

# Female representation in provincial legislatures and the gender wage differential: 1970-2010

By Mauricio Andres Ruiz

(5991965)

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Supervisor: Professor Pierre Brochu

ECO 6999

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*Abstract:* Using the Canadian Census and provincial election results from 1970 to 2010, I examine the shifts in the level of female political representation and its effects on the gender wage gap in Canada. Increases in female representation by 1 percent, decrease male wages by 0.6 percent and increase female wages by 0.1 to zero percent. The political ideology of the party in power are shown to have effects on the wage differential. Provinces with left-leaning parties in power increase female wages by 1.3 percent higher than centre-leaning parties. I also find that wage differences between males and females are smaller in the later censuses than in the earlier ones, but the effect of increasing female political representation is much bigger in the earlier years, 1.3 percent and 0.1 percent respectively. This paper also makes a secondary contribution; in order to identify the link between female political representation and the gender wage gap, I created a detailed provincial political representation dataset, that focuses on gender specific results dating back to 1970.

## 1. Introduction

A gender wage differential has always existed in Canada, but the magnitude has differed over time. Since the mid-twentieth century to the present time, the wage differential in Canada has been drastically reduced (Baker & Drolet 2010). The reduction in the differential is attributed to social and cultural changes that began between the 1960s and 1970s; deviations from traditional female roles were no longer frowned upon by Canadian society (Boothby 1984). More women entered the labour force, stayed after marriage, and returned to work after having children. Furthermore, female involvement in politics has increased since suffrage rights were won from the State. Provincial suffrage was granted in some provinces earlier than the federal right to vote which was established in 1918. Manitoba was the first province in Canada to grant women the right to vote in 1916. By the end of 1917, six provinces had granted this right to women who met certain criteria (Strong-Boag 2016). Quebec was the last province to grant this right in 1940. This paper will focus on the relationship between female political representation at the provincial level and the gender wage differential in Canada.

This paper makes two contributions. First, I create a provincial political representation dataset that contains gender-specific variables (such as number of seats held by men & women and their political affiliation) dating back to 1970.<sup>1</sup> To the best of my knowledge, this is the first time such a long historical series has been made available to researchers.

Second, to the best of my knowledge, this is the first paper to investigate the link between changes in the level of female representation at the provincial level of government and the gender wage differential over the 1971 to 2011 period. The choice of starting in the 1970s is due to the fact that social and cultural belief about women's role in North American society began to swiftly change, women became more active in the labour market and in the political setting (Goldin 2006). By the early 1990s, labour market outcomes of women started to resemble those of men due to increases in the level of women's education and higher levels of experience in the labour market (Baker & Drolet 2010).

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<sup>1</sup> Provincial election results are available for all the provinces since confederation, however none of them have gender-specific results (the number and percentage of seats won/held men & women). To achieve these results, I cross-referenced a list of all the women elected to the provincial legislatures, provided by the Library of Parliament, to all the election results individually. See Appendix A for more detail.

In this paper, I rely on two datasets. I used administrative election results data, which I mentioned above to calculate the proportion of women in provincial legislature, which is a key variable in my analysis. I also rely on Canadian Census of the Population data, (1971, 1981, 1986, 1991, 1996, 2001, and 2006), and National Household Survey data for 2011.<sup>2</sup> These datasets provide a rich and consistent source of socioeconomic data covering the 1971 to 2011 time period.

The results from an earning equation indicate that female representation is negatively correlated with the gender wage differential. More precisely, the higher the degree of female representation, the smaller the wage differential. These results are statistically significant at 1 percent level. They are also very robust to the choice of specifications. When focusing on earlier (1971, 1981) years and later (2001, 2006, 2011) years, the results are more mixed. The results are sensitive to the choice of specification, especially when one adds political ideology indicators to my findings. The pattern for the later years is similar to the overall results. Interestingly, the wage differential is reduced because increases in provincial female representation negatively affect male wages while having a small positive to neutral effect on female wages.

The provincial ruling party's ideology plays a role in the gender wage differences. In most cases, left-leaning parties have a more positive effect on female wages than do other parties. However, the variable of political ideology (in the three different time specifications) shows that men benefit more than their female counterparts. As expected, Education has a positive effect on the yearly wage. Interestingly, human capital premiums are higher in the later years of the sample. The wage and salary gap between high-school graduates and post-graduates is bigger in the 2000s than it was in the 1970s. Education results are found to be significant at the 1 percent level.

The paper will proceed as follows. Section 2 covers the literature review. In section 3, I present my two data sets, administrative election and Canadian Census data, and report some descriptive statistics. The econometric model used in this study is discussed in section 5. In section 6, I look at the role of increases in female representation in the provincial political theatre and its impact on the gender wage disparity. Section 7 provides some robustness checks. Lastly, I conclude in section 8.

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<sup>2</sup> Income information prior to 1981 was only collected every ten years.

## **2. Literature review**

The gender wage differential is not a new phenomenon in Canada. This social issue has been present in the labour market ever since women began entering the labour force worldwide. The issue has been widely studied by economists and continues to be of interest for researchers. In this section I present and discuss the literature on both female representation, in Canada and elsewhere, and the gender wage differential in Canada.

Krook and O'Brien (2012) explore the new trend in global politics of promoting more women into cabinet portfolios, but not all cabinet positions are created equal. In the past, females were usually given cabinet positions that had feminine characteristics that usually entailed lower levels of power and prestige. In recent years, a trend has emerged in the western world of parity in cabinets; it has occurred in Spain in 2004 and 2008 and in Chile in 2006. More recently, Canada's federal government saw Canada's first parity cabinet.

This paper focuses on the distribution of female appointments to cabinet. The authors divide cabinet positions into three mutually exclusive groups: masculine, neutral, and feminine positions. Furthermore, these cabinet positions have different prestige levels; they organized them into high, medium, and low prestige. Data from 117 countries for August 2009 was collected from the Central Intelligence Agency's (CIA) online directory.

They create an instrument to organize and rank countries parity cabinets called the Gender Power Score. It uses both levels of masculine vs. feminine positions held by women and their level of prestige to create a country score. A parity cabinet, under the Gender Power Score, would receive a score of three. Finland received the highest score of 3.67, and as such was held as the reference nation. For reference a score is 12 indicates an all-female cabinet. The world average score was not high; the median score was 0.21, while the mean was slightly higher at 0.49.

They conclude that increases in female representation in cabinet depend less on parliamentary or electoral reform but rather an increase in the supply of females into the political elite circles. Creating more female elites may be an effective way to improve womens' access into positions of power within governments. Nevertheless, improvements seen especially in the Western World have been an encouraging sign.

Tolley (2011) examines the perceived relationship that women fare better, i.e. have better representation levels, in municipal elections than at other levels of government. Previous studies have shown that women fare better in municipalities than at the provincial or federal level. These statements have been described in previous studies as a trend, because results have shown that the higher females climb the electoral ladder, the fewer will be elected for office (Bashevkin 1993). This is so because municipal office is seen as the lowest form of political office in the hierarchical system of politics, with provincial politics in the middle range of importance and federal office as the highest.

Using longitudinal data from the Federation of Canadian Municipalities (FCM) that included all 3,750 Canadian municipalities with elected councils, from 2002 to 2009, she examines whether the “the higher, the fewer” phenomenon is present in Canada. Her results indicate that this is not the case. Only four out of the ten provinces in 2009 have higher female political representation in the municipal theatre than at the other two levels of government. On the other hand, the Canadian aggregate percentage state that the level of female representation is fairly equal throughout the three level of governments, with the provincial level of governance having a slightly higher percentage among the three. These results indicate that the statement posed by Bashevkin is not valid when tested among all the municipalities in Canada rather than a select few.

Lastly, this study finds that women still face barriers in municipal office. It has been previously stated that women faced little to no barriers at the municipal level. In all three levels of government, women are still facing these barriers, such as a lack of financial support and recruitment opportunities to join political parties. Most of municipalities run under political party-less systems, yet women still face much of the same barriers as in the other levels of government. Nevertheless, Canada female representation seems to have stalled at the 25 percent level, and the reasons why need to be studied further.

Kenworthy and Malami (1999) looks at the worldwide gender inequality in political representation. Their analysis does not look at implications of different levels of female representation in the main legislative body on the gender wage gap, however. That being said, their paper investigates and explains why female representation differs among countries, which they argue is due to political structure and religious faiths. It has been noted that at least 30 percent female representation is needed for women to be able to exert considerable influence on

their countries politics. The same is true on corporate boards (one woman is a token, two is a minority, and three is a force<sup>3</sup>). Nevertheless, the worldwide average is only 10 percent.

They examine how female representation in the lower houses differs across 146 countries in 1998. To maintain consistency with previous studies, they also examine the 20 longest-lasting democracies separately. They use the UN statistical yearbook for 1998 as their data set. The dependent variable in the regression equation is the share of seats in the main national legislative body held by women in 1998.

They find that female education levels throughout the population and the economy labour force participation are not related to political success, but in particular types of jobs, professional careers, lead to higher success. On the other hand, religion has a negative relationship with the number of seats won by women. Countries with religions that express more traditional roles for women, for example Islam and Catholicism, tended to have fewer females in politics than more egalitarian religions, such as Protestantism for example. Women's suffrage plays a big role in success for women winning seats. Countries where women won the right to vote in the early twentieth century have been shown to have higher female political representation. In conclusion, there are three factors that affect female representation: political structure, socioeconomic variables, and cultural differences.

Shifting from a worldwide perspective to a more Canadian one, Fortin and Lemieux (2015) focus on the wage differences between males and females in Canada. Instead of using aggregate Canadian data, they utilized the Labour Force Survey (LFS) to estimate provincial differences. More importantly, they are interested on how wage inequality has evolved across the Canadian provinces from 1997 to 2013.

During the time-period in question, wage increases were more prominent in Alberta, Newfoundland, and Saskatchewan. These provinces also experience a decrease in the degree of wage inequality. The boom in the natural resource sector appears to be responsible for these shifts, as they benefit low-skill, least-educated workers, which helps reduce overall wage disparities. Furthermore, changes to minimum wage laws in most provinces in recent years help increase the wages for workers at the bottom of the distribution, which further decreases the wage disparities among workers. Lastly, a natural resource booms have negative effects on the return on education for some workers, as it decreases skill premiums. These types of booms

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<sup>3</sup> Quote from Vigdís Finnbogadóttir, President of Iceland.

disproportionately benefit low-skill workers; yet they are more severely affected when a resource crash occurs.

All these changes seen since 1997 have helped reduce the gender wage differential in all provinces. Prince Edward Island has the smallest gender differential in Canada, at 8.7 percent, a 4.6 percent decrease during the study period. The province with the highest wage differential is Alberta with 24.6 percent, the wage differential decreased 4.2 percent in 16 years. The provinces with the highest wage differentials in Canada are the provinces who benefitted the most from the natural resource boom, as the majority of the jobs generated are in male dominated labour sectors.

Boudarbat and Connolly (2013) examine changes in the gender wage differential among post-secondary graduates from Canadian institutions from 1988 to 2007 using the National Graduates Survey (NGS). They note that the female's share of the labour force has increased steadily since the 1970s. In 1976, female share was at 42 percent, and by 2009 it was almost at parity at 48 percent. Despite this improvement, women still earn on average 83¢ for every dollar a man earns. That being said, progress in the differential has been seen over the years. However, these improvements have not been shared equally throughout the wage distribution.

Their results show that females, on average, earn between 6 and 8 percent less than their male counterparts after the first two years of graduation. After five years of graduation, the gap widens to 6 to 14 percent less. Only a small percentage of the gap in earnings can be explained by differences in personal and job characteristics; the remainder is unexplained by the model. Overall, the gap has been shrinking throughout different percentiles of the distribution. The only point of concern is in the highest percentile of the distribution. Over the years the gender wage differential has actually been increasing in this percentile. The explanation proposed by Boudarbat is that the gender wage gap is widening at the highest percentile because of the heavy concentration university graduates, as skill premiums disproportionately benefit men more than females. Said differently, more years of education proportionality affect men's wages more than female wages; men earn a higher return on investment than females.

Kim (2013) examines the gap in income among men and women in the United States. Race plays a role in the size of the gap, with Asian women having the largest gap and Hispanic women having the smallest when compared to their male counterparts. This paper explores six policies if implemented that would help reduce the current wage gap in the U.S. Enforcing

existing equal opportunity statutes, such as sections of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, have been shown to be very successful in curbing discriminatory practices. Affirmative action initiatives in the past have helped increase women employment levels in certain male-dominated industries while reducing the wage gap.

The U.S. is the only developed country in the World that does not require maternity leave by law. These types of laws help encourage women to work. This is so because they allow them to have job and a family at the same time. Women participation in the labour market is higher in countries with family-friendly policies. These types of policies have decreased the gender wage gap in developed countries, such as European and Scandinavian countries.

Comparable worth advocate for pay equity such that when employers conduct job evaluations, they should not underpay a specific occupation because it is female dominated. Furthermore, policies that help protect workers in forming unions have been discussed by the American congress. The problem with these types of policies is the hostile political landscape of the U.S. Unions have always had negative connotations throughout their history, i.e. being associated with communism. Regardless of this, union representation has shown to have a higher union versus non-union wage premium for women than for men; therefore, forming unions in female-dominated industries have the potential of far reaching effects in reducing the male/female wage gap.

Boudarbat et al. (2010) investigate shifts in the return to human capital in Canada from 1980 to 2005. The point of interest of this study is the fact that they used Canadian census data. This is important since most past studies tend to use other surveys since wage data from the LFS was only available from 1997 onward. I use this study as a reference for my data. As such, my study uses the census instead of the LFS because my study goes as far back as 1970. I replicated many of the sample restrictions that they imposed in their study into mine. Their contribution to the literature is using census data to examine shifts in the return to human capital and using the 2006 census, which is also included in my study.

Warman et al. (2010) examine differences between professor's salaries in Canadian universities. Choosing this group is important because they are public employees and therefore one should not observe wage discriminate based on their gender, *ceteris paribus*. They use the master files of the Full-Time University Teaching Staff data collected by Statistics Canada. Their

results indicate that over time the gender differential has declined, as male salaries have been declining while their female counterparts have remained constant.

Male professors have been earning less than their previous cohorts. Due to the fact that males have observed steady salary declines, in real terms, over the years and females have not shifted, the wage differential between professor cohorts have decreased. Nevertheless, wage differentials still exist in Canadian universities, but the majority can be explained due to differences in rank between the sexes. Age plays a crucial role in explaining the wage differential. Age accounts for about 20% of the explained earnings gaps and 15% of the overall difference in earnings in 2000. Furthermore, the field of work helps to further explain wage differences; female professors in the arts and humanities have a lower wage premium than professors who teach engineering and business. Having more females involved in lower paying positions does have an effect on the wage differential.

They came up with the following saying, which appeared throughout their whole study, “the intercept is negotiable, but the slope is fixed.” Professors have some leverage when they negotiate their initial salary at the beginning of their career. Once they settle on a salary, their initial start point will and does play a crucial role in their lifetime salary. Discrimination toward female professors in the past had a long-term effect on their lifetime earnings.

