

Syrian Refugees in Jordan: Special Economic Zones as an Economic Action Plan

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Abstract

The war in Syria has had devastating effects on its population with massive human rights violations, war crimes, and the use of chemical weapons. Mostly all those who have been able to survive the terror are internally displaced or have fled to other countries. With 13.5 million Syrians in need of humanitarian assistance worldwide, this is the largest displacement of people since World War II. This has led to the necessity in innovation of refugee studies and management especially in developing states.

This thesis proposes the use of Special Economic Zones as a potential response to these modern challenges in Jordan as it hosts approximately 1.4 million Syrian refugees. By exploring the resource challenges of Syrian refugees and Jordan, Special Economic Zones are identified as a potential resource allocating mechanism that can be both ethical and mutually beneficial. Although narratives of Special Economic Zones exist, using them as a more sustainable economic solution to long term refugee displacement is largely absent in academia. This thesis aims to explore the viability of this proposal by identifying pragmatic concepts of human dignity, ethics, and political economy present in both Jordan's response to the refugee crisis and the practice of Special Economic Zones.

The notions of ethics and dignity are developed through Roberto Toscano's interpretation of Paul Ricoeur's ethical syntax and Aristotle's Eudaimonia to describe the observed refugee practices in Jordan. In addition, this thesis identifies power asymmetries that are present in the host-refugee complex by using concepts from Mahrdad Vahavi's *The Political Economy of Predation*. This thesis concludes that if ethical procedures are stringently followed and monitored, Special Economic Zones could be mutually beneficial to both Syrian refugees and Jordan.

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List of Abbreviations

Association of Owners of Factories, Workshops and Garments (AOFWG)
Asylum Seeker Certificate (ASC)
European Union (EU)
Export processing Zones (EPZ)
Extended Fund Facility (EFF)
Gender Based Violence (GBV)
Geographic Information System (GIS)
Incentive Based Volunteer (IBV)
International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC)
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR)
International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (ICESCR)
International Relief and Development (IRD)
International Labour Organization (ILO)
International Monetary Fund (IMF)
Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS)
Jordanian Dinar (JD)
Jordan Garments, Accessories and Textiles Exporters Association (J-GATE)
Jordanian Investment Commission (JIC)
Jordan Response Plan (JRP)
King Hussein Bin Talal Development Area (KHBTDA)
National Electric Power Company (NEPCO)
Non Governmental Organization (NGO)
Respect, Accountability, Fairness, and Transparency (RAFT)
Special Economic Zone (SEZ)
Syrian Refugees Affairs Directorate (SRAD)
United Nations (UN)
United Nations Commission of Inquiry (UNCI)
United Nations Human Rights Council (UNHRC)
United National High Commissioner of Refugees (UNHCR)
United States Dollar (USD)

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Introduction

The Arab Spring movement initiated in 2010-2011 with protests in Tunisia, Egypt, Libya, Yemen, and Syria. The resilience of the protesters coupled with mass media coverage brought forth international outrage. Protesters challenged the stagnant economy, official abuse, nepotism, and extortion (Bunton, 2016). In Syria, the protestors coveted political reform and fundamental rights and freedoms though the President of Syria Bashar Hafez al-Assad remained obstinate. As a result of the increasing acrimony on both sides the Assad regime violently shot back at the Arab Spring protestors in the March of 2011 (Çakmak & Ustaoglu, 2015). In August of that year, the Assad regime employed chemical weapons in the town of Damascus resulting in the deaths of several civilians (Çakmak & Ustaoglu, 2015). As the violence persisted the United Nations Human Rights Council established The Independent International Commission of Inquiry on the Syrian Arab Republic in order to report and monitor international law violations at much resistance of the Syrian government (Amnesty International, 2017). In July 2012 the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) declared the internal armed conflict in Syria (Gerges, 2016).

As the gravity of the conflict intensified the international community got involved and took different stances on the conflict; Iran and Russia sided with the Assad regime and United States of America with the Kurds and the rebels. The rebels had formed the Free Syrian Army who also had the support of Jordan, Turkey, and The Gulf States (Çakmak & Ustaoglu, 2015). The Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS) originally led by al-Baghdadi and al Qaeda moved into Syria and fought against both the Assad regime and the rebels with the intentions to create the Islamic State (Gerges, 2016). According to the 2016/2017 annual report undertaken by Amnesty International, the Syrian Government forces and Allies continued to conduct indiscriminate attacks and direct attacks on civilians (Amnesty International, 2017). Amnesty International has

charged the Assad regime with crimes against humanity and war crimes (Gerges, 2016). Non-state armed groups have also committed equally heinous war crimes and abuses to human rights (Amnesty International, 2017). Several of these crimes include the prevention of UN humanitarian aid delivery, attacks on medical facilities and personnel, torture and other ill treatment, unfair trials and unlawful imprisonment, unlawful killings, the use of chemical weapons, slavery, and rape (Amnesty International, 2017. 349-353). Around 6.6 million people in Syria have been displaced and roughly 4.8 million have fled the country, half being children (Amnesty International, 2017. 352). Whilst around 10 percent of Syrian refugees have gone to Europe searching for asylum, most stay in Turkey, Lebanon, Jordan, Iraq, and Egypt (World Vision, 2016). Despite the presence of international humanitarian aid, these countries in particular had to rapidly respond to the influx of refugees and the pressure they placed on their infrastructure and resources. The financial bearing of their response was derived from their own domestic economies, which in most cases were already fragile.

I. Jordan and Topic Exploration

Jordan, being in close proximity to Syria, has felt the impact of the Syrian War substantially. Syrians are not the first large wave of refugees that Jordan has experienced, as it also contains large populations of Palestinian and Iraqi refugees as well. Jordan also has the lowest ratio of natives to refugees in the world, 3:1, which given its geographical location comes as little shock (Fakih & Marrouch, 2015). With a crumbling economy, Jordan relies heavily on foreign aid to help provide temporary shelter and food to displaced Syrians within their borders. The insufficiencies of foreign aid have become increasingly apparent and despite its developing country status, the Jordanian government has paid for the necessary infrastructure to withstand

the amount of Syrian refugees. The Jordanian government has spent \$81.4 million for school enrolment for Syrian children refugees and \$168 million in health services (Fakih & Marrouch, 2015). They have also spent an additional \$1.7 billion as of 2013 in infrastructure such as water and electricity to accommodate for the volume of Syrian refugees (Fakih & Ibrahim, 2014). According to Abdullah Ensour, Jordan's prime minister reported that there are deteriorating conditions throughout the country as a result of the aid shortfalls (UNWIRE, 2016).

Whilst some Syrians have expressed their need and/or desire to enter the workforce, they are banned in order to protect Jordan's fragile economy and high unemployment rate of 15 percent (Fakih & Ibrahim, 2014). However, a report conducted by the UN and the Jordanian government estimates that roughly 160,000 Syrians are either working illegally or looking for work (Fakih & Ibrahim, 2014). Many adults and approximately 30,000 children, turn to agricultural labour, construction, domestic, and informal markets for jobs (Fakih & Ibrahim, 2014). It is pertinent that Jordan and the international community find a way to generate money and employment to balance the expenditures of hosting the Syrian refugees. The question of how to handle the refugee crisis has pertinence as there is yet a sustainable solution and current public policy has proven to be insufficient. Neglecting to find a solution will allow the continued depletion of resources from Jordan's domestic economy and will lead to decreased standards of living for Syrians and Jordanians creating potential civil backlash as a result. The objective of this thesis is to explore Special Economic Zones (SEZs) as a mechanism to ethically alleviate the financial strain of hosting Syrian refugees in Jordan and also as a tool to stimulate the Jordanian economy.

The existing literature has enabled insight into the necessary gaps that need to be filled in topics of Special Economic Zones and Jordans management of the Syrian refugees. There is

evidence that suggests that using SEZs will address the high unemployment rate of Jordanians and their large Syrian refugee influx has potential for Jordan's economic prosperity. However, SEZs have been largely debated in the academic community for their notorious ethical and labour rights infringements. Whilst many academics are quick to criticize existing SEZs, few offer mechanisms to promote their ethical functioning. The use of SEZs in refugee studies and ethical management is an understudied solution to the financial impact of large and rapid human displacement. If the SEZs can prove themselves as an ethical resource allocating mechanism, they could dramatically change current and future refugee management practices. This thesis explores that avenue, and answers the following question; *can the use of Special Economic Zones in Jordan be ethically used to alleviate the financial encumbrance of Syrian refugees while also bolstering its own economy?*

II. Methodology

A. Theoretical Framework

This study is broken down into three dimensions; the financial cost of hosting the Syrian refugees, the ethical concerns using refugees in SEZs in Jordan, and the economical benefits SEZs can have in Jordan. A realist approach is applied while pursuing these three dimensions. Realism emphasizes power in politics and opportunist intention contributing to the critical aspects of host-refugee relations and the potential predation by both the state and international actors (Ashley, 1981).

Mehrdads Vahabi's *The Political Economy of Predation, Manhunting and the Economics of Escape* is used in order to evaluate Jordan's restrictive refugee work policies as well as the

ethical implications of using SEZs as an energy allocating mechanism. Vahabi provides valuable concepts such as economics of predation, cost of protection, incentive problems, differential protection, and do no harm that are indicators of measuring the potential opportunist predation (Vahabi, 2015).

In addition, ethical considerations in regards to work and dignity of Syrian refugees are channeled through Paul Ricoeur's Ethical Triad; the preservation of the self, recognition of the other, and justice (Toscano, 2005). Ricoeur's Triad is also a framework through which the actions of Jordan can be understood. These included the restrictions of movement and employment permits Jordan places on refugees. This enables a more concrete foundation for the often subjective interpretation of ethics. These theories and concepts when combined helped measure the financial and diplomatic impact the refugees have on Jordan as well as addition costs and benefits of the SEZs.

B. Research Design

The contribution this thesis provides is the development of a proposal in refugee studies that has no precedent, using refugees in SEZs has never happened before let alone as a tool to generate state revenue, thus this research is imminently speculative in nature. In order to explore the viability of this proposition it is essential to understand the nature of SEZs, limitations and attitudes of refugees, as well as specific ethical approaches to harm to dignity. Attitudinal questionnaires, interviews, and quantitative data were necessary to explore the plausibility for SEZs to be the appropriate ethical response to the financial deficit the refugees have on the Jordanian economy. They also explored the potential for refugees to have a positive effect on the

Jordanian economy. The next paragraphs provide further details on the scope, methodology, and methods used in this thesis.

The research included research and collaboration with Syrian refugees in Jordan, the Jordanian government, the UNHCR, and other international actors. The results identified plausible alternative ways of handling refugees that leads to mutual reciprocity of all actors.

The research question was pursued through the consideration of three necessary and interdependent dimensions of this problem. The first is to define what a successful SEZ could be in reference to both Lotta Moberg, K.V Yankov, A.k Moiseev, and D.A. Efgrafov, and The World Bank's process of evaluating SEZs. The second scope is ethics, which was defined through The World Bank guidelines as well as through Ricoeur's Ethical Triad. In addition this scope includes the exploration of implications in the legality of employing refugees that Vahabi and Bierling from the University of Oslo's law department articulated. The third scope pursued the financial effects the Syrian refugees have on Jordan and the potential for Syrian refugees to contribute to the Jordanian economy. This was done through Vahabi's concepts of *cost of protection* and *rent and tribute* outlined in *The Political Economy of Predation, Manhunting and the Economics of Escape*. As well as Betts and Collier's *Help refugees help themselves: let displaced Syrians join the labour market*.

The methodology best used for the majority of this research question was qualitative. The study was explorative in its objective and was pursued by using case study analysis. Comparing and contrasting SEZs enabled a better understanding of their problematic and beneficial commonalities and the way in which they are analysed. The case study is restricted to the Zaatari refugee camp and centred its analysis on the speculative evaluation of the potential economic

viability of refugees' work in order to sustain their cost of living¹. This allowed a detailed composition of what a successful and ethical SEZ could be in a Jordanian refugee camp. The Zaatari refugee camp was the location of the study of this research for two reasons; it is the first and largest refugee camp in Jordan and resembles a city within itself, in fact by population it is Jordans fourth largest city (Aldrick, 2016). The Zaatari refugee camp has 3 hospitals, 120 mosques, 3 schools, 2,500 shops, and costs approximately \$500 000 USD to run per day (Ledwith, 2014. 20). Secondly, the market is the only one permitted within a refugee camp providing an example of Syrian refugees at work, despite the blurred lines of the legality of doing so. This provided an available sample group that would be able to respond to questions of work and labour for Syrian refugees in Jordan.

Regarding the specific methods used for data collection, questionnaires were distributed to Syrian refugees working in the North East of the market as well as others within district five of the Zaatari refugee camp. Interviews were then conducted to provide supplemental data to responses in the questionnaires conducted in the same areas. The questionnaires and interviews established a bottom up approach to understanding the needs of Syrian refugees in Jordan. They are needed in order to process the underlying intentions of Jordan as a host to Syrians and to evaluate SEZs as being an ethical response to the diminishing resources. They explored how Syrian refugees are impacted physically and psychologically from the war in Syria and how they have been coping with limited resources. They also sought to comprise general emotions in regards to the work permit restrictions and their feelings attributed to work and labour. This is

¹ The Zaatari refugee camp has also been cited as; Alzatry, Zataari, Zatari, and Za'atari. It will

important in identifying the potential labour pool that would be both willing and capable of working in a SEZ. The results were compared to an United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) skills assessment report around the same time as the fieldwork as well as a study conducted by Shannon Doocy (et al) of 1550 Syrian refugee households in Jordan and the feedback from the Incentive Based Volunteer scheme in the Azraq and Zaatari refugee camp.

Population data was needed in order to understand the demography of the study. REACH collected population data in Zaatari in 2015 with a mixed sex research team that was comprised of Syrian Cash for Work participants. They attempted to collect data from every household, visiting unoccupied homes up to three times on different days and times. In this data collection District 5 had approximately 5500 people in January 2015 with an increase to 6000 people in December. This is generally in the middle of the scale District 8 had around 7, 978 people and District 4 had around 4162. This report found that District 5 comprised 23.9 percent of people who had been at Zaatari for 1.5- 2 years, 24.4 percent for 2-2.5 years, 49.1 percent for 2.5-3 years, and 2.5 percent for more than three years (REACH, 2015). In Zaatari's overall population for late 2015 79, 086 of that only 71, 227 were present during the assessment. 83.1 percent came from Dar'a governorate, 14 percent came from Rural Damascus, 1.8 percent from Homs, 1.1 percent Damascus and 0.8 percent came from another area of Syria (REACH, 2015). The working age population 18-59 was 21 percent female and 19 percent male.

