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The Aesthetic Theory of Roman Ingarden:  
The Identification and General Applicability of  
Ingarden's Principles of Aesthetics with Particular  
Consideration Given to the Sculptural Work of Art

G. David Pollick

Submitted to the faculty of the Graduate School in  
partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree  
Doctorate in Philosophy in the Department of Philosophy,  
University of Ottawa

September, 1981

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## Preface

Several years ago I became deeply aware of the intimacy which exists between the arts and philosophy. While this may be only theoretically apparent to a professional philosopher, it is a commonplace practical assumption to an artist. There can be no truly good art unless the concept is clear, the idea well forged. And though the creative process is a constant dialectic of expression, revelation and reformulation, it always remains under the control of the artist's accepting or rejecting 'hand.' Granting that the standards for a 'successful' work seem to fluctuate from one artist to another, they are always present in some form, asserting a kind of pressure the artist can simply not escape; I know when my work is good and when it is not. As an artist, it is remarkable how simple it all is.

So it is not surprising that when I first read the work of Roman Ingarden I felt I had found a philosopher that could help me better understand why it was I was so convinced that art was never merely a matter of individual preference. He spoke of principles which made the work of art distinct from all other human creations. He sought out the reasons why some works are in fact good and some are not. He seemed to recognize that any human enterprise which could affect the course of human events

as profoundly as artistic creativity, must draw its life from deep in the human situation. Thus the arts were no more a matter of social convention or academic canon than human fulfillment is an accident of nature. All was an achievement dearly to be sought, but often quite elusive. And although Ingarden was unable to fully reconcile my artistic intuitions with my demands for intellectual explanation—an unreasonable request in the first place—he helped; at least he made my schizophrenia easier to bear. For where I had 'thought' there was diversity, he showed me unity, thus permitting the philosopher and the artist to break the same bread.

Over the long years of this study I have received both the personal love and professional assistance of my wife, Janice (to say nothing of our precious children, Dayna and Landon). If either our family or this study suffered for the poverty of my energies, I pray it was the latter. For though priorities between professional and personal lives can be difficult to establish, the joy and laughter of my home made it *nolo contendere*.

To each of those people who gave me what I needed at just the right time, a special thank you.

Professor Peter McCormick, for his remarkable clarity of direction.

Professors Robert Weber, Richard Albares, Rene McGraw and Ray Pedrizetti, for the kind of personal and profes-

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And finally, to my colleagues of St. John's University. Rarely has there been a university more conducive to the well-being of young scholar-educators.

G. David Pollick  
Collegeville, Minnesota

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The predicament of much of contemporary philosophy is partly due to the fact that ongoing conceptualizations have so far outdistanced the situations which engender philosophizing that their conclusions seem to be unrelated to the original problems. After all, philosophy was made for man rather than man for philosophy.

Abraham J. Heschel  
Who is Man?

## General Introduction

The work of Roman Ingarden (1893-1970) exemplifies the kind of growth and rigorous clarification so necessary to the well-being and evolution of insightful philosophical thought. Coming to intellectual maturity under the influence of Edmund Husserl, Ingarden produced a philosophy that is "more akin to the classical doctrine of the founder of phenomenology than any other philosophical inquiry originating from the same source."<sup>1</sup> His work (simultaneously clarification, re-evaluation, and partial rejection of the principles of Husserl's transcendental doctrine) has come to be known as the second classic phase in the history of phenomenology. From the transcendental philosophy of Husserl, springs the ontological investigations of Ingarden: the latter distinct but historically inseparable from the former.

The thread of continuity, never broken in Ingarden's lifetime, was his and Husserl's concern with the relation between pure consciousness and the real world.<sup>2</sup> A break lies in the realistic turn of Ingarden's ontology. He was convinced that the problems which Husserl encountered in his transcendental approach could be avoided if philosophy focused its attention on the nature of essences through an analysis of both existing and

possible objects of knowledge. The objects themselves were seen as determining the manner of cognition; thus it was to be through an ontological, not a transcendental investigation that a resolution to the problem of Realism/Idealism was to be discovered. It was from this perspective that Ingarden was led to the investigation of the mode of being of the work of art.

In an attempt to resolve the controversy over the existence of the world,<sup>3</sup> Ingarden began by examining an object "whose pure intentionality was beyond any doubt."<sup>4</sup> Thus his inquiry began with the literary work of art; an object which could not be equated with either real objects,<sup>5</sup> whose identity would be at the constant mercy of physical alterations, or with ideal objects,<sup>6</sup> essentially timeless in character. The literary work of art was seen as belonging to a third category of objects which did not succumb to the problems resulting from a world having two kinds of objectivities:

The literary work as such is a purely intentional formation which has the source of its being in the creative acts of consciousness of its author and its physical foundation in the text set down in writing or through other physical means of possible reproduction (for instance, the tape recorder). By virtue of the dual stratum of its language, the work is both intersubjectively accessible and reproducible, so that it becomes an intersubjective intentional object, related to a community of readers. As such it is not a psychological phenomenon and is transcendent to all experiences of consciousness, those of the author as well as those of the reader.<sup>7</sup>

Having an object believed to be perfectly suited to his broader philosophic concerns, Ingarden then proceeded to explicate the literary work of art's essential structure, and the subsequent manner in which it is cognitively constituted. But never in his investigations did he lose sight of the ultimate goal, namely demonstrating how phenomenology could lead to Realism:

Although the main subject of my investigations is the literary work, or the literary work of art, the ultimate motives for my work on this subject are of a general philosophical nature, and they far transcend this particular subject. They are closely connected to the problem of realism-idealism, with which I have been concerning myself for many years.<sup>8</sup>

Thus Ingarden himself has provided the basis for seeing his efforts as firstly epistemological and ontological and only secondly as aesthetical. A brief survey of the secondary literature on Ingarden would indicate that the majority of commentaries have followed suit. And of the literature which focuses on his aesthetics, the major portion addresses either the literary work of art specifically or one of the other individual art forms Ingarden had occasion to address. Only a relatively small minority of commentaries have focused on Ingarden's work as being the presentation of a general aesthetic theory. This has been particularly the case in North America where Ingarden's writings in aesthetics have only been partially translated and where the intellectual climate has been more conducive to doing other styles of

philosophy. A close examination of *The Literary Work of Art*,<sup>9</sup> however, reveals that this tendency results in an oversight of some significance for the field of aesthetics.

Historically, Ingarden saw his work in aesthetics as straddling the two major extremes of aesthetic history from ancient Greece to the present:

On one hand, it [aesthetic history] focused upon the "subjective," that is, creative experiences and activities which give birth to works of art, or it concentrated upon receptive experiences and behavior, upon the reception of sensation, the pleasure and delight in works of art (or other things for that matter) out of which, so it is commonly supposed, nothing further is born. At the other extreme it focused upon several distinct kinds of "objects" such as mountains, landscapes, and sunsets, or artificially produced objects usually called "works of art."<sup>10</sup>

In the writings of Plato and Aristotle the poles of this tension are clearly apparent. In the *Ion* Plato stressed the creative and receptive experiences of the artist and observer:

Many are the noble words in which poets speak concerning the actions of men; but like yourself when speaking about Homer, they do not speak of them by any rules of art: they are simply inspired to utter that to which the Muse impels them, and that only; and when inspired, one of them will make dithyrambs, another hymns of praise, another choral strains, another epic or iambic verses—and he who is good at one is not good at any other kind of verse: for not by art does the poet sing, but by power divine.<sup>11</sup>

In *De Poetica* (*Poetics*), Aristotle ignored these creative and receptive acts and focused entirely on the art work itself:

Our subject being Poetry, I propose to speak not only of the art in general but also of its species and their respective capacities; of the structure of plot required for a good poem; of the number and nature of the constituent parts of a poem; and likewise of any other matters in the same line of inquiry.<sup>12</sup>

The more contemporary efforts to focus on one aesthetic problem or another again stand in marked contrast to the systematic effort of Ingarden. Preoccupation with a mere part of the greater whole has had a tendency to draw the investigations too much in the direction of one of the two major extremes Ingarden wished to avoid. On the subjective side the emphasis lies on the nature of aesthetic experience and the grounds of aesthetic judgment<sup>13</sup> or on one of the so-called functions of the work of art such as expression or imitation.<sup>14</sup> No clearer expression of the objective extreme can be found than the following confident statement of DeWitt Parker:

The assumption underlying every philosophy of art is the existence of some common nature present in all the arts, despite their difference in form and content; something the same in painting and sculpture; in poetry and drama; in music and architecture. Every single work of art, it is admitted, has a unique flavor, a *je ne sais quoi* which makes it incomparable with every other work; nevertheless, there is one mark or set of marks which, if it applies to any work of art, applies to all works of art, and to nothing else—a common denominator, so to say, which constitutes the definition of art, and serves to separate, though not to isolate, the field of art from other fields of human culture.<sup>15</sup>

The spectrum of individual aesthetic problems, each wedded to a philosophic perspective, has become wide indeed in the recent years. But this cautious approach to

individual problems by recent studies seems to be a direct result of an inability to delineate the subject matter of the field. And on this point Ingarden has shown why it is that his investigations are of such importance.

Ingarden had a clear idea of what belonged to the subject matter of aesthetics. Individual problems were all seen as having a place in the field as a whole. Thus his work possesses a coherency and cogency which permitted him to surpass the cautiousness of other 'problem-oriented' ventures. In 1968 he indicated eight areas<sup>16</sup> which were *interconnected* and comprised the subject-matter of the field:

(a) ontology (general and particular) of the work of art, (b) ontology of the aesthetic object (involving the concretization), (c) phenomenology of creative process, (d) phenomenology of artistic style and its relationship to value, (e) ontology and phenomenology of artistic and aesthetic values, (f) phenomenology of aesthetic experience, (g) theory of cognition of artistic and aesthetic values as well as theory of criticism, and (h) theory of art's functions with special stress on its metaphysical significance.<sup>17</sup>

He firmly believed that the work of art could not be adequately understood without taking account of the deep relations that existed between the artist, the artifact, and the conscious activity of the experiencing subject. Fragmentary efforts are seen as incapable of coming to grips with the phenomenon since they represent a shattering of the field's unity and overemphasis on one of the extremes. Thus Ingarden's work must be seen as a

rethinking of aesthetic problems (many of which have been discussed by other theorists) from a more systematically encompassing perspective.

As such, Ingarden stands both close to and far from the contemporary work in the field. By and large his problems are the same problems, but his way of addressing these problems reveals a basic confidence in the coherency of the field—in the prospects for positive and rigorous advance. And it is the breadth of his intellectual embrace which justifies such optimism. In the face of the piecemeal efforts of contemporary aesthetics, Ingarden's work has the magnitude to place it among other important attempts at theory construction such as the work of Santayana, Croce, Dewey or Collingwood.<sup>18</sup>

It is the central contention of this investigation, therefore, that although Ingarden's work in aesthetics occupied a place of secondary importance for him personally, he did in fact develop an aesthetic theory of profound importance with universal application to the entire spectrum of art forms. And, more precisely, even though his aesthetic investigations initially centered around the literary work of art and only later began considering some of the other arts—always in the context of his original philosophic program—his writings present the essential principles of a general aesthetic

theory accompanied by the necessary guidance for applying his principles to art forms he never examined. The task of this study will be to demonstrate that this is, in fact, the case: that Ingarden has indeed provided us with a powerful general theory of aesthetics that cannot be ignored regardless of the art form under consideration.

The major difficulty that is encountered by this project is endemic to the Ingardenian program. Because he had never been concerned with the presentation of a general theory of aesthetics, as such, his theory must be extracted from his writings on particular art forms. By in large, the search must be for the universal contained within the particular. This is true both in attempting to identify the essential principles of the work of art as well as the proper manner of applying those principles to, as yet, untreated art forms. Thus this study must initially be concerned with identification and interpretation.

As further support for the claim that Ingarden has produced a general theory of art, we will present an Ingardenian analysis of the sculptural work of art utilizing the essential principles that arise out of his treatment of other art forms, as well as the guidance he provides for applying his principles. Since Ingarden never systematically treated the sculptural work of art,

it provides an excellent test case for the claim that his theory has general applicability. Although this cannot result in a claim of absolute universality, it would certainly show that his theory is indeed flexible enough to be applied to other art forms while remaining essentially intact. Thus the initial phase of identification and interpretation will be followed by a phase of extrapolation.

The method of proceeding will follow the course established by Ingarden's writings. *The Literary Work of Art* must be seen as the most central of his works on aesthetics. *The Cognition of the Literary Work of Art*<sup>19</sup> and the *Investigations into the Ontology of Art*,<sup>20</sup> as well as various articles, all represent the development and extension of the thought found in this extraordinary text. Obviously, *The Cognition of the Literary Work of Art* is fully committed to the position taken in *The Literary Work of Art* and must be considered as a companion to these investigations. Narrowly described, these two works focus on the structure and cognition, respectively, of the literary work of art. But more broadly assessed they contain the essential aesthetic principles to which we have already referred. Although Ingarden's thought did evolve through time, thus becoming more or less rigid on some issues in later works, the general direction of his program clearly articulated in these two texts remained

firmly in place throughout his career.<sup>21</sup> In his discussions of music, painting, architecture, and film in the *Investigations into the Ontology of Art*, there are consistent references made to the positions taken in these two earlier works. In fact, each art form under consideration receives special treatment in relation to the literary work of art. As Ingarden himself noted in the *Investigations into the Ontology of Art*, these later studies are to be seen as essentially in accord with his earlier work:

"They stand in a very close relation with the chief assertions of the book *The Literary Work of Art* and form only an extension of the investigations of that volume."<sup>22</sup>

Thus it is thoroughly within the spirit and interest of Ingarden's philosophy of art that we begin by examining the principles contained in *The Literary Work of Art* as a means of access to his position on other art forms. Following on this initial stage of the inquiry attention can then be turned to the art forms treated in the *Investigations into the Ontology of Art*.

This order of approach, while consistent with Ingarden's order of investigation, will also provide for the examination of two crucial areas foundational to this study: firstly, the essential principles of the literary work of art, and secondly, the manner in which Ingarden utilizes these principles in the extension of his literary theory of art to other art forms. The examination

of these two areas will provide what is necessary to perform an extension of his theory to the sculptural work of art. This extension will attempt to stay as close as possible to the course suggested by Ingarden in his investigations into other art forms. At this point we will have completed the first part of our two part investigation. The essential principles will have been identified and extended to the sculptural work of art in accord with the guidance given by Ingarden's extension of the principles of the literary work of art to other art forms.

The second part of the study will begin with a presentation and discussion of a few of the critical commentaries which have been directed to one aspect or another of Ingarden's general approach. Problems selected for treatment address major and significant aspects of the essential principles that will have been identified as belonging to Ingarden's general theory of aesthetics. Thus they are problems which must be seen as threatening to the contention that Ingarden has produced a general theory of significant merit and universal applicability.

The concluding chapter of the second part will contain a discussion of sculpture intended to assess the Ingardenian description of the sculptural art form. In places where Ingarden's perspective is in need of further clarification and modification, suggestions will be made which will attempt to strengthen the position which has

been attributed to him. Of particular interest will be the ability of his theory to give an adequate account of contemporary evolutions in the field of sculptural art, paying close attention to whether or not his essential principles can be retained given the suggested modifications. At this point it will have been shown that Ingarden has indeed provided an aesthetic theory of general applicability having the sufficient flexibility to give a powerful account of the most central art forms without obscuring their intrinsic diversities.

PART I

The Exposition and Extension of the Essential  
Principles of Ingarden's Theory of Aesthetics

## PART I

### The Exposition and Extension of the Essential Principles of Ingarden's Theory of Aesthetics

#### Section 1: Introduction to the Exposition and Extension of the Essential Principles of Ingarden's Theory of Aesthetics

Part I of this study has three distinct purposes. Firstly, in Chapter 1 the essential principles which govern Ingarden's analysis of the literary work of art will be identified. This will be an initial step in showing that Ingarden has provided the essential elements of a general theory of aesthetics. As such, those features of the literary work of art which are obviously not limited to works of literature will be focused on.

Secondly, Chapter 2 will be concerned with the manner in which Ingarden applies to music, painting, and architecture the essential principles of the literary work of art.<sup>23</sup> This will yield two important results: it will serve to identify Ingarden's procedure for the application of his aesthetic principles, and it will permit the distilling out of those aesthetic principles which apply to the central art forms Ingarden considered. Thus, the overall result will be the disclosure of Ingarden's general aesthetic theory.

Thirdly, Chapter 3 will be the application of Ingarden's newly distilled general theory to the sculptural work of art in an attempt to show, in fact, the general applicability of Ingarden's theory, both in method and principle. Since sculpture is an unexamined art form in Ingarden's work, it provides an excellent test case for the general character of Ingarden's thought in aesthetics.

The overall conclusion towards which Part I is headed is that Ingarden has produced a general aesthetic theory which is applicable to the full spectrum of objects lying within the artworld.

## Chapter One

### The Essential Principles of the Literary Work of Art

#### Section 2: Introductory Remarks Regarding the Essential Principles of the Literary Work of Art

It is the contention of this investigation that the essential principles of Ingarden's general aesthetics can be found in *The Literary Work of Art*. This chapter will focus on the identification and explication of those principles. Since our concern is with the principles which suggest universal applicability, many of the characteristics essential to the literary work of art alone will be touched upon only lightly. Ingarden's contributions in this area of aesthetics are the widest known and will no doubt continue to get the attention they greatly deserve. However, the universal character of his thought deserves equal appreciation, and it is around this point that this study revolves.

Although it is extremely difficult to isolate the central principles of Ingarden's theory, one from the other, such an effort must be made in order to present a brief exposition of the theory. Some overlap is inevitable and ought to be viewed as evidence of the organic interdependence so characteristic of this thought. For example, even though the literary work of art's

relationship to the material world is discussed in a separate section, the topic is very closely involved with the work of art's essential heteronomy and intentional character. In such cases, the topical divisions will be a result of the emphasis which Ingarden gave these subjects in his writings. Concern with the identification of the literary work of art's essential principles simply requires that the smooth expository flow of Ingarden's texts be interrupted.

Section 3: A Preliminary Brief of the Essential Principles of the Literary Work of Art

In *The Literary Work of Art* Ingarden describes the literary work of art as an intentional object which finds the source of its existence in the conscious acts of the author. The author embodies his or her intentions in a physical foundation, e.g., printed letters on paper, thus preventing an identification of the work with the psychic states of the author and providing for the work's continued existence beyond the life of the author. Thus a real thing stands as one of the ontic foundations of the work of art, as a support for the being of the work of art.<sup>24</sup> The real material is not to be identified with the work however. The work also has two other ontic foundations which serve to secure the work's independence. Firstly, the existence of the work depends upon the conscious acts of the reader, and secondly, upon the existence of ideal entities.<sup>25</sup>

The literary work of art is also understood to be a multi-layered formation composed of four strata:

- (1) the stratum of *word sounds* and the *phonetic formations* of a higher order built on them;
- (2) the stratum of *meaning units* of various orders;
- (3) the stratum of manifold schematical aspects and aspect continua and series, and finally,
- (4) the stratum of represented objectivities and their vicissitudes.<sup>26</sup>

When constituted by a reader these four strata combine in individual works to create a polyphonic harmony of the work's aesthetic value qualities which is peculiar to the individual work.<sup>27</sup> A reader is provided access to the intentions of the author through the guiding principles established in the real material. Through a process of constitution taking place within an aesthetic attitude, the reader actualizes the meaning intention embodied in the signs of the work.<sup>28</sup> The work of art thus constituted provides an intersubjective structure precisely, but not completely, determined by the author's intentions. Each work contains within it places of indeterminacy, or potential moments, which the reader is relatively free to 'fill-in.'<sup>29</sup> These 'gaps' or 'blanks,' such as a time lapse in the life situation of a character, while dictated by the text and its internal logic, permit different "concretizations" of the work of art by different readers. No two concretizations of the work, or in Ingarden's terms "aesthetic objects," are exactly alike in every respect. Their principle of identity is found in the schematic structure of the work of art which served as the basis for the different concretizations.

The work of art is thus seen as an intentional object whose strata form a polyphonic harmony of aesthetic value qualities. It has three ontic foundations: the

material thing, acts of consciousness—of both the author and the reader, and ideal entities. It is also schematic which serves to explain the multiplicity and diversity of aesthetic concretizations. Although there are many other features of the literary work of art, these are absolutely essential and must be regarded as having particular significance within Ingarden's general theory of aesthetics.<sup>30</sup> It will be the task of this study to clarify their application to differing art forms in the subsequent treatment of music, painting, architecture, and, finally, sculpture.

## Section 4: The Literary Work of Art's Relationship to the Material World

Although Ingarden clearly rejects the claim of neo-positivism that the literary work of art is reducible to its physical components, i.e., ink marks on paper,<sup>31</sup> he recognizes the necessity of arguing for a material foundation which would provide for the work's continuity and accessibility to a community of readers. Yet, it is only permitted a foundational role in the work of art itself. As such the material foundation of the work of art is an ontic foundation which supports the being of the work without ever becoming identified with it. The existential dependence of the literary work in respect to its material ontic foundation is affirmed in his discussion of word sounds.<sup>32</sup> In this regard he makes a distinction between the "concrete phonic material" of the real world, which is never identical in differing instances, and the word sound which is apprehended as the same each time the word is uttered.<sup>33</sup>

[A]word sound is built only in the course of time, under the influence of various real and cultural conditions, and it undergoes, with changing time, numerous and varied alterations and modifications. It is not real; yet it is anchored in reality, and it is changeable according to change in the latter. But its change is fundamentally different from change in the concrete phonic material, which originates at some point in time, exists, and then forever ceases to exist. Whereas the word may be uttered countless numbers of times, and the concrete phonic material may always be new, the "word sound" remains the same.<sup>34</sup>

Since the distinction between the concrete phonic material and the word sound is crucial to Ingarden's position on the relationship of the real world to the work of art, the cause for this distinction is of importance. The word sound is capable of standing in an identical relationship to differing concrete materials.

It appears that the utilization of the phonic material as the carrier of one—and indeed one and the same—meaning leads to the demarcation of the word sound as an identical phonic form distinct from the concrete phonic material.<sup>35</sup>

Since the word sound does go through "varied alterations and modifications," as noted above, it does assume a position between the concrete phonic material, which undergoes "fundamentally different" changes, and the meaning of the word. The identity of the word sound is found in the ideal meaning it carries. The word is made publicly accessible, however, by the concrete phonic material. In this capacity, the real material of the literary work of art provides the occasion for the concretization of the word sound and thus the actualization of the meaning carried by the word sound. The claim is clearly that the word sound is not real, nor is it ideal, but rather that it has intentional existence. This begins providing the literary work with a kind of existence that does not fall prey to the dangers that come from either reducing the work to its physical elements or to the psychic states of the artist. This is, of course, Ingarden's intention.

In order to buttress his claim that the word sound is not reducible to its real material, he introduces a possible criticism to his position. If the word sound does go through various alterations, is it not to be more identified with the concrete phonic material than has been indicated, the consequence being that there actually are only two kinds of objects, real and ideal? How can one speak of the *same* word sound when a shifting of position or a change of function within a sentence results in a different meaning? Ingarden argues that there are higher typical forms beneath which the individual word sounds are capable of being subsumed. He has stated that

the same word-sound can unite under certain circumstances with secondary, but equally typical, Gestalt qualities and, as a result, be able to express further nuances of the meaning that is bound to the word sound.<sup>36</sup>

This would imply that the complete meaning of any one word sound is never fully expressed. And, as will be seen, this is in fact the case. There is never a complete actualization of the ideal content pertinent to a word sound. When a word sound is combined with other word sounds, further nuances present themselves which were contained in the original typical form, though in a latent state. The word sound's position and function in the higher sentential form occasions the 'release' or presentation of meaning carried by the word sound.

New meaning is not added, but instead what was always there is realized. Thus, the kind of alterations that the word sound experiences are quite different from the essentially material changes that can take place in the concrete phonic material.<sup>37</sup>

The changes that are peculiar to the material thing are apparent in the creative process of the artist. The shaping of the real material is an effort by the artist to bring "about changes in the surrounding material world"<sup>38</sup> which make possible the work of art. Both passive and active moments comprise the artist's activity. The manipulation of the physical material in accord with an original intention is followed by a receptive moment—a moment of assessment.<sup>39</sup> If the artist is satisfied with the qualities presented by the material thing, further alteration of the medium affirms what has been embodied. If the artist is dissatisfied, the physical composition of the work may be altered and perfected or even abandoned altogether. The physical foundation of the work of art serves to bring to appearance the value which belonged to the "idea" of the artist's imagination. The value which accompanies the idea is seen as distinct from the material that carries it.<sup>40</sup> The aesthetically valuable qualities of the work depend upon the real material—are supported by the real material—but are not reducible to real material.

Ingarden's position on the autonomy of the real world, as well as the literary work of art's heteronomous relation to it, is quite clear. "All in all an independent material world—apart from other minds—was the indispensable prerequisite of the literary work of art."<sup>41</sup> It is because of Ingarden's position on the heteronomy of the literary work of art that he saw himself as a realist. He never doubted the realistic character of his work. He said that "he cannot be an idealist if he assumes the existence of intentional objects because this implies the existence of real objects also."<sup>42</sup> Yet, as is well known, the case can be made for his idealism. It seems that the issue cannot be conclusively resolved one way or the other.<sup>43</sup> What is clear, however, is the literary work of art's ontic dependency on the material world evidenced by the relation between the word sounds and the concrete phonic material. There will be further occasion to examine this ontic foundation in the later treatment of some of the criticisms raised against Ingarden's philosophy.

Section 5: The Literary Work of Art as an Intentional Object

In this section the inseparability of the essential elements of Ingarden's theory will be clearly in evidence. In order to understand the intentional character of the literary work of art,<sup>44</sup> it will be necessary to address both the work's second ontic foundation: acts of consciousness, since they are the source of the intentional object's existence, and the work's third ontic foundation: ideal entities, since they guarantee the identity of the work's meaning. The following statement clearly demonstrates their inseparability.

By a purely intentional objectivity we understand an objectivity that is in a figurative sense "created" by an act of consciousness or by a manifold of acts or, finally, by a formation (e.g. a word meaning, a sentence) exclusively on the basis of an immanent, original, or only conferred intentionality and has, in the given objectivities, the source of its existence and its total essence.<sup>45</sup>

Purely intentional objects "derive their existence and their entire endowment from an intending experience of consciousness (an 'act') that is laden with a determinate, uniformly structured context."<sup>46</sup> As such, they are heteronomous objects which "do not possess an essence of their own."<sup>47</sup> Both the material and formal content of the intentional object is derived from an act of consciousness. And Ingarden hastens to add a further qualification:

However, not every purely intentional object has its *immediate* existential foundation in a certain conscious act, or more generally speaking, in a self-existent object.<sup>48</sup>

Thus is introduced the distinction between originally purely intentional objects and derived purely intentional objects.<sup>49</sup>

The former draw the source of their existence and their essence directly from concrete acts of consciousness effected by an ego; the latter owe their existence and essence to formations, in particular to units of meaning of different orders, which contain a "borrowed" intentionality.<sup>50</sup>

Derived purely intentional objects are extensions of originally purely intentional objects. They are only indirectly dependent upon acts of consciousness, though dependent all the same. By not being directly dependent upon acts of consciousness, they have a particular advantage over originally purely intentional objects; "they can be intended or apprehended by various conscious subjects as identically the same."<sup>51</sup>

In the literary work the intentionality of the meaning units serves as the *immediate* ontic foundation of the derived objectivities. Though this ontic dependence is ultimately traceable to the act of consciousness responsible for the originally purely intentional object's existence, as distinct objects their continued existence and accessibility by other persons is guaranteed by their relationship to the units of meaning. The act of consciousness which determined and brought into

existence the meaning units is necessarily subjective and private. But the meaning units themselves, once intended, provide the derived purely intentional object with an ontic foundation which transcends subjective acts of consciousness. Here is clearly seen Ingarden's unavoidable dependence upon a third ontic foundation. In *The Literary Work of Art* the meaning unit is understood to be the "'actualization' of the meaning elements of corresponding ideal concepts."<sup>52</sup> Once the work is created it takes on an independent existence which is only possible because of the relationship meaning units have to ideal concepts.

The literary work of art's three ontic foundations are now all in place.

It [the literary work of art] exists as an ontically heteronomous formation that has the source of its existence in the intentional acts of the creating conscious subject and, simultaneously, the basis of its existence in two entirely heterogeneous objectivities: on the one hand, in *ideal* concepts and ideal qualities (essences), and, on the other hand . . . in real "word signs."<sup>53</sup>

The act of consciousness that performs the role of sentence-formation actualizes the ideal meaning thus becoming the necessary condition for the coming-into-being of the literary work of art. But the certain independence and intersubjective character of the literary work of art is found in the derived purely intentional object's ontic relativity to ideal entities.

The essential character of the purely intentional object can be seen to lie in two distinguishing features: heteronomy and derivacy.<sup>54</sup> As has been already stated, purely intentional objects are not self-existent; the foundation of their being is in another object. As such, they are heteronomous. They would not exist were it not for autonomous conscious acts. They rely upon the conscious acts for the bestowal of their essence. The conscious act

is "impotently creative:" what it creates lives by its grace and its support, and cannot become something "spontaneous," "independent," "autonomous." If it may be so expressed, it cannot "rebel" against the acts of consciousness that produced it, it cannot have any other properties in its contents, any other destiny, arbitrarily chosen, *but those* which have been ascribed to it. It does not have its own existential foundation in itself. Its existential foundation is in the conscious act that produced it intentionally, or, more exactly, in the psychic subject who performed the act.<sup>55</sup>

Derivation points more precisely to the genesis of purely intentional objects; "to be a derivative existent is equivalent to 'being created,' being doomed to have the *source of its origination in something else.*"<sup>56</sup>

And in conjunction with having its source of existence in another object, the derivative object also has the

foundation of its existence. . . in some other object. Consequently, an object that is derivative and heteronomous exists, after its generation by some other object, only if this or some other object *maintains it in existence.*<sup>57</sup>

This complex schema of dependencies is responsible for

the unique character of the work of art as a purely intentional object. It is, therefore, necessary to understand each ontic foundation's relationship to the purely intentional object.

The act of consciousness is the necessary precondition for the creation and the concretization of the work of art as an intentional object. It cannot be said that there exists a work of art without an act of consciousness. Both the material and ideal ontical bases of the work rely upon the conscious act for the performance of their role in the work. The real material, as a vehicle for the intentional object, is only capable of accepting and maintaining in readiness the guiding principles which allow for the creation or constitution of the work of art. As a physical thing it is incapable of actually embodying meaning in a strict sense. The meaning which belongs to the work is ontically founded in ideal entities. This is the most crucial relationship under consideration, for Ingarden has claimed that ideal entities are responsible for maintaining the work of art's existence after it has been intended by a conscious act.

The ideal meaning of the work is derived from ideal entities and supported by them, thus securing the work's identity. But this supporting function ought not to be seen as somehow separable from the act of consciousness,

for the conscious act is also a support for the work of art's existence. It is only via the conscious act that ideal entities are able to support the work of art. The ideal meaning of the work of art is not to be identified with the meaning contents of ideal entities. The act of consciousness actualizes, not realizes, the ideal content of the ideal entities. Since the ideal meaning of the work is only an actualization of ideal content, the act of consciousness is the necessary condition for the continued support of the work's existence, although it be in conjunction with the ultimate support provided by the ideal entities. Ingarden confirms the dependence which the purely intentional object has on both the act of consciousness and ideal entities:

The intentional act of pure consciousness is not creative in the sense that it can create genuine realizations of ideal essences or ideal concepts in an object that is intentionally produced by it. . . Thus in the forming of a sentence, it can produce only actualizations of ideal meaning contents of concepts and form them into new wholes (i.e., meaning contents of sentences).<sup>58</sup>

Unlike real objects, where there is actually a realization of ideal essences, an act of consciousness is indispensable for the support provided the purely intentional object by the ideal entities. If one may put it so, there is an intermediary function provided by the act of consciousness which is absolutely necessary for the ideal entities' participation in purely intentional objects.

The distinction between actualization and realization serves to explain Ingarden's statement that the act of consciousness provides the "total essence"<sup>59</sup> of the purely intentional object. A more precise formulation of the relationship between particular objects and ideal entities will be helpful.

In his exposition of Ingarden's thought, Eugene Falk has drawn the distinction between the particular object—the common essence of a diversity of essentially identical objects—and the general idea of the object as such. Using the example of a square, he says:

Because the same essence is concretized in the invariant constitutive nature of every square regardless of lateral dimension, we say that all squares are essentially identical. However, that does not mean that all squares are essentially identical *in respect to the essence squareness*. Individual squares can be essentially identical only in respect to their ideal correlate, *the general idea of the square as such* that allows for the variable of lateral dimensions; whereas the essence squareness is a quality, an immutable unity that can have *no variables*.<sup>60</sup>

The essence of an object is always ultimately derived from a general idea. The essence of many squares provides for the identity of each object by virtue of the relationship which the essence has to the general idea. Since the general idea of 'square' contains within it certain variables, it must be distinguished from any individual square which contains within it no such variables. But the individual square is never a direct actualization of the general idea of 'square' and here

enters the intermediary role of the act of consciousness.

The individual object has as a direct correlate a particular idea. The particular idea, unlike the general idea, contains within it all of the properties of the particular object. Falk describes this relationship as follows:

[A]n individual object is the individuation of its particular idea, but only its (essential) constitutive nature (and not its particular traits) may be considered as "derived" from the constant qualitative moment of the general idea under which it falls, because the general idea does not contain any of the object's variable particular traits. Consequently, the particular idea is an intermediary ideal correlate between the individual object and its corresponding general idea, and is therefore subordinate to that general idea.<sup>61</sup>

The ideal content actualized by the conscious act must therefore be seen as differing from the content of the general idea since the particular idea, upon which the object is directly based, contains properties not found within the general idea. It is because of the particular idea's role that the act of consciousness is not only a source of the object's existence, but a support as well. Simply put, the individual object contains more within it than can be attributed to the general idea and must therefore not only rely upon the particular idea for the source of its existence, but for continued support as well. Both ontic foundations are absolutely necessary for effecting and maintaining the purely intentional object's existence.

The purely intentional object, then, is a heteronomous and derivative formation which is ontically dependent upon a real thing, acts of consciousness, and ideal entities for the source and support of its existence both in respect to its content and structure. Of these three ontical foundations, the acts of consciousness play the most central role since they are the avenue for the ideal entities' participation in the object as well as the active component which structures the material thing in accord with the artist's intentions. In respect to ontic autonomy, the purely intentional object is a "nothing," an "illusion,"<sup>62</sup> which draws its very existence from the acts of consciousness; it is in "total submission to the sphere of influence of the 'I' of the consciousness."<sup>63</sup>

Section 6: The Literary Work of Art as a Schematic Formation

As purely intentional objects, the objects which are represented in the literary work of art differ from real objects in three significant ways. Firstly, "every real object is *unequivocally, universally* (i.e., in every respect) determined."<sup>64</sup> Secondly, "all determinations of real objects jointly constitute a *primary concrete unity*."<sup>65</sup> And thirdly, "every real object is *absolutely individual*, i.e., if the determination A is to pertain to it at all, it must be individual."<sup>66</sup> The represented objects of the literary work of art do not labor under the same restrictions.

Respecting the first characteristic, represented objects are projected by nominal expressions and sentences.<sup>67</sup> The content of the represented object is not determined in the same way as is the content of real objects. Nominal expressions, which ultimately comprise sentences, possess unlimited possible determinations. The form of the nominal expression provides for the possibility of an infinite number of determinations. Because of this, literary works of art are undetermined; they are essentially schematic formations. Pertaining to the second characteristic, the intentional object which is projected on the basis of a nominal expression represents only a partial actualization of the nominal

expression's content.

For in the case of simple nominal expressions, e.g., "table," "man," etc., the appertaining intentional object is projected explicitly and actually with respect to its material makeup only in one moment of its constitutive nature, so that, e.g., the indispensable material, determinations appertaining to mankind are already cointended only implicitly and potentially.<sup>68</sup>

The reader draws on the potential stock of word meaning, constituting an intentional object which only partially exhausts the potential determinations. The author, through the selection of nominal expressions, determines the potential boundaries which encompass the particular work. But within the boundaries there are "spots of indeterminacy."<sup>69</sup> The form of the represented object is only a schema requiring 'filling-in' on the part of the reader. But it is quite impossible to ever fully determine such an object.

If instead of simply "man," we say "an old, experienced man," we do remove, by the addition of these attributive expressions, certain spots of indeterminacy; but an infinite number still remains to be removed. They would disappear only in an infinite series of determinations.<sup>70</sup>

This is completely contrary to the nature of a real object which is universally and unequivocally determined and possesses an infinite number of determinate properties. And, finally, while the real object is absolutely individual, the represented object always remains somewhat general. It is impossible for a nominal expression to completely represent all the determinations which

individuate an object. In summation of this position:

We can say that, with regard to the determination of the objectivities represented within it, every literary work is in principle incomplete and always in need of further supplementations; in terms of the text, however, this supplementation can never be completed.<sup>71</sup>

From the perspective of the reader, the schematic character of the work serves to explain the diversity of experiences that differing readers have of the same literary work of art. No two readings are absolutely identical in every respect. Each reader completes and fills out the predetermined schemata of aspects provided by the author. These schemata are an essential element of the literary work of art, neither identifiable with the real concrete aspects nor the psychic states of the reader.<sup>72</sup> They serve to guarantee the identity of the work, while allowing for the many and varied concretizations of the work which occur in a community of readers. The essential schemata direct the course of the reading, predetermining the possible variations which can still be considered as being in accord with the work. But the variations here are infinite. The potential stock of word meanings which correspond to any nominal expression provides the reader with great, though precisely directed, latitude. The above distinction between the character of real and purely intentional objects makes this clear.

The diversity of concretizations is to a great extent determined by the past experiences which a reader

brings to the work.<sup>73</sup> These will determine the quality of the concretization. The following passage from Nikos Kazantzakis' *Zorba the Greek* is illustrative of this point.

A strong *sirocco* was blowing the spray from the waves as far as the little cafe, whose glass doors were shut. The cafe reeked of brewing sage and human beings whose breath steamed the windows because of the cold outside. Five or six seamen, who had spent the night there, muffled in their brown goatskin reefer-jackets, were drinking coffee or sage and gazing out of the misty windows at the sea.<sup>74</sup>

There are many different possible concretizations of this passage, each in accord with the provided nominal expressions. Minimally, all one needs is basic familiarity with the language. But the greater the reader's experience with the real objectivities represented in the passage, the richer the reading becomes. This sensual portrayal of a setting challenges not only the actualization of a particular place, but the constitution of a very specific culture and situation strongly determined by the senses of smell and touch. The actualization of the potentialities which this represented situation offers the reader is directly dependent upon the reader's ability to follow the course that each actualized schematic aspect offers. The successful filling-in of a heavy, sea-air morning when combined with the actualization of the smells of sage and coffee and well-salted human beings, offers the actualization of schematic

aspects which were initially not immediately apparent. These aspects were "held in readiness,"<sup>75</sup> only presenting themselves to readers capable of filling-in the prerequisite aspects. As can be seen from the example, the subsequent represented objectivities take on an astonishing richness only accessible to those readers of a particular background of personal experience. Thus, it is plainly evident that while the schematic aspects of the work are precisely determined, their inherent spots of indeterminacy provide for a multiplicity of concretizations not identifiable with the work itself. The work establishes the minimal criteria for adequate concretizations while simultaneously allowing for a virtually unlimited number of experiences which vary in their quality of actualization.

A final, and not insignificant, point regarding the character of the represented objects concretized on the basis of the schematic aspects, is that in virtue of the life imbued in them by the reader, they are, in a sense, taken to be real. But this is indeed only a pretension.

Aspects that are imposed on the reader in the reading can never be actualized as genuine perceptual aspects but can be actualized only within an imaginal modification, even though in the work itself they are commonly determined as being perceptual. They are, however, suggested to the reader only by artistic means, and they belong not to truly real, but to purely intentional objectivities, which, according to their content, are quasi-real.<sup>76</sup>

When such "existence-assuming moments,"<sup>77</sup> occur they enrich

the experience of the reader and effect the course the experience takes. But they need not always occur and, in fact, in non-representational works of art, such as architecture, they never occur. Thus they are a feature of the experiences of schematically represented objectivities in the literary work of art. Though this is essentially extraneous to the work of art, it further indicates the implications which schematism has on individual concretizations, thus going a long way in explaining the power which works of art are known to have over human beings. Though not real, literary works of art are capable of having the force of real objects in real situations, though without the practical impact that accompanies real events. Herein lies one of the great advantages which is peculiar to works of art having a schematic character.

