

THE INTELLECTUALISTIC FOUNDATION

OF

FREEDOM IN THE DOCTRINE

OF

ST. THOMAS AQUINAS

THE INTELLECTUALISTIC FOUNDATION

OF

FREEDOM IN THE DOCTRINE


OF

ST. THOMAS AQUINAS

by

James Wilfred Dore, C.S.B., M.A.

A Thesis presented in conformity with the
requirements for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy
at the University of Ottawa, 1941



UMI Number: DC53800

INFORMATION TO USERS

The quality of this reproduction is dependent upon the quality of the copy submitted. Broken or indistinct print, colored or poor quality illustrations and photographs, print bleed-through, substandard margins, and improper alignment can adversely affect reproduction.

In the unlikely event that the author did not send a complete manuscript and there are missing pages, these will be noted. Also, if unauthorized copyright material had to be removed, a note will indicate the deletion.

UMI[®]

UMI Microform DC53800
Copyright 2011 by ProQuest LLC
All rights reserved. This microform edition is protected against
unauthorized copying under Title 17, United States Code.

ProQuest LLC
789 East Eisenhower Parkway
P.O. Box 1346
Ann Arbor, MI 48106-1346

TABLE OF CONTENTS

	Page
INTRODUCTION	1
CHAPTER ONE Specification and Exercise in the Acts of the Intellect.	10
CHAPTER TWO Specification and Exercise in the Acts of the Will	47
CHAPTER THREE Mutual Interrelation of Will and Intellect.	77
CHAPTER FOUR Specification of Free Choice by the Intellect	106
CHAPTER FIVE Exercise of Free Choice by the Will.	136
NOTE TO CHAPTER FIVE	173
CONCLUSION	180
BIBLIOGRAPHY	195

I N T R O D U C T I O N

"What Augustine believed about free-will, what St. Thomas, no one can precisely say, though they and all men of the Middle Ages wrangled over the matter with unceasing eagerness, virulence and uncertainty."¹ Yes! The men of these ages and the men of all ages discussed this question, till the Great Naturalistic Revolution of the past hundred years disposed of the problem as too threadbare, too difficult or too unimportant for discussion. And the ages of men have seen many solutions to this problem proposed by numerous thinkers - and they all jostle for primacy.

The solution of St. Thomas, which this study proposes to explain in part, certainly does not merit the charge of obscurity, which is levelled against it in the above quotation. St. Thomas, like all great thinkers, did pursue the matter with eagerness, with the eagerness of the

¹G.H. Palmer, The Problem of Freedom (New York: 1911), p.3.

saint bent on overcoming all obstacles to the attainment of a closer union with God, with the eagerness of the scholar questing hungrily for truth and rending all veils with a sure touch the more intimately he penetrates that temple of truth. But of virulence there was none; an all-embracing charity made him the most charitable of teachers and the most forgiving of opponents. The clarity with which he illumined all that he touched rendered certain the road to truth which he consistently followed.

The labyrinthine ways of the debate on freedom or liberty know few expert travellers. The titanic glooms on that route remain unfathomable. But amid the dust of the mounded years there are sufficient gleams to enable the searcher to piece together the main points of the ageless debate. It is not a question of proving the existence of freedom here. St. Thomas' treatment shows and proves it to be a natural possession of the rational creature.

Freedom and Liberty - synonymous and mistreated terms! Freedom of choice and freedom of autonomy - chimera or divine gifts? Whatever we say, this phoenix, coming out of Arabia, found its Heliopolis in the heart of the Angelic Doctor, and its altar in his glowing intellect. Rising from the ashes of that purification, the doctrine of freedom,

clothed with a radiant youth and beauty, has resisted the sullyng efforts of all attempts at distortion, unspotted, has passed through the man-made fogs and mists of the idealist and the materialist, the religious revolutionist and the social reformer. Today, and for all time, it is there in the limpid stream of his written words, with the same freshness and youth which it had when it issued from his lips in the halls of Paris, of Cologne and of Rome.

In other hands, and in other ages, different meanings were attached to these terms. The wave of Liberalistic theory of the last century made freedom of choice an end in itself. Power politics, faithful to the Kantian tradition in this at least, attributes to the will a freedom of autonomy. Christian thinkers of the past followed St. Augustine in a more voluntarist explanation, or Boetius in his intellectualistic explanation of freedom of choice. In his own day, St. Thomas found a worthy antagonist in Duns Scotus, who championed the will as the principle of freedom.

There are variants and combinations of all these answers, and objections, metaphysical or mystical to all these answers, and numerous other answers. In other words, there is, and has ever been, confusion and chaos. Who, but the

genius of Aquino, could travel, with sure foot, amid the maze of error and distortion which has always encumbered this question. Who but he could taste at all fountains, and with his sense of taste unspoiled draw from an unspoiled source the sweet and fresh waters of truth.

This study is not an attempt to follow St. Thomas all the way in that wondrous doctrine. It is an attempt, rather, to show that he based it on an intellectualistic foundation. It is an attempt to show that the means to perfect freedom, the instrument by which freedom to enslave oneself to the Good is secured, freedom of choice, is linked in a very intimate and necessary way with the operation of the intellect. Linked so intimately is it, that there would be no freedom without intellectual operation - no freedom where intellect is lacking.

That means, that as faithful followers of St. Thomas, we accept in toto his teaching and doctrine and go on to one introductory part of that doctrine to study it closely and determine his meaning. It means that we must study freedom of choice to see the part intellect plays in choice, and secondarily, to determine in what sense choice is free. If freedom of choice has an intellectualistic basis and if it is basic to all human freedom, then our

object is achieved and our conclusion justified: totius libertatis radix est in ratione constituta.

That our purpose is justified is evident from a statement from a faithful interpreter of St. Thomas: "It is clear that a philosophy of freedom must begin with a doctrine of free will or freedom of choice. All the various meanings of the word freedom having any importance for man presuppose as a primordial freedom the fact that our will in its central irreducibility is free not only from any external constraint, but from any necessity which would determine it ad unum. For St. Thomas, freedom of choice is not something irrational imposed on the philosopher by the moral conscience; it is the property of a certain nature, more precisely of an intellectual nature. The root of freedom, he wrote, consists in reason; to be free is of the essence of every intellect. The will is thus not only founded on nature but is itself a certain nature, and being a nature, it has a certain necessary determination; by virtue of what it is, it desires the good as such, the good that the intelligence knows, the good in its universal amplitude, and therefore a good which saturates every desire."¹ To place

¹J. Maritain, Some Reflections on Culture and Liberty
(Chicago: 1933).

our problem in its proper perspective it is necessary to give a very brief summary of the Thomistic teaching on freedom.

As a special prerogative of intelligent creatures they possess, of their nature, a freedom from determination to particular things, though determined to their ultimate goal. This freedom, only the beginning of true freedom, is called freedom of choice, liberum arbitrium. Now willing is essentially an immanent act, a perfectant of the agent. By the operation of intellect and will the soul is perfected in its being. By the operation of the intellect it is made to be the thing understood, by the word born within it, which proceeds from it. Similarly, by willing, the soul is made to be the thing by loving it; by love the lover identifies himself with the beloved, so that his being and that of the beloved becomes as one in the lover, thus causing a procession of the loved within him. Similarly there is a perfection in the order of freedom. As the soul is in potency to its perfection of nature, in being, and that perfection is achieved by operation, so is the perfection of liberty achieved. The fullest perfection of liberty is to will only good and rest in it - as St. Augustine beautifully points

out - "The first liberty of the will was to be able not to sin, the last will be much greater, not to be able to sin."¹ Freedom of choice serves as a means to the acquisition of this fuller freedom, liberty of autonomy. This freedom, which in a still limited condition is the prerogative of the saint in this life, finds its fulfilment in the presence of the Beatific Vision. Here the means cease to function, here there is no longer need to choose particular goods, partial goods, goods containing something that is not all good; there is the perfection of that operation in the presence of the achieved goal, the perfection of liberty in union with God.

Now in the intellectual order the freest person has the most restrictions on the possibility of going astray. If one cannot accept the principle that two and two make four, then one is not free to do anything further in mathematics. To have freedom in science is to have power to acquire the truth of that science. Anything which contributes to this acquisition increases freedom in that domain. So we have principles, rules, maxims and regulations, all of which facilitate and render possible the gaining of

¹Augustine, De Corr. et Gratia, #33.

mathematical knowledge. To lack all determination in mathematics would prevent the possibility of mathematical knowledge. Thus indeterminacy is in one way an imperfection - determinacy is perfection. Freedom of choice means then liberty to determine self, and perfect determination of self to that which is the goal and perfection of self means perfect freedom. To this end all intelligent beings strive. Thus the order of nature and the order of freedom, with the same end in view, are equally perfected in the achievement of their end. That end will mean the perfection of being in keeping with human nature and the perfection of freedom in keeping with the same nature.

The plan which this study should follow now begins to unfold itself. As a study of that elementary freedom, aimed at a particular end, the perfection of freedom, the operations involved must first be treated. Chapter One, a study of the specification and exercise of the intellect, reveals a certain fixity, as well as a certain mobility, the fixity of specification dependent on the nature of the intellect. In Chapter Two a similar treatment of the specification and exercise of the will shows its determination dependent on the specification by the intellect and how

that determination is mediated by the intellect and will. Chapter Three will treat, more particularly, of the interaction of the two operations. This will provide the opportunity of distinguishing the will as nature and as choice. Where the will is not determined by nature, it chooses. In Chapter Four we will consider the specification of this act of choice and therein see one phase of the freedom of choice. The elaboration of this freedom of choice, and ultimately the determining factor of its freedom depends on exercise, so the exercise of the act of choice will be dealt with in Chapter Five. Here we will see wherein freedom of choice ultimately resides. Then will it be possible to draw our conclusions on the question at hand and justify the primary statement: totius libertatis radix est in ratione constituta.

CHAPTER ONE

THE SPECIFICATION AND EXERCISE OF

ACTS OF THE INTELLECT

The difference between things which know and those that do not know is that the knowing subjects are apt to contain within themselves the forms of other things.¹ The being which knows, besides being itself. i.e., besides having its own essence and particular existence, is apt to receive something else, without however ceasing to be itself, the object known, which henceforth exists in some manner in the knower; as a result then, the subject has in a certain way become the object. To know then is to be, in a new and fuller manner, since it means to cause something which at first was for its own sake to enter into

¹1.14.1. Ad cuius evidentiam considerandum est quod cognoscentia a non cognoscentibus in hoc distinguuntur, quia non cognoscentia nihil habent nisi formam suam tantum, sed cognoscens natum est habere formam etiam rei alterius; nam species cogniti est in cognoscente.

another being which previously had existed for itself.

Here we are faced with two kinds of being - the one which is never anything but itself; the other which is capable of taking up into itself the being of other things. Man is of the latter type of being but holding the lowest rank among intelligences capable of that perfective operation. It is a general principle of St. Thomas that the nearer an effect approaches to the efficient cause, the greater the participation of it shares in its nature -

Quanto enim aliquod receptivum est propinquius causae influenti, tanto magis participat de influentia ipsius.....¹

Applying this, we find that inasmuch as the human intellect is thus twice removed, as it were, from the form which is Pure Act, it represents an inferior degree of intellectuality, requiring a body to achieve its proper operations.² It is placed in the lowest degree of intelligent creatures since the human intellect is the weakest ray of the divine

¹ 3.7.1.

² 2.C.G.6. Actus autem purus, qui Deus est perfectior est quam actus potentiae permixtus, sicut in nobis est.

knowledge.¹ Nevertheless this intellect is infinitely superior to merely sensible forms, which entirely enclosed within matter, are constrained by the conditions of their particularity. In this way, the soul, having something of the angelic nature transcends the limitations of all matter and rises to the confines of the purely spiritual.²

Each angel, insofar as he is a pure spirit containing no matter by which he is designated 'this' or 'that' one, defines in himself a subsisting species and of himself shows forth completely one of the degrees of possible participation in the divine perfection. But we have seen that the human soul possesses too little perfection to come into existence by itself - though once it has come, it may continue to exist alone - wherefore, the whole human species taken collectively is necessary to represent the degree of

¹I.118.3. Anima (hominis) indiget uniri corpori, quo indiget ad operationem sensitivae partis, quod de angelo dici non potest. Cf. also I-2.4.6.

²I.76.1. Anima autem humana est ultima in nobilitate formarum. Unde intantum sua virtute excedit materiam corporalem, quod habet aliquam operationem et virtutem in qua nullo modo communicat materia corporalis et haec virtus dicitur intellectus. Cf. II Sent.39.3.a.1.c. Haec virtus (intellectus) est quaedam modica participatio intellectualitatis, respectu eius quod de intellectualitate in angelo est.

perfection corresponding to human nature.¹ It is consequent upon this, that man's soul, considered individually is an incomplete realization of its type, which tends to complete itself not through any strength of its own, but in virtue of some instrument which, itself incomplete, can yet be animated from within and so render the soul capable of realizing its natural perfection, viz., intellectual knowledge. Thus ordained by the imperfection of knowledge, man's soul becomes united to a body, and so attains its knowledge through this material medium by which it is put in contact with intelligible objects which it is made capable of assimilating. Otherwise human intelligence, being of the lowest grade of intellectuality, could in no way apprehend these objects, but would remain blank before them and wholly barren. God, however, never acts in vain, and so He places at the disposal of the human intellect the advantages consequent upon its union with the body.

¹ According to the law that an unattainable unity is imitated by a multiplicity. It is unnecessary to digress on this evident principle. In all phases of life man is always seeking order, the one in the many. Father Messaut in Themisme et Critique de la Connaissance, in Revue Thomiste, 1935, p.49, has brilliantly indicated this search of man.

It is necessary that such a union be effected because, in addition to the operation which is characteristic of man, i.e., knowing, it is equally true that man performs sensitive acts which evidently pertain to bodily organs. Vision, for example, presupposes an eye, the organ of sight, which perceives the coloured object; and the same applies to the other senses. If, therefore, feeling is a true - though not necessarily the proper - operation of man, it is clear that man is not only a soul but is a composite resulting from the union of body and soul. For this reason it is that knowledge is attributed to man as a whole, not only to the intellect. It is man who performs the intellectual operations. It is man who performs the operation of choice.

If it is I who know, and if intellectual knowledge is the peculiar activity of man, the intellective soul must be the form proper to man, because action is governed by being and that which makes a thing to be what it is, is the form. Hence St. Thomas concludes that the union of body and soul is a substantial one, i.e., the soul informs the body so that from these two, body and soul, one substance, man, is produced.¹

¹I.76.1.

In this way, human nature is composed of a spiritual and material element, each incomplete in itself but substantially united in the single complete being which is man. Thus, if the form is not a human soul, neither will the body be a human body. For the rational soul, being an integral part of the human composite, attains its natural perfection only by its union with a body, just as the matter of which this body is constituted, in order to be a real body and not simply matter, requires the actuality imparted by the form. But the higher a form, the greater number of virtues it gathers into the unity of its own perfection, "quia quod est inferioris, praeexistit perfectius in superiori,"¹ for the forms of natural things account for the quantity of being in which the things participate. Therefore, the substantial form, which is the human intellect, confers upon matter in one fell swoop, being, body, life, sense and intellection.² Consequently to each individual,

¹I.76.5. Thus in God all things are contained in the simplicity of His Essence.

²I.118.2 ad 2. Also Quaestiones de Anima I.9. Sic igitur cum anima sit forma substantialis, quia constituit hominem in determinata specie substantiae, non est aliqua alia forma substantialis media inter animam et materiam primam; sed homo ab ipsa anima rationali perficitur secundum diversos gradus perfectionum, ut sit scilicet corpus et animatum corpus, et animal rationale. Sed oportet quod materia secundum quod
(cont'd.)

there is one unique principle of being, one substantial form.

The term 'man' then for Aquinas cannot, in the strict sense, mean either the human body or the human soul, but refers to the composite of soul and body taken as one whole. For the soul informs the body and there results a physical composite of the same nature as any other composite of matter and form. In this case, however, the form alone is not what constitutes the species; it is the matter and form combined.

When he defines 'man' as 'rational animal', St. Thomas takes into account both of these elements. From the material element he places it in the genus 'animal', but adds the specific difference 'rational' which distinguishes man from all other animals. And this difference is from the form. Thus the logical definition of man as 'rational animal' refers to one metaphysical unity. True, the animal part of man is distinct in nature from his power of reasoning, although the two are inseparably joined during life in a

²(P.15 cont'd) intelligitur ut recipiens ab ipsa anima rationali perfectiones inferioris gradus, puta quod sit corpus, et animatum corpus, et animal intelligatur simul cum dispositionibus convenientibus, quod dat ultimam perfectionem. Sic igitur anima, secundum quod est forma dans esse, non habet aliquid aliud medium inter se et materiam primam.

common personality. It is not as if reason were some accidental property of his animal nature. Rather it is nearer the truth to say that 'man is animal which reasons' in which the whole predicate 'animal which reasons' expresses the mode of existence of that being to which the term 'man' is applied. Thus man is on the borderline between pure spirits and pure bodies, and so St. Thomas effects the transition in the universal order of things from simple intelligences to wholly corporeal beings.

But the soul is subject to the same imperfection that is characteristic of the angelic substance, it is composed of potency and act. It possesses only such being as its nature permits, following the general law that a creature participates in being according to the capacity of the participating essence.¹ But in the human soul there is a new degree of imperfection arising from the very nature of the soul which renders it inferior to the angels. For the soul is naturally apt to be united with a body.² This does not

¹I.75.7 ad 3. Anima ex natura suae essentia habet quod sit corpori unibilis, unde nec proprie anima est in specie, sed compositum. Et hoc ipsum quod anima quoddammodo indiget corpore ad suam operationem, ostendit quod anima tenet inferiorem gradum intellectualitatis quam angelus, qui corpori non unitur.

²I Sent.d.39.q.3.a.1. ...quia vero angelus simpliciter incorporeus est, nec corpori unitur.

mean that there is some accidental union effected, because although body does not belong to the essence of the soul, as such, nevertheless the capacity of union with the body is essential to the soul and characteristic of its nature, for as Gilson remarks, "this tendency towards union with the body is so far constitutive of the essence of the soul, that the soul separated from the body as it is between the death of a man and his resurrection, is in a state which without violating its nature is not yet in complete conformity with it."¹ Thus the soul is not a body but without the body it is not itself.

Lacking the perfection that is in other things,² that is their being, man possesses a remedy for this imperfection. He can make himself grow with new accretions.³ He has the power of intellectual knowledge. But "*animae humanae habent potentiam intellectivum non completam naturaliter; sed completur eis successive, per hoc quod accipiunt*

¹ Etienne Gilson, The Philosophy of St. Thomas Aquinas (Cambridge: 1929), p.216.

² For St. Thomas this is an imperfection and not a metaphysical evil, as it is with Leibnitz.

³ I.14.2. Intellectus perficiatur ab intelligibile.

species intelligibiles a rebus..."¹ Because of the extreme imperfection of this intellect, a certain passivity must be assumed with regard to it. It is in potency with regard to intelligibles, not only in the sense of being passive while receiving them, but also as being naturally deprived of them. But an active power is necessary too. No intelligibles, as such, could exist in a universe where only passive intellects were found, for the intelligible does not subsist in nature of itself. The forms found in matter do not subsist as intelligible, because only the immaterial is intelligible. The forms of things must be intelligible. Only a being in act can cause something to pass from potency to act, and therefore the intellect must have an active power.

The first requisite on the part of the object known is that it contains some degree of immateriality, because, "secundum immaterialitatis est modus cognitionis."² Because immateriality is the ratio of the knowing power, a universe wholly immersed in matter and devoid of intelligibility would, of necessity, lack transparency to the mind. There must be, in the object, then, some aspect under which it can be

¹
I.55.2.

²
I.14.1.

transformed into mind. This must be the form for "forma (dicitur)...ut sit principium cognitiones ipsius secundum quod formae cognoscibilium dicuntur esse in cognoscente."¹

The intellect is reduced to act only through the sensible contact with material things. The physical union of object known and subject knowing - by means of the senses - is a prerequisite of knowledge for "nihil est in intellectu quod prius non fuerit in sensu."² "Our natural cognition has its beginning in the senses, and therefore can go only as far as it is led by the senses."³ The sense, being a passive potency, is, under proper conditions, reduced to act by the form of an external, material, individual thing, and the result is a sensation. This sensation is the act of the sense, and consists in the intentional existence of the form of the object in the sense through the sensible species. The sense, being in act, acts on the imagination, an internal, passive cognitive faculty, to induce in it a phantasm, which is also a certain intentional form of the object. This is an exact reproduction of the

¹
I.15.1.

²
I.12.1.

³
I.12.12.

thing.¹ We are still in the realm of sense knowledge, and since this is the act of a bodily organ, the sense and the object which appeals to it is the form as existing in corporeal matter.

With the active intellect we enter the field of intellectual knowledge. So far we have only the necessary condition which precedes and is, as it were, the material cause of knowledge. The proper activity of the active intellect is to 'illuminate' the phantasm, and abstract from it the intelligible species. It apprehends the intelligible forms, existing in corporeal matter, but apprehends them not insofar as they exist in this individualized condition. The abstracted intelligible no longer exists as determined to a particular physical existence. It exists as a universal. Or there existed "a universal and intelligible element associated with a particular and material element. The operation proper to the active intellect consists precisely in separating these two elements so as to present to the possible intellect, the intelligible and universal, implicated in the

¹I.85.1 ad 3. Sed phantasmata, cum sint similitudines individuorum, et existant in organis corporeis, non habent eundem modum existendi quem habet intellectus humanus.

sensible."¹ The phantasm, formerly only potentially intelligible, has now been reduced to intelligibility. We might say the active intellect has produced the intelligibility from the form contained in the phantasm.

This intelligible, reflected on to the possible intellect, leads the latter to produce in itself the knowledge of what the impressed species represents. "The intellect, informed by the species of the thing, by the process of intellectio, forms in itself a certain intention (or concept) of the thing understood...and since the intelligible species, which is the form of the intellect, and the principle of the operation of intellection, is a similitude of the exterior thing, it follows that the intellect forms an intention which is similar to the thing."² Now the possible intellect is modified, in a certain sense, so that it becomes the thing, not with a natural being but with a conceptual being. Thus this knowledge trans-forms the mind, since it causes the intellect to pass from one stage of being to another. 'To know' then for the human being simply means 'to be in a specified manner', inasmuch as the

¹ Gilson, op.cit., p.250.

² I.C.G.53.

intelligible species specifies the act of intellection.¹

"Intellectus in actu et intellectum in actu sunt idem." The intelligible similitude is an exact likeness of the thing so that it is even a representation of the thing, presented now not merely in its natural being, but to the mind where it is to be understood, since things are received in the way in which the receiver receives them. The species in the thing has the act of 'esse'; in the mind of 'intelligere'.²

The species is not what thought knows of the thing but that by which thought knows the thing. The concept is an instrument of intellectual knowledge only of the universal nature of a class of objects which has no separate existence outside the mind; it cannot exist as such except within the mind. The mode of being assumed by objects in the mind that assimilates them is called 'intentional being', wherein the

¹ Man cannot simply know - he must know something. Man cannot simply think - he must think about something. The insistence on the operations without regard to the matter of the operation, a common fallacy of present day thought, is here shown as an impossibility.

² De Ver. 8.4. Species intelligibilis est similitudo ipsius essentiae rei et est quoddammodo ipsa quidditas et natura rei secundum esse intelligibile non secundum esse naturale prout est in rebus.

form of the object exists stripped of its material features as the species. The concept is the intelligible species created within the mind itself and expressed by a word. But if our knowledge is to be valid we must penetrate to the individual thing. This requires further operations of the intellect.

Such in brief is the Thomistic psychology of intellection. Before elaborating on the object of knowledge it will be necessary to consider the position of the intellect in the totality of the human creature. We speak of it as a power peculiar to the human being. A discussion of the nature of Power at this stage will save confusion later.

The soul, as the form of the body, confers perfection on the composite according to its nature.¹ Thus manness is conferred on the human being in its totality and is not susceptible of further perfection. The man will become no more man than he is. But the degree of actuality or perfection enjoyed by the individual man is not constant, even though the accretion of it does not alter his species.

¹
I.77.1. Non enim, in quantum est forma, est actus ordinatus ad ulteriorem actum, sed est ultimus terminus generationis.

There is potency and act in his vital operations; they are in act or at rest. Hence these operations cannot be the essence of the soul since the actuality enjoyed by the soul as form of the body could be varied only at the expense of specific identity, and these vital acts are not constant. The whole actuality of a man derives ultimately from the soul, and in so far as we regard it in this fashion, it is first act (principle of specific determination, form) and in potency to second act (operation).¹ The principle of operation as such is denominated a power or faculty of the soul. Such is the nature of the intellect. I say neither these operations nor more particularly the principles of them, the faculties, can be the essence of the soul. The soul could not be identified with a simple group of substances bound together. The faculties are accidents; but a little more than accidents. If they were mere accidents then it would be possible to consider the rational soul without intellect. But this cannot be. They hold a midway position between substance and accident, proper. The proper

¹I.77.1. Si ergo ipsa essentia animae esset immediatum operationis principium, semper habens animam, actu haberet opera vitae, sicut semper habens animam actu est vivum... Unde quod sit in potentia adhuc ad alium actum, hoc non competit ei secundum suam essentiam, in quantum est forma, sed secundum suam potentiam; et sic ipsa anima, secundum quod subest suae potentiae, dicitur actus primus, ordinata ad actum secundum.

does not belong to the essence of the thing. The faculty then is a natural property of the soul, a principle of action, but not in its own right as it receives its efficacy from the first principle of action, the soul.

