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From Being to Becoming: Mapping Out the Subjective, Affective, and Temporal "In-Between" in *A History of Violence*

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From being to becoming: Mapping out the subjective, affective, and temporal 'in-between' in *A History of Violence*

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Abstract

While the self is a central figure in the study of Communication, it is generally depicted as an autonomous figure that communicates to connect with others and the world. In this thesis we problematize this instrumental articulation by focussing on the concepts of affect and time. Specifically, we analyze these concepts in the film *A History of Violence* through the three-tiered methodology of discourse analysis, articulation, and intermediality. By analyzing specific scenes in this film, we demonstrate that affective investments function as a communicative circuit in which the individual becomes 'in-between' the pre-personal and subjective intensities of affect. Concomitant with this circuit is the revelation of multiple temporalities that underpin the present moment of investment. We then conclude that affect and time can help us move from being to becoming by challenging the assumption of autonomous selves, which raises new issues that are pressing to be recognized in Communication Studies.

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Introduction

The communicative self, cinema, and affect: An introductory overview of issues, methods, and curiosities

"A self does not amount to much, but no self is an island; each exists in a fabric of relations that is now more complex and mobile than ever before"

- Jean François-Lyotard, 1979/1984, p. 15

There comes a point early on in David Cronenberg's 2005 film *A History of Violence* where the viewer may, perhaps, realize that this is not going to be a 'regular' gangster film. This realization came to us in the film's opening sequence, which depicts two unnamed men checking out of a motel in the middle of a desert town that may just be anywhere and nowhere. One is older and more grizzled looking, with closely cropped black hair and a moustache. Meanwhile, the other man is younger, blonder, and somewhat fresher looking: he is neither clean-shaven, nor bearded. But shared between the two of them is a steely and cold look in their eyes, as well as an aura of menace and unease that is amplified by the shrill buzzing on the soundtrack, which sounds something like electric insects. The older man orders the younger man to get them some water for the road and the younger man walks into that unnamed motel's front office. Inside there are a number of dead bodies scattered around and blood is splashed everywhere, but the man walks blankly past them. The only moment he stirs is when a young girl comes out of a side room, whimpering and holding a stuffed animal tightly in her arms. She is most definitely in shock and is scared: the young man kneels down, shushes her, points his gun at her, and then pulls the trigger.

This scene is extremely shocking and unsettling. It also illustrates one of the main concerns of this thesis, which is *affect*.[1] If the viewer jumps in their seat, if they close their

[1] Affect and all subsequent italicized words not italicized for emphasis can be referred to in the glossary located in Appendix A.

eyes in disbelief, or are even intensely horrified and disturbed by what has just happened, then there has just been an affective investment made in this film, along with the elicitation of an affectively intense response. Huygens (2008) identifies this more intense and less rational aspect of film viewership in her own study of Japanese horror films; as she writes, "we not only perceive film on a representational level in terms of the story and characters, but also as it interacts with the whole of our emotional, corporal, and sensorial being" (p. 53). Indeed, there is one level of film spectatorship that surpasses narrative meanings and begins to engage the senses and emotions.

But affective investments do not just transpire when one is watching a film. Lawrence Grossberg (1992) argues that these investments occur in the everyday lives of individuals and are pressing to explore because, "they are the places at which people can anchor themselves into the world, the locations of the things that matter" (p. 82). Or more exactly: "Affect identifies the strength of the investment which anchors people in particular experiences, practices, identities, meanings, and pleasures, but it also determines how invigorated people feel at any moment of their lives, their level of energy or passion" (p. 82). Therefore, affect is pressing to explore because these are the intensities that underpin and help determine how exactly individuals invest themselves into the world. Also referred to as passion, affection, or emotion, these are the very means by which individuals come to feel and care about the world they live in. In his book Grossberg (1992) took these intensities for granted and proceeded to outline their political relevance in the emergence of the new popular conservatism movement. We are a bit more hesitant than he was and are, rather, more curious about the details of these investments. This curiosity has been spurred by evident tensions in the discourses on affect.

Specifically, there is a more existential and modern depiction of it, whereby it is posed that affect is a subjective bridge that emanates from one's mind and moods that reveals the world to that individual, while connecting them to it in a more authentic manner. This position was advanced by the German philosopher Martin Heidegger (1927/1962) in his classic work *Being and Time* and was continued in the work of Emanuel Levinas (e.g. 1932/1996). Conversely, the second stance is a post-structural one in which affect is argued to be a set of pre-personal intensities that are produced by the social world that the individual merely moves upon and passes through. This stance was advanced by the French philosopher Gilles Deleuze with his writing partner Felix Guattari (e.g. 1980/1987) and can also be seen in the writings of Brian Massumi (2002).

In this thesis we will situate ourselves 'in-between' these stances, which are usually set up against one another, and begin to argue that affect functions as a communicative circuit that is 'in-between' the subjective and the pre-personal. As a means to demonstrate this contention, David Cronenberg's 2005 film *A History of Violence* will be used as a pre-text to enter into these discourses and map them out.[2] In pursuing this project there will be three research questions posed, which will guide this critical engagement with affect:

> 1) How does the individual that is in the midst of affective intensities connect to the world?
>
> 2) To what extent can the film *A History of Violence* help us enter into these discourses and begin to understand them more clearly?
>
> 3) What impact could the intensities of affect have on studying communicative practices and technologies?

[2] The method that will enable us to pursue such a project, which is based in building analytical bridges between seemingly separate fields, is discourse analysis based in the critical purviews of *articulation* and *intermediality*. This three-tiered methodology will be explained more fully in the third chapter of this thesis.

We are especially curious about this last query because affect and, moreover, the pleasures of communicating and media use are underexplored in the study of Communication (Ott, 2004). But as a means to begin we will start by outlining the impact that affect could have on studying communicative practices and, moreover, the communicative self.

The (affectless) self in/and communications

The self has had a central position in the studies of cinema, media, and communication. Whether it is Walter Benjamin (1936/2004) highlighting the shock, awe, and distraction that he argued were part and parcel of the cinematic experience for film viewers or Marshall McLuhan (1964) placing the extendable individual's nervous system at the centre of media processes and practices, the abstracted and universalized self has been – and continues to be – a central analytic in the study of cinema, media, and communication. Moreover, these re-articulations fit within the ideological parameters of Western modernity (Grossberg, 1982; personal correspondence, July 4 & 5, 2008), whereby the self is argued to be rational, emotionless, and the source of all communicative activities. This bias has been unpacked in greater detail by Chang (1996), who revealed in his own examination of the epistemological assumptions of Communication Studies that the whole discipline is largely rooted in the idea of the transcendental subject, who is positioned as the penultimate origin of knowledge.[3] This impacts greatly on the study of communication because the self as central origin of all activity obscures external differences, including the 'other'. One result of this bias is that the most pressing issue for Communications theorists becomes: How does one transcend one's own self and start to connect with others? This issue is especially

[3] The transcendental subject was posited by noted philosopher of phenomenology Edmund Husserl. One of the many arguments he advanced was that when studying the world we must turn to studying the things themselves. In doing so, he ended up positioning the individual as the central figure that can understand these things by interacting with them. Refer to chapter one of Chang's book for more information on the rational and transcendental subject.

pressing because the transcendental subject as root of all knowing is a particularly isolated entity that is:

> Characterized by his or her essential aloneness, by his or her detachment from worldly contingencies . . . . [The subject] is conceived on the basis of a knowing, self-conscious mind existing with but irretrievably distanced from other subjects and the social world (Chang, 1996, p. 43).

Meanwhile, communicative practices and technologies serve the instrumental purpose of connecting individuals and helping them to cross the gap that is assumed to divide one from the other.[4] This assumption impacts greatly on the critical and theoretical presumptions of Communications Studies because,

> the postulation of the solitary communicative subject thus becomes the precondition for theorizing about communication, for it legitimates raising the question of communication to begin with and at the same time anticipates possible answers to it under the condition set by the problematic. (Chang, 1996, p. 44)

From this it becomes necessary, in turn, to examine how – and assume *a priori* that – communications activities, and those various media that are mobilized to bridge the gap between self and other, either brings people closer together or tears them further apart. This produces a critical situation in which, as Chang (1996) notes, "the problematic of communication articulates itself through this looplike structure, and by following through this loop, communication theories in turn reproduce the problematic as a finite economy of sending and return" (p. 62). Taken altogether, in the average (or is it, perhaps, ideal?) communicative situation the individuated self is isolated, autonomous, and always attempting to bridge the gap that transpires between it and the world through the act of communication. In turn, communication serves an instrumental function, becoming either the solution to an as yet unsolved problem or a problem that has to be resolved.

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[4] Refer to Peters (1999) for a critical overview of the variety of anxiety that arose from this model in early modern (i.e. late 19th and early 20th century) Western thought.

Chang counters this bias through a text-based, Derrida-inspired deconstruction of written and oral communications. From this, he concludes that a self is really the effect of communication that needs another individual to always be present. This is a grand step forward for communications theorizing but where did the passion go? In the midst of looking to texts, writing, and speech, Chang glosses over those various intensities that not only overlap the individual and the pre-personal, but also underpin how exactly the individual invests in the world and its desires. It is important to note that we are not denying Chang's conclusions; rather, we want to expand his conclusions by looking at how affect can impact the communicative self. More exactly, we want to mobilize and coordinate these normally separated discourses on affect as a means to re-articulate the communicative self as an affectively attuned and practice-based bodily site that is always in the midst of *becoming* within the world, rather than essentially there and autonomously separable from it. Such a project problematizes the claims of autonomy that underpins the study of communication, for the communicative self is really in the midst of becoming with others, rather than being essentially there and separable from others.

While the influx self will be focussed on in this thesis, it must be emphasized that we are not satisfied with the aforementioned assumption of essentialized interiority that underpins the transcendental subject. At the same time, we are also not interested in making grand claims about – and against – communicative selves that could pass as universal truths; rather, we want to focus this analysis by examining these tensions between affect and the self in one specific cultural context. This yearning for specificity, along with the generally intense nature of Cronenberg's cinema (Shaviro, 1993; Beard, 1994) is why the film *A History of Violence* has been chosen as an entryway into affect.

A History of Violence, affective investments, and the study of communication

A History of Violence (2005) is a film produced and directed by the critically acclaimed Canadian filmmaker David Cronenberg that was based on a graphic novel of the same name penned by John Wagner and illustrated by Vince Locke (1998). Largely set in Millbrook, Indiana – a small fictional American every-town created especially for the film – the film tells the story of Tom Stall (Viggo Mortensen), who is a happily married small-town diner owner that saves the lives of a handful of people in his diner from a pair of dangerous criminals. This act of heroism launches Tom into the public eye as a small town hero but he soon catches the attention of a couple of Mafia men from Pittsburgh Pennsylvania led by Craig Fogarty (Ed Harris). These men come to Millbrook because Fogarty is certain that Stall is actually a former Mafia man named Joey Cusack, who once ripped his eye out with barbwire. What initially starts off as a suspenseful "wrong-man" film indebted to the films of Alfred Hitchcock (Beaty, 2008) soon shifts into denser filmic territory, as Tom reveals to his family during a struggle with Fogarty that he is actually Joey. From this revelation the action shifts, identities begin to multiply and Tom-Joey embarks on a trip back to Pittsburgh to save his and his family's lives. And the way to do so is by confronting his brother Richie Cusack (William Hurt), who is now head of the mob and represents a threatening and violent past that Tom-Joey thought he had left behind.

A History of Violence has been chosen as an object of analysis because it is a spectacular entryway into the nuances of affect. This is because the film's protagonist Tom Stall-Joey Cusack is a fragmented figure that is constantly in the midst of being de-centred and re-connected by his passionate intensities. We will engage more fully with this tension in the fourth chapter of this thesis, wherein the degrees of intensity that the film's protagonist passes through as he moves from being Tom Stall to becoming the more conjunctural Tom-

Joey will be highlighted and analyzed. To achieve this goal, specific scenes will be picked from this film and juxtaposed with specific discourses on affect. This will help us demonstrate the exact manner in which the film's protagonist becomes 'in-between' the subjective and pre-personal intensities of affect. Yet this is not all that is happening in this film; rather, concomitant with the intensities of becoming 'in-between' singular and pre-personal affects are the various games of time that are transpiring in this film. More specifically, it appears that when Tom-Joey becomes intense, this does not merely connect the pre-personal and subjective; rather, his becoming-intense also reveals the layers of the past and future that underpin the present that those intensities are invested in. This indicates that there are just as many 'in-between' moments in time as there are in the intensities of affect. These interlocking instances demand to be highlighted because they could allow us to witness the complexity of the subjective, affective, and temporal 'in-between'. In turn, this will help us to achieve our research goal of re-articulating the self as a practice-based entity in the midst of becoming. It is important to note, however, that in pursuing this argumentative stream about violence we neither aim to glorify violence, nor do we wish to abstract it through the rubric of affect as a means to argue that it is a positive force. Rather, we are highlighting the productive quality of violence and, moreover, how exactly it is an intense field of engagement and production that is both subjectively singular and objectively pre-personal. Violence is, in short, one entryway into engaging with the complexities of affect.

Although this thesis will jump across a number of disciplines (e.g. Cultural Studies, Philosophy, Communications, and Media Studies) we have very specific goals in mind, which will be set up in the second chapter of this thesis and then demonstrated in the fourth chapter of this thesis. First and foremost, we will establish that affect functions in a

circuitous manner. Second, a less instrumental articulation of communication practices and technologies will be opened up by examining how Tom's violent desires and actions – as well as external media technologies – concurrently reveal and conceal his Joey Cusack past and his present identity. Third, the multiple layers of time that underpin the present and are revealed by Tom-Joey's intensities will then be turned to. This will help us to illustrate how different temporalities underpin investments of affect and are, furthermore, in the midst of communicating with one another in the now(s). All three goals will help us move, in turn, from being to becoming.

In pursuing this project it is our ultimate aim to incorporate affect into considerations of the communicative self as a means to destabilize this figure and open it up to the differences that it re-emerges from within the world. Executing this shift may help us keep the image of the self that is so central to the study of communication in our critical purview, while resisting those biased argumentative frames that constantly re-articulate essentialized interiors as transcendent realities. These framings reproduce, in turn, anxiety over external differences and produce the same old narratives in Media and Communications Studies predicated on attempts to cross the gap between self and other. Challenging this bias and establishing that communicative selves are always in the midst of becoming with others and the world could even open up new analytical paths in Communications Studies. The one that we have chosen to map in this thesis can be characterized as an *ontogenetic* study of how exactly the individual becomes invested in the world.

While it may seem peculiar to engage cinema as a means to enter into communicative issues, this is not so peculiar when we remember that borders do not merely function to contain and separate but, rather, borders and boundaries constitute the meeting points between seemingly separate phenomena (Gledhill, 2000, p. 237). Consequently, cinematic

depictions of affect – and, moreover, the interrelations that arise between these intensities, time, and the self – may reveal unforeseen nuances in contemporary articulations of communicative selves. This revelatory tendency connects with cinema's capability to be a spectacular entryway into the complex relationalities that constitute the social world. Indeed, the politics of power, identities, and differences intertwine with the complex ebbs and flows of cinematic images; taken together, it can begin to be argued that there is a whole complex world out there that is forever in the midst of re-emerging and cinema is right there alongside these tumultuous shifts, constantly re-presenting and intervening into that which transpires. This facet of cinema will now be turned to; more specifically, the complex practices of re-presentation that transpire between the cinematic apparatus, the self, affect, and the social world will be introduced in the first half of the next chapter.[5] Then in the second half of the chapter we will provide further details about the divergent articulations of affect, as well as the interrelations that arise between Heidegger's revelatory technologies, the subjective intensities of affect, and Deleuze's *desiring machines*. All three elements will play a pivotal part in the film analysis chapter and, moreover, are connected through the shared concepts of concealment and revelation.

[5] We are breaking up representation with a hyphen as a means to emphasize the very manner in which this film, on the one hand, is comprised of various representations and, on the other hand, re-presents discourses and issues that are evident in the real world. Both positions are pressing to consider in the way that film is used in this thesis. These issues will be further clarified in the second and third chapters of this thesis.

Chapter 2

Engaging the context: The self in/and cinematic technologies, Heidegger's singular being, and Deleuze's multiplicitous becomings

To begin, one of the earliest philosophical articulations of cinematic technologies can be traced back to Walter Benjamin's (1935/2004) essay "The Work of Art in the Age of Mechanical Reproduction".[6] In this essay Benjamin explores the nature of art's seemingly declining aura – which he defined as that ineffable quality of originality based in tradition and scarcity (pp. 793-795) – in the age of mechanical reproduction. This was done as a means to ascertain what the exact aura of art could be when scarcity is no longer a pressing issue. In the midst of pursuing this project, Benjamin ended up identifying and putting forth the centrality of subjectivities and, indeed, the self in cinematic practices based in technologies of re-presentation and reproduction. More explicitly, Benjamin highlighted the centrality of the self in four specific locations: the individual behind the camera recording and directing the action; the actor that stands before the camera, whose performance is inscribed by that very apparatus; the centred presence of actors/characters that are projected onto movie screens; and fourthly, the individual that watches this action on screen and identifies with those individuated subjectivities set up onto the screen before his or her eyes (pp. 799-804).

These first two locations have three specific figures – the actor(s), the camera, and the filmmaker/cameraman – and they are closely intertwined. The actor(s) perform to the camera in different ways, with different mannerisms and affectations while the camera

[6] There are two versions of this essay that will be referenced in this section: the 'official' version (1935/2004) initially published in *Illuminations* and a second draft that has recently been published in a collection of Benjamin's writings that more explicitly pertain to the study of media (1936/2008). Refer to Hansen (2004) for specific information on the differences between the two versions used in this thesis, and more general information on the three different versions of this essay that exist.

records all that it is set upon to record, inscribing the different takes and multiplicities of performances by those actors positioned before the camera. Concurrently, the filmmaker often directs the actions of the actor(s), calling for different takes and affectations (depending on the filmmaker's methods). It is only later in the editing phase that these various takes are pieced together, culminating in a representation of subjective singularity brought-forth from those multiplicities of performances inscribed by the camera (Benjamin, 1935/2004, pp. 799-801). Or as Benjamin notes: "His performance is by no means a unified whole, but is assembled from many individual performances" (1936/2008, p. 32).

While Benjamin focuses on the singularity of the actor-figure, analyzing the different relations an actor has with the public in person as compared to on the screen and how the camera actually replaces the public in cinematic – as compared to theatrical – performances, it is even more intriguing that there is instability for cinematic subjects in this essay. More specifically, Benjamin indicates the multiple potentialities of that individuated cinema actor's body, whose performances as a self are repositioned, reconfigured, and determined by the cinematic apparatus. With this it becomes clearer that an essential part of cinema is its capability to re-present and reproduce assembled images of singularity from numerous fragments. This ability to re-present and reconfigure the actor's body connects, in turn, with the filmmaker's ability to "cut-into" reality in a manner akin to a surgical procedure, thus modifying what it is that constitutes that reality (Benjamin, 1935/2004, p. 804). Benjamin highlights such cinematic, camera-specific techniques as slow motion, close-ups, and zoom-outs, which have the capability to extend, enlarge, reduce, accelerate, and reify everyday perceptions of the world. This modification occurs to the extent that even greater details of the world not easily noticeable with the naked eye become clearer to that eye (Benjamin, 1935/2004, p. 806).