Baker and Drolet (2010) examine differences in the female/male wage ratio. Specifically, they investigate the differences between using the ratio of the wage-based and the earning-based model to explain gender wage differences. Statistics Canada annual report called *Income Trends in Canada* reports differences in wages using the earning-based ratio model. Since 1992, according to their model, the female/male ratio has held constant at 0.70. Baker and Drolet propose using a wage-based model to investigate if the wage ratio stayed constant.

The study sample consists of workers who work full-year, full-time. A previous study conducted by Drolet suggested that older studies on the topic might have used the incorrect metric to monitor changes in the ratio. Her study indicates that the female/male ratio might be as high as 0.90 instead of the 0.70 value that the government has reported. Their new analysis shows that the gender pay ratio using wages show significantly different results from those generated by the earning-based models. By using a wage-based model, the pay ratio is always higher by 10 to 15 percentage points. The most recent analysis shows the gender pay ratio at 0.85 when using a wage-based model and 0.72 with an earning-based model. By using wages instead

of earnings, they show that the ratio has been increasing for women in the past 15 years; whereas Statistic Canada models show no improvement during the same period.

Gunderson (2006) outlines the empirical processes that ought to be used to test and examine the male-female wage differential and how discrimination plays a role. He focuses on more recent literature that tends to control for factors that are often unobserved and difficult to measure, such as cognitive skills and family background.

Evidence from numerous studies show that the unadjusted male-female wage differential is roughly 0.70, based on full-year, full-time workers, and increases to 0.80 when the number of hours are controlled more tightly by using the hourly wage. The differential increases further to 0.85 to 0.90 or even higher when other controls are included, such as experience, educational attainment and occupation.

Discrimination against females in the labour market tends to generate a wage differential between 5 and 15 percent, according to the evidence presented by Gunderson. He believes that competitive markets will continue to be women's "best friend" and the market forces will continue to decrease the gender wage differentials.

Kidd and Shannon (1996) research on the gender gap looked not only at Canada but on Australia as well. Their goal is to explain the gender wage gap difference between the two countries. Australia is a good country to use as comparison because it is part of the Commonwealth (similar law system) and have a similar culture and societal structure as Canada. One thing that sets these two countries apart, however, is their labour market institutions. Australia has a stronger union movement and a more centralized wage determination mechanism than Canada.

In Australia, the federal and state governments oversee the wage determination mechanism. When unions negotiate with the employers and reach a settlement, this settlement is legally binding across the whole occupation. This ensures a uniform wage levels across the sector; this is not the case in Canada, however. Negotiation does occur in Canada but it is often between the union and the employer for that specific plant; there is little in the way of pattern bargaining across the whole sector.

They use two data sets; one for each country: the 1989 Canadian Labour Market Activity Survey and the 1989-90 Income Distribution Survey for Australia. Based on the estimated earnings equations, their results indicate that the log wage difference for Canada is 0.287 and

0.143 for Australia. Australia's centralization determination of wage and higher union representation have been shown to decrease the gender differential. As well, the results indicate that in Canada, there is a higher human capital reward. This might help explain the inter-country differences, as both countries have almost the same educational attainment levels. In conclusion, larger and stronger union movements have been shown to decrease the gender wage gap in Australia with the help of a more centralized wage mechanism.

Shannon (1996) looks at how the minimum wages in Canada contributes to the gender wage differential. Minimum wages in Canada differ between provinces due to political differences and as the cost of living is not equal throughout the country. Overall in Canada, only a small portion of the population is employed at the minimum wage. Young workers (16-24 years old) are often the group earning this wage.

Shannon uses the 1986 Canadian Labour Market Activity Survey for his data source. Using the OLS estimator, the results indicate that the minimum wage reduces the gender wage gap for younger workers due to a drastic decrease in discriminatory practices in the labour market. The minimum wage did not decrease the wage gap for adult workers (25-64 years old), as most these workers do not work at those wage levels. As such, minimum wage laws tend to benefit the differential of younger workers more than the differential among adult workers.

Shamsuddin (1996) explores the relationship between unions and the gender wage gap for Canada. The female to male wage ratio was 58.4 percent in 1967 and increased to 69.6 percent by 1991 for full-time workers. This increase has been attributed to societal and economical changes in the Canadian labour force, such as changes to annual hours worked by females and increases in educational attainment. Their goal is to determine the effect of trade unions on gender earnings in Canadian CMAs and rural towns.

Over the time period, all CMAs and towns saw an increase in the female-male earning ratio except rural areas in the prairies. He determined that the gender wage gap is attributed to three components: the gender gap in union density, the gender wage gap within union workers, and the wage gap among non-union workers. He found that during the ten-year period, unionization rates were low, but there was a significant increase in female union participation rates in all CMAs and towns.

Part of the decrease in wage gap has been attributed to a decrease in the female-male unionization gap. The 1971 results indicate that males had earning advantage over females with

respect to unionization. On the other hand, the 1981 results indicated that the aggregate unionization rate increased female earnings by a higher amount than male earnings. Overall, the results suggest that trade unions may have helped to increase the gender wage gap in 1971 and then decreased it in 1981. In conclusion, the paper find that in 1971, unions favour males more than females in terms of increased earnings, but by 1981 females benefited more within unions. It is worth noting that the 1981 results are statistically insignificant.

Blau and Kahn (1994) explore why wage inequality has risen since the 1970s, while the wage gap has shrunk over that timespan in the U.S.. Before the 1970s, the gender wage gap held constant at around 60 percent. Since then, women's pay compared to men has risen steadily. During the same time period, wage inequality rose among different education and experience groups. These issues go hand and hand due to the fact that the U.S., compared to other nations, have had a longer and stronger commitment to equal employment and pay policies. Yet, the gender wage gap in the U.S. is larger than in most developed nations.

Some of the differences between the U.S. and other developed nations can be explained by their high level of wage inequality. Previous research shows that the U.S. would have a similar low wage differentials to Sweden or Australia if the U.S. had their level of wage equality.

The results show an overall progress in womens' wages between 1975 and 1987. Between this period, about two-thirds of pay differential cannot be explained by standard gender differences, i.e. human capital theory or racial factors Furthermore, women have gained more experience over the years, which explained one-half of the reduction of the gender differential. Had women not gain in these areas, the wage differential would have increased by 4 percent over the years; luckily this was not the case. The wage differential shrunk by 10 percent, such that women made 70 cents to a dollar earned by men in 1987.

My contribution to the literature is testing how shifts in female representation in Canada at the provincial level of government during a 40-year period has helped reduce the gender wage differential. Furthermore, the creation of the provincial political data set contributes to the field as this data set was not all available publicly and compiled into one aggregate data set.

### 3. Data

Two data sources are used in this study. The first one consists of detailed provincial election results from 1970 to 2011 created from multiple provincial administrative datasets.<sup>4</sup> The Census of Population (1971, 1981, 1986, 1991, 1996, 2001, 2006) and the National Household Survey (2011) is the second set used; it consists of Canadian microeconomic data collected and provided by Statistics Canada. These data sets are described in more detail below, followed by a description of the sample restrictions. This section concludes with a discussion of the summary statistics.

#### 3.1. Administrative data

This paper relies on detailed provincial elections and by-elections results data from 1970 to 2011. The numbers refer to April 1<sup>st</sup> of each year. Changes in the political landscape caused by elections or by-elections that happened after April 1<sup>st</sup> are counted in the following year's data.<sup>5</sup> The choice of threshold is designed to match the government's fiscal calendar; it is also close to when the census and the NHS data is gathered.

This data consists of election and by-election results for every provincial riding in Canada. This information includes, the name of the candidate who won, his or her gender, his or her political affiliation, the total number of seats in the legislature, and the winning party if (it was a general election). Using this information, I can construct the percentage of women elected to the provincial legislature, which is a key variable for this study. It also allows me to create a variable that accounts for the political ideology (left, centre, and right) of the party which was in power, another important variable for this paper.<sup>6</sup>

Although general information about past elections results are available to the general public (e.g. online), except in the case of Ontario, Alberta, and British Columbia, for example, they are only available in paper (hardcopy) form in specific locations, i.e. the head offices of

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<sup>4</sup> See Appendix A for further detail.

<sup>5</sup> For example, the Ontario general election of 2007 was held on October 10, 2007. The results of this election are registered in 2008 as they happened after April 1<sup>st</sup>, 2007.

<sup>6</sup> The three major political parties, New Democratic Party (left), the Liberal (centre) except for the liberals in British Columbia, and the Progressive Conservatives (right), are categorized as expected. For the other parties that have earned seats in provincial legislature, their categorization is not as clear-cut. Appendix B displays all the political parties that have been elected since 1971 and what political ideology they represent.

provincial election bodies.<sup>7</sup> Regardless, the detailed information required for this study – gender specific results – are not available. However, by using an exhaustive list of all the women ever elected to the provincial legislature in Canada, provided by Library of Parliament, I was able to cross reference the names of the seat winners, from each provincial election and by-election, to the names on the Library of Parliament list, thereby manually creating the gender specific results required.

Tables 1 through 10 provide a complete breakdown of the election and by-election data by year for all ten provinces.<sup>8</sup> The data consists of the total number of seats in each respective legislature, the number of men and women elected, the percentage of females elected, and the number of seats held by all major provincial parties. Although this paper only uses election results for 1970, 1980, 1985, 1990, 1995, 2000, 2005, and 2010 only as to match the census data, I nevertheless provide the information for each year dating back to 1970. To my knowledge this is the first time such a detail series is made readily available to researchers (and to the public) and as such is a contribution of this paper.

Figure 1 shows an overall picture of Canada's female representation at the provincial level of government.<sup>9</sup> Provincial legislatures have seen an increase in female representation since 1970. At that time, only 1.7 percent of all elected members of the legislatures in Canada were female.<sup>10</sup> In 1980 the Canadian average rose to 5.0 percent. It took another ten years for the Canadian average to surpass 10 percent. 1990 was the first time that women surpassed the threshold of 100 elected provincial officials, as 123 women held office.<sup>11</sup> By 2000, 137 women held office and in 2010 173 women held office throughout the Canadian provinces. The upward trend continued into the 21<sup>st</sup> century. In 2000 the percentage of women increased to just under 20 percent, (i.e. 19.4 percent). By the last census, the Canadian female representation average had increased to 23.9 percent.

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<sup>7</sup> See Appendix A for more detail.

<sup>8</sup> Although I do not use the data for Prince Edward Island, as mentioned in the introduction, I still provide detailed gender results because the purpose is to make this information available to future use.

<sup>9</sup> The results are an average of an average, i.e. as some legislatures are larger than others, this is not taken into account and each riding carries equal weight.

<sup>10</sup> Only 13 women were in provincial office in 1971. By 1981, the number rose to 34 present in elected legislatures.

<sup>11</sup> Between the 1986 and 1991 censuses, female representation saw its biggest change, i.e. an increase of 101.6 percent.

Figures 2 through 4 show the percentage of females elected for each province, divided in to three regional areas (east, central, and west). This is to illustrate the rich variation in the data. There are systemic differences across provinces. Provinces that tended to have higher female representation in the 1970s were the same provinces with higher levels in 2010. In 1970, British Columbia was the province with the highest percentage of women elected to their Legislative Assembly. With 9.1 percent, British Columbia led the rest of the provinces by a large margin. Manitoba came second with only 1.8 percent of their assembly consisting of women. The rest of the provinces did not fare much better. Three provinces, Newfoundland, Nova Scotia, and Saskatchewan, had zero women elected in their respective assemblies.

Nova Scotia in 1980 was the only province without any women elected to their legislature. In 1985, all the provinces had a varying percentage of women involved in their respective legislature; Québec with 14.8 percent was the province with the highest percentage of women. Manitoba was second with 14.0 percent, and Newfoundland had the lowest incidence among the provinces with only 1.9 percent.

In 1990, Manitoba surpassed Québec and had the highest level of female representation at 19.3 percent. Between 1985 and 1990, Ontario made great gains in their percentage of women elected to the legislature. They increased their percentage in the legislature by 156.4 percent. As such, by 1990 they came in second among the province with 18.5 percent. Québec was the first province to surpass the 30 percent threshold in 2005. 32 percent of their elected officials were women, which was the highest percentage observed in the study. British Columbia with its 22.8 percent was the closest province to Québec's level that census year.

Lastly, the range between provinces in 2010 was still large; 17.0 percentage points separated the top from the bottom. Manitoba had the largest percentage of women representatives with 31.6 percent, and New Brunswick had the lowest with 14.6 percent. Québec and British Columbia were close to Manitoba, with 29.60 and 29.41 percent, respectively. Canada only had three provinces, Alberta, Newfoundland, and New Brunswick, under the 20 percent threshold by 2010.

The upward trend seen through the years is positive as far as equality and equal voice in Canada are concerned. The highest percentage change occurred between the 1970 and 1980 census years; female representation in the provincial legislature increased by 142.6 percent nationwide. Percentage changes were all positive throughout the study but decelerated until the

2005 census reference year, where it bottomed out at 4.0 percent (between 2000 and 2005). The percentage change increased between the 2005 and 2010 census to 19.0 percent, which shows the potential for a renewal in an upward trend in female representation in Canada.

Figure 5 shows the percentage of provinces with different ruling political ideologies. These ideologies are organized in three mutually exclusive groups. They are as follows: left, centre, and right.<sup>12</sup> Right leaning ideologies have controlled the majority of Canadian provinces through the years. Between 1975 and 1985 they dominated the provincial political landscape, ruling eight provinces at their peak. Nevertheless, they saw a considerable decline through 1985 and 1996, when they went from controlling 80 percent of the provinces to 30 percent. Between 1990 and 2001, left-leaning ideologies saw a surge in provincial control, from zero provinces being ruled to four. Centrist parties have fared moderately well throughout the years. Between 1971 and 2001, they saw years (six years) when did not hold any province. Since 2001 though, they have seen a surge in popularity, peaking in 2007 when they held five provinces.

### **3.2. Census of the Population & NHS**

The 1971, 1981-2006, and the 2011 censuses and the National Household Survey are used in this study. The long-form census was held in Canada every ten years until 1971, at which point in time it changed to every five years. There was a census in 1976, but it only consisted of the short-form, and it did not ask about wages and salaries which are needed for this paper. The purpose of the census is to gather critical statistical information such as demographic, social, and economic characteristics, from all Canadians. It is used to create a snapshot of Canada for the given census year. The information gathered is vital to government, as it is used to plan and implement social programs, such as public works, educational reform, and employment programs just to name a few.

It is worth mentioning the controversy of the 2011 census. The NHS, as the 2011 census was called, was controversial due to the fact the long-form survey was no longer mandatory, as it was in the past. This caused unrest in academic circles (Green & Milligan 2010; Sheikh 2015); they argued that important data gathering was jeopardised by this policy change, and that the ramifications would be great and long-term. Nevertheless, I chose to keep the 2011 census in this

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<sup>12</sup> For a complete list of political parties and where they stand on the political spectrum, see Appendix B.

study. In total, eight public use census files, 1971, 1981, 1986, 1991, 1996, 2001, 2006, and 2011, are used.

