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SCHELER AND THE KNOWLEDGE OF OTHER PERSONS:

AN ESSAY ON PHENOMENOLOGY AND INTERSUBJECTIVITY

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CONTENTS

INTRODUCTION

As the new expressions "global village," "spaceship earth," and "world community" indicate, ours is an age of progressive interdependence. The significance that "dialogue" and "communication" have acquired for contemporary efforts to comprehend ourselves drive this point home.

But the continuous presence of conflict indicates that the processes of socialization are far from smooth. Further, it casts a profound shadow on the tacit assumption of these opening remarks, namely that it is somehow possible to reach and understand one another and to communicate meaningfully. And yet, skepticism about this assumption appears untenable. For carried to its logical conclusion, such skepticism would entail the end of all communal endeavours, including obviously philosophy itself.

The issues raised here have come to be known philosophically as those of the "other minds" problem. Unknown to antiquity, this problem is distinctly modern, originating in Descartes's redefinition of the criteria of the mental. When mind is defined as a non-spatial substance within me to which only I have a privileged access, another's mind becomes especially problematic. Paradoxically, I "lose" it when I "discover" mine.

Since Descartes, philosophers have struggled with this

paradox, attempting to provide an adequate epistemology complementary to the factual reaching of others that is a feature of all collective effort. J.S.Mill (1889) gave the "other minds" problem its first clear formulation and response. Mill asked and sought to justify knowledge claims that other minds exist. Subsequently, and with the influence of the metaphysics of causality on epistemology receding, there has been more concern to justify knowledge claims about feelings, intentions, and cognitive style of other minds, thus encompassing the issue of the degree or depth of our knowing others. But for the most part, these efforts have been greatly hindered by an epistemological solipsism, a position that considers the individual self and its states as the only possible or legitimate starting point for philosophical construction. For it is this position which those who accept the problem's original inspiration as valid must themselves logically assume.

The recognition that I am not alone in the world, that other beings around me think and feel as I do (or "have minds") and are indeed human, has received similar treatment. The arguments of analogy (Mill, Russell), logical behaviorism (Carnap), identity theorists (Feigl), and of those who treat the other as a hypothesis (H.H.Price) accept the Cartesian distinction between mind and body (or "mental states" vs. "behaviour"). They assume that it is logically impossible to apprehend immediately another person as experiencing something. Each represents the position that all knowledge of others as beings with "minds" is somehow inferential, that is,

indirect.

Among philosophers, the German phenomenologist Max Scheler (1874-1928)[1] proposed first an alternative strategy--one could call it a strategy of direct access. For Scheler, that others exist and that we know they exist are both rather obvious. As a phenomenologist he rejects the mind-body dichotomy of Descartes and asserts that much more is immediately given in perception than mere sense data. He finds in expression a primary datum which immediately reveals another being as an experiencing human subject. Moreover, Scheler believes that reference to others is an ontological or existential dimension of each individual self. That is, man* and community are correlative in such a way that his being includes a reference to community as an internal relation. Any consciousness of "I" is not anterior to but simultaneous with consciousness of a "thou"; knowledge of the existence of community is an irreducible background for any encounters between individuals.

Scheler thus avoids what is most problematic about "other minds", namely the lack of immediate evidence. He does so by rejecting the solipsistic assumptions upon which the problem's traditional formulation rests. In fact, the "problem" ceases to exist for him and the entire issue must be redefined. If he is correct that the meaning of an "I"

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*Terms such as "man" or "men" and "himself" or "his" as a possessive of subject, person, other, human being, etc., should, throughout this essay, be taken as referents of both sexes, thus being abbreviations for "man and woman," "himself or herself," his or her," and so on.

or "self" is a function of a "thou" or "community", then we should spend less effort to justify our knowledge that others exist, unless we question our own existence. Instead, we ought to put far greater emphasis and significance on the issue of the extent or degree of our knowing others, that is of knowing their personal identity or simply who they are.

The point of my essay is to establish the validity of this conclusion through a critical but sympathetic examination of Scheler's views on the knowledge of others. I am confident that the relevance of these views for the many contemporary difficulties inherent in communication will be judged as self-evident.

The discussion comprises two parts. The first part accounts for Scheler's justification of our recognition that others exist. The second part deals with his theory of knowing the identity of others, or what he alternatively calls their personal essence. In a critical summary I note and attempt to resolve the tension that exists between his view that we know directly that other persons exist (Part One) but apprehend indirectly their personal essence (Part Two).

Since I introduce each of the two parts separately, for the remainder of this introduction I will concentrate on saying something about the structure of this essay, Scheler's methodology, as well as his treatment of a key theme in philosophy.

First, it may appear rather strange that I am examining the process of recognition of persons before clarifying their essence. Should one not, the objection may run, reverse these

two "moments" of intersubjective knowledge and begin rather with describing the essential attributes of persons--and specifically what constitutes the essence of the mental--so as to furnish some criteria for instances in which we actually do perceive others? Logical as this objection is, it runs afoul of Scheler's equation of the mental or intentional (what provides for meaning) with the personal (1973a:389), to which in turn he attributes absolute uniqueness and individuality (1954:65). In other words, what ultimately individualizes persons and provides for their identity is also precisely what makes them persons. In this sense, then, there are for Scheler no general criteria for what constitutes persons.

Behind this position lies Scheler's conviction that the human body cannot individuate (since all life is for him metaphysically one) so that personal individuation and identity must be the responsibility of "spirit," a metaphysically distinct principle, one completely cut-off from the perceptual realm.

However, I reject Scheler's metaphysics of life, question his dualism of person (spirit) vs. ego (life) (Section 5), and argue in the Summary that from a strictly descriptive attitude all that can be legitimately said is that personal individuation runs on a continuum which begins with our bodily differentiation from others and progresses gradually to those more profound "spiritual" differences. From this perspective one avoids making individual identity synonymous with what constitutes the essence of the mental

viz. intentionality.

This, then, is precisely what I assume in Part One. We can immediately recognize that others are persons because the innumerable meanings of their (bodily) expressions of joy, anger, hate, resentment, etc. are also essentially intentional phenomena which exhibit an immediately apprehended coherence (see Appendix). No profound insight into who they are is required for this recognition.

Having said this, the initial objection against the structure of this essay may again be raised, this time even more forcefully. If it is possible to state some general criteria for personhood, why not do so at the outset? The difficulty here is in balancing faithfulness to Scheler's original thought with my own conclusions and objections. In the end, my decision about the structure of this essay was made on the premise that what I have done simply "hangs together" better, and that the benefits of the sense of continuity and coherence that I believe I establish outweigh the problems posed by certain logical inconsistencies or conclusions reached only towards the end.

On the other hand, the particular structure I have adopted does have some advantages. Almost all treatments of Scheler's theory of intersubjectivity (see Schutz 1962, Ranly 1966, Owens 1970) begin with an exposition of Scheler's conception of man, note the rigid bifurcation of man into the personal (spiritual) and lived-body (vital) levels, and finding that Scheler concentrates mostly on knowledge of the latter, skirt the issue of knowing the former.

Owens even says that Scheler lacks entirely any view of how understanding other persons is possible. This, as Part Two shows, is false. What is true, is that nowhere are the various "components" of this understanding explicated and coherently stated in one place. This difficulty, I believe, can be overcome more easily if one emphasizes less Scheler's perhaps erroneous metaphysical conception of man, and concentrates more--as I want to--on the epistemological issues involved, by adhering to a descriptive attitude.

One result of this descriptive concern, for example, is that I have throughout generally rephrased the issue of recognition of another "mind" as simply that of recognition that others "think and feel as I do." This avoids the potential reification of cognitive processes and the implication of some metaphysical substratum, "mental stuff" and the like. (As I have already indicated, I withold judgement about such a substratum.) But my rephrasing does not imply a recourse to the analogy argument (Section 2) which posits the existence of others as persons by analogy with my own case. Rather I am confident that I can say that others are "mindful" or like me because their coherently expressed meanings are essentially public, that is, embedded in common language, signs, and symbols. They are therefore meanings that I also employ. Conversely, the meanings I use are also "theirs."

Scheler scholars generally agree that his intellectual history[2] can be arranged into three major periods: the "neo-Kantian," the "phenomenological," and the "metaphysical."

Since this essay is concerned mainly with themes expressed in Scheler's middle period, I also thought it appropriate to acquaint the reader with his notion of phenomenology.

Like Husserl, Scheler sees in phenomenology a method whose goal is to know immediately the essential structures of the objects of experience. Such immediate knowledge is to be gained through a "categorial intuition," a notion Scheler appropriates from the early Husserl. Over and above implying an intentional act, for Scheler this intuition demands from a philosopher a unique attitude by which he is able to abstract from the intuitive act as well as its object all factors pertaining to their real condition and organization. In this way the philosopher attains to the essence or "eidos" of experienced objects and thus finds himself in the most intensive contact with the world. Since this contact is pre-logical the content of these essences cannot be defined nor inferred, but only "pointed at, or elucidated by progressive delimination, negative or positive description and tentative definition" (Hartmann 1968:249).

Unlike Husserl, however, Scheler ultimately puts phenomenology in the service of metaphysical speculation. Following Hegel, he believes that the phenomenologically uncovered essences are "windows into the absolute" (1961:50-1), in a sense that they possibly indicate something of the ultimate structure of the universe.

It is important to note that Scheler assigns to phenomenological essences neither the status of individuals nor that of universals. This distinction, he suggests, arises

only in relation to the objects in which an essence is manifest. An essence is universal if it comes to the fore in a plurality of otherwise different objects as an identical essence. Nothing however prevents an essence from signifying also the nature of an individual thing without it ceasing to be an essence (1973a:48-9). Moreover, Scheler refuses to make phenomenology conditional upon any criteria concerning what experience is or what can be experienced. All criteria, he reasons, are in the final analysis rooted in the intuition of the things themselves. A full understanding of phenomenology requires, therefore, also "doing" it.[3]

Finally, I would like to point to Scheler's active engagement of what I consider one of the most important issues in epistemology, the relationship between knowledge and affectivity, i.e. feelings and moods.

In most theoretical and popular accounts it has been customary to emphasize the ways in which affectivity "disturbs" cognition and even distorts truth. Consequently, the prevailing view has it that truth's acquisition is bound with the least possible intervention of the affect in any cognitive process.

Undoubtedly, affects can and often do mislead in the pursuit of truth. For this reason the statement "love is blinding" usually receives quick general assent. But there is a counterview, backed by a tradition extending from antiquity, which ascribes a crucially significant role to love in the development of knowledge. The claim is that love

leads to greater insight, thus recognizing that there are facets of experience other than ideas, judgements, and reasonings which are relevant to cognition.

Now if there is a measure of truth in each of the two contrary assertions, then to completely abandon investigating the first position (love is blinding) certainly runs the risks of delusion. But to ignore the second position (love makes one see) is equivalent to cognitive self-limitation and a corresponding limitation of reality in which we are cognitively, hence existentially, active.

It is in the context of intersubjectivity, and by examining those views of Scheler that are pertinent to it, that this essay hopes also to defend against the second possibility. By extension, it will be shown that a notion of an "affective epistemology" is not a specious philosophical proposition but a legitimate "discipline" worthy of serious consideration.

I would like to acknowledge my indebtedness to my wife Majka for her support and stoic patience, and to Peter McCormick for his professional help and good humor.

ABSTRACT

The following dissertation examines Scheler's contribution to the philosophical problem of "other minds."

One major aspect of this problem concerns our conviction about the existence of other human subjects. For some, justification of this conviction can come only in the form of indirect or inferential knowledge. This is either because their conception of subjectivity allows a "self" to be accessible only to the individual person who "has" it, or because they attempt to (but cannot) reconstruct all of intersubjective knowledge out of the epistemological resources of a single isolated ego. For others, however--and Scheler among them--such indirect justification fails to successfully overcome the charge of solipsism. Indeed, they see no alternative except to conceive of the self as an essentially social (rather than solitary-private) entity. On their view, that others exist is immediately evident.

But the two positions (indirect vs. immediate knowledge) need not necessarily be contrary or antagonistic to each other. Their complementarity can be established by recognizing in a wider context that they are clarifications that pertain to different types of human sociality, are based on different models of cognition, and use dissimilar examples of conscious

states as paradigmatic evidence of being human.

The other major aspect of intersubjectivity concerns knowledge of the specific character, identity (i.e. who they are), or personal essence of others. Such identity may be thought of as established through the identity of the human body or perhaps through the continuity of personal memory. However, the more we take into account the fact of human multidimensionality and transcendence and conceive of personal essence in individual or unique terms, knowledge of it does not appear to be possible without the peculiar powers of the human affect. Herein lies the originality of Scheler's thought.

At the same time, a successful reconciliation of Soheler's views on knowledge of the existence of persons with those on knowledge of personal essence requires a resolution of or "abstention" from his metaphysical dualism.

PART ONE

KNOWING THE EXISTENCE OF OTHERS

Introduction

That no serious philosopher has ever espoused metaphysical solipsism attests to the academic nature of this position. Who in his right mind would want to insist that only he exists? But with the subjectivistic turn of modern philosophy the knowledge that others are thinking and feeling beings like me, and that consequently communication with them is possible,[1] is, like everything else, subjected to the critical scrutiny of the skeptical mind. Still, even the modern skeptic would not consider himself as the sole human, even if he was logically compelled to do so. His doubt as to the existence of others is a methodological tool designed to ensure the solidity of his knowledge that other beings think and feel as he does, and that they therefore exist <u>as</u> human beings. Though we are not compelled to adopt this particular methodological procedure, we must nevertheless accept the challenge that motivates it.

In this first part of my essay I will examine Scheler's account of our recognition that others exist. I will also look at some other accounts, although these are formulated within conceptual frameworks quite different from the one used by Scheler. The understanding of a broader conceptual outline of a rationalist-empiricist approach on one hand, and of a transcendental-phenomenological approach on the other,

will, I believe, greatly facilitate understanding Scheler's own effort.

Specifically, I want to expose certain basic features of each account and show how these features influence the formulation of the problematic of intersubjectivity, the methodology employed, as well as what in each particular case counts as evidence. In looking for this evidence it makes a significant difference whether we aim to establish contact with the objective world and others (Descartes), whether we aim to re-establish that contact within the "post-reductive" context of a transcendental ego (Husserl), or whether we take this contact as established (Scheler). Clearly, much here depends on basic conceptions of subjectivity and its relation to reality. Different, for example, will be the path of a subjectivity conceived as a self-enclosed entity from that of a subjectivity viewed as essentially social. Different, as well, will be the path of a subjectivity related to the world in intentional as opposed to causal terms.

It is not my intention to pit one particular account against another. Rather, these accounts are presented in a deliberate order which should facilitate understanding of each position. In Section 1, I present a summary of Scheler's statement concerning the nature and scope of the problems pertinent to intersubjectivity. Pointing to key issues involved, Scheler's statement is a useful guide for research and structures many of the analyses in subsequent sections. Section 2 examines two accounts of intersubjectivity formulated within a rationalist-empiricist framework and Scheler's

critical response to them. I mentioned earlier that the problematic of intersubjectivity as a question concerning the existence of others is a distinctly modern problematic. The theories of analogical inference and projective empathy as found in two major offshoots of Cartesianism, positivist philosophy and associationist psychology, are the initial responses to this question. Their point of departure is the certitude of the existence of a solitary ego, with knowledge of others considered as probable. Since the comprehension of reality as a whole is seen as possible to the extent that we discover the mathematical-physical laws that purportedly govern it, causal inferences and analogies are naturally seen as the best tools that strengthen the probability of knowing others.

In Section 3, I examine Husserl's transcendental-phenomenological approach to intersubjectivity. I do this for two reasons. First, Husserl's philosophy as a whole is motivated by a commitment to overcome the scientism of positivism and associationism. His successful attack on psychologism indicts both, and by extension repudiates much of the Cartesian doctrine. Second, in my judgement the short-comings of Husserl's account of intersubjectivity best introduce Scheler's effort.

With Husserl we do indeed shift into a different key. Subjectivity is put in an intentional relation to the world and causal analyses are abandoned. Moreover, the factual existence of self and others is taken for granted. Indeed, it is entirely disregarded and plays no part in determining

the analysis of intersubjectivity. For Husserl follows a "methodological idealism"[2] that accepts as evidence only what can be constituted by a solitary individual consciousness. The failure of this procedure will suggest the need to include the fact of community in any analysis. This is explored in Sections 4 and 5, where for Scheler the fact of social existence is the starting point.

The conclusion puts in perspective the views of both Husserl and Scheler. It also suggests several specific directions of research useful for a deeper appreciation of the problematic.

Section 1

Intersubjectivity: Problems and Issues

In Chapter 1 of Part 3 of The Nature of Sympathy (hereafter Sympathy) Scheler offers a detailed survey of the issues involved in intersubjective knowledge. He does so, because he is convinced that a lack of proper distinctions and finer differentiations concerning the nature and scope of the issues involved, as well as the failure to formulate the solutions in a systematic way, has obscured progress in this area.

The survey furnishes an excellent working context for research. In presenting it here in concise form I hope that, in addition to its function as a preliminary clarification, it will put in perspective some of the exposition that follows.

The significance of several of the distinctions and questions Scheler articulates can be fully appreciated only within the broader context of his entire philosophy, since they deal with fundamental epistemological and metaphysical issues. For this reason I have avoided here as much as possible the use of some of his more technical terms, preferring instead to substitute more general "equivalents." As I have already intimated, at this point of the essay the value of Scheler's survey lies more in the clarity and

comprehensiveness with which he sees the problems, than in the particular ontological commitments he holds in order to make some of his distinctions. Moreover, if some of these commitments are themselves problematic, then perhaps a premature introduction of technical jargon may obscure finding a better way of talking about the issues involved.

Accordingly, Scheler subdivides "intersubjectivity" into six distinct areas whose problems must be addressed in any serious investigation of the theme.

1. The ontology of the self, community, and their relationship

Under this heading come the following questions: Is the relationship between the individual and community an essential relationship such that the meaning of being an individual carries a reference to community--and this independently of the existence of any particular individual or community? Or is this relationship merely factual and contingent? Furthermore, does phenomenological investigation into the essence of inter-human relatedness discover distinct necessary ties between ourselves at various levels of our existence (i.e., the vital, mental, or spiritual)?

2. The epistemology of intersubjective experience

The principal question here is: What entitles any individual to postulate a) the existence of community in general and b) the existence of another particular individual? As this question is part of a wider epistemological problem concerning the criteria necessary to judge the actual reality of things, closely related, and in fact

in need of prior resolution, is a set of issues associated with a general theory of cognition: a) what provides for the reality of an object and how is this object encountered as real by a conscious subject? b) what is the mark of a mental or spiritual reality of a conscious individual self and how in turn is this reality known? c) if certain levels or dimensions of our being cannot be objectified (e.g., the spiritual or personal level), how are we first acquainted with their reality in ourselves? in others?

3. The stratification of experience in intersubjective knowledge

Here Scheler calls for clarification of the essential order of meanings involved in our acquisition of knowledge of others. This entails showing what individual experiences and intuitions must be presupposed in intersubjective knowledge; it is to be an investigation of an "order of dependence among cognitive intentions" (1954:217). Concerned with the essential rather than temporal order, such investigation is therefore a matter for eidetic (and not empirical) psychology, that is, a psychology which examines consciousness's meaningful contents and the relationships thereof, rather than the causal laws under which such contents may appear.

This topic comprises such key issues as: a) does consciousness of others presuppose self-consciousness? b) does knowing others presuppose (or not) knowledge of the reality of the (inanimate) physical world? c) insofar as

the other as an animate being is also part of nature, is nature itself first apprehended under the aspect of expressive meaningfullness of living things in general, or, is expression somehow subsequently "added" to previously grasped inanimate matter? d) in actual perception of others, is knowledge of their mental aspect prior to, simultaneous with, or subsequent to knowledge of their organic form--the living body e)to what extent (i.e., level of being) can we know others, and knowledge of what forms of sociality (if any) is presupposed at various levels of this knowing?

4. Intersubjectivity and empirical psychology

Scheler holds that the referents of the various cognitive intentions in intersubjective experience are not all ontologically the same (i.e., they are irreducibly different "things"). Since it deals with the objectifiable, what empirical or experimental psychology can contribute to the problem of knowing others is constrained and circumscribed by certain ontological limits on what can be objectified within the mental field.

For Scheler, only a part of our total mental and cognitive existence is capable of becoming an object for us. This is vital or lived-body consciousness. In contrast, the connection of "higher" cognitive acts to the properly personal or spiritual order precludes their objectification. Their ontological status then places them outside the jurisdiction and competence of empirical psychology.

5. The consistency of an epistomology of intersubjectivity with metaphysics

A demand for the proper metaphysical background of an entire account of intersubjectivity generates issues of this problem area. In its context Scheler calls for compatibility, a "logical unity of style", between epistemology of intersubjectivity and metaphysics. (He allows only for a methodological separation of the two.) Thus, for example, a theory of knowing others through analogy is inconsistent with a metaphysics which posits a supra-individual mind, but quite compatible with a Cartesian dualism of interacting substances which does not do so. The metaphysics of the mind-body relation is therefore inseparable from any epistemology of knowing others.

6. Intersubjectivity and ethics

A cardinal feature of Scheler's general epistemology is its insistance that we originally encounter all existents as in some sense valuable, i.e. as bearers of value. Conversely, values relate to concrete existents.

In light of this intrinsic connection (between value and existence) Scheler suggests that certain moral "essentially social" acts--and in particular those which carry a necessary reference to others as bearers of value--constitute an "indirect proof" that others exist, especially since they are irreducible to a combination of some simpler "pre-social" components to which the experience of meeting others has somehow been "added." Thus, such emotions as love, sympathy,

or hatred, alone furnish sufficient "evidence" for others' existence; theoretical acts (i.e., objectifying cognitions) are not required to verify this.

To expose the potential issues of this problem area Scheler alludes to a somewhat conflicting view, that of Fichte. The idealist maintains that the very essence of an individual subject is formed by a primary consciousness of obligation; others towards whom I have obligations must therefore concretely exist. Though it has its merits--it is clearly akin to Scheler's analysis of "essentially social" acts--this view, Scheler thinks must be rejected because it obliterates an important distinction, namely, between our social nature in general and particular instances of particular individuals knowing particular others. It is to account for the latter that forms the crux of any theory of intersubjectivity.

Having completed this summary of problem areas relevant for accounts of intersubjectivity, I would like now to pass on to some concrete descriptions and examine how they resolve the key issues mentioned above. I shall first consider two well-established "classical" accounts of our knowledge that others exist (problem area 2) and Scheler's critical response to them. His critique is the first step toward the elaboration of his own positive statement on intersubjectivity. Its exposition and evaluation begins the task of the rest of this essay: to examine and evaluate whether the perspicuity with which Scheler saw the pertinent issues involved is matched by the solutions he proposes.

Section 2

Analogical Inference and Projective Empathy: Two Classical Accounts of Knowing Another's Existence.

An inability to overcome solipsism conclusively brings Scheler to a radical criticism of theories of intersubjectivity. This inability, Scheler observes, is self-engendered; it stems from adhering to a rationalist-empiricist paradigm as a suitable conceptual framework within which the problematic of knowing others is to be raised. (The paradigm was very much in vogue in Scheler's time with the burgeoning new discipline of psychology which furnished most of the accounts that he attacked.) Let me therefore briefly sketch those of its metaphysical and epistemological features which bear closely on the problematic.

Concerning the relation of mind and body, variations of two basic and underlying positions were current: 1) "interactionism," in which mind and body are seen as two different substances reciprocally influencing each other, 2) "psychophysical parallelism," according to which every reality of consciousness corresponds to a physical event, that physical

event playing in addition the ultimate explanatory role.

The basic epistemological premise of the rationalist-empiricist paradigm accepts as self-evident that each of us is primarily and indubitably aware only of his own self and its experiences, and that this is the essential datum of inner perception. This "first principle," taken as an axiom, provides the basis for a deductive model within which all human knowledge is to be set forth. The individual self and its states is regarded then as the only possible or legitimate starting point for philosophical construction.[1]

An obvious corollary of this primacy of self-awareness is that in our experience of others it is the appearance of their body which forms that experience's primary datum. For it logically follows that concerning perception of others, what is primarily given of them must be something other than what is primarily given only to them, i.e. their own self and its states. Since by definition inner perception gives each of us only our own private inner states, it is through outer perception that I must first apprehend others. And within the restricted empiricist notion of outer perception which claims its objects to be mere sense data, the other's body, described in strict physicalist terms, appears as the only legitimate source from which my sense organs could receive stimuli and thereby substantiate my belief that others like me do in fact exist.

A justification of this entire sequence can be offered at yet another and more basic level--one that abstracts from

the analytical understanding of "inner perception" and the epistemological logic it generates. At the heart of rationalist-empiricist thinking lies a distinction between non-extended mental events occurring "within" man and the extended physical things that appear in space around him. Since others appear in space around me, they are by definition given to me primarily as res extensae, that is, under their physical aspect. Hence, it can only be their bodies that are given to me; their non-extended dimension, the minds remain hidden.

It was in the light of such assumptions that J.S.Mill (1889) first explicitly raised the question of "other minds" (i.e., of the exact process by which we arrive at knowing that others like us exist). In continental Europe the issue found resonnance in late nineteenth and early twentieth century as part of an effort to provide a transcendental basis for the "cultural sciences" (Geistwissenschaften).[2] Troeltsch saw this clearly:

> The main problem here is the question of our knowledge of other minds; for this is the peculiar presupposition of history, and in general a central issue for all philosophy, since the possibilities and difficulties of any common thought and philosophizing all depend upon it (Scheler 1954: xlix).

