



National Library
of Canada

Acquisitions and
Bibliographic Services Branch

395 Wellington Street
Ottawa, Ontario
K1A 0N4

Bibliothèque nationale
du Canada

Direction des acquisitions et
des services bibliographiques

395, rue Wellington
Ottawa (Ontario)
K1A 0N4

Your file Votre référence

Our file Notre référence

NOTICE

The quality of this microform is heavily dependent upon the quality of the original thesis submitted for microfilming. Every effort has been made to ensure the highest quality of reproduction possible.

If pages are missing, contact the university which granted the degree.

Some pages may have indistinct print especially if the original pages were typed with a poor typewriter ribbon or if the university sent us an inferior photocopy.

Reproduction in full or in part of this microform is governed by the Canadian Copyright Act, R.S.C. 1970, c. C-30, and subsequent amendments.

AVIS

La qualité de cette microforme dépend grandement de la qualité de la thèse soumise au microfilmage. Nous avons tout fait pour assurer une qualité supérieure de reproduction.

S'il manque des pages, veuillez communiquer avec l'université qui a conféré le grade.

La qualité d'impression de certaines pages peut laisser à désirer, surtout si les pages originales ont été dactylographiées à l'aide d'un ruban usé ou si l'université nous a fait parvenir une photocopie de qualité inférieure.

La reproduction, même partielle, de cette microforme est soumise à la Loi canadienne sur le droit d'auteur, SRC 1970, c. C-30, et ses amendements subséquents.

A DIFFERENT SHADE OF BLUE: PEACEKEEPING BY CONFRONTATION
THE CANADIAN CONTINGENT IN CYPRUS, 1964-1975

by

Robert J.A.R. Gravelle

Thesis submitted to the
School of Graduate Studies and Research
in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the
Ph.D. degree in History

Universite d'Ottawa/University of Ottawa

c 1995 Robert J.A.R. Gravelle



National Library
of Canada

Acquisitions and
Bibliographic Services Branch

395 Wellington Street
Ottawa, Ontario
K1A 0N4

Bibliothèque nationale
du Canada

Direction des acquisitions et
des services bibliographiques

395, rue Wellington
Ottawa (Ontario)
K1A 0N4

Your file *Votre référence*

Our file *Notre référence*

The author has granted an irrevocable non-exclusive licence allowing the National Library of Canada to reproduce, loan, distribute or sell copies of his/her thesis by any means and in any form or format, making this thesis available to interested persons.

L'auteur a accordé une licence irrévocable et non exclusive permettant à la Bibliothèque nationale du Canada de reproduire, prêter, distribuer ou vendre des copies de sa thèse de quelque manière et sous quelque forme que ce soit pour mettre des exemplaires de cette thèse à la disposition des personnes intéressées.

The author retains ownership of the copyright in his/her thesis. Neither the thesis nor substantial extracts from it may be printed or otherwise reproduced without his/her permission.

L'auteur conserve la propriété du droit d'auteur qui protège sa thèse. Ni la thèse ni des extraits substantiels de celle-ci ne doivent être imprimés ou autrement reproduits sans son autorisation.

ISBN 0-612-11558-5

Canada



UNIVERSITÉ D'OTTAWA
UNIVERSITY OF OTTAWA

ABSTRACT

The study of conflict management in the post war period has encompassed various aspects, including the debates over the usefulness of international attempts in the maintenance of peace and security. Since 1945, Canada has been involved in all major United Nations peacekeeping missions including observation operations from 1945-1956, peacekeeping operations from 1956 to the present, and peace enforcement operations since 1991. The Canadian literature on peacekeeping missions has centred on foreign and defence policy questions and their influence on international affairs from a Canadian perspective. To fully appreciate the nature of peacekeeping operations in their foreign and defence policy contexts, we need to understand better how individual operations function, the principal problems encountered, and the way such operations have ended over time.

This study of the United Nations Force in Cyprus (UNFICYP) is an analysis of a Canadian military operation and the evolution of peacekeeping from 1964-1975, with emphasis on the crucial 1974 period, which witnessed the Canadian Contingent's leading role in redefining the concept and practice of peacekeeping in Cyprus. Overnight it went from peacekeeper in an inter-communal situation to a

peacemaker in a full scale war. The development of confrontational tactics in pressing cease-fires and in stabilizing the main confrontational area of Nicosia by declaring UN protected areas and the willingness to use force to retain these areas, was a major innovation in its modus operandi. The rendering of humanitarian assistance to both communities during the war and the protection of more than 200,000 refugees also necessitated the UN force to adopt new methods of providing aid. The UN presence was instrumental in saving countless lives and preventing a number of atrocities. The involvement of the UN through its presence in the cease-fire negotiations and the delineation of cease-fire lines underlined the important role and influence of the force that led to the ending of hostilities between the Turkish army and the Greek Cypriot National Guard. The leading role and influence which the Canadian Contingent exerted in UNFICYP, resulting in changing the concept and practice of peacekeeping in Cyprus, has been to this point overlooked.

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

The idea for this study resulted from numerous discussions and debates over the past years on the lack of operational histories of the Canadian contingents which have served in all of the major UN peacekeeping operations. It quickly became evident that such studies were required in order to round out the discussions and to provide factual detail on the influence that these Canadian contingents exerted on individual peacekeeping operations. As the United Nations Force in Cyprus (UNFICYP) was the longest of these operations which Canadian soldiers had participated in, it seemed appropriate to begin such a study with this unique operation. I wish to extend my appreciation to Brigadier General Clayton E. Beattie for his patience over the years in discussing this operation and for making readily available his personal diaries, tape recordings of actual events, and UN and UNFICYP documents of the period under analysis. His patience in editing notes and providing clarification on documents and important events is greatly appreciated.

I am also indebted to General John de Chastelain, Admiral John Anderson, Colonel M. Houghton, and numerous other Armed Forces personnel for allowing themselves to be

interviewed and providing critical assessments on the role of the Canadian contingents which served during the first decade of UNFICYP. To Mr. George Sherry, former advisor to Kurt Waildheim, Secretary-General United Nations, my great appreciation for the time he took to answer my many questions. To Mr. Geoffrey Pearson for providing insight as to how his father, Lester B. Pearson, reacted to the events of the times and his assessment of peacekeeping operations, I extend many thanks.

I also wish to thank the Department of National Defence, Directorate of History, especially Dr. Carl Christie, for providing UNFICYP and Canadian Contingent Operational Log Sheets of this period and assisting me in sorting out the multitude of documents. The service provided by the National Archives of Canada was most welcomed and a special thanks to Ms. Joclyne Legault for her enthusiasm in this regard. To Professor Michael Behiels, thesis advisor, for his constant support, patience, and constructive criticism, I wish to extend my deepest appreciation. My heartfelt thanks to Professor Norman Hillmer for his advice and making himself constantly available in assisting me by putting matters into their proper perspective. Finally, a special thank you to Marilyn Rutherford, whose constant belief in the validity of this story kept me going.

Table of Contents

ABSTRACT.....	i
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS.....	iii
TABLE OF CONTENTS.....	v
Introduction.....	1
Chapter 1: Cyprus At A Crossroads.....	30
1.1 Historical Perspective-Cyprus.....	31
1.2 The London and Zurich Agreements and Their Consequences.....	46
1.3 Conclusion.....	54
Chapter 2: Canada Prepares to Undertake Peacekeeping in Cyprus.....	56
2.1 Canadian Government Agrees To Participate.....	56
2.2 Early Military Planning for the Canadian Contingent.....	63
2.3 Creation of UNFICYP.....	75
2.4 Conclusion.....	85
Chapter 3: The Canadian Contingent's Role in UNFICYP.....	87
3.1 UNFICYP Becomes Operational.....	88
3.2 The Canadian Contingent Deploys...	92
3.3 Attempts at Disarming and Diffusing the Conflict.....	97
3.4 Maintaining the Peace: The Canadian Contingent.....	105
3.5 Preserving the Status Quo: The Canadian Contingent's Resolve....	109
3.6 Conclusion.....	120
Chapter 4: Prelude To Invasion.....	124
4.1 Background.....	125
4.2 The Attempted Coup.....	130
4.3 UNFICYP Responds.....	146
4.4 Conclusion.....	159

Chapter 5	The Turkish Invasion of Cyprus: Peacekeeping By Confrontation 20-31 July 1974.....	162
5.1	The Canadian Contingent Reacts To The Invasion.....	165
5.2	CANCON Takes The Lead.....	176
5.3	The Ledra Palace Hotel Incident..	182
5.4	The Nicosia Airport: Peacekeeping by Confrontation.....	203
5.5	CANCON Receives Reinforcements...	212
5.6	The Canadian Contingent and The Use of Force.....	214
5.7	New Developments in Greece and Cyprus.....	219
5.8	CANCON Reacts To Turkish Attempts To Take The Airport.....	220
5.9	First UNFICYP Contact With The Turkish Commander.....	229
5.10	Conclusion.....	234
Chapter 6:	Tripartite Cease-Fire Negotiations July 30-August 9.....	238
6.1	Canadian Participation.....	242
6.2	United Kingdom and UNFICYP Cooperation.....	246
6.3	Locating and Establishing The Forward Defence Lines.....	247
6.4	Military Areas Under Consideration.....	251
6.5	Kyrenia District.....	257
6.6	Nicosia District.....	258
6.7	United Nations Guarantee of Protection.....	262
6.8	Cease-Fire Violations and The Canadian Contingent's Response...	266
6.9	Conclusion.....	282
Chapter 7	The Turkish Invasion Phase II 14-18 August 1974.....	285
7.1	CANCON Reinforces and is Willing To Use Force.....	286
7.2	The Turks Break Out.....	290
7.3	CANCON Defends the Airport and Ledra Palace Hotel.....	300
7.4	The Cease Fire.....	305

7.5 Humanitarian Assistance.....	314
7.6 Conclusion.....	325
Chapter 8 UNFICYP Phase III: Classical Peacekeeping Supervising The Partition of Cyprus.....	328
8.1 The New Reality.....	329
8.2 The Establishment of a Buffer Zone.....	331
8.3 Freedom of Movement.....	341
8.4 Humanitarian assistance.....	346
8.5 Conclusion.....	349
Chapter 9 Conclusion.....	352
9.1 March 1964-July 1974 A Reflection.....	353
9.2 The Canadian Contingent Redefines Peacekeeping.....	355
9.3 Evaluation and Lessons Learned...	369
Bibliography.....	376
Annex A.....	397
Annex B.....	403
Annex C.....	404
Annex D.....	408
Annex E.....	412
Annex F.....	414
Annex G.....	422
Maps	

INTRODUCTION

Peacekeeping has been a fundamental aspect of United Nations operations since 1956, and Canadian soldiers have participated in every major United Nations peacekeeping operation. The longest of these commitments was the United Nations Force in Cyprus (UNFICYP) which lasted for over 29 years. A military operational analysis of the Canadian Contingent in Cyprus is warranted in order to understand how it influenced the concept and practice of peacekeeping in Cyprus.

The concept of peacekeeping does not lend itself to one specific definition; it is interpreted differently by almost all who study this practice. Rosalyn Higgins, in her excellent four volume study *United Nations Peacekeeping Documents and Commentary*, states that there are essentially three views of peacekeeping. First of all, peacekeeping is broad in its application and encompasses not only United Nations forces but also political, diplomatic, and secretarial functions in the maintenance of international peace and security. Secondly, peacekeeping operations entail the use of force; therefore, United Nations observer groups whose responsibilities are to observe, monitor, and report infractions of agreed to cease fires are excluded from being

classified as peacekeeping operations. Thirdly, peacekeeping includes all United Nations forces and observer groups which are deployed with the consent of host governments.¹

The third of these definitions is the one which is most widely accepted in Canada. John Holmes, the highly respected commentator on Canadian foreign policy over some three decades, described peacekeeping as:

...the interpositioning of an international will in the form of men drawn from the armed forces of various countries...acting as observers or supervisors or patrollers but not as combat troops to enforce peace...²

Historically, the peacekeeping approach that has most frequently been used is in the aftermath of armed conflicts such as the United Nations Emergency Force in Egypt (UNEF), and the United Nations Force in Cyprus (UNFICYP), when political conflicts have degenerated into civil or inter-communal war. What Holmes (among many other experts) overlooks is the fact that Canadian soldiers were actual combat troops and were instrumental in changing the concept and practice of peacekeeping in Cyprus. Indeed, as this study will demonstrate, the first ten years of operation of UNFICYP

¹ Rosalyn Higgins, *United Nations Peacekeeping*, Volume 4, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1981) passim.

² John W. Holmes in J.L. Granatstein, A. Taylor, and D. Cox *Peacekeeping: International Challenge and Canadian Response*, (Toronto: Canadian Institute of International Affairs, 1968) p. 1.

witnessed a change in the role of the force from peacekeeping to that of peacemaking by using what can be described as "Peacekeeping by Confrontation" tactics and the willingness to use force.³

The involvement of independent actors or third parties in the pursuit of peaceful settlement of international disputes has been evolving throughout the twentieth century. A semi-institutional expression of this desire for an international means of dispute resolution occurred at the Hague Conferences of 1899 and 1907. The concept was later written into the Covenant of the League of Nations in Articles 11-13, 15, and 17.⁴ The carrying out of the Saar Plebiscite is an example of the League's utilization of an international force to undertake an observation mission. On December 5, 1934, the League established the Plebiscite Commission to monitor and ensure a fair and honest election to determine if the Saar region was to be partitioned to France, returned to Germany or remain under League governance. An international force was established whose mandate was to be available "for the intervention (by force)

³ The confusion in terminology when discussing peacekeeping is partly due to the changing nature of United Nations involvement in conflict resolution situations. As it is intended to demonstrate that the original mission in Cyprus was dramatically altered in its first ten years of operation, definitions of a descending order of use of force are provided in Annex A.

⁴ David Wainhouse, *International Peace Observation*, (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins Press, 1966) pp. 1-11.

for the purpose of restoring order"⁵ if required. From this experience, two factors emerged which had implications for the peacekeeping operations of the United Nations. First, there was no adequate intelligence organization in the Saar region prior to troop deployment to make potentially crucial assessments of the situation. As political scientist David Wainhouse argues, "Had serious disturbances threatened or attempts to create disorder occurred, it would have been difficult to take suitable precautions."⁶ Secondly, the Saar operation demonstrated the importance of drawing such a force from countries that had no direct interest in the issue and could be neutral at all times.⁷ Only impartial troops from countries with no direct interest(s) in the issue could hope to obtain support from the population and therefore remain neutral. The Saar force was the first truly international unit used by the League and was successful in the prosecution of its mandate.

With the conclusion of the Second World War, the United Nations Organization established the concept of peaceful settlement of international disputes within the framework of its Charter. The advent of post-war Cold War politics, brought on by confrontational tactics by both the United States and the Soviet Union and the continuous use of

⁵ *Ibid.*, p. 26.

⁶ *Ibid.*, p. 26.

⁷ *Ibid.*, p. 27.

the veto power given to the five permanent members of the Security Council, nullified the original hopes of the UN for cooperation in dispute settlement.

The Charter of the United Nations has as its primary aim, "the maintenance of international peace and security." Nowhere in the Charter does the term peacekeeping, as a process of enforcing UN resolutions, appear. Since 1945, however, the United Nations has undertaken numerous observer operations, such as the United Nations Temporary Commission on Korea (UNTCOK) 1947-1948, United Nations Truce Supervision Organization in the Middle East (UNTSO) 1948-present, and the United Nations Military Observer Group India-Pakistan (UNMOGIP) 1949. A shift to interpositional operations, or peacekeeping, by the UN was developed in 1956, when a large force was interposed between two confrontational groups to allow, ostensibly, for the peaceful political settlement of their dispute. The United Nations Emergency Force in Egypt (UNEF) 1956-67, interposed between Israel and Egypt,⁸ was followed by the Organization des Nations Unies au Congo (UNOC) and the United Nations Force in Cyprus (UNFICYP) 1964, interposed between Greek Cypriot and Turkish Cypriot enclaves.

⁸ Henry Wiseman, ed. *Peacekeeping: Appraisals and Proposals*, (Toronto: Pergamon Press, 1983) p. 11.

Peacekeeping has evolved as one of several instruments by which the maintenance of the peace and security clauses of the UN Charter could be implemented. The United Nations organizational structure was established to facilitate its aims, and its two main organs are the General Assembly and the Security Council. It is not intended to enter into great detail regarding the operations of these bodies; numerous studies, such as those of H.G. Nicholas' *The United Nations As a Political Institution*, and Higgins' *United Nations Peacekeeping*,⁹ have given in depth descriptions. An account, however, of the functions of these bodies as well as the support roles of the Military Staff Committee and the Secretariat is required in order to identify the methods of dealing with conflict situations, and to link their activities to Peacekeeping operations.

The General Assembly is composed of all member states of the UN. Although executive power rests with the Security Council, the General Assembly, through Article 11 of the UN Charter, can, if it wishes, consider and discuss questions relating to the maintenance of international peace and security once the matter is brought before it by a member state. Indeed, the General Assembly has, in the past, acted

⁹ H.G. Nicholas, *The United Nations As A Political Institution*, (New York: Fourth Edition, 1971) Appendix I. Rosalyn Higgins, *United Nations Peacekeeping, Documents and Commentary*, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1981) passim.

to restore volatile situations in the international arena. In 1950, it debated and passed the Uniting For Peace Resolution that, notwithstanding Article 12 of the UN Charter, allowed the General Assembly to take whatever action it deemed necessary to keep the peace. In 1956, the Security Council was unable to reach a consensus on the Suez crisis; therefore the General Assembly, at the initiative of Lester B. Pearson, the Canadian Minister of External Affairs, established the United Nations Emergency Force which was interposed between Egypt and Israel. This action helped to restore calm in the area for over a decade.

The powers of the Security Council in regard to the maintenance of international peace and security are clearly defined in the Charter. Furthermore, the Charter is specific about what the Security Council can do to bring about the peaceful resolution of international conflicts. Under Article 33 the Council may call upon the parties concerned to settle their dispute or seek a solution through negotiation, inquiry, mediation, conciliation, arbitration, judicial settlement, and/or resort to regional agencies or arrangements. Articles 41-43 give the Security Council the authority to enforce peace if required and to call on member states to render assistance in this endeavour.¹⁰ Ostensibly

¹⁰ H.G. Nicholas, *The United Nations As A Political Institution*, Appendix I.

UN Peacekeeping operations have been undertaken in the name of peaceful intervention and not enforcement. Thus military personnel have been used to observe "agreed to" cease-fire arrangements. Examples of this observer role are the United Nations Truce Supervision Organization (UNTSO) to observe the cease fire agreements among Egypt, Jordan, Lebanon, Syria, and Israel (1948-present) and the United Nations Emergency Force II (UNEF II) in Egypt, where the UN observed the cease fire agreements between Egypt and Israel (1973-79).

Under Article 47 of the Charter, a Military Staff Committee, made up of the Chiefs of Staff of the armed forces of the Permanent Members of the Security Council, was established. Its function was to advise and assist the Council on questions relating to the Council's military requirements for the maintenance of international peace and security.¹¹ Cold War politics diminished the capabilities and capacity of this committee to function as intended. There is no available evidence that it has been consulted by the Security Council when peacekeeping operations are planned.

The Office of the Secretariat, provided for under the Charter and headed by the Secretary-General, has expanded to

¹¹ *Ibid.*

include the responsibility for the formation and day to day operations of missions authorized by the Council. This added role emerged from the Suez peacekeeping operation. In addition, Secretaries-General have undertaken personal "good offices" missions and individual peace initiatives. The Secretary-General may bring to the attention of the Security Council any matter that, in his opinion, threatens the maintenance of international peace and security. The Secretary-General also has the responsibility to inform and report to the Security Council on the status of the missions or operations which have been authorized.

Although various United Nations operations have been analyzed by authors such as James A. Stegenga, James M. Boyd, Indar Jit Rikhye and Bjorn Egge, and Gabriella Rosner¹², they have been studied more from a political perspective than from a military operational viewpoint. The scholarship has not focused on the influence or role of the ground troops which shaped the operational aspects of peacekeeping. There have also been excellent studies by David Wainhouse, Alan James, and Ruth Russell, attempting to survey all United Nations

¹² James Stegenga, *The United Nations Force in Cyprus*, (Ohio State University Press, 1968), James Boyd, *United Nations Peace-Keeping Operations: A Military and Political Appraisal*, (New York: Praeger Publishers, 1971), Indar Jit Rikhye and Bjorn Egge, *The Thin Blue Line*, (London: Yale University Press, 1974), Gabriella Rosner, *United Nations Emergency Force, Egypt*, (New York: Columbia University Press, 1963).

operations¹³. The exceptional four volume study of United Nations operations by Rosalyn Higgins concentrates on official UN documents to provide an analysis of what transpired in each operation and of the relationship between the UN operation and host nations. None of these, however, go into specific detail on the contingents attached to each operation.

The specifically Canadian literature on peacekeeping is relatively limited, and studies by J.L. Granatstein, Alistair Taylor, and David Cox,¹⁴ and Henry Wiseman, again focus on theory and high politics. All fail to take into account events and decisions at a military operational level.

What is required are operational histories of the ground forces which are mandated to carry out UN operations. Before peacekeeping operations can be properly placed in the larger context, it is necessary to better understand how they function, the principal problems encountered, and the way such operations have evolved.

Still, there is much of value in the existing literature. Michael Harbottle, in *The Blue Berets*, and *The*

¹³ Ruth Russell, *The United Nations and United States Security*, (Washington: Brookings Institute, 1968).

¹⁴ Norman Hillmer, "Peacemakers, Blessed and Otherwise", *Canadian Defence Quarterly*, August 1989, pp. 55-57, discusses the historiography of peacekeeping.

*Impartial Soldier*¹⁵, describes his efforts as a guide book to studying the more prominent peacekeeping operations up to 1971. He presents the facts of major UN operations and outlines the causes and effects of each operation. He discusses the circumstances leading to the inception of peacekeeping forces, beginning with the United Nations Emergency Force in Egypt (UNEF) 1956-1967, through UNFICYP in Cyprus. He points to the ad hoc nature of the operations and, from his experience as Chief of Staff of the force from 1966 to 1968, gives a useful insight into the UNFICYP operation from a political and military perspective. This approach is beneficial, allowing the reader to appreciate UNFICYP's overall role. However, no specific study of individual contingent contribution to the force is made,¹⁶ and the work is generally uncritical and lacking in analysis.

In *United Nations Peacekeeping Operations: A Military and Political Analysis*, James Boyd undertakes a comparative analysis of the UN operations in the Congo, Suez, and Cyprus. He investigates the patterns of activity of each operation and demographic factors which influenced each. His work is informative and detailed, but no specific analysis

¹⁵ Michael Harbottle, *The Blue Berets*, (Bath: Pitman Press, 1971) and *The Impartial Soldier*, (London: Oxford University Press, 1970).

¹⁶ Michael Harbottle, *The Blue Berets*, (Bath: Pitman Press, 1971).

of how and why , particular contingent reacted to continued changing circumstances is attempted, in order better to understand how it influenced the evolving role of peacekeeping operations.¹⁷

Another important study is the *United Nations Force in Cyprus*, by James A. Stegenga. He analyzes UNFICYP operations and concludes that overall the force, during its first four years of existence, was a model of efficiency in helping restore order to the island. Although giving UNFICYP high marks for its efficiency, he argues that only political settlement of the crisis will resolve the issue. Therefore, he argues, UNFICYP has role limitations. The approach is political rather than operational.¹⁸ *The Thin Blue Line* by Indarjit Rikhye, Michael Harbottle, and Bjorn Egge deals mainly with the authors' experiences as UN peacekeepers. They discuss UN operations in the Congo 1960, Egypt 1956, and Cyprus 1964, from an international perspective within the perceived Cold War realities of the times. These personal experiences are informative but again, no single contingent analysis is attempted.¹⁹

¹⁷ James M. Boyd, *United Nations Peace-Keeping Operations: A Military and Political Appraisal*, (New York: Praeger Publishers, 1971).

¹⁸ James A. Stegenga, *The United Nations Force in Cyprus*, (Ohio State University Press, 1968).

¹⁹ Indarjit Rikhye, Michael Harbottle, and Bjorn Egge, *The Thin Blue Line*, (London: Yale University Press, 1974).

Professor Henry Wiseman, of the University of Guelph, in an edited collection of articles titled *Peacekeeping: Appraisals and Proposals*, emphasizes, as do several of his contributors, the international perspective of peacekeeping developments. Wiseman analyses all the major UN operations up to 1982. He describes the evolution of peacekeeping operations as falling into four distinct periods: the nascent period, 1946-56; the assertive period, 1956-67; the dormant period, 1967-73; and the resurgent period beginning in 1973.²⁰ He describes each operation from a historical perspective and links them by describing the circumstances for their creation, the mandated role of the forces involved, and evaluates the overall effectiveness within an international context. While Wiseman's study is broad and suggestive, it is not based on operational histories.

Wiseman approaches UNFICYP from a political rather than an operational perspective. He indicates that the UN Force's main function was to be interposed "along the buffer zone between the Greek and Turkish communities, with freedom of movement throughout the island."²¹ He describes the broad international mandate under which the force was to operate and how this force expanded its function to include the resolution of local communal disputes and assisted in

²⁰ Henry Wiseman ed., *Peacekeeping: Appraisals and Proposals*, (New York: Pergamon Press, 1983) p. 22.

²¹ *Ibid.*, p. 41.

maintaining law and order on the island. Professor Wiseman also acknowledges that, with the Turkish invasion of the island in July 1974, the UN Force was required to alter its original role. What he fails to appreciate fully is that the invasion of Cyprus by Turkey on July 20, 1974, effectively nullified the original mandate and that the role of UNFICYP was dramatically altered by the Canadian Contingent. As part of this study's research and analysis, the circumstances that led to this change of mandate from peace-monitoring through observation to one of "peacekeeping by confrontation", and the leading role of the Canadian Contingent will be outlined. As with other missions, Wiseman analyzes the mission as one of a number in the evolving nature of peacekeeping at the international level. However, he ignores the military operational viewpoint.

In a similar fashion, Geoffrey H. Pearson, in one of his many contributions to the debate on peacekeeping, describes Canada's involvement in peacekeeping as part of its desire to ensure world stability through collective security arrangements. His arguments from this point of view are logical, and provide a diplomatic assessment of the value of participating in international efforts in helping

to maintain peace and security.²² Pearson's main argument is that,

Canada has focused attention on three aspects of the potential UN contribution to the peaceful settlement of disputes -- national preparations for peacekeeping, improvement of such international arrangements as existed, and the link between peacekeeping and peaceful settlement.²³

Nowhere was this three prong approach more evident than in the Suez Crisis 1956, and the Cyprus conflict in 1964. Both crises threatened international stability in general but further, and importantly for Canada, the very existence of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization. Canada's response was predicated on the expectation of diffusing a potential super power involvement in the two conflicts and preventing the weakening or breakup of NATO.

Furthermore, Pearson argues that Canadian membership in the United Nations has entailed certain responsibilities and Canada regarded participation in UN operations as part of these responsibilities. In addition, as a member of the United Nations, Canada could influence other members to join in UN operations to uphold these principles. As part of UNFICYP, Canada could use its influence in NATO to help ease

²² Geoffrey H. Pearson, *Canadian Attitudes to Peacekeeping*, in H. Wiseman *Peacekeeping: Appraisals and Proposals* (New York, 1983) pp. 118-129.

²³ *Ibid.*, p. 122.

tensions between the two main combatants in Cyprus, Greece and Turkey, both fellow members of NATO. As Pearson, Wiseman, and others have argued, it was more than embarrassing for NATO partners to explain why their forces were firing on Canadian UN troops. UN peacekeeping, as Pearson argues, allowed Canada to pursue its aim of international peace and security within the "guidelines" of its defence and foreign policy objectives.²⁴

J.L. Granatstein, A. Taylor and D. Cox, in *Peacekeeping: International Challenge and Canadian Response*²⁵, provide valuable insights in understanding the political and foreign policy aspects of Canadian UN peacekeeping operations. Cox reviews peacekeeping from the standpoint of Canadian foreign and defence policy and the status Canada expects to be given in world affairs from participating in such operations. Taylor looks at peacekeeping from a broad context of national interests and Cold War tactics. Granatstein focuses his historical account on peacekeeping from a stance of self-interest and suggests how this tends to take Canada into the realm of a defender of international peace and security arrangements.

²⁴ Geoffrey Pearson, interview held in Ottawa, Ontario, February 11, 1994.

²⁵ J.L. Granatstein, Alistair Taylor and David Cox, *Peacekeeping: International Challenge and Canadian Response*, (Toronto: Canadian Institute of International Affairs, 1968).

Numerous defence experts such as James Eayrs, R.B. Tackaberry, Sean Henry, Alex Morrison²⁶ and several military officers discuss peacekeeping from a defence policy perspective. The discussions presented by these authors all centre on the role of peacekeeping as part of the overall Canadian defence policy. Whether peacekeeping should be part of the total approach of collective security, as argued by J.L. Granatstein, or whether peacekeeping should be the sole function of the Canadian forces, most concede that Canadian participation has enhanced Canada's reputation as an effective peacekeeping agent. What is lacking in these analyses is individual assessment of Canadian military operations that underlay this reputation.

Examples of this lack of analysis are book-length accounts written by Colonel John Gardam of the Department of National Defence and Fred Gaffen of the Canadian War Museum. In *The Canadian Peacekeeper*, Gardam acknowledged that his study was not a detailed analysis of Canadian peacekeeping operations and was meant only to describe Canadian forces

²⁶ James Eayrs, *Future Roles For The Armed Forces of Canada*, (Toronto: *Canadian Institute of International Affairs*, 1969), R.B. Tackaberry, *Keeping The Peace: A Canadian Military Viewpoint on Peacekeeping Operations*, (Toronto: *Canadian Institute of International Affairs*, 1966). Colonel (Ret'd) Sean Henry, a member of the Canadian Defence Association and Alex Morrison, Director, Canadian Institute of Strategic Studies, have given numerous briefings on Peacekeeping to Parliamentary Defence Committees and have contributed articles on Peacekeeping to the *Canadian Defence Quarterly* and various national newspapers.

efforts. Although informative, the study is superficial and contained crucial factual errors. In describing UNFICYP he writes:

On July 20 1974, Turkish tank and parachute forces landed to ensure the safety of Turkish Cypriots after a military junta in Greece toppled the government in Cyprus in an attempt to create enosis (the union of Cyprus with Greece)...²⁷

In fact, the Turkish Army mounted a full scale invasion of Cyprus using combined amphibious troops, armour, infantry and airborne troops near the port of Kyrenia and the Plain north of Nicosia.²⁸ More seriously, the Greek military junta did not topple the Cyprus government as the attempt failed and the leaders of the attempted coup were Greek officers of the Greek Cypriot National Guard.

Another example of misinformation about the role of Canadian peacekeepers is Gaffen's *In The Eye of The Storm*. Gaffen claims to discuss peacekeeping operations from a Canadian military standpoint. In his study of UNFICYP he uses as his sources, letters from individuals, briefing notes, and various journal articles. He describes numerous incidents through the recollections of a few soldiers who

²⁷ John Gardam, *The Canadian Peacekeeper*, (Burnstown: The General Store Publishing House Inc., 1992) p. 34.

²⁸ United Nations, *United Nations Force in Cyprus Headquarters Report Nicosia*, Operational Briefing 21 July 1974, Situation Report 0800 hours, pp. 1-2.

participated in the UN force, and, when discussing the crucial event of July-September 1974, he glosses over this period giving the reader the impression that it was business as usual.²⁹ Overall, Gaffen's book is a quick and sometimes colourful summary of events without any analysis.

None of the Canadian contributions to the subject of peacekeeping make much use of primary source material available. Occasionally some mention is made of UN documents, but none really use the War Diaries accumulated over the years by the numerous Canadian Contingents rotated through UNFICYP or the personal papers and diaries of the various Canadian Contingent commanders involved.

Many sources are only now being made available for public view. The Canadian Contingent Nicosia Daily Operational Log Sheet in the Directorate of History of the Department of National Defence and the United Nations Force in Cyprus (UNFICYP) Headquarters' Log Sheet, represent new, albeit at times conflicting, assessments or data on particular incidents. An Operational Log Sheet is a record of communications to and from operational headquarters, which in this case was the United Nations headquarters for the entire Nicosia District. All United Nations Observation

²⁹ Fred Gaffen, *In The Eye of the Storm*, (Toronto: Deneau and Wayne Publishers, 1987).

Posts and Mobile Patrols in the Kyrenia and Nicosia Area controlled by the Canadian Contingent reported regularly and radio messages were logged. Similarly, the orders of the Contingent Commander and the Operations Officer were recorded as issued. United Nations liaison officers, attached to the Greek National Guard and the Turkish Cypriot leadership, relayed information that was faithfully recorded at the Joint Operations Centre UN Headquarters in Nicosia. Orders issued by the Deputy-Chief of Staff or under the authority of the Force Commander were also recorded. The information monitored was documented by radio operators and was then typed after each shift rotation. The information was cross checked to the original Log Sheet for verification and accuracy, and then signed off by the Operational Duty Officer who would in turn submit it to the Operations Officer for cataloguing.

To fully appreciate the detail provided by the Daily Operational Log Sheet, a copy of 0000 hours to 2300 hours, 2 January 1968 is attached as Annex B. This Log Sheet outlines the detailed radio reporting during these hours as the invasion of Cyprus by Turkish forces was taking place. This documentation is used to verify information gathered by interviews and media reports.

Examples of this detailed information provided by the Log Sheets are the events which occurred in Nicosia on 23 July 1974. The Daily Operational Log Sheet recorded in detail, minute by minute, the actions that took place at the Ledra Palace Hotel and in the area of the British High Commission, which resulted in two new responsibilities for the UN Force. The first was the designation of UN Protected Areas and the second, the deliberate pursuit of specific actions to ensure that humanitarian assistance was given to all who had a need.³⁰

I have also used available printed United Nations Security Council documents. These include the United Nations Force in Cyprus Headquarters Daily Operational Situation Reports, which were compiled from Daily Operational Reports of the various contingents of UNFICYP positioned throughout Cyprus, and correspondence between UN Headquarters in Geneva and New York to UNFICYP Headquarters. Unfortunately, Memoranda and Minutes from the Special Representatives of the Secretary-General in Cyprus to the Secretary-General on this specific operation have not yet been made available as they are still deemed sensitive and have not yet been declassified.

³⁰ Canada, Department of National Defence *Nicosia Daily Operational Log Sheet*, Canadian Contingent, 23 July 1974. A copy of the Log Sheet is supplied for that date as Annex A.

My other primary source materials include the private papers of Brigadier-General Clayton E. Beattie. BGen Beattie served a total of 12 tours of operation with UNFICYP as a senior officer of the Canadian Contingent during the 1960's, as Canadian Contingent Commander and Deputy-Chief of Staff, UNFICYP, and as Chief of Staff, UNFICYP during the 1970's. His diaries, private papers and correspondence with UN Headquarters in New York and Geneva, and primary participants such as General Prem Chand, Brian Urquhart of the UN Secretariat, British officers, and Turkish and Greek Force Commanders, cover a period of 13 years. These documents give new insights to the operational aspects of UNFICYP as well as the national and international factors which influenced the Force's response to various situations. Documents written by other Contingent Commanders and the internationally integrated UNFICYP Headquarters, provide supporting evidence about the leading role played by the Canadian Contingent in the development of UNFICYP. Brigadier-General Beattie was interviewed on several occasions and has made available tape recordings of events as they occurred in 1974.

Documents drawn from Record Groups of National Archives of Canada are also used. They include the Pearson Papers, which yielded little, and memoranda from the Canadian Department of External Affairs and the Department

of National Defence. These deal with UNFICYP from an External Affairs viewpoint and describe the reasons for participation in UNFICYP. These documents also provide new information on skepticism about the nature and duration of "Operation Snow Goose", as this UNFICYP operation was called, and the apprehension that a political solution would not be reached in a timely fashion. As well, the costs of this mission are discussed as are the implications of non-participation.

Interviews with prominent United Nations and External Affairs personnel prove useful in my analysis. Department of National Defence personnel were also interviewed and provided assessments on the role and influence of the Canadian Contingent on the Cyprus peacekeeping mission and what lessons, if any, were derived from this participation. These interviews provided contradictory assessments of the value of the Canadian Contingent's participation. Also interviewed was Mr. George Sherry, former advisor to the Secretary-General during the 1974 crisis.

The United Nations Force in Cyprus has been considered by many as a classical peacekeeping operation in response to an inter-communal conflict situation. It remains, however, a peacekeeping operation with unique characteristics that allowed it to adapt to critical situations that resulted in

changing the concept and practice of peacekeeping in Cyprus. Among the aspects of the operation worthy of note are the mounting of an unprecedented rapid military response to the United Nations request for Canadian troops to be deployed to Cyprus as part of a United Nations force in 1964; the strategic importance of Cyprus on the southern flank of NATO and the fact that the dispute involved member states of NATO; and the role played by the Canadian Contingent in changing the concept and practice of peacekeeping as it applied to the explosive situation during the 1974 crisis in Cyprus. Other factors influenced the Cyprus situation included the use of the Cyprus crisis by the Soviet Union for propaganda purposes; the embarrassment to the western powers of having two member states conflicting over the issue; and the ability of the United Nations force to exert a certain amount of influence on the outcome of the Cyprus crisis.

This study will add to the existing literature by providing an analysis of the Canadian Contingent's operational role in peacekeeping in Cyprus during the period of March 1964 to April 1975, with particular reference to the crucial 1974 period, which witnessed the change in the concept and practice of peacekeeping as it applied to Cyprus. As this is the first study of a Canadian military operational role on peacekeeping, it will pay particular attention to the military organizational environment in

which the Canadian Contingent operated. This study is an analysis of the emergence of a revised concept and practice of peacekeeping. It will establish that first, the UN Force, through the leadership of the Canadian Contingent, evolved through three distinct phases. Second, under the command of the Canadian Contingent Commander, peacekeeping was redefined to include a significant increase in the delivery of humanitarian assistance, the establishment of UN Protected Zones, and UN involvement in demarcation negotiations between combatants. Third, the effectiveness of the Canadian Contingent was directly related to national and international influences. Fourth, Canadian participation in UNFICYP influenced Canadian foreign and defence policy in regard to peacekeeping operations in Cyprus.

To achieve this, various aspects of peacekeeping operations will be assessed. These will include the typologies of peacekeeping; the composition of the force; the principles of consent and request; the deployment and command and control of the force; the operational roles assigned; the conduct of peacekeeping operations; and the operational restraints facing the peacekeeping force.

Within these guidelines certain aspects will be reviewed as to their impact on the Canadian Contingent's role in UNFICYP. These include the political and strategic

circumstances underlying Canada's involvement; the advantages and disadvantages of Canadian participation; the original role of the Force and the circumstances which led to a changed role; the effectiveness of the Force; the specific lessons learned from Canadian participation in UNFICYP; and the new practice of peacekeeping in Cyprus which emerged from the events of 1974.

Although each UN body has specific functions and authority in maintaining international peace and security, it is necessary to remember that peacekeeping has evolved over a relatively short time frame. The provisions of the Charter, as originally outlined, were inadequate to meet changing world situations such as occurred in Cyprus. This created the necessity of redefining and refining roles and responsibilities, attitudes and approaches towards peacekeeping. The pendulum had swung from non-violent peace observers missions such as the United Nations Military Observer Group India-Pakistan (UNMOGIP) 1947, to peacekeepers in Egypt (UNEF) 1956, to peacekeeping by confrontation in Cyprus by 1974, (UNFICYP). What will become evident is that approaches to peacekeeping have evolved and that each individual operation is unique. The changing faces of dispute settlement mechanisms called for flexibility and initiative in the maintenance of international peace and security.

The following chapters will outline the evolution of UNFICYP and the events that influenced the Canadian Contingent's role during the 1964-1975 period. Beginning with Chapter 2, a historical background of Cyprus will be presented. The events which led to the formation of the Cyprus Republic in 1960 will be reviewed as well as the factors that affected inter-communal relations which then led to conflict between the Cypriot communities. Chapter 3 will look at the reasons why Canada agreed to participate in the United Nations force in Cyprus, the planning involved to prepare the Canadian Contingent for deployment to Cyprus, and the creation of the United Nations Force in Cyprus and its mandate. Chapter 4 will outline the beginnings of the operational role of the UN force and the Canadian Contingent's role in attempting to implement the UN mandate as directed by the United Nations Security Council. This chapter will also present a description and analysis of events which influenced the Canadian Contingent's responses in the pursuit of its assigned tasks. It will be contended that the Canadian Contingent, as part of the UN force, was successful in meeting the stated objectives of the mandate, but in doing so, only established a stalemate and did not cause a political solution to the Cyprus problem.

Chapters 5 and 6 will provide a description of the events which led to the attempted coup of the Cypriot government by the Greek National Guard, the invasion of Cyprus by Turkey in response to this action, and the actions of the Canadian Contingent and UNFICYP. What will be described, in detail, are specific events and responses by the Canadian Contingent which led to the establishment of UN protected areas and the willingness to use force by the Canadian Contingent during phase one of the Turkish invasion. Chapter 7 will provide a description and analysis of the role of the UN, and in particular the Canadian Contingent Commander and Deputy Chief of Staff, in the Tripartite Cease-fire negotiations during the period July 30-9 August, 1974. The Canadian Contingent's response to cease-fire violations while negotiations took place will also be described. Chapter 8 will deal with the second phase of the Turkish invasion during the period 14-18 August 1974, when the Turkish army broke out of its bridgehead around Kyrenia and captured forty percent of the island. It will review and analyze the actions taken by the Canadian Contingent to halt forward advancement by Turkish troops in the Nicosia District and the efforts by the Canadian Contingent in stabilizing the Forward Defensive Lines in this area. Also, the efforts by the Canadian Contingent in expanding its efforts to provide humanitarian assistance to

both communities during this period of extensive conflict will be dealt with.

Chapter 9 will deal with the new reality which confronted Cyprus after the events of August 14-18 and the efforts by UNFICYP and the Canadian Contingent in establishing a buffer zone on the de facto cease-fire line. Also described will be the restrictions placed on the freedom of movement of UNFICYP into the northern half of the island held by the Turkish forces and the impact this had on the ability by the UN to provide humanitarian assistance. Chapter 10 will conclude by providing a reflection on the evolution of the UN force in Cyprus during the period of 1964-1975. It will evaluate the leading role played by the Canadian Contingent during this period in redefining the concept and practice of peacekeeping in Cyprus and the lessons which should have been learned during this United Nations peacekeeping operation.

CHAPTER 1

CYPRUS AT A CROSSROADS

Canadian peacekeeping efforts have taken place, during the past 47 years, on a global scale. The reputation of Canadian impartiality, professionalism, and dedication has been painstakingly nurtured during this period. The 27 UN Missions in which Canada has participated, beginning on November 14, 1947 with the UN Temporary Commission on Korea (UNTCOK) to the present UN Mission in Yugoslavia (ECMMY/UNPROFOR) in 1991, attest to this commitment of responsibility to the concept of maintaining international peace and security through the UN organization.¹ This international reputation was greatly enhanced during the period 1964-1975.

As indicated in the introduction, there have been numerous articles written on the Cyprus conflict which give an overview of UNFICYP from its inception to the present. Yet no author has succeeded in explaining or analyzing the factors involved in the redefinition of the original

¹ The list of UN operations in which Canada has taken part is outlined in Annex C.

mandate, the invasion period, and its aftermath. In order to better understand what transpired, it is necessary to develop a historical understanding of the events which first led to the organization of the force, its composition, mandate, and its reactions to specific events that transformed this UN operation. A method to achieve this understanding is to analyze one of the operation's major components. This study will accomplish this by focusing on the Canadian Contingent of UNFICYP. The first task is to review and analyze the factors which led to the establishment and deployment of the Canadian Contingent to Cyprus.

To fully appreciate the circumstances leading to Canada's participation in a peacekeeping operation in Cyprus, an historical analysis of the Cyprus problem is required.

1.1 Historical Perspective-Cyprus

Cyprus is the third largest island in the Mediterranean and has an area of 9,530 square kilometers. Lying 75 kilometers south of Turkey, Cyprus has been conquered, oppressed or colonized by successive empires including the Phoenicians, Assyrians, Persians, Greek,

Romans, Normans, Venetians, Genoese, Ottoman Turks, and Great Britain.

The predominant cultural influence in Cyprus has been Greek. In 1974 its population of approximately 600,000 was 80 percent Greek, 18 percent Turkish and the remainder of mixed ancestry.² Today the Cypriot community is approximately 75 percent Greek and 23 percent Turkish with 2 percent mixed heritage. This is the result of the influx of Turks after the island's territory was effectively divided into two parts in August 1974.

The Congress of Berlin in 1878 transferred Cyprus to British administration under nominal Turkish sovereignty. This was the result of a realignment of power in the Mediterranean during the latter part of the 19th century. In 1869 the Suez Canal was opened which obliged Great Britain to focus on its military and political interests in the area in order to protect its economic interests. During this period, Russian encroachment on the Ottoman Empire began to alarm Britain and Turkey. These factors led to the signing of a defensive alliance between Turkey and Great Britain with an agreement that Britain would occupy Cyprus.

² Polyvios G. Polyviou, *Cyprus: Conflict and Negotiation 1960-1980*, (New York: Holmes and Meier Publishers, Inc., 1980) p. 1.

After Turkey supported the Central Powers in 1914, Britain annexed the island, and in 1923 with the signing of the Treaty of Lausanne, Britain retained sole possession of Cyprus while Turkey relinquished any formal claims to the island. After World War II, the Greek Cypriots called for self-rule and eventual union (enosis) with Greece. Britain began considering self-rule for Cyprus but this slow process was not satisfactory to the Greek Cypriots. By 1950, open defiance and rebellion surfaced. The acknowledged leader of this drive for self-government was Archbishop Makarios, the head of the Greek Orthodox Church in Cyprus. The call for enosis by the Greek Cypriots and their leaders was perceived by the Turkish Cypriot minority as a direct threat to their survival. They looked to Turkey for support and to the British administration on Cyprus for sympathetic involvement on their behalf.

This sentiment or longing for enosis by Greek Cypriots is deep rooted. In spite of various foreign occupiers, the Hellenic cultural orientation and ties with the Greek homeland have been maintained. Even with four centuries of Turkish political domination, Hellenic culture was able to survive mainly due to the influence of the Greek Cypriot Church that held the position of leadership within the Greek communal society. Between 1931 and 1960, while Cyprus was

ruled by Governor's decree, major riots occurred in support of union with Greece.

Although international affairs specialists, such as Constantine Melakopides, of the University of Manitoba, describe this call for enosis as valid and claim it is received with sympathy in Greek government circles,³ Richard A. Patrick declares:

Despite formal Greek-Cypriot demands for union with Greece since the British occupation of 1878, Greece itself had never made a diplomatic request that enosis be fulfilled.⁴

According to Patrick, Greece was unsympathetic during the immediate post-war period to Greek Cypriot aspirations of enosis. Patrick describes the events of 1950 during which 97 percent of the Greek-Cypriots signed a petition that called for enosis. However, Greece did not respond to the offer. It was not, in fact, until 1954 that enosis with Cyprus was a part of Greek foreign policy. At this time, the inclusion of enosis as part of formal Greek policy was due

³ Constantine Melakopides, *The Cyprus Problem in Greek Foreign Policy*, (Winnipeg: University of Manitoba, 1989) p. 4.

⁴ Richard A. Patrick, *Political Geography and the Cyprus Conflict 1963-1971*, (Waterloo: University of Waterloo, 1976) p. 6.

to internal nationalistic appeal rather than pressure from Cyprus.⁵

Another factor in the Cyprus equation is Turkey. According to Tozan Bahcheli, there are three factors involved. First, the strategic importance of Cyprus. As Cyprus is only 15 minutes flight time away from Turkey, and should Cyprus join with Greece, there existed a possibility of a future attack by Greece from Cyprus on its traditional enemy, Turkey. In addition, should the Greek government should shift to the political left, the fear existed that the Soviets could entice Greece to give port facilities to the Soviet navy, thereby exposing Turkey to the threat of a Soviet attack. Second, the presence of a substantial Turkish community on the island led Turkey to believe that it had a right to speak and act on that community's behalf. Third, a psychological factor was present that encompassed the idea of providing protection to their Turkish brethren in Cyprus.⁶

It should be noted that the third factor of providing protection was also used by the Greek government on behalf

⁵ *Ibid.*, pp. 6-9.

⁶ Tozun Bahcheli, "Cyprus in the Politics of Turkey Since 1955", Unpublished paper presented at the 2nd Workshop on the Cyprus Dispute of the Canadian Institute of Peace and Security, Ottawa, Ontario, February 10, 1989.

of its Greek Cypriot brethren. The Turkish-Cypriots have regarded Turkey as their ancestral homeland and prior to 1974 called for partitioning of the island with the Turkish-Cypriot portion coming under Turkish authority. This call for partitioning or "takim" was in direct response to the call for "enosis" by the Greek-Cypriot community. After the 1974 invasion by Turkey, partition was effectively accomplished.

Great Britain also has a vested interest in Cyprus as it continues to have troops stationed on the island in two Sovereign Base Areas (SBA), Dhekelia and Akrotiri. The factors behind British presence are strategic and economic. After 1954, when Britain was forced out of Egypt by Colonel Nasser and, after the establishment of the Central Treaty Organization (CENTO) with the signing of the Baghdad Act (among Great Britain, Iran, Iraq and Pakistan) for collective security purposes in the near east in 1955, Cyprus provided Britain with a forward base of operations in order to protect its vital interests. An example of this strategic interest was the Suez Crisis of 1956. After Britain, France, and Israel were forced to pull back from the Suez Canal, the Sovereign Base Areas in Cyprus enabled Britain to ensure its oil supplies would be protected. Strategically, Britain did not wish to weaken NATO's

southern flank, and although not wanting to take sides in the Cyprus issue, it did favour the Turkish point of view as Turkey bordered the Soviet Union and was a bulwark against the Soviets.

However, Melakopides views American attitudes towards the Mediterranean as largely responsible for Greece's failure to protect Cyprus adequately against Turkish advances.⁷ Although the American policy of containment favoured a strong Turkey, Melakopides overlooks a central argument. His anti-American bias focuses blame for all of Greece's problems on the US while giving little attention to British attitudes. However, Michael A. Attalides in *Cyprus: Nationalism and International Politics*, correctly surmises that the British view was paramount during this period and Britain's influence was dominant. Britain, according to Attalides, favoured the Turkish position in regard to Cyprus. As Turkey bordered the USSR and was deemed the strongest of the two NATO allies, British sentiment was sympathetic towards Ankara. Attalides quotes a statement given by Anthony Eden in 1956. The British Prime Minister stated in part:

⁷ Constantine Melakopides, *The Cyprus Problem in Greek Foreign Policy*, pp. 1-7.

It is equally unrealistic to lecture Turkey as to the view she ought to take about an island no further from the coast than is the Isle of Mann from us...Our duty if called on...is to safeguard the strategic needs of our country and of our ally (in this case Turkey)...⁸

As for economic interests, Britain was straightforward in her attitude, for according to Eden:

...Her Majesty's Government must be concerned...to protect the vital interests of its own citizens. The welfare and indeed the lives of our people depends on Cyprus as a protective guard and staging post to take care of those interests, above all, oil.⁹

This British approach to the Cyprus problem is acknowledged by Bahcheli and other Turkish writers but they also appear anti-American, implying complicity on the part of the American government. Contrary to attempts of Greek writers to portray Greece as the sole victim in this issue, Turkey also paid a price for its intransigence over Cyprus.

It is, however, fair to state that the United States was one of the major external actors in the Cyprus dispute. Some of its actions in regard to Cyprus were derived by design, others by default. Cyprus, to American policy makers, fell into the category of a "western" problem and

⁸ Michael A. Attalides, *Cyprus: Nationalism and International Politics*, (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1979) p. 6.

⁹ *Ibid.*

not one of regional conflict. Both the Turkish Cypriots and Greek Cypriots saw the United States as the cause of their problems and interestingly enough, the potential deliverer of a solution. Since taking western responsibility in the 1960's for the Mediterranean area, the United States could have exerted a tremendous influence on both Cypriot parties as well as their respective patrons. However, it must be recognized that although the US had a direct role to play in this situation, it had to balance its approach. This has been the case from 1960 to the present as the NATO alliance is of paramount importance to American strategic interests. Ellen Laipson of the United States State Department described American attitudes towards Cyprus. According to Laipson, the US monitored the transition to independence of Cyprus:

... with a focus on implications for its British ally and the two NATO members. In the mid-1950's, the United States was skeptical about a prominent UN role in resolving the conflict, and preferred to have it solved within western circles [NATO Alliance].¹⁰

The United States did not begin to take serious notice of Cyprus until the events which developed during 1963-64. This was due to the acknowledgment of the strategic importance of the island. It was feared that Cyprus could

¹⁰ Ellen Laipson, The United States and Cyprus: Past Policies, Current Concerns, (Washington: Congressional Research Service, 1989) p. 2.

develop into an important gain for the Soviet Union either by the west's failure to resolve the issue between two NATO allies or, as the Turks emphasized, that the island's left leaning politics could be used as an advantage by the Soviets.

This strategic importance, as well as the substantial influence of the Greek American community, have played a part in the United States' attitude towards Cyprus. It is interesting to note some strategic and economic ties that have strengthened relations between the US and Cyprus, particularly since 1974.¹¹

The scope of this research does not include a detailed analysis from an international perspective of the issues which affected Cyprus prior to becoming independent and the resulting internal problems in the post 1964 period. R.R. Denktash, the present Turkish Cypriot leader, in his *The Cyprus Triangle*, Dr. P.N. Vanis, in *Cyprus: The Unfinished Agony*, Stanley Mayes, in *Makarios: A Biography*, and Thomas Ehrlich, in *Cyprus 1958-1967*, all give their own detailed perspectives and analyses on these issues. But, in order to

¹¹ After the 1974 Cyprus war the issue of refugees (mostly Greek Cypriots from the northern half of the island) was taken up by the Nixon Administration and Congress which resulted in the furnishing of Emergency Aid of several hundreds of millions of dollars.

assist the reader in better understanding why the United Nations and eventually Canada became involved, a brief description of the 1955-64 period is required.

Enosis, or unification with Greece, had, by 1955 become the rallying point for the vast majority of Greek Cypriots in their desire to oust the British. The Turkish Cypriots however, refused to countenance this Greek nationalistic sentiment and began preparing themselves for eventual communal confrontation. In addition, as a distinct cultural society, Turkish Cypriots began demanding *Taksim* (partition) and a formal alliance with Turkey to offset the perceived threat to their national survival. The rising tide of nationalism of both communities was now moving towards communal conflict.¹²

Greek Cypriot nationalism during the 1950's was the rallying cry of the *Ethnike Organosis Kypriotikes Apeleutheroseos* (EOKA-B), a Greek anti-British terrorist organization. This group was led by General George Grivas, who was a mainland Greek officer and a National Guard Commander. The main function of this terrorist organization was to harass the British administration of Cyprus with the objective of demoralizing the Cypriot administration and

¹² Attalides, *Cyprus: Nationalism*, p. 84.

forcing the British to seek a quick solution to the Cypriot unrest. In support of this tactic was the Entarch of the Greek Cypriot Church, Archbishop Makarios, who demonstrated his determination in this regard by stating, "The rulers realize we have entered upon a serious stage of the struggle."¹³ In spite of this terrorism, Grivas was forced to leave the island of Cyprus and Makarios was exiled to the Seychelle Islands until the British returned him to negotiate independence for Cyprus. Concurrent with this anti-British posture, the Turkish Cypriots also became targets of the EOKA-B. This was due to the British support of Turkish Cypriot aspirations of self identity. In order to offset violence against themselves, the Turkish Cypriots organized themselves into anti-EOKA-B groups and began exacting vengeance.

Between 1955 and 1959, the Greek government sporadically defended Grivas' actions and supported Makarios' call for *enosis*. According to Melakopides, however, Greek policy was erratic and at times contradictory:

...that Greek foreign policy constraints...does not commit one to claiming that Athens and Nicosia committed no errors regarding the problem. The

¹³ Stanley Mayes, *Makarios: A Biography*, (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1981) p. 63.

occasional oscillations of Greek foreign policy makers, the frequent disharmonies between the two decision-making centres, the initially passionate Greek commitment to Enosis, the rush with which Greece approached the United Nations in the mid-1950s,...all these must be treated as diplomatic faux pas resulting from either errors in judgment or connotive dissonance or both.¹⁴

Apparently passions raised the stakes on the future of Cyprus. At this time, the Turkish government began taking an active role in Cypriot affairs due to mounting concern over the strategic importance of Cyprus as a potential base from which Turkey could be threatened, especially by Greece. Turkish involvement included arms shipments to Turkish Cypriot enclaves that only fueled the fires of communal conflict. In addition, Turkish nationalism was evident. In September 1955, there were anti-Greek riots in Istanbul and Izmir. These resulted from a bomb explosion at the Turkish consulate in Salomika. The riots were viewed by Ankara as the opportune moment to demonstrate Turkish support for the Turkish Cypriot community in Cyprus. To illustrate this Turkish nationalism, there were violent demonstrations in Istanbul where thousands of people marched through the streets shouting, "Cyprus is Turkish."¹⁵ As Tozun Bahcheli argues:

¹⁴ Melakopides, *The Cyprus Problem*, pp. 2-3.

¹⁵ Mayes, *Makarios: A Biography*, p. 71.

Since the emergence of the issue [Cyprus]...Turkey's policy towards Cyprus has been reactive. Most of the time Turkey has responded to initiatives taken by the Greek Cypriot leadership and Greece...Turkey was slow to articulate a clear Cyprus policy during the Enosis campaign before independence...[Nonetheless] it has identified permanent interests on the island which have remained unchanged since the 1950's.¹⁶

The permanent interests for Turkey were strategic and nationalistic.

The situation which had developed threatened to strain the alliance between Greece and Turkey within the framework of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO). The Greek perception of the situation was that they felt London was siding with both the Turkish Cypriots and the Ankara government against Greek interests in Cyprus. In reaction to this perception of pro-British sentiment towards Turkey, the Greek Cypriots escalated their activities in the cause of self-government and to the eventual union with Greece. In the 1950's the Greek Cypriots pressed Athens for assistance in gaining self-government and used the UN declaration supporting the right of self-determination of colonial territories, to forward their arguments on enosis. As well, the argument which the Greek government put forth that NATO partners should side with Greece in this matter, was heralded throughout Greece and Cyprus. If non-support was

¹⁶ Bahcheli, "Cyprus in the Politics of Turkey", p. 1.

indicated, according to Melakopides, Greece should review "the burdensome membership in NATO since 1952."¹⁷ This tactic would return to haunt Greece in the 1970's. According to Melakopides and Poliviou, Greece felt betrayed by its NATO partners. Furthermore, Greece felt that the United Nations was not interested in "its just cause."¹⁸

Britain did not wish the Cyprus issue to be discussed at the UN, nor did the United States. The British government, with US and French support, ensured the issue of Cyprus was excluded from the UN agenda.¹⁹ However, by 1959 the recurring violence and communal strife, as well as Turkish and Greek antagonisms, made Cyprus an international issue which had to be smoothed over, if not resolved. The urgency of resolution was brought to the forefront in 1959 when Greece was successful in getting the Cyprus issue on the agenda of the UN for debate and resolution. This tactic by Greece forced Britain to forestall debate by agreeing to convene negotiations on Cypriot self-government. After numerous meetings attended by representatives of Britain, Greece, and Turkey, with Cypriot representatives as

¹⁷ Melakopides, *The Cyprus Problem*, p. 4.

¹⁸ Melakopides, *The Cyprus Problem*, p. 4 and Poliviou, *Cyprus: Conflict*, pp. 7-11.

¹⁹ Laipson, *The United States and Cyprus*, p. 2.

interested parties, agreement was reached on the question of Cypriot self-government.

1.2 The London and Zurich Agreements and Their Consequences

Under the London and Zurich agreements, a Republic of Cyprus was to be created which would avoid both union with Greece (*enosis*) and partition (*takim*). The London and Zurich Agreements of 1959-60 called for a proportional bi-national state that incorporated stringent safeguards for the Turkish Cypriot minority and guaranteed them a prominent role in the affairs of the state. These included the civil service, where 70 percent of positions would be Greek Cypriot and 30 percent would be reserved for the Turkish Cypriot minority. Within the 2000 man army, the breakdown was 60 per cent Greek Cypriot and 40 per cent Turkish Cypriot. In the House of Representatives, there were to be 35 Greek Cypriot representatives and the Turkish Cypriots were guaranteed 15 seats. The Cabinet was to be composed of 7 Greek Cypriot ministers and the Turkish Cypriots were allotted three cabinet portfolios. The justices of the Constitutional High Court and the High Court of Justice were similarly apportioned. The President of the Republic was to be a Greek Cypriot and the vice-president a Turkish Cypriot, both with veto powers. If this deliberate and confusing division of

power was not sufficient, other constraints were imposed. Britain was allowed to retain more than 240 square kilometers in two sovereign bases for its own interests. Greece was guaranteed the legal positioning of 950 armed troops on the island while Turkey was allowed 650. The above conditions were formalized in four documents signed in Nicosia, Cyprus on August 16, 1960. These were the Treaty of Establishment and the Treaty of Guarantee signed by Cyprus, Greece, Turkey and Great Britain; The Treaty of Alliance signed by Greece, Turkey, and Cyprus; and finally the new Constitution.²⁰

In effect, the three parties were guaranteeing the quasi-sovereignty of Cyprus but retained the right to independent action, including force, to re-establish conditions that were prevalent prior to independence, should circumstances warrant. In other words, any one of the Guarantor powers could become involved in the internal affairs of Cyprus if it deemed that the status quo of 1960 was being threatened. Although not totally satisfied, each of the two main parties to the agreements derived benefits from the London and Zurich Agreements. The government of Ankara was in agreement with the implementation of these

²⁰ Charles Foley and W.I. Scobie, *The Struggle for Cyprus*, (Stanford: Hoover Institution Press, 1975) pp. 155-156.

accords, as they were seen as a victory for Turkey on behalf of the Turkish Cypriots. Moreover, Turkey, through its diplomacy, now had a veto over Cyprus' future through the Treaty of Guarantee. Of utmost importance, Greece acknowledged Ankara's rights on the island. Greece, although not ecstatic over these events, did retain or was acknowledged to have rights on the island and was seen as upholding the rights of Greek Cypriots. Britain still retained its two SBA's and could play the part of mediator between its two NATO allies should the situation arise. Authors such as Foley and Scobie argue that Makarios was under pressure to accept the Agreements or risk losing the opportunity for self-government. They state that:

The archbishop felt certain that to reject the agreements would be to bring partition upon the island, in one form or another. The British ministers had given him until mid-morning of the following day...he [Makarios] telephoned his submission to the Foreign Office in London...²¹

While some measure of duress was present, Makarios understood the provisions of the agreement and was willing to sign them. As Stanley Mayes points out, Makarios was a shrewd politician and a hard bargainer, and although hesitant in signing the agreements, he was using this stalling tactic in order to negotiate the SBA's with

²¹ *Ibid.*, p. 157.