The questionnaires conducted during fieldwork of this thesis included several questions relating to resources and labour. Participants were asked if they had access to adequate food and water daily, clothing, medical services, and humanitarian assistance. This addresses many concepts Vahabi contributed to the debate of refugee studies including that of predation and more specifically, do no harm (Vahabi, 2016) (Wallace, 2015). In relation to labour, participants

were asked their level of education, working experience and skills, as well as their desire to work and in a new domain. The results would demonstrate the need and desire to work.

The questionnaires and interviews were conducted in targeted areas; District 5 and the North Eastern part of the market. In District 5, 15 women of working age and 3 men of working age completed the questionnaire. The North Eastern part of the market provided the most results from questionnaires as 28 men of working age completed them. The population of the North Eastern part of the market is undocumented and is frequently changing, therefore confidence levels could not be achieved. In order to produce results with higher confidence levels secondary sources were necessary. During the time of the fieldwork the UNHCR was in the process of publishing a similar assessment. With more volunteers, resources, and time, they were able to create a profile of skills and assets of the refugees in the Zaatari camp. The field work conducted by the UNHCR will be the foundation of this study. The research begun in 2016 at that time there were 30, 704 refugees between the ages of 18-59 at the Zaatari camp; 14, 847 males and 15, 857 females. Although the population has since decreased this study is the most current of its kind. As part of a cash for work program through International Relief and Development (IRD), a group of 12 refugees of the camp had been trained in Geographic Information Systems (GIS) and data collection. This group would be responsible for conducting the fieldwork. The fieldwork included interviews which were to follow questions according to a questionnaire. A sample of 372 males and 342 females were interviewed, thus producing results with a 95 percent confidence level and a 5 percent margin of error. The questionnaire included questions that were related to work, for instance; previous work experience, education level, skills, knowledge of laws, and desired incentives in a job (UNHCR, 2017, 4).

Interviews were used in the fieldwork as supplementary to the questionnaires. Interviews offer more in-depth qualitative insight towards the attitudes of the Syrian refugees but questionnaires are able to better represent the overall Syrian refugee population beliefs quantitatively. The use of interviews allowed for a more contextual understanding of what *ethical* means to the Syrian refugees and their *desires* to enter the workplace. They included themes of daily routine before the war and after in the Zaatari refugee camp as well as their future goals and ambitions. This allowed a more contextual understanding of lifestyle and future plans to be formed. This is advantageous to the orchestration and implementation of SEZs and their potential investors.

The researcher was a native anglophone speaker and the questionnaires were translated into Arabic and then back into English. Interviews had to be conducted through the use of a translator. This took away from the ability to create a more personal connection with those interviewed. Despite trying to initiate the interview with personal questions such as what their home life was like before the war and what they enjoy doing, there was a form of disconnect and formality in using the translator. This is an issue that occurs through cross-cultural research, the challenge of remaining objective and consistent in the interview questions despite several languages being used (Bloch, 1999).

In order to have the most accurate results, two approaches were applied to ensure that the questions in the questionnaires held the same meaning in both languages and cultures (Bloch, 1999). The first was a procedure called “Translating Decentralizing Procedure” and the second was “Back Translation” introduced by Brislin et al (1973). Translating Decentralizing Procedure was designed from previous coding of literature. Central themes were kept but questions were open to modification in order to convey the same sense in both languages. Back Translation was

used following Translating Decentralizing Procedure. Back Translation it is the process of translating the translated questions back into English - the original language - by an independent Arabic-Anglo speaker that had not been involved in the previous research (Bloch, 1999). For instance, the questionnaire included the question: “Do you have any mental health concerns that will inhibit your ability to be employed?” The original translation from English to Arabic translated “mental health” to having a brain condition. The use of the back translation method allowed this error to be caught and be properly translated.

C. Analysis of Limitations

During the fieldwork there were several limitations that inhibited the prospected contribution the questionnaires and interviews would have for the research. In regards to the original questionnaires, overall fieldwork would reveal a low literacy rate. When a participant was asked if they could read, several said that they were unable to while others said they could but were unable to recite the disclosure paragraph. This was one of the largest limitations in conducting fieldwork. Almost every questionnaire had to be read to the participant from start to finish, this slowed the process immensely. The women in District 5 also liked to talk among themselves which challenged the questioning process. Another challenge to the questioning process was the presence of guards or peers. In District 5, women gathered in one area while their questionnaire were read to them, this could have affected the results of questions such as ones regarding mental and physical health. This is due to the stigma in their society to admit publicly to having any of those conditions. In the market, a security guard followed closely. This could have made the participants feel coerced into participating or alter their responses. In particular, to questions “Do you think that Jordan and the international community are doing

enough to provide humanitarian assistance to you and other Syrian refugees in Jordan?” and “Do you think Jordan’s restrictions on work permits for Syrian refugees is fair?” Although not certain, the questionnaires in the study conducted by the UNHCR may have mitigated some of these limitations as the data collection was conducted by Syrian refugees. Due to the preceding and proceeding circumstances there was a low level of confidence in the fieldwork conducted.

There were several issues in regards to the obtainment of permits required to enter the Zaatari refugee camp enabling the progression of research. As there were interviews being conducted it was crucial to obtain a media permit, however as there were questionnaires being handed out in addition to interviews a research permit was needed as well. The communication between the government offices was a significant challenge, and this devoured much of the time that could have been used in the field. Time was exceedingly limited, as the research was undertaken simultaneously with course work in the semester it was crucial to miss as little class time as possible. The UNHCR were understandably highly inaccessible both online and in person before and throughout the research. However, once they were able to be contacted they assisted to the best of their ability.

III. Thesis Plan

In order to further develop this hypothesis this thesis is organized into four chapters. The first chapter will discuss refugees in Jordan and focus on Syrian refugees including their physical and psychological status based on previous studies and anecdotal experiences. This provides context enabling a higher level of understanding as to how inefficient access to the formal labour market and financial resources can further feelings towards lacking dignity. Chapter two defines Special Economic Zones (SEZs) and presents narratives on their successes and their failures in

practice. This chapter explores the current climate for SEZs in Jordan including their reported unethical practices and the progression in policy reform taken in order to prevent further maltreatment and further development. This chapter is central to delimiting the ethical dimension of this problem; is it possible for SEZs to be both ethical and financially beneficial to the refugees and the state? Chapter three further pursues the discourse of ethics and determines the grounds of what ethics is defined as for purposes of this thesis using Paul Ricoeur's Ethical Syntax and Aristotle's concept of Eudamonia. It discusses the treatment of Syrian refugees by Jordan, which include breaching several terms of their international agreements and covenants. Chapter three is necessary as it facilitated debate on refugee management and preservation of a state. It suggests ethical guidelines that should be followed, especially in using refugees in labour. The fourth chapter uses concepts from Vahabi's *The Political Economy of Predation, Manhunting and the Economics of Escape* including predator - prey relationships and how these could possibly transcend into the Jordanian - Syrian refugee relationship. This is supported by large amounts of debt accumulated by the Kingdom and historical International Monetary Fund (IMF) assistance. In addition, it also discusses the concept of *do no harm* according to CDA guidelines. The final section will discuss concluding arguments regarding the use of SEZs in Jordan for both refugee sustainability and dignity along with economic costs and benefits for Jordan.

Conclusion

Provided that there is not detailed data present to demonstrate the economic viability of the proposition of using Special Economic Zones, this is an exploratory exercise of their proposal. In order to demonstrate the plausibility of this scenario, the three main dimensions of

ethics, legality, and political economy will be explored. The main contribution of this thesis is to suggest that this scenario would have the potential to alleviate feelings of lack of dignity and economic stress in relation to the Syrian refugees.

Chapter 1

Syrian Refugees in Jordan

The first chapter provides the necessary precedent knowledge required in order to contextualize our analysis. It begins with factual and statistical information regarding Syrian refugees in Jordan and introduces the effects of the volume of asylum seekers on Jordan's resource and infrastructure. Following this, it describes the psychological and physical effects Syrians faced during the war and ramifications they continue to struggle with in Jordan in camps and off camp locations including feelings towards labour and their sense of dignity as a refugee in Jordan. This has crucial importance for the remainder of the study as it provides an elementary understanding of the challenges both Syrian refugees and Jordan face as a result of the Syrian war and the influx of refugees. It also identifies a potential labour pool for SEZ investment and the power of dignity restorative programs for refugees such as the Incentive Based Volunteer program. The final part of this chapter introduces the debate on refugees, labour, and ethics that will be discussed in the following chapters.

I. Facts and Statistics

Jordan has received approximately 657, 628 Syrian refugees since 2011 and up to 3, 500 crossed the border into Jordan daily (Qasaimeh, Shotar, Alkhail, Qasaimeh, 2017). At that rate 20 percent of the Jordanian population consisted of Syrian refugees by 2016 (Qasaimeh et al., 2017. 588). While only 21 percent, 140, 002, of refugees live in refugee camps, others are dispersed in urban, peri-urban and rural areas (UNHCR, 2018). Amman, the capital city of Jordan, holds the highest population of refugees at 186, 078 (UNHCR, 2018). The Marfaq governorate has 157, 951, and the third largest recipient of Syrian refugees is the Irbid governorate with 135, 779 (UNHCR, 2018). The high influx of refugees have caused Jordanian infrastructures to become immensely strained (Gavlak, 2013). Many doctors left Syria when the

conflict began leaving Syrians without access to health care causing high demand for rapid medical services both on and off of the camps (Gavlak, 2013). In addition, the Syrian government would often have checkpoints before hospitals in order to prevent those in need of care from receiving it (UNHCR, 2013). This would occur while both the Syrian government and the rebels would routinely attack persons hors de combat which is a human rights violation and a war crime (UNHRC, 2017). The Syrian refugees were affected in the prolongation of their stay in Syria during the conflict both physically and psychologically. The following section will discuss both then relate it back to the two themes of dignity and labour by discussing an incentive based volunteer program along with supportive anecdotal illustrations.

II. Psychological Implications in Syrian Refugees

Along with the inept and at times volatile conditions of the refugee camps, many of the refugees have witnessed horrible tortures, rapes, kidnappings, and killings in Syria and their journey into Jordan, and suffer from both physical injuries and from deep psychological trauma. A report from the United Nations commission of inquiry in Syria conducted 480 interviews of experiences in the Syrian conflict. Interviewees described frequent public executions, amputation and lashings conducted by ISIS (UNHRC, 2013). They described dead bodies being left in the open for days and mass disappearances particularly of men and boys (UNHRC, 2013). An assessment of the mental health of Syrians in Jordan, noted that there is “persistent fear, anger, lack of interest in activities, hopelessness and problems with basic function” (James, Sovcik, Garoff, & Reem Abbasi, 2014. 42). The assessment included 8,000 Syrians; 15.1 percent of refugees claimed to be afraid, 28.4 percent felt so angry that they could not calm down, 26.3 percent felt suicidal, and 18.8 percent felt that they were unable to carry out essential activities

for daily living (James et al., 2014. 42). Psychological problems, using age analysis, seem to be affecting older generations as well where 65 percent of them claimed to have psychological distress three times the amount higher than the refugees from younger generations (Skinner, 2014. 40). Skinner's findings help narrow down the demographics of those able to work in potential SEZs.

A study including refugee perspectives on psychological distress was conducted at Zaatari refugee camp in November and December 2012 when the camp had 30,000 Syrian refugees (Basheti, Qunaibi, and Malas, 2015. 1695). At the time, this was around 30 percent of the Syrian refugees in Jordan (Basheti et al., 2015. 1695). The results determined that 56 percent of the 73 randomly selected respondents of the distributed questionnaires claimed to be suffering from at least one of the following symptoms: "anger, fearfulness, nervousness, difficulty falling asleep or staying asleep, hopelessness about the future, and spells of terror and panic." (Baheti et al., 2015. 1698) In addition, 31.5 percent of those who claimed they needed psychological support were unable to receive it (Beheti et al., 2015. 1698).

In 2013, France implemented a program under the name "Tamour" that focused on providing psychological care to Syrian refugees in the Zaatari camp. They focused on trauma experienced from the war but also paid close attention to the psychological effects of living in the crowded, insecure, and often violent camp (Coutier, 2015). They also worked on challenges of identity the refugees experience having exile status (Coutier, 2015). By addressing concepts of identity, the Tamour project opened the discourse on identity and dignity which have a large impact on *self-inference processes* (Bénabou & Tirole, 2006). Self-inference processes are ways in which one defines themselves in their values and functionality (Bénabou & Tirole, 2006). This is an important connection that is reflected in both refugee attitudes and Jordanian attitudes

towards Special Economic Zones. At the end of Tamour's 15th month project at the Zaatari camp they had provided over 2000 psychological consultations (Coutier, 2015). Despite the psychological help, there is still a persistent fear of deportation from Jordan and refugee camps.

Those living at the camp were also not protected from deportation, for instance simply sneaking out of the camp or getting into arguments and fights were sufficient grounds to expel one and their family (Human Rights Watch, 2017). Marzouk and his brother were deported while they were in Zaatari after they spoke back to the police. Several others have been deported for simply taking or making calls back to Syria (Human Rights Watch, 2017). Omar, a refugee at the camp states "If someone so much as gets a call from a Syrian number, we think, oh no, this is going to be trouble" (Human Rights Watch, 2017.14). As a result of the high frequency of deportations from the camp, there is a climate of fear within the camp. Many believe that exiting the camp without a permit or working without one will be grounds for deportation. Omar also describes anxiety over leave permits from the camp, despite having obtained a work permits, without a leave permit from the camp could be grounds to send one back to Syria (Human Rights Watch, 2017). Away from the camp, this fear persists. Human Rights Watch interviewed several Syrian deportees from Jordan, "Ahmad" lived off of the refugee camps and worked for a Jordanian national in Amman (Human Rights Watch, 2017). Ahmad had been deported back to Syria along with his family after he had a confrontation with his employer in regards to his wages (Human Rights Watch, 2017). At the time, Ahmad was working for half the wage than that a Jordanian would have earned though was not receiving any earnings (Human Rights Watch, 2017). His employer had falsely accused him of being involved with Syrian terrorist organizations (Human Rights Watch, 2017). This fear demonstrates persistent threat that can

potentially be mentally debilitating posing additional risks to dignity loss and social and economic integration. This is discussed in the following chapters.

III. Physical effects of the war in Syria

In 2015, it was estimated that 230,000 Syrians were killed and more than 4 million were displaced as a cause of the Syrian war (Westcott, 2015). More than 80,000 needed prosthetic fittings, more than 50 times the amount that U.S soldiers experienced in Afghanistan and Iraq combined between 2001-2014 (Westcott, 2015). Age and gender analysis determines that men of working-age are the most likely to be injured due to their role in providing food, water, and security for their family (Skinner, 2014).