How many faculties are found in the human being? St. Thomas shows, how because of his imperfection, his infirmity, because he partakes of two realms of being, the spiritual and material, man is necessarily possessed of many faculties. Lowest of those able to arrive at beatitude, many powers and operations are necessary for him, just as the sick man who is able to have health needs more medication than the man who is able to preserve his health without any medicines.¹

Now since faculties are specified by their acts, and acts are specified by action, and action by the object,²

¹I.77.2. Homo autem potest consequi universalem et perfectam bonitatem, quia potest adipisci beatitudinem. Est tamen in ultimo gradu secundum naturam eorum quibus competit beatitudo; et ideo multis et diversis operationibus et virtutibus indiget anima humana.

²I.77.3. Si ergo ipsa essentia animae esset immediatum operationis principium, semper habens animam, actu haberet opera vitae, sicut semper habens animam actu est vivum.... Unde quod sit in potentia adhuc ad alium actum, hoc non competit ei secundum suam essentiam, inquantum est forma, sed secundum suam potentiam; et sic ipsa anima, secundum quod subest suae potentiae, dicitur actus primus, ordinata ad actum secundum.

To say that the faculties are distinguished by their acts and objects, is not at all to say that their distinction is manifested by the acts and objects; this would be tantamount to distinguishing them through effects which manifest the distinction, rather than rendering the cause of their distinction. Further, it does not mean that the powers are distinguished by the acts and objects as by efficient or final causes; the final cause, as well as the efficient, is something extrinsic, and cannot give us an intrinsic differentiation of the faculties. The end as such moves the agent to act, so that its influence is in the line of the existence of the effect rather than of specification: "Et eodem modo finis solum habet movere efficiens ad agendum, et consequenter in eadem linea respicit respectus ad efficiens, et ad finem prout sic, non specificat, quia non respicit definitionem rei secundum se, sed sub existentia." J. of St. Th. De An. 2.3. What is intended is that the acts and objects specify the faculties after the fashion of extrinsic formal cause; in this way, though they remain extrinsic principles, they pertain to the definition of the faculties.

Cajetan uses the example of heat to demonstrate what is meant by causality of this sort. Heat is not only the principle of the action of making warm, but is as well in a manner the formal principle of the action of becoming warm. Insofar as it gives rise to that action, it is the principle of it as efficient cause; but insofar as it gives specific determination to the action though it remain extrinsic to that which is made hot, it partakes of formal causality. Caj. in 1-2.9.1.No.4.

The powers, therefore, are related to their objects as to the extrinsic formal causes of their acts. Since they are ordered by nature to those acts and can be understood only in relation to them, the acts and objects must enter into their definition. The restriction of the interpretation of specification by the acts and objects, to extrinsic formal causality, forestalls any attempt to make the powers purely relative entities. That is, their whole being is not the relation they have to their acts and objects, as the whole being of fatherhood is a relation to the son; there can be no father without a son, but there can be a potency without its act. The potency depends upon the object for its act so that its being is in that much relative, and not entirely absolute; nevertheless

its being is not entirely relative, for its dependence on the object is not that it might be made to be, simply, but that it might operate.

Cajetan, Ferrari and John of St. Thomas agree in making the object to be the extrinsic formal cause of specification of the powers. The development given above may be found in Cajetan's Commentary in I.77.3 no.4; and in John of St. Thomas de anima, q.2.a.3. To this extent, these authors are in agreement, but they differ in many points of the application of the doctrine. A study of the agreements and divergences is given by H.D. Simonin, in Archives d'Histoire Doctrinale et Litteraire du Moyen Age; 1931, pp.199-245.

that which specifies the intellect is the object of knowledge. The primary perfection of a power is its bare constitution in reality as a particular power capable of this or that function. Its further perfection is attained when this power, by its proper act, brings its potency into realization. The act of knowing is the end of the intellect. This act is specified by the object known. Reducing its passivity to actuality it arrives at its own inner perfection. Every faculty seeks to become perfect, to find the fullest expression of itself in an act. Thus it strives to exhaust its natural capability of action and to come into full possession of the object for which it is ordained. The intellect exists to know and the natural power it has is the power of knowing. It seeks to become commensurate with the whole range of the knowable.

Only in this way will it have exhausted itself and realize its complete perfection. The scope of the intellect then is bounded by its object.

Ens est proprium objectum intellectus.¹ By the fact that a substance is endowed with intelligence it is capable of possessing within itself all being.² But each intellect conforms to being through being as it is to be found in a mode proportionate to the status of that intellect in the hierarchy of being.³ Now human souls hold the lowest place among intelligences, and the further off intellectual creatures are from the first principle, so much the more is the light divided and diversified.⁴ On account of its weakness, the human intellect is as much adapted for

¹I.5.2.

²2.C.G.98.

³John of St. Thomas. De An.10.3. Constat enim, quod in motibus specificantibus diversos intellectus, ut intellectos angelicos et intellectum hominis, non ab omni ente sumitur specificatio motiva, sed diversa a diversis, ut ab intellectu humano quidditas sensibilis, ab aliis diversae naturae spirituales... Similiter constat dari diversas species intellectuum, licet omnes istam amplitudinem capacitatis habeant, sicut differt intellectus hominis ab intellectu angeli, et diversi intellectus angelici inter se; ergo ex alio principio sumitur specificatio gradualis in intellectibus, scilicet ex proprio et connaturali motivo; ab alio vero capacitas, quae se extendit ad omni intelligibilie, neque adaequari potest a proprio et connaturali motivo, unde sumitur illa gradualis differentia.

⁴I.89.1.

knowing the supreme intelligible, as the owl's eye for seeing the sun. What is in itself the most knowable, Intelligibility Itself, is for the human intellect the most unknowable. To so sublime a vision the created intellect needs to be raised by some kind of outpouring of the Divine goodness. Consistent with its mode of existence as united with a body, the intellect has a mode of understanding by turning to corporeal phantasms. To understand its proper object it must of necessity turn to phantasms in order to perceive the universal nature existing in the individual. In the act of understanding a thing the intellect receives in some way the nature of the thing within itself and thus, in a certain sense, assimilates itself to that thing. Thus it is proper to the human intellect to know a form existing individually in corporeal matter, but not as existing individually in this individual matter.¹ This means to abstract the form from individual matter. The proportionate object of the intellect then is the intelligible

¹I.85.1. Et ideo proprium ejus est cognoscere formam in materia quidem corporali individualiter existentem, non tamen prout in tali materia. Cognoscere vero id quod est in materia individuali, non prout est in tali materia, est abstrahere formam a materia individuali, quam repraesentant phantasmata.

in the material universe.¹ In the process of grasping the intelligible the intellect begins with the most abstract concept of being or reality. The natural adequate object is the totality of finite reality.

As we have, so far, considered only the first act of the intellect, apprehension, it is necessary to return and follow the successive operations in the further acquisition of knowledge. In the first act the intelligibility of the thing is not exhausted; perfect knowledge of it has not been acquired.² What has been grasped is the metaphysical essence. The thing known has to conform to the manner of being of thought so that the thought may become it. This mode of being, assumed by objects in the mind that assimilates them, is 'intentional being', wherein the form of the object exists stripped of its material features as the species. This representation of the object perceived, as conceived by the intellect, is called the concept, the intelligible species created within the mind itself and expressed by the word.³

¹I.85.8. Respondeo dicendum quod objectum intellectus nostri secundum presentem statum est quidditas rei materialis, quam a phantasmatibus abstrahit.

²I.85.1. See previous page.

³IV.C.G.11. Dico autem intensionem intellectam id quod intellectus in seipso concipit de re intellecta. Quae quidem in nobis neque est ipsa res quae intelligitur, neque est substantia intellectus; sed est quaedam similitudo concepta in intellectus de re intellecta.

This concept cannot exist as such except within the mind.

The concept of a thing, the first product of the intellect is distinct from the object itself. The concept has no extramental existence. The concept is certainly not the thing, yet the intellect which conceives the concept is, on its part, actually the thing of which it forms the concept. The intellect has to be fecundated by the species of the object to be able to bring forth the concept and so the concept is an infallible representation of the thing. Thus in performing its natural operation, conceiving the intelligible essences, the intellect cannot err: "Cum autem omnis res sit vera secundum quod habet proprium formam naturae suae, necesse est quod intellectus, in quantum est cognoscens, sit verus in quantum habet similitudinem rei cognitae, quae est forma eius, in quantum est cognoscens."¹ Consequently the concept is in conformity with the object known, for indeed the concept is that by which the intellect knows the thing. The mind, however, at this point is not aware of this conformity, for the direct apprehension of reality by the intellect does not presuppose any conscious activity on its,

¹I.16.2. Cf. De Ver.1.12. Quidditas autem rei est proprium objectum intellectus; unde semper est verus...intellectus in cognoscendo quod quid est.

part. Faced with being, it cannot help knowing that it is, but to be conscious of this knowledge belongs to a second act of the intellect, i.e., a wilful reflection on itself and its own knowledge. When the mind so reflects, it contributes something of itself to the reality it has assimilated. Then the mind not only knows but moreover it knows that it knows. After such a reflection upon its knowledge, the mind assents to the reality of its knowledge and its knowledge of reality and affirms 'such is so and so'. This affirmation is the intellectual judgment.

Here it appears that the mind has made a distinct cleavage between itself and its object, for every judgment requires two terms, the judging and the judged. Only when the intellect, having duly considered each term, realizes the relation existing between them, is the judgment consummated. In judging therefore, the intellect really adds something to its previous knowledge, namely the affirmation that two things are identical. Judgment, as a consequence, reveals the possession of truth, for truth is the simple agreement between the intellect judging and the thing:

Veritas est adequatio rei et intellectus.¹

¹De Ver.I.3. Cf. S.T.I.16.1. Veritas principaliter est in intellectu, secundario vero in rebus, secundum quod comparentur ad intellectum ut ad principium.

By its apprehensive operation the intellect has many generic and specific representations, numerous concepts of the real, all more or less inadequate. But contact with the singular has been lost.¹ To know the thing as perfectly as possible it should be known as it exists in matter. Contact with the physical essence, that is as it exists in the thing, must be reestablished. This means the reintegration of the various concepts, which have given us various aspects of the thing, into one.

These concepts may be unified or separated without regard to such a union or separation in reality. Thus the concepts of horse and rational may be so united. But if these are considered as they are in reality and then united, a judgment is passed and the unity of the two is asserted in the thing.² Thus the judgment is the affirmation of the

¹ Quod. I.12.8. Humanus non cognoscit directe singulare. ...quia cognitio fit per similitudinem cogniti in cognoscente; et haec est in intellectu nostro per abstractionem a conditionibus individuans et a materia, ideo...non cognoscit directe nisi universale.

² I am attributing existence to an essence. Existence does not belong to this essence. This creature does not exist. Existence and essence are distinct in all created things. Only when the essence is the very existence are these two identical. Cf. De Ente et Essentia, 4.

existence of an object in which two concepts, declared unified in their intentional existence, are actually or possibly realized. This composition has reference now to the essences in their real existence and it is asserted that horse is rational.¹ As distinct from the mental union, assent is given to this union in reality. Our intellect is declared to be in accord with that which is not in reality. A correspondence is declared to exist between what is in the mind and what is not in reality. This is error. Only when the correspondence is actual is there truth. Thus our judgment makes the intellect to be in accord with reality or to be divorced from it.² By judgment then a closer conformation between intellect and object is achieved. But because of its debility another operation is necessary to achieve the perfection of being attainable by the human intellect. This is a discursive operation, required for the further elaboration of human knowledge.

¹De Ver., I., 3.

²I., 14., 8 ad 3. Res naturales sunt mediae inter scientiam Dei et scientiam nostram. Nos enim scientiam accipimus a rebus naturalibus, quarum Deus per suam scientiam causa est; unde sicut scibilia naturalia sunt priora quam scientia nostra, et mensura ejus; ita scientia Dei est prior quam res naturales, et mensura ipsarum.

At first man has no actual knowledge, therefore he begins at the beginning to acquire it. What is this beginning? It is the 'Prima Principia', the self-evident principles which arise spontaneously in the mind at the first sensory experience of the human being. All knowledge begins with these primal principles. We must note their nature.

St. Thomas draws a close parallel between three processes of development, the physical, moral and intellectual, for all three have their place in the building up of the whole man. The acquisition of knowledge he places on the same level as the attainment of virtues on the one hand, and the production of those forms which determine being in the physical order. Respecting these three processes, there is a difference of opinion. And the difference in each case follows the same lines, for they merely indicate three different realms of philosophic thought - metaphysics, ethics and epistemology.

Those who believed that sensible forms are entirely bestowed by some external agent. All physical forms have a source whose origin is wholly extrinsic to the eventual

subject. Physical agents do not cause the existence of these forms, they exercise only secondary causality, preparing matter for the reception of the forms. The form itself comes from a superior agent. Similarly, Avicenna, as an exponent of this view, taught that man's actions were not the cause of moral habits. Human actions merely forestall the development of opposed habits and thus prepare the soul for the reception of habitus. Thus Avicenna used this position to explain his theory of knowledge - the infusion of forms into the mind by means of the Active Intellect. All forms are of extrinsic origin.

At the other extreme are those who would have all forms latent in matter and only manifested by exterior causes which draw them out into appearance; habits of virtue are brought to light by the exercise of activities which remove the obstacles by which the virtues have remained hidden; so also knowledge is concreated in the soul, all habits of knowledge are innate.

But St. Thomas says that both these views are without reasonable basis. Both minimize the effectiveness of secondary causes. Steering a middle course, he applied the fundamental distinction between potency and act. Natural

forms, he asserts, preexist in matter in potency and are reduced to act by the medium of proximate agents and not solely by the First Cause. Thus in nature, nitrogen, hydrogen and oxygen exist as the potential forms of leaves, but these potential forms become actualized, among other things, by the agency of the rays of the sun. Too, habits of virtue and knowledge, before brought to consummation, preexist in us in potency as certain inclinations which are the beginnings, to be fully developed by exercise. Semina scientiarum are known immediately in the light of the active intellect through the species of things abstracted from the object of sensation. Science and virtue are present in the mind, from its very nature, but not there from birth in full development. What is there is in an inchoative condition to be perfected by practice. They are an endowment of nature, seeds of knowledge, common to all men. They are the foundations of all knowledge, which is virtually contained in them. *Idem autem est subiectum principiorum, et totius scientiae, cum tota scientia virtute continentur in principis.*¹ The light or reason by which these principles are known to us, is implanted in us by God, a

¹I.1.7. Cf. also Quaestiones Quodl.8.q.2.a.4.

likeness of uncreated truth reflected in us.¹ These principles, whence all our knowledge proceeds, are but a faint reflection of Divine Knowledge, just as the being of man is a participation in the Divine Essence. And as in God, knowledge and essence are identical, for suum esse est suum intelligere,² in Him alone 'to think' is 'to be', so in man there is a corresponding divergence in being and knowledge, for we have seen that 'to know' is 'to be in a specified manner'. This habitus of First Principles strengthens the human reason so that it may perform, what is for it, an unusual act. The act is intellectual in the strictest sense of the term, an active participation in the mode of understanding.³ The human soul is rational by nature, proceeding from known to unknown. If it were purely intelligent in the knowing operation, then, it would act as the angel - it would know all, immediately, in the principles. Due to the lack

¹ De Ver. II. 1. Huiusmodi autem rationis lumen, quo principia huiusmodi sunt nobis nota, est nobis a Deo inditum, quasi quaedam similitudo increatae veritatis in nobis resultantis.

² IV. C. G. 11.

³ 1-2. 58. 3.

of the fullness of intelligent light in the souls of men, conclusions are not naturally known as by the angels. The angel understands, does not reason nor make judgments. But for the angel it is not an all-embracing act but a succession in thoughts. There is no period when the angel is without thoughts. The thought under each species gives all the knowledge of the species immediately. The intellectual life of the angel is a succession of simple operations - what the angel thinks of as A is not lost sight of when it goes on to thought B, then A reverts to the position of first act, that is as habitus, it exists in a partially active manner, not only potentially.

Such is the type of cognition in which the human intellect participates when it knows first principles - a quasi-angelic operation. But men are not angels and none of man's natural acts is identical with the angelic act. Even the intuition of first principles is not angelic but human and therefore not identical with the intellective act of the angelic mind. For the development of this habitus a pair of potencies is necessary, one active and the other passive. These are complementary so that the passive one may be activated by the active one. The active and possible

intellect are such complementary potencies. In the beginning the active intellect is unable to activate the possible intellect since there are no intelligible species. These come to the soul through sensation and abstraction. Without these there can be no concepts. Before the possession of species the active and possible intellect are generically determined by their nature in the general cooperation of knowing truth. Since the possible intellect is brought into this relation with the active intellect at the moment of birth so the intellect has inchoative habits.¹ At most this is an imperfect habitus and this habitus becomes the perfect one by the action of the active intellect on the possible intellect immediately on possession of the intelligible species - the first intelligible species. The knowledge of the principles comes from the senses, but the power - the light - by which they are known, is innate. Thus we see that the understanding of these principles is no more innate than the conclusions of deductive reasoning; the difference lies in the fact that we discover the former naturally, but the latter we reach only by an effort of search, which has as its starting point the

¹I-II.63.1.

principles.¹

Being is the first of the simple principles. Into it all other concepts may be resolved and must be resolved if you want to go to the end. Other simple principles are, substance, reality, good and truth. The complex principles are mentioned more frequently by St. Thomas - the whole is greater than the part; things equal to the same thing are equal to each other.² In the speculative order the first complex principle following the simple principle of 'ens' is that of non-contradiction - non est simul affirmare et negare.³ All others depend on these two. In the practical order the first simple principle is 'bonum'. By knowing the definition of good there is the basis of the first complex one - bonum est faciendum, malum vitandum - the initial rule of all practical thought.⁴

¹ IV.C.G.11. Intellectus enim noster aliqua naturaliter cognoscit, sicut prima intelligibilium principia, quorum intelligibiles conceptiones, quae verba interiora dicuntur, naturaliter in ipso existunt et ex eo procedunt. Sunt etiam quaedam intelligibilia quae non naturaliter intellectum noster cognoscit, sed in eorum cognitionem ratiocinando partingit; et horum conceptiones in intellectus nostro naturaliter non existunt, sed cum studio quaeruntur.

² Cf. De Ver.10.12; De Ver.16.1 ad 9; C.G.11.83; I.84.3; 1-2.94.2; 6 Eths.lect.V.

³ 1-2.94.2.

⁴ 1-2.94.2.

Only in so far as our knowledge can be traced to these basic principles, can it certainly be guaranteed. This is the starting point of reason and when the intellect is led from this universal knowledge to an understanding of particulars, then is human knowledge acquired.

All knowledge, then, is contained in potency in these self-evident truths, but is contained there in active potency. Beginning with these principles there is an unfolding of all the conclusions that are virtually contained therein. This is reason; intellection in the process of becoming. Reason is related to intellection as movement is related to rest; as acquiring a thing is related to having a thing.¹ Like the necessity of judgment, the necessity of reasoning denotes a certain defect on the part of the intellect.² Just as one begins from the first principles in the search for truth, so reasoning appeals to these principles in the last resort, for a verification of its conclusions, because it is only in virtue of the principles that conclusions can stand. "Scientia cum sit conclusionum,

¹I.79.8. Patet ergo quod ratiocinari comparatur ad intelligere sicut moveri ad quiescere, vel acquirere ad habere.

²I.C.G.57.

est quaedam cognitio ab alio causata, scilicet ex cognitione principiorum."¹ As knowledge develops, then, it becomes more distinctly understood and serves to organize particulars within its universality. Thus, the concept which is the perfection of knowledge (i.e., the 'per-factum' attained when knowledge is consummated) is, as it were, a unifying principle containing within itself all the individuals of a class.

Through knowledge the knower becomes actuated by the form of the known. The form which has a physical existence in the known now acquires a non-physical or intentional existence in the knower. Now, since matter is the principle of individuation of things of the same specific nature, the form in the intellect will not be the individuated form, of this or that particular thing, but the specific form which

¹I.14.1 ad 2. Cf. In Boet.de Trin.2.6.a.1.ad 3. Sic igitur patet quod rationalis consideratio ad intellectualem terminatur secundum viam resolutionis, in quantum ex multis ratio colligit unam et simplicem veritatem. Et rursus, intellectualis consideratio est principium rationalis secundum viam compositionis et inventionis, in quantum intellectus in uno multa comprehendit. Illa consideratio, quae est terminus totius humanae ratiocinationis, maxima est intellectualis consideratio tota autem rationis consideratio resolventis in omnibus scientiis, ad cognitionem divinae scientiae terminatur.

is realized in the various individuals. Thus the intellect apprehends the universal,¹ whereas the sense is limited not only to particular knowledge of material things, but to one mode of manifestation of this material thing as well, since the matter of a material thing as such is not in potency to every form.

The intellect can know all things, but knows them intentionally. The ratio of a thing is the object of knowledge, so that in order to know all being, the intellect must apprehend them under a common ratio. Faculties are distinguished by their objects, and therefore, if the intellect did not apprehend all under the same common aspect, it would no longer be one faculty. Consequently, we say that whatever is known by the intellect is known in the light of being; being is that which the intellect first

¹De An. II. 5. 286. Ex unaquaque forma sequitur aliqua inclinatio, et ex inclinatione operatio. Since, for St. Thomas, the form is the principle of being, in knowledge, when I have become the other, the other in me, tends to its being, to its completion, to its good. The synthesis of the thing and me has only been begun in knowledge and must tend to completion in appetite. But, when in knowledge, we become the thing, we do not cease to be ourselves; and neither in willing, do our appetites cease to be our own, becoming the tendencies of those intentional forms only. Therefore everything known is not desired. If that form is to tend through me, it must be clothed by me, there can be tendency only where there is similarity of nature. The importance of this fact is seen in the specification of the will.

apprehends, and in it, all its apprehension resolves. Here we are considering being as truth.¹ Here is contained, in potency, all the items of knowledge that can be known. All intellectual operation is the development of this conception. This obviates any difficulty in attributing three acts to the intellect. They are acts of the same faculty since they are concerned with the same object, being. The object of the intellect, then, is being in its universality. But one of the ways in which being is realized is as goodness.² This apprehension is intimately bound up with the operation of another faculty, the will. This operation and the relationship with intellection remain to be considered.

¹De Veritate I.1. Convenientiam vero entis ad intellectum exprimit hoc nomen verum... Veritas est adequatio rei et intellectus.

²I.82.3. Objectum intellectus est ipsa ratio boni appetibilis; bonum autem appetibile cujus ratio est in intellectu, est objectum voluntatis.

C H A P T E R T W O

THE SPECIFICATION AND EXERCISE OF

ACTS OF THE WILL

Every agent acts for an end, an end that is befitting it. This end is that which is good for the agent.¹ This tendency to an end, called appetite, is conferred on a being by the form which determines it in being. The form directs to the end, being the principle of that tendency. This type of direction is called natural tendency.

If the end is sought, it is because the end is suitable or becoming to the being. It hardly makes any difference whether we say that a being tends to its end or to its good. By the fact that it tends to an end, it tends

¹3.C.G.2. Ergo tam agens secundum naturam, quam agens secundum artem et a proposito agit propter finem.

to the good.¹ There appear to be many ends. Among these, there must be an ultimate; an infinite series of intermediate ends is unthinkable. A twofold order is apparent, the order of intention and the order of execution. That which is first in the order of intention is the prime mover of the appetite. The first in the order of execution is where the operation begins. The principle then of the intention is the ultimate end, whereas the principle of execution is the first among the means.²

But all things do not move to their end in the same way; some move themselves and others are moved. It is proper to the rational nature to tend to an end by its own direction. But the irrational nature, even though cognitive, is led or

¹3.C.G.3. Inde enim manifestum est omne agens agere propter finem, quia quodlibet agens tendit ad aliquod determinatum. Et autem ad quod agens determinate tendit, oportet esse conveniens ei; non enim tenderet in ipsum nisi propter aliquam convenientiam ad ipsum. Quod autem est conveniens alicui, est ei bonum. Ergo omne agens agit propter bonum.

²1-2.1.4. In finibus autem invenitur duplex ordo scilicet ordo intentionis et ordo executionis, et in utroque ordine oportet esse aliquid primum, - id enim quod est primum in ordine intentionis, est quasi principium movens appetitum; unde subtracto principio appetitus a nullo moveretur. - Id autem quod est principium in executione, est unde incipit operatio; unde isto principio subtracto, nullus inciperet aliquid operari, principium autem intentionis est ultimus finis; principium autem executionis est primum eorum quae sunt ad finem.

directed by another.¹

Among living beings, plants move themselves in so far as the execution of their movement is concerned. But as the natural movement of a natural thing is a certain inclination resulting from an inner principle, it is necessitated by the agent who planted that principle within, but because it flows from the principle within, it cannot be said to be forced. How different is the movement of a thing forced, for it is according to a principle without and contrary to any principle within. These two movements are incompatible, the 'violentum' is repugnant to the natural thing.

Animals, besides controlling the execution of their movements, determine the form of their movement by the forms acquired through knowledge. They do not propose to themselves the ends of their movements. These are determined by nature. Man proposes to himself the end of his operation

¹
1-2.1.2. Illa quae rationem habent, seipsa movent ad finem, quia habent dominium suorum actuum per liberum arbitrium, quod est facultas voluntatis et rationis.- Illa vero quae ratione carent, tendunt in finem propter naturalem inclinationem, quasi ab alio mota, non autem a seipsis, cum non cognoscant rationem finis; et ideo nihil in finem ordinare possunt, sed solum in finem ab alio ordinantur.

because he knows the ratio of end and the ratio of means and the proportion existing between the two. He can define end and means and ordain means to end. An intelligent creature, acting in accordance with its nature, cannot do otherwise than have purpose in its acts. To see this more clearly we must enlarge on the two distinct cases.