### **3.3. Sample restrictions**

I restrict my samples to full-year, full-time workers 15 to 64 years of age, excluding those living in the territories and in Prince Edward Island. The age restriction is imposed because in most provinces it is illegal to work if under the age of 15<sup>13</sup>, and 65 is typically the retirement age in Canada.

Individuals who are self-employed are dropped because they often do not earn wages, and when they do, it is self-paid. As such, their self-reported wages and salaries reflect the risk of not truly representing the value the market assigns to their labour. The full-time restriction was imposed because part-time workers are often underemployed and work inconsistent hours, which leads to inconsistent and undervalued wages and salaries (Hirsch 2005), and cannot be compared in a meaningful way with full-time workers. The full-year restriction was also imposed due to limitation of the data (and to exclude seasonal workers). The 1971 census stated number of weeks worked via group ranges rather than specific weeks. As such, it was not possible to create a weekly wage variable for each individual. Rather, yearly income from wages and salaries must be used throughout all the census years. Lastly, earlier wages (i.e. censuses before 2011, as 2011 is the base year) are deflated using the Consumer Price Index. A yearly wage threshold of \$4,500, in 2011 dollars, was created for the sample. Individuals earning less than the threshold are dropped.<sup>14</sup>

Prince Edward Island and all the territories are dropped from sample because in the 1971 census, the population sizes in these areas did not meet the threshold of 250,000 inhabitants. Since the population in these areas are smaller than the threshold, confidentiality laws prevent its

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<sup>13</sup> There are some exceptions, such as informal work.

<sup>14</sup> This is an approach similar to Boudarbat et al. (2010) This is done because it is unlikely that anyone would have wages below this threshold in Canada and truly be working full-time in a given census reference year.

inclusion in the public use file. Finally, any individuals missing observations in key variables are also dropped.<sup>15</sup>

### **3.4. Summary statistics (Census and NHS)**

Table 11 shows the summary statistics of the restricted sample for both females and males for all eight censuses (and NHS) years. The average female real (2011 dollars) annual wage is \$44,494.19, whereas for males it is \$61,417.93; men earn 38.0 percent more on average.<sup>16</sup> The sample is skewed in favour of males; 41.2 percent of the individuals in the sample are female. This is expected because females in the earlier censuses are less likely to be working full-time than their male counterparts. (Reiter 2012) The education profile is as expected. Dropouts and high school graduates are highly represented, 18.7 and 23.4 percent respectively, in the sample because of educational shifts that occurred in the 1970s and 1980s. (Anderson et al. 2014) In the earlier censuses, the sample included a bigger proportion of individuals with low education levels, such as high school diploma and lower, because the premiums on human capital were lower in those times. Due to earlier years, individuals with undergraduate and postgraduate degrees represent a much smaller number than they presently would, 14.6 and 7.7 percent respectively.

Age is categorized in age groups. The biggest age group in the sample, throughout the eight censuses, is the 40-44 years-old group. The bulk of the sample size falls under the middle-age groups while the younger and older age groups are relatively small in their proportions. The age profile seen in the data is expected, small at the tail end of the distribution while the majority in the middle. Lastly, the distribution of the population within the sampled nine provinces is as expected. Ontario and Québec have over 64 percent of the sample size residing within their borders. The other two major provinces, Alberta and British Columbia, have a little bit over 22 percent. The remaining, 14 percent are dispersed among the rest of the provinces in a fairly equal manner.

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<sup>15</sup> 2,702,814 observations are dropped because they were missing the number of weeks worked during the reference year. 16,850 observations are dropped because they are missing wage information.

<sup>16</sup> Average based on the raw data.

#### 4. Econometric Model

The econometric model is the following:

$$\begin{aligned} \ln(\text{real wages})_{i,t} = & \alpha_0 + \beta_1 \text{female}_{i,t} + \beta_2 \text{wmp}_{p,t} + \beta_3 \text{left}_{p,t} + \beta_4 \text{right}_{p,t} + \theta_1 \text{female}_{i,t} * \text{wmp}_{p,t} + \\ & \theta_2 \text{female}_{i,t} * \text{left}_{p,t} + \theta_3 \text{female}_{i,t} * \text{right}_{p,t} + \text{age}_{i,t} \tau + \text{educ}_{i,t} \delta + \phi_p + \eta_t \\ & + \varepsilon_{i,t} \end{aligned} \quad (1)$$

where  $\ln(\text{real wages})_{i,t}$  is the log of real wages and salaries for individual  $i$  in year  $t$  (wages in 2011 dollars).  $\text{female}_{i,t}$  is a binary variable equal to 1 if the individual is female, and 0 otherwise.  $\text{wmp}_{p,t}$  represents the percentage of women elected to the provincial legislature in province  $p$  and year  $t$ . It is presented on a 0 to 100 scale. As such, a one unit change represents a percentage point increase in female representation in a provincial legislature.  $\text{left}_{p,t}$  and  $\text{right}_{p,t}$  are dummy variables accounting for whether the ruling provincial party is left or right leaning, respectively.<sup>17</sup> The first interaction term (female\*wmp) is a key explanatory variable in this paper, and its coefficient,  $\theta_1$ , measures how a one-percentage-point increase in the proportion of women in a provincial legislature will affect the male-female wage differential in that province. The remaining two interaction terms will account for how the ruling party's ideology could affect the gender wage differential. It is possible, for example, that a certain ideology could actually benefit men and have little impact on women. In such a case  $\theta_2$  and  $\theta_3$  would be negative.

I believe that changes in the gender composition in provincial legislatures' affect the gender wage gap in two ways. First, increasing the number of females in provincial politics would bring about legislative changes, such as changes to laws on workplace discrimination. Second, as more women enter the legislature, archaic views on women in politics would start to shift in a positive light.

$\text{age}_{i,t}$  is a vector of nine 5-year age dummies, with individuals aged between 40 and 44 years being the reference group.  $\text{educ}_{i,t}$  is a vector of four educational binary variables reflecting the highest educational attainment successfully obtained. They are the following: no high school

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<sup>17</sup> In general, the NDP is a left-leaning party, the Liberals centre, and the Conservatives right-leaning. British Columbia's Liberals are an exception and are classified as a right-leaning party, as their policies are more reflective of right-wing views. For a complete list of party classifications, see appendix B.

diploma, college and trades degree/certificate, undergraduate degree, and master's degree and higher.<sup>18</sup> High school diploma is the reference group. Finally,  $\phi_p$  and  $\eta_t$  represent province and time-fixed effects, respectively.

Controls are added sequentially when estimating equation (1). In the first specification, I include a female dummy, a women representation dummy and their interaction term, and province and year fixed effects. In the second specification, I add education controls. In the third, I further add age controls. In the final and richest specification, I also include provincial ruling party dummies and their interaction with the female dummy. The latter will account for the political parties' representational effects on the female wages. It should be noted that I will also be estimating equation (1) using the same four specifications approach but focusing on earlier years (1971, 1981) and later years (2001, 2006, 2011) separately.

## 5. Results

### 5.1. All years (1971-2011) pooled together

Table 12 shows the OLS regression results of estimating equation (1) by adding controls sequentially. There is a wage gap that is discerned in my results. Females, on average, earn between 35.9 and 43.7 percent less than their male counterparts. The results found in this study are found to be on the high-side compared to most of the literature (Baker & Drolet 2010). The key variable of interest is the percentage of women elected to the provincial legislature and its interaction with the gender wage differential. The results indicate increasing the number of women in a provincial legislature is negatively correlated with the gender differential. More specifically, increases in the level of female representation at the provincial level decreases male wages while increasing or keeping constant female wages. A 1 percentage point increase in the level of female representation at the provincial level of government decreases male wages by 0.6 percent. This result is consistent throughout the four specifications and as such, indicates that the results are robust. On the other hand, females see an increase in their wages as female representation increases in the provincial legislature. A 1 percentage point increase in the level of female representation in the provincial legislature increases female wages between 0.4 and 0.7

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<sup>18</sup> Some post-secondary but no university or college degrees are included in the college and trade degree category.

percent depending on the specification. Overall, depending on the specification, increasing female representation shows to benefit female wages.

Specifications (3) and (4), the richest and preferred specifications, indicate that both females and males face a decrease in their wages due to increases in female representation. Female wages decrease by 0.2 percent, whereas males face a 0.6 percent decrease. Specifications (1) and (2) continue to show that a 1 percentage point increase will not affect female wages, while males face a negative wage effect. Male wages decrease by 0.6 percent, while female wages increase by 0.1 and zero percent. These results from the four specifications are statistically and economically significant (and as the coefficients remain relatively constant throughout).<sup>19</sup>

The political leaning of the ruling party in the province of residence also has a statistically and economically significant effect on wages and salaries. The dominance of left-leaning parties, all else constant, increase male wages by 1.5 percent, while the dominance of right-leaning parties decrease it by 0.7 percent compared to centralist parties. On the other hand, having a left-leaning party in your province of residence would increase women's wages by 1.3 percent, and a right-leaning would decrease wages by 2.0 percent, *ceteris paribus*. Men are affected less by the ideology of the ruling political party than females. Therefore, left-leaning parties contribute more than centralist parties in generating increases in wages, while right-leaning parties perform worse than both centralist and left-leaning parties.

The results indicate that the impact of education has the profile that is expected. Education premiums are present in this study; higher levels of education are positively correlated with yearly wages and salaries. When compared to a high-school graduate, dropouts on average earn between 11.6 and 15.8 percent less. On the other end of the education spectrum, those with master's degree and higher earn, on average, between 48.3 and 55.2 percent more than someone with only a high school diploma.

## **5.2. Early years of the estimating sample (1971, 1981 only)**

The OLS results of estimating equation (1) by adding controls sequentially and focusing on the earlier years, i.e. 1971 and 1981, are shown in Table 13. It is important to focus on the earlier years due to the major changes that occurred in the labour market. More women entered and stayed in the labour market after marriage and bearing children. (Boothby 1984) Between

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<sup>19</sup> Statistically significant at the 1 percent level.

1971 and 1981, females earned between 43.4 and 37.3 percent less than males, on average. In the early years, increasing female representation in the provincial legislature by 1 percentage point increased male wages between 1 and 0.7 percent, all else constant. On the other hand, female wages would increase between 1.3 and 0.79 percent with a 1 percentage point increase in female representation. These results are statistically significant for both women and men; female representation is significant in all specifications at the 1 percent level, while the female interaction with female representation is significant at the 1 percent level only in specification (4). As such, for the earlier years, increases in female representation benefit both sexes quite equally, and these results are economically significant, thus no impact on the wage gap.

The dominance of right-leaning parties, when compared to centralist parties, *ceteris paribus*, increase male wages by 4.1 percent, while decreasing females' wages by 2.5 percent; these results are statistically significant at the 1 percent level. On the other hand, left-leaning parties decrease male wages by 0.7 percent and increase female wages by 0.05 percent; these results are not statistically significant. Nevertheless, both these results for women and men are economically significant.

The results for the earlier years of the sample continue to follow the expected educational profile. Dropouts continue to earn less than individuals who obtained a high school diploma; they earn 11.7 to 17.0 percent less. Master graduates (or higher) earn between 38.6 and 47.1 percent more than high school graduates. These results are economically and statistically significant in all four specification at the 1 percent level.

### **5.3. Later years of the estimating sample (2001, 2006, and 2011 only)**

Table 14 shows OLS results of estimating equation (1) by adding controls sequentially but focusing on the later years, i.e. 2001, 2006 and 2011. The later years are important as well because by 2000, the labour market outcomes, such equal access to education and positions, for men and women are expected to be very similar (Fortin 2005). During this time-period, females earn on average 32.1 and 39.5 percent less than males. These results are economically and statistically significant. Increasing female representation by 1 percentage point decreases male wages by 0.2 and 0.6 percent. Female wages increase by 0.01 to negative 0.01 percent with a 1 percent increase in female representation. These results for both females and males are

economically significant and statistically significant at the 1 percent level, except for specification (4) where males wage decrease is statistically significant at the 5 percent level.

Residents of provinces with left and right-leaning parties in power fare better than provinces with centrist party in power. On the one hand, males saw a wages premium, *ceteris paribus*, of 10.0 and 8.4, respectively, over centrist parties. On the other hand, female face a wage premium of 8.3 percent if they live in a province with a left-leaning ruling party and 4 percent if the ruling party is right. The results are both economically and statistically significant.

In the later years of the estimating sample, the estimated educational profile turns out to be as is expected. Also, the results indicate that the human capital premium has increased. Holding all else constant, an individual holding a masters' degree or higher earns between 51.9 and 57.7 percent more than someone with only a high school diploma. At the other end of the educational spectrum, a dropout earns 13.8 and 16.3 percent less a high school graduate, on average. The results are both economically and statistically significant.

## **6. Robustness checks**

Table 15 show the OLS results of estimating equation (1) for the richest specification with the addition of two new variables, marital status and knowledge of official languages. These two variables play a role in affecting yearly wages but their inclusion into models is often debated. As such, they are added to test the robustness of my previous estimates. I compare specification 4 from Tables 12 through 14 with the results from the equations with new added controls. My female representation results are robust to the addition of marital status and official languages, i.e. they continue to be economically and statistically significant.

As a further robustness check, I carry out a regression analysis for which every census (and NHS) count equally. This is in contrast to my previous analysis, for which each individual is counted equally by putting more weight on the later censuses.<sup>20</sup> Table 16 shows the richest specifications of all three time restrictions, were individuals counted equally, and when weights are added (where each census is counted equally in the sample). Again, the results show that the effect on my variables of interest are robust to the inclusion of weights. Female representation in the provincial legislature continue having a bigger negative effect on men's wages when

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<sup>20</sup> Each census represents roughly 2 percent of the population.

compared to female wages. The addition of weights does not change the economic and statistical significance of the original findings.

## **7. Conclusion**

The model, with its four specifications, indicate that increases in female representation in the provincial legislature affect wages for both males and females. Increases in female representation by 1 percentage point decrease male wages by 0.6 percent and increase female wages by 0.1 to zero percent, while provincial governments dominated by left-leaning parties increase female wages by 1.3 percent and right-leaning parties lower female wages by 2 percent, compared to centrist parties. Results differ between the three different sampling restrictions: all years pooled together (1971-2001), early years (1971-1981), and later years (2001-2011), - while some results are economically and statistically significant and others are not.

For the estimating sample including all census years, male wages decrease with increases in female representations whereas female wages increase or remain unchanged. These results are similar to the ones found by Boudarbat and Connolly (2013) pertaining to Canadian university professors; male wages decrease from cohort to cohort, while female wages remain constant between cohorts. The study used a different exogenous variable than this study, however the same pattern between cohorts is found in both. Since 1971, female representation in the provincial legislature has increased in Canada. These improvements help decrease male wages as female representation increases and female wages remain constant, as seen in Bourdarbat and Connolly's paper. These results are repeated in the later census years but are not seen in the earlier years. In the earlier years, improvements to female representation benefit male wages more than is the case for females, but the results are found to be not significant.

