



uOttawa

L'Université canadienne
Canada's university

**FACULTÉ DES ÉTUDES SUPÉRIEURES
ET POSTDOCTORALES**



uOttawa
L'Université canadienne
Canada's university

**FACULTY OF GRADUATE AND
POSTDOCTORAL STUDIES**

Lisa Perrella

AUTEUR DE LA THÈSE / AUTHOR OF THESIS

M.A. (History)

GRADE / DEGREE

Department of History

FACULTÉ, ÉCOLE, DÉPARTEMENT / FACULTY, SCHOOL, DEPARTMENT

**Born of Pillage and Plunder:
English Privateers and the Birth of the Royal Navy, 1585-1642**

TITRE DE LA THÈSE / TITLE OF THESIS

Richard Connors

DIRECTEUR (DIRECTRICE) DE LA THÈSE / THESIS SUPERVISOR

CO-DIRECTEUR (CO-DIRECTRICE) DE LA THÈSE / THESIS CO-SUPERVISOR

Nicole St-Onge

Jan Grabowski

Gary W. Slater

Le Doyen de la Faculté des études supérieures et postdoctorales / Dean of the Faculty of Graduate and Postdoctoral Studies

*Born of Pillage and Plunder:
English Privateers and the Birth of the Royal Navy, 1585-1642*

By Lisa Perrella

Thesis submitted to the Faculty of Graduate and Postdoctoral Studies in partial
fulfillment of the requirements for the MA degree in History

University of Ottawa

©Lisa Perrella, Ottawa, Canada, 2010



Library and Archives
Canada

Published Heritage
Branch

395 Wellington Street
Ottawa ON K1A 0N4
Canada

Bibliothèque et
Archives Canada

Direction du
Patrimoine de l'édition

395, rue Wellington
Ottawa ON K1A 0N4
Canada

Your file *Votre référence*
ISBN: 978-0-494-65962-5
Our file *Notre référence*
ISBN: 978-0-494-65962-5

NOTICE:

The author has granted a non-exclusive license allowing Library and Archives Canada to reproduce, publish, archive, preserve, conserve, communicate to the public by telecommunication or on the Internet, loan, distribute and sell theses worldwide, for commercial or non-commercial purposes, in microform, paper, electronic and/or any other formats.

The author retains copyright ownership and moral rights in this thesis. Neither the thesis nor substantial extracts from it may be printed or otherwise reproduced without the author's permission.

In compliance with the Canadian Privacy Act some supporting forms may have been removed from this thesis.

While these forms may be included in the document page count, their removal does not represent any loss of content from the thesis.

AVIS:

L'auteur a accordé une licence non exclusive permettant à la Bibliothèque et Archives Canada de reproduire, publier, archiver, sauvegarder, conserver, transmettre au public par télécommunication ou par l'Internet, prêter, distribuer et vendre des thèses partout dans le monde, à des fins commerciales ou autres, sur support microforme, papier, électronique et/ou autres formats.

L'auteur conserve la propriété du droit d'auteur et des droits moraux qui protègent cette thèse. Ni la thèse ni des extraits substantiels de celle-ci ne doivent être imprimés ou autrement reproduits sans son autorisation.

Conformément à la loi canadienne sur la protection de la vie privée, quelques formulaires secondaires ont été enlevés de cette thèse.

Bien que ces formulaires aient inclus dans la pagination, il n'y aura aucun contenu manquant.


Canada

Abstract

Born of Pillage and Plunder:

English Privateers and the Birth of the Royal Navy, 1585-1642

By: Lisa Perrella

Supervisor: Dr. Richard Connors

This thesis seeks to examine where and how privateers fit into the composition and development of the Royal Navy, beginning with the outbreak of the Spanish War in 1585 and ending with the beginning of the English civil wars in 1642. A chapter each will be dedicated to Elizabeth I, James VI and I, and Charles I and these will examine the role and use of privateers and compare this against the changes taking place in the Royal Navy at the time

Elizabeth I utilized an effective mix of private and public interests in her Royal Navy, which saw a return under Charles, although it was not fully realized until Parliament took control of the fleets in 1642. In the interim, James I's decision to outlaw privateering, and his reliance on the advice of his unqualified and inexperienced gentleman favourites led to the Royal Navy becoming a highly corrupted and inert force. The potential that James had inherited from Elizabeth in regards to English seapower was unrealized as naval officials motivated by personal avarice both literally and figuratively stripped the Royal Fleet of its power. Charles, with his understanding of the importance of skilled seamen to the English Navy, took the steps needed to reverse this decline albeit through dubious and unconventional means. During the Caroline era privateers again rose to prominence, and their exploits aided in the redevelopment of the navy as an effective arm of government. However, the time of Charles's rule was different than those of both Elizabeth and James, and the King's attempts to return of the Royal Navy to its former power failed to take into account the demands of a population whose cries for a

navy to protect shipping went unheeded. These demands would not be fully realized until Parliament took control of the navy, but the foundation for the immensely successful and remarkably powerful Royal Navy of Horatio Nelson was laid in the early modern period under the rule of such monarchs as Queen Elizabeth I and King Charles I.

Acknowledgements

First I would like to acknowledge the financial support of the University of Ottawa for providing me with both an entrance scholarship and Teaching Assistantships. I would also like to thank the Estate of Gaston Héon for graciously providing me with a Research Travel Award, which presented me with an incredible opportunity to spend time consulting manuscripts at The National Archives and National Maritime Museum of the United Kingdom.

I must thank Dr. Galen Perras especially for going above and beyond to respond to any and all of my requests for assistance regarding both my research and the appropriation of travel funds. I owe Dr. Richard Connors an immense amount of gratitude for his stellar performance as my thesis supervisor. His patience, direction and advice made this work possible, as did his willingness to enforce deadlines with an iron fist when necessary.

More personally, I would like to thank Asa McKercher, editor extraordinaire, whose patience and willingness to engage in thrilling conversations about capitalization never ceased to amaze me. To Jonathan Heggie, who has never been anything less than an extraordinarily understanding and supportive friend, thank you for absolutely everything. To Carina McDowell and Sophie Chevalier-Forget, thank you for enduring cancelled plans and many a wine-induced rant with smiles and supportive words.

Most importantly, I would like to thank my family for their constant love and support. Special thanks go to my brother, for showing me early on that stress relief is never more than a video game away. To the engineer and biologist especially, thank you for always being willing to spend countless hours in every museum within sight, and for your unwavering support of all of my endeavours, even those which you may not have fully comprehended.

Table of Contents

Introduction.....	1
Chapter One – A “glorious and wonderfull victory vpon the Seas”	17
Chapter Two – “I have no intention of obeying the orders of one king when I am, in a way, a king myself”	44
Chapter Three – “Irregular and almost incorrigible scum of rascals, whom the land hath ejected for their wicked lives and ungodly behaviour”	76
Conclusion	117
Bibliography	124

Introduction

Pirates dominate the imagination. Ever present as the subjects of books and films, the popular image of the ‘British’ pirate stems from the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, when men such as Captain William Kidd and Captain Edward Teach, better known as Blackbeard, terrorized the open seas. Their exploits, shrouded in intrigue and romance quickly became the subject of lore, and have remained so ever since. The reality of their experiences, like so many other things, is far from this romanticized and idealized image. It is true that pirates were rogue seamen who existed and acted outside and beyond the confines of government sanctions, and generally had little or no ties or loyalty to any given nation or crown. They would attack ships and men from their own country just as soon as they would prey on the shipping of their country’s enemies. This disloyalty, and the predation that went with it, are the very reasons that pirates were, and still are, seen as such a threat to governments who have historically been willing to pool resources and manpower into trying to crush piracy. As Daniel Defoe wrote in his 1724 seminal work *A General History of the Robberies and Murders of the most notorious Pyrates*, it could be extremely “dangerous...to Governments to be negligent, and not take an early Care in suppressing these Sea Banditti, before they gather strength.”¹ The damage and havoc pirates were capable of causing was immense in and of itself, while the threat of dissatisfied seamen deserting royal or commercial shipping in order to join the ranks of such lawless outlaws was an additional concern to public and private

¹ Daniel Defoe, *A General History of the Pyrates*, ed. Manuel Schonhorn (Mineola, NY: Dover Publications, Inc, 1999), pg 30.

officials. Yet, what of those pirates who served various states and who acted as tools of statecraft?

In the later sixteenth century, which this thesis takes as its starting point, although it had yet to reach its golden age, piracy² was hardly a new phenomenon. In fact, as the historian David Loades states, “piracy was as old as shipping.”³ Privateering, however, was a relatively new strategic development. Essentially, privateers were those seamen who were given royal authority to carry out acts of piracy. The first letter of marque, the document granting a pirate permission to become a privateer, was granted by the English King Henry VIII on 20 December 1544.⁴ Historically, various merchants had received what were called letters of reprisal, which permitted them to “recover their losses by direct action when other methods had failed”. Granted by England’s Admiralty Court, these letters of reprisal allowed for controlled acts of piracy to be used by seamen to recover damages. Letters of marque, on the other hand, were granted by the Crown and “enabled the [monarch]’s subjects to make war upon” England’s enemies “at their own expense, keeping the whole proceeds for themselves.”⁵ This development is significant, for it marked the beginning of the use of private ships, engaging in what would otherwise be considered piratical acts, as the strategic arm of the Crown. Seamen carrying letters of

² Piracy, as it would have been understood by contemporaries from at least 1552, is defined by the Oxford English Dictionary as “the action of committing robbery, kidnap, or violence at sea or from the sea without lawful authority, especially by one vessel against another”.

³ David Loades, *England's Maritime Empire* (Harlow: Pearson Education Limited, 2000), pg 42.

⁴ For this proclamation see Paul L. Hughes and James Francis Larkin, eds, *Tudor Royal Proclamations*, Vol. I (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1964), pg 345.

⁵ David Loades, *England's Maritime Empire*, pg 42. NAM Rodger counters that the term ‘privateer’ and the definition of a ‘letter of marque’ as “a licence issued by an Admiralty Court in time of war, under legal safeguards, empowering a privately-owned ship to cruise against the shipping of a named enemy, and to sell her prizes” only came about in the late seventeenth or eighteenth century. Rodger declares that it is therefore anachronistic to refer to ‘privateering’ in Elizabethan and Jacobean times. For further discussion, please see N.A.M. Rodger, *The Safeguard of the Sea* (New York: W.W, Norton & Company, 1998), pg 199-200.

marque became known as privateers and they would become heavily relied upon by the English during the reign of Henry's daughter, Elizabeth I, who has become popularly known as the 'Pirate Queen'.⁶ As the stories of their successes as privateers against the Spanish spread to all corners of the British Isles, the so-called 'Sea-dogs' of the Elizabethan era, such as Sir Francis Drake, Sir John Hawkins, and Sir Walter Raleigh, rose to the status of heroes.

Yet while figures like Drake, Hawkins, and Raleigh were undoubtedly privateers, the definition of what constitutes a 'privateer' is as varied as the historians providing the definition. The noted naval historian N.A.M. Rodger asserts that "the classic form of privateering, could by definition be practiced only in wartime, while in theory letters of reprisal could be issued only in peacetime." Yet, as he noted, "in the sixteenth century, 'peace' might very often mean undeclared war; civil wars and rebellions provided numerous authorities, desperate or unscrupulous, willing to issue letters with no questions asked...and English Lord Admirals were notoriously ready to turn a blind eye towards any activity from which they were entitled to ten per cent of the proceeds."⁷ Thus, Rodger stresses the amorphous nature of privateering. So too does military historian Jeremy Black, who, in his work *The British Seaborne Empire*, emphasises the difficult nature of defining privateering thanks to the "mingling of public and private naval warfare [as] an important aspect of English naval capability."⁸ A definition of what constitutes a privateer is difficult to make for the purposes of this thesis. In general, it would be acceptable to define a privateer as someone in possession of a letter of marque

⁶ Susan Ronald, *The Pirate Queen: Queen Elizabeth I, her Pirate Adventurers, and the Dawn of Empire* (New York: HarperCollins Publishing, 2007).

⁷ N.A.M. Rodger, *The Safeguard of the Sea*, pg 200.

⁸ Jeremy Black, *The British Seaborne Empire* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2004), pg 40.

or reprisal, or with a commission given directly to them to ‘annoy’ the realm’s enemies, and acting under the direction of the monarch. This understanding of the term ‘privateer’ is acceptable during the reigns of Elizabeth I (1558-1603) and Charles I (1625-1649), but does not apply to the rule of James I (1603-1625). This particular problem will be discussed in more detail below.

Although privateers existed as rather ambiguous legal entities of the state, to the nations against whom they committed their attacks, privateers were seen as nothing more than pirates. That they had received permission from their own monarch – in the form of commissions and letters of marque – to commit such acts meant nothing. For example, the King of Spain, saw privateers as little more than violence prone thieves, and yearly had to protect his bullion laden treasure fleet from aggressors such as Sir Francis Drake. As the scholar Paul M. Kennedy notes in his classic work *The Rise and Fall of British Naval Mastery*, “the first impressions that Elizabethan ‘sea-dogs’ made upon foreigners were hardly favourable and they quickly gained an unenviable reputation for their brutality, greed and willingness to rob anyone.”⁹

However distasteful they have appeared, privateers proved to be useful tools and they possessed distinct advantages for those states willing to utilize their services. For the English, privateers not only played a crucial role in aiding in England’s defence and carrying out offensive missions, but they also, as the historian Jeremy Black states, “led the Scots and English to more distant waters.” Acting in cohorts with the French, Black continues that “Scottish ships had taken part in attacks on the Spanish New World from at least 1547, while privateering voyages led the English into waters that were new to

⁹ Paul M. Kennedy, *The Rise and Fall of British Naval Mastery* (London: Penguin Books, 2001), pg 23.

them, including, in 1555, the earliest recorded occasion of an English voyage into the southern hemisphere.” These developments not only helped to expand England’s worldview, but they also, and here we must turn to the ever important drive for profits, expanded “mercantile horizons.”¹⁰ For Black, English privateers, thanks to the profit motive, drove England’s desire for empire-building. Kenneth R. Andrews also supports this view, as do other historians such as C.A. Bayly, John Brewer and David Armitage.¹¹

This drive for profits, combined with service in the state’s interest, also helped to transform the Royal Navy of the early modern period. Privateers, as we have seen, very adeptly combined both private and public interests. In *State Formation in Early Modern England* Michael Braddick asserts that “at sea the response of the English government to military challenge was more effective than on land, but it did not depend on the specialisation of function that had such noted political costs in the counties.” Instead of relying on costly specialisation, the Royal Navy “rested on a congruence of public and private interest which enabled the effective deployment of private resources. By the 1620s, however, this relationship was breaking down and in the 1630s efforts were made to develop a more specialised royal navy.”¹² During the reign of Elizabeth, the private and public sectors became so conflated that the lines of distinction blurred, with privateers fluidly acting as naval officials when they were needed to defend the realm. Under James, however, the private and public spheres were once again separated and

¹⁰ Jeremy Black, *The British Seaborne Empire*, pg 35-36.

¹¹ Please see Kenneth R. Andrews, *Trade, plunder and settlement* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1984); C.A. Bayly, *Imperial Meridian: the British empire and the world, 1780-1830* (London: Longman, 1989); John Brewer, *The Sinews of Power* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1990); and, David Armitage, *The Ideological Origins of the British Empire* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2000).

¹² Michael Braddick, *State Formation in Early Modern England, c. 1550-1700* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2000), pg 202-203.

kept so by his desire to appease the Spanish and keep peace at almost any cost. Although these efforts continued during the reign of Charles I, they did not come to fruition until the navy fell under the control of Parliament during the civil wars.

As is generally the case, there were also disadvantages to employing privateers, the chief drawback being they were not in fact a designated fighting force at the command of the state. Sir Julian S. Corbett, in his classic study, *Principles of Maritime Strategies*, stated an additional reason, namely that “privateering always had a debilitating effect upon [the] regular force” for it “increased the difficulty of manning the navy, and the occasional large profits had a demoralising influence on detached cruiser commanders.” Moreover, and in a reflection of the late Victorian sentiments about martial values, Corbett opined that privateering “tended to keep alive the mediaeval corsair spirit at the expense of the modern military spirit.”¹³ However much damage to the regular navy that the use of privateers may have caused, the frequency of their use in the early modern period goes far to show that to rulers like Elizabeth I and Charles I, privateers were an invaluable tool, capable of at least in part, compensating for the immediate shortcomings of the Royal Navy.

One simple way of examining the weaknesses of the early modern Royal Navy, is simply to look at personnel. Arguably some of the most famous privateers and seamen in British history come from the Elizabethan era. Sir Francis Drake, Sir John Hawkins and Sir Walter Raleigh all served, and became heroes of epic proportions, under the ‘virgin queen.’ Famous for their exploits in the West Indies which mainly targeted the Spanish, these men are also known for their voyages of exploration and their attempts at

¹³ Julian S. Corbett, *Principles of Maritime Strategy* (Mineola, NY: Dover Publications, Inc., 2004), pg 93.

colonizing the new world. Naval heroes are much harder to come by during this period for there were no Tudor or Stuart counterparts to Horatio Nelson or Edward Hawke, the heroes of the Royal Navy in later wars. Even those sailors made famous for their actions during the 1588 Spanish Armada were overwhelmingly the privateers who were able to use their superior naval skills and ships to England's advantage. The Tudor Royal Navy was much weaker than those of her European rivals, an acute problem for an island nation. Even though Elizabeth worked tirelessly to improve her fleet, it was the privately-owned and well-armed ships of England's merchant marine and privateers which allowed the small Elizabethan navy to be effective. While the Royal Navy patrolled the home waters and acted primarily as a defence force, English privateers and merchant mariners were able to aggressively act in offensive roles against England's enemies, to protect English trade, and to spur on colonial venturing too.

When James I took the English throne after Elizabeth's death in March of 1603, he very quickly issued a proclamation declaring all letters of marque issued by Elizabeth null and void. To show his intent, the new King had several former privateers imprisoned, and one of these, the Elizabethan hero Sir Walter Raleigh, was beheaded. James's opposition to privateering creates an interesting dilemma for historians, as it challenges the very definition of what constitutes a privateer. Simply because there was a new monarch did not mean that Elizabethan privateers ceased their piratical acts. Many of these men made no discernable change in their actions, and so they simply became pirates for the duration of James's time on the throne. Above all else, James was interested in pursuing peace with Spain, a goal that he generally achieved until shortly

before his death in 1625.¹⁴ However, English pirates still continued to harass the Spanish in the West Indies, prompting James to issue a general pardon to pirates in 1612, with the goal of stopping their actions through positive coercion. This pardon, which allowed those pirates who accepted it to keep their prizes, was embraced by few sailors; the rest preferred to continue to work outside of the auspices of royal control. Yet, at the same time as he undercut the privateers who had previously defended England, James neglected the Royal Navy, thus creating a vacuum of sea power. His attention focused on peace with Spain and on keeping a lavish court, James turned effective control of the Royal Navy over to one of his favourite courtiers, George Villiers, Duke of Buckingham who was named James's Lord High Admiral. Buckingham's own focus was personal gain, and he turned the navy into an exceptionally corrupted force, with men appointed for reasons of patronage and not necessarily because of superior skill or a desire to serve at sea. Further, money was siphoned off into private accounts, and many of the Royal Navy's ships rotted in port. However, Buckingham was also notorious for turning a blind eye to the actions of the former privateers, now pirates, who defended English interests despite the neglect of their King.

Unlike his father James, Charles I saw the importance of having a strong and effective Royal Navy. Remarkably, Charles's naval reforms began to see successes prior to the outbreak of the English civil wars in 1642. This was a rather incredible feat, for Charles was able to do this largely without the help of Parliament, a body which was overwhelmingly opposed to his naval programme because of its heavy reliance on

¹⁴ N.A.M. Rodger, *The Safeguard of the Sea*, pg 347.

taxes.¹⁵ The means that Charles utilized to raise money to support his fleet, called ‘Ship Money’, played a very important part in his eventual downfall. For while Ship Money made it possible for Charles to fund his naval improvements, its questionable legal basis aided in mobilizing the English people against his reign, which eventually ended in Charles’s execution.¹⁶ Under Charles, the Royal Navy still suffered from corrupt and inexperienced officers and deficient equipment, both of which were the legacy of Buckingham’s rule of the naval administration. Many of the navy’s operations thus saw only limited successes, while most of the more triumphant maritime expeditions of this period were carried out but a new generation of privateers, led by the Earl of Warwick and Sir Kenelm Digby. However, even these successes were nowhere near as spectacular as those undertaken by Drake and his colleagues. In fact, during this time period, the English were wrongly convinced that their naval forces were as glorious and successful as they had been under Elizabeth, thus creating an unrealistic understanding of the funds required to maintain naval supremacy. The Royal Navy at this time also had to confront the increasing power of other European navies, whose strength rendered England’s fleets nearly obsolete.

The study of British naval history and privateers during the reign of the later Tudors and the early Stuarts is dominated by a number of important scholars. In the late nineteenth and early twentieth century, historians such as Julian Corbett and Michael Oppenheim set the standards of the field with their respective works *Principles of Maritime Strategy* (1911) and *A History of the Administration of the Royal Navy and of*

¹⁵ See Kevin Sharpe, *The Personal Rule of Charles I* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1992).

¹⁶ L.M. Hill, “County Government in Caroline England, 1625-1640,” in Conrad Russell, ed., *The Origins of the English Civil Wars*, (London: Macmillan Press Ltd, 1973), pg 83-89.

Merchant Shipping in Relation to the Navy (1896). Although Corbett's work did not specifically focus on the Royal Navy in the early modern period, his work does look into the careers of such notables as Sir Francis Drake and he also provides an interesting discussion about some of the problems with the use of privateers by the state. There are a plethora of more recent and valuable studies: Kenneth R. Andrews's *Trade, plunder and settlement* (1984), *The Spanish Caribbean: Trade and Plunder 1530-1630* (1978) and *Ships, Money and Politics* (1991); Paul M. Kennedy's *The Rise and Fall of British Naval Mastery* (1976); N.A.M. Rodger and *The Safeguard of the Sea* (1998); Jeremy Black with *The British Seaborne Empire* (2004); and David Loades's *England's Maritime Empire* (2000). These thorough and authoritative histories have examined the development of the Royal Navy since the early modern period and all touch on the matters of privateering and piracy. On the surface all of these works appear to be relatively similar as they examine the same well-traversed events and personas. Of course, the reality is nuanced.

There are two general fields of thought on the subject of the development of the Royal Navy and its relation to privateering from 1585 until 1642. In the one camp, there are historians such as Paul M. Kennedy, Jeremy Black and David Loades, who argue that it was the English state, and more specifically the English monarch, who spearheaded any naval reforms. In the other camp, lay historians such as N.A.M. Rodger and Kenneth R. Andrews who believe that the impetus for change and development of the navy came from England's merchant marine. Both schools are important for they question who was responsible for the development of English sea power.

Paul M. Kennedy's seminal work on the subject of the development of the Royal Navy is *The Rise and Fall of British Naval Mastery*. As Kennedy believes, the rise of the

Royal Navy beginning in the mid-sixteenth century and continuing on into the Stuart period coincided with the growth of the English state, the centralization of power within that state, and the development of an economic system allowing the Crown to raise huge sums of money from its subjects. For Paul M. Kennedy, there was a “fusion of the desire” for overseas trade and for combating Spanish power both of which were led primarily by the Tudor monarchs. For him, it was the Crown which pushed forward “the country’s strategical, economic and religious aims” which meant furthering England’s naval power.¹⁷ In *The British Seaborne Empire*, Jeremy Black traces the origins of the British empire and looks at the actions and motivations of private individuals and the state in empire building. While not disregarding the influence of either, he places more importance on the role of the Crown, noting for instance that while Sir Francis Drake undertook his circumnavigation of the globe primarily for his own profit, Queen Elizabeth, by knighting him on his return, stole the show by turning the event into “an important symbolic moment” for herself and for “English imperialism.”¹⁸ Like Paul M. Kennedy before him, Jeremy Black places significant importance on the development of the English state in the early modern era, particularly in terms of the development of the English navy, army, and bureaucracy.¹⁹ David Loades, in *England’s Maritime Empire: Seapower, Commerce and Policy, 1490-1690*, similarly downplays the role of merchants, observing that “the main drivers of colonial ambition were...the gentlemen adventurers who wanted to show the flag, and gain honour for themselves, their country and their

¹⁷ Paul M. Kennedy, *The Rise and Fall of British Naval Mastery*, pg 22-23. For further examination of this, see: Paul M. Kennedy, *The Rise and Fall of the Great Powers: economic change and military conflict from 1500 to 2000* (New York: Random House, 1987).

¹⁸ Jeremy Black, *The British Seaborne Empire*, pg 36.

¹⁹ See Jeremy Black, *Great Powers and the Quest for Hegemony: The World Order since 1500* (London: Routledge, 2008).

faith.” It was these nobles who were supported by the Crown, and as Loades notes, it was the Crown that was doing much, if not most, of the pushing.²⁰

In *The Safeguard of the Sea* N.A.M. Rodger takes aim at Kennedy, Black and Loades, noting that such arguments are “mistaken and facile.” Disagreeing with the importance placed on the role of the state in the development of English naval power, Rodger looks to the fact that a “cross-section of society” was required to create the foundations of this sea power, and that “navies needed consensus”. In England there was such a confluence of opinion and as a result English sea power blossomed.²¹ Kenneth R. Andrews, perhaps the most prolific historian of British privateers during this period, has written numerous books on the subject, as well as compiling collections of documents relating to the navy. In *Trade, plunder and settlement*, Andrews, like Rodger, does not discount the “significant contribution” of the court and the Crown in the development of British naval power. However, he stresses that “plunder was a commercialized business, dominated by merchants” and hence it was these people who were the main drivers of empire, and with it, naval supremacy.²² Elsewhere, in *The Spanish Caribbean*, Andrews has similarly emphasized the “mass of seamen of piratical inclinations, many of them imbued with crude iconoclastic and nationalistic sentiments” who took to the seas to enforce England’s will.²³ These fertile debates continue to influence thinking and

²⁰ David Loades, *England's Maritime Empire*, pg 118. For similar arguments to Kennedy, Black, and Loades see: Geoffery Parker, *The Military Revolution* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1988); Max Boot, *War Made New: Technology, Warfare, and the Course of History, 1500 to Today* (New York: Gotham Books, 2006); and, William Hardy McNeill, *The Pursuit of Power: Technology, Armed Force, and Society since A.D. 1000* (Chicago: Chicago University Press, 1982).

²¹ N.A.M. Rodger, *The Safeguard of the Sea*, pg 431-432.

²² Kenneth R. Andrews, *Trade, plunder and settlement* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1984), pg 18.

²³ Kenneth R. Andrews, *The Spanish Caribbean* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1978), pg 135.

research on the navy, privateers and piracy in the early modern period. This dissertation contributes to that ongoing scholarly discussion.

This thesis seeks to examine where and how privateers fit into the composition and development of the Royal Navy, beginning with the outbreak of the Spanish War in 1585 and ending with the beginning of the English civil wars in 1642. A chapter each will be dedicated to Elizabeth I, James VI and I, and Charles I and will examine the role and use of privateers and compare these against the changes taking place in the Royal Navy at the time. Although this period is not part of the era of history in which the British were the undisputed masters of the seas, the foundation for the Royal Navy's later domination lay in the changes that took place in the early modern period. It is to that period and to those themes that we shall now turn. 'Rule, Britannia! Rule the waves' may not have yet been ingrained in the minds of late sixteenth and early seventeenth century English people, but the road to such eighteenth century sentiments was being paved by the work of the likes of Sir Francis Drake, Sir Walter Raleigh and the Earl of Warwick.

