

Canada's Immigration Policy, Moral Obligations and Global Justice

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1. Introduction

Canada and other liberal democratic countries are prime destinations for immigrants in search of a better life. This is, mostly, because these countries enjoy economic prosperity rooted in their social and political traditions (Shukla 91) (Wolff 243). Immigration policies are, therefore, increasingly important for determining who is allowed into a country's borders and who is excluded from entry. To further its national interests, Canada's immigration policy is primarily focused on maintaining the size of the country's "working age population at a time when Canada's overall population is aging and the need for skilled talent is increasing" (Government of Canada). Accordingly, Canada has an immigration system in place that selects immigrants on the basis of their academic and professional qualifications. The Canadian government considers its approach to immigration to be an "overall success" for meeting the country's economic, social and humanitarian objectives. The policy has, however, been described as being "unusually selective" (Alba and Foner 4). It has been argued that this creates "brain drain" (Wolff 251) when skilled professionals are poached from countries which the United Nations (UN) has classified as being Least Developed Countries (LDCs).

An overriding issue of concern in the debate on immigration is the extent to which host countries should allow immigrants, in search of a better life, into their borders and the implications of this decision (Miller) (Carens) (Collier). On the one hand, nationalists support the state's sovereign right to restrict immigrant entry and to control who may reside within a state's territory. Cosmopolitans, on the other hand, advocate for more open borders on the basis that we are all equal citizens of the world and, as a result, political boundaries should have no moral significance (Wolff 240).

In this paper, I defend Canada's nationalist approach to immigration because it allows Canadians to exercise control over their national priorities and the future direction of their political community. Canada's nationalist approach also allows Canadians preserve their national identity and the resourcefulness that it engenders. I base my arguments primarily on John Rawls' claims that reasonable people, interested in furthering their individual interests, want to live in a society in which they can cooperate with other members of the society in a manner that is, largely, agreed upon and accepted by all members. On this basis, members of the society are willing to establish and abide by mutually agreed upon principles of justice to guide the assignment and distribution of rights, advantages and obligations within their society (ToJ 150-156). I also argue that, while the loss of skilled professionals to emigration can be beneficial, immigrants who originate from LDCs owe obligations to those left behind.

In view of the myriad of challenges that LDCs face, I support Rawls' claims regarding the guilt that is felt when an agent fails to honour their duties and obligations. Of the different types and stages of guilt, he emphasizes that moral guilt points towards a moral ideal and feelings of principle-guilt are, in particular, a manifestation of a person's acquisition of a "sense of justice" (ToJ 496-505). I argue, therefore, that without feelings of principle-guilt towards those left behind, an immigrant from an LDC is not likely to be a good citizen of Canada. Finally, I argue that Canada's immigration policy can contribute towards achieving the ideal of a better world.

My arguments are important for two reasons. Firstly, in describing why some countries prosper economically while others do not, Rawls states that "the causes of the wealth of a people and the forms it takes lie in their political culture and in the religious, philosophical, and moral traditions that support the basic structure of their political and social institutions" (LoP 108).

With this diagnosis, Rawls implies that by changing some of their social, political and moral traditions, LDCs can potentially revise their domestic situations. While respecting the freedom and independence of such societies, Rawls advocates for countries with more effective social and political traditions to assist those living under unfavourable conditions so that they can have a more just society (LoP 37). This duty to assist has a crucial implication for Canada. To be able to assist disadvantaged societies, Canada needs to ensure that its own social, political and moral traditions, as contained in the *Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms*, are preserved and strengthened. Unrestricted immigration, however, poses a threat to some of the rights and freedoms that underlie Canada's social and political traditions.

Secondly, according to Gallup world surveys, for the period between 2015 and 2017, more than 750 million people or 15% of the world's adults would move to another country if given the opportunity. Of all the continents, sub-Saharan Africa had the highest percentage of people who would like to migrate at 33%. Two countries in the region, Sierra Leone and Liberia, had the largest number of people wanting to migrate per country at 71% and 66% respectively (Esipova, Pugliese and Ray). Due to immigration restrictions, only a small percentage of people actually migrate from these countries. The survey demonstrates, however, that a significant number of people view their happiness and well-being as existing in a different society.

While emigration is not a problem for big middle-income countries, the loss of skilled professionals can be damaging for those left behind in LDCs. In addition to being low-income countries, the UN describes LDCs as “confronting severe structural impediments to sustainable development. They are highly vulnerable to economic and environmental shocks and have low levels of human assets” (United Nations). The emigration of skilled professionals from these

countries is, therefore, worth examining to ensure that their losses to emigration are in some ways acknowledged and also compensated for.

In presenting my arguments, I first clarify my use of key terms. I then explain Rawls' ideas on the principles of justice as they relate to both the domestic and international sphere. I then provide an overview of Canada's immigration policy while discussing its nationalist implications. I then defend Canada's nationalist approach to immigration for two reasons. Firstly, based on the intrinsic value of a shared national identity and, secondly, based on the benefits derived from prioritising the needs of those who share the same political community over the needs of outsiders. In relation to my arguments, I then respond to three questions. Firstly, is the loss of skilled professionals damaging to those left behind in LDCs? Secondly, does an immigrant from an LDC owe obligations to their country of origin and what implications does this have for their being Canadian citizens? Thirdly, can Canada's immigration policy contribute towards the ideal of a better world?

2. Use of Key Terms

I use the terms 'immigrant', 'migrant' or 'economic immigrant' to refer primarily to those who, following an application process, are selected on the basis of their educational or professional qualifications. I recognise, however, that refugees and asylum seekers are also immigrants. Depending on the context, I refer to them separately as 'refugees' given the humanitarian nature of their admission as established under international law. Although my main focus is Canada, I use the terms 'host country' or 'host society' interchangeably to refer to liberal democratic countries. They reflect what Rawls describes as being "well-ordered" societies (ToJ 4) in three primary ways. Firstly, their members accept the same widely known principles of justice. Secondly, their political and social institutions fit together as systems of cooperation that

are known to satisfy the widely known and accepted principles of justice. Thirdly, their citizens have an effective sense of justice on the basis of which they comply with their society's political and social institutions and widely regard them as being just (Political Liberalism 35). In referring to 'LDCs', I focus mainly on LDCs in sub-Saharan Africa. To varying degrees, they fit into what Rawls describes as "outlaw states" or "burdened societies" (LoP 105-106). According to Rawls, though organised in certain respects, outlaw states have faulty political traditions, institutions of law, moral beliefs and underlying cultures. He describes burdened societies as lacking favourable political and cultural conditions. Essentially, they lack the required human capital, know-how, material and technological resources to be well-ordered societies

I use the term 'moral obligation' to refer to Kant's conception of 'duty', a term that is rooted in his ideas on freedom, autonomy and rationality or the use of reason. To guide our use of reason, Kant states that "a good will" is the only thing in the world that is good without limitation (Groundwork 9). For Kant, acting in favour of what one reasonably considers to be good is intrinsically good (Groundwork 10). Kant adds, however, that being reasonable is not sufficient for reliably guiding our wills. In employing our use of reason, he argues that we must act out of a sense of "duty" which he defines as "the necessity of an action from respect for the law" (Groundwork 16). By 'the law', Kant is referring to the "categorical imperative" as the fundamental principle of morality from which all our duties and obligations can be derived.

