CANADA AND THE CHANAK CRISIS 1922

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CURRICULUM STUDIORUM

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INTRODUCTION

The issues of Canada's Imperial relations and her international status were far from precisely defined when the news of the Chanak crisis broke upon Canada in September, 1922. The crisis revealed the unsatisfactory nature of this state of affairs and the need for clarification of these issues. Since 1914, much progress had been made towards the achievement of Canadian autonomy within the British Empire, and towards greater control by Canada of her foreign relations. The first section of this study presents a consideration of this evolution in Canada's status from 1914 to 1922. It is followed by a survey of the Chanak crisis in its international setting.

The purpose of this study is to view the effects upon Canada of the Chanak crisis. The reaction of the Canadian government to the crisis is considered, and the following chapter deals with the opposition which the government faced as a result of its policy. The sequel presents an estimation of the Canadian government's policy and the effects of the crisis are considered to 1926.

The use of such terms as nationalism and imperialism is unavoidable. Nationalism may be defined as a condition of mind of a people in which the highest loyalty

is directed towards the nation state. However, in describing nationalism in Canada, this definition demands qualification, and French Canada must be considered separately.

In English-speaking Canada during the period under study, nationalism is best described as a feeling that the nation had a destiny to fulfill, and that this could hardly be accomplished while there were any vestiges of subordination in Canada's relationship to Great Britain. Yet few nationalists felt that there was any need for immediate action on the relatively unsatisfactory state of affairs which existed in the early 1920's. Indeed, there were genuine feelings of affection for the mother country present in varying degrees throughout English-speaking Canada, and there was a realistic appreciation of the benefits which accrued from the imperial tie.

French Canadian nationalism reveals the highest loyalty directed towards French Canada as the nation state. There was little sentimental attachment to Great Britain, but there was little fear or suspicion either. These latter emotions were reserved for their English-speaking compatriots. French Canadians feared that the English-speaking zealot, in his enthusiasm for the Empire, might force unwarranted impositions upon French Canada.

The imperialist in Britain and in Canada believed that the British Empire, as a great force for good in the world, must be preserved and maintained. The true imperialist realized that this could be accomplished by agreeing to Dominion aspirations to greater autonomy. However, in this study, the imperialists referred to are those who feared that the Empire would be weakened as the bonds were loosened. This group felt that concessions to nationalistic desires must be resisted lest the Empire be ultimately dissolved.

It must be noted that the study has been completed without consultation of either the Mackenzie King Papers or the exchange of communications between the British and Canadian governments during the crisis; both of these sources were inaccessible. However, pertinent extracts from these two sources were available elsewhere.

CHAPTER I

EVOLUTION OF CANADA'S STATUS 1914-1922

Since the granting of responsible government in 1848, which ended the relatively simple mother country-colony association, Canada's relations with Great Britain and ultimately with the rest of the world slowly altered. Until 1914, this process of change towards quasi-equality was gradual and in Canada no sustained interest was displayed in the question of international status. The nation's energies were directed inwards[1] and focussed on the internal development and expansion of the country.

By 1914, Canada enjoyed autonomy in domestic affairs,[2] had the right to negotiate commercial treaties in practice, and had participated in several minor international conferences.[3] Control of military and naval defence was also in the hands of the Canadian government. Canada had made some noteworthy advances towards nationhood but she was still subordinate to Great Britain and this dependence was particularly evident in the field of foreign affairs.

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1 Arthur Berriedale Keith, Responsible Government in the Dominions, Vol. 2, Oxford, The Clarendon Press, 1927, p. 877.

2 G.P. deT. Glazebrook, A History of Canadian External Relations, Toronto, Oxford University Press, 1950, p.301.

3 Sir Robert Borden, Canada in the Commonwealth, From Conflict to Co-operation, Oxford, The Clarendon Press, p. 88.

When referring to Canada's position in foreign affairs at the outbreak of war in 1914, Glazebrook uses the phrase, "the last phase of colonial status".[1] By this he meant that in the conduct of foreign affairs Canada remained dependent on Great Britain. At the Imperial Conference of 1911, it had been resolved that in matters of interest to the whole Empire, the British government might consult the Dominions, "where time and opportunity and the subject matter permit";[2] but the opinions expressed were strictly advisory and could be discarded. Thus all formal control of such relations resided with the British government and Canada had no effective voice in the decisions on foreign policy made in London.[3] Canada had no diplomatic status and any representations to the Canadian government had to be made through British authorities; in 1907, official protests from Japan and China over the race riots in Vancouver were addressed to the British government.[4] Such a position of subordination could not continue indefinitely and, by 1914, it was becoming clear that Canada should have a voice in foreign policy decisions which would affect her.[5]

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1 Glazebrook, Op. Cit., p. 292.

2 Cmd 5741, Imperial Conference 1911, Précis of the Proceedings, H.M.S.O., p. 29.

3 Glazebrook, Op. Cit., p. 301.

4 Keith, Op. Cit., p. 861.

5 Borden, Op. Cit., p. 88.

The questions of foreign and imperial relations were extremely entangled[1] and the achievement of complete autonomy towards which Canada had been moving demanded that these questions be resolved. Yet many factors contributed towards procrastination in attempting to deal with these problems.

In spite of growing nationalism, few would wish to clarify Canada's international status if it meant a severance of the imperial tie. The other alternative, of having a real share in the formulation of foreign policy of the empire, was not much more attractive; for it would involve greater responsibilities and would reverse the process of evolution towards complete self-government.[2]

Canada's unwillingness to commit herself to closer imperial ties and thereby exert greater control

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1 G.P. deT. Glazebrook, "Canada and Foreign Affairs", Canadian Historical Review, Vol. 16, No. 2, 1935, p. 181.

2 R.M. Dawson, (ed.), The Development of Dominion Status 1900-1936, Toronto, Oxford University Press, 1937, p. 16-17.

over foreign policy had several origins. Sir Wilfrid Laurier,[1] particularly aware and concerned over the responsibilities concomitant with increased influence or consultation, had consistently refused any extension of Canada's control over the conduct of imperial foreign relations during the years 1896 to 1911 when he was prime minister.[2] His policy of avoiding commitments apparently satisfied most Canadians. The embarrassment of full liability for a foreign policy over which Canada exerted no influence was partially deflected or obscured by the precedent established long before 1914, that although when Britain was at war Canada was at war, Canada reserved the right to determine the extent of her participation.[3] The dangerous shortcomings of this

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1 Sir Wilfrid Laurier (1896-1919). He was chosen leader of the Liberal party in 1887. He became prime minister in 1896 and remained in power until 1911. At the outbreak of the First World War, 1914, he proclaimed a political truce and gave the Conservative government complete support. In the elections of 1917, fought on the issue of compulsory military service, he carried Quebec but was defeated in every other province and the Liberal party was badly split.

His years as prime minister left a deep impression on the country. At the several imperial conferences which he attended as prime minister, he successfully resisted any attempts to limit Canada's autonomy. He was a nationalist, but he was also completely loyal to Great Britain as shown in the Boer War and the First World War.

2 Arthur Berriedale Keith, Dominion Autonomy in Practice, London, Oxford University Press, 1929, p. 55.

3 Percy Elwood Corbett and Herbert Arthur Smith, Canada and World Politics, A Study of the Constitutional and International Relations of the British Empire, London, Faber and Gwyer, 1928, p. 72.

policy were overlooked and Canadians could congratulate themselves on keeping defence costs to a minimum while the internal development of the country went on apace behind the screen of security offered by the British navy and by their geographical position. During the prémiership of Sir Robert Borden[1] (1911-20) there was manifested a greater willingness to accept commitments providing Dominion autonomy was safeguarded. However, in the years from 1911 to 1914

> no steps were taken to implement the new approach, and thus the Canadian government remained in an ostritch-like pose while the British government continued to pursue a foreign policy which must have at least some effect on Canada.[2]

In summary, many factors contributed towards procrastination in dealing with the question of foreign affairs. There was an absence of urgency and an absence of consistent or unanimous opinion on the part of the several Dominions.[3] There were important advantages for

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1 Sir Robert L. Borden, (1854-1937). He was chosen leader of the Conservative party in 1901. In 1911, he became prime minister and, in 1917, formed a Unionist government of Conservatives and Liberals on a platform of compulsory military service. He represented Canada at the meetings of the Imperial War Cabinet and Conference in 1917 and 1918, and at the Paris Peace Conference in 1919. He resigned because of ill-health in July 1920, and retired from active politics.

2 G. P. deT. Glazebrook, Canada at the Paris Peace Conference, Toronto, Oxford University Press, 1942, p. 19.

3 Corbett and Smith, Op. Cit., p. 70.

Canada in the existing situation, and the problem of reaching a solution compatible with the continuance of Dominion autonomy and imperial unity was formidable. Furthermore, the avoidance of positive action had had satisfactory results which nurtured the prolongation of that policy.

The British declaration of war on August 4, 1914, brought the whole Empire into a state of war. Legally, the British declaration was binding on the whole Empire although the Dominions retained the right to determine the degree of their participation,[1] thereby upholding the position taken by Laurier. Great Britain carefully respected this position and made no appeals of any kind.[2] Canadian eagerness to participate as shown in her offer of a contingent of 30,000 men to serve overseas was gratifying but probably not surprising for the British government. The strength of the Imperial tie was considerable and it was clearly demonstrated in Borden's despatch of August 1st.

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1 Keith, Responsible Government . . . , p. 877-878.

2 Margaret Gordon, National Autonomy in Relation to Foreign Affairs, A Study in Canadian Development, unpublished Master's thesis, Department of History, University of British Columbia, 1927, p. 42.

> My advisers, while expressing their most earnest hope that peaceful solution of existing international difficulties may be achieved and their desire to co-operate in every possible way for that purpose, wish me to convey to His Majesty's Government the firm assurance that, if unhappily war should ensue, the Canadian people will be united in a common resolve to put forth every effort and to make every sacrifice necessary to ensure the integrity and maintain the honour of the Empire.[1]

No hint of the future racial controversy was to be seen in the enthusiastic and united Canadian response. Sir Wilfrid Laurier as leader of the Opposition clearly expressed this dedication and singleness of purpose.

> It is our duty, more pressing upon us than all other duties, at once, on this first day of this extraordinary session of the Canadian Parliament, to let Great Britain know, and to let the friends and foes of Great Britain know, that there is in Canada but one mind and one heart, and that all Canadians stand behind the mother country, conscious and proud that she has engaged in this war, not from any selfish motive, for any purpose of aggrandisement, but to maintain untarnished the honour of her name, to fulfill her obligations to her allies, to maintain her treaty obligations, and to save civilization from the unbridled lust of conquest and domination.
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> Long we have enjoyed the benefits of our British citizenship; to-day it is our duty to accept its responsibilities and sacrifices.[2]

Despite this expression of confidence in British motives, mounting dissatisfaction was soon voiced over the inadequacies of Canada's position. Lack of consultation and even information from the mother country, in light of

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1 Canadian House of Commons Debates, 1914, Special War Session, p. 17.

2 Ibid., p. 8-9.

Canada's sizeable war efforts, emphasized the subordinate nature of her status and as early as 1915 indignant comments were expressed over this unsatisfactory state of affairs. The British government expressed sympathy for Canadian aspirations but could see no satisfactory solution for the problem of fuller inter-imperial consultation.[1] Sir Robert Borden had been permitted to attend a meeting of the British Cabinet in 1915, and there was a Canadian resident minister in London throughout the war who played an important role in keeping the governments informed. However, by late 1916, there was a pressing need for some sweeping changes to mollify Canadian opinion. Doherty,[2] the Minister of Justice, portrayed the growing intractability of the Canadian government.

> Our recognition of this war as ours, our participation in it, spontaneous and voluntary as it is, determines absolutely once and for all that we have passed from the status of the protected colony to that of the participating nation. The protected colony was rightly voiceless; the participating nation cannot continue so.[3]

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1 Glazebrook, A History of Canadian . . . , p. 303.

2 Charles Joseph Doherty, (1855-1931). He served as minister of justice in both the Borden and Meighen administrations. He was one of the Canadian representatives at the Paris Peace Conference, and signed the Treaty of Versailles on behalf of Canada. He represented Canada at the League of Nations in 1920-21, and retired after his defeat in the elections of 1921.

3 Marriott, Evolution of the British Empire, and Commonwealth, London, Nicholson and Watson, 1939, p. 264.

In January, 1916, Sir Robert Borden had sounded an ominous note.

> It can hardly be expected that we shall put 400,000 or 500,000 men in the field and willingly accept the position of having no more voice and receiving no more consideration than if we were toy autonmata. Any person cherishing such an expectation harbours an unfortunate and even dangerous delusion. Is this war being waged by the United Kingdom alone, or is it a war waged by the whole Empire?[1]

Dominion restlessness gave a brief revival to the ideal of federation, but this really offered no solution and was negatived by the realization that no Dominion would surrender the smallest element of its powers.[2]

Lloyd George,[3] who became prime minister in December, 1915, recognised the obsolescence of much of the existing governmental machinery and took action to placate the discontent of the Dominions. This action involved the creation of the Imperial War Cabinet. The Dominion prime ministers and representatives from India were invited (December 1916)

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1 Henry Borden (ed.), Robert Laird Borden: His Memoirs, Toronto, Macmillan Company, 1938, p. 622.

2 Ibid., p. 87.

3 David Lloyd George (1863-1945). A British liberal statesman, he was first elected to the House of Commons in 1890. In 1900, he became Chancellor of the Exchequer in Asquith's cabinet. In 1914, he was made minister of munitions in the coalition government. In 1916, he was appointed secretary of state for war and, in December of that year, he became prime minister. He remained in office until October 1922. He resigned shortly after the Chanak crisis.

> to attend a series of special and continuous meetings of the War Cabinet in order to consider urgent questions affecting the prosecution of the war, the possible condition on which, in agreement with our Allies we could assent to its termination, and the problems which would then immediately arise.[1]

Concurrent with the sessions of the Imperial War Cabinet and on alternate days, were held meetings of an Imperial War Conference. This conference considered Imperial problems not connected with the war, and war problems of lesser significance, thereby leaving the Imperial War Cabinet free to deal with the more important aspects of the war and the possible terms of peace.[2] In June of 1918, a second session was held at which foreign policy and war aims were more fully discussed.[3] The question of communications within the Empire was raised and the following resolutions were passed by the Imperial War Conference and unanimously accepted by the Imperial War Cabinet:

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1 Canadian Commons Debates, 1917, Vol. 1, p. 24.

2 A.A. Webster, Canada at the Imperial Conference, unpublished Master's thesis, Department of History, University of British Columbia, 1928, p. 92.

3 Ibid., p. 87.

I.(1) The Prime Ministers of the Dominions as members of the Imperial War Cabinet have the right of direct communication with the Prime Minister of the United Kingdom and vice versa.

(2) Such communications should be confined to questions of Cabinet importance. The Prime Ministers themselves are the judges of such questions.

(3) Telegraphic communications between the Prime Ministers should as a rule be conducted through the Colonial Office machinery, but this will not exclude the adoption of more direct means of communication in exceptional circumstances.

II. In order to secure continuity in the work of the Imperial War Cabinet and a permanent means of consultation during the war on the more important questions of common interest, the Prime Minister of each Dominion has the right to nominate a Cabinet Minister, either as a resident or visitor in London, to represent him at meetings of the Imperial War Cabinet, to be held regularly between the plenary sessions.[1]

The rapid march of events in 1918 did not permit the implementation of the last point in the resolution and in practice the first was already in effect. The issue of communications is of particular concern in this study for their condition was an important factor in 1922 when the Chanak crisis occurred.

The Imperial Conference was concerned over the future development of the Empire. The representatives were

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1 Walter A. Riddell, Documents on Canadian Foreign Policy: 1917-1939, Toronto, Oxford University Press, 1962, p. 9-10.

aware that there was a need for constitutional revision but they decided that it was an inopportune time to attempt readjustments. Instead, they proposed the calling of a Constitutional Conference as soon after the war as possible and drafted a resolution to indicate the stage the Dominions had reached in their constitutional development. This resolution, Resolution IX, read in part as follows:

> Any such readjustment, while thoroughly preserving all existing powers of self-government and complete control of domestic affairs, should be based upon a full recognition of the Dominions as autonomous nations of an Imperial Commonwealth and of India as an important portion of the same, should recognize the right of the Dominions and India to an adequate voice in foreign policy and foreign relations, and should provide effective arrangements for continuous consultation in all important matters of common Imperial concern, and for such necessary concerted action, founded on consultation as the several Governments may determine.[1]

In spite of the inexactitude of much of the wording it was made clear that continued subordination in foreign affairs would not be acceptable and that Dominion autonomy must be carefully safeguarded in any future constitutional changes which might be made. Although the ideal of closer unity within the Empire was rejected, the separatist could find little of encouragement in the resolution. Mr. Dawson noted that the resolution, if generously read, conceded everything for which the Dominions could ask short of

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1 Borden, Canada in the Commonwealth, p. 91-92.

separatism.[1] Criticism of the ambiguous wording of the resolution is weakened when one considers that it provided the genesis for Balfour's classic statement of 1926 which, satisfactory or not, was as close as one could come to a concise and coherent description of the British Commonwealth of Nations.

The Imperial War Cabinet played an important role in the evolution of Dominion status towards complete autonomy. Lord Curzon,[2] in addressing the House of Lords, February 17th, 1917, spoke of it as the greatest step Britain had ever taken in recognizing their relations with the Dominions on the basis of equality.[3] In a letter to

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1 Dawson, Op. Cit., p. 27.

2 Lord Curzon (1859-1925). He was undersecretary of state for India, 1891-1892, and undersecretary of state for foreign affairs, 1895-1898. From 1898 to 1905, he held the position of Viceroy of India, after which he retired from active politics. In 1915, he returned to politics and occupied the position of Lord Privy Seal until January 1919, when he became secretary of state for foreign affairs. He shared this office with the incumbent, Mr. Balfour, who was at that time suffering from ill-health, until October 1919. From that time to 1924, Lord Curzon held the office alone.

3 British Parliamentary Debates, House of Lords, Vol. 1, 1917, p. 28.

Sir Robert Borden, July 12, 1919, N.W. Rowell[1] stated that it was "the outward and public recognition by Great Britain of the equality of status of the Dominions".[2] Lloyd George also emphasized the significance of the Imperial War Cabinet. He referred to the status of absolute equality which the Dominion representatives enjoyed and spoke of the gathering itself as a complete success and a landmark in the constitutional history of the Empire. The contributions of the "fresh minds and new points of view"[3] were stressed and the hope expressed that the Imperial Cabinet would become a permanent feature of the British Constitution.

> By this means they will be able to obtain full information about all aspects of Imperial affairs and to determine by consultation together the policy of the Empire in its most vital aspects, without infringing in any degree the autonomy which its parts at present enjoy.[4]

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1 N.W. Rowell (1867-1941). He was leader of the Ontario Liberal Party from 1911 to 1917 at which time he entered the House of Commons in Ottawa. In the same year, he joined the Unionist government as President of the Council and Vice-Chairman of the War Committee of the Cabinet. In 1918, he was a member of the Imperial War Cabinet and, in 1920, he was appointed as Canadian representative at the First Assembly of the League of Nations. He resigned his portfolio in the government in 1920, and his seat in the House of Commons in 1921.

2 Rowell Papers, Canadian Public Archives, Vol. 1, Folder 2, Sir R.L. Borden, 1920-1932, p. 9.

3 British Parliamentary Debates, House of Commons, 1917, Vol. 93, p. 1791.

4 Idem.

The sanguine hopes expressed by Lloyd George and echoed by Borden and others were not realized. The problem of combining a united foreign policy with Dominion sovereignty required more than a mere continuation of an improvised emergency system. However, several years would pass before its failure was finally confirmed. Dawson, in The Development of Dominion Status, observed that the smooth running efficiency of the War Cabinet was misleading since it was most attributable to pressures of war time.[1] Thus, the prevalent optimism for the future might well have been more restrained.

In October, with the German collapse imminent, the Dominion prime ministers returned to England for a third meeting of the Imperial War Cabinet. Before Borden's arrival, Germany had surrendered and the Canadian prime minister expressed unequivocally the view that Canadian delegates should participate at the peace conference.

> It was not even imagined that Canada, having been among the foremost on the battlefield, would be excluded from the Peace Conference. The feeling that her delegates should be there present was perhaps more intense among her own people than any other emotion except thankfulness for the conclusion of hostilities.[2]

The first hurdle which Borden had to overcome presented little difficulty; for the British government were

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1 Dawson, Op. Cit., p. 94.

2 Borden, Canada in the Commonwealth, p. 94.

generally sympathetic towards Dominion aspirations. Following agreement in London on Borden's proposals for representation, the Imperial War Cabinet transferred itself to Paris as the British Empire Delegation.[1] At Paris, Borden encountered a more sizeable obstacle in the form of the Supreme Council[2] which was less willing to accept the proposal of separate representation for the Dominions on a basis similar to the other small powers and, in addition, Dominion representation on the British Empire Delegation. The subtleties of Dominion status could not be grasped easily and the proposal, on the surface, seemed to indicate an unwarranted British influence at the conference. Nevertheless, in face of the firm stand taken by the British Empire Delegation, the Great Powers -- the United States, France, Italy, and Japan -- acquiesced. The considerable contributions of the Dominions to the war effort went far in justifying their position. The achievement of separate representation at the Conference was significant for it meant the break up of "the traditional Empire and replaced it with a brotherhood of nations"[3] and it

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1 Webster, Op. Cit., p. 90.

2 The Supreme Council was made up of representatives from Britain, United States, France, Italy, and Japan.

3 J.W. Dafoe, "Canada and the Peace Conference of 1919", Canadian Historical Review, Vol. 24, No. 3, September, 1923, p. 235.

established Canada as "a nation amongst nations".[1]

Canada's concern for recognition of her changed status reflected the growing nationalism which had developed steadily through the war years.[2] Glazebrook states,

> it is not surprising that the dominant Canadian feeling should have been that their country had paid its subscription to the society of sovereign states.[3]

Yet it was a long time before Canada accepted that membership in this society should involve anything save prestige. The recognition of her new status was not wholly achieved through the winning of representation at the Paris Conference, although this was an important step.[4] As Canada struggled to receive recognition as a sovereign state, the internal harmony of the Empire seemed to be retained perfectly. However, this harmony was based primarily on ignoring the anomalies of Dominion status, and on an unvoiced confidence in the results of the proposed constitutional conference.

The next stage in achieving more permanent recognition of Canada's status was accomplished through the

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1 Dafoe, Op. Cit., p. 241.

2 Hugh L. Keenleyside, et.al., The Growth of Canadian Policies in External Affairs, Durham, N.C., Duke University Press, 1960, p. 7.

3 Glazebrook, A History of Canadian . . . , p. 304-305.

4 Dafoe, Op. Cit., p. 243. It facilitated Canada's acceptance into the League of Nations, since all Conference members became original members of the League.

signing of the peace treaties and acceptance of her independent membership in the League of Nations, the International Labour Organization, and the Permanent Court of International Justice. Most authorities accept that the method adopted for signing the peace treaties secured for Canada the recognition of her new international status, in spite of the all-inclusive nature of the British signature.[1] The right of separate signature carried with it the right of separate action in regard to ratification. Thus the Treaty of Versailles was ratified by the Crown on the behalf of the whole Empire only after each Dominion parliament signified its approval of the treaty.[2]

The Tripartite Treaty[3] (June, 1919) deserves special attention for the inclusion of an article which stated that the treaty

> shall impose no obligation upon any of the Dominions of the British Empire unless and until it is approved by the Parliament of the Dominion concerned.[4]

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1 Webster, Op. Cit., p. 91.

2 Dawson, Op. Cit., p. 34.

3 This was a treaty of alliance which England and the United States signed with France which provided for assistance in the event of a German attack on France.

4 Gwendolen M. Carter, The British Commonwealth and International Security: The Role of the Dominions, 1919-1939, Toronto, The Ryerson Press, 1947, p. 77.

Although the treaty never came into effect, the procedure did underline the existing concern for the recognition of Dominion autonomy.

Canada's position at the Paris Conference and her attitude to the peace treaties have been viewed solely in light of their effect on her evolving status. Although the Canadian delegation performed creditably at the Conference,[1] the national interest of Canada as expressed in parliament and the press revolved around the question of Canadian status. Thus, the House of Commons and the Senate were not so interested in the peace treaties or the Leage of Nations per se as in the effect they had upon the nation's status.[2] This myopic approach to international developments is deserving of attention. The fact that the Department of External Affairs comprised only three men until 1927 indicates that few, if any, could speak with real authority on international affairs through to and after 1922. Growing nationalism as a result of the war also contributed to centrifugal forces in Imperial relations, and the turning inwards which was characteristic before 1914 became prominent again shortly after the war ended.[3]

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1 Glazebrook, A History of Canadian . . . , p. 315.

2 Ibid., p. 346.

3 Arnold V. Toynbee, The Conduct of British Empire Foreign Relations Since the Peace Settlement, London, Oxford University Press, 1928, p. 74.

The attainment of separate membership in the League of Nations meant the achievement of recognition in international affairs. Canada secured the right to a permanent seat on the Assembly, and the right to be selected as a member of the Council. Borden was alarmed at the possibility of Article IV disqualifying the Dominions from the Council membership and his fears were quieted only by the written guarantee of Premier Clemenceau,[1] Lloyd George, and President Wilson.[2]

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1 Georges Clemenceau (1841-1929). He was premier of France from 1917 to 1920 and presided at the Paris Peace Conference. He was skeptical of the League of Nations and concerned about a possible revival of German militarism. He compromised his desires for a more severe peace treaty in return for an Anglo-American guarantee to protect France; however, this treaty was never ratified. After the Treat of Versailles was signed, he lost public and parliamentary support and, in January, 1920, having failed to win election to the presidency, he retired from public life.

2 Woodrow Wilson (1856-1924). He was president of the United States from 1913 to 1921. In 1917, he led the United States into World War I. His appeal to lofty ideals as enunciated in the Fourteen Points dramatized the war as a moral crusade. At the end of the war he offended the Senate and the Republican Party by excluding them from any representation at the peace conference. His tactics made the peace treaty a partisan issue and his popularity declined. In September, 1919, he began a nation-wide tour to win support for his program but had to return to Washington in October in face of a threatened nervous collapse. He became paralyzed in October and was incapacitated thereafter from important political activity.

> The question having been raised as to the meaning of Article IV of the League of Nations Covenant, we have been requested by Sir Robert Borden to state whether we concur in his view, that upon the true construction of the first and second paragraphs of that Article, representatives of the self-governing Dominions of the British Empire may be selected or named as members of the Council, we have no hesitation in expressing our entire concurrence in this view. If there were any doubt it would be entirely removed by the fact that the Articles of the Covenant are not subject to a narrow or technical construction.[1]

"Canada was so pleased with the shiny new bauble that she did not notice the weakness of its manufacture or the strings attaching it to Europe."[2] Canada's desire to sever the 'strings', when they came to her attention, was manifested in the concentrated and persistent attack on Article X of the League Covenant. This article reads as follows:

> The Members of the League undertake to respect and preserve, as against external aggression, the territorial integrity and existing political independence of all Members of the League. In case of any such aggression or in case of any threat or danger of such aggression, the Council shall advise upon the means by which this obligation shall be fulfilled.[3]

The Canadian attack on Article X extended from the time of drafting through to 1922 and after, in an unsuccessful

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1 Glazebrook, Canada at the Paris . . . , p. 66-67.

2 Baldwin, Op. Cit., p. 34.

3 Canadian Sessional Papers, No. 116, 1925, The Covenant of the League of Nations and the Protocal for the Pacific Settlement of International Disputes, p. 7.

attempt to have it discarded or amended. In keeping with this attitude towards international issues Canada could be depended on annually

> to produce two speeches: one on the undefended boundary between the United States and the Dominions; the other on the satisfactory solution of the minorities question achieved in Canada.[1]

Thus Canada pursued a course in keeping with her tradition of avoiding any commitments towards collective security. She opposed any strengthening of the obligations of the Covenant,[2] although a minor loss of power would have been beneficial in making an effective League of Nations.

