

The Polarity of Arab Canadians' Political Affiliations

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Abstract

This research looks at the political ideology and political affiliation of Arab Canadians. This specific population is especially interesting politically due to the intersections of different ethnicities, cultures, and religions. This fills the gap of quantitative research on the political choices of Arab-origin people in Canada, of which there is little to none. It also adds on to the literature on the voting patterns and partisanship of the larger population of visible minorities and/or immigrant origin Canadians, which previous research has not found statistically significant reasons of strong and consistent Liberal Party support by. This also provides an addition to the barren field of qualitative research on Arab Canadian political opinions. In order to analyze Arab Canadian vote choice, I built three primary datasets (Arab Canadian, immigrant Canadian, born Canadian) from the Canadian Election Study (CES) results from 2000 to 2021, and analyzed descriptive statistics and ran multinomial logistic regressions based on respondents' vote choice for patterns and significance. I hypothesize and confirm that Arab Canadians vote more consistently Liberal than born Canadians, despite also being more religious than the general population. The regressions show that the Canadian and immigrant populations are much more alike than Arab Canadians. I carry out twenty interviews with Arab Canadians to confirm and deepen the understanding of the quantitative results. The participants share that the strongest reason for their Liberal vote is Liberal rhetoric and values focused on multiculturalism and acceptance of Arabs/Muslims/immigrants, as well as their progressive values.

Keywords: Arab Canadians, Arab Canadian values, Arab Canadian political ideology, Arab Canadian partisanship, Canadian immigrant partisanship

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I conclude with a quote summarizing the ethos with which I went into this project and topic:

“If we read *Arabia Deserta*, we are struck by the astonishing way in which every incident is informed with the emotional tone of Arab life. More than this, many of the incidents would be impossible with a different emotional background. Evidently then the emotional background is causally active within a culture, and no functional study can ever be reasonably complete unless it links up the structure and pragmatic working of the culture with its emotional tone or ethos.” (Gregory Bateson, *Naven*, 1936)

List of Tables and Figures

Table 1. Religiosity of both samples, based on the question, ‘In your life, you would say religion is:’	28
Table 2. Left-right self-placement scale of political ideology of both samples on a 0-3 scale	29
Table 3. Vote choice in the previous election to the survey, both samples	30
Table 4. Multinomial logistic regression model, Canadian dataset, vote choice by religion, left-right, religiosity, sex, and age, with survey year as a control variable	35
Table 5. Multinomial logistic regression model, immigrant dataset, vote choice by religion, left-right, religiosity, sex, and age, with survey year as a control variable	41
Table 6. Multinomial logistic regression model, Arab Canadian dataset, vote choice by religion, left-right, religiosity, sex, age, and immigration status, with survey year as a control variable ...	46
Figure 1. Coefficient plot for variables’ impact on Canadian model	38
Figure 2. Predicted probability graph for Canadians voting for the Liberal Party, at each religion	39
Figure 3. Predicted probability graph for Canadians voting for the Conservative Party, at each religion	39
Figure 4. Coefficient plot for variables’ impact on immigrant model	43
Figure 5. Predicted probability graph for immigrants voting for the Liberal Party, at each religion	44
Figure 6. Predicted probability graph for immigrants voting for the Conservative Party, at each religion	44
Figure 7. Coefficient plot for variables’ impact on Arab model	48
Figure 8. Predicted probability graph for Arab Canadians voting for the Conservative Party, at each religion	49
Figure 9. Predicted probability graph for Arab Canadians voting for the Conservative Party, at each religion	50

Table of Contents

Introduction	1
Background and Context	4
Canadian Culture, Identity, and Values	4
Arab Values	5
Canadian Vote Choice Indicators	8
Literature Review.....	8
Muslims and Arabs within Western Elections	8
Muslim and Arab Partisanship and Voting Patterns.....	10
Europe/France.....	10
United States of America	10
Canada.....	13
Theoretical Expectations/Hypotheses.....	17
Methodology.....	18
Quantitative Methods.....	18
Qualitative Methods.....	23
Results.....	27
Descriptive Statistics.....	27
Comparison of Canadian, Immigrant, and Arab Canadian Groups	32
Multivariate Regression Models	33
Canadian Model	34
Immigrant Model	40
Arab Canadian Model	45
Discussion of the Quantitative Results	50
Interviews.....	51
Religion.....	52
Arab Canadian Culture, Values, and Identity.....	55
Political Ideology and Arab Influence on Political Ideology.....	63
Discussion.....	81
References.....	90
Appendix A: List and categorization of all variables used	97

Appendix B: All frequency tables and cross-tabulations used.....	100
Appendix C: Substantive effects prediction model graphs.....	110
Appendix D: Interview questions template	113
Appendix E: Interview Sample (Interview 8)	116

The Polarity of Arab Canadians' Political Affiliations

This research discusses the voting patterns and political ideology of Arab Canadians. Visible minority immigrant-origin Canadians are growing in number in Canada and have increased impact on elections and a growing voice in the political issues in the country. In this light, it is both anthropologically interesting and politically important to have better comprehension of the driving factors behind their political opinions and actions. Arab Canadians, largely due to the ethno-religious amalgamations within this population, are an interesting study. However, despite being a rapidly rising demographic with significant impacts on elections in Canada, there is minimal data concerning Arabs exclusively, especially in Canada. It is interesting to study Arabs particularly, rather than Muslims, due to their more concentrated cultural similarities (despite some distinctions between Arab Christians and Arab Muslims). While Muslims as a group hold similar religious beliefs, this still greatly varies between different ethnic and national groups, which research often generalizes or ignores. Who do Arab Canadians vote for, and why? Do Arab Canadians, and specifically Arab Muslims, vote Liberal (if the research confirms this), why, and does this clash with any traditional, cultural, or religious values held? Do they show partisanship, and to what extent? Does their political ideology align with their voting patterns? Do their political ideology and voting patterns vary according to religion, age, immigration status, and other demographic characteristics? There is a gap in the Canadian (and indeed, most other countries') literature as there is little in-depth qualitative and quantitative research on the voting patterns of this group, which this research attempts to remedy.

Arab Canadians and Arab-origin immigrants are a significant demographic within Canada, making up 1.9% of the Canadian population as of 2021 and numbering 690,000, having increased by around 170,000 from 2016 (Statistics Canada, 2022). The Arab population in

Canada is sizable, young, and rapidly growing. In 2010, Arabs were the second-biggest group (12.4%) migrating to Canada (Finn & Momani, 2017, p. 68). The majority of Arab Canadians are immigrants, with 73% of Arab Canadians born outside of Canada, and 30% of them immigrating to Canada within the last ten years, as of 2021 (Canadian Arab Institute, 2021). The size of this group indicates that Arabs in Canada are an important group to study, as they will have more political influence as their population grows, and a stronger ability to impact elections.

Therefore, it is important to consider their values, views, and political ideologies in order to understand their voting patterns and how they view their position in Canadian politics. It is additionally important to focus new studies on this group considering the limited research that touches immigrant voting does not consider specific immigrant groups, including Arabs. There is limited but decisive research on non-European origin Canadians (Blais, 2005) and Muslims (Environics Institute, 2016) strongly preferring the Liberal Party. Does this hold true for Arab Canadians as well? Due to often differing cultural and religious values in relation to European-origin non-immigrant Canadians, Arab Canadians likely have different ways of approaching politics, partisanship, and political ideology than the dominant culture in Canada.

Arab Canadians or Arab immigrants in Canada tend to hold more traditional cultural characteristics, behaviours, and values than are common in mainstream Canadian culture (Rasmi et al., 2014; 2015). In this case, I conjecture that the values that set Arab Canadians apart from the Canadian/Western dominant values influence the former group's voting choices and political ideology and cause them to differ consistently from the latter, in the way that they vote and consider political ideology. Although there is always heterogeneity within groups, there are often central generalizable similarities, especially throughout cultural groups. This research attempts to

extricate the overlapping yet often distinct labels of Arab and Muslim, as well as shed light on the little-studied Arab Christian group.

First, I provide contextual information and statistics on these various Arab populations and the Canadian population. Second, I situate this study within the literature on values (both Canadian and Arab) and on Arab (Middle Eastern Arabs, Arab Americans, Arab Canadians...) and immigrant political ideology and voting patterns worldwide. Following this, I explain the database and methodology used. I outline and evaluate the multiple databases created, based on Canadian Election Study results, through descriptive statistics, multivariate regressions, and other substantive effects. Qualitatively, I carry out twenty interviews with Arab Canadians and analyze and interpret these to complement and enrich the quantitative. To conclude, I provide a synthesis of the quantitative and qualitative findings, considering their nuances and meanings, especially in the scope of the research questions, the existing literature, and the real world.

The four central research questions this paper intends to answer through the quantitative means are: 1) Do Arab Canadians have a higher tendency of voting for the Liberal Party? 2) If Arabs, and especially Muslim Arabs, vote and support the Liberal Party more strongly, why is this so? 3) Is there a difference in voting patterns and/or political ideology between Muslim and Christian Arabs? 4) Is there a significant difference in the political ideology and voting patterns of the rest of the general Canadian population and Arab Canadians, or not? I discover quantitatively that Arab Canadians do indeed vote overwhelmingly Liberal, more than non-Arab born Canadians and non-Arab immigrant Canadians, and Conservative at much lower rates despite reporting significantly higher religiosity than these latter groups. Secondly, through interviews with members of this population, I confirm once again that Arab Canadians vote almost exclusively for the Liberal Party, and have ideologically leftist political values, despite

traditional values in their personal lives. The Liberal Party's most powerful appeal is their openness to Arab and Muslim immigrants. There are various important contributions to the literature and field throughout this study, including that immigrant identity often trumps religious beliefs in terms of choosing a political party to support, and that Arabs are an exceptional group that have distinct differences to other immigrant groups as well as to the rest of the Canadian population.

Background and Context

Canadian Culture, Identity, and Values

Understanding Canadian values with regard to immigration is important contextually, when considering immigrant or immigrant-origin Canadians and how their sets of values and culture mix. It can also provide insight into why immigrant cultural maintenance is so strong in Canada, one reason for which might be that Canadian culture and values may not be very clearly defined or imposed. If Arab Canadians prioritize their culture and values of origin over Canadian ones, this may be a reason. Canadian culture and values are often debated in the literature. Much of the research on Canadian values and culture conclude that Canada does not have a strongly distinctive national identity. According to Schwartz (1967), Canada is a "puzzling and ambiguous nation" (p. 5) in terms of identity and values, especially in comparison to the United States, which has a more concrete social, political, and cultural identity. Canada is constantly attempting to distinguish itself from the United States, while largely remaining an agglomeration of Britain and the United States. The lack of a cohesive national identity may be exacerbated by more accentuated and distinct provincial identities (most notably seen in Quebec, though present in Alberta as well) that prevail over a national identity (Henderson & McEwen, 2005, p. 178). Canada's competing identities, including federalism, bilingualism, multiculturalism, and being

part of the Commonwealth, also all contribute to a more abstract value and cultural system. Canadian values seem to center around universal principles, including “the rule of law, and the strength to be drawn from diversity” (National Defence, 2009, ch. 2, sec. 3), equality, and freedom (Henderson & McEwen, 2005, pp. 178-179). It seems that there is a limited shared culture; instead, the central Canadian value centres around the various cultures within the country co-existing in the public arena: multiculturalism (Mackey, 1998; Blake, 2013; Winter, 2014). The *Canadian Multiculturalism Act* (1985), a cornerstone of Canadian society, centres around equality for all members of society, while preserving the various multicultural origins of all those living in Canada. The adoption and centring of this Act is largely the reason for Canada’s reputation of being welcoming to immigrants and ethnic difference, as well as a champion of equal rights. However, its usefulness to citizenship and the cohesion of a Canadian value system is arguable (Blake, 2013). In this light, it is interesting to understand how Arab Canadians mediate their culture within multicultural Canada.

Arab Values

Understanding core Arab values will help explain potential ways that Arab-origin Canadians conceive political ideology and the drivers behind their voting patterns, as well as provide clarity to the conclusions and assumptions of previous research on this population. According to Harb (2016), “Values are beliefs or concepts that pertain to desirable behaviours or end states; they transcend specific situations and guide the selection or evaluation of events and behaviour.” (p. 7). Extensive research, polling, and documentation over the years from various sources resulted in a set of common regional and cultural Arab values (although this is certainly a generalization, but a necessary one in most research). The World Values Survey shows that Arab countries display traditional views and values, and prioritize Islam (Harb, 2016, p. 10). The

Schwartz Value Survey finds that Arab respondents display Universal Value Types that indicate collectivist and conservative values, as well as highly valuing morality and hospitality (Harb, 2016, p. 11). Rasmi et al. (2014; 2015) also name as Arab values collectivism, hierarchy, reputation and honour, power, tradition, and conformity, contrasting with Western individualism, less hierarchy, and focus on the self (p. 1125; pp. 630-631). The Western world often misconceives Arab values of conservatism or traditionalism as pertaining exclusively to extreme religious convictions. However, these relate to more subtle ideals. Schwartz (1999) identifies conservatism as an important value present in Arab culture, encompassing traits such as self-discipline. Similarly, Whiteoak et al. (2006) find that values of tradition and loyalty, including familial, social, and tribal, are important to Arabs. Additionally, conforming to a norm or ideal (another aspect relating to conservatism/traditionalism), whether this relates to gender, the workplace, or social standing, is also prevalent in Arab countries and cultures (Whiteoak et al., 2006). Arab Christians and Muslims both identify religion as a core and central value to their everyday lives, but for Arab Americans and Canadians not living in their country of origin this also acts as an essential connection to their ethnic heritage (Amer & Kayyali, 2015, pp. 52-53).

Within the North American diaspora, many Arab Americans and Arab Canadians, as well as Muslim Americans and Canadians, hold these various specific values from their cultural origin that differ from the general Canadian values (pp. 5-6). The literature finds that these values, describable as generally more traditional than the norm in Canada and the United States, can leave them at odds with an increasingly (at least rhetorically) progressive society. It is worth noting that values are not static, they can change or shift, either decreasing or increasing in intensity, especially within a diaspora setting. According to Rasmi et al. (2015), many second-generation Arab Canadians display a different set of (or different levels of the same) values than

their immigrant parents. Many display lower levels of conservatism, as well as higher levels of openness to change. However, this varies greatly, as Rasmi et al. (2015) found that some second-generation Arab Canadians in the same study also show either identical value labels compared to their parents, or show higher levels (e.g., higher levels of conservatism or traditionalism) (pp. 635-638). This indicates that values change across generations, but, at least in the case of second-generation Arabs in North America, they can strengthen or weaken differentially according to personal identity.

There is a great deal of research on Muslim diaspora communities in the West. However, this often encompasses Arabs without differentiating any possible discrepancies. While the Arab-and-Muslim category has become common socially and politically, it is “problematic because it often does not recognize the complexity and the heterogeneity of the categories ‘Arab’ and ‘Muslim’ but conflates the two” (Arat-Koc, 2006, p. 218). While there are cultural similarities and overlap between Arabs and Muslims, since the majority of Arabs are Muslims, there are arguably more cultural differences between them, as the majority of Muslims are not Arabs (Pew Research Center, 2015; Desilver & Masci, 2017). The grouping of Arab and Muslim as a category, or the use of Muslim as a catch-all group to include all Arabs does not properly account for Arab Christians and Jews, and forces greatly different cultural groups with the same religion under one umbrella. The Muslim category is arguably a problematic conflation in and of itself, considering the plethora of ethnic and cultural populations grouped within it. While there are distinctions between Arab Christians and Muslims, there are generally more cultural similarities between Arabs of different religions, especially in the diaspora. Although there is overlap, where Muslim data may apply to Arab groups, and vice versa, this is not always exact.

Due to these categorization problems, research often limits itself to focus on only Muslims, or on “Arabs and Muslims,” both of which may not yield accurate results.

Canadian Vote Choice Indicators

Canada has a generally even share of power between the two principal parties, with the last three elections falling to the Liberal Party, and the three previous to this won by the Conservative Party. There are broad (excluding the outlier of Quebec) voting patterns; women vote more to the left than men, LGBT people support the Conservative Party much less, visible minority people support the Liberals much more strongly, and Catholics, Protestants, and non-religious Canadians generally support the Liberals, Conservatives, and NDP, respectively (Ma, 2021). The most relevant factor for this study is religion. Religion and religiosity are also generally strong political indicators, with more religious people generally tending to be more right-wing and to vote Conservative (Rayside et al., 2017; Wilkins-Laflamme, 2016; Wilkins-Laflamme & Reimer, 2019). According to Wilkins-Laflamme (2017), immigrants show higher levels of religiosity than native Canadians; following these trends, most immigrants should be more right wing in their political ideology, as well as tend to vote Conservative. This is a broad base of generalized information on how Canadians vote; with this established research, it will be simpler to compare and contrast the ways, if any, in which Arab Canadians differ significantly in their vote choice from the general population and from other immigrants.

Literature Review

Muslims and Arabs within Western Elections

As previously mentioned, the Muslim and Arab populations in Western countries are increasing. Pew Research Center (Mohamed, 2018) estimates that in the United States in 2017 there were 3.45 million Muslims, or 1.1% of the population. The estimated growth of this

population is to become the second-largest religion after Christianity by 2040. The same growth is seen in Europe, where Muslims made up around 4.9% of the European population in 2016 (Hackett, 2017). Certain countries such as France, the U.K., Germany, Sweden, and more are also home to sizable Arab-origin (majority Muslim) populations that make up over 5% of the population (Hackett, 2017), with Canada following suit. As a result, political parties and politicians target Muslim and Arab citizens and immigrants in elections. There are generally two reasons for this.

Firstly, more than most other minority groups, there has generally been a great deal of targeted anti-Muslim and Arab fearmongering and/or xenophobia and racism used as rhetoric during elections in many Western countries. Many European countries, including France and Germany, use Arabs and Muslims as scapegoats for various ills in society, with the promise to end immigration and curb ‘Sharia’ influence on European culture at the forefront of many campaigns. Oztig et al. (2021) document various ‘populist’ ‘anti-Islam’ political parties throughout Europe that, as a central aspect of their platform, emphasize “Islam as being incompatible with European values and a threat to European societies” (p. 447).

