DIALECTICAL EXPRESSIONS

CONFLICTS IN NIGERIA'S NIGER DELTA

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Abstract: Government troops, amphibious assault craft, armoured personnel carriers, helicopter gun-ships, high powered speed-boats, arbitrary arrests and extrajudicial killings on the one hand. On the other hand- arms trafficking, youth militancy, rival gangs, kidnapping of personnel operating the oil industry (foreign and local), sabotage of oil pipelines and installations, and heavy handed state repression have come to typify the social conditions that are manifest in the Niger Delta region for over 25 years. Add to the mix, impunity, illegal bunkering, a legacy of endemic state corruption and political kleptocracy. Over the past 50 years, 90% or the bulk of the nation`s source of wealth (gross domestic product- GDP) has been crude oil and gas, production and supply. Over time, transnational oil corporations have dominated oil exploration, drilling, pumping and shipping in the Niger-Delta and the indigenes of the Niger-Delta area have experienced environmental degradation, economic poverty, and disharmony. This in effect has led to the emergence of social movements, youth violence, increased geo-politics etc. The activities of transnational oil corporations have been a contentious issue leading to increased disputes and militant activities in the area. Women, children, and the elderly as usual feel the impact of these social disruptions- their voices have remained unheard and subdued. This paper examines what a critical sociological unpacking of oil politics in the Niger Delta reveals about the nature of development and social movements that has emerged. The paper concludes by illuminating what the present administrations` plan is to address the crisis of environmental degradation and poverty in the region.

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CHAPTER I

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INTRODUCTION

The ecology, nature and environmental controversy are relatively new in the discourse regarding sustainable development. Perhaps it can be argued that these new developments were a necessary concept of the human condition and its relationship to modernity. In developing countries like Nigeria, the local/communal societies in oil producing regions have not been given much of a forum to enable them clearly articulate their economic grievances, the impact of devastating environmental activities and consequences of the operations associated with multinational oil corporations.

(Culled in part from Adalikwu, 2007)

1.1 REVIEW OF THEORETICAL LITERATURE:

The purpose of this study is to examine the impact of a degrading environment on the indigenous inhabitants of the Niger Delta. Specifically it will explore how multinational oil corporations' activities have affected the lifestyles of the indigenes of this area. For the purposes of this paper indigenous people refers to local communities that have maintained cultural similarity and historical continuity, who have inhabited, owned and operate the lands of the Niger delta for generations. This use of the term indigenous people is not exclusive to people of Ogoni descent, but also refers to the Kalabari, Ibibio, Igbo, Ijaw, Itsekiri, Ondo, Urohbo, among others. But in the most, the reference in this paper relates to indigenous people of the Warri and Escravos area and environs, located within 15 minutes of each other. This is because some of

the most vocal voices have come from this area known for its low sulfur, wt% of 0.17 crude and the Chevron-operated, Escravos oil export terminal. “Nigeria only produces high value, low sulphur content, light crude oils - Antan Blend, Bonny Light, Bonny Medium, Brass Blend, Escravos Light, Forcados Blend, IMA, Odudu Blend, Pennington Light, Qua-Iboe Light and Ukpokiti.” (see NNPC Business > Upstream Ventures > Oil Production 2010). This paper seeks to explain how these vocal, if not militant, transformation in the region occurred. It more specifically will tend to focus on communal and women’s groups or social movements that have emerged in recent decades, as a result of the expansion of crude oil exploration and production activities.

Particularly and where appropriate I will discuss what has occurred in the delta region in relation to the issue of environmental politics and sustainable development, which will unfold in the paper through various content analyses. In order to do this, I will examine the emergence and role of the multi-national oil industry and discuss colonial/post-colonial attitudes in relation to the oil industry. It appears to me somewhat disingenuous to imagine that the concatenation of socio-economic and geo-political factors in play could simply be resolved without adequate consideration of power relations and issues of political domination.

Nigeria is the sixth largest oil producing country amongst the Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC) and the seventh largest oil producing country in the world. Over the past five decades, crude oil revenues have constituted the main source of Nigeria’s annual foreign exchange earnings. In fact, oil and gas exploration and production effectively account for approximately 90% of the country’s gross domestic product (GDP) (Adalikwu 2007:1, Ejibunu, 2007: 7). As Ejibunu points out, Nigeria has earned over $400 billion as oil revenue since the early 1970s (Ejibunu 2007: 6). Since the 1950s, the inhabitants of the Niger delta region of Nigeria have experienced ‘environmental degradation’, ‘economic poverty’ and ‘disharmony’,

which has in effect given rise to various ethnically motivated groups or movements vying to appease the distrust of several factions within the spheres of influence in geo-political leadership. It has been alleged that some of these groups have been, or remain affiliated in their allegiance to a socio-political basis of support (Cole et al 2008: 3).

For the more than fifty years that foreign oil companies have dominated oil exploration, drilling, pumping and shipping in the Niger-Delta, the environmental consequences have been a source of contentious socio-political turmoil leading to increasing disputes, armed confrontation and militant incursions in the region. As is usual with such conflict issues, women, children, the elderly and infirm, primarily suffer the brunt of these social upheavals. These salient voices remain muted, subdued and unheard due to the exercise of absolute governmental authority within the elitist political establishment. The area in question where this lucrative resource is predominantly situated, 'the Niger delta zone' is a tract of land approximately 70,000 square kilometres consisting of over 40 ethnic groups, speaking some 250 dialects (Oviasuyi and Uwadiae 2010: 115). It stretches from the two states in the south east (Cross River, Akwa Ibom), through the south central (Abia, Bayelsa, Imo and Rivers), to the mid-west states (Edo, Delta and Ondo), (TED Case Studies, Ejibunu 2007: 7 and Oviasuyi and Uwadiae 2010: 110). Nigeria's production and export quota of over 1.1 million barrels of oil a day is derived from between 7.5 to 12 percent of the country's land mass and whose inhabitants collectively account for about 25 percent of Nigeria's population (TED Case Studies: Case No. 149.) It was anticipated that from 2005 to 2010 Nigeria's total production output from the petroleum sector which includes natural gas liquids, lease condensates and refinery gains would increase to between 3 and 4 million barrels per day. However, actual total oil production in 2010 exceeded 2.46 million bbl/d, with crude oil production averaging some 2.15 million bbl/d for the year. More recently a combination of onshore and offshore developments increased crude oil production to an estimated 2.17 million bbl/d in July 2011. See graph below:



Upstream developments that are in the pipeline should boost oil production over the next 5 years.

Nigeria: Upcoming Projects

Project	Capacity ('000 bbl/d)	Est. Startup	Operator
Agbami 2**	100	2011-2014	Chevron
Usan	180	2012	Total
Gbaran Ubie Phase 1	70	2012+	Shell
Ehra North Phase 2	50	2013+	ExxonMobil
Bonga North, Northwest	50-150	2014+	Shell
Bonga Southwest and Aparo	140	2014+	Shell
Egina*	150-200	2014+	Total
Bosi	135	2015	ExxonMobil
Nsiko	100	2015+	Chevron
Uge	110	2016	ExxonMobil

Sources: Oil and Gas Journal; IEA Medium Term Oil Market Report; Wood Mackenzie; Total; Chevron; Rigzone; Business Week. Available at http://www.eia.gov/countries/cab.cfm?fips=NI Date accessed September 14, 2012

This research project is not intended to reveal any hidden truths which other studies have failed to unveil nor identify any weaknesses of other published works. Rather it is hoped that it may disclose several of the salient factors that have enabled exploitation and oppression of the indigenous people, and the endemic corrupt practices prevalent in the oil industry in the Niger

delta area. Its rationale is to emphasize that through social activism and struggle, peoples of the Niger delta from various generations and walks in life are increasingly becoming more active and relevant in political processes.

Subject to the foregoing, my research question is poised: 'what does a critical sociological unpacking of oil politics in the Niger Delta reveal about the nature of development and social movements?' In particular, my interests lead to exploring the issues which have led to militant movements and women's activism and what the future may hold for them under the prevailing situation. My hypothesis therefore, is that the descendants of the Niger delta area have been subjected to immeasurable exploitation in their communities culminating in their struggle for survival, which arose from the disruption of previous lifestyles and their dislocation from ancestral homes and natural habitat. Theoretically, I will engage in colonialism and post colonialism as it relates to this topic. My methodological approach will be based on a measure of literary review of several scholarly publications, case studies and reports relating to and arising from the circumstances that subsist in the Niger delta region.

1.2 OBJECTIVE AND RELEVANCE OF RESEARCH STUDY:

The primary objective of this study is to examine how successive Nigerian governments colluded if not otherwise participated with multinational oil corporations to exploit the resources of the Niger delta region, with apparently scant regard for the environmental consequences and the accompanying disruption to the lives and livelihood of the indigenous people. Particularly, it aims to emphasize how the operations of such multinationals have contributed not only to degradation but also retarded the development within the context of a sustainable cultural heritage and land use for subsequent generations, of these inhabitants. This research project further aspires to shed light and create awareness on the impact trans-national oil companies have on the environment in general, particularly in developing countries like Nigeria. The scope

and relevance of this paper seeks to illuminate the impact of a degrading environment on the evolving trend towards militant activities in the Niger-Delta. It is important to seek and appreciate the impact and significance that oil exploration and production activities have had in these communities. The relevance of this study may become more apparent when we identify the input and role of communal groups and movements in recognizing their growing awareness of environmental politics in relation to development and self determination. This may demonstrate how such groups through various social movements are becoming more enlightened and knowledgeable about their surroundings- socially, economically, politically and culturally. It is also hoped to illustrate how this awareness is contributing in the struggle towards empowerment, as they are increasingly demanding acknowledgment of their rights to subsistence living, rights to fertile land, clean drinking water, economic revenue, education, healthy territorial development and other basic amenities. Furthermore, the study is anticipated to underscore the evolving circumstance in the developing world, of diverse generations who are increasingly becoming politically active in their communities, jostling their voices in order to be heard, to raise consciousness on the effects of living unfulfilled lives that are based on a capitalist run ideological society. In essence, the effects of globalization are coming into play.

To be sure, the discovery of crude oil in the 1950s resulted in transnational oil company operations “destroying the social and physical basis of subsistence” (Turner and Brownhill, 2003: 4). As such, it is not really surprising that there would be a sustained effort and backlash to counter the stance against such corporate destruction, through resistance and opposition to the activities of a colonial oriented capitalist oil industry acting in collaboration with a morally bankrupt Nigerian political establishment. In brief, my assumption is that this study could be beneficial to policy and decision makers, individuals and scholars who have particular interest in the dialectical relationship between human activities, the environment and nature.