Cognitive beings, receptive of other forms through knowledge, have a tendency conferred by these received forms. With the additional acquired form comes a basis for an additional tendency, an additional end; for this being within a being tends to its own being, its own completion. This necessarily implies a special power, since there is now present an inclination surpassing the natural inclination. The result is an inclination on the part of the appetite, which will become effective, i.e., will turn into desire, when it (the acquired form) will have been subordinated to the natural form. Resulting operations will be attributed to this acquired form as to a source and principle in the order of determination. What is known is desired as well as that to which the being is inclined by its natural form.¹

¹I.80.1. Sicut igitur formae altiori modo existunt in habentibus cognitionem supra modum formarum naturalium, ita oportet quod in eis sit inclinatio supra modum inclinationis naturalis, quae dicitur appetitus naturalis. Et haec superior inclinatio pertinet ad vim animae appetitivam, per quam animal appetere potest ea quae apprehendit, non solum ea quae inclinatur ex forma naturali.

In the case of the animal, the sensed form, inasmuch as it is individual, is somewhat like the natural form, which is one, individuated by matter. However, it is superior to the natural form for it is not always one and the same, numerically. In the animal there is a succession of sensed forms. Because of this successive multiplicity, there is some sort of similarity between the 'information' of brutes and the 'information' of man. So it is with the consequent inclinations. The sensitive appetite consequent on the sensed form, inasmuch as it is an inclination to one act, is somewhat similar to the natural appetite, which is determined to one. The sensitive appetite, however, is superior to the natural appetite. Whereas the natural appetite is determined to one, the, one, always (as long as the natural form remains, making the thing to be specifically what it is); the sensitive appetite, on the other hand, is as multiple as are the sense forms. For each form, there is a corresponding inclination. Therefore, the sensitive appetite is now to this, now to that. For this reason, the sensitive appetite may be compared in a measure with the rational appetite. While in both man and animal there is a succession of acquired forms and corresponding inclinations,

there is a tremendous difference which might be stated briefly in this way; in man there is an inclination 'ad plura per unam ('formam'), but in brute animals an inclination 'ad unum per unam', and 'ad plura per plures'.

But the form, received by the intellect of man, is not joined to matter, and therefore not individuated by matter, is universal, then we have rational appetite, or will.¹ Man receives or acquires many such forms of intelligible things, vitally assimilates them, in a sense becomes the things known or intellected. Now, because of the presence of these intellectual forms, man can exercise an appetite not only toward that to which he is inclined by reason of the natural form with which he is endowed, but also to those things 'intellected' by reason of these acquired forms. There will be in man inclinations consequent on his own natural form. His own natural form, however, is individuated by matter and is determined to one. This is not the case with the intellected forms which are spiritual

¹ De Ver. 15.3. Sicut duplex est apprehensiva, scilicet inferior, quae est sensitiva, et superior quae est intellectiva vel rationalis; ita etiam duplex est appetitiva, scilicet inferior, quae vocatur sensualitas, quae dividitur per irascibilem et concupiscibilem; et superior, quae nominatur voluntas.

and therefore universal. Since they are universal, and since acts are particular things, man in his 'vis appetitiva' can remain undetermined to many. For any one intellectuated form, man is confronted with a number of possible particular acts into which that form might ultimately issue, but with no act into which that form must issue (for no one of those acts is universal and therefore able, as it were, to monopolize the inclination consequent on that intellectuated form).¹

Intelligent man becomes other, that is, he becomes in a sense what he knows. His natural form, individuated through matter, receives into its very bosom acquired forms of other things, forms which are of the very stuff of the immaterial human soul and are universal. His natural appetite (determined to one and necessitated through the necessity of natural inclination) carries the inclinations consequent on the acquired forms, inclinations not to one but to many. With the subordination of what is acquired to that with which he is endowed, man becomes more than himself and is not only

¹On this point we will eventually base the claim for freedom. Already the influence of intellect becomes apparent. Its introduction here, at the very beginning of a consideration on the will, is indicative of the solid grounding of freedom in the intellectual nature.

determined to one but is so affected that on that determination to one rides an indetermination to many. When one of these inclinations is seen (rightly or wrongly) to be in conformity with the natural inclination (to good), then, and then only, can result an act of rational appetite.

This appetite bespeaks imperfection, potency to that good desired. The appetite is directed towards that which is not possessed, towards a good which it lacks. Now as things attain their end or good, they become more perfect. The end then is perfective of a being,¹ and appetite is directed toward the perfective, that which is good for it.² It follows then that when there is a series of ends, the last end will be the final perfection of a being.³

The soul enters into a twofold relation with things, by intellect and will. Intellection is concerned with rendering the thing present to the soul by a likeness, while

¹3.C.G.16. Unumquodque autem, si perfectione propria careat, in ipsam movetur, quantum in se est; si vero eam habeat, in ipsa quiescit. Finis igitur uniuscuiusque rei est eius perfectio.

²I.19.1. Quaelibet autem res ad suam formam naturalem hanc habet habitudinem, ut quando non habet ipsam, tendat in eam, et quando habet ipsam, quiescat in ea; et idem est de quaelibet perfectione naturali, quod est bonum naturae.

³I.103.1. Ultima autem perfectio unius cuius quae est in consecutione finis.

willing is a movement of the soul toward that thing, which has already been apprehended by the intellect.

Thus it is said that the movement of knowledge is from thing to soul, but that of will, from soul to thing.¹ It follows from this that willing is concerned with the existence of the thing rather than with its essence. The intellect achieves its perfection through the assimilation of the essence, but the soul is not intellect alone and its perfection depends not only on the reception of essence, but also upon the satisfaction of its appetite in the goodness of things. The soul by intellect and will becomes in its own way all things; and since in things there is composition of essence and existence, so the soul is related to them in two ways.²

¹De Ver.1.2. Motus autem cognitivae virtutis terminatur ad animam; oportet enim ut cognitum sit in cognoscente per modum cognoscentis; sed motus appetitivae virtutis terminatur ad res. Et inde est quod Philosophus (De An.3.C.10. No.8) ponit circulum quemdam in actibus animae, secundum scilicet, quod res quae est extra animam, movet intellectum, et res intellecta movet appetitum, et appetitus tunc ducit ad hoc quod perveniat ad rem a qua motus inceptus.

²De Ver.21.1. In quolibet autem ente est duo considerare; scilicet ipsam rationem speciei, et esse ipsum quod aliquid aliud subsistit in specie illa; et sic aliquod ens potest esse perfectum dupliciter. Uno modo secundum rationem
(cont'd)

Objectum voluntatis est bonum apprehensum. The passage of any potency to its corresponding actus is effected in two ways. It is brought about by the subject and by the object. I am gazing into the sky, where a plane is soaring about. At one moment, unable to see it, I am, nevertheless, in potency to seeing it. At the next moment I see it clearly. My seeing of the plane is the actus, to which I had been in potency a moment earlier. That potency has been actualized; there has been movement from potency to act.

Just what is responsible for that movement? In simple words, what is it that makes me now see the plane where previously I had seen nothing? The answer is: myself (my eyes) and the plane, i.e., the subject of this sight, and the object of it. I could have closed my eyes and never have seen the plane; or I could have merely gazed idly ahead of me, and never identified the object as a plane. However, I opened my eyes and peered earnestly. I exercised my sense of sight, and therefore exercised the seeing of the plane,

²(P.55 cont'd) speciei tantum; et sic ab ente perficitur intellectus, qui perficitur per rationem entis; nec tamen ens est in eo secundum esse naturale... Alio modo ens est perfectivum alterius non solum secundum rationem speciei, sed etiam secundum esse quod habet in rerum natura; et per hunc modum est perfectivum bonum.

which is the 'actus' to which I had been in potentia. However, no matter how wide I opened my eyes and stared, I would never have seen the plane if there had been no plane (excepting cases of mirage, hallucination, etc., and neglecting here the question of the medium of light). For my seeing of the plane, the plane was just as necessary as my exercising my sense of sight. When a person sees, he does not see everything, he does not see nothing, but he must see something. His seeing is specified by that something, namely the object of his sight. If there be no object, there is no specification; and if there be no specification, then a man either sees everything (which is impossible), or he sees nothing, that is he does not see. Therefore, where there is no specification, there is no exercise; but wherever there is exercise, there must be specification. The exercise comes from the agent; the specification from the object. If any potency is to be moved (pass into act) the subject exercising must cooperate with the object specifying.¹

¹1-2.9.1. Sicut visus quandoque videt actu, et quandoque non videt; et quandoque videt album, et quandoque videt nigrum. Indiget igitur movente quantum ad duo, scilicet - quantum ad exercitium vel usum actus, et - quantum ad exercitium vel usum actus, et - quantum ad determinationem actus.

The specification of the will depends on this apprehended form. Now when the intellect is concerned with the ends of action it is referred to as the practical intellect. When so engaged the intellect is interested in the goodness of things. Its correspondence with the good differs from that of the will. The will is concerned with the appetibility of the good, the intellect with the apprehension of the ratio of it, which becomes the object of the will.¹ The object of the intellect is being in its universality, and one of the ways in which being is realized, is as goodness. As being is that which is first grasped by the speculative intellect, so is the good that which is first grasped by the practical intellect.² In each order primary indemonstrable principles are immediately grasped. Being, known under the guise of the good, is the source of the primary rules of practical thought. In the light of these principles the intellect judges of the goodness of particular objects. Thus the rational appetite is specified by the judgment of

¹I.82.3. Nam objectum intellectus est ipsa ratio boni appetibilis.

²1-2.94.2. Sicut autem ens est primum quod cadit in apprehensione simpliciter, ita bonum est primum quod cadit in apprehensione practicae rationis, quae ordinatur ad opus.

the practical reason. The appetibility of the particular object is decided by the intellect using the principles, naturally known, as criteria. It is judged as fitting or unfitting for the attainment of the natural end. The end is determined and the principles are unchangeable. Of course the application of the principles offers scope for divergence. The aspect under which the object is judged good is variable. It may be for the will, for the soul or for the whole man or any of his parts. Inadequate knowledge, errors in judgment and other factors may influence the judgment.¹ But all particular judgments are directed to the universal good and the intellectual grasp of this is infallible.

Now as being is apprehended as true and as good, it is perfective of a subject in two ways; by its essence in knowledge and by its esse in willing. The intellect knows what exists, as it exists in the intellect, the will

¹1-2.10.3. Passio appetitus sensitivi movet voluntatem ex ea parte qua voluntas movetur ab objecto, in quantum scilicet homo aliquo modo dispositus per passionem iudicat aliquid esse conveniens et bonum quod extra passionem existens non iudicaret. I.19.7. Quod (i.e., voluntas mutatur) quidem accidere non potest, nisi praesupposita mutatione vel ex parte cognitionis, vel circa dispositionem substantiae ipsius volentis.

desires to possess being as it exists in reality, as it is outside the intellect. Being is sought as perfective in both ways. Whence the natural tendency of the intellect to know essences and the natural tendency of the will to possess esse. Thence the movement of the will towards good is the movement of the being toward the esse of a thing.

Goodness belongs to the individual object in so far as it is willed by the Divine Will, and that goodness is its being. Goodness also belongs to it in so far as it is willed by us, but our will is not the cause of that goodness.¹ We determine the appetibility of a particular object in the light of a principle, the first principle of the practical order, synderesis. The object is judged as good in so far as it is seen to serve as a means to the natural end of the being.

As stated above, every agent acts for an end, that which is good for it. This does not designate some individual thing, but whatever is perfective. Now every being is

¹I.20.2. Quia enim voluntas nostra non est causa bonitatis rerum, sed ab ea movetur sicut ab objecto; amor noster, quo bonum alicui volumus, non est causa bonitatis ipsius, sed e converso bonitas ejus, vel vera, vel aestimata, provocat amorem, quo ei volumus et bonum conservari quod habet et addi quod non habet; et ut ad hoc operemur.

good according to the degree of its being, according to the perfection possessed which is appropriate to its nature. It is this perfection which makes it desirable; inasmuch as it has in itself, then, the capacity of perfecting things, it is desirable. Since a thing is desirable for the sake of an end, it follows that a thing is said to be good, either because it is an end, or because it is directed to an end. The last end must necessarily be that from which all things take the aspect of good.¹ That which is the supreme good and consequently the ultimate end is God.² Now things are not directed to God as the end that they may enhance his goodness but that they may gain something, that they may obtain Him from Himself, according to their measure. God, by His action, does not gain but bestows. He is not in potentiality to acquiring anything but in perfect actuality, whereby He is able to bestow.³ Now as

¹ I.C.G.40. Finis igitur ultimus est a quo omnia rationem boni accipiunt.

² 3.C.G.17. Quod igitur est summum bonum, est maxime omnium finis. Sed summum bonum est unum tantum, quod est Deus; ut in primo libro (cap.42) probatum est. Omnia igitur ordinantur sicut in finem in unum bonum quod est Deus.

³ 3.C.G.18. Deo autem non potest aliquid acquiri ex actione cuiuslibet rei; est enim sua bonitas omnino perfecta, ut in primor libro ostensum est. Relinquitur igitur quod Deus sit finis rerum, non sicut aliquid constitutum aut effectum a rebus, neque ita quod aliquid ei a rebus acquiratur, sed hoc solo modo, quia ipse rebus acquiritur.

in speculative matters conclusions are drawn from principles, so in appetitive matters the reason of all things to be desired is taken from the end. In speculative matters, the intellect necessarily assents to the first undemonstrable principles. It cannot possibly assent to the contraries.¹ Similarly the will necessarily adheres to the last end, so as to be unable to will the contrary.

This use of the word necessity with regard to the will in a treatment on the freedom of the will is anomalous and needs clarification. We speak of a stone falling freely, we say that a bird, out of its cage, is free, that an animal moves freely, and sometimes, in the same sense, we say that man acts freely. Here is meant that they move in accordance with the inclination of their nature. They move sua sponte, spontaneously; there is lack of constraint. They possess a freedom of spontaneity. This simply means that there is no compulsion exerted on the being, counter to its natural inclination. It does not mean that there is no necessity

¹I.C.G.80. Sed in speculativis intellectus de necessitate assentit primis principiis indemonstrabilibus, quorum contrariis nullo modo potest assentire. Ergo voluntas necessario inhaeret fini ultimo, ut non possit contrarium velle.

in their operations. Only constraint is excluded, external constraint or coercion. There is still implied in this type of action some necessity, some determination. The natural tendency of the being is a tendency of a nature to a determined end. Liberty of spontaneity then, is freedom from constraint, freedom from violence to be sure, but also freedom from impediment to natural action. Since this type of freedom can be attributed to all creatures of this universe, naturally this is not the freedom that is implied when we speak of man as being free, as possessing a special dignity which is lacking to those things below him in the scale of being. In the spiritual nature of man, this type of freedom is a freedom of independence and goes hand in hand with free will; but only at this level. It is not a question of the spiritual nature merely being able to follow the inclination of its nature but in making self the active cause of the action and perfecting self as a person in the act for which the self is responsible. St. Thomas distinguishes three kinds of necessity, the intrinsic necessity of nature - natural or absolute necessity, and the extrinsic necessities from the efficient or final causes, compelling

necessity and the necessity of end¹ - necessitas naturalis,
necessitas finis, necessitas coactionis.

As regards the first type of necessity, it determines the appetite absolutely and necessarily. The last end or the ultimate good of the rational appetite is the Good, that is its proper object and natural to it as will; the proper object of the will as the power of choice is the good in material things. Now it is not at variance with any future claim for freedom on the part of the will to claim that it is bound naturally to its final end. We have shown that the intellect must necessarily adhere to the first principles of knowledge. In both cases this necessity is the formal constitutive principle of the essence of the powers. Action in accordance with this natural direction of the will,

¹I.82.1. Necesse est enim quod non potest non esse; quod quidem convenit alicui, - uno modo ex principio intrinseco, sive materiali, sicut cum dicimus, quod omne compositum ex contrariis necesse est corrumpi; sive formali, sicut cum dicimus, quod necesse est triangulum habere tres angulos aequalem duobus rectis. Et haec est necessitas naturalis et absoluta - Alio modo convenit alicui quod non possit non esse ex aliquo extrinseco vel fine, vel agente; fine quidem, sicut cum aliquis non potest sine hoc consequi, aut bene consequi finem aliquem, ut cibus dicitur necessarius ad vitam, et equus ad iter; haec vocatur necessitas finis, quae interdum etiam utilitas dicitur; ex agente autem hoc alicui convenit, sicut cum aliquis cogitur ab aliquo agente, ita quod non possit contrarium agere; et haec vocatur necessitas coactionis.

unrestricted by deterrent forces from without, is the equivalent, in the realm of the rational creature, of that freedom of spontaneity possessed by the irrational beings of the universe. But this natural necessitation binds absolutely and the will cannot do otherwise than tend toward this natural end. Of course this observation is valid only in the realm of specification. In the order of exercise there is the possibility of failure to bind. When the intellect does not present to the will the object which possesses this binding power, then the will does not strive toward this object, it fails to exercise its desire. Only when the intellect presents the object, is the will bound by this natural necessity.

As far as the first movement of the will is concerned, it is necessary to postulate that the will of any being, not always willing, in actu, is moved by something exterior to it and that it is by the instinct of this exterior being that the will begins to will. The very first self-movement of the will is due to an initial push from an exterior mover.¹ Since this initial 'push' from an exterior mover

¹I-2.9.4. Secundum quod voluntas movetur ab objecto, manifestum est quod moveri potest ab aliquo exteriori. Sed eo modo quo movetur quantum ad exercitium actus, adhuc necesse est ponere voluntatem ab aliquo principio exteriori moveri.

is something direct, and since the will is rooted in reason, which is of a spiritual nature, the exterior mover must be something superior; it is God, who moves the will as He moves all things that not only are moved but do move. He moves them according to the 'ratio' of things capable of moving. This is merely another way of saying that God can move things without doing violence to them. When He moves the will, He moves it according to its own condition, to its own nature which He gave it. To use an inadequate illustration in an attempt to clarify the point, imagine a stalled automobile at the top of a steep hill, with roads branching off in many directions from the main road, as it descends the hill. A push given to that car would enable it to get to the bottom of the hill. A person steering the car, however, could direct it into any one of the diverging routes. If the car takes one of the side roads, who is responsible for that direction? The man in the car, or the man who pushed the car from the top of the hill? The man at the top of the hill did not make the car take the road to left or right, but he made it possible. The turning to the left owes its motion as such to the man on the hill; but its movement to the left, to the man at the wheel. The man on the hill

imparted the general motion and direction, but left the man at the wheel free to determine for himself the particular direction. Thus God imparts the first movement to the will and yet leaves its determination free. He gives to the will its general determination - as the general determination was given by the pusher, to the bottom of the hill - to which the will is naturally bound. That is its natural necessity. That which is necessary cannot not be. Whatever belongs to a thing by reason of an intrinsic principle and cannot not belong to it by reason of that intrinsic principle, is an instance of 'necessitas naturalis', i.e., three angles equal to two right angles are absolutely necessary to a triangle.

Looking now to the necessity arising from the extrinsic causes, we find the necessity of end. Whatever belongs to a thing by reason of some extrinsic principle and cannot not belong to it by reason of that extrinsic principle, is an instance of 'necessitas finis', provided that extrinsic principle is an end. When an end is desired it is necessary that certain means be taken to attain the end; quitting my present position is necessary 'ex necessitate finis' for my presence at the other side of the room. This is not a necessity that can do violence to the will.

It is otherwise with the other form of necessity, the necessity of compulsion. When this extrinsic principle is an agent which forces someone or something so to act that he or it cannot do the contrary, we have an instance of 'necessitas coactionis', which is force, coercion or violence. But no external force can compel the assent of the will. Violence of its nature is counter to the inclination of the will; but the act of willing cannot be counter to this inclination, so violence cannot effect the will act. It is a vain attempt of an exterior force attempting to dominate the act of the will within the inner sanctuary of the will, an inviolable spot.

A distinction in the will act is necessary to clarify this situation. The willed act is of two kinds. There is the act of the will which has its source and terminus in the will itself - this is called an elicited act of the will. Then there is the act of the will which arises in the will but finds its terminus in another faculty - the commanded act. The action of this other faculty may be impeded in its exercise by violence but that violence does not touch the willing of that act. I may will to move my arm but be prevented in that movement by external circumstances. But the

intention, the actual willing, has been carried out unimpeded by the fact that the result cannot be achieved. Nobody, not even God Himself, can coerce a human will. God cannot coerce it, because He has made it of a nature to determine itself intrinsically, and to coerce it He would have to contradict Himself.¹ Nay more, the human will cannot coerce itself, for that involves the contradiction of accepting something which is violent, which is about the same thing as saying that what is done willingly is formally done unwillingly. Violence is outside pressure to which the patient contributes nothing. Now, the will to force itself has to be both agent and patient. In so far as it is the agent of violence, it would contribute something to the violent motion, but in so far as it is the patient, it would contribute nothing. But to contribute something and at the same time nothing is contradictory.²

¹ De Ver.22.8. Deus potest immutare voluntatem de necessitate, non potest tamen eam cogere. Quantumcumque enim voluntas immutatur in aliquid, non dicitur cogi in illud. Cujus ratio est, quia ipsum velle aliquid est inclinari in illud; coactio autem vel violentia est contraria inclinationi illius rei quae cogitur.

² De Ver.22.9 ad 1. Non tamen ipsa potest se cogere, quia in hoc importatur contradictio, scilicet quod aliquid sit acceptum a seipso; quia violentum est in quo nihil confert vim patiens, confert autem vim inferens. Et sic voluntas non potest se cogere, quia sic seipsa in illa vi aliquid conferret, in quantum cogeret se, et nil conferret in quantum cogeretur; quod sit impossibile.

God can necessitate the human will, but no creature can. "No other created substance is joined to the intellectual soul in its own interior being and operation, except God, who alone is cause of it and sustains it in its existence."¹ It follows that there are only two agents which can work within the human will, the will itself and God. A spiritual being is an independent whole, a closed world in itself. So no creature, whether spiritual or material, can operate directly in or on a human will. They may operate indirectly or extrinsically by proposing some outside object to attract and seduce it, but they cannot necessitate it.² This fundamental principle holds good for passion, habit, temperament, etc. Since St. Thomas' day attention has been concentrated on the influence of hereditary factors on the working of intellect and will. In all his works the Saint assumed the effects of the composite on the activities of any part of it. It is the man who wills, the man who understands. It is by means of the will and

¹
3.C.G.88.

²
De Ver.22.9. Ex parte quidem voluntatis mutare actum voluntatis non potest nisi quod operatur intra voluntatem; et hoc est ipsa voluntas, et id quod est causa esse voluntatis; quod secundum fidem, solum Deus sit... Sic igitur patet quod nulla creatura potest directe immutare voluntatem, quasi agenda intra ipsam voluntatem, potest autem extrinsecus, aliquid proponendo voluntati eam aliquo modo inducere, non tamen immutare.

intellect that these operations are carried out. Therefore the general constitution of the composite will exert an influence in the actual operation. Answering an objection based on the Aristotelian statement that "according as each one is, such does the end seem to him", St. Thomas indicates the influence of temperamental characteristics.¹ His writings are replete with demonstrations that these factors cannot coerce the will but do have an influence on its workings.² In the same way he says of the intellect, "it is not possible for our intellect to form a perfect judgment, while the senses are suspended, through which sensible things are known to us."³ The experimental data, made available to recent philosophers, was, of course, not available to him, but the principles which he laid down on this matter, as on so many others, are being amply verified by these findings.

But good can be viewed under various aspects. We speak of the good as Honestum, Delectabile or Utile. The

¹I.83.1 ad 5. Sic igitur qualis unusquisque est secundum corpoream qualitatem talis finis videtur ei; quia ex huiusmodi dispositione homo inclinatur ad eligendum aliquid, vel repudiandum. Sed istae inclinationes subjacent iudicio rationis, cui obedit inferior appetitus.

²The following are a few references that might be given: Sent. II.d.25.q.1 ad 2.3; a.2 ad 2.3.6; a.3; 3.C.G.85; De Ver.q.24. a.1 ad 19; S.T.1-2.9.2; 1-2.10.3 ad 1; 1.77.1.

³I.84.8.

bonum honestum is the term of the appetite. As such, God is the perfect Good. The bonum delectabile designates the perfection of the appetite in possession of the desired good; this perfection follows on the possession of an intermediate bonum honestum. The bonum utile has goodness in so far as it is a means to the bonum honestum.¹

Movement or tendency of a being toward that which is not possessed denotes imperfection. The greater the movement then the more imperfect the nature, because perfection increases in indirect ratio with movement. Because of the great imperfection of the rational creature there are necessarily many movements to achieve its perfection. The will of man partakes of this imperfection of the being and consequently there is a diversity of movement of the will.

In dealing with the intellect two forms of activity showed themselves, a simple grasp of intellection, and a movement or reasoning. Since the rational appetite bears some

¹I.5.6. Id autem quod est ultimus terminus motus, potest accipi, dupliciter; vel ipsa res, in quam tenditur, utpote locus, vel forma, vel quies in re illa. Sic ergo in motu appetitus, id quod est appetibile terminans motum appetitus secundum quid, ut medium, per quod tenditur in aliud, vocatur utile.

dependence on the intellect for the apprehension of its object, there will be a corresponding distinction of operations in the will. Here too there are two acts, simple tendency or desire and a tendency by way of means. These are called will and choice respectively.¹ Now as intellect is to reason, so is the will to the power of choice; and as intellection and reasoning are acts of the same power, so are willing and choosing diverse acts of the one power. Reasoning takes its origin in intellection and ends in intellection, so does choice presuppose an act of will, and terminates in an act of will. And as reasoning presupposes an apprehension, which is not yet fully intelligible, and terminates in an unfolding of the intelligibility, so does choice presuppose an undetermined tendency and terminates in a tendency to this or that.