By extension, time, place, and space are modified by the cinematic apparatus and the filmmaker, thus impacting the very manner in which the world is perceived by individuals in the world. At the same time, the very processes and techniques by which the re-imaged world is modified are hidden in the production of these films, so that the world is revealed while the very means by which the world is revealed are concealed.[7] This produces a situation in which, "the equipment-free aspect of reality here has become the height of artifice; the sight of immediate reality has become the [unattainable] blue flower in the land of technology" (Benjamin, 1935/2004, p. 804). Picking up from this quote, with Benjamin we can see that artifice and reality blur in cinematic practices hinged in mechanical practices of re-presentation and reproduction. The collapse of this binary leads, in turn, to ". . . the radical subversion of hierarchy of original and copy upon which the theories of mediation and representation, or lack and substitution depend" (Shaviro, 1993, p. 36). Continuing from this, it can begin to be ascertained from Benjamin's essay that cinema is a mode of critical engagement and a technology one can mobilize to enter into contact with the world (i.e. 'the real') (Shaviro, 1993, p. 54). In turn, by engaging with cinema's products we too can come into contact with the world.[8]

Therefore, cinematic images are "piecemeal" images (Benjamin, 1936/2008, p. 35) brought-forth through specific practices and techniques particular to the cinematic apparatus. In turn, the world and the individuals that are part and parcel of the cinematic reality are piecemeal images brought-forth and re-presented by cinematic technologies and techniques.

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[7] These practices of concealment and revelation echo what Heidegger found to be central in being a self. Indeed, he argued that individuals largely exist in an inauthentic (i.e. concealed) manner while authenticity was achieved by revealing that which is inauthentic. We will unpack this tension further below, but this connection between cinematic practices and the processes of being a self is important to keep in mind.

[8] This is especially pressing because Heidegger argued that individuals are inextricably in the world. Thus, by engaging with the world and the real one can also, by extension, begin to engage with the 'real' self through the 'artificial' depiction of it, for the two are blurred in cinematic practices of re-presentation and reproduction.

Taken together, it can then be ascertained that cinema reveals "entirely new structural formations of the subject" (Benjamin, 1935/2004, p. 806) by breaking it down and recombining it. Weber (1996) expands this point and argues that the cinematic apparatus does this in three steps:

> First, it apprehends it the way a policeman apprehends a suspect, arresting what seems to be its spontaneous or intrinsic movements and submitting it to a series of operations that have nothing to do with its 'natural' inclinations; second, it opens the way for those elements to be dislocated and relocated, broken down into elements and recombined into ensembles that have little to do with their initial state; and finally, the finished product is placed into circulation (p. 90).

However, images of the self are not just set up onto those various cinematic screens; rather, Benjamin also emphasizes the role of those individuals that receive and identify with what they see in the midst of viewing a film. At this receptive level, the act of viewing a film is a moment of intimate identification for the individual because "the camera introduces us to unconscious optics as does psychoanalysis to unconscious impulses" (Benjamin, 1935/2004, p. 806). With his highlighting of the psychoanalytic nature of film viewership Benjamin can be identified as a pivot of sorts in reception theories predicated on psychoanalysis in film studies. While this thesis is not the place to outline the limitations of reception theory,[9] it can be noted that Benjamin sets up subjectivities at the plane of reception and depicts individuated subjects sitting in front of screens and identifying with (because they are receiving) whatever he or she may see on that screen. Hence, ". . . the subject is ensconced, 'embedded', held in place and at rest, by the scene that it both observes and also 'breathes in'" (Weber, 1996, p. 86). With this, Benjamin highlights the reception of films by audiences and identifies how cinema absorbs and distracts the masses.

[9] Refer to Shaviro (1993), Allen (2006), and Tomaselli (2006) for three critiques of reception theories.

With his focus on uniformity and anonymity in mass spectatorship practices, Benjamin foregrounds the more fascistic aspects of cinema; however, one of the subtler aspects of this essay is his depiction of cinema as a revelatory intervention of sorts. We propose intervention because from Benjamin we can see that cinema interrupts and modifies the world, bodies, and subjectivities starting from the very moment, ". . . man presents himself to mechanical equipment [and] also in the manner in which, by means of this apparatus, man can represent his environment" (Benjamin, 1935/2004, p. 805). This capability that cinema has to intervene in the world is not only apparent in the tendencies that cinema has to shock, fragment, and recombine the individual, but also in the manner in which cinematic practices of representation blur the line between that which is artificial and real. Shaviro (1993) picks up on this more dynamic and deconstructive aspect of film production and spectatorship in Benjamin's writing and proceeds to posit that in cinema's shock effects, ". . . all fixed points of reference and self-reference, all lines of perspective, and all possibilities of stabilizing identification and objectification are banished" (p. 54). Furthermore, this de-stabilizing aspect of film reception is connected with those very aspects of film spectatorship that Benjamin argued reified the subject and perception, such as zoom-ins, close-ups, and cinema's engagement of the unconscious. Indeed, these practices break apart bodies: for example, a portion of the body is set up in a close-up, which fragments the singularity of that body; a play of light shades a protagonist's face, perhaps indicating duplicity; or multiple points of view are set up, which explodes the coherence of a singular perspective. From this we can see that cinematic techniques of representation can break down the body, yet they can also re-assemble it: such is the ambivalence of art in the age of mechanical reproduction. A passage from Shaviro (1993) can help us understand this ambivalent process more clearly. As he writes:

> When the real is fragmented as a result of being permeated with machines, the opposition between subjectivity and objectivity, or between the observer and observed, vanishes. The machines used by the filmmaker can no longer be regarded as tools to manipulate reality from a distance, for there no longer is any distance. In a world of mechanical reproduction, fragmentation and construction are not modes of representation, but processes of the real itself. (p. 40)

With Shaviro's work on Benjamin we can start to ascertain that cinematic practices of re-presentation, which are hinged on the processes of breaking down and reassembling the real, correspond with the dynamic qualities of the ever-emerging social realm.

In relation to *A History of Violence*, by mobilizing Benjamin and those relevant commentaries by Weber and Shaviro we can begin to see that the ambivalence of the main protagonist's identity is not merely a series of philosophical discourses that lie too far 'above' this film. Rather, these tensions are part and parcel of cinematic practices of re-presentation based in mechanical reproduction. These practices are, in turn, intimately connected with the very processes and practices of the world. Indeed, the materiality of the cinematic image corresponds with the materiality of the body and the world, providing an intriguing cross-section of sites to interrogate based in cinema's contingent interrelations with the social realm. Hansen (2004), also working with this canonical essay, furthers this point and argues that, "the meaning of the image is determined less by its claim to resemblance than by its material bond with the depicted object . . . in semiotic terms, its indexicality" (pp. 39-40). So far we have established the contingent qualities of cinema and, moreover, how it interlinks with the social world and the individual. This contingency hinges on the processes of mechanical reproduction and re-presentation. But how exactly does the world become revealed by cinema? To answer this Heidegger's essay on technology will now be turned to.

More specifically, a little under two decades after Benjamin's essay, Martin Heidegger (1954/1993) too became interested in the concurrences between technologies, selves, and the world. He engaged with these issues in his essay "A Question Concerning Technology," in which he proposed to examine and ascertain the 'essence' of technology. In the midst of striving for essences, Heidegger found that there is a recurrent and dominant tendency to conceive of technologies in an instrumental and cause-oriented manner. This is so because technologies are often viewed as "means to ends" that put into effect changes in the world (Heidegger, 1954/1993, pp. 312-313). As a means to support this hypothesis, he traces the history of what causality means by exploring how this concept was initially articulated and applied in pre-Socratic Greek thought. One example that he focuses on is that of the artisan who produces goods for the public.

More specifically, the artisan produces items that have never before existed, which are brought-forth – or created from – existent materials at hand. For example, an artisan that is 'bringing-forth' [*Her-vor-bringen*] a bowl into the world is creating (or bringing into presence) something that was not there before. However, the materials and idea of the bowl precede this artisan, so when that artisan finally produces this bowl he is not so much producing it from nothing but, rather, 'brings-forth' something that has been waiting into the world from within itself and from his or her own creative whims (Heidegger, 1954/1993, p. 317). This process is not merely unique to the artisanal bowl-maker but is rather indicative of the larger processes of 'bringing-forth' objects into the world that underpins cause-oriented conceptions of technology. The leap from techniques of artisanal creation to effects-based technologies is made through Heidegger's mobilizing of the word *technē*, which is the Greek root of both terms (1954/1993, pp. 318-319). Keeping in mind that the essence of technology "is by no means anything technological" (1954/1993, p. 311), Heidegger continues to trace

the philosophical notions of instrumentality and causality, while also tracing different etymologies of the word. From this genealogical examination of *technē* he finds that technology is ultimately a means towards revealing [*alētheia*] things in the world. This is so because, "every bringing-forth is grounded in revealing" (1954/1993, p. 318). Indeed, in the midst of 'bringing-forth' particular objects into the world those objects, as well as the world itself, are revealed because these things do not appear out of nowhere. Rather, they are created and produced (i.e. brought into causation and/or presence) through particular means and techniques from materials and ideas that precede that particular act of creation. This is causality as it is purported to underpin the practices related to *technē* or, indeed, technologies. However, revelation does not only arise from crafty acts of creation; rather it is also something that is poetic [*poiēsis*] because these acts of creation involve "the arts of the mind and the fine arts" (p. 318).

However, Heidegger proposes that danger underpins this instrumental conception of technologies rooted in causality because the individual interacting with technology is revealed as something that is also instrumental – or as Heidegger names it, "standing-reserve" [*Bestand*] (1954/1993, p. 322). Once an individual is revealed as a being that is 'standing-reserve' they act in a regimented and orderly manner, much like the very instruments that are used. Consequently, 'standing-reserve' individuals that are ordered in an instrumental manner too approach the world instrumentally with technology and subsequently order the world into the 'standing-reserve' as well (1954/1993, p. 323). With this idea of 'bringing-forth' the 'standing-reserve', Heidegger is suggesting that the use of technologies could lead to the mastering of the natural world into something that is rational, orderly, and at the command of whoever has the power and means – extended by technology

– to 'bring-forth' the 'standing-reserve'. With this humankind becomes a central organizing figure in the world (Heidegger, 1954/1993, p. 332).

Thus, the practices that underpin cause-oriented and overtly rational approaches to technologies are purported to impart control of the world by whoever has the power to access and wield said technologies.[10] Concurrently, individuals become caught up in this frame of control – i.e. enframing [*Gestell*] (pp. 324-325) – and are consequently forced, or "challenged-forth" (p. 323), to reveal the world as something that is 'standing-reserve.' With these acts of concealment, one is contradictorily enough revealing the world as something that is concealed. Technologies not only put these changes into effect but also provide the frames of engagement to continue to put into effect such changes. Furthering this problem is the fact that the negative effects of these endeavours are concealed in the continuing perpetuation of ordering activities by humans with and through technology. Heidegger (1954/1993) cites the damming of the Rhine River for hydroelectric power as an example of this process, for that dam changes the river into something that is subservient to the whims of humankind, rather than merely being what it is naturally (p. 321). Moreover, as more rivers become dammed it will become increasingly necessary to dam more and more rivers.

By revealing this tendency Heidegger proceeds to eschew instrumental approaches to understanding technology and concludes his essay by pinpointing the incredible ambiguity of technology that relates to the concurrent movements of revelation and concealment, which is where truths begin to unfold (p. 338). This capability to reveal truths corresponds with the name that technology [*technē*] once had before – poetry [*poiēsis*]. Indeed, poetry reveals the world as well, but instead of revealing order and the 'standing-reserve' within instrumental

[10] Refer to Innis (1951/1991) and Beniger (1986) for a continuation of this theoretical stream, with their emphases on the role that communications technologies have in ordering the world. Refer to Escobar (2005) for a further exploration of the politics of such technological practices in ecological spaces.

ordering frames (i.e. *Gestell*) it reveals beauty and the world (1954/1993, p. 339). Moreover, poetic beauty underpins *technē* because technologies are capable of mediating artistry and expression, to the extent that "the poetical thoroughly pervades every art, every revealing of essential unfolding into the beautiful" (1954/1993, p. 340). From the revelation of beauty we also arrive at the realm where truths can be and are revealed (1954/1993, p. 338). This correlates with the practices of cinematic technologies because they can also reveal the world through those aforementioned practices of breaking apart and re-assembling all those elements of the world that are captured and re-presented by the cinematic apparatus. Indeed, as Benjamin (1936/2008) argues:

> Our bars and city streets, our offices and furnished rooms, our railroad stations and our factories seemed to close relentlessly around us. Then came film and exploded this prison-world with the dynamite of the split second, so that now we can set off calmly on journeys of adventure among its far-flung debris . . . . This is where the camera comes into play, with all its resources for swooping and rising, disrupting and isolating, stretching or compressing a sequence, enlarging or reducing an object. (p. 37)

In short, from Benjamin we can see the fragmenting and explosive effects that cinema has. From Heidegger we can see ambivalence in the uses of technology rooted in its capabilities to control and reveal the world. When these argumentative streams are taken together, technological practices like the cinema can begin to be re-considered as a series of practices that are essentially ambiguous because they are not only capable of oppressing and concealing the world we live in, but can also free that world; or, as Leverette (2007) surmises, "the very instrumentality (techné) that threatens us also saves us (as poiêsis)" (p. 345).

Heidegger's arguments about the revelatory practices underpinning technology are pressing to the study of cinema because – as we can see from the writings of Benjamin – cinema is, in and of itself, constituted of specific technologies that re-present, reassemble,

and 'cut into' the world and those subjectivities contained within the world, which are captured and re-presented by the camera's lens. When Heidegger writes of the capacity that technologies have to reveal that which is beautiful these notions relate to the study of cinema, which has the capability to reveal that which is poetic in the world. But this beauty comes with many risks and must not be taken for granted. We will be emphasizing the revelatory aspects of technology in this thesis by exploring how exactly the circuitous quality of affect can be revealed and mapped out through the film *A History of Violence*.

From Heidegger's essay on technology we can begin to see a socially situated depiction of technology, whereby it is not so much an object external to the world and to individuals but is, rather, a functional and practice-based network that is part and parcel of us and the world.[11] Or as Crockett (2005) surmises, technologies are ". . . not simply an external force which we shape instrumental tools to assist our existence in practical ways, but [are] fundamentally a self-shaping force, because it determines and reveals who we are in terms of our very being" (Crockett, 2005, p. 176). With this connection it can be argued that technologies – and, more specifically cinematic technologies – are socially contextualized practices that reveal the world and those individuals in the world. These practices of revelation are connected, in turn, with those previously outlined practices of breaking down and recombining the individual and the world that were identified by Benjamin. This is pressing to understand for two key reasons. Firstly, in this thesis we are interested in interrogating the cinematic interventions of David Cronenberg as a means to engage with affect, time, the self, and becoming. Such a project is reasonable to pursue because Cronenberg's 'artificial' depictions of affect and the self correspond with the actual flows of such social processes. Secondly, Heidegger's argument about technology's revelatory

[11] Refer to Sterne (2003) for an essay that clarifies this socially contextual reading of media technologies.

potential is also evident within the film itself. Indeed, Tom Stall's multiple identities become revealed and concealed by technologies that are both internal (e.g. Tom-Joey's *desiring machines*) and external (the news media's depictions of Tom as a hero-object). Since these discourses about non-instrumental technologies have been introduced, which are pressing both within and outside the film and will be continued further in the fourth chapter, it is now pressing to clarify the subjective articulation of affect. To do so we will turn to the singular and truthful self (i.e. *Dasein*) that is depicted in *Being and Time*. This is pressing to establish because Heidegger also argued that affect reveals and conceals the individual and the world. This connects affect with the aforementioned writings on technology. Following this, we will then begin to expand outwards by introducing Deleuze's writings on affect.

Singular being(s) in time: Existential *Dasein* and affect

In *Being and Time,* Martin Heidegger (1927/1962) is largely concerned with understanding what it means to be. This concern is sparked because Heidegger proposes that this fundamentally important issue has been largely "forgotten" (p. 21) and even rejected as "the most universal and the emptiest of concepts" (p. 23). As a means to begin remembering that which has been forgotten he approaches being through the rubric of the individual existing in the world – i.e. the being of beings (Raymond, 1991, p. 240) – because he contended that "human understanding is the only entrance and key to the nature of being" (Frede, 2006, p. 55). This is so because humans are argued to be the only entities in the world that have ontological concerns (i.e. are concerned with being). As a means to engage with being Heidegger utilizes the term *Dasein* to write about the human condition, which explicitly refers to a mode of being particular to humans that is not possessed by other entities and things within the world. Indeed, we are *Dasein* and as *Dasein* we are always concerned with our being (i.e. what we are), even when this concern is not explicitly

expressed in an overtly theoretical or ontological manner (Frede, 2006, p. 55). This concern is evident in our everyday lives, spanning from those minor decisions that take up our days to those grander decisions we make about what we will or will not make of our lives. We are concerned about ourselves and, at the same time, we are the sum of our experiences, which are expressed in our existence. For Heidegger "existence [*Existenz*] is," therefore, "the essence of *Dasein*" (p. 67).

The expressive and concerned individual is a central analytic in Heidegger's engagement with the meaning of being. Moreover, *Dasein* literally means "being-there" (Heidegger, 1927/1962, p. 27), which indicates that *Dasein* is "inextricably linked," with the world it resides in (Raymond, 1991, p. 242). Because of the contextual nature of humanity's 'being-there', Heidegger purports that *Dasein* is constituted of those things in the world that it makes sense of itself through and in (Frede, 2006, p. 63). Or, as Guignon (1984) writes, "we find ourselves 'already-in' a specific cultural and historical context which provides us with the determinate range of possibilities that shape our 'facticity,'" (p. 331) and knowledge of *Dasein* (Heidegger, 1927/1962, p. 90). These possibilities are encountered in *Dasein*'s everyday existence, which indicates that: (1) "the very being of human beings is inextricably bound up with what they take themselves to be" (Carman, 2006, p. 107) and (2) "there is no pregiven 'human nature' that determines what we are. Instead, we are what we make of ourselves in the course of living out our active lives" (Guignon, 2006a, p. 276). This lived involvement in, and active construction of one's, existence as actuality and possibility indicates that *Dasein* is a self-determining being that exists in and through experiences within the world that have been and have not yet been experienced (Heidegger, 1927/1962, p. 73). *Dasein* is, therefore, a largely practice-based individual that is "always already thrust into the midst of his possibilities" (Levinas, 1932/1996, p. 23). Specific technological

practices and ideational spaces like cinema, in turn, cut into, disassemble, and re-present that very context through which the individual pieces their existence together.

Underpinning this more practice-based depiction of a self that is thrown into the world and is, thus, always in the midst of its possibilities is the issue of how exactly *Dasein* is emotionally engaged with the world. Heidegger describes these affective engagements as "states of mind" contained within *Dasein* that emanate outwards and attune it to the world (p. 176).[12] These affective attunements with the world are, moreover, "*modes of self-understanding*, that is to say, of *being right-there*" (Levinas, 1932/1996, p. 24, emphasis in original). This indicates that *Dasein* is an active and affective agent always in the midst of piecing together its existence – which is as much actuality as possibility – by physically, cognitively, and emotionally engaging with – and appropriating – particular personal and societal cues provided by the world (Raymond, 1991, p. 14; Guignon, 2006b, p. 06). Affect also connects *Dasein* to the study of cinema because affect is generated through cinematic means (Shaviro, 1993, p. 24). Indeed, cinema produces emotions and investments that connect viewers to one another and to the film. This process is facilitated by popular filmic techniques like narratives built on singular, character-based points-of-view, which intimately connect the viewer to the individual that they are watching – and perhaps even identifying with – on the screen.[13]

Yet in Heidegger's writings, affect also connects with the notion of truth as revelation, which Heidegger (1927/1962) proposes is one of *the* fundamental characteristics of *Dasein* (p. 264). Specifically, in a world that is always already there and accessible to

[12] Or, as Heidegger (1927/1962) writes, "the 'there' gets equiprimordially disclosed by one's mood in every case – or gets closed off by it" (p. 389).
[13] Pevere (1995) writes of the dramatic absence of this narrative and filmic device in Atom Egoyan's films, which challenge and destabilize identifying with any one individual. One strong example of this can be found in the film *Exotica* (pp. 39-40).