While a "hypothetical imperative" is based on desire and represents actions that we engage in to achieve other objectives, a categorical imperative constrains our wills and guides us to engage in actions that are objectively good in themselves without reference to other objectives (Groundwork 28). Kant's categorical imperative is, in summary, that we are to engage only in actions that can be universally adopted. We are also to treat our own selves and others always as

ends and never only as means to an end. This signifies respecting the intrinsic worth, freedom, autonomy and rationality of oneself while extending the same respect to others. In a nutshell, as explained by Allen Wood, Kant's view of 'duty' refers to the respect we owe to humanity in ourselves as well as in others. It also refers to the forms of moral self-constraint that we must exercise in order to be reasonable persons (Wood 159).

3. Rawls' Ideas on the Principles of Justice

Rawls builds on Kant's ideas in conceiving of principles of justice to guide relations between reasonable persons in a society. He argues that the basic structure of a society where each person is concerned with individually furthering their own interests would be one that treats everyone as an end and never only as a means to an end. In other words, reasonable people would want a society where each person's intrinsic worth is recognised, and where each person can further their own interests without impeding or exploiting others. For Rawls, this does not imply treating everyone in exactly the same way. It does imply, however, treating everyone in accordance with principles that reasonable persons would consent to in what he describes as an "original position of equality" (ToJ 155).

In explaining the original position of equality, Rawls describes a hypothetical situation where free reasonable persons are to adopt principles of justice for regulating the assignment and distribution of rights, duties and advantages within their society. To ensure neutrality, the principles are agreed upon behind a "veil of ignorance" (ToJ 11). The veil blinds everyone to distinguishable factors about themselves and others such as status, strength, intelligence and other natural abilities. This is to encourage everyone to select principles that would further their own interests while avoiding principles that would be disadvantageous to anyone. From this original position of equality, Rawls argues, reasonable persons are likely to draw up principles of

justice that are fair to everyone in two ways. Firstly, they would give everyone basic liberties, civil and political rights. Secondly, everyone would have a fair equality of opportunity to prevent anyone from being discriminated against. To clarify what he means by this, Rawls introduces the “difference principle” (ToJ 52-54) which allows for some economic inequality as long as it makes the most disadvantaged members as well off as possible. While equal basic rights and equality of opportunity should always be respected, Rawls argues that some inequality in society would be to everyone’s advantage. For example, in Canada and other host societies, the higher taxes paid by wealthier members are used to support the disadvantaged. For Rawls, these principles should inform and regulate the basic structure of institutions for the distribution of rights, advantages and obligations in a liberal democratic society.

In *The Law of Peoples*, Rawls modifies and extends his ideas on principles of justice to the global community by envisioning a better world for the future. In doing so, he proposes principles of justice to regulate relations between independent states (114-115). In describing his motivation for envisioning a better world, Rawls refers to how the cruelties of political injustice have resulted in unjust wars, oppression, religious persecution and poverty. For Rawls, the most serious forms of political injustice and their negative effects can be eliminated through social policies and basic institutions that are just or that are, at least, decently non-liberal (6-7). In this regard, Rawls describes a social contract with what he describes as the “society of peoples” (3). By this he means reasonable persons who, within the context of their respective political communities, relate with each other while respecting a conception of justice that aligns with the principles of international law and practice.

In this international social contract, which can be accepted by both liberal and non-liberal societies, Rawls argues that reasonable persons should agree to eight principles of justice which he states as follows:

1) Peoples are free and independent, and their freedom and independence are to be respected by other peoples; 2) Peoples are to observe treaties and undertakings; 3) Peoples are equal and are parties to the agreements that bind them; 4) Peoples are to observe the duty of non-intervention; 5) Peoples have the right of self-defense but no right to instigate war for reasons other than self-defense; 6) Peoples are to honor human rights; 7) Peoples are to observe certain specified restrictions in the conduct of war; 8) Peoples have a duty to assist other peoples living under unfavourable conditions that prevent their having a just or decent political and social regime. (LoP 37)

In a better world, where these eight principles regulate relations between states, Rawls considers immigration to be a phenomenon that would disappear once the causes of migration, such as persecution, oppression and poverty, are eliminated. On restricting immigration, he states that “an important role of government, however arbitrary a society’s boundaries may appear from a historical point of view, is to be the effective agent of a people as they take responsibility for their territory and the size of their population as well as for maintaining the land’s integrity” (LoP 8-9). Essentially, Rawls places emphasis on the state’s sovereign right to protect its territory and control the size of its population by placing restrictions on immigration.

4. Overview of Canada’s Immigration Policy

Canada’s immigration policy, as set out in the Immigration and Refugee Protection Act (IRPA, 2002), is in accordance with Rawls’ view on immigration. It promotes Canada’s right to protect its territory and to control entry into its borders. To serve Canada’s interests, the policy

seeks to develop “a strong and prosperous Canadian economy, in which the benefits of immigration are shared across all regions of Canada” (Government of Canada). As a country made up primarily of immigrants and their descendants, Canada has had a selective approach to immigration since the late nineteenth century (Stead 56). By the 1960s, this approach shifted from being on the basis of race and country of origin to being on the basis of human capital criteria for two reasons. Firstly, following a post war period during which 82% of its immigrants were from Europe, Canada was faced with a shrinking supply of European immigrants. Secondly, changes to its immigration policy made the U.S. more attractive to skilled immigrants from Asia, the Caribbean, Africa and the Middle East for whom international demand was steadily rising (Alba and Foner 27). To compete favourably with the U.S., Canada introduced the “points system” to select immigrants on the basis of their educational and professional qualifications (Ferrer, Picot and Riddell 848-9).

The main objective of the IRPA is to address the problem of an ageing population, low fertility rates and a growing decline in Canada’s worker-to-retiree ratio which projections currently put at 2 to 1 by 2036 (Government of Canada). As of the 2016 census, those born outside Canada or recent immigrants, accounted for 21.9% of the Canadian population. Asia accounted for 61.8% of these recent immigrants while Africa ranked second, ahead of Europe, with a share of 13.4% (Statistics Canada). In 2020, Canada increased its annual immigration targets from between 250,000 and 300,000 to over 400,000 for the years 2021 to 2023. According to the Canadian government, the increase is “to help the Canadian economy recover from COVID-19, drive future growth and create jobs for middle class Canadians” (Immigration, Refugees and Citizenship Canada). The government also states that maintaining Canada’s annual immigration levels at 1% of the country’s 40 million population “is needed to ensure that our

economy continues to grow and can rely on a diverse and skilled supply of labour to compete globally” (Government of Canada).