The initial response to this problematic was formulated by two "classical" theories in philosophical and psychological literature.[3] The first is the theory of analogical inference; the second is the theory of projective empathy.

According to the theory of analogical inference--held by

Mill, while its leading continental advocate was Erich Becher --we become convinced of the existence of other selves, exterior to us but similar to ourselves, by perceiving in the other's organism movements analogous to our own. That is, on the basis of a similarity obtained in comparing the movements of the other's body with our own bodily reactions to our own inner states, we infer the existence of another self to which these movements "belong."

The theory of projective empathy (attributed to Theodor Lipps) justifies our knowledge claims for the existence of others with a hypothesis of an empathic projection of our own "ego-ness" of "self-hood" into a body exterior to our own. We come to know that others are really human by virtually putting ourselves in their place.

After a careful phenomenological investigation, and finding little justification for the proposed explanations, Scheler rejects both theories. Moreover, he argues that the difficulties of overcoming solipsism left unresolved by each theory are a direct consequence of their initial assumption of the priority of self-knowledge. Against the theory of analogical inference he advances four claims.

First, Scheler points to the fact that animals appear to be aware of the existence of other psychic centers. This could hardly be inferential knowledge. Likewise, infants possess definite knowledge of persons around them at an age when inferential processes clearly cannot be attributed to them.

Second, while we are conscious of our own expressions, we certainly do not experience them in the same manner as we experience the expressions of others. We are aware of our own bodily movements through kinesthetic sensations, whereas we encounter the gestures and expressions of others within the audio-visual field of perception. In view of how dissimilarly these phenomena are given, Scheler sees no common ground between them on which analogical inference leading to the existence of others could be established. In fact, any analogical inference makes sense only if we take the existence of the other self for granted. For only on this latter assumption can we consider any gestures appearing within the outer perceptual field as "expressions" and therefore similar in nature to our own gestures.

Third, we are certain of a type of "mental" life in animals, even though their expressive movements and actions hardly resemble ours. Comparisons and analogical inferences are clearly impossible here.

Finally, Scheler notes that inherent in the theory of analogical inference is the fallacy of the fourth term. "For such an argument [of analogy] would be logically correct . . . only if it implied that on the occurrence of expressive movements similar to those I perform myself, it is my own self that is present here as well--and not some other alien self. If the conclusion refers to an alien self, distinct from my own, it is a false conclusion, an instance of the fallacy of the four terms" (1954: 240). Analogical

inference remains then caught in a reduplication of the self.

The other classical account of reaching the existence of another mind, the theory of projective empathy, receives similar radical criticism. Even in its sophisticated formulation by Lipps, all that projective empathy seeks to establish, says Scheler, is a "blind belief" in the existence of others. It does not aim at a self-evident intuition nor even at a rational postulate--the latter at least being the merit of analogical inference--concerning the existence of others. Projective empathy's belief is blind because "it would be pure chance that the process of empathy should coincide with the actual presence of mind in the bodies so perceived" (241). Thus the theory lacks criteria by which it would be possible to differentiate between instances in which we impute psychic life to entities where such life is absent, and instances in which it is present. Nor can this theory adequately differentiate between levels of empathy--for example: between empathy as a source of our knowledge of the existence of others, and empathy as an "aesthetic projection" of self as in identifying with an actor on stage or screen in order to understand better his character.

To avoid the first and obviously the more serious of the latter difficulties--and thereby save itself--the theory of projective empathy claims that not just any visual content will do to initiate the empathic act. What is needed is perception of "expressive movements." But this, Scheler rightly objects, begs the question. The realization that

certain seen movements are expressive movements already presupposes knowledge of the presence of another mind of some kind; to recognize something as expressive is not the source but the outcome of this belief (241).

Thus, in spite of an apparent plausibility, the classical theories of analogical inference and projective empathy are vulnerable to objections which rather conclusively refute them, and which have drastically reduced the number of thinkers who seriously support them. One should not, of course, underestimate the attractiveness of these positions for popular consciousness. The strong Cartesian heritage within our culture, along with the associationist psychologists' artificial dissolution of our unified experiences into isolated sense data, makes such attractiveness unavoidable. Scheler's critique, even if it conveys what has become obvious to many professional philosophers, remains timely and can be successfully restated.

Scheler's argumentation needs no buttressing. Its cogency ensures its independent standing and his entire critique remains a sound philosophical contribution. By way of concluding here, I should like to justify this claim briefly by expanding on and amplifying its most significant ramifications.

To recall the basic assumption of the theories, they both asserted the primacy of self-knowledge over knowledge of others and claimed that especially in relation to psychic existence only one's own self is immediately and indubitably

given to consciousness. This common point of departure ensures that the two theses, in spite of the fact that they take distinctly opposite directions, reach essentially the same inevitable conclusions. While projective empathy moves in what we can call a centrifugal direction from myself as center toward the other, analogical inferences is a centripetal movement from the other to me.

However, in both theses my own self remains the central analogue, explicitly or implicitly, to whose terms the other is reduced. For this reason, as Scheler makes very clear, neither theory is capable of accounting for our knowledge of the other as other. Both analogical inference and projective empathy remain caught in a reduplication of the self; starting only with my own case I am condemned to end with it, merely "placed" elsewhere. Both then are unable to transcend the solipsism inherent in the premises they accept in their formulation, begging in fact the question in an attempt to do so. But since both theses are clearly quite consistent with the epistemological and metaphysical assumptions from which they proceed, the exposure of their failure at once puts in question these very assumptions themselves.

It is evident that the philosophical problems pertaining to our knowing others as raised in the rationalist-empiricist paradigm cannot in fact be solved within the framework of assumptions in which they are posed. Ultimately Scheler's critique suggests the need for radically different starting

points, if that certitude which I have about the existence of others--a certitude as unmistakable as that concerning my own existence or that of the physical world--is to be vindicated. The failure of analogical inference and projective empathy implies at the very least, that for such justification the other must be encountered far more directly than either thesis assumes, and that the problem of knowing others is rather different from a purely logical problem of finding evidence for an inference in which the existence of egos and thought processes other than our own are posited.

Before however following up on these suggestions as they are dealt with by Scheler, I will consider an account of intersubjectivity which is explicitly aware of both the spectre of solipsism and the inappropriateness of causal inferences for any solution, but which, in spite of its divorce from Cartesian metaphysics and empiricist epistemology, falls in my judgement short of being equal to the task set to it by its author. That account, formulated by a phenomenological contemporary of Scheler, will throw in relief problems pertinent to intersubjectivity still different from those posed by the classical theories I have just examined.

Secton 3

Intersubjectivity and Transcendental Phenomenology.

For Edmund Husserl the "objective world," or more precisely the world's objectivity, is dependent on inter-subjective experience. Objectivity attains its fulfillment when the sense of something cannot be discovered "in" (or is not reducible to) all possible acts of an individual consciousness precisely because that same object is a correlate of the consciousness of other individuals. Something exists objectively because it exists not merely for me but for others, is "there for everyone." Likewise, knowledge can be qualified as objective if and only if its truths are not private but are binding on others.

This concept of objectivity clearly assumes then knowledge of other individuals as other. And since it is the business of phenomenology to describe the objective (public) structures of the world, the issues of inter-subjectivity pertaining to our knowledge of the other as other and that of the constitution of the objective world become inseparable. Indeed, as Husserl himself admits, failure to account for intersubjectivity implies the collapse of phenomenology itself.

An objection of solipsism, which Husserl raised against transcendental phenomenology, motivates the entire argument of his "Fifth Cartesian Meditation" (hereafter CM 5). Such an objection would appear to follow almost automatically the use of the transcendental epoché, a methodological procedure which forms the core of Husserl's program and which is directly linked to his view of consciousness. This procedure assumes that consciousness is intentional--where intentionality refers to consciousness's selective and varied directedness toward real and ideal objects "through" which these very objects, and the world in general, are what they are for us--and seeks to elucidate the structure and "essence" of the world by a reflective examination of consciousness rather than of the physical existential world itself. It "brackets" this world and considers all intended or meant things only as they are meant; all being is "reduced" to being-for-my-consciousness. Thus the quite natural objection of solipsism.

But however strong the Cartesian flavour of this procedure may be, Husserl's aims here are quite different from those of the famous rationalist. Whereas Descartes takes the ego cogito as an indubitable first truth and from it tries to prove by deduction the existence of the real transcendent world, Husserl takes that world "for granted", and seeks only to bring forth the structure of the sense which the transcendent world has for us. Husserl's analyses are intentional not causal. And as long as phenomenology refrains from any metaphysical pronouncements and carries

out its program only as a "methodological idealism," it is irrelevant to ask of it proofs of the Cartesian sort.[1]

From this perspective, intersubjectivity must receive the same treatment as other regions of phenomenological investigations. If the sense of all existents is possible by virtue of the intentionality of my consciousness and its "constitutive syntheses," the other must be regarded as another case of an existent--to be sure a special one--who has sense for me through these operations of consciousness. Following his principles, Husserl must show how the other is constituted in my consciousness as another ego, a subject constituting a world of his own, and how this constitution (of the other in me) bears on the constitution of the objective world. In this context solipsism would signify a failure to account for the sense of the other as other, and a concomitant privatization of the transcendent objective world since the sense "objective world for all" would become an impossibility. Clearly then, it is not a metaphysical solipsism that Husserl attempts to overcome. The problem of our relation to others is maintained by him on the plane of knowledge or meaning, in strict separation from the plane of being; any solution rests explicitly on a cognition which suspends judgement about the factual existence of world, others, or interpersonal relations.

With these clarifications in place, I turn to the specifics of his account of intersubjectivity. Since all existents have sense for us because of the intentionality of

our consciousness, the individual subject or ego is the ego of all constitutions. It possesses infinite intentional possibilities, including, therefore, the capacity for that sort of intentionality through which we become aware of the sense "other subject" or "alter ego." To legitimize this claim Husserl must explicate the experiential conditions or processes in which this "alter-intentionality," presented first as a possibility, becomes concrete through adequate fulfillment in intuition, thus providing for the appearance of another subject. Essentially, three key steps are involved in this explication: 1) the reduction to the "sphere of ownness," 2) the grasping of the other through "analogical appresentation," and 3) the pairing of my and the other's perspectives through imagination.

In CM 5, Par. 44 Husserl outlines the reduction to the sphere of ownness. Its explicit aim is to "disregard all constitutional effects of intentionality relating immediately or mediately to another subjectivity" (1977:93). In other words, the world has to be stripped of all social meaning inherent in the ascription of intentional life to someone other than myself. This is done by an initial bracketing of others as living beings; further abstraction encompasses all cultural objects (which in themselves necessarily refer to others) until I finally withdraw from the world its character as a world for everyone. Through this procedure I have then reached my sphere of ownness in which this world, now "proper" to my ego, is transcendent only in a sense that as a correlate

of my consciousness it is irreducible to any one actual or possible act of that consciousness and that consciousness alone. The abstractions performed were not of the Aristotelian type, (i.e. of essence from existence), but involved rather a separation of, or sifting out of the various strata which determine the meaning the world has for me. Such separation is what Scheler has in mind by an investigation of the order of dependence among cognitive intentions. The separation of sense effected by Husserl here gives that which in the transcendental field of experiences is "my own" and that which is "of the other."

What is the reason for this procedure? Its aim, I believe, is to clarify how my body is constituted in my consciousness. This clarification is important, because in a philosophy advocating the primacy of perception[2] the perceived body "founds" intersubjectivity. Thus in the primordial sphere, among all natural bodies that are the correlate of my consciousness, my own body stands out as "the only body that is or can be constituted originally as an animate organism" (110). My active control of my body's movements gives it this special status.

But this restriction of original constitution as animate organism to my body implies that the other's "animateness" cannot find its direct justificaton in perception. It can only be d[illegible]ivative, Husserl suggests, of an "apperceptive transfer" from my animate organism. And he goes on to say that such apperceptive transfer or

"analogizing apprehension" receives its basis from a "similarity connecting within my primordial sphere, that body over there with my body" (111).

To supplant the apperceptive transfer Husserl appeals to the notion of association under the form of "pairing"--two data given in unity of one conscious act--with "appresentation"[3] as a "special case" of this pairing proving to be the key. Granting the impossibility of perceiving another consciousness, if consciousness maintains in principle a relationship with the world which is one of embodiment, then, in perceiving someone we can say that whereas only their body is directly presented to us, their consciousness is appresented by that body. It is this particular instance of appresentation (of consciousness by body) that Husserl uses in conjunction with the analogical apprehension of a body that now appears in my sphere of ownness as "another living body." Through analogical appresentation the sense "ego" arises; originally given only to me, it is transferred by means of an analogy to that other living body. From this "beginning" the other is confirmed as another human being through the continuous harmony of his behaviour (114).

The final step in intersubjective constitution involves Husserl in coordinating in imagination the perspectives belonging to different subjects. Through imagination, by an empathic positing of myself where the other is, "there," the other becomes for me more concrete. The full sense

"alter ego" arises when the analogous existence of others is "strengthened" by the fact that I associate them with my potential as well as actual experiences. The other becomes less enigmatic because an ego, my ego originally given to me and of which my certitude is absolute, can potentially be "there" living through that perspective.

Husserl's account of intersubjectivity has generated a fair amount of discussion and indeed controversy. For in spite of its subtlety it appears burdened by severe difficulties.

Is, for example, a reduction of the type Husserl proposes even possible? As Schutz (1966:60) points out--correctly I believe--the distinction between what is properly of the ego and what is not, and therefore a reduction to the sphere of ownness, are impossible to maintain because some meaning related to others must necessarily subsist in the very criterion of non-reference to others. Moreover, Husserl appears mistaken as to the status of the sphere of ownness. He thinks it to be a phenomenon sui generis. This much is clear when he suggests that within the ownness sphere we still retain a "unitary coherent stream of the phenomenon 'world'" which is at the same time "essentially a founding stratum [and that] I obviously cannot have the 'alien' or 'other' as experience, and therefore cannot have the sense 'Objective world' as an experiential sense without having this stratum in actual experience; whereas the reverse is not the case" (1977:96). That the sense "alien" is possible

because I experience something which I can call "my own" is not to be disputed. However, is not my immersion in, and experience of an objective world for all a necessary background against which I can experience "my ownness," a totality from which the world as my world can be drawn through my perspective? My own world does not emerge in distinction to a particular world of the other, but makes its appearance first of all in distinction to the world of all.[4] Far from pertaining only to me, "my ownness" reveals then a thoroughly social dimension without which it is unable to subsist,[5] thereby dissolving, it would appear, the transcendental problem of the conditions for the possibility of my experiencing others.

We also recognize easily the deficiencies inhering in the second step, that of analogical apprehension. Husserl based its possibility on the similarity between my own body and that of the other as they appeared to me. But with this similarity of appearances questionable, as Scheler clearly shows and Schutz (1966) and Ballard (1962) reiterate, the motive for analogical apprehension vanishes.[6] As for the confirmation of the other through his harmonious behaviour, a grasp of such harmony presupposes a grasp of the psychic unity behind it and so Husserl begs the question here. Nothing on his view could prevent me from taking as human a robot who resembles me; it too exhibits harmonious "behaviour."

Concerning the final step, the imaginary coordination of perspectives belonging to different egos, it must be

pointed out that my adoption of a different standpoint, the other's "here," does not essentially attain to his "here." My new "here" and his "here" remain different. For mere exchange of my spatial position cannot account for transference of all actualities and potentialities which belong to the ownness sphere of the other. My new "here" gives only my actualities and potentialities--a reproduction of me in a new place. Moreover, could I meaningfully talk about "potential experiences belonging to the other"? Perhaps I can say that I "can" from the other's "here," but the converse cannot be admitted precisely because in transcendental phenomenology all analogy and all sense begins from me and me alone. To say that the other "can" from my "here" implies an alien analogizing, presupposing this other as another--this then could not aid the constitution of the other. More than anything else, this lack of reciprocity is what ultimately subverts Husserl's project.

There is yet another significant difficulty; it pertains to Husserl's account as a whole rather than to any of its specific aspects. Husserl's transcendental ego is not "in" the world precisely because its relation to the world is intentional and not causal. Consciousness considered purely in its aspect as intentional, i.e. as "meaning" the world, does not for that reason belong to that world; it is not ontologically related to the world as an embodied consciousness is. Now for Husserl intersubjectivity is established when I reach the other as another transcendental subject, that is,

as another subject related intentionally to the world (but not "in" it). How then, one must ask, is the empathy of the analogizing apprehension--which empathizes the other solely as an embodied human being--to motivate me to take him as another transcendental ego? Husserl appears to involve himself in a contradictory effort, beginning with "alter-intentionality" of transcendental subjectivity on the noetic side while compelled by the primacy of perception to adopt the body as the starting point on the noematic side. Thus Frings, for one, concludes that "to adopt the body as one's starting point would be to exclude the project of a transcendental phenomenology: either it is the body of the other that constitutes intersubjectivity, or it is the egological otherness that constitutes transcendental intersubjectivity" (1978b:146).

What nevertheless induces Husserl to accept the founding acts of intersubjectivity as those of constitution based on bodily perception? That is, how legitimate in his own thinking is the primacy of perception in this strict sense, especially that it is the non-perceptual attitudes which seem to govern the meeting with the other and the sense he takes for us? Are there not instances, as Scheler argues, in which another subjectivity is given to me directly through expressions of joy or anger?

There are indeed some compelling reasons why in Husserl's accounts perception in its strict sense takes precedence over other attitudes, and why in consequence the other is

encountered indirectly. As in the analyses of perception, where Husserl uses visual perception of near objects, the paradigm social situation is for him one of bodily presence of people who find themselves within the perceptual field and range of each other. This paradigm has its source in the derivation of perception as the basic operation of consciousness from the transcendental attitude. For the object of visual perception, "that, over there," is the transcendent par excellence, satisfying phenomenology's principle of evidence: the "givenness" to consciousness of its objects; and it is in thetic or positional consciousness that Husserl believes the existence or reality of entities to be given.

Hence, though it does not deny the validity of different concrete (and especially emotional) attitudes towards others, transcendental phenomenology must treat these forms of intentionality as secondary. The other can be fully constituted only on the "foundation" provided by visual perception, since only this latter operation "legitimizes" a transcendent existent (as existing) and a possible consequent unity with him.

Husserl's account of intersubjectivity and the difficulties inhering in it prove, however, to be highly illuminating. Perhaps nowhere else is the idealism vs. realism conflict that Husserl tried so hard to resolve as visible as in the obvious tension between analogy as an indirect grasping of another ego beginning from my own and

the immediate knowledge of the other that (expressive) behaviour seems to offer. Husserl is working under the strains of the demands of description on one hand and of constitution on the other. "[Given] the idealistic requirement of constitution the other must be a modification of my ego and according to the realistic character of description the other never ceases to exclude himself from the sphere of 'my monad'" (Ricoeur 1967:130).

For the other, to use Ricoeur's expression, is somehow "more other" than any other object--and this precisely because of his ontological status of being-for-himself.[7] But this is more or less meaningless for transcendental phenomenology, because even if it does not subordinate ontology to phenomenology, (as some interpretors believe),[8] then at least it remains explicitly non-committal about being. It is determined to reconstruct the whole of inter-subjective knowledge out of the epistemological resources of a single isolated knowing subject. Placing all of the conditions for the meaning of the other on the side of that subject to whom the other is given, transcendental phenomenology finds itself in an awkward situation. Perhaps Husserl's method precludes the solution he is looking for. Indeed we must question whether the full unification of intentional constitution on one hand with description on the other can be attained only in fiction, as one commentator suggests with admirable clarity:

> When in effect Husserl affirms the harmony between the most concrete operations of consciousness and the intersubjective unity which develops and sediments in the objectivized world, is this not an affirmation of a principle of continuity which cannot always be elucidated? Between the principle of constitution of the other and the objectivations in the world, there is a gap which the transcendental analyses do not permit to overcome. The meditating ego can always reactivate a sense, but does it receive anything other than what is conveyed to it, without being able to reach and identify the origin of that sense? And in such a case, to admit something as "non-constituted" is to shatter the reflexive continuity in its identity with the continuity of the constituting activity, whose concept itself can be maintained only thanks to a transcendental illusion (Schérer 1971:91-2).[9]

Let me reiterate the major obstacles facing Husserl. Even discounting the problematic nature of his reduction to the sphere of ownness, within this sphere it appears impossible to go beyond the boundaries of our subjectivity. Still less is Husserl able to account for the real mark of intersubjectivity: reciprocity. No transcendental "we" is established, since adhering to the principle of the reduction, though I may have constituted the world and all other subjects in my consciousness, I have done so only for myself and not for other transcendental subjects as well. Finally, reaching others as transcendental subjects seems incompatible with empathizing them as psychophysical egos, that is, as embodied subjects; "alter-intentionality" lacks intuitive fulfillment.

These difficulties raise serious doubts whether the solution to the problems posed by intersubjectivity is to be

sought at the transcendental level. Instead, I propose to treat intersubjectivity from an "ontological" attitude, that is, an attitude which considers its object as comprising a distinct region of reality transcendent to consciousness and which takes certain things for granted about that region. Here the intuited data constitute determinations of which consciousness is no longer the sole source. I am then in complete agreement with the following sentiments expressed by Schutz:

> It is to be surmised that intersubjectivity is not a problem of constitution which can be solved within the transcendental sphere, but is rather a datum of the life-world. It is the fundamental ontological category of human existence. . . . The possibility of reflection on the self, discovery of the ego, capacity of performing any epoché, and the possibility of all communication and of establishing a communicative surrounding world, are founded on the primal experience of the we-relationship (1962:82).

The transcendental reduction and the intentional constitution linked to it stumble then, not before the fact of human relations, but before a structure of being in which any absolute primacy is cast in doubt. In the attitude I have just proposed, the point of departure of an analysis of intersubjectivity would no longer be the certitude of self-knowledge and individual ego-experience, but rather a presupposition of a relation to our fellows founded in our very being as men. And the ego on this view is not an irreducible and primary concept, as Husserl assumes, but results from a cognitive process considered as an

"ontological relationship," that is, a relationship in which consciousness has the actual ability to attain to what is. Hence,

> [t]he problem will no longer be to how, beginning from a pure subject conceived as an intransgressible origin, knowledge of another subject, and consequently communication with that subject, is possible. It will concern the totality of that being which is posed in reflection, subjectivity and relation: to which fundamental ontological structure must this being respond to assume simultaneously its diverse possibilities, what is its ultimate possibility, does it realize itself fully in subjectivity or inter-subjectivity, in solitude or communication? (Schérer 1971:98).[10]

Husserl's account underscores the difficulties of epistemologies which begin with a perceiving subject and/or give priority to self-experience over knowledge of others. Thus many thinkers have either rejected the primacy of perception or redefined perception by enriching its content. They have as well seen that for the problem of knowing others, self and other must be "co-given" immediately in non-theoretical consciousness.

It is the transcendental attitude which does not allow Husserl to overcome solipsism and it seems safe to suggest that it is that attitude which induces him at the same time to neglect the expressive moment of human existence. But in abandoning this attitude we not only leave its (untenable) idealism, but also the latter's counterpart: the perceptual realism.[11] This eventually frees us to consider human

expression as a mode of immediate manifestation of others allowing for a substantially more direct access to them.[12] Such considerations would be complementary to their new status of proximity to me deriving from their linkage to my very being as man.

We are now ready to rejoin the thought of Max Scheler to follow up on the main conclusions of the preceding discussions.

Section 4

Ontological Phenomenology and the General Knowledge About Community

For Scheler, the objective and real fact of social existence is the starting point of a positive analysis of intersubjectivity: "What we are saying is simply that the world of the thou, or of the community, is just as much an independent sphere of essential being as are the spheres of the external world, the internal world, the bodily environment and the realm of the divine" (1954:236). Moreover, he is quite explicit in asserting the nature of this sphere. It is given as a synthetic unity, an experienced reality in a form of a gestalt, and is in no way arrived at by some additive process: "Every irreducible sphere of being must necessarily be given as a whole beforehand, as a 'background' to the positing of the reality of any object within it; hence it does not simply comprise the sum of all the contingent facts within it" (236).

The notion of "sphere" deserves here particular attention. By "sphere of being" Scheler understands a region of reality which is given directly and intuitively in cognition, and which is irreducible to anything else. Such spheres correspond to fundamental manners or modes in which reality as a whole is

lived and experienced, each sphere being given to consciousness through a specific corresponding intentional act (e.g., the perceptual act, the religious act, etc.). Since any possible object cannot be posited without the background of a sphere, the latter must be considered independently of any particular content "filling" it, and indeed must be given prior to any such content in the order of dependence among cognitive intentions. We may say then that a sphere, as Scheler employs this notion, is a cognitive horizon whose limits and independence are established by its ontological status.

It should also be noted that Scheler considers knowledge of each particular sphere to be a priori (in his understanding of the term, of course). For although intuition of an essence of a sphere is not independent of experience, such essence is self-given by way of an immediate intuitive content independently of induction and the quantity of experiences undergone; hence, according to Scheler, it is a priori. Since man partakes of all spheres, the social dimension is an irreducible aspect of his being and knowledge of community is a priori knowledge.

However, we must be clear as to the subject matter of this a priori knowledge of community. It pertains to knowledge <u>about</u> the nature of community and the existence of others in general and not to knowledge <u>of</u> the contingent existence of a particular member of the community.[1] Scheler is quite insistant on this distinction, a distinction already

implied in considering the irreducible spheres of being as backgrounds to the particular objects appearing within them. For clearly knowledge, and therefore evidence, pertaining to particular objects must differ from that knowledge and evidence which is the latter's condition.