Section 7: The Literary Work of Art as a Polyphonic  
Harmony of Heterogeneous Strata

As was indicated at the outset of this study, the literary work of art is a multi-layered formation having four distinct strata. But, this "does not exhaust the peculiar essence of the literary work."<sup>78</sup>

The material of each stratum leads to the constitution of its own characters which correspond to the nature of the material. . . The stratification of the "material" produces in the literary work of art a remarkable *polyphony* of aesthetic characters of heterogeneous types, whereby the characters belonging to the various types are not alien to one another, as it were, but enter into various mutual relationships.<sup>79</sup>

Each stratum has aesthetic value qualities which are peculiar to it alone and which contribute to the overall harmony of the individual work of art. Let us briefly examine some of the properties which belong to each of the four strata.

The stratum of linguistic sound formations is capable of producing secondary characteristics which are aesthetically relevant to the work. Word sounds with individual meanings create different effects.

This is best known by the fact that when it is necessary. . . to say something delicately and least drastically, it is possible to avoid the particular effect of an obscene word by substituting one with an identical meaning but with a more neutral word sound.<sup>80</sup>

Word sounds, likewise, often contain aesthetically relevant qualities, e.g., "'beautiful' and 'ugly,'" "'light' and 'heavy,'" or words which sound "'funny' or 'serious,'

'solemn' or 'pathetic.'"<sup>81</sup> When word sounds with such aesthetically relevant qualities are combined into sentences, phonic formations are created which also create secondary characters.

If, for example, word sounds with a truly soft sound are followed by a sharp and hard word sound, there is an accentuation of the sharpness of the latter in the guise of a distinct phenomenon of contrast.<sup>82</sup>

And, in conjunction with both of the above characteristics, the phonetic phenomena of rhythm and tempo are also produced within this stratum. Although both these characters may be taken to be the result of individual readings, there is "a rhythm that is prescribed. . . by a given set of word sounds and immanent to it,"<sup>83</sup> and there is a tempo of the "determinate character of the phonetic side of language, its 'quickness' or 'slowness,' its 'lightness' or 'lazy heaviness.'"<sup>84</sup>

Although these aesthetically relevant qualities do not exhaust what is possible in this stratum, they serve to indicate the interdependence which exists between them and the overall meaning of the work. Ingarden confirms their role in the work in the following way:

The fact that the phonetic formation and characters truly possess their "own voice" in this polyphony is best supported by the drastic change which the work undergoes when it is translated into a "foreign" language. However faithful one tries to make the translation, whatever pains one takes to keep the closest resemblance between phonetic qualities, one can never reach the stage where the translation would in this respect fully match the original, because the otherness of the individual word sounds

inevitably carries with it other phonetic formations and characters.<sup>85</sup>

The entire structure and meaning of the work is effected by this stratum and upon it depends the very existence of the literary work of art. And, if it did not contain any special value-quality elements, the polyphony of the work would be poorer by a significant element.<sup>86</sup>

The stratum of meaning units contributes to the work's polyphony through the rationality it brings to the work. The literary work "can never be a totally irrational formation."<sup>87</sup> This is indispensable for the emergence of the other strata. In this regard, Ingarden points to a work's "rational clarity." He says:

If a work is "clear," it is like a crystal in whose structure we can orient ourselves without further ado. The fact that we can orient ourselves through and through in the whole, that we can obtain such "penetrating perceptions" at all, and that nothing impedes us in this—the fact that one perception does not cover another and thus prevent us from attaining in one glance a "survey" of the whole in all its parts, structures, and elements—all this seems to be involved in the peculiar phenomenon of clarity.<sup>88</sup>

The way in which this stratum participates in the work's polyphony lies in its producing of "unique aesthetic values,"<sup>89</sup> There is a beauty or ugliness produced by the "rational meaning-formation"<sup>90</sup> itself. Ingarden refers to the individual charm of the work which is closely aligned with, but not identical to, a particular style. The style of the work produces an experience of joy. In the experience of a beautifully

constructed sentence there is a "cheerful, cool, joyful peace,"<sup>91</sup> whereas just the opposite results from a sentence which is poorly constructed. Herein lies this stratum's particular voice in the polyphony of the work. When irrationally constructed, this stratum not only elicits a negative reaction on the part of the reader, but impairs the coming to appearance of the represented objectivities with their aesthetically relevant qualities.

The schematized aspects provide their own contribution to the work's harmony as well. One of Ingarden's rare references to sculpture is precisely to the point.

Sculptors, for instance, keep in mind similar moments of aspects when, in designing a monument—e.g., of a human form which is to stand on a high pedestal and thus to be seen from below and from a given distance—they do not adhere to purely anatomical proportions but fashion the figure in such a way that, seen from below, it can evoke the intended "impression" (i.e., nothing other than an aspect provided with special aesthetic value qualities).<sup>92</sup>

Likewise, the aspects of the literary work of art contain aesthetic value qualities peculiar to them alone. A manifold of aspects with a particular content constitutes the "style of a manifold of aspects."<sup>93</sup> This style is "value-possessing,"<sup>94</sup> and though it may appear through the objects represented, it actually belongs to the aspect stratum. Therefore, it is not so much that represented objects appear through the aspects, but how

they appear that is important. The aspects are appropriately constructed on the basis of their content to create a particular aesthetic style which is determining of specific value qualities. Through the selection and construction of aspects the author is capable of giving a work certain *colorations* or *shadings* which bring about the presentation of aesthetic values not equatable with the represented objects, but manifest through them. Thus, the same object in different works will have special stylistic features and differences.

The stratum of represented objectivities performs a particularly important role in the work's overall polyphony. The "most significant element of the literary work of art"<sup>95</sup> is the manifestation of metaphysical qualities. The metaphysical qualities themselves, as well as their manner of manifestation, constitute an aesthetic value.<sup>96</sup> As the most significant of all the literary work of art's achievements, they demand slightly greater attention.

Within certain situations there is "an atmosphere which, hovering over the men and the things contained in these situations, penetrates and illumines everything with its light."<sup>97</sup> This atmosphere is composed of certain qualities such as the 'tragic' or 'sublime,' the 'grotesque' or the 'peaceful.' Ingarden says that these qualities are neither properties of objects nor do they

belong to psychic states. In one of his most lovely passages he describes that which is of such paramount importance. The beauty of the passage calls for liberal quotation.

In our usual, everyday life, oriented on "small" practical ends and their realization, situations in which these qualities would be revealed occur very seldom. Life flows by—if one may say so—senselessly, gray and meaningless, with no regard for the great works which might be realized in this ant-like existence. And then comes a day—like a grace—when perhaps for reasons that are unremarkable and unnoticed, and usually also concealed, an "event" occurs which envelopes us and our surroundings in just such an indescribable atmosphere, whether it is frightening or enchanting to distraction, it distinguishes itself like a shining, colorful splendor from the everyday grayness of the days, and it makes of the given event life's culmination point, regardless of whether the basis for it is the shock of a brutal and wicked murder or the spiritual ecstasy of a union with God. These "metaphysical" qualities—as we would like to call them—which reveal themselves from time to time are what makes life worth living, and, whether we wish it or not, a secret longing for their concrete revelation constitutes the summit and the very depths of existence. . . . When we see them, the depths and primal sources of existence, to which we are usually blind and which we hardly sense in our daily lives, are "revealed," as Heidegger would say, to our mind's eye. But they not only reveal themselves to us; in looking at and in realizing them, we enter into primal existence. We do not merely see manifested in them that which is otherwise mysterious; instead, they are the primal (element) itself in one of its forms. But they can be fully shown to us only when they become reality. Thus the situations in which metaphysical qualities are realized and shown to us are the true high points of unfolding existence, and they are likewise the high points of the spiritual-psychic essences which we ourselves are. They are high points which throw a shadow on the rest of our lives; that is, they evoke radical transformations in the existence which is immersed in them, regardless of whether they bring with them deliverance or damnation.<sup>98</sup>

The appearance of metaphysical qualities in real life cannot be called forth, they appear as if by "grace" alone and are altogether too fleeting. The desire that they do appear and become the object of contemplation, however, does result in two remarkable and wonderful avenues afforded the human being:

This longing is the secret source of many of our acts. But it is also the ultimate source, on the one hand, of philosophical cognition and the drive for cognition and, on the other hand, of artistic creativity and satisfaction in it—the source, in short, of two psychic acts that are totally different and yet ultimately directed at the same end. Art, in particular, can give us what we can never attain in real life: a calm contemplation of metaphysical qualities.<sup>99</sup>

Since the metaphysical qualities possess an intentional ontically heteronomous mode of existence, they are unable to claim real existence. However, just as is the case with the metaphysical qualities of real situations, they are completely determined "concretizations of ideal essences."<sup>100</sup> The advantage of their appearance in the work of art lies in the opportunity they afford for calm contemplation. In real situations such appearances have immediate and significant import for the affairs of life. A real tragic murder cannot help but leave us to some degree permanently affected. The murder of Becket in T. S. Elliot's *Murder in the Cathedral*, while immediately powerful, gradually drifts away into the realm of the impersonal, not directly related to the course of the spectator's personal events. While

the difference between the effects of these two experiences is a matter of degree, the degree is significant. Ingarden's reference to Aristotle is revealing of the distinction he wishes to make.

In closest connection with the aesthetic manner of observing metaphysical qualities is what Aristotle had in mind when he spoke of "catharsis." Viewing them in an aesthetic attitude not only fills us with pleasure and bliss but also gives us the specific relief which we experience after all difficult events requiring the exertion of all our powers. It appears that precisely this relief and inner calm after an aesthetic apprehension of a metaphysical quality is what Aristotle meant by catharsis.<sup>101</sup>

Ingarden has also claimed that the manner in which metaphysical qualities are manifested is an aesthetic value. He is very insistent on the fact that while all of the other strata working in cooperation are necessary for the appearance of metaphysical qualities, it is the object stratum itself which brings them to appearance. They require appropriate objective situations for their manifestation. This obviously does not occur at the level of any of the other strata. While metaphysical qualities may be intended by meaning units, their manifestation requires that the represented world be constituted, which, while dependent upon all of the strata, cannot occur at any of the lower levels satisfactorily. Since the way in which represented objects appear has a profound influence on the appearance of metaphysical qualities, the entire structure of the work is responsible for their appearance, although that appearance

actually occurs in the final stratum.

If, for example, we read in our morning paper a police report of an event which is tragic by its nature, then the metaphysical quality of the tragic does indeed belong to this situation; but the official tone and style of the report make it impossible for the tragic to be manifested. In reading of it we can only *think* that the reported event is truly tragic, but we cannot see this unless we transcend the simple police report. Taking the matter purely objectively, the same event, if represented in a literary work of art, though represented in other states of affairs and in other aspects (and therefore, strictly speaking, not "the same" in every respect), can be such that the tragic is genuinely manifested. In the first instance we read the report with perfect composure over our morning coffee; in the second, we are deeply moved by what is represented, even though it may be something that never really occurred.<sup>102</sup>

Beyond the mere cooperation which must exist between the strata in order that metaphysical qualities appear, Ingarden calls for a further condition:

In particular, the polyphony of value qualities must not merely show a harmony that permits the appearance of a metaphysical quality; instead, it must be harmoniously compatible with it, so that the given metaphysical quality is *required* by the harmony as a complementing element.<sup>103</sup>

To the extent that the metaphysical qualities are held in readiness by the schematized aspects, they are predetermined by the objective situations and await concretization in them. As such, then, they are not manifested in the work, but determined by the work and held in readiness only. Thus the metaphysical qualities may or may not come to appearance depending upon the quality of the work as an organic polyphonic harmony.

If this manifestation does not attain fruition, or if the manifested quality is in conflict with other qualities manifested in earlier or later situations, so that not even a dissonant polyphonic harmony happens to occur in the course of the work, then the given work of art may perhaps possess other values, constituted in the remaining strata, and thus have secondary value, even though as a whole it cannot achieve perfection.<sup>104</sup>

So it can be said that not only does the final stratum of the work result from the work's polyphony, but it contributes to it as well. The represented objects and situations are the final and unifying element which brings to appearance the highest of aesthetic value qualities—the metaphysical qualities.


Section 8: Concluding Remarks on the Essential Principles of the Literary Work of Art

In summary, the following principles have been identified as essential to the literary work of art:

- (1) The literary work of art is not to be identified with any real thing.
- (2) It is a heteronomous intentional object ontically dependent upon three autonomous objects for the origin and support of its existence. They are
  - a) real objects
  - b) acts of consciousness of a psychic subject
  - c) ideal entities
- (3) It is a schematic formation which requires a reader for its completion and concretization. As such, the literary work of art cannot be identified with any one of its concretizations.
- (4) The literary work of art is a polyphonic harmony of heterogenous strata within which are founded its aesthetically valuable qualities.

The principles outlined above, while certainly directing the course of Ingarden's initial investigations into other art forms, were never assumed to be essential to all works of art. Specifically, Ingarden reacted negatively to Nicolai Hartmann's extension of the four-layered structure of literature to other arts. "It is . . . dangerous to assume the structures characteristic of works of one art are also present in works of other arts, as Hartmann has in fact done."<sup>105</sup> While some of the features of the literary work do prove to be universally applicable, thus supporting the contention that Ingarden does provide a general theory of aesthetics,

the uniqueness of each of the arts necessitates conclusions which are only partially in accord with the literary work's essential structure. In particular, attention must be paid to the differing art forms' schematic character, which in turn has implications for their ability to represent objects and/or situations, and also to the art forms as stratified formations. Both of these features, essential to the literary work of art, are not universally present in other art forms. Ingarden's modifications of his initial claims for literature serve to reveal the proper manner of extending his literary theory to, as of yet, untreated art forms.



## Endnotes

### Chapter One

<sup>1</sup> Anna-Teresa Tymieniecka, "Beyond Ingarden's Idealism/Realism Controversy With Husserl—The New Contextual Phase of Phenomenology," *Analecta Husserliana*, IV, ed. Anna-Teresa Tymieniecka (Boston: Reidel, 1976), p. 247.

<sup>2</sup> Roman Ingarden, *The Literary Work of Art*, trans. George G. Grabowicz (Evanston: Northwestern, 1973), pp. lxxii-lxxv. Ingarden published this work in German under the title *Das literarische Kunstwerk* (Halle: Max Niemeyer, 1931). He later published it in Polish under the title *O dziele literackim*, trans. from German by Maria Turowicz (Warsaw, 1960).

<sup>3</sup> Ingarden's later work is a more direct confrontation with this problem. See Roman Ingarden, *Spór o istnienie świata* (The Controversy over the Existence of the World), 2 vols. (Cracow: Polska Akademia Nauk, 1947-48; 2nd ed., Warsaw: Państwowe Wydawn. Naukowe, 1961-62). A German version of this work appeared as *Der Streit um die Existenz der Welt*, 3 vols. (Tubingen: Max Niemeyer, 1964-66). The third volume is not published in Polish. Volume I has been partially translated by Helen R. Michejda as *Time and Modes of Being* (Springfield: Thomas, 1964).

<sup>4</sup> Ingarden, *The Literary Work of Art*, p. lxxii.

<sup>5</sup> Ingarden, *The Literary Work of Art*, pp. 9-12.

<sup>6</sup> Ingarden, *The Literary Work of Art*, p. 10.

<sup>7</sup> Roman Ingarden, *The Cognition of the Literary Work of Art*, trans. Ruth Ann Crowley and Kenneth R. Olson (Evanston: Northwestern, 1973), p. 14. Ingarden published this work in Polish under the title *O poznawaniu dzieła literackiego* (Lvov: Ossolineum, 1937). He later published a revised and enlarged version in German under the title *Vom Erkennen des literarischen Kunstwerks* (Tubingen: Max Niemeyer, 1968).

<sup>8</sup> Ingarden, *The Literary Work of Art*, p. lxxii.

<sup>9</sup> For reviews of *The Literary Work of Art* in English, see P. Leon, "Das literarische Kunstwerk," *Mind*, 41 (1932), pp. 97-106, and Barry Smith, "Review of *The Literary Work of Art*," *Journal of the British Society for Phenomenology*, 6 (1975), pp. 141-144.

<sup>10</sup> Roman Ingarden, "Phenomenological Aesthetics: An Attempt at Defining its Range," *Journal of the British Society of Phenomenology*, 6 (1975), p. 257.

<sup>11</sup> Plato, *Ion*, in *The Dialogues of Plato*, 2 vols., trans. B. Jowett (New York: Random House, 1920), I, p. 289.

<sup>12</sup> Aristotle, *De Poetica*, in *The Basic Works of Aristotle*, ed. Richard McKeon (New York: Random House, 1941), p. 1455. For Ingarden's discussion of *De Poetica*, see Roman Ingarden, "A Marginal Commentary on Aristotle's Poetics," *Journal of Aesthetics and Art Criticism*, 20 (1961-1962), pp. 163-73, 273-85.

<sup>13</sup> Benedetto Croce, *Aesthetic*, trans. Douglas Ainslie (New York: Macmillan, 1909); John Dewey, *Art as Experience* (New York: Putnam, 1959); and in *Contemporary Studies in Aesthetics*, ed. Francis J. Coleman (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1968) see Donald F. Henze, "The Work of Art," pp. 26-37; W. B. Gallie, "The Function of Philosophical Aesthetics," pp. 393-410; J. O. Urmson, "What Makes a Situation Aesthetic?," pp. 356-369. In this very general grouping must be placed those theorists who have contended that there are no necessary and sufficient conditions of a work of art, but instead only similarities on the basis of which categories are established. See Morris Weitz, "The Role of Theory in Aesthetics," in *Philosophy Looks at the Arts*, ed. Joseph Margolis (Philadelphia: Temple, 1978), pp. 121-131; And again in *Contemporary Studies in Aesthetics*, see William E. Kennick, "Does Traditional Aesthetics Rest on a Mistake?," pp. 411-426; Paul Ziff, "The Task of Defining a Work of Art," pp. 94-111.

<sup>14</sup> R. G. Collingwood, *The Principles of Art* (New York: Oxford, 1938); C. J. Ducasse, *The Philosophy of Art* (New York: Dover, 1963); Eugene Veron, *Aesthetics*, trans. W. H. Armstrong (London: Chapman & Hall, 1879).

<sup>15</sup> De Witt Parker, "The Nature of Art," in *Problems in Aesthetics*, ed. Morris Weitz (New York: Macmillan, 1970), p. 61.

16 Roman Ingarden, "Asthetik und Kunstphilosophie," *Akten des XIV Internationalen Kongress fur Philosophie*, Wien, 2-9 September, 1968, 4 (Vienna, 1969), pp. 214-19.

17 Stefan Morawski, "Ingarden on the Subject-Matter and Method of Aesthetics," in *Roman Ingarden and Contemporary Polish Aesthetics*, ed. Piotr Graff (Warsaw: Naukowe, 1975), p. 174.

18 There have been more contemporary attempts at systematization in aesthetics by such theorists as Susanne Langer, *Mind: An Essay on Human Feeling* (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins Press, 1967) and Louis Arnaud Reid, *Meaning in the Arts* (New York: Humanities Press, 1969).

19 For a review of *The Cognition of the Literary Work of Art* in English, see T. Fiedler, "Taking Ingarden Seriously: Critical Reflections on *The Cognition of the Literary Work of Art*," *Journal of the British Society of Phenomenology*, 6 (1975), pp. 131-40.

20 This work was published in German under the title *Untersuchungen zur Ontologie der Kunst: Musikwerk, Bild, Architektur, Film*, (Tübingen: Max Niemeyer, 1962). Although an English translation of this work has been anticipated for several years, at this point in time the project is not moving forward. Mr. Raymond Meyer, the translator involved in the project, has been gracious enough to provide me access to his completed manuscript. Were it not for his trusting kindness, this study could not have been accomplished. Future reference to this work in the "Endnotes" will include author and the abbreviated title, *Ontologie der Kunst*, and pages cited.

21 Roman Ingarden, *The Literary Work of Art*, p. lxxvii.

22 Roman Ingarden, *Ontologie der Kunst*, p. viii.

23 It is quite remarkable that so much has been thought and written in response to Ingarden's very limited, and one would have to think preliminary, comments on the film and, to a lesser extent, the stage play. (Ingarden's work on the stage play and the film appear in *The Literary Work of Art* under the heading "Borderline Cases." An essay on the film appears in *Ontologie der Kunst*. For an excellent survey of the pertinent literature, see Alicja Helman's "The Influence of Ingarden's Aesthetics on the Theory of Film," in *Roman*

*Ingarden and Contemporary Polish Aesthetics*, (Warsaw: Naukowe, 1975), pp. 97-107.) But regardless of the interest Ingarden managed to engender on these topics, they will not be treated in this study. This is justified on two grounds. Firstly, both art forms fall into that category which Ingarden has called borderline (*Ontologie der Kunst*, p. 325 and *The Literary Work of Art*, p. 322). Therefore, in accord with the principles Ingarden establishes in his treatment of the borderline art forms of program music and abstract painting, namely that the essential features of art forms and works of art in general are not to be found in such examples, this study will focus on the art forms Ingarden saw as central. While this certainly does raise questions regarding the nature of borderline art forms, a question which will be treated in this study, the identification of Ingarden's essential aesthetic principles requires that we follow the course he has established. To look for the principles and method of extending those principles in borderline cases of art forms would not be in accord with Ingarden's approach. Therefore, while the peculiarities of the film and the stage play are certainly not without interest, they do not alter the course of this investigation. Secondly, given Ingarden's very limited treatment of these two art forms, they must be looked upon as only suggestive. An attempt to articulate and extend his central principles ought to rely on those studies which drew his most complete attention. This can hardly be said to be the case with the film and stage play.

24 Ingarden never explicitly defines the term 'ontic foundation.' But in his discussion of existential autonomy versus existential heteronomy, his meaning becomes clear. He says:

Something is self-existent (is existentially autonomous) if it has its existential foundation in itself. It has such a foundation if it is immanently determined in itself. But something is not self-existent (it is existentially heteronomous) if the foundation of its being is not in itself, but in something else. (Roman Ingarden, *Time and Modes of Being*, p. 43)

The ontic foundation (existential foundation) is thus concerned with the origin and/or support of something's existence. When a thing is inherently determined—meaning all of its defining moments are immanent—it is self-existent, or in other words, it has autonomous existence. When a thing's defining moments are not immanent, it is not self-existent; its existence is

heteronomous. And "an existential-ontological law obtains to the effect that every object that is not self-existent points ultimately—sometimes quite deviously—to a certain self-existent object in which the foundation of its being lies." (Roman Ingarden, *Time and Modes of Being*, p. 51) Ontic foundations are, therefore, responsible for supporting and determining the defining moments of things. In the case of intentional objects, e.g., the literary work of art, they do not possess an immanent ontic foundation. "Its existential foundation is in the conscious act that produced it intentionally, or, more exactly, in the psychic subject who performed the act." (Roman Ingarden, *Time and Modes of Being*, p. 51) Thus, the foundation of a thing's being is an ontic foundation. Whether it comes from within, e.g., a real object, or from without, e.g., an intentional object, it remains the ontic support for the moments which define the thing.

<sup>25</sup> This is one area of Ingarden's thought that went through serious reevaluation in his later work. For an account of the ontic basis of the literary work of art, see *The Literary Work of Art*, pp. 360-368. Also see Eugene Falk, *The Poetics of Roman Ingarden* (Chapel Hill: North Carolina University Press, 1981), pp. 125-130.

<sup>26</sup> Roman Ingarden, *The Literary Work of Art*, p. 12. See also Falk's exposition of the literary work's structure. It should be noted that Falk refers to represented objectivities as "presented" objectivities (p. 73). This is certainly acceptable as long as one does not lose sight of the fact that that which is presented in the literary work of art represents objects and situations from another realm. If this distinction is not made, then certain difficulties arise in the discussion of music and architecture which are presentational versus representational.

Ingarden is by no means the only theorist to arrive at a stratified description of the literary work of art. Nicolai Hartmann speaks of the work's strata, although he appears to have drawn on the insights of Ingarden (Nicolai Hartmann, *Das Problem des geistigen Seins* (Berlin and Leipzig: W. de Gruyter, 1933). Mikel Dufrenne in *The Phenomenology of Aesthetic Experience* (Evanston: Northwestern Press, 1973), must also attribute a great deal to Ingarden's conception of the work of art's structure. Ingarden specifically mentions the work of Juliusz Kleiner and W. Conrad as sharing similar orientations. Specifically, Ingarden claims closest kinship to Conrad's conception presented in "Der ästhetische Gegenstand," (*The Literary Work of Art*, pp. 31-32).

27 Roman Ingarden, *The Literary Work of Art*, pp. 29-30. For an important and interesting discussion of the role of value in the literary work of art's structure, see Ingarden's response to Rene Wellek and Austin Warren's *The Theory of Literature* (New York: Harcourt Brace Jovanovich, 1949) in the Preface, 3rd edition of *The Literary Work of Art*, p. lxxviii.

28 On the nature of the aesthetic attitude, see Roman Ingarden, "Aesthetic Experience and Aesthetic Object," *Philosophy and Phenomenological Research*, 21 (1960). For general discussions, see James L. Jarrett, "On Psychological Distance," *Personalist*, 52 (1971); Herbert Langfeld, *The Aesthetic Attitude* (New York: Harcourt Brace Jovanovich, 1920); Stanley Paluch, "Are there Aesthetic Attitudes," *Philosophy and Phenomenological Research*, 27 (1967), pp. 606-609; and Stephen C. Pepper, "Emotional Distance in Art," *The Journal of Aesthetics and Art Criticism*, 4 (1946).

29 Roman Ingarden, *The Literary Work of Art*, p. 265. Also see Eugene Falk, *The Poetics of Roman Ingarden*, pp. 87-89. The 'filling-in' activity of the reader, when combined with the structure of the work itself results in what Ingarden refers to as the "concretization" of the literary work. The places of indeterminacy are a structural feature of the work. The 'filling-in' activity represents the reader's contribution to the constituting process. The concretization is the result of these two factors. See Michal Glowinski, "On Concretization," in *Roman Ingarden and Contemporary Polish Aesthetics* (Warsaw: Naukowe, 1975), pp. 33-46.

30 Ingarden must be classed with those theorists who are concerned with the discovery of the essence of objects. This is clearly apparent in the way in which he situates his work in the context of other literary theories, both contemporary and classical, in his commentary on Aristotle's *Poetics*. See "A Marginal Commentary on Aristotle's *Poetics*," *Journal of Aesthetics and Art Criticism*, 20 (1961-1962), pp. 163-173, 273-285. He sets himself off from a) the formalist conception "which treats the literary work as a linguistic creation," and b) the objective conception which "holds that the literary work is a congeries of 'representations,'" and c) the conception that "treats the work as a separate sphere of reality."

31 Roman Ingarden, *The Cognition of the Literary Work of Art*, p. 20. See also Roman Ingarden, "The Physicalistic Theory of Language and the World of

Literature," *Yearbook of Comparative Criticism*, 2 (1969), pp. 80-90. Also see Augustin Riska, "Language and Logic in the Work of Roman Ingarden," *Analecta Husserliana*, IV, ed. Anna-Teresa Tymieniecka (Boston: Reidel, 1976), pp. 187-218, for a good historical contextualization and exposition of Ingarden's work on language.

<sup>32</sup> Eugene Falk, *The Poetics of Roman Ingarden*, pp. 30-35.

<sup>33</sup> Piotr Graff has questioned Ingarden's position on the work of art's ontic dependence upon a material thing. His position raises some interesting questions and possible problems. In Chapter 4 we will examine the force of Graff's criticisms. (Piotr Graff, "The Ontological Basis of Roman Ingarden's Aesthetics. A Tentative Reconstruction," *Roman Ingarden and Contemporary Polish Aesthetics*, pp. 69-96. For a brief summary of Ingarden's position on word sounds in the context of contemporary analytic philosophy, see Guido Kung, "Ingarden on Language and Ontology," *Analecta Husserlian*, II, ed. Anna-Teresa Tymieniecka (Boston: Reidel, 1972), pp. 204-17.

<sup>34</sup> Roman Ingarden, *The Literary Work of Art*, pp. 37-38.

<sup>35</sup> Roman Ingarden, *The Literary Work of Art*, p. 38.

<sup>36</sup> Roman Ingarden, *The Literary Work of Art*, p. 40.

<sup>37</sup> Roman Ingarden, "The Physicalistic Theory of Language and the World of Literature," *Yearbook of Comparative Criticism*, 2 (1969), pp. 80-90.

<sup>38</sup> Roman Ingarden, "Phenomenological Aesthetics: An Attempt at Defining its Range," *Journal of the British Society for Phenomenology*, 6 (1975), p. 264.

<sup>39</sup> The contemporary discussion of 'intention' in the arts has helped to clarify theorists' ways of thinking about the artist's role in the aesthetic process. The discussion which developed between the position of W. K. Wimsatt and Monroe Beardsley presented in "The Intentional Fallacy," and the position of Frank Cioffi in "Intention and Interpretation in Criticism," (both in *Philosophy Looks at the Arts*, ed. Joseph Margolis (Philadelphia: Temple University Press, 1978), pp. 293-306, 307-324), nicely sets the boundaries around the problem. Ingarden's description of the role of the artist in the creative process as an effort to embody intentions which ultimately serve as the basis for the concretization of the work,

goes much further, however, than either of the above articles in explanation of just how intentions do become publicly accessible via the work's structure. But there would not seem to be any real disagreement between the positions of Ingarden and Wimsatt and Beardsley regarding the manner of access to artistic intentions. It is in the work itself that intentions are discovered. What is not there is simply not an element of the work. Thus it should be noted that the spectre of the Intentional Fallacy does not hover over the work of Ingarden. This will become plainly apparent as we proceed in our exposition. See Katarzyna Rosner, "Literature and Artistic Communication;" in *Roman Ingarden and Contemporary Polish Aesthetics*, p. 199, for confirmation of the above point. Also see Anthony Savile, "The Place of Intention in the Concept of Art," in *Aesthetics*, ed. Harold Osborne (London: Oxford, 1972), pp. 158-176.

40 Roman Ingarden, "Phenomenological Aesthetics: An Attempt at Defining its Range," *Journal of the British Society for Phenomenology*, 6 (1975), p. 265.

41 Max Rieser, "Roman Ingarden and His Time," *The Journal of Aesthetics and Art Criticism*, 29 (1971), p. 445.

42 K. M. Dolgov, "Roman Ingarden's Phenomenology of Literature," *Dialectics and Humanism*, 2 (1975), p. 93.

43 K. M. Dolgov, "Roman Ingarden's Phenomenology of Literature," p. 108.

44 See Barry Smith, "Historicity, Value and Mathematics," *Analecta Husserliana*, IV, ed. Anna-Teresa Tymieniecka (Boston: Reidel, 1976), pp. 219-240, for an application of Ingarden's phenomenological ontology to mathematics.

45 Roman Ingarden, *The Literary Work of Art*, p. 117. Also see K. M. Dolgov, "The Question of Intentional Being in Roman Ingarden's Philosophy," *Dialectics and Humanism*, 2 (1975).

46 Roman Ingarden, *Time and Modes of Being*, p. 47. Also see Eugene Falk; *The Poetics of Roman Ingarden*, p. 36.

47 Roman Ingarden, *Time and Modes of Being*, p. 49.

48 Roman Ingarden, *Time and Modes of Being*, p. 51.

37. 49 Eugene Falk, *The Poetics of Roman Ingarden*, p. 37.
- 50 Roman Ingarden, *The Literary Work of Art*, p. 118.
- 51 Roman Ingarden, *The Literary Work of Art*, p. 126.
- 52 Roman Ingarden, *The Literary Work of Art*, p. 361.  
See Eugene Falk, *The Poetics of Roman Ingarden*, pp. 13-17, for a discussion of Ingarden's usage of the terms 'essence,' 'idea,' and 'schema.'
- 53 Roman Ingarden, *The Literary Work of Art*, p. 361.
54. See Anna-Teresa Tymieniecka, "Beyond Ingarden's Idealism/Realism Controversy With Husserl—The New Contextual Phase of Phenomenology," *Analecta Husserliana*, IV, ed. Anna-Teresa Tymieniecka (Boston: Reidel, 1976), pp. 266-274, for a descriptive discussion of Ingarden's existential concepts.
- 55 Roman Ingarden, *Time and Modes of Being*, p. 51.
- 56 Roman Ingarden, *Time and Modes of Being*, p. 49.
- 57 Roman Ingarden, *Time and Modes of Being*, p. 80.
- 58 Roman Ingarden, *The Literary Work of Art*, p. 362.
- 59 Roman Ingarden, *The Literary Work of Art*, p. 117.
- 60 Eugene Falk, *The Poetics of Roman Ingarden*, p. 14.
- 61 Eugene Falk, *The Poetics of Roman Ingarden*, p. 15.
- 62 Roman Ingarden, *The Literary Work of Art*, pp. 122-3.
- 63 Roman Ingarden, *The Literary Work of Art*, p. 122.  
For a further discussion of the relation of acts of consciousness to ideal entities and real objects, see Anna-Teresa Tymieniecka, "Beyond Ingarden's Idealism/Realism Controversy With Husserl," pp. 256-265.
- 64 Roman Ingarden, *The Literary Work of Art*, p. 246.
- 65 Roman Ingarden, *The Literary Work of Art*, pp. 246-7.
- 66 Roman Ingarden, *The Literary Work of Art*, p. 247.  
For a distinction between real and intentional aspects, see Eugene Falk, *The Poetics of Roman Ingarden*, pp. 92-96.

67 Roman Ingarden, *The Literary Work of Art*, pp. 218-9.

68 Roman Ingarden, *The Literary Work of Art*, pp. 248-9.

69 Roman Ingarden, *The Literary Work of Art*, p. 246. Also Augustin Riska, "Language and Logic in the Work of Roman Ingarden," *Analecta Husserliana*, IV, pp. 193-4. For a good account of Ingarden's position on spots of indeterminacy in a Literary Work, see Henryk Markiewica, "Places of Indeterminacy in a Literary Work," *Roman Ingarden and Contemporary Polish Aesthetics*, pp. 159-172. Excellent critical discussion, which we will treat in Chapter 4, are available in Wolfgang Iser, *The Act of Reading: A Theory of Aesthetic Response* (Baltimore: John Hopkins, 1978), pp. 170-9, and Dagmar Barnouw, "Critics in the Act of Reading," and Menachem Brinker, "Two Phenomenologies of Reading: Ingarden and Iser on Textual Indeterminacy," both in *Poetics Today*, 1 (1980), pp. 213-222; 203-212. Also see J. Fizer, "Schematicism: Aesthetic Device or Psychological Necessity," *The Journal of Aesthetics and Art Criticism*, 27 (1969), pp. 417-23; and Michal Glowinski, "On Concretization," *Roman Ingarden and Contemporary Polish Aesthetics*, pp. 47-68.

70 Roman Ingarden, *The Literary Work of Art*, p. 249.

71 Roman Ingarden, *The Literary Work of Art*, p. 251.

72 Roman Ingarden, *The Literary Work of Art*, pp. 264-271.

73 Katarzyna Rosner provides an excellent discussion of concretization in the context of a semiological approach to the literary work of art in "Ingarden's Philosophy of Literature and the Analysis of Artistic Communication;" Janina Makota addresses concretization more generally in the context of intercourse with architecture, painting, music and literature in "Roman Ingarden's Views on the Communication with a Work of Art;" Jerzy Kmita provides an interesting and critical discussion of concretization in relation to artistic value and aesthetic value in "Work of Art—Its Concretization. Artist Value—Aesthetic Value." All in *Roman Ingarden and Contemporary Polish Aesthetics*, pp. 191-222; 145-158; 109-128.

74 Nikos Kazantzakis, *Zorba the Greek*, trans. Carl Wildman (New York: Simon & Schuster, 1952), p. 3.

75 Roman Ingarden, *The Literary Work of Art*, pp. 44; 252.

- 76 Roman Ingarden, *The Literary Work of Art*, pp. 220-21.
- 77 Roman Ingarden, *The Cognition of the Literary Work of Art*, p. 214.
- 78 Roman Ingarden, *The Literary Work of Art*, p. 31.
- 79 Roman Ingarden, *The Literary Work of Art*, p. 58. See Anna-Teresa Tymieniecka, "Beyond Ingarden's Idealism/Realism Controversy With Husserl," pp. 309-334, for the relation of the literary work of art's multi-layered structure to the work's polyphony. Also see Maria Golaszewska, "Aesthetic Values in Ingarden's System of Philosophy," *Roman Ingarden and Contemporary Polish Aesthetics*, pp. 47-68; and "Ingarden's World of Values," *Dialectics and Humanism*, 2 (1975), pp. 133-46. A. Wegrzecki, "On the Absoluteness of Values," *Journal of the British Society for Phenomenology*, 6 (1975), pp. 109-15.
- 80 Roman Ingarden, *The Literary Work of Art*, pp. 44-45.
- 81 Roman Ingarden, *The Literary Work of Art*, p. 45.
- 82 Roman Ingarden, *The Literary Work of Art*, pp. 47-48.
- 83 Roman Ingarden, *The Literary Work of Art*, p. 49.
- 84 Roman Ingarden, *The Literary Work of Art*, pp. 49-50.
- 85 Roman Ingarden, *The Literary Work of Art*, p. 56.
- 86 Roman Ingarden, *The Literary Work of Art*, p. 61.
- 87 Roman Ingarden, *The Literary Work of Art*, p. 211.
- 88 Roman Ingarden, *The Literary Work of Art*, p. 213.
- 89 Roman Ingarden, *The Literary Work of Art*, p. 212.
- 90 Roman Ingarden, *The Literary Work of Art*, p. 214.
- 91 Roman Ingarden, *The Literary Work of Art*, p. 215.
- 92 Roman Ingarden, *The Literary Work of Art*, p. 284-5.
- 93 Roman Ingarden, *The Literary Work of Art*, p. 285.
- 94 Roman Ingarden, *The Literary Work of Art*, p. 285.

- 95 Roman Ingarden, *The Literary Work of Art*, p.  
290. Also see Eugene Falk, *The Poetics of Roman Ingarden*,  
pp. 116-120.
- 96 Roman Ingarden, *The Literary Work of Art*, p.  
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- 97 Roman Ingarden, *The Literary Work of Art*, p.  
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- 98 Roman Ingarden, *The Literary Work of Art*, pp.  
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- 99 Roman Ingarden, *The Literary Work of Art*, p.  
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- 100 Roman Ingarden, *The Literary Work of Art*, p.  
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- 101 Roman Ingarden, *The Literary Work of Art*, p.  
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- 102 Roman Ingarden, *The Literary Work of Art*, p.  
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- 103 Roman Ingarden, *The Literary Work of Art*, p.  
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- 104 Roman Ingarden, *The Literary Work of Art*, pp.  
298-9.
- 105 Roman Ingarden, *Ontologie der Kunst*, p. 33.
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## Chapter Two

### The Extension of the Essential Principles of the Literary Work of Art

#### Section 9: Introductory Remarks Regarding Ingarden's Extension of His Literary Theory to Music, Painting and Architecture

In accord with the direction taken by Ingarden, attention must now be turned to the extension of the essential principles elucidated in *The Literary Work of Art* to the art forms of music, painting and architecture. Initially, the essays contained in the *Investigations into the Ontology of Art* were intended as an appendix to *The Literary Work of Art*, but the physical magnitude of such a work prevented its being published in such a form. The first three essays went through various modifications with complete rewrites occurring in 1957.<sup>1</sup> As such, they are closely aligned with the thought expressed in *The Literary Work of Art* while simultaneously being an accurate account of Ingarden's mature thought on the application of his aesthetic principles. Thus the claim that the method of extension found in these essays demonstrates the proper application of his thought to other art forms proceeds from the soundest possible base.