Human capital premiums are present through all three year restrictions that are applied to the estimating sample. The wage differential caused by education was smaller in the earlier years than it was in the later years. A dropout between 1971 and 1981 earned 11.7 to 17.0 percent less than a high school graduate, whereas a master's or PhD graduate earned 38.6 to 47.1 percent more. The gap between a high school graduate and a master graduate widened to 51.9 to 57.7 percent, while the gap with a dropout remained relatively constant at 3.8 to 16.3 percent less.

In conclusion, this model and specifications can serve as a stepping-stone in explaining how changes in female representation in the provincial legislature help shift and reduce the

gender wage differential. The ability of starting an analysis in the early 1970s is paramount for capturing the major changes in female representation as well as in the Canadian labour market. Although the results derived from using census data are economically and statistically significant, data at an annual frequency instead of census data would be a great improvement, as it has the potential of capturing the effects female representation has on the gender wage differential better (such as hourly wage) and with greater detail (an analysis of industry wage differences using NAICS codes).

## Appendices

In Canada, provincial election results are public knowledge, and as such are available for all the provinces since joining the confederation. However, none of them have gender-specific results (the number and percentage of seats won/held men & women). That being said, some data were available on the number of seats held by the sexes for some provinces and for limited years (2000 and onward). To the best of my knowledge, a data set that contained the gender specific results for all the provinces and for the period in question, which is required for this study, did not exist. As such, it had to be created.

To gather the gender-specific results, I used a Library of Parliament document that contained all the names of women elected to the provincial legislatures (organized by province and year first elected). Then I cross-referenced the names of the elected members in each election, for all the provinces, to the document provided by the Library of Parliament. By using this method, I was able to compile the gender specific data required for the study.

Elections Ontario only had their election results digitally archived and publicly available from 2007 onwards. The election results for the earlier years are only available in hardcopy form at the head office of Elections Ontario in Toronto, Ontario. I would like to thank them for making this information available to me through inter-library loans.

In the case of Alberta, their election governing body was only created in 1976. As such, they only had election results digitally archived and available online from 1976 onwards, i.e. the elections which they oversaw. The earlier election results are only available in hardcopy form at Alberta's Legislative Library. I am very grateful to the library for scanning all the many pages of (earlier) election results and forwarding them to me through email.

Lastly, British Columbia's elections results are digitally archived and publicly available from 1972 onwards. Given that the rest of my data starts in 1971, I also required the results of the 1969 provincial election. These results are only available in hardcopy form at Elections B.C's head office in Victoria, British Columbia. I would like to thank Elections B.C for granting me online access to these earlier years.

## **Appendix B**


The political parties which are classified as left leaning are the following: New Democratic Party (NDP), Parti Québécois (PQ), Cape Breton Labour Party, Québec Solidaire, and Liberal-Labour. Liberals (LIB.) but not the British Columbia Liberals, Labrador Party, Reform Liberal Party, Parti National Populaire, Parti Égalité, and Progressive Democratic Alliance are classified as centrist party. The following parties are classified as right leaning: Progressive Conservatives (PC), British Columbian Liberals (LIB.), Saskatchewan Party (SP), Confederation of Regions Party, Union Nationale, Parti Créditiste, Action Démocratique du Québec, Alberta Party, Representative Party, Reform Party, and Democratic Reform.

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
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**Figure 1: Percentage of women elected to the provincial legislatures, 1970-2012**




Notes: Percentages as of April 1<sup>st</sup>, of every year.

**Figure 2: Percentage of elected females to the eastern provincial legislatures, 1970-2012**




Notes: Percentages as of April 1<sup>st</sup>, of every year.

**Figure 3: Percentage of elected females to the central provincial legislatures, 1970-2012**




Notes: Percentages as of April 1<sup>st</sup>, of every year.

**Figure 4: Percentage of elected females to the western provincial legislature, 1970-2012**



Notes: Percentages as of April 1<sup>st</sup>, of every year

**Figure 5: Percentage of provincial ruling parties by ideology, 1970-2012**



Notes: Percentages as of April 1<sup>st</sup>, of every year. For a list of political party classification see Appendix B.

**Table 1: Elections and by-elections results for the Newfoundland legislature**

| Year | Total | Male | Female | Female % | LIB. | NDP | PC | Other | Party in Power |
|------|-------|------|--------|----------|------|-----|----|-------|----------------|
| 1970 | 42    | 42   | 0      | 0.00%    | 39   | 0   | 3  | 0     | LIB.           |
| 1971 | 44    | 44   | 0      | 0.00%    | 9    | 0   | 33 | 2     | PC             |
| 1972 | 44    | 44   | 0      | 0.00%    | 9    | 0   | 33 | 2     | PC             |
| 1973 | 44    | 44   | 0      | 0.00%    | 8    | 0   | 33 | 3     | PC             |
| 1974 | 44    | 44   | 0      | 0.00%    | 9    | 0   | 32 | 3     | PC             |
| 1975 | 44    | 44   | 0      | 0.00%    | 9    | 0   | 32 | 3     | PC             |
| 1976 | 51    | 50   | 1      | 1.96%    | 16   | 0   | 30 | 5     | PC             |
| 1977 | 51    | 50   | 1      | 1.96%    | 16   | 0   | 30 | 5     | PC             |
| 1978 | 51    | 50   | 1      | 1.96%    | 18   | 0   | 29 | 4     | PC             |
| 1979 | 51    | 50   | 1      | 1.96%    | 18   | 0   | 29 | 4     | PC             |
| 1980 | 52    | 50   | 2      | 3.85%    | 19   | 0   | 33 | 0     | PC             |
| 1981 | 52    | 50   | 2      | 3.85%    | 19   | 0   | 33 | 0     | PC             |
| 1982 | 52    | 50   | 2      | 3.85%    | 19   | 0   | 33 | 0     | PC             |
| 1983 | 52    | 49   | 3      | 5.77%    | 8    | 0   | 44 | 0     | PC             |
| 1984 | 52    | 49   | 3      | 5.77%    | 7    | 0   | 45 | 0     | PC             |
| 1985 | 52    | 49   | 3      | 5.77%    | 7    | 1   | 44 | 0     | PC             |
| 1986 | 52    | 51   | 1      | 1.92%    | 15   | 1   | 36 | 0     | PC             |
| 1987 | 52    | 51   | 1      | 1.92%    | 15   | 2   | 35 | 0     | PC             |
| 1988 | 52    | 51   | 1      | 1.92%    | 16   | 2   | 34 | 0     | PC             |
| 1989 | 52    | 51   | 1      | 1.92%    | 16   | 2   | 34 | 0     | PC             |
| 1990 | 52    | 49   | 3      | 5.77%    | 31   | 0   | 21 | 0     | LIB.           |
| 1991 | 52    | 50   | 2      | 3.85%    | 32   | 1   | 19 | 0     | LIB.           |
| 1992 | 52    | 50   | 2      | 3.85%    | 32   | 1   | 19 | 0     | LIB.           |
| 1993 | 52    | 50   | 2      | 3.85%    | 32   | 1   | 19 | 0     | LIB.           |
| 1994 | 52    | 49   | 3      | 5.77%    | 35   | 1   | 16 | 0     | LIB.           |
| 1995 | 52    | 49   | 3      | 5.77%    | 35   | 1   | 16 | 0     | LIB.           |
| 1996 | 48    | 41   | 7      | 14.58%   | 37   | 1   | 9  | 1     | LIB.           |
| 1997 | 48    | 41   | 7      | 14.58%   | 37   | 1   | 9  | 1     | LIB.           |
| 1998 | 48    | 40   | 8      | 16.67%   | 36   | 1   | 10 | 1     | LIB.           |
| 1999 | 48    | 40   | 8      | 16.67%   | 32   | 2   | 14 | 0     | LIB.           |
| 2000 | 48    | 40   | 8      | 16.67%   | 32   | 2   | 14 | 0     | LIB.           |
| 2001 | 48    | 40   | 8      | 16.67%   | 30   | 2   | 16 | 0     | LIB.           |
| 2002 | 48    | 40   | 8      | 16.67%   | 29   | 2   | 17 | 0     | LIB.           |
| 2003 | 48    | 40   | 8      | 16.67%   | 27   | 2   | 19 | 0     | LIB.           |
| 2004 | 48    | 38   | 10     | 20.83%   | 12   | 2   | 34 | 0     | PC             |
| 2005 | 48    | 38   | 10     | 20.83%   | 12   | 2   | 34 | 0     | PC             |
| 2006 | 48    | 38   | 10     | 20.83%   | 11   | 2   | 35 | 0     | PC             |
| 2007 | 48    | 38   | 10     | 20.83%   | 12   | 1   | 35 | 0     | PC             |
| 2008 | 48    | 38   | 10     | 20.83%   | 3    | 1   | 44 | 0     | PC             |
| 2009 | 48    | 38   | 10     | 20.83%   | 3    | 1   | 44 | 0     | PC             |
| 2010 | 48    | 39   | 9      | 18.75%   | 4    | 1   | 43 | 0     | PC             |
| 2011 | 48    | 40   | 8      | 16.67%   | 4    | 1   | 43 | 0     | PC             |

Notes: Results as of April 1<sup>st</sup>, of every year. For a complete list of party abbreviations see Appendix B. Labrador Party, Reform Liberal Party, Newfoundland and Labrador First Party, and Independents are categorized in the Other category.

**Table 2: Election and by-elections results for the Prince Edward Island legislature**

| Year | Total | Male | Female | Female % | LIB. | NDP | PC | Other | Party in Power |
|------|-------|------|--------|----------|------|-----|----|-------|----------------|
| 1970 | 32    | 32   | 0      | 0.00%    | 17   | 0   | 15 | 0     | LIB.           |
| 1971 | 32    | 31   | 1      | 3.13%    | 27   | 0   | 5  | 0     | LIB.           |
| 1972 | 32    | 31   | 1      | 3.13%    | 27   | 0   | 5  | 0     | LIB.           |
| 1973 | 32    | 31   | 1      | 3.13%    | 25   | 0   | 7  | 0     | LIB.           |
| 1974 | 32    | 31   | 1      | 3.13%    | 25   | 0   | 7  | 0     | LIB.           |
| 1975 | 32    | 30   | 2      | 6.25%    | 25   | 0   | 7  | 0     | LIB.           |
| 1976 | 32    | 30   | 2      | 6.25%    | 25   | 0   | 7  | 0     | LIB.           |
| 1977 | 32    | 30   | 2      | 6.25%    | 24   | 0   | 8  | 0     | LIB.           |
| 1978 | 32    | 30   | 2      | 6.25%    | 24   | 0   | 8  | 0     | LIB.           |
| 1979 | 32    | 31   | 1      | 3.13%    | 17   | 0   | 15 | 0     | LIB.           |
| 1980 | 32    | 30   | 2      | 6.25%    | 11   | 0   | 21 | 0     | PC             |
| 1981 | 32    | 30   | 2      | 6.25%    | 11   | 0   | 21 | 0     | PC             |
| 1982 | 32    | 30   | 2      | 6.25%    | 10   | 0   | 22 | 0     | PC             |
| 1983 | 32    | 30   | 2      | 6.25%    | 11   | 0   | 21 | 0     | PC             |
| 1984 | 32    | 30   | 2      | 6.25%    | 11   | 0   | 21 | 0     | PC             |
| 1985 | 32    | 30   | 2      | 6.25%    | 12   | 0   | 20 | 0     | PC             |
| 1986 | 32    | 30   | 2      | 6.25%    | 14   | 0   | 18 | 0     | PC             |
| 1987 | 32    | 29   | 3      | 9.38%    | 21   | 0   | 11 | 0     | LIB.           |
| 1988 | 32    | 28   | 4      | 12.50%   | 22   | 0   | 10 | 0     | LIB.           |
| 1989 | 32    | 27   | 5      | 15.63%   | 22   | 0   | 10 | 0     | LIB.           |
| 1990 | 32    | 25   | 7      | 21.88%   | 30   | 0   | 2  | 0     | LIB.           |
| 1991 | 32    | 25   | 7      | 21.88%   | 30   | 0   | 2  | 0     | LIB.           |
| 1992 | 32    | 25   | 7      | 21.88%   | 30   | 0   | 2  | 0     | LIB.           |
| 1993 | 32    | 24   | 8      | 25.00%   | 31   | 0   | 1  | 0     | LIB.           |
| 1994 | 32    | 24   | 8      | 25.00%   | 31   | 0   | 1  | 0     | LIB.           |
| 1995 | 32    | 24   | 8      | 25.00%   | 31   | 0   | 1  | 0     | LIB.           |
| 1996 | 32    | 24   | 8      | 25.00%   | 31   | 0   | 1  | 0     | LIB.           |
| 1997 | 27    | 23   | 4      | 14.81%   | 8    | 1   | 18 | 0     | PC             |
| 1998 | 27    | 23   | 4      | 14.81%   | 8    | 1   | 18 | 0     | PC             |
| 1999 | 27    | 23   | 4      | 14.81%   | 8    | 1   | 18 | 0     | PC             |
| 2000 | 27    | 23   | 4      | 14.81%   | 8    | 1   | 18 | 0     | PC             |
| 2001 | 27    | 21   | 6      | 22.22%   | 1    | 0   | 26 | 0     | PC             |
| 2002 | 27    | 21   | 6      | 22.22%   | 1    | 0   | 26 | 0     | PC             |
| 2003 | 27    | 21   | 6      | 22.22%   | 1    | 0   | 26 | 0     | PC             |
| 2004 | 27    | 21   | 6      | 22.22%   | 4    | 0   | 23 | 0     | PC             |
| 2005 | 27    | 21   | 6      | 22.22%   | 4    | 0   | 23 | 0     | PC             |
| 2006 | 27    | 20   | 7      | 25.93%   | 4    | 0   | 23 | 0     | PC             |
| 2007 | 27    | 20   | 7      | 25.93%   | 4    | 0   | 23 | 0     | PC             |
| 2008 | 27    | 20   | 7      | 25.93%   | 24   | 0   | 3  | 0     | LIB.           |
| 2009 | 27    | 20   | 7      | 25.93%   | 24   | 0   | 3  | 0     | LIB.           |
| 2010 | 27    | 20   | 7      | 25.93%   | 24   | 0   | 3  | 0     | LIB.           |
| 2011 | 27    | 20   | 7      | 25.93%   | 24   | 0   | 3  | 0     | LIB.           |

Notes: Results as of April 1<sup>st</sup>, of every year. For a complete list of party abbreviations see Appendix B.