Britain. Eventually he negotiated a smaller area for the SBA's than the original demands of the British government called for.²² Whatever Agreements signed and agreed to and no matter the size of the SBA's, the only groups not making gains were the Greek and Turkish Cypriots who had a sovereign Republic in name only. This would become evident in 1964.²³

During the period 1960-63 the previously agreed to constitutional provisions proved less and less practical. Tensions grew between the two Cypriot communities. It was impossible to unify public services or to determine long term policy as both communities, the Turkish Cypriots headed by Rauf Denktash, and the Greek Cypriots headed by Makarios, accused each other of attempting to dissolve the republic.²⁴

²² *Ibid.*

²³ C. Foley and W.I Scobie, *The Struggle for Cyprus*, pp. 155-157. Once Cyprus agreed to the conditions as defined by the accords, it effectively became a stillborn state. No state can effectively function and retain its independence while foreign troops are on its soil and outside governments are able to dictate policy and influence communal responses to government programs or policies. As for the Turkish Cypriots, they gained far more power than their 18% minority status warranted, and with the power to hold up legislation or government administration, it was a matter of time before the situation exploded.

²⁴ Demitri S. Bitsios, *Cyprus: The Vulnerable Republic*, (Thessaloniki: Institute For Balkan Studies, 1975) p. 117. Rauf Denktash in his *The Cyprus Triangle*, (London: K. Rustem and Bros. and George Allen and Unwin, 1982) p. 26, states that Makarios wanted nothing less than total union with Greece even though Makarios' signature was on the accords. As proof he writes that Makarios stated to a Swedish

Many Greeks and Greek Cypriots also resented the preclusion or future possibility of union with Greece (enosis), while many Turkish Cypriots were insecure with the provision that partition under Turkish administration (takim) would not be sought. The Turkish Cypriot community also mistrusted the motives of the Greek Cypriot majority and feared that the Greek Cypriots would impose their will by force. Conversely, the Greek Cypriots complained that the Turkish Cypriot minority consciously held up progressive reforms and any attempt to force a revision of the constitution would, in all probability, be countered by Turkish intervention.²⁵ This constant communal bickering and political wrangling eventually turned into inter-communal violence and, by December 1963, the beleaguered Cypriot government was totally paralyzed.

One major crisis that contributed to this paralysis occurred on November 30, 1963 and is described in detail by numerous Greek, Turkish and Canadian writers. All agree that

newspaper on September 5, 1963, "It is true that the goal of our struggle is to annex Cyprus to Greece." With statements like this to world media, Makarios was not only fueling inter-communal tensions, he was challenging the Turkish Cypriots and Turkey to resort to means that would escalate the situation into armed confrontation. As will be demonstrated later, this type of action by Makarios would cost his nation in the long term.

²⁵ D.W. Wainhouse, *International Peace Observation*, pp. 436-437.

what Makarios proposed on this date was the catalyst that propelled the Cyprus issue into an international crisis. President Archbishop Makarios proposed major constitutional amendments that would establish unified municipal administrations and eliminate bi-communal sections of the constitution. Makarios was proposing the establishment of a unitary state to replace the bi-national state that presently existed. The proposed amendments put forward by Makarios would nullify the provisions which separated the communities along ethnic lines. Most importantly, these proposals would remove the veto power of the president and vice-president. The Turkish Cypriot community could not accept these constitutional proposals which, in effect, would reduce significantly its power and role in the government, would lessen its protection by law of its community, and would render the Turkish Cypriots a minority only, not a defined and protected community within the state. The constitutional proposals were sent to Greece and Turkey for information only but the Turkish government categorically rejected them.²⁶

While sporadic violence followed this November proclamation, it was on December 21, 1963, that a violent

²⁶ Wainhouse, *International Peace Observation*, p. 437 and J.L. Granatstein, *Peacekeeping*, p. 170.

confrontation erupted in Nicosia. This resulted in the deployment of the Turkish National Contingent to the northern portion of the city on December 24. Turkish aircraft overflew Cyprus while military and naval forces were reported to be building up in Turkey. Civil strife on the island led to Greek Cypriots over-running Turkish Cypriot enclaves. This resulted in high levels of casualties for the Turkish Cypriots. The Turkish Cypriot community appealed to Ankara for assistance resulting in political condemnation by the government of Turkey and military overflights by the Turkish Air Force.²⁷ Turkey threatened invasion in early January 1964, and tensions mounted as the two NATO allies, Greece and Turkey, threatened each other.

On December 24, 1963, all three Guarantor States offered their good offices to restore peace and order. They proposed a joint peacekeeping force comprised of troops already positioned on the island. Makarios agreed to this peacekeeping force but, in reality, only the British forces patrolled the "Green Line" that had been established in Nicosia to separate the two communities. On December 26, the Cyprus issue was brought to the attention of the United Nations by the Government of Cyprus. In a letter addressed

²⁷ Bahcheli, *Cyprus*, pp. 7-8

to the Secretary-General, the Cyprus government laid out its complaints against Turkey by stating:

[Turkey's] acts of aggression... [were revealed] through the following acts:

1. the violation of the air space of Cyprus by Turkish military aircraft...;
2. the violence of the territorial waters of Cyprus by the appearance of Turkish warships...; and
3. the movement of Turkish troops into Nicosia...²⁸

Although bringing the matter before the UN Secretary-General, the Cypriot UN Representative did not ask for an emergency Security Council meeting to deal with the crisis. This was due to the fact that the feared Turkish invasion or intervention did not materialize. Meanwhile, the British government offered to host a conference of the representatives of the interested parties in London in January 1964. The London Conference took place while inter-communal violence was rampant. The government of Cyprus rejected proposals to strengthen the existing peacekeeping forces based on the contingents of the three Guarantor States. J.L. Granatstein captures the Cypriot government's reaction:

²⁸ Wainhouse, *International Peace Observation*, p. 437 citing UN Document UN Security Council S/5488, Dec. 26. 1963.

Press reports towards the end of January 1964 had it that Sir Alec Douglas Home's government had asked the United States, France, Italy, and West Germany to contribute. All those countries named...were NATO members... the proposed peacekeeping body was not to be considered a NATO force... merely as a force from NATO countries.

The distinction was too fine for Archbishop Makarios, who rejected the British proposals.²⁹

Makarios, although agreeing that an international force was required to assist in returning Cyprus to a normal condition, was adamant that Greek and Turkish forces could not be part of the agreed force. He wanted a force under the operational control of the UN. Once the proposal that forces from NATO countries act as peacekeepers was rejected, the UN was again requested to deal with this urgent matter. Canada, part of the United Nations, well-known for its commitment to collective security through the UN, would take a leading role in the establishment of a peacekeeping force.

1.3 Conclusion

The Cypriot issue during this period had been followed by the world community. Canada, as a partner in NATO and a member of the United Nations, was aware of the issues involved. By January 1964, press reports indicated that the

²⁹ Taylor, Cox, and Granatstein, *Peacekeeping*, pp. 170-171.

British government of Sir Alec Douglas Home had asked the United States, France and West Germany to assist in the pacification of Cyprus. However, this request was not agreed to. Britain then wished to gather a force from Commonwealth nations, but was persuaded by the disapproval of the Soviet Union to abandon this approach. In the end, the United Kingdom brought the matter before the Security Council on February 18, 1964.³⁰ Once the Cyprus issue was formally before the Security Council, Canada indicated its willingness to participate in a United Nations peacekeeping force, but only if certain criteria were set. However, prior to this participation, there would be debate by the Canadian Parliament on this issue and planning for Canadian military deployment.

³⁰ *Ibid.*

CHAPTER 2

CANADA PREPARES TO UNDERTAKE PEACEKEEPING IN CYPRUS

It appeared reasonably certain that Canadian forces would participate in a United Nations Peacekeeping Force in Cyprus. Both the Department of External Affairs and the Department of National Defence (DND) were prepared for this eventuality. The Cyprus issue, which was now holding the attention of the world body, was used by Prime Minister L.B. Pearson to underline the necessity of having Standby Forces ready to be employed by the United Nations when circumstances warranted. The concept of having all member states having Standby Forces available for UN operations was not accepted, but Pearson persisted in his view that this approach could be effective to help diffuse critical situations.

2.1 The Canadian Government Agrees To Participate

Canada, a Commonwealth member, had been approached by the UK to provide troops for the force. As part of the United Nations, it seemed reasonably sure that Canada

would be approached again. In this light, the matter was brought up in the Canadian House of Commons.

Mr. Speaker: In view of the statement made by the foreign secretary of the United Kingdom while in Ottawa, could I ask the Prime Minister if he would give the house an assurance that no Canadian troops will be sent to Cyprus unless they are under the aegis of the United Nations?...that before any such action is taken there will be full consultation in the house and the approval of this chamber sought?¹

With these questions, T.C. Douglas, the leader of the federal New Democratic Party, introduced the subject of Cyprus to the Canadian House of Commons on February 18, 1964. What Douglas and others sought was the assurance that Canada would not participate in any operation regarding Cyprus unless it was under the auspices of the United Nations. The next day in the House of Commons Douglas made his point again:

...We do not think that Canada should get drawn into a power play between Great Britain, Cyprus, Turkey and Greece. If Canada is to take part in a peace force then we think our troops should be there as the servants of the United Nations and not become embroiled in what could be a bitter and bloody family quarrel.²

¹ *Hansard*, House of Commons, February 18, 1964.

² *Hansard*, House of Commons, February 20, 1964, p. 71

Douglas's questions were answered by the Prime Minister, who made no commitment to Canadian participation in a UN operation. He did, however, state that:

As far as sending Canadian troops to Cyprus is concerned, no decision has been taken by the government. It may be premature to speculate on the circumstances surrounding a possible Canadian contribution to a peace keeping force at a time when the whole matter is under discussion in the Security Council of the United Nations.³

Although not admitting to any commitment, Pearson went on to describe the circumstances in which Canada would, if requested, seriously consider any participation in this UN operation:

It is clear, however, that before the Canadian Government would decide to provide a force for peace keeping purposes certain requirements would have to be met. First, we would have to be satisfied that the composition and terms of reference of the force were such as to contribute to peace and stability in the area. Second, we would not wish the commitment of the force to be of indefinite duration. In addition, we would wish to ensure that the choice of a mediator and his terms of reference would be such as to lead to the expectation that a solution to the dispute in Cyprus might be found within a reasonable time. Third, the arrangements would, of course, have to be acceptable to the government of Cyprus in accordance with its constitutional procedure. Fourth, there should be an association of the force with the United Nations. Finally, if a request is made involving the use of substantial numbers of

³ Hansard, House of Commons, February 19, 1964, p. 6

Canadians abroad, we would bring the matter before Parliament before any final decision is taken.⁴

Of the four conditions outlined by Pearson, prior to making a commitment to sending a Canadian contingent to Cyprus, only two were followed: that the force be under UN command and that the force would be acceptable to the government of Cyprus. The condition that the force be for a limited duration dependent upon a political settlement, was not met. In fact, UNFICYP is still in existence and Canada remained part of this UN operation for 29 years. As for stating that the matter of Canadian military participation would be brought before the House before any decision was made, this condition was partially met.

In the House of Commons, the debate over Canadian participation in Cyprus continued. Douglas reiterated the NDP's position on Canadian participation:

I want to repeat what I said to the Prime Minister yesterday in referring to a question...We trust the government will make no commitment to send Canadian troops to Cyprus unless those troops are under the aegis of the United Nations...We do not think Canada should get drawn into a power play between Great Britain, Cyprus, Turkey and Greece. If Canada is to take part in a peace keeping force then we think our troops should be there as the servants of

⁴ Hansard, House of Commons, February 19, 1964, p. 7.

the United Nations and not become embroiled in what could be a bitter and bloody family quarrel.⁵

On 21 February 1964, Real Caouette, of the Ralliement Creditistes, gave his party's position on Canadian participation in the Cyprus issue.

I am now coming to the problem of Cyprus where two members of NATO are in opposite camps, that is, Turkey and Greece. Some big financial interests are also implicated. At the first news of conflict, the press announced that Canada was ready to send a force of one thousand men to preserve peace in Cyprus. What we do not understand, we who belong to the Ralliement Creditistes, is that the Liberal government acts so hurriedly in external affairs matters and problems which only affect us in a remote way, whereas this same government is so undecided and inactive when it comes to deal with problems condemning all Canadians.⁶

Caouette had stated his opposition to Canadian involvement in international matters which, in his opinion, did not directly affect Canada. He also referred to a telegram he had sent to Pearson regarding his concerns. He came to the crux of his opposition when he further stated:

Liberals and Conservatives alike are always anxious to interfere, to mobilize armed forces for risky ventures in all corners of the world. It dates back from Laurier, who sent to the rescue of the British some Canadian troops against the Boers...It went on under Borden, who during the first world war, set

⁵ Hansard, House of Commons, February 20, 1964, p. 71.

⁶ Hansard, House of Commons, February 21, 1964, p. 93.

his police and his pack of dogs at the French Canadians' heels when all they asked was to live in peace.

This went on with King and St. Laurent who mobilized all human, industrial and financial resources in Canada to fight the war against the axis powers.

When it comes to waging war, there is no indecision but quick and positive action, men and arms are available and money is forthcoming to meet the cost.

...Mr. Speaker, nobody would say there is no money to send Canadian troops to Cyprus, but it is claimed that there is no money to help the unemployed...In Cyprus the troops would be well dressed, well washed, well fed, but in Canada the unemployed are compelled...to take a shovel and dig in frozen ground under the winter works program while power shovels and bulldozers stand idle in heated garages, close to the places where these labourers are working in bitter cold.⁷

For all the symbolism of decrying the inadequacy of government assistance to help the working man, Caouette demonstrated his parochial provincial outlook. Quebec nationalists did not wish for Canada to take part in international affairs which they felt were caused by great powers, especially Great Britain. To Caouette, the Canadian government was bending to great power influence. In essence, Caouette and the Creditistes wished for Canada to remain isolated, inward looking, and aloof to matters that did not, in their opinion, concern Canadians.

⁷ *Ibid.*, pp. 93-94.

The Pearson government listened politely while continuing to direct Department of National Defence (DND) and External Affairs to prepare quietly for the deployment of Canadian troops to Cyprus. On 24 February, Pearson was again questioned on Canadian participation in Cyprus. He responded that negotiations between the United Nations and the Cyprus government over the terms of the force were still on-going and that the Canadian government was not in a position to discuss them at that time. However, on 27 February, Pearson was specifically asked if there was any action being taken to organize a potential Canadian contribution. The Prime Minister avoided a direct answer by stating that the matter was still before the Security Council and that he had no further information.⁸

The matter was discussed and the House approved Canada's participation. However, according to Foreign Secretary Paul Martin, and, as the following account will reveal, troops were airborne and on their way prior to parliamentary approval.⁹

⁸ *Hansard*, House of Commons, February 27, 1964, p. 288.

⁹ Paul Martin, *A Very Public Life*, Volume II (Toronto: Deneau and Wayne Pub., 1985) pp. 545-548.

2.2 Early Military Planning for the Canadian Contingent

It has already been mentioned that Pearson was a strong advocate of rapid response Standby Forces for UN operations. Canada's dispatch of troops was seen as being immediate. However, while Pearson and his government indicated readiness to participate, advanced military planning had been in progress during January-February 1964.

In fact, as early as 2 February 1964, the Department of National Defence (DND) had requested assistance from External Affairs in securing clearances for overflights by the Royal Canadian Air Force over France, Ireland, United Kingdom, West Germany, Italy, and Greece.¹⁰ On the same day, another DND memorandum from Group Captain D.A. Brownlee to Arthur Menzies, a senior official in External Affairs, outlined the cost involved to move the UN Standby Battalion to Cyprus. Another Memorandum outlining the complete breakdown of costs was forwarded to External Affairs on 4 February to the effect that:

¹⁰ *National Archives of Canada*, Department of National Defence Memorandum to A.R. Menzies, Office of Under Secretary of State for External Affairs, File 21-14-16. UNFICYP-8, 2 February 1964.

Estimated costs of sending Canadian Infantry Brigade Group to Cyprus for a three month period is \$600,000 for the Army and \$900,000 for the RCAF airlift. Airlift costs include cost of weekly support flight but does not include cost of returning force to Canada at about \$600,000. Funds not provided in 63/64 estimates or 64/65 estimates. There will be surplus funds in Operating Vote of Army of 63/64 therefore possible to absorb estimated extra costs of Army in current fiscal year. Funds for RCAF require supplementary estimate in 63/64 Operating Vote. DND would include additional cost for airlift estimated at \$800,000 for 63/64. For 64/65 additional cost of force is \$200,000 per month for Army and \$100,000 for Air Force.¹¹

The above indicates that funds were available from the existing budget of the Army for a three month period. As the three month mandate was continually renewed and then extended for six month periods, the cost of this peacekeeping force grew dramatically. Costs were absorbed into the DND operating Estimates, or budget, for the next 29 years.

In addition to cost estimates, the number of troops was also outlined in correspondence between DND and External Affairs. By 5 February, advance planning by DND had resulted in an agreement as to the size of the force

¹¹ National Archives of Canada, Letter Sent by. E.B. Armstrong, Deputy Minister DND, to R. Campbell, Assistant Under Secretary of State for External Affairs, File 21-14-6-UNFICYP-8, 4 February 1964.

required as well as the equipment needed. In a letter from External Affairs to the Deputy Minister, Department of National Defence, these issues were addressed:

On DND advance Plans for sending Canadian Contingent to Cyprus if and when decision is reached:

a. 3 advance (positioning flights) by 2 Yukon and 1 Herc (Hercules) carrying a small RCAF party would leave Canada 12, 12.25 and 24 hours respectively after the government decision is reached.

b. main force consisting of 815 troops with kit, 72 jeeps and trailers and 102,000 pounds of other stores (including personal arms and ammunition) would be lifted between the third and seventh day after the government decision. This would require 13 flights by Yukon and 5 by Hercules aircraft...The Department of National Defence has also made contingency planning for 11 additional Hercules flights to ferry 200 more troops and accompanying equipment if and when required.¹²

The Department of National Defence was directed to prepare contingency plans for an airlift of troops and equipment to Cyprus if and when the government decided to participate in the UN force which was being proposed. This planning was required as the transporting of troops to a theatre of operations is difficult and complex. In 1964 the capacity to carry out the commitment to provide Canadian troops for UNFICYP was readily available. At

¹² National Archives of Canada, Memorandum External Affairs, A.R. Menzies to R. Campbell, DND Advance Plans, File 21-14-6-UNFICYP-8, 5 February 1964.

this time, the total strength of the Canadian military was approximately 110,000, with the Canadian army numbering around 44,000. Included in this number were four infantry brigade groups, one of which was stationed in NATO, with a strength of 6,500, two others committed to NATO and one committed to North American defense and peacekeeping duties.¹³ Although still providing approximately 980 troops (Communications with one Reconnaissance squadron) to UNEF,¹⁴ the Canadian military still retained the capacity to provide 1087 troops to UNFICYP.

In addition to providing troops, the Canadian Military, along with the UK forces, was the only other force to provide its own contingent lift by their own transport means and at no cost to the United Nations. In the ensuing years, Canadian Contingent rotations were carried out by their own transport facilities. Furthermore, equipment, stores, and personnel were dispatched by sea, arriving in Cyprus on 30 March aboard the *Restigouche* and the aircraft carrier *Bonaventure*. To help support the lightly armed troops, the Canadian

¹³ The Military Balance 1966-1967 (London: *Institute of Strategic Studies*, 1966) p. 17.

¹⁴ David Wainhouse, *International Peacekeeping at the Crossroads* (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1973) p. 247.

Contingent also included one armoured car squadron consisting of 100 troops equipped with Ferret scout cars. This capacity was later augmented with one anti-tank platoon of 25 men equipped with jeep-mounted 106 millimetre recoilless rifles. As the evidence suggests, this was to be a lightly armed force and not a combat capable response force. However, 10 years later during the Turkish invasion phase of July 1974, the Canadian Contingent was augmented with both men and heavier equipment.

As indicated, the capacity to provide troops and equipment was available in 1964. Throughout the first decade, however, the strength of the Canadian Contingent, beginning with approximately 1100 troops, was steadily reduced due to a growing sense of stability on the island as well as for cost saving measures. Through 1967 and 1968 the Canadian Contingent was reduced to 950 and 750 troops respectively, and by 1969 numbered 574.¹⁵ This number would remain consistent until the events of July 1974 when the contingent was augmented by another 482 troops and additional armoured equipment.

¹⁵ *Ibid.*, p. 370.

By 1968, the Trudeau government succeeded Pearson and had begun a review of Defence Policy. In its White Paper on Defence, "Defence in the Seventies", the government placed peacekeeping involvement in the last priority category of defence.¹⁶ As well, commitment to NATO was halved and a total force reduction began. By 1974, the military numbered approximately 90,000 total strength. The force reduction had minimal impact on the participation in UNFICYP and the capacity to continue providing troop rotation was not affected. As a consequence, there was no further reduction in the number of troops in Cyprus. As will be discussed, Canada after ten years of providing troops to UNFICYP, was still committed to this operation.

In summary, once the decision to participate was made, the pre-planning initiated by DND enabled it to airlift troops and equipment without any serious difficulty. This demonstrated that such a force could be ready when required.

Concurrent with inquiries in the House, the Department of External Affairs was in contact with the

¹⁶ *White Paper on Defence, "Defence in the 70's"* Donald Macdonald, Minister of National Defence in Canada (Ottawa, 1971).

Canadian Permanent Mission in New York. On 25 February, Paul Martin, Minister of External Affairs, instructed the Permanent Mission New York (PERMISNY) to make Canada's views on the financing of this UN mission known to the Secretary-General. Canada's position was that UN operations were a collective responsibility of all member states and that contributing members to specific operations should not bear all the financial costs incumbent to this operation. In this regard, Martin wrote to the following to the PERMISNY two days later:

We recognize that the first objective of the UN in its consideration of the Cyprus question must be the maintenance of peace and that modalities of any UN action must be shaped to this requirement...In the face of these facts of life, it is understandable that the only method under consideration for financing the Cyprus Peace Force is that each contributor government should meet all costs for its troops. Nevertheless we think we should record our concern over the implications of this method of financing the operation as a precedent which may usually affect the negotiations of the working group of 21 this spring.¹⁷

The message further stated that Canada's initiative in regard to resolution 1874-S-IV, on the general principles for sharing costs of future peacekeeping operations involving heavy expenditures, had been tabled

¹⁷ *National Archives of Canada*, Message from PERMISNY to External Affairs File 21-14-6-UNFICYP-9, 25 February 1964.

as "Financing of such operations is a collective responsibility of all state members of the United Nations."¹⁸ What is of significance, especially for Canada, in the matter of collective responsibility for the financing of UN operations, was that the PERMISNY alerted Martin that, even though the majority of the UN members accepted the principle of collective responsibility, the concept was still a fragile one. The PERMISNY had done its research warning Martin that, although many of the member states had accepted the principle, they would welcome any excuse to avoid its practical application. The examples given included the USSR, who, it was believed, would claim that members not directly concerned with Cyprus should not accept financial responsibility. The PERMISNY argued that the Soviets would put forth the thesis that capitalist imperialist powers should pay for the consequences of their past misdeeds. Also, France argued that costs should be borne only by those willing to pay them, such as those with direct interests¹⁹. This is a surprising comment, for at the same time as they stated this premise, France had recently (within the last 10 years)

¹⁸ National Archives of Canada, Message from PERMISNY, File 21-14-6-UNFICYP-9, 25 February 1964.

¹⁹ National Archives of Canada, Message from PERMISNY to External Affairs File 21-14-6-UNFICYP-9, 25 February 1964.

left Indo-China and had requested the Americans to take over the responsibility of halting communist expansion.

The Canadian Government did not wish the Cyprus force to be a precedent for the financing of United Nations operations. This concern would be a continuing sore point with successive Canadian Governments, as the costs for UNFICYP were borne by the contributing country and the principle of collective responsibility did not apply to this force.

Another aspect that influenced Canadian participation and the willingness to accept financial responsibility were geo-political considerations. Paul Martin stated on 26 February:

that there existed special circumstances in relation to the Cyprus situation which have dictated special financing proposals, notably the inability of the United Nations to assume the financing of yet another costly peacekeeping operation at a time when the Organization is heavily in arrears from earlier ones; and the special considerations affecting western security which render it desirable to keep some UN members, particularly the Soviet bloc, at respectable arm's length from Cyprus...special Canadian interests are at stake, viz.: a dispute involving two members of an Alliance of which Canada is a member, and which is taking place in the territory of a fellow member of the Commonwealth.²⁰

²⁰ *National Archives of Canada, Memorandum For the Minister File 21-14-6-UNFICYP-9, 26 February 1964.*

Furthermore, Lester Pearson, a strong advocate of NATO, was infinitely aware of the critical Cyprus situation facing not only the UN but the Atlantic alliance as well, and its possible impact on the international and regional political landscape. When reflecting on the Cyprus issue in a Note for the Record dated August 9, 1964, he wrote:

Failure of the United Nations and the international community on this crisis will be far more than the failure of peace-keeping in Cyprus. It will put in jeopardy the whole peace-keeping function of the United Nations, the function on which the whole concept and organization of the United Nations is based.

The League of Nations received its death blow in Ethiopia. We must prevent the United Nations suffering the same fate through failure in Cyprus.

Furthermore, armed conflict between two NATO members, Turkey and Greece, will end NATO in its present form.

The stakes are high. They involve peace, the organization of peace, and the organization of regional collective security; in other words, humanity, the United Nations and NATO.²¹

Geoffrey Pearson also supported this reasoning:

Canadian involvement in United Nations operations [Cyprus] stems from two factors. First, our commitment to the United Nations and the principles of maintaining international peace and security, a foreign policy approach. Second, it provides us

²¹ Lester B. Pearson, Note for the Record, 9 August 1964, (MG 26 N3), *Pearson Papers*.

with an opportunity to assist in this principle by participating in international endeavours to help this process, and in the case of Cyprus, it was to help stop two members of NATO Greece and Turkey, from potential conflict and weakening the southern flank of the NATO alliance, the defence policy aspect.²²

Although the preceding outlines the primary reasons why Canada finally agreed to participate, pressure by the United States for Canadian involvement also played a part in this decision. Geoffrey Pearson stated:

I think the main fact was the pressure put on Canada by the United States to contribute. The Americans were extremely concerned, naturally, as the leader of the Alliance, that this would lead to a war between Greece and Turkey and disrupt NATO and disrupt western defence planning.

President Johnson intervened personally. He phoned my father [L.B. Pearson] and said we really had to take the lead and allow time to get the UN involved. That the United States couldn't participate in peacekeeping. If they had, the Russians had a veto in the Security Council Resolution and so they had to stay out of it. The British were there already, in Cyprus, therefore they couldn't take the lead. The French were not interested; it was a British problem.²³

Geoffrey Pearson also recalled that President Johnson tended to be gracious once he received what he wanted. According to Pearson, an added incentive was agreed to:

²² Geoffrey Pearson , interview held in Ottawa, Ontario, February 11, 1994.

²³ *Ibid.*

We went into this operation for these reasons. As well, Lester Pearson always maintained that LBJ requested Canada's participation and that Canada's price was the signing of the Auto Pact.

I've heard my father [L.B. Pearson] say that the President, in his usual way, or expansive mood, said; "and Mr. Prime Minister, if you do this, it will certainly help our relations and let me know if there is anything I can do for you." I recall Lester Pearson said, "well we have this difficulty over the agreement on auto trade, automobile trade, and your people are putting up real problems. Would you look into that?"

My father claimed that this made a real difference. And they did in fact sign the agreement in the summer of 1964. Three months after the Cyprus thing.²⁴

No documents exist, however, which can substantiate this assertion, nor does L.B. Pearson mention the Auto Pact in this regard in his memoirs.

²⁴ *Ibid.* During the 29 years of participation in UNFICYP, Canada, according to the Directorate of Peacekeeping Operations, DND, has spent approximately \$26 million per year for a total of approximately \$754 million dollars. Since 1970, the Auto Pact has generated approximately \$209 billion in exports and imports total approximately \$186 billion dollars. The net surplus is \$23 billion dollars.²⁴ As figures for the years 1965-1969 are unavailable, the 1970-1985 figures have been used. By subtracting the cost of the Canadian Contingent which is less than a billion dollars, Pearson's alleged deal with Johnson was most beneficial for Canada. Considering that over 35,000 direct jobs in the auto industry were created, it appears that Canada received the best of the bargain.

2.3 Creation of UNFICYP

On March 2, 1964, PERMISNY cabled External Affairs to inform them that five non-permanent members of the UN Security-Council had tabled a resolution calling for the establishment of a UN Force and the appointment of a mediator. The five members were Bolivia, Brazil, the Ivory Coast, Morocco and Norway. Staff at External Affairs were informed that, privately, the Turkish and Cypriot delegations had confirmed their acceptance of the resolution as being the best compromise attainable. As well, PERMISNY stated that the Security Council would meet again on the afternoon of 3 March as the Soviet delegate had asked for time to seek instructions from Moscow. It was believed by PERMISNY that the Soviets would not veto the resolution but would abstain from the vote. Included in the message was the assurance received by the Secretary-General from the Cypriots that they would accept UN forces. U Thant, the Secretary-General, was busily attempting to secure commitments from Ireland and Finland, while the Norwegians were attempting the same with the Swedes.²⁵

²⁵ *National Archives of Canada*, Message from the PERMISNY to External Affairs, Number 313, File 21-14-6-UNFICYP-9, 2 March 1964.

That same afternoon, the PERMISNY again cabled External Affairs and advised that a resolution had been tabled which stated in part:

Noting that the present situation with regard to Cyprus is likely to threaten international peace and security and may further deteriorate unless additional measures are promptly taken to maintain peace and to seek out a durable solution...calls upon all member states, in conformity with their obligations under the Charter of the UN, to refrain from any action or threat of action likely to worsen the situation in the sovereign republic of Cyprus, or to endanger international peace...²⁶

The resolution went on to recommend the creation of a UN Peacekeeping Force, with the consent of the government of Cyprus. The composition of the force was to be determined by the Secretary-General, in consultation with the governments of Cyprus, Greece, Turkey, and the United Kingdom. In addition, the force was to be established for a period of three months with all costs pertaining to it being met by the governments providing the contingents. The resolution also went on to recommend that the Secretary-General designate a mediator for the

²⁶ *National Archives of Canada*, Message from PERMISNY to External Affairs, Number 314, File 21-14-6-UNFICYP-9, 2 March 1964.

purpose of promoting a peaceful solution and an agreed settlement of the problem confronting Cyprus...The mediator shall report periodically to the Secretary-General on his efforts.²⁷

One condition of the resolution stated that the governments of Greece, Turkey, Cyprus and the United Kingdom would have to be in agreement on the naming of the mediator. This condition would severely restrict the choice and conduct of the mediator, and would severely limit the Secretary-General in the future.

In the House of Commons, Paul Martin was asked if Canada had entered into negotiations with the Secretary-General with respect to Canadian participation in the UN force.²⁸ He replied that nothing official had yet occurred. On 3 March, Martin was again in contact with PERMISNY over the issue of the financing of the proposed force in Cyprus,

...Canada has been one of the prime movers in endeavouring to foster acceptance of the principle of collective responsibility and the development of long-term financing arrangements based on the relative capacity to pay. Progress achieved in recent years as a result of our past efforts and those of our friends could suffer a serious and perhaps permanent reversal if the financing method now under consideration were adopted, particularly if responsible voices were not raised now in support of collective responsibility...expressing

²⁷ *Ibid.*

²⁸ *Hansard*, House of Commons, March 2, 1964. p. 397.

Canadian concern that, notwithstanding the ad hoc nature of the financing method for the first three months...any future costs should be borne at least in part by all member states...according to Article 43 of the Charter.²⁹

Martin also stressed the point that, should contributing countries meet the costs for its troops, this arrangement would:

be a retrograde step for the UN since it would strike a serious blow at the principle of collective responsibility for UN peacekeeping operations.³⁰

Although the expenses of the mediator would be paid by the United Nations, Martin thought of this as tokenism. He wrote of this measure as:

a token acceptance of the principle of collective responsibility, it is of such a minimal nature as to have the opposite effect-viz. to undermine the principle.³¹

The basic concern, as expressed by Martin, was based on the potential problems of future operations if

²⁹ *National Archives of Canada*, Memorandum for the Minister, Financing UN Peacekeeping Operations Cyprus, File-21-14-6-UNFICYP-9, 3 March 1964.

³⁰ *National Archives of Canada*, Message from External Affairs to PERMISNY, File 21-14-6-UNFICYP-9, 3 March 1964.

³¹ *National Archives of Canada*, Message from External Affairs to PERMISNY, File 21-14-6-UNFICYP-9, 3 March 1964.

the principle of collective responsibility was not adhered to. Martin also directed the Canadian delegate to seek a meeting with the Secretary-General to advise him of Canada's concern in this matter.

On 4 March 1964, the United Nations Security Council adopted a resolution that called for the establishment of a United Nations peacekeeping force in Cyprus. In this light, an exchange of Letters of Agreement between the UN and Cyprus was carried out. The mandate of the force was stated as being:

- a. To prevent a recurrence of fighting;
- b. To contribute to the maintenance and restoration of law and order; and
- c. To contribute to a return to normal conditions.³²

To carry out the mandate as prescribed, the following articles would be applied:

- 1. Achievement of freedom of movement on all roads.
- 2. Achievement of freedom of movement for all communities within the whole town of Nicosia and other cities; under conditions of security.
- 3. The progressive disarming of all civilians other than the regular police gendarmerie and the Cyprus army...

³² UN Doc. S/5634, March 4, 1964.

4. The control of extremists on both sides.³³

Meanwhile on 6 March, Air Chief Marshal F.R. Miller, Chairman, Chiefs of Staff, wrote a letter to Ross Campbell, of the Department of External Affairs, seeking assistance from him in procuring agreement from France to use the air base at Marville for a stop over. Also included was the request to receive permission from France, Italy, and Greece for overflight of their respective territories in order to complete the air transport of troops to Cyprus.³⁴ In response to this letter, Campbell minuted the following instructions to his subordinates:

Don't action yet but keep on top of the file for quick action at a moment to be pledged next week.³⁵

This document supports the contention that the government had already unequivocally made a decision to participate in the force. As stated, Pearson wished to demonstrate that a standby force could be deployed quickly. On this same day, Martin spoke in the House on

³³ *United Nations Monthly Chronicle* (New York: May 1964) p. 8.

³⁴ *National Archives of Canada*, Letter from F.R. Miller, Air Chief Marshall, Chairman Chiefs of Staff to Mr. R. Campbell, Under Secretary of State External Affairs, File 21-14-6-UNFICYP-8, 6 March 1964.

³⁵ *National Archives of Canada*, Letter from F.R. Miller to R. Campbell, File 21-14-6-UNFICYP-8, 6 March 1964.

this matter in response to a question posed by the Right Honourable J.G. Diefenbaker, Leader of the Opposition:

I have myself been in touch with the Secretary-General...Consultations between the Secretary-General and the proposed participating countries are still going on...³⁶

Although not misleading the House, Martin was not forthright in his reply.

As Canada was prepared to participate, military deployment plans were put into effect. On 8 March, in a Secret Message from the Canadian Embassy in London to the Embassy in Lisbon, the delegation was informed that Her Majesty's Canadian Ship (HMCS) Bonaventure had already been diverted to Halifax harbour from NATO exercises and would not call at Lisbon as previously planned. It stated that this was only a precautionary measure in case Canadian troops were deployed to Cyprus. By 10 March, messages from External Affairs were being flashed to various embassies and to PERMISNY. As requested on 6 March, permission from the French for use of the Marville air base was sought. However, the Embassy in Paris was cautioned to explain, should the need arise, that this

³⁶ Hansard, House of Commons, March 6, 1964, p. 620.

was only an exploratory request.³⁷ Notwithstanding, Paris gave its permission on 12 March.

In the meantime, External Affairs received a message from the High Commission in London. Through information received by the British Information Systems, Mr. Duncan Sandys, the Commonwealth Secretary, had responded to a question in the British House of Commons on the safety of British soldiers in Cyprus. He replied that the situation had turned critical as the Cypriot authorities had not assisted the British forces in maintaining peace. He further he stated that he had warned the Secretary-General of this situation. Sandys reiterated the British demand for UN action in Cyprus.³⁸

On 11 March, Turkey announced that it would intervene in the Cyprus situation unless the UN acted quickly. In response to this threat of military intervention, Martin flew to New York on 12 March to discuss the situation with the Secretary-General. The speed with which the force had been dispatched has been

³⁷ National Archives of Canada, Message from External Affairs to Embassy-Paris, File 21-14-6-UNFICYP-4, 10 March 1964.

³⁸ British Information Services, Statement by Mr. D. Sandys, Commonwealth Secretary, on the Cyprus issue, 10 March 1964.

credited to the actions taken by Martin. Journalist and commentator J. King Gordon stated in his article "The UN in Cyprus", that Martin saved the situation by placing telephone calls to numerous governments and by early evening on the 11th, U Thant was able to declare that a UN force had been established.³⁹ That evening, the House met and Pearson informed the House:

The conversations with the Secretary-General in New York are still going on. So far as the Canadian government is concerned, I can say those conversations have been completed, because we have informed the Secretary-General -and the Secretary of State for External Affairs is seeing him this evening in New York -that we will be participating in a peace keeping force for Cyprus if and when such a force is constituted by the United Nations.⁴⁰

The Secretary-General announced that the force had been constituted and the Canadian Parliament, after Cabinet discussion, authorized its participation. The force was not to exceed 1200 at one time.⁴¹

³⁹ J. King Gordon, "The UN in Cyprus", *International Journal*, Volume XIX, NO. 3. p. 340. Gordon describes how Martin flew to New York on 12 March 1964 and held discussions with U Thant. On 13 March, Martin who was then back in Ottawa, "made a series of telephone calls - to Ankara, to Stockholm, to Helsinki, to Dublin, to Washington, and to New York. At 6 p.m. U Thant announced that a UN Force made up of troops from Canada, Ireland, Sweden, and some of the British troops already in Cyprus would be constituted". Also see Paul Martin's *A Very Public Life* (Toronto: Deneau, 1985) p. 548.

⁴⁰ *Hansard*, House of Commons, March 12, 1964, p. 824.

⁴¹ *Order in Council*, PC 38-1964.

On 13 March, the exact timing (G Hour) was announced for the deployment of the force but stores were in fact dispatched prior to Parliament assenting to the Canadian participation in the UN force.⁴² The deployment of troops was delayed until the government authorized the move. That night a message from External Affairs was forwarded to PERMISNY with information copies to Canadian Embassies in Rome, Paris, Athens, Dublin, Ankara, London, Tel Aviv, and NATO Headquarters in Brussels. The message announced that the Canadian Parliament had authorized the deployment of Canadian troops to Cyprus under the aegis of the UN. It also advised that an RCAF flight would soon depart from Canadian Forces Base Trenton on a reconnaissance and fact finding mission. The senior officer would be Colonel E.A.C. Amy, accompanied by Group Captain Morrison. These two senior officers were accompanied by 33 army personnel.⁴³ A second message was flashed to the same embassies stating that permission had been requested for overflight clearances along the proposed flight path and that the airlift would begin on

⁴² *National Archives of Canada*, Message from Canadian Army to All Commands, To Commander Canadian Contingent Re: Operation Snowgoose, File 21-14-6-UNFICYP, 13 March 1974.

⁴³ *National Archives of Canada*, Message from External Affairs to PERMISNY, File 21-14-6-UNFICYP-6, 13 March 1964.

15 March 1964. The types of aircraft to be used in this airlift included Yukon and Hercules aircraft. The airlift would entail 27 flights to be conducted over a 148 hour period. (See Annex E).

2.4 Conclusion

The preceding demonstrates Prime Minister L.B. Pearson's commitment to the principles of the United Nations and the Canadian government's sense of responsibility towards collective responsibility to international conflict resolution. The Prime Minister's determination to pave the way for the establishment of UN Standby Forces for international emergencies was evident throughout the crisis. Although not notifying the House of Commons about on-going dialogue between the UN and External Affairs, his approach, by quiet diplomacy, was successful in dealing with this situation. The fact that planning for this type of response was on-going from early January 1964, and that the Canadian Contingent was in Cyprus by 17 March, demonstrates that the concept of a Standby Force was practical. This type of commitment was again expressed to the House of Commons on 13 March when Pearson addressed the Cyprus issue and Canadian participation:

The Canadian contingent to the peacekeeping force will consist of a self-contained battalion group augmented by a reconnaissance squadron...The 2nd battalion of the Royal 22nd regiment...on stand-by duty for the United Nations service - and I may say we have kept a battalion on stand-by duty for this kind of service...⁴⁴

Without the early planning that took place and the capacity to rapidly deploy the Canadian troops as part of the UN force, the possibility of war between Turkey and Greece was real.

⁴⁴ Hansard, House of Commons, March 13, 1964, p. 914.

CHAPTER 3

THE CANADIAN CONTINGENT'S ROLE IN UNFICYP:

PHASE I PEACEKEEPING BY OBSERVATION

In introducing this study, it was contended that UNFICYP evolved through a series of phases. The first phase was peacekeeping by observation and the mediation of local conflict between inter-communal factions. The second phase was "peacekeeping by confrontation". The third phase was peacekeeping by patrolling and controlling a buffer between two combatants after the invasion of Cyprus by Turkey in 1974. What transpired in the first phase was the setting up of the force in Cyprus. This entailed the establishment of static and mobile patrols which would be interposed between two Cypriot communities in order to either diffuse potential conflicts or to negotiate settlements to halt hostile action perpetrated by one side or the other. What follows is an analysis of the first phase of operations.

3.1 UNFICYP Becomes Operational

The advance party commanded by Colonel Amy arrived in Nicosia on 15 March 1964. On 16 March the first of the Canadian troops were flown into Cyprus by the RCAF. These consisted of the 1st Battalion Royal 22e Regiment (Van Doos) and the reconnaissance squadron of the Royal Canadian Dragoons. Within two weeks, the Canadian Contingent (CANCON) was at a strength of 1100 officers and men. HMCS Bonaventure arrived on 30 March carrying heavy equipment and materiel. Canadian soldiers were first on the ground but would not become operational until 27 March. With the quick deployment of CANCON to Cyprus, the situation was eased and Turkey did not make any hostile advances towards Cyprus. A possible war had been averted. This action on the part of the Canadian government to support UN efforts for international peace and security and the accompanying military pre-planning, had validated the concept of quick reaction Standby Forces. On 15 March this was acknowledged by a message to the Department of External Affairs from the Canadian Embassy in Cyprus which stated:

that after calling at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs on 14 March 1964, A Canadian External Affairs Officer was apprised by Mr. Pilavachi, Head of Division, of the Ministry's gratitude to Canada and reiterated his special emphasis on the certainty that the almost

immediate departure of the advance party following the Security Council emergency meeting had saved us.¹

The UN Force became operational on 27 March 1964 and was under the command of General P.S. Gyani of India. His second in-command was Major-General R.M.P. Carver of the United Kingdom. Headquarters UNFICYP was established near the Nicosia airport and was known as Camp UNFICYP. As the force was under UN authority, General Gyani emphasized that it was under the operational control of the Secretary-General. As such, he released his first communication which stated:

We shall function as an integrated force under an integrated headquarters. Our aims and objectives will be...to prevent a recurrence of fighting and, as necessary, to contribute to the maintenance of law and order.²

General Gyani strove to implement an infrastructure that would ensure that the force was cohesive and, as stated, integrated. In previous UN operations, national contingents, although nominally under UN authority, had a tendency to contact their respective home governments when orders issued under the authority of the Force Commander, were or appeared contrary to, country specific national

¹ *National Archives of Canada*, Message from Embassy in Athens to External Affairs, File 21-14-6-UNFICYP-7, 15 March 1964.

² *United Nations Monthly Chronicle*, May 1964. pp. 8-9.

interests. This tendency, although not eradicated totally in UNFICYP, was lessened. However, only the Canadian Contingent (CANCON) and the British Contingent (BRITCON) placed themselves under control of the Force Commander.³ Already noted, the Canadian Contingent was the first to arrive and was immediately joined by the British Contingent. Although the force was operational by 27 March, it was not until the latter part of June that the total Force was assembled. On 28 March, the advance parties from Sweden and Finland arrived and those from Ireland and Austria were on route. On 31 March the composition of the force included components from Austria (10), Canada (1087), Finland (1000), Ireland (636), Sweden (889), United Kingdom (2719), and a military police force (28), for a total of 6369 troops.⁴

The force of 6369 was divide into areas of responsibility with each Contingent being given a district to control. They were:

Limassol District

British Contingent (BRITCON)

New Zealand Civilian Police

³ Anthony Verrier, *International Peacekeeping*, (England: 1981) p. 84.

⁴ *United Nations Monthly Chronicle*, May 1964. p. 9.

Famagusta District

Swedish Contingent (SWEDCON)

Swedish Civilian Police

Paphos District

3rd Infantry Group Irish Contingent

Austrian Civilian Police

Morphou District

41st Infantry Group Irish Contingent

Austrian Civilian Police

Nicosia District

Canadian Contingent (CANCON)

Finnish Contingent

Danish Contingent (DANCON would later take over
Sector 1)

Austrian Field Hospital

Austrian Civilian Police

Danish Civilian Police

UNFICYP Headquarters (international
representation)⁵

The basic principle in dividing the island was to complement, as far as possible, Cyprus' regional boundaries. All districts were manned in accordance with the historical

⁵ R. Higgins, *United Nations Peacekeeping*, (Oxford: 1981) pp. 167-168.

boundaries of violence and confrontation. Therefore, Nicosia District with its high intensity of conflict situations was initially manned by two contingents. It would later fall under the responsibility of a single contingent-the Canadian Contingent. The first Canadian Contingent Commander was Brigadier A.J. Tedlie, who took up his appointment on 29 April 1964. The Nicosia District came under his command.

3.2 The Canadian Contingent Deploys

Upon arrival, living conditions for the Canadian Contingent were primitive. The Royal 22e and the Royal Canadian Dragoons were billeted under tents and it was some time before they established themselves in permanent living quarters. Upon arrival they were greeted by both the Turkish and Greek Cypriots and it was anticipated that calm would return to the island. This anticipation was premature. The first challenge to UNFICYP authority came from armed insurgents. One of the aims of UNFICYP, previously described, was the disarming of non-combat troops. This attempt to disarm the para-military groups was unsuccessful. Once this was realized, the issue of safety for Canadian soldiers became paramount. It should be noted that Canadian participation in past UN operations had been mainly in the area of logistical support. Now, as part of UNFICYP,

Canadian combat troops were deployed in the field for the first time as a self-contained force. The troops were positioned between communities that had a history of violent behaviour. As a consequence, Canadian soldiers were potential targets of aggression.

During the first few months of operations, the Canadian Contingent came under indiscriminate fire. It was reported in the *Toronto Globe and Mail* that Canadian soldiers had conducted themselves in a professional manner on many occasions. In an Article written in April 1964, the *Toronto Globe and Mail* described actions taken by CANCON personnel near the port city of Kyrenia. Apparently, Canadian soldiers became victims of indiscriminate shooting as the Greek and Turkish Cypriots were fighting. After futile negotiations, the Turkish Cypriots refused to halt this aggressive action that continued to place Canadian soldiers in grave danger. After giving warning to both sides without positive results, the Officer Commanding, ordered his troops to fire in the direction of the Turkish fighters. This order was carried out and the incident came to an abrupt halt.⁶ This action by CANCON, using force for self-defence purposes, earned the Contingent a reputation for

⁶ *The Toronto Globe and Mail*, 24 April 1964. p. 1. Canada, Department of National Defence, *Nicosia District Daily Operational Log Sheet*, 24 April 1964.

steadfastness and restraint. It also identified the UN force as professional and its impartiality was now recognized by both sides.

It should be noted that UNFICYP met with different expectations from the two Cypriot communities. The Greek Cypriot majority regarded the UN Force as a means to support the government and sovereignty of Cyprus. As such, the Turkish Cypriots were seen by the Greek Cypriots as insurgents who had taken up armed insurrection against the lawful government. Makarios also viewed UNFICYP as a mandated force to disarm Turkish Cypriots. In essence, the UN was an adjunct to the Cypriot government. The Secretary-General quickly dispelled any illusion as to the role of UNFICYP by stating:

UNFICYP was not established by the Security Council as an arm of the Government of Cyprus,...It respects at all times the sovereignty and the independence of Cyprus and the authority of the Government, but it acts independently in the discharge of its mandate.⁷

The Turkish Cypriot community, on the other hand, regarded the creation of UNFICYP as the maintenance of the status quo. The Secretary-General identified the error of this perception in a report to the Security Council in September 1964:

⁷ UN Doc. S/5950, September 10, 1964.

...there has been all along and continues to be what I consider to be a misunderstanding on the part of the Turkish community of Cyprus and of the Turkish Government as to the function and duty of the United Nations Force in Cyprus...in their eyes, UNFICYP should have been employing force, wherever and whenever necessary, to restore over the opposition of the Cypriot Government, the constitutional situation relating to the privileges, rights and immunities of the Turkish community in Cyprus. Thus, in this view, UNFICYP should not regard the Cypriot Government or any acts taken by it as legal...⁸

The Secretary-General went on to reinforce the concept that the UN force was established to prevent violence, promote a reduction in tension and to restore, as best as it could be done, normal living conditions. The force was not established to take sides in an internal dispute. Impartiality was the cornerstone to success.

One aspect of the UNFICYP operation that was new to UN peacekeeping operations was the fact that UNFICYP was the first UN operation to include a contingent from one of the Permanent Members of the Security Council. The other contingents were from small or non-aligned nations. The United Kingdom was now supplying troops, as opposed to only logistical or other services, to a UN peacekeeping force. Both Cypriot communities, however, were disinclined to draw a fine line between the previous encounters with British

⁸ *Ibid.*

troops, as a colonial power, than with the United Kingdom being a member of the United Nations. This was due to the fact that the British contingent was part of the same military force which had been a former colonial power and had been used to suppress insurgents from both communities. Questions were raised about the role of the British contingent within the force, and the fact that it was the largest contingent also caused concern. The Turkish Cypriot leaders advocated that the British contingent, because of past experience, should be reduced in size, while the Greek Cypriot House of Representatives voted in favour of ending what it labeled, a biased British participation in UNFICYP. As a result of this criticism, the Canadian Contingent was perceived as being less biased in its relations with the Cypriot community. Brigadier Michael Harbottle, the Chief of Staff and British Contingent Commander, wrote of the Canadians that the French-Canadians "got on much better with the Greeks than the British did, perhaps on account of their common attitudes towards the Anglo-Saxons."⁹ Although this sentiment may not be accurate, events would demonstrate that the Canadian Contingent acted impartially in its dealings with the two Cypriot Communities and this approach would

⁹ M. Harbottle, *The Impartial Soldier*, (London: 1970,) p. 345.

enable them to carry out their duties with respect from the Cypriot communities.

As UNFICYP began patrolling the island and peacekeepers were visible in areas where conflict situations had a history of erupting without notice, personal and positive working relationships developed. One of the tasks of UNFICYP was to provide escort to local farmers in the harvesting of their crops. As one of its primary functions was to help return the island to normal conditions, this type of assistance became common. The Nicosia District Daily Operational Log has abundant examples of this type of assistance rendered by the Canadian Contingent. The main result of this action was that trust, coupled with the degree of security provided, established UNFICYP's reputation with the local population.¹⁰

3.3 Attempts at Disarming and Diffusing the Conflict

One of the first priorities of the force commander was to disarm civilians threatening the peace on the island. By August 1964, this had still not been completed. General

¹⁰ *Nicosia District Daily Operational Log Sheets, October-November 1964.*

Gyani, in his report to the Secretary-General described his frustration in this endeavour:

...the irresponsible and senseless conduct of armed men of both communities do not appear to be responsible to any established authority but who had been acting on their own reckless initiative, regardless of the unfortunate and serious consequences of the acts.¹¹

In addition to writing the Secretary-General, Gyani had also approached the leaders of both communities to elicit their assistance in disarming these para-military organizations. On 20 April, the United Nations force suffered its first casualty due to a Turkish Cypriot Fighter (TCF) mistaking a Finnish UN soldier as an aggressor.¹²

Even though the UN force carried out its responsibilities the conflict was not subsiding. As a result the UN mandate for Cyprus was extended for a further three months.¹³ General Gyani, due to personal reasons, informed the Secretary-General that he would be unable to carry out the responsibilities as Force Commander and requested that he be replaced. This request was granted and General Kodenera Thimayya of India became the second UNFICYP

¹¹ *United Nations Monthly Chronicle*, June 1964 Vol. I. p. 19.

¹² *Ibid.*

¹³ UN Doc. S/5575, March 4, 1964.

Commander in July 1964. As part of the mandate, a mediator had been appointed and Mr. Sakari S. Tuomioja, the Finnish Ambassador to Sweden was the first such designate. However, his death in September necessitated another appointment. Galo Plaza, the former President of Ecuador, was chosen.

A major responsibility of UNFICYP was to prevent the recurrence of fighting. There were several aspects to the situation in Cyprus that made this situation very difficult. As mistrust between the two Cypriot communities was prevalent, any change in the deployment of forces by either community resulted in increased tension and the exchange of fire. The Canadian Contingent, as part of UNFICYP, viewed the build up of armed forces as a matter of urgent concern. By September 1964, it was acknowledged that the government forces greatly outnumbered the Turkish Cypriots. This fact was brought to light in the Secretary-General's Report to the Security Council in September 1964. The Secretary-General informed the Security Council that the government forces by then had reached such levels that they were capable of overrunning the Turkish Cypriot strongholds rapidly "when they so desire."¹⁴ In response, the government of Cyprus attempted to justify the expansion of

¹⁴ UN Doc. S/5950, September 10, 1964.

Greek Cypriot armed forces with reference to continued Turkish threats to intervene in Cyprus.

Another problem facing the Canadian Contingent, and UNFICYP as a whole, was the control of arms in that they were being smuggled into both communities. The Makarios government insisted that the importation of arms was a necessity in preparation for possible hostile actions against Cyprus by Turkey. In return, the Turkish Cypriots insisted on the right to arm and defend themselves against potential Greek Cypriot aggression. In response, the Secretary-General admitted that Cyprus, as a sovereign state, was normally entitled to import and manufacture arms. However, he questioned whether the introduction of conscription, the establishment of the National Guard, and the importation of arms by the Government was in fact "within the letter and the spirit of the Security Council resolution of 4 March 1964."¹⁵ Makarios replied by admitting that arms were being purchased from foreign sources but that he did not want UNFICYP to become involved and interfere with this practice.

One example of this intransigence on the part of the Cypriot government occurred in Limassol in late July 1964.

¹⁵ UN Doc. S/5764, June 27, 1964.

At this time UNFICYP believed that large shipments of military equipment were being shipped and unloaded from Greek freighters at the harbour in Limassol. To prevent any interference, severe restrictions were placed on UNFICYP that prohibited it from being near the docks. According to UN Security Council Documents and UNFICYP Headquarters Reports, the Cypriot security forces displayed such an aggressive posture that possible armed clashes were imminent. As a result of this standoff, UNFICYP decided temporarily to withdraw from the area in order to avoid fighting.¹⁶ There were three reasons for this tactical withdrawal. First, UNFICYP faced a superior force. Second, it had no mandate to prevent, by force, the importation of arms by the host country. Third, the force's very presence on the island depended on the concurrence of the Government, and should its troops take part in hostilities, it could be asked to leave Cyprus.

As for the Turkish community, its fighting element was comprised of members of the Cypriot Police Force and gendarmerie, and members of the Cyprus army. These forces were heavily augmented by large numbers of armed civilians many of whom belonged to the Turkish Cypriot Fighters (TCF) group. As the Turkish Cypriots could not import arms

¹⁶ UN Doc. S/5950, September 10, 1964.

legally, they were supplemented by Turkey through the smuggling of arms. The Secretary-General and UNFICYP made numerous attempts to halt this process but to no avail. This problem would not be resolved and remained part of UNFICYP's frustrations.

Inter-communal fighting, though not completely eliminated, became less intensive throughout the spring and early summer of 1964. However, it flared up again in mid-August. In response, the Security Council passed four additional resolutions calling upon both parties to desist from carrying out aggressive acts. By 9 August, the Security Council called on all parties to control its members and adhere to the agreed upon cease fire.¹⁷

Another criteria in the establishment of the force, and agreed to by the government of Cyprus, was the freedom of movement provision which was included in the mandate. Although agreeing to this provision, the Makarios government had created severe obstacles, and in some instances refused to permit access by the United Nations to Turkish Cypriot enclaves. The Government maintained the position that there were requirements of absolute secrecy on matters of state defence and security. Therefore, it was not possible to

¹⁷ UN Doc. S/5868, August 1964.

allow UNFICYP patrols to enter restricted areas. This refusal of freedom of movement of UNFICYP was strongly protested by the UNFICYP Commander. In a letter to the Cypriot Government in July 1964, this matter was brought forward by the Secretary-General.¹⁸ The Secretary-General outlined the responsibilities of the UN force and in order to carry out these responsibilities, it required the ability to observe and report changes in force levels, deployment and fortifications.

President Makarios responded in September 1964 when he delivered a map to the UN Force Commander showing 16 areas of special importance where UNFICYP could not enter. The Canadian Contingent Operations Officer, in District Operational Log Sheets, observed that these sensitive areas encompassed probable amphibious landing areas at strategically located positions around the island.¹⁹ In addition to these sensitive areas, another 15 sites might be visited only by the Force Commander after due process of notification to the Cypriot military authorities. In 57 other areas UNFICYP could enter but only with military escort. According to the Secretary-General, these restrictions render UNFICYP's effectiveness in carrying out

¹⁸ UN Doc. S/5842, July 22, 1964.

¹⁹ *Nicosia District Daily Operational Log Sheet*, 17 September 1964.

its mandate almost negligible. In response, the Security Council reaffirmed the conditions of the mandate. After further discussion with the Cypriot government, UNFICYP was assured that its freedom of movement would not be restricted. By the end of 1965 relations between them had gradually improved.²⁰

It quickly became evident that the UN force in Cyprus was in a precarious position in that it was involved in an undeclared civil war. As the force was established in part to bring the island back to normal conditions, it reacted to several incidents that helped cement its reputation of impartiality and fairness. In New York, the Secretary-General, aware of the delicate balance in Cyprus, attempted to have the Security Council enlarge the original mandate as laid out in March 1964. The request by the Secretary-General in this matter would not be supported by the Soviet Union. In response to the Secretary-General's remarks on the subject, the Soviet Union delegate answered:

that the force was established to assist the government of Cyprus in various measures taken by it as the government of a sovereign state which was fully responsible for the maintenance and restoration

²⁰ Indarjit Rikhye, et al, *The Thin Blue Line*, (London: 1974) pp. 104-111. D.W. Wainhouse, *International Peace Observation*, (Baltimore: 1966) p. 452.

of law and order in the country...and to protect the republic from any foreign threat.²¹

The Soviet Union would not support the enlargement of the mandate and allow the force to physically separate the two combating communities. The second part of the Soviet's statement is unclear. They would not agree to any enlargement of the mandate. However, they declared that UNFICYP was established to protect the island from a foreign threat. As no mention of this is found in the original mandate nor the actions required to carry it out, why did the Soviets not insist this be incorporated into the existing functions of the force? Had it been included, perhaps the mandate would have allowed the force and the UN to respond differently when faced with this exact situation in 1974.