Map: Niger Delta Oil Infrastructure



Source: U.S. Government. Available at – www. http://www.eia.gov/countries/cab.cfm?fips=NI. Retrieved September 20, 2012.

CHAPTER II

"There is a symbiotic relationship between the military dictatorship and the multinational companies who grease the palms of those who rule….They are assassins in foreign lands. They drill and they kill in Nigeria". Assassins in Foreign Lands, A Corp Watch Radio Interview with Human Rights Activist Oronto Douglas.

(Culled in part from Shah 2004).

COLONIAL AND POST COLONIAL LEGACY

2.1 The Emergence of the Multinational Oil Industry:

According to Steyn, in the absence of any major or meaningful studies or other publications relating to colonial oil exploration activities at the dawn of the 1900s, it would be naive to presume that the British or its other colonizing compatriots did not extensively seek out this soon to become valuable resource (Steyn 2009: 249). She also indicated that there has been some evidence to suggest that Nigerian oil historiography dates back to at least 1906-07 (Steyn 2009: 249). She argues that the colonial drive for oil took off in 1903 with the establishment of two companies, Nigeria and West African Development Syndicate (Limited) and Nigeria Properties (Limited) who started 'exploration for bitumen, coal and oil' (Steyn 2009: 252). Their exploratory activities were based on the positive results of geological surveys carried out by Bernard A. Collins and A. H. Harrison (1903–05 and 1904–05), who apparently confirmed the existence of vast deposits of bitumen and a good probability of petroleum (Steyn 2009: 252) Steyn points that a third concession was granted to the Northern Nigeria Exploration Syndicate, even as exploration did not appear very promising until 1905. The Nigeria Bitumen Corporation was established to explore for bitumen and crude oil in Southern Nigeria with the aim of acquiring and working to exploit the concessions granted to the two companies (Steyn 2009: 252). Steyn claims that most published accounts regarding oil exploration of the era, 'are incomplete and leave out more than they include.' This contention is borne out with respect to two peculiar observations; the absence in recognizing the enclave nature including cultural sensitivities as this exploitation impacted the country's overall economy, and an inaccurate

portrayal of the extent to which the crude oil resource would dominate revenue generation and resource allocation on the national stage. As such, the scant attention paid to the concerns and problems facing oil producing communities was a precursor, and has been claimed to have led to 'the emergence of oil-related minority struggles in the 1990s' (Steyn 2009: 252).

In many respects ethnic cultural multiplicity, religious diversity and the birth of socio-economic aspirations, including the evolution of environmental questions in Nigeria is a creature of the politics of amalgamation by British colonialists as far back as 1914 (Muhammad 2007: 212). Adalikwu indicates that since then and with the advent of Nigerian independence in 1960 the political establishment gradually shifted its economic base from an agricultural one, which supported the colonial empire, to one based on oil and gas exploration, which was intended to enhance meaningful development for its people (Adalikwu 2007: 1).

This is not to say that in the pre-independence colonial years under the British, there were no significant efforts to exploit this resource. In fact**,** the forerunner to all this was the Petroleum Act of 1914, which gave an exploration monopoly to two oil companies, Royal Dutch Shell and the British Petroleum Company, (Shell and BP); under a profit sharing agreement between them and the colonial state on fifty–fifty basis (Agbanifo 2002: 5). Under the guise and protection of the colonial empire, other laws were enacted, which enabled unrestricted exploitation of the land. Without much doubt, the colonial endeavour was profit driven, the motives and operation under its privileges did not take long to manifest; while in keeping with their insatiable needs, they reduced the colonized peoples states to relative poverty and underdevelopment, thus creating immense resistance from local populations (Agbanifo 2002: 5). This author also points to the fact that legislative Acts from the British parliament were passed as early as 1914, which proclaimed its sovereign rights over crude oil resources in Nigeria and indeed by 1938, Royal Dutch Shell was in essence guaranteed the entire Nigerian country for the purposes of such exploration (Agbonifo 2002: 5). The years leading up to the 1950's were marked by British commercial

interests gradually shifting their focus from the export of agricultural goods (cash crops), which the colonial economy had been reliant upon - such as industrial raw materials like cocoa, cotton, palm oil and kernels, groundnuts and rubber; that had been the subsistence of foreign private chartered companies and financial institutions (see Online Nigeria- The Colonial Economy, 1860-1960: posted 3/5/2003). By 1956, Shell had drilled its first oil wells in the Delta area (Oloibiri, Afam, Bomu and Ebubu), and it began exporting oil in 1958 (Agbonifo 2002: 5). Steyn also confirms that the first batch of Nigerian crude arrived in Rotterdam, the Netherlands in 1958 (Steyn 2009: 249). Agbanifo further states that such privileges did not end with the colonial departure; in fact these foreign commercial enterprises maintained many of their leases and licenses under the subsequent governments of an independent Nigeria (Agbanifo 2002: 5). Agbanifo contends that in contrast to the attitudes of competing global oil enterprises, who were prepared to offer more equitable terms and conditions to these states; most interesting is the contention by successive Nigerian governments to be irrevocably tied in to these non-negotiable decades long agreements which had been signed between Shell and BP with the colonial authorities (Agbanifo 2002: 6). Steyn also concludes that the dominance by the big two major oil companies would continue to remain a characteristic of the Nigerian oil industry well into the 1990s (Steyn 2009: 249). Agbanifo has also stated that these multinational oil corporations "resorted to exploitation of the people and environment destroying forests, farmlands and constructing overland crude oil pipelines without any regard to the wellbeing and safety of local peoples' rights to life and privacy" (Agbanifo 2002: 6).

In fact, Adalikwu further emphasizes that uncontrolled activities such as "gas flaring, use of worn-out oil pipes, pipe blow outs, oil well/pipe leaks, and numerous oil spillages all of which have contributed to environmental degradation" (Adalikwu 2007: 1). According to Adalikwu this in effect has led to communal tragedies and the deaths of many (Adalikwu 2007:1). She further states that over the past forty-five years national revenues of post-colonial Nigeria have

been comprised of over 90% from oil and gas exploration and production (Adalikwu 2007:3). Jasanoff indicates that this resource, which is predominantly situated in the Niger delta area, has over time due to the structural development of global capitalist enterprise, created and left its mark on political institutions, having a severe impact on environmental issues (Jasanoff 2004: 31). According to Adalikwu, it is no surprise that Nigeria has not been immune from the consequences of its shift from agrarian production in a desire to project its perceived position in the emerging world economy and under the prompting of the international community (Adalikwu 2007: 4). She further indicated that social, political and economic turmoil associated with post colonial governmental administration in Nigeria did not present much difficulty for exploitation by globally based multinational oil corporations (Adalikwu 2007: 4). Obi maintains that the dispossession of people in the Niger delta region was enforced through various legislative Acts' and military decrees. For example, the Petroleum Act/Decree No.51 of 1969, Land Use Act of 1978, and the Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ), Decree of 1978 (Obi 2010: 223). As such, these laws have borne out Nigerian governmental administration intentions to obtain maximum profit through shared agreement between it and the multinational oil corporations (Cole et al 2008: 3).

Nonetheless, another factor in this scheme of events needs to be mentioned; since the 1960s, government practices have tended toward endemic corruption, creating a culture of bribery, dupery and fraud. Nigeria has existed as an independent state for more than 50 years and yet its population has been traumatised by global events and internal strife, some of which have not been of their own making. As Adalikwu points out, the departing colonialists attempted a bold bid to remain relevant and maintain their clutch on the 'goose that lay the golden eggs.' Politically, indirect rule, which was such a success in the northern part of the country as opposed to direct rule, enforced in the south, "power has never been shared equally among the various geo-political groups" (Adalikwu 2007 : 4). In this instance indirect rule refers to the fact that the

colonial administration could rely on the Emir`s, Imams and Sultans of the North to collect taxable revenues on their behalf; whereas in the south they had to engage the participation of themselves and their western educated surrogates. She also maintains that with the British departure the elitist society of the north was handed the reins of the political establishment and in turn authority over the economic resources. Without a doubt, the ethnic composition of Nigeria was a recipe for regional animosity, so it is not surprising that the British colonialists would seek to exploit this through a policy of divide and rule (Adalikwu 2007: 5, U.S. Non-Governmental Delegation Trip Report 1999: 16). Accordingly this complicated societal scenario left the country in an uneasy state of calm. A combination of socio-political, economic, ethnic rivalry, and conflict was bubbling just under the surface. What resulted was an attempt to actualize a drive to recognize the uniqueness of communal self identity and indigenous culture; hence the first coup in January 1966, a second coup in July 1966 and an attempt at succession by a major ethnic group (Igbo) of the south east in 1967 (Adalikwu 2007: 3, Cole et al 2008: 2). In several respects, this trajectory has its origin in 'alienation', 'marginalization' and 'oppression' of minority groups in what is considered the contemporary Niger delta area. It is no wonder that scholars, Adalikwu included, have posited:

> that the processes of globalization have only brought detrimental consequences to the indigenous communities by transforming their cultural, social, moral, economic, and political lives as well as degrading their environment and destroying their means of livelihood (Adalikwu 2007: 6).

Contrasting and compounding such dire assertions are observations from writers like Nwankwo, who mentioned that "in 1990 economic intelligence sources revealed that a total of $2 billion received as petroleum oil exports was not accounted for" (Nwankwo 1994: 153 as cited in Corruption Democracy and Human Rights in West Africa). Adalikwu, has further indicated that the interrelated processes associated with economic globalization has shown its effect on culture, politics, moral and social values and it tended to imply a society without

involvement of the citizenry (Adalikwu 2007: 7). The federal model of centralized governance adopted in Nigeria means that the federal government's presence stipulates its ownership and thus its capacity to allocate revenue to the regions or states, and among its most controversial policy basis is its principle of 'derivation;'

> Under this regime, oil producing states, while receiving only 17% of petroleum revenues under the concept of "derivation", are immensely richer than those that receive only a federally allocated budget and have enjoyed windfall revenues amounting to billions of dollars in recent years (Peacebuild-Conflict Prevention Working Group, 2008:3).

This inequitably perceived revenue distribution policy may have been the root of grievance among the local population, which owing to a failure of environmental protection and governmental neglect has led to the emergence of ethnically motivated political groups such as the Ijaw Youth Council (IYC), the Movement for the Survival of the Ogoni People (MOSOP), Icelanders/Niger Delta Vigilantes, the Outlaws and the Movement for the Emancipation of the Niger Delta (Peacebuild-Conflict Prevention Working Group, 2008: 3-4). It has been suggested that some of these groups may be operating to advance the agenda of some local politicians. Perhaps this might account for why certain individuals residing in these areas, notably the youth have engaged the state by taking up arms and by no small means have contributed to the chaos, confusion and disorderliness which has been witnessed (Saliu et al, 2007: 275).