**Table 3: Elections and by-elections results for the Nova Scotia legislature**

| Year | Total | Male | Female | Female % | LIB. | NDP | PC | Other | Party in Power |
|------|-------|------|--------|----------|------|-----|----|-------|----------------|
| 1970 | 46    | 46   | 0      | 0.00%    | 6    | 0   | 40 | 0     | PC             |
| 1971 | 46    | 46   | 0      | 0.00%    | 24   | 2   | 20 | 0     | LIB.           |
| 1972 | 46    | 46   | 0      | 0.00%    | 24   | 2   | 20 | 0     | LIB.           |
| 1973 | 46    | 46   | 0      | 0.00%    | 24   | 2   | 20 | 0     | LIB.           |
| 1974 | 46    | 46   | 0      | 0.00%    | 25   | 2   | 19 | 0     | LIB.           |
| 1975 | 46    | 45   | 1      | 2.17%    | 31   | 3   | 12 | 0     | LIB.           |
| 1976 | 46    | 45   | 1      | 2.17%    | 31   | 3   | 12 | 0     | LIB.           |
| 1977 | 46    | 45   | 1      | 2.17%    | 31   | 3   | 12 | 0     | LIB.           |
| 1978 | 46    | 45   | 1      | 2.17%    | 31   | 3   | 12 | 0     | LIB.           |
| 1979 | 52    | 52   | 0      | 0.00%    | 31   | 3   | 12 | 6     | LIB.           |
| 1980 | 52    | 52   | 0      | 0.00%    | 29   | 2   | 15 | 6     | LIB.           |
| 1981 | 52    | 52   | 0      | 0.00%    | 29   | 2   | 15 | 6     | LIB.           |
| 1982 | 52    | 51   | 1      | 1.92%    | 13   | 1   | 37 | 1     | PC             |
| 1983 | 52    | 51   | 1      | 1.92%    | 12   | 1   | 38 | 1     | PC             |
| 1984 | 52    | 51   | 1      | 1.92%    | 12   | 1   | 38 | 1     | PC             |
| 1985 | 52    | 48   | 4      | 7.69%    | 6    | 3   | 42 | 1     | PC             |
| 1986 | 52    | 48   | 4      | 7.69%    | 6    | 3   | 42 | 1     | PC             |
| 1987 | 52    | 48   | 4      | 7.69%    | 6    | 3   | 42 | 1     | PC             |
| 1988 | 52    | 48   | 4      | 7.69%    | 6    | 3   | 41 | 2     | PC             |
| 1989 | 52    | 49   | 3      | 5.77%    | 21   | 2   | 28 | 1     | PC             |
| 1990 | 52    | 49   | 3      | 5.77%    | 21   | 2   | 28 | 1     | PC             |
| 1991 | 52    | 49   | 3      | 5.77%    | 21   | 2   | 28 | 1     | PC             |
| 1992 | 52    | 49   | 3      | 5.77%    | 21   | 3   | 27 | 1     | PC             |
| 1993 | 52    | 49   | 3      | 5.77%    | 21   | 3   | 27 | 1     | PC             |
| 1994 | 52    | 47   | 5      | 9.62%    | 41   | 3   | 8  | 0     | LIB.           |
| 1995 | 52    | 47   | 5      | 9.62%    | 41   | 3   | 8  | 0     | LIB.           |
| 1996 | 52    | 47   | 5      | 9.62%    | 41   | 3   | 8  | 0     | LIB.           |
| 1997 | 52    | 47   | 5      | 9.62%    | 41   | 3   | 8  | 0     | LIB.           |
| 1998 | 51    | 45   | 6      | 11.76%   | 19   | 19  | 13 | 0     | LIB.           |
| 1999 | 51    | 45   | 6      | 11.76%   | 19   | 19  | 13 | 0     | LIB.           |
| 2000 | 52    | 47   | 5      | 9.62%    | 11   | 11  | 30 | 0     | PC             |
| 2001 | 52    | 48   | 4      | 7.69%    | 10   | 11  | 31 | 0     | PC             |
| 2002 | 52    | 48   | 4      | 7.69%    | 10   | 11  | 31 | 0     | PC             |
| 2003 | 52    | 48   | 4      | 7.69%    | 10   | 11  | 31 | 0     | PC             |
| 2004 | 52    | 46   | 6      | 11.54%   | 12   | 15  | 25 | 0     | PC             |
| 2005 | 52    | 46   | 6      | 11.54%   | 12   | 15  | 25 | 0     | PC             |
| 2006 | 52    | 45   | 7      | 13.46%   | 12   | 15  | 25 | 0     | PC             |
| 2007 | 52    | 42   | 10     | 19.23%   | 9    | 20  | 23 | 0     | PC             |
| 2008 | 52    | 41   | 11     | 21.15%   | 9    | 20  | 23 | 0     | PC             |
| 2009 | 52    | 41   | 11     | 21.15%   | 9    | 20  | 23 | 0     | PC             |
| 2010 | 52    | 39   | 13     | 25.00%   | 11   | 31  | 10 | 0     | NDP            |
| 2011 | 52    | 39   | 13     | 25.00%   | 11   | 31  | 9  | 1     | NDP            |

Notes: Results as of April 1<sup>st</sup>, of every year. For a complete list of party abbreviations see Appendix B. Cape Breton Labour Party and Independents are categorized in the Other category.

**Table 4: Elections and by-elections results for the New Brunswick legislature**

| Year | Total | Male | Female | Female % | LIB. | NDP | PC | Other | Party in Power |
|------|-------|------|--------|----------|------|-----|----|-------|----------------|
| 1970 | 58    | 57   | 1      | 1.72%    | 32   | 0   | 26 | 0     | LIB.           |
| 1971 | 58    | 57   | 1      | 1.72%    | 26   | 0   | 32 | 0     | PC             |
| 1972 | 58    | 57   | 1      | 1.72%    | 26   | 0   | 32 | 0     | PC             |
| 1973 | 58    | 57   | 1      | 1.72%    | 26   | 0   | 32 | 0     | PC             |
| 1974 | 58    | 57   | 1      | 1.72%    | 26   | 0   | 32 | 0     | PC             |
| 1975 | 58    | 56   | 2      | 3.45%    | 26   | 0   | 32 | 0     | PC             |
| 1976 | 58    | 56   | 2      | 3.45%    | 26   | 0   | 32 | 0     | PC             |
| 1977 | 58    | 56   | 2      | 3.45%    | 26   | 0   | 32 | 0     | PC             |
| 1978 | 58    | 56   | 2      | 3.45%    | 26   | 0   | 32 | 0     | PC             |
| 1979 | 58    | 54   | 4      | 6.90%    | 25   | 0   | 33 | 0     | PC             |
| 1980 | 58    | 54   | 4      | 6.90%    | 25   | 0   | 33 | 0     | PC             |
| 1981 | 58    | 54   | 4      | 6.90%    | 25   | 0   | 33 | 0     | PC             |
| 1982 | 58    | 54   | 4      | 6.90%    | 25   | 0   | 33 | 0     | PC             |
| 1983 | 58    | 54   | 4      | 6.90%    | 28   | 0   | 30 | 0     | PC             |
| 1984 | 58    | 54   | 4      | 6.90%    | 28   | 0   | 30 | 0     | PC             |
| 1985 | 58    | 54   | 4      | 6.90%    | 27   | 1   | 30 | 0     | PC             |
| 1986 | 58    | 55   | 3      | 5.17%    | 29   | 1   | 28 | 0     | LIB.           |
| 1987 | 58    | 55   | 3      | 5.17%    | 29   | 1   | 28 | 0     | LIB.           |
| 1988 | 58    | 51   | 7      | 12.07%   | 58   | 0   | 0  | 0     | LIB.           |
| 1989 | 58    | 51   | 7      | 12.07%   | 58   | 0   | 0  | 0     | LIB.           |
| 1990 | 58    | 51   | 7      | 12.07%   | 58   | 0   | 0  | 0     | LIB.           |
| 1991 | 58    | 51   | 7      | 12.07%   | 58   | 0   | 0  | 0     | LIB.           |
| 1992 | 58    | 48   | 10     | 17.24%   | 46   | 1   | 3  | 8     | LIB.           |
| 1993 | 58    | 48   | 10     | 17.24%   | 46   | 1   | 3  | 8     | LIB.           |
| 1994 | 58    | 49   | 9      | 15.52%   | 44   | 1   | 5  | 8     | LIB.           |
| 1995 | 58    | 49   | 9      | 15.52%   | 43   | 1   | 6  | 8     | LIB.           |
| 1996 | 55    | 46   | 9      | 16.36%   | 48   | 1   | 6  | 0     | LIB.           |
| 1997 | 55    | 46   | 9      | 16.36%   | 48   | 1   | 6  | 0     | LIB.           |
| 1998 | 55    | 47   | 8      | 14.55%   | 47   | 1   | 7  | 0     | LIB.           |
| 1999 | 55    | 47   | 8      | 14.55%   | 45   | 1   | 9  | 0     | LIB.           |
| 2000 | 55    | 47   | 8      | 14.55%   | 10   | 1   | 44 | 0     | PC             |
| 2001 | 55    | 47   | 8      | 14.55%   | 8    | 1   | 46 | 0     | PC             |
| 2002 | 55    | 47   | 8      | 14.55%   | 7    | 1   | 47 | 0     | PC             |
| 2003 | 55    | 47   | 8      | 14.55%   | 7    | 1   | 47 | 0     | PC             |
| 2004 | 55    | 48   | 7      | 12.73%   | 26   | 1   | 28 | 0     | PC             |
| 2005 | 55    | 48   | 7      | 12.73%   | 26   | 1   | 28 | 0     | PC             |
| 2006 | 55    | 48   | 7      | 12.73%   | 27   | 0   | 28 | 0     | PC             |
| 2007 | 55    | 49   | 6      | 10.91%   | 30   | 0   | 25 | 0     | LIB.           |
| 2008 | 55    | 49   | 6      | 10.91%   | 30   | 0   | 25 | 0     | LIB.           |
| 2009 | 55    | 49   | 6      | 10.91%   | 31   | 0   | 24 | 0     | LIB.           |
| 2010 | 55    | 49   | 6      | 10.91%   | 31   | 0   | 24 | 0     | LIB.           |
| 2011 | 55    | 47   | 8      | 14.55%   | 13   | 0   | 42 | 0     | PC             |

Notes: Results as of April 1<sup>st</sup>, of every year. For a complete list of party abbreviations see Appendix B. Confederation of Regions Party is categorized in the Other category.

**Table 5: Elections and by-elections results for the Quebec legislature**

| Year | Total | Male | Female | Female % | LIB. | NDP | PC | PQ | UN | Other | Party in Power |
|------|-------|------|--------|----------|------|-----|----|----|----|-------|----------------|
| 1970 | 108   | 107  | 1      | 0.93%    | 50   | 0   | 0  | 0  | 56 | 2     | UN             |
| 1971 | 108   | 107  | 1      | 0.93%    | 72   | 0   | 0  | 7  | 17 | 12    | LIB.           |
| 1972 | 108   | 107  | 1      | 0.93%    | 72   | 0   | 0  | 7  | 17 | 12    | LIB.           |
| 1973 | 108   | 107  | 1      | 0.93%    | 72   | 0   | 0  | 7  | 17 | 12    | LIB.           |
| 1974 | 110   | 109  | 1      | 0.91%    | 102  | 0   | 0  | 6  | 0  | 2     | LIB.           |
| 1975 | 110   | 109  | 1      | 0.91%    | 101  | 0   | 0  | 6  | 1  | 2     | LIB.           |
| 1976 | 110   | 109  | 1      | 0.91%    | 101  | 0   | 0  | 6  | 1  | 2     | LIB.           |
| 1977 | 110   | 106  | 4      | 3.64%    | 26   | 0   | 0  | 71 | 11 | 2     | PQ             |
| 1978 | 110   | 106  | 4      | 3.64%    | 26   | 0   | 0  | 71 | 11 | 2     | PQ             |
| 1979 | 110   | 106  | 4      | 3.64%    | 26   | 0   | 0  | 71 | 11 | 2     | PQ             |
| 1980 | 110   | 105  | 5      | 4.55%    | 29   | 0   | 0  | 69 | 11 | 1     | PQ             |
| 1981 | 110   | 105  | 5      | 4.55%    | 32   | 0   | 0  | 69 | 8  | 1     | PQ             |
| 1982 | 122   | 114  | 8      | 6.56%    | 42   | 0   | 0  | 80 | 0  | 0     | PQ             |
| 1983 | 122   | 114  | 8      | 6.56%    | 43   | 0   | 0  | 79 | 0  | 0     | PQ             |
| 1984 | 122   | 113  | 9      | 7.38%    | 47   | 0   | 0  | 75 | 0  | 0     | PQ             |
| 1985 | 122   | 113  | 9      | 7.38%    | 49   | 0   | 0  | 73 | 0  | 0     | PQ             |
| 1986 | 122   | 104  | 18     | 14.75%   | 99   | 0   | 0  | 23 | 0  | 0     | LIB.           |
| 1987 | 122   | 104  | 18     | 14.75%   | 99   | 0   | 0  | 23 | 0  | 0     | LIB.           |
| 1988 | 122   | 104  | 18     | 14.75%   | 99   | 0   | 0  | 23 | 0  | 0     | LIB.           |
| 1989 | 122   | 104  | 18     | 14.75%   | 101  | 0   | 0  | 21 | 0  | 0     | LIB.           |
| 1990 | 125   | 103  | 22     | 17.60%   | 92   | 0   | 0  | 29 | 0  | 4     | LIB.           |
| 1991 | 125   | 103  | 22     | 17.60%   | 92   | 0   | 0  | 29 | 0  | 4     | LIB.           |
| 1992 | 125   | 103  | 22     | 17.60%   | 92   | 0   | 0  | 29 | 0  | 4     | LIB.           |
| 1993 | 125   | 103  | 22     | 17.60%   | 92   | 0   | 0  | 29 | 0  | 4     | LIB.           |
| 1994 | 125   | 103  | 22     | 17.60%   | 92   | 0   | 0  | 29 | 0  | 4     | LIB.           |
| 1995 | 125   | 103  | 22     | 17.60%   | 47   | 0   | 0  | 77 | 0  | 1     | PQ             |
| 1996 | 125   | 102  | 23     | 18.40%   | 47   | 0   | 0  | 77 | 0  | 1     | PQ             |
| 1997 | 125   | 101  | 24     | 19.20%   | 47   | 0   | 0  | 77 | 0  | 1     | PQ             |
| 1998 | 125   | 99   | 26     | 20.80%   | 47   | 0   | 0  | 77 | 0  | 1     | PQ             |
| 1999 | 125   | 96   | 29     | 23.20%   | 48   | 0   | 0  | 76 | 0  | 1     | PQ             |
| 2000 | 125   | 96   | 29     | 23.20%   | 48   | 0   | 0  | 76 | 0  | 1     | PQ             |
| 2001 | 125   | 96   | 29     | 23.20%   | 48   | 0   | 0  | 76 | 0  | 1     | PQ             |
| 2002 | 125   | 94   | 31     | 24.80%   | 51   | 0   | 0  | 73 | 0  | 1     | PQ             |
| 2003 | 125   | 90   | 35     | 28.00%   | 51   | 0   | 0  | 69 | 0  | 5     | PQ             |
| 2004 | 125   | 87   | 38     | 30.40%   | 76   | 0   | 0  | 45 | 0  | 4     | LIB.           |
| 2005 | 125   | 85   | 40     | 32.00%   | 74   | 0   | 0  | 46 | 0  | 5     | LIB.           |
| 2006 | 125   | 85   | 40     | 32.00%   | 74   | 0   | 0  | 46 | 0  | 5     | LIB.           |
| 2007 | 125   | 93   | 32     | 25.60%   | 48   | 0   | 0  | 41 | 0  | 36    | LIB.           |
| 2008 | 125   | 92   | 33     | 26.40%   | 48   | 0   | 0  | 41 | 0  | 36    | LIB.           |
| 2009 | 125   | 88   | 37     | 29.60%   | 66   | 0   | 0  | 51 | 0  | 8     | LIB.           |
| 2010 | 125   | 89   | 36     | 28.80%   | 67   | 0   | 0  | 51 | 0  | 7     | LIB.           |
| 2011 | 125   | 88   | 37     | 29.60%   | 66   | 0   | 0  | 52 | 0  | 7     | LIB.           |

Notes: Results as of April 1<sup>st</sup>, of every year. For a complete list of party abbreviations see Appendix B. Parti créditiste, Parti National Populaire, Parti Égalité, Action démocratique du Québec, and Québec Solidaire are categorized in the Other category.