Dasein in a relational unity that it interacts with,[14] *Dasein* is purported to be fundamentally truthful. However, while truth has largely been conceived as being based in the validity of a statement's correlation with reality – which Heidegger arrives at by performing a genealogical examination of how truth has been classically depicted in prior philosophical, mythical, and poetic examinations of being (pp. 257-261) – Heidegger challenges this accepted conception by mobilizing the writings of pre-Socratic Greek philosophers. From this re-articulation of the pre-Socratic philosophers he arrives at a conception of truth as a process rooted in revelation (p. 262).

By depicting *Dasein* as a being that is always affectively attuned to the world and, moreover, in the midst of truth as a process of self-revelation it is indicated that *Dasein* is largely a being that reveals both the world and itself through its interactions with that world it experiences and cares about. However, there is a central existential and ontological issue that arises with the tenet of revelation that connects with affect. This specific tension correlates with Heidegger's contention that individuals exist in one of two modes: either inauthentically or authentically. Inauthenticity is purported to occur in everyday life when one does not live for their own purposes but instead lives a life based on uniform conformity to – and consensus with – the masses of the 'they' (i.e. *das Man*). This is, furthermore, how everyone in the social realm is purported to exist. Conversely, there is a more involved and attuned segment of society that moves towards authenticity by turning away from the goings-on of the masses – which is communicated and maintained through idle talk and curiosity (Hardt, 1973) – and turning inwards towards the call of one's own conscience. This call is

[14] Refer to Charles Taylor's (2006) essay "Engaged Agency and Background in Heidegger" for a further clarification of what is involved in Dasein's meaningful interaction with the world, which is partially informed by a variety of pre-knowledge that is not necessarily rational but is necessary for one to make sense of and exist in the world (pp. 210-213).

spurred by the particularly intense feeling of angst. Therefore, affect does not just attune the individual to the world, but it can also reveal one's inauthentic everyday existence. In relation to *A History of Violence*, if we were to work solely with Heidegger's articulation of affect it would be posited that the film's protagonist is a singular, somewhat isolated, and largely inauthentic individual that is attempting to eke out an authentic existence. But there is much more going on than this.

While Heidegger depicts *Dasein* and its relevant affective experiences in an overtly subjective manner predicated in the notion that the individual generally lives in a state of false consciousness imparted by mass society, there is another discursive stream in which affect is considered to be productive and pre-personal rather than already there and singular. Connected with this position is the critical purview that posits affect is a pre-personal set of intensities that are, "without origin, they come from nowhere in particular; without destination, are not heading anywhere consequential and yet subsist or insist in an 'unstable time' that may last as long as a lifetime" (Robinson, 2003, p. 119). Mourning, anger, hope, violence, passion, anxiety, and lust: these are intense emotions that surpass the wills and consciousnesses of individuals. This is how affect works at the pre-personal level. This is also a stance that underpins select cinematic discourses, in which it is argued that cinematic affects de-centre spectatorship practices and, moreover, notions of a coherent self (e.g. Colebrook, 2002, p. 43; Shaviro, 1993, pp. 30-33).

We will now shift to this purview about affect as a means to move towards the production of desire and passion which, ". . . is pure multiplicity, that is to say, an affirmation that is irreducible to any sort of unity" (Deleuze and Guattari, 1972/1983, p. 42). Specifically, as a means to engage with this more dynamic facet of affect we will shift from singularities being to multiplicities becoming by moving on to the writings that Gilles

Deleuze did with Clair Parnet and Felix Guattari. In beginning this shift we will also be shifting our attention away from issues concerning *is* – which was Heidegger's main interest that he pursued in writing *Being and Time* – and move towards theorizing *and*, which was Deleuze's own concern. We are doing this because, as Deleuze and Parnet (1977/2006) write, being is an argument based in the idea of an "absolute first principle," which,

> is always a mask, a simple image. That does not exist, things do not start to move and come alive until the level of the second, third, fourth principle, and these are no longer even principles. Things do not begin to live except in the middle . . . . Relations are in the middle, and exist as such. (p. 41)

This shift from being to conjunction is not as radical a leap to make when it is kept in mind that both Deleuze and Heidegger emphasize the active, affectively engaged, and productive practices that emanate from and are constitutive of the social world always in the midst of emergence and movement. For Heidegger, there is the individuated *Dasein* that is affectively attuned to 'being-there' in the world and for Deleuze the world is a "body without organs" [15] that is always in the midst of becoming. Perhaps we can find a point in the midst of these two strata from which we can begin to move forward in the midst of Deleuze and Heidegger? In doing so, we will be keeping in mind that:

> The middle is by no means an average; on the contrary, it is where things pick up speed. *Between* things does not designate a localizable relation going from one thing to the other and back again, but a perpendicular direction, a transversal movement that sweeps one *and* the other away, a stream without beginning or end that undermines its banks and picks up speeds in the middle. (Deleuze and Guattari, 1980/1987, p. 35, emphasis in original)

Heidegger wrote in the middle when ontology slipped from his sight and he focused, rather, on the truthful revelations in an individual's ever-emerging and self-constructed existence. Meanwhile, Deleuze is all middles, traversing a variety of sometimes theoretical and

[15] The' body without organs' is a provocative image utilized by Deleuze and Guattari which indicates that at one level the world is a constantly generative site without one organizing centre.

analytical plateaus. Perhaps by writing 'in-between' Heidegger and Deleuze we will be able to ground Deleuze, expand Heidegger, and move towards theorizing *Dasein* as an affectively attuned and practice-based individual always in the midst of becoming. In doing so, we will keep the analytic of affect in our scope because affect transverses Heidegger and Deleuze. It also connects these issues and discourses about – and against – the self with the very structures and practices of cinema.

Deleuze (and Guattari and Parnet): Desiring machines, affect, and multiplicities

In their groundbreaking and challenging two-part treatise *Capitalism and Schizophrenia* – comprised of *Anti-Oedipus* (1972/1983) and *A Thousand Plateaus* (1980/1987) – Gilles Deleuze and Felix Guattari critically engage with a plethora of issues that are pressing for contemporary societies, including: the ambiguous and flowing nature of capitalism; the repressive and reductive tendencies apparent in psychoanalytic frames; social machines; and desire's productivity. These are extremely difficult and provocative volumes further complicated by Deleuze and Guattari's shared desire to not only write about multiplicities but to write in multiplicities. Thus, they flow into all sorts of different argumentative directions, touching upon Freud's wolf-man, lobsters, the "mommy-daddy-me" triad, savages, capitalism's codings, and barbarians in their attempt to describe the, "art of living counter to all forms of fascism, whether already present of impending" (Foucault, 1972/1983, p. xiii). And while these writings are seemingly haphazard, there is one recurrent thematic underpinning these critical volumes: multiplicities and heterogeneities that are always in the midst of reproduction and connection. These conjunctural multiplicities are emphasized over already-guaranteed homogenous unities. The reason for this emphasis arises from Deleuze and Parnet's (1977/2006) belief that the smallest "real unit" is not

actually singular, but is, rather, an assemblage made up of multiple heterogeneous terms (pp. 38, 52).

From the vantage point of the assemblage, Deleuze and Guattari proceed to highlight the assembled nature of desire, which is neither singular nor lacking but is, rather, always in the midst of reproduction. More specifically, in this process desire is a complex set of machines (i.e. desiring machines) that emanate from the social realm. Concurrently, the individual in the social world also desires, but these desires flow through that individual, rather than originating in the individual. This fragments the individual because he or she "consumes and consummates each of the states through which it passes, and is born of each of them anew, continuously emerging from them as a part made up of parts" (Deleuze and Guattari, 1972/1983, p. 41). Thus, individuals are always in the midst of re-emergence and reproduction because in the realm of desiring production everything is partial and fragmentary – especially the desiring individual – and only become singular through multiple converging processes. This is so because, as Colebrook (2002) argues:

> Desiring machines are, accordingly, nothing more than their connections or experiences. From the connections of bodies or from experience, human minds form ideas. The child's mouth, for example, that has experienced pleasure at the breast comes to desire or anticipate the breast. In this expectation desire can produce an image or 'investment' (p. 82).

In this instant, desire is produced from the connection of breast to mouth, rather than being relegated to the realms of either the breast or the mouth. Moreover, desire does not arise from the lack of a breast to the mouth: rather, it is at that moment of connection breast-mouth that desire is produced and invested in. This is, in short, an example of the conjunctural and assembled nature of desiring production *vis-à-vis* desiring machines.

Like Heidegger, Deleuze explicitly emphasizes the interconnections between individuals and the world. However, unlike Heidegger – who synthesized this complex

external world of diverse relationalities through the figure and states-of-mind of an abstracted, always-present macro-subjective entity that exists in an inauthentic manner – Deleuze depicts the world as an assemblage constituted of multiplicities. In turn, an entity like a self is a momentary effect of individuation similar to the way that a day is individuated by the rising and setting of the sun. This process of individuation is dubbed *haecceity* (Deleuze and Guattari, 1980/1987, p. 260; Deleuze and Parnet, 1977/2006, p. 68). Deleuze and Parnet (1977/2006) propose that *haecceities* deny stable subjects because the fluxes, speeds, convergences, and intensities of flows that constitute the subject surpass what would be necessary to form a subject (p. 68). Because of this, "a thing, an animal, a person are now only definable by movements and rests, speeds and slownesses (longitude) and by affects, intensities (latitudes)" (Deleuze and Parnet, 1977/2006, p. 69). *Haecceities* appear to be the larger process that determines where and when the fluxes of desiring machines stop, which produces singularity and, more exactly, points of individuation. In relation to *A History of Violence*, from this critical purview the protagonist of this film would not be a coherent subject set up on the screen but is, rather, a series of fragmented intensities that impact the viewer and elicit a variety of responses.[16]

While these individuated events deny such a thing as a subject or a coherent self, they do not deny corporeal realities; rather, individuations are predicated on bodies. However, Deleuze does not consider the body a unity. Rather, he emphasizes the assembled nature of the body as well by depicting it as being comprised and constituted of various machines that flow and interconnect with other machines that are both contained within and external to that

[16] Indeed, as Colebrook (2007) posits: "Cinema frees affect or the power of images from a world of coherent bodies differing only in degree, and opens up divergent lines of movement to differences in kind" (pp. 39-40). Refer as well to Rutsky (2007) for an essay on cinematic movement outside of the confines of the singular subject.

individual.[17] Indeed, for Deleuze the body as machine was not a metaphor. Rather, he mobilized this descriptor because "a machine has no subjectivity or organizing centre," and consequently it, "is nothing more than the connections and productions it makes; it is what it does" (Colebrook, 2002, pp. 55-56). As much is indicated when Deleuze and Guattari (1972/1983) propose that in the world there are:

> . . . machines driving other machines, machines being driven by other machines, with all the necessary couplings and connections. An organ-machine is plugged into an energy-source-machine: the one produces a flow that the other interrupts. The breast is a machine that produces milk, and the mouth a machine coupled to it . . . Hence we are all handymen: each with his little machines. For every organ-machine, an energy machine: all the time, flows and interruptions. (pp. 1-2)

According to Deleuze, with both Guattari and Parnet, the individual-as-*haecceity* exists as a discontinuous entity comprised of various flows and machinations that are interconnected with the flows and machinations of the social realm. The social realm, in turn, is a confluence of interconnected machines. However, that individual is not at the centre of the social realm; instead, this subject is, ". . . produced as a residuum alongside the machine, as an appendix, or as a spare part adjacent to the machine. . . " (Deleuze and Guattari, 1972/1983, p. 20). As a spare part, or residuum, the individual is still constituted of various types of machines (e.g. organ-machines, energy-machines, and desiring-machines). However, these machines connect that individual-as-assemblage to the world so that the individual is one more flux of machineries connected to an even greater flux of machineries that reconstitute how exactly the world functions. As a result, this subject has ". . . no fixed identity, [is] forever decentered, [and is] *defined* by the states through which it passes" (Deleuze and Guattari, 1972/1983, p. 20, emphasis in original). These states are determined,

[17] In doing so, he continues Heidegger's initial articulation of a non-instrumental conceptualization of technologies and technological practices. Refer to Coonfield (2006) for the elaboration of this connection between Deleuze's bodily machines and Heidegger's technological practices.

in turn, by the flows and productions of desire by desiring machines, which the individual passes through.

Once again, this contrasts with Heidegger's depiction of *Dasein* as playing a central role in revealing the world, as having localized emotions emerging from its own-most consciousness, and determining its own singular being in a continuous and always coherent manner. Yet, these two theorists are not so far apart. Rather, shared between Heidegger's *Dasein* and Deleuze's fragmented and desirous individuals are the intensities of affect, movement, and technologies. While affects emerged from the call of one's conscience in Heidegger, we can now see affects moving through and even pushing the fragmented individual further forward into newer and newer emergences. Again, there arises the shared image of the individual moving further forward in the world, but with Deleuze this individual is in flux and constantly emerging into newer formations and assemblages. And instead of technologies revealing or concealing the world, they are part and parcel of the world and the individual.

While individuals-as-assemblages are always on the move, there is still stability that occurs. This stability arises in the double captures of becoming, which is the conceptual frame that underpins Deleuze's arguments about flowing multiplicities in the midst of convergence and movement. In becoming there is stability but this stability is akin to the coupling of a wasp with an orchid flower. As Deleuze tells Parnet (1977/2006),

> Becomings are not phenomena of imitation or assimilation, but of a double capture, or non-parallel evolution, of nuptials between two reigns . . . . The wasp and the orchid provide the example. The orchid seems to form a wasp image, but in fact there is a wasp-becoming of the orchid, an orchid-becoming of the wasp, a double capture since 'what' each becomes changes no less than 'that which' becomes. The wasp becomes part of the orchid's reproductive apparatus at the same time as the orchid becomes the sexual organ of the wasp. One and the same becoming, a single bloc of becoming. (2)

In this depiction of investment there is neither the wasp nor the orchid; rather, there is the wasp that is becoming-orchid and an orchid that is becoming-wasp. One figure neither precedes nor proceeds the other but they are, rather, an assembled image of singularity emerging from the conjunctural swaps between these two figures. This site of exchange dashes the binary of either self/or world because the individual is complexly intertwined with the world and is constantly re-emerging into it as an 'in-between' site of flux, rather than an absolute subject fixed outside of specific times and spaces. From this overview of Deleuze it can be ascertained that individuals are constituted of various bodily machines and are, furthermore, determined from outside by grander forces in a manner that resembles the passing of a day or the sweep of fog over a town. This is the individual-as-*haecceity*.

This is not an exit: Shifting towards a conjunctural Heidegger-Deleuze

From this short review and initial juxtaposition of Heidegger and Deleuze we have noticed that there are incredible complexities that arise from the tenet of affect, as well as the individual that is in the midst of technological networks and cinematic re-presentation. From the challenges purported by Deleuze it may seem that to even continue with such a figure as the self is erroneous, but we counter that the idea and centrality of the self abounds nonetheless. This is so in the study of cinema, in which the centrality of filmic protagonists continues to be points of identification for film viewers. Meanwhile, the self also abounds, as we discussed in the first chapter, in how communication is largely theorized today. Therefore, it seems problematic to completely disregard the self. For one, we cannot so easily dismiss the pleasures that come about from having a consistent and stable identity. It is nice to have a sense of self and to feel like there is a consistent trajectory in one's life that is connected with what one feels they are. Indeed, the passions of the individual should not be rejected wholesale for the destabilized ideal of the pre-personal. Yet we do not subscribe to

those arguments that underpin more classic articulations of the self, which are predicated in fears of mass society diluting the individual. Therefore, we contend that the self cannot be completely abandoned but, at the same time, those more negligible facets should not be uncritically reiterated and reapplied. Consequently, in this thesis Heidegger's *Dasein* will be coordinated with Deleuze's pre-personal intensities. In doing so, could it be that we are now ready for *Dasein* as a practice based entity in the midst of becoming? Can we re-articulate an assembled and desiring self that lies outside of the meta-narrative of being? We will try to in this thesis and as a means to achieve this goal the concept of becoming will be entered into and connected with the self by mapping out the subjective, affective, and temporal 'in-between' through the film *A History of Violence*. These 'in-between' moments are helpful entryways into becoming and this film, in turn, is a helpful entryway into those aforementioned discourses on affect, time, and becoming.

In pursuing this project it will be shown that, "like the orchid and the wasp, in other words, the self is composed of its encounters with difference" (Vivian, 2000, p. 308). This is especially relevant to the film *A History of Violence* because Tom Stall-Joey Cusack is an elusive and contradictory figure that is also caught in the midst of various differences that he appears to re-emerge from. It is important to note, however, that we are not aiming for resolution here: this is not a dialectical exercise whereby the contradictions that lie between Heidegger and Deleuze will be juggled and overcome so that we can arrive at a 'better' image of the self. Rather, we are aiming for unity-in-difference: indeed, an image of the self that is fully in the midst of these tensions between singularity and multiplicities that is without resolution. Such an argumentative outcome appears to not only be more in tune with the complexities of affect but also relates to the very manner in which the self has been discoursed about in an ever emerging and forever unresolved manner (de B'béri, 2008; Hall,

1992). But before we do this we will first outline the methodology that will enable us to build analytical bridges between this film and the discourses on affect, time, and becoming: Discourse analysis rooted in the complementary critical purviews of articulation and intermediality.

Chapter 3

Considering methodology: Analyzing discourse, articulation, and intermediality

By proceeding with this thesis through the critical position of discourse analysis, there is one particular assumption being put forth: Films are communicative instances that reside in – and, moreover, are connected to – complex contexts constituted of particular ideational elements, practices, and structures that have discursive significance. Therefore, in doing discourse analysis the dynamic nature of cinema as an assemblage interconnected with other discourses is emphasized over the conception of cinema as a static, complete, and self-contained object. With this shift in emphasis comes another conjuncture that moves us towards re-conceiving of cinema as, moreover, a process-oriented field of conceptual creativity that is always expanding in its contingent interrelation with other social and cultural practices. By extension, film analysis then becomes a matter of sifting through, highlighting, and reconnecting the surplus of discourses that constitute and circumscribe particular films. Such a project can help one to understand more exactly what is going on within and outside that film. Indeed, we are not concerned with asking 'what does this film mean?' but, rather, 'to what other texts, ideas, contexts, social structures, ideologies, etc. does this film relate to and interact with?' By posing this question, we contend that there is no lack of meaning that is to be filled in by finding out what *A History of Violence* truly means; rather, there are multiple intersecting discourses that we aim to highlight, explore, and re-articulate through this film. This will be done by parsing through key scenes contained in this film and using these scenes as a means to enter into those aforementioned issues of affect, time, and becoming.