Now God or beatitude has been indicated as the ultimate term of the will, therefore the will functioning in

¹I.83.4. Similiter ex parte appetitus, velle importat simplicem appetitum alicujus rei; unde voluntas dicitur esse de fine, qui propter se appetitur. Eligere autem est appetere aliquid propter alterum consequendum; unde proprie est eorum quae sunt ad finem. Sicut autem se habet in cognitivis principium ad conclusionem, cui propter principia assentimur; ita in appetitivis se habet finis ad ea quae sunt ad finem, quae propter finem habet intellectus ad rationem, ita se habet voluntas ad vim electivam, id est ad liberum arbitrium.

regard to its final end, wills the end. That is the object of the will in which it finds rest. All other things serve as means to this end, therefore they are chosen as means to that ultimate end. We see, then, that choice indicates the will in transition to its ultimate end as reasoning indicated the intellect in transition to intellection. All that is chosen is chosen if it serves as a means to something further. This indicates that choice extends to everything except the term of the will, it cannot be a matter of choice,¹ since the will is determined to the Good. Since all particular goods lack the complete perfection of the Good, none of them draw the will inevitably; it remains indetermined in regard to any one of them and any one of them may be chosen.²

The will does not move itself in that specification of its act which is affected by the universal good. If the will wills, it cannot not will the good; that element in the specification is constant. In that much it is directed from

¹1-2.13.3. Illud cadit sub electione quod se habet ut conclusio in syllogismo operabilium. Finis autem in operabilibus se habet ut principium, et non ut conclusio, ut philosophus dicit in 2 Physic., text.89. Unde finis, in quantum est huiusmodi, non cadit sub electione.

²This is the basis of freedom in choice. The point will be amplified in a later section.

without, from God who gave it that direction, rather than directing itself; thus it acts as natural appetite. In this case it is willing as will or nature. Willing naturally in the order of exercise, the will cannot withhold its act. Willing naturally in the order of specification, it is determined to willing the Good if it wills at all.

The will wills naturally the ultimate end, beatitude, and those things evidently connected with it. It will naturally its own perfection and the perfection of the whole being.¹ Wherever the object is apprehended as inseparable from the perfections of man, then such an object is willed naturally.

Possessed, of its nature, by a tendency to its end, the will moves itself to will the means to this end. How? By counsel.² Counsel is an act of the intellect questing about the means leading to the end desired by the will.³

¹I.10.1. Non enim per voluntatem appetimus solum ea quae pertinet ad potentiam voluntatis, sed etiam ea quae pertinent ad singulas potentias et ad totum hominem.

²1-2.9.4. Manifestum est autem quod voluntas incipit velle aliquid, cum hoc prius non vellet. Necesse est ergo quod ab aliquo moveatur ad volendum. Et quidem, sicut dictum est, art.praeced., ipsa movet seipsam in quantum per hoc quod vult finem, reducit seipsam ad volendum ea quae sunt ad finem. Hoc autem non potest facere nisi consilio mediante. Cum enim aliquis vult sanari, incipit cogitare quo modo hoc consequi possit; et per talem cogitationem pervenit ad hoc quod potest sanari per medicum, et hoc vult.

³1-2.14.1. In rebus autem dubiis et incertis ratio non profert iudicium absque inquisitione praecedente; et ideo necessaria est inquisitio rationis ante iudicium de eligendis. Et haec inquisitio "consilium" vocatur.

The intellect does not impart efficient causality but specifies the action of the will so that its general tendency may be exercised through one of the various means to the end. The action of the intellect being always from the part of the object does not effect exercise of the act.¹ The will then is the cause of its movement counselled by the intellect. Its first act must be due to an external agent.² This agent must be God, who gives to the will its natural inclination, and hence is its first mover.³

¹1-2.9.1. Objectum movet determinando actum ad modum principii formalis, a quo in rebus naturalibus actio specificatur, sicut calefactio a calore, primum autem principium formale est ens, et verum universale, quod est objectum intellectus, et ideo isto modo motionis intellectus movet voluntatem sicut praesentans ei objectum suum.

²1-2.9.4. Et si quidem ipsa moveret seipsum ad volendum, (sanitatem) oportuisset quod mediante consilio hoc ageret ex aliqua voluntate praesupposita. Non autem est procedere in infinitum. Unde necesse est ponere quod in primum motum voluntatis voluntas prodeat ex instinctu alicujus exterioris moventis, ut Aristoteles concludit in quodam, cap. Eth. Eudem. cap. 18, circ. princ.

³Voluntatis autem causa nihil aliud esse potest quam Deus. Et hoc patet dupliciter, - Primo quidem ex hoc quod voluntas est potentia animae rationalis, quae a solo Deo causatur per creationem, ut in 1 dictum est, quaest. 90.2. Secundo vero ex hoc quod voluntas habet ordinem ad universale bonum; unde nihil aliud potest esse voluntatis causa nisi ipse Deus, qui est universale bonum.

CHAPTER THREE

MUTUAL INTERRELATION OF INTELLECT AND WILL

It would seem unnecessary, in the light of the foregoing individual treatment of the two faculties, to turn now to a consideration of the relationship between them before going on to note the interpenetrations of their workings. But the course of modern thinking on the problem of liberty renders that treatment indispensable. A certain order between the two faculties is immediately apparent from the doctrinal treatment by St. Thomas. It will be necessary to consider that order in detail however, because of the appearance, since St. Thomas' day, of a revolutionary inversion, which has profoundly influenced man's thought and action for two centuries.

It would be obviously impossible to give an exhaustive treatment of the origin and development of that revolution. But in order to review, even briefly, the most

salient phases of its evolution, one must begin from some definite standpoint. If we turn to the teachings of Immanuel Kant, we may discern in his thought and writings the principles upon which that revolution rests.

Kant called sense determinations, or the appearances of things, as presentable to the understanding, phenomena. That which does not appear to or in empirical consciousness, i.e., the thing as it is in itself, he called noumenon. Now what is noumenon is neither perceptible to the senses, nor demonstrable by reason nor capable of any scientific explanation. The existence of the noumenon is independent of empirical experience and is unknowable by pure reason; freedom, if freedom there be, may have its roots in the noumenal. But the field of scientific knowledge is an exclusive domain wherein nothing noumenal can play a role; in its realm freedom has no place. Here all events proceed in accordance with a rigid routine. If there be a world of morality and religion, proof of its possibility and validity must be sought elsewhere, and another set of categories or principles must be furnished for this purpose. There is a world of ideas representing the practical interests of man in these fields. But these

ideas cannot be explained in terms of knowledge. They are transcendental ideas. Man rises above the plane of understanding. His will becomes self-legislative. He has in himself notions of good and evil, duty and desire. Thus Kant claimed for man the right to a personal sovereignty as a moral being, and, when released from his theoretical leading strings, he found in freedom a possible way toward an interpretation of the world in terms of the highest in man - his moral self, and through freedom justified man's faith in moral values.

By making the world of God and the soul a province of belief rather than knowledge, he established the primacy of the will, or in Kantian language, the primacy of the practical reason.¹ The will, together with the scale of moral values peculiar to it, took precedence over knowledge. Truth fell from the objective plane to the level of a relative and fluctuating value. As a result, intellect and will have remained in modern thought unreconciled and irreconcilable. It remained for Goethe to phrase the final conclusion

¹Note: This is the difficulty presented by the third Kantian antinomy in The Critique of Pure Reason (Meiklejohn's translation, pp.252-257). Unable to find a place for freedom in the order of phenomena, he subordinated metaphysics to morality and admitted the principle of Voluntarism.

of Kant's teaching, and proclaim the dethronement of reason,
in that terrible passage where he makes Faustus proclaim:

'Tis written; "In the Beginning was the Word",
Here am I balked; who, now, can help afford?
The Word? - impossible so high to rate it;
And other wise must I translate it,
If by the Spirit I am truly taught.
Then thus; "In the Beginning was the Thought".
This first line let me weigh completely,
Lest my impatient pen proceed too fleetly.
Is it the Thought which works, creates, indeed?
"In the Beginning was the Power", I read.
Yet, as I write, a warning is suggested,
That I the sense may not have fairly tested.
The Spirit aids me; now I see the light!
"In the Beginning was the Act." I write.¹

This reversed the essential principle of Aristotelico-Thomistic thought and the traditional thought of the ages, the principle of the priority of the intellect, the primacy of the Word. By this reversal the way was prepared for an all-pervading subjectivism, and as a necessary consequence that fatal result followed. Historically the sequence of events which issued from this revolution is too well established to require elaboration here. But with the irrevocable logic inherent within the developments of history, that

¹Goethe, Paul Carus. Chicago, 1915, p.215 (Bayard Taylor's translation). It seems that 'deed' would be a better translation for the last word of this quotation; Im anfang war die That! This brings out more clearly the philosophical thought underlying Faustus' speech.

sequence was inevitable, for it necessarily follows that subjectivism must replace the traditional objective thought because will is of itself irrational. It is rational by participation.

In bringing the first book of the Ethics to a conclusion, Aristotle makes the statement: "Si autem oportet et hoc dicere, rationem habere, dupliciter erit, et rationem habens. Hoc quidem principaliter et in seipso. Hoc autem quemadmodum a patre audibile aliquid." Commenting on this passage, St. Thomas says: "Duplex erit rationale. Unum quidem sicut principaliter et in seipso rationem habens, quod est essentialiter rationale. Aliud autem est, quod est natum obedire rationi, ut et patri. Et hoc dicimus rationale per participationem", and goes on to give a basis for the primacy of the intellect, and the necessity for its specification of the will.¹ Anything essentially irrational

¹In Dec.Lib.Eth.Arist. Pirotta.Lib.1.Lect.XX.No.242. Subdividit aliud membrum divisionis primae, scilicet rationalem animae partem. Et dicit, quod si oportet dicere illam partem animae, quae participat rationem, esse aliquam rationalem, duplex erit rationale. Unum quidem sicut principaliter et in seipso rationem habens, quod est essentialiter rationale. Aliud autem est, quod est natum obedire rationi, ut et patri. Et hoc dicimus rationale per participationem. Et secundum hoc, unum membrum continetur et sub rationali et irrationali. Est enim aliquid irrationale tantum, sicut pars animae nutritiva. Quaedam vero est rationalis tantum, sicut intellectus et ratio quaedam vero est secundum se quidem irrationalis, participative autem rationalis, ut appetitus sensitivus et voluntas.

may be rational per participationem. For in the soul, as in all created substances, the 'quo est' differs from the 'quod est', existence from essence. It possesses only such being as its nature permits, following the general law that a creature participates in being according to the capacity of the participating essence. Since the essentialiter rational is also principaliter rational, the principium of rationality in that which is essentially irrational is the reason itself. Both sensory and rational appetite are by nature not essentially reasonable but they both share reason when reason gives to their activity the specification of 'rational'. This gives to the will its nobility, this sharing in reason. Divorce it from reason, raise it above reason, and it is immediately degraded and finds itself sinking to the service of the sensible. This transition, in the thought subsequent to Kant, did take place. F. Aveling has given a brief survey of this result:

Locke's treatment of personality and will definitely shifts the ground of enquiry from the metaphysical to the empirical level.... Locke's distinction between sensation and reflection pointed clearly to bodies and minds, extended and thinking beings, after the manner of Descartes. His substitution of masses of simple ideas for the idea of substance, however, virtually substantialized the simple ideas of themselves. Though he does not

state the laws of Association nor treat the subject in the now familiar way, his chapter on the Association of Ideas does lead to the notion of elemental ideas becoming associated together to constitute what has been called the empirical consciousness. This indication was to be fruitful for future development in the Associationist School. It only needed the explicit substantialising of ideas, and that the reference to minds should be dropped, in order that the notion of consciousness should be shifted altogether, and with it the notions of personality and will radically altered. Consciousness would then become the sum total of mental contents and states. Personality would then consist in a group or cluster of some of these phenomena. And volition would be then explained as consisting in a particular order in time in which the contents and states occur. With Hume the references in question were as a matter of fact definitely dropped, and mind accordingly, becomes a tissue of impressions and ideas related to nothing other than themselves. Substantial personality is reduced to a fiction. The self is made to consist in its events. And will is no more than a peculiar sequence of phenomena.

Hume substituted for the mind and its powers bare ideas and their connections. For him, accordingly, mind is in its whole sum and substance not an activity, but simply a collection of impressions and ideas in connections which we believe to be constant because we have previously experienced them to be so... This is a thorough going empirical view. Consciousness is the sum of contents and states, with no reference to, nor implication of, a mind, soul, self or person. Secondly Hume eviscerates the will of all substantive reality and power. He admits nothing but sequences of outer and inner events. Will thus becomes only a name for 'that class of events in which there occurs an observed sequence consisting of the strongest motive as inner event and change of place as outer event'.¹

¹F. Aveling, Personality and Will (Cambridge: 1931).

There is no hesitancy on the part of St. Thomas in asserting, "Intellectus est altior et nobilior voluntate".¹ This conclusion results from an absolute consideration of the object of both faculties and is a direct consequence of what he has said about the rationality found in the will. The very nature of the object of the will presupposes a wider object for its specifying power. For since the object of the will is good, since good is dependent on being, since being is the object of the intellect, therefore the object of the will is placed, as it were, on a lower level than that of the intellect.

This priority of the intellect is seen more clearly perhaps in the consideration of the end of the human creature. That end consists in an intellectual operation: "The urge to know is such that when we know effects, we want to know the causes, and no matter what the thing in question be, or which of its properties we may know, our desire does not rest until we know the essence of it, and so our born desire to know is restless until we know the first cause, and not in any

¹I.82.3.

haphazard way, but in its essence.¹ This first cause is God; the end of ends, then, for an intelligent creature is to see God as He essentially is."² Again, "the very heart and meaning of happiness lies in an act of the intellect."³

Only relatively may the will be higher than the intellect. The operation of the intellect is as it were to reduce all that it knows to its own compass, to grasp it and make it into self. Matter contracts essence to its proper existence, holds it to what it is and nothing else. As it emerges from matter it becomes more readily what it is not. The intellectual grasp of essences, as we have seen, is a spiritualizing operation. It transforms

¹It may not be without interest to remark how St. Thomas, following the strictest requirements of philosophical and theological reasoning, corroborates and supports the marvellous insight which St. Augustine so beautifully phrased in that well-known passage in the Confessions, I.1: Tu excitas, ut laudare te delectet, quia fecisti nos ad te et inquietum est cor nostrum, donec requiescat in te. Da mihi, domine, scire et intelligere, utrum sit prius invocare te an laudare te, et scire te prius sit an invocare te. Sed quis te invocat nesciens te? aliud enim pro alio potest invocare nesciens. An potius invocaris, ut sciaris? quomodo autem invocabunt, in quem non crediderunt? aut quomodo credent sine predicante? et laudabunt dominum qui requirunt eum. Quaerentes enim inveniunt eum et invenientes laudabunt eum. Quaeram te, domine, invocans te, et invocem te credens in te; predicatus enim es nobis.

²Comp.Theo., Ch.IV.

³1-2.3.4.

into itself. The operation of the will goes out to the object and desires it as it is. Thus we might say that if the object is higher in the scale of being than the human being himself, the direction of the will to that object would be a higher operation than the operation of the intellect in regard to that same object, provided that the mode of operation of these two faculties remains in the order of nature. Thus, in this life, 'it is better to love God than to know Him', for the operation of love looks to God as He is while the operation of knowing seeks to encompass God, to reduce him to the level of the intellect. In the Beatific Vision, however, the intellect does not reduce God to its level, but by the Light of Glory is superelevated to such an exalted level that the Word of God Himself replaces the species expressa of the natural intellect and we will know God not per speculum et in igmate as is our lot on earth, but facere ad faciem. In the scale of being below the human level, however, the operation of the intellect still remains higher. Each faculty has its own order where it is supreme. The intellect in the realm of knowledge is absolute. The will in the realm of doing, but possessing even there only a relative superiority, thus escaping the

pitfalls into which men have fallen by making the Ethos absolute. On this point we cannot do better than quote a wonderful summation made by M. Maritain: "If humanity is purely and exclusively volitional, it contemns truth and beauty and becomes the sort of moralist and fetichist monster of which a Rousseau, a Tolstoy, or a William James give us some idea. If humanity is purely and exclusively intellectual, it scorns its eternal interests, it becomes a kind of monster, metaphysician or aesthetic. The glorious danger of genius is always a terrifying risk."¹

Having considered this relationship of the faculties we may now go on to the discussion of their interrelationship. The natural tendency of being is to be. Now the being possessed by God is infinite, therefore there is no tendency to being, in God, beyond Himself.² The activity of the Divine Will is not tendency but enjoyment. Appetite denotes imperfection, lack of perfection. There is no perfection lacking to the All-Perfect. The act of the Divine

¹ J. Maritain, Lecture Notes.

² I.C.G.72. Deo autem nihil coordinatur quasi eiusdem ordinis nisi ipse; alias essent plura prima, cuius contrarium supra ostensum est. Ipse est igitur primum agens propter finem qui est ipsemet. Ipse igitur non solum est finis appetibilis, sed appetens, ut ita dicam, se finem.

Will is, then, an act of love, not of desire, an act of love of God Himself as the supreme Good.¹

The created being possesses being finitely.

Therefore it tends by its being to be fully itself, that is to realize all its potentiality. The perfection then of the finite being is in operating, in reducing its potentiality to act.² All beings having esse, tend to operate. The operation of the being is proportionate to the nature of the being, therefore the natural tendency of the being is proportionate to the nature possessed. Since the nature of the rational being is a rational nature, its tendency is to know. Thus it is the natural tendency of a man which impels him to act through intelligence. But as the being which moves or impels the rational

¹ I.19.1 ad 2. Voluntas in nobis pertinet ad appetitivum partem; quae, licet ab appetendo nominetur, non tamen hunc solum habet actum ut appetat quae non habet, sed etiam ut amet quod habet, et delectetur in illo. Et quantum ad hoc voluntas in Deo ponitur; quae semper habet bonum quod est ejus objectum; cum sit indifferens ab eo secundum essentiam, ut dictum est.

² I.C.G.72. Cuilibet autem enti competit appetere suam perfectionem et conservationem sui esse, unicuique secundum suum modum; intellectualibus quidem, per voluntatem; animalibus per sensibilem appetitum.

nature to know is imparted by creation, to say that natural appetite moves the intellect to know is the same thing as saying that God moves the intellect to know.¹ This natural appetite to know accounts for the operation of the intellect in its first or subsequent grasp of being. In any operation involving intellect and will this is the starting point, intellection.

Whereas the Divine power, the principle of the operation of God, is the Divine Essence itself, in man there is a distinction between power and essence. A diversity of powers in man is necessary because of his lack of perfection. The perfection of the soul is not achieved in the perfection of any one power at the expense of the others. Each faculty operates to achieve the perfection of the whole as well as its own perfection.²

¹I.83.1 ad 3. Deus igitur est prima causa movens et naturales causas, et voluntarias. Et sicut naturalibus causis, movendo eas, non aufert quin actus earum sint naturales, ita movendo causas voluntarias, non aufert quin actiones earum sint voluntariae, sed potius hoc in eis facit; operatur enim in unoquoque secundum ejus proprietatem.

²De Ver.12.12. Potentiis autem animae superioribus ex hoc quod immateriales sunt, competit quod reflectantur super seipsa; unde tam voluntas quam intellectus reflectuntur super se, et unum super alterum, et super essentiam animae, et omnes animae vires; et similiter voluntas vult se velle, et intellectum intelligere, et vult essentiam animae, et sic de aliis. Cum autem aliqua potentia super aliam fertur, comparatur ad eam secundum suam proprietatem; sicut intellectus cum intelligit voluntatem velle, accipit in seipso rationem volendi.

The mutual influence of one faculty on another does not involve the absorption of one faculty into another; the intellect operating under the influence of the will does not cease to elicit its proper act. One faculty may be the cause of the operation of another, as the will may command the exercise of my power of movement, but the action which results is caused wholly by neither. Each exerts the type of causality proper to it, and the unique effect is the effect of both, just as the picture is caused not only by the painter, but by the materials and the model.

The will is dependent upon the intellect for the form which is the principle of its act. The Angelic Doctor insists on this in numerous passages throughout his works: "the proximate moving cause of the will is the good understood, which is its object, and it is moved thereby as sight is by colour."¹ "The good perceived moves the will in the same way as a man who counsels or persuades, that is to say, by pointing out the goodness of an object."² "Because it is intellect which moves the will, the act that proceeds from

¹ 3.C.G.88.

² De Malo 3.3.

the will is the effect of knowledge."¹ Threading all his thought on this matter is the basic principle, nothing is willed unless it be known. The will must be specified, must have an object before there is any action of the will.

The influence of the intellect in the act of the will appears in the formal constituent of that act, and by that form the will is directed to this end or that. The intellect influences the will as an end influences an agent; the end moves the agent through its presence intentionally in the agent, just as the formal constituent of the act of the will is the form existing in the intellect.² Thus the intellect exercises a formal causality.

The object of the will is the good in general,³ the will terminates in the good universally.⁴

¹I. Rom. 7.3.

²1-2.9.1. Objectum movet determinando actum ad modum principii formalis, a quo in rebus naturalibus actio specificatur, sicut calefactio a calore. Primum autem principium formale est ens et verum universale, quod est objectum, intellectus, et ideo isto modo intellectus movet voluntatem, sicut presentans ei objectum suum.

³I.48.5. Quia verum bonum simpliciter est objectum voluntatis.

⁴I.59.4. Manifestum autem ex dictis quod objectum appetitus intellectivi, qui voluntas dicitur, est bonum secundum communem boni rationem, nec potest esse aliquis appetitus nisi boni.

That termination of the will cannot be achieved in this or that particular good. That which is known may be willed, and, since the knowledge of the intellect extends to being in its universality, and since the being of a thing and its goodness are one, the object which terminates, ultimately, the rational appetite can only be universal. The intellect, though its object is being in general, is nevertheless a particular faculty whose perfection is reached in the acquisition of truth. Thus even though it can know the good in general, its good is ratio boni appetibilis.¹ This is not the good in general, but a particular good; for the ratio of a thing is not its whole perfection. The object of the intellect is truth and the true is good. But the true is never revealed to the intellect except in particular things.

Consequently each true thing is particular and to the extent that it is a good thing it is an object of the intellect. Thus the object of the intellect as such is subordinate to the object of the will. The intellect acting

¹I.82.3. Objectum enim intellectus est ipsa ratio boni appetibilis.

about its particular good, is moved to act by the faculty which acts for the common good. The will, consequently, may be said to influence the intellect as regards the exercise of its act - its action on the intellect is in the line of efficient causality.¹

Since the will is founded on nature, it is necessary that the movement proper to nature be shared by the will to some extent.² In things there is essence and existence. There is necessarily then a twofold relationship of the soul with things.³ By intellection the essence is grasped. But the form understood, by which the intellectual substance

¹1-2.9.1. Nam fines et perfectiones omnium aliarum potentialiarum comprehenduntur sub objecto voluntatis, sicut quaedam particularia bona. Semper autem ars vel potentia ad quam pertinet finis universalis, movet ad agendum artem vel potentiam ad quam pertinet finis particularis sub illo universali comprehensus.

²1-2.10.1 ad 1. Sed quia voluntas in aliqua natura fundatur, necesse est, quod modus proprius naturae quantum ad aliquid participetur a voluntate, sicut quod est prioris causae, participatur a posteriori.

³De Ver. 21.1. Et sic aliquod ens potest esse perfectum dupliciter. Uno modo secundum rationem speciei tantum; et sic ab ente perficitur intellectus, qui perficitur per rationem entis; nec tamen ens est in eo secundum esse naturale alio modo ens est perfectivum alterius non solum secundum rationem speciei, sed etiam secundum esse quod habet in rerum natura; et per hunc modum est perfectivum bonum.

acts, is from the intellect.¹ That which is apprehended by the intellect moves the intellectual appetite. The intellect, of course, does not give the will its volitional exercise, but simply presents it with the object on which it may exercise that virtue; the dependence of the will on the intellect is of the same order as the dependence of the intellect on being; the intellect is informed by being, the will by the form apprehended. In consonance with the perfective urge there is tendency to its full perfection as it is. Therefore there is the tendency to its perfection or fullness of being; a love of being as it is in its natural existence. This leads the will to instigate the intellect to judge that the good is desirable; for the love or imperfect enjoyment of the good by the will leads it to seek rest in it. Thus we have, in the first relationship, apprehension of being as true followed by complacency in being as good and then the will moving the intellect to judge that this being is actually desirable.

The appetibility of the particular object is not determined for us by nature, but we determine it for ourselves

¹2.C.G.47. Forma autem intellecta, per quam substantia intellectualis operatur, est ab ipso intellectu, utpote per ipsum concepta et quodammodo excogitata.

in virtue of the principles naturally known to us, the object being judged to be good in so far as it is apprehended as a means to the attainment of the end determined for us by nature. Neither the end itself, nor the first principles of our reasonings about the goodness of things, are within our power to change, for the good is known intuitively, and the intellect must of natural necessity assent to the first principles. There is, however, some contingency involved in the application of those principles, for the things which are willed may be willed not only for their absolute goodness - the good commensurate with their truth and their being - but also for the attraction they may have for faculties other than the will as such.

The will wills not only its own perfection, but that of the whole and of each of the parts, so that the precise aspect under which the object is judged good, is variable. Moreover, the reasoning process itself is liable to an erroneous issue. This is a speculativo-practical judgment to specify the will. It is not sufficient to lead to action immediately. It prepares the way for the formulation of the intention on the part of the will,¹ which is

¹1-2.11.1 ad 3. Dicendum quod in delectatione duo sunt, scilicet perceptio convenientis quae pertinet ad apprehensivam potentiam, et complacentia ejus quod offertur ut conveniens, et hoc pertinet ad appetitivam potentiam, in qua ratio delectationis completur.

the movement of the will to the end to be acquired by the means. Therefore intention implies movement towards an end, not rest.¹ The will says, in effect, 'I want it'. We can have intention of the end without having determined the means which are the object of choice.² This imposes on the intellect a deliberation as to how to get it. The intellect is commanded to make inquiry before deciding on the objects of choice. In things doubtful and uncertain, the reason does not pronounce judgment, without previous inquiry; wherefore the reason must of necessity institute an inquiry before deciding on the objects of choice.

The will willing end moves itself by willing means. In potency to the willing of means, the will can move itself to the actual willing of the means, because it is already in actu in regard to willing the end. This is effected through counsel.