The international status of Canada was further enhanced by the acceptance of her independent position in the International Labour Organization and the Permanent Court of International Justice. The economic experts on the American delegation at Paris objected strenuously to separate Dominion representation on the International Labour Organization, but their objections were overridden by the American president himself.[3]

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1 Baldwin, Op. Cit., p. 208.

2 J. Bolton Slack, The External Policy of the Right Honourable William Lyon Mackenzie King, A Dissertation on the Development of Canadian Foreign Policy, 1919-1944, unpublished Master's thesis, Department of History, Queen's University, 1946, p. 49.

3 Glazebrook, Canada at the Paris . . . , p. 79.

The international readjustments of the post-war world made the calling of an Imperial Conference in 1920 impracticable. The British government continued to assume that the meeting would be a continuation of the Imperial Cabinet system, that the anomalies of Dominion-Imperial relations would be clarified, and that the Dominions would actively support and contribute to an Imperial foreign policy. These hopes were in complete accord with their interpretation of Resolution IX. However, the British government failed to take into consideration the growth of nationalism in the Dominions, which favoured decentralization. The British kept their attention fixed on the memories of the Dominion response in 1914, the efficiency of the Imperial War Cabinet, and the satisfactory record of co-operation at the Paris Peace Conference. It was easy to be misled by these indications, but there were, on the other hand, concrete examples of growing centrifugal forces within the Empire which might have caused misgivings in the United Kingdom.[1]

In May 1920, Canada took a further step towards autonomy. The Canadian government had established a

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1 The cool reception given Lord Jellicoe on his mission to the Dominions in 1919 reflected the divergency of interests in the Empire. As Admiral of the Fleet, he had hoped to create interest in the expansion of Dominion navies. Keith, Responsible Governments . . . , p. 1013.

Canadian War Mission at Washington in February, 1918, and although it was of a temporary nature, it was in effect a diplomatic missiom.[1] Before the war's end, Sir Robert Borden raised the subject of making this appointment permanent. His proposal was justified in view of the mass of business conducted by the two governments, and the precedents that could be found for his suggestion. The International Joint Commission, established in January, 1909, had dealt with diplomatic questions.[2] Canada had enjoyed temporary diplomatic status in the negotiation of treaties with the United States, and of course the Canadian War Mission was a precedent of significance. Borden's proposal was not a novelty for the feeling that Canada should have representation had been current since the last years of the nineteenth century.[3] British hesitation was caused by the fear of destroying the diplomatic unity and weakening the ties of the Empire. Thus, their final consent was in the form of a compromise aimed at assuaging the apprehensions of those who felt that such a step foreshadowed the breakup of the Empire. The following announcement was made in the Canadian parliament, May 10, 1920:

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1 Borden, Canada in the Commonwealth, p. 96.

2 Ibid., p. 97.

3 Keith, Responsible Government . . . , p. 893.

> As a result of recent discussions an arrangement has been concluded between the British and Canadian Governments to provide for more complete representation at Washington of Canadian interests than has hitherto existed. Accordingly, it has been agreed that His Majesty, on advice of His Canadian ministers, shall appoint a Minister Plenipotentiary who will have charge of Canadian affairs and will at all times be the ordinary channel of communication with the United States Government in matters of purely Canadian concern, acting upon instructions from and reporting direct to the Canadian Government. In the absence of the Ambassador, the Canadian minister will take charge of the whole Embassy and of the representation of Imperial as well as Canadian interests. He will be accredited by His Majesty to the President with the necessary powers for the purpose.
>
> This new arrangement will not denote any departure either on the part of the British Government or of the Canadian Government from the principle of the diplomatic unity of the British Empire.
>
> The need for this important step has been fully realized by both Governments for some time. For a good many years there has been direct communication between Washington and Ottawa, but the constantly increasing importance of Canadian interests in the United States has made apparent that Canada should be represented there in some distinctive manner, for this would doubtless tend to expedite negotiations, and naturally first-hand acquaintance with Canadian conditions would promote good understanding. In view of the peculiarly close relations that have always existed between the people of Canada and those of the United States, it is confidently expected as well that this new step will have the very desirable result of maintaining and strengthening the friendly relations and co-operation between the British Empire and the United States.[1]

Despite British attempts to avoid setting a precedent, the granting of the right of diplomatic representation was a

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1 Canadian Commons Debates, 1920, Vol.3,p.2178.

significant step in the evolution of Canada's status.[1] Strangely enough, this privilege was not acted upon until Vincent Massey was appointed to the post in 1927, three years after the Irish Free State had sent a representative.

There is no one reason which satisfactorily accounts for Canadian inaction and it is probably a combination of factors. The announcement was not particularly well received in Canada or the other Dominions[2] and Australia stated that it would be unacceptable to the Commonwealth that the Canadian delegate should take control of the Embassy in the absence of the Ambassador. Possibly there was no one suitable for the post.[3] In 1921, Mr. King became prime minister and was opposed to the connection with the British embassy as set forth in the announcement of May 10.[4] Whatever may have been the deciding factor, the issuewas shelved.

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1 Dawson, Op. Cit., p. 36.

2 Keith, Responsible Government. . . , p. 894. The Canadian representative would "be eclipsed by the Ambassador, compelled to accept the ruling of ministers across the border, he would become little more than a post box, subject to frequent supersession when Dominion Ministers crossed the border and negotiated, as they were fond of doing, direct with the United States Ministers".

3 Glazebrook, A History of Canadian. . . , p. 368.

4 Ibid., p. 369.

In 1920, Sir Robert Borden retired. He had instituted and presided over some striking changes in the evolution of Canada's status towards full sovereignty. Yet he always remained a firm supporter of the continuance of the British Commonwealth and undoubtedly viewed it as a great force for good. He believed in leading Canada towards a fuller realization of its responsibilities and thus a more active role in external affairs. He also supported a wider assumption of obligations in the Commonwealth and believed that Canada's security was greater and her responsibilities fewer than if she should withdraw.[1] The complexities in formulating and practicing an imperial foreign policy never gave him pause and he seemed to believe that this could be accomplished through frequent consultation by cable and by conference. In spite of the plausibility of this suggestion, it seems safe to state that it could never be satisfactory implemented. Even a constitutional expert like Borden was on the horns of a dilemma in trying to envisage a program to produce a united foreign policy which could preserve the complete sovereignty of the Dominions.

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1 Rowell Papers, Vol. 1, Folder 2, Sir Robert Borden, 1920-1932, p. 71.

In October, 1920, Mr. Meighen,[1] the new leader of the Conservative Party and the Canadian prime minister, received the following invitation from the British government:

> The Dominions are invited to attend the Imperial Conference in June on the lines of the Imperial War Cabinet Meetings which took place in 1917 and 1918, to deal with many urgent problems of common interest which call for co-ordination of policy and action by the different Governments of the Empire.[2]

The growth of nationalism and concern for increased autonomy in Canada led to misgivings over the wording of the invitation, since any form of cabinet implied executive powers and could lead to increased responsibilities for Canada. These apprehensions were further heightened by statements of men in authority in England. The Foreign Secretary, Lord Curzon, had said that all its members would be invested with the full authority and rank of cabinet ministers and that its decisions would not merely be decisions of the British government but of the British Empire.[3] Mr. Meighen

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1 Arthur Meighen (1874-1960). He was first elected to the House of Commons in 1908 and entered the cabinet of Sir Robert Borden in 1913. In 1917, he was appointed secretary of state and minister of mines. He attended the Imperial Conference in 1918. On the retirement of Borden in July 1920, he became prime minister and, when his party was defeated in the election in December 1921, he became leader of the opposition in parliament.

2 Canadian Commons Debates, 1921, Vol. 1, p. 467.

3 J. Castell Hopkins, (ed.), The Canadian Annual Review of Public Affairs, 1921, Toronto, The Canadian Review Company Ltd., 1922, p. 212.

partially allayed Canadian suspicions by his insistence that it would be merely an informal consultative gathering and that all decisions would have to be submitted to the Canadian parliament for approval.[1] Mr. Meighen's willingness to minimize the significance of the Conference was probably due in part to the charges of the opposition that he had no real authority to represent Canada,[2] and that he had neglected his duty in failing to go to the people immediately after succeeding Borden as prime minister.[3] The British government on its part deferred to Canadian mistrust by calling the gathering "The Conference of Prime Ministers and Representatives of the United Kingdom, the Dominions and India".

The remarks of Lloyd George at the opening of the Conference testified to the distance traversed by the Dominions towards complete autonomy since 1914:

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1 Webster, Op. Cit., p. 97.

2 Ibid., p. 95.

3 "The Federal Election", Round Table, Vol. 46, March, 1922, p. 388.

> In recognition of their services and achievements in the War the British Dominions have now been accepted fully into the comity of nations by the whole world. They are signatories to the Treaty of Versailles and of all the other Treaties of Peace; they are members of the Assembly of the League of Nations, and their representatives have already attended meetings of the League; in other words, they have achieved full national status, and now stand beside the United Kingdom as equal partners in the dignities and responsibilities of the British Commonwealth.[1]

In a more colorful part of his remarks, he added, "there was a time when Downing Street controlled the Empire; today the Empire is in charge of Downing Street".[2] In consideration of later developments, particularly the Chanak crisis, Lloyd George's optimistic reference to shared responsibilities was unwarranted, although significant, in view of his actions during the crisis.

Any attempt to define and clarify the changed constitutional relations of the Empire was rejected by a resolution stating that no advantage would be gained by holding a constitutional conference at that time.[3] The postponement was due partially to war weariness and the distraction of the international situation; partially to the fears of Australia and New Zealand that such a step might

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1 Cmd 1474, Imperial Conference, 1921, Summary of Proceedings and Documents, H.M.S.O., p. 14.

2 Idem.

3 Ibid., p. 9.

strengthen the separatist ideas; and partially to the belief expressed by Lloyd George that it was simply too difficult a task and that an attempt to define the British Empire would limit its utility.

> You are defining life itself when you are defining the British Empire. You cannot do it and therefore we came to the conclusion that the fact was the thing that mattered.[1]

A final factor was the impending elections in four of the Dominions which discouraged any positive commitments or policies on the part of the four premiers.[2]

The Conference devoted much of its time to the question of foreign affairs and the discussion

> revealed a unanimous opinion as to the main lines to be followed by British policy, and a deep conviction that the whole weight of the Empire should be concentrated behind a united understanding and common action in foreign affairs.[3]

The obvious disadvantage of full liability with a necessarily limited voice was apparently not perceived,[4] and certainly the gravity of the decision did not receive the attention it deserved in the Dominions.

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1 Webster, Op. Cit., p. 100-101.

2 Corbett and Smith, Op. Cit., p. 87.

3 Cmd 1474, Op. Cit., p. 3.

4 Dawson, Op. Cit., p. 45.

The position taken by Mr. Meighen removed any doubt that Canada subscribed to this arrangement for co-operation. The principles which he believed should guide Canada were set down clearly.

> (1) There should be regular and as far as possible continuous conferences between the representatives of Britain and the self-governing Dominions and India with a view, amongst other things, of determining and clarifying the governing principles of our relation with foreign countries, and of seeking common counsel and advancing common interest thereupon.
> (2) That, while in general final responsibility lay with the ministry advising the king, the ministry should, in formulating the principles upon which such advice is founded and applying these principles, have regard to the views of His Majesty's Privy Council in other dominions and the representatives of India.
> (3) That, in determining the Empire's foreign policy in spheres in which any dominion is peculiarly concerned, the views of that dominion should be given a weight commensurate with the importance of that decision to that dominion.[1]

The implications of Canada's commitment to an imperial foreign policy were not ignored; Lloyd George stated categorically that joint control meant joint responsibility.

> The advantage to us is that joint control means joint responsibility, and when the burden of Empire has become so vast it is well that we should have the shoulders of these young giants under the burden to help us along . . . They felt that there was not one among them who was not speaking for hundreds of thousands and millions of men who were prepared to risk their lives for a great Empire.[2]

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1 Riddell, Op. Cit., p. 63

2 British Parliamentary Debates, House of Commons, 1921, Vol. 149, p. 30.

It was further agreed at the Conference that meetings should be held annually, that direct communications between the prime ministers of the United Kingdom and the Dominions should continue, and that the right of the Dominions to nominate cabinet ministers to represent them in the United Kingdom should be maintained.[1] The importance of improved communications was repeatedly stressed at the Conference and a special committee was set up to investigate the whole question. Mr. Hughes,[2] the prime minister of Australia, spoke for many of the Dominion prime ministers when he complained that

> it is rarely that one does not read in the newspapers, sometimes a day, sometimes more than a day, before receiving your telegrams, a very good imitation of their substance.
> . . . . . .
> It is absolutely essential, if we are going to have any effective voice in foreign policy, that we shall be in the closest possible touch with you and with each other . . . we must have improved communication.[3]

In spite of the concern expressed over the inadequacies of the existing communications and the apparent realization of

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1 Cmd 1474, Op. Cit., p. 9-10.

2 William Morris Hughes,(1864-1952). A leader of the Australia Labour Party, he became prime minister in 1915. He was dropped from the party as a conscriptionist in 1916, but he continued as prime minister of a coalition government until 1923, when he resigned.

3 Cmd 1474, Op. Cit., p. 19.

the need for improvements, the disruption caused by the Chanak crisis in September, 1922, was partially attributable to the inefficiency of communications.

The British hope for Dominion contributions towards Imperial defence was dissipated by an evasive resolution stating that the subjectwas a matter for the parliaments concerned. The resolution also expressed the hope that the approaching conference on disarmament would dispel British concern over the matter.

Dr. Neuendorff has suggested that British concern for greater centralization was founded on the hope that the Dominions could be persuaded to contribute money rather than advice.[1] Although the issue of money contributions was avoided by the Dominions, their implied assistance in carrying out a united foreign policy must have been gratifying for Great Britain. However, the principle that parliament must decide removed from Canadian minds the fear of obligatory commitment should an Imperial foreign policy lead to war. The issue of communications proved the touchstone for the Canadian position. If communications were improved, Canada's reservations would become largely

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1 Gwen Neuendorff, Studies in the Evolution of Dominion Status, The Governor-Generalship of Canada and the Development of Canadian Nationalism, London, George Allan and Unwin Ltd., 1942, p. 351.

unmeaningful and she would be obliged to accept the consequences of a united foreign policy or withdraw her support. The onus would be on Canada to clarify her position. If communications were not improved -- and the onus here was on Great Britain -- then the Canadian formula that parliament must decide would become a meaningful principle. A policy of muddling through on the question of communications could not serve British interests at this juncture.

During the Conference, Canada's concern for amicable Anglo-American relations led her to launch an attack on the proposed Anglo-Japanese Alliance which the United States regarded as directed against herself.[1] The American naval build-up resulting from this threat to her security had led to the expected reaction in Britain and Japan; so much so that Japan was devoting half its revenue to naval and military establishments.[2] As far as Canada possessed a positive foreign policy outside the Empire, it was directed towards maintaining cordial relations with the American government, and Mr. Meighen expressed clearly the need for such a policy at the Conference.[3]

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1 Glazebrook, A History of Canadian. . . , p. 354.

2 Carter, Op. Cit., p. 41.

3 Riddell, Op. Cit., p. 63-64.

Lloyd George seems to have been convinced by Meighen of the advisability of cancelling the Anglo-Japanese Treaty.[1] Fortunately, the British premier was saved the embarrassement of such a step by the conjunction of simultaneous proposals by Britain and the United States to hold a conference to seek some solution to the ruinous naval armaments race. This conference, which met at Washington, is of interest because of the dubious threat which the procedure for issuing invitations seemed to pose for Dominion status. It is significant also for the retrenchment of Dominion status which eventually resulted.

The United States did not extend separate invitations to the Dominions to attend the Washington Conference and Britain's proposed method for appointing representatives did not follow the procedure adopted at the Paris Peace Conference. General Smuts,[2] the prime minister of South Africa, viewed these actions as a challenge to Dominion status.[3] Dr. Carter claims, however, that there was no

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1 Carter, Op. Cit., p. 44.

2 General Smuts (1870-1950). He fought against the British in the Boer War and played an important role in the formation of the Union of South Africa (1910). He represented South Africa at the Imperial War Cabinet meetings, and from 1919 to 1924 he was prime minister of South Africa.

3 Dawson, Op. Cit., p. 269.

slight intended or perpetrated in the omission of invitations to the Dominions and that the American action was simply diplomatic tradition.[1] In consideration of the offence taken by several Dominions at the time, Sir Clifford Sifton[2] made the following observation to Mr. Dafoe:[3]

> No foreign country can be expected to recognize Canada in foreign relations until Canada has defined its status and declared its position. If we do not define our status we cannot expect foreign Governments to do it for us.[4]

In spite of precedents set and implied understandings as to Dominion status, the argument of Sifton merited consideration.

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1 Carter, Op. Cit., p. 48.

2 Sir Clifford Sifton (1861-1929). He served in the Laurier Cabinet from 1896 to 1905. He resigned in 1905 over the government's educational policy for Saskatchewan and Alberta. In 1911, he withdrew from parliament and the Liberal party in opposition to the government's reciprocity proposal. He continued to play an important role in politics behind the scenes.

3 J.W. Dafoe (1866-1944). He entered journalism in 1883 as a parliamentary correspondent. In 1901, he became editor-in-chief of the Manitoba Free Press and held this position the rest of his life. He attended the Paris Peace Conference in 1919, and was an important figure in Canadian affairs. Professor Underhill wrote in 1932, that "for the past generation it has been generally true that what the Free Press thinks today western Canada will think to-morrow and the intelligent part of eastern Canada will think a few years hence". Frank H. Underhill, In Search of Canadian Liberalism, Toronto, Macmillan Company, 1960, p. 141.

4 Dafoe Papers, Canadian Public Archives, M 74, Sir Clifford Sifton to Dafoe, October 29, 1921.

Because of the importance of the Conference, Canada and the other Dominions agreed to overlook the affront to their dignity and Britain, on her part, was quick to take action to mollify Dominion sensitivities. Representation for the Dominions, their standing at the Conference, the form of treaties, their signature, and their ratification followed the precedent set at Paris.[1] The international status of Canada was thus reaffirmed, although there was no further advance. More significant, the principle of imperial diplomatic unity was reconciled with the principle of co-ordinate autonomy for the members.[2] The single commonwealth policy revealed at the Conference was "the lineal descendant of the practice begun in 1917 with the formation of the imperial war cabinet"[3] and Canada had made its contribution in determining what that policy would be. The discord in the preliminary stages of the Washington Conference indicated that feelings of decentralisation were strong in the Empire. Yet the overall impression of the conference was propitious for the successful continuation

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1 Borden, Canada in the Commonwealth, p. 115. It should be noted that the dual representation which the Dominions enjoyed at Paris did not occur at Washington. They had effective representation on the British Empire Delegation but no separate delegations.

2 Keith, Responsible Government . . . , p. 891.

3 Glazebrooke, A History of Canadian . . . , p. 356.

of a single commonwealth foreign policy and the confident manner in which the Imperial authorities regarded the future seemed justified.

In April, 1922, the five self-governing Dominions were accorded separate invitations to the Genoa Conference.[1] The recognition of their international status was further bolstered despite the fact that the invitations were issued primarily through the influence of Lloyd George.[2]

To summarize the status of Canada as a nation in 1922 is difficult. Oppenheim sought to reconcile the anomalies by saying that Dominion relationships defied definition, and Prime Minister Hughes' appeal to the mystery of the Trinity in his search for Commonwealth analogy indicated the formidable nature of the task.[3] Nevertheless, some general observations may be made.

By 1922, the possibility of Imperial federation was exanimate. Canada was recognized in practice as an international entity in the League of Nations, the International Labour Organization, and the Permanent Court of

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1 This conference was arranged to discuss the problem of pre-Bolshevik debts and the general world economic conditions. The conference broke down on the French demand for recognition by Russia of the pre-war debt.

2 Carter, Op. Cit., p. 48.

3 Dafoe Papers, M 74, Dafoe to Borden, January 24, 1923.

International Justice; and this recognition was strengthened by her representation at the International Conference at Washington in 1921, and Genoa in 1922. Yet the Canadian government lacked diplomatic representation in foreign capitals, in spite of the fact that the privilege had been extended in 1920.[1] The lack of an effective department of External Affairs further incapacitated her, for although the department had been set up in 1909, it consisted of only three officers by 1927.[2]

The issue of Canada's status was complicated by her membership in the British Empire. Despite rhetorical disclaimers to the contrary, equality of status did not exist within the Empire. No legal pronouncement of equality had been made and the procedure for conducting foreign policy was proof of Canada's inequality. True equality in foreign affairs demanded either that Canada must share in the formulation of an Empire foreign policy, or that Canada must conduct her own foreign policy. As a result of the Imperial Conference of 1921, Canada was to share in an Imperial foreign policy based on consultation. But the machinery necessary for effective consultation had never been created

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1 In 1927, Canada established representation at Washington, in 1928 at Paris, and in 1929 at Tokyo. By 1931, Canada had sixteen diplomatic posts abroad. Keenleyside, Op. Cit., p. 12.

2 Glazebrooke, A History of Canadian . . . , p. 383.

and, by 1922, the formulation and implementation of foreign policy was being carried out by the British Foreign Office. Dominion participation was practically non-existent. Moreover, no matter what the condition of communications, emergencies could still arise which would not wait on consultation, and it was understood that in such emergencies Britain must act on her own initiative. It was this fact that made any claim of equality rather dubious, assuming that the Dominions were bound by British action. This seemed a safe assumption. Few questioned that when Britain was at war, Canada was at war, and the formula that parliament would decide bore little significance if Britain became involved in a major struggle.

The Chanak crisis contributed to a clarification of the anomalies in Canada's position. However, before the crisis can be considered in its Canadian setting, an examination must be made of the European situation which led Britain and Turkey to the brink of war in September, 1922.

CHAPTER II

INTERNATIONAL BACKGROUND TO THE CHANAK CRISIS 1918-1922

When the First World War ended in 1918, the Turkish nation lay prostrate and shattered in defeat. Yet the victorious allies did little to achieve a settlement of the Turkish problem and four years elapsed before a final peace treaty was signed and accepted. In the interval, a resuscitated Turkey rose from the position of a vanquished supplicant to that of a dangerous and respected national state. The high point of Turkey's post war metamorphosis was reached in September, 1922, when her victorious and menacing troops, flushed with recent victories, advanced on the small detachment of British, French and Italian forces stationed in the neutral zone at the Straits. This began what historians call the Chanak crisis.

In the autumn of 1918, the possibility of such an occurrence within four years would have seemed absurd. In October of that year, the Turks surrendered to the allied powers aboard H.M.S. Agamemnon, a short distance from Mudros. The terms of the Armistice of Mudros[1] (October 30,

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1 For terms of the Armistice of Mudros see Cmd 53, Vol. 53, Terms of the Armistice concluded between the Allied Governments and Turkey, p. 123-126.

1918) were severe. Provisions were made for the demobilisation of Turkish forces. The Dardanelles and Bosphorus were opened and occupied, and the treaty clearly indicated that the allies would themselves determine the future arrangements for this area. By Article VII, the victors reserved the right to occupy any strategic points in the event of a situation arising which threatened their security.[1]

Yet the Turks awaited the final peace settlement with a degree of optimism. This attitude was founded on the belief that the final settlement, based on President Wilson's Fourteen Points[2] and several encouraging declarations by European statesmen, would not mean the entire partition of Turkey.[3] As recently as January, 1918, Lloyd George had said:

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1 Cmd 53, Vol. 53, Terms of the Armistice Concluded Between the Allied Governments and Turkey, p. 124.

2 Number Twelve of Wilson's Fourteen Points dealt directly with Turkey: The Turkish portions of the present Ottoman Empire should be assured a secure sovereignty, but the other nationalities which are now under Turkish rule should be assured an undoubted security of life and an absolutely unmolested opportunity of autonomous development, and the Dardanelles should be permanently opened as a free passage to the ships and commerce of all nations under international guarantees. E.H. Carr, International Relations Between the Two World Wars, (1919-1939), London, Macmillan and Company Ltd., 1947, p. 285.

3 Halide Edib, Turkey Faces West, a Turkish View of Recent Changes and Their Origin, New Haven, Yale University Press, 1930, p. 159.

> We are not fighting . . . to deprive Turkey of its capital, or of the rich and renowned lands of Asia Minor and Thrace, which are predominantly Turkish . . . We do not challenge the maintenance of the Turkish Empire in the homelands of the Turkish race with its capital at Constantinople.[1]

Two years elapsed before the abortive Treaty of Sevres was presented to the Turks (August, 1920) and by that time fundamental changes had occurred which doomed that proposed settlement. Had the victorious allies acted promptly in 1918, the most rigorous terms could have been imposed on the decrepit Turkish empire.[2] Several factors must be considered in accounting for this delay.

Woodrow Wilson's insistence that the first duty of the Peace Conference was the creation of a League of Nations caused a general delay in the formulation of the peace treaties. The first concern of the victors, a European settlement, cannot be criticised,[3] but this, too, must be considered in understanding the postponement of

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1 A.E. Prince, "Pride and Prejudice in the Near Eastern Problem", Queen's Quarterly, Vol. 30, 1922-1923, p. 169.

2 Winston S. Churchill, The World Crisis 1918-1919, The Aftermath, New York, Scribner, 1929, p. 381-382.

3 Harold Nicolson, Curzon: The Last Phase, 1919-1925, A Study in Post-War Diplomacy, London, Constable and Company Ltd., 1934, p. 64.

the Turkish settlement. The Supreme Council[1] avoided action in the Near East in the hope that the United States would assume some responsibility in this area.[2] This hope was only discarded in July, 1919, when the American Senate refused to ratify the Treaty of Versailles. The American President's determination to reserve judgment until the wishes of the peoples involved could be discovered also tended to forestall settlements until committees of investigation made their reports. This policy had harmful effects in the Mediterranean area, for as Churchill[3] observed, of all the policies likely to incite these peoples,

> none was more apt than the peripatetic Committee of Enquiry making a roving progress in search of truth through all the powder magazines of the Middle East with a notebook in one hand and a lighted cigarette in the other.[4]

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1 At the Paris Peace Conference the major decisions were made by the Supreme Council. In effect, it was composed of the prime ministers of the four major powers and President Wilson. The influence of Japan and Italy was secondary in comparison to Britain, France and the United States.

2 Nicolson, Op. Cit., p. 67.

3 Winston Churchill, (1874-). In 1900, he was elected a Conservative member. He served as undersecretary for the colonies, 1905-1908. In the Asquith cabinet he was president of the Board of Trade (1908-1910), and home secretary (1910-1911). In 1911, he was appointed first lord of the admiralty. In World War I, he espoused the Gallipoli campaign and when it failed he resigned (1915). In the coalition government of Lloyd George, he accepted the post of minister of munitions. From 1918 to 1921, he was secretary of state for war and air. In 1921-1922, he was secretary of state for the colonies. In the election of 1922, he was defeated, after which he went into temporary retirement until 1924.

4 Churchill, Op. Cit., p. 384.

The most significant factor in accounting for the delayed peace settlement was the dissension which existed amongst the British, French, and Italians in dealing with the problem of Turkey. This inter-allied friction developed from the series of secret and sometimes conflicting wartime agreements which proposed the partition of Turkey.[1] The distrust and suspicions amongst these allies had been largely suppressed due to the need for co-operation during the war; but with peace, this mistrust rose to the surface to hinder and delay a final peace settlement with Turkey. Each of the three powers was determined to reap its rewards, and efforts to make adjustments in conflicting claims were treated with the gravest suspicion. France and Italy were unwilling to press matters while British armies remained in possession of Turkish territory.[2] None seemed aware that their respective claims could best, and perhaps only, be imposed while Turkey lay numbed in defeat.