3.4 Maintaining the Peace: The Canadian Contingent

Previously noted was the fact that tensions, though somewhat relaxed, threatened to unleash fighting at any time. UNFICYP's reputation as a fair but firm mediator in conflict situations became evident in the fall of 1964. As part of the original London and Zurich Agreements, Turkey, as a guarantor power, had the legal authority to place

²¹ *United Nations Monthly Chronicle*, October 1964, p. 14.

troops in Cyprus. Part of this agreement also included the rotation of such troops to and from Turkey. One such rotation was scheduled for September 1964. The Makarios government became opposed to such a rotation. It felt that the rotation of Turkish troops would be a deliberate attempt by Turkey to provoke conflicts within Cyprus. Additionally, Makarios feared Turkey's hostile intentions towards Cyprus. This concern was the result of Turkish overflights and clashes between the Turkish Cypriot Fighters and the National Guard that had taken place at Kokkina during the summer.²²

In response to the Cypriot government's opposition to the Turkish troop rotation, the Turkish Cypriot Fighters and elements of the Turkish Contingent took over the Nicosia-Kyrenia Road and refused to allow any civilian movement along this route. Tensions between Cyprus and Turkey escalated and Turkey threatened invasion. On 29 September Secretary-General U Thant requested Ambassador Orhan Eralp to convey to Turkey his appeal that no undue haste be demonstrated in regard to the rotation of Turkish troops in Cyprus. U Thant emphasized that mediation talks were still on-going in Nicosia and that he had recommended the proposal that the control of the Kyrenia-Nicosia Road be placed under

²² I.J. Rikhye, *The Thin Blue Line*, pp. 111-112.

the UN force. By the end of September, an agreement had been reached on placing this road under UN control and the Canadian Contingent was given this responsibility. The Cyprus government had agreed not to interfere with the rotation of part of the 600 man Turkish contingent.²³

In addition, serious economic restrictions imposed on the Turkish community by the Cypriot Government aggravated the situation. In this regard, freedom of movement by Turkish Cypriots was curtailed. The Turkish Cypriot minority was forbidden to purchase what the Government considered to be strategic materials. These included cement for house construction, farming tools, batteries, and any construction material. These were deemed by the government to be capable of being used to build fortifications or forge weapons.²⁴ U Thant, although expressing sympathy with the Cypriot Government's concerns over security, indicated in September 1964 that perhaps the Cypriot government had other motives in mind:

...the economic restrictions being imposed against the Turkish communities in Cyprus, which in some instances have been so severe as to amount to a veritable siege, indicate that the Government of Cyprus seeks to force a potential solution by

²³ UN Doc. S/6102, December 12, 1964.

²⁴ BGen C.E. Beattie, interview held in Ottawa, Ontario, January 12, 1994.

economic pressure as a substitute for military action...²⁵

On 22 October it was announced that the Nicosia Kyrenia Road would be reopened to civilian traffic. The Canadian Contingent was directed by the Force Commander to assume exclusive control of this road on 26 October. In the agreements to reopen the Kyrenia-Nicosia road, it was agreed that two way convoys under United Nations escort would be allowed. The first convoy left Nicosia and consisted of 10 private vehicles and 10 other vehicles carrying journalists. Brigadier Norman Wilson-Smith, Canadian Contingent, supervised the organization and operation of the first convoy.²⁶

In addition to reopening the Kyrenia-Nicosia Road, UNFICYP also supervised the rotation of the Turkish National Contingent. This rotation occurred over a 10 hour period on 26 October in the areas of Nicosia and Famagusta. Canadian Contingent personnel acted as observers in this exercise.

The Canadian Contingent, as part of UNFICYP, helped to calm tensions on the island of Cyprus and carried out the mandate in a professional and fair manner. As the year 1964

²⁵ UN Doc. S/5950, September 10, 1964.

²⁶ *Nicosia District Daily Operational Log Sheet*, 26 October 1964.

came to a close, ... was never imagined that this would be the first of 29 years as part of UNFICYP.

Throughout 1965 the political situation in Cyprus remained in a stalemate. Galo Plaza, the UN mediator, was unsuccessful in achieving any agreements from either side which would have precipitated a rapprochement. The period of June-December 1965 witnessed a redeployment of UN troops and areas of responsibilities were revised to include the Districts of East and West Nicosia. The Canadian Contingent was reassigned to the Nicosia East District, which later became known as Sector 4.²⁷

3.5 Preserving the Status Quo: The Canadian Contingent's Resolve

On 10 December 1965, the Secretary-General informed the Council that the force would be reduced by 740 officers and men in 1966.²⁸ He also requested and was granted the authority to extend the mandate for another three months. The rationale for this force reduction was twofold. First, the situation had become more stable, and second, the cost of the force was still being borne by the contributing

²⁷ Higgins, *United Nations Peacekeeping*, p. 169.

²⁸ UN Doc. S/7001, December 10, 1965.

countries and was not assessed on all member states. In an External Affairs Memorandum, Canada's cost to the operation of UNFICYP was listed as follows:

From March 1964 to June 26, 1965	\$5,726,500
From June 27 to December 26 1965	\$2,008,000
Total recoverable from the UN	\$ 732,500
Net cost to Canada	\$7,002,000 ²⁹

The UN mediator, Galo Plaza, delivered what the Turkish authorities considered to be a slanted report of the existing situation. Unfortunately, this report has not been made public. Both BGen C.E. Beattie, former Chief of Staff UNFICYP, and General de Chastelain, Chief Of Defence Staff, however, have remarked that Mr. Plaza may have gone beyond his mandate by laying blame on Turkey for some incidents that had occurred. Turkey responded to the report by indicating that Plaza had overstepped his mandate in his mediation efforts and they would not return to discussion if Galo Plaza continued to represent the Secretary-General in this matter. Plaza was replaced by Mr. Carlos Bernardes.³⁰

²⁹ *National Archives of Canada, External Affairs Memorandum, file 21-14-6-UNFICYP-9, 26 June 1965.*

³⁰ General John de Chastelain, interview held in Ottawa, Ontario, 8 March 1994 and with BGen C.E. Beattie, 12 January 1994.

In April of 1966, as the conditions on the island were approaching a near normal state, the force was reduced to a strength of 4500. The stated reasons for this reduction were that the force had established itself and was contributing to a normalization of life and the number of incidents had decreased; and that the costs of maintaining the force were becoming prohibitive. According to Security Council documents, only one million of the twelve million dollars pledged had been received.³¹ In June 1966 the normal length of the mandate was extended from three to six months. Throughout the rest of the life of UNFICYP, the mandate would be extended on a six month basis.

Although the situation in Cyprus remained tense, the number of incidents during most of 1967 decreased. However, on 15 November 1967 an explosive situation erupted. The National Guard launched a series of attacks on several Turkish positions and fighting by both sides threatened to escalate into a full scale war. The Canadian Contingent reported that between 4:00 A.M. and 2:30 P.M. fighting had erupted in Ayios Theodoros and in several locations throughout Nicosia. The Canadian Contingent Standby Force was put on alert at 9:45 A.M. and was ordered to be ready to

³¹ *United Nations Monthly Chronicle*, pp. 12-13.

proceed to Ayios Theodoros.³² In the Limassol District, Captain Phillips, Canadian Contingent, proceeded to the Greek National Guard Headquarters and was advised by the Battalion Commander that no hostile acts were intended and that his troops were only on normal exercise training. However, it was observed that fighting between the two communities was in progress at various locations.³³

These attacks by the Greek National Guard brought a condemnation from the Secretary-General and a threat of invasion by Turkey.³⁴ Although a cease-fire was agreed to within 24 hours, there were still incidents of fighting reported throughout the island until 19 November 1967. In response to the outbreak of fighting, the Canadian Contingent Headquarters ordered the Reconnaissance Platoon to patrol areas considered extremely volatile. These areas were from Kyrenia, west on the Coast Road to Myrtou, Ayia Irini, Kondemenos, Avios Ermalos, Krini, Boghaz, and Kyrenia. Also, to patrol Kyrenia east on the coast to Ayios Epiaktitos, Kazaphni, Bellapais, Bore Hole, and then the Kyrenia Nicosia Road.³⁵ In one instance, a Canadian UN

³² *Nicosia District Daily Operational Log Sheet*, Serials 1-13, 15 November 1967.

³³ *Ibid.* Serials 32-37.

³⁴ UN Doc. S/8248, November 15, 1967.

³⁵ *Nicosia District Daily Operational Log Sheet*, Serial 3, 16 November 1967.

Patrol was physically harassed by the Turkish forces. Lieutenant Cox, leading a foot patrol, was stopped by a Turkish officer and was prevented from using his radio to contact the Canadian Contingent Headquarters. The Turks then laid wire across the road in the northern part of the city of Nicosia and refused permission to the Canadian Contingent patrol to proceed further. Lt. Cox attempted to negotiate with the Turkish Commander, Lt. Osmam, but to no avail. The Canadian Contingent Patrol Commander then attempted to go around the Turk position but was

physically stopped [Lt. Cox] four times with the Turk Commander shaking him and once wrestling him to the ground. Lt. Cox eventually got around him, [the] patrol carried on and finished the task on normal patrol. Lt. Osmam shouted obscenities after the patrol.³⁶

Throughout the next three days the Canadian Contingent investigated numerous incidents in Nicosia and the Kyrenia District and were at times subjected to further harassment. In addition, Canadian UN Observation Posts reported several sightings of Turkish fighter aircraft over the Kyrenia District.³⁷ Along with aerial sightings there were confirmed reports by Canadian UN Observation Posts of gunboats

³⁶ *Ibid.*, Serial 20.

³⁷ *Nicosia District Daily Operational Log Sheet*, Serials 32-33, 16 November 1964 and Serials 12, 14, 29-32 and 39, 18 November 1967.

patrolling near the Kyrenia Harbour and just outside the 3 mile limit off the northern coast of Cyprus.³⁸

Even though a cease-fire had been agreed to, the crisis sparked by the attacks was only resolved after ten days of intense international negotiations. The work of Cyrus Vance, Special Envoy of the President of the United States, was crucial in these negotiations and his constant shuttle diplomacy between Ankara, Athens, and Nicosia resulted in an agreement. This agreement called for the withdrawal of excess Greek forces from Cyprus in return for the cancellation of large scale Turkish military preparations, which were poised to intervene in Cyprus. Along with Vance, Dr. Rolz-Bennett, Under-Secretary General for Special Political Affairs, was dispatched to assist in these negotiations.³⁹ Once again a threatened invasion of Cyprus by Turkey in response to Greek Cypriot actions had been averted.

By 1968, as the tension subsided, the Canadian Contingent was reduced to 595, all ranks. Between 1967-1971, the Secretary-General continued to report to the Security Council on the operations and political developments in

³⁸ *Ibid.*, Serials 17-23 and 34, 18 November 1967.

³⁹ UN Doc. S/8248/Add. 4, November 15, 1967.

Cyprus. Although no political solutions had been agreed to, his view was that the presence of the force contributed greatly to the relative peace that had returned to the island.

Despite the difficulty and complexity of the existing situation, the Special Representative of the Secretary-General, Osario-Tafall, who had replaced Mr. Bernardes, established direct talks between representatives of the two Cypriot communities in June 1968. Representing the Greek Cypriots was Glafkos Clerides, President of the Cyprus House of Representatives and Rauf Denktash, the former President of the Turkish Cypriot Communal Chamber.⁴⁰ These talks covered a multitude of issues including the role of the executive branch of government, the judiciary and local administration. Discussions continued for two years but came to a stalemate in April 1971 when the Turkish Cypriots made a counter proposal on a package deal presented by Makarios the preceding November.

In the summer of 1971, U Thant, the UN Secretary-General, attempted to reopen negotiations when he proposed to establish a special committee made up of non-permanent members of the Security Council under the Chairmanship of

⁴⁰ UN Doc. S/8622, June 24, 1968.

France. However, Turkey, Greece, and the United States were lukewarm to this suggestion. It was agreed that discussions would reconvene between the two principal parties who would be assisted by constitutional experts for advice.⁴¹ Although agreeing to re-open discussion, major issues separated the two communities. In his last report to the Security Council on the Cyprus conflict, U Thant stated:

From the statements made by the two interlocutors, it is apparent that there is disagreement on two main issues, local government and guarantees for the independence of Cyprus.

On the issue of the local government, Mr. Denktash has proposed a form of local autonomy for each community under the control of central authorities. Mr. Clerides has said that he is willing to accept separate authorities for communal affairs...matters of administration, however, are governmental affairs and in no country are they considered communal affairs...

Each side has placed on the other the responsibility for raising the question of guarantees which both agree was not a matter within their terms of reference. Mr. Clerides has stated that it has always been understood that the question of guarantees would be considered at a different level...Mr. Denktash...has asserted that the question of guarantees had been introduced...by Archbishop Makarios, who, earlier in 1971 had stated publicly that he would never sign an agreement that barred the way to enosis. This made the issue a fundamental one for the Turkish Cypriot side, which would accept no agreement unless it closed the door to enosis.⁴²

⁴¹ UN Doc. S/10401, October 18, 1971.

⁴² *Ibid.*

Prior to 1974 the areas dominated by the Turkish Cypriots were not contiguous, and the issue of communal control was the most difficult problem facing the constitutional discussions between the two parties. As there was no geographical basis for a federal structure, the Turkish Cypriots preferred to call the existing arrangement a functional federation. When Kurt Waldheim took over as the Secretary-General in January 1972, the Cyprus situation was not as explosive as it had been in 1967-68. There remained, however, tensions that could easily escalate into another major crisis.

In 1971 the Canadian Contingent took control of the Nicosia District as the two districts were amalgamated. This new area of responsibility put the Canadian Contingent into the most volatile area in Cyprus and made it responsible for carrying out the stated mandate. This move would test Canadian resolve and sense of impartiality in the near future.

In 1972 the issue of arms importation again surfaced. Rumors were heard that large shipments of Czech arms were being clandestinely brought into the country by Makarios. A *New York Times* article in February 1972, stated that Makarios was importing arms to equip a special presidential

guard in order to combat an alleged conspiracy by the EOKA-B. The article went on to state that the Greek government had warned Makarios against enlarging his police force and that a note had also been forwarded to him urging him to invite EOKA-B moderates into his government.⁴³ In addition, the Greek government asked Makarios to hand over these weapons to UNFICYP. This new crisis fueled further mistrust and anxiety between the two communities.

Concern over new arms importation was voiced by the United Nations. Waldheim contacted both the Greek and Turkish governments and instructed his Special Representative in Cyprus to make his concerns known to the government of Cyprus.⁴⁴ Although not possessing diplomatic capabilities to exert significant pressure on Makarios, Waldheim did have one asset that could be useful. This was UNFICYP.

After numerous consultations, an exchange of letters between the Minister of Foreign Affairs, Mr. Kyprianou, and the Special Representative was presented which outlined a solution to the problem. This solution would put the arms in question into storage and have them periodically inspected.

⁴³ *New York Times*, February 13, 1972, p. 1.

⁴⁴ UN Doc. S/10564, February 12, 1972.

The Cyprus government agreed not to distribute the weapons, but rather have them placed in safe-keeping, under lock, in one place that would be known to the UN Force Commander at all times. The UN Force Commander would be allowed to inspect these weapons without any advance notification. The site chosen for this safe-keeping of weapons would be in a fenced area within the perimeter of UNFICYP's administration camp known as Blue Beret Camp.⁴⁵ This was part of the Canadian Contingent's area of responsibility. According to BGen Beattie, this area was off limits to everyone and the arms and ammunition were, in essence, controlled by the United Nations. As such, the Canadian Contingent was given the responsibility of ensuring that these arms remained out of the hands of Greek Cypriots. In fact, during the war in 1974, these arms were demanded by the Greek National Guard but the Canadian Contingent refused to relinquish them.⁴⁶

Although discussions between the two communities continued, both sides maintained mistrust towards the other. By 1974, political meetings discussing the future of Cyprus had become fruitless. It was only on 18 June 1974 that there was there a flicker of hope as negotiations were proceeding on amicable terms after a meeting between the two sides.

⁴⁵ UN Doc. S/10564/Add. 1, February 12, 1972.

⁴⁶ BGen C.E. Beattie, interview held in Ottawa, Ontario, 12 January 1994.

Since the situation in Cyprus was deemed stable, in 1974 the Canadian Contingent had been further reduced to 482 and the total UN force numbered 2341.⁴⁷ However, on 15 July an attempted coup against the Makarios government occurred which changed the Cyprus situation completely.

3.6 Conclusion

During its first 10 years of existence, CANCON's and UNFICYP's main responsibilities were to maintain a presence in order to prevent a recurrence of fighting, restoration and maintenance of law and order, and assisting in the return to normal conditions. The task of preventing a recurrence of fighting was complicated by increased levels of fighting within the Greek Cypriot community. As the force had no mandate in this regard, this development was difficult to control. UNFICYP's concern over the importation of arms has already been described. However, in most cases verification of illegal weapons was not confirmed as these weapons had been transferred to armed groups throughout the island. On several occasions members of CANCON were prohibited, by the Greek Cypriot authorities, from examining various shipments that were alleged to be weapons. On only one occasion was UNFICYP able to prevent the distribution of

⁴⁷ Higgins, *United Nations Peacekeeping*, p. 195.

arms. This was achieved when pressure was brought to bear by the UN Secretary-General and arms were stockpiled under Canadian Contingent supervision.

UNFICYP procedures and practices relating to restoration of law and order included the investigation of incidents that arose between the two communities. UNFICYP escorted convoys and the Canadian Contingent was tasked with opening up and securing the Kyrenia-Nicosia road for this purpose. It also cooperated with the International Red Cross by assisting in locating missing persons from both communities.

In helping to return the island to normal conditions, this task was usually carried out by providing humanitarian assistance to local villages or in Nicosia itself. In the local villages, patrols were performed to ensure Greek Cypriots did not harass Turkish Cypriots. On the Green line in Nicosia, the Canadian Contingent established UN Observation Posts with the consent of both communities in order to prevent incidents of confrontation. Further, the Canadian Contingent provided escorts to farmers in outlying areas in order that crops could be harvested. It did not matter if they were Greek or Turkish Cypriots, as UNFICYP provided protection to all who required it. In one of their

most successful negotiations, UNFICYP and CANCON were able to reach agreement with the Turkish National Contingent by taking over the control of the Nicosia-Kyrenia Road which allowed civilians under UN escort to transverse the island under relative safety. Also, CANCON acted as an impartial observer during the Turkish troop rotations to ensure no dangerous tensions would arise resulting in conflict situations.

The Canadian government had agreed to participate in UNFICYP for fear of a possible breakup of the NATO southern flank should two of its members fight over Cyprus. As well, Canada had been a strong advocate of collective international efforts in helping to maintain peace and security. In addition to idealism, there was the factor, as documents suggest, of keeping the Soviets and the eastern bloc at arm's length from the Cyprus issue. These aims had been achieved.

Did the Force promote opportunities for a political solution during this period? The answer would have to be in the affirmative. It gave the politicians an opportunity for negotiations while conflict was managed, but positive negotiations towards a political solution did not take place. However, by 1974, UNFICYP's presence had certainly

helped return the island to reasonably normal conditions. As well, the first 10 years witnessed the growth of the Canadian Contingent's reputation as impartial peacekeepers. Whatever the criticism, UNFICYP and the Canadian Contingent had established themselves and had earned the respect of both sides. They would require this hard earned respect to see them through the second phase of peacekeeping in Cyprus.

CHAPTER 4

PRELUDE TO INVASION

Events in Cyprus during July-September 1974 would have a significant impact on UNFICYP and in particular the Canadian Contingent. The attempted coup by the Greek officers of the Cypriot National Guard against the legitimate Cypriot government on 15 July, with the subsequent intervention of Turkey, through an invasion of the island, would present the United Nations and the Peacekeeping Force on Cyprus with situations that had not been envisaged. What transpired and emerged from these events would transform UNFICYP irrevocably. The Canadian Contingent would take a leading role in defining a new approach to the practice of peacekeeping. To illustrate the evolution of this force, certain events will be discussed and analyzed which led to this transformation. The evolution would entail: UNFICYP reaction to the attempted coup during the period of July 15-20; the nullification of the original mandate as laid out by the Security Council upon the invasion of Cyprus by Turkey; the designation of UN Protected Areas and enforcement by "peacekeeping by confrontation"; the significant increase in humanitarian

assistance provided by UNFICYP including refugee handling, evacuation, food and medical distribution, and prisoner exchanges; acting as mediator on demarcation negotiations; and establishing a "Buffer Zone" between combatants. In this evolution of UNFICYP, the Canadian Contingent, commanded by Colonel C.E. Beattie, would play a prominent role, a role which was not actively sought, but once accepted, defined a new approach to peacekeeping in Cyprus.

4.1 Background

By 14 July 1974, tensions in Cyprus had reached their peak. During the previous months, President Makarios had indicated that he believed the Greek government was behind a plan to either have him assassinated or his government overthrown. Previously, on 5 July, the *London Times* had reported that President Makarios had demanded the Greek government recall all Greek officers serving in the Cyprus National Guard. This demand stemmed from Makarios' belief that the Greek officers were involved in an EOKA-B conspiracy to assassinate him and take over the government.¹ Makarios explained his accusation by referring to evidence which he claimed proved complicity in this conspiracy on the part of the Greek officers of the Cyprus National Guard. In

¹ *Times* (London) July 5, 1974, p. 1.

addition, he strongly inferred they were acting on instructions from Athens, and that Athens had even supplied the terrorists with weapons and finances. Although never producing the documentary evidence for public inspection, it appeared that Makarios was attempting to break the hold that Athens had on Cyprus through the Greek officers in the National Guard.² It was ironic that Makarios called for an end to Greek interference in the internal affairs of Cyprus. Makarios had for decades been identified as a leading actor in the call for enosis with Greece. However, by 1973 he had begun to distance himself from the Greek Cypriot faction, led by Greek officers of the National Guard, which called for nothing short of union with Greece. By 11 July, the situation between the Makarios government and the Military Junta in Greece was extremely tense.

Furthermore, relations between Greece and Turkey were taking a turn for the worse. The tense relations between them had escalated since May 1974, over a dispute regarding resources in the Aegean Sea, specifically oil rights. This dispute stemmed from the Greek proposal to extend its territorial waters from six to twelve miles. Turkey felt threatened by this action, as a twelve mile limit would

² *Times* (London) July 5, 1974, p. 1. *The Toronto Globe and Mail*, July 6, 1974, p. 12.

alienate a majority of its Aegean coastline from the continental shelf. Turkish authorities declared that Greece was extending its territorial limit only to box Turkey in and to block Turkish claims over the eastern half of the Aegean sea bed.³ Turan Gunes, the Turkish Foreign Minister reportedly declared:

Turkey will never accept an extension of the territorial sea to 12 miles in the Aegean and it is out of the question that Greece should compel us to do so.⁴

This Greek attempt at exerting pressure on Turkey over Aegean interests, while also supporting enosis in Cyprus, put Turkey on the offensive. On 13 June, the *London Times* reported that the United States, through its Ambassador in Turkey, had offered to mediate the Aegean dispute between the two NATO partners. As well, the Turkish government had stated that any Greek extension of the territorial water limit would be interpreted as an act of belligerence against Turkey.⁵ Greece began adding fuel to this international crisis by increasing the pressure on Turkey by announcing that it would hold combined military maneuvers (army and navy) in the Aegean beginning 15 June. These maneuvers would be held on the same day that the Turkish government had

³ *Times* (London) June 10, 1974, p. 8.

⁴ *Ibid.*

⁵ *Times* (London) June 13, 1974, p. 9.

announced that it would dispatch its research vessel, the *Candarki*, to explore the Aegean Sea floor for oil reserves.⁶ It now appeared that rhetoric and military posturing by both belligerents was setting the stage for conflict.

On 15 June, it was announced by the *London Times* that the American President, Richard Nixon, would journey to Brussels on 26 June to sign a new Atlantic Declaration, renewing the principles of the original North Atlantic Treaty Organization. It was also inferred that this meeting would afford NATO the opportunity to discuss the Aegean crisis in relation to the two disputing partners. This meeting would then give the appearance that all was well between the allies of NATO, and that a family dispute could be settled amicably.⁷

In Cyprus meanwhile, two bombs had exploded during the period of June 13-17, in the areas of Famagusta and Kition near Larnaca. According to press and government sources, the terrorist acts were the actions of the EOKA-B guerrilla group who were the successors of the EOKA headed by General Grivas.⁸ In response to these terrorist activities, President Makarios was reported to be in the process of

⁶ *Ibid.*

⁷ *Times* (London) June 15, 1974, p. 1.

⁸ *Ibid.*

purging the island of terrorist groups affiliated with the EOKA-B who were demanding nothing less than enosis with Greece. Makarios was still attempting to rid the National Guard of its Greek officers who were believed to have brought undue influence and had open sympathies with the EOKA-B. Makarios also determined that these Greek officers were fermenting anti-Makarios agitation within the army which Cypriot government officials believed originated from Athens.⁹

By 26 June, discussions in Brussels regarding the Aegean situation had broken down. Press reports from NATO Headquarters indicated that Ecevit, the Turkish Prime Minister, had declared that the discussions over an Aegean solution between himself and Androusoopoulos had been fruitless and therefore the situation was deadlocked.¹⁰ During the first week in July, Greece had forwarded a diplomatic note to the Turkish government stating that Turkish incursion into the Aegean for oil research was contrary to international law, as Greece held sovereignty over the Aegean Islands and their offshore resources. The Turkish government publicly refused to accept this premise and strongly stated that Greek claims to the offshore

⁹ *The New York Times*, June 16, 1974, p. 4.

¹⁰ *Times* (London) June 28, 1974, p. 1.

resources, and indeed to the island themselves, were in question. In fact Turkey claimed that this area was under international law and not solely under the jurisdiction of Greek sovereignty. To back up its claims, Turkey quickly dispatched an oil research vessel to the area under dispute. Greece responded by stating it was prepared to defend its interests in the area and both Athens and Ankara put their armed forces on alert.¹¹ While disputes over potential Aegean oil interests mounted, Greek officers of the Cypriot National Guard were making final preparations for the overthrow of the Makarios government.

4.2 The Attempted Coup

The original UN Security Council Mandate outlined the objectives of UNFICYP which included the contribution to the maintenance and restoration of law and order.¹² Furthermore, one of the preconditions of the establishment of the force was that the legitimate government of Cyprus agree to allow the force onto its territory. What was not envisaged was that the UN force would be caught up in a coup attempt against the Cypriot government. The questions now facing UNFICYP were: would this coup jeopardize the carrying out of

¹¹ *Times* (London) July 11, 1974, P. 1.

¹² UN Doc. S/5634, March 4, 1964, para. 1.

the mandate and would the UN stand aside and let events take their course? In both areas, UNFICYP, and especially the Canadian Contingent, would forge new ground in peacekeeping operations.

The first indications that a coup was underway against the Makarios government began surfacing in the early hours of 15 July 1974. At 8:30 A.M. Headquarters UNFICYP and the Joint Operations Centre were advised that there were automatic weapons firing and that explosions were heard in the vicinity of the Paphos Gate Police Station in the old walled city of Nicosia. With this information, the Canadian Contingent Headquarters placed its Reconnaissance Platoon (RECCE PL) on standby. The Observation Company (OBSN COY) Reserve Platoon was also alerted and put on 15 minutes standby notice to move. This standby notice to move signified that UNFICYP, in particular the Canadian Contingent, would be ready to take up patrols or Observation Posts (OPs) throughout the city when ordered to do so. In addition, UNFICYP was placed on BLUE ALERT at 8:45 A.M. after a report from the Observation Company was forwarded to Headquarters UNFICYP stating that the Presidential Palace was under attack.¹³ By this time, UNFICYP had ascertained

¹³ *Nicosia Daily Operational Log Sheet*, CANCON 0840 hrs. 15 July 1974.

that an attempted coup was underway.¹⁴ At 9:00 A.M. the first incident of UN activity in the events that would follow, in the next 90 days, occurred. UNFICYP had established a UN Observation Post known as Roccas Bastion within the walled city between Turkish Cypriot and Greek Cypriot lines. On 15 July this observation post became the target of attack by the Greek National Guard. Observation Company, during its mobile patrol, came upon OP Roccas Bastion and discovered that a UN sentry had been physically attacked by four National Guard soldiers. They had also taken his weapon, magazine (ammunition) and bayonet.¹⁵ As well, the Acting Commander Canadian Contingent, Lieutenant Colonel Don Manuel, had taken to the air by helicopter for air reconnaissance of the city to assess the situation and determine the precise nature of what was transpiring.

Although tensions between Makarios and the Greek officers of the Cypriot National Guard were evident, it appeared that the coup being attempted against the government of Cyprus had been a surprise to UNFICYP. At this crucial time, the Canadian Contingent Commander, Colonel Beattie, was vacationing in the north of the island, near

¹⁴ *UNFICYP HQ Operations Briefing* at 1600 hrs. 15 July 1974, Item 1, p. 1,

¹⁵ *Nicosia District Daily Operational Log Sheet*, 0900 hrs. 15 July 1974.

Kyrenia, when the attempted coup began. According to Beattie, there had not been any intelligence reports or overt actions by the Greek National Guard that had indicated that events would evolve into what was then taking place. In fact, he had requested leave as circumstances presupposed that the situation, although volatile, would remain stable. Beattie's first knowledge of the attempted coup was gained while he was in the Kyrenia area:

The first knowledge I had of a coup taking place came early on the morning of 15 July 1974. I was on holiday at my cottage in Kyrenia...I received a telephone call from a friend in Nicosia to say some shooting had been heard coming from the area of the Central Prison in Nicosia; at that point the telephone connection was cut off and I lost contact with Nicosia...[Later] Mr. Kemal Rustem, a Turkish Cypriot...told me that a coup was taking place in Nicosia. I then called the Finnish Contingent in Tjiklos to arrange a helicopter to pick me up at the helipad at Tjiklos at about 1100 hours and flew back to Nicosia where I took up my duties as Deputy Chief of Staff.¹⁶

In fact, he informed the Finnish Contingent that a coup was indeed taking place in Nicosia.

Upon reporting to UNFICYP Headquarters, Colonel Beattie was informed of the air reconnaissance which LCol Manuel had completed. In his report, Manuel indicated that he had observed heavy fighting in the area of the presidential

¹⁶ BGen C.E. Beattie, interview held in Ottawa, Ontario, November 12, 1993.

palace. His aerial observations also confirmed reports by the Observation Company (OBSN COY) that an armoured column had been seen moving into the area and that access to all roads in the area of the palace had been sealed off.¹⁷ By 9:40 A.M. a full scale battle at the presidential palace was reported in progress. It was at this time that UNFICYP forwarded a full report to the Turkish Liaison at the vice-president's Office, Mr. Hassan, on the on-going activities and indicated that "we [UNFICYP] believe a coup d'etat is in progress."¹⁸ Hassan then indicated that he was concerned about the situation and requested further information as to "whether the shooting was between the National Guard and police or the EOKA-B and police."¹⁹ At approximately 10:00 A.M., Hassan contacted the Joint Operations Centre (JOC) to state that he had a report that President Makarios was dead. He requested UNFICYP to confirm this information. Also, he requested the local UN (Canadian Contingent) to:

secure the Green Line to prevent Greek Cypriots civilians or military from crossing into the Turkish enclave as the enclave will not give asylum to anyone.²⁰

¹⁷ *Nicosia District Daily Operational Log Sheet*, 0910, 15 July 1974.

¹⁸ *Ibid.*, 0940 hrs.. 15 July 1974.

¹⁹ *Ibid.*

²⁰ *Ibid.*, 1006 hrs.. 15 July 1974.

UNFICYP Headquarters then made a request to the Greek National Guard reserves for assistance in patrolling the Green Line throughout Nicosia. This request was refused. It now appeared that the Canadian Contingent UNFICYP would have to take on the responsibility of providing some type of security to the area of the Green Line which it controlled.

By mid-morning, Observation Company had reported to the Joint Operations Centre that OP Roccas Bastion had been withdrawn due to heavy fighting in the area. At approximately 10:00 A.M., the JOC ordered the Observation Company to reoccupy the UN Observation Post. The issue of unmanning UN OPs while under fire or, in some cases withdrawing from them, would become a contentious issue over the next six weeks. This procedure of unmanning Observation Posts was new, for UNFICYP was not established to be involved in the middle of a coup. UN OPs were established to observe and monitor Greek and Turk Cypriot enclaves and checkpoints and as such, were not fortified. In most cases, the UN Observation Posts were made of corrugated board and some were erected on roof tops of buildings overlooking certain areas of the city. As well, there were no sand bag emplacements or sufficient protection for UN observers should they come under direct heavy fighting. Their role was not to enforce cease-fires or stop military advances. As

BGen Beattie and Colonel M. Houghton stated: "Blue paint and a UN flag never stopped any bullets."²¹

As will be discussed later in this study, UN Observation Posts were erected on the orders of the Commander UNFICYP, and only on the specific instruction of the UN Secretary-General could OPs be withdrawn. This stipulation was incorporated into the UNFICYP Standing Operating Procedures (SOP). However, as Cyprus was the first incident that called for fluidity of the Green Line, new SOPs would evolve for future UN operations.

In response to Mr. Hassan's request for UN patrols along the Nicosia Green Line, the Canadian Contingent re-enforced its role as impartial observer. This ensured UNFICYP would have continued freedom of movement throughout the island. This Freedom of Movement capability was essential if UNFICYP was to carry out its obligations. The Joint Operations Centre (CANCON) ordered the Reconnaissance Platoon (RECCE PL) to commence patrolling the Green Line in the city. It also ordered the RECCE PL to man two static Observation Posts in the area of Paphos Gate within the walled city. In addition, the Canadian Contingent Commanding

²¹ BGen C.E. Beattie, interview held in Ottawa, Ontario, November 12, 1993 and with Colonel M. Houghton, April 27, 1994.

Officer, the Regimental Sergeant-Major, and a Radio Operator had proceeded to this area to ascertain what was happening.

Simultaneously, the Turk Cypriot Fighters (TCF) began to respond to events. In the Kyrenia District, the Finnish Contingent (FINCON), reported that the Turk Cypriot Fighters (TCFs) had been observed with two .30 calibre machine guns with two full sections (18 men) manning positions in the Kyrenia Pass while Greek National Guards had been observed establishing a road block near the Greek Camp on the Kyrenia side of the hills.²² By 11:00 A.M. the Turk Cypriot Fighters had taken up positions at or near the Kyrenia Gate of the old walled city of Nicosia, but the Turkish leadership had stated to the Turkish Liaison Officer that these were only precautionary measures.²³

For the remainder of the day the situation in Nicosia was unpredictable, as evidenced by the following report. At 1:45 P.M. the Observation Company reported to the Joint Operations Centre that at the Paphos Gate Police Station there remained one Greek T-34 tank along with approximately 40 Regular Force Unit Commandos. On the road north of the city, there were two Greek T-34 tanks in a static position,

²² *Nicosia Daily Operational Log Sheet*, 1150 hrs.. 15 July 1974.

²³ *Ibid.*, 1239 hrs.. 15 July 1974.

while in Metaxas Square in the city there was one tank covering the access road to the walled city.²⁴

At 3:20 P.M. the Joint Operations Centre was able to report to UNFICYP Headquarters the following information:

1. There have been no problems in exercising freedom of movement along the Green Line. 2 of our vehicles maintain a roving patrol pattern within the old city along the line.
2. Turk Cypriot Fighter OPs are manned by up to 5 sentries including reserves in civilian clothes.
3. Heavy fighting in the area of the Presidential residence continues.
4. Sporadic firing in the area of PGPS (Paphos Gate Police Station) and local UN unable to determine if National Guard controls PGPS at this time.²⁵

During the remainder of the day, the Greek National Guard had taken up positions all around the city to consolidate its advances.

By 3:30 P.M. however, Greek National Guardsmen began antagonizing the Turk Cypriot residents and the Turk Cypriot Fighters. Mr. Hassan had lodged a complaint to the Canadian Contingent Headquarters (Joint Operations Centre) stating that he was worried about the Turkish Cypriot civilians

²⁴ *Nicosia Daily Operational Log Sheet*, 1500 hrs.. 15 July 1974.

²⁵ *Ibid.*, 1520 hrs.. 15 July 1974.

stranded in the government controlled areas. He requested that the United Nations escort these civilians back to their own enclaves. Hassan was informed that this matter was under discussion at UNFICYP Headquarters and that it was a political matter which would be resolved. Further, during the ensuing hours, the Turkish Liaison Officer, Hassan, had complained to the Joint Operations Centre that Turkish Cypriot Fighters had come under fire from National Guardsmen and that any further actions of this kind would not be tolerated. By 4:30 P.M. the Turkish Liaison Officer also informed the Joint Operations Centre that mortar rounds had landed in the vice-president's Office. Hassan then demanded that UNFICYP do something to stop the harassment. The Canadian Contingent Headquarters responded by passing the information to UNFICYP Headquarters in order that the UN Liaison Officer contact the Greek National Guard in this matter.²⁶ This issue was put forward to the Commanding Officer of the Greek National Guard, Major Soulis, at 3 HMC headquarters. However, Major Soulis responded by stating that all conversations had be channeled through the Liaison Officer to the National Guard Headquarters and not through himself. The Greek National Guard Liaison Officer was unavailable and the protest was not acted upon.²⁷ These

²⁶ *Nicosia Daily Operational Log Sheet*, 1845 hrs.. 15 July 1974.

²⁷ *Ibid.*

actions by the Greek Cypriot National Guard against the Turk Cypriot Fighter positions and against the Vice-president's Office, along with harassment of Turkish Cypriots would lead to the government of Turkey evoking the clauses of the Treaty of Guarantee of 1960.

During the evening of 15 July, UNFICYP Headquarters, through the Joint Operations Centre, had established mobile and static patrols along the Green Line and outside the city. At 10:00 P.M. it was reported that one National Guard battalion consisting of 10-13 Lorries with troops, was moving towards Nicosia from Yerolakios. With this information, the Joint Operations Centre ordered a mobile patrol to monitor the movements of this convoy. Although initially only reporting sighting 4 vehicles, the UN patrol later confirmed that there were up to ten vehicles with troops. It was further reported that the convoy had split up, with troops and some armoured vehicles heading toward Paphos Gate area and others towards the UN compound at Blue Beret Camp.

One activity not yet discussed was the whereabouts of President Makarios and the initial claims of his assassination. The events surrounding the activities of President Makarios during this first day of the attempted

coup, would entail actions which could be described as bordering on the bending of international rules of engagement on the part of UNFICYP. As stated earlier, Hassan had reported to UNFICYP that he had strong indications that Makarios was dead. UNFICYP Headquarters attempted to verify this information but was initially unsuccessful. It was not until later in the day that it was established that Makarios had escaped from the presidential palace. According to Beattie's records, the following had taken place:

Mr. George Palagious, an aide to the Archbishop informed me that the attempted coup was unsuccessful as the Greek officers did not have Makarios as they had claimed. In fact, a Greek National Guard Commander had gone to the palace to place the President under arrest. Upon confronting Makarios with this situation, the President informed the officer that he was in the process of meeting guests, however he would dismiss them and return momentarily and place himself under the custody of the Greek National Guard. Makarios then went back into his office, through another entrance and then slipped out the back of the palace, crossed the Pedhios River, flagged down a car and proceeded to Paphos where the Bishop of Paphos granted him sanctuary.²⁸

Once safely in Paphos, Makarios then instructed the Bishop to declare that he [Makarios] was indeed alive and that the attempted coup had failed. According to the United Nations Headquarters Nicosia Daily Operational Log, the Bishop then forwarded the following message to Mr. Zenon

²⁸ BGen C.E. Beattie, interview held in Ottawa, Ontario, December 10, 1993.

Rossides, the Cyprus representative at the United Nations in New York, which the President directed him to make public.

The message stated:

Request by the President of the Cyprus Republic to call forthwith the Security Council of the UN to condemn the military government of Greece for the scandalous military intervention against the lawful government of the Republic of Cyprus, which took place this morning and ask the UN to take immediate measures to stop the intervention.²⁹

Once in the Paphos area, Makarios sought the protection of the United Nations. Makarios presented himself to the British Commander in the Paphos District and was given the guarantee of UN protection. As the United Nations was not involved in the internal affairs of Cyprus, this procedure was unprecedented. The UN Paphos Commander, under his own authority, was stretching the conditions of the mandate. Beattie states that this asylum was given under the heading of humanitarian assistance as no other guidelines fitted the situation. Beattie recalls:

The reason he [Makarios] was not turned away was that he was an elected head of state and a member of the Commonwealth. The British Commander then contacted HQ UNFICYP and informed Prem Chand of this situation. Prem Chand, the UN Force Commander and Dr. Luis Wechman, the Special Representative (UN), then proceeded by helicopter to the Paphos District Headquarters to verify Makarios' identity and once

²⁹ *Nicosia District Daily Operational Log Sheet*, 1330 hrs.. 15 July 1974.

this was confirmed agreed to protect him. Following this, Makarios was then taken to the British Sovereign Base Area of Akrotiri, where the British Commander reluctantly agreed to provide asylum for a short period of time. By 17 July, Makarios was flown by British forces carrier to Malta, then to London, and then to New York.³⁰

This action, under the heading of humanitarian assistance, could in fact be interpreted as interfering in the civil affairs of a sovereign state. However, as the coup had failed, Makarios was, technically, still the legitimate head of a sovereign state and member of the Commonwealth of Nations. Indeed, one of the principals of the mandate was to help return the island to "normal conditions" and this was, according to Beattie, interpreted as such an action. On 17 July, this action by UNFICYP was queried by the Canadian government. The Canadian Contingent Nicosia Daily Operational Log states:

0731 D/COS to JOC for CO - Report received from Canada stating that the President Archbishop Makarios received assistance during the coup from the UN, especially Canadian Troops. The CO was to query Col. Beattie as he was unsure of these connotations.³¹

Beattie, upon being questioned, declared that the UN, specifically UNFICYP, was in an untenable position:

³⁰ BGen C.E. Beattie, interview held in Ottawa, Ontario, December 10, 1993.

³¹ *Nicosia District Daily Operational Log Sheet*, 17 July 1974.

UNFICYP and the UN had to respond. Makarios was democratically elected and sought UN protection as head of state. Indeed, if UNFICYP had not supported him, Makarios could have called on the Secretary-General to declare UNFICYP as forfeited. If they did not help him, they (UNFICYP) would be acknowledging the legitimacy of the Greek officer led coup.³²

At the end of the first day of the attempted coup, UNFICYP Headquarters and the Joint Operations Centre had reacted to the situation by continuing to perform their functions and carrying out their responsibilities consistent with its mandate. The Operations briefing given at 4:00 P.M. on 15 July confirms this approach. Overall, UNFICYP and the Canadian Contingent Joint Operations Centre reported that indeed the National Guard had attempted a coup beginning at approximately 8:30 A.M. and that the National Guard had placed road blocks on all main roads leading into Nicosia. The National Guard had also attacked the Nicosia Airport and had placed some tanks and Armoured Personnel Carriers on the runways. As well, the Cyprus Broadcasting Corporation had been taken over by the National Guard and had transmitted a bulletin that Makarios was dead. As outlined above, this transmission had been premature.³³

³² BGen C.E. Beattie, interview held in Ottawa, Ontario, 12 January 1994.

³³ *UNFICYP HQ Operations Briefing* 1600 hrs.. 15 July 1974. p. 1.

The various United Nations District Commands had also been affected. From the Nicosia District the situation was reported as previously described. The Kyrenia District reported that small arms firing was the main activity. As well, the UN continued to have freedom of movement and this was substantiated by the Kyrenia District Commander who reported that previously unmanned Observation Posts were now completely manned and OPs along the Green Line had been reinforced without incident. Turkish Cypriot Fighter Reserves had been called up and had taken up positions but remained calm, even under a mortar grenade attack against their main camp. What is ironic is that the Turkish Cypriots had declared their support for Makarios. The UNFICYP Operations Briefing states that in the Kyrenia District:

The Turkish National Contingent has picked up a message that Makarios is still alive - and they want to support him - they have been told to remain calm - and seek advice from the Turkish Embassy.³⁴

At this stage of the civil unrest it is noteworthy that the Turkish National Contingent, which was part of the Turkish Force in Cyprus, as agreed to by the London and Zurich Agreements of 1960, was voicing public support for the Makarios government. As stated, it was advised to seek instructions from the Turkish Embassy. This advice was

³⁴ *Ibid.*

taken, for at this time, all assurances from the Greek National Guard to the Turkish Cypriot community stipulated that this was an internal matter and not directed at the Turkish community. As well, Hassan had already declared his intention not to become involved in what he termed an internal Greek Cypriot problem.

4.3 UNFICYP Responds

The UNFICYP Operations Briefings, a synopsis of all activity observed by all UN Contingents for the period July 16-17, indicated that sporadic fighting had taken place throughout the island. As each UN District was able to report on movements of the National Guard and Turk Cypriot Fighters without serious incident, UNFICYP was able to underscore its Freedom of Movement. According to UNFICYP and the Canadian Contingent Operational records, various towns and villages reacted differently to events.

In the Nicosia (West) District, controlled by the Canadian Contingent, 16 July was relatively calm. There had been reports of small arms firing in the city, and that the Paphos Gate Police Station had been captured by the National Guard. Additionally, government buildings were still under

attack.³⁵ The Famagusta District Commander (SWEDCON) had reported that the Cyprus Police (CYPOL) Station had been attacked by Turks and only small arms firing was heard in the old city of Famagusta. He also reported that the Turk Cypriot Fighters had manned their positions in Famagusta, however, no incidents were reported because of this action.³⁶

In the Limassol District, the UN Commander (BRITCON) had monitored the local radio station in Paphos which had called "for loyalists to take up arms and go to Limassol".³⁷ In response to this call for support, it was noted by the UN observers that approximately 800 men, some in uniform, left Paphos heading towards Limassol. It was also documented that heavy fighting was reported in the western part of Limassol at Ayiossioannis but that it had died out and the Power Station in Limassol had been rendered inoperable.³⁸

In the Larnaca District, the Austrian Contingent (AUSCON) reported that the National Guard had attacked the Cypriot Police (CYPOL) stations which were defended by the CYPOL and the Turkish Reserve Unit (TRU) and by 10:00 P.M.

³⁵ UNFICYP Operations Briefing 1130 hrs.. 16 July 1974. p.

1.

³⁶ Ibid.

³⁷ Ibid.

³⁸ Ibid.

had captured this position.³⁹ In the Lefka District, the Danish Contingent (DANCON) had reported that National Guard Units were fighting each other in Kokkina West and that the town of Morphou was controlled by the National Guard. In the Kyrenia area, the Nicosia (East) Finish Contingent (FINCON) had only small arms firing to report.⁴⁰

Although there were military activities throughout the island, these did not hamper UNFICYP's freedom of movement. Accordingly, each Contingent was able to observe and monitor such activity unobstructed. This gave UNFICYP the ability to identify areas of heavy fighting which were mainly located in Larnaca and Nicosia. The UNFICYP Operations Briefing for the period of 17 July indicates that fighting increased in two major locations; Nicosia and Kyrenia. The activities in Nicosia were especially concentrated in or around the Nicosia International Airport. The Canadian Contingent reported to UNFICYP Headquarters that the National Guard had established anti-aircraft weapons positions at the airport. A Canadian UN ration patrol returning from Larnaca had observed 10 tanks being loaded into vehicles. This action was noted as taking place near the Hilton Hotel. As well, other observations noted that:

³⁹ *Ibid.*

⁴⁰ *Ibid.* p. 2.

2 tanks and 15 National Guard soldiers were reported in position at the big roundabout, and 2 roadblocks were established at the airport road. Tanks in position were also reported opposite Ayios Proskonios Church.⁴¹

This tactic is interesting as the National Guard secured the area for use by themselves should events turn against them and the coup prove difficult. It should also be noted that although the National Guard had stated to the Turkish Cypriots that events were in no way directed against them, the control of the airport would be decisive should Turkey decide to intervene in Cyprus. Events would prove this out. However, it would be UNFICYP, led by the Canadian Contingent, not the National Guard, that would control the airport in the days ahead.

In addition to the Nicosia Airport district, there was small arms firing throughout the city. In fact, Canadian Contingent mobile patrols reported to the Joint Operations Centre (JOC) that armed Greek Cypriot civilians had been fighting against Turkish Cypriots in the area of St. Sophia Street, centre town, as well as firing against the National Guard in that area.⁴² The National Guard and the Turkish Cypriot Leadership both protested to CANCON and demanded

⁴¹ *UNFICYP Operations Briefing*, 17 July 1974, p. 1.

⁴² *Ibid.* p. 2.

that the other side halt aggressive actions. UNFICYP was expected to negotiate cease-fires between the two communities and carry out its obligations, even in these difficult times. The Canadian Contingent attempted to negotiate cease-fires and in some instances were successful. According to BGen Beattie:

During this period, CANCON was partially successful in diffusing some situations. In fact, along the Green Line there were times that UNFICYP was able to stop inter-communal fighting by placing observers in between the Turkish and Greek Cypriots. It wasn't that each side wanted to physically take over the other's positions (at this time), as much as they were reacting to volatile situations where each side didn't know what the other was going to do. In these circumstances, firing was a nervous reaction.⁴³

In the Kyrenia District, the Finnish Contingent (FINCON) had reported that tanks were positioned throughout Kyrenia and that, "scattered shooting was heard at the centre of town."⁴⁴ FINCON also reported that the National Guard had been fired upon by Turk Cypriot positions. This firing had been directed towards the Greeks over the heads of OP Martins Mound which was manned by FINCON UN Observers.⁴⁵ By the end of 17 July, the Police Station in Kyrenia had been taken over by the National Guard and apart

⁴³ BGen C.E. Beattie, interview held in Ottawa, Ontario, December 12, 1993.

⁴⁴ *UNFICYP Operations Briefing*, 17 July 1974, p. 6.

⁴⁵ *Ibid.*

from periodic scattered shooting, all remained calm. As well, FINCON reported that the Turkish Cypriot in Kyrenia did not display any real apprehension. The UNFICYP Headquarters Report confirms this:

It seems clear that the Turk Cypriot reaction to the overall situation has been very concerned but calm - and they do not consider that there has been any deliberate violations against them so far.⁴⁶

Events in Cyprus during this period were followed closely by Turkey and Russia. On 15 July it was announced by the National Guard, erroneously as already described, that Makarios was dead and that the Presidency was now held by Nicos Sampson. Sampson had been a leading member of the EOKA under the command of General George Grivas during Cyprus' struggle for independence. He had been held responsible for the murder of numerous British soldiers and Turkish Cypriots in Nicosia. When he was captured, he had been tried and was sentenced to death. This sentence was later commuted to life in prison. He had only served 17 months of this sentence when he was released under the amnesty terms of the London and Zurich Agreements of 1960. Once released, he returned to Cyprus and again took up the cause of enosis and became involved in the inter communal strife and was reported to be

⁴⁶ *Ibid.*

responsible for several Turkish Cypriot deaths.⁴⁷ According to Beattie:

The Greek National Guard officers could not have chosen a worse figure to be declared President. Here was a man who boasted his attempts to ensure enosis, and was implicated in numerous Turkish Cypriot deaths. His anti-Turkish stance was well known and by installing Sampson as President, the Greek backed coup ensured that Turkey would, in all probability, become involved.⁴⁸

The *London Times* reported from Cyprus that when Sampson was installed as President, he made a statement which would not help calm the fears in Ankara. Sampson was recorded as stating that the coup was the result:

of Cyprus deviating from the natural course of harmony of spiritual peace and unity between the people and the army.⁴⁹

It was further reported that Sampson had declared that the coup was an internal Cyprus decision and one not dictated by the Greek government. Sampson declared that it was due in part by Makarios' ousting of 650 Greek officers from Cyprus during his battle with Greece.⁵⁰

⁴⁷ *Times* (London) July 16, 1974, p. 50.

⁴⁸ BGen C.E. Beattie, interview held in Ottawa, Ontario, December 12, 1993.

⁴⁹ *Times* (London) July 16, 1974, p. 1.

⁵⁰ *Ibid.*

Meanwhile, Turkey declared that any attempt to annex the island by Greece would not be tolerated. Furthermore, President Korutturk of Turkey placed his troops on alert status and the government met in emergency session to discuss the situation. After this emergency meeting, it was announced that the Government of Turkey was of the opinion that it had the legal right to intervene in Cyprus as a Guarantor State of the Geneva Agreement. The timing of its intervention was not stated.⁵¹

According to the *London Times*, Russia was also apprehensive of the developments in Cyprus. Russia was reported to have stated that it would oppose any attempt to make Cyprus into a NATO base.⁵² On 17 July, the *London Times* reported that both Russia and Turkey had accused Greece of engineering the coup. Russia had also promised to send aid to the Cypriot government to assist it in fighting the Greek National Guard. Fearing Russian involvement, the Greek government publicly denied any involvement in Cypriot affairs.⁵³ At the same time, NATO had called for the removal of Greek officers from the National Guard, hoping this action would lesson tensions. The main factor for this

⁵¹ *Times* (London) July 16, 1974, p. 50.

⁵² *Ibid.*, p. 1.

⁵³ *Times* (London) July 17, 1974, p. 8.

declaration from the NATO Ministers was succinctly pointed out:

Greece and Turkey, the twin pillars of the Alliance's southern flank should not fight each other.⁵⁴

In essence, the NATO Foreign Ministers were acknowledging that the situation, if not resolved, could potentially lead to a split in the Alliance thereby weakening the southern flank of NATO and exposing this area to potential Soviet incursion.

On 17 July, both Greece and Turkey put their forces on a high state of alert over a possible confrontation of the Cyprus situation. Turkey was reported to have marshalled its forces consisting of tanks (the 29th Armoured Division) and artillery on its southern coast.⁵⁵ War fever had now surfaced and was best described by the Turkish newspaper *Gunaydin* whose headlines read, "We Are Making An Invasion of Cyprus."⁵⁶ At the same time the Turkish Prime Minister was reported to be going to London for consultations with Turkey's Guarantor Partner over the tense military situation.⁵⁷ In any event, it appeared that Turkey would take

⁵⁴ *Times* (London) July 18, 1974, p. 7.

⁵⁵ *Ibid.*, p. 1.

⁵⁶ *Ibid.*

⁵⁷ *Ibid.*

some type of action. The Turkish representative, Mr. Ecivit, declared in London:

Whether we decide to return to the status established by the London and Zurich Agreements, or we establish a new status, we must know where we stand.⁵⁸

Meanwhile Archbishop Makarios had landed in London on his way to address the United Nations Security Council on 19 July.

On July 19, it was noted by Canadian Contingent observers that during the day Turk Cypriot Fighters had been heavily fortifying their positions along the Green Line and in the Turkish Cypriot enclaves.⁵⁹ On this same day, Sampson, the interim President, had accused Makarios of abusing his power. He accused Makarios of torturing prisoners and stated that the coup had taken place to restore human rights and law and order.⁶⁰ This argument was contradictory to the one used on 16 July, in which Sampson had declared that the coup was underway to restore Cyprus in harmonizing the people and army towards its true path (enosis).

⁵⁸ *Times* (London) July 18, 1974, p. 7.

⁵⁹ *Nicosia Daily Operational Log Sheet*, 19 July 1974.

⁶⁰ *The Toronto Globe and Mail*, July 19, 1974, p. 1.

During 18 July, tensions continued to rise in some of the UN Districts. According to UNFICYP records, at approximately 4:00 P.M. the National Guard of approximately 200 soldiers, supported by a tank, had gathered around Camp UNFICYP, just outside the outskirts of south east Nicosia. The National Guard Commander then met with the Chief of Staff, Brigadier F. Henn, and demanded that he be allowed to check the weapons compound where Makarios supporters weapons had been stored. These weapons had been gathered previously as part of a cease-fire negotiation between Greek and Turk Cypriots and placed under control of UNFICYP. The response to this demand by UNFICYP and the Canadian Contingent was immediate. The UNFICYP records state:

[a] Stand To was ordered in both UNFICYP Camps. After this the COS had a meeting with COS National Guard at Athalassa HQ and got assurances that the National Guard had no intentions of an armed action against the camp in order to capture these weapons.⁶¹

By nightfall the National Guard had moved on towards the airport and the UN Camp was not harassed. This action by Brigadier Henn, as Chief of Staff UNFICYP, demonstrated to the National Guard that UN Base Camp areas would not be violated without armed resistance. This tactic would be used on many occasions during the following weeks.

⁶¹ United Nations, Nicosia, *UNFICYP HQ Operations Briefing* 18 0830 hrs.. July 1974. p. 1.

During this period, other UN Contingents were also active. The Kyrenia District (FINCON) reported that during the day the National Guard allegedly carried out searches in Turkish Cypriot houses in Ayia Irini, which the National guard termed a misunderstanding. Later, the National Guard did search Turkish Cypriot houses in Dhiorios and confiscated weapons found on these premises.⁶² The Turkish Leadership protested and the National Guard stated that Turkish Cypriot houses would not be searched. This action on the part of the National Guard gave rise to further tensions between Greece and Turkey.

On 19 July, the Greek government announced it was willing to replace its Greek officers in the National Guard. However, it refused to accept any complicity in the Cypriot events of the previous four days. Although Greek officers had led the attempted coup, the *London Times* reported that Mr. Chorafas, the Greek Ambassador to NATO, had declared:

that Greece rejects with indignation the allegations according to which they might have had the slightest responsibility for the recent events in Cyprus. They also considered as without foundation the accusations which have been levied against the Greek officers at present put at the disposal of the Cypriot Government. Nevertheless, they wish to give entire satisfaction to the request made by most members of

⁶² *Ibid.* pp. 2-3.

the Council and thus provide an additional proof of their good faith as well as of their peaceful and friendly intentions to all. They have taken the decision of replacing the above mentioned officers and hope that this gesture will be appreciated at its proper value.⁶³

Sampson, the interim Cypriot President, also stated that Cyprus would continue to honour its international commitments. He reiterated that the Turkish Cypriots were in no danger and questioned why Turkey had put its forces on full alert.⁶⁴ In response, the Turkish Cypriot community, led by Rauf Denktash, vice-president of Cyprus, stated that only a return to the status quo could prevent war. In Turkish Cypriot communities and regions of the island, preparations for military defences were underway under the direction of Turkish officers. With all this activity, Sampson imposed a curfew on Cyprus. Meanwhile, the Turkish government announced that it had extended its continental shelf in the Aegean Sea, in the area where Greece had claimed exclusive jurisdiction.⁶⁵ Turkey had also moved thousands of troops to its Mediterranean coast and warned that time for a diplomatic solution for Cyprus was running out.

⁶³ *Times* (London) July 19, 1974, p. 1.

⁶⁴ *Ibid.*

⁶⁵ *Ibid.*

4.4 Conclusion

UNFICYP was fully aware of the consequences of the events that had taken place since 14 July 1974. The attempted coup against Makarios had been initiated because he had distanced himself from the EOKA-B terrorist group that called for union with Greece and Greek officers of the National Guard, had planned the coup and had designated Nicos Sampson as interim President. This action was viewed by Turkey as a preliminary step to seek annexation by Greece of Cyprus. The naming of Sampson as President had inflamed the Turkish Cypriot community and, as Sampson was a known and avowed enosist and anti-Turk, it had the following effects. First, it insured that Turkey would have to respond to this action for it threatened Turkey's position on the island. Second, it precipitated the beginning of the Turkish National Contingent's preparations for defence on the island.

UNFICYP, though not directly involved in the internal affairs of Cyprus, responded in a manner which was deemed consistent with its mandate. First, it observed and monitored events and reported, through its contingents, to UN Headquarters. Second, it became involved with more humanitarian assistance, and assisting Makarios in fleeing

Cyprus and proceeding to New York to address the Security Council. It recognized Makarios as the legitimate head of the government of Cyprus by providing protection and an armed escort to the British Sovereign Base Area at Akrotiri where the United Kingdom gave him asylum and then air transported him to Malta and then to London. This continued recognition deprived the coup leaders of the legitimacy which they were seeking. Third, UNFICYP also carried out its mandate and maintained its Freedom of Movement and to protect Turkish Cypriot enclaves from National Guard actions. Fourth, UNFICYP had declared its willingness to protect its base areas through the use of force to the National Guard as described in the Camp UNFICYP situation. This willingness to use force and continue to carry out its functions, even under difficult situations, would be tested beginning the 20th of July. The events of the past few days had challenged UNFICYP and especially the Canadian Contingent in the Nicosia District. The events of 20 July to 30 September would transform it.

What is interesting is that the events as they unfolded did not have a significant impact on the Greek Cypriot perspective. According to BGen Beattie it appeared that the Greek Cypriots were not realistic in their assumptions about Turkey's possible reaction:

The events of the preceding days were viewed as a preliminary to what would happen next. Once Sampson was declared President; the Turkish Cypriots being under fire; the Greek government steadfastly refusing to reign in their officers in Cyprus; and Turkey declaring the offshore rights on the Aegean, it was not "if" the Turks were coming, it was a matter of "when".⁶⁶

The Greek Cypriots felt that unfolding events did not pose a serious threat to the Turkish Cypriot community and could not understand the Turkish Cypriot leadership's apprehensions. In this analysis the Greek Cypriot community was proven to be in error. At the UNFICYP and Canadian Contingent Headquarters, a similar error was not made.

⁶⁶ BGen C.E. Beattie. interview held in Ottawa, Ontario, December 12, 1993.

CHAPTER 5

THE TURKISH INVASION OF CYPRUS:

Peacekeeping by Confrontation

20-31 JULY 1974

The first phase, peacekeeping through observation, carried out during March 1964 to 20 July 1974 has already been addressed. The second phase, peacekeeping by confrontation, extended from 20 July to 16 August, and would transform the role of UNFICYP. The Turkish invasion of Cyprus on 20 July 1974, essentially nullified UNFICYP's mandate as set out by the UN Security Council in March 1964.

Indeed, the leading role of the Canadian Contingent in responding to the invasion would redefine the nature of UNFICYP. The actions taken by the Canadian Contingent during this period signified a change in the meaning of peacekeeping as it related to Cyprus. These actions included providing humanitarian assistance to both Cypriot communities on a scale not envisaged in the establishment of the force; the establishment of UN Protected Areas which denied access to the two combatants involved in hostilities and provided control of strategically located areas; the

participation of UNFICYP in the demarcation talks of Forward Defensive Lines; and the establishment and control of a Buffer Zone between the two opposing armies after 18 August 1974.