1 in 15 Syrian refugees in Jordan has been physically injured (Skinner, 2014. 40). 1,243 refugees at Zaatari camp were admitted to the impatient hospitalization in the year 2015 and 11,830 refugees were referred to Ministry of Health hospitals outside of the camp, that is more than 60 percent (UNHCR, 2015. 2). In 2013 there were only 43 percent of patients that transferred to Jordanian hospitals (Hornez, 2014. 143).

In June 2014 a survey was conducted with Syrian refugees living off of camps in 1550 households around Jordan. It sought to collect data regarding need and access to medical services. It concluded that 86.1 percent of households sought medical care when necessary, 51.5 percent of care was sought from the public sector, 38.7 percent in the private sector, and 9.8 percent in charity facilities (Doocy, Lyles, Akhu-Zaheya, Burton, & Burnham, 2016. 4). 64.5 percent of refugees who did not seek medical care when needed didn't do so due to the cost (Doocy et al., 2016. 4). In 2014 the most recent cost of care for an adult of the household averaged to \$67.3 USD in hospitals, \$18 USD for public services, and \$75 USD for private

services (Doocy et al., 2016. 5). In 2013 21.2 percent of those households had one or more hospitalizations (not including childbirth) with an average of 5.9 days stay (Doocy, et al., 2016. 9). Injuries were the most prevalent causes of hospitalization, this could be due to trauma from the war, working in high risk jobs the informal sector, dangerous accommodations, and other reasons (Doocy, et al., 2016). This is expected to get worse as restrictions to public services increase and funds become more limited for Syrian refugee families.

A study done by Shannon Doocy, Emily Lyles, Timothy Robertson, Laila Akhu-Zaheya, Arwa Oweis, and Gilbert Burnham found that out of the 1550 Syrian households surveyed in Jordan, 50.3 percent reported having someone whom had either hypertension, cardiovascular disease, diabetes, chronic respiratory disease, or arthritis (Doocy et al., 2015. 14). This means that there are double burdens of caregiver and income earner on every other individual in the household that does not have a non-communicable disease.

A study conducted in 2012 at King Abdullah University Hospital selected 90 consecutive Syrian refugees who came for treatment. Around 40 percent came from other hospital on referral. 86 patients were male and 4 females, 79 were adults (Qasaimeh et al., 2017). 47.8 percent of the patients came to the hospital due to injuries involving their head or neck while 54.4 percent of the patients had injuries to their extremities (Qasaimeh et al., 2017). 54.4 percent of injuries were caused by explosives and 50 percent were caused by gunshots (Qasaimeh et al., 2017). 9 of the cases had major amputations, the average was 18.78 days of hospital stay costing an average of \$6000 USD per person (Qasaimeh et al., 2017). Complications, mostly due to infection, developed in 59 patients and two patients died from their injuries (Qasaimeh et al., 2017). 8 patients ended up with neurological complications (Qasaimeh et al., 2017). Some physical and psychological violence continued from the war and into Jordan, however there are those more

susceptible to other forms of violence by their gender. The following section will discuss this further.

IV. Gender Based Violence

Female children are often married in order to establish a sense of security, while women refugees often feel forced to perform sexual acts in order to obtain basic necessities such as shelter, food, and clothing (Parker, 2015). In 2013, social workers reported that they had a total of 527 gender based cases of violence on Syrian refugees in Jordan including rape, sexual and physical violence, early/forced marriage, denial of services, psychological violence, and child marriages in the span of 4 months (UN Women, 2013). This has been reported in Jordan as well, especially in the northern regions where sexual assault allegations were made against community based organization workers providing aid (UN Women, 2013).

Marriage is legal between 13 - 17 for females in Syrian and 15 - 18 for males and was more frequent before the age of 18 in rural areas but have smaller age gaps than they do for Syrians in Zaatari and Jordan (Ledwith, 2014. 54). Jordan will only legally accept marriages of people over 18, however this is doing little to prevent child marriages from occurring (Ledwith, 2014. 54). In Zaatari, many marriages are performed in order to increase resources available to families (Ledwith, 2014). There are also “matchmakers” who set up arrangements for Jordanians to find brides in Zaatari (Ledwith, 2014). This has brought international concern involving human trafficking and exploitation (Ledwith, 2014). Inside Zaatari there has been reports of marital rape and domestic violence (Ledwith, 2014).

The UN Women’s Organization conducted a study of gender based violence among Syrian refugee families outside of refugee camps in Jordan. The study was conducted in

concentrated host communities in 2012 and included 613 respondents. They discovered a considerable amount of data correlating domestic abuse with increased stress from Syria during the conflict as well as in Jordan. The report reveals that 28 percent of Syrian refugees in cities fled Syria because they felt that they were at threat of gender based violence (UN Women, 2013). This coincides with an article by Bethan Stanton stating that stress in displacement and moments of trauma led to an increase in domestic abuse (Stanton, 2016). In Jordan, several women admitted that their husbands had been emotionally or physically abusive and felt the poor crowded living conditions, lack of job opportunities, and the conflict in Syria were at fault (UN Women, 2013. 21-24). Several men also agreed and stated that their was more turbulence in their relationship due to economic strains and both men and women felt that they were more susceptible to agitation (UN Women, 2013).

In the political economy of gender, social expectations of behaviour in the family have a large role in potential domestic violence (Cramer, 2010). For instance, if the woman was the main caregiver in Syria and continued to conduct her role as such in Jordan there may be increased tension if the male was the main provider in Syria and can no longer be in Jordan. There is a correlation with unemployment, social expectations, and intimate partner violence (Cramer, 2010). A study was undertaken in Kerala, India to research both urban and rural women and their experience with domestic violence and their husband's employment status. The results demonstrated that those with an employed husband were less likely to report domestic violence compared to women with unemployed husbands (Cramer, 2010). In Bangalore, India another study determined that women whose husband struggled to keep a job or find employment were two thirds more likely to experience domestic violence (Cramer, 2010. 8). These studies in India are particularly relevant to the state of several Syrian refugees in Jordan as employment is

usually seasonal or casual in nature and is similar to precarious labour in the informal workforce (Cramer, 2010). Similar results were shown in research in Kenya, Tanzania, and Jamaica. “Possessing no means to change their economic status, many [men] seem to be yielding to an exaggerated ‘owner’/macho behaviour and physical violence against women...In this way men may translate their economic subordination into a symbolic expression which is perhaps culturally rewarding, if politically displaced (Silberschmidt, 2001. 665; Cramer, 2010. 8).” This quote provides a closer link to domestic abuse as a result of threats to identity and dignity caused by unemployment. Therefore this section concludes that access to financial resources such as employment will increase feelings of dignity and may decrease the risk of domestic violence. The following section describes how the restrictions placed on Syrian refugees to prevent them from entering the formal labour market has led to further violence and loss of dignity.

V. Effects of Work Permit Restrictions

Jordan has imposed restrictions on the right to work on refugees due to high domestic unemployment rates, according to Alexander Betts and Paul Collier. As many as 83 percent of all refugees live off of the refugee camps and in crowded, slum-like conditions in the cities (Betts & Collier, 2015. 85). Only 30 percent of families interviewed in the study discussed in the previous section claimed to have ever had a minimum of one family member working for wages in the last month and over 65 percent who were living off of refugee camps reported that their primary and secondary source of income came from savings they had from Syria (UN Women, 2013. 22). With their savings depleting and humanitarian aid being insufficient and at times inaccessible, many have turned to illegal ways to make money (Betts & Collier, 2015). This has

led to increases in gang related violence, prostitution rings, abuse of women and children, and a turn towards informal sectors of the economy.

Aldrick described how fieldwork performed by developmental economist Stefan Dercon discovered that inaccessibility to trade outside of the Zaatari refugee camp containing approximately 80,000 Syrians, led to a decrease in the Syrians reported feelings of dignity (Aldrick, 2016). This last study led the author of this research to the hypothesis that access to trade and domestic Jordanian markets may increase the feelings of dignity among Syrian refugees. This may serve to demonstrate a potential positive correlation of increased mental health in relation to the opportunity of further access to the Jordanian formal market and domestic economy (James,L., Sovcik,A., Garoff, F., & Abbasi, R, 2014). Incentive Based Volunteer programs were created in order to introduce capital and may have reestablish feelings of dignity associated with employment.

VI. Incentive Based Volunteer/ Cash for Work Programs

An Incentive Based Volunteer (IBV) program was developed by the Syrian Refugees Affairs Directorate (SRAD) and the United Nations High Commission of Refugees in the Zaatari, Azraq, and other refugee camps. The program was created in order to provide volunteering opportunities and to generate income into the camp (UNHCR, 2016). The one in Azraq was designed and implemented in October 2016 in order to help facilitate participation in a work like environment (UNHCR, 2016). A study done by the Women's Refugee Commission in 2014 used a literature review, field research, interviews, and focus groups to determine how an institutionalized way of working in a refugee camp affected gender. The results found importance in local community projects and relationship building (Stanton, 2016). This is


important in restructuring shared views of employment and provider roles within the Syrian refugee populations. This can lead to reduced gender based violence.

The IBV programs included applications from both men and women, which already demonstrated a change to social expectations in power dynamics more Syrian’s believe women should be the caregiver at home unless they are doctors, lawyers, or professors (UN Women, 2013). According to the IBV in the Azraq refugee camp 33 percent of the 10, 215 applicants to the program were claimed to know at least one skill, 66 percent claimed they knew two or more skills, and 3 percent claimed that they were highly skilled (UNCHR, 2016. 1). Of the positions filled, 70 percent are occupied by men, despite the almost equal representation of men and women in the camp (UNHCR, 2016. 1). A total of 10,215 applications were submitted for the IBV in Azraq since May 2014 but only 1,979 refugees were recruited despite hourly wages ranging between 1-2.5 JD (UNHCR, 2016. 2). Of those 1,979 volunteers 602 are female and 1,377 are male, 1,187 positions are rotational, 62 are in highly skilled positions, 1, 303 are skilled positions, and 614 are semi-skilled (UNHCR, 2016. 1). This shows immense interest in employment.

Distribution of gender and skill level in the Azraq refugee camp in Jordan

Gender of cash for worker

Proportion of cash worker by gender:



Skill level


Proportion of cash for work position skill level:



Source: UNHCR (2016, 1)

In the Zaatari camp, 30 percent of men and women worked in the IBV program in 2017 (UNHCR, 2017.1). As of February 2017, there were 6, 133 participants in the Cash for Work program in Zaatari camp, comprised mostly of semi-skilled, rotational positions, 72 percent of them occupied by men (UNHCR, 2017.1). This identifies potential attractiveness for investors in semi skilled labourers as well as a better target demographic for Special Economic Zones.

Distribution of gender and skill level in the Zaatari refugee camp in Jordan



Source: UNHCR (2017, 1)

It is unclear the effects that the IBV program has had on the refugees well being as of yet, though a report by Su Yap reflected increased feelings of well-being and self preservation through refugee volunteering. Yap suggests that volunteering allows refugees and host country’s citizens to cope with the social changes relating to the refugee population (Yap, 2009). This is because it changes the discourse from refugees being a strain on the host country to them being beneficial to the host country (Yap, 2009). Yap’s report provides more concrete evidence that if refugees are seen as benefiting the host country, feelings of well-being, dignity, and self

preservation can be experienced both by the host country and by the refugees. The following section is a prelude to the second chapter and introduces the topic of refugees and labour.

VII. Refugees and Labour

The Zaatari refugee camp has an internal market referred to by many as Les Champs Élysées. Although far from what one would find on the popular street in France, it is filled with open exchange of commerce for goods and labour. There are falafel shops, bakeries, and grocery shops, there are also bike repair shops, clothing and shoe shops, and even a pet store. As refugees are forbidden to work without work permits, this location has been the source of contention, as foreign aid is being resold there. In 2013 caravans began to replace the temporary tents at Zaatari, this initially caused tensions and violence over who got them (Ledwith, 2014). Once caravans become more available refugees started selling or renting them to other refugees (Ledwith, 2014). Several of these have been turned into shops in the marketplace and can be sold from \$635 to \$2, 120 USD (Ledwith, 2014. 36). It is reported that children are employed in more than 680 shops which is against international labour laws (Ledwith, 2014. 50). In addition to the caravans other aid is being sold in the market. During the fieldwork conducted for this study, a shop owner at the Zaatari camp explained that they had taken blankets donated from Saudi Arabia and sold them in their shops “we do not need blankets,” he said. “we need money.” This demonstrates the disparity present in the camp amongst refugees. The overall reported employment rate at Zaatari is between 60 and 65 percent, almost all of this is through Syrian developed businesses (Ledwith, 2014. 48). In addition to the market there are other way to generate income. For instance, 350 refugees work as electricians which provide 73 percent of the camp with electricity (Ledwith, 2014. 51). This is hazardous and illegal as it is connected to the

UN infrastructure, it has also been reported as being a source for criminal behaviour including “turf wars” (Ledwith, 2014. 48).

The inaccessibility to the surrounding towns for goods, other markets, and lack of job prospect carried its toll on some of the shop workers. This was a slow suffocation of dignity for the people at Zaatari (Aldrick, 2016). Despite selling donated items, several store owners are not able to compete with aid and end up closing their shop (Aldrick, 2016). “No one wants to take money to stay at home. We want to work. Any kind of work will do” states Ehsan, a Syrian refugee (Kingsley, 2016.16). The entrepreneurship demonstrated by the Syrian refugees at the Zaatari camp proves that there is a desire for work. All they need is opportunity.

Conclusion

The aim of this chapter was to provide information regarding Syrian refugees in Jordan in order to understand their challenges and capacity. With all of the research found on psychological and physical trauma, both women and men are going to have to enter the workforce in order to support those who are unable to work. This is important as there may be a large gap in the amount of Syrian refugees willing or able to work, and a potential SEZ must accommodate for this. This chapter also determined that there is a relationship between dignity and access to financial resources such as employment. The research demonstrated that high levels of unemployment are associated with loss of dignity which can transcend into violent behaviour such as domestic abuse or illegal activity. It also proves that higher levels of dignity are experienced by those who are employed or volunteer and that that employment opportunity is welcomed and possible by the Syrian refugees. The second chapter discusses how Special Economic Zones can be this employment opportunity and how it could be both ethical and beneficial to Syrian refugees and Jordan.

Chapter 2

Special Economic Zones

The second chapter discusses Special Economic Zones as a heavily contested powerhouse of change that could facilitate both positive outcomes for Syrian refugees and the state. It also describes the challenges and potential harmful effects SEZs could have on the state and refugees. More specifically, it focuses on the ethical implications of the notorious labour infractions often emanating from SEZs. Whilst this chapter discusses a compilation of several existing SEZs, it focuses on the discussion and debate of SEZs as a practice present in literature rather than comparing and contrasting SEZ case studies. This enables a more abstract grasp of potential ethical challenges in labour that could emerge out of creating the first SEZ in a refugee camp in Jordan. Ethical issues regarding this will be more concretely developed in the following chapter.

