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THE RELEVANCY OF MARITAIN'S  
PERSONALIST POLITICAL PHILOSOPHY

by P.S. SHAO

A Dissertation Submitted to the School of  
Graduate Studies and Research of the  
University of Ottawa as Partial Fulfilment  
of the Requirements for the Degree of Doctorate  
in Philosophy.

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P.S. Shao, Ottawa, Canada, 1979.

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## PREFACE

Since I started this research several people have remarked to me that Maritain is a most difficult philosopher to understand. Some friends have even gone a step further to ask me why I got involved in Maritain's philosophy in the first place.

With the taste I have had of Maritain's philosophy I could react to some of my commentators with the Tanzanian proverb: Mtaka cha uvunguni budi kuinama (one who seeks to pick up something of worth from underneath the bed has to bend down).

I have been searching for a philosophy which can firmly found and rationalize politics in order to throw light on some of the economic, social political religious cultural problems inherited with colonialism by Tanzania and many countries which are emerging from colonial rule to self-government. With various advices I felt that somehow Maritain's philosophy, though thought out in a different sociological, cultural historical environment, can help in understanding the present historical climate and provide the metaphysical principles which can be applied analogically to the different historic-cultural matrices in order to synthesize the genuine concrete historical ideal and the adequate political philosophy to work towards this ideal.

Maritain has had a most active intellectual life. He has written in a manner quite involved and in almost all areas of knowledge. To understand his political philosophy adequately would demand a deep and extensive involvement in the diversity of problems to which he has addressed himself. This demand constitutes one of the difficulties I encountered in this research: with the limited scope of this work and the limited time, which works of Maritain, theoretical and practical, must I draw from?

I have resolved this difficulty by concentrating my attention on the social and political works of Maritain but at the same time drawing from his speculative works only as much as was necessary to understand his practical works.

Connected to the bibliographical difficulty is a methodological one. Not all of Maritain's original works in French which are necessary for the present study have been translated into English: some have been translated in part and others have not been translated at all. To worsen the matter some works have had several translations. Thus, I have had to work with the same works, citing from them sometimes in English, other times in French.

In order to avoid bibliographical inconsistencies I have entered the works used in both French and English as two separate entries but with the translation following immediately after the original although they would not

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follow each other in alphabetical order. Moreover, in the footnotes which have been put at the end of each chapter for convenience, I have referred to the various works by the system of abbreviations found below.

#### ABBREVIATIONS

AS	Art and Scholasticism (1920)
BPT	Bergsonian Philosophy and Thomism (1955)
PB	Philosophie Bergsonienne (1914)
CC	On the Church of Christ (1973)
CD	Christianity and Democracy (1945)
CT	Court Traité de l'Existence et de l'Existent (1948)
EE	Existence and the Existent (1948)
DK	Divide to Unite or Degrees of Knowledge (1932)
FMW	Freedom in the Modern World, (1936)
RTL	Du Régime Temporel et de la Liberté (1933)
HI	Humanisme Intégral (1936)
IH	Integral Humanism (1973)
MS or M&S	Man and the State (1951)
MP	Moral Philosophy (1964)
PM	Philosophie Morale (1960)
PG	Peasant of the Garonne (1973)
PCG	The Person and the Common Good (1947)
PH	On the Philosophy of History (1959)
QC	Questions de Conscience (1938)
RC	Religion et Culture (1930) Religion and Culture
RIV	Réflexion sur l'Intelligence et sur sa Vie Propre (1924)
RN	Rights of Man and Natural Law (1943)
Rr	Raison et Raisons (1948)
RR	Range of Reason (1952)

ABBREVIATIONS

x

- RT Ransoming the Time (1941)
- SP Scholasticism and Politics (1940)
- SPP The Social and Political Philosophy  
of Jacques Maritain (1965)
- SS Science et Sagesse (1935)
- SW Science and Wisdom (1940)
- T Theonas (1921)
- TNC Things that are not Caesar's (1930)
- TR Three Reformers: Luther, Descartes and Rousseau (1925)  
Trois Réformateurs: Luther, Descartes et Rousseau
- UP On the Use of Philosophy (1961)

## GENERAL INTRODUCTION

We wish to contribute to man's development if we can, but we do not claim to have any 'solution'; our only claim is that we intend to grope forward in the dark, towards a goal so distant that even the real understanding of it is beyond us - toward, in other words, the best that man can become.

J.K. Nyerere, Freedom and Unity, p. 121.

The need for authentic relation between the human person and political society<sup>1</sup> has continually been a matter of great interest to political philosophers.<sup>2</sup> This is because the relation is rooted in a tension between two orders of goods immanent in the very nature<sup>3</sup> of the person: the good of political society to which the person is ordained as a member of the human species; and the good transcending political society to which the person is ordained as an intellectual being. The former is a temporal good while the latter is a supratemporal one.

In order to attain the temporal good the person needs political society.<sup>4</sup> But simultaneously as he seeks to live in political society the person seeks to transcend it in order to pursue the supratemporal good. This simultaneous affirmation, in the very propensity of the human person, of his dependence on and independence from political society constitutes the political problem: does the individual person exist for political society or political society for the individual person? In other words, how should political society be conceived so that while it unites the individual persons towards the attainment of the temporal good it allows them to transcend this good and reach out to their supratemporal end? What is the relation between the human person as the social unit of political society and the common good of political society?

This problem is a practical one. It defies a solution which is permanent and for all times; for, such a solution would mean the end of tension, the absolute reconciliation between the changing and the unchanging, the temporal and the supratemporal. Rather, being a practical problem it assumes a contemporary significance for every historical age, and thus, calls for a dynamic solution suited both to the changing as well as the unchanging orders.

Jacques Maritain, living in a Christian Civilization whose values have been undermined for three centuries by liberalism<sup>5</sup> and now by the totalitarian regimes<sup>6</sup> of the twentieth century as well as by Marxian Communism,<sup>7</sup> has thought out a solution to the political problem for the contemporary scene. His solution is personalist democracy.<sup>8</sup> It is, according to him, a political humanism,<sup>9</sup> or an integral humanism;<sup>10</sup> for, it takes a full account of the true principles of the nature of the human person, and the authentic common good of political society.

The original élan which prompted Maritain to shift his attention from speculative philosophy to political philosophy was the condemnation by Pope Pius XI of the Action Française movement.<sup>11</sup> Maritain realized immediately after the condemnation that the root problem of the politics of the Action Française was a lack of genuine metaphysical foundation of politics. He responded to this need by resorting to

Thomistic philosophy from which he synthesized the immutable principles of his philosophy.

Having synthesized the immutable principles concerning the human person and his relation to political society - immutable in the sense that they are true to all politics irrespective of time and place - and having formulated the laws, metaphysical and historical, that guide the application of the immutable principles to the various historical climates, Maritain identifies the present historical climate and applies to it the immutable principles. The result of this application is what Maritain has termed integral humanism or personalist democracy.

This political philosophy, in Maritain's view, is relevant to the present historical climate. It provides a solution to the problems encountered by the materialist political philosophies of liberalism and totalitarianism. Not only does it bridge the gap created by liberal philosophy between the order of nature and the order of freedom or politics and morality; it also reestablishes the organic link between politics and religion. Thus, if it is true to its claims, Maritain's personalist political philosophy should be the solution to the positivist, empiricist and totalitarian politics rampant in the Twentieth Century.

But Maritain's personalist political philosophy has been challenged from various angles. Venant Cauchy has

criticized it for denying the autonomous existence of natural ethics.<sup>12</sup> According to Cauchy, although Maritain acknowledges the possibility of a natural order, yet his insistence that "moral philosophy adequately considered" must borrow from theology undermines the autonomy of natural ethics.<sup>13</sup> Hans Kersel objects to Maritain's insistence on the need of reconciling the democratic inspiration with the gospel inspiration.<sup>14</sup> For him adherence to an "absolute truth" whether philosophical or religious undermines tolerance in a democratic society.<sup>15</sup> Gregory Vlastos thinks that Maritain's doctrine of "absolute sovereignty" in the Church is incompatible with the full autonomy of the democratic society especially as regards the jurisdiction over moral matters on which both the State and the Church exercise authority.<sup>16</sup>

These three criticisms touch upon the very issues that Maritain set out to solve for the present historical climate. If they were valid then they would render Maritain's personalist political philosophy irrelevant for the present historical climate. But according to the present thesis Maritain's political philosophy can answer these criticisms.

Hypothesis:

Either Maritain's personalist political philosophy has within it the answer already thought out by Maritain for these criticisms or it has the principles from which an answer to these criticisms can be formulated. In either case the

relevancy of Maritain's personalist political philosophy can be demonstrated. It is the purpose of the present enquiry to make this demonstration.

#### The Relevance of this Enquiry:

This thesis has been prompted by a study done on the political programme of Julius K. Nyerere<sup>17</sup> attached as an appendix to this thesis. From the study it can be discovered that Nyerere's Ujamaa Socialism, a political programme<sup>18</sup> geared to immediate action, is an attempt at re-examining the age-old problem of the individual and political society. Nyerere affirms from the very start that "individual freedom and his life in political society constitutes an on-going conflict",<sup>19</sup> which demands a continual re-examination under the variants of the historical-cultural environment.

Central in this programme, is Nyerere's conception of the unique position of man in the cosmos. For him, man is the center of civilization. All the other beings in the cosmos are at his service.

The programme could be looked at as enhancing some form of humanism. But it is a humanism very much different from, in fact, completely opposed to, the humanism of bourgeois liberalism on the one hand and Marxist communism on the other. Actually, from Nyerere's severe criticism of both bourgeois democracy and communism<sup>20</sup> it is obvious that one of Nyerere's initial concerns in initiating the programme was to strike a

just median between these extremes.

Against this criticism, Nyerere juxtaposes his conception of the individual and political society. He emphasizes that man is a part and member of political society.<sup>21</sup> "He becomes meaningful to himself and to his fellows in society".<sup>22</sup> As a part, he is naturally subordinate to the political society and its common good.<sup>23</sup> On the other hand, due to the fact that the individual person has the "spark of the divinity"<sup>24</sup>, he is somehow superior to the political society. "To the service of man's development", Nyerere emphasizes, "any or all of the institutions of any particular society must be sacrificed if this should be necessary...".<sup>25</sup>

It is obvious from the foregoing statements that Nyerere's programme makes definite metaphysical assumptions. It invokes a political philosophy in which it is implicitly anchored. But what kind of political philosophy? Viewed from its intent to provide a just median between bourgeois democracy and Marxist communism, both of which thrive on a false philosophy of man and society, the programme invokes a true philosophy of man and society; true in the sense that it takes a full account of the trans-historic nature of the human person, the true nature of political common good, the historically accumulated material and spiritual energies defining the sociological cultural religious environment and the prospective goal towards which the human development is tending.

On the other hand, viewed from the emphasis on the human person and the mutual subordinations of the individual person and the common good of the political society, the programme points to a personalist political philosophy. It is so because the programme makes assumptions regarding the individual man as a corporeal - spiritual entity, autonomous, naturally immersed in political society but equally naturally transcendent to it.

It is these assumptions that have prompted the present study on Maritain's personalist democracy. For, since the programme seems to be founded in an implicit personalist political philosophy it is curious even without making this philosophy explicit to find out how Nyerere's political programme conforms on the practical level with Maritain's democratic charter.

Method:

In keeping with the nature of the problem this study comprises seven chapters. In the first chapter I shall study Maritain's concrete historical situation. This study shall hopefully expose the social, political forces and events together with the political problems resulting therein. I shall try in this chapter to pose the political problems which drew Maritain to philosophize in politics. The conclusions at the end of the chapter shall hopefully demonstrate whether the political problems are pertinent to politics as such and

for all times or are they only unique to Maritain's historical climate.

Once the political problems confronting Maritain have been outlined, the four following chapters will expose Maritain's theoretical solution. Chapters two, three and four shall be devoted to Maritain's doctrine on the nature of the human person, the nature of the common good, and relation between the human person and the common good respectively.

In chapter five I shall study Maritain's general laws of application of the immutable principles in synthesizing the concrete historical ideal. I shall try in this chapter to investigate whether the concrete historical ideal or New Christendom allows for a political regime which is suitable to the present pluralism of the body politic.

In chapter six an exposition of Maritain's personalist democracy will be made while chapter seven examines in a kind of appraisal the relevancy of Maritain's personalist democracy against his critics.

## GENERAL INTRODUCTION

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1. Political society is the most perfect of temporal societies. It is ordained by nature but attained and maintained by reason. It embodies the whole body of human persons, politically conscious and organized by a government under just laws and seeking the welfare of the human persons united by justice and friendship for the common good of their temporal life. In this study, the terms political society, civil society and body politic will be used synonymously. In chapter three these terms will be distinguished from other terms with which they have quite often been confused.
2. Leo Strauss makes a very penetrating study on political philosophy tracing the origin of Natural Right and showing that there is a fundamental distinction between right and wrong in politics. Natural Right and History, Chicago, 1951. The question of Natural Right and History is another manifestation of the political problem of the individual and the political society. See also K. Popper, The Open Society and Its Enemies, 1962.
3. In the Classical philosophy nature is understood in two ways. Nature as what specifically constitutes a thing or group of things. Aristotle, Physics, 193 b1 3-19; 194a 27-30 and 199a 9-10. Nature as the "first things", tradition or the ways of the ancestors. Plato, Laws, 891c1-4 and 892c 2-7. Nature as used in this thesis will be understood in the Scholastic sense. Nature as both the primitive constitution of things and as the intrinsic principle of their movement toward their perfection. See St. Thomas Summa Theologica, I-II, 94, 5, ad 3.
4. Advocates of the contractarian theory maintain that man enters political society by a contract. See Gough J. W., The Social Contract: A critical Study of its development, 1963. But whether by contract or by a spontaneous inherent tendency, the impulse of forming a political society is intrinsic in the very being of man.

## 5. Liberalism:

Although liberalism cannot be neatly defined, four meanings can be identified in the range of the usage of the term. These are the meanings identified by Jean Césaire in a very highly documented study, "Libéralisme et Libéralismes", in Revue de l'Université d'Ottawa, 1959, XXIX pp. 423-435. Harold J. Laski identifies the same uses in "The Rise of Liberalism" in Encyclopedia of the Social Sciences, Eds. Edwin R.A. Seligman, vol. 1, 1931, pp. 103-124; and also Schapiro J.S., Liberalism: Its Meaning and History, New York Nostrand, 1958.

In the first place liberalism is used to refer to a political doctrine opposed to statism or Royal absolutism. In this case liberalism emphasizes the freedom of the individual as opposed to the political power of the state, the body politic or the monarchy.

Liberalism is conceived also as a secular philosophy of man and society. In this respect the emphasis is not only on the freedom of the individual from the state but also from the transcendent. An effort is made to sever the organic link between social and religious life, the natural from the order of grace, philosophy from theology and reason from faith, the autonomy of Nature Reason, and Natural law is emphasized and at the same time their ties with the transcendent is denied.

Liberalism is also understood as the attitude of a historical epoch with its completely definite mode of life, art, maxims, literature, laws, etc...

Liberalism also meant and still refer in some circles, to the parliamentary democracy on the political level; on the economic level, capitalism; the bourgeois society on the social level; on the cultural level emphasis on freedom of thought and freedom of expression; individualism on the moral level; the rationalistic movement on the international level and on the religious level the anti-clerical movement.

The philosophical errors of liberalism according to Maritain:

Maritain does not concern himself with those meanings of liberalism. His primary concern is the philosophical errors of liberalism. He notes that the first errors of liberalism from which the movement owes its name is Kantian in nature, that is the conception of the liberty of man as consisting in the independence of his will from any exterior will. The second error which follows from the first consists in denying the right of the spiritual power to intervene in temporal matters. This error lies at the base of the four descriptions of liberalism above. It separates nature from grace, reason from faith, politics from morality and from theology.

The third error is consequent upon the second. It consists in attributing to civil society and to civilization an end which is only material. This error is consequent upon the second because in denying the organic link between the natural and the supernatural orders leads in assigning to civilization and to the goal of civil society an end which falls only within the ambient of the physical or material nature. According to this error, and it is clearly portrayed in the politics of Action Française (see note II below and also note 34 Chapter II), to introduce into nature an element which it does not contain is to destroy it. Maritain has made a whole treatise on the philosophy of freedom. (Freedom in the Modern World). In this work he outlines the Thomist or Christian understanding of freedom and the relation between freedom and culture. Alongside this treatise he exposes the philosophical errors of both liberalism and the modern materialist philosophies like Communism, Fascism and racism in relation to freedom.

6. In Maritain's view "we may call "totalitarian" in which the political community - whether it be the State in the strict sense of the word or the organized collectivity - claims for itself the entire man, either in order to form him or in order to be the end of all his activities or in order to constitute the essence of his personality and of his dignity. Thus, according to M. Mussolini, the State is "the true reality of the individual"; the Fascist State is "the highest and most potent form of personality"; "nothing human or spiritual, insofar as it has any value, exists outside the State"; "its principle, the directing inspiration of human personality joined in one society, penetrates into the soul...: soul in the soul" (B. Mussolini, La doctrina del Fascismo). IH p. 135.

The totalitarian regimes of the Twentieth Century according to Maritain have come as the final dialectic of the anthropocentric humanism. For him: Through an inevitable internal dialectic, the social divinization of the individual, inaugurated by "bourgeois" liberalism, leads to the social divinization of the State, and of the anonymous mass incarnate in a Master, who is no longer a normal ruler but a sort of inhuman monster whose omnipotence is based on myths and lies; and, at the same time, "bourgeois" liberalism gives way to revolutionary totalitarianism. SPP. p. 33.

## 7. Communism:

Talking about Communism, Maritain refers to more than the popular interpretation of historical materialism, that is, that "all 'ideology', the spiritual life, religious beliefs, philosophy, art, etc... is but an epiphenomenon of economics". IH. p. 45. Maritain's critique of Communism is aimed at Marxian communism or Marxism, which he sees, not only as "a philosophy of life based on a coherent and absolute rejection of divine transcendence, a discipline of life and a mysticism of integral revolutionary materialism". CD. p. 82 but also the radical rejection of the metaphysical primacy of act over potency, of form over matter IH. p. 46. This double rejection reveals that Marxism is much deeper a doctrine than the popular theories of economic infrastructure.

Maritain recognizes Marx's contribution in his profound intuition - "the conditions of heteronomy or alienation imposed in the capitalist world on the whole-force, and of the dehumanization with which the owners and the proletariat are thereby simultaneously stricken". IH. p. 46. However, this intuition is immediately blurred by Marx materialist conception of man, and by his "anthropocentric monist metaphysics and the abstraction of work from the spiritual dignity of the person. All these led him to endow the proletariat, already alienated from God and from the spiritual values with a kind of messianism akin only to God. Maritain notes well that the qualities Marx endows the proletariat are nothing short of divine. IH. p. 47.

But, according to Maritain, Communism must be counted as a Christian heresy; for in spite of its materialistic philosophy it belongs to the historical trend of modern rationalism of the anthropocentric humanism. Its origin like anthropocentric humanism itself is Christian. It stirs up energies which remain Christian in origin although they have now been entirely secularized. It seeks like Christianity to transform man, only instead of subordinating man to the transforming grace of the Son of God, it seeks in the collective revolution to renew society only for the temporal life. Cf. PCG. pp. 97-99. Refer also to Chapter VI.

8. MS. p. 109

9. RN. p. 50

10. IH. p. 132. See also FMW. p. 98.

## 11. Action Française:

The traditional and monarchist social and political movement in France at the turn of the Century, led by Charles Maurras. Its aim was, among other things, to restore the monarchy. Maurras himself was a positivist and agnostic. He wrote a number of books in which he expressed anti-Christian opinion. Yet, because of commitment to bringing order in France, the movement was supported by many Catholics of conservative background. The doctrine of the movement was that of Charles Maurras: a mixture of positivism and traditionalism. From these two the following formulae were synthesized:

I) Integral nationalism meaning the maintenance of national integrity and fostering the growth of national power.

II) Practical empiricism, that is, order in society no matter how it is obtained. This was more important than even individual freedom.

III) Forceful Blow: The restoration of the monarchy would have to come by force since it would not succeed by the ballot. The movement was condemned by Pope Pius XI in December 29th, 1926 on account of the moral errors in its doctrine. Cf. Encyclopedia of Social Sciences.

12. V. Cauchy, "A Defense of Natural Ethics", in The American Catholic Philosophical Association Proceedings, Vol., 29, 1955, pp. 206-218.

13. Ibid., p. 206

14. Hans Kersel, Foundation of Democracy, in Ethic, Vol., LXVI, No. 1, Part II, 1955, pp. 1-101

15. Ibid., p. 59ff.

16. G. Vlastos, "Of Sovereignty in Church and State", in Philosophical Review, 1953, Vol., 40, pp. 561-576.

17. Julius K. Nyerere is the President of the United Republic of Tanzania. This Republic was born from the Union of the two independent States of Tanganyika and Zanzibar in 1964.

In 1967 Nyerere tabled his political programme of action which was subsequently approved by the political movements of the two countries and legally adopted as the official plan of development for Tanzania by the National Assembly in the same year. Nyerere seeks in this programme, practical ways and means of tackling the problems of authentic human life in the political society of Tanzania. He focuses his attention on the personalist solution; personalist in the sense that it is a median between

individualism and collectivism. To achieve this solution, he has synthesized the principles of true democracy, as opposed to liberal democracy; true socialism as opposed to Marxian communism; with the assumptions of the traditional African society, into a practical creed of development. This synthesis, known as Ujamaa Socialism, is the political compass of Tanzania.

18. Political programme means a plan of political action. It is mapped out against the possible alternatives and adopted in order to be pursued. In the case of Tanzania the Arusha Declaration (1967) spells out the goals guiding the political action, the values inspiring these goals and the means towards the attainment of the goals.
19. J. K. Nyerere, Freedom and Unity/Uhuru na Umoja, A Selection from Writings and Speeches, 1952-1965, Dar es Salaam, Oxford University Press, 1967, p. 121.
20. J. K. Nyerere, Freedom and Socialism/Uhuru na Ujamaa, A Selection from Writings and Speeches, 1965-1967, Dar es Salaam, OUP, 1968, pp. 9 ff.
21. J. K. Nyerere, Freedom and Development/Uhuru na Maendeleo, A Selection from Writings and Speeches 1968-1973, Dar es Salaam, OUP, 1973, p. 216.
22. Ibid.,
23. Ibid.,
24. J. K. Nyerere, Freedom and Unity p. 121
25. J. K. Nyerere, Freedom and Development, p. 218.

## CHAPTER I

### THE SOCIO-POLITICAL ENVIRONMENT

The politician does not deal with abstract entities; the good and the evil with which he deals are incarnated in historical energies of a determinate intensity, duration, and amplitude. In the face of the forces in action on the scene of history, he has not to appreciate only the truth and the falsity, taken in themselves and in the abstract state, in their intemporal signification of the values which they represent. He has also to estimate the energy of historical realization and the coefficient of future of the good and of the evil that are conveyed by them.

## 1. Introduction:

Maritain's political philosophy, like every political philosopher's, has been shaped by the social political forces and events of his time. It is very necessary, therefore, to understand the political problems posed by his social political environment, in order to understand his philosophy and to enquire as to what extent it is relevant to the present historical climate. This is the goal of the present chapter which consists of two parts: the first outlines Maritain's home background and intellectual development; and the second is devoted to the study of the political problems which initiated Maritain's concern for politics and those that shaped the development of his political philosophy.

## 2. Personal Development:

## i. Home Background:

Jacques Maritain was born in Paris on November 18th, 1882. He and his elder sister, Jeanne, were the only two children of Paul Maritain and Geneviève Favre. His father, Paul Maritain, was a burgundian lawyer and a member of Paris bar from 1862-1882. He had a very keen interest in literature and poetry but he did not take his catholic religion seriously. His children were baptized by a protestant minister in the religion of their mother. Likewise he did not influence the upbringing and education of his children in any significant manner; for, he and his wife were divorced in the early childhood of the children whose formation was left entirely in the hands of their mother.

Geneviève was the daughter of Jules Favre, a very well known personality in the history of French Politics. He was a member of Parliament during the reign of Napoleon III, a vice-president and minister of foreign affairs in the third Republic, a prominent orator, a profusious writer, a supporter of humanitarian causes and a defender of the underdog. His political inclinations could be described as "left of center in the political spectrum of the French of his day. Strongly democratic and liberal in his views".<sup>1</sup>

Geneviève was Jules Favre's daughter of his marriage to a catholic wife. By then he belonged to the agnostic freemasonry which was the religion of many intellectuals in France. Later on, Jules, married a devout protestant who influenced him to adhere to some form of liberal protestantism. His personality has influenced his daughter so deeply that she followed him even in this complete religious mutation.

In her own personality Geneviève inherited many qualities of her father. This can be seen from the tribute given to her by Raïsa Maritain. Here is what she says:

As I came better to know Jacques' mother, I could admire in her a religious loyalty to the passionate ideal which animated the republican opposition under the empire, and indomitable spirit of liberty a fervent hope for the spiritual future of mankind and a boldness in her defiance of the world's opinion and a firmness...<sup>2</sup>

She was a very bright woman, highly educated, warm hearted and of indiscriminatory hospitality. She turned her home into a magnetic center of attraction for many politicians and intellectuals who convened there regularly for heated discussions in political and social issues.

Such was the home in which Jacques Maritain was brought up. It was a home which encouraged the deep abyss of thirst for knowledge which he had manifested from his very early years. He was indefatigable in the

search for the why behind the facts. Even at the lyc ee, while as young as only sixteen, his inquisitive behaviour and his ability to put some heat in any discussion had already put some of his teachers at unease both for failing to provide answer for his whys and for their intellectual inertness which hampered them from enquiring beyond the positive facts. For Maritain, it was a search for truth; the truth that quenches all human queries. He did not get this in the lyc ee however. He hoped when he went to the Sorbonne that he would find it.

ii. Intellectual Environment:

The intellectual atmosphere of the Sorbonne when Maritain, battered with a hunger for knowledge and a thirst for truth, joined it, was thoroughly suffused with positivistic spirit; a spirit which had been fathered by Auguste Comte (1788-1857) but which was brought to maturity by various other thinkers particularly by Ernest Renan (1823-1892) and Hypolyte Taine (1828-1893) who together with Comte may be called the "positivistic triad" of France.

Auguste Comte was not a scientist in the narrow sense of the term. He popularized the scientific spirit, however, endowing it with unprecedented status. He had a gift of synthesizing the gains of positive sciences and applying the results to the social sciences. With this application he hypothesized the direction of civilisation and history as a whole. In his view, the whole of human history falls into three stages pending on the

type and certainty of truth which controlled human life. The theological stage, marked by man's ignorance of the natural causes and consequently his total dependence on the gods, had gradually given way to the metaphysical age. This stage is distinctly marked by man's efforts to advance metaphysical arguments in order to explain the natural causes. As man made more progress in positive science, however, the metaphysical age has yielded to the positive stage. It is in this age that man has embarked, at Comte's time, on the most certain path of his history. For, having emerged out of the impotency of the theological truths and the inadequacy of the metaphysical truths, in Comte's view, the human race could, thanks to positive science, attain with absolute certainty the natural causes and discover their laws.

According to Comte, progress was necessary, but man did not need anything else for sure and rapid progress: on the one hand he had the facts as observable, measurable, experimentable and hypothesizable and on the other hand the techniques of positive science. Thus, positive science is the guarantor of truth; and just as in the previous historical stages man had tacked the whole of history and personal life by the predominant source of truth, so also must be in this positivistic age by the truth of positive science.

Obviously, Comte did not only embark on the journey of reorienting human history toward the promised land where

the truth of positive science would reign. In fact, his endeavour was not short of a Copernican revolution; man would close down the temples of the gods of the first and second stages of history and begin to worship in the temples of positive science. He made himself the high priest of the religion of humanity, a form of atheism which denied all absolutes beyond humanity. But he did not strip christianity of its divine claims. This step was absolutely essential in his christian environment if human history were truly and unhesitatingly to be dislodged from the truths of the previous ages. For, it is these truths which had, up to the time of Comte, anchored civilization and even given birth to positive science itself. Thus, there was a need to denude christianity of its divinity and the Bible of its divine authority. This work was undertaken and accomplished with remarkable success by Ernest Renan.

Renan's works especially the life of Christ stripped Christ of His divinity and Christianity of its supernatural claims. His was a style so beautiful and easy to read that he reached out even to the very ordinary man. As Jacques Maritain started his formal education and even when he joined Sorbonne, Renan's influence was still very high. Raïsa witnesses to this in the following words:

The story of Renan's religious opinions is well known; and everyone is aware of the immense influence of His writings, particularly of his life of Jesus, which turned so many souls away from faith...<sup>3</sup>

Hypolyte Taine's contribution to the positivistic intellectual milieu in France centers particularly in his applying of positivistic methods to fine art. He synthesized a most rigorous and deterministic theories to account for the nature of art. For him, any artist and any work of art can finally be reduced to only two sources of influence: heredity and environment. Thus, given any work of art and the period to which it belongs, one can, according to Taine, lay bare all the aspects constituting it and interpret it fully.

These three thinkers are generally responsible for establishing the positivist spirit in France. However, there have been many other thinkers who have endeavoured to apply the spirit of positivism in their particular field and to bring it to the form of the positivist atmosphere of France at the turn of the Century. Among these must be mentioned Emil Durkheim (1858-1917) who applied the positivist method in sociology with the purpose of establishing a philosophy of social facts and social behaviour; Lucien Levy-Bruhl (1857-1939) who worked extensively in moral philosophy with the purpose repudiating the normative in order to establish a purely descriptive morality. Leon Duguit (1859-1928) professor of Law in Bordeaux, whose concern was to discover the scientific laws that control and limit those who govern and bind in obedience those who are

governed. Intent on being a positivist and realist, he rejected all theological and metaphysical approach to law and insisted on establishing objective law by observation and direct determination of the facts alone.

iii. Search For Truth:

The spirit of positivism was in complete control of the Sorbonne when Jacques Maritain pursued his studies in philosophy after having graduated in science. His search for truth was frustrated more and more as he gradually discovered the impotency of positivism in providing an unshakable basis of truth. However, having disappointed him in his search for truth, the Sorbonne made it possible for him to meet Raïsa Oumansoff who became later Mme Maritain.

Raïsa had entered the Sorbonne at the age of 16 and like Jacques, she had unquenchable thirst for truth. Like Jacques she had hoped that the Sorbonne would relieve her of the deep tormenting questions of the whys beyond the facts. The two became inseparable and continued their search together. They were married in 1904 and gave up the hope of finding the truth in philosophy.

The lectures of H. Bergson gave them a new hope. They seemed to point out to a reality beyond the facts of positive science. But while Bergson's lectures helped them to clear their minds of the scientific superstitions on which they had been nourished at the Sorbonne, nonetheless,

his philosophy of intuition was too unreliable a refuge against the intellectual nihilism logically resulting from modern philosophy.<sup>4</sup> Bergson had not only repudiated positivism, he had, in William James's words, killed intellectualism definitely and without hope of recovery.<sup>5</sup> This made the search of Jacques and Raïsa impossible. Before they listened to Bergson their search was centered on the object of truth. They were sure at least of the intellectual light with which they searched. But in Bergson they were disenchanted even regarding the intellect. What then? They gave up the hope of finding the truth and even of searching.

With the influence of Leon Bloy the Maritains were converted to the catholic church and baptized on June 11, 1906. While already in the catholic church and contrary to their expectation, for they thought that they would never go back to philosophy having forsaken it for failure to quench their thirst for truth, and having mistakenly thought that the catholic church thwarts any intellectual activity, the Maritains discovered Thomistic philosophy in the church.

"Woe to me if I don't thomistize", exclaimed Jacques having discovered the Thomistic philosophy. He finally found what he had always sought. For the first time he discovered a philosophy that brought all things to a perfect harmony distinguishing the natural and supernatural orders yet uniting them; extolling the intellect very highly yet accounting for its subordination to faith. With this discovery, Maritain sets out

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to battle indefatigably against the errors of modern philosophy. His emphasis from the very beginning was theoretical philosophy as, that was the first nest of the positivist theories. When the occasion presented itself, however, the condemnation by Pope Pius XI, of the Action Française movement Dec. 29th, 1926, Maritain turned his attention to the practical philosophy problems which this movement posed and which prompted Maritain to shift his emphasis from the theoretical to the practical-theoretical issues and other political issues which gradually shaped the development of his political philosophy.

## 3. Contemporary Political Problems:

## i. Naturalism and Positivism:

The intellectual environment in France at the turn of the Century as we saw above, denied theology and metaphysics the right to exist as independent ways of knowing and as capable of providing a true unshakable basis for culture or civilization. Thus, what the positivist spirit achieved in the field of knowledge is, in short, to demystify religion and to deontologize knowledge. The question now is, what impact did this spirit have on the practical social and political realm? Or did this area remain immune from the positivistic influence?

It is a known fact that the social political atmosphere in France at the turn of the Century and for a large part of the first half of the twentieth century was determined by the socio-political movement known as Action Française.<sup>6</sup> Charles Maurras, its leader, was at once its philosopher and prophet so that the philosophy underlying this movement was by and large that of Maurras. Maurras was determined to pursue "integral Nationalism" and restore the monarchical regime in France. He was himself an apostate catholic; so also were many of the leaders of the movement; what Charles Fecher describes as: "professional breast-beaters, rabblers and demagogues of the most disgusting sort".<sup>7</sup>

The leaders of the Action Française were astute enough to realize that in predominantly Catholic France they could not attain their goal without involving the hierarchy and finding favour with the Catholic Church. They did so by glorifying it as the official religion of the State;<sup>8</sup> the saviour of the human race;<sup>9</sup> the guardian of order for nature and for humanity;<sup>10</sup> the perfect model for the organizing of democracy; an order and a harmony;<sup>11</sup> a hierarchy of thought and spirit as well as of persons;<sup>12</sup> the incarnation of tradition which is dearest of goods for man and for civilization;<sup>13</sup> and a keystone of society and the city of order.<sup>14</sup>

But what was the true philosophy of the Action Française vis-à-vis politics and its relation to morality and religion? Did these leaders glorify the church so highly because they truly believed in the subordination of politics to religion or simply because they wanted to use it as a means of attaining their end?

a) The General Outline of the Philosophy:

The philosophy of the Action Française was undoubtedly positivistic. Auguste Comte has supplied Maurras with a philosophy which he regarded as sufficient.<sup>15</sup> Maurras admitted his deep indebtedness to Comte in these works:

*J'estime heureux les hommes de ma génération qui, sans être positivistes au sens propre du terme, peuvent en pareil cas, se souvenir de la morale et de la logique de Comte.*

*Je ne connais aucun nom d'homme qu'il faille prononcer avec un sentiment de reconnaissance plus vive.<sup>16</sup>*

From Comte, Maurras derived what he has termed "Organizing Empiricism" and from Taine, his positivist approach to history.<sup>17</sup> He also admits his indebtedness to Renan for his approach of repudiating democracy and socialism. For, according to Renan, democracy is incompatible with national security; it has its origin in envy as socialism in egoism. For him there is an intrinsic contradiction between the idea of social justice and that of national power; for patriotism lessens when socialism prevails.

Maurras recognizes Renan's contribution to his political philosophy in the following text:

Comte put to flight the pernicious and artificial doctrine according to which there is an opposition between the interest of the ruler and the ruled, for the latter derives his greatest benefits from being directed and guided...Renan finally made me aware of the service any elite when it sincerely concerns itself with the highest considerations, render and must render to the multitude, even unconsciously.<sup>18</sup>

But Maurras and Action Française did not take the ideas of Comte, Renan and Taine and simply grafted them unchanged in their philosophy. Maurras drew upon these ideas eclectically and built upon them his theory of political society, his doctrine of man and his entire approach to political philosophy.

b) Political Society:

Maurras holds that the structure of the political society is determined by the same physical and chemical laws

as those that hold the stars in orbit or those which control the digestive system. His concept of the political society comes very close to that of Hobbes: a natural aggregate; for, we choose neither our blood nor our fathersland, our language or our tradition, our native society is imposed upon us.<sup>19</sup> In another text<sup>20</sup> he puts it more clearly that the social and political structure does not depend on the human will; for it is set up by nature and that what man does is simply to discover its laws and hypothesize its future direction in the same manner as he does with physical and biological structures. It defies the order of freedom, right and duty. It remains strictly in the order of the observable experimentable, and hypothesizable. It is thus completely separated from morality and from religion.

The condemnation of the Action Française for its naturalism and positivism rallied others of its leaders to the defense of its philosophy. M. Pujo, particularly, has advanced a number of arguments in defense of the movement against the "interference by Rome". In his view, "*La Structure de la société est l'oeuvre de la Nature, mais la civilisation ne peut être que l'oeuvre de la Sagesse, de la raison et de la vertu, où le Christianisme a une si grande part*".<sup>21</sup>

Obviously, according to the Action Française, it is not in the creation and institution of Society that morality and religion are summoned to play a part. These do not enter

intrinsically in the setting and animating of the political society. Rather they are superimposed on it in order to perfect the structure already set up by nature.<sup>22</sup> In the same vein Pujos confirm that "*à la fondation de la société civile comme à celle de la famille s'applique l'affirmation finale: "pas là d'effort vertueux, pas d'intervention de la volonté au sens moral du mot, le choix instinctif entre la vie et la mort".*"<sup>23</sup>

By allowing morality and Religion to play a part in the perfecting of the political society while they do not naturally enter into its intrinsic nature the masters of the Action Française claim that what comes first is politics; even morality and religion can be defended on purely political ground.<sup>24</sup> It is also by the same token of preserving the separation that Action Française has its *raison d'être*. For, as Maurras states it, the priority of politics over morality and religion is sustained by the Action Française: "*La ligue qui a mis sur son drapeau, politique d'abord et qui tranche et résout toutes les questions politiques pendantes du point de vue de l'intérêt national...*"<sup>25</sup>

c) Political Philosophy:

The separation of politics from morality and from religion coupled with the empirical organization of politics, turns the study of politics into a science whose goal is to observe, discover, measure and hypothesize the laws which institute and sustain political society in the same manner as

the Newton's laws of motion or Dalton's laws of chemical combination. It is a science whose method is purely positivist. And as Pujo remarks, one does not have to be a believer in God or even in an absolute in order to be a good political philosopher; for, according to him, Maurras who is a non-believer in God is a very good political philosopher.<sup>26</sup>

This denial of absolutes in the politics of Action Française stands as a chinning example in "*Des Syllabes Sacrées*". In them it is clearly stated "*Tout est relatif, voilà le seul principe absolu*". Also, "*induire pour déduire, afin de construire*".<sup>27</sup> It is evident, therefore, that political philosophy in the eyes of Maurras and the Action Française belongs to the same order of knowing as the positive sciences. But what is the nature of man according to such politics? What is the common good of political society?

d) Human Person and the Common Good:

The political positivism of Action Française seems to pose a host of problems. What, for example is the goal of political society? A political society which, according to Action Française, is determined by nature and which drifts along in history like a planet which orbits with absolute precision obeying only the physical law? This end is certainly not the classical common good. For, if there is no freedom, if reason aided by faith is not involved in setting it up, then there are no individual persons? There are only individual units. Hence Common good is what? As such, any politics which denies

the intrinsic moral structure and which sets a naturalistic order separated from the order of freedom, negates likewise, at least unconsciously or implicitly the individual persons who compose it. It fashions for itself such an individual as to make the full claim of all what it is and has. This seems to be the case with the Action Française vis-à-vis the human person. For, this is what Maurras implies by arguing that since human society produces the individual, it cannot be composed of what it produces.<sup>28</sup> For him man is essentially such a weak vulnerable animal that the family and not the individual is the basic unit. But what is the family? Is it not made up of individuals? Do these individuals set up the family freely or is it another naturally predetermined institution which the individual person can neither refuse nor modify?

For Action Française, "*l'objet intrinsèque de la politique c'est la bonne marche des affaires d'un peuple.*" That means the balanced fiscal conditions. And these as Pujo describes are not moral:

*Des choses inertes par elles-mêmes comme des institutions politiques, fiscales, économiques, etc..., ne pourraient être dites morales ou religieuses que si elles avaient été une fois pour toute établies par Dieu lui-même. Seule, cette théocratie directe et absolue aurait effectivement fixé la morale et la religion dans l'objet intrinsèque de la politique.<sup>29</sup>*

This denial of freedom is explicitated by Maurras in the following text which he cites from Comte:

*Il n'y a pas de liberté de conscience en astronomie, en physique, en chimie, en physiologie même, en ce sens que chacun trouverait absurde de ne pas croire de confiance aux principes établis dans ces sciences par des hommes compétents. S'il en est autrement en politique, c'est uniquement parce que les anciens principes étant tombés et les nouveaux n'étant point encore formés, il n'y a point encore, à proprement parler, de principes établis.<sup>30</sup>*

Thus, for the Action Française the individual person is only a moment in a long culture, a gesture among the many gestures of a force which has proceeded and will survive him.

While many other texts could be cited to demonstrate the extension and comprehension of the implications of the political naturalism of the Action Française, the ones outlined here suffice to clear the ground and enable the present researcher to enquire whether the political problems ensuing from the positivist political philosophy of the Action Française are unique and limited to the historical climate of Maritain or can they arise, at least analogically from cultures and historical climates different from that of Maritain. In other words to what extent are these problems contemporary to political philosophy?

e) Maritain and the Action Française:

The controversy that was orchestrated between the leaders of the Action Française and the representatives of the Holy See immediately before and after the condemnation of the Action Française reveals the opposing sides of the interpretation of the condemnation. Rome insisted that the condemnation was on purely moral and religious grounds; not political. The

error was judged to be political naturalism, understood as a separation of two types: nature from ethics or reason from virtue; and the natural from the supernatural order or reason from faith. The Pope, being the final judge on moral and religious matters for catholics, forbade them from belonging to a party, or to a political movement or to a school of thought which "prefers the interest of political parties to religion and uses religion in the service of the parties."<sup>31</sup>

In condemning the Action Française and in forbidding catholic from "supporting, encouraging or reading papers published by men whose writings are to be condemned on the ground that they offend against catholic teaching and morality",<sup>32</sup> the Pope exercised his right to intervene directly in politics in matters affecting the moral and religious lives of catholics. Implicitly, this intervention demonstrates the primacy of the spiritual order over the temporal one and the Pope's authority over the social and political matters affecting the moral life of catholics. The first because of the hierarchy of the ends of the two orders serve and the second because the Pope's authority transcends temporal and geographical boundaries; it has its origin from the Son of God who is supremely independent of the temporal order and of whom it is said, "*Non eripit mortalia qui regna dat coelestia*".<sup>33</sup> But it is a question whether the Action Française viewed the Church and the authority of the Pope in this way.

For the leaders of the Action Française, what merited

the condemnation was not their misconception of politics and their separating it from morals and from religion. For them, if there was any misconception of politics, it was on the part of Rome in craving to introduce morality and theology into it. For, in their view, "*introduire dans la nature un élément qu'elle ne contient pas, c'est la violenter, c'est la blesser, c'est la détruire, en empêchant le fonctionnement normal de la vie*".<sup>34</sup>

Nor is the condemnation due to the revolt of the Action Française leaders against the authority of the church. The leaders held, in fact, that if there is any revolt at all, it is not on the part of Action Française against Rome, but on the contrary, it is Rome against the intellect. In their view, Rome revolts against the intellect in rendering it impotent in its own domain of nature by insisting that it has to heed to the dictates of the order of virtue and of faith. Accordingly, for them, it is treason to heed to the line demanded by Rome; for, it is not a question of morals and religion at stake but rather a politics. On this score, what was needed on the part of the catholic members of Action Française was not obedience to Rome but, rather, obedience to their political leaders.

The only interpretation of the condemnation according to Action Française, was an attempt on the clerical conquest of the temporal power in order to absorb it completely into the spiritual order. In Pujo's words:

*...l'autorité de Rome étendant son pouvoir spirituel au domaine temporel et tendant à l'absorber tout entier. Il s'agit d'intervenir directement auprès des peuples et d'entreprendre plus facilement leur conquête. Nous assistons au réveil, singulièrement chimérique et dangereux en notre temps, du vieux rêve; d'impérialisme clérical auquel l'histoire a déjà infligé de si dures leçons.<sup>35</sup>*

It may be asked, at this juncture, what was Maritain's reaction to the condemnation of Action Française and to the controversy thereafter.

Maritain did not only accept the condemnation of the Action Française Movement; he also defended it strongly as a faithful son of the church. Hoping that he would be able to bring back the catholic members of the movement to obey the Holy Father, Maritain took, at first, a reconciliatory position. He published the little book: Une Opinion Sur Charles Maurras et le Devoir des Catholiques (1926), in which he made an overview of the problems of the secularistic politics of the movement. He also published, in collaboration with a number of theologians and philosophers, the two books referred to above: Pourquoi Rôme a Parlé (1927) and Clairvoyance de Rôme (1929).

In the first book Maritain defended the condemnation against the Action Française leaders who accused Rome of interfering in the politics of France. Maritain demonstrated that the condemnation was essentially on moral and religious ground; not political. In the second, which came after Pujo published Comment Rôme est Trompée (1929) Maritain makes a philosophical exposition of the political naturalism underlying the politics

of the movement. He treats in particular, the relation between politics and morality and that between nature and grace.

In 1927 Maritain published his first major work in politics: Primauté du Spirituel,<sup>36</sup> in which his main preoccupation was a philosophical treatment of the problems arising from the separation of the temporal from the spiritual orders, and the crisis of the catholic spirit arising thereof.

In all these publications, which, for the sake of distinguishing them from later ones, one may term the first set of publications, Maritain deals with the political problems as concretely associated with the politico-religious crisis in France. But he did not stop there. In the preface to the French edition of Primauté du Spirituel, Maritain remarks that although he is immediately referring, in this book, to the crisis of the Action Française Movement, yet the problem therein has a much wider application. He regards the problems as having "the greatest practical importance for the general interest of our culture."<sup>37</sup>

In what may be called a second set of publications<sup>38</sup> in politics, Maritain treats the problems, no longer as immediately giving rise to the politico-religious crisis in France but as intrinsically tied to the anthropocentric humanism<sup>39</sup> of modern western civilization. The root cause of these problems in Western civilization is liberalism.<sup>40</sup> In Humanisme integral particularly, Maritain makes a detailed study of the

problems showing that since they are inherently associated with the anthropocentric humanism, their solution will come only after the liquidation of this type of humanism and its replacement with theocentric humanism. He also thinks out the conditions and the possibilities of realizing the theocentric humanism which, in contradistinction to the Mediaeval Christendom and the Modern Anthropocentric civilization, is a New Christian Civilization. Thus although Maritain does not dwell exclusively on the historical development of the Western Christian culture vis-à-vis the problems of secularization of politics it is nevertheless, his emphasis in this second set of publications. This is what he affirms latter on, in Reflections on America, referring to Integral Humanism:

When I wrote this book, trying to outline a concrete historical ideal suitable to a new Christian civilization, my perspective was definitely European. I was in no way thinking in American terms, I was thinking especially of France, and of Europe, and of their historical problems, and of the kind of concrete prospective image that might inspire the activity, in the temporal field, of the Catholic youth of my country.<sup>40a</sup>

In a final set of publications<sup>41</sup> including Scholasticism and Politics (1940) and culminating with Man and the State (1951), one may notice Maritain referring again to the same problems; only this time an effort is being made to transcend both the concrete situation in France and the historical development of Western culture. This is obvious in his treatment of issues, for, example, "Human equality"<sup>42</sup> "Rights of man and

Natural law"<sup>43</sup>; "the human person and society"<sup>44</sup> "Democracy and Authority"<sup>45</sup>; Pluralist principle of Democracy"<sup>46</sup>; "Truth and Human Fellowship"<sup>47</sup>; and the entire treatise of Man and the State. In all these works Maritain deals with the problems as pertaining to politics purely and simply in its universal aspect.

It does not mean, however, that Maritain abandons his christian position. He holds to this with an unshakable conviction; for, even in this last book, Le Paysan de la Garonne: Un vieux laïc s'interroge à propos du temps présent, Maritain insists; "I am fully convinced that my way of justifying the belief in the rights of man and the ideal of liberty, equality, fraternity, is the only one which is solidly based on truth".<sup>48</sup>

What it does mean is that Maritain recognizes the universal nature of the problems posed by the Action Française Movement; problems arising from lack of recognition of two basics: the nature of politics as being moral and the subordination of this natural order to the order of grace. But are the problems stemming from these two broad areas truly universal and inherent in every politics and every civilization or is it only Maritain's impression? If they are universal what is unprecedented in the manner they are posed by Action Française?

Let us examine the nature of the problems arising from breaking the link between politics and morality and politics and religion. On the first stems the questions: What

is the nature of the human person? What is its temporal destiny? What is its absolute ultimate destiny? What is political society? The common good of political society? Relation between the common good of political society and the absolute ultimate destiny of man? On the second, arise questions such as: whether the ultimate absolute destiny of the human person can be known for certain by reason alone? Can the human person attain this destiny by reason alone? What is the relation between freedom and grace? What is the relation between politics and theology?

Considering these questions in relation to the intellectual nature of man, further analysis reveals that they finally concern the problems of freedom: nature of freedom; relation of freedom and the common good, and relation of freedom and grace. This is because the questions revolve around the life of man as both an intellectual being naturally endowed with freedom and as a social being naturally called to live in political society in order to pursue his temporal destiny.

When transposed, the three problems concerning freedom, present themselves in the age-old problems of natural right, natural law and the church-state relation. Reduced to this form, the political problems underlying the Action Française movement are as old as political philosophy itself. They occupied the minds of the Greek philosophers at the dawn of political philosophy,<sup>49</sup> the Roman lawyers,<sup>50</sup> the mediaeval philosophers and theologians,<sup>51</sup> modern philosophers,<sup>52</sup> and now, they are still

haunting political philosophers. It could be said that they are always contemporary to political philosophy.

Since these problems are tied, as it were, to the very nature of politics, and since they are practical problems, requiring practical solutions for the various historical climates, they will always continue to haunt political philosophers. For, it is in the nature of practical problems to defy a solution for all times. In fact, if such a solution were to be found, it would be, as Maritain notes, "the end of tension and conflict, the end of contradiction, peace itself",<sup>53</sup> which would be inconceivable in the presence of the changing components of a practical problem.

As we have shown above, each historical climate has had to respond to the three practical problems of political philosophy, seek their general solution and apply this solution to its concrete historical ideal in order to provide the practical solution for its historical climate. For this reason, two questions, pertinent for this enquiry, pose themselves as follows: the first, what is new in the way the Action Française poses the problems in our time? The second, how relevant is Maritain's solution to these problems, for the present historical epoch?

The second question is the subject of the present research; it can only be answered at the end of the enquiry. As for the first, however, suffice to say a few words here in the

form of a conclusion to this part, since a complete answer would constitute the subject matter of another thesis.

What emerges from the discussion of the problems underlying the Action Française crisis is the intransigent will to reduce politics and civilization to purely physical and mathematical science. The underlying doctrine of this movement is that progress is necessary and that it can only come through a reduction process of all entities to the material, the observable, the measurable, and the hypothesizable, whose certainty can subsequently be guaranteed by the scientific method. We thus witness the irreversible urge or severing the natural link of politics from morality and from religion. In accomplishing this urge the Action Française crisis seems to attain the final result of the logic of the anthropocentric humanism. Maritain makes this point very clearly in the following text:

Liberalism is not merely false in theory; it is finished in fact; bankrupt by the turn of events. The revolutions that are happening under our eyes are social and political revolutions with a "mystical" or religious basis - whether it be a soi-disant religion which worships the State as a superior form of human personality more intimate to each citizen than he is to himself, and which claims to be theist and even Christian in character; or whether it be the official atheist and materialist anti-religion of the Social Commonwealth which worships Work as supreme expression of the freedom and power of man. <sup>54</sup>

According to Maritain three moments inseparably bound together may be distinguished in the dialectic of modern culture. The first which Maritain identifies as " the moment of

Christian naturalism"<sup>55</sup> refers to the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries. This was the dawn of the Age of Reason, when man was turning to the power of reason as the sole basis of civilization. This period is termed the moment of Christian naturalism precisely because while civilization was still deeply embedded in the Christian values man was seeking to rediscover by his reason alone a naturalistic basis of civilization.

In the second moment, comprising the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, the first dialectic was pushed a step further; for, a civilization which separates itself from the supernatural standards and seeks to replace these by natural ones, logically takes sides against the supernatural values. Thus, the tendency during this moment was to free man from the revealed religion by banking more firmly on the native goodness of man and by making the goal of civilization the conquest of the material world. It was, as Maritain put it, "the bourgeois moment of our culture".<sup>56</sup>

The third moment, the unique characteristic of the twentieth century anthropocentric humanism is what Maritain terms the third dialectic during which man, the human, the metaphysical and the divine, all retire before the forces of matter. This is the final stage of the logic of the anthropocentric humanism.<sup>57</sup> Thus, the complete break of politics of Action Française is the necessary converging point of the anthropocentric humanism. For, it is in this that man attains the

summit of the myth of the liberal spirit; that is, man will become a superman through the complete conquest of material world. But ironically the liberal man has attained this by progressively subordinating his reason and his entire life to the same material dimension. This is so because in order to rule completely over matter, having rejected non-material values, including freedom, he must logically reduce his own knowing and living to the technological and properly speaking, inhuman or material necessities.

The crisis of the Action Française, although seemingly unaware of its own internal logic, comes as the fulfilment of the conditions that make man the irrevocable master of the material world: first, he had to renounce the intellect and freedom both of which cannot be reduced to the material dimension. This condition is fulfilled in the attempt of Action Française to separate politics from morality. The second, man had to "kill" God. This is logically necessary from the spirit of liberalism, because for man to be crowned superman and to be the uncontested god over the material world, any other god over and above him must cease to be. This condition is manifested and fulfilled in the separation of politics from theology. What then becomes of the three basic problems of political philosophy? What, in other words, is unprecedented in the manner Action Française poses the political problem?

Obviously, the three basic problems, inherent in all

politics, cease to be problematic. This is the novelty in the politics of Action Française and the final dialectic of the anthropocentric humanism. Having dispensed itself with the order of virtue and that of grace, the politics of Action Française shake off the very foundation of the political problem. But admittedly, this attempt of annihilating what makes it possible to pose the political problem is not only the most profound way of posing it; it is also the complete break with the past.

In the first moment of the dialectic of modern culture the goal of civilization is the domination of man over matter. God was invoked to guarantee this domination. In the second, man stakes the goal of civilization in a felicity to be attained by means of technological procedure and guaranteed by the physico-mathematical entities of the mind. God is reduced to an idea; the most clear and distinct idea, on the basis of which the validity of other ideas can be guaranteed. Obviously, therefore, the first and second moment, although rejecting values which are irreducible to the material, yet they did not make a complete break with these values. God was given a place, though a very faint one, in these moments. By the same token there was a basis, though a faint one, for posing the three basic questions of all politics.

In its final stage, as manifested in the Action Française crisis, anthropocentric humanism has managed to make a complete break with all values which cannot be reduced to mat-

ter; man has in other words, killed God and ridden himself of freedom. On this stage there is no foundation for posing the three basic problems of political philosophy. The problems concerning natural right, natural law and grace become irrelevant to political philosophy. This situation is unprecedented in the whole history of political philosophy.

I have dwelt at length on the problems implicit in the Action Française crisis because as these problems are anchored in the errors of liberalism and as Maritain remarks, all the other political problems and revolutions in the twentieth century, have resulted from it, a detailed treatment paves the way for the understanding of the other problems which contribute to define the socio-political environment of Maritain. These problems will be considered now.

## ii. Totalitarianism and Racism:

## a) The Event:

The accession of the Nazi<sup>58</sup> Party to power January 30th, 1933 and the establishment of Hitler's National Socialism in Germany has been viewed very differently by various people. Some saw it as a seal of the legitimacy of Hitler's charismatic leadership;<sup>59</sup> others saw it as an amazing luck on the part of Hitler and combination, in his favour, of time, place and events that could never be repeated even if Hitler were starting a fresh<sup>60</sup> Hitler himself, believing that he had been providentially sent to awake the slumbering German blood, saw his rise to power as only a step towards the realization of the "absolute idea".<sup>61</sup> Whatever the view point, it is a fact that the rise to power of the Nazi Party marks a turning point both in the history of Germany and Europe as well as that of the entire world.

This rise to power was a buildermment to honest and intelligent statesmen both in and outside Germany. For, Hitler won, not because his point of view was superior to that of the average man, but because it was precisely that of the ordinary man. His rise to power was also an embarrassment to the churches, because he won in a country predominantly christian by preaching hatred. "The people needs", Hitler recited repeatedly and openly, "pride and will-power defiance, hate and hate and once again hate".<sup>62</sup> This rise to power was equally a chal-

lénge to political philosophers; for, Hitler's triumph was that of emotion and instinct over reason. For his supporters there was no other authority but Hitler; his orders whether oral or written cancelled all written law.<sup>63</sup> Moreover, as a regime, Hitlerism views politics as essentially a relation with a friend against an enemy.