These policy statements indicate that Canada has a nationalist approach to immigration in two ways. Firstly, to meet its objectives on immigration, the IRPA places more emphasis on selecting immigrants that will contribute both socially and economically to the country’s overall well-being (Government of Canada). As explained by Jonathan Wolff, immigration policies that seek to attract immigrants on the basis of such criteria imply a nationalist position. Conversely, immigration policies that focus mainly on criteria that are in the interest of the immigrant, such as their need to migrate and existing family ties in the host country, imply a cosmopolitan position. While nationalist policies evaluate an immigrant’s desire to migrate against national interests, cosmopolitan policies evaluate an immigrant’s desire to migrate on the basis of factors in the interest of the immigrant (Wolff 246). Beyond Canada, host countries like the United Kingdom also have in place nationalist immigration policies. For example, their revised immigration policy seeks to “open up the UK to the brightest and the best from around the world”. It envisages an overall reduction in levels of immigration while giving “top priority to those with the highest skills and the greatest talents: scientists, engineers, academics and other highly-skilled workers” (GOV.UK).

Secondly, Canada’s nationalist position on immigration is demonstrated by the number of economic immigrants it admits relative to the number of admitted refugees. Between 2011 and 2016, approximately 60% of immigrants to Canada were admitted under the economic category, 30% to reunite families and approximately 10% as refugees and asylum seekers (Government of Canada). Canada has been criticised for this imbalance. In proportion to its population, Canada ranks highly among countries receiving new immigrants. In accepting refugees, however, it

ranks very low relative to other host countries. It has been argued that, given the number of economic immigrants that Canada attracts, it also has an obligation to receive a substantial number of refugees and asylum seekers (Ugland 110). I agree with this criticism and also argue that, by increasing the number of admitted refugees and asylum seekers, Canada's humanitarian support would be more in line with the duty which Rawls argues that liberal states have to assist those living under disadvantageous conditions (LoP 37).

Beyond Canada's commitment to immigration, immigrants are drawn to Canada because it is a secure country that is globally recognised for its dedication to the protection of human rights and respect for the rule of law. It also has a strong commitment to liberal democratic principles. Accordingly, Canada has in place a social system of cooperation that protects the wellbeing of its citizens. The attitude of the Canadian public towards immigration is also largely positive, relative to other host countries. In Canada, there is wide support for multiculturalism and ethnic diversity (Ugland 13-14). Within three years of being admitted into Canada as permanent residents, immigrants are able to apply to become citizens upon meeting requirements of residency, language and knowledge of Canada. As citizens, they take on all the responsibilities, benefits and opportunities that come with being Canadian (Government of Canada). In other words, and in accordance with Rawls' idea on the basic structure of society, they become partakers in the societal distribution of rights, advantages and obligations.

5. In Defence of Canada's Nationalist Approach to Immigration

In line with Rawls' position on immigration, I argue in favour of Canada's nationalist approach to immigration on the basis of two interrelated arguments. Firstly, on the basis of the intrinsic value of a shared national identity. Secondly, on the basis of prioritising obligations owed to compatriots, as members of the same political community, over obligations that are

owed to outsiders. I then argue that, despite its nationalist view, Canada's immigration policy demonstrates its commitment to and respect for liberal democratic principles.

In his arguments, David Miller defends the right that each state has to maintain its national sovereignty, defend its national interests and protect the common good of members of its community. In presenting the benefits of a shared national identity, he discusses immigrant integration and the difficulties that their inability to integrate creates in host societies. In this regard, Miller makes reference to the liberal utilitarian philosopher Henry Sidgwick. In spelling out the state's rights on immigration in the 19th century, Sidgwick argued that it was justifiable for states to be selective in admitting immigrants. He stated that "the governmental function of promoting moral and intellectual culture might be rendered hopelessly difficult by the continual inflowing streams of alien immigrants, with diverse moral habits and religious traditions" (Strangers in Our Midst 5). The selectiveness of government in deciding who to admit was, as Sidgwick's statement demonstrates, considered to be part of the government's function of promoting a desirable and sustainable public culture.

In putting forward his theory of justice, Rawls is critical of Sidgwick's classic doctrine of utilitarianism which attests that a "society is rightly ordered, and therefore just, when its major institutions are arranged so as to achieve the greatest net balance of satisfaction summed over all the individuals belonging to it" (ToJ 20). Rawls' main criticism against this stance is that it does not directly address how "satisfactions" are distributed among individuals and how they are distributed over time (ToJ 22-23). Despite their theoretical differences, however, both Rawls and Sidgwick agree that immigration needs to be strongly controlled in the interest of the host society.

In his arguments, Miller explains how, in about a century since Sidgwick shared his ideas on immigration, the promotion of international human rights increasingly imposes greater responsibilities on host societies in their treatment of those he describes as “newer immigrants” (*Strangers in Our Midst* 6). These changes are that, firstly, states now have positive duties to admit refugees and asylum seekers. Secondly, immigrants now benefit from wider scopes of toleration that multicultural policies give to minority groups. These developments have relieved immigrants of the pressure to assimilate into the dominant culture of their host societies. The idea of equality of opportunity, has also been strengthened by respect for human rights. This is by ensuring that an immigrant’s access to opportunities is not affected by their cultural background. Miller argues that the reduced pressure on immigrants to assimilate into their host society has, however, created problems. Miller describes how immigrants tend to live in clusters with fellow immigrants who share their nationality of origin and cultural background. These immigrant communities are often in deprived areas and tend to perpetuate social segregation between immigrants and other members of their host society. This in turn breeds conflict, resentment and racism between both groups. He explains that, in response to this challenge, some have argued for a celebration of diversity without requiring that immigrants either assimilate into or absorb the dominant culture (*Strangers in Our Midst* 130-133).

For Miller, the celebration of diversity in host societies is problematic. He explains the reasons why by clarifying the difference between three forms of immigrant integration namely, social, civic, and cultural integration. For Miller, social integration refers to patterns of behaviour and the extent to which people interact across a range of social contexts such as at work, clubs, associations, etc. Civic integration, on the other hand, involves sharing the principles, norms and values that guide a host society’s social and political life. This includes practices and norms like

voting and adhering to relevant behavioural rules and measures for handling disputes. Lastly, cultural integration is about sharing a common culture through shared values and experiences. This can occur by enjoying similar TV programs, films, music, books, etc.

Miller argues that social integration is essential. It is a requirement for not just civic integration but also for accessing social justice. He explains that when immigrants live together in clusters, for example, they deny themselves access to physical, human and social capital. Furthermore, Miller argues, social integration is required for creating understanding, communication and trust within a society. Beyond social and civic integration, Miller argues that an immigrant's cultural integration is important. This is because it allows immigrants to identify fully with their host society. It also allows them to adopt its national identity (*Strangers in Our Midst* 130-144). While acknowledging that a host society's notion of national identity needs to recognise the cultural diversity that immigrants bring, Miller argues that a shared national identity is intrinsically valuable. It also provides the basis for what he describes as "compatriot partiality" (*Strangers in Our Midst* 21) and its resulting "associative obligations" (*Strangers in Our Midst* 26).

According to Miller, compatriot partiality is the generally accepted understanding that states treat their citizens more favourably by giving them a plethora of rights, benefits and opportunities that outsiders are not entitled to. He also explains that associative obligations create a multidimensional relationship between members of the same political community in three ways. Firstly, members are involved in an inclusive economic scheme of cooperation. In principle, this allows everyone enjoy a higher standard of life than would otherwise be the case. Secondly, members are able to control the direction of their association and to determine what its priorities should be. Citizens relate with one another as members participating in a political and

legal scheme that offers them an array of rights and responsibilities. Thirdly, members share similar cultural values and have a shared sense of communal and ancestral belonging which Miller argues provides a kind of solidarity that complements their economic and political relationships.