For the specific instances in which the a priori knowledge about community and the existence of others in general is to be gained, Scheler refers us to such "essentially social acts" as love, sympathy, gratitude, promising, etc. Since "the intention toward a possible community is co-given by essential necessity with the nature of these acts themselves" (1973a:519), their analysis will reveal at least a possible existence of others; without this existence such acts would be meaningless and incomprehensible.

To demonstrate the a priori character of these insights we are provided with an example of a hypothetical "epistemological" Robinson-Crusoe, a rational and mature man who nevertheless lacks any past or present acquaintance with another actual individual like him, nor possesses any evidence, such as signs or traces, of the existence of such being or beings. Could such a man know anything about the existence of a community or of conscious subjects like him? Would he, furthermore, think of himself as a member of such a community? Scheler says yes to both questions, thereby insisting that the scheme of reference to community is an ever-present element of our consciousness. His Robinson would not remain a radical solipsist--an impossibility in

any case--but would think: "I know that there is a community and that I belong to one; but I am unacquainted with the individuals comprising it."

Since Scheler expressly rejects any notion of innate ideas, he must point to an experiential content which could justify his Robinson's claims. This, he asserts, would be a consciousness of absence experienced especially in such emotional acts as love, sympathy or hatred and in social acts in general, that is, in "acts which can only constitute an objective unity of meaning in conjunction with the possibility of social response" (1954:235). Robinson's experience would therefore be not one of loneliness as this term is usually understood, since loneliness is consequent upon positing a genuine presence. Rather, it would be an emptiness or incompleteness within the intentionality of these acts which by their nature are meant to reach other human beings, but which, for lack of definite object, cannot attain fulfillment. This emptiness, experienced as a "positive vacancy," would in turn be sufficient for an intuition and a positive idea of community and existence of others in general.

In this example Scheler is clearly exploiting a standard feature of all conscious acts to prove his point. Whatever is given in experience is always given against a certain background; this is the condition of an object's intelligibility. Our conscious acts carry a bipolar intentionality. In intending an object, consciousness implicitly intends its background, and the fulfillment of "both" intentionalities

provides for the unity of meaning. Moreover, the implicit intentionality and its correlate background may persist throughout a series of different conscious acts directed at distinctly different objects. The acts can be understood and their objects grasped insofar as that implicit intentionality is realized and its correlate background intuited. For example, every object of outer perception is found against the background and as part of "nature" extended endlessly spatially and temporally. And when questioned about the existence of a particular perceived object, our immediate response would surely be to point out that it must be real since it is out there, among all those other real things we perceive. The object is real, we would claim, because it is a part of the real world. Similarly, any grasping of a particular individual person, including myself, must occur within the background of a community whose member I am. Our strongest immediate supporting argument for the existence of another person would indeed be his membership in the human community. "He is human," we would say, "because he too is like all of us." In both instances it is the existence of the frame of reference which is sufficient for the belief in existence of the object appearing within it.

Now (it can be said that) in ordinary perception an object appears both because of, and in a very real sense to the "exclusion" of its background. Without a sustained focus on the object attention falls on its background. The object's "absence" directs us now to what was before only implicitly

meant and is now perceived to the "exclusion" of the object. Hence, just as a certain "non-inclusion" of the horizon contributes to the appearance of the object, so too the latter's absence contributes to the appearance of the horizon; the "non-inclusion" and "absence" are not strictly negative, and this is analogous for all conscious acts. This seems to me the thrust of Scheler's Robinson example. In the absence of a particular concrete object for his social act, Crusoe would direct himself to "community" as that background which by necessity is co-intended and co-given in such an act.

Still, we must question the possibility of the background (of community) being grasped in the absence of any differentiating factors provided by the objects with which it contrasts. Does not the background exist as background only insofar as it is a background for a particular object? An answer to this objection must admit its validity concerning outer perceptual consciousness. In outer perception, in the absence of differentiating factors, nothing indeed can be perceived. But this is far less true of affective consciousness whose objects are often clearly intuited only subsequently to experiences of very general, non-directed attitudes.

One may also argue that Scheler's Robinson could not perform any social acts because of a lack of specific objects. Love or sympathy are always directed at a particular person or group of persons, and since that particular content is needed to attain a unity of meaning in these acts, its absence

would seem to annul the possibility of these acts themselves. This is a valid point. Functionalists, like Dewey for example, contend that all characteristic or central impulses in the adult--and love and sympathy are precisely that in Scheler's anthropology--are integrated with and affected by reality. From this perspective, to speak of acts whose essence is to be directed at a particular other human being is, in the latter's total absence from present or past experience, meaningless.[2] Scheler would perhaps have been better off to suggest that his Robinson, as a mature and rational person, would experience an emotional directedness beyond himself, a tendency to love or sympathize, and a desire to concretize his feelings about community, without however being quite capable of such concretization.

As Scheler is more concerned here with apprehending general essences and the essential relationship among them within an already accepted ontology than with establishing that ontology itself on the basis of these apprehensions, the above objection is not, in my judgement, of overriding significance. Notwithstanding the validity of the functionalist's argument, I take Scheler's discussion on the knowledge about community rather as a valuable pointer that intersubjective knowledge must find its foundation in experience understood in the broadest sense of the term. That foundation cannot be restricted to induction and observation. Expressing his agreement on this issue, Schutz notes that "Scheler is certainly right if he underlines again

and again that the mere existence of a frame of reference referring to the Other, of a system of interpretable signs or symbols, for instance, is sufficient for the belief in the existence of other persons" (1962:177). Thus, while mere experience of certain forms of intentionality may induce us to believe in a possible existence of others, the only condition for a belief in others' actual existence is the givenness to our consciousness of an "ideal meaning of signs" (Scheler 1954:218).

For the purposes of this essay Scheler's discussion is of specific value as a clear indicator of the direction of his inquiry. For in effect he is saying that the objectivity of the other attains fullness in that attitude (and sphere) as is co-meant in such acts as love and sympathy. It is in the analysis of our emotional dimension that the ontological relation between self and others finds its ultimate explication.

This completes the discussion on the knowledge about community and the existence of others in general. Having elaborated on this background, I now turn to Scheler's analysis of how we actually perceive a concrete particular other who appears within it.

Section 5

Perceiving Others

In Part 3, Chapter 3 of Sympathy Scheler presents his theory of perceiving others. Its intention and scope are already circumscribed by the dintinction between the sphere of community and the particular subjects who are within it. Having treated of knowledge about the former, Scheler now addresses himself to the following task: within the surrounding reality, how and under what conditions do I recognize the presence of another particular thinking and feeling being like me? What justifies my conviction not of the existence of others in general, but of the psychic existence of this concrete other whom I now encounter in person?

Scheler's critique of the theories of analogical inference and projective empathy led him to a rejection of their common two-fold point of departure. Both theses assumed, we recall, that with respect to psychical existence only my own self and its states are immediately given to me--this as well being the sole object of inner perception, i.e. that mode of intuition by which the mental, a self and its experiences can possibly be apprehended--and that what is primarily given to me in perceiving others is merely the

appearance of their physical bodies (Körper). Scheler must replace then these assumptions, countering with evidence which at once refutes them and provides him with an adequate grounding for his own positive statement. Concretely, this involves a three-fold effort to: 1) refute the priority of self-knowledge, 2) redefine the notion of inner perception, and 3) clarify the status of human expression.

Beginning his task in questioning the priority of self-knowledge in psychic experience, Scheler points to our certitude of the fact that we occasionally think the thoughts of other persons or feel in sympathy certain of their feelings. These can be as vivid as our own thoughts and feelings, and indeed there are situations, Scheler claims, in which it is difficult to distinguish our own thoughts, feelings, or volitions from those of the people that surround us. In contrast, for example, to simple communication in which my thought is given as mine and the thought of another as his, there are instances of indentification (Gefühlen) in which an experience may present itself as not readily assignable either to myself or to the other:

> It is possible . . . for the same experience to be given both "as our own" and "as someone else's"; but there is also the case in which an experience is simply given, without presenting itself either as our own or as another's, as invariably happens, for example, where we are in doubt as to which of the two it is (1954:246).

This statement of Scheler's marks a complete reversal of the starting point of analogical inference and projective

empathy. On the basis of such phenomena of identification and against the priority of self-knowledge he posits a common psychic field or stream, "an immediate flow of experiences, undifferentiated as between mine and thine, which actually contains both our own and other's experiences intermingled and without distinction from one another" (246). It is not my own self that is first experienced, not the "I," but rather a general "we" from which the "I" gradually emerges in experience. (This actual primacy of consciousness of others in the undifferentiated psychic stream is of course complementary to the priority of the sphere of community asserted in the order of dependence among cognitive intentions that Scheler clarifies through his Robinson Crusoe example.)

In support for this theory of a common psychic stream, Scheler appeals to findings of anthropology and comparative psychology. Self-consciousness, he points out, is both a late phylogenetic as well as a late ontogenetic development. We therefore tend in the first instance to live more "in" other people's experiences than in our own. Community life precedes all individuated life; the self, initially too diffused within the undifferentiated flow of experience to allow self-objectification or objectification of others, gradually withdraws from the "we" until it becomes conscious of itself as a self-identical entity.

The concept of a common psychic stream leads necessarily to a reexamination of the notion of inner perception and its relation to outer perception. For if inner perception is

usually understood as that mode of intuition in which psychic phenomena are apprehended, in this new perspective it has certainly lost its status as an immediate perception exclusively of one's own self and its states. However, insofar as it still remains also a perception of oneself, we must ask how it is possible to have an inner perception of that self and the inner life of another person. For Scheler, an answer to this question depends on the meaning of inner perception.

It has been commonly held that inner intuition yields only self-experience because in it I am said to perceive myself. Scheler objects to this, noting that inner intuition cannot be defined by reference to its object, that is, by saying that a person engaged in such intuition is perceiving "himself," since he can also perceive "himself" through outer perception. In both acts it is in some sense the same "self" that serves as a pole of reference. (This way of arguing suggests at the very least, that however Scheler will define a "self," he has in mind an embodied self. The perception of a self would appear to be based on some type of a phycho-physical unity given in experience.) Now if the self, as he maintains, can in some way be perceived in a manner which by traditionally accepted definitions is directed at a realm where no psychical but only physical entities are present, then, unless the self is physicalized, the traditional notions of inner and outer perception must undergo significant revision.

Scheler's specific proposal on this issue is to make the distinction between inner and outer perception "not so much in respect to the subjective organs of perception"--these being traditionally divided according to whether they are used to apprehend the physical thing outside the individual, or the psychic event inside him--"but in reference to the level of penetration into the object perceived" (Ranly 1966:58). Thus, in a perceptual context, "inner" and "outer" refer in Scheler to two different perceptual directions, or perhaps better, modes of directedness toward something, rather than to (the spatial position of) that something itself. While outer perception grasps only the external physical features of myself or anyone else, inner perception is essentially concerned with the apprehension of conscious states in general, regardless whether they belong to me or another individual. The object of inner perception is then the entire psychic field which Scheler posited, and this explains our grasping of other selves:

> Thus internal perception represents a polarity among acts, such acts being capable of referring both to ourselves and to others. This polarity is intrinsically capable of embracing the inner life of others as well as my own, just as it embraces myself and my own experiences in general, and not merely the immediate present (1954:249).

Now there are certain conditions, Scheler concedes, which must be fulfilled before I can grasp the other's psychic experiences in inner perception. Specifically, my body must

undergo certain physical influences emanating from the other's body. For example, the sound waves carrying the other's utterance must reach my ear and alter its state. "But there is no reason," he suggests, "why this condition should entirely determine the act whereby these words are understood" (249). It is in the first instance not a condition of understanding but of making something available or present for understanding.

Could this situation, however, be used as an argument against the assumed immediacy with which we grasp the other in inner perception? Not so, and the answer to this question contains additional compelling reasons to reconsider the traditional distinctions and their evidential basis. For analogously to any outer perception, certain physical conditions and physiological processes must be accomplished in my body before even I myself can grasp my own experience in inner perception. In this sense no experience, even that of inner grasp of myself, can emerge immediately, by itself as it were, from the total continuity of my experiences. I can grasp my own psychic experience only insofar as it posits some variation of my lived body, and more specifically only "insofar as it discharges itself in intended movements, or at least in expressive tendencies" (251).[1] So true is this, suggests Scheler, that if an expression of an emotion is repressed, this invariably tends to repress it simultaneously from internal perception as well. There is then an equal necessity of fulfillment of certain physical conditions

operating regardless of whether internal perception apprehends my psychic experience or that of the other, so that giving a status of priority to self-awareness on the assumption that it is less mediated than the perception of others does not appear to be justified.

The above reasoning clearly underscores Scheler's dissociation from analogical inference and projective empathy on the issue of mind-body relation. Disregarding the possibility of an immediate grasp of the other, the classical theories "lock man within his own psychical prison where he can apprehend only whatever the metaphysical nexus of causality might happen to project within" (Owens 1970:95). On Scheler's account, this stems from failure to understand the role of the lived-body as a selector and analyst for all possible contents of inner (and outer) perception. The realm of the psychic is only <u>indirectly</u> related to bodily functions which make the psychic experiences visible in inner perception but by no means determine their <u>meaning</u>.

I will now examine the final part of Scheler's account of the perception of others: the clarification of the status of human expression. While the assumption of an undifferentiated psychic field and the correlative new understanding of inner perception are meant to contest and replace the priority of self-knowledge assumed by the classical accounts--and present in Husserl as well--the clarification of the status of human expression in perception is a complementary effort intended to show that what in the first instance we perceive

of the other is far more than merely his physical body (Körper). The tendency to expression was already mentioned in connection with the possibility of grasping any experience in inner perception. We need now to expose its specific role in perceiving the other.

Scheler is convinced that expression is the medium through which the other's psychical level manifests itself immediately for our perception.

This position is predicated on the assumption that as a factor in the constitution of intersubjectivity the human body is in the first instance a "field of expression," and that the various modes of expression appearing immediately in perception fall within a symbolic relation (1954:10). This means that the qualities of expression and the qualities of experience form essential, in themselves meaningful connections that are not reducible to causal laws:

> The relationships between expression and experience have a fundamental basis of connection. . . . We have here, as it were, a universal grammar, valid for all languages of expression and the ultimate basis of understanding for all forms of mime and pantomime among living creatures (11).[2]

Thus we perceive directly in the others' laughter their joy, shame in their blush, or anger in a frown or in the tenor of their voice (10). In fact, for every one of these experiential states there is a correlate natural expression. (On this view, any analogizing or empathic projection--perhaps to disperse one's doubts as to the genuiness of what is perceived of the

other--is secondary and derivative of the original experience of this familiar bond.)

On the other hand, Scheler does not argue that expressive manifestations displace the appearance of the body as a physical object, but simply that the latter is not all that is given in the perception of others. For clearly the body as a physical object is given too, and this cannot be prejudiced by the factor of expression; both data must be accounted for. He suggests, therefore, that what we first apprehend in intersubjective experience is neither merely the other's physical body nor his conscious states, but a unified totality within which there are physical and psychical elements not yet distinguished as such in terms of outer and inner perception. Body as thing and body as expression are two moments of the lived-body "co-given indifferently" in a primary perception whose psycho-physical unity is absolute. On this point Scheler is quite assertive:

> Our immediate perceptions of our fellow-men do not relate to their bodies (unless we happen to be engaged in a medical examination), nor yet to their "selves" or "souls." What we perceive are integral wholes whose intuitive content is not immediately resolved in terms of external or internal perception. From this stage of givenness we can then go on, in the second place, to adopt the attitude of internal or external perception. But the fact that the individual bodily unity thus immediately presented should be associated, in general, with a possible object accessible both to internal and external perception, is founded upon the intrinsic connection between these intuitive contents, a connection which also underlies my own perception of myself. It is not acquired through observation and induction from my own case. Such a connection holds good for the nature of all living organisms generally (261-2).[3]

The original co-givenness of both psychical and physical elements (and their subsequent differentiation as such within two different fields of perception discerned in two distinct act-directions) allows, as well, to safeguard the integrity of human expression against all reductionist attempts. For the primordial appearances are "incorporated into combinations and structures of quite a different kind, depending upon whether they take on the symbolic function in the act of external (or internal) perception" (262). Thus, what presents an appearance in which we perceive the other's body is an essentially different combination of (the same) stimuli from another combination of the same stimuli which gives an appearance in which we perceive his "self"; and the intelligibility of this is possible only because the phenomena presented belong to qualitatively different perceptual realms. For this reason expression can never be merely the sum of "its" physical parts:

> It is intrinsically impossible ever to resolve the unity of an expressive phenomenon (such as a smile, or a menacing, kindly, or affectionate look) into a sum of its appearances, however large, such that its members could equally well comprise a unity of appearance in which we might perceive merely the physical body, or a unitary impression from the physical environment. . . . [Conversely], in any combination of such [physical] unities I shall never come upon the unity of a smile, an entreaty, a threatening gesture and so on (262-3).

What however justifies granting to human expression its

status as a fundamental act of intersubjective experience allowing immediate access to the other? Just as we noted the reasons accorded to physical body apprehension in the rationalist-empiricist attitude and for the privilege of primacy accorded by Husserl to perception in its strict sense, we must now clarify why Scheler in his account of intersubjectivity privileges expression.

The clue appears to lie in Scheler's metaphysics of life. Its basic premise holds all organisms as characterized by an "ecstatic" vital urge, that is, a tendency to go outside themsleves. The other appears therefore primordially to me not as another transcendental ego nor as a physical body but as a bearer of life and its "ecstasis"--a "lived bodiliness." For this reason the human body appears always in the first instance not as a moving machine but as a consciousness which exteriorizes or ex-presses (i.e., presses out of) itself (Dupuy 1959,1:424). What governs my meeting with the other is my natural ecstatic immersion in his expression.

Perhaps nowhere else can we better appreciate the basic reason for the consequent difference between Scheler's approach and that of either the rationalist-empiricist or transcendental phenomenological framework. Frings states it clearly: "If this ecstasis of life proves to be our starting point, then the other must be given more in one's outpouring and immersion in his life community than in himself or the interiority of consciousness" (1978b:148). It also explains why Scheler treats of expression at the level of a

phenomenology of perception while Husserl does so at the level of a phenomenology of culture, that is, only subsequently to intersubjective constitution.

The perceptual theory of others offered by Scheler is quite original, but not without its problems. When, for example, seeking to establish the possibility of intersubjectivity, he postulates a common psychic stream of undifferentiated experiences, he does so initially on the basis of certain phenomena of identification (Gefühlen). Yet it is difficult to understand in his phenomenological descriptions what he means by psychic experiences which present themselves as not readily assignable either to myself or to the other, as for example happens "where we are in doubt as to which of the two it is." For this doubt is certainly a reflective act and, as Schutz (1962:170) observes, my turning toward the stream of experiences (i.e., adopting the reflective attitude) immediately reveals this stream to be through and through the stream of my experiences. There is no such thing as an indifferent (in terms of belonging) experience given to me (Stein 1964:27-8).

Such doubt as Scheler speaks of indicates actually the contrary of what he is seeking to prove. Does not any experience whatsoever pertain to an individual self who "has" it? An experience cannot possibly be presented to me in such a manner that it is somehow excluded from my consciousness, or if it can, any notion of differentiation between my consciousness and another becomes rather absurd. Scheler seems

to fall into a kind of monism in which experiencing subjects cannot be distinguished as separate entities simply because they may have an experience in common. But if the other and I do have an experience in common, then it is precisely not identical. Sympathetic identification with another's feelings implies neither the identity of the two experiences nor of the experiencers themselves. For this reason Scheler ought to have been more careful in his descriptions. When he suggests that we certainly perceive the other's joy, doubt, anger, etc. there is no hint that this perception is different at all from the other's perception of these feeling states. This unbalanced emphasis on the similarity of perceiving my psychic level and that of another person further opens him to charges of monism. Strictly speaking, we do not perceive the other's joy or doubt--we do not have a consciousness of these feeling states but rather a consciousness "of" or about them. Scheler's reification of such emotional states harkens back to that familiar Cartesian notion of some homunculus who "has" these experiences, and obscures the contribution he makes to a truly descriptive cause. It would be, it seems to me, far less contentious and still adequate to say that we perceive the other's expressions of these states or that we perceive him as angry, doubtful, happy, etc., that is, as "in" these states rather than as "having" them. In this way we retain the content of meaning and signification present in intersubjective perception without implying dubious meta-physical substrata.

What appears at the phenomenological level to lie behind the positing of a psychic stream of undifferentiated experiences is a confusion on Scheler's part of experiencing itself with the origin of experience. Indeed, reflection, aside from the fact that it reveals a "belonging to me" certitude with respect to the former, also generates a skepticism regarding the latter. That not all experience is self-originated is evident, for example, from our use of language which both structures and generates our experiences but which nevertheless is given to us as members of the linguistic community. But this situation by no means eliminates the quality of individual appropriation of that language and hence of individual experiencing. Granted that an infant is initially thoroughly extroverted, lives primarily "in" or "through" the experiences of others and does not differentiate experience as its own (Piaget 1932). In spite of its strong plausibility this claim remains, from a phenomenological perspective, hypothetical; the evidence for it is not recoverable in memory nor accessible to reflection, since such differentiation is the condition of both memory and reflection. Thus Scheler's psychic stream, even if actual, can receive its support only from the empirical sciences of child psychology and cultural anthropology. On a number of occasions, and particularly in connection with his psychic stream, Scheler has been accused of "overstepping the limits of pure phenomenological research" (Owens 1970:100). Considering, however, that he conceived of phenomenology in

terms quite different from Husserl, indeed seeing it as a means for metaphysics--a point I made in the introduction to this essay--it would perhaps be more correct to say not that Scheler oversteps the limits of pure phenomenology, but that the phenomenological evidence he seeks is simply absent.

On the other hand, there is much in Scheler's account of intersubjective perception that constitutes genuine advance in this theme. Within a phenomenological framework Scheler may be unable to provide the objective correlate for the priority of knowledge of others over self-knowledge. But only phenomenological purists will frown upon his borrowing of evidence from other disciplines. Indeed phenomenology would do well, in my estimate, to further such exchanges--something it is perhaps all too often hesitant to do. There is no reason a priori not to consider the results of child psychology or cultural anthropology; in a sense they do serve as a certain antidote to the rationalist dogma of the primacy of self-knowledge. They also suggest that the problematic of intersubjectivity cannot be adequately understoood in all its dimensions without considering along developmental lines both the psychological and sociological dimensions of human existence.

Establishing the intimate connection between inner perception and the lived-body clearly shows the inadequacy of the naive differentiation between inner and outer perception according to a spatial division of what is inside or outside an individual. The genuine advance of this position is that

it opens the possibility of viewing the other as a far more comprehensive totality, rather than as a mere facade behind which presumably lurks a mind. Here some of that traditional interiority is "externalized," as aspects of reality become perceived in such overlapping fashion that the determination of their meaning cannot be entirely conditioned by such dry-cut spatial divisions. In introducing the factor of expression Scheler shows that much more is immediately given in intersubjective perception than has been allowed by the prevalent formulations. We do not perceive isolated physical units to which we impute through analogy or empathy another human life. The other is given far more directly than is generally assumed by technical accounts, and even if we do not accept the metaphysical underpinnings Scheler gives to this process, there is no reason to discount expression as its proper medium.

Finally, although Scheler makes no mention of this anywhere, there is a purely formal reason why direct and positive knowledge of the existence of others must be a fact. If there is doubt as to the existence of others, it exists because we come in contact with some entities which appear to be human while they are not (e.g., robots, dummies, mannequins). But there must be that in intersubjective knowledge which allows this appearance/reality distinction to appear; the ground of this distinction cannot itself fall on the side of contact with the apparent. Any deception or doubt--and such skepticism appears to lie behind analogy and

empathy as accounts of intersubjectivity in both the rationalist-empiricist and transcendental phenomenological formulations--can be judged as such only in terms of genuine actual, and not merely possible, contact with a real other.

Conclusion

In concluding this part of my essay I wish first to convey the sense in which the efforts of Husserl and Scheler are complementary. I will then, on the basis of some fundamental differences between the two philosophers, point to several directions in which research could enhance the understanding of intersubjectivity at the level of justification of our conviction that others exist. These directions were all explicitly or implicitly touched upon. Regretfully, it is beyond the scope of this essay to pursue in depth any one or all of them.

Phenomenology successfully served notice that the claims of positivism and associationism to understand human experience adequately could only be made at the expense of a reification of that experience itself. For this reason alone we can discount the classical theories of analogical inference and projective empathy which, as Scheler correctly saw, put us within a psychical prison where understanding is entirely conditioned by the metaphysics of causality.

Still, in spite of the difficulties associated with empathy and analogy, in their formulations as intentional acts or processes they may yet find their place in intersubjective constitution. Husserl's notions of analogizing

apprehension and apperceptive transfers cannot be entirely disregarded; these acts are certainly frequently (though by no means always) performed in intersubjective experiencing. What should be recognized, however, is that "the validity of the argument that the other is given to me in terms of empathy is contingent upon whether or not he is given in a societal form of togetherness shared by adults" (Frings 1978b:248). If this position is correct, then Husserl's analysis of intersubjectivity would be an account at a primordial level only if togetherness in a "society" is taken as a primordial social form. On Scheler's view, as Frings emphasizes, "society" is only one and in the course of human development a relatively late form of togetherness. What precedes societal experience is what Scheler calls life-communal experience found in such forms of togetherness as the family, the tribe, clan, early youth, etc. (1973a:559-60). Within these latter groups men experience each other directly through the bondage of blood, tradition, and mutual trust; each has a natural immediate understanding of the other's expressions, unmediated by the "physicality" of the actual organs involved in conveying or perceiving that expression.