This is why it has persistently been contended by communal groups of the delta area, that not only are they impoverished as a consequence of the environment being degraded, but that they really derive only minor economic benefits (if any) from oil producing operations (Omotola, 2007: 74). In fact, 'Platts' the energy information, marketing services, research and consulting business of the McGraw-Hill Companies, reported on 31 July 2003 that "during the last 40 years, more than $320 billion worth of crude has been extracted from the Delta, earning huge profits for the government yet its inhabitants are among Nigeria's poorest" (Turner and

Brownhill, 2003: 3). There are some pretty ominous signs- a history of political leadership kleptocracy, government mismanagement characterized by cabal styled nepotistic meritocracy and the absence of any notion of responsive accountability. However, such a culture of national neglect bordering on criminal ineptitude is not essentially unique to Nigeria. To be sure, a significant number of developing nations are captive to the underlying trend which sows, nurtures and ultimately breeds such a profane state of affairs. From within all this chaos arises the audacious signs of an encouraging breath of fresh air, which portends the face of transition from the status quo in many 'developing' countries. It is yet to be seen whether the winds of democratic change towards transparent, accountable and responsive government, currently sweeping across the globe will have much of a meaningful impact in challenging the authority of entrenched state power.

2.2 INSIGHTS FROM THE THEORETICAL LITERATURE

Foucault argued that the exercise of 'power' has its roots 'deep in the social nexus' and is inherent to social existence (Van-Grasdorff 2005: page for the quotes?). Foucault (?) emphasizes that there is really no general theory on power and that its existence and exercise may not necessarily emanate from any given source nor be attributable to any specific institution. He makes a link between power, violence and passivity, indicating that power need not be imposed only from above and that violence, if inflicted on those who are oppressed may produce measures of passiveness in terms of reactions and behaviour (Van-Grasdorff 2005:22). Perceptions of neglect, which may have caused poverty and the lack of a social political voice, may explain why the environmental situation is giving rise to evolving social movements and resistance in the Niger-Delta area. What may be relevant to how this situation evolved is that Foucault has conceptualized that:

> ….there are a number of ways in which the exercise of power can be resisted. He argues at one point that resistance is co-extensive with power, namely as soon as there is a power relation, there is a possibility of

> resistance. If there is no such thing as a society without relations of power, this does not mean that existing power relations cannot be criticized. It is not a question of an 'ontological opposition' between power and resistance, but a matter of quite specific and changing struggles in space and time. There is always the possibility of resistance no matter how oppressive the system.
>
> (O'Farrell, Clare. 2005)

Hence the dynamics at play in the Delta region; of power relation and resistance exists between the government, political participants, multinational oil corporations, the indigenous community, vocal women and youthful dissidents.

Within the context of a society, the term ‘development’ could easily be described as an enigma if not paradox because it literally defies definition. In most respects the term represents a differing status of society situations to different observers, especially to the extent that they classify societies as “developed” or “underdeveloped”; “First World” or “Third World.” According to Crush, from an initial perception the term ‘development’ connotes the up-lifting of human conditions, through the alleviation of poverty and the realization of human potential; it can in another vain be shifted to portray ‘under’ and ‘over’ development or indeed signify ‘good’ and ‘bad development (Crush 1995: 27). In general, most self respecting ‘third world’ national governments, in efforts to elicit legitimacy on the international stage, have tended to tag on the label of ‘development’ to some part of its administrative apparatus or agenda in one form or another.

Following on the heels of the World Commission on Environment and Development report and the United Nations Conference on Environment and Development, a new phrase was coined fittingly for the 1980s and 1990s, which captured the imagination of the time and suffused development discourse – ‘sustainable development.’ Crush states that this phrase has since come into its own, transforming the perception and agenda of global development institutions while affording a platform for international non-governmental environmental participants to expound a vision for the direction and shape of developing countries (Crush 1995:

87). As with ‘development’ the term ‘sustainable development’ is confusing if not contradictory since it is interpreted differently by the various institutional protagonists (i.e the World Bank, the International Monetary Fund (IMF), United Nations Development Fund (UNDP) etc). In the absence of any precise analysis as to its exact meaning, adoption of the phrase and its utility is somewhat vague, though it has become synonymous with concepts centering on eco-development. Crush further refers to the official Brundtland’s definition as ‘development which meets the needs of the present without compromising the ability of future generations to meet their own needs’ (Crush 1995: 88). Simply put, this is the crux of the ideology that is important to so many in the Delta region.

In an approach more closely related to Escobar, however, one could see sustainable development as yet one more way in which international organizations compete to coerce into their spheres’ of power and influence. Crush (1995), Schech (2002a, 2002b), and (Peet 2009) all claim that there have been various possible approaches to power of domination and exploitation, premise of development and assertions on development and environmental conjecture as it relates to the disruption of subsistence livelihood in the Niger delta. In terms of understanding the historical context of development and what it entails, (Escobar 1995) made several interesting observations, but in the main these theories only act to assist in explaining the core perceptions of issues such as sustainable development in linkage with environmental activism.

An overview, (Wolf 1982) almost decisively leads to a conclusion that with this influential publication a radical if not contentious proposition emerged; that history has an important and reflective role when considering politics and development in a global context. His premise inherently emphasized to anthropologists, historians and sociologists that they should reconsider if not recognize the totality of the grand scheme of world events and the civilization process, especially regarding what can be considered transformational development. He appears

to question the hitherto accepted notion which measured communities, peoples, regions and nations as abstract or separate and distinct entities by failing to appreciate that in essence they were interrelated or in fact acted in conjunction with each other. According to Roseberry Wolf`s principal objection seems to be "their failure to confront questions of power and domination, their removal of anthropological subjects from the economic and political processes associated with the making of the modern world" (Roseberry 1983: 41). He linked if not questioned the past five hundred years of civilization and the complex fabric of civil society in cultures encountered including those which subsist in Africa and in this instance Nigeria. He expounded a unique perspective in examining the political transformations that have occurred in the Western world over the past six centuries. Then he tended to connect and relate these transformations with the histories of the 'people without history'– 'the primitives and peasants encountered, analyzed, and objectified by anthropologists (Roseberry 1983: 41). However, the main contribution of this book is to show that non-western people were already involved in commodity production and trade before the arrival of the European.

Wolf argues that what he has tried to do is to explain the world as inter-connected and dynamic in nature rather than as unitary and static. As a result his research can be said to have focused on the constant changes occurring in the various societies, cultures and peoples in an increasingly inter-connected and ever expanding world. He appears to relay some concerns regarding macro studies and historic explanations. Furthermore, he seems to support a Marxist strategy to address the fundamental forces that bring about change and reinforces occurrences such as colonialism, domination and exploitation. He highlights that there is a continuing ongoing process of reconstruction and recreation taking place across the globe. In the past, anthropologists have had a tendency of interpreting if not describing a people or society as having basically static characteristics. It is questionable and may be debatable that this has often been at the heart of unrelenting confrontations of interests by various heterogeneous people

throughout history leading to activism, conflict and resurgence in the demand for income equity and equality among voices of dissent.

Undoubtedly, the dominant European nations made bold efforts to acquire, dominate and exploit foreign lands for their natural resources. This included a quest to exhibit military superiority which led to the colonization of lands on overseas continents. This colonization syndrome ushered in a new world order, and in some respects specifically recognized the British, known for their 'indirect rule' system of administration. They also came to be regarded as perhaps one of the most successful European states' because of their ability to transition towards an economy and polity through recognition of tributary relationships. France, another imperialist power in the colonization of Africa, adopted a mode that came to be referred to as "assimilation". There were other colonial nations namely Belgium, Holland, Germany, Italy, and Portugal who also got in on the colonial enterprise syndrome. With cartographers having split up and drawn new maps and landscapes for Africa, the stage was set for the colonial economic interests of the transnational oil corporations to dominate Africa and Nigeria in particular into the 20th century. What was probably not envisaged at the time were the actions of the major participants and protagonists in this arena, and the effects that would arise in the years to come.

Furthermore, the Europeans, have not been alone in their consumption patterns, theory of capitalism and the means of production. They indeed have been joined by their 'brothers in arms,' who happen to be the descendants of the initial push which resulted in the capitulation of the Americas. This somewhat complicated relationship brings to the fore and encapsulates the essence of Wolfs' notion of inter-co relations. With the emergence of the United States from World War II as a major superpower, it has remained a prominent force in global geopolitics, harnessing and exhibiting numerous capacities which in many respects are unparalleled in history by any nation (Wittkopf et al, 2008:4). However, it can perhaps be decipherable that in

these contemporary times with the use of current economic parameters to determine where vested interests hover, and it is obviously in the activities of various omnipresent multinational corporations. Multinational corporations like Exxon-Mobil and Chevron/Texaco are in the forefront of fostering and furthering the US foreign policy agenda. If the past is right it appears that from the past to the present, US diplomatic and foreign policy aims and objectives rotate around the fulcrum of vested economic interests. These Multi National Enterprises (MNEs) having been playing pivotal roles in shaping modern trends of events and empowering the economies of various Western nations around the globe. It appears that the enormous financial resources at the disposal of transnational corporations increasingly gave them a particularly sturdy vocal position in determining state objectives.

CHAPTER III

"Development is skewed in disfavour of the geographical zone of the Niger-Delta of Nigeria because of public policies that have consistently failed to improve the welfare of the people. Part of the development enigma is orchestrated by the exploitative tendencies of multinational oil companies that have blandly plundered for fossil fuel and thereby truncated the sustainability of the indigenous environment…"

(Culled in part from Jike, 2004).