Miller's first two arguments are in line with Rawls' position on the ways in which rights, advantages and obligations should be distributed within a liberal society. In describing the "public sense of justice" that compatriots share, Rawls states that it "makes their secure association together possible". He further states that "among individuals with disparate aims and purposes a shared conception of justice limits the pursuit of other ends" (ToJ 5). In other words, a shared conception of justice enhances their social cooperation while reducing the achievement of individual objectives in ways that would disrespect or abuse a person's intrinsic worth or that of others. For the third point made by Miller, on sharing cultural values, compatriots are likely to share a similar ancestral heritage that significantly shapes their cultural values. While this does not prevent others from participating socially and politically as members of such societies, Miller argues that shared cultural values are important for the harmony required for social, economic and political relationships.

I agree with Miller's arguments on integration, especially since he also acknowledges the reality of cultural diversity. In this regard, he argues that, while cultural integration is important, it should not be a requirement for an immigrant's integration into their host society. He considers it to be, instead, an aspiration that an immigrant can recognise, acknowledge and then hopefully work towards (Strangers in Our Midst 145-149). As an aspiration, Miller recognises a shared national identity to be an ideal that some immigrants may not achieve. This reality needs to, therefore, be taken into consideration before immigrants are granted entry into a host society. To

buttress this point, Miller makes reference to immigrants from non-liberal societies for whom the expectation to adopt liberal values may cause inner conflicts, alienation and feelings of disloyalty (Strangers in Our Midst 8). He also maintains that discussions in host societies around the extent to which public policies should balance national identity with accommodating diversity is evidence that a national identity is widely considered as worth preserving (Strangers in Our Midst 28-30).

On the importance of a shared national identity, Miller describes its resourceful nature and the benefits to be derived from its intrinsic value. He states that:

... a shared national identity is a resource that can allow a society to solve collective action problems, pursue policies of social justice, and function more effectively as a democracy. It matters that the identity should be inclusive because part of its *raison d'être* is to establish trust between groups who might otherwise be disposed to treat each other with hostility or disdain. My argument here rests on the simple psychological claim that we are disposed to sympathize with, help, trust, and take responsibility for those with whom we feel we have something in common, and a sense of identity creates this feeling of likeness even with people with whom we are not in direct contact. (Strangers in Our Midst 145)

I discuss two interrelated points from Miller's statement.

Firstly, the inclusive nature of a shared national identity. In his arguments, Miller acknowledges that the idea of 'nationality' has been used to justify exclusivity and crimes against humanity such as occurred in WWII, Rwanda and the former Yugoslavia and Soviet Republics. He also recognises that promoting national identity can lead to assertions of superiority and inferiority among national groups. In addition, it can fictitiously promote a

national narrative that is selective in its representation (On Nationality 184). Rather than repress the principle of nationality because of these distasteful aspects, Miller urges a reassessment of nationalist views including, for example, a new understanding of what it means to be Canadian or German. Similarly, Bernard Yack has argued that justice counterbalances the undesirable tendencies that promoting nationality can evoke. According to Yack, beyond a shared heritage of experiences, national community is derived from associated feelings of what he describes as “social friendship” (45-46). For Yack, this is the special consideration that is given to each person’s well-being based on feelings of mutual connectedness, concern and cooperation. To ensure morality, he argues that social friendship must be counterbalanced by justice. While social friendship motivates us to show special consideration for community members, justice requires that we respond impartially to what people are owed as a matter of justice (164). As a justice requirement, therefore, a shared national identity should not exclude immigrants once they become members of a host society’s political community.

Secondly, the obligations and responsibilities derived from a shared national identity. In describing the psychological implications of a shared national identity, Miller argues that it creates emotional attachments, a sense of belonging and deeper associations that are extended in time. For Miller, “the obligations it creates stretch backward and forward—they can be inherited from the past and owed to future generations” (Strangers in Our Midst 27-28). This speaks to the depth of the commitments and obligations that arise from sharing a national identity with other people. In this regard, Miller argues that most people have a natural predisposition towards seeing continuity between their own lives and those of their ancestors (On Nationality 184). He argues that contained in the principle of nationality is the idea of existing as an ethical community. He explains that this ethical significance exists in the sense that our national identity

legitimately affects how we understand our moral commitments towards other humans. Through a national identity, a person acknowledges that they owe special obligations to fellow-nationals, or compatriots, which they do not owe to other people (On Nationality 48-49).

Joseph Carens holds a contrary view. As an advocate for the cosmopolitan view on immigration, he argues that liberal democratic principles greatly constrain the manner in which host societies can handle the issue of immigration. As the moral commitments that underlie social and political institutions in host societies, he argues that these principles include the recognition that all humans are of equal moral worth. There are, as a result, basic human rights that all individuals intrinsically possess. There is the duty to respect the rights and freedoms of all individuals and to not discriminate against anyone on the basis of race, religion or gender. There is also the requirement that host societies respect norms like fairness and reciprocity (Ethics 2). On the basis of these principles, Carens argues that it is morally unjustifiable for states to restrict entry into their borders. He considers it to be unjust and at odds with the fundamental democratic values that host societies claim to represent (Ethics 225-230).

In relating this to immigrant integration, Carens argues that liberal democratic values require a commitment to equality of opportunity and freedom from domination. They also require mutual respect, compromise, and fairness. He argues that, in keeping with efforts to avoid the tyranny of majorities over minorities in host societies, immigrants should be protected because they are an important and vulnerable category of minorities. Democratic principles, therefore, require their full integration. For this to take place, he argues, host societies cannot demand social and cultural assimilation as a prerequisite for immigrant integration. This is for the same reason that, even in the face of religious friction, members of a host society cannot be required to adopt the religious views of the majority. He explains that the reality of living in a

liberal democratic society is that people live together with profound differences and build a shared political community in the face of social and cultural diversity. For Carens, as long as there is no harm to others, the differences of culture and identity that immigrants bring to their host societies are an unavoidable consequence of respecting everyone's individual rights and freedoms (Overview 543-545).

On compatriot partiality, Carens acknowledges that there is the need to care more for those who are closest to us. In recognizing the equal moral worth of all humans, he does not require that the same weight and consideration be given to all humans regardless of distance or emotional attachment. From a moral perspective, however, he argues that there are limits to the claims that can be made on the basis of communal attachments. For Carens, these claims are limited because justice must constrain how favour is granted to compatriots over outsiders. He argues that while some ways of favouring compatriots are morally permissible, others are not. For instance, he argues, it is morally impermissible to favour members of a host society by denying entry to reasonable immigrants in search of a better life. To further illustrate this point, Carens uses the analogy of the family. He explains that while it is permissible to give priority to one's children, it is not always permissible to do so. For instance, it would be unfair to favour one's children while they are playing games with other children (Ethics 273-274).