The Canadian Contingent faced great difficulties as a result of the Turkish invasion. The tactic of Peacekeeping by Confrontation was, at first, an ad hoc reaction. It quickly developed into an overall strategic plan of imposing cease-fires along the Green Line and at strategically located positions. What will become evident is that singular actions by UNFICYP in attempting to impose cease-fires could not have curtailed Turkish military objectives from being attained. To assist in better understanding the importance of this approach to conflict resolution, three specific responses by CANCON will be analyzed and linked to demonstrate how and why an overall strategy developed. The three areas to be reviewed encompass two static positions, the Ledra Palace Hotel and the Nicosia International Airport, and the Chimo Club area, which formed part of the Green Line in Nicosia. The reasoning behind this strategy was clear. First, had UNFICYP (CANCON) concentrated solely on protecting the Green Line this would have left the airport open to Turkish forces which would have, most assuredly, used it for reinforcement, thereby allowing them

to flank the city and take the rest of the island. Secondly, had the Canadian Contingent focused on the airport only, this would have allowed the Turkish Forces to advance into the city area from the north without any opposition, bypassing the airport. Third, had the Canadian Contingent concentrated on specific locations overlooking Greek and Turkish Cypriot enclaves, the Turks could have surrounded UNFICYP and forced its evacuation, leaving the rest of the island open. Individually, each action taken by the Canadian Contingent (UNFICYP) would not have resulted in cease-fire agreements or halting of actions against the civilian population. However, when linked to a systematic approach, the actions taken by the Canadian Contingent demonstrate that the overall objectives of the Turkish forces were not met. The Turkish force failed to take the airport for the airlifting of reinforcements; they were continually challenged by UNFICYP for encroaching on the Green Line; and they failed to control vital static positions in Nicosia because of UNFICYP's actions.

The actions taken by UNFICYP, under the leadership of the Canadian Contingent, led to the establishment of UN Protected Areas. The requirement to protect both Greek and Turkish Cypriots from hostile activities of both the Greek National Guard and Turkish Forces resulted in humanitarian

assistance being rendered to both communities by UNFICYP, creating new objectives for the UN Force. Included in this humanitarian assistance were prisoner exchanges and the evacuation and protection of foreign nationals swept up in the midst of hostile actions.

5.1 The Canadian Contingent Reacts to the Invasion

When questioned as to the type of action the Canadian Contingent and UNFICYP could respond with as a result of the invasion of Cyprus by Turkey, BGen C.E. Beattie made the following reply:

When the Turkish forces invaded we [UNFICYP] were faced with three options. First, we could withdraw into our UN bases and become bystanders and do nothing until UN HQ decided how it would react. Second, we could withdraw the Force [UNFICYP] from Cyprus and let the combatants fight it out. Third, we could impose ourselves between the two forces and attempt to negotiate cease-fires and enforce Security Council resolutions which called for the cessation of hostilities. As the Deputy Chief of Staff and Canadian Contingent Commander, I preferred the last option and the Force Commander, Prem Chand, was also of this opinion. We chose the third option.¹

Although not mandated to deal with an invasion, the third option taken by UNFICYP altered peacekeeping as it had been exercised in Cyprus. The period of 20 July to 16 August

¹ BGen C.E. Beattie, interview held in Ottawa, Ontario, January 7, 1994.

1974 witnessed the Canadian Contingent taking the lead in this matter.

In the early hours of 20 July, the Canadian Contingent Reconnaissance Platoon, patrolling the Nicosia Green Line, reported the first indication of increased activity which signaled that the status quo was about to be altered. It reported that the Turk Cypriot positions within the walled city had established barricades made of concertina wire and lumber which had been manned with troops carrying weapons.² At 3:30 A.M. the Chief of Staff (COS), Brigadier Frank Henn, UNFICYP, radioed the Joint Operations Centre and requested the Canadian Commander, Lieutenant Colonel D. Manuel, to contact him by phone. Upon contacting the COS, Manuel was informed of the following:

Advise that he has some information that visitors are coming from the north. [He] wants our contingent ready for any action.³

In response, the Joint Operations Centre ordered all United Nations positions throughout the island be manned. In the Nicosia District the Canadian Contingent took up its positions. The Joint Operations Centre also directed that UNFICYP be on full alert status. All activity was to be

² *Nicosia Daily Operational Log Sheet*, 20 July 1974.

³ *Ibid.*

reported.⁴ In response, the Canadian Contingent had doubled its personnel in all Observation Posts (OP) by 4:00 A.M. Furthermore, the Commander of OP Flour Mill, located in Nicosia, was ordered to place himself on top of his OP and observe any activity to the north. At 4:10 A.M. the codeword TULIP was flashed to all contingents. TULIP was the code designated by the Force Commander for UNFICYP action in the event of an invasion by Turkey. Immediately following the full alert, Liaison officers were appointed to the National Guard, to the Turkish Leadership, and to the Finnish Contingent. The Liaison Officers appointed to these positions were; Captain Mathieu - Liaison Officer 3 HMC (National Guard); Lieutenant Langlois - Liaison Officer Leadership (Turkish Cypriot); and Captain Anderson - Liaison Officer FINCON.⁵

In the north, the Finnish Contingent reported the sighting of three ships north of Kyrenia, one of which was a cruiser steaming east to west.⁶ At OP Flour Mill, in Nicosia, at approximately 5:00 A.M., Sergeant Poirer, Observation Company Canadian Contingent, reported sighting an air force fighter at an altitude of approximately 2000 feet. The fighter was over the Kyrenia Mountains area and

⁴ *Ibid.*

⁵ *Ibid.*

⁶ *Ibid.*

appeared to be on a reconnaissance mission.⁷ Throughout the early morning hours of 20 July, UN Observation Posts reported that several hostile acts had been observed. These acts included machine gun fire from the north in the Kyrenia Pass; Turkish Cypriot Fighters who had taken up defensive positions and had deployed with weapons in Nicosia near Paphos II OP; and Turkish war planes that had bombed the National Guard Camp located west of Kyrenia.⁸

Between 4:00 and 6:00 A.M. the Canadian Contingent observed and reported that a full scale invasion of Cyprus by Turkey was in progress. Lt. Langlois, the UN Liaison Officer at 3 HTC (Turkish Cypriot Leadership), was able to report to the Joint Operations Centre the following:

I went to 3 HTC as an LO at 0545, when we arrived there were 4XLR (Land Rovers) with 106's (recoilless rifles) without trailers parked on the road facing north. I met with the Colonel in the OPs room and he gave me the following points:

- a. Turkish airforce had attacked;
 - 1. the Greek Contingent Camp
 - 2. National Guard Camp in Karavas
 - 3. National Guard Camp in Kyrenia
 - 4. Greek National Guard OP line in the Kyrenia range
- b. Turk Airborne Force is landing in the area of the Turk National Contingent.

⁷ *Ibid.*

⁸ *Ibid.*

At 0610 I was evicted out of 3 HTC and I noticed the above convoy was gone and 3 BTR 152 (Soviet armoured cars) were...moving south. 1 BTR 152 was still in the stadium, 1 Crew Cab Bedford was on the road and had 1 Bren Gun in the back. Everybody was loading weapons [and] some NCO's were giving crash courses on weapon's handling to recruits.⁹

The above information had been confirmed by reports from other UN observers that in fact the above locations had been attacked. As well, the Liaison Officer to the Greek National Guard had been dismissed as they [National Guard] were not prepared to accept any responsibility for agreeing to cease-fires which UNFICYP was trying to implement. In fact, at 8:00 A.M. the Canadian Contingent Observation Company (OBSN COY) had reported that this was indeed the case. OBSN COY submitted a detailed report confirming its observations:

At 0800 hrs on 20 July 74, I visited 3 HMC to gain contact. I saw Major Soulis and I was ushered into the office of the Comd of the 3 TAC GP, (Tactical Group) whose name was not given to me. I said that the fighting along the Green Line had to stop as soon as possible and that we, the UN, had LOs with the TCF COYS who were trying the same thing.

I was informed that the Comd had not received any instructions concerning a cease fire and that the Nat Gd HQ only could make that decision. I asked that he get permission and that a local cease fire for 1000 hrs be arranged. This was the plan of Nicosia District JOC (CANCON). After 20 minutes I was informed that no local cease fires could be arranged, and that all contact was to be with NAT GD HQ. I contacted the JOC and suggested that Col. Beattie go

⁹ *Ibid.*

to the [Nat Gd] HQ to arrange the cease fire. A civilian was also at 3 HMC, a Mr. Myrianthopoulos. He appeared to have a great deal of influence over the senior officers. He wanted me to contact Col. Beattie, who is a personal friend, and offer his advice....They did however agree to stop the Nat Gd firing in the area of Roccas Bastion to permit the UN OP to be evacuated.¹⁰

Two important factors emerged from the above description of events. First, the Greek National Guard as well as the Turk National Contingent were not willing to agree to local UN initiated cease-fires unless their respective Headquarters had authorized such activities. This would have to be dealt with at the highest levels of command with a senior UNFICYP commander representing the United Nations.

Second, the issue involved the unmanning of UNFICYP Observation Posts. This unmanning and movement of UN Observation Posts was and still is a contentious issue, as evacuation could only be carried out under orders of the UN Secretary-General. In this case, orders for withdrawal were given at the local level (CANCON). UN Observation Posts were either established to observe sensitive points of concern between the Greek and Turkish Cypriots or they were set up as static OPs in areas considered sensitive to both sides. The situation since 1964 had not witnessed a change in the

¹⁰ *Ibid.*, Serial 85.

military status quo. Observation Posts became fixed and acceptable to both sides which allowed UNFICYP to intercede, observe, and report. Therefore, the establishment or withdrawal of Observation Posts became the prerogative of the local commander, with the concurrence of the Force Commander, in order to meet changing situations as they occurred. This allowed for a flexible response to situations as they arose and permitted UNFICYP to diffuse potential conflict situations by providing a UN presence in areas deemed volatile. In most cases, UN Observation Posts were simply sun shades painted blue with UN insignia visible for all to see. This flexibility was consistent with the maintenance of the military status quo and the pursuit of the UN's mandate in assisting to the return to normal conditions. Prior to the invasion, UN OPs were only a noted presence established to delineate areas of confrontation or dispute and served their purpose under conditions of relaxed tensions. According to BGen Beattie:

The OPs were established to note a UN presence in a particular area of confrontation or dispute between the two Cypriot communities. In fact, they were little more than sun shades with the UN initials identifying them as such. Both sides had agreed on the location of the OPs and these were not fortified in any great depth.¹¹
Beattie's statement is supported by LCol Don Manuel

¹¹ BGen C.E. Beattie, interview held in Ottawa, Ontario, January 12, 1994.

Originally, up to 20 July 1974, UNFICYP and the Canadian Contingent were in Cyprus to prevent intercommunal fighting between the Greek and Turkish communities. This entailed the establishment of OP's which were agreed to by both sides. These OP's were undefended in that they were highly visible, no sandbags for protection, and both communities knew this. Essentially they [OP's] were there to demonstrate a UN presence and being unprotected they symbolized an attempt to bring normalcy back to the island.¹²

However, the invasion of Cyprus by Turkey and the ensuing war altered the pre-1974 situation. UN Observation Posts came under direct fire from both sides. Either side was prepared to take advantage of the location of these OPs in order to meet their immediate military aims. What quickly became evident on 20 July was that the UN OPs were not capable of withstanding any concerted assault. LCol Manuel, aware of the predicament of UN OPs, issued the following orders:

Ensure that all OBSN COY persons are not in the line of fire and that they have protective cover. If it gets too hot, withdraw.¹³

This order was issued to all OPs in order that UN personnel would not needlessly be imperiled or subjected to

¹² Lieutenant Colonel Don Manuel, telephone interviews held on 19 and 20 April 1995.

¹³ *Nicosia District Daily Operational Log Sheet*, Serial 56, 20 July 1974.

direct fire that could cost the lives of Canadian UN soldiers. At 7:00 A.M. the Joint Operations Centre reported on the status of the Canadian Contingent Observation Posts within Nicosia:

Hermes II & Constantine - Both move to Beaver Lodge
OP Paphos Gate - move to Roccas Bastion - holding
Golf Course - Abandoned
Paphos II - OK
Clinic - OK
Chimo - OK
Red Line - OK
Flour Mill - OK
OPS - OK¹⁴

During the next 30 days most of the Canadian Contingent Observation Posts would be unmanned, remanned, reinforced, and established and hardened in conflict areas that could be diffused. As the war advanced and demarcation of Forward Defensive Lines was established, flexibility and fluidity became watchwords for the UN Commander. In reality, UN Observation Posts would be established to denote forward advances, but would be bypassed by Turkish forces. The United Nations would again endeavour to delineate new Forward Defensive Lines and set up UN OPs. In some cases these OPs were fired upon,¹⁵ or set on fire. At times, both sides attempted to force Canadian Contingent personnel to surrender the OPs. Whatever the circumstance, CANCON would

¹⁴ *Ibid.*, Serial 64.

¹⁵ *Ibid.*, Serial 126.

either remain¹⁶ or temporarily withdraw, but would return to reoccupy the location in an attempt to enforce cease-fires as agreed to by both sides.

As both the Greek National Guard and the Turkish forces viewed UN Observation Posts as a nuisance to be bypassed or occupied, two examples are offered as to the flexibility and determination of the Canadian Contingent to remain in place during this period. On 20 July at 9:58 A.M. OP Louroujina reported to the Joint Operations Centre that the Turks had taken over the UN positions at that OP. As well, the UN Flag had been removed and the UN Section of troops were safely in the section house. The Joint Operations Centre responded by directing the UN (Canadian Contingent) Section to remain at the site in order to ensure the UN presence was known. No evacuation or withdrawal was ordered for this UN OP.¹⁷ The second example occurred at OP Roccas Bastion. Due to heavy fighting and firing on OP Roccas Bastion, this OP reported that it would be evacuated and moved to the location of OP Maple Leaf Manor. UNFICYP Headquarters was advised of this situation and LCol Manuel directed that the CANCON personnel of OP Roccas Bastion not

¹⁶ *Ibid.* Serial 129.

¹⁷ *Ibid.*

lose site of the exact location of this OP as it would be re-established at a later time.¹⁸

There are numerous other examples that describe the flexibility in the stationing or movement of UN Observation Posts in order to react to changing situations. The authority to withdraw, establish, and re-establish UN OPs, as stated, rested with the local commander. However, the UN wished to maintain a presence in the northern half of the island and UNFICYP wanted to maintain its OPs in that area. The reason for this approach was twofold. First, by keeping a UN presence in the north it could check the condition of Greek Cypriots who had been unable to evacuate before the onslaught of the Turkish Army. This presence would ensure, as much as possible, the safety of these persons as well as allow the UN to provide humanitarian services such as foodstuffs and medical care. Similar goals were being pursued to ensure the safety of the Turkish Cypriot minority in areas outside the Turkish control. Second, by stating that the removal of UN OPs could not be dictated by the Turk Force Commander, and that only the UN Secretary-General could authorize such movement, the UN in effect bought time to keep current on activities as they unfolded and at times dictated which areas would be under UN protection.

¹⁸ *Ibid.*, Serial 132 and 142.

5.2 The Canadian Contingent Takes the Lead

Events in Cyprus during this period were complex and interwoven. As history demonstrates, many causes are responsible for particular events. Results of a particular situation can be varied and numerous. Such was the case of the Canadian Contingent's actions which transpired at the Ledra Palace Hotel in the city of Nicosia. The results of the Canadian Contingent's actions included; providing humanitarian assistance; enforcing cease-fires through "peacekeeping by confrontation"; establishing a static and well-secured UN OP; and controlling strategic positions that both sides dictated should not be in possession of either combatant.

The following analysis is an example which demonstrates that from the first day of the invasion, UNFICYP, led by the Canadian Contingent, would deliberately redefine its role.

The main task of UNFICYP, and therefore of the Canadian Contingent, apart from ensuring the safety of its own personnel, was to attempt to negotiate local cease-fires. However, both combatants were reluctant to be the

first to halt hostilities against the other. It was therefore imperative that the Liaison Officers quickly relay and be able to receive instructions from their respective contacts. To support this approach of continuous liaison, the Commanding Officer, LCol Manuel, at the vice-president's Office, relayed the following instructions and information to the Nicosia District JOC.

Spoke to Mr. Hassan - Confirm that all TCF under orders not to fire at GK (Greeks) - However [he] has no control over TK NAT (Turkish Nationals).¹⁹

In addition, Manuel requested confirmation from the Joint Operations Centre that the Liaison Officers were in position with the Turk Cypriot Fighter companies and 3 HMC (National Guard) to enforce and monitor the no-fire policy as agreed to with the UN. At the same time, Manuel was attempting to arrange a cease-fire through the Turkish Leadership.²⁰ As reports indicate, efforts to establish and deploy Liaison Officers to the Turkish Cypriot Fighter companies was generally difficult. In the case of one TCF company, the Liaison Officer was disarmed, searched, and ordered to leave the immediate area.²¹ It was reiterated by 3 HMC that any cease-fires had to be negotiated through the

¹⁹ *Ibid.*, Serial 62.

²⁰ *Ibid.*, Serial 110.

²¹ *Ibid.*, Serial 85.

National Guard Headquarters and any requests in this matter could only be handled at that level.

Before concentrating on events at the Ledra Palace Hotel on 21 July, the reader should note that other events during the 20th also impacted on UNFICYP responses. Records and interviews confirm that the National Guard was indiscriminately firing mortars into the Turkish enclave and close to UN positions.²² Therefore, any retaliation by the Turk Cypriot Fighters or Turkish army would automatically affect the UN. At every level, military and political, the Canadian Contingent attempted to effect cease-fires and persuade the National Guard to cease hostile activities. This type of action by the Canadian Contingent was carried out. According to BGen Beattie:

It soon became apparent that they [National Guard] were attempting to use the UN as a shield in the hope that the Turks would refrain from returning fire. Both the Greek and Turk troops already knew the location of the UN OPs within the city and did not hesitate to advance in their direction. At the Nicosia Airport and Blue Beret Camp the situation was similar, as National Guard artillery and anti-aircraft units deployed near those areas. This of course, drew Turkish fire, from both the ground and the air.²³

²² *Ibid.*, Serial 104.

²³ BGen C.E. Beattie, interview held in Ottawa, Ontario, December 12, 1993.

At 12:30 P.M. three mortar rounds (60 MM) landed in Wolsely Barracks, a Canadian UN Base that was located in the middle of a fire zone. The Joint Operations Centre recorded:

A shell landed in Wolsely Barracks. We have 4 casualties none serious. They are treated locally. The injured are: Warrant Officer Moeller, Corporal Meister, Corporal Lafierre and Trooper Grenier.²⁴

This action witnessed the first Canadian casualties of the Turkish invasion. It became evident that the combatants would not respect UN positions. This type of aggressive action against the United Nations was further evidenced when Maple Leaf Manor, a Canadian UN OP, received shell fire resulting in one more Canadian casualty. An attempt was made to evacuate the casualty, Private Casse, through the Turkish lines. This endeavour was unsuccessful. The next attempt at medical evacuation was through the Greek National Guard Lines. On route to Blue Beret Camp, UNFICYP administrative base, the ambulance carrying Private Casse was fired upon. The Canadian Officer in command, escorting the ambulance in another vehicle, immediately gave the order to return fire. This signaled the first instance of Canadian soldiers using force to defend themselves.²⁵

²⁴ *Nicosia Daily Operational Log Sheet*, Serial 194, 20 July 1974.

²⁵ *Ibid.*, Serial 251 and 260.

During the day numerous cease-fires negotiated by the UN were broken within minutes by both sides. An example of attempting to reach agreement on a cease-fire was the negotiation, by UNFICYP, of a local cease fire which was to take effect at 2:00 P.M. The following is typical of the attempt and result:

At approximately 1330 hours we (Canadian Contingent) had what we believed to be a cease-fire, however as events and the Log attest this was not so.²⁶

The records support Beattie's recollections as they report:

1400 - As of presently Mr. Hassan has not heard about the 1400 cease fire

1410 - The cease fire planned for 1400 hours this afternoon has been violated by Turkish Airforces. The cease fire is presently cancelled

1424 - Mr. Hassan is under the impression that the cease fire was only on the Green Line between the TCF and National Guard.²⁷

Whatever the agreement, cease-fires were not complied with and in some cases were used as a pretext to attempt to halt firing from the opposite side. This was a fact which Mr. Hassan made abundantly clear. While stating that he was unaware that a cease-fire had been agreed to, he stated that

²⁶ BGen C.E. Beattie, interview held in Ottawa, Ontario, December 12, 1993.

²⁷ *Nicosia District Daily Operational Log Sheet*, Serials 222, 226, and 230, 20 July 1974.

he was under the impression it was only on the Nicosia Green Line.²⁸ Without wavering, he then demanded protection by the UN from the National Guard. One of numerous examples support this premise of pretext. At approximately 11:00 A.M. Hassan contacted the Joint Operations Centre to advise that there was mortar fire at Orta Keu which resulted in one elderly lady being killed.²⁹ He demanded the UN stop the Greek National Guard from firing. The Canadian Contingent response was an attempt to arrange negotiations at the Turkish Cypriot Fighter local level, but Hassan then declared that CANCON would have to proceed through his office to discuss this with higher authority. However, he further stated that he had no means of communicating with Turkish higher authority.³⁰

As the first day of the invasion ended, the extent of gun fire subsided. Events of the day had witnessed a Turkish invasion from the north with paratroops descending on the Nicosia Plain. During the morning of the 20th, the airport had been bombed; Kyrenia was under assault; and UN Observation Posts had been withdrawn due to heavy fighting and direct fire being brought against them. By mid-afternoon numerous cease-fires had been attempted by the UN. These had

²⁸ *Ibid.*, Serials 164, 168, and 172.

²⁹ *Ibid.*, Serial 164.

³⁰ *Ibid.*, Serial 172.

been violated and, in some instances, totally ignored. By the late hours of the day there was only sporadic gun fire. At 11:45 P.M. the Observation Company was able to report that in their area, all was relatively quiet with the exception of some small arms firing.³¹ What was also evident was the recognition by CANCON, and UNFICYP HQ, that the Turkish objective had been to secure a corridor from Kyrenia to the capital city of Nicosia. From this advanced position the Turkish army could then reinforce its beachhead and strike out east and west. This objective would not be met in Phase I. In New York, the Security Council called on all parties to cease hostilities and work with UNFICYP to maintain a cease fire.³²

5.3 The Ledra Palace Hotel Incident

The National Guard (3 HMC) was also unwilling to evacuate its soldiers from the Ledra Palace Hotel which was located in the southeast portion of the city of Nicosia. During 20-21 July the hotel came under constant fire from both the Turks and the Greeks due to its strategic location. The side which controlled the hotel would overlook the inner city and would be in the position to bring down fire on

³¹ *Ibid.* Serial 324.

³² UN Doc. S/11353, 21 July 1974.

opposing gun emplacements. In the hotel there were over 380 guests, including a large foreign press corps consisting of over 100 persons.³³ The Ledra Palace Hotel was to be the stage for one of the major incidents involving Canadians. The process implemented entailed humanitarian assistance, establishing a UN Protected Area, and eventually a strategic static UN Observation Post.

The Ledra Palace Hotel was the stage for a major CANCON initiative during the first two days of the Cyprus war. This incident, and the Canadian Contingent's response, signalled the shift from peacekeeping by observation to peacekeeping by confrontation. Further, it demonstrated the capability and willingness of the Canadian Contingent to place itself in extreme danger to effect humanitarian assistance under difficult conditions.

At approximately 9:00 A.M., the Joint Operations Centre received instructions from UNFICYP Headquarters to investigate the circumstances which had left civilian guests at the Ledra Palace Hotel frightened and upset.³⁴ This sense of apprehension was precipitated by reported firing on the

³³ LCol D. Manuel, telephone interviews 19 and 20 April 1995.

³⁴ *Nicosia District Daily Operational Log Sheet*, Serial 97, 20 July 1974.

hotel.³⁵ The Joint Operations Centre instructed the Deputy Commanding Officer (DCO), Major G.C. Lewis, to investigate this incident.³⁶ Upon arriving at the hotel, Lewis confirmed that 3 HMC had deployed soldiers to this area and were unwilling to evacuate the premises. However, Lewis was initially successful in obtaining a cessation of hostilities from the local National Guard and word was conveyed to the Turkish Cypriot Fighters to cease its return of fire.³⁷ This cease-fire was short lived. By noon, the Canadian Contingent was again alerted that the civilian guests at the Ledra Palace Hotel were under siege from both sides. LCol Manuel sent instructions through the Joint Operations Centre that he wanted the civilians out of the hotel and that the Liaison Officer to the Leadership should:

tell Mr. Hassan (Turkish Leadership) that we are going to get the civilians at Ledra and that the TCF are not to shoot.³⁸

We are evacuating the civilians from Ledra, confirm with Commander 11 Coy (Greek National Guard) that he will not fire on the Ledra while we are doing it.³⁹

³⁵ LCol Thane Wheeler, telephone interview on 20 April 1995. According to LCol. Wheeler, who was the Liaison Officer between CANCON and UNFICYP HQ, there had been numerous fire fights between Greek National Guards and Turkish troops near the Ledra Palace Hotel. This put civilians and CANCON personnel in the area in extreme danger and Wheeler stated that an order was transmitted to CANCON troops to return fire if fired upon.

³⁶ *Nicosia District Daily Operational Log sheet*, Serial 100, 20 July 1974.

³⁷ *Ibid.*, Serial 104.

³⁸ *Ibid.*, Serial 181.

Although both sides were advised of the Canadian Contingent's intention to immediately evacuate the hotel guests, this action was not effected until the 21st. The reason for this delay was that after LCol Manuel had assembled a small group of twelve soldiers to proceed to the hotel and, as they were preparing to depart the Joint Operations Centre, they were fired upon and the UN convoy remained in place.⁴⁰ After coming under direct fire, CANCON lodged a protest to both sides. It was agreed through negotiations that a local cease-fire would be honoured to permit the Canadian Contingent to evacuate the civilians from the hotel. At approximately 4:30 P.M. the Canadian Contingent initiated the first of a series of actions that resulted in the designation of the area as a UN Protected area. After holding discussions with Col Beattie, it was agreed that Manuel, accompanied by 10 soldiers, would return to the Ledra Palace Hotel to effect a rescue attempt. Manuel's objective was to assess the situation and attempt to declare the area under UN control. Prior to this initiative, Observation Company under command of Major Normand Blacquierre, had reported to the Joint Operations Centre:

³⁹ *Ibid.*, Serial 182.

⁴⁰ *Ibid.*, Serial 202.

Have talked to [the] National Guard senior officer in Ledra and requested them to move out and assured him it [Ledra] will only be occupied by UN. He waits for decision from his superior.⁴¹

According to Blacquierre:

I was ordered to the Ledra Palace Hotel to protect civilians and to ensure that looting by Turkish or Greek forces did not occur. In any case, the Ledra was situated in a strategic location overlooking the centre of the old city, and therefore was important to whomever controlled it. As CANCON took it over it became our responsibility.⁴²

Meanwhile, the Canadian Contingent was in discussions with the Turkish forces on the same matter. It was recorded that:

Ledra Palace is being negotiated to become a UN controlled zone. Turkish Cypriot Fighters have agreed. CO is negotiating now.⁴³

Even with the negotiations, the Greek National Guard was reluctant to leave the Ledra Palace Hotel area. It had been reported that they had set up a mortar position in the parking lot of the Ledra Hotel.⁴⁴ This report was proven to be false. What was evident was that the National Guard was not prepared to move from this area as long as the

⁴¹ *Ibid.*, Serial 281.

⁴² Major N. Blacquierre, telephone interview 18 April 1995.

⁴³ *Nicosia District Daily Operational Log Sheet*, Serial 282, 20 July 1974.

⁴⁴ *Ibid.*, Serial 311.

Turkish Cypriot Fighters (TCF) were in a position to carry out hostile acts. The TCF indicated the same intentions. The guests and journalists remained in the hotel which was now without power and water. It was not until 21 July that the hotel was secured.

This action by the Canadian Contingent was the first of many which resulted in the designation of a UN Protected Zone. The records demonstrate that at 10:00 P.M. on 20 July, the Commanding Officer who had taken 10 soldiers from the Reconnaissance Platoon to the Ledra Palace, had in fact, dictated the outcome. The record states "LEDRA PALACE UNDER UN CONTROL, 1 Sergeant and 10 men."⁴⁵

By mid-morning of 21 July, the Ledra Palace situation had become extremely tense. There had been reports that the Turkish Airforce had bombed areas north of the city and within the city area itself.⁴⁶ As well, mortar fire by the Turkish Cypriot Fighters had been directed at the Ledra Hotel. In fact, the TCF had attempted to get the National Guard to surrender. However, the Officer Commanding (OC) refused.⁴⁷ In the hotel itself, food and water were in short

⁴⁵ *Ibid.*, Serial 293.

⁴⁶ *Nicosia District Daily Operational Log Sheet*, Serial 57, 21 July 1974.

⁴⁷ *Ibid.*, Serial 30.

supply. There was considerable damage to the hotel, and the civilians who were trapped, demanded to be removed. Some of the journalists had begun to leave on their own. This precipitated a strong response from the CANCON Joint Operations Centre; "It is their problem if they leave the hotel."⁴⁸

The National Guard then reinforced its position by deploying a company to the south side of the hotel. These soldiers were highly belligerent and agitated.⁴⁹ In response to this development, the Canadian Contingent was ordered to send a convoy to pick-up and evacuate the hotel guests to the Hilton Hotel.⁵⁰ However, there was an unexpected development. According to BGen Beattie:

A serious snag developed when the National Guard soldiers in the hotel locked all doors and refused to permit anymore civilians to depart. The question of hostages immediately came to mind. This was solved only after the Greek Company Commander, an excitable little man with an AK-47, had been ordered by 3 HMC to release the civilians.⁵¹

This action was aided by the British High Commissioner, Sir Stephen Olver, who used his position and

⁴⁸ *Ibid.*, Serial 66.

⁴⁹ *Ibid.*, Serial 69 and 70.

⁵⁰ *Ibid.*, Serial 70.

⁵¹ BGen C.E. Beattie, interview held in Ottawa, Ontario, 12 December 1993. See *Nicosia District Daily Operational Log Sheet*, Serials 81, 83 and 85, 21 July 1974.

influence to assist in the negotiations with the Cypriot Ministry of the Interior. Foreign embassies were required to confirm the status of their own nationals, therefore Olver used this pretext to become involved and this aided in diffusing a tense situation.⁵² During this period, a convoy of vehicles was dispatched from the area of the Hilton Hotel to the Ledra Palace to effect the evacuation. At 2:30 P.M. a convoy of 54 trucks, 1 bus, 2 mini-buses, and 10 civilian cars headed from the Ledra Palace Hotel and made its way under CANCON escort to the Hilton Hotel.⁵³

The next challenge confronting the Canadian Contingent was the requirement to have the National Guard evacuate the premises of the hotel, and then declare the hotel a United Nations Protected Area. Negotiations to achieve this objective were continually obstructed by 3 HMC until approximately 4:00 P.M. At this time, Captain I.A. Nicol, the Liaison Officer, reported to the Joint Operations Centre that the commander of the National Guard had suddenly agreed to evacuate the hotel. The Log Sheet records that "[the] National Guard agree not to fire on the Green Line and will withdraw personnel from Ledra Palace if UN occupies it now".⁵⁴

⁵² *Ibid.*, Serial 95.

⁵³ *Ibid.*, Serial 121.

⁵⁴ *Ibid.*, Serial 137.

This turn of events was somewhat startling considering the National Guard's previous intransigence. As the Canadian Contingent was already focusing its efforts securing the hotel objective, orders were immediately transmitted directing that Observation Company was to immediately occupy the premises with 10-15 persons and establish Ledra as a UN designated zone.⁵⁵ A local cease-fire was arranged to permit the Greek National Guard to evacuate the premises. At 4:44 P.M., UNFICYP HQ was informed that the Ledra Palace Hotel was under UN occupation. The Canadian Contingent had placed a UN flag and a UN Observation Post on the roof and had dispatched one platoon to secure the ground floor and another to patrol the grounds.⁵⁶

As the UN secured the building, the Turk Cypriot Fighters opened fire on the hotel. The Canadian Contingent was concerned that this action would negate the evacuation by the National Guard. Colonel Beattie negotiated with the Turk Cypriot Fighters. They were willing to cease firing on that location. However, at the same time, the Greek Company Commander abruptly stood his ground and refused to leave the area demanding that the TCF stop firing. The 3 HMC Liaison

⁵⁵ *Ibid.*

⁵⁶ *Ibid.*, Serial 140.

Officer and a Greek interpreter arrived on the scene and clarified the situation. After much negotiation regarding the safety of the Greek troops, they finally left the immediate area. According to an eyewitness:

The Captain then tried to round up his forty strong company from all over the hotel and kept insisting that he would not leave if the Turks started firing. The CO offered to hold his hand and walk down the road with him if he so wished!⁵⁷

No sooner had the National Guard vacated the hotel, the Liaison Officer to the vice-president's Office, informed the Joint Operations Centre of an imminent Turkish air attack on the hotel. This warning was given to the Liaison Officer by the vice-president's office as the Turks believed that it was a Greek held strategic position.⁵⁸ By 6:00 P.M. all personnel, except a Reconnaissance Section which was located in the basement of the hotel, had left the immediate area. The vice-president's office stated that it could not halt this air attack as it was controlled from Ankara. This situation caused great concern to the Joint Operations

⁵⁷ Letter from Ian A. Nicol dated March 21, 1980, to BGen C.E. Beattie. Major Nicol was the Liaison Officer to the 3 HMC and wrote to BGen Beattie and gave his impression of the activities as they had occurred. His recollections are substantiated by Beattie as well as by the *Nicosia District Daily Operational Log Sheet* of 20-21 July 1974.

⁵⁸ *Nicosia District Daily Operational Log Sheet*, Serials 148 and 149, 21 July 1974.

Centre. Col Beattie contacted the VPO and demanded that the proposed air attack be terminated. According to Beattie:

I called the Turkish Ambassador, Mr. Inhan and stated that as the Commander of the Canadian Contingent I could assure him that there were no Greeks but only 10 Canadians in the basement of the Ledra Palace Hotel. Therefore he had to call off the imminent air attack. Ambassador Inhan told me that the air attack could not be called off for Ankara controlled this mission but I told him that if their forces were as professional as they claimed to be they would have a Forward Air Controller deployed and they could call off the attack in a matter of a few minutes. Inhan responded by stating he would do what he could but could not give any assurances. I then told him that if the attack was carried out that I would personally hold him responsible. Anyway the attack did not happen.⁵⁹

The attack was not carried out against the hotel and the Joint Operations Centre reported that Turkish aircraft had veered from the city area and dropped their bomb load outside Nicosia.⁶⁰

Beattie's actions were witnessed by LCol Manuel:

I talked to Beattie about the Turkish threat to bomb the Ledra Palace and my main concern was that we [CANCON] had personnel in that building. Beattie stated that he would attempt to call the Turkish Ambassador and have him call off the attack as only UN personnel were in the hotel. After a short time we saw a jet flying towards the city and then it just

⁵⁹ BGen Beattie, interview held in Ottawa, Ontario, 23 January 1994.

⁶⁰ *Nicosia District Daily Operational Log Sheet*, Serial 153, 21 July 1974.

veered off and dropped its bombs north of the city. I guess Beattie was successful in getting the Turks not to bomb the hotel.⁶¹

The remainder of the day was relatively quiet and no real advances by the Turks had been observed, although they had secured a corridor to the sea.

What had become evident was that UNFICYP, and especially the Canadian Contingent, was not prepared to retreat into their bases of operations and allow the two combatants to destroy each other or allow the indiscriminate harming of civilians. As well, the UN approached its response in a systematic manner once the Turkish objective became clear. By forcing itself on the Green Line and remaining in its UN Observation Posts, although withdrawing some and establishing others, the UN became a third player in the scenario. By forcing itself onto the scene at the Ledra Palace Hotel and establishing mobile patrols, UNFICYP effectively dictated what its role would be. As the original mandate was nullified, the force used the provision of humanitarian assistance and the attempt to secure cease-fires, which were called for by the Security Council, as the basis for its involvement. This approach to events resulted in establishing a UN protected Area and the provision of

⁶¹ LCol D. Manuel, telephone interviews 19 and 20 April 1995,

humanitarian assistance to whoever required such services. As BGen Beattie indicated: "We were not just going to stand by and do nothing. If we did not respond, the UN influence on the island would be non-existent."⁶² This is confirmed by Major Blacquierre:

The Canadian Contingent did the right thing by putting itself between the two warring forces, as this action resulted in slowing down some portions of the Turkish advance. We had to do something and withdrawing into base camps was not even considered. We were trying to minimize casualties and lessen the suffering all around us...If we withdrew, it was all over.⁶³

LCol T. Wheeler also recalled:

The aggressive actions ordered by Beattie and Manuel were all that stood in the way of the advancing Turks. Withdrawing would have been catastrophic. As Liaison Officer to UNFICYP HQ, I was in a position to view events from a wide perspective and if CANCON had not been aggressive in positioning itself as it did, the influence and credibility of the UN would have been destroyed.⁶⁴

The Ledra Palace Hotel incident had aspects of humanitarian aid. Throughout the war, this type of assistance would be rendered by all components of UNFICYP and, in the Nicosia District, the Canadian Contingent

⁶² BGen Beattie, interview held in Ottawa, Ontario, 13 January 1994.

⁶³ Major N. Blacquierre, telephone interview 18 April 1995.

⁶⁴ LCol. T. Wheeler, telephone interview 20 April 1995.

performed this assistance unselfishly. One such example was assistance provide to civilians in the area surrounding the British High Commission on 21 July. Derek Day, a Counsellor at the British High Commission, contacted Colonel Beattie and informed him that a pregnant woman and five children were under fire near the High Commission area. Day requested that the Canadian Contingent render assistance to extradite these people from their precarious situation. In addition to these people, there were families of the British delegation who required extraction from that same area. OBSN COY was dispatched to the area with vehicles to implement the evacuation and provide safety to civilians. By mid-day this humanitarian assistance had been successfully accomplished.⁶⁵ During the first two days of fighting, UNFICYP had been able to evacuate over 400 people from areas of intense fighting to the Sovereign Base Area of Dhekelia for transport to the United Kingdom.⁶⁶ These types of actions were to become

⁶⁵ *Nicosia District Daily Operational Log Sheet*, Serials 37, 39, 40 and 51, 21 July 1974.

⁶⁶ *The Times*, 21 July 1974, p. 1. In a letter from the British High Commissioner, Sir. S.J.L. Olver to the Canadian Ambassador T. Paul Malone, dated 23 January 1975, Olver officially acknowledged the Canadian Contingent's efforts in evacuating British High Commission personnel from probable injury. Sir Olver singled out Colonel Beattie's actions in diffusing a critical situation and extracting innocent civilians from danger. In this same letter Sir Olver stated that Colonel Beattie, " Had shown courage on many occasions - outstanding being the instance when he walked across the open, under fire, to halt the threatened Turkish Army attack on Nicosia Airport." This letter supports the Operational

commonplace throughout the invasion period. Following the war, UNFICYP facilitated the exchange of prisoners of war.

On 22 July, UNFICYP undertook one of its largest humanitarian efforts in the Kyrenia area. Major Peter Gill, British Contingent, was ordered by the Chief of Staff, Brigadier Frank Henn, to mobilize a UN Force and prepare a contingency plan to evacuate the tourists around the Kyrenia area.⁶⁷ The initial compliment consisted of 26 soldiers with four landrovers and four armoured cars. On the morning of 23 July, Major Gill met with Colonel Hunter, British Forces, and the British High Commissioner who informed him that clearance from the Greeks and Turks had not yet been granted for this humanitarian mission. However, the High Commissioner felt that the rescue attempt should proceed as planned. Initially, it was hoped that the tourists would be evacuated by sea. This proved impossible and it was now planned that helicopters from H.M.S. HERMES would be used to ferry tourists to the vessel.

Log Sheet and UN documents in regard to events at the airport on 23 July 1974. (See page 206).

⁶⁷ UN Nicosia Report by Major Peter Gill on UNFICYP Operations in Kyrenia and Dome Hotel July/August 1974.

After making its way to Tjiklos Camp in the north, the UN convoy found 200 tourists awaiting evacuation. The majority were Greek nationals. As Major Gill writes:

My brief had been that neither Greek nationals nor Turkish nationals nor any Cypriots would be allowed to be evacuated....therefore I had to tell them to wait and only those other nationals in the immediate area of Tjiklos were allowed to move down to the 6 mile beach.⁶⁸

While at Tjiklos, a Wessex helicopter from H.M.S. HERMES arrived and transported Major Gill to the ship. After discussions with the Captain of the British vessel, it was determined that the road running along 6 mile beach would be designated as the lift-off area. UNFICYP presence would be required to ensure that no incidents developed which could jeopardize this action. Tourists were gathered and delivered to this area. Major Gill proceeded to the Dome Hotel in Kyrenia where other tourists had gathered. A helicopter landing zone was established near the hotel and tourists were evacuated by helicopter.

Throughout the remainder of the day, the UN convoy initiated sweeps east to west from Kyrenia to local points in order to gather tourists requiring evacuation. The complete evacuation numbered a total of 1630 tourists whose

⁶⁸ UN Nicosia Report by Major Peter Gill on UNFICYP Operations in Kyrenia and Dome Hotel August 1974.

safety had been assured through the cooperative efforts of UNFICYP, British Forces resources, and the British High Commission. This humanitarian effort was one of the largest undertaken during the conflict.⁶⁹

During 22 July, there was a constant barrage of mortar shells in most areas under attack, supplemented by fire fights. Turkish airforces continued to overfly Nicosia and strafe the area. The runway at the Nicosia Airport was severely damaged.⁷⁰ Other parts of the island were also under fire.

In the Kyrenia District, heavy fighting had been reported with the National Guard retreating towards Bellapais in UN vehicles. These had been commandeered from the Finnish UN soldiers at gunpoint.⁷¹ In Famagusta, sporadic small arms firing as well as medium and heavy artillery fire was reported throughout the area. UN OPs Ayios Theodoros and Skarinou had been withdrawn.⁷² In Limassol, British civilians were reported to have been evacuated to Episkopi under local UN supervision. All UN Observation Posts had

⁶⁹ *Ibid.*

⁷⁰ *Nicosia District Daily Operational Log Sheet, 22 July 1974.*

⁷¹ *Nicosia District Daily Operational Log Sheet, 21 July 1974.*

⁷² *UNFICYP HQ Operations Briefing, 21 July 1974.*

been withdrawn and the area remained quiet. In the Lefka District it was reported that the National Guard had concentrated a heavy attack on Kokkina and there was fighting in the area of Limnitis and Xeros. Turkish Cypriots had been observed evacuating the village of Selemani. All UN OPs in this area had been withdrawn at first light of the morning of the 21st.⁷³

Meanwhile, in Nicosia, a UN initiated cease-fire was to take effect at 4:00 P.M. on 22 July. Two Canadian Contingent scout cars were detained by Turkish Cypriot Fighters who declared that the Green Line no longer existed and therefore the UN had no right of passage.⁷⁴ Although detained by the Turkish forces, by 6:00 P.M. the Canadian UN patrol was able to extract itself from this predicament. Throughout the remainder of the day sporadic fire was evident and the Greek National Guard agreed to hold their fire during the night. The Turks appeared to be willing to do the same thing.⁷⁵ This cease-fire was maintained in the Chimo Club district but elsewhere, clashes continued.

⁷³ *Ibid.*

⁷⁴ *Nicosia District Daily Operational Log Sheet, Serial 115, 22 July 1974.*

⁷⁵ *Ibid.*, Serial 143.

What became obvious was that both sides were willing to allow the United Nations to attempt cease-fires at the local level. This was a type of de facto recognition of the UN presence and its growing role. Neither side may have liked the presence of the UN, but both appreciated the efforts. Particularly if one side was under heavy attack and the Canadian Contingent appeared and was able to get a cessation of hostilities, even if only for a very short period. By the end of the 3rd day of the war, the UN and especially the Canadian Contingent, had imposed itself on an extremely dangerous situation and was prepared to risk casualties to effect cease-fires along the Green Line. What CANCON had accomplished was astonishing considering the number of troops at its disposal. This accomplishment by the Canadian Contingent was recognized by both the UNFICYP FORCE Commander and the Special Representative of the Secretary-General for Cyprus. General Prem Chand radioed to the Duty Officer at the Joint Operations Centre:

First: I wish to express to you and all those under your command my thanks and appreciation for what you have done during these past difficult days often under fire and dangerous conditions. Please convey to all on my behalf and the SRSG (Special Representative of the Secretary-General) our compliment of their efficient cheerful and devoted action which bring great credit on UN and country concerned [Canada].

Second: Cease-fire from 22 1600 (hrs) Jul 74 between National Guard and Turks.

Third: Now entering a new phase in which many dangers still exist. It is therefore imperative that UNFICYP makes renewed and energetic efforts to maintain effectiveness of cease-fire to continue its task in [the] prevention of inter-communal conflict while at the same time doing all it can in the humanitarian field to help the people of Cyprus at this unhappy time.⁷⁶

The remarks by Prem Chand indicate that the aggressive actions taken by the Canadian Contingent were supported by the UN. As well, UNFICYP was entering a new phase and this would be proven by events centred at the airport over the next few days. As for the cease-fire, small arms fire continued unabated and, on 23 July, full scale fighting resumed.

During the day, it was reported that Greece had given Turkey an ultimatum that stated: "If Turkish Forces are not withdrawn from Cyprus within 48 hours, Greece will declare

⁷⁶ *Ibid.*, Serial 183. In a telephone interview with Mr. George Sherry on 18 April 1995, the former advisor to the Secretary-General K. Waldheim and to under-Secretary-General Political Affairs, B. Urquhart, stated that UN Headquarters had discussions with Prem Chand on 21 July 1974. Mr. Sherry stated that instructions were given to Prem Chand that the force could not participate in the fighting since the original mandate did not apply to Turkey but only to the two Cypriot communities. According to Sherry, the first responsibility of the UN force was to protect civilians and prevent casualties, as much as possible. In other words, the humanitarian aspect of UNFICYP was to continue. As will be seen, UNFICYP, especially CANCON, did not become involved as a belligerent; however, it did hold its ground.

war on Turkey".⁷⁷ Although appearing to give no room for misunderstanding, Greece followed this statement by declaring that a cease-fire would be accepted if the Turkish forces returned to their enclaves in order that a political solution could be rendered. Turkey refused this offer by Greece and continued to consolidate its position.

The Canadian government was not prepared to order the withdrawal of its forces from Cyprus. Beattie states that daily reports on the situation were sent to National Defence Headquarters in Ottawa to General J.A. Dextraze, Chief of Defence Staff. As well, James Richardson, Minister of National Defence, made the following statement in support of the Canadian Contingent on 21 July:

...the presence of the Canadian Contingent continues to provide a degree of stability to the situation on Cyprus and the Contingent has the respect of both Turkish and Greek Cypriots.⁷⁸

This was reinforced by comments made by the UN Secretary-General:

UNFICYP Canadian troops resumed patrols of the Nicosia Green Line using scout cars to facilitate a shaky cease fire and in returning calm to the area.

⁷⁷ *The Times*, July 21 1974, p. 1.

⁷⁸ *The Toronto Globe and Mail*, July 22, 1974, p. 1.

By 1100 hours, UNFICYP had established an Observation Post at the Ledra Palace Hotel...⁷⁹

What the Secretary General had acknowledged was that UNFICYP, through the actions of the Canadian Contingent, had established for the first time in UN Peacekeeping operations history, a UN protected area. This would be followed by similar actions at the Nicosia Airport which was also proclaimed a UN protected area. The airport became the benchmark by which "peacekeeping by confrontation" would be measured.

5.4 The Nicosia Airport: Peacekeeping By Confrontation

The only major event of 22 July occurred in the early hours. A landing by Nord-Atlas transport aircraft was attempted by the Greek Airforce. At first, the Greek National Guard assumed that these were Turkish aircraft and opened fire on them. One aircraft was hit and careened into the airport area and two C119 aircraft that had managed to land were hit by an incoming aircraft. Records indicate that a possible total of seven aircraft had landed and managed to depart safely. Later, it was determined that approximately 200 Greek commandos had been air landed.⁸⁰

⁷⁹ UN Doc. S/11353/Add. 2, 22 July 1974.

⁸⁰ *Nicosia District Daily Operational Log Sheet*, Serials 9-17, 22 July 1974.

The Canadian Contingent's response to events at the Nicosia Airport was the measure by which CANCON was willing to use force to secure a UN Protected Area. This action dictated that confrontational tactics would have to be employed. Not only was it important to secure this area, but it was understood by the Canadian Contingent Commander that, should Turkey successfully establish control over the airport, two outcomes would be readily visible. First, the Turkish Forces could use the airport to reinforce its base of operations and effectively take the city and subsequently, the rest of the island. Second, if Turkey was successful in controlling the airport, UNFICYP could be discounted as having any influence on the outcome of what the Turks called their "intervention". As Turkey was a Guarantor Power, it defined its involvement as intervention, not invasion.

In order to appreciate the sensitivities and complexities surrounding the airport incident, it is necessary to recount the following events. Most of the following information was provided in an interview with BGen Beattie, and his recollections are supported by the Nicosia Daily Log Sheet and by LCol Manuel. Correspondence from various officers, foreign as well as Canadian, who present

at the airport, also support the assertion that the Canadian Contingent played the leading role in implementing peacekeeping by confrontation and securing the airport for UN purposes.

In the early hours of 23 July, the Joint Operations Centre received a report from one of CANCON's mobile patrols. The patrol observed that a Turkish platoon with an armoured car was moving from Yerolakos down the road that led to the airport.⁸¹ Within minutes of receiving this information, Brigadier Frank Henn, Chief of Staff, UNFICYP, held a closed conference with Colonel Beattie. According to Beattie:

Henn came to see me and informed me of the situation. The COS indicated to me that reports had the Turks headed for the airport and that the Turkish Forces had been seen in the area adjacent to Base UNFICYP. He [Henn] asked me to go to the airport and see what I could do about this situation.⁸²

Responding to the Chief of Staff's instructions, Beattie issued orders to his Operations Officer to form a protection party of five soldiers with two jeeps and

⁸¹ *Nicosia District Daily Operational Log Sheet*, Serial 38, 23 July 1974.

⁸² BGen Beattie, interview held in Ottawa, Ontario, 13 January 1994.

weapons. The patrol then headed down the Morphou Road which ran parallel to the airport area.

The patrol made its way to the old traffic control building, in the south east area of the airport. After completing a quick recce (reconnaissance) of the area we headed for Camp UNFICYP which lay just north east of our position. Once we made it to this area I made contact with a British Major by the name of Barker. He informed me that during the morning hours the Turks had cut the Morphou Road and that they had advanced south in what he believed to be in company strength. During their advance they had come under Greek fire. Barker also stated that some vehicles had attempted to proceed on the airport road but they had been unsuccessful. In fact he stated that a Cyprus Airways van had tried to run the road block but had been fired on.⁸³

After making their way to the scene, it was discovered that twelve passengers in the van had been killed. This report was confirmed by the Joint Operations Centre.⁸⁴ From all appearances, the van had attempted to run a Turkish road block. When Beattie evaluated the situation, it became clear that the Turks were going to attempt to overrun the airport facility.

At approximately 11:00 A.M., one battalion of Turkish soldiers with a tank and an Armoured Personnel Carrier was reported proceeding towards the airport.⁸⁵ Beattie was

⁸³ *Nicosia District Daily Operational Log Sheet, Serial 38, 23 July 1974.*

⁸⁴ *Ibid.*, Serial 80.

⁸⁵ *Ibid.*

informed of this situation. At the same time, it was reported to Beattie that a company of Greek National Guards was approaching the airport from the south. Further, it was confirmed that the Greeks had control of the airport buildings. The Canadian Contingent Commander then proceeded towards the Turkish troops to determine their plans. Captain Miles of the British Artillery accompanied Beattie to give the appearance of an international representation. The UN group finally made contact with a company of Turkish National Troops which had been in the area for several hours. Beattie recollects:

I demanded to speak to the Commanding Officer of the Turkish Forces, but as they spoke neither English nor French, this tactic was unsuccessful. After coming under direct fire from the Greeks and obtaining a sheltered position, I spotted several antennas which signaled a possible command post. It was located in an area called Luna Park. Once arriving in that area, it became evident that it was not a command post but a prisoner staging area. The Turks had thirty-five prisoners of varying ages, all sitting on their haunches with their hands behind their heads. At this same time two more vehicles came by and were stopped. Two women, a child and an old man were ordered out of the vehicles. I figured that the Turkish officer was ready to shoot them, so I told him in no uncertain terms that such actions would not be looked on favourably and after some serious discussion he agreed to let them go free under UN escort, which Captain Miles provided.⁸⁶

⁸⁶ BGen Beattie, interview held in Ottawa, Ontario, 13 January 1994.

It was apparent that this action had saved numerous lives and the issue of humanitarian assistance would become a major factor in the ensuing days.

After securing the release of these prisoners, Beattie then contacted Mr. Kirsja, the Counsellor at the Turkish Embassy, by telephone. Beattie requested that he inform the Turkish Officer on the ground to take the UN Deputy Chief of Staff to the Turkish Force Commander. Beattie was then escorted to the Battalion position and upon arrival discovered that three Rifle Companies were preparing to attack the airport. After a few minutes, a UN Protection Team, dispatched by the Joint Operations Centre to Beattie's location, arrived.⁸⁷ This protection team was composed of Captain Miles and Warrant Officer T.H. Walton, and a British Sergeant-Major who spoke German. This fluency in German was necessary as the Turkish Commander spoke no English but had a soldier who spoke German and could therefore converse with the British Sergeant-Major. Beattie advised the Battalion Commander that on the evening of the 22nd there had been declared a cease-fire to which both sides had agreed. As the Turkish officer was unsure of the present situation, the attack was called off at this time. At this point Beattie

⁸⁷ *Nicosia District Daily Operational Log Sheet, Serial 110, 23 July 1974.*

contacted UNFICYP Joint Operations Centre and requested that an officer be sent to the airport building held by the Greek National Guard, in order to establish a communications network.

As noted, the National Guard had approximately 600 soldiers in the airport complex including the control tower. This location gave them a tremendous vision over their field of fire. After a short delay, the Turkish commander ordered his troops to attack the airport. This attack was recorded by the Joint Operations Centre at 11:30 A.M.⁸⁸ Upon reaching open ground, the Turkish forces came under intense fire. For undetermined reasons, they did not bring up their tank for support. The majority of casualties suffered by the Turkish Forces were a result of Greek sniper fire. Although many were only wounded, the vast majority of these soldiers were burned to death. This was a result of ricochets creating fires which were being fanned by southerly winds headed in their direction. Beattie then attempted to negotiate a cease-fire but was rebuffed.⁸⁹ After three attempts to seize the airport had failed, he was successful in negotiating a cease fire. Beattie and the British Sergeant-Major then stated to the Turk Battalion Officer that the area proposed

⁸⁸ *Ibid.*, Serial 85.

⁸⁹ *Ibid.*

for cease fire negotiations was safe and under UN protection. As such, there was no reason to fear Greek fire as the Greeks had agreed to negotiate. According to Walton:

I returned to Col. Beattie who had by this time convinced the Turk Commander to come forward and negotiate. I assured the Turks that the Battalion Commander would be returned safely and I was assured by a Turk that if he didn't return they would come and get him and that they would not forget my face. We proceeded on foot towards the Air Traffic Control tower with the Canadians in front of the Turkish officer. On arrival, approximately halfway between the Morphou Road and the ATC tower, we met a British Brigadier and a Greek Officer who started to negotiate with the Turks.⁹⁰

As a result of the negotiations set up by Beattie and finalized by Brigadier Frank Henn, representing UNFICYP, it was agreed that the Greeks would evacuate the airport and that the UN would occupy it and declare it a Protected Area. As part of the agreement, both sides were to withdraw 500 metres from the airport perimeter. Any infringement by either party would not be tolerated by the UN. At 1247 hours the JOC dispatched CANCON troops to occupy the airport area. The officer in charge of this takeover was Major Dave Harries. As Harries recalls:

I thought it was a mistake to take over the airport. We were being put into an undefendable position.

⁹⁰ Letter to BGen C.E. Beattie from WO T.H. Walton, MMM, CD 22 October 1979.

Should the Turks attack we had nothing to repel the advance with.⁹¹

This assessment is not supported by either the British commander of the 16/5th Lancers who assisted in controlling the airport, or by LCol Manuel, or by the results which ensued. Once the takeover had been completed, the Canadian Contingent established roadblocks at the outside perimeters of both combatants. The casualties sustained by the Turkish forces were then retrieved and dispatched to the Nicosia hospital.

The preceding events outline the measures taken by the Canadian Contingent to secure cease fires and bring about negotiations to achieve this objective. The risks involved appeared not to outweigh the rewards. Again UNFICYP, and in this case the Canadian Contingent, was willing to impose itself between two combatants to not only help reduce casualties but also to secure an area under UN protection which neither side could hold for strategic purposes. The airport, a crucial strategic location, had been neutralized. However, during the night hours of 24-25 July, the Turkish forces would again attempt to take the airport.

⁹¹ Colonel D. Harries , telephone interview held on 29 June 1994.

5.5 CANCON Receives Reinforcements

In New York, Secretary-General Kurt Waldheim stated that he was seeking to expand the force from its present strength of 2300 to approximately 5000. This expansion of the force was in response to a request by the UNFICYP Commander and agreement by the Secretary-General that the existing force was inadequate to meet its added responsibilities.⁹² The countries requested to supply more troops included Britain, Austria, Sweden, and Finland. Although no mention of Canada was made as to providing troops, correspondence between Ottawa and United Nations Headquarters in New York state that Canada did respond by deploying an additional 464 troops to war torn Cyprus.

Colonel Beattie, the Deputy Chief of Staff and Canadian Contingent Commander, had been in contact with the Chief of Defence Staff, General Dextraze, during this period and requested additional troops and equipment be dispatched in order to supplement the existing Canadian troops. On 25 July, Mitchell Sharp, Secretary of State for External Affairs, replied to the UN Secretary-General's request for additional Canadian troops. Sharp wrote to the Secretary-General:

⁹² *The New York Times*, 23 July 1974, p. 17.

In response to your request of July 22, I am pleased to inform you that the Canadian Government has today decided to augment the size of the Canadian Contingent to the United Nations Peacekeeping force in Cyprus.

While the precise details of the size and nature of the augmentation are still being worked out, it is the intention of the Canadian military authorities to bring the Canadian Contingent up to the size and capability of an infantry battalion...It is anticipated that the airlift of the augmentation force to Cyprus can begin within 96 hours...

However, it is clear that as a result of recent developments in Cyprus the circumstances there have changed substantially. These changes will necessarily have implications for the roles and tasks that the Force as a whole and the Canadian Contingent in particular are asked to carry out in the period ahead...⁹³

The size of the additional Canadian force was that of half of an Infantry Battalion, which brought the Canadian Contingent to a total number of 950. The *Nicosia Daily Operational Log Sheet* states the composition of the augmentation was:

- a. Increase 464 all ranks to begin arrival within 96 hours
 - the Airborne Battery
 - Airborne Field Squadron
 - Airborne Service Group
 - 8 Signalers
 - Reconnaissance Troop from the Lord Strathcona Horse (LDSH)

⁹³ *National Archives of Canada*, Letter to the Secretary-General of the United Nations in response to a request for additional troops, File 21-14-6-UNFICYP-8, 25 July 1974.

- b. Increase vehicles by 175 vehicles
 - 7 X Lynx
 - 1 X M577
 - 16 X M113

- c. Equipment
 - 12 X 81 MM Mortar
 - 8 X 106 RR⁹⁴

With its existing force, and the increase in manpower and equipment, the Canadian Contingent would become more proficient in carrying out its various tasks.

5.6 The Canadian Contingent and The Use of Force

In his report to the Security Council of 23 July 1974 on the Cyprus situation, the Secretary-General outlined events as they had occurred. In the airport area there was fighting which had been halted by 12:30 P.M. as a result of a locally initiated cease fire. It was in this report that the Secretary-General reinforced the premise that there now existed UN Protected areas. The Security Council agreed with the following announcement from UNFICYP Headquarters:

⁹⁴ *Nicosia District Daily Operational Log Sheet, Serial 14, 26 July 1974.* It should be noted that the equipment dispatched to CANCON had to be taken from Canadian NATO stockpiles that were held in Germany. This information was given to the author in the summer of 1993 by General Dextraze, the Chief of Defence Staff during the 1974 crisis period.

The United Nations Force in Cyprus is taking over the Nicosia International Airport temporarily after a new and serious breach of the cease fire earlier this morning in the vicinity of the airport. The airport thus becomes a United Nations internationally protected area. This will at the same time facilitate the arrival of reinforcements for UNFICYP.⁹⁵

In addition to the situation around the airport, the Secretary-General described the hostile activities by the Turkish forces in the area of Camp Kronberg, where Canadian troops were stationed. These events involving Canadian troops had an influence on Canada's decision to augment its forces and equipment in Cyprus as evidenced by Mitchell Sharp's correspondence to the UN Secretary-General on 25 July 1974.