Consistent with Ingarden's conviction that ontological problems must be addressed first, the problems of value, aesthetic or artistic, remain as untreated in these essays as they did in his initial work. The importance of these problems was clearly seen, but Ingarden remained convinced that they would require a separate investigation into the structure of aesthetic experience which could only follow on the creating of an "ontological foundation for the investigation of the problem of value."<sup>2</sup> Correspondingly, the forthcoming presentation of Ingarden's extension predominately focuses on the essential structure and ontic foundations of each art form, and not on the structure of aesthetic experience as it pertains to aesthetic and artistic value.<sup>3</sup> References have already been and will continue to be made to the process of the aesthetic concretization of the aesthetic object; but it must be realized that in Ingarden's discussion of aesthetic and artistic value, he never fully elucidated the mode of existence of aesthetic and artistic values to his own satisfaction. The primary source for what he did accomplish in this area can be found in *The Cognition of the Literary Work of Art*.

The predominant focus of this chapter will be on the tracing of Ingarden's application of the principles identified as central to the literary work of art through his treatments of music, painting and architecture. We

will be constantly on the alert for their re-emergence, modification, or abandonment. In this way the principles which are common to all the art forms considered by Ingarden should be clearly brought to appearance. The consequent will not only be, then, the identification of Ingarden's general aesthetic theory, but the proper Ingardenian procedure for applying his general principles.

## Section 10: The Musical Work of Art

Ingarden's description of the musical work of art is an excellent example of his willingness to modify a rather cherished position on the work of art.<sup>4</sup> Much to his initial disappointment, the musical work of art is not a multi-layered formation. It is composed of a single layer of concrete tones and tonal formations. Consequently, the polyphonic harmony of heterogeneous strata found in the literary work of art is also absent.<sup>5</sup> There are, however, elements within the musical work that are heterogeneous;<sup>6</sup> in fact, "the essential basis of the 'individuality' of a musical work. . . lies in the unique, unrepeatable harmony of the pure qualities of the tonal formations and of the other qualities founded in them."<sup>7</sup> Thus the multiplicity of strata is not at all necessary for the heterogeneity that belongs to the elements of the musical work.

A further consequence of the musical work of art's non-stratified structure is that the strata responsible for the bringing to appearance of represented objects are also absent. This is fully in accord with Ingarden's claim that: "There is present in its content—so far as it is a musical work—indeed no reference and no relation to the real world."<sup>8</sup> The musical work has neither a stratum of phonological formations nor a stratum of meaning units occurring in its structure. The conclusion

is that "absolute" music does "not express, or present, anything that goes beyond the tones."<sup>9</sup> As such, the musical work of art is a non-representational art form. Program music, which stands as an immediate affront to this position, is relegated to the borderland between absolute music and works of literature.<sup>10</sup> In Ingarden's opinion, there is simply no adequate way of explaining how it is that "something which is first of all a tonal formation can 'express' something completely non-acoustic."<sup>11</sup> Lacking the necessary strata for the conveyance of meaning, understood as the meaning of a word or the sense of a sentence, there can be "no states of affairs projected by sentences and hence no objectivities presented"<sup>12</sup> as elements of the musical work of art.

Thus, whoever, upon hearing a musical work imagines certain objects (particularly things) or objective situations or events and in this imagining actualizes the corresponding aspects, that person in so doing goes beyond the proper content of the musical work; under the influence of the musical work he has literary fantasies, which can be absent (and indeed ought not to take place) without the aesthetic apprehension of the musical work itself being in any way impaired. For these literary fantasies distort and adulterate the aesthetic apprehension of the musical work.<sup>13</sup>

Ingarden in no way denies the reality of music which has a representational function. He even makes several suggestions which indicate that he believes progress has been made in the researches necessary to resolve some of the problems which surround program music. But he is

clearly insistent that though expressional or presentational content is objective, it is not specifically musical.<sup>14</sup> Neither does Ingarden exclude the emotional qualities which can belong to a musical work, e.g., terror or awe. But these non-acoustic qualities are only an "analogue" to the qualities found in real emotions.<sup>15</sup> They are qualities which belong to the tonal formations. Allowing the actual experience of musical works to direct the course of his investigation, he says:

There are . . . emotional qualities that can be brought to intuitive givenness in their particular concrete forms *only* by music, so that we have no name whatever for them. . . That is precisely the reason why we seek immediate commerce with many great musical works: They give us access to emotional qualities that we otherwise could not have.<sup>16</sup>

The conclusion, then, is that program music has an inexplicable character which has yet to be adequately accounted for. But even if these questions are put aside, program music can be compared with absolute music which does not express or represent anything. Consequently, neither the "function of expression or presentation, nor that which is expressed or represented, can constitute the indispensable essential moment of the musical work as such."<sup>17</sup>

The examination of the musical work has thus far been approached from a negative perspective: it is not a multi-layered formation; there is no polyphonic harmony resulting from heterogeneous strata; and expression and

representation do not constitute an indispensable element of its structure.

Quite consistent is Ingarden's claim that the musical work is not a real object. The actual physical score is one of the musical work's ontic foundations. It provides the work with continued existence and public accessibility. "But to provide intentional access to an objectivity is not the same thing as to be this objectivity itself."<sup>18</sup> The score, as blotches of ink on paper, possesses "neither the function of meaning, nor the peculiar symbolizing function which notes perform. The function of meaning is an intentional function."<sup>19</sup> As such, the score stands in the same relationship to the musical work of art as does the concrete phonetic material to the literary work of art.

What is usually called the 'physical' side of a sign is, strictly speaking, no physical material object but merely a typical figure, visual or acoustic, say, which, on the basis of appropriately formed physical things or processes and by virtue of an appropriate intentional act, emerges for apprehension as the self-identical figure, possibly many times.<sup>20</sup>

As was the case with the literary work of art, the musical work is to be understood as an intentional formation. As our previous discussion of intentional existence has shown, a purely intentional object is ontically dependent upon an act of consciousness for the origin and support of its existence. Musical works, as purely intentional objects, "would not ever exist without

the composer who created them and without the listeners who apprehend them cognitively and aesthetically."<sup>21</sup>

Two compelling reasons force the conclusion that the musical work is neither a real nor ideal object. Firstly, the composer is unable to 'fully' embody the musical work in a score. The musical notation is only able to provide the instructions for the performance of the work. As such, the work is only incompletely present in the musical notation. The work is

determined only in a *schematic* way, by the specification of only some determinations of its purely tonal (acoustical) base, while others are left open and variable within certain limits, although they are also mediately co-determined.<sup>22</sup>

Ingarden's familiar places of indeterminacy can only be removed in individual performances. It may be suggested, however, that with the technical means now available, it is not necessary to use musical notation, but instead the work can be recorded on tape or phonograph records. This does not threaten the work's schematic and intentional character, however. Regardless of the method of recording, a performance is still required. During these 'recording' performances, the places of indeterminacy must be filled-in just as in the performance which results from multiple copies of a musical work's score. And further, to presume that the first performance of a work by a composer is the musical work and subsequent performance are 'good' or 'bad' in relation

to this 'ideal' performance, ignores the fact that even a composer is not necessarily capable of producing the work exactly as it was intended.<sup>23</sup> The search for the best performance—the 'ideal' performance—is frustrated from the start.

Secondly, there are characteristics of the musical work which, in a sense, transcend the individual sounds and sound formations. The musical work

contains many different, so to speak, super-acoustic and non-'acoustic' constituents in its essential structure. It is a qualitative formation that is determined in very diverse ways, and this qualitative formation is in every case super-individual.<sup>24</sup>

These "super-acoustic" and "non-acoustic" qualities depend upon the musical work's ontic heteronomy for their existence and actualization. As such, they are unable to come to appearance without an act of consciousness bestowing them on the object, as is the case with the composer, or actualizing them in the object, as is the case with the listener.

But if neither the composer nor anyone else receives these waves and causes the performances of the work to arise for him in its concretely phenomenal, diversely qualitatively determined Gestalt—then there is in the final analysis no performance of the musical work.<sup>25</sup>

The musical work, when apprehended in its schematic character, results in concretizations which qualitatively differ one from the other. If the work were not a schematic, intentional formation, there would be no way of accounting for the heterogeneous qualities which

specifically belong to the musical work of art. The unavoidable conclusion is that the musical work is a self-identical schematic, intentional formation, not identifiable with the score or any other real thing. It is ontically founded in the

individual psychological acts of the composer, real events in the world which found realiter each individual performance of the work, and finally the various acts of consciousness and real physiological processes of the listener.<sup>26</sup>

Conspicuously absent in Ingarden's discussion of the musical work's ontic foundations are ideal entities. He does speak of "typical figures" in the musical work, but they do not have the same character as ideal entities.<sup>27</sup> It would be more proper to relate them to the word sounds of the literary work of art which have intentional existence. It seems clear that Ingarden has either retreated from his position on ideal entities expressed in *The Literary Work of Art*, or else simply cannot explain how ideal meaning could operate within the musical work.<sup>28</sup> In either case, they are not discussed in the context of the musical work, and in fact seem to be indirectly rejected:

In the reciprocal qualitative modification of tone-formations occurring together or following in sequence, and in the final quality of wholeness, unique in its kind, that results in this reciprocal qualitative modification, lies the sole basis of the individuality of a musical work.<sup>29</sup>

The "final quality of wholeness" is found in a concretization of the work of art. But does this not lead to

the positing of an ideal aesthetic object against which each concretization must ultimately be contrasted? After all, each concretization is unique. Ingarden thinks not. No one performance is optimal; "the work, as the schematic formation, determines a multiplicity of possible, aesthetically admissible concretizations."<sup>30</sup> Any concretization which stays within the boundaries determined by the score is 'correct,' though not necessarily equally aesthetically valuable. The identity of the musical work is guaranteed by the "constant stock of possibilities belonging to it," and the "unchanging structure determined by the score as well as the constancy of the range of possibilities."<sup>31</sup> This serves to explain the many and diverse interpretations given to musical works which are performed in different ways throughout history. Each epoch determines which manner of performance is 'best' for itself. And this is quite permissible within the guidelines established by the work. But, point in fact, there is no 'best,' only aesthetically 'better' in respect to the realization of the work's aesthetic value. And it is only on the basis of the work's aesthetic value that judgments can be made regarding its artistic worth. Therefore, "artistic worth is not decided merely by the number of different possible forms that the work can assume, but rather—and primarily—by the aesthetic values it can attain in

its concretizations."<sup>32</sup> Ingarden's move away from a dependence on ideal entities seems apparent when he says "that the composer's merit consists not so much in having created a simple ideal performance of his work, but rather in having made a schematic formation that admits of many possible performances."<sup>33</sup> The material ontic foundation has clearly assumed a role of great importance in the description of the musical work of art. This cannot go unnoticed in our later attempt to extend his theory to include the sculptural work of art.

In summation, the musical work of art must be seen as a schematic intentional formation, having no heterogeneous strata, although there is a polyphonic harmony of heterogeneous aesthetic value qualities. It is ontically founded, on one hand, in the conscious creative activity of the composer and the conscious processes of the listener and, on the other hand, in the real material of a score. Since it cannot be explained how it is that a work represents something which lies beyond the work, the musical work is essentially non-representational and therefore does not ontically depend upon a world of ideal meanings. The identity of the work is found in the formal properties of the work discoverable in and through the fixed musical text. These properties are all present in 'correct' performances and concretizations,

but no one performance or concretization exhausts all of the possibilities which the musical work possesses. As such, there is no ideal concretization, only a set of concretizations which are of greater or lesser value.

In the extension of his literary theory to the musical work of art, Ingarden displays a commitment to the work of art's intentional character and all the factors which that implies, i.e., ontic-relativity to autonomous objects, specifically, acts of consciousness and real objects, and schematicism. We do see, however, certain alterations taking place as regards the essential principles of the literary work of art. Firstly, it becomes clear that the work of art's polyphonic harmony is not wedded to the multiplicity of strata. Instead, the work's polyphony is directly dependent on the aesthetically valuable qualities themselves. Whether or not a work of art is stratified may influence the different kinds of aesthetically valuable qualities the work may have, e.g., qualities which pertain to represented objects, but it is not the necessary condition for the polyphonic harmony that is the work of art. Secondly, the third ontic foundation of the literary work of art, namely ideal entities, does not emerge in Ingarden's discussion of the musical work of art. One can safely assume that he sees them as simply having no application to this art form.

Thus, general principles now begin to take shape.

- 1) ~~The work~~ of art is not to be identified with any real thing.
- 2) It is a heteronomous intentional object ontically dependent upon at least two autonomous objects for the origin and support of its existence. They are
  - a) real objects
  - and
  - b) acts of consciousness of a psychic subject
- 3) It is a schematic formation which requires a reader/listener for its completion and concretization. As such, it cannot be identified with any one of its concretizations.
- 4) It is a polyphonic harmony of aesthetically valuable qualities.

Only by examining other art forms will we be able to say whether or not these developing essential principles are, in fact, applicable to the work of art in general.

## Section 11: The Picture as Work of Art

Ingarden's immediate distinction between the "picture," as an object of aesthetic appreciation and a "painting," as the real material of the work, i.e., paper, linen, wood, and pigments, etc., is in agreement with his contention that the work of art, in general, is no real thing.<sup>34</sup> As was the case in literature and music, the real thing is the "objective, real condition of the concrete seeing and of the existence of the 'picture.'"<sup>35</sup> The real thing, or painting, has many characteristics which do not belong to the work of art as a self-identical object, as a picture. The painting is

made of linen; it occupies a definite section of real space, and in fact a section that is of different sizes at different temperatures. It has various visual and tactile characteristics, and also definite chemical and physical properties, for example, electrical, thermal and so forth, that are not directly accessible to us in perception.<sup>36</sup>

The picture, as work of art, does not have any of these characteristics, though ontically dependent upon them. The real material of the painting provides the picture with what is essential for diverse experiences of a self-identical object. By examining pictures which represent life situations the issue becomes clearer.

A situation such as that presented in Leonardo da Vinci's *The Last Supper* is not actually brought to

appearance in the picture. The picture may copy or portray this situation, but it cannot give us this situation again. The objects brought to appearance in the picture, i.e., chairs, table, plates; etc., are not present in the way real objects are actually present in a real situation. The distinction is particularly apparent in the kind of space involved in each case. That which is portrayed in the picture occupies an altogether different space than does the painting. The portrayal within a certain represented space places certain limitations on the possibilities of visual perception. For example, in the visual perception of a real thing the observer can move closer or farther away from the thing while continuing to perceive the same thing. This provides either a closer more narrowly precise visual perception or a more distanced less precise perception of the thing. If one wishes to perceive the portrayed situation and objects of the picture, however, the case is somewhat different. While the observer can move closer to or farther away from the picture and still perceive the portrayed objects, there are limits beyond which the picture dissolves into the physical elements of pigment, linen or paper:

The difference that this change of our location makes is that at one time we "see" the portrayed things better, when we are the right distance from the painting, and at another time, when we are too close or too far away, we see them poorly. But at

no time can we overcome the distance established by the picture. If we approach too close to the painting, then the represented thing is no longer given to us at all.<sup>37</sup>

To further attest to the distinction between picture and painting, one need only note the essential one-sidedness of the picture. The painting can be walked around or can be located in different places on a wall, for instance, but the objects of the picture are always locked within their represented space; "the things presented in the picture can show themselves to us only from one definite side and at a definite distance, from that which the artist fixed in the picture once and for all."<sup>38</sup> The observer can never see these objects from another side or from behind. The mode of givenness of the depicted objects and situations of the picture is quite different from that which is involved in the apprehension of real things, thus confirming the distinction between work of art and real thing.

So here, again, we find that Ingarden claims a material ontic foundation for the work of art. The picture is determined and founded by the real material of the painting. The painting provides for the work's continued and relatively permanent existence and public accessibility.<sup>39</sup>

Turning attention to the picture, we again find a formation of heterogeneous strata. This is the case

with representational pictures specifically, however. There are exceptions, of course, such as the abstract picture. Ingarden makes the interesting point that whether or not a work of art is stratified "is irrelevant for the individuality of the work of art."<sup>40</sup> His central concern is with securing the work's identity and not with a cherished model of explanation, already evidenced by the description of the musical work of art as being non-stratified. So whether the issue is the structure of representational painting or abstract painting, the number of strata ought not to be viewed as an indispensable condition for the picture's existence. The number of strata primarily serves to permit distinctions within this one category of art works. With this, let us turn to the central example of the representational picture. Here is found a work of two and sometimes three strata.

They are

- 1) the stratum of reconstructed aspects
- 2) the stratum of represented objects or situations, and
- 3) the stratum of literary or historical content, whenever present.<sup>41</sup>

The reconstructed aspects "form the constitutively most important element of the picture, without which there would be no representational picture at all and also no aesthetic object belonging to the art of painting."<sup>42</sup> An artist selects and arranges color patches

that have their ontic foundation in the properties of the real painting with the intent of bringing objects to appearance. Objects can only be represented by the presentation of a limited number of views or perspectives. In the experience of a real object, the observer takes different perspectives toward the object thus, in a sense, composing an object correlate out of a multiplicity of views. The real object as presented to the observer appears to change in shape, quality and brightness. Each view is one aspect of the real object.<sup>43</sup> The object which is experienced by the observer possesses definite properties which are correlated to the content of the aspects. In order for an artist to create a picture which brings to appearance represented objects, he or she must reconstruct in the picture aspects that correspond to the object represented.<sup>44</sup> It is only through reconstructed aspects that objects can be made intuitively present in the picture. And furthermore, as the objective constitutive factor of the picture, any other qualitative factors which can be attributed to the picture ultimately depend upon this stratum for their constitution.

There are two kinds of elements which may be present in the content of the reconstructed aspects. Firstly, those elements which perform the function of the presentation of represented objects, e.g., the presentation

of the brow of a person. Secondly, there are elements which serve a decorative function. These elements are aesthetically valuable in that they either bear within them aesthetically valuable qualities or in conjunction with other elements bring aesthetically valuable qualities to view.<sup>45</sup> Decorative elements can serve both the function of presenting represented objects and presenting aesthetically valuable qualities. For example, a color patch which presents the brow of a man might also have a certain brightness which in conjunction with another color patch determines a definite aesthetically valuable quality.

The two functions of the reconstructed aspects do not interfere with each other.<sup>46</sup> A represented object can be appreciated for the depth and richness of color as well as for the clarity of the representation. The importance of the reconstructed aspects to the picture is readily seen in that both the presentation of represented objects and the qualities relevant to the work's aesthetic value depend upon them. The dependence of the picture's subsequent strata on the reconstructed aspects is most evident when these two content functions are appreciated.

The stratum of represented objects or situations, while dependent upon the reconstructed aspects, must be distinguished from the aspects, on the one hand, and from

the literary theme and historical content of the picture, whenever such is present, on the other. If we take the example of a "still-life" presenting fruit in a bowl on a table, this stratum can best be seen as distinct. Such a work is totally devoid of an event which plays a central role in the picture. There are only objects which are presented in a particular condition. These objects have, and must have, visual properties which can be visually expressed.<sup>47</sup> Non-visual properties either cannot be presented, or can only be presented indirectly: "One can paint neither the stench of tainted flesh, nor the sweetness of sugar, nor the moistness of water."<sup>48</sup> Through the selection of colors and color patterns, objects are presented directly which result in the indirect copresentation of such non-visual properties. And the directly presented objects are not reducible to the aspects that brought them to appearance either. The visual perceptual aspects must be reconstructed by an observer in order that the objects come to appearance. As such, neither the aspects nor the represented objects which are presented are elements of the painting. They constitute elements of the picture and as such are ontically dependent upon the intentional acts of the artist or observer.

The picture, therefore, has two ontic foundations, namely the real physical material of the painting and

acts of consciousness. This is essentially an affirmation of the principles which have guided the discussion of the literary work and the musical work. Once again, the third ontic foundation of ideal entities appears to be abandoned in the analysis of the picture. This would seem to confirm Graff's opinion that Ingarden retreated from his earlier position expressed in *The Literary Work of Art*.<sup>49</sup>

The role of the observer in the constitution of the picture confirms the distinction between the strata of aspects and represented objects. The observer must reconstruct the aspects in order that objects be brought to appearance. But there are always places of indeterminacy in the objects presented. This results from the fact that "there is a unique aspect that brings the object to appearance always only partially and from one side."<sup>50</sup> There are no aspects, for example, which correspond to the 'back side' of objects presented in the picture. As such, the back side remains undetermined, though co-intended. The observer fills-in these schematic moments in accord with what has been visually presented. Thus the presented object is not identifiable with the aspects which brought it to appearance, since the objects are 'more' than what the aspects specifically provided.

The case is the same with the bringing to appear-

ance of emotional qualities:

What causes itself to be "realized" with the medium of painting in the picture is first of all only a facial expression or a gesture. But the intuitive appearance of such a gesture or such an expression brings it about that a specific emotional character, for example, is shown to us intuitively, which in fact is not apprehensible purely visually, but which still attains to appearance through the corresponding attitude of the observer.<sup>51</sup>

The aspects direct the course of constitution of the objects presented, but it is left to the observer to remove the places of indeterminacy thus bringing to appearance the objects represented in the fullness of their qualitative determinations. As such it can be seen that the represented objects presented in the picture are not reducible to the aspects which directed their appearance.

Carefully eliminated from the discussion thus far have been pictures which either have three strata, i.e., pictures with literary themes, and abstract works where a single layer is present. In both cases the picture adheres to the principles already stated regarding the work's two-fold ontic foundations. By literary theme Ingarden means a preceding story which is determined by, exclusively, the story content presented in the picture.<sup>52</sup> Through an appropriate arrangement of represented objects a certain literary theme is presented which constitutes a stratum in its own right. The successful presentation of the objects in a "still-life" without a literary theme is sufficient reason to see the

literary theme which is brought to appearance through presented objects as a distinct element of the picture.

Unlike the "still-life" the picture with a literary theme

requires in most cases the presentation of a number of objectivities, whose presented conditions are such that all of them all together yield one and the same "occurrence," the same fact, the same situation, which forms a transitional phase of an incident.<sup>53</sup>

In a picture with a literary theme the most important element of the work is an event which plays a central role. When this is absent (when there is no literary theme) there then remains a picture which culminates in the presentation of objects in the same way as occurs in a "still-life."

Historical pictures, unlike pictures with a literary theme, require non-pictorial means of presentation for their constitution. They are "fully understandable only when they have an appropriate title and are regarded with a story in mind that has been told to the viewer by literary means."<sup>54</sup> As such, these works are not to be considered independent works of painting. They must be seen as, in some way, transitional between literature and painting.

There would appear to be two basic categories of abstract painting. The first would be characterized by the cubist work of Picasso. Here the artist attempts to present the inner structure of the object without using the object's aspects.<sup>55</sup> However, one can never directly

paint the inner structure of a thing without some use of aspects. In this kind of painting there still remains a stratum of reconstructed aspects and a stratum of the objects presented by the aspects.<sup>56</sup>

Purely abstract painting, as distinguished from cubist painting, does not have a layered structure. There are no objects presented in the picture and consequently there are no reconstructed aspects. The three-dimensional space which characterizes representational pictures is absent and the picture is reduced to a two-dimensional surface.<sup>57</sup> There are no represented bodies, therefore no represented persons presenting certain psychological states of affairs. There are, therefore, no interpersonal life situations. What remains are pure color combinations on the surface of the picture. Purely abstract painting is a presentation of itself. It does not reach beyond itself to another realm, namely a world of real objects and situations.<sup>58</sup> The arrangement of colors in certain patterns ultimately decides the whole question of the picture's value. As such, this kind of picture "forms the solution (or at least an attempt at solution) of a wholly particular, perhaps even completely unique problem."<sup>59</sup> And therefore

every abstract picture that is to be considered as a successful solution of an artistic problem in painting must be observed as an independent work of art.<sup>60</sup>

Purely abstract pictures are therefore seen as borderline

cases of works of painting, standing between representational pictures and non-representational architectural works of art.<sup>61</sup>

We have seen that the picture is no real thing while being ontically founded in a real thing. We have also seen that the picture may have one, two, or three layers, depending upon the kind of picture under consideration. Briefly discussed was the second ontic foundation of the picture, acts of consciousness. Here is found confirmation of the fact that the picture is an intentional formation ontically dependent upon the creative and constitutive acts of the artist and observer. In the case of representational pictures, the picture is a schematic formation requiring the 'filling-in' process of the observer. However, this issue is not clear in respect to purely abstract pictures since neither the stratum of reconstructed aspect nor represented objects brought to presentation occurs. The only other art form that is not multi-layered is the pure musical work of art. It is schematic by virtue of the indetermined moments in the score. But there would seem to be nothing comparable to a schematic score in the purely abstract painting. Thus the conclusion must be that some pictures are schematic formations while some are not. In this respect the abstract picture has a certain kinship with the architec-

tural work of art, as we will soon see, which is never a schematic formation. Ingarden has already indicated that this is in fact the case when he refers to such pictures as borderline instances lying between representational pictures and architectural works. As such, the abstract picture is a simultaneous presentation of itself, wholly determinate in all of its constructive elements of color, color pattern and arrangement.

In the picture, much like the literary work of art and the musical work of art, the aesthetically valuable qualities of the work enter into reciprocal relationships which call for the recognition of the picture as a polyphonic harmony of aesthetically valuable qualities and, in the case of representational pictures, heterogeneous strata. If there are two or more strata, then the aesthetically valuable qualities of each stratum either harmonize or conflict with one another providing for or preventing the occurrence of a qualitative synthesis.<sup>62</sup> If the work is not stratified, i.e., the purely abstract picture, the aesthetically valuable qualities may still harmonize or conflict with one another having the same set of possible consequences found in the representational picture. Therefore, being stratified is not a necessary condition for the picture's polyphony of aesthetically valuable qualities. The difference between these two kinds of pictures is a matter of degree and not kind in this

respect.

[I]t must still be stressed that precisely the fact that aesthetically relevant qualities occur in different strata of the picture and collaborate in the definitive constitution of the picture's aesthetic value compels us to hold that the picture as a work of art is a polyphonic whole, analogous to the polyphony that is present in the literary work of art. Only this polyphony in the picture is never so rich as in the literary work of art. Of course this polyphony, at least in principle, is richer [in a representational] than in an "objectless" picture, since special value qualities issue from the life situation presented in the picture.<sup>63</sup>

Utilizing the same line of argument that Ingarden employed in the discussion of the musical work of art, since the purely abstract picture can be compared to the representational picture, neither the function of representation, nor that which is represented can constitute the indispensable.essential moment of the picture.<sup>64</sup> This would seem to present a problem for Ingarden since he obviously would like to argue that absolute music on one hand is the preferable example of the musical work of art, and that the representational picture on the other hand is the preferable example of the picture. If the basis for this judgment is to lie in how aesthetically rich or poor the work is, program music and the presentational picture can both provide for a richer polyphony of aesthetically valuable qualities than non-representational music and the purely abstract picture. There would seem to be a certain inconsistency in Ingarden's position, although the spectre of just how it is that music can repre-

sent anything must be seen as a pivotal problem in the discussion.<sup>65</sup> If this could be adequately resolved, however, then indeed program music and the representational picture would both occupy the central seat in their respective art forms.

As already noted, Ingarden never treated the subject of aesthetic values to his own satisfaction. But regarding the picture, it is clear that they are closely aligned with the composition of the picture. The influence which colors have on one another, much as individual tones of the musical work create harmonies and disharmonies, brings to appearance aesthetically valuable qualities.<sup>66</sup> And to the extent that they play a constructive role in the picture, they give rise to aesthetically valuable qualities of a higher order which are closely dependent upon the way in which objects that are presented are 'composed' or grouped in the picture.<sup>67</sup> The objects that are presented in a picture can be presented in many diverse ways. The manner of presentation selected by the artist results in aesthetically valuable qualities which are peculiar to the work and not merely to the presented objects. It is indeed the manner of presentation; the uniqueness of the composition, that allows for the bringing to appearance of the aesthetically valuable qualities which distinguishes one picture from all others. Each work provides for a harmony or disharmony of aesthetically

valuable qualities which ultimately constitutes the single aesthetic value of the picture, the valent Gestalt of the picture.<sup>68</sup>

In creating the picture the artist takes into account which valent composition is to be made the basis of the picture. . . Should this valent composition be actually realized in the picture, it then receives a definitive, qualitatively determinate aesthetic value, a value of the whole picture and not only of its individual parts or moments.<sup>69</sup>

It is for this reason that pictures of great value, such as those of Rembrandt or Raphael or Leonardo, can all be considered as "beautiful," but in very different respects. Each of these works are qualitatively different yet of the same basic value. It would be inappropriate to say that one is of greater value than the other, for the aesthetic value of each is so different. "The reason for this lies precisely in the qualitative nature of aesthetic values."<sup>70</sup>

The ultimate achievement of the picture's polyphony of aesthetically valuable qualities, and consequently of the picture itself, lies in the bringing to appearance of the metaphysical qualities already spoken of in the literary work of art. It is the most important achievement of every type of work of art, whether it be literary, musical, or plastic; whether it be abstract or representational. More than any other feature of works of art, they represent the primary motive for the creation of works of art as well as the most significant contribution

of the artistic enterprise. "Only through them does the work of art begin to be something meaningful and valuable."<sup>71</sup> But it is not merely the experience of these qualities which the work of art provides, for these qualities are equally accessible in the experiences of situations in day to day living.<sup>72</sup> Most importantly the work of art provides for a distanced experience without the weight and force which are customary to such experiences when had in the real world. The work of art allows for a peaceful contemplation of metaphysical qualities which can even permit an experience of delight or joy not normally equated with such occurrences when they appear in the form of a real event. The impact and force of "damnation", present in Michelangelo's Sistine fresco, while extraordinarily powerful, can be contemplated and even appreciated on many levels in ways simply inconceivable when the same quality is experienced in daily life. This is the central contribution which works of art make to human existence. And it ultimately depends upon the fact that the aesthetically valuable qualities of the work enter into a polyphonic harmony in such a way that a unique and universal presentation of such qualities is possible.

In summation, then, the picture is similar to the other art forms already discussed in that it is an intentional formation of heterogeneous aesthetically valuable qualities which, in this case, are located in the work's

strata. It possesses two ontic foundations which guarantee its independence from the real world and the psychic states of the artist and the observer. Yet it is the ontic foundation of the real material which provides for the work's continuity and public accessibility. Once again, there is no discussion of ideal entities. Except in borderline instances of abstract pictures, the picture is a schematic formation which requires that the observer fill-in indetermined moments. It is this fact which accounts for the differences that are present in the multitude of aesthetic experiences of the same self-identical work of art. Guided by the predetermined structure of the picture founded in the painting, the observer is permitted a certain latitude in the aesthetic constitution of the work: a latitude which simultaneously constrains and directs the course of the experience, as well as providing for the actualization of the picture's potential aesthetically valuable qualities. Here Ingarden strikes a delicate balance between the absolute authority of the work of art and the creative response of the observer—a balance which recognizes the consequences of overemphasizing either pole.

What is of particular interest in Ingarden's treatment of the picture, however, is the introduction of a third stratum; namely, the literary theme. While this does not affect the identification of the principles

essential to the work of art in general, it will have implications for the upcoming discussion of the sculptural work of art, which would seem to have similar capabilities in this area.<sup>73</sup>

In an effort to remain consistent with Ingarden's approach to differing art forms, attention must be concentrated on the central examples of each art category. Therefore, the borderline case of abstract painting ought not to be used as a basis for determining what is essential to the picture. And since Ingarden's analysis of the representational picture remains in harmony with the general principles which were abstracted from the previous discussions of the literary work of art and the musical work of art, those principles remain unaltered as we turn attention to the architectural work of art.

## Section 12: The Architectural Work of Art

As might be expected, Ingarden's description of the structure of the architectural work of art does not deviate from the principles which emerged in his analysis of literature, music and painting. He is remarkably consistent. Therefore, one expects and finds an immediate distinction between the real material of the work and the work of art itself.

An analogous difference to that between a building (in the sense of a real object) and a "church" or a "theatre"—to take another example—is that between a piece of cloth and a flag. For example, with the piece of cloth we clean pots; with the flag we render military honors, we preserve it, often for whole centuries, for memorial purposes, although the cloth in it is badly damaged and without value. This cloth forms, once again, simply the ontic foundation of the flag, without being identical with it.<sup>74</sup>

Neither the Renaissance palace nor the Roman cathedral are identified with the real building. The real building is simply a certain collection of bricks and stones constituting a basic physical structure of walls and the like. The building serves as the occasion and precondition for the constitution of the palace and cathedral—the work of art. Buttressing this claim, Ingarden points to the modern trend of constructing many dwellings which each correspond to one design; "the same architectural work of art can be 'executed' many times."<sup>75</sup> The case is that there are many real buildings, but only one work of art.

But let us suppose that every European city were to build for itself a specimen of the Notre Dame of Paris. Would not that be a senseless endeavor? And if we wished to place these hundred Notre Dames side by side—as is the case with the blocks of apartment houses now built in many cities—then this would evoke in us only the strongest disfavor, precisely because it belongs to the nature of every work of art to be an individual—in the sense of something qualitatively unique.<sup>76</sup>

As a unique entity which cannot be identified with any real building, the architectural work of art must be seen as an intentional formation standing in the same ontic relationship to the real world as do literature, music and painting. The work's intentional character is made clear in the analysis of its structure.

The architectural work of art resembles the musical work of art in one crucial respect. Neither art form is representational—requiring that the observer depart from that which is directly given.<sup>77</sup>

In architecture, one must apprehend a certain perceived body in its determined spatial pattern, which is bounded by colored surfaces of one kind or another, in order to attain to the entirety and the fullness of the architectural work of art. It suffices that a building is seen correctly and is understood in its structure and selection of determinations, for it to appear to us, when we are in the corresponding attitude, as a "cathedral" or a "castle" or a "palace" or the like, as an architectural work of art.<sup>78</sup>

As a result of the musical and architectural work of art's basic similarity, one might suppose that both art forms are essentially one-layered. This is not the case, however.<sup>79</sup> There are two strata:

- 1) the visual aspects in which the spatial shape of the architectural work exhibits itself in appearance;
- 2) the three-dimensional shape of the work (of the cathedral, of the theatre, and so forth) that attains to appearance in the aspects.<sup>80</sup>

The visual aspects of the architectural work of art are pure perceptual aspects which belong to the physical form of the work. Since the architectural work is not representational, the aspects are not reconstructed as was the case with the picture. And further, since there are in principle an endless number of perspectives which can be taken towards the work as an observer moves around and through the work, there does not exist a correspondence between any single aspect and the represented object. In the picture each aspect does correspond to the object represented. The manifold of aspects of the architectural work, when experienced by an observer, results in certain "concrete" aspects peculiar to the perspective taken towards the work. As such, they must be seen as schemata which an observer concretizes. Ingarden thus distinguishes between the visual aspects which are an element of the work proper and the schemata of concrete aspects which belong to each individual experience of the work.

Of course the aspects that are determined by the physical form of the building are still not the individual and concrete aspects which the individual observer experiences. For to each observer and indeed upon every individual observation, these

concrete aspects are different and always new; moreover they are not conditioned merely objectively through the architectural work of art, but also through the observer at the time and his chance psychophysical disposition.<sup>81</sup>

It is because of the visual aspects present in the work that a physical form can be brought to appearance. The ordering of the elemental masses and their forms is subordinated to this purpose. This is what Ingarden has called "the properly architectural factor of the work of art."<sup>82</sup> When an observer experiences the work, a certain manifold of concrete aspects are experienced which represent a selection from the manifold of visual aspects, which in turn results in the bringing to appearance of a three-dimensional shape, such as a cathedral or castle.

The fact that the visual aspects are purely perceptual more deeply weds the architectural work of art to the real world than does the aspects of painting, for example, which are reconstructed and consequently less identifiable with the physical substrate of the work. The intimacy between the architectural work of art and the real world is unique in the world of art forms. Unlike painting or music, the demands of real space in which the work must be located places fixed and certain demands on architecture. The effects of gravitational fields cannot be ignored. The terrain of the land which becomes very much a part of the

architectural work must be considered at all times, not only for strictly aesthetic purposes but for engineering reasons as well. The arrangement of the heavy mass forms cannot be done in isolation with no regard for the laws which govern their ordering, as is the case with painting.<sup>83</sup> The physical world places constraints and limits upon what is possible in the art form, a dramatically different set of limitations than occur in the literary work of art where the real material plays a very different and in many respects less significant role. Ingarden draws this contrast.

A whole realm of what is simply impossible for the architect stands open to the poetic fancy.

While on the other hand:

The founding of the architectural work in a material thing gives it in contrast a concreteness and fullness of a kind that no pure literary work, not even in its most complete concretization, can reach.<sup>84</sup>

In consequence of the relationship which exists between the architectural work of art and the material world, not only does a material thing form an ontic foundation of the art form, but the architectural work of art cannot be understood to be a schematic formation.<sup>85</sup> This must represent the second disappointment for Ingarden, the first being that music was not to be considered as a stratified formation. Only on the level of the subjective concretizations which result from individual experiences of the heavy masses and forms

can we speak of schemata, not at all an essential feature of the work itself.

One cannot draw direct parallels between the second stratum of the architectural work of art and the portrayed objectivities of the literary work of art and the picture. Since the architectural work represents nothing for Ingarden, portrayed objectivities really have no place in the discussion. However, this stratum does bring to appearance what we call the 'palace' or the 'cathedral' as distinct from the real building. It also brings to appearance aesthetic value qualities which are responsible for the deep significance which architecture has for human kind. Of this we will soon speak. And further, this stratum is of primary importance to the objective character of the architectural work of art, a particularly crucial function to which we now turn.

The architectural work is distinguished specifically, from the work of painting

in that in the dual-layered construction of the picture the stratum of reconstructed aspects forms the structurally constitutive factor of the whole of the picture, while in the architectural work the structurally and phenomenally most important factor forms its *objective* stratum, that is, the three-dimensional mass and its shape, upon which foundation only, specific aesthetically valuable qualities are constructed.<sup>86</sup>

The ultimate purpose of the stratum of visual aspects is to bring to appearance the form of the heavy mass. Without the first stratum this could never occur since it is

the door through which an observer must pass. What occurs in the second stratum is dependent upon the grounding present in the first. Therefore, even though it is within the second stratum that the spatial form of the work and the aesthetically valuable qualities come to appearance, without the first stratum this could not come about. The architect creates a real thing, a building, with certain spatial properties and a certain arrangement of surfaces. On the basis of this real thing, precisely determined, a spatial form emerges when experienced in a particular fashion.

One could say that the real building, and in particular a certain selection of its properties, forms for the observer only the occasion to *intend* a new object upon this ground and to apprehend it intuitively, which is suited to the real building in a series of important moments, but which surpasses it in a different respect—in particular, in what concerns the aesthetically valuable qualities attaining to appearance upon it.<sup>87</sup>

The architectural work of art which is brought to appearance (the three-dimensional mass and its shape), is an intentional object built upon a real one. Just how this stratum of the architectural work emerges as the objective stratum is of interest here.

Ingarden speaks of the principles of artistic design which go beyond the building's practical purposes. In his discussion of these principles the work's objective character becomes clearer:

But here the word "principle" has a double meaning. On the one hand, under it can be understood a conformity to law, that can be fixed in words and be applied as rules of design—or which is even read from the finished work. On the other hand, it can be understood as a *concrete regularity* which exists or is realized on the finished work between the moments befitting it and which at least in some cases finds its *concrete expression* or its *realization in an immediately apprehensible Gestalt-quality*. With architectural works the principle of design comes into consideration in both meanings, while this need not always be the case in other works of art, for example in a literary work of art. Therefore it is essential for the architectural work that this intuitively appearing Gestalt-quality is in the strict, direct sense a *Gestalt pattern quality*, and indeed not simply that of a "form" (to be taken in the spatial sense), but that it also concerns a quality yielding itself out of the arrangement and mutual influencing of the patterns of masses, characterizing the whole of the work, bringing its "logic of design" (*Gestaltungslogik*) to expression. Only this brings the visibly present unity into the structure of the architectural work of art.<sup>88</sup>

The stylistic characteristics of a particular work determine the selection of creative and constructive elements which in turn results in an identifiable and objective work such as a Doric temple or a Gothic cathedral. The architectural work of art, as such, can only occur when the whole of the work results in the bringing to appearance of a qualitative unity, such as a palace or a cathedral, which transcends the real building.

Initially, the architectural work is a result of man's familiarity with Euclidean geometry in respect to three-dimensional formations. The idealization of forms found in nature results in a work which in many respects

contradicts the random and capricious character of the natural world, and provides for a logically cogent and consistent formation, regardless of stylistic difference. But the architectural work of art is more than this, as our reference to a qualitative unity might indicate.