**Table 6: Election and by-election results for the Ontario legislature**

| Year | Total | Male | Female | Female % | LIB. | NDP | PC | Other | Party in Power |
|------|-------|------|--------|----------|------|-----|----|-------|----------------|
| 1970 | 117   | 115  | 2      | 1.71%    | 27   | 20  | 69 | 1     | PC             |
| 1971 | 117   | 115  | 2      | 1.71%    | 20   | 19  | 78 | 0     | PC             |
| 1972 | 117   | 115  | 2      | 1.71%    | 20   | 19  | 78 | 0     | PC             |
| 1973 | 117   | 115  | 2      | 1.71%    | 20   | 19  | 78 | 0     | PC             |
| 1974 | 117   | 115  | 2      | 1.71%    | 20   | 19  | 78 | 0     | PC             |
| 1975 | 117   | 115  | 2      | 1.71%    | 20   | 19  | 78 | 0     | PC             |
| 1976 | 125   | 118  | 7      | 5.60%    | 35   | 38  | 51 | 1     | PC             |
| 1977 | 125   | 118  | 7      | 5.60%    | 35   | 38  | 51 | 1     | PC             |
| 1978 | 125   | 119  | 6      | 4.80%    | 34   | 33  | 58 | 0     | PC             |
| 1979 | 125   | 119  | 6      | 4.80%    | 34   | 33  | 58 | 0     | PC             |
| 1980 | 125   | 119  | 6      | 4.80%    | 34   | 33  | 58 | 0     | PC             |
| 1981 | 125   | 119  | 6      | 4.80%    | 34   | 21  | 70 | 0     | PC             |
| 1982 | 125   | 119  | 6      | 4.80%    | 34   | 21  | 70 | 0     | PC             |
| 1983 | 125   | 119  | 6      | 4.80%    | 33   | 22  | 70 | 0     | PC             |
| 1984 | 125   | 119  | 6      | 4.80%    | 33   | 22  | 70 | 0     | PC             |
| 1985 | 125   | 118  | 7      | 5.60%    | 31   | 23  | 71 | 0     | PC             |
| 1986 | 125   | 116  | 9      | 7.20%    | 48   | 25  | 52 | 0     | PC             |
| 1987 | 125   | 116  | 9      | 7.20%    | 48   | 25  | 52 | 0     | PC             |
| 1988 | 125   | 116  | 9      | 7.20%    | 47   | 25  | 53 | 0     | PC             |
| 1989 | 125   | 116  | 9      | 7.20%    | 47   | 25  | 53 | 0     | PC             |
| 1990 | 125   | 116  | 9      | 7.20%    | 47   | 25  | 53 | 0     | PC             |
| 1991 | 130   | 106  | 24     | 18.46%   | 36   | 74  | 20 | 0     | NDP            |
| 1992 | 130   | 106  | 24     | 18.46%   | 36   | 74  | 20 | 0     | NDP            |
| 1993 | 130   | 107  | 23     | 17.69%   | 36   | 73  | 21 | 0     | NDP            |
| 1994 | 130   | 107  | 23     | 17.69%   | 36   | 72  | 22 | 0     | NDP            |
| 1995 | 130   | 107  | 23     | 17.69%   | 36   | 72  | 22 | 0     | NDP            |
| 1996 | 130   | 112  | 18     | 13.85%   | 30   | 17  | 82 | 1     | PC             |
| 1997 | 130   | 112  | 18     | 13.85%   | 30   | 17  | 82 | 1     | PC             |
| 1998 | 130   | 112  | 18     | 13.85%   | 30   | 17  | 82 | 1     | PC             |
| 1999 | 130   | 112  | 18     | 13.85%   | 30   | 17  | 82 | 1     | PC             |
| 2000 | 103   | 85   | 18     | 17.48%   | 35   | 9   | 59 | 0     | PC             |
| 2001 | 103   | 85   | 18     | 17.48%   | 35   | 9   | 59 | 0     | PC             |
| 2002 | 103   | 85   | 18     | 17.48%   | 35   | 9   | 59 | 0     | PC             |
| 2003 | 103   | 85   | 18     | 17.48%   | 35   | 9   | 59 | 0     | PC             |
| 2004 | 103   | 81   | 22     | 21.36%   | 72   | 7   | 24 | 0     | LIB.           |
| 2005 | 103   | 81   | 22     | 21.36%   | 72   | 7   | 24 | 0     | LIB.           |
| 2006 | 103   | 80   | 23     | 22.33%   | 72   | 7   | 24 | 0     | LIB.           |
| 2007 | 103   | 78   | 25     | 24.27%   | 72   | 7   | 24 | 0     | LIB.           |
| 2008 | 107   | 78   | 29     | 27.10%   | 71   | 10  | 26 | 0     | LIB.           |
| 2009 | 107   | 79   | 28     | 26.17%   | 72   | 10  | 25 | 0     | LIB.           |
| 2010 | 107   | 79   | 28     | 26.17%   | 72   | 10  | 25 | 0     | LIB.           |
| 2011 | 107   | 79   | 28     | 26.17%   | 72   | 10  | 25 | 0     | LIB.           |

Notes: Results as of April 1<sup>st</sup>, of every year. For a complete list of party abbreviations see Appendix B. Liberal-Labour and Independents are categorized in the Other category.

**Table 7: Election and by-election results for the Manitoba legislature**

| Year | Total | Male | Female | Female % | LIB. | NDP | PC | Other | Party in Power |
|------|-------|------|--------|----------|------|-----|----|-------|----------------|
| 1970 | 57    | 56   | 1      | 1.75%    | 5    | 28  | 22 | 2     | NDP            |
| 1971 | 57    | 56   | 1      | 1.75%    | 5    | 28  | 22 | 2     | NDP            |
| 1972 | 57    | 56   | 1      | 1.75%    | 5    | 28  | 22 | 2     | NDP            |
| 1973 | 57    | 56   | 1      | 1.75%    | 5    | 28  | 22 | 2     | NDP            |
| 1974 | 57    | 57   | 0      | 0.00%    | 5    | 31  | 21 | 0     | NDP            |
| 1975 | 57    | 57   | 0      | 0.00%    | 5    | 31  | 21 | 0     | NDP            |
| 1976 | 57    | 57   | 0      | 0.00%    | 5    | 31  | 21 | 0     | NDP            |
| 1977 | 57    | 57   | 0      | 0.00%    | 5    | 31  | 21 | 0     | NDP            |
| 1978 | 57    | 56   | 1      | 1.75%    | 1    | 23  | 33 | 0     | PC             |
| 1979 | 57    | 55   | 2      | 3.51%    | 1    | 23  | 33 | 0     | PC             |
| 1980 | 57    | 55   | 2      | 3.51%    | 1    | 23  | 33 | 0     | PC             |
| 1981 | 57    | 55   | 2      | 3.51%    | 1    | 23  | 33 | 0     | PC             |
| 1982 | 57    | 51   | 6      | 10.53%   | 0    | 34  | 23 | 0     | NDP            |
| 1983 | 57    | 51   | 6      | 10.53%   | 0    | 34  | 23 | 0     | NDP            |
| 1984 | 57    | 51   | 6      | 10.53%   | 0    | 34  | 23 | 0     | NDP            |
| 1985 | 57    | 51   | 6      | 10.53%   | 0    | 34  | 23 | 0     | NDP            |
| 1986 | 57    | 49   | 8      | 14.04%   | 1    | 30  | 26 | 0     | NDP            |
| 1987 | 57    | 49   | 8      | 14.04%   | 1    | 30  | 26 | 0     | NDP            |
| 1988 | 57    | 49   | 8      | 14.04%   | 1    | 30  | 26 | 0     | NDP            |
| 1989 | 57    | 48   | 9      | 15.79%   | 20   | 12  | 25 | 0     | LIB.           |
| 1990 | 57    | 47   | 10     | 17.54%   | 20   | 12  | 25 | 0     | LIB.           |
| 1991 | 57    | 46   | 11     | 19.30%   | 7    | 20  | 30 | 0     | PC             |
| 1992 | 57    | 46   | 11     | 19.30%   | 7    | 20  | 30 | 0     | PC             |
| 1993 | 57    | 46   | 11     | 19.30%   | 7    | 20  | 30 | 0     | PC             |
| 1994 | 57    | 47   | 10     | 17.54%   | 7    | 20  | 30 | 0     | PC             |
| 1995 | 57    | 48   | 9      | 15.79%   | 7    | 20  | 30 | 0     | PC             |
| 1996 | 57    | 46   | 11     | 19.30%   | 3    | 23  | 31 | 0     | PC             |
| 1997 | 57    | 46   | 11     | 19.30%   | 3    | 23  | 31 | 0     | PC             |
| 1998 | 57    | 46   | 11     | 19.30%   | 3    | 23  | 31 | 0     | PC             |
| 1999 | 57    | 45   | 12     | 21.05%   | 3    | 23  | 31 | 0     | PC             |
| 2000 | 57    | 44   | 13     | 22.81%   | 1    | 32  | 24 | 0     | NDP            |
| 2001 | 57    | 43   | 14     | 24.56%   | 1    | 32  | 24 | 0     | NDP            |
| 2002 | 57    | 43   | 14     | 24.56%   | 1    | 32  | 24 | 0     | NDP            |
| 2003 | 57    | 43   | 14     | 24.56%   | 1    | 32  | 24 | 0     | NDP            |
| 2004 | 57    | 44   | 13     | 22.81%   | 2    | 35  | 20 | 0     | NDP            |
| 2005 | 57    | 44   | 13     | 22.81%   | 2    | 35  | 20 | 0     | NDP            |
| 2006 | 57    | 44   | 13     | 22.81%   | 2    | 35  | 20 | 0     | NDP            |
| 2007 | 57    | 44   | 13     | 22.81%   | 2    | 35  | 20 | 0     | NDP            |
| 2008 | 57    | 39   | 18     | 31.58%   | 2    | 36  | 19 | 0     | NDP            |
| 2009 | 57    | 39   | 18     | 31.58%   | 2    | 36  | 19 | 0     | NDP            |
| 2010 | 57    | 39   | 18     | 31.58%   | 2    | 36  | 19 | 0     | NDP            |
| 2011 | 57    | 39   | 18     | 31.58%   | 2    | 36  | 19 | 0     | NDP            |

Notes: Results as of April 1<sup>st</sup>, of every year. For a complete list of party abbreviations see Appendix B. Social Credit and Independents are categorized in the Other category.

**Table 8: Election and by-election results for the Saskatchewan legislature**

| Year | Total | Male | Female | Female % | LIB. | NDP | PC | SP | Other | Party in Power |
|------|-------|------|--------|----------|------|-----|----|----|-------|----------------|
| 1970 | 59    | 59   | 0      | 0.00%    | 35   | 24  | 0  | 0  | 0     | LIB.           |
| 1971 | 60    | 60   | 0      | 0.00%    | 15   | 45  | 0  | 0  | 0     | NDP            |
| 1972 | 60    | 60   | 0      | 0.00%    | 15   | 45  | 0  | 0  | 0     | NDP            |
| 1973 | 60    | 60   | 0      | 0.00%    | 15   | 45  | 0  | 0  | 0     | NDP            |
| 1974 | 60    | 60   | 0      | 0.00%    | 15   | 45  | 0  | 0  | 0     | NDP            |
| 1975 | 60    | 60   | 0      | 0.00%    | 15   | 45  | 0  | 0  | 0     | NDP            |
| 1976 | 61    | 59   | 2      | 3.28%    | 15   | 39  | 7  | 0  | 0     | NDP            |
| 1977 | 61    | 59   | 2      | 3.28%    | 15   | 39  | 7  | 0  | 0     | NDP            |
| 1978 | 61    | 60   | 1      | 1.64%    | 15   | 39  | 7  | 0  | 0     | NDP            |
| 1979 | 61    | 60   | 1      | 1.64%    | 0    | 44  | 17 | 0  | 0     | NDP            |
| 1980 | 61    | 60   | 1      | 1.64%    | 0    | 44  | 17 | 0  | 0     | NDP            |
| 1981 | 61    | 60   | 1      | 1.64%    | 0    | 44  | 17 | 0  | 0     | NDP            |
| 1982 | 61    | 60   | 1      | 1.64%    | 0    | 44  | 17 | 0  | 0     | NDP            |
| 1983 | 64    | 59   | 5      | 7.81%    | 0    | 9   | 55 | 0  | 0     | PC             |
| 1984 | 64    | 59   | 5      | 7.81%    | 0    | 9   | 55 | 0  | 0     | PC             |
| 1985 | 64    | 59   | 5      | 7.81%    | 0    | 9   | 55 | 0  | 0     | PC             |
| 1986 | 64    | 59   | 5      | 7.81%    | 0    | 9   | 55 | 0  | 0     | PC             |
| 1987 | 64    | 59   | 5      | 7.81%    | 1    | 25  | 38 | 0  | 0     | PC             |
| 1988 | 64    | 59   | 5      | 7.81%    | 1    | 25  | 38 | 0  | 0     | PC             |
| 1989 | 64    | 59   | 5      | 7.81%    | 1    | 25  | 38 | 0  | 0     | PC             |
| 1990 | 64    | 59   | 5      | 7.81%    | 1    | 25  | 38 | 0  | 0     | PC             |
| 1991 | 64    | 59   | 5      | 7.81%    | 1    | 25  | 38 | 0  | 0     | PC             |
| 1992 | 66    | 54   | 12     | 18.18%   | 1    | 55  | 10 | 0  | 0     | NDP            |
| 1993 | 66    | 54   | 12     | 18.18%   | 1    | 55  | 10 | 0  | 0     | NDP            |
| 1994 | 66    | 54   | 12     | 18.18%   | 1    | 55  | 10 | 0  | 0     | NDP            |
| 1995 | 66    | 54   | 12     | 18.18%   | 1    | 55  | 10 | 0  | 0     | NDP            |
| 1996 | 58    | 45   | 13     | 22.41%   | 11   | 42  | 5  | 0  | 0     | NDP            |
| 1997 | 58    | 45   | 13     | 22.41%   | 11   | 42  | 5  | 0  | 0     | NDP            |
| 1998 | 58    | 45   | 13     | 22.41%   | 11   | 42  | 5  | 0  | 0     | NDP            |
| 1999 | 58    | 44   | 14     | 24.14%   | 11   | 42  | 5  | 0  | 0     | NDP            |
| 2000 | 58    | 46   | 12     | 20.69%   | 4    | 29  | 0  | 25 | 0     | NDP            |
| 2001 | 58    | 46   | 12     | 20.69%   | 4    | 29  | 0  | 25 | 0     | NDP            |
| 2002 | 58    | 46   | 12     | 20.69%   | 4    | 29  | 0  | 25 | 0     | NDP            |
| 2003 | 58    | 46   | 12     | 20.69%   | 4    | 29  | 0  | 25 | 0     | NDP            |
| 2004 | 58    | 47   | 11     | 18.97%   | 0    | 30  | 0  | 28 | 0     | NDP            |
| 2005 | 58    | 47   | 11     | 18.97%   | 0    | 30  | 0  | 28 | 0     | NDP            |
| 2006 | 58    | 47   | 11     | 18.97%   | 0    | 30  | 0  | 28 | 0     | NDP            |
| 2007 | 58    | 47   | 11     | 18.97%   | 0    | 30  | 0  | 28 | 0     | NDP            |
| 2008 | 58    | 46   | 12     | 20.69%   | 0    | 20  | 0  | 38 | 0     | SP             |
| 2009 | 58    | 46   | 12     | 20.69%   | 0    | 20  | 0  | 38 | 0     | SP             |
| 2010 | 58    | 45   | 13     | 22.41%   | 0    | 20  | 0  | 38 | 0     | SP             |
| 2011 | 58    | 45   | 13     | 22.41%   | 0    | 20  | 0  | 38 | 0     | SP             |

Notes: Results as of April 1<sup>st</sup>, of every year. For a complete list of party abbreviations see Appendix B.