Things are quite different, though, in the case of "society." Here the other is given with far more detachment, and this for two reasons. First, the organization of and interaction within society requires a high degree of rationalization. The arrangements involved in attaining common goals, and in co-existence generally, are not naturally

understood but must be worked out and thematized among the cooperating members. This mediates or even displaces the natural affective ties, as the other appears under a multitude of symbolic significations co-authored anonymously by the "all" and foreign to the individual subject. Second, and more to the point, the competitive and utilitarian aspects of society provide for an atmosphere in which the other is viewed either as an adversary or a commodity. Natural trust becomes displaced by common suspicion whether others' expressions are genuine and can justify my confidence in them; the motive for verification takes over. It is here that analogizing apprehensions and empathetic intendings do in fact play a significant role. We grasp the size, shape or position of the parts of the other we focus on; we compare these features with our own, imagined or remembered in similar situations, or look for resemblences with other persons we encountered and can claim to know. Only then do we make judgements as to the truth value of what is perceived, but with a never excluded possibility of skepticism.

Husserl's analysis of intersubjectivity is not so much wrong then, as simply ignorant of the sociological dimension of man and his various forms of togetherness. Husserl does not consider subjectivity developmentally, but rather from the perspective of adulthood and as an ideality. All this is of course understandable in view of the transcendental project's aim to grasp in experiencing precisely that which transcends the spatio-temporal differences among us. But

the fact remains that through his general neglect of research into our psycho-social dimension Husserl missed perhaps the most valuable line of inquiry necessary for an adequate understanding of intersubjectivity.

A reexamination of basic metaphors on which conceptualizations of cognitive processes are based would, I believe, be another highly pertinent project. William Sadler (1969:369) suggests that one significant reason for the difficulties encountered by Western approaches to intersubjectivity is that they are riveted to visual imagery. In contrasting visual and auditory experience, he notes that our interpretation of auditory space is quite different from space interpreted visually. Auditory space transcends the limits of visual space; it is characterized by interpenetration and lacks the characteristics of visual space, i.e. having parts, three dimensions, setting limits or barriers (150-1). Similar to auditory experience, and in contrast to vision, touch is also a participatory experience. Visual experience is an experience of distance or detachment and of a lack of experiential reciprocity, while touch is more of an experienced reciprocity. Touch imbeds man in the world and recovers him from his "absence" in the object.

Earlier I pointed out that the ecstatic impulse which Scheler posits at the ground of all experience is a major determining factor for his accounting of intersubjectivity in terms quite different from Husserl. For Scheler the primordial experience of reality is not a "knowing of" of

a consciousness gazing with detachment at its objects, but above all, an ecstatic "having of" reality through vital contact (1973b:324). For this reason intersubjectivity is accounted for in man's outpouring and immersion in the field of expression, that is, in direct encounter, rather than in the interiority of consciousness.

That Husserl chooses the latter route should not come as a big surprise. For Husserl's descriptions are based on a view of knowing as seeing. He takes visual perception as the basic operation of consciousness since it satisfies the requirements of the transcendental attitude--the perfect givenness of objects to consciousness. Reciprocally, the turning for adequate evidence to consciousness is derivative of and motivated by the "inadequacy" inherent in vision, this "inadequacy" stemming from the fact that vision is always perspectival and at any given moment only a profile of the thing is given to me. It is precisely because inner experience does not present itself in profiles that Husserl grants it its import. The consequences are a "withdrawal" into a transcendental subjectivity and a complementary strict concept of perception bordering on a perceptual realism. Intersubjectivity cannot be attained directly on account of both this "withdrawal" and because expression, in order to be grasped in its form as a gestalt, demands a less reifying apprehension.

It appears then that knowing as touching or hearing is better suited than knowing as seeing to account for

intersubjectivity at the primordial level.[1] Again, my aim is not to discredit Husserl but to point out the influence that different modes of apprehending the world may exert on the understanding of and accounting for intersubjectivity. It is unquestionably true that in Occidental culture "vision" has served as the dominant metaphor for cognition to the exclusion of recognizing the possibilities inhering in other modes of world-apprehension or in their interpenetration.[2] This suggests that full comprehension of intersubjectivity requires an examination of all metaphors used for knowing and an explication of the basic experiences that underlie them.

Finally, taking cue from Scheler's discussion on the intimate link between experience and expression and the latter's role in interpersonal perception, most useful would be a typology of experiences in terms of the alterations they effect on the lived-body. It is possible that Husserl neglected human expression (at the perceptual level) and argued for indirect access to the other, as much because of his rigorous adherence to perception in a strict sense as because of the cognitive states he usually considered in paradigmatic situations. Clearly the changes effected in the lived-body in the awareness of the "cerebral" concepts of logic or mathematics are much less perceptible than the changes effected in awareness of emotional states. Emotional states are far more extended and partake more of the bodily sphere. For this reason they are much more easily

apprehended and provide greater certitude about the other's humanness than some abstract thought of his.

Nevertheless, our conviction of the presence of abstract thought processes in others suggests that there is a whole range of intersubjectively shared experiences with a varied degree of perceptibility and a multitude of modes in which they are shared. While some psychic states are indeed immediately manifest through expression, others cannot be reached except through analogizing transfers of the type proposed by Husserl; the conviction of the existence of these latter states belongs more to the inferential rather than the intuitive order. Granted these states cannot be involved, as Scheler shows, in the apprehension of the other at the primordial or founding level. Still, their apprehension contributes to my belief that this other whom I face is indeed like me, since they too partake of the defining characteristics of what makes him human. The typology of the kind proposed here would clarify the distinct possibilities of intersubjective sharing pertinent to different levels or aspects of human experience.

PART TWO

KNOWING THE ESSENCE OF OTHERS

Introduction

As the issue of justifying the recognition that I am not alone in the world but co-exist with others attains adequate resolution, that of understanding personal identity assumes increasing significance. Scheler believes that this understanding is possible only through such axiological acts as love and sympathy, i.e. acts which expressly address themselves to the value dimension of each person. This position is a synthesis of three distinct themes in Scheler's philosophy: 1) the conception of man and the theory of personality in which this conception culminates, 2) the notion of an emotional intuition of value, and 3) a theory of love. The three sections in this part of the essay are corresponding clarifications of these themes.

In Section 6 I attempt to delineate what constitutes for Scheler personal identity. I begin here witih an exposition of the argument of Scheler's last work Man's Place in Nature (hereafter Man's Place). I do this for two reasons. First, the book addresses itself most directly to the question "What is Man?". Second, it is an explicitly metaphysical work. We can expect it then to offer insight into Scheler's ontological commitments implicit in his descriptions of man elsewhere.

Scheler's procedure in Man's Place is to look for what

we have in common with the organic and animal worlds and then to isolate the essential point of our distinction. Though he couches his answer in terms of metaphysical principles of vital impulse or drive (Lebensdrang) and spirit (Geist), it is clear that the basis of our distinction from animals lies in intentionality and consciousness's capacity to objectify its surrounding environment. These attributes pertain to a sphere in man Scheler calls "person."

The obvious debt owed here to phenomenology, as well as the sketchiness of the argument of Man's Place lead directly to the theory of person as presented in Formalism in Ethics and Non-Formal Ethics of Values (hereafter Formalism), an earlier phenomenological work. Stated in the context of a response to Kantian ethics, the person on this theory is a unity of essentially different intentional acts, a being living its life through diverse acts and in "objectivities" other than merely rational ones. The person is certainly also more than a self-conscious being, since not all act differences are included in self-consciousness. In this ignoring of rationality and self-consciousness, Scheler thus rejects the two main criteria that have figured in most philosophical characterizations of personhood from Boethius, through Locke, to contemporary times.

Since intentional acts cannot themselves be objectified, crucial, above all, is the dynamic and unobjectifiable nature of the person himself. This anti-substantialist emphasis ensures that the identity of persons can be established

neither through the identity of their bodies nor through a set of memories--historically the most common criteria for identity--but lies rather in the "qualitative direction" of intentional acts. This is also Scheler's answer to the paradox of sameness and change, a perennial issue in discussions of personal identity. As for knowing the person as a non-object, it is limited to a co-presence with him and a "co-performance" of his acts; this is a knowledge provided by participation.

These purely "theoretical" descriptions of person are subsequently complemented by descriptions from ethical contexts. Here the most important conclusion reached by Scheler is that each person is fundamentally not a thinking being but a loving being who lives most concretely in feelings or acts of objective-value-apprehension. Moreover, man's affective dimension is asserted to have a definite structure with its own laws somewhat like those of logic. All this is reflected objectively in a set of values by which each person lives. This is also the "medium" in which personal identity is to be defined and sought most concretely.

Section 7 establishes the possibility of apprehending the objective correlate of person's affective structure by examining Scheler's ideas on the cognitivity of emotions and the objectivity of values. Since the person cannot be given as an object, examined also are the modes of co-presence through which he becomes manifest at a specific level of value-being.

Toward the end of Section 7 I note the limitations of co-presence (or co-performance) with the other as to his givenness as person. With these limitations in mind, in Section 8 I look at Scheler's theory of love as a creative movement and how, as such, it renders possible the adequate apprehension of personal reality.

The conclusion discusses some of the philosophically problematic issues inherent in knowledge of personal essence through love.

Section 6

Scheler's Conception of Man

6.1 "Man's Place in Nature": Toward An Outline Of What Is Man

Man's Place in Nature is both a culmination of a long process of systematic reflection on Scheler's part in the philosophy of man[1] and a condensed summary of his intended but never published Philosophical Anthropology (Philosophische Anthropologie). The latter, understood also as a thematic study, was to be the beginning of a special autonomous philosophical discipline that would provide the framework in which anthropological issues could adequately be formulated and pursued.

This of course does not mean that systematic reflection on man began with Scheler; it is just that he wished to give a definite direction and adequate scope to all anthropological studies--a task he considered necessary for both theoretical and practical political reasons.[2] It was Scheler's judgement that the three prevalent and competing conceptions of man--theological (man as God's creation), Greek philosophical (man as a being endowed with "reason"), and modern scientific (man as a recent product of evolution different only in degree of biological complexity from other animals)--obscure as much as they clarify, alternatively displacing each other in the

mind of layman and theoretician alike. A unified conception of man is lacking. At no time in history, notes Scheler, has man been so much of a problem to himself as he is now.

What concretely was the intent of the new philosophical anthropology? In an essay "Man and History" (written two years prior to the publication of Man's Place), Scheler states that philosophical anthropology is to be

> a basic science which investigates the essence and essential constitution of man, his relationship to the realms of nature (organic, plant, and animal life) as well as the source of all things, man's metaphysical origin as well as his physical, psychic, and spiritual origins in the world, the forces and powers which move man and which he moves, the fundamental trends and laws of his biological, psychic, cultural, and social evolution, along with their essential capabilities and realities (1958:65).

However clear he is about the aims and content of philosophical anthropology, Scheler remains somewhat ambiguous with respect to its methodology. On the one hand he understands "essences" in phenomenological terms, so that in seeking to delineate the essence of man anthropological studies clearly imply the use of the phenomenological method. On the other hand, he does not clarify whether these studies are to be judged within the context of phenomenology, or whether evidence from other disciplines such as biology and genetic psychology is to carry equal weight. In the end Scheler appears to favour the second alternative--certainly if we are to base our judgement on Man's Place.

One additional caveat concerns the status of the new

discipline. The increasing preoccupation with philosophical anthropology toward the end of Scheler's life reflected his conviction that all philosophical problems could find their common denominator in the question "What is man and what is his status in being?" Within philosophy, therefore, philosophical anthropology would carry a status similar to that given by Aristotle to metaphysics, a status of a first discipline. Indeed, philosophical anthropology would remain intimately linked with metaphysics, as both the description of its content and the thrust of the above unifying question already indicate.

This link is established concretely in Scheler's thought through a non-thematized (from an anthropological perspective) metaphysical decision that man is a "microcosm" of being. That is, man is an entity comprising all essential types of being--material, living, and spiritual--so that, through insight into him, we can discern the real attributes of being in general and formulate the ultimate principles of the "macrocosm." Thus metaphysics becomes a "meta-anthropolgy." (The apparent disharmony between this program and the use of the phenomenological method dissipates if we remember that Scheler ultimately puts that method in the service of metaphysics.)

Scheler introduces the argument of Man's Place by noting a deceptive ambiguity inherent in the concept "man." That concept is subordinate to the concept "animal," while simultaneously signifying in all cultures something radically

different: a being whose specificity and situation are incomparable to any other. The legitimacy of this second meaning of "man," the essence giving man's being different, becomes then for Scheler the real theme of his investigations in Man's Place.

Scheler first situates man within the "overall structure of the biological-psychological world" (1961:8). Here he is guided by a basic principle that "the limits of psychic life coincide with the limits of the organic life itself" (8). Considering plant life as the limiting case of organic life at one end of the spectrum, Scheler thus asserts that the lowest form of psychic life is a vital feeling, drive, or impulse (Gefühlsdrang) devoid of consciousness, sensation, or representation. Directed wholly outward toward its medium the plant best shows the ecstatic character of this drive.

The second form of the objective stages of psychic life is classified under instinct. Instinctual behaviour is the first mode of differentiation and specialization in the psychic process. It is: 1) teleological 2) rhythmic, 3) typical, i.e. responsive to recurring situations necessary for species survival, 4) innate, and 5) hereditary. No representations, images, or ideas function in instinctual knowledge. It is rather a "feeling of value-charge resistances which are differentiated as attractive or repulsive according to these value impressions" (21). In instinct one also finds an individual unity of foreknowledge and action such that

whatever is anticipated is never more than what pertains to the immediately next stage of an action.

Associative behaviour is correlative to the third stage of psychic life. Manifesting itself in the conditioned reflex (and possible due to the separation of an organism's sensory and motor complexes) it is the result of a learning process and is modifiable on the basis of quantifiable reinforcements. Present in all animals, associative behaviour reaches its highest degree of development in man.

The fourth and final stage comprises practical intelligence. It is seen, for example, in an animal's problem-solving response to a novel situation. Implied in this response is an intelligent grasp of the new situation as well as a limited capacity for deliberate choice. In contrast to the "reproductive" character of associative behaviour practical intelligence is itself productive and carries a more extended mental anticipation. In spite of this, Scheler views practical intelligence as subordinate to the vital interests of the organism.

Now insofar as man is an animal all of these life-forms are incorporated in him. There is of course a certain specificity about him, even as animal. In man, for example, is found the most disproportionate conversion of assimilated materials for the creation of nervous substance, since a very large part of these materials is transformed into purely functional brain energy. Man is also capable of expanding his milieu (Umwelt), while other animals are incapable of

changing their environment to any significant degree. Still, these differentiating characteristics of man are, Scheler contends, of a purely quantitative nature. For adhering to his original premise that the limits of organic and psychic life coincide, he must conclude that the psychic dimension of man exists in strict relation to his physiological processes. From Scheler's perspective "the physiological and psychic processes are strictly identical in an ontological sense; they differ only as phenomena" (74). There exists one and the same life process with a dual aspect. Rejecting any notion of some special substratum in consciousness and traditionally called soul, Scheler suggests that the difference between "soul" and body as a physical entity arises when we examine this life process under either its internal (psychological) or external (physiological) aspect (74).

As an answer to the traditional soul-body problem this vitalistic monism runs counter to Cartesian dualism, counter to the monism of mechanistic materialism, and counter to any spiritual monism.[3] But while Scheler may indeed avoid extremes on this issue, his own stand, as will soon be apparent, is determined less on the basis of anthropological or phenomenological analyses than on stated metaphysical assumptions.

Whatever judgement one may pass on this position, Scheler makes it quite clear that it is not at the level of life or vital reality that the essential distinction between man and animal can be made. This distinction must obviously transcend the capacity for choice and improvisation predicated of

practical intelligence. Indeed, we find him saying:

> The new principle [of distinction] transcends what we call "life" in the most general sense. It is not a stage of the particular mode of life called psyche, but a principle opposed to life as such, even to life in man. Thus it is a genuinely new phenomenon which cannot be derived from the natural evolution of life (36).

In Part 2 of Man's Place Scheler affirms the existence of the new principle under the notion of "spirit." The latter not only includes the concept of reason, but in addition to conceptual thought encompasses the "intuition of essences and a class of voluntary and emotional acts such as kindness, love, remorse, reverence, wonder, bliss, despair, and free decision" (36). The center of action in which spirit appears within a finite mode of being Scheler calls "person," in sharp contrast to all functional vital centers which from an inner perspective may be called "psychic centers" or "ego" when reference is made to such a center in human beings. "Person" is then for Scheler a technical term pertaining to that level of man which qualitatively distinguishes him from anything else in the vital and inorganic realms; whereas, in order to avoid conceptual ambiguities, the term "man" is left to signify the total reality of human existence, i.e. physiological, vital, psychical, and spiritual.

The progressive delineation of the reality of spirit centers around three key characteristics. The first of these

is spirit's "existential liberation from the organic world--its freedom and detachability from the bondage and pressure of life" (37). That is, in relation to his environment and the psycho-physical dimension of his existence, man as spiritual being exhibits essentially an independence which manifests itself as an unlimited openness to the world. Such openness to world and independence from a milieu (Umwelt) is made possible by spirit's capacity of transforming the primary centres of resistance to man's vital drives into "objects." In contrast, the animal remains "ecstatically" immersed in the milieu. Man as spirit grasps then the qualities, being-such, or essences of objects. Spirit's openness to world is correlative to its standing before an infinite field of intuitions and "essences," a field incommensurably larger than that of "things" of (immediate) environment. Scheler sums up all this curtly: "Spirit is objectivity, or the determination of the objective nature of things" (37).

The second essential characteristic of man as spirit is his capacity to objectify his own physiological and psychological states, every psychic experience and every vital function. "World" then is not merely an expanded version of the external environment but also includes the objectifiable inner dimension of man. "World" pertains equally to self-consciousness, a new act of centering one's existence.

The third essential attribute of man as spirit is his

non-objectifiability. Spirit's transcending function which enables man to go beyond his own organism (by transforming everything in to an "object," thereby giving it "worldly" status) is such that man as spirit surpasses himself. He is not in the world as an object is in the world. Here Scheler agrees with Kant. The center of objectifying acts cannot itself be subject to the conditions of objectivity:

> Spirit is the only being incapable of becoming an object. It is pure actuality. It has its being only in and through the execution of its acts. The center of spirit, the person, is not an object or a substantial kind of being, but a continuously self-executing, ordered structure of acts. The person is only in and through it acts (47).

Scheler completes the picture of spirit's reality by stressing that in essence spirit is radically different from and opposing life and indeed completely powerless. Spirit is also supremely individual.

The expressly metaphysical context in which the above descriptions of spirit are set should not detract from their obvious debt to phenomenology. For their ultimate source appears to lie unambiguously in an intentional view of consciousness and the concept of "categorial intuition" which Scheler, like Heidegger, appropriated from Husserl.[4] In Man's Place this intuition reappears as "ideation." The latter, Scheler suggests, is distinct from all practical intelligence and technical knowledge in that its grasp of the essential structures of the world occurs independently of the number of observations and inductive inferences.[5]

This, along with the fact that ideation "withdraws" us from our surroundings, in a sense de-actualizing them, enables one to conceive of it as an "ascetic" act in which the primitive sense of reality given in the phenomena of resistance to vital drives is "cancelled." Herein lies the meaning of spirit's "existential liberation from the pressure of life."

The meaning of the powerlessness of spirit, and the sense of its opposition to and essential difference from life become also intelligible through a reference to phenomenology and its view of consciousness. These attributes of spirit, as A. R. Luther shows, clearly ensue from a phenomenological contrast of intentionality with organic and inorganic reality:

> To say that spirit is essentially without power or force is not merely to distinguish spirit from vital impetus or basic drive, which is interiorly directed and blind power or force, but to disclose spirit as it <u>is</u>. Spirit is not power or force, and cannot be power or force because spirit is spirit, which is to say, not an object or a thing, hence, not circumscribable or measurable or observable as such. This does not however, mean that spirit as such is ineffective; it means only that spirit cannot "force" or "push" or "resist" because spirit is no-thing, and no-thing cannot force or push or resist (1974:18).

While the premise of coincidence of the limits of organic and psychic life grounds Scheler's psycho-physical monism (of body and soul), intentionality, intuition of essences, and capacity for objectification lead him to posit the metaphysical dualism of life and spirit. In Part 3 of <u>Man's Place</u> Scheler elaborates on the relationship between

these radically different and autonomous principles. From an anthropological perspective this is a description of our concrete existential situation.

Spirit, Scheler has claimed, in "essence" opposes life and is powerless. In "reality," however, it must stand in close dependence on life. Scheler links here the processes of ideation and sublimation, suggesting that only through the "ascesis" of ideation and the concommitant withdrawal of energy from vital drives can spirit acquire any energy for itself and come "alive." At the same time, to safeguard the autonomy of each principle, and especially that of spirit, he reaffirms a view that remained constant throughout his philosophy, one stated in fact considerably earlier in his phenomenological writings: "Between spirit and life, between person and life center we discern no unity of <u>substance</u> but only a bond of dynamic causality" (1954:76).

The analysis of spirit as powerless and its bond with life as nonsubstantial contradicts at once a "classical" and a "negative" view on spirit. To strengthen and clarify his own position Scheler subjects both views to a brief critique.

The classical view holds that "spirit," "mind," or "reason," as the highest forms of being in the universe, constitute also being's most powerful forms. Scheler disagrees with this "unproven hypothesis"; indeed, the opposite seems to be the case. In anticipation of the atomic age he suggests that the most powerful forces inhere in the centres of energy in the inorganic world. And if Scheler's

metaphysics is ultimately a "meta-anthropology" his position is not surprising. Clearly our lowest drives assert and exercise themselves most powerfully, while the existence of the higher levels is precariously fragile. What Scheler concedes as the truth of the classical view is its insistence on the autonomy of spirit.

As for the negative theory, it states that spirit is only a product of sublimation or repression of vital drives. On this view--held principally by Schopenhauer, Ahlsberg, and Freud, among others--spirit is not autonomous but differs only in degree from these drives. Scheler agrees that this theory, unlike the classical one, gives life it's due, but points to a legitimate difficulty. What is it that causes the sublimation or repression of vital drives? The negative theories appear to beg the question. Inevitably they presuppose the existence of an autonomous psychic center that initiates these processes but are unable to account for it. For Scheler it is not sublimation of vital drives that produces spirit but rather spirit which somehow effects the sublimation.

Still, how is one to conceive the non-substantial linkage between ideation effected by spirit and the process of sublimation of, and withdrawal of energy from, vital drives? How is the originally powerless spirit capable of repressing the all powerful forces of life? Scheler offers that spirit does this through "direction" which consists of "withdrawing from the opposing vital impulses the images necessary for

action" and "guidance," a process of "presenting ideas and values which are then realized through the impulses" (1961:62).

From this we can safely assume, I think, that "direction" and "guidance" are based on consciousness's intentional relation to real and imaginary objects. How and why these mechanisms "lure the drives with a bait of appropriate images" (62) Scheler does not say. He provides virtually no descriptions exploring the manifold transformations and dynamic interactions between life and spirit. Moreover, there are certain inconsistencies. Recognizing the potential controversy of a powerless spirit initiating any activity whatsoever, Scheler at times writes as if spirit after all did possess beside intentionality some energy, as in an act of pure will.

To say that Scheler's solution is sketchy and incomplete would be a vast understatement. The reason for this is two-fold. First, Man's Place is a highly condensed unsystematic work attempting hastily to synthesize large amounts of diverse material with a few grand strokes. Second, and more to the point, Scheler himself did not appear to be entirely satisfied with the formulation of his solution; the tenuous nature of the book's last pages gives ample proof of this. Indeed, it would not be entirely inappropriate to suggest that in the end there is more faith than anything else involved in what turns out to be merely a hunch stated in grand terms. Unfortunately, Scheler never lived to pursue it further in the announced works on metaphysics and anthropology.

This completes the sketch of the argument of Man's Place. I began with it since of all of Scheler's works this book poses most directly the question "What is man?". Moreover, I hoped that its expressly metaphysical context would provide clues to ontological commitments implicit in various descriptions of the human phenomenon we find dispersed elsewhere. Unfortunately, Scheler's ambitious question is not matched by an adequate response. The answer provided is nothing more than an outline for a more systematic and total study. Indeed, without reference to his other writings--a reference he himself suggests as necessary (1961:97)--the position taken in Man's Place remains all too fragmentary and hardly defensible.

It is in the writings of Scheler's phenomenological period, notably in Formalism and Sympathy, that concrete and detailed descriptions of such characteristics of spirit as individuality, actuality, and non-objectifiability are to be found. The theory of person expounded in Formalism, a work written fifteen years earlier, is without doubt the basis for positive metaphysical descriptions of spirit, and hence the basis for any consideration of the essence of man. To this theory I now turn.

6.2 The Theoretical Conception of Person

In Part 2, Chapter 6 of Formalism Scheler provides his reader with the most detailed description of his conception of person. In contrast to Man's Place, where the findings of

the diverse mixture of natural science, speculation, and phenomenology are raised to metaphysical status, Formalism is methodologically a far more rigorous work throughout which its author maintains, for the most part, a descriptive attitude. As I have earlier sketched Scheler's notion of phenomenology, my introduction to his theory of person will be limited here to noting the context of its formulation.