Carens makes an important point about the moral commitments that host societies have to liberal democratic principles and how notions of justice must constrain certain aspects of communal attachments. I argue, however, that he undermines the extent to which communal attachments make adherence to liberal democratic values possible. Rawls' original position of equality is founded on the assumption that reasonable persons in a given society would react to the distribution of rights, advantages and obligations in a manner that would further their

individual interests (ToJ 155). In this regard, he describes “self-respect and a sure confidence in the sense of one’s worth” as the most important primary good (ToJ 358). What is considered to be in a person’s interest is, to a large extent, shaped by the dominant cultural and moral beliefs that govern the person’s society and, therefore, varies from one society to another. This difference in societal ideals affects the degree to which a given society is able to effectively create, sustain and eventually benefit from its social and political institutions. In relating this to communal attachments, I argue that liberal democratic values cannot emerge or be adhered to in societies where individuals disrespect core liberal principles, such as respecting their own intrinsic worth as well as that of others.

Based on Carens’ arguments, liberal democratic principles are the basis for admitting immigrants in search of a better life into host societies. These same principles can, however, be eroded by conflicting values and need to be preserved. As earlier discussed, Rawls describes how the differences in economic prosperity between societies is attributable to “religious, philosophical, and moral traditions that support the basic structure of their political and social institutions” (LoP 108). In other words, to understand why one society is rich and another is poor, we need to examine their respective societal beliefs. From the huge number of people willing to migrate in contemporary times, and the direction towards which they migrate, we can discern that immigrants consider some societal beliefs to be more conducive for furthering their individual interests than others.

In explaining how host societies have better political and economic institutions, Paul Collier argues that they have, built into their social norms, the capacity for higher trust, cooperation and an enhanced ability to empathize with each other. He explains how these factors facilitate the emergence of effective organizations which promote higher productivity among

their workforce (Collier 28-35). He also argues that immigrants affect the sense of mutual regard that exists in host societies by reducing levels of loyalty, solidarity, reciprocated trust and cooperation (Collier 61-64). He also refers empirical research which demonstrate that the greater the proportion of immigrants in a community, the lower the levels of mutual trust between them and the host population (Collier 74-75). Since the research was conducted in the US, however, it is probable that variables such as race and economic factors affected its outcome. Nevertheless, non-liberal norms and cultures are potentially harmful for host societies and can breed mistrust and suspicion within them. Rawls describes how, without principles of justice, “distrust and resentment corrode the ties of civility, and suspicion and hostility tempts men to act in ways they would otherwise avoid” (LoP 6).

While these factors are not a basis for treating immigrants from non-liberal societies with condescension, they have implications for immigrant admission which Canada’s immigration policy clearly recognises. While Canada currently encourages and celebrates multiculturalism and ethnic diversity, it has not always been this way as a society. It has been argued that, in its earlier developmental stages, Canada benefitted from the resourcefulness and cooperation that comes with sharing a common ancestral heritage (Yack 23-24). In other words, this strong foundation is what now affords Canada the ability to encourage and celebrate multiculturalism and ethnic diversity. By selecting its immigrants, therefore, Canada can ensure that core aspects of its moral and philosophical beliefs are protected, and that its social and political institutions continue to be effective and even strengthened. This is especially important given that, as stated by Collier, “migrants are essentially escaping from countries with dysfunctional social models” (Collier 34). I argue, therefore, that Canada’s immigration policy is, contrary to Carens arguments, actively preserving and promoting liberal democratic principles. It is doing so by

ensuring that Canada remains a society where each person's intrinsic worth is recognised, and where each person can further their own interests without impeding or exploiting others.

The arguments I have presented in defence of Canada's nationalist approach to immigration have two implications. Firstly, the intrinsic value of a shared national identity and giving priority to compatriots also applies to the societies that immigrants originate from, especially when the society is poor and impoverished. While there are challenges with national identities in LDCs, it has been argued that their being fragile states makes national identities even stronger markers of people's identities (Grotenhuis 125-126). Secondly, while Canada's interests are being served by its immigration policy, immigrants first belonged to existing societies that could benefit from their continued presence and for whom an immigrant's decision to migrate now constitutes a human capital loss.

6. Is the Loss of Skilled Professionals Damaging to those Left Behind?

Scholars discuss the damage that immigration does to those left behind within the context of the "brain drain" that occurs when skilled professionals leave their countries in search of a better life in a richer more developed country (Miller, *Strangers in Our Midst* 111) (Brock 200-205) (Wolff 251-253) (Collier 196-200). Miller argues that those most likely to lose out from a host country's selective immigration policy are countries that are small, poor and already dealing with human right shortfalls. The loss of skilled professionals in such countries is, for Miller, most felt in the health sector with some countries losing up to three quarters of their trained medical staff to emigration. In speaking of this problem in relation to Africa, Gillian Brock explains the nature of the distribution of health care professionals around the world. She describes how, with 21% of the world's population, Europe and North America have 45% of the world's doctors and 61% of its nurses. On the contrary, with 13% of the world's population,

Africa has only 3% of the world's doctors and 5% of its nurses (200). As argued by Wolff immigrants lose the opportunity to contribute towards the growth and development of their home countries. They also deprive those left behind of much needed public resources. He explains that when skilled professionals, trained at the public's expense migrate to wealthier countries, they create a situation where host countries receive "a massive subsidy from the developing world" (251).

Wolff describes the loss of skilled professionals from LDCs as being experienced in three ways. Firstly, the loss of skilled professionals of which they had few of to begin with. Secondly, the loss of public resources spent on their education, training and development. Thirdly, the loss of the broader role that an immigrant would have played in their country's political and community life (252). Political losses to countries of origin has also been highlighted by Collier. He argues that the emigration of skilled professionals weakens democratic governance in LDCs. On the one hand, a country's diaspora can use external pressure to improve democratic governance in their countries of origin. On the other hand, however, the loss of educated people also weakens democratic governance since a democracy is more likely to flourish with a population of more educated people. By migrating, therefore, skilled professionals from LDCs deplete the amount of internal pressure that could improve democratic governance in their countries of origin (Collier 184).

Against these arguments, some scholars argue that human capital losses from LDCs to migration are offset by benefits that accrue from learning and networking opportunities. Additionally, the losses are offset by the inward flow of remittances in the form of money sent by immigrants to those left behind. In presenting their arguments on the positive effects of "brain drain", Frédéric Docquier and Hillel Rapoport argue that when human capital is concentrated in

the most advanced economies, it stimulates progress across the world that trickles down to less advanced economies in a number of ways. Firstly, the prospect of emigration has a positive effect on the education decisions that people make in LDCs. In view of the opportunity to migrate, people are more likely to take their educational advancement more seriously to increase their chances of migrating. The possibility of migrating, therefore, induces more people to invest in quality education resulting in “brain gain” for the country of origin (698). This is especially since most of those being educated are going to end up not being able to migrate. This is due to the costs and requirements involved in migrating as a skilled professional. Docquier and Rapoport also use empirical evidence to demonstrate that public expenditure on education is lower in countries that experience high-skill emigration. Rather than harm such countries, migration tends to provide an immense opportunity for those who migrate to benefit from free or subsidized education in host societies (718-719).