This rhetoric is less prevalent in Canada, with Arab and Muslim Canadians as part of a broader immigrant voter base are more so ‘targeted’ as a minority group that could bring decisive votes. This minority power is clear in the 2015 federal election (won by Liberal Justin Trudeau) statistics from Elections and Statistics Canada, where the ridings with the most immigrants were overwhelmingly Liberal (Paperny, 2015). It is estimated that 79% of Muslim Canadians voted in the 2015 federal election, compared to 46.5% in the 2011 federal election (Mainstreet Research, 2015). This shows that the Arab/Muslim vote holds an influence in elections, hence the stronger attempt by candidates/parties to attract these groups.

Muslim and Arab Partisanship and Voting Patterns

Europe/France

Muslims and Arabs in Europe are strong supporters of left-wing parties for the most part, despite having long been targets of xenophobia in the continent, largely from all sides of the political spectrum. According to a survey carried out by IFOP (Institut français d'opinion publique) for La Croix newspaper, almost 70% of Muslim voters in France voted for Jean-Luc Mélenchon (far-left candidate) in the first round of the 2022 presidential election (Le Normand, 2022). A separate questionnaire carried out by Arab News en Français (Sarkis, 2022) surveyed Arab-origin binational and expatriate voters in France during the first round of the 2022 presidential election. The results show that a majority of Levant and Egyptian (59%), and Gulf origin (52%) voters voted for the centrist candidate and current president Emmanuel Macron. Maghreb-origin voters (the main Arab origin in France) almost evenly split their votes between Macron (42%) and Mélenchon (44%). Among all these voter groups, the three other candidates who were representing right-wing parties each had only 13% or less of their votes.

United States of America

Arabs and Muslims in the U.S.A. are also consistently left-wing voters. According to Walid (2020), in the 2000 election in the United States, pre-9/11, the majority of Muslim Americans (70% total; 80% of non-Black Muslim Americans) voted Republican. Among the varying Muslim ethnic groups, only Black Muslim Americans were majority Democrat (p. 32). Post-9/11, however, Muslim American support for the Republican Party/Republican president George W. Bush's support levels fell to 7% (Walid, 2020, p. 33). In a poll for Emgage (Change Research, 2021), 86% of the Muslim American sample polled voted for/supported Joe Biden, the 2020 Democratic party candidate, contrasted with only 6% supporting Donald Trump, the

Republican candidate. The Cooperative Election Study (CES; formerly CCES, prior to 2020), a national stratified sample election survey of over 50,000 American people (Harvard University, n.d.), showed that during the period from 2008 to 2020, Muslim voters consistently strongly voted for Democratic candidates at higher rates than Mormons, Jews, Buddhists, Evangelicals, mainline Protestants, Catholics, agnostics, and ‘nothing in particular’ voters. Muslim vote choice for Republican presidents was less than 15% for all four polled elections. The only group that reported voting more for Democratic candidates than Muslims, were Black Protestants. While Muslim support for Republican candidates has slowly been rising, from less than 5% in 2008 to 14.7% in 2020, this is still a great minority, especially compared to the pre-9/11 party support favouring Republicans.

In terms of partisanship, the 2018 CCES poll (Burge, 2020) shows that while the majority of Muslims (67.1%) self-identify as Democrats (strong to leaning) compared to 46% of the entire sample of Americans, they are also almost double as likely to identify as Independents, at 22.2% to 14%. Ideologically, however, the majority (51.1%) of Muslim respondents identify themselves as moderate, compared to 30.6% of the entire sample (Burge, 2020). They have much lower self-identification rates of conservatism, but almost identical distributions of liberalism. This same CCES survey shows that Muslim voters within the sample consider themselves Democrats in terms of partisanship, but their positions on central issues compared to the average Democrat varies greatly. For example, support for abortion is at 61% for the Muslim sample, compared to 81% for the rest. Muslim support for the U.S. ‘visa lottery’ is also 13 percent lower than average, while support for tax cuts for the wealthy and for corporations are almost twice as high among the former (Burge, 2020). These opinions provide insight that Muslim voters oppose many of the Democratic Party’s economic and social positions, and either support their identity politics

stances or simply strongly oppose the alternative, which is the Republican Party. Finally, in a 2023 poll by the Arab American Institute (2023) on the partisanship of Arab Americans, support for the Republican Party declined to 24%, while support for the Democratic Party was at 40% (p. 2). The number of self-identified independents was 28%, which is the “highest amount recorded since tracking began in 1996” (Arab American Institute, 2023, p. 4). This indicates that Arab Americans are searching for alternatives outside of their regularly supported political parties.

In the United States, the central reason for the rise in support for Democrats by Muslims and Arabs post-9/11 was due to the effects of the Patriot Act and the targeting of Muslims and Arabs by the Republican administration (Walid, 2020, p. 33). They largely transferred their support to the Democratic Party, regardless of common Democratic support for the same Republicans backed/enacted measures (Walid, 2020, p. 35). Walid (2020) says that one reason that explains this support is simple opposition to the right, which publicly spoke out more against Muslims/Arabs (p. 38), while the public stance of the left/Democrats were of being arbiters of equality and diversity (p. 35). Among Muslim Arab Americans, religion may be a factor influencing the support of certain political parties. According to the Arab American Institute (2023), Arab Muslim support for the Republican Party having control of Congress is much lower (20%) than among Catholic or Protestant/Orthodox Arabs (40% and 39% respectively). This may be due to the more common anti-Muslim rhetoric, or negative stereotyping of Muslims/Arabs by the Republican Party, whereas Christian Arab Americans feel more integrated due to their common religion (Arab American Institute, 2023, p. 8). However, both groups still support the Democratic Party more strongly.

Although the Arab American immigrant voters are seemingly dedicated to the Liberal parties in their host countries, the second and third generations may not be as strongly partisan. Chouhoud (2022) finds that second-generation American Muslims “are significantly less likely to believe that the Democratic Party is “friendly” to their community” than their immigrant predecessors, likely due to the Democratic Party’s stance on many issues involving Muslims (including most post-9/11 stances such as support of the Iraq War) (p. 39). However, certain Democratic Party values (such as a focus on LGBT) and “culture wars” are also beginning to cause dissonance with Arab and Muslim voters. Walid (2020) contends that more ‘progressive’ politics might hinder Muslim Americans’ “freedom of religious conviction and their ability to transmit Islamic morality to future generations” (p. 37). In other words, morally and religiously, American Muslims may be more aligned with the Republican/right-wing party than with the socially progressive Democrats, though some studies find they have self-reported moderate to progressive political values. Despite their widespread belief that the Republicans are “hostile toward Muslims,” many Muslims are now seriously questioning which party is the lesser of two evils (Walid, 2020, p. 37).

Canada

There is little to no research on Arab Canadian voting patterns. The literature on immigrant voting in Canada is generalized and applicable to most immigrant groups, Arab Canadians included. Some scholars (Blais, 2005 and White, 2017) argue that culture/immigrant background affects vote choice. Immigrants/visible minority immigrant-origin Canadians vote very strongly for the Liberal Party, and there are a few central theories in Canadian political science literature as to why. Since the post-World War II period, the majority of immigrants in Canada vote for the Liberal Party, “perceived as both powerful and pro-immigrant” (Pikkov,

2011, p. 181). Specifically, according to Kim and Perrella (2008), immigrants “as a whole, show greater support for the Liberals, [but] when disaggregated,” (p. 2) visible minority immigrants supported the Liberal Party more strongly, while European immigrants largely voted Conservative (pp. 1-4). Thomas (2012), specifies that “Canadian-born visible minorities are no more likely to vote Liberal than Canadian-born non-minorities” (p. 10), indicating that immigration status affects vote choice more than ethnicity alone. The following, dated, research is the most comprehensive, highlighting the need for further research on this topic.

Bilodeau and Kanji (2010) explain that the majority of immigrants to Canada since 1965 originate from non-European countries, which includes the Arab states. Pikkov (2011) states that Arab League-origin immigrants have a much higher voter turnout rate than expected based on their countries’ democratic traditions (p. 28). These ‘new immigrant voters’ support the Liberal Party at higher rates than any other immigrant groups in Canada, despite the lack of prolonged political socialization within the country to develop strong partisan attachments like most born Canadians (Bilodeau & Kanji, 2010). Instead, these ‘new immigrant voters’ develop partisan attachment following an understanding of the Canadian political system and evaluating which party creates the most “repeated positive experiences” and is the most beneficial to/aligned with their needs (Bilodeau & Kanji, 2010, pp. 68-69). Immigrant support is vital to the Liberal Party, since “When support for the Liberal Party declined, the new immigrant voter remained more loyal to the Liberal Party than the Canadian-born voter” which has helped “maintain the Liberal Party’s significance on the Canadian political landscape” (Bilodeau & Kanji, 2010, p. 78). Immigrant-majority ridings voting Liberal can change the course of an election (Paperny, 2015). Bilodeau and Kanji (2010) present two theories for this strong new-immigrant loyalty to the Liberal Party in Canada. The first is that the Liberals present themselves and seem the most

welcoming to and protective of immigrants, and the second is due to policies seen as aiding immigrants and ethnic minorities passed by Liberal governments (such as Pierre Trudeau's 1971 Multiculturalism Act) (p. 79). While this image has been slightly altered negatively since this time, partisanship has maintained, especially when these groups compare the Liberals to parties such as the Bloc Québécois (Bilodeau & Kanji, p. 80). As told by Finn and Momani (2017), Arab Canadians reacted even more strongly in support of the Liberals through rejection of the Conservatives in 2015, when the Conservative government (despite some Liberal support for these) passed various 'racist' and seemingly anti-Muslim/Arab-targeted bills and acts (including the Zero Tolerance for Barbaric Cultures Practices Act and the 2015 Anti-terrorism Act Bill C-51) (pp. 71-72).

Meanwhile, André Blais (2005) also provides a comprehensive and renowned review of immigrant support for the Liberal Party, using the Canadian Election Survey studies from 1965 to 2004. He argues that non-European Canadians (visible minorities, immigrants...) and (religious) Catholics provide the crucial "main source of Liberal strength" (Blais, 2005, p. 825). These two groups encompass both Arabs as a whole (visible minority, immigrant origin) and Arab Christian Catholics as well. Blais (2005) discovers that Catholics do not differ significantly in their attitude to societal issues from European-origin non-Catholic Canadians yet vote much differently. Catholics and many visible minorities, Arabs included, in fact, usually oppose abortion and LGBT issues, which the Liberals champion. According to Blais (2005), the generally more traditional and 'conservative' nature of these groups, along with their policy views, shows that support of the Liberal Party is not due to an overwhelming centrist or left-wing tendency (p. 834). Blais (2005) finds that non-European origin Canadians support the Liberals strongly in and of themselves, not out of a rejection of the other political parties. Blais (2005)

tests and rejects various hypotheses and variables to understand the strongly partisan support of immigrants and Catholics for the Liberal Party, which warrant closer, and updated, testing. The original tested variables include religion, ethnicity, year of immigration/incumbency (which party was in power upon immigrants' arrival), 'lesser evil' (both parties are not ideal but the Conservative Party is worse), and perceived Liberal Party support of minorities (in issues involving immigration, religion, cultural preservation...). Blais (2005) finds that Catholics do have strong, statistically significant attachments to the Liberal Party, but he finds no statistically significant outcome or variable to pinpoint the reason for Catholics' and visible minority immigrants' strong Liberal support. Immigrants and Catholics vote much more consistently and strongly for the Liberal Party than the rest of Canadians. Given these groups' generally arguably more traditional and conservative values, it is a puzzle to understand why they support the Liberal Party so strongly rather than the Conservative Party, which may align more with these.

There is still limited research on Muslims' specific political partisanship in Canada. The most extensive is the Environics Institute (2016) poll: *Survey of Muslims in Canada 2016*. The survey discovers that 65% of the Muslims polled reported voting for the Liberal Party in the 2015 election. Reported support for other parties was at much lower proportions; the NDP received 10% of Muslim votes, the Conservatives 2%, and the rest 1% or lower. Interestingly, 19% of respondents refused to say how they voted in the last election. It is possible that this group of people simply did not vote or voted for a party (such as the Conservatives) that they feel is not socially acceptable. This survey data shows an increase in support for the Liberal Party, as well as a decrease in support for the NDP and Conservative parties. This is compared to a 2011 Ipsos Reid voter exit poll that assessed that 46% of Muslim Canadian voters had voted for the Liberals, 36% supported the NDP, and 12% voted for the Conservatives (Grenier, 2016).

There must be further research to differentiate and determine whether Arab Canadian voters specifically also vote predominantly Liberal. Apart from minimal Census data, surveys, and election statistics, there is even less in-depth research on the partisanship of Arabs in Canada than on Muslims. This current research adds to various topics in the literature, including immigrant political affiliation, Arab/Arab immigrant political ideology, Arab Canadian partisanship/political ideology, and more. There is little to no research on Arab Canadians' political ideology, which this research will remedy. Canadian immigrant research is also relevant to American research, as there are similarities in political ideology and cultural influence on voting in both countries.

Theoretical Expectations/Hypotheses

Based on the literature review there are many basic assumptions about Arab Canadians, and the answers to many of my central research questions can be conjectured. I assume that Arab Canadians vote predominantly for the Liberal Party. One of the most significant differences between the Arab Canadian and general Canadian populations, apart from the cultural difference (which can be present for any immigrant groups, even European), is the difference in the level of religiosity. Considering this also allows us to determine whether the majority of Muslims and Arabs can largely be generalized together in terms of political opinions, due to holding the same religion. I put forth several hypotheses for the quantitative section of the research, to establish a base of knowledge and more solid conjectures about the populations, before the deeper qualitative analysis.

Hypothesis 1: Arab Canadians are more religious than the general Canadian population

Hypothesis 2: Arab Canadians are more to the right, in terms of political ideology, than the rest of the general Canadian population.

Hypothesis 3: Arab Canadians vote for the Liberal Party more than the general population.

Hypothesis 4: Arab Canadians and other Canadian immigrants differ in their vote choices.

Methodology

This paper utilizes an explanatory sequential design. First, I carry out quantitative research and statistical analysis (with Stata) using an existing voter survey database. Following this, I carry out qualitative methods, in the form of in-depth interviews with eligible respondents. The purpose of this is to establish a base of knowledge for the little-researched population (Arab Canadians) and determine some plausible reasons for my research questions/hypotheses through quantifiable responses in a bigger scope, before examining more comprehensive, varied, and first-hand accounts of answers to these.

Quantitative Methods

Statistics Canada (2001) defines Arab Canadian, or Canadians of Arab origin as “people in Canada who have ethnic or cultural ancestry in the Middle East or North Africa” (p. 8). This includes first-generation Arab Canadians (immigrants to Canada, born outside of the country), second-generation Arab Canadians (those born in Canada with one or both of their parents born outside of Canada), third-generation Arab Canadians (those born in Canada with both parents born in Canada), and further (Statistics Canada, 2021).

For the purposes of this research, ‘Arab’ encompasses the Middle East and North Africa (MENA) region. It includes the twenty-two League of Arab States (LAS) countries: Algeria, Bahrain, Comoros, Djibouti, Egypt, Iraq, Jordan, Kuwait, Lebanon, Libya, Mauritania, Morocco, Oman, Palestine, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, Somalia, Sudan, Syria, Tunisia, the United Arab Emirates, and Yemen (European Union External Action, 2021). The ‘Arab’ dataset includes Arab

immigrants or Arab-origin Canadians who identify themselves as ethnically coming from one of these countries.

The database for this research comprises Canadian Election Study (CES) election polls (campaign period surveys), from the years 2000, 2004, 2006, 2008, 2011, 2015, 2019, and 2021. CES is a reliable, historic, and large-scale Canadian election survey; it is used because it is one of the most likely sources to provide an adequate database for the population and topic researched. The Canadian Election Study is largely controlled to be proportional to the demographics of Canada, in terms of age, sex, language, province, and more. Due to this, it is generally a reliable form of representation for the overall population and voter base of Canada. The CES surveys target Canadians pre- and post-election and pose various questions about their opinions on Canadian political issues, politicians, and elections. The long span of years used adds more data to the incumbency variable, as well as enlarges the Arab dataset sample, which would be small otherwise. Because of the span of years and large samples in some datasets, I use the survey years as a control variable to control any effects that the progression of the years may have on the results. However, I exclude the survey year variable from the Arab Canadian dataset; due to the few observations, the correlation between survey year and the other variables is too high and results in skewed data in the regression model. Utilizing the surveys from 2008 onward allows us to update the voting literature based on the CES, the most comprehensive of which (Blais, 2005) ends in 2004.

There are three databases within this research, each using the CES database. The first dataset, totalling 639 respondents, isolates and compiles solely respondents that identified as ethnically Arab (as 'Middle Eastern,' 'Arab,' or one of the specific countries identified in the Population section) from each of these previously mentioned survey years. Respondents

excluded include those born in an Arab country but who did not identify themselves as ethnically Arab in the survey. Some questions within the dataset, including self-placement on the left-right scale of political ideology, decrease the sample further with much lower response rates. Due to the small dataset, as well as some literature (Rasmi et al., 2015) affirming that many North American Arabs inherit cultural values from their immigrant parents, I kept the Arab immigrant respondents in the Arab dataset and not the immigrant dataset. Another reason for this was to completely isolate the Arab Canadians and ascertain any possible exceptionalism. Weighting this sample would have been ideal. Due to the design of the dataset, where ethnicity was generally a fill-in-the-blank and not a drop-down list of ethnicities (e.g., White, Black, Arab, Asian, South Asian...), it was quite difficult to weigh these responses appropriately and accurately. For this reason, all of the descriptive statistics are unweighted.

The second dataset is the general Canadian population dataset, comprising all responses to the campaign period surveys throughout the years mentioned above, minus all Arab respondents, and minus all respondents that reported being born outside of Canada. This dataset numbers almost seventy-three thousand over the course of the years used ($n=72,987$). While the Arab database filters an ethnicity variable, Arab, as it solely includes Arab Canadians, this larger dataset includes all other respondent ethnicities. It would involve a great deal of filtering to separate each other ethnicity in the dataset and would likely not yield much more substantive results than simply comparing the whole rest of the Canadian population to the Arab Canadian population, especially as the vast majority of Canadians are one ethnicity (white/Caucasian/non-immigrant European-origin) in reality (Statistics Canada, 2023c), and in the study data. The respondents within this dataset are referred to as ‘Canadian,’ ‘born Canadian’, or the ‘general Canadian population.’