Above all, Formalism is a work on ethics. Throughout Scheler is continually engaged in a critique of, dialogue with, and response to Kant and his rational ethics. This is an intensive effort, whose aim is to readmit "emotions" back into the philosophical discourse on ethics. Opposing Kant's insistence on the validity of the moral judgement as based on subjective conformity to a formal law, Scheler postulates an objective order of values as the authentic object of intuition of the moral subject. This intuition, he suggests, is at bottom emotional rather than intellectual. For this reason the theory of person in Formalism begins with a critique of and is meant to eventually replace Kant's "rational person" (Vernuftperson)--the unknown logical subject of rational activity. In addition, then, to emphasizing the radical difference between man's vital and spiritual levels and the irreducibility and autonomy of the latter in particular--this being the main purpose of the later analyses of Man's Place--in Formalism Scheler aims as much, if not more, to expose human affectivity as a most significant, indeed essential dimension of the spiritual sphere. In short, he

categorically rejects the attempt of rationalism or any other philosophy to define the human person solely in terms of reason or rational activity.

A phenomenological reflection upon the multiplicity and diversity of our intentional experiences compels Scheler to introduce the notion of person. What, he asks, gives unity to the diverse and essentially different intentional acts of internal and external perception, voluntary acts, acts of judgement, representation, love, hate, preference, affective perception, intellectual acts, etc.? In Kant the problem of unity of acts performed by an individual is resolved through the notion of an intellectual "I" accompanying diverse acts. But for Scheler the ego of transcendental apperception is too thin, abstract, and insufficient; it pertains to the effecting agent of rational activity only. Thus, to the above question he answers that it is the "person [who] is precisely that unity which exists for acts for all possible <u>essential differences</u> insofar as these acts are thought to be executed" (1973a:382-3). What does this mean?

As beings who live in many different modes we "are" diverse (logical) subjects of essentially different acts. Appearing fundamentally identical--in effect it is the same "I" who performs now an act of will, now an intellectual act--these subjects are nevertheless different precisely as subjects of different acts. How then can we reconcile the fact of these diverse subjects, considered not in respect of their different essences but as existent or effecting their

acts and existing as a unity, if not by affirming that "it belongs to the nature of the differences of acts to be in a person and only in a person"? (383).

Where there is no diversity of acts the question of person therefore does not even arise. Nor for the same reason can the person be defined simply as a self-conscious being, unless all possible types of acts are contained in this consciousness "of" itself. Subjects of single activity, be it rational or any other, remain only logical and not existential subjects. This is why Kant's Vernunftperson is vacuous.

What then is most significant for the subsequent development of the notion of person is that "the different logical subjects of essentially different acts can only be in a form of unity insofar as we reflect on the possible 'being' of these subjects and not merely on their nature" (383). It is this necessity of reflecting upon the existence of these diverse "performers" (and not merely on their nature) that leads Scheler directly to the following definition: "The person is the concrete and essential unity of being of acts of different essences which in itself precedes all essential act differences i.e., inner and outer perception, feeling, loving, hating, thinking, etc. The being of the person is therefore the 'foundation' of all essentially different acts" (383).[6]

Being, existence, and essence are all equated here in a phenomenological sense. The intuited existence of the person

as a core and source of diverse intentional or meaningful activity is the essential condition of the grasp of any of his particular acts. From the intimate link between the being of unity and essential diversity of acts--this being the essence of person--it follows that for an essence of an act to be given as concrete (i.e., as pertaining to an existing rather than abstract agent) a reference to the essence of the person must always be presupposed. The latter is co-intended and co-given in considering any concrete act whatsoever. In other words, any act is concrete only by virtue of belonging to the essence of this or that individual person. The person, Scheler insists, is not an "empty 'point of departure' of acts"; he is rather a concrete being without reference to whom full and adequate intuition of the essence of any act would be impossible (384). (This also means that implicit in the apprehension of any concrete act is the presence of all act-essences that are properly of the person, i.e. inner and outer intuition, thinking, feeling, etc. [386].)

To come back to Scheler's essential definition of person, we must now examine the nature of the relationship between the person and his acts--a relationship clearly implied by such terms as "precedes" and "foundation." Here we encounter the most obscure and problematic aspects of Scheler's theory, some of which we can appreciate if we recognize that in spite of insisting that a separation between the unity of several acts and the acts themselves is not phenomenologically given, he nevertheless wants to delineate an essential background

against which particular acts become intelligible.

At first glance Scheler's intent appears clear. The person as a unity of being of intentional acts cannot be a "thing" or "substance" with a permanent structure and properties.[7] Acts by their very nature are dynamic and changing and it is precisely in this "medium" that the person is "contained." For Scheler the person is and experiences himself only as a being who executes acts and is no sense "behind" or "above" them like a fixed point: "It belongs to the essence of person to exist and to live solely in the execution of intentional acts" (390). Moreover, "the whole person is contained in every fully concrete act and the whole person 'varies' in and through every act" (385).

These statements suggest that Scheler favours an "actualist" interpretation of person. Such an interpretation, however, would be difficult to reconcile with the thesis of the person as "preceding" and "founding" the essentially different acts. In addition, any difference between person and acts would be eliminated, while an explanation of personal identity would prove virtually impossible. Indeed, in another set of statements Scheler himself appears to condemn the actualist position, suggesting that person cannot be reduced to a mere "interconnective complex" of acts; though wholly contained in and varied in and through each act, the person is nevertheless never exhausted in its being, nor "changed" like a thing in any of these acts (385). Scheler is clearly emphasizing here the persistence of that aspect of person as orientated and initiatory source of all acts.

Considering this irreducibility of person to his acts, how then are we to conceive adequately the identity between person as existing only in acts and person as the co-given concrete unity distinct from his acts? The issue, notes Dupuy, is quite problematic:

> The question is embarrassing, since the diverse formulations used by Scheler do not always render the same "tone," and taken literally, they would be even difficult to reconcile. It is obvious that the author is searching to break through between two extremes which are on one hand the idea of a person-substance distinct from his acts, and on the other hand the idea of person as a pure correlation or simple interconnection of acts (1959,1:341-2).[8]

Elsewhere, in Sympathy, Scheler gives expression to such a middle course between substantialism and actualism through use of such terms as "personal-substance," "spiritual act-substance," "unitary substance of all acts that a being effects," and "act-substance" (Actsubstanz) to describe the reality of person. And W.Hartmann offers the following summary of the thrust of Scheler's thinking on person:

> But through all the descriptions the following ideas remain clear: reject every separation of the person and its acts in the sense of substance-accident relation; encounter substantialistic invariability with variability; and still speak meaningfully of a "performer" (1968:254).

One is still left wondering, though, what ultimately is to be made of that "more" which distinguishes from his acts

a being who exists only in their accomplishment. For his part Dupuy states: "There is no alternative but to take recourse . . . in an idea of a form, whose nature is precisely to exist only by virtue of a substance with which it cannot be confounded since it determines that substance" (1959,1:344).[9] Dupuy further compares Scherer's person to a unity of style or an art work, suggesting that when Scheler speaks of an act-substance he wishes to indicate the identity of sense or inspiration, which, immanent in person's different acts, binds one act to another and confers upon their unity an original character. Similarly, A.R.Luther interprets Scheler's person as "an intrinsic coherence of dynamic orientation" (1972:41) and makes an insightful analogy of person with a sentence to justify such an interpretation:

> The meaning of a sentence, for example, is the intrinsic coherence of its individual words. Insofar as all of its words refer one to another, a sentence is a meaningful unity. The referential or intentional character of all the words is "fixed" in the "point" that the words together constitute and express. For this reason a removal of one word destroys the meaning of a sentence, or changes it fundamentally. A sentence, then, is a unique system of relations in which each word functions as a reference to other words. As integral to a sentence, a word is not a word plus a relatedness to other words. The word is the being related to other words in meaningful expression; the word is a reference.
>
> Being a reference or relatedness to other words does not mean, however, that one word or the mere sum of all the words is identical with the meaning of the sentence. The meaning of the sentence is distinct from the words. The meaning of a sentence is a "more than mere words."

> On the other hand, the meaning of a sentence is not separate or somehow apart from the words themselves. The coherence of the sentence is <u>in</u> the words (53-4).

Scheler himself dedicates to this issue few brief remarks, which nevertheless appear to legitimize the interpretations I have presented. Personal identity, he believes, does not require a permanent being but can be retained solely in the "qualitative direction" of person's becoming different in his acts (1973a:385).[10] Expressions making reference to person, such as "form of unity" or "it is the person himself . . . permeating every act with his peculiar character" lend additional support to the above interpretations, with the proviso that "form" is not understood here in a logical or epistemological but rather ontological sense.

As the principle of unity of diverse intentional acts person by no means exhausts all dimensions of human existence. Thus, parellel to the differentiation made between spirit and life in <u>Man's Place</u>, in <u>Formalism</u> we find a strict distinction between the personal and vital-psychical levels of man, or between "person" and "ego," and correlatively between acts and functions.

By functions Scheler understands seeing, hearing, tasting, smelling, vital feeling, etc. These arise out of man's psychophysical level as a <u>reaction</u> directed toward the environment and other men. All functions are functions of the psycho-physical unity which constitutes the ego and necessarily presuppose a lived body and an environment. They are also

facts which occur within phenomenal space-time sphere and are given, along with the ego, as objects in inner intuition or perception.

In marked contrast to functions intentional acts are spontaneously initiated and can never be objectified. Since the person is only in the execution of acts he can a fortiori never be an object either,[11] a fact Scheler never tired of stressing. But if person can never be objectified this immediately raises the question as to his knowability. Scheler's response is that "the only and exclusive kind of givenness of the person is his execution of acts." From this it follows as well that "as long as we look only at the so-called experiences and not their being experienced, the person remains completely transcendent" (386). Concerning other persons, they are experienced in terms of "post-execution" or "co-execution" of acts in togetherness; any objectification of them is nevertheless excluded.

As for the relationship between acts and functions, it can be twofold. First, functions can be objects of acts. Second, they can be that "through" which acts can be directed towards something objectified. An essentially similar judgement can be made with respect to an object now seen, or another time heard. Under no conditions, however, does the person and his acts belong to or partake of the psycho-physical sphere. This is consistent with Scheler's metaphysical position that between spirit and life there exists only a dynamic and not a substantial bond. The occurrence of acts of

the person is "not analogous and parallel to the functional processes of the nervous system, but parallel and analogous to the objective structure of objects and values in the world itself" (1958:28). Scheler summarizes the autonomy of the person vis à vis the psychic-vital sphere by saying that both person and acts are "psychophysically indifferent." By this he means that the personal level is neither something physical, nor psychical, nor psycho-physical, but spiritual.

In ending the exposition of the theoretical conception of person as outlined in Formalism (Chapter 6A), I wish to emphasize that I have so far touched only on what Scheler regards are strictly formal descriptions grounded in the reflection on the unity of essentially different intentional forms. Additional content to the notion of person must now be provided by considering the person in some explicitly ethical contexts, thus allowing us to gain a more concrete picture of what Scheler understands by person. This order of presentation would likely be endorsed, in any case, by Scheler himself. For he admits that ultimately it is his ethics that found the philosophical image of the person, and not vice versa.[12]

Specifically, I will be considering three sub-themes: i) our individuation, ii) our relation to ethical values, and iii) the priority of the affective over the intellectual order within the personal sphere.

6.3 The Person In Ethical Contexts:

i. Person as Individual ii. Person as Bearer of Value iii. Person as a Loving Being

i. Person as Individual

It is at the personal level that Scheler locates the principle of man's individuation. Aligning himself with those philosophers who have considered individuation as a function of total being (Hartmann 1968:255), he declares that the concrete center of spiritual or psycho-physically indifferent acts which constitute the person is already individuated through itself and in itself. This characteristic of person is for Scheler no less important than non-objectifiability and autonomy as compared with the vital level. It signifies his attempt to recover the dimension of uniqueness in every human being.

Person and individuality constitute an essential connection, such that "every man is an individual and therefore a unique being distinct from all others to the same degree that he is a pure person" (1973a:508). This essential connection implies an outright rejection of the natural assumption that a certain core typified as "human nature" is common to all men who in turn become individuals by virtue of particular embodiment as well as particular inherited and acquired psychological traits.

In Formalism the theme of individuation is stated as a defense against Kant's "law-rule" of pure reason and the one-

sided emphasis on universality and general validity. For if the person is defined solely in terms of rational activity--where rational acts are acts corresponding to a certain lawfulness, hence being extra-individual--then the notion "individual person" becomes in fact a contradiction in terms. Indeed, this would be a depersonalization of person, as would also be such views as those of Fichte or Hegel where the person is regarded as a mode or function of an impersonal universal spirit.

The autonomy of the person, i.e. its essential transcendence of the psycho-physical level, implies that the latter level is excluded from human individuation. Such exclusion also follows from the fact that it is the bodily drives and their structure that make up the most general characteristics and processes within us. From Scheler's metaphysical perspective they are identical in an ontological sense with the psychical or ego processes. Thus any attempt to postulate the principle of individuation in the body, in terms of (outer or inner) contents of experience, or in terms of any space-time reference is at bottom, Scheler insists, a confusion of individuation with "singularization" (510). From this perspective, the theme of individuation is restated at length in Sympathy:

> Even if we abstract from the physical and spatio-temporal differences between persons, and from everything which distinguishes the possible contents of their consciousnesses, . . . they always continue to differ in their intrinsic character as concrete act-centers. And they would still do so even

> if their bodies and the entire contents of their consciousnesses could be made to tally exactly. They are indeed the only examples of the independent existences of substances whose individuality is completely self-determined. They cannot be distinguished, like bodies in other respects identical in character, upon spatio-temporal, numerical and quantitative grounds, since as pure act-centers they transcend time and space; . . . they therefore can and must be distinct in their pure character (or personal essence) alone. Physical objects, and bodies even, may be identical in character and yet really distinct owing to differences of spatio-temporal position. But the only ultimate distinction between persons is one of character, i.e. the fact that they are absolute individuals. Schopenhauer's theory of spatio-temporal order as the sole principle of individuation is therefore completely fallacious (1954:65).

Scheler does not offer any strict proofs in support of his thesis of absolute individuality of persons. However, his assertion that absolute individuality belongs to structure of persons is not a tautology; it ensues from phenomenological observation. Persons are absolute individuals because they reveal themselves in this mode. The deeper the "penetration" into another human being "through knowledge and understanding, guided by personal love," the more this other appears as unique, irreplacable, and indispensible--hence individual:

> As knowledge [of the other] progresses from the associative level of the soul to the vital, and from thence to the existence of the spiritual person, the impression of the individual quality grows, increasing by leaps and bounds as each new level is reached, until full individuality is attained (123).

(This progression, incidentally, reveals the Platonic flavour

of Scheler's thought. Man is the inmost personal and therefore individual self, the more he is reduced toward his bodiless being. This impression is amplified when Scheler further declares that at this level the existence of persons as separate entities is given only through their being different in character or essence).

The direct relation between individuality and personality imposes limits as to both describability of the person and communicability between human beings. The penetration into the wholly original personal nature of the other is accompanied by an ever greater difficulty of putting this knowledge into words. The person in his ultimate uniqueness and individuality is not only ineffable or a-rational, but essentially "transintelligible," that is, "eternally transcendent to all possible cognition and valuation of the other" (1973a:569-70) and "essentially impenetrable to understanding" (1954:67). He is encountered in an "awareness of the fact of absolute uniqueness, and of there being a sphere of absolute personal privacy, but with no possibility of adding to those attributes some missing content of understanding" (67).

Absolute incommunicability and privacy pertain to person's "intimate" sphere. Scheler also postulates in person a "social" sphere which is correlative to person's membership in different types of community.[13] The latter sphere is constituted by those acts which can be performed only with the possibility of social response and which by their very

nature are intentionally directed towards others. It is in the performance of such "essentially social acts" as love, sympathy, promising, etc. that the social and the relatively intimate spheres of person become revealed.

ii. Person as Bearer of Values

Another key feature of persons is that they are bearers of moral values. A person is always a "value-person" (Wertperson). By moral values ("good" and "evil") Scheler understands not something that is a content of any act (i.e. as attached to a given object) but rather something that pertains to acts themselves insofar as these realize a positive (higher) or negative (lower) value. As non-intended, moral values "connect" to acts which realize non-moral or objective values.[14] They correspond therefore to what in the theoretical conception of person is defined by Scheler as the qualitative direction of acts, or personal identity (1973a:28).

Since moral values depend on the pursuance of acts, and such pursuance in general constitutes in man the sphere of person, they can be equally well qualified as values of the person. As allocated to the becoming and being of the spiritual individuality of the person, moral values are unique. Thus every person distinguishes himself through his own peculiar and irreplacable axiological character. He has an "individual-personal value-essence" (489).

To say that a person is a bearer of moral values is to underline from an ethical perspective the dynamic nature of

personal being. A person is never a static or finished entity. He exists as a "task" or "vocation" and experiences this as an ought-to-be of a content, an action, a deed, or a project through him. Such obligation is ultimately based on the person's individual value-essence felt under its potential or ideal aspects, i.e. as value intentions immanent to the person himself. All of empirical life as manifested in one's acts, Scheler suggests, develops under the influence of the goal of this value-ideal of the individual person (491). Only in this dynamic context are moral values, as Scheler defines them, intelligible, since only on the basis of insight into what (a person) ought to be, can acts and persons be judged as approximating or not this preferred state of being.

iii. Person as a Loving Being

The last theme to be considered here in connection with Scheler's conception of person is perhaps the most important. It bears closely on the preceding discussion and concerns his preoccupation with our emotions generally, and his granting to them a special significance specifically.

The insistence on a priority of the emotional over other dimensions of human existence is the striking feature of Scheler's philosophy as a whole--a feature his philosophy is undoubtedly most noted for. Whatever modifications it may have undergone, Scheler's philosophy of man remained based on a fundamental tenet according to which man is primarily not a

thinking or willing being but a loving being, an ens amans. "If this is not understood," notes Frings, "Scheler's philosophy as a whole is not understood" (1965:68). In light of what has already been said, neither a priority of the emotional order within the personal sphere, nor the just professed significance of such priority for all of Scheler's thought, should be all that surprising. While in Man's Place we see a fundamental differentiation between the vital and spiritual spheres with particular emphasis on the radical autonomy of spirit, in Formalism, as I noted earlier, Scheler begins his theory of person with a critique of Kant's Vernunftperson. This twofold insistence, affirming an original sphere of spiritual non-psycho-physical acts and opposing the notion of Kant's rational-person, is indeed directly related to Scheler's thinking on emotional activity. For through this insistence he combats the classical prejudice which upholds a division between "reason" and "sensibility," and according to which only rationality pertains to the spiritual while anything in the mind that does not follow the laws of formal logic or is a-rational, (i.e., intuition, feeling, striving, loving, hating, etc.), is regarded as dependent on human physiological organization. This division is completely inadequate, Scheler believes, in conveying the structure of the spiritual.

The exposition on the theoretical conception of person has shown why it is impossible to characterize the latter by one predominating activity, be it rational or any other. Thus Scheler insists that in the autonomous personal sphere there

are, along with and equally original as rational acts, acts of "pure intuiting and feeling, pure loving and hating, pure striving and willing which are as independent of the psycho-physical organization of man as are pure thought, and which at the same time possess their own original laws that cannot be reduced to laws of empirical psychic life" (1973a:254). Not limited to rational activity only, personal being, therefore, realizes itself necessarily through a variety and multiplicity of intentional acts. What however serves as the basis for the assertion of primacy of certain acts, namely emotional, over others?

First, Scheler's phenomenological investigations into ethics lead him to conclude that in all cognition before we know any object in a theoretical or neutral mode we apprehend it in its value aspect, and do so through an emotional intuition:

> All primordial comportment toward the world-- i.e., vis à vis not only the outer but also the inner world, vis à vis not only others but also our own ego--although not precisely "representational" one of perceiving (Wahrnehmung) is nevertheless . . . a primordial emotional comportment of value-ception (Wertnehmung) (197).

Second, and more fundamental for the issue raised here, is Scheler's understanding of knowledge and love in their most formal sense, and the relationship he envisages between the two:

> Knowledge is an existential relationship, and one which presupposes the ontological

> forms of whole and part. It is the relation of participation (Teilhabe) of an existing being in the essence (Sosein) of another existent entity by which no change is brought about in the latter. What is "known" becomes a "part" of the "knower," but without moving in any way from its place or being otherwise transformed. This ontological relationship is not spatial, causal or temporal relationship. "Mens" or "mind" we call the X or the sum and substance of the acts in the "knowing" being by dint of which such a participation is possible; by which a thing, or rather the essence (Sosein)--and only the essence--of an existing thing becomes an "ens intentionale" in contradistinction to a mere existence (Dasein) ("ens reale") which always and necessarily remains outside and beyond the relationship of knowing. The root of this X, the direction-giving moment for the realization of acts which lead to some form of participation (Teilhabe), can only be that self-transcending interest (Teilnahme) in it which, in its most formal sense, we call "love." Knowledge is there, and only there, where the essence (Sosein) is, in strict identity both extra mentem, i.e., in re, and at the same time also in mente--as ens intentionale or as "object" (Deeken 1974:185-6).

No knowledge, no having any part in being is possible then, without the knowing subject's going out of himself to participate in being. Love as effecting this process is an "emotion" in the most literal sense of the word. It is a motion or tendency which leads us out of and beyond ourselves. Scheler thus expressly ties in with a tradition extending back into antiquity, from Plato through Augustine, which ascribes a supremely significant role to love in the development of knowledge. The act of love is basic to all other acts in the sense that as "pure taking interest in," it is the presupposition

for any taking notice of, or becoming aware of, observing, imagining, thinking, willing, etc.; and this is to be taken as valid in a transcendental sense. Love is what awakens both knowledge and volition, and is indeed "the mother of spirit and reason itself" (Scheler 1973b:110). Scheler creatively summarizes this situation: "Everywhere the 'amateur' precedes the 'savant.'"

Herein lies then the meaning of the priority of the affective order. Love as the primordial spiritual act circumscribes the reality in which we are cognitively active. The measure of man's love determines the depth and the scope of his knowledge, the possible range of his contact with the world. And when Scheler submits that the affective order possesses its own original lawfulness and autonomy he naturally invokes Pascal's notion of an "ordre du coeur" or "logique du coeur." The expression "le coeur a ses raisons" must be taken as meaning not that the "heart," (i.e. the entire range of human affectivity,) has anything which is equivalent to reason in its rank and meaning, but that it possesses a strict lawfulness in its own domain that is not borrowed from the formal logic of intellectual understanding. The heart possesses a definite structure and is not "the seat of confused states, of unclear and indefinite agitations or some other strong forces tossing man hither and thither in accord with causal laws" (117). Scheler calls this structure "Ordo Amoris," the order of love.

In the service of objectivistic ethics Ordo Amoris refers to the correct order of the hierarchy of values intended in

ordered love, i.e. love not permeated and altered by spite or resentment. Existentially, it is a ranking of values which each individual carries with him as if it was an encasing shell, perceiving the world through its windows. In effect it is the structure of man's most basic activity as spirit, determining all other personal activities. The theme of Ordo Amoris converges then with what in other contexts Scheler expresses under the notions of personal-individual value-essence and the qualitative direction of our becoming different in acts. Existentially, the order of love points to the identity of each individual; it is "the simplest structure of the most fundamental goals of the goal-directed core of the person, the basic ethical formula, so to speak, by which he exists and lives morally" (99). In one of his most profound statements Scheler summarizes the issue of knowing who the other is:

> Whoever has the Ordo Amoris of a man has the man himself. He has for the man as a moral subject what the crystallization formula is for a crystal. He sees through him as far as one possibly can. He sees before him the constantly simple and basic lines of his heart (Gëmut) running beneath all his empirical many-sidedness and complexity. And heart deserves to be called the core of man as a spiritual being much more than knowing and willing do. He has a spiritual model of the primary source which secretly nourishes everthing emanating from this man. Even more, he possesses the primary determinant of what always appears to surround and enclose the man: in space, his moral environment; in time, his fate, that is, the quintessence (Inbegriff) of possibilities belonging to him and to him alone. Nothing in nature which is independent of man can confront him and have an effect on him even as a stimulus, of whatever kind or degree, without the cooperation of his Ordo Amoris (100).

6.4 Scheler's Conception of Man: Summary and Appraisal

The analysis of Man's Place revealed that man owes his distinction from all other living beings to a superior and autonomous metaphysical principle called "spirit," and present in him as "person." Spirit as objectivity, i.e. as the principle of transformation of pockets of resistance to man's vital drives into "objects," performs its function through "ideation," a notion akin to that of Husserl's "categorial intuition."

The theoretical exposition of person (Formalism, Ch. 6 A), formulated in the context of an attempt to readmit the human affective dimension into ethics, completes this image of man by showing that person does not limit himself solely to rational activity but realizes himself necessarily in a multiplicity and variety of essentially different intentional acts. Person can thus be defined in virtue of discovery that intentionality and cognitivity are attributable to an intuition other than a rational one--(this being also the all-important premise of Scheler's ethics). As actualized only in the execution of intentional acts which themselves cannot be objectified, personal reality remains always essentially dynamic and non-objectifiable. Person is no "object" and no thing. His givenness as person remains limited to a "co-presence" with him, a participation in the performance of his activity. His identity lies neither in the types of acts performed nor in their content but in their "qualitative direction."

