government has had relative success in identifying and either capturing or eliminating several of the 37 individuals listed in Annex A.

⁴⁴Luhnhow, David and Jose De Cordoba, "The Perilous State of Mexico", The Washington Street Journal, February 2009, <http://online.wsj.com/article/SB123518102536038463.html>

⁴⁵New York Times, "The Complete Interview With President Felipe Calderón in Spanish (La Entrevista Completa en Español)", October 2011, http://www.nytimes.com/2011/10/24/world/americas/calderon-transcript-in-spanish.html?pagewanted=all&_r=0

⁴⁶Dirección General De Compilación Y Consulta Del Orden Jurídico Nacional, "Procuraduria General De La Republica : Agreement A/123/09", Gobierno De Mexico, Secretaría de Gobernación, 23 de marzo de 2009, pp.1. [http://ordenjuridicodemo.segob.gob.mx/Federal/PE/PGR/Acuerdos/2009/23032009\(1\).pdf](http://ordenjuridicodemo.segob.gob.mx/Federal/PE/PGR/Acuerdos/2009/23032009(1).pdf)

⁴⁷Dirección General De Compilación Y Consulta Del Orden Jurídico Nacional, pp.1-3.

For instance beginning on December 2009, Arturo Beltrán Leyva (alias ‘El Barbas’), the supposed creator of the Beltrán Leyva DTO, was gunned down during a raid by Mexican marines.⁴⁸ On July 2010, the military was able to track down and kill Ignacio Coronel Villarreal (alias ‘El Nacho’), who was believed to be in charge of operations in central Mexico as the Sinaloa DTOs 3rd in command.⁴⁹ On November 2010, Antonio Ezequiél Cárdenas Guillén (alias ‘Tony Tormenta’), who had emerged as one of the top leaders of the Gulf DTOs, was killed during a gun fight with the Mexican marines in the city of Matamoros.⁵⁰ On December 2010, La Familia Michoacán commander Nazario Moreno González (alias ‘El Más Loco’) was killed in a firefight with Mexican military units; while leader José de Jesús Méndez Vargas (alias ‘El Chango’) was later apprehended by Mexican authorities on July 2011.⁵¹ On October 2012, Heriberto Lazcano (alias ‘The Executioner’), the leader and creator of Los Zetas drug cartel and former Mexican special forces officer, was killed in shootout with Mexican marines.⁵²

As of late-2012, nine DTO leaders were confirmed dead while another sixteen had been captured by the Mexican government; of the nine that were killed, two were found murdered by other drug cartels⁵³(see Figure 3 in Annex A). Of the 25 individual DTO leaders or commanders of influence that have been eliminated or captured by the Mexican government, 11 of them had an affiliation to Los Zetas, while six had an affiliation to the Beltrán Leyva DTO. The Sinaloa, La Familia Michoacán and Gulf DTOs each lost two DTO leaders, while the Juarez DTO lost one leader to the government forces.

⁴⁸Beittel, June S., pp.15.

⁴⁹Beittel June S., pp.10.

⁵⁰Cattan, Nacha., “Killing of Top Mexico Drug Lord ‘Tony Tormenta’ May Boost Rival Zetas Cartel,” *Christian Science Monitor*, November 8, 2010., <http://www.csmonitor.com/World/Americas/2010/1107/Killing-of-top-Mexico-drug-lord-Tony-Tormenta-may-boost-rival-Zetas-cartel>

⁵¹Beittel June S., pp.17.

⁵²Rodriguez, Olga., “Heriberto Lazcano Dead: Mexico Zetas Boss Killed By Accident, Navy Says”, *Huffington Post*, October 2012, http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2012/10/10/heriberto-lazcano-dead_n_1954650.html

⁵³The Economist, “Mexico’s Drug Lord: Kingpin Bowling”, Mexico City, October 2012, <http://www.economist.com/news/americas/21564897-most-wanted-men-mexico-are-tumbling-will-crime-follow-suit>

Eradication of the Mexican DTOs

In addition to removing the leaders of the Mexican DTOs, President Calderon's decision to increase the military presence in Mexico was part of the government's strategy to confront and dismantle the DTOs that had infiltrated the various Mexican states. According to President Calderon's aides, "while other presidents had been soft on cartels, allowing them to grow into monsters...he (Calderon) will infiltrate them and send them to jail."⁵⁴ The President himself articulated as much when addressing military troops at a base in Michoacán in 2006. "New pages of glory will be written. I instruct you to persevere until victory is achieved. We will give no truce or quarter to the enemies of Mexico"⁵⁵.

The lack of information available regarding the status of the DTOs has made it difficult to assess the success of President Calderon's strategy. However in 2012, Harvard scholars Michele Coscia and Viridiana Rios were able to develop a tool that extracts information from the web and has the capability of assessing the location and areas of operation for specific Mexican DTOs within the country.⁵⁶ The methods used to assemble the information are explained as an "automatized search algorithm designed to extract online content from specialized blogs and local newspapers filtering assuming a hyper geometric distribution". The inputs for this algorithm would be "key terms that proxy for location and membership to criminal organizations, and provides as outputs the municipalities in which 16 criminal organizations have operated from 1991 to 2010."⁵⁷ The tool reveals whether the increase in military assisted in removing Mexican DTO presence from different areas in Mexico, or whether the increase in

⁵⁴ International Crisis Group, "Peña Nieto's Challenge: Criminal Cartels and Rule of Law in Mexico", Latin America Report N°48, March 2013, pg.17., <http://www.crisisgroup.org/~media/Files/latin-america/mexico/048-pena-nietos-challenge-criminal-cartels-and-rule-of-law-in-mexico.pdf>

⁵⁵ International Crisis Group, pg.16.

⁵⁶ Coscia, Michele and Viridiana Rios "[Knowing Where and How Criminal Organizations Operate Using Web Content](http://projects.iq.harvard.edu/files/ptr/files/cosciarios.pdf)" in CIKM'12, October 29–November 2, 2012, Maui, HI, USA. Copyright 2012 ACM 978-1-4503-1156-4/12/10., <http://projects.iq.harvard.edu/files/ptr/files/cosciarios.pdf>.

⁵⁷ Coscia, Michele and Viridiana Rios 2012.

military had no effect on the growth of DTOs in Mexico at all. A chart indicating the presence and migration of DTOs within Mexico from 1995 to 2010 can be found in Annex B.

According to the data collected by Coscia and Rios, only four of the seven major DTOs conducted operations in 1995: Sinaloa, Gulf, Tijuana and Juarez DTOs. By 2004, all seven of the major DTOs were conducting operations within Mexico. In addition, only seven Mexican States (Chihuahua, Guanajuato, Jalisco, Nuevo León, Sinaloa, Sonora and Tamaulipas) recorded a DTO presence in 1995. This number increased to 17 states in 2000, 25 states in 2005, and 32 states by 2009.

Taking a closer look at the Mexican DTOs, both the Sinaloa and Gulf DTOs exerted their drug trafficking dominance by occupying the largest amount of territory in 1995. The Sinaloa DTO occupied the states of Jalisco, Sonora and Sinaloa, while the Gulf DTO occupied the states of Guanajuato, Nuevo Leon and Tamaulipas. In 2000, the Gulf DTO continued its dominance by occupying eight different states, followed by the Tijuana DTO which occupied five different states; the Sinaloa DTO only occupied four different states at this time. In 2005, the Gulf DTO continued to impose its dominance by occupying 14 different states, followed by the Sinaloa DTO which had a presence in 13 different states; Los Zetas now had a presence in 12 different states. The latest information from 2010 indicates that Los Zetas occupied 30 of the 32 different Mexican states, while the next closest rivals were the Sinaloa and Beltrán Leyva DTOs, with a presence in 20 different states, followed by the Gulf DTO, with operations in 19 different states.

Taking a closer look at the individual Mexican states, Jalisco was the only state to be occupied by more than one DTO in 1995. This changed in 2000, as four Mexican states (Guanajuato, Guerrero, Tamaulipas and Veracruz) had more than one DTO conducting operations in their state. In 2005 this number increased to 17 Mexican states, as five DTOs inhabited the Sinaloa state, while four were conducting operations in the Federal District. Finally

in 2010 this number escalated to 29 Mexican states, as all seven DTOs had a presence in the Mexican states of Chihuahua, Jalisco and Michoacán de Ocampo.

Reduction of DTO-related violence

President Calderon's strategy to deploy an excess of military officers into DTO-occupied areas of Mexico should have increased the violence in the short-term. However the expectation would have been that the violence would eventually decline over the course of President Calderon's tenure, with the elimination of DTO leaders and contraction of operations in Mexico. The intensity of DTO-related violence in Mexico will be assessed through two different approaches. The first section will reveal the homicides that have occurred before and during Calderon's tenure, while the second section will evaluate the conflict intensity of the Mexican drug war in comparison to other conflicts within the region.

Measures of Homicides in Mexico

Homicides related to DTO-violence

The Attorney General's Office (Procuradaria General De La Republica – PGR), in combination with several other government agencies, released a database detailing homicides related to DTO-violence. The government released data from December 2006 – September 2011; after which the PGR declared it would no longer be updating the database, citing 'security' concerns and difficulty in accumulating and differentiating between homicide data⁵⁸.

According to the PGR database figures below, 47,682 homicides were linked to DTO violence, with the highest amount of DTO-related homicides of 15,256 deaths (32%) in 2010, followed by 13,087 deaths (27%) in 2011. The lowest annual number of DTO-related homicides was in 2007 with 2,826 deaths (6%), followed by 2008 with 6,837 deaths (14%).