When ethnicity is a variable, as it is in the Arab dataset, there may be questions about its legitimate or distinguishable impact on outcomes, as well as whether second and third generation immigrants inherit culture or differ from those born abroad. To lessen this, I created a third dataset that isolates the immigrant respondents in the data from those that are born in Canada. In this way, I can make even more specific comparisons about subgroups of our studied groups and determine the exceptionality (or lack thereof) of Arab Canadians as a cultural and ethnic group within Canada. Immigrant here refers to people not born in Canada, although I note that immigrants born in Canada are also seen as Canadians and may have citizenship, but due to immigration status may have different worldviews than those born in Canada. The reason for this is that there is a larger base of research distinguishing the differing behaviours and attitudes of Canadian immigrants versus Canadians (born in Canada). It does not include any respondents within the Arab dataset, regardless of immigration status. This dataset totals $n=13,434$.

The main dependent variable in this research is Arab Canadian vote choice; within the survey and dataset, this is the party that respondents voted for in the previous election. The independent variables are religion, religiosity, immigration status, political ideology (on a left-right scale), age, sex, incumbency (political party in power at the time of arrival, for immigrant respondents not born in Canada; calculated by hand). The variable of age is a ratio variable, while political ideology and religiosity are ordinal. Vote choice, religion, immigration status (year of immigration), and sex are nominal variables. Immigration status is a hand-coded variable based on whether the respondent reported a year of immigration and a country of birth other than Canada, or not. Incumbency is also a variable created by grouping the years that the Liberal Party or Conservative Party was in power and cross-checking this with the year of immigration (when applicable) to see what party was in power when the respondent arrived in

Canada. However, I excluded incumbency in the regressions, as descriptive statistics did not indicate it to be impactful (see Appendix B, Tables B17, B18) and it was collinear with the more central independent variable of immigration status in the regressions. The screening of ethnicity as a variable happened naturally in the Arab dataset as it includes solely Arab respondents (see Database section). There is a distinction within the dataset between Catholic and other Christian denominations, to analyze whether Catholics, as theoretically in the literature, also had a stronger support for the Liberal Party than other Christians. For this reason, the religion variable has a Catholic group and a ‘Christian’ group that encompasses all other sects. Every effort is made to normalize all three datasets according to the variables; for this reason, I use the same variables for regressions for the three datasets, despite variance in their frequency. The exception to this is the variable immigration status, which is within the Arab Canadian dataset, but not the immigrant or Canadian datasets, as these latter two are already divided by immigration status (born in Canada or not). See Appendix A, Table 1 for a complete list of variables.

I use the statistical program Stata to analyze the basic preliminary descriptive statistics, regressions, and other statistical procedures. This research’s objective is to answer the research questions, confirm or question the literature, and discover the statistically significant links between Arab Canadians’ voting choice/partisanship and the multiple independent variables that could possibly explain these (detailed previously). I use frequency tables and cross-tabulations of the variables to analyze the basic preliminary statistical results.

The dependent variable, vote choice, is a categorical variable with more than two choices. Because of this, multivariate analysis comprehensively tests the impacts of each of the independent variables against each of the dependent variable categories. I run a multinomial regression, using the Stata command *mlogit*, on each of the three datasets-Canadian, immigrant,

and Arab Canadian-previously detailed and analyze the central variables that are statistically significant. Relative risk ratios in Stata for each regression provide odds ratio equivalent findings to add complexity to the regression results. I also create coefficient and margins plots and graphs in Stata from the central multivariate models to ascertain and visualize the results of the multivariate regression model.

There are a few limitations to the quantitative side of this research. First, the sample size for the Arab dataset is adequate for descriptive statistics but is quite small within the models. Performing this analysis again with a much larger sample size would be ideal. It would be especially helpful to have a greater response rate to the (often polarizing or ‘controversial’) questions on vote choice and political ideology. Additionally, weighting the descriptive statistics may have improved the precision of the analysis. Finally, filtering ethnicity to analyze the other biggest visible minority groups in Canada may refine the analysis. This would allow us to compare other visible minority groups to Arab Canadians and further determine whether this former group is truly exceptional, or if most other visible minority ethnic/cultural groups hold similar characteristics and difference from the dominant white Canadian majority.

Qualitative Methods

Qualitative work will more comprehensively explain and further substantiate the hypotheses and the quantitative results, especially as previous in-depth quantitative research on the topic (see Blais, 2005) yields no conclusive responses. This is a contribution to the literature, as there are few, if any, quantitative interview studies (just as there are few quantitative ones) with Arab Canadians on the topic of political affiliation. Interviews with a diverse set of Arab Canadian respondents will allow the sharing and examination of more dynamic and expandable opinions and ideas. The quantitative research and results here provide overarching results to

interpret, confirm or deny hypotheses, and advance the possible responses to research questions. Interviews provide the essential complementary human factor, where the people concerned provide concrete reasons and real, testimonial insights into the research questions, which can only be conjectured with statistics. With only quantitative research, the wide range of emotions and opinions is lessened greatly, if not lost. Within political science, personal opinions are central.

I carried out the interviews following the completion of the quantitative analysis and ethics approval, between February 2024 and July 2024. The interview respondents were gathered through a snowball sample approach, stemming from word of mouth, social media sharing, physical posters, and interviewees recruiting other interested participants. There was an effort to have a diverse pool of interviewees with regard to age, country of origin, life stage (students, parents...), and sex. I carried out interviews in person or over Zoom, based on the preference and convenience of the participant. I provided the interviewees with the ethics consent form prior to the interviews, which were recorded for transcription purposes; however, all interview data is anonymous. The interviews were structured, with central themes from the literature review and quantitative research discussed, and with specific questions posed to the respondent. However, this was flexible, and interviewees were allowed the freedom to speak freely and diverge from the question if they wished to, while I asked clarifying and follow-up questions as well. Respondents were asked their age, ethnicity, country of origin, generation status/year of immigration, and religion in each interview for demographic data.

The comprehensive interview questions (see Appendix D) attempt to go beyond the hypotheses. The aim is to understand the nuanced reasons for Arab Canadian partisanship, and whether Arab Christians and Muslims differ in their political ideology, values, and voting

patterns and why. The central research questions these interviews intend to answer are: whether Arab Canadians have a higher tendency of voting for the Liberal Party, how their religiosity impacts their political affiliation, if there is a difference in voting patterns and/or political ideology between Muslim and Christian Arabs, and if Arabs, and especially Muslim Arabs, vote and support the Liberal Party more strongly, and why. It is important to note certain limitations in the qualitative research. Naturally, one of these is the low number of interviews. Another possible limitation is possible bias in responses since the interviews targeted Arab Canadians directly. As a result, respondents were aware of the topic of research, which may have influenced the way they thought about the questions and responded, possibly centring culture more than they might in other situations solely concerning political ideology. However, as participants were aware ahead of time and volunteered to share their views on this topic, this creates a lesser incentive to lie about their political affiliation or vote choice, considering their willingness to share specific political opinions.

The interviews number 20. Of these twenty, 8 participants are male and 12 are female. The age of the interviewees ranges from 20 to 52, with the average age being 29 and the median being 25.5. In terms of ethnic origin, 6 are of Lebanese origin, 6 are of Egyptian origin, 2 are Syrian, and the remaining 6 are originally from Palestine, Yemen, Morocco, Iraq, Libya, and Sudan, respectively. Five respondents are Christians originally (with one identifying more as agnostic as an adult) and mainly Orthodox (Greek or Coptic), while the remaining 15 are Muslim. Nine participants are born Canadians, while the rest obtained Canadian citizenship following immigration. Of these 11 immigrated Arab Canadians, 8 immigrated as minors. The majority of participants (14) are based in or from Ontario (either Toronto or Ottawa), while 5 are from Quebec (Montréal or Gatineau), 1 is from Alberta, 1 is from British Columbia, 1 is from

Nova Scotia, and 1 currently lives in the United States. Note that some participants are between two cities, or from one city and living/attending school in another province. In terms of occupations, 7 are students, while the rest hold a variety of jobs, including public servant, assistant project manager, engineer (2), art educator, news writer, talent acquisition, environmental economist, insurance account executive, entrepreneur, self-employed, professor (2), and healthcare provider.

In order to carry out the qualitative analysis and interpretation, I favoured a blended inductive-deductive method, as described by Linneberg and Korsgaard (2019). Due to the established literature on immigrant voting and the subsequent quantitative (descriptive statistics, multivariate regression, and substantive effects) findings, there were already pre-established concepts and theories to consider and further investigate, as well as ideas that were almost cemented, such as Arab Canadians' dominant vote choice. Additionally, the interview questions generally centred around ideas based on the literature and the quantitative results. Because of this, it was necessary to utilize a deductive process when coding, as there were previously conceived themes and specific questions to answer. However, simultaneously, new and more complex themes, ideas, and subthemes came into play as the respondents provided their opinions and rationalized and discussed them with me. This is where the inductive analysis, namely grounded theory (as developed by Glaser and Strauss [1967]) came into play. I attempted to centre themes that were essential to the research questions and study as a whole but keep them open enough to allow participants' responses to mould these. New ideas that the participants shared and delved into informed and added nuanced voices to the more factual and rigid responses to the central themes. I broke up the new information and created new sections and discussions accordingly in the qualitative section. Throughout, I prioritized the minimization of

themes and code words to make the results more focused, especially due to the low number of interviews. To examine these two facets of qualitative coding, I carried out manual qualitative analysis on the interview transcripts largely through thematic analysis and some key-word identification. I used NVivo to locate key words and themes to look for throughout the transcripts. The central themes identified are: Arab culture, ethnicity, and values; impact of religion/religiosity; political ideology; and influence of Arab culture on political ideology. For the first cycle, I coded the main themes in the transcripts by identifying them in the participants' responses to each question, highlighting them by colour. Following this, as a second cycle of coding, I expanded and provided subthemes to each important thematic section. I organized the qualitative interpretation along the lines of the four themes, while adding in additional significant thematic findings from the interviews.

The limitations of the qualitative part of this research include that the sample could be bigger and more diverse and wide-reaching. Many respondents were students, due to the snowball sampling networks. Given the time frame and scope of the study, 20 interviews was the most reasonable goal. In a future study, there should be more older respondents recruited.

Results

Descriptive Statistics

This section explores and analyzes descriptive statistics based on each of the three datasets—Canadian, immigrant, and Arab Canadian. One central question within the literature on political partisanship (especially Liberal Party partisanship) and vote choice generally, is whether and how religion, and any traditional values that may accompany it, play an influencing role. To the question of the importance of religion in their lives, less than two-thirds (60.7%) of Canadian respondents consider religion to be very or somewhat important in their lives, while over a third

(38.1%) find religion to be not very important or not important at all (see Table 1). This is higher than a 2019 study where 54% of all Canadians reported religion as somewhat or very important to them (Cornelissen, 2019). However, the sample for this question falls to less than 75% of the full sample for this group, indicating that many of the respondents with an ‘other’ religion have no religion, which would increase the proportion of the ‘not important at all’ response.

Table 2 helps illustrate that religion is an important and intrinsic part of Arab Canadians’ cultural and ethnic identity (as seen in Amer & Kayyali, 2015, and others). Almost four out of five Arab Canadian respondents (79.3%) listed their religion as very or somewhat important in their lives. Comparing the immigrant results, we can see that immigrants similarly find religion more important than the general Canadian population, with 71.4% reporting religion to be very or somewhat important, but less so than the Arab population. This all shows that Arab Canadians find religion to be more important to them than the general Canadian population and the immigrant population, which can be consequently inferred as that they are more religious, confirming Hypothesis 1.

Table 1. Religiosity of both samples, based on the question ‘In your life, you would say religion is:’

Religiosity	Canadian (n=52,446)	Immigrant (n=10,232)	Arab Canadian (n=551)
Not important at all	15.11%	10.87%	7.99%
Not very important	24.23%	17.76%	12.70%
Somewhat important	36.65%	34.75%	35.21%
Very important	24.00%	36.62%	44.10%

Table 2 presents Canadian, immigrant, and Arab Canadians’ political ideology on a left-right interval scale from 0 to 2. Almost a majority (47.5%) of Canadians consider themselves to be in the center, with the remaining leaning more toward the right (27.4%) than the left (25.1%) by a slim margin. Immigrants reported being on the right almost 5% more than Canadians (at 31.5%), and both slightly less on the right and less centrist. As seen in Table 2, there is quite an

even split by Arabs between being on the left and right (around 31% each). However, the Arab group also shows more polarization overall, as they have the lowest percent of reported centrism (38%) of the three groups and the closest split between left, right, and center political ideology.

Interestingly, there is a significant difference in the political ideology of immigrants and Arab respondents, possibly accounted for by the mix of immigrant and Canadian-born respondents within the sample. When considering the cross between political ideology and immigration status (see Appendix B, Table B34) in the Arab sample, those who immigrated are more centrist and right-wing, which aligns with the dominant political ideology in both the immigrant and Canadian groups. Meanwhile, 40% of Arab Canadians born in Canada are on the left, and only a quarter are on the right, less than any other group. This clarifies that while Arab Canadians as a whole are less on the right than other immigrant groups, Arab Canadian immigrants within this sample are actually more to the right. Hypothesis 2 is confirmed, as Arab Canadians are more on the right than Canadians (though less than immigrant Canadians).

Table 2. Left-right self-placement scale of political ideology of both samples on a 0-3 scale

Left-right¹	Canadian (n=35,096)	Immigrant (n=6,686)	Arab Canadian (n=242)
Left (0)	25.09%	22.15%	30.99%
Center (1)	47.49%	46.37%	38.02%
Right (2)	27.41%	31.48%	30.99%

Table 3 confirms the voting patterns/vote choice distribution of Canadians and Arab Canadians. It is important to note that the Canadian and immigrant samples are much larger than the Arab Canadian sample. Canadian votes are somewhat evenly distributed when accounting for Liberal political dominance (41.2% for the Liberals and 28.4% for the Conservatives), showing Liberal preference but without severe adherence to a specific party. These results may even show

¹ Furthest left is 0, furthest right is 2. See Appendix A, Table 1 for the coding of the left-right variable

underrepresentation of the Liberal Party, reportedly voted for by only 42% of respondents, though they won 5 out of the 8 elections throughout 2000 to 2021, the years included in the database. Meanwhile the Arab Canadian vote choice distribution (see Table 3) confirms the literature and shows that Arab Canadians vote Liberal at very high rates. Almost two thirds (64.8%) of Arab Canadians in the sample confirmed voting for the Liberal Party in the previous election. The remaining voters split their support at much lower rates between the Conservative Party (14.8%) and the NDP (13.8%). Immigrant voters report voting Liberal more (48.1%) than Canadians but less than Arab Canadians and voting for the Conservative Party slightly more than the former group and much more than the latter, while voting for the NDP at lower rates than both (see Table 3).

Table 3. Vote choice in the previous election to the survey, both samples

Vote choice	Canadian (n=55,241)	Immigrant (n=8,307)	Arab Canadian (n=392)
Liberal	41.21%	48.10%	64.80%
Conservative	28.37%	29.83%	14.80%
NDP	16.41%	12.90%	13.78%
Other ²	14.01%	9.16%	6.63%

This confirms Hypothesis 3, as it is clear that despite much higher religiosity, Arab Canadians vote more highly for the Liberal Party than the rest of the general population. Hypothesis 4 is also confirmed, as Arab Canadians differ drastically in their voting patterns not only from the general Canadian population, but also specifically from the immigrant population. Considering the Liberal Party a centrist party, this indicates that most people tend to vote in alignment with their political ideology, though this is not completely straightforward for those who consider themselves to be far to the left, as the most left-wing party, the NDP, does not have a viable chance of winning in most elections. While many may see or consider the Liberal Party

² Other includes other political parties such as the Bloc Quebecois.

as a leftist party due to some of their rhetoric, it is historically and politically a generally centrist or moderate party. This makes the fact that Canadians vote less overall for the Liberal Party than Arab Canadians, despite higher levels of centrism, another interesting anomaly, especially when Arab Canadians report being more to the right of the political spectrum than Canadians.

According to Blais (2005), centrist tendencies do not attribute for support for the technically centrist Liberal Party, as visible minority/immigrant-origin and Catholic Canadians are not more centrist in policy than non-Catholic and European origin Canadians. These results confirm this idea. Having a slightly more centrist-dominant political ideology, coupled with the Liberal Party's immigrant/Arab/Muslim-friendly rhetoric, may be the main reason for the strong Arab Canadian adherence to the Liberals.

The immigrant group is the most consistent in terms of voting in alignment with their stereotypical political ideology; around 46% of immigrants report being centrist (see Table 2), and around 48% vote for the Liberal Party, while around 31.5% of immigrants report being on the right, and around 30% report voting Conservative. This indicates that political ideology more strongly guides immigrant and Canadian groups' votes than Arab Canadians'. This is reinforced through both the group as a whole, and the Arab Canadian immigrant subgroup, 70% of which report voting for the Liberal Party, despite being more to the right than the other immigrant group. These results indicate the exceptionalism of the Arab Canadian group and the presence of a specific reason(s) for the fact that Arab Canadians are so much more distanced from the Conservative Party than the rest of the Canadian population, Canadian-born and immigrant alike, especially despite similar or higher religiosity and right-wing political ideology.

Comparison of Canadian, Immigrant, and Arab Canadian Groups

Based on the descriptive statistics results, we find religiosity is much stronger within the Arab Canadian group, following the literature. Almost 80% of Arab respondents considered religion important in their lives, in contrast with only around 62% for Canadians and 71.2% for immigrants. In general, higher religiosity is an indicator of being more ideologically to the right, as well as a higher tendency to vote Conservative (Ma, 2021). Despite higher reported tendencies of both of these indicators, Arab Canadians more strongly support the Liberal Party, which arguably is a more secular and radically progressive party (especially in terms of ‘moral social issues’ such as abortion and LGBT rights) than the Conservative Party. We see that Arab Canadians are much more supportive of the Liberal Party than Canadians and immigrants; around 65% of Arab Canadians reported voting for the Liberal Party in the previous election, compared to just around 42% of all Canadians and around 48% of immigrant Canadians.