There had been four treaties drawn up during the war years which dealt with the future partition of Turkey. The first of these was the Constantinople Agreement (March,

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1 G.M. Gathorne-Hardy, A Short History of International Affairs, 1920 to 1938, London, Oxford University Press, 1938, p. 109.

2 Sir Valentine Chirol, "Four Years of Lloyd-Georgian Foreign Policy", The Edinburgh Review, Vol. 237, January-April, 1923, p. 13.

1915) negotiated by Great Britain, France, and Russia. The discussions were initiated by the Russians who were determined to settle the Straits question in their interest. The

> lock and key of our house. . . must therefore be placed in Russian hands along with the necessary territories on both shores.[1]

Russia felt a prize of this nature was necessary to offset the discouraging military reverses she had suffered. There were also doubts and misgivings over her allies' proposed attack at the Dardanelles which, if successful, could have easily jeopardized Russia's future interests in this area. British and French acquiescence to Russian demands followed from the need to keep Russia in the war at all costs.[2] In return, Russia recognized certain rights of her two allies in Asiatic Turkey. These rights were reserved for more precise definition[3] at a later date, and a neutral zone in Persia, as defined in the Anglo-Russian Agreement of 1907, was placed in the British sphere.[4] The Soviet government

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1 Coleman Phillipson and Noel Buxton, The Question of the Bosphorous and Dardanelles, London, Stevens and Haynes, 1917, p. 205.

2 James T. Shotwell and Francis Deak, Turkey at the Straits, A Short History, New York, Macmillan and Company, 1940, p. 101.

3 H.W.V. Temperley (ed.), A History of the Peace Conference at Paris, Vol. 1, London, Oxford University Press, 1920, p. 170.

4 Arnold J. Toynbee and Kenneth P. Kirkwood, Turkey, London, Ernest Benn Limited, 1926, p. 69.

denounced this agreement in 1917 and the serious problem of the Straits was reopened at the Paris Peace Conference.[1]

In April 1915, Italy was induced to enter the war on the side of the Entente Powers by concessions offered her in the Treaty of London. Britain and France were anxious to bring in a fourth power to offset Russian claims in the Near East.[2] Although Russia could object and obstruct, she ultimately had to agree for her weapon of a separate peace had been "thrown away in Turkey".[3] The terms of the treaty dealing with Italian acquisitions in the Ottoman Empire were left quite vague. Thus, by Article 9, Italy was entitled to "a just share of the Mediterranean region adjacent to the province of Adalia".[4] Since it was "not Italy's business",[5] she was left uninformed of the earlier Constantinople Agreement. The vagueness of Article 9 created difficulties in the later attempts to reach a settlement in the Near East, and the provisions for Italian aggrandisement at the expense of Austria-

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1 Nicolson, Op. Cit., p. 84.

2 A.J.P. Taylor, The Struggle for Mastery in Europe, 1848-1918, Oxford, Clarendon Press, 1957, p. 544.

3 W.W. Gottlieb, Studies in Secret Diplomacy During the First World War, London, George Allan and Unwin Ltd., 1957, p. 356.

4 Nicolson, Loc. Cit.

5 Gottlieb, Op. Cit., p. 357. For a definitive treatment of the Treaty of London, see p. 312-359.

Hungary also contributed to the problems of the Peace Conference.[1]

French suspicions over Britain's policy of securing Arab support during the war led to the Sykes-Picot[2] Agreement (May, 1916). French interests had not been precisely defined in earlier treaties and hence she was alarmed over Britain's actions in the Middle East. The Arabs would inevitably present demands at the end of the war and it would be only prudent for France to state beforehand her exact claims in the area. The agreement roughly defined the future areas which would be controlled by France, Great Britain and Russia in Asiatic Turkey. Provision was also made for the establishment of an independent Arab state which was in turn divided into British and French zones of influence.[3]

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1 Gathorne-Hardy, Op. Cit., p. 109.

2 Sir Marks Sykes (1879-1919). An English traveller and politician, he was an enthusiastic supporter of Arab independence. His special knowledge and experience led to his participation in the Anglo-French discussions on the Syrian question in 1915, from which resulted the Sykes-Picot Agreement.

Georges-Picot, Francois-Marie-Denis (1870-1931). French diplomat and lawyer. In 1914, he became chargé du consulat général at Beyrough. From 1917 to 1919, he was chargé des fonctions de haut commissaire in Palestine and Syria. From 1920 to 1924, he was envoyé extraordinaire et ministre plenipotentiarie at Sofia (Bulgaria). He retired in 1928.

3 Edward Mandell House and Charles Seymour, (ed.), What Really Happened at Paris, The Story of the Peace Conference, 1918-1919, New York, Charles Scribner's Sons, 1921, p. 182-183.

There is no doubt that this agreement contradicted in spirit if not in letter Britain's understanding with the Arabs.[1] The British had induced Emir Hussein,[2] Sherrif of Mecca, to revolt against Turkish rule by a vague promise of an independent Arab kingdom. Hussein should have demanded a more precise arrangement, for the indefinite nature of their agreement served British and not Arab interests. When the Russians revealed the terms of the Sykes-Picot Treaty, the Arabs were furious over this apparent betrayal by the British.

Italian interests in the future plans for the partition of the Ottoman Empire were further protected by the Treaty of St. Jean de Maurienne (April, 1917). Italy was promised seventy thousand square miles of territory in Asia Minor which included the important port of Smyrna.[3] This treaty did not become legally binding until it was accepted by Russia and this acceptance was forestalled by

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1 Henry H. Cumming, Franco-British Rivalry in the Post-War Near East, the Decline of French Influence, London, Oxford University Press, 1938, p. 37-38.

2 Emir Hussein, Faisal I of Iraq, (1885-1933). He played a leading role in the Arab nationalist movement. In 1916, he helped lead the Arab revolt against Turkey. He served as chief of Arab forces under Allied command and, in February 1920, became King of Syria. Under French pressure he resigned in July 1920, and in 1921, with British support he became King of Iraq. He remained King until his death in 1933.

3 Nicolson, Op. Cit., p. 87.

the Revolution in the spring of 1917. Whatever moral obligations one might feel were attached to this treaty, the Italians could not use it as a basis for legal claims after the war.

These secret treaties created a web of confusion and suspicion at the Peace Conference which delayed any attempts to arrive at a settlement in the Near and Middle East. A final solution was further hindered by Russia's disavowal of her part in the treaties, and Woodrow Wilson's aversion for the whole principle of secret agreements.[1]

The Greeks, as loyal supporters of the allied cause, also looked towards the Ottoman Empire as a source of reward for their sacrifices. Although, as Driault has pointed out, the Greek premier, Venizelos,[2]

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1 House and Seymour, Op. Cit., p. 187.

2 Eleutherios Venizelos (1864-1936). Born in Crete, he became premier of Greece in 1910. He strongly supported the Allied cause during the war years, and this policy brought him into sharp conflict with the pro-German King Constantine. The king forced his resignation in 1915, whereupon, he set up a provisional government at Salonika with Allied support and declared war on the Central Powers. When Constantine abdicated in 1917 under Allied pressure, Venizelos became premier and took Greece fully into the war. He was defeated in the elections of 1919, at which time the Greeks voted for the return of Constantine. In 1922, Constantine abdicated a second time after serious Greek defeats at the hands of the Turks. Venizelos returned to serve in the newly formed government, but not as prime minister.

> jeta son pays dans l'immense bataille sans avoir obtenu des Alliés la moindre engagement, la moindre garantie,[1]

there was an obligation on the part of the Entente powers to provide some recompense for the sacrifice and assistance of his people. The compulsory nature of this obligation was viewed by the wartime allies with the widest range of opinion. Italy would have happily minimized and possibly even ignored the debt, while the British prime minister, Lloyd George, was determined to reward the Greeks handsomely.[2] The Ottoman Empire provided the only practical, if unwilling, source for this intended generosity.

On May 14, 1919, under cover of British, French and American warships, Greek soldiers landed at Smyrna on the coast of Anatolia.[3] Almost immediately, disorder, destruction, and brutal massacres by the Greeks occurred, foreshadowing the appalling war which raged through Anatolia until the Greeks were finally driven out in September, 1922. Gontaut-Biron states that the Supreme Council "dans sa

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1 Edouard Driault, La Question D'Orient, 1918-1937, La Paix de la Méditerranée, Paris, Libraire Felix Alcan, 1938, p. 84.

2 David Lloyd George, The Truth About the Peace Treaties, Vol. 2, London, Victor Gollancz Limited, 1938, p. 1226.

3 Sir Reader Bullard, Britain and the Middle East, From the Earliest Times to 1950, London, Hutchinson's University Library, 1951, p. 80.

souveraine incompétence, régissait despotiquement les destinées du monde".[1] Certainly the motives in despatching Greek forces to Smyrna bore a dubious relation to the Fourteen Points upon which the peace was to be constructed.

By Article VII of the Armistice of Mudros, the victorious powers retained the right of occupation if they felt their security was endangered. This, however, does not provide the explanation for the Smyrna landing. Italy could not legally claim Smyrna but she felt it was her due reward. In order to forestall a possible unilateral occupation by the Italians, Greece was given a mandate over the area. Italy's recent coup d'état in Fiume justified British, French and American mistrust of a possible similar action in Smyrna, and Italy's temporary withdrawal from the peace conference presented the Supreme Council with an ideal opportunity to ignore Italy's aspirations and resolve the situation in favour of the Greeks.

Other factors must be mentioned to explain the fateful decision of the Supreme Council. France was reluctant to have Italy established in Smyrna as a possible competitor.[2] Lloyd George's personal admiration of the Greek

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1 Comte R. De Gontaut-Biron et L. Le Révérend, D'Angora a Lausanne, Les Etapes d'une Déchéance, Paris, Plon-Nourrit et Cie, 1924, p. 7.

2 Prince, Op. Cit., p. 173.

people and their premier must also be considered.[1] A less personal British motive was the realization that her maritime routes would be protected by establishing a grateful nation in control of this important area.[2]

For Venizelos it was a diplomatic triumph and it seemed a Hellenic empire would be established by a man whose "pen and tongue were mightier than Poras Kevapoulos' sword".[3] Unfortunately for Greece, the fulfillment of such a dream was hardly possible for the Turks would resist to the death the establishment of a Greek Empire in their lands. The Greeks were viewed with the profoundest contempt by their former masters and the occupation of Smyrna merely confirmed the Turkish estimate of the Greeks as "jackals of international politics greedily devouring what someone else has killed".[4] Moreover, Smyrna provided an essential outlet to the Aegean which the Turks would not easily surrender.[5]

In Constantinople the badly disorganized government of the Sultan pursued an obedient and subservient policy towards the conquerors of Turkey. The Grand Vizier, Damad

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1 Lloyd George, Op. Cit., p. 1204, 1226. Venizelos is spoken of as the greatest Greek statesman since Pericles.

2 George Lenczowski, The Middle East in World Affairs, New York, Cornell University Press, 1952, p. 103.

3 Prince, Loc. Cit.

4 Ibid., p. 170.

5 House and Seymour, Op. Cit., p. 142.

Ferid Pasha, felt that such strategy was in the best interests of Turkey. He believed it would ensure the continuation of the dynasty and enable him to salvage something from the wreckage of the Ottoman Empire.[1] The Greek landing at Smyrna brought about no change in the government's policy, but it did give rise to a nationalist movement which came to challenge and finally supplant the government at Constantinople. The members of this movement who established themselves at Ankara in central Anatolia were referred to as both Nationalists and Kemalists after their leader Mustafa Kemal.[2]

During the Gallipoli campaign, Mustafa Kemal had enhanced his reputation as both a brilliant soldier and a national hero. In 1919. he was appointed as Inspector-General of the Third Army in the interior of Anatolia to hasten the disarmament of Turkish troops. This appointment seems to have resulted from the government's desire to be rid of a popular, ambitious, and outspoken individual who

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1 Sir Andrew Ryan, The Last of the Dragomans, London, Geoffrey Bles Limited, 1951, p. 127.

2 Mustafa Kemal (1881-1938). He entered the army after attending Military School at Constantinople. Brilliant headstrong and independent, he founded a secret political society (Vatan) in 1905. He was an enthusiastic leader of the left wing opposition in the Young Turk Organization. At the outbreak of World War I he was a Military Attaché at Sofia with the rank of colonel.

might easily hinder the government in its determined course of action.[1] The landing at Smyrna which occurred while Kemal was on his way to the interior created a situation which cried out for bold and resolute leadership. Kemal answered this call and began to organize the dislocated military forces in the interior to resist the Greeks and restore and maintain the integrity of Turkey. In the wilds of the interior, neither the Sultan's government nor the Allied High Commissioner at Constantinople could exercise sufficient authority to hinder his movements.

In July, 1919, Mustafa Kemal called his first congress at Erzerum where the future policy of the Nationalist organization was discussed. At Sivas in September, a second Congress was held. At this time a National Army was organized from local militias; permanent headquarters were set up at Ankara; and the sultan was ordered to dismiss Damad Ferid Pasha and call new elections.[2]

The Sultan's alarm over the increasing strength of the Nationalist Party led him to consent to Kemal's demands and, in January, 1920, a newly elected Chamber of Deputies met in Constantinople. The Nationalist Party possessed a

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1 G.L. Lewis, Turkey, London, Ernest Benn Limited, 1955, p. 54.

2 Toynbee and Kirkwood, Op. Cit., p. 87.

large majority and one of the first acts of the new parliament was the presentation and adoption of the National Pact, apparently as a gesture of defiance in face of attempts by Britain, France, and Italy to depose the Turkish Minister of War.[1]

The National Pact has been referred to as a "clarion call to national honours",[2] and a "Declaration of Independence of the Turkish Nation".[3] It traced its origins to the Congresses at Erzerum and Sivas and, although moderate in its demands, it was not couched in the language of a vanquished nation. Britain, France, and Italy still failed to realize that the Nationalists spoke for a new Turkey -- aroused, defiant and rapidly growing in strength. Subsequent allied[4] actions were as tinder to smouldering Turkish antagonism.

In March, 1920, Constantinople was occupied by allied soldiers, parliament was raided, and several Nationalist leaders were arrested and deported to Malta.[5]

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1 Nicolson, Op. Cit., p. 248.

2 Idem.

3 Toynbee and Kirkwood, Op. Cit., p. 85.

4 The term 'allies' is used hereafter in this chapter to refer to Britain, France, and Italy when they acted in concert. Admittedly, the term is not wholly satisfactory since the three powers often acted in opposition in their relations with Turkey.

5 Toynbee and Kirkwood, Op. Cit., p. 87.

This was the allied answer to the National Pact. Damad Ferid Pasha was returned to office, the Chamber of Deputies was dissolved and the Nationalist Party was outlawed.[1] Such action did not crush the Nationalists. Instead, it was tantamount to tramping on the tail of a fretful but dozing lion. The allies would have had to strike at the heart in Ankara where the prudent Mustafa Kemal had remained, if they wished to destroy the Nationalist Party.

The Nationalists summoned a new parliament, and set up a rival government in Ankara which declared itself the true government of Turkey since Constantinople was under the control of foreign powers.[2] Mustafa Kemal was elected President and Commander-in-Chief of the Turkish Army, and the National Pact was adopted. From all parts of Turkey men began to arrive in Ankara to join in the resistance. The possibility of imposing a severe peace settlement on Turkey was becoming more and more of a delusion.

In June, the allies were alarmed at the news of a clash between British and Kemalist forces in the Ismed area. Venizelos' proffered assistance at this juncture was gratefully accepted thus increasing the allies' responsibility for the Graeco-Turkish war. The immediate successes of the

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1 Lewis, Op. Cit., p. 60.

2 Edib, Op. Cit., p. 185.

Greeks in driving back the Turks convinced Britain and France that a conqueror's peace could still be imposed. The Treaty of Sèvres[1] was presented to the Sultan's government on August 10, 1920.[2]

This treaty intended to relegate Turkey to the position of a minor protectorate. Even the subservient delegation led by Damad Ferid Pasha at first rebelled at the severity of its terms. Turkey was to lose the Arab portions of her empire. Armenia was created as an independent state. Eastern and Western Thrace were ceded to Greece, and Smyrna was placed under Greek control for a five year period after which a plebiscite would be held. The Straits were demilitarised and placed under the control of an International Commission. In the centre of this zone the independence of Constantinople would be illusory.[3] Turkish sovereignty

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1 For terms of the treaty see Cmd 964, Vol. 51, Treaty of Peace with Turkey, signed at Sèvres, August 10, 1920, p. 609-714.

2 Although Canada took no part in the actual negotiations, the Canadian prime minister, Sir Robert Borden, participated in an investigating committee whose recommendations were used in drafting the final treaty. The treaty was never ratified by the nations involved although Canada did pass an enabling act which empowered the government to act under the treaty when it became effective. Robert MacGregor Dawson, (ed.), The Development of Dominion Status, 1900-1936, Toronto, Oxford University Press, 1937, p. 55.

3 Toynbee and Kirkwood, Op. Cit., p. 76.

was further infringed by the re-establishment of capitulations,[1] the limitations on her military forces, and the loss of her financial independence to an international Financial Commission representing Britain, France, and Italy These three nations concluded a Tripartite Agreement at the same time, whereby the zones of influence in Asia Minor, as indicated in the Sykes-Picot and St. Jean de Maurienne Agreements were apportioned to the respective countries.[2]

There was never any possibility of the Ankara government agreeing to the Treaty of Sèvres, and its acceptance by the Constantinople government led to a sharp loss in the latter's prestige. Turks who were unconvinced of the need for resistance had their doubts removed. As contemporaries noted, "every Turk worth his salt became a Nationalist".[3] The future of the Nationalist cause was fortified further by the allied policy of sacrificing only Greek soldiers in support of the treaty. Thus the war was

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1 Capitulations consisted of a series of arrangements between the Ottoman Empire and the European powers whereby the latter enjoyed economic concessions in Turkey and jurisdiction over their own subjects. Innocuous courtesies originally, they became sources of humiliation and exploitation and were abolished by the Turks in 1914. Chester M. Tobin, Turkey, Key to the East, New York, G.P. Putman's Sons, 1944, p. 27.

2 Cmd 963, Vol. 51, 1920, Tripartite Agreement Between the British Empire, France and Italy Respecting Anatolia, signed at Sevres, 10th August, 1920, p. 43-44.

3 Harold Armstrong, Turkey in Travail, The Birth of a New Nation; London, John Lane, the Bodley Head Ltd., 1925, p. 120.

fought by proxy,[1] and it had to be fought for this was a treaty which could only be imposed, not accepted.[2] The limitations of Greek military prowess and the rapid growth of Turkey's soon made it clear that the need for some revision in the treaty was necessary.

The need for revision is clearer in retrospect. In August, 1920, Turkey still faced, in theory at least, the combined might of Britain, France, Italy, and Greece. The Italians had landed in Adalia; the Greeks were penetrating further into the interior; the French were established in Cilicia; the Straits and the capital were occupied by the allies; Armenia was in revolt; and Turkey was divided between the supporters of the Sultan and Mustafa Kemal. Yet there were many factors to encourage the Kemalists. The Constantinople government had forfeited its right to the allegiance of the nation. The return to isolationism in the United States was a serious blow to both the power and prestige of the allied camp.[3] Rapid demobilization and public war-weariness in the allied nations contrasted sharply with the situation in Turkey. The growing divergency of interests amongst the allies was

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1 Churchill, Op. Cit., p. 399.

2 Cummings, Op. Cit., p. 133.

3 Nicolson, Op. Cit., p. 111.

encouraging for the Kemalists. Only two weeks after the Treaty of Sèvres was signed, Russia concluded an accord with the Turkish National government. This provided a source for desperately needed supplies and was even more significant in its effect on the Kemalists' morale. By December, 1920, the provisions of the Treaty of Sèvres in regard to Armenia were negatived by Turkish and Russian victories over these peoples.[1] Finally, the fall from power of Venizelos in Greece November, 1920, was a contributing factor in the growth of Turkish confidence and in their final success.[2]

King Alexander of Greece[3] died by mischance in October, 1920. Venizelos, confident that he would retain support for his policies, decreed a general election in November to determine whether the pro-German Constantine,[4]

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1 Lenczowski, Op. Cit., p. 105.

2 Toynbee and Kirkwood, Op. Cit., p. 66.

3 Alexander I (1893-1920). He became king of Greece in 1917 after his father, King Constantine, was deposed. He died in 1920 as a result of a monkey's bite. During his reign, the actual power of government was in the hands of Venizelos.

4 Constantine (1868-1922). He had studied in German Universities (1886-1889), was commissioned as colonel in 1886, and served briefly in the German army. In 1887, he married the sister of William II. His pro-German sympathies led him to favour neutrality in the First World War. In face of Allied pressure he fled the country in 1917. In spite of bitter opposition from Britain and France, he returned to the throne in 1920 after Alexander's death. After severe Greek reverses at the hands of the Turks in 1922, Constantine abdicated again.

who had abdicated in 1917, would return to the throne. The Greek premier had been absent in Paris for twenty months and did not appreciate the war-weariness of his countrymen nor the determination and strength of the pro-Constantine royalist party. The experience of the ancient Greek leaders like Themistocles and Militiades might have taught him not to count too heavily on the gratitude of his people.[1] But the return of Constantine, and the fall from power of Venizelos, was unexpected and surprising news for all nations. The Greeks rejected their great war leader at a time when his counterpart in Turkey was strengthening his position. More seriously, the return of the pro-German king led to a weakening of allied support for Greece. The force of public opinion in Britain and France turned strongly against Greece and the claims that Greece could now make on these two nations were reduced to a strictly legal nature.[2] The Greeks were informed clearly of the change in sympathies created by the "new and unfavourable situation in the relations between Greece and the Allies".[3]

The return of Constantine presented an opportune moment for France to disassociate herself from the Greeks

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1 Prince, Op. Cit., p. 174.

2 Churchill, Op. Cit., p. 412.

3 Chirol, Op. Cit., p. 16.

whose policy seemed directed not only towards Greek aggrandisement, but also towards the extension of British influence in the Near East. The fact that there was a "small substratum of truth"[1] in the French suspicions of British motives made relations all the more strained. The personal and emotional quality which Lloyd George brought to the conduct of British foreign policy in the Near East was another factor which confused the French and thus contributed to the ever-widening breach between the two countries. Perhaps as his biographer states, Lloyd George was not mesmerized by Venizelos,[2] but his fierce hatred of the Turk and the abundance of his affection for the Greek made difficult the application of cool dispassionate reasoning to the conduct of foreign policy. Lloyd George's attitude towards these nations was incomprehensible to the French, who could detect no British interest underlying it and as a result suspected all sorts of motives.[3] The full explanation of the deterioration of Anglo-French relations is not to be found solely in the Near East, and indeed the explanation is centered on the problem of French security in Europe.[4] The German problem had not been settled to the

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1 Nicolson, Op. Cit., p. 104.

2 Frank Owen, Tempestuous Journey: Lloyd George, His Life and Times, London, Hutchinson, 1954, p. 631.

3 Churchill, Op. Cit., p. 441.

4 Nicolson, Op. Cit., p. 195-198.

satisfaction of France and French security still seemed in jeopardy. A British policy of moderation towards the defeated Germans, as seen in their attitude on the reparations question, was in direct conflict with what France conceived as her vital interests. The failure of the Anglo-American guarantee[1] left France both bitter and disappointed. The possibility of Britain reaching a rapprochement with Russia was disconcerting for the French. The Soviet government refused to honour the debts of the Tsar's government, and the French, with heavy investments at stake, were alarmed at the British policy which would further strengthen the new regime in Russia.[2]

Thus, the Anglo-French estrangement in the Near East cannot be divorced from the conflict of interests which existed elsewhere. Nevertheless, the apparent changes in the Turkish situation made it clear that some effort should be made to settle matters and bring an end to the Graeco-Turkish struggle. The increasing strength of the Kemalists indicated that the Treaty of Sèvres would have to be revised and, in February, 1921, the contestants came to

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1 This treaty, signed by France, England and the United States, June 28, 1919, provided for English and American assistance in the event of German aggression. Rejected by the United States Senate, it never came into effect.

2 Chirol, Op. Cit., p. 8-11.

London for this purpose. No settlement resulted but the presence of two Turkish delegations, from Ankara and Constantinople, indicated that the internal changes occurring in Turkey were to be recognized. The Kemalists, conscious of their growing prestige, refused the concessions offered. Greek imperialism clashed with Turkish nationalism.[1] Thus, the Greeks too refused mediation and determined to settle matters by a new military offensive directed towards the capture of Ankara.[2] On May 15, 1921, the allies declared their neutrality in the struggle and, at the same time, designated a neutral zone along the Straits, which neither belligerent was to trespass.[3] The British were never as emphatic as they should have been in this declared change in policy, and the Greeks continued to believe that Britain would support them if such support ever became essential.[4] Lloyd George must bear heavy responsibility for this state of affairs.

Throughout 1921, Turkey steadily strengthened her position both militarily and diplomatically. Before the end of the year she had negotiated settlements with Russia,

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1 Cumming, Op. Cit., p. 137.

2 Prince, Op. Cit., p. 179.

3 Lewis, Op. Cit., p. 64.

4 Nicolson, Op. Cit., p. 260.

Italy and France. A Russio-Turkish Alliance was concluded on March 16. The Soviets' suppression of the White forces (April, 1920) meant that more military supplies could be sent to Turkey and, although the two nations had had an earlier agreement, Turkish prestige was further enhanced by this treaty. Just three days earlier, Turkey had negotiated an agreement with Italy whereby Italian troops withdrew from Adalia in return for economic concessions in Anatolia.[1] Italian jealousy of Greek successes at Smyrna had inhibited allied unity from the outset. Domestic problems and general war-weariness at home led Italy to make her peace with Turkey. The circumstances surrounding the Greek landing at Smyrna in 1919 restrained Britain and France from criticising Italy's withdrawal. The selling of military equipment to the Turks, however, was open to censure.[2]

The most important diplomatic coup for the Turkish government was the negotiation of the Franklin-Bouillon[3]

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1 Arnold J. Toynbee, The Western Question in Greece and Turkey, A Study in the Contact of Civilisations, London, Constable, 1922, p. 42.

2 Armstrong, Op. Cit., p. 90-91.

3 Henry Franklin-Bouillon, (1872-1937). A French political leader, diplomat and journalist, he played an important role in the Near East and the United States during the First World War by expanding and developing French propaganda. He was a Radical-Socialist deputy from 1910 to 1927, but he resigned from the party since he considered it to be too leftist. He formed his own party, the Gauche Unioniste et Sociale, in 1928.

Agreement with France (October, 1921). Her bargaining position had been greatly strengthened by a striking military triumph in the previous month,[1] when she defeated a Greek offensive at the battle of Sakkaria (August 24-September 26, 1921). This French settlement with Turkey marked the culmination of the steadily differing policies of France and Britain, and placed a severe strain on amicable relations between the two western powers.

The French had first initiated talks with the nationalist government after the fruitless London Conference of 1921.[2] The British government had expressed suspicions later at the news of Franklin-Bouillon's presence in Ankara but were mollified by the statement of the French government that the French journalist was there solely in a private capacity and was not acting for governmental interests. In September, the British were informed that Franklin-Bouillon was actually there for the purpose of discussing minor issues respecting Cilicia.[3] French difficulties in this area were causing such a drain in lives and money that France was determined to reach some settlement with Turkey.

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1 Donald Everett Webster, The Turkey of Ataturk, Social Process in the Turkish Reformation, Wisconsin, The Collegiate Press, George Banta Publishing Co., 1939, p. 92.

2 Cumming, Op. Cit., p. 137-138.

3 Nicolson, Op. Cit., p. 261.

In face of the steadily increasing influence of the Nationalists, it seemed some concessions would be necessary if France were to retain a secure hold even in Syria. The British reaction to the news of this separate settlement was immediate and furious. Despite French disclaimers, it was equivalent to a separate peace treaty negotiated by the French government with an enemy government behind Britain's back.[1] The agreement ended hostilities, provided for the French evacuation of Cilicia and certain areas of northern Syria, transferred a section of the Baghdad railroad to Turkey, and granted France economic concessions in Turkey.[2]

Lord Curzon, the British Foreign Secretary, vehemently protested this unilateral action by the French government. The latter met Britain's recriminations with the claim that it was not really a treaty and that when the time came for a general settlement, the terms of the Franklin-Bouillon Agreement would have to be adjusted.[3] On this basis, cordial relations were officially restored between the two countries.