When examined in ethical contexts (Formalism, Ch. 6 B)

the person reveals himself as supremely individual and a bearer of moral values, that is, values which pertain to personal activity itself rather than content of any particular act. The qualitative direction of acts becomes designated here as a "personal-individual value essence," a peculiar and irreplacable axiological character. Under the influence of this peculiar axiological bent, or more precisely under its potential or ideal aspects, each person exists as a "task" or "vocation" in a self-experience of an ought-to-be of a content, action, deed, or state of being.

With the theme of man as a loving being Scheler announces that the person actualizes himself most concretely and profoundly in and through his emotional activity. The understanding of knowledge as an ontological relationship suggests that the tendency to go outside of oneself in order to participate in another being--this constituting a definition of love in its most formal sense, i.e. as "pure taking interest in"--is indeed the precondition for the disclosure of the intelligibility of the world, since it grounds all cognitionally relevant activity. Phenomenological investigations into ethics confirm this by noting values as the authentic objects of an emotional intuition, and that the grasp of something in its value dimension is the precondition for the appearance of any of its "theoretical" aspects.

An equally significant result of these investigations is the discovery of the human emotional activity as possessing a definite sense or structure[15] with its own laws analogous to

those of (intellectual) understanding. Scheler calls this structure Ordo Amoris, the order of love. It indicates concretely the contours of our emotional life. A grasp of this "most hidden of all phenomena" would reveal one's identity, i.e. who he is. The order of love, understood existentially, is synonymous therefore with the qualitative direction of personal activity, the personal-individual value-essence or orientation of intrinsic coherence.

The most serious, indeed frequently raised objection against Scheler's anthropology is that it neglects the unity of man (see Strasser 1957, Ranly 1966, and Owens 1970). This, I think, is a valid claim. Although his dualism is unique and original, the bifurcation of man into a spiritual sphere on one hand and a vital or psycho-physical one on the other is just as radical as that effected by Descartes. The dual principles in man of life and spirit tend to destroy the very unity that Scheler implicitly sought in his criticism of other forms of dualism. It appears that Scheler somewhat arbitrarily extracted the personal level from the totality of our conscious life, severing from the latter its acting (intentional) aspect. One would think that not only is the "life" of the personal sphere dependent on the functions of the organism and psychic mechanisms, but that the manner of this "life" is likewise conditioned by normal as well as pathological states and processes of the psycho-physical level. Once personality is torn out of the body and consciousness it becomes impossible to successfully again bridge this gap. The strictly dynamic

union between person as spirit and the psycho-physical ego is certainly wanting. It hardly explains how the person as spiritual, by way of being embodied, can act upon the world surrounding him and existing with him. Nor is it imperative on Scheler's own premises that even in immediate face-to-face encounters a perceived human body be taken as a body of that individual person (Strasser 1954:46).

Undeniably there are meaning structures as well as intentional activity that appear qualitatively different from what Scheler regards as functions and their content and are unlike anything found in the realm of physical causality. Unquestionable, as well, is the fact that with genuine maturity we become less impulsive (reactive) and more spontaneous (creative), that is, less controlled by organic processes and psychic mechanisms of the type so well described by contemporary psychoanalysis. (Compared to Freud's conception of an infant as a "polymorphous pervert" bent on continuous drive gratification, a mature adult is indeed a great "ascete.") And certainly legitimate is Scheler's question whether such "spiritual" activity can adequately be accounted for by the processes of sublimation, as naturalistic reductionist theories attempt to do.

Still, my own position is to remain agnostic as to the actual existence within man of an autonomous spiritual act-center. Mere coherence of intentional activity (see Appendix) is certainly insufficient to posit a metaphysical stratum "behind" it; indeed, by what kind of truth would such an

act-center be accessible? When Scheler suggests that the existence of this act-center is solely affirmed by the difference of character found among us, is he not going against his own thinking insofar as the existence of anything is given, according to him, in resistance to our voluntative powers?[16] The non-substantive bond between lived-body and the spiritual person makes it impossible to assume the latter upon encountering the former and Scheler is left affirming a rather paradoxical notion of something that is without existing. To posit in man the existence of a spiritual act-center must then be taken on faith, or as a matter of principle. This, it seems to me, is ultimately Scheler's way out. For without an autonomous spiritual factor in man his personalism would collapse for lack of metaphysical underpinnings.

Even if a spiritual act-center does exist, there remains something problematic about assuming its responsibility for man's individuation. Certainly insight into someone makes them appear all the more unique and different from others. But at the level of metaphysics the attribution of absolute individuality to spirit is derived negatively. That is, if men do appear unique, Scheler must predicate absolute individuality of the spiritual or personal sphere since he believes all life to be metaphysically one. Yet this last assumption is highly questionable. The insight that all physical or material bodies are identical in essence and are differentiated strictly by their position in a given spatio-temporal setting pertains more to contemporary physics, and

specifically to the reducibility of all physical things to energy, rather than to phenomenology. From a strictly descriptive perspective the self-identity and wholeness exhibited especially by living organisms point more to their independence from one another than to their partaking of some common "life-stuff." On the plane of metaphysics the equation of person and individuality would seem then to lack adequate positive foundation.[17]

On the other hand, without the metaphysical leap the descriptions of person that Scheler provides are some of the richest and most original of their kind to be found in all of phenomenological literature. The theoretical conception of person attempts to explicate as adequately as possible that experience in which the other appears not as one object or thing among others, but as a being-for-himself who manifests himself dynamically in an infinity of modes and whose activities (given in innumerable meanings of human expression) appear to be initated and executed from within him but nevertheless from "outside" the limitations of physical space and time, since they are essentially phenomena of intentionality. Each individual is encountered as a creative source or initiative, a presence that is "there"--and this entails aspects of freedom, richness, openness--which is lived, felt, and experienced concretely and is neither a mere unifier of sense perception nor a product of some deduction that argues prereflectively from an activity to a necessity of an actor behind it. Reduced to a phenomenological essence this is

"the being of unity of essentially different acts."

An important feature of this encounter is that the impression of the other as a source or initiating center of diverse acts persists throughout even a single activity of his, and this over and above the impression of his being an actor of that particular activity. The former impression, as a kind of implicit background is not spent in the experience (or apprehension) of that single activity, even though the whole individual appears concretely involved in it. Thus he appears as an active totality or whole that is never, however, exhaustively given through any one perspective or expression. It is in this sense that the person who is "wholly contained in and 'varied' by each act is never exhausted nor 'changed' like a thing in any of these acts." It is also in this sense that the apprehension of a single act carries with it a reference to the essence of person (as the being of unity of diverse intentional acts).

As for Scheler's suggestion that man is his most personal self the more he is reduced towards his bodiless being, this is simply a formalization of a phenomenologically observable fact that the more we focus on the pure meaning intention given in a particular expression, the more peripheral to our attention becomes the physiological organization that conveys that expression.

Scheler deserves credit for not having fallen victim to a spatializing and reifying tendencies of consciousness and to have insisted, in spite of conceptual difficulties, on the non-objectifiable, intentional, dynamic, open-ended and

unfinished structure of human reality.[18] Transcendence, as Scheler insisted in an early essay "On the Idea of Man" (1978), is not optional for man; it is intrinsic to him. The somewhat baffling relationship between person as existing only in acts and at the same time as "founding" them is testimony to the tension of refusing to hyposthasize the person, while recognizing on the other hand the continuous presence of the identical human being. And in a dynamic context, can one indeed say anything more about personal identity than the "qualitative direction" (of transcendence) that Scheler ascribes to it?

Perhaps these ideas, along with those of man as a "task" or "vocation," do not strike one as particularily original. This, I submit, is true only because they found their widespread dissemination through the much more popular than phenomenology movements of contemporary existentialism and personalism. Though it remains true to this day that Scheler is far less known (and appreciated) than those upon whom he exerted considerable influence, in many ways he was at the forefront of both of the latter philosophical currents. In view of what Scheler says about personal reality not surprising, for example, is the existentialist's difficulty of providing content for the notion of authenticity.

Scheler is also certainly right to insist on each person's uniqueness and individuality. Though we may typify ourselves and others, the sense of inadequacy and illusiveness remains an ever-present element of such efforts when they refer to

individuals. For somehow seldom, if ever, do we have the same feelings or reach exactly same conclusions about any two human beings--this likely being in proportion to the length of our knowing, and certainly in relation to insight we possess into each. Ultimately every man as a multi-dimensional dynamic and individual entity is beyond speech or "ineffable."[19] In this context Scheler's distinction between social and intimate spheres of personality seems particularily appropriate. For there remains an oblique part of oneself, incommunicable, unintelligible, and inaccessible even to oneself.

Finally, to have perceived in human affectivity not only a structure but also an immediate and spontaneous cognitive relatedness to the world is the most significant of Scheler's contributions to contemporary thought. This aspect of Scheler's thought will be examined in greater detail in the following section as part of a response to the question which, considering the aims of this essay, I must now pose. How do we come to apprehend the essence of man as no thing or finished product, but as a dynamic being characterized by a multi-dimensional openness which at the same time is lived in a unique way? Who is the other? What is his qualitative direction? Scheler believes this essence's most concrete manifestation to persist in the realm of feelings and values. Thus, his answer to the above question is that in order to grasp the peculiar character of the other we must 1) love him, and 2) love with him what he loves (1954:168). I shall

first address myself to the second condition.

The non-objectifiable nature of man as person suggests, that his givenness as person lies solely in a co-presence with him. The revelation of his unique essence is therefore conditional upon the "co-performance" (on our part) of the other's core activity. Now the other's intentional acts are non-objectifiable, but Scheler, it was mentioned, in insisting on the autonomy of the personal sphere asserts its activity as parallel to the objective structure of the world and not to the psycho-physical processes. Intentional co-performance must presuppose then an objective meaningful referent on which it could be based. It must also presuppose some manifestation of the other's grasp of this referent.

In Part 3 of this section I noted that for Scheler the Ordo Amoris (as a structure of human emotional life) is reflected objectively as a ranking of values governing each man's comportment. And in Section 5 we saw that Scheler insists on an intimate connection between expression and experience. These key ideas, examined in the context of the general relationship between feelings and values will clarify, I believe, the possibility of the type of co-performance of acts he has in mind.

We will then be in a position to see how the totality of man as a dynamic being for whom values constitute the most concrete content of experience can be adequately approached and apprehended in one specific emotional act only: the act of love.

Section 7

Values and the Cognitivity of Emotions

Surveying critically the treatment of affectivity in the history of philosophy, Scheler identifies (1973a:262-4) two main periods dominated by two distinct perspectives. According to him, the belief that emotions can be intentional continued right up to the end of the eighteenth century; it constitutes the first period. However, during this period the accepted intentionality of the emotions was regarded merely as a confused prelude to the clear intentionality of the intellect. Modern rationalists like Leibniz, for example, held intentional feelings to be a type of vague conceiving or thinking, whose objects are in need of clarification by the intellect so that their ultimate "foundation" in evident rational relations can be appreciated. From this perspective intentional feelings are not considered as ultimate and primary activities of the mind. Correlatively, in the objective sphere there is nothing irreducible about the assumed objects of affective intuition, the phenomena of value. The latter are seen merely as derivative qualities of (rationally apprehended) being.

The second period began with Kant. In early nineteenth century the irreducibility of the emotional life to the

intellectual order was gradually recognized. However, the intellectualist attitudes of the preceding century remained dominant. Although irreducible, the emotions were no longer considered even as a confused cognition. The possibility of an affective intuition was rejected altogether because emotions were denied intentionality. They were regarded strictly as chaotic states lacking any cognitive function.

Against this rather roughly sketched historical background Scheler elaborates his own position. The pre-Kantian conception of affectivity is correct, he thinks, insofar as it recognizes that there are in addition to feeling states intentional "feelings of," that is, emotional functions and acts in which something is objectively given. But this conception is misguided in its attempt to reduce this intentionality to that of the intellect. The Kantian and post-Kantian conception on the other hand correctly recognizes the irreducible character of affectivity, but falsely denies it any intentional character, thus leaving its investigation solely to causal explanations of experimental psychology.

Now Scheler believes that in our apprehension of the world we come across definite content which, in spite of the fact that it may lack direct signification in the mind, lacks neither integrity nor objectivity. Accepting the general premise of phenomenology that objective essences appear in the coincidence of what is "meant" (signified) and what is "given" (effected) (51), he must point to an activity in which this content appears. If the intellectual intentional

act is characterized by a content of signification, then the objective structures which cannot be immediately outlined by acts of signification and which therefore do not partake of the rational or logical realm, are, Scheler suggests, felt emotionally rather than grasped rationally, through the senses, or in internal perception. That a state of affairs is just or unjust, or that something is beautiful, charming, or lovely is experienced through feeling as an essential aspect of the experienced thing, and this as "forcefully" as, for example, the triangularity of the triangular thing perceived. Applying one of the fundamental principles of phenomenology and intended against any type of ontologism, namely, that there is an interconnection between an essence of an object and the essence of an act grasping it, he asserts: "It belongs essentially to these qualities to be given originally only in a 'feeling of something'" (243).

Scheler holds, therefore, for an irreducible emotive intentionality with an irreducible objective correlate, value. In feeling something is given and comes to "appearance." Feeling has the same intentional relation to its value-correlate as "representing" has to an "object" of a strict perceptual act (258). With no mediation through an objectivizing act of the imagination or judgement, values are given to intentional feeling as immediately as colours are to seeing or sounds to hearing.

To bring into sharper focus what he understands by "intentional feelings of something" Scheler contrasts them with

other aspects of the emotional sphere. For the latter is not exhausted by intentional feelings. In addition, but also in strict distinction, there are also feeling states. That there indeed are intentional feelings and that a valid distinction between these two modes of the affective order can be maintained is perhaps best illustrated by cases in which a feeling is found to be an object of another feeling. A sensual pain may, for example, be "suffered," "endured," "tolerated," or even "enjoyed." By itself a feeling state does not indicate the mode in which it is felt or lived. This mode is revealed in intentional feeling. Hence the most general distinction between feeling states and intentional feeling is that the former belong to contents and appearances, the latter to "functions" of reception(256). What does this mean?

Whereas all feeling states are inactive, i.e. non-intentional, and are related to objects indirectly through a content of sensation, imagination, or perception given in supplementary relational acts, intentional feeling is active reception (of value) in which there is no mediation through an objectivizing act of perception or imagination. Here something is apprehended immediately but only in terms of its value dimension; the frequent lack of definite pictorial content in intentional feeling suggests that its objectivizing function does not require the mediation of representation. Intentional feeling is therefore an "activity" in which something is lived and experienced; it is "an original relatedness or directedness toward something objective, . . . a

punctual movement . . . in which something is given to me and in which it comes to 'appearance'" (257-8). As a meaningful occurrence intentional feeling is clearly subject to "fulfillment" or "non-fulfillment." It is both active (intentional) and cognitive (receptive), i.e. functional in objective apprehension, in contrast to re-active, hence non-cognitive, feeling-states. The ascription of receptivity to intentional feeling and its equivalence to cognitivity must be understood here in the context of Scheler's epistemological realism according to which objective essences are discovered rather than created by the mind. For Scheler, " 'understanding,' contrary to Kant, does nothing, makes nothing, forms nothing" (Kelly 1977:76).

That values are given in intentional feeling by no means implies that they are produced by feelings and still less that they are identical with feelings. A value "is" no feeling-state just as colour "is" no visual sensation. Nor can a value be a relation to or between feeling states since the " phenomenological givenness of value and the value difference of the object concerned precede in principle the experience of feeling-states which the objects effect and are the foundation of these states and their completion" (Scheler 1973a:246). As an ethician Scheler distances himself as far as possible from axiological relativism, and as a phenomenologist he stands far removed from psychologism. To say that feelings are intentional is to assert their spontaneous directedness toward a content which is heterogenious to them

and to insist at the same time on the objectivity and independence of this content. For it is a phenomenological fact, Scheler emphasizes, that in feeling a value, the value is given as distinct from its being felt (244). Values, then, are original, ultimate, and irreducible phenomena.

Whenever Scheler insists on the priority of the emotional order in our relatedness to the world he does so not only on the basis of the formal relationship that obtains between love as "pure interest" and knowledge as an act of "participation in being"--the former being the precondition of the latter--but also on the basis of concrete phenomenological description of the content of immanent intentionality, the primary experience of consciousness. It is on the basis of such description that he formulates the following essential connection between value-apprehension and cognition of entities:

> In the objective sphere value-qualities and value-units are received as data before anything belonging to the value-free sector of the object, so that no information at all of an utterly value-free nature can become the original content of a perception, memory, or expectation--subsequently an object of thought and judgement--unless we have been given beforehand, in some way, the value-quality of the entity or its value-relation to some other thing (equality, difference, etc.) (1960:85-6).

From the perspective of this essential connection values are the first messengers, so to speak, of the nature of all objects, and feeling as value-apprehension indicates a type of original, preconceptual seeing--the most immediate and

direct involvement with reality. Evidence for the priority of givenness of values can be found, for example, when someone we encounter strikes us at first sight as sympathetic, friendly, repulsive, or resentful without any possibility of knowing the reasons for why we feel this way. Or we may enter a room for the first time and experience it emotionally as inviting, homely, warm, or unfriendly without being immediately aware of that which makes such values present to us or which specifically are the carriers of such value-qualities.

Now Scheler insists on both the priority of values and their irreducibility. The latter feature of values is supported not only by the frequent lack of pictorial content in value experience but also by the fundamental transcendence of values given in imaginary variation (the "eidetic" reduction). The priority of values and their ordered relations, i.e. their being lower or higher which dwells in the nature of the values themselves, is independent of things and their relations. Values are irreducible because a stable a priori order of values does not involve or imply a stable a priori order of value bearers, i.e. valuable things, actions, goals, states of affairs, etc. As "redness" and its relation to other colours can "inhere" in many different red objects so values, as true objective essences, do not change with changing objects nor in the latter's absence. The value of friendship, for example, is not diminished or exhausted by a failed personal relationship.

Care however must be exercised as to the precise meaning

of the priority of emotional-axiological experience over thinking, perceiving, etc., and the integrity and independence of values. The integrity and independence of values from things, facts, etc.,—must not be interpreted platonically, as if values existed apart from things as separate forms or ideas or as prior to experience. In the preface to the third edition of Formalism Scheler most emphatically guards against such an interpretation: "I reject in principle and at the very threshold of philosophy, a heavenly realm of ideas and values that is 'independent' of the essence and execution of living spiritual acts" (1973a:xxx). Elsewhere, he clarifies that the priority of value-apprehension refers solely to the constitutive order of acts in which reality is cognized without by any means implying that there is an intrinsic priority of value over being. (1960:88). In the order of reality values and things form an insoluble connection. Values are actualized in and through something valuable--a value carrier. It is not as if value, pure and simple was given in feeling; rather, values appear in "special nuances which belong to the structure as a unified whole of the good in which they inhere . . . without [however] losing their qualitative identity" (Luther 1972:73). The independence of values exhibits itself only phenomenologically, that is, as irreducible objective content of immanent consciousness. Values are certainly not to be found on the empirical level of reality, given as things or objects to be encountered lying before one. Scheler's perhaps most adequate and clear

formulation of these issues is stated in the context of our meeting others:

> Although in the ontological order the existence of a person, while contemporaneous with his character as an individual, is necessarily prior to his value in the order for us, the value of the person is actually given prior to his character, though not . . . prior to the givenness of his existence. It is intrinsically impossible for the value of personality to be given in advance of its existence (and not merely its character), for there can be no such thing as value apart from existence, either in appearance or reality (1954:228).[1]

It is at once evident here, that in contrasting emotional and rational apprehension (of "value" vs. "character") Scheler is talking about two distinct but <u>not</u> separate "moments" of the (total) cognitive act or process, and not about an apprehension of two different objects. (The unity of these moments is guaranteed by their common reference to the identical existent.) And yet, as lucid and direct as these claims of his are, several questions still linger. Even if one grants the priority of emotional attitudes over other moments of cognition--a plausible thesis, I believe[2]--is there not, as Chang (1971:247) suggests, an interaction within man of affectivity and rationality that makes Scheler's dichotomy (of reason and affect) simply too great?

An adequate response to this issue entails, I think, the following. It must be remembered that Scheler was among the first of contemporary thinkers to react against philosophy's dogmatic suppression of the significance of affectivity for

knowledge; his was a radical break with a long and influential tradition. In these circumstances one must allow for a certain exaggeration in Scheler's pleading of his cause--a cause he considered extrememly important. It was only natural for him to reassert as forcefully as possible what had been in such long neglect. Even so, Scheler would have perhaps benefited from reexamining Husserl's methodology for its considerations of horizon, gradations of evidence, adequacy, and certitude (Sweeney 1980:31), or from looking at some of the intellectual presuppositions from which certain feelings and desires borrow their objects as this is done by Meinong (1972,Sec.10).[3]

With these suggestions I do not mean to give up or even downplay Scheler's crucially important point about the irreducible character of value-apprehension through emotion and its role in cognition. I think he is on solid ground here, and it is indeed heartening to see that an ever-increasing number of thinkers are recognizing the informative (as opposed to the merely functional) character of emotions, as at least one recent anthology indicates (A.Rorty 1980). But I do believe that a greater concern for the interplay between affectivity and rationality would have lessened Scheler's reliance on intuitionism, reduced the number of some infamous "phenomenological quarrels," and minimized the danger of interpreting values as some hyposthasized floating Platonic forms. All this, no doubt, would have been strategically more sound and beneficial.

A number of serious incongruities on Scheler's part are involved in another important issue connected with his theory of value-apprehension. The issue is that of the ontological status of values as essences. While on one hand Scheler steadfastly maintains the impossibility of apprehending essences without the corresponding acts of mind, on the other hand the rhetoric against Kant ("Understanding adds nothing") seems to get the better of his judgement and he postulates that essences do in fact exist outside the mind. Yet nowhere does he provide a theory, such as Meinong's (1972) for example, accounting for there being values at once given in and through emotion but at the same time also ontologically independent of it. And strikingly he does not apply to essences his own criteria for the extra-mental existence of anything, namely, that of resistance to vital drives--he cannot, of course, because essences cannot resist--so that Kelly (1977:77) concludes that Scheler's metaphysical realism is in fundamental conflict with his theory of knowledge.

With these remarks on emotional value-apprehension in place, we can go on to note the different kinds of values that Scheler's believes are correlative to different types of intentional feeling. He identifies four basic value categories.

The first category is constituted by the axiological series ranging from the pleasant or agreeable to the unpleasant or disagreeable. These values are given in functions of sensorial feelings.

Values given in vital feelings and constituting the

axiological series from the noble to the vulgar pertain to the second category. It was pointed out earlier that for Scheler "life" is an authentic irreducible sphere of reality. The values in question here correspond to states of health, sickness, vital vigour and regression, youth and old age.

The third category comprises spiritual values. Values falling within this axiological series include the aesthetic values of the beautiful and the ugly, the values of right and wrong, just and unjust, as well as the values of pure knowledge, (i.e. knowledge for its own sake). These values are given in functions of spiritual feelings which are different from and irreducible to the vital level.

Under the fourth category Scheler lists values of the holy and the unholy or the profane. Their condition of givenness is such that they appear only in objects that are intended as "absolute" objects, i.e. as objects of the absolute sphere of reality. Although Scheler correlates with these values such feeling states as supreme bliss or happiness and despair, he makes it quite clear that the act which originally grounds the apprehension of values of this series is a "special kind of love which precedes and determines all pictorial representations and conceptions of holy objects" (1973a:109). What is significant about this is that in Scheler's ethical system these values ultimately pertain to the being or actuality of the <u>person</u> of God. The values of the fourth modality are therefore personal values and precisely as such, i.e. as personal, Scheler insists, they can be given

only in love. This is an essential connection obtaining "no matter what content of or what 'conception' of personhood is implied" (109). It is this essential connection, abstracted however from a religious context, which constitutes the subject matter of the following section.

By virtue of the fact that they cannot form the content of an intending act, moral values of "good" and "evil" are excluded by Scheler from the above classification of value modalities. These values pertain only to the actualization of objective values. Thus "good" are acts which realize the higher value, and "evil" are the acts that realize the lower one. But the existence of moral values as they are defined here necessitates the explication of the finer differentiation that Scheler proposes with respect to the levels of the intentional emotive life. This clarification will indicate more fully how the person actualizes himself most concretely in the world.

Good and evil acts as realizing higher or lower values presuppose the latter to be arranged in some type of hierarchy. Indeed, it is Scheler's contention that there is an a priori arrangement in which vital values are higher than the sensible ones, spiritual values higher than vital values, and values of the holy still higher than those of the spiritual category. (This particular order of values does not of course deny the possibility of other individual value hierarchies. It simply provides the normative background needed by a non-relativist ethic to judge these value hierarchies as well as the

aberrations within emotional life.) While the relatedness of values to each other is intrinsic to and grounded in the essence of the values themselves, the particular act in which a given value is apprehended as higher or lower than another (and in which we generally comprehend the rank of values) is what Scheler calls "preferring" and "placing after." Whereas intentional functions of feeling or immediate value perceptions give only isolated values, preference is distinguished by its "comparative" or referential character. For this reason it constitutes a higher stage of emotional intentionality.

Scheler insists that preference is an irreducible activity; only in (not before or after) acts of preference does the superiority of values reveal itself and not in any sort of reflection or rational consideration. He cautions however that this act is passive (receptive),[4] that is, it belongs to the sphere of value-cognition and is not to be confused with such connative acts as choosing. Choosing is subsequent to preferring since, strictly speaking, it refers only to courses of action taken or not with respect to what is preferred. Preference excludes all choosing, striving, or willing. As an immediate and direct perception of (higher) value it is "intentional in a strict sense, 'directed' and sense-giving" (1973a:260).