The selection of geometric forms is always modified, or co-determined, by two different considerations: with respect to the practical determination of the building upon which the architectural work of art attains its appearance, and with respect to creating, in selected geometric forms and their arrangement, an artistic whole that in a corresponding observation brings to appearance aesthetically valuable qualities in a meaningful association.<sup>89</sup>

A further consideration overriding the creative and practical features of the creative process, is the psychological factor of the artist, or artists, involved in the process. The historical context within which the architect stands and creates, as well as his or her personal inclinations, influences the overall character of the work and therefore provides for a unique personal and cultural expression, both intellectually and emotionally.

The merging of the three factors of the practical, the rational, and individually and socially creative, brings about the qualitative unity called the architectural work of art. All three must be coordinated and in harmony, otherwise the work is in some respect deficient.<sup>90</sup> Above all others, the rational element—that being the system of purely geometric forms—rules

the entire work as properly architectural. All other characteristics are based on this dominant feature. As such the architectural work of art is the most rational of all the art forms. Ingarden is quite clear on the very special character of the architectural art form and its ultimate significance.

The architectural work of art, among all works of art, is in its structure the most reasonable, rational formation; and at the same time, because it exhibits aesthetically valuable as well as varied moments of expression, is a formation that embodies in itself the expression of emotional and desiderative factors of the human soul. Next to music, architecture is perhaps the most *human* art, and indeed just because it reproduces the whole human soul in the domination of the logical-constructive factor in its closely intertwined qualitative and emotional moments.<sup>91</sup>

By "the whole human soul," Ingarden seems to be referring to the three elements of architecture we have already mentioned—the practical, the rational, and the creative: It reproduces the human soul "through the expression of his [man's] fundamental psychological structure and his intellectual capability, as much the constructive-rational as the perceptual aesthetic."<sup>92</sup>

We have clearly stated that architecture represents nothing for Ingarden, but is instead a presentation to the observer of spatial forms which found aesthetic value qualities. As such, it is a manifestation of the deep poignancy of the human spirit, not reducible to a moment of expression or representation. This is captured

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in the following statement:

But architecture is creative because it rests upon the discovery (upon a kind of artistic uncovering) and realization or embodiment of new "forms"—that is, shapes—and new qualitative harmonies, new both in relation to the spatial forms of rigid bodies encountered in our environing nature, and in relation to the already discovered forms of finished architectural works of art of earlier ages. Limited and made difficult by the principles of heavy rigid bodies, it is at the same time an expression and a result of the living together of man with the world of matter, a mode of the self direction of man in the world, that makes life easier, and at the same time an appearance of his victory over matter, a sign of his dominance through it and its subordination under his practical requirements. At the same time it is an expression that man is capable of forcing forms onto lifeless matter, which corresponds most to his intellectual life and his emotional needs, since they quiet his yearning after beauty and aesthetic charm.<sup>93</sup>

The aesthetically valuable qualities of the architectural work of art arise out of the spatial forms as they enter into mutually affecting relationships. It was in a similar fashion that the elements of color in the painting brought to appearance aesthetically valuable qualities which then provided for qualities of a higher order. The architectural work of art is likewise a polyphony of aesthetically valuable qualities brought to appearance through the heterogeneity of the two strata. The qualitative harmonies which arise out of the architectural work are specifically architectural, thus separating this art from from all others. But by the same token, architecture is capable of bringing to appearance qualities which are common to all the arts—metaphysical

qualities. Here again the polyphonic character of the different works of art is seen as the essential feature which provides for the value and meaning of the work of art in general. . .

In accord with the pattern thus far established, the architectural work of art is no real thing, though ontically founded in the real building. The dependence of the work of art on real material is greater than in any of the art forms so far discussed. Yet its dependence upon the creative acts of the artist and the constituting acts of the observer affirm its purely intentional character, thereby completing its two-fold ontic dependence. Although it is essentially non-representational, there are two heterogeneous strata of aesthetically valuable qualities which provide for the work's overall polyphony.

Setting the architectural work of art apart from those art forms previously discussed is its non-schematic character. Though the borderline instance of the abstract picture shared this characteristic, it was not considered an example central to the art form. In the case of architecture, however, not being schematic is of the essence of the art form. Thus the principles considered to be essential to all works of art must undergo further modification as they now assume their final form:

- 1) The work of art is not to be identified with any real thing.
- 2) It is a heteronomous intentional object ontically dependent upon at least two autonomous objects for the origin and support of its existence. They are
  - a) real objects
  - and
  - b) acts of consciousness of a psychic subject
- 3) The work of art requires a reader/listener/observer for its constitution and concretization. As such, it cannot be identified with any one of its concretizations.
- 4) It is a polyphonic harmony of aesthetically valuable qualities.

Section 13: Concluding Remarks on the Extension of the Essential Principles of the Literary Work of Art

Through the examination of music, painting and architecture, in the light of the previous discussion of the literary work of art, the essential principles of Ingarden's general aesthetic theory have been elucidated. Some of the principles which were seen as essential to the literary work of art have come to be seen as not universally present in the art forms considered, namely, ideal entities as an ontic foundation, stratification, and schematicism. Others reappear regardless of the art form under consideration: the distinction between the work of art and real objects; the work of art's heteronomous intentional existence; the ontic role of real objects and acts of consciousness; the constituting activity of the reader/listener/observer in the multiplicity of concretizations of the same self-identical work of art; and the polyphonic harmony of aesthetically valuable qualities which constitutes the work of art.

On the basis of the reappearance of certain essential principles, we can safely conclude that in respect to the art forms considered, Ingarden has indeed produced a general aesthetic theory. And since he has performed the extension of the principles contained in *The Literary*

*Work of Art* to other central art forms, he has also indicated the proper procedure for applying his theory. But this would not seem to be enough to support the initial claim that Ingarden has provided a general aesthetic theory. Might there not be further modifications necessary to these essential principles as other art forms are considered?

To help resolve this question, attention will now be turned to an art form not examined by Ingarden. The sculptural work of art affords an excellent opportunity to test the general character of Ingarden's aesthetics. Not only did he not treat it, but it is an art form central to the fine arts. Why it was never examined appears as a mystery, for it remains the only major lacuna in the spectrum of art forms falling under Ingarden's thoughtful scrutiny.

## Endnotes

### Chapter Two

<sup>1</sup> Roman Ingarden, *Ontologie der Kunst*, p. vii.

<sup>2</sup> Roman Ingarden, *Ontologie der Kunst*, p. viii.

<sup>3</sup> Also see Roman Ingarden, "Artistic and Aesthetic Values," *The British Journal of Aesthetics*, 4,3 (July 1964), pp. 198-213. In the upcoming discussion of the sculptural work of art, the aesthetic experience will be discussed more in depth. As regards Ingarden's dissatisfaction with past treatment of the mode of existence of aesthetic and artistic values, see *Ontologie der Kunst*, p. viii.

<sup>4</sup> Very little work has been done on Ingarden's theory of the musical work of art outside of Poland. However, one translated article, important for its contextualization of Ingarden's musical theory within contemporary studies of musical theory, is Zofia Lissa, "Some Remarks on Ingardenian Theory of a Musical Work," *Roman Ingarden and Contemporary Polish Aesthetics*, pp. 129-144. Here Lissa broaches a problem which seems to reoccur throughout Ingarden's extensions, namely his examples of actual art works are limited to more traditional art expressions. We will look at this more carefully in the upcoming examination of the sculptural art form.

<sup>5</sup> Roman Ingarden, *Ontologie der Kunst*, p. 32.

<sup>6</sup> Roman Ingarden, *Ontologie der Kunst*, p. 34.

<sup>7</sup> Roman Ingarden, *Ontologie der Kunst*, p. 39.

<sup>8</sup> Roman Ingarden, *Ontologie der Kunst*, p. 49.

<sup>9</sup> Roman Ingarden, *Ontologie der Kunst*, p. 31. The debate over whether or not music contains ideas, emotions, or representations, or is simply restricted to sounds in motion, is central to musical theory. Ingarden clearly saw this as a difficult and maybe even an enigmatic problem. He would appear to argue on the safe side pending further investigation. Some of the interesting literature surrounding this topic includes John Hospers, *Meaning and Truth in the Arts* (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1946); Eduard Hanslick, "Music,

Representation and Meaning," and Leonard B. Meyer, "On Rehearing Music," both in *Problems in Aesthetics*, ed. Morris Weitz (New York: Macmillan, 1970), pp. 491-519; 520-531; Roger Sessions, "The Composer and His Message," *A Modern Book of Aesthetics*, ed. Melvin Rader (New York: Holt, Rinehart & Winston, 1973), pp. 300-307. These articles provide a good representation of the two central positions of the debate.

<sup>10</sup> Roman Ingarden, *Ontologie der Kunst*, p. 31.

<sup>11</sup> Roman Ingarden, *Ontologie der Kunst*, p. 30. Susanne Langer in her work *Philosophy in a New Key: A Study in the Symbolism of Reason, Rite and Art* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1951), discusses the application of the term 'language' to non-verbal arts. She contends that this is really "loose terminology." In an attempt to explain how symbolism is operative in both cases, she distinguishes between the symbolism of a proper language and the "presentational symbolism" of non-verbal arts such as music. Ingarden was clearly familiar with Langer's work and, in fact, responded favorably to it in his "Foreward to the *Investigations into the Ontology of Art*," (p. IX).

<sup>12</sup> Roman Ingarden, *Ontologie der Kunst*, p. 32.

<sup>13</sup> Roman Ingarden, *Ontologie der Kunst*, p. 32.

<sup>14</sup> Roman Ingarden, *Ontologie der Kunst*, pp. 84-85.

<sup>15</sup> Roman Ingarden, *Ontologie der Kunst*, p. 74.

<sup>16</sup> Roman Ingarden, *Ontologie der Kunst*, p. 78.

<sup>17</sup> Roman Ingarden, *Ontologie der Kunst*, pp. 30-31.

<sup>18</sup> Roman Ingarden, *Ontologie der Kunst*, p. 26.

<sup>19</sup> Roman Ingarden, *Ontologie der Kunst*, p. 24.

<sup>20</sup> Roman Ingarden, *Ontologie der Kunst*, p. 24.

<sup>21</sup> Roman Ingarden, *Ontologie der Kunst*, p. 23.

<sup>22</sup> Roman Ingarden, *Ontologie der Kunst*, p. 101.

<sup>23</sup> Roman Ingarden, *Ontologie der Kunst*, p. 102.

<sup>24</sup> Roman Ingarden, *Ontologie der Kunst*, p. 104.

- 25 Roman Ingarden, *Ontologie der Kunst*, p. 103.
- 26 Roman Ingarden, *Ontologie der Kunst*, p. 104.
- 27 Roman Ingarden, *Ontologie der Kunst*, p. 24.
- 28 Piotr Graff argues for the former position which is confirmed by Katarzyna Rosner's reading of some very late statements by Ingarden in 1960. Max Rieser, on the other hand, believes Ingarden felt they were simply not applicable to the musical work of art. Piotr Graff, "The Ontological Basis of Roman Ingarden's Aesthetics. A Tentative Reconstruction," and Katarzyna Rosner, "Ingarden's Philosophy of Literature and the Analysis of Artistic Communication," both in *Roman Ingarden and Contemporary Polish Aesthetics*, p. 74; p. 210; Max Rieser, "Roman Ingarden and His Time," *The Journal of Aesthetics and Art Criticism*, 29 (1971), p. 449.
- 29 Roman Ingarden, *Ontologie der Kunst*, p. 39.
- 30 Roman Ingarden, *Ontologie der Kunst*, p. 126.
- 31 Roman Ingarden, *Ontologie der Kunst*, p. 128.
- 32 Roman Ingarden, *Ontologie der Kunst*, p. 129.
- 33 Roman Ingarden, *Ontologie der Kunst*, p. 135.
- 34 Roman Ingarden, *Ontologie der Kunst*, p. 139.
- 35 Roman Ingarden, *Ontologie der Kunst*, p. 139.
- 36 Roman Ingarden, *Ontologie der Kunst*, pp. 139-140.
- 37 Roman Ingarden, *Ontologie der Kunst*, p. 143.
- 38 Roman Ingarden, *Ontologie der Kunst*, p. 144.
- 39 For a discussion of the 'life' of the painting in the context of Ingarden's position, see Maria Rzepinska, "Remarks on the Existence of a Painting," *Roman Ingarden and Contemporary Polish Aesthetics*, pp. 223-235.
- 40 Roman Ingarden, *Ontologie der Kunst*, p. 223.
- 41 Roman Ingarden, *Ontologie der Kunst*, p. 153.
- 42 Roman Ingarden, *Ontologie der Kunst*, p. 154.
- 43 A work that has come to be recognized as a contemporary classic in the field of aesthetics is E. H.

Gombrich's *Art and Illusion: A Study in the Psychology of Pictorial Representation* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1972). Gombrich has presented an elaborate theory of perception which attempts to give an account of the role of representation in visual art. A more in depth examination of what might be called Ingarden's phenomenological theory of perception would benefit greatly from Gombrich's efforts.

44 Roman Ingarden, *Ontologie der Kunst*, p. 154.

45 Roman Ingarden, *Ontologie der Kunst*, p. 172.

46 Roger Fry in "The Problem of Representation," *Problems in Aesthetics*, ed. Morris Weitz (New York: Macmillan, 1970), pp. 454-456, discusses the way in which these two functions may cooperate in the picture, as well as the way in which one function may predominate. In this regard, he is in agreement with Ingarden; they need not interfere with one another. Henri Matisse in "Notes of a Painter," also in *Problems in Aesthetics*, pp. 446-453, has said that "the purpose of a painter must not be conceived as separate from his pictorial means," once again confirming Ingarden's insight.

47 Roman Ingarden, *Ontologie der Kunst*, pp. 148-149.

48 Roman Ingarden, *Ontologie der Kunst*, p. 149.

49 See earlier Endnote #28.

50 Roman Ingarden, *Ontologie der Kunst*, p. 258.

51 Roman Ingarden, *Ontologie der Kunst*, p. 239.

52 Roman Ingarden, *Ontologie der Kunst*, p. 146.

53 Roman Ingarden, *Ontologie der Kunst*, p. 148.

54 Roman Ingarden, *Ontologie der Kunst*, p. 146.

55 Roman Ingarden, *Ontologie der Kunst*, p. 186.

56 On this point, Reiser has clearly misinterpreted Ingarden when he says that cubist painting lacks the stratum of aspects. There is indeed a diminished role played by the aspects, but they do not disappear entirely. Abstract painting of this kind remains multi-layered. Max Reiser, "Roman Ingarden and His Time," *The Journal of Aesthetics and Art Criticism*, 29 (1971), p. 450, and "The Philosophy of Roman Ingarden in a Critical Light," *Dialectics and Humanism*, 2 (1975), p. 93.

57 Roman Ingarden, *Ontologie der Kunst*, p. 218.

58 In a discussion with Anna-Teresa Tymieniecka at the Winter meeting of the World Phenomenological Institute, 1981, she used these terms to describe the difference between works of architecture which are purely presentational and sculptural works which are representational in the context of Ingarden's thought.

59 Roman Ingarden, *Ontologie der Kunst*, p. 222.

60 Roman Ingarden, *Ontologie der Kunst*, pp. 222-223.

61 Roman Ingarden, *Ontologie der Kunst*, p. 218.

62 Roman Ingarden, *Ontologie der Kunst*, p. 191.

63 Roman Ingarden, *Ontologie der Kunst*, p. 206.

64 Roman Ingarden, *Ontologie der Kunst*, pp. 30-31.

65 Roman Ingarden, *Ontologie der Kunst*, p. 30.

66 Roman Ingarden, *Ontologie der Kunst*, p. 193.

For a good introduction to composition in painting, see Albert C. Barnes, *The Art in Painting* (New York: Harcourt, Brace, 1937), Book II, Ch. V.

67 Roman Ingarden, *Ontologie der Kunst*, pp. 188-189.

68 Roman Ingarden, *Ontologie der Kunst*, p. 192.

69 Roman Ingarden, *Ontologie der Kunst*, p. 192.

70 Roman Ingarden, *Ontologie der Kunst*, p. 195.

71 Roman Ingarden, *Ontologie der Kunst*, p. 200.

Bernhard Berenson may well have been speaking of a similar quality of painting when he said that there occurs a higher coefficient of reality to the object represented in the painting. *The Italian Painters of the Renaissance* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1930), p. 68. Rudolf Arnheim in "The Expressiveness of Visual Forms," *A Modern Book of Esthetics*, ed. Melvin Rader (New York: Holt, Rinehart & Winston, 1973), p. 317, argues strongly "that the content of the work must go beyond the presentation of the individual objects of which it consists." Though Arnheim's and Ingarden's terms differ, they share a basic sympathy over the necessity to subordinate representation to aesthetic qualities of a 'higher' order. In Ingarden's case, it is metaphysical qualities; in Arnheim's case, it is "the theme which embodies the

nature of existence for the author." (p. 317) Though their terms do differ, they seem to be pointing to a similar quality of ultimacy belonging to works of art.

72 Roman Ingarden, *Ontologie der Kunst*, p. 200.

73 It also touches on a point of critical interest, specifically, the value potential of differing artistic styles. For by arguing that the representational picture's polyphony is, in principle, richer than the 'objectless' picture's polyphony, Ingarden is setting up a hierarchy of art works with significant implications for contemporary developments in the arts. We will return to this subject in the final chapter.

74 Roman Ingarden, *Ontologie der Kunst*, p. 262.

75 Roman Ingarden, *Ontologie der Kunst*, p. 278. Jadwiga Slawinska discusses and confirms this point in "Roman Ingarden's Theory of the Work of Architecture," *Roman Ingarden and Contemporary Polish Aesthetics*, pp. 237-245.

76 Roman Ingarden, *Ontologie der Kunst*, p. 278

77 Roman Ingarden, *Ontologie der Kunst*, p. 268.

78 Roman Ingarden, *Ontologie der Kunst*, p. 269.

79 Anna-Teresa Tymieniecka in her review of *Studia z Estetyki* in *The Journal of Aesthetics and Art Criticism*, 17 (1959), p. 392, refers to the architectural work of art as having one stratum. When I questioned her on this point, she explained that her review was based on Ingarden's earlier position which was ultimately altered when these essays later appeared in the *Investigations into the Ontology of Art*. Also worthy of note is that in the same review Tymieniecka expressed the opinion that Ingarden had provided a "coherent theory of aesthetics." To the best of my knowledge, she was the first, and certainly one of the few, theorists, to make such a claim.

80 Roman Ingarden, *Ontologie der Kunst*, p. 269.

81 Roman Ingarden, *Ontologie der Kunst*, p. 270.

82 Roman Ingarden, *Ontologie der Kunst*, p. 271.

83 Geoffrey Scott in his *The Architecture of Humanism* (London: Constable, 1914), has attempted to

show how the three Vitruvian elements of architecture, namely, 'commodity,' 'firmness,' and 'delight' are interdependent and to a degree mutually determining. Moving from the course set by Sir Henry Wotton in *Elements of Architecture*, Scott provides a concise statement of the tensions which have guided the traditional criticism of architecture. In principle, Ingarden's thought on architecture shares this traditional perspective. The element of 'firmness' corresponds to Ingarden's concern with the real world's demands on the creation of architectural works of art.

84 Roman Ingarden, *Ontologie der Kunst*, p. 307.

85 Roman Ingarden, *Ontologie der Kunst*, p. 307.

86 Roman Ingarden, *Ontologie der Kunst*, p. 271.

87 Roman Ingarden, *Ontologie der Kunst*, p. 279.

88 Roman Ingarden, *Ontologie der Kunst*, p. 283.

For a discussion of the architectural work of art's Gestalt pattern from the point of view of an architect, see Robert Venturi, *Complexity and Contradiction in Architecture* (New York: Museum of Modern Art, 1966), Ch. 10, pp. 89-103.

89 Roman Ingarden, *Ontologie der Kunst*, p. 294.

See again Geoffrey Scott, *The Architecture of Humanism*, "Introduction," for his discussion of 'delight' as an essential element of architecture.

90 Roman Ingarden, *Ontologie der Kunst*, p. 297-298.

91 Roman Ingarden, *Ontologie der Kunst*, p. 300.

92 Roman Ingarden, *Ontologie der Kunst*, p. 300.

93 Roman Ingarden, *Ontologie der Kunst*, p. 301.

## Chapter Three

### The Sculptural Work of Art

#### Section 14: Introductory Remarks Regarding the Sculptural Work of Art

Having discussed Ingarden's description of the literary work of art, the musical work of art, the painting as work of art, and the architectural work of art, we are now prepared to discuss the sculptural work of art. Sculpture, unlike the foregoing art forms, has only received very limited treatment by Ingarden. As already mentioned, one can't help but find this curious. Even though the traditional distinction between "Art," "Fine Arts" or "Beaux Arts"<sup>1</sup> may not be altogether functional any longer, sculpture has historically occupied a position of centrality in the world of art regardless of the categories used for identification; more than one theorist has observed that "To the Greeks it was the supreme art, the one which called for the highest talent in the artist and the subtlest sensibility in the spectator."<sup>2</sup> And though Leonardo gave primacy to painting over sculpture because of the greater intellectual demands of painting, the Renaissance shows itself to be a period deeply committed to the importance of the sculptural art form. So merely in terms of history, any theory of aesthetics which truly wishes to claim general applicability must

be able to give an adequate account of the sculptural work of art.

A further reason for addressing sculpture lies in the uniqueness of the art form, a uniqueness which is responsible for the contribution belonging to the sculptural work of art alone. As an art form which claims its own category, it provides human beings with opportunities of experience simply not available in the same way with the other arts. We will discuss these opportunities in Chapter 5. Of importance at the moment is the fact that if Ingarden's theory is to be considered general, it must be able to come to grips with sculpture, a major art form in the history of art.

Although Ingarden never explicated the structure of sculpture, in *The Cognition of the Literary Work of Art* he did discuss the sculptural work, *Venus de Milo*. He was not, however, attempting an analysis of sculpture; his principle motivation was to describe the stages of aesthetic cognition. Yet, an analysis of these passages provides some very important indications of his thoughts on the subject. The same can be said of his references to sculpture in the *Investigations into the Ontology of Art*, particularly in the section on architecture. It is by virtue of these references plus Ingarden's treatment of other art forms and the guiding principles they suggest, that certain conclusions regarding sculpture

present themselves. In some instances our speculations will result in the raising of certain questions—questions which might have been easily resolved in dialogue with Ingarden. Not having this luxury, they will be treated as indicative of legitimate problems requiring resolution.

Before undertaking a description of the structure of the sculptural work of art, a preliminary comment regarding the kinds of sculpture under consideration is necessary. Ingarden's primary example of a sculptural work of art would have to be the *Venus de Milo*, since this particular work received the only attention he gave to sculpture. It is undisputedly sculpture and undisputedly representational. His choice of a work which was so obviously the representation of a human form cannot be ignored. Employing the same line of argumentation that he employed in distinguishing between absolute music, non-representational in that it is not necessary to make the transition to a thing represented, and borderline music, i.e., program music, Ingarden chooses to make representation a necessary feature of sculpture. Works commonly referred to as abstract are considered "transitional" and not pure examples of the art form. He says:

If one seeks to realize an abstract figure in sculpture, then it is only a transitional form between sculpture, which according to its nature is a form of representational art, and architecture which is quite completely free from the representational function.<sup>3</sup>

Although Ingarden would obviously like to avoid problematic examples, his theory must ultimately be able to give an adequate account of broader examples of sculpture than those which fall into the category of representational. To relegate all of abstract sculpture to a category of transitional forms would seriously cripple any theory of sculpture since the predominant direction of contemporary sculpture has been to move towards the abstract.<sup>4</sup>

Consistent with the application of Ingarden's aesthetic principles to differing art forms, in this chapter precedence will be given to an ontological approach to the structure of the sculptural work of art. Of primary importance, of course, will be the consistent application of the general aesthetic principles identified in the previous chapter in order that the exposition of the sculptural work of art can truly be said to be Ingardenian. This can best be achieved by following Ingarden's order of addressing those topics that consistently reoccur in each of the art forms he considered. The general topics and pattern of treatment are identical in every case, thus providing the clear guidance necessary for their application to sculpture. Recommendations for the modification of the Ingardenian position to accommodate contemporary art trends must wait until the final chapter.

## Section 15: The Real Object and the Sculptural Work of Art

The examination of the musical work of art, the painting as work of art, and the architectural work of art has shown that none of them are to be considered real objects. Each is a purely intentional formation which stands in a similar relationship to the real thing which serves as a foundation of its being. If Ingarden's theory of art is a general theory applicable to all art forms, then certain features of the work of art, such as its intentional character, ought to be applicable across the board. Does this, however, present a problem with the sculptural work of art? Initially, it might seem rather ridiculous to speak of a marble statue or a bronze relief as anything other than a real thing. As is the case with the sculpture of the *loggia* of Florence, they are often surrounded by shops, buildings, fountains, rivers, and any number of random objects. They appear to be every bit as real as the objects in their immediate vicinity. The suggestion that these objects are intentional objects rather than real objects is in need of explanation.

Any attitude taken toward an object allows certain features to emerge which remain hidden on other occasions. The attitude of a maintenance worker results in one set of properties; the attitude of a structural engineer, another set of properties; and the aesthetic observer,

again, another set of properties. Each attitude results in the seeing of 'different' objects. In the case of the maintenance worker and the structural engineer, an object appears whose properties can be identified with the real material. Their experience is of a totally determinate real thing. In the case of the work of art, however, the real object points to a wholly different object whose properties cannot be identified with the real thing. The real object serves as the objectively determining basis for the constitution of the object called the work of art. The attitude taken towards the real object becomes the occasion for the work of art's coming to appearance. Ingarden's example of the aesthetic experiencing of the *Venus de Milo* is most illustrative of this point.

Whether a practical attitude or an aesthetic attitude is taken toward a sculpture, both may begin with a sense perception of the real thing. But this is not necessary for the unfolding of the aesthetic experience and the ultimate constitution of the work of art. Even if the real object—the block of marble of the *Venus*—was an illusion, the *Venus* could still be the source of an aesthetic experience. The real object seen within the practical attitude is not only not necessary to the experience of the *Venus*, but may in fact hinder the experience. If the observer becomes preoccupied with the characteristics of the real object, i.e., the pieces of

marble which have been chipped away, this may serve as a distraction thus impairing the flow of the aesthetic experience.<sup>5</sup> In Ingarden's account of the aesthetic experiencing of the *Venus*, the distinction between the real object and the intentional formation becomes clearer.

The *Venus*' defects, i.e., holes, chipped nipple, missing arms, etc., are overlooked when the work is apprehended within an aesthetic attitude. The observer begins with a conception of the female form and ignores any of the defects which would contradict that conception:

We behave as if we did not notice these details of stone, as if we had seen the form of the "nose" in a uniform color, as if the surface of the breasts did not reveal any damage. One might perhaps be inclined to say that, although we actually see the smooth, somewhat gleaming, yellowish-white surface of the block of marble, it is as if we didn't see it, as if we somehow forgot that the "body" of the *Venus* would not, after all, be so blindingly "white" as the marble, that it would not have such a gleaming surface, etc.<sup>6</sup>

The observer actually completes what is absent from the form, thus filling out the work in accord with a conception of the human female form. Although the direction of completion may certainly be suggested by the real object, the object that has begun to be constituted is already more than the real thing—a block of marble. Many of the characteristics of the marble are overlooked and many characteristics of the sculptural form are added.

A work of art has begun to emerge which, while determined by the real object, surpasses it.

In the aesthetic attitude it does not disturb us that the arms are missing. As is well known, it has often been asked whether it would not be better if these arms were not broken off. But in what respect "better?" Certainly not for the block of marble, which has surely already lost its material value as a block. But, in the same degree, not for the Venus as a woman. One is not thinking of that at all, even if it really is better to have sound arms than severed ones. But certainly "better" for the formation of an aesthetic object coming to constitution in an aesthetic experience.<sup>7</sup>

In this regard, the sculptural work of art has the same relationship to the material world as does any other work of art, plastic or otherwise. No work of art of any kind is identifiable with a real thing. Further evidence of this can be seen in the alterations which effect the real properties of sculptural works while not affecting the work of art itself. In the instance of Donatello's *David*, the bronze metal of certain physical properties is the real thing which stands in an ontical relationship to the *David*. The patina of the work has, no doubt, changed with time. With the changes in temperature the metal has expanded and contracted to some degree. Yet, it would be incorrect to say that the *David* has changed—that it is no longer the same work of art. Even if it were ever necessary to fully restore the patina of *David*, the work as work of art would remain the same. This is clearly the case with Ghiberti's doors on the north side of the Baptistery of San Giovanni in Florence. The

reliefs have been restored on numerous occasions as a result of air pollution eroding away their surface of gold. Yet throughout these changes to the material thing, they have remained the works of art which comprise the *Gate of Paradise* by Ghiberti.

By turning attention to a discussion of the pertinent strata of the sculptural work of art, the degree to which the sculptural work of art is embodied in the real object will be made clearer. The primary point at this stage of the inquiry is the strong affirmation of the distinction Ingarden makes between the real thing, which stands as the foundation of the sculptural work of art, and the work of art itself. Ingarden has confirmed the principle that

every work of art, of whatever fundamental kind, is *sensu stricto* no real object. Neither is it an ontically autonomous object in general; and it is distinguished by a relativity of being, in principle, a relativity to be excluded from no art, namely by the relativity to the creative acts of the artist.<sup>8</sup>

This ontic relativity is not only limited to the creative acts of the artist and the constituting acts of the observer, but also includes the certain dependence of the sculptural work of art on "a fully determined real thing shaped in a special way."<sup>9</sup> The remarks thus far, while necessary, must be seen as merely preliminary. They do, however, show the general applicability of a most important Ingardenian principle—the work of art is an

ontically relative intentional formation.

To further clarify the distinction between the real object and the sculptural work of art, as well as the relationship which exists between the two, the next stage of the analysis must begin, namely, the identification and description of the strata belonging to the sculptural work of art.

## Section 16: The Three Strata of the Sculptural Work of Art

Determining the number of strata appropriate to sculpture within the Ingardenian context is best achieved by examining the structural description of the art forms which seem to stand in closest proximity to sculpture. This would mean giving primary consideration to painting on the one hand and architecture on the other: painting because Ingarden considers sculpture as a representational art form and in some cases as possessing a literary theme; architecture because of sculpture's certain dependence on the ordering of masses, its three-dimensionality, and the close proximity of the sculptural work of art to the foundational real object. It shares characteristics of both art forms while clearly being incapable of being subsumed by either. In fact, one of sculpture's significant features is that it does gravitate back and forth between these poles without ever becoming identified with either.

Regarding sculpture's representational character, Ingarden is very clear: the transition to the thing represented "takes place directly. . . both in literature and in painting—except for so-called abstract painting—and also in sculpture."<sup>10</sup> Regarding sculpture's close proximity to the material world, only the architectural work of art is closer and more dependent.<sup>11</sup>

Resulting from sculpture's standing between painting and architecture, a multi-layered description of sculpture suggests itself. Three strata ought to be distinguished:

- 1) the aspects in which the spatial form of the sculptural work exhibits itself in appearance
- 2) the spatial form of represented objects
- 3) the literary theme, whenever present

From our analysis of architecture comes the first stratum. From painting's strata of represented objects and literary theme comes the second and third strata. Each stratum has obvious peculiarities in its application to sculpture, thus making the extension of Ingarden's theory anything but mechanical. However, Ingarden's treatment of each of these strata in other art forms is clearly indicative of their appropriate application to the sculptural work of art. And, as a final note, we will not be applying architectural or painterly categories to sculpture: the use of these other art forms is a means of identifying *sculptural* categories which reflect an Ingardenian perspective. This is possible because of the basic universality of art forms as well as the commonality of many essential principles. In fact, ideally, one ought to be able to discover the same essential categories by a direct examination of sculpture without the benefit of Ingarden's analysis of literature, music, painting, and architecture.

## Section 17: The Stratum of Aspects

When a sculptor has chosen a particular real material to serve as the basis of an artwork, the realization of the artistic conception has begun. Although this particular moment of the creative process is preceded by a complex formulation of a preliminary intention, the selection of the material is primary in the process of actually embodying the artist's conception of the work. The artist's selection and manipulation of the real material is, in fact, an ordering of mass and volume in accord with an initial intent. In the instance of painting, the selection and manipulation of the materials of the medium created certain aspects which stood for each represented object in the work. In representational sculpture the case is much the same. Ingarden contrasts painting and architecture on this point, thus providing an insight into sculpture as well:

The essential distinction, however, between every architectural work and picture rests in that while in painting the aspect is only reconstructed and a single one stands for each represented object, in architecture there is a manifold of aspects—in principle endless (from all sighting-points in the surroundings of the work). At the same time they are purely perceptual aspects, that belong to the physical form of the work in a complete system.<sup>12</sup>

And sculptural aspects also possess many of the same characteristics that belong to architectural aspects. It is through the manifold of aspects that the represented objects of sculpture are ultimately brought to

appearance. And, like architecture, they are closely related to the work's physical form. The selection of sculptural aspects through the manipulation of the real material is not merely directed by the artist's concern with the aesthetic character of the work, but must also be responsive to the demands of the real material. In both architecture and sculpture, these demands are very great. The dependence of these two art forms on the real material is much greater than in painting, for example. And the greater the role of the real material in an art form, the more responsive the artist must be to the limitations resulting from natural laws.

In these two art forms there is in evidence a concern for balance and proportion which has greater consequences than in other arts. The natural forces which affect masses literally dictate design possibilities. The artist must select the aspects which will bring to appearance the spatial shape or form with these natural forces in mind. Thus, design is never simply a matter of artistic taste or preference. For example, since a sculpture always finds itself within the influence of gravitational fields, their influence cannot be ignored. The design of Michelangelo's famous Florentine *David* demonstrates an artist's responsiveness to the natural laws which affect the work. The block of marble which was used for the figure had been preselected by the city

of Florence. Another sculptor had begun work on it at an earlier time, but had abandoned the project. Michelangelo was given the marble block which already had a large piece removed from one of its sides. Regardless of how the sculptor wished to sculpt his figure, the block placed certain restrictions on the design. If a figure of the desired monumental proportions was to come out of the block, it had to be designed around the flaw. In order for the figure to stand erect without the aid of external supports, it was necessary to sculpt the *David* in the, now well known, relaxed posture that maintained the necessary center of gravity. Thus, the sculpting of the hips in relation to the upper torso was first dictated by natural laws and only secondly by aesthetic preference. This kind of material influence over artistic design is not uncommon in either sculpture or architecture. The mere selection of materials by a sculptor or architect clearly indicates the importance which the real material has for these art forms. A flawed block of marble will literally shatter to an improperly placed blow; a block of wood, if not cured properly, will split down the middle.

As a result of the deep dependence which exists between the real material and the sculptural work of art, the aspects must be seen as standing in very close proximity to the real material of the work. In fact, the

sculptural work of art's close proximity to the real material is only second to that of architecture's.<sup>13</sup> Therefore, the stratum of aspects comprises a complete system which is, on one hand, reflective of the demands and constraints of the real material and, on the other hand, directed to the bringing to appearance of a three-dimensional form of represented objects. Of course, the observer's experience of the work does involve the reconstructing of the aspects, as it does in painting, and the aspects do correspond to represented objects, but, the aspects which are possible in the sculptural work of art are greatly determined by the medium itself, much more so than in the painting.

When the artist determines the physical form of the sculpture, the resulting aspects present a manifold of aspects which an observer might experience.. For example, a sculptural work may be characterized by a highly polished surface having certain reflective qualities. In the case of a work in bronze, it may have a certain patina which provides varying colorations intended to create a particular effect. The ordering of its mass may emphasize certain lines of tension or harmony in order to create a work referred to as either 'dynamic' or 'static.' All of these aspects, and others like them, are objectively determined in the work's physical form by the artist. But since the aspects of the

sculpture are closely dependent upon a three-dimensional object, no one or even series of observations will experience them in their entirety. Thus the aspects of the sculptural work of art are not to be identified with the aspects an observer might experience.

Drawing on Ingarden's distinction between the visual and concrete aspects of architecture,<sup>14</sup> the aspects which an observer experiences are the concrete aspects, schemata of experienced visual aspects. Resulting from this, no two experiences of the same work are identical. The observer always brings to the experience a unique standing in relation to the work, and a particular psychophysical disposition. Therefore, the schemata are objectively determined by the mass and physical form of the work, and by the changing conditions of the physical setting and the social and psychological disposition of the observer. For example, though the polished surface of a marble sculpture is an objectively determined aspect of the work, the changing conditions of light will produce differing effects one moment to the next. The sculptural work of art will attain to appearance differently, depending on the character of the visual aspects and the differing effects which the external conditions have on them. Thus, every individual experience or series of experiences of one and the same work will differ in varying degrees. This results in the fact that an experience

will always vary in its degree of faithfulness to the work itself. Our earlier example of Michelangelo's *David* may serve to highlight the point.

The *David* originally stood in an open piazza as a testament to the character of the Florentine city-state. It has since been moved to the Accademia Art Gallery where it occupies a room which depends upon a glass dome for its natural lighting. Although the lighting is quite natural, the effect is certainly not the same as if it were standing outdoors in the open piazza. Minimally, the building which encompasses the work, serves to 'confine' it. The question arises, therefore, whether the work is best presented in its current circumstance or whether a more adequate presentation might occur in another setting. Clearly, contemporary analysis of the aesthetic value of the *David* is based upon individual experiences which result from the work's current location; and conversely, earlier analysis was based upon individual experiences of the *David* in other physical settings. Each location, to some degree, permits the experience of some aspects while excluding the experience of others. Therefore, the concretized schemata of concrete aspects have not only been conditioned by individual psychological and social perspectives, but also by factors which go beyond both the work and the observer.

When the artist selected the work's aspects, his selection was apparently under the guiding influence of a particular intention. It would also be reasonable to assume that he was greatly aware of the affects which external conditions have on the material sculpted with certain formal properties. And some conditions were, no doubt, considered more optimal than others. While the resolution of this question may very well lie within the domain of art history, it indeed has implications for a discussion of the qualitative character of the work, as well as for the adequacy of aesthetic cognition. No one would question whether or not it was possible to have an adequate experience of the *David* in any of its historical locations; however, the effect of external conditions on each experience cannot be ignored either. It is quite possible that because of location during a certain period that the experiences of the *David* were less aesthetically valuable than the work itself provided for. And it is these different experiences which confirm Ingarden's distinction between visual and concrete aspects in application to sculpture.

Returning to the visual aspects of the work, the influence of Ingarden's analysis of painting emerges. Sculptural aspects mutually influence each other in such a way that other aspects are brought to appearance, much in the manner that two or more color patches produce

adumbrational aspects in the picture. The form, volume, and surface features of color and texture, likewise produce adumbrational aspects in the sculptural work of art. Their appearance depends upon the bringing to appearance of the primary aspects of the work which must be seen as distinct aspects in themselves. The adumbrational aspects must also be seen as belonging to the work, but they are distinct from the primary aspects. For example, aspects of volume, form, and color may produce a contrast phenomenon such as a facial expression.<sup>15</sup> The facial expression itself can be said to belong to a represented object of the work. But as an aspect of the represented object, the facial expression is dependent upon other preconditional aspects which brought it to appearance. And further, other aspects are directly dependent upon the facial expression for their appearance. The facial expression may give rise to the "intuitive appearance of certain emotional conditions (for example, delight or terror), or character traits of a mental individual and even the intuitive self-presence of this individual."<sup>16</sup> Thus, the primary function of some aspects is to bring to appearance other aspects which may in turn bring to appearance represented objects and situations.

Ingarden's clearest reference to a sculptural aspect has been noted earlier in another context. It would help

to recall it. Sculptors select from the possible aspects of the objects they wish to represent those aspects which will best construct a work of relevant aesthetic features:

for instance, . . . in designing a monument—e.g., of a human form which is to stand on a high pedestal and thus be seen from below and from a given distance—they do not adhere to purely anatomical proportions but fashion the figure in such a way that, seen from below, it can evoke the intended "impression" (i.e., nothing other than an aspect provided with special aesthetic value qualities.<sup>17</sup>

Thus the sculptor fashions the medium in such a manner that the originally selected aspects, those chosen to construct the representation, are brought to appearance. Utilizing Ingarden's example, it can be seen that other aspects of the particular work could not come to appearance unless the impression of being proportionate is actualized. And, ultimately, the bringing to appearance of the represented object would itself be dependent upon the success of the aspects in their constructive role.