DEBATING FRACTIOUS QUESTIONS AND ANSWERS

3.1 Nexus of Multinational Oil Corporations (MNOCs) in the Niger-Delta:

Although much in the past two decades has been documented of the Ogoni cause and struggles, in reality they have not been the only casualties of injustice in the Niger-Delta tragedy. According to Jike, (2004) historically, the indigenous population of the Niger-Delta have been the subject of extensive documentation (Coleman 1986 as cited in Jike, 2004: 286). He states that the delta area always presented resistance to European intrusion for over three centuries, and mentions Professor Dikes' (a notable Nigerian historian)- contention identifying the local chieftains as being perhaps the main underlying force for the rejection and exclusion of foreign inroads to the communal areas (Jike, 2004: 687). However, this is not to suggest the prior to the arrival of the Multinational Oil Corporations' there had been no communal resistance to the colonial exploitative infrastructure. The Delta area has always held an intriguing allure to foreigners even before the expectation that crude oil may exist there (Jike, 2004:687). Of the three refineries in the country, (they are owned and operated by the Nigerian state, with joint venture technical maintenance participation of several major Multinational Oil Corporations'- who's primarily objective is oil and gas exploration, production and export); two are located in this area (Port-Harcourt and Warri with the third in Kaduna) (Jike, 2004: 688). Unverifiable indigenous conjecture suggests that activism in the Delta area arose from activities associated with oil prospecting, and more prevalent concerns centered on petroleum exploration, production, and downstream related techno-industrial issues like fires, toxic waste disposal and

spillage. Ancillary to all this are claims regarding adverse effects on the quality of traditional staple diets due to soil infertility, pollution of waterways leading to aquatic life disruption, local customs of land tenure, involving succession and inheritance rights which are affected with the loss of use of productive agricultural and dispossession/displacement of ancestral land when environmental degradation occurs. Numerous instances of oil spillage from the 1980s to 2000s have been documented, in some instances prompting inspection tour delegations from local and international NGOs' including the World Council of Mayors, some of whom have made scathing indictments on the oil companies. This is aside from negative social consequences characterizing the question of sustainable development, which include public health implications of respiratory and other diseases, alcoholism, school truancy and migration to urban centers most notably by the younger generation (Jike, 2004: 689-693). Early settlement patterns in the Delta area were dictated due to the unique geographical location which were determined by the natural terrain and more importantly dry land, these factors apparently defined the contemporary means of livelihood inhabitants; as a consequence any multinational oil corporation seeking to establish or make inroads in the region should have considered what these communities relied upon as their primary livelihood source– farming and fishing (Alabi and Ntukekpo, 2012: 363-364; Eregha and Irughe, 2009: 161).

Some of the multinational oil corporations (MNOCs) operating the petro-business in the Delta area are Shell Petroleum Development Corporation (SPDC), Exxon-Mobil, Chevron-Texaco, British Petroleum, Italy's Agip, France's Elf-Aquitaine and Total, Conoco-Phillips, Ashland Oil and Sunray. However, the three major players are Shell, which recorded success in the late 1950s and controls over 40 percent of production, followed by Exxon-Mobil and Chevron-Texaco, who account next in terms of production. Many other companies began exploration in Nigeria in the 1960s. The larger corporations operate in joint ventures with the Nigerian state through the government owned subsidiary Nigerian National Petroleum

Corporation (NNPC), which has controlling equity participation in the range of 55-60 percent of each joint venture. NNPC operates seven joint venture partnerships with companies, equities and details as listed below:

	Partners	Equity Interest	Operator	No. of OMLs
1	Shell Agip Elf NNPC	30% 5% 10% 55%	Shell	58
2	Mobil NNPC	40% 60%	Mobil	4
3	Chevron NNPC	40% 60%	Chevron	16
4	Agip Philips NNPC	20% 20% 60%	Agip	N/A
5	Elf NNPC	40% 60%	Elf	14
6	Texaco Chevron NNPC	20% 20% 60%	Texaco	6
7	Pan Ocean NNPC	40% 60%	Pan Ocean	1

Six operators of the seven joint venture partners with NNPC (Shell, Mobil, Chevron, Agip, Elf and Texaco) produce about 97% of Nigeria's crude oil. OIL AND GAS: Major Industry Policies. Available at http://www.nipc.gov.ng/venture.html. Date accessed, September 22, 2012.

Hence, it is not difficult to appreciate the federal government's involvement to protect its investment that happens to be the mainstay of the economy as the primary budgetary source, and whose actions on many occasions have appeared heavy handed if not repressive and has been seen to exacerbate conflicts in the region (Alabi and Ntukekpo 2012: 362 and 363; Omeje 2006: 479; U.S. Non-Governmental Delegation Trip Report 1999: 4). Since oil was first struck and discovered in commercially viable quantity it has been over 50 years, and since then Shell lost the sole exploration concession granted to it across the entire country (Alabi and Ntukekpo 2012: 363). The Anglo-Dutch entity known as Shell (SPDC in Nigeria) is a truly international conglomerate and its full name is Royal Dutch Shell Group, and it comprises of over 1,700

companies across the globe including Shell Argentina, Shell South Africa and Shell Petroleum of the USA. It is 60 percent owned by Royal Dutch Group of Holland with 40 percent ownership belonging to Shell Transport and Trading Group of the U.K., they've been working in conjunction since 1903. Aside from SPDC being a substantial oil producer of the parent company Royal Dutch Shell, it has provided in excess of 50 percent of the revenues for successive Nigerian administrations including military dictatorship (Essential Action Group 2001: Part 1; Obi 2009: 471-472).

Although most Multinational Oil Corporations operating in the Delta petro-business claim that they adhere to the strictest international environmental standards, indigenous communities in the area vehemently challenge and dispute this allegation and so too does Human Rights Watch (U.S. Non-Governmental Delegation Trip Report 1999: 4). Coupled with this is a sense of marginalization which local communities claim excludes them from employment opportunities and the benefits of ancillary contracts. Increasing activism since the 1980s saw a deterioration in the relationship between several host communities and MNOCs operating in these areas. Demonstrations and protests around oil terminals and other facilities became a fairly frequent sight. As the clamour grew louder, sporadic attacks began occurring against several oil installations, including the kidnapping of personnel (Alabi and Ntukekpo 2012: 362; Omeje 2006: 477 and 478). As indicated by Omoje (2006), these obstructionist activities escalated and prompted some notable scholars to label it as petro-violence. As the 1990s wore on, the seemingly low profile security measures previously embarked upon (perimeter fencing and unarmed police patrols) appeared inadequate, and in attempts to redress rising incidence of violence several multinational oil corporations with onshore/near-shore operations resorted to recruiting youth volunteers from the communities as contract security personnel. This is in contrast to multinational oil corporations operating strictly offshore which rarely reported disruptions on such a scale (Omeje 2006: 477, 481 and 483- see Apendix II: Table 2. In any

event, some multinational oil corporations have provided compensation to several affected communities for hazardous environmental contamination arising from their actions in attempts to subdue the volatile nature of the situation, but as Frynas (2001) indicates according to Omotola this has been criticized for being below generally accepted international rates (Omotola, 2007: 75). The World Business Council for Sustainable Development (WBCSD) has stated that it believes the actions and policies of multinational oil corporations in the area have been the source for much of the turbulence being witnessed (Alabi and Ntukekpo 2012: 364). The oil and petro-business in the Delta utilizes less than 5 percent of the terrain yet it is precisely this that constitutes a fundamental problem, these coastal areas are swamps or waterlogged with over 70 percent of inhabitants residing on the water or on the water front (many homes in the area are/have been designed and built on stilts). Relying on 2006 UNDP Report statistics, there are more than 7,000 kilometers of pipelines with some 250 flow stations being operated by at least a dozen oil corporations (Eregha and Irughe 2009: 163- see Appendix III Table 3). Scores of oil spills per year are not uncommon and at least 2,000 sites have been noted as being contaminated according to statistics released by the National Oil Spill Detection and Response Agency (Amnesty International Report 2009: 2). The government-operated Department of Petroleum Resources (DPR) indicated that from 1976 to 1996 there were some 4,647 incidents in the oil sector resulting in the spillage of an estimated 2,369,470 barrels of crude oil (Ebiede 2010: 141). Such staggering data, despite the increasing occasions of crude oil bunkering and theft in the 2000s, prompted Shell (SPDC) to state that between 2003 and 2007 approximately 70 percent of spillage incidents were as a result of sabotage with corrosion or equipment malfunction and human error among other causes accounting for about 30 percent (Ebiede 2010: 142). It has been estimated that, on average, at least three major spills occur each month. In the first quarter of 1997, Shell was attributed 35 incidents and in one instance it was reported that over 800,000 barrels of crude had leaked over a period of several months. MNOCs assert that they are not

responsible for or mandated to compensate or clean up spills under the law caused by sabotage, but even in the absence of sabotage a risk of oil induced fires from pipelines exists. In 1998 a leaking pipe resulted in an explosion and a death toll estimated at between 700-1,000 people (U.S. Non-Governmental Delegation Trip Report 1999: 6; Eregha and Irughe 2009: 165)

3.2 POLITICS, POVERTY AND DYSFUNCTIONAL SOCIAL DEVELOPMENT

Since independence in 1960, the country's political landscape had been traditionally dominated by the three major ethnic groups (Igbo, Hausa-Fulani and Yoruba with their various splintered dialects), but the discovery of commercially viable oil in minority controlled areas that became the life-line of the country raised questions about its strategic, economic and political role in the status quo of historical authority. The dynamics of these ethno-cultural allegiances, a throwback to the pre and post colonial hegemony were characterized by capital accumulation and dictated resource distribution as the basis of policies and legislation relating to the oil sector, and this in turn fostered a pervasive nature of patron-client largess and networks; geared towards optimum returns for the state and its corporate allies- mainly to the detriment of indigenous communities, their environment, security and sustainable development (Idemudia and Ite 2006: 393-394, Omeje 2006: 478, also see Oluwaniyi 2010: 317. See Appendix IV: Table 4).