⁵⁸ Procuraduría General De La Republica, "Estadística: Base De Datos Por Fallecimientos Por Presunta Rivalidad Delincuencial", Estados Unidos Mexicanos, 2011, <http://www.pgr.gob.mx/temas%20relevantes/estadistica/estadisticas.asp>

Mexican State	2006	2007	2008	2009	2010	2011	Totals
Aguascalientes		37	38	31	46	41	193
Baja California	8	209	778	484	540	250	2,269
Baja California Sur		6	2	1	10	10	29
Campeche		8	7	6	10	10	41
Chiapas		57	82	88	77	62	366
Chihuahua	1	244	2,118	3,345	4,427	2,494	12,629
Coahuila		18	78	179	384	589	1,248
Colima		2	12	33	101	94	242
Durango		108	276	674	834	122	2,014
Federal District	1	182	144	135	191	709	1,362
Guanajuato		51	79	234	152	155	671
Guerrero	12	299	412	879	1,220	1,555	4,377
Hidalgo		43	38	34	52	36	203
Jalisco	1	70	148	261	593	820	1,893
México		111	364	440	623	579	2,117
Michoacán	24	328	289	590	520	539	2,290
Morelos		32	48	114	335	206	735
Nayarit		11	28	37	377	353	806
Nuevo León	4	130	105	112	620	1,052	2,023
Oaxaca		62	122	87	167	110	548
Puebla		6	22	28	51	58	165
Querétaro		5	6	13	13	17	54
Quintana Roo		26	29	32	64	148	299
San Luis Potosí		10	34	8	135	139	326
Sinaloa	3	426	1,084	1,059	1,715	1,082	5,369
Sonora	5	141	252	365	495	239	1,497
Tabasco	1	27	35	65	73	88	289
Tamaulipas		80	96	90	1,209	837	2,312
Tlaxcala		-	3	6	4	7	20
Veracruz	1	75	65	133	179	550	1,003
Yucatán	1	4	18	1	2	1	27
Zacatecas		18	25	50	37	135	265
All States	62	2,826	6,837	9,614	15,256	13,087	47,682

Table 1: DTO-related homicides in Mexico from PGR database during December 2006 - September 2011⁵⁹

Looking at the total DTO-related homicide rate over the course of the PGR database, the state of Chihuahua had the highest total with 12,629 (26%), followed by Sinaloa with 5,369 (11%), Guerrero with 4,377 (9%), Tamaulipas with 2,312 (5%), Michoacán with 2,290 (5%) and Baja California with 2,269 (5%). In 2011 alone, 9 of the 32 Mexican states had nearly 45% or more of their total DTO-related homicides occur in 2011. Of the total DTO-related homicides that

⁵⁹ Presidencia de la República, “Base de Datos De Fallicimientos”, Gobierno do Mexico, 2013, <http://www.presidencia.gob.mx/base-de-datos-de-fallicimientos/#>

occurred in 2007 (the first full year of PGR reporting), the Mexican state of Sinaloa had the highest amount of homicides for the year at 15% (426 homicides), followed by Michoacán with 12% (328) and Guerrero with 11% (299). In contrast, the Mexican state of Chihuahua had the highest amount of DTO-related homicides in 2010 with 29% (4,427 homicides), followed by Sinaloa with 11% (1,715) and Guerrero/Tamaulipas with 8% (1220 and 1209).

Despite the release of the DTO-related homicide data by the Mexican Government, experts such as Eric Olson of the Woodrow Wilson International Center dispute the credibility of the information, citing lack of clear definitions and investigative effort of bodies, which may have lead to incorrect conclusions about the number of actual homicides caused by DTO violence.⁶⁰ Moreover, the main reason the Mexican government chose to release the database was because they were accused by “media organizations, civic groups, and the government’s autonomous transparency agency” of lacking transparency and withholding information on the ongoing drug war.⁶¹ Due to these investigative breakdowns and unreliability of the database released by the PGR, many experts believe the most reliable figures come from the National Institute of Statistics, Geography and Informatics (Instituto Nacional de Estadística, Geografía e Informática - INEGI) list of homicides.⁶²

The INEGI collects information from census surveys and administrative records documented by the Mexican government, which it then uses to produce basic statistics on economic, demographic and social areas of interest for Mexico.⁶³ The INEGI homicide database

⁶⁰ Cave, Damien., “Mexico updates Death Toll in Drug War, but critics dispute the data”, New York Times, January 2012, http://www.nytimes.com/2012/01/12/world/americas/mexico-updates-drug-war-death-toll-but-critics-dispute-data.html?_r=1&

⁶¹ Molzahn, Ferreira and Shirk., “Drug Violence in Mexico: Data and Analysis Through 2012”, Trans-Border Institute, University of San Diego, March 2012, pg.9., <http://justiceinmexico.files.wordpress.com/2013/02/130206-dvm-2013-final.pdf> - These homicides were originally labeled as ‘homicides allegedly linked to organized crime’, but were relabeled in 2011 as ‘homicides allegedly caused by criminal rivalry’.

⁶² Cave, Damien, January 2012.

⁶³ Instituto Nacional de Estadística, Geografía e Informática (a), “Acerca del INEGI”, Gobierno de Mexico, 2013, <http://www.inegi.org.mx/inegi/acercade/default.aspx>

gathers its data from the death certificates and the administrative records of accidental and violent deaths recorded within the public prosecutors offices.⁶⁴ This section will examine the statistics categorized as homicides from 1995-2011, to compare data before and after President Calderon's tenure. For a full representation of these homicides, see Annex C.

According to INEGI, the number of homicides in Mexico from 1994-1999 was 84,859, which decreased to 59,899 in 2000-2005; this demonstrated a 29% decrease in the homicide rate. From 2006-2011 the homicide rate increased to 105,541 which illustrated a 76% increase in the homicide rate from the previous period, and a 24% increase from the 1994-1999 period. During the period of 2006-2011, the highest number of homicides came in 2010 at 25,757 and 2011 at 27,213. The lowest number of homicides within this period was in 2007 at 8,839.

Investigating the Mexican states individually, the state of México accumulated the highest number of homicides within the 2000-2005 timeframe with 11,556 deaths. This was followed by the Federal District (5,647), Guerrero (3,841), Oaxaca (3,751), Michoacán (3,549), Chihuahua (3,433), Jalisco (2,782), Sinaloa (2,654), Baja California (2,644) and Veracruz (2,236). These ten states made up 70% of the homicides that took place in Mexico from 2000-2005.

Conversely, over the period of 2006-2011, Chihuahua had the highest number of homicides totaling 18,358. The state of México accumulated 11,175 homicides during this period, followed by the states of Guerrero (8,368), Sinaloa (7,451), and the Federal District (5,757), Baja California (5,742), Jalisco (4,766), Michoacán (4,696), Nuevo Leon (4,108) and Durango (4,015). These ten states made up 78% of the homicides that took place in Mexico from 2006-2011.

⁶⁴ Instituto Nacional de Estadística, Geografía e Informática (b), "Registros Administrativos: Mortalidad", Gobierno de Mexico, 2013, <http://www.inegi.org.mx/sistemas/olap/proyectos/bd/consulta.asp?p=11094&c=15273&s=est&cl=4>

By utilizing and comparing the accumulated homicide rates within the 2000-2005 and 2006-2011 timeframes, the data indicates that 27 of the 32 states suffered an increase in homicide rates, with 11 states experiencing a growth of 50% or more during the 2006-2011 period. The state with the highest growth was that of Nuevo León, which recorded an 82% increase in homicides in the period of 2006-2011. The State of Chihuahua indicated a growth of 81%, followed by the states of Durango (74%), Sinaloa (64%), Aguascalientes (63%), Coahuila de Zaragoza (56%), Nayarit (56%), Tamaulipas (55%), Baja California (54%), Guerrero (54%) and Sonora (50%).

Conflict Intensity in Mexico

The Major Episodes of Political Violence study, which was compiled by Monty Marshall and was founded by The Centre for Systemic Peace (CRS), was designed to give a descriptive tally of all of the ‘episodes’ of major armed conflicts that have occurred all over the world between the years of 1946-2012. According to CRS, an ‘episode’ of major armed conflict is defined as “involving at least 500 ‘directly-related’ fatalities and reaching a level of intensity in which political violence is both systematic and sustained (a base rate of 100 ‘directly-related deaths per annum’)”.⁶⁵ Each episode is “coded on a scale of one to ten according to an assessment of the full impact of their violence on their societies that directly experience their effects”, and these effects “of political violence and warfare include fatalities and casualties, resource depletion, destruction of infrastructure, population dislocations... psychological trauma to individuals and adverse changes to social psychology and political culture of affected social identity groups”.⁶⁶ Each episode of armed conflict includes a set of descriptive variables including: inclusive years, episode type, magnitude of societal-system impact, episode location,

⁶⁵ Marshall, Monty G., “Major Episodes of Political Violence: 1946-2012”, Center for Systemic Peace, April 2013, <http://www.systemicpeace.org/warlist.htm>

⁶⁶ Marshall, Monty G., April 2013.

and estimates of ‘directly-related’ deaths.⁶⁷ A list of all the episodes of armed conflict that have taken place in the Americas is provided in Annex D.

According to the CRS, there have been a total of 327 total episodes of armed conflict that have occurred in the world during the period of 1942-2012. 31 of these episodes have occurred in the Americas over this timeframe. The episode in Mexico has been defined by CRS as a civil-interstate conflict involving rival political groups, with violence being utilized in an instrumental manner, without necessarily exclusive goals.⁶⁸ The data indicates that there have been 14 similar civil violent armed conflicts that have taken place in the Americas since 1942. Of these 14 conflicts, only Peru (1982-1997), Colombia (1975-present) and Mexico (2006-present) have had episodes that have lasted more than one year. According to the CRS, the magnitude of the episode in Mexico is defined as a category three armed conflict, with serious political violence.

The category three is defined as,

“Technologies of destruction are limited; objectives are usually focused on strategic authority, including control of human and/or material resources. Long periods of relative quiescence may be punctuated by focused operations targeting armed factions, group leaders, or symbols of defiance. Population dislocations respond to specific, localized operations and may be counted in the tens of thousands; deaths range from ten to fifty thousand. Effects of political violence are unevenly distributed, mainly targeting militias, leaders, and symbolic targets.”⁶⁹

Within the Americas, only three other episodes have been rated with a higher magnitude scale. In Colombia, the civil war from 1948-1960 scored a magnitude of five, while the civil violence from 1975-present scored a magnitude of four. The ethnic war in Guatemala that took place from 1966-1996 also scored a magnitude of five while the civil-interstate violent conflict that took place in Peru also scored a magnitude of three. Moreover, total homicides that are related to the conflict in Mexico range around 60,000 from 2006-2012. Only two other conflicts in the

⁶⁷ Marshall, Monty G., April 2013.

⁶⁸ Marshall, Monty G., April 2013.

⁶⁹ Marshall, Monty G., April 2013.

Americas have amassed greater death tolls; the civil war in Colombia (250,000 deaths) and the ethnic war in Guatemala (150,000 deaths). Of the three ongoing conflicts today – United States inter-state war in Afghanistan and Colombian inter-state civil violence – the episode in Mexico has been the bloodiest in the shortest timeframe. The civil-interstate violent conflict in Colombia, which has been occurring since 1975, has amassed a DTO-related homicide count of 55,000. Furthermore, the only other inter-state violent conflict in the world since 1942 to amass over 60,000 fatalities occurred in China from 1950-51, where 1,500,000 people were killed.