While there are a variety of streams of discourse analysis that we could have chosen to capture this process of emergence,[18] we decided to engage with the analytic of discourse through two complementary critical lenses: articulation and intermediality. Articulation is a powerful critical purview that has been advanced in cultural studies (e.g. Hall 1980, 1985; Grossberg, 1986, 1992) that, at its most basic level, situates language and discourses into social structures. This is the step that Michel Foucault is argued to have failed to take in his own archaeological-cum-genealogical approach to analyzing discourses that Stuart Hall identified and modified in his own studies and theorizations of the complex interrelations of language and power.[19] However, we are not merely content to reiterate the discursive terms that are reproduced in this film. Rather, we also wish to mobilize this film and the discourses about affect, time, and the self that it re-presents as a means to re-articulate the communicative self as an affectively attuned and practice-based bodily site that is always in the midst of becoming-invested in the world, rather than essentially there and autonomously separable from it. As a means to ground this particular application of discourse we will situate discourse analysis informed by articulation within the critical lens of intermediality, which is a theoretical frame and emerging critical positionality mobilized to study media and communication.[20] Intermediality too emphasizes the complex ways in which texts coordinate with other texts and contexts but it is a more active re-conception of intertextuality that can be mobilized to advance new critical knowledge practices. This is because intermediality writers treat film as a medium that interconnects with other media. More exactly, in this

[18] A few varieties of discourse analysis include: Critical Discourse Analysis (e.g. Fairclough, 2003) and Social Discourse Analysis (e.g. Angenot, 2004).
[19] For a critique of Foucault refer to Hall, 1985. For a Foucaultian critique of Hall, refer to Chang, 1986. For an example of the application of Foucault for cultural studies purposes refer to Escobar, 1984/1985.
[20] Refer to the journal *Intermédialités* (http://www.intermedialites.ca) and the Centre for Research on Intermediality (http://cri.histart.umontreal.ca) out of the University of Montreal for more information about this emergent school of critical thought.

critical lens it is argued that cinema is socially contextualized, has political implications, is interrelated with particular modes of thinking, and is always in the midst of re-emergence and, indeed, becoming (Nelson, 2003, pp. xxi-xxiii). But the analytic of discourse will now be turned to as a means to begin outlining what exactly will be involved in this critical pursuit.

To begin, one of the earliest practitioners of discourse analysis was the linguistic philosopher J.L. Austin (1962/1975), who was more concerned with what exactly language *does*, rather than what it *means*. In his groundbreaking work *How to Do Things with Words*, Austin shifted linguistic analyses away from the purported truth values contained within any text, conversation, etc. and towards the very contexts those statements emanate from and are situated in. Whether outlining the nuances of what exactly is involved in articulating a performative utterance – whereby one says instead of does (Lect. VIII) – or analyzing the manner in which the articulation of language impacts effects onto the world (Lect. IX), Austin can be identified as a pivotal figure that shifted the analysis of language away from transcendental meanings and truths to situation-specific functions and practices. While those more exact and categorical aspects of his work are not so pressing for our own analytical purposes – for if they were, we would be doing speech act analysis rather than discourse – there are two especially pressing tenets from him that we wish to highlight.

Firstly, Austin (1962/1975) emphasized the significant role that contexts play in the formulation and communication of particular utterances and sentences (p. 139). When this aspect of his thought is kept in mind, it then becomes especially important to demarcate the exact context in which particular communicative instances occur. This critical focus on demarcation not only denies the proposal of universal truth claims but also denies absolute

and transcendental subjects of thought and utterances.[21] When this facet of communicative utterances are taken into account, it thereby becomes pressing to highlight the context that information is communicated from, rather than merely engaging with that communicative instant as an autonomous and self-contained instant residing above specific contexts and differences. In this thesis it will be emphasized that *A History of Violence* is neither an autonomous text, nor that those statements that are uttered in the movie are only located in this film. Rather, the statements circulate within and outside that text in particular contexts that must be highlighted.[22]

Secondly, Austin emphasised the representational quality of language. This facet is specifically engaged with in the concluding lecture of this book, in which Austin argues that speech acts do not mean anything in and of themselves but, rather, begin to mean something in their capacity to stand-in for ideas and objects that exist in the world (pp. 148-149). This position is mirrored in Stuart Hall's writings on representational ideology, in which the manoeuvrings of ideological apparatuses were considered to be in the midst of coming into effect through various linguistic means (Pillai, 1992, p. 229). Indeed, as Hall (1985) once posited: ". . . the social is never outside of the semiotic. Every social practice is constituted within the interplay of meaning and representation and can itself be represented" (p. 103). When Hall is connected with Austin the power that language has to stand-in for and put into effect specific plays of power and ideology that are occurring in the world becomes clearer; more exactly these two writers reveal to us the effective quality of language that is rooted in its representational capacities. This argumentative stream helps us engage, in turn, with the

[21] It is none too surprising that Jean-François Lyotard (1979/1984) picked up on the theories of Austin to eventually dismantle dominant narratives through the deconstructive methods of language games.
[22] The fact that we are turning to other texts as a means to ascertain these contexts is not a rhetorical flaw; rather, as Chang (1996) working with Derrida argues, "there is no context as such; there is no context-in-general because context dissolves itself, dissolving itself into an empty term, a signifier whose signified is nothing but its own self-dissolution . . . . To put it straightforwardly, context is just more text" (p. 199).

contextual quality of specific linguistic utterances, which have the ability to impart effects onto the world. This is pressing for us to emphasize because we do not want to produce a more 'truthful' reading of *A History of Violence*; rather, we wish to mobilize this film as a means to untangle the specific discourses that underpin the emergence of this cinematic object and, moreover, to argue that affect functions in a circuitous manner. Both goals demand pushing cinema's language-like structures to the foreground. Hence we will be re-emphasizing what Christian Metz (1974) also posited: "that the cinema is a language of reality – and that its specific nature is to transform the world into discourse, but so that its 'worldness' can be retained" (p. 143). This occurs through the very processes and practices of filmmaking, which integrates elements of the social world into the filmic object. One such result is that "fragments of reality" (Metz, 1974, p. 140) are reproduced and, thus, come to reconstitute specific films. But these fragments are not entirely predicated in that film; rather, there are loose overlaps between the film's representations of such signs and the very culture in which those signs circulate (Metz, 1974, p. 140).

Keeping in mind that cinema has discursive qualities that overlap with the social world, the writings and philosophy of Michel Foucault will now be turned to. Like Austin, Foucault too was not so much concerned with the truth or validity of particular utterances but the very context of such utterances. To be more exact, he was concerned with the type of power that was put into effect by the coordination of utterances and statements into discursive formations. Indeed, Foucault found that there are powerful discursive formations – such as madness, sexuality, and discipline – that are not only evident in the writings of particular time periods, but are also constituted of the statements, utterances, and discourses put forth by whoever has the power to form these discursive formations. Thus, the task for anyone pursuing the analysis of discourse is to situate themselves in the midst of these

statements, parse through them, and identify what goes in to the construction of that formation. Or as Macdonald (2003) posits,

> To make such an evaluation we need to weigh up the contested evidence, in the manner of contemporary historians, taking as wide a sample as possible. The search is less for a singular 'truth' than for the distilled wisdom achievable through an examination of multiple and contrasting discourses. (p. 18)

Interestingly enough, even though Foucault mobilized this critical methodology throughout his works, there was no exact operational method to his methodology (Deleuze, 1990/1995, p. 87). Rather, for him doing discourse analysis involved coordinating a number of statements into the network that they are identified as both reflecting and constructing as a means to ascertain what specific effects particular discourses have on the practices and techniques involved in knowing and constru(ct)ing the world. In doing so, he was looking to identify the rules that governed the construction and communication of discourses (Macdonald, 2003, p. 16) as well as the events that arose from such complex practices (Foucault, 1971/1972, p. 231).

With this shift from meanings to purposes, it can be argued that analyzing discourse is a more practice-based and contextual understanding of language wherein "even the *identity* of a statement depends on the use that is made of it" (Dreyfus and Rabinow, 1982, p. 55, emphasis in original). The usages of statements are, in turn, guided by the discursive and disciplinary procedures that contextualize particular utterances and statements; however, this procedure, or *dispositive,* is not prior to experiences. Rather, this procedure is always in the midst of emergence and is concurrently constituted of these very statements.[23] Thus for the Foucaultian discourse analyst, "what counts as the relevant contexts is itself determined by the system of serious statements in which a particular statement is being used" (Dreyfus and

[23] Refer to Foucault's (1971/1972) "Discourse on Language" for more details about who can and cannot control the circulation and management of discourses.

Rabinow, 1982, p. 58). In short, if one wishes to do discourse analysis through Foucaultian lenses, it becomes his or her aim to reveal particular discursive formations by identifying and reconstructing the connections between different discourses and mapping out the greater whole – or assemblage – that is made up of these multiple, heterogeneous parts. The way to demarcate this complex process is by looking at the ordering, exclusions, and rarity of the very discourses that circulate (Foucault, 1971/1972, p. 234). Yet there is a certain level of neutrality that is demanded for such a project. Part and parcel of this neutrality is the pressure that is imparted on the analyst to bracket off any sort of value or truth claims that he or she may feel towards what they are analyzing (Dreyfus and Rabinow, 1982, p. 49). More exactly, in this bracketing off one should not be concerned with the quality of the statement, the sensibility that underlies it, or even whether that statement is true or not. Instead, recurrent themes that are repeated, the manner in which discourses coordinate, and the power formations that are put into effect within particular discursive formations are those more pressing facets to be kept in focus. Indeed, as Foucault once argued:

> The analysis of statements, then, is a historical analysis, but one that avoids all interpretation: it does not question things said as to what they are hiding, what they were 'really' saying, in spite of themselves, the unspoken elements that they contain . . . but, on the contrary, it questions them as to their mode of existence, . . . what it means for them to have appeared when and where they did (as cited in Dreyfus and Rabinow, 1982, p. 51).

Therefore, pursuing the analysis of discourse is a predominantly social and historical project, whereby one situates particular statements into their respective context as a means to ascertain the sign-structures of particular epochs. Moreover, one is not as concerned with what could or even should be; rather, it is an issue of what exactly has happened, and may continue to be happening, within and outside those discourses that one has put forward into their analytical focus. Hence, ". . . an analysis of discourse starts its enquiry with an ear to

the texts themselves, and in a spirit of openness to the patterns that may emerge" (Macdonald, 2003, p. 2).

Yet, how does one proceed in analyzing discourse if they wish to break down the complex power relationalities that are constantly in the midst of reproduction? Moreover, how exactly do discourses connect with the social realm? Articulation is one particularly powerful concept that loosens up the relationalities of power that occur in the world (L. Grossberg, personal communication, July 4 & 5). To be more precise, articulation is an anti-essentialist purview that, "would have to start with the principle that nothing is guaranteed, that no correspondences are necessary, that no identity is intrinsic" (Grossberg, 1992, p. 53). To illustrate this non-essential re-construction of the social realm – and those various ideational, governing, and linguistic structures that are concomitant with the social realm – Hall draws out the image of a long-haul truck. More exactly, such a truck has a front cab that the driver sits in. There is also a trailer, which is not always necessarily connected to the truck, depending on a number of factors related to the particular situation that that driver finds him or herself in (Grossberg, 1986, p. 53). Much like the cab and the trailer aren't connected at all times, so too do particular meanings and ideological formations contained in practices of knowing not necessarily coordinate in all instances. Hence, for Hall (1985), "the question is not the unfolding of some inevitable law but rather the *linkages* which, although they can be made, need not necessarily be" (p. 96, emphasis in original).

With this loosening up of the structures of power in language that impact specific societies and cultures, that which is heterogeneous, contingent, and exterior is emphasized over that which is homogeneous, always already there, and immanent. Thus, such immediate and necessary narratives like the power of the State or the economic domination of the proletariat become problematic because such things are neither guaranteed nor inevitable.

Rather, one must re-engage with these ideas and practices and examine how they really occur in the world. This is accomplished by unpacking the complex network of relationalities and practices that play a formative role in such a thing as State power.[24] Articulation loosens up those once dominant ideologies and narratives without succumbing to the overt relativity and political lethargy of postmodernism. This is so because, as Hall posits to Grossberg (1986), articulation ". . . enables us to think how an ideology empowers people, enabling them to begin to make some sense or intelligibility of their historical situation, without reducing those forms of intelligibility to their socio-economic or class location or social position" (1986, p. 53).

Therefore, articulation is, as Grossberg (1992) has argued, "a continuous struggle to reposition practices within a shifting field of forces, to redefine the possibilities of life by redefining the field of relations – the context – within which a practice is located" (p. 54). Language and, more exactly, discourses produce meaning about these social structures and contexts of power, for language intertwines with the social realm and specific power apparatuses. Yet, the production of meaning and ideologies is just as malleable as the social world itself. The dynamism and interconnected quality of the social realm, media, and language is pushed further into the foreground of media studies in Hall's (1980) work on the cultural situated*ness* of communication activities. More specifically, in the essay "Encoding/Decoding" Hall writes that particular messages communicated in the media are 'produced' from particular institutional and ideological contexts (p. 129). This site of production is, furthermore, the site where "encoding" occurs, and it is constituted of particular social, institutional, and productive relations, as well as discursive and non-

[24] While they did not use this type of terminology, refer to Plateau 9 of Deleuze and Guattari (1980/1987) for such an analysis of the State.

discursive elements (pp. 128-130). In turn, Hall proposed that there are three hypothetical positions from which one could decode the various messages that are received. For instance, there are those that uncritically receive messages, others that are completely critical of messages, and others still that are somewhere in the midst of these two positions. In a later interview Hall (1994) elaborates that these positions are not fixed but that they, rather, indicate that communication is not transparent (p. 254). Slack (2003) later picked up on this point, arguing that the encoding/decoding model ". . . challenges the simple assertion of intrinsic identity by insisting that the components of the process (sender, receiver, message, meaning, etc.) are themselves articulations, without essential meanings or identities" (pp. 123-124). Thus, meanings arise in the connections between the different components that constitute the mediated transmission of that message. This is, in short, "communication as articulation" (Slack, 2006). And as Grossberg, Wartella, and Whitney (1998) argue:

> This process, at a broader level, implies that texts themselves have meaning only in relationship to the codes with which they are articulated or located, and hence, in relationship to the broader set of other texts that carry those codes with them. The meaning of a message depends on the ways these codes are linked or articulated to other codes in and through texts. Hence, meanings are always *intertextual.* (p. 139, emphasis in original)

However, just because communication practices and discourses are intertextual, this does not mean that meanings are relative and that there are never preferred meanings. Rather, particular meanings are rendered dominant through the practices of articulation as well. Hall (1980) highlights this tendency of articulation to code meanings into the production of particular media messages. More exactly, according to Hall the social world does not mean anything in and of itself but, rather, meanings arise through the intervention of codes. As he writes,

> Reality exists outside language, but it is constantly mediated by and through language . . . . Discursive 'knowledge' is the product not of the transparent

> representation of the 'real' in language but of the articulation of language on real relations and conditions. (p. 131)

In effect, preferred meanings are rendered dominant through naturalizing coding processes that gloss over the complex work of ideology (Hall, 1980, p. 132). This produces a situation whereby individuals come to think that meanings are naturally as they are. This is enabled by the socializing process of interpellation, wherein it is posited that each individual is installed into – and (re)produces knowledge and practices from – particular social and ideological contexts not of their own making (Grossberg, 1982, p. 96). Specifically, this installation is the work of ideology because, as Stuart Hall (1990) writes:

> Ideologies 'work' by constructing for their subjects (individual and collective) positions of identification and knowledge which allows them to 'utter' ideological truths as if they were their authentic authors. This is not because they emanate from our innermost, authentic and united experience, but because we find ourselves mirrored in the positions at the centre of the discourses from which the statements we formulate 'make sense' (p. 09).

While ideology is a powerful process that locates and positions social subjects into particular meaning-making contexts – while also naturalizing these highly unnatural conditions involved in the construction of meaning – it is neither all-powerful, nor essentially given. Instead, ideological processes and practices – much like the production of meaning, the social realm, communication codes, etc. – are constituted of distinct and diverse elements that are brought-together through the mechanisms of articulation (Hall, 1985; Grossberg, 1986). This lack of rigidity indicates that ideologies are neither unitary, nor absolute, as it has been indicated in more reductionist writings on ideology (e.g. Baudry, 1975/1992). Rather, ideologies are systems that operate as signifying chains constituted of diverse clusters of discourses, practices, and representations (Hall, 1985, p. 104). And while these systems exist in contradistinction to one another, they do not exist in isolation. Instead, they

are multiple, complementary, and contradictory, ostensibly reacting against, while also informing, one another.

From this review of the literature on articulation it can begin to be argued that the 'popular' and 'dominant' meanings that reoccur in particular communicative instances, which are interrelated with and produce the meanings intrinsic to specific social contexts, do not appear either by happenstance or haphazardly. Instead, it is through specific – yet heterogeneous – naturalizing ideological processes that particular meanings become 'preferred'. For our purposes, affect, time, and communicative selves can be re-considered as coded concepts represented in language that are further naturalized through select media representations that have discursive significance. Moreover, by turning to these media instances these codes can be unpacked and problematized by highlighting and disarticulating the complex field of meanings that circumscribe and reconstitute that media instant. By extension, the film *A History of Violence* can be mobilized as an entryway into those naturalizing discourses about the self. Moreover, doing discourse analysis of film through the theoretical purview of articulation enables one to engage with that this larger realm of meanings. This is so because *A History of Violence* can be reconsidered as a singular node in the cluster of ideologies that are articulated to, and re-articulate in turn, what it means to be and become a communicative self. However, one outstanding issue that remains is: How exactly do these linguistic and discursive processes interrelate with the passages of mediation? Such a question is pressing to ask because in media studies, articulation – as operationalized in the model of encoding/decoding – is still overtly linear. This limitation connects with the inability this model has to take into account the flowing and circuitous quality of media passages that are communicating with and against one another. Indeed, Hall (1994) later critiqued his encoding/decoding model because it ". . . lays reading

and the production of meaning side by side. It makes it lateral rather than a circuit" (p. 272). In turn, this flat linearity echoes the assumptions of transparent communication rooted in sending and receiving models that the encoding/decoding model originally set out to problematize (Grossberg, personal correspondence July 4 & 5). As a means to move further forward with the circuitous dimensions of mediated discourses we will shift to the critical positionality of intermediality.

Intermediality is a dynamic method and theory that enables one to ". . . build analytical bridges between the practices of cinema and the wider discursive articulations that link specific moments of the past with specific contexts of expression in the present" (de B'béri, 2006, p. 33). At the same time, intermediality has the capacity to produce ". . . innovative philosophical conceptuality and interactivity" (Oosterling, 2003, p. 30). This is so because one is not striving for origins, those ineffable first principles that are always *a priori* and too simplistic, but is rather attempting "to connect and produce new knowledge about an object of study, [rather than] justify the causality of that object" (de B'béri, 2006, p. 38). Indeed, intermediality takes the circuitous and flowing quality of media as a given and proceeds to take into account the complexity of how films circulate within the structures of feelings, ideologies, and discourses that are pressing in the social world. Taking into account the implosion of temporalities in the age of mediation, with intermediality one is enabled to jump across divergent temporalities, spacialities, codes, and practices in their analysis as a means to highlight and elucidate the significance of that particular object of focus in all its complexity and "in-betweeness" (de B'béri, 2006, p. 37). This is, indeed, a way to apply those analyses of power that underpin articulation but without losing the circuitous quality of media flows.

Notable applications of this methodology include Tolloff Nelson, who has produced a number of intriguing projects that span from his 2005 effort to coordinate the writings of philosophers like Martin Heidegger and Immanuel Kant with Atom Egoyan's film *Calendar* as a means to map out temporality unique to the diasporic experience, to his 2003 Ph.D. dissertation, wherein he used Tarovsky's 1975 film *The Mirror* to map out a philosophy of time and rhythm specific to the film medium. Another intriguing intermediality writer is Boulou Ebanda de B'béri (2006), who has worked within this critical school and revealed how exactly transgeographical representations of Africanicity flow in black cinema. In this complex book de B'béri references poets, writers, philosophers, and theorists in cultural studies and postcolonial studies and coordinates these writings with specific films to reveal the complex structures of affect and resistance in cinematic expressions of Africanicity. Meanwhile, Oosterling (2003) has pursued an ontological analysis of intermediality by mobilizing Heidegger's writings on *Dasein* and Deleuze's writings on difference, while Mariniello (2005) has mobilized the films of Wim Wenders to map out the complexities of (cinematic) memory.

