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EXISTENTIA DEI

"Esse in natura rerum Ens Primum et Necessarium quod vocamus Deum, et motus in mundo existens, et series causarum efficientium, et natura rerum corruptibilium et contingentium, necnon inaequalitas earum in gradibus perfectionis ac tandem mirabilis ordo in orbe universo refulgens evidentissime manifestant."

F. H. BRADLEY,

UNIVERSITY OF OTTAWA.

1930 -

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THE EXISTENCE OF GOD.

FOREWORD.

In this essay I have made use of the following works:

St. Thomas: Summa Theologica.

Garrigou-Lagrange: Dieu.

Joyce: Principles of Natural Theology.

La Revue Philosophique, 1924 & 1925.

Mercier: A Manual of Modern Scholastic Philosophy.

Dictionnaire Apologétique de la Foi.

These sources were utilized in a general way throughout the essay. When any particular argument or point has been taken from any one of them, the fact is indicated in its proper place, so that the reader may verify it and satisfy himself as to whether I have correctly interpreted the author or not. I have not always quoted the exact words of St. Thomas when referring to him because most people are familiar with his teachings on this question and it would be difficult to attribute anything to him that is not found in his writings. Furthermore, a constant quoting of authors sometimes gives an impression of pedantry. It requires no genius to go through the works of St. Thomas and copy what he said in different places in support of this metaphysical demonstration of the existence of God. I have, therefore, omitted many lengthy paragraphs, that, so far as I could see, would serve but to increase the length of my essay.

It is rather difficult to write anything original after reading Garrigou-Lagrange's monumental work. Most authors who have written since his book appeared quote him profusely and use his arguments quite freely.

I have not enumerated the adversaries of this thesis in the introduction. They have been dealt with in turn after each of the five

arguments, and I have limited myself to those that are best known.

In my conclusion I have dealt with the personality of God and the fact that he is distinct from the world. This naturally led to a refutation of Pantheism. A short disquisition on Atheism seemed to be a logical ending for an essay of this kind.

Needless to say, I have not attempted a literary work. My aim has been clearness, and to attain it I have often sacrificed force and beauty, the two other qualities of style.

THE EXISTENCE OF GOD.

* * * * *
* * * * *

This essay aims at demonstrating the existence of God the supreme all perfect being, the first efficient cause of all things as well as of all order among created beings. I shall not treat the question of the attributes of God because they are the matter of a subsequent thesis in our programme, but shall limit myself to the question of proving the existence of the First Cause, etc., supposing, for the purpose of this essay, the preceding thesis on the demonstrability of the existence of such a being.

The existence of God must be demonstrated. It is not a truth "per se nota quoad se et quoad nos". Existence, it is true, is an essential predicate of God, but as we do not know the nature of God, the fact that existence essentially belongs to Him, is not apparent to us immediately but must be demonstrated.

Our manner of proceeding will be a posteriori, i.e., from effect to cause. It is possible to demonstrate the existence of God by any effect, but not with the same ease and facility because of the danger of confusing the causes we might meet with on the way. It is necessary in the first place, to go from an effect to its proper cause, and as we must arrive at the ultimate cause of the effect with which we began, it is evident that many intermediary and subordinate causes will be encountered in the course of the demonstration. It is necessary, therefore, to distinguish between causes that are accidentally subordinated, and causes that are essentially subordinated. Furthermore, we are concerned with causes essentially subordinated in the present. We shall leave aside

all consideration of the temporal order, and limit ourselves to the causal order, which does not imply any succession of time, but rather simultaneousness. When it is said that the cause is anterior to the effect all that is meant is that the cause is a pre-requisite with regard to the effect, is anterior in nature (not in time) to the effect.

In the argument from efficient causality it will be necessary to distinguish between causes ad fieri and causes ad esse. This will be done in its proper place, so that it is unnecessary to develop the idea here. Let us say at the outset, however, that it is essential to bear in mind the distinction already mentioned, i.e., the distinction between the temporal order and the causal order, because modern scientists have led us to give undue prominence to series or rather successions of phenomena, to the neglect of real chains or series of causes.

It is necessary, likewise, to limit ourselves in the series of causes we study, to the immediate cause. For instance, the argument from contingency demonstrates immediately the existence of a necessary being, but not the existence of a personal God. After the five arguments are developed, we must show that the five distinct attributes must be found in one God who is spiritual, intelligent, free, personal, etc. (cf. Garrigon-Lagrange p.81.).

Our arguments will be based on first principles which may be formulated as follows:-

a) The principle of non-contradiction or the negative expression of the principle of identity: the same being cannot be and not be what it is at the same time and from the same point of view.

b) The principle of substance:-that which is, is one and the same in all its changing or different ways of existing.

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c) The principle of sufficient reason:- every being must have that which makes it intrinsically such a being (nature) and that which makes it exist. It must have this in itself, if it exists by nature, i.e., if its nature is to exist. If it is not its nature to exist, then it must have this cause in another.

d) The principle of causality which follows from the preceding principle and can be stated as follows:- that which does not exist by itself, exists by another.

e) Finally, that being which gave existence to another did so for a reason determining it to produce that definite being and not some other being. Omne agens agit propter finem.

These are first principles. It remains for us to declare their ontological value. In a general way St. Thomas declares, -"Proprium est horum principiorum quod non solum necesse sit ea per se vera esse: sed etiam necesse est videre quod sint per se vera". I shall not enter into a refutation of the diverse systems of Philosophy that are opposed to the Thomistic teaching on this question, but shall simply state in summary form what the Angelic Doctor teaches concerning them. I must profess my indebtedness to the Revue Philosophique, 1925, p.502, and p.511-512 for the substance of what these pages contain on the question of these first principles.

In the first place, these principles are not the fruit of reasoning, neither are they an a priori artificial fabrication of the mind, but they result from the objective analysis of the terms.

Secondly, the terms are extracted from the exterior and interior sensible experiences. They are not innate. The only thing that is innate is the intellectual faculty, which, when in presence of the two terms immediately sees their essential connection in a subsequent judgment.

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This^{is} the sense in which these principles are said to be analytical or the result of the analysis of the subject and the predicate. This connection between the subject and the predicate appears in two ways, either ~~that~~ because the subject implies the predicate in its comprehension e.g. man is a rational animal, or when the predicate which is an essential ^{property} ~~part~~ of the subject, implies the subject in its definition, e.g. man has the faculty of laughing. The faculty of laughing implies rationality.

These analytical judgments are preceded by the act of vision on the part of the intelligence which reads in its formal object, being, these necessary relations which it affirms in a judgment. Consequently these principles are universal and necessary. They are also immutable in themselves and in us. Their value is a transcendental ~~ontological~~ value. The evidence upon which they are founded is objective.

***** We shall employ, as I have already said, the a posteriori method in proving this thesis. The a priori method cannot demonstrate the existence of God, although St. Anselm built up an argument a priori that has caused a great deal of discussion throughout the centuries since he invented it. Even Descartes has attempted to make use of it.

As St. Anselm conceived of it, the argument may be formulated as follows:-

The term "God" signifies that than which nothing greater can be conceived.

A nature than which nothing greater can be conceived is a necessarily existing nature.

Therefore God exists.

(cf. Joyce, p.201.)

We cannot admit the validity of this argument because it does not prove the existence of such a being outside of our imaginations. All that it proves is that a being than which nothing greater can be conceived, must be conceived of as existing if it exists.

St. Anselm did not seem to consider that the possibility of an infinite nature is open to contradiction. With regard to the infinite, all that we can say is that we do not detect its impossibility. Our concept of the infinite is negative. For this argument to be valid, it would be necessary to demonstrate a posteriori the truth of statement that an infinite nature is possible. Scotus detected this flaw in St. Anselm's reasoning, and showed that the argument neglects the fact that the range of our cognitive powers is limited and that our knowledge of the super-sensuous world is obtained by reasoning upon sensible data.

Descartes formulated the argument in practically the same way as St. Anselm. We can understand this in Descartes because of his system in which he teaches that pure knowledge is always internal and ~~spiritual~~ spiritual i.e., that we have no direct or immediate knowledge of anything ^{except the ideas} within the soul. He divides ideas into two classes, "adventitious" or particular perceptions that appear to inform us of a material world outside, but whose testimony we cannot admit without further proof, and "innate" or common notions, universal ideas or axiomatic truths which can in no way come from without.

I shall not refute his theory of innate ideas here because that would lead me beyond the scope of this essay. It need hardly be pointed out that his theory is baseless.

So far as his use of St. Anselm's argument is concerned, all that I intend in mentioning it here, is to show how it fits into his system. The same refutation holds good in his case as in that of St. Anselm as given above.

Argument From Motion.

This is the first argument by St. Thomas. The main objection to it, namely, that it reposes on a principle which physical science has shown to be false, is the result of an erroneous idea of motion introduced by Descartes. Motion is not only change of place or position, or relation to other beings, it is transition from one form of being to another from potency to act, an energetic and incomplete actualization of a potency. This transitus may tend towards a new quality, an increased quantity, or a specific nature. Local motion is just one form of motion.

Aristotle defines motion as "the act of that which is potential inasmuch as it is potential!" It is the passage from one form of being to another, and hence cannot be a state of being, nor a being, but a becoming. It is fieri not esse. It is always on the road to realization and never attains full actualization for when it reaches its term it has ceased to be as motion. It is also infinitely divisible, each part being motion just as the whole is motion, yet all the parts are different and are not interchangeable but occur in a definite order or series which is continuous. At every stage of a movement, and at every fraction of every stage, something new emerges, there is a continuous passage from potency to act, i.e. from being potentially in movement or having a capacity for movement, to being actually in movement. Movement is not a stable entity which once produced continues to work and function, but each part is a necessary condition of the part that follows and

necessarily depends on the part preceding it.

By potentiality we mean a capacity for receiving some perfection. A being is said to be in potentia with regard to something else when it has within itself the capacity of realizing that something else or that perfection. For example, a tree is many different things potentially. It may become a piece of furniture, the wall of a house, a baseball bat etc., etc. It is, however, none of these things, actually. It has in itself the capacity of becoming any one of them. This potentiality is not nonentity. It is something real and if it were not present in the tree the tree could not be made into any of the numerous articles that can be manufactured from it. Furniture cannot be made from water because water has not in itself that capacity necessary to receive the modification or perfection of a piece of furniture. Neither can we say that potentiality is being or entity. It is rather half-way between entity and non-entity, less than entity and more than non-entity.