Counsel is a certain appraisal of the suitability of different means, all of which are clamoring, as it were,

¹1-2.12.2 ad 3. Dicendum quod fruitio importat quidem quietem, quae est in fine, quod pertinet solum ad ultimum finem; sed intentio importat motum in finem non autem in quietem.

²1-2.12. 1 ad 3. Quod intentio finis esse potest, etiam nondum determinatis his quae sunt ad finem, quorum est electio.

for the judgment's endorsement. An endorsement on the part of the judgment is made only after counsel has been instituted. The willing of anything previously not willed implies, prior to it, this counsel, and prior to that some other willing. For example, John wills to take a tonic, although five minutes earlier his will had been strongly opposed to this. How was this will made possible? Where did it come from? This was made possible only because he had already been actually willing to regain his health. From the actuality of the initial willing, the other willing came into act. The influence of the initial will, however, was exerted through the medium of counsel. Willing the end (the regaining of his health) he examined the various means conducive to this end. Fresh air, long sleeps, travel, a tonic, all presented themselves, each one calling out its own merits. After considering all of them, the counsel terminated at the tonic; a judgment was made; and a new willing was called into existence. Thus the will moved itself through counsel. The important thing to keep in mind is that the counsel could just as easily have stopped at the fresh air as a means, or at the travel. For this very reason the use of counsel and the latitude it gives, the will moves itself -

but not of necessity. Were there no counsel, there would be necessity - the choice would be determined to one. It is through counsel that innumerable avenues are opened to the will.

Now counsel is about matters of conduct within our control. Those matters beyond our control are not subject to our deliberation. We do not counsel about matters which we cannot affect, nor about matters determined by nature, nor of those things subject to regularity and unchangeable laws. We deliberate about those things of which we are the agent or can be the agent. Even among these matters some are not subject to counsel. There must be an element of uncertainty in our voluntary actions before this need of counsel arises. The principle of this inquiry is the end. But counsel is about operations, in so far as they are ordained to the end.¹ The student flyer does not counsel or seek counsel about the end in view for him. He seeks counsel and counsels himself about the means to attain that goal - to be a good combat flyer. When the end is in

¹1-2.12.2 ad 2. De operationibus est consilium, in quantum ordinantur ad aliquem finem. Unde si aliqua operatio humana sit finis, de ea, in quantum hujusmodi, non est consilium.

view we consider how and by what means the end may be attained. If there is only one means to its attainment, then we deliberate about its attainment by this means. The situation calling forth counsel is that in which we find ourselves when we have arrived at that point where we pause and, in effect, say to ourselves, 'that is what I am going to do, now how will I do it?'

Counsel belongs, in a way, both to the will, on whose behalf and by whose command the inquiry is made, and to the reason that executes the inquiry.¹ It is an application of prudence to the principles, which reason can grasp, as a directive light in the research of counsel. Here is the free creature in operation, the intellectual creature, uncompelled by natural necessity in matters which do not concern the ultimate end, debating about the means to attain that end. Since the appetite tends to the last end naturally, the application of the appetitive movement to that end is not subject to any direction by intellect, it is acting as nature.

¹1-2.14.1 ad 1. Ita Damascenus dicit, loc.sup.cit.quod consilium est appetitus inquisitivus, ut consilium aliqua modo pertinere ostendat et ad voluntatem, circa quam et ex qua fit inquisitio, et ad rationem inquirentem.

Consent, presupposing the judgment about that to which consent is given, indicates the establishment of a kind of union with the object of consent, the will tends to that upon which the reason has passed judgment. It is only an act of the appetitive power because of, or, as a consequence of, the act of reasoning, deliberating and judging. Thus we can assign it both to will and reason. Since it is the result of the intellectual operation, the practical reason, judging and pronouncing on matters of action, the limitations of consent are readily discernible. When it is a question of the end, there is no matter for judgment and hence no consent is possible; therefore consent is given only in matters which concern means. If the matter of counsel concerns only one means, then there is no absolute distinction between consent and choice. Then we call it consent, according as we approve of doing the particular thing and choice according as we prefer this means to achieve the end. In matters where the counsel is about several means, counsel may indicate several means to attain the end and all meeting with approval may be consented to. Then the further operation of preferring one among these is necessary, and this is the function of choice.

Thus we have pursued the matter to the crux of the operation. An intellectual creature can exercise this choice, and only an intellectual creature. But choice is involved and we must consider all its facets intimately. But first we can now clear up one beclouding difficulty.

If free choice is impossible except to intellectual creatures, is it not perhaps because free choice is a judgment? If the intellect directs and guides the choice of men, it would appear that the act of choosing is nothing but the pronouncement on the ratio boni of an object, and this is nothing but intellectual decision. The intellectualist will argue thus and there would seem to be good reasons behind his argument. But where, the voluntarist asks, can you have room for freedom in an intellectual judgment? Obviously the spontaneity of voluntary activity points to untrammelled liberty. How then can the essence of free choice rest on an intellectual decision, wherein the connection between the terms of the judgment must obviously be necessary in order to determine the assent of the intelligence? This alternative between intellectualism and voluntarism, however, is only an apparent dilemma.

From the treatment of the operations of the intellect and will so far, we see that St. Thomas refutes the intellectualist. The free choice has a reason for it, but this reason is determined by the will (the nature of that determination remains to be discovered) - intelligo quia volo. Similarly he solves the difficulties presented by the voluntarist. The free choice has will in it, but this will is determined by the intellect, by its specification - intellectus intelligit suum velle. As we have seen, the interpenetration of intellect and will in choice is but a special instance of the veritable maze of their mutually reciprocal relations. The free act of choice in which both will and intellect are involved, is the dominating indetermination of the will determining the judgment which determines the will. Here we are up against the profundity of St. Thomas' thought, here are the depths of that mystery. The will needs to be specified by the intellect but the exercise of the will has primacy over the intellect and subordinates it to its own dominating indetermination. The act of choice determines itself, since the particular is chosen. If that choice be free then the determination of it must be in the power of the chooser.

If we make the determination of choice solely an intellectual determination with the Intellectualists, then we cannot explain how the choice could have been otherwise. It is possible of course to explain why the particular choice is made but that is as far as we can go. Then we would have intellectual determinism and any further discussion of freedom of choice would be futile.

If with the voluntarists we make the determination of choice solely voluntary, we will have to go all the way and claim that the will is never necessitated by the intellectual presentation of the good. This would be true even in the presence of the Good. There too it would retain its power of self-determination, its freedom of action, since it can always turn away from the intellectual presentation of the object. But choice would have no reason in it as to why it was not necessitated. Thus we might assert the immunity from necessity of this spontaneous choice but we cannot prove it from the reason alleged, viz., that choice is purely spontaneous. To put it briefly; if the reason for choosing this or that is an exhaustive reason, such a reason explains not only why one chooses but also why one could not have chosen otherwise;

if there be no reason for choosing this or that, why then maybe one might have chosen otherwise, and maybe not. It is essential to liberty, then, if one wishes to maintain choice's exemption from necessity upon philosophical grounds - that the determination of the free act ad unum be at once voluntary and intellectual. Intellectual, in order that the reason why a man chooses this render some account also why his choosing this was not necessitated; voluntary, in order that the reason for his choice of this be his own reason. This position is no doubt delicately subtle, but it seemed demanded by the exigencies of the situation as seen by Saint Thomas. He threaded his way successfully through this maze and as a result we have interesting but involved exposition of the inter-relationship of intellect and will.

We have followed this interlocking action of intellect and will through the various steps from the apprehension of being by the intellect, complacency in being as good by the will, to the judgment that this is good, which stirs up the intention, - I want it, which causes the intellect to counsel - how to get it, and results in consent. To reduce this to practicality there

is now necessary the practical judgment on the part of the intellect and the choice on the part of the will. A full treatment of these operations is reserved for the following chapters.

CHAPTER FOUR

SPECIFICATION OF CHOICE BY THE INTELLECT

Since it is impossible to choose without choosing something, the act of choice needs to be specified.¹ This specification depends on the intellect, the practical reason, passing a practical judgment. The speculative intellect

¹1-2.13.3. Electio consequitur sententiam vel iudicium, quod est sicut conclusio syllogismi operativi.

It is interesting to note here, though it is outside the scope of our problem, the interesting application which may be made to the field of rational psychology. Both sensitive and rational appetite share in the specification of rational when they are duly subject to the reason in the pursuit of the bonum commune. The sensitive appetite shares in that specification more directly when it is subject to the rational will. Because of this participation in reason the human sensory operations are essentially distinct from the animal operations. No matter what the human being does, he is always a human being and as a result all his operations are coloured by that rationality. Consequently psychology beginning with biology and rising through animal psychology is counter to the principles of St. Thomas for the formation of a human psychology. No sound human psychology can be adduced in this way, and all such attempts must necessarily end in failure, in that they start from a false view of man and will end in a distortion of this creature.

ordains what it apprehends, not to operation but to the consideration of truth for its own sake. But now we are in the practical realm and it is the practical intellect which ordains what is apprehended to operation. The speculativo-practical judgment is itself concerned only with the goodness of the object, as such. It is not concerned with action in any way. The practico-practical judgment passes judgment on the means to attain the end.¹

¹ Note: The terms 'speculativo-practical' and 'practico-practical' are not found in St. Thomas' writings. The interpretation of his thought justifies this distinction and common usage of the terms by Thomists justifies their continued use. The following passages point to the accepted usage.

Maritain, La Phil.Berg., Paris, 1930, p.356. Il importe distinguer ici avec les scolastiques trois especes de jugements; en premier lieu le jugement purement speculatif, celui qui ne concerne en rien l'action, par exemple; le tout est plus grand que la partie, l'homme est un animal raisonnable; en second lieu le jugement speculativo-pratique, c'est celui qui concerne l'action, mais en enoncant une verite universelle, abstraction faite des circonstances concretes et de la realite singuliere de l'acte a accomplir, par exemple; il faut faire le bien; il ne faut tuer; il faut aimer son prochain. Enfin le jugement practico-pratique, c'est celui qui prescrit une action determinee, dans telles circonstances particulieres et concretes.

Garrigou-Lagrange, Dieu, p.609. Une acte libre est celui que la volonte accomplit avec une maitrise our une indifference dominatrice telle qu'elle peut ne pas l'accomplir, si bien que, les circonstances restant rigoreusement les memes, la volonte pourra une autre fois suspendre son acte, ne pas agir. Cette indifference dominatrice de la volonte sera sauvegardee si le principe determinant immediat du vouloir est lui-meme indifferent. Ce principe est le

(cont'd)

We considered the nature of the speculative judgment in the first chapter. It is concerned with being as truth, simply and solely for the satisfaction of the natural craving of the intellect for that which satisfies it. It rests in its satisfaction. It says, in effect, 'this is good', and remains content with it. Its object is achieved. Its grasp of esse is complete - as far as that operation goes. The intellect has ordained what it has apprehended to the further consideration of truth.

But the intellect ordains what it apprehends to operation also. Man is not pure intellect and because of the intellectual desire stirred by that partial grasp of the being, he sets himself in operation to become more

¹(P.107 cont'd) jugement pratico-pratique qui precede l'election volontaire, le jugement par lequel nous affirmons que tel object hic et nunc est bon pour nous et qu'il est bon de le vouloir. Ce jugement est appele pratico-pratique qu'il porte sur un acte envisage dans telles circonstances bien determinees ou il va etre accompli, par opposition aux jugements speculativo-pratiques, commes les preceptes de la morale, vrais en soi partout et toujours independamment des circonstances, exemple; il faut faire le bien; il faut etre juste. Le jugement purement speculatif est celui qui ne concerne en rien l'action, exemple; le principe de contradiction, de causalite, un jugement d'existence quelconque. Cf. also Sertillanges Saint Thomas D'Aquin, Vol.II,p.245.

intimately identified with that truth. As in the first judgment, he said in effect, 'this is good', so now to achieve a transition to the practical realm he says, 'this is good for the end'. He has determined the relation of an object to the attainment of the end.

This judgment is not dependent upon particular circumstances. It relates the good to the end but as it were with a universal sway. Both judgments are concerned with the truth or good as is. That is, they are concerned primarily with the esse. For action, a third judgment is necessary to specify this good thing as the term of this particular appetite in its present disposition, here and now. To fully grasp that good he must say, he must judge, 'this is the way', now, under these circumstances for the attainment of this good, for this end. It is a judgment concerned with truth or good as is to be, that is its interest is in the existence. The first judgment, the speculative, is concerned with truth simply for its own sake, the second, the speculativo-practical with truth or good as leading to the end, the third, the practico-practical with truth or good for the sake of doing or making. The very definitions of the two spheres of the practical order

stress that to-be-ness, recta ratio agibilium and recta ratio factibilium. Now it is the first realm with which we are concerned as the directive operation of the will distinct from the operation of the intellect. It is that realm of action, which next to the speculative activity of the human being, is highest in the scale of his works, the use of the will in its free choice.¹

Now the function of the practical intellect is to measure the work to be done and regulate it. Its truth lies in what ought to be according to the rule and the measure for regulating the thing in question.² The practical intellect as a motive power, leads toward movement. Its function is to put into act, not as the efficient cause but to make the formal causality effective. The formal causality given to the will by the speculative judgment would always remain potential, always ineffective

¹De Ver. 16.1 ad 15. Judicium est duplex; in universali et hoc pertinet ad synderesim; et in particulari operabili, et hoc est judicium electionis, et hoc pertinet ad liberum arbitrium.

²1-2.57.5 ad 3. Verum intellectus speculativi accipitur per conformitatem intellectus ad rem..... Verum autem intellectus practici accipitur per conformitatem ad appetitum rectum.

for operation without the practical judgment. This is true also of the speculativo-practical judgment. M. Maritain phrases the situation with his usual clarity when he says:

Or le jugement speculativo-pratique, le jugement universel, est incapable par lui-meme de determiner necessairement la volonte. Pourquoi? Parce qu'il porte sur une verite universelle, sur une action en general a faire en general, par exemple; l'homme doit aider son prochain, d'ou il suit qu'etant homme j'ai le devoir de conseiller mon ami, en vertu d'une loi universelle s'appliquant a l'action humaine en general. Mais l'acte que j'ai a faire est un acte concret et particulier; ce n'est pas une action humaine en general ni une action mienne determinee simplement en tant qu'humaine, c'est essentiellement un acte mien, determine en tant meme que mien. La volonte requiert de l'intelligence, pour etre determinee en tant meme que mien. La volonte requiert de l'intelligence, pour etre determinee a une telle action, un decret qui porte en particulier sur cette action en tant meme que mienne, en tant qu'action concrete et singuliere en rapport avec ma fin, et avec mon vouloir personnel et singulier de ma fin. C'est dire qu'elle requiert absolument de l'intelligence un jugement practico-pratique.¹

It is the practico-practical judgment which passes judgment on the means to attain the end.

¹J. Maritain, La Philosophie Bergsonienne (Paris: 1930), p.367.

Being as truth, is that which is first grasped by the speculative intellect. Being as good, is the first object of the practical intellect.¹ The first operation of the speculative intellect results in the apprehension of a group of indemonstrable principles. These principles serve as a basis for subsequent operations of the speculative intellect.² But it is the end, in practical matters, which plays the same role as the principles in speculative matters. The truth of the speculative judgment is in conformity to the thing. The truth of the practical judgment is in conformity to well ordered appetites.³

¹ I.79.11. Nam intellectus speculativus est qui quod apprehendit, non ordinat ad opus, sed ad solam veritatis considerationem; practivus vero intellectus dicitur qui hoc quod apprehendit, ordinat ad opus.

² 1-2.94.2. Nam illud quod primo cadit in apprehensione, est ens, cujus intellectus includitur in omnibus, quaecumque quis apprehendit. Et ideo primum principium indemonstrabile est, quod non est simul affirmare et negare, quod fundatur supra rationem entis et non entis; et super hoc principio omnia laia fundantur..... Sicut autem ens est primum quod cadit in apprehensione practicae rationis, quae ordinatur ad opus..... et ideo primum principium in ratione practica est quod fundatur supra rationem boni, quae est; bonum est quod omnia appetunt. Hoc est ergo primum praeceptum legis, quod bonum est faciendum et prosequendum, et malum vitandum.

³ 1-2.57.5 ad 3, quoted on page 110.

The object is judged according as it serves as a means to attain the natural end of the creature. The judgment passes on the goodness of the particular thing as an object of action.

Since there can be no error in the apprehension of the first principles, and since they cannot suffer corruption, any error which appears in the judgment follows from the application of the principles. The sensitive appetite may exert influence on the will. Affected by passion, that which otherwise would not appeal to him now appears fitting.¹ Numerous are the examples we experience during life of the change to a certain disposition wrought by the sensitive appetite. The young soldier, for the first time faced with the temptation to join his companions in a drinking bout, has also the thought of his mother in mind and her counsel. To avoid the charge of being lacking in good-fellowship, or to enjoy the companionship of his fellows, he drives out the picture of his mother and her

¹1-2.9.2 ad 3. Unde et irascibilis et concupiscibilis possunt in contrarium movere voluntatem; et sic nihil prohibet voluntatem aliquando ab eis moveri.

counsel.¹ The will turns the intellect aside from the contemplation of this idea and concentrates it on the goodness that is present in the association with his companions. Nothing prevents that which is better simply and in itself from being less excellent in a certain respect. Since the sensitive appetite is a particular power, it has great influence in disposing man so that something seems to him more preferable in particular cases. Since we sometimes choose that which is known to be evil, it seems that the judgment errs in its exercise. In this case the seeming contradiction arises from using the speculativo-practical judgment as the basis. Hence stealing is judged as wrong. But the practico-practical judgment is concerned with this act in the particular circumstances of the here and now. This particular act of stealing is appetible for the good that is seen in it and is so judged. The act of stealing is not willed as an evil but in so far as it is judged good by the practico-

¹I.83.1 ad 1. Appetitus sensitivus, etsi obediat rationi, tamen potest in aliquo repugnare, concupiscendo contra illud quod ratio dictat.

practical judgment.¹ Thus our changing dispositions, the influence of the passions, inadequate knowledge, errors in our reasoning, all influence the practico-practical judgment. But these all influence the will in the order of specification only.

To come to the crux of our problem in its first aspect, we must consider what indetermination exists in the specification of choice. The object moving the will determinately is the last end.² If the intellect be applied to thinking of beatitude, it must judge it to be good, since there can be no possibility of evil in beatitude, it is all good and completely satisfies. The will

¹ De Ver.24.2. Et quod quandoque appetitus videatur cognitionem non sequi, hoc ideo est, quia non circa idem accipitur appetitus et cognitionis iudicium; et enim appetitus de particulari operabili, iudicium vero rationis quandoque est de aliquo universali, quod est quandoque contrarium appetitui. Sed iudicium de hoc particulari operabili, ut nunc, numquam potest esse contrarium appetitui. Qui enim vult fornicari, quamvis sciat in universali fornicationis malum esse, tamen iudicat sibi ut tunc bonum esse fornicationis malum esse, tamen iudicat sibi ut tunc bonum esse fornicationis actum, et sub specie boni ipsum eligit. Nullus enim intendens ad malum operatur, ut Dionysius dicit. (C.4. de Div.Nom.)

² I.83.1 ad 5. Naturaliter homo appetit ultimum finem, scilicet beatitudinem.

could not will the opposite of it.¹ But the practico-practical judgment is not concerned with the absolute goodness but with the thing as suitable for the will here and now. None of the goods with which it is concerned fulfil the conditions of 'bonum et conveniens'. No thing, no object, contacted in the universe satisfies the intellect's capacity for truth or the will's capacity for good.

The will remains indetermined before those things which are not evidently connected with its beatitude.² The

¹ De Malo 6. Objectum movens voluntatem est bonum conveniens apprehensum; unde si aliquod bonum proponatur quod apprehendatur in rationi boni, non autem in ratione convenientis, non movebit voluntatem. Cum autem consilia et electiones sint circa particularia, quorum est actus, requiritur ut id quod apprehenditur ut bonum est conveniens in particulari, et non in universali tantum. Si ergo apprehendatur aliquid ut bonum conveniens secundum omnia particularia quae considerari possunt, ex necessitate movebit voluntatem; et propter hoc homo ex necessitate appetit beatitudinem, quae, secundum Boetius, est status omnium bonorum congregatione perfectus. Dico autem ex necessitate quantum ad determinationem actus, quia non potest velle oppositum; non autem quantum ad exercitium actus, quia potest aliquis non potest velle oppositum; non autem quantum ad exercitium actus, quia potest aliquis non velle tunc cogitare de beatitudine; quia etiam ipsi actus intellectus et voluntatis particulares sunt.

² De Ver. 22.6. Respectu objecti quidem est indeterminata voluntas quantum ad ea quae sunt ad finem, non quantum ad ipsum finem ultimum, ut dictum est art. praeced.; quod ideo contingit quia ad finem ultimum multis vilis perveniri potest et diversis diversae viae competunt perveniendi in ipsum. Et ideo non potuit esse appetitus voluntatis determinatus in ea quae sunt ad finem..... Unde respectu hujus est in potestate
(cont'd)

judgment concerning these things is not from a natural instinct, but from the act of comparison in the reason which discerns many possible means of attaining that end. It compares these means with the ratio of good. The irrational creature, lacking this knowledge of goodness, only knows that the thing is good or bad in this experience with it and is drawn by the good and repelled by the evil thing. The indetermination of the rational creature in the judgment is safeguarded because the judgment can pass on the usefulness or lack of usefulness of means which are partially loved and partially hated; it also can pass on the fittingness of means among means.

Since the will's capacity for goodness is only completely satisfied by the absolute good, since it is only drawn inevitably to that infinity, the partial goods which are presented to it cannot exert that complete

¹(p.116 cont'd) ejus appetere hoc vel illius. I.83.1.
Sed quia iudicium istud non est ex naturali instinctu in particulari operabili, sed ex collatione quadam rationis; ideo agit libero iudicio, potens in diversa ferri. Ratio enim circa contingentia habet viam ad apposita, ut patet in dialecticis syllogismis et rhetoricis persuasionibus.

determination. That object which does not exhaust the capacity of the faculty leaves it in a state of indifference. A good without limit is the only one which would satisfy that infinite desire for good which is the rational will. All desires are comprehended in this general desire. "The will is said to have the dominion of its act, not by the exclusion of the first cause, but because the first cause does not so act in the will that it, of necessity, determines the will ad unum as it does determine nature ad unum; and therefore the determination of the act is left in the power of reason and will."¹ This dependence of indetermination upon determination is stressed by St. Thomas: "God moves the will of man, as the universal mover, to the universal object of the will, which is the good; and without this universal motion a man cannot will anything."² Rational creatures are moved by

¹De Potentia, 3.7 ad 13. Voluntas dicitur habere dominium sui actus, non per exclusionem causae primae, sed quia causa prima non ita agit voluntate ut eam de necessitate ad unum determinet, sicut determinat naturam; et ideo determinatio actus relinquitur in potestate rationis et voluntatis.

²1-2.9.6 ad 3. Deus movet voluntatem hominis, sicut universalis motor, ad universale objectum voluntatis quod est bonum; et sine hac universali motione homo non potest aliquid velle.

God to the good in general (velle bonum universale); that is the nature bestowed on them. They are moved toward it naturally. But to the good in particular they have the power of determining their act.

The practico-practical judgment is always presenting partial good, goods with some admixture of evil, some lack of goodness. How then can these inadequate objects draw the will to chose them? Since it is of the nature of the will to will the good, the ratio volendi is, in every instance of desire, the good; just as the ratio videndi is, for the eye, colour. It is not the good as such, which the will desires, as it is not colour as such which the eye sees. We see coloured objects and desire good things. But as the colour is the reason why we see coloured things, so the good is the reason why we desire good things. Thus we might say that the good in itself is not the object of desire, it is the reason for desiring any object.¹ No good object ever compels the reason to desire

¹De Ver.22.5. Natura autem et voluntas hoc modo ordinata sunt, ut ipsa voluntas quaedam natura sit; quia omne quod in rebus invenitur quaedam natura dicitur. Et ideo in voluntate oportet invenire non solum id quod voluntatis est, sed etiam quod naturae est. Hoc autem est cuiuslibet naturae, creatae, ut a Deo sit ordinata in bonum, naturaliter appetens illus. Unde et voluntati ipsi inest

(cont'd)

it so strongly that we must necessarily will that object. God would be such an object, if we saw Him, and when we do, there will be no question of what we shall do.¹ But incorporated goods with which we are confronted are such that we can accept or refuse them. This is apparent, because the only supposition upon which we should have to embrace a given good would be that such a good so completely fulfilled the reason for desiring it, that there would be no reason for not desiring it. The middle term

¹(p.119 cont'd) naturalis quidam appetitus sibi convenientis boni; et praeter hoc habet appetere aliquid secundum propriam determinationem, non ex necessitate; quod ei competit in quantum voluntas est. Sicut autem est ordo naturae ad voluntatem, ita se habet ordo eorum quae naturaliter vult voluntas, ad ea respectu quorum a se ipsa determinatur, non ex natura. Et ideo sicut natura est voluntatis fundamentum, ita appetibile quod naturaliter appetitur, est aliorum appetibilium principium et fundamentum. In appetibilibus autem finis est fundamentum et principium eorum quae sunt ad finem; cum quae sunt propter finem, non appetentur nisi ratione finis.