Reduction of Drugs in Mexico

By increasing the military presence in Mexico, the government believed that the DTOs would no longer possess the ability to traffic drugs into and throughout the country without detection. Moreover, if the government's plan to remove DTO leadership was successful, then the DTOs operations would have been further hampered by their inability to prudently plan and coordinate their efforts. The success of this initiative will be assessed through two different approaches. The first section will assess the amount of criminals that have been apprehended both before and during President Calderon's tenure, while the second section will measure the change in the quantity of drugs that have been seized within Mexico during the same period of time.

Criminals Apprehended for Drug Trafficking in Mexico

This section will examine the statistics for suspected criminals that have committed crimes under the Federal criminal code of narcotics, using the INEGI criminal matters database which collects its records from criminal proceedings in Mexico.⁷⁰ The data was collected from 1997-2011, to allow for comparison to prior years.

⁷⁰Instituto Nacional de Estadística, Geografía e Informática (c), "Registros Administrativos: Judiciales en material penal", Gobierno de Mexico, 2013, <http://www.inegi.org.mx/est/contenidos/Proyectos/registros/sociales/judiciales/default.aspx>

Suspected/Processed Criminals

According to the database, there have been a total of 230,401 suspected criminals that have been processed under the Federal criminal code for crimes related to narcotics from 1997-2011. The totals for the period of 2000-2005 were 78,416; however, this figure improved dramatically to 117,985 suspected criminals from 2006-2011, indicating a 34% increase.

For the 2000-2005 timeframe, the states with the largest number of suspected narcotics criminals included: Sonora (13%), Baja California (12%), Chihuahua (9%), Jalisco (8%) and Sinaloa (6%). For the 2006-2011 timeframe, this changed to Baja California (20%), Sonora (11%), Jalisco (9%), Federal District (7%), Sinaloa (6%) and Chihuahua (5%).

When comparing the Vicente Fox tenure (2000-2005) to the Felipe Calderon tenure (2006-2011), the Mexican states with the greatest percentage of growth for suspected/processed narcotics criminals included: Tlaxcala (72%), Querétaro (60%), Baja California (60%), Baja California Sur (60%), Puebla (56%), Yucatán (56%), Oaxaca (51%), Quintana Roo (50%) and the Federal District (49%). In addition, 11 Mexican states demonstrated an increase of over 1,000 suspected/processed narcotics criminals when comparing former President Fox's tenure to President Calderon's tenure. These states included: Baja California (+14,194), Distrito Federal (+4,296), Jalisco (+3,910), Guanajuato (+2,308), Sinaloa (+2,289), Sonora (+2,257), Nuevo Leon (+1,728), México (+1,188), Querétaro (+1,180), Oaxaca (+1,108), and Quintana Roo (+1,067).

Drug Seizures in Mexico

The United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC), which collects data and information on drugs and drug markets around the world, developed an online database from "the Annual Reports Questionnaires sent to all Member States, but also supplemented by other

sources such as Interpol and UNODC Field Offices”.⁷¹ This section will use two sets of data from the UNODC to assess the government’s impact on drug trafficking within the country. The first section will assess the drug seizures that took place in Mexico from 2001-2010⁷², while the second section will examine the estimated prices of drugs on the market within Mexico and the United States, based on 2010 prices (or the latest year possible).⁷³

Change in Drugs Seized by Mexican Government

As the UNODC chart on drug seizures below indicates, nearly 20 million kilograms of Amphetamines, Cannabis (Herb & Resin), Cocaine (Base and Salts) and Opium were seized by the Mexican authorities from 2001-2010, with over 98% of the drugs seized coming directly from Cannabis (Herb).

Years/Drugs	Amphetamines	Cannabis Herb	Cannabis Plant (single units)	Cannabis Resin (Hashish)	Cocaine (base and salts)	Opium (raw)
2001	19.7	1,839,357.1		29.5	29,988.5	516.4
2002	1.8	1,633,326.2	355,578.0	0.0	12,639.0	309.9
2003	20.5	2,160,309.1	347,277.0	1.1	21,105.8	192.0
2004	0.3	2,164,160.8	254,554.0	0.3	26,843.6	463.7
2005	45.3	1,781,063.6	216,630.0	89.4	30,226.9	283.7
2000-2005	87.7	9,578,216.9	1,174,039.0	120.3	120,803.9	1,765.6
2006	0.1	1,892,658.1	203,087.0	102.2	21,336.6	105.5
2007	27.0	2,176,748.0	147,645.0	6.1	48,168.0	292.1
2008	521.0	1,657,853.1	122,408.0	279.1	19,333.0	174.6
2009	1.4	2,104,954.4	116,382.0	11.0	21,631.9	802.9
2010	0.2	2,313,115.2	133,953.0	23.1	9,892.9	1,195.3
2006-2010	549.7	10,145,328.7	723,475.0	421.4	120,362.5	2,570.4
Totals	637.4	19,723,545.6	1,897,514.0	541.7	241,166.4	4,336.1

Table 2: Number of Drugs Seized in Mexico from 2001-2010 in kilograms (aside from Cannabis Plant)⁷⁴

⁷¹ United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC)(a), “Online Database: Seizure Reports”, United Nations, 2013, <http://www.unodc.org/unodc/en/data-and-analysis/Research-Database.html>

⁷² UNODC (a), 2013.

⁷³ United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC)(b), “World Drug Report 2012: Prices”, United Nations, 2013, <http://www.unodc.org/unodc/en/data-and-analysis/WDR-2012.html>

⁷⁴ United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC)(a), “Online Database: Seizure Reports”, United Nations, 2013, <http://www.unodc.org/unodc/en/data-and-analysis/Research-Database.html>

Comparing the Vicente Fox era (2000-2005) with the Calderon era (2006-2011), Amphetamine drug seizures increased from 84.7 kg to 549.7 kg, indicating an 84% growth. Drug seizures of Cannabis Resin (Hashish) increased from 120.3 kg to 421.4 kg (71% growth); while Opium (raw) increased from 1.765.6kg to 2,570.4 kg (31% growth). Drug seizures of Cannabis (Herb) saw minimal growth between the two periods (6% increase), but the actual amount seized increased from 9.58 million kg to 10.12 million kg, showing a difference of 567,111.8 kg (the largest increase in actual seized drugs of all drug categories).

Estimated Prices of Drugs on Market

According to UNODC the prices for drugs vary by country, and also vary by wholesale and retail levels. At a wholesale level, Cannabis (Herb) sells at \$80 USD per kilogram in Mexico, while it ranges from \$100-\$12,000 USD per pound in the United States, or \$220-\$26,455 USD per kilogram using prices for 2010. However at a retail level, Cannabis (Herb) sells at \$705-\$63,493 USD per kilogram in the United States using prices for 2010; while the retail level in Mexico is unknown.

Reflective of these prices, the total value of the Cannabis (Herb) seized by the Calderon government is estimated to be equal to \$812 million USD wholesale in Mexico, or approximately \$2.2 billion - \$269 billion USD at wholesale level in the United States. At the retail level, the estimated value is approximately 7.2 billion - \$644 billion USD within the United States.

The value for cocaine (base and salts) is estimated to be at \$12,500 USD per kilogram at a wholesale level in Mexico, while the wholesale value in the United States is estimated to be within \$11,500-\$50,000 USD using prices for 2010. The retail value for cocaine in the United States is estimated to be \$8-\$300USD per gram or \$8,000-\$300,000 USD per kilogram using prices for 2010; while the retail level in Mexico is unknown.

Reflective of these prices, the total value of cocaine (base and salts) seized by the Calderon government is estimated to be equal to \$1.5 billion USD wholesale in Mexico, or \$1.3 billion - \$6 billion USD at wholesale level in the United States. At the retail level, the estimated value is believed to be \$963 million- \$36 billion USD within the United States.

Cumulatively between the two drugs, the Calderon government is estimated to have seized a value of \$2.3 USD billion worth of drugs, according to the prices for wholesale level drugs in Mexico. The value according to US wholesale level prices is estimated to be within \$3.6 billion - \$275 billion USD, while the value at the US retail level is estimated to be within \$8.2 billion- \$680 billion USD.

Undesired Impacts

Declining Human Rights of Mexican Citizens

A grave consequence of the Mexican drug war has been the declining rights and freedoms experienced by the Mexican civilians, not only from the violence committed by the Mexican DTOs, but also from human rights abuses committed by the Mexican military forces. The main source of the issue has been the lack of discipline and training from the Mexican military that has resulted in the vast increase of human rights complaints made by Mexican citizens. In addition, the lack of transparency by the military when carrying out its own investigations on these complaints has left civilians experiencing a lack of justice and safety from the military institution. This section will examine the human rights abuses experienced by Mexican civilians before and during President Calderon's tenure.

Human Rights Violations Committed by Mexican Military

According to the United Nations, human rights are "rights and freedoms inherent to all human beings, whatever our nationality, place of residence, sex, national or ethnic origin, colour,

religion, language, or any other status”.⁷⁵ Human rights are protected by international and national laws and treaties and under these laws, Mexico is obligated to “deter and prevent violations of human rights, and to investigate, prosecute and remedy their abuses.”⁷⁶ In particular, the Mexican government has “an obligation to provide victims of human rights abuses with an effective remedy – including justice, truth and adequate reparations – after they suffer a violation.”⁷⁷ However the Code of Military Justice in Mexico, through interpretation of the Mexican Constitution, establishes military jurisdiction over any crimes or issues committed by military officers. This has given the Mexican military the ability to “expand the scope of cases it asserts a right to investigate and prosecute to include serious human rights violations committed by the military against civilians”⁷⁸. Therefore, the Military Attorney General’s Office (Procuraduría General de Justicia Militar, PGJM) “applies the appropriate federal or state law to investigate federal or state crimes, but it carries out the investigations, prosecutes the cases, and tries them before military courts.”⁷⁹

The reputation of the PGJM within and amongst Mexican citizens has been low since the 1960-70’s, when the Mexican military is believed to have been responsible for mass human rights abuses during Mexico’s ‘Dirty War’. Even though complaints were lodged against the military during and after this period, no military officer was or has ever been convicted of a crime for those abuses.⁸⁰ The military abuses continued during the 1980’s and 1990’s as well, and many civilians issued complaints against military officers. For instance on June 1994, 10 military officers allegedly detained and repeatedly beat and raped three sisters, Ana, Beatriz and

⁷⁵ United Nations Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights, “Your Human Rights”, United Nations, 2013, <http://www.ohchr.org/en/issues/Pages/WhatAreHumanRights.aspx>

⁷⁶ Human Rights Watch, “Uniform Impunity: Mexico’s Misuse of Military Justice to Prosecute Abuses in Counternarcotics and Public Security Operations,” April 2009, pg.63.