By act or actus we mean the result of the operation by which a potentiality is realized, or the complement of the potentiality. Actus means perfection. As a further explanation, let us say that actus as well as potentia is a reality, and a reality distinct from the potentia that it perfects; The two cannot be identical though sometimes it is impossible to separate them. In these cases, as in all others, they combine as two distinct principles. Let it be observed here, that what is an act perfecting a potentiality is distinct from that particular potentiality, but may be potentiality with regard to something else in another order. For example,

the human soul is the act of the body, but it is potentia with regard to thought etc. When a thought arises in the mind it is a new actus perfecting the intelligence which is a faculty of the soul really distinct from the soul, but in the soul nevertheless. The question of the real distinction between the soul and its faculties belongs to another department of Philosophy and need not be treated here. I think the idea I wish to convey is sufficiently clear as I have put it.

All limited perfection and that is the kind of perfection we are considering in this essay, the only perfection in this world, is limited because of its potentiality. Potentially itself, on the other hand has its limiting principle within itself. The very meaning of potentiality is limit. It is capacity to receive a definite perfection and no more. A tree, to adhere to the same example used above, can become a piece of furniture, or a baseball bat or anything of that order and nothing else. It cannot become a metal or a liquid. It is limited by its own potentiality.

With regard to actus or perfection, however, the idea of limit has no place. I mean perfection ut sic absolute perfection. When perfection is limited and becomes this or that definite perfection it is on account of the potentiality that it actualizes. Actus may be limited by potentia in different ways. Firstly it is limited by the potentia to which it corresponds. For example, the sculptor's ideal, though not limited by time and space as long as it exists only in his mind, becomes limited by the particular piece of marble in which it is embodied. Insofar as actus is a potentiality with regard to an actus of a higher order it is

also limited because that higher order is not absolute perfection.

Let us now propose the argument from motion or movement in the world. It may be formulated as follows:

In the world of created beings there is movement and there are series of movements.

Whatever is moved, is moved by another. We cannot proceed in infinitum in the series of movements, i.e. in the series of subordinate movers or motors. Therefore, we must come to a motor or mover that has movement in itself and gives or communicates movement without having received it from another.

To prove this argument, I think that it should suffice to explain and establish the two minors. So far as the major is concerned, it is sufficiently clear to everybody. Motion or movement meets us on every side. The world is full of movement. It would seem unnecessary likewise to determine whether we are to deal with substantial or actual mutation, spiritual or corporal movement, local, qualitative or quantitative movement. All we need to do is to admit the existence of movement of some kind and to study it as such. This is how Garrigou-Legrange sets out to establish the proof of the existence of God from movement in the world. (Dieu, P.241) Let me say here that I shall use his arguments in this part of my essay. They may be found in the above mentioned work from page 241 to page 248.

To proceed, then, to our first minor: whatever is moved is moved by another, let us endeavour to show that it results from the very nature of movement. Movement, we said above is transitus de potentia in actum. It is fieri, not esse, it is a becoming. When it reaches its term, it ceases to be, as motion. Motion or movement

necessarily depends on something else. It is impossible for a being to be in potentia and in actu with respect to the same thing. For an agent to communicate movement, it must have that movement in itself or have received it from another, just as to receive a movement it is necessary to be in potentia with regard to that particular movement. Becoming or transitus or movement requires an actualizing agent outside of itself, which agent must be in act or have that which it confers on the patient or second term of the movement. This immediate agent of movement need not be altogether external to the substance in which the movement occurs, but it must at least be external to that part which is the immediate subject of change. Here we may invoke the axiom: *nemo dat quod non habet*.

Allow me to quote here a paragraph from Aristotle (Physics III. c.3

"We have now solved the difficulty, and shown that motion is in the thing moved. For it is the act of this latter effected by the agency of the mover. And the act of the mover is not something other than it. For it must of necessity be the act of both. For the mover is so termed by reason of an active power it possesses; and it is said to be "moving" because it exercises that power. But it exercises it in the thing moved. So that the act of both is one and the same. Just as the difference between one and two is the same as that between two and one, and uphill and downhill are the same reality. the things are the same but they are conceived under different aspects. The case is similar as regards the mover and the moved! This extract from Aristotle's Physics makes it clear that wherever there is motion there is not only a body which is moved (motus) but also an agent moving it (movens) or communicating

movement to it. The latter is just as essential as the former in every movement. The process of change taking place in that which is moved is actio in the agent and passio in the movable or moved body, but it is in both, not only in the latter, and the latter receives it from something outside of itself.

The same idea is expressed by St. Thomas, (I. q. 2 a. 3). The following translation is from the English edition of the Summa, quoted by Cardinal Mercier:

"The first and most manifest way is the argument from motion. It is certain and evident to our senses that some things are in motion. Whatever is in motion is moved by another, for nothing can be in motion except it have a potentiality for that towards which it is being moved; whereas a thing moves inasmuch as it is actual. By "motion" we mean nothing else than the reduction of something from a state of potentiality into a state of actuality. Nothing, however, can be reduced from a state of potentiality into a state of actuality ^{except by something already in actu}. Thus, that which is actually hot, as fire, makes wood which is potentially hot, to be actually hot, and thereby moves and changes it. It is not possible that the same thing should be at once in a state of actuality and potentiality from the same point of view and in the same way anything should be both moved and mover, or that it should move itself. Therefore, whatever is in motion should be put in motion by another. If that by which it is put in motion be itself put in motion, then this must also need be put in motion by another, and that by another again. This cannot go on to infinity, because then there would be no first mover, and consequently, no other mover—seeing that subsequent movers only move inasmuch as they are put in

motion by the first mover; as the staff only moves because it is put in motion by the hand. Therefore, it is necessary to arrive at a first mover, put in motion by no other; and this everyone understands to be God!

Our second minor is as follows: we cannot proceed in infinitum in the series of movers or motors. This statement has nothing to do with the possibility of an infinite series of motors accidentally subordinated in the past. St. Thomas himself says that the impossibility of such a series cannot be demonstrated by the reason alone. Of course, we have Revelation which teaches that there is no such series, but Revelation is not the means by which we reach conclusions in Philosophy. What is contrary to reason is that an existing movement should have its sufficient reason, its actualizing raison d'etre in a series of motors all of which are moved, all of which receive the movement that they transmit. If there is not one that transmits without having received, no movement can ever take place because there is no cause. Garrigou-Lagrange explains this (Page 244) using a quotation from Sertillanges. The substance of what Sertillanges says is as follows: No matter how many intermediate motors you have you have no source of movement. You have a canal or a stream that is lengthened but you have no spring or source. If there is no source, the intermediate motor is powerless and can produce no result.

All the intermediate motors are motors per accidens. We need not find an end for these motors i.e. terminate the series, but it is sufficient for us to get out of the series, and find a motor of a higher order, a motor that is not moved by another, an immovable motor, not immovable in the sense that it is in potentia towards movement but will never move, but in the sense that it is immovable in actu, i.e.

cannot become because it is already.

Garrigou-Lagrange (P. 246 and 247), gives two examples to help the imagination, one physical and the other spiritual. The first is the example of a sailor carrying an anchor on board a ship. The ship carries the sailor, the sea supports the ship and the earth supports the sea, the sun holds the earth in place and an unknown centre sustains the sun etc. What holds the unknown centre of the sun? If the series is infinite or eternal it is infinitely insufficient. Every member of the series of transformations that preceded our present solar system, all the anterior forms of energy are not causes except per accidens of the succeeding movement and they require a non-transitory cause of movement or an immovable motor, not at the beginning of the series, but above the series, a sort of permanent spring from which all movement and life originally come.

Such a source cannot be matter endowed with energy because matter is a constant subject of change and cannot be the reason or cause or agent of its own mutations.

The second example is, of the spiritual order, and is taken from St. Thomas Ia 2ae q. 9 a. 4. It is the example of the will, willing things that it did not previously will. A sick man desires to get well. This getting well is at first desired in the general desire of good that is the constant inclination of the will. Now, our will is not an eternal act of love of the good. This desire of a cure began in the general desire of being well as a good, which general desire had a beginning.

General Conclusions:

If movement in the world requires a mover that is immovable, a mover that has movement without having received it, a mover, not at the

beginning of an infinite series but outside of any such possible series, above it, communicating movement to it, such a motor must be a necessary being, must be God, perfect in the order of being, having within Himself the actus of all movement without having received it and having the power of communicating it to the world. The words of Holy Scripture are therefore philosophically correct when God is spoken of as "Him in whom we live and move and have our being"

To explain the matter more definitely and clearly in philosophical language, let us say that such an immovable mover must be pure perfection, pure act. Potentiality can have no place in such a being, otherwise the axiom "operatio sequitur esse et modus operandi modum essendi" would be false. He must be an immaterial being, because if he had any matter in his make-up he would have potentiality. He must consequently be an intelligent being because spirituality, immateriality is the foundation and basis of intelligence. Omnipresence must likewise be an attribute of such a being since everything that is moved is moved by him. He must likewise be eternal since he has being without having acquired it. His action is not measured by time but its results can be in time. He is likewise unique because a being that is pure act cannot have an equal or a superior.

Objections to the Argument From Movement.

Garrigou-Lagrange (P. 248-264) groups the different objections to this argument under three headings:

- a) Objections to the principle: "quidquid movetur ab alio movetur"
- b) Objections to the necessity of stopping somewhere in the series of subordinate motors.
- c) Objections to the existence of a motor, which they declare to be intrinsically repugnant.

He then proceeds to refute them in the same order. We shall likewise refute them using the same principles, though we shall not go into so much detail because most of them can be easily refuted by referring to the explanation of motion already given in the general explanation or in establishing the argument.

The first group of objectors, following Descartes, admit only local motion, which they call a distinct reality passing from one body to another.

To this we may answer first of all that local motion is only one kind of motion, and viewed philosophically it is like other forms of motion passing from potency to act. A body must be in some place but it always has the potency of being some place else. When in a new place it acquires a new actuality and loses the potentiality it had to be in that new place. It can never be in potentia and in actu with regard to the same place. These objectors hold that contrary to what we have said local motion is the only kind of motion and that all change can be explained by it. Of course we can understand that local motion should be all important to mathematicians like Descartes but we are dealing with Metaphysics, not mathematics. Descartes says that in the beginning God gave the universe a certain amount of movement which still exists, passing from body to body and always remaining the same. He goes further and maintains that such motion once communicated will remain in a body until some external force intervenes and hence he styles motion as a mode of corporeal substance. Cf. Joyce: Principles of Natural Theology.