Indeed the WBCSD relates corporate social responsibility (CSR) to a "commitment by business to behave ethically and contribute to economic development while improving the quality of life of the workforce and the families as well as the social community" (Alabi and Ntukekpo 2012: 366). The issue of sustainable development cannot be over emphasized because apart from it being integral to the health and well being of the people (present and future), the international push projected by the Millennium Development Goal was to enhance a sustainable environment through a reduction in degradation (Eregha and Irughe 2009: 161). The incessant call for resource control by the minority ethnic groups of the Delta had been somewhat

innocuous, but it is perhaps the decades of political marginalization and neglect by the political establishment and government coupled with the moral ineptitude of MNOCs operating in the region who have failed to exercise CSR and infuse a reasonable concept of sustainable development, that underlies the endemic poverty occurring (Alabi and Ntukekpo 2012: 364-366 and table at 167; Idemudia and Ite 2006: 391). This region riddled with innumerable canals, creeks, streams and rivers including the River Niger ultimately drain into the Atlantic; yet even mainland areas are susceptible to flooding. The reference to poverty and its accompanying social disruptions serves a unique purpose and extrapolates certain specific features, the assertion made by George 2004 and supported by the Niger Delta Development Commission (NDDC) is that poverty levels in the area are above the national average – typified by the fact that being situated in the vicinity of an oil facility inhabitants feel constantly under the scrutiny of state security personnel; they experience some degree of paranoia due to endemic poverty surrounding over 90 percent of them; they can only rely on a poor infrastructural network; their options make them reliant on unpredictable water sources provided by MNOCs; the community education system which is lacking basic amenities essentially is responsible for school dropouts leading to a lack prospects for employment in the petro-businesses within their communal sphere; and that means that their traditional means of livelihood have been severely compromised (Alabi and Ntukekpo 2012: 364; also see tables on unemployment & poverty Eregha and Irughe 2009 at 167-169 in Appendix V Table 5)

Basic analyses of poverty, coupled with social development indices, portray an abysmal picture. Based on the UNDP (2006) Niger Delta Human Development Report, while the human development index (HDI) for the region ranks somewhat above the national average, it observed lower levels of poverty within communal areas where no oil facilities were located and noted the contrast of these rates when compared to two other oil producing nations (Indonesia and Venezuela). This disparity of the HDI on the national level is apparently explainable by regional

poverty trends which show the north having higher rates than the south; indeed numerous reports have narrated the extent of deprivation in the region including the World Bank in 1995 which noted the lack of educational opportunities with the cost of living and poverty levels transcending the national average (Oviasuyi and Uwadiae 2010: 118-120 see table at 118 & 119 in Appendix VI: Table 6a & b). When the above mentioned conditions are juxtaposed with other social issues, we observe an erosion of the fabric in many communities which manifests in several forms; increasing incidences of juvenile delinquency, violent youth robberies, prostitution and unwanted pregnancies (Jike 2004: 696; Shah 2004: 2). Of particular criticism regarding teenage/young and other women has to be the proliferation and disintegration of core moral values that due to depravity and the dire economic conditions have resorted to the sex trade, with much of their actions centering on the irresponsible behaviour of expatriate employees in the oil industry. There are innumerable accounts of such personnel patronizing prostitutes and their activities are widespread in the host communities, they have also developed a dubious reputation for rape, degrading violence and the fathering of unwanted children who are frequently abandoned (U.S. Non-Governmental Delegation Trip Report 1999: 10; Shah 2004: 2). In addition to this is the recognition of a somewhat corrosive element on the traditional matrimonial institution where it has been alleged that a tenuous situation has been developing with wives abandoning their husbands and marriages in pursuit of younger expatriate workers because of the obvious financial income gap that exists, hence it should come as no surprise that divorce rates among younger couples in the area are on the rise (Jike 2004: 697). Final points worth mentioning in this section are the political dimensions to these complications which pertain to accountability, corruption and mismanagement which were pervasive and seemingly flourished under successive administrations of the Nigerian state at the various levels of government. At the state and local government levels, oil revenues generated towards budgetary spending in the Delta region have not been appropriately utilized for social projects and

development, instead it has sourced unimaginable wealth accumulation for the political leadership and public officials, who usurped these funds to sustain their position, enhance patronage affiliations and augment political party alliances and patrimonial networks. This has supported what could be termed 'the corruption thesis' borne out by corruption and money laundering charges leveled against and resulting in the prosecution of several previous governors. The scope of such corrupt practices at the local government level was recognized by Human Rights Watch in a 2007 report which indicated that the inadequate resource allocation arising from imprecise budgeting and implementation while failing to prioritize basic needs, provides a forum for the stealing of public funds, mismanagement and corruption resulting in severe consequences for community development (Ebiede 2010: 145-146). This corrupt influence was accompanied by outrageous levels of violence brought about by criminal disposition and impunity to prevent any threat to the underlying power structure (Cole et al 2008: 4 and 7).

3.3 REGIONAL ACTIVISM, STATE ACTIONS AND THE HUMAN RIGHTS DEBACLE

In many respects, things started to fall apart in the 1980s, and were marked by the unravelling of the hitherto casual coalition that existed between the ethnic minorities of the Delta area and the Nigerian government (Omotola 2009: 129; Idemudia and Ite 2006: 391). The Movement for the Survival of Ogoni People (MOSOP) was one of the initial minority resistance groups, and instrumental to the Ogoni insurrection which demanded environmental protection and social justice. This insurrection was undoubtedly a turning point in the history of resistance in the Delta region (Ebiede 2011: 143; Obi 2009 475-476; Omotola 2009: 134-135). The grievances of many Delta communities were predicated around the usual issues: an absence of social development and infrastructure, lack of employment prospects and a call for greater

resource control among others (Oluwaniyi 2010: 314-319). In the aftermath of this social compact collapse over the years, what was witnessed was the emergence of militant groups, their birth though unclear or exactly why had its basis rooted in local ethnic frustrations. However, the darker side to some of these groups was a criminal element engaging in "sabotage of oil infrastructure, large scale theft of oil and abuses of human rights including kidnapping and killing including of oil workers" (Amnesty International 2009: 3). The cycle of violence and insecurity appeared to be escalating, typified by government crackdowns and tactics involving the deployment of heavily armed members of the state security apparatus (military and police), resulting in allegations of brutality, destruction of personal property, extrajudicial killings, arbitrary detentions, torture and other human rights violations (Amnesty International 2009: 3; Omotola 2009: 137). In reality, the dichotomy between those who have and the have not's was portrayed as a stark contradiction in the wake of the Gulf conflict in 1991, which lead to global oil shortages and a spike in oil prices where revenue amounting to approximately $ 12 billion from oil sales went missing or was lost in transition and as yet been accounted for (Essential Action Group 2001: Part 3).

Apparently to multinational oil corporations and the government the unfolding situation of activism, dissent and militancy represented an existential crisis in the making, to this end the major multinational oil corporations and the government stepped up efforts to suppress what they regarded as criminal acts if not subversive terrorist activities; to this achieve goal the Joint Military Task Force (JTF) was established and a gradual militarization began within the area (Oluwaniyi 2010: 321; Ebiede 2011: 147). In particular, the government and Shell admit to the multinational oil corporations contribution to military funding in the Delta under the guise of protection. Human Rights Watch in 1995 reported that an estimated 2,000 people had been murdered with suspicion falling on the Rivers State Internal Security Task Force in collaboration with the 'Shell Spy Police'. Shell has admitted that on at least two occasions it funded military

excursions into specified local communities, and each of these operations resulted in the deaths of inhabitants; further, the multinational oil corporations also conceded to purchasing munitions for local police operatives responsible for guarding its installations in one of the Delta states (Rivers state) alone (Essential Action Group 2001: Part 2). An analysis of the data elaborates a compelling story: In 1990 Shell made an official request for a military presence to protect one of its facilities from non-violent demonstrators and protestors from an adjoining community, although Shell couldn't have known at the time this act was a precursor to a spate of rampant violent clashes and an increase in militancy from several homogenous ethnic groups in the area like the Ekwerre, Ijaw, Ogbia, Oyigba and Ogoni. In one incident in 1990, about 80 people were reportedly killed in a clash with a local community in close proximity to one of Shell's facilities arising from a peaceful demonstration, where it is claimed that homes and crops also destroyed. Other incidents were reported in the Ogoni environs in 1993 and 1994 involving peaceful demonstrators objecting to the acquisition and damage of farmland for pipeline installation, which resulted in the military government sending a permanent occupation force into the area (Essential Action Group 2001: Part 2 - 3). On other occasions, multinational oil corporations have been accused of acquiring arable farm land to enhance their facilities and production without payment of adequate compensation, which in turn fuels corporate-community conflict (Idemudia and Ite 2006: 400).

The extent of state repression in response to activism within the Delta communities markedly intensified as the 1990s wore on. Public gatherings and demonstrations were banned, agitation for greater autonomy and disruption at oil facilities was criminalized and labeled as treason attracting the death penalty. These draconian measures bizarrely led to inter communal strife between hitherto peaceful neighbours (Andonis, Ogonis and Okirikas), which reportedly left over 1,000 dead with about 30,000 homeless (Omotola 2009: 139). By the late 1990s in several Ijaw communities of the Delta under the auspices of the Ijaw Youth Council (IYC), a

loose confederation of youth associations signaled its intention to defy the government through the ‘Kaiama Declaration’ thus upping the ante for a confrontation with the state. The means and manner of state response were swift and brutal. They extensively deployed to the areas armoured personnel carriers, artillery, tanks, amphibious attack craft and warships, with several hundred assault and combat troops; what ensued was nothing short of mayhem – deserted and destroyed communities with tales of assault, death, rape, extortion and harassment. Another instance in 1999 state security personnel reportedly acted as if on a vengeance mission over the murders of a dozen peacekeeping policemen by indigenous militants, here the deployment was described as the largest troop mobilization since the Nigerian civil war; resulting in the locality of Odi being leveled with thousands killed, injured and displaced (Ibid: 139 and 140). The situation is further compounded by allegations of the state in collusion with multinational oil corporations attempting to breed discord, discontent and unrest among various communities, which is an intriguing all be it subtle propagation of divide and rule in its purest form; especially in view of historical ethnic animosity. Shell, for instance, is alleged to have implemented a controversial ‘sit at home allowance’ to selected youth in certain areas, where instead of providing gainful employment prospects these youth are given a monthly payout equivalent to N1,000 per day to stay at home and not disrupt its facilities or harass staff. The utilization of this stipend for counterproductive schemes including alcohol use and womanizing has been a source of major clashes with youth in neighbouring communities who resent the inequality and being denied such benefits (Oluwaniyi 2010: 317). Other multinational oil corporations are also implicated in similar dubious tactics, for instance in 1999 Elf Oil allegedly hired more than three dozen youths to forcefully disrupt a demonstration by some 5,000 women with an inducement of N2,000 for each participant; similarly earlier in the year in the first three weeks of July after being denied permission to drill in Epubu communal lands, Nigeria Agip Oil is alleged to have recruited persons from adjoining communities to attack the community which resulted in three deaths, the

kidnapping of a pregnant woman and two others with many people injured, the perpetrators were identified by the boats used which they recognized as belonging to the Agip Oil facility located nearby (U.S. Non-Governmental Delegation Trip Report 1999: 16). Indeed, Human Rights Watch concluded that multinational oil corporations are "complicit in abuses committed by the Nigerian military and police" (Shah 2004: 1). The women caught up in this chaos have had no option other than to congregate at night under disguise for fear of harassment and being brutalised. Without much doubt, the Task Force occupation has created a scenario of fear, intimidation, persistent surveillance and the anxiety of forcefulness especially with the intensification of military presence in 1997/98 (Essential Action Group 2001: Part 2).

CHAPTER IV

"…we confront these deadly enemies with the only weapon which they lack: TRUTH….we would have to be ready to suffer arrest, detention, imprisonment and death, as the only alternative to the struggle is extinction…" Ken Saro-Wiwa – one year before his execution."