Over and above preference, the acts of loving and hating constitute in Scheler's scheme the highest level of our intentional emotive life. This level stands farthest removed from all (non-cognitive) feeling-states. Love and hate are

also to be distinguished from any re-active responses (e.g. revenge). For they are purely spontaneous acts in which the value-realm accessible to feeling functions and preference, is either extended or narrowed (261). The extending function of love implies that it is an act that does not follow value-feeling and preferring but is ahead of them as a "pioneer and guide." It is an act which plays a disclosing role in value comprehension.

The structure of our affective intentional life may thus be briefly outlined: functions of feeling which apprehend isolated values; acts of preference which grasp the relatedness of values to each other and their general order; acts of love and hatred which delineate the realm of values accessible to us.

In the context of person's most concrete and profound actualization as occurring in and through emotional acts of feeling functions, preference, and love, values as authentic, objective (hence referential to subjects or persons) correlates cannot be understood statically. This is to say that the fulfillment of the self-opening or intention of person by value signifies an enrichment on the side of the person. This enrichment is in coincidence with the actualization of what objectively appears, i.e. value. The person becomes who he is through the appropriation of this or that particular value. Value is lived relation, concrete experience. Values fulfill the emotional acts which he as the source and center of acts initiates and creatively executes, indicating at the same time something of his essentially unique structure as person.

The non-objectifiability of the person implies that the apprehension of this unique structure is conditional upon a co-presence with the other, a "joining in the performance of his acts, either cognitively, by 'understanding' and vicarious 're-living', or morally, by 'following in his footsteps'" (1954:167). Thus we understand partially who the other is when we value, prefer, and love what he values, prefers, and loves. What reveals itself through this co-performance is a specific level of his personal reality under the aspect of its value-being.

A further clarification is needed here with respect to the notion of co-performance. For explicated must be not only its objective referent, (in this case value), but also that which reveals the other's meaningful experiences that are subject to actual or possible co-performance. In what do we grasp his meaning-intentions? Earlier (Section 5) I noted that Scheler insists that what is first given in our experiences of another is never merely a physical body but a life which expresses (presses out of) itself. The intimate link between experience and expression—a sort of a "universal grammar" which is the sole basis of perceiving the inadequacy of a person's gesture to his experience or the contradiction between an expression and what was meant to be expressed--ensures that the experiences of the other are "given" to us in expressive phenomena, that is, not by inference but directly as a sort of primary "perception." Insight into another is possible therefore only insofar as his body is

treated as a field of expression of his experiences. However, the degree or depth of this insight depends on our posture taken toward that "perceived" experience. In this context Scheler acknowledges four basic types of orientation or directedness.

The first type corresponds to simple awareness of the other's feeling-states. Propositionally this could be expressed in such statements as "X has pain" or "X suffers pain," or "X is joyful."

The second type refers to an "appreciation" of the other's feelings. Over and above mere awareness or judgement that the other experiences a certain feeling we can grasp the quality of that feeling, "visualize" it and state, so to speak, the "reasons" for it, without the feeling itself shifting over to ourselves or a similar feeling state being produced in ourselves. Such appreciation remains in the sphere of observation and recognition.

Under the third type Scheler considers "reactive" sympathy or "fellow-feeling." Fellow-feeling is an emotional response (hence "reactive") to an emotional state experienced by another person. Upon becoming aware of his suffering, for example, we may commiserate with him. Two phenomenologically distinct facts are present in this case: his suffering and our commiseration. This form of sympathy is not however a mere causal reaction to another's joy or suffering, as various genetic theories of sympathy would maintain. For all sympathy, Scheler insists, is <u>intentional</u>.[5] Fellow-feeling, though a

response, is still an initiated act whose execution concretizes a sharing of the emotional quality lived by the other. Sympathy means the other's joy or sorrow and means it as an emotional function, that is, as value actualization. The emotions, perceived as lived by the other, are grasped for this reason at once as significant, such significance pertaining to his value-fulfillment.

"Immediate sympathy" or "community of feeling" constitutes the fourth type of orientation towards experiences of another. The example which Scheler provides to outline this particular directedness is that of a father and a mother standing beside the dead body of a beloved child. This mutual experience is not such that one feels sorrow, the other feels sorrow, and over and above this each recognizes that they both feel sorrow. Rather it is a feeling-in-common in a sense that they both feel and experience in common the self-same value situation as well as the same intensity of emotion with respect to it. Here sorrow as value content and sorrowing as quality of emotional orientation appear phenomenologically as one, such being the degree of interpenetration of the representative and the sympathetic functions. The sorrow of one in no sense becomes objective or "external" with respect to the other's emotional orientation, as is the case in "reactive" sympathy. It is perceived and understood in and through immediate experiencing of the "same" loss (1954:13).

This fourth type and its clarifying example reveal for Scheler the depth and core of sympathy phenomena. Sympathy

in its deepest meaning is an openness towards another and an actualization of a shared life as simultaneously lived, an actualization of being together in some way that is also a value perception, that is, a function in and through which the other appears in his value dimension.

In the general context of the theme of value apprehension through feeling it should be readily apparent why insight into value-being of another person is at minimum in the first of the above-outlined modes of co-existence, progressing through to reach greatest depth in immediate sympathy. What simple awareness and appreciation of another's feeling have in common is that both belong to a cognition that is rational. In these cases we are concerned with a type of immediate and direct knowledge which grasps experience as a (neutral) object or is expressed in a concept or idea. All the essential connections of relatedness of the expressed experience to values may be noted, but insight is limited because the values in question are not concretely felt. One can perceive immediately that the other suffers or is joyful without in any way participating in these emotions, just as one can fully appreciate (in the sense of appreciation indicated above) these states in another while remaining entirely indifferent towards him.

Sympathy alters this situation and brings with it radically greater possibilities for insight into the value dimension of another human being. Since value is a lived relation, the depth of such insight increases as we get <u>experientially</u> closer

to the value-meaning that "generates" the particular emotional state of the other, a condition exactly implied in, indeed, "founding" sympathy, and certainly "regulating" its depth. Hence where I am actualized in relation to another in terms of <u>similar</u> value, as in immediate sympathy --in spite of the fact that the other appears in his separatness as well as his integral individuality and difference from me[6]--insight into his actual value-being is greatest precisely because that value content "runs" through me and is immediately felt and lived by me (60).

By virtue of the depth of its insight there is little doubt that immediate sympathy is what Scheler primarily (though not exclusively) has in mind when, concerned about the other's givenness as person, he speaks of co-performance of intentional acts. Or at least immediate sympathy is the "purest" type of co-performance. But however insightful such co-performance may be, it nevertheless presents definite constraints as to how much of the other's essential structure as person can be given in it. For co-performance is essentially directed to what actually is, which is to say in a dynamic context, that which already has been. Put differently, co-performance can only confirm a past anticipation or fulfill an immediate intention but offers little insight into the immanent future direction of another person as a dynamic movement in a realm of openness. Co-performance grasps only a <u>specific</u>, hence limited, aspect or level of value-being of person as dynamic presence; it is not directed

towards the whole of this presence, that is, in all of its temporal dimensions. To be sure we can and often do foresee or predict someone's actions on the basis of their personal history as revealed in a series of value concretizations. Such insight, useful as it may be, remains nevertheless totally inadequate in comparison with what essentially characterizes personal reality: creativity, transcendence, openness, freedom, and orientation toward future. Personal essence cannot be a matter of deduction or extrapolation from past or even present course of action. Moreover, if as Scheler suggests no person ever exhausts himself through any single act or expression, then his actual frame of intentions remains largely transcendent to our understanding even in co-performance. Certainly, in time, our knowledge of it expands quantitatively, so to speak, nevertheless remaining at any given time insignificant in view of the immense depth, potential, and richness signified by each person.

The principal aim of this section has been to indicate the possibility of co-performance of fundamental personal activity. This entailed the clarification of the relationship between affectivity, the objectivity of values, and the apprehension of person's relatedness to values through different kinds of orientation towards experience as revealed through expression. Having stated the (ontological) limits to the understanding of person as provided by co-performance at any emotional level, I shall now examine the claim that

personal essence can be adequately grasped only when the co-performance of the other's acts occurs in the context of loving him.

Scheler's notion of love and how it relates specifically to the apprehension of personality is thus the subject matter of the following and final section of the essay.

Section 8

Love and the Apprehension of Personality

When Scheler makes a three-fold distinction of the levels of the intentional emotive life he also believes that each of these levels has a different significance for our apprehension of reality. Whereas emotional functions and preference belong to the sphere of value-apprehension, love, Scheler emphasizes, cannot be considered as an act of apprehension at all. For love is not directed intentionally toward value but refers to objects inasmuch and insofar as these possess value; it is never values we love but always something that possesses value (1954:148). Love invariably relates to concrete existents (162-3).

It appears then that love is not cognitive per se, especially since Scheler holds that knowledge and cognition can be of essences only. Yet love must possess a cognitive aspect; its transcendental role as the "mother of spirit and reason itself" clearly implies that. This cognitive aspect is grasped adequately only when the nature of love as a creative movement (of the human spirit) is correctly understood. The analysis of love from this perspective will lead directly to a claim of Scheler's I am attempting to make intelligible here, namely, that "the essence of individuality

of a person is only revealed in its purity by love or by virtue of the insight it provides" (160).

Stating some basic tenets of a phenomenology of love, Scheler cautions that love is never merely a sort of an affirmative emotional "staring" or gaping at a value-object given completely before one. What characterizes love, and indeed sets it apart from all other emotional acts such as sympathy and value-receiving feeling functions, is, above all, spontaneity and its general character as a tendency:

> Love is that movement of intention whereby, from a given value A in an object, its higher value is visualized. Moreover, it is just this vision of a higher value that is of the essence of love. In its ultimate nature, therefore, love is not just a "reaction" to a value already felt . . . nor yet an attitude to a pair of previously given values, such as "preference." . . . Those who treat love as a merely consequential "reaction" to a value already felt, have failed to recognize its nature as a movement (153-4).

But "higher value" as that toward which love is specifically directed is, given its context, a somewhat ambiguous notion and in need of clarification. For it is evident that love's directedness toward higher value contradicts what was initially insisted on, namely, that the real object of value is never simply any value itself but the bearer of value.

To begin with, the higher values which are of concern to love are never given beforehand; they appear or disclose themselves only in the course or at the end, so to speak, of the intentional movement of love. The distinctiveness of this phenomenon is not prejudiced by the fact that this

disclosure is made possible on the basis of values already given. For there is no question here of any sort of extrapolation of the new values from the already given ones; whatever connections may exist between the present given value and the future higher one are certainly not of a logical nature. The latter are "implicit" in the former only as an "appointed goal" or an "objective ideal challenge" to greater value fulfillment of the object. They are "not yet given as positive qualities being envisaged concurrently as potential ingredients of a corporate structural pattern" (154).

These peculiarities of love clearly indicate that higher values "pure and simple" cannot be intended by love. Such an intention would demand the givenness and apprehension of higher values as higher, a "function," I noted, Scheler leaves to acts of preference. Moreover, nothing new would appear here, invalidating the claim that love expands our cognitive horizons.

Among the various of Scheler's descriptions of the phenomenon of love there is an assertion that the intentionality of love is an "orientation toward an enhancement of value" (158). This seems to be a far better and more fortunate formulation of what he has in mind. It signifies that love intends the being superior of something in terms of its intrinsic value dimension, without suggesting in any way what values specifically are involved. The directedness of love is then not so much towards higher values as towards their realization. Scheler gives additional weight to this interpretation by pointing to love's fundamental "indifference" as compared with a prospective

attitude in which higher values are actively searched for, or a pedagogical attitude which attempts to actualize abstract higher value which an object has not yet attained:

> The movement (of love) is as yet completely unconcerned as to whether this higher value is already in existence (having been merely unperceived or undiscovered hitherto, for instance), or whether it does not yet exist and merely "ought" to do so (in an ideal, individual sense, not as a general obligation). This indifference with regard to either possibility is a characteristic feature of love (156-7).

To say that love is indifferent in the sense indicated above, is but another way of stating that the higher value in question here appears only in the movement of love. To actively search for higher value or attempt to actualize a potential but abstract value can occur only where the higher value is extrinsically derived. Whereas, in authentic love the opposite is the case. Higher value, as intrinsic to the object, appears by itself as it were--Scheler uses in this context the expression "flashes out" (Aufblitzen)--and can therefore be neither sought nor abstractly attributed to an object as part of a (logical) connection to be actualized. Whatever "oughtness" appears with respect to the object, it must "announce" itself from the side of the object and cannot be part of a judgement outside the concrete act of love nor subject to our intrusion in deed or thought.

From a cognitive standpoint it would be justified then to consider love as a sort of an opening which intends "more"

with respect to an object than is immediately or actually given of it in value-apprehending emotional acts. Love transcends what is empirically given in the sense of "visualizing" or anticipating the objects's state of greater fullness of being what it is in its value dimension.[1] To indicate this "more" Scheler uses such terms as "whole" or "gestalt" (Gestaltstruktur) [2], or "idealized paradigm of value." Since it pertains to a higher level of value-being of the entire object rather than any particular higher value, the whole or gestalt is certainly inclusive of what empirically is or has already been disclosed in intentional feeling. At the same time the anticipatory "more" of love is intended on the basis of what empirically is; the whole or gestalt is rooted and immanent in the empirically given itself. There is then no Kantian phenomenon-noumenon distinction here. The relationship between what actually or empirically is and the gestalt, i.e. the ideal or potential being state, is dialectical. Although the gestalt as gestalt is not given exhaustively with the factual, it is not given apart from the factual. The whole, or gestalt is present in what is empirically given, albeit as a fullness yet to be actualized and confirmed in feeling (154).

The gestalt as "an embodiment of the [object's] 'true' nature and 'real' value" (154) is what love presupposes. As it is not given empirically but nevertheless refers to the identical object before us, it can be said that what is "there," given empirically, is either perhaps not exhaustively

perceived or simply not exhaustively present. The first possibility points to limitations in our cognition and is a matter of speculation only, since nothing of these limitations belongs as part of the content of what appears in love. But the second possibility, since it addresses itself to the ontological exigencies of the object itself, is far more fundamental.[3] It indicates--according to the essential connection between the essence of an object and the essence of the act which apprehends it--that the empirically given has as yet unrealized potentialities and possibilities which are rooted in the fundamentally unfinished and incomplete structure of its reality.

We are here at the heart of our problematic. For what could the unfinished and incomplete reality par excellence faced by love be other than personal reality? The person, precisely as person, is no object, no finished thing, but a unity of transcending dynamic orientation actualizing itself in a realm of openness and possibility. He is a concrete existence which moves from the past, through the present, and into the future. He is the gestalt. Conversely, love as a (continuous) movement in the direction of fullness of being is the only act which "coincides," as it were, with the unfinished future-oriented lived directedness of the person in the direction of fulfillment through performance of acts. This is what brings Scheler to assert: "Being an 'object' of love represents, as it were, the only objective status wherein personality has existence and can therefore be manifested" (167).

Love as movement apprehends the other in his dimension of being-on-the-way towards fuller realization. In addressing itself to the totality of his being, both actual and potential, it grasps the "ideal" aspect of his personality as the basic value-intention immanent to him or the inner dynamism that is operative in his very being and experienced by him as "task" or "vocation." Through its "bi-polar" orientation in which its object's actual and ideal aspects merge love turns genuinely to the empirical individual in his uniqueness, but envisages at the same time the highest possibilities which are already present in him as an essential tendency or movement striving towards actuality. The dialectical relationship that exists between what the person actually is and his potential or ideal dimension indicates that love does not turn to some abstract ideal phantom. Indeed love's essential indifference whether particular higher values exist (but are not perceived), or whether they ought to exist, ensures that in all authentic manifestation of the phenomenon we turn to the empirical person as he is.

In examining the sense in which the movement of personality is "visible" in the movement of love, the discussion has so far focused on the dynamic aspect of love and the pertinence of this aspect for the apprehension of personality, given the latter's ontological exigencies. Now Scheler also claims that love not only intends higher-value-being but that it is also creative of value, a fact initially noted in Scheler's understanding of love as creative movement.

His basic acceptance of epistemological realism suggests that the notion of creativity has its own peculiar meaning here, since values, he maintains, are never created but only discovered. What then is this sense of creativity, and how in turn does it pertain to the apprehension of personal reality?

To clarify this issue we note that Scheler refers to love also as a "unique attitude towards objects of value" (148), indeed, "the most personal of attitudes but a thoroughly objective one none the less" (167). This description is best understood in light of some of the basic tenets of Scheler's anthropology. In the context of that anthropology Scheler stated that "spirit is objectivity," meaning that the distinctive feature of man as spiritual being is his capacity to objectify the pockets of resistance given to his vital drives. Objectification, hence objectivity, are possible to the extent to which the energies of these drives are sublimated. Insofar then as love is the most personal (hence spiritual) of attitudes, precisely in it as personal are these drives least operative and the (subjective) conditions for objectivity greatest.

This of course is not to suggest that personality can appear in love as an object, i.e. as a thing. Rather, noting the main point of this discussion on objectivity, (i.e. to delineate the subjective conditions necessary for objectivity), the objectivity of love refers in this context to a freeing of ourselves from bondage to our own interests, wishes, and

ideas. It implies a certain "plasticity of constitutive structures of awareness" (Blankenburg 1972:35) with the a prioric character of our cognitive faculty loosing some of its apathy and rigidity, so that whatever we encounter we will do so "not merely in terms of its possibility of being dominated but in terms of that through which it becomes capable of demonstrating ever more clearly what it is or is able to become" (35). Through its anticipatory and imaginative function which sets up the "idealized paradigm of value" love facilitates the appearance of new phenomena insofar as it provides the infinite intendings or meanings with which what is "given" can coincide. For phenomena, all phenomenologists agree, become manifest precisely in this coincidence. Here "every form of unilaterally constituting intentionality is replaced with an infinite process of the reciprocal constitution of object and consciousness" (34). In a very real sense love "sees" more because it "asks" more and thus sensitizes or opens the mind to ever greater range of reality's response.

To emphasize the autonomy of love, i.e. its purely spiritual (intentional) nature, and hence its capacity for objectivity, Scheler goes so far as to suggest that love follows "an opposite law to that of effort" (1954:141). In conjunction with Scheler's point that in this effortless activity the higher values "flash out" or emanate from the beloved object itself, the statement underscores Scheler's basic epistemological realism and safeguards the sense in

which he holds love to be a dynamic movement creative of values. The creativity of love does not imply that love itself creates new values or their rank. Rather, as we have just seen, love creates the conditions for their presence or appearance in consciousness, be that for acts of feeling, preference, volition, etc. Love, as Scheler puts it, is "creative of 'existence' relative to these spheres [of experience]" (154).

The relevance of this type of creativity for the apprehension of personal reality is self-explanatory. In its creative aspect love coincides with the other as a source of inexhaustable richness, diversity, openness, transcendence, creative transformation, etc. These characteristics demand utmost cognitive flexibility, openness, receptivity, and minimum intrusion on our part. Only on the basis of the latter conditions can the uniqueness and individuality of the other reveal-itself in its full nuance. Love can grasp the person as person because its "flexibility" signifies a readiness for infinite possibilities; the "idealized paradigm of value," the "more" intended with respect to personality is essentially an open-ended realm whose fulfillment is awaited but never sought. It remains strictly up to the other person to reveal himself.

But love is creative, Scheler suggests, in yet another sense. The creativity of love, which in the cognitive sphere is manifested by flexibility of categories, imagination, openness towards novelty, "freedom" from own ideas, wishes,

prejudices, etc., acquires a somewhat different and indeed more profound significance when the discussion of love is not set exclusively in an epistemological context. Viewed in a concrete intersubjective situation, the peculiar capacities of love constitute an existential attitude which is literally an invitation to another person to break out of the incomplete and limited structure of his actual being and to move towards his "ideal" level, that is, towards a fuller and deeper actualization in the realm of (his) value-being. Here the fundamental indifference of love which precludes any predetermined or advanced indication of what might appear in love's movement lets the other person be as he is, and encourages him to become who he is as he is in the totality of his intrinsic value-being. It expresses itself in a simple plea to the other: "Become who Thou art." Love as an existential attitude is creative in the sense of being the most conducive of attitudes for the continuous promotion and unfolding of the other in his very essence as person.

Should the other accept our invitation, the boundaries or forms of many of his relationships with reality will obviously be broken or transcended so that his interaction with reality will reestablish itself with ever greater depth and extension, affirming anew the creativity of love. Synthesizing the insights into the dynamic and creative (cognitive and existential) character of love Scheler gives this definitive description:

> Love is that movement in which every concrete individual who is a bearer of

> values successfully achieves the highest possible values for that subject according to his ideal vocation. Again, love is that movement in which the individual attains the ideal value-essence compatible with his nature (161).

Let me recapitulate briefly. The limitation on the givenness of personality noted in connection with sympathetic co-performance of acts stemmed from the fact that such co-performance can grasp only a specific (hence limited) aspect of personal reality. Directing itself towards past or even present action it reveals the already actualized, but intuits nothing of the person's being-on-the-way or his immanent potentialities. And whatever qualitative direction someone may have exhibited through his past action, the creative and transcending characteristics of person categorically preclude any projection of that direction into the future.

Where love is concerned, its intentionality as a creative movement is directed towards the fullness of the person as a dynamic transcending being. The movement of love "coincides" with the movement of personality, "envisaging" the "end" result or "final" state, pointing to the person's "absolute" limits of fulfillment as person. Love is eminently creative precisely because it addresses itself to the totality of the person as a dynamic source of richness. Cognitively, this suggests a maximization of range and depth of insight with respect to what potentially may appear to consciousness.

Here and only here can we intuit the essence of an individual human being, his peculiar axiological character.

The fullness, or gestalt, or "ideal" being, as immanent to the person himself, indicates that towards which he moves in his actualization through acts. Here appears that qualitative direction of acts of a future-oriented being who actualizes himself in a realm of infinite possibilities.

The intuition of this direction is subsequently "verified" through co-performance in an emotional intuition of value, that is, whenever what love "envisages" through its anticipatory-imaginative function coincides with what eventually appears in feeling as actual. Owing to personal trancendence this of course must be a continuous process which cannot be hyposthasized. Personal essence is revealed concretely in the in-principle infinite and never-ending series of dialectical exchanges between what is anticipated ("ideal") and what is confirmed in co-performance and feeling functions as actualized, between what is intended on the basis of this new confirmed actuality and what is subsequently confirmed, and so on.

Though not constitutive per se in the apprehension of personal essence, love as an existential stance or invitation creates the most conducive atmosphere for the other to reveal himself in his full nuance as person and ensures the possibility of confirmation of what has already been anticipated as well as of ever new anticipations and confirmations.

Conclusion

Scheler's ideas on knowing the peculiar character of each individual person are most valuable for their extended challenge to the alleged objectivity of the so-called "detached" observer. It is love and not antipathy or lack of emotional involvement that leads to greater insight into reality in general and into personal reality in particular. The detached observer insists on the lack of objectivity in the lover precisely because he himself "fails to recognize the particular individual values present in the object, but discernible only to the sharper eye of love. The blindness, then, is all on the side of the 'detached observer'" (Scheler 1954:160).

Still, to suggest that Scheler is basically correct in his estimation that the peculiar character of each individual person can be adequately grasped only through love--a view I personally want to uphold here--is philosophically difficult to sustain. There are several aspects of this problem.

To begin with, it is evident that any one of the outstanding features of personality, and certainly all of them in concert, ensure that the essence of a person forever eludes any rational analysis and make it impossible for that essence to be expressed in conceptual terms. For example, in his uniqueness and individuality, each person is ineffable, indeed

ultimately "transintelligible" or beyond full intelligibility. Personal essence as an individual essence does not meet the requirement of universality necessary for concepts and usually associated with rationality. Conversely, conceptual thought must fall short of the singular. Second, the person actualizes himself most concretely in the realm of feeling and value. In this context personal essence refers to a unique axiological character; it partakes of the realm of values and as such is accessible only through an emotional intuition to which, Scheler insists, the intellect is completely blind. Finally, the person is a dynamic transcending being. From this perspective personal essence cannot be approached statically; it can never be pinned down as an "object," finished thing, complete structure, etc.[1] It reveals itself in person's continuous activity as person and our continuous love and sympathy for him, and does so with a clarity far different from the clarity of reason:

> Although the structure love-person is profoundly "clear" in its cognitive, dimension, that is, what is perceived or disclosed in and through love is absolutely grounded and irrefutable, the structure is profoundly "unclear" in its active dimension, that is, what is lived in and through loving is towards unrealized creative possibilities. The structure of persons in love can only be open and radically dynamic . . . . Where persons in love are concerned there are no objects, no things, no this or that; there is only unique and intense penetration (Luther 1974:162).

But the conceptual difficulties are not limited only to the description of what appears in the experience of love;

they also extend to the grasp of the experience itself. If, as Scheler claims, nothing opens man up more powerfully and in a positive sense for the world than love, then it is also that force which most powerfully shatters the bounds of the self. That consequently the person can see more on continually fresh "levels" of objectivity points to an intensification or "recoiling" of his subjectivity necessary to positively resolve the initial "disintegration." The fluidity as well as the highly personal (subjective), hence unique, character of these processes present obvious obstacles for attempts to frame them conceptually.