Special Economic Zones are riddled with criticism, a flawlessly functioning SEZ by any standard, especially specific to ethics, simply does not exist. This analysis of the discussion surrounding SEZs enables a more conceptualized understanding of their habitual issues contrary to ethical and economical considerations. This includes worker rights violations and poor working conditions. The shortcomings identified contribute to the development of possible checks and balances that can be utilized in order to reduce possible risks. This chapter will also discuss how Jordan has already initiated new policies in order to address some of these concerns and if they are effective. Analyzing the overall discussion surrounding SEZs also helps to determine the advantages of implementing SEZs in Jordan in further chapters. The first section outlines what SEZs are and their role in potential development and uses select authors to provide insight into successful and unsuccessful SEZs including positive investment climates. The second section will describe ethical implications of SEZs including concerns regarding the

employment of refugees in SEZs. Finally, the last section describes what Jordan is doing to mitigate negative aspects of SEZs and implications regarding employing refugees.

I. Special Economic Zones

Special Economic Zones (SEZs) are zones in designated areas where lower taxes, tariffs, and often lighter regulations are offered by governments as a developmental policy (Moberg, 2017. i). The objective is to attract investment, increase exports, and employment opportunities (Moberg, 2017). SEZs can also assist in a country's capacity to attract foreign direct investment and increase industry competitiveness while also enabling a more facile government or single body oversight (Akinici & Crittle, 2008). As SEZs began to grow both in popularity and age, the word SEZ has developed into an encompassing term to describe Free trade zones, Export processing Zones, Enterprise zones, Freeports, Single factory EPZ, and specialized zones (Akinici & Crittle, 2008. 3). There are several components that ultimately dictate if a SEZ can be a success or failure; its policy and incentive framework, location, and development and management (Akinici & Crittle, 2008. 48). The following section will break down each of those components.

II. Incentive Framework

Given the competition for foreign direct investment, measures can be implemented in order to appeal or to lure potential investors. These measures can have ramifications such as diverting foreign direct investment by creating strict policies or environments where the investment is unlikely to thrive. Other measures can be more devastating to the country that imposed them from an economical to an ecological perspective.

A. Negative Incentives

There can be immense pressure imposed on government budgets for offering incentives such as tax exemptions (Akinci & Crittle, 2008). In addition, some states may take on a “race-to-the-bottom” approach to make themselves appealing to investors. This can be done by having poor labour standards such as long hours and health and safety issues and using child labour (Aart Scholte, 2005). The World Bank states that from 19 different countries, SEZs did not match the work performed outside of the zones; they had more overtime work, harsh leave terms, and less safety and security in their job (The World Bank, 2011). They were also unable to collectively bargain or form unions (The World Bank, 2011). Jordan has had several complaints of employer wage theft, forcible deportation, and unpaid overtime from migrant workers in the garment industry (Toppa, 2017). In addition, 90 percent of migrant worker in the garment industry had their passports confiscated in 2013-2014 by their employer (Toppa, 2017). There have also been complaints of abuse and overcrowded accommodations, which reported electricity and water cuts and insect infested food (Reznick, 2018). Some factory owners made their workers purchase their meals and even water despite it being included in their contracts (Reznick, 2018). The race to the bottom is evident in the environment as well. Having low environmental regulations including lack of policies or reduced enforcement of policies regarding ecological integrity standards creates “pollution havens” (Aart Scholte, 2005. 286). While these environmental conditions may seem like they are a means to an end, they can cause irreversible damage (Aart Scholte, 2005).

On the contrary, some national policies are too restrictive and thus are less appealing as restrictions on owning land, holding title to leasehold improvements, having real assets for collateral financing, and private sector development such the case in Jordan (Akinci & Crittle,

2008. 49). Some states may be unappealing to investors due to high costs of operation, Jordan's energy, transportation, and goods could pose potential disinterest in investors for this reason, especially if they provide room and board to their workers (Azmeah, 2015). The Arab spring uprising had an acute effect on Jordan's economy, despite never having a remarkably robust economy to begin with. Tourism fell from 142,000 to 78,000 annually between 2011- 2015 having a marginal impact on both the national and local economies (Schenker, 2015). In addition, problems with the natural gas pipeline shared with Egypt caused a \$3 billion deficit in the national economy in 2015 as Jordan was forced to purchase more costly crude oil from the open market (Schenker, 2015). These major issues in addition to the modifications to infrastructure required by the large influx of Syrian refugees caused fragility within their market. This fragility was detrimental to current and prospect foreign direct investment.

Weak administration to operate and regulate activity is also another determining factor in SEZ success. Over centralization in decision-making is also problematic. This was an issue in Jordan, it lead to an increase in processing time and bureaucracy for changes of leased land rates as it was exclusively approved by the Jordanian cabinet (Akinci & Crittle, 2008).

B. Positive Incentives

The World Bank states that SEZs can be useful for creating competition, driving structural change while also strengthening political coalition (The World Bank, 2011). Jordan does have attraction for investors for several reasons including considerable political stability and a fairly propitious business environment (Azmeah, 2015). They also enjoy a free trade agreement with the USA and is quite favoured by them as they have one of the highest trade preference utilization rates going from essentially nothing in the late 1990s to \$1.25 billion in

2006 (Azmeh, 2015). As part of the Jordan Compact Agreements from the 2016 Conference in London, Jordan would be able to have better access to the European Union market with relaxed roots of origin policies provided that they give more work permits to Syrians (The World Bank, 2016). Another incentive to investors is the pre-existing infrastructure. King Hussein Bin Talal Development Area (KHBTD) and Ad-Dulayl Industrial Park are examples of zone that already serve as SEZs, exhausting less time and money for the investors.

Jordan's policies are flexible with migrant workers which can be an incentive to investors as they have more certainty in filling labour gaps and currently cost less, despite efforts from the Better Work Program (Azmeh, 2015; Reznick, 2018). Garment workers in Jordan are paid differently depending on their citizenship to the country. Jordanian garment workers are paid \$290 USD a month whilst expatriate workers are paid \$169 USD in addition to room and board (Reznick, 2018). Currently there are 50,000 migrant garment workers, over 75 percent of the workforce are from Bangladesh, Sri Lanka, and Nepal (Resnick, 2018). In Jordan, there are few job opportunities, finding Jordanians to fill the mandated 30 percent of labour in SEZs would be easier where there is demand (Toppa, 2017). This is likely to increase with the access to the EU market.

C. Location

In terms of the physical design, location is a large factor in the success of a SEZ, for instance it can increase the cost of transporting goods if it is not well situated to a port or other means of transportation (Akinici & Crittle, 2008). When SEZs are isolated there is less of a need to localise sourcing, leading to less economic links between the investor and the host country. This is also a way for the investors to have a quick "exit option" should business be unsuccessful

(Azmeah, 2015). This was evident in Jordan where there was a heavy reliance on imported materials such as fabrics from China for the garment industry (Azmeah, 2015). The World Bank addressed this issue while discussing the Better Work Program and the Jordan Compact agreements. This is described in further detail at the end of the chapter.

III. Development and Management

In regards to development and management there are a few major consistencies from the analysis of SEZ narrative. They should be privately developed with government oversight, have additional checks and balances for government run SEZs, and have cooperation with the community. These main principles are demonstrated through analysis of narratives on SEZs in Africa, China, and Russia.

Zhihua Zeng uses data from several individual case studies to compare SEZs in Africa to those in China. He uses statistical analysis to compare employment with exports, downtime as an effect of inefficient electricity, and slow processing times at ports. The case studies explain how private zone development is important as investment decisions are made from people whom have a lot of market knowledge. Having this market knowledge enables them to be more likely to be able to identify potential issues such as inefficient electricity and poor access to ports. However, Zhihua Zeng concurs that despite being developed privately, it is advised that the host government be given administrative powers (Zhihua Zeng, 2015) (Akinici & Crittle, 2008).

Lotta Moberg described how the core values of SEZs are of free trade, and many have been shown to breach World Trade Organization agreements (Moberg, 2017). Moberg also described that due to rent-seeking there is a higher probability of corruption by private interest in policy making (2017). In addition to Zhihua Zeng's input on private development and

governmental oversight, Moberg adds that state ownership and bureaucracy can also add to corruption in SEZs through the use of bribes for infrastructure contracts (Moberg, 2017). It is with hope that by having the international community act as a liaison and a watchdog over the potential development and operation of SEZs these concerns would be mitigated.

In a study measuring growth rates of output, growth rates of investments, export growth rates, employment, and tax payments of SEZs within a three year time frame in Russia, better performance resulted from better cooperation between the interest parties and the government (Yankov et al., 2016). This is one of the main examples of mutual benefits and reciprocity SEZs have to offer as a solution to the refugee influx in Jordan. The analysis of this literature is important as it provides feedback from case studies and actual experiences of SEZs that will enable better development of SEZs stronger levels of management.

VI. Refugees and Special Economic Zones

There is endless information written upon SEZs and the Jordanian economy, but there is limited information connecting the two with refugees. This section addresses the most influential authors in the concept of SEZs and refugees, Alexander Betts and Paul Collier. Betts and Collier discuss the King Hussein Bin Talal Development Area (KHBTDA) that currently employs 10,000 Jordanians, but has the ability to employ 100,000 people. They state that the KHBTDA is “an ideal place to launch a development-based approach to the Syrian refugee crisis (Betts and Collier, 2015).” Currently, it is not an ideal place for investment, as local and Jordanian business are not willing to take the risk in investment there (Betts and Collier, 2015). Aldrick, along with Betts and Collier, mentioned lowering trade tariffs for Jordan's exports into the EU in Jordan. As Jordan already exports \$1.4 billion to the USA per year this would open trade up immensely.

This is frequently mentioned in debates around foreign aid relief and is included in the Compact Agreements. Subsequently, Jordan's economy would flourish, however the expectation would be that they agree to allow Syrian refugees to take up half of the employment in the SEZ (Aldrick, 2016). The UNHCR Refugee Skills assessment in Zaatari camp reported that 54 percent of women and 75 percent of men would take a job opportunity outside of the camp if training was offered, demonstrating that there would be significant labour available for a SEZ while still leaving employment opportunities for Jordanians (UNHCR, 2017. 6). However, despite being offered the minimum wage in Jordan and the high unemployment rate, there remains a lack of interest locally amongst Jordanians (Reznick, 2018). It is believed that the conservative social values in Jordan are to blame, as there is stigma with working in the manufacturing industry (Reznick, 2018). As a result there are gaps in necessary labour that migrants usually fill. This demonstrates not only the importance of refugee labour in SEZs for economic development for Jordan and the refugees, but also for investors.

The Economist, in addition to Betts, Collier, and Aldrick also supported the idea of SEZs but used the Ad-Dulayl Industrial Park by Amman as an example of a good industry for refugee employment. It went further to provide an example of Needle Craft, a company that has volunteered to employ and give food and shelter for Syrian refugees (The Economist, 2016). Results of the UNHCR skills assessment also concluded that women would prefer to work in the garment industry (UNHCR, 2017). Current discussion on the use of SEZs seems to be fairly positive as a potential to continue long term aid to refugees and Jordan. However, Bierling from the University of Oslo's faculty of law discusses the potential harm in using refugees in labour.

Bierling discusses the historical case studies of refugees used in order to fill employment gaps in Greece, the Income-Generating Project for Afghan Refugees in the 1980s, Mexico with

Guatemalan refugees, and Uganda's Self-Reliance Strategy (Bierling, 2016). This report argues the lack of political power, limited movement, and exclusion can blur the lines between refugee employment and exploitation (Bierling, 2016). This is ultimately the biggest concern amongst the (limited) narratives of using refugees in SEZs and will be discussed in the final two chapters.

V. The International Community and Jordan's Response

In order to improve Jordan's attraction to investors, The Program for Results developed by the World Bank will provide \$300 million to Jordan as part of the Jordan Compact (Saade, 2016). This will be invested in Jordan's labour market reform including facilitating Syrian employment and access to work permits (Saad, 2016). This is projected to create 100, 000 in Jordan within 5 years (Saade, 2016). The Jordanian Investment Commission (JIC) is one of the authorities undertaking the project and will be working alongside the International Labour Organization. The JIC is a government agency that focuses on zone development and attracting investment to diverse economic development that is sustainable and competitive (Jordanian Investment Commission, 2018).

According to The World Bank, 11 zones have been selected and they already have the necessary infrastructure for Special Economic Zones (Saade, 2016). These zones are in close proximity to main populations in Jordan and anticipate using local links. According to an article in the *Cambridge Journal of Regions, Economy, and Society* if the SEZs were to localize labour, materials, and service they could increase economic spillover from the SEZs by approximately 36.9 percent in Jordan (Azmeah, 2015. 483).

A Better Work Program was created in association with the International Labour Organization to better monitor conditions within Jordanian factories (Saade, 2016). It has

successfully decreased the use of child labour and put forth a Collective Bargaining Agreement in 2013 with Jordan Garments, Accessories and Textiles Exporters Association (J-GATE), the Association of Owners of Factories, Workshops and Garments (AOFWG) and the General Trade Union of Workers in Textile, Garment & Clothing Industries (Brown et al, 2016. 47).

In their most recent study, they found that there was still discrimination between the wages of migrants in comparison to Jordanians and that there continued to be issues with health and safety, adequate food, water, and accommodations (Brown et al., 2016). The relativity to more densely populated towns of the zones selected in Jordan may provide better living conditions for workers. There have been large improvements in hiring disabled workers 80 percent of factories had met the quotas determined by the Ministry of Labour, one disabled employee for every 25-50 employees, and four percent for factories with more than 50 employees (Brown et al., 2016. 47). According to a refugee skills mapping project in Zaatari, 28 percent of males and 21 percent of females reported that they would need special working conditions due to a medical condition or disability (UNHCR, 2017. 8). This shows the capacity and willingness to hire injured refugees if they chose and are able to work. This can be beneficial to senses of dignity as it re-establishes order and productivity.

The Better Work Program has initiated the development of standard working contracts in order to reduce exploitation and improve and maintain work environments (Saade, 2016). They will also conduct assessments on labour standards, and social and environmental impacts in which monetary incentives will be given upon improvement (Saade, 2016). They will also create locations within the SEZs that will provide “medical services, legal advice, and a secure grievance redress system (Saade, 2016).”