The challenge of Hitlerism to political philosophy has been taken very seriously by Jacques Maritain. He sees it as a Pagan Empire and a Sovereignty of hate;<sup>64</sup> an empire rooted in radical evil;<sup>65</sup> a regime built on the "worst kind of materialistic mockery"<sup>66</sup> of whose law is "*l'ultime désespoir des suicidés, une image d'une chose plus terrible encore: l'irréremédiable et monstrueuse corruption de l'âme humaine...et l'abîme de perversion où ils risquent de jeter la race humaine*".<sup>67</sup>

But what is Hitlerism? What is National Socialism? What is its philosophy? What problems does this National Socialism pose for political philosophy? Are these problems unique to the situation in Europe and in Hitler's time or can they be posed by similar circumstances elsewhere and at different times?

b) Philosophy Underlying Hitler's National Socialism:

At first, it seems contradictory to couple philosophy and Hitlerism, or philosophy and Nazism or philosophy and Hitler's National Socialism. John Dewey demands that quotation marks be put around philosophy if it were to describe

"Hitler's outgivings".<sup>68</sup> For, in his view Nazism is the very denial of philosophy.

But the emphasis that Hitler put on spiritual causes of German's collapse and its defeat in the first world war, together with his definition of the National Socialism as a Weltanschauung<sup>69</sup> suggest either a philosophy sustaining the National Socialism or a negation of philosophy, which negation is also a philosophy. This philosophy may be synthesized from Nazi orators and writers; particularly Hitler himself, Alfred Rosenberg and Carl Schmitt. Oswald Spengler occupies an ambivalent position in the history of the Nazi movement. His ideas in the Decline of the Occident (1919) and Prussianism and Socialism have, without the slightest doubt, influenced the ideas and slogans of the Nazi party in the twenties. But his later writings especially his Hour of Decision (1934) in which he rejected the racial theory of the Nazi Party put him in disfavour with it. From Spengler's early influence and from the official theorists of the Nazi Party we can synthesize what may be called the Nazi doctrine of the individual, society and political philosophy.

c) Society:

Central to the Nazi Weltanschauung, as evolved into a policy by A. Rosenberg and W. Darré under the Sponsorship of Hitler at the Party's Congress of 1935, is the racial basis of society. Race according to this Weltanschauung is at the very core of the National Socialist philosophy; that is, the Nazi

Society is an organism of people of the same race. But not only society, in actual fact, according to Nazism, race accounts for everything under the sun; for, as Hitler put it, "All that is not race in this world is trash".<sup>70</sup>

But this concept of race as the foundation of society and civilization is not sufficiently primary. The Nazi orators appeal quite often to the blood as one major constitutive factor of the race. In this respect, according to them, all races are not equal. In actual fact the Nazi theorists make no bones of it; the German Aryan<sup>71</sup> Race is superior to all the races of the world. The others are inferior races. They must be conquered by war in order to be dominated by the Aryan Race, the only one which forms culture. In turn, this Aryan Race must keep its blood pure by avoiding any form of contamination by the lower races. Hitler makes it quite clear that the Aryan Race stands on a completely different level of humanity from the other races.<sup>72</sup> Its superiority and the natural inequality of races stems from a profound and specific difference in the races. This is what was claimed by the National Socialists at Nuremberg in 1933; that "the distance between the lowest forms that are still called human and their highest races is greater than that existing between the lowest type of human beings and the ape".

In order to bring out the complete meaning and implication of the Aryan Race and to make explicit its superiority

over all other races, there was a need to define it geographically. Spengler had suggested this in his call for Prussianism and Socialism, a brand of socialism particularly adapted to Germany. But this was neither explicit enough nor viable in the eyes of the Nazi leaders. For them the myth of blood must be completed by that of soil - *blut und Boden* as two concepts inextricably woven to form the firm basis of Nazis theory of the Folkish Community. This Folkish Community is given a mystical and religious connotation as it can be seen in the following text of Hitler.

First of all stands the inner value of the people which is transmitted through the generations, a value which suffers change when the Folk who is the custodian of the value changes its inner blood - conditioned composition - trait of character are bound to recur as long as the nature of a people, its blood-conditioned state, does not alter. This value, not to be destroyed without change in blood substance, is the chief source of all hope for revival of our people. Otherwise the mystic hope of millions for a new Germany would be incomprehensible.<sup>73</sup>

Together with this inner blood - conditioned-trait, there is the outer trait of the *patria* whose deeper meaning is this "that it is not merely a land where our fathers have lived, but that it is the land which is our father - the primal basis and source of our existence".<sup>74</sup> In short, the Folkish Community is not only a political entity; it is also religious. This is why Hitler has the following to say:

After assumption of power neither of the denominations - Catholic or Protestant, they are all the same - has any future left. At least not in the Germans. Fascism may perhaps make its peace with the church in God's name. I will do it too. Why not? But that won't stop me stamping out christianity in Germany, root and branch. One is either a christian or a German. You can't be both.<sup>75</sup>

Obviously the reason why Nazism won't tolerate any other religion is because it is itself a form of religion.

d) The Human Person and the Folkish State:

According to the leaders of the National Socialism when blood and soil combine over a long period of time they produce the superman. But the Folkish Community does not develop randomly towards any direction and unconsciously; it has its leaders. It has a naturally higher specimen which emerge to the foreground to lead the Folkish Community in its God given mission of conquering the world. These superior specimen form the Folkish State. But over and above these specimen is the Führer, the prophet and mouthpiece of the Volk and the sole interpreter of the Weltanschauung. To him must be accorded blind obedience.

But the individual has a meaning only as a member of the Folkish Society. His freedom is a myth; for, his only freedom is to serve the Community. This is so, indeed, because the individual is a property of the Folkish Society. Hitler makes this point in the following text.

There is only one sacred human right and this right is at the same time the most sacred obligation, namely: to see to it that the blood is preserved pure, so that by the preservation of the best human material a possibility is given for a more noble development of these human beings.<sup>76</sup>

The totalitarianism implicit here has been made explicit in Hitler's Speech to the Reichstage on Jan. 30, 1937. He said:

*Sous le rapport de principes à la place du concept de l'individu ou du concept de l'humanité, nous prenons l'idée du peuple, du peuple issu du sang qui coule dans nos veines et du sol qui nous a vu naître. Pour la première fois, peut-être, dans l'histoire de l'humanité, on a proclamé dans ce pays que de tous les devoirs qui incombent à l'homme, le plus noble et le plus élevé consiste à maintenir la race qu'il tient de Dieu... Au point de vue juridique, il en résulte les conclusions suivantes:*

- 1) *La conception que le droit comme tel trouve en lui-même la justification de son existence est fausse.*
- 2) *La conception que le droit a pour objet, d'assurer et de maintenir la protection de l'individu dans sa propre personne et dans ses biens est également fausse.<sup>77</sup>*

e) Political Problems implicit in Hitlerism:

The philosophical error of Hitlerism emerges forcefully from the exposition above and particularly from the last quote. Hitlerism suffers from totalitarianism of the Racial Community. It destroys the individual person by laying an absolute claim on it. For this form of totalitarianism, there is no difference between a human individual and an animal individual; for, both are conceived as a part and parcel of the species. They exist in, by and for the species. Thus the human individual is destroyed by being reduced like the animal individual to only material unit which is fashioned by the Folk Community and used by this community to the goal of the Community.

But this error does not stop at destroying the human individual; it also destroys the human species; for as Hitler said, "in the place of the concept of the individual and that of humanity we place that of the racial community". What is this racial community? Is it not the one whose constitutive element is the myth of blood and soil?

This racial Community is certainly formed by the ties of blood and soil. But that is not all. It is also the most superior race entrusted with the messianic mission of conquering the whole world stamping out the lower races which are not fit to form and develop culture. According to the very internal logic of Hitler's National Socialism, therefore, the whole of humanity must be destroyed in order to put in its place the Aryan Race.

Yet the internal logic of Hitlerism does not stop there. If it were to stop there it would certainly have stopped in midstream. The process of destruction continues within the race itself. Wasn't the motto of Naziism built on antagonism? Always a unity with friend against an enemy? Is hatred not built intrinsically into the foundation of the National Socialism? What therefore stops the forces of hatred once unleashed? Can a human community be united and sustained by hatred?

Maritain reacted quite forcefully to this brand of totalitarianism. And for good reason; for, it destroys everything there is in political philosophy.<sup>78</sup>

But as it can be seen from the premises of this totalitarianism the philosophical problems therein are bound neither to European Sociological, cultural historical environment nor the time of Hitler. It is true that certain combinations of events and the time made it possible for this totalitarian regime to come to power but there is nothing intrinsic in human history which rules out absolutely an analogical existence of events and forces favouring a totalitarian regime akin to that of Hitler. It would certainly be a denial of human freedom and a complete ignorance of history to concede to the contrary. As a matter of fact, we do not need to search very far, either in place or in time, to see an analogical repetition of the Hitlerian claims of racism.

In October 4th, 1935, during the Italo-Ethiopian War, there appeared in Le Temps a manifesto: "*Manifeste Pour la Défense de l'Occident*", drawn up by M. Henri Massis and signed by over a hundred, so-called, Intellectual Fascists in France. These intellectuals were disturbed after sanctions were imposed on Italy for having massacred women and children in open villages which were not even within an easy reach from the war zone. In the manifesto, they denounced those who would hold Italy as culpable; for, to do so is to attempt to equalize the higher people of Western civilization with some uncultivated people. The imposition of sanction, according to these intellectuals, is based on the theory of absolute equality among nations.

This will result in war and bring about the end of Western civilization, just for the sake of giving security to some savage tribes.<sup>79</sup>

It does not need much intellectual effort to see that this sophism of "absolute equality of nations" smacks of racism similar to that of Hitler. It suggests an essential inequality of races and of human individuals. Fortunately, the fascist manifesto did not pass unchallenged. Jacques Maritain and a group of other intellectuals took an issue with its claims. In a manifesto: "*Un Manifeste d'intellectuels Catholiques pour la Justice et la Paix*;"<sup>80</sup> this latter group flatly denounced the sophism of the inequality of races. "The soul and the life of a black", they affirmed, "are as sacred as those of a white".<sup>81</sup>

## iii. Communism:

## a) The Event; Spanish Civil War.

The Spanish civil war is another event that contributed to the development of Maritain's political philosophy. It involved social and political principles and values which were dear to Maritain. For, the fact that the issues involved the integral culture of both Spain and the entire Western Civilization; and the fact that the War involved divisions of the Left and the Right a thing which is contrary to true politics which, according to Maritain, is neither Left nor Right, stirred up Maritain to tackle the political problems associated with the War.

In a long introduction to a very well documented work on the Civil War by Alfred Mendizabal, Maritain comments that the situation that prompted the Civil War in Spain is not unique to Spain. The lesson provided by the Spanish Civil War, in his view, has a wider validity. For, to leave a country long divided into two quasi enemy groups confronting each other in a war of extermination is madness which costs very dear.<sup>82</sup> In another work, La Guerre Sainte,<sup>83</sup> Maritain challenges the Spanish Dominican who claimed that the Spanish Civil War is a holy war, the holiest known in history.<sup>84</sup> In his reply to this contention, Maritain insists that the present historical climate, rather than being sacral, like that of the mediaeval period, is secular and that even if the notion

of holy war might have a meaning in the sacral civilization, it, nonetheless, loses all significance, in the present civilization.<sup>85</sup>

Maritain denounces the massacre of priests and the poor innocent people of Spain during the war. "It is horrible sacrilege to kill priests - were they to be fascists, they are the ministers of Christ - in hatred for religion; it is another horrible sacrilege to kill the poor - were they to be marxists, they are the people of Christ - in the name of religion".<sup>86</sup>

b) Causes of the War:

The events in Spain for five years before the War reveal the political problems of the War. In the first place, when the King abdicated in 1931, it was very clear, as Mendi-zabal witnesses, that a large majority of the people of Spain who had voted against the monarchy wanted a Republic; one to be established neither by a military *coup d'état* nor by a violent revolution, but by the ballot.<sup>87</sup> The people hoped that the Republic would establish social order, justice peace and table programmes which would bring about the desired social change and economic progress.

Unfortunately, however, neither the Republic established immediately after the abdication of the King in 1931 nor that after the general election of 1933 nor even that after the general elections of 1936 and the accession of the

Popular Front to power met the aspiration of the people. All along, those who came to power were those who had been revolutionary, organizing the workers against previous regime. They wetted the appetite of the people for utopian solutions of their social and economic problems. They constantly divided the people into classes inciting them to violence against the regime they wanted to change. But when they themselves came to power, they failed to meet the demands of the people. At the same time, inspired by a spirit of revenge against the leaders of previous regime, they tolerated anti-social propaganda against them, persecuted them, exploited the poor, and institutionalized hatred.<sup>88</sup>

When the Popular Front came to power in 1936, the situation did not change. In actual fact, it had worsened. There was a continual disruption of the social order, organized violence against the Church, persecution of priests, and limitation of freedom. In short, the regime of the Popular Front was failing miserably to meet the just expectation of the people.

The people had a just cause. Maritain expresses this neatly in the following text which deserves to be cited in full:

*C'est une chose aussi difficilement supportable de voir les aspirations d'un peuple à une vie sociale et politique plus conforme à la dignité des personnes humaines, sa volonté de sortir d'un injuste état de misère, et son espérance d'arriver à des libertés qui lui rendent la cité temporelle plus habitable, menacées d'échec (et de corruption, interne virant aux instincts de destruction) par les préjugés et les réflexes de classe de catégories privilégiées pleines de mépris pour lui, insoucieuses de justice sociale, et confondant leurs avantages matériels avec tout ce qu'il y a de saint.<sup>89</sup>*

Thus, all the signs cried out for a way out this situation where liberty, order and justice were at the mercy of the régime. Yet, the politicians, instead of seeking an authentic solution to meet the problems squarely, were busy dividing the people into fractions of Left and Right much more so than ever before. "Men have had to be on the one side or on the other", remarks Allison, "there is no longer any centre".<sup>90</sup>

It is argued that the ordinary people who were being stirred up in big numbers in a movement to fight for their cause against the corrupt government were marxists; they were preparing communist revolution.<sup>91</sup> On the other hand, Franco and his supporters convinced that the communist revolution was definitely coming, decided to take over the government in a military rebellion. This kind of military take over, was nothing new in Spain; there had been many of that kind. However, this time the people were completely opposed to a military regime. Thus the Civil War broke out. There was on the one side the so-called communist forces comprising the Popular Front government forces, the Republican Union, the

Republican left, socialists, Unified Marxist communists, Syndicalists, and anarchists. These were supported by law abiding citizens who disliked the military take over, and outside Spain they were supported by Soviet Union.

The other side which was called Fascist, for it was supported by the Fascist regimes in Germany and Italy, comprised of the insurgents of the army, and the citizens who supported them hoping to root out of Spain all the Communist influence and recover the values and ideals which were dear to them and which were tramped underfoot by the government. It was a social war, political war, a war of classes, a war of international interests and a war of international intervention.

c) The Political Problems Involved:

The first set of political problems at the root of the Spanish Civil War includes all the problems arising from either a lack of understanding of, or a deliberate distortion of the nature and purpose of the state, the body politic and the people. These problems include others stemming from the misuse of political authority, political power and their relationship. These notions will be discussed in detail in Chapter III below. However, for the present purpose it may be remarked that by state, here, is meant that part of the body politic especially concerned with the maintenance of law, the promotion of the common good and public order, and the administra-

tion of public affairs.<sup>92</sup>

Authority and power are intrinsically related. The former implies the right to direct or to command and the latter the force which one can use to oblige others to obey.<sup>93</sup> To the extent that the people have a natural and inalienable right to self-government,<sup>94</sup> they have the authority to govern themselves. However, they may transfer the exercise of this authority, not its possession, to the government which they set up to run the state. Thus, it is normal and valid that the government and the state be responsible and answerable to the people.

The fundamental duty of the state is the pursuit of the common good. This presupposes social order, just laws, and civic amity. The Popular Front government and the two previous governments since the abdication of the King failed precisely in this regard. The government set itself in opposition to the people, it perverted many of the essential qualities which constitute its nature: it institutionalized hatred, it exploited the people, it derogated liberty and used the public institutions to serve sectarian interests of the party in power.

The problem outlined here have to do with the Good and the Right in relation to the State. The end of the State must be something befitting to the nature of man. Now, how about the means of running or changing the state? How about the activities of violence, prior to the war, aimed at changing the

the government? The burning of churches? The killing of the poor? The insurrection in the army? All these were means employed to bring about a change in the oppressing government. The end was indeed good. But according to the old saying, does the end justify the means? Should a moral end be pursued by immoral means?

Maritain has insisted in the same work of Mendi-zabal that this problem of means has most central importance, it engaged the whole of morality; in actual fact, it is the whole of morality.<sup>95</sup> He invokes the Apostolic letter of Pope Pius XI to the Mexican Bishops, March 28th, 1937, as an authoritative statement of the Church concerning the right of revolution or insurrection or violence against the constituted powers. If however, a political authority violates justice and truth, as was the case in Spain prior to the Civil War, then the citizens may defend themselves and their country by "licit and appropriate means to be employed against unlawful authority. They forbid the use of intrinsically bad means, the employment of legitimate means in such a way that greater evil result, the use of these means by the clergy, and finally enjoins the clergy and Catholic Action to aim at peace so that love will unite persons of all classes in a common endeavour for social betterment".<sup>96</sup>

The problem of means brings us to that of communism. For, it was mentioned above that the communists agitated the

people to violence and disruption of the social order, to the killing of priest and the burning of Churches. It is here, no longer a simple problem of means, but of the problem of communism and its tactics.

The very communists who agitated the workers by preaching the preservation of the Spanish Culture, the dignity of the human person and his liberty, equality between the workers and their employers, are the very ones who did not hesitate to unleash the emotional forces of hatred among the people, hatred for religion which resulted in killing priest, burning of churches and sacrificing in thousands the innocent people as a means of seizing power. Obviously, the communists are inspired by a materialist ideology of the human person and of the common good; they conceive of him as purely immanent in the economic society. That is why communists are ready to sacrifice the individual for the society. Not only that; communism is also totalitarian. By absorbing man completely into the economic society, it destroys all the spiritual values of the person, the moral nature of the political society, justice and civil amity as the necessary condition of the common good.

Obviously, the problems associated with the Spanish Civil War, among which I have only mentioned the three: the nature of the state and its relation to the people, the problem of means, and communism, are a threat to any politics. For,

they affect the very nature of politics. They destroy both the true nature of human person and that of political society. It is true that these problems surfaced forcefully in the Spanish Civil War because of the situation as outlined here. However, they are not unique to the situation in Europe at the time of the Spanish Civil War. As long as they undermine the very essential components of political society and political philosophy, they are universal both in place and in time.

d) The Stavisky Scandal:

The Stavisky scandal in France two years before the break of the Spanish Civil War, January, 1934, reflects in an analogical form some of the problems behind the Spanish Civil War. There was corruption in the government, a great demonstration in Paris confronting the demonstrators and the police and resulting in many deaths; there was division in the people between the Left and the Right each accusing the other of the responsibility of the events and of the massacres.

Maritain wrote the Manifesto of Pour le Bien Commun and fifty-one other lay French Catholics signed it. In it they declared the duty of Christians in the face of national crisis. They called upon the opposing sides to unite and work for the common good of the whole of France. Fortunately, there were people like Maritain who were inspired by right reason, love for their country and authentic principles; for it is largely due to them that the Stavisky swindle which could have

precipitated into a civil war was healed in time.

Obviously, although this incident is quite local, limited only to the immediate environment of Jacques Maritain, yet it provides a universal lesson. Politics is moral. Corruption of whatever form and scale destroys the very foundation of politics.

## 4. Summary:

The events I have discussed in this chapter define the sociological cultural historical environment of Western Europe in the first half of the Twentieth Century. As I have endeavoured to show, this environment is the necessary converging point of the anthropocentric humanism and the end result of the spirit of liberalism. The Twentieth Century witnesses the fruits of this spirit, the spread of fascist, totalitarian, racist and communist regimes, and the atrocities of the two world wars.

But neither the spirit of liberalism nor the consequences thereupon have been confined to Western Europe. The voyages and Wars of geographical conquest in the 16th and 17th Centuries helped to spread the liberal spirit to the newly discovered lands. More effectively, however, the political conquests of the 18th and 19th Centuries and the scramble of the Western Europe for the acquisition of colonies witnessed the conscious effort to superimpose to the colonies the spirit of liberalism through the social, political, economic and even the religious institutions. Thus, by the turn of the 20th Century the liberal spirit had attained a World-wide perspective and although it has naturally attained its apogee in Western Europe where it was born, it is, nonetheless, the spirit that distinctively defines the historical climate of the contemporary scene.

The socio-political problems associated with this spirit are multifold and most divergent in nature. In the chapter I have grouped them around the three areas: freedom, freedom and the common good and freedom and grace. But they cover the whole field of political philosophy in its transhistoric principles, in the nature of the law that guide the application of these principles, in the understanding of the concrete historical climate and in providing the political regime ideal for this historical climate.

In the order of principles, all the problems discussed in this chapter have one thing in common, they all reduce man to a material being and the common good of political society to a collection of material goods. They deny the human person any dimension that goes beyond the material. Consequently, the regimes established by this materialistic philosophy of man are all totalitarian: of the social, racial, economic or political community. Likewise, the common good is stripped of justice, amity, generosity and charity.

In the order of means, the politics of liberalism and totalitarianism resulting therefrom have the tendency, as I have endeavoured to show, to adopt machiavellian or mechanical means rather than moral means. This is logically consequent upon the liberal conception of politics in a positivistic manner. This manner separates politics from morality and from religion. The laws that guide the political activity are put on the same

level as those guiding the physical and biological activity.

Finally, the misconception of the human person, the common good and moral nature of both politics and the laws that guide political action leads logically to the denial of the unity of mankind or human equality, freedom, the dignity of the human person, human rights, law, justice and the ideal of peace, all of which sustain the democratic philosophy. For, this material reduction, rather than creating unity, it provides the base of divisions: men are divided into social, political, economic or racial classes. Matter is not the root of unity in any way; for, it is in its very nature, the root of multiplicity and division. Thus, the materialist philosophy of liberalism logically denies true democracy which is founded on the unity of the human race, freedom and the other spiritual values mentioned above and others which have their origin in the religious dimension of the human person. Instead, as I have shown above, it favours either idealist democracy, or the various totalitarian regimes.

There is every sign that the civilization that has led to the problems discussed here is in the process of being liquidated. This is true in the capitalist world whose majority of people are awakening to the inconsistencies between the idealist philosophy it professes and the inhuman conditions of the lot of its subjects; the communist world whose majority of people is becoming more conscious of the incongruencies

between the messianic goal of the liberation of man which the communist philosophy professes, and the inhuman means employed to attain this goal, and the newly politically independent World which is in the process of rejecting the premises of the liberal philosophy received with colonialism. On the whole the World-wide crisis of the liberal civilization calls for a preparation of a different kind of civilization. One which must be built on a political philosophy which, in contrast to the liberal philosophy, provides firm and sound metaphysical principles of the true nature of the human person, and political society, identify the ideal of civilization which fulfills the desires of contemporary man and society; generate the political laws that guide the application of the metaphysical principles to the concrete conditions and provide the ideal political regime for the civilization we are moving into after the liquidation of the liberal civilization. The political philosophy which meets these requirements will be both real and universal since both the liberal spirit and political problems it poses are real and universal.

Having identified the sociological cultural historical climate of Jacques Maritain and the political problems therein it remains to enquire whether, in responding to these problems, Maritain has thought out a political philosophy which meets the above conditions and which can thus be applied universally. I shall start by exposing the metaphysical principles of his political philosophy.

1. Julie Kernan, Our Friend Jacques Maritain, New York, Doubleday, 1975, p. 17.
2. Raïsa Maritain, We have been Friends Together and Adventures in Grace, trans., J. Kernan, New York, Doubleday, 1961, p. 48
3. Ibid.,
4. J. Maritain, Letters of Leon Bloy to His God Children, Conf. Raïsa Maritain, Op. Cit., p. 97
5. Pluralistic Universe, New York, E.P. Dutton, 1971, p. 224
6. See Note 10 in the General Introduction above.
7. The Philosophy of Jacques Maritain, p. 36
8. La Politique Religieuse, 1912, pp. 293-303  
The same theme appears in the Declaration of the Ligue d'Action Française, particularly in the clauses: Je m'engage à combattre tout régime républicain. La République, en France, est le régime de l'étranger. L'esprit républicain désorganise la défense nationale et favorise des influences religieuses directement hostiles au Catholicisme traditionnel. Politique Religieuse, p. 377
9. Ibid., p. 23
10. Trois Idées Politiques, p. 10
11. La Politique Religieuse, p. 179
12. La Démocratie Religieuse, pp. 17-19
13. Ibid., p. 464.
14. Ibid., p. 41
15. C. T. Muret, French Royalist Doctrines since the Revolution, p. 248
16. Romantisme et Révolution, p. 91
17. E. R. Tannenbaum, The Action Française: Die-Hard Reactionaries in Twenty Century, France, p. 65.
18. C. Maurras, "Au signe de Flore", p. 31. Cited in Tint, The Decline of the French Patriotism, 1870-1940, p. 144

19. C. Maurras, Mes Idées Politiques, 1937, cited in S. Osgood, French Royalism Since 1870, p. 59
20. Démocratie Religieuse, p. 245
21. M. Pujo, Comment Rôme est Trompée, 1929, p. 242
22. Ibid., p. 163
23. Ibid., p. 166
24. Politique Religieuse, p. 373
25. Ibid.,
26. M. Pujo, Op. Cit., p. 80
27. C. Maurras, Romantisme et Révolution, pp. 92-93
28. Démocratie Religieuse, p. 315.  

Obviously, this statement is, without the slightest doubt a contradiction of the classical position regarding the relation of the individual and the political society. Aristotle, for example, argues that the city does not make men, but it takes them from nature and perfected them.
29. Op. Cit., p. 245 Note 1. Cited in Clairvoyance de Rôme, p. 165
30. Romantisme et Révolution, p. 101. Cited in Pourquoi Rôme a Parlé p. 73
31. Pope Pius XI, Consistorial Allocution of 24th Dec. 1926. Cited in A. Dansette, Religious History of Modern France, p. 394.
32. Ibid.,
33. Pope Pius XI, Encyclical Quas Primas, cited by Maritain, J. Man and the State, p. 153
34. Comment Rôme est Trompée, p. 246
35. Ibid., pp. 306-307. Also in Clairvoyance de Rôme, p. 264
36. Primauté du Spirituel, Paris, Plan, 1927. This work was translated into English by J. F. Scanlan, The Things that are not Caesar's, 1931, London, Sheed and Ward.

37. Primauté du Spirituel p. 4; The Things that are not Caesar's p. XXIII
38. Religion et Culture, 1930; Du Régime Temporel et de la liberté, 1933; (Freedom in the Modern World, 1935); Science et Sagesse, 1935; (Science and Wisdom, 1940); Humanisme Intégral : Problèmes Temporels et Spirituels d'une Nouvelle Chrétienté, 1936; (The Humanism, 1935, Integral Humanism, 1973); Christianisme et Démocratie, 1943; (Christianity and Democracy, 1944).
39. The term humanism according to Maritain, is quite ambiguous. Its meaning depends on the conception one has of man. According to the conception one has of man, humanism may be a theocentric if is conceived on the christians' image of man and anthropocentric humanism which has its origin in the Renaissance. The difference between the two forms of humanism lies in the fact that theocentric or christian humanism conceives of God as the centre of man and this latter as a person or "a universe of spiritual nature endowed with freedom of choice and constituting to this extent a whole which is independent in face of the world" IH p. 9. The human person according to this humanism is directly ordained to God. The relation from the human person to God is one of the created freedom to the uncreated freedom. FMW p. 36. In short theocentric humanism recognize as a fact that "it is impossible to share a complete image of man unless we include the God whom he adores" FMW p. 89.
- Anthropocentric humanism believes that man himself is the centre of man and therefore of all things - man is the measure of all things - it seeks to liberate man from God and from everything that goes beyond the naturalistic nature of man - it implies a naturalistic conception of man and of freedom IH p. 28.
- Anthropocentric humanism according to Maritain is inhuman humanism; it is antihuman and even tragic. As it emerged with the Renaissance Anthropocentric humanism obliges man to renounce the inheritance with which the whole of this history had been entwined. This is tragic. And not only that, in denying religious values which are so intrinsic in the very civilization anthropocentric humanism was bound to found a new religion, the religion of humanity.
- All the problems of culture that originate from the Renaissance and which constitute the tragedy of modern civilization, according to Maritain have their origin in this anthropocentric humanism. He affirms that the totalitarian regimes are springing under our eyes. (*Communism in Russia*, *Fascism in Italy*, *National Socialism in Germany*, and *the Civil War in Spain*) are social and political revolution with a "mystical" or religious basis. They all signal the finished phase of liberalism; for according to him, "liberalism is not merely false in theory (Ref. Note 5 in the general introduc-

tion); it is finished in fact; bankrupt by the turn of events. (cf. FMW pp. 63 - 64; RTC pp. 74-75.

40. Refer to note 5 of general introduction
- 40a. Reflections on America, p. 175
41. De La Justice Politique: Notes sur la Présenté Guerre, 1940; Scholasticism and Politics, 1940; Ransoning the Time, 1941; Les Droits de l'Homme et la Loi Naturelle, 1942; (The Rights of Man and Natural Law, 1943); Principes d'Une Politique Humaniste, 1944; La Personne et le Bien Commun, 1947; (The Person and the Common Good, 1947); Raison et Raisons, 1947, (Range of Reason, 1952) Man and the State, 1951.
42. Ransoning the Time, 1941, pp. 1-32.
43. Rights of Man and the Natural Law, 1943; p. 119
44. Scholasticism and Politics, New York, 1972, pp. 45-70, also in The Person and The Common Good, 1947
45. "Democracy and Authority" in Scholasticism and Politics New York, 1972, pp. 71 - 93.
46. Range of Reason, 1952, pp. 165-172
47. On the Use of Philosophy, pp. 16-43
48. The Peasant of the Garonne, 1968, p. 52
49. Leo Strauss, Natural Right and History, pp. 12-164
50. R.E. Carlyle, and A.J. Carlyle, A History of Mediaeval Political Theory in the West, vols. I and II.
51. G. H. Sabine, A History of Political Theory, pp. 224-257
52. Ibid.,
53. J. Maritain, Ransoning the Time, p. 149
54. FMW pp. 63-64; RTL pp. 74-75.
55. IH p. 31.
56. Ibid.,
57. Ibid., See also note 38 above.
58. Mein Kampf, p. 606.

59. J. Nyomarkay, The Nazi Party, p. 12.
60. A. Hitler, Mein Kampf, New York, Reynal and Hitchcock, 1940, p. 608.
61. Ibid., p. 752.
62. A. Hitler's Dictum in 1922. Cited in J. Dewey, German Philosophy and Politics, p. 18.
63. Hans Frank's directives for Judges, 1936. Cited in J. Nyomarkay, Op. Cit., p. 12, fn.2.
64. "The Pagan Empire and the Power of God", in Virginia Quaterly Review, 1939, no. 2, pp. 161-175.
65. France My Country, p. 47.
66. "The Menace of Racism", in The Catholic Mind, Vol. XXXVIII, no. 865, 1937, p. 506.
67. Le Mystère d'Israël, p. 166.
68. J. Dewey, German Philosophy and Politics, p. 20.
69. Weltanschauung: it may be translated as a "world-outlook" or "World Intuition". John Dewey taking the latter, shows that it is characteristic of all German philosophy that a look without must be based on a prior look within. With this light we may understand why Hitlerism is not a philosophy. There is no theory preceding the events, rather, the events flowing from the inner-bloodconditioned trait, are then followed by the theory.
70. Mein Kampf, p. 406
71. German Aryan: For some people Aryan and German mean one and the same thing, (Houston Stewart Chamberlain), for others, Aryan means "friends; for the term is supposed to have a Sanskrit origin from friends. According to German Lexicographers these friends are Indo-Germans who had invaded India and conquered the "lesser breeds". In any case, whether simply German or Aryan German, the important thing is the reference to the German Race and Races of Germanic Origin. These form the super Race. All the rest particularly Jews and Negroes must be eliminated.
72. Mein Kampf, p. 405.
73. Hitler, Cited in J. Dewey, Op. Cit., p. 35.

74. Mein Kampf, p. 591.
75. H. Rauschning, Hitler Speaks, p. 57 note 1/2. Cited in H. Conway, The Nazi persecution of the Churches, 1933-1945, 1968, p. 15.
76. Hitler, Mein Kampf, p. 608.
77. There exists an official English translation of this speech published by Müller und Sohn, Berlin, and another one translated by N. H. Baynes, The Speeches of Adolf Hitler 1922-1939, Oxford University Press, I have found both of these translations inadequate. The first, because of the difficulty in the language of the translation, the meaning of the text is diffused. The second, because, since Baynes has cut the speech into 8 pieces in order to fit it into subject matter, he has left out some important parts which do not definitely fit into the eight classifications, particularly at the end of the beginning of each part. A good example is the first part of the text cited here. He leaves it out and starts with the illustration corresponding to: "Au point de vue juridique...". It is for this reason that I have preferred the French text cited in Jacques Maritain, Le Mystère d'Israël, Paris, 1965, pp. 169-170.
78. "Manifeste Pour la Défense de l'Occident", in Europe, November, 15, 1935, p. 451.
79. Ibid.,
80. Ibid., pp. 454-456.
81. Ibid., p. 455.
82. Alfred Mendizabal, Aux Origines d'Une Tragédie, La Politique Espagnole de 1923-1936, Préface de Jacques Maritain, Paris, Desclée, 1937, p. 14.
83. "La Guerre Sainte" in Nouvelle Revue Française, July, 1937, pp. 21-37.
84. "La Guerra Nacional Española es Guerra Santa, y la más Santa que registra la historia", R.P. Ignacio G. Menendez-Reigada O.P., La Ciencia Tomista, Salamanca, 1937.
85. "La Guerre Sainte", Op. Cit., pp. 25-27.
86. A. Mendizabal, Op. Cit., p. 42.

87. A. Mendizabal, Op. Cit., p. 125.
88. Ibid., p. 123.
89. Ibid., pp. 11-12.
90. Peer E. Allison, The Spanish Tragedy, 1937, p. 241.
91. Lettre Collective des Evêques Espagnols, 1937, p. 9.
92. MS. p. 11.
93. SP. p. 73.
94. MS. p. 25.
95. Op. Cit., p. 33.
96. Ibid., pp. 20-21.

CHAPTER II  
MARITAIN'S DOCTRINE OF MAN

Celui qui veut rechercher, d'une manière qui le mène à la certitude, quelle est la meilleure organisation de la cité, doit nécessairement considérer d'abord quelle est la vie la plus digne de l'homme. En effet, si l'on ignore quelle est la meilleure vie pour l'homme, on ignorera quelle est la meilleure forme de la cité; la meilleure forme de la cité étant précisément celle où les hommes pourront, suivant les circonstances, atteindre le plus aisément la meilleure vie.

\*St. Thomas D'Aquin in Polit. Aristot. VII, lect. I.

## 1. Introduction:

Every political philosopher builds his political philosophy on his philosophical anthropology. Aristotle's doctrine of the end of the polis as the formation of civic virtue in the citizens, for example, is premised on his doctrine of man as a rational animal; for, it is inconceivable to form virtue in a being which lacks reason. Hobbes's insistence on security as the main purpose of the Contract of Government presupposes his doctrine of the individual man as basically selfish, pursuing his own goal and cooperating with others only when they can offer him security for attaining his goal. Rousseau's Social Contract Theory which was meant to defend and protect the individual while uniting him with others to whom he does not owe any obligation of obedience but to himself alone, is premised on Rousseau's doctrine of the native goodness and native freedom of the individual.

Maritain's political philosophy is no exception. It presupposes his metaphysical doctrine of man. This is why the enquiry into the political philosophy of Maritain which this thesis embarks on, starts in this chapter, with an exposition of Maritain's doctrine of man.

## MARITAIN'S DOCTRINE OF MAN

### 2. The Nature of Man:

Maritain's conception of man is, undoubtedly, what distinguishes his political philosophy from all others. His image of man is that of "...a being made of matter and spirit."<sup>1</sup> This does not suggest, nevertheless, that man is a union of two natures, one material and the other spiritual, if by nature is meant the principle of activity; there are not two principles of activity in man. Neither does it mean a union of two beings, or two substances, one material and the other spiritual, if by being is meant that which is or what exists, and by substance, that which exists without existing-in another thing. It means, rather, that man is a composite being, what Maritain alludes to as a metaphysical being,<sup>2</sup> whose substantial constitutive co-principles are a material principle and a spiritual principle.

Though man is a constituted being from these two substantial co-principles, he is nonetheless, specifically different from a purely material being as from a purely spiritual one. And even if his body, which ultimately owes its origin from the material principle, may have emerged from the historical evolution of the lower beings,<sup>3</sup> yet this alone does not constitute the nature of man. His immortal soul, the spiritual co-principle which is, according to Maritain, created directly by God, does not alone constitute the nature of man either.<sup>4</sup> For Maritain, the two co-principles

enter into a substantial union forming the substance of man.

Obviously, therefore, although man is a corporeal being the fact that his substance is constituted of the spiritual and material co-principles he is not, according to Maritain, an ordinary corporeal or material individual.

"...He is an individual who holds himself in hand by intellect and will. He exists not merely physically; there is in him a richer and nobler existence: he has spiritual superexistence through knowledge and through love".<sup>5</sup> Thus, "that by which man is most truly man is the intellect, which in him is something divine and by which he participates in the nature of spirits...".<sup>6</sup> On this account, a life which is truly human, which is in agreement with the principal part of man must reach out for a perfection which belongs, not to the level of material nature, but, to the realm of the spirit. In fact, it is for this reason that Maritain emphasizes with Aristotle that "...it is a betrayal of human nature to persuade men to know only what is human, mortals to know only mortal things: it is towards the immortal and the divine that human nature must reach out."<sup>7</sup>

This conception of the human reality implies that to be human carries with it a response to a vocation stamped in the very being of man; a call to become more man. This is a call to unfold, through intellection and volition, the inner mysterious source; for human personality is a great

metaphysical mystery.<sup>8</sup>

The aspects of the nature of man described here and many more, have been artistically knit together by Maritain in a text which deserves to be cited *in toto*.

It is the same text that will be mostly, but not exclusively, referred to throughout the exposition of Maritain's doctrine of the nature of man here below.

What do we mean precisely when we speak of the human person? When we say that man is a person, we do not mean merely that he is an individual, in the sense that an atom, a blade of grass, a fly, or an elephant is an individual. *Man is an individual who holds himself in hand by intellect and will. He does not exist only in a physical manner. He has spiritual superexistence through knowledge and love; he is, in a way, a universe in himself, a microcosm, in which the great universe in its entirety can be encompassed through knowledge; and through love he can give himself completely to beings who are to him, as it were other selves, a relation for which no equivalent can be found in the physical world. The human person possesses these characteristics because in the last analysis man, this flesh and these perishable bones which are animated and activated by a divine fire, exist "from the womb to the grave" by virtue of the very existence of his soul, which dominates time and death. Spirit is the root of personality. The notion of personality thus involves that of totality and independence: no matter how poor and crushed he may be, a person, as such, is a whole and subsists in an independent manner. To say that man is a person is to say that in the depth of his being he is more whole than a part and more independent than servile. It is to say that he is a minute fragment of matter that is at the same time a universe a beggar who communicates with absolute being, mortal flesh whose value is eternal, a bit of straw into which heaven enters. It is this metaphysical mystery that religious thought points to when it says that the person is the image of God. The value of the person, his dignity and his rights belong to the order of things naturally sacred which bear the imprint of the Father of being, and which have in Him the end of their movement.*<sup>9</sup> (The italics are mine).

### 3. Individuality and Personality:

In the text cited above, Maritain says that man is not only a material individual like those he mentions - an atom, a blade of grass, a fly, or an elephant; he is rather an "individual who holds himself in hand by his intelligence and his will".<sup>10</sup> He is a person. Elsewhere, he affirms that, "...the human being is caught between two poles; a material pole, which in reality, does not concern the true person but rather the shadow of personality or what in strict sense is called individuality; and a spiritual pole, which does concern true personality".<sup>11</sup> Thus, it emerges clearly here and implied in various other texts of Maritain's social philosophy, a distinction between individuality and personality. In the following pages we shall first present Maritain's doctrine on these notions separately and then combine them together with a critique as to the validity of the distinction.

#### i. Individuality:

According to Maritain, individuality describes the concrete state of unity and indivision required by existence in virtue of which every actually or possibly existing nature can posit itself in existence as distinct from other beings.<sup>12</sup> It is opposed to the state of universality which things have in the mind.<sup>13</sup> As such it is a characteristic common to all existents; common to an atom, a stone, a plant, an animal, man, and even God. For, all these are individuals; they

either exist in fact or can exist outside the mind of a knower. But, granted that all these beings are individuals, it is a question whether they are individualized alike. Is what makes an atom an individual the same as what makes God an individual? Or is what individualizes man the same as what individualizes a pure spirit? For Maritain the answer is without any doubt, No. On this answer rests the importance and the necessity, according to Maritain, of the distinction between human individuality and personality.

The atom, the fly, man and all corporeal beings are individuals by virtue of the principle of individuation - matter with its quantity designated.<sup>14</sup> As such, they are units of a species. But pure spirits - forms which can receive and exercise their 'to be' directly without depending on matter - are individuals by virtue of their species. They are, as it were, individualized species. This means, "...each pure spirit differs specifically from every other; each is an individual by the very form (absolutely free from any matter) in which its being consists and which constitutes it in its species."<sup>15</sup> This is not the case with the human soul which is a spiritual form, or with any other form which depends on matter in order to subsist. Such forms, complete as they may be in their essence as forms, suffer, nonetheless, substantial privation. For, they cannot subsist or act as complete substances.

The human soul needs to be completed in this privation it suffers as a substance. It is thus completed through its transcendental relation with matter in the process of individuation. This means that by the very fact that the human soul must inform matter and thereby subsist and act, it is, by the same token, particularized. It becomes an individualized unit, through individuation by matter, of a multiplicity of beings, all of which share the same specific nature. This is so because, while the human soul as a substantial form, specifies, yet due to its dependence on matter, the species designated thereby cannot be fully realized in a single being. On the contrary it must be said that the human soul is distributed through matter to a plurality of beings within the same species. The nature of these beings is, on that account, spiritual and fleshy,<sup>16</sup> or carnal and spiritual;<sup>17</sup> spiritual, that is to say, arising from the soul, the spiritual principle, and material; that is, arising from the material principle. Thus, "...soul and matter are two substantial co-principles of one and the same being, of a single and unique reality whose name is man".<sup>18</sup> But what about the individuality of this being, man? What, in other words, is the metaphysical source or root of individuality in man?

Maritain argues that for man as for all corporeal beings individuality has its first ontological root in matter.<sup>19</sup>

Their individuality is rooted in matter, so far as matter has uniquely distinct determination with respect to location in space.<sup>20</sup> What Maritain is saying here seems somehow confusing. It would seem to me that he is short - circuiting the argument. What he means seems to be: In order that the human soul can receive and exercise its being, for, being is received by and through the form, it has to be completed and thus particularized through the process of individuation. Through this process in which the principle of matter plays the limiting role, on account of its avidity, the human substance is completed on an essential order and it has with it its potential individuality which is made real upon the reception and exercise of being. But this potential individuality arises from the particularizing aspect of matter in its transcendental relation with the soul. Hence, matter is the primary ontological origin of individuality for man as for all forms involved in matter. Primary ontological origin here, with an emphasis on primary, is meant to show that the potential individuality arising from individuation is more primary to being than the real individuality which, in fact, is the potential made real upon the reception and exercise of the first act of being. The conclusion is that individuality in man has its primary ontological root in matter because of the way man is individualized.

What conclusions flow from this doctrine of individuality? The first conclusion is that due to this type of individuality that man has, he is only a fragment of matter.<sup>21</sup> As a fragment or a part of the universe of material things man is a "...point of that immense network of forces and influences; physical and cosmic, vegetative and animal, ethnic, atavistic, hereditary, economic and historic to whose laws we are subject."<sup>22</sup> Since this point is of paramount importance in the application of the distinction between individuality and personality to social and political problems, it must be stressed once again that man is a part not by virtue of his being an individual but rather by being that type of individual whose individuality rests on the principle of individuation which in turn is governed by matter.

The second conclusion is that on account of that type of individuality which is proper to man, to be man is to become more and more man. "Since matter is there in view of its form, it is one and the same thing for a form to actualize its matter more completely and for itself more completely to be".<sup>23</sup> This becoming is attained through various operations.

The third conclusion is that on account of the type of individuality, man's unity is but a precarious one.<sup>24</sup> This is because, as Maritain affirms, "...matter as such tends to decompose itself."<sup>25</sup> It is inclined to disintegration

just as space is inclined to division.<sup>26</sup> At the same time, on account of this type of individuality "each of us is subject to the determinism of the physical world."<sup>27</sup> This is a characteristic which may lead us to consider the individual as closed on account of the form of individuality due to him. Since individuality is marked by incommunicability and indivisibility, the human individual considered from its individuality, excludes from itself every thing which it is not. This is what Maritain describes as the narrowness of the ego, forever threatened, and forever eager to grasp for itself.<sup>28</sup>

I have drawn here only the conclusions which are relevant in the application of the doctrine of the distinction to social and political philosophy. Some of the issues raised here will be elucidated further as we discuss Maritain's doctrine of the person. It must be emphasized, nevertheless, that the doctrine of the individual we have presented here, and particularly that of the person we shall discuss presently, is not based on Maritain's purely speculative works.<sup>29</sup> In these works, Maritain discusses the nature of the person as person and as applicable analogically to human, angelic and divine persons. He is not primarily concerned with the human person and his life in political society. He shows this concern in his social and political works,<sup>30</sup> in which he is primarily preoccupied, no longer, with the nature of the person as such, but with the human person and his life in communion with other human persons in political society.

## ii. Personality:

In the text cited above,<sup>31</sup> Maritain refers to man as a person. "He does not exist only in a physical manner. He has spiritual superexistence through knowledge and love."<sup>32</sup> The root of this form of existence is, according to Maritain, the spiritual nature of the human soul. He makes this point in the following text:

Unlike the concept of individuality of corporeal things, the concept of personality is related not to matter but to the deepest and highest dimensions of being. Its roots are in the spirit inasmuch as the spirit holds itself in existence and superabounds in existence.<sup>33</sup>

What is this spirit that holds itself in existence? It is the spiritual soul which is also the substantial form of man. This is why Maritain affirms that "...personality is the subsistence of the spiritual soul communicated to the human composite".<sup>34</sup>

As it is obvious from this last statement, Maritain brings out the two aspects which are essential in personality: subsistence and spiritual nature. Maritain concerns himself primarily, though not exclusively, with the aspect of the subsistence of personality in his speculative works.<sup>35</sup> He strives to answer the question, what is the first metaphysical root of personality? He answers that it is subsistence. However, in the social and political works, the emphasis is shifted from the subsistence of the person to its spiritual nature. Why? Precisely because he is no longer dealing with

the first metaphysical root of personality. His enquiry in these works is how the person is both a whole and a part in society. For him the person is not a whole in society because of its "subsistence"; but rather, because of the way it subsists. The being of man subsists in a nature which is not only material but spiritual; that is, in a nature which is not only material but spiritual; - in a nature whose form is spiritual. It is this nature that makes man "a complete individual substance, intellectual in nature and master of its actions - *sui juris*, autonomous, in the authentic sense of the word".<sup>36</sup> But as it filters from the text above, this personality has its roots, not in matter as has individuality, but in spirit. "Spirit" Maritain emphasizes, "is the root of personality".<sup>37</sup> As such it involves the notion of "totality and independence".<sup>38</sup> It implies interiority,<sup>39</sup> self possession,<sup>40</sup> mastery of self.<sup>41</sup> Maritain knits these aspects together in the following definition of the person.

...the person is a reality, which subsisting spiritually constitutes a universe by itself and an independent whole (relatively independent), in the great whole of the universe and facing the transcendent whole which is God.<sup>42</sup>

It does not take much intellectual effort to realize that Maritain has paraphrased the Bethian definition of the person.<sup>43</sup> However, he has tailored it in a way that he projects to the foreground the themes which will be most relevant to his socio-political philosophy in relating the person to political

society, to the whole universe and to God.

In the first place to distinguish the aspect of personality from that of individuality, which as we saw above, has its primary ontological root in matter, Maritain emphasizes that the person is a reality which subsists spiritually. Personality is thus, absolutely removed from the ambient of matter. It is a spiritual subsistence,<sup>44</sup> superabounding in existence,<sup>45</sup> having its roots in spirit,<sup>46</sup> and directly related to the Absolute.<sup>47</sup> Maritain explains this last note by saying that the spiritual homeland of the person is the whole universe of the Absolute.<sup>48</sup> The Absolute Whole is the origin and final end of the person. But the Absolute Whole is not simply the origin and final end of the human person in the same way as He is of all other creatures. The human soul, according to Maritain, resembles God in a proper and peculiar fashion. It is the image of God.<sup>49</sup> Without overstretching the analogy we could understand Maritain as saying that while the individuality has its roots in matter - the body, personality has its basis in the soul, which in turn makes man to be the image of God. Nevertheless, to avoid treading the temerarious ground leading to the Cartesian dualism of soul and body, we must heed to Maritain's emphasis on the unity of man. For him, it is the same entire being man, that is wholly an individual by reason of what it receives from matter, and wholly a person, by reason of what it receives

from spirit. We shall have the occasion to return to this point.

The last clause of the definition above, alludes to the person as independent whole (relatively independent), in the great whole of the universe and facing the transcendent Whole which is God. The person constitutes a universe by himself. This is different from the material individual which exists, as a fragment of the species, with the species, and for the species. The person is willed and governed, not through or for the species; but directly for its own sake. To bring this point home, Maritain invokes the authority of St. Thomas in the following text:

Intellectual creatures, though they, like all creatures are ordained to the perfection of the created whole, are willed and governed for their own sake. Divine providence takes care of each one of them for its own sake and not at all as a mere cog in the machinery of the world. Obviously, this does not prevent them from being related first to God and then to the order and perfection of the created universe, of which they are the most noble constitutive parts.<sup>50</sup>

The two aspects of the person, that is, that it is independent and that it is open emerge clearly here. But while we shall reserve the discussion on the person and independence to the treatment on the person and freedom, here below, suffice it to make a few remarks here on the person as open. This is an important note, for it contrasts that of the individual as closed.

At birth, a material individual, for example, a cat, is born as a finished product. It has received, as Walgrave puts it, the "whole capital of life" at birth.<sup>51</sup> It is completely sealed or closed in the sense of being incommunicable. This is because matter has the virtue of limiting things to their proper being by making them metaphysically impenetrable.<sup>52</sup> But this is not the case with the human person. He is not a finished product at birth. He is not an isolated unity without doors or windows, like the Leibnizian monad.<sup>53</sup> Of course as a material being he is impenetrable. But that is not all. He is an open whole. Because of his spiritual superexistence, there surges from his interiority a self-conscious, thinking freedom. This demands that the human person becomes a personality or that he realizes in his psychological and moral life, what is but a sketch in his metaphysical nature. He realizes this through knowledge and love.

According to the very nature of knowing,<sup>54</sup> the knower, (and here we are concerned with intellectual knowledge), by knowing becomes the known. Maritain says it differently: to know is to become a thing other than the self, *fieri aliud a se*, to be or become the other as other *esse seu fieri aliud in quantum aliud*.<sup>55</sup> Knowing is thus a mysterious act through which and by which the human person communicates most intimately with other things and other selves. He becomes these

things and these other selves. But the knowing faculty in the human person is spiritual. It is limitless in its capacity of knowing. The Scholastics put it neatly by saying *anima humana fit omnia*. He can know material things, other selves, spiritual beings and God himself. Thus, thanks to his capacity of knowledge the human person is open to other selves, to the whole universe and to God.

But the human person does not only communicate with things and other selves in an indifferent manner. Having a capacity of infinite knowledge, the human person must likewise have a corresponding appetite of infinite desire; "...an appetite or a power of desire and of inclination, creating in the soul spiritual wrights which attract the whole of it; its primordial act is love."<sup>56</sup> This appetite draws the person together in order to direct him to love the things he knows. In a special way and more true to the nature of the person, however, the person gives himself to other selves. He loves the deepest reality or the metaphysical centre of the other; not only the appearances or the qualities of the other.<sup>57</sup> This is why Maritain affirms strongly that personality, of its essence, requires a dialogue in which souls really communicate.<sup>58</sup> The person gives himself to others as he receives others to himself. This capacity of giving and receiving is infinite. The person is for that matter completely transparent or open. He never closes himself by

loving others. In fact he could never. Being spiritual he is open to all being, for no other self and no being whatever, save the Absolute, that can fully satiate the desire of love in the person. As long as the entire person is related to the Absolute in which alone it can find fulfilment,<sup>59</sup> the person will remain open to all other beings. This behaviour of the human person is related to the nature of free will, which we shall treat hereafter. At the moment, it may be concluded that, according to Maritain, the human person as person is open, thanks to its infinite capacity of knowledge and love. These ordain him to dialogue directly with other things, other selves and God.

iii. Individuality and Personality:

In the foregoing exposition, Maritain's doctrine on both the individual and the person is very clear. Intrinsic in the discussion of individuality is the notion of part while in the discussion of personality is that of a whole. Putting these notions together one might get the impression that Maritain is making a distinction between the individual and the person as a part and a whole in the same metaphysical being or as two separate beings, the individual and the person, the former being the part of the latter. This is undoubtedly the impression of some of Maritain's critics on the distinction. J. A. Baisnée,<sup>60</sup> for example, regarded the distinction as metaphysically unfounded; J. Creaveny<sup>61</sup> claims that it has

been forced while P. Descoqs<sup>62</sup> whose writing seems to have inspired the other two critics, rejects the distinction as being gratuitous. Maritain dismisses Descoqs' criticism in a footnote; meaning, perhaps that it ~~deserves~~ not to be attended to, "...for the amount of nonsense which Father Descoqs gratuitously attributes to the doctrine he criticises."<sup>63</sup>

What is at stake in the doctrine of the distinction is not the separation of two metaphysical substances like the pure spirit and geometrical extension in Descartes. If it were so, Maritain would be a Cartesian and it would be an enormous pretence on his part to lament that Descartes put assunder what Scholasticism had succeeded to unite, and in regarding Descartes as "my dear enemy" on account of his dualism.<sup>64</sup> Maritain is certainly free from this crime. Does he not emphasize that "the same reality is wholly an individual and wholly a person?"<sup>65</sup> Or that "one and the same reality is, in a certain sense an individual, and in another sense a person?"<sup>66</sup> Or that "there is not in me one reality called my individuality and another my personality?"<sup>67</sup> Does he not caution those whose motto is "'Death to the individual, long live to the person' that in killing the individual they also kill the person?"<sup>68</sup> Maritain is certainly free from the count of the Cartesian dualism.

It must be kept in mind that the distinction Maritain has sought was not simply a metaphysical exercise for his mind.

It was, rather, to provide a basis for the solution of the problem of the person in political society. Hence, *Maritain se place en effet dans la perspective d'une philosophie sociale. Il ne cherche pas les fondements métaphysiques de la personne pour eux-mêmes, mais en vue d'établir sur une base solide une doctrine sociale.*<sup>69</sup>

With this understanding, it is relatively easy to realize that the distinction must be centered on the formal aspects of the same being-man. It is he, who, on account of the aspects of his individuality and personality plays the role of a part and a whole in society. He does not, however, play these roles separately. Nor does he play them in opposition one to the other. These two formal aspects are far from being in opposition. Croteau has elucidated this point very clearly. He says:

*L'individualité ne s'oppose pas à la personne en tant que tout subsistant comme la raison de partie à celle de tout...Au plan donc de la subsistence nous verrons que c'est l'individualité prise dans son sens fort, qui constitue la totalité subsistante de la personne. La spiritualité d'autre part, ne représente que la nature dans laquelle se réalise cette unité de subsistence.*<sup>70</sup>

Personality is viewed by Maritain, on account of its spirituality, as a signature or a seal in one's substance.<sup>71</sup> It enables one freely to perfect and freely to give this substance; it evidences in each of us that expansiveness of being which, in a corporeal-spiritual being, is linked to the spirit, and which constitutes, in the secret depths of our ontological

structure, a source of dynamic unity and of inner unification.<sup>72</sup>  
In this respect, although the human person exists in a political society as a part, subordinated to it and existing for it in view of the things he receives from it, yet he exists in it as a spiritual being; and as a whole for that matter.

There is no better way of concluding this part than to quote the two texts of St. Thomas which have inspired Maritain on this distinction:

"Each individual person is related to the entire community as the part to the whole".  
Summ. Theol. II-II, 64,2.

This text according to Maritain,<sup>73</sup> refers to the individual person as a part of the political society.

"Man is not ordained to the body politic according to all that he is and has" S.T. I-II, 21, 4, ad 3.  
"But all that man is, and can, and has, must be referred to God".

It is this text which inspires Maritain<sup>74</sup> to consider man in so far as he is a person as whole in political society.

