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Title: One Size Doesn't Fit All: Better Sport Governance Depends on Your Design Archetype¹

Abstract

Milena Parent, Russell Hoye, Marijke Taks, Michael L. Naraine, and Benoît Séguin challenge the tendency to present a one-size-fits-all approach in good governance codifications, arguing that there is no one ideal type of good governance for all sport organizations. Through a case study of Canadian national sport organizations, they build the case for an empirical approach to determining key governance guidelines/indicators that builds on ideal types of sport organisations. It consists of using a cluster approach that allows deriving good governance principles from real data rather than theory. This allows for considering the scale and context of the specific sport organisations of interest.

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Introduction

Following a range of cases of corruption and other governance performance issues among national and international sport organizations, the international sporting world has seen a spate of “good” governance guidelines and indicators presented by various government and non-governmental organizations. In addition to the binary logic of “good” vs. “bad” – in contrast to seeking to improve governance (i.e., better governance) as no organization is governed perfectly – we follow Chappelet (2011, Chappelet and Mrkonjic, 2013) in seeing “good” governance as being context sensitive and therefore difficult to apply universally to all sport organizations of all levels. Thus, we will use the term “better governance” for the rest of this chapter.

For more than 15 years, organizations have proposed typologies containing three guidelines for better sport governance (e.g., Australian Sport Commission, 2015), four guidelines (e.g., Alm, 2019, Council of Europe, 2005, European Union, 2011), five guidelines (e.g., Council of Europe, 2004), six guidelines (e.g., Australian Sport Commission, 2007), seven guidelines (e.g., International Olympic Committee, 2008, Sport England, 2011, Sport and Recreation Alliance, 2017, Sport New Zealand, 2006), 10 guidelines (e.g., United States Olympic Committee, 2005), 11 guidelines (e.g., Union Cycliste Internationale, 2004, Wales Sports Council, 2006), and 31 guidelines (e.g., UK Sport, 2004).

Some of these guidelines have been suggestions, others have become mandatory. For example, the Canadian federal government enacted a new non-profit act setting out very clear governance rules and procedures for all national non-profit organizations in Canada, and not just in sport; Canadian national sport organizations (NSOs) had to update their governance policies and procedures to follow the new Canada Not-for-profit Corporations Act (NFP Act; Minister of Justice, 2017) or face dissolution. In the United Kingdom, any sport organization requesting government funding is

required to follow a set of transparency, accountability, and financial integrity guidelines (Sport England, n.d.).

There has been a tendency for these organizations to present one view of so-called good governance, in effect presenting a one-size-fits-all approach, such as the International Partnership Against Corruption in Sport's decision to produce a single set of good governance indicators and guidelines for sport based on the existing set of indicators and standards (International Partnership Against Corruption in Sport, 2019).

On the surface, such efforts are laudable to help combat problems with corruption, conflicts of interest, financial mishandling, abuse, and so on. But different sport organizations have different capacities and different contexts to consider. For instance, while it may be legal and appropriate to have board members appointed solely for representation purposes (e.g., gender, stakeholder group) in other jurisdictions, this cannot be the case in Canada as the NFP Act mandates that board members must be elected and skills-based. Of course, Canadian NSOs can seek to have representation on their board, but individuals must still be elected and fill a required skill-set. Yet, this only applies at the national level. Provincial/territorial and local sport organizations in Canada are not beholden to the NFP Act's rules and guidelines.

Therefore, how can a one-size-fit all approach to good governance be appropriate, even if it would make policymakers' and decision-makers' lives easier, when sport organizations within a country do not need to follow all the same laws? Furthermore, sport organizations do not all have the same financial, human or material capacity. Additional governance processes and expectations can burden already-resource-stretched organizations.

Moreover, even when capacity and/or size are considered, suggested good governance indicators use somewhat arbitrary benchmarks, as is the case with the International and National Sport Governance Observer projects (Geeraert, 2015, Geeraert 2018).

A key reason for this issue is that many of these proposed or imposed principles, guidelines, indicators, and/or codes are typologies, that is, they are theoretically-derived. Even if they stem from a review of the existing literature, most remain conceptual in nature, and therefore empirically unsupported in relation to their efficacy in delivering better governance (Parent and Hoye, 2018). Without empirical analysis of the indicators, guidelines, and so on, we have no proof that they are the right indicators or that they will be effective in improving sport organizations' governance.

As such, an empirically-derived approach to develop good governance principles is required. Furthermore, this empirically-driven approach should consider multiple governance ideal types or archetypes.