In our case, with intermediality we will do the following: (1) Explore 'back' to Deleuze and Heidegger; (2) Look 'forward' to contemporary discourses about this film's articulation and re-articulation of identities; (3) Engage with interviews by Cronenberg, and even the writings of other scholars and film critics about this film and this filmmaker; and (4) Mobilize supplementary objects that tend to be underexplored in the study of film (e.g., movie posters, promotional shoots, still photos, DVD commentaries, etc.) as a means to support our efforts to map out the subjective, affective, and temporal 'in-between'. Yet by pursuing intermediality through the critical purview of articulation those most pressing and socially relevant aspects of this film's social and cultural rootedness can be sought. This will

help us to avoid overt relativism in our critical pursuit, which is predicated in building analytical and conceptual bridges between those aforementioned discourses and this film. Indeed, we will not be seeking any connections we can find but will, rather, re-articulate the self, which is a figure pressing to the study of communication, as an affectively attuned and practice-based bodily site that is always in the midst of becoming-invested within the world, rather than essentially there and autonomously separable from it and others.

Chapter 4

A cinema of mutation and transformations: Mapping out the 'in-between' in *A History of Violence*

It has been recognized in scholarly (e.g. Taubin, 2005; Shaviro, 2005; Beaty, 2008) and popular (e.g. Dargis, 2005; Travers, 2005; Ebert, 2005) writings alike that *A History of Violence* is a film that connects realistic, yet overtly grotesque, violence with action movie heroics and complex psychological issues. Indeed, this is a stunningly complex film that poses to the viewer numerous questions, tantamount among them being: Who exactly *is* Tom Stall? Moreover, what is it that makes an individual who they say they are? While Bart Beaty (2008) has recently proposed that Tom Stall is a mask put on by Joey Cusack that slips whenever he is in the midst of violence (pp. 110-111), this argument presupposes that there is such a thing as an essential and authentic self one could conceal and maintain. However, when the pre-personal intensities of affect are introduced, this essentialized conclusion becomes less than satisfactory.

In this chapter we will establish in a more exact manner why this essentialized conclusion is less than satisfactory. To do so, the writings on non-instrumental technologies, desiring machines, and affect, which were introduced in the second chapter, will be connected with, and re-explored through, the film *A History of Violence*. More precisely, we will start by establishing how Tom Stall begins the film as a more restrained and controlled individual that lacks intensity. In doing so Heidegger's writings on inauthentic 'they-selves' will be mobilized and connected to four specific scenes in the film in which Tom Stall appears to be restraining his past passions and intensities. Following this we will then move on to describe and analyze a few key scenes in which this blankness breaks and Tom becomes more intense. In these sections – i.e. sections two and three – it will be

demonstrated that Tom-Joey's violent affects are complex desiring machines that emerge from his own-most passions, while also overlapping with the violent intensities of others. The complexity of these intensities and their movements are useful because they indicate the manner in which affect occurs in a circuit that connects the pre-personal and the subjective. They also bring us further forward with the non-instrumental capacities of technologies argued for by Heidegger and indirectly continued by Deleuze (Coonfield, 2006). Third, and final, we will then establish how exactly these desires and intensities appear to 'bring-forth' and reveal other temporalities that are sheets of the present. We are especially intrigued by the layers of the present because this argument opens up new lines of critical investigation in the study of communication, whereby one can begin to look at how different temporalities communicate with one another in the now(s) that one invests their affective intensities in.

Throughout this chapter these three conclusions will often intersect. However, this does not take away from our analysis; rather, it indicates the manner in which affect and time are complexly intertwined and, indeed, in the midst of becoming. In moving from being to becoming the inauthentic/authentic binary advanced by Beaty can be dashed and we can, furthermore, map out the intensities of affect that are individuated and pre-personal. In doing so this thesis is a testing ground of sorts, in which we can explore the potential impact affect, time, and becoming can have on the study of communication. But before we get ahead of ourselves, it will first be established how exactly Tom exists in an overtly restrained manner, which takes up much of the first half of this film.

Being Tom Stall: Denied intensities in the restrained now(s)

When Tom Stall first appears in the film, he is introduced as a seemingly loving, compassionate, and soft-spoken man that is placed at the normative centre of the film. This process of 'fixing' comes about through the juxtaposition of two different scenes. More

specifically, his introduction in the film comes after – and appears to strongly contrast with – the film's opening sequence. This sequence is all menace and unease, in which an unbroken steady-camera shot depicts two unnamed men in the middle of nowhere checking out of a motel. The film opens with the screen completely black while the soundtrack is all shrill buzzing – a high noise that may be electrical wires or insects. The blackness quickly cuts to a medium shot of a dusty motel in what looks like the desert. Two men are leaving their motel room; they are dirty, dusty, and look mean. One is older (Leland) and the other is younger (Billy). Leland tells Billy that he is going to check them out and to bring the car up to the front to meet him. This man walks off camera into the elsewhere outside of the frame and the camera stays fixed on the young man in the car. He sighs, turns the car on, and drives the car forward for a few seconds and then hits the brakes and turns it off – he has arrived at where he needs to be.

When the other man comes back, he asks the younger man to go get them some water. The younger man sighs and moves out of the car and the camera begins to follow him into the motel. The shot has been unbroken so far but the edit occurs when the man enters into the motel. The camera waits on the other side of that door and now follows the younger man as he goes to the front desk. He rings the bell and the camera then pans up and reveals the bodies of two motel workers. It has been silent so far in the motel but upon this reveal, the music swells. There is a bloody handprint scraped along the front desk, a man in a chair with large blood stains spilling onto his shirt from gashes on his neck and face, and a dead cleaning lady propped against her cart. The young man passes by these figures as if they were invisible and their presence produces no affective response from him. He goes to the fridge, and grabs a soda pop. He then moves towards the water fountain. The camera spins around from him to the other side of the desk, where there is another dead person on the

ground lying facedown in a pool of blood (5:17). He begins to fill up the jug and in the midst of filling it he suddenly hears a small whimpering girl behind him: he turns around, crouches low, shushes her, pulls a gun from the waist of his pants, aims it at the girl, and pulls the trigger. The camera is focused in tight on the barrel of the gun as he pulls the trigger and we see and hear the gun go off. The sound of a young girl screaming then fills the soundtrack. The scream continues but this image then abruptly cuts to a new young girl who is the source of this screaming: this is Tom Stall's daughter, Sarah, who has just awoken from a nightmare about monsters. The viewer is then introduced to Tom Stall, who bounds into his daughter's room.

In stark contrast to this opening scene of violence, Tom appears to be the supreme vision of normalcy: the soft spoken, gentle, and loving father there to assuage Sarah's fears and comfort her from her nightmare. She is whimpering about shadow monsters and Tom softly tells her that, "there's no such thing as monsters". Compared to what we have just seen in the motel, this is an especially ironic comment. Stall is then followed by Jack and Edie and the three family members all sit around Sarah's bed and begin to gently reassure her that there are no such things as shadow monsters. In this scene Tom appears to be calm and at ease – indeed, he is there to assuage the anxieties of a young girl and, by extension, the audience, who has just witnessed the brutal and disturbing killing of a small child. Taken altogether, in this introductory scene Stall appears to be the film's comforting, heteronormative centre. This connection is set up through the manner in which he is depicted as existing in another realm that is in seemingly stark opposition to the marginal violence perpetrated by those two unidentified bad men at the motel. But as we will show more clearly below, these two regimes are actually intimately connected.

While it may appear that Tom is the heteronormative centre of both the film and this family there is something that appears to be slightly off about him. More specifically, he appears to be a largely blank individual whose face rarely reveals intensity. Stall's face is especially pressing to consider in our analysis of affect because, as Deleuze (1983/1986) posited in his first cinema book "affects, quality-powers can be grasped in two ways: either as actualised in a state of things, or as expressed by a face. . ." (p. 99). In this instant – as well as throughout the film – Tom's face expresses very little intensity.[25] In this particular scene there are few shots of Tom's face, for he is largely at either the back of the bed holding Sarah or appears at the sides of the screen in shadowy profile shots. More exactly, when Jack comes in the room Tom is sitting behind Sarah and his face drops down. When Jack begins to talk about how light scares away the shadow monsters, there is a medium shot of Jack, Tom, and Sarah but in this instant Tom's face is obscured by shadows and tilted downwards (6.54). The shading of Tom's face serves to distance the viewer from Tom and to produce, within the frames of Deleuze's writings on affect, a face in which intensity goes largely unexpressed.

At the same time, we can hear restraint in the tone that Stall uses when he is talking to his daughter, for he tries to calm his daughter by telling her there are no monsters. The words he says to his daughter sound right, yet there is little passion in the words that he says. This restrained intensity is evident in the hushed tone and clipped words that Tom uses when talking. He says few words to Sarah – asides from merely repeating that there are no shadow monsters – throughout this scene and remains mainly at the back of the bed and by extension the shot. Comparably, it is Tom's youngest son Jack that most fully engages with Sarah in his effort to comfort her, for he is the one that suggests getting her a nightlight to ward off

[25] Refer to Appendix B, Figures B.1 – B.3 for still images that indicate this restrained blankness.

the shadow monsters. In this instant Jack offers a suggestion about how to actually help the young girl feel better. This contrasts with Tom, who merely keeps on repeating to her and his family in a soft and impractical way that there are no shadow monsters. At this early stage of the film Tom appears to be an individual that is restrained and lacking in intensity. This is evident in his largely inexpressive face, the hushed and passive tone of his words and actions, as well as the numerous shadings of his face that transpire in this short scene. These qualities have the effect of limiting the viewer's ability to either invest in Stall or to see intensity in him.

This night-time scene then cuts to a static shot of the Stall family mailbox; it is now the daytime and the Stall family are around the breakfast table. Specifically, Tom is sitting at the kitchen table with Jack and Sarah while Edie is just leaving the kitchen. The camera frames a medium long-shot of the three of them eating. It then focuses in tightly on Tom, who picks up a cereal box and tries to pour his son a bowl of cereal. The son rejects this offer and grabs the cereal away from him. Tom then asks him what is in store for the day and Jack tells him that he has a math test and will be playing baseball in gym class so that all he really has to look forward to is "sucking in right field." Tom offers him the somewhat generic advice about how to catch the ball – "Remember don't let the hitter get the ball over your head" – but Jack bluntly counters and dismisses this advice by telling him, "Unless it's out of the park". From this brief exchange between son and father we can see that Tom has a strained relationship with his son. While one could counter that this strained exchange is indicative of his son attempting to strike out on his own and become an independent man – as Beaty (2008) has suggested elsewhere (p. 44) – such a suggestion becomes problematic when taken with the other actions presented onscreen. Between the restraint Tom show to his daughter in the aforementioned scene and the somewhat contrived and ineffective manner he

talks to his son in this scene, it can be suggested that Stall is, perhaps, performing his duties as father and is somewhat distanced from this performance.

While this restraint is evident throughout Tom's opening scenes with his children it can also be ascertained more clearly in two subsequent scenes Tom shares with Edie. The first scene comes directly after this breakfast scene and it depicts Edie driving Tom to work. Specifically, the scene begins with a moving reverse shot of the Stall's car as it passes through the lush greenery of the Millbrook countryside. The sun is out, the road is winding, the landscape is full of plush green trees, and the music swells. This reverse shot then moves to the front of the car and the car then pulls off the road and is parked. The shot cuts to a tight two-person shot of Edie and Tom sitting in the car. Edie is in the driver's seat and Tom is in the passenger's seat. They begin to talk about what they should do for the night and Tom suggests going to the drive-in theatre so that they can make out. Edie then counters that there has not been a drive-in in Millbrook since the 1970s. She then begins to talk about how she wishes they had known each-other when they were teenagers. Edie's face is full of a wide range of emotions in this scene – moving in between wistful longing, nostalgia for another time, and even a hint of sadness – as she stares intensely at Tom. Conversely, Tom is distantly scattered, looking as much out the car's window behind Edie as much as he looks at Edie. Interestingly enough, the image of Tom sitting in the passenger seat being driven by his wife subverts his position as the heteronormative centre of this film, even before the extreme violence and sex that transpires later on. Indeed, Tom reclined in the passenger seat is a fantastic image that distils the restrained passivity that has been depicted so far. This image also indicates that Edie not only holds much of the power and responsibility in their household but that Tom is, moreover, a passenger in his own life. While nothing much is happening in this scene, it does become clearer that Tom is a restrained individual that is

passively filling in the roles he performs as husband and father. In all three of these instances examined so far Tom Stall appears to be barely there to the people that love him: a somewhat absent father and husband that appears to love them, engages with them, and almost says the right things but who is not exactly there.[26]

Another scene shared by Tom and Edie indicates more fully the passive and barely-there presence of Tom. When Edie picks up Tom from work she drives him home and tells him that the kids are gone for the night. Edie and Tom then go into their bedroom at home and Edie goes into the bathroom. We hear her in the bathroom off-screen, while the camera is focussed tightly on Tom as he begins to strip in preparation for her. He sits on the bed and his body fills the frame. He then tells her to hurry up and she responds by telling him to keep his shirt on: this is a humorous exchange because Tom is already in the midst of taking it off. The sound of a door opening then fills the soundtrack and the camera is still focussed tight on Tom, but his jaw drops. The shot cuts to Edie from Tom's purview and she is standing in the doorway wearing a cheerleader's uniform. She tells him to be quiet because her parents are sleeping in the next room and then performs a brief cheer before jumping onto him. She is laughing and passionate throughout these moments of sexual role-play while Tom is, once again, lacking in intensity. That is not to say that he is a robot in this scene: rather, Tom playfully teases Edie in a coy manner and engages in a bit of flirtatious fun, but there is still something about him in this scene that appears to be overtly controlled. Indeed, while smiles play across his face as him and his wife begin to fool around there is still a tangible passionless restraint within Tom: he appears to be tightly coiled and distanced. This is further evident in the very manner that Edie is the one that is initiating sex with Tom. This passivity

[26] Shaviro (2005) highlights this blankness in his own blog post about the film, in which he contends that, "as Tom, Mortensen is simply too blank to 'identify' with . . . "

indicates once again that Tom is a passenger in his life, but in this instant he is a passenger in their sexual relationship.

Tom's restrained awkwardness can be ascertained more clearly in this scene because his performance as the cheerleader's boyfriend resembles the same sort of intensity that Tom also projects as husband and father. Indeed, Tom is just as awkward as the high-school boyfriend as when he is the loving father to Sarah and Jack, or as Edie's concerned husband that is trying to plan a date night with his wife. This contrasts greatly with Edie, who is playing and performing a multiplicity of roles in this scene that she is passionately connected with. More exactly, while rolling around on the bed Tom asks Edie "What happened to my wife?" to which Edie retorts that, "there are no wives in here Mister". This exchange indicates that Edie is reflexively and passionately becoming from – and amidst – the multiple roles that are connected with her present and past in Millbrook. More exactly, Edie appears to be performing a memory of her high-school experiences, which is not only from her past but is also intimately rooted in the present passion she expressed to Tom about knowing him in high school. At the same time, she is also the role-playing lover in the present. This intimates a circuitous interconnection of Edie's past and present that is expressed in Edie's passionate investment in the now(s) of their lovemaking. Evident in Edie's passions are, "the more or less broad, always relative, circuits between the present and the past, [which] refer back, on the one hand, to a small internal circuit between a present and *its own* past . . ." (Deleuze, 1985/1989, p. 80, emphasis in original). There is, indeed, a complex, inter-referential intersection of past and present for Edie that interconnect with her passionate intensities in the now(s) of her sex with Tom. Conversely, Tom is awkwardly blank and in the now(s) as he attempts to perform a past that he does not know in a restrained present that lacks intensity. As much is evident when he begins to go down on Edie and she counters that,

"there wasn't too much of that in high school". He is disrupting her past-present circuit with more 'adult' referents and actions that break up her temporally complex moment and brings her into the now(s) with him.[27]

It can be argued that both Edie and Tom have multiplicities within but there are disconnections between Tom's multiplicities that arise from his effort to restrain and control his past passions and desires. This contrasts strongly with Edie, who is affectively attuned and passionate in her multiplicitous becoming(s)-with the world. At this time we want to mobilize Heidegger's writings on being a 'they-self' as a means to illustrate more fully the awkwardness of existing in a pre-conceived social role. This is pressing to argue because it is a predominant modernist anxiety that has also been identified as playing a central role in Cronenberg's films. As Grünberg (2006) explains:

> If any character is central to the cinema of David Cronenberg, it is the man of the crowd . . . which is to say the very figure of modern man: he no longer belongs to a people, a tribe or a clan. Has he even come from a nuclear family? One cannot say for sure. He lives in the kind of absolute solitude that is possible in the vast cities of North America and Europe, and he does not define himself by his work. . . . The universe into which he plunges himself, often with delectation, strips him of all individuality until he attains the nervous twitch of the cipher. (p. 8).

Hence, we can see the re-articulation of a figure that is common in modern thought and in Cronenberg's films: The outsider as mundane resident of the social world that uneasily fits into pre-designated social roles.

Heidegger (1927/1962) argued that one falls into specific social roles from the very moment that one begins to exist alongside – i.e. is "dispersed" amongst – the 'they' (p. 167). More exactly, in one's "being-with" [*Mitsein*] others, the uniqueness of that individuated

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[27] It is also intriguing that this mono-temporal quality of Tom is intimated in his last name Stall, which indicates a stoppage or a complete absence of movement. Much like his last name, Tom too appears to be a stunted figure that is moving neither forward nor back. His very name is another clear indicator of his stunted, or stall*ed*, presence in the now(s).

Dasein – and, moreover, "all possibilities of being" (p. 165) – is levelled down (Heidegger, 1927/1962, pp. 163-165). This levelling down produces "averageness" (Heidegger, 1927/1962, p. 164) in each individual rooted in their tendency to define who they are against what they perceive others to be. As a result, one is always alongside and absorbed in the social world that is comprised of other individuals (pp. 163-164). This is largely the way things go in mass society but it is still problematic because, "in its Being-with towards Others [*Dasein*] is not itself" (p. 163). This is so because a 'they-self' largely lives as others do, for a 'they-self' has the tendency to be concerned with all those things in the world that everyone else is concerned with. These concerns do not just distract *Dasein*; rather, they actually obscure one's chances to achieve a more authentic understanding of their own being (p. 167). Therefore, an inauthentic 'they-self' is a largely uncritical individual that is content in its existence in the social world, which is comprised of external roles and values that the individual falls into and reproduces. Interestingly enough, an inauthentic 'they-self' is not actively pursued, nor is it chosen; rather, ". . . *Dasein* makes no choices, gets carried along by the nobody [sic], and thus ensnares itself in inauthenticity" (Heidegger, 1927/1962, p. 312).