Now what is wrong with this system? There are four points upon which Descartes is mistaken. In the first place he forgets that motion is change, not an added reality. Secondly, being a mathematician, he considers motion in regard to rest. According to him the terminus

a quo as well as the terminus ad quem is considered under this aspect and he reasons that the terminus a quo being in a state of rest is inferior to the process of change since a mere potentēcy is inferior to a potency on the road to actualization. He concludes, therefore, that motion is some reality added to the already constituted substance. Thirdly, it may be said as we have already explained, that motion is not a state. State and movement are mutually exclusive. Lastly, it is a contradiction to say that movement is something which remaining the same passes from one body to another. "Movement does not pass (from one to another) is not communicated, but communicates movement to another body; heat does not circulate, but produces heat in a given way" (P. Lacombe, quoted by Garrigou-Lagrange P.251.) Such an explanation might help the imagination to represent the constant relations of different phenomena, but it does not give us the intrinsic nature of the reality.

This objection seems stronger when we consider Newton's law which assures us that a body in motion persists in motion unless it is subjected to some external force. The examples generally given are the arrow shot from a bow or the billiard-ball rolling over the surface of the table. The intervening obstacle is said to be the friction of the air or of the surface of the table.

Garrigou-Lagrange quotes St. Thomas as follows: "Instrumentum intelligitur moveri a principali agente, quamdiu retinet virtutem a principali agente impressam: unde sagitta tandiu movetur^a projiciente, quamdiu monet vis impulsus proficientis." Along with other Scholastics he maintains that "the arrow having received an impetus is not at the same time in potentia and in actu with regard to that impetus, but it is in potentia with regard to the position to which it tends. In other words, the arrow is in actu so far as its dynamic quality is concerned, and in potentia with regard to its local positions! This

solution he borrows from Goudin, and he also quotes Maritain as follows:
"That movement once given to a body continues indefinitely, is perhaps a convenient fiction to represent certain mathematical or mechanical relations in astronomy, but philosophically it is very debatable. (contestable)

We might add to this, that even granted the impetus etc. as Garrigou-Lagrange explains, we must also insist on the necessity of the continuous action of an external force to explain the persistence of movement in the arrow. Newton says that the arrow, to use an example will continue in a straight line unless acted upon and made to change its direction or cease moving, by external forces, but he does not deny that the continued and uniform movement is also due to another external force. This other external force must needs be moved from potency to act and we are compelled to have recourse to an immovable motor, since a processus in infinitum has been already shown ^{to be repugnant} to reason.

The second group of objectors is made up of those who pretend that ~~that~~ we can go back indefinitely in the series of motors that are essentially and actually subordinated. There is no question here of accidentally subordinated motors. Those who make this objection use Aristotle's question concerning the possibility of a circle of causes whereby the first motor would be movable in another class different from that in which ^{it is} mover or movens. The answer is that such a circle is impossible in the same order of causality, otherwise the cause would have and not have at the same time the power of causing the same effect.

The third and last group of adversaries is composed of those who deny the possibility of an immovable motor. They say that such a motor implies a contradiction because a motor supposes a beginning and therefore excludes all possibility of immobility. Aristotle gave the principles that solve this difficulty. He says that every mover in so far as it is

considered a mover (motor in se) is immovable, and is movable per accidens. As a matter of fact, to move is to determine or reduce to act. It is purely accidental that what moves another is already determined by a superior i.e. prior mover. What is necessarily required in a mover is that it be in actu. If a being is by nature, essentially in actu, if not only it can act but is its own action it can act and produce movement in another without being moved itself. It can be conceded that such a mover can move others ab aeterno, but cannot commence to move i.e. enter into movement.

We must admit, therefore, in view of what has been said in the positive and in the negative parts of this argument, that the movement and the series of movements in the world are a clear proof of the existence of an immovable mover, I.E. of a mover who has not received movement, a mover that is essentially in actu and is the source of all movement.

From all this it follows that such an immovable mover must be immaterial and, therefore spiritual, that such a mover is its own existence etc.

The Argument from Efficient Causality.

In the preceding argument, we started from the process of becoming, of transitus from potentia to actus and proved the necessity of an immovable motor. In this second argument we no longer deal with the process of becoming, but with the being which is the term of movement or becoming, and remains in existence after that process has ceased. It is sometimes claimed that this is the same argument as the preceding one and that it is just a repetition of principles already given. However we must say that there is a distinction between coming into existence and remaining in existence. St. Thomas tells us clearly that created beings need to be kept in existence by God.

In this proof we shall demonstrate the necessity of an uncaused efficient cause to keep the world in existence. We are not at all interested in the question of the possibility of an infinite number of efficient causes ad fieri. We know, of course, by revelation, that such a series is impossible, but seeing that St. Thomas says that we cannot prove the impossibility of such a series by reason, we shall not attempt to do so. We are interested, so far as this essay is concerned, in the question of an efficient cause ad esse, a conserving cause that has not been caused but that is outside and beyond any series of accidental causes and explains the continued existence of the world that surrounds us.

Before giving this proof, however, let us explain the notion of efficient causality. What is an efficient cause? It is defined in manuals of Philosophy as follows: principium extrinsecum quod actione sua physica alteram producit existentiam. This may be rendered in English as follows, -an extrinsic principle which by its physical action produces the existence of another.

This definition may require some explanation for those who are not familiar with the terminology of Philosophy. A principle is that from which something proceeds or comes some way or other. The English rendering of this definition is rather awkward. The Latin "id a quo aliquid quocumque modo procedit" is clearer and more compact. This principle is extrinsic i.e. outside of the effect produced and has nothing to do with the intrinsic principles of which the effect is made up or constituted. This extrinsic principle produces another existence outside of itself and in this it is distinguished from the material cause and from the formal cause which are intrinsic to their effect and are only distinguished from it as the part is distinct from the whole. This new existence is produced by the physical action of the efficient cause and in this it is distinguished from the final cause which does not exert any physical action but rather attracts the agent by the good it holds out to him. Action is mid-way between cause and effect and may be called the link between the two. As a result the effect does not merely succeed or follow the cause, but comes as the result of the action of the cause.

A cause is more than a condition. A condition is that which permits a cause to act, but does not itself positively influence the production of the effect. It may be said to remove an obstacle. If it is a simple condition it is not indispensable but contributes to make the possible action more perfect. If it is an indispensable condition, or a sine qua non, it is such that without it the action of the cause cannot take place and it cannot be supplied by any other condition.

Cause also differs from occasion which is defined: "id ad cuius praesentiam aliquid fit" or a circumstance or combination of circumstances favourable to the action of a free cause, e.g. darkness is an occasion of theft.

The occasion is not necessary to the production of the effect i.e. to the exterior efficiency of the cause, but it has a positive influence on the effect, at least upon the determinations of the will of the agent, which determination precedes the effect. This is the main difference between an occasion and a condition sine qua non. Here let it be observed that occasion can only exist in reference to free causes.

There are many species of efficient causes. I shall enumerate and define them briefly, dwelling at greater length on those most necessary to the proof I shall give later. There is first cause and there are second causes. By first cause we mean a cause that depends on no other cause either with regard to the force or power with which it acts or with regard to the exercise of this power. A second cause is a cause that depends on a prior cause, both for its power and for the exercise of that power. A principal cause is one that acts through its own power, and an instrumental cause is a cause that acts through the power of a principal cause. A writer is a principal cause and his pen is the instrumental cause. Of course the instrumental cause directed by the principal cause co-operates, if we may use the term in this sense, according to its own nature and has something to do with the nature of the effect, but as an instrument.

Efficient cause may be physical or moral according as it produces its effect by physical action, or by moral action moves the physical cause to act.

An efficient cause is said to be a cause per se when it produces an effect according to its nature or according to the intention of the agent. It is called causa per accidens when it produces an effect which is not a direct consequence of its nature, or which does not follow from the intention of the agent, i.e. which is praeter intentionem.

There are several other species of causes: proximate and remote, total and partial, universal and particular, which need not be defined. The terms themselves are sufficiently clear.

There are, however, some other causes that need to be clearly understood for the purposes of this essay. The first is what is known as necessary cause, i.e., a cause which cannot ^{not} produce its effect when all conditions for its acting are verified or fulfilled. For instance, the sun is a necessary cause of light, heat, etc. A necessary cause is distinguished from a contingent or free cause which can refrain from acting even when all the required conditions are fulfilled. An artist may or may not paint a picture.

Lastly, we come to an important pair of species of efficient causes, i.e. causes ad fieri and causes ad esse. These must be carefully explained for the proper understanding of this essay.

A cause ad fieri is a cause of a thing's becoming what it is. A cause ad esse is a cause that sustains a thing in being. A carpenter builds a house. He is the cause ad fieri of the house he builds. The material of which the house is built is the cause ad esse as regards the continued existence of the house. We are not here concerned with the question of proximate and remote causes. Of course there are causes which are at the same time causes ad fieri and causes ad esse. For example, a candle is the cause ad fieri of the light in a room when it is first introduced into the room. It is also the cause ad esse because its continued presence is required if the light is to continue. In other cases the cause ad fieri is ~~the~~ distinct from the cause ad esse. For example, the carpenter in the example given above, is the cause ad fieri only. Of course we must concede to the cause

ad fieri some connection with the being of the thing it produces, it effects the transition from potentia to actus, and is therefore indirectly the cause of being also, but the direct effect of such a cause is limited to this process of transition. The continuance of a being is due to a cause ad esse, which may be the same as the cause ad fieri, or it may be distinct from it.

Let us now propose our argument in form. It is similar to the preceding argument from movement and ^{may} be worded as follows;

The world we see all around us furnishes us with examples of substances and accidents, all coming into being through the action of efficient causes.

That which comes into being through the action of a cause is also dependent on a cause for its continuance in existence.

We cannot proceed in infinitum in the series of these efficient causes.

Therefore we must admit the existence of a first cause, itself uncaused and self-existent.