Therefore, this chapter will show the value of empirically deriving better governance principles. It will demonstrate different factors that can be considered in an analysis of governance principles and indicators, as well as offer an example of governance archetypes that are empirically derived for Canadian NSOs.

Argument

Fundamentally, we agree with past efforts to determine better governance practices and indicators of better governance to improve sport organizations' practices and increase their effectiveness and efficiency. We also agree with the idea that society and institutions (e.g., the Olympic Movement) set out a common set of guidelines or principles to normatively define better governance, such as accountability, transparency, and democracy (cf. Chappelet and Kübler-Mabbott, 2008, Chappelet

and Mrkonjic, 2013, Geeraert, 2015, Geeraert 2018, Parent and Hoye, 2018, Zintz and Gérard, 2019). But, as better governance appears to be context-specific, we take issue with the fact most sets of better governance guidelines and/or principles are not empirically-grounded.

We conducted a review of academic and grey literatures² and obtained a multitude of suggested better governance indicators. We ran a word frequency query in NVivo 11 Plus on the large number of sets of suggested indicators (Association of Summer Olympic International Federations, 2020, Australian Sport Commission, 2007, Australian Sport Commission, 2015, Burger et al., 2006, Chaker, 2004, Chappelet and Kübler-Mabbott, 2008, Commonwealth Games Federation, 2006, Council of Europe, 2004, Council of Europe, 2005, Council of Europe, 2012, de Zwart and Gilligan, 2009, Dutch Olympic Committee*Dutch Sports Federation, 2005, European Olympic Committee and Fédération Internationale de l'Automobile, 2001, European Team Sports Association, 2008, European Union, 2000, European Union, 2007, European Union, 2011, Henry and Lee, 2004, Hoye et al., 2015, International Olympic Committee, 2008, Katwala, 2000, McNamee and Flemming, 2005, Mowbray, 2012, One World Trust, 2007, One World Trust, 2008, PriceWaterhouseCoopers, 2012, Sport England, 2011, Play the Game, 2011, Alm, 2019, Geeraert, 2018, Sport and Recreation Alliance, 2011, Sport and Recreation Alliance, 2017, Sport and Recreation South Africa, 2004, Sport New Zealand, 2006, European Union Expert Group on Good Governance, 2013, Taylor and O'Sullivan, 2009, Transparency International, 2010, Transparency International, 2011, UK Sport, 2004, Union Cycliste Internationale, 2004, Union of European Football Associations, 2008, Union of European Football Associations, 2011, United States Olympic Committee, 2005, Wales Sports Council, 2006). Results indicate that most of these sets

² Search ("sport governance"; all-text, title, abstract, keywords) conducted on the following databases: (a) *SCOPUS*, (b) *ABI Global*, (c) *SPORTDiscus*, and (d) *Business Source Complete* on March 9, 2020.

of indicators are focused on the board of directors, their transparency, accountability, responsibility, and corruption issues.

Beyond these more common governance principles seen across different sets of guidelines and indicators, the number of proposed guidelines highlight an inconsistency in approaches to analyzing better governance. By inconsistencies, we mean the variations in the number and types of better governance guidelines, which makes their interpretation ambiguous and choice of applicability difficult (Parent and Hoye, 2018). These inconsistencies are exacerbated by the often seemingly arbitrary cutoffs of specific numbers of indicators for a governance principle and means of measuring these indicators. For busy managers or directors to answer governance questionnaires, the number of indicators is often kept to a minimum and assessment is done on a simple Likert scale or basic descriptive scale (Fowler, 2014). That managers and directors usually self-report their governance efforts is fraught with methodological issues as well (Tacon and Walters, 2016). Support for these methodological issues can be seen in, for example, FIFA (Fédération Internationale de Football Association) obtaining the second highest governance score in the Sport Governance Observer rankings (see Geeraert, 2015) when it was in the middle of a corruption scandal, albeit while it was also developing reforms to its governance.