The first chapter of this thesis will focus on the reign of Elizabeth from the outbreak of the Spanish war in 1585 until her death in 1603. Elizabeth managed, rather successfully, to bolster the power of the Royal Navy by utilizing privateers such as Sir Francis Drake, Sir Walter Raleigh and Sir John Hawkins as an offensive arm of the state which was employed in the struggle against Spain, England's main rival. Elizabeth's issuing of letters of marque or reprisal was ingenious, for this ensured that English privateers would share a percentage of their potential spoils with the state, while also allowing the Queen to deny such men her support should the Spanish take offense to their

actions. Yet the privateers were not fools in accepting these letters, for they offered them the permission to pursue huge financial profits. In addition, many privateers also acted out of devotion to the Crown and to England. Men such as Drake, Hawkins and Raleigh were thus able to move fluidly between their own private privateering ventures and Elizabeth's royal service in times of conflict, such as during the Spanish Armada in 1588. This allowed the navy to benefit immensely from their years of experience and expertise, sparked many of the reforms that the navy saw during this era, and led to the rise of Elizabethan England as a notable seapower. Sir Francis Drake, perhaps the most famous of these privateers, serves as an excellent example of the Elizabethan privateers, and his exploits, in particular his successful mission to Cadiz in 1587, is examined in detail.

The second chapter of this dissertation focuses on the rule of James I, alternately James VI of Scotland. Holding the English Crown from Elizabeth's death in 1603 until his own demise in 1625, James undertook a complete departure from both Elizabeth's foreign and naval policy. As one of his first acts as King, James outlawed privateering. As will be seen, this would come to have a profound effect on the Royal Navy which was robbed of the experience that these seamen brought to the royal service. A rather staunch pacifist in his policies, and therefore a great anomaly in the early modern period, James permitted the Royal Navy to rot in the dockyards. He also relied heavily on patronage as he and his officials did not seem to see the point in maintaining a navy during times of peace, the naval bureaucracy became rife with corruption. Further, men were named to positions in the navy based upon their social status, and not merit. This caused considerable discontent aboard the ships, as ordinary seamen were generally unwilling to obey the commands of such inexperienced and often absent leaders. The officials of the

Admiralty, especially the Lord High Admiral George Villiers, the Duke of Buckingham, and a favourite of James, added to the corruption and waste of the Royal Navy, more often than not putting his own desire for personal profit above the needs of the Royal Fleet. The changes that James ushered in are best shown through the experiences of Sir Walter Raleigh. A privateer who began his career under Elizabeth, Raleigh was put to death by James, who proved unwilling to support Raleigh's persistent exploits against the Spanish Crown. Under James's rule, the Royal Navy lost much of the prestige it had gained under Elizabeth, which would not be fully realized until his son Charles took the throne in 1625.

The third and final chapter examines the rule of Charles I, from his accession to the throne in 1625 until the outbreak of the English Civil Wars in 1642. Charles would unfortunately become the victim of regicide in 1649, the result of his inability to rule with Parliament, which would order his death. In this respect, Charles largely exacerbated the problems that had begun under his father, but unlike James I, Charles understood the need for a strong navy. After numerous naval failures early in his reign, he thus set out to try to restore the Royal Navy to its Elizabethan glory. In order to implement his naval policies, Charles resorted to the unconventional means of Ship Money, a levy which had traditionally been raised in coastal counties for the protection of the realm and maintenance of the Royal Navy. Charles, who was ruling without the aid of Parliament and who therefore was in dire need of funds, extended this levy to the inland counties of his kingdom, causing considerable discontent amongst many of his already unhappy subjects. However, Ship Money and the resulting Ship Money fleets did much to improve the state of the navy. Corruption and waste began to be reversed, and men were

once again appointed based on merit rather than social standing. In addition, privateers returned to prominence, though they were not used as frequently as they had been under Elizabeth. Regrettably, these improvements were not enough to save Charles's fleet in terms of the public's opinion. Seapower was ever changing in this period, and the public was calling for a defensive navy aimed primarily at protecting merchant shipping. Although Charles was aware of these calls for what would in effect need to be two navies, they never materialized, thus further inflaming public discontent. In analyzing Charles's successes and failures, this chapter turns to the career of Robert Rich, the Earl of Warwick, who acted as a sanctioned privateer and who was also a promoter of both colonization and privateering. Rich was so well-regarded after Parliament took control of the Royal Navy in 1642, he was appointed as Lord High Admiral. Charles had inherited from James a navy dwindling in power, much as Elizabeth had from her sister Mary I, but he had managed to restore it to prominence, a feat made even more remarkable when one realizes that he did so without the luxury of funding from Parliament. Through the work of Charles, then, the Royal Navy was able to regain a semblance of its former grandeur under Elizabeth.

Chapter One

A “glorious and wonderfull victory vpon the Seas”

Perhaps no period of English history has been characterized more by piracy and privateering than the Elizabethan era, a period lasting from 1558 to 1603. Thanks to their military successes and exploratory voyages, privateers such as Sir Francis Drake, Sir John Hawkins and Sir Walter Raleigh dominate perceptions of the period. These men, and their exploits, had an important impact on England’s maritime and foreign policy during this time. One of the chief tools of Queen Elizabeth’s statecraft and maritime policy was the privateer. Elizabethan England was a fledging and fiscally immature state. Privateers provided an affordable means of defending English interests and of securing Elizabeth’s rule. Thus, the English Queen had specific goals for her maritime policies. These were “to strengthen royal authority within the kingdom, to provide for its defence against invasion and to frustrate the ambitions of foreign powers in Ireland, Scotland and the Netherlands.”¹ Privateering played a key role in each of these areas. Additionally, the privateers were often explorers and while Elizabeth was willing to support the voyages of those intent on creating settlements in the Americas, these colonizing voyages were treated as “secondary to the main issues of European power”.² Although there were voyages of discovery and settlement during her reign, Queen Elizabeth’s main focus was, and remained, the safety of her kingdom and the related issue of European power politics. The following analysis looks at the use of this tool as it

¹ Kenneth R. Andrews, *Trade, plunder and settlement* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1984), pg 11.

² *Ibid.*, pg 10-11.

was principally used against Spain, as well as the correlation between privateers and the development of the Royal Navy in this period.

English privateers for the most part had the backing of the English Queen, but there were differences of opinion regarding the strategy of privateering. While Elizabeth was primarily concerned with maintaining a defensive strategy, many of the privateers under her service were more predatory and offensively minded. These men wanted England to be more active and assertive in world affairs. Sir Walter Raleigh, for one, held a view that “may well have expressed the ideas and attitudes prevailing among such westward-looking sea-dogs and gentlemen-adventurers”. For him “naval strength” was “the key to empire, the necessary means of waging oceanic war with Spain, challenging her Atlantic trade and colonial domination in America.”³ The Queen and the privateers did not disagree on the goal of employing naval forces for the purposes of defending English interests and security. The privateers, however, had an additional goal of securing private wealth and personal glory. Profit was at the root of their offensive thinking, since their livelihood was based upon having to go out and seek plunder. Elizabeth’s preoccupation with defending her country’s security, made her look like “a timid strategist” to some who advocated a more adventurist foreign policy. And if such a policy had the added benefit of fattening their coffers, those advocates observed, so be it. Therefore, the Queen’s “political interests did not for the most part seriously conflict with

³ Kenneth R. Andrews, *Trade, plunder and settlement*, pg 9. See also Paul M. Kennedy, *The Rise and Fall of British Naval Mastery* (London: Penguin Books, 2001), pg 13-35; and, Kenneth R. Andrews, *The Spanish Caribbean* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1978), pg 81-107.

the commercial, maritime and colonial ambitions of her merchant and gentlemen adventurers.”⁴

Despite the shared interests between them, in the interest of state cooperation between Elizabeth’s Government and its private sailors was a secretive matter. Not only did privateers provide a cost effective means by which Elizabeth could harm her enemies and protect her realm, but they were also tools that the English Crown could deny using, or at the very least controlling, when pressed on the matter by its European rivals. By their very nature, privateers were businessmen, and so no matter what they did, the Crown could plead ignorance and deny any responsibility for the actions of these private sailors. Indeed, as historian Kenneth R. Andrews has noted, “[i]n none of [their] enterprises, even the expeditions of war, did the state take full responsibility.”⁵ This was certainly the case with the actions English privateers took towards Spain in 1568. An examination of Anglo-Spanish maritime rivalry illustrates the importance of English privateering as an irreplaceable but secretive tool of Elizabethan statecraft.

A clear example of the issue of legality and responsibility of privateering arose in December 1568, when Elizabeth and her privy council chose to seize the cargo of a number of Spanish ships that were wintering in Southern English ports. With Spain rapidly losing hold of its possessions in the Spanish Netherlands, England took actions that could only been seen by the Spanish throne as provocative. Laden with bullion destined for troops in the Low Countries, the ships seemed to be an easy target for the enterprising English. After much deliberation, a majority of the council and the Queen

⁴ Kenneth R. Andrews, *Trade, plunder and settlement*, pg 12-13.

⁵ *Ibid.*, pg 15-16.

decided not to let such an opportunity pass them by, and £85,000 of the bullion was seized by English privateers with permission from the Crown. Understandably, the Spanish took offence to this action. Elizabeth's justification for the seizure was that since the spoils still technically belonged to the Genoese, from whom the Spanish had borrowed the funds, she was free to take the loan upon herself. This line of argument, in which the Queen defended the actions of English privateers, did little to curb the anger of the Spaniards. The seizure of the Spanish bullion thus had, in the opinion of historian Mark Nicholls, an important lasting effect. Namely, the seizure caused the Spanish and English to take a number of measures and counter-measures against one another, which led to a massive disruption of trade for both realms. This, in turn, set the relations of England and Spain on a course that would eventually end in "open war."⁶

Throughout the 1570s and into the 1580s, English privateers continued to target the Spanish, ravage Spanish shipping and menace Spanish colonies in the West Indies. While the English Crown offered no official and public support for these efforts, these privateers certainly could not have gone about their business successfully had they lacked aid from various highly placed nobles, gentlemen, and officials in the burgeoning bureaucracy, particularly from within the English admiralty. These various groups provided money, dockyards and repair facilities, and ports for shelter, all of which aided privateers in their efforts. It cannot, however, be argued that the English government did not entirely turn a blind eye or refrain from attempts to curb these indiscretions. Nevertheless, efforts to forestall such privateering endeavours were primarily rhetorical and amounted to little. Indeed any measures meant to stop piracy were more often than

⁶ Mark Nicholls, *A History of the Modern British Isles, 1529-1603: The Two Kingdoms*. (Oxford: Blackwell Publishers, 1999), pg. 202-203.

not ineffective as “all too frequently those responsible for executing the law were themselves notorious offenders.” In early modern England, where government corruption was rife, many elements of the English state were involved in supporting privateering. Both minor officials and the Lord Admirals alike were guilty of this clandestine support; indeed the latter were often “less concerned with keeping law and order at sea than with profiting, directly or indirectly, from lawlessness and disorder.” The attitude of the state to piracy and privateering was certainly duplicitous. Yet this type of warfare was profitable, as it was also necessary to English security. In pursuing this course of action, Elizabeth also had the support of Francis Walsingham, her principal secretary and one of the most influential men in the country, who was known to “cast a benevolent eye” on expeditions meant to pester the Spanish Crown.⁷ So, while the Crown realized that piracy was injurious to international relations and commerce, it was also “quite prepared to adopt pirates as a means of waging war by proxy.”⁸

In some cases the role of the English Crown went unhidden. In April 1581, Sir Francis Drake was knighted by Queen Elizabeth. Drake had become the first Englishman to successfully circumnavigate the world. Leaving Plymouth in 1577 and returning three years later after voyaging around the southern coast of South America and across the Pacific to South East Asia, Drake’s circumnavigation of the globe was quite an impressive feat. Upon his return, Elizabeth knighted Drake on board his ship, the *Golden Hinde*. As Nathaniel Crouch stated in his work, *The English Hero*:

Q[ueen] Elizabeth...knighted and much Honoured him for this Service, he being the first who had accomplish'd so vast a Design; for tho' Ferdinando Magellane

⁷ Kenneth R. Andrews, *Trade, plunder and settlement*, pg 15.

⁸ *Ibid.*, pg 28.

had already discover'd those Streights, which still bear his Name, yet he [did] not...come home, being slain at the Molacco Islands, in endeavouring to reduce the Natives to the obedience of their new Master the King of Spain.⁹

For some observers, namely the Spanish, this was a provocative act, for in addition to being an adventurer, Drake was also notorious for attacking Spanish merchant ships. To the English, Drake's successful circumnavigation of the world, an impressive feat in itself, made him a hero, but to the Spanish, Drake was little more than a "pirate and a thief."¹⁰ The noted naval historian N.A.M. Rodger further asserts that in political terms, Drake's successful circumnavigation "demonstrated in the most forceful possible manner the wealth and vulnerability of the Spanish empire."¹¹ Moreover, Drake's achievement had a profound effect on the English. As John Hooker, a contemporary noted, Drake's circumnavigation "'inflammeth the whole country with a desire to adventure unto the seas'."¹² Given their remarkable successes, Elizabeth's recognition of Drake and his crew was perfectly understandable, but it was no less alarming and galling for Spain.

Drake's abilities as an explorer and seaman and his skills as a successful privateer were both extraordinary. His martial qualities ensured that his ships returned to England laden with booty, most of which was liberated from the Spanish on the high seas. Not only did Drake and his sailors benefit from such actions, but so did his investors as well as the Crown. For instance, Queen Elizabeth's share of the profits from Drake's voyage of circumnavigation was more than the annual income of the English state. This prize

⁹ Nathaniel Crouch, *The English Hero: or, Sir Francis Drake Reviv'd, Being a full Account of the dangerous Voyages, Admiral adventures, Notable Discoveries, and Magnaimous Atchievements of that Valiant and Renowned Commander* (London: C. Hitch & J. Hodges, 1750), pg 139.

¹⁰ Mark Nicholls, *A History of the Modern British Isles, 1529-1603: The Two Kingdoms*, pg 257.

¹¹ N.A.M. Rodger, *The Safeguard of the Sea*, (New York: W.W, Norton & Company, 1998), pg 244.

¹² John Hooker, quoted in N.A.M. Rodger, *The Safeguard of the Sea*, pg 244.

money allowed Elizabeth to pay off England's foreign debt with money to spare.¹³ Contemporaries were also quick to note the monetary success of Drake's circumnavigation. As Nicholas Breton wrote in prose in his 1581 pamphlet, *A discourse in commendation of the valiant as vertuous minded gentleman, Maister Frauncis Drake, with a reioysing of his happy aduentures*:

Little I say in limme, but not in minde,
for greater hart [never] Ceasar beare:
By hard attempts, such happy Fame to finde,
as well [deserves] the [Laurel] braunche to weare.
What need more words? let Housebirds keepe their hold:
Our Captain Drake, hath won the Gole of Gold.¹⁴

The promise of such riches were undoubtedly part of the reason behind the Queen's sponsorship of Drake's exploits; so too was the opportunity to threaten Spanish power. Also, as an island nation, Queen Elizabeth realized that the Royal Navy was her only means of defence, therefore, she was reluctant to take actions that could weaken or limit her fleet. The utilization of Drake, and men like him, were the only offensive tools at her disposal. Hence, "tolerating Drake's voyage around the world," N.A.M. Rodger argues, "was meant to warn Philip II that England was not powerless."¹⁵ However, it must be stated that regardless of Drake's accomplishment and his abundance of plunder, neither he nor any other Englishman could yet hope to truly undermine Spain's power. They could however, defend England through the pursuit of both personal and state profit. This is precisely what they did in the later sixteenth century.

¹³ N.A.M. Rodger, *The Safeguard of the Sea*, pg 245.

¹⁴ Nicholas Breton, *A discourse in commendation of the valiant as vertuous minded gentleman, Maister Frauncis Drake, with a reioysing of his happy aduentures* (London: John Charlewood, 1581), pg 2.

¹⁵ N.A.M. Rodger, *The Safeguard of the Sea*, pg 245-246.

In the summer of 1585, English privateers, led by Sir Francis Drake, began to increasingly harass Spanish shipping in the Atlantic and in the Caribbean. This campaign was launched in retaliation for an embargo, put in place that spring, by Philip II, the Spanish King. The embargo saw the seizure of English ships and their cargoes and crews in Spain's northern ports. Although the Spanish embargo has traditionally been seen to have caused Drake's expedition, according to N.A.M. Rodger the English had been planning their attack on Spanish shipping and possessions for some time.¹⁶ Using the embargo as a timely pretext, Drake and "five and twenty sail of ships and pinnaces, and having assembled of soldiers and mariners to the number of 2,300 in the whole" set sail in September for the West Indies.¹⁷ Of these twenty-five ships, two belonged to the Queen herself. But what made this expedition unique is that Drake also carried Elizabeth's commission. As Rodger asserts, "though composed of the same mixture of public and private interests as earlier naval expeditions, this one was unequivocally a public operation of war, undertaken in the Queen's name."¹⁸ Drake, the privateer, had now become an official servant of the Crown. This was an important and symbolic moment for Elizabethan maritime policy. It was also a rousing success.

During the expedition westwards, Drake managed to capture and ransom two important Spanish possessions in the Caribbean, Santo Domingo and Cartagena. However, Drake and his company were unable to capture the Spanish treasure fleet which

¹⁶ N.A.M. Rodger, *The Safeguard of the Sea*, pg 249; and, Kenneth R. Andrews, *Trade, plunder and settlement*. pg 223.

¹⁷ Richard Hakluyt, *Hakluyt's Voyages to the New World*, ed. David Freeman Hawke (New York: The Bobbs-Merrill Company, Inc., 1972), pg 162. N.A.M. Rodger notes that there were twenty-nine ships and not twenty-five. See N.A.M. Rodger, *The Safeguard of the Sea*, pg 249.

¹⁸ N.A.M. Rodger, *The Safeguard of the Sea*, pg 249-250; and, Kenneth R. Andrews, *Trade, plunder and settlement*, pg 223; and David Loades, *England's Maritime Empire* (Harlow: Pearson Education Limited, 2000), pg 121.

was returning to Spain loaded with silver worth nearly three-quarters of a million pounds. In addition, the ransoms they collected were not enough to satisfy the Crown or Drake's investors. Nevertheless, the expedition was a success in that it showed the Spanish how weak their position in the New World was next to the power of English privateers. As N.A.M. Rodger suggests, the very shock of Drake's ability to take settlements in the West Indies, prompted King Philip II to both increase the security of the West Indies and to formulate a plan to punish the English and so serve as an example to other would be challengers of Spanish power. It was for the latter reason, Rodger asserts, that the Spanish began to plan their fabled 1588 invasion of England.¹⁹ The historian David Loades takes a more pessimistic view of Drake's failure to acquire a vast return for his investors on this voyage. According to Loades, the pressure that Drake faced to make his voyages more profitable hampered his actions. Loades argues that in order to procure "rich prizes" for his investors, Drake lost his focus and became increasingly distracted with "booty hunting" rather than advancing English security.²⁰ This tension between the two roles of privateering, securing private wealth and public interest, are evident with Drake. The tension is important because war with Spain became a reality by the summer of 1585. In August of that year England gave official support to the Spanish Netherlands, which were waging a full-fledged rebellion against Spain. This action precipitated the open conflict between the English and Spanish, which had begun earlier that summer with the Spanish embargo of England's merchant ships.

England's war with Spain would last eighteen years, from 1585 until King James I signed the Treaty of London in 1604. This war, as Kenneth R. Andrews asserts, was

¹⁹ N.A.M. Rodger, *The Safeguard of the Sea*, pg 250.

²⁰ David Loades, *England's Maritime Empire*, pg 121.

“inconclusive, even at times half-hearted,” but nevertheless “marked a turning-point in the fortunes of both nations and above all their oceanic fortunes.”²¹ The conflict was one in which privateering and privateers played a huge role. As a direct result of Spanish power on the Continent and the inability of English forces to mount an offensive against Spain’s greater armed forces, England pursued a defensive strategy.²² Further, because the English Navy was on the defensive, the English relied to a large extent upon privateers. Although the latter were in no position to undertake military operations that were more extensive than raiding commercial vessels and attacking Spanish possessions in the West Indies they were highly useful and successful. The war with Spain was also marked by one of the most important events in early modern English history and indeed in the history of naval warfare: the Spanish Armada.

In July 1588, a Spanish fleet of 130 private vessels and royal ships set sail for England. Their goal was to launch a land invasion of England, with the Armada acting in an auxiliary role by blockading English ports and strangulating the country. English privateers also attacked Spanish shipping, especially off the coast of the Low Countries, where Spanish troops were engaged in fighting against Dutch rebels. So the Spanish amassed a large fleet and although the force was certainly formidable, the degree of secrecy the plan demanded was not afforded to the Spanish. This was due in part to the delays in setting the plan into motion and to Spain’s well-known attempts to raise funds for the expedition in Rome. The execution of Mary, Queen of Scots – a staunch Catholic - in February 1587 alarmed Philip II. The Spanish had viewed Mary as an appropriate replacement for Elizabeth on the throne of England. Turning to Pope Sixtus V for funds,

²¹ Kenneth R. Andrews, *Trade, plunder and settlement*, pg 223.

²² See Paul M. Kennedy, *The Rise and Fall of British Naval Mastery*, pg 13-35

Philip and his ambassadors used the “martyred” Mary as proof of why the protestant Elizabeth must be quashed. The Pope was nevertheless reluctant to give Philip support for the mission.²³ The English were aware of Philip’s manoeuvrings, and so they prepared to meet the coming Spanish fleet.

What did catch the English by surprise, however, was how late in the summer the Spanish decided to launch the Armada, which was not seen off the coast of Plymouth, Cornwall, until 29 July 1588. In the beginning, the Spanish Armada certainly appeared incredibly powerful. England’s Lord Admiral, Lord Howard of Effingham, declared, while describing the first day of fighting, that “we durst not adventure to put in amongst them, their fleet being so strong. But there shall be nothing either neglected or unhazarded, that may work their overthrow.”²⁴ The English did ‘put in amongst’ the Spanish ships and by 9 August adverse winds had driven the Spanish fleet into the North Sea, with English ships following closely behind. Having been attacked by English fireships, which they could not wholly avoid due to the poor weather, the Spanish, their morale low and their strength faltering, made the decision to return to Spain via the only route open to them. This was to travel north around Scotland and down the coast of Ireland. It was during this voyage back to Spain that storms ruined much of the remaining fleet, with at least one-third of the Armada failing to return to Spain.²⁵ Thus, the Armada proved to be a disaster for Spain and not England.

²³ Garrett Mattingly, *The Armada* (Boston: First Mariners Books, 2005), pg 52-68.

²⁴ Lord High Admiral Charles Howard “Lord Howard of Effingham to Sir Francis Walsingham,” 21 July 1588 in John Knox Laughton, ed., *State Papers Relating to the Defeat of the Spanish Armada*, (London: Navy records society, 1894), pg 288-289.

²⁵ Mark Nicholls, *A History of the Modern British Isles, 1529-1603: The Two Kingdoms*, 261-263.

Although it has traditionally been understood that Spain's fleet was much larger and better armed than the English, this has not held up to scrutiny, with many historians now agreeing that the two fleets were very closely matched.²⁶ This was largely thanks to the presence of a large number of privateers amongst the English fleet. The threat posed by the Spanish Armada had necessitated drastic action by the English. According to the contemporary Richard Hakluyt, the Privy Council had decided "that the English fleet should be divided into four squadrons: the principal whereof was committed unto the Lord Admiral: the second, to Sir Francis Drake: the third, to Captain [John] Hawkins: the fourth, to Captain [Martin] Frobisher."²⁷ Privateers were, therefore, officially sanctioned members of the Royal Navy for the duration of the fighting. The Lord Admiral's squadron aside, men who were privateers and who had an important impact on the course of events that summer commanded the three remaining squadrons. In fact, according to the historian Jan Glete, "John Hawkins, Francis Drake and other privateers and naval administrators who combined guns with swift and versatile ships developed the weapon system that defeated the Spanish Armada."²⁸ This is notable because the actions of these men in commanding squadrons in one of the most important English naval battles of the early modern period influenced the subsequent development of the Royal Navy.

The defeat of the Spanish Armada had become a storied event, one influential because it showcased English naval power and heralded a period where England would

Richard Hakluyt records the number of Spanish ships in the Armada as 150, but this is surely an exaggeration. See Richard Hakluyt, *Voyages and Discoveries*, ed. Jack Beeching (Baltimore: Penguin Books, 1972), pg 312-326.

²⁶ See Mark Nicholls, *A History of the Modern British Isles, 1529-1603: The Two Kingdoms*, pg 254-267; David Loades, *England's Maritime Empire*, pg 109-136; Paul M. Kennedy, *The Rise and Fall of British Naval Mastery*, pg 13-35; N.A.M. Rodger, *The Safeguard of the Sea*, pg 254-271; and, Jan Glete, *Warfare at Sea, 1500-1650* (New York: Routledge, 2000), pg 145-164.

²⁷ Richard Hakluyt, *Voyages and Discoveries*, ed. Jack Beeching, pg 320.

²⁸ Jan Glete, *Warfare at Sea, 1500-1650*, pg 34.

become a major sea power. Indeed “down even to Cromwell’s time Englishmen looked back upon the Elizabethan war with Spain as an age of naval glory, when their seafaring forebears had dominated the ocean.” This was part fantasy, for as one historian has noted, while “[t]he queen’s ships and their auxiliaries did defeat [Spanish ships]...natural forces actually destroyed King Philip’s armada in 1588.”²⁹ The contemporary Richard Hakluyt held a slightly more realistic, though still immensely patriotic, view of the English defeat of the Armada, stating in his *Collection of the Early Voyages, Travels and Discoveries of the English Nation* that:

I thinke that neuer was any nation blessed of IEHOVAH, with a more glorious and wonderfull victory vpon the Seas, then our vanquishing of the dreadfull Spanish Armada, 1588. But why should I presume to call it our vanquishing; when as the greatest part of them escaped vs, and were onely by Gods out-stretched arme ouerwhelmed in the Seas, dashed in pieces against the Rockes, and made fearefull spectacles and examples of his iudgements vnto all Christendome.³⁰

However, not surprisingly, for the English the former fact took precedence. Thus:

The Spanish war accelerated the fermentation of these ideas [of a British maritime empire] in the national psyche by popularizing them. Not only was the nation as a whole identified with the fleet that defended the Channel in 1588; many sailors, merchants and gentlemen took part directly or indirectly in the privateering war, which focused national attention upon the Atlantic as a theatre of operations and itself a potential prize. Envy of the ‘wealth of the Spaniards and Portugals’, which had long spurred the pioneers, now became an immediate stimulus activating every port from London round to Bristol, multiplying the nation’s ships and fanning the flames of aggressive nationalism.³¹

More specifically, the victory against Spain in 1588 had a transformative effect on the development of an English colonial empire. English hegemony at sea led to an increase

²⁹ Kenneth R. Andrews, *Ships, Money and Politics*, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1991), pg 139.

³⁰ Richard Hakluyt, *Hakluyt's Collection of the Early Voyages, Travels and Discoveries of the English Nation*, Vol. 1 (London: R.H. Evans, 1809), pg xxiii.

³¹ Kenneth R. Andrews, *Trade, plunder and settlement*, pg 36.

in the number of Englishmen willing to invest in overseas trade, a dangerous and risky gamble at the time. Hence, the number of large private ships built by 1629 doubled what they had been prior to the war in 1582.³² Elizabeth encouraged this expansion of private seafaring because she relied so much on private shipping to defend her realm and to conduct predatory and mercenary operations in various parts of the world. Further, these merchantmen enriched the Queen and her realm. Most importantly for the purposes of this study, it is also obvious that the conflict with Spain radically altered the fortunes of the Royal Navy. It is to that subject that we should now turn.