Another benefit from emigration is seen in certain fields, such as among scientists, where the migration of experts can facilitate the international spread of knowledge and technology through brain circulation and the development of knowledge networks. For LDCs, these networks are likely to facilitate technological spread and adoption among those left behind. In the area of trade, Docquier and Rapoport argue that immigrants reduce international transaction costs which facilitates the movement of goods and capital between their host and home countries (708-709). Linked to this, they argue, is the benefit of remittances in the form of money sent by immigrants to their countries of origin. It has been argued that such monies could help with cash flow in an LDC. They could also stimulate investments in education and reduce levels of poverty. The positive effects of remittances, however, depends on the amounts transferred and the manner in which it is distributed (704).

Despite its size and potential benefits, Brock argues that remittances contribute towards economic inequality in an immigrant's country of origin. This is because, firstly, remittances are targeted towards private consumption and usually benefit only an immigrant's immediate family members and close contacts. By implication, they are typically not received by the most disadvantaged amongst those left behind. Secondly, remittances do not usually support the provision of public goods and services such as infrastructural development, basic education, security, health care and sanitation. These facilities, however, have a huge impact on tackling structural poverty and contribute significantly to making a society worthwhile to live in (205).

I agree with Brock's arguments on the basis of Rawls' ideas about the structure of effective social and political institutions within a prosperous society. To be effective, sustainable and in the interest of everyone, including the most disadvantaged, the resources for building economic prosperity need to be generated within the society and not externally. For example, the World Bank has reported a sharp decline in the flow of remittances into LDCs, by about 20% in 2020, due to the global economic crisis induced by the COVID-19 pandemic (World Bank). This attests to the unreliability of remittances in achieving reliable and sustainable growth and development in LDCs.

In their arguments, Docquier and Rapoport acknowledge that the benefits of emigration are more likely to be felt in big emerging economies like China, India, Indonesia and Brazil than in small and medium-sized African countries (702). This is because larger populations and bigger economies are better positioned and able to withstand negative impacts from the emigration of skilled professionals. They acknowledge that African countries are less likely to have the infrastructure in place to derive positive benefits from interactions with diaspora networks (723). They further explain that the public policies in place in bigger economies are

more likely to favour their deriving positive benefits from migration (725). For the bigger economies, as explained by Collier, there are also higher chances of immigrants returning home after acquiring additional knowledge and expertise in a host country than is the case for immigrants from LDCs (Collier 200-201). In Collier's estimation, LDCs are overall the losers from migration. He goes on to list examples of countries that could benefit from emigration controls most of which are LDCs in sub-Saharan Africa. Of these countries he states that:

Intractable poverty as a problem that warrants substantial and sustained international attention is becoming concentrated in the small, poor countries that have suffered significant net losses of their scarce skilled population. As their diasporas build up, their rate of emigration is likely to increase. For these societies, "brain drain" unfortunately remains the right concern. (Collier 203)

He acknowledges, however, that having controls on emigration is neither practical nor ethical.

I agree with Collier that the loss to emigration experienced by LDCs cannot justify emigration controls that force them to remain in their countries of origin. This is because an immigrant has moral obligations towards themselves which is usually their basis for migrating to another country. According to Kant, a man owes it to himself to maximise his own natural predispositions, capacities and potentials (Kant and Gregor, *Metaphysics of Morals* 239). Rawls also describes as "moral" a person who has chosen specific ends for themselves and, in fulfilling them, has a fundamental preference for conditions that enable them to express their nature as free and equal rational beings as fully as their life's circumstances would allow (ToJ 561). This does not signify a right to migrate. To be moral and to honour their duties to themselves, however, some skilled professionals from LDCs find themselves having to migrate to countries like Canada who are in need of their presence. This point is supported by scholars who argue that,

rather than “brain drain”, not being able to migrate often results in “brain waste” for some skilled professionals in LDCs (700). This is because fields of study in some countries of origin usually responds to emigration prospects and international demands for specific professions. When people trained in such professions are unable to migrate, their skills get wasted since or under-maximized and, in the end, everyone loses.

On the one hand, as already explained, it is neither practical nor ethical to control emigration from LDCs. On the other hand, however, it is important to ensure that these societies are not drained of their skilled professionals to the point where they can no longer continue to exist as independent and autonomous political communities. This is a possibility because many LDCs are small countries with small populations. Over 60% of LDCs have populations of below 20 million inhabitants. Some countries, specifically Comoros, Djibouti and Sao Tome and Principe, have populations of less than one million people each (World Bank). Losing their skilled professionals could, therefore, lead to the rest of their population becoming refugees and asylum seekers in the nearest future. We must, therefore, ensure their continued existence. In this regard, Collier refers to the concept of “existential value” (247) which means that even though we might never see the animal called a ‘panda’ in our lifetimes, our lives are enhanced from knowing they exist and are being preserved somewhere on the planet. This is because we realise that pandas have some form of intrinsic value. We must ensure that LDCs are preserved for their intrinsic value and must protect them from being wiped out due to human capital losses.

7. Does an Immigrant Owe Obligations to their Country of Origin?

I argue that, in ensuring that LDCs continue to exist, the immigrants who originate from them have a role to play because of the obligations that immigrants owe to their countries of origin. These obligations are not imperative and can take various forms depending on the

situation of the immigrant in their host country, and the extent to which the immigrant can continue to engage with their country of origin. In making this argument, I support Rawls' claim that principle-guilt is required for a person's moral development. It is also essential for their ability to acquire a "sense of justice" (ToJ 496-505). In view of this, I argue that without principle-guilt towards those left behind, an immigrant from an LDC is not likely to be a good citizen of Canada. According to Rawls, "a sense of justice is an effective desire to apply and to act from the principles of justice and so from the point of view of justice" (ToJ 497). He considers a sense of justice as something which persons possess. He further argues that an effective sense of justice regulates a person's desire to comply with corresponding principles of justice. He also links our having a sense of justice to our ability to persist in achieving our life plans (ToJ 498).

Rawls' notion of a 'life plan' is rooted in his idea of the "original position of equality" and how reasonable people would react to the distribution of rights, advantages and obligations in a manner that would further their own interests (ToJ 155). He argues that "rational individuals, whatever else they want, desire certain things as prerequisites for carrying out their plans of life" (ToJ 155). For Rawls, our lives are lived according to a plan on the basis of which we draw up our life's goals and objectives (ToJ 358). For Rawls, having an effective sense of justice aids rather than prevents us from achieving our objectives. He argues that, psychologically, a sense of justice consists of three parts which represent three forms of guilt feelings namely, authority guilt, association guilt, and principle-guilt (Sense of Justice 286).

Rawls describes 'authority guilt' as being related to the authority that parents have over children. Children do not have their own standards of criticism, and so they accept their parent's rules and precepts which, when violated, can induce feelings of guilt. He also describes

‘association guilt’ as guilt that is experienced between associates when promises or duties have not been fulfilled. ‘Principle-guilt’, on the other hand, is according to Rawls felt when those injured or put at a disadvantage are not persons with whom we are tied by any form of particular fellow-feeling (Sense of Justice 291). For Rawls this form of guilt is linked to a person’s participation in social and political institutions. He argues, for instance, that when we benefit from successful and enduring institutions or schemes of co-operation, we acquire a sense of justice as long as such institutions satisfy the widely known and accepted principles of justice.