## 4. The Person and Freedom:

In the text cited at the beginning of this chapter Maritain characterizes personality by freedom of independence. He emphasizes therein that no matter how poor and crushed it may be, a person as such is a whole and subsists in an independent manner.<sup>75</sup> Elsewhere, Maritain makes it more explicit that personality and freedom of independence are related and inseparable.<sup>76</sup> Thus, freedom of independence which is also referred to as freedom of autonomy,<sup>77</sup> or freedom of spontaneity,<sup>78</sup> is intrinsically tied to the notion of personality.

But what is this freedom of independence? How is it distinguished from what is popularly known as freedom of choice? How is it related to the nature of the human person? What becomes of this freedom when Maritain's doctrine of the person is applied to political society? These are some of the questions I shall consider as I make the exposition of Maritain's doctrine of freedom and ~~the~~ human person.

## i. Divisions of Freedom:

That Maritain's approach to the concept of freedom corresponds to the two principal lines of meaning common to scholastics is certainly unquestionable. The one concerns freedom as an absence of necessity. This meaning of freedom refers to the nature of free will in performing a free act; for, to be free in this sense excludes any form of inner

necessity. This freedom is popularly called freedom of choice. The other concerns freedom as an absence of constraint, appropriately called freedom of spontaneity.

Maritain distinguishes two forms of freedom of spontaneity. The one is pertinent to everything that is or that acts; for, everything that is or acts has the power of acting according to its own internal constitution and inclination without undergoing compulsion imposed by any external agent.<sup>79</sup> On this score, Maritain sees this type of freedom of spontaneity as admitting of various degrees.<sup>80</sup> A star that orbits freely, for example, having a cosmic centre and a motion unique to itself, has a certain degree of spontaneity; so also has a plant that grows freely from within its own inner motion; and the bird that flies freely. All these beings enjoy freedom of spontaneity in the sense that they are relatively independent. They "obey" the internal inclinations of their constitution. By the same token, this kind of freedom is found in a higher proportion in the human person. For, "...when freedom of spontaneity crosses the threshold of the realm of spirit, it becomes properly speaking, freedom of independence".<sup>81</sup>

Considered on this level, freedom of independence means more than just following the inclinations set up already in the nature of man. It consists in the making of oneself the principle cause of ones operations and in possessing,

developing and perfecting oneself. To this extent, Maritain distinguishes this kind of spontaneity as freedom of autonomy. But it is according to him only the initial freedom of autonomy.

Maritain's other distinction of freedom of autonomy which is his most unique point in his doctrine of freedom, is the terminal freedom of autonomy or freedom of exultation.<sup>82</sup> This is achieved when the spiritual nature will have realized itself or blossomed fully. Maritain places freedom of choice between the initial autonomy, "the datum of metaphysics", as Maritain calls it,<sup>83</sup> and this terminal autonomy, "towards which the aspirations of personality themselves tend".<sup>84</sup> This is not the terminal freedom as many of the contemporaries erroneously think by making it the highest freedom, and through it, condemn the person to "recurrent acts of choice without ever being able to bind himself".<sup>85</sup> In so doing, the contemporaries destroy freedom; for, if freedom of choice lies at the heart of love, as one chooses because he loves, and since to love is to bind oneself,<sup>86</sup> one cannot choose indefinitely without committing himself to some act.

Neither is freedom of choice simply the vital spontaneity as Bergson made of it.<sup>87</sup> For Maritain freedom of choice is essentially a means; it is anchored in the initial freedom of autonomy and it is ordained towards the achievement of the terminal freedom of autonomy. In order to appreciate fully Maritain's doctrine of the person and freedom and its relation

to political society, I shall examine these notions separately.

ii. Freedom and Nature:

Maritain thinks that one root error of the moderns, which dates to Kant and the Critique of Practical Reason is the dichotomy between the order of nature and the order of freedom.<sup>88</sup> This dichotomy which has become a common-place among philosophers of liberalism<sup>89</sup> has also introduced a rift between ethics and metaphysics, theory and practice. For them, man wins his freedom by controlling and overcoming nature which would otherwise thwart his freedom.

The domination over nature has led to enormous scientific and technological progress. Man is realizing his dream as the master of nature. However, it is a question whether in doing so, he is also liberating himself - the thesis presupposed in the distinction of the two orders. Has man, one may ask, liberated himself through his domination of nature? Must it not be admitted that he has entrenched himself more deeply to the slavery of nature? The anxiety and fear of self-destruction by applying the same technology haunts him more so now than ever before.

Besides leading man to this frightening impasse in his relation to nature, the separation of the order of nature from that of freedom and the opposition of one to the other has also led man to an equally frightening situation vis à vis human relations. Liberalism portrays freedom as a static

right existing in the *noumenal* order and to be preserved at all costs. Political society according to this theory, exists to protect this inalienable right of each individual. Thus political society is dissolved for the individuals and the logical conclusion is anarchism pure and simple or individualistic materialism which favours the strong against the weak.<sup>90</sup>

Maritain credits Spinoza and Hegel for grasping the alarming consequences of the Kantian and liberal dichotomy between the order of nature and that of freedom. Hegel, in fact took it upon himself, the special mission to bridge the Kantian rift. Unfortunately, however, he ended up confusing and identifying the two freedoms - freedom of choice and freedom of autonomy. The result has been just as inimical to freedom and to nature as the errors Hegel set out to correct in the first place.<sup>91</sup>

Maritain believes that the Thomistic philosophy of freedom is free from the problems encountered by all the philosophies which introduce a dichotomy between the order of nature and that of freedom.<sup>92</sup> While this is a philosophy of being by virtue of its primary intuition, "*l'intuition de l'être secundum quod est ens*",<sup>93</sup> and the intuition of the analogy of Being, it is, from the angle of ethics, a philosophy of freedom, as it is, from the angle of knowledge, the philosophy of spirit.<sup>94</sup>

The virtue of this philosophy is in grounding freedom in nature, the latter understood in its metaphysical meaning

as the essence of a person or the principle of its activity; thus distinguishing the latter from the former without separating or opposing them. But such an order affirms the primacy of nature over freedom. Indeed, the dictum, *agere sequitur esse* has its fullest meaning and application here. To act as a free being or to exercise freedom follows the nature of a free being (ens). And here, Maritain emphasized that if freedom necessarily presupposes the order of nature, it above all presupposes the nature of a being endowed with intellect and will.<sup>95</sup> It is so because, as Maritain repeats with St. Thomas, "the whole root of freedom lies in reason."<sup>96</sup> Hence, ethics presupposes metaphysics and speculative philosophy, and for this reason, the true use of our freedom presupposes the knowledge of being and the supreme laws of being.<sup>97</sup>

### iii. Free Will:

The will, according to Maritain, functions under the illumination of the intellect. In itself it is a blind faculty; and according to the dictum, *nihil volitum nisi praecognitum*, or *ignoto nullum cupidi*, it cannot desire without first of all being preceded by the intellect. However, in itself, as a faculty or as a kind of nature, it has an operation proper to itself as to its constitution; it desires the Good as such.<sup>98</sup>

Maritain makes it explicit that the Good in this regard is not the moral good<sup>99</sup> which suits the intellectual creature in the line of its finalities. It is not the Good in so far as it satitates the desires of the will. It is rather, the Absolute Being apprehended under its aspect of goodness.

It may be worthwhile here to recall that the notion of Being is convertible to its transcendental qualities: Unity, Truth, and Goodness. Each of these transcendentals is Being as manifested under one or the other aspect. They are transcendental modes or qualities of Being itself. Thus, Being in as much as it is undivided, it is Unity; in as much as it is intelligibility manifesting itself as subsistence for thought; it is truth; and in as much as Being confronts the will manifesting itself as "subsistence" for love, it is Good. These are transcendental modes of Being, precisely because they do not add anything to Being as such. Rather, they are manifestations of Being. And since they are transcendental, they are, like Being itself, universal; they are applicable to being universally. They are also, just like Being, analogical notions. For this reason, an infinite Being is infinite Unity, infinite "Truth" and infinite Good.

Thus, what Maritain is saying is that by its very nature, the will is drawn to the absolute Being in its aspect of absolute Good. This is the operation proper to the will; it is the act proper to the nature of the will, its very deter-

mination as an intellectual faculty or nature. In the same way as the intellect is, by its nature oriented to Being apprehended as Truth, so also is the will naturally drawn to the absolute Being in its mode of absolute Good. The difference is that since the intellect is a faculty of knowing, it draws to itself every being in so far as it is intelligible while the will as a faculty of loving is not drawn necessarily to any good short of the infinite Being, or any good which is mixed with non-good. This is why Maritain affirms that the will cannot desire evil as evil or partial good in its aspect of evil. It can, however, determine itself with regards to partial good in the aspect the intellect presents it rightly or wrongly as good.<sup>100</sup>

We are entering, at this juncture, into the "mystery" of a free act which plays such a prominent role in Maritain's doctrine of freedom. I shall not expose fully the doctrine of the free act, however, because it does not pertain to the present study. But I shall discuss it to the extent it distinguishes the freedom of choice from the freedom of autonomy and also to the extent it reveals the dignity of the person in being able to bring into existence an act which was not before.

## iv. Freedom of Choice:

...the will is grounded in nature and is itself a kind of nature ...There is something which it must desire by virtue of what it is, something which it desires necessarily ... the metaphysical good, which relates to what is capable of satisfying desire and of bringing joy in every line... If that which necessarily determines my will is a limitless good, an absolute good which completely satiates all my capacities of desire, it is evident that whatever is not this limitless, absolute good, cannot determine my will necessarily.<sup>101</sup>

Because the will is ordained by its very nature to the Absolute Good, it is indifferent to every finite good; for, no finite good is pure good, it is a mixed good; mixed between good and non-good, being and non-being. As such it cannot bind the will necessarily. The latter is absolutely free before the former as long as the former presents itself as both a good and a non-good. Yet, the will freely chooses particular things, or particular operations. How does this come about? How can the will be bound to the particular? Is this not contrary to its very nature?

Since the will is determined only by the absolute Good, and since it is indifferent to the particular good, there is need of a judgement which bears upon a particular good or on the concrete action to be accomplished *hic et nunc*. This judgement cannot be a purely speculative; that is, a judgement which concerns only principles. Nor can it be a speculative practical judgement; that is, a judgement which concerns action as viewed in its universality by leaving out the concrete

circumstances accompanying it. All these cannot determine the person to act here and now. The judgement required is a practico-practical judgement; one which prescribes what must be done in a certain concrete condition.<sup>102</sup>

Now, the intellect alone cannot enunciate such a judgement "because this judgement does not bear upon the relation of my act to being as truth", but rather, "it bears on the relation of my act, considered *hic et nunc*, to what I need, I who produce it".<sup>103</sup> But the judgement that the intellect can make about particular good is only relative. It presents the good and its limitations. It cannot pass an absolute judgement regarding what must be done. And such a judgement is precisely what is needed; because "in acting I cause something to be which was not and I thereby exclude from being all other possibles. The practico-practical judgement, this incommunicable judgement exclusively mine, in which I commit myself completely and by which I say to myself, 'I must *hic et nunc* accomplish this act', cannot therefore be expressed except in the absolute: *fiat!*"<sup>104</sup> It must be expressed in other word, in an unconditional judgement. And how does the person achieve this?

While the intellect formerly determines the person by the speculative-practical, in which case he still remains free to act or not to act, for, the speculative-practical lacks the absolute command, the will, while open to the absolute

Good gives itself the motivation for the particular act. It gives it a value as a means towards the attainment of the absolute Good, and hence it is the very cause of the attraction it undergoes.<sup>105</sup> In this respect, the will bends the judgement in the direction it desires and thus transfers "to the particular good in question the excess of motivation which fills through its determination by the infinite good".<sup>106</sup>

In Maritain's perspective, freedom of choice is fully anchored in both the intellect and the will. It is caused by both, according to the Aristotelian adage: *Causae ad invicem sunt causae*. The intellect specifies the act theoretically. In this respect it is a formal cause of what is to be done. It is judgement in relation to truth or to Being. However, it cannot exercise an actual movement towards the particular being. This can be done by making the practico-practical judgement in relation to the will which efficiently endows the particular being with the infinite motivation. Thus, the intellect as a formal cause and the will as an efficient cause vitally envelop each other and produce an effect which is truly a free act.

Obviously, therefore, what makes the free act so unique as revealing the internal mystery of the person does not lie in the inadequacy of the particular object or bind the will; it does not lie in the existence exercised by the partial goods. Rather, and this is what makes the free act so intrinsic to

the person, it lies in the act which the free will of the person as a subject brings into existence by determining itself towards the partial good and by mastering the practico-practical judgement.

v. Freedom of Autonomy:

Freedom in the sense of free will, is a datum belonging to the metaphysical structure of the human person. We inherit it with our rational nature. According to Maritain, this is not, as it is for many modern philosophers, the whole of freedom. Of course it is the spring of freedom; for, there cannot be true freedom without this freedom of the will or free choice. However, freedom of choice should not be treasured on the metaphysical level only. It has to be exercised towards a goal. It has to grow into the moral and psychological life of the person. Man is called, as Maritain put it, to become in action what he is already in the metaphysical order: a person.<sup>107</sup> He is called to fulfill or realize himself by becoming the true master of his actions.

This means that although the human person as such is whole, it is a finished whole on the metaphysical order only. On the moral and psychological order, it is not finished. Man must on these orders win his personality through a progressive conquest of himself. He "must win his personality as well as his freedom and he pays dearly for it, and runs many risks."<sup>108</sup> This process is succinctly described by

Maritain in the following:

The true and fully natural man is not nature's man, the uncultivated soil but the virtuous man, the human soil cultivated by undeviated reason, man formed by the inner culture of the intellect and moral virtues. He alone has a consistency, a personality.<sup>109</sup>

On this score, Maritain identifies the freedom of fulfilment or freedom of autonomy.

This freedom connotes mastery of self and self-sufficiency. These expressions were also used by the ancients, according to Maritain, to signify that the free man governs himself without suffering external constraint. With this type of freedom, it is clear that freedom of choice is not an end in itself as many modern philosophers have made of it. For Maritain, as for Thomists, freedom of choice is only the initial freedom, it develops and directs the person to the realization of freedom of autonomy.<sup>110</sup> For this reason, there is a natural process for the person to realize his personality through the conquest of freedom. Maritain calls this process the dynamism of freedom,<sup>111</sup> and he notes that this realization of freedom is attained on two orders: the spiritual order and the social order.<sup>112</sup>

The confusion of the two kinds of freedom, freedom of choice and freedom of autonomy on both of these orders has been, according to Maritain, the root error of many of the contemporary philosophers. Some have conceived freedom of

choice as an end-in-itself, while others have conceived freedom of autonomy as something already possessed by man on the metaphysical level and not as something to be won.

Maritain thinks that Kant made the latter error. For him, according to Maritain, freedom of autonomy is not the fruit of moral progress but the property and expression of the metaphysical datum which man inherit with his intellectual nature. This is enjoyed in the Kantian noumenal world. Freedom of choice, follows from this freedom. Thus, although Kant does seem to make the distinction between the two freedom, yet he cripples both of them by mixing them up badly.

Against Kant and his followers, the Thomists maintain that freedom of choice is not an end-in-itself. It is not the formal constitutive element of moral action either. It is only the material element of moral action. It is a prerequisite to morality, but it does not constitute morality. The formal constituent of morality according to St. Thomas, is consonance with reason. 113

Spinoza and Nietzsche made the former error. They, each one in his own way, rightly recognize that the final liberation of man, the spiritual liberation of man does not lie in the freedom of choice but in the freedom of autonomy. Moreover, they also appreciate that this freedom is in truth proper to God. However, both of them make a radical error attributing to man the power of divinizing himself by natural

means alone. For Spinoza, man is capable of divinizing himself by losing his nature in pure intellectuality, while for Nietzsche the superman can divinize himself through his Will to Power.<sup>114</sup>

vi. Conquest of Freedom:

Regarding this issue of the dynamism of freedom, Maritain emphasizes that the true answer must take account of two basic truths. The human person, being both person and human, has two forms of constraints or servitudes. As a person, he is subjected in the first place to realities other than himself. The specifying object of his intellect and his will is other than himself. Thus, he is, as a person subjected to, and necessarily determined by this Object. He is subjected in the second place to the laws which regulate his actions.<sup>115</sup> These two constraints have determined the human person, beyond his own choice, to the lowest degree of personality and to a precarious freedom of independence.<sup>116</sup> At the same time, the human person, as human, is involved in all the miseries and fatalities of material nature - the servitude and needs of the body, heredity, ignorance, selfishness, and the savagery of instincts.<sup>117</sup>

Corresponding to these two orders of constraints are man's two orders of aspiration for his liberation. On the one hand, there is in him what Maritain calls transnatural and metaphysical aspirations that emerge from him in so far as

he is a person.<sup>118</sup> This means that the person as person aspires to higher forms of freedom and independence, to a super-human freedom and to freedom pure and simple. This freedom, in Maritain's view, is not proper to man. It is proper to God alone, the source of Being and of all Goodness.<sup>119</sup> Man has no right to this form of freedom. Yet, he aspires to it according to the very inner desire of his personality. On this score, Maritain emphasizes that the human person, the created freedom, cannot pass to the supernatural condition by himself alone. He cannot, in other words, divinize himself alone. He must attach himself to God; for, "God being the perfection of personal existence and man being also, though precariously, a person, the mystery of the achievement of freedom is contained in the relation of these persons".<sup>120</sup> For that matter, the human person can attain the supranatural condition he aspires to, only through the grace of God.<sup>121</sup> This means that the dynamism of freedom is pursued by the human person aided by divine grace.<sup>122</sup> With this aid, the human person adheres by his intellect and will to always choosing the good.

Although this adhesion will be fully attained in the final beatitude when the person shall attain, through his intellect, wisdom and the full possession of spiritual life or freedom of exultation, and through his will, the plenitude of perfection love and freedom or autonomy, yet, even in his

temporal life, the human person can through the continual exercise of his free will aided by divine grace, attain a certain degree of this type of freedom of autonomy.<sup>123</sup>

According to Maritain, therefore, the human person can be divinized. He can attain to the freedom of autonomy which is divine in nature; for he has in him the transnatural aspirations. But the object of these aspirations transcend the realm of his proper nature. Hence to attain it, he must be aided or gratuitously elevated to a level above his proper nature. This aid is what Maritain refers to as divine grace.

By recognizing the initial freedom in the human person and his transnatural aspirations, and by putting emphasis on the initiative and the gratuitousness of divine grace vis à vis the attainment of freedom of autonomy on the spiritual level, Maritain's position differs conspicuously from that of Spinoza and of Nietzsche. His position is rather very similar to that of St. Augustine and the mediaeval Theologians who asserted that, "man cannot save himself by himself alone, nor begin by himself alone the work of his salvation, nor prepare himself for it by himself alone, and that by himself alone he can do only evil and error."<sup>124</sup> Maritain's position is nevertheless, also different from this one. His is not a theological but philosophical approach to the freedom of autonomy pursuant of the person's transnatural aspiration. We shall present here-below Maritain's doctrine on the

freedom of autonomy in accordance to the person's connatural aspirations.

In Maritain's perspective, the connatural aspirations of the human person emerge from him as a member of the human species. They, thus incline the person and the entire species to the liberation from the constraints arising from the human nature. In this respect, it must be recalled here that man as a corporeal being, as a 'political animal', is more destitute than any of the animals. Alone he can never stand; for, he can never satiate all his needs. The connatural aspirations incline or ordain him to repair his destitute condition in society with his fellows.

In saying this, I am far from suggesting that Maritain agrees with the Rationalists of the 17th and the 18th century. Because these posited the State of Nature and the existence of individuals prior to that of society, they naturally ran against the problem of the origin and necessity of society. For Maritain, as for all realists, this is not a problem. Man's need for society is connatural to him. His Sociality is, as Leo Strauss put it, tied to his being.<sup>125</sup> Thus, it is not a question whether or not society in general and political society in particular is necessary for the human person. Rather, the question is as to the form of political society which satiates the connatural aspirations of man and of the whole species. In other words, if the connatural aspirations

incline the human person to the pursuit of his temporal life in order to achieve freedom of independence from the miseries and the destitute conditions of the animal aspect of his nature, how must political society be constituted in order to enable the individual persons achieve this freedom? Must not political society be ordained to the pursuit of freedom? What kind of freedom?

Modern political philosophers, in Maritain's view, have seriously confused the two freedoms in building social life. Some have sought to build social life on freedom taken in the sense of freedom of choice while others on freedom, understood in their own way, as freedom of autonomy.

The political society which flourishes on freedom conceived as freedom of choice, is liberal or individualist. Since this type of freedom is something which every individual has by birth, the first insistence by individualists is that it be protected from external assailants. The second is that each individual must be allowed to make his choices and pursue his goals unhampered. The only provision is that there should not be any interference on any other individual's freedom.

In such a society, the state is naturally conceived as a neutral umpire who sees to it that each individual is left free to choose. This position has been summed up succinctly by John Locke, who is undoubtedly the most rigorous and consistent

liberal philosopher in the English tradition, in The Second Treatise of Government. The reason for the existence of the State or to use his own words, the reason why men join together in the "Social Compact" is the preservation of their lives, liberties and estates".<sup>126</sup> John Stuart Mill, Locke's countryman appealing to the principle of Utility in order to give the liberal philosophy a more solid basis, maintained that "the only freedom which deserves the name, is that of pursuing our own good in our own way, so long as we do not attempt to deprive others of theirs, or impede their efforts to obtain it".<sup>127</sup>

For both Locke and Mill, the serious problem of freedom and political authority cannot be avoided. Each individual is free to pursue his choices, yet within a certain legal context. Locke tries to explain this with the analogy of hedges. Thus, for him "Liberty is to be free from restraint and violence from others, which cannot be where there is not law."<sup>128</sup> Obviously, in whatever way one tries to explain away the problem of freedom and political authority, it must be kept in mind that as long as the freedom here implied is the freedom of choice or free will, the problem is bound to persist.

Rousseau, one of the greatest theorists of freedom in the liberal sense, thought that he overcame the problem once and for all. For him, the reason for the existence of

society is the protection of the individual freedom in the sense of self-government or autonomy. Left at this, it would appear as if Rousseau has escaped from the liberal camp. One might think, "he refers to self-government or autonomy, thus he is not building his political philosophy on the freedom of choice but rather on the freedom of autonomy!" But Rousseau emphasizes that the real problem of political philosophy is to find "a form of association which will defend and protect with the whole common force the person and goods of each associate and in which each, while uniting himself alone, and remain as free as before."<sup>129</sup> Rousseau has thus overcome the problem of freedom and political authority. But this is not without serious concessions. He has come out very clearly that the end of society is the protection of individual freedom. In order to achieve this, the society has no authority over the individual. The individual in society obeys but himself alone. The logical conclusion of this position is either anarchy pure and simple, with no law and order or a milder form of anarchy where the state and its institutions exist in order to protect the rights of the more freer or the stronger against the less freer or the weak. In either case, the whole is dissolved for the parts.

The other kind of political philosophy is the opposite pole of individualism. This is built on the concept of freedom of autonomy understood as "...a type of transitive action

which expresses itself in the production of material goods, and in their control."<sup>130</sup> Clearly, this is not exactly freedom of autonomy in the sense outlined above. Autonomy of what? Autonomy for what?

Obviously, it is not the individual person who is the subject of freedom. It is rather the political community itself, the state, that is the subject of freedom. In the place of the individual person, his freedom of choice, freedom of autonomy, this political philosophy substitutes the grandeur of the common task determined by the State as it courses through history. The State has therefore, some kind of dynamism of freedom.

Maritain maintains that Hegel is responsible more than any other single philosopher for developing this dynamic conception of freedom. He has embodied the concrete expression of this dynamism in the Freedom, and Power and Achievement that are incarnate in the State, and that come into being with the State and through its action.<sup>131</sup>

Although it is the State that is free in this Hegelian approach, yet individual persons are made to feel that they are free in order to continue spending their energy and initiatives to sustain the common undertaking. Moreover, a conscious effort is made to create myths and secular religion which substitutes for the spiritual life of the individual persons who develop personal reasons for offering themselves as sacrifices to social utility. The end result is what

Maritain calls "a Leviathan dominating the whole earth, to the freedom of which a multitude of happy slaves will gladly sacrifice their souls."<sup>132</sup> The logical conclusion here, is obviously the opposite of that of Liberalism; it is the annihilation of the individual by the whole, which is in turn destroyed; for without the individual person, there is no whole.

Because these political philosophies are built on the confusion of the two freedoms, they end up destroying the true freedom of the human person. Moreover, by divinizing the individual and the collective respectively, both political philosophies deny God. There is no place in their political philosophy for a second God. These philosophies are thus practically atheist. They also destroy the common good and the true nature of political authority.

The political society built on Maritain conception of freedom "has for its principle a conception of autonomy of the person that is in conformity with the nature of things and therefore 'theocentric'."<sup>133</sup> Such a society has a common good, - *bonum honestum* - of the temporal life. But since it is a society of human persons, who are directly ordained to the Absolute, the common good of the temporal society must also be ordained not directly as the person is, but indirectly, to the eternal good of the person. In other words, the common good of the temporal order is an intermediate end, not a final one.<sup>134</sup>

It is intrinsically subordinated to the final end of the human person. What does this mean?

The human person as we showed above has transnatural as well as connatural aspirations. The transnatural incline him to seek freedom of autonomy in common with God. The connatural ones lead him to seek freedom of autonomy in communion with his fellows in the political society. But since man's temporal life is not concatenated from his spiritual one but rather, lived and transcended to the eternal one, the integral quality of the temporal society is that it must be subordinated to eternal aspirations of the person. I call these aspirations eternal because they transcend the temporal order. They may be identified on both the spiritual and the temporal orders. On the temporal order the person aspires to truth, love, friendship, generosity and justice. All these are spiritual values which in themselves are necessary for the pursuit of the freedom of autonomy on the temporal order. These aspirations which Maritain has termed connatural stem from the person as human and they ordain it to overcome the constraints due to it from its nature as a member of the human species. On the other hand the person has transnatural aspirations which ordain it to overcome the constraints due to it as a person. Whatever the level, whether as a member of the species or as a person the aspirations transcend the ambient of the political society. It

will be shown in Chapter III how the common good of the political society must, by its proper nature be subordinate to these aspirations of the human person.

The political society, however, has its own proper end; and this end is neither that of conducting the person to his eternal domain nor of simply supporting the person with material advantages. The political society has the function of establishing social climate such as to secure for the person a standard of material, intellectual and moral life as will conduce to well-being of the whole community, so that every citizen may find in it a positive help in the progressive achievement of his freedom of autonomy.<sup>135</sup>

Although this freedom of autonomy, as it was shown above, finds its highest type in the saint, Maritain argues that it makes its appeal to men of all conditions. This is why, according to him any civilization whose common good refers to some kind of transcendent, necessarily aims at securing for the mass of its citizen, thus equipped, for the life of reason and virtue in the way of advancing towards perfect freedom and of achieving his eternal destiny.

Maritain's doctrine of the person and freedom reveals the profound mystery of the human person. It is true; the person is characterized by freedom of independence of autonomy. But the full understanding of this type of freedom not only determine the relation of the person, the created personality,

with God the Uncreated Personality; for, in realizing his freedom of autonomy on the spiritual order he must need help from God; but it also dictates the kind of society needed in order to provide the conditions for the realization of the connatural aspirations and the conquest of his freedom of autonomy.

## 5. Summary:

In this Chapter I have presented Maritain's doctrine of the human person. This presentation has, out of necessity, been very selective, focussing attention only on the themes which I deem to be salient to the present enquiry. The theme of individuality and personality is very central in Maritain's political philosophy; for, it answers many questions relating to how the person is both a part and a whole in political society. It also throws light on the issue of the nature of the common good as both an ultimate end of the political society in which the individual person plays his role as a part and as an intermediate or infravalent end to the absolute ultimate end to which the individual person is ordained as a person.

The theme of the person and freedom is equally central in the political philosophy of Maritain. Besides revealing more profoundly the nature of the person, it also lays bare the true goal of the political society. It is not the protection of freedom of choice as a datum on the metaphysical order. Nor is it the gaining of power and triumph over the material world. It is, rather, the conquest of freedom which is attained on the temporal order as that is the proper order of the political society. But this conquest must positively aid each individual to the attainment of his ultimate freedom of autonomy of the spiritual order.

But although these themes are very salient in Maritain's

philosophy, yet it was not my intention to treat them exhaustively. The theme of freedom, for example, particularly the intricacies of the free act, and the controversy of how that free act comes about, have deliberately been restricted to only the minimal necessary to appreciate Maritain's doctrine of the person and freedom. So also is the doctrine of personality and individuality; I did not dwell on Maritain's formal treatment of subsistence and the ensuing controversy.

Nevertheless, what has been presented here suffice to understand, within the scope of the present enquiry, the nature of man. It also is enough to clear the ground for understanding of the relationship between the person and the common good. This will be discussed in Chapter IV below. Before I do that, I shall present in the following Chapter Maritain's doctrine of political society and the common good.

1. RR. p. 195
2. FMW. p. 14
3. RR. p. 195
4. Ibid.,
5. RN. p. 3
6. T. p. 22
7. Ibid.,
8. SPP. p. 27
9. Ibid.,
10. RN. p. 3
11. PCG. p. 33
12. Ibid., p. 34
13. Ibid.,
14. Materia signata quantitate. Matter is understood here as a mere potency, or ability to receive forms and to undergo substantial limitation; in short an avidity for being.  
PCG. p. 35
15. Ibid.,
16. SP, p. 48
17. Ibid.,
18. PCG. p. 36
19. SP. p. 48 also PCG. p. 36
20. SP. p. 48
21. TR. p. 21
22. PCG. p. 38
23. St. Thomas, Cont. Gent. III, 20. Cited in E. Gilson, Being and some Philosophers, Toronto, Pontifical Institute of Mediaeval Studies, 1949, p. 181.

24. SP. p. 49.
25. Ibid.,
26. PCG. p. 38
27. PCG. p. 38
28. Sp. p. 49
29. Existence and the Existent, (1949); Degrees of Knowledge, (1931); Art and Scholasticism, (1937); Prayer and Intelligence (1943); Theonas (1922); Science and Wisdom (1940).
30. The Peasant of the Garonne (1968); Man and the State (1951); Person and the Common Good (1947); Rights of Man and Natural Law (1943); Scholasticism and Politics (1940); Principes d'une Politique Humaniste (1944); Integral Humanism (1936); Christianity and Democracy (1943); Freedom in Modern World (1933); Things That are Caesar's (1927).
31. SPP. p. 27
32. Ibid., p. 28
33. PCG. p. 30
34. Ibid., p. 41
35. DK. p. 430ff (1954)
36. TR. p. 20
37. SPP. p. 28
38. RN. p. 3
39. SP. p. 51
40. PCG. p. 40
41. PCG. p. 40
42. SP. p. 51

43. Individua substantia rationalis naturae: Boethius synthesizes together the two elements which uniquely distinguishes the person from other beings: Individua substantia refers to the subsistence of the being. Rationalis natura refers to the spiritual mode of subsistence of persons. Subsistence and spirituality are, therefore, the two elements of personality per se. In his metaphysical works where he is concerned with the person as such, to distinguish it from non-persons, Maritain has focussed his attention on the existing whole (tout subsistant) by emphasizing subsistence. (Cf. Degree of Knowledge pp. 231-236 where Maritain sees the metaphysical root of personality as being subsistence. He has a special treatise on the notion of subsistence. Cf. Degrees of Knowledge pp. 430-444 (1954).

But in emphasizing the aspect of subsistence in these works Maritain does not exclude the aspect of spirituality. It is also included in an implicit manner.

Maritain dwells more on the spiritual nature of the person in his socio-political philosophy. Here a need calls for such an emphasis. The issue here, is not simply whether or not the person subsists in the political society. Confronted on the one hand, with individualism, which confuses the person with the material individual and extols this individual above the common good of the political society, and hence destroying both the person and the common good; and on the other hand, Totalitarian regimes which lay an absolute claim on the whole person, crushing him by denying his transtemporal and transpartial qualities, Maritain realizes that what is at stake is the spiritual nature of the person. This is what he emphasized in his socio-political works without ignoring the subsistence of the person. Cf. The Person and the Common Good, The Right of Man and the Natural Law; Scholasticism and Politics.

44. PCG. p. 41  
45. SP. p. 51  
46. Ibid.,  
47. Ibid.,  
48. PCG. p. 42  
49. SP. p. 52.

50. PCG. p. 17
51. J. H. Walgrave, Person and Society, A Christian View, Pittsburgh, Duquesne: University Press, 1965, p. 98
52. RIV. p. 53
53. PCG. p. 41
54. DK. p. 113. Maritain treats this subject ex professo in his books: Reflexion Sur l'intelligence et Sur Sa Vie Propre, (1924); The Degrees of Knowledge (Distinguer pour Unir) 1932. In these volumes, Maritain exposes the deep mystery of spiritual knowing. Knowing, he says, is an active, immaterial superexistence whereby a subject is as a thing enclosed within one genus - as a subject existing for itself - but with an unlimited existence in which by its own activity it is and becomes itself and other things.
55. DK. p. 112. Cited from RIV. p. 53
56. SP. p. 95.
57. PCG. p. 42
58. SP. p. 50
59. Ibid., p. 51
60. "Two Catholic Critiques on Personalism" in Modern Schoolman, Vol. XXII, 1945, pp. 59-75
61. "Person and Individual", in New Scholasticism, Vol. XVII, 1943, pp. 231-350
62. "Individu et Personne" in Archives de Philosophie Vol. XIV, 1938, pp. 1-58.
63. PS p. 49
64. RC. p. 24
65. SP. p. 52
66. PCG. p. 43
67. SP. p. 52

68. PCG. p. 45
69. J. Croteau, Les Fondements Thomistes du Personalisme de Maritain, Ottawa, 1955, p. 59
70. Ibid., p. 134
71. SP. p. 51
72. Ibid.,
73. PCG. p. 70
74. Ibid., p. 71
75. RN. pp. 3-4 also SPP. p. 28
76. SPP. p. 29
77. FMW p. 30
78. SPP. p. 28
79. SP. p. 104
80. Ibid.,
81. SPP. p. 28
82. FMW p. 34
83. Ibid., p. 30
84. SP. p. 108
85. FMW. p. 31
86. Ibid., p. 32
87. EPT p. 257, PB p. 272
88. Ibid.,
89. FMW p. 3
90. Ibid., p. 31
91. PCG p. 50

92. FMW p. 4
93. Ibid.,
94. EE. p. 19, CT. p.
95. FMW. p. 4
96. Ibid., p. 5
97. Totius Libertatis Radix est in ratione constituta,  
FMW p. 5; EPT p. 266, PB. 284; St. Thomas, De Veritate,  
q 24, a 2
98. FMW p. 13
99. Maritain following the Aristotelico-Thomistic tradition  
distinguishes good as such and good as desirable. Good  
as such is being inasmuch as it is perfect or as it  
exists. It is one with being just as Unity, Truth and  
Beauty are all one with Being. They are the transcendental  
modes of Being. Good in the second sense "is qualified  
to move desire, either for the perfection it includes  
and which makes it desirable in itself - the good pro-  
perly so-called; good as an END in itself, that the  
School calls the *bonum honestum* - or for another good  
it will procure for us - the useful good, which is only  
a MEANS, - or for the pleasure we take in it or the joy  
we get out of it, - the delectable good, which is only  
an effect or a repercussion of the possession of a good.  
Rest in the good possessed". Cf. J. Maritain; Bergsonian  
Philosophy and Thomism, trans by Mabelle L. Andison in  
collaboration with J. G. Andison, New York, Greenwood,  
1968, p. 267 fn. 1:
100. SP. p. 96
101. SP. pp. 96-97
102. EPT. p. 267, PB p. 285
103. Ibid., p. 269; Ibid., p. 288
104. Ibid., p. 270; Ibid., p. 289
105. Ibid., p. 271; Ibid., p. 290
106. Ibid., p. 276; Ibid., p. 296.

107. FMW p. 30
108. SP. p. 107
109. RC. p. 5
110. SP. p. 108
111. FMW. p. 30
112. Ibid.,
113. Ibid., p. 33
114. FMW p. 33
115. SP. p. 107
116. SPP. p. 29
117. SP. p. 107
118. SPP. p. 29
119. FMW p. 36
120. Ibid.,
121. Ibid.,
122. Ibid.,
123. Ibid.,
124. IH. p. 11
125. L. Strauss, Natural Right and History, Chicago, University of Chicago Press, 1950.
126. J. Locke, The Second Treatise of Government, ed. T.P. Peardon, New York, Nos. 57 and 122.
127. J.S. Mill, On Liberty, Chapter IV
128. Op. Cit. No. 57
129. JJ. Rousseau, The Social Contract and Discourses, trans., and by GDH Cole, New York, Everyman's Library, 1968, p. 12.
130. FMW. p. 41

- 131.. FMW. p. 41
132. Ibid., p. 43
133. SPP. p. 33
134. FMW. p. 36
135. Ibid., p. 43

### CHAPTER III

#### MARITAIN'S DOCTRINE OF POLITICAL SOCIETY

The commonwealth is the affair of all the people, but the people is not any assembly of men gathered together in any fashion, but is a gathering of the multitude associated together under a common law and in the enjoyment of a common wellbeing.  
Cicero De Rep., 1, 25, 39

Since the beatitude of heaven is the end of that virtuous life which we live at present, it pertains to the king's office to promote the good life of the multitude in such a way as to make it suitable for the attainment of heavenly happiness.  
St. Thomas, De Regimine Principum, I, 15.

## 1. Introduction:

In formulating the mature form of his political philosophy, in Man and the State, Maritain recognizes as a primary need the correct restatement of the three concepts: Nation, Body Politic or Political Society, and State. For, in his view, the confusion that has existed between them, or the systematic identification of any two of these concepts has been a common-place and a woe to modern history.<sup>1</sup> This clear formulation, however, must be preceded by an appropriate distinction between community and society. This need arises from the fact that a clear understanding of those three terms presuppose the distinction of these two.

## 2. Body Politic, State and People

## i. Community and Society:

Although community and society may rightly be used synonymously as meaning ethico-social reality which is truly human and not merely biological, yet the two can and must rightly be distinguished. The former "is more of a work of nature and more nearly related to the biological"<sup>2</sup>. It may be referred to as the biologico-social datum unconsciously arising from the nature of man just as a "community" of bees is a biologico-instinctual datum intrinsically arising from the nature of bees. Society on the other hand "is a conscious work of reason set up in response to the more intellectual and spiritual properties of man".<sup>3</sup>

Viewed from the fact that social life as such, or human society has an object, the common object of their togetherness, the distinction can also be elucidated by focussing on their respective common objects. To this end, Maritain identifies the common object of a community as "a fact which precedes the determinations of intellect and will; a fact which creates, acting independently of intellect and will, and through a kind of unconscious psyche, common feelings, and psychological structures and common mores".<sup>4</sup> In this respect, social relations are defined, as it were, by the historical situations and environments. Ethnic and linguistic groups furnish good examples of community. They correspond adequately to the description above.

The object of society, on the other hand, is a task to be performed or an end to be aimed at and attained through the exercise of intelligence and will. The common object here, is extrinsic to the group and a rational choice is necessary for the personal commitment to this object. Likewise, social relations are determined more and more by the use of intellect and freedom. Labour unions, professional associations and the body politic are examples of society.<sup>5</sup>

ii. Nation:

Following the distinction of community and society, Maritain categorizes Nation as belonging to the order of community. He warns the reader, however, that Nation should not be confused neither with Race, Class nor Country. Nation refers particularly to the community of feelings rooted both in the physical soil of the origin of the group as well as the moral soil of their history. But this is not all. According to the very concept of Nation - from the Latin *nasci*, meaning to be born - a nation is only born when a community of people become aware of themselves as belonging to the physical soil of origin and history that has fashioned them. In this respect, they turn to themselves with a special love; love of the land and of their history as they actually know it or as they imagine it to be; and as instilling in each individual a general pattern of life.<sup>6</sup>

However, nation is as such, in Maritain's view, ace-

phalous; it lacks a ruling authority or a head. It may have elites and centers of influence but no juridical organization no common good, no civic friendship and no formal norms and order.<sup>7</sup> All these qualities belong essentially to a political society. Hence, since a Nation essentially lacks them, it stands on a completely different order from a political society. In fact, Maritain affirms further that the former cannot be transformed into the latter; it can only provide the propitious soil for a political society.<sup>8</sup> Once this has been established as a work of reason, it may progressively differentiate and identify within itself national groups of ethnic, linguistic and other origins.

### iii. The Body Politic:

In contradistinction to Nation, body politic belongs, in Maritain's view, to the order of society. From its birth, the concept of body politic has been confused with nation, society, and state. In modern times the confusion between body politic and state has grown enormously. Body politic in Maritain's view, is "a concretely and wholly reality, tending to a concretely and wholly human good - the common good."<sup>9</sup> This human whole is an accidental being, that is, it is a form of organization through which a substantial many becomes an accidental one, for the mode of unity which a thing has conforms to its mode of being. Thus according to St. Thomas, "many men are one nation, and many stones are one heap, which is a unity

of composition or order".<sup>10</sup> Maritain brings out this point home by remarking that "this whole, not being a substantial whole, like a living organism, but a community of persons and families ought to have regard for the more fundamental rights which natural law confers on the human personality and domestic society, otherwise it corrupts its own good".<sup>11</sup>

This human whole is not born of social compact; neither is it held together by the interests of the individuals as such. It has its foundation in nature but it is attained through reason; human reason exercised at the highest possible order. This is one of the reasons why the body politic is the "most perfect of temporal societies".<sup>12</sup> Its goal, the common good, is not a datum of nature as that of nature. It is, rather, something to be attained through intelligence and will.

The body politic is essentially pluralist. It identifies and unites various communities within itself; family, economic, cultural educational religious, and regional communities. All these are naturally sustained by and in the body politic. Likewise, since all these must be organized towards the common good, the notion of body politic includes that of authority. But this does not come from above the body politic. Rather, it comes from below; from the people. On this account, Maritain sees it as only normal that due to the natural pluralism of communities within the body politic, the authority in the body politic be made up of partial authorities rising like

tiers from the smallest community to the highest, the body politic itself.<sup>13</sup> This question of authority leads to the notion of the state.

iv. The State:

Maritain makes a sharp distinction between Body Politic and the State. While other authors have used these synonymously with an occasional subjection of the former to the latter, Maritain has parted company with this kind of usage. "The state", in his view, "is only that part of the body politic especially concerned with the maintenance of law, the promotion of the common welfare and public order, and the administration of public affairs".<sup>14</sup>

This part of the body politic is, admittedly, the topmost part. It is the highest embodiment of reason or reason embodied in institutions, structures and various artistic and lasting designs which man has created to serve the body politic. The State is thus the impersonal agency of the body politic. It is set up and sustained by reason. This is why Maritain protests strongly to any attempt of putting man at the service of the State, which is, in fact, his own creation. The state is thus inferior to the body politic.<sup>15</sup>

This notion of the State is instrumentalist. It stands at variance with the substantialist or absolutist conception of the state. This conception taking the state as the head of the body politic personifies it into a moral person and subject of

rights. But Maritain argues that this is a false conception. It is, according to him, a tendency which occurs in all human organizations. Often times those who specialize in the affairs of the whole have a tendency to substitute themselves for the whole. This has been the case with the substantialist theory of the State.<sup>16</sup>

Maritain notes that a part of the confusion of the State and the body politic can be traced to the very dawn of politics. For him, although the notion of the state was implicit in the ancient concept of City State which meant body politic, it was never disengaged from the latter. It only appeared in the course of modern history and thus it passed easily for the whole. Maritain thinks that the only lasting delimitation of the state will come when the body politic acquires full consciousness and renews its own structures so that the people can become more fully equipped for the exercise of freedom while at the same time the state is put in its proper place as an instrument of the body politic for the attainment of the common good.<sup>17</sup>

#### v. The People:

The notion of the people in its modern usage, according to Maritain, has a long history and stems from "a singular diversity of meanings which have fused together".<sup>18</sup> In itself, the notion is socio-ethical. It may be used to designate the whole multitude in the same way as the Roman notion of

*populus*. But it may and it has, in fact been used often in a sense similar to the Roman notion of plebs to refer to the low ranks of society; the underprivileged or the manual workers. In this latter usage the notion carries with it an implicit negative sense: the underprivileged.

Maritain, while recognizing this latter usage of the term, insists that it should not be limited to the negative value. In fact, even in this usage, Maritain demands that the positive value of the term should be accentuated. The concept of the people, according to him, while referring to the lower ranks of society, must include the positive element of a moral community centered on manual labour. He makes this point in the following:

By using the term moral community, I imply that the central characteristic I just mentioned - the function of manual labour - is enough to define the people. We must take into account a certain historical patrimony connected with labour, and made up of sorrows, efforts and hopes - the dimension of *past time* and memory comes in. - We must similarly take into account a certain common call as well as a certain inner moral behaviour - the dimension of *consciousness* comes in also - a certain way of understanding and living out suffering, poverty, hardship and especially work itself, a certain conception of how a man must help or correct another, look at joy and death, belong to the anonymous mass and have his name within it, a certain way of being "always the same ones who get killed".<sup>19</sup>

This description of the people is ethical-social in origin; not racial. Maritain remarks that at least where it is used today with this meaning of ethical-social, the concept of people is fused with a spiritual value derived from christia-

nity. It carries with it the idea of "the little people of Our Lord, or the people of the poor to whom the promise of the Beatitudes has been made, and who enjoy an 'eminent dignity' in the *Communion of Saints*."<sup>20</sup>

While the elements of spiritual, ethical and social have all fused together to contribute to the development of the concept of the people as a moral community the fusion has also yielded to unfortunate historical ambiguity. For, it is a fusion of values arising from the spiritual order with those belonging strictly to the temporal order holding a concept of the people which corresponds neither to the rather civic and national idea of *populus*, nor to that of the *plebs*, the underprivileged, the poor or the wretched. Maritain describes the consequences of this ambiguity in the following:

The result was what Auguste Comte would have called "a happy ambiguity" between the idea of the poor, the wretched, the disinherited, and the idea of husky worker. This ambiguity can give rise to spurious sentimentalism and romanticism, in so far as the first idea is considered a natural category in society, defined by the compassionate thrill or else by the resentment it awakens. It remains a well founded ambiguity in the sense that as a matter of fact the husky worker usually has no inheritance and is condemned to a condition of poverty (in which today's middle classes are sharing as well as the proletariat). Be it added that the greatest mass of men represents a mass of non privileged conditions of existence (which means, in the present state of the universe, not only poverty, but also, for a terribly large number of people, unernourishment, servitude and oppression).<sup>21</sup>

In Maritain's view, Marx did not only inherit this ambiguity; he actually worsened the confusion by identifying

the notion of the people with that of the proletarian class. This was a capital error, according to Maritain; for, "neither the concept of class - nor (and still less) the concept of race - only the broader concept of "the people", is possessed of a primordial social value on a genuinely human level"<sup>22</sup>.

As Maritain has applied it in his political philosophy, the concept of the people plays a very prominent role: "It is the highest and noblest among the basic concepts that we are analysing"<sup>23</sup>. "The people," Maritain says elsewhere, "are the very substance, the living and free substance of the body politic".<sup>24</sup> They remain "the great granary of vital spontaneity and non-pharisaic living force".<sup>25</sup> Employed in this sense, the concept of the people is with an august vocation: to bring about the realization of God's promises to these creatures. Maritain makes this point as follows:

Under the inspiration of the Gospel at work in history, the secular conscience has understood the dignity of the people and of the common man...people in the sense of the community of the citizens of a country, united under just law; people in the sense of the community of manual labor and of the stock and resource of humanity. In those who toil close to nature - ...the people make up the slowly prepared and fashioned body of common humanity, the living patrimony of the common gifts and the common promises made to God's creatures...and all the equal dignity and equal weakness of all as members of the human race.<sup>26</sup>

The people play a special role also in the establishment of the New Civilization, after the liquidation

of the Bourgeois Civilization. For, "the people in their rise to historical adulthood, are the human reserve of a new civilization"<sup>27</sup>. They are the kings of the new Civilization.<sup>28</sup> But in order that they may fulfil this vocation, the people need to be awakened; they need prophets.<sup>29</sup>

Maritain compares the role of the people in the personalist democratic society, the ideal of the new Civilization, to that of the Kings of the past ages. On this score, just as the Kings had great councillors around them, so also, do the people need "inspired servants". It is these inspired servants of the people who play the role of the prophets for the people and who evoke the slumbering spirit of the people. Maritain makes this point as follows:

The people are to be awakened - that means that the people are asleep. People as a rule prefer to sleep. Awakings are always bitter. Insofar as their daily interests are involved, what people would like no business as usual: everyday misery and humiliation as usual. People would like not to know that they are *the people*.<sup>30</sup> (italics in the text).

It will be enquired below<sup>31</sup> how the people control the exercise of their authority in the personalist democracy. This will demonstrate further the very prominent position, Maritain assigns to the concept of the people in his personalist democracy. They are a mass of human persons. Moreover "the actual quantitative fact of their constituting the mass is important here, for, it is within the mass that life takes root"<sup>32</sup>. However, Maritain is also quick to

separate the notion of the people from that of the *sovereign people* of Rousseau.

The people in Maritain's perspective are not sovereign; if sovereignty is to be understood as "a power and independence which are supreme separately from and above the whole ruled by the sovereign".<sup>33</sup> The people do not have an infallible reason which is transcendent to themselves, nor a will which transcendentally determines once and for all the criteria for virtue. Nor for the same reason, have they the power which is supreme. The people are a multitude of human persons. On this score, what has been said in the foregoing chapter about the human person may also be said about the people. Except it must be added that the people as a multitude of human persons each one called to supra-temporal end, are yet on a temporal level united by just laws and mutual friendship and are on this level pursuing a common good of their temporal existence. They constitute, thus, properly speaking the body politic. They have a natural right to self-government. They exercise this right upon establishing a constitution, establishing themselves into a body politic, making a law or electing their representatives to run the state.<sup>34</sup>

In electing the representatives who form the governing body and who run the state, the people invest them with the authority to governing them for a certain limited time.

They invest them not with their right of self-government but rather with the exercise of that right. The right of self-government, according to Maritain, remains permanently in the people; it neither ceases nor diminishes.<sup>35</sup> Thus, in the proper understanding of things, the administrative officials are deputies of the people. They exercise the people's natural right of self-government by forming the government which runs the state because the people have made them in the body politic, the representatives or deputies of the whole.<sup>36</sup> This is, according to Maritain, in perfect agreement with Lincoln's saying, "government of the people, by the people for the people".<sup>37</sup>

The concept of the people is the "highest and noblest"<sup>38</sup> of the basic concepts of Maritain's approach to the nature of political society. It is the people who are the living force of the body politic. But they are the living force of human persons who are ordained to a destiny beyond the temporal and who freely devoted themselves to the common good of the body politic. Considered from this angle, Maritain establishes a different dimension in the relation of the people, the body politic and the state.

The people, the multitude of human persons, all of whom are called to the attainment of autonomy on both spiritual and temporal orders, form the cradle of political society and political philosophy. Organized in their tem-

poral life under just laws and in mutual friendship and for the pursuit of their common good the people form the body politic or political society. But for the pursuit of the common good of this society, there is need of order, authority and power. Order to determine the hierarchy of ends and means; authority, to determine these for certain, and power to enforce law and order. Internally the state must protect the people's rights from egoistic interests of particular privileged groups and to bring about through various programmes the development of the people. Externally, the state must protect the people from threats of peace. Thus the power of the state shields the people both from internal and external enemies and brings about positively the conditions as to attain a certain level of material intellectual and moral life of each person as well as conduce to the well being of the whole. To ensure that the state does pursue this goal the body politic and finally the people must control it. In this hierarchy, the state is for the people while the people as a community of persons have a reciprocal relation with the body politic and its common good. We shall now delve deeper in Maritain's doctrine of the common good while we reserve the reciprocal relation to the fourth chapter.

### 3. Purpose of Political Society:

The purpose of political society, according to Maritain, is not "to ensure the material convenience of scattered individuals, each absorbed in his own well-being and enriching himself."<sup>39</sup> Nor is it the material achievement of the state or political power over other states. The purpose of political society or the body politic, its most essential task is rather, "to better the conditions of human life itself, or to procure the common good of the multitude, in such a manner that each concrete person, not only in a privileged class but throughout the whole mass, may truly reach that measure of independence, which is proper to civilized life and which is ensured alike by the economic guarantees of work and property, political rights, civil virtues, and the cultivation of the mind."<sup>40</sup>

But what is this "to procure the common good"? What is the common good? In Maritain's own words: why must it be ethically good-*bonum honestum*? Why must it be common? How does it differ from public good?<sup>41</sup> It is necessary to present here in summary form an analysis of both good and common in order, better to understand what common good is. A more detained analysis, however, does not pertain to the scope of the present thesis.

## i. What is the Common Good?

## a) Good:

It is in accordance to the Aristotelico-Thomistic tradition, in which Maritain is thinking out his political philosophy, that every good can be regarded as good from two different angles.<sup>42</sup> First as possessing a certain perfection or to the extent that it is being. Good in this sense refers to the perfection of being; and particularly to its first act of existing.

Two conclusions may be drawn from this first angle or regarding good. It may be concluded first of all that good in this regard is intrinsically related to being; it is actually the transcendental mode of being, for, everything that is, is perfect and thus good. But like being, good, in this sense is analogical concept. It is applicable to finite good as well as to infinite good, to created or caused good as well as to uncaused good; in other words to the participated good as well as the good *per se*. The second conclusion is that because good refers to perfection it is also the cause of any other perfection either in the same being if it is a limited being in the state of act and potency or in other beings in so far as it is in act either limited act or pure act. Whatever the case, good in this first sense refers to the formal cause of being, or good as existing, - existential good.

The second way of regarding good is insofar as it is an object of a being's desire, natural or elicited. Good in this sense is what satiates the desires of a being; it may be the final cause of the desire to be satiated or of the desiring being if the good saturates all the desires of the being. In this latter case it also provides the criterion or the term of the operations of the being in order to finally attain the good.

Two conclusions may also be drawn from this second way of regarding good as something desired by being. The first is that because good in this regard satiates the desire of a desiring being, this latter must be in potency for the good or the perfection it desires. Man, for example, has many desires because he is not a pure act; he has the potency to become more fully man. The second conclusion is that there must be a good to which all imperfect beings or all created being tend as to their final satisfaction. From this second conclusion good as desired may also be termed essential good; for, it is that to which the very essences of things are ordained as to their final cause.

These two ways of regarding good are certainly correlated. The existential good which is also the formal cause is also the final cause *finis causa* in the order of execution. On the other hand the essential good, insofar

as it is attained when the potency of the being has been fully realized is also the final effect *finis effectus*.

But *finis causa* and *finis effectus* are correlated in the same way as the good as desired and the good as enjoyed or good as essential and good as existential and finally as potency and act.

b) Common:

Common as used to qualify good here above, is opposed to individual which as such carries with it the connotation of indivisibility, uniqueness, or incommunicability; it refers to universality in which many participate. The commonness, the character which defines the whole of participation is multifold. It may be a name, for example which is common to many things described by it; an essence of many individuals which retain unity but which realizes this essence in an existential diversity; or it may be an idea or knowledge through which many minds know the same thing. Thus, a name, an idea or an essence may be common to many things; they refer to a multitude sharing one quality or many united somehow. The commonness or the character which brings about the unity is necessarily communicable to all the individuals of the multitude.

## c) Common good:

It is obvious from what has been outlined about good and about common that common good may be understood in two ways.<sup>43</sup> In the first, a good is common in the same way an essence is common. The specific nature of human beings, for example, is common to all the individual human beings, it is one and the same essence, although it is existentially multiplied in the individuals. In like manner a good may be common if it is the natural desire of many individuals or the perfection to which the specific nature of the species tend. It is a common good because it is essentially the same for all the individuals of the same specific nature although it is existentially achieved and enjoyed by the individuals. This common good is also an immanent good in the same way as the common nature is immanent.

Secondly, a good may be common by being the end or the perfection to which a multitude is ordained. The common good on this score is a separate common good. It is in this sense that St. Thomas and Maritain refer to God. According to St. Thomas "the supreme good, namely, God is the common good, since the good of all things depends upon him; and the good whereby each things is the particular good of that thing".<sup>44</sup>

According to Maritain, the common good of political society fulfils these two definitions of common good. It is both immanent and separate. It is a proper common good in essence, although existentially it is enjoyed by individuals. It is immanent in the very nature or essence of the multitude of human persons which is united by the common nature. On the other hand the common good of political society, to be realized at any moment is a goal to which the individual persons are drawn as to their temporal ultimate end and the attainment of their connatural aspirations. It is in this respect a separate common good.