Conclusion

This section demonstrated crucial arguments towards the implementation of Special Economic Zones in regards to policy and incentive framework, location, development, and management. It was able to identify global concerns of SEZs and used that information to put in context in Jordan. It concluded that there are risks and ethical questions regarding SEZs and refugees working within them, however it also identified that the international community and Jordan are aware of those risks and are making further steps to resolve and improve them. One of these ways is to increase enforcement of policies and monitoring within SEZs. This chapter also established the dialogue needed for the following section regarding the current treatment of refugees and their susceptibility to exploitation.

Chapter 3

Ethics

The third chapter describes the ethical considerations regarding work and liberty by use of Roberto Toscano's interpretation of Paul Ricoeur's Ethical Triad and Aristotle's concept of Eudaimonia. Ricoeur and Aristotle are the foundations of determining what is ethical practice used in this work. This chapter mobilizes and develops those concepts into the discussion of actions and intentions of the state and SEZs explored in the last chapter. It also outlines the international laws in regards to right to work and freedom of movement and the laws in which Jordan is obliged by and those they place on their refugees. Most importantly, this contributes to the discussion on the variation of ethical treatment of refugees prescribed by law and how it is and should be practiced including defining ethical guidelines or criteria not to be crossed. The first section will discuss the philosophical principles of ethics that are used in this thesis. The following section of this chapter will discuss the laws that are prescribed to and by Jordan and their violations. The last section describes a pragmatic approach to the ethical and legal practice of SEZs for refugees. It offers guidelines that include core principles that should not be overstepped.

I. Philosophical Principles in Ethics

According to the Paul Ricoeur's Ethical Syntax, ethics is "the project of an accomplished life" that aims to answer "how should I live?" (Toscano, 2005. 1). Ricoeur's response would be "the project of an accomplished life" (Toscano, 2005. 1). Perhaps Aristotle's response would be a life of Eudaimonic well-being. Eudaimonia is derived from "eu" which means good and virtuous and "daimon" which is one's true self (Synard & Gazzola, 2017. 247). This notion of well-being will be defined here as "flourishing" by "becoming one's best self, pursuing virtue, having life meaning, personal growth, and autonomous self-congruence" (Synard & Gazzola,

2017. 247). This section uses Ricoeur's Ethical Triad which has three components; The preservation of the self, recognition of the other, and justice (Toscano, 2005). As well as Aristotle's concept of Eudaimonia to discuss ethics and dignity involving the restriction of movement and employment Jordan places on refugees.

The preservation of the self, this concept can be seen through the processes of becoming refugee, the very fact that they are refugees determines that they hold the preservation for their life highly. But there are different aspects to preservation of the self that include aspects of Aristotle's concept of Eudamonia, such as psychological wellbeing which includes autonomy, personal growth, feelings of meaning and a sense of purpose, belonging, and control (Capuccino, 2013). Incidentally both Syrian refugees and the Jordanian government want several of these including growth and autonomy. The problem that arises here, is that there are not enough resources currently for this to be compatible.

According to the World Trade Organization, Jordan is a developing country that has an open yet small economy with a low per capita income as well as a high unemployment rate (WTO, 2001). Thus Jordan places restrictions on employment and access to resources because it puts its self preservation above "the other." We may assume that this reasoning is why Jordan has non signatory status on the Refugee Convention, the location is in the centre of states prone to conflict and therefore places restrictions on what it can provide given its resources to refugees. However, despite not signing the Refugee Convention they are bound by other laws and conventions that they are breaching in the process of this "self preservation". The refugee convention on the other hand places the preservation of the refugee as a top priority as it is heavily reliant on aid from the international community to assist host countries, which usually is

insufficient causing the host country to bare the social and economic costs of the refugees (McAdam, 2007).

Self preservation for the refugee under the concept of Eudamonia can be enabled by access to resources and to the labour market. McAdam describes the 1951 Refugee Convention and the relevancy of it in present time given the modern displacement issues. McAdam describes that a sustainable response to the displacement issues should respect human dignity (McAdam, 2007). As a reiteration from chapter 1, inaccessibility to trade outside of the Zaatari refugee camp lead to a decrease in the Syrians reported feelings of dignity (Aldrick, 2016).

“I cannot give value to myself without giving value to the other as myself

-Ricoeur (Toscano, 2005).”

One can interpret this as one of the reasons that compelled the international community to establish the United Nations in the first place. The recognition of *the other* as an extension of the self, as being human. And although Jordan does provide refuge for a vast amount of the Syrian refugees, the economic ramifications that occurred in Jordan as a result of the Arab spring created a narrative that placed the Syrian refugees as a scapegoat for several issues regarding lack of resources and economic struggles (Francis, 2015).

While the government of Jordan does not fail to see Syrian refugees as human, there is an interesting dialogue about the theory of reciprocity, especially under the rights that potential Jordanian refugees would have in Refugee Convention signatory state that they themselves do not offer. This seems unjust according to Ricoeur, who sees justice as “a condition of the recognition of the other, and it entails both reciprocity and impartiality (Toscano, 2005).” In addition, perhaps refugees find themselves grateful towards Jordan for the protection they have given them and on the basis of reciprocity would like to participate in the labour market in order


alleviate the financial encumbrance they may feel that they are and/or to assist in the growth of the economy. When at the Zaatari refugees camp, when asked if they were happy to be at the camp and happy with how Jordan was treating them almost all of them responded “yes” followed by “inshallah” meaning “God willing.” This shows their gratitude and potential of reciprocity.

A further example of how refugees are portrayed to the host population includes the avoidance of the term “refugee” when possible, choosing terms such as ‘guest’ and ‘visitor’ in order to evade international scrutiny in their refugee policies (Francis, 2015). This lack of recognition as a refugee, a citizen in Jordan, nor as a refugee with rights pertaining to the 1951 Refugee Convention, Syrian refugees are left with a lack of identity in their new environment. In addition children who are born to two Syrian parents or to a Syrian father in Jordan are essentially stateless as Jordanian citizenship is passed paternally. This was one of the reasons the “Tamor” organization worked so closely with identity in the psychiatric care they provided at Zaatari.

Applying a notion of the relation of self-work and ethno-social practice in the trajectory of the self, refugee self-awareness and relations to their fellow Syrians in the refugee community as well as their relations with the host society create new identities that are constantly being worked on (Valenta, 2010, 16). They are strongly embedded within a Self-Other dichotomy in Jordan, where they will potentially permanently be viewed as outsider. This could inhibit their desire or capability of integrating into the Jordanian society or even leaving their homes or camps. UN Women reported that almost all women who took part in a study of families living off the refugee camps felt that their safety was at risk if they left the house (UN Women, 2013). Several discussed fears of being recognized as Syrian by their accents and being harassed (UN Women, 2013). Out of all of those interviewed one-fifth of girls never went outside at all (UN

Women, 2013. 23). The survey asked respondents why this was the case and recorded their attitudes reflected in Table 2.

Table 2: Survey Responses To “If Family Members Go Out Rarely or Never Then Why?”



Source: UN Women (2013, 22)

McAdams also discusses the need for quicker integration into the new society for displaced people (McAdam, 2007). This will help reduce the feelings of “the other” or “outsider” by both the refugee and host society. It is anticipated that this integration will lower the perceived threat preventing women and girls from even leaving the house. Volunteering can reduce feelings of powerlessness due to inaccessibility of the labour market (Yap et al., 2010). This study uses the positive correlation found in a study of retired adults over 65 which proved that volunteering reduced depression (Yap et al., 2010). Yap et al.,’s study also discusses how a lack of occupational status can increase negative effects on well-being (Yap et al., 2010). This can be argued that the lack of access to the labour market as a refugee inhibits the ability for them to respond to Ricoeur’s question of ethics; how should I live? by an accomplished life or by Aristotles concept of Eudamonia. The following section will describe how Jordan is breaching

laws in covenants they ratified, specifically the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights/ The International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights. Having the section regarding ethics precede the section on law, establishes the context in which the law breaching can be referred back to the concept of dignity. The understanding of both sections will enable a better understanding of the following section that recommends guidelines for refugee management in Jordan.

II. Laws

The first set of universal guidelines in the treatment of refugees was The 1951 Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees that was ratified by 141 States, following the second World War. The effects of large scale displaced persons caused by the rippling destruction of the war highlighted the vital necessity of international laws in regards to both the status and rights of refugees. Over sixty years later the Syrian War would have similarly ravaging effects of the displacement of people as the second World War. Jordan and the international community takes a protective role through the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, NGOs, and other aid agencies to provide a place of refuge.

However, Jordan is a non-signatory of the 1951 Refugee Convention, thus there are some laws and rights that refugees would have access to in a signatory state that they do not in Jordan. For instance the right to work and freedom of movement is restricted for Syrian refugees in Jordan, a policy enforced by the Jordanian government. This has ethical and legal implications as Syrian refugees experience inaccessibility to the labour market and confinement to refugee camps.

Although Jordan is not a signatory state of the 1951 Refugee Convention this chapter argues that it is breaching laws they are bound by in the Memorandum of Understanding agreement with the UNHCR and the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights or The International Covenant of Economic, Social and Cultural Rights. These included non refoulement and the right of self-determination. The following section provides further evidence of these contraventions. Subsequent to this evaluation will be the discussion on the proposed ethical guidelines of SEZs and refugee management.

According to the Convention and Protocol Relating to the Status of Refugees in Article 17, all refugees have the right to engage in wage earning employment (UN,1951). If there are any restrictions on this right due to concerns regarding the protection of the national labour market, they would be lifted after residence in the country for three years (UN, 1951). Article 18 and 19 in the Convention also state that refugees have a right to engage in several fields of work and that their recognized diplomas allow them to practice their profession (UN, 1951). However, Jordan did not sign this Convention, it is not bound by these laws. If it were, it would be in violation of all of them.

Jordan's high unemployment rate of 15 percent, has caused a closed profession list that bans all non-Jordanians from jobs in those sectors even if they have valid diplomas and/or experience in those fields (Fakih &Ibrahim, 2014 ; Al Katamine, 2016). This is done in order to protect the national labour market. This restriction is not lifted after three years of residency as ascribed in the 1951 Convention and nationality can only be achieved through marriage to a Jordanian man or by being fathered by one (Emanuel, 2012). These jobs include;

- Administrative and accounting professions
- Clerical work including typing and secretarial work
- Switchboards, telephones and connections works

- Warehouse work
 - Fuel selling in main cities
 - Electricity professions
 - Mechanical and car repair professions
 - Drivers
 - Guards and servants
 - And medical and engineering professions* (Al Katamine, 2016, 1).
- * Medical and Engineering professions are accessible if there are no Jordanian replacements (Al Katamine, 2016).

However, there are laws that Jordan is bound by which one can argue are being breached. The Memorandum of Understanding agreement with Jordan and the UNHCR of 1998 states that lawfully residing refugees need to provide a living for their family though contradicts this by stating that refugees do not automatically have the right to employment (Sadek, 2013). One could argue that it would be challenging for a refugee to provide for their family when they are unable to access the labour market.

Jordan is a signee of the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights also known as The International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, it breaches several of laws within this Covenant including;

Article 1, that states the “All peoples have the right of self-determination (UN, 1966, 2).” “By virtue of that right they freely determine their political status and freely pursue their economic, social and cultural development (UN, 1966, 2).” It also states that all peoples should not be deprived of their own means of subsistence (UN, 1966).

Article 2, each signee must provide all individuals in its country with all rights included in the Covenant without discrimination of any kind including national or social origin (UN, 1966).

Article 6 also states that “the State Parties to the present Covenant recognize the right to work, which includes the right of everyone to the opportunity to gain his living by work which he freely chooses or accepts (UN, 1966).” It also mentions the responsibility of the state to provide

policies to achieve economic, social, and cultural development (UN, 1966). As Jordan restricts access to the formal labour market it is breaching the aforementioned laws by preventing their right of self-determination, economic development and self subsistence, and ability to be treated equally without being discriminated against. The following subchapters discusses the inaccessibility to work permits and restriction of movement and how that further affects the Syrian refugees.

A. Access to Work Permits

In February 2017, the Supporting Syria and the Region Conference was conducted with the World Bank and focused on Syrian refugees in Jordan, Lebanon, and Turkey. There they launched a series of Compact Agreements which sought more long term solutions for the Syrian refugee crisis. For Jordan, the Compact Agreements relies on the Government of Jordan to reform their work permits for refugees as well as to adjust investment interests and checks and balances (The International Rescue Committee, 2017). The International Rescue Committee proposed that the Jordanian government improves access to documentation, rights, an increase the sectors open to refugee employment, and investment both locally and externally (IRC, 2017).

Jordan, in compliance, has made some reforms to the process of applying for work permits according to the International Labour Organization. However there are still procedural challenges involved in obtaining the limited work permits they do issue (ILO, 2017). Prior to April 2016, work permit fees were around \$170-370 and were paid for by either the employers, which gave little incentive to hire Syrians, or the refugees and prior to September 2016 required a passport and a medical examination (ILO, 2017). Work permits now are free of charge to apply for and a previous medical examination can be used (ILO, 2017). If found working without a

permit, the Syrian refugee could be deported back to Syria and banned from working in Jordan for three years, breaching the nonrefoulement rule that Jordan is bound by (ILO, 2017). Recently Jordan has reportedly ceased to do this yet refoulement numbers have increased and many Syrians feel that they will be sent back to Syria if they are found working without a permit (ILO, 2017). A study of 450 Syrian workers reported that 11% felt that work permits restricted their mobility and 66% did not have social security despite the assumption that permits increased social protection (ILO, 2017).

Even with the strict restraints on Syrian refugees obtaining work permits, Syrians do find informal work, usually in general labour, and are driving down the wages for Jordanians. Syrian refugee's increased involvement in agricultural work dropped wages by 60 percent (Errighi & Griesse, 2016). Syrian refugees also work long hours and in dangerous conditions thus producing an unhealthy competitive environment amongst the Syrian refugees and the Jordanians (Errighi & Griesse, 2016). Results from a survey done in 2015 showed that the percentage of Syrian refugees who were working 60 hours or more weekly was 16 percent higher than Jordanians and that 19 percent of those Syrians were working 80 hours or more, usually without overtime pay despite Jordan enforcing overtime pay to anymore than 40 hours a week (Errighi & Griesse, 2016) (ILO, 2017).

B. Restriction of Movement Laws

Those refugees outside of the camps may have left them due to the unsanitary over crowded conditions, lack of electricity, and perhaps what they felt, opportunity. Perhaps they were fortunate to have been granted a work permit or have found a job in the informal market. It is clear, however, that their presence has not gone unnoticed by the local infrastructure. With a

frail economy, Jordan relies heavily on foreign aid to help provide temporary shelter and food to displaced Syrians within their borders. Foreign aid is not adequate enough and the Jordanian government has paid for the necessary infrastructure to withstand the amount of Syrian refugees.