To prove this argument it does not seem necessary to say anything about the major. It is self-evident. With regard to the first minor, a brief explanation is necessary. It is quite evident, I think, that a thing which requires a cause to bring it into being, requires a cause to keep or maintain it in existence. At first sight, this statement may present some difficulty to those who limit their observation and reasoning to what is actually before their eyes. We are accustomed to think that once a being comes into existence, it is independent of all but itself. Once the chicken is hatched from the egg, it apparently exists by itself. We have no difficulty in admitting that it needed a cause to give it being, but what other

cause than itself does it need to continue to be ? Some say that the existing nature of the being is a sufficient cause of its continuance in existence until some hostile force destroys it. This does not explain matters at all, for the continued existence of the existing nature is what we ~~are~~ seeking to explain. Whatever keeps the thing in existence must be a reality above itself, though it need not be an object of sensible experience. A further example will perhaps make matters clearer. An iron-worker makes a key. He is the efficient cause ad fieri of that key. Once he has fashioned it, it continues to exist independently of him, but what makes it retain its form and continue to be a key? I suppose we must say that the iron of which it is made, being hard and rigid, will not change its form until another cause ad fieri acts upon it. Its continued existence, therefore has a cause, the qualities of the iron. We are not interested in determining whether an infinite series of such accidental causes is possible or not. That belongs to our second minor. What we must admit is that the key requires something besides itself to ensure its continued existence. This, of course, is an example of an accident. It is a little more difficult to deal with substances because our senses do not help us in studying substances. Hence it is that we are faced with the following difficulty: what about the man who made the key? When he is once formed, when his elementary constituents are assembled in the required way do they not keep him in existence, as the materials that compose a house keep it in existence? This difficulty is generally brought up by those who forget that man is not an agglomeration of atoms. He has more true unity than the house. Man is a single substance and acts as such. His actions are attributable to his person "individua substantia rationalis naturae", not to the

individual particle that actually is employed in the action. Man is of a higher order than the material constituents that go to form his body, and he requires a sustaining cause of a higher order than these constituents. The constituents of a man, like the materials of a house, may be the cause in esse of the particular arrangement whereby one is a man and the other a house, but they themselves, must in turn have a sustaining cause not only for their existence, but for their existence in that particular arrangement one to the other.

Our second minor is the main part of the argument. We must prove that an infinite series of causes ad esse is impossible. If no member in our series of efficient causes possesses being independently of the operation of a higher cause, we shall be forced to conclude that there are no secondary causes in existences. Furthermore, nothing can be the cause of itself, because it would have to be prior to itself which is inconceivable.

An example frequently used to demonstrate the utter impossibility of an infinite series of causes ad esse, as an explanation of the continued existence of the beings of the universe, is the example of a clock. Its movement depends on a series of wheels, which series depends ultimately on the spring. No matter how many wheels we may add we must finally have a spring actually producing the movement of the wheels, otherwise the clock will not go. It does not matter whether the number of wheels be great or small. Neither do past windings have anything to do with the present movement of the clock. The movement of the hands of the clock as a present act depends on a cause to which all the intermediary causes are subordinate.

St. Thomas uses the example of a carpenter driving a nail. The final effect i.e. the fastening of the nail is caused by the hammer, which is moved by the arm, which movement results from the motor im-

pulses communicated from the nerve centers of the brain. The subordinate causes must be finite in number and connected with a starting point of motion. Otherwise the hammer would not move and the nail would never be driven, because these subordinate causes are causes on which the driving of the nail is essentially dependent. The same could not be said of the carpenter breaking an infinite number of hammers and constantly replacing them. Here we have the causes on which the work does not essentially depend.

Difficulties to be Answered Regarding this Argument.

This argument has been attacked on the grounds that it does not prove the existence of God at all since it does not show the efficient cause of which it proves the necessity is intelligent and personal. At the end of this essay we shall sum up the conclusions of our five arguments and show the attributes that must necessarily belong to the first motor, efficient cause, etc. All we have proposed to establish in this argument is the existence of such a cause. Subsequently we shall deal with what is logically the complementary point, the intelligence and personality of the efficient cause.

There is, however, a difficulty which may be dealt with here. It is from J.S.Mills in his "Three Essays on Religion." In these essays, he contends that the evidence at our disposal does not enable us to conclude to any other ultimate causes than matter and force. Let us express the difficulty in his own words.

"There is in nature a permanent element and a changeable: the changes are always the effect of previous changes: the permanent existences, so far as we know, are not effects at all.-----That which in an object begins to exist is that in it which belongs to the changeable element in nature; the outward form and the properties

depending on mechanical or chemical combinations of its component parts. There is in every object, another and a permanent element, viz.- the specific elementary substance or substances of which it consists, and their inherent properties. These are not known to us as beginning to exist; within the range of human knowledge they had no beginning, consequently no cause." He goes on to say that force adequately accounts for all changes that take place in nature. With regard to the reasoning whereby we use the existence of the human soul as the basis of an argument for an intelligent and personal cause, he says: "The notion seems to be that no causes can give rise to products of a more precious and elevated kind than themselves. But this is at variance with the analogies of nature. How vastly nobler and more precious, for instance, are the higher vegetables and animals, than the soil and manure out of which, ^{and by the properties of which,} they are raised up".

This last quotation refers to our contention that the world requires an intelligent and personal cause. This has not yet been demonstrated in this essay. Nevertheless, as I have proposed to deal with the difficulties in connection with each argument, in their regular place, I shall here give a few principles that will enable us to see the fallacy of Mill's reasoning. They will be clearer when the general conclusion has been read.

In the first place, the specific types of nature are more than mere combinations of chemical elements. They have unity and a principle of unity constituting them as single substances, special types of perfection. These substantial perfections must be accounted for. If their existence is not the result of the operation of an efficient cause, what explains it? Mill explains it by force, but he does not tell us what he means by force. It seems to be a principle of local motion operating without any particular end in view. He

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does not deny the necessity of a self-existent first cause, but says that matter and force serve the purpose. He does not seem to have faced the fact that a self-existent being must be infinite in perfection, immaterial, and intelligent. This will be demonstrated later on, and needs to be taken for granted at this stage. The only reference made by Mill to this fact is when he denies the value of the argument that uses the existence of the human soul as a proof of the necessity of an intelligent and personal cause. The only observations to be made in answer to this are, that if an effect can surpass its cause in perfection, then being can spring from nonentity, that when an effect appears to surpass its cause, that cause is only a partial cause, or a causa per accidens. To use his comparison of plants, etc. springing from soil and manure, let us say that the perfection of a vegetable is attributable to a higher cause than earth and fertilizer. These are but partial causes. We must note furthermore, that while Mill was attacking the Scholastic argument for the necessity of an efficient cause ad esse, he was arguing about causes ad fieri, which fact changes the question considerably, although he does not say a word about the possibility of an infinite series of changes succeeding each other in time, such as his theory of self-existent matter and force would necessarily involve. Would not such a series be a contradiction in terms according to his system?

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From this we must also conclude that there is a first cause that is the source of all being---a cause that is uncaused, that needed no other cause to bring it into existence and that needs no cause to keep it in existence. This cause, having never been reduced from potency to act, must be pure act like the first mover the existence of which we proved in the first argument. As matter is potency, this cause must be immaterial. It must likewise be omnipresent in order to attain all other beings and keep them in existence. It is likewise all-powerful.

The Argument From Contingency.

In the preceding argument, we saw that the source of being must exist of itself and by itself. In this argument we shall prove the existence of a necessary being, that is, of a being that cannot not exist. The demonstration will be *a posteriori*, and starts from being itself as we have experience of it, i.e. from contingent being, or being that can not exist, i.e. being that may or may not exist, being of which existence is not one of the essential predicates. Existence is an essential predicate of a necessary being, just as to be three-sided belongs to the nature of a triangle.

The argument may be briefly stated as follows: there are in the world, contingent beings and series of contingent beings, or the world is made up of contingent beings.

Contingent beings and series of contingent beings require a necessary being to explain their existence. Therefore above and beyond the world there is a necessary being.

With regard to the major of the above argument, we may say that observation proves that there are contingent beings in the world. We see all around us beings coming into existence and passing out of existence. Plants grow up and die, animals are born, live, and die, inanimate substances enter into composition with other inanimate substances, and form new beings or compounds different from the substances that constitute them (chemical changes). This seems to be a sufficient explanation and proof of the major.

The minor is likewise easy enough to prove. Since contingent beings may or may not exist, we must admit that they do not account for their own existence. A being that accounts for its own existence is a being of which existence is a necessary predicate, a being that

cannot not exist, hence it would be necessary being. Once a being is said to account for its own existence, it must cease to be contingent. Since these contingent beings do not account for their own existence, something else must account for it, it must owe its existence to another being external to itself.

Likewise, we must say that no series of contingent beings can ever constitute a necessary being, no matter how extensive that series may be, even though it were infinite. Contingency is an attribute that is essential to the nature of these beings individually, and essential attributes are predicable not only of individuals but also of the whole body of such individuals whether that body is a series or not. Intelligence is an essential attribute of each individual man, and also of mankind in general. "We might as well say that although one idiot is not reasonable, a million idiots would suffice to form a reasonable being as to maintain that an infinite number of contingent substances would constitute a necessary being." (Joyce).

Neither can this necessary being be the law that unites contingent and transitory elements. A law does not explain itself nor explain all the beings to which it applies. A law supposes the existence of these beings and is a relation between them. A law may exist in the ideal order between hypothetical beings, but such a law has no actual existence and is only a hypothetical truth.

Positivists use the example of the law of the conservation of energy to support their claim that law does constitute the necessary being. The same explanation may be applied to it as to other laws. It supposes the existence of the beings in which energy exists. Furthermore, this law cannot be verified in the case of inorganic beings and is therefore not universal.

Many materialists take the view that matter, in the sense of the material substratum common to all natural substances, is necessary

being. This cannot be, because it is evident that matter is capable of receiving perfections that do not belong to it essentially. Perfections that are not essential must be due to something external to that in which they are received., because nothing can take place without a sufficient reason. If two things are found united, the sufficient reason cannot be found in either one of them. Of course, I mean things that are essentially distinct. Each one is the reason of its own attributes only. We do not need any explanation of why a triangle should have three ~~tri~~angles. That belongs to its essence. But we do need an explanation of why a particular triangle should be made of wood, or paper etc.

There is therefore ,a necessary being whose very essence is to exist, a being that enters into no species or genus,a being that has all perfection,since all perfections belong to the perfection of being,and as this being not only has being but is being,it not only has all perfection,but it is all perfection and must be said to be infinite perfection.

The Argument from the Degree of Perfection in the World.