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1 Earl of Ronaldshay, The Life of Lord Curzon, Being the authorized Biography of George Nathaniel Marquess Curzon of Kedleston, K.G., Vol. 3, London, Ernest Benn Ltd., 1928, p. 277.

2 Nicolson, Op. Cit., p. 261-262. See also Cmd 1556, Vol. 1, 1921, Despatch from His Majesty's Ambassador at Paris, enclosing the Franco-Turkish Agreement signed at Angora on 20th October, 1921, p. 121-128.

3 Ronaldshay, Loc. Cit.

The National Assembly in Ankara had received French recognition of its sovereignty in Turkey and it was inevitable that their attitude should become less accommodating in face of the open rift between France and England. The French had travelled far from the mere disassociation from Greek support after Constantine's return to the throne. Turkish forces were supplied with French guns and ammunition[1] and the Turks were now able to concentrate their forces against the Greek invaders. With Lloyd George persevering in his pro-Greek policy, the situation had reached a truly dangerous state. The Greek position in Anatolia was becoming steadily more precarious yet all attempts at mediation were ineffective.

Many reasons can be offered for the delays and failures in mediating the Graeco-Turkish struggle. The fall of Briand's government in France and the procrastinating attitude of his successor, Poincaré[3] contributed to the

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1 Nicolson, Op.Cit., p. 264, and Webster, Loc. Cit.

2 Aristide Briand (1862-1932). A lawyer and leader of the Socialist Party, he served as premier and minister of the interior in 1909-11 and 1913. He was minister of justice 1912-13 and 1914-15. In 1915-17, 1921-22, and 1929, he was premier and foreign minister.

3 Raymond Poincaré (1860-1934). A lawyer, he possessed a strong republican outlook. He first became premier during the Agadir crisis (1912), and in 1913 was elected president of the republic. His term of office ended in 1920, and in 1922 during the reparations crisis he again became premier. He held office until 1924.

delay. A change of governments in Italy also served to deter a settlement. It is Toynbee's opinion, however, that:

> These attempts at peace-making really came to nothing because the Powers each still expected in their hearts to gain more by playing their pawns against each other than by stopping the game, while the pawns each believed and openly declared that with such powerful players behind them, they had a sporting chance of checkmating their adversaries.[1]

Certainly the Greeks continued to believe that Britain would support them in spite of Lord Curzon's warnings to the contrary.[2] Occasional rhapsodical eulogies by the British prime minister on the fine qualities of the Greeks frustrated Curzon's admonitions and confirmed them in their belief.

During these years, British foreign policy was often confusing because of a form of dual authority which existed. The prime minister in conducting his original and secretive foreign policy tended to ignore the important role traditionally played by the Foreign Office. Moreover, the prime minister and foreign secretary found it difficult to establish a harmonious and co-operative working relationship and this also served to confound British policy and led to a steady decline in the influence of the Foreign Office.

In March of 1922, a conference was held in Paris which proved to be the final concentrated effort to end

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1 Toynbee, Op. Cit., p. 98.

2 Owen, Op. Cit., p. 98.

hostilities in Asia Minor and reach a settlement with Turkey. The Greeks agreed to the broad concessions offered Turkey but the negotiations floundered on the question of an armistice.[1] The Ankara government insisted on the immediate evacuation of Asia Minor by the Greeks and talks were suspended on the issue of Turkey's unwillingness to halt military operations.[2] A proposed reopening of talks in Venice in July was forestalled by a final Greek attempt to resolve the issue through force of arms.

Late in July, Greece announced its intention to send a military force to occupy Constantinople. Such a stroke would undoubtedly have done much to bolster the sagging prestige of Greece and the confidence of her soldiers. The announced coup was forbidden by the three occupying powers: Britain, France and Italy, in keeping with their declaration of May, 1921, about the inviolability of the neutral zone.

A few days after the frustration of Greek plans, an indignant Lloyd George made another eulogy on the virtues of the Greek soldiers. To the British prime minister, it seemed the allied action had infringed on the principle of fair play. In Greece, his speech was published in the army

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1 Toynbee and Kirkwood, Op. Cit., p. 104.

2 Ronaldshay, Op. Cit., p. 288.

orders, and by both belligerents it was interpreted as an invitation to the Greeks to continue the struggle.[1] On August 18, Turkey replied with a new offensive[2] which rolled back the Greek army with such surprising speed that by early September the last Greek soldier had fled, been imprisoned, or lay dead in the smouldering ruins of Smyrna. The Turks then turned, in their pursuit of the Greek armies, towards the British, French and Italian forces stationed in the neutral zone at the Straits. Only a month earlier these same three powers had upheld the integrity of this zone against the Greeks. Now a more formidable army was challenging their position. The day of reckoning for four years of hesitation, procrastination and blunder was at hand.

The British commander in the area, General Sir Charles Harington,[3] realized the first defence of the neutral zone must be made at Chanak and appealed for Italian

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1 Chirol, Op. Cit., p. 19.

2 In Nicolson's biography of Lord Curzon (p. 270), the point is made that the speech was immaterial since Turkey had already planned the new offensive. Nevertheless, the incident is indicative of the personal role played by Lloyd George in the period.

3 Sir Charles Harington (1872-1940). A British soldier, he led his forces to an important victory at Messines (1917) during the First World War. In 1921-23, he was leader of the Allied occupation forces in Turkey. He later became governor and commander-in-chief of Gibraltar (1933-1938).

and French support so they could show "three flags instead of one".[1] This support was forthcoming and, on September 14, 1922, Poincare agreed to send representatives to Mustafa Kemal, informing him that the neutral zone must be respected. British reinforcements were rushed to the area and it appeared that this policy of firmness would force the Turks to adopt a policy of caution which would make possible a peace settlement and enable the allies to retain some remnants of their damaged prestige. But British action on September 15 and 16 brought a sharp split in allied ranks.

On September 15, the British cabinet issued an appeal to the Dominions and the Balkan states for assistance in the defence of the Straits. The response of the Balkans was negative[2] while two of the Dominions expressed their willingness to support British policy.[3]

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1 Owen, Op. Cit., p. 633.

2 Cumming, Op. Cit., p. 178.

3 Australia and New Zealand responded instantly and this was significant because the Turks had recent memories of the fighting qualities of these soldiers. Undoubtedly, their response contributed to the peaceful settlement of the crisis and it was their response that was emphasized at the time.

Canada answered with the statement that parliament would decide, and requested further information.

The prime minister of South Africa was in the interior of the country when the British message arrived. By the time the message reached him, the acute stage of the crisis had passed.

On September 16, the British government issued an official press communiqué in response to a natural desire for information.[1] This news release, drawn up by Winston Churchill and approved by the British prime minister, has been spoken of as being provocative and reckless.[2] The Foreign Secretary, Lord Curzon, who was absent when it was drawn up, referred to it as a "manifesto" and "flamboyant in style".[3] Much consternation was expressed over the government acting without the consultation of the Foreign Secretary. Yet Nicolson's observation, that Curzon's absence at his country seat at this juncture was inexcusable,[4] seems more to the point.

The French felt that Britain's unilateral action was perilous, and they were unwilling to risk the life of the government in what seemed a reckless and irresponsible policy. The Italian reaction was similar to the French and by the 19th there was only one flag facing the massing Turkish troops at Chanak. When Lord Curzon arrived in Paris on September 20 to try to mend the break in the

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1 For text of the communiqué, see Appendix 1.

2 "The Crisis in the Near East", The Spectator, September 23, 1922, Vol. 129, p. 388.

3 Ronaldshay, Op. Cit., p. 302.

4 Nicolson, Op. Cit., p. 300-301.

allied front, he learned that the French were unwilling to consent

> to any action by the Allied commanders on the spot which might expose a single French soldier to the danger of being shot at by a Turk.[1]

The French agreed with the principle of maintaining the freedom of the Straits, which the British government was emphasizing, but they differed about the methods to be employed. The French government could not risk a policy which might lead to war although the position of the British government was only slightly less precarious. It seemed a time to discard half-way measures, which the British government did with a vengeance, for the preservation of national prestige and vital interests. The French distrust of British foreign policy in the past and resentment over British single-handedness at the time was understandable, but an opinion on the French withdrawal on September 19, would probably be determined more by one's national sympathies than any other factor.

After three hectic days of bitter reproaches and recriminations in Paris, Lord Curzon succeeded in reaching an accord on September 23, whereby the three allies agreed to send a joint invitation to Mustafa Kemal to attend a peace conference at Mundania. Broad concessions were

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1 Ronaldshay, Op. Cit., p. 303.

offered. Eastern Thrace including Adrianople was to be restored, allied troops were to evacuate Constantinople, the freedom of the Straits was to be maintained, minorities were to be protected, and the allies would support Turkey's entrance into the League of Nations. It seemed the crisis had passed and Lord Curzon returned to receive the congratulations of his countrymen.

The air of tension continued for several days. In Greece, a revolution occurred which led to the exile once again of King Constantine and the return of Venizelos to a position of authority in the new government. The spectre of a renewed martial effort by the Greeks increased world tension. The Turks were not inclined to let the Greeks reorganize for such a venture and Kemal's troops moved dangerously close to the British lines. The steadiness and prudence of General Harington, in face of the provocative action by Turkish troops, must be credited for the maintenance of peace and, by the 30th, the crisis had passed. On October 3, the allied commanders met with the Turkish Chief of Staff at Mundania.

This conference again witnessed a split in allied ranks and a renewed danger of hostilities. The French representative agreed to Turkish demands which General Harington could not accept. The allies were then informed

that if these demands were not met the Turkish forces would attack on October 6. Once again, Curzon crossed to Paris in an attempt to restore a united front. A compromise was agreed upon which was presented to the Turks. Kemal had demanded the immediate evacuation of Eastern Thrace. The compromise involved a temporary allied occupation of the evacuated area prior to its transfer to Turkey, and the establishment of neutral zones along the Straits. Allied forces would remain pending a final peace conference.[1] In face of this renewed solidarity, the Turks agreed and the Mudania Convention was signed on October 11, 1922.

The effects of the Chanak crisis were manifold. In England, the Spectator, highly critical of government policy, commented as follows during the crisis:

> We think that those Englishmen who are abusing the Government for the decision to stay at Chanak in the circumstances have failed to distinguish between the shocking muddles of the past and the necessity of accepting the immediate result of those muddles if we are to pull through. . . . We are not out of the wood, but we have a good hope of getting out of it. If and when we do so we must never again trust to Mr. Lloyd George as guide.[2]

The commentary proved prophetic. On October 19, Lloyd George resigned the premiership. In getting out of the

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1 Shotwell and Deak, Op. Cit., p. 111.

2 "Chanak", The Spectator, September 30, 1922, Vol. 129, p. 420.

woods the British managed to recover much of the loss of their prestige which had occurred in the Near East since the conclusion of the war.[1] Of greater significance, the firm stand taken by the British government during the crisis undoubtedly prevented the outbreak of war[2] and prepared the way for a negotiated settlement at Lausanne.

The Treaty of Sèvres, long recognized as ineffectual, was discarded in view of the changed situation in Turkey. From the ashes of defeat the Turkish nation had arisen in a blaze of military glory to recoup its lost prestige and shape its own destiny. The new flow of ideals and ideas which looked only towards future successes, was personified in their great leader Mustafa Kemal. His dominance and mastery of the country were supreme.

In Canada, far from the scene of those tense September days, the unfolding of the drama was watched with apprehension and concern. Long before the denouement had been reached, the dry tinder of Canadian emotions was enkindled by sparks from the crisis at Chanak.

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1 Nicolson, Op. Cit., p. 272. Gathorne-Hardy, Op. Cit., p. 114. Lord Raglan, "The Government's Foreign Policy", The Nineteenth Century, Vol. 94, July-December, 1923, p. 687.

2 Cumming, Op. Cit., p. 181. Churchill, Op. Cit., p. 464. Gathorne-Hardy, Op. Cit., p. 114.

CHAPTER III

THE CRISIS BREAKS IN CANADA: ACTION OF THE LIBERAL GOVERNMENT

On June 27, 1922, the Canadian parliament was prorogued and did not re-assemble until January 31, 1923. In the intervening months the Chanak crisis, the news of which broke upon Canada in mid-September, put a brief but severe strain on the leaders of the country and the nation itself.

A few days after parliament had ended its sittings in June, a pundit remarked on the government's record:

> There is reason to suspect that somewhere in its ranks, concealed or otherwise, there is someone with the genius of the politician.[1]

There were solid grounds for this observation. The Liberals had not served as the government of Canada for a decade; yet they could look back on some real successes and no real difficulties in the recent session in which they possessed only a slim majority of two in the House of Commons. The Liberals had replaced the Conservatives as the governing party in the election of December, 1921, the results of which were as follows: Liberals 117, Conservatives 50, Progressives 66,[2] Independents 2.[3]

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1 The Standard, Montreal, Saturday, July 1, 1922.

2 Although the Progressives possessed the second largest number of seats in the House of Commons, they did not choose to act as the official opposition.

3 See Appendix 2 for election results by provinces.

Admittedly, the Conservatives as the official opposition, possessing only one-fifth of the total number of seats in the House, did not in themselves present a formidable threat to the government's longevity. Nevertheless, the newness of a three-sided parliament betokened caution and vigilance on the government's part. Although the antithetical political aims of the Conservatives and Progressives[1] made co-operation between the two parties doubtful, there was always the possibility that they would combine to jeopardize the government's position. This fact gave an air of impermanency to Mackenzie King's premiership and led him to pursue a cautious policy as he strove to strengthen his government.

This could be accomplished by winning over the Progressives either en masse or individually and was a consistent policy of Mr. King throughout the 1920's. His taks was facilitated by the similarities which could be found in the respective programmes of the Progressives and

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1 The Progressives were an agrarian political party founded in 1920. They supported a low tariff and advocated a purer form of democracy emphasizing the use of referendum, iniative and recall. They expressed openly their suspicion of the old political system and the old political parties, were distrustful of the eastern industrial and financial interests, and wished to nationalize all forms of transportation. They were criticized for their sectionalism and were accused of being interested in only one class, the farmer. Discipline within the ranks of the party was extremely weak.

Liberals. As Mr. King stated it: "Over and over again I have said that the Progressive Party is a sort of advance Liberal group".[1] The efforts to bring them into the Liberal party in 1921 and 1922 had failed but there were encouraging signs for the ultimate success of King's policy which was directed towards the absorption of the Progressive party. While rejecting the Liberal overtures after the election in 1921,[2] the Progressive leader, Thomas Crerar,[3] had sounded an optimistic note for the future. He offered King his party's support in all progressive measures which the Liberal government might introduce, and Mr. King could face the future with the hope that some incident might arise which would draw the two parties closer together.

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1 From a speech of Mr. King given at Newmarket, January 19, 1922, cited in W.L. Morton, The Progressive Party in Canada, Toronto, University of Toronto Press, 1950, p. 138.

2 For an excellent coverage of these negotiations, see Hudson Papers, Canadian Public Archives, No. 55-110, Vol. 2, Documents numbered 87-88.

3 Thomas Alexander Crerar (1876-). He was born in Ontario in 1876, and his family moved to Manitoba in 1881. A teacher and county elevator operator, he became president of the United Grain Grower Company in 1907. He was elected to parliament in 1917, and entered Borden's Union government as minister of agriculture. He resigned over the tariff issue in 1919. He played an important role in the agrarian revolt against the old two party system and, in 1921, led sixty-five members of the new Progressive party to the House of Commons at Ottawa. He continued as leader of the Progressives until November, 1922, when he returned to his business interests. After the disintegration of the Progressive party in 1929, he was persuaded to enter the Liberal cabinet as minister of railways.

In the interim, King emphasized co-operation in parliament whenever possible and, at the same time, he attempted to dissuade individual Progressive members from their allegiance to the agrarian party.[1]

When parliament prorogued in June, the Progressive leaders remained in Ottawa for several weeks to discuss further the feasibility of an alliance with the Liberals.[2] The negotiations were again fruitless but they undoubtedly convinced the prime minister that amalgamation on some basis was a distinct possibility. When the Chanak crisis occurred in September, it was not unnatural that King should attempt to use the incident as a catalyst in a Liberal-Progressive alliance.

On the day before the news of the Near Eastern crisis reached Canada, King travelled to his constituency of North York. Here he gave the first account of his stewardship since the election; and in the same speech he again stressed the advisability of co-operation between the Liberals and the Progressives, stating "that the dictionary showed the word 'liberal' to mean 'progressive' and the word 'progressive' to mean 'liberal'".[3]

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1 Gouin Papers, Canadian Public Archives, Correspondence, 1922-1929, Vol. 32, File 66, George W. Kyte to Gouin, June 16, 1922.

2 The Ottawa Citizen, July 1, 1922.

3 The London Free Press, September 16, 1922.

On the following day, Saturday, September 16, 1922, between noon and two o'clock, the Canadian press broke the news of the British government's decision to resist with force the Turkish threat at the Straits. It was through a local newspaper that the Canadian prime minister was first made aware of Britain's decision and the invitation to Canada to lend its support. This press communiqué given out by the British government was couched in the rather inflammatory language of Winston Churchill[1] and caused a sensation not only in Canada but in many other countries as well. Mr. King learned at the same time of New Zealand's decision to associate herself with Great Britain.

King was quite unprepared for these developments,[2] and the way in which he concealed this fact was adroit. In reply to repeated queries from newsmen, he emphasized that it was a matter for the decision of the cabinet, and when further pressed he replied only that he had no views on the matter "apart from those of the Cabinet".[3] This deference to his cabinet need not be viewed solely as an expedient

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1 See Appendix 1 for text of the press communiqué.

2 Quebec Telegraph, December 1, 1922. In a speech at Carleton Place, Prime Minister King said, "We had no message of warning and no previous intimation of a Near Eastern crisis."

3 The Toronto Star, September 16, 1922.

for he worked closely with his colleagues throughout the crisis. Mr. H. Blair Neatby maintains that close co-operation with the cabinet was one of the guiding principles of Mackenzie King's career.[1] Moreover, his relative youth (age 47) and the considerable prestige, experience and capabilities of his colleagues[2] made his actions only natural. The province of Quebec accounted for more than half of the total number of Liberal seats in parliament and King would necessarily consider the views of the five cabinet members from that province. Mr. Neatby also insists that King was guided by the conviction that on all questions there existed a consensus which could usually be reached through discussion by liberally-minded men.[3] The Chanak crisis presented Mr. King with an excellent opportunity to test this conviction.

The prime minister persued the official communication from the British government for the first time when he arrived back in Ottawa on Sunday morning, September 17.

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1 H. Blair Neatby, "Mackenzie King", Lecture delivered at Carleton University, Ottawa, March 2, 1963.

2 Messrs. Lapointe, Graham, Mackenzie, Robb, and Murphy had all entered the House of Commons between 1904 and 1910; Mr. Fielding had entered in 1896, Mr. Beland in 1902, and Mr. Bureau in 1900. J. Castell Hopkins, The Canadian Annual Review of Public Affairs, 1921, Toronto, The Canadian Review Company Ltd., 1922, p. 523. Cited hereafter as Canadian Annual Review. See Appendix 3 for Liberal Cabinet.

3 Neatby, Loc.Cit.

The official message had reached Canada late on Friday evening. It had to be decoded and, as was the customary procedure, pass through the Governor General's office. It reached the prime minister's office between two and three o'clock on Saturday afternoon, September 16.[1] Churchill's press communiqué had been released by Canadian newspapers between noon and two o'clock. Thus, as Mr. King later emphasized, his absence from his office on Saturday had no bearing on the announcement being made in the press before a responsible minister of the Canadian government received the official message.

One may sympathize with King's chagrin at what appeared to be an attempt to go over the head of the Canadian government, but to call it a "deliberate attempt"[2] does not seem to fit the facts. One explanation of the press release was that it had been merely a general statement drawn up by Winston Churchill and was meant to be paraphrased by Lloyd George's secretariat.

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1 Canadian House of Commons Debates, 1923, Vol. 1, p. 30. Cited hereafter as Commons Debates.

2 Robert M. Dawson, (ed.), The Development of Dominion Status, 1900-1936, Toronto, Oxford University Press, 1937, p. 67.

> It was not intended to be circulated or published textually. The secretary, however, finding it a little difficult to paraphrase so vigorous a document, suggested to George that the best way after all was to issue it as it stood, and George after some hesitation agreed. . . .This story should not be allowed to get into print your side.[1]

The dismissal of the Secretariat of the British Cabinet by the Bonar Law government, which replaced Lloyd George's coalition shortly after the Chanak crisis, lends some credence to this version. Winston Churchill, in The Aftermath, stressed that the official telegram to the Dominion governments had been approved seventeen hours earlier, had had at least a twelve hour start before the press communiqué was released, and that it had been the duty of the British government to advise the British public of the precarious situation which had developed in the Near East.[2] One cannot deny the aggressive tone of the press release and Britain should have given some thought to the effect which would result if the public of the Dominions were to learn of Britain's actions before the Dominion governments. Yet the pressures on the British government were great and with the need for immediate action such a mishap was understandable. It seems, as the prime minister

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1 Rowell Papers, Canadian Public Archives, Vol. 6, Folder 27, H. Wilson (Daily News) to N.W. Rowell, November 2, 1922, p. 3948.

2 Winston S. Churchill, The World Crisis, 1918-1928, The Aftermath, New York, Scribner, 1929, p. 455.

of South Africa observed, the press release was issued without ulterior motives.[1]

In the official cable from the British government Mr. King learned of the recent developments in the Near East and of the decision of the British cabinet, in general accord with the Italian and French governments, to resist the Turkish threat and maintain their position in the Straits zone until a stable peace could be achieved. The vital part of the despatch for Canada was the statement that the British government

> would be glad to know whether the Dominion government wished to associate itself with the action the British government were taking, and whether we would desire to be represented by a contingent.[2]

The despatch added that an offer by any or all the Dominions

> would undoubtedly exercise a favourable influence on the situation and might conceivably be a potent factor in preventing any actual hostilities.[3]

The British government received no actual answer to this inquiry until Monday, September 18, because King was determined to consult with his colleagues who did not re-assemble in Ottawa until the 18th. However, after his first perusal of the communication and before he met with

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1 A. Gordon Dewey, The Dominions and Diplomacy, The Canadian Contribution, Vol. 2, Toronto, Longmans Green and Co., 1929, p. 121-122.

2 Commons Debates, 1923, Vol. 1, p. 31.

3 Idem.

his cabinet, King sent a despatch which must have been unexpected in British quarters. In this message, instead of an answer to Britain's inquiry, King complained about the Canadian press having carried the news of the invitation or inquiry before any representatives of the Canadian government had been informed. He emphasized the embarrassment of his own position and inquired if he could reveal the contents of the cable, marked secret, and if not, what communication Britain would wish to have made public. His message concluded with the statement that parliament, when it met, would demand to have the communications brought down and he asked if the Canadian government would be given consent to comply.[1]

Mr. King's annoyance was evident in his first despatch and it was not confined solely to the manner in which he had first learned of Britain's actions. In his diary on Sunday evening, he had recorded:

> I confess it (the official message) annoyed me. It is drafted designedly to play the imperial game, to test out centralization vs. autonomy as regards European wars. . . . I have thought out my plans. . . . No contingent will go without parliament being summoned in first instance. . . . I shall not commit myself one way or the other, but keep the responsibility for parliament - the executive regarding itself as the committee of parliament.[2]

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1 Commons Debates, 1923, Vol. 1, p. 32.

2 Diary, September 17, 1922, cited in R. MacGregor Dawson, William Lyon Mackenzie King, A Political Biography, 1874-1923, Toronto, University of Toronto Press, 1958, p. 409.

Mackenzie King's distrust of any form of centralization was deep-seated and of long duration.[1] Thus, his belief that the Lloyd George government was playing the imperial game was significant. To concur in such a policy would not only contradict traditional Liberal policy but also his own long held beliefs. King's reference to the constitutional role of the executive also demands further comment for it was significant in determining the Canadian response to the British inquiry.

The prime minister's ideas on the duties and relationship between parliament and the cabinet had been clearly reiterated before the Near Eastern crisis. In 1920, as leader of the opposition, he had said:

> So long as, in the last analysis, all matters pertaining to Canada in her external or inter-Imperial relations are made subject to the approval of this Parliament, so long as no action can be taken of which the Parliament of Canada does not have ample opportunity to approve, we shall feel that to all intents and purposes, we are a nation in the true sense of the word. But let the sovereignty of this Parliament be impaired as respects anything that concerns Canada in either her inter-Imperial or international relations, and we shall feel that the position of Canada as a nation has been menaced to that extent.[2]

Shortly after the Chanak crisis, in a speech at Carleton Place, King repeated these same beliefs:

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1 Dawson, William Lyon . . . , p. 167-168.

2 Commons Debates, 1920, Vol. 1, p. 474.

> Was I alone to decide whether Canada was to go to war against Turkey or Russia or anyone else? It is for parliament and the people to decide and to control such matters. If ever you let the control of such decisions get solely into the hands of any small group of men, then you are forfeiting one of the principles for which Britain has long stood.[1]

The change in attitude which he later developed towards parliament's role, particularly in the field of foreign affairs,[2] presents no grounds for questioning the sincerity of his beliefs in the early 1920's.

Yet these ideas were questioned and criticized before the crisis occurred.

> His notion that the Cabinet is merely a committee of Parliament chosen to administer such legislation as the parliamentary majority enacts, may be admirable as a means of maintaining power, but it is not British, not moral, not conducive to the ultimate public good. King must realize the anomaly of responsibility without power, and humiliation of this incompetence to frame a course until they have counted noses.[3]

In spite of this harsh criticism, the public need not have been surprised at the answer which was sent to Britain on September 18, for it was in accord with the pledge King

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1 Quebec Telegraph, December 1, 1922.

2 James Eayrs, The Art of the Possible: Government and Foreign Policy in Canada, Toronto, University of Toronto Press, 1961, p. 110, and F.H. Soward, "Canada and the World", Alexander Brady and F.R. Scott, (ed.), Canada After the War: Studies in Political, Social and Economic Policies for Post-War Canada, Toronto, The Macmillan Company Ltd., 1945, p. 151.

3 The Gazette, Montreal, June 28, 1922.

had made during the election campaign of 1921. "The cabinet would regard itself, not as an autocratic executive but as a committee of parliament."[1]

The cabinet met for the first time during the crisis on September 18, and there was substantial agreement[2] on the answer which should be sent by the Canadian government. This answer coincided with the course of action which King had determined upon and set down in his diary in the previous night. At half past six on the evening of September 18, King informed the Canadian public through a press conference of his government's reply to the British inquiry.[3]

> As already mentioned the only communication which our Government has thus far received with regard to the situation in the Near East from the British Government is a cable marked secret, the contents of which, without the consent of the British Government, we do not feel at liberty to make public.
>
> It is the view of the Government that public opinion in Canada would demand authorization on the part of Parliament as a necessary preliminary to the despatch of any contingent to participate in the conflict in the Near East.[4]

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1 John Lewis, Mackenzie King: The Man: His Achievements, Toronto, Morang and Co., 1925, p. 99.

2 Eayrs, Op. Cit., p. 10.

3 In the interim, Britain had sent a reply to King's first cable of the previous day. They refused consent to the publication of the interchange of telegrams but suggested a form of statement drawn up by Winston Churchill which the Canadian government could put out. Dafoe Papers, Canadian Public Archives, M 74, Dafoe to Sifton, November 2, 1922.

4 The Gazette, Montreal, September 19, 1922.

In the cable which informed Britain of this position, King added that Canada would welcome the fullest information in order to determine whether or not parliament should be summoned.