But the sculptural aspects do not merely play a constructive role in the work—a role which is dedicated to the construction and presentation of objects. Independent of their presentational function, they may also perform a decorative function, "that is, they are themselves aesthetically valuable moments or bear such moments in themselves."<sup>18</sup> For example, the surface texture of a sculptural aspect may be responsible for the construction of a human feature such as a "nose." But at the same

time it may also provide a 'soothing' or 'irritating' effect which creates other adumbrations when contrasted with other aspects of the work. By way of example, one only need compare the highly polished surfaces of Classical Greek sculptures of the human form with the heavily textured surfaces of Giacometti's human representations. In both instances a human form is brought to appearance; thus they are similar in their constructive aspects, but they are dramatically different when viewed from the perspective of their decorative aspects. As a special element of each sculptural work of art, the decorative aspects provide for unique aesthetically valuable qualities quite different from those brought about through the aspect's constructive function. And it is because of the compatibility of these two functions that each sculpture is a unique work of art, having its own peculiar aesthetic value.

The two functions of the sculpture's aspects must work in harmony with one another if the work is to be the achievement of the desired intent. The sculpture can be deficient if either function is in any way lacking. Many works are very precise constructions of represented objects while having very little aesthetic value. Marketplace religious statues are an excellent example of this. And by the same token, there are works which are so preoccupied with decorative aspects that the presentation

of a represented object never adequately occurs. Such works are in abundance in university studios where students have just begun to discover the decorative potentialities of their medium at the expense of the representation. A sculptor who is involved in the creating of representational sculpture must constantly take both factors into consideration if the work is to be truly harmonious.

The importance of the stratum of aspects to the sculptural work of art is great indeed. Since the aspects are ultimately responsible for the bringing to appearance of the represented objects, as well as the aesthetically valuable decorative moments, they are the most important factor of the sculptural work of art and stand as the art form's objective stratum. As such, they must be seen as meaning-determining for the whole work. Any deficiencies which might occur in this stratum will not only influence the appearance of represented objects, but will also have a significant effect on the work's overall aesthetic value. The polyphonic harmony of aesthetically valuable qualities will not occur if this stratum fails in either its function of decoration or its function of constructing represented objects. It is this latter function which now leads to a discussion of the sculptural work of art's second stratum.

## Section 18: The Stratum of the Three-Dimensional Spatial Form of the Represented Objects

There are many similarities between the second strata of architecture and sculpture. But since architecture is not a representational art form and sculpture is, the second strata of the two art forms differ both in their nature and their function within the whole of the work of art. And, in respect to the representational character of sculpture, many characteristics of painting's second stratum are likewise applicable.

Within the course of the aesthetic experience of a sculpture, the spatial form of the work comes to appearance. This is the same form which the artist embodied in the real material via the work's aspects thereby establishing the guiding principles for the constitution of the aesthetic object. When an observer performs this, then and only then do the aesthetically relevant qualities and aesthetic values emerge.<sup>19</sup> The stratum of aspects' ultimate purpose is the expression of the form thus bringing to appearance the higher qualities and values. Let us return to Ingarden's description of the aesthetic experience as it unfolds in the encounter with the *Venus de Milo*.

Beginning with his distinction between the real object, e.g., a block of marble, and the *Venus*, he says

we can say that the object of the aesthetic experience is not identical with any real object. It is just that some real objects, constituted in a certain way (in particular in sculpture: things), serve as point of departure and basis for the constitution of certain aesthetic objects in the course of an experience unfolding in the aesthetic attitude.<sup>20</sup>

In the encounter with the *Venus*, the observer is immediately struck by the spatial form of the represented object.

This interpretation is forced on us immediately, at first glance. It is decided to some extent automatically that we intuitively apprehend the form of the female body in the spatial form of the stone, so that we then obtain the right, secondarily, as it were, to speak of the head, of the (missing) arms, of the breasts, of a particular movement of the entire body. We see that we are given a particular female body. And not just a body. To a certain extent we see still more in the aesthetic experience; we apprehend "Venus" in an intuitive way, but now that means only that we apprehend a particular woman in a particular situation and physical position and in a psychophysical state which shows clearly in the facial expression, in the glance, in a very particular smile, etc. At the same time, however, it is not a real female body and also not a real woman. We can imagine that if we caught sight of a real woman with such severed (let us say, already healed) arms, we would certainly feel a strong repugnance or disgust or, finally, sympathy for the poor woman. In the aesthetic perception (apprehension) of the *Venus de Milo*, on the other hand, nothing of the kind is to be found. Something quite remarkable occurs here. We can neither say that we do not see the arm stumps at all nor that we see them quite distinctly, direct our attention toward them, and underscore to a certain extent the presence of this defect or else somehow restore the missing arms in our thoughts. . . . Without being precisely focused on the defect of the "missing" arms, we also do not completely overlook their absence, but we see it only secondarily. We apprehend above all an intuitive character of positive aesthetic value of the whole form of the *Venus*; the arms do not prevent us from seeing directly the pure line of the body and the peculiar slenderness

of the whole form, which shows itself especially when we catch sight of the statue from a distance and are struck by the subtlety and agility of the scarcely suggested movement of the body.<sup>21</sup>

The individual elements of the form interplay in such a fashion that a represented object emerges which seems to dominate the entire experience. Within a practical attitude this is not at all the case. But within an aesthetic attitude, the spatial form moves to the forefront, thus obscuring the deep dependence the work has on the real object and the stratum of aspects constituted within. It is characteristic of the aesthetic experience that this occurs, which further attests to the singularly peculiar character of both the second stratum of sculpture and, finally, the constituted aesthetic object.

The stratum of aspects, when assuming its proper role, should never predominate thereby preventing the unfolding of the spatial form. When the aspects do exert a greater influence, the entire character of the work is altered. This is in evidence in what Ingarden has called "transitional appearances." Addressing such occurrences in painting, architecture and sculpture, he says:

There are pictures, indeed whole schools of painting, which, born so to speak in the spirit of architecture, show a preponderance of the real objective form of the represented thing over the factor of aspects. On the other hand, there are architectural works that thrust the painterly quality into the foreground of the totality of the work. There are in this sense a painterly architecture and an architectural painting, just

as analogously there is an impressionistic sculpture born in the spirit of impressionism (see for example the works of Rodin).<sup>22</sup>

Thus, the stratum of spatial form predominates in the sculptural work of art when there is a purely expressed instance of sculpture. The tendency of the stratum of aspects to predominate in, for example, Rodin's sculpture is an infringement of painterly aspects upon the spatial form of the sculptural work. This further reinforces the use of the *Venus de Milo* as a central example of sculpture within the Ingardenian perspective. The represented object which is brought to appearance in this work clearly dominates the aspects.

In the represented object of the *Venus* we see a pure example of the representational character of sculpture. Sculpture is always concerned with representational illustration and therefore "the factor of reconstruction plays a significant role in all which belongs to the represented world."<sup>23</sup> Thus, its similarity to the picture is apparent; sculpture reconstructs the individual fortunes of man by reproducing the content of his or her experience.<sup>24</sup> Certainly this is clearly in evidence in the representation of the *Venus*. The emotional qualities, represented through the facial expression and the idealization of the female form in an individual 'woman,' are readily seen as a presentation of a sculptor's human experiences and desires. An attempt to understand the

basis of the representational character of sculpture will help to clarify its application to this art form.

Ingarden makes an apparently minor reference which gives a clue to his use of the term 'representation' in relation to sculpture. When speaking of the proper way in which architecture ought to be analogously thought of as an organism composed of interrelated parts, he points to deviations which occur in nature among the same kind of things, as well as deviations of pattern within an individual thing, e.g., the parts of an oak leaf. While this is normal in the organic world, such things are considered anomalies in architecture. Within architecture "forms from the organic world often appear, but always correspondingly 'stylized,' that is, idealized, modified in the feeling of a regularly patterned motif."<sup>25</sup> Here is where Ingarden makes a reference which indicates the meaning of the term representation in application to sculpture.

But in exactly this case one sees best what has arisen from the spirit of the purely architectural mode of design and what on the contrary is peculiar to organic nature and is eventually applied in a different art, for example, in sculpture. One can infer directly from the fact of alteration or even transformation to which the organic forms within the framework of the architectural work submit, that we have to do in the case of architecture not with a kinship in principle with the organic world, but precisely with a profound opposition between these two realms.<sup>26</sup>

Working from this limited reference, it would seem that the conclusion could be drawn that sculpture's

reproduction of the content of human experience might at least partially rely upon a kinship with the organic world. Although sculpture need not be reduced, to the literal reproduction of organic forms, it need not strive for the idealization of organic forms under the same constraints that are found in architecture. For example, although the caryatides of the Athenian Acropolis also play a role in the architectural design of the temple, each sculpture is intended to be a unique individual. By contrast, the design of the columns of the temple, commonly understood to be idealizations of the organic form of the tree-trunk, strive for regularity and sameness within the totality of the individual work known as a Greek temple. Principles of static bodies and geometric forms governed the construction of the columns in a way that they did not govern the sculpting of the caryatides. While there must be an internal logic to the ordering of the parts of the sculpture, it is predominately a result of certain aesthetic considerations such as the appearance of a balanced or proportionate work. In architecture these considerations are more than simply aesthetic. Since there are laws which govern the ordering of the masses, the regular spacing of the columns of a temple is as much a result of certain structural laws as it is a matter of aesthetics.

In the case of sculpture, it is not at all difficult to think of an artist spontaneously and radically modifying a work during the creative process. The architect, however, must constantly contextualize such tendencies within the overriding considerations affecting the structural integrity of the work. It might be suggested that this alleged difference between these two art forms is only a matter of degree since the sculptural work of art must also remain attentive to the work's physical integrity. This would be true, but the degree is great. In sculpture, the design can be altered relatively easily while still remaining sensitive to the physical laws of the medium. In architecture these concerns are of far greater importance and require much more complicated adaptation. The representation of the irregularity and randomness of forms found in nature simply makes sculpture a much 'freer' and more spontaneous art form, while the regularity of architecture's geometric forms, governed by the work's practical determinations, imposes many more restrictions.

Sculpture's relationship to organic nature has another implication for the character of the stratum of represented objects. The representation of forms relies heavily upon the associative properties which the work has for the artist and the observer. Relying upon a person's familiarity with natural forms, the artist

sculpts a figure which indicates certain emotional and physical properties. This is obviously not to be limited to organic forms, although the majority of sculptural works throughout history have focused on organic forms over inorganic forms. Respecting organic forms, whether or not the facial expression of the *Venus* conveys a certain serenity or subtle sensualness might be debated, but it clearly does not convey anger or excited passion. Such a conclusion is based entirely on the observer's past experiences with real persons. As such, the represented figure takes on qualities that would be normally equated with real existence. This only occurs within representational works of art. The observer acts as if the object were real thereby being capable of having certain emotional characteristics. It is in this sense that the sculptural aesthetic object is understood as having a "quasi-real" character.<sup>27</sup>

But such existence-assuming moments, moments asserting to the existence of something, appear in only some aesthetic experiences, in direct aesthetic contact with works of sculpture, representational pictures, or literary works. Hence they are not altogether indispensable; they are absent, for example, in the aesthetic apprehension of works of pure, non-representational music. But when they do appear in an aesthetic experience, they enrich it and influence its course in a way quite similar to that in which a many-layered aesthetic object that also possesses among its strata the stratum of portrayed objectivities is richer in a certain sense than, e.g., a one-layered abstract picture.<sup>28</sup>

As a result of the associations which the observer makes, the consequent quasi-real character of the represented

objects enriches the art form dramatically. Thus, here again is seen how closely dependent the overall aesthetic value of a work is on the number of strata which belong to an art form. Abstract sculpture, as non-representational, would thus have to be looked upon as potentially less aesthetically valuable than representational sculpture. So although stratification does not affect the individuality of the work, it does seem to affect its potential aesthetic value. This raises some important questions which will be examined in Chapter 5.

The stratum of representational objects is a necessary condition for the embodiment of the sculptural work of art's meaning. Although the aspects are selected by the artist in accord with the work's intended meaning and are thus meaning-determining, their primary purpose is to bring to appearance the form of the represented object through which the meaning of the work is manifest.

In order for representation to take place via a spatial object, the artist must accommodate him or herself to the limitations which result from the pertinent medium. There is no possibility of embodying the sculptural work with the infinite number of aspects belonging to the thing represented. Therefore, it is necessary that within the second stratum the represented objects are brought to appearance only schematically. The sculptural elements which are embodied in the work are

determining and suggestive of the spatial form which the artist is attempting to represent, but by necessity they are incomplete. The sculpting of human hair in Greek and Roman busts, for example, while clearly meant to represent hair, can only suggest hair since it would be impossible to sculpt the infinite number of corresponding physical aspects. The same is true of the psychological and emotional qualities which are conveyed in a work. The sculptor does not literally sculpt the emotions which are attributed to the *venus*. They are instead portrayed via the schematic representation of a human form. Our discussion of the sculptural work of art's third stratum will again raise this point. The observer then completes the indetermined moments of the work, thus filling out the work's unfulfilled qualities in accord with the sculpted determining principles found in the work. It is because of this filling-in of the work's schematic moments that sculpture is capable of assuming a quasi-real character. The observer brings to the work a rich stock of human experiences thus restoring the 'life' that the inanimate object had in the intentions of the artist.

If there is any doubt about whether or not our use of the term 'representation' has been in accord with Ingarden's usage, one only need examine Ingarden's clear instances of non-representational art works. Architec-

ture represents nothing for Ingarden. Yet it certainly relies upon forms drawn from the natural world. It is because they are idealized that they are not representing anything. But certainly the constitutive formal elements of the idealized forms could be seen as drawn from forms discoverable in nature. Obviously this is not what Ingarden means by representation. Rather, it would seem that the term, in application to sculpture, must refer to the reproduction of human experiences and desires through the representing of commonly identifiable forms.

Once again, Ingarden's selection of the *Venus de Milo* as a sculptural example asserts itself as particularly revealing of his attitudes on sculpture. Although a sculptural work of art, such as the *Venus*, is partially determined by a system of geometric forms and by the principles which govern rigid and heavy masses in a similar way as with architecture, these characteristics serve the bringing to appearance of a three-dimensional represented object. Sculpture's similarities with architecture are subordinate to that which sets the art form apart.

Using our usage of the term representation, it would indeed be an odd question to ask, 'What does this building represent?' This is not at all the case with sculpture, however. It is extraordinarily common to hear

people ask, 'What is it?' when viewing a sculpture. Generally, it is quite obvious that they are not in doubt about the object being a sculpture. They are concerned, rather, with what it represents as a work of art. The appropriateness of such a question in light of contemporary sculpture may certainly be questioned, as indeed it ought to be. But the expectation of the majority of people who encounter sculpture is that it will be representational, while just the opposite is true of architecture. From the Ingardenian perspective, the question, though only preliminary to what follows upon the representation of the spatial form, is rightfully asked.

In summary, the stratum of the spatial form of represented objects' primary function is the expression of the spatial form which serves to bring to appearance the aesthetically relevant qualities and aesthetic values of the work. As such, it is the stratum of the sculptural work through which the meaning of the work is presented. Although the role of the stratum of aspects is of major importance to the whole work, it plays a subservient role to that of the second stratum. The aspects serve as the means of access to the work without which an observer could not even experience the sculptural work of art. But it ought not overshadow the represented objects brought to appearance in the second stratum.

The sculptural work of art reconstructs the individual fortunes of man by reproducing the content of his or her experience through the representation of natural spatial forms. The representational character of sculpture has a certain kinship with organic nature in two respects. Firstly, it retains the irregularity of nature's constitutive elements, guided by such aesthetic concerns as creating a 'balanced' or 'proportionate' work. While sculpture must remain attentive to the principles which govern static and rigid bodies, thus imposing some definite limitations on the actualization of the artist's intentions in a concrete medium, sculpture is a much freer and more spontaneous art form than architecture where the work of art's dependence upon its real material is at its greatest.

Secondly, through the representation of organic forms, as well as inorganic forms, sculpture relies upon the associations which the human community makes between the things represented and the representation of those things. In consequence of this, the artist is able to determine the work of art with certain principles which direct the observer towards the reconstruction of desired artistic intentions. Although the exactitude of association is not as precise as is possible in, say, the literary work of art where a proper language is involved, such characteristics as a facial expression or the

relationship between the line of the work and its mass and volume, are highly suggestive and more or less precisely determining of the work's meaning. But these guiding principles can only be established through schematic representation since the aspects of any real thing are infinite in number. By virtue of the possible associations resulting from the representational nature of sculpture, the represented objects take on a quasi-real character. The observer acts as if the object were in fact real, thereby imputing certain attributes to the object which are actually to be found only in real objects. Because of this, the work is capable of taking on a richness which clearly transcends the real material of the work.

And finally, we have taken the term representation to mean, within Ingarden's perspective, the reproducing of commonly recognizable forms, such as a human female, and the consequent qualities which human beings associate with such forms in their various represented attitudes and situations. By examining his use of the term in architecture, it would appear that it cannot be understood as referring to the mere representation of the constitutive formal elements of nature since this would reduce all art forms to the representational level in a most rudimentary way. Therefore, not all aspects of the represented thing are literally determined by the work,

but only those aspects which will allow the reconstruction of the represented spatial form and its attendant qualities. It is left to the observer to fill-in these moments of indefiniteness within the aesthetic experience of the work, such that the represented object is not seen as incomplete, but instead as a fully determined aesthetic form with all of its intended characteristics.

Regarding these conclusions on the nature of representation in the sculptural work of art, a word of caution must be added. We have predominantly drawn on references which Ingarden has made to the use of the term in respect to other art forms. The application of the term to sculpture, therefore, has a certain speculative character about it which, while unavoidable, is even greater than was necessary with the extension of his literary theory to music, painting and architecture. This must be kept in mind when it becomes necessary to modify this extension to sculpture in ways that seem appropriate given the diversity inherent to contemporary sculpture. But for the moment, there remains another stratum which is occasionally present in the sculptural work of art that is in need of explication.

## Section 19: The Literary Theme of the Sculptural Work of Art

Going beyond the central case of two-layered sculptural works of art, certain sculptures have various elements which result in the presentation of a very specific life situation. Although this need not occur in order that the object be a sculptural work of art, when it does the work must be seen as having three strata, not merely two.

The life situation brought to appearance in sculpture "is that which one usually has in mind when speaking of the 'subject'" of the sculpture.<sup>29</sup> It is not a real situation, but only a portrayal of a real situation. It is immediately present in a way that differs from the presence of real things such as a human body or a chair, but it is present all the same. And: "it can also be contemplated by us as often as we wish, and indeed as something self-identical, entirely unchangeable in its being and in its properties."<sup>30</sup> And it is only accessible through that which is visually present—sculpture cannot speak nor gesture as is the case with a real person.

Narrowing the topic, the works of sculpture that are of particular interest are those which have an objective situation which has no real correlate. Here we follow the lead provided by Ingarden's analysis of painting:

for example, when we "see" in a picture how one man in a frenzy of rage strikes another and at the same time are clearly aware that the presented scene has no definite real correlate, that in other words this scene never actually existed. I will call this objective situation (in a particular human situation) presented and brought to appearance in the picture itself, the "literary theme" of the picture.<sup>31</sup>

This would seem to be perfectly applicable to sculpture as well. There are those sculptures which require that the observer transcend what has been presented, e.g., any one of the more famous  *Davids* , but by the same token there are sculptures which present a self-contained life situation which has no real correlate, e.g., Rodin's  *Kiss*  or  *Thinker* . It is sculptures of the latter kind which have a literary theme versus an historical theme.

While the work itself is determining of the literary theme, the theme "leads us necessarily beyond itself"<sup>32</sup> and beyond the sculpture; "it requires, so to speak, an unfolding in a temporally extended process and in particular in a 'story' in which humans ordinarily take part."<sup>33</sup> The observer is unable to limit him or herself to that which is, strictly speaking, presented in the sculptural work. In a very limited sense, the literary theme of the sculpture indicates the story which precedes and follows what has been presented. When this takes place in the thought of the observer, a subsequent return to the sculpture will result in a better understanding of the work.

An historical work, such as a 'David,' possesses such a literary theme, but also depends upon the observer's familiarity with a certain historical story which is not fully determined by the work. This serves to further clarify the meaning Ingarden attributes to "literary theme." The literary theme of, say, Donatello's *David*, is concerned with a young man who has apparently physically overcome a male foe. The stature of the youthful figure in comparison to the massive head under his foot, possibly indicates a mis-match of relative importance. Such a 'story' does not depend upon the historical story of "David and Goliath." When this enters into the observer's experience, information has been provided from a non-sculptural source. This would seem to indicate that historical sculptural works of art are not independent works of sculpture, but are instead examples of one art form infringing upon another.<sup>34</sup>

The presentation of a literary theme is dependent upon the objects which are brought to appearance in the stratum of represented objects. "If the presentation of a certain literary theme is to be achieved, then the exhibition of certain objects is indispensable."<sup>35</sup> And since there are sculptures which have represented objects without there occurring the presentation of a literary theme, this would seem to suggest that the literary theme does constitute a separate stratum whenever it is present.

Rodin's *Age of Bronze* would be an excellent example—clearly representational, but without any indicated story.

The presentation of a literary theme in the sculptural work of art usually requires

the presentation of a number of objectivities, whose presented conditions are such that all of them together yield one and the same "occurrence," the same fact, the same situation, which forms a transitional phase of "an incident."<sup>36</sup>

An excellent example would be the two human figures in the attitude of an embrace in Rodin's *Kiss*. And this situation can only be brought to appearance through the visual properties of the sculpture. The 'tenderness' of the *Kiss*, for example, cannot be directly presented. The properties of sculpture are only capable of directly presenting objects in a particular posture which allows for the bringing to appearance of the tenderness of the embrace. This tenderness, while founded in the sculptural properties of the presented objects, is essentially non-visual and can only be presented indirectly. As such, it is "co-presented."<sup>37</sup>

Consequently, the co-presented properties of the sculpture are not fully determined.

These things distinguish themselves from material things in nature in that they are not at all determined in certain respects, such as odor, taste, warmth. They contain, in other words, certain "places of indeterminacy."<sup>38</sup>

The observer completes or fills-in these properties in accord with the principles established by the presented life situation. The constituted properties, therefore, will have an individual character which will be largely dependent upon the observer's particular social history and psychophysical disposition. Again, more will be said of this in the next section on the aesthetic concretization of the sculptural work of art.

As a final note, when a sculpture has a literary theme, it plays a central role in the work. It is not merely a component of the sculpture. It

is the structurally (although perhaps not aesthetically) most important element of the work of art concerned, "what it is really about," upon which the attention of the viewer is concentrated and to which the principal emotional factor of the aesthetic apprehension so to speak must cling.<sup>39</sup>

All other components of the work perform a supplementary function in respect to the chief element of the work, the literary theme. If a literary theme is not present, then the bringing to appearance of represented objects stands as the work's chief element. But in either case, the ultimate goal is the bringing to appearance of an aesthetically valuable work. And this is judged to be the case by reference to the work's overall value, not its number of strata.

In this regard, we now turn attention to the aesthetic concretization of the sculptural work of art. This is of crucial importance since it is here that the

sculpture as an aesthetic object is constituted and, consequently, where the aesthetically valuable qualities and aesthetic values finally come to full appearance.<sup>40</sup>

The significance which Ingarden attributes to this aspect of the aesthetic inquiry is clearly expressed:

And only when we have succeeded in concretizing these values in intuition and in attaining synthetically to the final unity of the whole can we give ourselves over in a quite special emotional contemplation to the magic of the visible and felt beauty of the finally constituted aesthetic object.<sup>41</sup>

## Section 20: The Aesthetic Concretization of the Sculptural Work of Art

Though the aesthetic concretization of the other art forms thus far treated in this study was only touched upon lightly, it is in need of more attention in our discussion of the sculptural work of art. There are two reasons for this: firstly, what little Ingarden did say on the topic of sculpture was mostly in reference to the process of aesthetic concretization. Thus Ingarden's writings on the topic are a primary source of some import for the subject at hand; secondly, since the extension of Ingarden's principles to the sculptural work of art is, according to the best evidence available, being done here for the first time, the more complete picture must include the process of cognition as an accompaniment to the earlier description of the art form's structure.

In response to Wladyslaw Tartarkiewicz's assertion that a distinction must be made between different kinds of aesthetic experiences—those corresponding to works which are heavily reliant upon sense experience and those which correspond to literary works of art—Ingarden, while generally agreeing with the necessity of making distinctions between the aesthetic experiences of the different arts, argues for a certain commonality among all such experiences. He says that he has attempted to

demonstrate that there are

elements of the aesthetic experience which are essential for every aesthetic experience and which at the same time do not exclude the differences existing between the experiences taking place in contemplation of works of art given in sensory immediacy and the aesthetic experiences in the reading of a literary work of art. For they are quite independent of these differences.

The analysis which I have carried out here shows that, even in the contemplation of a picture or a sculpture, normal visual perception—a perception, that is, such as that which we perform when we are trying to cognize a real thing, hence, in particular, the physical foundation of the work of art—takes a different course from the one it takes when we are using it as a preliminary operation in order first to apprehend the work of art in question and then to apprehend it in the aesthetic attitude. It is also insufficient for the realization and course of the aesthetic experience. My investigations also indicate that the aesthetic object is actually given to us in the final phase of the aesthetic experience (specifically, on the basis of acts of perception or imagination and signitive acts); but in order for this stage even to be reached, the aesthetic object must first be constituted in the manner described above; thus it is never an object which we simply encounter as given in mere sensory perception of it. And indeed, this is true quite independently of whether we have to do with sculpture, a picture, a building, or with a literary work of art.<sup>42</sup>

By claiming that aesthetic experiences have certain universal elements belonging to all aesthetic experiences, Ingarden has provided a basis from which an analysis of the aesthetic experience of the sculptural work of art can take place. We also have the benefit of his comments on the aesthetic concretization of the *Venus de Milo* which will provide a concrete example of Ingarden's position on this topic.

In the above quoted passage, the distinction between the real object which stands as the foundation of the sculptural work of art's being and the aesthetic object is reaffirmed. The real object, e.g., a block of marble, is an individual thing of a specific kind. There can, however, be many aesthetic objects formed by one or more observers as a result of aesthetic intercourse with the same sculptural work of art embodied in the identical block of marble. Each observer forms an intentional object as a result of each set of manifold experiences. If the apprehension of the object which arises within an aesthetic attitude belongs to an aesthetic experiencing of the object, then the result is the constitution of a sculptural aesthetic object.<sup>43</sup> Consequently, it can be seen that there are as many aesthetic objects of the same work of art as there are aesthetic experiences of the work. Just how the identity of the different aesthetic objects is maintained will become clearer as we describe the course of the aesthetic experience and, more specifically, when we discuss the critical comments of Wolfgang Iser in the next chapter.

To begin this portion of the analysis, the aesthetic experience of the sculptural work of art should be situated within the spectrum of other aesthetic experiences. There exists a closer kinship between the aesthetic experiences of architecture, painting and sculpture than

between these aesthetic experiences and the experience of the literary work of art or the musical work of art. Ingarden confirms this point in the discussion of the aesthetic experiences of literature and music.

A much deeper difference exists, however, between the two kinds of aesthetic experiences just considered than those which take place in the apprehension of so-called spatial art—a picture, a work of sculpture, or a work of architecture.<sup>44</sup>

Thus the general division between spatial and non-spatial arts serves to more closely align the aesthetic experience of sculpture with the aesthetic experience of other spatial art forms. But further precision is still possible. Even within the category of spatial art, the similarities between the aesthetic experiences of sculpture and architecture are in some respects greater than the similarities between sculpture and painting.

Compared with the full qualification of the architectural work of art, most architectural aesthetic objects are consequently inadequate. We could express this in another way by saying that their constitution is, to be sure, concluded but is, at the same time, incomplete. It is essentially no different with the constitution of aesthetic objects in the domain of sculpture. In contrast, the situation with the aesthetic concretizations of pictures is somewhat different. To be sure, it is not true that the picture, as we might perhaps be inclined to maintain, can be apprehended aesthetically in a single moment. For even in the contemplation of a picture, there are various possible standpoints which lie in various directions and at various distances from the surface of the picture. It need not be viewed from all sides, however, but only "from the front," and even there we can secure an optimal apprehension of the picture only within a relatively limited space. It is also unnecessary to view that picture from all

points within this space in order—as, for example, with an architectural work—to achieve a "full" aesthetic concretization of the picture. . . . Despite all temporal duration of the aesthetic experience and also of the constitution of the aesthetic object, there exists here a moment of completion of this constitution in a more or less statically apprehended "picture."<sup>45</sup>

By comparing and contrasting the aesthetic experiences of these art forms, certain principles applicable to sculpture suggest themselves:

- 1) The sculptural work of art must be viewed from as many points as possible within the space surrounding the work in order to arrive at a "full" concretization of the aesthetic object.
- 2) The sculptural work of art cannot be apprehended in a single moment. Although the parts of the work are simultaneous, they cannot be present to the observer at the same time. The experience of the work is sequentially unfolding. As such, the constitution of the aesthetic object may take place over longer or shorter periods of time.
- 3) Although the constitution of the sculptural aesthetic object can be concluded, it is necessarily incomplete because of the infinite number of perspectives which could, in principle, be taken towards the work.

In order to illustrate how these principles actually apply to the aesthetic experience of the sculptural work of art, we should return to the only account Ingarden provides of the aesthetic experience of a sculptural work of art, the experience of the *Venus de Milo*.

The role of sense experience in the constitution of the aesthetic object is greater in the experience of sculpture than, say, in literature. The physical foundation of the sculptural work exerts a much more powerful influence

over sculpture than it does over literature. Yet, the aesthetic object is never simply encountered in the sensory experience.

[T]his is true quite independently of whether we have to do with a sculpture, a picture, a building, or with a literary work of art. In order to apprehend the work of art, we must always go beyond the sense perception which serves as a point of departure and beyond the real things given in sense perception and, through a transition to the aesthetic attitude, allow the aesthetic object to be constituted.<sup>46</sup>

Just as the literary work of art is not the book—paper and ink, bound in a volume—the sculptural work of art is not marble, wood, metal, or any other real material. However, this real material, as we have already seen, supplies a relatively stable foundation which provides observers with access to the work. The qualities which are attributed to the sculpture, such as the emotional qualities of the *Venus*, are only co-presented: Ingarden even goes so far as to say that the real thing, in principle, is not even necessary for the aesthetic experience of the sculptural work of art.

Suppose that when we perceive the block of marble which, according to the general conception, is the *Venus de Milo*, we are subject to a strange deception or illusion. We would then of course be convinced that we were perceiving this block of marble as something real, but this would be just an illusion; "in reality" there would be no such real thing in that hall of the Louvre, or else there would exist something completely different from what is (ostensibly) perceived by us. Would an aesthetic experience then be possible? To this we must answer: as long as the phenomenon of the *Venus de Milo* continued to exist, nothing would change in

the conditions of an aesthetic apprehension. The same traits of the concretized work of art would be given us, and we would feel at the proper moment the same admiration. The reality of the perceived physical object (the marble block) and the apprehension of this reality are thus not at all necessary for the unfolding of the aesthetic experience.<sup>47</sup>

How then does the *Venus* come to concretization?

When an observer encounters a sculpted physical thing, it is generally within a natural attitude. Consequently, the object is seen as a real thing among other real things. But, if an aesthetic experience of, say, the *Venus* is to come about, there must occur a shifting from the natural investigative attitude taken towards the things and events of daily experience, to an aesthetic attitude which will permit the unfolding of the female form and its accompanying qualities. Thus there must occur a moment of captivation. This initial moment of encounter with the work of art produces the "original emotion" of the aesthetic experience; a peculiar quality or set of qualities "strikes us, forces itself upon us, grips us, or however one wishes to put it."<sup>48</sup> Something has grabbed our attention which, in a sense, beckons the observer to engage the source of this emotion more fully; it may be the graceful lines of the *Venus*, or an initial recognition of a female form. And, at this point, if the experience is to continue,

the original emotion passes over into a more articulated, delineated emotional experience in which the

following original elements can be distinguished: (a) the emotional, direct intercourse with the received quality, which intercourse is still in the process of developing; (b) a certain hunger for the possession of the quality and for intensification of the enjoyment which the intuitive possession of it promises; and (c) a growing striving for satisfaction from this quality, for lasting possession of it.<sup>49</sup>

Here occurs a moment when the observer is, in a sense, brought up short. The practical concerns which had previously occupied his or her attention, become uninteresting, unimportant, and a matter of indifference.

There is produced "a certain check in the preceding 'normal' course of experiences and modes of behavior in regard to the objects surrounding him in the real world."<sup>50</sup>

The events and things of the real world slip into the periphery of awareness. If the quality or qualities of the work of art do not possess the "power" to hold the observer's attention, then a return to the normal practical course of events will likely occur. But, if the work holds the observer's interest, promising more enjoyment and satisfaction of the initial desire it created, then the aesthetic experience continues to unfold within the accompanying shift to an aesthetic attitude. This is the most important effect of the original emotion. The observer is transported to a world within a world—a self contained moment where the pressures of the real world are greatly suspended.

Within the aesthetic attitude, the observer is not

concerned with whether or not there actually exists a real thing such as a block of marble. He or she "focuses on intuitive qualitative formations and the achievement of a direct contact with them."<sup>51</sup> Respecting the *Venus*, this means that those attributes of the specifically real thing which serve to distract the observer from the concretization of the *Venus* are overlooked, and, instead, those qualities which properly belong to the work of art are attended to.

One might perhaps be inclined to say that, although we actually see the smooth, somewhat gleaming, yellowish-white surface of the block of marble, it is as if we did not see it, as if we somehow forgot that the "body" of the *Venus* would not, after all, be so blindingly "white" as the marble, that it would not have such a gleaming surface, etc. We overlook what does not suit our conception of the "living body of a woman," indeed of a "goddess"; and without bringing this clearly to consciousness, we supplement those elements which are in keeping with the form of the "living body of a woman."<sup>52</sup>

The qualities of the *Venus* which are apprehended, are "freed" from the formal structure of the object and momentarily become pure quality, "a center of crystallization for a new object: the aesthetic object."<sup>53</sup> This only occurs within the aesthetic attitude. Therefore, the maintaining of this attitude is essential for the constitution of the aesthetic object.

It is at this point in the process that the active role of the observer becomes obvious. There exists a creative dimension to the observer's encounter with the

work which is necessary to the final fulfillment of the experience. It is a process of constant dialectical passivity and activity. While the phase of the initial emotion is characterized by its passivity, the continued course of the experience relies upon the active involvement of the observer. There must be at least an implicit decision by the observer to continue the experience. This is characterized by a return to those qualities which originally excited interest; but now more of the work is revealed than was initially apparent. Through a multiplicity of successive phases more aspects of the work are experienced, each enriching the previous experience, and drawing the observer deeper and deeper into the 'mystery' that is the work of art.

With the partial satisfaction of each hunger and desire comes an increase in fascination accompanied by the desire for a richer and even more satisfying experience. With each return to the work, the observer fulfills the objectively determined object by filling-in the schematic moments, thus, in a sense, giving the work the 'life' and 'color' of the originally intended work of art. It is from this perspective that the sculptural work of art is to be understood as co-created.

Since we are now focused exclusively on qualities and on a desire to enjoy the sight of them and their presence, either we notice a certain inadequacy or a need for supplementation in the quality itself, or else new details of the work of art now obtrude of

themselves. In the first case it could be, for example, the beginning of a developing melody, the continuation of which announces itself, or the particular expression of a human face which was not itself apprehended, or the general outline of the facade of a Gothic cathedral, which seems to demand to be filled in with specific details.<sup>54</sup>

In the process of supplementing the work in accord with the principles established by the artist, new qualities and harmonies of qualities emerge which enrich the content of the aesthetic object. If these qualities are vividly enough present and "harmonize well with the originally given quality and form with it a 'well-rounded' (*gut abgeschlossen*) qualitative whole,"<sup>55</sup> then they are attributed to the work of art. So, although the observer is creative within the aesthetic process, there are directing principles established by the work itself which guide the observer in the faithful constitution of the aesthetic object.

The course of the aesthetic experience of the sculptural work during its creative phase is heavily dependent upon the observer going through the above process from several perspectives within the surrounding space of the sculpture. Since there are an endless number of perspectives which can be taken toward a sculptural work, it is most important that an observer take as many views as the physical magnitude of the work dictates as being reasonable. From each perspective the same course of events will ideally take place—a movement from the

original emotion to a creative phase wherein the aesthetic object is constituted. Each new perspective results in the experiencing and constitution of new qualities and qualitative harmonies. Qualities which were not apparent from one perspective may present themselves from another. And then each of the new qualities are seen in relation to the previously constituted qualities already experienced. Each experience confirms and supports or rejects and denies the previous experiences. The result is a synthetically constituted harmonious whole of qualities called the aesthetic object.

Ingarden indicates that in the process of apprehension the observer forms apprehended qualities in two ways: "Specifically, (a) in categorial structures and (b) in structures of qualitative harmony."<sup>56</sup> Let us examine both of these in order.

Firstly, if the quality, or qualities, which initially caught the observer's attention appear as belonging to a 'human form,' as is the case with the *Venus*, the observer brings to the apprehension a certain familiarity with the human form which will govern the course of the experience. The observer experiences the *Venus* 'as if' it were a human form, and not merely a block of marble.

We impute to the given qualities, so to speak, the formal structure of a subject of attributes, which is materially determined in its nature in a way suggested to us by the apprehended quality.<sup>57</sup>

When this occurs, the real object in a sense disappears from our vision, and the *Venus*—as nothing other than an aesthetic object with certain qualitative attributes—becomes the subject of our attention:

[U]pon the phase of categorial forming of the object which is portrayed in the work of art follows the phase of perceiving (of receiving) the object by the aesthetically experiencing subject, as well as the phase of the varied emotional reaction to the imagined quasi-existing object.<sup>58</sup>

Once the object has come to appearance in this manner, the observer begins "empathizing" in such a way that new psychological states and acts are seen as belonging to the object. The facial expression of the *Venus*, for example, results in the imputing of certain emotional qualities to the object. The observer fills-in what such an expression might mean based upon previous experience.

Feelings arise in us which are very similar to the feelings we would have if we were close to such a person and his states in reality—feeling of rejoicing with him, admiring with him, hating with him, etc.<sup>59</sup>

Thus, the represented object comes to full constitution when the attributes belonging to the particular category, i.e., female human form, are concretized. But the aesthetic object is much more than merely a represented object belonging to a particular category of objects. Maybe most importantly, it is a harmony of aesthetically valuable qualities.

Secondly, it is especially true of the work of art that the whole is greater than the sum of its parts.

As each of the qualities are apprehended within the influence of other qualities, the qualitative harmony which results has characteristics not found in the individual qualities.

The simplest examples of such qualitative transformations are to be found in the domain of colors. It is well known that in order to obtain a spot of color with a rich and vivid tone it is necessary to choose an appropriate background, one which does not weaken the luminous power of the color. All cases of so-called (simultaneous) contrast belong here, but not only these.<sup>60</sup>

Similar effects occur in the sculptural work of art. A particular surface when combined with a certain volume will give the impression of an increase in height or breadth, thus giving the work either a static or dynamic quality. Sculpture is dependent upon the effects which result from the relationships between the varying qualities which compose it.

The adumbrations which result from individual qualities of the work are specific qualities in themselves, not identifiable with any of the "founding" qualities which are responsible for their appearance.

"This new quality constitutes a kind of clasp which unites the qualitative elements founding it into a whole, by given the whole a qualitative stamp peculiar to itself. I call it the "quality of harmony;" after Ehrenfels, it is usually called "Gestalt" or "structure" or even "totality."<sup>61</sup>

This is exactly what Ingarden means when he says that the work of art is a polyphonic harmony of aesthetically valuable qualities.