Evidently, therefore, the common good of the political society is most properly a common good; it satisfies the two aspects of common good. As a common good, naturally communicable to both the whole multitude and the individuals, the common good differs substantially from both the private goods of the individual as well as from a public good.<sup>45</sup> It is also different from the supreme separate common good in the sense that this latter is supremely separate; it is not immanent to the essence of the individual created beings although it is the cause and final end of all. It is thus obvious that the common good of political society which truly comprises the two meanings of common good may henceforth be properly referred to simply as common good while all other common goods

will need to be qualified. With this understanding of common good it may be asked now as to what constitutes the common good.

ii. Two Historical Errors:

Two extreme errors, in Maritain's perspective, have been unleashed in delineating the common good. The first, which may be called individualist, reduces the common good to the collection of the individual goods. The body politic, for this error, does not have its own *raison d'être* or form of existence. Rather it has a service value which is to supervise and protect the goods of the individuals who are conceived as "self-sufficient beings". Such a conception dissolves the society for the individual parts. The result is either anarchy pure and simple or "the old disguised anarchistic conception of individualistic materialism in which the whole function of the city is to safeguard the liberty of each; thus giving to the strong full freedom to oppress the weak".<sup>46</sup> The second error may be termed totalitarian.<sup>47</sup> The common good is conceived as the good of social whole. This is best illustrated by the Hegelian ideal of the state, the divine representative of the absolute morality itself: The individual persons are completely submerged in the social whole and they are only as parts in a machine. Thus, the person is sacrificed for the whole and there is no genuine common good.

## iii. Maritain's concept of the Common Good:

For Maritain, the common good is neither the collection of the individual goods nor the good of the social whole. It is "common to both the whole and the parts into which it flows back and which, in turn, must benefit from it."<sup>48</sup>

Since it must recognize the transcendence of the person as such and its primordial right to belong to communities within the body politic; communities which are more primitive than the body politic, the common good must necessarily include within itself as a principal value, the highest measure of the distributive qualities which are compatible with the whole. Such are for example, the person's life as a person, his liberty of expansion and the communication of generosity consequent upon this expansion.<sup>49</sup> This reveals a unique nature of the common good as such; that is, because it must necessarily include these qualities which in themselves are transcendental to the political society, it naturally implies an intrinsic ordination to a standard that transcends it. Thus, as it was shown above, it is both immanent to the persons as well as separate from them.<sup>50</sup>

The recognition of this intrinsic ordination of the common good to a transcendent standard exposes the falsity of Madariaga's formula: "The citizen is for the state and the state is for man".<sup>51</sup> This formula suggests that the final goal of the state is man understood as a material individual.

Conceived in this way, the final good of the state is in man and thus, we are back to the individualism of the form "man is the measure of things". For Maritain, however, the final good of the state lies outside of both the state and the individual man. It is only on this score that the common good can, in fulfilment of its own nature and that of the person, flow back upon the persons.<sup>52</sup>

What then constitutes the common good? What must it include? In the following passage which deserves to be cited *in toto*, Maritain makes a *quasi* exhaustive enumeration of what must be included in the common good.

...That which constitutes the common good of political society is not only: the collection of public commodities and services - the roads, ports, schools, etc...; which the organization of common life presupposes; a sound fiscal condition of the state and its military power; the body of just laws; good customs and wise institution, which provide the nation with its structure; the heritage of its great historical remembrances, its symbols and its glories, its living traditions and cultural treasures. The common good includes all of these and something much more besides - something more profound, more concrete and more human. For it includes also and above all, the whole sum itself of these; a sum which is quite different from a simple collection of juxtaposed units. (even in the mathematical order, as Aristotle points out, 6 is not the same as 3+3). It includes the sum or sociological integration of all the civic conscience, political virtues and sense of right and liberty, of all the activity, material and spiritual riches, of unconsciously operative hereditary wisdom, of moral rectitude, justice, friendship, happiness, virtue and heroism in the individual lives of its members. For these things all are, in a certain measure, communicable and so revert to each member helping him to perfect his life and liberty of person. They all constitute the good human life of the multitude.<sup>53</sup>

Emerging from this description of the common good are the basic intrinsic properties of the common good. It is the *totum bene vivere* of mankind on this earth.<sup>54</sup>

The last statement is in agreement with the Thomistic-Aristotelian tradition in which Maritain is operating. According to this tradition, all beings aim at some good. Political society is a being, in fact it is the highest and most comprehensive of human societies. It thus aims at the highest good. This is the common good, the constitutive formal aspect of the body politic. It is therefore, a good in itself, what is termed in the Thomistic tradition, *bonum honestum*.<sup>55</sup>

But this good, in itself, is not the absolute good or the absolute ultimate end of the persons that constitutes the political society. It is rather the ultimate temporal good; one which is not only material but which is also and preeminently moral and spiritual; for being the good of human persons, it must be, in agreement with the nature of the human person both moral and spiritual.<sup>56</sup> Finally, being common to both the whole and the parts, the persons into whom it flows back and who must benefit from it, the common good implies essentially an order of justice.<sup>57</sup>

It is imperative at this juncture to examine these three fundamental characteristics of the common good in order to shade light on the following questions: why is the common good necessarily a moral good *bonum honestum*? How and why is

it both a final end in itself and an intermediate end to the absolute ultimate end of human person? Why must the common good be intrinsically an order of justice? Let us examine these properties of the common good separately.

## 4. Properties of the Common Good:

In Maritain's perspective, human society and its common good can only be fully understood upon the understanding of the nature of man, his dignity, the spiritual and eternal aspirations immanent in him and which surpass, by reason of what is highest in him, both the life and conditions of temporal society.<sup>58</sup> For this reason the common good is neither simply the material good useful to the state; if it were only that, it would naturally cease to be a good common to the whole and the persons who constitute the whole. We may recall here, what St. Augustine has observed about material things.<sup>59</sup> They constitute a divisive force. Material things alone would not be able to unite the persons; instead, supposing they were made the common good of political society, they would destroy both the state and the human persons.

## i. Moral:

Maritain argues that the person does not need society only for his material needs of bread, shelter and clothes, but also and especially for his higher intellectual dimensions which cause and sustain the political society; his work of intellection and volition. He needs society in order to be elevated to a certain degree of perfection in his moral development. In this respect the common good of political society in proportion to the person must be moral. Thus the

person as social unit and as a moral whole is likewise a mirror of the whole. By the same token, the common good which must naturally flow back to the person must be moral.<sup>60</sup>

Nor is the common good only a collection of utilities and advantages which further the private goods and well being of the individuals. The common good, like the body politic, must have a qualitative, not only quantitative difference from the collection of individual utilities.

Obviously, these two positions of conceiving the common good either as a collection of the material goods useful to the state or as collection of utilities advantageous to the individuals, corrupt both the nature of the person as well as that of the political society - the assembled multitude of persons. The common good of the political society must conform to the nature of the political society. It is a good of the assembled multitude of human persons in their temporal life. It must intrinsically imply a life both morally right and good for the whole multitude. It must also imply in its intrinsic nature a redistribution to the individual persons who constitute the political society.<sup>61</sup> It is thus common to both the whole and the parts and it is morally good; for it must be proportional to the moral nature of the persons to whom it is redistributed.

To be more precise, since the persons that make up the body politic are moral wholes pursuing by their intellect

and freedom, a moral end, the temporal ultimate end, the common good in which the persons engage fully, cannot but be a moral good. However, it is not a moral good in the narrow sense of the individual morality. Maritain remarks that besides individual morality and the morality that governs the family or the domestic society, there is properly speaking the morality that concerns specifically the good of men assembled in political society. This good is an essentially human good, measured above all by reference to the ends of the human person.<sup>62</sup>

Being a moral good, a good proper to the nature of the human person, and the ultimate end of the body politic, the common good insures the welfare, vigour and peace of the whole while helping the individual persons in a positive manner to progressively attain their freedom of expansion and autonomy which embodies above all the acquisition of higher levels of moral and intellectual life and what Maritain calls the "immanent interior activities which are the intellectual and moral virtues".<sup>63</sup>

Saying that the common good is the ultimate end of the body politic and at the same time a means for the individual persons to acquire virtues and live well brings us to deeper scrutiny of the common good in relation to the absolute ultimate end of man; to the common good as both an ultimate end and an intermediate end to the absolute ultimate end of men. Two

points come to mind here. First of all, the purpose of the political society is the good human life of the temporal order. It is thus, an end in its own order and in its own right. It is in fact the ultimate end of the political society.

According to Maritain, the subordination of the common good of the temporal order to the spiritual realm of the person arises from the fact that the human personality has two aspirations whose very nature ordains the hierarchy of the orders. It has aspirations, on the one hand, which come from it as human or as "constituted in such a species." These aspirations are connatural to man and "specifically human". On the other hand, it has aspirations which may be called transnatural; for, they are embeded in the human person as person and they refer to its participation in the transcendental perfection which is personality as realised in God.<sup>64</sup>

The subordination may also be argued from the doctrine of freedom. For Maritain, civil society is essentially ordained to the common good of the temporal order which provides the true earthly life of man, which life is both material and moral. But for this common good to be genuine, it must by its very nature be subordinated to the eternal goods of the person. Thus it is clear, since one of the basic eternal goods is the achievement of freedom of autonomy on the spiritual order that the common good must be subordinated to this. This is the reason why Maritain considers the common good as an in-

intermediate end.<sup>65</sup>

The second point is connected as a concession to the first. Although the good life on the temporal order is a good life of human persons united in the body politic, yet, this good life is not the absolute ultimate end of human person. For, the human person is ordained, not to the temporal order, but to a destiny superior and transcendent to it; he is directly ordained to God. Thus, it is imperative that the ordination of the persons to the temporal common good intrinsically though indirectly imply a reference to the absolute ultimate end of the human person.<sup>66</sup> This is indirect reference because primarily the aim of the common good is the temporal end, which includes among other things the positive aid to the persons to pursue their conquest of freedom of independence and autonomy in their temporal life. But since this conquest of freedom is not final but only a gateway to the conquest of freedom at the temporal ultimate end, the common good necessarily indirectly "wills" or aims at the absolute ultimate end of the persons. Thus while the common good is an ultimate end, it is also intermediate to the absolute ultimate end of the person.<sup>67</sup>

This subordination of the common good to the absolute ultimate end of the human person is truly a fundamental character of the common good as an ultimate end of the political society. Maritain calls it an infravalent end,<sup>68</sup> for by its very nature the common good of the city or of civilization in

order to preserve its true nature as a common good of human persons must naturally be subordinate to the order of eternal goods to which the human person is subordinated. It is a fundamental character of the common good because it uniquely defines it as both an ultimate end in the temporal but also as an end which is naturally infravalent to the absolute end of the person.<sup>69</sup>

Noteceably, therefore, the common good is not simply a means. It is in its own right an end; an ultimate end for that matter, of the civil life. Nor is it a closed end. It is on the contrary an open end. Open in the sense that through it the person reaches out to the attainment of the absolute ultimate end. Thus the common good is both an ultimate end, ultimate in a relative sense and in the temporal order; for it is also a means to the absolute ultimate end of the person. Before we terminate this study of the common good as being necessarily moral, we must emphasize two points in connection with the infravalent nature of the common good.

The first concerns the spiritual realm to which the common good is subordinate. Maritain mentions in Man and the State that we are here faced with the law of the primacy of the spiritual.<sup>70</sup> But then it is a question whether he means the spiritual as revealed in Christianity. In one of his earlier works which appeared before he had engaged himself formally in political philosophy, Maritain hinted the answer

in referring to the hierarchy of orders and saying that the temporal order, *la cité est tenue d'assurer à ses membres les conditions d'une droite vie morale, d'une vie proprement humaine, et de ne poursuivre le bien temporel qui est son objet immédiat qu'en respectant la subordination essentielle de celui-ci au bien spirituel et, éternel, auquel chaque personne humaine est ordonnée.*<sup>71</sup> In a more recent work,<sup>72</sup> he makes it clear that although the common good includes values which are supra-human by the very fact that it serves indirectly the ultimate end of man, yet these supra-human aspects are neither properly theological nor are they essentially Christian. He affirms that the intrinsic subordination refers above all else to the supernatural beatitude to which the human person is directly ordained. However, he is quick in arguing that this supernatural beatitude is not only known through revelation. He identifies it in more or less the same way as Aristotle who has remarked that the common good is greater and more divine than the private good.<sup>73</sup>

Maritain refers to the natural law, the rule of justice and the requirement of fraternal love as spiritual things which are natural to the human person and to the civil society.<sup>74</sup> Thus, in pursuing a life in agreement to these spiritual goals the civil society arms the individual persons with a natural beginning towards the pursuit of contemplation. In short, the spiritual aspects inherent in the common good do not pertain to the theological faith but to what Maritain calls the secular.

faith or creed which constitutes the Democratic Charter.<sup>75</sup>

The second point is a corollary of the first. Because the common good is both an ultimate end in itself and an intermediate end towards the absolute ultimate end, the whole man is engaged in the common good of the civil society.<sup>76</sup>

In order to attain the common good of the whole society, each person engages in the common action of the body politic in his entirety. However, this entire engagement is not like that of the engagement of a mere part to the good of the whole. Rather, it is the engagement of a moral whole in its totality as a part of the civil society whose common good, while being an ultimate end in itself is nonetheless a means though not a pure means for the persons as persons to attain their absolute ultimate end. This engagement of the person in his entirety to the common good poses the question of the common good as being necessarily an order of justice. We turn to this question now.

### ii. Justice:

In referring to the dynamism of the body politic towards attaining the common good, Maritain stresses that the common good is what it is only on condition that it is according to justice and moral goodness.<sup>77</sup> Thus, justice according to Maritain is not only a primary condition for the existence of the body politic; it is also fundamental for the assurance of the continual conditions of the existence and daily

operations of the whole, made up of persons. At this juncture, it is a question as to what exactly is justice according to Maritain.

In order to grasp the full significance of Maritain's conception of justice and its relation to the common good, it may be recalled that two extreme errors emerged in the nineteenth century political philosophy. The one regarded the state as merely a legalistic institute having neither moral character nor moral end. This error was nurtured by liberal philosophy. The main purpose of the state for this philosophy minimized, to the extent of destroying, the common good.

The other error, which is Hegelian in origin, elevates the state to an absolute moral end and character. The state lives and reigns in an absolute moral character because it exists as an embodiment of all morality.<sup>78</sup>

These two extreme errors have made their reappearance in the contemporary scene.<sup>79</sup> The modern Marxian position is similar to what has been caricatured by Thrasymachus in Book I of Plato's Republic, that justice is simply the law of the stronger. For the modern Marxists, the stronger is the most dominant, economic class. The laws, religion and culture are accordingly those of this dominant class. Obviously, this notion of justice is false from its very basic assumptions of the nature of a man as *homo economicus*; and from the assumption that society is constituted by classes

of conflicting economic interests.

For Maritain, as for St. Thomas, justice is at once ethical and religious. It is the rectitude of the person and of the assembled multitude together with its instrument the state which must function in the best possible way in order to attain the common good. Because this common good must be communicable to the whole as well as to the persons that make up the whole<sup>80</sup> it is essentially distributive. It includes as its principal value the access of persons to their liberty of expansion.<sup>81</sup> Here is where Maritain's conception of justice as an intrinsic condition of the common good differs from John Rawls' notion of justice. For, although Rawls argues that we are rationally committed to acting justly by our very nature as persons, yet due to his conception of man as simply egoistic individual, his notion of justice leans very much if not exclusively on commutative justice. He emphasizes the reciprocal recognition by the members of the community; a community of rational egoists, pursuing similar and completing interests but none of which counts on getting his way against all the rest. Here, there is no obligation for the state to act justly towards the individual members.

For Maritain, justice includes all the Aristotelian divisions of the virtue as elevated and restated with the light of Christian inspirations by St. Thomas.<sup>82</sup> The virtue

of justice in its general form and in its particular forms as legal, distributive and commutative justice, is, for St. Thomas, directly the concern of the state. Other virtues only so far as they are actually related to the common good and to justice. Maritain reiterates this position by emphasizing that the common good essentially requires the development of the virtues for the persons that make up the body politic and an essential integrity of life, the good and righteous human life of the multitude, of the various communities within the body politic and of the entire political society. Thus, "social life aspires by nature" to be woven according to the same laws of integrity, of justice and of love of neighbour, which presides over the moral development of our personality. According as they apply to the person or to society, these laws assuredly involve diverse modalities: their substance remains the same; and their rigor also.<sup>83</sup>

To the extent that justice presupposes original rights justified by rules or laws, it differs from generosity, benevolence or any other virtue for that matter. This is also why in order to organize the multitude of human persons towards the common good, the state has as its final cause the *ordo juris*, the order of law and peace. The task of the state as legislator and judge is to establish social conditions which "will secure for the mass of men such a

standard of material, intellectual, and moral life as will conduce to the well being of the whole community".<sup>84</sup> Rommen says this differently, although it amounts to the same thing as what Maritain is saying. For him the task of the state is to develop, to protect and to preserve through legislation the order of justice and peace.<sup>85</sup>

But what holds the assembled multitude together in their pursuit of the common good is not only law and justice. It is true that there are absolutely necessary. For, "justice and law, by ruling man as a moral agent and appealing to reason and free will, deal as such with personality, and transform into a relation between two wholes - the individual and the social - what would otherwise have been a mere subordination of the part to the whole".<sup>86</sup> Yet, this is not enough. Justice and law alone cannot bring about the full conquest of freedom. According to Maritain, justice and law are necessary in establishing and guaranteeing the structure of the political society. For its vital dynamism and the internal creative force, however, love is absolutely necessary. In this connection, Maritain argues that love is the only one proper way of peace and unity. He distinguishes love or friendship from charity and emphasizes that although the former can effect this union and fellowship between men, on account of their common nature, same suffering and same natural dignity, yet the roots of strife are too strong for

this blend of bond. There is need for higher bond, a love in God and for God. It is, according to Maritain, this love or charity above which can open the heart to love all men because coming from God who first loves us, charity desires for all men the same divine good. This quality of the political society and its common good does not stem from the enforcement of law and order. What gives the common good its uniquely human and personalistic character is the proper life of persons, "of the gift of self which that life implies, and of free generosity whose source is in the depths of the heart"<sup>87</sup>. This means, in short, good will, a relation of mutual respect and love between persons and between the person and the community. Before leaving this subject of the common good, it is imperative to expose another concept which Maritain has associated closely with it.

iii. Authority:

In the book, The Rights of Man and Natural Law, Maritain mentions that the common good is the foundation of authority.<sup>88</sup> He affirms that it is necessary that some individuals be charged with the authority of guiding the whole towards the common good. Yves Simon makes the same point in arguing that given the fact that every community wills the common good and given also the fact that for any single community there may be a multiplicity of ways of attaining the common good, authority is absolutely essential for uniting

the community for a common action towards the common good.<sup>89</sup>

In delineating what exactly authority is, Maritain distinguishes it from power. "Power", he remarks, "is the force by means of which you can oblige others to obey you" while, "Authority is the right to direct and command, to be listened to or obeyed by others."<sup>90</sup>

As viewed by Maritain, authority means right. This means that, since the human nature can only be preserved and developed in a society, which society necessarily implies the existence of the state or government with a function to command and govern towards the formation of social and political virtues necessary for the attainment of the common good, then this function is naturally a demand of the Natural Law, implying a right to command and to govern.<sup>91</sup>

This right of authority belongs inherently and permanently to the people.<sup>92</sup> Nevertheless, for the vital operation of a large and more differentiated body politic, a need arises to designate a few people to exercise authority for the people. When this happens, the small group have the right, for they receive it from the multitude of the people, to command and to be obeyed by reason of conscience for the sake of the common good.

It is thus in Maritain's perspective that authority in the body politic comes from below; from the people who in turn receive it from the Author of Nature. In other words,

the relation of authority among men proceeds from Natural Law. On this score, it is intrinsically connected to justice.<sup>93</sup> For just as it is according to justice for the body politic to be organized by the government, so also is it in accordance to justice for those few who run the government to be invested with the authority and to be obeyed. It is for the same reason that Maritain emphasizes with St. Thomas that "unjust authority is not authority, as an unjust law is not law."<sup>94</sup> Because the authority is just or right it necessarily demands obedience. But does this fact of some people commanding and others obeying suggest inequality of men in the body politic? What is human equality in Maritain's view?

iv. Equality:

Obviously, what has been said above in connection with justice and friendship is incomplete without Maritain's conception of human equality if one wants to understand fully his doctrine of the common good. He ties together the three concepts - justice, friendship and equality - by observing that justice to a certain extent restores equality, thereby making civic friendship possible.<sup>95</sup> Bringing this point home, he presents the following text of St. Thomas which knits together the three concepts effectively.

Friendship is a certain union or society of friends, which cannot exist among persons remote from one another but has as its prerequisite that they have access to equality. Hence, it pertains to friendship equally to use the equality which has been previously established; but it pertains to justice to lead unequals to equality. When this equality has achieved reality, the task of justice is performed. Thus, equality is a final end as regards justice, but a principle as regards friendship.  
(St. Thomas in VIII, Ethic, Lect. 7)<sup>96</sup>

Maritain develops the doctrine of equality fully in a little work entitled Human Equality. Although that is the title of the work, yet he notes at the very beginning the need to substitute this expression with another which brings out more effectively the philosophical content. For the expression, human equality lends itself rather easily to two forms of difficulties. The first is that, although theoretically the content of the expression is philosophical, yet as it stands, equality suggest a comprehensive treatment so that a philosopher would only do full justice to it by referring to such diverse forms of knowledge as biology, psychology, anthropology, sociology and politics since all these contribute enormously to what makes the concrete man in political society. The second difficulty stems from the fact that the concept of equality connotes mathematical overtones which may obscure the real philosophical issue. For these reasons, Maritain has chosen to speak of unity of human nature rather than human equality, although practically for him, the two expressions are purely and simply synonymous. Yves Simon arrives

at the same conclusion as Maritain in delineating the concept of human equality. For him, however, rather than analysing the expression as Maritain has done to expose the difficulties associated with it, he sums up the conclusions by stressing that to ask whether men are essentially equal in spite of all the accidents which cause inequality among them, is the same as to ask whether there is one human nature common to all men.<sup>97</sup> What then does the expression unity of mankind mean for Maritain?

According to Maritain, "the term unity of mankind is the Christian name, and the truest name of the equality in nature between men. It helps us to justify the idea of that equality from all erroneous associations and implications, whether they arise from a geometric imagination or from a passion for levelling".<sup>98</sup>

This equality in nature among men includes a recognition of the concrete communion in the mystery of the human species; a mystery which is hidden in the heart of the individual and of the concrete, in the roots of the substance of each man.<sup>99</sup> Yves Simon argues out the same point by saying that the features that make up the universal human nature exist in the state of individuality. This means that human nature exists in John. And also in Paul as identical with the individual reality with Paul. Yet Paul and John are not identical.<sup>100</sup> The reason is what Maritain formulates by

echoing St. Thomas as interpreted by Cajetan. He says, "Every man is a man in his very essence, but no man is man in essence".<sup>101</sup> This means that no single human individual can realize in a comprehensive and exhaustive manner the human nature. Yet, by the fact that each individual realizes this human intelligibility, all men are one in nature. They are all equal.

But according to Maritain, the unity of mankind also includes the individual inequalities which arise from the very equal nature. While recognizing these two aspects of the unity in nature, he emphasizes, nonetheless, that it is the equality which is primordial; the inequalities are secondary. As this Christian view focuses on the unity of the human nature, it does not suppress or level the inequalities. Rather, it recognizes and develops them. "Christianity" affirms Maritain, "fearlessly asserts the necessity of these inequalities; it respects them, furthers them, favors them, for it knows that as long as they remain normal the inequalities, which lend variety to human life and intensify the richness of life's encounters, in no way injure the dignities which befit the unity of mankind and the rights which are grounded on this unity".<sup>102</sup> On account of the fact that this Christian position both recognizes the equality of nature and allows for the individual inequalities it is as Maritain terms it a Christian realism.

Against Maritain's doctrine of equality, there are two extreme errors. The one, which Maritain calls pure nominalism or empiricist<sup>103</sup> and which grounds the philosophy of enslavement is represented by "cheap Nietzschean, Machiavelianist, rightist-Hegelian or rightist-positivist leaders of modern politics."<sup>104</sup> Their error does not lie in their emphasis on the inevitability and necessity of individual inequalities between men. Rather, their error consists precisely in making their differences the only reality. Thus, they brush aside the ontological rational nature which is the same for all men, the source of their dignity, rights and equality, and which subsists and sustains the individual differences. This position lends itself to spreading the philosophy of enslavement because once the ontological nature of man is denied, there remains but unequal secondary traits. There may be biological and hereditary or social. But according to these traits, some men may be and are actually superior by physical strength, intellectual capacity, moral or social status. Accordingly, the weaker in any of these aspects would easily be enslaved by the stronger. Thus, the nominalists regard equality as a mere myth. It is in Maritain's perspective anti-Christian.<sup>105</sup>

The second error which lies on the opposite pole of the first one is idealist. It is represented by "cheap Rousseauist, enlightenmentist, Tolstoyan, leftist Hegelian or

leftist positivist leaders of modern politics".<sup>106</sup> These are naively egalitarian. They conceive of the unity of human nature as "the unity of a subsisting idea, of Man-in-himself, existing outside time, and of whom all individuals involved in concrete life are merely shadows without substance; in their eyes this realized abstraction is reality itself."<sup>107</sup> In a way, this position is quite hypocritical. While the inequalities on the physical, intellectual, social and political raise their cry and hurt themselves at them, these politicians play the ostrich. They neither heed to their cry, loud enough to wake the dead, nor do they see the glaring inequalities. "Against such inequalities" Maritain retorts, "the idealist who legislates for the Man-in-himself sets up a practical denial: they should not exist; the Man-in-himself cannot be unequal to himself; his essential dignity is outraged each time one individual is unequal to another and, in short, each time one individual differs from another".<sup>108</sup> Thus, the error of the egalitarian idealist is precisely in locating all the human substance in the abstract species alone.

Maritain's position indicates the truth of the unity of mankind against both of these extreme errors. In juxtaposing his position - the Christian realism to the idealist egalitarian or Pseudo-Christian positions, he marks their distance neatly in saying:

To affirm the equality of nature between men is for idealist egalitarianism to wish that all inequality among them should disappear. To affirm the equality in nature between men, or the unity of human nature is for Christian realism to wish that those fruitful inequalities, whereby the multitude of individual participates in the common treasure of humanity, should develop themselves. Egalitarian idealism interprets the word equality on a plane surface; realism interprets it with the dimension of depth as well.<sup>109</sup>

In applying his doctrine of the Unity of human nature to social and political philosophy, Maritain develops fully what he means here by the "dimension of depth".<sup>110</sup> He notes as one of the essential aspects of a right social and political organization a need for the unity and equality in nature to spill over to social and political equality. However, although this form of equality is based on the first, yet Maritain warns us of the temptation of comprising the two. Racial equality according to him is an "expression or development of the unity and equality of nature on the social order". Here, Maritain is consistent with his doctrine of the political society as a reality different both from the individual persons that constitute it and from the mere sum of the individuals. Thus, the social equality is the natural equality as recognized and sanctioned by society in defining the fundamental rights of the human person; in the proportional equality which is justice itself and which directs social custom to treat each individual according to his merits; and in political equality where all men are equal before

the law. Thus, social equality is intrinsically associated with justice in all its scope; another proof why the common good is intrinsically a moral good and intrinsically in the order of justice.

In pursuing social equality, Christian realism views certain social inequalities as stemming from natural inequalities or as required by them and others as of social origin. As to the first group, Maritain sees it as a principle that the individuals who by "innate or acquired" superiority must necessarily render more service to the society. In return, it is also just and equitable that they must receive more. It is in this respect that Maritain remarks that the more a man has, the more he should receive.<sup>112</sup> However, he stresses strongly that the excellence of some individuals is not for their own glory and egoistic pursuits but rather for the service of the whole. This point is inherently connected with that authority for the society. For in Maritain's view, and here he echoes Aristotle and St. Thomas, those in society who have been gifted with a higher intellectual capacity have a duty to lead the society.

Besides these social inequalities stemming from the natural inequalities, there may be in society inequalities of social origin. While these may be expected from the need of internal differentiation in the society, a need which is quite natural, allocating advantages to individuals who perform

certain duties, yet, Maritain warns us that such inequalities can easily turn into a perversion of political life. It is possible for some individuals to perform duties which they are not competent to perform but which they have assumed either through inheritance for example an imbecile king, or elected to rule by an ignorant class of people. In either case, they enjoy the advantages which are attached to these duties. Society must guard against such inequalities; for they can easily turn into a perversion if the beneficiaries of these advantages get drunk with the power in their incompetent hands pursue oppressive measure for those under their authority.

It is evident, therefore, that the doctrine of human equality is of capital importance in Maritain's political philosophy. It not only founds other doctrines like equality, human rights, particular justice all of which pertains to the essence of the political society; it also provides the principles for the existential relations of the various individuals, and communities within the body politic. The doctrine emphasizes how equality is primordial while the inequalities are secondary. To use Maritain's allegory, equality lies at the root and inequality rests in the branches. Hence, there is to be a new kind of equality which is realized in the fruit.<sup>113</sup> This results from the vital interaction of the entire justice, love, good faith and compas-

sion. In short, the true nature of the political society can be vitally realized only through the devotion and commitment of persons as persons to the common good.

## 5. Summary:

In this chapter I have tried to make a brief exposition of the salient features of Maritain's doctrine of political society. This is brief both in extension as well as in comprehension. It serves the purpose of understanding only the points in which Maritain takes an undisputable distance, in the meaning he gives to the various concepts, from other political philosophers. But even this purpose is not exhaustively pursued in this chapter. I discussed these salient features only to the extent they enable me to enquire how Maritain's doctrine of the state is applicable in identifying the adequate political philosophy for the New Civilization.

As seen above, the concept of the people plays a very basic role in Maritain's doctrine of the political society. In his view this concept has various meanings. The meaning he gives it in his political consideration refers to the multitude of human persons who are united by just laws and mutual friendship in order, by their communal action, to pursue the common good of their temporal life. Being a multitude of persons, the people, like the person, have a vocation to goods which transcend their temporal existence; goods such as truth, virtue, amity and charity.

The people have a natural right to self-government and full autonomy in pursuing their common good. They form the body politic when they become conscious of this right and or-

ganize themselves through a constitution or by making laws which conduct them to the attainment of the common good. This task of the body politic demands an agency that is endowed with authority and power. It is the body politic that sets up the State, the uppermost political agency.

Maritain's concept of the State is instrumentalist. It is the people who organize themselves in the body politic and it is thus, they who set up the State to serve them. For this reason, those who form the government and run the State are not masters of the people. They are, rather, the deputies of the people. Their chief duty is not to govern the people but to lead them, to educate them by existing with them and by continually evoking their slumbering spirit so that they can govern themselves.

What makes the common good and the State, whose concern is the attainment of the common good, uniquely what they are, is that they embody in their very nature the vocation of the people they serve; the vocation as mentioned earlier, to goods which transcend both the state and the common good. These latter must be subordinated to the absolute ultimate end of the people.

Obviously, Maritain's doctrine of the civil society is intrinsically suffused with the christian inspiration. His way of justifying the various concepts, for example, the dignity of human person, the people, equality, and common good,

draws heavily from the christian inspiration. He does not make bones of it; he says that it is the best way of justifying them. But is this the only way of justifying them? Does Maritain make allowance for other ways of understanding and justifying these concepts and the doctrine of the body politic as a whole? Supposing it is the best, what principles can we draw from it in relating the person to the common good? In the following chapter I shall discuss this last question while the others will be put aside for further reflection.

1. Man and the State, p. 1
2. M & S, p. 2
3. M & S, p. 3
4. M & S, p. 3
5. M & S, p. 4
6. M & S, p. 5
7. M & S, p. 6
8. M & S, p. 6
9. According to the Oxford Dictionary, Body Politic made its headway in legal and political philosophy in the 16th century. At that time, the Nation with corporate character was termed the Body Politic in relation to the Sovereign King - the head of the corporate body. In 1532-38, for example, King Henry VIII is referred to as the supreme Head and King who ruled over a Body Politic which owed him a natural and humble obedience. (Act. 24, Henry VIII, XII). Hooker who described law as the deed of the whole body politic (Ecclesiastical Policy, 1593) seems to have tried to delineate the term from both Nation and state. Later writers especially jurists used all the three terms as synonymous. The word state according to story, for example, means the whole people, united into one body politic; and state and the people of the state, are equivalent expressions. Joseph Story, Commentaries on the Constitution of the United State, Boston, 1851, I, p. 143
10. M & S, p. 10
11. M & S, p. 10
12. M & S, p. 11
13. M & S, p. 12
14. M & S, p. 13
15. M & S, p. 14
16. M & S, p. 24

17. Ibid.,
18. MS, p. 26
19. RR, p. 122
20. RR, p. 123
21. Ibid.,
22. RR, p. 123
23. MS, p. 26
24. MS, p. 26
25. RR, p. 123
26. CD, pp. 48-49
27. RR, p. 135
28. MS, p. 140
29. MS, p. 139
30. MS, p. 142
31. Chapter VI
32. RR, p. 123
33. MS, p. 25
34. Ibid.,
35. Ibid.,
36. Ibid.,
37. Ibid.,
38. Idem, p. 26
39. Idem, p. 54
40. Ibid.,

41. Maritain distinguishes common good from public good by showing that only societies whose social unit in a moral whole can properly speaking have a common good. This is what he says: "In an animal society, the *individual* is not a person; hence, has not the value of a moral "whole" and is not a subject of right. If the good of the whole profits the parts, as the good of the body profits its members, it does not in the sense that it is turned back or *redistributed* to them. It is merely in order that the whole itself might subsist and be better served that its parts are kept alive or maintained in good condition. Thus, they partake of the good of the whole but only *as parts* of the whole. Indeed, how could it be the good of the whole without thereby profiting the parts which compose the whole (except when it requires the sacrifice of this or that part which then spontaneously exposes itself to peril, as the hand to save the body, because by nature it loves the whole more than itself, cf, Cajetan, in I, 60, 5)? Such a good is a common good in a general and improperly social sense. It is not the *formally social* common good, with which we are concerned in this paper. It is common to the whole and to the parts only in an improper sense, for it does not profit the part *for themselves* at the same time as *for the whole* according to the characteristic exigencies of a whole constituted of persons. It is rather the proper good of the whole-not foreign to the parts, to be sure, but benefiting them only for its own sake and the sake of the whole.

This kind of common good of an animal society is analogically a *bonum honestum* (reached *materialiter et executive, sub directione dei auctoris naturae*), but in its proper order to be truly common good and to attain, as common good, the character of *bonum honestum*, implies redistribution to the persons as persons."

42. According to St. Thomas to the extent that a thing exists it is good *omne ens in quantum est ens est bonum*. Sum. Theol. I, 53. On the other hand to the extent that a thing is desirable is good. *Omne enim ens in quantum est ens in actu est quodammodo perfectum, quia omnis actus perfectio quaedam est. Perfectum vero habet rationem appetibilis et boni.* Sum. Theol. I, 5, 3. The concept of desire here is extended by St. Thomas to include "not only the appetites of beings endowed with sense-perception or with reason, but also the tendencies exhibited by beings altogether without knowledge, yet he is well aware that in the proper sense of the term most things do not "desire" the good,

but rather tend by nature to some determinate goal which their creator desires for them" cf. Sum. Theol. I, 5 art I note 6 (Blackfriars). See also The decision of good into the worthy, the useful and the delightful in Sum. Theol. I, 5, 6. Maritain refers to these divisions in Bergsonian Philosophy and Thomism, trans by M. L. Andison in collaboration with J. G. Andison, New York, Greenwood 1968, p. 267 fn. 1. Also a very lucid study by M. J. Adler and W. Farrell, "The theory of Democracy", in The Thomist Sheed and Word, Vol. III, No. 3 (July, 1941) to Vol. VII, No. 1 (January, 1944). In particular Vol. III No. 4 where M. J. Adler and W. Farrell make a very detailed and enlightening study of common good. See also Note 108 of chapter II above.

43. Maritain describes what constitutes the common good of political society in The Things that are not Caesar's, 1939, p. 140, fn. 3; The Rights of Man and Natural Law, 1943, pp. 7-11; and The Person and the Common Good, pp. 49 ff. and Man and the State pp. 54 ff. His treatment is relevant to the socio-political issues he is concerned with, and thus it is a practical approach to the common good. In The Things that are not Caesar's, for example, he has the following to say about the common good: "This common good (*communicatio in bene vivendo*) is a different thing from the mere aggregation of particular goods, and is not the peculiar good of a whole which (like the species, for example, compared with individuals) relates only to itself and sacrifices the parts to itself; it is the common good of the whole and its parts, a good which integrates particular goods in the whole so far as they are communicable (externally, in the natural manner of human communication here below), and as it is itself communicable to the parts-whether the material prosperity of the State be in question or its intellectual and moral patrimony. And this whole, not being a substantial whole, like a living organism, but a community of persons and families, ought to have regard for the more fundamental rights which natural laws confer on human personality and domestic society. Otherwise it corrupts its own good". Maritain is not concerned here or in his other socio-political works with the common good as such or with the divisions of common good. This does not mean, however, that he is not aware of the divisions of the common good. Nor of the theoretical analysis of the common good. He makes a reference of this type of treatment in the first chapter of The Person and the Common Good and also appreciates I. Th. Eschmann's work on the person and the common

- good in St. Thomas: "In defense of Maritain" The Modern Schoolman, St. Louis University, 1945, Mai pp. 192 ff.
44. Summa Contra Gentiles, III, 17. Cited by MJ. Adler and W. Farrell in Op. Cit. Part II p. 601.
  45. See note 41 above.
  46. PCG p. 50. See also FMW pp. 39 ff.
  47. RN pp. 11 ff.
  48. PCG p. 51
  49. Ibid.,
  50. SP. p. 86
  51. S. De Madariaga, Anarchy or Hierarchy, New York Macmillan, 1937, p. 89. According to Madariaga, "the finality of an individual as a man and his subservience to the State as a citizen are perfectly compatible: for, the State serves man in the realm of aims and values and is served by him in the realm of means and functions."
  52. "The end of the terrestrial State is the *totum bene vivere* of mankind on this earth; a temporal good; no doubt, but one which is not only of the *material* order, but also and pre-eminently of the *moral and spiritual* order." TNC p. 127.
  53. PCG pp. 52-53. See also IH. p. 216 and Sp. p. 56
  54. TNC p. 127
  55. PCG p. 53. "The common good is something ethically good. Included in it, as an essential element, is the maximum possible development, here and now, of the persons making up the united multitude to the end of forming a people, organized not by force alone but by justice". See also IH pp. 216 ff.
  56. TNC p. 127
  57. Justice and moral righteousness are thus essential to the common good, RN. p. 10 and elsewhere: "The common good is at once material, intellectual, and moral, and principally moral, as man himself...Justice and civic friendship are its cement". RR. p. 142.

58. M & S, p. 148
59. Epist., Xciii.xi
60. PCG, p. 49 fn 28
61. Ibid.,
62. RR, p. 143
63. RN, p. 44
64. SPP, p. 29
65. The common good of civil life is an ultimate end, but an ultimate end in a relative sense and in a certain order, not the absolute ultimate end": MS, p. 149. Hence, "both society itself and its common good are indirectly subordinated to the perfect accomplishment of the person and his supra-temporal aspirations as to an end of another order". M & S, p. 148.
66. Ibid.,
67. Ibid.,
68. MS, p. 62. See also PCG, p. 62
69. PCG, p. 62
70. M & S, p. 150
71. Trois Reformateurs, 1925, p. 33
72. PCG, p. 63
73. (Eth. 1, 2, 1094 b 7) Yves Simon brings out very clearly the full significance of the comprehension and extension of Aristotle's dictum. "Greater" interprets Simon, "Expresses a higher degree of perfection with regard both to duration and diversity". "Divine", he continues, "as translating the Greek theion, does not designate so much a godlike essence as a participation in the privilege of imperishability." Thus, the common good is more perfect both as regards quality and duration. It is also divine in the sense that while all material individuals come and go in fulfilment of the law of generation and corruption, yet the human species transcend this law by the fact that it is an incorruptible species consti-

tuted of immortal persons.

Yves Simon, "Common Good and Common Action", Review of Politics, XXII.

74. MS, p. 112. This point will be of paramount importance in the last chapter of this study. It will contribute to demonstrating how Maritain's political philosophy, though thought out in a Christian environment, can have an application to cultures which are not Christian.
75. MS, p. 148
76. PCG, p. 53
77. PCG, p. 54
78. FMW, p. 41
79. PCG, p. 90 ff. Maritain mentions here the three contemporary problems which are based upon a materialistic conception of life and the world. All of them liquidate the true nature of the human person either by "dissolving it to anarchy or, as inexorably happens under pressure of political necessities by subjecting it to the social body as number, economic community, national or racial state". In a way, the three political problems as identified by Maritain is a reappearance of the nineteenth century liberalism and Hegelian totalitarianism as identified by Rommen Heinrich and these will always continue to be the major problems that every political organization must guard against.
80. PCG, p.
81. PCG, p. 55
82. S.T. II - II, q. 61, a.1
83. IH, p. 215 - 16
84. FMW, p. 43
85. Rommen, H.A., The State in Catholic Thought, London, Herder, 1944, p. 329
86. RN, p. 35
87. SPP, p. 35
88. RN, p. 9
89. Review of Politics, XXII, 1960, p. 223

90. M & S, p. 126
91. M & S, p. 126
92. MS p. 25
93. M & S, p. 127
94. Ibid.,
95. RT, p. 28
96. S. Thomas, in VIII, Ethic, lect. 7, cited in RT, p. 28
97. Philosophy of Democratic Government, p. 197
98. RT, p. 21
99. RT, p. 17
100. Yves Simon, Op. cit., p. 200
101. RT, p. 20
102. RT, p. 20
103. RT, p. 2
104. RT, p. 2
105. RT, p. 2
106. RT, p. 10
107. RT, p. 11
108. Ibid.,
109. RT, p. 21
110. Ibid.,
111. Ibid.,
112. RT, p. 24
113. Ibid.,

CHAPTER IV

MARITAIN'S POLITICAL PERSONALISM

## MARITAIN'S POLITICAL PERSONALISM

Cum enim unus homo sit pars multitudinis,  
quilibet homo hoc ipsum quod est, et quod habet,  
est multitudinis, sicut et quaelibet pars id  
quod est est totius. Sum. Theol., I-II, 96, 4.

Homo non ordinatur ad communitatem politicam  
secundum se totum et secundum omnia sua...  
sed totum quod homo est, et quod potest et habet  
ordinandum est ad Deum. Sum. Theol., I-II, 21, 4 ad 3.

S

## 1. Introduction

The foregoing two chapters bring us to what Maritain calls the typical paradox of social life.<sup>1</sup> This is a paradox which arises from relating the person to the common good of political society. It has arrested the attention of every scholastic philosopher who has ventured to grapple with scholastic personalism. In a peculiar way, it has constituted a very central point of focus in Thomistic political philosophy. For it is a capital doctrine in the Thomistic tradition that, on the one hand, the person is that which is most noble and most perfect in all of nature,<sup>2</sup> and on the other hand, the common good is greater and more noble than the private good of the individual person.<sup>3</sup>

Moreover, following the same tradition, Maritain emphasizes that the human person naturally seeks communion with its kind, partly on account of its indigencies and partly on account of its abundance in existence. Pursuant of the former, the person needs political society which provides it with the temporal adequate conditions and the goods essential to satiate its needs and to attain its plenitude. As for the latter, the person, being naturally a whole, aspires to unite with other wholes in political society in spiritual exchange of intellect and will,<sup>4</sup> and thus communicate its very superabundance in being, life, knowledge and love.<sup>5</sup>

The paradox thus arises from this seeming antinomy in the relation of the person to the common good. It may be summed up in this way: Is the political society for the individual person or is the individual person for the political society and its common good? Which, in other words, commands supremacy over the other: the person or the common good of political society?

The present chapter is an effort to present Maritain's doctrine on the matter in question. The first part of the chapter dwells on his doctrine of the person and the common good while the second deduces from the first the principles of political personalism according to Maritain.

## 2. The Person and the Common Good:

Maritain seeks the solution of the "typical paradox" of social life through the application of his metaphysical distinction of personality and individuality.<sup>6</sup> He affirms in his earlier works<sup>7</sup> that when this distinction is applied to the relation of man and the political society, it contains on the metaphysical level the solution for many social problems.<sup>8</sup> But his approach to the problem has not rallied all the Thomists behind him. In fact, there has been a prolonged controversy among Thomists on account of Maritain's approach to the problem.<sup>9</sup>

Walter Farrell, while recognizing as a serious problem in scholastic personalism the place of the person in rela-

tion to the common good, does think, nevertheless, that this question should be delineated from Maritain's distinction of personality and individuality as two separate issues. The solution of the former, in Farrell's view, does not depend on the validity of the latter.<sup>10</sup>

For Maritain, there are no two questions, one of the person and the common good and another of the distinction of personality and individuality. The only problem is that of the person and the common good. In Maritain's perspective, however, this problem arises from the fact that man is in his entirety an individual and in his entirety a person.<sup>11</sup>

Maritain emphasizes that the person is naturally social and political and that the common good of civil society is essentially human. For this reason, it is illusory, in his view, to pose the problem of the person and the common good in terms of either separation or opposition. It must rather be posed in terms of reciprocal subordination and mutual implication.<sup>12</sup> For man can only become what he is and has, metaphysically, by subordinating himself to the group. At the same time, the group attains its goal as a human society only by serving man and by recognizing that man has secrets which escape the group and a vocation which the group does not encompass.<sup>13</sup>

## i. Reciprocity of the person and the common good:

Maritain views both the person and the common good each in its own way, as both a whole and a part. As for the person, it is a fundamental Thomistic thesis, according to Maritain, that the notion of the person is inherently tied to the notion of the whole. It is, moreover, an analogical notion. Its supreme analogate, the pure personality which stands at the summit of personality,<sup>14</sup> individuality,<sup>15</sup> subjectivity,<sup>16</sup> is God.

The notion of society, too, implies a whole. Its social unit is the person.<sup>17</sup> But the notion itself of society is also an analogical term. It is predicated by the analogy of proper proportionality to human society, angelic society and divine society. All these societies have the person as their social unit and a common good for the whole society which is necessarily communicable to the members. However, they differ precisely because these aspects which are common to them all, intrinsically and formally in each of them, are yet only present in each in the proportion of its being.

The concept of society is also applied to animal groups. This application is, nevertheless, according to the analogy of improper proportionality; for although in animal society there may be found some form of community, hierarchy of function and duty, yet, these are only instinctual. The social unit is not a person and the society

has only a public good which is not a common good; for it is not communicable to the members of the group. This society is the lowest analogate on the scale of the analogy of society. The members are not, like those of human, angelic or divine society, moral wholes which govern the independence due to a spiritual mode of existence.

The supreme analogate of society on either level of predication is the society of Divine Persons.<sup>18</sup> It is this society that accomplishes the mystery of society of persons: a whole of wholes, whose common good is absolutely identical to the good of the members.

Maritain locates human society on the analogical scale between the supreme analogate - divine society, and the lowest one - animal society. Being placed therein, human society shares aspects of both. On the one hand, human society like divine society is composed of persons. But on the scale of personality, the human person is on the lowest scale of the analogy of personality; infinitely inferior to the Divine Person. For the human person is no more pure personality than it is pure intellect.<sup>19</sup> It is a person individualized by matter. Consequently, just as it is at the lowest level of intellectual or spiritual being, so also is it at the lowest level of personality.<sup>20</sup>

But common to animal societies, the human

society is constituted of material individuals which, due to their mode of individuation, are not only members but are also parts of the whole.

Although human society shares certain aspects in common to both divine and animal societies, it differs substantially from both of them. While divine society has a common good which is absolutely identical with that of the members, and while animal society lacks a common good, a human society has both a common good and private goods of the individual members. In other words, while divine society is a substantial whole made up of wholes or persons which exist as pure act and while animal society is an accidental whole constituted of parts, material individuals, which only exist within the species and for the species; human society is an accidental whole made of wholes which are also parts for they are both spiritual and material. Maritain makes this point in the following text:

Human society is located between these two (divine society and animal society); a society of persons who are material individuals, hence isolated each within itself but nonetheless requiring communion with one another as far as possible here below in anticipation of that perfect communion with one another and God in life eternal. The terrestrial common good of such a society is, on the one hand, superior to the proper good of each member but flows back upon each. On the other hand, it sustains in each that movement by which it strives toward its own eternal good and the transcendent Whole; the same movement by which each goes beyond the order in which the common good of the terrestrial city is constituted.<sup>21</sup>

It is thus clear from the foregoing discussion that the human person and the common good have a mutual relation as wholes.

But while they are mutually related to each other as wholes, the human person and the common good have also a relation of mutual subordination as parts.

We are here concerned with the question of order which in the Aristotelico-Thomistic tradition is twofold: one is the order of parts to a whole and the other is the order of things to an end. In the first, the whole unites the parts which serve the end of the whole and thus are subordinated to the whole. This is the case with the individual person as a member and part of society. Maritain refers to this type of order of the human person in society by citing St. Thomas in affirming that "Each individual person is related to the entire community as the part to the whole".<sup>22</sup>

In the second, as things are subordinated to the end they serve and as means are ordained to their end, so also is an end of a lower order subordinated to that of a higher order. This is the case with the subordination of the common good which is a temporal good to the ultimate absolute good of the person which is a spiritual good.

Maritain makes this point in the following:

Human life has two ultimate ends, the one subordinate to the other; an ultimate end in a given order, which is the terrestrial common good, or *bonum vitae civilis*; and an absolute ultimate end, which is the transcendent, eternal common good. An individual ethics takes into account the subordinate ultimate end, but directly aims at the absolute ultimate end; whereas political ethics takes into account the absolute ultimate end but its direct aim is the subordinate ultimate end, the good of the rational nature in its temporal achievement.<sup>23</sup>

It is obvious therefore, that "man is not ordained to the body politic according to all that he is and has... but all that man is, and can, and has, must be referred to God."<sup>24</sup> Hence the private goods of the person as individual are subordinate to the common good and this latter to the absolute ultimate common good of the person as person. It is in this respect that Maritain demands that the problem of the person and the common good be posed in terms of reciprocal subordination and mutual implication.<sup>25</sup> In other words, the human person and the common good are related mutually and reciprocally as parts and as wholes. The following formula sums up the reciprocity of this relation:

...just as the person requires society both on account of its abundance or as a person, and on account of its poverty or as an individual so the common good, by its very essence directs itself to the persons as persons and directs the persons as individuals to itself.<sup>26</sup>

Walgrave arrives at a similar formula in discerning the reciprocal relation of the person and the common good.

"The person", he says, "is as much the end of society as the society is the end of the person".<sup>27</sup>

The foregoing discussion leads to the enquiry of the supremacy of the common good over the private good of the individual person and that of the person's absolute ultimate common good over the common good of the temporal society.

ii. Supremacy of the Common Good:

The common good has superiority over the private goods of the individual person or the good of the individual citizen in the scale of terrestrial values which rate the citizen as a part of the political society.<sup>28</sup> This is so because in its temporal life the individual person is a part of the civil society. The civil society is the whole and it is accordingly more perfect than its parts.

It must be recalled here that the body politic has an existence proper to itself. True, it is the assembled multitude of individuals, nevertheless, its existence as well as its temporal endurance is both distinct and separate from the existence of any one or more

of its members, though certainly not from all of them at any given time or in any given place. Having an existence of its own, and being the most perfect of human societies,<sup>29</sup> the civil society in accordance to the Aristotelico-Thomistic principle that every being aims at some good, aims at the highest good on the temporal order. This is the common good which is also the constitutive formal aspect of the body politic.<sup>30</sup> On this score, the common good has primacy over the private goods of the individual person as a part of it.

Maritain emphasizes that this primacy is over the person as a material individual and as a constitutive part of the body politic. For as it was remarked above the entire man though not by reason of his entire self and all that he is and has, is a part of the political society.<sup>31</sup> The key word here is the entire self. In another place Maritain argues that, as far as the body politic has moulded the individual person, he owes to the body politic, by that very token, not only what he has but also what he is. He is justly subject to the temporal society and its common good.<sup>32</sup>

This subordination of the individual person to the common good is demonstrated in practical terms in that the person is duty bound in justice to risk its own existence for the salvation of the whole when the whole is in danger.<sup>33</sup> Two points need to be clarified here. The first regarding

the existence of the individual person which is called upon to serve the temporal society. This existence is not one of the material individual; it is the very existence and dignity of the human person; for, whether considered as a part of the temporal society or as a person ordained directly to God, man has but one being: it is the spiritual being of his soul. But it is a question, and this brings us to the second point, as to the nature of the common good. Why does the common good, the good of the temporal society deserve to lay claim on the dignity and spiritual existence of the human person?

In Maritain's perspective, the common good is only a common good in so far and to the extent that it is a human good; it is proportionate to the nature and dignity of the person. It includes in it suprahuman values and it is indirectly related to the absolute ultimate end of man.<sup>34</sup> It includes as a part of its essential trait the service of the human person.<sup>35</sup> This is why Maritain continually insists in saying that the common good must in justice flow back over or redistribute itself to the persons who constitute the body politic. Also, and this will be made clear later, in so far as the person as such transcends the political society, the common good will only be human and deserving of the life of the person if it helps or ordains the person towards his absolute ultimate end.

Maritain's argument on the supremacy of the person to the common good will be presented below. But already here it can be seen that the supremacy of the common good over the individual person is at the same time the supremacy of the person over the common good. Implicitly the common good is superior to the individual good only because it is the common good of the multitude of human persons. Thus, it emerges clearly that the doctrine of the supremacy of the common good over the individual good, according to Maritain, is at the same time the doctrine of personalism which establishes the hierarchy of common goods.

While this personalism recognizes the supremacy of the common good of the temporal society over the individual good, it establishes at the same time the infravalency of this common good to the intrinsic common good of the universe of created things. But this is not the end. The recognition of the superiority of the common good of the universe of created things calls at the same time for a recognition of the transcendent separate common good of all created things to which all other common goods are subordinate and subservient. With this hierarchy of common goods it follows according to Maritain that since the person as such is ordained directly to the transcendental common good, it is by that very fact superior to the common good of both the temporal society as well as the intrinsic common good of

the universe of created things. Obviously, therefore, the supremacy of the common good is the supremacy of the spiritual which in turn implies the supremacy of the personal.

iii. The Supremacy of the Person over the Common Good:

The common good, as we have just seen, draws its supremacy and ethical sense from the human person who serves it freely and gives his life generously for it. In itself, the common good is terrestrial; for as Maritain remarks, the body politic has no immortal soul.<sup>36</sup> It is the human person which has an immortal soul. It is the person that is constituted as such with the spiritual soul, made for eternal life before it is constituted a part of the human society.<sup>37</sup> Consequently, it is a whole superior to the body politic and its common good.

On account of its constitution by a spiritual soul the human person is accordingly ordained directly to God as to its absolute ultimate end. Its spiritual fatherland, as Maritain puts it, is the whole order of goods having an absolute value.<sup>38</sup> In this respect the human person by its ordination to God, who is its transcendent separate good, transcends every created common good, both the common good of the political society and the intrinsic common good of the universe. The logical conclusion from this ordination is that ~~the~~ human person commands supremacy over the common good of civil society.

Arguing that the person commands supremacy over the common good of both the civil society and the intrinsic common good of the universe, Maritain does not succumb to the error that De Koninck attributes to personalists, Maritain not excluded.<sup>39</sup> Maritain is very far from suggesting that the person is directly ordained to God only as the common good of the universe of nature. Maritain is rather saying that the human person is ordained to God in His infinite perfection as a Person. Here is how Maritain puts it:

...though God is the "separated common good" of the universe, the intellectual creature is related primarily as to the object of its beatitude, not to God as the common good of the universe of nature and creation, but to God in the transcendence of His own mystery; to God as Deity conceptually ineffable, expressible only in the uncreated World; to God as common good of the Divine Persons and of the souls which have entered by participation into the universe of the Deity.<sup>40</sup>

It follows thence that the relation of the human person to God is one of the created to the uncreated personality or that of created freedom to the uncreated freedom.<sup>41</sup> On this score, man as a person and God as a person have a common good: the very nature of the Holy Trinity. It is for this reason that the human person commands supremacy over the common good of the temporal society as well as that of the whole universe of nature.

Obviously, at this level, the question is no longer between the private good of the person and the

common good of political society; but rather the proper good of the human person, its subjective good is identical with the objective good of the entire universe.<sup>42</sup>

We are faced here with the law of the constitution of being. As it was shown above, both the body politic and the human person have separate being. Man is being both as a person and as a member of the body politic. But he is constituted in his being as person, a whole directly ordained to eternal life before he is constituted a part of the human species. Before, in this context, does not suggest temporal precedence. Rather, it refers to ontological priority.

On the essential level, although admittedly the soul receives its being in substantial composition with matter, yet it does receive it directly and communicates this same being to the composite. This composite pursuant of its material origin, carries with it the mark of a part. Thus constitutionally, the person as person, governing its spiritual existence and ordained to God, is prior to its constitution as social. But even on the existential level, while man is naturally social and political and thus he naturally enters into communion with his fellowmen in constituting the whole of the political society, yet, the existent individual person is prior to the existent political society.<sup>43</sup> Obviously this is not as clearly visible

in the order of concrete practice; for man is born into society. However, in the order of principles, the indivisible whole of the person, being a substantial whole has supremacy over the whole of the body politic which is an accidental whole made from the wholes of concrete persons.