In order to provide better health care services to Jordanians, the government revoked free medical services for refugees, thus refugees can only acquire medical services at refugee camps or have to pay at hospitals.

The government also took away access to education by stopping the UNHCR from issuing Asylum Seeker Certificates (ASCs) which allow them to enrol in schools (Saliba, 2016). This is a borderline breach against the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights/The International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights as stated in;

Article 12 1) “The States Parties to the present Covenant recognize the right of everyone to the enjoyment of the highest attainable standard of physical and mental health” and

Article 12 2d “The creation of conditions which would assure to all medical service and medical attention in the event of sickness (UN, 1966).”

As well as Article 13; “Primary education shall be compulsory and available free to all (UN, 1966).” While Jordan is still providing these services, they are only within camps. Leaving those outside of camps with a lack of resources.

This can be interpreted as a restriction on movement. According to the ICCPR Article 9(1) “no one shall be subjected to arbitrary arrest or detention and deprived of his liberty (UN,1966).” This, under the Revised Guidelines on Applicable Criteria and Standards in reference to the Detention of Asylum Seekers, includes closed camps (Bierling, 2016). Seeing as refugees camps are closely monitored by officials, for instance at Zaatari refugee camp, barbed wire fences encapsulate them, ditches are dug around them to keep people from leaving and

getting inside, and access to outside of the camp is only warranted by a permit, these camps qualify as closed camps (Bierling, 2016). This confinement thereby furthers the argument that practices perpetrated by Jordan on the Syrian refugees is unlawful. There are, however exceptions in enforcing some of the laws previously described by virtue of protecting one's national economy and resources, especially in developing countries. This exception will be challenged in the following section.

Article 2 states that developing countries can limit the economic rights of non nationals, however with due regard to human rights (UN, 1966). While this does perhaps give some leeway to the limit of work permits Jordan issues it does not excuse the violations of freedom of movement. Article 4 of the ICCPR acknowledges that States in the Covenant can limit the rights in the covenant only to promote general welfare in a democratic society (UN, 1966). However, Jordan is not considered a democratic society. They are governed by a constitutional monarchy where the King appoints the members of the senate (Tell, 2013). While they do have a house of representative, the ultimate rule is with the monarch. One could argue that this would omit them from noncompliance with the Covenant with the exception of Article 2. Despite what law prescribes and how Jordan decided to practice it, the treatment of the Syrian refugees is unethical. The following section sets out ethical and legal guidelines that should and need to be met in refugee policies.

III. Ethical and Legal Guidelines

This section combines the first section of ethics and the second section of law to propose definitive pragmatic practices that should not be crossed in the treatment of Syrian refugees in Jordan. Jordan already shows signs of progress towards some of these suggestions. The first

criteria to be proposed is to lift the restriction on the jobs Syrians have access to after three years of being in Jordan such as in engineering and medical fields. This is included in the UN refugee convention but could be practical for Jordan, especially with the criticism of Syrians taking up jobs and putting strain on their social services such as hospitals. According to figures from 2010, there were approximately 15 729 doctors in Jordan that is 2.6 doctors per 1000, in Syria at the time there were 1.5 doctors for every 1000 people (Aire, 2015). Though there is no data acknowledging how many Syrian refugees are doctors in Jordan, what is clear is that their access to practice, even with restricted licenses, can alleviate a lot of tension on the healthcare system and benefit Syrian refugee's overall health.

In addition, Jordan would allow Syrian refugees to provide aid to others and recognize their qualifications as they had before the Arab Spring uprising. As the Jordanian government removed free health services from Syrians, it is advised that they still pay less of the cost other non-jordanians pay due to their inaccessibility to the formal labour market. It is also advised that Jordan take the 75 percent cost of life saving and emergency surgery fees provided by the UN and reduce the amount left for the Syrian refugees to pay, as 25 percent is too high for many refugees preventing them from seeking aid (Arie, 2015. 6). If this is not a viable option then perhaps creating payment plans will allow more Syrian refugees to have access to the services needed. Setting up small clinics by Syrian doctors for Syrians should be decriminalized and should be supported by relief efforts not penalized. In one report, after an unlicensed clinic was raided, a refugee patient receiving medical aid was deported back to Syria. This has major grounds for ethical concern (Arie, 2015). Deportation of refugees will be discussed later in this section.

Other restrictions on jobs such as warehouse work should be lifted immediately as there are significant labour shortages in warehouse and factory work that remain unappealing to Jordanians. This is evident in the garment industry as they had a shortage of 19,000 position occupancies and within two years only 4,000 people applied (Toppa, 2017. 3). As Jordan argues that they are implementing these measures to protect their economy and high unemployment rate to “preserve” themselves, the evidence proves there is a demand for labour in some occupations. Access to the formal job market will allow aspects of Eudaimonic well-being to be achieved as it will promote autonomy, personal growth, feelings of meaning and a sense of purpose (Capuccino, 2013). In addition, it will also help reduce the feeling of “otherness” described in Ricoeur's Ethical Triad as it increases notions of belonging, social and economic development while most evidently allowing self and familial preservation.

An ethical guideline that is most crucial to this discussion is that Jordan should not breach laws of non-refoulement by sending Syrian refugees back to Syria. This has been reported both by individuals and supported by statistics. While the Jordanian government says that it no longer does this, the international community should also impose penalties if they continue to breach laws of non-refoulement. There is an issue arising with the imposition of these penalties, for instance sanctions and other economic or trade penalties go against the ambitions of creating an appealing investment climate in Jordan, which is essential for the use of SEZs. Perhaps better controls put into place around the borders by non-jordanian governmental organizations will be sufficient enough in preventing further deportations. There also needs to be more access to legal information regarding refugee rights in order to reduce feelings of fear and exploitation. This includes labour and movement rights and easier access to work permits. In a representational survey at Zaatari refugee camp only 9 percent of Syrian refugees knew about workers rights and

only 7 percent knew Jordanian laws on social security (UNHCR, 2017. 6). There should also be more standardized contracts in labour including acknowledgement of social security and health and safety precautions. In addition to this there needs to be an increase in monitoring working environments and conducting frequent checks on employers. These recommendations would mitigate some of the concerns in employing refugees that Bierling discussed in the previous chapter.

Conclusion

By using Ricoeur's Ethical Triad, Aristotle's concept of Eudaimonia, and evaluation of binding versus practiced laws, this chapter attempted to provoke the debate between the ethical considerations and responsibilities to refugees by a non signatory state. It argued that access to the labour force is necessary for the well being and growth of refugees. In addition, it argued that the repeal and new restrictions to health services and education implemented by Jordan are against binding laws in international covenants in regards to the right of freedom of movement and nonrefoulement. Most importantly, this chapter takes into considerations that Jordan is a developing country that is incapable of providing refugees with all rights they are entitled to in Jordan. It is clear that Jordan's political economy needs the international community's assistance in order to fulfill their obligations to Jordanians as well as refugees. Special Economic Zones and the foreign investment that comes with them could facilitate Jordan's obligations while also promoting growth of both the refugees, citizens, and the domestic economy. The following chapter discusses the ethical challenges persistent in the host country - refugee dichotomy, as opposed to a law and philosophical ethics perspective that this chapter provided. the following and last chapter discusses potential for exploitation in using refugees in labour with a specific realist undertone.

Chapter 4

Cost Versus Tribute

The fourth chapter discusses the state and refugees in terms of a predator- prey relationship. This is not by means to reduce their status to animalistic dimensions, but to understand the power asymmetries in the most basic representation. It discusses refugees as a “species of alterity” and how their human life is removed from them as they transition from citizen to refugee. As they do this they no longer have political qualifiers such as agency, a voice, and a presence (Nyers, 2006). The first section of this chapter uses concepts of state predation, rent and tribute, cost of protection, incentive problems, and differential protection offered through Vahabi to discuss the current state of affairs in Jordan and in Zaatari refugee camp. The second section discusses Vahabi’s concepts as indicators of measuring the potential opportunist predation in the future. The CDA’s principle of do no harm and Ricoeur’s preservation of the self are then utilized to evaluate the common economical interests and gains for Jordan as a host state to the Syrian refugees and using SEZ.

I. Predation

In *The Political Economy of Predation*, Vahabi discusses the concept of *predation* and *prey*. This concept is exceptionally useful in understanding the relationship between the state and refugees in labour, economy, and politics. Predator has several meanings according to the Cambridge Dictionary. As an ecological behaviour it is “an animal that hunts, kills, and eats other animals” in humans, it is “someone who follows people in order to harm them or commit a crime against them (Cambridge Dictionary, 2018).” In an economical perspective, predator is defined as; “a company that buys or tries to buy another company that is in a weaker financial position (Cambridge Dictionary, 2018).” Prey, as an ecological behaviour is “ an animal that is hunted and killed for food by another animal (Cambridge Dictionary, 2018).” It is also defined as

“someone who can be easily deceived or harmed (Cambridge Dictionary, 2018).” In essence, the predator-prey relation is a form of energy transfer or imposition in an asymmetrical interaction (Vahabi, 2016. 8). This relation has been used to describe asymmetries in human interaction before, such as in class struggles in capitalist societies (Vahabi, 2016. 49). The homo economicus paradigm is embedded within the predator-prey relationship and has an important role in this chapter. This paradigm is an analytical tool used in understanding the rational and self-interested agent present in predatory activity (Meyer, 2016).

Polyadic intraspecific predation is common with humans, it derives from an “imbalance-of-power between groups of people.” (Vahabi, 2016. 52-53) This predation can be seen in several instances, especially in labour relations. For “when the prey is plentiful, the predator can kill and feed on the prey whenever meat is required (Vahabi, 2016. 70).” In other words, when there are several people, those with less power and status such as the Syrian refugees, the ones with more power, such as the Jordanian government or employers can use their labour, their skills and their mere presence when they see fit to nourish their benefits. For instance, the lack of work permits distributed to Syrian refugees causes an increase in informal labour, informal labour comes with an array of issues. As previously mentioned, it causes many to work for lower pay than the worth of their work, they also are highly subjective to unsafe working conditions and unpaid wages. Their lack of leverage and disposable labour makes them easy prey to unfair and malevolent practices.

Vahabi also acknowledges the lack of political power and limited movement of refugees that Bierling does, though it transforms this concept into a relationship of a predatory state, where the refugees are its prey (Vahabi, 2015). Through the predatory state, Vahabi introduces the concept of the *cost of protection* which addresses the predatory state as sellers or providers of

protection (Vahabi, 2015). This suggest that *tribute*, or *absolute protection rent*, be sold as a commodity (Vahabi, 2015. 140-141). The protection can then be bought or earned through ways in which benefit the host state. Vahabi provides a sobering, yet essential realist perspective to the research. BBC Monitoring Middle East's article Jordan Fears "imposition" of new "peace agenda" over Syria argues that Jordan desires to capitalize their diplomatic power by hosting Syrian refugees (BBC Monitoring Middle East, 2013). This article directly relates to concerns of prey and predation that Vahabi refers to. In addition, using the volume of refugees in order to ask for foreign aid and investment in local infrastructure is also a form of predation, this will be further discussed as rent and tribute later in the chapter.

II. Protection

Vahabi discusses the process of herding and domestication of prey by the human predator.

"The human predator protects the prey to economise on the costs of keeping the prey in captivity and increase it's benefits (Vahabi, 2016. 74)." This can be seen in the concentration of refugees in camp, which include cost of surveillance and security in order to monitor refugees. "The major difference between man as a master predator and other predators is that he behaves both as an efficient predator and as a protector. As a protector he exerts domination over the prey by behaving as rule-maker and legislature and through transforming it into his property (Vahabi, 2016. 74). In order to continue protecting the prey, they must be of pecuniary value (Vahabi, 2016. 80). The price of protection is determined by the value the prey have in order to meet the interests of the predator (Vahabi, 2016. 81). The more mobile and resistant the prey is, the higher

cost of protection (Vahabi, 2016. 81). This could be a reason for restricting refugee movement, surveillance is more costly when they are dispersed.

However, Vahabi discusses the protection costs that would be limited if the prey are more independent such as having the ability to be shopkeepers as they would be more self-sustaining (Vahabi, 2016. 81). For instance, the *peculium* was a contract used in Italy between the slaves and their masters, essentially allowing slaves working capital rented from their master (Vahabi, 2016. 81; Silver, 2016). This working capital enabled the slaves to have a sense of “independence of action” (Silver, 2016. 67). It also increases work production for the master as the *peculium* enables liberty for the slave after a contracted time or finished job (Silver, 2016). The master also cuts cost of protection because there is little need to surveil the slave as there are legal ramifications for breaching the contract with their master and with others they conducted business with (Vahabi, 2016) (Silver, 2016). The *peculium* is not only for slaves and masters, people can be “self-sellers” in which they voluntarily have a *peculium* (Silver, 2016). Silver discusses the value of *peculium* to a “self-seller” they are able to collect enough funds for “purchasing freedom,” and with that came Roman Citizenship (Silver, 2016). This is similar to Vahabi’s concept of the “prey” being buyers of protection (Vahabi, 2016). This could be a viable option for Syrian refugees in Jordan, though it would not give citizenship, it could lead to more benefits and an increase their living standards (Silver, 2016).

Vahabi discusses the complexity of the Predator, a seller of protection yet also an aggressor (Vahabi, 2016. 63). Predatory activities are a form of self-interest, and when it is unrestrained, economics and politics become inseparable (Vahabi, 2016. 101). In order to monitor and limit this, new governance structures are needed (Vahabi, 2016, 101). In

microeconomics, this is usually by the state, however, it is with hopes that an international organization would have the oversight to intervene if needed.

III. Rent and Tribute

Vahabi discusses rent and tribute in the form of coercive redistribution as welfare-degrading and welfare-enhancing. *Rent* is defined as “the return to owners of resources in excess of opportunity cost” (Vahabi, 2016. 311). *Tribute* or *Absolute Protection Rights* is the objective of the monarch, or semi-constitutional monarchy, as sellers of protection (Vahabi, 2016. 308). It is essentially tax that is put on land, assets, people, and income which is later redistributed. This redistribution can be degrading to welfare or enhancing, this varies on the receiving end. The international community and foreign aid provide tribute to Jordan for hosting the Syrian refugees, while Jordan could be potentially rent-seeking. Rent-seeking is defined as searching for “part of the payment to the owner of resources over and above that which those resources could command in any alternative use (Buchanan, 1980. 3) (Vahabi, 2016. 311).” This is essentially coercive redistribution (Vahabi, 2016). This concept of redistribution is discussed later in the chapter.