When considering the breakdown of vote choice by religion, we find Catholics in all three datasets are generally more likely to vote for the Liberal Party than other Christian groups are (see Appendix B, Tables B4, B5, B6), which lends support to Blais’ findings that Catholics, along with immigrants, have high and strong Liberal partisanship. Muslims across all three categories: Canadian/born in Canada, immigrant, and Arab Canadian, are the most likely to vote Liberal and adherent to the party, with 70% or more reporting voting for the Liberal Party in each of these three groups (see Appendix B, Tables B4, B5, B6). Stemming from these observations, an interesting consideration comes in attempting to analyze, in a more qualitative way, how similar Arabs are through culture versus different through religions (e.g., do the descriptive statistics mainly uphold the literature, largely based on a Muslim-majority view, indicating that regardless of religion, Arab Canadians are more similar than different, or do they present a new

portrait of the Arab population, in distinguishing the differing opinions of Christian and Muslim Arabs?)

These findings confirm Hypotheses 1 through 4 and partly support the theory that visible minority/immigrant-origin Canadians vote much more strongly for the Liberal Party. Arab Canadians specifically are much more adherent to the Liberal Party as a whole than Canadians and other immigrants in Canada, despite these two groups being more centrist than Arab Canadians, and less religious. In this case, it is likely that Islam is the outlying factor, as the majority of research on religiosity and conservatism is based on the general Canadian population, which is majority Christian, whereas Arabs in Canada are majority Muslim. Further statistical methods and later qualitative analysis attempt to determine this.

Multivariate Regression Models

The calculations and analysis of the main multinomial logistic regression model for the Canadian, immigrant, and Arab Canadian datasets are below (see Tables 4, 5, and 6 respectively). The generation of the models happened through Stata, with the command *mlogit*. In all of the models, the dependent variable of vote choice (with the four categories: Liberal Party, Conservative Party, NDP, and ‘Other’) is present. Most of the Arab Canadian models have low observations compared to the full sample size. This is simply due to the answering of survey questions. Many people, as seen in the descriptive statistics, did not respond to questions on vote choice and their political ideology and in order for the models with multiple variables to apply to them, a respondent must have answered each of these questions. The independent variables used (see Appendix A, Table 1) are religion, left-right (political ideology scale) religiosity, sex, age, and immigration status (only for the Arab Canadian model, as it is the only one with both born and immigrant Canadians), with survey year as a control variable (except for the Arab dataset).

Canadian Model

The main model used for the general Canadian dataset (see Table 4) includes all of the independent variables, except for incumbency and immigration status, as all respondents in the dataset are born in Canada. Most variables within this model are statistically significant, showing that religion, political ideology (on the left-right scale), religiosity, sex, age, and immigration status all have an effect on how the Canadian population votes. This model contains 20,083 observations, around 27.5 % of the full sample of 72,987. The chi2 value is 0.00, while the explanatory Pseudo R-squared is at around 11.6% based on this iteration of the model.

Within the Conservative Party category of this model, there are statistically significant higher log odds of voting for the Conservative Party over the Liberal Party if one is a Catholic, Christian, or other religion as opposed to a Muslim. The strongest of these variables is Christianity, where being a Christian increases the log odds of voting for the Conservatives over the Liberals by 2.3 points. In all other categories, the same rule applies to religions; all other religious groups have higher log odds/chances than Muslims of voting for the NDP or 'other' parties over the Liberal Party, though the coefficients are of medium strength. There are slightly higher log odds (0.07) of voting for the Conservative Party as opposed to the Liberal Party for each point increase in religiosity, and the inverse (increased religiosity decreasing odds) for voting for the NDP over the Liberals. The strongest indicator of religiosity is in the 'other' parties category, where a point increase in religiosity decreases the log odds of voting for 'other' parties over the Liberal Parties by 0.3. Next, in the Conservative Party category, for each one-point increase to the right on the left-right scale, there are increased log odds (1.27) of voting for the Conservatives over the Liberals; again, the inverse is true for the other two categories. Within the NDP outcome category specifically, an increase to the right on the left-right scale results in decreased log odds (-0.3) of voting for the NDP over the Liberals. An increase in religiosity also

decreases the likelihood of voting for the NDP (-0.06) as opposed to the Liberals; the same is again true for voting for other parties over the Liberal Party as well.

The relative risk ratio (rrr) exponentiates the coefficients in the mlogit multinomial regression models and compares the risks of an outcome between two groups; within Stata they are akin to odds ratio. As there are many statistically significant variables and the central question is based on Liberal versus Conservative, only the Conservative Party outcome category will be discussed. The relative risk of voting for the Conservative Party over the Liberal Party for Catholicism, Christianity, and other religions relative to Muslims is expected to increase by factors of 4.9, 10.2, and 6.6, respectively, all other variables held constant. The rrr for Christians relative to Muslims of voting for the Conservative Party over the Liberals increases by a factor of 10.2; Christians are around ten times more likely to vote Conservative over Liberal than Muslims (all other variables held constant). Being more to the right also holds increased relative risk of 3.6, of voting for the Conservatives over the Liberals. Religiosity holds a low relative risk; being more religious only increases the relative risk of voting for the Conservatives by a factor of 1.1. The strongest rrr coefficients are in the Conservative Party category. For example, the relative risk of ‘other’ religions in voting for the NDP over the Liberals is only 2.8 compared to the 6.2 rrr of ‘other’ religions in the Conservative outcome category.

Table 4. Multinomial logistic regression model, Canadian dataset, vote choice by religion, left-right, religiosity, sex, and age, with survey year as a control variable

Vote choice	Variables	Coefficient ^{3 4}	z-score	p-value	95% Confidence Interval		RRR ^{5 6}
					Lower Bound	Upper Bound	
Base outcome (Liberal Party)							

³ Coefficients and confidence interval rounded to the nearest hundredth

⁴ Standard errors are in parentheses

⁵ Relative risk ratio; rrr for constant estimates baseline relative risk for each outcome

⁶ Lower and upper limits at the 95% confidence interval are in parentheses.

Outcome 2: Conservative Party	Religion ⁷						
	Catholic	1.60 (0.24)	6.63	0.000***	1.12	2.07	4.93 (3.08, 7.91)
	Christian	2.32 (0.24)	9.65	0.000***	1.85	2.55	10.21 (6.37, 16.36)
	Other	1.89 (0.24)	7.78	0.000***	1.41	2.11	6.62 (4.11, 10.65)
	Left-right	1.27 (0.03)	43.11	0.000***	1.21	1.32	3.56 (3.36, 3.77)
	Religiosity	0.07 (0.02)	3.56	0.000**	0.03	0.10	1.07 (1.03, 1.11)
	Sex ⁸						
	Female	-0.27 (0.04)	-7.11	0.000***	-0.34	-0.20	0.77 (0.71, 0.82)
	Other	-0.08 (0.33)	-0.25	0.802	-0.74	0.45	0.92 (0.48, 1.77)
	Age	0.00 (0.00)	2.53	0.012*	0.00	0.01	1.00 (1.00, 1.01)
	Survey year						
	2004	0.24 (0.14)	1.70	0.089	-0.04	0.47	1.27 (0.96, 1.68)
	2008	1.61 (0.14)	11.20	0.000***	1.33	1.89	5.01 (3.78, 6.64)
	2011	1.69 (0.13)	12.66	0.000***	1.43	1.98	5.43 (4.18, 7.05)
	2015	2.05 (0.12)	16.52	0.000***	1.81	2.27	7.79 (6.11, 9.94)
	2019	0.92 (0.10)	9.14	0.000***	0.73	1.12	2.52 (2.07, 3.07)
	2021	1.04 (0.10)	10.29	0.000***	0.84	1.24	2.82 (2.31, 3.43)
Constant	-5.08 (0.27)	-18.55	0.000***	-5.62	-4.55	0.01 (0.00, 0.01)	
Outcome 3: NDP	Religion						
	Catholic	0.58 (0.22)	2.64	0.008*	0.15	1.01	1.78 (1.16, 2.74)
	Christian	0.86 (0.22)	3.90	0.000***	0.43	1.29	2.35 (1.53, 3.62)
	Other	1.02 (0.22)	4.64	0.000***	0.59	1.46	2.79 (1.81, 4.30)
	Left-right	-0.33 (0.03)	-9.83	0.000***	-0.40	-0.27	0.72 (0.67, 0.77)
	Religiosity	-0.06 (0.02)	-2.52	0.012*	-0.11	-0.01	0.94 (0.90, 0.99)
	Sex						
	Female	0.06 (0.05)	1.31	0.189	-0.03	0.15	1.06 (0.97, 1.16)
	Other	1.06 (0.27)	3.92	0.000***	0.53	1.59	2.90 (1.70, 4.93)
	Age	-0.01 (0.00)	-8.11	0.000***	-0.01	-0.01	0.99 (0.99, 0.99)
	Survey year						
	2004	0.11 (0.17)	0.66	0.512	-0.22	0.44	1.12 (0.80, 1.56)
	2008	0.81 (0.18)	4.50	0.000***	0.46	1.16	2.25 (1.58, 3.20)
2011	1.01 (0.16)	6.25	0.000***	0.69	1.33	2.75 (2.00, 3.77)	
2015	2.10 (0.14)	15.42	0.000***	1.83	2.36	8.14 (6.23, 10.62)	
2019	0.40 (0.12)	3.42	0.001**	0.17	0.63	1.49 (1.19, 1.87)	
2021	0.47 (0.12)	4.02	0.000***	0.24	0.70	1.60 (1.27, 2.00)	
Constant	-1.42 (0.22)	-5.40	0.000***	-1.93	-0.90	0.24 (0.15, 0.41)	
Outcome 4: Other parties	Religion						
	Catholic	1.72 (0.32)	5.42	0.000***	1.10	2.34	5.57 (2.99, 10.35)
	Christian	0.85 (0.32)	2.67	0.007**	0.23	1.48	2.35 (1.26, 4.39)

⁷ The reference category for religion is Islam/Muslim

⁸ The reference category for sex is male

Other	1.26 (0.32)	3.95	0.000***	0.63	1.89	3.53 (1.89, 6.59)
Left-right	0.05 (0.03)	1.42	0.157	-0.02	0.11	1.05 (0.98, 1.11)
Religiosity	-0.27 (0.02)	-11.25	0.000***	-0.31	-0.22	0.77 (0.73, 0.80)
Sex						
Female	-0.29 (0.05)	-6.33	0.000***	-0.38	-0.20	0.75 (0.69, 0.82)
Other	0.40 (0.35)	1.13	0.261	-0.29	1.09	1.49 (0.74, 2.97)
Age	-0.00 (0.00)	-2.35	0.019*	-0.01	0.00	1.00 (0.99, 1.00)
Survey year						
2004	-0.19 (0.12)	-1.62	0.106	-0.42	0.04	0.83 (0.65, 1.04)
2008	-0.36 (0.16)	-2.27	0.023*	-0.66	-0.05	0.90 (0.52, 0.95)
2011	-0.24 (0.14)	-1.72	0.085	-0.51	0.03	0.87 (0.60, 1.03)
2015	-0.05 (0.12)	-0.43	0.666	-0.29	0.19	0.90 (0.75, 1.21)
2019	-1.27 (0.09)	-14.76	0.000***	-1.44	-1.10	0.28 (0.24, 0.33)
2021	-0.57 (0.08)	-7.10	0.000***	-0.73	-0.42	0.59 (0.48, 0.66)
Constant	-0.85 (0.34)	-2.53	0.011*	-1.52	-0.19	0.61 (0.22, 0.83)

Number of observations = 20,083

Log-likelihood = -22678.509

LR chi2(45) = 5962.43

Prob>chi2 = 0.0000

Pseudo R2: 0.1162

* p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001

The following marginal effects/coefficient plot gives an indication of the impact of the independent variables on vote choice. When the coefficient estimates are at or close to the 0 line, this indicates that they are not statistically significant or do not have an impact on the overall model. For categorical variables (religion, sex, survey year), this also shows the differences between the categories, relative to the base category. The coefficient plot seen in Figure 1 shows that the variables within the Canadian model that have the most impact and influence on vote choice are the religions, with Christian having the most influence overall. The left-right political ideology spectrum variable also has an impact on the model, with a smaller confidence interval than the religions. The rest of the variables do not have a significant impact. Since religion has

the biggest impact of all the variables, a later probability plot will display the predicted likelihood of an individual belonging to various religions voting for the Liberal or Conservative Parties.




Figure 1. Coefficient plot for variables' impact on Canadian model

The probability plots display the predicted probability of choosing each political party for each different religion. According to Figure 2, the predicted likelihood in the Canadian population dataset of Muslims born in Canada voting for the Liberal Party increases to around 75 percent (0.75 points). If one is Catholic this probability goes down to less than 0.5, while the probability for Christian is slightly over 0.4. Other religions have a slightly higher probability than Christians, but lower than Catholics who are around 0.45.




Figure 2. Predicted probability graph for Canadians voting for the Liberal Party, at each religion

The probability of voting for the Conservative Party is much more varied. Within the Canadian population (see Figure 3), Christians have a higher likelihood than any other religion of voting for the Conservatives, at almost 40 percent. In illustration, we see that other religions are the second most likely to vote Conservative, at slightly below 0.3 points. Catholics and Muslims have the least likelihood, the former at 0.2 points and the latter at over 0.05 points.




Figure 3. Predicted probability graph for Canadians voting for the Conservative Party, at each religion

Immigrant Model

Similar to the Canadian model, the immigrant model (see Table 5) includes all independent variables (religion, left-right political ideology scale, religiosity, sex, age, and immigration year as a control variable) except for incumbency and immigration status. The model contains 3,266 observations, a chi-squared probability of 0.0, and a pseudo R^2 of 12.44%.

The significant variables in this immigrant model are religion, left-right, religiosity, and age. Firstly, in the Conservative Party outcome category, all three religions (Catholic, Christian, and ‘other’) have a statistically significant higher likelihood than the outcome category (Muslims) of voting for the Conservatives over the Liberals. Next, for each point increase to the right in political ideology, there is a 1.3 point log odd increase in voting for the Conservatives over the Liberals. Age is also statistically significant (increase in age having higher log odds of voting Conservative over Liberal), but the coefficient is close to 0 (0.01). In the NDP category, the same relationships for Christian and ‘other’ religions are present, albeit with much lower coefficients. The left-right and religiosity variables are also significant in the NDP category; for each point increase in either left-right (to the right) and religiosity (more religious), there are decreased log odds (-0.5 and -1.3 respectively) of voting for the NDP over the Liberals. Finally, in the ‘Other’ parties category, religion and religiosity are significant. All religions are significant, and being Catholic, Christian, or an ‘other’ religion each indicate higher log odds of voting for ‘other’ parties over the Liberal Party than Muslim immigrants. The more religious one is, the less likely (-0.3 points) one is to vote for ‘other’ parties over the Liberal Party.

For the relative risk ratio of the Conservative Party category being Christian is the strongest variable. The rrr for being Christian is around 8.1 in this category; all other variables held constant, the relative risk of voting for the Conservatives (over the Liberals) as a Christian

is expected to increase by a factor of 8 compared to those who are Muslim. For Catholics and ‘other’ religions, this relative risk increases by around 4.1 and 4.5 respectively. The likelihood of voting Conservative over Liberal increases by a factor of around 3.6 for each point increase to the right in political ideology one is. The relative risk ratio factor for age is 1, indicating no real increase in likelihood of voting for the Conservatives over the Liberals based on age.

Table 5. Multinomial logistic regression model, immigrant dataset, vote choice by religion, left-right, religiosity, sex, and age, with survey year as a control variable

Vote choice	Variables	Coefficient	z-score	p-value	95% Confidence Interval		RRR
					Lower Bound	Upper Bound	
Base outcome (Liberal Party)							
Outcome 2: Conservative Party	Religion						
	Catholic	1.41 (0.25)	5.54	0.000***	0.91	1.91	4.10 (2.49, 6.75)
	Christian	2.09 (0.25)	8.23	0.000***	1.59	2.59	8.07 (4.91, 13.28)
	Other	1.50 (0.26)	5.83	0.000***	0.99	2.00	4.47 (2.70, 7.40)
	Left-right	1.29 (0.07)	17.67	0.000***	1.14	1.43	3.62 (3.14, 4.17)
	Religiosity	-0.08 (0.05)	-1.74	0.082	-0.17	0.01	0.92 (0.84, 1.01)
	Sex						
	Female	-0.12 (0.09)	-1.35	0.177	-0.30	0.06	0.89 (0.74, 1.06)
	Other	-1.02 (1.09)	-0.93	0.350	-3.16	1.12	0.36 (0.04, 3.07)
	Age	0.01 (0.00)	2.58	0.010*	0.00	0.01	1.01 (1.00, 1.01)
	Survey year						
	2004	0.05 (0.38)	0.13	0.897	-0.69	0.79	1.05 (0.50, 2.20)
	2008	1.63 (0.36)	4.59	0.000***	0.94	2.33	5.13 (2.55, 10.30)
	2011	2.02 (0.32)	6.25	0.000***	1.39	2.66	7.56 (4.01, 14.27)
	2015	2.12 (0.30)	7.05	0.000***	1.53	2.71	8.36 (4.63, 15.09)
2019	1.10 (0.25)	4.35	0.000***	0.60	1.59	3.00 (1.83, 4.92)	
2021	1.09 (0.25)	4.36	0.000***	0.60	1.58	2.97 (1.82, 4.84)	
Constant	-4.99 (0.42)	-12.00	0.000***	-5.80	-4.17	0.01 (0.00, 0.02)	
Outcome 3: NDP	Religion						
	Catholic	0.46 (0.26)	1.78	0.075	-0.05	0.97	1.58 (0.96, 2.62)
	Christian	0.65 (0.26)	2.53	0.011*	0.15	1.16	1.92 (1.16, 3.19)
	Other	0.57 (0.26)	2.22	0.027*	0.07	1.08	1.77 (1.07, 2.95)
	Left-right	-0.54 (0.09)	-6.17	0.000***	-0.71	-0.37	0.58 (0.49, 0.69)
	Religiosity	-1.33 (0.06)	-2.25	0.025*	-0.25	-0.02	0.88 (0.78, 0.98)
	Sex						
	Female	-0.12 (0.12)	-1.02	0.309	-0.35	0.11	0.89 (0.70, 1.12)
Other	0.61 (0.71)	0.85	0.395	0.79	2.00	1.83 (0.45, 7.42)	