At 11:36 A.M. Camp Kronberg reported that a Turkish platoon had moved south along the camp perimeter. At the same time, a Greek National Guard platoon was observed at the front entrance of the UN camp. Within minutes the Turks had been sighted by the Greeks moving swiftly in the direction of the British High Commission complex, directly north of Camp Kronberg and west of the Pedhios River.⁹⁶ Within 30 minutes, ten National Guard soldiers had positioned themselves in an area overlooking the river and

⁹⁵ UN Doc. S/11353/Add. 4, 23 July 1974.

⁹⁶ *Nicosia District Daily Operational Log Sheet*, Serials 89, 90 and 94, 23 July 1974.

were observing the movement of the Turkish forces. At this juncture the Greeks opened fire and the Turks pulled back towards the river where they attempted to cross through the UN compound by seeking asylum. The UN refused this request.⁹⁷

The actions by the Turkish soldiers brought fire to bear on the UN compound and, in order to relieve this pressure, Captain Blacquierre, the camp Commanding Officer, quickly sized up the situation and decided the only course of action was to get the Turks out of the area.⁹⁸ To achieve this objective, the Turks would have to be escorted through the UN camp, then cross the river bed and be sent towards the Turkish lines. The location of the UN compound was strategic and therefore had to be preserved for UN control. The camp was situated near a bridge and whoever held this location, had control over the area. Captain Blacquierre, aware of this fact, determined it would be prudent to remove the Turks which then would give the Greeks no possible excuse to mount an attack on the UN camp. Blacquierre, moved forward to the Turk patrol and advised them that he would lead them out of the area. While discussing this option with the Turks, the Greek soldiers opened fire and four Turks were immediately killed. Blacquierre was severely wounded in

⁹⁷ *Ibid.*, Serial 96.

⁹⁸ Major N. Blacquierre, telephone interview 18 April 1995.

both legs.⁹⁹ Paratrooper Plouffe, who had accompanied Blacquierre was shot in the face while attempting to give aid and comfort to the camp Commanding Officer.

The incident was monitored by the Joint Operations Centre and ordered the UN troops in the camp to rake the area with fire and effect a rescue. The JOC also dispatched two scout cars with automatic weapons to the location in order to prevent the Turks or Greeks from interfering with this medical evacuation.¹⁰⁰ Lieutenant Forand was dispatched with the scout cars and, once at the camp established covering fire to protect his rescue mission. While carrying out his task, he was fired upon by the National Guard. Forand ordered return fire and the Greek troops ceased their actions. The order to return fire by Forand was given by LCol Manuel at the Joint Operations Centre.¹⁰¹ Once the rescue had been completed, LCol Manuel proceeded directly to the location of the National Guard Commander to lodge a complaint against the actions of his troops. A cease fire was established and according to Major Ian Nicol:

Altogether, 400 rounds of .50 cal and 200 rounds of .30 cal were fired and it was thought that a least two soldiers in the [Greek] position were killed. The

⁹⁹ *Nicosia District Daily Operational Log Sheet*, Serial 111, 23 July 1974.

¹⁰⁰ *Ibid.*, Serial 113 and 114.

¹⁰¹ *Ibid.*, Serial 125.

local National Guard Commander of 3 HMC, Colonel Lianis, was repeatedly warned by the CO through the LO that the UN would return fire if either faction fired deliberately aimed shots. The Greek Colonel replied "Of course, I admire your commander; I would do exactly the same thing!"¹⁰²

The result of the use of force by the Canadian Contingent in UNFICYP operations was immediate. BGen Beattie stated that he contacted the Turkish Embassy and informed the Counsellor:

I know what you are trying to do, please do not put me in a position where I have to open fire, because I am going to, if you come.¹⁰³

This warning was forwarded to the Greek National Guard Commander to advise him of the consequences of any attack by either side. Two important precedents had been established. First, should the Canadian Contingent withdraw and allow either the Turks or Greeks to occupy a UN base or protected area, the credibility of the United Nations would be eroded beyond repair. Second, armed resistance by UN forces would be employed should any forced entry be contemplated by either side. This order was issued to the UN force at 2:50 P.M. 23 July 1974.¹⁰⁴

¹⁰² Letter to BGen C.E. Beattie by Major I.A. Nicol 21 March 1980.

¹⁰³ BGen C.E. Beattie, interview held in Ottawa, Ontario, 13 January 1994.

¹⁰⁴ *Nicosia District Daily Operational Log Sheet*, Serial 125, 23 July 1974.

5.7 New Developments in Greece and Cyprus

24 July witnessed new developments in Greece and Cyprus which would have an impact on the situation. The ruling military Junta in Greece had been replaced by a civilian government. The *London Times* reported that Mr. Karamanlis, a former conservative Prime Minister, had agreed to return to Greece from Paris to head a national unity government. The military Junta had stated it wanted professional politicians to form a national unity government in light of the events that were taking place in Cyprus.¹⁰⁵ This change occurred after General Phaedon Ghizikis, the President, had met with eight prominent leaders, including four former Prime Ministers. It was decided that a new government was required as the country was virtually leaderless. A new government could better represent Greece at the Geneva conference scheduled to take up the Cyprus conflict.¹⁰⁶

In Cyprus, Nicos Sampson, the self-proclaimed president of Cyprus, resigned on that same day and was replaced by Glafkos Clerides, the President of the House of

¹⁰⁵ *Times* (London) July 24, 1974, p. 1.

¹⁰⁶ *Ibid.*

Representatives. Clerides was the acknowledged spokesman of the Greek Cypriot community. It was also reported that his appointment as President was only a temporary measure until Makarios was able to return.¹⁰⁷ The impact of these political changes signaled that the new Greek and Greek Cypriot leaders were willing to attend a Peace Conference in Geneva, within the next few days, with the leaders of Turkey to discuss a possible solution to the Cyprus crisis. This shift in the political approach was precipitated by the fact that the Greek National Guard, the Sampson administration, and the Greek Military Junta were incapable of producing a positive military or political settlement in Cyprus.

5.8 The Canadian Contingent Reacts to Turkish Attempts To Take the Airport

In the early hours of 25 July, the Turkish High Command instructed its forces to attempt a seizure of the Nicosia airport. According to George Sherry, former advisor to the Secretary-General, Prem Chand contacted New York and informed them that the Turkish commander had given UNFICYP an ultimatum. The Turks wanted UNFICYP to evacuate the airport premises and turn the complex over to them. In

¹⁰⁷ *The New York Times*, 24 July 1974, p. 1. and see the *Times* (London) 24 July 1974, p. 1.

response, Mr. Sherry inquired as to the composition of the UN force at the airport and was informed that it was under CANCON control. Sherry then indicated to Prem Chand that in view of the fact that a local agreement had been reached on 23 July between UNFICYP and the local Turkish commander, in regard to the airport, the airport should then be considered to have the same status as other UN camps under UN control. In other words, it was considered a UN protected area and would be treated as such by the UN commander.¹⁰⁸

The attempt to take the airport by the Turks stemmed from the fact that the local cease fire and agreement by the Turkish Company Commander had not been authorized by the Turkish Force Commander. This attempt by the Turkish Forces would not be successful. As stated, UNFICYP (the Canadian Contingent) was prepared to use force to safeguard the areas that had been designated UN Protected Areas and the airport was one such area so designated. Colonel Beattie had by this time been appointed coordinator of the defences of all the UN complexes, including the airport, Blue Beret Camp, and Kykko Camp. LCol Manuel, Officer Commanding 1 Commando Group (Canadian), was designated local district commander in charge of the airport defences. According to Beattie, the Turks had re-evaluated their position with regard to the

¹⁰⁸ Mr. G. Sherry, telephone interview 18 April 1995.

airport and had planned to launch an attack against it. In response, Beattie called for additional equipment to be dispatched to the airport and put his forces on alert.¹⁰⁹

This turn of events would solidify the decision to use force by UNFICYP in securing its Protected Areas. Once Beattie was informed of the possibility of a Turkish attack, he proceeded to the airport complex and held discussions with LCol Manuel. As he explained:

I went to see Don Manuel and told him that if they [Turks] come at us, they're going to come here, to the main building, and I don't want to interfere with your command responsibility, but, if anybody has to open fire and there are Canadians involved, then I'd rather it be me than have a subordinate give the order. When you think the thing through, in a peacekeeping operation, the Commander better be up front at the crucial time.¹¹⁰

Once LCol Manuel had his orders, Beattie proceeded directly to UNFICYP HQ and met with the Chief of Staff, Brigadier Henn:

I went to see Henn to make my position very clear. I said to him; look, if you can do anything with your authorities and get them to put pressure on the Turks to stop this, prevent it from even happening, my intention would be the same. But I'll tell one thing,

¹⁰⁹ Nicosia District Daily Operational Log Sheet, Serial 127, 24 July 1974.

¹¹⁰ BGen Beattie, interview held in Ottawa, Ontario, 13 January 1994.

I didn't come to Cyprus to surrender Canadian soldiers to[*#!*]Turks and that's it!¹¹¹

LCol Manuel, although having some reservations about the ability to hold the airport if attacked, stated the following in support of Beattie's proposed course of action:

After discussing the situation confronting us with Beattie, I knew he was going to see Henn and Prem Chand to advise them that they had better talk to whoever they had to and let them know that we [CANCON] were serious about holding the airport. As to the feasibility of holding the airport, it was a hell of a good operation of show force-but I am not sure we could have lived up to it if put to the test. It was bravado in a way, but it worked, especially after being reinforced by Morris and the 16/5th Lancers.¹¹²

Once informed of the Canadian Contingent's decision to use force to repel any Turkish advance on the airport, the Chief of Staff held discussions with the Force Commander, Prem Chand. It was then decided to keep the airport as a UN Protected Area. In order to assist the Canadian Contingent, it was also decided to reinforce the airport with the British 16/5th Lancers from Dhekelia and with other UN contingent personnel from UNFICYP headquarters' staff. According to Sherry, this approach to reinforcing the airport by other UN contingent personnel would give the UN

¹¹¹ *Ibid.*

¹¹² LCol D. Manuel, telephone interviews 19 and 20 April 1995.

force a truly international appearance which would hopefully deter Turkish attempts to take the airport by force. The leading role taken by the Canadian Contingent was therefore supported by the Force Commander and UN Headquarters in New York. This action to use the British 16/5th Lancers was unprecedented as these troops were from a British Sovereign Base Area and were part of the Guarantor Powers. Notwithstanding, according to LCol R.Q.M. Morris, the following took place:

After a fraught period in Dhekalia ...our notice to move was changed from 24 hours to "move in 40 minutes"...from Pergamos to Nicosia at 2000 hours on 24 July 1974...this after we arrived well before the emergency on a normal peacetime posting to SB Dhekelia...B Squadron had Salidins not tracked Scorpions...and they went to war for UNFICYP!

By 2359 hrs I, my adjutant and my Ops Officer, were with Brigadier Frank Henn in his office at HQ UNFICYP being briefed on the situation, receiving a blue Beret and United Nations Badge and being told that we were to join the force in the airport and hold it for the United Nations. We were given an astonishing order -astonishing from the United Nations that is - that we were to open fire on any force attempting to capture it! I tape-recorded this order for Regimental records as it was a racing certainty that the Turks would attack at first light.¹¹³

It was evident that the Canadian Contingent, led by Col Beattie, had set the tone for future actions in that the UN Force Commander would use force to repel any attack on

¹¹³ Letter to BGen C.E. Beattie from LCol R.Q.M. Morris, OBE 16/5L British Army, 21 January 1980.

designated UN Protected Areas. The 16/5th Lancers were deployed armed with 76 millimetre guns, and Harrier aircraft were requested for support. The Canadian Contingent had on hand four 106 recoilless rifles and four heavy machine guns. During the night of 24/25 July, these weapons were continually moved to various points in the airport complex which gave the Turks the impression that the UN force had more weapons than they thought.¹¹⁴

To support this resolve to hold the airport, the Force Commander, Prem Chand, called a press conference and publicly declared that the UN force at the airport had been reinforced by members of other UN contingents and now had an international representation. He also declared that any operation against the UN force by either side would not be tolerated and would be viewed as a hostile act against the UN. Prem Chand's actions were further supported by UN New York. According to Sherry:

I then contacted the Permanent Missions of the UK, the FRG, and the French in order that they should contact Ankara to express their concerns and to persuade Ankara not to attack the Nicosia airport. Along with diplomatic efforts, the UK agreed to deploy aircraft for support to assist CANCON in defending the airport.¹¹⁵

¹¹⁴ BGen C.E. Beattie, interview held in Ottawa, Ontario, 12 January 1994.

¹¹⁵ Mr. G. Sherry, telephone interview 18 April 1995.

What was at stake was the reputation and credibility of the UN, and the two sides realized by 25 July that this UN force would defend itself against any hostile act. Peacekeeping by confrontation had been initiated by the Canadian Contingent.

Colonel Beattie, as the Canadian Contingent Commander, had insisted that his troops would not abandon the airport position and would be willing to use force to maintain and secure the facility. Once this decision was reached, UNFICYP Headquarters was forced into a position of supporting their Contingent Commander or lose credibility within its own structure. This support was immediate as witnessed by the orders by the Chief of Staff to LCol Morris of the 16/5th Lancers. Further, the call up of air support from British Harriers meant that the situation was most serious, and that UNFICYP had to defend the position or "fold its tent and go home". This stand, led by the Canadian Contingent, dictated future responses in Cyprus. The anticipated Turk attack never materialized. Subsequent events strongly support the conclusion that this was strictly the result of the Canadian Contingent willing to use force to secure its area of responsibility.

This approach to peacekeeping by confrontation provided the impetus to use this tactic along the Green Line in the city of Nicosia. As previously described, the events surrounding the Camp Kronberg incident of the same day, had resulted in this area being secured for UN purposes. Between 25-29 July, several other incidents occurred which reinforced this approach to peacekeeping and attempting to hold cease fire lines. One such incident occurred on 27 July in the area of the Nicosia Race Course. The Turkish forces repeatedly made aggressive movements forward within the city, and Clerides, the acting Cypriot President, had declared that his troops "would take effective counter-measures if Turkish troops did not halt their aggressive moves on Cypriot territory."¹¹⁶

General Prem Chand, the UNFICYP Commander, was contacted by Clerides who charged that Turkish forces had advanced to an area south of Geunyeli during the previous night. He informed Prem Chand that, should the Turkish forces continue and not be halted by the UN, he would order his troops to open fire.¹¹⁷ Prem Chand then directed Beattie to investigate this alleged breach of the cease fire.

¹¹⁶ *The Times*, July 27, 1974, p. 1.

¹¹⁷ BGen C.E. Beattie, interview held in Ottawa, Ontario, 13 January 1994.

Beattie recalled that he went to the area with a protection team and discovered elements of a Turkish advance in the area of the Race Course.¹¹⁸ Upon arriving he ordered that UN troops from the Finnish Contingent be deployed immediately to his position. Canadian Contingent tactics of confrontation would be employed by other UN contingents. While performing a reconnaissance, Beattie discovered Greek and Turkish troops facing each other and preparing to make contact:

I said that if I received assurances that they [Greeks] would not open fire, the UN would remove the Turkish forces from the area. The Greek officer agreed to hold his fire and I advanced forward to the Turkish position. Once in the Turkish area I emphasized to the Turks that a cease fire which their government and military headquarters had agreed to, was being violated. I strongly stated to the Turk Platoon Commander; "I'm going to have you shot if you don't stop this [advance] right now! Also, I demand to see your Commander, and you stop right here until your Commander tells you what to do."¹¹⁹

Subsequently a UN flag was planted in the ground to emphasize that this area was now under UN control. Within a short time, a vehicle approached and Beattie was transported to the Turkish Battalion Commander's headquarters in Geunyeli.¹²⁰ Upon arriving Beattie informed the Turk

¹¹⁸ *Nicosia District Daily Operational Log Sheet*, Serial 28, 27 July 1974.

¹¹⁹ BGen C.E. Beattie, interview held in Ottawa, Ontario, 13 January 1994.

¹²⁰ *The Toronto Globe and Mail*, August 1, 1974, p. 1.

Commander of the cease fire violation. Beattie states that he informed him that if he was prepared to halt the Turkish advance, the UN would erect a UN Observation Post to keep the Greeks and Turks from coming into contact with each other. Beattie emphasized the sensibility of this as it would allow politicians to work out differences without any military incidents to distract them.¹²¹

This proposal was accepted by both sides and a Canadian UN OP was erected on the location near the Race Course. This approach to forcible peacekeeping was not unusual during this period. Although it had the appearance of theatrics, it became necessary in order to provide proof positive to both sides that, first, the UN was in command of cease fire arrangements, and second, confrontational tactics would be utilized to demonstrate UN resolve in holding their positions.

5.9 First UNFICYP Contact With The Turkish Force Commander

During the opening days of the war, UNFICYP Headquarters had attempted to establish contact with the Turk invasion Force Commander, Lieutenant-General Nvrettin

¹²¹ BGen C.E. Beattie, interview held in Ottawa, Ontario, 13 January 1994.

Ersin. Only on 26 July was it agreed that a meeting between Major-General Prem Chand and Lt-Gen Ersin would take place. As the Turkish Force's presence in Cyprus became more pronounced and as UNFICYP attempted to interpose itself in order to stabilize the situation, the requirement for face to face meetings between the Turk Force Commander and UNFICYP Commander became imperative. As stated, initial approaches by UNFICYP were unsuccessful, but finally the Turkish High Command agreed to a meeting.

On 26 July, Prem Chand was invited to meet with the Turk Force Commander at 6:00 P.M. The location for this meeting was in the southern outskirts of the Village of Boghaz at a privately owned residence. In attendance were; Major-General Prem Chand, Commander UNFICYP; Lieutenant-General Nvrettin Ersin, Commander-in-Chief Turkish Forces; Ambassador Asaf Inhan, Turkish Ambassador; Colonel C.E. Beattie, Deputy Chief of Staff UNFICYP; Colonel M. Katircioglu, Commander Turkish National Contingent; Colonel Nezihi Cakar, Turkish Forces Liaison Officer; and Major I. Beris, Assistant Turkish Liaison Officer.¹²²

¹²² *UNFICYP Minutes of Meeting Between Turkish Senior Commander and UNFICYP Force Commander, Cyprus 26 July 1974.* These Minutes of the meeting are part of BGen Beattie's private papers.

The UNFICYP personnel gathered at the Turkish Embassy and were escorted to the location of the meeting. According to the report:

Upon our arrival Major-General Prem Chand expressed his appreciation for the opportunity to meet the Commander Turkish Forces at this critical time when both were heavily committed in the pursuit of their duties. He [Prem Chand] went on to explain UNFICYP's mission in Cyprus noting that although he had a relatively small force, he believed that UNFICYP could help in restoring peace. He emphasized the need for a peaceful settlement and that UNFICYP was anxious to do all that could be done in pursuing the realization of this objective.¹²³

Lt. General Ersin replied that his forces also had the same objective as UNFICYP, that being to ensure peace in Cyprus, and that was the reason why his force had landed.¹²⁴ This remark is somewhat surprising as it was the Turks who invaded. However, during the whole operation the stance that they had only fulfilled their responsibilities under the Treaty of Guarantee was continually put forward as justification for their actions. Prem Chand went on to suggest that in order to effect a peaceful solution to the crisis, an exchange of liaison officers along with required communications between the respective headquarters, be established. Ersin then agreed and designated Colonel Cakar and Major Beris as contacts through the Turkish Embassy in

¹²³ *Ibid.*

¹²⁴ *Ibid.*

Nicosia. This designation of Cakar would be of benefit in the days to follow. When both sides agreed to a meeting in Geneva to discuss a solution to the present conflict, a Tripartite Committee was established to delineate Forward Defensive Lines (FDL) and both Beattie and Cakar would represent their respective headquarters. Thus a personal communication relationship was established which proved beneficial during these negotiations (see following chapter).

Prem Chand went on to indicate that UNFICYP might be able to establish a buffer zone between the two combatants to assist in halting hostilities but would require the location and disposition of Turkish troops to implement such a strategy. Ersin replied that his troops were "badly mixed up and that it was difficult to give exact locations at the moment."¹²⁵ Further, Ersin stated that conditions over the whole island would have to be reviewed and that Ankara would make the final decision. The Turkish Commander further stated that his aim was to safeguard the lives and property of Turkish Cypriots and if the UN could guarantee that Turkish villages would be returned to Turkish control, then there might be hope for a solution.

¹²⁵ *Ibid.*

At this point, Ersin declared that he wanted to see Turkish villages returned to the state that they had been in prior to the intervention. Prem Chand, concerned about all Cypriot villages responded, "Would the Commander-in-Chief Turkish Forces like to say the same of the Greek villages located in Kyrenia District?"¹²⁶ According to the records, Ersin made no reply. The meeting produced no visible results except contact being made and respective positions being drawn. In reviewing this document, Ersin made a statement which appears to suggest that previous days activities at the airport and Ledra were on his mind. When questioned about this, Beattie recalled: "General Ersin stated that the security of UN personnel and their equipment would be respected and gave direction to that effect."¹²⁷

The United Nations stand at these locations had been known to Ersin as communication between his headquarters and local commanders had been established. In addition, he was aware of the two airport incidents which first saw UNFICYP occupy the facility and then declare that force would be used to keep it. It is therefore probable that Ersin was acknowledging that the UN would be a force which had to be inserted in the Turkish equation for military and political

¹²⁶ *Ibid.*

¹²⁷ BGen Beattie, interview held in Ottawa, Ontario, 13 January 1994.

planning purposes. This interpretation will be supported by events that transpired between 1-18 August 1974.

Between 29 July and 13 August, there were several minor incidents which occurred along the total Green Line and these advances were either checked or reported by UNFICYP. This is not to downplay the seriousness of the situation, but it appeared that the Turks were now consolidating their positions and using this lull to reinforce their personnel and equipment. On 29 July it was announced by the Turkish and Greek government representatives in Geneva that discussion to find a political solution would also entail demarcation of military lines in Cyprus as of 31 July 1974. During these negotiations situations arose which would force UNFICYP to make immediate judgments to secure local cease-fires. These events will be addressed in the following chapter.

5.10 Conclusion

As a consequence of the events outlined in this chapter, UNFICYP, especially the Canadian Contingent, was faced with a new situation that was not foreseen in its original mandate. UNFICYP was established to control inter-communal conflict and not to react to large-scale

hostilities resulting from an invasion by a state that was a Guarantor Power under the London and Zurich Treaties of 1960. When Turkish landings occurred on the morning of 20 July, UNFICYP responded by going on full alert. Once the invasion took place and UNFICYP interposed itself between the combatants, its original mandate was nullified. This argument is supported by General J. de Chastelain, a later Chief of the Defence Staff, who stated:

In July 1974, the Turkish intervention essentially negated the mandate of UNFICYP, as outlined in March 1964, by the Security Council...With the intervention, the original mandate no longer applied and UNFICYP's temporary role consisted mainly in giving humanitarian assistance and easing suffering where possible. In addition, there was the designation of UN protected zones. UNFICYP was no longer there to assist in bringing back the island to normal conditions, but to carry out humanitarian assistance whenever and wherever possible. After Cyprus was effectively divided, with Turkish forces holding 40% of the island (the northern half), UNFICYP's role was changed.¹²⁸

In rendering humanitarian assistance, UNFICYP enlarged its role in this area by evacuating foreign nationals to the Sovereign Base Area at Dhekelia. Furthermore, UNFICYP (the Canadian Contingent) removed 386 civilians from the Ledra Palace Hotel to the safety of the Hilton Hotel. Patrols were also dispatched in the north to maintain a close watch over

¹²⁸ General John de Chastelain, Chief of Defence Staff, interview held in Ottawa, Ontario, 9 March 1994.

the battle area and all possible efforts to promote the safety of civilians was undertaken.

UNFICYP (CANCON) also endeavoured to assist in the cessation of hostilities by arranging local cease-fires to supplement those called for by the Security Council. Additional UN Observation Posts were established while others were withdrawn due to heavy conflict situations or as a result of direct fire against these unfortified positions. The development with regard to the Ledra Palace Hotel and the Nicosia International Airport established, for the first time in UN operational history, UN designated Protected Areas under UN control, and the willingness by the UN to use force to secure these areas from attack. This action set a precedent for future operations in Cyprus which will be dealt with in an upcoming of this study.

During this period it quickly became evident that the size of the UN Force required augmentation. Contributing countries assisted in this endeavour. Colonel Beattie contacted General Dextraze in Ottawa and strongly requested that reinforcements be deployed along with armour in order to carry out new functions by CANCON previously described. Overall, the Canadian Contingent UNFICYP reacted in a positive manner and, once the initial shock of events had

been absorbed, there emerged a strategic approach to confront both sides and help secure cease-fires as directed by the United Nations Security Council. The events outlined demonstrate that UNFICYP, with Canadian Contingent leadership in certain circumstances, redefined the practice of peacekeeping. Additionally, these actions were supported by the Canadian government as they readily agreed to augment the Canadian Contingent with personnel and equipment and there is no record of the government disagreeing with the actions taken by Beattie. As for UN headquarters, they supported UNFICYP by reinforcing the actions taken at the Ledra Palace Hotel and the airport by officially declaring them UN Protected Areas.

Between the phase of the Turkish invasion and the outbreak of the Turkish forces from their established beachhead, UNFICYP was to play a prominent role in delineating forward defensive lines of both combatants. As Deputy Chief of Staff UNFICYP, Colonel Beattie would play a major role in the Tripartite cease-fire negotiations which would help propel the history of UNFICYP into its second phase.

CHAPTER 6

TRIPARTITE CEASE-FIRE NEGOTIATIONS

JULY 30 - AUGUST 9

By 30 July the first phase of the Turkish invasion of Cyprus had been completed. The Turkish army had established a beachhead in the area of the northern city of Kyrenia and was reinforcing its defensive positions. Previously, on 20 July, the Security Council had passed Resolution 353 that called upon all parties for a cease-fire and an immediate end of foreign military personnel in Cyprus other than those under the authority of international agreements. The resolution also called on Greece, Turkey, and Great Britain to begin negotiations for the immediate observance of peace.¹

In response to the Security Council Resolution, the Foreign Ministers of Greece, Turkey, and Great Britain agreed to meet in Geneva to discuss the situation. Attending the discussions as an observer was Mr. Guyer, the Under-Secretary-General for Special Political Affairs. One of his responsibilities was to bring into the discussions, the role

¹ UN Doc. S/11353, 21 July 1974.

of UNFICYP as it related to the present crisis and its role in the future. As a result of these discussions, the main antagonists agreed to halt further aggression and discuss demarcation lines (Forward Defence Lines) in order to allow political discussions to continue in Geneva during the period of 30 July to 9 August. To achieve this demarcation of Forward Defence Lines (FDL) the Foreign Ministers of Greece, Turkey, and the United Kingdom agreed to establish a Tripartite Committee of the three Guarantor Powers and a United Nations representative.² The activities of the Tripartite Demarcation Team were to be based on the declaration of 30 July by the Foreign Ministers of Greece, Turkey, and the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland. The Foreign Ministers' declaration called for participation by UNFICYP in the deliberations which were to follow. Certain tasks envisaged for UNFICYP were included in paragraph 2 and 3 of the Declaration which stated in part:

Declaration by the Foreign Ministers of Greece,
Turkey, and The United Kingdom of Great Britain and
Northern Ireland

2. The three Foreign Ministers declared that in order to stabilize the situation, the areas in the Republic of Cyprus controlled by opposing armed forces on 30 July 1974 at 2200 hours should not be extended; they called on all armed forces, including irregular

² UN Doc. Geneva Declaration by Turkey, Greece, and the United Kingdom, Geneva, July 30, 1974.

forces, to desist from all offensive or hostile activities.

3. The three Ministers also concluded that the following measures should be put into immediate effect:

(a) Security zones of sizes to be determined by representatives of Greece, Turkey and United Kingdom in consultation with UNFICYP should be established at the limit of the areas occupied by the Turkish Armed Forces at the time specified in Paragraph 2 above. This zone should be entered by no forces other than those of UNFICYP, which should supervise the prohibition of entry.

Pending the determination of the size and character of the security zone, the existing area between the two forces should be entered by no forces.³

The Committee first met at Headquarters UNFICYP at 1:15 P.M. on 2 August 1974. The Geneva Declaration of 30 July 1974, Report on the Demarcation Talks, outlined the Committee's responsibility:

The work of the Committee was restricted to an attempt to establish the limit of the areas occupied by the Turkish Armed Forces at the time of the cease-fire, 2200 hours (local Cyprus time) on 30 July 1974. It is the understanding of this Committee that a separate Committee will subsequently study the question of a security zone, which will be based on the demarcation line agreed by this Committee.⁴

³ UN Doc. Declaration by the Foreign Ministers of Greece, Turkey and the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, Geneva, 30 July 1974.

⁴ UN Doc. The Geneva Declaration of 30 July Report on the Demarcation Talks, 10 August 1974.

This resolution would be taken literally by UNFICYP and particularly the Canadian Contingent in the Nicosia Zone District. As a participant in these negotiations the UN representative, the Canadian Contingent Commander, would help redefine the role of UNFICYP.

In response, Acting Cypriot President G. Clerides was quoted as stating, "The cease-fire concessions made by the Greek Cypriot's had been very hard to bear." In actuality, the truce or cease-fire had left the Turkish invasion force of approximately 20,000 men and 200 tanks in control of approximately 120 square miles of the northern coast and a bridgehead into the Nicosia area.⁵ One item not covered by the declaration was the stipulation that Turkey was not to reinforce its army from the mainland while negotiations were proceeding. During this period and up to 13 August, the Turkish forces would consolidate their bridgehead and lines of communications by reinforcing its support services, forces and equipment. This oversight or omission of not including the requirement for a cessation of build-up on the part of the Turks, would have grave consequences on 14 August 1974. The result of these negotiations undertaken by the Committee, although not totally successful, did have positive impacts on events. The most significant of these

⁵ *The New York Times*, August 1, 1974, p. 2.

was the strengthening of UNFICYP's credibility and the reinforcement of Canadian impartiality.

Chosen to participate in the Tripartite Committee were military representatives from Greece, Turkey, the United Kingdom, and UNFICYP. They included: Colonel J.J.G. Hunter, Chairman, United Kingdom; Colonel N. Cakar, Turkey; Major E.J. Tsolakis, Greece; and Colonel C.E. Beattie, UNFICYP.⁶ In addition to the above, the Committee was assisted by Lieutenant-Colonel T.A. Linley, Royal Engineers, Assistant Director of Military Survey at the Headquarters of the British Forces Near East, Land; and Major R.K. Collins, Headquarters British Forces Near East, who acted as Secretary to the Committee.⁷

6.1 Canadian Participation

Colonel C.E. Beattie, Canadian Contingent Commander and UNFICYP Deputy-Chief of Staff, was chosen to represent the United Nations. It is interesting to note that Brigadier Frank Henn, as Chief of Staff, was not selected to represent UNFICYP at these negotiations. Brigadier Henn, although second in Command of UNFICYP, was not regarded by the Turks

⁶ Diary of Brigadier-General C.E. Beattie, August 3 1974.

⁷ *Ibid.*

as an impartial representative. Britain was one of the Guarantor Powers of the 1959-1960 Zurich and London Agreements together with Turkey and Greece. The Turks were reluctant to have a senior British Officer involved as representing an independent and impartial entity. In any event, there would be a British representative on the negotiation team. Perhaps this factor was also considered in the establishment of the negotiating team. According to Colonel Beattie:

As I was Deputy-Chief of Staff, Henn had other fish to fry. Everybody was working under pressure and as DCOS, I had really developed a record of being a trouble shooter and of being sent to National Guard Headquarters the day the war began to negotiate a cease-fire with the National Guard. I was successful in getting them to agree to a cease-fire. Whereas the Turkish forces wouldn't speak to Henn and he was having difficulty contacting them.⁸

Another factor which worked in Beattie's favour was that he had accompanied Major-General Prem Chand, Commander of UNFICYP, on 26 July 1974, to meet with Lieutenant-General Nvrettin Ersin, Commander-in-Chief Turkish Forces. As discussed earlier, this contact had resulted in the Turkish Forces being made aware of UNFICYP's role and the chain of command at the UN headquarters level. This initial meeting, as well as Beattie's own activities in the field prior to

⁸ BGen C.E. Beattie, interview held in Ottawa, Ontario, February 7, 1994.

the establishment of the negotiations team, had earned him and the Canadian Contingent high respect.

There were two other factors which influenced the decision of the placement of a Canadian as representing the UN on this team. First, Brigadier Henn, as Chief of Staff, was pivotal in ensuring the uniform operation of UNFICYP Headquarters during this critical period. Brigadier Henn was constantly in contact with the Force Commander and supported the directives issued by him, therefore he could not be spared for other duties. Second, Beattie, as Deputy Chief of Staff, had experienced two years of involvement in investigations of all types of complaints from both Greek and Turkish Cypriots. The Canadian record of impartiality, fairhandedness, and firmness in its responses and activities had established a rapport with both sides. According to Beattie, he was acceptable because:

...I had been with Major Tsolakakis (Greek Officer) the morning the war began in his headquarters when the building was being strafed by Turkish jets on three occasions. We were first on the floor in the Commander's Office and then on the floor in the hallway, and then on the floor in his office while negotiating with him. All this while Turkish aircraft were attacking the headquarters...But I had gone through some of these things with both sides. I had been with the Greeks under fire from the Turks the day the war began. On the 23rd, I was in the middle of a battlefield with the Turks while receiving fire

from the Greeks. So I guess I was seen as acceptable. Certainly to both the diplomats and the military.⁹

One of the major difficulties facing the Tripartite negotiation team was that this was the first time a United Nations Force would be involved in this type of negotiation. The United Nations Emergency Force in Egypt had only the responsibility to monitor the agreed to cease-fire lines during 1956-67 period, as were the other UN Missions in the middle east. In Cyprus, the situation was unique as the UN would be involved in delineating Forward Defensive Lines (FDL) of both parties and negotiating agreed to forward positions.

As part of the Tripartite negotiation team, Beattie rapidly settled any question of Canadian bias or special interests in these proceedings and re-confirmed the Canadian Contingent's impartiality. Colonel Beattie upon being questioned in this matter replied:

There was relatively little influence by the Canadian Government, because I was an UNFICYP Officer, officially a UN officer, as Deputy-Chief of Staff of the UN Headquarters. Although I did have Canadian responsibilities as Canadian Contingent Commander, first and foremost I was a UN soldier.¹⁰

⁹ *Ibid.*

¹⁰ *Ibid.*

Additionally, when the Canadian government agreed to provide troops to participate in UNFICYP, one of the conditions it laid out was that the peacekeeping force would be under operational control of the United Nations. This in effect meant no interference by Canada, at the operational level, in the Canadian Contingent carrying out UN orders.

6.2 United Kingdom and UNFICYP Cooperation

In approaching the task of being part of the Tripartite negotiating team, the UN representative addressed the matter of basic fundamental principles. The Resolution and the Declaration were worded in broad terms and thus were studied in a critical manner. This allowed for the anticipation for constructive action which could be initiated, or other positive contributions which might be made to promote or facilitate agreement among the three major participants. In this regard, there developed what could be described as collusion or a collective effort on the part of the British and UN representatives to reach an agreement. Beattie stated:

In these preparations, and in subsequent negotiations, I came to work closely with Colonel J.J.G. Hunter, who served as both UK representative and the Chairman of the Committee. We were to find, as meetings went on, that differences had to be resolved between the opposing views of the Turkish

and Greek representatives concerning UNFICYP's role in the negotiations. However, the common goal of the UK and UN representatives to promote an agreed solution, as the basis for further talks at Geneva, meant that we cooperated frequently in smoothing a way to agreement.¹¹

However, Beattie stressed that in his relationship with Colonel Hunter there was:

one area of course which was not subject to negotiation or compromise, [that] was the official impartial and objective position of UNFICYP concerning the military status quo as it existed at 2200 hours the 30th of July 1974, the time of the agreed cease-fire.¹²

6.3 Locating and Establishing the Forward Defence Lines

The first meeting of the Tripartite Committee took place in the briefing room Headquarters UNFICYP on the afternoon of 2 August. At this time it was acknowledged by the Committee members, that the primary objective was to agree to the extent of the area occupied by Turkish Forces as of the cease-fire date of 10:00 P.M. 30 July 1974. It was further acknowledged that any consideration of a "Buffer Zone" would be subsequently delved into as another phase by which political direction would have to precede military

¹¹ *Ibid.*

¹² BGen. C.E. Beattie, interview held in Ottawa, 7 February 1994. UN Doc. The Declaration of the three Foreign Ministers in Geneva, July 31, 1974 also specified the parametres of UN involvement.

negotiations, as stated in the Geneva Declaration.¹³ The Record of the Meeting: Cyprus Cease-Fire, dated 2 August 1974, clearly marks the Committee members positions on this matter. Colonel Hunter, the Committee Chairman, clarified his position by stating that only after the Forward Defensive Lines had been agreed to would the subject of the buffer zone be discussed. He stated in part:

Phase 1 is to agree to the limit of the area occupied by the Turkish Armed Forces...We can then take action or receive political direction about buffer zones.¹⁴

Colonel Cakar responded by stating that he understood the objective of the first phase and that:

The second phase...is beyond the scope of our duty here...We are here only to set out front lines at the times indicated. The establishment of a buffer zone is something to be taken up at the meeting of 8 August. I am not authorized to discuss zones of security areas.¹⁵

In other words, any agreed to zone of United Nations occupation between combatants would be predicated on political agreements, not military. This meeting also evidenced the beginnings of a dispute over the status quo in the area as of the date of the agreed to cease-fire. This

¹³ UN Doc. Geneva Declaration, para 3(a), 30 July 1974.

¹⁴ UN Doc. Record of Meeting Cyprus Cease-Fire Held at HQ UNFICYP, 2 August 1974.

¹⁵ *Ibid.*

dispute would underline a very sharp difference in the Turkish interpretation concerning ground held or occupied by their forces. To appreciate this concept, the following event is provided by Beattie and verified by UN documents:

The Turks who occupied the Kyrenia mountain range overlooking these villages, concluded they held them because they could cover them with fire from the range above. Thus they claimed that their western limit to the extent of their penetration westward along the top of the Kyrenia mountains as of 30 July 74. For them, the area to the north between the mountain range and the sea became a pocket of resistance in which they claimed to be mopping up as they returned fire of the National Guard contained in the pocket.¹⁶

In fact, UN operational log entries, UN Security Council Documents for this period,¹⁷ and independent reports from the *London Times* dated 2 August,¹⁸ state that Lapithos and Karavas had not been taken and that Greek resistance was formidable. It would not be until 7 August that Lapithos would be overrun.¹⁹ Colonel Beattie, in order to be current with proceedings in the field, was consistently briefed each morning at the UN operations room from 7:00 to 8:00 A.M. as to the previous day's activities as observed by UN Observation Posts (static or mobile). Furthermore, the meetings were conducted on UN premises at UNFICYP

¹⁶ UN Doc. S/11353/Add. 15, 5 August 1974.

¹⁷ UN Doc. S/11353/Add. 16, 6 August 1974.

¹⁸ *Times* (London) August 2, 1974, p. 1.

¹⁹ *Times* (London) August 7, 1974, p. 1.

Headquarters located at Blue Beret Camp (BBC). Information was readily available to Beattie from various contingent Observation Posts situated in all areas of the island. As to the Lapithos and Karavas region, the representatives, at the urging of the UN representative, boarded a helicopter and flew to the area in dispute. Upon landing in the area it was discovered that the troops surrounding the UN helicopter were Greek not Turkish. The Turkish representative refused to leave the helicopter and after a brief reconnaissance the tripartite team returned to UN Headquarters in Nicosia.²⁰

Another significant point of difference between Committee members arose in the second meeting on 3 August 1974. The point of contention was revealed when the Greek and British members requested the UN representative to present UNFICYP's position or view on the military positions as at 10:00 P.M., 30 July. The Turkish representative interrupted and stated that in the view of the Turkish government, UNFICYP had no mandate within the Turkish area of occupation. Therefore UNFICYP was incapable of fulfilling such a requirement as to give its view on Forward Defensive Lines. The Turkish representative did, however, indicate that UNFICYP's

²⁰ BGen C.E. Beattie, interview held in Ottawa, Ontario, February 7, 1994.

consultative role would be most welcomed in discussions regarding the demarcation line through the city of Nicosia after agreement was reached with the Turkish controlled area by the Committee.²¹

This Turkish stance proved to be a major setback and the Greek and British representatives indicated that they would have to consult with their respective governments. Turkey, meanwhile, registered its reservation regarding UNFICYP's status at the Geneva discussions. Hunter, as Chairman, strongly declared that the availability of UNFICYP consultation had been a central factor in the Geneva Declaration and, in his opinion, the stand now being taken by Turkey was a stumbling block to real progress in negotiations. This position by Turkey would not significantly alter during the negotiation talks. However, Beattie was successful in pursuing dialogue with Cakar and even though this position was held, both sides agreed on continuing negotiations.

6.4 Military Areas Under Consideration

On 4 August the meeting was reconvened with Colonel Cakar holding to the Turkish position as declared the previous day. Major Tsolakis explained to the Committee that

²¹ Diary C.E. Beattie and interview with C.E. Beattie February 7, 1994 Ottawa.

he was still awaiting instructions from the Greek government and stated:

Having asked for and while awaiting possible new instructions from my Government, my Commander instructed me to ask the Committee, and if it is agreed, to continue working and establish the line at today's date, by flying in a helicopter, which we see may present an opportunity for further discussions and establishing the line marking the limit of the areas occupied by Turkish Armed Forces at 2200 hours on 30th July.²²

Tsolakis also requested that the Committee proceed with the previous day's offer put forth by UNFICYP and the Committee Chair to visit four areas of contention. The Committee could then establish the positions of the Turkish forces to date. This agreement to visit and mark the four areas of contention would form the basis of discussion. The agreement by the Committee members was forwarded to UN Headquarters and the Secretary-General referred in part to the communiqué:

The meeting assembled at 1000 hours...We agreed to attempt to establish where the Turkish forces are today, Sunday 4 August 1974, without prejudice to discussions in the future as to where their positions were in fact at 2200 hours July 30. We decided to visit by helicopter four areas on the ground. We adjourned...to enable the Greek and Turkish representatives to clear the flight with their respective military authorities and to make reception facilities at the proposed landing points.²³

²² UN Doc. Demarcation Talks, Record of Meeting on Sunday Tripartite Committee, Nicosia, August 4, 1974.

²³ UN Doc. S/11353/Add. 15, 5 August 1974.

The members of the Committee agreed to this proposal.²⁴ Upon landing in the first area it was found that the Turkish forces were actually forward (farther west) of what had been claimed as the cease-fire line. The second area was just north of the Kyrenia mountains and in the centre of an area claimed by the Turkish representative as being held by his forces. The first point of contention, as previously identified, was that the Turkish Forces felt that if they could observe the area under their fire, it was an area held by them. Contrary to this Turkish claim, Beattie described the following events:

Upon landing we found that we were in the middle of a National Guard battalion area; a sub-unit area could be seen from the helicopter and some of the troops approached to challenge our aircraft and to investigate our presence. While Major Tsolakakis and Colonel Hunter identified us to the National Guard soldiers, I remained by the helicopter with Colonel Cakar and his advisor, Colonel E. Bitlis. The Turkish officers appeared to be visibly surprised and anxious about the presence of Greek troops. Two or three National Guardsmen approached the helicopter but remained about five yards distant. From their appearance they had obviously been engaged in difficult fighting and I identified one as having come from one of the RFUs (Raiding Force Unit).²⁵

²⁴ Diary C.E. Beattie and interview February 7 1994, Ottawa, Ontario and UN Doc. Record of Meeting on Sunday Tripartite Committee, August 4, 1974. The areas to be surveilled were located at Grid References WE 155034 to WE 151070, WE 143087 to the coast at WE 137128, WE 373104 to WE 378089, and WE 379060 to WE 379030. See maps.

²⁵ Diary C.E. Beattie, August 4, 1974.

Beattie further stated that the Turkish officers made a strongly worded request that the Committee should move out of the immediate area. They were advised that as soon as Colonels Hunter and Tsolakis had completed their reconnaissance, the team would proceed. The Committee's safety was now being guaranteed by the United Nations. After leaving the area, Colonel Beattie was informed by Major Tsolakis that:

Turkish troops had entered the outskirts of Karavas the previous night and as of the 4th of August, there was still some fighting in the area of Lapithos and surrounding areas.²⁶

The object lesson derived from this episode was that on-the-ground verification and inspection of Forward Defensive Lines by the United Nations was required. The verification to delineate FDLs was crucial so that any future movement or change could be plotted, monitored, and curtailed by UNFICYP, as part of its mandate to enforce cease-fire agreements. This new responsibility was reluctantly accepted by the UN and would become a prominent task of UNFICYP in its new role after September 1974. As well, UNFICYP established itself as protector of opposing force representatives and demonstrated that it would carry

²⁶ *Ibid.*

out its functions as dictated by the United Nations and the Geneva Declarations.

On 5 August, the Tripartite Committee again investigated the Forward Defensive Lines. An overflight by a UN helicopter confirmed the Turkish eastern flank positions. Major Tsolakis requested that the Committee carry out a detailed reconnaissance of the Lapithos and Karavas areas to verify the previous day's indication of Turkish movement. This request was denied by Colonel Cakar. Cakar reaffirmed the Turkish position that these villages "were behind the Turkish line of resistance."²⁷ He also stated to the members of the Committee that the Greek troops in these areas:

had been invited to cease their resistance, and if they did not, then the Turkish forces would not be responsible for any consequences.²⁸

In other words, the Turkish forces were requesting the Greeks to surrender these areas which then would confirm Colonel Cakar's assertions that Turkish forces did indeed control the area which they overlooked.

Tsolakis, according to documents and Beattie's recollection, responded by requesting that:

²⁷ Diary C.E. Beattie, August 5, 1974.

²⁸ *Ibid.*

[the] terms behind and on the western front be deleted from the record since there was no accepted front and that the committee had been trying to establish the limit of the Turkish occupied areas.²⁹

The implication here was that the Greek military representative was attempting to dispute the Turkish Forward Defensive Line. By forcing Turkey to accept this premise, territories such as Lapithos and Karavas, which were under dispute, could be returned to their original occupants, lessening the loss of territory to Turkish forces.

The Turkish representative, Colonel Cakar then shifted his area of interest to Nicosia. He stated to the Committee members that the UN consultative role would be welcomed in this area.

The UN representative, Colonel Beattie, did not confirm Cakar's comments and would not be drawn into taking sides as to where Forward Defensive Lines were situated. Impartiality was paramount in order to confirm UN neutrality. Cakar went on to note that all other parts of the line were agreed to with the exception of the north-west and Nicosia areas. Tsolakis was still calling for an actual verification of the Lapithos and Karavas positions and, as

²⁹ *Ibid.*

the Turkish representative refused to comply, the day ended on an impasse.

6.5 Kyrenia District

On 6 August both the Turkish and Greek military representatives agreed to confirm the provisional approval of the Forward Defensive Line thus far determined by the Committee. The exceptions being the Lapithos and Karavas areas. However, it was noted by the British and UN representatives that Greece, through its military representative, was taking this opportunity to warn all Committee members that there existed a real and present danger that hostilities could re-occur in these areas. Major Tsolakis claimed that Greek forces had evidence that a local Turkish force, under Turkey's orders, had in fact launched an attack in that area at approximately 5:00 A.M. that very morning. The meeting was adjourned briefly and Colonel Beattie, the UN representative, stated that Colonel Cakar had approached him and:

confirmed the policy of no visit and claimed that there had been no Turkish attack, but rather local operations to mop up resistance behind the Turkish front lines had been undertaken.³⁰

³⁰ Diary C.E. Beattie, August 6, 1974.

Without on-the-ground verification of actual circumstances, and the refusal of Turkish authorities to allow the UN to reconnoitre the area, Turkish forces could and did continue forward operations to press their position on the Forward Defensive Lines. This allowed them to consolidate their hold in the area.

6.6 Nicosia District

Under the chairmanship of Colonel Hunter, and with continued insistence from Colonel Beattie, the UN representative, it was agreed by all members that the Committee's focus should now shift to the Nicosia area. It was at this juncture that UNFICYP's view of the military status quo as of the time of the cease-fire of 30 July, was solicited by the Committee. It was agreed that four specific areas required attention and all members acquiesced to the UN suggestion that the UNFICYP version of the Forward Defensive Line would be utilized to resolve Turkish and Greek differences. In this suggestion, Colonel Beattie was fully supported by Colonel Hunter, as both acknowledged that the discussion would be primarily bilateral between the Greek and Turkish representatives. The four areas under discussion included the area immediately north of the airport; the area north east of Ormophita (in the Nicosia

suburbs); the area of the Nicosia Club; and certain other points along the FDL in Nicosia along the walled city, including the Golf Course, Chimo Club and Roccas Bastion.

It should be recalled that the role of UNFICYP which was agreed to by General Prem Chand, UN Force Commander, was one which was strictly consultative. Colonel Beattie re-emphasized this point to the Committee members and stated that:

decisions in reaching agreement would be the responsibility of the three members as they were the Guarantor Powers.³¹

The UN could not and would not become the mediator as that role would exceed its mandate. In any event, only a decision at the political level could confirm agreements reached by the Tripartite Committee. The dialogue and the confidence built by the United Nations Deputy-Chief of Staff, Colonel Beattie, during the previous weeks actions on the part of the UN, would be strained and at times put under pressure. It is remarkable that the Committee continued in its functions and events would bear this out.

³¹ UN Doc. Geneva Declaration Para 3(a), and Diary C.E. Beattie, August 6 1974.

Colonel Beattie, in considering the first of the four areas under dispute, recalled the events which had led to the cease-fire arrangements of 23 July agreed to between the UNFICYP Deputy-Chief of Staff and the Turkish Representatives. This cease-fire arrangement had, as detailed previously, resulted from Colonel Beattie's efforts in securing the Nicosia International Airport as a UN designated Protected Zone which in essence had redefined the original mandate of UNFICYP. Brigadier Henn, Chief of Staff UNFICYP, had, as previously described, achieved a negotiated agreement for the on-going terms of the original cease-fire reached between Colonel Beattie, the Turks and Greeks. Colonel Cakar however, refuted this premise. According to the documents of the meeting, Cakar reserved the Turkish position, "on the grounds that nobody had been authorized to make such an agreement." ³² United Nations Security Council documents highlight this confusion. According to U Thant's report dated 24 July:

An agreement was reached by both sides under which UNFICYP would control the Nicosia airport complex...At 1500 hours [23 July] UNFICYP troops and scout cars were moved into the airport area...The Turkish Authorities informed UNFICYP that they did not concur with the agreement reached at 1430 hours...³³

³² Diary C.E. Beattie, August 6, 1974.

³³ UN Doc. S/11353/Add. 5, 24 July 1974.

Whatever the Turkish position, the Nicosia Airport was now under United Nations control and had been designated as such by the UN Secretary-General on 24 July 1974. Although the UN only acknowledged this after the fact, it was nevertheless a de facto situation which the Turkish forces reluctantly accepted. In a further report to the UN Security Council, U Thant stated:

In Nicosia District, Nicosia airport remains under United Nations control. Canadian troops are deployed around the perimeter. At approximately 0800 hours, the runway was blocked with vehicles to prevent its use for military purposes. The Turkish forces however continue to threaten to occupy the airport.³⁴

As noted earlier, the airport remained under UN control and Canadian troops were prepared to defend the area with the use of force. The concept of "peacekeeping by confrontation" as practiced by Colonel Beattie and the Canadian Contingent had been implemented. After further discussion, all members agreed that the Forward Defensive Lines, as designated by UNFICYP, would be used as a basis for further study by both the Greek and Turkish representatives.

³⁴ *Ibid.*

6.7 United Nations Guarantee of Protection

On 7 August, Colonel Cakar again stated his position with respect to the International Airport area and claimed that the Turkish limit ran further to the north and east than had been acknowledged by UNFICYP. Cakar also requested that the area north-east of Ormophita be again reconnoitered as both the Turkish and Greek representatives strongly differed with the Forward Defensive Line as delineated by UNFICYP. Patience and forbearance would become the order of the day for UNFICYP. A foot and vehicle reconnaissance was agreed to by all members and was initiated at approximately 10:00 A.M. This activity was concluded at the end of the day in the area of the Nicosia Club where UNFICYP personnel were in occupation of the premises. During the evening of 7 August, the Committee was reviewing the Forward Defensive Line in and around the Nicosia airport. It was at this time that Colonel Cakar was introduced to the situation as it existed and the United Nations guarantee of protection to the Committee members was tested.

During the previous few days, a cease-fire was negotiated by the Canadian Contingent with the Turks positioned along the Morphou Road, which was located south

west of the city. The Greek position as agreed to was 500 metres south of the airport perimeter. The Committee was reconnoitering the Forward Defensive Line in this area but had not yet established a route through which they could travel safely from one sector to the next. After each day's negotiations, the Turkish representative, Colonel Cakar, would be driven, without incident, by Colonel Beattie back behind the Turkish lines to the Turkish Embassy in Nicosia, on the north side of the line. However, on the evening of 7 August, an incident occurred which required UNFICYP to adhere to its guarantee of protection to the Turkish representative. The action taken by Colonel Beattie would be viewed as highly favourable by the Turkish representative and the result would be that UNFICYP would gain high marks for impartiality, courage, and integrity. Colonel Beattie described the following events of 7 August 1974:

Until one night at about midnight [no incidents]... We finished up late and were coming down and a Greek platoon, for whatever reason, was carrying out some kind of security exercise, and justifiably so, near Wolsely Barracks. They stopped my car. Cakar wasn't wearing his Turkish cap and I was wearing my blue beret and I had a pistol. I took out the pistol, handed it to Cakar because he was unarmed. I gave him my pistol and I got out of the car and sorted the thing out. I told them to get the hell out of the way, that the UN was in charge and I was on a UN mission. No lights were showing so they didn't see that I had Cakar in the car.

When I got back in, he gave me back my pistol, it was loaded with a round up the chamber and the pistol was cocked. That's why I gave it to him, because if they [Greeks] had decided to write us off, at least he would have had a chance to defend himself.³⁵

Colonel Beattie's actions, as a UN officer, won the admiration of the Turks. These types of actions were neither isolated nor one sided.

To further demonstrate this sense of impartiality and commitment to ensure cease-fires were adhered to, the following incident was recorded in Colonel Beattie's Diary and by the Nicosia Daily Operational Log Sheet of 5 August 1974. Mr. Clerides, the Acting President, called the UN Commander, General Prem Chand and declared that the Turks were in violation of the agreed cease-fire and were moving forward in the area of the Race Course in Nicosia. The Force Commander briefed Colonel Beattie who then proceeded to the area to investigate the allegations. Upon reaching the area, it was confirmed that Clerides had been correct in his complaint. Beattie decided to establish an OP in this immediate area. He also contacted the Greek forces commander in the area and assured him that the UN would not tolerate infractions of the cease-fire. He directed the Turks to

³⁵ BGen C.E. Beattie, interview held in Ottawa, Ontario, 21 October 1993.

withdraw. According to the Log and Beattie, the following took place:

The point platoon [Turk], we encountered them about 250 yards in front of the Greek defences. I simply walked up to the Turkish officer with a UN flag and said "Stop, you're breaching the cease-fire. You're acting in contravention of assurances given by your commander. And where is your commander?" Of course he's pleading he doesn't understand what I'm saying...Well we got them stopped. And Barikof [his driver] was with me through all this.

This guy gets on his radio to his company commander and eventually an old car pulls up and I tell Barikof to stand there and wait. Barikof stands there with the UN flag and the Turks don't move. Meanwhile I finally meet the Battalion Commander and tell him that "they had breached the cease-fire and assurances given by the Turkish High Command and that he was going to be in deep sh..." I asked him who was running his army and demanded to see his commander.

After another drive in the car to Gywalea, I finally meet the Turkish Contingent Commander, the National Contingent Commander, and this guy E. Bitlis, the guy whose assisting Cakar. After telling them that they were in violation of the agreed cease-fire and they stating that they had been there all the time, it was agreed that they would not move any further. They returned me back to where Barikof was and nobody fired a shot. Not the Turks not the Greeks. Then within ten minutes a British ferret scout car from the 16th/5th Lancers drove up and offered me a lift. I told him that my car was just down the road and we walked back. A UN OP was established and the Greeks and Turks pulled back.³⁶

The above demonstrates that the types of incidents which took place during this period were everyday

³⁶ BGen C.E. Beattie, interview held in Ottawa, Ontario, February 7, 1994. These events are also recorded in the *Nicosia Daily Operational Log Sheet*, 5 August 1974.

occurrences. The result was that the UN earned respect from both sides and was able to secure local cease-fires and turn back forward movement that contravened agreements. This fortified the reputation of the Canadian Contingent as a firm and fair impartial third party. Because of these incidents the Committee members were more agreeable to UN versions of Forward Defensive Line positions.

6.8 Cease-Fire Violations and the Canadian Contingent's Response

On 8 August, the Committee resumed its reconnaissance at the Nicosia Club. At this time the Greek, British, and UNFICYP representatives agreed to the United Nations view as to line location. The Turkish representative, however, expressed his disagreement with UNFICYP's delineation of the Forward Defensive Line. Colonel Beattie reiterated that UNFICYP records and information had revealed that the Turkish Forces had not advanced into the Nicosia Club area until 1:30 P.M. 31 July. It was clearly evident that Turkish forces had advanced in contradiction to the agreed cease-fire of 30 July. Colonel Beattie informed the members that in fact, Turkish forces had attempted to force the UN personnel (CANCON) at the UN Observation Post to evacuate

the area, but they were repulsed. Colonel Beattie had already been briefed on this particular incident.

The Nicosia Daily Operational Log Sheet kept by CANCON had documented this movement by Turkish forces.³⁷ As well, James Anderson, of the *Toronto Globe and Mail*, wrote of the incident on 1 August. He stated that Canadian UN troops were attempting to identify and move up to the lines between the Turks and the National Guard. According to Anderson, Captain Alain Forand, in command of 25 Canadian troops, interrupted 20 Turk troops as they inched their positions forward and were caught at the Nicosia Golf Club. Colonel Beattie verified this:

The Turks were inching forward, jockeying for position, as Canadian troops staked out new lines of demarcation between Greek and Turkish areas.³⁸

Anderson also quoted Captain Forand in his assessment of the situation:

The Turks stated they had been there for two days but Captain Forand disputed their claims. The Turks then replied, "You must have been asleep, we were here." Captain Forand when asked of this replied, "They tell me they were here two days ago, but they are full of sh.. I had three men here until the Turks came at

³⁷ *Nicosia Daily Operational Log Sheet*, 1 August 1974.

³⁸ *The Globe and Mail*, August 1, 1974, p. 1.

noon today and told them to go away. So we came back with a platoon and three scout cars."³⁹

With the return of the Canadians reinforced with heavier weapons, the area was stabilized and Turkish forward movements were halted. The disagreement between UNFICYP and Colonel Cakar was noted and displayed on the master map of the Committee. In addition, differences between the Turkish, Greek, and UNFICYP versions of the Forward Defensive Line were recorded in the areas of the Golf Course, Chimo Club, and Roccas Bastion.

The delineation of Forward Defensive Lines was not always agreed upon nor was reconnaissance always carried out without incident. Beattie, in carrying out this task, was under great pressure to resolve conflicts and to ensure disputed areas were marked clearly and accurately. To accomplish this, actual walking the line within the walled city was necessary. As the Committee proceeded, minor differences between the Turkish and Greek representatives were recorded or resolved. By mid-morning of 8 August, the Committee paused in a Turkish corner shop immediately east of the Canadian UN Observer Post named Constantine 2. At this time the Committee came under fire. According to the

³⁹ *Ibid.*

Canadian Contingent Operational Log and confirmed by Colonel Beattie in his report, the following action took place.

During a map confirmation near Constantine, it was agreed that the Committee should backtrack along the line in order to resolve a contentious point. As the Committee was retracing its course westward on Constantine the Great Street, and almost in line with OP Constantine 2, Turkish Forces forward elements threw two hand grenades into the street, exploding them approximately fifty yards to our front. The apparent purpose of this exercise was to destroy a Greek flag that had been shot off a flag pole at the intersection of Constantine the Great Street and Costas Kyriaou Street. The Turks now seemed to be trying to destroy the flag by bouncing grenades onto the base of the flag pole.⁴⁰

This episode was a reminder that the situation within the walled city was not as stable as believed by both the Turkish and Greek representatives. In reality, the UN role of verifying Forward Defensive Lines of both combatants was extremely dangerous and situations were volatile. According to reports, Colonel Beattie then led the members of the Committee along the left side of the street toward a safe location. By the time the second grenade exploded, the rest of the Committee members had quickly retreated from this area. It was observed by Colonel Beattie at the time "how quickly people had lost interest in drawing a line."⁴¹ The

⁴⁰ Diary C.E. Beattie, August 8, 1974. The episode described by Beattie is also recorded in the *Nicosia Daily Operational Log Sheet*, 8 August 1974.

⁴¹ BGen Beattie, interview held in Ottawa, Ontario, March 12 1994. Unknown to General Beattie at the time was that the

result of these grenade explosions was that both sides opened fire along the line.

Firing continued for approximately two hours while the Committee carried on with its negotiations. As the sporadic gun fire escalated, Colonel Beattie attempted, through HQ UNFICYP and Headquarters Nicosia Zone (CANCON), to restore the cease-fire. While attempting to do so, the Turkish and Greek representatives agreed to the position of the remainder of the line. The camaraderie and respect between the representatives and, the UN declaration of protection for all members of the Committee in the fulfillment of its obligations, was made evident during this period by actions taken by Colonel Cakar.