Yet, being a 'they-self' is not a completely passive existence; rather, Heidegger (1927/1962) posits that "Being-with-one-another . . . is an intent, ambiguous watching of one another, a secret and reciprocal listening-in" (p. 219). By extension, one listens to and appropriates from the others that they exist alongside, which culminates in *Dasein* being absorbed and fallen into the world of the 'they'. From Heidegger we can begin to see that one actively constructs and appropriates notions of selfhood from the immediate context they reside in. When this argument is re-coordinated with this sequence, it can be suggested that both Edie and Tom are going through this process, but each invests in the world and,

moreover, this process in a different way. Indeed, the identities of Tom and Edie come from specific social roles and types provided from the very town they reside in and the people they know. The difference between them is that Edie is attuned with these roles while, conversely, Tom is distanced from these roles. While identifying within the social world is a complex process predicated on appropriating from what one knows and gleans from others, this sequence helps us to see the mechanisms that underpin this process, for Tom is distanced from being fully immersed in this process. It must be pointed out, however, that Tom is a much more intriguing figure than Grünberg's twitching cipher because he is attempting to appropriate this 'average' identity as a means to conceal his more undesirable and transgressive gangster identity. So rather than being oppressed by some grander force of the ideological or existential *status quo*, which is an anxiety evident in Heidegger's writings on being a 'they-self', Stall is actively seeking out this *status quo* as a means to maintain a modicum of normalcy and to, moreover, evade the dangerous advances of his former mafia brethren. But in the midst of attempting to appropriate this average life Stall appears to be the 'wrong man' in the very life that he leads. This distance can help us to see both the limitations in, and relevance of, Heidegger's arguments about being a 'they-self' in action. Throughout the instances that have just been highlighted, the social roles Tom inhabits and appropriates are connected to – and emanate from –the peacefully tranquil small town of Millbrook Indiana. Yet there is a gap between Tom and Millbrook, for his passion and desire resides elsewhere.

However, it is important to note that time also played a significant role when Heidegger wrote about being a 'they-self'. Specifically, when time is introduced into issues pertaining to being, a 'they-self's' existence no longer becomes an issue of merely being with and like others; rather, the future (i.e. what exactly they are 'being-towards') and past

(i.e. what they have been) become relevant focal points. This is especially so because in one's everyday existence they are not privy to knowing and feeling that death is the ultimate reality that frames their life,[28] and that they are, at the same time, part and parcel of a cultural-national historical heritage that predates and envelops each individual.[29] In moving towards authenticity, one takes up these cues and incorporates them in their everyday life and begins to live in a united past, present, and future. From these writings about one's propensity to live in the everyday in a fragmented, yet ever-emerging series of now(s), we can begin to see that, at another level, Tom's lack of intensity corresponds with his effort to live in Millbrook in an ever-emerging present that lacks past referents and future directionalities. This is so whether he tries and fails to play 'high school' with Edie, or with the manner in which he denies those past passions that constituted his Joey Cusack identity. But it is important that this does not come through neglect; rather, Tom is trying to control and bracket off those different temporalities – and concomitant intensities – he does not want to associate with anymore. Indeed, Tom is trying to control himself by denying his past passions; however, this film problematizes such an effort in that it indicates that time and those concomitant intensities are not so singular and easily controllable. This is because such intensities are always in the midst of coming from spaces outside of the self. This is evident in a revealing instant in the early act of this film that does not advance the film's narrative but is, rather, a punctuated moment that reveals the games of time and concomitant intensities that Tom has a stake in. This brief scene takes place in Tom's diner before the previously analyzed sex scene.

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[28] This is more fully explained in Section 2, Chapter 2 of *Being and Time*.
[29] This is more fully explained in Section 2, Chapter 5 of *Being and Time*.

Tom enters into his diner and behind him you can see printed backwards the name of his diner: Stall's Diner. There is a customer sitting at the booth that is finishing his breakfast and a chef named Mick that is cleaning the grill and Tom has walked into the midst of a conversation that has them both laughing uproariously. The customer turns to Tom and asks him, "Who is the craziest woman you've ever dated?" Tom has no answer that he wishes to share and shifts the question on to Mick the cook. Mick answers that he used to date a woman that constantly woke up in the middle of the night thinking he was a demented killer (10:11). One time, she even stabbed him in the shoulder with a fork. Tom and the customer laugh incredulously at this absurd revelation and Tom asks Mick how long it was before he dumped her. Mick laughs this off and tells him that he married her and they were together for six years. Tom chuckles and incredulously exclaims "Jesus Christ," to which Mick defensively counters that, "Nobody's perfect".

In this scene we see the predominant themes of this film – time, duplicitous identities, and the dreams (and dramas) that divide and unite people – but in an extremely truncated and random manner. There are laughs to be had at the absurd exchanges here but there is also something very disconcerting and unsettling in this exchange, for we can begin to see the way that intensities and desires that have been denied in one individual can still, nonetheless, rise up elsewhere and impact on the now(s). Indeed, Tom-Joey's central drama about his past violence and identity is mirrored in the delirious nightmares and fears of the cook's former wife. In effect, this random incident indicates that the violent intensities Stall is trying to bracket off and deny cannot be completely bracketed off, for they are not only contained within but occur outside as well. The circuitous quality of affective investments and desires will now be turned to. In doing so, the sheets of the present that underpin these investments

will also be pushed further into the foreground and we will continue to move from being to becoming.

Internal and external technologies: 'Bringing-forth' repressed desires and the temporal elsewhere

While the aforementioned diner scene foreshadows the temporal and affective 'in-between', the circuits of time and affect become clearer after these sequences. But before we can move forward we must move back to the opening sequence, which juxtaposes the motel killers with Sarah Stall's nightmare. This sequence is pressing to revisit because in it we can see the setting up of those past intensities that will become revealed and invested in the present. This investment, in turn, triggers Tom Stall to become Tom Stall-Joey Cusack.

More specifically, the motel killers reside in a different time and place that is unknown and unnamed: it could be past, present, or future. All that is certain is that these two men exist in a temporal and spatial elsewhere that swaps night-time for daylight, and familial love for coldblooded killing. Yet, this temporal and spatial elsewhere is being brought-forth by Sarah into the now of the Stall household. Thus, at one level this opening sequence depicts the manner in which specific intensities connected to particular times and spaces can unfold (i.e. be brought-forth) into the present. Much like, ". . . the bursting of a blossom into bloom, in itself (*en huautōi*)" (Heidegger, 1954/1993, p. 317), in this case, violent affects that exist elsewhere are being brought-forth into the now(s) of the Stall household through the figure of Sarah Stall. In this instant, Sarah is the non-instrumental medium that reveals the denied intensities and desires that underpin the now(s). It is not so much that Sarah is dreaming of these men, but with the edit – which connects the motel killers to the Stall family – the fears of a child being killed connect with the fearful screams

of Sarah. There is interconnection through fear. In turn, the motel men are violent others that mirror Tom's own intensities, which are being restrained in the now(s).

In this sequence Deleuze's writings on time and Heidegger's arguments about revelation interconnect in an intriguing manner. More specifically, Deleuze posited that the past co-exists with the present (Lampert, 2006, p. 31) and the future puts the past, present, and future into communication with one another (Lampert, 2006, p. 66). Such a depiction of time is evident in this scene but the catch is that these layers are not self-evident. Rather, these layers of the now(s) are in the midst of becoming revealed by Sarah Stall, who is 'bringing-forth' and revealing the complex circuits of time and concomitant desires that underpin the now(s) of the Stall household. When these arguments from Heidegger and Deleuze are coordinated with this specific sequence it can be proposed that different temporalities do not only co-exist with the present but specific intensities can reveal the various layers that underpin the present. With this, we can see that the violent others displaced in time, space, and place are, nonetheless, intimately connected to the fears and desires of the Stall family. Moreover, these violent others have much to reveal about the mechanisms of desire that underpin this familial unit. This sequence is not only an early bridging of temporalities that is unbeknownst to Tom Stall but it also indicates the pre-personal quality of violent intensities. Yet, at this early stage of the film things are still quite fragmented and disjointed, for Cronenberg is still setting up the pieces that will play a pivotal role in the film. Indeed, these two sets of intensities and temporalities are still displaced from one another and it will be another fifteen minutes until these two bad men appear again. And when these two regions cross the second time, the motel killers literally crash into the now(s) of Millbrook by almost getting into a car accident with Bobby, the teenage bully that torments Jack.

After they are almost hit by the truck being driven by Bobby the scene cuts to a tight two-person shot of the men in the truck. The framing echoes the framing of Tom and Edie's earlier drive into Millbrook. Leland is driving and Billy is sitting in the passenger seat and Billy begins to complain about all the small towns they pass through and how broke they are. Leland interjects that he knows how to fix this and there is then an abrupt cut to the interior of Stall's diner. Tom, Mick, a blonde server named Charlotte, and a young teenage couple on a date are all in the diner. An older man is getting up and leaving and he tells everyone that he will see them in Church tomorrow. As the man exits the two bad men come in through the same door and sit down. Tom looks them up and down and tells them that they are closed for the evening but Leland and Billy order coffee and a lemon meringue pie anyways. Tom tells him that he cannot get them their order because the diner is closing but the older man repeats his request for coffee, this time angrily yelling at Tom. His yell is hoarse and abrupt and it becomes evident that something is definitely wrong here. Tom tells Charlotte to leave but the older one is now beginning a violent stick-up. Billy stops Charlotte in a threatening manner and Tom tries to calm this situation down. In this scene Tom is quiet, meek, and insistent that they solve this without anyone getting hurt. The older one ignores this and instead tells Billy that they should, "show this asshole we mean business". He then pulls out a gun and aims it at Tom. Tom then jumps into action.

Throughout this exchange between the two motel killers Tom has been holding a coffee pot and he now smashes the coffee pot into the older man's face. This man crashes to the ground, drops his gun, and begins to scream. The young one aims his gun at Tom and shoots but Tom is already over the counter and grabbing the gun that the other man has dropped. Tom pivots around and shoots the young man through the chest a couple of times and the bullet blows push him out the door. The man on the ground stabs Tom in the foot;

Tom screams in pain, whips around, hesitates for a moment, and then shoots him point-blank in the head. He then grimaces and looks ambivalently at the gun. There is a quick variety of emotions that play across his face: satisfaction, anger, surprise, and even familiarity. This is also the second moment in the film that Tom has shown any intensity; the first came a few seconds before when he was stabbed in the foot and he screamed in pain. The people in the diner look incredulously at Tom and Tom looks remorseful, in pain, and a bit scared (Appendix C, Figure C.1). These intensities play across his face as it, perhaps, becomes apparent to him that life, as he has known it as Tom, is now coming to an end. Indeed, his bracketed off past, which has co-existed with him in the present but in a repressed and controlled manner we have already highlighted has now been revealed and reproduced in this present moment. At the same time, Tom has begun to re-embrace the violent intensities that are part and parcel of his Joey Cusack past that he has been heretofore denying.

This is the first instant where Tom Stall becomes the more intense Tom-Joey. But rather than a mask slipping in this scene – which is an image predicated on a façade that transpires solely in the now(s) and on top of an essential core – this instant appears to demonstrate a larger process of temporal abridgement and affective intensities that triggers Tom Stall to take up his past and present and become the more conjunctural Tom-Joey. This is so because Tom's past intensities flare up and are put into effect in the now(s) of this diner scene. Yet this revelation of past intensities was not solely interior; rather, it came into effect through his encounter with external differences that concurrently elicit and feedback into the intensities that come from within. This indicates that Tom-Joey not only needs another to articulate himself, but that the intensities of violence occur in a communicative circuit, whereby Tom-Joey is in the midst of internal and external passions that feedback into one another. This echoes what Massumi (2002) has written about the intensities of playing soccer

with a team; indeed, in the midst of game play, "the body figures not as an object, one substantial element among others, but as a part-object, a conversion channel, a transducer . . ." (p. 75). In this instant, Tom-Joey is a bodily transducer that is concurrently unfolding and folding-in the intensities that he is a part of. Yet this feedback is not so linear and straightforward; rather, it is within and outside of Stall, connecting Tom to his past, to the multiplicities within, and to the motel killers. This complex process of intensities mirrors a network in which Tom-Joey is in the midst of these multiple interlocking movements: indeed, Tom-Joey is a boundary moment caught 'in-between' these interlocking rhythms of external and internal movements of intensity. The complexity of the movements in this scene indicates that, "the self is only a threshold, a door, a becoming between two multiplicities" (Deleuze and Guattari, 1980/1987, p. 249). In this instant those multiplicities are affective and temporal; they also transverse the internal and external and, indeed, the subjective and pre-personal.

While this scene sets in motion the 'bringing-forth' of Tom's gangster past and the pre-personal intensities of violence that function in a circuitous manner, there is another subtler circuit of time transpiring in this scene. More exactly, when Tom tries to talk down the motel men to stop them from their violence, this scene mirrors an earlier scene between his son Jack and his bully. In this scene Bobby tries to start a fight with Jack that is spurred from Jack actually catching the ball in his baseball game and winning the game. He hurls abusive insults at Jack but Jack uses his humour and quick wit, which arise out of his fear of a violent encounter, to parrot those insults back at Bobby. This has the effect of stemming Bobby's aggression and Jack escapes from a violent confrontation. Tom's effort to stop the motel men echoes this scene with Jack, but he lacks the words and fear to actually stop the violence. While he does not produce his desired outcome there is still, nonetheless, an

intimate connection of father and son in these two scenes and, moreover, another time circuit that reveals the layers of the now(s) that are quickly slipping into the past. Indeed, Jack's passivity reappears in Tom's hesitant restraint in the diner, which reveals the affective loop that transpires between Tom and Jack as well. Could there be multiple sheets of time in this present in Millbrook that Tom is disconnected from knowing and feeling because he is too caught up in restraining his desires and playing a role that he does not feel? Moreover, is Jack intimately connected with the dispositions and intensities of his father? Both answers seem likely, for we can recognize in the juxtaposition of these scenes an unspoken bond between Tom and Jack that reveals their circuitous interconnection. This father-son circuit is clearer in future scenes where Jack becomes violent like his father and will be turned to shortly.

So far Sarah Stall's mediating role has been highlighted and, more exactly, how she 'brings-forth' and reveals different temporalities and intensities that underpin the now(s). This indicates the complexity of affective circuits, as well as the very ways that these intensities can reveal other timelines that underpin the present. This echoes Heidegger's writings on the non-instrumental essence of technology but there are another set of scenes that also demonstrate these writings in a clearer manner. These scenes deal with the subsequent mediated representation of Tom's diner fight, which concurrently conceals and reveals who he has been, is, and will become.

Specifically, following the diner fight Tom is set up and re-presented as a small-town hero-object who saved the lives of those individuals that would have been killed by these two violent criminals. The viewer is invited to share in this victory because they are affectively attuned to the rhythms and actions of this scene's central violent confrontation, which guides

one to identity with Tom.[30] Thus he does not appear to be a conflicted and dangerous man that is duplicitously concealing his past identity but is, rather, an objectified symbol of small town goodness and justice. This association is established when local news media outlets catch wind of this story of Stall, the small town hero. Specifically, after his confrontation with the two men, we then catch up with Tom Stall, who is now recovering in a hospital. This scene begins with a close-up shot of a television and on that screen is an image of the Stall's diner sign. The reporters have descended onto the Millbrook and this story has gone big. The first story has Mick the diner cook in it and he is telling a reporter that Tom's a hero. The camera focussed on the television screen pulls back and we see Tom's in a hospital bed watching TV. He flips the channel and another news story picks up, with a reporter telling that these men were wanted criminals and that Tom is "a family man with longstanding ties to this community" (25:13). Tom changes the channel and another story begins; the dialogue goes: "Tom Stall was just another hard-working small business owner and operator in Millbrook, Indiana, but now" and then Tom changes the channel (25:22). Another story begins but another co-worker, Charlotte, is now talking about how "Tom was amazing . . ." Tom then shuts off the TV.

This is an extremely reflexive moment in which the viewer is watching the setting up of Tom as an 'average' hero through the cameras that lie before the camera of the cinematic apparatus; thus, one is privy to seeing the mediated construction of a hero fighting for small town values against the values of others. The hook of these various news stories is that Tom Stall is an 'average' small town hero. Tom is reluctant about this coverage, which is most

[30] As Taubin (2005) notes: "I've seen the film four times, and at each screening I felt the audience change in these scenes, coming together like one mesmerized body" (p. 26).

clearly articulated when he arrives home from the hospital and is asked questions by a reporter. The exchange goes like this:

> Reporter: "Were you surprised by your own reaction to the situation?"
> Tom: "Um . . . what I did was . . . I mean, anybody would have done that. It was just . . . It was a terrible thing. I think we'll all be better off once we get past it."
> Reporter: "Yeah, but you really went beyond what the average-"
> Tom (interrupting): I – I need to – I really need to be with my family. Thanks"
> Reporter: "I'm Jennie Wyatt in Millbrook and that was Tom Stall – American hero, man of few words" (27:41).

His dismissal and emphasis on saying that he merely did what anyone else would have done in this situation is quite ironic considering the level of action movie heroics – and, indeed, the mechanical efficiency of his violent movements – that he performs in killing these two men. He may wish that he is just like everyone else but in this diner confrontation scene that is far from the truth. This excerpt also indicates the limits of verbal communication because, in this instant, actions speak louder than words. Indeed, Tom's speech is elliptical and erratic as he stammers and stutters out an attempt to maintain his 'average' Tom Stall identity. His intentional self-communications of identity through verbal means are not as strong as the intensities of his violent actions, which reveal something that is contained within that has not been seen up until this point.

What is especially intriguing about these sequences is the role that the media plays in Stall's identity. Specifically, the news media pick up on this isolated instant in a diner and reconstruct his violent actions so that they tell the story of a hero saving the lives of those people. Yet this act of construction is, ultimately, a means towards revealing the complexity of Tom's identity. This is so because it 'brings-forth' Tom's past, firstly in the embodied form of Fogarty and his men[31] and then in the disembodied voice of his brother calling his

[31] As it was mentioned earlier, Craig Fogarty is a mafia man from Pennsylvania that was viciously attacked by Joey back when he was in the mob in Pittsburgh.

home late at night with threats. At the same time, these news stories actually conceal who Tom is, so that this blank and restrained small town guy that is barely there is re-presented as a morally right hero-object that is fighting for that which is heteronormative. This ambivalence in mediated representation echoes Heidegger's (1954/1993) contention that technologies become new spaces in which one's self can be revealed and concealed, often in concurrent movements. In this instant, these news stories and the various cameras set upon Tom dislocate and re-present Tom Stall to America, concealing and revealing who he is, will be, and is in the midst of becoming.

While the goal of these stories is to construct him as a hero, which works for a short time, these stories actually end up capturing the attentions of Fogarty and his men, and bring them all to Millbrook. And when they step into that diner named *Stall's Diner* they do not meet Tom Stall, small town hero but, rather, Joey Cusack: a former mafia man who was, once upon a time, just as violent as the two bad men that Stall 'heroically' killed in his diner. This meeting of former comrades and the naming of denied names signals the end of the film's first act. This diner scene is also the moment of transition to the film's last two acts, in which the identity of Tom Stall begins to concurrently unravel and multiply and Stall begins to exist in a more affectively intense manner within a complex synthesis of interlocking temporalities that transverse the individual and the pre-personal.

It is now important to recapitulate what is important. So far, it has been highlighted how Tom lives in a restrained and blank manner. We proposed that this connects with his propensity to live in the now(s) and suppress his past and present passions. Yet the violent confrontation in the diner, in which Tom's violent techniques are first revealed, as well as its subsequent mediated representation, 'brings-forth' Tom's past. Thus, this scene serves as a bridge of sorts that 'brings-forth' the past and pushes Tom to (re)produce a more

conjunctural and affectively intense 'Tom-Joey' identity. There is, however, much ambivalence in this initial 'bringing-forth' because Tom is first set up as a small town hero-object, which actually conceals who he is and can be. The effects of this mediated re-presentation play out in a suspenseful manner over the second act of this film, in which Fogarty and his men come into Millbrook and begin to harass Tom Stall and his family. It is not until the end of the second act that Tom actually admits that he is Joey Cusack, so this second act is a suspenseful one for the first-time viewer that makes them question whether Fogarty and his men are mistaken or if Tom is actually Joey. But these instances of narrative ambivalence will be turned away from in favour of those specific syntheses of time in which Tom becomes the more intense Tom-Joey.[32] In doing so, the singular and pre-personal nature of these memories, actions, and affects will be further emphasized.