The aesthetic object is thus not a mere sum of aesthetic qualities but a new entity founded in the aesthetic qualities of each layer and produced by the conjunction of the aesthetic qualities of all layers in the unfolding stratified structure as a whole. Clearly, aesthetic qualities are not properties of a carrier, they are characteristics of its phenomenally exhibited properties, and they may be actualized in the process of concretization. The harmony of the polyphony depends, of course, on the congruity of the aesthetic qualities that constitute it.<sup>62</sup>

When the harmony of the sculptural work of art is concretized in an aesthetic object the qualities which pertain to the objects represented—to the categorial structure of the objects—must also have been brought to appearance. These two ways of apprehending the sculptural work of art are deeply connected. Jointly, they constitute the fullness of the presented world and, further, occasion the appearance of the metaphysical qualities which pertain to the work. As such, the metaphysical quality is only indirectly presented and fully depends upon the apprehension of the work's categorial structure and structure of qualitative harmony. "Our intuition of it is a function of the layer of presented objects in their phenomenal appearance."<sup>63</sup> Once this 'world' of represented objects is fully concretized, then it falls to the metaphysical quality which is brought to appearance to provide the keystone of the work's essential unity.<sup>64</sup>

In conclusion, each successive moment of the constitution of the aesthetic object reveals more of the nature

and potentiality of the individual work. The more attentive and disciplined the observer is, the greater the likelihood of there occurring a rich and full concretization of the work. The variables in this course of events are understandably enormous, as the diversity of accounts within the observing art community clearly affirms. But the course and direction the experience ought to take is clearly indicated by the structure of the work itself. It remains to the observer to enrich, not alter, what the artist has provided.

This harmony, and in particular its determining quality, is—if we may so put it—the final principle of the constitution and existence of the aesthetic object. The work of art helps us (in the case discussed) in this constitution by furnishing us with the guidance of the highest quality and the structure of the aesthetic object.<sup>65</sup>

And once the aesthetic object is constituted, the aesthetic experience approaches its moment of achievement in the calm, peaceful contemplation of the riches that works of art offer. Here lies the conclusion of the aesthetic process:

It consists, on the one hand, in the constitution of the aesthetic object and thus in the "realization" of quite specific values which can be concretized in only this way and, on the other hand, in the realization of an emotional-contemplative experience of the harmony of aesthetically valuable qualities and thus also of the values founded in it. The performance of this essential function enriches the world belonging to man by specific values which cannot be replaced by anything else; it also enriches human life by a kind of experience which opens the door to those values and, finally, also endows man himself with an ability which belongs to his constitution as a human person.<sup>66</sup>

## Section 21: Concluding Remarks on the Sculptural Work of Art

Our description of the structure and concretizing process of the sculptural work of art results from the application of the essential principles derived from Ingarden's analysis of other art forms, on one hand, and from close attention to the manner in which he treated characteristics not common to every art form, on the other. This has had the effect of providing us with a picture of how the sculptural work of art would look when viewed from the Ingardenian perspective.

In regards to the general category of work of art, the sculptural work of art shares every essential principle common to all the arts: it is not a real thing, but is instead a heteronomous intentional object ontically dependent upon real objects and acts of consciousness; it relies upon an observer for its concretization, and; it is a polyphonic harmony of aesthetically valuable qualities. On the basis of Ingarden's general aesthetic principles, we are justified in claiming that our description is compatible with Ingardenian theory.

And, although a unique art form, Ingarden's guidance for applying his principles allowed us to retain the distinctive character of sculpture. By focusing on other art forms which had some characteristics in common with

sculpture, e.g., representation, three-dimensionality, and literary theme, we were able, through extrapolation, to present an Ingardenian view of the sculptural work of art which clearly distinguished this art form from all others.

Consequently, there seems to be good reason for claiming that Ingarden has indeed provided an aesthetic theory with general applicability. For not only are the essential principles general, but they possess the necessary flexibility to give an adequate account of individual difference among the arts. Both are essential to a theory of aesthetics.

As regards the relative importance of the sculptural work of art in the family of art forms, by Ingarden's standards it ought to be seen as quite high on the scale of potential aesthetic value. For not only does it fully correspond to the basic essential principles of Ingarden's aesthetics, but it is both stratified and schematic as well. Thus, it is capable of producing those aesthetically valuable qualities which go along with representation and the presentation of a literary theme. And, as Ingarden has clearly stated, art forms with these capabilities are in some sense richer than those which lack them.

Section 22: Concluding Remarks Regarding the Exposition and Extension of the Essential Principles of Ingarden's Theory of Aesthetics

Three general conclusions can be drawn from the efforts of this, the first part of our investigation into the aesthetics of Ingarden. Firstly, there are identifiable principles which guide Ingarden's analysis of the literary work of art (Chapter 1). All literary works of art:

- a) are distinct from real objects.
- b) are heteronomous intentional objects dependent upon three autonomous objects for the origin and support of their existence, i.e., real objects, acts of consciousness, and ideal entities.
- c) are schematic formations which require a reader for completion and concretization, thus distinguishing them from any one of the many actual or possible concretizations.
- d) are a polyphonic harmony of heterogeneous strata within which are founded the work's aesthetically valuable qualities.

Secondly, through the application of the essential principles contained in *The Literary Work of Art*, Ingarden has demonstrated the manner in which his principles ought to be applied to other art forms (Chapter 2). This guidance is predominately characterized by the ontological character of his investigations. No characteristic peculiar to the literary work of art is seen as in some way sacred. The investigation of other art forms must first and foremost be directed by the kind of object under consideration. Consequently, some of the principles

essential to the literary work of art are not universally applicable to other art forms. Not all art forms are schematic or stratified. And in some cases, there are distinctions to be made within the same general category of art objects, e.g., the abstract picture is neither schematic nor stratified while the representational picture is both; absolute music is schematic though not multi-layered while program music is both. The most important conclusion that can be drawn from this, then, is that the object itself ought to guide the analysis of art works.

But even given the role of the art object in directing the course of the investigation, Ingarden's analysis of music, painting and architecture, still shows that there are principles which are applicable to the literary work of art which are also applicable to each art form considered. The general, essential aesthetic principles now look like this: all works of art

- a) are distinct from real objects.
- b) are heteronomous intentional objects dependent upon at least two autonomous objects for the origin and support of their existence, i.e., real objects and acts of consciousness.
- c) require a reader/listener/observer for their constitution and concretization. Schematicism is not universally applicable.
- d) form a polyphonic harmony of heterogeneous aesthetically valuable qualities. Stratification is not universally applicable nor necessary for this characteristic.

Thirdly, through the application of the general essential principles of the work of art to the sculptural work of art, it may be concluded that Ingarden has indeed produced a general aesthetic theory having implications throughout the artworld (Chapter 3). It will fall to Part II of our study to evaluate the strengths and merits of his general theory given some of the critical commentaries as well as the problems which are posed by contemporary sculpture.

## Endnotes

### Chapter Three

- 1 Paul Oskar Kristellar, "The Modern System of the Arts," *Problems in Aesthetics*, ed. Morris Weitz (New York: Macmillan, 1970), pp. 108-164, provides a superb survey of the literature pertinent to the historical development and application of the terms "Art," "Fine Arts," and "Aesthetics."
- 2 Herbert Read, *The Philosophy of Modern Art* (New York: Meridian, 1958), p. 218.
- 3 Roman Ingarden, *Ontologie der Kunst*, pp. 300-301.
- 4 See Karsten Harries, *The Meaning of Modern Art* (Evanston: Northwestern, 1968) for an interesting account of the motivation behind and necessity of the development of modern art.
- 5 Roman Ingarden, *The Cognition of the Literary Work of Art*, pp. 177-178.
- 6 Roman Ingarden, *The Cognition of the Literary Work of Art*, p. 181.
- 7 Roman Ingarden, *The Cognition of the Literary Work of Art*, pp. 184-185.
- 8 Roman Ingarden, *Ontologie der Kunst*, p. 267.
- 9 Roman Ingarden, *Ontologie der Kunst*, p. 266.
- 10 Roman Ingarden, *Ontologie der Kunst*, p. 268.
- 11 Roman Ingarden, *Ontologie der Kunst*, p. 267.
- 12 Roman Ingarden, *Ontologie der Kunst*, p. 270.
- 13 Roman Ingarden, *Ontologie der Kunst*, pp. 306-307.
- 14 Roman Ingarden, *Ontologie der Kunst*, p. 270.
- 15 Roman Ingarden, *Ontologie der Kunst*, p. 165.
- 16 Roman Ingarden, *Ontologie der Kunst*, p. 165.

- 17 Roman Ingarden, *The Literary Work of Art*, pp. 285-286.
- 18 Roman Ingarden, *Ontologie der Kunst*, p. 172.
- 19 Roman Ingarden, *The Cognition of the Literary Work of Art*, p. 182.
- 20 Roman Ingarden, *The Cognition of the Literary Work of Art*, pp. 185-186.
- 21 Roman Ingarden, *The Cognition of the Literary Work of Art*, pp. 184-185.
- 22 Roman Ingarden, *Ontologie der Kunst*, pp. 272-273.
- 23 Roman Ingarden, *Ontologie der Kunst*, p. 301.
- 24 Roman Ingarden, *Ontologie der Kunst*, p. 301.
- 25 Roman Ingarden, *Ontologie der Kunst*, p. 291.
- 26 Roman Ingarden, *Ontologie der Kunst*, p. 291.
- 27 Roman Ingarden, *The Cognition of the Literary Work of Art*, pp. 214-215.
- 28 Roman Ingarden, *The Cognition of the Literary Work of Art*, p. 214.
- 29 Roman Ingarden, *Ontologie der Kunst*, p. 142.
- 30 Roman Ingarden, *Ontologie der Kunst*, p. 141.
- 31 Roman Ingarden, *Ontologie der Kunst*, p. 145.
- 32 Roman Ingarden, *Ontologie der Kunst*, p. 145.
- 33 Roman Ingarden, *Ontologie der Kunst*, p. 145.
- 34 Roman Ingarden, *Ontologie der Kunst*, pp. 146-147.
- 35 Roman Ingarden, *Ontologie der Kunst*, p. 147.
- 36 Roman Ingarden, *Ontologie der Kunst*, p. 147.
- 37 Roman Ingarden, *Ontologie der Kunst*, p. 149.
- 38 Roman Ingarden, *Ontologie der Kunst*, p. 150.
- 39 Roman Ingarden, *Ontologie der Kunst*, p. 148.

- 40 Roman Ingarden, *The Cognition of the Literary Work of Art*, p. 182.
- 41 Roman Ingarden, *The Cognition of the Literary Work of Art*, p. 187.
- 42 Roman Ingarden, *The Cognition of the Literary Work of Art*, pp. 220-221.
- 43 Roman Ingarden, *Ontologie der Kunst*, p. 308.
- 44 Roman Ingarden, *The Cognition of the Literary Work of Art*, p. 228.
- 45 Roman Ingarden, *The Cognition of the Literary Work of Art*, pp. 229-230.
- 46 Roman Ingarden, *The Cognition of the Literary Work of Art*, p. 221.
- 47 Roman Ingarden, *The Cognition of the Literary Work of Art*, p. 177.
- 48 Roman Ingarden, *The Cognition of the Literary Work of Art*, p. 189.
- 49 Roman Ingarden, *The Cognition of the Literary Work of Art*, p. 190.
- 50 Roman Ingarden, *The Cognition of the Literary Work of Art*, p. 192.
- 51 Roman Ingarden, *The Cognition of the Literary Work of Art*, p. 195.
- 52 Roman Ingarden, *The Cognition of the Literary Work of Art*, p. 181.
- 53 Roman Ingarden, *The Cognition of the Literary Work of Art*, p. 196.
- 54 Roman Ingarden, *The Cognition of the Literary Work of Art*, pp. 198-199.
- 55 Roman Ingarden, *The Cognition of the Literary Work of Art*, p. 200.
- 56 Roman Ingarden, *The Cognition of the Literary Work of Art*, p. 202.
- 57 Roman Ingarden, *The Cognition of the Literary Work of Art*, p. 202.

- 58 Roman Ingarden, *The Cognition of the Literary Work of Art*, pp. 202-203.
- 59 Roman Ingarden, *The Cognition of the Literary Work of Art*, p. 203.
- 60 Roman Ingarden, *The Cognition of the Literary Work of Art*, p. 204.
- 61 Roman Ingarden, *The Cognition of the Literary Work of Art*, pp. 204-205.
- 62 Eugene Falk, *The Poetics of Roman Ingarden*, pp. 119-120.
- 63 Eugene Falk, *The Poetics of Roman Ingarden*, p. 118.
- 64 Eugene Falk, *The Poetics of Roman Ingarden*, p. 119.
- 65 Roman Ingarden, *The Cognition of the Literary Work of Art*, p. 206.
- 66 Roman Ingarden, *The Cognition of the Literary Work of Art*, p. 212.

PART II

A Critical Examination of the Essential Principles  
of Ingarden's Theory of Aesthetics with Particular  
Consideration Given to the Sculptural Work of Art

## PART II

### A Critical Examination of the Essential Principles of Ingarden's Theory of Aesthetics with Particular Consideration Given to the Sculptural Work of Art

#### Section 23: Introduction to the Critical Examination of Ingarden's Theory of Aesthetics

Part I concluded with the claim that Ingarden has indeed produced a general theory of aesthetics. This was accomplished by identifying principles which Ingarden applied throughout his investigations. To further buttress this claim, these selfsame principles were applied to an investigation of the structure of the sculptural work of art, an art form which lay beyond Ingarden's research. Noting their consistent applicability, the conclusion that Ingarden has a general theory of aesthetics was deemed well made.

But, it is one thing to produce a general theory and it is an altogether different thing to produce a general theory which can withstand strong and insightful criticism without becoming diluted in concession and compromise. It is the task of this, the second part of this study, to show that Ingarden's theory does have (a) the strength to stand against critical commentary, and (b) the flexibility to accept necessary and justified modifications without the loss of coherency and consistency.

In accord with this two-fold task, Part II will be divided into two separate chapters. The first chapter will examine some of the critical commentaries which have been aimed at those aspects of Ingarden's aesthetics which have now been identified as general aesthetic principles. This will provide a further means of assessing the strength of Ingarden's general theory. The second, and final, chapter, will focus on the ability of Ingarden's theory to accept necessary and justified modifications without loss of coherency and consistency. This will be done by examining the Ingardenian description of the sculptural work of art presented in Chapter III in light of contemporary sculptural developments. The point of significant interest will be whether or not the modifications to the Ingardenian description of the sculptural work of art will require the drawing back from any of the principles previously identified as essential to all art forms; this will indeed be a test of the strength of Ingarden's aesthetic theory.

## Chapter Four

### Certain Critical Commentaries Pertinent to Ingarden's Aesthetic Theory

#### Section 24: Introductory Remarks Regarding the Critical Commentaries

The large number of scholarly responses to aspects of Ingarden's writings is a testament to the importance of his contributions to the field of philosophy in general and to aesthetics in particular. Since his work possessed the scope so characteristic of great philosophic ventures, critical responses have covered a very broad range of topics, many of which have only indirect relevance to the field of aesthetics. And since it would be neither possible nor desirable to examine the number of critical discussions sufficient to account for the breadth of philosophic topics treated by Ingarden, a reasonable principle of selection must guide the choice of problems to be considered. Since this study is primarily concerned with Ingarden's general theory of aesthetics, it would seem appropriate to allow the identified essential principles of the theory to determine which critical discussions ought to be examined.

There is, of course, a certain artificiality to the identification of some topics as having applicability to Ingarden's aesthetics and others as pertaining to his

wider philosophic concerns. Ingarden's work can rightfully be called a unified whole; any one problem has implications throughout the body. The problems selected for treatment are simply seen as having immediate and obvious implications for his general principles of aesthetics. The claim that Ingarden's general theory has the strength to stand the test of critical appraisal greatly depends upon the strengths and weaknesses of the principles which comprise it. Though other aspects of Ingarden's thought have importance for his aesthetics, it will be upon the essential principles previously identified that his theory will rise or fall. Discussions pertaining to other topics will only result in nuance and modification. Discussions pertaining to the essential principles, however, go to the very core of Ingarden's aesthetic program.

Again, the four principles which resulted from Part I are as follows: all works of art

- 1) are distinct from real objects.
- 2) are heteronomous intentional objects dependent upon at least two autonomous objects for the origin and support of their existence, i.e., real objects and acts of consciousness.
- 3) require a reader/listener/observer for their constitution and concretization.
- 4) form a polyphonic harmony of heterogeneous aesthetically valuable qualities.

Corresponding to these four principles, four critical discussions of Ingarden's work will be examined.

They are:

- a) The Act of Consciousness as an Ontical Foundation of Purely Intentional Objects. (This discussion relates directly to principle #2 and indirectly to principles #1, #3, and #4).
- b) The Material Object as an Ontical Foundation of Purely Intentional Objects. (This discussion relates directly to principles #1 and #2 and indirectly to principles #3 and #4).
- c) On the Possibility of the Existence of Aesthetic Objects. (This discussion relates directly to principle #3 and indirectly to principles #1, #2, and #3).
- d) Indeterminacy and the Role of the Reader/Listener/Observer in the Process of Concretization. (This discussion relates directly to principles #3 and #4 and indirectly to principles #1 and #2).

Since these critical commentaries strike right at the heart of Ingarden's general principles, the strength of his theory rests, at least partially, on its ability to withstand or accommodate itself to these critical observations.

Section 25: The Act of Consciousness as an Ontical  
Foundation of Purely Intentional Objects

Discussion of the role of acts of consciousness in Ingarden's philosophy has been fairly constant since the early 1930's. Since conscious acts play an absolutely crucial role in the process of concretization, the bestowal of meaning, and the ontical founding of the intentional object, there is hardly a topic in Ingarden's work which can be separated from them. In 1932 P. Leon questioned how it was possible to view the concretization as anything other than psychical since "in the concretion the meaning is actually and really (*wirklich*) meant and not merely 'lent.'"<sup>1</sup> The crux of Leon's question revolved around conscious acts as an ontic foundation of intentional objects. His call for clarification was an alert for subsequent Ingardenian readers that an important element of Ingarden's philosophy required careful scrutiny. And in various ways, this scrutiny was forthcoming. Discussions of Ingarden's philosophy of man found the topic unavoidable.<sup>2</sup> The same was true of the topic of meaning.<sup>3</sup> Any discussion of concretization and the companion subject, places of indeterminacy, forced confronting the ontical foundation of conscious acts, as Section 28 will clearly show.

As a way of clarifying this aspect of Ingarden's thought, the challenge posed by Piotr Graff provides an

excellent frame of reference for a critical discussion. He has raised the issue of the very possibility of acts of consciousness serving as an ontical foundation for the work of art. Since his argument is direct and well developed, it will serve to provide an excellent means of access to this topic of such importance to Ingarden's theory.

Recalling to mind that the work of art is a purely intentional object, Graff's target can be stated as: a conscious act serves as an ontic foundation of the purely intentional object. But herein lies the problem. How are we to understand the relationship which exists between an intentional object and the conscious act? Or, as Graff has stated it, "should acts of conceiving be recognized as a foundation, or merely as a source of the purely intentional object?"<sup>4</sup> The problem revolves around Ingarden's statement that purely intentional objects "draw the source of their existence and their essence *directly* from concrete acts of consciousness effected by an ego."<sup>5</sup> Graff translates this passage to read "that purely intentional objects draw their existence and their *complete bestowal* from an intentional experience of consciousness (from an 'act')."<sup>6</sup> This translation more precisely addresses the problem. He accepts the fact that intentional objects draw their existence from conscious acts, but questions whether the

complete bestowal and support of its qualities can be attributed to an act of consciousness. He asks:

- a) is the ontical foundation of an object in its intentional form (i.e., as the object of conceiving), fully embodied in the act

and,

- b) Does an act constitute the ontical foundation of the contents of the purely intentional object, and if so, to what degree, i.e., does it constitute such a foundation in whole, or only in some part or aspect?<sup>7</sup>

If the response to both questions is in the affirmative, then one can rightly question the role of any other ontic foundation, e.g., the material object, in the purely intentional object. Graff, therefore, is questioning the range of Ingarden's ontic foundations. He readily acknowledges that an act of conceiving stands as the intentional object's source of existence. But the contents and maintaining of the intentional object's existence do not seem to be fully attributable to the act of consciousness, thus threatening the intentional object's heteronomy in this one regard.

Graff cites as the basis for his conclusion the role of the form of the intentional object's contents. He says that: "The form of a state of affairs is not 'conceived,' but it is taken up, used, applied."<sup>8</sup> While the color of a fictitious rose, for example, is conceived, the operative state of affairs is not. Consequently, it is the role of ideal essences to provide the formal

content of the intentional object, as well as to provide the necessary support for the object's continued existence. This is clearly contrary to Ingarden's position. The purely intentional object is to be understood as "ontically heteronomous in form and relative to the subjective operation."<sup>9</sup> If Graff is correct in his observation, a most important element of Ingarden's general aesthetic theory is in jeopardy.

In order to adequately respond to Graff's comments regarding the intentional object's heteronomous relationship with the conceiving act, notation must first be made of a statement by Ingarden which would seem to give strength to Graff's criticism.

For at the basis of the sentence being formed there lies what one may call an empty formal schema, which is predetermined by the general type of sentence-forming operation.<sup>10</sup>

Graff has, in fact, made use of this statement to support his position. But there is more to the quote which would tend to complicate the issue:

If there were no sentence-forming operation, there would be no sentences. As a result, the transformations in the individual word meanings appearing in the sentence, which go hand in hand with sentence-formation, are completely relative to the execution of this operation; they originate from it in the true sense of the word. But precisely for this reason, the sentence as a whole, as well as the organically interconnected parts appearing in it, forms something which has nothing in common with the purely ideal sphere of "concepts" and ideal concepts in general, that is, with a sphere in which individual objects are beyond reach of any spontaneous activity of the conscious subject and where they resist any attempt at changing them.

The whole sentence, along with all the elements of meaning appearing in it, is "established" (*gestiftet*) to use Husserl's term—and is, in a manner of speaking, maintained in its ~~existence~~ by this operation.<sup>11</sup>

On one hand, Ingarden seems to call for a sentential form which precedes the act of consciousness, while, on the other hand, "the whole sentence" is seen as ontically founded in the act of consciousness. One can hardly ignore Ingarden's ultimate dependence upon ideal concepts clearly expressed in *The Literary Work of Art*. The role, however, of ideal concepts in respect to the intentional object's form is complicated in the above passages. Does or doesn't the act of consciousness support *and* bestow the formal content of the purely intentional object? It would seem that in some sense the form precedes the material content of the intentional object and the act of intention; and in some sense, there is nothing in the intentional object which was not first in an act of consciousness because an act of conceiving establishes and maintains the content of the intentional object. Is Ingarden in conflict?

Ingarden's use of the term 'ontic foundation' clearly indicates what meaning ought to be attributed to it. Graff's reading is correct; "the ontical foundation is what formally and materially determines the defining moments (loosely speaking, the 'qualities') of a something."<sup>12</sup> Ingarden holds firm to the position that the act of consciousness is an ontic foundation of the purely

intentional object; there is indeed nothing in the intentional object which is not formally and materially dependent upon the act of consciousness. Graff's claim, however, is that the formal content of the intentional object has its foundation in ideal entities. He understands this to mean that while the act of conceiving is the source of the intentional object's being, it does not either (1) bestow all of the object's content, or (2) maintain the object's existence. The crux of the problem lies in the relationship which exists between one autonomous entity and another—acts of consciousness and ideal essences. At its heart, it is the identical problem which Leon called attention to almost five decades ago. Let us return to what Ingarden has said on the subject.

The formal content of an act of consciousness *is* dependent upon ideal essences. Of this there can be no doubt. It is for this reason that Ingarden speaks of the sentence's empty formal schema as predetermined. But Graff's statement that a form is "taken-up," "used," or "applied," is in need of precise clarification. For if Graff means that the formal content of the intentional object is either identical with the ideal form of the general idea or 'caused' by the general idea, his position is open to question.

Firstly, as Ingarden has already stated, the content

of the intentional object "has nothing in common with the purely ideal sphere of 'concepts.'" Thus, there is reason to believe that their content is not identical. The intentional object has as its ideal correlate a particular idea "which contains all of the properties and traits of an individual object,"<sup>13</sup> while the purely ideal concept, or general idea, does not contain such properties and traits.

We may describe the relation between a particular and a general idea in the following manner: an individual object is the direct individuation of its particular idea, but only its (essential) constitutive nature (and not its particular traits) may be considered as "derived" from the constant qualitative moment of the general idea under which it falls, because the general idea does not contain any of the object's variable particular traits. Consequently, the particular idea is an intermediary ideal correlate between the individual object and its corresponding general idea and is therefore subordinate to that general idea.<sup>14</sup>

Therefore, because the particular idea plays the intermediary role which permits the participation of the general idea in the intentional object, the content of the intentional object is under the direct influence of the particular idea and not the general idea. In this sense, the act of consciousness is responsible for the support and the complete bestowal of the intentional object's formal content. And in further support of this contention:

The intentional act of pure consciousness is not creative in the sense that it can create genuine realizations of ideal essences or ideal concepts in an object that is intentionally produced by it. . . Moreover, these are actualizations in which

no ideal, realized (i.e., having the ontic form of realization) meaning contents really (*reell*) inhere, that is, they are not immanent in the true sense that we find in the realization of ideal essences in *real* (and *ipso facto* ontically autonomous) objects.<sup>15</sup>

The intermediary function of the particular idea guarantees the act's of consciousness role of support and bestowal.

Secondly, the relationship between the ideal essences and the acts of consciousness is derivative and not causal.<sup>16</sup> The ideal essence does not produce an effect in an act of consciousness called formal content. This is the case, however, in the relationship between the act of consciousness and the intentional object.<sup>17</sup> The act of consciousness actualizes the formal content of the ideal essence and then is the cause of this formal content in the intentional object. As such it is the act of consciousness which is bestowing the formal content on the intentional object, not the ideal essence. And further, since it is the act of consciousness, and not the ideal essence which is the cause of the intentional object, the immediate continued support of the intentional object's existence must be attributed to the act of consciousness since it contains everything within it that is necessary for its effect's existence. If the act of consciousness disappears, so does the intentional object. The ideal essence is only indirectly, though necessarily, the support of the intentional object.

The situation just described is based upon Ingarden's assertion that an autonomous entity can also be derivative. It seems clear that the formal content of the act of consciousness is to be understood in this way. Within derivation there is to be found dependence and separateness simultaneously. Consequently, Graff is quite correct in saying that Ingarden's theory contains a certain dependence on ideal essences. But this dependence can only be seen by virtue of the active role of the conscious act as it actualizes the ideal essence in intentional objects. As such, the ideal essence is dependent upon the act of consciousness for its influence in the intentional object..

The conclusion must be, then, that the act of consciousness is an ontic foundation for the intentional object in that it is responsible both for the formal content and continued existence of the intentional object. It is responsible for the formal content of the intentional object because it is its direct cause and no other such cause can be found. Ideal essences do not stand in such a relationship. The act of consciousness supports the intentional object's existence because without it the intentional object goes out of existence. The support which an ideal essence provides, is dependent upon an act of consciousness actualizing its content through a derivative relationship. Therefore, the

act of consciousness is a direct ontic foundation for the intentional object, while ideal essences are an indirect ontic foundation. Both are simultaneously required.

Section 26: The Material Object as an Ontical Foundation  
of Purely Intentional Objects

As previously noted, Ingarden's primary concern was always with resolving the controversy over the existence of the world or, in other words, the Idealism/Realism problem. Therefore, the relation of the real world to purely intentional objects was of utmost importance. Since he argued that the existence of intentional objects implies the existence of real objects,<sup>18</sup> the relation which the work of art has to its material ontic foundation had far reaching implications for Ingarden's greater program. It is, therefore, not surprising that this topic has drawn significant interest. Max Rieger found this ontic dependence of the work of art to be "doubtful."<sup>19</sup> At the other extreme others have claimed that there is no reason to see the work of art as anything other than a material object.<sup>20</sup> Since this topic has import for Ingarden's general aesthetic theory as well as for his entire philosophic program, it is worthy of attention.

Once again, Graff has provided a current critical appraisal of Ingarden's position on the material object as an ontical foundation of the work of art. In a relatively brief discussion he raises several interesting questions. Only one of these, however, is fully developed into a complete argument. And since it is by far

the most threatening of those questions he raises, we will focus our attention on it. The argument is short and can be quoted in its entirety.

There is no doubt that material objects which fund artistic ones indeed can and often are multiple and different for one and the same artistic object. The same text can be printed in many copies, in different types, according to different rules of orthography (as when old texts are modernized); it can also be uttered by people with different voices and accents and in different conventions of stage declamation. The same picture can be realized in many copies (if we assume that the copies need not be identical, but only that a reasonable standard of similarity is observed), etc.

But if this is so, can we still speak about the material object as an "ontical foundation" of the artistic object, if it is a part of the meaning of the term "ontical foundation" that it warrants the identity of the funded object? Now, if different objects (numerically and, sometimes, qualitatively different) "fund" the same artistic object, then there must be some link between each of the material things; indeed, there is such a link and a very close one, namely they all "fund" the same work of art. But such a usage of "funding" entails a vicious circle. As it appears, it is not a material object that "fixes" and "warrants the identity" of a work of art, but rather the opposite seems to be true; it is the artistic object that determines the identical character of a certain set of conceivable material objects; their identity with each other consists precisely in that they are all in the same—and unexplained—relationship to the artistic object. If we say, as Ingarden does, that the essence of the relationship is that the artistic object is "funded" by any or all of its material substrates, we are trapped in a vicious circle.<sup>21</sup>

Although there are several possible approaches to Graff's argument, for example, 'What is the relationship which reproductions have to the original material object?; 'Is a 'relationship' reproduced or are the necessary conditions for the establishing of a relation-

ship reproduced?, attention will be given to a particular aspect of the argument which appears to be clearly mistaken. Graff has used the terms "fund" and "funding" to describe the relationship which material objects have to artistic objects. But he has also used these same terms to describe the relationship which the act of consciousness has to purely intentional objects:

Ontical foundations are, as it seems, mentioned or listed on the underlying principle that there is a pair of functions: "funding something" and "being funded by something."<sup>22</sup>

And more precisely to the point:

Perhaps it would be more to the point to say that acts fund the form of purely intentional objects.<sup>23</sup>

Since Ingarden has clearly indicated that the relationship between the act of consciousness and the purely intentional object is causal, we would be justified in interpreting Graff's use of the term 'fund' to mean cause.<sup>24</sup> Now, if we take Graff's statement that the underlying principle of all the ontical foundations is that they 'fund' or 'cause' the respective object, then he is clearly misinterpreting Ingarden. Ideal essences are not in a causal relationship with acts of consciousness, but rather a derivative relationship.<sup>25</sup> But for the sake of argument, let us put this aside. Let us assume that by claiming that the relationship between the acts of consciousness and the purely intentional object is a funding relationship, Graff means causal. (Either

this is the case or he has not understood this relationship correctly.) Then when he uses this term in the argument already quoted, he wishes to question whether or not a multiplicity of material objects are the cause of the artistic object. But the only ontic foundation which Ingarden speaks of as causal is the act of consciousness. To be an ontic foundation for a purely intentional object does not necessitate a causal relationship. The terms 'funds' and 'funding' imply an active dimension which can only be attributed to one ontic foundation—the act of consciousness. The ideal essence is dependent upon the act of consciousness for its actualization in the purely intentional object. Likewise, the material object is only the occasion for the constitution of the aesthetic object. Any relationship which exists between a material object and an artistic object is dependent upon an act of consciousness, not some causal activity of the material object. Therefore, the relationship or "link" which Graff claims to be the principle of identity between a multiplicity of material objects cannot be attributed to Ingarden's position.

If, on the other hand, we were to understand 'funding' to mean a foundational occasion for the constitution of the artistic object, thus ignoring the active character of the term, we would immediately be in accord

with Ingarden. (This would, of course, result in the questioning of the applicability of the term to the relationship which exists between the act of consciousness and the purely intentional object.) Given this interpretation, the force of Graff's argument is greatly diminished. For the principle of identity of a multiplicity of material objects is found in the act of consciousness as it actualizes the ideal meaning content suggested by the material object. Material ontic foundations direct the course of the act of intention in accord with the ideal meaning intended by the artist. The act of consciousness is the active occasion for the actualization of the object's ideal content. Herein lies the material object's principle of identity, as well as the identity of a multiplicity of concretizations. There is simply no avoiding Ingarden's ultimate dependence upon ideal essences. Although this would seem to be Graff's ultimate conclusion as well, his means of getting to it relies on a basic misunderstanding of the different roles of the three ontic foundations of the purely intentional object.

Section 27: On the Possibility of the Existence of  
Aesthetic Objects

The problem of defining and locating the work of art has engendered as much contemporary debate as any topic in the field of aesthetics. Between the poles of Richard Wolheim's denial of the "physical-object hypothesis"<sup>26</sup> and Paul Ziff's "rejection of "the ghost of aesthetics, the mysterious aesthetic object,"<sup>27</sup> theorists have been involved in a philosophic tug-of-war of little give and much finesse. Stephen C. Pepper has argued for the existence of three related objects, namely, a vehicle generally understood to be a physical object, the object which is experienced when a spectator encounters a vehicle, and, finally, the work of art—the object of criticism.<sup>28</sup> Donald Henze, in much the same vein as Ziff, has thoroughly criticized giving the work of art some special "ontological status outside the scope of experience and the realm of physical objects."<sup>29</sup> In fact, there are so many theorists that have wrestled with this most central of aesthetic problems, that little is achieved by enumeration.<sup>30</sup> Since it is highly unlikely that the debate can be settled in any conclusive fashion, more to the point are the merits of the criticisms which have been directly leveled against Ingarden's claim that aesthetic objects are to be distinguished from real objects.

Gary Iseminger and William Hamrick, in particular, have both responded to Ingarden's article, "Aesthetic Experience and Aesthetic Object."<sup>31</sup> In a response to Iseminger, Peter McCormick has correctly noted that the criticism is based upon one article without any consideration being given to Ingarden's major works in aesthetics. The same observation holds true of Hamrick's response, a point he readily acknowledges. The force of McCormick's response can be directly attributed to the familiarity it displays with the whole of Ingarden's work in the field. In order to adequately appreciate the merits of Ingarden's position, one indeed must be familiar with

three important aspects of Ingarden's treatment which have been too often left without careful enough scrutiny, namely the nature of real objects, the idea of aesthetic properties, and the notion of aesthetic perception.<sup>32</sup>

By examining Hamrick's criticisms we can easily see the propriety of McCormick's recommendation. Hamrick is concerned with demonstrating that there are cases where we are not justified in distinguishing between real and aesthetic objects. He poses three arguments which he attributes to Ingarden, qualifying each by saying they only apply to particular cases. There is a certain artificiality in the framing of these arguments, since each represents an abstraction from the body of Ingarden's work. Therefore, our primary concern will be the proper

contextualization of Hamrick's observations.

The first argument runs as follows:

- I. (1) We can constitute aesthetic objects in imagination.
- (2) Imagination does not directly imply the perception of a real object.
- (3) There can be aesthetic experience without a prior perception of a real object.<sup>33</sup>

Tentatively accepting Hamrick's distilling of the first argument, the conclusion is that *some* aesthetic objects are distinct from real objects. The argument is provided as support and further cause for accepting the distinction between real and aesthetic objects. Hamrick does not resist this conclusion. And the same is true of the second argument since it likewise focuses on a particular case:

- II. (1) We can sometimes constitute an aesthetic object while having illusions.
- (2) The aesthetic object still manifests aesthetic value which causes our delight or or aversion to it.
- (3) The reality of the work of art-real object is not a necessary condition for the emergence of aesthetic value.<sup>34</sup>

Neither the first nor the second argument presented by Hamrick is sufficient for asserting a complete distinction between real and aesthetic objects; nor should either argument be construed as attempting such an end. Hamrick acknowledges this point.

The third argument pays attention to a peculiar

situation—deficient art works.

- III. (1) We relate to real objects (and works of art *qua* real objects) in terms of scientific cognition and other practical functions (such as dusting statues).
- (2) In scientific cognition, we want to include all the features of the real object and exclude all factors which are foreign to it (e.g., the viewer's psychic state).
- (3) But in aesthetic experience, we often (as in the "Venus" case) (A) "overlook" certain features of the real thing which interfere with the constitution of the aesthetic object, and (b) supplement "in thought" these deficiencies by providing qualities which contribute to the final harmony of qualities which is the aesthetic object.
- (4) The aesthetic object is not identical with either the real object or with certain aspects of it.

and

- (5) The sense-perceptions of the real object-work of art are only a basis for the subsequent constitution of the aesthetic object (the *terminus a quo-terminus ad quem* relation).<sup>35</sup>

Hamrick criticizes this argument because the generalization (4) is not strictly limited to the experiences of (3). But in this example, Ingarden does indeed limit his conclusion to deficient artworks. Hamrick's criticism has gone beyond the argument. The conclusion is that "in this case"<sup>36</sup> the real object cannot be identified with the aesthetic object. The cognition of deficient artworks is merely offered as further support for his distinction between the two objects.

To further buttress his position, Hamrick says that

There are a great many aesthetically non-deficient works of art, in the experience of which we do not feel inclined to distinguish the work itself and its qualities which stand out as aesthetically valuable. If, for example, I am studying Utrillo's "Rue du Mont Cenis," and am drawn to its use of sweeping perspective, its contrasts and hues of colors, and so forth, there is here no distancing relation between the real work and its qualities.<sup>37</sup>

Though Hamrick may not "feel inclined" to make the distinction, his statement would indicate it is necessary, if we understand "real work" to mean material thing.

As soon as we attend to a painting's perspective, we have left behind the material thing, i.e., canvas and pigment. Perspective in painting is concerned with the creating of objects which appear to have their natural dimensions. This implies that there are first certain represented objectivities, which are in no way identifiable with the material thing, and then that these objectivities are seen as standing in a particular relationship to one another.<sup>38</sup> This relationship is in some sense as illusionary as are the represented objectivities.

Ingarden has, of course, characterized these phenomena as quasi-real and as not belonging to the real material object.<sup>39</sup>

Utrillo's work, conveniently, is an excellent example of representational painting. It is peculiar that Hamrick would turn to a painter who is so heavily dependent upon representation to make his point. It would

be quite impossible to appreciate the perspective of Utrillo's work without first leaving behind the material substrate and constituting the represented objectivities which are the precondition for the work's perspective. Familiarity with Ingarden's two-layered description of the work of painting clearly demonstrates the necessity of distinguishing between the real materials and the two strata of the work.<sup>40</sup> Contrary to Hamrick's position, the distinction is valid for non-deficient as well as deficient works of art.

Now, if Hamrick wishes to contend that he is experiencing the *Rue du Mont Cenis* without experiencing the represented objectivities, i.e., the experiences of color patches and contrasts, one could rightly question the plausibility of his claim. It would be quite difficult to imagine a viewing of such a representational work which was totally devoid of any associations arising out of the objects represented. And even if this were possible, one would be forced into a kind of reductionist position which is, minimally, devaluing of the work. The *Rue du Mont Cenis* is certainly much more than the physical elements of color patches on canvas. It is even possible that we could speak of such an experience as entirely within the investigative attitude, thus not permitting the experiencing of aesthetic qualities at all. Hamrick has not, however, provided a complete

enough description of the elements of his experience to make this final judgment.

The first three arguments presented by Hamrick do not individually or collectively refute or affirm Ingarden's claim that there are aesthetic objects. Hamrick's reference to Utrillo, however, inadvertently sets the proper course for appreciating the merits of not identifying the work of art with a material object. Hamrick seems to place his greatest wager on a fourth argument which is clearly different from the first three in that it does not address particular cases, but instead confronts the more basic Ingardenian apparatus. Let us turn to Hamrick's framing of a fourth so-called Ingardenian argument.

- IV. (1) In the "preliminary emotion" of an aesthetic experience, we seize on a certain quality of the (possibly) real object which strikes us with its beauty and lures us to it.
- (2) This quality effectively "checks" our normal behavior by means of a "narrowing of the field of consciousness."
- (3) In this narrowing, the reality-reference of the quality and the object to which the quality pertains is either "partially extinguished" or "completely removed."
- (4) (In this "specifically aesthetic" attitude) the object of an aesthetic experience cannot be a real object.<sup>41</sup>

Of this argument, Hamrick makes three criticisms:

- a) The conclusion does not follow from the premise. "That is, from the fact that I mentally exclude,

or find excluded, the reality-reference of a given quality, . . . it does not follow that the quality is not a feature of a real work of art.<sup>42</sup>

b) "It seems that the entire structure of the preliminary emotion. . . is also present in non-aesthetic experiences of real objects." Therefore "in what sense does the preliminary emotion create a 'specifically aesthetic' attitude?"<sup>43</sup>

c) The third criticism is made from two perspectives.