Cakar arranged for the Committee members to move from this dangerous position through the Turkish controlled area by way of a Turkish Fighter position across the street from the shop where the Committee was holding its discussions. The Greek representative was assured of his safety by not only the Turkish representative but also by UNFICYP, under

official UN photographer also had a belt-type tape recorder and had recorded the events as they unfolded, beginning with the first grenade explosion to Beattie's cryptic remark. This writer reviewed the tape recording during the interview.

whose protection the Committee was guaranteed. The safety of the Committee was such that Beattie stated:

Upon arrival in the Turkish Sector we found a restaurant where we had a cold drink, the negotiation of this part of the line was finalized; I was able to pursue restoration of the cease-fire; and to fulfill a request that I telephone the Force Commander with a sitrep on the progress of the Committee.⁴²

Meanwhile in Geneva, the Greek representatives had threatened to leave the talks. The Greeks were accusing the Turkish forces of continually encroaching upon Greek held territory in the northern part of the island or into the areas supposedly controlled by the UN. The *London Times*, under the banner headline, "Greeks Will Leave Geneva Unless Turks Pull Back Forces", reported that Greece was prepared to stop negotiations unless Turkey ceased its movement of forces on Cyprus. Greece, according to the *Times*, was prepared to take its case directly to the UN to get Turkey to halt its advance. The Soviet Union declared its sympathy with Greece and stated it was prepared to back a Greek demand for the United Nations to send additional troops to confront this Turkish aggression.⁴³

⁴² Diary C.E. Beattie August 8, 1974.

⁴³ *Times* (London) August 9, 1974, p. 1.

This stance by Greece and the Soviet Union is perplexing. First, Greece had already brought the matter of Turkish aggression on the island to the attention of the Secretary-General and the Security Council on 21 July 1974. The Secretary-General's letter called for a cease-fire and a halt to all Turkish aggression. In response, Ambassador Osman Olcay, the Permanent representative of Turkey to the UN, had written the Secretary-General that Turkey's actions were justified as:

It is only to stop these [Greek] outrageous attacks against the civilians that air action was taken by Turkey. Turkey deeply regrets the loss of innocent civilian lives in this action, but cannot be blamed for the action, itself precipitated by the Greek atrocities against civilians.⁴⁴

What is missing from the Turkish note to the Security Council is that airborne, armour, and infantry were also used to put a stop to this "Greek aggression" against civilians. The question is, what action did the Greek government want the United Nations to take? The original mandate as agreed to by Greece and Turkey did not call for enforcement of cease-fires. As for the Soviet Union, it appears that they were attempting to split NATO by taking sides. The Soviet Union's aim of publicly backing Greece and indicating that it would support a measure that would allow

⁴⁴ UN Doc. S/11365, 23 July 1974.

UNFICYP to use force to stop Turkish advancement, was calculated on this premise. It is doubtful that the USSR would have voted for the enlargement of the existing mandate. This would have been contrary to its stated position in the Security Council. In 1964 the Secretary-General had recommended that the mandate of UNFICYP be expanded to allow it to be utilized to separate what he termed "two combatants" in Cyprus. The Soviet Union did not agree, and only supported the existence of UNFICYP under the original mandate. For the Soviets, the Force was established:

...to assist the Government of Cyprus in various measures taken by it as the government of a sovereign state which was fully responsible for the maintenance and restoration of law and order in the country.⁴⁵

Confronted with the threat of Greece walking out of the talks at Geneva, the Committee continued the attempt to delineate the Forward Defensive Line. At almost midnight of 8 August, the Committee was still attempting to achieve a greater degree of consensus as to the location of the line. In addition, it was still seeking to finalize a report on this matter which would be forwarded to the respective Foreign Ministers at Geneva by the time negotiations were to

⁴⁵ *United Nations Monthly Chronicle*, October 1964, p. 14.

be renewed.⁴⁶ Although considerable agreement among the representatives had been reached on the Forward Defensive Lines, the issue of the Lapithos and Karavas areas in the north west was still a point of contention, as were specific areas of the Nicosia line. What was evident, however, was that during the past seven days and nights of continuous negotiations, often under intense pressures and under fire, a reluctant admiration and respect emerged among the various representatives. This was especially so for UNFICYP. What came out of the negotiations appeared encouraging. What transpired at Geneva was not.

Despite the differences of opinion between the Tripartite Committee members on the location of the Forward Defensive Lines, the aim of these discussions was to present a negotiable document for consideration at the Foreign Ministers meetings in Geneva. That this objective would be achieved by the Tripartite Committee within the time frame outlined in the Geneva Declaration is a credit to the Committee Chairman, Colonel Hunter, and to the UN representative, Colonel Beattie. Without their cooperation and aim of getting the two combatants to discuss their positions freely and in strict privacy, the Committee could

⁴⁶ UN Doc. Declaration By The Foreign Ministers of Greece, Turkey, And The United Kingdom Of Great Britain And Northern Ireland, August 26, 1974, p. 2, para 5.

not have endured, let alone deliver recommendations to the Geneva representatives.

Notwithstanding differences on specific locations of the line, it was agreed that:

to save vital time in dispatching the report to Geneva, each representative would endeavour to seek instructions which would permit him to accept minor amendments to the draft report, without reference to superior authority, and to enable him to sign the report on behalf of his government.⁴⁷

Colonel Hunter, as Chairman, also confirmed his previous offer to make arrangements for the delivery of the documents signed by Greece, Turkey, the United Kingdom, and the representative of UNFICYP, to Geneva. According to Beattie, the final report outlining its findings and recommendations was agreed to and finalized during the night of 8/9 August 1974, and was officially signed by the Tripartite members on 9 August 1974. (See Annex F) Once signed, the Royal Air Force provided a courier jet to fly the document to Geneva.⁴⁸

On 10 August 1974, the press reported that the Joint Commission had reached an agreement on the Forward Defensive

⁴⁷ Diary C.E. Beattie, August 8, 1974 and interview with C.E. Beattie February 7, 1994.

⁴⁸ *Ibid.*

Line and that the respective representatives would authorize it in Geneva. *The London Times* quoted Colonel Jerry Hunter as stating, "There is a basis in here for agreement everywhere and most of it is finally agreed." Hunter also indicated that all the Tripartite representatives were in agreement with the contents of the report.⁴⁹ It was also reported that with the signing of the agreement the commanders of both the Greek National Guard and the Turkish Force Commander had given orders that the cease-fire was to be observed. This agreement would be tossed aside within four days. The document produced by the Tripartite Committee never came under serious consideration in Geneva. The talks broke down and Phase II of the war began on 14 August 1974.

The question of whether the negotiations undertaken by the Tripartite Committee were ever intended to be the basis of a final agreement or not, is difficult to answer. There is a case that can be argued that the Turkish authorities and the Turkish force commander used this period of negotiation to regroup and reinforce their forces for the second phase. Reports forwarded to the Secretary-General from UNFICYP on daily activities during this period support the contention that Turkish forces were consolidating their bridgehead and forward positions. On 31 July, Kurt Waldheim,

⁴⁹ *Times* (London) August 10, 1974, p. 1.

the Secretary-General presented his report to the Security Council where he stated:

The situation during this period [July 29-31] remained generally quiet except for the Kyrenia District where fighting continued on 29 July in the area of Ayios Epiktetos...On 31 July, the Greek National Guard withdrew from the Greek Cypriot towns of Karavas and Lapithos, West of Kyrenia, after fighting broke out again in that area. An UNFICYP patrol was obliged to withdraw from Larnaca (Kyrenia District) when it came under artillery fire. The Turkish forces advanced approximately 1000 metres west from Ayios Ermoiaos, and approximately 500 metres south from a point near the Nicosia race course.⁵⁰

The policy of not allowing UNFICYP to patrol the areas under the control of Turkish forces was reinforced during this period. This allowed the Turkish Force commander to resupply and reinforce his force without direct observation by UNFICYP. In contrast however, UNFICYP patrols were allowed in the Bellapais area for humanitarian purpose only. However, their [UN] freedom of movement was severely restricted.⁵¹ This policy of restriction on freedom of movement was seen by the Turkish Force commander as a justifiable one. Essentially, the Turkish arguments were as follows. Turkish forces were operating under the banner of the "Turkish Peace Force" whose role was the achievement of peace and security for Turkish Cypriots on the island. The

⁵⁰ UN Doc. S/11353/Add. 12, 31 July 1974.

⁵¹ UN Doc. S/11353/Add. 14, 4 August 1974.

Turkish Force Commander perceived his force's role as parallel to that of UNFICYP. He preferred that UNFICYP look after the security of Turkish Cypriots in parts of Cyprus outside Turkish Forces control. On many occasions UNFICYP had to remind him that the UN did look after Turkish Cypriots outside the area controlled by Turkish Forces. As well, it was also UNFICYP's responsibility to look after Greek Cypriots inside that area controlled by their forces. These arguments and counter arguments were presented many times during this period.

One example of the restriction of movement occurred in Bellapais. The UN Observation Post situated in this town was ordered to withdraw by a lower level Turkish officer. After negotiation and direct talks between the UN Secretary-General and the Turkish Prime Minister, the UN Observation Post was reinforced by nine Finnish Contingent UN personnel. What the Turkish forces attempted to do was maintain the lightest possible level of survey by UNFICYP, therefore making it extremely difficult to observe and monitor activity which could be detrimental to Turkish objects. This restriction on the freedom of movement was not carried out during this time due to the efforts of local UN commanders

and the steadfastness of the Security Council against this Turkish demand.⁵²

Throughout the negotiation period there were confirmed reports that the Kyrenia and Famagusta Districts were under fire by both the Greek and Turkish forces. However, it was in the Kyrenia district that consolidation by Turkish forces was taking place. In reports to the Security Council by the Secretary-General for the dates of 6-7 August, Turkish forces were observed applying pressure on Greek forces in the area by use of mortar fire. Specifically, on 7 August, shelling and mortar fire was recorded at Vasilie, Kyrenia Pass, Agri dhaki and Kondemenos. Greek forces were under severe pressure to withdraw and, on 8 August, the Lapithos and Karavas area was occupied by Turkish forces.⁵³ By 9 August, the date of the signing of the Tripartite Report and Recommendations to the Foreign Ministers in Geneva, the Kyrenia District (West) was still under tank and mortar fire. Further, the Turkish Cypriot leadership had secured the Famagusta Harbour and its stores for "safekeeping".⁵⁴

⁵² UN Doc. S/11568, 6 December 1974, p. 8.

⁵³ UN Docs. S/11353/16, 6 August 1974; S/11353/17, 7 August 1974.

⁵⁴ UN Doc. S/11353/Add. 18, 9 August 1974.

Along the Green Line in Nicosia, both the Greek National Guards and the Turkish Cypriot Fighters and Turkish forces had continually encroached upon the line in attempts to consolidate pockets of resistance or to strengthen their positions. Events recorded by the UN Canadian observers and patrols confirmed these movements. On 4 August, at approximately 9:00 P.M., Canadian UN observer patrols reported to the Joint Operations Centre that there was a Turkish force build up near the UN OPs Rosslyn and Jasper. It was recorded that over 165 Turkish troops with weapons, including .50 calibre machine guns and 14 tanks, were taking positions along the line.⁵⁵ The Turkish forces were not alone in their movements. In the early hours of 5 August, advancing Greek soldiers wearing UN berets, were stopped and confronted by a Canadian UNFICYP patrol. Apparently, the Greek soldiers believed that they would not be challenged by any Turkish forces if they were wearing UN headdress and could clandestinely move forward. They were quickly stripped of their berets. At the same time Turk Cypriot Fighters were stopped and were discovered wearing Canadian uniforms. Both combatants claimed that they had purchased these items from Canadian soldiers but it was revealed that they had stolen them from a UN OP, Maple Leaf Manor, near the Pathos Gate

⁵⁵ *Nicosia District Daily Operational Log Sheet*, 2143 hrs. 4 August 1974.

Police station.⁵⁶ This incident was not an isolated case. Prior to the beginning of the Tripartite negotiations, it was noted by UNFICYP that both sides had attempted to use UN dress and paraphernalia to carry out forward movement without recrimination. On 28 July, LCol. H.E. Skaarup, UNFICYP HQ sent a message to all contingents advising the following:

There is good reason to believe that items of UN identification such as blue berets and UN flags have fallen into hands of...both sides. Both are concerned that troops of the other may be masquerading in UN dress...Although...contrary to...UNFICYP practices...UN personnel may show ID when requested by either side...⁵⁷

The above incidents were indicative of the attempts by both sides to secure or improve their defensive or forward lines. However, evidence supports the argument that the Turkish forces were using this period of negotiation to consolidate and build up resources for another advance. In any event, this period allowed both sides to prepare for whatever would happen.

⁵⁶ *Nicosia District Daily Operational Log Sheet*, 5 August 1974.

⁵⁷ UN Doc. Unclassified Routine Message From HQ UNFICYP To List F (UN ZONE Commanders), 28 July 1974.

6.9 Conclusion

Within the context of the negotiations themselves, three aspects merit review. First, the UNFICYP role in the Tripartite Committee. While it is true that Turkey raised objections to having UNFICYP play a role in these negotiations, the UN presence was beneficial. As demonstrated, UNFICYP was able to monitor, with a fair amount of accuracy, the movements of the Turkish forces not only outside Nicosia, but within the city as well. As Brigadier General Beattie stated and UN Operational Logs confirm:

UNFICYP posts and patrols had followed the operations very closely. The arrival of the 16/5th Lancers on the night of 24/25 July had helped immeasurably and elements of this regiment were in a position to monitor Turkish operations, especially the western flank [Lapithos/Karavas].

In fact, UNFICYP was able to produce a map which defined the entire Turkish lines as at 2200 hours 30 Jul 74 and could have negotiated its position with confidence. The flights into the Lapithos/Karavas area on 4 August served to confirm the validity of the UNFICYP position concerning this area but which was never officially recorded in the deliberations.⁵⁸

It should be noted that the Turkish representative, even after being confronted by Greek forces in the area on that date, refused to acknowledge the point. The Turkish

⁵⁸ Diary C.E. Beattie August 1974 and interview February 12 1994.

position often held the view that UNFICYP information on FDLs was not valid or up to date. In reality, they refused to accept UNFICYP information for it contradicted their own.

Second, the Turkish interpretation of the term "ground occupied" as opposed to being "under fire". They used "under fire" as meaning controlled and under Turkish authority. Although this concept is contrary to military thinking, it gave the Turks time to push forward while deliberations were undertaken to define their position. What was perhaps required was a definition of terms prior to demarcation of Forward Defensive Lines.

Third, the Tripartite negotiations emphasized the need for immediate reconnaissance and "freezing of positions in the event of a cease-fire."⁵⁹ Attempting to define a line held by a combatant, three to five days after the event, is next to impossible. The only method to achieve this would be if both sides adhered strictly to UN declarations of cease-fires and non-movement. This was not the case in this situation. Therefore the line could only be confirmed on the day of the visit by the Committee. In addition, movement by both sides after the lines were agreed to, became common occurrence thereby negating agreed to positions.

⁵⁹ *Ibid.*

Despite the problems faced by the Committee and in particular the UN, a document was produced in the time specified. Colonel Beattie was promoted to Brigadier-General and he assumed the responsibilities of Chief of Staff following the events of July-September 1974. UNFICYP's credibility was secure, due to his and CANCON's efforts. As well, UN representation on the Committee allowed UNFICYP to assist all parties involved by presenting factual information, and being impartial in its dealings with various participants. As for the document produced for the Foreign Ministers in Geneva, it could have been a useful tool to help find a peaceful solution. The fact that it was not used does not indicate the failure of this exercise, but rather the failure of those who did not use the result of these negotiations.

On 14 August, at 2:11 A.M., a secret message from UN Headquarters in Geneva was flashed to the attention of Prem Chand with a copy to Brian Urguhart in New York which stated:

Conference broke down at 0225 hours local time.
British delegation is of opinion that Turkish forces
could move in two hours.⁶⁰

The Second phase of the Turkish invasion was about to begin.

⁶⁰ UN Doc. Secret Message from UN Geneva, dated 140211Z Aug 74, to UNFICYP Commander General Prem Chand. This message is part of BGen Beattie's private papers.

CHAPTER 7

THE TURKISH INVASION PHASE II

14-18 AUGUST 1974

The five days of Phase II of the Turkish invasion witnessed the Canadian Contingent's determination to prevent, as much as possible, the loss of human life. This period would culminate in the establishment of a new role for UNFICYP. Caught in the middle of a renewed offensive, the Canadian Contingent reinforced its willingness to use force to control UN Designated Areas, supervise cease-fire agreements, continue to press for freedom of movement by UN forces, and provide humanitarian assistance.

The secret message from the United Nations Geneva Headquarters to Prem Chand proved to be accurate. In the pre-dawn hours of 14 August, the Turkish forces began breaking out of their secured beach head areas and within days had taken control of approximately 40 per cent of the island of Cyprus. In message number UNFICYP 1191 signed by Prem Chand, the following was dispatched to Brian Urquhart in New York:

1. Turkish aircraft attacked Nicosia area around 0500 hours. UN has already suffered casualties; five Finns at Kykko Camp and four British at Ayia Marina...Firing going on in city area and UN OPs there being evacuated. Aircraft attack on Angastina area and Turkish tank movement towards Mia Milea. Artillery fire.

2. In accordance previous arrangement all UN troops in areas concerned being withdrawn to main camps.¹

7.1 CANCON Reinforces and is Willing to Use Force

Although stating that UN troops would be withdrawn to their main camps, in fact UNFICYP, and specifically the Canadian Contingent, once again took the initiative to interpose itself between the two combatants. In the previous chapter, it was noted that General Dextraze, Chief of Defence Staff, and Mitchell Sharp, Minister for External Affairs, had readily agreed that the Canadian Contingent would be immediately reinforced. As such, with the deployment of the majority of the Airborne Regiment to Cyprus in late July and early August 1974, the units which had been divided (one half in Cyprus/the remainder in Canada) were reunited and the Regiment was reconstituted. The make up of the Regiment has already been described but

¹ UN Doc. Message From UNFICYP Commander, General Prem Chand to Brian Urquhart, UN HQ New York, UNFICYP 1191, 14 August 1974. This document is also part of Beattie's private papers.

the first line holdings (combat capability) now included a seven day stock of ammunition.²

The Canadian government and Defence Department had ensured that the Canadian Contingent reinforcements were deployed with all necessary equipment to both carry out its UN role and to ensure the security of its own personnel which included the prevention of abuses against its peacekeepers by both belligerents. With this added strength, there would be no more cases of Canadian soldiers being disarmed or being ignored. This point was made very clear during the period 1-12 August 1974. One example occurred on 2 August, when it was reported that a section of Turkish soldiers had been observed in the old UN Observation Post, Golf Course, at approximately 11:00 A.M. It was ascertained that the Turks were in the process of excavating the site to strongly fortify their position. This situation posed a serious threat to the shaky cease fire as the Greeks were preparing to advance on this position.³ In response, the Joint Operations Centre ordered a mobile patrol to investigate and stabilize the situation. Upon approaching the location, it was verified that the Turks had been

² BGen C.E. Beattie, interview held in Ottawa, Ontario, 13 January 1994.

³ *Nicosia District Daily Operational Log Sheet*, Serial 23, 2 August 1974.

preparing to heavily fortify the old UN OP and the on-the-spot CANCON Commander strongly protested this activity. With the mobile patrol having a Lynx vehicle with a .50 cal. machine gun and the Canadians refusing to countenance this activity and prepared to stand their ground, the Turks halted excavation. Through negotiations, the Greeks agreed to move back 50 metres from the location and CANCON established a new Observation Post.⁴

Another example of the Canadian Contingent's determination to forcibly impose itself between the combatants was recorded on 4 August at 9:20 A.M. Call sign Northstar (Force Commander) passed the following order to CANCON:

Now that actual fighting has stopped in most parts of Cyprus you are required to increase patrol activity within your zone/district in order to prevent looting/maltreatment etc. Emphasis should also be placed on investigation reporting of threats and allegation from the two communities. All such incidents should be reported to this HQ.⁵

This type of activity, coupled with defusing potential hostile acts and aggressive movements by both sides, would ensure that the Canadian Contingent was fully engaged along

⁴ *Ibid.*, Serial 26.

⁵ *Nicosia District Daily Operational Log Sheet*, Serial 7, 4 August 1974.

the Green Line. An example CANCON's resolve to not be mistreated was recorded on the same day. At 5:20 P.M. it was flashed to the Joint Operations Centre that the local Turk Commander, at the Golf Course area of Nicosia, had vigorously protested the presence of UN (CANCON) troops at OP Nicosia Club and had demanded their immediate removal.⁶ To make his point, the Turk Commander physically removed the UN flag at the Observation Post. The Canadian UN personnel at this location refused to be intimidated and stood their ground.⁷ The Joint Operations Centre stated it would lodge a formal complaint of this incident. It also ordered the dispatch of two Lynxes to reinforce both the patrol and the UN Observation Post at the club. The Canadian UN personnel at the location informed the Turk Commander of this action and advised him that CANCON would not leave the UN Observation Post under any circumstances and that it was prepared to defend this location. By 6:35 P.M. the Joint Operations Centre ordered the Lynxes back to CANCON Base and the record stated:

Show of force not required. Recommend Lynx remain in readiness. Discussion between local UN and Turk Commander improving.⁸

⁶ *Ibid.*, Serial 34.

⁷ *Ibid.*, Serial 35.

⁸ *Ibid.*, Serial 37 and 38.

The preceding incidents, and the Canadian Contingent's response, assured UNFICYP's role as a significant factor to be considered by both sides. What CANCON accomplished was to make very clear that the United Nations would not be abused, mistreated, bullied nor ignored. Without UNFICYP interposing itself along the Green Line, there would have been far greater incidents of both Greek and Turk Cypriots and soldiers from either side being killed or maimed. Further, the presence of the United Nations made it more difficult for both sides to completely ignore cease fire resolutions. By their presence, the Canadian Contingent initiated local cease fires and prevented wide spread carnage from occurring. This allowed the peacemaking process to continue in Geneva. However, the supervision of local cease fires by the Canadian Contingent and the interposing of itself between the two combatants did not prevent the Turkish Forces from initiating the second phase of their invasion plans.

7.2 The Turkish Army Breaks Out

Following the receipt of the flash message from Geneva that the Turks had demanded an immediate solution to the Cyprus situation and that hostilities on their part were

anticipated, UNFICYP Headquarters issued ORANGE ALERT.⁹ This alert was sent out in anticipation of Turkish forces resuming their drive to advance in the northern part of the island. It should be remembered that since the first day of the invasion, on 20 July, the Turks had continually resupplied their forces. In fact, they had reinforced their troops with tanks and guns after they had established a bridgehead near Kyrenia. What transpired with this second phase was that the Turkish Army pushed east and west and ultimately captured approximately 40% of the island, including the majority of its major ports.

During the preceding period, records indicate that the Canadian Contingent continually reinforced its UN Observation Posts with sandbags and trenches. They [CANCON] were now better prepared for the upcoming events than during the first phase of the Turkish invasion. Throughout 13 August, the Canadian Contingent witnessed the concentration of vehicles north of the city.¹⁰ At 6:30 P.M. it was reported that 60 vehicles including 38 tanks had been spotted in the area of Geunyeli.¹¹ By 9:00 P.M. more than 125 vehicles, including tracked vehicles, had been reported by UN

⁹ *Nicosia District Daily Operational Log Sheet, Serial 2, 13 August 1974.*

¹⁰ *Ibid.*, Serial 35.

¹¹ *Ibid.*, Serial 50.

Observers moving in the areas north of Nicosia and in the area of Kyrenia.¹² In addition to vehicle movement, the National Guard had begun redeploying its vehicles and establishing new roadblocks within the city.¹³ It was evident that something was about to occur.

In response to these activities, the Canadian Contingent carried out mobile patrols to help diffuse potential cease fire violations. The Commanding Officer of the Regiment, Colonel G.H.J. Lessard, who had arrived in Cyprus with Canadian reinforcements, ordered all Armoured Personnel Carriers and Lynxes to be operational for 6:00 A.M., 14 August 1974.¹⁴

In Guenyeli, the lights of the town were turned off. This left only the Greek positions illuminated. With no illumination, the recording of movement by the Turks would be harder to observe. Concurrent with this activity, an unidentified aircraft was observed flying at approximately 10,000 feet on what appeared to be a reconnaissance mission.¹⁵ UNFICYP and CANCON now anticipated a full scale Turkish advance. They did not have long to wait.

¹² *Ibid.*, Serials 73-75, 79 and 81.

¹³ *Ibid.*, Serials, 33, 35, 38, and 54.

¹⁴ *Ibid.*, Serials 70-71.

¹⁵ *Ibid.*, Serial 87.

During the early hours of 14 August, reports by CANCON Observation Posts stressed that vehicle and troop movements had increased significantly by both the Turks and the Greeks. At the Nicosia Club it was reported that the Turks had manned their trenches with 12 persons and that ammunition was being stockpiled.¹⁶ Reports indicated that both sides had fully manned their positions throughout the Green Line area of the city.¹⁷ At approximately 5:00 A.M. UNFICYP observed 10 Turkish Phantom jets overflying the city and further observed the bombing and strafing of Greek National Guard positions throughout the city.¹⁸

Although UN Observation Posts had been established during the lull in the fighting prior to 14 August, and both sides had been informed of their locations, each side began ignoring the UN OPs in their desire to confront each other. At 5:12 A.M. Observation Posts Klondike, Rosslyn, and Cornaro received direct aimed fire. In fact, it was reported that OP Cornaro had been forced to move from the roof position into the building in order to escape injury.¹⁹ Under direct and heavy fire it was ordered that all Observation Posts except Ledra, Cornaro and Electra, be withdrawn.

¹⁶ *Nicosia District Daily Operational Log Sheet*, Serial 14, 14 August, 1974.

¹⁷ *Ibid.*, Serial 15.

¹⁸ *Ibid.*, Serial 18 and 23.

¹⁹ *Ibid.*, Serial 20.

Although not wishing to withdraw, discretion became the overriding factor in face of such heavy weapons fire. UN Observation Posts were neither supported by armour nor did they have anti-tank guns to defend themselves. The order to withdraw was at the local Commander's discretion and, in these circumstances, it was deemed appropriate as the safety of UN troops was paramount. In fact, Headquarters UNFICYP had reported that at 7:38 A.M. four British Contingent and eight Finnish Contingent personnel had been wounded.²⁰ Although sustaining heavy fire and having to withdraw Observation Posts, the UN was assured by the Turks that they were "being careful not to fire on the UN."²¹

This assurance that the Turks had not deliberately fired upon Canadian Contingent personnel was of small comfort or had little meaning to those who had already experienced such shelling. A Canadian UN Armoured Personnel Carrier (APC) had been dispatched to OP Pegasus in the north east of the city to evacuate Canadian Contingent personnel who had been under direct fire. As the Observation Post came under increased fire, it was ordered withdrawn by the use of an Armoured Personnel Carrier. As the APC moved out, it came under small arms fire, and, as it proceeded south, was

²⁰ *Ibid.*, Serial 60.

²¹ *Ibid.*, Serial 117.

disabled by an explosion. It reported its predicament to the Joint Operations Centre and stated it had been hit by Turk anti-tank fire and that it would seek shelter at OP Kronberg.²²

A similar incident occurred at OP Cornaro, located in a tall hotel situated in the city. Due to its strategic location, the hotel was deemed important enough to be kept manned as long as possible. However, by 7:15 A.M. it had come under artillery and small arms fire.²³ As firing became heavier, it was decided that the Canadian UN personnel should seek safety in the basement of the hotel. By 8:00 A.M. eleven Turkish tanks moved within 200 metres and the OP was ordered abandoned, safety being the main concern. The CANCON personnel were rescued by Armoured Personnel Carriers and returned to base camp.²⁴

In each difficult situation there is inevitably a humorous occurrence. Such was the case at the Kennedy Hotel. At 7:37 A.M., the Joint Operations Centre ordered two Armoured Personnel Carriers to the Kennedy Hotel to pick up civilians from that location. As the Canadian soldiers

²² *Ibid.*, Serial 35.

²³ *Ibid.*, Serial 34 and 49.

²⁴ *Nicosia District Daily Operational Log Sheet*, Serials 48, 66 and 68, 14 August 1974.

arrived and began evacuating UN civilians, one young woman, as she was being carried to the APC, was heard to remark, "Thank goodness, the United States Army has arrived."²⁵ The Canadian Contingent UN personnel still delivered her to safety.

To protect UN bases from occupation, the Deputy Commanding Officer, LCol Manuel, was ordered to assume command of the Blue Beret Camp (BBC). At 9:00 A.M. a 20 vehicle convoy, under the command of Captain Wesko, was formed at Wolsely Barracks to evacuate non-essential personnel to BBC.²⁶ Within the hour, the Joint Operations Centre attempted to arrange a cease fire for 11:00 A.M. The Turkish vice-president's Office agreed to this cease fire immediately. However, the Greek National Guard Headquarters would only agree if:

the Turks agree and the Turks won't take advantage of the cease fire and advance their forces and the UN guarantees it. If agree have UN contact the National Guard.²⁷

In response, CANCON advised the National Guard that they could not guarantee the cease fire as both sides were

²⁵ BGen Beattie, interview held in Ottawa, Ontario, 13 January 1994.

²⁶ *Nicosia District Daily Operational Log Sheet*, Serial 75, 14 August 1974.

²⁷ *Ibid.*, Serial 109 and 128.

responsible for the disposition and control of their own forces. It appeared that the National Guard wanted someone to blame if the cease fire failed.²⁸

The cease fire lasted 24 minutes and was negated by Turkish jets dropping napalm on Greek positions near the grammar school and the Greek National Contingent Camp.²⁹ Throughout the afternoon of the 14th there was sporadic gun fire and the only concentrated use of force by either side occurred at the grammar school. The area was of critical importance for the Turkish forces as it overlooked the Greek National Contingent Camp and had to be overrun if the airport was to be isolated. According to Beattie, the attempt failed due to poor artillery, armour, and infantry coordination to concentrate on the objective.³⁰ Once the attack on the grammar school failed, the Turks moved back to their previous forward position.

This type of concentrated activity near the city of Nicosia and the area and road adjacent to Famagusta, was not experienced in other areas of the island. The Turks had three columns of infantry proceeded by tanks, which had been

²⁸ *Ibid.*, Serial 129.

²⁹ *Ibid.*, Serial 179 and 187.

³⁰ BGen Beattie, interview held in Ottawa, Ontario, 13 January 1994.

observed pushing eastward towards Famagusta. The objective of this force became apparent as the centre group secured Famagusta, the left group captured Boghaz and the Panhandle, and the right group secured a line generally following the old Famagusta Road.³¹ (See adjacent map) As the day ended, a relative calm descended over the city of Nicosia. Only sporadic gun fire was reported.

The second day of the Turkish breakout began with an artillery barrage in the area north-west of the Nicosia Race Course. Simultaneously, the entire front of the Forward Defensive Line within the city erupted with exchanges of fire from both sides. UN positions were once again threatened by mortar fire.³² By mid-morning it was reported that the National Guard had also fired upon UN vehicles in the city.³³

During the day, UN positions had come under heavy shelling. One such position was the Finnish camp at Kykko, near Blue Beret Camp. This UN position had suffered heavy mortar and artillery fire.³⁴ The bombardment resulted from

³¹ *Nicosia District Daily Operational Log Sheet*, Serial 299, 14 August 1974.

³² *Nicosia District Daily Operational Log Sheet*, Serials 15, 18, 19, 23, 25, 27, and 28, 15 August 1974.

³³ *Ibid.*, Serial 37.

³⁴ *Ibid.*, Serial 96.

heavy fighting which had taken place near the Grammar School and in the vicinity of the Airport. After reporting 10 casualties, Headquarters UNFICYP ordered the evacuation of the Camp. The Canadian Contingent responded to this directive and, upon arriving at the Camp, found that the Finnish soldiers were reluctant to leave the area. As the rescue unit had come under direct fire and had been subject to napalm bombing from the Turkish Airforce, the Canadian Contingent personnel were anxious to gather the Finns and remove themselves from danger. After a brief discussion on the benefits of leaving the area, the Finns were loaded into the Armoured Personnel Carriers and the evacuation was completed. Following the deliberate attack on the United Nations base of Kykko Camp, Prem Chand, UNFICYP Commander, contacted the Commander Turkish Forces in writing and lodged a formal protest. In his message to Lt Gen Ersin, the UNFICYP Force Commander, wrote:

Turkish mortars once again bombed the close vicinity of UN Kykko Camp on August 15 at about 1800 hrs. Bombs were landing close by and we were fortunate that there were no casualties. I am sure you will agree that it is most regrettable indeed that this should be happening again after the many casualties we suffered in this very camp from Turkish mortar bombs on 14 August and in spite of your assurances together with the fact that I have conveyed a map reference of the UN Camps to you. I cannot imagine that strict orders have not been issued to your Commanders in the area, and the fact that they have

not been able to carry them out is something I find difficult to understand.³⁵

At Camp Kronberg, the Canadian Contingent suffered four casualties. At 1:00 P.M. it was noted by the Joint Operations Centre that:

7 or 8 Mortars landed in Kronberg. 1 injured, not too serious. If mortaring continues will evacuate.
1303 - 3 casualties at Kronberg.³⁶

Within minutes, Kronberg was ordered evacuated with the exception of one section of Canadian UN soldiers.

7.3 The Canadian Contingent Defends the Airport and Ledra Palace Hotel

During the first phase the Nicosia Airport had been designated a UN Protected Area. The determination to continue to hold this strategic location was made evident during the afternoon of 15 August. Major Dave Harries, who commanded the Task Force responsible for the security of the airport, reported that artillery rounds were falling extremely close to the airport.³⁷ It was determined that a

³⁵ UN Doc. Message to CRESCENT From UN Force Commander to Commander Turkish Forces, 16 August 1974. This document is part of Beattie's private papers.

³⁶ *Nicosia District Daily Operational Log Sheet*, Serials 78 and 81, 15 August 1974.

³⁷ *Ibid.*, Serial 54.

National Guard Battery to the south was firing over the airport at the Turkish positions on the other side.³⁸ However, some rounds were falling short. In retaliation, the Turks attempted to infringe upon the airport perimeter which had been established as a 500 meter no entry zone. After several near misses from artillery fire, the Turks were warned that the Canadian Contingent would not permit passage or infringement on to United Nations areas. The Turks did not advance on the airport area.

Throughout the day, heavy refugee traffic was observed moving south from the city. The case of these refugees was to become one of the Canadian Contingent's major humanitarian efforts as thousands of displaced persons began camping in numerous villages to the south. The following report was recorded at the Joint Operations Centre in regard to the location and numbers of refugees:

Para 200-300, Politika 50-100, Episkopion 100-150, Kilrou 200-300, Kalo Kohorio 100-150, Agro Kipia 50-100, Mitsero 50-100, Orunda 50-100, Ayia Varvara 250-350, Tseri 100.

All require blankets, food, warm clothing and will require medicines supplied within a few days.³⁹

³⁸ *Ibid.*, Serial 66.

³⁹ *Ibid.*, Serial 167.

Within its zone of responsibility, the Canadian Contingent had to deal with approximately 20,000 refugees.⁴⁰ As records indicate, Canadian UN patrols delivered tons of food and supplies, tents, blankets, and cots before the Red Cross and welfare agencies were able to organize their responsibilities. Once organized, these agencies were assisted by the Canadian Contingent by relaying, to both Turk and Greek Cypriots, messages for family purposes and, in some cases, escorting relief agencies to and from villages. Canadian Contingent doctors also attended to those who required medical aid and, in the village of Kochati, administered relief to over 400 people.⁴¹

By 1:00 P.M. a local cease fire had been arranged to take effect at 2:00 P.M. local time. However, within 17 minutes this cease fire broke down when one mortar round fell in the area of the Ledra Palace Hotel.⁴² The second day of Phase II of the Turkish Invasion was not as hectic as the first. The main strategy for the Turks appeared to be to push east and west in the north and to fortify their positions in the Nicosia District. The Greeks appeared to want to maintain their positions in Nicosia and prepared to

⁴⁰ BGen C.E. Beattie, interview held in Ottawa, Ontario, 13 January 1994.

⁴¹ *Ibid.*

⁴² *Nicosia District Daily Operational Log Sheet, Serials 86,99, and 103, 15 August 1974.*

defend the southern part of the island. CANCON had held the airport and Camp Kronberg, while still maintaining its position at Wolsely Barracks and BBC. At the Ledra Palace Hotel, the day was spent mostly improving defensive positions. Additionally, OP Cornaro was remanned as an observation point which overlooked the battle area to the north west of the city.

The heavy fighting resumed in the early hours of 16 August. Turkish F-100s resumed their bombing raid on the Grammar School area and the Headquarters of the 11 Tactical Group National Guard.⁴³ This air attack was followed up three hours later by an attack of a Battalion of Turkish soldiers supported by six M-48 tanks.⁴⁴ Meanwhile, OP Cornaro had once again come under attack and had to be withdrawn.⁴⁵ After heavy fighting and many casualties, the Greek National Guard began to give ground. In the area of OP Cornaro, the Turks had advanced and attempted to take the Central Prison.⁴⁶ This area was vital for the Greek National Guard. Should they lose it, they would have to fall back from their positions on the west bank of the Pedunios River. This would then isolate positions near Wolsely Barracks and the Ledra Palace

⁴³ *Nicosia District Daily Operational Log Sheet*, Serials 14-15, 16 August 1974.

⁴⁴ *Ibid.*, Serial 33 and 42.

⁴⁵ *Ibid.*, Serial 39.

⁴⁶ *Ibid.*, Serial 40.

Hotel. As this area was occupied by Greeks (in other outposts) and by Canadian UN personnel, it was imperative that the Canadian Contingent not give ground.

To forestall any attempt to advance and overrun UN areas, the Commanding Officer of the Regiment, Colonel Lessard, ordered Canadian UN personnel in these areas to be ready to repel any aggression. The Joint Operations Centre radioed to all Observation Posts:

Due to the present situation of possible Greek withdrawal en masse, possibly through UN ground. Prepare defensive positions; barbed wire, locate .30 cal and 106 RR.

NOBODY Greek or Turk are (sic) to go through UN ground. Surrenders will be accepted. Persons will surrender their weapons and be under UN protection from then on.⁴⁷

Both the Greeks and the Turks were advised through their respective Liaison Officers that the Canadian Contingent would not permit any violation of UN areas and was prepared to defend them from any attack. The combatants reassessed their positions and did not advance. This was another example of the determination by the Canadian Contingent to be prepared to use force. This action once again reinforced the UN's determination to secure UN

⁴⁷ *Ibid.*, Serial 87.

Protected Areas. At 3:00 P.M. it was determined through Liaison Officer contact that the Turks would implement a full cease fire throughout the island commencing at 1800 hours.⁴⁸ However, by 5:30 P.M. the Grammar School fell to the advancing Turks and a Turkish Flag was raised on its roof.⁴⁹

7.4 The Cease Fire

Although sporadic gun fire was reported throughout the remainder of the day, essentially the cease fire held. The priorities for the Canadian Contingent for the upcoming day were identified as being two main tasks. First, the establishment of a United Nations presence between both sides and second, the determination of the new demarcation line between the two combatants. The Joint Operations Centre recorded the following:

Patrol Plan 17 August

General Task: Under their CS (Call Signs) CANCON [to] patrol sector 1 and 2 with mission to confirm South flank of Turk Contingent area in Nicosia District. CS 1 and 2 to intensify patrol in respective sectors starting first light.

⁴⁸ *Ibid.*, Serial 88.

⁴⁹ *Ibid.*, Serial 107.

General Task: Confirm refugee situation location, no problems. Confirm National Guard and Turk dispositions intentions and capabilities. Reports to be submitted as SITREP and to be confirmed by patrol reports.⁵⁰

In the early hours of 17 August, Canadian UN patrols were operating in the Kronberg area. The patrol reported that, with the exception of the Cornaro Hotel UN OP which was now held by the Turks, no significant advance by either side had occurred.⁵¹

Based on reports, the fighting in the area had been close and extremely violent. What was surprising was that the National Guard had indeed withdrawn from positions previously mentioned on the Pedhios River. The Turks however, had not taken advantage of this withdrawal. The question arises as to the stand taken by the Canadian Contingent in this area on the previous day where no forces were to be allowed to enter UN areas. Was it the determination by the Canadian Contingent which prevented advancement or advised caution on the part of the Turks? In all probability, it was a combination of stubborn resistance by the Greeks and the firm stand by the Canadian Contingent that prevented the Turks from advancing.

⁵⁰ *Ibid.*, Serial 141.

⁵¹ *Ibid.*, Serials 1-14.

An interesting event occurred at approximately 10:00 A.M. The Regimental Commander, Col Lessard ordered 2 Commando to push Turk Cypriot Fighters back across the Pedhios River as they had violated the cease fire agreement.⁵² Upon reaching the area a series of tense incidents occurred. The hate and apparent minimal respect for human life by both sides became evident. At one stage, one of the Turkish Cypriot Fighter's was caught at the end of a street in the area and was about to be shot by the Greeks. The Commanding Officer (CANCON) upon arriving at the scene, took the Turk Cypriot Fighter into UN custody and ordered an Armoured Personnel Carrier to extract the soldier. Meanwhile, the Turk Cypriot Fighter leader put a gun to a Canadian soldier and warned that, should the Greeks kill his soldier then he [TCF] would kill the Canadian in return.⁵³ At this time another CANCON APC with a Lynx arrived on the scene with weapons fully cocked. The Turk Cypriot Fighter leader, yielding to a superior force, lowered his weapon and removed the rest of his men back across the river. The Turk Cypriot Fighter, previously rescued by Canadian UN personnel, was escorted back across the river. The Canadian Contingent's willingness to use force to not

⁵² *Nicosia District Daily Operational Log Sheet, Serial 46, 17 August 1974.*

⁵³ BGen Beattie, interview held in Ottawa, Ontario, 13 January 1994.

only supervise a cease fire but for protection was clearly demonstrated and acknowledged by both sides.

In another incident, Turk Cypriot Fighters ordered Canadian UN personnel to leave the area as it was under Turkish control. According to Colonel Houghton, it was reported that the TCF had given the Canadian UN patrol an ultimatum to leave the area in "five minutes or else." The response by the Canadian UN patrol was typical of numerous responses to threats from either sides. The response was, "Or else what?"⁵⁴ During this incident the Joint Operations Centre dispatched Armoured Personnel Carriers to the location and CANCON remained at the UN Observation Post. Once again the Canadian Contingent had demonstrated its willingness to use force to hold its position was not an idle threat.

Throughout the day, small arms fire and sporadic mortar shelling was observed throughout the city and the rest of the island. In the Greek village of Pyroi, south east of Nicosia, the National Guard was still under fire. By 5:30 P.M., Turkish tanks with infantry support had entered

⁵⁴ Colonel M. Houghton, interview held in Ottawa, Ontario, 11 March 1994.

the village and by 6:00 P.M. the village had been captured.⁵⁵ The last incident recorded on 17 August was that of the vice-president's Office complaining to the Joint Operations Centre that the UN OP near the Cornaro Hotel was shining lights towards the Turkish lines. In fact, these lights were Coleman lanterns which illuminated the UN Observation Post. The fact that the Turk Cypriot Fighters were complaining about UN activities signified that operations on the Green Line were returning to the normal condition of complaints against the UN, not the Greeks. This last entry signaled the end of Phase II of the Turkish invasion.

The days following the formal cease fire witnessed numerous violations but, in general, the Turks and Greeks held their positions. In the city itself, in the early hours of 18 August, Greek National Guard troops removed their forward position from the traffic circle area near Blue Beret Camp. This action was precipitated by fear of an attack by the Turk Cypriot Fighters.⁵⁶ In the area of Pyroi, the Greeks complained that the Turks had moved up more tanks. However, when Canadian UN personnel investigated, it was discovered that the Turks had only repositioned their

⁵⁵ *Nicosia District Daily Operational Log Sheet*, Serials 103, 106 and 108, 17 August 1974.

⁵⁶ *Nicosia District Daily Operational Log Sheet*, Serials 4-5, 18 August 1974.

tanks and assured CANCON that no movement was contemplated. To ensure that no further incidents would develop, the Canadian Contingent erected a UN Observation Post between the Greeks and Turks in Pyroi.

During this period, various embassies requested Canadian UN assistance in returning to their premises and protection from possible hostile acts while assessing damages. The Canadian Contingent provided such assistance to the Italian Ambassador and to the Egyptian Embassy.⁵⁷ At approximately 10:30 A.M., CANCON was requested to negotiate the release of Turkish Cypriots who had been detained by Greek soldiers. These Turk Cypriots had attempted to flee to Louroujina for safety. This type of incident would become all too familiar in the ensuing weeks.⁵⁸ In addition to securing local cease fires, the Canadian Contingent began the relief effort of feeding people who had fled the fighting. CANCON was requested to see to the needs of numerous people in the south of the city, including 30 babies, who were in dire need of food and milk. This was in response to a request to the Joint Operations Centre, as the Red Cross had not yet arrived to render assistance. Further, Headquarters UNFICYP had ordered the purchase of 10,000

⁵⁷ *Ibid.*, Serial 17 and 18.

⁵⁸ *Ibid.*, Serial 22.

pounds of rice which would be required to help feed refugees. The Canadian Contingent was ordered to pick up these supplies and move them to secure areas.⁵⁹

By the early hours of 19 August, the Canadian Contingent had remanned or established 24 UN Observation Posts along the Green Line. To accomplish this, the Canadian Contingent consisting of personnel from the Airborne Regiment, was divided into two groups, the 1st and 2nd Commando. The following is a list of Observation Posts established by each group to patrol the Green Line:

1 Commando

- Ledra North	- UN II	- Potamia
- Maple I	- Ormophida I	- Dahli
- Hermes	- Ledra Parking Lot	- Pyroi
- Constantine	- Pegasus	- Louroujina
- Clinic	- Villages	

⁵⁹ *Ibid.* Serial 20.

2 Commando

- School (Grammar) - Cornaro
- Rosslyn - Kronberg
- Mojave - Kronberg Area (2)
- Orchard - Traffic Circle (near BBC)⁶⁰

With the establishment of these Observation Posts, the Canadian Contingent was better able to monitor the on-going situation and react to any infringements of the cease fire within its area of responsibility. As well, during the day CANCON responded to requests by both sides to remove dead soldiers from areas contested by either the Greeks or Turks.⁶¹

As noted, the Turks had consolidated their positions and, by 19 August, controlled approximately 40% of the island. Although the cease fire was generally effective, Turkish advances continued in areas they felt would be uncontested. At each advance, a protest from the Canadian Contingent Commander or the Force Commander was lodged, but each protest was rejected. What became evident, was that the Turks refused to recognize United Nations authority within

⁶⁰ *Nicosia District Daily Operational Log Sheet, Serial 5, 19 August 1974.*

⁶¹ *Ibid.*, Serial 7 and 13.

the zone occupied by Turkey. Several examples of continual encroachment are recorded for 19 August.⁶² Turkish troops advanced when not confronted, but upon being challenged, would usually refrain from further advances. An eyewitness account of such an incident was reported by James Anderson of the *Toronto Globe and Mail*. According to Anderson, and verified by UNFICYP Log Sheets, a Canadian patrol under the command of Major K. Courbould confronted a Turkish patrol that was in the process of establishing a new position. Courbould repeatedly requested the Turks to move back, however, they did not respond. After many attempts at negotiations, the Canadian officer physically placed a UN flag on the area under dispute. The Turks threatened to overrun the UN position so designated, but Courbould refused to be intimidated. Courbould then ordered his subordinate, Corporal Mackenzie, to remain in place and after a few tense minutes, the Turks withdrew to their previous position. Asked by Anderson why he was willing to remain and face potential danger, Mackenzie replied, "We are doing our job for a change."⁶³ Anderson further reported that Canadian soldiers were fully aware that their role as peacekeepers was being redefined.

⁶² *Ibid.*

⁶³ *The Toronto Globe and Mail*, 19 August 1974, p. 1.

7.5 Humanitarian Assistance

Examples of humanitarian assistance to non-combatants have already been described, however, there is one aspect that must be reviewed. That being the protection of foreign nationals. One of the fundamental guidelines of any United Nations operation is the non-involvement in the internal politics of a member state of the United Nations. At the same time, humanitarian assistance must be rendered whenever there is a requirement. This was the situation which faced the Canadian Contingent at 12:42 P.M. on 19 August.⁶⁴ At this time it was reported to the Joint Operations Centre that demonstrations were occurring in the vicinity of the American Embassy in Nicosia. The demonstrators were estimated to number approximately 2000. As a result of the Turkish invasion and the inability of the Greek National Guard to stem the attacks, Greek Cypriots focused their anger and frustration on the United States. The Greek Cypriots chanted anti-American slogans. They believed there was an American/Turkish conspiracy in regard to the de facto partitioning of Cyprus as a result of the Turkish invasion.

⁶⁴ *Nicosia District Daily Operational Log Sheet, Serial 51, 19 August 1974.*

The Joint Operations Centre was ordered to deploy an armoured vehicle to the area and maintain a presence in the hope of diffusing the situation. The patrol was specifically ordered not to become involved with the demonstrators but to report what was transpiring. At approximately 1:00 P.M. the patrol reported that the demonstration had turned violent and that gun fire had been directed towards the American Embassy. After a brief investigation of this incident, it was determined that two Americans had been shot. Immediately the Joint Operations Centre deployed two Armoured Personnel Carriers and a medical assistant to the embassy.⁶⁵ In addition, the first evacuation team was ordered to evacuate the residents of the embassy and, by 2:00 P.M. this was accomplished. The injured Americans were transported to the Nicosia Hospital, but both died. One of the fatalities was the American Ambassador.⁶⁶

Meanwhile, in the District of Famagusta, Turkish forces were hampering UNFICYP freedom of movement to provide humanitarian assistance. Already noted was the Turkish refusal to acknowledge the United Nations in their area of control. As early as 31 July 1974, Headquarters UNFICYP had

⁶⁵ *Ibid.*, Serials 59-61.

⁶⁶ UN Doc. S/11353/Add. 32, 19 August 1974. The events are also recorded in the *Nicosia District Daily Operational Log Sheet*, Serials 65, 67 and 70, 19 August 1974.

established criteria for remaining in the Turkish controlled area. In a "SECRET MESSAGE" to its Zone Force Commanders the subject was dealt with under title:

WITHDRAWAL OF UNFICYP FROM TURKISH AREA OF CONTROL

FIRST: Instructions have been issued by SEC GEN that UNFICYP should in no circumstances commence withdrawal from Turkish area of control without reference to him. Should Turkish army request such withdrawal details must be reported immediately to HQ UNFICYP.

SECOND: Care must be taken to avoid any actions which may compromise UNFICYP in Turkish area of control. In this connection you are to stress to all those under your command that while it is proper to continue to report main elements of situation relating to cease fire, we must avoid any idea that UNFICYP is engaging in intelligence activities which may give Turks cause to terminate UNFICYP presence in their area. This calls for discretion, nice judgment and proper observance of communications security.⁶⁷

The criteria outlined were developed as a result of the UN Secretary-General's insistence that UN Observation Posts were to remain in place within areas controlled by Turkish forces. In a *Note for the Record*, dated 30 July, Brian Urquhart, calling on behalf of the Secretary-General, outlined the following to Brigadier F. Henn:

⁶⁷ UN Doc. Precedence Information (SECRET) from HQ UNFICYP to Zone Commanders, 312030B Jul 74. This document is part of Beattie's private papers.

Urquhart said that he was telephoning because the Secretary-General had felt that he might not have made himself clear...concerning UNFICYP's position in the Turkish controlled areas...the present situation in which UNFICYP found itself had not been envisaged under the 1964 mandate...The Secretary-General's view was that it was very important that UNFICYP should stay in the Turkish controlled areas and he wished the Force Commander and SRSG to do their best in this respect, playing for time and stressing the humanitarian role which must apply impartiality to both communities.⁶⁸

During the Tripartite Negotiations, the Commander of the Turkish Forces, General Ersin, had acquiesced to the UNFICYP Commander's insistence of freedom of movement by the United Nations in matters pertaining to humanitarian assistance. However, by 21 August this freedom of movement was severely restricted. The Turkish Force Commander couched his argument for coercing the United Nations into leaving his area of control on humanitarian reasons. In a message to the UNFICYP Force Commander, he explained his reasoning:

...As you well know at present we do our best to help UNFICYP in carrying out humanitarian functions in the Turkish controlled areas, but on the other hand we are of the opinion, that the bulk of these efforts should be dealt with by the Red Cross to relieve your forces in protecting Turkish civilians in Greek controlled areas. I particularly emphasize this point, since the reports I had recently on mass massacres of Turkish civilians has caused me great concern. It has been very discouraging to learn

⁶⁸ UN Doc. Note for the Record, Telephone Conversation Between COS UNFICYP and Mr. B. Urquhart, UN HQ, 30 July 1974. This document is part of Beattie's private papers.

UNFICYP unawareness of such important incidents, while other matters of no value are being followed.⁶⁹

It is interesting to note that the Turk Force Commander did not refer to Turkish Cypriots, only to Turkish civilians.

In response, the Force Commander wrote to the Secretary-General voicing his concerns on this matter. However, in a personal letter from the UNFICYP Commander to the Turk Force Commander, Prem Chand strongly protested the Turkish restrictions placed on UN troops.

It should be noted that the Ankara government had called the invasion of Cyprus an intervention, and their force, the "Turkish Peace Force." As such, it felt that the role and tasks carried out by UNFICYP had reverted to their forces as they now controlled the northern half of the island. To emphasize this point, Prime Minister Bulent Ecevit wrote on 4 August in an open letter to the Greek Cypriots:

The Turkish action in Cyprus is aimed at bringing lasting peace and security for all Cypriots, Turkish and Greek alike.

⁶⁹ UN Doc. Message From Commanding Officer Turk Forces to Force Commander UNFICYP, 21 August 1974, from Beattie's private papers.

Your sons and husbands are protected not only by the provisions of the Geneva Conventions but also by our determination to uphold humanitarian considerations that goes beyond the said conventions.⁷⁰

General Prem Chand replied to the Turk Force Commander on 21 August. To underscore the importance of this aspect of humanitarian assistance it is necessary to quote extensively from the letter:

In my personal message to you...concerning freedom of movement for UN forces in the District of Famagusta, I referred to the terms of Resolution 359 adopted by the Security Council at its meeting on 15th August 1974. I have been informed today that the Secretary General of the UN has been in touch...with the Personal Representative at the UN of Turkey...
...In your message to me of 1st August you assured me that you would be most happy if you could help UN supported humanitarian activities in the Turkish controlled areas in the future and I welcome this assurance. For the present, UN activities are confined...to humanitarian activities, such as bringing relief supplies, medical assistance and other aid...We are engaged in the same activities in the Greek Cypriot controlled area where we are providing great assistance to the Turkish Cypriot communities. But to enable UNFICYP to carry out these humanitarian tasks...it is essential for my forces to have freedom of movement...without freedom of movement, which I must stress is freely accorded to UNFICYP by the National Guard, all our efforts to help are frustrated...

I was therefore especially disturbed to learn that yesterday the Commander of UN Swedish Civilian Police in Famagusta was not permitted to move his headquarters...in Famagusta.

⁷⁰ UN Doc. Letter to the Committee of Greek Parents and Relatives of Missing Soldiers, From Bulent Ecevit, Prime Minister Turkey, August 4, 1974, from Beattie's private papers.

Finally...the UN Commander in Famagusta has been informed that his previous liaison with the local Turkish Cypriot leadership...can no longer take place. I would be most grateful therefore if you would inform me as soon as possible of the officer with whom the UN District Commander should deal with.

In view of the urgency of the matter, I would appreciate it if you could let me have an early reply as I am anxious to begin patrolling some of these areas, if possible some time tomorrow.⁷¹

The message was transmitted to the Turk Force Commander but a reply was not received. It became a political issue that was discussed at higher levels. In any event, a small amount of humanitarian assistance was delivered but freedom of movement was curtailed and eventually halted. It was only in areas not controlled by Turkish Forces and along the Green Line that freedom of movement was not restricted.

On 23 August, another demonstration occurred in Nicosia. Once the cease fire had been effectively implemented, the Greek Cypriots once again focused their anger and frustration on the United States. A crowd of approximately 6000 gathered and marched on the United States Embassy. Once in the area, they began to burn flags, set

⁷¹ UN Doc. Message For Crescent (Turk Force Commander) From UN Force Commander, 21 August 1974, from Beattie's private papers.

cars on fire and shoot at random targets.⁷² The American Charge d' Affairs, Mr. Brown, requested assistance from the Canadian Contingent in rescuing the people trapped in the embassy. According to BGen Beattie:

We were in a tough predicament as to giving assistance. Assistance could only be given if the Government of Cyprus specifically requested such action. However, events began to move rapidly and there were reports that gas was being thrown into the embassy complex. I then contacted a member of the Cypriot Department of the Interior and he assured me that the situation was under control. In fact, the opposite was true. After some discussion, we agreed that the Cyprus government would request CANCON to render assistance on humanitarian grounds to assist them in re-establishing order. CANCON troops were quickly dispatched to the area and they, along with the Cypriot police, restored order, thereby diffusing a potential insurgency.⁷³

Once the situation was relatively calm, Canadian UN personnel evacuated the embassy and brought the Americans to Camp Maple Leaf.

Other forms of humanitarian assistance were provided by the Canadian Contingent following the cessation of hostilities. In some villages, United Nations patrols were threatened with physical violence if aid not forthcoming. In Mia Milea, there was an urgent requirement for food and baby

⁷² *Nicosia District Daily Operational Log Sheet*, Serial 29, 23 August 1974.

⁷³ BGen C.E. Beattie, interview held in Ottawa, Ontario, 13 January 1994.

milk. In Nicosia at the main park, there were thousands of refugees who required food and water. In Kambina, over 1200 persons required food, blankets, and medical supplies. At UNFICYP's request, foodstuffs, medical supplies and blankets were delivered by UN personnel to outlying villages throughout the island. Although restricted by Turkish Forces, Canadian UN personnel delivered humanitarian aid wherever possible.⁷⁴ Some examples of the efforts provided by CANCON in these endeavours were: in the village of Ayios Epiphanios, CANCON escorted the International Red Cross to deliver cots; in Anayia, CANCON distributed five tents and 160 blankets and, at Politika 75 tents and 200 blankets were delivered.⁷⁵

The Canadian Contingent's effectiveness in providing humanitarian assistance to all the Cypriots was acknowledged and confirmed at the end of August 1974. The refugee problem had been declared stabilized with the exception of one refugee camp. With Canadian Contingent assistance and with help from local authorities, CANCON was cited by the Force Commander for its tremendous humanitarian efforts:

⁷⁴ UN Doc. Nicosia District Economic/Humanitarian Situation Report 38/74, 22 August 1974.

⁷⁵ UN Doc. Nicosia District Economical/Humanitarian Situation Report 41/74, 25 August 1974.

We have a close and co-operative relationship with the IRRRC and the results are rewarding. When Major Courbould, whose patrols do much work with refugees, visited one particular camp, he received a standing ovation and an invitation to a camp party in his honour.⁷⁶

According to Beattie and available documents, it was UNFICYP, through the Canadian Contingent, that was fundamental in providing resources and assistance that enabled the International Red Cross to become established and headquartered in the Nicosia Hilton Hotel. Although severely restricted in their humanitarian assistance by the Turks, a great amount of humanitarian aid was distributed to both communities by the UN. According to United Nations records, approximately one-third of the population of Cyprus became homeless or otherwise in need of assistance during this period.⁷⁷ In fact, the Secretary-General designated Prince Sadruddin Aga Khan as Co-ordinator of United Nations Humanitarian Assistance for Cyprus.⁷⁸ The cost of the tremendous effort required for relief during August to December 1974 was estimated at 22 million US dollars.⁷⁹

The total number of Greek Cypriot refugees was indicated at approximately 203,000. The Canadian Contingent

⁷⁶ UN Doc. Nicosia District Economical/Humanitarian Situation Report, (Joint Operations Centre) 3350-8.

⁷⁷ UN Doc. S/11568, 6 December 1974.

⁷⁸ UN Doc. S/11488, 20 August 1974.