On the basis Rawls’ arguments, I argue that principle-guilt is an appropriate guilt feeling that immigrants from LDCs should have towards their countries of origin based on benefits received from their country’s public resources prior to migrating. These benefits could be in the form of fully or partially subsidized healthcare, education, professional trainings or the use of publicly funded infrastructure and basic amenities such as water supply, electricity, public security, schools, roads and hospitals. Given the developmental problems that persist in LDCs, some of these amenities are not available at desirable levels. Nevertheless, many LDCs have decent enough infrastructure to sustain immigrants until they are considered as desirable to contribute to Canadian society both socially and economically. I argue, therefore, that immigrants without principle-guilt feelings towards those left behind are less likely to have such feelings towards their Canadian compatriots. As argued by Rawls, a person’s acquisition of a sense of justice is evident in at least two ways. Firstly, they would accept the institutions that they and others have benefited from as being just. This acceptance, Rawls argues, would reveal itself in feelings of guilt for violations which harm others, even if those harmed are not “the objects of any particular fellow-feelings” (Sense of Justice 292). Secondly, a person’s sense of

justice will manifest itself in a willingness to work for, or at least not oppose, the setting up of just institutions or the reform of existing ones where justice requires it.

While feelings of principle-guilt cannot be compelled, I argue that Canada's immigration policy should acknowledge the existence of these feelings and sentiments by providing avenues through which they can be expressed. This could be in the form of giving back in ways that are facilitated and recognised by the Canadian government. There is, however, a need for empirical evidence to establish the extent to which principle-guilt exists amongst immigrants from LDCs in Canada. There is, however, a related study which indicates that immigrants are generally found to be mentally and physically healthier upon arrival in Canada than the Canadian-born population. Their being healthier on arrival, referred to as the "healthy immigrant effect", tends to disappear over time partly due to stress and other integration challenges (Edward and Zhang). Another study indicates that, as time spent in Canada increases, the health of immigrants declines rapidly based on their mental and physical self-assessments. Of the geographical regions that immigrants originate from, the study reveals that levels of emotional problems among immigrants from Africa has been on the increase. Main sources of stress are related to employment and their economic situations (Robert and Gilkinson 8-12).

Scholars describe as the "immigrant bargain" (Alba and Foner 66) the decision by first generation immigrants from LDCs to migrate to countries like Canada. It signifies an immigrant's willingness to take on menial jobs in the hope of eventually creating a better future in their host country for themselves and, more realistically, for their children. Unfortunately, skilled professionals are not immune from engaging in this bargain which affects the immigrant's well-being as well as the extent to which the Canadian economy benefits from immigration (Alba and Foner 32). I argue that this challenge, mostly faced by first-generation

immigrants, can provide an opportunity for them to fulfil their moral obligations towards those left behind. This is especially since, from being in Canada, they are likely to have experienced within their host society the moral transformations that can be derived from “social friendship” (Yack 164) and acquiring a sense of justice.

8. Can Canada’s Immigration Policy Contribute towards the Ideal of a Better World?

In responding to this question, I first discuss Rawls’ idea of a “realistic utopia” (LoP 7) or, simply put, a better world. I then support Rawls’ claim that a better world is one in which the factors that currently drive migration, such as poverty and political instability, are greatly reduced. I then argue that Canada’s immigration policy can contribute towards achieving a better world. In this regard, I draw on an important point made by Carens on how open borders could reduce global inequality. I argue that some aspects of his point are relevant for Canada’s immigration policy.

Rawls’ idea of a better world for the future is one in which a social contract exists between liberal and non-liberal states. As long as the non-liberal states are decent, Rawls argues that they can relate with liberal states while respecting the eight principles of justice. To cater for the divergence of values and cultures, Rawls’ global ideal is one in which each society is free and independent. There is equality, respect for human rights and there are restrictions on the conduct of warfare. Lastly, members of disadvantaged societies are assisted by liberal societies, so that they can have in place more decent political and social arrangements (LoP 37). Rawls is not advocating for a reform of the global economic order nor is he advocating for equal rights, advantages and opportunities at the global level. Despite conceiving of the difference principle to cater for the disadvantaged within a unified liberal society, Rawls does not extend the difference principle to international relations between states. He argues that in a reasonably decent society,

inequalities of power and wealth should be decided upon within the confines of the political community (LoP 39). In other words, each society should be able to develop their own principles of justice for the distribution of rights, advantages and obligations.

Rawls' idea of a better world has been criticized for a number of reasons, as compiled by Brock (24-29), of which I discuss three. Firstly, rather than limit his initial principles of justice to a domestic setting, it has been argued that equal political rights, fair equality of opportunity and the difference principle should apply globally. This is especially since a global system of cooperation exists between states for ensuring that the most disadvantaged in the world are as well off as possible. In this regard, reference is made to the international agreements and cooperation mechanisms that exist to reduce poverty and underdevelopment in the poorest parts of the world. Secondly, Rawls has been criticized for assuming that states are sufficiently independent of each other and that each state can be held responsible for the wellbeing of its citizens. He has also been criticized for ignoring the unfavourable conditions that some societies are confronted with and the manner in which the global economic order perpetuates inequality in favour of rich developed countries. Thirdly, Rawls' aim of a realistic utopia has been criticized for not deviating sufficiently from the prevailing status quo on relations between states. By advocating for principles of non-intervention, freedom and independence, Rawls appears to tolerate unjust and unstable political regimes.

On extending the difference principle to the global level, Rawls argument is that the process of assisting burdened states does not require the same type of distributive justice that is necessary at domestic level. In this regard, the duty to assist disadvantaged states is not intended to adjust wealth or to regulate economic and social inequalities among different societies. For Rawls, great wealth is not required to establish a just or decent society. What needs to be

established, instead, is a social order that makes possible a worthwhile life for all citizens regardless of the society that they find themselves in (LoP 107). Rawls makes the point, however, that the structure of our international society should be such that the citizens of one country should not be treated as inferior to the citizens of another. He also argues that the duty to assist disadvantaged states is not to continue indefinitely. It is simply to “assist burdened societies to become full members of the society of peoples and to be able to determine the path of their own future for themselves” (Rawls, LoP 118). In other words, while acknowledging the need to help disadvantaged societies, Rawls respects each state’s right to self-determination and considers it important that they be treated with respect and dignity.

On the interdependent nature of states and the advantages that are enjoyed by rich developed countries, Rawls argues that the differences in levels of wealth and prosperity among societies is attributable to the political culture of burdened societies and is not based on the amount of resources at their disposal (LoP 108). In other words, he suggests that if outlaw states and burdened societies were to reconsider and reform their social and political traditions and attitudes, they could achieve greater wealth and development. In defence of Rawls, Brock states that it is not “reasonable to expect all decent societies to conform to all the norms of a constitutional democracy as a requirement of peacefully coexisting and cooperating with them. If we reject Rawls’ way of addressing the issues, it appears the only alternative is to intervene constantly in other states’ affairs, which seems very unattractive and destabilizing” (Brock 30). In other words, it is important to respect the autonomy of decent non-liberal societies even in the face of dissenting values, cultures and beliefs.