(culled from 'Oil for Nothing,' A US Non-Governmental Delegation Trip Report 1999:2)

A STRUGGLE OF INDIGENOUS PEOPLE-BACKGROUND

4.1 Youth Restiveness, Rebellion and Violence:

After the initial exploration exercise, the first oil was drilled in Oloibiri in what is present day Bayelsa State, in 1956 (Agbanifo, 2002: 5; Uwadiae 2010: 110 & 111; Eregha and Irughe 2009: 1). From then and hence forth it is conceivable that the brand of federalism in Nigeria changed from true federalism to the skewered version that now exists, and oil companies for years operated without any serious regard for the environment. It is no wonder that casual conversation and conventional wisdom assert that the multinational oil corporations' were aided by the Federal Government who received enormous tax revenues, but did little to nothing in ensuring compliance with environmental and safety regulations of international standards.

One of the first attempts at articulating a struggle for the Niger delta was the Major Isaac Adaka Boro and others who led a separatist attempt to break from Nigeria in 1966, asking for more control over the oil resources (Omotola 2007:74). That flame was quickly put out but little did the Nigerian state know they could not stem the tide. For many years, oil companies made huge profits and the Nigerian Government became wealthier, yet the bulk of these financial resources were used to develop, first Lagos, then Abuja and other regions/states neglecting the key states/communities that produced the wealth. It was only a matter of time before they became aggrieved.

From the 1980s, indigenous communities increasingly began to have conflicts with the oil companies over land rights and compensations for environmental degradation, they also

initiated conflict with the federal government over land issues which became tagged ‘resource control’. In addition, there was the question of internal conflict between neighbouring communities, as communities claimed areas where oil facilities and benefits were sited (e.g. Urhobo/Itsekiri in Warri, Odimodi/Ogulagha, etc). In fact, the 1980s and early 1990s saw a lot of such strife. The Niger delta had woken up from their repressive slumber. The early 1990s saw the prominence of the “Movement for the Survival of Ogoni People (MOSOP)” and other non-violent protests for resource control. This period was marked as a time that issues concerning the Niger-Delta were being articulated with an intellectual flavour by inhabitants from the Niger-Delta region, as opposed to other parts of the country (Inokoba and Imbua 2010:108-109). It was also the beginning of restiveness for youths of the Niger delta. Objective consensus appears to conclude that one of the major underlying causes of the unbelievable if not unconscionable levels of corruption and lack of transparency and concern for the situation in the Niger delta is its political leadership. It is noteworthy to mention that the region is notorious for electoral fraud and violence due to its combative and violent nature of political competition, which utilizes all means necessary to seek political power. Politicians have been alleged to engage and arm local unemployed and restive youths many of whom are suspected gang members to ensure the desired voting outcome (Inokoba and Imbua 2010:110). Other festering issues manifesting among the delta youths is the perceived blatant injustice associated with asymmetric power relations that “have placed the destiny of the Niger Delta people in the hands of the major ethnic groups who control the state,” the disproportionate development projects undertaken such as bridges, road networks and infrastructure had borne out the realization that the Nigerian nation (through secret deals if not effective recolonization) was essentially short-changing them; which deprived them of equal “opportunity for growth, development and progress.” Hence, they began organising themselves and agitating for their rights (Inokoba and Imbua 2010:106-109). The 1990s were certainly pivotal because as MOSOP began to attract public and international attention to the

plight of the Niger-Delta people, the Nigerian government became more repressive. And the 1990s became synonymous with several uprisings in the communities in the Niger-Delta which were ruthlessly subdued by the Nigerian state, including but not limited to the execution of Ken Saro-Wiwa (Inokoba and Imbua 2010:112). For all intents and purposes, over the years the Federal Government has embarked on several initiatives (ministerial departments or agencies) to project an impression of major concern for the plight and experience of the indigenous people in the region. The results however, have fallen short of the mark in many respects. Several of these measures adopted and/or implemented, which started with the Niger Delta Development Board (NDDB) in 1961 and later transformed into the Niger Delta Basin Development Authority (NDBDA) in 1976 to, the so called one and half per cent Committee, the Oil Minerals Producing Areas Development Commission (OMPADEC) under the Babangida regime that initiated the Petroleum Trust Fund (PTF) and ultimately led to today's Niger Delta Development Commission (NDDC), in general most of these initiatives were colossal failures and ended in inadequacies' failing to address the developmental needs of the people ***(*** Inokoba and Imbua 2010:111***).***

In the 1990s through 2000s, there were several developments in the region which were First, the Niger-Delta Development Commission was set up to help redress the decades of neglect suffered by the region. It was run by member states with the idea that its intervention when added to the federal and state governments and the corporate social responsibility of the oil companies will bring development closer to the people of the Niger-Delta. The 2000s also saw the youth restiveness in the region reach unprecedented heights. The employment and poverty rates began to bite in the region and soon the youth began to indulge in kidnapping and 'oil bunkering' as a way out. Heavily armed youths would seize an oil facility, kidnap expatriates and ask for a huge ransom. As the 'business' became more lucrative, the more daring they became. By the year 2007, many of these armed groups had taken over the landscape of the Niger delta (Shirbon, 2007: 1). Incidentally, most of the armed groups were really not fighting

for the Niger-Delta cause including the “Movement for the Emancipation of the Niger-Delta (MEND)” and to a much lesser extent, the “Niger-Delta Volunteer Force (NDVF).” Many of these groups have indicated a desire to perpetuate such and other desperate tactics for the foreseeable future, to accomplish the aim of terrorizing the oil companies out of the delta region and effectively disrupting Nigeria’s crude oil exporting reputation on the world stage (Shirbon, 2007:1).

It is debatable whether a majority of the groups have any larger ideology or cause. It appears to be simply about their individual or collective economic benefit; and bunkering was the main stay. The result was the turf wars that engulfed the region and in some cases obliterated whole villages and towns, rendering their fellow villagers “internally displaced persons”. In 2007, the federal government under the Yar’Adua presidency set about bringing an end to the violence in the Niger-Delta by taking two actions. The first was to begin the process of disarming the young men in the Niger-Delta and finding them an alternative means of livelihood. The federal government also set up the full ministry of Niger-Delta to enable the federal government to bring about even more assistance to the people.

4.2 The Current Situation:

Since 2010, several reports have been published. On an annual basis, the Oil majors’ – Shell, Chevron and Mobil publish annual reports and separate corporate social responsibility reports. The United Nations Environment Programme (UNEP) also came out with a report that examined the claims of spillages in Ogoni that had occurred in the area and an assessment of what Shell Petroleum Development has been doing to clean up, and whether it was adequate. It also discussed the impact of the spillages on ground water supplies and soil quality.

Regarding the environment, a cursory look at all the reports show that there have been quite a few spillages which have affected farmlands and fisheries. As usual, spillages destroy the

vegetation and agricultural lands by contaminating the ground water and soil thereby destroying crops and aquaculture, and the mangrove and freshwater swamps environment. But the causes of the spillages are what have been contentious.

The oil companies generally agree that burst well-heads and pipelines do damage to farms and vegetation. But the oil companies contend that criminal damage also contributes greatly. As earlier stated in chapter 3.3, bunkering and sabotage of oil pipelines has been on the increase and is currently a serious threat to the economy of the Nigerian state. How does this work? The pipelines are damaged by the youth and crude oil is extracted from it. They fill up barges and then take it out to sell speedily on the black market to crude oil traders. This operation is extremely dangerous as there have been huge fires and sometimes lives have been claimed. But in their assessment, the financial benefits far outweigh the dangers to the participants. Unfortunately, these financial gains, rather than being put to good use, have been used for a proliferation of arms in the region. It is these arms that have been used both in the turf battles and the battle against the state in the last couple of years. It is in recognition of the sheer amount of arms in the Niger-Delta, that the federal government under Yar'Adua offered an amnesty and the exchange of arms for money and education (Saliu et al 2007: 275, Nigeria Daily News Saturday, June 27, 2009 - Okey Muogbo, Donald Ojogo & Bolaji Ogundele, Global Security.org 2011: 1st paragraph, also see News Source Chanels Television News Nigeria-April 3rd, 2008: 7th paragraph). Whether that strategy was the best option may well be a subject for further discussion at another point.

Militant activists and the people who live in the Niger-Delta tend to play down the role of pipeline vandalism, but in all truth it has become so excessively rampant, that the inhabitants of the Delta must find ways of dealing with this. It appears absurdly counterproductive to continuously damage pipelines in your 'neighbourhood' for pecuniary profits, and then turn

around and attempts to blame the foreign oil industry. For instance, when pipelines are damaged, they go unnoticed by the oil companies for days in which time their contents would have seeped in to the soil and done the damage to the environment. Also the sheer number of pipelines criss-crossing the Niger-Delta means that pipeline damage is a serious issue and should be addressed and tackled properly.

However, pipeline damage as serious as it is, does not distract from the fact that many of the pipelines are ageing which means corrosion of pipes, tanks and the rupturing or leaking of these is a serious problem. They also take a significant amount of time to repair, thereby compounding the issue. In addition there have been numerous instances of burst well heads and offshore spills. In all, the question remains whether the standard of care used in the operations of the oil companies is of international standard and whether the duty of care is exercised in the clean-up operations. So far the impact of the clean up exercises is generally adjudged to be poor and not leading to environmental restoration especially as sometimes there is delay in tackling the problem.

Following on the heels of spills, is the burning issue of natural gas flaring. A few years ago, flaring in Nigeria was said to have been amongst the highest compared to any part of the world (Brownhill and Turner 2006: 1). Apparently, flaring made it possible for the oil companies to separate commercially viable associated gas from the oil. Of major concern here is claim being leveled that this flaring also releases extremely dangerous toxins to the air/environment that cause acid rain and global warming amongst others, all of which are harmful to the environment (Brownhill and Turner 2006: 1) The evolving international trend is for flaring to be stopped or at least curtailed. But in Nigeria, it still portrays an endemic problem that needs to be tackled. From a commercially viable stand point, it is not only, a waste as the gas can be properly harnessed and used for other purposes, it is also a danger to the environment as previously stated.

The Nigerian government has attempted to provide appropriate regulations but unfortunately, the enforcement mechanism is rather weak and the practice still continues unabated. Regulatory bodies must improve their record on legislative compliance.

Perhaps the greatest tragedy the Niger-Delta has suffered is in terms of how the conflict has affected the lives of the young people in the region. The Nigerian state failed to take a firm hand over the youth restiveness, which initially started as mere agitation for rights and against unemployment. The military regimes' repressiveness tactics quite simply instilled in the male youth a culture of defiance that they needed to be tougher and perhaps they toughened up. It started with seizing oil installations and then graduated to kidnapping of expatriates, and later bunkering (again see News Source Chanels Television News Nigeria-April 3rd, 2008: 7th paragraph).