⁷⁹ UN Doc. S/11568, 6 December 1974.

was responsible for the safe return of 24,000 to their homes in Nicosia. Homes or shelters were found or erected for approximately 101,000 persons while 30,000 others were given shelter at the British Sovereign Base Area of Episkopi.⁸⁰ In addition to providing shelter, UNFICYP delivered approximately 2,000 tonnes of food to Greek and Turkish villages. As well, UNFICYP transported 300 tonnes of flour and 60 tons of rice to the north.⁸¹

Pursuant to negotiations and agreement between Clerides, the acting President, and Mr. Denktash, Turkish Cypriot Leadership, exchanges of prisoners and detainees were completed by 31 October. UNFICYP, represented by the Canadian Contingent, supervised this transaction and the exchanges took place at the Ledra Palace Hotel, a designated UN Protected Area.⁸²

The Canadian Contingent also dispatched troops to the south of the island to provide assistance whenever and wherever possible. This assistance included the deployment of Canadian UN troops to Turkish villages as a precautionary measure. This was carried out to ensure Greek troops did not harass Turkish Cypriots which might have given the Turk

⁸⁰ *Ibid.*

⁸¹ *Ibid.*

⁸² *Ibid.*

Force Commander a pretense to initiate a new round of hostilities. Furthermore, prisoners on both sides were treated humanely due to the efforts of UNFICYP and the Canadian Contingent in the Nicosia District. BGen Beattie stated the following in regard to the Canadian Contingent's reputation during this period:

This [humanitarian effort] greatly enhanced the Canadian Contingent's and UNFICYP's reputation for fairness, sympathy and quick action without which countless lives would have been lost.⁸³

7.6 Conclusion

Two new developments resulted from the renewed advance by the Turkish military forces. First, in response to the renewed Turkish offensive, Greece pulled its troops out of the NATO Alliance. To demonstrate its total lack of confidence in the Alliance and NATO's willingness not to become involved in the Cyprus situation, a Greek government representative declared:

After the Atlantic Alliance demonstrated its inability to prevent Turkey from creating a state of conflict between two allies, the Prime Minister ordered that the Greek armed forces should be withdrawn from NATO. Greece shall remain a member of

⁸³ BGen Beattie, interview held in Ottawa, Ontario, 13 January 1994.

the Alliance only in connexion with its political aspects.⁸⁴

Secondly, the response by UNFICYP and the Canadian Contingent to events resulting from the second phase of the Turkish invasion revealed certain criteria that would be adopted subsequently by UNFICYP. First, it was crucial to protect UN personnel from direct fire by providing safe UN Observation Posts. These were established after the second phase. As well, UN Protected Areas were well identified and both sides were advised, in as strong language as possible, that these areas were not to be infringed upon. If such infringement occurred, the United Nations was willing to use force to secure their areas. The events that took place at the Nicosia International Airport and Ledra Palace attest to this UNFICYP (CANCON) resolve. This action was made possible by the Canadian Contingent Commander's resolve and support by the Canadian government in providing additional troops and equipment in order that CANCON be effective. It also demonstrated the Canadian government's acceptance of the need for the Canadian Contingent to alter its role in responding to events. Third, the Canadian Contingent was willing to interpose itself between the two combatants to effect cease fires as witnessed by the Canadian actions at Kronberg and the Race Course. Subsequently, Canadian resolve

⁸⁴ *The Times*, 15 August 1974, p. 1.

to not be mistreated or overrun was demonstrated on many occasions. Fourth, regardless which Cypriot community required humanitarian assistance, UNFICYP and CANCON were willing and able to provide it. Humanitarian assistance not only entailed the delivery of food, supplies, and medicines but also the supervising of prisoner of war exchanges and the return of refugees to their villages and homes. The Canadian Contingent also assisted the International Red Cross by providing it with vehicles, communications and establishing their headquarters at the Nicosia Hilton.

The Canadian Contingent had led an effort which had redefined a United Nations operation, one which was initially established to curtail conflict between two communal groups. By 31 August, a new *modus operandi* was established and UNFICYP now entered its third phase. This entailed the establishment and patrolling of a "Buffer Zone" between the two opposing forces while diplomacy attempted the art of peacemaking.

CHAPTER 8

UNFICYP PHASE III

CLASSICAL PEACEKEEPING: SUPERVISING THE PARTITION OF CYPRUS

The arguments presented in the previous chapters have focused on the first two phases. The first phase involved the role of peacekeeping through observation and mediation. The second phase entailed peacekeeping by confrontation. Characterizing this phase was the decision by UNFICYP, led by actions taken by the Canadian Contingent, to become the first United Nations operation that established UN Protected Areas; that UNFICYP was willing to use force to secure these designated areas; and that UNFICYP enlarged its humanitarian assistance role.

This chapter will address the third phase of the evolution of UNFICYP. Included, is a description of the Canadian Contingent confronting a new reality of Cyprus in the aftermath of the Turkish invasion; the establishing of a buffer zone on the cease-fire line and the use of force to implement and secure it; and the provision of humanitarian assistance, all part of its new role and responsibilities.

8.1 The New Reality

It has already been noted that the Turkish forces had declared a cease-fire at 6:00 P.M. local time, on 16 August 1974. On that same day, the Security Council adopted resolution 360 (1974), which recorded its formal condemnation of the military invasion and actions that were taken against the Republic of Cyprus. The Council also urged both parties to comply with all provision of previous resolutions and a resumption of the Geneva discussions.¹ What confronted the United Nations and UNFICYP was the challenge of helping to repair the war torn nation.

The immediate result of the events of July-August 1974 was a drastic change in the political landscape of Cyprus. The Turkish army, numbering approximately 40,000, occupied nearly 40% of the island. Cyprus was effectively partitioned into two territories, with the Turkish forces controlling the northern half. According to BGen Beattie, there were over 200,000 displaced persons, mainly Greek Cypriots. As well, the economic situation was totally disrupted. These problems required immediate attention in order to address the humanitarian problems. However, the pressing problem of

¹ UN Doc. SC Res. 360, 16 August 1974.

resettlement was the major issue as this was linked to geographical and political considerations.²

Kurt Waldheim, the UN Secretary-General, undertook a tour of Athens, Ankara, London, and Nicosia during 25-27 August 1974, and held several discussions with the various leaders. These discussions covered numerous issues. These included the requirement for immediate humanitarian assistance, the question of the opening of the Nicosia airport, and the lack of cooperation by the Turkish authorities in allowing UNFICYP access to the area controlled by Turkish forces.³ Waldheim also arranged for Clerides and Denktash to meet face to face to discuss the political, economic, and humanitarian problems facing Cyprus.⁴

On 30 August, the Security Council passed Resolution 351 which expressed appreciation to the Secretary-General for his successful efforts at re-opening discussions between the two sides. The Resolution also called upon both parties to actively seek a solution with assistance from the Secretary-General.⁵ It also called upon the two communities

² BGen C.E. Beattie, interview held in Ottawa, Ontario, 12 February 1994.

³ UN Doc. S/11473, 27 August 1974.

⁴ UN Doc. S/11568, 30 August 1974.

⁵ UN Doc. SC Res. 351, 30 August 1974.

to search for solutions to the problems facing Cyprus and to do so in cooperation with UNFICYP. As a result of this resolution, the roles of the Secretary-General and UNFICYP were enhanced. In support of the Security Council Resolution, the General Assembly passed Resolution 3212 (XXIX) on 1 November 1974, which called upon the two communities to work with the Secretary-General and UNFICYP in humanitarian relief. It also called for the removal of all foreign troops from Cyprus.

8.2 Establishment of a Buffer Zone

Although a cease-fire had been agreed to by both sides, there remained several problems facing UNFICYP and the Canadian Contingent. One problem was the forward advancement of positions by the Turkish forces. Immediately following the cease-fire declaration, an intensive patrol program was established by UNFICYP. The objectives were first; establish and record the forward limits of the positions of both sides; and second; establish a surveillance system of observation posts and patrols to monitor all military activity with particular emphasis on the sensitive and contested areas. In keeping with these objectives, UNFICYP (CANCON) negotiated numerous local cease-fire agreements, particularly in the Nicosia area. To

effect this new role, UNFICYP proposed the establishment of a Buffer Zone.

To implement the concept of a neutral or Buffer Zone, there was a need to understand the principles and related requirements in the successful establishment of such a zone. Under the conditions it faced, UNFICYP had to be impartial or "without prejudice" to the political positions and considerations of both the Turks and Greeks. Consequently, certain assumptions had to be made and, according to BGen Beattie, these were:

that the "Buffer Zone" had to be fully acceptable to both parties in the dispute;

that such acceptance established a mandate within which a successful modus operandi could be established for UNFICYP; and

that this mandate include freedom of movement for UNFICYP throughout the island except those camps, installations or areas of both sides which were agreed upon as restricted.⁶

It became apparent to the Canadian Contingent that the concept of a buffer zone for Cyprus had to be designed in order that cease-fire violations by either gunfire or movement of troops could be prevented. The concept included the safety, security, and well being of both Turk and Greek

⁶ BGen Beattie, interview held in Ottawa, Ontario, 28 February 1994.

Cypriots. Within this framework, certain principles were inherent in the proposed Buffer Zone:

First, the full acceptance by both parties of the Buffer Zone and related procedures in the successful establishment and maintenance of the zone;

Second, the unanimous agreement, or at a minimum, the acceptance of UNFICYP decisions in the case of disagreement, of the exact delineation of the boundaries;

Third, that the boundaries had to be clearly marked as such along both sides of the zone in clear Greek, Turkish, and English as well as the ability to deny access by physical impairments;

Fourth, that access to and egress from the zone had to be strictly controlled by the UN at certain designated points of entry or exit;

Fifth, that access to or transit through the Buffer Zone had to be denied, with the use of force if necessary, but with restraint, against all uniformed or armed persons and warlike material and equipment; and

Sixth, that the Buffer Zone area had to be under UNFICYP surveillance at all times by either UNFICYP presence in the form of OPs and/or patrols (including land and air).⁷

In conjunction with the above, it was imperative that UNFICYP have total freedom of movement. Another area where consent was mandatory was the establishment of UNFICYP camps

⁷ BGen Beattie, interview held in Ottawa, Ontario, 13 January 1994. These principles are established standard operating procedures for use within a UN operation. This concept was utilized in Egypt with the establishment of UNEF I and II.

to allow for resupply, maintenance, and equipment in the carrying out of its mandate.

The establishment and maintenance of a Buffer Zone that had as its objective the prevention of incursions or attacks by one side upon the other, was costly, both in manpower and materiel. This was the case in Cyprus, for the cease fire line ran continuously from Limnitis in the west, to the coast near Famagusta in the east, and was approximately 170 kilometres long. The topography of the Buffer Zone encompassed hilly terrain, orchards, and cultivated land. Additionally, it encompassed villages and the city of Nicosia itself. In delineating the buffer zone, it was important to note that it would, in some areas, be only a few metres wide and several kilometres wide in others. Therefore it was incumbent upon UNFICYP in its negotiations, to obtain a suitable buffer zone that included dominating ground that was held by UNFICYP for observation purposes.

Establishing the buffer zone in the city of Nicosia presented a different challenge for the Canadian Contingent. The concept of a neutralized city without forces was unrealistic. Therefore, the Canadian Contingent was obliged

to insure, as far as possible, that the cease-fire line in Nicosia remained essentially where delineated.

In establishing the Buffer Zone, it was essential that it be surveilled properly. Therefore, all Observation Posts had to be visible to each other. It was estimated that there would be a requirement for a minimum of 170 Observation Posts. In total, only 130 were established.⁸ In an ideal situation, there should be 25 persons assigned to each Observation Post, including logistical and administrative support. Therefore, as BGen Beattie stated in an interview, a total force of 4250 would have been required to man the Buffer Zone.⁹ These figures included mobile reserves, capable of rapid movement by helicopter and tracked vehicles. Further, the willingness and capability to repel armed personnel of either side was essential. To effect a realistic surveillance system in the Buffer Zone, the number of Observation Posts was halved. There were 65 locations still designated as OPs but unmanned, and mobile patrols were substituted.

In the end, a Buffer Zone was both acceptable and practical in helping to achieve a relative calm. It was

⁸ UN Doc. S/11568, 6 December 1974.

⁹ BGen Beattie, interview held in Ottawa, Ontario, 28 February 1994.

hoped that force reductions by both sides would occur. However, this did not transpire.

Although shooting incidents were recorded and observed along the Green Line, which, in some instances were capable of flaring up, local cease fires were arranged and incidents grew less frequent. By October 1974, major exchanges of small arms fire had been replaced by the occasional rifle shot.¹⁰ The only incident of a major eruption was recorded on the night of 21/22 October, where Greeks and Turks exchanged a series of gunfire in Nicosia.¹¹ Through the recording of isolated incidents during September-December 1974, it was noted that the majority occurred in the north-west part of Nicosia and outside Nicosia, in the area of Pyroi and Louroujina. In all reported incidents, the local UN troops attempted to negotiate a cease-fire and were successful in the majority of cases. In response to all incidents, the Force Commander, UNFICYP, General Prem Chand, lodged a formal complaint to the transgressor responsible.

A typical incident of this kind is recorded on 1 December 1974, where both sides accused each other of firing

¹⁰ *Nicosia District Daily Operational Log Sheet, September-November 1974.*

¹¹ *Nicosia District Daily Operational Log Sheet, 21-22 October 1974.*

on opposing positions. The Nicosia Operational Log sheet for that date records that at approximately 5:00 P.M. there was a protest lodged by the vice-president's Office that the Greek National Guard had fired upon a Turkish position. Although not having heard gunfire in the vicinity, the Canadian Contingent investigator could only lodge a complaint to the Greek Commander on this alleged breach of the cease-fire. At 6:00 P.M., the Greek position, near the Turkish position previously investigated, lodged its own complaint against the Turkish forces. The Greek National Guard position protested that the Turks had opened fire with a burst of machine gun fire. In response, the Canadian Contingent then lodged a protest to the Turkish local commander. These types of incidents became an everyday occurrence along the Green Line.¹²

Shooting by both sides was aimed not only at the opposing forces. UNFICYP troops were also targets. On 4 December, at approximately 11:00 P.M., Greek soldiers took aim at a Canadian Contingent Observation Post in the north west part of the city of Nicosia. A total of four deliberately aimed shots were fired at the UN position. As well, three dynamite sticks exploded close to the CANCON

¹² *Nicosia District Daily Operational Log Sheet, 1 December 1974.*

position. A strong protest was lodged at the Greek National Guard Headquarters.¹³

Sporadic shootings by both sides increased the chances of major incidents erupting if they were not held under control. The Canadian Contingent's response was to immediately investigate and, if necessary, establish temporary Observation Posts between the two combatants. This presence and the investigation of the incidents reduced the chances of all-out aggression. This reduction was due to quick action and the process of conflict management at the local level by the Canadian Contingent. This would be followed by discussion of the situation with either the Greek or Turkish local Commander in the area. Thus, both sides were reassured that these incidents would be logged and protests would be made at a higher level. This had a calming effect and allowed for the diffusion of conflict situations.

There were numerous recorded incidents with regard to forward movement of troops by either side. Reports of troop movement by the Turks were observed in the Gallini, the Dhekelia, and the Famagusta areas. However, Turkish advances

¹³ *Nicosia District Daily Operational Log Sheet*, 4 December 1974.

were checked and, when disputes arose, the Canadian Contingent forcibly stood its ground.¹⁴

The Operational Log records the following incidents. On 2 December, at 9:05 A.M. OP Corridor, in Nicosia, reported that 11 Turkish tanks had moved up past the agreed to cease-fire line. By 11:00 A.M. a total of 22 tanks were reported at this position along with 17 Turk soldiers wearing blue berets. After lodging strong protests at the local and Company level, CANCON was able to effect a withdrawal of the Turkish forces back to the original cease-fire line.¹⁵ At the same time, Lieutenant J. Shields reported that at Dhikomo, north east of Nicosia, the Turkish forces had moved forward, erected road blocks, and had taken up defensive positions along both sides of the road. This advance was protested but the Turkish Major refused to move.¹⁶

The Canadian Contingent's determination to remain in Observation Posts to patrol the Green Line was also tested. On 3 December at approximately 4:30 P.M. a Turkish Commander confronted UN soldiers in the centre of Nicosia and demanded

¹⁴ *Nicosia District Daily Operational Log Sheet, October 1974.*

¹⁵ *Nicosia District Daily Operational Log Sheet, 2 December 1974.*

¹⁶ *Ibid.*

that the OP be removed. Captain Campbell proceeded to this area and held discussions with the Turkish officer. Campbell was informed that the Turks had not been notified that this United Nations position was to be established and therefore it had to be removed. As well, the Turkish Commander stated that he would use force, if necessary, to remove the UN Observation Post. Campbell reported this to the Joint Operations Centre. He was directed to man this position and that under no circumstances would the OP be removed. After heated discussion the Turk officer withdrew and the UN Observation Post remained in position.¹⁷

Again, on 4 December the Turks attempted to forcibly remove Canadian UN personnel from Observation Posts. The vice-president's Office contacted the Joint Operations Centre and stated that OP's were not to be manned on the Pegasus Route of the Green Line in Nicosia. In response, the Joint Operations Centre informed the vice-president's Office that the four UN standing patrol locations would be occupied periodically. The vice-president's Office was also informed that this procedure by the Canadian Contingent would continue until they were ordered by higher authority to

¹⁷ *Nicosia District Daily Operational Log Sheet, 3 December 1974.*

remove the Observation Posts. The final result was that the Observation Posts remained in place.¹⁸

8.3 Freedom of Movement

The aspect of freedom of movement by UNFICYP personnel has already been addressed, in part, throughout this study. However, it is important to analyze this principle in light of the cease-fire agreement. Freedom of Movement encompasses two aspects. First, the freedom to move uninhibited along the Green Line, and secondly, the freedom to move in the Turkish held part of the island.

Following the end of the war, and according to cease-fire agreements, UNFICYP was authorized to carry out reconnaissance to enforce the agreements. However, Turkish and Greek forces were constantly encroaching on the cease-fire line and verification of positions was difficult. Numerous incidents prohibiting the Canadian Contingent from carrying out its responsibilities are documented. Reconnaissance Patrols were continually harassed in the performance of their duties and, on 1 December a Canadian UN patrol was prevented from observing the cease-fire line by a

¹⁸ *Nicosia District Daily Operational Log Sheet*, 4 December 1974.

Greek National Guard road block. After face-to-face meetings with the Greek officer in command, the CANCON patrol had to circumvent the road block and continue its reconnaissance.¹⁹ Another example of the restriction on the freedom of movement occurred on 7 December. Major Thompson, Officer Commanding Ledra Company, had arranged for the Company Liaison Officer to be deployed to the Ormorphida area with Turk Cypriot Fighters. The Liaison Officer was sent, but was denied access to the agreed area of observation. When he requested to speak to the Turkish officer in charge, he was advised that no one was available as all officers were currently at a party and could not be reached. A protest was made to the Turkish Battalion Commander in that specific area. The Turkish Battalion commander responded by stating that he was "too busy to let an LO into his area..." The Liaison Officer returned to Ledra Company Headquarters.²⁰

In some instances, the Canadian Contingent refused to allow Turkish troops to halt their (CANCONs) freedom of movement. One such incident occurred in the afternoon of 8 December. A Canadian UN mobile patrol was progressing down Kikkou Street in Nicosia and was stopped by a Turkish road

¹⁹ *Nicosia District Daily Operational Log Sheet, 1 December 1974.*

²⁰ *Nicosia District Daily Operational Log Sheet, 7 December 1974.*

block. The Joint Operations Centre was informed of the situation and dispatched Major Barish, Officer Commanding B Company. Major Barish demanded to speak to the local Turkish Battalion Commander and a heated discussion ensued. After reminding the Turkish Commander that the cease-fire agreement had the support of the Turkish Forces Commander, and that the Canadian Contingent would carry out its patrol, regardless of what the local commander thought, the barrier was removed and the Canadian UN patrol continued to have access to the Kikkou route. However, when this was brought to a higher level, it was agreed to allow United Nations access to this area only during day light hours.²¹

As the Green Line areas required agreement by all parties, there were occasions when the Turkish commanders refused to recognize certain routes to be accessed by UNFICYP. One such occasion occurred on 14 December. In discussions with both sides, the Operations Officer, UNFICYP, was unable to secure agreement on routes to be patrolled by the Canadian Contingent. The routes in dispute concerned the patrolling of some areas under control by the Turkish forces in the northern section of Nicosia. The Turks refused to accept the first trace showing a route in the

²¹ *Nicosia District Daily Operational Log Sheet, 8 December 1974.*

Turkish enclave of Nicosia and no patrols were carried out. As well, the Greek National Guard refused access to the Canadian Contingent on the use of the Larnaca route and stated that discussion would have to be held at a higher level. In regard to this route, it was eventually agreed that UNFICYP would have access to patrol this area of Nicosia.²²

Since the adoption of Resolution 359 (1974) and the cease-fire, effective 16 August, UNFICYP made numerous requests and attempts to promote the safety and well being of the Cypriot citizenry. The efforts of delivering humanitarian assistance involved the exercise of UNFICYP's freedom of movement. In the south, UNFICYP generally had no problems in safeguarding Turkish Cypriots, with the exception of the war period when access to some villages was restricted.²³ Once the cease-fire was effective, UNFICYP established its presence in or near Turkish Cypriot villages and kept the vice-president's Office informed of their requirements. UNFICYP also assisted by delivering foodstuffs, medicines, and by tracing missing persons.

²² *Nicosia District Daily Operational Log Sheet*, 14 December 1974.

²³ *Nicosia District Daily Operational Log Sheet*, 21 July 1974, and 15 August 1974.

In the north, however, restrictions imposed by the Turkish military, which have previously been discussed, made it difficult to carry out humanitarian assistance. Instances of formal complaints to the Turkish Commander and to Ankara by the Force Commander and the Secretary-General in this regard have been previously outlined. By December 1974, it appeared that the Turks would relax their restrictions. In later years, once the Greek Cypriots had fled the north or "voluntarily moved" south, the requirement to carry out humanitarian assistance ended and freedom of movement was either denied or became a non-issue.

The composition of the UN force on 4 December 1974, totaled 4335 troops. The Canadian Contingent numbered 859 troops, the United Kingdom 1419, Austria 320, Denmark 420, Finland 599, Sweden 569, Ireland six, and there were 152 UN police. During the war period, 65 United Nations soldiers were wounded while 9 lost their lives.²⁴ In all, UNFICYP had fared reasonably well, given the circumstances under which it operated.

²⁴ UN Doc. S/11568, 6 December 1974.

8.4 Humanitarian Assistance

Since the establishment of the cease-fire agreement, the security and well-being of both Greek and Turkish Cypriots was of paramount concern to UNFICYP. To positively influence this aim, United Nations detachments were stationed in the vicinity of all Turkish Cypriot or mixed villages. Also, extensive daily mobile patrols were set up to observe that law and order were maintained and that local incidents did not flare up due to civilian clashes. In the Turkish controlled areas, a similar attempt was made concerning Greek Cypriots but this endeavour was not successful. As a result, the year following the cease-fire witnessed the abandonment by Greek Cypriots of their homes. They then fled south across the buffer zone into Greek Cypriot territory.

Instances of the Canadian Contingent providing humanitarian assistance during hostilities have been described. The provision of assistance continued once the cease-fire came into effect. Examples of providing assistance include the donating of blood by Canadian UN soldiers to both the Greek and Turkish Red Crescent,

removing corpses from buildings destroyed by mortar fire, and providing medical assistance.²⁵

One example of providing medical assistance occurred on 3 December 1974. The Canadian Contingent dispatched its Medical Officer, under escort, to the nearby village of Kochati to render medical services to three sick children as a Turkish doctor could not secure a pass to travel through Greek Cypriot territory.²⁶ Upon reaching the village, it was discovered that only two children required attention as one of the patients was in fact a 51 year old woman. After diagnosing the ailments, one child and the elderly woman were evacuated to Nicosia for treatment. The Medical Officer remained in Kochati to look after the other child who was approximately one and a half years old. This child could not be properly diagnosed in the village and a medical evacuation was ordered. However, the Greek Cypriot police refused to give permission to remove the child as clearance had not been authorized to transport the patient through Greek Cypriot territory. In response, the Canadian Contingent dispatched a convoy to escort the Medical Officer back to Nicosia. On the route back, the convoy stopped and another ailing child was picked up in the village of Marki.

²⁵ *Nicosia District Daily Operational Log Sheet*, 3 December 1974.

²⁶ *Ibid.*

The escorted patients were met at a United Nations checkpoint and the convoy quickly proceeded to the local hospital.²⁷ One result of this action was that CANCON was able to secure a pass from the Greek Cypriot authorities to allow one doctor and one nurse to visit outlying areas under UNFICYP protection.²⁸

Another example of the Canadian Contingent rendering assistance occurred on 5 January 1975. At 6:20 P.M. the Joint Operations Centre was contacted by a Turkish doctor in Dahi that a 27 year old woman was about to give birth. The Turkish doctor requested assistance and CANCON dispatched an ambulance and transferred the expectant mother and her two children back to Nicosia for hospitalization.²⁹ This type of emergency response was not limited to this type of activity. On 10 January, two Turkish women were apprehended by Greek National Guard soldiers. After one hour they were released but one Greek National Guard soldier chased the women into the Turkish side of the Green Line on Phaneromenis Street, in Nicosia. He was stopped by a Turk Cypriot Fighter and was threatened. Lt. Christensen, CANCON, who was on the scene,

²⁷ *Nicosia District Daily Operational Log Sheet*, 5 December 1974.

²⁸ *Nicosia District Daily Operational Log Sheet*, 10 December 1974.

²⁹ *Nicosia District Daily Operational Log Sheet*, 5 January 1975.

intervened and was able to extricate the Greek National soldier from certain physical injury.³⁰

The provision of humanitarian assistance by UNFICYP was rendered regardless of the side requiring it. BGen Beattie remarked:

What was important was that CANCON, as part of UNFICYP was in a position to render assistance wherever and whenever possible. We were not there (in Cyprus) just to keep the both sides from killing each other. We were also there to provide assistance to the civilian population caught in between the opposing forces. Whether this was by providing protection to civilians, rendering emergency medical assistance, delivering foodstuffs, or assisting the International Red Cross, what was important was to help in any way we could. In this we were impartial.³¹

8.5 Conclusion

On 18 August 1974, UNFICYP began exercising its new role as peacekeeper. It was now given responsibility to monitor the cease-fire line agreed to between the two opposing forces. It established itself in this new role quickly and effectively. It was able to curtail Turkish and Greek advances along the Green Line and to diffuse cease-fire violations. Although pressured to either remove or

³⁰ *Nicosia District Daily Operational Log Sheet*, 7 January 1975.

³¹ BGen C.E. Beattie, interview held in Ottawa, Ontario, 12 January 1994.

abandon United Nations Observation Posts, it steadfastly refused to do so. As for patrolling the Green Line, the Canadian Contingent was required to make adjustments when one side or the other refused access to certain areas. However, in some instances, as described, the Canadian Contingent refused to be thwarted in carrying out mobile patrols.

In providing humanitarian assistance, the Canadian Contingent was able to render such assistance in an impartial manner. This was accomplished by either securing permission from the appropriate authorities, or by direct action such as described above. Colonel Houghton describes why this aspect was important:

By providing medical assistance or protection to those providing it, by supplying needed materials, we (the Canadian Contingent) not only helped save lives, but declared our intention to be involved. This type of assistance, given to both sides, cemented our reputation as impartial and professional soldiers. Anyway, we couldn't turn our backs on these people because we were there to help them.³²

By the end of 1974 and the early part of 1975, UNFICYP had settled into its new role as peacekeeper by patrolling the buffer zone between the Turkish forces and the Greek National Guard. Although isolated incidents continued to

³² Colonel M.J.R. Houghton, interview held in Ottawa, Ontario, 27 April 1994.

surface, a status quo developed. This status quo of separation of communities would continue. As for the Canadian Contingent, it was responsible for the most volatile area, Nicosia. Here antagonists were closely positioned to each other and tensions could easily escalate and often did. However, the process of conflict management, as practiced by the Canadian Contingent, was a major factor and contributor to keeping the peace on an island that had witnessed a serious conflict. The Canadian Contingent's role in this conflict was a major factor in not only helping to halt aggression, but also in redefining the concept and practice of peacekeeping.

CHAPTER 9

CONCLUSION

This study dealt with the Canadian Contingent's operational role, as part of UNFICYP, in regard to peacekeeping operations in Cyprus. It addressed why and how the Canadian Contingent adapted to fit the realities as they unfolded during 1964-1975 and the post-war period, with special emphasis on the crucial 1974 period. As background, it was necessary to describe the circumstances in which it operated. In the context of Cyprus, this meant a military operation under the auspices of the United Nations to assist in the maintenance of law and order and in the interposition of an international force between two warring nationalities. This operation was undertaken in parallel with peacemaking efforts at the highest political levels with, at first, a UN mediator and then, with a Special Representative of the Secretary-General in Cyprus. The first principle of the United Nations operation was to carry out the mandate as laid out by the Security Council in 1964 in order to prevent a recurrence of fighting; to contribute to the maintenance and restoration of law and order; and to contribute to a return to normal conditions.¹

¹ UN Doc. S/5634, 4 March 1964.

The study has concluded that Prime Minister L.B. Pearson had been eager to demonstrate to the international community the effectiveness of a Standby Force for international peacekeeping responsibilities. Further, Canada had readily agreed to participate in UNFICYP to prevent the possible collapse of NATO's southern flank and, a belief in the concept of a shared international responsibility in the maintenance of international peace and security. The study has primarily dealt with the problems faced by UNFICYP, specifically the Canadian Contingent, in regard to the operational tasks of this United Nations peacekeeping mission in Cyprus. It focused on the mandate as originally specified by the Security Council and the conditions under which the Canadian Contingent operated as it attempted to fulfill its role and adapted to a changing situation.

9.1 March 1964-July 1974: A Reflection

Prior to the July-August 1974 period, the Cyprus situation was stable. The United Nations presence was not necessarily tasked with strictly peacekeeping efforts, but more with observing that the two civilian communities did not initiate hostilities. Given the evidence, and based on the operational duties to observe and report through a

system of established Observation Posts and foot and vehicle patrols, along with on-going military/political meetings, the efforts of the Special Representative of the Secretary-General, and the Political Liaison Committee, the use of the term peacekeeping has been too simplistic. The above, along with an agreed to Green Line in Nicosia and, an assortment of Turkish enclaves widely distributed across the island in various confrontational areas, necessitated the establishment of a system of working agreements and understandings governing sensitive issues. The establishment of UN Observation Posts and patrol parties had often been achieved by mutual consent. Often altercations were discussed with both sides to avoid the escalation of tensions.

It can also be argued that this system worked too well and that maintaining the status quo without political solutions only delayed the reopening of hostilities, or in this case, the Turkish invasion. It should be noted that a United Nations military operation remains essentially a function which allows the situation to become stable, thereby giving the politicians the opportunity to solve the crises and resolve the issues.

The military goal of calming the situation during the first phase of UNFICYP was achieved relatively easily. In essence, the UN force had created and maintained a climate within which peacemaking was supposed to proceed. Nevertheless, the Greek Cypriot military used force during this period against the Turkish Cypriots in Kokkina, Mansoura in August 1964, and at Kophinou and Ayios Theodoros in 1968.² Both incidents caused retaliation against Greek Cypriot targets by the Turkish airforce through the use of limited air strikes. United States diplomacy, however, averted the threatened invasion by Turkish forces until the events of 15-19 July 1974, when the Greek National Guard staged the unsuccessful coup against Makarios, and temporarily established Nicos Sampson as the eight day President.

9.2 The Canadian Contingent Redefines Peacekeeping in Cyprus

The stabilized peacekeeping environment which UNFICYP established was severely disrupted during the coup period of 15-19 July 1974. At the outset UNFICYP, and the Canadian Contingent, was taken by surprise by the rapidly changing circumstances and found itself caught up in the internal

² *Nicosia District Daily Operational Log Sheet*, August 1964 and October 1968.

politics of the island. The changing situations included the need to liaise with the Turkish Cypriot leadership in the hope of having a calming influence which would prevail on the Turkish Cypriots not to become involved. At first, this was a noble gesture, but as Nicos Sampson was declared President, this naive strategy disintegrated. The Turkish Cypriots were well aware of Sampson's pro-Greek stance and feared that the future would not bode well for Turkish Cypriots. In addition, UNFICYP had become an active participant by providing safe conduct to President Makarios from the Paphos District to the British Sovereign Base Area where he was given asylum and then flown to New York. Although UNFICYP was a bystander during this period,, it used its influence and personal contacts at the local and national level and attempted to help calm the situation. In retrospect, it is difficult to envision what UNFICYP, led by the Canadian Contingent, could have done differently given the existing circumstances.

Although caught unprepared by the coup, as intelligence had not foreseen this situation, UNFICYP was not blind to a possibly provocative response that Turkey would likely make. Turkey's response was not long in coming. In the early hours of 20 July, the United Nations Chief of Staff, Brigadier Frank Henn, contacted the Canadian

Contingent Commander, Colonel Beattie, and gave him notice that "visitors" were coming from the north. BGen Beattie was not surprised at the turn of events.

UNFICYP's responses to the invasion was severely limited. The only operational orders available were those which outlined a Force withdrawal if considered warranted. The Deputy Chief of Staff, Colonel Beattie, in conference with Brigadier Henn and Prem Chand, the Force Commander, never entertained the removal of the force from Cyprus, or envisaged that the force would fall back to base camps and allow the two combatants to fight it out. It became evident that, in these new set of circumstances which it faced, UNFICYP had shifted its role from a clearly mandated force hoping to redress, by peaceful means, an inter-communal problem, to a severely constrained force that operated in the middle of a war between and often "with" the two belligerents. UNFICYP attempted, as far as possible, to pursue the original mandate which was negated by the invasion, but this approach proved increasingly unrealistic.

During the first two days of the war, principles of operation emerged. These principles included a minimization of United Nations casualties; the designation of UN Protected Areas and the willingness to use force to secure

them; the development of peacekeeping by confrontation tactics; and the provision of humanitarian assistance to non-combatants.

Once these principles were established, UNFICYP's new mandate, although not formally approved by the Security Council, established the force as a viable United Nations presence that carried out a new role and worked to diffuse the rapidly expanding crisis. This was accomplished by keeping the Secretary-General informed of the on-going situation; arranging local cease fires in Nicosia and other areas in the combat zone; assisting inter-communal, national and international refugees (approximately 200,000); assisting international aid agencies to establish themselves (UNHCR, UNDP, Red Cross, and the Red Crescent); providing liaison between the parties to promote the resolution of the conflict situation by mediation and negotiation; providing for prisoner and population exchanges; and interposing UN troops into circumstances which would otherwise have become more brutal.

Clearly, if UNFICYP was to have any influence, the first problem to be solved was securing its Observation Posts and ensuring, as much as possible, the safety of its foot and mobile patrols. The issue of withdrawing or

abandoning Observation Posts quickly came to the forefront, and as records have indicated, most Observation Posts were withdrawn during the first few days of conflict. The authority to withdraw was given by the Force Commander to the local zone Commander, in this case LCol D. Manuel. His discretionary authority was used in ordering the unmanning of Observation Posts when they were under severe bombardment or heavy small arms fire. The records also indicated, however, that the Observation Posts were remanned, or new ones established, as the situation warranted. It is clear that UN Observation Posts were established during the last days of phase one of the Turkish invasion and were to be used to verify and define the Forward Defensive Lines during the Tripartite Negotiations which were held during the period of 29 July-9 August 1974.

Once the Turkish breakout occurred on 14 August, the Canadian Contingent Observation Posts, for the most part, remained manned and this allowed the United Nations to provide assistance to those Turkish Cypriot villages that required humanitarian aid. Within the city itself, the Canadian Contingent continued to man Observation Posts. In some cases, sites such as the Ledra Palace, Blue Beret Camp, Camp Kronberg, and the airport, were ordered to be defended with armed force if necessary. Once the cease fire had taken

effect on 16 August, the Canadian Observation Posts remained in place. In some instances they were readjusted to take into account the forward advance of Turkish and Greek Cypriot troops. After the agreed to cease fire, Canadian Contingent Observation Posts were utilized to monitor and report cease fire violations that erupted and, to establish local cease-fires.

The study also concluded that UN personnel, in particular the Canadian Contingent, took extremely high risks in providing aid and assistance to non-combatants. During the war period, numerous evacuation teams were dispatched to evacuate those who were caught between Greek and Turkish forces. Rescue missions were launched at the Ledra Palace Hotel on 21/22 July, which resulted in the safe evacuation of 386 persons, including approximately 100 media personnel. In the diplomatic community, the Canadian Contingent provided assistance to numerous civilians through protection and, at the request of the United Kingdom High Commissioner, British High Commission personnel and families were also evacuated from situations which, if not resolved, could have led to a number of casualties. Another example of the Canadian Contingent facing extreme conditions was the situation that took place at the United States Embassy complex. The Canadian Contingent, though it was unable to

save the American Ambassador from death and another American staff member, provided humanitarian assistance by evacuating people from the premises while significant anti-American demonstrations were in progress.

In the north, the British Contingent was able to effect rescue operations for thousands of stranded tourists in the Kyrenia district. Civilians from the Dome Hotel and areas east and west were transported to safety by helicopter to the H.M.S. Hermes. As well, thousands were given safe haven in Dhekelia, a British Sovereign Base Area, and then flown to safety.

Medical assistance was also provided by the United Nations to both sides by such means as medical evacuations of casualties, and interposing itself at times to effect the treatment and removal of combat casualties, even under circumstances which drew down fire upon United Nations personnel. Civilian casualties were also treated by UN medical personnel. Examples of other aspects of humanitarian assistance that the Canadian Contingent provided were by way of relief convoys, which had delivered foodstuffs, blankets, and shelter to those dispossessed in the city of Nicosia and in outlying villages. These missions of mercy were recognized, if not by the two opposing forces, at least by

those receiving assistance and by United Nations headquarters in New York.

Communications networks were also made readily available during the conflict. As demonstrated, UNFICYP was able to establish liaison relationships with both sides rather quickly. In addition, it was noted that personal relationships which developed over the years between Canadian Contingent officers and the Turk Cypriot Fighters and the Greek National Guard had remained relatively intact. The Deputy Chief of Staff, Colonel Beattie's relationship with the Turkish Ambassador, Major Cakar of the Turk Cypriot Fighters, and with the Greek National Guard commanders, attest to this fact. As well, junior United Nations officers who had established working relationships prior to and during the conflict were such that, as Liaison Officers, they were able to remain continually at the respective headquarters and communicate with the UNFICYP Headquarters or the Joint Operations Centre as required. This enabled them to provide information on current situations and act as United Nations representatives in local cease fire negotiations.

On August 16, 1974 the Turkish initiated cease fire had taken hold, and the Turks had established what they

referred to as their Attila Line, and 40% of the island came under Turkish control. Immediately following this cease fire declaration, UNFICYP interposed itself between the two combatants. Many of the old UN Observation Posts became unusable and new sites were established, in some cases fortified with sandbags. This redeployment by the United Nations was not met with any serious resistance from either side. Although tempted to remain as a passive observer, the Canadian Contingent's efforts and leadership quickly signaled that the United Nations would not be mistreated or be used to enhance forward positions by either opposing force. UNFICYP developed a new role and, as General J. de Chastelain pointed out:

Essentially UNFICYP controlled the Buffer Zone between the two combatants and has patrolled this area ever since. What this period has produced is the maintenance of the status quo while political negotiations were held to seek a solution to the problems facing Cyprus.³

As de Chastelain stated, the role had been to man the Buffer Zone between the two sides and observe, to monitor, and negotiate local cease fires which resulted from confrontational incidents along the Green Line. It can be argued that this role had been of limited value, as political negotiations since the war have not produced a

³ General John de Chastelain, Chief of Defence Staff, interview held in Ottawa, Ontario, 8 March 1994.

lasting settlement. What must be remembered is that peacekeeping has remained only one part of peacemaking, and that a political will must be present to secure an enduring settlement. Moreover, how limited is the value of saving lives?

Since the de facto cease fire, UNFICYP efforts remained, for the most part, focused on humanitarian tasks. This included the delivery of supplies to isolated villages, the provision of medical assistance when requested, and the provision of escort troops to farmers wishing to work the land that remained under dispute between the two sides. The list of types of assistance provided is long and varied. Without such aid, many on the island would have been in serious condition. The Turks might well have taken over the island. The presence of UNFICYP obviously influenced the outcome, and prevented that eventuality.

Another area reviewed in this thesis was the use of force by UNFICYP and here the Canadian Contingent took the leading role. United Nations operations were mainly being carried out by soldiers who, though armed, were ordered to refrain from using force to attain their aims or the mandated mission of the force. Peacekeepers were trained not to use deadly force with the exception of self-defence.

In the majority of United Nations operations, the use of force was rarely in the interest of the United Nations or its objectives. This was clearly evident as missions were mounted mainly under Chapter 6 of the UN Charter, which emphasized the humanitarian aspects rather than the confrontational aims. UN Observation Posts and foot and mobile patrols were located where the best ground for observation was usually controlled by the United Nations. Thus, when a conflict erupted, both sides have naturally wished to occupy these advantageous positions for military advantages. UN Observation Posts, by their very design, have usually been manned by two guards and have been vulnerable to attack should hostilities begin. Their main purpose has been to signal a United Nations presence and observe any movement which could disturb the existing military status quo. Once an infraction was observed, it was reported and the United Nations then usually took steps to investigate the incident or attempted to remedy the situation. As well, a military/political committee was usually established, comprising of the United Nations and representatives of both sides, to discuss a solution that would then be implemented under the supervision of the United Nations force.

In the context of the Cyprus situation, this doctrine was the modus operandi during the first ten years of the force's existence. Once the war erupted on 20 July 1974, this approach was deemed totally inappropriate. Initially, the use of force was authorized for self-defence purposes only. As well, Observation Posts were ordered to withdraw as they afforded no means of protection against aimed fire. To have ordered the use of force to defend corrugated shacks or indefensible positions would not only have been foolhardy but militarily insupportable.

The conclusion is that UNFICYP had only three choices. The choice it made was the only proper one. Should UNFICYP have returned to its base camps or withdrawn from the island, the credibility of the United Nations would have been irreparably damaged.⁴ The decision to interpose itself between the combatants posed a risk, but it was one that reinforced the United Nations' commitment to negotiate a peaceful solution to the existing conflict situation. As UN Headquarters in New York provided no firm guidance as to the role of the force during this period, a new role was carved

⁴ This conclusion is supported by Mr. G. Sherry who stated to this author that the force had only one choice when it was confronted by the Turkish invasion. If UNFICYP had retreated back to its base camps or withdrawn from Cyprus, according to Sherry, the reputation and credibility of the UN would have been severely damaged. Telephone interview 18 April 1995.

out and the Canadian Contingent, under the command of Colonel Beattie, led this effort. Force was used to protect United Nations personnel in the case of Camp Kronberg and in the support of the Finnish Contingent located at Kykko Camp. Where there was no sound reason to defend a UN Observation Post, troops were withdrawn and these sites were later remanned when circumstances warranted. Further, the use of force was authorized when rescue efforts were undertaken. Such was the case with the medical evacuation of Captain Blacquierre and Paratrooper Plouffe, from no-man's land on the banks of the Pedhios River in Nicosia.

Concurrent with using force for self-defence purposes, UNFICYP was prepared to use force to defend areas that it had designated UN Protected Areas. This stance by the Canadian Contingent, supported by the British 16/5th Lancers, irrevocably altered United Nations operations in Cyprus. The doctrine established the concept of UN Protected Areas which would be defended against any transgressor. The threat of the use of force by the United Nations became a reality.

The events surrounding the Ledra Palace, Camp Kronberg, and the Nicosia International Airport were analyzed in this study. The actions taken by UNFICYP and,

especially the Canadian Contingent with support from the British, give conclusive evidence of the resolve by UNFICYP to defend territory which had come under United Nations control. This determination was made clear on 4 August 1974, when UNFICYP Headquarters forwarded a message to both sides that stated in part:

Nicosia Airport was declared a United Nations protected area by the UNFICYP Force Commander on 23 July 1974, when hostilities were at their height, in order to remove a cause of conflict and to preserve the Airport, its equipment and its facilities for the future. At the same time agreement was reached by HQ UNFICYP with the local Commanders of the combatants in the area that the Airport should be denied to everyone except UNFICYP and that the opposing military forces should not approach within 500 metres of the perimeter wire surrounding the Airport and the general complex comprising RAF Nicosia and the UNFICYP Camps. Since 23 July 1974 UNFICYP has observed its part of the agreement in a scrupulous manner and the Airport continues to be controlled very closely by UNFICYP as a UN protected area.⁵

This determination was reinforced during the period 14-17 August when the Turks contemplated overrunning the airport during phase two of the war. In addition to the Nicosia Airport, the Ledra Palace Hotel was also designated as a protected area. Accordingly, this fact was also reinforced on 28 July 1974:

The Ledra Palace Hotel was declared a United Nations protected area on 20 July 1974 and since then... has

⁵ UN Doc. NICOSIA AIRPORT: Note by HQ UNFICYP, Nicosia, 4 August 1974.

been occupied by UNFICYP and has been free of any other armed personnel including the National Guard. UNFICYP will continue to maintain the Ledra Palace Hotel area as a United Nations protected area for as long as it is necessary...So long as it remains a UN protected area UNFICYP will ensure that no armed personnel other than UNFICYP shall have access to it.⁶

Both areas remain UN protected Areas to this day. The Ledra Palace Hotel has been utilized as a Canadian Contingent barracks from August 1974 until its departure from Cyprus on 30 June 1993. (Attached as Annex G is a copy of the Nicosia Airport declaration)

9.3 Evaluation and Lessons Learned

The evidence supports the argument that UNFICYP altered its role once it found itself in a situation which its original mandate had not envisaged. Overnight its status was altered from a peacekeeping force in an inter-communal situation to the role of a preventive and humanitarian aid agency in the middle of a war. The speed with which this multi-national organization, led by the Canadian Contingent, reacted has surprised many observers. It must be admitted that had UNFICYP not been present, the loss of life and destruction of property would have been far greater.

⁶ UN Doc. UNFICYP HQ Note, Nicosia, 28 July 1974, from Beattie's private papers.

There have been several immediate lessons that have been drawn from this United Nations operation. First, caught in the middle of a shooting war, the protection of UNFICYP soldiers became paramount. This had necessitated an obvious need for more troops, armoured reconnaissance vehicles and armoured personnel carriers. It became obvious that dead or wounded peacekeepers could not intercede on anyone's behalf, let alone supervise a cease fire. In this regard, priority needs were identified and met, and the dispatch of the remainder of the Canadian Airborne Regiment and suitable armoured vehicles from Canada ensued. Therefore, for purposes of the Canadian Contingent, a well organized, manned, and equipped contingent became paramount for future operations.

Second, in pursuing protection of its personnel, more sophisticated and secure protection became a requirement in all Observation Posts, accommodations, or Base Camp areas.

Third, the requirement to keep national authorities informed of the delicate events that transpired became critical. It became obvious that the Canadian Contingent required dedicated communications, as the communications available was incapable of meeting the traffic load. This lesson became valuable as logistics and communications

requirements were addressed and United Nations Headquarters, New York, was kept abreast of unfolding events. United Nations Headquarters then in turn was able to keep the countries who contributed troops apprised of all situations.

Fourth, it was found that the reputation held by the United Nations on the island permitted it to deal most effectively in minimizing casualties and damage. This was achieved by using its good offices in either evacuating people, interposing UN troops in delicate confrontational situations, occupying and neutralizing key areas, or in carrying humanitarian aid or protection to areas that had come under siege or harassment. In many instances the presence of UN personnel at Prisoner of War compounds or collection points ensured reduced possibilities of ill treatment of prisoners and civilians.

Fifth, in the immediate aftermath of the war, UNFICYP's investigation into alleged atrocities, and the objective and impartial stand it took, prevented this issue from escalating into a propaganda battle or the escalation of atrocities.

More far-ranging lessons were derived from the Cyprus experience as UNFICYP's, specifically the Canadian

Contingent's, responses were analyzed by the Department of National Defence. As a result, UNFICYP was used to demonstrate the need for reinforced training for peacekeeping operations and to stress the need to handle confrontational situations in keeping with mandates authorized by the United Nations Security Council. The concept of a new practice of peacekeeping was supported by those responsible for setting up new operations or modifying existing ones. Here it is important to reflect on what the achievements in Cyprus have come to signify. According to General de Chastelain:

Each UN operation is unique, and therefore models are hard to establish. As for UNFICYP being the cornerstone of Canadian peacekeeping, the answer is no. However, UNFICYP was a very important part of Canadian peacekeeping. It allowed for training in conflict management and to react under pressure. These lessons were valuable in that it taught members how to restrain from using force when not required, leaving the unfortunate Somalia incident aside, and how to handle confrontation. These lessons were applied during the Oka crisis and are being applied today in Croatia...This is due to the ability to handle confrontational situations and the ability to differentiate between hostile action and intimidation tactics.⁷

This assessment was supported by others including Colonel M.J.R. Houghton, a former Director of Peacekeeping Operations, Department of National Defence. Although

⁷ General John de Chastelain, interview held in Ottawa, Ontario, 8 March 1994.

Houghton stated that no official model for peacekeeping exists, as each operation is different, he indicated that UNFICYP permitted the drawing of some lessons:

I think that Cyprus, because of its longevity, was used as a model for peacekeeping...Not necessarily as an official model. But it certainly became a model for peacekeeping operations...I think it's been used incorrectly as a model. I think people have said "I know all about peacekeeping because I was in Cyprus"...There are a number of lessons that can be learned from Cyprus such as what happened in 1974. I draw a tremendous lesson from Cyprus which...I'm talking about training for peacekeeping.⁸

Both argued that UNFICYP was a unique operation and, as such, cannot not be used as a total model for other United Nations operations. In this they are correct. What was not discussed, however, was the need for clearly defined terms in regard to United Nations operations. As each operation has been different, one of the basic principles has been to articulate the term used in such operations. The term "Peacekeeping" has had different meaning to different people. In articles found almost daily in the media, the term has been used to describe every operation since 1947. In Chapter 1, definitions of peacekeeping (also in Annex A) were identified in order to assist in the understanding of the type of operation required in resolving conflict

⁸ Colonel M.J.R. Houghton, former Director of Peacekeeping Operations, Department of National Defence, interview held in Ottawa, Ontario, 27 April 1994.

situations. It remains important to identify the requirement prior to deploying troops to confrontational areas. This lesson has not been learned from the Cyprus conflict.

Since the Cyprus war, there have been several changes in deployment and strength of both combatants. Initially, greater publicity was given to reductions of the Turkish National forces. However, the Turks' absolute trump card has remained air power. From their forward fighter bases in Turkey, 40 miles to the north, they have the capability to virtually scramble constant air strikes and combat air patrol aircraft to Cyprus. These aircraft have the capacity to be over the target area in 15 minutes and have a loiter time of almost one hour. By comparison, the Greeks have to fly from Crete, some 400 nautical miles to the west. Detailed arguments about the exact numbers of Turkish National soldiers on the island have been, to a certain degree, superfluous. The important factor has been that the Turks appear to have retained the outline structure of one Corps two Division capability in Cyprus with logistic and communication facilities to resume operations at immediate notice.

In 1976, UNFICYP recorded 86 separate minefields in the main confrontation areas and experienced an average of

three violations of the cease fire per day.⁹ Finally, as this study is of the first decade, it is of interest to note that only one major incident occurred in 1976. This occurred when approximately 1500 rounds of ammunition were fired in Sector 1 to the west of Nicosia.¹⁰ In comparison to activities which had transpired during the period 20 July to 17 August 1974, this incident was one of a lesser magnitude.

The foregoing has been a historical analysis of the Canadian Contingent's role in redefining the concept and practice United Nations peacekeeping operations in Cyprus. The Canadian Contingent provided leadership through example, took unqualified risks, bluffed its way into positions of confrontation, and physically interposed itself into situations that could have resulted in heavy casualties, despite the lack of direct orders to do so. The Canadian Contingent established, for the first time, United Nations Protected Areas, and earned a reputation of impartiality, objectivity, and an international acknowledgment of the determination to carry out its peacekeeping responsibilities.

⁹ UN Doc. UNFICYP HQ Briefing, 3 December 1976, from Beattie's private papers.

¹⁰ *Nicosia District Daily Operational Log Sheet*, 31 March 1976.

BIBLIOGRAPHY

I. Primary Sources

A. Official Records

- (I) Department of External Affairs Records (National Archives Canada) 1963-1974.
 - (ii) Department of National Defence Records (National Archives Canada) 1963-1974.
 - (iii) Department of National Defence Records (Directorate of History) UNFICYP Canadian Contingent War Diaries.
- Nicosia District Daily Operational Log Sheets, 1er Bn, Royal 22e Regiment and The Royal Canadian Dragoons, March-September 1964.
- Nicosia District Daily Operational Log Sheets, 1st Bn, The Canadian Guards and Lord Strathcona Horse, September 1964-March 1965.
- Nicosia District Daily Operational Log Sheets, Queen's Own Rifles of Canada and The Royal Canadian Dragoons, March-October 1965.
- Nicosia District Daily Operational Log Sheets, The Canadian Guards and the Royal Canadian Dragoons, October 1965-April 1966.
- Nicosia District Daily Operational Log Sheets, 2nd Bn, The Black Watch (Royal Highland Regiment of Canada) and the 8th Canadian Hussars, April 1966-October 1966.
- Nicosia District Daily Operational Log Sheets, 1st Bn, The Royal Canadian Regiment and Fort Garry Horse, October 1966-April 1967.
- Nicosia District Daily Operational Log Sheets, 2nd Bn, Queen's Own Rifles and The Royal Canadian Dragoons, April 1967-October 1967.

Nicosia District Daily Operational Log Sheets, 1st Bn, The Black Watch and the Fort Garry Horse, October 1967-April 1968.

Nicosia District Daily Operational Log Sheets, 1st Bn, Princess Patricia's Canadian Light Infantry and The Royal Canadian Horse Artillery, April-September 1968.

Nicosia District Daily Operational Log Sheets, 3e Bn, Royal 22e Regiment, September 1968-April 1969.

Nicosia District Daily Operational Log Sheets, 2e Bn, Royal 22e Regiment, April-September 1969.

Nicosia District Daily Operational Log Sheets, 2nd Bn, The Black Watch, September 1969-March 1970.

Nicosia District Daily Operational Log Sheets, 1st Bn, The Royal Canadian Regiment, March-October 1970.

Nicosia District Daily Operational Log Sheets, 3rd Bn, Princess Patricia's Canadian Light Infantry, October 1970-March 1971.

Nicosia District Daily Operational Log Sheets, 1st Bn, Princess Patricia's Canadian Light Infantry, March-October 1971.

Nicosia District Daily Operational Log Sheets, 2e Bn, Royal 22e Regiment, October 1971-April 1972.

Nicosia District Daily Operational Log Sheets, Lord Strathcona Horse, April-October 1972.

Nicosia District Daily Operational Log Sheets, 2nd Bn, Princess Patricia's Canadian Light Infantry, October 1972-March 1973.

Nicosia District Daily Operational Log Sheets, 3e Bn, Royal 22e Regiment, March-October 1973.

Nicosia District Daily Operational Log Sheets, 2nd Bn, The Royal Canadian Regiment, October 1973-April 1974.

Nicosia District Daily Operational Log Sheets, The Canadian Airborne Regiment, April-December 1974.

Nicosia District Daily Operational Log Sheets, 1st Bn, The Royal Canadian Regiment, December 1974-May 1975.

B. Private Papers

Brigadier-General (retired) Clayton E. Beattie. (Private collection)

The following papers refer only to those documents which were of primary importance and dealt directly with the topic of this study. These are invaluable for a student studying particular United Nations operations. As they are not public, the following documents are listed for reference.

- (i) United Nations. United Nations Force in Cyprus Headquarters Operational Briefings. July-August, 1974.

United Nations. United Nations Force in Cyprus Headquarters Operational Briefing. 3 December 1976.

- (ii) Dairy of Brigadier-General C.E. Beattie 1964-68, 1972-1976.

- (iii) Briefings for District Zone Commanders UNFICYP HQ July-October 1974.

Communications to Forces Mobile Command (DND) and DND from HQ CANCON re: casualties, August 1974.

Declaration by the Foreign Ministers of Greece, Turkey, United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland. (discussions in Geneva 25-30 July 1974.) July 30, 1974 and 31 July 1974.

Declaration by the Foreign Ministers of Greece, Turkey, and the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, August 26, 1974.

Letter from Ian A. Nicol to BGen C.E. Beattie, March 21, 1980.

Letter from Warrant Officer T.H. Walton, MMM, CD, to BGen C.E. Beattie, October 22, 1979.

Letter from Lieutenant Colonel R.Q.M. Morris, OBE, 16/5th Lancers, Great Britain to BGen C.E. Beattie, January 21, 1980.

Letters of Protest Of UNFICYP Action, sent by Osman N. Orek, Office of the Minister of Defence, Cyprus to General Prem Chand UNFICYP Force Commander 21 July 1974.

Memorandum for the Record, Meeting between the UN Force Commander and the Commander in Chief "Turkish Peace Forces" Cyprus 1800 hrs. 26 July 1974.

Messages from the Chief of Staff (COS) to Cypriot National Guard Commander July-September 1974.

Messages from HQ Turkish "Peace Force" to HQ UNFICYP July-September 1974.

Messages From Danish Contingent (DANCON) to HQ UNFICYP on establishment of Observation Points (OP) in Kakopetria, July 1974.

Messages from Swedish Contingent (SWEDCON) to HQ UNFICYP re: UNFICYP operations in controlled areas, July-August 1974.

Messages from LIMZONE (Limmosol Zone) on Greek National Guard strength and positions, July 1974.

Messages from Austrian Contingent (AUSCON) Larnaca to HQ UNFICYP on Turkish amphibious landing forces and deployment July 1974.

Messages from UN Geneva to UNFICYP HQ re: occupation forces of Turkey August 1974.

Messages to HQ UNFICYP from Turkish leadership (Mr. Hassan, LO to VPO) August 1974).

Message to Commander National Guard from Commander UN Forces re; Killing of UN soldiers, September 1974.

Messages from UN Commander to Commander Turkish Forces re: troop movements on post-cease-fire agreement July-September 1974.

Messages for "CRESCENT" (Force Commander Turkish Armed Forces) from UN Force Commander July-September 1974.

Message From UNFICYP Commander, General Prem Chand to Brian Urquhart, UN Headquarters New York, 14 August 1974.

Message to Crescent from UN Force Commander to Commander Turkish Forces, 16 August 1974.

Message From Commanding Officer Turk Forces to Force Commander UNFICYP, 21 August 1974.

Message From UNFICYP HQ to Zone Commanders, 28 July 1974.

Minutes of Conferences at HQ UNFICYP 2 August 1974 re: Turkish invasion and Cypriot National Guard Response, Cease-fire Negotiations, and Humanitarian Assistance.

Notes of Protest by COS UNFICYP on behalf of Soviet Embassy, Counselor Mr. Belieav, re: Turkish Troop fire, 14 August 1974.

Note by Headquarters UNFICYP, Nicosia, 28 July 1974.

Note by Headquarters UNFICYP, Nicosia Airport, 4 August 1974.

Open letter to "Committee of Greek Parents and Relatives of Missing Soldiers" by Bulent Ecevit, Prime Minister of Turkey, August 1974.

Precedence Information (SECRET) from Headquarters UNFICYP to Zone Commanders, 31 July 1974.

Record of Meeting Cyprus Cease-Fire, UNFICYP HQ, 2 August 1974.

Record of Meeting on Demarcation Talks, Tripartite Committee, Nicosia, 4 August 1974.

Report to UNFICYP HQ, on "UNFICYP Operations in Kyrenia and DOME Hotel July-August 1974". Prepared by Major Peter Gill and transcribed from a verbal tape-recorded report in August 1974.

"SECRET" Messages from UN HQ Geneva to HQ UNFICYP re: Cease-fire Talks 14 August 1974.

"Suggested Policy to be Adopted in Regard to UN Relief" August 1974.

Situation Reports, prepared by UNFICYP HQ 1974-1976.

Transcribed telephone message from Mr. B. Urquhart UN New York, 30 July 1974 (0130 hrs) to COS UNFICYP HQ re: UN role in humanitarian assistance.

UNFICYP Casualty Lists, August 1974.

UNFICYP HQ requests with Cyprus vice-President's Office re: meetings on cease-fires July 1974.

United Nations Force in Cyprus Daily Operational Briefings, UNFICYP HQ, June-October 1974.

Brigadier-General Edward Leslie. (Private collection)
Contains a few items on UNFICYP operations 1970-1971.

Martin Papers (not opened)

Pearson Papers (National Archives Canada, MG 26 N3 and N6)
These papers contain few items relevant to the Cyprus issue other than copies of Hansard and the one Note for the record which outlined Pearson's personal thoughts of the critical situation facing both the UN and NATO.

Sharp Papers (not opened)

C. *Parliamentary Debates*

Dominion of Canada, *Hansard's Parliamentary Debates*, 1964-1974.

D. Canada. Parliament, *Order In-Council*. PC 38-1964

E. Canada. Parliament, House of Commons, Report on the Standing Committee on External Affairs and National Defence, 1964-1993.

F. Great Britain. *British Information Services*. Statement by Mr. D. Sandys, Commonwealth Secretary on the Cyprus Issue. 10 March 1964.

G. *United Nations Documents*

(i) Nicosia District Economic/Humanitarian Situation Report 38/74, 22 August 1974.

Nicosia District Economic/Humanitarian Situation Report
41/74, 25 August 1974.

(ii) United Nations Security Council Report S/5634, 4 March 1964; S/5575, S/5754, 27 June 1964; S/5848, 22 July 1964; S/5868, August 1964; S/5950, 10 September 1964; S/6102, 12 December 1964; S/7001, 10 December 1965; S/8248/add. 4, 15 November 1967; S/8266, 24 June 1968; S/10401, 18 October 1971; S/10564/add. 1, 12 February 1972; S/11353, 21 July 1974; S/11353/add. 2, 22 July 1974; S/11353/add. 4, 23 July 1974; S/11365, 23 July 1974; S/11353/add. 5, 24 July 1974; S/11353/add. 12, 31 July 1974; S/11353/add. 14, 4 August 1974; S/11353/add. 15, 5 August 1974; S/11353/add. 16, 6 August 1974; S/11353/add. 17, 7 August 1974; S/11353/add. 18, 9 August 1974; S/11353/add. 32, 19 August 1974; S/11488, 20 August 1974; S/11568, 6 December 1974.

(iii) United Nations. United Nations Security Council
Resolution 360, 16 August 1974.

H. White Paper on Defence, "Defence in the 70's" Donald
Macdonald, Minister of National Defence in Canada, Ottawa,
1971.

I. *Periodicals and Newspapers*

Canadian Defence Quarterly
*Canadian Institute of International Affairs, "Behind the
Headlines"*
Canadian Journal of Economics and Political Science
Foreign Affairs
Institute for Strategic Studies
International Journal
International Organization
Journal of Conflict Resolution
Maclean's
Queen's Quarterly
The World Today
Time Magazine
United Nations Monthly Chronicle

The New York Times
The Ottawa Citizen
The Times
The Toronto Globe and Mail
The Toronto Telegraph
The Winnipeg Free Press

J. INTERVIEWS

Admiral J. Anderson, Chief of Defence Staff, Canadian Forces, completed 22 December 1993.