⁷⁷ Human Rights Watch, pg.63.

⁷⁸ Human Rights Watch, pg.13.

⁷⁹ Human Rights Watch, pg.13.

⁸⁰ Human Rights Watch, pg.22.

Cilia Perez, in order to get the sisters to confess to an affiliation with a DTO in Chiapas. Despite having a gynecological report showing evidence of the sexual abuse, and providing testimony of the accounts that occurred, the PGJM closed the case a year later, citing “statements provided by several individuals who attest to the good conduct of the soldiers and denial of these individuals that the rapes occurred”⁸¹.

The violent and ill-treatment of civilians continued during President Calderon’s tenure, as various human rights complaints have been issued against various military officers. Examples include a civilian report from the state of Michoacán in 2007 that stated the military detained 36 people, including five minors, for well over three days and “committed dozens of abuses, including torture, beatings, rapes and illegal entries into homes”⁸². Another report from the state of Sinaloa in 2009 claimed that drunken military soldiers shot a truck carrying eight people, five of which were children. The result of the military firing led to the injury of six and killing of two, one of which was a 3 year old child. Three of the injured people ended up dying on the way to the hospital, after military officers took over three hours to provide them with proper medical attention. In both of these instances the PGJM held jurisdiction over the investigations and prosecutions, and both issues have been dealt with privately with little details available for the public. This lack of civilian oversight and transparency is present because the military justice system is – for all intents and purposes – closed to the public; only parties taking part in the process (prosecutor, public defenders, accused, and victims) are privy to the information.⁸³

The trend of human rights abuses during President Calderon’s tenure is further substantiated by the data from the National Human Rights Commission of Mexico (Comisión Nacional de Derechos Humanos, CNDH). The CNDH, which “receives complaints of serious

⁸¹ Human Rights Watch, pg.26-27.

⁸² Human Rights Watch, pg.28.

⁸³ Human Rights Watch, pg.19.

human rights violations, such as torture and other ill-treatment, in which federal public officials are implicated or involved”⁸⁴, reports that the Mexican government received 182 human rights complaints in 2006 against the Ministry of Defense (Secretaria de Defensa Nacional, SEDENA). This number increased to 392 complaints in 2007, 564 complaints in 2008, 1,055 complaints in 2009, 1,161 complaints in 2010 and 1,669 complaints in 2011.⁸⁵ That means that within a span of six years (2006 - 2011), the CNDH received 1,487 more complaints regarding human rights abuses, or 917% more. What’s more is that many experts, including human rights advocates such as Amnesty International, are still skeptical of the numbers represented by CNDH, due to the intimidation and lack of justice the Mexican civilians encounter when they experience human rights abuse from the military officers. As demonstrated in the examples above, the military justice system may hinder the amount of human rights abuses reported, due to the lack of transparency and civilian oversight over the criminal matters.

Increasing Mexican DTO Influence

A final unintended consequence of the Mexican drug war has been the continued increasing Mexican DTO power and influence in the region, despite the introduction of greater military officers. As previously demonstrated within this paper, Mexican DTOs have not only increased in numbers but have also increased their operations in a variety of states, making additional communities increasingly susceptible to DTO influence. This has amplified the DTOs capability to influence major public institutions and officials, spreading corruption throughout the country through payoffs or increased promises of security. The result has been the increase in the DTOs power within Mexico, making the country appear relatively unstable to external observers and security experts.

⁸⁴ Amnesty International, “Known Abusers, But Victims Ignored: Torture and Ill Treatment in Mexico”, Amnesty International Ltd., 2012, pg. 3., http://www2.ohchr.org/english/bodies/cat/docs/ngos/AI_Mexico_CAT49_en.pdf

⁸⁵ Amnesty International, pg. 4.

The first part of this section will assess the level of corruption that has afflicted Mexico, as well as the modification in strategies employed by the Mexican DTOs during President Calderon's tenure. The second section will assess the governance capabilities of Mexican institutions before and during Calderon's tenure, and will also examine the Mexican public's opinion of the drug war throughout Calderon's tenure.

Rising Power and Influence of DTOs in Mexico

Corruption and Bribery within Mexican Institutions

Transparency International defines corruption as “the abuse of entrusted power for private gain... classified as grand, petty and political, depending on the amounts of money lost and the sector where it occurs”.⁸⁶ Corruption exists in every country, and Mexico is no exception; the main difference is that the magnitude of corruption in Mexico is much greater due to the influence and position of the DTOs within the country. One of the easiest and most fundamental ways Mexican DTOs corrupt public officials is through bribery. According to June Beittel, Senior Analyst for Latin American Affairs within the Congressional Research Service, “the proceeds of drug sales (either laundered or as cash smuggled back to Mexico) are used in part to U.S. and Mexican border officials and Mexican law enforcement, security forces, and public officials to either ignore DTO activities or actively support and protect them”⁸⁷. Recently, it has become evident that this type of corruption is prevalent within Mexico, as the practice of bribery “helps neutralize government action against the DTOs, ensure impunity, and facilitate smooth operations.”⁸⁸

⁸⁶ Transparency International, “Who We Are: FAQs On Corruption”, 2012, http://www.transparency.org/whoweare/organisation/faqs_on_corruption

⁸⁷ Beittel, June S., pp.6.

⁸⁸ Beittel, June S., pp. 5.

There are plenty of examples of public official bribery in Mexico, such as when the former governor of the Mexican state of Quintana Roo – Mario Villanueva – was charged with assisting drug traffickers smuggle nearly 200 tons of cocaine while in office from 1993 to 1999, to which he was paid \$500,000 for each shipment received and delivered by the Juarez DTO.⁸⁹ In another incident, a 2005 ‘narco-video’ sent to the media and created by one of the DTOs in Mexico portrays content where four captured Zetas members – two of which were former Mexican soldiers – explain their roles as assassins for the DTO, but also go into detail to describe their links to Mexican law enforcement agents and high ranking officials. The captured men explain their recruitment practices of other police and military officers as potential assassins for the DTO, before being gunned down by the rival DTO member filming them.⁹⁰ Following the release of the video, authorities announced that 11 elite Federal Investigations Agency (AFI) were under investigation for having connection to the kidnapping and murder in the video.⁹¹ Court files would later reveal that the AFI agents “probably kidnapped the Zetas in the resort city of Acapulco, than handed them over to members of the Sinaloa cartel to be interrogated and executed.”⁹² Unfortunately, corruption has persisted during Calderon’s tenure through other means. For instance in October 2010, a Mexican radio station broadcast a recorded conversation between federal congressman Julio Cesar Godoy and Servando Gomez – one of the top officials in the La Familia Michoacán DTO. During the recorded broadcast, Mr. Gomez pledges to support Mr. Godoy in his upcoming election, in exchange for names of possible police and

⁸⁹ Meyer, Maureen, “At a Crossroads: Drug Trafficking, Violence and the Mexican State”, Washington Office on Latin America (WOLA), Briefing Paper 13, November 2007, pp.3.

⁹⁰ Laurie Freeman, “State of Siege: Drug-related violence and corruption in Mexico”, Washington Office on Latin America (WOLA), June 2006, pp.13., http://dl.dropboxusercontent.com/u/64663568/library/WOLA_RP_DrugViolenceMexico_EN.pdf

⁹¹ Laurie Freeman, pp.14.

⁹² Laurie Freeman, pp.15.

military informants to assist in DTO operations.⁹³ In addition to the bribery and corruption of public officials, police officers from the municipal, state and federal departments have continued to be vulnerable. For instance, in August 2010, nearly 3,200 police officers, or one-tenth of the Federal police force, were fired for failing basic integrity testing, which included failing medical testing for drug use and links to criminal activity. Another 465 police officers were charged for infringing on federal laws, while over 1,000 officers were disciplined for failing drug screening testing.⁹⁴

More importantly, the Mexican military has proven to be just as penetrable. In May 2012, four high ranking generals were arrested and sentenced on drug trafficking and corruption charges with links to the Beltrán Leyva DTO. The former Secretary of Defense Tomas Angeles Dauahare, who served under President Calderon from 2006 to 2008, was among the Generals charged.⁹⁵ Furthermore in April 2012 it was reported that over 56,000 military officers that had been deployed in Mexico had abandoned their military services; the whereabouts of nearly 25,000 could not be accounted for by the National Defense Secretariat (SEDENA). The belief is that the officers that are unaccounted for are accepting employment from the DTOs, as a majority of the desertions have come from officers operating in the states of Michoacán, Sinaloa, Guerrero and Chihuahua.⁹⁶ Another reason for this belief is the low pay the military officers receive for compensation from the government, which is estimated to be around \$200-\$300 USD a month; Mexican DTOs can easily triple this figure with the compensation made by drug trafficking.

⁹³ Luhnow, David, "Questions Over Tape Face Mexico Politician", The Wall Street Journal, October 2010, <http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424052748704300604575554563244385990.html>

⁹⁴ Ellingwood, Ken (a). "Mexico fires 3,200 federal police officers", Los Angeles Times, August 2010, <http://articles.latimes.com/2010/aug/31/world/la-fg-mexico-police-fired-20100831>

⁹⁵ Beittel, June S., pp.33.

⁹⁶ Fox, Edward., "Mexico Military Sees Over 56,000 Desertions Under Calderon", April 2012, Insight Crime, <http://www.insightcrime.org/news-briefs/mexico-military-sees-over-56000-desertions-under-calderon>

DTO members will also use different tactics of coercion to force public officials, police and military officers to cooperate. For instance, it is believed that Federal Police Director Edgar Millan Gomez was assassinated in May 2008, because of his refusal to cooperate with the Beltrán Leyva DTO and provide information on military whereabouts within the Federal District.⁹⁷ In 2009, DTO members continuously targeted police and military officers in Juarez until the chief of police resigned from his position. The chief of police walked off the job after three officers were gunned down, and another was dumped in the street over a seven day period.⁹⁸ It is this type of corruption and coercion, in conjunction with the historically weak policing, judicial and political institutions, that has many experts questioning whether the Mexican government continues to hold the power to adequately control the rule of law within the country.⁹⁹

The True Power of Merciless Violence for Mexican DTOs

Bribery and coercion are not the only tools Mexican DTOs have at their disposal. One of the main reasons the DTOs have had a greater influence within the country is because of the ruthless violence they have displayed throughout President Calderon's tenure, which has in turn demonstrated the DTOs true power and capabilities. Graphic details of "beheadings, public hanging of corpses, killing of innocent bystanders, car bombs, torture, and assassination of numerous journalists, public and government officials"¹⁰⁰ have spread fear throughout the country. The beheading of victims has particularly alarmed many citizens within Mexico, as this type of violent activity has been associated with Islamist radical groups from the Middle East

⁹⁷ Beittel, June S., pp.16.