The supremacy of the eternal common good of the person over his temporal common good which in fact is that of the human person over the common good of the body politic can also be demonstrated from the respective finalis causa of the human person and of the body politic. The final cause of the body politic in Maritain's view is communicatio in bene vivendo on the temporal order. That of the human person, however, is the life of contemplation. It is this life, according to Maritain, which is the proper call of the human person.

Arguing in this manner, Maritain is not only operating on the level of Aristotle who had concluded many centuries before him that: *vita quae est secundum speculationem est melior quam quae est secundum hominem.*<sup>44</sup> Maritain is, with St. Thomas, transcending Aristotle infinitely. For, in Maritain's perspective, human life is compounded not only by animality and rationality as in Aristotle, but by animal nature, reason and grace. Two worlds meet and interpenetrate one another in man: the world of nature and that of participated Deity.<sup>45</sup> These two worlds are, according to Maritain, distinct though

not separate. The natural world has its proper end which is nevertheless intermediate or infravalent to the supernatural world. What exactly does this mean?

For Maritain there is no such thing as pure human nature in the present reality of human life. This is what Cauchy seems to suggest in advocating an autonomous natural ethics.<sup>46</sup> For Maritain, man is not in a purely natural state; he is rather in the state of nature fallen and redeemed; his is a nature exalted by grace above itself, to a formal participation in the uncreated life of God.<sup>47</sup> For this reason, it would be vain according to Maritain to cut this reality into pieces and set apart one of them, a natural and temporal order, against the other, the order of grace. The worlds are united in such a way that the ultimate natural end of man is not eliminated. Maritain confirms this in the following text:

It (the natural end) is realized in excess by and in the last supernatural end; so that the supernatural last end can be viewed not only from the point of view of God as the supreme outpouring and manifestation of His love, assimilating creatures to uncreated life and joy; but also from the point of view of man, as the supreme realization of the desires of his nature, stretching beyond their limit through superabundance of grace.<sup>48</sup>

This digression brings us to the two levels of contemplation. On the temporal level, contemplation means happiness while on the eternal level it means beatitude. Now, whether the final cause of the person is considered as happiness, the temporal ultimate end or beatitude, the eternal one, it is

absolutely true that the body politic and its common good is not its principal but only its instrumental cause. This is what Maritain means by asking: "...to what end is the whole government of civil life, if not to assure the exterior peace necessary to contemplation?"<sup>49</sup> Obviously, therefore, from their respective final causes, the person commands supremacy over the common good of the body politic.

By considering the life of virtue which is in fact the means of attaining contemplation on either level, we can arrive at the same conclusion as above regarding the supremacy of the person over the common good of the body politic. The common good, as we saw above, is communication in bene vivendo. It naturally requires that political society, and in particular the state, establishes conditions such as are conducive to the life of virtue. But as it is unmistakably clear, this function of the state is just the material cause of virtue; it is neither the efficient cause nor is it the possessor of virtue. Both the efficient cause as well as the subject of virtuous life is the human person. Thus, in accordance with the hierarchy of causes and in relation to virtuous life which is a necessary condition for the attainment of contemplation, the human person commands supremacy over the common good of political society.

At this juncture, there can be little doubt as to the necessary conclusion of Maritain's doctrine of the rela-

tion between the person and the common good. They are related in a reciprocity of mutual transcendence and subordination. This reciprocity stems from the supremacy of the spiritual. That is to say, the supremacy of the personal over the common good and vice versa is in fact the supremacy of the spiritual or eternal over the temporal.

Maritain sums up the implications of this conclusion by synthesizing the two laws governing the relation and the necessary tension that exists between the person and the political society on the practical level. Regarding the laws Maritain has this to say:

Just as the person requires society both on account of its abundance or as a person, and on account of its poverty or as an individual, so the common good, by its very essence, directs itself to the persons as persons and directs the persons as individuals to itself.<sup>50</sup>

It is in accordance with justice that the common good be naturally distributive over the persons. At the same time, due to the transcendence of the person over the common good, the latter must help the persons in their extratemporal and extrapolitical propensity towards their absolute ultimate end.

As for the tension between the personal and the social political aspects of the life of human persons in society, Maritain remarks that it is a natural tension. The political society tends naturally to regard the person as nothing more than its part. The person on the other hand insists on being

a whole in society and on devoting itself freely to the service of the common good while it moves simultaneously towards the plenitude of its own nature qua person. In other words, the person serves society in search of overcoming the con-natural constraints and attains freedom of autonomy. But it does so on condition that society does serve it in alleviating its transnatural constraints in order to attain its complete freedom of autonomy. We shall now turn to the principles of political personalism consequent upon the doctrine outlined above.

### 3. Principles of Political Personalism:

Maritain's doctrine of the nature of the human person, the political society and the laws of redistribution and transcendence that govern the relation of the human person and the common good gives rise to a humanist<sup>51</sup> political philosophy. This is what Maritain refers to as political humanism.<sup>52</sup> It is a political philosophy which is true because it is founded in reason<sup>53</sup>; and also because it is the political philosophy of the society of free men.<sup>54</sup> It has the "typical characteristics"<sup>55</sup> which shall be outlined in the following pages.

#### i. Personalist and Communal:

These two features are consequent upon Maritain's doctrine of the person and that of the common good. By means of the personalist characteristic, Maritain emphasizes that the true political philosophy must recognize and maintain

that very superiority of what is eternal in man over the political society. To this transtemporal dimension of the human person must be subordinated the common good of political society. Political society and all its institutions, for that matter, must serve the human person and help him to pursue his supratemporal aspirations.<sup>56</sup>

The personalist feature of Maritain's political humanism does not refer only to the transcendence of the person over the political society on the spiritual order. For Maritain, even on the temporal order the political society must recognize the personal supremacy over the common good. In seeking justice for all men, love for all men, and the spiritual life for example, the person transcends the political society; for all these are supratemporal in nature. The personalist characteristic is, therefore, an inherent feature of a true political society and political philosophy.

But as it was shown above, Maritain stresses equally strongly that the person naturally seeks communion with his fellows. He is naturally social and political. Thus the political whole formed of the natural association of the individual wholes or persons has naturally a common task and a common good which is different from the mere collection of good of the individuals. A true political philosophy must necessarily be communal.

The personalist and communal characteristics of Maritain's political philosophy are essential characteristics of any political philosophy which is true to the nature of both the human person and the common good of political society. In themselves, these characteristics are so inherently related to one another that one could not be realized without the other. The reason is that while the human person is destined to the Absolute, yet it pursues that end within the body politic, a temporal society, as a member and part of it, spending itself for the attainment of the common good.

What the above reasoning means is that the common good of the political society is naturally open. The human person gives his life to attain this common good because the common good, all the while being desired for its intrinsic goodness allows and helps him ultimately to go beyond it in attaining his absolute ultimate end. It is by its very nature intended to foster the higher ends of the human person.<sup>57</sup>

The two characteristics, personalist and communal, provide the bedrock foundation of all the other characteristics of a true political philosophy. The first deals with the nature of the person, the moral unit of political society, while the second points out the aim of political society as a common task or a work to be done in common. All the other characteristics seem to be in one way or another related to these two.

## ii. Pluralist:

It belongs to the nature of political society to encompass in a superior unity a multiplicity of communities and other societies which proceed from the liberty of the individual persons and whose existence and autonomy is necessary in keeping with the diversity of needs of the person.<sup>58</sup> The person needs the family, the clan, economic, cultural, educational, religious and professional societies. In uniting all these groups within itself, the body politic must needs be pluralist. But these groups are not just mechanically united. Maritain emphasizes in fact, that what the pluralist principle calls for is an organic heterogeneity in the very structure of the body politic. And this pluralism is so inherent in this structure that even the authority in the body politic must reflect it. For: "Since in political society authority comes from below, through the people, it is normal that the whole dynamism of authority in the body politic should be made up of particular and partial authorities rising in tiers above one another, up to the top authority of the state."<sup>59</sup>

This kind of pluralism which may be described as social and political is distinct from religious pluralism. The first, according to Maritain, belongs to the very nature of the political society. For as it was demonstrated earlier both the concepts of person and the common good are analogical

both as concepts in themselves and as they are understood and applied by various people and in diversity of historical climates. The true description of the human person, for example, is, as Maritain remarks, common to all philosophies which in one way or another recognize the existence of an Absolute superior to the entire order of the universe and the supratemporal value of the human soul.<sup>60</sup> This observation points to the theist aspect of the true political philosophy. Maritain believes, nonetheless, that his Christian description is the only one which provides a complete rational justification. Moreover, as regards the common good, various societies will understand it more or less perfectly as long as these societies avoid the extremes of anarchism<sup>61</sup> and totalitarianism<sup>62</sup> and assign to the aim of the body politic its own proper common good which is the good of the social and political whole made of human persons.<sup>63</sup>

iii. Theist:

Besides the three characteristics mentioned hereabove, Maritain includes as one of the characteristics of political personalism to be theist or Christian:

The conception of society we are describing is theist or Christian, not in the sense that it would require every member of society to believe in God and to be Christian, but in the sense that it recognizes that in the reality of things, God, principle and end of the human person and prime source of natural law, is by the same token the prime source of political society and authority among men.<sup>64</sup>

This characteristic feature follows again from the personalist

and communal characteristic. From the first because the person is directly ordained to God and from the second because the common good of political society is naturally subordinated to the absolute ultimate destiny of the person which is God. As it was outlined above (Note 22), while personal ethics takes into account the subordinate end but directly aims at the absolute ultimate end, political ethics, although concerned directly with the subordinate ultimate end has nonetheless to take into account the absolute ultimate end.

It is a supreme principle according to Maritain that the political society bears obligations towards truth and that its common good implies a concrete or factual, not verbal, recognition of the existence of God. For him the Kings of old implemented this duty incumbent upon them by leading the body politic to what the Kings believed to be the true religion. But in the present historical climate which is no longer sacral but secular the obligation the body politic bears to truth, the duty of assuring the public recognition of the existence of God is no longer incumbent upon divinely instituted kings; it is rather incumbent upon the people and enforced by their own conscience, by giving expression to and adopting as the enlightening and inspiring moral standard in their own social and political life what they hold to be the true religion.<sup>65</sup>

The theist characteristic, according to Maritain, does not mean that the body politic must adhere to any particular religious truth. In itself the body politic does not have the mission of conducting the human persons to their absolute ultimate end. "By nature", Maritain affirms, "the body politic, which belongs strictly to the natural order, is only concerned with the temporal life of men and their temporal common good."<sup>66</sup> It is consequently secular. On the other hand, and this follows from the fact that "secular" does not mean "secularized", the body politic is not completely indifferent to the religious life of the people. It has to recognize it and guarantee the people's factual recognition of the existence of God. It is in this sense that the body politic must essentially be theist. But supposing among the communities that constitute the body politic is a community of atheists: has the body politic an obligation towards its believers? Should the other communities within the same body politic tolerate and cooperate with the community of atheists? On what level can these communities cooperate?

These questions do not pertain directly to the issue being discussed here: Why the personalist and communal body politic must also be theist. It is a question as to how the communities, subscribing to diverse, even opposed religious creeds can cooperate. This question shall be

tackled in Chapter VI. For the moment suffice it to conclude that in Maritain's view the theist character is essential for the personalist and communal political philosophy we are discussing, not because of the body politic itself but because of the people that constitute it. But why must it be Christian? Does Maritain suggest that theist and Christian are synonymous?

In Integral Humanism Maritain explains what he means by Christian and theist:

The phrase *la cité Chétienne* must be rightly understood. The true Christian city in the absolute sense of the word is the Church; it is no temporal city whatsoever. Here, however, I am speaking of the temporal city.

Like philosophy, the political order has its own proper specification. But like philosophy, it can receive the influence of Christianity and find itself thus in a Christian state; and moreover, just as there is, so I hold, a practical philosophy, an "ethics adequately considered" which is subalternated to theology and which for this reason has in its very specification a Christian impregnation (cf. my book *Science et Sagesse*), so the political order by the fact that it depends intrinsically upon ethics, can have and should have, the while it remains in its own order, a Christian impregnation in its properly political specification. A Christian city is a temporal city intrinsically vivified and impregnated by Christianity.<sup>67</sup> (*Italics in the text*)

The theist characteristic is more extensive than the Christian one. It is applicable, according to Maritain, to all politics which revere "... truth and intelligence, human dignity, freedom, brotherly love, and the absolute value of moral good"<sup>68</sup>; to any politics which "... recognize the existence of an Absolute superior to the entire order of the universe, and the supra-temporal value of the human soul"<sup>69</sup>. In short, it is applicable

to any and every politics which is truly personalist and communal.<sup>70</sup>

#### 4. Summary:

I have endeavoured to examine in this chapter the typical paradox of social life. It was discovered that, according to Maritain, the relation between the person and the body politic is one of mutual implication and reciprocity. Both the human person and the common good are in their own way a whole and a part of the other. On this account each is subordinate to the other as a part to the whole.

The person as an individual is a part of the civil society. Its private goods are subordinate to the common good. On the other hand, the common good is subordinate in the order of ends to the absolute ultimate end of the person as person. This means that although the common good is an ultimate end in the temporal order, it is nonetheless an infravalent end in relation to the spiritual order which alone provides the absolute ultimate end of the person.

From the mutual implication and reciprocity of the person and the common good emerge the characteristic features or the immutable principles of all politics which recognize this relation of the person and the common good. These principles, according to Maritain, are extratemporal

and extraterritorial precisely because they are applicable to politics at all times and places.

However, before enquiring how Maritain has applied them to the present historical climate, it is necessary to survey what Maritain has outlined as the laws that guide the application of these principles. This shall be the subject matter of the following chapter.

1. PCG. p. 55  
Maritain alludes to the human predicament; that is, the human person naturally seeks to live in society with his fellows while it seeks at the very same time to transcend the realm of society. It affirms with one stroke a temporal dependence on and intemporal independence on political society. This intrinsic characteristic of the human person constitutes a typical paradox in its social life.
2. S.T., I, 29, 3. Cited in PCG p. 32
3. FMW p. 52  
Yves Simon commenting on this, brings out clearly the sense of this Aristotelian dictum. He explicates greater, as meaning a higher degree of perfection, both in regard to duration and diversity and Divine, translating the Greek Theon, as participating in the privilege of imperishability. Thus, the eminence and the transcendence of the common good over the particular good is a mark of the incorruptibility of the species, and the immortality of human association. For, individuals come and go according to the law of generation and corruption. The eminence of the natural world is to be found in the preservation of the species. "Common Good and Common Action", in Review of Politics, XXII, 1960, p. 207
4. FMW p. 49
5. PCG p. 48
6. Cf. (Chapter II i) above.
7. By early, here, I don't mean to subscribe to the theory that there is an earlier and a latter Maritain the two of which are separate. Cf. Gurian Waldemar, "On Maritain's Political Philosophy", in The Thomist, V, (Maritain's Volume 1943), pp. 7-22. Rather early works refers to the period before 1927 when Maritain begun more systematically to philosophize in politics.
8. Trois Réformateurs: Luther-Descartes-Rousseau, Paris, Plon, 1925, p. 32.

9. Regarding the distinction itself, see (Chapter II, 2), iii. The controversy stems from De Koninck's publication of his book, De la Primauté du bien Commun. Contre les Personalités: Le Principe de l'ordre Nouveau, in which he implicitly includes Maritain among those Personalists who extoll the individual good of the person above the common good. De Koninck's position is a defense of the common good. Following this publication various Thomists have taken part in the dispute while either defending Maritain or De Koninck or reconciling the two positions. Cf. I. Th. Eschmann, "In Defense of Maritain," in Modern Schoolman, Vol. XXII; or De Koninck. In Defense of St. Thomas: A Reply to Father Eschmann's Attack on the Primacy of the Common Good, Laval Theologique et Philosophique. Or Reconciling the two positions: Yves Simon, "On the Common Good" in Review of Politics, VI, 1944. pp. 530-533; Walter Farrell "Person and the Common Good in a Democracy", The American Catholic Philosophical Association, Proceedings, 1945, pp. 38-47; Jacques Croteau, Fondements Thomistes du Personalisme de Maritain, Université d'Ottawa, 1955.
10. "Person and the Common Good in a Democracy" The American Catholic Philosophical Association: Proceedings, 1945.
11. PCG p. 56
12. Ibid.,
13. Ibid., Also, RN p. 18
14. PCG. p. 56
15. SP. p. 49 Fn. 1, Also PCG. p. 58
16. EE p. 73, CT. p. 118
17. PCG. p. 47
18. PCG. p. 57
19. FMW. p. 41
20. FMW p. 47
21. PCG. p. 59
22. Sum. Theol., II-II, 64, 2. Cited in PCG p. 70

23. MS. p. 62
24. Sum. Theol., I-II, 21, 4, and 3. Cited in PCG. p. 71
25. PCG. p. 65
26. PCG. p. 76
27. Walgrave J. H. Person and Society, p. 134.
28. FMW p. 50
29. Aristotle, Pol. I, 1252a 1-5.
30. We see the essential relation between the final cause and the formal cause. While it is the last in the order of execution, the final cause is yet the first in the order of constitution. This is why the common good is on the one hand the constitutive formal aspect of the body politic - communication in *bene vivendo* - and on the other hand the final end of political society. To understand this point, refer to Farrell and Adler who have made a very exhaustive study on the matter and recorded their findings in "A Theory of Democracy" in *The Thomist*, Vol. III Nos. 3 1941 to Vol. VII No. 1, 1944. In particular no., III, Adler and Farrell distinguish between the essential and the existential common good. The former, as the end to be attained by the body politic while the latter is what any body politic aims to achieve in its own historical ideal.
31. MS. p. 10
32. SPP. p. 34
33. PCG. p. 69
34. Ibid.,
35. Ibid.,
36. RR p. 147
37. SP p. 61, also FMW. p. 44
38. SP. p. 51

39. Si l'on concède que les personnes singulières sont ordonnées au bien ultime séparé en tant que celui-ci a raison de bien commun, on ne concèdera pas si volontiers que dans l'univers même, les personnes ne sont voulues que pour le bien de l'ordre de l'univers, bien commun intrinsèque meilleur que les personnes singulières qui le constituent matériellement Op. Cit., p. 27. De Koninck as it is clear from this citation, seems to think that the personalists, Maritain mistakenly included, put the person as a constitutive part of the universe above the extrinsic common good of the universe.
40. PCG. p. 23
41. FMW. p. 36
42. The true subjective good of the person as person is God in His nature as Person. But God is the objective common good of all creation. Thus the subjective common good of the person is the self same as the objective common good of entire universe.
43. FMW. p. 44; also SP. p. 61.
44. Eth., Nic., X 8. Cited in S.T., II-II, q 47, a.15.
45. SW. p. 180 SS. p. 298
46. Op. Cit.,
47. Tn. p. 126. Also, SW 179; SS. p. 297
48. SE. p. 179, SS p. 297
49. AS. New York, 1930, p. 80. Cited in MJ. Adler and W. Farrell, "The Theory of Democracy", Part, III, The Thomist, 1943, p. 146.
50. PCG. p. 76
51. Refer to Note 3 Chapter I
52. NR. p. 50
53. IH. p. 133; HI. p. 140.
54. NR. p. 20
55. IH. p. 133; HI p. 140

56. MS. p. 148
57. MS p. 149
58. MS. p. 11
59. Ibid.,
60. RN. p. 5
61. PCG. p. 50.
62. Ibid., p. 51
63. IH. p. 133 HI. p. 140
64. RN p. 21
65. MS p. 66
66. MS p. 153
67. IH. p. 168n.; HI. p. 173n
68. MS. p. 111
69. RN. p. 53
70. FMW. p. 56

## CHAPTER V

### APPLICATION OF THE IMMUTABLE PRINCIPLES AND THEIR LAWS OF APPLICATION

There are in human history typical climates or constellations of existential conditions, which express given intelligible structures, both as concerns the social, political, and juridical dominant characteristics and moral and ideological dominant characteristics in the temporal life of the human community, and which constitute frames of reference for the ways of applying in human existence the immutable principles that holds way over the latter.

MS p. 156

## 1. Introduction:

The exposition of Maritain's doctrine of man and of political society in the foregoing three chapters reveal what Maritain calls the immutable or supra-temporal principles of a true political philosophy. These are: a) the primacy of the spiritual and b) the subordination of the temporal order to the spiritual one.

According to the first principle it is clear that although the human person is a part of the body politic he is superior to it through what is supratemporal in him, his personality; and through his direct ordination to God. As for the second, it is also obvious that the common good, which is in accordance to its very nature both immanent in the nature of the persons and separate from them, is an ultimate end in a relative sense and in a certain order. It is an end naturally infravalent or intermediate to the absolute ultimate end of the person. For this reason, both the political society and its common good are indirectly subordinated to the perfect accomplishment of the person and his supra-temporal aspiration as to an end of another order.

The two principles from which Maritain draws the cardinal features of a true political philosophy-personalist, communal, pluralist and theist - are immutable. They are valid for and applicable to all politics. They are accordingly transhistoric and transterritorial.

Maritain remarks that these same immutable principles were applied in a manner partly similar and partly different in the history of civilization; for, although historical climates differ yet because history does not move in jumps, the various historical climates do not differ substantially. They do not always start afresh. History is, according to Maritain, governed by certain laws which warrant its continuity. In likemanner, the application of the immutable principles to the various historical climates is not left to a random chance; there are according to him, laws, both metaphysical and historical that guide the application of the immutable principles to the various historical climates.

Maritain has sought to apply the immutable principles to the present historical climate in order to synthesize his political philosophy. It is therefore, important at this juncture, before enquiring into the relevancy of his political personalist democracy, to study what Maritain has identified as the present historical climate and the laws that guide the application of the immutable principle. This study shall be made in the present chapter.

The chapter consists of two main parts. The first deals with the concrete historical ideal of the civilization we are entering after the disintegration of the sacral age and the liquidation of the liberal civilization. The purpo-

se of this treatment is to enquire, what according to Maritain, is the present historical climate? Can it be identified for certain? What are its characteristic features? How does it differ from the historical climate that dominated the Mediaeval period? How does it differ from that of the modern civilization? The second part studies the laws that Maritain has proposed as necessary for guiding the application of the immutable principles - the law of analogy, the law of essence - existence polarity the law of political ethics and the historical laws.

## 2. The Present Historical Climate:

## i. The Concrete Historical Ideal:

Maritain speaks of the concrete historical ideal as "a prospective image signifying the particular type of civilization to which a certain historical age tends"<sup>1</sup>.

Being thus defined, a prospective image, a concrete historical ideal is completely different from an utopia.

Marx, in Maritain's view, made the mistake of confusing an Utopia and ideal by enveloping both in a single criticism<sup>2</sup>.

An utopia is an unrealizable *ens rationis* which, because it is a mental being or being of reason, is isolated from existence at any particular historical climate. An utopia expresses an absolute maximum of social and political perfection<sup>3</sup>.

Such are the utopia of Thomas Moore, or Fenelon, Saint Simon or Fourier.

A concrete historical ideal, on the contrary, is not *ens rationis*. It is "an ideal essence which is realizable not as something made but as something on the way to being made and which is an essence capable of existing and calling for existence in given historical climate"<sup>4</sup>. A historical ideal is something of the future; it is formulated in the present but it is essentially appropriate to the coming age of civilization;<sup>5</sup> the guiding star<sup>6</sup> of the present social, political perfection, but rather, with a relative social and political perfection. Relative because although all the forces point to the realization of that essence, yet during the ti-

me when history moves towards the "being" we approach closer to it. This is the reason why the present can but present a framework and a rough draft which may later be determined of a future reality.<sup>7</sup>

This future oriented ideal can also be understood from what Maritain has called the New Christendom or Third Age; considering the middle ages as the maturation of the first age and modern times as the second age. In this respect, the third age, "one could say that it has begun but, rather we are taking part in the preambles, in the distant preparations which announce it".<sup>8</sup> We are presently only in the preambles of the New Christendom. On this account, Maritain's use of the concept of *prospective image* to describe the concrete historical ideal is quite adequate.

It may be remarked here that Maritain talks of a New Christendom. Obviously, he is not referring to a civilization already realized concretely in the present historical climate. Nor is he alluding to an unrealizable civilization or an utopia. He is rather preoccupied with the realization of the immutable principles with a christian flavour or inspiration in a new social and political order. To this effect, the modern world, the Christian world itself will have to break with "a regime of civilization spiritually founded on bourgeois humanism and economically on the fecundity of money, while at the same time keeping itself immune from the

totalitarian or communist errors to which this same regime leads as to its logical catastrophe"<sup>9</sup>. For Maritain, in order to usher the New Christendom, the modern civilization or the bourgeois civilization which has corrupted the immutable principles must be liquidated. In the place of the modern civilization which tried to dispense itself with metaphysical truths and the gospel inspiration must be build a new civilization which is deeply founded in metaphysics and whose socio-terrestrial order must be vivified by the spirit of the gospel.<sup>10</sup> As the Modern civilization is being liquidate, the concrete historical ideal towards which all the forces point can only be imperfectly or partially realized. This is because by its very essence a historical ideal can never be completely realized at once; it can nevertheless be approximated gradually, each time getting closer and closer to the ideal.

Maritain perceives two chronological moments towards the realization of the New Christendom or the concrete historical ideal. The first moment is ushered by two conditions. The first is what we have mentioned a while ago; that is, the liquidation of the bourgeois civilization while guarding against the totalitarianism resulting logically from the bourgeois Christendom. The second is the recognition of the need for the reinforcement of the human means by divine aid in carrying out the liquidation.<sup>11</sup> In saying this, Maritain

recognizes the fact that the realization of the New Christendom will need means which are themselves proportional to the end itself which is Christian. Thus the Christians of the present epoch will feel more and more the need to recognize the role of Providence in History. Maritain states this more clearly in the following:

....It seems likely that, if democracy enters its next historical stage with sufficient intelligence and vitality, a renewed democracy will not ignore religion, as the bourgeois XIXth century society.<sup>12</sup>

The second moment in the realization of the New Christendom follows the liquidation of the modern epoch. However, it will be formed and prepared slowly.<sup>13</sup> During this formation as Maritain notes, there will be a necessity of radical changes.<sup>14</sup> It is with these changes and hard work that the realization more or less precarious in the near future or a full realization in the distant future but it will certainly come. At that time, "man would remain in it that which he is, but he would be under a new temporal regime, a new historical sky, also destined to decline in the end for new dawns, since all that is of time wears away; and it is only under this regime that there would begin to flower the integral humanism, the humanism of the incarnation".<sup>15</sup> Maritain shows here a deep Christian hope which overcomes all the pessimism of the time he wrote the lines.<sup>16</sup>

## ii. The Mediaeval Civilization:

Maritain describes the characteristics of the concrete historical ideal of the present epoch in contrast to the Mediaeval civilization. Thus in keeping with his procedure, a brief outline of the characteristic features of the Mediaeval civilization will be given here before we examine those of the New Christendom.

There are, according to Maritain, five typical features that characterize the Mediaeval Christendom.<sup>17</sup> The first was the tendency towards a maximal unity. This unity was organic; it enhanced both diversity and pluralism. Its focal point was the spiritual life of the person.<sup>18</sup>

With this central point of focus, the guiding Star<sup>19</sup> was to organically unify the world in temporal matters under one emperor as the Church was united in spiritual matters under one Pope.<sup>20</sup> It was a maximal unity. For the center of formation and unification was very high above the temporal order. It was the spiritual order itself. The temporal common good could not bring about this highly exacting unity. Instead, as it will be seen below, even the temporal common good was turned into a means of serving this unity.

From that maximal center of unity, the spiritual order, all the dimensions of human life in the temporal order were to be tacked and united in the same manner. The person's social and political life had not only to reflect the same unity,

but it had to be intactly united likewise on the spiritual order; and so also was the unity in educational, legal, and economic matters. In short, the unity of faith was a prerequisite for the political unity and it also provided the frame of reference for the unity in the social body which was religio-political in nature.<sup>21</sup>

Because the whole civilization was tacked on this spiritual unity, the greatest enemy of the civilization was its breaker - a heretic. The disturber of the faith was not only an enemy of the Church; he was an enemy of the whole religio-political institution.

The second characteristic feature of the Mediaeval Civilization was the "effective predominance of the ministerial role of the temporal".<sup>22</sup> This trait follows logically from the first one. For, to say that the organic maximal unity was sought through the spiritual order means simply that the temporal order was accordingly subordinated to the spiritual. But what kind of subordination?

There are two forms of subordinating something to an end according to the Scholastics. And these can be explained by considering either the ends or their causes. In the line of ends, the first is the subordination known as infravalent or intermediate end. A good example is the formation of virtue in order to live a good and integral human life. The performance of the virtuous acts terminate in the

end which is virtue. But this is only an intermediate end. The final end of the virtues including the various operations which are performed in order to attain the virtuous life is the complete well being of man. Thus virtuous life though the ultimate end of the virtuous acts is nonetheless the intermediate end to the complete well being of man.

The second form of subordination is one of a pure means to an end. Reasoning for example, is a means of acquiring knowledge. No one reasons for the sake of reasoning. Thus reasoning is not an end; it is a means to the end which is the acquisition of knowledge.

These two forms of subordinating one thing or one operation to another, as an inferior end to another more superior end or as a pure means to an end may also be distinguished by considering causes instead of ends. In the line of efficient causality scholastics distinguish a secondary principal cause from a material cause. The former produces an effect proportional to its specific degree of being while the latter exercises its proper causality only when it is being used by another higher cause.

The brush a painter uses to produce an artistic design is a material cause. By itself it can not produce the design. But man who brings the artistic design into existence by communicating being into it does so only to the extent that he himself participates in being. He is certainly a principal agent and a true efficient cause of the artistic

design. But considered from the fact that he is a finite being depending for his own existence on another cause, the infinite cause or the primary cause, then, his causing of the artistic design or any other effect for that matter is secondary.<sup>23</sup>

The subordination of the temporal to the spiritual order in the Mediaeval Civilization was one of an instrumental cause. "The things that are Caesar's, affirms Maritain, "though clearly distinguished from the things that are God's, had in great measure a ministerial function in regard to them".<sup>24</sup> This is why the Mediaeval Civilization is appropriately called by Maritain "a Sacral Age."<sup>25</sup>


The third trait of the Mediaeval Civilization is consequent upon the second feature. It is the use of the external force proper to the temporal order; the constitutional and institutional set up of the state, for man's spiritual good.<sup>26</sup> This use of power resulted from the Mediaeval conception of an organic unity of the politico-religious order. This organic unity was thus compelling and enforcing the spiritual well being of man against the freedom of faith the right of conscience, and the social unity at the level of individual persons..

It is understandable why such severe punishment as death was metted for heresy. Truth to tell, heresy is primarily a religious crime. But for the Mediaeval Civilization

which was united on faith, heresy was also a socio-political crime; according to the politico-religious order, heresy did not only injure the spiritual welfare of the person, it also was a threat to the politico-religious unity of the people. But there are also the abuses of its temporal force for the spiritual order.

The fourth typical trait of the Mediaeval civilization is the essential disparity of social classes. This disparity was recognized to be at the very base of authority and it established the hierarchy of social functions. Whether regarding political authority in the body politic or any authority in the social economic or other institutions, this disparity between the leader and the led was strictly observed. Besides, it was also rendered sacred. For, originally the patern of authority was that of paterfamilias in the family; an institution considered natural and sacred. By allying this sacred authority with the notion of God's universal fatherhood, the Middle Ages saw the disparity of the leaders and the led as one sacred and between different classes.

Between the father and his children there was no disparity in essence, the child though inferior belongs to the same social race as the father. The father exercised his authority as a sacred function over the child. But between the king and the body politic the gap widened. It was



not only the question of inferior to a superior in the same social class. Because the king was annointed,<sup>27</sup> and given authority over the body politic he was regarded as sovereign<sup>28</sup> and as standing on a completely different order from the people.

This characteristic is of great importance to the present study. It brings out a clear example how the myth of the time led the people to make a king not only their vicar but also the vicar of God.<sup>29</sup> With the dawn of the age of monarchical absolutism the king was no longer the people's vicar but rather God's vicar only.

The disparity of social races was quite significant in the community of work which was conceived as an extension of the family, bringing together masters and workers. In this family or gild<sup>30</sup> there was a rigorous hierarchy of relations. Besides that of masters and workers, there was also one of the rich and poor although the poor did not form the class of marketable labour or the proletariat in the Marxian sense.<sup>31</sup>

In spite of the rigorous heterogeneity in the social structure, there was a certain amount of familiarity; a familiarity as Maritain puts it, sometimes brutal, between the masters and the workers. Also there was a cohesion within the classes. This cohesion springing up progressively but more lived than conscious was real and efficacious. It was

a cohesion for the pursuit of freedom and popular immunities.<sup>32</sup> There were thus, in spite of the disparity, lively and popular movements of economic and social importance.

The fifth characteristic feature has got to do with the common end for which the body politic labours. This is, as Maritain calls it, "to build up an empire for Christ"<sup>33</sup>. This trait is very closely related to the second; in fact, the two might easily be confused. It is however, different from the second. For while recognizing the temporal order, while recognizing the distinction between the two orders, and focusing attention on the miseries and the conflicts proper to the temporal, yet what inspired the activities of the baptized man and the baptized political life was not just the ministerial role of the temporal, it was, rather, the urge of building up of an immense fortress here on earth with God as the sovereign ruler.

For the Mediaeval Christian, therefore, the Kingdom of God was not something to come. It was here and now being built. The baptized man and the baptized social and political institution were at work constructing this kingdom.

These are the five characteristic features of the Mediaeval Christendom. Maritain does not condemn any of them. In fact, he explains them with an appreciation of the circumstances of the time, historian of political philosophy as he is. He does not have nostalgia for them either. He has

pointed out that "the life of human societies advances and progresses, thanks the vitalization or superelevation of the energy of history springing from the spirit and from human freedom. But at the same time, this same energy of history is degraded and dissipated by reason of the passivity of matter. Moreover what is spiritual is, to this very extent, above time and exempt from aging<sup>34</sup>. Obviously, therefore, what is needed for our time is to delineate the concrete historical ideal and to apply to it the same transhistoric principles of man and of political society.

## iii. A New Christendom:

Should a new Christendom, in the conditions of the historic age we are entering, while incarnating the same principles<sup>35</sup> be conceived according to a type essentially distinct from that of the Mediaeval world? Maritain answers this question in the affirmative and proceeds to draw the distinctive features of the present concrete historical ideal. We shall outline these characteristic features in the following pages:

## a) Pluralism:

In contrast to the Mediaeval Civilization, which maximized its unity, the institutional and organic unity through the unity of faith, the civilization which is called for by the present historical age must admit of pluralism. This is the first characteristic feature of the New Christendom. Pluralism here, means more than religious pluralism. The unitary system of the Mediaeval Civilization was moulded on the unity in religion. This unity was refracted in the social political economic and juridical structures.<sup>36</sup> This is why Maritain estimates it as necessary that with the differentiation of the temporal from the spiritual order, the former must no longer seek maximal but minimal unity whose necessary condition is pluralism. It is necessary, for the present historical age to stress that it belongs to the temporal city to unite men subscribing to diverse religious or non-re-

ligious creeds.<sup>37</sup> The creed or faith needed for this unity is a civic or secular faith; not a religious one.<sup>38</sup>

In stressing on the need of secular creed which unites the temporal and which naturally encompasses the organic conception of civil life, Maritain is at once opposed to bourgeois liberalism's anarchical atomization of society and to the Hegelian-Marxist totalitarian conception of society. Metaphysician as he is, Maritain recognizes the fact that the unity of a being just as being itself, is analogical; it is proportional to the *esse* it cuts out for itself. Thus, for Maritain, "political society, that being that is human persons be-ing together with the super-added existence, that is, the intellecting and willing of the good human life in all its totality, is a being that admits of, indeed calls for, much plurality and diversity".<sup>39</sup>

The unity in diversity proper to the very being of the political society must likewise be refracted in all its structures. Maritain singles out particularly the economic and social, together with the juridical structures as areas which must reflect the pluralism of civil life. By economic pluralism Maritain means that the pluralist body politic will have economic structures which are completely different from the family economy on the one hand and from the bourgeois economy on the other. The pluralist economy will have a certain measure of collectivization. While the capitalist eco-

nomy is like a "hive of salaried workers"<sup>40</sup>, the pluralist body politic will establish the form of economy which will "bring things back to an order more in harmony with justice."<sup>41</sup> The governing rules of the industrial economy ought to subordinate this collectivist movement to the interest of human personality and the common good.<sup>42</sup>

Maritain refers to this form of pluralist economy as corporative.<sup>43</sup> It will neither be in the hands of the state like in the Marxist Communist economy, nor in those of a few capitalists. Rather, it must be managed by corporate bodies composed of workers, technicians and shareholders viewed as moral persons.<sup>44</sup>

The pluralist economy that Maritain is advocating calls for a few remarks here on Maritain's critique on both Capitalism and Marxist Communism.<sup>45</sup> Maritain condemns the capitalist economy as being unethical and as being wedded to the unnatural principle of the fertility of money.<sup>46</sup> Capitalism must be condemned; for, its spirit is one of hatred of poverty and of contempt for the poor.<sup>47</sup> Because of its perverted adhesion to the fecundity of money and the neglect of human values the capitalist economy sins on various counts: on the very nature of man;<sup>48</sup> on human liberty by making the freedom of choice the end of freedom;<sup>49</sup> on the nature of the political society, by conceiving as purely abstract;<sup>50</sup> by denying any transcendence and by substituting this by a

natural religion which is in fact atheistic in that it does not admit of any other God besides the individual.<sup>51</sup>

On the contrary, Marxist Communism, supposedly only an economic system, set up for the liberation of the bourgeois man, ended up committing the same errors against the human person. It sins on all the counts against the human person. On the transtemporal and supraeconomic nature of the human person;<sup>52</sup> on the freedom of the person;<sup>53</sup> the conception of the social and political society as only material;<sup>54</sup> and a denial of God by its Hegelian atheistic monism.<sup>55</sup>

The pluralist economy that Maritain sees as a *sine qua non* of the concrete historical ideal will only be established by a radical revival of the Christian involvement in the temporal order.<sup>56</sup> It will come to pass under the conditions which Maritain describes succinctly in the following:

*La "rupture entre l'ordre Chrétien et le désordre établi" n'intéresse pas seulement les choses économiques ou politiques, mais tout l'ensemble de la culture, les relations du spirituel et du temporel, la conception même qu'on doit se faire de l'oeuvre de l'homme ici-bas et en ce temps de l'histoire du monde. Elle n'intéresse pas seulement le régime extérieur et visible de la vie humaine; elle intéresse aussi et en premier lieu les principes spirituels de ce régime. Elle doit se manifester à l'extérieur, dans l'ordre visible et tangible. Mais la condition inéluctable est qu'elle se consume d'abord dans l'intelligence et dans le coeur de ceux qui veulent être les coopérateurs de Dieu dans l'histoire, et c'est qu'ils en comprennent toute la profondeur.<sup>57</sup>*

b) Juridical Pluralism:

The body politic of the concrete historical ideal we

are entering, must, according to Maritain, be totally suffused by the pluralist principle. Its juridical structure as Maritain envisages must permit of various standards according to the moral consciousness of the communities that constitute it. Maritain's doctrine of pluralism as applied to the juridical structure emerges forcefully from the following text:

...We have to maintain that the legislation of the Christian society in question could and should never endorse or approve any way of conduct contrary to Natural Law. But we have also to realize that this legislation could and should permit or give allowance to certain ways of conduct which depart in some measure from Natural Law, if the prohibition by civil law of these ways of conduct were to impair the common good, either because such prohibition would be at variance with the ethical code of communities of citizens whose loyalty to the nation and faithfulness to their own moral creed, however imperfect it may be, essentially matter to the common good, or even because it would result in a worse conduct, disturbing or disintegrating the social body, for a great many people whose moral strength is not on a level with the enforcement of this prohibition.<sup>58</sup>

Maritain is advocating here a form of civil legislation which will be adapted to the morality of the diverse religious families in the body politic. He makes it clear, however, that the state does not endorse any of the religious creeds; nor does it condemn any. Rather, it simply allows the various communities to be legislated according to their own moral creeds provided these are not contrary to the Natural Law, though they may part slightly from it,<sup>59</sup> and provided this allowance is to the interest of the common good of the whole.

The subject of juridical pluralism stands out promi-

nently in Maritain's doctrine of Church and State. He distinguishes the three areas in this relations as being the area of the autonomy of the Church arising from the supremacy of the spiritual; the autonomy of the temporal in its own proper field, and the area where the two overlap. This last one includes questions of marriage, education etc...; question which call for the cooperation of the Church and the State. It is on this score that Maritain sees the need of the application of the pluralist principle. The communities will all be united as they belong to the same body politic. Yet, because the body politic is both personalist and pluralist, "the law of the body politic recognize in such matters the moral codes to which the consciences of the main spiritual stocks of lineages that make up the national community and its complex moral heritage..."<sup>60</sup> Maritain advocates this because since the aim of law is to make men morally good and since in some cases this goal can be attained more efficaciously by adapting, where possible, the law to the various spiritual families, juridical pluralism is not only laudable in the body politic of the concrete historical ideal or the New Christendom; it is indeed a necessary aspect of its being. The question that remains is who is to decide as to the what and when of the allowance of freedoms in order to avoid the greater evil for the sake of the common good?

The second characteristic feature of the present historical ideal is the autonomy of the temporal order. Maritain has constantly insisted on this. He says that with the passage of time the temporal order has gradually differentiated itself from the ministerial role it played in the Middle Ages. It has come of age as Maritain puts it.<sup>60</sup> With this differentiation the temporal regime is to be envisaged as a secular or lay body politic; no longer sacral.

Envisaging the temporal<sup>61</sup> as autonomous, Maritain does not suggest that it is, therefore, completely indifferent to the spiritual order. No. On the contrary, while the temporal order asserts its supremacy in its own order and while it has its own proper end, the common good, it will still play an infravalent or intermediate end.<sup>62</sup>

With the gaining of autonomy of the temporal order, Maritain insist that the subordination of the temporal to the spiritual, no longer as ministerial, but as a truly principal agent in its own order, must be recognized. This is so because as it was demonstrated in Chapter III, it is in the nature of the common good that it must be ordained to something higher than itself; to the supratemporal goal of the person. The common good is ordered to this, not as a simple means but as an intermediate end.<sup>63</sup> It has its own desirability and it is capable of uniting men of divers spiritual creeds on their temporal life.

Although the temporal order, differentiated from the spiritual, has the capability of uniting all the communities of diverse spiritual origins, yet it is not a sacral regime as that of the middle ages. It is rather lay or secular. However, lay or secular does not mean that the regime is neutral to philosophical and theological issues like the Baroque Age.<sup>64</sup> The meaning that Maritain gives to lay emerges from the following:

There is no distinction without an order of values. If the things that are God's are distinct from the things that are Caesar's, that means that they are better. The said distinction, developing its virtualities in the course of human history, has resulted in the notion of the intrinsically lay or secular nature of the body politic. I do not say that the body politic is by nature irreligious or indifferent to religion ("lay" and "laicized", "secular" and "secularized" are two quite different things), I say that by nature the body politic which belongs strictly to the natural order, is only concerned with the temporal life of men and their temporal common good.<sup>65</sup>

In order to grasp the true relation of the political regime to the spiritual order Maritain sees the need to purify the notion of secular or lay regime from the two extremes of bourgeois liberalism which dispensed itself with metaphysical and religious matters, and the Hegelian concept of state which assumes in the totalitarian manner the complete moral dimension of human life. The former is amoral while the latter is hypermoral. The true conception lies in the understanding of political ethics. Maritain states this with

lucidity in the following text:

...Political hypermoralism is not better than political amoralism and, in the last analysis, answers the very purpose of political cynicism; politics is a branch of Ethics, but a branch specifically distinct from the other branches of the same stem. For human life has true ultimate ends. The one subordinate to the other; an ultimate end in the given order, which is the terrestrial common good, or the *bonum vitae civilis*; and an absolute ultimate end, which is the transcendent, eternal common good. And individual ethics takes into account the subordinate ultimate end, but directly aims at the absolute ultimate one; whereas political ethics takes into account the absolute ultimate end, but its direct aim is the subordinate ultimate end, the good of the rational nature in its temporal achievement. Hence a specific difference of perspective between those two branches of Ethics.<sup>66</sup>

Maritain's warning about the distinction of the two orders of ethics is very important here. Since the present historical climate can no longer be united through the unity of religion and this is undesirable; for it destroys the very pluralistic nature of the body politic, it remains absolutely essential to recognize the existence of the different spiritual families within the body politic.

The third characteristic feature of the new christendom is, according to Maritain, the conquest of freedom.<sup>67</sup> This character puts the present age at the opposite pole of the Middle Ages ideologically. For, while the middle ages, as was remarked above, sought to realize the idea of strength as certitude in the service of God the present age seeks to realize conquest of freedom of the human person. This is

also the centre of unification of the temporal and political order of the present age.<sup>68</sup>

As it is clear this centre of unification is not as high as in the Mediaeval Civilization. While this civilization sought unity of the temporal through the conformity of religious faith, here the unity is sought in the freedom of the person. In a way, as the centre of unification is lowered at the same time the dignity and the freedom of the person emerges still higher above the temporal order.<sup>69</sup> But what freedom?

Maritain emphasizes that, the freedom being sought here is neither the individualist-liberalist conception of freedom, freedom of choice of the individual nor the imperialist conception of freedom, the freedom conceived as the grandeur and power of the state. It is, rather, the freedom of autonomy of persons as understood in the Thomistic tradition.<sup>70</sup>

We can note at this juncture the big shift in the emphasis on the inner dimension of the person. Where the Middle Ages emphasized the coercion of persons, by the ministerial role of the political, to conform to the ideals of the time, now the tendency is an appeal to the inner forces of the person.<sup>71</sup>

By insisting on the inner life of the persons Maritain is in fact emphasizing the transcendence of the person to the political society and at the same time the spiritual qualities of the persons which are absolutely necessary to guarantee the moral function of the political regime. The person

gives himself generously to the body politic. The body politic on the other hand needs, besides justice, friendship in order to persevere. But friendship emerges from within persons; it cannot be generated by coercion. Maritain says this in the following words which deserve to be cited in toto:

...We are men, each containing within himself the ontological mystery of personality and freedom; and it is in this very mystery of freedom and personality that genuine tolerance of freedom takes root. For the basis of good fellowship among men of different creeds is not of the order of the intellect and of ideas, but the heart and of love. It is friendship, natural friendship, but first and foremost mutual love in God and for God. Love does not go out to essences nor to qualities nor ideas, but to person; and it is in the mystery of persons and of the divine presence within them which is here in play. This fellowship, ... is not a fellowship of beliefs but the fellowship of men who believe.<sup>72</sup>

What Maritain is saying here brings to mind Heraclitus words: "those who are awake have a common world, but those who sleep turn aside each into his own particular world."<sup>73</sup>

To be awake as a human person is to communicate in knowledge and love. Thus the capital importance of friendship in the New Christendom. As long as those who are awake turn to each other and appreciate in true friendship to other person, then it does not matter if he subscribes to another creed or whether he is materially poor or rich.

The fourth feature defining the concrete historical ideal of the present climate is the unity of "Social Race".<sup>74</sup>

While the Middle Ages thrived very well on the disparity of

social races, the age we are entering, in Maritain's view, will insist on the unity of the races. What does this mean?

Those who held positions of authority in the Middle Ages stood on a different level as if they belonged to another race. But in the present climate men are struggling for an essential parity in their common conditions; whether these conditions be economic, social or political. Men are in search of a society of brothers where one or several are chosen as rulers by the others. Thus those who are chosen are deputies of the people; not of God. They are neither sovereign nor do they by the fact of their being given the exercise of authority belong to a different race from the people.

In the political order particularly, this parity governs all the forms of government. While authority finally comes from God, as a Christian believes, yet once the people set up the organs in a way either formulated or unformulated, authority resides on those to whom they give it. It is they who exercise it for the people. And it does not matter, according to Maritain, what form of regime this takes. It may be monarchy to whom the authority has been given for an indeterminate future, both in form of the regime and to those who wield the power; it may be a democratic which is given an indefinite future as regard the form of the regime, but is periodically renewable as regards the holders of power. In any case what is distinct in the relation of the leader and the led

in the present historical age is that the head is simply a companion who has the right to command others. This is the distinguishing mark of authority in a purely secular and "homogeneous" conception of temporal authority.<sup>75</sup>

As regards the economic order, Maritain notes that it will be different from both that of the Middle Ages which conceived the economic as an extension of the family economy and that of the bourgeois liberalism which resolved the economics into a confrontation of two classes alien to each other.<sup>76</sup> The economic order of the present age - once the capitalist regime has been liquidated - will, rather, constitute of institutional form corresponding to the natural association of collaborators in one work.<sup>76a</sup>

The fifth feature is the common human creed for the realization of fraternal community. This characteristic feature stands opposed to that of the mediaeval period. For that civilization, the common task was a divine work to be brought about on earth by man. Now, however, the common task in a human work itself.<sup>77</sup> Thus "the Middle Ages sought with the Holy Empire to erect a fortress for God on Earth."<sup>77a</sup> Today the poor and oppressed are setting out for the land of justice and fraternity.<sup>78</sup>

It stands to reason that there must be a creed which inspires the body politic to set out for this land of justice. This creed is not a religious one; for the body politic is a

pluralistic one and it is not maximally united. Rather it is a creed in the order of secular and temporal life.<sup>79</sup> This creed, as Maritain insists, is not a set of universally proclaimed theoretical principles either on theological or philosophical doctrines. It is, rather, a set of practical tenets, or conclusions or practical points of convergence.<sup>80</sup> This conviction that men divided in their philosophical and religious conviction can still agree is based on Maritain's doctrine of equality. For him "the equality in nature among men consists in their concrete communion in the mystery of human species; it does not lie in an idea, it is hidden in the heart of the individual and of the concrete; in the root of subsistence of each man."<sup>81</sup> It is in other words anchored in the natural love of the human being for his own kind, which reveals and makes real the unity of species among men.<sup>82</sup>

However, this unity does not suffice to guarantee a community of action because the nature we are referring to here, is not a pure nature. It is a fallen nature. Fallen and redeemed nature but wounded.<sup>83</sup>

The gradient to be surmounted—selfishness, egoistic interests, suspicion, hatred etc... is so difficult that the fallen nature alone would be defeated. Moreover, even if the nature was not fallen it would still not be able to attain this very exacting love - the unreserved giving of the self to others. This love needs more than the merely natural instinct for others. The bondage for community of action is without any doubt, foun-

ded in this natural instinct for unity and love. It is this unity that is the first ground of similarities on which our principles of action, though different otherwise, can have accord among themselves. However to build on this natural instinct a community of action which is in agreement on the practical tenets there is needed a divine help.<sup>84</sup>

Maritain insists that in order that this natural agreement on the practical tenets can succeed there is need of the Gospel inspiration. He makes this point by insisting that the progress of moral conscience which is necessary for the natural apperceptions, in discovering the practical tenets have been awakened by the Gospel leaven fermenting in the obscure depths of human history.<sup>85</sup>

## 3. Laws Guiding the Application;

The exposition we have made in the foregoing provides the essence of the historical age we are entering. It is what Maritain has referred to as "intelligible constellations dominating human history". This intelligible structure belongs to the realm of the ideals or the essences which are possible in themselves. In order that these essences be realized in our time there is need to investigate the laws that guide their realization here and now. In other words, since essences are inseparably bound to their existence in order to be being, there is need to outline the conditions of the realization of these essences. We shall do this by outlining the general laws which guide the application of the immutable principles in order to make the possible essence of our historical age a reality. These laws shall be grouped under two categories: metaphysical, historical.

## i. Metaphysical Laws:

In his book Court Traité de l'Existence et de l'Existant, 1948; Maritain insists that one necessary quality of a philosopher is that he must be a metaphysician. And what makes a metaphysician, for him, is the intuition of being: "l'intuition de l'être *secundum quod est ens*".<sup>86</sup> But the intuition of being, in his perspective, is also the intuition of its transcendental character and analogical value.<sup>87</sup> Expounding on this analogical value, Maritain affirms that "the analogical

infinitude of the act of existing is a created participation in the unflawed oneness of the infinity of the *Ipsum Esse Subsistens*; an analogical infinitude which is diversified according to the possibilities of existing.<sup>88</sup>

What Maritain insists here about a philosopher in general and about being applies particularly to a political philosopher and to a political being respectively. For, it is the task of the political philosopher to deal with the political being which, as we saw above,<sup>89</sup> is the being of human persons with the added existential act of togetherness binding them for the attainment of their temporal common good. This being obeys the general laws of all human being; that of essence-existence polarity, that of analogy of being and that of political morality. Let us examine these laws separately; for, they guide the application of the immutable principles from the metaphysical point of view.

a) Essence-Existence Polarity:

The law of essence-existence polarity is a general metaphysical law in the Thomistic philosophical tradition. It is founded in the very concept of Being as Unity in its transcendental mode. Just as every thing that is, is Being, so also every thing that is, is Unity. But the Unity of a substantial being, for example, is different from that of an accidental being. In short the Unity of a being is proportional to its essence. And since the Unity of Being is finally sealed

on the existential order by the act of being (existence) then, Thomistic metaphysics has drawn this law of the essence-existence polarity as a law applicable to all being. Now, what is so special in applying this law to the political being?

Political being which is the being together of human persons, *ens politicum*, cuts for itself the *esse* - that acting together of human persons, in proportion to its essence - human persons as being social and political. Human persons as being naturally social and political is far from constituting the political being. It is only the essence of political being. To be a political being, this essence is naturally inseparable from its *esse*, the actual existing together of human persons performing a communal activity.

Modern political philosophers according to Maritain have made the error of confusing the political being with the political essence. They have treated politics as an abstract science. In liberal individualism, culture and society are treated as having an essential function of preserving something given as in the platonic world: *the free will of man.*<sup>90</sup>

This philosophy suffers, in Maritain's view, from an uncscious form of hypocrisy, for it ignores for the benefit of man in the abstract all the heavy and severe burdens that lie on man in real life.<sup>91</sup> Kierkegaard's criticism against Hegel has an analogical application here. For, Liberal individualism like Hegelianism is likened to constructions of ideal and

abstract palaces while the real man lives in a ramshackle.

This error of Liberal Individualism is suffered by all politics which only knows essences.<sup>92</sup> It forgets that the political philosopher does not deal with abstract entities only. For, as Maritain remarks, *the good and evil with which he deals are incarnated in historical energies of a determinate intensity, duration and amplitude.*<sup>93</sup> Thus, although one may know what is man in essence, one can only begin to philosophize in politics when he takes into account the existential conditions in which that essence is subjected. It is for this reason that Maritain makes the following remarks:

Political life concerns itself with concrete forces charged with humanity, heavy with fatality and with contingencies, and which are born of the event and move toward the event and the existential significance of which the politician has to take into account.<sup>94</sup>

These may include, educational, economic, cultural as well as philosophical and religious societies. The political being is constituted from all these individuals, communities and associations. Hence, the unity of the political Being must be very different from the unity of a substantive being. It is in accordance to the essence-existence polarity, a unity which is proportional to the unity of the essence.

As it was shown above,<sup>98</sup> the Mediaeval Civilization craved for a maximum unity based on the spiritual life of the person. The human person, for that matter, entered the political society by belonging to the same spiritual faith as the

members of the political society. Thus, the unity of the political society was founded on *the unity of theological faith and religious creed.*<sup>99</sup> This unity was much too high for the essence of the political society. No wonder why the attempt failed in the course of time; for there was no proportionality between the essence of the political being and the unity that was imposed on it. On the other hand, an effort has been made in modern civilization of uniting the political society and civilization on a purely material goal. But as it was shown above,<sup>100</sup> this effort failed even more miserably. The final result of this effort is seen in the atrocities that came with the totalitarian regimes at the turn of the twentieth century.

Maritain, being both a metaphysician and a historian of philosophy and of civilizations demands that the unity of the political being be proportional to its essence. This essence is constituted of moral beings acting together in order to achieve their common temporal well being. Hence, political being or political society is united by "a common good and a common task which are earthly, "temporal" or "secular" order, and in which citizens belonging to diverse spiritual groups or lineages share equally".<sup>101</sup> While this is a real unity, it is, nonetheless, a "minimum unity"<sup>102</sup>. This unity of the political being is proportional to the very nature of political society and of temporal civilization.

This law of the essence-existence polarity of the po-

political being is of paramount importance in applying the immutable principles to the concrete historical ideal. Not only does it help to determine the unity of various civilizations within the same epoch, or the unity of the various societies within the same civilization or the unity of the various communities within the same body politic; it also helps to identify the changing essence of civilization and civil societies as they develop in history.