With a few exceptions examining national-level sport organizations aside (e.g., Geeraert, 2018, Zintz and Gérard, 2019), a closer inspection of the sets of guidelines and indicators points to these being focused on international federations (IFs). IFs have different responsibilities and operational foci compared to sport organizations at other levels of the sportscape. One key difference is that IFs are not beholden to a particular government, save, perhaps for the generous Swiss laws for those headquartered in Switzerland. In fact, IFs can be considered as masters of their sport domain and are the regulators for the lower-level sport organizations. Thus, the stakeholder network – and

therefore stakeholder pressures, expectations, and inter-dependencies that drive an organization to achieve more robust and transparent governance – can differ according to the level of the organization. In addition, the activities of IF directors and their paid staff who are focused on delivering large international events and setting of rules for competition for example, differs to the dynamic between the elected board members and paid staff of national, provincial, or local level sport organizations who are focused on fielding national teams, club development and other more fundamental operational matters. The governance context is different; so it follows that the guidelines for better governance should also differ between organizational contexts. Funding is also an issue; and sport organizations’ minimal resources are maximized for efficiency. As such, better governance principles and indicators may or may not apply in the same manner for lower-level sport organizations compared to IFs.

Moreover, the sheer number of guidelines and indicator proposals as noted above has flooded the sportscape with options making it hard to know which approach is good, better, or best. Which set of guidelines and/or indicators should a sport manager favour? An analysis of these different governance indicators is therefore needed to clear the path, so to speak. Yet, as Parent and Hoye (2018) found in their systematic review of 2,155 studies on better governance principles and their impact on organizational performance (however defined by the studies’ authors, though always about an organizational outcome), only 0.9% empirically examined this relationship.

At the same time, these proposals rest on a fundamental assumption: by following these better governance guidelines, sport organizations’ performance will improve. While 19 empirical studies in Parent and Hoye’s (2018) systematic review demonstrated a link between board structure and organizational performance, no empirically-demonstrated link between any other governance principle or guideline and organizational performance was found.

Finally, many governance analyses provide scores and rankings of organizations (e.g., Association of Summer Olympic International Federations, 2020, Geeraert, 2015). While some scores may seem odd – such as FIFA’s high scores when in the middle of a corruption scandal – they can also stigmatize organizations ranked/scored at the lower end. The assumption in such rankings and scorings is that there is one ideal “good” governance type. Yet, with the variations in capacity and objectives between organizations, for instance, how can we compare all organizations to the same ideal type? A set of archetypes or range of ideal types would be preferable, more representative, fair, and more accurate.

In sum, the sheer number of proposed guidelines/indicators, the inconsistencies between these guidelines/indicators, the questionable transferability between organizational levels, the measurement issues, the unsupported assumption of better governance leading to organizational performance, and the assumption of one ideal good governance type, lead to the need for a different approach. With the slew of conceptual pieces, we suggest using an empirical approach to ascertain the key governance principles and indicators that can differentiate between organizations and can impact organizational performance (cf. Parent and Hoye, 2018) by looking at an archetypes option for better governance, thereby taking the context into consideration. Using an archetype approach will immediately address this shortcoming.

Illustrative Case – Determining Governance-Based Archetypes in Canadian NSOs

To illustrate the value of empirically deriving indicators, we detail our efforts to revisit NSO design archetypes and how empirical results can help discriminate between indicators.

Design archetypes are useful to compare and contrast organizations and also explore organizational change (Hoye et al., 2019), which is necessary for organizational survival and

growth. At the NSO level, Kikulis and colleagues (1992, 1995) derived three design archetypes: the kitchen table, the boardroom, and the executive office. These archetypes were derived based on (Kikulis et al., 1992):

- *Organizational values* defined as the organization's orientation (private, volunteer, non-profit, and funding source), domain (from mass sport participation to high performance sport), organizing principles (hierarchy, decision-making locus, work done by volunteers vs. professional paid staff), and effectiveness criteria (e.g., effectiveness, efficiency, membership numbers vs. medals)
- *Organizational structure* defined as specialization, standardization, and centralization.

These criteria highlight legal considerations, financial and human resource (HR) capacity, values, complexity (structural aspects, strategic goals, and performance aspects). However, they also, arguably, stigmatized NSOs falling into the kitchen table archetype given the negative “unprofessional” image of kitchen table organizations. For more details on these concepts, the three archetypes and their implications for today's sport organizations, see Hoye and colleagues (2019).

In today's sportscape and for an archetype analysis meant to discriminate between organizations, the legal considerations is a moot point, as all NSOs are private, non-profit organizations. They can, however, differ on potentially all other factors. Though innovative at the time, Kikulis et al.'s (1992) factors require some updating in light of the more recent expansion of the better governance guidelines/indicators research.