The first unacceptable conclusion can be made to appear in the following *reductio ad absurdum* argument.

- (1) Suppose that sense-perception of a real object can include no apprehension of aesthetic value.
- (2) Works of art, such as statues, or paintings, as well as non-aesthetic things, are available to us in sense-perception.
- (3) If a work of art has no aesthetic value, then sense-perception of it contains its apprehension.
- (4) If a work of art has no aesthetic value, then it cannot be distinguished from a real thing. (That is, what would make it a work of art?)
- (5) Ingarden says that a work of art can be distinguished from a thing (a literary work from a book, the "Venus" from a piece of marble.)
- (6) (5) denies the consequent of (4) and (by Modus Tollens) implies that a work of art does have aesthetic value. But this is the antecedent of (3): therefore, (by Modus Ponens), sense-perception does contain the apprehension of aesthetic values which makes (1) both true and false, which is impossible. And, since (1) leads to a contradiction, it seems that, over against Ingarden, we must reject it.<sup>44</sup>

And secondly,

Suppose, on the other hand, that a work of art is not a real object. . . Then, not remaining "within the limits" of a real object "when becoming acquainted with a work of art" either means constituting an aesthetic object in which the reality of things is "neutralized," or some other kind of constitution. If the former, then it would follow that, as against Ingarden, work of art and aesthetic object are identical. But since Ingarden only allows the work of art to be a background source of data on the basis of which aesthetic objects come to be constituted, we must assume that coming to recognize something as a work of art involves some other kind of constitution. But the type of constitution required is surely correlated to the same factors that Ingarden has discussed in terms of the constitution of the aesthetic object, such that we are able to say in the first place that Carroll's *Through the Looking Glass* or Monet's "Sea Coast at Trouville" are works of art. But if this is the case, how then do we distinguish the object of aesthetic experience from the work of art?<sup>45</sup>

Each of Hamrick's criticisms suffers from the same general weakness that McCormick brought against Iseminger—a basic lack of familiarity with the essential elements of Ingarden's aesthetics. This is easily demonstrated by examining the way in which each of the arguments is framed. Obviously, it does not follow that because the reality reference of a quality is excluded the quality is not a feature of a real thing. Such a conclusion could only be made if there were persuasive evidence that there was a cause for this exclusion which was not solely the product of a subjective operation. The argument which Hamrick has attributed to Ingarden cannot be drawn from either the text under consideration

or any other of Ingarden's works on aesthetic objects:

A closer look at the pertinent passage shows that this conclusion is never drawn as a logical consequent of the premises Hamrick has framed. The original emotion does cause a "check" of normal behavior. This check does result in a "narrowing of the field of consciousness" in reference to the real world. The real world "loses its importance and strength." But Ingarden acknowledges that this moment "is not characteristic of an aesthetic experience,"<sup>46</sup> since the same thing can occur in other situations, e.g., in mathematical or philosophical researches. Now, if the experience is to continue in the aesthetic mode, there occurs a change in attitude, a shift from the natural attitude to the ~~ses-~~ aesthetic attitude which is "directed to an intuitive intercourse with qualitative essences."<sup>47</sup> We must now look for the conclusion which Hamrick has attributed to Ingarden, namely, that because of the above course of events, "the object of an aesthetic experience cannot be a real object." Hamrick would seem to draw his conclusion from the following statement:

[T]he quality, which had primarily occurred as a property of a real thing given in this perception, becomes, as it were, freed from the formal structure; it remains for a moment a pure quality, usually to become in the further phases of the process of the aesthetic experience a center of crystallization for a new object: an aesthetic object.<sup>48</sup>

Ingarden is saying that *sometimes* this quality results in the constitution of an aesthetic object; but not always. In respect to the experience of art works founded in real objects, the quality is a necessary, but not sufficient condition for the constitution and existence of the aesthetic object. There is no proof here for the existence of aesthetic objects. All that Ingarden is doing is describing the stages of the cognitive experience of the work of art. Ingarden's support for the existence of the work of art and the aesthetic object as distinct from the real object comes out of an analysis of the aesthetic properties' ontic foundations and their relationship to the work of art. Simply because an observer takes up an aesthetic attitude which results in a lack of concern for the object's reality status does not argue for the existence of aesthetic objects. What is needed, in addition, is an explication of the ontic foundations of the qualities which are experienced within this attitude; and this Ingarden has provided on numerous occasions and in works accessible in English translation. This is the significance of Ingarden's statement regarding the "intuitive intercourse with qualitative essences." Here we find the determining factors for the distinction between real objects and aesthetic objects. The aesthetic attitude in its passive mode merely becomes the necessary condition

for the emergence of aesthetic properties. The content, and the source and support of the content of the work of art and aesthetic object, provide the argument for the distinction between real objects and aesthetic objects. And these areas remain unexplored in Hamrick's article.

Consequently, the three criticisms which Hamrick has made of his fourth argument, fail to make the case against the existence of aesthetic objects in the context of Ingarden's theory since the argument does not adequately represent Ingarden's position.

We must return to McCormick's recommendation. To appreciate Ingarden's position one must be familiar with the essentials of his philosophy. Though McCormick's demands must be considered great, since the three aspects he emphasizes come close to embracing the entire territory of Ingarden's aesthetics, they are justified in light of the carefully constructed edifice which Ingarden has erected. Both happily and regrettably, one article cannot provide access to the very extensive and inter-related body of literature Ingarden has produced. His position on the aesthetic object is not only an integral element of his aesthetic theory, but his aesthetic theory must be seen as integral to a greater philosophic program which occupied his entire career. Here are found ontological, metaphysical, and axiological

investigations which permeate his conclusions in aesthetics. Both the strengths and the weaknesses of Ingarden's work can only be assessed in this broader context.

Section 28: Indeterminacy and the Role of the Reader/  
Listener/Observer in the Process of  
Concretization

Probably no topics in Ingarden's aesthetics mirror the concern which he had for maintaining a balance between the creative acts of the reader/listener/observer and the identity of the work of art as do the topics of concretization and places of indeterminacy. Ingarden absolutely refuses to give up either the work of art as a self-identical object or the concretization of the work as bearing characteristics of the reader/listener/observer. The line he has chosen to walk is precarious indeed as the subsequent discussion will indicate. Since most theorists have found it difficult to maintain this balance themselves, it is not surprising that the subject has drawn a significant amount of attention.<sup>49</sup>

Ingarden's efforts in this area have led to the accusation that his theory of the literary work of art is "clearly normative and elitist" and presents a "highly static view of the relationship between text and reader."<sup>50</sup> One certainly cannot dispute the normative and even elitist character of Ingarden's aesthetics, though it is not immediately evident why either of these observations need be taken as negative. But the relationship between the text and reader as highly static indeed does pose a serious challenge to Ingarden's theory.

Wolfgang Iser frames the criticism as follows:

For him [Ingarden], concretization was just the actualization of the potential elements of the work—it was not an interaction between text and reader; this is why his "places of indeterminacy" lead only to an undynamic completion, as opposed to a dynamic process in which the reader is made to switch from one textual perspective to another, himself establishing the connections between "schematized aspects," and in doing so transforming them into a sign-sequence.<sup>51</sup>

Or as Menachem Brinker has put it in summarizing Iser's position:

The 'original emotion' which sets the reader on his way by attracting him to the artistic quality of the literary work, is tied to the actual words used in the text rather than to the gaps, blanks and hidden meanings of the work which are not formulated in the text.

By taking empathy to be the factor that explains the continuation of reading, Ingarden turns the unformulated aspects of the story and its meaning into a passive, static and secondary accompaniment. He does not realize that gaps, negations, blanks hidden implications are the dynamic elements of the literary text.<sup>52</sup>

Iser's dissatisfaction with the function of the places of indeterminacy in Ingarden's theory, and consequently the role of the reader, lies with an equating of the work's polyphonic harmony with "norms of classical aesthetics."<sup>53</sup> The places of indeterminacy must be filled in in accord with the norm of harmony, therefore not permitting the reader to bring to the work the social and psychological influences of his or her world. Thus the question revolves around Ingarden's description of the role of the places of indeterminacy in the literary work of art in particular, and in the work of art in

general.

Iser describes the "original emotion" of the aesthetic experience as a propellant "for the actualization of the potential elements"<sup>54</sup> of the work of art. In accord with Ingarden, he says that the original emotion, which results from a particular quality or harmony of qualities of the work, motivates the constitutive activity of the reader. The places of indeterminacy are not seen as having any propelling force, for this is left to the original emotion. Thus the conclusion is that the places of indeterminacy do not provide for a genuine interaction between text and reader which would give the reading the dynamic dimension Iser demands.

Ingarden's description of the role of the places of indeterminacy does not seem to fully coincide with Iser's description. On this discrepancy rests, at least partially, Iser's conclusion that there is little room for the social and psychological contribution of the reader. While Iser recognizes that the original emotion is not responsible for sustaining the aesthetic experience—this is left to the empathy which the original emotion elicits<sup>55</sup>—he does not satisfactorily describe the changing character of the reader's emotional response to the work throughout the course of the concretization process. Neither does he elucidate the effects which

the places of indeterminacy have on the reader's emotional response and thus on the concretization itself. This results in a lack of recognition of the dynamic which exists between text and reader. The reader is seen as caught up in the momentum of the original emotion, removing the places of indeterminacy in accord with a rigid, predetermined normative harmony, and driven forward in the experience by empathy. If this were in fact the case, the role of the reader would indeed be reduced to a level of secondary importance, subservient to the work's polyphonic harmony, bound to the very strict limits imposed by the text. As a means of clarifying this discrepancy, let us return to Ingarden's account of the concretization process.

The original emotion which motivates the aesthetic experience is not capable of sustaining the concretization process all the way through to the actualization of the aesthetic object without the impetus which results from the removal of places of indeterminacy. The dialectic between the reader and text produces modifications to the original emotion, thus intensifying and sustaining the experience. Every return to qualities previously experienced is under the influence of and is conditioned by the previous experience, thus having the effect of revealing new qualities not originally experienced. This supplies new life to the overall experience and becomes

the motivation for a further and deeper experience. Each return "produces a new wave of emotion in us,"<sup>56</sup> which in turn is accompanied by a "new feeling of being unsatisfied."<sup>57</sup> In response to this new feeling, the reader may be led to the supplementation of the experienced quality in an effort to satisfy the desire which was caused by the original emotion and intensified by the subsequent emotional phase. Thus, the new qualities that are revealed throughout the course of the experience play an important role in the continuance of the concretization.

Following upon each return, the reader's emotional response is significantly altered. And it is this alteration which is responsible for sustaining the momentum of the experience. The qualities which cause the alteration of the original emotion, and are thus responsible for the continuance of the concretization process, can only come about by the removal of places of indeterminacy. Therefore, the actualization of the potential moments of the work represents a dynamic element of the work. Even though the work's potential elements cannot be identified with the places of indeterminacy, as Iser correctly points out,<sup>58</sup> the potential elements are determined by the indetermined moments of the text. By what is expressly not stated, if it may be put this way, a set of possibilities are determined. Iser would seem to separ-

ate these two elements of the text more than they should be when he says: "'Places of Indeterminacy' must be removed, whereas potential elements must be actualized."<sup>59</sup> Potential elements of the work are actualized by the removal of the places of indeterminacy. And the continuance of the experience is dependent upon this activity. So although the places of indeterminacy cannot be understood as the initial propellant of the experience, they are responsible for sustaining the experience. Here they play a very dynamic role.

This still does not directly address the extent of the reader's social and psychological contribution to the actualization process. It is obvious that the reader is responsible for the concretization itself, but the question is, rather, to what extent does the text determine and, therefore, control the course of the concretization?

During the process of concretizing the work the reader is moving back and forth between passive/receptive and active/creative moments.<sup>60</sup> And, as we have seen, each active/creative moment results in a modification of the subsequent passive/receptive moment. It is during the active/creative phases of the concretization that the places of indeterminacy are filled in thus bringing to appearance new qualities which are responsible for the modification of the next emotional phase. The question

thus focuses on how narrow the constraints of the text are. Is there room here for the influence of the reader's social and psychological world?

Ingarden's position on the relationship between the reader and the text is well known. The text does indeed direct or guide the faithful concretization. But there is also an acceptable latitude: "Any place of indeterminacy can be filled out in several different ways,"<sup>61</sup> none of which would violate the identity of the work. Iser is quite correct when he says that the harmony of the work's elements are the norm for the faithful concretization, but this does not necessarily exclude a reasonable amount of reader influence over the content of the concretization. And this influence is indeed wedded to the reader's world:

Since . . . the concretizations of a literary work are dependent on the attitudes of the reader, they consequently carry in various respects the "traits of the times" and to a certain degree take part in changes of cultural atmosphere.<sup>62</sup>

Were it not for the attitudes of the reader, many of the work's aesthetic qualities could never be actualized.

And, in fact, exactly which qualities will be actualized is greatly dependent upon the social and psychological perspective that is brought to the work.

The potentialities which belong to the work are great in number and not mutually exclusive of one another. One reading may bring about a set of actualizations which,

while quite different from another set of possible actualizations, remain in accord with the work's harmony. Because of the building process that results from the dialectic between the reader and the text, the actualization of certain qualities will make possible the actualization of other qualities which would quite possibly not have resulted from having taken a different perspective towards the work. This serves to explain the diversity of valid concretizations of the same work throughout the work's "life."

It [the work of art] has places of magnificent development and perfection as well as phases in which, through impoverishment of the concretizations, it itself becomes more and more impoverished, etc. It is also possible for the language in which the work is written to lose its manifestation qualities for us because it is no longer a "living" language.<sup>63</sup>

Clearly the reader's contribution to the text through dynamic interaction is of extreme importance to Ingarden. In justice to Iser's criticism, however, one cannot ignore the constraints which the harmony of the work imposes on each reading. This is undeniably an essential feature of the work of art. But once it is recognized that the work's harmony does not prevent the reader's social and psychological contributions from influencing the course of the concretization, but instead only sets certain limits on them, then it becomes a question of whether or not the reader's role can be seen as greater given the necessity of preserving the

identity of the work of art. The balance that Ingarden has sought in this matter represents an attempt to give adequate and appropriate weight to each factor.

This, then, brings the discussion to another important criticism raised by Iser which relates to the use of harmony as a norm given the constant indeterminacy of every concretization. For as he has correctly observed, unfulfilled qualities can never be completely removed. And since "aesthetic value and metaphysical qualities, as condition and substance of the norm that controls the 'adequate' concretization,"<sup>64</sup> are both blanks which the reader fills in, the norm which governs the filling in of places of indeterminacy is itself a place of indeterminacy. In Iser's opinion, this places the norm for concretizations within the actualization process, whereas for Ingarden it must "possess a foundation in a reality that is quite independent of the concretization."<sup>65</sup> Iser concludes:

Indeed, one would then have to abandon the postulate of the 'adequate' concretization, for this can only be maintained so long as aesthetic value and metaphysical qualities have a transcendental position beyond the act of concretization.<sup>66</sup>

Iser's criticism hinges on a proper understanding of Ingarden's use of the term 'harmony.' Is the harmony of the work which is responsible for the work's identity to be understood in terms of the work's structure or in terms of the concretized aesthetic qualities? Brinker

is particularly helpful here; the identity of the work of art is located in the work's skeletal structure.

For Ingarden there is a distinction to be maintained between the identity of the work (a 'reading' which misses that identity is not a 'concretization' of it) and the value-potential inherent in the work itself but actualized in a reading.<sup>67</sup>

The identity of the work of art is discovered through adequate concretizations, but this does not lead to an identification of the actualized aesthetic qualities with the self-identical structure of the work. The diversity of adequate concretizations precludes founding the work's identity in actualized aesthetic qualities since each concretization will differ in the qualities that are actualized. What remains constant is the structure of the work of art which determines the scope of possible adequate concretizations.

There is no question of breaking the identity of the individual literary work of art in the less successful concretizations as all concretizations are concretizations of the 'same' work.<sup>68</sup>

Thus the harmony of the work which provides the work's identity is to be found in the work of art and as such does transcend any concretization. The potential harmony of actualized aesthetic value qualities which gives evidence to there being an appropriate concretization is determined by the harmony of the work of art's structural elements. Brinker adds

those concretizations that achieve a maximalization of aesthetic values will be regarded as closer to

the 'style,' the 'idea' or the specific 'polyphonic harmony' of the individual work.<sup>69</sup>

Therefore, it is true that the 'better' reading will actualize more of the work's aesthetic value potential, and accordingly the metaphysical qualities, but their actualization is evidence of the work's identity which is found in the work itself and not in the actualization.

The conclusion then is that since there is a significant degree of latitude permitted the reader in the filling in of places of indeterminacy, and that since the aesthetic qualities which are actualized are a direct result of the reader's activity, and since these qualities have a very significant affect on the continuance of the constituting process, as well as on the content of the many possible appropriate concretizations, the places of indeterminacy ought to be seen as a dynamic factor in the work of art. Further, since the reader's social and psychological world greatly influences the way in which places of indeterminacy are filled in, thus giving each concretization a unique individuality, the contribution which the reader makes to the work is not at all slight nor insignificant.

Ultimately, whether or not the reader's contribution is judged to be great enough may very well rest on philosophic preference. Obviously, Iser would like to extend the scope of the reader's influence. But there would seem to be nothing resulting from an analysis of

the work of art that would require expanding the reader's range of influence. The maintenance of the work of art's identity argues for extreme caution in any such effort.

And finally, an appreciation of Ingarden's use of the term harmony is essential to a proper understanding of the work of art's normative character. It must be acknowledged that this issue requires further examination since the very identity of the work of art is at stake. But we do not see any inconsistency in the position which Ingarden has formulated. This does not, however, rule out some future clarifications of this position which would provide for a clearer understanding of the influence which the aesthetic value qualities and metaphysical qualities have over the concretization of the work of art. Brinker has promised just such a study.<sup>70</sup>

## Section 29: Concluding Remarks Regarding the Critical Commentaries

The critical commentaries which were selected for special treatment are considered to be representative of areas in Ingarden's aesthetics which are of major importance; they are directly and/or indirectly related to the essential principles of Ingarden's theory. And while most of them must be seen as merely representative of the body of critical commentaries belonging to each subject area, each was regarded as truly indicative of a basic critical tact theorists have taken towards each of the general principles. This was true both in respect to the quality of argumentation as well as the topic of concern.

But it must be acknowledged that any conclusions regarding the overall strength of Ingarden's theory as a result of its ability to withstand the selected criticisms are directly related to the strength of the criticisms. Beyond the challenges which these commentaries provide, it must be left to other critical appraisals to test the limits of Ingarden's approach. Certainly further evaluation will be forthcoming given the significance of Ingarden's contribution to aesthetics.

On the basis of the criticisms discussed, however, Ingarden's general aesthetic theory must be seen as carrying significant force. Graff's examination of the

role of conscious acts and material objects as ontical foundations of the work of art, while displaying a good familiarity with Ingarden's work, must ultimately be found wanting. In the case of the discussion of conscious acts as a support for the continued existence of intentional objects, Graff has missed the essential intermediary role which conscious acts perform between intentional objects and ideal essences. In respect to conscious acts and ideal essences, it is not a case of either/or, but instead both/and; neither ontic foundation can be absent. Any attempt to drive Ingarden away from his commitment to the ontical foundations of conscious acts would result in inconsistencies not attributable to the position he so carefully and precisely articulated.

Graff's criticism of the ontical role of material objects rests more blatantly on a misinterpretation of the different kinds of relations which differing ontical foundations have to intentional objects. Where he should have distinguished between the active 'funding' relation of acts of consciousness (here meaning a causal relation), and the static foundational precondition of material objects, he did not. Both relations were grouped together under the terms 'fund' or 'funding' thus obscuring Ingarden's distinction between the two relationships. To be in an ontical relation to an intentional object

does not necessarily, though it may, incorporate the notion of causal connection. And by saying that the material object is in a 'funding' relation (taken to mean causal relation) to the intentional object, Graff has misunderstood Ingarden.

Hamrick's criticisms of Ingarden's position on the aesthetic object are of particular interest for two reasons. Firstly, as one of the relatively few critical appraisals of an aspect of Ingarden's work in North America, many initial encounters with Ingarden's work will occur through Hamrick's article. The accuracy of Hamrick's commentary is therefore of some importance to the future influence of Ingarden's thought in North America. Secondly, Hamrick's comments are of interest because they address a very essential principle of Ingarden's general aesthetic theory, namely the existence of aesthetic objects. And since this is a topic which has had general interest in the field of aesthetics, the highly developed nature of Ingarden's position argues for its significance in future discussions of the definition and location of the work of art.

The assessment of the validity of Hamrick's criticisms was necessarily negative. The arguments he framed were either not conclusive or not attributable to the philosophy of Ingarden. Hopefully this will indicate the importance of being attentive to, at least, Ingarden's

readily available translated works.

Iser's discussion of Ingarden's philosophy is representative of a heightened interest in the active role of the reader/listener/observer in the process of experiencing a work of art. This could be looked upon as a pendulum swing away from what Iser referred to as the norms of classical aesthetics, norms which so rigidly governed the work of art that the experiencing subject was reduced to playing a role of insignificance. But as with all pendulum swings, there are extremes at both ends. Iser's concern with protecting the experiencing subject's contribution to the concretizing process led to the conclusion that Ingarden's position did not allow a great enough role to the subjective pole. But given the active and creative role of the subject in Ingarden's process of concretization, it must be asked why the subject ought to be given more latitude than Ingarden has allowed for. Once again, the balance is precarious and the stakes are quite high. Nothing less than the identity of the work of art is at issue. Though there may indeed be reason to closely scrutinize Ingarden's position on this point, it would appear unjustified to begin from the contention that Ingarden attributes to the experiencing subject a static role.

And finally, regarding the critical problem of locating the source of the work's identity, Iser and

Ingarden seem to be missing one another. While Iser has located Ingarden's norm for the adequate concretization in the concretization itself, Ingarden has located it in the structure of the work. The means of access to the work is obviously via a concretization. The actualization of the work's value potential, however, is indicative of the work's overall structural harmony, not identifiable with it. Brinker's reading of Ingarden confirms this interpretation.

Although our discussion of some critical commentaries certainly does not allow for any absolute judgments regarding the truth of Ingarden's claims, it does argue for the formidable character of his general aesthetic theory. And although the truth of any theory is of great importance, of equal importance might be the level of interest a theory engenders as well as the new directions of development it suggests. From this perspective, the strength of Ingarden's theory would have to be considered extraordinary.

## Endnotes

### Chapter Four

- <sup>1</sup> P. Leon, "Das literarische Kunstwerk," *Mind* 41 (1932), p. 103.
- <sup>2</sup> Andrzej Poltawski, "Ingarden's Way to Realism and His Idea of Man," *Dialectics and Humanism*, 2 (1975), pp. 65-76; and "Consciousness and Action in Ingarden's Thought," *Analecta Husserliana*, 3 (1974), pp. 124-137.
- <sup>3</sup> Augustin Riska, "The A Priori in Ingarden's Theory of Meaning," *Analecta Husserliana*, 3 (1974), pp. 138-146; and Guido Kung, "Ingarden on Language and Ontology," *Analecta Husserliana*, 2 (1972), pp. 204-217.
- <sup>4</sup> Piotr Graff, "The Ontological Basis of Roman Ingarden's Aesthetics. A Tentative Reconstruction," *Roman Ingarden and Contemporary Polish Aesthetics*, p. 75.
- <sup>5</sup> Roman Ingarden, *The Literary Work of Art*, p. 118.
- <sup>6</sup> Piotr Graff, "The Ontological Basis of Roman Ingarden's Aesthetics. A Tentative Reconstruction," *Roman Ingarden and Contemporary Polish Aesthetics*, p. 75.
- <sup>7</sup> Piotr Graff, "The Ontological Basis of Roman Ingarden's Aesthetics. A Tentative Reconstruction," *Roman Ingarden and Contemporary Polish Aesthetics*, p. 76.
- <sup>8</sup> Piotr Graff, "The Ontological Basis of Roman Ingarden's Aesthetics. A Tentative Reconstruction," *Roman Ingarden and Contemporary Polish Aesthetics*, p. 86.
- <sup>9</sup> Roman Ingarden, *The Literary Work of Art*, p. 162.
- <sup>10</sup> Roman Ingarden, *The Literary Work of Art*, p. 102.
- <sup>11</sup> Roman Ingarden, *The Literary Work of Art*, p. 102.
- <sup>12</sup> Piotr Graff, "The Ontological Basis of Roman Ingarden's Aesthetics. A Tentative Reconstruction," *Roman Ingarden and Contemporary Polish Aesthetics*, p. 70.
- <sup>13</sup> Eugene Falk, *The Poetics of Roman Ingarden*, p. 15.
- <sup>14</sup> Eugene Falk, *The Poetics of Roman Ingarden*, p. 15.

- 15 Roman Ingarden, *The Literary Work of Art*, p. 362.
- 16 Roman Ingarden, *Time and Modes of Being*, pp. 76-71, 157-163.
- 17 Roman Ingarden, *Time and Modes of Being*, p. 76.
- 18 Max Rieser, "The Philosophy of Roman Ingarden in a Critical Light," *Dialectics and Humanism*, 2 (1975), p. 93.
- 19 Max Rieser, "The Philosophy of Roman Ingarden in a Critical Light," p. 93.
- 20 Most notable is Paul Ziff's often quoted article referring to the aesthetic object as the mysterious "ghost of esthetics;" see "Art and the 'Object of Art'," *Mind* 60 (1951), p. 480.
- 21 Piotr Graff, "The Ontological Basis of Roman Ingarden's Aesthetics. A Tentative Reconstruction," pp. 88-89.
- 22 Piotr Graff, "The Ontological Basis of Roman Ingarden's Aesthetics. A Tentative Reconstruction," p. 70.
- 23 Piotr Graff, "The Ontological Basis of Roman Ingarden's Aesthetics. A Tentative Reconstruction," p. 76.
- 24 Roman Ingarden, *Time and Modes of Being*, p. 76.
- 25 Roman Ingarden, *Time and Modes of Being*, p. 77.
- 26 Richard Wollheim, "Art and Its Objects," *Philosophy Looks at the Arts*, ed. Joseph Margolis (Philadelphia: Temple University Press, 1978), pp. 169-188.
- 27 Paul Ziff, "Art and the 'Object of Art'," *Mind* 60 (1951), p. 480.
- 28 Stephen C. Pepper, *The Work of Art* (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1955).
- 29 Donald Henze, "The Work of Art," *Aesthetics: Contemporary Studies in Aesthetics*, ed. Francis J. Coleman (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1968), p. 38.
- 30 See Monroe Beardsley's excellent survey of the literature on this topic: *Aesthetics* (New York: Harcourt, Brace, 1958) Ch. 1 and the very helpful endnotes.

31 Roman Ingarden, "Aesthetic Experience and Aesthetic Object," *Philosophy and Phenomenological Research*, 11 (1961), pp. 289-313; Gary Iseminger, "Roman Ingarden and the Aesthetic Object," *Philosophy and Phenomenological Research*, 33 (1973), pp. 417-420; William Hamrick, "Aesthetic Experience and Aesthetic Object," *Journal of the British Society for Phenomenology*, 5 (1974), pp. 71-80.

32 Peter McCormick, "Ingarden on the Existence of Aesthetic Objects," *Dialectics and Humanism*, 2 (1975).

33 William Hamrick, "Aesthetic Experience and Aesthetic Object," p. 72.

34 William Hamrick, "Aesthetic Experience and Aesthetic Object," p. 72.

35 William Hamrick, "Aesthetic Experience and Aesthetic Object," p. 73.

36 Roman Ingarden, "Aesthetic Experience and Aesthetic Object," p. 294.

37 William Hamrick, "Aesthetic Experience and Aesthetic Object," p. 74.

38 Roman Ingarden, *The Literary Work of Art*, pp. 217-264.

39 Roman Ingarden, *The Literary Work of Art*, pp. 160-173; and *The Cognition of the Literary Work of Art*, pp. 214-218.

40 Roman Ingarden, *Ontologie der Kunst*, p. 40.

41 William Hamrick, "Aesthetic Experience and Aesthetic Object," p. 74.

42 William Hamrick, "Aesthetic Experience and Aesthetic Object," p. 76.

43 William Hamrick, "Aesthetic Experience and Aesthetic Object," p. 78.

44 William Hamrick, "Aesthetic Experience and Aesthetic Object," p. 79.

45 William Hamrick, "Aesthetic Experience and Aesthetic Object," pp. 79-80.

- 46 Roman Ingarden, "Aesthetic Experience and Aesthetic Object," p. 299.
- 47 Roman Ingarden, "Aesthetic Experience and Aesthetic Object," p. 299.
- 48 Roman Ingarden, "Aesthetic Experience and Aesthetic Object," p. 300.
- 49 Similar to the position of Ingarden is Rene Wellek's contention that the literary work of art is a "stratified system of norms." Though they differ on some essential points, the similarity is a bit remarkable. Rene Wellek and Austin Warren, *Theory of Literature* (New York: Harcourt, Brace, 1942). A general topic under which much of the discussion of the work as having both objective and subjective elements is the 'ontological status of works of art.' As a means of general access to the topic, see Harold Osborne, *Theory of Beauty* (London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1952) and *Aesthetics and Criticism* (London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1955); also see Joseph Margolis, *The Language of Art and Art Criticism* (Detroit: Wayne State University Press, 1965), pp. 49-63 and "On Disputes about the Ontological Status of Works of Art," *The British Journal of Aesthetics*, 8 (1968), p. 147 and "The Ontological Peculiarity of Works of Art," *Philosophy Looks at the Arts*, ed. Joseph Margolis (Philadelphia: Temple University Press, 1978), pp. 213-220. For a more specific treatment of concretization and places of indeterminacy in Ingarden's theory, see M. Glowinski, "On Concretization," *Roman Ingarden and Contemporary Polish Aesthetics*, pp. 33-45; J. Fizer, "Schematicism: Aesthetic Device or Psychological Necessity," *The Journal of Aesthetics and Art Criticism*, 27 (1969), pp. 417-423; J. Kmita, "Work of Art—Its Concretization. Artistic Value. Aesthetic Value," *Roman Ingarden and Contemporary Polish Aesthetics*, pp. 109-128; and H. Markiewicz, "Places of Indeterminacy in a Literary Work," *Roman Ingarden and Contemporary Polish Aesthetics*, pp. 159-171.
- 50 Dagmar Barnouw, "Critics in the Act of Reading," *Poetics Today*, 1 (1980), p. 218.
- 51 Wolfgang Iser, *The Act of Reading* (Baltimore: John Hopkins University Press, 1978), p. 178.
- 52 Menachem Brinker, "Two Phenomenologies of Reading: Ingarden and Iser on Textual Indeterminacy," *Poetics Today*, 1 (1980), pp. 204-205.

- 53 Wolfgang Iser, *The Act of Reading*, p. 178.
- 54 Wolfgang Iser, *The Act of Reading*, p. 174.
- 55 Wolfgang Iser, *The Act of Reading*, pp. 172-174.
- 56 Roman Ingarden, *The Cognition of the Literary Work of Art*, p. 197.
- 57 Roman Ingarden, *The Cognition of the Literary Work of Art*, pp. 197-198.
- 58 Wolfgang Iser, *The Act of Reading*, p. 173.
- 59 Wolfgang Iser, *The Act of Reading*, p. 173.
- 60 Roman Ingarden, *The Cognition of the Literary Work of Art*, pp. 202-203.
- 61 Roman Ingarden, *The Cognition of the Literary Work of Art*, p. 54.
- 62 Roman Ingarden, *The Literary Work of Art*, p. 350.
- 63 Roman Ingarden, *The Literary Work of Art*, p. 354.
- 64 Wolfgang Iser, *The Act of Reading*, p. 172.
- 65 Wolfgang Iser, *The Act of Reading*, pp. 172-173.
- 66 Wolfgang Iser, *The Act of Reading*, p. 173.
- 67 Menachem Brinker, "Two Phenomenologies of Reading: Ingarden and Iser on Textual Indeterminacy," p. 205.
- 68 Menachem Brinker, "Two Phenomenologies of Reading: Ingarden and Iser on Textual Indeterminacy," p. 205.
- 69 Menachem Brinker, "Two Phenomenologies of Reading: Ingarden and Iser on Textual Indeterminacy," p. 205.
- 70 Menachem Brinker, "Two Phenomenologies of Reading: Ingarden and Iser on Textual Indeterminacy," p. 205.

## Chapter Five

### Critical Evaluation of Ingarden's Aesthetic Theory as Applied to Sculpture

#### Section 30: Introductory Remarks Regarding the Critical Evaluation

It has been shown in the foregoing treatment that within Ingarden's writings on literature, music, painting and architecture, he has provided us with the essential principles of a general aesthetic theory. Once again, the work of art

- 1) is not to be identified with any real thing.
- 2) is an heteronomous intentional object ontically dependent upon at least two autonomous objects for the origin and support of its existence. They are
  - a) real objects
  - and
  - b) acts of consciousness
- 3) requires a reader/listener/observer for its constitution and concretization. As such, it cannot be identified with any one of its concretizations.
- 4) is a polyphonic harmony of aesthetically valuable qualities.

And through the application of his principles to major art forms, he has also provided us with concrete examples of how his principles should be utilized. As further evidence of the general character of Ingarden's theory, his principles were applied to the sculptural

work of art, an art form which he did not examine. The result was a description of the sculptural work of art which was truly Ingardenian, consistent in every way with the essential principles. Part I was thus able to conclude with confident assurance that Ingarden had created a general aesthetic theory which was capable of being applied across the spectrum of art forms.

Part II began with an examination of the strength of Ingarden's principles. By examining critical commentaries which were directly aimed at each of the essential principles, we were able to develop a 'good sense of the ability of Ingarden's theory to withstand severe and critical evaluation. While no theory is completely correct or without need of modification, our examination of a few of the commentaries showed that the principles have the strength of character required to provide further insight and assistance in the field of aesthetics. But having shown all this, certain problems remain.

The extension of Ingarden's general theory to sculpture indicates that the theory has the necessary scope to account for the central categories within the fine arts. But, since he was predominately concerned with clear-cut instances of each art form, questions must arise regarding the versatility and flexibility of his theory in relation to evolving contemporary movements in each of the arts. And in the sculptural work of art we find an

excellent opportunity to assess this aspect of Ingarden's approach.

Analogous to other art forms, sculpture has evolved dramatically from the days of a classical work such as the *Venus de Milo*. But maybe more than in any other art, the boundaries of sculpture have become almost totally ill-defined. The breadth of phenomena which has been categorized by the term sculpture encompasses not only traditionally sculpted figures, but also such objects as Calder's mobiles and Christo's running fences. In order for Ingarden's theory to be truly useful, it must be able to give an adequate account of such phenomena. It is with this end in mind that we will now focus our attention on sculptural works which are transitional forms.

As our point of departure, it is worthy of note that regardless of the art form under consideration, transitional art forms remain in accord with the essential principles of Ingarden's aesthetics. Abstract painting, abstract sculpture, program music, film and stage play, while possessing a peculiar status, do not violate the necessary conditions of a work of art. So where is the problem in Ingarden's position?

Let us begin by recalling Ingarden's clearly stated position on the sculptural work of art:

Similarly, if one seeks to realize an abstract figure in sculpture, then it is only a transitional form between sculpture, which according to its nature is a form of representational art, and architecture, which is quite completely free from the representational function.<sup>1</sup>

In consequence of the above distinction, those forms of sculpture which are relegated to the area of a transitional form, are viewed as being significantly different from purely expressed sculpture (essentially representational) and purely expressed architecture (essentially non-representational). Abstract sculpture would appear to be neither, while in some respects being both—a rather problematic status. (The same problem emerges in other transitional forms, i.e., abstract painting, program music, film and stage play.) If there are characteristics which make both sculpture and architecture what they are, then there must also be certain identifiable characteristics which make abstract sculpture what it is, if Ingarden's distinction is to be retained. Ingarden's position thus results in a multiplication of the categories of art. And, in principle, given the evolution of the arts, this multiplication has the potential of being endless. Thus, whether or not this multiplication is necessary becomes the question. For if it could be shown that there are sufficient grounds for distinguishing between sculpture of all kinds and architecture, then it would not be necessary to create

a new art category for abstract sculpture; and therefore, what Ingarden refers to as a transitional form could be adequately accounted for in the already provided categories of sculpture and architecture. One might then be led to suspect that the same reduction of categories could be performed with other transitional art forms.

While this problem transcends the question of whether or not Ingarden has created a general aesthetic theory applicable to the major portion of past artistic developments, it is of great importance to the applicability of his theory to much of current and future artistic developments. For any theory which finds developing art movements to be 'exceptions' or as somehow 'living on the fringe' of traditional art categories, is certain to have difficulties in giving an adequate account of possible artistic developments. Thus, one way of strengthening Ingarden's approach to the arts would be to show that what he has termed to be transitional forms are, in fact, instances of central art forms—art forms which simply possess a certain inherent diversity of expression while maintaining a basic commonality of purpose. In order to show that this is in fact the case, two questions must be addressed:

- 1) Is all sculpture necessarily representational?
- 2) Is the basis for claiming that the characteristic of representation ought to be used for distinguishing between various modes of sculpture satisfactory?

The above questions are sequentially related. By resolving the first we are necessarily led to the second. Their resolution will result in certain modifications to Ingarden's approach. Since these modifications do not directly address the essential principles, they cannot be looked upon as a rejection of the general character and strength of Ingarden's theory. They should be viewed as an attempt to strengthen an already strong theory.

Section 31: Are All Sculptural Work's of Art  
Necessarily Representational?

There is little difficulty in accepting architecture as non-representational, given Ingarden's usage of the term. His claim for architecture is that it is a self-presentation which reproduces man's soul "through the expression of his fundamental psychological structure and his intellectual capability, as much the constructive-rational as the perceptual-aesthetic."<sup>2</sup>

While representational art forms do this to some degree, their representational character is ultimately a hindrance to the presentational possibilities of the art form. Ingarden's dichotomy between the two types of art forms is fairly complete. It hinges on an understanding of the differences between the characteristics of presentational and representational.

In the architectural work of art there occurs a complete presentation of the spatial form. Neither the perceptual aspects nor the three-dimensional spatial form are schematic. All is simultaneously present. The logically and creatively ordered masses represent nothing. They are, simply put, what they are. The architectural work is a presentation of itself. The logical interdependencies between the masses result in a "pure self-opened play in the simultaneity of spatial forms" which "lead to correspondingly aesthetically

valuable qualities and to the aesthetic value qualities built upon them."<sup>3</sup> The observer does not reconstruct what the artist has intended since the architectural work of art is not concerned with representing situations or objects drawn from the life experiences of the artist.

[A]rchitecture is creative because it rests upon the discovery (upon a kind of artistic uncovering) and realization or embodiment of new "forms"—that is, shapes—and new qualitative harmonies—new both in relation to the spatial forms of rigid bodies encountered in our environing nature, and in relation to the already discovered forms of finished architectural works of art of earlier ages.<sup>4</sup>

The aesthetic encounter with the architectural work of art is an encounter with new forms and qualitative harmonies—an "expression of the emotional and desiderative factors of the human soul"<sup>5</sup>—an experience of the human soul manifest in the logically and creatively ordered spatial forms of the work. It is not an experience of a reproduction of the content of man's experience. It is in this sense that the term presentation ought to be understood in relation to the representation of sculpture.

Sculpture is also partially presentational.<sup>6</sup> As a three-dimensional art form, the spatial form of the work relies upon the sculptural aspects in a similar fashion as does the spatial form of the architectural work. But, on the other hand, unlike abstract painting, the visual

aspects of sculpture must always be present regardless of the kind of sculpture, abstract or otherwise. The proximity which the sculptural work of art has to the material thing demands that this be so, thus explaining why it is that sculpture also possesses the presentational quality attributed to architecture, though not to the same degree. And it is this question of the degree of difference which becomes an issue, since it would seem that Ingarden attributes this difference to sculpture's inability to abandon its representational function.