Becoming 'in-between' times: Connecting singular and pre-personal affects and histories

In this section it will be established more clearly how exactly time is also in the midst of becoming and, moreover, how Tom-Joey's violent actions are desiring machines that reveal the singular and pre-personal intensities of Tom-Joey. Indeed, much like Tom-Joey's intensity is not solely singular, so too is the past that becomes revealed not merely singular. The first scene chosen depicts Tom Stall confronting Fogarty and his men on his own land. This scene comes after twenty minutes of conjecture and ambivalence, as Fogarty and his men alternately try to get Tom to admit that he is Joey and convince Edie that Tom is actually Joey. In this scene it is finally revealed to the viewer that Tom is also Joey.

More specifically, in this scene Fogarty and his men are trying to take Tom back to Philadelphia. The bait for him to go is that they have Tom's son in the car with them. Tom is

[32] Refer to Figures C.1 – C.3 in Appendix C for still images of this more affectively intense and 'in-between' state of existence that transverses the singular and pre-personal.

hesitant and restrained in this scene while Edie begins to scream hysterically at the men to give her back her son. She lunges violently towards them but Tom holds her back, soothingly telling Edie that he will get their son back. He then demands her to leave and go upstairs with Sarah. Once Edie leaves, Tom then agrees to go along with the men. After they let Jack go, Tom slowly walks alongside Fogarty and his men to the car and then he abruptly begins to attack Fogarty's associates. He attacks the first man by pounding him repeatedly in the nose with the palm of his hand, grotesquely smashing the man's nose up and into his brain. Tom then drops to the ground and shoots the other associate; meanwhile, Fogarty reacts and shoots Tom in the shoulder. This forces Tom to the ground and his gun flies out of his hand. Tom is now injured and Fogarty then moves towards Tom, swears as he surveys his dead men, and stands menacingly above Tom. When he asks him if there is anything he wants to say before he dies Tom responds, "I should have killed you back in Philly". With the communicative revelation of Tom's other identity Fogarty chuckles, rolls his eyes, and then points his gun at Tom. However, standing behind Fogarty is Tom's son, who has a shotgun pointed at Fogarty. Tom's son is standing close enough to Fogarty and Tom that he has heard his father admit he is actually Joey. Jack shoots Fogarty and the scene cuts to a close-up of Tom, who gets splashed in the face with Fogarty's blood. Fogarty then crumples to the ground.

In this scene it can be seen once again that violence is an affective intensity that is within and outside the individual that crashes into the now(s). Indeed, in this scene son and father are intimately connected through these intensities but instead of them being united in their attempts to stem violence, the son takes up his father's position and shoots these threatening outside forces. Yet, these 'outsiders' are connected to Jack and Tom as well, for these men are not only in the midst of unfolding and folding-in these intensities but they

were, furthermore, once another family for Joey Cusack. Once again the circuitous interconnection of Tom-Joey with external forces is evident but there is, in this instant, an off-frame past that co-exists with the present that Tom is concurrently reacting against and reincorporating into the now(s). Hence, in this scene the multiple sheets of time and concomitant intensities are in the midst of becoming revealed through specific violent actions. These revelations interconnect with Tom becoming Tom Stall-Joey Cusack.

The collapsing of these timelines is concisely expressed when, after his son has killed Fogarty, Tom-Joey stands up, grabs the gun out of his son's hand, takes the bullets out, and an odd mixture of emotions begin to cross his face (Appendix C, Figure C.2). Recognition, fear, pride, anger, disappointment, and anxiety play across his face: could it be that Tom-Joey sees in his son what he sees in himself, within Fogarty, Fogarty's associates, his former Joey Cusack identity, and even the two bad men in the diner? There is little dialogue in this scene to indicate what exactly is going on within Tom Stall but we can see, nonetheless, the contagiousness of violence. This contagiousness indicates that it is an affective state that is concurrently singular, pre-personal, always in the midst of reproduction and, lastly, produces contextually specific positionalities that the individual passes through. Indeed, this scene illustrates Deleuze and Guattari's (1972/1983) description of desiring machines constituting the centre of the social world and individuals, in turn, passing through these machines, constantly being reborn as they pass through the various states produced by these machines (p. 20). More exactly, all the figures in this scene concurrently pass through violence, enact it, and are positioned by it. But there is stability in this scene, which challenges the image of rebirth put forth by Deleuze and Guattari. Instead, with this scene it is more appropriate to posit that these external desires are folded-in by the individual, who passes on these intensities and projects these intensities outwards. Thus it would appear that violent desires

are neither pre-personal, nor contained within but occur, rather, as a circuit that connects these two regions.

However, while violence's circuitous 'in-between' indicates the pre-personal and subjective passages of such intensities, the enactment of violent desires actually reveal the singularity of Tom-Joey's Joey past. This revelatory tendency is rooted in Joey's machine-like prowess at killing people. Fogarty's ability to look through the 'Tom Stall' identity is the clearest indicator of this revelatory quality of Tom-Joey's violent machines, which Fogarty tells Edie about in a heated exchange that precedes this fight scene. As Fogarty says:

> See? This isn't a completely dead eye. It still works a bit. The problem is, the only thing I can see with it is Joey Cusack. And it can see right through him, right through your husband, Edie. See what's inside him, what makes him tick. He's still the same guy . . . . Ask Tom about how he tried to rip my eye out with barbed wire. And ask him, Edie, how come he's so good at killing people? (47:32)

With these words, Fogarty highlights and identifies the machine-like efficiency of Tom's violent actions. From his words we can see that Tom-Joey's violence is a Heideggerian technology of sorts that 'brings-forth' and reveals Tom's violent abilities and past. Yet this revelation occurs in the now(s) and is, moreover, connected with others. In effect, the mechanistic movements of Tom interconnect with the aforementioned desiring machines that constitute the centre of the social world, thus coordinating and (re)producing the conjunctural becoming(s) of Tom-Joey with the world as well.[33] When Deleuze and Heidegger's writings on non-instrumental technologies are connected to the intensities of Tom-Joey's violent desiring machines it can be ascertained that these intensities concurrently express and reveal qualities that are not only his own-most, but also interconnect with the world's qualities. Indeed, these action-movements reveal the multiplicities contained within Tom-Joey but they

[33] Within this purview of technology, violence would be a complex mechanistic process that not only produces affects, but also organizes bodily and social relations (Coonfield, 2006, p. 290).

are not solely within. Rather, these intensities concurrently circulate between him and the social world he resides in, thus connecting him to the social world through those intensities. This dynamic, interconnectivity is pressing to note because it challenges the autonomous self that is separable from others and the world.

There is another scene that demonstrates this complex process in action, which occurs shortly after Tom-Joey's violent confrontation in the diner. In this scene, Jack becomes violent just like his father. Shortly after Tom has become a small-town hero, Bobby tries to start another fight with Jack in the school hallway. This time, however, Jack does not back down and stop the fight by cracking jokes. Rather, he viciously attacks Bobby, startling him with a punch in the face. This stuns him and Jack then punches him a few more times before Bobby crumples to the ground. Jack then grabs him, throws him into the lockers, and proceeds to kick him in the chest a few times while angrily yelling insults at Bobby that he had previously said to Jack. Shared between both of these scenes is the depiction of the desire for – and concomitant reaction against – violence as an intensity that encapsulates and transverses Tom and those people that are connected to him; indeed, violent passions concurrently implode and explode in this scene – and that last one – carrying everyone along with it. Both scenes described so far demonstrate that "desire is a plenitude of production, producing a multiplicity of connections between particular point-signs or 'assemblages' that are as likely to be subindividual or social aggregates. Desire transverses the social and the individual, the fragment and the whole" (Grossberg, 1992, p. 50). With this it can be gleaned that the intensities of violence fragment outward, cohere inward, and constantly reconnect these two points. On one level, the flowing intensities of violence depicted across these scenes indicate the conjunctural nature of desires and affective intensities. Yet violence also occurs at another level that indicates those aforementioned circuits of time. But what is the

exact nature of those interconnected timelines? To answer this, the writings of Heidegger will be turned to again.

Specifically, the violence that Tom Stall produces and encounters – both in the diner, as well as when he is confronted by Fogarty – indicates that, in these instances, Tom is facing the reality of his own death. Of course there are multiple aspects of violence, including: moral and ethical questions; the not-so-simple biological aspects involved in survival of the fittest; the psychology of pathological behaviours; and the very affective dimensions that underpin any act of violence. Focussing on the potential for death may appear to be one of the more obvious facets of violence – and it may also appear to, at first glance, gloss over those other more political implications that have been previously connected with the film's violence (e.g. Dargis 2005; Travers, 2005; Beaty, 2008) – but it is most intriguing that the very mortality, and not morality, of the film's violence has resounding implications. This is so because death has political implications in the writings of Heidegger rooted in his consternation that human-subjects embracing the reality of their own death – which one is attuned to through the particularly intense affect angst – was purported to be *the* bridge that connects them to the world and their own-most self more authentically. Indeed, angst over the realization of death is the affective state-of-mind that "specifically brings [*Dasein*] back to itself from its lostness in the 'they'" (Heidegger, 1927/1962, p. 312).

Heidegger argued that this was so because when the individual realizes that he or she is always 'being-towards-death' and actually begins to anticipate it, this appropriation loosens the shackles of the 'they' [*das Man*] and moves that individual towards a more reflexive existence in which the norms of the 'they' can begin to be understood in a more

distant manner.[34] This is so because, in the midst of feeling anguish over the imminence of death, it is realized by the individual that his or her existence has been created within the parameters provided by the 'they'. In turn, one can begin to modify his or her life so that it matches his or her own-most wishes and passions. Underpinning this newly realized freedom is another even more serious revelation that that individual is not an infinite being that exists in an ever-present now(s) but is, rather, finite and limited. In turn, this produces a more meaningful and self-aware existence for that individual (Raymond, 1991, p. 52) whereby the more conformist aspects of one's existence as a 'they-self' becomes revealed. While Heidegger's depiction of time and angst helps us understand the manner in which the individual is inextricably in the social world and is, moreover, determined by the forces he or she is subject to this articulation is too rigid to take us far. This is so because there is still separation between self and world. Conversely, we contend that the immediate threat of death that underpins these violent intensities pushes Tom into a more liminal state between the now(s) and his own-most end. This end is, to be more exact and less deterministic, a limit: a border that provides the frame for the quilt of interconnected temporalities that are in the midst of becoming revealed.[35] The trajectories of Tom and his past, Tom and his son's own existence, and Tom and his future – and many more points in-between – are brought into communication with one another through the destructive acts of violence enacted in this scene. Furthermore, the intensities of violence, which intimate the imminence of death, connects him with those other people he is in the midst of being violent with in an affective communicative circuit whereby he is, once again, a boundary moment or transducer.

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[34] Hoffman (2006) clarifies this move to authenticity in the first-person; as he writes: "due to my anxious grasp of death I come to see the everyday world as a stage dominated by impersonal pressures and conformism" (p. 239).

[35] Braidotti (2001) emphasizes end-limits in her writings on a sustainable nomadic subject for these limits demarcate the end of the subject-as-intensive potentiality (p. 197). In turn, when limits arise, this is where an ethics of a nomadic, Deleuzian subject can start to be articulated (p. 179).

While the manner in which violence bridges Tom-Joey to his ending, to others, and his own-most past has been established, the complexities of the pre-personal past he shares in has not yet been demonstrated. This was another facet of temporal bridging processes argued by Heidegger, wherein one locates and places their own life and trajectory into the grander trajectory of the social context they reside in. While this was another step towards authenticity for Heidegger we contend that within an ontogenetic analysis of becoming-invested, this is, rather, another layer of the sheets of the present. More exactly, at another level both Tom-Joey and this film are connected to myths and ideals of the American West and, in more cinematic terms, the Western film. Cronenberg (2005) highlights this element throughout the DVD's Commentary track, positing the following as Western signatures: the Midwestern setting of the film; Stall's farmland home; the significant role that the Sheriff plays in this film; and the film's soundtrack, which has a heroic and epic quality to it. A number of critics and writers have picked up and expanded on this element as well, arguing that Tom-Joey's violence connects him with the history of America (e.g. Dargis, 2005; Ebert, 2005). At this level, Tom-Joey's enacting of violence connects him with the American history of domination through violent means. This violent trajectory is intimated in the very title of this film, in which the article "A" prefigures one particular "History of Violence". This 'A' is neither definitive, nor is it all inclusive; instead, it is specific iteration of violence, a continuation of a violent trajectory enacted by one specific figure, in one particular society – perhaps of modern Western societies? This is, indeed, a singular, micro-history of violence – i.e. one story enacted by an individual that is part of a larger history of violence specific to the American experience.[36]

[36] As Taubin (2005) notes violence serves an almost institutional role in "the American way" (p. 26).

Cinematically, Tom-Joey would be a re-articulation of the Western filmic hero: indeed, it can be suggested that Tom is a John Wayne styled hero that is fighting for the values of the small town that he lives in and the family that he loves. Cronenberg even identified this generic signature in an interview with Taubin (2005); as he noted: "We thought of the western . . . . the Western myth of the homesteader with his gun, defending his family and piece of property against other men with guns" (p. 24). This is especially put forth in the previously examined confrontation between Tom-Joey, his son, Fogarty, and his men, which is a "classic" American stand-off between a homesteader who is defending his land (Cronenberg, 2005, 52:00). This is another layer of the temporal 'in-between' or, indeed, the circuits of time that circulate in this film. This is so because when Tom-Joey is in the midst of violence he is connected with his own-most past, with a collective American history of violence, with his present, and with his own-most future. Yet, this narrative of the pre-personal Western past is hard to apply fully because it has already been noted that Tom-Joey stands awkwardly within the norms of the town that he fits himself into. Also, he is one of those outsiders that Sam the Sheriff is trying to protect his town from.[37] Beard (2008) identifies this lack of heroism in Tom; as he writes: ". . . an argument can be made that Joey is not the hero of the film, but is simply another one of the villains. Cronenberg opens up this interpretation by relentlessly twinning Joey with the other killers, highlighting a secret, coded brotherhood among them" (p. 99). Additionally, his enactments of violence also occur in more intimate settings with less than heroic results. We will now turn to the less heroic, more passionately out of control aspects of violent engagements by engaging with the "gangster sex" (Grünberg, 2006, p. 173) scene that Tom-Joey and Edie have together.

[37] In an earlier scene that takes place after Fogarty has visited Tom in his diner, Fogarty and his men are stopped by Sam the Sheriff and he asks them to leave to leave town. He then visits Tom and Edie and tells them that he protects his own in Millbrook.

This is a particularly powerful and disturbing scene that occurs after Tom-Joey has come home from his second trip to the hospital. This time, however, there is no hero's welcome when he comes home; rather, Tom comes home unaccompanied in a taxi. He starts to work on his truck and Sam the Sheriff comes by to talk to him about some things that strike him as being wrong about this most recent bout of bloodshed. They go in the living room and are soon joined by Edie, who is coming home from work. Sam repeatedly asks Tom whether or not he is who he says he is and he posits how weird it is that such professional men would make such a grand mistake. Tom is about to tell Sam that he is actually Joey but Edie suddenly interrupts Tom and begins to cry. While crying, she tearfully asks the Sheriff to leave them alone because they have been through so much already. Sam apologizes and leaves. Once he is gone Tom turns to Edie and thanks her for keeping his secret, which is now theirs.

Edie runs off towards the stairs and Tom starts to chase her. He catches up to her, pushes her into the wall, and grabs her. She yells, "Get off of me" and slaps him hard across the face. Tom grabs her by the throat and brings her towards him. He is glaring at her and she yells, "Fuck you Joey!" She escapes, runs up the stairs but he grabs her by the ankle and pulls her back; she falls down hard on the stairs. She yells, "Get off" and kicks him hard in the chest. They violently struggle with one another a bit longer but this struggle soon turns into sex on the stairs. They rock up and down the stairs and start to groan and moan together. He leans her against the wall, they begin to move more quickly together, and then they begin to go up and down the stairs entwined together in an almost lobster-styled manner. Once they finish Tom holds her, they look into each-others' eyes and then she throws him to the side, and goes up the stairs in disgust (1:09:36).

This sex scene echoes the previously analyzed one but, in this instant, both Tom and Edie are in the midst of becoming together, for they are intertwined and sharing in passionate intensities that are violently articulated. Indeed, this is a rough and hard sex scene in which bodies crash into the stairs, into the wall, and into one another. As actress Maria Bello (Edie) notes in a making of Featurette included on the DVD release of this film, this is an extremely animalistic and primal scene shared between the two of them (Zeifman, 2005, 42:00). Moreover, in stark contrast to the first love scene shared by Tom and Edie, in which it was only Edie that partook in the temporal and subjective multiplicities that are part and parcel of her own-most past and her being-with-others in Millbrook, in this scene both her and Tom are becoming multiplicitous in their mutually shared intensities. Indeed, there is experimentation in this scene: a conjunctural synthesis of identities that are new, old, and inextricably intertwined. But in this instant it is Edie who is becoming-intense and incorporating another series of intensities into her relationship with her husband – could it even be that she too is becoming-Joey? It can be argued with more certainty that Tom is becoming-intense and becoming Tom-Joey in this scene, for he is re-embracing a set of forgotten passions and experiences in the now(s) of their sex. This exchange is instigated by – and concurrently expressed in – the animalistic sex shared by Edie and Joey, in which violent desires push and pull each of them towards the other. This violence comes from within and outside, producing an inextricable 'in-between' they pass in and out of. This indicates once again that the intensities of affect functions as a communicative circuit that individuals pass through.

In this scene we can begin to see more clearly the figure we have been striving to map out, which is the self as an affectively attuned and practice-based bodily site in the midst of becoming within the world, rather than autonomously separable from it. In this specific

moment Edie is Tom-Joey's difference – indeed, his other – that concurrently triggers and shares in his violent intensities and imploding timelines. This makes sense, however, because when the self is re-articulated as a practice-based entity that resides in the 'in-between' there needs to be more than one individual ". . . so as to be transported fully into the magnificent chaos of life" (Braidotti, 2001, p. 179). This is because such a figure exists as ". . . an in-between: a folding-in of external influences and a simultaneous unfolding-outwards of affects" (Braidotti, 2001, p. 182). But it is not as simple as this; rather, concurrent with these investments is the revelation of numerous temporalities that co-exist with the present and, furthermore, provides the beat to this complex folding process. In this specific instant Tom-Joey bridges his violent passions and past with his and Edie's shared present(s). Edie too shares in these desires, eliciting them and feeding them back to Tom-Joey. With the depiction of these swaps of energies and shared affects we can actually see the dynamic double captures of becoming triggered by violently intense passions. Concomitantly, could it be that Tom is the orchid, Edie the wasp, and violence is the 'in-between' that they pass through, reproduce, and are reconstituted of? Or is Edie the orchid, Tom the wasp, and Edie-Tom-Joey the 'in-between'? All these possibilities ring true because one figure neither precedes, nor follows the other. Rather, both are inextricably interlinked. In effect, this scene reveals the complex interconnections of two mobile regions that are in the midst of becoming.