¹1.82.1. Similiter etiam nec necessitas naturalis repugnat voluntati; quinimo necesse est quod sicut intellectus ex necessitate inhaeret primis principiis, ita voluntas ex necessitate inhaereat ultimo fini, qui est beatitudo. Finis enim se habet in operativis sicut principium in speculativis, ut dicitur in 2 Physic.text 89. Oportet enim quod illud quod naturaliter alicui convenit, et immobiliter, sit fundamentum, et principium omnium aliorum; quia natura rei est primum in unoquoque, et omnis motus procedit ab aliquo immobili. Cf. also 1-2.10.1; De Veritate 22.5.

of our practical syllogism, the ratio volendi, would have to cover the minor term, the desired object, de jure. For example; in the syllogism, the good (A) is to be desired (B); this (C) is good (A); therefore this (C) is to be desired (B). A would have to be exhausted by C. Obviously the condition on which such a de jure identification of the good (A) with a good (C) could be made is the absolute goodness of the minor term (C). In fact, the minor term never measures up to the middle. This good is never, in our experience, the good; this good is always relative, defective. We do indeed accept the minor, this good; we do, in fact, substitute the values of A for C; but we do not have to. And the reason is, we see the difference. Thus, "Since the form conceived by the intelligence is universal (the ratio volendi, the good as such), under which many things can be comprised", since further, "our acts are related to singulars, none of which exhausts the possibility of the universal, the inclination of the will remains indeterminately related to many things; just so, an architect conceives in general the idea of a house, under which are comprised various forms of houses; his will can be inclined to make a round one, or a square

one, or one of some other figure."¹ It is precisely the sort of judgment by which we see the difference (between a good and the good), that is at the source of free choice. To bring this out St. Thomas compares free activity with other kinds. Fire rises, generates its kind; stones fall, etc., no judgment is involved here. Animals act with judgment, but it is not a free judgment. The lamb flees the wolf, but this action is from its natural instinct, or from instinct plus the experience of having previously been chased. But man compares; he decides what he ought to do or not to do, and he does this, not because of a natural form or a cognitive form necessitating a determinate action in a given case, but because he deliberates, weighs, and hews his path amidst contingent affairs, now this way, now that. Whence, since action is something contingent; since further, the kind of action in our experience is also contingent, since lastly, man can know all this, it follows that precisely because man can know it, he is free, a rational animal has free choice. The will follows the good presented by the intellect;² unable

¹De Malo 6.1.

²I.82.3 ad 2. Bonum intellectum movet voluntatem.

to elect what is not a good,¹ it is able nevertheless not to elect a particular good, or to elect a different good; and this it can do, because reason, which presents the particular good, is collativa plurium.²

But, it is claimed, if the will follows the judgment, then - although one may see that there are alternatives - nevertheless there is only one alternative which can be chosen. If so, the reason for this choice, supposing the will follows this reason for the choice, is also the reason which makes any other choice impossible; the will is not free.

St. Thomas here introduces the main point of his theory. The judgment presenting a good which one is to accept or reject, is due to an influence not wholly intellectual. We do indeed choose what we have finally decided is the best, but this only means - since best here is just a relative, contingent best - that our will has made it the best. The will supplements the judgment in order that the

¹I.82.2 ad 1. Voluntas in nihil potest tendere, nisi sub ratione boni.

²I.82.2 ad 3. Ratio est collativa plurium; et ideo ex pluribus moveri potest appetitus intellectivus, scilicet voluntas, non ex uno ex necessitate.

combined efficacy result in a choice. The will determines the judgment and overcomes the inadequacy of the object to determine it. John of St. Thomas speaks of this indifference as the indifference of liberty.¹ The determining factor of the judgment is the inclination of the will to one of the means. The judgment is elicited by the intellect only at the instigation of the will. The intellect alone cannot elicit the judgment since it does not grasp the necessary connection between this particular act and the end, because that connection does not as yet exist. I must make that connection to exist by the will. If at the moment I have a match and a cigarette in my hands, there is no necessary connection between the match and the lighting of the cigarette. I must make that connection by an act of my will; then, and only then, will I be able to see the connection - which I have made. In this way it is made to be and at the same time it is made an object of knowledge.

Man is not such that he chooses what he thinks he should not choose. What man chooses is what he thinks best,

1

Indifferentia libertatis consistit in potestate dominativa voluntatis non solum super actum suum ad quem movet sed etiam super iudicium a quo movetur. John of St. Thomas
De An.XII.2.

and what he thinks best, in the field of action, is what he wills to think best.¹ The origin of our choice then can be traced either (or both) to the understanding or (or and) to the will. It depends merely upon your point of view. If you ask, why does John do this and not that? the answer is: John sees it this way. If then you ask, why does John see it this way? the answer is: John wills to see it this way. The intellect is the first principle specifying choice, the will is the first principle which causes the accomplishment of choice. And, since the true is a particular kind of good, and the good a particular kind of truth, a man thinks it best to choose the way he does, because he so wills, and he so wills, because he thinks it best so to will.²

¹Here we are dealing with practical propositions and not speculative.

²De Malo 6.1. Si autem consideremus objectum voluntatis et intellectus, inveniemus quod objectum intellectus est primum principium in genere causae formalis, est enim eius objectum ens et verum; sed objectum voluntatis est primum principium in genere causae finalis, eius objectus est bonum, sub quo comprehenduntur omnes fines, sicut sub vero comprehenduntur omnes formae apprehensae. Unde et ipsum bonum, in quantum est quaedam forma apprehensibilis, continetur sub vero quasi quoddam verum; et ipsum verum, in quantum est finis intellectualis operationis, continetur sub bono ut quoddam particulare bonum. Si ergo consideremus motum potentiarum ex parte objecti specificantis actum, primum principium motionis est ex intellectu; hoc enim modo
(cont'd)

As God makes the thing good in itself, by conferring being on it, I make it good as a means by making it to be a means, and so existing, it is immediately an object of knowledge for the intellect and subject to judgment. I can do this because since the goodness is in the esse, that goodness does not exist until the thing has been made a means. It is the will which makes it to be a means and so confers goodness. That is a "creation" of my will. So the goodness in things, to be made good as means, depends on me.

In possession of several alternatives the intellect is not necessitated by any one of them, since all are particulars. And since the judgment judges the goodness of an object in relation to the present inclination of the will the judgment is elicited only upon the inclination of the will. The speculativo-practical judgment is entirely the work of the intellect knowing the relation of acts to ends; the practico-practical judgment is confronted with a particular occasion, subject to being

²(p.125 cont'd) bonum intellectus movet etiam ipsam voluntatem. Si autem consideremus motus potentiarum animae ex parte exercitii actus, sic principium motionis est ex voluntate. See also 1-2.9.1 ad 3; 1.82.4; 1.C.¶.72.

apprehended either as good or as not good, as something to be done or as something not to be done, and the intellect of itself is not determined to either part. The will intervenes here not only to move the intellect to the exercise of its act, but it enters even into the sphere of the specification of that act; for the intellect judges only in relation to the disposition of the appetite.¹

There is an apparent contradiction implied here. Our basic principle is that 'nothing is willed, unless it be known'. We have stated that the practico-practical judgment issued only when the will inclines. Is the principle violated? The will inclines to one of the means known but not judged best, which judgment depends upon the inclination of the will. Has the will moved without a previous act of the intellect? The principle which will aid in clearing this difficulty is, "causae ad invicem sunt

¹ Cajetan in 1-2.77.2 ad 4. Absolute loquendo de determinatione intellectus, dicendum simpliciter est quod voluntas determinat intellectum ad iudicandum alterum oppositorum faciendum; sed diversimodo in bonis et malis. Quia cum neutrum oppositorum habeat rationem mali moraliter, voluntas ex se sola flectit iudicium quo vult; ad alterum vero oppositorum moraliter malum, voluntas ipsa flectit iudicium sed non nisi concurrente ad hanc flexionem aliquo alio defectu intellectus, saltem non consideratione omnium considerandorum, quae sufficit ad hoc quod omnis malus ignorans sit, ut de peccato angelis dictum fuit.

causae, sed in diverso genere". The act of the will inclining to one of the means has its efficient cause in the will, its formal cause in the means to which it inclines. The act of inclination is none other than the act of choice. There is not temporal succession between the inclination of the will (choice) and the specification of it.¹ They are one and the same act. The active and dominating indetermination of the will operates in regard to the judgment itself which determines it; the will can do nothing without an intellectual judgment; and it is the will which makes itself determined by judgment and by this judgment rather than by another one. This solves another difficulty; without a reason a free act is impossible, with a reason an act cannot be free - such is the contention which might be made. St. Thomas answers: a free act has a reason, but this reason, though determining, is itself determined by a voluntary influence.

"Election follows the ultimate practical judgment, but

¹1-2.113.7 ad 4. Quod en eodem instanti in quo forma acquiritur, incipit res operari secundum formam..... motus autem liberi arbitrii, qui est velle, non est successivus, sed instantaneus.

that the judgment be ultimate is due to the will."¹ And, if it be urged, what then determines the will? the answer is, once more: the intellect determines the will by presenting the good in the guise of a particular truth (that this is good is true). So, after all, it is the intellect which determines choice - our contendor continues! Yes, but in the sense explained and with the restrictions that the judgment (that this is good is true) is due quite as much to the will desiring the particular good that this be true - intelligo quia volo.² Then, after all, it is the will which determines the judgment? Again yes, but with the restriction that the will's desire of a particular good is due quite as much to the presentation, by the intellect of the truth of that good.

But can we be specific and say one or the other? Either the will determines the intellect or the intellect determines the will. St. Thomas refuses to be cornered like that simply because the question has no answer. The

¹ Sacra Studiorum Congregatio, Acta Apostolicae Sedis, Jul. 14. Ann. VI. Vol. VI. Romae Typ. Pol. p. 386. Sequitru proinde electio iudicium practicum ultimum; at, quod sit ultimum, voluntas efficit.

² De Malo 6.1.

Angelic Doctor would not accept the question because it has no validity as a question. Choice, for him, is a particular, 'sort of' - quoddam - judgment; 'sort of' because choice is essentially an act of the will which wills, not of the reason which judges. But though choice is essentially an act of the will, St. Thomas included in that act the judgment, the voluntary choice of which is the conclusion of a deliberation.¹ An act which is a combination of the will and intellect. Free choice is thus a willed judgment or a judged willing. Just as one cannot define man by his form alone, or his matter alone, but by a necessary conjunction of form and matter - homo est animal rationalis - so free choice cannot be defined, satisfactorily, or completely, by either the will alone or by the intellect alone, but by both together. Thus, it must be said - electio est actus et voluntatis et rationis.

As we have seen, there is, in the order of formal causality, a priority of judgment, while in the order of efficient causality, as we shall see more definitely in the

¹De Ver.24.1 ad 20. Cum electio sit quoddam iudicium de agendis, vel iudicium consequatur, de hoc potest esse electio quod sub iudicio nostro cadit.

following section, there is a priority of volition, which causes the intellect to judge in such and such a way or to suspend its judgment. In effect, the will causes the intellect to judge that a certain good is by nature disposed to move it. It is the cause of its own direction because it moves the intellect to impress that direction upon it.

The practico-practical judgment, since the intellect can assent or withhold its assent, is determined by something other than the truth of the object. That 'something other' is the will. The will here functions as it does when we accept something on faith rather than on the evidence of the object; we believe in something, not because our judgment is evident from the definition of its terms (as with first principles), nor because it is established by demonstration (as by reasonings from first principles), but because eternal life is promised to those who do believe. We do some things while willing not to do them, but we can believe only if we will; caetera potest homo nolens, credere non nisi volens.

Faith whereby we believe in something which we do not understand, is consequent upon a judgment assenting to a

thing under an aspect whereby that thing is sufficient to move the will, even though its evidence of truth is of itself not sufficient to move the intellect to assenting to it.¹

¹

De Ver.14.1. Quandoque vero intellectus possibilis determinatur ad hoc quod totaliter adhaeret uni parti (contradictionis); sed hoc est quandoque ab intelligibili, quandoque a voluntate. Ab intelligibile quidem quandoque mediate, quandoque immediate; immediate, quando ex ipsis intelligibilibus statim veritas propositionum intelligibilium infallibiliter apparet; et haec est dispositio intelligentis principia, quae statim cognoscuntur notis terminis; et sic ex ipso quod quid est, intellectus immediate determinatur ad hujusmodi propositiones; mediate vero, quando cognitio definitionibus terminorum, intellectus determinatur ad alteram partem contradictionis, virtute primorum principiorum; et ista est dispositio scientis. Quandoque vel intellectus non potest determinari ad alteram partem contradictionis neque statim per ipsas definitiones terminorum, sicut in principiis, nec etiam virtute principiorum, sicut in conclusionibus demonstrativis est; determinatur autem per voluntatem, quae eligit assentire uni parti determinate et praecise propter aliquid, quod est sufficiens ad movendum voluntatem, non autem ad movendum intellectum, utpote quod videtur bonum vel conveniens huic parti assentire; et ista est dispositio credentis, ut cum aliquis credit dictis alicujus hominis, quia videtur decens vel utile; et sic etiam movemur ad credendum dictis in quantum nobis repromittitur si crediderimus, praemium aeternae vitae; et hoc praemio movetur voluntas ad assentiendum his quae dicuntur, quamvis intellectus non moveatur per aliquid intellectum -----
Garrigou-Lagrange, Dieu, loc.cit. p.618. Dire que l'intelligence est indifferente, c'est dire qu'elle n'est pas ici comme devant un principe premier ou une conclusion necessaire, auxquels elle ne peut refuser son adhesion. Ici, comme dans la foi, l'object ne la determine pas suffisamment; et il ne saurait y avoir de determination intellectuelle si la volonte n'intervenait pour suppléer a cette insuffisance dans l'ordre de specification. S. Thomas emploie exactement les memes termes lorsqu'il s'agit d'expliquer le role de la volonte dans la foi et dans le dernier jugement pratique.

This accounts for the insistence, as above, that the practical judgment judges, not of the absolute goodness of the thing (which is convertible with its being), but of the goodness of this thing in relation to appetite. The speculativo-practical judgment determines the relation of a certain object to attaining the end; this judgment is not dependent upon particular circumstances, but holds universally; e.g., act justly. The practico-practical judgment on the other hand, relates to this object as the term of this appetite in its present disposition; e.g. do this just act. The truth of the practico-practical judgment is in its conformity to well ordered appetite. The practico-practical judgment is confronted with a particular occasion, subject to being apprehended either as good or not good, as something to be done or not to be done, and the intellect of itself is not determined to either. The will intervenes here, not only to move the intellect to the exercise of its act, but it enters even into the sphere of the specification of that act; for the intellect judges only in relation to the disposition of the appetite.¹ The practico-practical judgment in judging

¹Such is the position of Maritain, Sertillanges, and Garrigou-Lagrange. The latter gives further references. Cajetan in 1-2.77.2.No.4. Billuart De Actibus Humanis, D.III, art. 6. sec. 4. solv. obj.

some particular to possess goodness, partial goodness, and therefore capable of being loved or not loved, desired or not desired, is spurred by the will in the same way as when in exercise the judgment affirms or refrains from affirming that something is immediately good for action. Man himself is the cause of this judgment.¹ This is essential to the nature of man, of the intelligent creature, else no operation could be attributed to the creature.²

Thus the practico-practical judgment, since the intellect can neither assent or withhold its assent, is determined by something other than the truth of the object; it is determined by the will. It is not necessary to seek a further cause to account for the specification of the

¹ De Ver.24.1. Homo vero pervirtutem rationis iudicans de agendis, potest de suo arbitrio iudicare, in quantum cognoscit rationem finis et ejus quod est ad finem, et habitudinem et ordinem unius ad alterum; et ideo non est solum causa sui ipsius in movendo, sed in iudicando; et ideo est biberi arbitrii, ac si diceretur liberi iudicii de agendo vel non agendo.

² De Ver.24.2. Appetitum autem, si non sit aliquid prohibens, sequitur motus vel operatio. Et ideo, si iudicium cognitivae non sit in potestate alicujus, sed sit aliunde determinatum; nec appetitus erit in potestate ejus, et per consequens nec motus vel operatio absolute. Iudicium autem est in potestate iudicantis secundum quod potest de suo iudicio iudicare; de eo enim quod est in nostra potestate, possumus iudicare.

inclination other than the knowledge of the means which is already possessed. In this inclination of the will is its liberty, its mastery over its own act, its domination over the practico-practical judgment.

Of course the essence of that liberty need only reside in the exercise of choice. It would be sufficient that the will be able to choose or not to choose. In making the specification also dependent to a certain extent on liberty, the position of the free choice is strengthened.

C H A P T E R F I V E

EXERCISE OF CHOICE BY THE WILL

We have already attributed efficient causality to the exercise of choice. Now efficient causality amounts to this, that something which did not previously exist, is brought into existence. Something, which has not of itself the sufficient reason of its existence, is now made to exist. This may be a creative action or a transformative action; the former by producing the being from nothing, the latter by producing a new form in an already existing subject. God of course is the primary efficient cause of all that is; nothing comes into being and nothing is changed or altered but by and through His power. Yet except in the instance of direct and immediate creation, or in cases of Divine intervention, equivalently creative, the 'hierarchy of subordinate causes' is sufficient to account for all that eventuates.

Now, in the exercise of choice, the efficient causality of the will is not only transformative causality but is of a quasi-creative kind. First we may note a parallel operation which takes place in intellection, the causation of truth.

When the intellect judges that the essence existing in my mind and the essence existing in the thing are identical, then truth has been, in a sense, created. Truth did not exist there before, because there was no relationship established until I made it to be. And this relationship is the necessary attribute of truth. By the judgment that relationship is made.¹ But the human intellect is a trial and error creator. It must constantly make reference to God's created world, to determine the truth of this creation of the intellect. If my world then is found to be in accordance with God's world, there is adequation, my judgment is true. My mind must conform to things as they are. My judgment is not a fiat, as is God's judgment. God judges that this object before me is

¹De Ver. 1.3. Ibi primo invenitur ratio veritatis in intellectus ubi primo intellectus incipit aliquid proprium habere, quod res extra animam non habet, sed aliquid ei correspondens; inter quae adaequatio attendi potest.

a typewriter, and it is a typewriter. There is creation of the thing in conformity with God's plan. If I judge this object to be a typewriter I conform my mind accurately to the thing as it is, and I have truth. But if I judge it to be a red herring then there is lack of conformity between intellect and world of reality or error. Recourse must frequently be made till that adequation is established. If when it is compared with God's world and found not to conform with it, but is preferred to God's world, then my world, my 'creation', is simply a tissue of error and I am in heresy. Lucifer made a world of error in this way; he clung to his world in face of God's truth, and as a consequence is truly named the father of lies. He chose his own intelligence, despite its lack of conformity with reality, as a guide to decision of the means to achieve the end, rather than the light of faith.

Now there is a similar operation in the exercise of choice. The good terminating the will is in things. The Good actually exists in God. As things are manifestations of God they participate in goodness according to

their capacity, according as God makes them to participate in it. Therefore the way to get to the Good is through a participation of the partial good that is in things. Now the good which God put in things exists there by the Will of God as the end of His creation. These things are termini of the creative act, they are not necessarily means. The creation of things, the goodness in them are both dependent on God. To serve my purpose I use those goods for the achievement of an end of mine. I make things to be means. By that very fact, that I use them as means, I confer goodness on them as means by choosing them to be means. As God makes the thing good as being so do I make the thing good as a means. Its goodness as a means does not exist until I have chosen it and made it to be a means. Thus the exercise of choice is a quasi-creative action, making a world of goodness, by choosing things to be means to achieve the end I have in view. There is no question here of the conferring of goodness of being on things by a created agent, that belongs to God alone.

As the world of truth, which I make, has no validity unless it corresponds with reality, so the world of goodness, which I make, has no validity unless it corresponds to the world of being. Thus if I confer the goodness of means on something which by its own being is not good, I create a world of evil, as by the other operation I can create a world of error. That is to say, without God I create being without essence. Such is the nature of the sinful human act. It is the creation of that on which I can confer the being necessary and suitable for it as act; but in withholding that reason which should be in it, I deprive it of its proper being, of that which should be in it. I create a vacuum, nothingness. I prostitute the capacity I have, as a creator made to the image of the Creator, in imaging His activity. This is sin. Is this an indication of freedom? We shall see that it is a result of imperfect freedom.

Two acts on the part of the will have been distinguished; simple tendency and tendency through means to an end, will and choice. In the first case, where it acts as nature determinately to its proper object, when presented

with this object by the intellect, it must necessarily will it. Functioning as choice, the will can act or not act, will this or will that.¹ Functioning as choice the will is never concerned with the last end.²

In man, as in all else, there is a principle of proper acts or movements. In natural things that principle is the form and the natural inclination following the form. In man that principle is the intellective form, and the natural inclination which follows is the tendency of the will. In so far man and things are alike. But in things the form is individuated by matter and the natural inclination is determined to one; in man the intellectual form is universal and it can comprehend many things.³

¹ Pot.2.3. Voluntas, inquantum voluntas, cum sit libera, ad utrumlibet se habet. Potest enim voluntas agere vel non agere, sic vel sic facere, velle et non velle. Et si respectu alicujus hoc voluntati non conveniat, hoc accidet voluntati non in quantum voluntas est, sed ex inclinatione naturali quam habet ad aliquid, sicut ad finem ultimum, quem non potest non velle beatitudinem, nec potest velle miseriam. Ex quo patet quod omne illud cujus voluntas est principium, quantum in se est, possibile est esse vel non esse, et esse tale vel tale, et tunc vel nunc.

² 4.C.G.95.

³ De Malo 6. In hoc est differentia quia forma rei naturalis est forma individuata per materiam; unde et inclinatio ipsam consequens est determinate ad unum, sed forma intellecta est universalis sub qua multa possunt comprehendit.

Since acts are singular, there is nothing in them to equal the potency of the universal,¹ and the inclination of the will remains indeterminate to many.² This is at the root of the indetermination of choice. If universal judgments were impossible to man, he would not possess freedom. The architect has the universal idea of house in his mind, and may, therefore, choose to build a house of any style and description; and animal could build a house of only one style.

The animal is midway between natural things and man. Natural things have only one form, but brutes have many sense forms and through them are moved variously. But these sense forms are determined to one, for the sense form, being elaborated through a material organ, is

¹De Ver. 24.4. ad 14. Notitia et amor dupliciter possunt comparari ad mentem. Uno modo ut ad amantem et cognoscentem; et sic ipsam mentem non excedunt, nec recedunt ab aliorum accidentium similitudine. Alio modo possunt comparari ad mentem ut ad amantem et cognitum; et sic excedunt mentem; quia mens non solum se amat et cognoscit, sed etiam alia; et sic recedunt ab aliorum accidentium similitudine.

²De Malo 6. Unde cum actus.....se habens ad multa.

determined to one.¹ "Brutes have a certain likeness of reason, in as much as they participate in a certain natural prudence.... They have a judgment ordained to a few things, but it is from natural estimation, and not from comparison, since they ignore the reason of their judgment; their judgment extends only to a few determined things, and not to all things as does the judgment of reason. And, likewise, there is in them a certain likeness of the power of free choice, inasmuch as they can act or not act. Thus, there is in them a certain conditioned liberty; they can act, if they judge they have to act, or not act, if they judge that way. But because their judgment is determined to one, their appetite and action are determined to one; they are driven by passion."² Men cause their own judgment, animals do not. Man knows the ratio of end and the ratio of means and the relationship between the two, and is able to ordain

¹ De Malo 6. Principium autem activum in brutis animalibus medio modo se habet inter utrumque. Nam forma apprehensa per sensum est individualis, sicut et forma rei naturalis; et ideo ex ea sequitur inclinatio ad unum actum sicut in rebus naturalibus, sed tamen non semper eadem forma recipitur in sensu sicut est in rebus naturalibus, quia ignis nunc forma delectabilis, nunc tristia.

² De Ver. 24.2.

means to ends. Man can will many ends and choose many means to the same end. The animal is restricted to one determined end through the restricted means of natural instinct. A piece of meat before a hungry man and the same piece of meat before a hungry dog affects the sensitive organism similarly. The dog's judgment will drive him to the meat, the man can control his judgment. Hence reason is said to be the root of liberty, since it is through reason that man can control his own judgment.¹

The intercausality of intellect and will, as indicated previously, gives the key to the nature of the power of free choice. Choice implies both a judgment and an act of the will. How can one act come from two different faculties? "The power of free choice must be but one power for it puts forth only one act. It is one determinate power which virtually unites the other powers. All powers emanate from the essence of the human soul, in such a manner, that

¹De Ver. 24.1. Homo vero per virtutem rationis iudicans de agendis, potest de suo arbitrio iudicare, in quantum cognoscat rationem finis et ejus quod est ad finem, et habitudinem et ordinem unius ad alterum; et ideo non est solum causa sui ipsius in movendo, sed in iudicando; et ideo est liberi arbitrii, ac sic diceretur liberi iudicii de agendo vel non agendo.

the origin of one presupposes the previous origin of another, i.e., the act of the appetitive power presupposes the act of the apprehending power; and just as the power of the essence of the soul is left in a power, so the virtue of a prior power is left in the subsequent power. Thus it is that one power may virtually unite the virtues of many powers, and that is the case with the power of free choice, as is evident from its act. For to choose, the act of free choice, implies discretion and desire. But to discern and to desire belong to the reason and the will respectively. Hence, it is evident that the power of free choice unites the virtue of the will and reason, and on that account is called a faculty of both.¹ The power of free choice is one power, but the virtue of another power or powers has been left in it, and thus it produces an effect impossible from it alone. It is the will that immediately produces the effect.² An act always belongs to that power that immediately produces the effect even though it may bear the impress of the influence of another power.

¹Sent. II. d. 24. q. 1. a. 2.

²1-2. 13. 1. Manifeste actus est appetitivae potentiae.