In outlining the government's action, the prime minister emphasized the absence of any previous information from Great Britain. This was an important factor in determining the generally negative tone of Canada's response. As early as 1917, Sir Robert Borden had stated in the House of Commons:

> It is not proposed that the Government of the United Kingdom shall in foreign affairs act first and consult us after. The principle has been definitely laid down that in these matters the Dominions shall be consulted before the Empire is committed to any important policy which might involve the issues of peace and war.[1]

Furthermore, at the Imperial Conference of 1921, it had been agreed that communications should be improved within the Empire and that the Dominions should be kept advised on foreign policy. Britain had failed to implement either of these conference resolutions; reports on foreign policy, which were far from comprehensive, usually took more than a month to reach Canada from Great Britain.[2] Although consultation was not practicable when the crisis broke,

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1 Commons Debates, 1917, Vol. 1, p. 15281.

2 Eayrs, Op. Cit., p. 132.

Britain can be criticized for failing to anticipate the crisis.[1]

An unfounded and particularly unjust charge carried in some newspapers in England and Canada claimed that Canada's delay in determining a reply was based on incompetence and carelessness on the part of the government. It was maintained that Britain had kept Canada informed on developments in the Near East but the Canadian ministers had neglected to read the reports. The prime minister "in his profound innocence of foreign affairs",[2] was particularly reproached for being remiss in his essential duties as head of the Department of External Affairs.[3] In view of King's statement that the British cable of September 15 had been the only communication Canada had received in regard to the crisis, this charge intimated that the prime minister had been lying.[4]

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1 Dawson, The Development of . . . , p. 60.

2 The London Free Press, October 3, 1922.

3 Idem.

4 It should be noted that Sir Robert Borden found it almost inconceivable that King had not been kept informed by the British government, and made some private inquiries on the matter. These inquiries substantiated King's statements. Borden Papers, Canadian Public Archives, Correspondence, Vol. 283, File 237, Borden to Sir Campbell Stuart, November 20, 1922, p. 159106.

There was in fact no basis for these rumours. No cables had preceded Lloyd George's inquiry on September 15[1] and no reports at all had been received in the preceding ten days. The last report, received on September 6, and dated August 15, was a copy of a memorandum from the Italian ambassador in London stating that "the Turks are beginning to consider with increased inclination the necessity of terminating the war".[2] Since there is no evidence of forewarning, King's decision to gain time by referring the matter to parliament seems only judicious.

Shortly before midnight on September 18, King held another press conference. He reviewed what he had said earlier and announced that the information received was wholly reassuring. When informed of the vast numbers who were anxious to come to Britain's assistance, he commented that it would tend "to show the Turk the unity of the Empire and the spirit of the people".[3] However, he was not prepared to demonstrate the unity of the Empire in any official manner and the reply which had been sent was hardly calculated to please the British government or the

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1 Eayrs, Op. Cit., p. 131.

2 King Papers, Memorandum for the Prime Minister, December 16, 1922, cited in Eayrs, Op. Cit., p. 132.

3 The Gazette, Montreal, September 19, 1922.

section of the Canadian population who desired immediate action in support of Great Britain.

Lloyd George's cable in answer to Canada's dilatory reply stated that there was no need for an immediate decision to send troops, nor was it necessary to summon a special session of parliament.

> A definite statement, however, that Canada will stand by the Empire in the event of the terms of the Armistice being broken will do much to ensure the maintenance of peace.[1]

Mackenzie King remained adamant in face of this appeal and two subsequent attempts to secure a declaration of solidarity and did not waver from his reply to the above cable:

> We have not found it necessary to reassert the loyalty of Canada to the British Empire . . . Should it become necessary to summon Parliament, Canada, by decision of its Parliament will so act to carry out the full duty of the Canadian people.[2]

In determining the reply that parliament must decide, there was general agreement within the cabinet. The

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1 Ralph Allan, Ordeal by Fire, Canada 1910-1945, Toronto, Doubleday, 1961, p. 239.

2 Idem.

one known exception was W.S. Fielding,[1] the minister of finance who, with Ernest Lapointe,[2] the minister of marine and fisheries, was attending the League of Nations Assembly at Geneva. Mr. King had sent a cable on Sunday, September 17, to ascertain their views on the question of Canada's reply. On Monday, Mr. Fielding wired back. "We heartily approve attitude British government respecting Constantinople.[3]

If disconcerting, the reply was probably not surprising, for Fielding's reputation as a staunch imperialist was well known. Shortly before the Chanak crisis, at a small celebration marking the fortieth anniversary of his

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1 W.S. Fielding (1848-1929). From 1884 to 1896, he was the Liberal premier of Nova Scotia. From 1896 to 1911, he was minister of finance in the Laurier government. In 1917, he broke with Laurier over the question of compulsory military service and, in the 1917 election, he was returned to the House of Commons as a Liberal Unionist. He did not enter Borden's cabinet, but he gave it general support. After the war, he returned to the Liberal party and was a candidate for the party leadership after Laurier's death. Both his age and his apostasy in 1917 worked against him and King was elected leader. In 1921, he became finance minister in King's government and held his position until his retirement in 1925.

2 Ernest Lapointe (1876-1941). He first entered the House of Commons as a Liberal in 1904. After the death of Sir Wilfrid Laurier in 1919, he became the chief protagonist of the Liberal party in Quebec. In 1921, he was appointed minister of marine and fisheries in the King government. In 1924, he became minister of justice.

3 King Papers, W.S. Fielding to Mackenzie King, September 18, 1922, cited in Eayrs, Op. Cit., p. 10.

entrance into politics he had stated:

> I hold strong views on that subject. There is a jingoism, a blaring of trumpets which is not Imperialism, but when one has faith in the British Empire as the greatest organization for the peace and development of the world that is real Imperialism.[1]

Fielding's reply to King's cable did not receive support in the cabinet[2] and King was convinced that a non-committal response would better reflect the actual consensus of the party and the nation. The following day, September 19, a cable from Lapointe re-echoed the Canadian government's reply and revealed that Mr. Fielding had spoken only for himself:

> Be governed by Canadian opinion . . . Would advise delaying answer and being non-committal.[3]

Undoubtedly, Fielding's absence in Geneva facilitated the government's task of reaching a decision and Fielding did not feel strongly enough on the issue to indicate that there was any division in cabinet solidarity.

In the early days of the crisis, Mackenzie King saw the possibility of bringing the Progressives into the Liberal camp:

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1 Canadian Annual Review, 1922, p. 256.

2 Sifton Papers, Correspondence, 1922, Vol. 209, Dafoe to Sifton, November 2, 1922, p. 163251-94. Dafoe had received the information from Mr. Crerar.

3 King Papers, Ernest Lapointe to King, September 19, 1922, cited in Eayrs, Loc. Cit.

> I believe we have found the basis on which the Progressives of Western Canada may be brought into a real accord with the Liberals in the Province of Quebec and other parts of the Dominion.[1]

The Progressive leader, Mr. Crerar, was invited to Ottawa and, on September 22, after a day-long session with the prime minister, he announced his emphatic agreement with the government's policy.[2] He later re-affirmed this agreement in a letter to Sir Clifford Sifton.

> Canada should not be committed to any war- unless she were attacked- except with the full approval and consent first had of the Canadian people through their representatives in Parliament.[3]

In spite of agreement on this issue, the negotiations aiming at a Liberal-Progressive alliance reached an impasse. The Progressives were particularly distrustful of the big business interests in the Liberal party which centered in Montreal and were personified in the figure of Sir Lomer Gouin,[4] the minister of justice in King's government. Crerar

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1 Mackenzie King to J.R. Boyle, October 3, 1922, cited in Dawson, William Lyon . . . , p. 413.

2 The Ottawa Journal, September 23, 1922.

3 Sifton Papers, Correspondence,1923, Vol. 210, Crerar to Sifton, February 8, 1923, p. 163722.

4 Sir Lomer Gouin (1861-1929). From 1905 to 1920 he was premier and attorney general of Quebec. In 1921, he entered federal politics and, from 1921 to 1924, he was minister of justice. A noted financier, he was director of the Bank of Montreal and Royal Trust Company, president of Title Bond, Guarantee and Trust Corporation of Canada Ltd., and director of Montreal City and District Bank and Mount Royal Assurance Company.

wanted Gouin, who had objected to the negotiations, dismissed from the cabinet. King refused and the rapid denouement in the Near East deprived the negotiations of any sense of urgency.[1] Evidence of disunity in the Progressive party made it extremely doubtful that King's hopes would have been crowned with success. The Winnipeg Tribune claimed that Crerar did not represent opinion in the Progressive party and that furthermore his

> poorly concealed desire to enter the Mackenzie King cabinet helps to place his views at a discount.[2]

The opportunity passed but, in spite of this, the continued proof of division amongst the Progressives indicated that King's policies were not entirely fruitless. The division within the agrarian party was indicative of the strain that was placed on the whole country.

It should be noted that the other Dominions were not subject to the same strains during the crisis. Prime Minister Smuts of South Africa was in the interior when the British communication arrived. By the time he returned to the capital, the acute stage of the crisis had passed, and a second cable had arrived from England stating that it had been to Australia and New Zealand that the inquiry

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1 Dawson, William Lyon . . . , p. 413

2 Winnipeg Tribune, September 23, 1922.

was primarily addressed. In Smuts' reply to the British government he stated that he would have to consult parliament before he could commit his government to the support of British policy in the Near East.[1]

New Zealand signalled without question or hesitation its readiness to support Great Britain and send a contingent. With Australia, she had fought against the Turks at Gallipoli, and the strength of the tie with the mother country was clearly revealed in the words of the leader of the Legislative Council in speaking of New Zealand's response. If they had bothered to consult parliament, it

> would have consumed at least three days; then what would the world have said - that New Zealand had taken three days to make up its mind, instead of the three minutes actually required.[2]

Premier Hughes of Australia, like King, received his first notice of the crisis through the press. Nevertheless, when the official inquiry arrived, he decided on immediate action. Australia pledged its support but, in the same cable,there was a strongly worded protest about the press release which it was felt was an effort to stampede the government into action.

> I feel I ought to speak quite frankly, and say that the unity of the Empire is imperilled by such action.[3]

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1 Dawson, The Development of . . . , p. 57.

2 Dewey, Op. Cit., p. 115.

3 Frank Owen, Tempestuous Journey, Lloyd George, His Life and Times, London, Hutchinson, 1954, p. 639.

The replies of Australia and New Zealand exposed the decision of the Canadian government to some unfavourable comment and comparisons.[1] Yet King did not waver from his course which was directed towards minimizing the friction in the country which would have necessarily been augmented by a direct yes or no to the British inquiry. In effect, his reply evaded the issue while at the same time Canada's refusal to co-operate was clearly demonstrated.[2]

King could not have forgotten the bitter memories of the 1917 Conscription crisis and reckless handling of the Chanak crisis could conceivably lead to a similar disaster. The precarious position of the Liberal government in the House of Commons also contributed to a non-committal policy. As noted in the press during the crisis,

> almost two-thirds of its (the government's) support is from Quebec, where a formidable body of opinion is unalterably opposed to Canada's participation in European wars. Naturally the Cabinet's decision must be based on consideration of that significant fact.[3]

It was calculated that, had the government agreed to support Britain with a contingent, "at least forty of their

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1 Algoma News, Saturday, October 7, 1922, and Canadian Commons Debates, 1923, Vol. 1, p. 163.

2 Dewey, Op. Cit., p. 128.

3 Sydney Post, September 21, 1922.

supporters would have gone into open revolt".[1] Therefore it seems doubtful that King could have committed Canadian forces without a dangerous cleavage along racial and party lines. Yet by adopting the course he did, he avoided an anti-French solidification in the English-speaking provinces which must surely have followed from an absolute no in answer to the British appeal.[2] In the interests of both party and national unity the course adopted by the Canadian government was well advised.

Nevertheless, there was a portion of the population which disagreed with the government's policy. Early in the crisis, this group found that they could close ranks under the banner of the Conservative Party. This aspect of the Chanak crisis is reserved for a later chapter. It may merely be noted at this juncture that the Conservatives conducted a vigorous and critical campaign against the Liberal government's policy.

The sense of crisis continued into October, but even before the end of September there was a perceptible change of opinion towards a more calm approach reflecting

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1 J.A. Stevenson, "Canada and Foreign Policy", Foreign Affairs, Vol. 1, No. 3, March 15, 1923, p. 110.

2 Idem., "All the old and very deep resentment felt against Quebec for its imperfect sympathy towards the national war effort in 1914-1918 would have blazed out in full fury."

approval of the government's position of no commitments without the consent of parliament.[1] The rapid restoration of tranquillity in the Near East eased the pressure on the Canadian government, and King could be portrayed as the man not disloyal to the Empire, but first, foremost, and always a staunch defender of democratic principles and the Canadian people. The slings and arrows of the Conservative party had been largely spent during the crisis itesèlf, and when parliament reassembled in late January, 1923, the Liberals were prepared to meet the opposition without fear or trepidation over the government's stand during the September crisis. Mr. King's decision had proved acceptable to the vast majority of the Canadian public and this decision could be defended and defended well.

When parliament met on January 31, 1923, no mention of the Near Eastern Crisis was made in the Speech from the Throne, and one searches the Senate Debates of 1923 in vain for any discussion of the crisis itself. However, a few questions were asked in the Senate in an attempt to clarify the issue of Canadian participation in war, and these were related to the crisis of the preceding September. During this exchange on March 14, 1923, when asked why the Senate had been given no information on the Near Eastern

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1 Dawson, William Lyon . . . , p. 413.

situation, the Liberal leader in the Senate, Mr. Dandurand,[1] replied:

> No information in regard to the Near East situation was given in this chamber during the debate on the Address because no request was made upon this subject nor any allusion to it by any member of this House.[2]

On February 1, the prime minister reviewed the Chanak crisis in the House of Commons in order to give "as clearly and as fully as I can, an exact statement of what has taken place".[3] This speech was primarily an objective account of what had occurred, although a few points served to justify the government's action. Mr. King mentioned the unsatisfactory manner by which the government had been informed and emphasized that his absence from Ottawa when the British invitation came on September 15, had had no bearing on the announcement being made in the press before the Canadian government received the official message. He also defended his absence:

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1 Raoul Dandurand (1861-1942). He was called to the Senate in 1898 and, from 1905 to 1909, he was speaker of the Senate. In the first King administration in 1921, he was appointed minister without portfolio, and the representative of the government in the Senate. The same appointments were held in the second King government in 1926.

2 Canadian Senate Debates, 1923, p. 159.

3 Commons Debates, 1923, Vol. 1, p. 29.

> I think that through the whole of last year, I did not allow myself a single day's vacation: so far as I recall, there was but an exception of one day. On this particular occasion I was spending two days in my own constituency, the only two days I had been privileged to spend there during the year.[1]

The lack of forewarning was mentioned and it was noted that the appeal had been

> addressed primarily to Australia and New Zealand on account of their interest in the Gallipoli peninsula, and that its being subsequently sent to the other Dominions was due to the circumstance that the British government having sent it in the first instance to these two Dominions, felt they should send it to all four.[2]

The Liberal member, Mr. Putman, credited King for having acted in keeping with the spirit of the League of Nations,[3] and noted that had the prime minister acted otherwise he would have offended the principle of responsible government.[4]

These points were significant, but a detailed defence of the government's actions was made by Mr. W.J.

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1 Commons Debates, 1923, Vol. 1, p. 30.

2 Ibid., p. 31.

3 The League of Nations was not an important factor during the crisis. On September 22, 1922, Dr. Nansen of Norway moved a resolution requesting the Council to take some action directed towards ending hostilities in the Near East. The Canadian representatives were silent during the discussion and the matter was referred to a committee. Then the Supreme Council made it clear that it reserved this matter for its own exclusive management. Thereafter the League made no further attempt to involve itself.

4 Commons Debates, 1923, Vol. 1, p. 13.

Raymond.[1] He explained that parliament had not been convened during the crisis because it was unnecessary and would have indicated a lack of confidence in the administration. There appears to be some inconsistency in this argument since the administration's appeal to the formula that parliament must decide was tantamount to a vote of lack of confidence in itself.

It was noted by Mr. Raymond that the British telegram came as a "bolt from the blue"[2] and that Winston Churchill, the man from whom it came, was "rather impetuous, a very Hotspur".[3] This alone, he maintained, betokened caution on the part of the prime minister in determining his reply.

Mr. Raymond claimed that it would have been ridiculous and absurd for Canada to commit herself and then find her support was not needed. He did not clarify why a peaceful settlement, under such circumstances would have made Canada's commitment absurd and ridiculous and the reasons are open to conjecture.

Reference was made to the unfavourable comparisons which had been drawn at the time of the crisis and since

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1 For text of speech see Commons Debates, 1923, Vol. 1, p. 163-166.

2 Ibid., p. 163.

3 Idem.

between Canada's response and that of Australia and New Zealand. The speaker appealed to Canada's pride in its past and future, noting that it was Canada who had discovered the solution which had enabled these two countries to come into existence, and adding that he did not want

> the action of Australia or New Zealand ever to influence the mind of Canada with regard to her national destiny.[1]

The members of the House of Commons were reminded that English newspapers had applauded Canada's action and that the British public had not supported the Lloyd George government in the subsequent election. This disapproval by the British public of their government's actions was stressed and to underscore his point, Mr. Raymond emphasized the defeat of Winston Churchill in Scotland.

> It is bad enough to be beaten at any time; but when honourable members consider the bitter irony of being beaten in Scotland by a prohibitionist, they will realise the strength of the feeling that was in the hearts of those voters must have been much more than usual.[2]

Mr. Raymond disposed of the contention that Canada should have acted for the moral effect by pointing out that Britain's game of bluff lacked completely any basis for an appeal of this sort. While avoiding any involvement

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1 Commons Debates, 1923, Vol. 1, p. 183.

2 Ibid., p. 164.

in the question of the morality of the issue, it may at least be noted that the Lloyd George government was not bluffing in its stand at the Straits. Mr. Raymond also denied that Canada's honour was in any way at stake during the crisis.

In explaining the absence of any mention of the crisis in the Speech from the Throne, an analogy was drawn. Mr. Raymond compared the government's action to that of a sea captain who sailed past a dangerous rock or reef. The captain would not claim credit for this nor would be call it to the attention of his passengers. Thus the Canadian government did not feel it should be claiming credit for its actions during the crisis.

Prime Minister King was commended for his wisdon and the hope was expressed that all future leaders, in similar circumstances, would weigh as carefully the costs in money and lives of any untoward actions; the prime minister must never forget that he must be able to look the widow and the orphan in the face and this should temper his judgment. The prime minister's policy was endorsed for upholding Dominion status, for had King acted in accordance with Britain's hopes, Canada would have been reduced to a position of tutelage.[1] The government's action was also

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1 Commons Debates, 1923, Vol. 1, p. 165.

credited for having contributed to the maintenance of peace.

> Had the action of our Prime Minister been rash there was a possibility that the world might have been plunged into a war not much less serious than that of 1914.[1]

Further praise was lavished on the judgment, moderation and sagacity of Mackenzie King and it was re-emphasized that of course when questions of liberty, honour and justice were at stake, Canada could be depended upon. But in questions of foreign policy, Canada must form its own opinions and must not be bound to follow the foreign policy of Great Britain wherever it might lead. Canada would not shirk its duties within the Empire, but she would determine "by instinct"[2] what these duties were--and not by responding automatically to all appeals from Great Britain.

Mr. Raymond noted that there were certain areas in the world where Canada had no great interest. Herein was the best justification for Mr. King's refusal to co-operate, for there was no essential Canadian interest at stake in the crisis at the Straits. The emotional tie with Great Britain was closely balanced by feelings of

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1 Commons Debates, 1923, Vol. 1, p. 165.

2 Idem.

isolationism; but of greater importance, Canada lacked sufficient information to form an opinion on the wisdom of Britain's actions at the Straits.[1] Therefore, it would be something less than judicious to endorse unreflectingly a war policy against a nation thousands of miles away, and over an issue which did not endanger Canadian security and about which few in Canada had any detailed knowledge.

This does not attempt to dismiss our of hand the arguments of those who desired to stand at Britain's side during the crisis. This group desired to keep the Empire united at all costs,[2] and they had important and deeply-routed motives for taking the position they did. When the Canadian government indicated that it was not willing to co-operate with Great Britain during the crisis, this section of the population soon found that the Conservative party provided a nucleus around which they could unite in their opposition to the government's policy.

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1 A. Berriedale Keith, "The Imperial Constitution and the Imperial Conference", The Edinburgh Review, Vol. 238, No. 485, July, 1923, p. 6.

2 F.R. Scott, "The Permanent Bases of Canadian Foreign Policy", Foreign Affairs, Vol. 10, No. 4, July, 1932, p. 622.

CHAPTER IV

THE GOVERNMENT ENCOUNTERS OPPOSITION TO ITS POLICY: 1922-1923

After the news of the Chanak crisis broke in Canada, a full week elapsed before the Conservative party stated its position on the issue. Mr. Meighen, as leader of the Conservatives, partially explained this taciturnity on September 20, and in the same speech gave an indication of the stand his party would take.

> The question of the Near East is one on which no one should endeavour to embarrass the government . . . every citizen should give the government the opportunity to live up to the best traditions of sterling British character.[1]

His emphasis on the gravity of the situation was realistic and undoubtedly sincere, and the opposition party must be admired for the non-partisan nature of their position in the early days of the crisis. Yet other reasons may be sought to explain this reticence on the part of the Conservatives.

Mr. Meighen's leadership of the party was of relatively recent origin (1920) and his record in this capacity was far from enviable. He had overseen the party's fall

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1 The London Advertiser, September 21, 1922.

from power in 1921 and in the December election he had witnessed its transformation from the leading national party to what could be described fairly as a splinter group. Even his position as official leader of the opposition in parliament resulted from the peculiar political doctrines of the Progressives, which led them to refuse the office, although it would ordinarily be theirs by right of possessing the second largest number of seats in the House of Commons.

No one would attribute this striking decline in party fortunes solely to Mr. Meighen. Nevertheless, as leader he had held the reins of power during these years and the party had wandered into the political wilderness.[1] If the party moved at all it must be certain that it was moving ahead and caution was the byword.

Historically, the Conservative party was the party of the Empire, in spite of the cynical remark of Henri

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1 The issue of the responsibilities of the leader was well recognized by Mr. H.S. Truman when he served as President of the United States. Over his desk he kept a sign which read, "The buck stops here".

Bourassa.[1]

> Mr. Meighen is in favour of the unity of the Empire and the autonomy of Canada; Mr. King is in favour of the autonomy of Canada and the unity of the Empire.[2]

The broad diversification of sectional, racial, religious, and economic interests has made it necessary for political parties in Canada to extensively broaden their appeal in order to gain the adherents necessary for a national party. The resulting "bargaining and log-rolling"[3] of political parties has tended to obscure the lines of difference in their respective aims, and to justify to a degree the observation of Bourassa. Yet the Conservatives retained their recognition as the party most strongly committed to the Imperial tie, and on several occasions produced slogans

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1 Henri Bourassa (1868-1952). A French-Canadian politician and journalist, he was the grandson of Louis Joseph Papineau. He entered the House of Commons in 1896 and resigned in 1898 in protest against Laurier's policy during the South African war. He became leader of the Nationalist party in Quebec and, in 1900 and 1904, was re-elected to parliament. From 1908 to 1912, he was a member of the Quebec legislature. He bitterly opposed conscription and English policy generally during the First World War. In 1910, he founded the Montreal newspaper Le Devoir and continued as editor to 1932.

2 Alexander Brady, Democracy in the Dominions A Comparative Study in Institutions, Toronto, University of Toronto Press, 1955, p. 108.

3 Frank H. Underhill, In Search of Canadian Liberalism, Toronto, The Macmillan Company of Canada, 1960, p. 39.

which dramatized their position -- and won elections. In 1891, Sir John A. MacDonald caught the public imagination when he declared: 'A British subject I was born - a British subject I will die.' In 1911, Sir Robert Borden stirred similar emotions when he proclaimed: 'One flag, one king, one navy, one empire.' And before the Chanak crisis ended Mr. Meighen too would make his contribution to these emotional aphorisms.

While advocating close co-operation within the British empire[1] the Conservative party also stressed Canadian autonomy, particularly after 1914. When Mr. Meighen became leader he brought no innovations to this policy. However, his predecessor, Sir Robert Borden, had hoped to see Canada's status clarified by a constitutional conference and felt some uneasiness over the inadequacies of Canada's voice in the formulation of imperial foreign policy. Mr. Meighen, on the other hand, was willing to leave these issues somewhat clouded as demonstrated in the Imperial Conference of 1921.

Meighen left no doubt as to the strength of his sympathies for the British connection. Like others in his

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1 J. Castell Hopkins, The Canadian Annual Review of Public Affairs, 1921, Toronto, The Canadian Review Company Limited, 1922, p. 221. Hereafter cited as Canadian Annual Review.

party he viewed the British Empire as a great force for peace in the world and did not visualize any conflict arising over the issue of foreign policy.

> So far as foreign policy is concerned I do not think there are many in Canada who would have this country decline an invitation to come and help. We must walk with the nations of this Empire or walk away from them. The gospel of isolation is the gospel of separation.[1]

Thus, Mr. Meighen's genuine conviction of the importance of the unity of the British Empire and his belief that this unity held no threat for the maintenance of full autonomy in the Dominions[2] made it likely that he would voice disapproval over the Liberal government's response to the British communications during the Chanak crisis. Had he continued as prime minister there is no doubt that he would have supported the British policy at the Straits. Vacillation would have been most unlikely in view of his convictions and the outstanding qualities of his character.

Certain qualities in Meighen's character have on occasion been held up for citicism. Professor Underhill has referred to him as that

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1 Hopkins, Op. Cit., p. 220.

2 Rowell Papers, Canadian Public Archives, Vol. 6, Folder 27, Harris, H.W. (The Daily News) Rowell to Harris, June 24, 1921, p. 3931-2.

> lean and hungry Cassius, the bitter fanatic who lost votes all across the country every time he won a debate in the House.[1]

Yet there was much to admire in his character. He was noted for his clear crisp reasoning, possessed a talent for dialectic display,[2] and few would deny his qualities of courage and conviction. He held no sympathy for fools and knaves and the Liberals as such were considered children of the devil.[3] Meighen was somewhat of a tragic figure for in spite of his many talents he was never able to establish himself firmly at the pinnacle of Canadian politics -- the prime ministership.

> What might have become the era of Meighen became instead the age of Mackenzie King, a rival whom Meighen regarded as unworthy and despicable.[4]

As one observer expressed it, Meighen had too hard and unyielding a mind for the times in which he lived.[5] His very proneness to reduce so many questions to matters of honour on which compromise and retreat were difficult put

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1 Underhill, Op. Cit., p. 117.

2 T.M. Fraser, "The New Government in Action", The Canadian Magazine, Vol. 62, November 1923, p. 6.

3 Dafoe Papers, Canadian Public Archives, M 74, J.A. Stevenson to Dafoe, December 12, 1919.

4 Professor R. Graham, The Ottawa Citizen, January 26, 1963.

5 Dafoe Papers, M 74, Stevenson to Dafoe, December 12, 1919.

him at a great disadvantage. Mr. King, who never suffered under such liabilities,[1] was despised for what appeared to be supine and unprincipled behaviour. Such charges against King were undoubtedly unfair, but King's policies were nothing if they were not flexible.[2]

The two leaders were both convinced of the justice of their respective opinions. However, Mr. King's convictions were strengthened by the peculiarity of character which assured him that his life was a divinely ordained mission[3] directed by an "Unseen Hand".[4] These profound mystic beliefs of Mr. King, coupled with a certain facility for self-delusion,[5] must undoubtedly complicate the historians' task; but it seems a safe assumption that there will be no denial of King's abilities as party leader, his shrewdness, and his political insight -- all of which qualities were demonstrated during the Chanak crisis.