Militants from the Movement for the Emancipation of the Niger Delta patrolling the delta. Photographs by Michael Kamber. Also on VF.com: Michael Kamber's photographs from Nigeria.
http://www.vanityfair.com/politics/features/2007/02/junger200702

Suddenly the region had developed an indigenous economy all of its own, and the federal Nigerian state began to lose not only revenue but may have been confronted if not threatened with international ridicule arising from a crises of legitimacy. What made matters worse, bunkering and kidnapping brought with it criminal gangs who were not fighting any great cause but were rather lining their pockets by illegal means. The region suddenly became a theatre of

war where various criminal warlords fought for control of turfs, and where sophisticated arms and weaponry were tested. The word “militancy” became a common part of daily language.

In this conflict theatre of war, each side recruited more foot soldiers from the local communities and soon most young men in the communities had dropped out of school and had joined the gangs. It was certainly more profitable for them to do so as they saw the benefits of bunkering. As time went by, younger and younger boys were being recruited and the dropout rate for boys in schools had become alarming. In the towns and villages, lawlessness became the order of the day and it was not uncommon to see that guns were now used to settle common disputes. This lawlessness eroded the respect for elders, which had hitherto made for order in the society. Another development during this period was the deployment of joint military task forces to patrol and enforce security of the creeks, thereby militarizing the region. The Federal Government needed to protect its golden egg so at the end of the day, the communities were worse off as the death tolls were rising steadily and most of it involved young vibrant men.

Today, the Niger-Delta has a crisis on its hands as it is trying to disarm, rehabilitate and educate its young men. The Federal Government has fashioned out what can only be seen as an imperfect amnesty programme. It is imperfect because those who did not join the gangs are now at a disadvantage as there is no programme to deal with their unemployment problems. Also, the program emphasizes monetary payments and it is unclear if it is sustainable. Be that as it may, there is some motion towards demilitarization of the boys. What remains a challenge is how to refocus the young men on education and away from the deprived and non-chalant lifestyle. Bunkering has been so profitable, especially for the younger boys (boys as young as 13yrs old), they had never imagined that from their status in life, they could ever generate such income.

For the female youth and teenage girls, quite a few dropped out of school to join their male counterparts in the camps as their ‘women’ and thus indulging in the affluent lifestyle but

there are others who are violated when the gangs clash at each other's camps or communities. The resultant increase in school drop-outs, teenage pregnancies and sexually transmitted diseases are problems that the region is still trying to contend with. Unfortunately, the kind of money being thrown at the amnesty program excludes this category of victims because they did not carry physical arms. In all, the amnesty program has helped to calm some of the restiveness in the region, but will it be sustained? There are still some kidnapping going on but now it is directed at local people and is not restricted to workers in the oil industry and so issues of security still exist that need to be tackled.

4.3 Effects on the Female Population:

The women in the Niger-Delta, who have historically been at the forefront of the demand for autonomy and control of resources, have been greatly affected by turmoil in the region. Women play a critical role in the region's economy especially in rural communities where they are the producers of food. Women also constitute a majority of the poor. When the environment is polluted, women tend to suffer more as not only do they lose their farmlands but they also have to travel further to get water for their domestic chores.

From the 1980s, women in the Niger-Delta started organising protests against the oil companies for environmental degradation, lack of development and the lack of local community participation. In 1986, the women of Finima in Bonny Island shut down Shell's operations, blocking their helipad in their bid to win compensation for the destruction of their land. In 1999 and 2002, women near Chevron's installations in Delta State were killed by the Nigerian military while protesting against the oil company at its Escravos facility. The women were demanding jobs for their sons, brothers, and husbands; investment in local infrastructure and clean up of the environmental damage done by Chevron. The 2002 female protesters blocked the rig for an

unprecedented 10 days, stopping production. In September 2011, the Gbaramatu women again occupied the Chevron facility to protest against broken promises .

There are other ways in which women have been impacted by the turmoil in the region. Women feel the burden of internal displacement that arises from all the violence in the region. When communities are destroyed, women not only lose their goods and shops but in many cases they suffer physical, psychological and emotional trauma. As the troops or militias move into towns, women have suffered sexual abuse and sexual violence.

Women protest at a ChevronTexaco flow station in the Niger Delta (Photo: AFP)
Source: http://worldpress.org/Africa/725.cfm

Women are also impacted because they suffered directly by the loss of their sons, brothers and husbands who were tortured, maimed, or killed, sometimes in their presence. They are therefore important to the peace building and conflict efforts all over the region. Unfortunately in trying to fashion out solutions for the Niger-Delta, the issue of internally displaced people and issues affecting women is never quite dealt with. Ultimately, what the Niger-Delta cries for are justice, development, transparency and good governance. A well planned integrated remediation is what is therefore required. (on the issues above: see Tax et al 1995, The Guardian (independent), Lagos, Nigeria, July 24, 2002)

CHAPTER V

CONCLUSION

Conjecture and Dialectic Expressions in the Niger-Delta – The 1990s' and Beyond:

Turmoil, violence and destruction have ruptured the social fabric of many Delta communities. Despite claims to the contrary, the host communities charge that the oil multinationals are not doing enough in terms of fostering community development. As such there is an acrimonious atmosphere existing, and it is a challenge to bring about peace and reduce tension. It can be argued that the oil multinationals can take the first step to restore some calm by engaging in corporate social responsibility projects. On the other hand, if the government should act in a manner, which indicates concern and understanding for the plight of host communities it could restore some semblance of law and order . The cause of much of the grievance is well known and there are means to alleviate them. If these two parties act in concert in addressing environmental damage, equitable resource allocation and meaningful social development projects, much of the perceived neglect being charged could be muted. Such actions if actively involving local participation in the decision making process would recognize the sensitivity that oil and gas will run out one day; if oil and gas runs out, what happens to the land? What happens to their livelihood and how do they and future generations survive?

This brings us to consider the role of the indigenous people on the political front; their leaders need to be more accountable and responsive because their practices to date have not necessarily been more liberating or virtuous than the oil multinationals. On the other hand, the militant elements need to be discouraged from criminal acts of vandalism and destruction, and the Federal Government Amnesty program is a welcome first step.

Following in the wake of the Millennium Development objectives, 'think tanks' and policy decision makers have repeatedly emphasized concepts behind cliché phrases such as 'sustainable development' and 'corporate social responsibility' which are not necessarily

exclusive of each other, and hold special significance for the Niger-Delta region. For all intents and purposes, the grievances expressed and its spin-off effects enunciated in the preceding parts of this paper is predicated not only upon corporate marginalization, a lack of political participation, inadequate educational resources and employment opportunities, but also on the absence of an adequate forum to articulate legitimate concerns and demands about the trajectory of present and future development in the petro-industry. There appears no general consensus among inhabitants of the Delta region about: environmental devastation, pollution, social security, communal health and safety– predicated on sustainable development models and corporate social responsibility. This especially is emphasized by the direction such initiatives should take to positively impact the lives and livelihood of the indigenous people.

There has been intense criticism over the manner of neglect for the environment, health and safety of surrounding communities by the multinationals and the Nigerian state; in fact the International Herald Tribune reported on a 2004 study titled 'Peace and Security in the Niger Delta' and noted several observations including assertions that Shell's presence in the region has contributed to increased violence (claiming some 1,000 lives annually – roughly equivalent to the carnage in Colombia and Chechnya), environmental degradation, institutionalized systemic corruption and is epitomized by its utilization of the state security apparatus. (Shah 2004: 3). Indeed many studies attempting to correlate the link between the environmental impact of the petro-business and socio-economic consequences have been lacking in depth if not inconclusive; that aside the dynamics involved in such situations actually reflect some of the pessimistic impacts industrial advancement can have in developing economies (Eregha and Irughe 2009: 161). To put into context the notion of 'sustainable development,' we need to go back some 25 years to 1987 when the term was coined at the World Commission on Environment and Development (Brundtland Commission), and it is imperative to recognise where this is coming from. The international dimension to the social and environmental situation has been introduced

by writers like Escobar, who emphasized that a sustainable development-oriented corporation are those that contribute 'to sustainable development by delivering simultaneously economic, social and environmental benefits' (Escobar 2011: 39). The government should ensure that the oil multinational codes should reflect international environmental standard.

Over the years subsequent governments in response to the social turbulence generally agitating the struggle for good governance of the environmental sector in the Delta, have instituted gestures mainly in the form of development agencies. The purpose of this agencies was to increase financial allocations to the area- as far back as 1961, with the Niger-Delta development board, through the oil and mineral producing area development commission (OMPADEC) of 1992 (Omotola 2007: 74). More recently in 1999, the Nigerian Presidency sent a bill to the National assembly for the establishment of Niger Delta Development Commission (NDDC), and from the outset this policy decision was severely attacked particularly from people of the delta region for a lack of consultation. In any event, it was shoved through and passed in 2000. Its major provisions stipulated for the formation of guidelines and policy to assist in developing the Niger-Delta. Though somewhat ambiguous in its details, this legislation provided for several sources for the commissions' funding including approximately 15% in statutory allocation to the members states from the federation account. Further, a 3% levy was placed on the onshore and offshore operations of the oil companies. The drawback however, was a lack of accountability and oversight within this process, even though 'so called' mechanisms were in place to address these issues (Omotola, 2007: 80-81, see table below).

Table 1: Sectoral Summaries of Projects Executed by the NDDC in 2002 and 2003 (NDDC 2004b)

Project type	**2002 projects**	**2003 projects**	**Completed projects**	**Commissionable projects**	**Commissioned projects**	**Total no of projects**
Building	402	15	316	275	138	417
Canalization	9	9	0	0	0	18

Electrification	130	24	125	106	46	154
Flood control	1	0	1	1	0	1
Jetty	41	6	32	31	11	47
Roads/bridges	40	18	20	12	4	58
Water	91	24	76	70	21	115
Grand total	**714**	**96**	**570**	**495**	**220**	**810**

Source: (Omotola, 2007: 82)

The evaluation process in assessing the effectiveness of projects executed and success rates undoubtedly is a near daunting task. There is much room for skepticism and in fact the Niger Delta Development Commission (NDDC) has been the subject of calls to be dismantled or outright scrapped, with hardly any encouragement or support for its reinforcement (Omotola, 2007: 83). Effective implementation would require the adoption of specific measures; and this is in a society with a culture rife with corruption, and fumbling with meritocracy may prove difficult. In all fairness the more recent administrations have made strides to enhance social justice and accountability, while fostering a path towards sustainable development.