IV. The State of The Jordanian Economy

Although Jordan has been selling protection to Syrian refugees the procured debt in doing so is destabilizing the already fragile economy. Jordan had a \$1.44 billion deficit in 2011, and by 2016 the Syrian refugees had cost Jordan over US \$2.5 billion yearly, which was 6 percent of GDP and a fourth of annual revenues (The World Bank, 2016. 5). In addition Jordan’s ratio of debts to G.D.P is currently 95.1 percent (Al-Daameh, 2017. 1). Its public debt went from \$18.9

billion to \$ 37.4 billion from 2011 to 2017 (Ghazal, 2016; Al-Daameh, 2017. 2). This impact on the economy can not be attributed to Syrian refugees alone, as the economy was already suffering by 2011 when the influx of Syrian refugees did not start until after. The instability in Egypt caused Jordan to look for alternative sources of gas, thus increasing the electricity prices leading to high fuel import costs and electrical subsidization (The World Bank, 2016). The National Electric Power Company (NEPCO) were \$7.6 billion in debt within five years (Al-Daamen, 2017. 2). In the last three years in addition to electricity and gas other subsidies such as water and bread amounted to over \$2.8 billion (The Jordanian Times, 2014; Fenek, 2016). This increase in costs for electricity and gas may also be a large facture into the inhospitable climate for investment in Jordan.

A. Jordan and the International Monetary Fund

Jordan has reached out to the International Monetary Fund (IMF) for assistance with its economic instability. Jordan had implemented an economic adjustment and austerity plan with the IMF in 1989 which had violent repercussions including mass riots and another in 1996 (Ryan, 1998). In 1973 the petroleum economy experienced a period of prosperity and rapid economic growth and opportunity (Ryan, 1998). Jordan was able to access the Gulf labor markets and foreign aid, which they were highly dependant on (Ryan, 1998. 55). Jordan relied on the Gulf states for Jordanian employment remittances and foreign aid (Ryan, 1998). However, the oil shock after the Iranian Revolution in 1979 along with the Iran-Iraq war resulted in a decline of labour and foreign aid (Ryan, 1998. 56). Jordan was struggling to repay debts and agreed on a five-year economic adjustment and stabilization plan with the IMF and the World Bank for \$125 million in 1989 (Ryan, 1998. 56). Jordan also formed a new partnership with the

Arab Cooperation Council and executed austerity measures (Ryan, 1998). This caused civil unrest as the public rioted against the large augmentation in prices of fuel, beverages, and cigarettes (Ryan, 1998, 57). The riots had brought attention to the failure of the government in the political liberalization process and soon after the government was dismissed and new elections took place (Ryan, 1998). In 1996, Prime Minister Kabariti was in office as another IMF economic adjustment and stabilization plan was put into place. During this time the international price of wheat increased rapidly and the cost of bread was more than twice its normal cost (Ryan, 1998). The public began rioting once more damaging government property, the army had to be dispatched to settle the unrest (Ryan, 1998).

In 2016 Jordan and the IMF had finalized an Extended Fund Facility (EFF) for 3 years (The Economist Intelligence Unit, 2016). The EFF will continue the work of the 2012-2015 Stand-By Arrangement which focused on “structural reform and competitiveness to fostering high and inclusive growth (IMF, 2012).” In addition, the objective of the EFF is to also to “increase private-sector development, job creation, enhancing the business environment and encouraging investment, ensuring sustainability in the energy and water sectors, financial sector resilience, and improved accountability and governance (EIU, 2016).” The taxes will be raised on several goods such as “cigarettes and alcohol, clothes, watches, perfume, jewellery, toys and cosmetics” (EIU, 2016). It maintains tax breaks in the sectors of technology and tourism while also addressing the losses at NEPCO (EIU, 2016). The taxes are high and with the removal of the bread subsidy, many fear public disapproval for the programs similar to the ones in the past (EIU, 2016). Several scholars and international agencies have come up with a solution that may be able to balance payments more effectively; allowing the Syrian refugees to work.

B. The Refugee Economy

The Jordan Response Plan (JRP), a three year integration and resilience plan was initiated in 2017 and focused on development and harmonization with the national agenda (UNHCR, 2017). The Jordan Compact Agreements were part of the JRP to “turn the response to the Syrian Crisis into an opportunity for the development of the country (UNHCR, 2017. 12).” Several authors, policy makers, human rights activists and politicians find this a complex agreement as did Bierling, as previously mentioned. While some agree that this could be a mutually rewarding agreement, it does fall to the right of the political spectrum and could potentially be susceptible to rent-seeking. Jordan’s international political leverage is benefiting from hosting the Syrian refugees, just as Syrians are benefiting from the protection Jordan provides. For instance, the compact agreements give them better access to the EU market with reduced tariffs, at 16.9 percent of its trade in 2015, the EU is Jordan’s biggest trading partner (European Commission, 2017). This could be a rent-tribute relationship.

C. Cost - Tribute

Whilst this thesis explores the concept of the predator- prey relationship where Jordan is portrayed as the predator and the Syrian refugees the prey, it is important to consider both Jordan and Jordanian nationals as prey too. The IMF has been historically scrutinized for implementing unfavourable policies in lending states, and such is the case in Jordan. The IMF has been accused of making misguided ‘recommendations’ that failed to account for the socioeconomic climate of Jordan (Awad, 2017. 3). Soon Jordan saw itself rapidly become prey to the IMF and World Bank as unsustainable economic liberalization and austerity measures heightened instability (Awad, 2017). This instability transcended onto the Jordanians as the cost of living, unemployment, and

poverty rates increased. Direct and indirect taxes also increased to 24 percent, allocation of tax redistribution was used to benefit the rich rather than the poor and tax corruption and evasion rates were high (Awad, 2017. 5). Jordan has also fallen prey to the predation of their resources by refugees. However, this thesis argues that there is a predator- prey relationship via Jordan - Syrian refugees. What this chapter pursues is the plausibility of there being an equilibrium between the predator and prey relationship. This can be achieved by better welfare enhancing coercive redistribution.

Vahabi discusses high and low state protective capacity. A strong state will have a high protective capacity when it is able to implement its political decision in practice (Vahabi, 2016. 331). In contrast, a state with low protective capacity is unable to enforce its own political decisions (Vahabi, 2016. 332). Vahabi uses Charles Tilly, author of *Social Movements and National Politics* to define state capacity as “the extent to which interventions of state agents in existing non-state resources, activities, and interpersonal connections alter existing distributions of those resources, activities, and interpersonal connections as well as relations among those distributions” (Vahabi, 2016. 332). Jordan are sellers of protection to Syrian refugees and it is currently experiencing *resource constraints*. In order for Jordan to have a high protective capacity, it needs to be able to remove or improve these resource constraints (Vahabi, 2016. 333). This can be done by creating a coherent strategy to relax these constraints (Vahabi, 2016. 333). Vahabi suggests three possible ways to do this;

- 1) external extension through conquest
- 2) internal or territorial consolidations
- 3) a combination of both external extension and conquests (Vahabi, 2016. 333).

These concepts are transformed in order to better apply to the current case in Jordan. External extension in this case could mean the higher the influence Jordan has by being a host to Syrian Refugees. Instead of relying on their army for extension of power it relies on the refugees. This can be reflected in Jordan's ability to enter the EU market under the Jordan Compact. Internal or territorial consolidations refer to Jordan's ability to redistribute public goods and services. Both seek to maximize tribute however, they can also increase internal stability. Jordan can transform itself into a state with strong protection capacity and maximize tribute despite resource constraints if it can better redistribute goods and services.

Syrian refugees are considered *prey* as they do not benefit from the market laws. Lack of redistribution of market laws leads to lack of dignity and restricted access to economic resources. Opening SEZs and applying market laws upon refugees would enable Jordan to redistribute goods and services to both Jordanians and to Syrian refugees. In addition, Syrians would be paying taxes on their respective incomes thus contributing directly to the Jordanian economy. In turn, Syrians would have better access to benefits such as social security. Not only does this benefit the economy but it also promotes the notion of mutual reciprocity while complying with principles of *do no harm*.

V. Do No Harm

The concept of *do no harm* suggests that inaction can be dangerous and can actually be more harmful than action (Wallace, 2015). It also states that once local capacity is identified there is a responsibility to support it (Wallace, 2015. 20). Having identified the possibility and capacity of Jordan to ethically utilize SEZs, not taking measures to implement them would be against these principles. Access to the labour market through SEZs are an answer to both the

dividers and *connectors* in the economic conflict. Dividers increase tensions between groups and lead to “destructive competition” (Wallace, 2015. 27). Where as connectors are “things or factors that reduce tensions between people or groups and lead to an undergrid constructive collaboration” (Wallace, 2015. 27). High unemployment and limited economic resources and jobs are dividers, while economic contribution, employment, and sustainability are connectors between Jordanians and Syrian refugees. Critical detail mapping has already been established throughout the thesis and by international actors and agreements. These critical details include focusing on a specific target, understanding available resources, capacity, and partnerships. Another important factor in the do no harm principle is the impact analysis or ABCs, which stands for Actions and Behaviours have Consequences (Wallace, 2015. 57). This thesis has developed guidelines both in evaluating the relative success of SEZs as well as the ethical standards in order to measure and analyze impact.

There are five patterns of resource transfers identified in the principles and practices of do no harm (Annex B). These include; distribution effects, legitimization effects, market effects, substitution effects, and theft (Wallace, 2015. 62). This section discusses three; the distribution effects, legitimization effects, and market effects as they are the most relevant. The distribution effect of resources are addressed by determining Jordanians needs which include access to employment and financial resources. This reduces the perceived favouritism or bias in resource transfers. This was addressed in the previous section. Legitimization effects are when an organization is perceived to support the government via its resources (Wallace, 2015). While this proposal does discuss creating incentives for the governing authority it also highlights the importance of public and private involvement. Negative market effects similarly to distributional effects can also be mitigated by better redistribution practices. Sustaining or developing local

incomes and wages is also an important factor. When different wages are given to two different groups for the same labour there can be tension and jealousies that can initiate and/or perpetuate conflict. This is one of the reasons why equal pay for equal work was suggested as a necessary ethical guideline earlier in chapter three. This concept will reduce the self-other dichotomy between the Jordanians and Syrian refugees.

Finally RAFT, Respect, Accountability, Fairness, and Transparency, should be implemented through regular checks and balances through monitoring and collaboration with international programs and organizations such as The Better Work Program mentioned in chapter two. This concept stresses the importance of conduct, policy, and publicity and being cautious of potential dividers (Wallace, 2015. 83). The following table outlines the principles of RAFT more clearly.

Principles of RAFT

| Negative Patterns of Behavior | RAFT | Positive Patterns of Behavior |
|--|-----------------------|---|
| <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Hostile Competition • Suspicion • Anger, Aggression, Belligerence • Indifference | Respect | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Cooperation and Collaboration • Trust • Calm • Sensitivity (to local concerns) |
| <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Powerlessness • Impunity • Security, Arms & Power | Accountability | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Positive Action • Responsibility • Rule of Law or Nonviolence |
| <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Different Value for Different Lives • Ignoring Rules | Fairness | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Recognition of Value • Following Rules |
| <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Closed • Decision making process unknown • Hide information <p>Lack of transparency contributes to all above behaviors</p> | Transparency | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Open • Decision making process known • Share information <p>Transparency contributes to all above behaviors</p> |

Source: Wallace (2015, 84)

Conclusion

This chapter has implemented key concepts provided by Mehrdad Vahabi with the objective to explain how using Special Economic Zones could create a better equilibrium between the current predator - prey relationship. This chapter acknowledges the different forms the predator - prey complex is attributed and exacerbated by this conflict by discussing instability during the implementation of International Monetary Fund measures and austerity programs. It offered suggestions regarding the redistribution of public goods and services that could lead to a more balanced budget and mutual reciprocity between Jordan, Jordanians, and Syrian refugees. It also used crucial aspects of the CDA's guidelines to explain that utilizing SEZs can be compatible with do no harm principles and has the capacity to do so.

Conclusion

This thesis contributed to the explorative exercise of the use of Special Economic Zones as a mutually beneficial energy allocating mechanism. It was persistent in exploring the main dimensions of ethics, legality, and political economy of pursuing a Special Economic Zone. It also identified how those three dimensions exist in Jordan's current Syrian refugee management practices and provided alternative guidelines. The main contribution of this thesis is to establish that if Special Economic Zones are ethically implemented and maintained they will have the potential to promote feelings of dignity for Syrian refugees and economic growth for both Syrian refugees and Jordan.

Chapter One provided the necessary information about Syrian refugees and how they were affected by the Syrian War and how they were affecting Jordan. It identified the potential skills and capacity for work that the Syrian refugees have and wish to exert. In addition it also demonstrates that there is a link to dignity and access to financial resources such as employment this led to the hypothesis that Syrian refugees could be able to obtain dignity they felt that they may have lost during the transition into becoming a refugee. Chapter Two identified Special Economic Zones as the energy allocating mechanism most appropriate in addressing both Syrian refugee employment and revenue for Jordan. It demonstrated the risks that are involved with SEZs such as poor incentives and monitoring, this enabled a better insight into identifying positive incentives and better checks and balances that would be required for an SEZ to be ethically functioning.

The third chapter defined the ethical foundations used in this thesis through the philosophical concepts of Paul Ricoeur's Ethical Triad as interpreted by Roberto Toscano and Aristotle's Eudaimonia. It then emphasized the contradictions between binding versus practiced laws in Jordan, and how some of the past and current treatment of Syrian refugees is not only

unethical but also contrary to international and Jordanian law. It provided recommended guidelines that should be addressed and followed in order to mitigate loss of dignity and harm to Syrian refugees. The final chapter expressed realist perspectives on host - refugee relationships by using several of Mahرداد Vahabi's concepts in *The Political Economy of Predation*. It demonstrated the role of homo economicus active in predatory behaviour. This chapter also used CDA's principles of do no harm to address those behaviours and to maintain the ethical practices of SEZs. In conclusion, this study speculated that by upholding laws, practicing ethical treatment, and using CDA's principles of do no harm, SEZs can be mutually beneficial to both Jordan and the Syrian Refugees.

Future Implementations

As discussed in Chapter 2, The World Bank stated that 11 zones in Jordan have been selected and already have the necessary infrastructure for Special Economic Zones. They will create new opportunities in Jordan which hopefully can be accessible to Syrian refugees. As this study started back in 2016, the response to a more sustainable form of aid and substance has rapidly developed within two years. It is with high hopes that the implementation of SEZs as a solution can be both ethical and mutually beneficial as this thesis optimistically suggests.