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This argument is called the henological argument, because in it we reason from multiplicity to unity. From truth, goodness, etc., as we know them from experience, we show the necessity of admitting the existence of a being who is the True, the Good, etc., absolutely infinite in all perfections.

Before stating the argument, we must explain some of the terms that will be used. In the first place we are going to deal with the limited perfections, and show that they require the existence of absolute perfection. This expression "limited perfection" requires some explanation. We have no difficulty in understanding the idea of limitation with regard to quantity. We can readily see how quantity can be greater or less. We also readily admit that heat and light can be more or less intense, or more or less extensive. With regard to relative quantities, that are specified by the object to which they are applied, we also see the possibility (and the reality), of their being greater or less. Everybody admits that this is the case of science, and virtue for instance. The case is somewhat less clear when we speak of absolute quantities that have their specification within themselves. For those unfamiliar with Scholastic Philosophy, the matter is a little confusing. All of these qualities are not susceptible of being possessed in a greater or a less degree. Those that constitute the specific difference of species are not divisible. Man has the quality of being rational. That quality which constitutes his specific difference is indivisible. He has it. If he had not, he would not be man. Of course the faculty by which he reasons is susceptible of greater or less development. The same may be said of animality or of germs. A man and a lion both possess animality, and one has not more or less of it than the other. Substance also is indivisible in this respect.

These are, however, qualities that are called transcendental, qualities that are above all species and genera, qualities, whose concept implies or connotes no limit or imperfection, but which are limited with regard to the being in which they exist. This does not mean that they are restricted to a particular mode of being, but in the being in which these qualities exist, and they exist in all beings, they admit the idea of less or more. A being may have them in a greater or a less degree, and as we shall demonstrate, one being has them without limit. These transcendental qualities are:- being, unity, truth, and goodness. They are not diversified like the genera by an extrinsic specific difference, but they are on the contrary, continued in that very thing that makes beings vary one from the other. Thus every being has them in a manner and a degree proper to itself. These transcendental qualities belong to beings analogically not universally. Let us explain. A generic or a specific attribute is always universal, i.e. it always has the same signification in all the subjects of which it is predicated, it always expresses identically the same notion. For example,- the word animal denotes identically the same characteristics, whether it refers to a man, a lion, or an insect. These transcendental qualities or characteristics, however, are not identically the same in all the subjects of which they are predicated. They are only proportionally the same. The goodness of a man is not the same as the goodness of a horse. Nevertheless, there is a proportionate resemblance in the two cases. In one case the qualities that constitute the goodness are moral, and in the other they are physical. Similarly with regard to this argument. When we argue from the goodness of the creature to the goodness of the Creator, we do not mean that the goodness is in all respects the same in the two cases. There is always analogy when we pass from the finite to the infinite. We are now in a

position to expose our argument, in which we shall proceed from the fact of limited transcendental perfections in created beings, to the necessity of a being that is absolute in all these characteristics i.e. absolutely being or real, absolutely true, absolutely good.

We shall, first of all, expound the argument in a general way, and then apply it to truth and to goodness. The argument is as follows.

The things in our experience possess in common the perfections of being, of unity, of truth, and of goodness, perfections that do not involve in themselves any idea of imperfection.

Now, when one and the same perfection is found in different beings, it is impossible that they should possess it independently. All must have received it from one and the same source.

Furthermore, when this perfection is one whose concept implies no imperfection, its source must be that perfection itself subsisting as an independent being.

Therefore we must admit the existence of the Real, the One, the True and the Good.

The major requires no elucidation. The two minors, however, must be clearly established. We shall, therefore, make clear the grounds on which it is asserted, that when the same attribute is found in different individuals it cannot belong to each of them in its own right and in virtue of its being the particular thing it is. Even though there be but two such individuals, either one must have received the perfection in question, or both must have received it from a cause belonging to a higher order. With St. Thomas we must maintain, "Multitudo non reddit rationem unitatis." This follows from the principle of causality with regard to the union of diverse elements. "Quae secundum se sunt diversa non conveniunt in aliquod unum nisi per aliquam causam adunantem ipsa". This principle refers not only to the combination of different elements in a concrete

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being, but also applies to the combination of separate individuals in a single class. In such a union we have a combination of the diverse. The individual men that constitute humanity are, in virtue of their individuality, distinct, yet their common nature makes them specifically one. We cannot explain this unity, apart from a common cause. We cannot attribute the existence of such unity to each member in virtue of his being what he is. That would be equivalent to saying that the principle of unity and the principle of diversity are one and the same. What makes a man what he is, is his individuality, and individuality is the principle of distinction. It cannot be said, therefore, that a man is a man because he is the individual which he is.

In order to avoid all danger of being accused of falling into Platonism, let us say that while our argument leads us to conclude that when the same perfection is found in many individuals, we must refer this singularity to a single cause, we do not say that there are such things as immaterial essences the same as the material things themselves, although there are archetypal ideas in the Divine mind. Plato, on the other hand, taught that there exists a world of immaterial essences, the archetypes and causes of all sensible objects, but belonging to a supersensible plane of being. Now, there can be no such thing as an immaterial essence of a material nature. Matter belongs to the essence of material things. An immaterial essence of a material thing, subsisting as an individual, is a contradiction in terms. Such natures can exist only in the mind, as concepts.

With regard to our second minor:—"when this perfection is one whose concept implies no imperfection, its source must be that perfection itself, subsisting as an independent being.", let it be said that we are dealing here with a special kind of perfection, known as transcendental perfection, into the essence of which,

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matter does not necessarily enter. The concept of truth or goodness, involves no limits. Of course, we have knowledge and experience, only of limited truth and goodness, but this does not affect the significance of the terms which signify analagous perfections but do not limit them to the particular modes in which they are found in subjects of which they are predicated. These qualities, as we know them in this world, are all imperfect, composed of the perfections themselves and something that limits them. The limit that constitutes imperfections may be the contrary of the perfection, the privation of it, or its negation. What we are interested in is not what it consists in, but why it affects such perfections as truth, goodness, etc. , which are not of themselves mixed with their contraries Etc. Were we to say that these perfections are of themselves (de se), limited, we should be affirming that plurality is unity, that the diverse (de se), is one, that elements which of themselves, by their essence, do not demand to be united, are, as a matter of fact, united de se, which is equivalent to denying the principle of identity.

Now, the union of perfection and what limits perfection, not being unconditional, requires an extrinsic reason to explain it. This extrinsic reason cannot be found in the subject in which we find both the perfection and its limit, because what constitutes the subject and makes it what it is, is proper to itself, while, on the contrary, the perfection we are considering in the subject, truth, for instance, exists also in other subjects. Furthermore, what constitutes a being, i.e. its essence, is indivisible and cannot be said to have degrees of existence, and cannot be, and is not, the same as the limited perfection under consideration.

Whatever is in a being without belonging to its essence, is something that is due, therefore, to an extrinsic cause. The being that has such a perfection, not having it essentially, must receive it from another, and ultimately from a being that has it of

itself, immediately and according to its essence. Hence we arrive at the conclusion that there exists a being that is being itself, that is, essentially One, True, and Good. We must arrive at the existence of a being containing all these perfections not only eminently, i.e. in a higher manner in such a way that the same definition is not verified when we refer to those perfections in that first being and in lower beings, but the being whose existence we must admit, must have all of these perfections formally, i.e. the essential characteristics of these perfections must enter into the definition whether we refer to them in the being causing them or in the beings in which they are caused. As we affirmed above, this being must not only have formally the perfections it confers, but it must be those perfections. Being, Truth, Beauty, must be a subsistent entity. The cause of being must be subsistent being, etc.

FIRST INTELLIGENCE.

So far, we have proven the existence of a First Being whose essence is being, who is being. We shall now proceed to apply the proof already given to the transcendental quality of intelligence. St. Thomas applies the proof by degrees of perfection to the intelligence and combines it with the proof from movement. We shall say nothing here concerning the proof from movement, seeing that it has already been proven. The following are St. Thomas' words:-

" Considerandum est quod supra animam intellectivam humanam si necesse est ponere aliquem superiorem intellectum, a quo animo virtutem intelligendi obtineat. Semper enim quod participat aliquid, et quod est mobile, et quod est imperfectum, praeexigit ante se aliquid quod est per essentiam suam tale, et quod est immobile et perfectum. Anima autem humana intellectiva dicitur per participationem intellectualis virtutis: cujus signum est quod non tota est intellectiva, sed secundum aliquam suam partem. Pertingit

etiam ad intelligentiam veritatis cum quondam discursu et motu arguendo. Habet etiam imperfectam intelligentiam, tum quia non omnia intelligit, tum quia in his quae intelligit de potentia procedit ad actum. Oportet ergo esse aliquem altiorem intellectum quo anima juvetur ad intelligendam." (1a Pars, q.79 a4.).

Intelligence, not being a genus, but being analogous, and defined by relation to being is susceptible of being realized in different degrees, and must therefore, exist in some being pure and without mixture of potency or limit. Man is intellectual insofar as he is immaterial, insofar as his soul rising above the limits of matter, space and time permits him to know, not only particular beings but also being in the full extent of the meaning of the word. As man is not Being de se his intelligence is relative to his being, and hence, limited. It is an accident and his intellectual operation is an accidental act of his intelligence. Pure being subsisting by itself must be intelligent also in the measure in which it is immaterial, As such a being is absolutely immaterial, its intelligence must be intelligence itself, i.e. being itself in the sense of supreme intelligibility and always actually known.

There is no duality of subject and object here, because such duality comes from potentia or imperfection in one or in the other (subj. or obj.). In our act of intelligence the fact^{ulity} becomes intentionally the object it knows. The knowing and the known intellect are identified. There is a certain duality of subject which results from the fact that our intelligence is not actually knowing and known at all times. In God, this intellect must always actually be knowing and known, and hence there is no duality of subject and object, but intelligence pure and simple. Pure intelligence and pure being are identified absolutely in God.

This last statement, i.e. pure intellection and pure being are absolutely identified in God, is also equally evident if we consider him not as the just intelligence, but as the first intelligence. God is always actually intelligible and known, -always eternal intellection. St. Thomas states this as follows,-

"Invenitur in rebus aliquid magis et minus verum. Sed magis et minus dicuntur de diversis secundum quod appropinquant diversimode ad id quod maxime est. Est igitur aliquid quod est veracissimum. Quod autem dicitur maxime tale in aliquo genere est causa omnium quae sunt illius generis." (1a q.2 a3.).