It is no wonder that perceptions of the Elizabethan era are so dominated by English privateers and not by English naval men. The Royal Navy had been weak in relation to the navies of the rest of Western Europe. As Kenneth R. Andrews notes, in the mid sixteenth century England's "nautical resources ... were poor in quantity and quality, quite insufficient to sustain the oceanic expansion which nevertheless occurred".³³ When Elizabeth took the throne in 1558, she commissioned a survey of the navy. The result was the 'Book of Sea Causes', a study of the existing fleet, consisting of thirty-four ships, of which twelve were deemed to be beyond repair. The survey also identified forty-five merchant ships, which, importantly "may be put in fashion for war."³⁴ These numbers show the differing sizes of the Crown's navy and of the private warships. The number of Royal Navy ships was far from enough to maintain an adequate maritime defence against the Spanish. This deficiency, as well as the correspondingly large number of private ships, prompted the aforementioned reliance on privateers as

³² Kenneth R. Andrews, *Trade, plunder and settlement*, pg 24.

³³ *Ibid.*, pg 22.

³⁴ N.A.M. Rodger, *The Safeguard of the Sea*, pg 229.

instruments of defence and foreign policy. By the end of 1564, Elizabeth had overseen the building of fourteen new royal ships.³⁵ However, this was still barely enough to maintain a defensive fleet, and subsequent additions to the Royal Navy did little to alter this situation. By the time of the war with Spain, the Navy was stronger than it had been under the earlier Tudors, but Elizabeth's reliance on privateers was nevertheless a foundation of her foreign policy and of her nation's defence. This was because her fleet was needed for defence and could not spare ships to campaign abroad against the Spanish. Thankfully for the English, the strength of their private ships meant that England lacked a merchant marine that relied on the navy for protection as many other kingdoms of the era did. This freed up Royal Navy ships for their prime duty of patrolling the home waters.

During the war with the Spanish, the role of privateers was increasingly emphasised and has subsequently overshadowed that played by the Royal Navy. This owes something to the exploits of the privateers, which captured the English imagination and that of their historians too. Raw numbers support this view of the role of privateering. The historian David Loades asserts that these seamen provided fifty percent of the war effort from 1585 to 1604. This made "it possible for a country with a totally inadequate financial infrastructure to sustain one of the longest wars in its history, and to confront a power whose resources were in every way superior." Still, the Royal Navy put in the remaining fifty percent of the war effort. Its role was to 'keep the seas', "the essential but unglamorous work of patrolling the Channel and the North Sea at all seasons

³⁵ N.A.M. Rodger, *The Safeguard of the Sea*, pg 229.

of the year, while the privateers went chasing prizes, often in warmer climates.”³⁶ The necessity of carrying out this task and in combating the Spanish, spurred an expansion of the Royal Navy and prompted an increased willingness amongst Englishmen to support naval forces under the control of the Crown.

Over the war years, England’s navy took the steps necessary to formalise itself into a permanent force. John Hawkins, who became Treasurer of the Navy in 1578, is often cited as being the impetus behind the transformation of the Royal Navy. Hawkins’s experiences as a prominent and successful privateer for the Queen certainly would have influenced his strong belief in the need for a powerful and well organised English Royal Fleet. N.A.M. Rodger states that Hawkins was, from his appointment as Treasurer of the Navy until his death in 1595, “the dominant figure in English naval administration.”³⁷ Indeed, Hawkins’s work and prominence can be seen not only in the good condition of the Queen’s ships, but also in that by Elizabeth’s death in 1603, the ships were bigger and better than those that she had inherited upon taking the throne in 1558.³⁸ However, as Kenneth R. Andrews asserts, regardless of Hawkins’s best efforts, the Royal Navy “did not keep pace with private shipping – nor...with the expansion of the nation’s maritime interests.”³⁹ Elizabeth’s navy was not built with the intent of protecting and supplying colonies in the Americas, nor was it built to fight wars to gain dominance in trade. The Royal Navy was built as protection for the island nation, and to conduct small campaigns in Western Europe, if need be. Anything above and beyond these goals were the responsibility of the merchant marine and private ships.

³⁶ David Loades, *England's Maritime Empire*, pg 128.

³⁷ N.A.M. Rodger, *The Safeguard of the Sea*, pg 331.

³⁸ *Ibid.*, pg 334.

³⁹ Kenneth R. Andrews, *Trade, plunder and settlement*, pg 25.

Although the Royal Navy certainly began to grow during Elizabeth's reign, many problems that led to widespread corruption were also birthed while she was Queen. The patronage system of the admiralty had been overseen by Elizabeth, either acting on her own or else acting on the advice of her chief advisor, Lord Burghley. However, after Burghley died in 1598, Lord Admiral Howard took over and in the words of historian David Loades "engrossed the whole system." Loades is careful to state that it was not necessarily Lord Admiral Howard who was overtly corrupt, but rather his Treasurer and his Surveyor, to both of whom Howard had given a free hand. Sir Robert Mansell, appointed to the position of Treasurer in 1604, and Sir John Trevor, who had been given the position of Surveyor in 1598, fully exploited the system of appointments which Howard allowed them to control. As Loades states, "every position was sold at a going rate...without regard to the suitability of the candidate." This did not necessarily mean that the navy was staffed by wholly incompetent sailors, for those who often bought the positions then sold them at an inflated price to men who actually wanted to serve at sea.⁴⁰ Although the widespread corruption of the navy came to fruition during James's reign, it is clear that the seeds were sown during Elizabeth's years as Queen, for the patronage system slipped from the Crown's control and into the hands of the Lord Admiral. Expansion of the navy went hand in hand with growing corruption, which was not a factor for the privateers.

Where similarities existed between the privateers and navy sailors was in their common experiences aboard ship. Life aboard the ships of both the navy and the merchant marine was nothing if not dangerous. Death was a possibility that each seaman

⁴⁰ David Loades, *England's Maritime Empire*, pg 149.

faced even in times of peace. Although encounters with the enemy could very well prove to be deadly, so too could the mere act of setting sail. As historian Mark Nicholls states, “inadequate diet and sanitation killed men by the thousand on major naval expeditions without any assistance from the enemy.”⁴¹ On the other hand, Kenneth R. Andrews asserts that “the extraordinary high casualty rate among ships and men was chiefly due to the inadequacy of the ships and their basic equipment.”⁴² Despite the difference in opinion between these two historians, it is clear that fatality rates were quite high on ships in this period, be they royal or merchant. This was especially true during the years of the Spanish War. Regardless of the obvious and inherent dangers of going to sea, Andrews believes that during the Spanish War “there was evidentially no shortage of ordinary seaman,” since “large numbers were prepared to go to sea for nothing but board, lodging and shares in hypothetical prizes.”⁴³

Prize money, or the promise of it, was important because sailors’ wages were quite low. It cannot be said that sailors generally went to sea and received no wages, but the wages that they did receive were often little more than a pittance:

The normal basic wage for the unskilled sailor ranged from ten to twenty shillings a month and he might make something extra by taking merchandise to trade on his own account or in return for handling cargo (primage). Windfalls like these and the irregularity of employment make it difficult to assess seamen’s earnings, but beyond doubt what they brought home was a poor recompense for the hardship and danger endured at sea.⁴⁴

In fact, David Loades laments that over the sixty year period, from 1525 to 1585, officers’ salaries and expenses had not increased while over this same time span, inflation

⁴¹ Mark Nicholls, *A History of the Modern British Isles, 1529-1603: The Two Kingdoms*, pg 273.

⁴² Kenneth R. Andrews, *Trade, plunder and settlement*, pg 24.

⁴³ *Ibid.*, pg 26.

⁴⁴ *Ibid.*, pg 26.

had risen at least 100 per cent. During the same period, seamen's wages had been raised only once.⁴⁵ For many sailors then, the motivation of profit was key to their decisions to join privateering fleets rather than the Royal Navy. The common sailor on a privateer was in almost all respects similar to those aboard Crown vessels, but they were separated by money and freedom. The differences that existed were, therefore, based upon the context in which these men served. Kenneth R. Andrews writes, "bad victuals, arrears of pay, the injustices of the press system and the brutality of the punishments in the royal service drove seamen repeatedly to desperate riot during the wars with France and Spain."⁴⁶

Regardless of the differences between the Royal Navy, merchants and privateers, during this period the navy lacked regular officers other than the members of the Navy Board. The commanders and men that staffed England's ships were recruited from the ports for as long as the operation for which they were needed lasted. After this, they would return to port where some would go to sea on merchant or privateering vessels.⁴⁷ In this way, the Royal Navy was not yet completely distinct from the merchant marine. It was also relatively common "for private vessels to be bought into the royal fleet, [and] for royal ships to be sold off to private owners, or chartered to a trading syndicate, or invested as capital in joint-stock expeditions."⁴⁸ In any case this constant turn over of both men and ships impacted the professionalism of the navy, although many of those who were lifelong sailors, either on private vessels, naval ships, or both, were certainly experienced.

⁴⁵ David Loades, *England's Maritime Empire*, pg 149.

⁴⁶ Kenneth R. Andrews, *Ships, Money and Politics*, pg 13.

⁴⁷ Kenneth R. Andrews, *Trade, plunder and settlement*, pg 26.

⁴⁸ *Ibid.*, pg 26.

Privateering served as a way to supplement the low earnings that seamen could expect to make. Piratical acts were also not confined to times of war, although they were more prevalent during periods of conflict. Andrews explains this by observing that “war, peace and neutrality were ill-defined quantities, while the international law of prize and spoil was in its infancy, and partly that the Crown was powerless to check the disorders of its subjects at sea.”⁴⁹ Money thus served as a driving force behind nautical expeditions, and aboard ship personal gain impacted relations amongst the crew and their leaders and amongst the crewmen themselves.

As has been previously discussed, fleets were not the only weapon that the English utilized in their fight against the Spanish. The use of privately funded privateers, who yearly stalked the Spanish treasure fleets returning laden with bullion from South America, was a strategy in and of itself.⁵⁰ The face of maritime violence was rapidly changing in this period alongside the expansion and introduction of a truly international trading system. As the monetary value of items being transported across vast swathes of ocean increased, so too did the number of seafarers interested in intercepting said goods. Pirates and privateers began to conduct small-scale warfare on their own, leaving merchants little choice but to arm themselves to protect against those who would plunder their wares.⁵¹ Although success could almost certainly guarantee riches for all those involved, failure was all too real of a possibility. Many privateers turned only small profits or indeed failed to make any money. Still, those who engaged in piratical acts hoped to gain wealth and so “oceanic expansion and privateering therefore tended to

⁴⁹ Kenneth R. Andrews, *Trade, plunder and settlement*, pg 27.

⁵⁰ Mark Nicholls, *A History of the Modern British Isles, 1529-1603: The Two Kingdoms*, pg 284.

⁵¹ Kenneth R. Andrews, *Trade, plunder and settlement*, pg 28.

promote each other and fuse.” Due to the immense wealth being generated by overseas trade, nation states became intensely interested in tapping into this resource either through legal or illicit means. For England, there developed “a powerful interest which embodied to a great extent the actual sea power of the nation, vested as that was in the stronger sort of merchant shipping and the relatively small force of royal ships.”⁵²

The profitability of privateering, although often placed under scrutiny by historians, was most likely enough to, at least in part, be the reason behind Elizabeth’s continued support of it. As Dr Julius Ceasar, the Admiralty Judge, stated in 1590 “her majesty hath gotten and saved by these reprisals since they began above £200,000”. David Loades calculates this to be about £40,000 a year, which was approximately two-thirds of the cost of running the Royal Navy.⁵³ Moreover, it was not unthinkable that the Queen and her admirals and captains would direct these privateering voyages themselves. In fact the English Crown and bureaucracy were involved in these voyages so often that foreigners were prompted to call such actions the “national business of maritime predation.” As Andrews observes, “Elizabethan sea power thus depended upon the effective amalgamation of a small, but efficient Royal Navy and a large number of voluntary ships, together making up a genuinely national navy.”⁵⁴

Perhaps the best exemplar of the reality of the Royal Navy and voluntary ships working in tandem during this period is Sir Francis Drake. As a privateer, Drake had not only received the distinction of being the first Englishman to circumnavigate the world, but his exploits against the Spanish in the West Indies and his actions during and

⁵² Kenneth R. Andrews, *Trade, plunder and settlement*, pg 26.

⁵³ Dr. Julius Ceasar, as quoted in David Loades, *England's Maritime Empire*, pg 127.

⁵⁴ Kenneth R. Andrews, *Ships, Money and Politics*, pg 139-140.

following the Spanish Armada had earned him a reputation as a hero to the English, and as a “demon of almost mythological proportions”⁵⁵ to the Spanish.

Sir Francis Drake perhaps best embodies the gentlemen pirates who fluidly moved between privateering missions and the Queen’s royal service. His well-known exploits established him as an English hero, most notably his actions against the Spanish Armada which had saved England from invasion. Drake was certainly an exceptionally talented seaman, and his 1577 circumnavigation of the globe did not go unnoticed by England’s foes. Nor, of course, did his menacing actions against the Spanish treasure fleets in the Spanish Caribbean decades earlier. What follows provides an examination of Drake’s relationship with the English Crown to demonstrate the role of privateering in the Elizabethan state.

In *The voyages and travels of that renowned captain Sir Francis Drake. Into the West-Indies, and round about the world* Drake describes himself as being “the World’s Wonder, the Nation’s Glory and Terror to his Enemies”⁵⁶ a compliment with which many of his contemporaries would have agreed with. Drake was adept at concealing his real objectives from his enemies, but as his notoriety rose, so too did Spanish sources of information, and it became nearly impossible for Drake to hide his true destinations.⁵⁷ In fact, Drake’s primary target for his acts as a privateer was indeed the Spanish. As related by John Cooke in “For Francis Drake,” Drake is noted as saying, “So it is that I would gladly be revenged on the Kynge of Spayne, for dyvers iniuries that I have received,

⁵⁵ David Loades, *England's Maritime Empire*, pg 129.

⁵⁶ Sir Francis Drake, *The voyages and travels of that renowned captain Sir Francis Drake. Into the West-Indies, and round about the world* (Stamford, 1725), pg 2.

⁵⁷ Harry Kelsey, *Sir Francis Drake: The Queen's Pirate* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1998), pg 207-208.

and...[Drake] was thonly man that might do this exployte, and withal craved his advice therein. Who told hir Maiestie of the smale good that was to be done in Spayne, but thonly waye was to anoy hym by his Indyes.”⁵⁸ Thus, Drake knew that in order to truly annoy his enemy, the King of Spain, he must attack him in the West Indies, where he was the most exposed and vulnerable. In many respects Drake was, of course, motivated by personal ambition and financial gain. Yet, he was also caught up in the great theological questions of the time, and was inspired by a militant Protestantism and a desire to fight Catholic Spain. As Kenneth R. Andrews argues, Drake became “the personification of holy wrath, [and] emerged as the hero of the nation.”⁵⁹

His first major achievement was his circumnavigation of the globe for which he received a knighthood. This accolade was well-deserved for Drake’s voyage around the world was an incredible feat “conducted for the most part in seas utterly unknown to him and his companions, practically unaided as they were by the available maps and continually in danger of hostile action by Spaniards and Portuguese. No one in that age matched this feat of sustained seamanship.”⁶⁰ Drake travelled around the tip of South America through the perilous Straits of Magellan, north to the coast of present day Ecuador where he managed to capture a Spanish ship laden with twenty-six tonnes of silver and then made his way across the Pacific Ocean to the Moluccas in South East

⁵⁸ Sir Francis Drake, *The World Encompassed*, ed WSW Vaux, “Appendix VI,” (New York: Burt Franklin, 1963), pg 216.

⁵⁹ Kenneth R. Andrews, *Trade, plunder and settlement*, pg 36.

⁶⁰ *Ibid.*, pg 147.

Asia, where he picked up a cargo of spices, and finally returned home to Plymouth in September of 1580.⁶¹

The mere fact that Richard Hakluyt named his description of the circumnavigation “The famous voyage of Sir Francis Drake into the South Sea, and thence about the whole globe of the earth, begun in the year of our Lord, 1577”⁶² goes far to show how important this voyage was to both Drake and the English. Indeed, for the English, Drake became a hero, as evidenced by the fate of his ship, the *Golden Hinde*, which upon his return “was laid up at Deptford where it continued several Years, and was held in great Admiration by many who came to see it”.⁶³ Drake’s voyage around the globe “promoted both confidence and ambition in the maritime forces of the country, for it seemed to lay open the western and eastern worlds to English enterprise. Although for the next two decades those hopes and dreams were continually frustrated, the struggle with Spain ceaselessly nourished them.”⁶⁴ This voyage of course shocked the Spanish. Drake’s circumnavigation and the associated acts of privateering that occurred on this voyage escalated the serious situation between England and Spain.⁶⁵

“The great significance of this circumnavigation was always symbolic” for while it had opened no new trade routes or anything of the like, what it accomplished was to “send out an unequivocal signal to other maritime powers that the English now had

⁶¹ For an excellent first hand account of this voyage, see Richard Hakluyt, *Voyages and Discoveries*, ed. Jack Beeching (Baltimore: Penguin Books, 1972), pp 171-188, and Sir Francis Drake, *The world encompassed*, ed. William SW Vaux (New York: B Franklin, 1963). For a more concise version, see N.A.M. Rodger, *The Safeguard of the Sea* (New York: W.W, Norton & Company, 1998), pg 244.

⁶² Richard Hakluyt, *Voyages and Discoveries*, ed. Jack Beeching, pg 171.

⁶³ Nathaniel Crouch, *The English Hero*, pg 139.

⁶⁴ Kenneth R. Andrews, *Trade, plunder and settlement*, pg 36.

⁶⁵ See Wallace T MacCaffrey, *Queen Elizabeth and the Making of Policy, 1572-1588*. (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1981), pg 302-19.

global aspirations, and the necessary knowledge and skills to make them real.”⁶⁶ Drake’s fame was immense. As one historian has observed of the Spanish King, “like almost everyone else on the continent, Philip often spoke as if the English fleet were just an extension of Francis Drake”⁶⁷ Understandably then, it is difficult to separate the Royal Navy from Drake and the other privateers who served Elizabeth.

Inevitably war between England and Spain broke out in 1585. The fighting at sea for the first two years of the conflict was a minor affair with the continuation of commerce raiding. However, King Philip had larger goals in mind, and he set about building a large fleet, which would become the Spanish Armada. Catching word of the Spanish King’s preparations, Drake plotted his own operation, a pre-emptive strike against Spain’s navy. In March 1587, Drake departed Plymouth with a fleet of twenty-three ships, of which two were Royal Navy ships, and the remainder were privately-owned vessels. Historian David Loades writes that the contract outlining the operation “specified that any plunder was to be divided equally between the Crown and the investors, but at this stage there was no dispute that the aims of the expedition were military.”⁶⁸ The goal was Cadiz, a major Spanish port on the southwest of the Iberian Peninsula from which Spain’s Atlantic fleet was based. When the English arrived on 19 April, they found that the Armada had left. However, as Drake himself described to Walsingham, one of Elizabeth’s most important advisors:

the 19th we arrived into the Road of Cadiz, in Spain, where we found sundry great ships, some laden, some half-laden, and some ready to be laden with the King’s provisions for England. We stayed there until the 21st, in which meantime we sank a Biscayan of 1,200 tons, burnt a ship of the Marquess of

⁶⁶ David Loades, *England's Maritime Empire*, pg 116.

⁶⁷ Garrett Mattingly, *The Armada* (Boston: First Mariners Books, 2005), pg 246.

⁶⁸ David Loades, *England's Maritime Empire*, pg 129.

Santa Cruz of 1,500 tons, and 31 ships more of 1,000, 800, 600, 400 to 200 tons the piece, carried away four with us laden with provisions, and departed thence at our pleasure, with as much honour as we could wish, notwithstanding that during the time of our abode there we were both oftentimes fought withal by twelve of the King's galleys, of whom we sank two, and always repulsed the rest⁶⁹

Drake's mission was a great success. Loades writes that "the surprise was complete, and the destruction immense. At least two dozen ships were burned, and huge quantities of naval stores destroyed." Over the next month, Drake raided several other ports, captured and burned additional ships along the coast of Spain before heading for the Azores, where additional plunder was secured. So, "having satisfied all reasonable expectations, he returned to Plymouth with his prize on 26 June."⁷⁰

Drake's final voyage would be taken on a commission by Elizabeth in 1595. This voyage was meant to quash the "hostile attemptes dailye practised againste this our realme and person, altogether without juste cause given by us"⁷¹ in the "Islands and Main of the West Indies".⁷² Drake and his eminent colleague, Sir John Hawkins, were commissioned to "withstande suche attempt, whereunto both of you have assented, and knowing your approved fidelitie and wisdome, valor, and circumspection." To achieve this end, Drake and Hawkins were given "full power and authoritye to receive at the handes of our Admirall sixe of our shippes".⁷³ Unfortunately, both men, along with many of their crew, succumbed to illnesses while on this expedition. As a contemporary noted of Drake's death, "On the 27 of January...to the Grief of all Englishmen, the

⁶⁹ Sir Francis Drake, "Sir Francis Drake to Walsyngham", 27 April 1585 in Julian S. Corbett, ed., *Papers Relating to the Navy During the Spanish War, 1585-1587*, (London: Navy Records Society, 1898), pg 107-108.

⁷⁰ David Loades, *England's Maritime Empire*, pg 129.

⁷¹ "Commission to Sir John Hawkins and Sir Francis Drake against the Spaniards", 1595 in R.G. Marsden, ed., *Law and Custom of the Sea: 1205-1648*, Vol. I (London: Navy Records Society, 1915), pg 284-285.

⁷² Richard Hakluyt, *Hakluyt's Voyages to the New World*, ed. David Freeman Hawke, pg 185.

⁷³ "Commission to Sir John Hawkins and Sir Francis Drake against the Spaniards", 1595 in R.G. Marsden, ed., *Law and Custom of the Sea: 1205-1648*, Vol. I, pg 284-285.

renowned and truly worthy Sir Francis Drake ended his Days, was set down in a Coffin of Lead into the sea, on which he had so often triumphed; the Drums beating, Cannons sounding at his last Farewel to the World.”⁷⁴ Death while on a privateering mission for Elizabeth, served to ensure that Drake’s heroic status was maintained. Unlike some of his colleagues, Drake was saved from potential ruin under the rule of James by his untimely death while doing that which had made him so famous and engrained in the myth of England’s Elizabethan sea power.

Sir Francis Drake serves as a perfect exemplar of the good relationship that privateers had with both the Crown and the Royal Navy under Elizabeth. His fluid movement from his own private ventures to those with the Royal Navy illustrates the important cohesion between the public and private spheres in terms of foreign and defence policy during this era. However, Sir Francis Drake was just one privateer among many who rose to fame under Elizabeth, with men such as Sir John Hawkins and Sir Walter Raleigh also rising as prominent figures in both the Royal Navy and the private sector. The profits that these men supplied the Crown with, as well as the experience that they brought to the Royal Navy and their effective use as a strategic tool against the Spanish all contributed to the rise of England as an important seapower. The failure of the Spanish Armada and the success of Drake’s expeditions, especially that to Cadiz, showcase emergence of a powerful and effective English Royal Navy. This navy had the support of privateers, which were in turn supported by the Crown; when Elizabeth’s successor, James I, weakened the power of privateers, the Royal Navy suffered as well. Thus, the legacy of the Elizabethan period did not last long.

⁷⁴ Sir Francis Drake, *The voyages and travels of that renowned captain Sir Francis Drake. Into the West-Indies, and round about the world* (Stamford: publisher unknown, 1725), pg 23.

Chapter Two

“I have no intention of obeying the orders of one king when I am, in a way, a king myself”

With the death of Queen Elizabeth on 24 March 1603, the golden age of English privateering came to an end. Under Elizabeth, England’s privateers had had a powerful patron; under her successor, James VI of Scotland and James I of England, they found someone unwilling to offer them support or official sanction. Still, privateering persevered through the subterfuge of various English nobles and officials as well as the efforts of the privateers themselves to preserve a lucrative means of employment and, even if unauthorized, a way of preserving England’s maritime and domestic security. Further, the privateers continued to have an important impact upon the development of the Royal Navy. The early Stuart years were, however, trying ones for English sailors especially in comparison with the heyday of privateering under the Elizabethan regime.

When James inherited the throne of England from Elizabeth, he had already been King of Scotland for nearly 36 years. The only child of Mary, Queen of Scots, one of Elizabeth’s chief rivals, James had ascended to the Scottish throne in July 1567 when he was just over a year old. This was after his mother had been forced to abdicate her crown following an ill advised marriage to the Earl of Bothwell, the man widely assumed to have murdered her previous husband and James’s father, Henry Stuart, the Lord Darnley. England, for its part, largely supported the regency of James, seeing a toddler on the Scottish throne as being preferable to his ever-plotting, and solidly Catholic mother. This support, which saw the English wage war against Mary’s forces to secure James’s spot on

the throne, turned Scotland's focus from its "Auld Allegiance" with France to its "auld inemie", England.¹

Regardless of this newly formed alliance, before Elizabeth's death James had acted as the king of an independent nation, which he was, and sought to pursue the interests of his own kingdom. This often meant that he had refused to bow to Elizabeth's wishes simply because he hoped to inherit her kingdom and differences arose particularly in areas of foreign policy. Not only did James refuse to co-operate when the arrival of the Spanish Armada in English waters seemed imminent and when England itself was gravely threatened, but he also managed to extract a nearly £58,000 annual pension from Elizabeth.² For the most part, James's kingship in Scotland was relatively successful, but it was that very success which made his rule of England all the more difficult. While the leading English politicians like Sir Robert Cecil assumed not only that James would let Scotland fade into the background, but also that he would take efforts to defend first and foremost the interests of the English Crown. James had different ideas. His long success as Scotland's ruler led him to believe that he was a capable leader, and James saw himself not as King of Scotland and England separately, but as the King of Britain.³ Moreover, James had an important advantage over his predecessors in that he was an adult male, with heirs, no less. This was a drastic and seemingly welcome change for the English, whose previous three monarchs had been two childless queens, and a sickly young man who had died young. In the form of James I then, England found stability in the succession.

¹ Jenny Wormald, "James VI & I," *History Today* 52, no. 6 (June 2002), pg 27-28.

² *Ibid.*, pg 29.

³ *Ibid.*, pg 29-30.

More importantly for the purposes of this thesis, James's accession to the throne brought not only great change to the rule of England and Scotland, but also to the navy and, more widely, to English foreign and defence policy. Unlike Elizabeth, who spent decades at war with the Spanish, James's focus was peace, and he was not afraid to make sweeping changes in order to ensure this came to pass. His efforts included seeking to improve relations with Spain, England's chief foreign rival. In May 1603, less than two months after he acceded to the throne, James outlawed the practice of privateering, which had proven a tool of foreign policy under Elizabeth. Moreover, not only did James refuse to grant new Letters of Marque to privateers, but he also declared all those Letters of Marque or Reprisal made "in the tyme of the Queene our sister deceased" were thereby "voyd, from the day of her death".⁴ By declaring documents which had officially sanctioned privateering null and void, James immediately put his own mark upon English relations with Spain. The punishment for those who did not upon hearing of this declaration and not "desisting from all spoyle, molestation or violence" immediately return to home ports, was that they "shal be taken and executed...as a pyrate."⁵ A subsequent declaration, explicitly noted that Spain was no longer a target and again rescinded letters of reprisal or warrants that may have been granted by the late Queen against that country.⁶ These declarations represented both a complete departure from Elizabeth's naval strategies as well as a new direction for Anglo-Spanish relations. It was reflective of a Jacobean pacific policy which sought to avoid costly European wars and reduce strain on coffers which had been all but left bare by years of Elizabethan

⁴ The National Archives United Kingdom [hereafter referred to as T.N.A.U.K.], "Declaration by King James I," May 1603, State Papers [hereafter referred to as SP] 14/1/111 fol. 252.

⁵ T.N.A.U.K., SP 14/1/111 fol. 252.