⁹⁸ Luhnhow, David and Jose De Cordoba, "The Perilous State of Mexico", February 2009, The Wall Street Journal, <http://online.wsj.com/article/SB123518102536038463.html>

⁹⁹ Beittel, June S., pp.43.

¹⁰⁰ Beittel, June S., pp. 1.

and did not appear within the country until 2006.¹⁰¹ Within a 10-day period in May 2012, 81 beheaded bodies were discovered in Mexico; 49 were discovered in the city of Monterrey in plastic bags on the side of the road in plain sight for the public to observe.¹⁰²

Mass graves have also been found in various towns within Mexico. In April 2011, 183 bodies were uncovered in the town of San Fernando, Tamaulipas – and autopsies showed that the victims were killed with weapons similar to sledgehammers and were burned alive. Investigators surmise that the victims may have been kidnapped from buses within the region, and were believed to be robbed and raped by the Zetas DTO.¹⁰³ These mass graves have repudiated claims made by the government that a majority of DTO-related homicide victims are involved in criminal matters. Mexican DTOs have also been able to dislocate entire villages and towns. In 2010, citizens of Miguel Aleman, Tamaulipas were given the choice to leave or be killed by the Zetas DTO; this resulted in a dislocation of hundreds of Mexican citizens, while DTOs were left to fight amongst each other and military forces for control of the area.¹⁰⁴

The fearlessness of the Mexican DTO members also plays a factor in their influence on the country. On August 2011, armed men entered a casino in Monterrey, Nuevo Leon and lit in on fire; this attack resulted in the deaths of 52 Mexican civilians. To this day, there is no knowledge on why the attack took place, which places fear that attacks may occur anytime and at any place.¹⁰⁵

One of the greatest influences on public opinion is the fact that civilians are being targeted, especially those that choose to speak out against these organizations. For example Maria

¹⁰¹ Grant, Will, "Mexico Violence: Fear and Intimidation", BBC News, Mexico City, May 2012, <http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-latin-america-18063328>

¹⁰² Grant, Will, 2012.

¹⁰³ The Economist, "Mexico's Drug War: Shallow graves, deepening alarm", April 2011, <http://www.economist.com/node/18621268>

¹⁰⁴ Hale, Gary, "A 'Failed' State in Mexico: Tamaulipas Declares Itself Ungovernable", Rice University, July 2011, pg.9.

¹⁰⁵ CNN Wire Staff, "52 killed in attack at Mexican Casino", CNN, August 2011, <http://www.cnn.com/2011/WORLD/americas/08/26/mexico.attack/index.html>

Marcias, a 39 year old internet activist from Nuevo Laredo, began reporting any information available concerning criminal activity within the area on an internet website called 'Nuevo Laredo en Vivo'. For some time, she advised others in the community to do the same, in an effort to reduce violence within her community. After several weeks of posting online, her headless and mutilated body was dumped on a busy street in Nuevo Laredo with a sign that said: "Ok Nuevo Laredo en Vivo and social networks, I am Laredo Girl and I am here because my reports and yours." The message was signed with the ZZZZZ for Los Zetas.¹⁰⁶

Many of the Mexican DTOs have also begun to use social media to demonstrate their capacity for killing, as there are many instances where videos are posted using tools such as YouTube to showcase killings of rival DTO members.¹⁰⁷ The targeting of journalists and civilians that choose to speak out against the DTOs has resulted in the self-censorship of media and the public, which plays a significant part in molding the public opinion of Mexican citizens.

In regards to tactics, Mexican DTOs have even become more sophisticated using stolen vehicles to coordinate road blockades when carrying out operations or setting fire to military checkpoints to divert attention elsewhere, and thus, increase the probability of success of other operations within the area. This occurred in the cities of Reynosa and Matamoros, where coordinated operations allowed inmates from multiple prisons to escape.¹⁰⁸ The occurrence of these events has resulted in security experts and policy analysts questioning whether the Mexican Government continues to hold the monopoly on the use of force within the country. For instance in 2008 and 2009, many security analysts were beginning to put forth a 'failed state' argument, "suggesting that the Mexican government was no longer exercising sovereignty in all areas of

¹⁰⁶ Reuters, "Mexican Social Media Boom Draws Drug Cartel Attacks", September 2011, <http://www.reuters.com/article/2011/09/27/us-mexico-drugs-idUSTRE78Q6H220110927>

¹⁰⁷ Reuters, 2011.

¹⁰⁸ Booth, William, "Drug War Violence Appears in Mexico's Northeast, Near Texas Border", Washington Post, April 2010, <http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2010/04/20/AR2010042004961.html>

the country”.¹⁰⁹ Furthermore, former State Attorney Gonzalez Ruiz cited the brutal killings by the DTOs as a ‘terrorist’ strategy, due to the message sent by the beheadings of victims: “If you do not allow us to control our illegal business, we will do the same to you”.¹¹⁰

DTOs Impact on Mexican Institutions and Public Opinion

The Decline of Institutions Developed to Protect Citizen Security

The World Bank Institute (WBI) defines governance as “the traditions and institutions by which authority in a country is exercised”. WBI measures three areas of governance,

“(1) the process by which governments are selected, monitored and replaced; (2) the capacity of the government to effectively formulate and implement sound policies; and (3) the respect of citizens and the state for the institutions that govern economic and social interactions among them”¹¹¹.

To measure governance of countries, the WBI aggregate data from 30 different sources into 6 ‘Worldwide Research Governance Indicators’; where each aggregated indicator is given an estimation of governance from -2.5 (weakest) to +2.5 (strongest).¹¹² For the purposes of this paper, the governance indicators measuring the Political Stability and Absence of Violence, Control of Corruption and Rule of Law will be used to demonstrate the Mexican institutions governance capabilities during Calderon’s tenure.

According to the WBI, the control of corruption (CC) indicator “captures perceptions of the extent to which public power is exercised for private gain, including both petty and grand forms of corruption, as well as ‘capture’ of the state by elites and private interests”.¹¹³ The

¹⁰⁹ Beittel, June S., pp.4.

¹¹⁰ Grant, 2012.

¹¹¹ The World Bank Institute (WBI), “Worldwide Governance Indicators”, The World Bank Group, 2013, <http://info.worldbank.org/governance/wgi/resources.htm>

¹¹² Daniel Kaufmann, Aart Kraay and Massimo Mastruzzi, “The Worldwide Governance Indicators: Methodology and Analytical Issues”, The World Bank, September 2011, http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1682130##.

¹¹³ The World Bank Institute (WBI), 2013.

aggregate data provided by this indicator illustrates that Mexico's *CC* governance rating decreased from -0.23 in 2006 (-0.23) to -0.38 in 2010.

The Rule of Law (*RL*) governance indicator,

“captures perceptions of the extent to which agents have confidence in and abide by the rules of society, and in particular the quality of contract enforcement, property rights, the police, and the courts, as well as the likelihood of crime and violence”.¹¹⁴

The aggregate data provided by this indicator illustrates that Mexico's *RL* governance rating also decreased from 2006 (-0.46) to 2008 (-0.71), before increasing gradually until 2010 (-0.57). Two data sources from the aggregated *RL* governance indicator in particular show the decline of the rule of law in Mexico within Calderon's tenure. The first data source, from the Economist Intelligence Unit (EIU), measures variables such as violent and organized crime, as well as fairness of judicial process¹¹⁵. In 2006, Mexico was given a score of 0.53 (out of 100, with the highest ranking being the most ideal) by the EIU; however, this score gradually declined to 0.44 in 2008, where it has remained until 2011. The second data source, from Cingranelli-Richards (CIRI) Human Rights Database, measures the variable of 'independence of judiciary', which indicated “ the extent to which the judiciary is independent of control from other sources, such as another branch of the government or the military”.¹¹⁶ In 2006, Mexico was given a score of 0.50, equating to a 'partially independent' judiciary (1.0 being fully independent); however, this score declined to 0.0 by 2008, where it remained until 2011.

Finally, the political stability and absence of violence (*PSAV*) governance indicator “measures perceptions of the likelihood that the government will be destabilized or overthrown

¹¹⁴ The World Bank Institute (WBI), 2013.

¹¹⁵ The World Bank Institute (WBI), 2013.

¹¹⁶ Cingranelli, David and David Richards, “The Cingranelli-Richards (CIRI) Human Rights Data Project Coding Manual”, CIRI Human Rights Data Project, 2008, http://www.humanrightsdata.org/documentation/ciri_coding_guide.pdf

by unconstitutional or violent means, including politically-motivated violence and terrorism”.¹¹⁷

The aggregate data provided by this indicator illustrates that Mexico’s *PSAV* governance rating persistently decreased during Calderon’s tenure, as the rating dropped from 2006 (-0.58) to a low in 2010 (-0.77).

DTOs Impact on Public Opinion

All of the fear and chaos caused by the Mexican DTOs during Felipe Calderon’s tenure has had an incredible impact on the public opinion of Mexican citizens within the country. For instance Buendía y Laredo, a highly qualified consultation firm that is a “leader in the design, implementation and analysis of market research and public opinion in Mexico”¹¹⁸, publishes a quarterly public inquiry report on drugs and security within Mexico. In 2011, Buendía y Laredo surveyed the public on multiple issues, such as violence within the country and the government strategy against the DTOs. The survey was conducted from 1,000 interviewees of both men and women, aged 18+ who permanently reside in electoral districts within Mexico, from November 10-15, 2011. The report also contains results from surveys as far back as September 2008, which used similar methodology.¹¹⁹

The first question put forward by Buendía y Laredo in the 2011 survey was, “thinking about the past six months, do you think that violence associated with DTOs in Mexico has increased, stayed the same or decreased?”¹²⁰ From the period of September 2008 to August 2011, an average of 74% of survey respondents indicated that violence associated with DTOs had increased over the past six months (from when they filled out the survey); during the same period, 13% of respondents indicated the violence had stayed the same, while 10% indicated it

¹¹⁷ The World Bank Institute (WBI), 2013.