There is a hierarchy of truths as well as a hierarchy of being. As we have contingent beings and a necessary being, we have contingent truths and necessary truths. We have truths that are purely contingent, i.e. facts, we have the conclusions of particular sciences and we have first principles. These first principles are eternal and independent of their realization, - they would remain as objective truths even though all contingent realities should disappear. "Remotis omnibus singularibus ^{hominibus,} ~~XXXXXX~~, adhuc remaneret rationabilitas attribuibilis humanae naturae". (Quodlibet viii q.1 a. ad 1 um.), - we do not mean to say here that essences are eternal quantum ad esse existentiae, because esse without existence is nothing, but we do mean that these truths are absolute in the order of possibility and intelligibility, that they dominate contingent realities, but they are conditionally as far as existence is concerned.

From this fact we can proceed a posteriori to demonstrate the existence of God, the Supreme Intelligible. These truths being anterior to the existence of contingent beings must be founded on the existence of a necessary being, and in that necessary being they must be found as intelligible truths known from all eternity.

There is a common element, eternal and necessary truth, in all

the necessary truths that we know. This common element is realized in different degrees in different truths. It is more perfect in a first principle than in a conclusion arrived at by a process of reasoning. This common element cannot be accounted for by the contingent realities that surround it, nor by our individual and contingent intelligences. Neither can they find their reason for existence one in the other, because they are multiple and they are not all of the same degree. In virtue of the principle already invoked, we must conclude that these various truths require the existence of a Supreme Truth. "The Maxime verum" that ST. Thomas mentions, - a Supreme Truth that is the source of all intelligibility. This Supreme Intelligible must be intelligible and known in actu, and is identical with the first intelligence. It must also be independent of our intelligences, which are contingent, not even causes of themselves, and hence incapable of being a condition of the existence of the First Intelligence.

We are not interested here in showing how all truth is contained in the Supreme Truth. We aim simply at demonstrating the existence of such a truth.

FIRST GOOD.

This Supreme Being and also the First Intelligence is also the Supreme Good. This conclusion is arrived at by the consideration of man's natural desire of happiness or beatitude. The argument may be stated as follows; the desire for full and complete happiness unmixed with any imperfections is common to all men of all times, is in fact inborn in the soul.

The existence of such a constitutional tendency indicates that a satisfaction corresponding to the desire is to be found.

But no finite good can satisfy the soul. Therefore we must find an infinite good which is God himself.

Before explaining and establishing ^{the} premisses of this argument, it is necessary to point out that when we say that all men desire perfect happiness, we do not mean that every man must have at some time or other found some idea of such a state and that he must have elicited the wish of enjoying it. The desire we refer to is not necessarily an act of the will but a tendency of the will belonging to its nature and determining the direction of its activities.

Beatitude as we use it here means a state in which the will has found repose in the possession of good, a state in which it seeks no further because its appetencies are completely satisfied.

We are now in a position to establish our major: man naturally desires beatitude or the possession of good.

Man is always seeking something good, to obtain something which attracts him or to avoid something which he views as an ~~evil~~ evil. Sometimes he makes mistakes in his choice and chooses apparent good for real good, but when he chooses something that is in reality bad, he chooses because of the good aspect of the object, it may be good of an inferior order, but it captivates him and he seeks it because for some reason or another he does not reason out the relation between different goods at the moment. We are not interested here, in the effects of concupiscences, but simply in noting a particular fact of experience. What we mean to stress, is, that what man's will seeks, is the good. Now since experience shows that man seeks the good in everything he does, it follows that the object of his will is the good in its universality. The will involves a longing for all good.

Our first minor:- The existence of such a desire or constitutional

tendency indicates that a satisfaction corresponding to it is to be found, is proved by showing that the voice of nature is not deceptive. It is a fact evident to all that there is no natural tendency for which a corresponding satisfaction is not to be found. This holds good throughout all nature. By induction we can demonstrate it. The formula "Nature does nothing in vain", is a concise statement of the principle involved. Now, man has the desire for the possession of good. It is a natural, not an acquired, desire, it is a fundamental characteristic that makes the will what it is. To suppose, therefore that this craving of the will for happiness or beatitude lacks a corresponding object is to suppose a wholly irrational element in nature.

Our second minor:- No finite good can satisfy this desire or constant tendency of the will, it is easy to establish. Seeing that no finite good can contain all good or good in its universality, and that no series of finite goods can combine to form universal or absolute good without mixture of imperfections, no finite good can satisfy man's will.

The conclusion follows,- therefore,- he must find the object of his will in God the infinite Being, etc.

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Our argument proves what we have already affirmed above before treating the question of the First Intelligence, i.e. that the degrees of perfection in the universe show the necessity of admitting the existence of a being that has all of these perfections formally. From what has been said in connection with the other arguments, it is easy to conclude that such a being must be pure act, not only having but also being all perfection infinitely. Such a being is, therefore immaterial, omnipresent etc. since it is the cause of all perfection in other beings.

The Argument From Order in the Universe, or the Teleological Argument.
.. .. .

St. Thomas enunciates this argument as follows:-

"The fifth way is taken from the governance of the world; for we see that things that lack intelligence, such as natural bodies, act for some purpose, which fact is evident from their acting always, or nearly always, in the same way, so as to obtain the same result. Hence it is plain that not fortuitously but designedly, do they achieve their purpose. Whatever lacks intelligence cannot fulfil some purpose, unless it is directed by some being endowed with intelligence and knowledge; as the arrow is shot to ^{its} mark by the archer. Therefore some intelligent being exists by whom all natural things are ordained towards a definite purpose; and this being we call God." (1 q.2, a.3.)

We may summarize this proof as follows:

Nature offers us on every side instances of ~~adaptation~~^{of} means to ends.

The ~~adaptation~~^{of} means to ends is an evident sign of an intelligent cause.

Therefore there is an intelligent cause of this ~~adoption~~^{of} means to ends in nature.

Before proceeding to the proof of our premisses, let us briefly explain the word "means". Every cause is not a means, a cause whose action has been determined in view of result as an end. The wind blowing down trees is a cause, but not a means, while on the contrary, the bit in the horse's mouth is the means of control.

Now let us establish our major. This hardly requires much demonstration. It seems sufficiently evident that everything that exists has a final cause, but there are some who deny this. They affirm that ~~sufficient~~ causality is alone sufficient to explain the natural

order. Let it be observed here, that they have not in mind the efficient cause whose existence we proved in our second argument. They say that man acts with a definite end in view, because he is conscious and rational, but that we have no reason to attack this conception of the works of nature. The bird, they say, does not possess wings in order that it may fly, but it flies because it has wings.

This way of arguing is misleading because it makes use of examples that are widely different and do not serve as illustrations of the same thing. In the case of man, we have an example of external finality, and in the case of the bird we have internal finality, - the actual operation of the organ in question, the wings. There is internal finality in man too, but in the example given by the adversaries of our argument, reference is made only to the external finality of man's actions.

Our argument does not rest on external finality but on internal finality.

It is an undeniable fact that our intellect recognizes finality in nature's operations. Finality is one of those features of reality that forms the proper object of the intellect. The mind apprehends what a thing is and why a thing is when the requisite conditions are present. It judges of the four causes. An example frequently given is the following: - when the mind considers the *arrival of a* female animal of the class of mammals, and knows that animal possesses glands for the secretion of milk, which glands function at the time of parturition, and produce milk which is the food best adapted for the nourishment of its new born offspring, it recognizes without possibility of doubting, that nature has given these glands to the mother animal for the purpose of feeding her young.

It would be nonsensical and opposed to ~~the~~ clear perception of the intellect to adopt the views of those who say that the mother feeds her young on her own milk because she happens to have milk.

Of course we sometimes make mistakes and reach wrong conclusions, but this is accidental, and explained by the fact that we reason sometimes without sufficient data. Nevertheless there are many cases where the evidence is so clear that we cannot possibly make a mistake. We know that under due conditions, that the evidence of our senses is infallible with regard to their proper object, though sometimes they deceive us because of abnormal conditions. The same is true of the mind's judgment within its special province.

So far as the facts of nature are concerned, we must say that they, more than any form of reasoning fully demonstrate the necessity of a final cause. Let us use the example already mentioned, i.e. the example of the wings of a bird. These wings have a function, and that function is a single perfection. It is like the function of the eye or ear. This singleness or unity is not a unity of composition or a unity per accidens, but a unity per se. The organ itself is complex, but it has a principle of unity. It produces a single effect. It cannot be contended that the constituent parts of an organ acting separately and independently result in a combined effect. We can admit that a plurality of causes acting independently may be imagined to unite by chance to produce a composite result, but we cannot admit the same thing when we consider a simple result, because a simple result requires an objective principle of unity before it can be produced by diverse agents.

We must conclude that the only principle of unity capable of producing such a simple effect is a principle consisting in a relation to the end to be realized, a relation whose office determines the separate agents to the production of the end, or determining the agents in view of their final cause.

If we do not admit such a principle, we must suppose that a plurality of physical agents, each operating according to its own specific nature, and without any determination toward the ultimate result, actually choose from the millions of possible courses or combinations open to them, that combination which leads to the result in question. This is the same as saying that order can result from chaos, or that perfection is the result of an agglomeration of imperfections.

There is another kind of finality in the world, of which we may take notice here as an illustration of the major of our argument, and that is aesthetic finality. Who has not admired the beauty of the world of nature that surrounds us, the order or the symmetry of natural objects, - the beauty of the smallest flower or of a vast forest. It was Joyce Kilmer who said, after describing a tree, in the most picturesque language:

"Poems are made by fools like me,

But only God can make a tree."

Artists fail miserably in their attempts at producing color schemes that even remotely resemble those found in nature. Everybody knows how difficult it is to reproduce the perfect proportions of a natural object and express them in stone or otherwise. Nevertheless, these perfections of proportion, color, etc., are found everywhere in nature. It must be clear to all reasonable and reasoning men that this beauty results from design and not from chance. Here we see results constantly the same, constantly perfect. This shows the need of admitting a final cause adapting means to ends.

Our minor: - "the adoption^{at} of means to ends is an evident sign of an intelligent cause," is easy to prove.

As we said above, means are causes directed towards an end, or determined in view of an end. Only an intelligence has power to apprehend the relation of one thing to another, or to understand the

proportion of an means to its end. It seems clear, therefore, that only an intelligent ^{cause} ~~course~~ can set one thing in relation to another as its end. An example frequently given to illustrate this truth, and used by Joyce, is the definition of man as " A tool-using animal". Man is a "tool-using" animal because he is a rational animal.