⁶ T.N.A.U.K., SP 14/1/111 fol. 253.

governance.⁷ No longer would privateers be relied upon by the Crown to help ease the financial burden of war on England, nor would they be used to weaken England's enemies. Further it seemed that the expertise and skill that had been gained by the privateers would also be lost to England. Sir Francis Drake, and other "gentlemen pirates" and heroes of the Spanish Armada and men like them were no longer to have the same place of pride in the English hierarchy or in the Royal Navy. With the death of Elizabeth, the so-called "Pirate Queen"⁸ a new monarch ascended the English throne and he was not intent on being a 'pirate king'. In fact his actions were not only motivated by his desire to seek peace but he was also driven by a personal outlook. As one historian has noted of James, "he, unlike his predecessor, detested corsairs."⁹

The manoeuvre of seeking peace with Spain was very much in line with James's overall character. As the noted historian N.A.M Rodger observed, James "was himself a man of peace; his upbringing in a weak and unstable kingdom had taught him the risks of war and men of war, at home and abroad."¹⁰ This did not, as Rodger is keen to point out, mean that James was uninterested and uninformed about governance; rather he was simply perhaps overly cautious from his experience of ruling Scotland, which was by no means one of Europe's more important powers nor was it known for its naval strength. So Rodger concedes that "James was a learned and in many ways an intelligent man, keenly interested in politics, and much better informed about foreign affairs than most of his English subjects, but not interested in administrative detail."¹¹ During his time on the

⁷ John Guy, *Tudor England* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1988), pg 455-457.

⁸ Susan Ronald, *The Pirate Queen* (New York: HarperCollins Publishers, 2007).

⁹ Kenneth R. Andrews, *The Spanish Caribbean* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1978), pg 192.

¹⁰ N.A.M. Rodger, *The Safeguard of the Sea* (New York: W.W, Norton & Company, 1998), pg 347.

¹¹ *Ibid.*, pg 347.

Scottish throne, James had entirely different dealings with the Spanish than Elizabeth, and so when he succeeded her, these past experiences influenced him greatly.

Following his outlawing of privateering in May 1603, James sought, in June, the restoration of all prizes taken by his subjects since his accession to the throne and also opened negotiations with Spain for a formal peace. This was concluded the following year, in August 1604, with the Treaty of London.¹² Once this treaty had been successfully concluded, James's "attitude emerged still more clearly" for James had promised the Spanish ambassador to England that he would "execute any who 'set forth to disturb your majesty's seas.'"¹³ With this threat, many privateers withdrew from attacking Spanish ships operating out of Spain's ports. Evidently, James's referral to 'your majesty's seas' also included the Caribbean. The Spanish had long viewed the English 'gentlemen adventurers' and privateers in the West Indies as no more than pirates, and James could not permit their activities to continue. In this vein, when the Spanish ambassador requested that James personally ensure that the prizes that a certain Captain Cleeve had captured in the Caribbean earlier that year be returned, the judge overhearing the case noted, "the king's majesty is very earnest to give all lawful expedition to the said lord ambassador's desire."¹⁴ James also "frankly assured the ambassador that 'he had no wish to permit his subjects to go to the Spanish Indies and places already reached by his [the King of Spain's] forces, but to many other parts of America.'"¹⁵

¹² Kenneth R. Andrews, *Trade, plunder and settlement*. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1984), pg 253.

¹³ *Ibid.*, pg 286.

¹⁴ T.N.A.U.K. High Court of Admiralty [hereafter referred to as HCA], 14/36, fol. 221.

¹⁵ As quoted in Kenneth R. Andrews, *The Spanish Caribbean*, pg 218-219.

In the pursuit of peace with Spain, not only was James willing to punish English privateers, but he was also set on turning a blind eye to Spanish reprisals against those circumventing his May 1603 decrees outlawing privateering. In December 1604 the Privy Council had received a complaint that nearly forty Englishmen had been murdered by Spanish forces in Puerto Rico. Even though they had apparently been killed “with great cruelty” any dispute between English sailors and Spain was silenced because, as one of James’s officials argued, since these men were breaking the treaty, committing piracy and acting without the King’s licence, they had suffered the consequences and there was nothing more to be said or done.¹⁶ That James allowed the brutal deaths of nearly forty of his subjects to go unpunished, speaks to how committed he was to peace with Spain. From his perspective, James was not one to let his newly secured peace with the Spanish slip out of his hands because of the actions of some rogue English sailors.

In taking these steps towards peace, James confronted a divided nobility. As historian Kenneth R. Andrews has argued, English public opinion consisted of “those – probably a majority of the political nation – who welcomed the end of a burdensome war, looking forward to a resurgence of trade... as the Iberian ports were opened to English ships, and those who, like Raleigh and Richard Hawkins, urged the continuation of the war, pointing to Spain’s weakness and the opportunity it gave for gain.”¹⁷ There was thus a divide between those who believed that peace could bring them prosperity and bring security to England, and those for whom war was the means to achieve these things. Additionally, as ‘burdensome’ as the Spanish war may have been to many, the noted historian Paul M. Kennedy rightly observed in his seminal work *The Rise and Fall*

¹⁶ Kenneth R. Andrews, *The Spanish Caribbean*, pg 219.

¹⁷ Kenneth R. Andrews, *Trade, plunder and settlement*, pg 253-254.

of British Naval Mastery, the long war with Spain had given England “world renown.”¹⁸ Regardless of these contributions, the end of the war meant that the ‘burden’ of keeping the fleet could be lifted from the English and vast reductions in the country’s armed services could ensue what in modern times would be called a ‘peace dividend.’ These reductions, however, were to prove impossible for the navy to sustain. As the noted historian Jeremy Black observes, “the withdrawal of royal support for the navy by James, and his antagonism towards piracy and privateering, had removed an underpinning of naval capacity”. Further, Black notes that “the expeditions of the 1620s showed that, within 20 years, English naval capability had been severely diminished, with a drastic decrease in the competence of its commanders and a serious failure in logistics.”¹⁹ However loud the complaints about the navy got, in a state of peace, the grumblings of sailors and their supporters were ignored by the Crown.

Despite this protectionism, the Jacobean state found it possible to outlaw privateering for the simple reason that by the time James became King, there were fewer privateers to oppose his policies. By 1603 many of Elizabeth’s most successful captains, men lauded as heroes, such as Frobisher, Grenville, Hawkins, and Drake had all met their demise, and hence left a void in the naval hierarchy and deprived the navy of important advocates for its interests. Furthermore, the death of these men robbed the navy of men who had sought to enforce professionalism amongst the naval forces. Thus, during the early years of James’ rule, from 1605 to 1608, “it was claimed that fraud cost the Admiralty over £39,000 ... and nobody could quantify the decline in efficiency and

¹⁸ Paul M. Kennedy, *The Rise and Fall of British Naval Mastery* (London: Penguin Books, 2001), pg 38.

¹⁹ Jeremy Black, *The British Seaborne Empire* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2004), pg 50.

morale.”²⁰ Gone were the days when the English fleet and the privateers were seen as the bulwark of English power. As Kennedy has asserted, “the fleet was laid up and allowed to languish; corruption was rampant throughout the naval administration; the merchant fleets were at the mercy of Dunkirk pirates and Barbary corsairs; and privateering by Englishmen was forbidden by the new monarch.”²¹ These problems and the obvious loss of prestige caused by demobilization and scaled backed naval spending at the end of the war with Spain understandably created contempt from many English citizens for the new posture of English foreign and defence policy. In fact, as Kennedy has argued, “observations were openly made, by Englishmen and foreigners alike, about this decline and...many agreed with Sir Edward Coke’s nostalgic complaint that ‘England never prospered so much as when she was at war with Spain’.”²² Peace, then, was the King’s ultimate goal as he sought to be at ease in his new kingdom, but the mundane details surrounding this peace were left to be dealt with by other officials. This resulted in the King’s goal being undermined by some who did not share his ultimate aim.

Although Elizabeth was dead, many of her trusted political advisors maintained their power upon James’s accession and they carried on her legacy of supporting privateering. One of these nobles, indeed one of the most powerful and influential of these, was Sir Robert Cecil who impatiently waited for several weeks as James made the journey from Edinburgh to London. This worried Cecil, who was concerned that his influence over the new monarch could be affected by those who were intent on gaining the new King’s favour who were simply travelling north to intercept his party while Cecil

²⁰ David Loades, *England's Maritime Empire* (Harlow: Pearson Education Limited, 2000), pg 150.

²¹ Paul M. Kennedy, *The Rise and Fall of British Naval Mastery*, pg 38.

²² *Ibid.*, pg 38.

remained in London with nothing to do but await James's arrival.²³ Cecil need not have worried, however, as he was able to manage James's peaceful accession well and did so while maintaining his prominent position of power within the court. Yet, his influence with the new King on naval matters was undermined. James's intense interest in peace, which, as has been seen, included orchestrating the end of privateers, created tension with both Cecil and Lord Nottingham, who held the post of Lord High Admiral. As Rodger observed, "King James disliked pirates as much as any other men of violence, but Sir Robert Cecil discreetly, and Lord Nottingham openly in his official capacity of Lord Admiral, were the effective heads of the privateering interest which had grown and gained so much during the war."²⁴ Kenneth R. Andrews, meanwhile, has astutely opined that even though Cecil and Nottingham were a "political force not to be sneezed at", James "made it clear from the start his intention to direct foreign policy."²⁵ Still, although the new King had lofty ambitions for peace with Spain - which entailed the cessation of English privateers as a tool to annoy the Spanish - other quite powerful men in England were not of the same persuasion.

By the Treaty of London in 1604, and the effective end of English privateering, "the enterprise and the capital that for nearly 20 years had been channelled into privateering became available for new activities."²⁶ The easiest option, which required the least amount of effort, was for the privateers to simply turn to piracy itself. Thus, as historian David Loades asserted, "many small operators shifted their bases to southern Ireland, and worked out of minor havens like Kinsale and Baltimore, preying on

²³ Jenny Wormald, "James VI & I," pg 30.

²⁴ N.A.M. Rodger, *The Safeguard of the Sea*, pg 347.

²⁵ Kenneth R. Andrews, *The Spanish Caribbean*, pg 218.

²⁶ David Loades, *England's Maritime Empire*, pg 139.

legitimate trade without regard to nationality.”²⁷ Legitimate trade also benefitted from the funds that had, until recently, been invested in privateering ventures as upgraded ships were able to switch easily from commerce-raiding to commerce-carrying. Additionally, while traditional trading routes with Europe changed little after privateering was outlawed, there was now “a much greater willingness to risk money in speculative ventures than there had been in the nervous 1570s and 1580s.”²⁸ English merchant vessels now plied the waters of the Indian Ocean, the North Atlantic and into the Spanish Caribbean. This does not mean, though, that overseas trade became any safer than it had before. In fact, James’s ban of privateers had just the opposite effect. Without privateers and with a very weak navy, merchants now had to protect their own wares. Not only did this make life at sea more dangerous for merchants, but it was also worrisome because other European monarchs had not outlawed privateering, leaving ‘British’ merchants vulnerable, and with no English privateers to help reclaim any losses.²⁹ Regardless of the legitimate, albeit more dangerous trade available to former privateers and their supporters, it was piracy that appealed to most of these men.

James did see some successes. 1608, for example, saw the establishment of Piracy Commissions, which were responsible for the dismissal of the Elizabethan naval hero, Sir Richard Hawkins and which “chastened others.” The following year saw a truce between Spain and the Netherlands, which served to reduce the acts of piracy in the English Channel as there were less warships to prey upon. These achievements were undermined, though, because while piracy subsided in the Channel, “in Ireland, and

²⁷ David Loades, *England's Maritime Empire*, pg 139.

²⁸ *Ibid.*, pg 139.

²⁹ Paul M. Kennedy, *The Rise and Fall of British Naval Mastery*, pg 39.

especially among the English settlers of the Munster plantation...the old attitudes persist.”³⁰ The sailors based in these ports had a powerful patron. Lord Nottingham, who was still Lord High Admiral and was as dedicated to piracy as he had ever been, “was his own Vice-Admiral for Munster, and his deputies were deeply committed to piracy.” Moreover, “Baltimore and Crookhaven were the great pirate bases, where all the justices and indeed all the population were involved. The men went to sea with the pirates, sold them victuals or bought their booty; the women of Baltimore were reported to be all the wives or mistresses of pirates.”³¹ In such places where the entire population supported piracy in one way or another, it is easy to understand why piracy reached the level it did. James’s government really had no solution to this scale of piracy and throughout his reign it intensified into a large problem before eventually receding. As N.A.M Rodger has forcefully asserted, “it is not altogether clear why [piracy] declined” by the end of James’s reign because throughout it was so popular.³²

Piracy became a growing problem under James’s reign, with many sailors continuing to act without sanction or support and indeed with the threat of severe punishment from the English Crown. James sought to remove the problem of piracy by issuing a general pardon for pirates in 1612, this action was “intended as an amnesty to encourage pirates to abandon their trade.”³³ This policy was meant to curb the problem of piracy which had been steadily growing since James had outlawed privateering. Yet piracy was popular, and despite the inducement that the pardon allowed pirates to keep their spoils, only a few sailors came forward to take it; instead many of them continued

³⁰ N.A.M. Rodger, *The Safeguard of the Sea*, pg 349.

³¹ *Ibid.*, pg 349.

³² *Ibid.*, pg 349.

³³ *Ibid.*, pg 348.

on but moved their bases of operations from England to Ireland. With James's fierce opposition to piracy of any sort, Rodger explains that, "[t]he most successful of the Jacobean pirates were based in overseas ports, usually Mamora or Sallee in Morocco in wintertime, and Munster in the summer."³⁴ These pirate leaders, such as Henry Mainwaring and Peter Easton, had the command of powerful squadrons that could put the ships of the Royal Navy to shame. An event in 1612 illustrates the power that these pirate leaders truly held in comparison to those serving the English Crown. As Rodger describes, "Richard Bishop, vice-admiral to Captain John Ward ... arrived in Irish waters with a squadron of ten or eleven ships carrying a thousand men; Easton had at least twenty ships."³⁵ In the name of the King, Bishop hoped to defeat Easton or at least bring him to terms; Easton refused to surrender and instead defiantly stated "I have no intention of obeying the orders of one king when I am, in a way, a king myself."³⁶ His larger fleet then defeated that of Bishop. Rodger has pointed out that this event, while not significant in itself, was reflective of the power that former privateers had at this time. As he put it, "The years 1608 to 1614 were the heyday of these English and Dutch pirates, and the north Atlantic was their cruising ground, from Iceland to the Canaries, and from the Newfoundland Banks to the Channel."³⁷ There was little incentive for these pirates to abandon their trade, and the aforementioned general pardon of 1612 certainly was not enough to effectively curb piracy on this scale.

Furthermore, the disincentives of piracy were not really enough to dissuade sailors from becoming pirates because while James wanted those guilty of piracy to be

³⁴ N.A.M. Rodger, *The Safeguard of the Sea*, pg 349.

³⁵ *Ibid.*, pg 349.

³⁶ Quoted in Barbara Fuchs, "Faithless Empires: Pirates, Renegadoes, and the English Nation," *ELH: English Literary History* 67, no. 1 (Spring 2000), pg 69.

³⁷ N.A.M. Rodger, *The Safeguard of the Sea*, pg 349.

dealt with harshly, many officials did not feel the same way. Indeed when pirates were captured, the crew was most often pardoned, as were many of the leaders. Especially near the end of James's reign, maritime regulations had gradually become circumvented more than they had been when he was a new King of England. In 1624, when a Dutch admiral finally captured an infamous Scottish pirate, Captain Herriot, he did not act in a manner reflecting James's detestation of pirates. Rather, the admiral instead shockingly suggested that, "if his Majesty's mercy give them life they may prove able and honest subjects."³⁸ A nearly identical argument was made by other officials in 1626. In this case, the Lord Deputy of Ireland recommended that another captured pirate, one Captain Sallenenfue, be pardoned as "a spirit of action and experience both of seas and foreign countries [who may be of] valuable service in these stirring times."³⁹ By this point, it must be noted, England had become embroiled in a war after nearly thirty years of peace, so there is no doubt that this return to armed conflict at least offers some way of explaining the drastic return to the view that the experience that pirate gains may, in fact, be useful to the state. Much like Elizabethan naval heroes such as Drake and Hawkins, men such as Robert Walsingham and Henry Mainwaring ended their careers not as pirates, but as men of substance in the King's fleet.⁴⁰

Although James did not support piracy or privateering, he was not above trying to claim his share when booty laden ships returned to English ports. This can be illustrated with a situation that occurred in 1623. In that year, the East India Company had lent their support to the Persians with the aim of pushing the Portuguese out of the port of Hormuz

³⁸ Sir J. Bagge to Lord Buckingham, 21 August 1624, Historical Manuscripts Commission, *Cowper* I, 123.

³⁹ Lord Falkland to the Duke of Buckingham, 8 February 1626 in Robert Pentland Mahaffy, ed., *Calendar of State Papers Relating to Ireland preserved in the Public Records Office, 1625-1670*, (London: Eyre and Spottiswoode, 1900), pg 90.

⁴⁰ N.A.M. Rodger, *The Safeguard of the Sea*, pg 348-349.

and reclaiming it for the Persians. This helped the East India Company, for a short time, ease the rivalry that the Portuguese presented them with in the far east. Yet again in 1622 after the fall of Hormuz, the Lord High Admiral, Duke of Buckingham and one of James's favourites, claimed a tenth share of the prizes that the company took in the campaign. The East India Company, "resolved to stand on their innocency"⁴¹, but the alternative to this claim, was that the participants would be charged as pirates and have all of the prizes seized. Buckingham received £10,000, which prompted James to complain to the company's directors "Did I deliver you from the complaint of the Spaniard and do you return me nothing?",⁴² which prompted the directors to grant him the same amount.⁴³ By 1622, however, the situation with Spain was quickly deteriorating, and James's bribed support of the Hormuz campaign would not have been conceivable in his earlier years on the English throne.

Regardless of James's distaste for supporting privateers, his reign saw, as Andrews notes, "the effective beginnings of the British Empire: the establishment of colonies in North America, the development of direct trade with the East, and even the first annexation of territory in a recognized Spanish sphere of influence – the West Indies."⁴⁴ These efforts were undertaken by people who engaged in acts of privateering and in actions which were often contrary to James's wish for peace with Spain. This included a number of nobles, including Cecil and Nottingham, all of whom had an interest in privateering. England's increased colonial initiative began in 1606, a mere

⁴¹ Edward Nicholas, Minutes "touching the business of Ormuz, and more especially the prizes taken in the Indies by the East India Company", 23 July 1623, in W. Noel Sainsbury, ed., *Calendar of State Papers Colonial, East Indies, China and Japan, 1622-1624*, Vol. IV (London: Public Records Office, 1878), 303.

⁴² *Ibid.*, 303.

⁴³ Kenneth R. Andrews, *Trade, plunder and settlement*, pg 278.

⁴⁴ *Ibid.*, pg 13.

three years after James's accession to the throne. This was not, though, a venture made by the Crown of its own volition; rather, it was a "response to pressure from below" as nobles sought to enrich themselves through expanded trade and settlement opportunities overseas. Moreover, the Crown itself "seemed more concerned to assert royal sovereignty over the colonies than to govern them – or even create an effective form of government."⁴⁵ For a time, the colonies and companies were "advised, instructed and supervised" by the King's council, on which Cecil served, however, the colonies and companies themselves were "left the work of administration, justice, evangelization, exploitation, trade and so forth." The Crown's rather lofty interest in the colonies did not translate into funds for the companies; instead James sought a relaxed approach to expansion. Still, he did see the value of it and made clear to stake claim to "a fifth of the precious metals produced"⁴⁶ by the colonies. The financial gains that the colonies presented were welcomed by a King who was constantly lacking funds, but the responsibility for these overseas possessions was not something that the English Crown was yet prepared to undertake. Despite the mercantilist approach of the English King to England's expansion overseas, this competition for land and trade nevertheless raised the spectre of tension and war with other European powers.

Just as privateers suffered under James's rule, so too did the navy. During Elizabeth's reign, men such as John Hawkins and Francis Drake had not only been knighted, but also rose in the ranks of the admiralty and played an important role in redesigning the Royal Navy. These men not only had proven their skills and efficiency at sea and in administration, but they did, of course, engage in privateering. This latter

⁴⁵ Kenneth R. Andrews, *Trade, plunder and settlement*, pg 312-313.

⁴⁶ *Ibid.*, pg 312-313.

issue was, or has been shown, no minor concern to James, and under his rule men who had engaged in privateering were marginalized. Further, during James's reign things were much different for another reason, as it was social rank rather than pure skill that allowed men to rise in the High Admiralty.⁴⁷ James's efforts thus influenced the type of sailor who was recruited into the navy and those tainted by having engaged in privateering, despite their skills and valuable experience, were often dismissed and blocked from senior and important positions.

This was no small matter because the navy that James inherited had become a permanent force in the Tudor period, well before the Stuarts ascended the English throne. The fleet that he commanded was not large, but it was considered to be "by far the finest fleet of men-of-war then afloat, for it was not until the close of the sixteenth century that Spain and Holland commenced to build ships for purely fighting purposes."⁴⁸ Elizabeth left James about thirty-one ships of 100 tons and upwards. This number can be deceiving, however, as it can easily be compared to the twenty-five ships that Elizabeth received from Mary I, and is still less than the twenty-eight that Edward VI inherited from Henry VIII.⁴⁹ Nevertheless, as Paul M. Kennedy astutely claims:

James's reign...helps us to see how fragile and immature English naval power was at the beginning of the seventeenth century. It only needed a monarch who lacked interest in the service or a Commons which declined to vote men into its still primitive administration – and a sharp decline was inevitable. There was no standing national concern in the existence of a large fleet, not at least if it also meant an increase in permanent taxation.⁵⁰

⁴⁷ Jan Glete, *Warfare at Sea, 1500-1650*, (New York: Routledge, 2000), pg 53.

⁴⁸ M. Oppenheim, *A History of the Administration of the Royal Navy and of Merchant Shipping in Relation to the Navy* (London: The Shoe String Press, Inc, 1961), pg 184.

⁴⁹ Kenneth R. Andrews, *Trade, plunder and settlement*, pg 25.

⁵⁰ Paul M. Kennedy, *The Rise and Fall of British Naval Mastery*, pg 38.

An increase in permanent taxation, as will soon be seen, was not something that the House of Commons could seem to fully understand the need for. This was, in part, because of the glorification of English history, which saw people beginning to believe that not only had England won its previous war with Spain, but moreover, that it had profited from it. With such an idea held in the common consciousness, it is little wonder that the Parliament was reluctant to raise taxation for a cause that should very well be able to pay for itself, as it had in the past.⁵¹

This became important because towards the end of his reign, James began to take a more active role in European politics and this raised the spectre of war during which the navy would need to play a vital role. In a bid to form concrete ties between England and Spain, in 1623, James attempted to arrange a marriage between his eldest son and heir, Charles, and the Spanish Infanta. Having already married his daughter, Elizabeth, to Frederick V, the Elector of Palatine, and staunch Protestant, James sought to marry Charles to the Catholic Spanish Infanta. Religion, though, which may well have been a motivating factor for James who wanted to represent both Catholicism and Protestantism in his dynasty, made this union impossible. The Spanish could not conceive of marrying a princess to a heretic, and it would be utterly impossible for the heir of the English Crown to convert to Catholicism. Charles, however, did not accept this rejection, and he, along with Lord Admiral Buckingham, travelled incognito to Spain in an attempt to woo the Spanish princess himself. The mission ended in disaster, and an embarrassed Charles and Lord Buckingham returned to England and added their support to the growing cries demanding war with Spain. These cries were largely the result of James's son-in-law,

⁵¹ David Loades, *England's Maritime Empire*, pg 153.

Frederick V, Elector Palatine who had been elected as the King of Bohemia. This had upset the Catholic balance of power in the Holy Roman Empire, and had resulted in Frederick losing both his titles. The English, it seemed to many, had little choice but to ally themselves with the Protestant Netherlands, Denmark and Sweden against the Catholic Spain and the Holy Roman Empire. It was in the midst of this tense political climate that Charles and Buckingham travelled to Spain to win the hand in marriage of the Spanish princess.⁵²

In the end, Charles was betrothed and married to Henrietta Maria, sister of France's King Louis XIII. Louis XIII demanded English religious concessions be made in return for his sister's hand, much as Philip had before him in return for the Spanish Infanta. This time, however, Buckingham succeeded in convincing James that such concessions were well worth the advantage of a military alliance with France, and so, in November 1624, James signed the Anglo-Franco marriage treaty. The religious concessions of the treaty meant that James "had to undertake to suspend the recusancy laws in England" which were fines for non-attendance at church, "and to promise naval help against the colony of French Huguenots (Protestants) at La Rochelle who had rebelled in order to defend their freedom of worship."⁵³ Although James was "ashamed of these concessions [and] preferred not to face Parliament again in late 1624 as he had originally planned",⁵⁴ the marriage of Charles to the Catholic Henrietta Maria, was along

⁵² N.A.M. Rodger, *The Safeguard of the Sea*, pg 353-356. For a more thorough discussion of the potential match of Charles I and the Spanish Infanta, please refer to Glyn Redworth, *The Prince and the Infanta: The Cultural Politics of the Spanish Match* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2003).

⁵³ David L. Smith, *A History of the Modern British Isles, 1603-1707: The Double Crown* (Oxford: Blackwell Publishers, 1998), pg 64 and 38.

⁵⁴ *Ibid.*, pg 64.

the lines of his “ideal of a ‘general Christian union in religion.’”⁵⁵ As the historian David L. Smith observes, James was “less unequivocally hostile towards papists than were many of his subjects,” and was careful to preserve the distinction between moderate and radical Catholics as he did between the same extremes of Protestantism.⁵⁶ These concessions were in line with James’s earlier attempts to secure the Spanish Infanta with religious measures, and had gone so far as to “[ease] restrictions on English Catholics, while suppressing critical Puritan sermons and pamphlets.” These actions, along with the more radical terms James accepted in Henrietta Maria’s marriage treaty “were disliked not only by a large segment of the English population, but by several of James’ own privy councillors, [and] had significant ramifications in domestic politics.”⁵⁷

The Parliament of 1624 was called to release funds for the war against Spain, but “few members of the Commons had any conception of the cost of modern war; most believed that war against Spain would pay for itself without taxation, or that fresh burdens laid on the English Catholics would provide all that was needed.”⁵⁸ This misconception was a large stumbling block on the path to adequately preparing for war. The House of Commons notoriously “tended to regard tax grants, not as necessary preparation for war, but as a reward for success in a godly cause.”⁵⁹ As archaic as this may seem, it was not a problem that was confined to England, as many European monarchs were faced with an unwillingness to tax subjects in times of war. As Rodger notes, “everywhere in Europe, parliaments inherited from the Middle Ages strove to

⁵⁵ David L. Smith, *A History of the Modern British Isles, 1603-1707: The Double Crown*, pg 38.

⁵⁶ *Ibid.*, pg 38.

⁵⁷ Malcolm Smuts, “Religion, European Politics and Henrietta Maria’s Circle, 1625-41” in Erin Griffey, ed., *Henrietta Maria: Piety, Politics and Patronage*, (Burlington, VT: Ashgate Publishing Limited, 2008), pg 14.

⁵⁸ N.A.M. Rodger, *The Safeguard of the Sea*, pg 356.

⁵⁹ *Ibid.*, pg 357.

protect traditional liberties, above all the right of the well-to-do not to pay taxes, and insisted that war and foreign policy was the business of kings.”⁶⁰ As is generally the case, it took some time for the English to comprehend the new realities and actual costs in waging warfare in the seventeenth century. In fact, “most Englishmen in 1624 ... were committed to the idea that the ancient constitution would answer all their requirements, that victory could be had without compromising liberty.”⁶¹ It was against all these elements that Buckingham was forced to face when it came time to prepare for war.