If we had followed the lead of previous governance guidelines/indicators research, we would have simply put all these factors together to create a new set of archetype factors. However, two issues

remain with this approach: (1) we would just have a long list of factors, not knowing if any are more important than others to add to yet another set of conceptually-defined guidelines and indicators to the literature; and (2) we would not have descriptors to populate the factors or discriminate between NSOs. For instance, as board characteristics (composition, gender representation) and processes have dominated the sport governance literature, we would have to assume that the nature of the board would be a key part of our new set of guidelines and indicators. Likewise, we would assume accountability, transparency, democracy, and responsibility to be high up on the list. But, as our empirical analysis will show, the nature of the board is not a key discriminating factor, nor are internal accountability processes and procedures.

Method

To empirically ascertain the relative importance of the different factors and their ability to discriminate between NSOs, we undertook a landscape survey of Canadian NSOs. Fifty-five percent ($n=32$) of NSOs listed on the Sport Canada website completed an online survey, which included questions related to their organization and governance, as well as questions to address six different potential archetype options: (1) capacity, (2) values & complexity, (3) nature of the board, (4) funding sources, (5) governance, and (6) a combination of the previous. These options were based on the governance literature as well as discussions with sport governance colleagues around the world. We also conducted follow-up interviews to clarify certain answers and examined organizational documents (e.g., strategic plans and financial statements, organizational charts, and bylaws).

We first ran descriptive statistics using SPSS and content analysis using NVivo to understand the dataset. We then converted the raw data into analyzable data for each archetype option. Next, we

ran cluster analyses using SPSS. Because cluster analyses are open-ended analyses, we tried analyses of two, three, four, five, and six clusters to determine the best fit for each option.

Results

Organizational values and structure

NSOs ranged from no employees to 58; \$140,000 CAD to \$24 million CAD in budget; four to 15 board members, with zero to 71% of women on the board ($M=36%$, $SD=17%$). NSOs funding came from public (49.5%), commercial (sponsorship and events/hosting; 30.7%), memberships (17.8%), and other (e.g., donations; 2%) sources.

Unlike Kikulis et al. (1992, 1995), all NSOs included both mass sport participation and high performance aspects in their domain activities and values. NSOs were also all private non-profit organizations. Thus, these factors, were common characteristics among NSOs, no longer discriminating between them as they did for Kikulis and colleagues in the early 1990s.

In terms of organizing principles, we found NSOs' volunteer boards focused on strategic, long-term decision-making. For 62% of NSOs, the chief executive officer (CEO) assisted in this regard. 95% of NSO boards and their CEOs also shared financial decision-making responsibilities. In turn, CEOs were responsible for

- Sport-related decision (86% of NSOs),
- Marketing-related decision (81% of NSOs), and
- HR-related decisions (95% of NSOs). Here, 48% of boards also make HR decisions or assist in HR decision-making.

Most communications and social media decisions (86%) are made by lower-level NSO staff. Thus, there are more policy governance boards than before and a greater distinction between governance/strategic and management/operational actions than in the early 1990s.

Finally, in terms of effectiveness criteria, 75% noted meeting organizational objectives, 69% international success, 44% financial results, and 42% memberships. Thus, other than meeting organizational objectives, we found little consensus in effectiveness criteria, which could indicate potential discriminant behaviour for this factor. However, this also means organizational performance definitions vary, even within an organizational field.

Other governance factors

First, in terms of transparency, 100% of NSOs offered reports at their Annual General Meeting (AGM), 97% had bylaws and 97% published key documents (e.g., strategic plan) on their website for all to see. As such, all Canadian NSOs are highly transparent – a key good governance indicator according to the existing literature. Second, NSOs agreed there were different types of accountability. Third, beyond the fact all NSOs now elect their board members, 50% of NSOs have stakeholders represented on their board. Many NSOs also involve stakeholders in branding processes ($M=3.27$, $SD=0.98$ on a scale from 1= not at all, to 5=allways) and strategic planning processes ($M=3.40$, $SD=1.33$ on a scale from 1= not at all, to 5=allways). Though this information is useful to get a basic idea of the landscape, it does not provide much in the way of a potential analysis of the governance situation. While most authors have turned to providing scores and rankings from these results, we developed governance archetypes to determine different ideal-type options for analysing NSOs without the potential stigma of a high or low score.

Archetypes development

We first examined the simplest option, capacity. Here, capacity focuses on human (personnel = number of full-time equivalents or FTEs) and financial capacity. After running the different cluster options, we determined that four clusters offered the best fit and discrimination. The results highlight we have small, medium, large and extra-large capacity NSOs but not much else could be gleaned.