	Age	-0.00 (0.00)	-1.20	0.231	-0.01	0.00	1.00 (0.99, 1.00)
	Survey year						
	2004	-0.20 (0.45)	-0.44	0.656	-1.09	0.69	0.82 (0.34, 1.99)
	2008	1.33 (0.37)	3.58	0.000***	0.60	2.06	3.80 (1.83, 7.88)
	2011	0.25 (0.45)	0.57	0.570	-0.62	1.13	1.29 (0.54, 3.10)
	2015	1.62 (0.31)	5.16	0.000***	1.01	2.24	5.07 (2.73, 9.39)
	2019	0.23 (0.27)	0.86	0.392	-0.30	0.75	1.26 (0.74, 2.13)
	2021	0.23 (0.26)	0.88	0.379	-0.28	0.75	1.26 (0.75, 2.11)
	Constant	-1.12 (0.43)	-2.58	0.010*	-1.97	-0.27	0.33 (0.14, 0.76)
Outcome 4: Other parties	Religion						
	Catholic	1.11 (0.37)	3.03	0.002**	0.39	1.83	3.04 (1.48, 6.25)
	Christian	0.82 (0.38)	2.17	0.030*	0.08	1.56	2.27 (1.08, 4.75)
	Other	0.86 (0.38)	2.29	0.022*	0.12	1.60	2.37 (1.13, 4.95)
	Left-right	-0.03 (0.20)	0.34	0.736	-0.16	0.23	1.03 (0.85, 1.26)
	Religiosity	-0.27 (0.07)	-4.04	0.000***	-0.41	-0.14	0.76 (0.67, 0.87)
	Sex						
	Female	-0.20 (0.14)	-1.43	0.153	-0.46	0.07	0.82 (0.63, 1.08)
	Other	0.84 (0.82)	1.02	0.306	-0.77	2.45	2.32 (0.46, 11.59)
	Age	-0.00 (0.00)	-0.68	0.497	-0.01	0.01	1.00 (0.99, 1.01)
	Survey year						
	2004	-0.13 (0.33)	-0.38	0.701	-0.77	0.51	0.88 (0.47, 1.67)
	2008	0.84 (0.32)	2.64	0.008**	0.22	1.46	2.32 (1.24, 4.33)
	2011	0.48 (0.32)	1.48	0.138	-0.15	1.11	1.61 (0.86, 3.02)
	2015	-0.59 (0.38)	-1.55	0.122	-1.33	0.16	0.56 (0.26, 1.17)
	2019	-1.13 (0.23)	-4.95	0.000***	-1.58	-0.69	0.32 (0.21, 0.50)
	2021	-1.09 (0.22)	-4.97	0.000***	-1.51	-0.66	0.34 (0.22, 0.52)
	Constant	-0.91 (0.50)	-1.82	0.069	-1.90	0.07	0.40 (0.15, 1.07)

Number of observations = 3,266

Log-likelihood = -3373.7918

LR chi2(45) = 958.51

Prob>chi2 = 0.0000

Pseudo R2: 0.1244

* p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001

The coefficient plot for the immigrant model confirms that, as in the Canadian model, being Catholic, Christian, or other religions have the most impact on the model and influence on

vote choice. Being Christian is the most impactful overall, while left-right is also significant. The rest of the variables do not have an impact.




Figure 4. Coefficient plot for variables' impact on immigrant model

Figure 5 (immigrant probabilities of voting for the Conservative Party at each religion) shows an almost identical pattern to the Canadian figure, though the likelihoods of each religious group voting for the Liberal Party are higher than within the Canadian dataset. The likelihood of immigrant, non-Arab Muslims voting for the Liberal Party is also at 0.75. The probability for Catholics voting Liberal is around 0.55, while for Christians this goes down to 0.45, and up to around 0.55 for other religions.




Figure 5. Predicted probability graph for immigrant Canadians voting for the Liberal Party, at each religion

Figure 5 shows immigrants' probabilities of voting for the Liberal Party, which are also identical to the Canadian probabilities. Christians have the highest probability once again, at around 0.375, while 'other' religions are at around 0.275. The probability of voting for the Conservatives rises to 0.2 when one is Catholic, while it increases by only around 0.075 when one is Muslim.




Figure 6. Predicted probability graph for immigrant Canadians voting for the Conservative Party, at each religion

Arab Canadian Model

Religion, left-right, and religiosity are the independent variables consistently statistically significant throughout the three models. In the Arab Canadian model (see Table 6), there are 144 observations (a moderate number, relative to the other models), or around 22.5% of the full Arab Canadian dataset sample. The chi-square probability for this model is 0.0005, so with the alpha level threshold set to 0.05, the results therefore contain at least one statistically significant variable that can reject the null hypothesis. The chi2 value at 0.0, indicates at least one very strong statistically significant variable within the model. There is a moderate explanatory pseudo R^2 of around 17%.

Within the model, only Christians have statistically significant higher log odds (2.3) relative to Muslims of voting for the Conservative Party over the Liberal Party. Religion is not statistically significant in any of the other categories. A one-point increase on the political ideology scale (to the right) results in a 1.4 increase of log odds of voting for the Conservative Party over the Liberals. Finally, being an immigrant (versus being Canadian-born, as this is a binary variable; see Appendix A, Table 1) results in a decrease in log odds of around 2 units of voting for 'other' parties over the Liberal Party.

The relative risk ratio comparing Muslims, Catholics, Christians, and others in the Conservative Party category shows that for Christians relative to Muslims, we expect the relative risk of voting for the Conservative Party over the Liberal Party to increase by a factor of 9.7, all other variables held constant. Therefore, we can say that Christians are almost ten times more likely than Muslims to prefer the Conservative Party over the Liberal Party. Next, for a one-unit increase in the left-right scale (to the right), holding all other variables constant, the expected relative risk of voting for the Conservatives over the Liberals increases by a factor of 3.9. So,

when one's political ideology increases to the right by a unit, the rrr of being in the Conservative voter group rather than the Liberal voter group is almost four times more likely, all of the other variables held constant; if a participant is more to the right, they are more likely to prefer the Conservative Party over the Liberal Party. Other religions are not significant anywhere in the model. Immigration status is only significant in the 'other' party vote choice, where for each one-point increase in immigration status (that is, being an immigrant, see Appendix A, Table 1), the relative risk of voting for an other party decreases by a factor of 0.13, all other variables held constant. This means that Arab immigrants are more likely, though less than one times more, than Canadian-born Arabs to prefer the Liberal Party over 'other' parties, by a small number.

These results show that there are much less statistically significant variables in the Arab model than in the immigrant and Canadian models. This indicates that there are fewer factors/variables that highly impact Arab Canadian vote choice, at least statistically.

Table 6. Multinomial logistic regression model, Arab Canadian dataset, vote choice by religion, left-right, religiosity, sex, age, and immigration status

Vote choice	Variables	Coefficient	z-score	p-value	95% Confidence Interval		RRR
					Lower Bound	Upper Bound	
Base outcome (Liberal Party)							
Outcome 2: Conservative Party	Religion						
	Catholic	1.33 (0.84)	1.59	0.111	-0.31	2.97	3.79 (0.74, 19.54)
	Christian	2.28 (0.92)	2.47	0.013*	0.47	4.08	9.74 (1.60, 59.15)
	Other	1.38 (0.96)	1.44	0.151	-0.51	3.27	3.99 (0.60, 26.43)
	Left-right	1.36 (0.46)	2.95	0.003**	0.46	2.27	3.91 (1.58, 9.68)
	Religiosity	0.50 (0.34)	1.47	0.141	-0.16	1.15	1.64 (0.85, 3.17)
	Sex	-1.19 (0.63)	-1.89	0.058	-2.41	0.04	0.31 (0.09, 1.04)
	Age	0.01(0.02)	0.38	0.703	-0.03	0.04	1.01 (0.97, 1.05)
	Immigration status	-0.17 (0.62)	-0.27	0.789	-1.38	1.05	0.85 (0.25, 2.86)
Constant	-5.66 (1.66)	-3.42	0.001	-8.91	-2.41	0.00 (0.0, 0.09)	

Outcome 3: NDP	Religion						
	Catholic	-0.54 (0.79)	-0.68	0.498	-2.09	1.02	0.59 (0.12, 2.76)
	Christian	-0.14 (0.92)	-0.15	0.879	-1.94	1.66	0.87 (0.14, 5.27)
	Other	0.60 (0.65)	0.93	0.354	-0.67	1.87	1.82 (0.51, 6.50)
	Left-right	-0.10 (0.33)	-0.32	0.749	-0.75	0.54	0.90 (0.47, 1.71)
	Religiosity	0.15 (0.28)	0.54	0.590	-0.40	0.69	1.16 (0.67, 2.00)
	Sex	-0.43 (0.56)	-0.77	0.440	-1.53	0.67	0.65 (0.22, 1.94)
	Age	-0.02 (0.02)	-0.89	0.427	-0.05	0.02	0.98 (0.95, 1.02)
	Immigration status	-0.78 (0.59)	-1.33	0.183	-1.93	0.37	0.46 (0.14, 1.45)
Constant	-0.58 (1.35)	-0.43	0.670	-3.23	2.08	0.56 (0.4, 7.97)	
Outcome 4: Other parties	Religion						
	Catholic	1.11 (0.93)	1.19	0.232	-0.71	2.92	3.02 (0.49, 18.61)
	Christian	0.53 (1.19)	0.45	0.655	-1.79	2.85	1.70 (0.17, 17.35)
	Other	0.52 (1.03)	0.51	0.613	-1.50	2.54	1.68 (0.22, 12.67)
	Left-right	-0.29 (0.40)	-0.74	0.458	-1.07	0.48	0.75 (0.34, 1.62)
	Religiosity	-0.16 (0.32)	-0.49	0.625	-0.78	0.47	0.86 (0.46, 1.60)
	Sex	-0.57 (0.65)	-0.89	0.376	-1.84	0.69	0.56 (0.16, 2.00)
	Age	0.01 (0.02)	0.76	0.447	-0.02	0.05	1.01 (0.98, 1.05)
	Immigration status	-2.07 (0.88)	-2.36	0.018*	-3.78	-0.35	0.13 (0.02, 0.70)
Constant	-1.40 (1.51)	-0.92	0.356	-4.37	1.57	0.25 (0.13, 4.81)	

Number of observations = 144

Log-likelihood = -130.42971

LR chi2(24) = 53.49

Prob>chi2 = 0.0005

Pseudo R2: 0.1702

* p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001

The Arab Canadian model's coefficient plot shows, as with the other two models, that the religion variable, most strongly the Christian category, is the most impactful within the model.

The confidence intervals are much larger than within the other models due to the significantly lower n within this model. Interestingly, within the plot, religiosity shows a slight impact.




Figure 7. Coefficient plot for variables' impact on Arab Canadian model

With regard to substantive effects, note that there are much more disparate thresholds of the high and low ends of likelihood in the Arab Canadian dataset, again due to the smaller sample size. For Arab Canadians (see Figure 8), the probability of voting for the Liberal Party is higher than the previous two groups. In this case, Arab Catholics have a closer likelihood (0.65) than Arab Muslims (0.75) of voting for the Liberals than to Canadian Catholics. Other religions' probability of voting for the Liberal Party in the Arab dataset is around 0.6. Meanwhile, Arab Christians have a lower likelihood than Arab Catholics of voting for the Liberal Party, at slightly below 0.6. These results indicate that culture plays a role in similarity of partisanship, despite differences in religion. However, there is also a consistency in the probability of voting for the Liberal Party for Muslims, regardless of ethnic origin, culture, or immigration status.




Figure 8. Predicted probability graph for Arab Canadians voting for the Liberal Party, at each religion

Arab Canadian likelihoods of voting for the Conservative Party (see Figure 9) mirror the pattern of the Canadian and immigrant datasets, though the likelihoods of each religion voting for the Conservative Party are lower than in the Canadian and immigrant datasets. Arab Canadian Muslims' likelihood of voting for the Conservative Party is less than 0.1, while being Catholic marginally increases the likelihood of voting Conservative to around 0.13. Christian and other religions' likelihoods of voting Conservative are at around 0.25 and under 0.1, respectively. This confirms that Catholics are generally quite unlikely to vote for the Conservative Party compared to other Christian denominations and other religions except for Muslims, who are even less likely to support them. The opposite is true as well; Muslims and Catholics are the most likely to vote for the Liberal Party.




Figure 9. Predicted probability graph for Arab Canadians voting for the Conservative Party, at each religion

Discussion of the Quantitative Results

There are some differences in the three models. Within the Arab Canadian dataset, the central significant variables surround the Conservative Party, indicating that there are a few specific factors (being Christian and being further to the right) that drive Arabs to vote for the Conservative Party over the Liberal Party, and few for any other party. In contrast, for Canadians and immigrants there are many factors (including sex, religiosity, religion, and age) that could influence voting for any party over the Liberal Party. This indicates that Canadians and immigrants have more factors that influence their vote choice than Arab Canadians, and/or that there is a specific variable not found or not included here that accounts for more of the latter's vote choices. The immigrant model is almost identical to the Canadian model, with the same, though weaker, relationships between most of the variables and the outcome categories (e.g., the variable religion shows the same positive relationships in each category of both models, with similar coefficients). One difference is in religiosity, as it is not significant in the Conservative

Party category for immigrants and Arab Canadians, but is for Canadians, indicating that religiosity has a more significant influence on vote choice for Canadians, regardless of the overall higher religiosity of the former two groups. Religiosity being significant in the Canadian dataset backs up the literature on higher religiosity generally leading to voting more on the right/Conservative Party (Rayside et al., 2017; Wilkins-Laflamme, 2016; Wilkins-Laflamme & Reimer, 2019). This may show that there are key aspects that separate immigrant Canadians and born Canadians in terms of politics. However, these findings indicate that despite some differences, immigrant Canadians and born Canadians are very similar. This adds an interesting component to the descriptive statistics, which found that Arab Canadians were more to the right than Canadians, more religious than both other groups, and voted much more for the Liberal Party than both as well. The multivariate regressions show that these strong characteristics may in fact influence Arab Canadians less than they influence immigrants and born Canadians. This indicates that cultural and religious factors are not highly involved in political ideology or affiliation for Arab Canadians, contrary to for most other Canadians. The following qualitative research attempts to uncover reasons for this.

Interviews

Throughout the interviews, the interview participants explained the importance of their Arab culture, identity, and ethnicity. Even as second, third, or further generations, Arab Canadian participants still felt connected to their identity as Arabs, in various spheres of life. Nine participants considered that they had a unique culture that was different from the mainstream in Canada. Meanwhile, thirteen participants explicitly explained the importance of being Arab or of their Arab identity as a whole to them, as well as how essential it is to them that they share or

portray their culture well, whether to society or to their children. This also seemed to increase in importance with age, as three participants mentioned.

Being an Arab is important to me because that's who I am, right. I was born and raised in Egypt, I try my best to keep the culture and traditions, and not forget them. Especially that we live abroad right, so you try your best to hold onto these things because these are the things that remind you of what home feels like. So, yes, especially abroad you try your best to meet Arabs, as well, to feel like what's back home – Participant 5

Religion

Religion, as seen in the literature and the descriptive quantitative statistics, is an important aspect for Arabs. The interview participants reinforced this, with sixteen out of the twenty participants explaining in various terms, that religion in their lives was very important, everything, had the number one place, and more. Three other participants said that they were either spiritual or religious but not hugely practising. None said religion had no place at all in their lives (one respondent mentioned having been an atheist for a time and returning to religion with a strong belief), and only one was agnostic. Even compared to other Canadians, some participants considered Arabs as a whole to be more religious than the average (white) Canadian.

I feel as an Arab Canadian, you're closer to religion than most white Canadians I would say, whether you're Muslim or Christian or whichever religion you follow. But I would say as an Arab Canadian I definitely feel a stronger relationship to religion compared to other Canadians. – Participant 2

[Religion has] The number one place that it could have. I try my best to make it my center, and then everything comes afterwards, so it holds a very significant importance in my life. – Participant 3

A few participants made a point to differentiate culture and religion and explained that religion had a more important place in their lives than culture, whether in terms of values or political ideology. Participant 2 explained that “the thing is Arab culture is so intertwined with religion. I would say religion [is] more [impactful than culture in deciding who to vote for or support], while Participant 7 explained that “I feel like I identify more with the fact that I’m Muslim first and then Arab as well, although those two things people seem to conflate, which is fair I guess from a western perspective.” Participant 19 also shared that they “wouldn’t say being an Arab is important, being Egyptian maybe a little bit, but being a Muslim is more important.”

Similarly, another participant shared that:

My religion’s important to me, I think it’s a big factor in who I am. If I want to do anything, as long as it’s not *haram* [forbidden], if my religion doesn’t forbid it, then I guess my religion is more important than culture, I would say. – Participant 11

This indicates that while cultural origin and ethnicity is important to some extent, religion is more central to participants. This shows that religion is also a strong tie between Muslims, regardless of culture, which aligns with the similarities between Muslims (Arab and non-Arab) in the quantitative section. Other respondents similarly specifically specified that their values, social or political, stemmed from religion:

So my values and ethics and morals come from my religion...such as faith and love in God, and loving your neighbour, loving your enemies, forgiving one another, kinship, and relationship-based and caring about your fellow brethren and staying focused on your spiritual health and God, doing whatever you can, even if it means your own sacrifice for others, then that’s what’s important to you. – Participant 12

For me as a Lebanese Christian, religion for me is the central part so when it comes to family or interactions with others, the values that are, not only the values that are taught by my religion but are central, and things that I live by every day and things that I would put first before anything else. – Participant 15

The literature mentions that Arab Christians may feel more comfortable voting for the Conservative Party than their Muslim counterparts. This is in large part because Christianity is the dominant religion in Canada and consequently the former integrate more smoothly into Canadian life and do not have to pander to a certain political party. While this may be true politically, Arab Christians did not agree on whether Canadian values clashed or aligned with theirs. One explained that:

It's a lot of similarities, because I think that Canada includes the Christian faith in some way. It allows people to freedom of religion, it allows people to marry whoever they want, we try to separate government, like church and state. So I would say Canada is a good country that aligns with those types of values... – Participant 12

Meanwhile, another Arab Christian participant disagreed and found that “in terms of the values, the difference in values, I think Canada has took a turn to become a very liberal country.” (Participant 15).