Nonetheless, so many of these iconic terms have been unable to resonate within the political class or indeed been juxtaposed**,** yet there is much enthusiasm that this shall come to pass in yet the years ahead. The past three administrations' have attempted to make several bold strides to enact if not impose a 'final solution' to these obvious problems.

APPENDIX I: Table 1: List of Abbreviations & Accronyms	
GDP	Gross Domestic Product
IMF	International Monetary Fund
IYC	Ijaw Youth Council
MEND	Movement for the Emancipation of the Niger Delta
MNE	Multi National Enterprises
MOSOP	Movement for the Survival of Ogoni People
MNOC	Multi National Oil Corporations
NDDC	Niger Delta Development Commission
NDVF	Niger Delta Volunteer Force
NNPC	Nigerian National Petroleum Corporation
OMPADEC	Oil Mineral Producing Areas Development Commission
OPEC	Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries
SPDC	Short Petroleum Development Corporation
UNDP	United Nations Development Fund
UNEP	United Nations Environmental Programs
WBCSD	The World Business Council for Sustainable Development

APENDIX II: Table 2

TNOCs' Operations – A Summary of Domestic Security Threats and Response Patterns
Operational concentrations and response patterns to threats

Types of security threats	Shell	Mobil	Chevron
Operations and concentration of Facilities	Mostly onshore production (land, swamps and creeks) Facilities dispersed accordingly.	Offshore production. Storage/export terminals and non-production facilities on land.	Offshore, nearshore and onshore production. Facilities dispersed accordingly.
Office-related threats: gate barricade and road blockade (rarely violent)	Electric perimeter fences with highly regulated gates. Spy or company police (unarmed). Highly visible armed state police deterrent.	Electric perimeter fences with highly regulated gates. Spy or company police (unarmed). Highly visible armed state police deterrent.	Electric perimeter fences with highly regulated gates. Spy or company police (unarmed). armed state police deterrent in the background.
Abduction and kidnapping of oil workers	Negotiated settlements using company's community liaison offices (CLOs).	Negotiated settlements using company's community liaison offices (CLOs).	Negotiated settlements using company's community liaison offices (CLOs).
Non-violent seizure or occupation of oil facilities, sometimes with staff taken hostage	Negotiation using company's CLOs.	Not Applicable.	Negotiation using company's CLOs. Engagement of state security forces (background).
Attacks on non-oil facilities (e.g. vehicle, guest houses, recreation sites)	Rarely applicable.	Violent intervention by state police; arrests and detention of suspects. Negotiated settlements using CLOs.	Rarely applicable.
Seizure of non-oil facilities (e.g. vehicles and	Negotiation using CLOs.	Negotiation using CLOs.	Negotiation using CLOs.

consignments)			
Attacks on soil sites and installations (e.g. wells, pipelines, flowstations)	Evacuation of oil workers. Violent police or naval action. Negotiated settlements. Surveillance contracts (community youths).	Not Applicable.	Evacuation of oil workers. Violent police or naval action. Negotiated settlements. Security contracts (community youths).
Violent seizure of oil sites/facilities sometimes with hostage of staff	Negotiation using CLOs. Engagement of state security services.	Not applicable.	Negotiation using CLOs. Engagement of state security services.
Massive youth or community uprising and communal strife (intra-/inter-community)	Evacuation of oil workers. Shut down of oil operations. Violent state intervention and military campaign.	Rarely applicable.	Evacuation of oil workers. Shut down of oil operations. Violent state intervention and military campaign.
Oil 'bunkering' i.e. perforation of pipelines (mostly in obscure swamp and creek locations) and siphoning of crude oil for export to regional black markets (action of a criminal network)	Naval surveillance.	Not applicable.	Not applicable.
Extortion from company contractors and delivery trucks (a criminal externality by some local youths)	Top-up provision otherwise called 'cashes' for sorting out extortion by local youths permitted in contract budgets.	Ignored for contractors to sort out themselves.	Ignored for contractors to sort out themselves.
Stealing of equipment from oil platforms in	Irregular naval patrol of swamp and inland	Occasional offshore naval patrol.	Irregular naval patrol f nearshore and swamp

water bodies and swamp locations by pirates) a criminal externality)	water facilities.		facilities.

Source: Omeje, Keneth 2006. "Oil in Africa: Petrobusiness and Security Threats in the Niger Delta, Nigeria" (table on p. 484-486). Current Sociology 54 (3) 477-499

APPENDIX III: Table 3

Time Series Analysis of Oil Spill in the Niger-Delta

Year	No. of Spill	Quantity Spilled(in barrels)	Quantity Recovered (in barrels)	Quantity Loss to the Environment (in barrels)
1976	128	26157	7135	19021.5
1977	104	32879.25	1703.01	31176.75
1978	154	489294.75	391445	97849.75
1979	157	94117.13	63481.2	630635.93
1980	241	600.511.02	42416.83	558094.2
1981	238	42722.5	5470.2	37252.3
1982	257	42841	2171.4	40669.6
1983	173	48351.3	6355.9	41995.4
1984	151	40209	1644.8	38564.2
1985	187	11876	1719.3	10157.3
1986	155	12905	522	12358
1987	129	31866	25757	25757
1988	208	9172	1955	7207
1989	228	5956	2153	3803
1990	166	14150.35	2785.96	12057.8
1991	258	108367.01	2785.96	105912.05
1992	378	51187.9	1476.7	49711.2
1993	453	8105.32	2937.08	6632.11
1994	495	35123.71	2335.93	32787.78
1995	417	63677.17	3110.02	60568.15
1996	158	39903667	1183807	38716.87
Total	**4647**	**2369470**	**549060.38**	**1820410.5**

Source: Uyigue and Agho, 2007 as cited in Eregha and Irughe2009:164- "Oil Induced Environmental Degradation in the Nigerian's Niger-Delta: The Multiplier Effects" Journal of Sustainable Development in Africa Vol 11, No. 4 2009

APPENDIX IV: Table 4

Table 5 Chronicle of Political Leadership in Nigeria

Period of Rule	Head of State	Type of Govt.	Ethnic Origin	How the Rule Ended
1960-66	Balewa	Civilian	Hausa	Attempted Coup/ Assassination
1966	Ironsi	Military	Ibo	Coup/Assassination
1966-75	Gowon	Military	Angas/Middle Belt	Coup
1975-76	Mohammad	Military	Hausa	Attempted Coup/ Assassination
1976-79	Obasanjo	Military	Yoruba	Elections
1979-83	Shagari	Civilian	Fulani	Coup
1984-85	Buhari	Military	Fulani	Coup
1985-93	Babangida	Military	Minority Group In the Niger State	Election, nullified in June 1993 Stepped down In August 1993
1993	Shonekan	Civilian	Yoruba	Head of Interim Govt, coup
1993-98	Abacha	Military	Kanuri	Presumed heart attack
1998-99	Abubakar	Military	Middle Belt	Group Elections
1999 -	Obansanjo	Civilian	Yoruba	

*Source: Fynas, 2000 as cited in (Udemudia & Ite 2006: 396) *Review of African Political Economy. No 0: 391-406 copyright ROAPE Publications Ltd. 2006*

APPENDIX V: Table 5

Unemployment Rates by States in the Niger-Delta

States	Camp	Urban	Rural
Abia	**10.6**	**8.70**	**10.8**
Ak-Ibom	**36.9**	**29.8**	**37.1**
Bayelsa	**23.6**	**20.7**	**24.1**
C-Rivers	**16.6**	**7.30**	**18.3**
Delta	**23.3**	**23.5**	**19.0**
Edo	**14.3**	**24.0**	**11.8**
Imo	**22.3**	**23.8**	**32.8**
Ondo	**17.0**	**14.0**	**19.8**
Rivers	**34.2**	**27.5**	**35.2**
All Nigeria	**18.1**	**14.2**	**19.8**

Source: Federal Office of Statistic News, 2011 as cited in Oil Induced Environmental Degradation in the Nigeria's Niger-Delta: The Multiplier Effects by Eregha and Irughe 2009. Vol 11. No. 4

APPENDIX VI: Table 6a

Incidence of Poverty in the Niger-Delta Region – 1980 – 2004

Country/States	1980	1985	1992	1996	2004
Nigeria	**28.1**	**4/63**	**42.7**	**65.6**	**54.4**
Edo/Delta	**19.8**	**52.4**	**33.9**	**56.1**	**Delta 45.35** **Edo 33.09**
Cross River	**10.2**	**41.9**	**45.5**	**66.9**	**41.61**
Imo/Abia	**14.4**	**33.1**	**49.9**	**56.2**	**Imo 27.39** **Abia 22.27**
Ondo	**24.9**	**47.3**	**46.6**	**71.6**	**42.15**
Rivers/Bayelsa	**7.2**	**44.4**	**44.3**	**44.3**	**Rivers 29.09** **Bayelsa 19.98**

Source: National Bureau of Statistics as cited in P.O. Oviasuyi and Jim Uwadiae 2010: 118. *Journal of Peace, Conflict and Development. Issue 1*

APPENDIX VII: Table 6b

Trends in Poverty Levels by Zones in Nigeria (1980 – 2004)

Zone	**1980**	**1985**	**1992**	**1996**	**2004**
South South	13.2	45.7	40.8	58.2	35.1
South East	12.9	30.4	41.0	53.5	26.7
South West	13.4	38.6	43.1	60.9	43.0
North Central	32.2	50.8	46.0	64.7	67.0
North East	35.6	54.9	54.0	70.1	72.2
Morth West	37.7	52.1	36.5	77.5	71.2

Source: National Bureau of Statistics as cited in (Oviasuyi and Uwadiae 2010: 119) "The Dilema of Niger-Delta *Region as oil Producing States of Nigeria" Journal of Peace, Conflict and Development. Issue 16, November 2010* ***www.peacestudiesjurnal.org.uk***

Ranking of Major Environmental Problems in the Niger-Delta

Problem Type	*Problem Subset*	*Priority Ranking*
Natural Environment	*Coaster/River bank erosion* *Flooding* *Sedimentation/Silt Substance* *Exotic (water hyacinth)*	*Moderate* *High* *Moderate* *Low* *Low*
Development Related	*Land degradation/Soil fertility Loss* *Agricultural decline/ shortened fallow* *Delta forest loss(Mangrove)* *Biodiversity depletion* *Fishery Decline* *Oil spillage* *Gas flaring* *Sewage and waste water* *Other Chemical*	*High* *High* *High* *High* *High* *High* *Moderate* *High* *Moderate*

Source: Okon and Egbon, 1999 as cited Eregha and Irughe2009:165- "Oil Induced Environmental Degradation in the Nigerian's Niger-Delta: The Multiplier Effects . "Journal of Sustainable Development in Africa Vol 11, No 4, 2009

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