BGen C.E. Beattie (Ret'd) Chief of Staff and Contingent Commander UNFICYP 1973-1977, interviews held in Ottawa, Ontario, in October 1993, November 12, 1993, December 10, 12, 1993, January 7, 12, 13, 23, 1994, February 7, 28, 1994.

Major Normand Blacquierre, former Operations Officer of Observation Company, Canadian Airborne Regiment and member of the Canadian Contingent Cyprus during Turkish invasion period of 20 July-18 August 1974. Interview held on 11 November 1993 and a telephone interview on 18 April 1995.

General J. de Chastelain, Chief of Defence Staff, Canadian Forces, interviews held in Ottawa, Ontario, 8 and 9 March 1994.

Colonel D. Harries, former Camp UNFICYP Commander 1974 and former District Commander UNPROFOR Yugoslavia 1992-93. Telephone interviews 28 and 29 June, 1994.

Colonel M. Houghton, former Director Peacekeeping Operations, NDHQ, Department of National Defence, interviews held in Ottawa, Ontario, 28 January, and 8, 27 April, 1994.

Mrs. H. Leslie, widow of the late BGen. Leslie, former Deputy Chief of Staff UNFICYP 1972-1973. Mrs. Leslie has diaries of BGen Leslie and allowed research of these documents during week of February 14-18, 1994.

Lieutenant Colonel Don Manuel (Retired) former Officer Commanding Canadian Contingent Cyprus during 1974 crisis and DCO Airborne Regiment. Telephone interviews 19 and 20 April 1995.

Mr. Geoffrey Pearson (retired) former Ambassador to the USSR and former Executive Director of the Canadian Institute for International Peace and Security, held in Ottawa, Ontario, 11 February 1994.

Mr. George Sherry, Advisor to the International Peace Academy, New York and former member of the United Nations Secretariat and advisor to the Secretary-General Mr. K. Waldheim and Under-Secretary General, Mr. B. Urquhart during 1974 Cyprus crises. Telephone interview 18 April 1995.

Lieutenant Colonel Thane Wheeler (retired) former Operations Officer Canadian Contingent Cyprus during 1974-75. LCol. Wheeler wrote most dispatches to National Defence Headquarters in Ottawa and accompanied BGen Beattie throughout the 1974 crisis. Telephone interviews 18 and 20 April 1995.

Brigadier-General Gabriel Zuliani former Regimental Major of 2 Commando, Canadian Airborne Regiment which reinforced the Canadian Contingent in Cyprus on 30 July 1974. Telephone interview 18 April 1995.

K. *Memoirs and Autobiographies*

MacKenzie, Lewis. *Peacekeeper: The Road To Sarajevo*. Toronto: Douglas and McIntyre, 1993.

Martin, Paul. *A Very Public Life*, 2 vols. Toronto: Deneau and Wayne Publishers Limited, 1985.

Pearson, Lester B. *Mike: Memoirs of the Right Honourable Lester B. Pearson*, 3 vols. Scarborough: New American Library of Canada, 1973-1976.

Sharp, Mitchell, *Which Reminds Me...: A Memoir*. Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1994.

II SECONDARY SOURCES

A. *Books*

Abi-Saab, Georges. *The United Nations Operation in the Congo, 1960-1964*. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1978.

Adams, Thomas, W. and Cothell, Alvin, J. *Cyprus Between East and West*. Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins Press, 1968.

Altschuller, Donald. *The United Nations' Role in World Affairs*. New York: H.W. Wilson, 1993.

Attalides, Michael, A. *Cyprus: Nationalism and International Politics*. New York: St. Martin's Press, 1979.

Baehr, Peter, R. and Gordenker, Leon. *The United Nations in the 1990s*. New York: St. Martin's Press, 1992.

Barros, James. ed., *The United Nations: Past, Present, and Future*. New York: Free Press, 1972.

Berridge, G.R. and Jennings, A. *Diplomacy at the UN*. London: Macmillan Press, 1985.

Bitsios, Dimitri, S. *Cyprus: The Vulnerable Republic*. Thessalonki: Institute for Balkan Studies, 1975.

Bloomfield, Lincoln, P. (ed.) *International Military Forces*. Boston: Little Brown and Company, 1964.

Boyd, James, M. *United Nations Peace-Keeping Operations: A Military and Political Appraisal*. New York: Praeger Publishers, 1971.

Bowett, D.W., et al. *United Nations Forces: A Legal Study*. New York: Praeger Publishers, 1964.

Brewin, Andrew. *Stand On Guard: The Search for a Canadian Defence Policy*. Toronto: McClelland and Stewart, 1965.

Burns, Arthur, L. and Heathcote, Nina. *Peace-keeping by UN Forces*. New York: Praeger Publishers, 1963.

Burns, E.L.M. *Between Arab and Israeli*. London: Harrap, 1962.

Calvocoressi, Peter. *World Order and the New States*. London: Chatto and Windus, 1962.

Calvocoressi, Peter. *International Politics Since 1945*. New York: Praeger Publishers, 1968.

Canada and the UN, 1945-1965. Ottawa: Queen's Printer and Controller of Stationary, 1966.

Citrin, Jack. *United Nations Peacekeeping Activities: A Case Study on Organizational Task Expansion*. Denver: University of Denver, 1965.

Claude, Inis, L. *The United Nations and the Use of Force*. New York: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 1961.

Cordier, Andrew, W. and Foote, W. *The Quest For Peace: The Dag Hammarskjold Memorial Lectures*. New York: Columbia University Press, 1965.

Cornelson, Verlag. *The United Nations, Blue Helmets on Patrol*. Berlin: Cornelson, 1983.

Cox, Arthur, M. *Prospects for Peacekeeping*. Washington, D.C.: The Brookings Institution, 1967.

Eayrs, James. *Canada and World Affairs, 1955-1957*. Toronto: Oxford University Press, 1959.

English, John. *The Life of Lester Pearson*. 2 Vols. Toronto: Lester and Orpen Dennys, 1989-1992.

Enrlich, Thomas. *Cyprus 1958-1967*. London: Oxford University Press, 1974.

Fabian, Larry, L. *Soldiers Without Enemies: Preparing the United Nations for Peacekeeping*. Washington: Brookings Institution, 1971.

Fehrenbach, T.R. *This Kind of Peace*. New York: David McKay Company, 1966.

Foley, Charles. *Legacy of Strife: Cyprus from Rebellion to Civil War*. Harmondsworth, Middlesex, England: Penguin Books Ltd., 1964.

Foley, Charles, and Scobie, W.I. *The Struggle for Cyprus*. Stanford California: Hoover Institution Press, 1975.

Forsythe, David, P. *United Nations Peace Making*. Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1972.

Fromuth, Peter, J. ed., *A Successor's Vision: The United Nations of Tomorrow*. New York: University Press of America, 1988.

Frydenberg, P. (ed.) *Peace-Keeping: Experience and Evaluation*. Oslo, Norway: Norwegian Institute of International Affairs, 1964.

Frye, William, R. *A United Nations Peace Force*. New York: Oceana Publications, Inc., 1957.

Gaffen, Fred. *In The Eye Of The Storm*. Toronto: Deneau and Wayne Publishers Limited, 1987.

Gardam, John. *The Canadian Peacekeeper*. Burnstown: The General Store Publishing House, 1992.

Goodrich, Leland, M. *The United Nations in a Changing World*. New York: Columbia University Press, 1974.

Gordenker, Leon. ed., *The United Nations in International Politics*. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1971.

Gordon, King. *The United Nations in the Congo: A quest for Peace*. New York: Carnagie Endowment for International Peace, 1962.

Granatstein, J.L., ed. *Canadian Foreign Policy Since 1945: Middle Power or a Satellite*. Toronto: Copp Clark Pub. 1973.

Granatstein, J.L. *Pirouette: Pierre Trudeau and Canadian Foreign Policy*. Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1990.

Granatstein, J.L. and Bercuson, D.J. *War and Peacekeeping: From South Africa to the Gulf-Canada's Limited Wars*. Toronto: Key Porter Books, 1991.

Granatstein, J.L. *Shadows of War, Faces of Peace: Canada's Peacekeepers*. Toronto: Key Porter Books, 1992.

Granatstein, J.L., ed. *Towards a New World: Readings on the History of Canadian Foreign Policy*. Toronto: Copp Clarke Pitman, 1992.

Gray, Colin, S. *Canadian Defence Priorities: A Question of Relevance*. Toronto: Clarke, Irwin, 1972.

Harbottle, Michael. *The Impartial Soldier*. London: Oxford University Press, 1970.

Harbottle, Michael. *The Blue Berets*. Bath: Pitman Press, 1971.

Higgins, Rosalyn. *United Nations Peacekeeping: Documents and Commentary*, 4 Vols. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1981.

Higgins, Rosalyn. *United Nations Peacekeeping: Past Lessons and Future Prospects; Annual Memorial Lecture*. London: David Davies Memorial, Institute of International Studies, 1976.

Hillmer, Norman and Granatstein, J.L. *Empire to Umpire: Canada and the World to the 1990s*. Mississauga: Copp Clark Longman, 1994.

Home, Gordon, C. *Cyprus: Then and Now*. London: J.M. Dent and Sons Ltd., 1960.

Hunt, B.D. and Haycock, R.G. *Canada's Defence: Perspectives on Policy in the Twentieth Century*. Mississauga: Copp Clark Pitman, 1993.

James, Alan. *Peacekeeping in International Politics*. Houndmills, Basingstoke, Hampshire: Macmillan in association with the International Institute for Strategic Studies, 1990.

James, Alan. *The Politics of Peacekeeping*. London: Chatto and Windus, 1969.

Lall, Arthur. *The UN and the Middle East Crisis, 1967*. New York: Columbia University Press, 1968.

Lefever, Ernest, W. *Crisis in the Congo: A U.N. Force in Action*. Washington, D.C.: The Brookings Institution, 1965.

Lefever, Ernest, W. and Joshua, Wynfred. *United Nations Peacekeeping: 1960-1964: An Analysis of Political, Executive and Military Control*, 4 Vols. Washington D.C.: Brookings Institution, 1966.

Mayes, Stanley. *Cyprus and Makarios*. London: Putman, 1960.

Mayes, Stanley. *Makarios: A Biography*. New York: St. Martin's Press 1981.

Meron, Theodore. *The United Nations Secretariat*. Lexington: Lexington Books, 1977.

Miller, Linda, B. *World Order and Local Disorders: The United Nations and Internal Conflicts*. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1967.

Minifie, James, M. *Peacemaker or Powder-Monkey: Canada's Role in a Revolutionary World*. Toronto: McClelland and Stewart, 1985.

Murphy, John, F. *The United Nations and the Control of International Violence: A Legal and Political Analysis*. Totowa, New Jersey: Allanheld, Osum Publishers, 1982.

Nicholas, H.G. *The United Nations As a Political Institution*. New York: Fourth Edition (1971)

Padelford, Norman, J. and Goodrich, Leland, M. *The United Nations in the Balance: Accomplishments and Prospects*. New York: Praeger Publishers, 1965.

Patrick, Richard, A. *A Political Geography and the Cyprus Conflict 1963-1971*. Edited by James H. Bater and Richard Preston, Published by the Department of Geography, Faculty of Environmental Studies, University of Waterloo, 1976.

Paxman, John, M. and Boggs, George, T., ed., *The United Nations: A Reassessment; Sanctions, Peacekeeping, and Humanitarian Assistance*. Charlottesville: University Press of Virginia, 1993.

Pelcovits, Nathan, A. *Peacekeeping on Arab-Israeli Fronts: Lessons From the Sinai and Lebanon*. Boulder: Westview Press, 1984.

Polyvios, Polyvios, G. *Cyprus: Conflict and Negotiation 1960-1980*. New York: Holmes and Meier Publishers Inc., 1980.

Polyvios, Polyvios, G. *Cyprus: The Tragedy and the Challenge*. London: John Swain and Son Ltd., 1975.

Ries, John, C. "Peacekeeping and Peace Observation: The Canadian Case" (ACDA/WEC 126 Vol.IX) U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, 30 June 1968.

Riggs, Robert, E. *The United Nations: International Organization and World Politics*. Chicago: Dorsey Press, 1988.

Rikhye, Indarjit, Harbottle, Michael, and Egge, Bjorn. *The Thin Blue Line*. London: Yale University Press, 1974.

Rikhye, Indar, J. and Skjelsbaek, ed., *The United Nations and Peacekeeping: Results, Limitations, and Prospects: The Lessons of 40 Years Experience*. Houndmills, Basingstoke,

Hampshire: Macmillan in association with the International Peace Academy, 1990.

Rosenau, James, N. *The United Nations in a Turbulent World*. Boulder: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 1982.

Rosner, Gabriella. *United Nations Emergency Force*. New York: Columbia University Press, 1963.

Russell, Ruth. *United Nations Experience With Military Forces: Political and Legal Aspects*. Washington, D.C.: The Brookings Institution, 1964.

Russell, Ruth. *The United Nations and United States Security*. Washington: Brookings Institution, 1968.

Saksena, Krishan, P. *The United Nations and Collective Security: A Historical Analysis*. Delhi: D.K. Publishing House, 1974.

Seyersted, Finn. *United Nations Forces on the Law of Peace and War*. Leyden: A.W. Sijthoff, 1966.

Sohn, Louis, B. *The United Nations in Action, Ten Cases From United Nations Practice*. Brooklyn: The Foundation Press, 1968.

Stegenga, James, A. *The United Nations Force in Cyprus*. Ohio State University Press, 1968.

Stevens, Robert. *Cyprus, A Place of Arms: Power Politics and Ethnic Conflict in the Eastern Mediterranean*. New York: Praeger Publisher, 1966.

Surendra, Bhutani. *Hope and Despair: The United Nations and the Arab-Israeli Conflict*. New Delhi: Sopan Publishing House, 1980.

Taylor, Alistair, Cox, David, and Granatstein, J.L. *Peacekeeping: International Challenge and Canadian Response*. Toronto: Canadian Institute of International Affairs, 1968.

The United Nations and the Maintenance of International Peace and Security. Boston: Martinus Nijhoff Publishers and the United Nations Institution for Training and Research, 1987.

Tompkins, E.B. ed., *The United Nations in Perspective*. Stanford: Hoover Institution Press, Stanford University, 1972.

United Nations. *Everyman's United Nations*. New York: United Nations Publication, 1956.

United Nations. *The United Nations at Forty*. New York: United Nations Publication, 1985.

United Nations. *United Nations Peacekeeping*. New York: United Nations Publication, 1993.

Verrier, Anthony. *International Peacekeeping: United Nations Forces in a Troubled World*. Harmondsworth: Penguin Books, 1981.

von Horn, Carl. *Soldiering for Peace*. New York: David McKay Company Inc., 1967.

Wainhouse, David, W. *International Peace Observation: A History and Forecast*. Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins Press, 1966.

Wainhouse, David, W. *International Peacekeeping at the Crossroads: National Support-Experience and Prospects*. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins Press, 1973.

Waldheim, Kurt. *The Challenge of Peace*. New York: Rawson, Wade Publishers, 1980.

Waters, Maurice. *The United Nations: International Organization and Administration*. London: The Macmillan Company, 1967.

Wiseman, Henry, ed., *Peacekeeping: Appraisals and Proposals*. New York: Pergamon Press, 1983.

C. Articles

Allan, Ralph, "Fourteen Days in Cyprus", *Maclean's*, LXXVII, No. 12 (June 20, 1964) pp. 15-15, 36-42.

Bacheli, Tozun, "Cyprus in the Politics of Turkey Since 1955", paper presented to the Canadian Institute of International Peace and Security, Ottawa, Ontario, (February 1989).

Beattie, Clayton, E., "Preparations for Peacekeeping at the International Level", *Canadian Defence Quarterly*, Vol. 8, No. 2, (Autumn 1978), pp. 26-29.

Beattie, Clayton, E., "Defence and Security in the 1980s", *Canadian Defence Quarterly*, Vol. 10, No. 3, (Winter 1980/81), pp. 21-25.

Bergstrand, Brad, M., "What Do You Do When There's No Peace To Keep?", *Canadian Defence Quarterly*, Vol. 23, No. 3, (March 1994), pp. 25-29.

Beuregard, J.P.R.E., "UN Operations in the Congo", *Canadian Defence Quarterly*, Vol. 19, No. 1, (Summer 1989), pp. 27-28.

Bishop, Peter, V., "Canada's Policy on the Financing of UN Peacekeeping Operations", *International Journal*, Vol. XX (Autumn 1965).

Boyd, James, M., "Cyprus: Episode in Peacekeeping", *International Organization*, XX, No. 1 (Winter, 1966), pp. 1-17.

Burns, E.L.M., "The Withdrawal of UNEF and the Future of Peacekeeping", *International Journal*, Vol. 23 (1967) p. 9.

de Chastelain, A.J.G.D., "The Art of Prudent Wing Walking", *Canadian Defence Quarterly*, Vol. 19, No. 6, (June 1990), pp. 11-14.

Claude, Inis, L. Jr., "United Nations Use of Military Force", *Journal of Conflict Resolution*, Vol. VII (June 1963).

Crawshaw, Nancy, "The Republic of Cyprus: From the Zurich Agreement to Independence", *The World Today*, XVI, No. 12 (December, 1960) pp. 526-540.

Crawshaw, Nancy, "Cyprus: Collapse of the Zurich Agreement", *The World Today*, XX (August, 1964) pp. 338-347.

Dabros, M.R., "The Multinational Force and Observers: A New Experience in Peacekeeping in Canada", *Canadian Defence Quarterly*, Vol. 16, No. 2, (Autumn 1986), pp. 32-35.

Delvoie, Louis, A., "Canada and Peacekeeping: A New Era", *Canadian Defence Quarterly*, Vol. 20, No. 2, (Autumn 1990), pp. 9-14.

Dewitt, David, B., "Canadian Defence Policy: Regional Conflicts, Peacekeeping and Stability Operations", *Canadian Defence Quarterly*, Vol. 21, No. 1, (Special No. 2/1991), pp. 40-49.

Dewitt, David, B., "Cooperative Security: A Canadian Approach to the Promotion of Peace and Security in the Post-Cold War Era", *Canadian Defence Quarterly*, Vol. 23, No. 3, (March 1994), pp. 11-18.

Dirlik, Andre, "Le Role de Chypre dans la Strategie Turque", *Canadian Defence Quarterly*, Vol. 4, No. 3, (Winter 1974), pp. 12-14.

Eayrs, James, "Future Roles For The Armed Forces of Canada", *Canadian Institute of International Affairs*, (1969).

Gibson, J.A., "Canadian Foreign Policy", *Queen's Quarterly*, LVIII (Winter 1951).

Gordon, J.A.R., "The United Nations Emergency Force", *Canadian Defence Quarterly*, Vol. 19, No. 1, (Summer 1989), pp. 19-20.

Gordon, J. King, "The UN in CYPRUS", *International Journal*, Volume XIX, Number 3, (Summer 1964) pp., 326-347.

Harries, David, "Peacekeeping Futures", *Canadian Defence Quarterly*, Vol. 21, No. 2, (October 1991), pp. 25-31.

Hillmer, Norman, "Peacemakers, Blessed and Otherwise", *Canadian Defence Quarterly*, (August 1989), pp. 55-58.

Hillmer, Norman, "Peacekeeping: Canadian Institution, Canadian Myth", in J.L. Granatstein and Sue Akerman, eds., *Welfare States in Trouble* (Toronto: York University, 1994) pp. 159-170.

James, Alan, "The Future of Peacekeeping for Canada", *Canadian Defence Quarterly*, Vol. 8, No. 1, (Summer 1978), pp. 30-36.

James, Alan, "The History of Peacekeeping: An Analytical Perspective", *Canadian Defence Quarterly*, Vol. 23, No. 1, (September 1993), Pp. 10-17.

Kirsch, Phillippe, "The Legal Basis of Peacekeeping", *Canadian Defence Quarterly*, Vol. 23, No. 1, (September 1993), pp. 18-23.

Laipson, Ellen, "The United States and Cyprus: Past Policies, Current Concerns", paper presented to the Canadian Institute of International Peace and Security, Ottawa, Ontario, (February 1989).

Leslie, E., "Some Thoughts on International Peacekeeping", *Canadian Defence Quarterly*, Vol. 7, No. 3, (Winter 1977/78), pp. 18-22.

Lezee, Pierre, "The Challenge of Conflict Resolution in Cambodia", *Canadian Defence Quarterly*, Vol. 23, No. 1, (September 1993), pp. 35-42.

MacInnis, J.A., "Cyprus-Canada's Perpetual Vigil", *Canadian Defence Quarterly*, Vol. 19, No. 1, (Summer 1989), pp. 21-26.

MacEachen, Allen, J., "Peace-keeping and Cyprus: The Canadian Experience", United Nations Seminar at Mount Allison University, Sackville, New Brunswick, (July 4, 1974).

MacPherson, J.R., "A Canadian Initiative and Its Results: Active Peacekeeping After 30 Years", *Canadian Defence Quarterly*, Vol. 16, No. 1, (Summer 1986), pp. 42-48.

Manson, Paul, D., "Peacekeeping in Canadian and Defence Policy", *Canadian Defence Quarterly*, Vol. 19, No. 1, (Summer 1989), pp. 7-12.

Melakopides, Constantine, "The Cyprus Problem in Greek Foreign Policy," University of Manitoba, (1989).

Mills, Susan, R., "Paying For Peacekeeping", *Canadian Defence Quarterly*, Vol. 23, No. 1, (September 1993), pp. 31-33.

Morrison, Alex, "The Renaissance of United Nations Peacekeeping: Some Observations From New York", *Canadian Defence Quarterly*, Vol. 19, No. 1, (Summer 1989), pp. 13-17.

Norton, Augustus, R., "Peacekeeping, Civil Society and Conflict Regulation", *Canadian Defence Quarterly*, Vol. 23, No. 1, (September 1993), pp. 31-33.

Pearson, Lester, B., "Force for the United Nations", *Foreign Affairs*, Vol. 35 (April 1957).

Pearson, Lester, B., "A New Kind of Peace Force", *Maclean's*, (May 2, 1964).

Pearson, Lester, B., "Keeping the Peace", *Survival*, Vol. 6 (July-August 1964).

Rae, Saul, F., "The Question of Cyprus", presented to the 30th Session of the United Nations General Assembly, (November 13, 1975).

Reay, G.M., "Building Peace in the Age of Fragmentation", *Canadian Defence Quarterly*, Vol. 23, No. 3, (March 1993), pp. 6-10.

Rosenbaum, Naomi, "Cyprus and the United Nations: An Appreciation of Parliamentary Diplomacy", *Canadian Journal of Economics and Political Science*, Vol. XXXIII (May 1967).

Tackaberry, R.B., "Keeping the Peace: A Canadian Military Viewpoint on Peacekeeping Operations", *Canadian Institute of International Affairs*, Behind the Headline series, Vol. XXVI (September 1966).

United Nations, *United Nations Monthly Chronicle*, New York, (May 1964), p. 8.

United Nations, *United Nations Monthly Chronicle*. New York, (June 1964), p. 19.

United Nations, *United Nations Monthly Chronicle*. New York, (October 1964), p. 14.

United Nations, *United Nations Monthly Chronicle*. New York, (March 1966), pp. 12-13.

Weiss, Thomas, G., "UN Military Operations After The Cold War: Some Conceptual Problems", *Canadian Defence Quarterly*, Vol. 23, No. 1, (September 1993), pp. 5-9.

Windsor, Philip, "NATO and the Cyprus Crisis", Adelphi Paper No. 14, London: Institute for Strategic Studies, (1964).

Wiseman, Henry, "Has New Life Been Breathed Into U.N. Peacekeeping?", *Canadian Defence Quarterly*, Vol. 5, No. 1, (Summer 1975), pp. 22-28.

Yuill, Douglas, W.A., "The United Nations Disengagement Observer Force", *Canadian Defence Quarterly*, Vol. 19, No. 1, (Summer 1989), pp. 28-33.

Annex A

UNITED NATIONS OPERATIONS TERMINOLOGY

Peacemaking has been identified with, or predicated upon, a determination to use any necessary violence. Historically, it has been the alternative to the acceptance of an international ultimatum usually following a violent and/or surprising breach of a treaty or the "status quo." While having most of the characteristics of a "hot war," there have usually been subtle differences of purpose and tacit understandings with respect to the escalation of the methods employed. In the Korean conflict, it was the concept of sanctuary (China) and the avoidance of nuclear weapons. In the Gulf War, the objective was the expulsion of Iraqi troops from Kuwait and not the pursuit of Iraqi troops to totally defeat them. Since Canada did contribute to the UN peacemaking endeavours in Korea and the Gulf, Canadian participation in international peacemaking at the upper end of the spectrum seems assured for the foreseeable future.

Peace enforcement has been described as having the authority to use specified enforcement violence.

Historically, this has existed after protracted negotiations have failed and ultimata have been rejected. This approach has been nebulous as peace-enforcement operations have had a tendency to switch from peacemaking to peacekeeping. The operation in Somalia (UNOSOM II) is an example where UN cease-fire agreements with ultimata have been rejected and US led UN operations have attempted to enforce such agreements. Continued defiance of the UN by certain nations or factions within the conflict area, however, could lead to Canadian participation in responses that escalate from sanctions to supervised enforcement.

Peacekeeping can be defined in two ways. The first has been described as an operation by military forces armed for defensive purposes. Historically, this approach has most frequently been used in the aftermath of armed conflicts (UNEF), when political conflicts have degenerated into civil or communal war (UNFICYP) and in some aspects of UNPROFOR in the former Yugoslavia. However, peacekeeping may fall under Chapter VI or VII of the UN Mandate and this has delineated the type of armed response that was allowable for defensive purposes. While Canadian experience with peacekeeping by defensively armed forces has been more limited than is generally supposed, and of late has been concentrated on the support of defensively armed forces of

other nations, the probability is that Canada will continue to provide defensively armed forces for peacekeeping when requested by the UN. To date Canada has only participated in three "PEACEKEEPING OPERATIONS." These are Cyprus (UNFICYP), Somalia (UNOSOM), and Yugoslavia (UNPROFOR). Indeed, the period of July-September 1974 witnessed a change in the role of UNFICYP from peacekeeping to that of peacemaking by using what can be described as "Peacekeeping by confrontation" tactics and the willingness to use force to ensure that newly designated UN protected areas were free from violent intrusion by Turkish invasion forces or Greek-Cypriot National Guardsmen. In addition, with the growing world concern with oceanic resources and the stresses that are inevitable when changes to national maritime limits are implemented, there exists the possibility that defensively armed maritime and airforces will be required for international peacekeeping purposes. The possible extension of Canada's 200 mile limit to 300 miles to protect fish stock off Canada's east coast is a prime example.

Peacekeeping, the second type, has been usually connected with the utilization of sanction, blockade and pre-emptive occupation. Sanctions, which have frequently escalated, have been utilized in both armed and political

(Rhodesia) conflict situations while pre-emptive occupations seem peculiar to recent circumstances. Haiti was a case of pre-emptive occupation that was sanctioned by the United Nations Security Council. As well, it is probable that growing international awareness of social inequalities and concern over barbaric behaviour as well as anxiety over armament, particularly nuclear armament (Iraq and North Korea), will lead to a wider use of sanctions and blockade as a peacekeeping device.

Peace monitoring, on the other hand, has been accomplished by supervision and/or enforcement of international conventions or agreements. Acceleration of international concerns over resources and environmental pollution, as well as impending changes to zones of national maritime control, will in all probability see an increase in this type of peacekeeping scenario.

Peace observer has been closely linked to peace monitoring and can be described as the "classical peacekeeping" operation. It has utilized the use of fact finding as a basis for negotiation, conciliation, arbitration, litigation or disengagement. It has been best known in its military forms such as the United Nations India-Pakistan Observation Mission (UNIPOM), the United

Nations Truce Supervision Organization (UNTSO), the United Nations Military Observer Group in India and Pakistan (UNMOGIP), the United Nations Observer Group in Lebanon (UNOGIL, and the International Commission of Control and Supervision ICCS), etc. It has also been described as paramilitary as was the Electronic Warfare Chain in the Sinai. Changing international circumstances and concerns (improved communications and techniques) make it probable that an increase in "observer" status will occur. It should be noted that non-military organizations will be taking part in these operations such as the election monitoring in Cambodia and UN relief efforts in Ethiopia, and will require closer cooperation and understanding between the military UN presence and Non-Government Organizations (NGO).

Peace enhancement has been described as international assistance in the maintenance of law and order and/or stability. While best known in association with conflicts United Nations Civilian Police (UNCIVPOL) and through relief organizations such as United Nations Relief and Rehabilitation Administration (UNRRA) and the World Refugee Organization, Canada has constantly contributing to this type of "peace" with commodities and medical and law

enforcement support. Haiti in 1994 is an example of this endeavour.

Nation Building and peace maintenance has primarily been the purpose of assistance agencies such as CIDA and other non-military organizations. Canada has been committed to bilateral international nation building programmes such as the former Caribbean Assistance Programme.

Economic and commodity assistance has also been used in the pursuit of international peace and security. Although long term, economic and commodity assistance in shorter programmes have had and do have immediate and beneficial effects on problems that could escalate into political and armed conflicts. Traditionally, this has been a non-military activity effected bilaterally or through international agencies such as the World Bank, and the United Nations Development Program. In the Humanitarian assistance field, military airlift or logistical capabilities have often been utilized for delivery or evacuation purposes such as in Ethiopia or Yugoslavia or in food aid to Russia in 1990.

OPERATIONS LOG

DATE 02 JAN 68

UNIT 1 RUC

PAGE NO

1

SERIAL	TIME	FROM	TO	REMARKS	ACTION TAKEN	INITIALS
1	0630	OFC KG TJMG	+	Overnight SITREPs from each coy - NTR		JF
2	0800	+	+	Lt FULLER assumes duty.		JF
3	1045	OFC	+	At 020500B Pta FARMER stepped off OP and observed a TK CYP fighter standing by the gate at BEAVER LODGE OP. The TK Fighter pointed his rifle straight up into the air and fired a shot. He then ran to the TK barrier at GR R 903807. At 020515B same FIGHTER was observed at wire around OP when noticed he took off again for barrier. Protest lodged with TK CYP FIGHTER HQ BOCHAZ.	CO Info	JF
4	1230	OFS A 1	+	Reference Serial 6, 31 Dec 67 of Bn log. Bomb was exploded in the minaret of the mosque at GR S 002874. Due to the damage done the Gk CYPOL are reluctant to enter the building until the FWD inspect it. CYPOL state that all doors and windows were locked when they arrived. They assume entry was gained through a hole in the roof and a timing device used.	SITREP	JF
5	1500	OFC 1	+	AIR ACTIVITY REPORT. A. 021525B B. MARTIN'S MOUND OF GR R 998768 C. One (1) TK G-84G D. 500 ft flying east to west E. Nil F. Nil G. Local UN	SITREP	JF
6	1700	FGH via Sig Gen	+	CONVOY REPORT. No 1 D/3 0902 A/1 0926 C10 B0 V1 To MCO A18 C3 B0 No 2 D/1 1032 A/3 1056 G16 B0 V3 To MCI A16 G13 B0 No 3 D/3 1131 A/1 1155 G16 B0 V2 T1 MCO A68 C7 B0 No 4 D/1 1600 A/3 1625 G11 B0 V2 TO MCO A37 C6 B0	Logged	JF
ANNEX B						

ANNEX C

Canadian Peacekeeping Operations1947-1993

<u>Mission</u>	<u>CDN Part.</u>	<u>Dates</u>	<u>Type</u>
United Nations Temporary Commission on Korea (UNTCOK) Korea	2	1947-48	Observers (0)
United Nations Military Observer Group India-Pakistan (UNMOGIP) Kashmir	27	1949-79	Observers (1)
United Nations Military Armistice Commission (UNCMAC) Korea	2	1953-	Liaison Officers (1)
United Nations Truce Supervision Organization (UNTSO) Egypt, Israel, Jordan Lebanon, Syria	22	1954-	Observers (13)
International Commission for Supervision and Control (ICSC) Cambodia, Laos, Vietnam	133	1954-74	Observers (0)
United Nations Emergency Force (UNEF I) Egypt	1007	1956-67	Eng., Log (0)
United Nations Observer Group in Lebanon (UNOGIL) Lebanon	77	1958	Observers (0)
Organization des Nations Unies au Congo (ONUC) Congo	421	1960-64	Sigs, Air Unit (0)
United Nations Temporary Executive Authority (UNTEA) West New Guinea	13	1962-63	Air Unit (0)
United Nations Yemen Observer Mission (UNYOM) Yemen	36	1963-64	Air Unit Observers (0)

United Nations Force in Cyprus (UNFICYP) Cyprus	1126	1964 (3)	Peace- keepers
Representative of the Secretary-General in the Dominican Republic (DOMREP) Dominican Republic	1	1965-66	Observer (0)
United Nations India- Pakistan Observation Mission (UNIPOM) India- Pakistan	112	1965-66	Observers (0)
Observer Team Nigeria (OTN) Nigeria	2	1968-70	Observers (0)
International Commission for Control and Supervision (ICCS) South Vietnam	248	1973	Observers (0)
United Nations Emergency Force II (UNEF II) Egypt	1145	1973-79	Sigs, Log (0)
United Nations Disengagement Observer Force (UNDOF) Golan Heights (Syria)	230	1974-	Sigs, Log 211
United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon (UNIFIL) Southern Lebanon	117	1974	Sigs (0)
Multinational Force and Observers (MFO) Egypt	140	1986-	ATC Unit (28)
United Nations Good Offices Mission Afghanistan and Pakistan (UNGOMAP) Pakistan-Afghanistan	5	1988-90	Sigs Observers (0)
United Nations Iran-Iraq Military Observer Group (UNIIMOG) Iran-Iraq	525	1988-91	Sigs Observers (0)
United Nations Transition Assistance Group (UNTAG) Namibia	301	1989-90	Log Air Unit (0)
United Nations Observer	174	1989-92	Observers

Group in Central America (ONUCA) Costa Rica, Guatemala Honduras, El Salvador, Nicaragua			Air Unit
Office of the Secretary-General in Afghanistan and Pakistan (OSGAP) Pakistan-Afghanistan	1	1990-92	Military Advisor (0)
United Nations Observer Group for the Verification of the Elections in Haiti (ONUVEH) Haiti	11	1990-91	Observers (0)
United Nations Iraq-Kuwait Observer Mission (UNIKOM) Iraq-Kuwait	301	1991-	Observers Engineers (5)
United Nations Angola Verification Mission II (UNAVEM II) Angola	15	1991-93	Observers (0)
United Nations Observer Mission in El Salvador (ONUSAL) El Salvador	55	1991-	Staff and Liaison Officers (2)
United Nations Mission for the Referendum in Western Sahara (MINURSO) Western Sahara	34	1991-	Force Comd Observers (30)
European Community Monitoring Mission in Yugoslavia (ECMMY) Yugoslavia	12	1991-	Monitors (12)
United Nations Transitional Authority in Cambodia (UNTAC) Cambodia	TBA	1992-	Eng, Log (205)
United Nations Protection Force (UNPROFOR) Yugoslavia	TBA	1992-	Inf, Eng (2275)
United Nations Operations in Somalia (UNOSOM II) Somalia	1278	1992-	Joint Task Force (7)
United Nations Operations in Mozambique (ONUMOZ) Mozambique	15	1993-	Observers (15)
United Nations Observer	9	1993-	Observers

Mission in Uganda and Rwanda
(UNOMUR) Uganda-Rwanda

(2)

United Nations Mission
in Haiti (UNMIH)

200

1993-

Eng
Observers
(3)

ANNEX D

The Canadian Contingents of UNFICYP

The following is the list of dates and names of the Canadian Contingents which served with the United Nations Force in Cyprus during 29 years and 3 months of peacekeeping duties:

March 1964 to September 1964

1er Bn, Royal 22e Regiment and Recce Sqn, The Royal Canadian Dragoons

September 1964 to March 1965

1st Bn, The Canadian Guards and Recce Sqn, Lord Strathcona's Horse (Royal Canadians)

March 1965 to October 1965

1st Bn, Queen's Own Rifles of Canada and Recce Sqn, The Royal Canadian Dragoons

October 1965 to April 1966

2nd Bn, The Canadian Guards and Recce Sqn, The Royal Canadian Dragoons augmented by W Bty, 4th Regiment, Royal Canadian Horse Artillery

April 1966 to October 1966

2nd Bn, The Black Watch (Royal Highland Regiment of Canada) and Recce Sqn, 8th Canadian Hussars (Princess Louise's)

October 1966 to April 1967

1st Bn, The Royal Canadian Regiment and Recce Sqn, Fort Garry Horse

April 1967 to October 1967

2nd Bn, Queen's Own Rifles of Canada and Recce Sqn, The Royal Canadian Dragoons

October 1967 to April 1968

1st Bn, The Black Watch (Royal Highland Regiment) of Canada and Recce Sqn, Fort Garry Horse

April 1968 to September 1968

1 Bn, Princess Patricia's Canadian Light Infantry augmented by X Bty, 3rd Regiment, Royal Canadian Horse Artillery

September 1968 to April 1969

3e Bn, Royal 22e Regiment

April 1969 to September 1969

2e Bn, Royal 22e Regiment

September 1969 to March 1970

2nd Bn, The Black Watch (Royal Highland Regiment) of Canada

March 1970 to October 1970

1st Bn, The Royal Canadian Regiment

October 1970 to March 1971

3rd Bn, Princess Patricia's Canadian Light Infantry

March 1971 To October 1971

1st Bn, Princess Patricia's Canadian Light Infantry

October 1971 to April 1972

2e Bn, Royal 22e Regiment

April 1972 to October 1972

Lord Strathcona's Horse (Royal Canadian)

October 1972 to March 1973

2nd Bn, Princess Patricia's Canadian Light Infantry

March 1973 to October 1973

3e Bn, Royal 22e Regiment

October 1973 to April 1974

2nd Bn, The Royal Canadian Regiment

April 1974 to December 1974

The Canadian Airborne Regiment

December 1974 to May 1975

1st Bn, The Royal Canadian Regiment

May 1975 to November 1975

2e Bn, Royal 22e Regiment augmented by Q Bty, 5e Regiment
d'Artillerie Legere du Canada

November 1975 to April 1976

3rd Bn, Princess Patricia's Canadian Light Infantry

April 1976 to November 1976

2nd Bn, Princess Patricia's Canadian Light Infantry

November 1976 to April 1977

3rd Bn, The Royal Canadian Regiment

April 1977 to October 1977

12e Regiment blindé du Canada augmented by X Bty, 5e
Regiment d'Artillerie Legere du Canada

October 1977 to April 1978

2nd Bn, The Royal Canadian Regiment

April 1978 to November 1978

1st Bn, Princess Patricia's Canadian Light Infantry

November 1978 to April 1979

8th Canadian Hussars (Princess Louise's)

April 1979 to November 1979

3e Bn, Royal 22e Regiment

November 1979 to April 1980

Lord Strathcona's Horse (Royal Canadians) augmented by U
Bty, 3rd Regiment Royal Canadian Horse Artillery

April 1980 to October 1980

3rd Bn, Princess Patricia's Canadian Light Infantry

October 1980 to April 1981

5e Regiment, d'Artillerie Legere du Canada augmented by 5e
Regiment de Genie

April 1981 to October 1981

The Canadian Airborne Regiment

October 1981 to April 1982

2e Bn, Royal 22e Regiment

April 1982 to October 1982

3rd Regiment, Royal Canadian Horse Artillery

October 1982 to April 1983

2nd Bn, Princess Patricia's Canadian Light Infantry

April 1983 to October 1983

12e regiment de blindé du Canada

October 1983 to April 1984

2nd Bn, The Royal Canadian Regiment

April 1984 to October 1984

1st Bn, Princess Patricia's Canadian Light Infantry

October 1984 to March 1985

1st Bn, The Royal Canadian Regiment

March 1985 to September 1985

3e Royal 22e Regiment

September 1985 to March 1986

2nd Regiment, Royal Canadian Horse Artillery augmented by 3
Cdo, The Canadian Airborne Regiment

March 1986 to September 1986

3rd Bn, The Royal Canadian Regiment

September 1986 to March 1987

The Canadian Airborne Regiment

March 1987 to August 1987

2e Bn, Royal 22e Regiment

August 1987 to March 1988

5e regiment d'Artillerie Legere du Canada

March 1988 to August 1988

3rd Bn, Princess Patricia's Canadian Light Infantry

August 1988 to March 1989

Lord Strathcona's Horse (Royal Canadians)

March 1989 to September 1989

The Royal Canadian Dragoons

September 1989 to March 1990

1st Bn, The Royal Canadian Regiment

March 1990 to August 1990

2nd Bn, Princess Patricia's Canadian Light Infantry

August 1990 to March 1991

12e Regiment blindé du Canada

March 1991 to August 1991

1st Bn, Princess Patricia's Canadian Light Infantry

August 1991 to March 1992

2nd Bn, The Royal Canadian Regiment

March 1992 to August 1992

3e Royal 22e Regiment

August 1992 to February 1993

1st Regiment, Royal Canadian Horse Artillery

February 1993 to June 1993

2nd Regiment, Royal Canadian Horse Artillery

ANNEX E

D.L.(1) Div., J.C. Cousineau/rg
 DEPARTMENT OF EXTERNAL AFFAIRS
 MEMORANDUM

TO:Mr. Ross Campbell.....

Security Confidential

Date ...February 5, 1964...

FROM:Defence Liaison (1) Division.....

File No.		
21-14-6-UNFICYP		
3		

REFERENCE:

SUBJECT: ...Cyprus Airlift - Advance Planning.....

National Defence's advance plans for the sending of a Canadian contingent to Cyprus, if and when a decision to that effect is taken by the Canadian Government, are as follows:

(a) Three advance ("positioning") flights by two Yukon and one Hercules aircraft carrying a small RCAP party plus administrative and servicing equipment would leave Canada 12, 12-14 and 24 hours respectively after the government decision. Personnel and equipment would be picked up at Marville, Baden-Soellingen and Duesseldorf en route. No arms or ammunition would be carried. Overflight and landing clearances would be required from France and West Germany, overflight clearance only from Italy and Greece, (British clearances would be sought through service channels).

(b) A main force consisting of 815 troops with kit, 72 jeeps and trailers and 102,000 pounds of other stores (including personal arms and ammunition) would be lifted between the third and the seventh day after the government decision. This would require 13 flights by Yukon and 5 by Hercules aircraft. Overflight clearances would be required for Ireland (most useful although not absolutely essential), France, Italy and Greece. Marville would be used as a staging post for all flights both going and returning. Alternate airports should be available at Shannon (Ireland), Lyneham (Great Britain), Athens and Beirut.

CIRCULATION

European
Div.

... 2 ...

- 2 -

(c) The Department of National Defence has also made contingency planning for 11 additional Hercules flights to ferry 200 more troops and accompanying equipment if and when required.

2. We do not anticipate difficulties in obtaining clearances from the Governments of West Germany, Italy, Greece or Turkey. Ireland's concurrence is not absolutely essential. A serious problem would be created if the French authorities refused permission to overfly their country. The best alternative would probably be over Spain, using Lyneham as staging post. From a technical point of view, this would be feasible but it would require extensive changes in planning. Even if the French eventually agree, delays in forwarding acceptance might force the RCAF to postpone all flights for several hours. In view of your recommendation not to approach other governments before a government decision is taken, we do not propose to make informal soundings in Paris.

AP Hughes

Defence Liaison (1) Division.

ad - this
Wes

date 24/2
62

RESTRICTED

414

THE GENEVA DECLARATION OF 30 JULY 1974
REPORT ON THE DEMARCATION TALKS

ANNEX F

1. This report is made by the Committee established by paragraph 3 (a) of the Geneva Declaration of 30 July 1974.
2. The Committee first met at Headquarters UNFICYP at 1415½ hours on 2 August 1974. Thereafter meetings were held daily. A copy of the Record of each of these meetings is attached to this report.
3. The work of the Committee was restricted to an attempt to establish the limit of the areas occupied by the Turkish Armed Forces at the time of the cease fire, 2200 hours (local Cyprus time) on 30 July 1974. It is the understanding of this Committee that a separate Committee will subsequently study the question of a security zone, which will be based on the demarcation line agreed by this Committee.
4. The composition of the Committee was:-

Colonel J.J.G. HUNTER	British Representative
Colonel C.E. BEATTIE CD	UNFICYP Representative
Colonel NEZIH CAKAR	Turkish Representative
Major E.G. TSOLAKIS	Greek Representative

In Attendance:
Lieutenant Colonel T.A. LINLEY, Royal Engineers
(Assistant Director of Survey, Headquarters Near East Land Forces).

Major R.K. COLLINS (Headquarters British Forces Near East) - Secretary
5. At intervals the UNFICYP, Greek and Turkish Representatives called in technical experts with local knowledge, to assist the Committee.

1.

RESTRICTED

RESTRICTED

6. This report consists of:-
 - a. This paper, containing a brief summary of the method of work adopted by the Committee and a list of points on which unanimous agreement could not be reached.
 - b. A copy of the Record for each day.
 - c. Marked maps to show:-
 - (1) At a scale of 1:50,000, the Committee's final version of the areas occupied by the Turkish Armed Forces (Map 1)
 - (2) At a scale of 1:7500, the Nicosia sector, excluding Nicosia Within The Walls, showing the final version produced by this Committee (Map 2)
 - (3) At a scale of 1:2500, Nicosia Within The Walls showing the final version produced by this Committee (Map 3).
7. The Committee based its work on the versions of the line submitted by the Greek and Turkish Representatives. Once it became apparent that the disparity between their versions prevented any bilateral agreement between the Greek and Turkish Representatives, a detailed reconnaissance of the whole line began. This was carried out in part by use of a Puma helicopter provided by 33 Squadron Royal Air Force; in part by vehicle and in part on foot.
8. For each section being reconnoitred the result was recorded and positions plotted by Lieutenant Colonel Linley, who was accepted by each Representative as being an impartial Survey expert.
9. Where no agreement could be reached, the differing versions are marked on the master maps. As it was impossible to establish the limit of the areas occupied by the Turkish Armed Forces at 2200B hours on 30 July, it was accepted that the best that the Committee could achieve was to note the areas occupied by the Turkish

Forces on the day of the reconnaissance of that area. Each map is annotated to show these dates. The Turkish Representative has placed on record that his position is that there has been no change in any area since the cease fire agreement was signed. The lines drawn on the master maps are annotated to show on which day the reconnaissance took place. The Turkish Representative reserves his position that, notwithstanding the date of the reconnaissance, the lines on the master maps indicate the limit of the areas occupied by the Turkish Armed Forces at 2200 hours on 30 July 1974. The other Representatives accept these lines as the position on the day of the reconnaissance, without prejudice to any future discussions as to the position at the time when the cease fire agreement was signed in Geneva.

10. In the view of the Turkish Representative, UNFICYP has no mandate to operate in the areas under Turkish control. Therefore the lines marked on the 1:50,000 map are without benefit of formal UNFICYP consultation. The Committee agreed to accept consultation with UNFICYP in the Nicosia sector and to refer to their superior authorities the question of UN consultation in the outlying areas. Thus the lines drawn on the 1:7500 and 1:2500 maps have been established with the UNFICYP Representative being able to draw on Headquarters UNFICYP records. The UNFICYP view as at 2200 hours 30 July 1974 will be available to the Special Representative of the Secretary General in Geneva if requested.

11. The areas where agreement could not be reached are as follows:-

- a. North Western Sector: (See paragraphs 11 and 14 of the Record for 4 August; paragraphs 9 - 16 of the Record for 5 August, paragraphs 4 - 10 of the Record for 6 August; paragraph 2 of the Record for 7 August and paragraphs 14 - 15 of the Record for 8 August.) On 4 August, the Committee discovered the forward edge of a Turkish

Battalion position at GR WE 144103. The Committee were advised that there were no Turkish troops between this point and the sea. In the view of the Turkish Representative, this position, being on high ground, was able to dominate the plain northwards to the sea by use of its heavy weapons and by taking into account naval support from ships of the Turkish fleet. The Greek and British Representatives were unable to accept this view. Each asked for a further reconnaissance of the area to establish the limit of the areas occupied by the Turkish Armed Forces. This was denied by the Turkish Representative on the ground that his line was correct and that the Committee had no mandate to reconnoitre Turkish rear areas. Requests for reconnaissance of the area were formally reiterated on each succeeding day; each request met with the same answer. On 7 August the Turkish Representative submitted the Turkish version of where the line should be drawn. On 8 August, in the absence of a reconnaissance, the Greek Representative was invited to produce his version. Both versions are marked on Map 1.

b. Western Nicosia Sector:

- (1) (See paragraph 5 of the Record for Wednesday 7 August). The Committee failed to reach agreement about an area centred on grid reference 26689318. The British, Greek and UNFICYP Representatives take the view that the word "occupied" in their terms of reference requires them to record positions established on the ground. The position of the Turkish Representative is that the houses are not occupied physically in an attempt to avoid damage to property but are under Turkish control. Both versions of the line are recorded on the 1:7500 Map 2).
- (2) Area North of the Race Course: There is a discrepancy, which has yet to be satisfactorily resolved, of 700 metres between the present positions of the Turkish Forces, in the area north of the

race course, as noted during reconnaissance on 7 August and the UNFICYP version.

- c. North Western Nicosia Sector: (See paragraphs 7 and 8 of the Records for 7 August and paragraphs 2 - 7 and 13 of the Record for Thursday 8 August). The Committee failed to reach agreement about the general area of the Nicosia Club and golf course. The British, Greek and UNFICYP Representatives take the line of prepared positions which they personally observed. They noted the presence of Turkish troops in and adjacent to the Nicosia Club itself but were advised by the UNFICYP Representative that these troops moved in at 1130Z hours on 31 July, the day after the cease fire. The Turkish Representative indicated that the Turkish forces were present in the Nicosia Club on 30 July 1974 before the cease fire agreement was signed. The Turkish Representative presented a line generally along the road bordering the golf course to the south-west and south. Both versions of the line are recorded on the 1:7500 map. (Map 2).

d. Nicosia City Area:

- (1) (See paragraph 13b of the Record for 8 August). The Chimo Club (GR 32129309), which is the Canadian Forces Junior Ranks Club, is at present occupied by Turkish Forces. The Club lies on the original Green Line in a very sensitive area. The cooperation of the Turkish Representative during discussion of this problem leaves open the possibility of an agreed situation to the future of this building and the facilities which it offers to the Canadian Contingent of UNFICYP.
- (2) The Roccas Bastion Sports Field (GR 32409285). The Committee failed to agree on a line in this area. The original Green Line passes between the football field (Turkish) and the stands (Greek). The Turkish Representative claims the

area of the stands. The Greek Representative claims that the line should be drawn along the wall of the old city where the Turkish positions are located. Both versions are marked on Map 2.


e. Nicosia Within The Walls: (See paragraph 13c of the Record for 8 August).


(1) Roccas Bastion (GR 324926). This is possibly the most sensitive part on the original Green Line. It is a position accepted as being under Turkish control but has for many years been the site of a UN observation post and virtually neutral ground, in an endeavour to prevent it becoming a flash point. During detailed examination of the problem comment by the Turkish Representative accepted the desirability of a continued UN presence there in close cooperation with Turkish forces and gave hope of an agreed solution acceptable to all concerned.

(2) The Walled City: (See paragraph 13d of the Record for 8 August). At certain points within the walled city, the Greek and Turkish Representatives were unable to agree exactly on the line. The differences occur in areas where the opposing forces are very close together. Many of the buildings are in ruins and in some fires were still smouldering during the reconnaissance. The Committee, being unable to reach a unanimous solution and conscious of the need to present as complete a solution as practicable, as soon as possible, for the information of the re-assembled Geneva Conference, now in session, have recorded both versions on the 1:2500 map. (Map 3). They feel that these areas


may only be resolved when a Committee examines the problem of the establishment of a security zone.

12. The Committee have agreed that, in an endeavour to forward this Report to Geneva as rapidly as possible, the initial issue will be limited to 12 copies. These are to be distributed 3 each to the Turkish and British Representatives, 4 to the Greek Representative and 2 to the UNFICYP Representative. By agreement, this Report has been produced only in the English language.


 E.G. TSOLAKIS
 Major
 Greek Representative


 FERIHİ ÇAKAR
 Colonel
 Turkish Representative
 (as authorised by the
 Turkish Peace Force
 Commander)


 C.E. BEATTIE
 Colonel
 UNFICYP Representative


 J.J.G. HUNTER
 Colonel
 British Representative
 (Chairman)

NICOSIA AIRPORT

(Note by HQ UNFICYP)

ANNEX G

Nicosia Airport was declared a United Nations protected area by the UNFICYP Force Commander on 23 July 1974, when hostilities were at their height, in order to remove a cause of conflict and to preserve the Airport, its equipment and its facilities for the future. At the same time agreement was reached by HQ UNFICYP with the local Commanders of the combatants in the area that the Airport would be denied to everyone except UNFICYP and that the opposing military forces should not approach within 500 metres of the perimeter wire surrounding the Airport and the general complex comprising RAF Nicosia and the UNFICYP Camps. Since 23 July 1974 UNFICYP has observed its part of this agreement in a scrupulous manner and the Airport continues to be controlled very closely by UNFICYP as a UN protected area.

HQ UNFICYP has been informed that the Foreign Secretary of the United Kingdom has sent a message to the Foreign Ministers of Greece and Turkey and the Acting President of the Republic of Cyprus suggesting that the British Government should start the necessary repair work forthwith for the opening of the Airport as soon as possible for humanitarian and economic reasons. It is anticipated that the conditions for and timing of the Airport reopening will be a matter for discussion at the forthcoming meeting in Geneva.

In the meantime UNFICYP is aware that its continuing refusal of access to the Airport is causing unnecessary deterioration of expensive aircraft and technical equipment which in many cases require urgent maintenance now if they are to be brought back into service when the Airport is reopened. UNFICYP has therefore decided to permit with effect from Monday 5 August 1974 certain limited access to the Airport for essential maintenance personnel as follows:

- a. Access will be allowed only between the hours 0800 - 1700 hrs daily.
- b. No armed or military personnel other than UNFICYP and British personnel engaged on Airport repairs will be allowed access.
- c. Initially access will be limited to personnel required to carry out maintenance on:

- (1) aircraft of commercial airlines,
- (2) terminal building technical facilities,

- (3) Joint Air Traffic Control facilities,
- (4) communications facilities.

These categories may be extended in due course if this appears desirable.

- d. If so required, HQ UNFICYP will also permit former members of the Joint Air Traffic Control to reactivate it in view of its important role in controlling the Cyprus Flight Information Region.
- e. HQ UNFICYP also intends to permit access by UK technical personnel required for repair work to the Airport, as may be appropriate.
- f. All the above personnel will be required to enter the Airport by the Old Airport Road and will be processed through UN check points at the Airport manned by military and UN civilian police.
- g. The UN Commander at the Airport, Lieutenant Colonel Morris, is authorised by HQ UNFICYP to decide those persons to be admitted in accordance with para c, d and e above. Enquiries should be addressed to him. (Telephone 76204 Ext 248).

HQ UNFICYP wishes to stress that the above arrangements are being made in the general interest of all parties in order to save further damage or deterioration to expensive technical equipment, and without prejudice to any decisions which may be taken at Geneva concerning the future of the Airport.

Your cooperation is requested in informing all concerned, especially the military forces in proximity to the Airport, of the above action.

NICOSIA
4 August 1974

Distribution

UK High Commission, Nicosia
 Embassy of Greece, Nicosia
 Embassy of Turkey, Nicosia
 Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Republic of Cyprus
 Ministry of Interior, Republic of Cyprus
 Ministry of Communications and Works, Republic of Cyprus
 HQ National Guard, Nicosia
 HQ Turkish Armed Forces in Cyprus (through Liaison Officer)
 Vice-President's Office, Nicosia

UNFICYP


Comd Kyrenia District (West) - 10 copies
 SPA
 CAO
 Pol Adv - 4 copies
 DCOS
 COO
 Ops/Info
 ALO
 CFLO
 FPM
 FEO - 4 copies
 FE
 FSO
 Comd Nicosia District
 OC 34 Bqn Det RAF
 PIO and MPIO

NOT TO BE USED FOR SURFACE
OR SUB-SURFACE NAVIGATION

BRIG-GEN CE BEATTIE, COS / COMD CANCON.

M E D I T E R R A N E A N S E A





CYPRUS

DISTRIBUTION OF POPULATION
BY ETHNIC GROUP 1960

&
POSITIONS OF THE INVADING
FORCES

Scale 1:250,000

Kilometres 0 5 10 15
Miles 0 5 10

THE EXTENT OF CONTROL GAINED ON THE ECONOMY BY THE TURKISH INVASION FORCES

- 1 70% of the gross output
- 2 65% of the tourist accommodation
- 3 86.6% of hotel beds under construction
- 4 83% of the general cargo handling (Famagusta)
- 5 56% of mining and quarrying output
- 6 41% of the livestock production
- 7 48% of agricultural exports
- 8 41% of the plant production

NOTE:

- (a) Greek contribution to the gross domestic product is 90% and Turkish 10%.
- (b) Land ownership: Greeks 83.2%, Turks 16.8%
(Distributed on the total area of Cyprus
excluding the non-private owned Land)
- (c) 20% of the main state forest
has been burnt out




RUS

OF POPULATION
GROUP 1960.

INVASION
TURKISH
CES

250 000

10 000 15 000 20 000 Meters
10 15 Miles



- (a) Daily loss of production valued at C£2 million.
(b) Value of household movable property seized
and/or looted by the Turkish Army: C£100 million.
(c) Value of land and buildings owned by Greeks
in the Turkish occupied area: C£2.25 billion.

REFERENCE

Greeks	Blue
Turks	Brown
Maronites and Armenians	Green
Others	Black

POSITIONS OF THE INVADING TURKISH FORCES


- Position of invading forces on 22.7.1974 at 16.00 (Agreed time for the cease-fire in pursuance of Security Council Resolution No. 353 of 20.7.1974)
- Position of invading forces on 30.7.1974 (Date of the Geneva Declaration signed by the Foreign Ministers of Greece, Turkey and the U.K. and providing inter alia for the cease-fire)
- Position of invading forces on 8.8.1974 (prior to the second round of the Geneva Conference)
- Position of invading forces as on 16.8.1974 at 18.00 (Security Council Resolutions Nos. 350 and 360 of 15, 16 of August, respectively)
- Positions occupied by the invading forces after the agreed time for cease-fire (18.00 of 16.8.1974) and as on 18.00hrs, 29.8.1975
- District boundary
- Sovereign Base Area boundary
- Occupied Area

CYPRU

DISTRIBUTION OF POPUL.
BY ETHNIC GROUP 196

2
POSITIONS OF THE INVADING
FORCES

Scale 1:250,000




THE EXTENT OF CONTROL GAINED ON THE ECONOMY BY THE TURKISH INVASION FORCES

- 1 70% of the gross output
- 2 65% of the tourist accommodation
- 3 86.6% of hotel beds under construction
- 4 83% of the general cargo handling (Famagusta)
- 5 56% of mining and quarrying output
- 6 41% of the livestock production
- 7 48% of agricultural exports
- 8 45% of the plant production

NOTE

- (a) Greek contribution to the gross domestic product is 90% and Turkish 10%.
- (b) Land ownership Greeks 83.2%, Turks 16.8%
(Distributed on the total area of Cyprus
excluding the non-private owned Land)
- (c) 20% of the main state forest
has been burnt out

- NOTES
1. NOTE ANNOTATIONS.
 2. THE ORIGINAL MAP IS GREEN.
 3. OPS LOGS IN HQ UNFICYP DO
TALLY WITH THIS GREEK MAP.



PRUS

OF POPULATION
C GROUP 1960.

8.
THE INVADING TURKISH
FORCES

1:250 000

0 10 20 30 Kilometres
0 10 20 Miles

NS.
AP IS GREEK
UNFICYP DO NOT
K MAP.

E

OSIA
NO
INFORMATION
AVAILABLE

15 AUG

16 AUG

17 AUG

18 AUG

19 AUG

20 AUG

21 AUG

22 AUG

23 AUG

24 AUG

25 AUG


26 AUG

27 AUG

28 AUG

29 AUG

30 AUG



- (a) Daily loss of production valued at C£2 million.
- (b) Value of household movable property seized and/or looted by the Turkish Army: C£100 million.
- (c) Value of land and buildings owned by Greeks in the Turkish occupied area: C£2.25 billion.

REFERENCE

Greeks	Blue
Turks	Brown
Maronites and Armenians	Green
Others	Black

POSITIONS OF THE INVADING TURKISH FORCES

- Position of invading forces on 22.7.1974 at 16.00 (Agreed time for the cease-fire in pursuance of Security Council Resolution No 353 of 20.7.1974)
- Position of invading forces on 30.7.1974 (Date of the Geneva Declaration, signed by the Foreign Ministers of Greece, Turkey and the U.K. and providing *inter alia* for the cease-fire)
- Position of invading forces on 8.8.1974 (prior to the second round of the Geneva Conference)
- Position of invading forces as on 16.8.1974 at 18.00 (Security Council Resolutions Nos 358 and 360 of 15, 16 of August, respectively)
- Positions occupied by the invading forces after the agreed time for cease-fire (18.00 of 16.8.1974) and as on 18.00hrs, 29.5.1975
- District boundary
- Sovereign Base Area boundary
- Occupied Area