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1 R. MacGregor Dawson, William Lyon Mackenzie King, A Political Biography, 1874-1923, Toronto, University of Toronto Press, 1958, p. 318. "King was at heart a pragmatist whose chief concern was results."

2 Ibid., p. 319. "He would not push a needed reform at the risk of dividing his party".

3 F.A. McGregor, The Rise and Fall of Mackenzie King: 1911-1919, Toronto, Macmillan Company, 1962, p. 227.

4 Ibid., p. 12.

5 H. Blair Neatby, "Mackenzie King", Lecture delivered at Carleton University, Ottawa, March 2, 1963.

While the prime minister grappled with the problems arising from the British communication of September 15, Mr. Meighen had ample time to consider the stand which his party would adopt on the issue. Demonstrations of old-fashioned jingoism indicated that there would be public support for an affirmative reply to the British inquiry.[1] When the British inquiry was first announced in the press, the government had been showered with offers to serve. The Calgary Herald recorded that

> the possibility of Canada's help being needed has evoked a flood of offers from all parts of the Dominion of men and officers for service.[2]

In Montreal it was observed that

> Canada is ready to do its part. . . . Overseas battalions, militia regiments, Red Cross and hundreds of individuals . . . are volunteering for service.[3]

Veteran organizations across Canada expressed their readiness to support Great Britain,[4] and The Globe (Toronto) described as a deluge the offers to serve which poured into Ottawa. Some church congregations in Toronto passed a standing vote on Sunday evening, September 17, stating

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1 "Men in all walks of life, when interviewed by The Globe, declared themselves in favour of whole-hearted support of Great Britain." The Globe, Toronto, September 18, 1922.

2 The Calgary Herald, September 19, 1922.

3 The Montreal Daily Star, September 19, 1922.

4 The Globe, Toronto, September 18, 1922.

that Canada should stand by the mother country,[1] and similar despatches were received by the government from other centres.

> Toronto churches yesterday heard the call that the Dominions . . . rally round Great Britain in defending her from the Turks and last night several congregations passed resolutions respectfully urging the Dominion Cabinet to provide assistance.[2]

Although there were sharply conflicting opinions in the press, the newspapers generally favoured action on the part of the government.[3] The London Free Press advised the prime minister that only whole-hearted support of Great Britain would represent the spirit of the great masses of the Canadian people,[4] and The Globe (Toronto) and The Ottawa Citizen took relatively the same position.

When the government announced its policy on September 18, the criticism from some sections of the press became more virulent at the

> unmanly un-Canadian un-British response of the King Government. . . . The Prime Minister's shifty shabby answer brings a blush to the cheeks of Canadians who cherish their citizenship in the Empire.[5]

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1 Sifton Papers, Canadian Public Archives, Correspondence, 1922-1923, Vol. 210, Crerar to Sifton, Feb. 8, 1923, p. 163722.

2 The Globe, Toronto, September 18, 1922.

3 Canadian Annual Review, 1922, p. 182.

4 The London Free Press, September 19, 1922.

5 The Mail and Empire, Toronto, September 23, 1922.

The Winnipeg Tribune advised that if Canada should continue to refuse aid, she should have "the decency and manliness to withdraw from the British Empire, and quit under fire at that".[1] The Globe (Toronto) stressed Canada's moral obligation to resist the Moslem menace to civilization.

> We are confronted once more with the hideous spectacle of the human tiger uncaged, gorging himself on Christian flesh and blood.[2]

It was also noted that Canada was pledged to support the Treaty of Sèvres. "Is that to become another historic scrap of paper?"[3] queried the London Free Press.

On September 22, Mr. Meighen dramatically entered the acrimonious debate between those who supported and those who deplored the government's action. On that day in a speech to the Toronto Business Men's Club, he placed himself squarely at the head of those forces who were dissatisfied with the government's policy. The Toronto Mail and Empire described the speech as a "fervid outburst of indignation",[4] interrupted throughout by cheers and applause.

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1 Winnipeg Tribune, September 22, 1922.

2 The Globe, Toronto, September 19, 1922.

3 The London Free Press, September 20, 1922.

4 The Mail and Empire, Toronto, September 23, 1922.

Mr. Meighen emphasized the seriousness of the Turkish threat at the Straits in defiance of the Treaty of Sevres and asked:

> Where should Canada be found when the Motherland invites her to take her stand in defence of the Treaty? There is much of destiny hangs upon the decision. . . . From this week . . . may date a struggle on the outcome of which may depend, not only our place in the world, but also the influence of the Empire in her power for good and peace. There are those who write and talk as though Britain were not our good partner and friend but our chief antagonist . . . seeking to lead us to our ruin. . . . It would be more manly if they came forward themselves in favour of secision (sic).
>
> We in Canada do not recognize any inevitable foes. . . . That, however, does not mean that we should shut our eyes to the lessons of experience. What. . . would have been the fate of Turkey but for the friendly offices of Great Britain in respect of the very Straits now in dispute? They have been in Turkey's possession because Britain stood by her side, . . . but Turkey, in treachery, turned, and in Britain's hour of dire peril handed to Germany the strategic corridor, . . . that she might strangle the Empire and encompass our destruction. The plan failed and one of the most practical progenies of the peace was the neutralization of the . . . Dardanelles. . . (Applause)[1]

Meighen observed that the neutralization of the Straits had been defied, but he was confident that Britain's actions would restore peace and maintain the neutrality of the Straits.

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1 The Mail and Empire, Toronto, September 23, 1922.

> Britain is not prepared to surrender that prize of victory because she wishes to secure that the future may belong to peace and not to war. She sends a message to the Dominions, not a mere indifferent inquiry as to what was the mind of Canada, but a message to see if the Dominions were solid behind the Motherland. The exact wording of the message we do not know, but judging from the evidence that was its purport. From Australia and New Zealand the British Government got messages of co-operation in defence of the Treaty of Sèvres. Those messages have been met with an expression of gratitude. . . . We were a party to the Treaty of Sèvres and the trials and sacrifices that made it possible. There is no suggestion at all that we should send armed forces across the sea. Britain merely sought a declaration of solidarity on the part of the Dominions (Applause) -the existence of which the war has demonstrated once and for all. Let there be no dispute as to where I stand. When Britain's message came then Canada should have said: 'Ready, aye ready; we stand by you.'[1] (Loud cheers) I hope the time has not gone by when that declaration can yet be made. If that declaration is made, then I will be at the back of the Government.
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> By that course we do not bring the country nearer war. We take the best step in our power to ensure that war shall not come. (Applause) . . . By any consequences of my decision I am prepared to stand.[2]

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1 An extract from a speech of Sir Wilfrid Laurier, August 19, 1919, was found in this file of the Meighen Papers, Series 4, Vol. 87, File 76, Imperial Relations, p. 055998. In reference to Canada's participation in World War I, Laurier had stated: "When the call comes our answer goes at once, and it goes in the classical language of the British answer to the call of duty, 'Ready, aye ready'". It is ironic to conjecture that Meighen found inspiration for his attack on Liberal policy from Sir Wilfrid Laurier.

2 The Mail and Empire, Toronto, September 23, 1922.

If amends were necessary to his adherents for the days of silence, Mr. Meighen had certainly made them. The emotional fires of the country were stoked and stirred, and the whole issue was propelled into the field of partisan politics. The time honoured principle of loyalty to the Empire was revived and around this principle the speaker had enshrined the other virtues of honour, courage, honesty, manliness, and peace. Yet one can detect the anomaly of colonialism which continually haunted the Conservative party's position on the imperial connection. The emphasis which was placed on the treachery of the Turks was open to serious question, as was the impugnment of the honour of the Canadian government in the references made to the Treaty of Sèvres.

Mr. Meighen had not seen the correspondence exchanged between the Canadian and British governments, but his impression of their general character was not far wrong. Britain had stressed that all that was necessary was a declaration of solidarity after receiving the first cool reply from the Canadian government.

In reply to Mr. Meighen's speech, the prime minister issued a press release on September 24, in which he concentrated on the question of Canada's obligations

arising from the Treaty of Sèvres.[1] Mr. King made it quite clear that there actually was no treaty since it had never become operative. Therefore, no one could be bound by it. A second and third set of proposals had been considered since the Treaty of Sèvres had been signed in August, 1920, and a fourth set was at that time under consideration. Great Britain had never ratified the treaty and the Nationalist revolutionary government of Mustapha Kemal had never signed it. The only action taken by the Canadian government in respect to the treaty had been the passing of an enabling act to permit the Governor-in-Council in certain eventualities to act under what might become a treaty. No order-in-council had ever been passed under this enabling act and hence the treaty had never been ratified by Canada. In effect, Mr. Meighen was accused of being misinformed and of misleading the Canadian public.

The Conservative leader refused to accept this refutation, and the following day issued a press release in which he roundly declared that Canada had ratified and was bound by the Treaty of Sèvres, and that the Canadian government was shirking its duty.[2] To substantiate the

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1 For the text of Mr. King's press release, see The London Free Press, September 25, 1922.

2 Vancouver Province, September 26, 1922.

claim that parliament had ratified the treaty, Mr. Meighen quoted from Hansard. On June 27, 1922, Senator Dandurand, a member of the Liberal cabinet and party leader in the Senate, had indeed stated when the treaty was under discussion: "We are now ratifying it".[1] This confusion on the senator's part, however, did in no way alter the truth of the prime minister's peroration on the treaty and its bearing on Canada.

A further investigation of Hansard proved significant and even alarming in its exposure of the perfunctory and casual manner with which matters of foreign affairs were treated in parliament. The Treaty of Sèvres had been rubber-stamped through the House of Commons with only one inane question by Thomas Crerar, who asked: "Are we likely to get anything out of Turkey?".[2]

In the Senate more was said but it was far from enlightening for the participants, or for the reader of the debates. Indeed, the discussion bordered on the ludicrous.[3] The apparent confusion over the meaning of ratification and the lack of knowledge about the subject

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1 Canadian Senate Debates, 1922, p. 713.

2 Canadian House of Commons Debates, 1922, Vol. 4, p. 3490. Cited hereafter as Commons Debates.

3 For extract on the Senate discussion, see Appendix 4.

under discussion might even be considered humourous were it not for the realization that foreign relations were serious business. It was disturbing to discover the haphazard, uninformed, and indifferent manner by which Canada undertook obligations in foreign affairs.[1] The circumstances which released Canada from any obligations under the treaty were largely fortuitous. The absence of discussion in parliament clearly lacked foresight, particularly in view of the apparent determination on the part of the Canadian government not to become involved in the Near East during the Chanak crisis. Although Mr. Meighen's position in regard to the Treaty of Sèvres was not defensible, the investigation which brought this out cast no credit on any of the three parties.

Mr. Meighen continued to criticize the government's policy but the controversial treaty was discarded as a weapon. He stressed the value of the imperial connection for Canada and for the peace of the world, and charged the government for failing to take the public into its confidence during the crisis.[2] The government was denounced for its inaction and the Conservative leader emphasized the

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1 The Quebec Chronicle, September 27, 1922.

2 Canadian Annual Review, 1923, p. 164.

constitutional weaknesses in Mr. King's principle that parliament will decide. Mr. Meighen pointed out that the executive does possess the right to act in an emergency.[1] Sections of the press also derided King's constitutional theories and the motives behind them.

> The cabinet is responsible for all policies. It enunciates policies and atakes its life on them.[2]

> Premier Hughes of Australia did not require the mandate of parliament before he gava (sic) his answer, when asked the same question his reply was "yes". He knew that constitutionally he had authority to speak for his country and he spoke. Premier King on the other hand does not know the constitutional authority of the Premier of Canada, or knowing it he shirks his responsibility for fear of "losing his job".[3]

The same article noted that King was evading his duty of "helping Britain to fight the Turks"[4] because he feared losing the support of the French Canadians in the party.

The constitutional basis was in fact weak for the government's action of devolving responsibility on parliament and refusing to give positive direction or leadership

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1 Canadian Annual Review, 1922, p. 225.

2 The London Free Press, September , 1922.

3 Algoma News, October 7, 1922.

4 Idem.

to the nation in an emergency.[1] That parliament would decide the extent to which Canada would be committed in any war was an accepted convention by 1922.[2] However, the Militia Act stated that parliament must be summoned within fifteen days after any part of the militia had been placed on active service,[3] and the British North America Act in Section 132 states that:

> The Parliament and Government of Canada shall have all powers necessary or proper for performing the Obligations of Canada . . . as Part of the British Empire, towards Foreign Countries.[4]

Moreover, the British parliamentary system assumes that the exectuve presents policies to parliament.[5] Without denying the right of parliament to determine the extent of Canada's participation in war, it must be conceded that the cabinet

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1 John Russell Baldwin, Canada and the International Political Agreements of the Post-War Period, 1918-1932, unpublished Master's thesis, Department of History, University of Toronto, p. 180.

2 Arthur Berriedale Keith, Responsible Government in the Dominions, Vol. 2, Oxford, Clarendon Press, 1927, p. 999.

3 Percy E. Corbett and Herbert A. Smith, Canada and World Politics, A Study of the Constitutional and International Relations of the British Empire, London, Faber and Gwyer, 1928, p. 90.

4 British North America Act and Amendments, 1867-1943, Ottawa, Edmund Clouthier, 1943, p. 58.

5 A. Gordon Dewey, The Dominions and Diplomacy, The Canadian Contribution, Vol. 2, Toronto, Longmans Green and Company, 1929, p. 128.

did have the privilege and/or the responsibility to take action during the crisis. Normally, parliament would begin to fulfill its duty only after a decision of the cabinet, which would still leave the final verdict in the hands of parliament. Mr. King's policy went further and eliminated the role of the cabinet altogether. Thus parliament's authority was extended from the power it possessed of deciding the issue of participation in war in the final analysis to the power of making the decision in the first instance. The Liberal government's policy was not censured and defeated in parliament and therefore a precedent was created to which any future leader might appeal under similar circumstances.

It might be argued that Mr. King's refusal to co-operate was merely following a precedent set by Sir John A. MacDonald when, in 1885, he declined to become involved in Britain's troubles in the Sudan.[1] In reply to a suggestion by Sir Charles Tupper, the Canadian High Commissioner, MacDonald had stated:

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1 John S. Ewart, Canada and British Wars, Ottawa, John S. Ewart, 1922, p. 8.

> We think the time has not yet arrived, nor the occasion for our volunteering military aid to the Mother Country.
> . . . . . .
> Why should we waste money and men in this wretched business? Our men and money would therefore be sacrificed to get Gladstone and Company out of the hole they have plunged themselves into by their own imbecility.[1]

King and MacDonald acted similarily in their unsympathetic attitude to the wave of indignant patriotism which swept the country on both occasions. However, Mr. King was confronted with a unique situation in the form of the British communication inquiring if Canada wished to assist in the Near Eastern imbroglio. There were no comparable occasions in Canadian history of Great Britain appealing to the Dominions for assistance,[2] and in view of this, Mackenzie King was travelling in unchartered waters in 1922.

Mr. King's appeal to the constitutional issue that parliament must decide, served as an effective political smokescreen. It skillfully obscured the fact that the Canadian government was not prepared to give an unequivocal yes or no in answer to the British inquiry. In pursuing the constitutional question, Mr. Meighen and those who

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1 Dandurand Papers, Canadian Public Archives, Vol.4, File 4, National Politics, Correspondence of Sir John A. MacDonald to Sir Charles Tupper, March 12, 1885.

2 Robert MacGregor Dawson, (ed.), The Development of Dominion Status, 1900-1936, Toronto, Oxford University Press, 1937, p. 60.

followed him were drawn slightly off center from the principal question, which was whether or not Canada should support Great Britain at the Straits. Moreover, the prime minister's position on the constitutional question possessed a powerful and cogent appeal. Mr. King could and did present himself as the defender of democratic principles and the protector of the people against the autocratic designs of the Conservatives.

> Was I alone to decide whether Canada was to go to war against Turkey or Russia or anyone else? . . . If ever you let the control of such decisions get solely into the hands of any small group of men, then you are forfeiting one of the principles for which Britain has long stood.[1]

In parliament, King sounded the same theme.

> It is for parliament to decide whether or not we should participate in wars in different parts of the world, and it is neither right nor proper for any individual or any group of individuals to take any step which in any way might limit the rights of parliament in a matter which is of such great concern to all the people of our country.[2]

The individual referred to who might endanger the rights of parliament was, of course, Mr. Meighen whom the prime minister had earlier compared to Lenin and Trotsky in his readiness to violate the rights of the legislative body of government.[3]

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1 Quebec Telegraph, December 1, 1922.

2 Commons Debates, 1923, Vol. 1, p. 33.

3 Canadian Annual Review, 1921, p. 460.

The bellicose display of "military enthusiasm, swashbuckling and froth"[1] continued during the days of crisis, but as noted above there was a gradual strengthening of the support for the non-committal position taken by the government. On October 4, Sir Clifford Sifton credited Dafoe and The Manitoba Free Press for influencing the other newspapers in the country to adopt a more restrained attitude towards the crisis.

> You have done your work; more effectively than you have any idea of. The whole press of Canada was on the verge of an hysterical shriek for war. Your first article steadied theirs. I think the danger is over.[2]

However, the Canadian press must also have been affected by the strong reaction in the British newspapers against the policy of Lloyd George.[3] Furthermore, The Manitoba Free Press was not the only newspaper which supported the Canadian government's action. Bourassa's paper, Le Devoir, which represented French-Canadian nationalist opinion,

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1 Dafoe Papers, M 74, Sifton to Dafoe, September 18, 1922.

2 Dafoe Papers, M 74, Sifton to Dafoe, October 4, 1922. Sir Clifford Sifton was not adverse to distributing credit liberally even to himself. On December 14, 1922, he wrote to Dafoe: "In my own mind I accept full responsibility for furnishing Mackenzie King with a ready made policy. His declarations on the subject were almost word for word what I said in an address at Ottawa where King was present."

3 Foster Papers, Canadian Public Archives, Diaries, January 1, 1922-March 31, 1924, entry for October 4-10, 1922.

was bitterly critical of the British government. Le Canada appealed for calm during the crisis and stated: "Le Gouvernment ne doit prendre aucune décision sans rassembler le parlement."[1] Other papers which supported the Liberal government were the Farmers' Sun, Toronto, The Toronto Star, The Herald, Montreal, The Gazette, Montreal, the Sydney Post, the Vancouver Province, and the Moose Jaw Times.[2]

On September 21, the Sydney Post made a penetrating commentary on public opinion in the country. It noted that there were two minorities in the country, one of which was violently opposed to and the other violently in favour of Canada standing by Great Britain. It was observed that the vast majority of Canadians felt

> loyalty to the British connection and a readiness to make any effort necessary to maintain the integrity of the Empire, coupled with a desire to be convinced as to the necessities of the situation before committing themselves to any further effort overseas.[3]

The position taken by the Conservative opposition appealed to only one of these minority groups, whereas the government's non-committal policy was generally satisfactory to the vast majority.

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1 Le Canada, Montreal, September 19, 1922.

2 Canadian Annual Review, 1922, p. 183.

3 Sydney Post, September 21, 1922.

The crisis ended rapidly, but it was assumed that when parliament assembled the Conservatives would launch a sharp attack against the policy the government had adopted during the crisis. "There promises to be some lively echoes across the floor of the House of Commons."[1] Mr. Meighen's vehement outbursts against the government seemed to indicate that he would use the opportunity to state clearly the alternative course which he would have pursued.

> He will doubtless feel it is his duty to bring up the question for discussion. . . . it does not seem possible that the next session of Parliament can pass without some honest consideration of questions which have been put in the forefront of the stage by the developments of the last few months.[2]

When parliament reassembled, Mr. Meighen commented on the absence of any reference to the Chanak crisis in the Speech from the Throne. He noted that one of the Liberal supporters had praised the government's action in September, and stated that "if there was action, I could not really define it myself - in refusing to submit a policy until parliament met".[3] He added the observation that the Speech from the Throne was

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1 Winnipeg Tribune, September 21, 1922.

2 The Manitoba Free Press, October 10, 1922.

3 Commons Debates, 1923, Vol. 1, p. 25.

> as barren of any suggestion or submission of policy to parliament as the government was barren when other parts of the Empire answered in September last.[1]

He expressed the hope that the government would bring down all the communications which had been exchanged between the Canadian and British governments. Mr. King did not comply because of the request of the British government not to do so; but the correspondence was presented for the personal scrutiny of the Conservative and Progressive leaders.

The Conservative party's criticism of the handling of the Near East crisis was conducted by Mr. J.B.M. Baxter. He attacked the government for its failure to present a policy, and exposed the weaknesses in the government's formula that parliament will decide. The Liberals were accused of shirking their duty behind this fatuous formula while they realized the information which would enable parliament to decide would be withheld.

> If parliament had been assembled, all we would have had would have been a despatch-case set up on a desk in the House, and we would have been told "The reason for what we are doing or not doing or not attempting to do is contained in that case. . . . but we cannot unlock that case and cannot show you what is in it".[2]

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1 Commons Debates, 1923, Vol. 1, p. 25.

2 Ibid., p. 141.

The Liberals were also charged with using a most grave and solemn national issue for the imprudent and shameful furthering of party interests. Why, wondered Mr. Baxter, was Mr. Crerar and not Mr. Meighen consulted, and if Mr. Crerar had favoured war, would Canada have then decided differently and sent a cable pledging support to Great Britain? He deplored that the national interest should be at the mercy of such time-serving opportunism. A plea was made for Canada to accept a positive and responsible position in international affairs. This, the speaker maintained, could be best accomplished by greater participation in the councils of the Empire,

> so that long before war would even be in prospect, we would know whether or not all had been done to avoid a possible conflagration.[1]

A significant statement in Mr. Baxter's speech was that

> if the Empire is really in peril once more, if it is not the political swashbuckling of Downing Street, if it is real peril, there will be no question about the answer of real Canada.[2]

The implications of the statement were important and indicated a subtle change in the Conservative estimation of the crisis. They had not retreated from the position that

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1 Commons Debates, 1923, Vol. 1, p. 142.

2 Ibid., p. 141.

Canada should have stood by Great Britain.[1] However, the reference to the political swashbuckling of Downing Street indicated that Conservatives were not willing to follow unquestioningly wherever British policy might lead. Nor were they any longer willing to pursue with enthusiasm the strident belligerency which Meighen demonstrated in his 'Ready, aye ready' speech. It seemed more discreet to stress the weaknesses in the tactical rather than the strategical position of the government.

This change in emphasis was not surprising in view of the developments since September, 1922.[2] It had been learned that Canada was under no obligation arising from the defunct Treaty of Sèvres. The British communication represented largely the personal policy of Lloyd George and a few adherents, and it had been sent without the knowledge of the Foreign Secretary and others in the cabinet. Subsequently, Lloyd George had fallen from power amongst the almost universal denunciation of the British

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1 Another Conservative member noted that British policy was directed towards peace and that Canada could have best made its contribution by assuring Great Britain that the Canadian government supported the action at the Straits. Ibid., p. 169.

2 One could say that this change in emphasis reached its culmination point in 1925 when Mr. Meighen in a speech at Hamilton claimed that no troops should be sent from Canada without a general election first being held. Willison Papers, Canadian Public Archives, Vol. 57, Meighen to Willison, December 5, 1925, p. 21561.

press.[1] Furthermore, in March, Sir Clifford Sifton remarked that Canadian public opinion had undergone a reaction against participation in any more wars, and the stand taken by Mr. Meighen during the crisis was no longer popular.

> I spoke with complete freedom on the subject at Montreal and declared flat-footedly that . . . the continued participation in British wars meant absolute ruin for Canada. The audience cheered me.[2]

Mr. Crerar had noted in February that the general feeling in the country was one of apathy and disinterest.[3] Such feelings on the part of the public would not encourage the Conservatives to persevere in the bellicose attitude they had adopted in the heat of the crisis. Finally, the rapid restoration of peace in the Near East and the urgency of many other questions swiftly deprived the Chanak crisis of its prominence.

The Progressives and independents in parliament expressed general approval of Mr. King's policy during the

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1 Foster Papers. Diaries, Entry for October 4th to 10th, 1922. "The Home Government in its foreign policy gets little support - France is right Kemal is right Italy is right. . . No story is too absurd and no motive too base to saddle on Lloyd George."

2 Sifton Papers, Correspondence, 1922-1923, Vol. 210, Sifton to Dafoe, March 8, 1923, p. 163766-31.

3 Ibid., Crerar to Sifton, February, 1923, p. 163721.

crisis.[1] However, Mr. Woodsworth,[2] after complimenting Mr. King on following the "very best Liberal traditions",[3] expressed disappointment that the government had not attempted to clarify the relationship between Canada and Great Britain. He also disapproved of parliament not being granted the privilege of seeing the correspondence which had been exchanged between the two governments.

It would be difficult to argue with the final observation of the Conservative member who said:

> I think sir, it is fortunate indeed for all concerned that the crisis passed, but it is no more fortunate for anyone than for the Prime Minister (Mr. Mackenzie King) and the government of this country.[4]

Yet this must have been small consolation for the opposition.

Amongst the matters demanding the attention of parliament and the government were the Lausanne Conference and the impending Imperial Conference. These matters were not unrelated to the Chanak crisis and are dealt with in the sequel.

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1 Commons Debates, 1923, Vol. 1, p. 40, 45, 71.

2 J.S. Woodsworth (1874-1942). A pacifist, he opposed participation in World War I. He played a prominent part in the Winnipeg strike of 1919, and his arrest and imprisonment undoubtedly aided his political career. He was elected to the Commons in 1921 as an independent Labour candidate, and held the seat until his death. He played an important role in the founding of the CCF in 1932.

3 Commons Debates, 1923, Vol. 1, p. 45.

4 Ibid., p. 169.

CHAPTER V

SEQUEL: 1922-1924

1. An Estimation of the Liberal Government's Policy.

The Chanak crisis demonstrated clearly the need for Canada to clarify both her foreign and her imperial relations.[1] Moreover, it indicated that a co-operatively controlled foreign policy for the whole Empire was impossible.[2] The inadequacies of the existing system of communications were made abundantly clear.[3] This was incidental, although a few individuals with imperialistic sympathies claimed that the lesson to be drawn from the crisis was that there need only be an improvement in the machinery for consultation to avoid the repetition of such an incident.[4] If this had been the only result

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1 G.P. deT. Glazebrook, "Canada and Foreign Affairs", Canadian Historical Review, Vol. 16, No. 2, 1935, p. 184.

2 R.A. MacKay, "Canada and the Empire - Historical Retrospects", Canadian Institute on Economics and Politics, Canada: The Empire and the League, Toronto, Thomas Nelson and Sons Limited, 1936, p. 77.

3 J.A. Stevenson, "Canada and Foreign Policy", Foreign Affairs, Vol. 1, No. 3, March 15, 1923, p. 110.

4 Rowell Papers, Canadian Public Archives, Vol. 6, Folder 27, Harris H.W., Rowell to Harris, November 21, 1922, p. 3951.

of the crisis, the Canadian imperialist would have been quite pleased. However, no attempt was made by the Canadian government to remedy the unsatisfactory communication system and Canada moved in an opposite direction towards greater and more aggressive nationalism,[1] and the development of a separate foreign policy. The incident established that British interests and Canadian interests could be completely unrelated or even sharply divergent. Even if communications between the mother country and the Dominions had been excellent, it seems a safe assumption that the conclusions drawn by Canada as a result of the crisis would have been the same. In matters where the interests of Canada and the Empire coincided, efforts should be made to work together, but it should be recognized that they were separate and distinct nations who would often have separate and distinct interests in foreign affairs. However, the invisible bonds of loyalty and kinship remained and could not be completely ignored, and this accounts for the tentative and gradual manner by which these conclusions were applied.