Second, we turned to the Kikulis et al. (1992) factors. Examining only the values, three clusters were better; examining the different organizational structure components, clusters of three or four could work. When combining the values and structural components from Kikulis et al. criteria into one analysis, four clusters proved best. Thus, this demonstrates how the specific composition of the criteria to analyze can significantly change the (empirical) outcome of the analysis. Our empirically-derived results demonstrate that: (1) only the organizational values of governance, stakeholder engagement, and diversity offer any discrimination between groups, as all had sport participation and high performance equivalent domains/values; (2) four groups, not three like Kikulis et al. (1992), are a better fit and provide clear distinctions between groups; and (3) the traditional description of the kitchen table is no longer present in the results. We can also note a decision-making focus on the board for group 1, compared to a focus on the CEO for group 2, a shared focus on the board and CEO for group 3, and a decentralized approach for group 4.

Third, we examined the NSOs based on the nature of their boards. Results indicated we have small (5 members), medium (8-10 members) and large (14 members) boards. Also, the bigger the board, the less likely to have women represented. However, these results did not sufficiently discriminate between NSOs to help address our purpose.

Fourth, as funding appeared to be a key differentiator in the Kikulis et al. (1992, 1995) archetypes, we examined funding-based clusters, finding again that four clusters offered the best fit.

Comparing the cluster analyses and the funding source dominance, we find commercial revenue sources (specifically sponsorship and broadcasting) help differentiate NSOs. Thus, funding appears to help distinguish between potential archetypes.

Fifth, we examined different cluster options for various governance principles.

- *Performance*-based (effectiveness and efficiency) analyses resulted in four clusters. We found different foci for effectiveness measures (throughputs vs. outputs) between clusters and differing degrees of efficiency or use of resources – financial (budget), HR (number of FTEs), and material (in the form of the number of headquarters).
- *Accountability*-based analyses:
 - Internal accountability: though three clusters were deemed the best fit, NSOs were found to generally follow internal accountability measures (all medium to high scores), so no real discriminant power was seen here.
 - External accountability: three clusters were deemed the best fit and there appeared to be a range (from none to high) demonstrating potential discriminant power.
- *Transparency*-based analyses resulted in five clusters. Contrary to the basic descriptive analysis, low to high results were seen across the five clusters, demonstrating that transparency may actually be a good factor to use for discrimination because we incorporated a range of transparency indicators in the exploratory analysis: having stakeholders on the board, having transparency as a core value, having transparency in the strategic plan, having formal accountability structures, offering public access to all organizational documents, offering member-only access to some organizational documents, controlling information, discussing brand issues with stakeholders, and using

social media to communicate. This finding highlights the importance of having multiple measures per governance principle.

- *Stakeholder participation* and democratic-based analyses resulted in four clusters. Like transparency, stakeholder participation is a complex factor found to provide good discrimination across clusters when examining the number of types of voters for boards of directors, the number of stakeholders dealt with formally, the number of stakeholders involved in decision-making, and the number of stakeholders involved in brand-based decision-making.

Finally, we combined all above criteria except internal accountability into one cluster analysis based on capacity, organizational values and complexity, nature of the board, funding, and governance characteristics. This resulted in four groups being the best fit. Table 1 presents the criteria and general descriptors of the resulting clusters. What is critical to see here is that being in the smaller NSO group does not mean that the NSO is bad at governance. In fact, these NSOs appear to excel at efficiency.

[Insert Table 1 about here]

In sum, using an empirical approach to governance guidelines/indicators allows us to see that:

- What can be considered better governance behaviour by NSOs depends on their ideal type or archetype, which increases comparison fairness (i.e., not all to the same single ideal). There are different ways to be good at governance, depending on the context.
- The number of criteria chosen for the analysis affects the clustering outcome – that is, the determination of the archetypes or ideal types – and therefore the analysis of the quality or fit of the NSO’s governance compared to its ideal type.

- The specific criteria chosen affects the distribution of NSOs across the clusters, as seen when comparing the n of each cluster between the different analyses undertaken.
- Not all criteria help discriminate between archetypes. As much as internal accountability may be lauded in the literature as part of better governance practices, in our case, all NSOs undertake internal accountability activities and therefore it does not help discriminate between ideal types.
- Using an archetypes approach allows for both structural and procedural aspects of governance to be considered when examining better governance options.

Conclusion

The existing governance guidelines and indicators literature demonstrates a number of issues, including:

1. The assumption that there is one good governance ideal type for all sport organizations;
2. Measurement issues associated with indicators; and
3. The popularity of scoring and ranking organizations to show the better ones and those who “needs improvement”.