In saying this I am taking into account that the essence of the political being is dynamic. It is never exactly the same; for since it is the work of reason, the political essence will change with the *prise de conscience* of the members that constitute it. As the persons in political societies gradually develop their awareness as wholes in the whole of political society, and as the communities and primordial societies within the body politic become aware of the cultural philosophical or religious backgrounds of the others the more fully the essence of the body politic becomes mature, as a work of reason. Maritain alludes to this in the following:

...if it is a mistake to forget that essences act only in existence...it is no less grave an error to forget that existence is the place of realization of essences. and that in the measure in which they are realized there, they develop there their internal energies and their logic, while at the same time combining with other forms, and with the whole historical heritage of the matter which receives them.<sup>103</sup>

From here, two conclusions emerge to the foreground. The first

points to the essence-existence polarity as a law guiding the application of the immutable principles to the concrete historical ideal by focusing attention on the need of appreciating the pluralism of the essence of the body politic and of temporal civilization as a whole. The second, helps in understanding the internal development of the political essence. Considered from this double function this law is very closely linked with another metaphysical law, the law of analogy which we shall now outline.

b) The Law of Analogy of Being:

It was remarked above that the existential conditions of the political being are diverse while the essential principles remain the same. But what do we mean by saying that the existential conditions are diverse? Does it mean that every historical epoch makes a fresh start? Maritain answers this question negatively. In the following text he warns about the two extreme errors to be avoided in philosophizing in politics and in culture.

In our opinion, the philosophy of culture must avoid two opposed errors, one of which brings all things together as if univocal, while the other separates all things as if equivocal. A philosophy of equivocity will imagine that with a change in time historical conditions become so different that they depend on supreme principles which are themselves heterogenous as though truth and right, the supreme rules of human action were mutable. A philosophy of univocity would lead us to believe that these supreme rules and principles always apply in the same way, and that in particular the way in which Christian principles are proportional to the conditions of each age and are realized in time should not vary at all. 104

For Maritain the being of political society is neither the same in all historical climates nor does it undergo a complete transformation from one epoch to another. There are permanents from one epoch to another as well as changes. Thus, it is only the philosophy of analogy that can understand culture as well as guide the application of the immutable principle to the changing historical climates which Maritain likens to various skies of constellations under which civilization passes.<sup>105</sup> The principles which are immutable, as well as the supreme practical rules of human behaviour are applied in various ways essentially diverse and answering to the same concept only according to similitude of proportion.<sup>106</sup>

Maritain admits that the principle of analogy was used by both Aristotle and St. Thomas in their political philosophy and particularly in determining the various political regimes with the corresponding types of common good.<sup>107</sup>

While Maritain sees the richness of the law of analogy in dealing with the being and becoming in political regimes, he does not stop there. For him the law of analogy is at the very heart of any authentic philosophy of culture and of politics. First of all he employs this law in the being and becoming of types of cultures or civilization. It is this philosophy, for example, which is needed in order to understand and explain the passage from the Mediaeval civilization to the modern age and from the modern age to the historical age we are entering. But besides this general application the law of

analogy must also be predominant in applying the principles to cultures within the same historical epoch. In this, Maritain admits the diversity of historical cultural and geographical conditions. But with the law of analogy which is able to contain both the permanent and the contingent it is possible to deal with the various shades or constellations of civilization within the same culture.

Besides this second level of the application of the law of analogy, Maritain sees a third level; that is the level of the political regimes within a culture or civilization. A regime like, for example democracy may be realized within the same historical age by civilizations which are different and yet be authentic democracy.

The law of analogy as it can be seen here plays as an important and indispensable part in Maritain's philosophy of culture as in his metaphysics. In his view a political philosopher intuits the political being together with its transcendental character and the analogical infinitude of its act of existence. He intuits the infinite ways of the realization of the possible political essence, the infinite possibilities the political essence may develop through existence and the various stages or levels of *Maturity* the political being assumes through the consciousness of the persons constituting it. However, he does not intuit these by a simple empirical observation of the facts. Rather he enters by Intuitions into

the ensemble of the matrix of economic social political ideological religious forces mapping the historical climate. He employs what Maritain has termed vectorial laws which we shall examine hereafter. For the moment suffice it to emphasize that the law of analogy suffuses the whole political philosophy of Maritain.

c) The Law of Political Morality:

What guides the application of the immutable principles to the concrete historical ideal as seen from the metaphysics of the political being must take into account that the political being like the persons who constitute it is a moral being. However, political morality is very much different from both individual morality and the morality of the domestic community. These are all branches of the same stem. However, political morality is distinct from the other branches precisely because it concerns itself with "the good of men assembled in political society."<sup>108</sup> This good as we saw above,<sup>108a</sup> is the terrestrial common good. It is a human good and therefore principally moral.

Maritain has strongly emphasized this last point in his treatise on Machiavellianism. What Machiavellianism has bequeathed to human history according to Maritain is a "profound split, an incurable division between politics and morality, and consequently an illusory but deadly antinomy between what people call idealism" (wrongly confused with ethics) "and what people call

realism" (wrongly confused with politics).<sup>109</sup> On the other hand he has equally strongly condemned a complete fusion of politics with morality, what he calls political hypermoralism. This is moral purism or moral pharisaism. It treats morality as pure theorems in the abstract while ignoring the concrete forces and pressures in which the concrete man and society are imbedded. "The principles of morality"; Maritain emphasizes repeatedly, "are neither theorems nor idols, but the supreme rules of a concrete activity which aims at a work to be done in such and such circumstances."<sup>110</sup>

In delineating political morality from both political amoralism and political hypermoralism, Maritain is submitting that the application of the immutable principles to the concrete historical ideal is subjected to certain norms which are proper to political morality.

The first of these is that of hierarchy of means. It demands of the application to be proportional to the end of political life. For, the order of means corresponds to that of ends.<sup>111</sup> It demands of "means in which that very justice which pertains to the essence of the common good and that very sanctification of secular pertains to its perfection shall be embodied."<sup>112</sup>

To sort out the means and to apply the rules of political morality to the particular cases of political life, the virtue of prudence is called into practice. This is another guiding norm proper to political morality. It is the indispensable virtue of a politician. For, as Maritain remarks, echoing both

Aristotle and St. Thomas, it does not suffice to be a pious just, holy, in order to be a good politician<sup>113</sup>. A politician must, besides being in himself a good man, have knowledge of technique necessary for the attainment of the common good; a knowledge of the human and moral value engaged in the common good, a knowledge of the social and political becoming and other exigencies arising from his knowledge of the aspiration of human persons in political society, the demands of justice and fraternal love.<sup>114</sup> With this knowledge and with his own moral integrity, a politician exercises the virtue of prudence in applying the immutable principles to the concrete historical ideal.

Essentially connected with the two foregoing norms and intrinsically related to the very nature of political morality is the principle of the lesser evil. This is another norm and the final one we shall examine in relation to the present subject. The principle refers to the recognition of the proper end of political morality, and the ambivalent nature of history, that is, the good and evil with which it deals. A politician does not seek to rid off from society all evils and vices. He does not seek to ferry individual persons to their absolute ultimate end. This is the concern of individual ethics. But political ethics, while taking into account this absolute ultimate end of the person it directly aims at the good of the assembled multitude. For this reason

there has to be a toleration of evils whose interdiction would bring with them greater evils.<sup>115</sup>

## ii. Historical Laws:

What shall be referred to here as historical laws comprise what Maritain has called Vectorial Laws or Typological formulas.<sup>116</sup> Primarily, they refer to given segments of history which are determined in extent and direction and in significance. Since, as we saw above, the immutable principles must be applied to various historical ages according to their proportional similitude, we must now investigate further how the vectorial laws of history themselves qualify this application. We shall be contented to examine only two of the vectorial laws; for it is, in my judgement, these two which are predominantly significant in our present subject.

## a) The Law of The Passage from "Sacral" to "Secular" or Lay Civilization:

Maritain views the gradual differentiation of the temporal from the spiritual order as a universal law. It is the law of the passage from the "sacral" to the "secular" or "lay" civilizations. This passage, if Maritain's observation is universally true, like history itself, does not move in *staccato*. There is no complete break from one historical age to another. One historical age may be called "sacral" because of its unity of faith. But by the time the passage of history will have turned as to pass under a completely different constellations as to deserve to be called "secular", it would have gone through many shades of sacral-secular matrices. For this

reason the application of the immutable principles must be guided by the existing relation between the temporal and the spiritual orders.

Maritain himself admits that although this distinction has been realized in the Western tradition where the Gospels distinction between God's and Caesar's domains has been fermenting, nonetheless, it is far from been realized in such a clear cut distinction in the Indian Civilization,<sup>117</sup> Moslem Civilization,<sup>118</sup> and even as regards the destiny of the Jewish people.<sup>119</sup> Yet the law according to him, remains universal. The universality of this law will be examined in the last chapter of this research. For the moment, let us assume that it is. Now, if it is universally valid, it must guide the application of the immutable principles to the particular conditions. Its importance lies in two areas: First of all since man is naturally religious, the organization of his social and political life cannot ignore this vital aspect of his life. Secondly, since the organization of his religious life varies with the different existential condition, the organization of his temporal life must also be dynamically affected. In short the relation of the temporal life of man to his spiritual one or in a narrower sense, the relation between the Church and the State is vectorial. It must take into account the content, the direction and the significance of the various forces at play in the relation.

b) The Law of the Political and Social coming of age of a people:

Maritain is referring here to the progressive passage of the people, whom as we saw above,<sup>120</sup> have a natural right to full autonomy and to self government from a state of subjection be it social or political, to a regime of civilization characterized by the democratic cast of mind and democratic philosophy.<sup>121</sup> This passage is natural to the progress of the people. It comes with the consciousness of the people and their awareness of the implications of the Natural Law. Its ultimate goal is the democratic state of mind and the democratic regime. This, according to Maritain, is "the highest terrestrial achievement of which the rational animal is capable here below."<sup>122</sup> However, Maritain holds that Democracy can only live on Gospel inspiration.<sup>123</sup> We shall see in chapter VI as to whether Maritain's doctrine on Democracy makes his political philosophy less universally applicable.

This law guides the application of the immutable principles. For, the people coming to age socially or politically are, even in the same historical age, subjected to very different forces. Some have tasted only political democracy and they are setting out to the land of social and economic democracy; others have tasted some form of economic and social democracy but they are herded like sheep by regimes of totalitarian tendencies; and yet others are struggling to shake off the yoke of colonialism in order to be a people. These various stages

of the people's coming of age must be taken into consideration in applying the immutable principles to the present historical age.

## 4. Summary

This chapter is undoubtedly a necessary link in Maritain's political philosophy, between the immutable principles and the practical formulae which are to guide the immediate political action. In it, I have outlined the salient features which identify the historical constellations defining the new civilization and the laws that guide the application of the immutable principles. The laws have been identified as metaphysical and historical.

The metaphysical laws, so properly designated, are immediate deduction from Maritain's metaphysical doctrine of human person and the political society. This means that, once it has been shown that the political society, like the human person who is its social unit, is a moral being, pursuing a moral end, then it necessarily follows that a) for this political being, its unity of being is proportional to its essence—the being together of human beings with their added togetherness; b) its analogical nature arising both from its participating in the transcendental nature of being and from the realization of the same principles in different historical, spatial and cultural matrices; and c) the important role of prudence in directing the activities of this political being arises from the very moral nature of its activity as it courses towards its moral end. The historical laws are not deductible from the metaphysical nature of man and political society.

If they were so, Maritain would not differ from Hegel whom he criticizes severely for turning the study of history into a purely speculative study. Rather, they are conclusions or formulas arrived at inductively from the study of the various historical segments taking into account the historical forces defining the segments, their direction and their significance. Maritain has drawn these formulas from his keen study of the history of civilizations.

In the same way he has arrived at the determinants of the concrete historical ideal of the New Civilization, after the liquidation of the liberal civilization. These determinants are very general observations, akin to large sign posts with many very roughly written instructions, to orientate all the peoples of the World, roofed under the same historical sky, towards the direction of the New Civilization. This orientation is unmistakably vectorial; for, not only does it guide all the peoples of the World, it also allows for their different cultural contents, their different historical stages of development as well as their social and political level of consciousness.

Having defined the salient features of the concrete historical ideal and the laws that guide the application of the immutable principles to this ideal, I shall now present, in the following chapter, Maritain's personalist democracy, the ideal political philosophy for the New Civilization.

1. IH p. 127; HI p. 134. See also FMW pp. 103-111; RTL pp. 120-131.  
A concrete historical ideal may be assembled by using the vectorial laws defining the content, direction and significance of the segment of history. A philosopher of politics intuitively grasps the essence of this historical realization or civilization and the conditions which make it probable. Different from a speculative philosopher, however, the political philosopher deals with concrete historical and political events; thus, he is able in a concrete way to assemble, although in a remote manner, the ideal or essence toward which the political and historical vectors point. Both in grasping the essence of the concrete historical ideal and in applying the immutable principles to define the new political regime, the political philosopher is bound to use the law of analogy of being.
2. IH. p. 123; HI. p. 136.
3. IH. p. 128; HI. p. 135.
4. Ibid.,
5. Ibid.,
6. In his use of the term myth as distinguished from Utopia George Sorel shares a lot with Maritain's concept of Ideal. However, as Charles O'Donnell remarks, Maritain does not share the anti-intellectualism of Cardinal Newman whose Grammar of Assent, Sorel cites in support of his views. The Ideal of a New Christendom: The Cultural and Political Philosophy of Jacques Maritain, Unpublished Ph.D. Thesis, Harvard, 1940. Fn. 23 Chap. VIII.
7. IH p. 128; HI p. 135.
8. IH p. 244; HI p. 248.
9. Ibid.,
10. Ibid.,
11. Ibid.,
12. MS p. 109.
13. IH p. 253; HI p. 258.

14. IH p. 253; HI p. 258  
Maritain uses the term Revolution here in a sense much more profound than is usually accorded to the word: a sudden political overthrow brought about from within the system, often accompanied by killings. Maritain avoids this sudden change of the externals of a system. For him, using the words of Peguy, "The social Revolution will be a moral Revolution or not at all". It is a Revolution, first of all, of the spiritual life of the individuals. For, a renewal of the social order on Christian lines will be a heroic work of sanctity. This requires a true Revolution within the lives of the individuals. Cf. FMW pp. 144-147, RTL pp. 169-172; and IH pp. 246-252, HI pp. 250-257.
15. IH p. 244, HI p. 248.
16. The world wide depression of 1929, The Nazi ascendancy of 1933, the Stavisky scandal of 1934, the Spanish Civil War of 1936 and the break of the Second World War are but a few of the many bitter events of the 30s. These events and their consequences inspired on the international scene as well as in France a spirit of despair and a profound pessimism for the future of humanity. The spiritual anarchy, economic and political disorder, all seemed to point to an irresistible catastrophe of the world. Cf. J.L. Loubet del Bayle, Les Non-Conformistes des Années 30, 1969, pp. 185-267, "Rupture avec le Desordre Etabli." See also Chapter I, above.
17. IH p. 146; HI p. 153.
18. IH p. 146; HI p. 153.
19. This is a very appropriate analogy for the maximal unity; just as the star is above the horizon, the unity of faith is very much above the nature of the body politic.
20. IH p. 147; HI p. 154.
21. RR. p. 165. See also MS p. 157, 160.
22. IH p. 148; HI p. 155.

23. "So therefore if we consider the agent supposito, each particular agent is immediate with regard to its effect. But if we consider the power by which the action takes place, the power of the superior cause will in this way be more immediate to the effect than the power of the inferior one; for the inferior power is brought to bear (conjointly) upon the effect only through the power of the superior". De Pot., III, 7c. "...it is not inadmissible that the same effect be produced by the inferior agent and by God, immediately by both, though in different ways." CG, III, 70. Cf. ST, I, 36, 3, ad 4m.
24. IH p. 146; HI p. 156.
25. RR p. 165. See also MS p. 157. Maritain explains "sacred" by citing Charles Journet, L'Eglise du Verbe Incarné, 2 vols., 1955. In Volume I, pp. 246ff. Journet draws clearly the distinction between the sacred and the temporal. The mediaeval civilization was sacred because the temporal order was subjected as an instrument of the spiritual order. But when the two orders are clearly kept distinct both in theory and in practice, Maritain argues that the secular age, though truly secular in the sense that temporal civilization has its own proper common good, yet this civilization is built on something truly and by nature sacred: the vocation of the human person to a spiritual fulfilment and to the conquest of true freedom, and the reserves of moral integrity required for all this. Cf. IH p. 183, HI p. 188; also FMW pp. 36-46.
26. IH p. 150; HI p. 156.
27. The anointing of a king by the Pope indicated two things: first of all that the King in his person is separated from the people and given a power and an independence of a whole transcending the political whole, Max Adam Shepard, "Sovereignty at the Crossroads: A Study of Bodin", Political Science Quarterly, XLV, 1930, pp. 580-603. On the other hand, the fact that the King was anointed by the Pope indicates the implicit subordination of the King to the Pope as the temporal order to the spiritual one. Maritain makes a thorough critique of the first in his effort to demonstrate the erroneous origin of sovereignty. Cf. Man and the State, pp. 30-36.


28. Maritain relates the concept of Sovereignty to a power and independence which are supreme separately from above the whole ruled by the sovereign. Thus, for him political philosophy must get rid of this concept because it is intrinsically wrong. It does not belong to this realm. Neither a King nor the people is or can be sovereign. He demonstrates the origin of the concept of sovereignty to substantiate his thesis. Man and the State, Chapter III.
29. IH p. 151; HI p. 157.
30. The concept of Gild was, throughout the Middle Ages synonymous with fraternities. It included in its definition the fraternal and occupational aspects. The relationship between the members was personal and intimate. For, although the need of Gilds sprang from economic need, yet, because the economic was inextricably intertwined with the social and the spiritual aspects of the life of the community, the economic was always subordinated to the latter aspects. Cf. Tawney R.H., Religion and the Rise of Capitalism, 1969, (1926); T. Sylvia, "The Gilds", pp. 230-280 in the Cambridge Economic History of Europe From the decline of the Roman Empire, Vol., 3: Economic Organization and Policies in the Middle Ages, Cambridge University Press.
31. IH p. 152; HI p. 158.  
The fact that the economy of the Mediaeval Civilization was conceived within the politico-spiritual community with definite moral and spiritual values of man did not allow the alienation of the class of workers with marketable labour akin to the Marxian analysis.
32. IH. p. 152; HI. p. 158.
33. IH. p. 153; HI. p. 159
34. PH. p. 47.
35. cf. The introduction to this Chapter above.
36. IH p. 139; HI p. 146.
37. IH p. 177; HI p. 182.
38. IH p. 176; HI p. 181.

39. J. W. Evans, "Jacques Maritain and the Problem of Pluralism in Political life", in Review of Politics, XXII, 1960, p. 308.
40. FMW p. 61; RTL p. 72.
41. Ibid.,
42. Ibid.,
43. FMW p. 33, RTL p. 39.
44. FMW p. 61; RTL p. 72.
45. Yves Floucat has made a very illuminating study on this subject: "La Philosophie Sociale de Jacques Maritain", Revue Thomiste, Avril-Juin, 1978, pp. 226-269. The present remarks are not aimed at the depth that Floucat has attained. Rather, it is an effort to deliceate Maritain's corporate economy" from the other two which he condemns in his major philosophical works.
46. FMW p. 127; RTL p. 148.
47. FMW p. 129; RTL p. 151.
48. IH. p. 77; IH. p. 85.
49. FMW p. 30; RTL p. 36.
50. FMW p. 40; RTL p. 47.
51. FMW p. 100; RTL p. 117.
52. PM. p. 316 (1960); MP p. 254 (1964) See also, IH p. 81 HI p. 88.
53. MP p. 254, PM. p. 316.
54. QC p. 103.
55. IH p. 84; HI p. 92.
56. FMW p. 139; RTL p. 163.
57. RC p. 152. Cited in Floucat Op. Cit., p. 255.
58. MS pp. 167-168.

59. MS p. 168.
60. MS p. 170.
61. IH p. 177; HI p. 182.
62. IH p. 176; HI p. 181.
63. Nic. Eth. 1094a 1-5. Aristotle distinguishes two types of ends: Ends in themselves and ends as activities to other ends. This latter fits in the category which Maritain is describing as intermediate end. And this refers to the Thomistic distinction of "fins ultimus simpliciter" and "fins ultimus secundum quid".
64. Baroque Age: From the Portuguese "barroco", an irregularly chaped shell often used as decoration, Baroque Age describes roughly the century 1550-1648, the dawn of the reflexive age or the age of reason. During this time, there was a gradual turning away from objective to subjective aspects in art. While the classical age sought to describe the objective, impersonal and perfect, the baroque age ushered the subjective impressions objectified through imagination. On this account, diversity was introduced where there had always been unity in conformity, irregularity and incalculable freedom where there had been objectivity and regularity. Cf. Will and Ariel Durant, The Story of Civilization. 11 Vols., New York, Simon and Schuster, 1961: The Age of Reason Begins, Vol. VII, pp. 265-267.
65. MS pp. 152-153. See also FMW p. 107; RTL p. 125; IH. p. 177; HI p. 182. See also note 12 on MS. p. 158 where Maritain refers to Charles Journet's comment on the distinction in L'Eglise du Verbe Incarné, p. 243.
66. MS pp. 61-62, Cf. IH pp. 217-219; HI pp. 221-223.
67. IH p. 178; HI p. 183.

68. In a text very revealing, Maritain shows how the turning away from the unifying centre of the Unity of Faith towards the Conquest of Freedom in the awareness of self marks the modern era: "A general progress of prise de conscience of self---characterises the modern era. While the World turned away from spirituality par excellence and from that love which is our true end, to turn to exterior goods and the exploitation of sensible nature, the universe of immanence appeared on the scene, sometimes through sordid doors: a subjective deepening revealed their own peculiar spirituality to science, art, poetry, to the very passions of man and his vices, and the demand of freedom became all the more clamorous as men moved farther and farther away from the conditions and the true notion of freedom. In short, in virtue of the ambivalence of history, the reflex age, with all the diminutions and losses which, this word connotes, involved in other respects an undeniable enrichment, and one that we must hold for a definitive gain, in the knowledge of the creature and of human things, even if this knowledge was to empty into the interior hell of man a pray to himself. This murky way is not without issue, and the fruits that have been gathered while traversing it have been incorporated into our substance". Religion et Culture, Paris 1946, pp. 30-31. (J. W. Evans's translation as cited in, "Jacques Maritain and the problem of Pluralism in Political Life", in The Review of Politics, Vol. XXII, 1960, p. 308.
69. IH p. 178; HI p. 185.
70. IH p. 178; HI p. 185. Cf. Chapter I above.
71. MS. p. 161.
72. Truth and Human Fellowship, Princeton, 1957, pp. 23-24.
73. Heraclitus, Fragments, 8a Diels, cited by J. W. Evans, Op. Cit., p. 311.
74. IH. p. 199; HI p. 204
75. IH p. 200; HI p. 206
76. Ibid.,
- 76a. Ibid.,
77. Cf. Chapter V pp. 13ff.

- 77a. IH p. 203; HI p. 208.
- 78. CD. p. 28.
- 79. MS p. 78.
- 80. MS p. 111.
- 81. RT p. 17.
- 82. Ibid.,
- 83. PH p. 80.
- 84. RR pp. 179-184.
- 85. MS. p. 111.
- 86. EE. p. 19; CT. p. 52.
- 87. PM. p. 49 (1962).
- 88. EE. p. 36; CT. p. 80.
- 89. Cf. Chapter III above.
- 90. FMW p. 40; RTL
- 91. Ibid.,
- 92. IH p. 220; HI p. 224.
- 93. IH p. 137; HI p. 141.
- 94. IH p. 220; HI p. 224.
- 98. Chapter V p.
- 99. RR. p. 165.
- 100. Chapter I
- 101. MS p. 109.
- 102. Chapter V p.
- 103. IH p. 220; HI p. 224.
- 104. IH p. 138; HI p. 145.

105. MS p. 156. See also IH p. 138; HI p. 145.
106. "The Diversity of cities stems from the diversity of ends, or from different ways of tending to a same end. From the fact that they choose different ends or different ways of proceeding to a same end, men create varying forms of common life and in consequence diverse cities, *diversas vitas faciunt, et per consequens diversas republicas*" *Ek Vii, Lec. 6; Cf. Summa Theologica, II-II, 62, 2.* Cited in IH p. 138; HI p. 144.
107. MS p. 63
108. IH p. 216; HI p. 220.
- 108a. See Chapter III.
109. RR p. 137.
110. IH p. 217; HI p. 228.
111. MS p. 63.
112. MS p. 63. Cf. FMW pp. 139-192; RTL pp. 163-225; IH pp. 246-252; HI pp. 250-256.
113. IH. p. 217; HI p. 221.
114. IH. p. 217; HI p. 221.
115. IH. p. 218; HI. p. 222.
116. PH. p. 113.
117. Ibid.,
118. Ibid., p. 85
119. Ibid.,
120. Cf. Chapter III above.
121. MS. p. 59.
122. MS. p. 61.
123. SP. p. 66ff.
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## CHAPTER VI

### MARITAIN'S PERSONALIST DEMOCRACY

...The personalist conception of democracy is first of all determined by the idea of man as God's image, and by the idea of the common good, of human rights and of concrete liberty; and it is based on Christian humanism. I do not pretend at all however, that personalist democracy may ever impose itself in the name of the Christian creed, no more than, in the speculative order. Thomist metaphysics can impose itself in the name of this creed. SP. p. 68-69. /

## 1. Introduction:

The foregoing chapters have treated Maritain's personalist democracy from its various constitutive parts. In Chapter I, I discussed how the development of Maritain's political philosophy was gradually shaped by the existential conditions that defined the historical period of his life time and the political problems posed by these conditions.

The subsequent chapters have been devoted to the examination of the way Maritain tackled the problems. Thus, the various components of Maritain's political personalism have been exposed. It might be deemed opportune at this juncture to proceed with the enquiry into the relevancy of Maritain's political personalism. But in order to make this enquiry more orderly and sufficiently exhaustive, I shall first make a résumé of Maritain's personalist democracy, no longer in its constitutive elements as I did in the foregoing chapters, but as a whole.

There may be a risk of repetition here, but it can be tolerated with the understanding that in the present treatment the main purpose, while presenting Maritain's personalist democracy as a whole, is not simply to repeat what has been discussed above, but rather, to accentuate, for the sake of the subsequent assessment, the importance and centrality in this

philosophy of various themes, principles and ideas.

This chapter shall, therefore, consist of two parts. The first shall be devoted to the resumé of Maritain's personalist democracy while the second part shall be devoted to the assessment of the relevancy of this philosophy.

## 2. Nature of Personalist Democracy:

## i. The Nature of Democracy:

"The tragedy of the modern democracies is that they have not yet succeeded in realizing democracy".<sup>1</sup> This is the statement with which Maritain opens one of the chapters in his book Christianity and Democracy. With this statement Maritain attains two goals with one stroke: he distinguishes the two uses of the word democracy and passes a judgement on modern democracies. What, then, is democracy as he employs it?

The word democracy, as it appears in the first part of the statement above, designates, in more or less the same manner as in classical philosophy, political democracy - poli-teia. This is one of the three classical systems of government, the others being monarchy and aristocracy. These were the three legally possible forms of government and which, as Maritain remarks, were compatible with human dignity.<sup>2</sup> )

As it appears in the second part of the statement, however, and this is how it is used by modern people,<sup>3</sup> democracy has a much wider meaning. It designates, "...first and foremost a general philosophy of human and political life, and a state of mind".<sup>4</sup> This is the interpretation given to the word through the efforts of the Catholic Church at the end of the XIXth Century, and especially by Pope Leo XIII, to procure for the working classes, "...more than ever oppressed in modern world, the human conditions of life required not only by charity, but also and in the first place by justice".<sup>5</sup> It is

also in the same vein that communists, particularly during the 1936 Communist International, determined to support popular fronts and popular democracies. Likewise, liberal individualism craved for this philosophy of democracy. Unfortunately, Rousseau raised it to the religious and mythical democratism.

Obviously, whether as interpreted by Christianity or by liberal individualism and communism, democracy has one thing in common. It means "...the supreme ideal which the political and social work in mankind has to aim at".<sup>6</sup>

This understanding of democracy does not, a priori, align itself with nor exclude any of the three classical forms of government. Any of them can be democratic, provided that it is consistent with the principles of this philosophy. However, the natural tendency is that as soon as the "...historical circumstances lend themselves, the dynamism of democratic thought leads as a natural current to the government of its own name".<sup>7</sup> This government is what Maritain describes in the words of Abraham Lincoln: "...government of the people, by the people, for the people".<sup>8</sup>

Maritain submits that the whole human history tends to the realization of the democratic philosophy by inaugurating and gradually striving to perfect a "...brotherly city, which does not imply the hope that all men will someday be perfect on earth and love each other fraternally, but the hope that the existential state of human life and the structures of

civilization will draw near to their perfection, the standard of justice and friendship...".<sup>9</sup>

Maritain is referring here to a natural historical level of development following what he describes as "...the law of the political and social coming of age of the people",<sup>10</sup> by which political society and civilization attain their true nature as a work of reason. Thus, political society, in applying reason to its organization, opts for the moral rationalization rather than mechanical or Machiavellian means. In this respect, "...democracy is the only way of bringing about a moral rationalization of politics - because democracy is a rational organization of freedoms founded upon law".<sup>11</sup> Not only that. The whole historical process through which man has gradually realized his nature as rational and free in society, is a process towards the coming to pass of the democratic philosophy which is "...the highest terrestrial achievement of which the rational animal is capable here below".<sup>12</sup>

It has been stated above that the democratic philosophy is the supreme ideal that the whole human history tends to. In Maritain's view, however, there is Christian democracy which is radically different from individualist democracy. This latter is anarchic, neutral, and pharisaic. Its protagonists believed that they could erect the brotherly city, a work requiring justice, law, respect for the human person, and civic friendship by "...rejecting any traces of transcendence of the

supreme foundation of justice and personality".<sup>13</sup> These wished to be, as Maritain puts it, "...surpassingly human, and also practically atheist".<sup>14</sup> Unfortunately, they did not heed Aristotle's admonition that to propose to man only human things is to destroy him. Consequently, the liberal civilization with its individualist democracy is collapsing, "...drawn dry by its hypocrisies and by the lack of evangelical sap".<sup>15</sup>

But the failure of the individualist democracy is far from being the failure of democracy just as a mistake in addition is far from being the failure of arithmetic. Nor do we need to change the name on account of the corruption rendered to it by the bourgeois civilization. What is needed, rather, is to discover the true essence of democracy. This is what Maritain claims to have done. He has proposed a "personalist democracy" in the place of the individualist democracy: "...integrally human or real, contrary to the abortive democracy of the liberal civilization".<sup>16</sup>

ii. Personalist Democracy:

In Maritain's view, democracy is entering a new stage. It is a stage, as we have shown above,<sup>17</sup> which breaks with the modern civilization. In order to do so, that is, in order to sever itself from a civilization "...spiritually founded on bourgeois humanism and economically on the fecundity of money while at the same time keeping itself immune from the totalitarian or communist errors to which this regime leads

as to its logical catastrophe",<sup>18</sup> this new democracy must be Christian. But it radically differs from the mediaeval Christendom which was Christian only in structure,<sup>19</sup> as well as from bourgeois democracy which was built on a materialist conception of man.

What uniquely distinguishes this democracy, which shall be designated from now on as Maritain's personalist democracy is that it is personalist. It follows Maritain's distinction of personality and individuality as well as his doctrine of freedom of expansion.<sup>20</sup> In the following text Maritain describes this democracy which is not only organic but also the concrete historical ideal of the New Civilization.

This organic democracy does not suppress, even in principle, either authority or power. It wishes both to come from the people and to be exercised in its name. At its root we find the idea that man is not 'born free' (independent), but must conquer freedom and that in the State - a hierarchic totality of persons - men must be governed as persons, not as things; and towards a common good truly human, which flows back to the persons, and whose chief value is the latter's freedom of expansion. Naturally, (sic) democracy thus understood is a concrete historical ideal, which still needs many centuries of human education before it will take on all its dimensions in history. But this tendency is precisely in line with a rational nature's aspirations towards its perfect accomplishment.<sup>21</sup>

We shall discuss below the principal characteristics of this democracy and the ways recommended by Maritain for its realization. However, from the citation above we may draw the conclusion that the personalist democracy of Maritain is "...immanent to the people and it is ordained to a common good which

is also an immanent common good of the people".<sup>22</sup> What does this mean?

The people, as was demonstrated earlier, is, according to Maritain, a multitude of human persons. They naturally form the civil society, partly because of their indigencies as individuals and partly also because of their superabundance in existence; an existence which is due to the spiritual mode of being of their personality. Now, due to this spiritual mode of being, the persons' vocation is towards the enjoyment of spiritual goods. They seek these even as they live in political society. They naturally, as members of political society, tend to make these spiritual goods overflow into the organization of their temporal life.<sup>23</sup> In this regard, Maritain affirms that personalist democracy is the philosophy most compatible with this process; for in its very bosom it respects the dignity of the human person, human equality, freedom, and the ideal of peace.<sup>24</sup> But as it was also demonstrated above, these spiritual goods must be embodied in the very essence of the common good. Thus, it is obvious why this personalist democracy is both immanent in the nature of the people and why it is ordained to the immanent common good of the people.

One more point in connection with the nature of personalist democracy needs to be discussed in order to fully understand the true nature of personalist democracy. This is the relation between Maritain's personalist democracy and religion.

iii. Personalist Democracy and Christian Inspiration:

"If democracy enters its next historical stage with sufficient intelligence and vitality", Maritain emphasizes, "a renewed democracy will not ignore religion, as the bourgeois XIXth Century society".<sup>25</sup> What does this mean? Does Maritain mean, as several of his critics seem to suggest,<sup>26</sup> a natural tie exists between personalist democracy and Christianity?

One of the most serious errors of the bourgeois democracy, according to Maritain, is that it is a philosophy of life which attempted an illusory naturalization or secularization of evangelical truths. This, in his view, went against the very natural process of human history. For, as Bergson remarks, and Maritain cites this in several of his books, "...democracy is evangelic in its essence, and its motive power is love".<sup>27</sup> Thus, Maritain insists that his personalist democracy contrary to the bourgeois democracy takes full account of the human history labouring towards a fuller evangelization of nature".<sup>28</sup>

The link between democracy and the evangelical inspiration is not one of right. This means that democracy is not so intrinsically related to evangelical inspiration that to be democrat is to be a Christian. This is the error that Hans Kersel reads to Maritain. Regarding the emphasis Maritain puts on the need to reconcile the gospel inspiration with the democratic inspiration Kersel seems to understand Maritain as

advocating an essential connection between democracy and christianity so that without the latter one cannot have the former.<sup>29</sup>

But Kersel attributes gratuitously to Maritain what he criticizes. As a matter of fact, Maritain, metaphysician as he is, does not lose sight of the fact that democracy is an analogical term; it is realized practically in diverse ways. Not only that. It is also justified theoretically in equally diverse ways. He is convinced nonetheless that his christian way of justifying the basis of democracy is the only one which is solidly based in truth.<sup>30</sup> But for him this connection does not prevent him from agreeing on the practical tenets underlying the democratic charter.

Maritain's insistence on the need of reconciling the democratic inspiration with the Christian inspiration is a recognition of the historical fact that the ideal of democracy sprung up from the gospel inspiration. It is to recognize as a fact that in principle democracy tends towards the fulfilment of the Christian idea of the person. For this reason while there may be many levels of realizing democracy which may or may not be attained without the gospel inspiration the factual attainment of the ideal of democracy which is the fulfilment of the Christian ideal of the person can hardly be reached without the Christian inspiration.

The relation between the democratic inspiration and the Gospel inspiration is, for Maritain, one of fact. "It concerns

only - as in the question of slavery -, the germinations naturally reduced in the depths of profane and temporal conscience itself under the influence of Christian leaven".<sup>31</sup> It is, thus, the historical coming of the age of humanity due to the Christian light. And this light is not Christianity as religion. If it were so, Maritain would be contradicting himself by saying that the christianly inspired body politic of his personalist democracy, "...would recognize that men belonging to most different philosophical or religious creeds and lineages could and should cooperate in the common task and for the common welfare, provided they similarly assent to the basic tenets of a society of free men".<sup>32</sup> It is thus clear that Maritain is not talking of Christianity as a religious creed. Does he not insist elsewhere that Christianity and Christian faith cannot be subservient to any politics or even to democracy as a philosophy of human and political life?<sup>33</sup> What Maritain means by Christian inspiration emerges from the following text:

The question does not deal here with Christianity as a religious creed and road to eternal life, but rather with Christianity as leaven in the social and political life of nations and as bearer of the temporal hope of mankind; it does not deal with Christianity as a treasure of divine truth sustained and propagated by the Church, but with Christianity as historical energy at work in the world. It is not in the depths of the secular conscience and secular existence that Christianity works this fashion.<sup>34</sup>

What, then, has Christianity as leaven in the social and political life of nations contributed to the democratic awakening

of the secular conscience?

Maritain reminds his readers that from the advent of Christianity Christ himself drew the distinction of the spiritual order from the temporal one. "Give to Caesar what is Caesar's and to God what is God's". With this distinction and the vocation of the person to supernatural life in the kingdom of God the secular conscience has been awakened to the dignity of the human person. The secular conscience has gradually understood that the person, while truly a part of the political society, transcends it infinitely. From this inspiration, mankind has gradually been awakened to the various rights of the person: as a human person, as a civic person, as engaged in social and economic activity; and to the dignity of the common people, their equality in nature, the relative in equality in the necessary hierarchical setup of the civil society.<sup>35</sup>

In regard to the nature and organization of the civil society, the secular conscience has learned from the Christian inspiration that politics depends intrinsically upon morality, that the political society has a proper common good which is immanent in the nature of the human person and which must thus embody the goods due to it from its transcendental vocation; in particular that common good must be the temporal conquest of freedom from which the persons receive positive aid as they pursue the higher freedom of exultation and auto-

nomy. For that reason the secular conscience has also understood that civic friendship is not enough to attain this high ideal of the person; it has been awakened to the need and role in the temporal city.

In short, all these inspirations that have now been inculcated in human history and from which the democratic inspiration germinated, have arisen from the leaven of Christianity. Thus, as Bergson has remarked, "...in the democratic state of mind a great effort whose direction is inverse to that of nature"<sup>36</sup>, it is clear that democracy is a heroism; it places its stakes on justice, equality and generosity. All these nourish on the spiritual energy that comes from the divine in order to lift up the human and the political to the highest degree of their level. It is only through the generous gift of the person as person to the political society that this can come about.

The whole doctrine of the need of reconciliation between the democratic inspiration and the Christian inspiration is another manifestation of the doctrine which is absolutely central in Maritain's practical philosophy, that is, moral philosophy is only adequately considered after it takes into account the fact that man is not in a state of pure nature, but in one fallen and elevated. For this reason, while democracy is presupposed by natural law, yet, in the reality of the present state of man, the law of the Gospel working like

leaven in human history is necessary for the very nature of democracy, which in Maritain's view is the personalist democracy. I shall now examine the characteristics of this democracy.

### 3. The Characteristics of Personalist Democracy:

Maritain's doctrine of the human person and of the political society and its common good determine the characteristics of his personalist democracy. When making the exposition of the doctrine of the human person above, in Chapters II and IV, we saw that a person is a universe or a whole of spiritual nature endowed with freedom of choice and intended to enjoy freedom of autonomy. We also saw in Chapter III that he pursues his freedom of autonomy with his fellow men in political society. Although this latter, in Maritain's view, has its origin, preparation and plan in nature, nonetheless, it reaches its fulfilment as a work of reason.<sup>37</sup> It provides the conditions and means that will guarantee the achievement of the common good, which is a proper good of the human person, while at the same time, assisting each person positively to attain, through the flowering of his initial freedom, the terminal freedom or the spiritual freedom of the citizens.<sup>38</sup> This understanding of the human person and the political society signals the characteristics of Maritain's personalist democracy.<sup>39</sup> Although I have discussed these characteristics already in Chapter IV, I shall deal with them, here by summarizing, for the sake of emphasis, the aspects of these characteristics which have not yet been dealt with above and which play a very important role in Maritain's personalist democracy.

## i. Personalist:

Maritain's understanding of the human person reveals that human life has two movements in response to the two sets of aspiration intrinsic in the nature of the person: the "connatural" and the "transnatural" aspirations.<sup>40</sup> The two movements do not simply correspond to these aspirations. These aspirations qualify both the vertical and the horizontal which are simultaneously connatural and transnatural. This is obvious from the consideration of Maritain's concept of the person. Personality and individuality are not separated. They are only distinguished; otherwise it is the whole which plays the role of part and whole in society.

Bearing the unity of the person in mind it can be said that the direction of the first movement is towards the person's vocation to his ultimate absolute end.<sup>41</sup> This movement demands a gradual and continual growth in that love of God which surpasses everything else: "...even though in the present the person carries with him imperfections and weakness."<sup>42</sup>

It is very important to point out at this juncture that the personalist democracy does not directly aim this vertical movement. However, it demands that there be a recognition at least as a practical tenet, of vertical aspiration of the person, and his fulfilment in goods that transcend the temporal common good. This is the minimum requirement for a personalist democracy.

The personalist democracy, understanding this first movement, "...recognizes all that is irrational in man in order to tame it by reason, and all that is supra-rational, in order to have reason vivified by it and to open man to the descent of the divine into him".<sup>43</sup> It wards off the errors of the materialist or individualist democracy by firmly integrating in its charter the belief that man's liberty and creative forces are not awakened neither by the grace of the state nor any party pedagogy but only by that love "...which fixes the center of his life infinitely above the world and temporal history".<sup>44</sup> Thus, contrary to the individualist democracy which sought the perfection of man and society from external techniques, this personalist democracy is personalist precisely because it counts on the internal energies of the person due to it through its vertical movement.<sup>45</sup>

Besides the vertical movement, the human person and his life are lodged in a horizontal movement. This is the movement of temporal civilization towards its authentic aim, the liberation of man from the constraints due to him from his material nature; liberation from servitude and misery. It was shown above<sup>46</sup> that the supreme ideal of this historical movement is the establishment of the democratic spirit through which the work of inaugurating a brotherly city is started.

The personalist democracy understands that the two movements of the dynamism of human life are not separated one

from the other; they are distinguished rather than separated. As a matter of fact, according to the description of the organic nature of the personalist democracy,<sup>47</sup> the two movements are dependent one upon the other. On the one hand, while the horizontal movement endeavors to attain its genuine common good which is immanent in the persons, it simultaneously and positively assists the individual persons in their vertical movement. For the genuine common good embodies in itself the moral and spiritual goods of the person. On the other hand, the energy with which the temporal movement is animated flows from the persons as persons, in their pursuit of the vertical movement. Without this energy the horizontal movement would dry out of the energy needed to drive it forward.<sup>48</sup>

In view of the two movements inherent in the dynamism of human life in society the personalist philosophy of Maritain sees the mark of human dignity not in the power of each individual citizen to appropriate, to enjoy and to dispose of the goods of nature as he wants, this was the mark of human dignity for the individualist democracy. Nor does it stake human dignity, as Marxists do, in the power to submit the goods of nature to the economic collective in order to "free" human labour and to control history. The personalist democracy of Maritain sees the mark of human dignity "...in the power to make these same goods of nature serve the common conquest of intrinsically human, moral and spiritual goods and of man's freedom of autonomy"<sup>49</sup>.

The final comment to be made in connection with the personalist characteristic of Maritain's democracy is that it is "classless". Not classless in the Marxian sense. For Marx, the final stage of the communist society will be classless because it will be stateless. The state is born from class struggle and war of man by man. Thus the final stage shall witness the natural death of the state, the end of the class of rulers and the ruled. Besides, it will be marked by man's complete return to himself from the various forms of alienation. On this stage, man will work spontaneously appropriating only what he needs and distributing the excess to his fellow men. Thus, men would be equal and the society would be classless.

But Marx's theory is illusory. First of all, his premises that human society is constituted of warring classes is false. It is build on a materialistic conception of man. Secondly, Marx seems to confuse class and order; for to suggest that the final stage of communism is classless because it will be stateless is to shift from his original theory of class struggle to the denial of the natural hierarchy in a human society. The former is a fact of the society that Marx was criticizing; a fact due to the capitalist structure. The latter is, however, a requirement due to the very nature of human society as a work of reason. Moreover, in Maritain's view, Marx confuses the order of doing and that of making, or action and production, prudence and art, the government of men

with the government of things by suggesting that the adequate administration of production will dispense human society of the government of men.<sup>50</sup> Thirdly, Marx found recourse in external conditioning; material and mechanical means, for conducting man to the final stage of liberation. But this state is *suprahuman*; it demands a complete possession of man's material nature by his spiritual virtues. It is thus inconceivable for this *suprahuman* state to be attained by means inferior to the nature of man. In this case, as long as the Marxian thesis is premised on a materialist nature of man, neither human equality, nor a classless society properly speaking can be attained.

The true classless society can be inaugurated and sustained only by the personalist democracy. For as Maritain affirms this philosophy, true to the nature of the human person, the equality of human nature, the true nature of authority,<sup>51</sup> the friendship vitalized by higher virtues than civic virtues, constitutes the "...historical ideal for which men can be asked to work, fight and die".<sup>52</sup> The society inspired by this philosophy is classless in the true sense of the word. While it seeks the liquidation of all the classes due to the capitalist society, it sets new forms of differentiating orders in political society, for there is no order without diversity and inequality of rank.<sup>53</sup> These orders, according to Maritain, would not be based on birth, nor on riches, but on work.

## ii. Communal:

The communal characteristic of the personalist democracy refers to the common good<sup>54</sup> of the body politic. This means that the body politic is ordained to a common good which is temporal in nature and which is capable of uniting and drawing as to its final end the common task of the body politic. This common good of civil society is, therefore, its ultimate end. Since it is a common good of human persons, however, it is immanent in their nature;<sup>55</sup> it embodies as a necessary property the human person's vocation to goods which transcend the political common good.<sup>56</sup> This common good is thus at once an ultimate end, when it is considered as the end, *finalis causa*, of the political society, and as an intermediate end, when considered as naturally subordinate to the absolute ultimate end of the human person. What does this statement mean?

What uniquely defines the common good and the communal characteristic of the personalist democracy is precisely the nature of the common good as both an ultimate end and an intermediate or infravalent end. To understand this point in relation to the personalist democracy, we may consider the two movements involved in the dynamism of the human person and human life in society. To the extent that the political society is only concerned with the temporal life of men,<sup>57</sup> the common good of political society is an ultimate end. It is both the formal and final cause of the political society. This takes

care of the horizontal movement. But to the extent that the human persons, while pursuing as a group this common good, are also called as persons to the absolute ultimate end, what has been mentioned above<sup>58</sup> as the union with God, then the temporal common good is only an intermediate final end.

Personalist democracy is communal precisely because it recognizes this double aspect of the common good. It recognizes that as an ultimate end of the body politic the common good is related to the nature of the persons who constitute the body politic. It is not foreign or alien to the proper good of the persons. It is the good of the multitude made up of human persons but as distributed to each person. In this respect the common good constitutes a part of persons' proper good. Hence, consonant to the nature of the persons and their pursuit of freedom, personalist democracy does not aim at the simple freedom of choice, which Maritain identifies as only the initial freedom; nor does it aim at the freedom of power and domination over material things which Marxists confuse as a naturally given freedom of autonomy; rather it aims at the realization of autonomy which allows the individuals who enjoy this freedom to let it overflow even into their temporal life, making justice and friendship the true foundation of social life.<sup>59</sup> This realization addresses itself directly to the aspirations of the person due to his nature as human. So, while the personalist democracy directly aims at the temporal

common good, it recognizes at the same time, that the good of the human person as person, due to it from its vocation to transcend the political society, are also embodied in the common good. Is the common good so understood capable of uniting into the same body politic the various communities of diverse philosophical and religious creeds?

The communal characteristic of personalist democracy, the new civilization uniquely distinguishes the latter from the mediaeval civilization. In this latter the unity of religion was a prerequisite for the political unity. For personalist democracy, however, religious unity is not a necessary condition for political unity. As a matter of fact, Maritain emphasizes that, "...men subscribing to diverse religious or non-religious creeds have to share in and work for the same political or temporal common good".<sup>60</sup> For this reason, the unity of the personalist body politic is not a formal unity, what we called above "maximal unity".<sup>61</sup> It is rather a material or minimal unity; one of "becoming or of orientation which springs from a common aspiration and gathers elements of heterogeneous creeds and philosophies, all of which are fully consonant with the eternal interest of the human personality and with man's freedom of autonomy".<sup>62</sup>

The communal characteristic of personalist democracy when translated into concrete terms gives birth to the democratic charter. This is another subject that needs some emphasis on the communal characteristics of the personalist democracy of

Maritain. It will be dealt with below.<sup>63</sup>

Saying that the personalist body politic is not united by a common religious or philosophical creed does not mean that the body politic has no common creed. If it were to mean that, then the personalist democracy would not differ from the individualist democracy in this regard. For Maritain criticizes the individualist democracy precisely for its indifference to a common creed: "...it was neutral even with regard to freedom".<sup>64</sup> What it means is that the personalist body politic does not aim at a theoretical creed, nor a theoretical justification of its common action from either religion or philosophy. Religious division among men, according to Maritain, and we may add philosophical division, is a fact which must be willy nilly recognized.<sup>65</sup>

The personalist body politic is united by what Maritain calls the civic or secular faith. This deals with practical tenets or practical conclusions which are "true in themselves",<sup>66</sup> for example, that good politics is a politics that is just, or that truth is the expression of what is, the absolute value of moral good, that the human person is endowed with a dignity which the very good of the community presupposes, the rights and duties flowing from the dignity of the person and the inviolability of conscience.<sup>67</sup> These are practical conclusions. They depend basically on a simple, "...natural apperception, of which the human heart becomes capable with the progress of

moral conscience and which, as a matter of fact, has been awakened by the Gospel leaven fermenting in the obscure depths of human history".<sup>68</sup>

The theoretical justification of these practical tenets is left to each individual person and to individual religious and philosophical schools. However, Maritain emphasizes that these practical tenets must have a practical or ideological justification. In other words, the personalist body politic must be able to defend these against forces which might seek to destroy them. By means of the practical tenets as well as by their justification the members of the body politic can "...assent and commit themselves to the common action consequent on the practical tenets".<sup>69</sup> Maritain stresses these practical tenets so much that in his last book he expresses the hope that it is through adhering to such tenets that an enduring state or world peace can be achieved:

If a state of peace worthy of the name, firm and enduring, is to be established one day among the peoples of the world, this will depend not only upon economic, political and financial arrangements reached by diplomats and statesmen, nor will it depend solely upon the juridical building up of a truly supra-national coordinating organism endowed with efficient means of action; it will depend also upon the deep adherence of men's consciousness to practical principles...and upon a victorious outpouring of that supreme and free energy which comes to us from on high, and whose name we know - whatever may be our religious denomination or school of thought - to be brotherly love, a name which has been pronounced in such a manner by the Gospel that it has stirred the conscience of man for all time.<sup>70</sup>

Before I close this subject there is need to examine briefly Maritain's views on the secular creed and the Gospel inspiration.

Obviously, what has been said above in connection with the democratic inspiration and the Gospel inspiration is being repeated in a slightly different way by Maritain in connection with the secular creed. For him, and this has been mentioned already, the secular creed does not need the same theoretical religious or philosophical justification for the entire body politic. However, Maritain holds that since these practical conclusions have arisen in history from the Gospel inspiration "...the more the body politic is imbued with Christian convictions and aware of the religious faith which inspires it, the more deeply it would adhere to the secular faith in the democratic charter".<sup>71</sup> This means that for a Christian the justification of the secular faith is both more logically attained and it is more solid. Maritain makes this point quite explicit: "I am fully convinced that my way of justifying the belief in the rights of man and the ideal of freedom, equality and fraternity is the only one which is solidly based on truth".<sup>72</sup>

iii. Pluralist and Authoritative:

The Pluralist characteristic of personalist democracy has been treated in detail above.<sup>73</sup> However, there is need at this juncture to discuss one issue which relates to this characteristic and which was not dealt with above. This concerns authority.

It was mentioned above<sup>74</sup> that by pluralist body politic Maritain has in mind "...an organic heterogeneity in the structure of civil society".<sup>75</sup> This heterogeneity pertains to the very nature of the body politic; for by definition the body politic comprises in its superior unity the family units and other communities and societies which spring from the person's exercise of his freedom.<sup>76</sup> However, to bring about this pluralism the state in Maritain's view "...would launch a movement of progressive decentralization and 'destatization' of social life...".<sup>77</sup> The question is: How should the state exercise authority in this heterogeneous body politic?<sup>78</sup>

In Maritain's perspective, the exercise of authority in the personalist body politic would be as pluralist as the society itself. First of all, the aim of authority in a personalist body politic is "...the freedom and the friendship of the persons".<sup>79</sup> For this reason, the state will have to leave free all the communities within the body politic to regulate the affairs in those matters which pertain to themselves alone. The state will only concern itself with the functions which concern the totality of the body politic.<sup>80</sup> This is necessary for two reasons. Firstly, it is in accordance with the pluralist nature of the personalist body politic. Secondly, it is basic in the nature of political authority; for: Since in political society authority comes from below, through the people, it is normal that the whole dynamism of authority in

the body politic should be made up of particular and partial authorities rising in tiers above one another, up to the top authority of the state".<sup>81</sup>

From this last quote it is evident that Maritain's personalist democracy differs markedly from the individualist democracy and from the mediaeval civilization. Because of its misconception of freedom, individualist democracy looked at authority as opposed to freedom. Mediaeval civilization, on the other hand, reconciled authority with freedom only through the maximal unity of religious creed. Authority, just as the unity itself of political society, did not pertain properly to the political society; it was imposed from above.

Against the individualist democracy Maritain insists that "...all no-materialist conceptions of the world, be they religious or simply philosophic, admit in one way or another that authority among men has its original foundation in the origin of nature itself and in the primordial root of the world's intelligibility".<sup>82</sup> Against the ideal of the mediaeval civilization Maritain argues that although political authority finally comes from God, nonetheless, it depends on the people who install it on whomsoever they wish.<sup>83</sup> In this respect, those who exercise authority are not vicars of God as it was wrongly thought in the middle ages, confusing political with ecclesiastical authority; they are, rather, the vicars of the people.<sup>84</sup> For this reason, by the very fact that the authority

comes from the people, a state of parity of social races is demanded among the rulers and the people. Both belong to the same social race. The leaders of the personalist democracy must be composed of the "working and peasant élite"<sup>85</sup>, who exist and work with the people. But if the leaders get their authority from and through the people, and if they belong to the same social race as the people, being equal to the people, why should they have a right to command and to be obeyed?

According to Maritain, the *nature* of authority among men proceeds from Natural Law.<sup>86</sup> In another place he says that authority has its source in God.<sup>87</sup> This means that since political society has its origin and preparation in Natural Law and since the formal and final cause of the political society is the common good, there is ordained by nature a necessary hierarchy of leadership to be established among men in order to guarantee the attainment of the common good. Moreover, their authority is not granted to them by the people but rather by the Author of life.<sup>88</sup> Thus, the people do not obey them for their own sake, but for the sake of the common good and because their authority comes from God. Their dictates bind in conscience; not because they are men; for no man and no particular group of men has in itself the right to rule others; rather because their right to command comes from the creative and conservative principle of nature through the channels of nature itself, that is through the people.<sup>89</sup>

## iv. Theist or Christian:

This characteristic of personalist democracy has already been discussed both from the doctrine of the human person and that of political society,<sup>90</sup> and from the historical origin of the democratic inspiration.<sup>91</sup> From either treatment, one conclusion can be drawn: Since personalist democracy recognizes God as the author of the Natural Law, which is the foundation of political society, it recognizes likewise that God is both the origin and end of political society.<sup>92</sup> Personalist democracy is thus essentially theist.

Maritain goes a step further in demanding that personalist democracy be characteristically theist. It may be recalled that for Maritain ethics adequately considered has to take into account the law of the Gospel.<sup>93</sup> For this reason, the Natural Law will appear in its full perfection only when the Gospel has penetrated into the human and political life.<sup>94</sup> Thus personalist democracy recognizes that while political society has its preparation in Natural Law and its establishment as a work of reason, yet these two, natural law and reason, are perfected in their own level by the law of the Gospel. This has gradually inspired and prepared the secular conscience towards the coming of age for the democratic inspiration.<sup>95</sup> Thus, looked at from this angle, the theist characteristic of personalist democracy is also designated as Christian.<sup>96</sup>

In short, the theist characteristic arises from the intrinsic morality of both the common good and the common life, both of which point to the organic link between civil society and religion,<sup>97</sup> and the need of reconciling the democratic inspiration and the Christian inspiration. From this characteristic I shall draw two conclusions for the sake of emphasis; for they play a very central role in Maritain's personalist democracy.

The first has to do with tolerance in its civic dimension: whether civic society must respect the realm of conscience and refrain from imposing religious creed by coercion;<sup>98</sup> the second with its communal dimension: whether the various communities of different philosophical and religious creeds within the body politic should enjoy mutual tolerance.