Interestingly, almost half of the participants (nine) mentioned that their values were a mix of progressive and traditional or conservative. Four responded that their values were progressive, while four others mentioned having stronger conservative or traditional values, two of these being Christians.

Arab Canadian Culture, Values, and Identity

The consideration of Arab values and their influence were a driver throughout the interviews. A great deal of the participants felt that their Arab culture was unique and special. Often, when comparing these to Canadian values, participants had difficulty in naming many core Canadian values. Two born Canadians explained this:

I feel a huge difference. Especially for me, I was born and raised in Canada, so I've been pretty immersed in Canadian culture and society. However Canada doesn't really have any culture, there's no food, there's no history, there's no depth, there's no traditions...it's just really hard to explain but it's like there aren't any deep Canadian values that I find white Canadians value the way us Arabs value our culture and our food and our traditions. I thank God I'm in Canada as an Arab because our culture is so rich and it means so much, and I feel like our values are very different... – Participant 6

I'm not really sure what Canadian values are. I think that there's no such thing as Canadian values in general. There's a false perception that Canadian values means being good, being nice, being friendly, which I think any culture, any country, that's part of the values...though I feel like I'm different than most people, again based on religious values. But I'm not 100% sure what general Canadian values are... – Participant 19

The most central Arab value, aligning with the literature (including Rasmi et al., 2014 and 2015 and Harb, 2016) was the importance of community and family; namely, collectivism. Fourteen out of the twenty participants mentioned community and/or family when asked what they needed to live a fulfilling life. Over half (eleven) of the participants found that their values differed from Canadian values, with only three thinking that their values were more similar than different. Only three participants mentioned religion specifically as a reason for this difference. The most

common reason for this perceived difference was the focus on family, as well as collectivism more largely, within Arab culture. Participant 18 explained that “Canadian values are rooted in individualism and seeking personal gain and growth, whereas Arab values are rooted in community and the overall group benefit instead of the individual ones,” and Participant 8 concurred, explaining that they are “definitely leaning towards Arab Canadians, or Arab identity, more than Canadian, because my values are still familial, collective, I’m not very individualistic, I guess. There’s definitely a difference...” Other participants agreed:

My values, I think are largely reflective of several Canadian values, but I think in my personal life I’m aware that either like my experiences or like some of the values that I have around family specifically might differ than the average Canadian in terms of either familial responsibility or...when it’s the individual versus the collective or the family –

Participant 1

I’m sure obviously there’s some people where that doesn’t apply to but I’m saying in general, whereas in the Arab world, in our culture, you need to take care of your parents. A retirement home is just not an option because I feel like our religion and our culture has told us that it’s your duty to take care of your parents and I think that Canadians don’t share that value as much. I could give you a million examples but that’s just the first one that comes to my mind. – Participant 6

I definitely see a big difference I feel, not to say that my non-Arab friends don’t value their family as much but I just feel like it is a lot different in that it’s a lot more acceptable just to move away thousands of kilometers for school, for work, etcetera, like your career and yourself is the most important thing, whereas I feel like well I moved away from my family to study here but it was a big deal, right, it wasn’t just like oh yeah it’s no problem

we'll do it. Right now I'm just thinking about OK now I need to, after I graduate, find a job. I need to either move my family here with me, my parents, or I need to go back to them, something like that, right. It's not something that they just leave the equation and they'll take care of themselves – Participant 7

I think there's a lot of that, til you're so old, I feel like Arab parents will support you no matter what, in that way. Of course it's different in every family unit. But I do feel like I would say it's different. So I do feel that there is a difference between that and I feel like, yes. I would say my views are very much more Arab values rather than...I don't think I connect with white or Canadian values if that answers your question. Yeah, I feel like we're constantly looking out for each other. We want to help each other, you know.

There's that sense of we're very giving. We're very, again, hospitable. We're also very community oriented, but I also think that because we're also immigrants, we're also very community oriented... – Participant 9

These explanations provide a plausible reason for the similarities between all Arabs, as well as between Arabs and non-Arab Muslims, found within the quantitative results. Arab cultural maintenance is strong, as previously mentioned, and this may be in large part through the strong cultural community ties that foster this maintenance, as well as similarity through collectivism and community. Additionally, the sense of being immigrants (even as born Canadians) or of having an alternate shared culture, also enhances ties and similarity. Though non-Arab Muslims and Arab Muslims (the majority of Arab Canadians) may not share the same culture or often the same ethnicity, the shared characteristics of immigrant origin and religion are enough to foster a feeling of community and uphold similarity, political and social. Four participants specifically

mentioned the community that comes through cultural connection and/or the importance of the immigrant community for Arab Canadians.

...you can be Arab from so many different countries and the culture changes, but yet it's still the same and everyone still speaks the same language so it's pretty cool being Arab. –

Participant 6

I'm Egyptian, but I see myself as a broader member of that Arab community and then that Muslim community, and we know that also here in the West they see us all the same. Even if I was maybe in Egypt I wouldn't have seen myself as part of the broader Muslim community, maybe only Arabs. But then I think the fact that I'm here and you know that you are being perceived as all of you falling under the same umbrella, that kind of creates a community of all of you being together as well. – Participant 11

Three participants, however, found that though there were key differences attributed to inevitable variations of culture, religion, or ethnicity, most base values were the same. They based value more on an individual level on how people are as people and not their socio-cultural characteristics, with values being universal:

I think the values are all the same, when it comes to anyone, with any race. It's just the religion that kind of adds some slight differences. But if you think about it, I think we all have the same values. We all believe in studying, working, building a family, having a successful career, basically just living life. So we all share the same values, it's just that religion will somewhat change it. Even if you're from different backgrounds, traditions obviously are different for each race, but at the end of the day, the values are the same, the morals are the same, we all know what's wrong from what's right. It doesn't matter if we're Arabs and they're white, I think we all know what's wrong and what's right, so the

values are the same. The morals, we know what's ethical and what's not, even though we're religiously different, but it's still the same thing at the end of the day. – Participant 5

Interestingly, one participant found that values were the one point where Arab Canadians and Arabs differed, and that most other aspects of life were the same for all:

I think my values and the country's values per se have kind of parted ways. I tend to hold more traditional values, so that's one way I differ from most Canadians, I'd say, or a good majority of Canadians. I mean that's about it. I think the rest is relatively similar. – Participant 15

While some participants found that their Arab identity and culture were present in the private sphere (among family and community) and not in the public sphere (in places such as work and school), multiple others felt they were or had been marginalized in the public sphere due to their Arab (often involving their concurrent Muslim identity) culture or identity. One participant explained the importance to her that people acknowledged and were aware of her identity:

But to me, I think that if I didn't wear it [hijab], then people would not think that I'm Muslim, not think that I'm Arab, or they'd think that I'm something else, and actually I am all those things. And so in addition to having religious reasons of wearing it, I think I do want to be all those things because I think when people treat me like I'm not [Arab/Muslim] then [the interaction, the relationship] that's not real to me – Participant 11

Two other participants shared similar ideas about wearing the hijab. This indicates the importance of showing Arab and Muslim features, despite possible marginalization in response. In fact, a great deal of participants (around a quarter) detailed the negative impact of their Arab

culture/identity/ethnicity on their treatment in society. The various anecdotes and observations throughout the interviews by different participants showed that, especially parallel to global politics, Arabs are still othered, and this is felt and accentuated in everyday life. While this could be in 'small' ways that any visible minority may feel, such as feeling tokenized or like a diversity hire, this is also present in much heavier aspects. Participant 18 shared that "as a visible minority, being Afro-Arab plays a role in all my daily interactions in Canada, especially in my interactions with Canadians of European ancestry." Various participants shared on this:

...you can always tell who's an Arab and who's not, from how we look. So let's say whenever my friends and I would show up to a restaurant or just walk in the streets, people would just look at us like from up to down kind of thing. If we talk in Arabic in the streets, laugh, throw a joke, some people, some white Canadians would look at us in a disgusted way. And we're not dumb, we can tell, we're Arabs, you guys don't like us, you would give us that look. And then they would try their best to make us realize that they're giving us those looks. So I mainly feel that there is a difference between us and them, because they make us feel that difference on purpose. – Participant 5

I feel like in today's society there are a lot of misconceptions and stereotypes about being Arab, so being Arab in Canada you have a pretty big responsibility because in a way it's your duty to show people what it truly is to be Arab. You always kind of feel like you have to prove yourself and defend yourself and defend your culture and defend your people and it's kind of a huge moral responsibility, I find. – Participant 6

I do recognize that it feels to me that Arabs are marginalized a lot more easily than other communities and like whenever people talk about equity, diversity, inclusion, it's about

everybody except the Arabs because the Arabs are typically the enemy right – Participant 7

I think even with the political climate right now, being Arab or, not being afraid to let people know my identity means a lot more to me just because of the way the world views us. There's a lot of fear associated with being Arab, especially as an Arab woman who is also a hijabi. It was hard to assimilate in the same way others would. But you try to assimilate in other ways, right? You try to kind of water down your personality to make yourself more palatable to white people – Participant 9

I know people who avoid to tell where they are from, that they have an Arabic background, especially when what happened now, those days. – Participant 10

When I moved here, for example, I know some of my friends who had taken it [hijab] off, and some people say, 'I don't want to have people that are projecting all these things on me and I don't want to have to deal with that'. And I think that's a fair thing, especially sometimes when you live in Edmonton or something, where I remember there was a wave of Islamophobia back in the day or something. – Participant 11

Despite this, certain participants acknowledge that there is improvement in the day-to-day of being Arab in Canada, that there is equality and justice for them as Arab Canadians, and that Canada is a more accepting and open western society than most. Though Participant 5, above, felt judged in public spaces, he later explained that there was no inequality present in any bureaucracy, paperwork, or government he encountered, and that he “never felt someone was religiously racist to me, because I'm a Muslim.” Participant 13 concurred that “I think of course there is a difference [between Arab/Arab Canadian and Canadian values]. We are fortunate in

Canada it's not necessarily a negative thing. People are used to having a lot of different cultures in one place”.

I don't think it's as scary to be visibly Muslim anymore because of the way the world has kind of erupted, the way now we can actually point and be like, ‘hey, actually you have wronged our people’, and it's no longer we are the bad guys. It's like there's a clear enemy now, almost. And so we don't have to be afraid of being called the bad guy or I don't know, the T [terrorist] word. So I think I can proudly walk out and be a hijabi woman and be like yeah, you wanna talk to me or you wanna come at me? I will stand up for my religion and stand up for that part of myself rather than let you disrespect me. –

Participant 9

I think when I first moved here and everybody was telling us we were new Canadians, that was a bit of a shift for me, and I was like oh wow. And I think that definitely helped me feel like I belonged here a lot faster. – Participant 11

...Canada is so ethnically diverse that it was rare for me to be surrounded by only white Canadians. Growing up, I never felt like I didn't belong or that other members of my friend/social groups were outcasts because we outnumbered the white Canadians in school and university. – Participant 17

Despite lived and perceived differences in values and treatment, Arab Canadians still also consider themselves Canadian. Throughout the interviews, the interviewees reiterated at multiple occasions that they often felt or are in between two worlds and have taken from both their country/culture of ethnic origin and Canada, their country through birth or immigration. This enhances the feeling of being in between two worlds; the blend of immigrant and citizen, traditional and progressive, and Arab and Canadian/western values, politics, and culture, both in

and of themselves, and due to the conceptions or treatment of others. As Participant 3 detailed it: “it’s weird for me because I feel like I’m too white for the Arabs, and too Arab for the white people. I’m somewhere in between.” Other participants explained various facets of this:

I find as though I’ve had a lot of trouble being Arab around Arab people, even my family and stuff. They always say I’m whitewashed or things like that. So I’ve found it very difficult to be Arab, but it is a big aspect, a big part of me. – Participant 4

I think it's reflected in how white Canadians-I'll just say white Canadians-feel entitled as a Canadian and feel like I'm an immigrant here, although I'm an Arab Canadian, I feel like that's how it is. Although they are, I guess, immigrants too, because they're not originally from here either. – Participant 8

I think, and it's something that probably a lot of immigrants will say or feel, is that they feel like they might be a little more conservative for the people here but more progressive for the people back home... – Participant 13

Political Ideology and Arab Influence on Political Ideology

All of these values and cultural ideas lend to a political ideology that is an amalgamation of learned cultural ideology, both Arab and Canadian, and nuanced views of the world, of values, and of political agendas. For the most part, many participants emphasized the idea of ‘live and let live’, where their political and cultural views and beliefs should not be imposed on others, and nor should others’ be imposed on them if they disagreed. This imposition generally referred to social or religious values that they might not necessarily privately agree with or usually participate in, such as LGBT ideology (though two participants mentioned LGBT rights as important political considerations for them). It is important to note that some respondents veiled their language and censored themselves when speaking about LGBT issues. Six participants felt

that they were torn between two cultures or sets of values, while eight found that they had a strong mix of traditional and liberal values. To many participants, universal values and individual rights were the most essential. So, while they often held a mix of traditional and progressive ideas, both political and social, the ideas tied to religion and personal values were generally held apart from the public sphere or from politics, so as not to impose their personal beliefs on others. Participant 18 said that “my strong religious/traditional values don’t mean that I don’t support others being able to freely express themselves.” Others felt the same.

So...I want to say, I am religious in my own ways. So even though the traditional...let’s use the same sex example, religion does not permit this, but the Liberal Party permits this. Me as an individual, I am religious, but I take a step and I think that if people want to live the way that they want to live, who am I to stop them? Why would I vote to keep someone illegal, or their marriage be illegal or whatever. Everyone should have the right to be happy and free as long as they’re not impacting others with their decisions, for example forcing another person to believe in something. – Participant 4

To be honest, let’s carry on using the LGBTQ example, because we all know in Islam that’s prohibited. Personally, I’m against it, even if it didn’t have anything to do with my religion, but at the end of the day I live in Canada, right. Even though I’m Canadian, I wasn’t Canadian, so who am I to tell them what to do and what not in their own country? If you guys want to support LGBTQ, go for it, I don’t care, as long as it’s not affecting me...I can still live my life if they support LGBTQ...it’s still not prohibiting me from getting my rights. – Participant 5

As we said, it's not hate, but don't force it to me, we asked them, don't force it to me. But we understand that it's minorities, so we cannot ask them for 'no, don't do this', but don't force it to our kids, that's the only thing that we are asking for. – Participant 10

...I do think Canadians are welcoming, we value diversity, we value all those things, and I do value that as well. I don't think that any of this stuff comes into conflict with my values, because I think the most religious values to me...there's layers to it to, you know justice, fairness, these are the things that are the most important to me. I am super activist-y, I'd say, as well, and these are the things that I think are the guiding principles. Everything else is more private, and so I wouldn't put that on the same level as my life values versus personal things, like if I dress a certain way or if I want to pray, whatever. I don't think that would conflict with Canadian values, if people don't want to do it, don't do it. I'd say the most important values are more broader, ethical values that do align with Canadian values. – Participant 11

...Although there's a lot of sins that are openly accepted in society, and that might just be the result of open free will and freedom, which is part of my religion. It's not like I condone a lot of decisions that are done openly from everybody, but I love the fact that we have the freedom to do so. – Participant 12

As discussed, Arab culture has an influence on the political ideology of Arab Canadians.

Whether due to immigration and the deeper socialization and observation of politics in their countries of origin, or the community and familial influence, Arab Canadians look at politics through a unique lens. Firstly, they are more implicated in foreign affairs due to their ties to other countries. Some participants mentioned that they consider the politics of their home country, such as Participant 8, who explained that “culturally, as a Libyan, we've had a lot of political

changes in the last 15 years, and we've learned a lot from them and I think that trickles down to how I vote here". Secondly, many participants mentioned having to examine political issues as minorities or Arabs specifically, not just as Canadians. This can be due to both potential negative impacts on their communities (Arab and/or Muslim) from political rhetoric or acts in Canada, or negative impacts abroad in the countries themselves. Fourteen participants affirmed that their cultural identity influenced who they voted for or supported politically. This was largely assessed by looking at the ways that politicians would treat or speak about Arab Canadians, Arabs in general, or Muslims. Participant 17 mentioned that culture did not affect vote choice "unless that party/politician were outwardly hostile or negative to my country or the Middle East". Other participants shared perspectives of this phenomenon:

...in that sense I feel like that it's different in that I feel like as an Arab as a Muslim I have to look through every single party... 'what are you doing, what are you claiming you're gonna do', and I actually have to think about what is the balancing act I want to balance this time right...I agree with tax cuts, I think the government shouldn't be involved, but then the guy who's gonna get involved is or is gonna get elected is also a racist so I it's a balancing act, it's very difficult and I feel like these are things that white Canadians don't think about as often because it doesn't really affect them as much potentially." – Participant 7

Finally, religion, which is a central and dominating aspect of being Arab Canadian for most participants whether Muslim or Christian, is generally a factor of influence in their political ideology. This may be indirectly through religion influencing social and political values and consequently impacting political ideology or vote choice or more directly through religion directing whom to vote for. Fewer participants (nine out of the twenty) said that religion

influenced their voting and political support than culture, overall. Many mentioned that religion itself did not influence their voting per se, but that they considered how those they voted for would treat their religion and them by extension. Participant 13 mentioned that when they vote or support a political entity, they consider whether the person or party is “more accepting and that includes being accommodating or just making sure that the decisions they take also don't impact us negatively, in terms of how we practice our religion and then our culture”.