¹¹⁸ Buendía y Laredo(a), “Quienes Somos”, 2013, <http://www.buendiaylaredo.com/quienessomos.php>

¹¹⁹ Buendía y Laredo(b), “Seguridad y Narcotráfico: Encuesta Nacional Trimestral”, November 2011, http://www.buendiaylaredo.com/publicaciones/203/201111_SEGURIDAD_Y_NARCOTR_FICO.pdf

¹²⁰ Buendía y Laredo (b), pg.2.

had decreased. 83% of respondents indicated violence had increased from November 2010 to May 2011.

Another question asked was, “In your opinion, has President Calderon’s anti-drug strategy made Mexico safer, less safe, or had no impact on safety at all?”¹²¹ From the period of September 2008 to August 2011, an average of 20% of respondents indicated the President Calderon’s anti-drug strategy has made Mexico safer, while an average of 51% indicated that the anti-drug strategy has made Mexico less safe. From November 2010 to February 2011, an average of 67% of respondents indicated that the anti-drug strategies had made Mexico less safe.

The survey also asked, “In 2012 there will be a new Mexican President. In your opinion, should the next President continue with the same strategy of combating the DTOs that was instilled by President Calderon, or should they change strategies?”¹²² An average of 50% of the respondents within the period of May 2010 to November 2011 indicated that the Mexican government should change strategies; however the average increased to 56% of respondents within the timeframe of May – November 2011. An average of 30% believed that government should continue with its current strategy of combating the DTOs.

Finally the survey asked: “Who do you consider is winning the war on drugs, the Mexican military or the Mexican DTOs?”¹²³ An average of 43% of respondents within the timeframe of May – November 2011 indicated they believed the DTOs were winning, while 30% felt that the Mexican military was winning the drug war.

¹²¹ Buendía y Laredo (b), pg.3.

¹²² Buendía y Laredo (b), pg.5.

¹²³ Buendía y Laredo (b), pg.7.

Desired versus Undesired Impacts

To summarize the information provided from the previous section, there are both positive and negative aspects of President Calderon's decision to increase the military presence in Mexico.

On the positive side, the increased military presence has assisted and increased the Mexican governments success in eliminating many of the DTO leaders it has sought since 2009, as 23 of the 37 had been either arrested or killed by the military forces. The second positive impact is that the use of military as a policing unit has led to increase in processed (34%) narcotics criminals during Felipe Calderon's tenure, in comparison to Vicente Fox's tenure. The third positive impact of the amplified military force in Mexico is the increased seizure of illicit drugs. The Mexican government seized a much greater percentage of Amphetamines, Cannabis (Hash) and Opium (Raw) in comparison to President Fox. More importantly, the Mexican government seized an estimated retail value of \$8.2 billion - \$680 billion of Cannabis (Herb) and Cocaine between 2006 and 2011.

On the negative side, it has become clear that the introduction of greater military forces did not hinder the DTOs expansion in Mexico; the value of drug trafficking routes motivated the Mexican DTOs to infiltrate and set up operations in every state by 2009, creating an expanding market for DTOs. Second, the increase in military forces has increased violence in Mexico to the highest levels ever encountered in the history of the country. The deployment of military into many States of Mexico, such as Sinaloa, Tamaulipas, Chihuahua, Baja California, Michoacán, Jalisco, Guerrero, Nuevo Leon and Veracruz, has only served to enrage the conflict with DTOs, and has led to the mass escalation of homicides within these areas. Moreover, the total level of homicides accumulated in Mexico is one of the highest totals to ever occur in the world.

Third, the Mexican military has continued to carry out human rights abuses at an alarming rate during Felipe Calderon's tenure, with human rights complaints increasing from 182 in 2006 to 1,669 in 2011. Furthermore, it is suspected that many citizens have abstained from issuing their complaints of abuses due to intimidation tactics committed by military officers, but also due to the lack of transparency and punishment carried out by the military courts on culpable officers. Fourth, bribery and coercion have continued to plague Mexican public officials and military officers, which have been used as effective tools by DTOs to generate greater influence in Mexico, while simultaneously reducing public safety in the country. This type of activity plays a considerable role in the declining evaluations of Mexico for Corruption, Rule of Law, and Absence of Violence during Calderon's tenure.

Lastly, the military's conflict with the drug traffickers, which facilitated the elimination of leaders and the fragmentation of the DTOs, triggered the recent brutal tactics implemented by the DTOs towards public officials, policing forces and civilians in Mexico. These war-like assaults have increased the perception of the DTOs power and influence, and have cast a shadow over the Mexican government's control and authority within the country; so much so that public opinion over the government's military operations and strategy against the DTOs has faltered over the past few years.

As this synopsis details, the undesired impacts prevail and overshadow over the desired impacts and makes Felipe Calderon's strategy to increase the military presence in Mexico to combat DTOs irresponsible and neglectful of his duty to protect the citizens against the violence of DTOs.

Section 4 – President Calderon’s Inefficacious Military Strategy

Skepticism of Using the Military in Mexico

Many Mexican public officials expressed their displeasure with Felipe Calderon’s military strategy during his Presidency. To begin with, much of Calderon’s initial Presidential campaigning in 2005 was focused on “creating stability within the country, particularly focusing on increasing transparency and reducing the widespread corruption that had continually plagued the Mexican institutions”.¹²⁴ Felipe Calderon failed to communicate that in order to create stability within the country he would be increasing the military presence. Thus, Calderon’s unprecedented use of the military to launch an attack against the DTOs came as a surprise to many within the Mexican government, as no discussion of this offensive ever took place in Congress.¹²⁵

Opponents have also argued that Felipe Calderon’s strategy was flawed because it did not contain a genuine crime prevention policy, in that “the government did not explain whether the offensive aimed to get rid of all drug traffickers, reduce the killings or something else”.¹²⁶ Moreover, Felipe Calderon has never stipulated “what specific benchmarks would be used to determine when the military could return to the barracks.”¹²⁷ This lack of transparency has induced skepticism from many within and outside of government, who believe the offensive against the DTOs would inevitably lead to an escalation of violence, without any resolution to the crisis. Javier Sicilia, the father of a 24-year-old male who was part of a group of seven who were kidnapped and killed in Cuernavaca, Mexico City, has led multiple protests against the Mexican Government’s military strategy. Sicilia noted, “Sending the army out was an

¹²⁴ Murphy, Heather., “Mexico’s Presidential Candidates – Profiles and Campaign Information”, The Washington Post, June 2006, <http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2006/06/09/AR2006060900814.html>

¹²⁵ International Crisis Group, “Peña Nieto’s Challenge: Criminal Cartels and Rule of Law in Mexico”, Latin America Report N°48, March 2013, pg.17., <http://www.crisisgroup.org/~ /media/Files/latin-america/mexico/048-pena-nietos-challenge-criminal-cartels-and-rule-of-law-in-mexico.pdf>

¹²⁶ International Crisis Group, pg.17.

¹²⁷ International Crisis Group, pg.17.

irresponsible act. We are not in actual war in that sense. We are not invaded by a foreign country. The ones losing the war, suffering the war, are not the criminal factions or the government side... It's us (the Mexican people).”¹²⁸

The pessimism and negativity over the government's actions to increase the military presence in Mexico has continued to trouble Felipe Calderon to this present-day. In late-2012, the Harvard Kennedy School of Government announced that Calderon would become an Inaugural Angelopoulos Global Public Leader in their program which is designed for “high-profile leaders who are transitioning out of public office or other leadership positions to spend time in residence at Harvard for teaching, learning and research”¹²⁹. Within days of this announcement, multiple petitions were started by Mexican citizens to motivate the President of Harvard to revoke Calderon's fellowship, citing his irresponsibility and failure as President to protect the citizens of Mexico; the petitions garnered over 35,000 signatures in less than two months.¹³⁰

Alternative Strategies Available to the Mexican Government

Many critics have candidly expressed their criticisms of Felipe Calderon's use of military to instigate and neutralize the DTOs, yet few of these critics have provided an alternative strategy for the Government to administer, simply citing the fact that a ‘different’ initiative is needed to reduce the current levels of violence. There are however a small number of policy and security analysts that have deliberated on diverse approaches for the Mexican government to consider.

¹²⁸ Ellingwood, Ken (b). “Criticism of Calderon mounts over Mexico drug violence”, Los Angeles Times, May 2011, <http://articles.latimes.com/2011/may/06/world/la-fg-mexico-blame-20110507>

¹²⁹ Knoll, Andalusia. “Fleeing His Own War On Drugs, Felipe Calderon Finds Refuge At Harvard”, Truthout.Org, March 2013, <http://truth-out.org/opinion/item/14761-fleeing-his-own-war-on-drugs-felipe-calderon-finds-refuge-at-harvard>

¹³⁰ Knoll, 2013.

One such approach, articulated by Mark Kleiman of the UCLA School of Public Affairs, envisions a strategy that would “reconfigure the drug law enforcement efforts of both US and Mexican agencies to create disincentives for violence... by de-emphasizing drug quantities in the algorithms used to select targets of drug law enforcement”.¹³¹ The strategy would centre around a government crafted scoring system based on a ‘set of violence-related metrics’, wherein the Mexican government would be responsible for tracking and updating the scoring system over a publicly announced set period of time. The most violent DTO after a set period of time would be targeted by both the Mexican and US law enforcement agencies, and the expectation would be that the specific targeting would compel the specific violent DTOs status to decline within the drug trafficking industry. Moreover the repetitive process would optimistically induce the remaining DTOs to “reduce their violence levels in order to escape becoming the next target”.¹³²

Another option for the Mexican government to consider, which would decrease the escalating violence against Mexican citizens, would be to negotiate a truce with the DTOs. It is clear that the utilization of an enforcement strategy to neutralize the DTOs, which the Mexican Government has imposed since 2006, has failed to ensure the principal duty of the government which is to ‘protect the public from harm’¹³³. It is instead necessary to adopt a government policy “adapted to the political realities of the contemporary armed conflict”, in a manner that signifies “returning to a level of political engagement with powerful drug lords...which is necessary to prevent mass violence, not only to save lives but to encourage an environment where legitimate businesses can thrive alongside criminal enterprises”.¹³⁴ Many analysts,

¹³¹ Kleiman, Mark. “Targeting Drug-Trafficking Violence in Mexico: An Orthogonal Approach”, UCLA School of Public Affairs, in Yale Center for the Study of Globalization’s “Rethinking the ‘War on Drugs’ Through the US-Mexico Prism”, 2012, pg.134.

¹³² Kleiman pg.135.

¹³³ Carpenter, Ami. “Beyond Drug Wars: Transforming Factional Conflict in Mexico”, Conflict Resolution Quarterly, Vol.27, No.4, Summer 2010, Wiley Periodicals, pp.402.