But it is as principle that the power directed to the principal end moves to act the powers that are directed to particular ends, or better, directed to the means to the end. Since this is the function which the will serves we must conclude that it is the will which moves itself and all the other powers.¹

If the will moves itself, must it not move and be moved from the same point of view? In the speculative order a man who is informed with first principles can move himself to reason, and thus move from a known truth to a truth that was, previously, only potentially known. In the practical order, however, when a man actually wills something, he can move his will to actually will something else. If a man actually wills health, he moves himself to will the taking of medicine. If he wants health he begins

¹De Malo 6. Si ergo consideremus motus potentiarum animae ex parte exercitii actus, sic principium motus est ex parte voluntatis. Nam semper potentia ad quam pertinet finis principalis, movet ad actum potentiam ad quam pertinet id quod est ad finem; sicut militaris movet frenorum factricem ad operandum, et hoc modo voluntas movet se ipsam et omnes alias potentias. Intellego enim quia volo; et similiter utor omnibus potentiis et habitibus quia volo; unde et Commentator (Averroes) definit habitum in III de Anima, Com.18, quod habitus est quo quis utitur cum voluerit.

immediately to deliberate and to take counsel about the means conducive to health, and once the deliberation is ended, he decides to take the medicine. The will to take the medicine precedes the counsel, or rational inquiry, but the latter in turn is the effect of the will's willing to be counselled. But since counsel of its very nature is not demonstrative, but something that hangs between opposites, then a counselled will does not move itself from necessity.¹

There are only two agents which can work within the human will, the will itself and God.² A spiritual

¹De Malo q.6. Nec propter hoc sequitur quod voluntas secundum idem sit in potentia et in actu. Sicut enim homo secundum intellectum in via inventionis movet se ipsum ad scientiam, in quantum ex uno noto in actu venit in aliquid ignotum, quod erat solum in potentia notum; ita per hoc quod homo aliquid vult in actu, movet se ad volendum aliquid aliud in actu; sicut per hoc quod vult sanitatem, movet se ad volendum sumere potionem; ex hoc enim quod vult sanitatem, incipit consiliari de his quae conferunt ad sanitatem; et tandem determinato consilio vult accipere potionem; Sic ergo voluntatem accipiendi potionem praecedit consilium, quod quidem procedit ex voluntate volentis consiliari. Cum ergo voluntas se consilio moveat, consilium autem est inquisitio quaedam non demonstrativa, sed ad opposita viam habens, non ex necessitate voluntas seipsam movet.

²3.C.G.88. Nulla autem substantia creata conjungitur animae intellectuali quantum ad sua interiora nisi solus Deus, qui solus est causa ipsius et sustinens eam in esse.

being is an independent whole, a closed world in itself. No creature can operate directly in or on a human will. They may operate indirectly or extrinsically by proposing some outside object to attract and seduce it, but they cannot necessitate it.¹ In an act of free choice, God is the first agent and gives the first initiative, moving the will in such manner that the will moves itself freely. The will in this case is the second agent, and determines itself freely.²

Finally is the act of choice determined by its object or does the will dominate the practico-practical judgment? Again it needs to be emphasized that we are free only in regard to our judgments concerning particular operables. Our abstract judgments are not free. I have

¹De Ver. 22.9. Ex parte quidem voluntatis mutare actum voluntatis non potest nisi quod operatur intra voluntatem; et hoc est ipsa voluntas, et id quod est causa esse voluntatis; quod secundum fidem, solus Deus sit.... Sic igitur patet quod nulla creatura potest directe immutare voluntatem, quasi agendo intra ipsam voluntatem, potest autem extrinsecus, aliquid proponendo voluntati eam aliquo modo inducere, non tamen immutare.

²De Malo 6. Patet ergo quod ei consideretur motus voluntatis ex parte exercitii actus, non movetur ex necessitate.

no freedom about judging that two and two are four. Both the intellect and the will necessarily tend to what they are naturally ordained to, for the natural is determined to one. The intellect necessarily assents to first principles naturally known, nor can it deny them, and the will naturally and necessarily wills happiness, nor can anyone will to be miserable. The will is moved necessarily only to what has a necessary connection with happiness, and it is free in regard to all that has not that necessary connection. But all particular goods have no such connection, because man can be happy without any of them. God, the Perfect Good, has a necessary connection with happiness, because man cannot be happy without Him, but the necessity of that connection is not evident to man in this life, since we do not see the essence of God.

Therefore, the will does not necessarily adhere to God in this life, but the wills of the blessed necessarily adhere to God, for they know Him as He is, face to face, and they necessarily will Him, just as we necessarily will beatitude in this life. But in the beatific vision, it is not the Object, as such, which necessitates the exercise

of the act of the will. The necessity of exercise derives from the part of the subject, and the will of God is an 'elicited', not an 'innate' appetite.

The rational appetite, as such, is disposed to the universal good; there is an innate appetite of such good. The necessary will of God, on the other hand, is elicited by the will when God, in His goodness, is apprehended by the intellect, enlightened by supernatural grace. That act is necessarily exercised whereas the innate appetite does not involve such necessity; the necessity of exercise, therefore, is not from the object, but from the disposition of the subject willing.¹

¹John of St. Thomas, De Anim. Q. 12. a. 4. Unde obiter colligo, quod licet possit dari objectum circa quod necessitetur voluntas quod exercitium, ut in visione clara Dei, tamen haec necessitas non provenit formaliter ex ipso obiecto, ut objectum est, sed ex ipsa dispositione subiecti circa tale obiectum. In quo veram existimo sententiam Cajetani (in 1-2.10.2; Leon., Vol. 6. p. 86. No. 11). Quam sequitur Bannez ibidem (in 1.82.2). Ratio est quia objectum, ut obiectum formaliter solum est principium specificandi, et sic ab ipso prout tale non provenit formaliter necessitas exercitii, sed exercitium seu elicentia formaliter provenit a subiecto operante, et eius necessitas ex ipsa dispositione, et statu subiecti. Est enim voluntas talis naturae, quod si toto pondere fertur in obiectum, fertur necessario, quia nihil remanet, quo possit detinere et suspendere elicentiam. Tunc autem fertur toto pondere, quando adaequatur universalitati eius totaliter obiectum,
(cont'd)

Hence, when we say that we will God in every one of our acts, it means that we implicitly will Him in the form of happiness, in every particular end which we will. Any particular good that is presented to the will can be chosen. The conclusion of a syllogism pertains to reason and is called a statement or judgment which choice follows; and for this reason the conclusion itself pertains to choice as a consequent, or conclusion.¹ But this might be interpreted in two ways; either the act of choice is determined by the judgment, or it is choice which controls the judgment. If the judgment dominates the choice, man is

¹ (p.150 cont'd) etiam cum plena advertentia. Tunc enim cum voluntas ratione suae naturae et formalis rationis sit determinata ad bonum ut sic; quando omni parte et totaliter proponitur bonum in omni sua universalitate et plenitudine, non est in voluntate indifferentia, sed totalis naturaliter et necessario ferri voluntatem ad tale bonum, fertur per modum appetitus innati, sed eliciti, licet necessario. Et ita dicitur naturalis ille appetitus, quia necessarius non quia innatur; procedit enim ex cognitione, imo ex plena advertentia, et ideo maxime est voluntarius, quia ex maxima et plena cognitione, scilicet ex visione Dei, et ex principio interno, scilicet ex ipso pondere voluntatis. Cf. Maritain, Du Reg.Temp., p.36ff.

¹ 1-2.13.1 ad 2. Conclusio syllogismi, quae fit in operabilibus, ad rationem pertinet, et dicitur sententia vel iudicium, quam sequitur electio; et ob hoc ipsa conclusio pertinere videtur ad electionem tanquam ad consequens.

not free, but if the will dominates the judgment, man is free. On the solution of this problem, therefore, hinges the whole question of liberty or of free choice.

That the will tends to what is offered to it more according to this particular condition than to another, may come from one of three sources; there are three ways in which the will is able to choose one particular good and not another:¹ A) When two particular goods are appealing for the will's choice, the will can choose that which has more weight as good, which is the greater good. The other good may be more immediately satisfying to the will itself, but when the reason reveals which it is that has the more good, then the will can deny itself (as it were) and choose the greater good. In such a case the will then will be

¹De Malo 6. Et quod voluntas feratur in id quod sibi offertur magis secundum hanc particularem conditionem quam secundum aliam, potest contingere tripliciter. Uno quidem modo in quantum una praeponderat, et tunc movetur voluntas secundum rationem; puta, cum homo praeeligit id quod est utile sanitati, eo quod est utile voluntati. Alio vero modo in quantum cogitat de una particulari circumstantis et non de alia; et hoc contingit plerumque per aliquam occasionem exhibitam vel ab interiori vel ab exteriori, ut ei talis cogitatio occurrat. Tertio vero modo contingit ex dispositione hominis; quia, secundum Philosophum (Lib.III Ethic.cap.vii.l114.b.1.- in III Ethico.l.13. Pirott.515-516) qualis unusquisque est, talis finis videtur ei.

acting rationally. B) Attention to one particular circumstance on the occasion of some recollection or mood or sound or sight may tip the scales in favour of the object with which that circumstance is connected, and the will will choose. Another rival circumstance might have exerted its influence on the choice, had it been noticed; but no occasion arose favourable to the calling of attention to this circumstance, and unnoticed it was unable to make its influence felt.¹ C) Disposition plays a considerable part in the act of choosing. Here 'disposition' does not mean 'a habit not deeply rooted' but refers rather to a 'causa dispositiva'. It is divided into 'dispositio naturae' and 'dispositio specialis', which includes passion and habit. Man is disposed by nature to seek good. If by a disposition which is natural and not subject to human will an object appears to be good and suitable, then by a natural necessity the will will choose that. Man's ultimate end, good as such, is judged to be good for the man tending toward it, not by

¹ 1-2,13,6 ad 3. Ad tertium quod nihil prohibet, si aliqua duo aequalia proponantur secundum unam considerationem, quin circa alterum consideretur aliqua conditio per quam emineat, et magis flectatur voluntas in ipsum quam in aliud.

reference or comparison to anything else but by reason of a natural disposition which his will cannot change. If this is an end, though, man wills it but does not choose it. By natural disposition men desire to be, to live, and to know.

In regard to special dispositions, which are not natural and which are under the control of the will, the case is different. Something may seem good and suitable because of a special disposition, say anger. This will not move the will of necessity. That disposition, the anger, is under the control of the will, and the will can get rid of it by banishing the phantasm which is nourishing it. When that disposition has been eliminated, then the object will not seem so good and suitable; but if he choose to permit that disposition to remain, then the will cannot but choose the object that seems so good and suitable; but in this case, he is freely allowing himself to be drawn by passion. The presence of the special disposition prevents man from judging a thing impartially on its own merits, so to speak, but obliges him to judge it in the partial light of the disposition. Man is free, however, to dispel the

disposition and the 'prejudice' which it intrudes.¹ A passion, since it does not enjoy the character of a quasi-second nature and does not possess a proportionate permanence, is more easily dispelled than a habit.

Thus from the point of view of the object, the will is necessarily moved to some things, but not to all things, but from the point of view of the exercise of its act the will is not necessitated. And eventually this is the essence of freedom, that the will be able to choose or not to choose. That is a surer and more sound indication of freedom than the mere ability to choose among different objects of choice.

Thus the will determines itself to act or not to act, and in this it can in nowise be necessitated. If it wills anything, it must necessarily will happiness and the necessary means to happiness, as existence and life, because

¹1-2.10.3.ad 1. Ergo dicendum quod, etsi voluntas non posset facere quin motus concupiscentiae insurgat, de quo Apostolus, dicit Rom.7,19; quod odi malum, illud facio, id est concupisco, tamen potest voluntas non velle concupiscere, aut concupiscentiae non consentire; et sic non ex necessitate sequitur concupiscentiae motum.

this is a natural inclination over which the will has no control. But in all other cases, man evidently has free choice. To choose health instead of pleasure would no doubt be a rational choice, but a man is not forced to forego the pleasure and choose what is conducive to health. Again a man may choose something, because of his present frame of mind, his present way of thinking, but the interior or exterior source is only an occasion and not a necessary cause; and he can control his passions and habits. In cases where choice can be exercised, it is dictated to, neither by right judgment or reason, nor by present thinking, nor by passion and habit. Then will must freely determine its own choice.

There is a distinction between synderesis, conscience and judgment, which noted, sheds further light. Judgment pertains to the three, but in different ways. Judgment belongs to the power of free choice by way of participation, because the will itself does not judge; whence the judgment of choice itself is of the power of free choice. But judgment itself is either universal - and then it pertains to synderesis, or it is particular -

and then it pertains to conscience. Therefore, both conscience and choice are conclusions about something particular to be done, but the conclusion of conscience stays within the limits of knowledge and is cognitive only, while the conclusion of choice is affective or practical. This distinction offers a key.

Confronted with a choice, the judgment that determines the choice is an affective judgment, a conclusion dictated by the will. This is the active dominating indifference of the will over the last practico-practical judgment. The will by throwing its spiritual influence, its love, into the scales, determines the judgment. The act of free choice is one vital act put forth by the will and reason conjointly, the will being the immediate efficient cause, the judgment being the mediate formal cause. The will thus exercises its power of free choice.

Several times in this treatment of choice the question of liberty and moral evil was touched upon. Before stating a valid conclusion on the whole topic it remains to eliminate any confusion which exists on this matter. It is a fact that man can and does choose moral

evil, and because moral obligation is not always pleasant for one part of human nature, the conclusion is often drawn that liberty consists in the power to choose good or evil. But, as we shall attempt to point out, this is a further defect of created liberty, a further imperfection of both the angelic and human creature. Everything which is, is good; for whatever has being strives to preserve it. If its being is imperfect, it strives toward the perfection of that being. Being thus appears as that which is desired by all beings, and that appetibility is their goodness.¹ Since then, evil is opposed to good, it is likewise opposed to being. Thus evil cannot be a thing, a subject to which existence belongs. Rather, it is a privation in a subject, the lack of a good which ought to be there. While that is good for a thing which perfects its being, that is evil which depletes it; and while a thing is good insofar as it possesses its due perfection, it is evil insofar as it is deprived of it.

Freedom to sin is not true liberty. The primary meaning of liberty of free choice is the power to choose

¹ See page 54.

or not to choose, or to choose one good instead of another. Whatever impedes the power of free choice from reaching good, then, is the first and primary impediment and corruption of that power. Hence liberty from sin is liberty absolutely, primarily. Any other impediment or corruption of the power of free choice, can only be secondary, relative. For instance, the destruction of ignorance in a man is called a secondary, or relative corruption. In the order of knowledge, the primary and positive thing is the knowledge itself, so the first and primary corruption is what destroys and corrupts knowledge, namely ignorance. The destruction of ignorance, therefore, can only be corruption in a secondary sense. The fundamental reason for this is that evil is a privation. But in the nature of things the positive precedes the negative, the relative, secondary thing presupposes the absolute, primary thing. In other words, the esse comes before the non-esse, the good before the privation. Therefore, if we classify corruption or destruction, the first will be the corruption of esse or of good, the second will be the corruption of non-esse, or of the evil. e.g., fire is the first corruption

of what it destroys, and the corruption of the fire itself is a relative, secondary corruption.

Now, the positive and primary thing in liberty is the rectitude of justice (freedom from sin) in reason and the will. Therefore, freedom from sin is liberty in a primary sense; freedom to sin is liberty in a secondary sense. The latter is not true liberty because it is destructive of true liberty. Hence it should not be classified under liberty. Liberty from sin is the habit, or disposition of doing good, a virtue; liberty to sin is the habit or disposition of doing evil, a vice. So, both are habits or dispositions, but they are contraries, and from the point of view of their results, liberty from sin takes away a privation, while liberty to sin puts in a privation. In short, liberty to sin is a parasite feeding on true liberty, and this is amply borne out by experience; a vice does not free, it enchains. That is why freedom to sin is called license, not liberty.¹

¹ Sent. II. d. 25. l. 5 ad 2. Ad secundum dicendum quod liberum arbitrium quamvis possit in bonum et malum, tamen per se in bonum ordinatum est; et ideo illud quod impedit ipsum a bono, simpliciter impeditivum ipsius est, et a corruptivum; et propter hoc libertas ab eo quod impedit a bono,
(cont'd)

Since an act of will is always the willing of something, there are two ways in which evil may attach to it, namely, from the part of the object, or from the part of the volition itself. If there be a privation of the good which ought to belong in the subject willed, then the will sins in willing that object. Since no object is willed unless it be apprehended as a good, it happens then that the will of any evil object is consequent on the apprehension of evil as good. There can be no desire of evil under its aspect of evil, for appetite is directed to good, and evil being opposed to good, is likewise opposed to appetite. But the will could also deviate from the true order to the end by willing a good object beyond the measure in which it ought to be willed;

¹(p.160 cont'd) simpliciter libertas dicitur, quae est libertas a peccato; quod autem impedit illud a malo, quod corruptio ejus est, non est impeditivum ejus nisi secundum quod, sicut etiam cum corrumpitur ignorantia in homine, dicitur corruptio secundum quid. Hoc autem quod a peccato impedit, est justitiae rectitudo in ratione existens; et inde est quod libertas a justitia non est libertas simpliciter sed secundum quid; et ideo inter principales partes libertatis assignari non debet, sed tamen reducitur ad illam libertatem quae est a peccato, propter similitudinem in modo; sicut enim peccatum per se impedit a bono per modum habitus vel dispositionis, ita etiam justitia impedit a malo.

the defect of goodness then would lie in the act of the will itself.¹

Human liberty leaves us open to either defect.

On the one hand, our imperfect mode of knowledge makes it possible that at a given moment we be not in a position to judge of the real goodness of the object. Our knowledge is not perfect from the beginning, but must grow and perfect itself. Again, the judgment which specifies the act

¹I.63.1 ad 4. Peccatum mortale in actu liberi arbitrii contingit esse dupliciter. Uno modo, ex hoc quod aliquod malum eligitur; sicut homo peccat eligendo adulterium, quod secundum se est malum. Et tale peccatum semper procedit ex aliqua ignorantia vel errore; alioquin id quod est malum non eligeretur ut bonum. Errat quidem adulter in particulari, eligens hanc delectationem inordinati actus, quasi aliquod bonum ad nunc agendum propter inclinationem passionis, aut habitus, etiamsi in universali non erret, sed verum de hoc sententiam teneat. Hoc autem modo, in angelo peccatum esse non potuit; quia nec in angelis sunt passiones, quibus ratio aut intellectus ligetur; nec iterum primum peccatum habitus praecedere potuit ad peccatum inclinans. Alio modo contingit peccare per liberum arbitrium, eligendo aliquid quod secundum se est bonum, sed non cum ordine debitae mensurae, aut regulae; ita quod defectus inducens peccatum, sit solum ex parte electionis, quae non habet debitum ordinem, non ex parte rei electae; sicut si aliquis eligeret acorare, non attendens ad ordinem ab Ecclesia institutum. Et huiusmodi peccatum non praeredit ignorantiam, sed absentiam solum considerationis eorum quae considerari debent. Et hoc modo angelus peccavit, convertendo se per liberum arbitrium ad proprium bonum, abseque ordine ad regulam divinae voluntatis.

of the will, is not the speculativo-practical judgment of the absolute goodness of the object, but the practico-practical, which judges of the thing as an object of love or desire hic et nunc. That judgment being about a particular, is the conclusion of a syllogism of which one premise is particular. For example, the judgment that this adultery would be evil, presupposes that the agent knows both that adultery in itself is evil, and that this particular act is adultery. If the knowledge of either premise be lacking, then the adultery would be caused by ignorance.¹

¹

There is a proviso here of course - that the possession of the knowledge would have prevented it. If that knowledge would not have prevented it, then the judgment in favour of the adultery would be due to a perverse will. Such a will causes the intellect to judge without taking into account the full extent of its knowledge. 1-2.76.1. Causa movens est duplex; una per se et alia per accidens. Per se quidem est, quae propria virtute movet, sicut generans est causa movens gravia et levia; per accidens autem, sicut removens prohibentis. Et hoc modo ignorantia potest esse causa actus peccati; est enim privatio scientiae perficientis rationem, quae prohibet actum peccati, in quantum dirigit actus humanos. Considerandum est autem quod ratio secundum duplicem scientiam est humanorum actuum directiva, scilicet secundum scientiam universalem et particularem. Conferans enim de agendis utitur quodam syllogismo, cujus conclusio est iudicium seu electio vel operatio; actiones autem in singularibus sunt; unde conclusio
(cont'd)

Another factor which is apt to influence the judgment and cause the will to swerve from the order of right reason, is the attraction which the object may have for the sensitive appetite. In this case, the judgment of the appetibility of the object is dependent upon the interpretation of it in the light of its delectability for the sense. Such a defection is possible only where the sense appetite is not subject to reason, but is even apt to dominate the will.¹

¹(p.163 cont'd) syllogismi operativi est singularis. Singularis autem propositio non concluditur ex universali, nisi mediante aliqui propositione singulari; sicut homo prohibetur ab actu paricidii per hoc quod scit patrem non esse occidendum, et per hoc quod scit hunc esse patrem. Utriusque ergo ignorantia potest causare paricidii actum, scilicet et universalis principii, quod est quaedam regula rationis, et singularis circumstantiae. Unde patet quod non quaelibet ignorantia peccantis est causa peccati, sed illa tantum quae tollit scientiam prohibentem actum peccati. Unde si voluntas alicujus esset sic disposita quod non prohibetur ab actu parricidii, etiam si patrem agnosceret, ignorantia patris non est huic causa peccati, sed concomitanter se habet ad peccatum; et ideo talis non peccat propter ignorantiam, sed 'peccat igmorans' secundum Philosophum

¹1-2.77.1. Passio appetitus sensitivi non potest directe trahere aut movere voluntatem sed indirecte potest; et hoc dupliciter alio modo ex parte objecti voluntatis, quod est bonum ratione apprehensum. Impeditur enim iudicium et apprehensio rationis propter vehementem et inordinatum apprehensionem imaginationis et iudicium virtutis aestimativae, ut patet in amentibus. Manifestum est autem quod
(cont'd)

Another instance concerns the supernatural order. There may be a lack of due proportion in the love of the object. Since the tendency, following upon the apprehended form, is exercised through a movement of the soul, there is possibility of disorder if the appetite itself bestow on the thing such inordinate love as to remove itself from the true order to the end. The will which sets up for its end the acquisition of riches, or power, or temporal goods, falls into this defect, making of those ends in themselves.¹

In the case of the angel there are no sensual allurements influencing the practical judgment. But in the case of the angel, as in man, there is the possibility

¹(p.164 cont'd) passionem appetitus sensitivus sequitur imaginationis apprehensio et iudicium aestimativae, sicut etiam dispositionem linguae sequitur iudicium gustus; unde videmus quod homines in aliqua passione existentes non facile imaginationem avertunt ab his circa quae afficiuntur; unde per consequens iudicium rationis plerumque sequitur passionem appetitus sensitivi, et per consequens motus voluntatis, qui natus est semper sequi iudicium rationis.

¹De Malo 16.2. Dupliciter ergo potest esse malum in appetitu hominis. Uno modo quia apprehensio sensitiva non regulatur secundum.... Alio modo quia ratio humana est dirigenda secundum sapientiam et legem divinam.

of an inordinate love. The angelic intellect is free from insufficient knowledge of the true goodness of the thing, insofar as that thing may naturally be known to it. While our intellect proceeds by composition and division, with the natural liability to error, the angel knows the goodness by apprehension alone, and for this reason its knowledge of the goodness of any object is no more subject to error than our knowledge of first principles.¹

¹I.58.5. Nam nos componendo et dividendo quandoque ad intellectum quidditatis pervenimus; sicut cum dividendo et demonstrando, definitionem investigamus. Quod quidem in angelis non contingit; sed per quod quid est rei, cognoscunt omnes enuntiationes ad illam pertinentes. Manifestum est autem quod quidditas rei potest esse principium cognoscendi, respectu eorum quae naturaliter conveniunt rei, vel ab ea removentur; non autem eorum quae a supernaturali Dei ordinatione dependent. Angeli igitur boni habentes rectam voluntatem, per cognitionem quidditatis rei non judicant de his quae supernaturaliter ad rem pertinent, nisi salva ordinatione divina; unde in eis non potest esse falsitas aut error. Daemones vero per voluntatem perversam subducentes intellectum a divina sapientia absolute interdum de rebus judicant secundum naturalem conditionem. Et in his quae naturaliter ad rem pertinent, non decipiuntur; sed decipi possunt quantum ad ea quae supernaturali sunt. Sicut si considerans hominem mortuum, judicet eum non resurrecturum; et si videns hominem Christum, judicet eum non esse Deum.

This distinction in human and angelic knowledge forms the foundation for a distinction in the nature of the choice of each. The choice of the angel, though free, is, like God's, irrevocable. Human choice, because our knowledge of the object varies, is variable. Where the knowledge is perfect from the beginning, no further incentive to influence or change the judgment or choice which has been elicited, can be forthcoming.¹

Being, like man, a created being, the angel is ordered to an end ordained for it by the Creator. Both creature, angel and man, both capable of beatitude, are directed to a supernatural end as well as to a natural end. The natural end lies in the perfection of which the agent is capable by its nature, but the final

¹I.64.2. Efferat apprehensio angeli ab apprehensione hominis quantum ad hoc, quod angelus apprehendit immobiliter per intellectum, sicut et nos immobiliter apprehendimus prima principia, quorum est intellectus; homo vero per rationem apprehendit mobiliter, discurrendo de uno ad aliud, habens viam procedendi ad utrumque oppositorum. Unde et voluntas hominis adhaeret alicui mobiliter, quasi potens etiam ab eo discedere et contrario adhaerere; voluntas autem angeli adhaeret fixe et immobiliter. Et ideo si consideretur ante adhaesionem, potest libere adhaerere et huic et opposito; in his scilicet quae non naturaliter vult. Sed postquam jam adhaesit, immobiliter adhaeret.

beatitude of the created intellectual beings is to be found in a supernatural vision of the Divine Essence. Of his natural end, the angel is in possession from the beginning. In this sense the angel was created in a state of natural beatitude, whereas man must acquire even such natural perfection.¹ But even the angel with such perfect natural knowledge is unable naturally to see the cogency of an adherence to its supernatural end, but must accept it on faith. Consequently, by the non-consideration of the things not naturally known, the will of the angel may be directed to evil, by willing its own good without willing it as it should be willed to be in accordance with the end for which the creator has destined it. The angelic intellect is thus not deceived in judging of the natural goodness of a thing, but its will is evil because it has refused to judge of the thing in harmony with what supernaturally pertains to it. Peccability from the part of the volition itself, therefore,

¹I.62.1.quantum ad primam beatitudinem, quam angelus assequi virtute suae naturae potuit, fuit creatus beatus; quia perfectionem hujusmodi angelus non acquirit per aliquem motum discussivum, sicut homo; sed statim ei adest.

arises in the will from the fact that the end which is loved, is not loved in harmony with a higher end with which it should be harmonized. In man, the defection is possible on two scores, in that the object may be willed because of its attraction for the sense without being reconciled with the end prescribed by reason; or again, from failure to will it as it should be willed if the will were in harmony with the end ordained by God. We are naturally determined to willing our perfection, but we may fail in it, either by loving too much a good of the sense at the expense of reason, or by loving our own good without observing the Divine order. The peccability of the angel lies in its ability to withdraw itself from the Divine order.