As we have seen, since pure sculpture is a representational art form it must always have a stratum of represented objects. Through this stratum the artist is capable of reconstructing the individual fortunes of man and reproducing the content of his experience.<sup>7</sup> By embodying the work with the guiding principles which direct the observer in the concretization of commonly recognizable forms, the artist is capable of representing certain aesthetic qualities and harmonies of qualities which bring to appearance the intended aesthetic values. By way of a painterly example, the figure of the damned man in *The Last Judgment* by Michelangelo is understood to represent the despair and anguish of damnation. The representation of the human form with a certain recognizable facial expression, situated

within the context of the entire work, can truly be said to represent these emotional qualities.

In contrast to non-representational art forms, *The Last Judgment* is not merely a presentation of certain emotional qualities, but the representation of forms which, in their quasi-real character, could be said to express such emotions. The very same kind of representation can be seen in some sculpture. Certainly, there can be no dispute over the representational character of either the *Venus* or the *David*. Firstly, they are clear representations of the human form. Secondly, they are representations of an individual woman and an individual man. Thirdly, they each have a physical posture which represents qualities peculiar to each—*Venus* with her soft, gentle and relaxed attitude, and *David* with his powerful, confident and noble stature. And finally, there are numerous aesthetically valuable qualities which result from the qualitative determinations of the spatial form brought to appearance through the represented object. Even the work of Pablo Picasso can be seen as representational. In this case, the artist attempted to "reduce the images given in visual perception to a schematic or structural order."<sup>8</sup> As such, Picasso's work remained representational and never achieved a style of pure abstraction. But the question must be asked, does this exhaust the possibilities of

the field of sculpture, as Ingarden would seem to indicate?

There is indeed sculpture which does not attempt to represent anything in the sense that Ingarden has employed the term. In much the same way that Ingarden has spoken of architecture, there exists a sculpture which is an act of discovery—an uncovering of the potentialities of the medium. The artist is, in this sense, exploring the principles which govern the relationship of mass and volume and the aesthetic qualities which the medium is capable of receiving. Oddly enough, Ingarden's statement regarding the architectural work of art is equally applicable to sculpture of this kind. By substituting the word sculpture for architecture, we can indicate the direction we would like to take.

But [sculpture] is creative because it rests upon the discovery (upon a kind of artistic uncovering) and realization or embodiment of new "forms"—that is, shapes and new qualitative harmonies—new both in relation to the spatial forms of rigid bodies encountered in our environing nature, and in relation to the already discovered forms of finished [sculptural] works of art of earlier ages. . . . At the same time it is an expression that man is capable of forcing forms onto lifeless matter, which corresponds most to his intellectual life and emotional needs; since they quiet his yearning after beauty and aesthetic charm.<sup>9</sup>

The terms which have been used to describe this kind of non-representational sculpture have gone through their own evolution. Cubism provided the necessary impetus for the development of a non-representational

movement in the plastic arts. We have already stated that Cubism can easily be understood as representational. This is now in need of qualification. Cubism went through its own evolution which left representation behind. In its early developments it attempted to reduce common forms to their constitutive elements of planes and surfaces, thus remaining representational (See Picasso's *Head of a Woman*, 1909-1910). But in its later developments, the objects became increasingly more difficult to recognize, until finally they reached a stage which was non-figurative. At this point these later moments in Cubism's evolution were no longer identified with the original intent of either Picasso or Juan Gris, but instead became known as non-objective, non-figurative, or most commonly, as abstract art.

Finally, along came artists who said: Why bother to introduce representational elements at all? Why not let your geometric or architectural structure speak for itself, in terms of pure form and colour? And they proceeded to paint pictures and carve materials in conformity with such principles. Thus a new type of art was born which has been called abstract, constructivist, neo-plastic and several other names, but all these varieties of abstract art agree in rejecting the notion that art is in any way dependent on nature. They neither 'screen' nature, in the manner of Reynolds nor respect nature, in the manner of the Impressionists; they will have nothing whatsoever to do with nature. Some of them may attempt to represent what is fundamental to Nature—namely, the laws of harmony inherent in the physical structure of the Universe itself; but others claim to be independent even of this given quantity, and to invent an entirely new reality.<sup>10</sup>

Artists such as Naum Gabo and Antoine Pevsner attempted to "research into basic elements of space, volume and colour, in order to discover, as they said, "the aesthetic, physical and functional capacities of these materials."<sup>11</sup> Their works became known as 'constructions'. The shift was from reproduction to creation—the creation of works which presented space and time embodied in a material construction. The observer encountering either the works of Gabo or Pevsner is seldom inclined to make associations between commonly identifiable objects and the sculptures. These works aggressively resist such attempts. The artist, instead of representing, presents a construction of the world in respect to its space and volume. Of Franz Marc, and the constructivists in general, Karsten Harries has said that they are "engineers of the spirit. . .chanting magical formulas to force a hidden reality to show itself."<sup>12</sup>

Abstract sculpture, therefore, is capable of providing an immediacy between the world and the observer which is in every respect presentational in the fashion of architecture. By asserting that there are transitional forms, Ingarden would seem to be acknowledging that there are non-representational objects such as Read has described. Whether or not he would call them sculpture is another matter, since they lack the feature of

representation. In any case, the problem which must be faced is whether or not abstract presentational sculpture ought to be seen as in some way outside of or on the fringe of the art form of sculpture by virtue of its presentational character.

Section 32: The Uniqueness of the Sculptural Work  
of Art

In order to justify the position of a new art category, i.e., abstract sculpture as a transitional form, it would seem necessary to demonstrate that there are a significant enough number of essential differences between the two sculptural expressions to justify the claim that there is indeed a difference in the kind of art objects involved. Obviously, the exact number of differences which is sufficient for such a distinction is difficult to determine. But it must be noted that Ingarden has moved abstract sculpture, abstract painting and program music out of the category of a 'purely expressed' art form on the basis of one characteristic—representation. If it can be shown that the similarities which these two forms of sculpture have with one another are in some respect peculiar to a general category of sculpture and, in turn, far outweigh the similarities which are peculiar to architecture and presentational sculpture, then it would seem unnecessary to create a new category for presentational sculpture. Only then can an attempt be made to identify exactly what does separate sculpture in general from other works of art, and specifically architecture.

A primary difference between architecture and sculpture is that architecture is essentially hollow. It is

not only concerned with exterior space, but must take into account the arrangement of interior space as well. Sculpture, on the other hand, is either solid or else presents voids which are only intended to be seen from an appropriate distance and not from within. It can never become fully architectural since there is truly no interior space in the architectural sense.<sup>13</sup> Whether or not a sculptural work is representational or presentational, this is true. There is no basis here for distinguishing between kinds of sculpture.

Another difference between sculpture and architecture lies in the degree of dependence these two art forms have on the material world and the consequent effects of this dependence. Architecture is bound to the physical world in a way that limits the creative possibilities available to the artist to a greater degree than is the case with the sculpture and sculptor. Architecture must have a base, or foundation, which takes into account the demands of the terrain. As a work of art, it is tied to its foundation and is not readily mobile. Sculpture, on the other hand, only minimally faces such limitations. Many small sculptural works are transported from one place to another with the greatest of ease. This was particularly true of artifacts of early art history, i.e., amulets. Particularly, abstract sculpture can often be turned over, around, and

even 'upside down' and still remain aesthetically valuable. Calder's mobiles are an excellent instance of the completely free character of abstract sculpture. And even representational sculpture must be similarly distinguished from architecture in this regard. While a base is necessary for Michelangelo's *David*, the work still remains relatively mobile. And in an essential way, the base is not part of the work of art itself. It supplies a horizon line, not really necessary in this case, as well as giving the work physical stability. But because of the work's representational character, the base actually serves as a distraction to the *David*. The center of gravity of the block of marble is different from the center of gravity of the work itself. In this sense, abstract sculpture is freer to achieve its artistic ends than is representational sculpture. And sculpture on the whole is much freer than architecture. The balance and proportion of the sculptural work of art are more determined by factors internal to the work of art itself than they are by external factors which effect the real material. Just the opposite is true with architecture.

A third characteristic which serves to separate sculpture of any kind from architecture is the overwhelming practical character of architecture. Very simply, human beings live within architectural structures.

The arrangement of the interior spaces are determined by the work's practical function. Even the exterior design must be practically determined since the interior and exterior are to a very great degree mutually determining. Nothing similar can be said of any kind of sculpture. Even in the decorative, memorial, and architectural use of sculpture, e.g., the caryatides, sculpture does not perform a practical function which in any way approaches the practical character of architecture. And it must be seen that it is essential to architecture and only peripheral when it occurs in sculpture. In architecture it determines design, thus once again demonstrating the freer character of sculpture.

Even the most contemporary architects have not been able to bring themselves to the actual denial of the practical factor inherent in the architectural work.

"Though we no longer argue over the primacy of form or function (which follows which?) we cannot ignore their interdependence."<sup>14</sup> And more poignantly, Robert Venturi has said:

Architecture occurs at the meeting of interior and exterior forms of use and space. These interior and environmental forces are both general and particular, generic and circumstantial. Architecture as the wall between the inside and the outside becomes the spatial record of this resolution and its drama.<sup>15</sup>

Although there are certainly many questions regarding the nature of the relationship between the functional

determinations and the formal qualities of the architectural work, these poles are genuine and always present.

In the above three ways sculpture is clearly distinct from architecture. Although there are many very specific differences, as Ingarden's analysis of architecture has shown, these three are major. Ingarden has also based his distinction between these two art forms on the characteristics of presentation and representation. This is deserving of closer attention.

Architectural presentation, while indicative of difference, does not truly provide what is necessary to distinguish architecture from all other art forms, as Ingarden would seem to want to indicate. It must be stressed that literature, painting, and sculpture are also presentational, although not to the same degree.<sup>16</sup> Consequently, according to Ingarden, there are art forms which are absolutely presentational, i.e., architecture and music, and there are art forms which are both presentational and representational in varying degrees. A purely representational art form does not seem to be a possibility. Therefore, to distinguish between abstract sculpture, representational sculpture, and architecture on the basis of presentation is to make the distinction on the basis of a degree of difference and not on a difference of kind. This would not seem to justify the

creation of a new art category. And further, by virtue of the characteristics which presentational and, if it may now be said, presentational/representational sculpture share in common, in order to avoid needlessly multiplying categories it would seem more reasonable to maintain one category of sculpture which embraces both modes of expression than to argue that representation is sufficient in itself to set one form of sculpture apart. But, by not allowing the characteristic of representation to be used as the basis for multiplying categories of art, we enter into a basic conflict with the main thrust of past opinion. The conflict, however, is simply unavoidable. A closer look at the consequences which result from distinguishing art categories on the basis of representation shows this to be the case.

Rhys Carpenter provides an excellent statement of the more traditional attitude toward sculpture:

[S]culpture is a visual and not a tactile art, because it is made for the eyes to contemplate and not for the fingers to feel. Moreover, just as it reaches us through the eyes and not through the finger tips, so it is created visually, no matter how the sculptor may use his hands to produce his work. . . sculptural form cannot be apprehended tactilely or evaluated by its tactual fidelity.

It may be argued—and with entire warrant—that sculpture frequently involves an appeal to our sense of touch and physical contact; but so does painting. Such tactile sensations are, in either art, induced and secondary, being derivative of subjective mental association. In a painting of Titian or Bronzino, the representation of material textures such as fur and velvet may be so visually

exact that it evokes in us a memory of how velvet and fur may feel when we stroke them. I do not think that sculpture's tactual appeal is very different or much stronger. Any dissenting opinion is probably inspired by the heightened physical actuality of sculptural presentation: we cannot directly sense a painted texture by touching the canvas, whereas we can actually explore with our fingers the solid sculptural shape. But the logic is faulty if it is thence inferred that sculpture is more immediately involved in the tactile sense; for, at best, we can only touch the material medium and not the artistic representation which is intended and calculated for the eye's contemplative vision.<sup>17</sup>

At first it may appear that Ingarden would tend to be in agreement with Carpenter. Certainly Ingarden would agree with the emphasis placed upon sculpture's representational quality. He also would agree that the representation of velvet does not permit a direct experience of the texture of velvet; this would be a co-presented quality dependent upon memory. And, he would also agree that our experiences of artistic representation are not experiences of the material medium. But Ingarden does not seem to be committed to all that Carpenter's assertions imply. F. David Martin has said: "The eminence of the eye and, in turn, the subordination of sculpture as a species of painting presupposes the traditional theory of sense perception."<sup>18</sup> This theory sees the private subject as set against the public objects of the world. Sensory data are organized into objects which, while supposedly reflective of the world, are not identified with it. The subject never truly experiences the world, as such,

but instead experiences the mind's logical constructions of sensory data. In short, the traditional theory of sense perception results in the commonly referred to subject/object dichotomy.

According to Martin, this approach "proclaims the eye the fundamental sense organ that establishes a world of objects."<sup>19</sup> As a consequence, representation occupies a place of preeminence. What this ignores that is so crucial to sculpture, is the phenomenon which precedes and is the precondition of the mind's logical constructions of sensory data:

We are not *in* space; we *inhabit* space. We are not encapsulated bodies, egos wrapped in skin, distinct from things and space. We are open bodies with things journeying through space. As *primordially* perceived, our bodies, things, and space are an inseparable community, a pre-given unity.<sup>20</sup>

In primordial perception we are aware of the essential unity of the 'world'; there exists direct contact in which we are aware of our essential 'oneness' with the world. The objects of the world are not set off against the subject as 'things out there' to which we only have access via logical patterns and models. The abstractions of traditional sense experience do not permit a 'revealing' of the world we are in, but instead result in a distortion of the phenomenon. As such, logical constructions are once removed from the 'concrete suchness' of things. This is the necessary consequent of seeing

the body as radically separate from mind—as an object of knowledge. Again, we turn to Martin:

Our minds are incarnate, embodied, a unity of awareness of body with things within a world so tightly interwoven in primordial perception that the threads can be separated only by the abstractive knives of secondary perception.<sup>21</sup>

Thus the key to appreciating the sculptural work of art lies in an understanding of the way in which sculpture presents itself to us. If this presentation is reduced to that which is present via sensory perception, particularly visual perception, then the sculpture's being-in-the-world is distorted and our being-with the sculpture is obscured. While this does not result in the denial of the representational quality of some works, it does reduce its overall importance to sculpture.

Therefore, in conjunction with the three very specific sculptural characteristics already discussed, there would still appear to be much more that needs to be said regarding the uniqueness of the sculptural work of art. By transcending the question of representation versus presentation, this has begun to become apparent. Henry Moore provides an insight of particular merit and, if it may be said, typical of artistic insight:

The understanding of three-dimensional form involves all points of view about form—space, interior, and exterior form, pressure from within; they're all one and the same big problem. They're all mixed up with the human thing, with one's own body and how one thinks about everything. This talk of representational and non-representational art, spatial

and non-spatial sculpture, is all nonsense. There's no cutting it up into separate compartments. It's all one.<sup>22</sup>

By placing the discussion of presentation versus representation in its proper place, Moore truly focuses on the crux of the matter; three-dimensional form is "mixed up with the human thing, with one's own body." A more precise statement of this insight reads: "The autonomy of sculpture follows from the distinctive way sculpture manifests itself in our perceptions."<sup>23</sup>

Read speaks of the autonomy of sculpture in the following way:

The peculiarity of sculpture as art is that it creates a three-dimensional object in space. Painting may strive to give, on a two-dimensional plane, the illusion of space, but it is space itself as a perceived quantity that becomes the particular concern of the sculptor.<sup>24</sup>

Thus he concludes that sculpture is an art of "touch-space," in contrast with painting which is an art of "sight-space."<sup>25</sup>

For the sculptor, tactile values are not illusions to be created on a two-dimensional plane: they constitute a reality to be conveyed directly, as existent mass. Sculpture is an art of palpation—an art that gives satisfaction in the touching and handling of objects. That, indeed, is the only way in which we can have direct sensation of the three-dimensional shape of an object.<sup>26</sup>

Read is also arguing for a rejection of the position represented by Carpenter, although he needlessly limits the direct experience of sculpture to "touching and handling." Martin supplies the proper corrective:

to Read by saying that

the space around a sculpture, although not a part of its material body, is still an essential part of the perceptible structure of that sculpture. And the perceptual forces in that surrounding space impact on our bodies directly, giving to that space a translucency, a thickness, that is largely missing from the space in front of a painting. . . With a sculpture, on the other hand, even though we do not actually touch the material body, we sense its power and pressing on our bodies. The shadows cast, the reflective surfaces, the bulges and hollows, the textures, and the attraction or repulsion of the material itself pull our bodies in and out. The hidden aspects—especially with sculptures in the round—lure our bodies around.<sup>27</sup>

It is in the above sense that the sculptor's activity ought to be viewed as not only concerned with the mass of the medium, but with space and voids as well.

For the sculptor, space is much more than the mere absence of a material medium. Space is as much the recipient of the sculptor's creative acts as is the real material. To sculpt is to reorder the relationship which exists between the two necessarily related sculptural elements. Similar to the way in which Venturi so eloquently spoke of architecture, sculpture is the wall between mass and space: a record of the essential identity of the two elements, as well as their perceptual diversity. The traditional theory of sense perception emphasizes the perceptual differences while the primordial experience of ourselves with the world reveals the essential identity of the space and body of the world in which we are immersed. Thus, it can be said that a

sculptor does not merely manipulate a material medium as if it were an object set apart, as an object 'over-there.' The sculptor reveals the 'concrete suchness' of the world by highlighting the diversity of perceptual possibilities which belong to it. Therefore, the presentation of objects is not an end in itself, but instead only a means; a means of revealing our place with the world. And it is here where our awareness of Ingarden's metaphysical qualities occurs.

Within the aesthetic experience of sculpture the uniqueness of the art form presents itself. No longer merely an object set apart, the sculpture resonates with us.

The tactile-haptic harmony in the perception of sculpture gives us a sense of "withness" that no other art achieves. . . The mass and volume of our bodies and the mobile flow of our tactual feelings come forth with the sculpture.<sup>28</sup>

And, as Moore has suggested, this is not a question of representation or non-representation. It is, rather, a question of our deep involvement with the world; an involvement which sculpture is able to call us back to in a unique way via its visual and tactual character.

Sculpture revives the withering of our tactual senses by bringing us back in direct contact with the raw power of reality: the bumping, banging, pushing, pulling, soothing, palpitating tangibility of our withness with things.<sup>29</sup>

The sculptural work of art, therefore, must be distinguished from architecture on the three basic grounds

already discussed. By themselves, they are sufficient to support the claim that both sculptural forms ought to belong to a single category of art objects. And the visual-tactual character of sculpture—the way it manifests itself to our perception—simply confirms the propriety of maintaining one category for all sculptural works of art as well as dispelling any thoughts of sculpture being either inferior to or derivative of any other art form.

These characteristics clearly establish a difference in kind between sculpture and any other art form, and particularly architecture and painting. And further, any distinction that is made within the general category of sculpture is based upon a degree of difference, thus not justifying a multiplication of categories. By maintaining this position Ingarden's theory is strengthened since a significant portion of existing sculptures, as well as sculptural works to come, are not relegated to the periphery of the art form. To maintain the distinction of transitional forms seems to imply that abstract sculpture is in some sense a 'lesser' art expression than representational sculpture. In fact, Ingarden has indicated that representational art works are potentially aesthetically more valuable than non-representational art works, as we have seen. Modern art, in general, has been forced to fight this perspective and any theory

which, encourages it can only serve to negatively affect the positive contribution which developing art trends provide. And as we have attempted to show, the value of sculpture does not lie merely in its ability to represent. Henry Moore knows from whence he speaks.

If anything, the development of abstract sculpture can be said to be an attempt to call sculpture back to its primary historical concerns. The artist throughout history has sought, above all else, to 'see' clearly and to present that clarity of insight to his or her community. By moving away from representation, the abstract artist has attempted to aid in the disclosure of the forces, laws and harmonies which govern and comprise material and spiritual existence. Such sculptural works of art are poem and appraisal united in one object—not a represented object, but the object which is matter and spirit momentarily locked in an unreflective identity. Can this possibly be looked upon as a transition from one art form to another? Rather, it would seem to be the ultimate achievement of sculpture, that towards which it has striven throughout history. In fact, a case could well be made that representational sculpture is more of a transitional form than is presentational sculpture, attempting to free itself from the limitations placed upon it by a world of material appearance in order to disclose the underlying unity implicit within.

Interestingly enough, Ingarden's position on non-representational music as the highest musical expression coincides with this view of the sculptural work of art.

When viewed from this perspective, all art forms possess a certain common purpose—an identical goal of ultimate achievement towards which they all strive. Each must contend with the barriers and limitations their medium imposes. But all attempt to transcend the peculiarities unique to the art form, revealing the core of the artistic enterprise as a whole. True, it is because of the peculiarities of each art form, which can never be totally relinquished, that there exists the possibility of diverse expressions. But all art forms, to the extent that they are presentational, possess the potentiality of achieving a commonality of purpose. Music and architecture do this quite naturally and, as such, exemplify the highest purpose to which an art can aspire. Sculpture and painting, on the other hand, are forced to contend with the natural schizophrenia of the art forms which arises out of the human tendency to imitate, of which Aristotle spoke. Thus these art forms must surpass imitation in their attempt to disclose the universality which stands in stark contrast to the imitation of anything.

Resulting from the uniting of sculpture within one category, the description of sculpture's structure needs

re-examination. Since some sculpture is now considered presentational and representational and some sculpture is now considered simply presentational, our earlier description of the stratified structure of the sculptural work of art requires some modification if both sculptural forms are to be accommodated for.

Section 33: A Modification of the Sculptural Work of Art's Structure

In respect to representational sculpture, e.g., the *Venus de Milo*, our earlier description of the work's strata is in need of no modification. Representational sculpture has two layers; namely a layer of schematic aspects and a layer of represented objectivities. If the work has a literary theme, then three layers ought to be distinguished. There are distinctions to be made, however, regarding the purely abstract, or presentational sculpture.

Since all forms of sculpture are spatial and three-dimensional, there must always be a stratum of aspects. Ingarden's analysis of the architectural work of art shows that this is clearly the case. The aspects of architecture are so closely connected with the physical building itself, that the arrangement of the real material is in fact a process of aspect selection which is directed at the bringing to appearance of a three-dimensional shape. Unlike the abstract painting, where the real material's role in the work is not as great, neither the architect nor the sculptor can merely abandon the stratum of aspects, going directly to the representation of an object's essential structure as, for example, Picasso attempted to do. Both architecture and sculpture are restricted by the essential three-

dimensionality of the art forms. But due to the fact that architecture is never representational and sculpture can be either representational or purely presentational, unlike architectural aspects the aspects of sculpture will sometimes play differing roles in the sculptural work of art.

In architecture the stratum of the work's three-dimensional shape is the structurally constitutive factor of the entire work. In representational painting, as noted in our earlier treatment of painting, the layer of aspects was determining of the entire work. But in sculpture it would appear that the stratum of aspects is always the objectively determining factor regardless of whether the sculpture is representational or presentational. This can be explained by the absence of the representational element in presentational sculpture. In architecture, the three-dimensional shape is the objectively determining stratum of the work, e.g., a cathedral or a theater. This cannot be the case with presentational sculpture, however. There are no objects to be represented and there are no three-dimensional forms which could possibly correspond to cathedrals or theaters. The aspects are always the objectively determining stratum of the sculptural work of art; they bring to appearance represented objects, on one hand, or they provide for a simultaneous presentation

of the work's perceptual form, on the other. In presentational sculpture there is simply no second stratum. Consequently, the stratum of aspects has a different function in each of the two sculptural expressions, while remaining objectively determining.

It can be concluded, therefore, that presentational sculpture is quite similar to the musical work of art, also a single-layered formation. The basic material of music and presentational sculpture is homogeneous. In architecture and representational sculpture, however, it is necessary that there be a second stratum within which the spatial form of the work is brought to appearance. Since neither of these strata are present in either purely expressed music or presentational sculpture, we can attain to the musical work of art and the presentational sculpture "through apprehension of the directly given."<sup>30</sup> It is neither necessary to make the transition to a represented object nor to an appearing spatial form such as a cathedral. Consequently, the first result of our re-examination of sculpture's structure is that it is sometimes a multi-layered formation and at other times a single-layered formation depending upon whether or not the work is purely presentational.

A second consequent of including presentational sculpture within the general category of sculpture is that not all sculpture can be said to be a schematic.

formation. In representational sculpture the represented objects are only schematically presented. The aspects of presentational sculpture, however, are perceptual and thus complete. They provide a full presentation of the work. So as a result of presentational sculpture's close proximity to the work's real material and the absence of represented objects, the aspects cannot be seen as schematic.

What has been suggested regarding sculpture's structure is not without implications for other art forms. As soon as a transitional form is seen as capable of being subsumed within a basic category of the fine arts, the purity of Ingarden's description of the structure of art works is tarnished. And this leaves open the possibility that program music, abstract painting, film and stage play could likewise be subsumed beneath other central art categories. Whether or not this is the case, however, can only be determined through individual examinations of each art form such as was carried out on the sculptural work of art. It would be nice if the complexities of art forms could be eliminated by the careful determination of categories, but this regrettably cannot help but distort the phenomena under consideration. Much of an art form's richness lies in its complexity and diversity of expressive possibilities.

Although the universal presence of characteristics such as 'multi-layered' or 'schematic' would create an aesthetically pleasing and somewhat homogeneous theory of aesthetics, the absence of such universality does not suggest a weakening of the theory. In fact, it would seem to suggest that the theory has the necessary flexibility to account for the many and diverse phenomena which must come under consideration in aesthetics. From this perspective, one should not be negatively influenced by the disappointment Ingarden expressed when he discovered that not all art forms are schematic or multi-layered.<sup>31</sup> If anything, just the opposite should occur. He found that his central assertions need not be abandoned in the face of these unexpected deviations.

Section 34: Concluding Remarks Regarding the  
Critical Evaluation

Given our analysis, it would seem that sculpture can be either presentational and representational simultaneously, or it can be purely presentational. It is necessary to argue, therefore, that since sculpture need not always be representational, it is best distinguished from architecture by (1) its lack of interior hollow space (space which is meant to be entered); and (2) by its relationship to the real world as exemplified by the difference between the sculptural work of art's center of gravity and the real object's center of gravity, as well as the sculpture's mobile character; and (3) by the absence of practical determinations which govern architectural design, e.g., size of rooms, lighting, plumbing, etc.

If this is not found acceptable, then a new category would have to be introduced, i.e., presentational sculpture, which would be considered distinguishable from all other art forms, including representational sculpture. But given the unique way in which sculpture in general creates an awareness of our being-in-the-world, such a distinction would be guilty of an abstraction which would have a tendency to emphasize less significant features of sculpture, i.e., non-representation and representation, to the detriment of the much more significant potentiality of the art form. Regrettably,

Ingarden's position on the essential representational character of sculpture results in this kind of multiplication of categories. And claiming that a new category would be needless because presentational sculpture is merely a transitional form between sculpture and architecture, ignores the uniqueness of the sculptural art form in general, as well as leaving the basic question unanswered; one still has to ask, 'What is this thing?' It is obviously not architecture and, since it is not representational, according to Ingarden it is not sculpture. A better approach would appear to be to recognize the distinction between sculpture and all other art forms to lie in the characteristics peculiar to sculpture in general and, in particular, the unique way its three-dimensionality calls us to a primordial experience of the 'concrete suchness' of the world; a world where the human does not stand off and peer in, but is instead deeply immersed.

Certainly there are distinctions to be made based upon very specific structural characteristics. And in this regard, the sculptural work of art is indeed complex. It is sometimes representational and sometimes presentational. Thus it is sometimes schematic and at other times not. It may have either one, two, or three strata, the first always being the structurally constitutive factor of the entire work. But it is this very

complexity which argues for a transcending of categories too narrowly defined. The very richness of the art form lies in the diversity of distinctions which pertain to the general category. To multiply categories on the basis of this diversity, however, is to threaten the essential unity of the sculptural enterprise—the commonality of purpose belonging to all sculptural expressions from the masterpieces of Phidias to the explorations of Gabo.

And finally, though it was found necessary to suggest certain adjustments to Ingarden's perspective on the sculptural work of art, his theory is able to accept these course corrections without any alteration of his essential principles. Thus it must be concluded that his theory does possess the necessary flexibility and versatility to give a very strong account of developing art movements, as well as the artistic developments of the past. Though it is impossible to foretell the future course of artistic evolution, there is every good reason to believe that Ingarden's aesthetics will occupy a place of permanent importance in our attempts to understand and appreciate the gifts of the artistic spirit.

## General Conclusion

Although Ingarden's primary concern always remained focused on the problems relating to the controversy between the philosophical positions of Realism and Idealism as they emerged from Husserl's philosophy, his attempt to articulate the specific nature of intentional beings led to an aesthetic theory of monumental significance. To lose sight of this is to deprive aesthetics of one of its most rigorous and promising advances. But Ingarden's general aesthetic theory is not easily mined. And it was at this point that our investigation began.

Since Ingarden's original intent was not the development of a general aesthetic theory, he came to the field through the investigation of a single art form—the literary work of art. Remarkably, however, the guiding principles for a complete theory of aesthetics can be found in his two major works on literature. This has been our contention from the start. In support of this claim there has been an attempt to identify those principles essential to the literary work of art and then to show how they are in fact applicable to other art forms. Ingarden's later work on music, painting and architecture serve to demonstrate this point if the guiding principles of the literary work of art are

completely traced through these subsequent investigations. By doing so we have shown that Ingarden has not only provided us with the essential principles of an aesthetic theory, but has also shown us the proper manner of applying his principles to a diversity of art forms.

To further buttress the claim that Ingarden's aesthetic principles form a general theory of aesthetics, we have applied the Ingardenian perspective to the sculptural work of art, a central art form which was not included in his studies. While it was concluded that certain modifications to his theory are necessary if it is to adequately account for the many and diverse objects which are subsumed beneath the category of sculpture, the basic essential principles of his theory are applicable and remain intact.

As with all works of art, the sculptural work of art is an intentional object. It neither falls prey to the consequences of being identified with the transitory order of real beings nor the eternal unchanging order of ideal entities. However, it is guaranteed its public accessibility and identity through its ontic dependence upon autonomous objects. As such, it is essentially a heteronomous object.

Each work of art is ontically dependent upon a real thing, though each art form varies in its degree of

dependence. The literary work of art is the least dependent while the architectural work of art is the most dependent. Consequently, the basic similarities between sculpture and architecture would indicate that the sculptural work of art's dependency on its real material is only second to that of the architectural work. But in any case, a real material object serves as an ontical foundation for all works of art.

In response to the subjective-intentional role of conscious activity in the constituting of works of art, Ingarden asserts that all works of art are ontically dependent on the conscious acts of the artist, on the one hand, and the conscious acts of the reader/listener/observer, on the other. It is through the creative and constituting acts of the artist and observer that the work of art has a 'life' within the human community: a dynamic ebbing and flowing of acclaim and silence. And much more than this, it is because of the creating and constituting role of conscious acts that works of art must be understood as belonging to the order of intentional being; as intentional objects which find their origin and continued support in such activity.

It is by asserting the two-fold ontic dependence of all works of art that Ingarden has attempted to bring together the transcendental life-world of Husserl with the objective structure of reality. Through the work

of art, ontologically transcendent of both the real world and the subjective-intentional processes of consciousness, Ingarden has attempted to show a 'way-out' of the Realism/Idealism problem as traditionally conceived. As such, these two ontic dependences are and must comprise a central feature of works of art in general. To have drawn back from this position at any point in his investigation would have posed a threat to his entire program.

The third ontic foundation of ideal entities was only discussed in his earlier work on the literary work of art. All indications would point to an increasing discomfort with their role in works of art. Like Graff, we have come to see it as an abandoned position not applicable to Ingarden's general aesthetic theory. Consequently, sculpture was treated as having two ontic foundations, sufficient in their own right to adequately account for the contributions of artist and observer and the sculptural work of art's stability within the collective consciousness of human history.

Ingarden demonstrated the flexibility of his theory through the manner in which some principles pertinent to one art form were not seen as essential to all art forms. Specifically, this was the case with schematicism and stratification. The art forms discussed ranged from having no layers, as such, to having four. All representa-

tional art forms are schematic. Even within a single art form, there are variations. Ingarden's theory does not force art forms into a preconceived mold. He vehemently rejected any such mechanical extension of his principles. To this he remained true even to the point of several theoretical disappointments. It is probably as much for this reason as any other that his theory can truly be viewed as general. For were it not for the flexibility inherent in his aesthetic theory, any modifications to account for developing art trends, e.g., contemporary sculpture, would likely have the effect of threatening his entire system. This was not the case; however, as we showed in our discussion of sculpture.

Truly of utmost importance to all art forms is the role and significance of the work's aesthetically valuable qualities. Not wedded to a multi-layered description of the work of art, the aesthetic value of an art work is determined by the overall harmony of the work's aesthetically valuable qualities. In the case of multi-layered art forms, each layer brings to the work aesthetically valuable qualities which then enter into a harmonic whole which in turn is identified with the work's overall aesthetic value. When there are no layers there are still aesthetic value qualities which enter into harmonic relations, and they likewise comprise the aesthetic value of the work. Stratification is not

essential to the polyphony of aesthetically valuable qualities, although Ingarden has claimed that when there is a stratum of represented objects the work is capable of having a greater aesthetic value than when this does not occur. But as we noted, Ingarden would seem to be inconsistent on this point given his view on absolute music as being in some sense superior to program music. In any case, it is by virtue of the polyphony of all work's of art's aesthetically valuable qualities that there comes to appearance the highest of aesthetic value qualities—metaphysical qualities. Here again, we see a principle of universal applicability throughout the world of art works.

By viewing sculpture through the Ingardenian perspective, we found it necessary to indicate ways in which Ingarden's approach might be strengthened to give an account of contemporary sculptural developments. These suggestions did not challenge any of Ingarden's essential principles. They did, however, point to areas where there appeared to be problems of emphases.

Ingarden seems to be committed to an implicit hierarchy of art forms based upon their potential aesthetic value. While this does not in itself pose a problem, at times he seems to connect potential aesthetic value with representation, i.e., representational painting is of greater potential aesthetic value than abstract

painting and the same would be true of sculpture which is seen as essentially, and always to some degree, representational. While this may be a result of Ingarden's first formal entry into aesthetics occurring with the literary work of art, it is a principle which can only cause theoretical problems. Even within Ingarden's own work it raises questions of consistency, as already noted.

The whole notion of their being transitional art forms needlessly multiplies categories on the basis of characteristics which do not seem to be essential to an art form. The claim that all sculpture is to some degree representational is to take an excessively narrow view of the art form. The same could be said of painting. This could easily have the effect of altogether missing that which might clearly separate, say, painting in general from sculpture in general. In fact, if our extension of Ingarden's theory to sculpture accurately reflects his principles, then this is exactly what occurred. By focusing on the characteristic of representation versus presentation, one could easily miss what is truly distinctive about the sculptural art form.

The manner in which sculpture manifests itself to our perception would indicate that the essential structure of the art form, that which is sought in an onto-

logical analysis of objects, lies beyond the characteristics Ingarden uses to establish the category of transitional forms. Certainly there are differences between sculptural works which are representational and those which are presentational, but these would appear to be differences of degree which obscure the fact that all of sculpture is capable of re-involving us with the world. It is for this reason that we have suggested that the problem here is a matter of emphasis. To emphasize the structural differences which exist between one sculptural form and another tends to fragment the phenomenon as a whole thus giving the impression of essential diversity where one ought to be emphasizing the art form's essential unity. Here it can be seen that fragmentation is equivalent to abstraction which is in turn equivalent to distortion. In the case of sculpture, the price of such a move is very high for it poses an immediate threat to the potential progress and discovery belonging to the art form of sculpture. And sculpture, as no other art, addresses our deep involvement with our bodies and the body of the world. No other art form, by its very nature, possesses the same potentiality for healing the contemporary schism of body and spirit. Seen in this light, the problem of emphases surrounding the concept of transitional forms ought not to be understood as minor or insignificant. For that which does not serve

to heal, to restore, to disclose, further misleads and reinforces our disorientation.

Our conclusion, then, is that Ingarden has indeed provided us with a general theory of aesthetics which is clearly articulated in his writings on individual art forms. There are essential aesthetic principles which are universally applicable throughout the fine arts. And not only has he provided essential principles, but he has also shown how it is that they ought to be utilized. A major strength of his theory can be found in its inherent flexibility—a flexibility which does not require paying the price of a radical relativism or rigid idealism. It is a theory which promises to remain essentially intact in the face of future artistic developments while not permitting the diluting of the arts to the petty and chaotic. His theory is not a closed building offering no means of escape, but is instead a rigorous and systematic mind-course within a field too often composed of piecemeal efforts leading no where but to disappointment and frustration. And, finally, from the lofty perspective of a sculptor:

When possessed by my art, when my materials of space and mass lovingly reveal their natural order, I know it is working. Something has been recovered, something which is true. Reasons may be found and explanations given, but they cannot threaten the moment of clarity that is the work of art. And here lies the vision of Roman Ingarden; he insists that there are things we are about—reasons why our forms

and textures and colors and sounds 'work.' And even more importantly, he leaves room for the judgment that threatens every act of artistic courage—*sometimes it doesn't work.* And may God help us when this possibility no longer remains; for on that day, art will be dead.

G. David Pollick  
September 4, 1981

## Endnotes

### Chapter Five

- 1 Roman Ingarden, *Ontologie der Kunst*, pp. 300-301.
- 2 Roman Ingarden, *Ontologie der Kunst*, p. 300.
- 3 Roman Ingarden, *Ontologie der Kunst*, p. 301.
- 4 Roman Ingarden, *Ontologie der Kunst*, p. 301.
- 5 Roman Ingarden, *Ontologie der Kunst*, p. 300.
- 6 Roman Ingarden, *Ontologie der Kunst*, p. 300.
- 7 Roman Ingarden, *Ontologie der Kunst*, p. 300.
- 8 Herbert Read, *The Philosophy of Modern Art* (New York: Meridan, 1955), p. 95.
- 9 Roman Ingarden, *Ontologie der Kunst*, p. 301.
- 10 Herbert Read, *The Philosophy of Modern Art*; (New York: Meridan, 1955), pp. 75-76.
- 11 Herbert Read, *A Concise History of Modern Sculpture* (New York: Frederick A. Praeger, 1964), p. 101.
- 12 Karsten Harries, *The Meaning of Modern Art: A Philosophical Interpretation* (Evanston: Northwestern, 1968), p. 100.
- 13 F. David Martin, "The Arts and the 'Between'," *British Journal of Aesthetics*, 17 (1977), p. 26.
- 14 Robert Venturi, *Complexity and Contradiction in Architecture* (New York: Museum of Modern Art, 1966), p. 26.
- 15 Robert Venturi, *Complexity and Contradiction in Architecture* (New York: Museum of Modern Art, 1966), pp. 88-89.
- 16 Roman Ingarden, *Ontologie der Kunst*, p. 300.
- 17 Rhys Carpenter, *Greek Sculpture* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1960), p. 34.

<sup>18</sup> F. David Martin, "The Autonomy of Sculpture," *The Journal of Aesthetics and Art Criticism*, 34 (1976), p. 274.

<sup>19</sup> F. David Martin, "The Autonomy of Sculpture," p. 274.

<sup>20</sup> F. David Martin, "The Autonomy of Sculpture," p. 276.

<sup>21</sup> F. David Martin, "The Autonomy of Sculpture," p. 278.

<sup>22</sup> Henry Moore, *Henry Moore on Sculpture*, ed. Philip James (London: MacDonal, 1966), p. 275.

<sup>23</sup> F. David Martin, "The Autonomy of Sculpture," p. 282.

<sup>24</sup> Herbert Read, *The Art of Sculpture* (New York: Pantheon, 1956), p. 226.

<sup>25</sup> Herbert Read, *The Art of Sculpture* (New York: Pantheon, 1956), p. 227.

<sup>26</sup> Herbert Read, *The Art of Sculpture* (New York: Pantheon, 1956), p. 228.

<sup>27</sup> F. David Martin, "The Autonomy of Sculpture," p. 282.

<sup>28</sup> F. David Martin, "The Autonomy of Sculpture," p. 283.

<sup>29</sup> F. David Martin, "The Autonomy of Sculpture," p. 285.

<sup>30</sup> Roman Ingarden, *Ontologie der Kunst*, p. 269.

<sup>31</sup> Roman Ingarden, *Ontologie der Kunst*, p. 307.

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