Regarding the first, Maritain insists that civic tolerance in a personalist body politic is a condition *sine qua non* of its very existence. First of all, while conceding that the human being both in his individual and social life bears obligations to truth,<sup>99</sup> Maritain insists that the body politic has been charged only with the temporal life of men and their temporal common good;<sup>100</sup> it does not and it cannot require from its citizens, as a condition for membership, the adherence to any philosophic or religious creed.<sup>101</sup> Neither can it regulate on truth; for "The universe of truths of science, of wisdom and of poetry - towards which the intelligence tends by itself,

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belongs by nature, to a plane higher than the political community".<sup>102</sup> Hence, the political society is not equipped to deal with these matters.<sup>103</sup>

However, this is far from suggesting that it must be irreligious or amoral. Maritain draws a sharp distinction between "lay" and "laicized", "secular" and "secularized".<sup>105</sup> The body politic and its common good have an intrinsic morality. This means that it is organized in such a way that while all the recognized religions have a right to exist, none of them is allowed to impose itself on another. All are called to respect the existence of the others. This is mutual tolerance. But what exactly does mutual tolerance mean?

Two errors in relation to truth and tolerance, according to Maritain, have been leashed in this regard. On the one side, there is the error of absolutism who would impose the truth by force and on the other side the error of the theoreticians in making ignorance, relativism and doubt a necessary condition for mutual tolerance.<sup>106</sup> The first sins against human freedom while the latter violates truth and the very capability of man to attain it. Maritain denounces both errors. He describes true and genuine tolerance as follows:

There is real and genuine tolerance only when a man is firmly and absolutely convinced of a truth, or of what he holds to be a truth, and when he at the same time recognizes the right of those who deny this truth to exist, and to contradict him, and to speak their own mind, not because they are free from truth but because they seek truth in their own way, and because he respects in them human nature and human dignity and those very resources and living springs of the intellect and of conscience which make them potentially capable of attaining the truth he loves, if someday they happen to see it.<sup>107</sup>

A personalist body politic attains this kind of tolerance. And since it is vitalized by the democratic and Christian inspiration, it will have its own "...social and political morality, its own conception of justice and civic friendship, temporal common good and common task, human progress and civilization vitally rooted in Christian awareness".<sup>108</sup> This brings us to the second conclusion.

Tolerance, both civic and communal, alludes only to the practical recognition of the right of existence, either of an order beyond the political, in the case of civic tolerance, or of other communities of diverse philosophical and religious creed, in the case of communal or mutual tolerance. Regarding this latter, Maritain calls for something more than the mere mutual tolerance. He calls for fellowship which he alludes to as "something positive and elementary" in human relationship.<sup>109</sup> He rejects what he calls the "haughty and queer"<sup>110</sup> idea that division of the speculative order or on the religious order must necessarily divide men practically

and that in order to unite such people there must either be a force of arms or force of argument of one philosophical or religious creed over all the rest. For him, unity in the political society is minimal, on the practical order. And this unity must not only tolerate the divergent opinions; indeed it must strengthen them. For, according to him, "...the more we fraternize on the level of practical principles and common action, the more we should strengthen the edges of the opposite connections which divide us in the speculative order and on the level of truth, the first to be served".<sup>111</sup>

Maritain sees the various communities in the body politic as "...travelling companions, who meet here below by chance and journey through life - however fundamental their differences may be - good humoredly<sup>9</sup> in a cordial solidarity and human agreement, or better to say, friendly and cooperative disagreement".<sup>112</sup> The basis of this fellowship according to Maritain is not of the order of the intellect;<sup>113</sup> such a unity, philosophical or religious, is too high for the required minimal unity of the pluralist body politic of the personalist democracy. Rather, it is "friendship", natural friendship, which is first of all anchored in "...mutual love in God and for God".<sup>114</sup> And love, as Maritain says elsewhere, does not deal with possible or pure essences, it deals with existents;<sup>115</sup> it goes to persons.<sup>116</sup>

Obviously, fellowship, rather than calling for simple respect of the existence of the other communities, like mutual tolerance, goes a step further to insist on mutual cooperation among persons, who believe and not among beliefs: persons who are engaged totally in the pursuit of the same temporal common good. Further explanation of this cooperation can be deduced from the principles guiding the Church-State relation here below.

#### 4. The Dynamics of Personalist Democracy:

It is natural for the philosophy of personalist democracy, when the historical circumstances become favorable, to realize itself in the democratic form of government. How is this democratic government installed? How is it controlled by the people? What is the relation between this regime and the Church? In the following pages, Maritain's views on these questions shall be presented.

##### i. The Democratic Government:

Maritain insists time and again, especially in Man and the State, that the right of the people to self-rule resides both inherently and permanently in them. But except for a small community and for popular referendum in which the entire people participate, the exercise of the people's right to self-rule demands that they designate a certain number of representatives among them to form the government and run the State.<sup>117</sup> In this respect, it is quite natural for the personalist democracy that "...authority and power wishes both to come from the people and to be exercised in its name"<sup>118</sup> in a manner limited both in extent and in time.<sup>119</sup> But how are the few who exercise the people's authority designated?

Maritain does not treat *ex officio* the question as to how the people must designate their representatives. It is a question, one could say, which does not belong strictly to political philosophy. However, from the comments Maritain

makes in passing on issues such as universal suffrage, political parties and the corporative nature of personalist democracy, his view on the present questions can be explicated. In the first place, according to Maritain, universal suffrage is a necessary practice of designating the representatives of the people. It attests the human person's right to political life and it offers the people the means of controlling their government.<sup>120</sup> However, the personalist democracy demands a more pluralistic system than what democracies have practiced heretofore. For him, what has been practiced as universal suffrage, has only a symbolic value; for the individual person votes as an abstract atom.<sup>121</sup> In order to attain its genuine value, the universal suffrage must realize the pluralist principle of personalist democracy and take into account the communities of labour, spiritual families and regional institutions to which the person belongs concretely and whose representation, in the people's government, is sought.<sup>122</sup>

By proposing the corporative electoral system, Maritain seems to focus his attention on the nature of the unity of the political being; a unity, as it was shown above, of autonomous communities, and societies to which the human person primordially belongs. It must be noted, however, that, while the unity of the whole is a minimal unity, that of the communities within this whole tends towards maximal unity. Now, if Maritain counts on an electoral system which leans

towards the maximal unity - what would be the role of political parties which naturally flourish on the partisan spirit?

Would not Maritain reject political parties as constituting a divisive force in the people instead of uniting them in a common action towards the common good?

Ironically Maritain does not reject political parties. While he recognizes as just the criticism advanced against political parties, Maritain suggests, nonetheless, that their existence seems normal in all democratic regimes, in so far as a party groups its members precisely on one basis of a certain political conception.<sup>123</sup> Political parties, according to Maritain, have a positive function in realizing democracy. For they hold together their members, educate them politically and provide them with the needed tradition which guarantees the necessary stability of political life.<sup>124</sup> As for the abuses which have everywhere corrupted their functioning and "...caused the degeneration of the European democracy",<sup>125</sup> Maritain argues that these do not belong to the essence of political parties but rather to the mode of functioning.

Political parties, in Maritain's perspective, should not be suppressed; they spring from the person's freedom of association and of thought. For, "...because of the very fact that every person as such should normally be able to make his thought and his will felt in political matters, it is also normal for the members of political society to group themselves

according to the affinity of their ideas and aspirations, into political parties or political schools".<sup>126</sup> What must be suppressed, rather, is the corrupting element in political parties. This can be achieved, in Maritain's view, by recasting all political structures in order to render the government independent of parties and the parties' political schools.<sup>127</sup>

Maritain's argument in favour of political parties is premised on the assumption that what corrupts parties is not essential to political parties but only accidental. It is thus, in his view, possible to save political parties by suppressing only the corrupting accidents. But if, what in fact corrupts them is substantially inherent in them, how can political parties be saved? Would it still be possible to recast all the political structures in order to render them free from party domination and turn political parties into political schools?

This question will be discussed in the critique below. For the moment, however, it is necessary to note that, according to Maritain, whether the universal suffrage will be organized with or without political parties, the important thing is to designate the representatives of the people in a corporative manner so that "...the organic city would be ruled not by the wheels of a bureaucratic machine but by decisions taken by men chosen as leaders of their several organizations and having in their respective ranks all the privileges and all

the obligations of responsible office".<sup>128</sup> This statement leads to the inquiry as to what makes the government by the representatives of the people a government "of the people, by the people, and for the people".<sup>129</sup>

The only government completely consistent with Maritain's personalist, communal and pluralist characteristics is, in the formular of Abraham Lincoln, "government of the people, by the people, for the people".<sup>130</sup> But, according to Maritain, "by the people" does not mean a government exercised by the people themselves, except perhaps where the people constitute a very small number; it means, rather, a government by the representatives of the people, or a government exercised in the virtue of the peoples' mission.<sup>131</sup> Now, under what conditions is a government by the peoples' representatives a government by the people?

In answering this question Maritain excludes two extreme cases: first, where the representatives of the people stand above or separate from the people; and second, where the representatives of the people are regarded as passive instruments of the people.

It is an intrinsic demand of the personalist democracy that the representatives of the people are vicars of the people. Their authority rises from the people and it has to be exercised in union with and not separate from the people. The vicars of the people participate in the authority which inheres

permanently in the people. They must necessarily exercise the peoples' authority in communion with the people; for, separate from the people they have no authority.<sup>132</sup>

On the other hand, the representatives of the people govern truly and spontaneously as intelligent and free beings, responsible to their conscience and to the peoples' constitution. They possess authority as living and active vicars of the people. They must be able to represent the people while at the very same time being ready to incur the displeasure of the people, if their conscience so demands it.<sup>133</sup> These two objectives can be achieved only if the representatives of the people govern in "communion with the people". What does this mean?

According to Maritain, to rule in communion with the people seems to mean three things. First, it means that representatives of the people participate in the peoples' naturally given right of self-rule.<sup>134</sup> Secondly, the rulers indentify themselves with the people since they belong to the same "social race" as the people.<sup>135</sup> Thirdly, to rule in communion with the people means that representatives of the people govern with the people through constantly educating them awakening their slumbering spirit and demanding of them a greater and more conscious participation in the decision making process. In this respect, the leaders of the people are genuinely in communion with the people; they don't only act for the people, they exist with the people.<sup>136</sup>

In order that representatives of the people achieve these three aspects of governing in communion with the people, they must be educators in the true sense of the term.<sup>137</sup> They have to be intent on evoking from the people "...what is deep and lasting, and most really worthy of man, in the aspiration and psyche of the people".<sup>138</sup> But since in the organic community allowance must be given to what Maritain alludes to as "the prophetic shock minorities",<sup>139</sup> Maritain sees it as "...the happiest circumstance for the body politic when the top men in the state are at the same time genuine prophets of the people".<sup>140</sup>

## ii. Means of Controlling the Government:

In his treatment of the subject of means, Maritain discusses two problems:<sup>141</sup> that of means to end and that of the peoples' means of supervising or controlling the state. The present discussion shall focus the attention on this latter problem.

The subject of means plays a very central role in Maritain's personalist democracy. This is obvious, first of all, from the nature of political authority. It was discussed above that while authority in the body politic resides inherently and permanently in the people, its exercise is by the vicars of the people. For this reason the people naturally must have at their disposal the means of controlling their vicars and of changing the government; for the exercise of the peoples' authority by their vicars is limited by the people in extent and time.

But it is not enough for the people to designate their vicars from time to time in order to control the state. The people must have a control over the normal functioning of the state. For, since the representatives have an autonomous activity answerable to their conscience, the people must have the means of controlling this activity lest it should assume an order separate from the people. Maritain insists on the necessity of this control because the lessons from the history of political philosophy attest to the tendency of the state

to ascribe to itself a peculiar common good, "...its own self-preservation and growth distinct both from the public order and welfare which are its immediate end and from the common good which is its formal end".<sup>142</sup> In order to keep the state in check in its daily operations, Maritain suggests two ways of effecting the control. He sees, on the one hand, the press, the radio and other means of expression of public opinion, as particularly important in controlling the state. On the other hand, he commends pressure groups and noninstitutional ways through which some particular fragment within the body politic exert pressure on government agencies.<sup>143</sup>

Obviously, these means apply only to a truly personalist democratic government which both recognizes and leaves free the person's rights to express himself. However, even in such a regime the means recommended by Maritain may be neither as real nor as effective as he seems to suggest. For it is also true, and Maritain recognizes this as a fact, that the right of the individual person to freedom of expression, which Maritain prefers calling "freedom of investigation and discussion",<sup>144</sup> is not an absolute right, and that the state may restrict this right for the sake of the common good.<sup>145</sup>

If the state were to misuse this right in order to suppress freedom, Maritain recommends as a third alternative of means of political agitation pressure groups, propaganda groups which he designates as "flesh-and-bone means of political

warfare".<sup>146</sup> However, this means and all the others mentioned above presuppose at the very base of the foundation of the body politic "...an awakening of common consciousness in the smallest local communities".<sup>147</sup> With this demand Maritain submits a more permanent means of controlling the state. It consists of the conscientisation of the smallest local communities to the higher values of the human person and to the political life of the community. This proposal points to the spiritual means of controlling the state which play a very prominent role in Maritain's doctrine of means.

In Maritain's perspective, since there is an organic link between the social-political and religious life of the people, the means of controlling the state and of curing the maladies of the social and political order will always be inadequate without applying the divine principles in the deep sources of human and political life.<sup>148</sup> It is in this respect that Maritain interprets Charles Peguy's saying: "The social revolution will be a moral revolution or not at all".<sup>149</sup> For, the means of controlling the state, like the social and political life itself, demands special heroism or special sanctity.<sup>150</sup>

Maritain distinguishes two forms of spiritual means of controlling the state. First, he identifies purely spiritual means like prayer, penance, fasting and acts of charity which are directed towards God but which have an effect in the

temporal life. Maritain argues that although the Gospel has hallowed these with its supernatural authority, these means are not the monopoly of the Christian faith; they are familiar in the religious techniques of all the people of the earth.<sup>151</sup> The second form of spiritual means includes means such as patience, enduring and suffering voluntarily born from what is called passive resistance. These are not purely spiritual but rather spiritual means which are incarnate in the activities that have a temporal end.<sup>152</sup>

From these remarks, it is obvious that whatever the form of the spiritual means Maritain is referring to, the point of emphasis is that the people's means of controlling the state will have to depend more and more on the inner lives of the people. The good State depends on the good and righteous lives of the people. It is on this score that Maritain attributes to the people the corruption of the leaders that led France to her disaster and fall. He makes this point as follows:

*...En Angleterre comme en France les démocraties ont misérablement abandonné dans le monde leur cause et leur propre idéal. Elles se sont laissées conduire à la boucherie par la faute d'un leadership incapable et en partie corrompu.*<sup>153</sup>

This type of responsibility of the entire population results from the fact that the people have allowed themselves to slacken in those values which sustain and quicken the democratic inspiration: faith in the dignity of the human person, fraternal love, justice and the supratemporal vocation of the human person. By electing leaders who are incapable the people have allowed

these values to be swept away. In turn they have lost control over their own government. A genuine social political revolution will have to be preceded and suffused continuously by the moral revolution of the people. In this respect, the genuine means of controlling the state will have to spring from the heroic inner life of the people.<sup>154</sup> It is in this same inner life that all the other means of controlling the state will be rooted.

iii. The Church-State Relation:

A/ The State of the Problem:

What has come to be described by "...the stock phrase 'the problem of church and state'..."<sup>155</sup> is consequent upon the composite nature of the human person whose implications Maritain has explicated in his doctrine of individuality and personality.<sup>156</sup> According to this doctrine, while personality naturally seeks social life, it naturally also tends to travel beyond society until it enters into the divine society, which is, as was shown above, the highest analogue of society,<sup>157</sup> for it is a society of pure persons.<sup>158</sup> On the temporal level the person travels beyond the family to the various ethnic, regional communities and from these to the various associations and societies which spring from his freedom and which fulfil his intellectual and moral desires. The highest among these societies is the body politic, which caters to his needs more fully than any other temporal society; it is the most

perfect temporal society.<sup>159</sup> However, since the person transcends the body politic to reach out to his spiritual vocation, the body politic, too, fails to satisfy fully the person's intrinsic desires. He thus enters the spiritual society or the Church whose office is to lead the person to his spiritual perfection.<sup>160</sup> The human person naturally belongs to these two quite different societies simultaneously. Their relationship in serving the person, their exercise of authority, their overlapping jurisdiction have constituted what is generally described as the problem of the Church and State.

Stated as it has always been stated - "the Church-State problem" - this phrase is quite ambiguous and imprecise; for what is "church"? What is "the state"? What is the relation between these two?

To avoid the ambiguity, Maritain states clearly that for him "church" means the Catholic Church.<sup>161</sup> Thus, the principles he develops apply directly to the Catholic Church, although he remarks that in an indirect and qualified manner the same principles can be applied to other churches and other religious institutions.<sup>162</sup>

As for the concept of the State, Maritain remarks that it is quite ambiguous; for we find philosophers talking about church-state relation in very different political regimes. For example, the Church dealt with emperors and kings of christendom, absolute kings, absolute and totalitarian states

modern democracies. Obviously what the church relates to is not in fact the State, as a subject of rights. If so, there would be no continuity in this so-called church-state problem. The State as a subject of rights in Maritain's view does not exist. And even if it were to exist, it would be completely different in the various historical epochs so that it would be meaningless to talk of the church-state relation problem as applicable to all the historical epochs. What the Church relates to, rather, is the body politic or the civil society "...in the whole range of its institutional organization".<sup>163</sup> Maritain hopes that "...if the democratic principle is to develop fully in the world, there will be an age in which the Church will have to do with the people, ...with political societies in which the State will cease pretending to be a person and will only play its true part as central agency of the body politic".<sup>164</sup>

B/ The Two Societies:

What we are faced with in the Church-State relation in the personalist democracy of Maritain is, in fact, the relation of two societies belonging to different orders and both ministering to the human person who seeks in his vertical movement to transcend them to reach the society of pure persons. It is thus a question of the hierarchy of orders which Maritain has explicated and emphasized throughout the development of his political philosophy. He clearly distinguishes the two

societies; they differ in nature, origin, the end they serve, their respective authority, and mode of exercise of this authority.<sup>165</sup> The foundation of the Church is accomplished from above; so also is its authority.<sup>166</sup> Political society, on the other hand, has its origin and preparation in nature and its accomplishment as a work of reason; its authority rises from the people. For this reason, while in the Church the Pope is the vicar of Christ, in the political society the leaders are the vicars of the people.<sup>167</sup>

The two societies differ on a more profound aspect; for as Maritain remarks in his Book On the Church of Christ,<sup>168</sup> while the body politic subsists with the subsistence of its individual members, the Church has, besides the subsistence of its own members, its own proper subsistence: it has a double subsistence. Like the body politic or any other human society the Church subsists by the subsistence of the individual members. But unlike any other human society, the Church transcends the natural subsistence of individual persons. It is this latter that makes it a whole, one, universal, eternal and properly speaking a person.<sup>169</sup>

Obviously, the two societies serve different objectives: the civic society, the temporal common good, and the Church the absolute or eternal common good.<sup>170</sup> For this reason, what has been said above regarding the relation between the human person as person and the common good of the civil society is

applicable here in determining the relation between the Church and civil society.

In respect to things that are not Caesar's, as Maritain emphasizes, both political society and its common good are indirectly subordinated to the perfect accomplishment of the person and its supratemporal aspiration as to an end of another order which is directly served by the Church.<sup>171</sup> It is in this respect that Maritain's constant emphasis on the hierarchy of the spiritual can be understood. This supremacy, as we saw above, is preserved even on the natural order; for, according to Maritain, the common good of civil society implies an intrinsic though indirect ordination to something which transcends it.<sup>172</sup> This is why Maritain appropriately describes the genuine mode of dealing with civic society and its common good as follows:

...One must endeavor to raise one's thought above the level of time, not with a view to the abandonment of the things of time but in order to liberate the mind from "univocal" images that hold it in a world of illusion. That is the first step. The next is to return to the things of time with our thoughts purified and able at once to respect things that are eternal and things that change....<sup>173</sup>

While this process is applicable in general to the relation of the civil society and any of the things which are not Caesar's, it is more applicable to the relation of the civil society and the Church. For, although both serve the human person, the former is not equipped to deal with the matters that transcend it: matters of intelligence, beauty, freedom etc....

These can only be dealt with by the Church; she is a spiritual society. But in spite of this hierarchy of orders one can distinguish three areas which uniquely define the Church and State relation and which lead to the immutable principles guiding this relation: the transcendency of the human person over the body politic, the Church as a person and its freedom over the civil society; and civil society as a natural society and its functional relation to the church. The immutable principles consequent upon these areas, are, according to Maritain, the supremacy of the church, the freedom of the church and the cooperation between the church and the state.

a) The Primacy of the Spiritual:

The first immutable principle is drawn from the very nature of the things that the Church deals with; spiritual values to which its members have committed themselves and to which their moral standards are appended.<sup>174</sup> These values, as was shown above, constitute a part, what Maritain alludes to as the most important part<sup>175</sup> of those supratemporal goods with respect to which even on the natural order the human person transcends the political society and its common good. Thus, even for one who does not believe in these values it must be understood that, while the Church is in the social community, yet, due to the fact that it deals with the values which transcend the civil society, it enjoys the right to freedom. This right to freedom does not only stem from the individual

members of the church's rights to freedom of association and to freedom of conscience; it is rather consequent upon the acknowledgement of the church's or churches' existence as bodies pursuing a proper and essential end of its members.

As for the believer, the freedom of the Church is even more obviously seen; for to him there is a "...supernatural society, both divine and human which unites in itself men as co-citizens of the Kingdom of God and leads them to eternal life".<sup>176</sup> On this score, the freedom of the Church is not only to be recognized and defended on the grounds of the freedom of association and freedom of religious belief without interference from the State but from the fact we have mentioned above: the Church as a person having freedom "...grounded on the very rights of God and identical with His own Freedom in the fact of any human institution".<sup>177</sup> Emerging from this freedom of the person of the Church is her freedom "...to teach and worship the freedom of the Gospel, the freedom of the World of God".<sup>178</sup>

b) The Superiority of the Church:

The Church has in Maritan's perspective, in so far precisely as it is one and universal, a supernatural subsistence and a supernatural personality.<sup>179</sup> It is a whole which transcends the whole order of created things including the political society and its common good; for by nature the body politic which belongs strictly to the natural order is only

concerned with the temporal life of men and their temporal common good.<sup>180</sup> However, although it transcends the body politic, yet, its members have an impact on the common good; these members and the institutions of the Church supported by them are within the political society. But, like it was said of the human person, and infinitely more valid, so, the person of the Church is never a part of the political society. It enjoys a superiority which stems from her spiritual nature. This superiority constitutes the second principle. Maritain emphatically remarks, however, that from the concept of superiority must be removed any "...accidental connotation of domination and hegemony..."<sup>181</sup>

c) Principle of Cooperation:

Maritain's emphasis on the distinction of the Church and the political society has already been referred to. It is a distinction of two societies which serve two distinct, not separate orders; and as sharply distinct as they may be, these two societies cannot live and develop in sheer isolation (or) ignorance (of) one another.<sup>182</sup> Moreover if they were to do so they would cut into two the human person whom both claim simultaneously as member.<sup>183</sup> Thus, the third immutable principle is the necessary cooperation between the Church and the body politic.

C/ Application of the Immutable Principles to the Personalist Democracy:

It is necessary at this juncture to understand that what Maritain refers to as immutable principles are not ideal essences in a Platonic world of ideas, which descend in order to be incarnated in a way of approximation in the real world. What Maritain means is that the meaning of the statements "the full freedom of the Church is both a God-given right belonging to her and a requirement of the common good of political society" or "the spiritual order is superior to the temporal one," or "Church and State must cooperate", is immutable. These statements are true for all times. But we know from the general laws that guide the application of principles in politics<sup>184</sup> that the historical climate or historical constellations to which these principles are applied cannot be conceived neither univocally nor equivocally; they are rather conceived analogically. Thus, the application of the principles concerning the Church-State relation is analogical. Now, what mode does the application of the three principles take in the personalist democracy?

a) Principle of Superiority of the Church:

Maritain observes that one of the specific characteristics of the personalist democracy is that it is secular.<sup>185</sup> The order of terrestrial civilization and of temporal society has gained a complete differentiation and full autonomy.<sup>186</sup> On the other hand, the Church has become aware that its supe-

riority is not in those things that are proper to the realm of the body politic; for its mission is not to erect God's kingdom on earth. It has become aware that its mission is a spiritual one, so that its superiority must likewise reside in the primacy of the spiritual over the temporal orders. It is the superiority of the moral and spiritual power with which the Church "...vitally influences, penetrates, and quickens, as a spiritual leaven, temporal existence and the inner energies of nature, so as to carry them to a higher and more perfect level in their own orders".<sup>187</sup>

b) Principle of Cooperation:

What form should the principle of the necessary cooperation between the Church and the State take in the personalist democracy? In answering this question, Maritain distinguishes three implications of the application of the principle of cooperation. The first refers to the most general and indirect form of cooperation which concerns both the body politic and the state and the mutual assistance between them and the Church. This is a very general and indirect one because it arises from the very intrinsic propensity of the human person in its dynamism of vertical and horizontal movements. Thus the body politic and the State owe to the human person in respect to its eternal destiny, in other words: to the Church, the duty of creating both the material and moral conditions - political, social, economic, cultural, "...which will favor the ends of

human personality, the peaceful enjoyment of all rights, the unobstructed performance of all its duties, the full development of all its power".<sup>188</sup>

The second implication which concerns particularly the civil authority or the State deals with the public acknowledgement of God. This condition is consequent upon the very nature of the personalist body politic which, as was referred to above,<sup>189</sup> has to be conscious of the doctrine and morality which inspires it. The form of this public acknowledgement of God would, according to Maritain, assume the form of Christian confession to which the very democratic inspiration is most vitally linked. However, other religious confessions which are institutionally recognized would also be represented in the councils of the nation. As for atheists, Maritain suggests that they would have to realize that the body politic has just as much a right to publicly express its own faith just as the individuals are free with regard to the private expression of their own religious or non-religious convictions.<sup>190</sup>

The third implication which concerns the State and the body politic differently, deals with the specific forms of mutual cooperation. It is important to repeat here that the necessity of this mutual cooperation stems from the fact that the human person belongs to both societies and that he would be cut in two if his membership to the temporal society were cut off from his membership to the spiritual society. Moreover,

the nature of the common good demands that the human person be assisted in attaining its supra-temporal vocation. Finally, in the present state of man: fallen, redeemed and elevated, the existential condition of man needs divine grace in order to achieve its highest human ends.<sup>191</sup>

The State is thus called upon to cooperate specifically with the Church by guaranteeing the full freedom of the Church, while the body politic should seek the assistance of the Church for its own temporal common good and by this very fact assist the Church in her spiritual mission. What Maritain is saying here is, that by the very fact that the Church serves a superior goal the body politic will be assisting it by allowing itself to be assisted by the Church. This assistance is in the line of the temporal common good. But as it was submitted time and again above, the temporal common good is only true to itself if it embodies the supra-temporal values of the human person. Thus when the body politic and its free institutions ask the cooperation of the Church in activities which aim at enlightening the human mind and life, it is by the same token being assisted by the Church on its level to become more perfectly itself in attaining freedom and equality of rights for all citizens.<sup>192</sup> The Church cooperates with the body politic and its institutions by assisting positively, upon invitation, in the religious, social and educational work.

1. CD. (1945) p. 25
2. Ibid., p. 33
3. Ibid.,
4. Ibid.,
5. TNC p. 133
6. RR, p. 198
7. CD. 33
8. CD. 34
9. RR. 198
10. PH, p. 115
11. Ms, p. 59
12. Ibid.,
13. SP, p. 79
14. Ibid.,
15. CD. p. 31
16. SP. 68
17. Chapter V above
18. IH p. 224, HI p. 248
19. IH p. 7, HI p. 15
20. Chapter I above
21. SP. pp. 79 - 80
22. SP. p. 86

23. This theme is discussed further below. It is the question of the dynamism of the life of the person in political society. Maritain treats this subject RN pp. 18-19, RR pp. 197-199.
24. UP p. 12
25. MS p. 10
26. Rr pp. 257 ff.
27. Two Sources of Morality and Religion, 1935, p. 282; Les Deux Sources de la Morale et de la Religion, 1958, p. 300 cited also in Sp, p. 68; Sp, p. 80; MS, p. 62.
28. SP. p. 67
29. Hans Kersel, "Foundations of Democracy", Ethics LXVI, Oct. 1955, pp. 1-101; p. 41
30. PG, p. 82; see also MS, p. 78
31. SP. p. 69
32. MS. p. 109
33. CD. p. 36
34. CD. pp. 37-38
35. Ibid., pp. 42 ff
36. H. Bergson, Op. Cit., p. 282.
37. FMW p. 96; RTL p. 112
38. FMW p. 46; RTL p. 53
39. RN p. 20
40. See Chapter I p.112 Also SPP p. 29
41. RR p. 197
42. Ibid.,
43. RR p. 194
44. RR p. 195

45. FMW p. 96; RTL p. 112
46. Nature of democracy
47. Nature of democracy
48. RR p. 198
49. MS p. 107
50. Cf. IH. p. 232
51. See below p. 321
52. RR p. 198
53. FMW p. 58
54. Chapter IV
55. Chapter IV
56. MS p. 149
57. MS p. 153
58. Chapter III
59. FMW p. 46; RTL p. 53
60. MS p. 160
61. Chapter V
62. FMW p. 71; RTL p. 83
63. Chapter VI p. 316 ff.
64. MS p. 110
65. MS p. 108
66. MS p. 112
67. MS p. 111
68. MS p. 111
69. PG p. 83

70. PG p. 85
71. MS p. 85
72. MS p. 78; See also PG p. 82
73. Chapter V
74. Chapter V
75. FMW p. 61; RTL p. 72
76. MS p. 11
77. MS p. 22
78. Maritain makes a distinction between "authority" and "power". The first corresponding to the Latin *Autoritas* means "right to direct and to command, to be listened to or obeyed". The latter, referred to by the Latin equivalent - *potestas*, - means "force, which one can use, and with the aid of which one can oblige others to listen or to obey".<sup>73</sup> In the order of right or justice all authority evokes power and vice versa; for authority without power lies exposed to its own enemies and is inefficacious in itself, while power which is not based on authority is "iniquitous". Although the real seat of authority is the moral realism and of power the physical yet, according to Maritain, "...authority descends into the physical order in the form of power while power to the extent it is backed up by authority, can be raised to the moral and legal order".<sup>74</sup>
79. SP p. 87
80. SP p. 87
81. MS p. 11
82. SP. pp. 82-83
83. SP p. 83
84. SP. p. 84
85. CD p. 50
86. MS p. 127
87. CD. p. 50

88. SP p. 84

89. CD p. 50

Maritain refers to Pope Leo XIII in connection to how the authority is granted to its holders. It is not granted to its holders by the choice of the multitude but rather by the Source itself of being and of all Nature.

90. In Chapter IV I discussed this characteristic in relation to the natural of the person. The fact that he is called to enjoy goods which are divine in nature demands that the organization of the body politic towards the attainment of its common good as well as the common good itself embody these goods. From that point of view the personalist democracy which achieves these two objectives is essentially theist.

91. In part I of Chapter VI I discussed the Christian inspiration as being the origin of the democratic inspiration. Thus, personalist democracy which is fully imbued with this spirit is essentially Christian or Theist. It may thus be said that the Theist characteristic of personalist democracy arises from both the doctrine of the human person and the body politic as well as from the historical origins of democratic inspiration.

92. RN p. 21

93. SW pp. 174-209

94. RN p. 64

95. CD. pp. 42-56

96. RN p. 21

97. RN p. 55

98. UP p. 32

99. MS p. 166

100. MS p. 153

101. MS p. 110

102. NR p. 76

103. MS p. 118
104. UP p. 30
105. MS p. 153
106. UP pp. 22-23
107. UP p. 24
108. MS p. 167
109. UP p. 32
110. PG p. 86
111. PG p. 86
112. UP pp. 32-33
113. UP p. 35
114. Ibid.,
115. EE p. 49  
Maritain explains this Thomistic theme by his doctrine of "Moral Philosophy Adequately Considered". By this, he means that moral philosophy apt to guide human action in the present state of man after his fall, redemption, and elevation, is conceivable only if it takes into account the existential state of humanity, "with all the wounds or weakness and all the resources that it comprises in fact;...". SW pp. 138-220.
116. UP p. 35 See also PCG pp. 38-49.
117. MS p. 133
118. SP. p. 79
119. MS. p. 133
120. SP. p. 90
121. SP. p. 90
122. SP. p. 90
123. SP. p. 91

124. Ibid.,
125. RN. p. 86
126. RN p. 85
127. SP. p. 91. See also RN. p. 86 where Maritain submits the following: "What we ask of democracy is not to abolish political parties, but rather to regulate the make up of the state, of the legislative assemblies and the organs of government; in such a manner that the latter, while subject to the control of the assemblies in matters of major interest, would be freed from party domination."
128. FMW p. 57
129. MS p. 25
130. Ibid.,
131. SP. p. 85
132. MS. p. 137
133. MS. p. 136
134. SP. p. 84
135. IH. pp. 199-201.  
This is one of the characteristics of the concrete historical ideal we are entering after the liquidation of the Modern civilization. In this historical ideal which is at once secular the rulers are made to participate in the authority of the people. They are for that reason companions who have the right to command others.
136. RR. pp. 121-123.  
The distinction between to act for the people and to exist with the people. This latter has a more profound dimension. It is what Maritain requires of the representatives of the people in order to govern truly in communion with the people. See also MS. p. 137 where Maritain argues that by governing in communion with the people the representatives of the people can still rightly incur disfavour with the people. In CD. pp. 75-80; Maritain refers to the same theme. "The New leaders must come forth from the depths of the nation. It will be composed of the working and peasant élite, together with the elements of the former leading class which have decided to work with the people".

137. Education at the Crossroads, pp. 29-31
138. MS. p. 137
139. MS. p. 139
140. MS. p. 140
141. In Man and the State, pp. 54-64; Maritain discusses this problem under End and Means, emphasizing the distinction between the moral and mechanical or machiavellian rationalization of means. Later on in pp. 64-75, he discusses the question of the people's means of controlling the State. In Integral Humanism pp. 246-252 under the title of "The Question of Means", Maritain focuses his attention on the morality of means, the morality of the context in which the means are used and the hierarchy of means; in Freedom in the Modern World, pp. 139-192, under the heading "The Purification of Means, Maritain discusses how means must be proportional to their end. It is in this book that Maritain discusses in detail the Spiritual means of warfare; in Religion et Culture, under the title; "Considerations Pratiques", pp. 57-79; and in a long preface in Mendizabal's book, Aux Origines d'Une Tragedie, pp. 31-34, Maritain treats again the relationship between means and end and the morality of means in proportion to the end they serve.
142. MS. p. 14
143. MS. p. 66
144. NR. p. 89
145. NR pp. 90-91
146. MS. p. 66
147. MS. p. 68
148. FMW. p. 151
149. FMW. p. 142
150. Ibid., pp. 144-145
151. FMW p. 184
152. FMW p. 185

153. A Travers le Désastre, 1942, Paris, Minuit, p. 24
154. Maritain develops the same theme in his philosophy of Education; particularly Chapter VI of Pour Une Philosophie de l'Education, (1969) pp. 156 ff.
155. MS. p. 159
156. See Chapter II pp. 94 ff
157. See Chapter IV. pp. 203 ff
158. FMW. p. 51
159. See Chapter III.
160. FMW. p. 51
161. FMW. p. 147
162. MS. p. 147
163. MS. p. 165
164. MS. pp. 165-166
165. Rr. p. 294
166. MS. p. 184
167. SP. p. 84. See also MS. p. 184
168. On the Church of Christ. trans. Joseph W. Evans, Notre Dame University Press, 1973, p. 18
169. Ibid.,
170. Chapter IV.
171. Cf. PCG. p. 61
172. MS. p. 149
173. FMW. p. 110
174. MS. p. 150
175. MS. p. 150

176. MS. p. 151
177. MS. p. 151
178. MS. p. 162
179. On the Church of Christ, p. 19.
180. MS. p. 153
181. Ibid.,
182. Ibid.,
183. Ibid.,
184. Chapter V.
185. MS. p. 160
186. MS. p. 159
187. MS. p. 165
188. MS. p. 172
189. Chapter VI, 2
190. MS. p. MS. 173
191. MS. p. 176
192. MS. p. 178

## CHAPTER VII

### THE RELEVANCY OF MARITAIN'S POLITICAL PHILOSOPHY

Maritain is a Christian Philosopher to whom non-Christians will listen...Maritain's studies of the person, freedom, authority, the nature of evil, and the moral conscience of men are in the first rank of importance for the future of political action as well as thought.

C. O'Donnell, "Jacques Maritain - Political Philosopher", in Jacques Maritain, The Man and His Achievement, Ed. J. W. Evans, p. 178.

## Introduction

The object of this final Chapter, as it is obvious from the title, is to assess the relevancy of the personalist political philosophy of Jacques Maritain. This assessment occupies this Chapter and the Conclusion at the end of the thesis. It will be done in three different approaches: first, and this is the major part covered in Chapter VII proper, there will be an appraisal of the major critics of Maritain's personalist political philosophy; major in the sense that they are addressed to the themes that form the foundation of Maritain's political philosophy - relation between politics and morality, the need to reconcile the Christian inspiration and the democratic inspiration and the Church-State relation.

The second shall assess the relevancy of Maritain's political philosophy from his answers to the needs of the present historical climate. The third is to cast a quick glance at the conformity of Maritain's democratic charter with Nyerere's political programme in order to see whether Maritain's political philosophy and also be relevant in a historico-cultural environment which is very much different from Maritain's.

## Appraisal of Maritain's Critics.

This appraisal is not primarily concerned with the critics who have questioned the metaphysical principles of Maritain's political philosophy.<sup>1</sup> Nor does it deal with those who confuse Maritain's doctrine of personalism as being opposed to the Thomist doctrine of the common good.<sup>2</sup> Nor is this appraisal concerned with the critics who think that Maritain's distinction of individuality and personality is not necessary for solving the problem of Thomistic personalism and that the solution of the latter does not depend on the validity of the former.<sup>3</sup> It is not to discuss the critics of the historical development of Maritain's political philosophy and his relationship with the political parties of the Left and the Right.<sup>4</sup> Nor is it to discuss the critics that Maritain has already answered.<sup>5</sup>

The purpose of this chapter is to deal with the most recent critics who question Maritain's political philosophy on two aspects: with those who criticize it as denying the order of natural ethics;<sup>6</sup> and with those who criticize it as having failed to tackle adequately the problem of the relationship between democracy and religion.<sup>7</sup>

The present study will limit itself to these two types of criticism because they are directed to the very problems that Maritain set out to tackle in political philosophy in the first place. For, prompted by the Action Française which was

inspired, as shown above,<sup>8</sup> by the philosophy of liberalism and which nourished itself on political naturalism separating politics from morality and from religion, Maritain set out to think out a philosophy of politics which would heal the wounds of the politics of the Action Française. Moreover, in reacting to the totalitarian regimes of his environment,<sup>9</sup> Maritain has thought out his philosophy which, in contrast to the totalitarian ideologies, bears an essential or organic link to religion. For this reason, if the critics we are considering here were valid, Maritain would have failed in his initial objectives and hence his political philosophy would be irrelevant to the problems he set out to tackle.

However, as it was indicated in the introduction, and this was one of the reasons for pursuing the present study, I think that Maritain's philosophy can answer these criticisms. How?

i. Maritain's Political Philosophy and Natural Ethics:

In the work referred to already, Venant Cauchy formulates two arguments against Maritain's ethics in an effort to defend Natural Ethics whose autonomous existence, according to Cauchy, has been denied by Maritain. On account of the fact that these arguments are addressed to Maritain's ethics without heeding to the distinctions Maritain makes, they also apply to Maritain's political ethics.

The first argument is doctrinal. According to Cauchy although Maritain acknowledges the possibility of a natural order<sup>10</sup>,

yet his insistence that "moral philosophy adequately considered" must borrow from theology undermines the autonomy of natural ethics. Cauchy affirms too; "...it is our firm conviction however that the theological elements remain extraneous to moral philosophy".<sup>11</sup> In so doing he seems to suggest that Maritain holds the contrary: that for Maritain, theological elements enter intrinsically into Moral philosophy.

Obviously Cauchy is accusing Maritain of having fallen not to political naturalism - the political error that Maritain set out to correct - but to the opposite error; of having assumed ethics into moral theology by allowing it to exist in subalternation to moral theology, instead of eliminating it all together. But is this true? Does Maritain subordinate ethics as a science to moral theology as a science? Or more precisely does he subordinate the whole of ethics to moral theology?

It seems to me that Cauchy has in certain ways, misunderstood Maritain's ethics. The root of this misunderstanding seems to be a failure on the part of Cauchy to heed two fundamental distinctions which Maritain has made time and again in his socio-political works..

The first distinction is that of political ethics from individual ethics and from the ethics that govern the domestic community.<sup>12</sup> This point was treated in detail in Chapter V above. It was demonstrated that, according to Maritain, politics, though a branch of ethics, is nevertheless a branch specifically distinct

from other branches of the same stem. Its end is the common good which is an ultimate end in the temporal order. Thus, different from individual ethics which, while taking into account the temporal end of man, directly aims at the absolute ultimate one, political ethics takes into account the absolute ultimate end of man but aims directly at the common good; the good of rational nature in its temporal achievement.<sup>13</sup>

Saying that political ethics takes into account the absolute ultimate end but directly aims at the common good, a temporal common good, is far from suggesting that political ethics aims at the common good as a pure means of attaining the absolute ultimate end. In actual fact, as it was demonstrated in Chapter IV, the common good is the ultimate end of the body politic. It is what Maritain calls elsewhere the natural and temporal end of human life:

But the natural and temporal ends of human life are not pure means in relation to the life of grace and glory. They are ends - intermediate or infravalent ends - and in this respect they are not specified by the supernatural last end. They have an order of specification which is their own, though subordinate. And the last natural end of human life is not eliminated.<sup>14</sup>

On account of the fact that political ethics aims at the common good it does not seek to rid society of all evils. It seeks to apply the principle of the lesser evil and thus tolerate evils whose interdiction would bring about a greater evil.<sup>15</sup>

Moreover, the political philosopher and the politician deal with the good and the evil "incarnated in historical energies

of a determinate intensity, duration, and amplitude".<sup>16</sup> Thus, "...both the politician and the political philosopher have constantly to *estimate the energy of historical realization and the coefficient of future* of the good and the evil that are conveyed by them."<sup>17</sup> (italics in the text).

It is thus obvious that, whether Maritain's theory of "Moral philosophy adequately considered" is valid or not, the fact remains that it does not immediately affect political ethics. For, as Maritain repeats elsewhere, "by nature the body politics which belongs strictly to the natural order is only concerned with the temporal life of man and their temporal common good".<sup>18</sup> On this account political ethics concerns itself directly with the temporal life of men and whether Maritain's theory of "moral philosophy adequately considered" is valid or not it does not change the validity of the principles of political ethics. As a matter of fact Maritain is so conscious of the autonomy and necessity of natural ethics in his personalist political philosophy that he insists in his Education at the Crossroads that any teaching of morality in schools must start with political morality which is in actual fact the field where natural morality feels most at home. This is what he says:

...the field in which natural morality feels most at home, and least deficient, is the field of our temporal activities, or of political, civic, and social morality: because the virtues proper to this field are essentially natural ones, directed toward the good of civilization; whereas in the field of personal morality, the whole scope of the moral life cannot be comprehended by reason with regard to our real system of conduct in actual existence, without taking into account the supratemporal destiny of man.<sup>19</sup>

Maritain makes a very sharp distinction here between political and individual ethics. What other conclusion can be drawn from here except that as regards political ethics, which is the subject of the present thesis, Maritain's ethics does not succumb to the error that Cauchy accuses it of. In actual fact it emerges clearly from the above discussion that Maritain defends natural ethics with solid "natural" arguments; not based on revelation but forged by philosophical wisdom, the domain of reason.

The second distinction which Cauchy has failed to appreciate in Maritain is that of the practical nature of ethics. This distinction leads to the second argument of Cauchy against Maritain's ethics. According to Cauchy, "Millions of people throughout the world do not enjoy the benefit of faith...". Hence following Maritain's theory of ethics would "...forego discussion with them or perhaps reason with them on the presupposition that faith alone validates our conclusions as rules of conduct".<sup>20</sup>

Clearly Cauchy seems to fail to follow the fine distinctions that are frequently made by Maritain. In his insistence of the practical nature of ethics and the specific nature of political ethics Maritain has presented, as we saw above<sup>21</sup> the distinguishing mark of the politics of the New Civilization. Maritain emphasizes that for the present historical climate "the civil society has become grounded on a common good and a common task which are of an earthly, temporal, or secular order and in which citizens belonging to diverse spiritual groups or lineages share equally".<sup>22</sup> What unites the various communities in the body politic is in Maritain's view not a religious faith; it is rather a secular faith, which deals with "...practical tenets which the human mind can try to justify - more or less successfully, that's another affair - from quite different philosophical outlooks, probably because they depend basically on simple, natural apperceptions, of which the human heart becomes capable with the progress of moral conscience...".<sup>23</sup>

Moreover in applying the principle of pluralism and in teaching the democratic charter, Maritain goes even further than simply seeking agreement on practical tenets. Although what is sought in teaching the democratic charter is unity - practical unity - yet, Maritain insists that the means of teaching it must aim at a sound pluralism which will respect the inner differentiation of the various communities within the body politic.<sup>24</sup>

Not only that. Maritain even concedes to a pluralist legal system in order to respect the diversity of communities within the body politic:

...In matters in which civil law is most typically related to a conception of the world and of life legislation would then grant a different juridical status to the various spiritual families within the body politic. For a sane philosophy it is evident that the only morality is the true morality. But for the legislator who must aim at the common good and the peace of such and such a given people, is it not necessary to take into account the existential conditions of this people and the conditions of the moral ideal, the more or less defective, yet *a de facto* existing ideal, of the various spiritual families or lineages which make up this people, and consequently must he not use the principle of the lesser evil?<sup>25</sup>

Finally it must be remarked here that contrary to the accusation of Cauchy that Maritain foregoes discussion with the millions of people who do not enjoy the benefit of faith - meaning the Christian faith, as that is what Maritain is talking about when he refers to "moral philosophy adequately considered" - Maritain calls for cooperation and fellowship, within the body politic, among people of different and even opposed spiritual and philosophical schools and even with atheists.

What conclusion must be drawn from the above discussion except that whether in his doctrinal or practical approach to political ethics, Maritain does not succumb to the error of absorbing natural ethics into moral theology. To the extent that his political philosophy respects natural ethics, Maritain's political philosophy is relevant even to cultures that have not

embraced christianity but which revere the various truths revealed to them by right reason.

ii. Maritain's Political Philosophy as a Foundation of Democracy:

While Cauchy's criticism against Maritain's political personalism was termed "A Defense of Natural Ethics", Hans Kersel has voiced a criticism which may be termed "A Defense of Democracy against any Absolutist Truth, Metaphysical or Religious". For him democracy is undermined by any adherence to philosophical and/or religious absolutist truth which he alludes to as follows:

Philosophical absolutism is the metaphysical view that there is an absolute reality, i.e., a reality that exists independently of human cognition. Hence its existence is beyond space and time, to which human cognition is restricted.<sup>26</sup>

Besides this absolute philosophical truth, there is also, according to Kersel, absolute religious truth: "...religion is by its very nature belief in an absolute value, in an ideal which is perfect, because it is belief in God, who is the personification of perfection, the absolute *par excellence*"<sup>27</sup>.

Obviously, Kersel terminology "Philosophical and Religious Absolutism" is not in tune with scholastic terminology; for scholasticism truth in so far as it is truth is in its own way absolute. However, for the sake of tackling the criticism Kersel raises against Maritain's political philosophy we may bear with his terminology of philosophical and religious absolutism.

Kersel reproaches Maritain for advocating that the democratic ideal has its origin in evangelical inspiration. For him "...one cannot maintain that there is a connection between the essence of democracy and a definite religious system because this system guarantees to democratic government a higher degree of efficiency than any other religious system".<sup>28</sup> But as it was shown above,<sup>29</sup> Kersel misses the point in what Maritain refers to as the relationship between the democratic inspiration and the gospel inspiration. Maritain does not find recourse in this relationship in order to guarantee efficiency in democratic government; as a matter of fact Maritain is wise enough to realize that, judged by efficiency alone, democratic government is bound to be the most inefficient in contrast to either monarchy or oligarchy. It involves both the participation of the people in the decision making process as well as in controlling the government. Surely a government involving all the people is bound to be less efficient than that of one man or a few men.

Maritain's concern with democracy is not from the point of view of efficiency; it is adequately quite inefficient. But in spite of its inefficiency, "...democracy is the only way of bringing about a moral rationalization or politics. Because democracy is a rational organization of freedoms founded upon law".<sup>30</sup> This is precisely what Maritain is concerned with: not efficiency. "with democracy", affirms Maritain, "mankind has entered the road to the only genuine, that is moral rationalization,

of political life: in other terms, to the highest terrestrial achievement of which the rational animal is capable here below".<sup>31</sup>

Maritain insists on the need of reconciling the democratic inspiration with the gospel inspiration because of the historical link between the two. In other words, as it was pointed out above<sup>32</sup> the ideal of democracy sprang up from the gospel inspiration: the fact that in principle democracy tends towards the fulfilment of the Christian ideal for the person. This recognition of the historical origin of the democratic inspiration from the gospel inspiration, according to Maritain, logically means that democracy can only attain its highest ideal<sup>33</sup> by continuing to draw from the gospel leaven which continues to charge human history. This is what Maritain is saying about the need of reconciling the democratic inspiration and the gospel inspiration.

Besides the above mentioned objection, Kersel's article raises another, quite disturbing and definitely more devastating one to democracy. He sees an adherence to an "absolute reality" whether philosophical or religious as a complete hindrance to toleration in a democratic society. He implicitly reproaches Maritain for linking his politics, with ethics and religion both of which anchor democracy in "absolutist philosophical and religious truth", to use Kersel's terminology. Absolute truth in Kersel's mind undermines tolerance which is necessary in any democratic system of government. He defines tolerance as follows:

Tolerance is...the virtue of people whose religious conviction is not strong enough to overcome their political proclivity, to prevent them from the inconsistency of recognizing the possibility and legitimacy of other religious connections.<sup>34</sup>

According to this definition Kersel argues that to believe in an absolute truth and at the same time to tolerate another's belief in absolute truth is contradiction in terms; for it is like believing in an absolute truth relatively. In his own words:

A religious belief which admits that the object of the belief constitutes not an absolute but only a relative value that it represents not an absolute but only a relative truth, and that consequently another religion the belief in another God, another value, another truth, is not excluded and must therefore be tolerated is a contradiction in terms.<sup>35</sup>

What does Kersel's position mean when applied to democracy?

Obviously for him, as Helen Silving justly observes: "...whoever knows or claims to know absolute truth or absolute justice" - that is to say, truth or justice simply - cannot be a democrat, because he cannot and is not expected to admit the possibility of a view different from his own, the true view.<sup>36</sup>

But is it true that a metaphysician and a believer can not tolerate other philosophical and religious schools of thought? Must a believer necessarily impose his beliefs on others? Does to believe or to know the truth decrease or destroy the chances of cooperation in a pluralist body politic? In Kersel's opinion the answer is yes, and that Maritain must logically be wrong in advocating that democracy - which by definition requires tolerance - is founded in metaphysical and religious truth.

Maritain's political philosophy, especially his doctrine of tolerance, can certainly meet Kersel's challenge. First of all, to hold that neither a believer nor a metaphysician cannot not impose his convictions is, so Maritain insists, to deny the very existence of reason in man. Because the metaphysician trusts human reason, and because the believer trusts divine grace and knows that "...a forced faith is a hypocrisy hateful to God and man; they don't impose their convictions...They appeal to the inner freedom of other people by offering them either their demonstrations or the testimony of their love."<sup>37</sup>

It is a paramount principle in Maritain's personalist democracy that the body politic must be pluralist. For this reason, tolerance, which was preferably called "fellowship", by Maritain is a necessary feature of a personalist body politic. And not only is it centrally important for the pluralist body politic, it is, according to Maritain, "...a cardinal one for our age of civilization".<sup>38</sup>

In Maritain's political personalism tolerance among the communities in the body politic - or what he terms fellowship - is not between doctrine or in ideas nor in systems, it is rather between human beings; the people who live together concretely, who interact with each other, whose being is shaped by the same historical energies and who look forward with hope into some future which they can only attain through their common action. On this score, both metaphysical and religious truth strengthen their ties rather than break them.

## iii. The Church-State Relation:

Gregory Vlastos<sup>39</sup> raises an objection concerning "the compatibility of absolutistic sovereignty within the church with the full autonomy of self-governing political society".<sup>40</sup> Vlastos remarks that Maritain denies the State of Sovereignty and *endows* the Pope with "absolutistic Sovereignty ". He does use the term sovereignty as defined by Maritain: "...a power and independence which are supreme separately from and above the whole ruled by the sovereign".<sup>41</sup>

Vlastos recognizes that Maritain affirms in very clear terms the principle of self-government in political society<sup>42</sup> and the full autonomy of the State from the Church.<sup>43</sup> But since both the State and the Church have jurisdiction over moral matters, Vlastos thinks that Maritain's doctrine of absolutistic sovereignty in the Church and the complete autonomy of the State introduces a conflict of obligation in the people: the obligation to obey the decision of a democratic government which right or wrong in itself carries the moral authority of the democratic process and the obligation to follow one's conscience which in the Catholic context is inspired by the Church. In this case the sovereign authority of the Church would infringe upon the autonomy of the democratic State.<sup>44</sup>

Vlastos considers Maritain's doctrine on sovereignty as being most pernicious in the process of legislating laws in the State. In his view, this doctrine coupled with the Thomist doctrine that "...no law is a just law unless it conforms to

'Natural law"', and that "...an unjust law, even if it expresses the will of the people is not law"<sup>45</sup>, would undermine the authority of the State to legislate on moral matters. It is a question, according to Vlastos, as to who is to judge whether a law is just or not. What happens to the autonomy of the State in cases where the Church might rule that one or more of its laws are contrary to natural law? Vlastos thinks that by this fact alone that the Church's authority surpasses on account of its absolutistic sovereignty that of the State, autonomy of the State would be gravely prejudiced.

Moreover, whenever the Catholic citizens encounter "a conflict between a given statute and a pronouncement of the Church on the content of "natural law", they would know that, for themselves at least, the authority of the Church would annul at this point the political authority of the democratic State".<sup>46</sup> This, according to Vlastos leads to the perplexing situation where the same statute would be believed at least for the members of the Church to be and not to be law simultaneously. Thus, Maritain's doctrine of absolutistic sovereignty within the Church, in Vlastos mind, undermines his theory of the autonomy of the State.

Undoubtedly, this is a very serious accusation against Maritain's political philosophy. It is directed to a theme of capital importance in Maritain's political philosophy. For, what Maritain has endeavored to do in relating politics to religion is to distinguish the two orders: the temporal and the spiritual,

by recognizing their respective autonomy and mutual dependence. But if ~~it~~ is true that his doctrine of sovereignty within the Church undermines the autonomy of the democratic State then it would seem as if Maritain's political philosophy would not be relevant at least as regards the issue of the Church-State relation. But is Vlastos criticism valid? Is it true that by affirming sovereignty within the Church on account of spiritual nature and mission the autonomy of the State whose nature and mission are temporal is gravely undermined?

As for many other issues, Maritain deals with in Man and the State, the answer for the criticism in question here is not given in a package in his book. This does not mean, however, that Maritain does not address himself to the question. As a matter of fact, the whole of Maritain's political philosophy comprising the immutable principles of the superiority of the spiritual over the temporal; the reciprocal relationship of part and whole of the person and the common good; the laws that guide the application of the immutable principles to the concrete historical ideal and the personalist democracy offers enough suggestions for formulating an answer to the present critique.

That Maritain was aware of this problem is clear from the following text written in 1944: Summarizing the problem he had endeavored to tackle in his political philosophy.

*Comment concilier le principe de droits supérieurs que l'Eglise tient de sa mission spirituelle avec le principe de l'égalité de droits non pas de religions...mais des citoyens, qui est désormais incorporé dans la conscience que la Communauté politique a prise d'elle-même.<sup>47</sup>*

The two societies, the Church and the State belong to different orders. If the objection of Vlastos were simply to rest on the incompatibility of the sovereignty of the Church as spiritual society with the autonomy of the democratic State as a temporal society, it would be reduced to Kersel's argument above. That is, whether the authority of the Church due to her, from above and for spiritual matters threatens the autonomy of the democratic state on temporal matters. The answer has already been given above...

But the objection of Vlastos is more subtle than that. It is the incompatibility of the authority of the Church as touching upon the temporal life of its members and the autonomy of the democratic state. But here, too, Maritain has indicated ways of overcoming the difficulty.