This sex scene is the most concise expression of becoming-intense 'in-between' multiple interlocking temporalities and desires. After this, there are only two more scenes that show an affectively attuned Tom Stall-Joey Cusack. The first instant comes about when Tom leaves Millbrook to go to Pennsylvania to see his brother Richie. This movement east is spurred by a late night phone call from Richie, in which he asks Tom if he's going to come

see him or if Richie will have to come see him. Tom decides to go see Richie and leaves for Pittsburgh. Upon arriving in Pittsburgh Tom meets up with one of Richie's henchmen and gets driven out to his richly luxurious crime lair. Once he enters Richie's home, Richie begins to playfully tease and question Tom-Joey about his life. Throughout this scene Tom-Joey has a big, warm grin on his face, which indicates that he is happily in the present and the past and is achieving an affective and temporal 'in-between' that is not directly rooted to violence.[38] But this talk between brothers – which covers a gamut of topics, from their shared past together to whether or not Tom-Joey enjoys being married and living the small town life – soon turns dark as Richie begins to get angry at Tom-Joey for all the hardships that Joey's attack on Fogarty back in the day caused him. Richie soon dispenses his henchmen to kill his brother but Tom-Joey once again reacts with his multiple, interlocking violence-producing desiring machines and quickly kills all these men. This is quite an anticlimactic conclusion that lacks much of the rallying power of that first diner sequence.

Once he kills his brother and his henchmen Tom-Joey goes outside and cleanses himself in the body of water on the property of his brother's crime lair. The sun is rising and Tom-Joey bends over the body of water and begins to splash water on his face and body. He looks into the water but the camera frames him from the water, so we see no reflection. This lack of reflection indicates the ambivalence of this conclusion: indeed, if Tom-Joey kills everyone that has known Joey, what will he become next? Where will the 'in-between' and the magnificent chaos of life go if there are no more others? There are no easy answers provided, for Tom-Joey does not wait and reflect. Rather, he quickly stands up and begins his trip back to Millbrook. When he returns home a third time there is no hero's welcome or

[38] Refer to Appendix C, Figure C.3 for a promotional advertisement that does not show this warmth but does show this intensity.

even acknowledgement from his family. Instead, they are sitting together at the dinner table with his spot empty and they wearily eye this imperceptible stranger that has sapped up their passions and introduced them to experiences that they had not known they had wanted, yet too-easily shared in. Indeed, Edie looks to Jack, Jack looks to Edie, and Edie looks to Sarah but no-one looks to Tom-Joey. It is only their young daughter, whose screams opened this family's story that has not been privy to these transformations and passions. She sets her father a place at the dinner table, which is a return to routine. Yet she also plays the point of mediating bridge once more, helping to 'bring-forth' and re-integrate this familiar stranger back into the familial fold. By setting him a place at the table Sarah is connecting him once again to the collective intensities he is a part of, but in this instant it is the intensities of the familial unit.

Once Tom-Joey sits down the camera rests on the family in a static medium long-shot. The camera then cuts to close-ups of a number of person to person visual exchanges: Jack looks to Edie but she is looking down. Jack then looks down and the camera cuts to Tom-Joey, who is also looking down at the table. The camera cuts to Edie, who is still looking down but then she looks up to Tom-Joey and her eyes are welling up with tears. Nothing is said in this scene but when the camera follows Edie's tearful look we see Tom-Joey in her purview, and the camera frames him in such a way that he takes up the whole frame. He looks up to Edie and we no longer see the blankly restrained individual but, rather, his face is red, his eyes are filled with tears, and he is intensely staring into the camera and, by extension, into Edie's eyes. The shot holds on Tom-Joey for a few seconds and the screen then fades to black, after which the credits start to roll.

In this concluding scene the collapse of Tom and Joey into a singular collective that is affectively attuned and has entered into the familial fold in a more intense manner is

depicted. More exactly, his past, present, and future have been re-coordinated and are being incorporated into their now(s). This bridging of timelines indicates that he is now in the 'in-between' without having to produce and react against violence. Indeed, he has shared his own-most passions and memories with his family while they too have participated with the more conjunctural and affectively intense Tom-Joey. But in this concluding scene we have seen that the predominant affect shared by this familial unit has shifted from violence to mourning and despair. This whole concluding scene is intensely sad, ambivalent, and open-ended, leaving numerous questions for the viewer to ask. Yet, even though it is ambivalent there is something that is still, nonetheless, promising in the passionate exchange of looks shared by Edie and Tom-Joey, which may indicate that they have now entered into a more affectively intense manner within a shared past that is now being brought-forth into the now(s). What exactly will come about from this, however, is not so clear. As a means to wrap up this chapter time and, more explicitly, memory will be re-examined through the tenets of the virtual and actual. This will help us to establish how exactly they are in the midst of becoming. Following this, what this film has to reveal about communicative subjects will be teased out in the concluding chapter along with a fuller summary of this thesis' predominant findings.

Memories of the virtual, living the actual: Becoming-intense, revealing the now(s)

In a short essay published at the end of *Dialogues II* called "The Actual and the Virtual", Deleuze proceeds to dash the recurrent tendency to distinguish between that which is actual and virtual in an extremely succinct manner. While more pessimistic postmodern theorists (e.g. Baudrillard, 1994/1981; Jameson, 1984) mourned the death of actuality in the media era, arguing that the 'real' world of emotions and connections are being substituted for hyper-mediated simulacra and disconnection, Deleuze argued that the virtual intermingles

with the actual in a sort of cloud-circuit (p. 112). Conversely, the actual roots the virtual so that in every actual moment there are multiple virtual moments connected with that actual moment. Thus there is swapping between the two blocs that resemble the aforementioned swapping between the wasp and the orchid. But Deleuze does not stop here; rather, Deleuze (2006) then proceeds to connect the virtual with memory and the actual with the present. This produces a situation in which:

> You get to an inner circuit which links only the actual object and its virtual image: an actual particle has its virtual double, which barely diverges from it at all; an actual perception has its own memory as a sort of immediate, consecutive or even simultaneous double . . . memory is not an actual image which forms after the object has been perceived, but a virtual image coexisting with the actual perception of the object. Memory is a virtual image contemporary with the actual, its double, its 'mirror image' . . . (pp. 113-114)

This re-articulation of time and memory indicates that memories are multiplicitous, in the midst of becoming, and always interconnected with the actual. With this, there can be stability for subjects that are always in the midst of re-emerging from differences both external and internal, but it is a non-essentialized image of stability represented as an ever-emerging series of double captures that are 'in-between' virtual memories and actual experiences. In the context of *A History of Violence*, it can be argued from this literature that Joey Cusack is the virtual element integrated with Tom Stall and vice-versa. Rather than there being either Tom/or Joey there is the conjunctural Tom-Joey that is connected to, and constantly re-emerging from, the world, others, and all those external differences that are both within and outside.

With the integration of the virtual and actual into considerations of the self, the past is still folded-in by each individual. But it is more dynamic and constantly in the midst of reproduction. This more dynamic re-articulation of memory connects Deleuze to Heidegger but now it is no longer something that can be merely appropriated from the traditions of

one's national-cultural heritage – although this option is still open. Rather, there are spaces for pre-personal and individual memories, which actually intermingle together. In other words, there are those 'official' national-cultural histories that can be taken up but that are greater than one person but there are also multiple heterogeneous memories within each individual that can also be taken up. This more active re-articulation of the work of memory resonates with this particular film because violence can be understood as an individual memory held by Tom-Joey connected with Joey's mob past and a pre-personal memory interrelated with America's will-to-dominate. At the same time it is also his passion in the present moment, an external affect that is folded-in, and a series of intensities that connect him with his finitude. Therefore, Joey Cusack is always with Tom Stall, but he emerges as a circuit-memory of Tom's past that is always present with him but comes out in different proportions depending on the particular context and situation he finds himself in, projects on, and folds-in. This dynamism challenges the stricter authentic/inauthentic binary proffered by Heidegger and indirectly continued by Beaty in his analysis of this film.

In effect, from this film the self can begin to be re-conceived as a forever re-emerging, practice-based site that is affectively attuned to the world and all that it encounters. Or more concisely, it can be posited that the individual is in flux, is constituted of various affective flows and desiring machines that emerge from within and are enfolded from outside, and is constantly in the midst of becoming-with the world as a boundary moment or transducer. Yet there is stability that arises, not only in the continuity of the body but also in the confluence of memories that 'fix' these various fluxes of intensity into the present. In turn, the present is also constituted of multiple interconnected circuits of time constantly in the midst of becoming revealed through these intensities. These complexly interrelated processes were mapped out in this chapter through the film *A History of Violence*

but we are now ready to summarize the major findings of this thesis and, moreover, establish what this film has to reveal about affect, time, the self, and communication.

Conclusion

"One thing is itself only insofar as it differs from other things either present or absent with it: Identity must be defined through the detour of difference . . ."

– Briankle G. Chang, 1996, p. 154

In this thesis we identified and re-coordinated a selection of discourses pertaining to affect, desiring machines, technology, time, becoming, and cinema's interconnection with the social realm through the film *A History of Violence*. It was our contention that this film was an especially useful cinematic site that we could mobilize to begin mapping out the circuits of affect, the multiple temporalities that become revealed by affect, and how exactly the self is a boundary moment that becomes in the midst of these circuits. This film was useful because it expresses the complexities of trying to maintain an identity in the midst of internal restraint and external determinations. As a means to engage with these tensions and intervene into the discourses that this film's expressions of identity interconnect with and re-present, we mobilized and explored the discourses of Heidegger and Deleuze through this film. The method of discourse analysis, rooted in the complementary critical lenses of articulation and intermediality, enabled us to build connections between the film and these writings and, moreover, to use this film as a pretext to enter into these curiosities.

More exactly, in the second chapter Heidegger's writings on technology were coordinated with Benjamin's writings on cinema. From this it was established that specific media technologies like the cinema have a material bond with the social world facilitated by the processes of mechanical reproduction. Following this, the manner in which technologies can alternately conceal and reveal an individual was then identified. These concepts were pressing to highlight because they connect with Heidegger's writings on truth and affect, which underpin his studies of existential *Dasein* and socially contextualized technological

practices. Thus, affect, cinema, technologies, and the self are all interconnected by the shared concepts of concealment and revelation. However some problems arose that interrelated with these shared concepts. Specifically, in his writings on *Dasein* Heidegger proposed that individuals largely exist in an inauthentic manner and that it is through the intensities of affect, which pull *Dasein* away from the masses that dilute it, that authenticity is achieved. This is a problematic depiction of selfhood because the outside world and other individuals – in short, all those varieties of difference not contained within an individual and their practices – are bracketed off and denied as inauthentic influences that conceal the individual. Yet as flawed as the politics of this representation are, the notion of revelation that Heidegger posits as being central to technologies – as well as the singularity of affects that emerge from one's moods – should not altogether be eschewed. Indeed, his focus on the practices that constitute what it means to be, the emergent singularity and interiority of each individual's affects, and the manner in which technologies are part and parcel of these practices are significant to note in this contemporary, (hyper)mediated age. But his constant yearning for origins and stability made the complete application of his discourses problematic.

In an attempt to counter these qualities and 'loosen up' Heidegger, we connected his writings with those of Deleuze. From this articulation we outlined a few differences. Specifically, while Heidegger depicts affect as a state-of-mind that brings the individual inwards and away from the 'they' and technology as a series of practices individuals are always in the midst of, Deleuze, respectively, exploded and imploded both of these claims. Indeed, for Deleuze affect is greater than an individual, alternately fragmenting them while connecting them to the social world that they are inextricably linked with. Meanwhile, he broke up the body and focused on the divergent functionalities contained within that

interconnect with larger processes in the social world. Both arguments challenge the self because such a stance concludes that every individual is actually constituted of a variety of machines. These machines negate any sort of core that could be called selfhood. These tensions were then mapped out through the film *A History of Violence*.

When Heidegger and Deleuze were used to analyze the film *A History of Violence* we realized that affect is both a force that is greater than any individual, as well as still being contained within and even folded in by each individual. Taken together, this indicates that the individual is there in the world but their subjectivity is not so much an authentic interior to be maintained but is, rather, produced 'in-between' the social world. In turn, there are intensities within that interconnect with intensities outside. From this coordination the intensities of affect can be re-considered as a communicative circuit that the individual becomes-with as a boundary moment. Consistency arises in the continuity of the body, the work of memory, and the interdependent domains of the virtual and the actual, which too are in the midst of becoming. On top of this, mapping out the intensities of affect also revealed to us how exactly the past and future co-exist with the present and can actually become revealed by and through the investment of these intensities.

When the intensities of becoming are pushed further into the foreground, the self can no longer be considered an anxious entity that is separable from others. At the same time the idea of the self as a rational and autonomous individual is challenged with the emerging emphasis on the body in the midst of revelation, disassembling, and re-connection. As a result of this shift in emphasis, the most significant and pressing issue becomes what exactly the body does (Deleuze& Parnet, 2006/1977, p. 45). Foucault (1976/1990) was also taken by the functionality of the body and concluded his first book on sexuality's history by arguing for a "history of bodies" that takes into account what they invest in and are invested by (p.

152). Perhaps we are now ready for such a history to begin to be etched out in Communication Studies as well? But what exactly could this emphasis on corporeal functionality have on the study of communication practices?

When the image of the wasp and the orchid are turned to once again it becomes apparent that the wasp and orchid connect through an irrational process of chemical communication based in passionate intensities, survival, and intuition. We do not want to talk too much about Biology but the wasp and the orchid are interlocked figures that demand one another to be and become. This image indicates two things: Firstly, the manner in which everyone is inextricably interlinked with the world and one another. Secondly, the sort of instinctual, pre-cognitive, and passionately intense means by which individuals communicate with themselves, others, and the world. We identified and demonstrated the possibility of these circuits of intensity in the narrative of this film, but these depictions circulate further than the actions set up in this film itself. Indeed, these movements seem to be contingent with the social world. At the outset of this conclusion the complexity of these intensities appear to be much clearer.

Achieving clarity on this complex and contentious issue was the predominant goal of this thesis, because it was our main goal to engage with the under-explored tenet of affect, explore it by mapping it out through this film, and then provisionally test what impact it could have on the study of communication. It appears that affect can have a great deal of impact, for it is opening up new lines of questioning that demand further research. Such issues as the multiple temporalities that underpin the investment of affect, the manner in which individuals invest in particular media products and communication practices, and the very means by which we are all interconnected open up new lines of investigation that the autonomous self as origin or end of communication activities cannot take into account. These

questions also challenge the instrumentality that underpins existent arguments in communication. Thus it is not only an issue of what ends can be served by communicating but, also, what relations can be revealed. What are the multiplicities and relationalities that can become revealed by and through the investments of affect? This thesis was a first step into these issues that was oriented through the study of the film *A History of Violence.*

From this project such areas as the pleasures, disgusts, and fears that connect us to one another, to particular media products, and to communications practices begin to open up as research areas that demand to be further unpacked. This is not only because affect is a newer, non-connotative realm of ideological work (Grossberg, 1992; Massumi, 2002) but it is also the very means by which individuals place themselves into the world. With affect the study of identity overlaps with the study of media and communication, which are all in the midst of communicating with one another. This is an exciting and complex plane of research that demands further critical attention so that we can begin to, if not understand, at least demarcate and map out the multiple fluxes, lines, and sites in which the affectively intense individual, the social world, and media technologies all intersect, invest, and even communicate with one another. This thesis was one provisional step into this complex terrain that, at the conclusion of this conclusion, appears to demand further curious footsteps to follow and, perhaps, to even lead.

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Appendix A – Glossary of Special Terms Used

Affect: The intensities that underpin how individuals invest themselves into the world. Sometimes referred to as passion, affection, emotion, etc. these are the very means by which individuals come to feel and care about the world they live in. However, there are inconsistencies in the discourses of affect. For instance, Martin Heidegger (1927/1962) argued that these intensities are extremely personal and emanate from the inner confines of one's own-most mind while Gilles Deleuze and Felix Guattari (1980/1987) argued that they are pre-personal passages that link the various experiences that one goes through. For further information refer to Deleuze and Guattari (1980/1987); Grossberg (1992); Heidegger (1927/1962); and chapter two of Massumi (2002).

Articulation: A way to rethink the dynamic structures of power that underpin the production of meanings in language, the powers that are put into effect in the social world, and the very practices of mediation. This is done by breaking down these processes and highlighting the productive relationalities that are disjunctive and come to be connected in specific contexts under specific circumstances and with differing effects. Refer to Grossberg (1986, 1992); Hall (1980, 1985); and Slack (2003, 2006) for further details on articulation as theory and method.

Becoming: This is a term that describes how exactly events, individuals, and even the social world come into emergence. The image proffered by Deleuze and told to Parnet (1977/2006) is that of the wasp and the orchid who, in the midst of pollination, (re)produce a third, 'in-between' space. At one level, this is how the individual comes into being in the world; indeed, they are inextricably in the world so that it is not so much either self/or world but, rather, 'in-between' self and world. Refer to Vivian (2000) and the introductory section of Deleuze and Parnet (1977/2006).

Dasein: This is Heidegger's (1927/1962) word to describe the individual in the social world and, more exactly, the extent that individuals are always in the world. When broken with a dash (*Da-sein*) it literally translates into "Being-there," which indicates the active qualities of existing and, moreover, being inextricably in the world.

Desiring Machines: Deleuze coined this term to describe desire as a complex entity that does not lack but is, rather, reproductive. Moreover, desiring machines constitute the centre of the social world, producing positions for the individual to take up, as well as objects for that individual to desire. Refer to Deleuze (1990/1995) and chapter one of Deleuze and Guattari (1972/1983) for further information.

Haecceities: A term mobilized by Deleuze to describe the individual as an assembled entity constituted of various fluxes and lines, which is then individuated by larger external forces. With this, an individual would be an entity with characteristics similar to the passage of a day, which is determined by the rising and setting of the sun. Refer to Deleuze and Parnet (1977/2006) and Plateau 10 of Deleuze and Guattari (1980/1987) for further information.

Intermediality: An emerging critical theory and methodology in Media Studies that emphasizes the passages that transpires within and outside media processes. In this instant, a medium is an interlinking moment and movement between different technologies, cultural practices, epistemologies, and discourses in this age of extensive technological and cultural (inter)mediations. Instead of technologies playing a determinative role they are, rather, in the midst of *becoming* alongside these flows. Refer to Nelson, 2003 (p. xxii) and de B'béri, 2006 (p. 37) for further information.

Ontogenetic: A study of emergences, which contrasts with ontology, the study of being (Massumi, 2002, pp. 8-9).

Appendix B – Still images, promotional posters: Tom Stall, restrained in the now(s)



Figure B.1



Figure B.2

Figure B.1. Publicity still for Cronenberg (2005) from *Viggo-Works* (http://www.viggo-works.com/index.php?page=813&&offset=6), Accessed June 29, 2009

Figure B.2. Screencap of Cronenberg (2005) from *Viggo-Works* (http://www.viggo-works.com/index.php?page=811&&offset=30), Accessed June 29, 2009



Fig. B.3. Promotional Poster of Cronenberg (2005) from *Viggo-Works* (http://www.viggo-works.com/index.php?page=816), Accessed June 29, 2009

Appendix C – Still images, promotional posters: Tom-Joey, intensely in the 'in-between'



Figure C.1. Promotional still shot by Takashi Seida for Cronenberg (2005). Accessed June 29, 2009 from *Viggo-Works* (http://www.viggo-works.com/index.php?page=813&&offset=12)

Figure C.2. Screencap of Cronenberg (2005) from *Viggo-Works* (http://www.viggo-works.com/index.php?page=811&&offset=12), Accessed June 29, 2009

Figure C.3. An advertisement for Academy Award Consideration. Accessed from *Viggo-Works* (http://www.viggo-works.com/index.php?page=814&&offset=0) June 29, 2009.