Either the ignorance of the true nature of the object, or the wilful ignorance which accompanies a judgment deliberately elicited without taking into account the things that ought to be considered, is a mark of imperfection. Peccability is a defect of created liberty, rather than a perfection of it.¹ Impeccability does not

¹I.62.8 ad 3. Quod liberum arbitrium diversa eligere possit, servato ordine finis, hoc pertinet ad perfectionem libertatis ejus.

reduce our liberty, but shows a rectification of the factors which permit liberty in our acts. Sin due to ignorance of the goodness of the object does not occur where there is no deception about the goodness of the object; and sin due to an inordinate love of the object, does not occur where the will is directed to its true object.

Thus we see that freedom to sin is not true liberty. It is a defect of liberty, an abuse of liberty, a mockery of liberty. In this matter of peccability we see clearly the factor of intelligence at work in that imperfection. It is the last indication necessary of the intellectualistic foundation of true liberty. (See Note 2, p.176.)

We are now in a position to draw some conclusions on the whole matter of choice and prepare the way for a summary. The field of choice embraces all actus humanis, where there is no natural determination. Since the human act of choice is specified by the human agent, and since man is the cause of its exercise, the act of choice possesses liberty of specification and of exercise.

By his reason the goodness of things is made known to him. Of course his reason is a natural endowment and the first principles of his knowledge are made known naturally, but his use of reason in choice is not naturally determined, since the tendency following upon the form in his intellect, a universal form, is in potency to diverse terms, for no particular is the adequate term of the inclination of the universal form. "The indifference of liberty", says John of St. Thomas, "consists in the dominating power of the will, not only over his act, to which he moves, but even over the judgment by which he is moved." Even when the object must be judged good, the actual willing is not necessarily forthcoming; we can will or not will. If we will at all, then beatitude must be willed, but it is not necessary that the will act be elicited. Thus in exercising choice there is freedom in all acts except that where God is concerned, and strictly speaking that is not a concern of choice, it belongs to the will as will. Therefore here in exercise we have the essence of freedom, that we be able to act or not to act. That capacity is coextensive with

the operation of choice. The natural limitations of the freedom of specification do not detract from this liberty of exercise.

Following on the act of choice, there is an act of command on the part of the intellect followed by the act of use by the will.¹ This instigates the act which causes and results in perfect fruition as the consummation of the act. These latter acts contribute nothing to freedom, they are but consequent upon and the terminus of the act of choice in which freedom resides.

¹
1-2.17.3 ad 1. Non omnis actus voluntatis praecedit hunc actum rationis qui est imperium; sed aliquis praecedit, scilicet electio; et aliquis sequitur scilicet usus; quia post determinationem consilii, quae est iudicium rationis, voluntas eligit et post electionem ratio imperat ei per quod agendum est quod eligitur; et tunc demum voluntas alicujus incipit uti exsequendo imperium rationis.

NOTE TO CHAPTER FIVE

Before concluding our study it will be well to summarize in tabular form the various steps we have noted, all of which lead to the act of choice.¹ In the complete human act it is customary to distinguish twelve partial acts in its totality. These are equally divided between intelligence and will. Carrying the act no further than the operation of choice we are able to distinguish eight of these incomplete steps, four on the part of the intelligence and four on the part of the will, culminating in the choice. This chart will show, briefly, what was elaborated in Chapter Three. The interlocking

¹ This chart follows that given by M. Benoit Lavaud, O.P., Introduction a la Theologie de Saint Thomas, Ancienne Librairie Roger et Chernoviz, Paris, 1928, p.121, and also that of Joannis A Sancto Thoma Cursus Theologici, Rom.1, Desclée et Sociorum, Paris, 1931. Isagoge, p.165.

action is not so evident in a chart of this kind but if we state that following the numerical order there is a causal relation from number to number, then the influence of the will of the practico-practical judgment becomes evident, as does this judgment on the act of choice, as was shown in Chapter Five. The interlocking action may be shown by following the numbers indicating each action:

<u>The action on the part of the intelligence</u>	<u>The action on the part of the will</u>
1. Knowledge of the good.	2. Desire of that good.
3. The speculativo-practical judgment indicating that it is a good.	4. The intention to acquire the good.
5. The intellect takes counsel about the means to acquire this good.	6. The intention to acquire the good.
7. The practico-practical judgment on the means determining the most suitable.	8. The will chooses the means judged most suitable.

The most difficult part of our problem centres round the last three steps in this plan, the double causality exercised on the practico-practical judgment - that of

truth and the will. Stated briefly the judgment is based on the goodness of this thing in relation to the appetite or will at this particular instant in these particular circumstances. As the will is the efficient cause so is reason the formal cause. The judgment is, in a sense, dictated by the will; the will exercises dominion over this judgment (cf. p.157). Here we have the act of choice flowing from reason and will, each playing its part. The act of choice belongs to intellect and will, to intellect first because of the priority of its action, but to will primarily because of its causality.


NOTE 2

It is by this 'defective' liberty, by the peccable free will that we rise to the perfection of liberty, that we achieve the freedom of autonomy. There seems to be a contradiction here which is stated by M. Maritain: "Quand dans la vertu de sa grace et par le moyen de ce libre arbitre faillible et peccable, une creature est parvenue au terme ultime et devenue libre d'une liberte de choix desormais surnaturellement impeccable, alors le neant a ete vaincu dans la ligne meme de la liberte de choix."¹

The complete union with God in love, the perfection of liberty, autonomy, can be achieved by the creature only if that creature is made to the image of God. As God possesses the perfection of liberty, then that creature must possess freedom in keeping with its

¹ J. Maritain, L'Idee Thomiste de la Liberte, Revue Thomiste, Juillet Septembre, 1939, p.459.

condition, and that is freedom of choice. But as the creature lacks perfection in the ontological order, so too does it lack perfection in the order of freedom. The creature being the faint image of the Exemplar, its prerogatives are but faint replicas of their perfection in Him. This creature must possess freedom in order that it may correspond and refuse to correspond with the divine promptings. This may be shown by a chart:



In its progress to the Good the creature may advance along a direct path toward that consummation or may take the vertical path away from that perfection. In that consists its peccability. But in the achievement of its goal all choice is embraced and contained within the orbit of the divine sufficiency. As the end is the regula, where then the end is attained the end serves of itself and for itself; there is autonomy, there the perfect freedom which no longer possesses the imperfection of going astray, but chooses only the Good and rests in it, possessed of supernatural impeccability.

God leads us to this end by His grace acting as first cause and leaving us entirely free as second cause. When we choose then by virtue of the universal scope of our will and the dominating indifference of our judgment, we retain the power not to perform the act; our will dominates the attraction that any good has for it. The act is free because it flows, under that indifference of judgment, from the will which has a universal amplitude which extends farther than the particular good to which it is inclined. But led by the Spirit, the Spirit abiding

within, frail creatures, possessed of this peccable freedom, the freedom of God Himself, independent of all else but the abiding Divine causality. By losing himself in the chasm of Divinity, man gains himself in Love, he is whole and entire within himself in Divinity. Thus does he achieve impeccability, the perfection of freedom, his destiny with God, the perfection of freedom possible to human nature.

C O N C L U S I O N

"That a man should have free will is a necessary consequence from the very fact of his being a rational creature."¹ "The root of liberty is the will as subject; but it is the reason as its cause."² Here in the words of St. Thomas himself, is the conclusion to this survey of his teaching on the basis of liberty. From a study of his thought no other conclusion is possible. Freedom is a necessary concomitant of rationality. Where the rational creature is, there is to be found the creature possessing freedom. As reason is the cause, so we say it is the root or basis of freedom.

¹I.83.1. Et pro tanto necesse est quod homo sit liberi arbitrii ex hoc ipso quod rationalis est.

²1-2.17.1 ad 2. Radix libertatis est voluntas sicut subjectum; sed sicut causa, est ratio.

In itself, freedom of choice is a perfection for man, here and now. But it is a limited perfection and the unlimited perfection, in accord with his nature, is only achieved by means of this freedom of choice; but freedom of choice is transcended in that transition. In his present state, the possession of this freedom guarantees man freedom from determination to particular things, and in possession of dominion over his act of will.

It is from determination that indetermination flows for it is the determination to the Good which forms, as it were, a basis of his freedom, for consequent on this determination is the inability of any particular thing to determine him. Before all particular goods, all those which confront him during his life, he remains indetermined. Because the will naturally has the desire and tendency to Goodness, therefore is it free as regards these particular goods. When it chooses a good - freely and without any compulsion other than its own choice - then does it endow that chosen object or act with the goodness by which it is made appetible - not the goodness

of being but the goodness of a means.

Here then we come, more particularly, to the foundation of this prerogative of the rational creature - liberty. Man has dominion over the indifference of his will with respect to particular things which do not of themselves determine him - and all particulars are of that character. This dominative power depends on his rational nature because it is the judgment which specifies the elicited appetitive act. To be free means to be master of that judgment. Now, because man possesses reason, therefore he is master of that judgment. Thus is reason the root of liberty and freedom is proper to the rational creature. Reason criticizes the possible options, and affirms, by an affirmation which responds to desire and is conformed by desire, that one is better than the others. Thanks to this rational critique, man is free.

Looking more closely, we ask what is the will's part. That too has been outlined in accord with the Angelic Doctor's exposition. The will's part, eventually, is to will to act or not to act, to act thus or so. This is over and above the will's power to exercise its peculiar

power in forming reason to its desire. But we could even rest our case on the former situation. That is really all that would be necessary to show the freedom of the will, that it may act or not act. It is not necessary to possess freedom that it choose this or not choose that, but simply that it act or refrain from acting. But free choice is a sort of free judgment, because it is essentially an act of the will which wills, not of the reason which judges; it is, too, an act of the will, but an act which is the conclusion of a practical syllogism.¹ Free choice is a judgment which comes from the will, insofar as the will's election is a sort of judgment; a judgment, too, which affects the will insofar as one can judge one's very choice.²

To put it in another way, election (the free act) is the convergent result from two sources; a) reason, which presents a particular good in the guise of a

¹ De Ver. 24.1 ad 20. Electio...quoddam iudicium de agendis vel iudicium consequatur. This point is brought out forcibly also in S.T. 1-2.13.1 ad 2.

² De Ver. 24.1. Also: S.T. 1.83.3 ad 2.

particular truth; b) will, which accepts a particular truth in the guise of a particular good.¹ Or it may be put in still another way; the will influences the judgment - by removing its indetermination - not merely quoad exercitium tantum actus, but quoad specificationem iudicii as well, inasmuch as this truth is also a particular good; and the judgment influences the will not merely quoad specificationem tantum actus but quoad exercitium actus as well, inasmuch as this element (to act or not to act) is a particular kind of truth.² If therefore, one asks to which is due the kind of action one will perform, will or intellect, the answer must necessarily be, to the intellect. If one asks, to which is due the determination to act, or not to act, will or intellect? the answer is, to the intellect. For on the part of the exercise of the will, there is no question at all of necessity of choice. Even the fact that God

¹ De Malo 6.1.

² John of St. Thomas, De Anim.12.2. Indifferentia consistit in potestate voluntatis non solum super actum suum ad quem movet, sed etiam super iudicium a quo movetur.

imparted the very first movement, set the motor running, as it were, even that fact does not contradict another fact, viz., that the will chooses freely. The will is the cause of the attraction it undergoes, because it depends on the will to bring the intellect to judge that such and such a good is a sort that will move it (the will); the will is the cause of the direction it receives, in that it moves the intellect to give it (the will) its direction. In a word, there is, in election, a mutual priority of cause in different orders of causality; what I choose is from the intellect specifying and from the will making the intellect so to specify; that I choose is from the will acting, and from the intellect specifying the 'to-act or not-to-act' as a kind of truth.

We can see readily how St. Thomas' philosophy here is a bulwark against many errors. It is squarely against the pessimistic view of human nature, of Calvin and Luther, for every man has the natural power to attain happiness, his power of free choice. On the other hand, it is not kindly to the optimism of a Rousseau, for human nature is beset by many imperfections and evils. It

condemns blind irrational voluntarism which breaks away from reason. The act of choice is made dependent on intellect and will; on intellect to avoid an unchecked and absolute will; on will to avoid the aberrations of a thinking machine. Making the act of choice an act of the will principally, but not absolutely, avoids these two extremes. Limits are assigned to the freedom of choice thereby. This teaching refutes immanentism in all its forms, by showing that the movement of the soul, due allowance being made for its immanent operations, is centrifugal, not centripetal, or in other words, it makes the world of human life as well as of all existence theocentric, not egocentric. It makes things, and ultimately God, the measure of man, and not man the measure of things. The only autonomy it recognizes is the one that is directed to real happiness, God. St. Thomas' philosophy of liberty is a liberty that is real, dynamic, living, not ideal, static, dead; it leads to full freedom, not slavery.

Choice is only made of those things about which we take counsel. Those which are subject to the necessity of nature do not come within its scope. The world of

intellect and will, groping toward beatitude, but seeing it only darkly, is the world of choice. But freedom of choice is an imperfection as well. "Is there any worse death for a soul than liberty to go astray", exclaimed St. Augustine.¹ Indeterminacy is imperfection and power to go astray is contrary to the freedom of the faculty. It is a defect of liberty to choose that which is evil (though not as evil). The fullest perfection of liberty is to choose only good. If the intellect fully regulated choice we would be truly free.

The perfection of human liberty can best be seen as a reflexion of Divine liberty. Where all potentiality and imperfection is lacking, there the act of choice is identical with the act of will; here then is perfection, the love of Himself and^all that He is and dominating indifference to all else. This is complete autonomy. In man we find the inspiration to reach the borders of this Divine prerogative. Freedom of choice, the step by which we enter that world of freedom, does not exist for itself. It is directed towards an autonomy in keeping with human

¹Ep.166. Quoted in Mirari vos. Gregory XVI, Aug.15, 1832.

nature. Choice in accord with our rational nature, elevated to the supernatural, will eventually bring that true freedom of autonomy. This is the purpose of that free choice, the voluntary conforming to the Divine plan. It is not a question of choosing to be able to choose further but of choosing to enslave ourselves, to attain that goal of free choice, autonomy, and the perfection of liberty possible to human nature. Then will the true meaning of cui servire regnare est be unfolded to us, and the reigning will be complete freedom.

Here we meet mystery and obscurity profound. For in verging on the question of the reconciliation of the efficacy of grace with free will, though it is beyond the scope of our enquiry, and on this point we accept the conclusion of St. Thomas in toto, we see how God in the noblest and most intimate manner causes us to will freely by the help of His grace. We fail to question our liberty when the person whom we love and who loves us moves us to will freely what he desires us to will. Can we question our liberty when God exercises the same, but infinitely greater effect in us? Rather is it that we are truly free

only in proportion as God dwells and reigns in us.

"Things effected by the divine will have that kind of necessity that God will them to have, either absolute or conditional. Not all things, therefore, are absolute necessities."¹

We, as rational creatures, are masters of what conditions our choice in the order of secondary causes and thus choice is in our power though the divine motion and decree is beyond us. It does not of necessity belong to liberty that what is free should be the first cause of itself. By moving natural causes God does not prevent their acts being natural, so by moving voluntary causes He does not deprive their actions of being voluntary. But we must go further and say that the more fully we resign ourselves to the direction of God, the more fully we enslave ourselves to Him, the more readily we place ourselves in His hands, in a word, the more saintly we

¹I.19.8 ad 3. Posteriora habent necessitatem a prioribus secundum modum priorum. Unde et ea quae fiunt a voluntate divina, talem necessitatem habent qualem Deus vult ea habere, scilicet vel absolutam, vel conditionalem tantum. Et sic non omnia sunt necessaria absolute.

become, the freer we become; the more we enslave ourselves to Him, the more mastery we gain over ourselves, the less chance or opportunity of being captivated by apparent goods, the great^{est} dominating indifference which is at the core of freedom.

As he is perfected, then does man more closely mirror the perfection of Divine liberty, in loving Goodness. It is the nature of love to bind itself and that more perfect love and freedom, as it is achieved by man, will lead him to impose that yoke on himself, consistently with his nature. Then will the necessity of being forced to use that freedom of choice grow less until in contemplating God, face to face, its freedom of specification ceases, and there is only freedom to will Him. That is its culmination, that is the heritage and goal of the rational creature. By his free will he wins freedom. By his free will he wins emancipation from all that would hinder him in the attainment of the perfection of freedom that is almost divine and surpasses all that he craves. No more perfect expression of this destiny could be given than that which St. Thomas gives himself. "We must observe

that the sons of God are led by the divine Spirit, not as though they were slaves, but as being free. For, since to be free is to be cause of one's own actions, we are said to do freely what we do of ourselves. Now this is what we do willingly; and what we do unwillingly, we do, not freely but under compulsion. This compulsion may be absolute, when the cause is wholly extraneous, and the patient contributes nothing to the action; for instance, when a man is compelled to move by force; or it may be partly voluntary, as when a man is willing to do or suffer that which is less opposed to his will, in order to avoid that which is more opposed thereto. Now, the sanctifying Spirit inclines us to act, in such a way as to make us act willingly, inasmuch as He causes us to be lovers of God. Hence the sons of God are led by the Holy Ghost to act freely and for love, not slavishly and for fear; wherefore the Apostle says (Rom.8:15): You have not received the Spirit of bondage again in fear; but you have received the spirit of adoption of sons.

Now the will is by its essence directed to that which is truly good; so that when, either through passion

or through an evil habit or disposition, a man turns away from what is truly good, he acts slavishly, in so far as he is led by something extraneous, if we consider the natural direction of the will; but if we consider the act of the will, as inclined here and now toward an apparent good, he acts freely when he follows the passion or evil habit, but he acts slavishly if, while his will remains the same, he refrains from what he desires through fear of the law which forbids the fulfilment of his desires. Accordingly, when the divine spirit by love inclines the will to the true good to which it is naturally directed, He removes both the servitude whereby a man, the slave of passion and sin, acts against the order of the will, and the servitude whereby a man acts against the inclination of his will, and in obedience to the law, as the slave and not the friend of the law. Wherefore the Apostle says (II Cor.3:17): Where the Spirit of the Lord is, there is liberty, and (Gal.5:18): if you are led by the Spirit you are not under the law."¹

¹
4.C.G.22.

There is the culmination of freedom, freedom of autonomy, in accord with our nature, but given far more freely and generously than our aspiration would ever aim at, freedom from all, freedom from law - freedom bound only by charity in union with Caritas. I do not hesitate to draw this study to a conclusion by quoting from the speech of a master interpreter of this thought: "Free will is the very root of the world of freedom, it is a metaphysical datum received with our rational nature, it does not have to be won; it appears as an initial freedom. But this metaphysical root must fructify in the psychological and moral orders, we must become in our action what we already are metaphysically, a person; each of us must through his own effort make himself a person; a master of himself and a unified whole. Here another freedom appears, a freedom which must be dearly gained; a terminal freedom. By what word can it best be designated? We may say that it is a freedom of autonomy. The ancients characterized it by the word by which they understood that a free man is sufficient unto himself; and by the term causa sui, they understood that a free man

is the master of his own life; expressions which taken in all their force relate to the extreme exigencies of the nature of personality. We maintain, therefore, that freedom of choice is not its own end. It is a means to the conquest of freedom in its autonomous sense, and the dynamism of freedom is in this very conquest demanded by the essential postulations of human personality.....

When freedom of choice has led a spiritual nature, capable of the infinite by its intelligence and will, to the goal for which it has been made, then its work is finished. At this consummation, there is still freedom, but it is another freedom which occupies the place because this nature, being spiritual, can only have its full realization in absolute spontaneity. And this freedom of which we speak, freedom of exultation or freedom of autonomy, is, to use a word frequently employed by modern philosophy, but badly applied, the perfect spontaneity of a spiritual nature..... The perfectly spiritual man has become something of God and from then on he is free with the very freedom of God."¹

¹J. Maritain, Some Reflections on Culture and Liberty
(Chicago: 1933).

B I B L I O G R A P H Y

A. Principle Sources

JOHN OF ST. THOMAS: Cursus Philosophicus Thomisticus, De Anima, Paris edition of 1663.

Introduction a la Theologie de Saint Thomas; traduction et notes de M. Benoit Lavaud, O.P.; Paris, Libraire Roger et Chernoviz, 1928.

ST. THOMAS AQUINAS: In Decem Libros Ethicorum Aristotelis ad Nicomachum Expositio. Pirota ed. Taurini; Marietti, 1934.

In Libros Posteriorum Analyticorum Expositio. Leonine ed. Rome, 1882, Vol.I.

Summa Theologica, Leonine ed. Rome, 188-1916. Vols. IV-XII.

Summa Theologica, Pecci ed. Paris.

Summa Contra Gentiles, Leonine ed. Rome. Vols. XIII-XIV.

ST. THOMAS AQUINAS: De Ente et Essentia, Mandonnet ed.
Opuscula Omnia; Paris, Lethielleux,
1927, Vol.I. On Being and Essence,
trans. C.C. Riedl, Toronto, 1934.

In Aristotelis Librum de Anima Commen-
tarium. Pirotta ed. Taurini, 1925.

Quaestiones Disputatae, De Potentia.
Marietti ed. Taurini, 1931, Vol.I.

Quaestiones Disputatae, De Malo,
Marietti ed, Taurini, 1931, Vol.II.

Quaestiones Disputatae, De Veritate.
Taurini, 1931, Vols.III-IV.

Scriptum Super Libros Sententiarum,
Mandonnet ed., Paris, 1929-1933, 3 Vols.

THOMAS DE VIO, CARDINAL
CAJETAN, O.P.:

Commentaria in Summam Theologicam S.
Thomae Aquinatis. Leonine ed., Opera
Omnia S. Thomae Aquinatis. Vols.IV-
XII. Rome, 1888-1916.

B. References

- ANSHAN, RUTH N.: Freedom; Its Meaning, New York, Harcourt Brace & Co., 1940.
- AVELING, F.: Personality and Will, Cambridge, 1931.
- COMBES, J.E.: La Psychologie de Saint Thomas d'Aquin; Montpellier, 1860.
- EUCKEN, RUDOLF: Main Currents of Modern Thought, trans. M. Booth, London, Fisher Unwin, 1912, pp.431 ff.
- GARRIGOU-LAGRANGE, R.: Dieu; Son Existence et Sa Nature, 5th ed., Paris, Beauchesne, 1928. Found also in Revue des Sciences Philosophiques et Theologiques, 1re.annee, 1907 - 3me annee, 1909.
- God: His Existence and His Nature, trans. from 5th French edition by Dom Bede Rose, O.S.B., London, Herder, 1936.
- GILSON, E.: L'Esprit de la Philosophie Medievale, Paris, Vrin, 1932. 2 Vols.

- GILSON, E.: The Spirit of Mediaeval Philosophy, trans. by A.H.C. Downes, New York, Scribners, 1936.
- Le Thomisme, Paris, 1922.
- The Philosophy of St. Thomas Aquinas, trans from 3rd French edition by E. Bullough, Cambridge, Heffer. 2nd edition, 1929.
- The Unity of Philosophical Experience, New York, Scribners, 1937.
- GRABMANN, MARTIN: Thomas Aquinas: His Personality and Thought, trans. by Virgil Michel. New York, Longmans, Green & Co., 1928.
- LOTTIN, O.: La Theorie du libre arbitre depuis Saint Anselme jusqu'a Saint Thomas d'Aquin, Louvain, Abbaye du Mont-Cesar, 1929.
- MARITAIN, J.: La Philosophie Bergsonienne, 2nd ed. Paris, Tequi, 1930.
- L'Idee Thomiste de la Liberte, Revue Thomiste, juillet-septembre, Vol.45, n.3, pp.440 ff.
- Elements de Philosophie, I. Introduction Generale a la Philosophie, Paris, Tequi, 1930.
- An Introduction to Philosophy, trans. from the 11th French edition by E.I. Watkin, London, Sheed and Ward, 1930.

- MARITAIN, J.: Les Degres Du Savoir, Paris, 1932.
- Reflexions Sur L'Intelligence, Paris, 3rd edition, 1930.
- Some Reflexions on Culture and Liberty, Chicago, Univ. of Chicago Press, 1933.
- Du Regime Temporel et de la Liberte, Paris, Desclee de Brouwer et cie., 1933; trans. by R. O'Sullivan; Freedom in the Modern World, London, Sheed and Ward, 1935.
- PALMER, G.H.: The Problem of Freedom, New York, 1911.
- RAND, BENJAMIN: Bibliography of Philosophy, Psychology and Cognate Subjects, New York, 1905, 2 Vols.
- ROUSSELOT, PIERRE: The Intellectualism of St. Thomas, trans. by J.E. O'Mahony; London, Sheed and Ward, 1935.
- SCHUTZ, LUDWIG: Thomas-lexikon, Paderbron, Druck und verlag von Ferdinand Schoningh, 1895.
- SERTILLANGES, A.D.: S. Thomas d'Aquin, Les Grands Philosophes series, Paris, Alcan, 1910, 2 Vols. Index bibliographique, Vol.2, pp.337 ff.

SIMON, Y.: Introduction a l'ontologie du connaitre,
Paris, Desclee de Brouwer et cie.,
1934.

Critique de la connaissance morale,
Paris, Desclee de Brouwer et cie.,
1934.

VANN, O.P., GERALD: Morals Makyth Man, London, Longmans
Green and Co., 1938.