From the concept of the nature of the body politic: the body politic that Maritain is conceiving for the personalist democracy is not constituted simply of so many religious or philosophical communities each one firmly committed to its own faith and having no common ground for uniting these communities. The body politic, in other words, is not united by a religious or philosophical creed. On the other hand, it is not neutral to any and every creed. It has a creed, the democratic charter.<sup>48</sup>

The body politic is conscious of its own principles to which all the members, irrespective of their philosophical and religious creed, are fully committed. On this point Maritain has the following to say:

...if men are genuinely to cooperate in view of certain objectives which have to do with the common good of mankind, it will be only on condition that they can establish an intellectual agreement on the basis of common practical principles in spite of their irreducible divisions on the level of speculative convictions. In other words, on condition that they are able to formulate together certain common principles of action.<sup>49</sup>

It is unmistakably obvious that these convictions must conform to the nature and aspirations of man. They must, in other words, be in accordance with the natural law as understood by the people at that level of their civilization. And this charter will be such that any other law to be enacted in the future must reflect its basic convictions. The role of the various religious communities, the Catholic Church not excluded, is to conscientiate their members on the various theoretical implications and to enlighten them on the theoretical justification of the democratic charter. For this reason, what would be at stake for any future laws is not: who will judge whether or not it is valid, since the people have the democratic charter which is like a socio-political-cultural-compass of their activities. Rather, what would be at stake is the theoretical justification of the law in accordance with the democratic charter. This theoretical justification can and should be offered by the various religious

and philosophical communities for their members. This justification is bound to be analogical to the *prise de conscience* of the various communities. This brings us to a different consideration of Maritain answer to Vlastos objection.

From the law of the progress of moral consciousness and the principle of pluralism: according to this law the rectitude and purity of moral conscience are independent of the explicit knowledge of all particular moral laws.<sup>50</sup> But the explicit knowledge of the various norms of natural law grows with time. The various religious and philosophical schools are not indispensable to this law. This means that although i.e. the Church has revealed theological truth, yet, interpreting this truth to a people is intrinsically tied to the moral consciousness of the people. For the Church, being both divine and human, its human dimension does not follow a set of historical laws different from those of human progress.

Coupling the law of the progress of moral consciousness with that of the pluralism of the body politic, it becomes clear that it is not necessary that the various communities making up the body politic concur in extent and comprehension of the knowledge or the various moral laws, a knowledge whose source may be among other sources from the spiritual communities: their knowledge will be analogical to their level of moral consciousness. But the difference arising from the diversity of understanding of the moral laws does neither impede nor undermine the force of the laws of

the state, because these latter are not based on the theoretical knowledge but on the practical knowledge. It is in this sense that Maritain's doctrine of the legal pluralism finds its best application. For, according to Maritain, although it is evident that the only morality is the true morality, yet, for the body politic which must aim at the common good and the peace of a concretely existing people, it does take into account the existential conditions of the various communities within itself. For this reason it may be necessary to legislate the various spiritual families which make up in their more or less defective yet *de facto* existing ideal and in keeping with the principle of the lesser evil.<sup>51</sup>

Obviously, therefore, the solution of legal pluralism means for Maritain that in order to avoid greater evils, for example, the ruin of society's peace, the petrification or the desintegration of conscience, the body politic could and should tolerate within itself ways of worship, and even legislate according to these ways, which are removed more or less from the true one.<sup>52</sup> Thus, whether the Church has "absolutist sovereignty" or not, the fact of the matter is that it is the people who design the programme of their practical agreement. It is not offered from above, whether from the State or from the Church both of which may and should educate the people;<sup>53</sup> it is the work of the people.

1. In Chapter II above were mentioned and answered some of these critics. Some of them reject Maritain's doctrine of individuality and personality: J. A. Baisnée, J. Craveny, P. Descogs reject the distinction as being metaphysically unfounded. It was demonstrated above, Chapter IV, p. 200 that the root errors of these critics is to have misread or misinterpreted Maritain or to have criticised without first of all reading him.
2. Charles de Koninck wrongly thinks that Maritain is putting the human person as a part of the created world above all the common goods. In Chapter III, p. 210 it was shown that Maritain's doctrine of personalism affirms with the same stoke the supremacy of the spiritual over the temporal as the hierarchy of common goods.
3. In Chapter IV it was mentioned how Walter Farrell makes this objection and how it was evaluated in the light of Maritain's doctrine.
4. Brooke William Smith has made a highly documented study on this matter. See Chapter II of his book: Jacques Maritain Antimodern or Ultramodern? New York, Elsevier, 1976, pp. 19-49.
5. In Raison et Raisons pp. 257-285 Maritain has grouped together his answers to critics he answered at various occasions in Le Devoir de Montréal, 26 mai 1943; O Diario de Belo Horizonte (Brésil), 23 Décembre 1943; El Diario Ilustrado de Santiago du Chili, 1e Mai 1944; The Tablet of London, 13 December 1945.
6. Venant Couchy, "In Defense of Natural Ethics", in: The American Catholic Philosophical Association Proceedings, vol. 29, 1955, pp. 206-218.
7. Hans Kersel, "Foundation of Democracy", in: Ethics: An International Journal of Social, Political and Legal Philosophy, 1955, vol. XLVI, No. 1, part II, pp. 1-101; Gregory Vlastos, "On Sovereignty in Church and State", in: Philosophical Review, 1953, vol. XL, pp. 561-576.
8. Chapter I

9. In Maritain's view, all the totalitarian regimes of the Twentieth Century are build on a materialist conception of man. They all stem from the final dialectic of bourgeois liberalism: for: "...though an inevitable internal dialectic, the social divinization of the individual, inaugurated by 'bourgeois' liberalism, leads to the social divinization of the state, and of the anonymous mass incarnate in a master, who is no longer a normal ruler but a sort of inhuman monster whose omnipotence is based on myths and lies; and, at the same time, 'bourgeois' liberalism gives way to revolutionary totalitarianism". SPP, p. 33. See also note 6 in the general introduction above.
10. Op. Cit., p. 206  
Cauchy refers here to the following text of Maritain: Cet objet formel et cette raison formelle sont communs à la philosophie morale adéquatement prise et à la partie morale de la théologie, parce que la seule fin dernière à laquelle l'homme soit ordonné de fait ou existentiellement, et que doit considérer une science véritable et complète de la conduite humaine, est la fin dernière surnaturelle. De la Philosophie Chrétienne, Desclée de Brouwer, Paris, 1933, p. 116.
11. Ibid.,
12. IH. p. 218
13. MS. p. 62
14. SW. p. 179
15. IH. p. 218
16. Ibid.,
17. IH. p. 218
18. MS. p. 153
19. EC. p. 94
20. V. Cauchy, Op. Cit., p. 217
21. Chapter VI above
22. MS. p. 108

23. MS p. 111
24. MS p. 122
25. IH p. 166
26. "Foundations of Democracy", in Ethics, 1955, Vol. LXVI, No. 1, part II, p. 16
27. Ibid., p. 59
28. Ibid., p. 64
29. Chapter VI part 1
30. MS p. 59
31. Ibid.,
32. Chapter VI, 1, iii.
33. Refer to page
34. Ibid., p. 61
35. Ibid., p. 59
36. Helen Silving, "The Conflict of Liberty and Equality", Iowa Law Review, Spring 1950. Cited by J. Maritain in The Use of Philosophy, p. 20
37. Ibid.,
38. Ibid., p. 33
39. "On Sovereignty in Church and State", in Philosophical Review, 1953, vol., XL. pp. 561-576
40. Ibid., p. 563
41. MS p. 25
42. The peoples' right to govern themselves is both inherent and permanent. MS p. 128-129.
43. See Chapter VI.
44. G. Vlastos, Op. Cit. p. 569

## CHAPTER VII

45. G. Vlastos, Op. Cit. p. 569. Cited from MS p. 48
46. Ibid., p. 570
47. Raison et Raisons, p. 264
48. PG. p. 82
49. Ibid., p. 85
50. PH p. 104
51. IH p. 160
52. MS p. 167
53. It is important to recall here that for Maritain the essential office of the law is an office of pedagogy of freedom tending to render the constraints of law superfluous. SP. p. 81

The relevancy of Maritain's personalist democracy emerges from this study. The study reveals that Maritain's political philosophy is capable of answering the objections which would have rendered it irrelevant: for, they address themselves to some of the central issues in his political philosophy. But this would be a defensive and somewhat negative way of judging the relevancy of Maritain's political philosophy. His political philosophy is also relevant in a positive way. It proposes metaphysical principles and the laws of applying these principles to the present historical climate in order to solve the political problems arising from the political empiricism and positivism, communism and any form of totalitarianism.

This empiricism and positivism is manifested in the tendency, at the turn of the Century particularly in Europe, of separating politics from morality and religion. The first separation, as was shown in Chapter II has its origin in the Kantian dichotomy between the order of nature and the order of freedom. It is this same dichotomy that was at the base of the philosophy of liberalism and the politics of Action Française.

Both in the order of principles as presented in Chapters II, III and IV and in the application of these principles as outlined in Chapters V and VI above Maritain has

endeavored to bridge this dichotomy.

In the order of principles Maritain's doctrine of personality and freedom and that of the distinction of individuality and personality make an inestimable contribution to political philosophy. With the first, Maritain has been able with one stroke to tackle the political problems connected with freedom in both liberal or individualist political philosophy and in the imperialist or dictatorial political philosophy.

The first as was shown in Chapter II seeks to build social life on freedom taken in the sense of freedom of choice while the latter on freedom of autonomy over the material world. Maritain's philosophy regards freedom of choice as only the initial freedom and freedom of autonomy as something to be achieved, not by lording over the external world but by gradually realizing the datum of the metaphysical nature of man through intellection and volition. The true freedom of autonomy is therefore terminal; what the human person achieves as his intellectual nature blossom fully.

The objective of political society is the conquest of freedom: it is to establish the social, economic, political conditions which secure for the multitude of persons such a standard of material, intellectual and moral life as will benefit the whole community and enable each individual person to progress towards the achievement of his freedom of autonomy. Thus Maritain's doctrine of freedom takes into account both

the individual persons and the multitude of human persons that constitute a political society.

Maritain's doctrine of the individual and person as playing the role of a part and a whole in political society is also a very big contribution to political philosophy. It helps to define authentically the relationship between the person and the common good as well as that between the common good and the absolute ultimate end of the human person. This doctrine and that of freedom of autonomy provide the principles which Maritain has used to solve the political problem for the present historical climate.

It is very true that the present historical climate is characterized by freedom. Man is aware of freedom much more so now than ever before. But while freedom has almost become a cliché without a clear delineation of what it means exactly in the various contexts: social, political, moral and religious, Maritain's doctrine of the human person and freedom presents a very clear analysis of freedom in its various uses. His political philosophy answers the needs of the time by providing the immutable principles on which a genuine political philosophy can be built. He has applied these principles to the present historical climate by proposing his personalist democracy as the concrete historical ideal for the new civilization after the liquidation of the Bourgeois Civilization. But does this personalist democracy

offer a genuine solution to the totalitarian tendencies in politics?

Besides overcoming the errors of the Kantian dichotomy of nature and freedom; liberalism, political naturalism and political positivism, Maritain's personalist political philosophy does succeed also to heal the wounds of Machiavellianism and any form of totalitarianism including the Hegelian hypermoralism in politics. Political hypermoralism in Maritain's view is not any better than political amoralism in his personalist political philosophy. Maritain assigns to the body politic a specific end which while being principally ethical in keeping with the nature of the persons who constitute the body politic is only a temporal end. He emphasizes as we saw in Chapter III that the direct and specifying end, the common good of a nation is something temporal: the very existence, temporal and terrestrial, the very improvement, temporal and terrestrial, the very prosperity of a nation temporal and terrestrial, really and essentially pertain to the common good. It is the temporal ultimate end of political society.

Connected to the problems of hypermoralism and amoralism is the problem of means to which Maritain has given quite an ample treatment in his political philosophy. In his personalist democracy especially as formulated in Man and the State, Maritain states in very clear terms that democracy is the only

way of bringing about a moral rationalization in politics and that, "...through democracy mankind has entered the road to the only genuine, that is moral rationalization of political life".<sup>1</sup> Thus, it may be seen that Maritain has succeeded in reestablishing the link between politics and ethics. But has he equally been able to link politics with religion?

Maritain's personalist democracy is characteristically theist. But this does not mean that the State or the government must be identified with any religion. In other words the basis of the theist feature of personalist democracy is not in the institutions: the institutions have no immortal soul. The theist characteristic is rather founded in the nature of the person. It is the persons who have an immortal soul; who, on account of what is supratemporal in them and in their spiritual interest and final destination recognize God as the cause of all things, the conservor of all things and the final end of all things. But for personalist democracy, Maritain does not require that everyone recognizes God theoretically. What he insists upon is that at least in the practical tenets the body politic recognizes that the person aspires to goods which transcend the common good of the body politic. For those who uphold the Christian faith, as Maritain's society is supposed to do, the good transcendent to the common good is identified with God. But this need not be the case for every personalist democracy. The guiding

criterion for the theist aspects of personalist democracy is simply the practical recognition of the existence of an Absolute superior to the entire order of the universe and to which the human person is directly ordained.

This practical recognition by the body politic of the vertical movement of the persons who constitute it implies a practical assistance to the persons towards their supratemporal goal. It is so because, as it was demonstrated in Chapter IV and VI, it is an essential quality of the common good to assist the person positively in their movement towards supratemporal achievement, which according to Maritain is an essential part of the pursuit of happiness. For this reason the body politic cannot be neutral. It itself will have no separate belief in God or separate religious truth. However, by the virtue of serving the people, it will have its own social, political morality, its own conception of justice and civic friendship, temporal common good, the common task, the ideal of civilization etc... all of which reflect the peoples commitment to supratemporal good.

At this juncture one question poses itself irresistibly: must the body politic lynch atheists? On what ground in Maritain's personalist democracy can atheists and theists collaborate if one of the practical tenets of this democracy is the ordination of the person to an Absolute transcendent to the whole order of the universe?

Maritain's answer is not very clear. In fact there seems to be some anomalies in what he says on this matter. On the one hand Maritain does not explicitly condemn atheist. His personalist democracy does recognize their right to exist like all other citizens. Furthermore it does grant and even protect their right to adhere individually to their belief. But on the other hand Maritain's personalist democracy denies atheists the right to express their belief publicly. In denying atheists the right to express publicly their belief, Maritain insists that atheist "...would have only to realize that the body politic as a whole was just as free with regard to the public expression of its own faith as they, as individuals, were free with regard to the private expression of their non-religious convictions".<sup>2</sup>

It would seem as if Maritain's position on Atheists is consistent with his doctrine of the body politic and that of political ethics. In the first place the body politic does not legislate on matters of intelligence, beauty and religion. The body politic respects the realm of conscience of all citizens; even of atheists. In the second place for the sake of preserving peace and unity, the body politic may refuse a certain community the right of public expression of its faith. In this case the atheists may hold to their faith as individuals, but they may not exercise their right of religious association publicly.

But if Maritain were consistent with the principles of his personalist democracy especially the ordination of the person to the Absolute, atheism would never be allowed to creep into the body politic. It is not a question here of tolerance. Nor is it a question of the principle of the lesser evil. It is a question rather, whether or not in principle the body politic or a part of it can be and not be simultaneously. For, to be a person according to Maritain carries with it both in its individual and social life a recognition of the Absolute transcendent to the whole order of the universe. Thus to advocate personalism should naturally be intolerable to any form of atheism. In other words atheism as a denial of the Absolute transcendent has no place in a personalist democracy. But why doesn't Maritain say this in clear and precise terms?

Maritain's rather ambivalent position on atheists is seemingly a recognition of the existential conditions of his sociological cultural historical environment. His civilization has been crippled by the materialist conception of man and society. His society was once christian both in its internal life as well as in its structures, but it has remained christian largely in its structures. Maritain refers to this change by noting that "...it is a great misfortune that a civilization should suffer from a cleavage between the ideal which constitutes its reason for living

and acting, for which it continues to fight, and the inner cast of mind which exists in people, and which implies in reality doubt and mental insecurity about this same ideal".<sup>3</sup> This dichotomy, between the professed ideal and the real; the idealization of man, human dignity, equality, freedom by either ignoring or implicitly denying the true conditions of man in society; and the invocation of the Absolute as a way of defending an ideology and protecting the rights of some privilege classes even where these rights violate justice and the liberal tenet of success through material gain have all contributed to the creation of atheist: people who deny the god that society has fashioned for itself. On this score it is very necessary to tolerate atheists; for society has created them.

But it seems that for cultures which are not as entrenched in materialism and whose technological progress never lose sight of the human values the question of atheism is alien.

Maritain's position on political parties seems equally ambivalent. On the one hand Maritain admits that political parties are validly criticized for their partisan spirit. But on the other hand he suggests that their existence seems normal in all democratic regimes, in so far at least as they group the members in one basis of a certain political conception. He thus believes that parties should not be suppressed and

that only the corrupting element of parties should be suppressed.

To say that the existence of parties seems normal in all democratic regimes is to suggest that political parties are intrinsically associated with democracy either in principle or in practice so that one can not have democracy without political parties. But by definition neither the democracy as an ideal: the supreme ideal which the political and social world in mankind has to aim at, nor democracy as a regime: the government of the people by the people and for the people is intrinsically tied to the concept of parties. As a matter of fact it would seem that political parties obstruct the establishment of the democratic regime. For, political parties are essentially divisive; rather than integrating the people in the body politic they divide them into groups. And this division is not only on superficial matters. Were political parties divided only on superficial and accidental matters, they would cease to be as soon as the divisive accidents cease. But the fact that political parties are said to enjoy a normal existence in democratic regime would seem to require a division of the body politic on essential matters. It is in this way that political parties can enjoy a permanent existence in democracy. But this permanent divisive factor in democratic regime would destroy the body politic as it would destroy the common action and

the common good. It would thus seem that political parties are not essential in democratic regime by definition. But are they essential to it by operation? In other words, does the establishment and the function of the democratic regime need political parties?

This is not a question of political philosophy; it is rather, one of political science. It pertains to the establishment and functioning of democratic regime in certain defined existential conditions. As such it is a local problem whose solution will be given by the consideration of the matrix of social, political, historical conditions of the climate in question. In Maritain's social political, cultural conditions parties have been associated with the practice of democracy. But just as the democratic philosophy is not *a priori* aligned to any of the three classical regimes of government, so, neither is its realization into a democratic government aligned necessarily to political parties.

But just as the operation of democracy in Maritain's local condition is associated with political parties and in keeping with the nature of democracy as analogical concept it would be illogical to deny the possibility of having a democratic government either with a single political party or with no parties at all.

It was mentioned in the general introduction that this thesis has also been prompted by Nyerere's political programme. At the end of this thesis will be found an appendix of a part of a study done on Nyerere's political programme. It may be seen from this study that Nyerere's programme is founded in an implicit personalist political philosophy and that when this philosophy is made explicit it might provide ways of overcoming some of the problems of Maritain's personalist democracy.

Looking first of all at Maritain's call for a democratic charter on which is based the common action of the personalist body politic, and which presupposes a certain agreement on the practical level regarding the aspiration of the person to goods transcending the temporal order it may be remarked that Nyerere is thinking out his programme in a sociological cultural and historical climate in which the whole existence of man is regarded by the people, as a religious phenomenon in which man is a deeply religious being living in a religious universe.<sup>4</sup> Thus Nyerere has the advantage of thinking out his programme in an environment in which the conception of man and of society presupposes that of God.<sup>5</sup>

In his highly documented study on the peoples of Africa concerning their religions and philosophies Mbiti has demonstrated that for the African "...He (God) is personally involved in His Creation, so that it is not

outside of Him or His reach. God is thus simultaneously transcendent and immanent;...".<sup>6</sup> He interacts in a special way with man in his daily activities. In this way man is constantly living in communion with his God in a family whose head is God Himself.

The traditional african society was seen as an extension of the family. The members of this extended family interacted with each other having responsibilities to God and for the well being of each other. This society was essentially collectivist,<sup>7</sup> communalist,<sup>8</sup> cooperative<sup>9</sup> and socialist.<sup>10</sup>

Nyerere has endeavoured to rediscover the principles behind this conception of individual and social life in the traditional african societies. His political programme is an effort to apply these principles analogically to the present historical climate in Tanzania having emerged from two colonial regimes<sup>11</sup> in order to find an authentic synthesis of the individual and society. In his application, as seen in the study appended to this thesis, he not only makes a distinction, akin to that of Maritain, of the individual and the person as playing the role of a part and a whole in society<sup>12</sup> he also stresses the ethical and religious roots of democracy,<sup>13</sup> the need of a secular faith - what he calls National Ethic - which will inspire each Tanzanian to be able to say: "...we cannot do this because it is un-Tanzanian".<sup>14</sup> Or the president to be able to say: "...I have the power to do this under the constitution but I cannot do it,

it is un-Tanzanian".<sup>15</sup>

With the same national ethic founded on the ethical and spiritual roots of the human person Nyerere sees the role of Tanzania in the international community as follows:

We the people of Tanganyika (Tanzania), would like to light a candle and put it on top of Mount Kilimanjaro which would shine beyond our borders giving hope where there was despair, love where there was hate and dignity where before there was humiliation...We cannot unlike other countries, send rockets to the moon, but we can send rockets of love and hope to all our fellow men wherever they may be...<sup>16</sup>

Moreover, as a leader he also views his role and that of his colleagues as primarily pedagogical and as one of service to the people:

There must be a deliberate effort to build equality between the leaders and those who are led. A Tanzanian leader must be completely free from arrogant, extravagant, contemptuous and oppressive attitudes... He must be a lover and defender of heroic bravery justice and equality.<sup>17</sup>

There are many themes in Nyerere's political programme which seem to correspond to Maritain's themes of political personalism. It would seem on the outset that Maritain's personalist democracy is relevant even to the Tanzanian sociological, cultural historical climate which is very different from that in which Maritain thought out his philosophy. As a matter of fact it would seem as if Nyerere's practical approach to some of the issues which Maritain has tackled theoretically might contribute to overcome some of

the shortcomings in Maritain's Personalist Democracy.

However, to what extent this is true would constitute a very good subject for a future thesis.

For the present thesis, the Relevancy of Maritain's Personalist Democracy has been demonstrated from three angles: first it has adequate solutions for the crisis of culture resulting from the Modern Civilization. Second, it can squarely meet objections of its critics. Third, it demonstrates the possibility of a potent accord with a political programme belonging to a sociological cultural and historical climate different from Maritain's.

1. MS. p. 59
2. MS. p. 173
3. UP. p. 11
4. J. Mbiti, African Religions and Philosophy, London, Heinemann, 1970, p. 15. See also, J. Mbiti Concepts of God in Africa, London, SPCK, 1970; Michael Dei-Anang, "The Concept of The African Personality", in Ghana Resurgent Accra, Waterville Publishing House, 1964, pp. 194-214; D.K. Chikiza, "The Outlook for Contemporary Africa", in The Journal of Modern African Studies, I, 1963, pp. 38-54; Boubou Hama, Les Problèmes Brûlants de l'Afrique 2 Vols., Paris, Pierre Jean-Oswald, 1973: Vol. I, Pour un Dialogue avec nos Jeunes, 172 p. Vol. II, Changer l'Afrique, 140 p.; J. Mawinza, The Human Soul: Life and Soul-concept in an East African Mentality Based on Luguru: A Discertation Presented to the Faculty of Philosophy of the Pontifical Urbanian University, Rome, 1963; Dominique Northomb, Un Humanisme Africain; Valeurs et Pierres d'attente, Bruxelles, Editions Lumen Vitae, 1965; Tempels, p., Philosophie Bantoue, CPA, Paris 1959; L. Sengor, On African Socialism, trans. by Mervier Cook, New York, Praeger, 1964; Sylvain Uffer, Ujamaa, Espoir du Socialisme Africain en Tanzanie, Paris, Aubier, 1971.
5. J. K. Nyerere, Freedom and Unity, p. 145
6. J. Mbiti Op. Cit., p. 29
7. F. Blockway, African Socialism, London, The Bodley 1963.
8. Ibid.,
9. Igor Kopytoff, "Socialism and Traditional African Societies", in W. Friedman, African Socialism, California, Stanford University Press, 1964.
10. F. Blockway, Op. Cit.,
11. German 1884 - 1918 and British 1919 - 1961: 1919-1944 as a Mandate and 1945 - 1961 as Trustee Territory.
12. J. Nyerere, Freedom and Unity, p. 121ff
13. J. Nyerere, Freedom and Socialism, see introduction.

14. J. Nyerere, Freedom and Unity, p. 174
15. Ibid.,
16. Ibid., p. 72
17. TANU Guidelines, 1970, cited and trans. by P. Shao in "Ujamaa and Self-Reliance and its Application to Education", Unpublished paper presented to the Faculty of Education of the University of Ottawa, 1973, p. 23. Note that what Nyerere refers here as equality between the leader and the led is exactly what Maritain alludes to as "Unity of Social Race". Ref. Integral Humanism, pp. 199-202.

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APPENDIX I

The following is the first Chapter of a major paper presented to the Faculty of Philosophy of the University of Ottawa as a partial fulfillment of the Ph.D. Programme.

THE ANALOGICAL APPLICATION OF  
JACQUES MARITAIN'S PHILOSOPHY TO  
NYERERE'S POLITICAL PROGRAMME

by P.S. Shao

A Paper submitted to the Faculty of  
Philosophy of the University of Ottawa  
for the Course PHI 5605 given by Prof.  
J. Croteau as a partial fulfillment  
of the Ph.D. Programme

Ottawa, March 1977

## INTRODUCTION

Nyerere's political programme may be seen as an attempt to deal with the problem of the inauthenticity of human existence. In his view, every historical epoch has to face anew the crisis which arises from Man's very contingent nature; because man cannot comprehend truth absolutely, he fails to give a lasting solution to the various needs, wants, conflicts and oppressions.

In Nyerere's own time, the crisis has manifested itself on two different yet related levels. On a local level, meaning Tanzania and in an applied sense all the third world countries which share a lot in the predicament of Tanzania, the crisis has taken the form of colonialism which in the long run precipitates into some form of racialism because the imperial powers were racial communities. These forces have created conflicts between the oppressor and the oppressed, the ruler and the ruled, man and society, man and man and finally man with himself. The state of unfreedom and inequality which both colonialism and racialism have created, destroys the very roots of authentic human life even to the colonizing powers. Indeed, "no country is completely free", Nyerere emphasizes, "if it keeps other people in a state of unfreedom".<sup>1</sup>

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1. J. K. Nyerere, Freedom and Unity/Uhuru na Umoja, Dar-es-Salaam, O.U.P., 1967, p. 145.

Although colonialism has had a far more reaching consequence on the socio-economic and political levels, yet the force has its origin in and is constantly being nourished from deeper sources - a philosophical fountain. It is fairly easy to determine this philosophy. Since colonialism and Western imperialism as a whole emerged conclusively and was defended by Western Europe in the late nineteenth century, its practice was inspired by the then reigning philosophy of man and society in Europe. To this the greatest contributors were J.J. Rousseau and John Locke. Their liberal individualism wrecks both the individual person and society. In rejecting colonialism even on a local level, Nyerere is posing the more fundamental issue of authentic human existence.

The second level on which the crisis of inauthentic human existence manifests itself is the international scene. International because the forces and processes at work on this level have a world wide impact. On this level, Nyerere identifies the crisis as manifesting itself through the power contest between East and West. He laments this division because not only does each block arrogantly claim to have attained the perfect model of society, but each struggles fanatically to draw the rest of the world on its side. Implicitly the two blocks are claiming to have attained the perfect pattern of human society; it is either liberal democracy or communism.

## INTRODUCTION

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Nyerere condemns this either/or pattern of human society. It denies man in general the power of reason to continue with the search for better solutions to man's continual needs, conflicts and oppressions. In particular it denies the other peoples of the world their power and right to think out new solutions and make a contribution to the international community. In Nyerere's view, both liberal democracy and communism are totalitarian and monopolistic. They fail to appreciate the diversity and pluralism of both the human potential and the environment.

Although liberal democracy and communism are opposed in their assumptions of man and society, yet they have one essential similarity. They are both built on a false image of man and society. Thus the crisis is actually deeper than it manifests itself in the East-West antagonism. It is a crisis of civilization, what Nyerere calls, human development. This, in turn, reveals a crisis of truth, the truth about man, society and the cosmos. It reaches deep down to the foundations of the human nature and its relation to society and to the entire cosmos.

Nyerere's solution is immediately socio-economic and political in nature. Yet because the crisis is philosophical, his answer too has philosophical overtones.

## CHAPTER I

### NYERERE'S POLITICAL PROGRAMME

Ujamaa Socialism is what Nyerere has proposed as a solution to the crisis of inauthentic human existence. This is an analogue of the traditional way of life.

As Nyerere describes it, Ujamaa Socialism, rooted in the African history, encompassing the traditional value while transcending the environment in which these were practiced, revitalizing these values in the present historical epoch, provides the new synthesis of the individual freedom and his life in society. Ujamaa, the spirit of the traditional society, which disposed every individual to regard all the others in the extended family as his brother, must be revitalized for the present society. But it must transcend the confines of the extended family; it must encompass the whole tribe, the nation, the whole continent of Africa and the world at large. This spirit must be the inspiring force for the new society and a vehicle of establishing Ujamaa humanism.

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1. This is an expression which occurs quite often in Nyerere's writings. It describes the African pattern of family which encompass many nucleus families. These arise, exist and persist because they carry out activities more extensive than would be possible for a nucleus-family group.

1. The Traditional Model.

In the traditional society, according to Nyerere, there were three values which characterized the Ujamaa spirit. Nyerere sums them as follows:

...There was an attitude of mutual respect and obligation which bound the members together...the property which is important to the family, and thus to the individual members of it, is held in common. And every member of the family accepts the obligation to work.<sup>1</sup>

In another place he refers to these "vital factors" more emphatically. This is how he puts it:

The first of these assumptions, as principles of life, I have sometimes described as "love", but that word is so often used to imply a deep personal affection that it can give a false impression. A better word is perhaps "respect"...

While the first principle of the Ujamaa unit related to person, the second related to property. It was that all the basic goods were held in common, and shared among all members of the unit.

Finally, and as a necessary third principle, was the fact that everyone had an obligation to work.<sup>2</sup>

These three vital factors<sup>3</sup> welded the community into one unit. They guaranteed in the community the unity, equality, and solidarity so often referred to by Nyerere.

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1. J. K. Nyerere, Freedom and Unity/Uhuru na Umoja, Dar-es-Salaam, O.U.P., 1967, p. 8-9.

2. J. K. Nyerere, Freedom and Socialism/Uhuru na Ujamaa, Dar-es-Salaam, O.U.P., 1968, p. 338-339.

3. J. K. Nyerere, Freedom and Unity, p. 8.

These vital factors governed entirely in space and time, the life of the community. They defined the forms of social, economic and political relations which affected the daily life of the community.

On a political level, the mutual respect and obligation was translated into the African form of democracy. Nyerere sums up this practice in one sentence taken from G. Glutton-Broch's Little Book on Malawi: "The Elders sit under the big tree, and talk until they agree".<sup>1</sup> They talked freely, as equals and they came to a consensus. From this practice Nyerere notes that the three basic elements of democracy are manifest - equality, discussion and liberty. He observes, nevertheless, that the environment in which this practice was carried out favoured it fully. In particular, Nyerere takes note of two characteristics of the traditional society which nourished this practice. Here is what he says for the first:

In his own traditional society the African has always been a free individual, very much a member of his community, but seeing no conflict between his own interest and those of his community. This is because the structure of his society was, in fact, a direct extension of the family.<sup>2</sup>

Being an extension of the family, the traditional society was moulded on the same pattern of relationships as the family.

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1. J. K. Nyerere, Freedom and Unity, p. 195. See also J. K. Nyerere, Ibid., p. 104.

2. Ibid., p. 105

From this pattern of relationship can be deduced the second characteristic of the traditional society: the government of the society was always personalized, either in the chief or in the elders. Thus, although there were discussion and consensus, yet the mode of governing the affairs of the community was not institutional, it was personal. "The African mental conception of government", Nyerere reiterates, "was personal, not institutional".<sup>1</sup> This means that what the community looked upon as the final authority which governed their lives was neither a set of laws imposed upon them from outside nor the enunciations from a parliament building; it was their customs - the unwritten creed. These imprinted their stamp on all activities and relations. The chief and the elders were the living standard bearers. They not only interpreted the customs in different circumstances, they enabled the members to interact personally with one another and with the authority. This is reminiscent of Plato's Philosopher King.

In his endeavour to set up a modern society which in an analogate of the traditional one Nyerere takes a note of the need of a common creed and some form of "personalized government". His target for making this comes true in a form of democracy synthesized from the traditional African form - participatory democracy, and the modern institutional

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1. Ibid., p. 105

form - Representative democracy.

## 2. The Modern Analogate.

The Ujamaa communities worked so well in the traditional society partly because they were relatively small and partly because of the bond of kinship. In embarking on Ujamaa Socialism - the modern society -, Nyerere emphasizes that his aim is not to revive the traditional society as such. What is gone by can never be revived. Nevertheless, Nyerere proposes a concrete historical ideal which answers his two questions: "What will be built on our past?" and, "What kind of society will eventually replace the traditional one?"<sup>1</sup> Thus, Nyerere seeks a model of society which is suitable for the present but which encompasses the qualities, values and the aspirations which guaranteed unity, equality and solidarity to the traditional society.

a) Need of Common Faith - Nyerere has expressed emphatically that what is needed to supplant the Ujamaa spirit is a national ethic. A creed which enables leaders to say, "we cannot do this because it is un-Tanzanian";<sup>2</sup> or the head of a state to be able to say, "I have the power to do this under the constitution but I cannot do it, it is un-Tanzanian".<sup>3</sup> Nyerere is

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1. Ibid., p. 6.

2. Ibid., p. 174

3. Ibid.,

confident that with this kind of creed or national ethic, a body of explicit or implicit ethical principles which lie at the basis of the Tanzanian Nation, the whole political economic and social organization of the body politic can attain the unity, equality and solidarity akin to the traditional society.

This national ethic must be the inspiring force for the type of democracy which Nyerere has led the Tanzanian body politic to opt - a one Party Democracy. According to him this is a type of democracy which must have all the qualities of the traditional African Democracy but which must be organized according to modern development of institutional democracy.

Like any form of democracy, Nyerere's One Party Democracy is firmly built on faith in humanity. This is why he declared to the United Nations Assembly, "...we have faith in humanity; that we shall endeavour to strengthen man's attempt to progress spiritually as well as material wealth..."<sup>1</sup>. This faith is for him the very lifelihood of democracy.

"Democracy", he emphasizes, "is a declaration of faith in human nature".<sup>2</sup> It is a "declaration of faith in mankind";<sup>3</sup> and "The whole essence of democracy is the will of the people and

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1. Ibid., p. 155.

2. Ibid., p. 175

3. Ibid.

faith in the people".<sup>1</sup> In this respect, an enemy of democracy is some person who somewhere has no faith in human beings. "...He thinks he is all right, but other human beings are not all right".<sup>2</sup>

This faith in mankind must penetrate and sustain the daily vital practices. It must make the national ethic a reality. It can do so through a one-party movement. Nyerere emphasizes this point as follows:

...Where there is one party and that party is identified with the nation as a whole, the foundations of democracy are firmer than they can ever be where you have two or more parties, each representing only a section of the community.<sup>3</sup>

Two cardinal ideas in Nyerere's programme are implicit in this text. The party is identified with the body politic. It is not an elitist party.<sup>4</sup> It encompasses the whole body politic. Nyerere argues that with one goal for the nation, with an implicit or explicit ethic for the entire nation, the foundation of democracy can be most firm if there is only one political movement leading the nation towards the goal. In saying this Nyerere does not deny the pluralism of human potential; far from it, what he is saying must be accommodated in his other

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1. Ibid, p. 27

2. Ibid., p. 175

3. Ibid., p. 196

4. Nyerere, Freedom and Socialism, p. 91

emphatic ideas of freedom and quality. He affirms, for example, that "within the Party, as in national institutions, the members must have absolute freedom to choose their representatives".<sup>1</sup>

The other concept which is latent in the above text is that of the supremacy<sup>2</sup> of the body politic. The government and all its institutions are and must be subservient to the body politic. He makes this point in the following:

...the sovereignty of the people is the most important of all our aspirations, and in many ways the most difficult to achieve. It is the most important because the good of the people is the only legitimate purpose of all national activities.<sup>3</sup>

In another text he makes the point clearer. "It is the Government which is the instrument through which the party tries to implement the wishes of the people and serve their interest".<sup>4</sup>

By the same token, the leadership must be one of service to the people. Service as practiced in the family. "Just as a father does not use his status to dominate and exploit his wife, children and other relatives", Nyerere affirms,

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1. Ibid., p. 91

2. Nyerere quite often refers to the body politic in contradistinction to the government as being supreme. It is constantly used to mean the people's "sovereignty". Their autonomy to control their economic activities, decide for themselves the laws they will have, the customs, and the political institutions through which they will govern themselves. J.K. Nyerere, Freedom and Development/Uhuru na Maendeleo, Dar-es-Salaam, O.U.P., 1973, p. 35

3. Nyerere, Freedom and Development, p. 35

4. Ibid., p. 33

"so in a nation the leaders...must not use their position... to exploit others".<sup>1</sup> On this score the leaders should not seek their own security. Nyerere emphasizes this in the following text:

...there is no personal security for members of Parliament, for members of the government, or even for the President. Politics is, and must be looked upon as a field of service, not as a means of earning a living.<sup>2</sup>

In another text he repeats that,

...a Tanzanian leader must be completely free from arrogant, extravagant, contemptuous and oppressive attitudes... He must be a lover and defender of heroism, bravery, justice and equality.<sup>3</sup>

Obviously, what Nyerere is saying here ties in with his general philosophy. It is the people who govern themselves. It is they who make the various choices of both immediate and distant goals. The work of the leaders is to educate, to persuade and to animate. In this sense, leadership means being one with the people, persuading them without usurping their right of deciding on issues which affect their daily lives. This is the only guarantee of true democracy.

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1. Nyerere, Freedom and Socialism, p. 142.

2. Ibid., p. 90.

3. Tanu Guidelines, para 15, 1971.

b) Participatory and Representative Democracy - What emerges from the foregoing is Nyerere's unremitting efforts to lay down a basis for civic friendship and justice for modern society. He notes that the traditional communities could attain these virtues through the practice of participatory democracy. All the members participated in the daily affairs of the whole community. Since this organization cannot be attained for a society as large as the present Tanzania - 16 million, Nyerere seeks to have the best of both participatory and representative democracy. Drawing from the ideal of the traditional communities, Nyerere has called for the establishment of villages of about 250 families. These are economic communities. But since even this unit is too large for a true living unit which practices the ideals of pure democracy, Nyerere has instituted throughout the nation the cell system - a ten-family unit. On this level and somehow on the village level, participatory democracy is practiced. The members are involved in the well-being of one another daily. Besides these levels, the higher forms of organization which terminate to the Parliament practice a representative form of democracy.

With this combination of participatory democracy for the grassroots and representative democracy for the national institutions, there is guaranteed a free upward-downward movement of ideas. In turn this warrants civic friendship which is inspired by the national ethic. On the whole this combination

of participatory and representative democracy is an endeavour to provide to the modern society a value akin to that of love, mutual respect and obligation lived by the traditional society. Let us now turn briefly to the other values of the traditional community.

c) Cooperation and communal ownership - Through the establishment of the village communities mentioned above, Nyerere intends to attain the traditional vital factors of cooperation and communal ownership. He has expressed this intention as early as 1967. This is what he said:

...we must aim at creating a nation in which Ujamaa farms and communities dominate the rural economy and set the social pattern for the country as a whole.<sup>1</sup>

These are villages which would practice, as mentioned above, all the ideals of democracy. The members, "would live together in a village, market together, and undertake the provisions of local services and small local requirements as a community".<sup>2</sup> In short they would cooperate freely and fully in all their activities. Consequently,

...the land this community farmed would be called "our land" by all the members; the crop they produced on that land would be "our crop". It would be "our shop" which provided individual members with the day-to-day necessities from outside; "our workshop" which made the bricks from which houses and other buildings were constructed, and so on.<sup>3</sup>

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1. Nyerere, Unity and Socialism, p. 251

2. Ibid.

3. Ibid.

In order that the cooperation and communal ownership outlined here become a reality, two conditions are necessary. The first condition is that the members must agree to live together and choose to do so freely for the benefit of all. Once the members have come together freely the villages "must grow from an application of the principle of self-reliance;<sup>1</sup> they must grow through the efforts of their own members".<sup>2</sup> Nyerere emphasizes here that the communities must be distinguished from the pure kinship group on the one hand and from a mere collective on the other. In these communities the consciousness of the benefits of living together and the rational choice to benefit from these advantages bind the members together in civic friendship and justice. The communities are par excellence political organizations. They are demanded by reason and implemented by free choice.

Besides the fact that these communities are demanded by reason they must also be true models of ideal democratic communities. Their organization must aim at the "equality of all members of the community, and the members' self-government in all matters which concerned only their own affairs".<sup>3</sup>

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1. This is another cardinal theme in the programme. It will be discussed briefly below.

2. Nyerere, Unity and Socialism, p. 358.

3. Ibid., p. 353

This condition holds true with all the organizations in cities, industries, schools and universities. All of them must as far as possible be organized as cooperative communities. In consequence there will also be communal ownership at all levels.

### 3. Self-Reliance.

In order to do justice to Nyerere's programme, it is absolutely necessary to take a look at the theme of self-reliance which is very central in the pursuit of Socialism. Ujamaa as outlined above refers both to the traditional values which Nyerere wants to revive in the present day Tanzania, and the belief which sustained these values. In its former meaning Ujamaa stands at the *terminus a quo* of Ujamaa Socialism. This in turn alludes both to the *terminus ad quem* of the society and the belief that should sustain the struggle towards its construction. It is in the latter sense a belief that Tanzanians can only do justice to themselves and to the universal community if they unite into a society of free and equal persons who live together and work together for the good of all.<sup>1</sup> On this score, Nyerere is convinced that if Tanzania works steadily towards this goal the love and unity of its members can spread even to other parts of the world. It is in this regard that

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1. Ibid., p. 349

he hopes to see the spirit of Ujamaa as a means of establishing humanism in the larger human community. He suggests this in the following text:

...the people of Tanganyika (Tanzania) would like to light a candle and put it on top of Mount Kilimanjaro<sup>1</sup> which would shine beyond our borders giving hope where there was despair, love where there was hate and dignity where before there was only humiliation... We cannot unlike other countries, send rockets to the moon, but we can send rockets of love and hope to all our fellow men wherever they may be.<sup>2</sup>

implicitly, therefore, the spirit of Ujamaa Socialism can spread like candlefire. This is possible because *per se* to live together like an extended family is good; and good as it is obvious, diffuses itself. However, to arrive at this level of providing a model to the universal community, Tanzanians must struggle indefatigably in a self-reliant manner towards the goal.

Self-reliance is a quality both of the individual person as well as of the entire society. This quality must be inherent both in the spirit of Ujamaa Socialism and in the society to which this spirit gives birth.

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1. Kilimanjaro is the tallest mount in Africa (29,340 ft.). It is snow-capped and it stands to the North of Tanzania only 3° South of the Equator. This mountain has been regarded with religious significance by some of the ethnic groups living on its slopes.

2. Nyerere, Freedom and Unity, p. 72

On the societal level, self-reliance means self-determination in identifying the national values, the goals to be attained and the priorities in the pursuit of the goal. In short, a nation is self-reliant if it has the full responsibility in controlling its own destiny.

Evidently the above presupposes at least three things. First, the people must have the knowledge to determine their goal. The second is that they must have freedom of choice. This freedom according to Nyerere includes the freedom to think independently of established societal patterns. "We shall grope forwards...but the most important thing for us to do now is to guard our freedom to THINK (sic) as well as to act".<sup>1</sup> The third requirement is that even after they have exercised their freedom of choice, the people must be able to act autonomously towards the goal. This means that besides the knowledge of their needs and besides their freedom of choice, the people must have the freedom to carry out their own decisions.<sup>2</sup>

On the individual level Nyerere emphasizes that any individual Tanzanian can only be self-reliant if he thinks critically and acts freely and responsibly. In his own words:

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1. Nyerere, Freedom and Unity, p. 121.
  2. Nyerere, Freedom and Development, p. 61.

...it (Education for self-reliance) has also to prepare people for their responsibilities as free workers and citizens in a free and democratic society ...They have to be able to think for themselves, to make judgements on all the issues affecting them; they have to be able to interpret the decisions made through the democratic institutions of our society, and to implement them in the light of the peculiar local circumstances where they happen to live.<sup>1</sup>

It is obvious from this text that a self-reliant society can only be built by a self-reliant individual. "Only free people conscious of their worth and their equality can build a free society".<sup>2</sup>

From these few considerations of self-reliance it is evident how this theme is so intimately tied with the notion of freedom. Hence, a fuller understanding of self-reliance can be attained from a discussion on Nyerere's conception of freedom. This is what must be done presently.

Nyerere neither defines freedom philosophically nor treats it *ex professo* in a speculative manner. Nevertheless, what he says about it in his treatment of development suffices to elucidate the philosophical basis of both freedom and self-reliance.

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1. Nyerere, Freedom and Socialism, p. 274

2. Ibid., p. 275

Development refers primarily to human development.

It is so because according to Nyerere, only a free agent can determine itself freely towards an end. As such, development seems to refer to an immanent activity in an individual human being, a group or a society. In associating this human activity with freedom, Nyerere seems to suggest that development is as proper to man or to the human nature as freedom is. However, Nyerere does not develop this doctrine any further. Instead he touches upon another mode of freedom. He says, "Development brings freedom, provided it is development of people".<sup>1</sup> Thus, besides the freedom which is a prerequisite of development, there is in Nyerere's view, this other type of freedom, the freedom to be achieved. What exactly does Nyerere mean?

As it was pointed out earlier, Nyerere's language is not philosophical. However, his use of the term freedom seems to imply three things. In the first place he refers to the presence in man of the faculty of free will. This is the prerequisite of free choice. The second use of freedom refers to the exercise of free will. This is obvious from Nyerere's constant allusion to the freedom from external force, and from ignorance. He also refers to the freedom of self-determination. Both this and the former are necessary freedoms for development. The third use of the term freedom encompasses

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1. Nyerere, Freedom and Development, p. 59

the state to be attained through development. This what he calls self-reliance. It is a quality which is attained when both the individual and society are fully developed through the exercise of the freedom of choice. This theme of freedom leads to Nyerere's conception of the individual person.

#### 4. Nyerere's Concept of Man

The foregoing exposition of Nyerere's political programme is heavily loaded with metaphysical assumptions. Chapter two here below shall be devoted to analysing these assumptions. Before doing so however, it is important to make a brief outline of Nyerere's conception of man.

From the various texts in which Nyerere has employed the term man, or individual person or individual man two different predications may be deduced.

According to Nyerere, man is a member of society; he is submerged to society as its fragment or part; thus, his life is ordained to the good of the whole society as a part is ordained to the good of the whole. In this respect society has the right where necessary to regulate, encourage or discourage those actions of individuals which affect other members of the society.<sup>1</sup> Moreover, he may have to, "...sacrifice, in the interest of the society certain of the private freedoms which he possesses in private".<sup>2</sup>

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1. Nyerere, Freedom and Socialism, p. 12

2. Ibid., p. 7

Nyerere takes pains to explain in very ordinary language the difficult concept of man being a part of society but at the same time being very unique. He touches on the notion of the common good which is common to the whole society and at the same time to each individual man. For him, the end of society is not simply that of the species - man. What he calls - the national interest implies "the interest of the individuals who comprise the nation".<sup>1</sup>

It is important at this juncture to examine the other aspect of the individual man which, as revealed in the foregoing, makes it imperative for society to pursue a good which is only justifiable because it is the good of the members.

Nyerere affirms in other texts that although man is a member and a part of the society he is nonetheless not ordained to the whole as a hand is to the whole body or a card to the pack. He is in a way a whole because of his freedom and because of the divine sparks he possesses within himself. The New Synthesis of the individual man and society must enhance "...the freedom for each individual to develop the spark of divinity within himself at the same time as he contributes and benefits from his membership of community."<sup>2</sup> By this Nyerere recognizes as a fact that although man is a part of society, yet due to certain aspirations in him, neither he nor his life can be completely subordinated to society.

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1. Nyerere, Freedom and Unity. Cited in Africa Report 1963, vol. 8.

2. Ibid., p. 121

Nyerere states this clearly by stressing that "...every person is unique; there are somethings which are and which must be privat to himself;"<sup>1</sup> and that "...God, - any God - has a relationship only with the individual who has faith in Him; no religion presupposes a God who has a relationship with an abstract noun or only with a collectivè unit."<sup>2</sup>

Thus, because of his nature, - having a divine spark, - and his relation to God, man enjoys freedom and dignity which nobody can take away from him and to which the society is called upon to serve. To this effect, Nyerere emphasized by saying that the purpose of development is man.<sup>3</sup>

"...It is the creation of conditions, both material and spiritual which enable man to individual and man the species to become his best."<sup>4</sup> Nyerere, addressing a group of missionaries remarks that this notion of development is easy for christians to grasp because "...Christianity demands that every man should aspire towards union with God through Christ."<sup>5</sup>

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1. J. K. Nyererè, Freedom and Socialism, p. 12
  2. J. K. Nyerere, Freedom and Unity, p. 12
  3. J. K. Nyerere, Freedom and Development, p. 215
  4. Nyerere, Freedom and Development, p. 215
  5. Ibid.

This second aspect of man, - man as having a divine spark - seems to be the very foundation stone of the new synthesis. In one of his famous papers on the New synthesis - "the purpose in man, Nyerere stresses the following:

The Arusha Declaration is also a commitment to a particular quality of life --- The document is in other words, Man - Centered --- it is a commitment to the belief that there are more important things in life than the amassing of riches; and that if the pursuit of wealth clashes with things like human dignity --- then the latter will be given priority.<sup>1</sup>

Here Nyerere seems to suggest that human dignity which as was pointed out above, is consequential upon human freedom and the immediate relation of man and the absolute, must be pursued before anything else. However, he goes a step further and points out that even the society and all its institutions must be put to the service of human freedom and dignity. "To the service of man's development" Nyerere affirms, "any or all of the institutions of any particular society must be sacrificed if this should be necessary."<sup>2</sup> The term sacrifice here is used in a completely different depth of connotation from that above.<sup>3</sup> Whereas the individual man may sacrifice himself for the goal of the society, meaning that man may freely do

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1. Nyerere, Freedom and Socialism, p. 310 (the Purpose of man).

2. J. K. Nyerere, Freedom and Development, p. 227

3. Cf, p.

so and that he could not be sacrificed for the society, the institutions of the society may, and must if need be be sacrificed for the purpose of man. What Nyerere is saying here amounts to this that man is not a means. He is an end in himself. The society may be an end but also a means.

It is an end when considered from the individuals who constitute it, but it is also a means when considered as a sum of institutions which are ordained to the service of man. More about the society will be discussed hereunder. For the moment, suffice it to observe the stress Nyerere puts on the dignity and freedom of the individual man. He emphasized these two themes so much that, in Hatch's words; "it became common for Nyerere to be accused by some of his colleagues of too great a concern for personal liberty in a society experiencing a revolution".<sup>1</sup>

Nyerere's conception of the individual human being reveals that on the one hand he considers man as a part of society, ordained to serve the end of society and sometimes ready to sacrifice himself freely for the society. On the other hand, due to his spiritual element, man is not entirely

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1. J. Hatch; Op. Cit.,  
What Hatch means here is not a violent revolution. He is using a phrase which Nyerere uses quite often when talking about the need of complete transformation of man. For this matter he views what is been done in Tanzania as an "evolutionary revolution".

subordinated to the society. He transcends society. For this reason the institutions of society must be at his service. Nyerere has obviously tried to draw a distinction between two aspects of the individual man. Unfortunately, however, clear as his explanation may be, it suffers from the lack of proper philosophical distinction. Moreover, although he has argued quite often with very convincing arguments there is a need of a metaphysical justification of some of the arguments. A good glaring example is the argument that society and all its institutions must be sacrificed to the development of man if need be. There is in his argument a need to define such terms as individual human being, dignity, freedom, man the individual and man the species. It is important to define these terms in order to avoid any ambiguity in their usage.

APPENDIX II

ABSTRACT<sup>1</sup>

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1. P.S. Shao, "The Relevancy of Maritain's Personalist Political Philosophy", a dissertation submitted to the School of Graduate Studies and Research of the University of Ottawa for the Degree of Doctorate in Philosophy, Ottawa, June, 1979.

1. The Problem:

This thesis deals with Maritain's solution to the political problem: does the individual person exist for the political society or political society for the individual person? In other words, how must the relation between the individual person, the social unit of political society, and the common good, the ultimate end of political society be conceived so that while the political society unites the individual persons towards their temporal ultimate end, the common good, it assists them positively in attaining their absolute ultimate end?

This problem is obviously speculative practical; for while it assumes a contemporary significance for every historical climate it presupposes certain immutable principles relating to the nature of man and the common good.

Now, Maritain's solution to this problem, his personalist political philosophy, was thought out in the thirties and forties. It was prompted by the specific problems of political naturalism and political positivism inherent in the politics of the Action Française movement. It evolved as he responded to the various political forces and events of the time: Hitler's National Socialism, The Spanish Civil War, The Italo-Ethiopian War, and the Second World War.

The question being posed in this investigation is: Considering the various problems to which Maritain addressed himself, and the various components of Maritain's political

philosophy, to what extent is his political philosophy relevant to the contemporary scene? Does Maritain deal with problems which confront politics as such; problems which are so intrinsic in politics that they manifest themselves in the politics of every age and climate? The position taken in this investigation is that Maritain's personalist political philosophy is relevant.

But it is noted that among other critics, Venant Cauchy, Hans Kersel and Gregory Vlastos have directed rather serious criticism to Maritain's political philosophy. These three are neither the only critics of Maritain's political philosophy, nor are their objections contained like those of Father Meinville, in extensive philosophical treatises; they are, nevertheless, significant. They address themselves to the central themes in Maritain's political philosophy: the relation of politics to ethics, the relation of the democratic inspiration to Christianity, and the relation between the Church and State.

If these objections are valid, they render Maritain's political philosophy irrelevant. But are they valid? Can Maritain's philosophy meet these objections? Hence, a further demonstration of its relevancy.

Coming from a different cultural background from that of Maritain - Tanzania - the present researcher cannot not wonder whether Maritain's political philosophy bears upon the political atmosphere of Tanzania. This is why he refers in the thesis as a side issue, the possibility of conformity between Maritain's democratic charter and the political programme of Julius Nyerere. This however, is a possible future work on Maritain.

## 2. Methodology:

In keeping with the nature of the problem, this enquiry comprises seven chapters: The first chapter is devoted to the study of Maritain's concrete historical situation. The purpose of this study is to analyse the political forces and events rampant in this historical situation in order to demonstrate whether or not the political problems resulting therein and to which Maritain addressed himself, have a universal applicability.

Chapters II, III, IV, are devoted to the essential component of Maritain's personalist political philosophy. The purpose of these chapters is to determine what Maritain has termed the immutable principles of his political philosophy and to enquire whether they have a universal applicability. In Chapter II an analysis of Maritain's doctrine of the human person is made. This analysis centers particularly on Maritain's metaphysical distinction of individuality and personality and that of the person and freedom of autonomy. Chapter III is devoted to the study of Maritain's doctrine of the political society focussing attention on the nature and essential features of the common good. Chapter IV deals with the relationship of the person as the social unit of the political society and the common good, the final end for which the political society exists. From these three chapters emerge the immutable principles:

- a) the supremacy of the spiritual and b) the subordination of the temporal order to the spiritual one; and the essential characteristic of political personalism: personalist, communal, pluralist and theist.

Chapter V and VI deal with the practical aspect of Maritain's political philosophy. Chapter V is devoted to the study of the concrete historical ideal, and the laws which guide the application of the immutable principles to the various historical climates. Chapter VI is devoted to the analysis of Maritain's personalist democracy.

Chapter VII and the conclusion constitute, properly speaking, the conclusion to the thesis by bringing together the conclusions arrived at in the six previous chapters. Also in this same chapter an evaluation of the criticisms of Venant Cauchy, Hans Kersel, and Gregory Vlastos in the light of Maritain's political philosophy.

3. Conclusions from the Enquiry:

This study arrives at the following conclusions:

- a) The problems of liberal individualism, fascism, racialism, and communism which preoccupied Maritain throughout the evolution of his political philosophy are not unique in his environment; they manifest themselves differently in time and place.
- b) The immutable principles and the general laws of applying these principles are pertinent to all politics.
- c) Maritain's personalist democracy which is built on his doctrine of the human person and that of the common good and which, according to Maritain, is the concrete historical ideal of the New Civilization, after the liquidation of the bourgeois civilization, is analogical; it can be applied to historical climates different from that of Maritain's.
- d) Maritain's personalist political philosophy is relevant to the contemporary scene. It has an adequate solutions for the crisis of culture resulting from the Modern Civilization; it can meet the objections of Venant Cauchy, Hans Kersel and Gregory Vlastos; it also demonstrates the possibility of a potent accord with Julius Nyerere's political programme which belongs to a sociological cultural and historical climate different from that of Maritain.