In 1625, Buckingham did just that, with very little funds at his disposal. Moreover, it had been almost three decades since England had been at war, thanks largely to James’s inherent need and desire for peace. Worse still, “[b]ecause of the acute shortage of money, the force took far too long to prepare. Only when the victuals had been provided did the Ordnance Board begin to get money, so that food was consumed or decayed while the ships waited for powder and shot.” This waste was immense, even in a navy that by this point in time, had become comfortable with widespread corruption. The naval fleet comprised of one hundred ships (thirteen of which belonged to the King, and twenty belonged to the Dutch), set sail on 8 October 1625, and was “poorly found in many essentials, and immediately ran into an equinoctial gale. Old, leaky ships overloaded with guns laboured badly. Spars and rigging were rotten; the captain of the *St George* even claimed that his second suit of sails had been worn by the *Triumph* against the Armada in 1588.”⁶² As problematic as the general disrepair of the fleet was, it was also faced with poor and hasty planning, adding to an already slim chance of victory.

⁶⁰ N.A.M. Rodger, *The Safeguard of the Sea*, pg 357.

⁶¹ *Ibid.*, pg 357.

⁶² *Ibid.*, pg 357.

The fleet lacked successful strategies, it seems, as much as it wanted for able, sea ready ships. After prolonged discussions, it was the major Spanish trading port of Cadiz which was chosen as the point of attack in the following campaign. The expedition was, in short, a complete and utter disaster, with Buckingham taking most of the blame for the failure. According to N.A.M. Rodger, “when Cecil’s fleet entered the bay [at Cadiz] he lost his chance of surprise in prolonged consultations, in spite of which the attack was made in complete disorder. The merchantmen refused to fight, most of the King’s ships waited for orders, and only Lord Essex and the Dutch showed any initiative”⁶³ The Spanish were able to move their merchant ships to safety, and maintained the flow of supplies to the city by carting them in from across the bay. Adding to this failure, as David Loades notes, “most of [the] officers were both inexperienced and inept, owing their promotions to their courtly connections with Buckingham rather than any capacity to do the job required. Experienced seamen were available, but were kept in subordinate positions.”⁶⁴

The situation only became more troublesome when the English ground troops landed at Cadiz. The soldiers arrived on land without food, which resulted in the hungry soldiers finding wine and proceeded to become too drunk to fight anyone, with the exception of themselves when someone accidentally fired on their own ranks. Sir John Glanville, a member of the expedition noted in his journal that the soldiers had been “utterly forsaken by the Inhabitantes and all their goodes carried awaie, save onely what was left to doe us mischief.” After setting up camp for the night, the situation only grew worse with:

⁶³ N.A.M. Rodger, *The Safeguard of the Sea*, pg 358.

⁶⁴ David Loades, *England's Maritime Empire*, pg 153.

the Soliders...having obtayned...wyne for every Regiment, therewith to refresh themselves, were soe disordered in the expence thereof, that some of the worsor sorte, being first distempd therewith, sett on the rest and grew to demand more wyne, in such disorder and with such violence that they contemned all command and sett light not onlie by their ordinary officers but even by the more eminent Comanders, not repecting my Lo. Leiutenant himselfe, nor abstained from slighting his authority, useing base and contemptuous wordes both against his person and place.⁶⁵

The return journey fared no better than the attack had, with disease spreading amongst the overcrowded ships, and rotting victuals exacerbating the problems. The fleet was scattered, with more than one ship only narrowly avoiding sinking. One of the worst of these, the *Anne Royal* “took in so much water as all the mariners were forced to work in water up to their knees.”⁶⁶ The return journey was as arduous and dangerous as the short lived campaign had been, and proved to be nearly as deadly, with some ships returning with far fewer men than with which they had departed the battle. Loades makes a significant observation that “Buckingham had either forgotten, or had never known, that victories at sea are not won only by good weapons and heroics. Without trained captains and efficient support services, even the best of fleets can achieve nothing. The Cadiz expedition cost thousands of lives, almost entirely by starvation and disease, and something approaching £500,000 in cash.”⁶⁷

Under James’s rule, the navy became rife with corruption, with seamen finding ways to bolster their wages in nearly every way possible. Charging the Crown double for supplies, officers paying themselves the wages of admirals,⁶⁸ and perhaps most cynically, reports of “victuallers, pursers, and even cooks” trading their good victuals for

⁶⁵ Sir John Glanville, *The Voyage to Cadiz in 1625 : being a journal written by John Glanville* (New York: Johnson Reprint, 1965), pg 59.

⁶⁶ Sir E. Cecil to Sir J. Coke, 8 November 1625, Historical Manuscripts Commission, *Cowper* I, 224.

⁶⁷ David Loades, *England's Maritime Empire*, pg 153-154.

⁶⁸ *Ibid.*, pg 149.

inexpensive rotten supplies and pocketing the difference. Indeed, the quality of the victuals which had so harmed the English in the 1625 Spanish campaign, were not a new problem in the Royal Fleet. Although “[i]t had long been complained that tubs of salt beef turned out to be one-third brine,” the swapping of good provisions for rotten ones took corruption to a new level. As David Loades states, “it is not surprising that seamen fell sick, deserted, or swore that they would be hanged rather than serve in the navy. ‘Everyone practiseth to accomplish his own end of profit, not caring how he hath it as long as he may come by it.’”⁶⁹

This corruption did not go wholly unnoticed. Henry Howard, the Earl of Northampton, saw the corruption as a way to discredit Lord Admiral Nottingham, his political rival. This led to two commissions of enquiry in regards to the navy, “one into the navy as a whole, and one specifically into the circumstances of the building of a new great ship which Phineas Pett had in hand, and which had been the subject of particular complaint.”⁷⁰ The commissions both took place in 1608, and produced highly unflattering reports. Sir Robert Mansell, Treasurer since 1604 “had made an illicit profit of £12,00 in four years from the sale of stores, and had embezzled £1,000 in a single year from the wages account.”⁷¹ Unfortunately for both the navy and Northampton, James refused to act, seeing the reports as mere products of Northampton’s “political malice” for Lord Admiral Nottingham. The King did lecture Mansell “on the merits of honesty,” and then proceeded to go to Deptford to personally “name Pett’s new creation the *Prince*

David Loades, *England's Maritime Empire*, pg 150.

⁷⁰ *Ibid.*, pg 151.

⁷¹ *Ibid.*, pg 149, 151.

Royal.” Everything carried on as it had before, though “it was not long before the strictures upon Pett’s workmanship began to be justified.”⁷²

With knowledge of the corrupt officials who ran the navy, it seems unfair to lay the blame for the fleet’s miserable state on James alone. True, James’s “political favouritism” and “financial laxity” aided the demise of Elizabeth’s royal fleet, Paul M. Kennedy points to both “Nottingham’s increasing senility and Mansell’s financial delinquency” as a major source of the fleet’s failure.⁷³ The fleet, which was yearly rotting in docks with guns being sold or rusting beyond use, was one problem caused by corruption, “while the payment and general treatment of the crews were so negligent that most seamen defected, either to merchant vessels or to the service of the Dutch or even the corsairs” was another major problem. The average expenditure on the navy during James’s reign was roughly half of what had been spent in the 1590s, but the widespread waste and corruption that had by now become inherent in the navy and its administration can easily lead one to conclude, as Kennedy has, that “a respectable force could have been maintained had the administration been in the hands of a Hawkins or a Pepys.”⁷⁴

Blame for the failure of the navy to sustain its Elizabethan greatness can also be placed on “the courtiers and favourites who stood closest to the Stuart kings” who simply did not understand the need for having highly skilled seamen. As has been alluded to, the professional skills of seamen under the Stuarts were not what they had been under the Tudors. Having a skilled seafaring community was essential for the maintenance of a great fleet, but those great “sea-dogs” who had maintained close ties to counsellors and

⁷²David Loades, *England's Maritime Empire*, pg 151.

⁷³ Paul M. Kennedy, *The Rise and Fall of British Naval Mastery*, pg 39-40.

⁷⁴ *Ibid.*, pg 39-40.

the nobility were no more. In the 1620s, “when court and country began to drift apart... the maritime community went with the country.”⁷⁵ Blame could also be laid at the feet of the House of Commons:

which declined to grant [James] the sums necessary for the upkeep of a large fleet: it was simply impossible for the monarch to be expected to live ‘of his own’ at the same time as he was also asked to maintain a *national* naval force. Yet now that the Spanish war was over, the taxpayers – and especially their parliamentary representatives – were unwilling to vote the money which they had granted Elizabeth and which even she had found quite inadequate.⁷⁶

It is true that corruption may have made any increase of funds provided to the navy as useless as the money it was already given was squandered, it is clear that it was a combination of failures on behalf of many people which is responsible for the sorry state the navy found itself in by the end of James’s reign in 1625.

Through the effect of James’s reign on England’s navy, especially when compared to Elizabeth’s, it becomes clear that the navy flourished with interest and encouragement from the monarch. A strong navy was essential for good overseas trade as well as colonial initiatives, both of which, while not ruined under James’s rule, were certainly not encouraged to prosper. It is easily understandable why James did not feel the need to keep the thirty-one ships in his navy in full service after peace with Spain had been won, but why James did not keep a minimum, protectionist fleet is less understandable. Perhaps James expected that the European world would begin to see things in the pragmatically peaceful way that he did, although this seems to be unlikely. James, an ever elusive pragmatist in the early seventeenth century, undoubtedly damaged

⁷⁵ David Loades, *England's Maritime Empire*, pg 159.

⁷⁶ Paul M. Kennedy, *The Rise and Fall of British Naval Mastery*, pg 39.

England's fleet and international prestige on the open seas.⁷⁷ The failures of the Jacobean state can be seen through James's poor treatment of Sir Walter Raleigh, who had risen in fame and prominence as an adventurer and privateer under Elizabeth.

Sir Walter Raleigh provides an interesting study as his career spanned the reign of both Queen Elizabeth and King James. While Raleigh shared in the same glories as Sir Francis Drake, he met a very different fate. James, as we have seen, sought peace with Spain, spurned privateering and while he tolerated Raleigh for some time, in the end he had the famous privateer beheaded for his attacks on the Spanish. Raleigh became "the most spectacular victim" of James's peace policy.⁷⁸ The following discussion, focusing on the years of James's rule, provides an examination of Raleigh's relationship with the English Crown to demonstrate the role, or lack thereof, of privateering in the Jacobean state.

Like other privateers, Raleigh favoured aggressive commercial and military policies. As Kenneth R. Andrews observes, the type of trade Raleigh "valued most was 'forcible trade' and the kind of expansion he called for and attempted was militant and acquisitively imperialistic. He admired Spain's colonial achievement and urged his countrymen to emulate the courage and endurance of the *conquistadores*."⁷⁹ Furthermore, Raleigh saw colonization as a way to injure Spain and he associated overseas expansion with anti-Spanish policies. These anti-Spanish policies can be seen in Raleigh's 1596 work *The discoverie of the large, rich, and bevvtiful empire of Guiana*, as he observes that:

⁷⁷ Paul M. Kennedy, *The Rise and Fall of British Naval Mastery*, pg 38.

⁷⁸ Robert Ashton, *James I by His Contemporaries* (London: Hutchinson & Co, 1969), pg 205.

⁷⁹ Kenneth R. Andrews, *Trade, plunder and settlement*, pg 9.

the port townes [of Guiana] are few and poore in respect of the rest within the land, and are of little defence, and are onely rich When the fleets are to receiue the treasure for Spaine: And we night thinke the Spanyards verie simple, having so many horses and slaves, that if they could not upon two daies warning, carrie all the Golde they have into the land, and farre enough from the reach of our footmen⁸⁰

This goes to show that Raleigh, like so many privateer adventurers like him, saw colonization as a means to target the Spanish and make huge commercial gains.

During the years of Elizabeth's rule, Raleigh's stance found favour in the court and with the Crown. The Queen, it is certain, was "inclined [to give] a more responsive ear to those who volunteered to 'annoy' the King of Spain".⁸¹ Raleigh, as one of these volunteers, and as one who was very good at annoying the Spanish, thus found favour with Elizabeth. In 1583, as Raleigh's biographer, Raleigh Trevelyan, states, "there was no doubt that Raleigh was Elizabeth's chief favourite. Throughout the year he was steadily promoted in influence".⁸² This was due, in part to the flattering poems that Raleigh penned for his Queen, but also because of his relative successes as a privateer and explorer of the new world. Although Raleigh did briefly fall out of favour with Elizabeth over his seduction of one of Elizabeth's maids in 1589,⁸³ he had regained her favour by 1597 when "Sir Walter Raleigh was brought by [Cecil] to the Queen, who used him very graciously, and gave him full authority to execute his place as Captain of the Guard, which immediately he undertook...In the evening he rode abroad with the Queen, and had private conference with her; and now he comes boldly to the Privy Chamber, as

⁸⁰ Sir Walter Raleigh, *The discoverie of the large, rich and bevvtiful empire of Guiana* (London: Robert Robinson, 1596), pg 4-5.

⁸¹ Kenneth R. Andrews, *Trade, plunder and settlement*, pg 203.

⁸² Raleigh Trevelyan, *Sir Walter Raleigh* (New York: Henry Holt and Company, 2004), pg 52. The following discussion is also drawn from this source.

⁸³ John Guy, ed., *The Reign of Elizabeth I* (Cambridge: University of Cambridge Press, 1995), pg 3.

he was wont.”⁸⁴ Unfortunately for Raleigh, this favouritism was not to outlast Elizabeth, as Raleigh’s conduct did not endear him to James VI and I.

Under Elizabeth’s successor, Raleigh found a completely different scene. Upon the Queen’s death in 1603, Raleigh, who was serving as governor of the Isle of Jersey, was arrested on suspicion of plotting against the new King. Thus James was already disposed against this renowned privateer for reasons other than his profession. Had he not been incarcerated it is likely that Raleigh would have come into early conflict with the King, who, in his pursuit of peace with Spain, was unwilling to protect or tolerate the actions of English privateers. Under James “it no longer seemed to the Crown desirable to encourage overseas ventures which directly challenged Spanish power in ways likely to arouse hostility” and he held a “pathetic eagerness to placate the Spaniards.”⁸⁵ Imprisoned for over a decade in the Tower of London, Raleigh was released, but not pardoned, in 1616. Ordered to prepare a voyage in search of El Dorado, Raleigh set sail along with fourteen ships and almost one thousand men, for Guiana, the supposed site of this city of gold. Yet the region was occupied by the Spanish, and Raleigh’s gold-hunting expedition, warned the Spanish ambassador, Diego Sarmiento de Acuña, amounted to an invasion of Spanish territory. As Kenneth R. Andrews notes, “James’s response was that if it was in Spain’s effective possession and Raleigh consequently came into conflict with Spaniards he would suffer the penalty of death.” The King only permitted Raleigh to go on the condition that any conflict with Spanish forces should be avoided at all costs. This position “was entirely consistent with his general policy in

⁸⁴ Arthur Collins, ed., *Letters and Memorials of State*, Vol II, (London: Printed for T. Osborne, 1746), pg 54.

⁸⁵ Kenneth R. Andrews, *Trade, plunder and settlement*, pg 12.

respect of Spain's claims and possessions overseas and Raleigh accepted the condition".⁸⁶
His acceptance proved fatal.

Yet why would the King allow Raleigh to go with the risk of an inadvertent war looming over the mission, and why would Raleigh go to Guiana knowing that James would not support him? For Andrews, Raleigh's motivation seems to have been "to demonstrate that the Spanish claim to Guiana had little or no real basis and so, with proof of gold as an additional spur, to induce James to assert English sovereignty. If that increased the chances of war with Spain, well and good."⁸⁷ The King, meanwhile, had nothing to lose because he had warned Raleigh that he would not fight to protect him. Robert Ashton notes of James that "anxious to pursue the Spanish marriage on the one hand, lured by the prospect of American gold on the other, he seems to have been prepared to half-believe Raleigh's view about the English title to Guiana."⁸⁸ In the end, however, the King would disavow any support for Raleigh.

Raleigh was granted a commission by King James for his last mission to Guiana in search for the gold of the legendary El Dorado, which contained specific stipulations for Raleigh's good behaviour. The King paid close attention to this mission, and assured that Raleigh understood the terms of his commission prior to its commencement, issued a recognisance for the Raleigh's good behaviour which reads in part:

the condition of the above written obligacion is such whereas...Sir Walter Rawleighe, Knighte, and companie, sett for the to the seas, on an intended voiadge in trade of merchandize...Yf...the said shipps, nor anie of them nor the captaines, masters, and companies thereof, duringe the said voiadge, do not robbe, spoile, hurte or indammage anie of his Majestie's subjects, or the

⁸⁶ Kenneth R. Andrews, *Trade, plunder and settlement*, pg 298.

⁸⁷ *Ibid.*, pg 298-299.

⁸⁸ Robert Ashton, *James I by His Contemporaries*, pg 205-206.

subjects of anie other Prince or Potentate in league or amitie with his Highness, that then this present obligation to be voide and of noe effecte, or else the same to stande, abide, and remaine in full power, force, and vertue.⁸⁹

Raleigh, unfortunately, paid this warning no heed, and proceeded to “[attack] the Spaniards,” and “did not find any gold mines.”⁹⁰ Upon his return to England, Raleigh would pay the price for his indiscretion with his life.

By this point, James had clearly had enough of Raleigh’s exploits and refusal to obey royal directions – directions which in Jacobean terms, threatened the peace and prosperity of the realm. At least one historian claims that James executed Raleigh as a means to prove his willingness to appease the Spanish Crown when he was desperately trying to orchestrate a marriage between his son, Charles, and the Spanish Infanta.⁹¹ However, it seems more likely that James was simply trying to rid himself of a troublesome menace. James would have been more than happy to forgo charging Raleigh again and simply execute him for his conviction of 1603. Public opinion, however, demanded more, and Raleigh was charged, by the Attorney General, Sir Yelverton, under three areas relating to “Faults before his going this last voyage. Faults committed in his voyage. Faults committed since.”⁹² Raleigh was found to have “never intended a mine...purposed to set war between the 2 kings of England and Spaine...He abandoned and put in danger all his companie”, and finally fault was found with “his unfaithfull

⁸⁹ R.G. Marsden, ed., *Law and Custom of the Sea: 1205-1648*, ed. R.G. Marsden, Vol. I (London: Navy Records Society, 1915), pg 395-396. See also, “Proceedings at the Privy Council against Sir Walter Raleigh”, 17 August 1618, in Charles II, *Five Letters of King Charles II*, Vol. V (New York: Johnson Reprint, 1968), pg 9.

⁹⁰ Jeremy Black, *The British Seaborne Empire*, pg 49.

⁹¹ See Derek Hirst, *Authority and Conflict: England, 1603-1658* (Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University Press, 1986), pg 130; David L. Smith, *A History of the Modern British Isles, 1603-1707: The Double Crown*, pg

⁹² “Proceedings at the Privy Council against Sir Walter Raleigh”, 17 August 1618, in Charles II, *Five Letters of King Charles II*, Vol. V, pg 9.

carriage to the king and his companie.”⁹³ In this way, James could charge Raleigh for the same things he had been convicted for in 1603, with the additional charges meant to bolster the Council’s decision to execute Raleigh. James assured that Raleigh’s last trial was not held in the public’s, nor the nobility’s eye, and opted for Raleigh to be tried only in front of the Commission.⁹⁴ These precautions, however, did not stop public opinion from speaking out against Raleigh’s execution. As Trevelyan relates, someone in the crowd at the execution cried out ““we have never had such a head cut off.””⁹⁵

James’s decision to execute Raleigh without a public trial, assured that “for all of his fraudulent claims and dangerous ambitions, Raleigh emerged the moral victor in the eyes of posterity, acclaimed alike by anti-Stuart Whigs and imperialist historians as a martyr in their respective causes.”⁹⁶ As had been the case with Drake, the manner of Raleigh’s death simply added to his legend, and acted to secure his place in history as a hero and a martyr.

Sir Walter Raleigh’s ill-advised exploits illustrate not only his own inability to alter his actions to suit the new English monarch, but also the extent of the changes that James I made to both the Royal Navy and English foreign policy. Under his rule, peace with Spain was pursued at almost all costs, and the lack of conflict had a profound effect on the Royal Navy, which was plagued by corruption and mostly left to rot in the dockyards. Men of high birth were granted important positions in the navy, while experienced seamen did not rise in the ranks as they had under Elizabeth. The outlawing

⁹³ “Proceedings at the Privy Council against Sir Walter Raleigh”, 17 August 1618, in Charles II, *Five Letters of King Charles II*, Vol. V, pg 9-10.

⁹⁴ Raleigh Trevelyan, *Sir Walter Raleigh*, pg 538-539.

⁹⁵ As quoted in Raleigh Trevelyan, *Sir Walter Raleigh*, pg 552.

⁹⁶ Kenneth R. Andrews, *Trade, plunder and settlement*, pg 299.

of privateers robbed the royal service of many of these experienced seamen, who turned to all out piracy as a means to survive. These changes effectively saw the improvements made by the Elizabethan state to the Royal Navy fall to the wayside, leaving England and the navy weakened and its private seamen at odds with the Crown. It would be up to James's unfortunate son and heir, Charles I, to attempt to rectify the failures of the Jacobean state.

Chapter Three

“Irregular and almost incorrigible scum of rascals, whom the land hath ejected for their wicked lives and ungodly behaviour”

Charles I, certainly one of the most ill-fated monarchs in English history, took the throne from his father, James I, in 1625. Not only did his reign end ingloriously with his execution, but it began under an inauspicious cloud of delusion. In analysing English naval policy under Charles, one cannot escape either the march towards the English Civil War, nor the war itself. As the historian David Loades has noted, by the time of Charles’s coronation “the English were suffering from illusions of grandeur. They not only believed that they had won the last sea war against Spain, but that they had made a profit out of it.”¹ Yet England’s navy was in fact weak and was largely living on the memories of its past glories. Having inherited a navy dwindling in power, and try as he might to revive it, by the time of Charles’s death in 1649, England’s navy was weakened and destitute. For much of his reign, Charles would have to battle against limited funds and a populace and Parliament reluctant to support his financial and military aims. Part of the problem was complacency on behalf of the English, who believed in the overwhelming superiority of their fleets. Although their late sixteenth century successes against the Spanish lay in the past, Englishmen largely refused to acknowledge this reality. The belief in unparalleled English sea power was unfounded and hence dangerous to the polity and to her maritime interests. Charles reign, though fraught with difficulties, saw the Royal Navy regain a semblance of its former self. The implementation of the collection of Ship Money, and the fleet it created did much

¹ David Loades, *England's Maritime Empire* (Harlow: Pearson Education Limited, 2000), pg 153.

towards realizing this goal, but the wider societal problems that it exacerbated did irrevocable damage to the King.

England in the mid seventeenth century was a turbulent and divided polity. The civil wars which gripped the nation and ultimately left it, albeit only for a short time, without a King, changed nearly everything. Charles I unfortunately paid the ultimate price for failings which, though his own, had roots in the reign of his father, James I. As the historian Blair Worden asserts, “many of the provocative things that Charles I said and did about parliaments and Puritans have parallels in the reign of his father and even of the Tudors. He faced challenges that would have taxed any ruler.”² Regardless of how taxing these challenges were, Charles’s own manner of governing, and indeed his own character, also played a large part in his demise. According to Worden, Charles had three qualities which, in combination, proved to be fatal:

First, he had alarming policies, which he pursued with alarming methods. Secondly he was incorrigibly deficient in political judgement. Whether or not his goals were attainable, they required realistic assessments of the balance of political power, and of the likely consequences of his actions, that were too often beyond him. Thirdly no one could trust him. Behind his duplicity there lay failings of political imagination and of personal presence and authority. His goals required arts of management and persuasion to which he was again unequal, largely because of an inability to enter the minds of people with views different from his own or to take sensitive or tactful account of their concerns. An inner insecurity made him wary of public display and denied him regality or manner.³

Unfortunately then, although many of Charles’s problems in the period could easily be perceived as being out of his control, it was Charles and Charles alone who was responsible for his ultimate downfall. As much ground as he may have gained in correcting problems which stemmed from his father’s lavish lifestyle and disinterest in

² Blair Worden, *The English Civil Wars: 1640-1660* (London: Weidenfeld & Nicholson, 2009), pg 6.

³ *Ibid.*, pg 7.

the military and administrative matters,⁴ it was Charles's personal shortcomings which affected his reign in the most tragic manner.

Although it would be easy to describe the civil wars as wars of religion alone, this was not, as it so often is, the case. Charles's misguided attempts to force the beliefs of Arminianism, which challenged the Calvinist idea of predestination, on a rapidly growing Puritan population certainly illustrated how out of touch his was with the desires of his subjects, but this alone was not what Charles's objectors were fighting for. As Worden asserts, "those who opposed [Charles] in the 1640s believed themselves to be contending on two fronts: for 'the liberty of the subject', which depended on the free meetings and debates of parliaments and on the security of property, and for 'religion'."⁵

The entire fact that parliament was willing to declare a civil war in 1642, is indicative in itself of just how bad the situation had become. The Crown's military and political power was based on the voluntary cooperation of its subjects, which was, under normal circumstances, readily obtainable. Worden notes that "habits of conformity and obedience ran deep in a society which agreed that tyranny, however hideous, was preferable to anarchy".⁶ That parliament and the people of the British Isles, were as prepared to engage in a catastrophic civil war in 1642 is telling of the problems that the country faced. The long period of peace under James I, which had spiralled the Royal Fleet into disarray, also served to readily involve the lower classes in the conflict. Peace had led many of the aristocracy to be inexperienced in leading men in battle, and they had taken to being absentee courtiers across the nation. This meant that "lesser men were

⁴ Blair Worden, *The English Civil Wars: 1640-1660*, pg 6.

⁵ *Ibid.*, pg 7.

⁶ *Ibid.*, pg 14-15.

therefore left freer to decide, or to stay neutral, in this crisis.”⁷ The civil wars, therefore, were conflicts that left no part of English society untouched.

Charles’s entire philosophy about the Royal Navy, according to the distinguished maritime historian Kenneth R. Andrews, was for the navy to be restored to its former Elizabethan glory, but on the cheap. The idea of creating power in the navy with the least amounts of funds had been prescribed by Elizabeth, who in turn, had passed this policy to her successor, James I. This was problematic, as Andrews asserts, “the sinews of state power, dependent as they were on taxation and the voluntary collaboration of the landed and commercial élites which largely owned and managed the realm, could not sustain re-armament on the scale required to wage successful war in the 1620s.”⁸ Charles’s reforms were limited by his misperceptions of England’s growing discontent with his rule.

By 1628, a mere three years after Charles’s coronation, the Royal Navy had failed to successfully carry out a major military operation in over a decade. Although the navy was used in other contexts during the early years of Charles’s reign, its consistent failure to succeed in military operations left the navy humiliated as it had not been since the fifteenth century. Lord Buckingham, the High Admiral and a former favourite of James I, bore much of the responsibility for the deteriorated fleet. In effect he had institutionalized a system of corruption, which led to gross fiscal inefficiencies, illustrated by the failed capture of Cadiz in 1625, which was discussed previously. Yet, Buckingham never had to answer for the problems plaguing the navy as he was assassinated in August of 1628. The new King was left to redress the deficiencies of his

⁷ Derek Hirst, *Authority and Conflict: England, 1603-1658* (Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University Press, 1986), pg 228.

⁸ Kenneth R. Andrews, *Ships, Money and Politics* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1991), pg 8.

navy, and the House of Commons was largely unwilling to aid him. Because of Parliament's experience with James, and its distrust of Lord Buckingham, the Members of Parliament in Charles's first Parliament of 1625 were suspicious of the spending habits of Stuart Kings.⁹ They, therefore, granted Charles money for only one year's worth of tonnage and poundage, instead of appropriating funds for the whole of his lifetime, as had customarily been the case. This money, notes historian Derek Hirst, "seemed an appropriate weapon for striking at a lord admiral whose monopoly of office, extravagance and diplomatic failings were all resented, and whose ships were having little success against pirates." The one year grant was thus an "insulting proposal" and the King subsequently lacked "parliamentary authorization for a revenue he had to have if he were to go to war."¹⁰ Due to their quarrels with the Crown, England's Parliamentarians were largely unwilling to take measures necessary to rectify the problems with the navy.