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
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
Annex

I. The Creation of Zaatari Refugee Camp from September 2012 - April 2013



Source: (Ledwith, 2014. 17)

II. Map of Zaatari Refugee Camp



Source: (UNHCR, 2017)

III. Five Patterns of Resource Transfers

Five Patterns of Resource Transfers

| | |
|--|--|
| Distribution Effects | A Distribution Effect occurs when people perceive that an organization has a bias in favor for or against a specific group through the way they distribute resources. |
| Distribution Effects in post-conflict settings | In post-conflict settings, everybody has needs, often quite severe ones. At the same time, a losing side will almost always have more needs than a winning one. |
| Distribution Effects in resource management | Resources that are used in common, such as water, forest, or pasture, are always challenges to manage. When more than one group wants to access a resource this can lead to conflict. |
| Distribution Effects based on the easy route | Some people are easier to reach than others. This can be based on geography, language, cultural affinity, transportation networks, education, and so on. |
| Distribution Effects based on social or economic criteria | The use of social or economic criteria ("poorest of the poor", "the landless", "subsistence farmers", etc.) can trap organizations into working with a limited set of people. |
| Distribution Effects in post-disaster settings | While similar to post-conflict settings in that everybody has needs, the concern here is that those defined as "most affected" by the disaster might come from a specific group. |
| Legitimization Effects | A Legitimization Effect occurs where an organization is perceived to be using its resources to support a political or governing authority. |
| Legitimizing a bad actor | By allowing their resources to be co-opted by a governing authority who uses them for nefarious ends, organizations can contribute to conflict. |
| De-legitimizing a good actor | By not working with a governing authority, organizations can miss opportunities to help strengthen local capacities. |
| De-legitimizing a bad actor | By using their resources to clearly differentiate the organization from the governing authority, an organization can avoid being co-opted. |
| Legitimizing a good actor | By explicitly supporting a governing authority's initiatives through their own activities, organizations can maintain their independence while also helping to build local capacity. |
| Market Effects | Market Effects are the result of changes in the local incentive structures and patterns of opportunity caused by the introduction of new resources. The new resources noticeably affect incomes, wages, profits, and prices so that people's perception of economic winners and losers changes. |
| Market Effects on Incomes | Interventions can flood areas and local markets with cheap or free substitutes that compete directly with local products and the incomes of those who relied on selling that good will fail. |
| Market Effects on Wages | Hiring local people affects the wage structure of local communities. Such effects can increase jealousies at the personal level and, when one group has a greater representation among those who get paid than other groups, this pattern increases tensions. |
| Market Effects on Profits | Sourcing goods and services locally provide profits to local people. However, if the profits tend to accrue to members of one group over others, this can cause tensions to rise. When profits flow to politically connected people, this can be perceived as corruption. |
| Market Effects on Prices | Interventions that require local goods and/or services can drive the prices of these up, placing them out of the reach of locals, or changing incentives around those items. |
| Substitution Effects | A Substitution Effect occurs when an organization takes over for local capacity, reducing or replacing local efforts. |
| Substitution Effects free up resources to pursue conflict | Governing authorities in conflict situations often see the resources of interveners as supplementary to their own. They also understand how to manipulate intervener values. |
| Substitution Effects result in authorities' loss of capacity | When systems that should be supported by a local governing authority are pushed onto NGOs or usurped by them, the governing authorities may well forget that they once had responsibility for that system or they may lose the competence they had. |
| Substitution and legitimacy | When a government reduces its connection with its citizen by giving up more and more services to other entities, its legitimacy erodes bit by bit. Delegitimizing government undermines Connectors and may increase Dividers. |
| Theft | Theft occurs when people simply take resources from an organization. |

Source: (Wallace, 2015. 78)

VI. Questionnaire in English

Disclosure:

My name is Lindsey Barr and I am a university student at Saint Paul University in Ontario Canada. I am conducting research in relation to Syrian refugees in Jordan and their attitudes towards employment. I am conducting fieldwork for three days in the Zaatari refugee camp and your participation by filling out this questionnaire will be greatly appreciated and will further my studies greatly. All questionnaires will be kept anonymous. If you have any questions or concerns you can reach me by email at lbarr074@uottawa.ca.

Thank you,

Lindsey Barr

Instructions:

Check for correct responses. Example

Circle the appropriate responses when instructed

Sex: Male Female

Age (circle the range that applies) : 18-24 25-34 35-44 45-54 55-59

Languages fluently spoken: Arabic English French Other: _____

When did you leave Syria ? (Circle the appropriate time)

Less than 3 months ago 3 - 6 months ago 6 - 8 months ago

8 - 12 months ago 1 year + 2 years +

3 years + Do not know

How long have you been in Jordan? (Circle the appropriate time)

Less than 3 months ago 3 - 6 months ago 6 - 8 months ago

8 - 12 months ago 1 year + 2 years +

3 years + Do not know

Did you come to Jordan with anyone?

Yes

No

If yes, who: (Circle all that apply)

Grandfather Father Brother Uncle Son Nephew
Grandmother Mother Sister Aunt Daughter Niece Other: _____

Did you leave anyone from your family in Syria?

Yes

No

If yes, who (Circle all that apply):

Grandfather Father Brother Uncle Son Nephew
Grandmother Mother Sister Aunt Daughter Niece Other: _____

Do you have enough money for day to day expenses?

Yes

No

Do you have access to sufficient food and clean water daily?

Yes

No

Do you have access to sufficient health care?

Yes

No

If not, what do you need for it to be sufficient? (Circle all that apply)

Doctors First Aid Supplies Medication Counselling & Trauma Therapy

Other: _____

Do you have a sufficient amount of clothing to protect you from environmental conditions?

Yes

No

Is your shelter sufficient for temporary living?

Yes

No

Do you think that Jordan and the international community are doing enough to provide humanitarian assistance to you and other Syrians refugees in Jordan?

Yes

No

How much longer do you expect you will be in the refugee camp?

Less than 3 months 3 - 6 months 6 - 8 months

8 - 12 months 1 year + 2 years +

3 years + Do not know

How long do you expect you will be in Jordan for?

Less than 3 months 3 - 6 months 6 - 8 months

8 - 12 months 1 year + 2 years +

3 years + Do not know

Where do you hope to live in the future?

Jordan Syria Other: _____ Do not know

Why? _____

What was the highest level of education you received in Syria?

Elementary school or less

Secondary school

College

University undergraduate degree

University masters degree

University doctors degree

Did you work in Syria?

Yes

No

If yes, what was your occupation in Syria? _____

What experience do you have? (Circle all that apply)

Textiles/Sewing

Healthcare

Education/Childcare

Engineering

Agriculture

Driving

Technology

Business

Manufacturing

Trades

Crafts

Other: (Please specify) _____

Were you the main financial provider for your family in Syria?

Yes

No

Contribution was equal

Are you the main provider for your family in Jordan?

Yes

No

Not applicable

Do you feel that you are physically capable to be employed?

Yes

No

Do you have any mental health concerns that will inhibit your ability to be employed?

Yes

No

Do you work for pay now?

Yes

No

If yes, what do you do? _____

If yes how many hours do you work a week? (circle the best answer)

1- 15 16- 20 21-24 25-30 31-34 35- 40 41-45 46-50 51-55 56 +

Is this too much or too little?

Too much

Too little

Do you feel safe at work?

Yes

No

Why?: _____

If you are not employed would you like to work?

Yes

No

How many hours would you like to work per week?

1- 15 16- 20 21-24 25-30 31-34 35- 40 41-45 46-50 51-55 56 +

Other than the financial compensation, do you see other benefits of being employed?

Yes

No

If you were offered employment for a low wage would you take it?

Yes

No

Would you accept work if it was in a different occupation than what you had in Syria?

Yes

No

Would you take a position of employment if it was below your skill level?

Yes

No

Do you think Jordan's restrictions on work permits for Syrian refugees is fair?

Yes

No

Do not know

Thank you for completing this survey

V. Questionnaire in Arabic

استبيان

الإفصاح

أنا اسمي ليندزي بار وأنا طالبة جامعية في جامعة سانت بول في أونتاريو، كندا. إنني أجرى بحثاً ذو صلة باللجانين السوريين في الأردن وحول سلوكهم تجاه التوظيف. أنا أجري عمل ميداني لمدة ثلاثة أيام في مخيم الزعتري للاجئين، وستكون مشاركتك في ملء هذا الاستبيان في موضع بالغ التقدير، وستسهم أيضاً في مواصلة دراسي بشكل كبير. لن يتم ذكر هوية الأشخاص الذين سيقومون بملء هذا الاستبيان. إذا كان لديك أية أسئلة أو استفسارات، فيمكنك التواصل معنا على البريد التالي: lbarr074@uottawa.ca .
مع جزيل الشكر والتقدير،
ليندزي بار

التعليمات:

ضع علامة صح على الاستجابات الصحيحة مثال:

ضع دائرة على الاستجابات المناسبة عند اعطاء التعليمات

الجنس: ذكر أنثى

العمر (ضع دائرة حول الفئة العمرية التي تنطبق عليك): 18 24 25 34 35 44 45 54 55 59
اللغات التي تتحدثها بطلاقة: العربية الانجليزية الفرنسية أخرى: _____

متى غادرت سوريا؟ (ضع إشارة دائرية على الخيار المناسب)

قبل أقل من 3 شهور قبل 3 الى 6 شهور قبل 8 شهور
قبل 8 الى 12 شهراً قبل أكثر من سنة قبل أكثر من سنتين
قبل أكثر من 3 سنوات لا أعرف

كم المدة التي مكثتها في الأردن؟ (ضع إشارة دائرية على الخيار المناسب)

قبل أقل من 3 شهور قبل 3 الى 6 شهور قبل 6 الى 8 شهور
قبل 8 الى 12 شهراً قبل أكثر من سنة قبل أكثر من سنتين
قبل أكثر من 3 سنوات لا أعرف

هل هاجرت الى الأردن مع أي شخص

نعم

لا

إذا كانت الإجابة بنعم، فمن هو الشخص: (ضع علامة صح على جميع ما ينطبق)

الجد الأب الأخ العم الأبن ابن الأخ

الجدة الأم الأخت العممة الأخت ابنة الأخت غير ذلك: _____
هل تركت أي أحد من أفراد عائلتك في سوريا؟

نعم

لا

إذا كانت الإجابة بنعم، فمن هو الشخص (ضع علامة صح على جميع ما ينطبق):

الجد الأب الأخ العم الابن ابن الأخ

الجدة الأم الأخت العممة الأخت ابنة الأخت غير ذلك: _____

هل لديك ما يكفي من المال للنفقات اليومية؟

نعم

لا

هل يمكنك الحصول ما يكفيك من الطعام والماء التنظيف يومياً؟

نعم

لا

هل يمكنك الحصول على رعاية صحية كافية؟

نعم

لا

إذا كانت الإجابة بلا، فماذا تحتاج لكي تكون كافية بالنسبة لك؟ (ضع علامة صح على جميع ما ينطبق)

الأطباء امدادات الاسعاف الأولي العلاج الطبي علاج آثار الصدمات غير ذلك: _____

هل لديك مقدراً كافياً من الملابس لحماية نفسك من الظروف والأحوال الجوية والبيئية؟

نعم

لا

هل الملجأ الذي تعيش فيه كافياً للعيش المؤقت؟

نعم

لا

هل تعتقد أن دولة الأردن والمجتمع الدولي يعلان كل ما بوسعهما لتقديم المساعدة الانسانية لك وللباقى اللاجئين السوريين في الأردن؟

نعم

لا

كم أطول فترة ممكنة تتوقع أن تبقى في مخيم اللاجئين؟

أقل من 3 شهور من 3 الى 6 شهور من 6 الى 8 شهور

من 8 الى 12 شهراً أكثر من سنة أكثر من سنتين

أكثر من 3 سنوات لا أعرف

حسب وجهة نظرك، ما المدة المتوقعة لبقائك في الأردن؟

أقل من 3 شهور من 3 الى 6 شهور من 6 الى 8 شهور

من 8 الى 12 شهراً أكثر من سنة أكثر من سنتين

أكثر من 3 سنوات لا أعرف

أين تأمل أن تعيش في المستقبل؟

الأردن سوريا غير ذلك: _____ لا أعرف

لماذا؟ _____

ما هو أعلى مستوى تعليمي حصلت عليه في سوريا؟

المرحلة الابتدائية أو أقل

المرحلة الثانوية

كلية

شهادة جامعية

درجة الماجستير

شهادة دكتوراه

هل كنت تعمل في سوريا؟

نعم

لا

إذا كانت الاجابة بنعم، فماذا كانت مهنتك في سوريا؟ _____

ماهي خبرتك في العمل؟ (ضع علامة صح على جميع ما ينطبق)

المنسوجات / الخياطة الرعاية الصحية التعليم / رعاية الطفل الهندسة

الزراعة السياقة التكنولوجيا الأعمال

التصنيع التجارة الأعمال الحرفية

غير ذلك: (الرجاء التحديد) _____

هل كنت أنت المعيل المالي الرئيسي لأسرتك في سوريا؟

نعم

لا

كانت المساهمة متساوية

هل أنت المعيل المالي الرئيسي لأسرتك في الأردن؟

نعم

لا

لا ينطبق

هل تشعر أنه لديك القدرة الجسدية لأن يتم توظيفك للعمل؟

نعم

لا

هل لديك أي مشاكل صحية عقلية تعيقك عن التوظيف؟

نعم

لا

هل تعمل مقابل أجر حالياً؟

نعم

لا

إذا كانت الإجابة نعم، ماذا تعمل؟

إذا كانت الإجابة بنعم، كم عدد الساعات التي تعمل بها في الأسبوع؟ (ضع دائرة على الإجابة الصحيحة)

1 15 ساعة 16 20 ساعة 21 24 ساعة 25 30 ساعة 31 34 ساعة 35 40 ساعة 41 45 ساعة 46 50 ساعة

هل هذه ساعات عمل كثيرة أم قليلة؟

أكثر مما ينبغي

قليلة جداً

أتشعر بالراحة بعملك؟

نعم

لا

لماذا؟:

ان لم تكن موظفاً، فماذا تحب أن تعمل؟

نعم

لا

كم عدد الساعات التي تريد أن تعملها لكل أسبوع؟

1 15 ساعة 16 20 ساعة 21 24 ساعة 25 30 ساعة 31 34 ساعة 35 40 ساعة 41 45 ساعة 46 50 ساعة

هل هذه ساعات عمل كثيرة أم قليلة؟

بخلاف التعويض المالي، هل ترى فوائد أخرى من وراء توظيفك؟

نعم

لا

لو عرض عليك العمل مقابل أجر منخفض، فهل تقبل به؟

نعم

لا

هل تقبل العمل بمهنة مختلفة عما كنت تعمل في سوريا؟

نعم

لا

هل تقبل بوظيفة أقل من مستوى مهارتك؟

نعم

لا

هل تعتقد أن القيود الأردنية على تصاريح عمل اللاجئين السوريين عادلة؟

نعم

لا

لا أعرف

أشكركم على استكمال هذا الاستبيان!