...I don't say like, “me as an Arab, I vote this way”. I vote as like an individual first, but I recognize that like being like Lebanese specifically is like maybe part – some of the values coming from a family that immigrated from Lebanon might have like shaped some of my worldviews or just my considerations of like how I can look at things or give me like a secondary viewpoint for looking at political issues. – Participant 1

I feel like my religion is kind of what I use to guide which direction to vote for in the year, whenever it [an election] comes up. – Participant 7

[Does religion affect your voting or political support?] I'd say yes because with religion comes values, and the government of course also has sway and controls what values are pushed forth to the people of the country, so I'd say yes – *Participant 15*

With regards to the participants' political ideology, many referred to a mix between liberal and conservative values, as previously mentioned. Participants were asked to describe their political ideology in terms of center, left, or right, and/or use the 0-10 left-right scale of political ideology (as used within the quantitative part of this work). Seven participants said they were center or ‘middle’, and/or 4, 5, or 6 on the scale. These people generally either explained that they take from both the left and the right, or that they were centrist (often with center left or center right tendencies). Other participants placed themselves on the scale at 0, 1, 2, ‘3 or 4’, 8, or 7. Some

opted not to place themselves on the scale, and instead described their ideology, mainly as varying center-left, center-right, or a mix of all sides. The participants were similar in that most did not have a very rigid political ideology position, opting to consider various points from both sides.

Progressiveness does not mean you're not religious, because progressiveness just means advancing. If you mean progressiveness as in trans issues, climate change, things like that, those are not, in my opinion, progressive values. Those are more ideological values and religious values. People say they're not religious, but those are types of religions...I think I'm conservative but that doesn't mean I'm not progressive. I'm very for advances in technology, I'm very for a lot of things that will advance and progress our society...-

Participant 19

There was very low partisanship across all of the participants, with only one (Christian, Conservative) showing consistent and continued loyalty to their party. Nine interviewees, in following with the overall political ideology of most participants, explicitly mentioned either not liking either party or subscribing to the left-right partisanship divides, and that they made their vote choice by reviewing the policies and choosing what they found to be the best. As Participant 7 iterated, most "don't feel strong affiliation with any of them and pretty much anything could make me swing either way", especially as he has such political views from both sides of the spectrum. Participant 17, strongly progressive, also mentioned that she doesn't feel "intensely devoted to any one party and would switch to any party that fights to support my rights and values". Various other explanations of this low partisanship and flexible political ideology are explained in participant quotes below:

[Would you describe your values more progressive or conservative/traditional?] I would say some of them are conservative, some more of them are liberal...it's just that like I said earlier, it's hard to fit into the mold of what the western politics identify things are. For example, UBI is liberal or NDP, or very very left-leaning, right, but Islamically UBI is a thing that just should be, right. Similarly on the topic of...I don't know if I'll say this, but homosexual, LGBTQ, that kind of stuff, like that would be conservative but I would also say that I don't agree with that stuff like a conservative would say, so in a sense I wouldn't identify to either of those. I think you said traditional, so maybe it would be traditional. I would describe it as just Islamic paradigm, but the issue with that is that that's not very well defined academically. – Participant 7

...the Liberal Party does not always stand for actual progressive means. There's sometimes anti-progressive means and that's why I made the switch to NDP last time. Do I stand completely with the NDP party? No, absolutely not, there are things that I don't stand for. So whenever there is a new voting opportunity, I actually look at them separately. Just because I was Liberal or NDP before, doesn't mean [I will vote for them this time] it really depends on who's running and what they're running for. – Participant 8

Again, maybe this is because I grew up a big part of my life in the Middle East, I don't feel like politics becomes part of my identity, whereas I feel like white people, it's like their identity, it's like you're either one or the other [Liberal/Conservative/other political party]. – Participant 9

I support them because it seemed that they were the best party out of the rest and they had good views at the time, but I'm not loyal to any party, because...even before Palestine to be honest, I wasn't. I don't know, I haven't been loyal to any one party in politics, but I

just think that's not healthy. They do the things that align with your values, you vote for them, they don't, you don't vote for them. – Participant 11

I'm not someone who will be right or left, it depends on the options, the situation, the leader, and especially the program. I'm not someone who will be 'I'm Conservative, I will stay there', no, it's up to the one who will represent these parties." – Participant 10

"Because some policies on both sides I think are good, and all of one or all of the other isn't the way to go. I'm probably a little blend of both. That's why I don't really care who I vote for because I'm so divided between most topics... – Participant 12

We don't have any left-wing parties here. All our parties are right-wing parties...or at least I would say center. We don't have a left-wing party because nobody really is here that's fighting for real support or change or for what left issues would be concerned about which means not have homeless people on our streets, everybody have a job or has some sort of funding to be able to live, not having a bunch of open areas that people can shoot up and get wasted, use drugs, and we call that liberal or progressive values, and those are not liberal or progressive values and they're not left-wing values. – Participant 19

As affirmed by the literature and the dataset, the majority (eleven) of interviewees were Liberal Party voters. There were three NDP voters, two of whom voted for the Liberal Party in one of the two elections prior to the 2021 election. Two participants were Conservative voters, one of which was an infrequent voter and had voted once for the Liberals in youth and for the Conservatives in the last election. Four others said they had never voted, two due to travel or immigration status at the time of the last election, the third due to low trust in politicians and his vote counting, and the fourth because all parties are "garbage". Only four participants mentioned relatively strong support for their party, one of these being a Conservative voter. Almost everyone also mentioned

voting the same way as their parents or family, and four mentioned that choosing who to vote for is a family discussion. One of these participants explained that he feels like “most people will vote tribalistically in that it's Liberal, Conservative, NDP...whereas myself and my brothers, we all literally sit down as a family and we're like OK who are we voting for this year”. When asked about the upcoming election, the responses were extremely unsure. Out of the seventeen who said that they would be voting in the next election, ten disclosed that they were undecided, were very unsure, or were hesitating between two parties. One of these mentioned the possibility of spoiling their ballot. There was only one change from Liberal to Conservative, by a previously staunchly Liberal immigrant Christian Arab Canadian. The only participants who affirmed that they would vote for the Conservative Party in the next election were three out of four of the Arab Christians interviewed. Two Muslim participants were considering voting for the Conservative Party. Only six participants named a party directly, without hesitation or the words ‘probably’ or ‘maybe’, when asked which party would have their vote if the election was tomorrow.

I think as an Arab, Arab in Canada, Muslim in Canada the Liberal Party always aligned the most with our values, not totally of course, but for the most part yeah so I think in general it was very rare to find an Arab who would vote Conservative... – Participant 6

Despite considering themselves to have flexible vote choice and taking their political ideology from both sides of the spectrum, there was often a Muslim fear of the Conservatives winning due to their visible minority status (see pp. 76-77). Some considered the NDP, and had voted for them, with one participant explaining that “if we have the NDP and we vote for them, and they always have to share with the Liberals and at least they pull them to the left”. However, the general consensus is that participants did not feel that they could “win a majority government”. This leaves the Liberal Party. While the current support for the Liberals is quite weak, many

participants mention having faith in them in the past, for various reasons. One of the central reasons for original support of the Liberal Party by the Arab-origin voters interviewed was having progressive political values or in general having aligned views. At least five participants mentioned the importance of progressive, far-left, or individual rights issues to them, and that they felt that out of all the parties, the Liberal Party did the most for these. This, along with the previously discussed idea of live and let live, combine so that religiosity, traditional views, and religious and cultural values do not clash with voting for, supporting, and believing in the Liberal Party.

I just felt that the Liberals were doing the most in terms of social justice, I guess, in terms of making sure the poor were taken care of, that the homeless, the veterans, the sick, all these people were being taken care of basically, whereas Conservatives were like oh we want to dismantle public healthcare, which made no sense to me right. That does seem like a way forward towards a just society and that's kind of what I look for... –

Participant 7

...everything that the Liberals are supposed to be, supposedly stand for, which is proper immigration rights and the free healthcare and equal rights and women's rights and all those good things, believing in everyone is entitled to their rights and entitled to fair and equal access to everything, I think that's where I stand... – Participant 9

A second reason for staunch Liberal support by the participants (at least in the past) were the Liberal party values. At least nine participants (two of whom Conservative) mentioned supporting Liberal party values, or that their “values” aligned with the Liberals’. The main reason for the staunch Liberal votes by the Arab Canadian interviewees was due to the Liberal Party’s multiculturalist-based party values and specifically vocal support of immigrants, visible

minorities, Arabs, and Muslims, as affirmed directly by ten participants. This shows that Liberal immigrant-friendly, inclusive rhetoric, as well as some actions, is effective. The support started because these were felt to be not just words, but inclusive ways that made this othered group feel that they belonged and were appreciated. Two of these did mention incumbency and the idea that the Liberals ‘let’ them into the country, and as a result they (or their parents) felt both grateful and indebted to them through political support. Participant 12 told that his parents who immigrated to Canada “supported Liberals growing up. They came in the country under a Liberal government...”. Other participants explained the reasons for Arab Canadian support of Liberals, most aware that immigrant support was the dominant norm, including Participant 6, who said that “their [Liberal Party] acceptance of immigrants, letting in immigrants, and wanting to create a multicultural country. I think maybe that's what pushed me towards voting for them.”

They were very welcoming. He [Justin Trudeau] would come out and he would go to the different engagements and he would connect to Muslim communities and he would do all those things and, I think when I first voted for Trudeau, Justin Trudeau, he was very much like the “feminist icon”. And I think that really what put him on the map is like he was like this very forward guy, very forward, very progressive, and still very...almost relatable. And he was, as cliché as it sounds, but he was *for* us. It felt like he was working for us, he came up and he was saying the right things, and that’s why I voted for him because he seemed like he could have been a person that was going to fight for a better way of life for our people, to feel safe in this country, to have access to things like everyone in this country, as a Muslim, but also as a woman, the ‘have equal wages’ and not live in fear, and to have someone that's gonna call terrorists out when terrorism is

being happened. I think that's why I voted for him is because he was very much a person that you felt like he could be a voice, more for you. – Participant 9

When we are new here we think that Justin Trudeau is the one that gave you this opportunity, so for us it was kind of normal to vote for him, especially when you got citizenship and you got the message from Justin saying congratulations and every Ramadan Justin is doing a video to say Ramadan Mubarak for everyone, things like that. So it was normal to vote for the Liberals. – Participant 10

So I started supporting them because as someone who was not from this country, originally they were a lot more accepting and open than the Conservatives, and that at the time felt like these are the perfect people to represent me. – Participant 13

While the voting pattern was clear, the participants expressed a new distrust and distancing from the Liberal Party. As previously detailed (p. 69) many of the people interviewed were very unsure of their vote in the next election. The reason that most of these gave was that they had been very let down by the Liberal Party and so no longer had a straightforward vote in the upcoming election. Four participants explained that Liberal values were changed or revealed to not actually be progressive, just opposed to the Conservative Party, and that “the values that they said they had, especially concerning multiculturalism, and things for climate change and all that stuff...those values have not been met” (Participant 4). Five other participants mentioned disagreeing with Liberal agendas of sex education for young children in schools, while two others mentioned the government mishandling Covid-19. The two most common reasons for not supporting the Liberal Party, or considering switching parties, were cost of living (including topics such as taxes, the economy, government incompetency...) and foreign affairs, namely Palestine, with nine participants naming the former and eleven naming the latter issue. Most

Muslim Arab interviewees mentioned the Palestinian genocide as a pressing issue and a red line for them politically, while no Christians mentioned it. This lends additional credence to the idea of a pan-Arab cultural nationalism in diaspora, led by religion; Arabs recognize themselves as a larger group, despite within-group differences, and this is often extended to non-Arab Muslims as well due to shared religion (of the majority of Arabs). One participant clearly stated that “Palestine makes me question voting for them [Liberal Party]”, while another also referred to the Liberals saying that they “feel that it's just very difficult to vote for somebody who I believe is committing genocide”. Other participants elaborated on this issue.

Even with all the protests for example, for Palestine. We were continuously protesting for months, whereas the social media for the Liberal Party were still like “we support the other side” blah blah blah, so if they don’t listen to our voices, why would I support them? – Participant 4

I won’t vote for them [the Liberal Party] in the upcoming election. The way they deal the way they dealt with so many different things in the last four years you know like from COVID to different rules and the Supreme Court and now all of these like new pronouns and just there's been so many things that have happened under this government where it's like now...their involvement in the genocide going on in Palestine... and I don't trust them. I will not be voting for them. – Participant 6

I attended, for example, protests and things like that, and they would, Trudeau and Jagmeet, come out and straight out lie and say that these protests were protesting against the Jewish hospital. They were lying and Jagmeet would tweet that immediately, no checking, no anything. And I feel like I knew that there was misinformation, but it’s different when you’re there and you see that they’re straight up lying. And what does that

do? It just creates a lot of Islamophobia and racist sentiment. I thought that that was crazy, and I think that was definitely a changing point for me, where I was like, they are...so I don't know who I'm going to vote for to be honest. – Participant 11

These external actions on the economy and foreign affairs, as well as other issues, has also fomented very low trust and dislike of Liberal politicians, but all politicians, parties, and the political system as a whole consequently. Some specifically mentioned disappointment in the current Prime Minister. Participant 8 explained that “I voted for Liberal because I thought it stood for more progressive things, but always was disappointed...and I don't like Trudeau”, while Participant 4 said that “...I don't agree with anything Justin Trudeau has been doing, but I voted for him, so obviously that is going to change.”

Because like I said, I just don't trust them [the politicians] and I feel that they're just selling you stuff that isn't there. They're selling you an idea of “oh we're going to do this, we're going to do that” and then once they win or are elected, just get into deeper problems. – Participant 2

...sanctions and foreign intervention and all this stuff is typically bipartisan and that's kind of what I mean by that we're marginalized and that our opinions on these topics do not matter at all and feels like our vote doesn't matter because whether I vote Conservative, Liberal, NDP, even Green Party, they all agree on that we should have this foreign policy. – Participant 7

So they say one thing and you hear it and you're like OK, I like it, I'm on board, but then you don't see it in action and so it's really hard for you. I think we've heard it a lot, but it is true when we say they [the Liberal Party] have lost our trust. It's so cliché to say that,

but it is a party that has disappointed us. At least twice in the last two elections. –

Participant 9

Last time I voted for the Liberals, but I don't think I will vote for them this time. Because when we came, we used to know Justin is doing a very good job, things like that, but time after time he let down a lot of things and you find out there is something that we can do better – Participant 10

I don't know what I'm going to do for the next election, but I think if the Conservatives win, then, good, because they should know that that doesn't work anymore. I just feel like they should realize that maybe you should actually have a platform of your own and do the things that we want you to do, instead of telling us 'but this guy is going to win'. Because to me, worst case scenario is happening. There is a genocide happening, you guys are letting it happen, and Trudeau just said it last week, he supports Israel's security no matter what...what does that even mean? So I think it's worst scenario anyway, I don't know why they're fearmongering us 'the Conservatives!'...what are they going to do, you know, things are not good. – Participant 11

I've grown cynical towards politicians and don't believe they will ever truly enact change once in office. Despite their liberal rhetoric during campaign runs, very few politicians are willing to put their money where their mouth is, as it were, once elected. –

Participant 17

Cost of living or the economy was mentioned as a topic that was important to improve from the Liberal government in the upcoming election; many respondents affirmed that the Conservatives seemed more capable in this arena. Participant 6 mentioned that "I like the Conservative Party's stance on the economy, I really do, but I don't like their stance on foreign policy...", and

Participant 7 concurred that “in terms of economics and stuff like that the Conservatives know more about what they're doing. The Liberals don't really know what they're doing in that field...”

Other participants agreed:

I've always reasoned more with Conservatives because I think it was mostly their economic plan, how everything was about ensuring the economy was good, that no spending was going over budget, or whatever the thing is. For me they focused on the numbers and when the numbers are good then the people tend to be okay, so I think that's how I initially started. I think that kind of answers both questions. I think the fact that they tend to focus on the economy and the financials of Canadians themselves, not overtax Canadians as the Liberal Party does. I think that for me it leads to a more civil economy, a better Canadian dollar, so overall when those things are good, the rest kind of falls into place... – Participant 15

However, despite the endorsement in this way and the loss of confidence in the Liberals, only three uncertain voters affirmed they were deciding between Conservative and Liberal or Conservative and NDP for the next election, while only one other participant declared they were voting Conservative (after being a long-time Liberal voter). A few participants mentioned their dislike for Conservative Party leader Pierre Poilievre. However, this Conservative aversion has not started with Poilievre, so why is there such tremendous hesitation on the part of Arab Canadians to vote for the Conservative Party, despite thoughts that it would be better economically, and some values fitting? The response, though containing sub-reasons, was straightforward throughout most interviews. The Conservative Party is seen as racist, anti-Arab, anti-immigrant, Islamophobic, and generally unaccepting of the Arab Muslim community, which six participants explicitly pointed out. This includes the succinct feeling of Participant 6, who

said that “traditionally you find the Conservative Party is more Islamophobic and their rhetoric is a lot more insulting to us”. While fiscal policy was important to Muslim Arab voters, party values and rhetoric were also essential, while the latter was vocalized less by Christian Arab voters. Although some mentioned the importance of party values and that the Liberal Party did not align with their personal values, discrimination did not seem to come into play as it often did come up for Muslim Arabs. Therefore, they were able to focus more on practical issues such as the economy, and even value issues, without fear of future discrimination by the Conservatives. Muslim Arab participants shared their feelings about voting for the Conservative Party, with many echoing Participant 20, who wanted the Conservatives to “reflect different values in a broad sense and not solely Christian values.” Some participants shared that they would vote for Conservative Party given some changes, while more did not see this as a possibility. An example of the former comes from Participant 16, who shared that “a lot of their [Conservative Party] values align with Muslim values, so we would vote for them if they were less racist and more pro-immigrant, because we are the children of immigrants.” Other participants shared:

Honestly it's pretty easy, just be less racist. The Conservative party, I feel like a lot of Muslims, a lot of Arabs, would all vote for them if they were just less racist. If they weren't so keen on making it an us versus them, Muslims have a lot more in common with Christians than they do with atheists and secularists so honestly it would be a very easy alliance, it's just that they insist that they don't like us, that's basically it. –

Participant 7

I was raised in a very traditional way, so I have liberal views because of where we grew up, we grew up here, and then we saw the effect of the Conservative views and how they

were against our people, so how would I vote for you if you don't really want us here, so naturally you become more left-leaning. – Participant 9

[What changes to the Conservative Party would make you vote or consider voting for them?] Well they would have to have entirely different values and platforms...if they entirely change. I don't know. They would have to change completely. They would have to: one, become less racist. There's a lot of anti-immigrant, anti-Arab, anti-Palestinian sentiment. All of the parties have them, to be fair, but the Conservatives have them the most. – Participant 11

Because of this fear that a Conservative government would result in a worse quality of life for Arab Canadians, mainly due to damaging negative rhetoric, many participants were hard-pressed to actually consider voting for them. This, again, is despite what is seen as strong Conservative economic policy. This issue seems to be exacerbated by what a participant described as “fearmongering” (p. 75)/lesser evil voting done by the Liberal Party to coerce voters into voting for them out of fear that any given situation will become worse under the Conservative Party. The NDP likewise suffers from this, due to its position as a secondary party that currently seems unlikely to win an election due to the dominance of the two main parties. A few participants mentioned considering voting for the NDP due to their similarly inclusive but more progressive values, but did not have confidence in its ability to win an election (which is certainly accurate within Canada's political system). While most NDP voters mentioned they would vote NDP again, some said that they might vote Liberal strategically, to not ‘waste’ their vote and risk the Conservatives winning. It is important to note that NDP voters or those considering switching to the NDP do not have much more support or faith in them than many Liberal voters; the NDP has

also been seen to not uphold the progressive values that it has used to set itself apart from the Liberals.