The Imperial Conference of 1921 had been unwilling to attempt to clarify the anomalies in the constitutional relations between Great Britain and the Dominions. After

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1 Robert MacGregor Dawson, (ed.), The Development of Dominion Status, 1900-1936, Toronto, Oxford University Press, 1937, p. 65.

the Chanak crisis, this trend towards a pause in constitutional discussions was reversed.[1] There was by no means a sharp reversal but it was generally accepted that there must be some effort made to remedy the misconceptions and confusion of thought existing in the Empire in matters of imperial relations and foreign affairs. Mr. King probably realized that certain anomalies would long continue in Canada's relations with Great Britain, but it was inevitable that in matters of foreign relations there must be separate policies,[2] with co-operation reserved for matters in which it would be possible and desirable. Professor Eayrs has observed that little was done towards the development of an effective or independent foreign policy.[3] Nevertheless, it was significant that as a result of the crisis Canada would have the unquestioned privilege to pursue an isolationist and negative course; which was still of course an independent foreign policy.[4]

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1 A. Berriedale Keith, "The Imperial Constitution and the Imperial Conference", The Edinburgh Review, Vol. 238, No. 485, July, 1923, p. 5.

2 R. MacGregor Dawson, William Lyon Mackenzie King, A Political Biography, 1874-1923, Toronto, University of Toronto Press, 1958, p. 420.

3 James Eayrs, The Art of the Possible: Government and Foreign Policy in Canada, Toronto, University of Toronto Press, 1961, p. 110.

4 G.P. deT. Glazebrook, A History of Canadian External Relations, Toronto, Oxford University Press, 1950, p. 348.

The principle that Canada was at war when Britain was at war was not brought into question by the Chanak crisis. Mr. King's action strongly reaffirmed the corollary of that principle which maintained that Canada must be the sole judge of the extent of her participation.[1] Sir Wilfrid Laurier had consistently upheld this position.

> If England is at war, we are at war and liable to attack. I do not say that we shall always be attacked, neither do I say that we would take part in all the wars of England. That is a matter that must be determined by the circumstances.[2]

Yet where Mackenzie King stressed the role of parliament, Laurier did not state precisely who would decide[3] and he usually did not distinguish between "the will of the government, the will of parliament, and the will of the people".[4]

During the crisis and after, King was often commended for following in the footsteps of Sir Wilfrid Laurier, and insofar as his actions avoided any commitments and contributed to the development of Canadian autonomy,

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1 Dawson, Development of Dominion . . . , p. 63-64.

2 Canadian House of Commons Debates, 1910, Vol. 2, p. 2965; cited hereafter as Commons Debates.

3 A. Gordon Dewey, The Dominions and Diplomacy, The Canadian Contribution, Vol. 2, Longmans Green and Company, 1929, p. 129.

4 Commons Debates, 1910, Vol. 2, p. 7472.

this was true. Nevertheless, King's formula that parliament must decide was his own device for the continuation of Laurier's policy.

> It was a utilisation of the relationship created by his former master in order to refuse co-operation on this occasion, a refusal veiled by the assertion of an entirely different proposition, namely the supremacy of Parliament in foreign relations, or, it might be said the relegation of Parliament of the onus of decision in such matters.[1]

The general acceptance by the public of King's policy indicated that he had struck the common chord in his decision to avoid any form of commitments. One newspaper focussed attention on a very important point in relation to the discussion of King's belief that parliament must decide.

> In the last analysis the decision will hinge upon the will of the people. Neither Premier nor Cabinet nor Parliament can fetter the will of the people.[2]

It is difficult to ascertain the will of a people but it was apparent that Liberal policy was not out of step with the people's will. The genius of Mackenzie King during the crisis lay in his ability to perceive that a non-committal policy would be acceptable to the majority of Canadian citizens. There was undoubtedly a lack of wisdom and logic in waiting on developments during the crisis and making no

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1 Dewey, Loc. Cit.

2 The Gazette, Montreal, November 18, 1922.

effort to control the course of events which could quite conceivably lead Canada into war. Nevertheless, the public in effect endorsed this policy and Mr. Dafoe's observations were penetrating albeit bitter. A large number of Canadians

> are mentally lazy and timid . . . . there appears to be no greater illusion than to assume that an unanswerable logic is conclusive with the public.[1]

Mackenzie King's policy during the crisis was politically judicious. Furthermore, it is difficult to envision an alternative policy which would have produced such a satisfactory outcome for Canada. In view of the circumstances of the moment and the factors which had to be considered, his response seems almost inevitable.

The absence of forewarning and the manner by which the Canadian government was first informed of the British inquiry gravitated towards a negative response on the part of Canada. The government's answer to the British inquiry preserved the traditional Liberal position as the "exponent of zealous political nationalism".[2] Mr. King saw in the crisis an opportunity to bring the Progressives into the Liberal camp, for in this matter at least the Progressives

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1 Dafoe Papers, Canadian Public Archives, M 74, Dafoe to Sifton, February 12, 1923.

2 Alexander Brady, Democracy in the Dominions, A Comparative Study in Institutions, Toronto, University of Toronto Press, 1955, p. 106.

could be brought into substantial agreement with the powerful Quebec wing of the Liberal party.

Prime Minister King's actions also served to strengthen party unity. Shortly before the crisis The Manitoba Free Press had commented on the confused and diversive characteristics of the Liberal party.

> Some issue will come up to divide the Liberals into the two camps to which they belong.
>
> The chances are ten to one that when this time comes the Conservatives in the Government (led by Sir Lomer Gouin) and the Conservatives in the opposition will come together and take over the government of the country.[1]

The Round Table too stated that Gouin completely ignored the party platform.[2] Unquestionably there was some basis for these observations and for rumours of party restiveness under the apparent dictation of the Montreal vested interests.[3] Mr. King's policy during the crisis served as a cohesive force within the party. His concern for party unity was well-advised for the Liberals "had not yet recovered from the division and discord caused by the conscription issue and the formation of the Union government".[4]

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1 The Manitoba Free Press, August 15, 1922.

2 "The Liberal Regime", The Round Table, Vol. 50, March, 1923, p. 389.

3 Sifton Papers, Correspondence 1923, Vol. 209, Dafoe to Sifton, July 11, 1922, p. 163251-82.

4 Dawson, Development of Dominion . . . , p. 62.

The precarious position of the Liberal government in parliament contributed to the formulation of a non-committal policy. In the lower house they had a bare majority and in the Senate they were outvoted. Reference has been made to the government's dependence on French Canadian support and the Quebec element were historically wary of Canadian involvement in British wars. The Chanak crisis was no exception and the member for Hull, Mr. J.E. Fontaine, reflected the feelings of many French Canadians in an attack on Mr. Meighen's position during the crisis. He described Meighen as the one dissenting voice in opposition to the prime minister's courageous action.

> He (Mr. Meighen) would have liked, I suppose, despatching our Canadians to be killed across the seas; he would have felt some satisfaction in forcing upon us a new conscription act.[1]

In view of Mr. King's background and experience his decision during the crisis was to be expected. As deputy minister of labour (1900-1909), minister of labour (1909-1911), and as labour consultant for the Rockefeller organization during the war years, he had become convinced that the use of force in industrial disputes was not only unnecessary, but abhorrent. These ideas on industrial peace

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1 Commons Debates, 1923, Vol. 3, p. 2816.

came to be applied to questions of international peace as well.[1] Convinced that reason and the spirit of good will would always make possible the peaceful settlement of disputes, he would naturally hesitate to support a policy which he felt might hasten the outbreak of hostilities.

Another characteristic of Mr. King which he revealed in a letter to his brother in 1917, was probably of some consequence in determining his response to the British inquiry. He wrote of

> just letting each day work out the problem for itself. I always remember . . . that it never does to plan far ahead, events determine for us the course of our lives. To be right in each step at the time it is made should be the supreme endeavour.[2]

That the writer of these words should reply to Lloyd George's inquiry as he did, indicated an unsophisticated reaction. Certainly, there was no far-seeing plan underlying the response and the position taken was anything but irrevocable.

The economic situation in Canada affected the nation's outlook on foreign affairs and questions of peace and war. Canada was struggling, with some success, to overcome the dislocation in trade, agriculture, and industry

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1 F.A. McGregor, The Fall and Rise of Mackenzie King, 1911-1919, Toronto, The Macmillan Company, 1962, p.79. "He thought of the causes of unrest in industrial and international relations as basically the same."

2 Ibid., p. 293.

resulting from the war;[1] and there was much concern over budget deficits arising from the war and the railroad building mania of the pre-war years (1900-1912).[2] In attempting to balance the budget military expenses were considered particularly expendable.[3] The Canadian public had only recently (1917) been introduced to a Dominion income tax and neither the government nor the public would favour a new expensive military build up; this unsavoury prospect was evaded by Canada's reply during the crisis.

Chanak was thousands of miles away, there were no treaty obligations and in no way was the nation's security endangered. In light of these factors the response of the Canadian government to the British appeal was both understandable and probable. Nevertheless, the Canadian response reflected little credit on the government.

The executive refused to give direction or leadership to the nation in an emergency and, as noted above, the constitutional basis for devolving responsibility on parliament was weak. Evasion and procrastination provide a

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1 J. Castell Hopkins, The Canadian Annual Review of Public Affairs, 1923, Toronto, The Canadian Review Company Limited, 1924, p. 257, Cited hereafter as Canadian Annual Review.

2 The Observer, London, September 16, 1923.

3 Canadian Annual Review, 1922, p. 283-284.

dangerous and unrealistic policy in times of crisis. If the government carried its policy to its logical conclusion, the confusion in the nation and in parliament could have been immense. The parallel of the Greeks wrangling amongst themselves as Philip of Macedon prepared for their destruction breaks down, but it deserves mention. Some writers have condemned the government's policy as selfish in ignoring that positive action on Canada's part might have contributed to the maintenance of peace.[1] War was avoided, of course, but Canada's action was negative[2] and many echoed the Round Table's comment.

> The Government followed the line of least resistance and is lucky to discover that for once the counsels of weakness and the counsels of prudence coincided.[3]

In 1928, a minor furor arose when Prime Minister King claimed in the House of Commons that his action during the Chanak crisis had helped avert war.[4] In The Times (London) it was reported that Mr. King had credited Canadian action for averting a serious European war,[5] and the

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1 John Russell Baldwin, Canada and the International Political Agreements of the Post-War Period, 1918-1932, unpublished Master's thesis, Department of History, University of Toronto, p. 180-181.

2 Dewey, Op. Cit., p. 127.

3 "The Near East Crisis", The Round Table, Vol. 49, December, 1922, p. 177.

4 Commons Debates, 1928, Vol. 2, p. 1715.

5 Ibid., Vol. 3, p. 3479-3480.

Conservative leader vigorously attacked the prime minister's assertion. Although one could hardly deny that The Times (London) had interpreted Mr. King's statements fairly, he claimed that the report was untrue.[1] The incident does not demand that the controversial statements of Mr. King be considered in detail. He had said in parliament:

> More than that we were told that but for the action of Canada in taking the position which she did at that time in asking that the facts be brought out and that the parliament of Canada should have its say before contingents were sent abroad, a second great European conflict might have taken place.
>
> Some honourable members: Oh, oh.
>
> Mr. Mackenzie King: Some honourable gentlemen opposite question that statement . . . . I thought that point had come to be generally conceded.[2]

The prime minister went on to present arguments to substantiate his position. Yet the contention that Canada had played the role of a peacemaker in 1922 is difficult if not impossible to accept.

2. The Lausanne Conference, 1923-24, and the Imperial Conference, 1923.

In October 1923, the second Imperial Conference since the war assembled in London. The Chanak incident

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1 Commons Debates, 1928, Vol. 3, p. 3480.

2 Ibid., Vol. 2, p. 1715.

"cast its shadow over all the deliberations from the opening of the Conference to its close",[1] and introduced a mood of reticence and caution on the part of many of the Dominion representatives. Other events of importance which had occurred since the Conference of 1921 were the controversial Halibut Treaty[2] signed by Canada alone, and the Lausanne Conference. The former was a commercial and political treaty negotiated between Canada and the United States,[3] through which Canada established her right to act without British intervention in the matter of treaties affecting Canada alone. The precedent was fixed when only the Canadian representative signed the treaty, and the constitutional advance was formally recorded in the resolution of the Imperial Conference of 1923 dealing with the negotiation, signature, and ratification of treaties.[4]

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1 Dawson, Development of Dominion . . . , p. 82.

2 The Halibut Treaty, signed at Washington, March 2, 1923, dealt with the Halibut fisheries of the North Pacific and was actually a matter of concern only for Canada and the United States.

3 Dawson, William Lyon . . . , p. 431.

4 Cmd 1987, Imperial Conference, 1923, Summary of Proceedings, H.M.S.O., p. 13-15.

The Peace Conference at Lausanne[1] which was called to reach a final settlement with Turkey was not attended by a Canadian representative, nor did Canada desire to have representation. In the correspondence exchanged between Canada and Great Britain,[2] King's government made it clear that the Canadian parliament must determine how far, if at all, Canada would be bound by the agreement which Britain might reach with Turkey.[3] The confusion and misunderstandings associated with the refusal of the Canadian government in March, 1924, to sign the treaty or submit it to parliament for approval are not germane to a study of the Chanak crisis itself. King's refusal appealed to the nationalistic sentiments of the country, and was based on the claim that

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1 The Lausanne Conference continued from November 1922 to February 1923, and after an interruption concluded its work from April to July, 1923. By the terms of the Treaty of Lausanne, Turkey gave up all claims to non-Turkish territories lost as a result of World War I, but recovered Eastern Thrace to the Maritza River. The Aegean Islands went to Greece with the exception of Imbros and Tenedos which Turkey received. Capitulations were ended, Turkey paid no reparations, and the Straits were demilitarised with a zone on either bank. Turkey also agreed to protect minorities.

The question of Canada's refusal to ratify the treaty did not arise until after the Imperial Conference of 1923, but it seems it is best considered at this juncture.

2 For text of correspondence, see Canadian Sessional Paper No. 232, 1924, Lausanne Conference and Treaty, Exchange of Telegrams between the British and Canadian Governments.

3 Glazebrook, Op. Cit., p. 152-153.

the precedents of the Paris and Washington Conferences had not been followed and therefore Canada would not sign nor ratify the treaty.[1] To offset criticisms that his actions were directed towards the dissolution of the Empire and to dispose of the perplexing fact that Canada was still legally at war with Turkey, the prime minister admitted that as part of the British Empire, Canada was legally bound by the treaty; but Canada was not morally bound to support the treaty if force were needed.[2] Thus, Canada was placed in the ambiguous position of

> refusing to accept a treaty by the terms of which they at the same time admitted being bound.[3]

Ambiguous though it was, Canada was legally at peace with Turkey and as the Chanak crisis had indicated Canada's unwillingness to be held responsible for a British-made war, the Lausanne Treaty extended Canadian independence into the sphere of a British made peace.[4]

Prime Minister King's attitude at the Imperial Conference was essentially the same as during the Chanak

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1 Dewey, Op. Cit., p. 147.

2 Commons Debates, 1924, p. 2928-2929. The Prime Minister discussed the issue at length in parliament, p. 2923-2930.

3 Dewey, Loc. Cit.

4 Dawson, Development of Dominion . . . , p. 72, 79.

crisis: no commitments and parliament must decide. He did not believe that public opinion was yet prepared for any dramatic constitutional advances, although some observers felt that a resolution should be presented on the doctrine of equality which had been for so long avowed, and that the question of Dominion status should be clarified once and for all.[1] Although this was not done, the resolutions passed, and what was left unsaid, did reveal more clearly the status of the Dominions.

Shortly before the Conference, Mackenzie King expressed privately his concern over the possibility of an attempt at centralization by some of the British representatives. He referred to

> the very apparent intention of some of those participating in the conference to make it an occasion of fresh efforts at centralization in all matters of imperial concern.[2]

A speech by Lord Curzon on June 5, gave some solid grounds for King's suspicions.

> But we also have to see how far by consolidation, by improvement of communications, we can develop a common policy in international matters, so that the Foreign Minister of this country, when he speaks may speak, not for Great Britain alone but for the whole British Empire.[3]

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1 Dafoe Papers, Dafoe to Sifton, M 74, September 12, 1923.

2 Ibid., Mackenzie King to Dafoe, August 17, 1923.

3 Quebec Chronicle, June 5, 1923.

Thus not everyone had concluded from the Chanak crisis that a united foreign policy for the Empire was impractical or impossible.

In the weeks preceding the Conference, the Canadian government was warned both in the press[1] and in parliament that it had no right to pledge or commit the people of Canada to anything. Yet the adomonition "to be careful, to go slow, to make no rash promises"[2] was preaching to the converted. As the defender of Canadian autonomy, the Liberal government had found a cohesive and constructive issue which they would not lightly abandon.[3]

Before leaving for London, the prime minister defined his position in parliament.

> So far as we are concerned we do not propose to raise any questions of constitutional changes. I may say further that in that regard the position of the government would be very much that expressed in a resolution which I moved when in opposition in reference to the conference which my right honorable friend the present leader of the Opposition (Mr. Meighen) was about to attend:
>
> That the House, while recognizing the propriety of Canada being represented at any Imperial Conference or conference of the Prime Ministers of the Empire that may be called, desires to record its opinion that at the coming conference no steps should be taken in any way involving any change in the relations of Canada to other parts of the Empire.[4]

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1 Ottawa Journal, September 13, 1923.

2 Commons Debates, 1923, Vol. 5, p. 4656.

3 Ottawa Journal, August 9, 1923.

4 Commons Debates, 1923, Vol. 5, p. 4661.

On the eve of his departure, he added that Canada had no grievances to take to the Imperial Conference;[1] and in London he returned to the theme in his opening speech at the Conference, which implied that the representatives were there largely as parliamentary messengers.

> I can think of no greater service any of us could find it possible to render than that, perhaps of taking back to our Parliaments, and through our Parliaments transmitting to our people, much of the information which we shall gather here. . . . Similarly I feel positive that no contribution can be rendered to this gathering of greater value or of greater permanent worth than that as representatives we should seek not merely to express our own individual views, but, so far as we can do it, set forth the views of our Parliaments, and the views of the people represented in our Parliaments.[2]

In the major matters discussed by the Conference, the principle of parliamentary supremacy was given full recognition as revealed in the resolutions passed dealing with the discussion of defence.

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1 Brampton Conservator, September 21, 1923.

2 Cmd 1988, Imperial Conference 1923, Appendices to the Summary of Proceedings, H.M.S.O., p. 13.
Mr. King's ideas on the duties of the elected representative present a sharp contrast to those of President Kennedy. Kennedy stated in 1957 that he had not been elected to serve as a seismograph of public opinion and on different occasions it was the elected representative's duty to "lead, inform, correct, and sometimes even ignore" public opinion. "The Bases of a Foreign Program", New York Times Magazine, January 6, 1957.

> The Conference expressly recognises that it is for the Parliaments of the several parts of the Empire, upon the recommendations of their respective Governments, to decide the nature and extent of any action which should be taken by them.[1]

Foreign affairs were discussed in detail and a common understanding was reached on the main lines which British foreign policy should follow.[2] But no assumptions could be drawn that the Dominions were automatically bound and responsible for Britain's foreign policy and the discussion ended with the following statement:

> This Conference is a conference of representatives of the several Governments of the Empire; its views and conclusions on Foreign Policy as recorded above, are necessarily subject to the action of the Governments and Parliaments of the various portions of the Empire, and it trusts that the results of its deliberations will meet with their approval.[3]

Avoidance of discussion of the problem of communications afforded tacit recognition, arising from the Chanak crisis, of the impracticality of a united foreign policy for the whole Empire. However, it was recognized that co-operation would still occur when the interests of all made it desirable and possible, and this was reflected in the concluding resolution of the Conference.

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1 Cmd 1987, Imperial Conference 1923, Summary of Proceedings, p. 16.

2 Ibid., p. 11.

3 Ibid., p. 13.

> The members of the Conference are unanimous that the hours spent in consultation have been of the greatest value, and will do much to facilitate the work of achieving unity of thought and action on matters of common concern to all parts of the Empire.[1]

The resolution dealing with imperial defence was quite inconclusive. The necessity for adequate defence of the territories and trade of the British Empire was accepted, but there were no suggestions as to how the costs should be shared, and in effect Britain was left to bear the burden.[2]

From the standpoint of the Canadian government, the Conference must be regarded as a success. As General Smuts of South Africa said:

> Canada ought to be satisfied with the outcome. . . . Because the Canadian representatives had their way in everything,[3]

and certainly King's policy of avoiding commitments and reserving all decisions for parliament was reflected in the resolutions of the Conference.

The Conference has been described as generally negative,[4] but it did have some significant results. It

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1 Cmd 1987, Imperial Conference 1923, Summary of Proceedings, p. 24.

2 Arthur Berriedale Keith, Responsible Government in the Dominions, Vol. 2, Oxford, Clarendon Press, 1927, p.1211.

3 Morning Bulletin, Edmonton, December 22, 1923.

4 The London Free Press, November 20, 1923.

cleared up the confusion and misunderstandings surrounding the question of foreign policy which had resulted from the Imperial Conference of 1921. An important advance was made in the resolutions which set down the guiding principles for the future negotiation, ratification, and signing of treaties by the Dominions. Admittedly, the questions of constitutional relations and Dominion status were not confronted and answered unequivocally. Nevertheless, these matters were clarified and the future direction which the commonwealth would follow was unmistakably indicated.[1] As the Chicago Tribune observed:

> That independence of spirit, thought and act was more definitely and clearly stated in the recent imperial conference than ever before, and it was stated in such terms as to leave no doubt in Great Britain or among the subordinate members . . . . It declared itself independent of British Foreign entanglements reserving the right to act as conscience might dictate in any international development.[2]

The question of Dominion status was dealt with in a far more spectacular manner by the Imperial Conference of 1926. Yet one feels that the Balfour declaration of that

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1 J. Bolton Slack, The External Policy of the Right Honourable William Lyon Mackenzie King: A Dissertation on the Development of Canadian Foreign Policy, 1919-1944, unpublished Master's thesis, Department of History, Queen's University, 1946, p. 33.

2 Chicago Tribune, November 28, 1923.

year was largely an anti-climatic affirmation of the view of the Commonwealth which was accepted in 1923; and the Chanak crisis had contributed much to the final acceptance of that view.

CONCLUSION

As an incident in Canadian history, the Chanak crisis must continue to be viewed as an integral stage in the nation's evolution towards complete autonomy in its relations with the Empire and with foreign nations. Both foreign relations and imperial relations were inextricably interwoven in the 1920's[1] and the Chanak crisis clearly indicated the need for a revaluation of Canada's position. The Imperial Conference of 1923 helped to clarify Canada's status, while the resolutions of the Imperial Conference of 1926 cleared away the clouds of ambiguity as far as was humanly possible.

In dealing with the conduct of foreign policy, the latter Conference stated:

> We felt that the governing consideration underlying all discussions of this problem must be that neither Great Britain nor the Dominions could be committed to the acceptance of active obligations except with the definite assent of their own Governments,[2]

and within the Empire,

> every Dominion is now, and must always remain, the sole judge of the nature and extent of its co-operation.[3]

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1 Glazebrook, "Canada and Foreign Affairs", Canadian Historical Review, Vol. 16, No. 2, 1935, p. 184.

2 Cmd 2768, Imperial Conference 1926, Summary of Proceedings, H.M.S.O., p. 26.

3 Ibid., p. 14.

The most famous resolution of the Conference clarified the problem of both foreign relations and Imperial relations.

> They are autonomous communities, within the British Empire, equal in status, in no way subordinate one to another in any aspect of their domestic or external affairs, though united by a common allegiance to the Crown, and freely associated as members of the British Commonwealth of Nations. . . . Every self-governing member of the Empire is now the master of its destiny. In fact, if not always in form, it is subject to no compulsion whatever.[1]

It seems not unwarranted to suggest that the Chanak crisis has been underrated in the importance of its contribution to the final acceptance of the Commonwealth ideal as expressed in the Imperial Conference of 1926. This underestimation may be partially accounted for by the brief duration of the crisis and the fact that it did pass. Moreover, four years elapsed between the crisis and the positive resolutions of the Imperial Conference of 1926, and it is naturally awkward to carry the cause-effect relationship over a four year period with any great force. One might concede that the Chanak crisis contributed to the final promulgation of the Balfour report but it would be difficult to refer to any resolution of the Imperial Conference

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1 Cmd 2768, Imperial Conference 1926, Summary of Proceedings, H.M.S.O., p. 26.

of 1926 and claim that it was solely a result of the Chanak crisis.[1]

Yet the crisis has a quality which raises it above the many other incidents of the post-war years which contributed to the declaration of equality in 1926. It is unique in that it presented the problem of imperial relations to the Canadian public in an emotional, dramatic and concrete manner. For a few days, constitutional issues were removed from the speculative arena of academic discussion to the supercharged and sensitive area of the individual's personal life; for a few days these issues were set off in sharp relief against the backdrop of such personal questions as separation from loved ones, sacrifices, life, and death. Few pondered the constitutional issues during the crisis, but thereafter it was no longer difficult to view these issues as genuine problems deserving of realistic attention. Even a superficial survey of the press reaction is indicative of the national cathargis which the nation underwent in September, 1922. To attempt to draw generalizations from such a broad basis is replete with

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1 Mr. Eayrs noted that the changes which took place in the position of the Governor General after 1926 were directly related to the prolonged delay in communicating the British inquiry to the Canadian government on September 16, 1922. James Eayrs, The Art of the Possible: Government and Foreign Policy in Canada, Toronto, University of Toronto Press, 1950, p. 29-30.

danger; but it would be less wise to presume there were no after effects.

It is submitted that the Chanak crisis contributed more than any other incident in the post-war years to conditioning the Canadian people to accept a realistic reappraisal of both imperial and foreign relations. The resulting changes were not clearly described until four years after the crisis, but the national acceptance at that time of what could easily be interpreted as the final severance of the tie with the mother country can best be explained through a process of conditioning. It appears that the Chanak crisis played the major role in this conditioning process between 1919 and 1926.

One can conjecture how the crisis might easily have produced a contrary effect in Canada had circumstances been different. For example, had Meighen still held the premiership, the effect of the incident in Canada would have been a dramatically different story. Yet this is mere speculation and does not alter the sequence of events nor the significance of the crisis. Hereafter, the defender of the imperial tie in Canada laboured under the onus that the connection with the mother country had almost involved Canada in a needless war brought on by incompetence, or as one Conservative member expressed it, the political swash-buckling of Downing Street. This was a weighty burden

and helps to explain the relatively smooth transition towards a declaration of equal status within the Commonwealth.

Mackenzie King seldom marched at the head of public opinion and indeed like a good general he was usually found far in the rear. Thus there was a lapse of four years before there was an attempt to clearly define the international status of Canada. One feels it could have come sooner although undoubtedly a period of postponement accorded with public opinion in Canada. The evolution of Canada's status within the Empire and in her relations with foreign nations is a prolonged story and it is difficult to attach any great significance to the continuation of the narrative for another few years.

In January, 1963, Professor R. Graham made an appeal for a return in politics to the candor which Mr. Meighen had displayed during his career. In the same address, the professor described the King approach as one of procrastination, inconsistency, compromise, equivocation, and expediency.[1]

The Chanak crisis could provide a test case with which one might judge the veracity of such charges against

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1 The Ottawa Citizen, January 26, 1963.

Mr. King. Similar denunciations were levelled at King during the crisis, and undeniably, Mr. Meighen offered the country a straight forward and unequivocal alternative. Yet, as Mr. Dawson has observed, one of the primary tasks of the politician is to retain power,[1] and to this end Mr. King's policy was directed. Admittedly, Mr. King temporized and the country was not offered dramatic leadership. However, it was no mean achievement that the internal strains upon the Canadian nation were kept at a minimum. Further, it is difficult to envision any other course of action which would have retained so well the national unity, and this must include the alternative policy proposed by Mr. Meighen.

In answer to criticisms similar to those of Professor Graham, which were directed against the Liberal government during the crisis, Mackenzie King might paraphrase the epigram of Pope and reply,

> For dramatic actions, let fools contest;
> What'er is best administered is best.