¹³⁴ Carpenter, pg.418.

including former President Vicente Fox, have advocated this approach in the past. During an interview with the media in 2011, Vicente Fox made it clear that the government needed to pursue new and creative solutions to end the violence and attain a level of peace and harmony necessary for Mexican society and its citizens.¹³⁵ Fox then proposed “the integration of a liaison group of international experts to convene a truce with organized crime and the creation of an amnesty law...given the levels of unusual and cruel violence Mexican citizens are faced with on a daily basis.”¹³⁶

The process of negotiating a ceasefire with internal adversaries of the state is not uncommon. Ecuadorian rival gangs MS 13 and Barrio 18 negotiated a truce that was sanctioned by the Ecuadorian government in March 2012. Although the majority of the details remain unknown, the main logistics of the truce between government and the 60,000 gang members included a reduction in the number of homicides, in exchange for improved prison conditions and a reduction in ‘hard-line’ policies targeting the gangs.¹³⁷ The Ecuadorian Government’s decision to change strategies may be summed up by Congressman Raul Mijango: “I saw gang policies not only as inefficient but as counterproductive...The more you repress, the more they reproduce”.¹³⁸ The early results of this truce have been positive: in 2012 the number of murders reached 2,195, nearly a 50% drop from the murder rate of 2011, and the lowest since in the past five years.¹³⁹ In light of these results, the Honduran government declared in early-2013 that it would be working on a truce agreement with its rival gangs, in order to lower the homicide rate and violence within the country.

¹³⁵ Alvarez, Xochitl, “Fox propone tregua a criminales tras ataque en NL”, El Universal Mexico, August 2011, <http://www.eluniversal.com.mx/notas/788981.html>

¹³⁶ Alvarez, 2011.

¹³⁷ Dudley, Stephen. “Religion and Violence in Latin America: The El Salvador Gang Truce and the Church”, CLALS White Paper Series, No.1, May 2013, pg.16.

¹³⁸ Dudley, pg.15.

¹³⁹ Brodzinsky, Sibylla. “El Salvador Gang Truce Leads to Plummeting Murder Rates”, The Guardian News, March 2013,

Negotiating any type of agreement with the DTOs would be a difficult process, both logistically and politically; however, if the level of violence were to decrease in Mexico, then current Mexican President Peña Nieto's strategies to increase citizen security for the short and long term would be easier to administer. For instance, President Nieto intends to increase spending on social programs "to keep young people from joining criminal organizations in the 251 most violent towns and neighbourhoods across the country".¹⁴⁰ This type of policy is lauded by public officials and citizens alike, yet there is no incentive for young kids and adults to join these social programs if they can earn respectable funding by acting as lookouts or gunrunners for the DTOs. However, if the level of violence were reduced because of a negotiated truce, then these social programs would have a higher rate of success, due to the lack of opportunities elsewhere for the 'young people'.

A similar argument could be made for the altering and strengthening of policing institutions. President Nieto plans to develop a national 'gendarmerie', which is described as a "paramilitary force with heftier defense capabilities than regular police which can better withstand attacks by criminal groups and deter brazen violence".¹⁴¹ The purpose of such a force would be to decrease the military's role operating role in Mexico; however, the implementation of the 'gendarmerie' would take some time, as the recruitment and training process would be extensive and complex.¹⁴² With a truce, the Mexican government would have the capability to optimally develop the 'gendarmerie' and implement adequate vetting and recruiting procedures to develop and strengthen the local and state institutions. Without a truce, the violence and human rights abuses will continue to plague the Mexican citizens, which will force the Mexican government to

¹⁴⁰ The Guardian AP, "Mexico unveils new strategy in war on drugs and for preventing crime", The Guardian News, February 2013,

¹⁴¹ Venda, Felbab-Brown, "Peña Nieto's Piñata: The Promise and Pitfalls of Mexico's New Security Policy against Organized Crime", Latin America Initiative, February 2013, pg.7.

¹⁴² Venda, pg.7.

rush the process and get the ‘gendarmerie’ implemented into the military’s policing role, prior to the unit being fully prepared to do so.

Section 5 - Conclusion

Drug trafficking has afflicted Mexico since the beginning of the 20th century, and unfortunately, Former President Felipe Calderon’s strategy to use the augmented military force to neutralize the DTOs into submission and order has proven to be futile and ineffective. This claim is corroborated by the reality that within the past few years, Mexico has experienced a chain of events that includes the evolution and proliferation of the DTOs, the vast increase in DTO-related homicides in Mexico, and the creation of one of the bloodiest civil-interstate violent conflicts to ever occur in the world.

In order to remove the country from its current precarious position, President Peña Nieto has developed the ‘Pact for Mexico’ security strategy, which aims to reduce violent acts such as homicides and kidnappings that have been increasing in Mexico on a yearly basis. Despite instituting initiatives to increase social programs and new federal police forces in early-2013, the problem with Nieto’s strategy thus far is that there have been no specific details or measures on how these violent acts are going to be reduced, and the pact does not indicate the government’s strategy on reducing drug trafficking or neutralizing the DTOs.¹⁴³

Regardless of the strategy President Nieto decides to implement, it is important the Mexican government focuses on reducing the level of violence and increasing the level of citizen security, instead of making a pledge to use the military to eliminate and neutralize the presence of the DTOs from the Mexican borders. That is Felipe Calderon’s error in judgement, and that is the legacy he is left to endure as the former leader and President of the Mexico.

¹⁴³ International Crisis Group, pg.37

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Annex A – List of Mexican DTO Leaders

The Mexican DTO leaders were identified as follows:

A. Gulf-Zetas Cartel

1. Heriberto Lazcano Lazcano, alias “El Lazca”; “Z-14”; “Z-3”; “El Verdugo”; “El Bronce”; “El Pitirijas”. Zetas
2. Jorge Eduardo Costilla Sánchez, alias “El Coss”. Gulf
3. Antonio Ezequiel Cárdenas Guillén, alias “Tony Tormenta”. Gulf
4. Miguel Angel Treviño Morales, alias “L-40”; “Comandante 40”; “La Mona”. Zetas
5. Omar Treviño Morales, alias “L-42”. Zetas
6. Iván Velázquez Caballero, alias “El Talibán”; “L-50”. Zetas
7. Gregorio Saucedo Gamboa, alias “El Goyo”; “Metro-2”; “Caramuela”. Zetas

B. Sinaloa Cartel

1. Joaquín Guzmán Loera y/o Joaquín Archivaldo Guzmán Loera, alias “El Chapo”.
2. Ismael Zambada García, alias “El Mayo Zambada”.
3. Ignacio Coronel Villarreal, alias “Nacho Coronel”.
4. Juan José Esparragoza Moreno, alias “El Azul”.
5. Vicente Zambada Niebla, alias “El Vicentillo”.

C. Beltran-Leyva Cartel

1. Arturo Beltrán Leyva, alias “El Barbas”.
2. Mario Alberto Beltrán Leyva y/o Héctor Beltrán Leyva, alias “El General”.
3. Sergio Villarreal Barragán, alias “El Grande”.
4. Edgar Valdez Villarreal, alias “La Barbie”.

D. Juarez/Carrillo Fuentes Cartel

1. Vicente Carrillo Fuentes, alias “El Viceroy”; “El General”.
2. Vicente Carrillo Leyva.

E. ‘La Familia’ Cartel

1. Nazario Moreno González, alias “El Chayo”; “El Mas Loco”.
2. Servando Gómez Martínez, alias “El Profe”; “La Tuta”.
3. José de Jesús Méndez Vargas, alias “El Chango”.
4. Dionicio Loya Plancarte, alias “El Tío”.

F. Arellano-Felix Cartel

1. Teodoro García Simental, alias “El Teo”; “El Lalo”; “El 68”; “El K-1”; “El Alamo 6”; “El Tres Letras”.
2. Fernando Sánchez Arellano, alias “El Ingeniero”.

While the other members of influence within the Mexican DTOs were identified as:

A. Gulf-Zetas Cartel

1. Sigifredo Nájera Talamantes, alias “El Canicón”. Zetas
2. Ricardo Almanza Morales, alias “El Gori”. Zetas

3. Eduardo Almanza Morales, alias “El Gori”. Zetas
4. Raymundo Almanza Morales, alias “El Gori”. Zetas
5. Flavio Méndez Santiago, alias “El Amarillo”. Zetas
6. Sergio Peña Solís y/o René Solís Carlos, alias “El Concord”; “El Colosio”. Zetas
7. Raúl Lucio Fernández Lechuga, alias “El Lucky”. Zetas
8. Sergio Enrique Ruíz Tlapanco, alias “El Tlapa”. Zetas

B. Beltran-Leyva Cartel

1. Francisco Hernández García, alias “El 2000”; “El Panchillo”.
2. Alberto Pineda Villa, alias “El Borrado”.
3. Marco Antonio Pineda Villa, alias “El MP”.
4. Héctor Huerta Ríos, alias “La Burra”; “El Junior”.

C. Juarez/Carrillo Fuentes Cartel

1. Juan Pablo Ledesma y/o Eduardo Ledesma, alias “El JL”.¹⁴⁴



Figure 3 - Eliminated Mexican DTO Leaders¹⁴⁵

¹⁴⁴Dirección General De Compilación Y Consulta Del Orden Jurídico Nacional, pp.2-3.