As we highlighted in this chapter, an empirical approach to determining key governance guidelines/indicators, and the use of an archetype approach to determine ideal types for more appropriate governance analyses helps address the contextual and one-size-doesn't-fit-all issues by creating ideal types for, in this case, NSOs. This approach also addresses the three issues noted in the following manner:

1. There is more than one ideal governance type in a given organizational field. Canadian NSOs, for instance, have four options to choose from. By using a cluster approach, we can

let the data tell us the best fitting model (e.g., three vs. four vs. five groups; which variables/indicators help to distinguish between organizations);

2. By using a combination of data sources (online self-administered questionnaire in combination with interviews and organizational documents), we move away from the self-reporting issue and obtain a richer dataset and more complete understanding of what is really occurring in these organizations. We also used multiple measures per governance principles (e.g., transparency) to ensure a more holistic understanding of the reality.
3. By using an archetypes approach, we present organizations with their ideal type (archetype) as opposed to giving a score to help them improve their governance for their ideal type.

Thus, there is no stigmatization of organizations linked to low scores.

Below we detail implications for researchers and practitioners wishing to use this empirically derived approach to develop good governance principles and guidelines that are specific to their context, as one size doesn't fit all.

Implications for researchers and potential future directions

The approach outlined in this chapter suggests future research should focus on empirically developing and assessing better governance guidelines that are germane to the scale and context of the specific sport organizations of interest. Researchers should focus on developing and testing guidelines that might have the most impact on influencing director behaviour, are practical, and are focused on the organizational capacity of sport organizations to enact the guidelines and enable comparison between types and levels (international, national, provincial, local) of organizations. As Parent and Hoye (2018) argued, future research in this area should also move to assess the impact of an organization adopting or implementing guidelines on their governance performance so as to develop greater understanding of what the governance principles or guidelines are that

matter most, for what types of sport organizations, and how these principles or guidelines affect organizational performance.

As space was limited, only one case, governance archetypes of Canadian NSOs, was presented. A next step is to undertake similar studies for organizations at different levels (e.g., IFs, local) and in different countries, given the context dependence of better governance principles and indicators. Only once this empirical work is conducted could researchers conceivably look to develop common guidelines/indicators across contexts, that are empirically-grounded and not top-down/theoretically-derived.

Implications for practitioners

Developing a clearer sense of the governance guidelines that take into account the organizations' context will have the most impact on a sport organization's performance and quality of their governance. It will assist policymakers and sport managers make better evidence-based decisions on investments in director training, governance reform, and monitoring of governance changes. This will also enable sport organizations, all of which face capacity challenges, to invest in the governance activities that truly matter and undertake meaningful efforts to improve their sport's governance for the benefit of their stakeholders.

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Table 1: Combined NSO governance archetype criteria and descriptors

| | Group 1 (n=8) | Group 2 (n=8) | Group 3 (n=3) | Group 4 (n=2) |
|---|---------------------------------------|---|--|---|
| Key values | Stakeholder engagement and governance | Governance, and some stakeholder engagement and diversity | Stakeholder engagement | Governance, stakeholder engagement and some diversity |
| Specialization | Rather small & flat | Tall | Tall with 1-2 offices | Complex |
| # Revenue sources | 2.63 | 3.00 | 3.00 | 3.50 |
| Revenue sources | Public, membership, sponsors | Membership, sponsors, broadcasting | Public, membership, sponsors | Public, membership, sponsors, hosting |
| Revenue dominance | Public to membership | Public | Public to membership | Sponsors to broadcasters |
| Formalization (# policies) | Lower | Medium | Medium | Higher |
| Centralization | Centralized around the board | Centralized around the CEO | Mixed locus of decision-making | Decentralized |
| Personnel (#FTEs) | 3.25 | 11.78 | 20.50 | 58.00 |
| Budget (\$) | 822,312.50 | 2,867,312.50 | 6,818,666.67 | 22,750,000.00 |
| # BoD members | 7.38 | 8.13 | 8.33 | 12.50 |
| % women on BoD | 35% | 41% | 39% | 33% |
| Performance (effectiveness & efficiency) | Participant-based; high efficiency | Financial; Med-high efficiency | Meeting organizational objectives; medium-lower efficiency | Meeting organizational objectives; lower efficiency |
| External accountability | Medium | High | Medium | High |
| Transparency | Medium-high | Lower | Lower | High |
| Stakeholder participation | Lower | High | Medium | High |
| Interpretation/governance archetype | Boardroom-led | CEO-led | Professional-led | Corporate |