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1 R. MacGregor Dawson, William Lyon Mackenzie King, A Political Biography, 1874-1923, Canada, University of Toronto Press, 1958, p. 419.

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This was a well-written and particularly useful book for background. The author's references to and quotations from other material widened the area for investigation.

Dawson, R. MacGregor, William Lyon Mackenzie King, A Political Biography, 1874-1923, Canada, University of Toronto Press, 1958, xii-521 p.
This book covers in detail the political career of Mr. King during these years. It is generally a sympathetic portrayal. An excellent coverage of the Chanak crisis is found on pages 407-430. Quite valuable.

Dawson, Robert MacGregor, (ed.), The Development of Dominion Status, 1900-1936, Toronto, Oxford University Press, 1937, xiv-466 p. (1-103), (234-295).
This book is largely made up of formal and informal documents relating to the title subject. It was quite helpful in indicating sources which should be consulted further, and it also contained a lucid examination of the period under study.

Dewey, A. Gordon, The Dominions and Diplomacy, The Canadian Contribution, Vol. 2, Toronto, Longmans, Green and Co., 1929, 397 p. (1-174).
This book was of great value. It considers the nationalist and imperialist position in Canada,

and their respective programmes. The author considers the roles of the several Dominions in the evolution of Dominion status and emphasizes the role of Canada. It gives a good coverage of the Chanak incident.

Driault, Edouard, La Question D'Orient, 1918-1937, La Paix de la Méditerranée, Paris, Librairie Felix Alcan, 1938, xvi-538 p. (73-119).
The consideration of the Chanak crisis was brief and the book was of limited value.

Eayrs, James, The Art of the Possible: Government and Foreign Policy, Toronto, University of Toronto Press, 1961, viii-232 p.
The author describes the historical development of Canada's foreign policy. There is only a limited treatment of the Chanak crisis itself, but the book was most valuable in providing an insight into the development of Canadian foreign policy in all its ramifications. It is particularly well-written.

Edib, Halide, Turkey Faces West, A Turkish View of Recent Changes and Their Origin, New Haven, Yale University Press, 1930, xiv-273 p.
As the title might indicate, the author writes with a strong pro-Turkish bias. The Western Powers are admonished strongly for conduct and principles on which they based their conduct in relations with Turkey in the War Years (1914-1918) and after. There are well-written and interesting commentaries on the part of the author, e.g., "There is no such thing as a guilty nation." The book is of value in providing a strongly pro-Turkish version of events in the period under study.

Ewart, John S., Canada and British Wars, J.S. Ewart, Ottawa, 1922, 88 p.
A valuable work. It "proves" Canada was correct in her actions. The author bases his contentions on precedents, constitutional developments, and reason.

Gathorne-Hardy, G.M., A Short History of International Affairs, 1920 to 1938, London, Oxford University Press, 1938, x-487 p.
The coverage of the period related to study was limited but the book was of value in outlining the international situation.

Glazebrook, G.P. deT., A History of Canadian External Relations, Toronto, Oxford University Press, 1950, 449 p. (250-350).
This is a well-written study of the development of Canadian foreign policy. The author does not view the years since the First World War as merely reflecting a negative policy on Canada's part. He feels Canada's foreign policy is a considered, justifiable, and understandable policy.

Glazebrook, G.P. deT., Canada at the Paris Peace Conference, Toronto, Oxford University Press, 1942, vii-156 p.
A comprehensive study of Canada's position. The author considers all the various ramifications of Canada's action. The importance of Borden is emphasized and references are made to public opinion in Canada during these years.

Gontaut-Biron, Comte R., et L. Le Révérend, D'Angora à Lausanne, Les Etapes d'une Déchéance, Paris, Plon-Nourrit et Cie, 1924, ix-226 p., (1-20).
The author presents a critical study of French policy during this period. He expresses strong disapproval of British motives.

Gordon, Margaret, National Autonomy in Relation to Foreign Affairs, A Study in Canadian Development, unpublished Master's thesis, Department of History, University of British Columbia, 1927, p. 42.
This contains little original thought. It seems that the author tried to cover too broad a field in her study.

Gottlieb, W.W., Studies in Secret Diplomacy During the First World War, London, George Allan and Unwin Limited, 1957, 430 p. (19-135: 312: 359).
This is a scholarly and thoroughly researched study. It contains a definitive study of diplomatic relations of the Great Powers over Turkey prior to and during the war. Italy's entrance into the war in all its hesitations and ramifications is also examined.

Hopkins, J. Castell (ed.), The Canadian Annual Review of Public Affairs, 1921, Toronto, The Canadian Review Company Limited, 1922, 981 p. (75-129: 315-369: 445-524).
It contains reviews of the political situation in Canada and the election of 1921, and was valuable.

Hopkins, J. Castell (ed.), The Canadian Annual Review of Public Affairs, 1922, Toronto, The Canadian Review Company Limited, 1923, 1046 p., (174-188: 216-307).
It has a good review of the Chanak crisis and the Canadian public opinion as expressed in the press during the crisis.

Hopkins, J. Castell (ed.), The Canadian Annual Review of Public Affairs, 1923, Toronto, The Canadian Review Company Limited, 1924, 909 p., (158-178: 85-100).
Coverage of the Imperial Conference, 1923, and Canadian politics in 1923, is valuable though brief.

House, Edward Mandell and Charles Seymour, (ed.), What Really Happened at Paris, The Story of the Peace Conference, 1918-1919, New York, Charles Scribner's Sons, 1921, xiii-528 p. (140-204).
The book is a compilation of a series of talks by American personages who had attended the Conference in various roles. The section on the Near East is informative.

Keenleyside, Hugh L. et.al., The Growth of Canadian Policies in External Affairs, Durham, N.G. Duke University Press, 1960, x-174 p.
This contains a series of articles which provide a broad consideration of the development of Canada's foreign policy.

Keith, Arthur Berriedale, Dominion Autonomy in Practice, London, Oxford University Press, 1929, vi-92 p.
This is a brief summary of the Governments of the Dominions. Pages 52 to 92 deal with foreign affairs. These sections were of some, but limited, value.

Keith, Arthur Berriedale, Responsible Government in the Dominions, Vol. 2, Oxford, Clarendon Press, 1927, 597-1339 p.
A most definitive study of the evolution of Canada's status towards autonomy. The author feels it was still ambiguous at the time of publication.

Lenczowski, George, The Middle East in World Affairs, New York, Cornell University Press, 1952, xx-459 p. (67-113).
The scope was very extensive but the author's consideration of the period under study was good.

Lewis, G.L., Turkey, London, Ernest Benn Limited, 1955, xiii-222 p.
The section on the Chanak crisis was brief and of limited value.

Lewis, John, Mackenzie King: The Man: His Achievements, Toronto, Morang and Company, 1925, 136 p.
This is a laudatory summary of King's character and career. Superficial and not critical.

Lloyd George, David, The Truth About the Peace Treaties, Vol. 2, London, Victor Gollancz Limited, 1938, 743-1471 p., (751-902), (1001-1363).
This contains a detailed consideration of the Treaty with Turkey and the final settlement. The author defends his policies effectively. The book is of limited value to this topic.

Marriott, Sir John A.R., The Evolution of the British Empire and Commonwealth, London, Nicholson and Watson, 1939, xv-388 p. (250-300).
This is too brief a coverage of the period in study to be of any significant value.

McGregor, F.A., The Fall and Rise of Mackenzie King: 1911-1919, Toronto, Macmillan of Canada, 1962, 358 p.
The author presents a study of the 'unknown years' of Mackenzie King's career from his defeat in the elections of 1911 to his victory in the 1919 Liberal Party Convention which brought him the leadership of the party. It is a sympathetic study of this period of King's career and reveals much of the character of Mr. King and the ideals which governed his conduct.

Morton, W.L., The Progressive Party in Canada, Toronto, University of Toronto Press, 1950, xii-331 p.
This is a detailed study of the Progressives from their early origins to their disintegration or absorption by the Liberals in the 1920's. The section on the relations with the Liberals and King's attempts to win them into his Cabinet is of value. (96-168).

Neuendorff, Gwen, Studies in the Evolution of Dominion Status, The Governor-Generalship of Canada and the Development of Canadian Nationalism, London, George Allen and Unwin Limited, 1942, vi-379 p.
Two-thirds of the book traces the evolution of the office of Governor-General in Canada since the nineteenth century. A definitive study of this topic.

Nicolson, Harold, Curzon: The Last Phase, 1919-1925, A Study in Post-War Diplomacy, London, Constable and Company Limited, 1934, xvi-416 p. (1-350).
This is a good psychological study of the factors which served to shape the character of Curzon. The study of the period of the Chanak crisis is detailed and valuable.

Owen, Frank, Tempestuous Journey: Lloyd George, His Life and Times, London, Hutchinson, 1954, 784 p. (629-660).
A valuable work, but the author is rather too sympathetic in his treatment of Lloyd George.

Phillipson, Coleman and Noel Buxton, The Question of the Bosphorus and Dardanelles, London, Stevens and Haynes, 1917, xvi-264 p.
The authors consider the historical problem of the Straits at a time when another effort would soon be made to reach a solution. The problem is examined in detail and the authors offer a solution for the future; i.e., that the Straits be internationalised and neutralised, and Constantinople be made a free city. Of limited value.

Ronaldshay, Earl of, The Life of Lord Curzon, Being the Authorized Biography of George Nathaniel Marquess Curzon of Kedleston, K.G., Vol. 3, London, Ernest Benn Limited, 1928, 457 p., (117-343).
This book is valuable in revealing the intricacies of British policy and different forces at play, particularly the tension and frequent disagreement that existed between the prime minister and his foreign secretary during the early 1920's.

Ryan, Sir Andrew, The Last of the Dragomans, London, Geoffrey Bles Limited, 1951, 351 p. (121-199).
The author, a member of the Civil Service, presents his personal impressions of the period under study.

The book provides an entertaining account by a British official who was on the spot. Enjoyable but of limited value.

Shotwell, James T., and Francis Deak, Turkey at the Straits, A Short History, New York, Macmillan, 1940, ix-196 p.
The section dealing with the period under study is limited, but there is definite merit in that it provided background.

Slack, J. Bolton, The External Policy of the Right Honourable William Lyon Mackenzie King, A Dissertation on the Development of Canadian Foreign Policy, 1919-1944, unpublished Master's thesis, Department of History, Queen's University, 1946, 317 p., (1-51).
The author considers at length the principles guiding King's conduct of foreign affairs. From this point of view the thesis is valuable. He emphasizes King's policy as being similar to that of MacDonald, Laurier and Borden. The treatment of Chanak is summary.

Taylor, A.J.P., The Struggle for Mastery in Europe, 1848-1918, Oxford, Clarendon Press, 1957, xxxvi-638 p., (500-568).
This book proved useful in the section on international relations during the war years.

Temperley, H.W.V. (ed.), A History of the Peace Conference of Paris, Vol. 1, London, Oxford University Press, 1920, xxxi-517 p.
Some value as a reference.

Tobin, Chester M., Turkey Key to the East, New York, G.P. Putman's Sons, 1944, 170 p., (1-132).
This is a sympathetic study of Turkish history in which the author reveals its strengths and weaknesses from its early origins. He attempts to end the unfortunate idea of the "terrible Turk" which the author contends was the result of propaganda. It contains a valuable, if not too laudatory account of Mustafa Kemal's career.

Toynbee, Arnold J., Survey of International Affairs: 1920-1923, London, Oxford University Press, 1925, xv-526 p.
This book is useful as a reference for the Conferences dealing with the problems in the Near and Middle East in the early 1920's.

Toynbee, Arnold J., The Conduct of British Empire Foreign Relations Since the Peace Settlement, London, Oxford University Press, 1928, xii-126 p.
A brief survey. This book contains a good section on the Lausanne Treaty and Canada, and a fairly detailed section on Chanak.

Toynbee, Arnold J., The Western Question in Greece and Turkey, A Study in the Contact of Civilizations, London, Constable, 1922, xv-420 p., (1-106).
The author's direct familiarity with the period enables him to speak with authority. It is valuable although perhaps the author was too close to the events in time. It was published before the Chanak crisis.

Toynbee, Arnold J., and Kenneth P. Kirkwood, Turkey, London, Ernest Benn Limited, 1926, xiv-329 p., (1-126).
The authors attempt to provide a full background for the reader by tracing Turkish history from the period of the Old Ottoman Empire. The book contains a well-organized study of the Graeco-Turkish War 1919-1922 and builds the story of this period around this structure. A good study.

Underhill, Frank H., In Search of Canadian Liberalism, The Macmillan Company of Canada, 1960, xiv-282 p.
This book consists of a series of essays written over a period of thirty years which deal generally with the theme of liberalism in Canada. It is valuable in providing an insight into several of the individuals in the period of study as well as some of the issues.

Webster, Arnold Alexander, Canada at the Imperial Conference, unpublished Master's thesis, Department of History, University of British Columbia, 1928, 175 p.
The author considers the evolution of Canada's status towards autonomy from the Colonial Conferences to 1926. Much emphasis is given to the role of Laurier. Others, including King, followed in his footsteps.

Webster, Donald Everett, The Turkey of Ataturk, Social Process in the Turkish Reformation, Wisconsin, The Collegiate Press, George Banta Publishing Company, 1939, xv-337 p., (73-103).
This is a thoroughly researched study. The author reviews Turkish history from pre-Ottoman times to

the 1930's. However, the text is primarily a sociological study. The period under study is covered briefly, but well, with a strong pro-Turkish bias.

Articles and Periodicals

Braithwaite, W.E., "Canada As a World Leader", The Canadian Magazine, Vol. 59, No. 3, July, 1922, p. 175-181.

"Britain, France - and Turkey", The Spectator, Vol. 128, January 28, 1922, p. 102-104.

"Canada: Current Politics", The Round Table, No. 51, June, 1923, p. 616-628.

Chambers, L.P., "Some Causes of Turkey's Present Condition", Queen's Quarterly, Vol. 30, 1922-1923, p. 164-181.

"Chanak", The Spectator, Vol. 129, September 30, 1922, p. 420-421.

Chirol, Sir Valentine, "Four Years of Lloyd Georgian Foreign Policy", The Edinburgh Review, Vol. 237, January, 1923, p. 1-20.

"Crisis at Home and Abroad", The Spectator, Vol. 129, October 14, 1922, p. 488-489.

"Crisis in the Near East", The Spectator, Vol. 129, September 23, 1922, p. 388-389.

Dafoe, J.W., "Canada and the Peace Conference of 1919", Canadian Historical Review, Vol. 24, No. 3, September, 1943, p. 233-248.

Dennis, Alfred L.P., "British Foreign Policy and the Dominions", The American Political Science Review, Vol. 16, No. 4, November, 1922, p. 584-589.

Ewart, John S., "Canada's National Status: A Reply", North American Review, Vol. 216, December, 1922, p. 733-780.

Fisher, Herbert A.L., "Mr. Lloyd George's Foreign Policy 1918-1922", Foreign Affairs, Vol. 1, No. 3, March, 1923.

Fraser, T.M., "The New Government in Action", The Canadian Magazine, Vol. 59, No. 1, May, 1922, p. 1-13.

Glazebrooke, G.P. deT., "Canada and Foreign Affairs", Canadian Historical Review, Vol. 16, No. 2, June, 1935, p. 180-186.

Hehir, Sir Patrick, "The Near East Crisis", The Nineteenth Century and After, Vol. 92, November, 1922, p. 829-842.

Johnson, Willis Fletcher, "Affairs of the World", North American Review, Vol. 216, November, 1922, p. 705-709.

Keith, Professor A. Berriedale, "The Imperial Constitution and the Imperial Conference", The Edinburgh Review, Vol. 238, No. 485, July, 1923, p. 1-25.

Kennedy, W.P.M., "Canada's National Status", North American Review, Vol. 216, September, 1922, p. 299-311.

Kerr, Philip, "From Empire to Commonwealth", Foreign Affairs, Vol. 1, No. 2, December 15, 1923, p. 83-99.

Mackenzie, William, "The New Diplomacy", The Canadian Magazine, Vol. 62, No. 1, November, 1923, p. 3-13.

Pearce, Haywood J. Jr., "Problems Occasioned by Ministerial Government Within the Federal State of Canada", Canadian Historical Review, Vol. 6, No. 2, June, 1925, p. 104-109.

Pollard, Professor A.F., "The Dominions and Foreign Affairs", Proceedings of the British Institute of International Affairs, May, 1921, p. 1-15.

Prince, A.E., "Pride and Prejudice in the Near Eastern Problem", Queen's Quarterly, Vol. 30, 1922-1923, p. 164-181.

Raglan, Lord, "The Government's Foreign Policy", The Nineteenth Century and After, Vol. 94, 1923, p. 680-689.

Scott, F.R., "The Permanent Bases of Canadian Foreign Policy", Foreign Affairs, Vol. 10, No. 4, July, 1932, p. 617-631.

Sifton, Clifford, "Some Canadian Constitutional Problems", Canadian Historical Review, Vol. 3, March, 1922, p. 3-23.

Stevenson, J.A., "Canada and Foreign Policy", Foreign Affairs, Vol. 1, No. 3, March 15, 1923, p. 108-120.

"The Federal Election", The Round Table, March, 1922, No. 46, p. 386-392.

"The General Election", The Round Table, Vol. 45, December, 1921, p. 161-168.

"The Liberal Regime", The Round Table, Vol. 50, March, 1923, p. 388-398.

"The Near East", The Round Table, March, 1922, Vol. 46, p. 319-337.

"The Near East Crisis", The Round Table, Vol. 49, December, 1922, p. 176-177.

"The New Imperial Problem", The Round Table, Vol. 51, June, 1923, p. 459-493.

"The Progress of the World", Review of Reviews, Vol. 66, September, 1922, p. 278-279.

"Progress of the World", Review of Reviews, Vol. 66, October, 1922, p. 369-373.

"The Progress of the World", Review of Reviews, Vol. 66, November, 1922, p. 462-464.

Other Sources

H. Blair Neatby, "Mackenzie King", Lecture delivered at Carleton University, Ottawa, March 2, 1963. (The Ottawa Citizen, March 4, 1963)

Professor R. Graham, Address to the 15th Annual Conservative Student Convention delivered at the Bruce MacDonald Motor Hotel, Ottawa, January 25, 1963, (The Ottawa Citizen, January 26, 1963.)

APPENDIX 1

PRESS COMMUNIQUE RELEASED BY THE BRITISH GOVERNMENT, SEPTEMBER 16, 1922

APPENDIX 1

Press Communiqué Released By the British Government, September 16, 1922.[1]

". . . The approach of the Kemalist forces to Constantinople and the Dardanelles and the demands put forward by the Angora Government . . . if assented to, involve nothing less than the loss of the whole results of the victory over Turkey in the late war. The channel of deep salt water that separates Europe from Asia and unites the Mediterranean and the Black Sea affects world interests, European interests, and British interests of the first order.

"The British Government regard the effective and permanent freedom of the Straits as a vital necessity for the sake of which they are prepared to make exertions. They have learnt with great satisfaction that in this respect their views are shared by France and Italy, the other two Great Powers principally concerned.

"The question of Constantinople stands somewhat differently. For more than two years it has been decided that the Turks should not be deprived of Constantinople, and in January of last year at the Conference in London the representatives of the Constantinople and Angora Turkish Governments were informed of the intention of the Allies to restore Constantinople to the Turks, subject to other matters being satisfactorily adjusted.

"The wish of the British Cabinet is that a Conference should be held as speedily as possible in any place generally acceptable to the other Powers involved, at which a resolute and sustained effort should be made to secure a stable peace with

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1 Winston S. Churchill, The World Crisis, 1918-1928, The Aftermath, New York Scribner, 1929, p. 452-454.

Turkey. But such a Conference cannot embark upon its labours, still less carry them through with the slightest prospect of success, while there is any question of the Kemalist forces attacking the neutral zones by which Constantinople, the Bosphorus, and the Dardanelles are now protected.

"The British and French Governments have instructed their High Commissioners at Constantinople to notify Mustapha Kemal and the Angora Government that these neutral zones established under the flags of the three Great Powers must be respected.

"However, it would be futile and dangerous, in view of the excited mood and extravagant claims of the Kemalists, to trust simply to diplomatic action. Adequate force must be available to guard the freedom of the Straits and defend the deep-water line between Europe and Asia against a violent and hostile Turkish aggression. That the Allies should be driven out of Constantinople by the forces of Mustapha Kemal would be an event of the most disastrous character, producing, no doubt, far-reaching reactions throughout all Moslem countries, and not only through all Moslem countries but through all the States defeated in the late war, who would be profoundly encouraged by the spectacle of the undreamed-of successes that have attended the efforts of the comparatively weak Turkish forces.

"Moreover, the reappearance of the victorious Turk on the European shore would provoke a situation of the gravest character throughout the Balkans, and very likely lead to bloodshed on a large scale in regions already cruelly devastated. It is the duty of the Allies of the late war to prevent this great danger, and to secure the orderly and peaceful conditions in and around the Straits which will allow a conference to conduct its deliberations with dignity and efficiency and so alone reach a permanent settlement.

"His Majesty's Government are prepared to bear their part in this matter and to make every possible effort for a satisfactory solution. They have

addressed themselves in this sense to the other Great Powers with whom they have been acting, and who jointly with them are associated in the defence of Constantinople and the neutral zones.

"It is clear, however, that the other Ally Powers of the Balkan Peninsula are also deeply and vitally affected. Roumania was brought to her ruin in the Great War by the strangulation of the Straits. The union of Turkey and Bulgaria would be productive of dealy consequences to Serbia in particular and to Yugo-Slavia as a whole. The whole trade of the Danube flowing into the Black Sea is likewise subject to strangulation if the Straits are closed. The engagement of Greek interests in these issues is also self-evident.

"His Majesty's Government are therefore addressing themselves to all these three Balkan Powers with a view to their taking a part in the effective defence of the neutral zones. His Majesty's Government have also communicated with the Dominions, placing them in possession of the facts and inviting them to be represented by contingents in the defence of interests for which they have already made enormous sacrifices and of soil which is hallowed by immortal memories of the Anzacs.

"It is the intention of His Majesty's Government to reinforce immediately, and if necessary to a considerable extent, the troops at the disposal of Sir Charles Harington, the Allied Commander-in-Chief at Constantinople, and orders have also been given to the British Fleet in the Mediterranean to oppose by every means any infraction of the neutral zones by the Turks or any attempt by them to cross the European shore."

APPENDIX 2

ELECTION RESULTS, DECEMBER, 1921.

APPENDIX 2

Election Results, December, 1921.

	Liberals	Con-servatives	Pro-gressives	Inde-pendent
Ontario	21	37	24	
Quebec	65			
Nova Scotia	16			
New Brunswick	5	5	1	
Prince Edward Island	4			
Manitoba	2		12	1
British Columbia	3	7	3	
Alberta			11	1
Saskatchewan	1		15	
Yukon		1		
Total	117	50	66	2

APPENDIX 3

LIBERAL CABINET, 1922.

APPENDIX 3

Liberal Cabinet, 1922.

Hon. W.L. Mackenzie King	- Prime Minister, Secretary of State for External Affairs, President of the Privy Council.
Hon. G.P. Graham	- Minister of Militia and Defence, Minister of the Naval Service
Hon. Charles Murphy	- Postmaster-General.
Hon. Thomas A. Low	- Minister without Portfolio.
Hon. W.C. Kennedy	- Minister of Railways and Canals.
Hon. Raoul Dandurand	- Minister without Portfolio.
Hon. J. Murdock	- Minister of Labour.
Hon. H.S. Beland	- Minister of Soldiers' Re-Establishment and Minister in Charge of the Department of Health.
Hon. Sir Lomer Gouin	- Minister of Justice and Attorney General.
Hon. Jacques Bureau	- Minister of Customs and Excise.
Hon. E. Lapointe	- Minister of Marine and Fisheries.
Hon. J.A. Robb	- Minister of Trade and Commerce.
Hon. W.S. Fielding	- Minister of Finance.
Hon. D.D. McKenzie	- Minister without Portfolio and Solicitor-General.
Hon. A.B. Copp	- Secretary of State.
Hon. J.E. Sinclair	- Minister without Portfolio.

Hon. W.R. Motherwell	- Minister of the Interior, Superintendent-General of Indian Affairs, Minister of Mines.
Hon. James H. King	- Minister of Public Works.

APPENDIX 4

EXTRACT FROM THE DISCUSSION OF THE TREATY OF SEVRES IN THE CANADIAN SENATE, JUNE, 1921.

APPENDIX 4

Extract from the Discussion of the Treaty of Sèvres in the Canadian Senate, June, 1921.

Right Hon. Sir George E. Foster: One of these treaties has been ratified, the other has not.

Hon. Mr. Dandurand: I do not think either of them has been ratified by Parliament.

Right Hon. Sir George E. Foster: The Turkish Treaty has not been ratified by Turkey.

Hon. Mr. Dandurand: There never has been any ratification as regards Turkey; and, in view of the most recent despatches upon the subject, that country may never ratify the Treaty.

Right Hon. Sir George E. Foster: Why are we required to ratify it?

Hon. Mr. Dandurand: It is necessary that the treaties be ratified for the purpose of dealing with former enemy property and debts in Turkey and Hungary in a manner similar to that which is already provided for dealing with former enemy property and debts in Germany, Austria and Bulgaria. That the House may see the need of this legislation I might mention that one concern in Canada has a claim against these countries amounting to $600,000, which cannot be dealt with without the statute in question.

Hon. Mr. Belcourt: It is extraordinary that we should pass an Act to provide means for carrying out a treaty which we have not ratified.

Hon. Mr. Dandurand: We are now ratifying it.

Hon. Mr. Belcourt: This is for carrying it into effect, and assumes that we have ratified it.

Right Hon. Sir George E. Foster: No.

Hon. Mr. Belcourt: Then what does it mean?

Right Hon. Sir George E. Foster: These treaties have been passed and have been signed by us, but as I understand, Turkey has not agreed to sign the treaty in question.

Hon. Mr. Belcourt: Nor has Turkey ratified it.

Hon. Mr. Beaubien: The Bill gives authority for the appointment by the Governor in Council of certain officers to carry it out. What does that mean? That means that we accept it. That is the implication.

Hon. Mr. Belcourt: But my right honourable friend points out that Turkey has not signed it yet.

Hon. Mr. Beaubien: I do not deny that.

Right Hon. Sir George E. Foster: We will do our part.

Hon. Mr. Beaubien: One has to act before the other anyway.

Hon. Mr. Belcourt: Parliament should not ratify a treaty that one of the parties has not signed.

Right Hon. Sir George E. Foster: I think the treaties have been signed.

Hon. Mr. Beaubien: But have not been ratified by their Parliaments?

Hon. Mr. Dandurand: Yes, they have been signed.

APPENDIX 5

ABSTRACT OF

Canada and the Chanak Crisis

APPENDIX 5

ABSTRACT OF

Canada and the Chanak Crisis 1922[1]

This is a study of the effects that the 1922 Chanak crisis had upon Canada. Canada's international status was still anomalous in 1922, but in the eight years which precede the crisis, she had advanced rapidly towards the position of an independent nation and a co-equal partner within the British Commonwealth. This evolution of Canada's status is traced, and the international situation leading to the crisis is surveyed.

The reaction of the Canadian government to the crisis, and the opposition which the government encountered, are both considered. The thesis concludes that the government's actions were defensible and politically judicious.

The crisis revealed divergent interests within the Empire and indicated that some adjustments had to be made. The Imperial Conference of 1923 marked clearly the direction in which the Commonwealth was moving. However, it was not until the Imperial Conference of 1926 that a straight-forward

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1 Thomas K. Cavanagh, master's thesis presented to the Department of History, University of Ottawa, Ontario, August 1963, vii-196.

declaration of equality was stated. As an event in Dominion-Imperial relations of the post-war period, the Chanak crisis is presented as a unique and important step leading to this declaration of equality. This declaration was more readily acceptable to Canadians as a result of the Chanak crisis.