¹⁴⁵The Economist, “Mexico’s Drug Lord: Kingpin Bowling”, from the Dirección General De Compilación Y Consulta Del Orden Jurídico Nacional, <http://www.economist.com/news/americas/21564897-most-wanted-men-mexico-are-tumbling-will-crime-follow-suit>

Annex B – Visualization of the Expansion of Mexican DTOs overtime¹⁴⁶

Mexican States	1995	1996	1997	1998	1999	2000	2001	2002	2003	2004	2005	2006	2007	2008	2009	2010
Aguascalientes								J		Z	SJ	ZG	Z		ZF	Z
Baja California		ST	SJT	JT	J	T	T		T	T	T	T	T	ZT	ZFT	ZFT
Baja California Sur												T	T	T	T	ST
Campeche		T	J		T			G		Z	S	Z	ZG	ZG	ZG	ZBL
Coahuila de Zaragoza			G		T	G	S	J	JT	ZGJ	ZG	ZS	ZGS	ZGS	ZFGTBL	ZGSJT
Colima			T	J		G	SJ			G	G	S	GS	GS	ZFS	ZFSJ
Chiapas				ZS		J		GT		GJ	Z	Z	ZSJT	ZG	ZGSTBL	ZGBL
Chihuahua	J	GJ	JT	J	J	S		JT	T	ZJ	GSJ	SJ	ZGSJT	ZSJTBL	ZFGSJT	ZFGSJTBL
Distrito Federal						T	ZST			T	GSJBL	S	S	SBL	FGSTBL	FGSTBL
Durango		T	T		J		S		GJ	ZS	ZS	ZS	S	ZSJ	ZFST	ZSJBL
Guanajuato	G	G	J		G	ST	J	J		G	Z	FGS	ZGS	ZFG	ZFG	ZFGS
Guerrero			J	T		SJ	BL	GJ		GJ	BL	ZSBL	ZGSBL	ZSJBL	ZFSBL	ZFGSJBL
Hidalgo													Z	ZG	ZGS	Z
Jalisco	ST		JT	JT			S	ST	ZSJT	ZGS	ZGS	ZGST	ZGSBL	ZGSJTBL	ZGSJTBL	ZFGSJTBL
México		ZT	J	GJ	Z	T	GST	T	ST	ZGST	GSBL	GSTBL	ZGSJT	ZFGSTBL	ZFSJTBL	ZFGSJT
Michoacán de Ocampo						G	BL		T	FG	ZG	ZFGS	ZFGABL	ZFGSJT	ZFTBL	ZFGSJTBL
Morelos			J	J	Z			S			ZS	ZG	GS	ZSBL	ZBL	ZGBL
Nayarit									S		S	Z	Z	BL	ZS	ZSBL
Nuevo León	G	G	J		GT	G	ST	G	G	ZGT	ZG	ZGSJBL	ZGSBL	ZGSBL	ZFSBL	ZGSJTBL
Oaxaca		G		Z						G		ZS	ZGS	ZG	ZS	ZSBL
Puebla		G			G		SJ	ST	T	Z	BL	ZST	ZGSJBL	ZJ	ZFGSJBL	ZFGSJBL
Querétaro							T	T						GBL	S	ZFSBL
Quintana Roo				J		G					ZG	G	G	ZFG	ZGBL	ZFGRL
San Luis Potosí							BL		G		G	ZG	F	ZGJ	ZFJ	ZFGS
Sinaloa	S				Z	S	ST	S	ZSJBL	ZST	ZFSJBL	ZST	ZGSJT	ZSJTBL	ZSJTBL	ZSJTBL
Sonora	S	T	J	J	Z		SJT	T	ST	J	SBL	ZSBL	ZGSBL	ZGS	ZFSTBL	ZFSBL
Tobasco				Z								G	ZG	ZG	ZBL	ZGBL
Tamaulipas	G	GJ	GJT	GJ	JT	GT	G	ZGT	ZG	ZG	ZGSJ	FGS	ZFGSJT	ZFGST	ZFGSJT	ZFGRL
Tlaxcala													Z	Z	Z	Z
Veracruz			J	GJ	J	GJ	J	G	G	J	ZGS	ZGSJ	ZGJ	ZFGSJ	ZFGSJ	ZGSJTBL
Yucatán					T	G	J			ZJ		ZGS	ZSBL	ZGSBL	ZGJBL	ZG
Zacatecas			T			G				G	GBL	F	ZGSJ	ZFG	ZGSJ	ZFGJ

¹⁴⁶ The list below is derived from the data accumulated from the tool developed by Coscia and Rios. The presence of the Mexican DTOs are noted by the acronym assigned to them, which are: Los Zetas (Z), La FamiliaMichoacan (F), Gulf Cartel (G), Sinaloa Cartel (S), Juarez Cartel (J), Tijuana Cartel (T), Beltran Leyva Cartel (BL). The shading of cells indicates greater DTO presence, so the lightest gray notes the presence of one cartel, while the darkest shade notes the presence of all seven in one state.

Annex C - Homicides in Mexico from 1994-2011¹⁴⁷

Mexican States	1994-1999	2000	2001	2002	2003	2004	2005	2000-2005	2006	2007	2008	2009	2010	2011
Aguascalientes	179	17	23	27	25	21	25	138	26	44	59	67	75	105
Baja California	2,686	440	404	427	454	480	439	2,644	465	369	1,031	1,530	1,525	822
Baja California Sur	174	28	23	32	25	29	34	171	26	35	38	34	55	50
Campeche	494	66	53	54	44	37	47	301	33	50	54	58	48	51
Coahuila de Zaragoza	998	120	155	140	121	117	154	807	104	107	175	270	449	718
Colima	360	57	57	43	42	53	49	301	43	43	56	61	131	169
Chiapas	4,043	429	173	475	443	223	303	2,046	538	101	262	514	199	196
Chihuahua	3,791	588	621	634	542	478	570	3,433	648	518	2,604	3,680	6,421	4,487
Distrito Federal	7,294	924	983	939	975	948	878	5,647	819	848	931	981	1,078	1,100
Durango	1,611	161	166	177	213	166	169	1,052	181	178	426	1,033	1,112	1,085
Guanajuato	1,755	233	224	210	220	177	216	1,280	207	219	296	492	446	616
Guerrero	6,645	804	641	616	600	591	589	3,841	788	764	1,001	1,851	1,567	2,397
Hidalgo	846	87	119	53	71	88	73	491	48	74	75	145	113	211
Jalisco	3,970	475	495	480	478	411	443	2,782	480	450	547	681	1,081	1,527
México	15,677	2,012	1,932	1,948	1,912	1,734	2,018	11,556	1,748	1,243	1,579	1,864	2,114	2,627
Michoacán	5,642	596	630	534	557	552	680	3,549	988	556	658	934	707	853
Morelos	2,088	238	210	175	169	158	138	1,088	141	126	215	259	494	435
Nayarit	993	107	108	147	110	140	131	743	103	108	155	195	541	583
Nuevo León	724	109	92	105	148	114	151	719	169	279	241	342	928	2,149
Oaxaca	6,215	709	640	608	621	626	547	3,751	520	563	617	598	731	685
Puebla	3,024	393	423	377	348	364	316	2,221	353	274	352	360	376	440
Querétaro	575	105	108	69	84	74	80	520	61	56	73	89	73	109
Quintana Roo	545	74	103	70	136	137	76	596	67	121	144	141	145	164
San Luis Potosí	1,456	274	230	158	145	136	136	1,079	159	142	199	211	363	364
Sinaloa	3,542	458	488	472	419	381	436	2,654	457	397	820	1,413	2,397	1,967
Sonora	1,761	201	257	223	229	252	259	1,421	249	321	435	573	740	542
Tabasco	1,113	93	101	97	116	110	99	616	145	146	154	173	194	230
Tamaulipas	1,842	264	188	186	227	217	348	1,430	358	193	265	315	963	1,097
Tlaxcala	381	56	52	52	39	52	49	300	45	36	54	81	56	89
Veracruz	3,444	423	380	352	406	331	344	2,236	359	380	341	692	461	999
Yucatán	263	43	37	47	42	36	38	243	42	49	49	37	34	53
Zacatecas	728	43	37	47	42	36	38	243	42	49	49	37	34	53
All States	84,859	10,627	10,153	9,974	10,003	9,269	9,873	59,899	10,412	8,839	13,955	19,711	25,651	26,973

Table 3: Total Homicides Accumulated by INEGI from 1994-2010

¹⁴⁷ Information from: Instituto Nacional De Estadística y Geografía (c), "Registros Administrativos: Mortalidad (Defunciones de Mortalidad)", INEGI, 2011, <http://www.inegi.org.mx/sistemas/olap/proyectos/bd/consulta.asp?p=11094&c=15273&s=est&cl=4>

Annex D – Conflicts within Americas from 1942-2012¹⁴⁸

Begin	End	Type	Mag	States Directly Involved	Brief Description	Deaths
1976	1980	CW	3	Argentina	The Dirty War repression of dissidents	20000
1955	*	CV	2	Argentina	Civil violence (army rebellion)	3000
1982	*	IW	1	Argentina-UK	Falklands-Malvinas War	1000
1952	*	CV	2	Bolivia	National Revolution	2000
1946	*	CV	1	Bolivia	President Villarroel ousted by general armed uprising	1000
1980	*	CV	1	Brazil	Repression of dissidents (death squads)	1000
1974	1976	CW	3	Chile	Repression of dissidents ("disappeared")	20000
1973	*	CV	2	Chile	Civil violence (army ouster of Allende)	5000
1987	*	CV	2	Chile	Civil violence	3000
1948	1960	CW	5	Colombia	La Violencia civil war (Liberals)	250000
1975	2012+	CV	4	Colombia	Civil violence, land reform, and drug trafficking (left: ELN, FARC, ELP, MAO, M-19; right: MAS, AUC)	55000
1948	*	CV	1	Colombia	Civil violence (Conservatives)	1000
1948	*	CV	1	Costa Rica	Civil violence (National Union)	2000
1955	*	CV	1	Costa Rica	Civil violence	1000
1995	*	IV	1	Ecuador Peru	International violence (border dispute)	1000
1969	*	IW	2	El Salvador-Honduras	Soccer War	5000
1966	1996	EW	5	Guatemala	Repression of indigenous peoples	150000
1954	*	CV	1	Guatemala	Civil violence (coup against Arbenz)	1000
1981	1986	IV	1	Honduras-Nicaragua	International violence; Contra armed forces	2000
1957	*	IV	1	Honduras-Nicaragua	International violence (border dispute)	1000
2006	2012+	CV	3	Mexico	Federal Army and police offensive against entrenched drug cartels and corrupt police and officials, mainly in the northern region bordering the USA	60000
1994	1997	EV	1	Mexico	Ethnic violence (Chiapas)	1000
1978	1979	CW	3	Nicaragua	Civil war (Sandinistas)	40000
1981	1990	CW	3	Nicaragua	Civil war (Contras)	30000
1989	*	IV	1	Panama-USA	International violence	1000
1947	*	CV	1	Paraguay	Paraguay Civil War "Febrerista Insurrection"	1500
1982	1997	CV	3	Peru	Civil violence (Sendero Luminoso)	30000
2001	*	IV	2	United States	Al Qaeda attacks on New York/Washington	3000
2005	2012+	IV	1	United States	Stabilization operation in Afghanistan	2200
2003	2010	IW	2	United States	Invasion of Iraq and military occupation	4400
1958	*	CV	1	Venezuela	Civil violence (popular revolt against President Perez Jimenez)	800

¹⁴⁸ Information from: Marshall, Monty G., "Major Episodes of Political Violence: 1946-2012", Center for Systemic Peace, April 2013, <http://www.systemicpeace.org/warlist.htm>