One of the problems which was then afflicting the navy was the complete lack of professionalism that pervaded the Caroline fleet and naval administration. The men serving in the navy had changed drastically since the glory days of Elizabeth. Elizabethan privateers such as John Hawkins, who had fluidly moved from their roles in the navy to privately funded voyages, did not serve Charles I, nor were there similar replacements. Meanwhile, those few civil servants who served in the burgeoning bureaucracy were able to manage the navy in peacetime, but lacked the skills required to turn the navy into an efficient wartime fighting force. The patronage system, begun

⁹ For a discussion of the lavish spending of the early Stuarts, see Linda Levy Peck, *Consuming Splendor: Society and Culture in Seventeenth-Century England* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2005).

¹⁰ Derek Hirst, *Authority and Conflict: England, 1603-1658*, pg 140.

under Elizabeth had been institutionalized under her successors and had flourished under Buckingham's command. This led to a bureaucracy riddled with officers and officials who were motivated by graft. Furthermore, the patronage system saw the navy staffed largely with incompetent officers. While not necessarily corrupt, these officers were "untrained, inexperienced, and often temperamentally unsuited for their responsibilities."¹¹ Nor had these men experienced wartime conditions where their skills could be improved or refined, such as many of those appointed by Buckingham during the failed raid of Cadiz in 1625.

Inadequate administrators and commanders were not the only problem plaguing the Caroline Navy. Mutiny, which had only taken place sporadically and generally as a result of poor management in the late sixteenth and early seventeenth century, became routine among the crews of both the Royal Navy and the private merchantmen. This rise in mutinies can be traced to the lack of professionalism amongst officers and bureaucrats. It also had its roots in the flourishing colonial trade system. Trans-Atlantic trade stemming from commercial interests (and by extension the empire) brought with it a disproportionate loss of life and ships, conditions which alarmed many sailors. This was especially the case with the short-lived but lucrative tobacco trade, the profits of which often barely covered repairs to the ships involved.¹² Related shortfalls in the number of volunteers for service led to an increase in impressments. Understandably, the pressing of men into service on the King's ships did not make for happy crews. Further, cases where merchantmen were forced into royal service, made relations between merchants and the navy increasingly tense. Merchant captains were in turn more reluctant to come

¹¹ David Loades, *England's Maritime Empire*, pg 154-155.

¹² See Kenneth R. Andrews, *Ships, Money and Politics*, pg 100-104.

to the aid of the state. Relations were also characteristically difficult between gentlemen and tarpaulins, those men who had achieved positions of power through merit rather than social status. This was an “old antagonism” but it “festered into a general and debilitating resentment.”¹³ Captain Henry Stradling, one of Charles’s young, appointed, commanders exclaimed of the tarpaulins, “they hate all gentlemen, especially such as serve his Majesty at sea” and “no ships are more stubborn and unwilling to give his Majesty’s ships respect than our own merchants.”¹⁴

The Royal Navy’s problems could also be traced to a larger issue: England’s relative decline was due to the efforts of other states to overcome their own weaknesses. During the early years of Charles’s reign England’s European rivals were even more powerful than those faced by Elizabeth. Throughout the years when James had been King, the Spanish, in particular, had sought to increase the size and strength of its naval forces and the level of professionalism of their officers. This was, of course, in sharp contrast to the trends plaguing the Royal Navy. The contrast was thrown into sharp relief during the Spanish War of 1625-30. Further, thanks to overseas trade expansion the demands made upon England’s naval forces were much more arduous than they had been before. Therefore, while Charles made efforts early on to reverse the navy’s decline, his efforts were not significant enough to create forces able to compete with the stronger European navies. By the 1630s, England had effectively lost its maritime lead. This had a direct impact on the ability of the English Crown to project power throughout the naval struggles of the Thirty Years War, which plagued Europe from 1618 until 1648.

¹³ Kenneth R. Andrews, *Ships, Money and Politics*, pg 1-2.

¹⁴ The National Archives of the United Kingdom [hereafter referred to as T.N.A.U.K.], State Papers [hereafter referred to as SP] 16/222/13.

Although the King's ships were impressive war machines, there were few. Worse, these ships were "notoriously sluggish, unwieldy and leaky, and so expensive to operate that it was a matter of policy to use them as little as possible."¹⁵

By 1630, with the signing of the Treaty of Madrid and the conclusion of its war with Spain, England's navy had gone through a period of crisis in the midst of conflict. Wartime weakness and improvisation led to peacetime impoverishment, compounding the problems that had arisen during the reign of James I. N.A.M. Rodger observes that in 1630, "the English Navy had thrown away all the reputation it had won in Queen Elizabeth's reign, and there were at least three navies, those of Spain, Algiers and the Netherlands, which certainly outnumbered and possibly outmatched it."¹⁶ Well aware of this, Charles recognised that restoring the reputation of his naval forces was of utmost importance for the continuation both of his rule and England's independence. As a monarch, Charles's own reputation was at stake for England prided itself for its prowess at sea. Naval weakness thus threatened his own position for as a contemporary Spanish statesman, Don Baltasar de Zúñiga, the Spanish King's principal minister observed, "in my view, a monarchy which has lost its *reputación*, even if it has lost no territory, is a sky without light, a sun without its rays, a body without a soul."¹⁷ Additionally, restoring the power of the navy was important for the very real reason that England's security and interests demanded it. Yet, thanks to Parliamentary obstructions, Charles's treasury was empty. Hence the King's only real option was to deter his enemies, avoid

¹⁵ Kenneth R. Andrews, *Ships, Money and Politics*, pg 7.

¹⁶ N.A.M. Rodger, *The Safeguard of the Sea* (New York: W.W, Norton & Company, 1998), pg 379.

¹⁷ Quoted in J.H. Elliott, *The Count-Duke of Olivares* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1986), pg 58.

war, and slowly build up the navy's strength. Emphasising English naval power was the means to do this, even if such strength was largely illusory.

A tangible change taken by Charles was the implementation of several policies meant to boost the strength of the navy. One such measure was a reformation of the Navy Board. In effect Charles took over the committee and made important decisions about naval affairs by himself. In doing so, he was able to end much of the corruption which tainted the naval bureaucracy. While not impervious to influence peddling, Charles, "like Elizabeth... made important appointments himself, and although he did not always make good ones he did at least make them for valid reasons."¹⁸ Through these means, Charles was able to appoint at least some well-qualified officials and remove other poorly-qualified ones. His efforts also included making officers accountable to him. In doing so Charles was helped by the assassination of the Duke of Buckingham, whose patronage system collapsed with his death in 1628. So, as "bitterly as he mourned his friend, Buckingham's death was a benefit to the king in many ways."¹⁹ The chief way, as far as naval policy was concerned, was that more and more qualified and competent officers were put in charge. Still, the changes to the navy did usher in a new kind of officer, "gentlemen who were making their careers in the Navy, most of them good seamen and capable commanders."²⁰ This ensured that the navy became a more professional, consistent and reliable force, a service whose administrative weaknesses were not enough to damage it as an effective arm of state. Gentlemen captains made

¹⁸ David Loades, *England's Maritime Empire*, pg 155.

¹⁹ *Ibid.*, pg 155.

²⁰ N.A.M. Rodger, *The Safeguard of the Sea*, pg. 404.

careers in the navy and were rewarded for merit rather than their status at birth.²¹ In order to foster the development of these skills, in the 1630s the position of lieutenant was created. The purpose of this measure was to “breed young gentlemen for the sea service.”²² This had important effects over the long term as it began to create a more professional and capable cohort of seamen.

The changes to the naval bureaucracy begun in the 1630s did not correct all of the problems that plagued the Royal Navy. While changes may have helped to lessen weakness at the top, corruption was still as common throughout the rest of the navy as it was in every other area of government during the seventeenth century, as “the English economy...in many ways under pressure, burdened as well as stimulated by demographic change.” The English population had nearly doubled between 1500-1640,²³ which would have made it difficult enough for Charles to garner funds even if he did have the luxury of ruling with Parliament instead of without it. This was especially true when salaries were in arrears, which was often the case from the reign of Elizabeth through to Charles. Money, which had always been lacking for the navy, became an acute problem under Charles I. In order to raise funds for the navy, Charles began collecting Ship Money, a levy of sorts. For Charles, Ship Money was a necessity for raising the funds he required to make the English Navy into a formidable force once again. Charles’s ‘personal rule’ meant that he could not turn to the Parliament for funds, and hence he turned to raising

²¹ N.A.M. Rodger, *The Safeguard of the Sea*, pg 409.

²² M. Oppenheim, *A History of the Administration of the Royal Navy and of Merchant Shipping in Relation to the Navy* (London: The Shoe String Press, Inc, 1961), pg 226.

²³ Penelope Corfield, “Economic Issues and Ideologies” in Conrad Russell, ed., *The Origins of the English Civil Wars*, (London: Macmillan Press Ltd, 1973), pg 198-199. See also R.A. Houston, *The Population History of England and Ireland, 1500-1750*, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1992); and E.A. Wrigley and R.S. Schofield, *The Population History of England, 1541-1871: a Reconstruction*, (London: E. Arnold, 1981).

funds directly from the populace. In 1634, Ship Money was instated in the coastal regions of England, and after some success, it was expanded to the inland counties the following year.

Interestingly, Ship Money had been contemplated at several points before its actual implementation. Charles had not been the only English monarch who had sought out a means to raise income to literally keep the navy afloat. Queen Elizabeth had instituted a scheme very similar to Charles's Ship Money programme, though this was quickly abandoned in 1603 when Elizabeth died, and her ministers did not attempt to explain a scheme which resembled a new form of taxation.²⁴ There had also been a shipping levy of 1626 into which only London reluctantly contributed and had, therefore, not proven to be successful. Although these schemes had failed rather miserably, Charles's ministers noted that there was a rather long tradition of English coastal communities providing funds or ships themselves for naval defence. In 1627 the Crown was completely unimpressed by the performance of the merchantmen, and considered expanding the navy with swifter men-of-war to replace the merchant ships which were acting in cohesion with the navy. Although this idea never reached fruition, the Crown did consider having all of England contribute funds for the maintenance and expansion of the navy, which would come to pass in 1634.²⁵

Officially, Ship Money was not a tax but a levy in place of service. Thus, the English were in effect forced to pay for the services of the navy. This money was paid directly to the Treasurer of the Navy, and was accounted for separately from the normal

²⁴ N.A.M. Rodger, *The Safeguard of the Sea*, pg 342. See also, Robin J. W. Swales, "The Ship Money Levy of 1628," *Bulletin of the Institute of Historical Research* 50, no. 122 (November 1977), pp 164-176.

²⁵ Kenneth R. Andrews, *Ships, Money and Politics*, pg 9.

annual naval income.²⁶ Ship Money was initially very effective, as it produced £800,000 between 1634 and 1638. To put that sum into context, Charles received £600,000 from parliamentary taxation throughout the whole of his reign.²⁷ The levy was imposed on coastal counties, but was soon extended to inland counties. The achievements of extending Ship Money to the land-locked counties then saw it become an annual levy. This gave rise to those who argued that the Crown's actions were illegal and autocratic. It was not until nearer to the end of Charles's reign that this became a source of serious contention.²⁸ Having been brought before the Exchequer Chamber, in the case of John Hampden who alleged that the collection of Ship Money was illegal, the court found in Charles's favour, but in a close vote of 7-5. Although Charles won the court case, dissent over the collection of Ship Money spread to the pulpits across the country, and thus the opposition to Ship Money spread.²⁹ Ultimately Ship Money helped alienate thousands and sowed the seeds of doubt about the conduct and behaviour of Charles. Parliament never forgot Ship Money, and it haunted Charles and his successors.

However, in Charles's eyes at the very least, Ship Money seemed a success. It certainly resulted in a huge increase in the amount of money available to the Crown. However, because England was not at war when the levy was first introduced, forces were at work against Charles. Without a pressing threat, and with popular perceptions of English maritime supremacy firmly ingrained throughout the country, there seemed to be little need in the minds of many for the levy. Indeed, it may have been easier for the

²⁶ David Loades, *England's Maritime Empire*, pg 156.

²⁷ N.A.M. Rodger, *The Safeguard of the Sea*, pg 381-382.

²⁸ Keith M. Brown, "Monarchy and Government in Britain, 1603-1637" in Jenny Wormald ed., *The Seventeenth Century* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2008), pg 38.

²⁹ L.M. Hill, "County Government in Caroline England, 1625-1640," in Conrad Russell, ed., *The Origins of the English Civil Wars*, (London: Macmillan Press Ltd, 1973), pg 83-89.

inhabitants of the inland counties to understand the need for Ship Money had there been an evident and pressing need for the money. In fact, by 1640, Charles had to issue a *Proclamation for the levying and payment of the Ship-Moneys in Arreare*. As the Proclamation states the collection of Ship Money was for:

the great preparations of Shipping beyond the Seas, as well as this present year, as in divers years preceding, and the imminent perils thereby appearing on every side in these dangerous and warlike times: For the speedie defence of his Kingdom and people, guarding of the Seas, and secure conduct of Shipping and Merchanize, (wherein all his Subjects were concerned)³⁰

Further, Charles stated his orders for the furnishing of Ship Money had been as follows:

Did as well for divers yeers past, as in November last, direct his severall Writs to severall Sheriffs, Mayors, Bayliffs, and other his Officers and Subjects, of the severall Counties of England and Wales, thereby commanding the providing and getting in readiness certain Ships furnished with Ordinance and Arms, and manned and victualled at the charges of the said Counties³¹

These criteria had not yet been met, which caused Charles to proclaim that a failure to do so, “to the Treasurers of his Majesties Navie, at or before the first day of October next, without further respite or delay” would result in “pain of high contempt against his Majestie, and to be further proceeded with and punished according to the quality of their offences, in that which so much imposteth the publike good and safety of the Kingdom.”³² This proclamation is indicative of the kind of dissent that Charles faced in the counties of his realm. The coastal counties had traditionally carried the burden of funding the navy on their own, but by making defence a national issue rather than merely a regional one as it had been previously, Charles was treading on dangerous ground. The King did attempt to justify the extension of Ship Money to the inland counties, warning

³⁰ King Charles I, *By the King, a proclamation for the levying and payment of the ship-moneys in arreare* (London: Robert Barker, 1640) pg 1.

³¹ *Ibid.*, pg 1.

³² *Ibid.*, pg 1.

about the looming threats presented by “certain thieves, pirates, and sea-robbers, as well as Turks, enemies of Christianity, and others federated together”³³ But to people far away from the coast, and for whom English sea power was a given, the King’s worries were not something that they shared. In fact, Charles even faced this opposition in some coastal counties as well.³⁴

Charles’s move to make the weakness of the navy a matter of national security came at a point when the King was dangerously losing touch with his subjects. The English, historian Jenny Wormald has observed, were becoming much more desirous for information on the nature of governance and were more readily questioning royal power than they had been previously. Also, they had more readily available means of gathering information than they had had in the past. Copies of parliamentary speeches, newsletters, and pamphlets were new media which were becoming more easily disseminated throughout the literate populace. Charles was thus “dealing with considerable political awareness in the localities.”³⁵ Much of this awareness was against the idea of Ship Money. Hence the resulting level of public debate and dissension created a climate where it became increasingly difficult for Charles to take actions which would not spark the ire of his subjects.

Charles I’s decision to extend the collection of Ship Money to the inland communities of England was certainly ill-advised because it brought to a head many of the problems then facing the English system of government. These problems, a holdover

³³ Writ of 22 May 1637 in Thomas Bayley Howell, ed., *Cobbett's complete collection of state trials and proceedings for high treason and other crimes and misdemeanors from the earliest period to the present time*, Vol. III (London: Bagshaw, 1816), col. 848.

³⁴ Derek Hirst, *Authority and Conflict: England, 1603-1658*, pg 56.

³⁵ Jenny Wormald, “Conclusion,” in Jenny Wormald ed., *The Seventeenth Century*, pg 228.

from the year of James's rule, came to the fore under Charles I, and led to the English Civil War. As the historian David Armitage writes, the imposition of the Ship Money levy over the whole of England rather than simply the coastal regions, led to "some of the fiercest political arguments" in contemporary English politics. In conflict with one another were "competing conceptions of England, Scotland, Britain and the British Empire as maritime communities. In due course, such conceptions also underlay the ideological definition of Britain as a maritime power, with a commercial destiny based on its natural insularity".³⁶

Ship Money helped usher in the idea of England, Scotland and later all of Britain as being maritime empires, but it also forced England and Scotland to face their mutual claims to *mare clausum*. This idea, based upon the writings of the Dutch medieval scholar Hugo Grotius, whose work, *Mare Liberum* supported the Dutch claim that the "seas were free for all to fish,"³⁷ established each nation's perceived right to control the seas surrounding the British Isle. In 1635 the English government published a pamphlet, *Mare Clausum*, written by John Selden. This work explored the notion of the sovereignty of the sea based on international law. Selden saw the English right to rule the sea as self-evident and based in history:

For, what true English heart will not swell, when it shall bee made clear and evident (as in this Book) that the Soveraigntie of the Seas flowing about this Island, hath, in all times, whereof there remain's any written Testimonie, both before the old Roman Invasion and since, under every Revolution, down to the present Age, been held and acknowledged by all the world, as an inseparable appendant of the British Empire; And that by virtue thereof the Kings of England successively have had the Soveraign Guard of the Seas;

³⁶ David Armitage, *The Ideological Origins of the British Empire* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2000), pg 104-105.

³⁷ Paul Christianson, *Discourse on History, Law and Governance in the Public Career of John Seldon, 1610-1635* (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1996), pg 248.

That they have imposed Taxes and Tributes upon all ships passing and fishing therein; That they have obstructed and open'd the passage thereof to strangers, at their own pleasure, and don all other things that may testifie and absolute Sea-Dominion.³⁸

That Selden specifically mentioned the Crown's right to impose taxation, shows that in the mindset of the time, the right to rule the seas was very much tied to the right to tax for the protection of said seas. Additionally, it is important to remember that although Scotland and England shared a monarch, they remained separate kingdoms until the 1707 Act of Union. The conflicts between the two nations and peoples served to exacerbate the far-reaching issues that would eventually result in the civil wars. In the 1630s, Charles attempted to exclude the Dutch from 'British' waters, in the hope of forcing mutual co-operation between the English and the Scottish; he was ultimately unsuccessful.³⁹ What his efforts were successful in doing was to firmly ingrain in the minds of Englishmen the idea that their country was a maritime power while leaving unanswered the question of who should bear the cost of this navy.

Asserting England's power over the seas was only part of Charles's reasoning behind his new legal claims. Charles's foreign policy was very similar to his father's in that it focused on good relations with the Spanish Crown in order to oppose the French and Dutch. In 1634 England went so far as to enter into a secret treaty with Spain. This agreement saw joint convoys sailing through the Channel in an effort to allow Spanish troops and money to be transported by the English through the Dutch blockade of northern Europe which was an effort to check Spain's military operations during the Thirty Years War. While Charles's Ship Money fleets did gain what the English would

³⁸ John Selden, *Of the dominion, or ownership, of the sea* (London: William Du-Gard, 1652), pg 13-14.

³⁹ David Armitage, *The Ideological Origins of the British Empire*, pg 115.

see as respect from the French and the Dutch, the French had been instructed to avoid the English, while the Dutch were instructed to yield to the salute of the English flag. To the Dutch, however, this was seen as a courtesy and not an acknowledgement of any English legal claims to the sea, for they held a belief in the idea of the general freedom of the seas.⁴⁰

Charles's political struggles aside, when the Ship Money fleets were built they were a marked improvement over those which had previously been part of the Royal Navy. English shipwrights were not able to match the economic maritime capabilities exemplified by the Dutch *fluyt*, but they were able to build warships and larger armed merchant vessels which could at the very least compete with, if not best, those of their rivals.⁴¹ These new ships were kept financially separate from those of the navy proper. In 1635, the first of the summer fleets set sail containing five armed merchantmen and nineteen of the Crown's ships. This fleet, commanded by Lord Lindsey, was instructed to "enforce the salute" and to "prevent belligerents fighting one another within 'his Majesty's seas'." In practical terms, this meant that Lindsey's fleet had to protect ships in English waters seeking protection from enemy vessels.⁴² In 1636, a larger Ship Money fleet containing three merchant ships and twenty-seven Crown ships commanded by the Earl of Northumberland cruised the channel and into the North Sea without seeing much, if any, action. There was not much for the men aboard to do to keep occupied, prompting Northumberland to complain on 15 July 1637:

We are extremely idle. Ever since coming aboard I have attended here some Directions for the disposing of the Fleet, but yet have not received

⁴⁰ N.A.M. Rodger, *The Safeguard of the Sea*, pg 383.

⁴¹ David Loades, *England's Maritime Empire*, pg 146.

⁴² N.A.M. Rodger, *The Safeguard of the Sea*, pg 382.

any...To ride at this Place [the Downs] at Anchor a whole Summer together without Hope of Action, to see daily Disorders in the Fleet and not to have Means to remedy them, and to be in an Employment where a Man can neither do Service to the State, gain Honour to himself nor do Curtesies for his Friends, is a Condition that I think nobody will be ambitious of.⁴³

Regardless of Northumberland's complaints, the summer cruises were not without purpose. Charles's fleets were impressive, and did much to reassert England's command of the oceans in a way which had not been achieved since the time of Elizabeth. In fact, as historian N.A.M. Rodger states, "neither the ships nor the fleets of Queen Elizabeth had been so formidable."⁴⁴ It must be remembered, however, that the same could be said about the fleets of England's foes.

The historian David Loades takes a less positive view than Rodger when it comes to the successes of the Ship Money fleets. According to Loades, Charles's endeavour to restore the idea of *mare clausum* was ambitious, and his demands for recognition were not always met. "Sometimes" Loades states, Charles's insistence for acknowledgement "was respected when the other party was in a complacent frame of mind, and Charles was probably led to believe that his policy was more successful than it was."⁴⁵ It is clear that Loades views the situation as one which depended more on the mood of England's rivals than it did on the fleets themselves. Perhaps, the truth lies between these two competing views. Charles, Loades asserts, could have easily believed that the voyages of his fleets were much more successful than they truly were. However, it is also realistic that England's rivals were indeed impressed with the Ship Money fleets, as the vessels

⁴³ William Knowler, ed., *The Earl of Straffords's Letters and Dispatches*, (Dublin: R. Reilly for Robert Owen, 1740) pg 84.

⁴⁴ N.A.M. Rodger, *The Safeguard of the Sea*, pg 383; and Keith M. Brown, "Monarchy and Government in Britain, 1603-1637," in Jenny Wormald ed., *The Seventeenth Century* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2008), pg 38.

⁴⁵ David Loades, *England's Maritime Empire*, pg 156.

themselves were much more formidable than any the navy had possessed under James. The potential for England's Navy to return to its Elizabethan glory returned with the Ship Money fleets, but potential, in and of itself, was hardly enough to ensure that it became a reality.

Charles I's devotion to the Royal Navy can be illustrated through his 1633 introduction of a program of shipbuilding. Eleven ships were launched in the nine years after the program was first introduced, including the 1,500 ton ship *Sovereign of the Seas*, which was completed in 1637.⁴⁶ It is easy to understand, then, why the Ship Money levies were so crucial to the Crown. The building of new ships was not the only tangible example of Charles's commitment to improving the navy, as by the 1630s even the stores were seen to be in much better condition than they had been previously. A Venetian visitor to the Chatham docks stated, "Everything is admirably organised, so that all the requisite apparatus is always in readiness, carefully guarded and deposited in a place near here...divided into several compartments, each one containing everything necessary for arming a ship. The arms or device of the name of each ship is placed on the door of these apartments, and thus distinguishes what belongs to them."⁴⁷ The improvement in stores points to the previously mentioned improvement in administration that the navy saw following Buckingham's assassination. Of course, this does not mean that the navy was completely rid of corrupt officials, but it does exemplify the changes taking place in the professional sea service under Charles.

⁴⁶ David Loades, *England's Maritime Empire*, pg 156.

⁴⁷ Anzolo Correr "Anzolo Correr, Venetian Ambassador in England to the Doge and Senate," 13 April 1635 in Allen B. Hinds, ed., *Calendar of State Papers Relating to English Affairs in the Archives of Venice, 1632-1636*, Vol. 23 (London: Public Records Office, 1921) pg. 368.

The results of Charles's naval reforms can perhaps be best highlighted by the 1637 expedition undertaken by Captain William Rainsborough against Dutch pirates operating from the Moroccan port of Sallee. Rainsborough, it is important to note, was not a gentleman officer, but a tarpaulin, who had gained his experience as the flag-captain of the Earl of Northumberland and as a master of ships in the Levant trade. Rainsborough's fleet was made up of a mixture of private vessels and the King's ships, and commanded largely by commoners like Rainsborough himself. Many of Rainsborough's commanders had ties to the navy, but only Sir George Carteret, Rainsborough's vice-admiral was actually a naval captain and an official representative of the Royal Navy. The expedition was largely a success, as it managed to block the port for five months thanks, in large part, to Rainsborough's creativity in fomenting a political struggle between the pirate port of New Salle, the nearby port of Old Sallee, and the two cities' shared sovereign, the Emperor of Morocco. Rainsborough's success demonstrates just how effective Charles's Navy had become. While the fleet had acted in the public's interest providing the protection against piracy that had long been demanded by the English from their navy, it unfortunately did little to ease the public's dissatisfaction with their King. As Rodger states, the expedition was seen to be "too little to offset the general impression of a monarch and his court intent on personal prestige and indifferent to the sufferings of his people."⁴⁸

The Ship Money fleets thus show the limits of Charles's reforms. While the fleets' presence alone did serve as a deterrent for some time, they could not provide the kind of protection that the merchants had been demanding. The protection of trade was

⁴⁸ N.A.M. Rodger, *The Safeguard of the Sea*, pg 384-385.

not, according to Rodger, what the fleets had been designed to do.⁴⁹ David Loades views Charles's Ship Money fleets in a much more negative light. According to Loades, the entire premise of the Ship Money fleets was to demonstrate to Charles's European rivals that the Royal Navy was once again a bastion of maritime strength. Loades sees the navy as being ill-equipped, with only a few quick pinnaces capable of catching raiders which were, more often than not, never "in the right place at the right time."⁵⁰ Yet again, Charles was proving himself to be dangerously out of touch with his people.

The wars of the 1620s did much to reveal the instability of both Charles's reign and the Royal Navy itself. European Dynastic and religious rivalries – as well as territorial and imperial trade ambitions – were becoming much more menacing to the British Isles, which required a strong naval response to protect the British peoples from the debilitating conflicts and war that gripped the continent until the Treaty of Westphalia concluded the Thirty Years War in 1648. However, the naval response required to ensure the safety of the kingdoms essentially meant that the King needed two navies; a powerful fleet meant to dissuade foes, and another comprised of cruisers and escorts to "defend shipping, fishermen and coast-dwellers everywhere...also a Navy which might have been capable of asserting the sovereignty of the seas and collecting fishing licences"⁵¹ which growing public opinion demanded. However, the public also generally accepted the need for a powerful navy to deter and influence England's rivals, but they were also acutely aware of the need to protect private vessels. Essentially, they were calling for one navy for foreign policy purposes, and another for domestic politics. These two navies did not

⁴⁹ N.A.M. Rodger, *The Safeguard of the Sea*, pg 385-386.

⁵⁰ David Loades, *England's Maritime Empire*, pg 156.

⁵¹ N.A.M. Rodger, *The Safeguard of the Sea*, pg 393.

appear, as Charles focused on building a force capable of dissuading enemies and not a force which could act as an escort to private and fishing vessels. This focus gave the dissenters ammunition against Charles, as they could easily argue that Charles's foreign policy navy was "an expensive personal indulgence"⁵² which brushed aside the demands of Charles's subjects. Although it appears that by 1640 Charles himself realized that the public was demanding a navy that "secure[d] [the] conduct of Shipping and Merchanize, (wherein all his Subjects were concerned)"⁵³ as he wrote in a proclamation for the collection of Ship Money in arrears, but by 1640 it was still not clear that the Royal Navy was actually fulfilling this mandate. In this way, Charles was again ignoring the demands of an increasingly political and aware population.