**Table 9: Election and by-election results for the Alberta legislature**

| Year | Total | Male | Female | Female % | LIB. | NDP | PC | SC | Other | Party in Power |
|------|-------|------|--------|----------|------|-----|----|----|-------|----------------|
| 1970 | 65    | 64   | 1      | 1.54%    | 3    | 0   | 6  | 55 | 1     | SC             |
| 1971 | 65    | 64   | 1      | 1.54%    | 3    | 0   | 6  | 55 | 1     | PC             |
| 1972 | 75    | 73   | 2      | 2.67%    | 0    | 1   | 49 | 25 | 0     | PC             |
| 1973 | 75    | 73   | 2      | 2.67%    | 0    | 1   | 49 | 25 | 0     | PC             |
| 1974 | 75    | 73   | 2      | 2.67%    | 0    | 1   | 49 | 25 | 0     | PC             |
| 1975 | 75    | 73   | 2      | 2.67%    | 0    | 1   | 69 | 4  | 1     | PC             |
| 1976 | 75    | 73   | 2      | 2.67%    | 0    | 1   | 69 | 4  | 1     | PC             |
| 1977 | 75    | 73   | 2      | 2.67%    | 0    | 1   | 69 | 4  | 1     | PC             |
| 1978 | 75    | 73   | 2      | 2.67%    | 0    | 1   | 69 | 4  | 1     | PC             |
| 1979 | 79    | 73   | 6      | 7.59%    | 0    | 1   | 74 | 4  | 0     | PC             |
| 1980 | 79    | 73   | 6      | 7.59%    | 0    | 1   | 74 | 4  | 0     | PC             |
| 1981 | 79    | 73   | 6      | 7.59%    | 0    | 1   | 74 | 4  | 0     | PC             |
| 1982 | 79    | 73   | 6      | 7.59%    | 0    | 1   | 74 | 4  | 0     | PC             |
| 1983 | 79    | 73   | 6      | 7.59%    | 0    | 2   | 75 | 0  | 2     | PC             |
| 1984 | 79    | 73   | 6      | 7.59%    | 0    | 2   | 75 | 0  | 2     | PC             |
| 1985 | 79    | 73   | 6      | 7.59%    | 0    | 2   | 75 | 0  | 2     | PC             |
| 1986 | 79    | 73   | 6      | 7.59%    | 0    | 2   | 75 | 0  | 2     | PC             |
| 1987 | 83    | 72   | 11     | 13.25%   | 4    | 16  | 61 | 0  | 2     | PC             |
| 1988 | 83    | 72   | 11     | 13.25%   | 4    | 16  | 61 | 0  | 2     | PC             |
| 1989 | 83    | 70   | 13     | 15.66%   | 8    | 16  | 59 | 0  | 0     | PC             |
| 1990 | 83    | 70   | 13     | 15.66%   | 8    | 16  | 59 | 0  | 0     | PC             |
| 1991 | 83    | 70   | 13     | 15.66%   | 8    | 16  | 59 | 0  | 0     | PC             |
| 1992 | 83    | 70   | 13     | 15.66%   | 8    | 16  | 59 | 0  | 0     | PC             |
| 1993 | 83    | 70   | 13     | 15.66%   | 8    | 16  | 59 | 0  | 0     | PC             |
| 1994 | 83    | 69   | 14     | 16.87%   | 32   | 0   | 51 | 0  | 0     | PC             |
| 1995 | 83    | 69   | 14     | 16.87%   | 32   | 0   | 51 | 0  | 0     | PC             |
| 1996 | 83    | 69   | 14     | 16.87%   | 32   | 0   | 51 | 0  | 0     | PC             |
| 1997 | 83    | 63   | 20     | 24.10%   | 18   | 2   | 63 | 0  | 0     | PC             |
| 1998 | 83    | 63   | 20     | 24.10%   | 18   | 2   | 63 | 0  | 0     | PC             |
| 1999 | 83    | 63   | 20     | 24.10%   | 18   | 2   | 63 | 0  | 0     | PC             |
| 2000 | 83    | 62   | 21     | 25.30%   | 18   | 2   | 63 | 0  | 0     | PC             |
| 2001 | 83    | 67   | 16     | 19.28%   | 7    | 2   | 74 | 0  | 0     | PC             |
| 2002 | 83    | 67   | 16     | 19.28%   | 7    | 2   | 74 | 0  | 0     | PC             |
| 2003 | 83    | 67   | 16     | 19.28%   | 7    | 2   | 74 | 0  | 0     | PC             |
| 2004 | 83    | 67   | 16     | 19.28%   | 7    | 2   | 74 | 0  | 0     | PC             |
| 2005 | 83    | 71   | 12     | 14.46%   | 16   | 4   | 62 | 0  | 1     | PC             |
| 2006 | 83    | 71   | 12     | 14.46%   | 16   | 4   | 62 | 0  | 1     | PC             |
| 2007 | 83    | 71   | 12     | 14.46%   | 16   | 4   | 62 | 0  | 1     | PC             |
| 2008 | 83    | 67   | 16     | 19.28%   | 9    | 2   | 72 | 0  | 0     | PC             |
| 2009 | 83    | 67   | 16     | 19.28%   | 9    | 2   | 72 | 0  | 0     | PC             |
| 2010 | 83    | 67   | 16     | 19.28%   | 9    | 2   | 71 | 0  | 1     | PC             |
| 2011 | 83    | 67   | 16     | 19.28%   | 9    | 2   | 71 | 0  | 1     | PC             |

Notes: Results as of April <sup>1st</sup>, of every year. For a complete list of party abbreviations see Appendix B. Social Credit, Alberta Party, Representative Party, and Independents are categorized in the Other category.

**Table 10: Election and by-election results for the British Columbia legislature**

| Year | Total | Male | Female | Female % | LIB. | NDP | PC | SC | Other | Party in Power |
|------|-------|------|--------|----------|------|-----|----|----|-------|----------------|
| 1970 | 55    | 50   | 5      | 9.09%    | 5    | 12  | 0  | 38 | 0     | SC             |
| 1971 | 55    | 50   | 5      | 9.09%    | 5    | 12  | 0  | 38 | 0     | SC             |
| 1972 | 55    | 50   | 5      | 9.09%    | 5    | 12  | 0  | 38 | 0     | SC             |
| 1973 | 55    | 49   | 6      | 10.91%   | 5    | 38  | 2  | 10 | 0     | LIB.           |
| 1974 | 55    | 49   | 6      | 10.91%   | 5    | 38  | 2  | 10 | 0     | LIB.           |
| 1975 | 55    | 49   | 6      | 10.91%   | 5    | 38  | 2  | 10 | 0     | LIB.           |
| 1976 | 55    | 49   | 6      | 10.91%   | 1    | 18  | 1  | 35 | 0     | SC             |
| 1977 | 55    | 49   | 6      | 10.91%   | 1    | 18  | 1  | 35 | 0     | SC             |
| 1978 | 55    | 49   | 6      | 10.91%   | 1    | 18  | 1  | 35 | 0     | SC             |
| 1979 | 55    | 49   | 6      | 10.91%   | 1    | 18  | 1  | 35 | 0     | SC             |
| 1980 | 57    | 51   | 6      | 10.53%   | 0    | 26  | 0  | 31 | 0     | SC             |
| 1981 | 57    | 51   | 6      | 10.53%   | 0    | 26  | 0  | 31 | 0     | SC             |
| 1982 | 57    | 51   | 6      | 10.53%   | 0    | 27  | 0  | 30 | 0     | SC             |
| 1983 | 57    | 51   | 6      | 10.53%   | 0    | 27  | 0  | 30 | 0     | SC             |
| 1984 | 57    | 52   | 5      | 8.77%    | 0    | 22  | 0  | 35 | 0     | SC             |
| 1985 | 57    | 52   | 5      | 8.77%    | 0    | 23  | 0  | 34 | 0     | SC             |
| 1986 | 57    | 52   | 5      | 8.77%    | 0    | 23  | 0  | 34 | 0     | SC             |
| 1987 | 69    | 60   | 9      | 13.04%   | 0    | 22  | 0  | 47 | 0     | SC             |
| 1988 | 69    | 60   | 9      | 13.04%   | 0    | 22  | 0  | 47 | 0     | SC             |
| 1989 | 69    | 60   | 9      | 13.04%   | 0    | 24  | 0  | 45 | 0     | SC             |
| 1990 | 69    | 59   | 10     | 14.49%   | 0    | 26  | 0  | 43 | 0     | SC             |
| 1991 | 69    | 59   | 10     | 14.49%   | 0    | 26  | 0  | 43 | 0     | SC             |
| 1992 | 75    | 56   | 19     | 25.33%   | 17   | 51  | 0  | 7  | 0     | NDP            |
| 1993 | 75    | 56   | 19     | 25.33%   | 17   | 51  | 0  | 7  | 0     | NDP            |
| 1994 | 75    | 56   | 19     | 25.33%   | 18   | 51  | 0  | 6  | 0     | NDP            |
| 1995 | 75    | 56   | 19     | 25.33%   | 18   | 51  | 0  | 6  | 0     | NDP            |
| 1996 | 75    | 56   | 19     | 25.33%   | 19   | 51  | 0  | 5  | 0     | NDP            |
| 1997 | 75    | 55   | 20     | 26.67%   | 33   | 39  | 0  | 0  | 3     | NDP            |
| 1998 | 75    | 55   | 20     | 26.67%   | 33   | 39  | 0  | 0  | 3     | NDP            |
| 1999 | 75    | 54   | 21     | 28.00%   | 33   | 39  | 0  | 0  | 3     | NDP            |
| 2000 | 75    | 53   | 22     | 29.33%   | 33   | 39  | 0  | 0  | 3     | NDP            |
| 2001 | 75    | 53   | 22     | 29.33%   | 33   | 39  | 0  | 0  | 3     | NDP            |
| 2002 | 79    | 62   | 17     | 21.52%   | 77   | 2   | 0  | 0  | 0     | LIB.           |
| 2003 | 79    | 62   | 17     | 21.52%   | 77   | 2   | 0  | 0  | 0     | LIB.           |
| 2004 | 79    | 62   | 17     | 21.52%   | 77   | 2   | 0  | 0  | 0     | LIB.           |
| 2005 | 79    | 62   | 17     | 21.52%   | 76   | 3   | 0  | 0  | 0     | LIB.           |
| 2006 | 79    | 61   | 18     | 22.78%   | 72   | 3   | 0  | 0  | 4     | LIB.           |
| 2007 | 79    | 61   | 18     | 22.78%   | 72   | 3   | 0  | 0  | 4     | LIB.           |
| 2008 | 79    | 61   | 18     | 22.78%   | 72   | 3   | 0  | 0  | 4     | LIB.           |
| 2009 | 79    | 60   | 19     | 24.05%   | 71   | 4   | 0  | 0  | 4     | LIB.           |
| 2010 | 85    | 60   | 25     | 29.41%   | 49   | 35  | 0  | 0  | 1     | LIB.           |
| 2011 | 85    | 60   | 25     | 29.41%   | 49   | 35  | 0  | 0  | 1     | LIB.           |

Notes: Results as of April 1<sup>st</sup>, of every year. For a complete list of party abbreviations see Appendix B. Reform Party, Democratic Reform, Progressive Democratic Alliance, and Independents are categorized in the Other category.

**Table 11: Summary statistics, all years pooled together**

| Explanatory Variables          | Mean      |            |
|--------------------------------|-----------|------------|
| <i>Real wages and salaries</i> |           |            |
| female                         | 44,494.19 | (28067.14) |
| male                           | 61,417.93 | (52881.31) |
| <i>Gender</i>                  |           |            |
| female                         | 0.412     | (0.492)    |
| <i>Education</i>               |           |            |
| dropout                        | 0.187     | (0.389)    |
| high school                    | 0.234     | (0.423)    |
| college and trades             | 0.354     | (0.478)    |
| undergraduate                  | 0.146     | (0.353)    |
| masters and up                 | 0.077     | (0.267)    |
| <i>Age groups</i>              |           |            |
| 15-19                          | 0.007     | (0.084)    |
| 20-24                          | 0.066     | (0.249)    |
| 24-29                          | 0.122     | (0.327)    |
| 30-34                          | 0.134     | (0.341)    |
| 35-39                          | 0.139     | (0.346)    |
| 40-44                          | 0.142     | (0.349)    |
| 45-49                          | 0.138     | (0.345)    |
| 50-54                          | 0.118     | (0.322)    |
| 55-59                          | 0.081     | (0.272)    |
| 60-64                          | 0.040     | (0.197)    |
| <i>Provinces</i>               |           |            |
| Newfoundland                   | 0.014     | (0.116)    |
| Nova Scotia                    | 0.028     | (0.166)    |
| New Brunswick                  | 0.022     | (0.147)    |
| Quebec                         | 0.238     | (0.426)    |
| Ontario                        | 0.405     | (0.491)    |
| Manitoba                       | 0.038     | (0.192)    |
| Saskatchewan                   | 0.030     | (0.171)    |
| Alberta                        | 0.107     | (0.310)    |
| British Columbia               | 0.116     | (0.321)    |
| N                              | 1,579,269 |            |

Notes: The base year is 2011. Standard deviations are in parenthesis. The sample does not include data on Prince Edward Island.