Our conclusion stands therefore, and we must admit the existence of an intelligent cause of the order existing in the world.

This argument has not come down to us unchallenged, however. There have been, and there are, adversaries to each of our premises. We shall proceed to deal with them in order.

In the first place, we have Descartes, who makes the following objection: Man cannot be the end of creation.**** It is impossible and absurd to pretend that the sun which is so many times larger than the earth exists to give light and heat to man, who occupies but a small part of the earth. We may say at the outset, that this objection refers to external finality, which Descartes himself seems to admit elsewhere. With regard to external finality, Garrigou - Lagrange (p.317.) says in substance, that we are often unable to determine what it is in particular cases. For instance, a venomous serpent has no apparent reason to account for its existence. This lack of power to discern the final cause of a serpent, does not, however prove that there is no such cause, but that our human intellect is too limited to ascertain what it is.

With regard to internal finality, we may say that in the venomous serpent as in all other creatures, this finality is manifest. The eye exists to see with, etc.

We come now to **exelutionism** as taught by Darwin, Spencer, Haeckel, etc. These gentlemen pretend to explain all order in nature by what they call natural selection and the struggle for life. According to Darwin the offspring of plants and animals is subject to fortuitous variations, and those individuals which were fortunate enough to come

into existence with some difference that gave them an advantage over the normal individuals of the type, survived at the expense of the others, and transmitted their peculiarities to their descendents. Each generation developed further and further along the lines of the first advantageous difference from the normal type. In this way he explains the development of all the organs.

This theory is absolutely valueless. It is as Garrigan-Lagrange shows us, contrary to common sense, to science, and to philosophical reasoning.

Common sense or spontaneous reasoning cannot help but see in all co-ordinations of parts, as in an organ, or in all co-ordinations of acts, as the work of bees etc., a *raison d'etre* or a final cause. When our reason sees spontaneously that there is something rational in the objects it views, it also knows that it sees this rationality, (in this case finality), because it is there in reality.

Scientists generally admit that the structure of such a complicated organ as the eye cannot result from the "Survival of the fittest", or by hazard. Diderot once said that by emptying a case of type a sufficient number of times, one would ultimately arrive at a combination of letters that would give a complete text of the Iliad. This, however, has never been taken seriously as a possibility. It seems that the chances in favour of such a combination are as one is to infinity.

If we turn now to sound philosophical reasoning, we see that this theory is likewise untenable. The adoption of means to ends as we meet with it in nature cannot be accounted for by chance, nor by necessity.

Chance is not an explanation, but the absence of all explanation.

When we say that a thing happened by chance, we mean that exceptio-
nally, accidentally, something occurred as if intended by an intelli-
gent cause. Chance is but the meeting or union of two actions, that
in themselves ^{are} intentional. The example most frequently given is
that of man digging a hole and finding a treasure. Digging the hole
is intentional, although it has a purpose altogether independent of
finding a treasure. The treasure hidden in the ground was intention-
ally placed there. Aristotle tells us that it is accidental that a
man be at the same time a doctor and a musician, but it is not
accidental that a doctor knows medicine or that the musician knows
music. If we try to explain the natural order by chance, we are
trying to ~~secure~~ ^{reduce} what is essential to what is accidental, and hence
to destroy all nature and even all being. As ~~Carrigon~~-Lagrange points
out we should say that there would be nothing in the world but
accidental (fortuitous) encounters, without anything to be encountered.

(cf. P. 322-323, etc.).

Necessity does not explain the ^{adoption} of means to ends as we
find it in nature. By necessity in this sense, we mean efficient
cause and its inherent determination. This statement is open ~~to~~
to serious objections. In the first place, if there is in the
action of such an efficient cause no end or good corresponding to
the natural inclination of the agent, its action is produced for no
reason at all. Why then, should an efficient cause act? And what
explains this determination in the efficient cause? If we are to
explain the flying of the bird by the formation of its wings, we must
explain the necessity of such a formation, and proceed until we
ultimately reach a final cause.

Here, we might profitably note a difference between mathematical

laws and principles, and physical laws and principles. A triangle in geometry, i.e., without considering the material or the efficient causes, is necessarily three-sided. If, however, we consider a triangular object, matters are different. In geometry we say that a triangle has three sides, as a result of its very nature. In physics, we can ask ourselves why a certain object is triangular, because a triangular object requires a cause. We cannot impose mathematical abstractions on such sciences as Cosmology, etc. These sciences deal with the four causes of being, while mathematics deals with only one (the formal cause).

(cf. P. 327 - - .)

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The existence of an intelligent cause ordering all things is the only explanation of the order that exists in the universe. Internal finality is manifest in all beings. Descartes' objection concerning external finality is only an apparent difficulty. All that it proves is that in certain particular cases our finite intellect cannot at first sight determine the final cause. It does not prove that there is no such final cause. Evolution with its theories of the struggle for life, the survival of the fittest etc. being refuted above we must still adhere to the existence of a first intelligence disposing all things, a first intelligence that is being itself, because such an intelligence being the cause of all order could not be itself ordained to being by something outside itself. It follows, therefore that this intelligence has all the perfections of the first mover, the efficient cause, the necessary being and of the being that is all perfection. This first intelligence is identified with the first mover etc., as we shall say later on.

COROLLARIES.

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The arguments developed in this thesis are purely metaphysical, as has been said already, but there are other arguments that have been used from time to time and that appeal to a great many people, impressing some more than the metaphysical demonstration given in this essay. It seems necessary, or at least appropriate, to mention some of them here, and to pass judgment on their value as proofs of the existence of God.

In the first place, we meet a number of what are called scientific proofs of God's existence, which arguments tend to show that a simple intrinsic evolution of matter is not sufficient to account for vegetable life, sensitive life, and especially for intellectual life. Such arguments are valuable as indications of something above the world to direct its evolution, but in order to be really cogent arguments they must be supported by the metaphysical demonstration that this principle is pure actuality, necessary being, etc.

With regard to the proof drawn from the common consent of mankind, we must concede that it has a certain value. It does not demonstrate the existence of God, but it supplies a strong presumption that there are real proofs of his existence, which is something different. The argument by itself cannot be used as a proof of God's existence because the unanimous verdict of mankind is not always infallible. Many of the ideas that were universally held in Astronomy for instance, have been abandoned in modern times.

There is an argument drawn from the higher aspirations of mankind. Man yearns for happiness which consists ultimately in

the possession of the good and the true. The good and the true are found in God alone. Therefore God exists.

This argument is based on the assumption that our nature is a perfect production. But, our nature is a perfect production because God has made it. We cannot argue from the needs of that nature to the necessity of the existence of God. Another point that may be mentioned in this connection is that the only reason why we need God as the satisfaction of the aspirations of our nature is that we need God as a necessary explanation of the world, and thus we must revert to our metaphysical arguments again.

With regard to the argument drawn from man's feeling of moral obligation to avoid evil and do good, it must be noted at the outset, that when man admits this moral obligation, it is because he already has admitted the existence of God. Otherwise, his feeling of moral obligation would be an illusion.

Secondly, our human nature itself has a tendency towards what perfects it. Evil is repugnant to the law of our nature. I mean a law that comes from our very being, a law in man with regard to right and wrong that resembles the laws of chemistry or any other natural science, not necessarily an ordinance of a superior etc. Of course this law of nature in us comes from God, but we ignore this fact until we know that God exists, so that a man that ignores the existence of God could still feel a tendency to avoid evil and do good.

Hence we must conclude that this argument by itself does not prove the existence of God, but is a development of the argument from the degrees of perfection in the universe, and to a certain extent a development of the argument from contingency or of the

argument from movement, because the necessary being, the immovable motor proved by these two arguments cannot feel itself under any obligation. Neither can he progress in perfection or goodness, seeing that he is perfection itself.

(cf. Mercier).

CONCLUSION.

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In this essay, I have attempted to develop the five metaphysical arguments that prove the existence of God. To these I have added a few words of explanation of the physical and moral arguments and I have said that though these confirm the conclusion arrived at i.e., the existence of God, their value depends ultimately on the metaphysical proofs already given.

To sum up the conclusions arrived at, I shall, at the risk of repeating what has already been said, gather up the tangled ends of each argument and endeavour to present the necessary result of this reasoning from the metaphysical principles. What has been proven so far?

The first argument, as I have already said, demonstrates the existence of a first motor that is not moved by a superior motor - an immovable motor - a motor that does not receive movement, but acts by itself - a motor that is its own activity and consequently its own being, because "operari sequitur esse et modus operandi modum essendi". As there can be no potentia in this being, either in the order of activity or in the order of being, the first motor must be "ipsum esse subsistens". This is further explained in St. Thomas. (1a q.3 a.4).

The second argument proves the existence of an uncaused cause which must be being itself.

The third argument proves the existence of a necessary being that not only has a capacity for existence but is existence itself - "Ipsum esse subsistens".

The proof from the degrees of perfection in beings shows that in virtue of the principle of causality we must ultimately arrive at a being that is absolutely perfect and therefore absolutely simple - a being that has never received any perfection

and that can never receive anything - and absolutely transcendent being really and essentially distinct from the world which is complex and therefore imperfect.

The last proof shows the necessity of arriving at a final cause of the world, a supreme intelligence ordering and disposing everything in the world, because intelligence alone can be the cause of order. Beings deprived of reason act according to a natural tendency and tend towards an end, but, as St. Thomas says do not perceive in the object towards which they tend the formal notion of an end, they have only a sensible knowledge of this end and they are really moved towards it by an intelligence that controls the universè. I think that it is sufficiently clear in this proof that the Supreme Intelligence must be "Ipsum intelligere subsistens" - intellection itself.

These five arguments prove or demonstrate the existence of God who is "Ipsum esse subsistens", above and beyond and independent of the world and therefore distinct from it.

To deny this is equivalent to denying the principle of causality. To deny the principle of causality and declare that changeable (mutable), contingent, complex, imperfect and relative beings, do not require an immutable, necessary, simple, perfect and intelligent cause, is a denial of the principle of contradiction. To illustrate, let us take the example of a contingent being. Were it to exist without a cause, it would exist neither by itself nor by another, and would not be distinguished from non-entity. Ens, would at the same time be non-ens. The same thing can be demonstrated with regard to the four other arguments.

It seems unnecessary to call attention to the fact that these five arguments do not call for the existence of five different beings.