As problematic as ignoring what his subjects desired from the navy was, Charles also faced acute challenges when it came to keeping his ships well manned. As the Earl of Northumberland complained to the Earl of Strafford on 21 February 1636:

I know not yet how I shall be disposed of this Summer, whether in his Majesty's Service at Sea, or in my own House at *Petworth*; for it is not declared who shall command the King's Fleet. If that Charge be committed to any other Body, I shall not envy him that hath the Honour of it: for, I profess to your Lordship...that as it is now managed, it is not an Imployment fit for any Person of Honour.⁵⁴

Staffing the navy was always difficult, but during times of war it became nearly impossible to do so without resorting to impressment. The English seemed to have honed impressment into a fine art with quotas provided to press-masters and to vice-admirals by the Privy Council. Often, impressment was fulfilled by these so-called press-masters

⁵² N.A.M. Rodger, *The Safeguard of the Sea*, pg 393-394.

⁵³ King Charles I, *By the King, a proclamation for the levying and payment of the ship-moneys in arreare*, pg 1.

⁵⁴ William Knowler, ed., *The Earl of Straffords's Letters and Dispatches*, pg 51.

who were generally former petty or warrant officers, sometimes by vice-admirals, while at other times officers were sent out by the Captains to recruit men. Pressing had to be completed during the winter months, ““for if seamen be not taken at the beginning of March, by the middle thereof they are gone upon their voyages, and all England will not be able to furnish so many men as will man his Majesty’s ships.””⁵⁵ In 1627, Sir John Pennington complained that:

presently sent my lieutenant and master away to Dartmouth to get me what men they could...they returned from Dartmouth but brought me never a man, notwithstanding I had formerly sent warrants to Sir John Drake, Vice-Admiral of Devon, as also to the Mayor of Dartmouth for the pressing 160 men for us, but their answer is they can find none. But I know there be men and good men, which do absent themselves and [are] winked at.⁵⁶

This is a telling statement. Not only would able bodied men avoid impressment as best they could, but in some cases they were efficiently concealed by the very authority figures charged with handing them over to the King’s service. This was true of communities, as well as their leaders, which could also successfully band together in order to shield their male members from service in the Royal Navy. The resentment of men forced to serve in this manner would have understandably been immense.

Seamen, who had not necessarily been attracted to the King’s service even in times of peace, certainly knew how to avoid it in war when the problems the navy faced were much more pronounced. Corrupt officers, which had characterised the navy as it did the rest of the public service in the seventeenth century, became a secondary issue to the navy’s extreme lack of funds during wartime. However, even if wages had been paid promptly in wartime, crews would have been warranted in complaining about the rate of

⁵⁵ Sir William Monson, *The naval tracts of Sir William Monson*, vol. III, pg 381.

⁵⁶ Quoted in N.A.M. Rodger, *The Safeguard of the Sea*, pg 399.

pay which they received in the King's service. Rates had not been increased from 10 shillings per a twenty-eight day month since the outbreak of war with Spain in 1585. This was far less than mariners could expect to earn on merchant ships, and goes far in explaining why Charles had such a pronounced problem staffing his ships. As a result of the appeals of Wimbledon and others, mariners pay was increased to 15 shillings in 1626, but as the historian Rodger points out, "it is doubtful if even then it equalled what a good mariner could earn elsewhere – or would have equalled had it been paid."⁵⁷

Levels of both mutiny and desertion rose in the navy during wartime in protest to long outstanding pay and poor conditions. From the beginning of the War in 1625, "the confidence which many mariners and seafaring men have taken of late in disobeying his Majesty's prests, running from his ships, and serving foreign power, is notoriously known."⁵⁸ Further, the crews manning the ships on the Cadiz expedition were described as being:

the worst that ever were seen, and it is so confessed by the most experienced seamen that have been with us; for they are so out of order and command and so stupefied, that punish them or beat them, they will scarce stir, doing their duties so unwillingly as if they had neither heart nor mind to do any service, their ordinary talk being that his Majesty presseth them, and giveth them so little means that they are not able to live on it, and that it were better to be hanged or serve the King of Spain, or the Turk, then his Majesty.⁵⁹

These were strong words indeed, which go far to illustrate the sufferings that ordinary seamen faced everyday in the navy during times of conflict. However, not all commanders were as indifferent to the dismal state that their men were subjected to.

⁵⁷ N.A.M. Rodger, *The Safeguard of the Sea*, pg 403.

⁵⁸ *Ibid.*, pg 401.

⁵⁹ T.N.A.U.K., Earl Cowper Historical Manuscript Collection, Coke MSS, I, pg 258.

During the final major expedition of the war in the Narrow Seas in 1629, Sir Henry Mervyn, a commander remarked that:

the state of six ships here in the Downs, two of which, the *Dreadnought* and *Third Whelp*, have neither meat nor drink. The *Tenth Whelp* hath drunk water these three days. The shore affords soldiers relief or hope, the sea neither. Now with what confidence can punishment be inflicted on men who mutiny in these wants?...These neglects be the cause why mariners fly to the service of foreign nations to avoid his Majesty's...His Majesty will lose the honour of his seas, the love and loyalty of his sailors, and his Royal Navy will droop.⁶⁰

These dismal conditions acted as a virtual breeding ground for discontent, as Mervyn astutely pointed out. Sir Ferdinando Gorges, a high ranking member of the Plymouth Company, detailed that the seamen:

say they are used like dogs, forced to keep aboard without being suffered to come ashore to refresh themselves. They have not means to put clothes on their backs to defend them from cold, or to keep them in health, much less to relieve their poor wives and children. When they happen to fall sick, they have not any allowances of fresh victuals to comfort them, or medicines to help to recover them. Some of their sick fellows being put ashore in houses erected for them, are suffered to perish for want of being looked unto, their toes and feet rotting from their bodies, and so smelling that none are able to come into the rooms where they are. Some provisions put aboard them is neither fit nor wholesome for men to live on. They had as lief be hanged as to be dealt with all as they are.⁶¹

It must be noted that poor conditions were hardly a reality in the navy alone. Privateering vessels were known to have worse discipline than the navy, and were more prone to utilize more savage means of punishment than inflicted upon those in the King's service. In 1627, two men aboard a privateering ship owned by the Earl of Warwick were condemned to death by a court martial for raising a mutiny because they were served cheese instead of butter. The sentence was converted to keel-hauling, a particularly

⁶⁰ T.N.A.U.K., Calendar of State Papers, Domestic Series, 1629-31, pg 64-65.

⁶¹ T.N.A.U.K., Calendar of State Papers, Domestic Series, 1628-29 pg 29.

brutal practice which involved men being tied to a rope, thrown over the ship and dragged under the ships's keel to the other side. As hulls were covered in barnacles and other highly abrasive material, men would suffer from lacerations and other injuries, and keel-hauling often proved fatal. Keel-hauling, it should be noted, was not practiced by the Royal Navy. This ship's master described his crew as being "contentious, turbulent, troublesome, unruly, inhuman company...Newgate not yielding worse, nor Tyburn enjoying the like."⁶² A master of an East Indiaman merchant vessel eloquently described his men as being "irregular and almost incorrigible scum of rascals, whom the land hath ejected for their wicked lives and ungodly behaviour"⁶³ while flogging them for mutiny. Regardless of the more severe punishments that privateers and merchants could dole out on their crews, the higher rates of pay and more competent leadership still made serving on these vessels more desirable than the King's ships.

Poor conditions were not the only source of complaints about the navy. In 1634, the surveyor Kenrick Edisbury opined about the condition of the men who were staffing the King's ships themselves, stating that:

The allowance of servants to be entered to particular officers belonging to the ships in harbour is disadvantageous to the King's service. Heretofore the boatswains of the great ships only had each of them a younkard which they bred and instructed, but now the whole navy almost consists of masters and servants, for of 330 men borne on the harbour there are but 42 men that are properly termed the King's own men and most of them old

⁶² Quoted in N.A.M. Rodger, *The Safeguard of the Sea*, pg 406-407.

⁶³ Captain Martin Pring, "Captain Martin Pring to the East India Company," 23 March 1619 in W. Noel Sainsbury, ed., *Calendar of State Papers Colonial, East Indies, China and Japan*, Vol. III (London: Her Majesty's Stationary Office, 1860), pg 267.

and married, and the rest raw youths which they hire for small wages for their particular profit.⁶⁴

Edisbury's complaint that most of the men were 'old and married' deserves some consideration. Married men with families would inherently be much less amenable to face the dangers of sea, and would perhaps be more reluctant to engage in work which had a higher likelihood of resulting in death once they were pressed onto vessels. It was well known that life at sea was anything but easy, and it is understandable that older, married men with families to support would be much more reluctant to take such a risk, especially when the payment did not make the risks worthwhile.

Edisbury was definitely not the only naval official who found fault with the men staffing the King's ships. Six years after Edisbury's statement, another declared that the navy had "been made receptacles for aged and decrepit persons or else for persons of all callings that have had broken and decayed fortunes."⁶⁵ The previous year another official complained about the quality of the men in the King's service, stating that they were "altogether ignorant of that kind of labour, being some gardeners, tailors, glovers, coachmen, smiths etc., or incapable of labour of all kinds, being either old serving-men, decayed citizens, alehouse-keepers, horse-grooms, or at least servants that serve the King's servants."⁶⁶ The shortage of able-bodied and skilled seamen in the Royal Navy was not the only personnel problem with which Caroline authorities and the Admiralty were forced to contend.

⁶⁴ Kenrick Edisbury, "Kenrick Edisbury to Nicholas," 8 January 1634, in John Bruce, ed. *Calendar of State Papers, Domestic Series, Charles I: 1633-1634*, (London: Longman, Green, Longman, Roberts, and Green, 1863), pg. 403.

⁶⁵ Sir William Monson, *The naval tracts of Sir William Monson*, III, pg 436.

⁶⁶ John Hollond, *Two Discourses of the Navy, 1638 and 1659*, ed. J.R. Tanner, Vol. 7 (London: Navy Records Society, 1896), pg 14.

In the 1620s, and while Buckingham was serving as Lord High Admiral, the officers who staffed the navy became an acute problem. A great believer in the patronage system, Buckingham staffed the navy with well-born gentlemen, who more often than not possessed little or no nautical skill or background. Often, these gentlemen officers were not to be found on their ships. "His Majesty's ships are very often so ill manned that they might be made ready prizes to any pirate or other that durst assail them; but the true cause hereof is not this limitation of the men, but that the captains and commanders do almost never come on board, which is a disorder that no state but ours would endure, nor did ours in former times."⁶⁷ By the time war with Spain began in 1624, there were very few experienced Elizabethan officers left, and by 1625, many of the captains were just as ill-prepared for their duties as were their admirals. The result was that with the onset of war with Spain in 1624, there was an acute shortage of skilled officers. As a result, ships sustained unnecessary damage. For example, one ran aground because no look-outs were sent to warn the crew of dangers, while another came close to losing its mainmast simply because the sails were not taut enough.⁶⁸ Careless mistakes such as these go far in illustrating not only why mutinies increased during this time period, but also the problems Charles faced with his officers following Buckingham's death.

Experienced officers, or 'tarpaulin' officers, were quite rare in Charles's navy. The 1625-1630 Spanish War had seen a lack of participation from privateers, which certainly hurt the English war efforts. Although it is true that too much participation from privateers could hurt the control that the navy had over their operations, but privateers did add immense amounts of skill to naval operations which the navy seriously

⁶⁷ T.N.A.U.K., SP 14/101.

⁶⁸ N.A.M. Rodger, *The Safeguard of the Sea*, pg 395-396.

lacked.⁶⁹ This forced the navy to engage the services of the merchants as auxiliaries during the war, and as alluded to above, the merchants made unwilling and uncooperative partners. Disrespectful if not wholly dismissive of the gentlemen officers of the navy, the merchants also suffered from the loss of men pressed into their service, who were quickest to rise in mutiny or desert the service at any chance they were given. The owners of the ships lost revenue as they were forced to employ their vessels in the war effort instead of in trade, and did not necessarily agree with either the war or the manner in which it was being fought. As N.A.M. Rodger astutely states, “their war experience did nothing to endear the seafaring community to the royal service and left a legacy of suspicion and dislike on both sides.”⁷⁰

The lack of professionalism and skill of the officers in the Royal Navy did not go unnoticed. The crews certainly realized that they were not being commanded by skilled men, and some commoners in higher positions went so far as to disobey the orders which their commanders made. John Grant, who was the master of a flagship under the command of an inexperienced vice-admiral Valentia, proves a telling example of such disobedience. When Valentia attempted to give orders to Grant, Grant bluntly rebutted, “telling his Lordship in direct terms that the ship was in the master’s charge and not in his Lordship’s, and that therefore he would not hoist sail when his Lordship commanded.”⁷¹ Grant was supported by his flag-captain, but Viscount Wimbledon, who was generally displeased with the performance of gentlemen officers, was rather non-committal about

⁶⁹ David Loades, *England's Maritime Empire*, pg 157.

⁷⁰ Kenneth R. Andrews, *Ships, Money and Politics*, pg 9.

⁷¹ Sir John Glanville, *The Voyage to Cadiz in 1625 : being a journal written by John Glanville* (New York: Johnson Reprint, 1965), pg 28-29

the issue, choosing only to state his opinion that noblemen were chief commanders of their ships, but should only give orders in moderation.⁷²

The King himself had ideas about how his, and moreover, all English ships should be manned and armed. In a proclamation dated 24 December 1625, Charles wrote to “his owne Subjects, if they shall adventure to set to Sea in these perilous times, being weakly manned, and ill furnished with Armes to resist and repell such as shall assayle them”, and commanded that:

none of His Highnesse Subjects, doe at any time hereafter, presume to put to Sea any Ship or Pinnace...out of any Port or Creeke, of or belonging to this Realme of England, unless they furnish the same with serviceable Muskets and Bandeliers, sufficient for the arming at once, of halfe the number of all the Persons or Company, of, and in those Ships: And that they be also provided aboard every such Ship, of a sufficient quantitie of Match, and Powder, and Bullets for those Shott, according to the length of their Voyage intended to bee made by them.⁷³

These precautions were “for the safetie of His people,”⁷⁴ and one could, perhaps cynically, argue that they would not only help to private shipping from Spanish ships, but could also ensure that more experienced men be made ready for the impressment into the King’s service which would soon follow.

Beyond simply lacking the skill and experience which was so necessary in the navy, gentlemen officers were also notoriously quick to exploit their positions of power. Wimbledon himself vigorously complained that:

More ignorant captains and officers can hardly be found, and men more careless of his Majesty’s honour and profit, as if they were rather enemies then servants, studying their own ease and commodity more than anything

⁷² N.A.M. Rodger, *The Safeguard of the Sea*, pg 396.

⁷³ King Charles I, *A Proclamation for the well manning and arming of the Ships, of, or belonging to this Realme, upon their setting forth to Sea* (London: Bonham Norton, 24 December 1625), pg 1.

⁷⁴ *Ibid.*, pg 1.

else, which had they not done there might have been much more done; and officers are so set upon cozenage and thievery that they rather combine with the mariners then correct them, their own faults are so great and the cause of all.⁷⁵

This problem, however, was not confined to the navy. The use of wholly unqualified gentleman in positions of power reflected social changes occurring at the time. The navy, which had always been seen as a facet of government in which skill rather than birth were rewarded, began to struggle with the question of whether it should be run by persons of high birth and ‘quality’, or by coarse and salty mariners. Privateers, such as those on the Earl of Warwick’s ship *Hector*, and even France’s Cardinal Richelieu wrestled with these very same problems.⁷⁶ One would be amiss to consider this problem exclusively in terms of the navy and not in terms of society as a whole. In some senses, the navy was a microcosm for the problems facing English society as a whole during this period. According to Rodger, tarpaulin officers were often of lowly birth, and represented all those who disapproved of Charles’s reign. Since they were of a lower social order than the gentlemen officers, who were used to serve royal purposes and the stateliness of the Crown more than they were to serve the well-being of the navy, they represented the demands of the general population, such as the unheeded demand that the navy protect shipping, the King’s suppression of parliament and his refusal to support an anti-Catholic foreign policy. Religion, as it always was throughout this turbulent period, was a problem that the King could not overcome. Ship owners and shipmasters tended to be fiercely Presbyterian or Godly Protestants, which was in direct opposition to Charles’s own Arminianist belief system – a theological perspective which most of the general population did not share. Under James’s rule, English Protestants

⁷⁵ Sir John Glanville, *The Voyage to Cadiz in 1625 : being a journal written by John Glanville*, pg xxxvii.

⁷⁶ N.A.M. Rodger, *The Safeguard of the Sea*, pg 397.

could assume that “the church was united in its basic beliefs”. This was not the case during Charles’s rule, when his support for Arminianism, which challenged the Calvinist belief in predestination, became clear.⁷⁷ The resolution of these political, social and perhaps most importantly religious questions, were crucial for the survival of the Royal Navy in this turbulent time.⁷⁸

Problems in Europe, which Charles was in no position to contend with, were also threatening to engulf England at this time. Charles’s personal rule and lack of revenue from Parliament put him at a great disadvantage to his European rivals. The military revolution, which was quickly creating a new European order of those who could afford to match their neighbours might, and those who could not, saw those countries with undeveloped taxation systems fall by the wayside. Although the fundamentals for an effective taxation system did exist in England, Charles’s personal rule made it impossible to utilize.⁷⁹ Therefore, in order to maintain some sort of illusion of strength, Charles had to avoid becoming entangled in the general European war. Charles succeeded in this until 1639, and very well may have faced complete obliteration at the hands of his foreign enemies had his domestic problems not reached a head and both saved, and ultimately doomed, Charles’s rule as civil war throughout the British Isles became a tangible reality.⁸⁰

By 1642, Charles had lost control of his navy to Parliament. The control, and use of the seas, proved crucial during the civil war years. Moreover, the fact that Charles fled

⁷⁷ Derek Hirst, *Authority and Conflict: England, 1603-1658*, pg 141.

⁷⁸ N.A.M. Rodger, *The Safeguard of the Sea*, pg 410.

⁷⁹ Please see John Brewer, *The Sinews of Power* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1990), pg 3-24; and, Kevin Sharpe, *The Personal Rule of Charles I* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1992), pg 105-130.

⁸⁰ N.A.M. Rodger, *The Safeguard of the Sea*, pg 394.

London and left it to the Parliamentarians proved a fatal decision for the Stuart cause in the 1640s because the colonial and commercial profits which flowed to London from her fledgling empire from coastal trade, provided seventy percent of the Parliament's wartime revenue. This staggering amount proved crucial to the events that would unfold during the civil war. The navy became less a tool of foreign policy and more a tool for protecting private shipping, which the general English population had demanded for some time. The men who ran this new fleet of smaller vessels combined private business with public service, much as Drake and Hawkins had so efficiently done under Elizabeth. Even amid the turmoil of the civil wars, in 1642 Warwick sent privateers to the Caribbean where, for a short time, they captured Jamaica.⁸¹ All of Charles's reforms and good intentions were not enough to secure the loyalty of the Royal Navy. The loss of this control and the revenue that came with it, it could easily be argued, was what brought about Charles's demise. With Charles's demise, however, came the rise of Robert Rich, the Earl of Warwick, as the widely successful Parliamentary Lord High Admiral.

Like both Sir Francis Drake and Sir Walter Raleigh before him, Warwick had strong ties with both the Royal Navy and to the overseas voyages of exploration and trade. Under his command, English privateers took to the seas ravaging Spanish shipping as they had in the Elizabethan era. However, unlike Drake and Raleigh, Warwick was appointed Lord High Admiral under the direction of the House of Commons and not by the Crown. Warwick's career thus had two parts: the first as a servant of the Crown during which time he actively warred against the Spanish; the second as the chief naval commander of the Parliamentary navy during the English Civil War. The growth of

⁸¹ N.A.M. Rodger, *The Safeguard of the Sea*, pg 415, 421.

Warwick's navy under Parliament, it is important to note, mirrors the growth of the New Model Army under the command of Oliver Cromwell and Sir Thomas Fairfax during the civil war.⁸² The fleet which Warwick took command of at the beginning of the civil war became a formidable force, eventually crushing the privateers based out of Ireland who were fighting for the royalist cause. Much like the Lord Admirals before him, Warwick's own interests flourished under his command for he was as interested in enriching himself as he was in protecting England. His talent is best illustrated by his ability to not only promote voyages of privateering, exploration and settlement, but to simultaneously command a successful fleet during a time of unrivalled instability and upheaval in the British Isles. The following overview provides an examination of Warwick's relationship with the English Crown to demonstrate the role of privateering in the Caroline state.

A prominent supporter of both privateering and the Protestant cause, the Earl of Warwick, was also staunchly Godly. As the historian Derek Hirst notes, "Warwick's joviality and high fashion hardly fit the conventional image of the puritan."⁸³ While his firm faith may not have influenced his personality, it heavily influenced his career as a seaman and policymaker. For him, it was a duty to defend Protestantism from the ravages of Catholic Spain. He believed fervently in "the idea of a Protestant foreign policy and a triumphant naval war with Spain ... but Charles was not interested."⁸⁴ This thus had a direct influence on privateering because Warwick is considered to be the "only great shipowning [English] aristocrat of his time" and he had the money with which he could pursue his own goals regardless of the King's wishes. Warwick was naturally

⁸² See Mark A. Kishlansky, *The Rise of the New Model Army*, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1983).

⁸³ Derek Hirst, *Authority and Conflict: England, 1603-1658*, pg 75.

⁸⁴ Jeremy Black, *The British Seaborne Empire*, pg 50.

then, the “patron and chief entrepreneur of westward colonization, especially in the West Indies and the Somers Islands”, and throughout the 1620s and 1630s he promoted privateering against Spain.⁸⁵ Careful to promote his own interests and those of his friends, Warwick only occasionally owned ships outright. More often, he sponsored the privateering and colonisation voyages of other merchants, gentlemen, and seamen. He did, however, own one of the best warships of the era, the *Constant Warwick*. Finished in time for the English Civil War, it had been meant to harass the Spanish but instead became a terror of the seas for Royalist sea captains and their Irish allies. As Warwick noted when he issued letters of marque for the ship, the *Constant Warwick* would “be of special use in scattering and surprising Irish men-of-war, preserving trade, infesting the trade to and from the rebels, and of great assistance to the Irish squadron.”⁸⁶ Because of its proven successes, the *Constant Warwick* served as a “famous ... prototype of the new frigate class and as a man-of-war of outstanding performance.”⁸⁷

Beyond the later achievements of his own ship, early on in his career Warwick had established himself as a leading opponent of the Spanish as a patron of privateering and merchant interests. He purchased control of the Massachusetts Bay Company, and established some minor posts along the Virginia Coast. Then in 1629, along with Lord Saye, a leading puritan, Warwick founded the Providence Island Company, a private enterprise which served as a base from which privateers could wage war against Spain. Warwick and Saye “like so many others, felt the crown should have conducted” such a

⁸⁵ Kenneth R. Andrews, *Ships, Money and Politics*, pg 37, 113.

⁸⁶ T.N.A.U.K., High Court of Admiralty [hereafter referred to as HCA] 13/61 fol. 392-393, 395.

⁸⁷ Kenneth R. Andrews, *Ships, Money and Politics*, pg 194-195.

war and through their own private efforts they took up the slack.⁸⁸ Based off of the coast of modern day Nicaragua, the Providence Island Company was not only a base for privateering in the New World, but it was also meant to colonize the island of Santa Catalina. As Andrews asserts, “from the beginning the colonies of the West Indies were directly associated with anti-Spanish operations.”⁸⁹ In this manner, the creation of the Providence Island Company served as a direct affront to Spain, for the company’s founding came at the end of 1625-1630 Spanish War and its operations continued long after the cessation of hostilities. So although by the 1630s, when Charles had decided that allying with Spain was in his interest, Warwick and his friends continued “a private war in the name of Protestantism and profit in the true Elizabethan style.”⁹⁰ Warwick’s belief in and use of privateering is important because he was an “outspoken opponent of ship money” who believed that the Crown should instead pursue “a strategy of maritime enterprise in an Elizabethan tradition” which was “at odds with the main direction of early Stuart policy.”⁹¹

Charles was not interested in Warwick’s brand of private naval enterprise, but he was unwilling to punish the piratical acts carried out by the Providence Island Company. Indeed, the King was at least partially supportive of Warwick’s other privateering ventures. Unlike his father who had punished Raleigh, Charles went so far as to grant several commissions to Warwick. One such commission, granted in 19 June 1629, permitted the Earl “to take in hand a voyage by sea, intended and purposed by him, to the increase of his owne experience and benefitt by his honorable endeavour for recoverie of

⁸⁸ Derek Hirst, *Authority and Conflict: England, 1603-1658*, pg 156.

⁸⁹ Kenneth R. Andrews, *Trade, plunder and settlement*, pg 302.

⁹⁰ N.A.M. Rodger, *The Safeguard of the Sea*, pg 362.

⁹¹ Kenneth R. Andrews, *Ships, Money and Politics*, pg 6-7.

his former losses heretofore received at sea.” The commission permitted Warwick to take prizes “from the Kinge of Spaine, or the Archdutchess, or from their subjects, or from the subjects of any prince or potentate which is not in league and amitie with us, or shall not be during the saide whole intended voyage.” Although this kind of commission was relatively standard fare for captains and merchants who had been subject to the pirates and privateers of other nations, it did have one rather distinct difference. This was that Charles granted Warwick permission, “for the better performance of this his intended voyage,” to “have occasion to [use] the helpe and assistance of divers of our subjects, who shalbe willinge thereunto”⁹² What this meant in fact was that Warwick could impress men into service and could call the King’s naval officers into his own service should this be required. It must be noted that these measures were taken because of the war with Spain, but it is worth remembering that in the same year that Warwick was granted this commission he had earlier established the Providence Island Company, of which the King did not approve. An interesting parallel can thus be drawn to the Elizabethan era, for Elizabeth had set the precedent by giving commissions which turned over so much power to private individuals.

The King’s 1629 grant was the second such commission given to the Earl of Warwick. In 1627, over the protest of the Duke of Buckingham who was then Lord Admiral and a man generally opposed to privateering, Charles granted Warwick the first such commission since Elizabeth’s reign. Buckingham’s attempts at stopping the voyage were ultimately unsuccessful, and “[Warwick’s] expedition in 1627 was his largest and

⁹² Admiralty Court, Miscellanea, “Commission to the Earl of Warwick ‘to take in hand a voyage by sea’”, 19 June 1629 in R.G. Marsden, ed., *Law and Custom of the Sea: 1205-1648*, Vol. I, pg 457.

by far best advertised.”⁹³ As William Bell, a mariner who accompanied Warwick on the expedition explained, the voyage was undertaken by Warwick “for the glory of God, honour of his king and country, and for the suppressing of the enemies of Christ and the haters of England”.⁹⁴ The voyage saw a part of the Warwick’s fleet engage in a battle with a large Spanish armada, and losing quite spectacularly. Unfortunately, the Earl returned home without prizes and with a ship full of ill men and mutinous crews on some of the other ships in his squadron.⁹⁵ However, those who accompanied Warwick on the expedition did not seem to believe that the failures of the mission were entirely his fault. In a letter to Edward Nichols, Buckingham’s secretary, Sir James Bagg, the Vice-Admiral of Devon, wrote that “the mariners in praise of his Lordship [Warwick], and their own valours, blow up the business as much as they can. It was fit for him to come away, for there were so great an odds against him.”⁹⁶ However dismal a defeat this voyage was for Warwick, it only spurred him on, leading him to found the Providence Island Company and to seek his second commission in 1629. For the Earl, this commission was simply “part of a long-term policy which continued after the war” and one which even failure could not deter him from.⁹⁷

Warwick’s interest in privateering and overseas interest, and his opposition to Ship Money, gradually distanced him from the King but won him support from many Parliamentarians. Thus, Parliament turned to him in a moment of serious crisis. In July

⁹³ Nelson P. Bard, *The Earl of Warwick's Voyage of 1627*, in *The Naval Miscellany*, Vol. V, ed. N.A.M. Rodger (London: Allen & Unwin for the Naval Records Society, 1984), pg 15.