**Table 12: OLS regression results, all years pooled together**

| Explanatory Variables | Specifications        |                       |                       |                       |
|-----------------------|-----------------------|-----------------------|-----------------------|-----------------------|
|                       | (1)                   | (2)                   | (3)                   | (4)                   |
| female                | -0.437***<br>(0.002)  | -0.422***<br>(0.002)  | -0.381***<br>(0.002)  | -0.359***<br>(0.003)  |
| wmp                   | -0.006***<br>(0.0002) | -0.006***<br>(0.0002) | -0.006***<br>(0.0001) | -0.006***<br>(0.0002) |
| left                  | ...                   | ...                   | ...                   | 0.015***<br>(0.002)   |
| right                 | ...                   | ...                   | ...                   | 0.007***<br>(0.002)   |
| female*wmp            | 0.007***<br>(0.0001)  | 0.006***<br>(0.0001)  | 0.004***<br>(0.0001)  | 0.004***<br>(0.0001)  |
| female*left           | ...                   | ...                   | ...                   | -0.002<br>(0.002)     |
| female*right          | ...                   | ...                   | ...                   | -0.027***<br>(0.002)  |
| dropout               | ...                   | -0.116***<br>(0.001)  | -0.158***<br>(0.001)  | -0.158***<br>(0.001)  |
| college and trades    | ...                   | 0.146***<br>(0.001)   | 0.114***<br>(0.001)   | 0.114***<br>(0.001)   |
| undergraduate         | ...                   | 0.407***<br>(0.001)   | 0.379***<br>(0.001)   | 0.379***<br>(0.001)   |
| masters and up        | ...                   | 0.552***<br>(0.003)   | 0.483***<br>(0.002)   | 0.483***<br>(0.002)   |
| age controls          | No                    | No                    | Yes                   | Yes                   |
| province F.E.         | Yes                   | Yes                   | Yes                   | Yes                   |
| year F.E.             | Yes                   | Yes                   | Yes                   | Yes                   |
| constant              | 10.708***<br>(0.003)  | 10.717***<br>(0.003)  | 10.866***<br>(0.003)  | 10.860***<br>(0.003)  |
| N                     | 1,579,269             | 1,579,269             | 1,579,269             | 1,579,269             |
| R <sup>2</sup>        | 0.087                 | 0.187                 | 0.262                 | 0.262                 |

Notes: Log wage is the dependent variable. Standard errors are in brackets. \*Significant at the 0.10 level, \*\*Significant at the 0.05 level, \*\*\*Significant at the 0.01 level.

**Table 13: OLS regression results, early years of the estimating sample (1971-1981)**

| Explanatory Variables | Specifications       |                      |                      |                      |
|-----------------------|----------------------|----------------------|----------------------|----------------------|
|                       | (1)                  | (2)                  | (3)                  | (4)                  |
| female                | -0.434***<br>(0.005) | -0.432***<br>(0.005) | -0.392***<br>(0.005) | -0.373***<br>(0.007) |
| wmp                   | 0.010***<br>(0.002)  | 0.007***<br>(0.002)  | 0.008***<br>(0.002)  | 0.008***<br>(0.002)  |
| left                  | ...                  | ...                  | ...                  | -0.007<br>(0.006)    |
| right                 | ...                  | ...                  | ...                  | 0.041***<br>(0.014)  |
| female*wmp            | -0.0001<br>(0.001)   | 0.001<br>(0.001)     | -0.0001<br>(0.001)   | 0.005***<br>(0.001)  |
| female*left           | ...                  | ...                  | ...                  | 0.012<br>(0.009)     |
| female*right          | ...                  | ...                  | ...                  | -0.066***<br>(0.009) |
| dropout               | ...                  | -0.117***<br>(0.003) | -0.170***<br>(0.003) | -0.169***<br>(0.003) |
| college and trades    | ...                  | 0.104***<br>(0.003)  | 0.057***<br>(0.003)  | 0.057***<br>(0.003)  |
| undergraduate         | ...                  | 0.335***<br>(0.005)  | 0.279***<br>(0.005)  | 0.278***<br>(0.005)  |
| masters and up        | ...                  | 0.471***<br>(0.006)  | 0.386***<br>(0.006)  | 0.386***<br>(0.006)  |
| age controls          | No                   | No                   | Yes                  | Yes                  |
| province F.E.         | Yes                  | Yes                  | Yes                  | Yes                  |
| year F.E.             | Yes                  | Yes                  | Yes                  | Yes                  |
| constant              | 10.650***<br>(0.005) | 10.683***<br>(0.005) | 10.778***<br>(0.006) | 10.750***<br>(0.015) |
| N                     | 156,792              | 156,792              | 156,792              | 156,792              |
| R <sup>2</sup>        | 0.168                | 0.260                | 0.321                | 0.322                |

Notes: Log wage is the dependent variable. Standard errors are in brackets. \*Significant at the 0.10 level, \*\*Significant at the 0.05 level, \*\*\*Significant at the 0.01 level.

**Table 14: OLS regression results, later years of the estimating sample (2001-2011)**

| Explanatory Variables | Specifications        |                       |                       |                      |
|-----------------------|-----------------------|-----------------------|-----------------------|----------------------|
|                       | (1)                   | (2)                   | (3)                   | (4)                  |
| female                | -0.385***<br>(0.006)  | -0.395***<br>(0.006)  | -0.392***<br>(0.006)  | -0.321***<br>(0.008) |
| wmp                   | -0.005***<br>(0.0003) | -0.005***<br>(0.0002) | -0.006***<br>(0.0002) | -0.002**<br>(0.0003) |
| left                  | ...                   | ...                   | ...                   | 0.100***<br>(0.004)  |
| right                 | ...                   | ...                   | ...                   | 0.084***<br>(0.004)  |
| female*wmp            | 0.005***<br>(0.0003)  | 0.005***<br>(0.0002)  | 0.005***<br>(0.0002)  | 0.003***<br>(0.0003) |
| female*left           | ...                   | ...                   | ...                   | -0.017***<br>(0.004) |
| female*right          | ...                   | ...                   | ...                   | -0.044***<br>(0.003) |
| dropout               | ...                   | -0.138***<br>(0.002)  | -0.163***<br>(0.002)  | -0.161***<br>(0.002) |
| college and trades    | ...                   | 0.165***<br>(0.002)   | 0.139***<br>(0.002)   | 0.139***<br>(0.002)  |
| undergraduate         | ...                   | 0.434***<br>(0.002)   | 0.417***<br>(0.002)   | 0.417***<br>(0.002)  |
| masters and up        | ...                   | 0.577***<br>(0.002)   | 0.519***<br>(0.002)   | 0.519***<br>(0.002)  |
| age controls          | No                    | No                    | Yes                   | Yes                  |
| province F.E.         | Yes                   | Yes                   | Yes                   | Yes                  |
| year F.E.             | Yes                   | Yes                   | Yes                   | Yes                  |
| constant              | 10.971***<br>(0.006)  | 10.833***<br>(0.005)  | 10.940***<br>(0.005)  | 10.805***<br>(0.008) |
| N                     | 905,320               | 905,320               | 905,320               | 905,320              |
| R <sup>2</sup>        | 0.060                 | 0.165                 | 0.246                 | 0.247                |

Notes: Log wage is the dependent variable. Standard errors are in brackets. \*Significant at the 0.10 level, \*\*Significant at the 0.05 level, \*\*\*Significant at the 0.01 level.

**Table 15: OLS regression, specifications including marital status and official language as regressors**

| Explanatory Variables  | All years             |                       | Early years<br>(1971-1981 only) |                      | Later year<br>(2001-2011 only) |                       |
|------------------------|-----------------------|-----------------------|---------------------------------|----------------------|--------------------------------|-----------------------|
|                        | (1)                   | (2)                   | (3)                             | (4)                  | (5)                            | (6)                   |
| female                 | -0.359***<br>(0.003)  | -0.342***<br>(0.003)  | -0.373***<br>(0.007)            | -0.340***<br>(0.007) | -0.321***<br>(0.008)           | -0.321***<br>(0.008)  |
| wmp                    | -0.006***<br>(0.0002) | -0.006***<br>(0.0002) | 0.008***<br>(0.002)             | 0.008***<br>(0.002)  | -0.002**<br>(0.0003)           | -0.002***<br>(0.0003) |
| left                   | 0.015***<br>(0.002)   | 0.016***<br>(0.002)   | -0.007<br>(0.006)               | -0.003<br>(0.006)    | 0.100***<br>(0.004)            | 0.101***<br>(0.004)   |
| right                  | 0.007***<br>(0.002)   | 0.009***<br>(0.002)   | 0.041***<br>(0.014)             | 0.050***<br>(0.014)  | 0.084***<br>(0.004)            | 0.086***<br>(0.004)   |
| female*wmp             | 0.004***<br>(0.0001)  | 0.003***<br>(0.0001)  | 0.005***<br>(0.001)             | 0.004***<br>(0.001)  | 0.003***<br>(0.0003)           | 0.003***<br>(0.0003)  |
| female*left            | -0.002<br>(0.002)     | -0.004<br>(0.002)     | 0.012<br>(0.009)                | 0.003<br>(0.009)     | -0.017***<br>(0.004)           | -0.016***<br>(0.004)  |
| female*right           | -0.027***<br>(0.002)  | -0.031***<br>(0.002)  | -0.066***<br>(0.009)            | -0.081***<br>(0.009) | -0.044***<br>(0.003)           | -0.044***<br>(0.003)  |
| married                | ...                   | 0.090***<br>(0.001)   | ...                             | 0.101***<br>(0.003)  | ...                            | 0.085***<br>(0.001)   |
| french only            | ...                   | -0.057***<br>(0.002)  | ...                             | -0.103***<br>(0.004) | ...                            | -0.047***<br>(0.003)  |
| both english/french    | ...                   | 0.060***<br>(0.001)   | ...                             | 0.013***<br>(0.004)  | ...                            | 0.079***<br>(0.002)   |
| neither english/french | ...                   | -0.386***<br>(0.006)  | ...                             | -0.325***<br>(0.014) | ...                            | -0.402***<br>(0.008)  |
| education controls     | Yes                   | Yes                   | Yes                             | Yes                  | Yes                            | Yes                   |
| age controls           | Yes                   | Yes                   | Yes                             | Yes                  | Yes                            | Yes                   |
| province F.E.          | Yes                   | Yes                   | Yes                             | Yes                  | Yes                            | Yes                   |
| year F.E.              | Yes                   | Yes                   | Yes                             | Yes                  | Yes                            | Yes                   |
| constant               | 10.860***<br>(0.003)  | 10.771***<br>(0.003)  | 10.750***<br>(0.015)            | 10.649***<br>(0.015) | 10.805***<br>(0.008)           | 10.729***<br>(0.008)  |
| N                      | 1,579,269             | 1,579,269             | 156,792                         | 156,792              | 905,320                        | 905,320               |
| R <sup>2</sup>         | 0.262                 | 0.270                 | 0.322                           | 0.334                | 0.247                          | 0.255                 |

Notes: Log wage is the dependent variable. Standard errors are in brackets Column (1) corresponds to column (4) in table 12, column (3) corresponds to column (4) in table 13, column (5) corresponds to column (4) in table 14. \*Significant at the 0.10 level, \*\*Significant at the 0.05 level, \*\*\*Significant at the 0.01 level.

**Table 16: OLS regression, robustness (weighted)**

| Explanatory Variables | All years             |                       | Early years<br>(1971-1981 only) |                      | Later year<br>(2001-2011 only) |                       |
|-----------------------|-----------------------|-----------------------|---------------------------------|----------------------|--------------------------------|-----------------------|
|                       | (1)                   | (2)                   | (3)                             | (4)                  | (5)                            | (6)                   |
| female                | -0.359***<br>(0.003)  | -0.375***<br>(0.002)  | -0.373***<br>(0.007)            | -0.378***<br>(0.006) | -0.321***<br>(0.008)           | -0.317***<br>(0.007)  |
| wmp                   | -0.006***<br>(0.0002) | -0.006***<br>(0.0001) | 0.008***<br>(0.002)             | 0.008***<br>(0.002)  | -0.002**<br>(0.0003)           | -0.002***<br>(0.0003) |
| left                  | 0.015***<br>(0.002)   | -0.002<br>(0.002)     | -0.007<br>(0.006)               | -0.007<br>(0.006)    | 0.100***<br>(0.004)            | 0.087***<br>(0.004)   |
| right                 | 0.007***<br>(0.002)   | -0.004***<br>(0.002)  | 0.041***<br>(0.014)             | 0.040***<br>(0.013)  | 0.084***<br>(0.004)            | 0.068***<br>(0.004)   |
| female*wmp            | 0.004***<br>(0.0001)  | 0.004***<br>(0.0001)  | 0.005***<br>(0.001)             | 0.006***<br>(0.001)  | 0.003***<br>(0.0003)           | 0.002***<br>(0.0003)  |
| female*left           | -0.002<br>(0.002)     | 0.004*<br>(0.002)     | 0.012<br>(0.009)                | 0.003<br>(0.008)     | -0.017***<br>(0.004)           | -0.014***<br>(0.003)  |
| female*right          | -0.027***<br>(0.002)  | -0.026***<br>(0.002)  | -0.066***<br>(0.009)            | -0.076***<br>(0.008) | -0.044***<br>(0.003)           | -0.039***<br>(0.003)  |
| education controls    | Yes                   | Yes                   | Yes                             | Yes                  | Yes                            | Yes                   |
| age controls          | Yes                   | Yes                   | Yes                             | Yes                  | Yes                            | Yes                   |
| province F.E.         | Yes                   | Yes                   | Yes                             | Yes                  | Yes                            | Yes                   |
| year F.E.             | Yes                   | Yes                   | Yes                             | Yes                  | Yes                            | Yes                   |
| constant              | 10.860***<br>(0.003)  | 10.861***<br>(0.002)  | 10.750***<br>(0.015)            | 10.766***<br>(0.014) | 10.805***<br>(0.008)           | 10.819***<br>(0.008)  |
| N                     | 1,579,269             | 1,579,269             | 156,792                         | 156,792              | 905,320                        | 905,320               |
| R <sup>2</sup>        | 0.262                 | 0.276                 | 0.322                           | 0.326                | 0.247                          | 0.247                 |

Notes: Log wage is the dependent variable. Sample is weighted for regression results for (2), (4), and (6). Standard errors are in brackets. Column (1) correspond to column (4) in table 12, column (3) correspond to column (4) in table 13, column (5) correspond to column (4) in table 14. \*Significant at the 0.10 level, \*\*Significant at the 0.05 level, \*\*\*Significant at the 0.01level.