They all demonstrate the existence of a being that is being itself, pure act, and hence unique. I think that from what has been said in the course of this essay, that point has been sufficiently cleared up.

There is, however, a point upon which we may lay some stress, and that is the fact that God, whose existence these arguments demonstrate, is not only distinct from the world, but is also a personal God. Of course, this essay does not call for any explanation of God's attributes. Nevertheless, I shall deal with them insofar as it is necessary to prove the personality of God.

From what we have demonstrated, especially in the first argument, it is manifest that in God there can be no potentia. God not only can and does act, but He is His own action. In God there is not, never has been, and never can be, transitus from potentia to Actus in any sense of the word. He is pure act. Existence is an essential predicate of His. Now a being that is pure actus, a being that has no potentia, must be absolutely spiritual. There can be no matter in such a being, because matter is potentia. If there is no matter in God, if He is limited in no way, He cannot be anything else but a pure spirit and therefore He must be intelligent, because immateriality is the basis of intelligence. Moreover, we have shown that God is a supreme intelligence (fourth argument).

Now, what are the essential notes of personality ? Person is defined as follows; " Substantia individua rationalis naturae." A person must be a substance. There is no doubt concerning that point with regard to God. A person must also be rational or intelligent. That has been demonstrated above , with regard to

God. Finally there is the note of incommunicability (substantia individua). This means that a person is a suppositum, an individual, i.e. has existence distinct from every other being (ens a quolibet ente ^{alio} divisum)-- a being that is neither an integral part nor a constitutive part of some whole. This note of individuality or incommunicability is verified in God. This has been sufficiently demonstrated when we made it clear that the first motor, first cause, etc., is distinct from all other beings above and beyond all possible series of subordinate motors, causes, etc.

We must remember, in this connection, that personality is predicated analogously of God and of man. Personality, as we conceive of it, implies a certain consciousness of self, and this consciousness of self requires a consciousness of at least another than self. This, however, is not an essential note of personality as such, but results from human intelligence which derives its knowledge from without. A newly-born infant, although unaware of his personality, is a person. God, contemplating His own infinite perfection needs no being outside of Himself to make Him aware of His personality.

It is clear therefore, that God is a personal God, and, although personality is predicated of him and of man analogously, he has the essential notes of personality, and those notes which are diverse in God and in man are accounted for by the imperfection of our human intellect. They in no way belong to personality as such.

The fact of God's being personal adds emphasis to what has been said concerning his being distinct from the world, for it is one of the essential properties of a person to be distinct from all other beings, to be an individual, to have the note of incommunicability

PANTHEISM.

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While we are dealing with the question of God's being distinct from the world, it might be well to show that Pantheism is not only not established by proofs, but that it also is a contradiction in itself. Pantheism leads to a negation of God or to a denial of the existence of the world.

There are three groups of Pantheists,, those who teach that God is the soul of the world. This was the doctrine of the Stoics. Others hold that God is the matter of the world. This was held by some early Ionian philosophers. Finally, a third group of philosophers, the Amerroistes teach that God is the efficient cause of the world, but that He must necessarily produce the world, which is an emanation from God who is not the free cause of the universe.

These are the ancient forms of Pantheism. The modern forms can easily be reduced to these first expressions of the doctrine. Spinoza and Schelling hold a doctrine that may be summed up as follows: God becomes the world. Hegel teaches that the world becomes God by an ascending scale of evolution which he conceives from the point of view of an idealist., Hœckel, from the materialistic standpoint, maintains the same ascending evolution that Hegel does. No matter what way we take it, Pantheism makes God one with the world. Either God absorbs the world or the world absorbs God.

It would seem a sufficient refutation of this error to establish positively that God is distinct from the world, as I have already done. Nevertheless, I shall say a few words in

refutation of the three forms of Pantheism mentioned above, and furnish principles for the refutation of the modern expressions of the error.

In the first place, the metaphysical proof of God's existence, given above, makes it clear that God is the supreme cause of all perfection in the universe, and that He must be an absolutely simple cause. If He were the soul of the world, He would be part of a complex being, and therefore less perfect than the being of which He is said to be a part.

The arguments by which we established the existence of a First Motor, an Efficient Cause, and a Necessary Being, give us the key to the solution of all difficulties arising from the teachings of those who say that God is the matter of the world. Matter cannot be the principle of its own activity, etc.

So far as the last group, those who say that God is the efficient cause of the world which he produces necessarily, are concerned, our metaphysical proof furnishes the principles by means of which they are refuted. We have made it clear that every natural agent needs to be directed by an intelligent first cause, which cause acts by intelligence and will, not by any necessity of its nature. If God acted by necessity of nature, he would produce effects specifically similar to Himself. We would have no explanation of the variety that exists among His works. As God is infinite perfection, creation can add nothing to Him, and therefore there can be no motive necessitating the creation of the universe.

The world cannot be an emanation ^{from} God, because God would have to be material and divisible, for something of Himself to pass from Him into the world. We have shown that He is spiritual and indivisible. Neither can we be called accidents of the

divine substance, because the divine substance is pure act incapable of receiving further determination and therefore cannot have accidents.

This brief refutation of Pantheism is taken, substantially from Garrigou-Lagrange p.784 - 786, and in giving it I have aimed at pointing out where the principles are to be found rather than at developing them. Any development would necessitate the repetition of what has been said already in establishing the metaphysical arguments.

ATHEISM.

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What shall I say concerning atheism and Atheists ?

Atheism is not so easy to define, as might appear at first sight. Vaguely it is understood to be the doctrine of those who ignore or deny the existence of God. Lortie divides atheists into two groups:- practical ~~atheists~~ and speculative ~~atheists~~.

Practical ~~atheists~~ he defines as men who are totally indifferent about the question of the existence of God - men who never occupy their minds with the problem - men who live as though God did not exist. Speculative ~~atheists~~, on the other hand, he tells us, are those who lack knowledge of the existence of God, either because they ignore this science or deny it. Those who simply ignore the existence of God through ignorance of the reasoning or the revelation that makes His existence known to us are called negative ~~atheists~~ and those who openly deny God's existence are called positive ~~atheists~~.

Are there really any ~~atheists~~ in the world ? Lortie has a thesis:- "In homine ratione utente, dari non potest invincibilis ignorantia existentiae Dei". In this thesis he proves that any ignorance of the existence of God that may be met within individuals is ~~invincible~~ ignorance i.e., ignorance that can be overcome, because of the fact that the arguments by which God's existence is established are very easy to understand. The principle of causality is so clear and evident that no man who uses his reason can fail to arrive at the conclusion that there is a God. The a posteriori demonstration of this truth is so clear that it must at least leave in the minds of those who declare themselves positive ~~atheists~~, a doubt, or a fear of error. When there is a fear of error in one's knowledge there is no certitude and

therefore there can be no positive ~~atheists~~, though it is possible there can be many men who are seriously of the opinion that there is no God, which is not the same thing at all, for opinion is not certitude, and wrong opinions can be corrected. Hence it can be concluded that there can be no such thing as invincible ignorance of God's existence for a man that uses his reason.

What I have given so far is the speculative side of the question. A study of the works of the more important contemporary philosophers who do not admit our thesis, discloses the fact that these men are not ~~atheists~~ in the strict sense of the word, i.e., they ~~are~~ not absolutely atheists. It does not follow, however, that they ~~are~~ atheists. They are neither one nor the other. They write of God, but for them God is impersonal. They seem to recognize a divine influence in the world but do not admit a personal God. Their teachings are not very easy to grasp because they are not clearly defined, and they are constantly changing. It is easier to pick out what truths they deny than to find any positive doctrine among them. Of course we must remember that error cannot possess the quality of being clear. Clearness belongs to truth and falsehood is always obscure. All systems opposed to truth find it simpler to deny than to affirm. They substitute for the personal God distinct from the world, what they call the Idea, the Unconscious, the blind will or the eternal axiom.

Proclaiming one or all of these to be what we call God, these men disclose that History and Psychology are opposed to our teaching of a personal God but they fail to prove anything. Their statements are very broad and general, and at the same time very

misleading. They will declare, for instance, that "Science demonstrates clearly that there is no God," forgetting the distinction between science and sciences. Science is the certain and evident knowledge of a thing through its causes. Science is knowledge that is certain and leaves no room for doubt, Science gives us truth and truth is one and immutable. Sciences, on the contrary are teachings based on theories and hypotheses. Now a hypothesis is just a ^{long} ~~good~~ word for a good guess. We make a hypothesis and build up a system upon it and arrive at all kinds of conclusions, but our conclusions are of no more value than their foundation, and this foundation is constantly being shot from under our conclusions because discoveries, etc. show that the hypothesis upon which they rest is no longer tenable. Another guess is made and it holds good until further developments show that it is worthless. Thus our atheists proceed without any certitude regarding their conclusions and illogically endeavour to maintain them in the face of incontrovertible metaphysical arguments as well as in contradiction to Revelation. Here, of course, I must limit myself to the philosophical side of the question. If they said that there are many opinions current that are contrary to the facts already established concerning God's existence and nature, they would be speaking correctly, but they are most unreasonable to set opinions based on theories and hypotheses against the established principles of metaphysics and still call themselves philosophers. Truth being one cannot be in contradiction with itself. A truth of metaphysics cannot be false in physics or chemistry or astronomy etc. The trouble is that these writers do not know their metaphysics or have forgotten the limitations of their particular sciences.

We cannot say, of course, that all professed atheists ignore the arguments that demonstrate the existence of God. Those who ignore them, and those who do not desire to learn them because they prefer to live as if God did not exist, are not the most interesting cases met with. There are others who know our arguments and they are quite capable of understanding and of expounding them. Why do they not admit them? The most that can be said is that these writers examine our arguments not for the purpose of discerning truth, but in a critical way, seeking for their weak points. If they displayed half the energy they use in trying to demolish them, in an honest endeavour to clear up their doubts and establish truth, we would have no adversaries to the thesis of the existence of God. Theirs is not so much a defect of logic as a defect of the will. They have ceased to believe because they no longer wish to believe. This general statement is difficult to apply to particular cases. Therefore I shall abstain from giving examples to illustrate the argument, although many could be found. Then, of course, we must remember Paul Bourget's famous sentence, - "Quand on ne vit pas comme on pense, on finit par vouloir penser comme on vit." It would be rash to apply this saying to all atheists, but it explains the attitude of some of them at least.