⁹⁴ William Ball, “Might and Would Not” in N.A.M. Rodger, ed., *The Naval Miscellany*, Vol. V (London: Allen & Unwin for the Navy Records Society, 1984), pg 20.

⁹⁵ See Nelson P. Bard, *The Earl of Warwick's Voyage of 1627*, in *The Naval Miscellany*, ed. N.A.M. Rodger, Vol. V, pg 16-19.

⁹⁶ T.N.A.U.K., SP 16/72, fol. 9.

⁹⁷ N.A.M. Rodger, *The Safeguard of the Sea*, pg 362.

1642, Charles dismissed the Earl of Northumberland from his post as Lord High Admiral, for Northumberland had openly sided with Parliament against the King. The Parliamentarians responded by appointing Warwick to the position on a temporary basis that July. The Parliament's decree proclaimed that Warwick, in the name of "the Parliament and Kingdom, in this Time of Imminent Danger", shall

have Power to grant Commissions, and to remove or displace all Officers, and other Persons whatsoever under your command, and to place others in their Rooms...and all Officers, Mariners, and Soldiers, belonging to the said Fleet, and also all Commanders of Forts, are hereby required to yield Obedience unto you, the said Earl of Warwicke, in all Things concerning the Service.⁹⁸

This appointment was vital for the future success of the Parliamentary cause during the civil war. Of immediate concern at that time was the defections of huge numbers of naval ships from the navy, which, under Northumberland, had been shifting towards supporting Parliament. Derek Hirst asserts that Warwick's temporary appointment as Lord High Admiral "calmed much of the storm, and ultimately all but ten ships returned to their allegiance."⁹⁹ Therefore, in December 1643, "the Lords and Commons now assembled in Parliament," upon "taking into Consideration the great and faithful Services done to the King and Parliament by Robert Earl of Warwick, both by Sea and Land, and his great Experience, Judgement, and Fidelity, in Maritime Affairs," officially named Warwick the Lord High Admiral.¹⁰⁰

⁹⁸ "1 July 1642 Ordinance for the Earl of Warwick to remain in his Command of the Fleet," in C.H. Firth & R.S. Rait, eds., *Acts and Ordinances of the Interregnum, 1642-1660*, (London: H.M. Stationery Office, 1911), pg 12.

⁹⁹ Derek Hirst, *Authority and Conflict: England, 1603-1658*, pg 283.

¹⁰⁰ "An Ordinance of the Lords and Commons, to make Robert Earl of Warwick Lord High Admiral of England," December 1643, in C.H. Firth and R.S. Rait, eds., *Acts and Ordinances of the Interregnum, 1642-1660*, pg 351-352.

Warwick, a gentleman of a high standing, staunchly Protestant and, as we have seen, an extraordinarily talented and experienced seaman, seems to have been a natural choice to become parliamentary Lord Admiral. Indeed, Warwick excelled at his post, and played an important role in securing victory for the parliamentary cause. This view is supported by historians, who are in general agreement that Warwick did an excellent job as Lord High Admiral. As Jeremy Black states, “under [Warwick’s] command, the navy helped maintain the commercial buoyancy of London, the centre of the rebellion, and this was crucial to the revenues on which the Parliamentary cause depended.”¹⁰¹ Along much of the same lines as Black, David Loades believes that once Warwick took control of the navy, “civilian interference with the navy reduced. Thereafter, the deployment of the navy was determined by the strategic needs of fighting the royalists.”¹⁰² Not only did Warwick manage to turn the navy into an efficient and very effective force for Parliament during the civil war, but he also managed to promote privateering ventures at the same time. While he had control of the fleet in September 1642, Warwick sent out powerful expeditions to raid the Spanish Caribbean and these forces temporarily captured Jamaica.¹⁰³ Although he had to contend with the privateers being used by the royalist forces, Warwick still managed to keep his commercial privateering interests alive while securing the victory of the parliamentary cause.

Warwick’s privateering ventures under Charles and his own success as the Parliamentary High Admiral, show a return in spirit to the Elizabethan manner of running the Royal Navy. Although Warwick was not permitted to take such spectacular voyages

¹⁰¹ Jeremy Black, *The British Seaborne Empire*, pg 52.

¹⁰² David Loades, *England's Maritime Empire*, pg 158.

¹⁰³ N.A.M. Rodger, *The Safeguard of the Sea*, pg 415.

as both Sir Francis Drake and Sir Walter Raleigh had under Elizabeth, his establishment of the Providence Island Company and his commissioned voyages as a privateer serving the Crown harkened a slow return to the kind of Royal Fleet that Elizabeth had created. Charles himself had toiled throughout his reign to return his navy to the mythically glorious fleet that still existed in the minds of both the English people and officials at court and in the House of Commons. The wider problems that Charles had to contend with during his reign made these attempts at reform all the more difficult. Ruling without the financial help of the House of Commons meant that Charles had to resort to unconventional means in order to secure funding, and some of these efforts, such as Ship Money, proved to be fatal. There were far too many other issues plaguing the Crown, and while Charles did manage to make vast improvements to the navy that his father had left him, he did not succeed in making the navy what it had been under Elizabeth. Still, his improvements were nevertheless impressive. The problems of widespread corruption and the inexperience of the commanders of the Jacobean Royal Navy were generally fixed under Charles's careful watch and the Crown embarked on a massive ship-building campaign. Unfortunately, it would not be until after Charles's death that the Royal Navy realized its true potential and became the fleet of lore.

Conclusion

The Royal Navy underwent a transformation under the rule of Elizabeth and those of her successors, James I and Charles I, from a position of great power under the 'Pirate Queen' to a destitute force under James. By the time that Charles fled London at the outset of the English Civil War in 1642, the navy had regained a semblance of its former Elizabethan glory which had been tragically lost by ineptitude and neglect during the Jacobean era. The exploits of privateers did much to aid in the formation of the navy as a professional force, as their experience and willingness to arm their ships and men for the service of the Crown forced the ships and sailors of the royal service to gain equal footing with their private counterparts. It is also understandable that in times of peace, ordinary seamen in the Royal Navy turned to merchant and privateering missions in order to supplement their meagre earnings. In fact, the lure of these voyages and the pitiful state of naval wages, which were often in arrears during this era, made staffing the navy notoriously difficult. Further, under the rule of James and Charles, impressment became incredibly commonplace, which did little to bolster the morale of the navy, which over these years seemed to spiral into a disorganized and unprofessional force. Yet, despite these problems England's navy was still viewed as a powerful and important force and a special symbol of English power. The idea that the Royal Navy was both invincible and able to financially maintain itself, however untrue, had its roots in the Elizabethan period, specifically from the 1585-1604 war with Spain. The English defeat of the Spanish Armada in 1588 did much to contribute to this idea, and indeed it was an important victory, although it was, perhaps, not the great naval victory that it is now remembered as. The memory of the great English victory over the Spanish Armada made

contemporaries difficult to persuade when the inadequacies of the early Stuart navy were revealed, and made Parliament notoriously unwilling to provide Charles with the funding he requested to correct the problems that plagued the Royal Navy he had inherited.

Queen Elizabeth was particularly fond of using privateers as a strategic arm of the state. These men, a mix of wealthy merchants, minor nobles, and simple businessmen, became ingrained into the royal service during Elizabeth's reign, and in times of war they often proved ready and willing to contribute not only their expertise, but also their ships to the royal cause. During this era, maritime violence was swiftly changing, thanks to the discovery of the New World and the voyages of navigation and trade that came as a result. Merchants began to arm themselves in order to protect their wares on lengthy voyages from those predators who wished to gain riches through illicit means. Often they required protection from seamen from other countries. Above all these privateers and pirates were businessmen, and it was the drive for profits which motivated them to undertake such dangerous voyages. The English Crown was quick to realize that by supporting these missions through relatively little funding and through letters of marque or reprisal, it could come to share in the spoils that these missions could potentially provide. Profit, then, became not only the motivating force for the privateers and their private supporters, but also influenced the Crown, for the relatively minor risks did not outweigh the promise of spectacular gains. The increased involvement of the Crown in these missions, has prompted one historian to note that foreigners came to believe that privateering had become a "national business of maritime predation" in England.¹

¹ Kenneth R. Andrews, *Ships, Money and Politics*, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1991) pg 139-140.

The exploits of Sir Francis Drake serve as an excellent example of the good relationship that privateers had with both the Crown and the Royal Navy in the Elizabethan era. Drake's fluid movement from his own privateering voyages to a captaincy in the English Navy shows the important cohesion between the public and private spheres in terms of foreign and defence policy during this period. The experience brought to the Royal Navy by men like Drake and Raleigh, and their effective role as a strategic tool against the Spanish, played a large part in the rise of England as a significant maritime power. The English defeat of the Spanish Armada and the wild success of Drake's expeditions, especially that to Cadiz in 1587, showcase the emergence of a powerful and effective English Royal Navy. This navy was supported by the country's privateers, and indeed could not have survived without them. In turn, the privateers enjoyed the support of the Crown. This navy of amalgamated interests did not, however, outlast Elizabeth, as her successor James very quickly reversed the improvements which had been made in this era.

James I is generally blamed for the lacklustre state of the Royal Navy that existed during his reign and after his death. This blame is not entirely unfounded, as James showed little interest in the maintenance and growth of his fleet. Indeed, although James did authorize two separate commissions of the navy, he and his officials did not take their recommendations to heart, preferring to allow the navy to continue to be corrupted by all levels of naval men. The men who staffed the navy were not the same as those who had helped it achieve greatness under Elizabeth; many, if not most, were promoted out of patronage rather than merit. This problem was characteristic of Jacobean policy, as James had surrounded himself with advisors and favourites who generally did not possess

the expertise that their posts required, nor did they understand the value of having skilled and experienced seamen staffing the Royal Fleet. In fact, one of James's early acts as King was to outlaw the practise of privateering, thus robbing the Royal Navy of some of its most experienced and successful sailors and depriving England of a valuable tool in defending itself from the Spanish. Yet, it was not only James and his advisors who can be blamed for the failures of the Royal Navy over these years, but also the House of Commons, which staunchly refused to grant James the money to maintain the fleet. The end of the Spanish War in 1604 and the peace that it ushered in saw many Englishmen fail to understand the need for funds and the continuation of the taxes which were required to raise such large sums of money. Worse, the money that the navy did collect was squandered, with many ships being stripped of anything that could be sold for a profit, and then left to rot in the dockyards. The failure of the navy to maintain its Elizabethan splendour, cannot be rested solely on James, but his failures as a monarch allowed others to corrupt the navy and turn it into a force which looked nothing like its Elizabethan predecessor.

Especially in contrast to Elizabeth's, James's reign shows that in order to flourish, the navy required the interest and encouragement of the monarch. The actions and failures of the Jacobean state are best seen through James's poor treatment of Sir Walter Raleigh, who had risen to fame and prominence as an adventurer and privateer under Elizabeth and then lost it all in 1649 when he was executed by the Crown. While Raleigh's own actions are in part to blame for his demise, James's decision to execute him illustrates the changes James had made to English foreign and naval policy. The

aforementioned changes to the Royal Navy under James saw England and the English navy weakened, leaving James's son, Charles, to rectify England's maritime problems.

The problem of patronage in the navy and in the English state in general continued under James's successor, Charles I. This problem was not confined to England during this era, as many states, such as France, struggled with the question of whether the navy should be run by high-standing men of 'quality,' or the unrefined but immensely experienced and skilled mariners. Even privateers struggled with this problem, as is shown by the experiences of those aboard the *Hector*, the ship of the infamous privateer Robert Rich, the Earl of Warwick. Furthermore, in this time of great turmoil, these problems persisted in society as a whole, and not just within the seafaring community. Charles's reign, though plagued by these problems, did begin to see a restoration of the professionalism and power of the Royal Navy. The experienced, tarpaulin officers, who served in the navy stood in stark contrast to the gentlemen officers of the navy whose main purpose was to serve the Crown. The latter group serve as an example of the problems plaguing the English population at this time. Indeed, they are symbolic of a number of issues: the unheeded public demand for a navy in order to protect shipping; the King's active suppression of Parliament; and Charles's outright refusal to support an anti-Catholic foreign policy. Religion became a main facet of discord and dissent among the English population of this time, and again the experiences of the navy and England's merchant marine exemplify the religious questions which overwhelmed and overtook Charles. Ship owners and masters were often staunchly Presbyterian or they were 'Godly' Protestants in the Church of England, a belief system in direct opposition to Charles's own Arminianist beliefs. The eventual resolution of these political, social and

perhaps most importantly, religious questions, proved to be vital for the survival of the Royal Navy during this tumultuous period.²

In addition to his domestic quarrels, Charles also had to contend with problems in Europe, which was then gripped by the bloody Thirty Years War of 1618-1648. Charles managed to avoid becoming entangled in the conflict until 1639, which was fortunate for him as this could have exposed his financial weaknesses, and might have brought about his downfall at the hands of his European rivals. In a sense then, Charles was saved from this fate by the outbreak of civil war. Unfortunately for him, this conflict sealed his fate in an equally bloody manner. By 1642 Charles had lost control of the Royal Navy, and with it the profits that English shipping brought in; this money was instead transferred to his enemies in Parliament. The Earl of Warwick, Robert Rich, was named Lord High Admiral of the Parliamentary Fleet, and under his influence, the navy continued its reversion back to the Elizabethan model, by effectively combining public and private interests so that it finally became a force capable of protecting English shipping, a role the population had long demanded. Both Charles's reforms and his sound intentions were not enough to capture the loyalty of the Royal Navy, whose fall to Parliament was swift and ushered in yet another cycle of change. The loss of the navy, and the revenue it provided, did much in securing the fate of the unfortunate Charles I. It would not be until after Charles's death that the Royal Navy became the extremely effective force it would remain for centuries.

The mix of private and public interest, so effective under the Elizabethan regime, saw a return under Charles, although it was not fully realized until Parliament took

² N.A.M. Rodger, *The Safeguard of the Sea*, (New York: W.W, Norton & Company, 1998), pg 410.

control of the fleets in 1642. In the interim, James I's decision to outlaw privateering, and his reliance on the advice of his unqualified and inexperienced gentleman favourites led to the Royal Navy becoming a highly corrupted and inert force. The potential that James had inherited from Elizabeth in regards to English seapower was unrealized as naval officials motivated by personal avarice both literally and figuratively stripped the Royal Fleet of its power. Charles, with his understanding of the importance of skilled seamen to the English Navy, took the steps needed to reverse this decline albeit through dubious and unconventional means. During the Caroline era privateers again rose to prominence, and their exploits aided in the redevelopment of the navy as an effective arm of government. However, the time of Charles's rule was different than those of both Elizabeth and James, and the King's attempts to return of the Royal Navy to its former power failed to take into account the demands of a population whose cries for a navy to protect shipping went unheeded. These demands would not be fully realized until Parliament took control of the navy, but the foundation for the immensely successful and remarkably powerful Royal Navy of Horatio Nelson was laid in the early modern period under the rule of such monarchs as Queen Elizabeth I and King Charles I.

Bibliography

Primary Sources

Manuscripts

The National Archives of the United Kingdom (T.N.A.U.K.)

Calendar of State Papers, Domestic Series, 1628-29

Calendar of State Papers, Domestic Series, 1629-31

Earl Cowper Historical Manuscript Collection

High Court of Admiralty

State Papers

National Maritime Museum of the United Kingdom

Leconfield

Royal Navy: Central Administration

Royal Naval: List of Ships

Printed Primary Sources

Andrews, Kenneth R., ed. *English Privateering Voyages to the West Indies, 1588-1595*. Cambridge: Hakluyt Society, 1959.

Ashton, Robert. *James I by His Contemporaries*. London: Hutchinson & Co, 1969.

Breton, Nicholas. *A discourse in commendation of the valiant as vertuous minded gentleman, Maister Frauncis Drake, with a reioysing of his happy aduentures*. London: John Charlewood, 1581.

Bruce, John, ed. *Calendar of State Papers, Domestic Series, Charles I: 1633-1634*. London: Longman, Green, Longman, Roberts, and Green, 1863.

Collins, Arthur, ed. *Letters and Memorials of State*. London: Printed for T. Osborne, 1746.

Corbett, Julian S., ed. *Papers Relating to the Navy During the Spanish War, 1585-1587*. London: Navy Records Society, 1898.

Crouch, Nathaniel. *The English Hero: or, Sir Francis Drake Reviv'd, Being a full Account of the dangerous Voyages, Admiral adventurers, Notable Discoveries, and*

- Magnaimous Atchievements of that Valiant and Renowned Commander*. London: C. Hitch & J. Hodges, 1750.
- Drake, Sir Francis. *The voyages and travels of that renowned captain Sir Francis Drake. Into the West-Indies, and round about the world*. Stamford: unknown publisher, 1725.
- . *The world encompassed*. Edited by William SW Vaux. New York: B Franklin, 1963.
- Firth, C.H., and R.S. Rait. *Acts and Ordinances of the Interregnum, 1642-1660*. London: H.M. Stationery Office, 1911.
- Glanville, Sir John. *The Voyage to Cadiz in 1625: being a journal written by John Glanville*. New York: Johnson Reprint, 1965.
- Hakluyt, Richard. *Hakluyt's Collection of the Early Voyages, Travels and Discoveries of the English Nation*. Vol. 1. London: R.H. Evans, 1809.
- . *Hakluyt's Voyages to the New World*. Edited by David Freeman Hawke. New York: The Bobbs-Merrill Company, Inc., 1972.
- . *Voyages and Discoveries*. Edited by Jack Beeching. Baltimore: Penguin Books, 1972.
- Hattendorf, John B, and et al, . *British Naval documents, 1204-1960*. Aldershot, Hants: Scolar Press for the Navy Records Society, 1993.
- Hinds, Allen B., ed. *Calendar of State Papers Relating to English Affairs in the Archives of Venice, 1632-1636*. Vol. 23. London: Public Records Office, 1921.
- Hollond, John. *Two Discourses of the Navy, 1638 and 1659*. Edited by J.R. Tanner. Vol. 7. London: Navy Records Society, 1896.
- Howell, Thomas Bayley, ed. *Cobbett's complete collection of state trials and proceedings for high treason and other crimes and misdemeanors from the earliest period to the present time*. Vol. III. London: Bagshaw, 1816.
- Hughes, Paul L., and James Francis Larkin. *Tudor Royal Proclamations*. Vol. I. New Haven: Yale University Press, 1964.
- Knowler, William, ed. *The Earl of Straffords's Letters and Dispatches*. Dublin: R. Reilly for Robert Owen, 1740.
- Larkin, James F., ed. *Stuart Royal Proclamations*. Vol. II. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1973.
- Larkin, James F., and Paul L. Hughes. *Stuart Royal Proclamations*. Vol. I. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1973.
- Laughton, John Knox, ed. *State Papers Relating to the Defeat of the Spanish Armada*. Volumes I and II. London: Navy records society, 1894.

Mahaffy, Robert Pentland, ed. *Calendar of State Papers Relating to Ireland preserved in the Public Records Office, 1625-1670*. London: Eyre and Spottiswoode, 1900.

Marsden, R.G., ed. *Law and Custom of the Sea: 1205-1648*. Vol. I. London: Navy Records Society, 1915.

Monson, William, Sir. *The naval tracts of Sir William Monson*. London: Navy Record Society, 1902.

Payne, E.J., ed. *Voyages of the Elizabethan Seamen to America*. London: Thomas De La Rue & Co, 1880.

Raleigh, Sir Walter. *The works of Sir Walter Raleigh, Kt. political, commercial, and philosophical; together with his letters and poems*. Vol. I. London: R. Dodsley, 1751.

—. *The arraignment and conviction of Sr VValter Rawleigh*. London: William Wilson, 1648.

—. *The discoverie of the large, rich and bevtiful empire of Guiana*. London: Robert Robinson, 1596.

—. *The Works of Sir Walter Raleigh*. Edited by William Oldys and Thomas Birch. Vol. VIII. New York: B. Franklin, 1964.

Rodger, N.A.M., ed. *The Naval Miscellany*. Vol. V. London: Allen & Unwin for the Navy Records Society, 1984.

Sainsbury, W. Noel, ed. *Calendar of State Papers Colonial, East Indies, China and Japan*. Vol. III. London: Her Majesty's Stationary Office, 1860.

—, ed. *Calendar of State Papers Colonial, East Indies, China and Japan*. Vol. IV. London: Public Records Office, 1878.

Selden, John. *Of the dominion, or ownership, of the sea*. London: William Du-Gard, 1652.

Stuart, Charles I. *A Procolmation for the well manning and arming of the Ships of, or belonging to this Realme, upon their setting forth to Sea*. London: Bonham Norton, 24 December 1625.

—. *By the King, a proclamation for the levying and payment of the ship-moneys in arreare*. London: Robert Barker, 1640.

Stuart, Charles II. *Five Letters of King Charles II*. Vol. V. New York: Johnson Reprint, 1968.

Secondary Sources

Monographs

Andrews, Kenneth R. *The Spanish Caribbean*. New Haven: Yale University Press, 1978.

—. *Drake's Voyages*. New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1967.

—. *Ships, Money and Politics*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1991.

—. *Trade, plunder and settlement*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1984.

Armitage, David. *The Ideological Origins of the British Empire*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2000.

Bayly, C.A. *Imperial Meridian: the British Empire and the World, 1780-1830*. London: Longman, 1989.

Black, Jeremy. *Great powers and the Quest for Hegemony : the World Order Since 1500*. London: Routledge, 2008.

—. *The British Seaborne Empire*. New Haven: Yale University Press, 2004.

Boot, Max. *War Made New: Technology, Warfare, and the Course of History, 1500 to today*. New York: Gotham Books, 2006.

Braddick, Michael. *State Formation in Early Modern England, c. 1550-1700*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2000.

Brewer, John. *The Sinews of Power*. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1990.

Christianson, Paul. *Discourse on History, Law and Governance in the Public Career of John Seldon, 1610-1635*. Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1996.

Corbett, Julian S. *Principles of Maritime Strategy*. Mineola, NY: Dover Publications, Inc., 2004.

Corbett, Julian S. *Drake and the Tudor Navy*. Vol. I. New York: Burt Franklin, 1969.

—. *Drake and the Tudor Navy*. Vol. II. New York: Burt Franklin, 1969.

Defoe, Daniel. *A General History of the Pyrates*. Edited by Manuel Schonhorn. Mineola, NY: Dover Publications, Inc, 1999.

Elliott, J.H. *The Count-Duke of Olivares*. New Haven: Yale University Press, 1986.

Glete, Jan. *Warfare at Sea, 1500-1650*. New York: Routledge, 2000.

Griffey, Erin, ed. *Henrietta Maria: Piety, Politics and Patronage*. Burlington, VT: Ashgate Publishing Limited, 2008.

- Guy, John, ed. *The Reign of Elizabeth I*. Cambridge: University of Cambridge Press, 1995.
- . *Tudor England*. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1988.
- Hampden, John, ed. *Francis Drake: Privateer*. London: Eyre Methuen Ltd, 1972.
- Herman, Arthur. *To Rule the Waves*. New York: Harper Perennial, 2005.
- Hirst, Derek. *Authority and Conflict: England, 1603-1658*. Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University Press, 1986.
- Houston, R.A. *The Population History of England and Ireland, 1500-1750*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1992.
- Kelsey, Harry. *Sir Francis Drake: The Queen's Pirate*. New Haven: Yale University Press, 1998.
- Kennedy, Paul M. *The Rise and Fall of British Naval Mastery*. London: Penguin Books, 2001.
- . *The Rise and Fall of the Great Powers: economic change and military conflict from 1500 to 2000*. New York: Random House, 1987.
- Kishlansky, Mark A. *The Rise of the New Model Army*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1983.
- Loades, David. *England's Maritime Empire*. Harlow: Pearson Education Limited, 2000.
- MacCaffrey, Wallace T. *Queen Elizabeth and the Making of Policy, 1572-1588*. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1981.
- Mattingly, Garrett. *The Armada*. Boston: First Mariners Books, 2005.
- McNeill, William Hardy. *The Pursuit of Power: Technology, Armed Force, and Society since A.D. 1000*. Chicago: Chicago University Press, 1982.
- Nicholls, Mark. *A History of the Modern British Isles, 1529-1603: The Two Kingdoms*. Oxford: Blackwell Publishers, 1999.
- Oppenheim, M. *A History of the Administration of the Royal Navy and of Merchant Shipping in Relation to the Navy*. London: The Shoe String Press, Inc, 1961.
- Parker, Geoffrey. *Europe in Crisis 1598-1648*. Glasgow: Fontana Publishers, 1979.
- . *The Military Revolution*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1988.
- Peck, Linda Levy. *Consuming Splendor: Society and Culture in Seventeenth-Century England*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2005.
- Redworth, Glyn. *The Prince and the Infanta: The Cultural Politics of the Spanish Match*. New Haven: Yale University Press, 2003.

- Rodger, N.A.M. *The Safeguard of the Sea*. New York: W.W, Norton & Company, 1998.
- Ronald, Susan. *The Pirate Queen*. New York: HarperCollins Publishers, 2007.
- Russell, Conrad, ed. *The Origins of the English Civil Wars*. London: Macmillan Press Ltd, 1973.
- . *Unrevolutionary England, 1603-1642*. London: The Hambledon Press, 1990.
- Sharpe, Kevin. *The Personal Rule of Charles I*. New Haven: Yale University Press, 1992.
- Smith, David L. *A History of the Modern British Isles, 1603-1707: The Double Crown*. Oxford: Blackwell Publishers, 1998.
- Trevelyan, Raleigh. *Sir Walter Raleigh*. New York: Henry Holt and Company, 2004.
- Wilson, Derek. *A Brief History of the Circumnavigators*. London: Robinson, 2003.
- Worden, Blair, ed. *Stuart England*. Oxford: Phaidon Press Limited, 1986.
- Wormald, Jenny, ed. *The Seventeenth Century*. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2008.
- Wrigley, E.A., and R.S. Schofield. *The Population History of England, 1544-1871: a Reconstruction*. London: E. Arnold, 1981.

Articles

- Black, Jeremy. "Review." *The English Historical Review*, February 1999: 131-133.
- Christianson, Paul. "Politics, Patronage, and Conceptions of Governance in Early Stuart England." *The Hutchinsons Library Quarterly* 60, no. 3 (1997): 289-302.
- . "Two Proposals for Raising Money by Extraordinary Means, c. 1627." *English Historical Review* 117, no. 471 (April 2002): 356-373.
- Fuchs, Barbara. "Faithless Empires: Pirates, Renegadoes, and the English Nation." *ELH: English Literary History* 67, no. 1 (Spring 2000): 45-69.
- Hattendorf, John B. "Review." *The International History Review* 21, no. 1 (March 1999): 138-140.
- Langelüddecke, Henrik. "'I finde all men & my officers all soe unwilling": The Collection of Ship Money, 1635-1640." *Journal of British Studies* 46 (July 2007): 509-542.
- Popofsky, Linda S. "The Crisis over Tonnage and Poundage in Parliament in 1629." *Past & Present*, no. 126 (February 1990): 44-75.
- Quintrell, Brian. "Charles I and his Navy." *Seventeenth Century* 3, no. 2 (Autumn 1988): 159-179.

Runyan, Timothy J. "Review." *The Journal of Military History* 65, no. 1 (January 2001): 175-176.

Senning, Calvin F. "Piracy, Politics, and Plunder under James I: The Voyage of the "Pearl" and Its Aftermath, 1611-1615." *The Huntington Library Quarterly* 46, no. 3 (Summer 1983): 187-222.

Swales, Robin J. W. "The Ship Money Levy of 1628." *Bulletin of the Institute of Historical Research* 50, no. 122 (November 1977): 164-176.

Wormald, Jenny. "James VI & I." *History Today* 52, no. 6 (June 2002): 27-33.

—. "James VI and I: Two Kings or One?" *History* 68, no. 223 (1983): 187-209.