What legitimately reflects these conceptual difficulties (and the problems of communicability and intersubjective sharing implied with them) is of course the fact that throughout centuries, attempts to record and clarify the experiences of love and their evidence have been made in art, particularly through poetry rather than in philosophy. This situation is indeed consistent with what Scheler insists on at the first mention of the idea of personal identity as a "qualitative direction of acts," namely, that it is the "most hidden of all phenomena" which can be pointed at "only by way of images" (1973a:385). And Binswanger, a close follower of Scheler in some respects, commenting on the sort of knowledge furnished by love, writes: "This knowledge is image-laden . . . for love neither 'thinks' logically-discursively, nor metaphysically-substantially, but imaginatively-speculatively" (Blankenburg 1972:35).

Binswanger's comment is valuable for its appreciation of yet another difficulty which affects how personal essence is apprehended through love. He clearly understands the implications of that essence's being given incompletely and indirectly. The dynamic and creative aspects of personal reality imply that this reality can never in principle be given exhaustively. Its discovery is a matter of a process of the other's continuous actualization as person and our continuous loving him, for he is never given to us as a complete structure. And since our understanding of him is conditional upon a being-with-him in similar modes, it is in some sense always mediated by the significance this co-performance has for us. Both then the incompleteness with which the other as person is given as well as the indirectedness of this givenness, suggest that who he is (his personal essence) is ultimately a matter of interpretation by each of us who meet him.

Which brings me directly to the most problematic issue facing Scheler's theory: the issue of its verification. As Scheler contends, it is only in and through love that we can grasp the essence of another person. The peculiar direction that the other takes as person can only be determined "inside" the movement of love. There are no extrinsic determinations here, no predictions as to what the meaningful direction taken by the other might be. Love "affords an evidence of its own" (1954:150). To appreciate the significance of this contention for the problem of verification needs a restating

of some axiomatic features of the love-person co-relation.

The person perceived in love is the person as a dynamic and creative source of possibilities. The manner of this apprehension is characterized by flexibility and openness. The nature of the "object" grasped suggests, therefore, that there can be no criteria for what can appear, while the understanding process itself, (i.e. love), is constituted precisely in overcoming or "abolishing" any such criteria as constitutive of cognition. This amounts to saying that what appears in the intuition of love can be verified only by that intuition. Moreover, what appears is unique and ineffable and it appears in the most personal, hence unique, of modes or attitudes. There is no checking here with someone else as to the correctness or "truth" of our apprehension. Both the experience itself and the content of what is apprehended are original and incommunicable. Which is to say, that if the personal essence of another can at all "reappear," it will do so only in the loving praxis of the very person to whom it was initially given. Scheler's theory can certainly be tested then by experience, (as all theories must be), but evidence for its validity is not objective in the sense as "there for everyone" but remains private. If valid, the theory is literally "true-for-an-individual-person." For personal essence may indeed be the paradigm case of "different things to different people."

Should this be looked at as arbitrary and an odd way out, I can perhaps counter with a pragmatic argument. In the last

decade, an increasing number of psychotherapists, especially of the humanistic and existential schools, have concluded on the basis of their practice that the results of therapy improve considerably whenever the therapist assumes an unconditional positive regard toward the patient. (Some, e.g. C. Rogers, have even insisted that such positive regard is the condition of the therapeutic process itself.) Scheler's theory would seem then to be supported by this fact, if we grant that what constitutes the core of therapy is the gaining (and conveying in a dialogical exchange) of the knowledge of who the patient is (his "qualitative direction"), so that on its basis he can introduce concrete existential changes by taking a different stance toward himself and the world.

Finally, is it not the case that, it is precisely when we are loved that we feel ourselves best understood, confirmed so to speak in our activities? From Scheler's perspective this is not by accident. If each of us as person is in the execution of essentially different acts in a realm of openness, then precisely in love as an attitude grasping and promoting this actualization is one "confirmed" in one's very being a person and "encouraged" to go on being a person. The experiences of being well understood are thus also experiences of being fundamentally accepted and at the same time of being profoundly relaxed and "centered." Indeed, they are experiences in which we feel most certain of the existence in us of those dimensions characteristic to our being persons--transcendence, freedom, creativity, love, etc. Here the certitude of being

is the certitude of being known. In this perspective, the rationalist's "I think therefore I am" and its existentialist equivalent "I am therefore I think" are both inverted in an altogether radically different dialogical thesis: "I am loved therefore I am."

CRITICAL SUMMARY

If we adhere to Aristotle's contention that whatever is given in experience must be qualified, i.e. it must be given as something, then at the heart of Scheler's thinking on knowing others appears a certain contradiction. The fact that other persons exist, he claims, is given to us non-inferentially and immediately through their expression, and yet he also claims that their essence or identity as persons can be apprehended only indirectly.

I believe that Scheler is entirely correct in adhering to the first of these conclusions, and correct also with respect to the second assessment insofar as he considers personal essence as a peculiar qualitative direction taken by each human being. That qualitative direction is certainly a hidden phenomenon, given indirectly, incompletely, through a continuous process, and adequately only in love. Where the difficulty occurs--and what indeed gives rise to a contradiction of an existence given without an essence--is in Scheler's assuming this qualitative direction to be the sole principal factor responsible for individuation, and in fusing it together with intentionality and capacity for objectification in an autonomous sphere cut off completely from the perceptual realm. In the attempt to recover and guarantee each man's uniqueness through the theme of personality as

individuated in itself certain features constitutive of persons in general are made synonymous with who they are as individuals. From Scheler's perspective the latter tack is understandable. The higher personal sphere must individuate since the bodily drives and their structure make up the most general processes within man, and since ultimately all life is metaphysically one. At the same time the personal sphere must incorporate the principle of our differentiation from the animal, and it must be autonomous because one of the main thrusts of Scheler's ethics is to make the latter's content irreducible to the sense sphere.

But, it must be asked, do we not in our immediate apprehension that others exist grasp them also as individuals? And certainly evident is their distinctiveness from members of other species, since the innumerable meanings of human expression, such as joy, anger, hate, love, resentment, etc., are essentially phenomena of intentionality. That the other has an "objective world" correlative to his being a person is articulated through his expression. To grasp these essential attributes of personhood requires neither love nor profound insight.

There is no difficulty in asserting that embodiment can to some extent individualize the person if one does not take the dubious step of positing all life to be metaphysically one and if one does not sunder the unity of the human being, as Scheler does through his radical split between person (spirit) and lived-body (vital consciousness or ego). Indeed,

all we can justifiably say is that the uniqueness of each man appears on a continuum in which he is initially individuated through his body, and that subsequently in a process of gradual unfolding of his personality and our discernment of it this basis for individuation becomes insignificant. The particularity of corporeal features becomes displaced by a far more profound type of individuality as the basis of his distinction from others. What remains transcendent to our immediate apprehension of others is this deep sense of their uniqueness as well as the significance that their "world" has for them. Should however this level of individuality be considered as the sole factor responsible for human individuation and the full grasp of the significance for others of their "world" made a condition of recognizing that they are persons, then the contradiction initially noted in this summary becomes impossible to resolve.

The understanding of who the other is, is an emotional understanding in the sense that it is an understanding rendered impossible without active participation of the human affect. Only love on the basis of a felt value can "visualize" the gestalt of personality, and since the "content" of this gestalt is value-being, only feeling functions can confirm the direction offered by this "vision." It was also noted in the conclusion to Part One that it is the affective states which effect the greatest modification of the lived-body and hence constitute at the perceptual level, the primordial evidence in the immediate apprehension of others through expression. For these reasons

I believe we can successfully qualify Scheler's clarification of knowledge of others as an "affective epistemology."

An objection may be raised here concerning the appropriateness of applying the term "epistemology" to Scheler's effort. The private or non-sharable nature of the evidence offered by love and the conceptual difficulties inherent in recording it present formidable obstacles to the prevalent cannons of what constitutes knowledge: objectifiability and transmittability. Yet the certitude concerning what is seen of the other through love is absolute, and to disregard it because of a potentially restrictive concept of knowledge is to take risks of far greater magnitude than those posed by lack of intersubjective verification. For if Scheler is correct, then the ultimate or essential status of persons cannot be truly discovered and elaborated without an affective knowing, (hence epistemology), of the type he proposes.

In a more general context, the main impact of these views of Scheler is to force us to take seriously the distinction between understanding and information. In light of these views it becomes perfectly clear, for example, why the so-called "communication explosion"--based largely on the progressive rationalization of communicative media and a decreasing use of our sympathetic functions--has not, in many instances, enhanced our knowledge of others but may have often in fact produced the reverse effect of exacerbating the problems of alienation and misunderstanding.

APPENDIX

The Phenomenological Givenness of "Minds"*

A phenomenally sound mind is given when we attempt to "understand" the expressions of man without further ado, in contrast to our seeking to explain them "causally." In this "understanding," the fact that psychic processes take place in the other person, processes which have causes and whose life-expressions are "effects," is never present as a state of affairs. What is essential for "understanding" is that out of the spiritual center of the other, which is cogiven in intuition, we experience the acts of the person (speech, expressions, deeds) with respect to us and the environment as intentionally directed toward something, and that we re-execute such acts, i.e., that we "rejudge" his spoken propositions and the corresponding judgments, "refeel" his feelings, and "relive" his acts of will, and that we attribute to all of this at once the unity of some "sense." Of course, this "rejudging, refeeling, and reliving" is not a "cojudging" in the sense of "agreeing with" or making the same judgment as the other, nor is it a feeling of the same or similar feelings. It is only a reforming of the "sense" contained in a number of acts with random temporal distribution of their execution,

*Excerpted from Scheler (1973a:476-8).

acts that are directed toward changing variations of sameness. This continuity of sense in the course of the acts of the other is, in all understanding, the continuous intuitive background of single acts of comprehension. This is independent of the question of whether this sense is true or false, good or evil, a question that belongs to a sphere other than that of this "sense." This sense is also the "background" of "misunderstanding." And only when we encounter obstructions to this intention of understanding that prove to be unalterable, even if we assume misunderstandings on our part, does our attitude toward the other change in a characteristic manner. Someone tells us a somewhat curious and extravagant story that seems "hard to understand." We are in the attitude of "understanding." Then someone comes and whispers into our ear, "This man is mad." Our attitude changes at once in a characteristic manner. An empty spot replaces the previously given spiritual center out of which we relived his acts with him. Only his body-and life-center and his egoness remains in the givenness of intuition. We cease to see meaningfully directed intentions that end in his life-expressions. What remains given are movements of expression and other movements behind which we begin to look for psychic processes as causes. A band of "causality" or of environmental stimuli which releases his expressions replaces the "band of sense" of his former expressions. "Objects" that we saw with him in understanding now become "stimuli"; intentions become "processes"; the "nexus of sense"

becomes a nexus of causes; the personal act-center becomes an objective unity of body and ego; "understanding" becomes "explaining"; and the "person" becomes a piece of nature. If someone with whom I find myself in an understanding attitude says, "It is a nice day today," I do not make the judgment, "Mr. X is telling me that we have a nice day today," or, "X experiences the process of judgment pertaining to the state of affairs of its being a nice day." His saying so is only the occasion on which my intention is directed toward the being of a nice day (as a state of affairs), and I may perhaps merely correct his assertion with regard to the reality of this. But it is quite different when something given is not "meaningful." In this case I make the following judgment first: "X says that it is a nice day today," "X judges that it is a nice day today," "He says first this and then that." And it is this process in him that I now bring into a causal relation with other psychic processes and the environment.[109] It does not matter in either case whether the proposition of judgment is true or false. A human being can always "be mistaken," but he does not thereby lose his sound mind. Even if an insane man happens to find the most original truth, he remains insane.

NOTES

INTRODUCTION

[1] For the best biographical study on Scheler I refer the reader to Staude (1967). See also Ch. 1 of Ranly (1966).

[2] A complete Scheler bibliography was compiled in Germany by Hartmann (1963). More recently, Frings (1978a) has listed all English translations of Scheler's works. In addition, extensive bibliographical material in both German and English appears in Frings (1965) and (1974), Ranly (1966), Staude (1967), and Deeken (1974).

[3] For a more detailed treatment of Scheler's understanding of phenomenology see Emad (1972) and Spader (1978); also, Frings (1970) and Spiegelberg (1965).

PART ONE

Introduction

[1] It is the cluster of issues associated with this knowledge that the term "intersubjectivity" refers to consistently throughout Part One.

[2] This is a term coined by Paul Ricoeur (1967:36) to indicate phenomenology's non-commitment with regard to being. Ricoeur contrasts it with "doctrinal" or metaphysical idealism.

Section 2

[1] This in essence is the position of epistemological solipsism.

[2] This term has had a variety of translations. Of "sciences of man," "social sciences," or "humanities," the latter is perhaps the best candidate.

[3] For examples of more recent treatments of this issue see Buford (1970).

Section 3

[1] Husserl does not seek to prove the existence of others (or the possibility of communication) because the other's existence along with the existence of the external world is presupposed by and given to consciousness in the mode of the natural attitude, whose certitude about being phenomenology does not question but merely explicates.

[2] The outer perceptual field is therefore the logical choice of realm from which the objective material for the "alter-intentionality" of the ego of all constitution is to be sought. On this point Manfred Frings also remarks that "underlying [Husserl's] analysis persists the implicit distinction between the ego as ego and the constitution of the other as perceived other" (1978b:145).

[3] The concept of appresentation had made its earlier appearance in Husserl's writings on perception. The hidden aspects of the perceived object are said to be appresented by the objects presented, visible sides.

[4] If, as Husserl maintains--rightly, I believe--that the otherness of the other issues from a distinction from my identity, the factor of his difference from me cannot then in turn be used to establish my identity--this being the procedure of the reduction to the sphere of ownness. Husserl's argumentation on this point appears circular and the positing of the apodicity of "my ownness" questionable if not dogmatic.

[5] This insight was not attainable in the Cartesian cogito. As long as the emphasis remained on the existence rather than on the sense (or "essence") of the "I" the social nature of that ego remained obscure. The very fact that Descartes is compelled to call upon God to guarantee the existence of others attests to this.

[6] In a sympathetic treatment of Husserl, Elliston (1977) disagrees with this objection, arguing that behind its line of reasoning lurks a logical fallacy, namely, the assumption that if 'two things' are apprehended in different ways then those two things must be different. As counterexemplary, he points to instances in which the identity of something is maintained in spite of the different modes of our apprehension, e.g., I now see and later remember the same person, not two persons.

I do not wish to dispute the truth of Elliston's counterexample but rather its applicability. What must be

pointed out is that it is the logically prior identity of meaning which allows us to differentiate seeing, remembering, touching, imagining, etc., from each other. Whereas Husserl's procedure exhibits an exactly reverse order. He wants to establish an identity of meaning "another living body" by a comparative "inductive" process, in which case the similarity of how the two bodies (mine and other's) appear is crucial. The original objection is therefore to the point.

[7] David Carr (1973-4:21) suggests that it is difficult to see why the alter-ego is a special case of being "more other" than other objects since any transcendent object is given as other. This is so, only if one accepts a priori the "disontologizing" project of Husserl's phenomenology.

[8] Ricoeur (1967) suggests that the founder of phenomenology does indeed pass on to a "doctrinal" or metaphysical solipsism. Schutz (1966:87) also thinks along these lines.

[9] Lorsqu'en effet Husserl affirme la concordance entre les opérations les plus concrètes et l'unité intersubjective qui se développe et se sédimente dans le monde objectivé, n'est-ce pas là l'affirmation de principe d'une continuité qui ne peut être à tout moment elucidée? Entre le principe de la constitution de l'autre et les objectivations dans le monde, il y a une faille que les analyses transcendentales ne permettent pas de combler. L'ego méditant peut toujours réactiver des sens, mais recoit-it autre chose que ce qui lui est transmis, sans pouvoir parvenir à identifier l'origine de ce sens? Et en ce cas, admettre un 'non-constitué' est briser la continuité réflexive dans son identité avec la continuité de l'activité constituante, dont le concept même ne peut être maintenu qu'à la faveur d'une illusion transcendentale.

[10] Le problème ne sera plus de savoir comment, a partir d'un sujet pur concu comme origine intransgressible, une connaissance d'autrui-sujet et, par suite, une communication avec ce sujet autre est possible, mais il concernera la totalité de cet être qui est posé à la fois dans la réflexion, la subjectivité et la relation: à quelle structure ontologique fondamentale cet être doit-il répondre pour assumer contemporainement ces diverses possibilités, quelle est sa possibilité dernière, se réalise-t-il pleinement dans la subjectivité ou l'intersubjectivité, dans la solitude ou la communication?

[11] "But this critique of authenticity of subjectivity is to lead Husserl to reduction after reduction and first to a reduction of evidence itself. Every philosophy of seeing, of immediacy, threatens to turn to naive realism--that of Husserl more than any other, insofar as he insists on the presence of the thing itself in 'flesh and blood.' This is a danger that Husserl never ceased to invite. The more he

insists on a return from the thought to the originarily evident, the more he has to compensate for the latent risks of his intuitionism in ever further radicalizing the idealistic interpretation of constitution" (Ricoeur 1967:192). With the reverse relationship, one might add, holding just as true.

[12] Husserl is prevented from such consideration by the polarization of his thought. On one hand his reifying perception cannot grasp the expressive gestalt; on the other, as a consequence of his idealism, he attempts to locate the essence of human expression in mental privacy.

Section 4

[1] The use of "about" and "of" in this context is borrowed from Schutz (1962:158). It renders Scheler's thought more adequately.

[2] In this vein Kelly attacks Scheler's Robinson example as a "faulty metaphysical argument, one founded upon the assumption that the human mind develops according to laws that bear no reference to the physical environment" (1977:134).

Section 5

[1] A corollary to this necessity of mediation by the lived-body is that "factual perception of the ego and of psychic facts is, for this reason, as subject to deception as factual outer perception through outer 'sensibility' is" (Scheler 1973a: 412). The purported absolute truth value usually ascribed to perception of one's inner states cannot therefore be maintained.

[2] Recent evidence of ethnographic research tends to support this claim. As Ekman (1980:93-4) notes, cross-cultural studies indicate that certain facial expressions are consistently interpreted by various peoples as conveying the same emotions.

[3] This passage in particular, and Scheler's theory of perceiving others in general, is reflective of a major shift in German psychological theory that occurred during his lifetime. Whereas the old associationists emphasized an analytic study of elements, the new movements were more concerned with the total individual who alone provided the background necessary for the intelligibility of any elements. This shift was evident, for example, in William Stern's "personalism," the various forms of "understanding" psychology

(Versthendenpsychologie), and the Gestalt school. See Owens (1970:77).

Conclusion

[1] Sadler, for one, finds it telling that of the two Western philosophers for whom intersubjectivity is least problematic, Marcel and Buber, one was a musician (Marcel) while the other (Buber) was raised in Jewish oral tradition (1969:369).

[2] The visual metaphor "structures" not only conceptions of cognition, but of subjectivity as well. For an appreciation of the significance of ocular imagery in the history of philosophy and its profound influence on major shifts in epistemology and philosophy of mind in particular, see Richard Rorty (1979 Ch. 1,2).

PART TWO

Section 6

[1] The problematic of man was the main theme of lectures given by Scheler at the University of Cologne during the last six years of his life.

[2] Not unlike Husserl in this respect, Scheler perceived the European Community to be in a spiritual crisis whose overcoming was contingent upon developing a new philosophy with a deeper conception of man.

[3] For Scheler spiritual monism neglects the legitimate claims of physiology, while materialistic monism misses the gestalt nature of the life process.

[4] In the earlier written Formalism Scheler flatly declares: "... we use the term mind (Geist) ... to designate all things that possess the nature of act, intentionality, and meaning." (1973a:389).

[5] From this it follows that the essence of ideation can be grasped through a single case only (Scheler 1961:50).

[6] The meaning of this is that whatever we grasp of the person's particular act is conditional upon grasping him as an existent core of intentional activity. The descriptive intent here categorically excludes any interpretation of person

as effecting its own existence, (i.e. as a causa sui). For Scheler it remains strictly the prerogative of God to have an essence consumating itself in existence.

[7] We can appreciate this even more in light of Hartmann's (1980:250) note that Scheler in his phenomenological period considered "substance" not in its Greek-Scholastic meaning of having relative permanence and changing accidents but in its modern, especially Kantian, understanding as absolutely permanent and unchangeable.

[8] La question est embarrassante, car les diverses formules dont use Scheler ne rendent pas toujours le même son, et, pris au pied de la lettre, elles seraient même difficilement conciliables. Il est evident que l'auteur cherche à se frayer un chemin entre deux extrêmes qui sont d'une part l'idée d'une personne-substance distincte de ses actes, et d'autre part d'idée d'une personne qui ne serait qu'une pure correlation ou un simple entrecroisement d'actes.

[9] Il n'est d'autre issue que d'avoir recours . . . à l'idée de la forme, dont c'est précisément un caractère de n'exister qu'à la faveur d'une matière avec laquelle elle ne se confond pas puisqu'elle la règle.

[10] Scheler also calls this qualitative direction "the most hidden of all phenomena" (385).

[11] This premise can in fact be considered as the determining factor of Scheler's conception of man. His theory of human levels oscillates between two polarities; it is "clearly connected with the phenomenon of possible [degree of] objectivation. The more a thing can be objectified, the farther removed it is from the spiritual center of man, the Person" (Strasser 1977:45).

[12] This is true at least in the following sense. Intellectual or rational intuition is generally taken for granted. But only because Scheler's ethics postulates the existence of an affective intuition with an objective correlate can there be any talk of diverse intentionalities and essentially different acts, hence person. Conversely, spirit as "objectivity" must refer to all meaningful structures and not merely the rationally accessible ones.

[13] Scheler also postulates the existence of "relatively intimate" spheres of the person. The person is never either wholly intimate nor wholly social. Intimacy and sociality are two polarities between which concrete persons carry out their existence.

[14] This discussion presupposes of course Scheler's theory of objective values and their hierarchy. Its explication, however, is not necessary at this time. Here I am only concerned with pointing to the "medium" within which personal

identity or qualitative direction is discernible, not the particular contents which comprise it.

[15] All care must be taken not to misinterpret here "structure" statically.

[16] This situation is exactly parallel to that noted by Kelly (1977:77) with respect to Scheler's claim that essences exist outside the mind. See also below p. 129.

[17] It seems to me that the question of the source of individuality is as important to ask as impossible is its answer. One can basically either argue for a common core ("human nature") individuated by spatio-temporal influence or for an individuating center acting and leaving its peculiar stamp upon man's common constitutive make-up. Disregarding the so-called controlled experiments used to isolate certain factors in the nature vs. nurture debate, at the descriptive level nothing points conclusively to one alternative rather than to the other, especially if one suspends judgement about the actual existence of a spiritual center in man.

[18] The emphasis on the actuality of person and essential openness to an infinitely vast "objective world" is somwhat akin--with qualifications to be sure--to Marcel's discussion on the presence of self and its availability (disponibilité) for reality. See Marcel (1951).

[19] A view adopted already by Aristotle.

Section 7

[1] The thesis of the priority of value is also not to be confused with a quite different claim that the properties of objects of cognition are determined by the particular kind of values. A particular constellation of values determines only which objects are accessible to an individual's cognitive apprehension, and not to what those objects themselves are. Other aspects of the apprehended thing are as irreducible as its value componnent. At any rate, Scheler guards against possible misinterpretations by arguing against both Kant's subjectivism and Plato's ontologism of essence.

[2] Citing "insurmountable difficulties," Kelly (1977:62) disagrees here with Scheler's position. He argues that since few objects are apprehended through a single intentional act and are in fact complex unities of (implicit) meanings (e.g., the intuition of "table" presupposes the intuition of "spatiality") Scheler, in order to establish the priority of the value element in cognition, would have to show as well that priority in all those "moments" implied in cognizing anything. Scheler does however, in my opinion, offer a solution

to this dilemma. In his essay "Idealism and Realism" (1973b) he suggests that the law of figure and background is based "on the relative urgency of the individual drives of the organism and on the relative obtrusiveness of the individual impulses accompanying these drives so that the perceptual complex based upon the more obtrusive impulse becomes in each case the 'figure' while the other remains the 'background'." Thus, even at this fundamental level there is the influence of the vital feelings "inhering" in the sensory-motor complex, though admittedly it is difficult to speak here of "objective values."

Compare Scheler's position to that of Maslow's (1954) contention that even rationality (as a general quest for knowledge) has a conative--affective base.

[3] Especially since Scheler himself acknowledges (1973a:xxi) the proximity of Meinong's theory of emotional presentation to his own views on the essence of values and value-comprehension.

[4] Again, this has to be understood in the context of Scheler's realistic epistemology. The higher actuality of one value over another is intrinsic to the value itself and reveals itself in the act-value correlation from the side of the value.

[5] "All fellow-feeling involves intentional reference of the feeling of joy or sorrow to the other's experience" (1954:13).

[6] All these are conditions, Scheler stresses, of any authentic sympathy.

Section 8

[1] "Love loves and in loving always looks beyond what it has in hand and possesses" (Scheler 1973b:113).

[2] P. Heath translated this as "corporate structural pattern" (Scheler 1954:154).

[3] In fact, given Scheler's realistic framework only on the basis of ascertaining what the object is could one meaningfully speak of whether one's means to apprehend it are adequate.

Conclusion

[1] Proof of this is implicit in a hope or anxiety we sometimes express that someone, perhaps a close friend, has not changed during a prolonged absence. For we cannot be sure until we face him again concretely in person.

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