This is especially important in view of Rawls’ argument that each state is free and responsible and societies should be able to determine the path of their own future for themselves

(Rawls, LoP 118). In building on this, I argue that Canada's immigration policy can contribute towards achieving Rawls' idea of a better world. As earlier discussed, Rawls has a nationalist view on immigration that supports a state's right to control who may reside within its territory. This position aligns with his theory of justice which he situates within the context of the social and political arrangements of a unified liberal society. He argues that, in the global utopia, a major part of immigration would disappear because the causes of migration, such as persecution, oppression and poverty, would be eliminated (LoP 8-9). In such a world, migration would occur more out of preference than out of necessity. In today's world, the issues that Rawls mentions are still very much the factors that drive mass migration from LDCs to host societies (Alba and Foner 1-2). By indicating that the inexistence of these factors would reduce migration, Rawls suggests that in a better world, there would be much fewer immigrants than exists today in host societies like Canada.

With regards to those who migrate, Rawls states that "people must recognise that they cannot make up for failing to regulate their numbers or to care for their land by conquest in war, or by migrating into another people's territory without their consent" (LoP 9). This statement demonstrates, however, that Rawls' focus is on the actions of those who migrate and the actions of the states that they originate from. He leaves out the actions of countries like Canada who need and actively seek out immigrants to boost their population. In the better world that Rawls envisions, the gap between rich and poor countries would be narrowed (LoP 114). This would, for Rawls, be achieved through a combination of policy and institutional reforms in outlaw and burdened societies through the assistance of liberal societies.

I support Rawls' claim that a better world is one in which the factors that drive migration are greatly reduced. In such a world, for instance, there would be less pressure felt by skilled

professionals in LDCs to migrate to countries like Canada to search of a better life. In a better world, there would be a huge distinction between, firstly, immigrants selected on the basis of their skills and, secondly, refugees seeking asylum. Miller makes the distinction by describing the former as those who migrate “out of preference” or “economic migrants” while referring to the latter as those who migrate “out of necessity” (National Responsibility 202). In reality, as pointed out by Martha Nussbaum, migrating as an economic immigrant or as a refugee is not always sharply distinguishable and is often one and the same (16). For skilled professionals in LDCs, migration is more of a necessity than a preference. In a better world, there would be less of a difference between the pressure to migrate from, say Uganda, and doing so from Sweden. Skilled immigrants from LDCs would no longer need to migrate out of dire necessity.

In the interim, for reasons already discussed, restrictions should not be placed on skilled professionals from LDCs to prevent them from migrating. Nevertheless, there is an important point made by Carens on how open borders can contribute towards reducing global inequality. He argues that open borders and freedom of movement are important for reducing global inequality (Carens, Ethics 226-228). As occurred in ancient feudal times, he argues, contemporary social arrangements grant people with advantages on the basis of their country of birth. These advantages are then further entrenched when people’s ability to move from one country to another is legally restricted. As he rightly argues, this prevents the disadvantaged from changing their situation regardless of how hard they work as individuals or what their talents are (Ethics 225-226). To address this, Carens suggests that we view freedom of movement across borders as a fundamental human right that logically extends from the established practice of moving freely within a state. For example, as is the current practice within the U.S and regional blocs like the European Union, Carens argues that people need to be able to move to available

opportunities in order to be able to take advantage of them. He argues in a nutshell that it is immoral and unjust for the social conditions of one's birth to limit the range of their opportunities for a better life (Ethics 226-228).

On the other side of this argument, Miller predicts that it would likely take several decades for us to significantly close the economic gap between rich and poor countries even if the global economic order were to be reformed and poor countries were to adopt pro-growth policies. He argues that, as a result, the sheer number of those willing to migrate from poor countries precludes the open border option that Carens is proposing (Strangers in Our Midst 1-4). On freedom of movement being a fundamental human right, Miller argues that neither the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR) or the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR) make mention of a general right to migrate. They, however, recognise the right to leave any country and the right to re-enter one's own country. For Miller, if a human right to immigrate is used to justify open borders, it must apply to all human beings regardless of their circumstances. While acknowledging the special case of refugees and asylum seekers, Miller argues that even if a human right to migrate were recognised, those most in need of it would still not be able to relocate to a country of their choice. Those who would benefit the most, Miller argues, are those in poor countries who are already advantaged such as skilled professionals. Those who are forced to remain behind would instead have their human rights violated because they would have reduced access to professionals such as doctors and nurses (Strangers in Our Midst 49-53).

It is important to highlight that Carens' arguments, in favour of open borders, were developed against the backdrop of public sentiments in the U.S on accepting Haitian refugees following the 2010 earthquake in Haiti. Carens describes feeling torn about "excluding people in

such obvious need and the worry that admitting everyone with comparable claims would be overwhelming and would be especially harmful to those already most disadvantaged in America” (ix). These sentiments account for his largely humanitarian perspective on immigration. In spite of this humanitarian perspective, however, Carens eventually argues for the need to “assume a background of greatly reduced inequality between states” (277) before his arguments in favour of open borders can be achieved. In other words, despite his claims that freedom of movement would contribute to global equality, Carens eventually argues that there must first be in place a more egalitarian world before freedom of movement can be achieved internationally. This takes us back to the point made by Rawls on immigration where he argues that, in a more egalitarian world, there would be fewer people migrating to achieve a better life.

I consider the relationship that Carens establishes between freedom of movement and reducing global inequality to be important. While he establishes this point from the perspective of a better life for immigrants in their host societies, I argue that it is also relevant for the obligations that skilled professionals from LDCs owe to their countries of origin. As already discussed, this does not require restricting immigrants from LDCs from migrating to Canada. It does, however, require factoring into Canada’s immigration policy the burden that the policy’s blind objectivity places on already burdened societies. Once the nature of the burden is established, remedial actions can be discussed with LDCs that are most affected. In this regard, immigrants that originate from such societies should be called upon to play an active role in view of the communal connectedness, social friendship and national identity that they already share with those left behind. These qualities are assets that Canada can deploy in fulfilling its duty to assist burdened societies. Such an initiative would further demonstrate Canada’s commitment to

liberal democratic principles. It would also serve as an example that other host societies could follow.

9. Conclusion

In this paper, I defended Canada's nationalist approach to immigration. I did so on the basis that it allows Canadians to exercise control over their national priorities and the future direction of their political community. It also allows Canadians preserve their national identity and the resourcefulness that it engenders. I based my arguments primarily on Rawls' claims that reasonable people, interested in furthering their individual interests, would prefer to live in a society in which they can cooperate with others in a manner that is largely agreed upon and accepted by all members of the society. On this basis, they would be willing to establish and abide by mutually agreed upon principles of justice to guide the assignment and distribution of rights, advantages and obligations within their society (ToJ 150-156). I also argued that, while the loss of skilled professionals to emigration can be beneficial to LDCs, immigrants who originate from LDCs owe obligations to those left behind. I then argued that, in view of the challenges that LDCs face, without feelings of principle-guilt towards those left behind, an immigrant from an LDC is not likely to be a good citizen of Canada. Finally, I argued that Canada's immigration policy can contribute towards achieving the ideal of a better world.

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