And so yes, on paper I probably would vote for the Liberals, but also I think out of fear of having someone else sit in that seat and possibly make things worse. Because that's the thing though, because it's a gamble at the same time, right? Because you're sitting here thinking, OK, if we let them win, you know, is it gonna get better for us or is it gonna get worse? – Participant 9

NDP is the other one doing a very good job as well, but we are not sure they will win. I am sure it will be between Liberals and Conservatives as usual. NDP are good in terms of being in the opposition, but when they will have the power we don't know if they will be as good as now, these are the things we should take into consideration..." – Participant 10

"I voted NDP twice, and maybe the first time I voted Liberal. I think that was out of fear. I don't want to vote like that anymore...you know, you vote Liberal so the Conservatives don't win, and then I was like that's not the point of a democracy, that's not the point of voting anyway. I'm going to vote for a party that's more aligned. – Participant 11

Discussion

Arab Canadians' voting patterns and political ideology are complex phenomena to analyze and study in depth. There is very limited research and data on Arab Canadians' political lives and opinions, and a low understanding of the reasons that they vote the way that they do. Why do Arab Canadians, both more religious, and more culturally traditional/conservative than the general Canadian population, vote more consistently Liberal? This research attempts to remedy this lack of research by presenting statistical analysis on comparing both the general Canadian population and Arab Canadians, based on the Canadian Election Study over the past 20

years, complemented by a qualitative consideration of the topic through interviews and socio-political analysis. There are no, to my knowledge, similar studies on this population.

Religion, the left-right political ideology scale, and immigration status are the only significant variables with respect to Arab Canadians; being more to the right, as well as being Christian (excluding Catholic) increased the odds of voting for the Conservatives over the Liberals and being born outside of Canada compared to being Canadian-born, lowered the chances of voting for the NDP over the Liberals. I confirm all hypotheses put forth, through descriptive statistics: that Arabs are more religious than both other groups, that Arabs are more to the right than the general Canadian population (though less than non-Arab immigrant Canadians), that Arabs are much more adherent toward the Liberal Party/have a higher propensity of voting Liberal, and that Arabs and immigrants (born outside of Canada) differ in their voting patterns. Despite the fact that Arabs seem to have a much stronger sense of religiosity compared to the other two groups, religiosity was not significant in the odds of which party to vote for in the Arab Canadian dataset, but significant in almost each category of both the immigrant and Canadian datasets. This indicates that although Arabs are more religious than the general Canadian population, their religiosity does not dictate their vote choice or political ideology very strongly. This does not mean that Arabs or Arab Muslims are not choosing the Liberal Party because they feel this party is supportive of Islam, but more so that their personal religious views (such as disagreeing with abortion, if this is the case) are not at the forefront of their political choices. This is in contrast to Christian Canadian voters, according to the literature, and backed up by the quantitative results, which show that the strongest indicator variable within all three datasets/models is being Christian. This indicates that Arabs as a whole, as well as Muslims generally, are less swayed than Canadian (and indeed Arab and immigrant) Christians

by their religion and religiosity when it comes to political affiliation and vote choice. The fact that none of the different religions within the Arab dataset are statistically significant as variables, while they largely are within the two other datasets, also indicates that Arabs are more similar than different in terms of vote choice, regardless of religion, which is not the case in the immigrant and Canadian datasets.

As seen in the probability figures, there is much less difference between religions in the Arab dataset compared to the between those in Canadian and immigrant datasets. This is a strongly interesting finding that shows that culture is still an important indicator of similarity; Arab Canadians are more similar to each other (at least in regard to vote choice) regardless of religion than to Canadians of the same religion. The strong Arab partisanship toward the Liberals seems strongly directly linked to general Muslim Liberal adherence as well. In the immigrant and Canadian multivariate regressions, every other religion was more likely than Muslims to vote for any other party over the Liberal Party. These results, coupled with the descriptive statistics results, lead to the conclusion that non-Arab Muslims are more similar to Arabs of all religions than to the rest of the Canadian population. In contrast, Arab Catholics, and indeed also most Arab Christians and 'other' religions, are more similar to Arab Muslims/other Arabs, than Canadians of the same religion as them. Based on all these results, it is clear Arabs are generally loyal to the Liberal Party, but that Muslim Arabs are especially strongly partisan to the Liberal Party. This seems to be largely due to Muslim Arabs' ideological dispersion across the political spectrum. This lends credibility to the idea that the Liberal Party is seen as a centrist, middle-ground party that is not too extreme on either the left or right. Given the very low rates of support for the Conservative Party by Muslim Arabs, compared to the other religious groups, it

seems that the Conservative Party has strongly pushed Muslim voters away due to perceived previous and current Islamophobic or xenophobic stances.

In the qualitative parts of the research, most of the culture/value-based literature on Arabs holds true; Arab Canadians consider the most important traits or values in life to be community, family, and religion for the most part. It is interesting that even in those born in Canada, Arab culture remains a central defining characteristic and important social aspect of most Arab Canadians' lives, as well as a point of difference, and sometimes contention, with the rest of the general population in Canada (specifically, European-origin, non-immigrant Canadians). Culture not only provides a set of traditions and values, but also builds communities and common ground between a large group of people, that might not have found as many similarities in their countries of origin otherwise. Traditional culture and roles are also important and respected, although not flexible and not enforced. As both the literature and descriptive statistics found, the interview participants reinforced the importance and centrality of religion in their personal lives, their values, and the way they carry themselves. Arab immigrants specifically did not show many differences in opinions to Arab-origin born Canadians, especially as many of the immigrant participants in this study immigrated as minors and therefore likely integrated almost as closely into Canadian culture. Despite traditional values held by many of the participants, the Liberal Party was the dominant party of choice for most Arab participants. Due to the small sample, it was a coincidence that the majority of Christians were born Canadians. This may also affect the ways Christian Arab participants felt more comfortable focusing on practical issues and less on identity, as they were more secure in their Canadian identity.

The central reason Arabs, especially Arab Muslims, vote Liberal, is two-fold. The first is due to previously discussed multiculturalism rhetoric or policies that the Liberal Party adhered

to, making them feel welcomed and appreciated, rather than othered. The second is a tendency toward left-leaning political issues. Unlike the common view, in literature and everyday discourse, that religiosity and traditionalism must necessarily accompany conservative views and exclude far-left issues, most Arab Canadian participants showed deep interest and concern for social activism (including social security, homelessness, and war), at local, national and international levels. On the whole, though on average all participants were centered, Christian Arab participants focused more on fiscal policy, while Muslim Arabs focused more on social/ideological, left-wing issues (such as pro-immigration and fighting racism) and foreign policy. The reason for this stems mainly from the fact that Arab Muslims feel and/or are, othered, largely due to religion combined with ethnicity and immigration status. Arab Muslims, especially visibly Muslim hijabi women, feel their status in Canada is more threatened, compared to Arab Christians who generally did not voice these fears. Consequently, Arab Muslims move more to the left where more social rights or rhetoric is more focused on or spoken about. Still, a majority of participants were flexible in their political ideology and vote choice, and overall, almost all participants, regardless of ethnicity, country of origin, sex, religion, or other characteristics, did not have faith or trust in the Liberal Party, or in most politicians.

Though Arab Canadians have seemed to vote in a partisan manner for the Liberal Party, most participants revealed that they reassessed their vote choice at each election and found the Liberals to consistently be the best/least negative among the choices, largely in terms of social action and minority support; Arab Canadian and Liberal Party central values were aligned. However, their political support is not immovable. There has been a recent large upheaval in political affiliation within the past few years. Arab Canadians now feel othered by the Liberal Party as well, and have become increasingly disillusioned with political parties, politicians, and

even the political system. This is due to a plethora of reasons and various polarizing current events; Arab Canadians feel that the Liberal Party has either changed or has been disingenuous from the start. Both Christian and Muslim Arabs, raised value clashes between Arab culture and liberal Canadian culture (including on issues such as abortion) as ideological mismatches, but most participants seemed to find that this was a recent problem. The central such issue was pushing LGBT ideology or sex education on young children. There used to be a clear 'live and let live' mindset on the part of Arab Canadians; they stayed open but they did not want to force their culture or values on others, just as they did not want the same to be done to them. While these ideological issues were values previously accepted as part of the Canadian culture on the condition that they would not directly affect them, they found them to be forced on them more and more in the recent years. The most prominent current issue mentioned by Arab Canadians in this project is the Liberal Party's support/lack of concrete opposition of Israel's genocide in Palestine. These issues now turn up a value mismatch, whether economic or social, that cannot be ignored. The disappointment is so that many participants questioned voting in the next election at all. This indicates that the high Liberal vote choice by Arab Canadians is not synonymous with unwavering trust and support, but instead lack of better choices.

This also brings to the discussion the idea that even in light of the loss of trust in the Liberal Party for many Arab Canadians and Muslims, not voting is still better than voting for the Conservative Party. For a number, voting Conservative is not a question, as they see the Conservatives platform as fundamentally misaligning with their values, largely due to perceived racism. This shows the importance of rhetoric, as the Conservative Party has consistently pushed away a large voter group for decades due to negative rhetoric towards them. The Liberal Party, in reality and as illustrated by the participants, is much more vocally and rhetorically supportive of

immigrants and Arabs or Muslims in general than the main opposition, the Conservative Party. Even if they were more conservative in political ideology than they purported to be in the interviews, it is seen as a risk, politically and socially, to vote for the Conservative Party. The Conservatives, due to either no rhetoric on this topic/these groups, or negative rhetoric, isolates Arab Canadians (the majority of whom in Canada are Muslim) and Muslims as a whole.

The question now is whether this can be swayed, and how. Currently, the Liberal Party's popularity is decreasing, while the Conservative Party has been attempting to counteract classic Liberal or NDP policies and cultivate more traditional or conservative voters. Considering that Arab Muslim and Christian voters have consistently voted Liberal, it is likely that their partisanship will not be swayed. However, with polarizing issues such as that of Palestine and Israel, it is possible that this partisanship could be put into question depending on each of the political parties' stances. Multiple participants mentioned the possibility of voting for the NDP due to their marginally more aligned political stances but did not consider this a sound plan due to the unlikelihood of them winning an election, and their lack of strength even in a minority government. This shows consistent far-left support (whether due to policies, party values, or supportive rhetoric), and more importantly shows that although Canada is a multi-party system, it is for all intents and purposes more realistically a two-party system, at least at the federal level.

This group is a very interesting case, as it is diverse in terms of ethnicity and religion and is one of the only groups that have faced largely socially accepted rhetorical discrimination (e.g., following 9/11). There is almost no research on the political affiliations of Arab Canadians, and this study provides both a novel quantitative and qualitative analysis of this topic. Much previous specific research on Muslims in Canada consists of election period survey statistics, such as Paperny (2015), Mainstreet Research (2015), and Grenier (2016) which simply provides

statistics and does not provide further statistical or qualitative analysis on the reasons (statistically significant and personal) for this group's Liberal vote. A few other studies, including Environics' (2016) survey of Muslims in Canada, delves slightly more into the drivers behind Muslims' opinions, including political. However, this still does not provide either analytical statistical results or deeper qualitative ones. Further, there are little Canadian studies of the same kind focused on Arab Canadians, let alone statistical or qualitative with interviews. This study provides a generalizable in-depth political opinion and vote choice study of a visible minority immigrant origin population in Canada, complementing Blais (2005) and Bilodeau and Kanji (2010) among others. It is singularly comprehensive as well, as it also provides a specific look at two significant populations within Canada, Arabs and Muslims, while including comparisons with immigrants as a whole and the rest of Canadians. There is also a unique focus on specific religions (Islam, Catholics, Christians, and other religions) within each of the groups (Canadian, immigrant, and Arab Canadian) as well.

Through this study's descriptive statistics, statistical analysis, and interviews, there is now more insight into the political opinions and drivers of this group. This research confirms Arab Canadians vote consistently for the Liberal Party, more than their immigrant and Canadian-born peers of all religions and cultures, as opposed to the Conservative Party, despite their high religiosity. This is an interesting finding, as it indicates that political ideology can be held separately from religious (and cultural) views, and that vote choice is measured through advantages and disadvantages. A central contribution of this research is the finding that immigrant or minority identity is generally more important to most Arab Canadians than personal/religious conservative or traditional ideology; politicians and political parties being supportive of immigrants, including Arabs and Muslims, is more essential for them as voters than

explicitly supporting or not supporting certain polarizing ideological topics. Another is the exposition of the exceptionalism of the Arab Canadian group, as they exercise different ideas, ideology, and voting patterns (being more Liberal) than Canadian immigrants as a whole. This in turn invites further questions about the heterogeneity and variety of opinion between immigrants of different cultures. This research also confirms that Arab Canadians feel used, isolated, and othered by right-wing parties, as the literature confirms for Arabs in most Western countries, but that they are still slowly drifting away from the center-left parties due to sharp value shifts. Now is a pivotal time for the Liberal Party of Canada; many polarizing current events are occurring and affecting Arab Canadians strongly enough to finally affect their partisanship, which could sever the ties of Muslims and Arabs (a vast voter base) to the Liberal Party.

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Appendix A: List and categorization of all variables used

Variable code	Variable name and question	Type of variable	Possible responses ⁹
Dependent variable			
vcp	Vote choice (in previous federal election): <i>Which party did you vote for in the Federal election in []?</i>	Nominal variable	Liberal Party (1), Conservative Party (2), NDP (3), Bloc Québécois (4), Green Party (5), People's Party (6), Another party (specify) (7), I spoiled my vote (8), Don't know/prefer not to answer (9) ¹⁰
Independent variables			
sex	Sex : <i>Are you... ?</i>	Nominal variable	A man (1), A woman (2), Non-binary (3), Another gender, please specify (4) ¹¹
age	Age : <i>To make sure we are talking to a cross section of Canadians, we need to get a little information about your background. First, in what year were you born?</i>	Interval variable	1920 (1)...2010 (91) ¹²
immstat	Immigration status : <i>Were you born in Canada?</i>	Nominal variable	Yes (0), No (2), Don't know/prefer not to answer (3) ¹³
incumb	Year of immigration :	Nominal variable	1920 (1)...2021 (102), Don't know/Prefer not to answer (103)

⁹ These responses include all of the possible responses within the CES dataset; however, some have been recoded, as noted

¹⁰ Recoded as Liberal (1), Conservative (2), NDP (3), and all other (4)

¹¹ The one 'other' gender respondent in the Arab dataset was omitted for simplicity.

¹² Year of birth responses were recoded as the age of the respondent in the year of the survey.

¹³ Don't know/prefer not to answer responses were left as missing values

	<i>In what year did you come to live in Canada?</i>		
rel	Religion : <i>Please indicate your religion, if you have one?</i>	Nominal variable	None/ Don't have one/ Atheist (1), Agnostic (2), Buddhist/ Buddhism (3), Hindu (4), Jewish/ Judaism/ Jewish Orthodox (5), Muslim/ Islam (6), Sikh/ Sikhism (7), Anglican/ Church of England (8), Baptist (9), Catholic/ Roman Catholic/ RC (10), Greek Orthodox/ Ukrainian Orthodox/ Russian Orthodox/ Eastern Orthodox (11), Jehovah's Witness (12), Lutheran (13), Mormon/ Church of Jesus Christ of the Latter Day Saints (14), Pentecostal/ Fundamentalist/ Born Again/ Evangelical (15), Presbyterian (16), Protestant (17), United Church of Canada (18), Christian Reformed (19), Salvation Army (20), Mennonite (21), Other (please specify) (22) ¹⁴ , Don't know/Prefer not to answer (23) ¹⁵

¹⁴ This may, for example, include another Christian denomination but classed under other due to the respondent specifying within the other response rather than choosing one of the other available responses.

¹⁵ Religions were recoded as Muslim (1), Catholic (2), Christian (3), all other religions (4)

religiosity	Religiosity : <i>In your life, you would say religion is:</i>	Ordinal variable	<i>In your life, you would say religion is:</i> Very important (1), somewhat important (2), not very important (3), not important at all (4), don't know/prefer not to answer (5) ¹⁶
leftright	Political ideology : <i>[In politics, people sometimes talk of left and right.] Using the same scale where 0 means the left and 10 means the right, where would you place yourself on this scale?</i>	Ordinal variable	0, 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10 ¹⁷ /0, 1, 2
Surveyyr	Survey year (control variable): year campaign period survey was carried out	Nominal variable	2000, 2004, 2005 ¹⁸ , 2006, 2008, 2011, 2015, 2019, 2021

¹⁶ Don't know/prefer not to answer responses were left as missing values to preserve the ordinal scale

¹⁷ Original 0-10 responses in CES recoded as 0 (0, 1, 2, 3), 1 (4, 5, 6), and 2 (7, 8, 9, 10) to represent left, center, and right more simply

¹⁸ A few surveys for the 2006 campaign were carried out in 2006

Appendix B: All frequency tables and cross-tabulations used

Below are the frequency tables and cross-tabulations for all of the independent variables not included within the paper. These include the full distributions of the left-right variable tables.

Table B1. Distribution of immigrant respondents' religions

Religion	Freq.	Percent (%)	Cuml. %
Islam	499	0.70	0.70
Catholicism	23,372	32.58	33.28
Christianity	18,548	25.86	59.14
Other ¹⁹	29,309	40.86	100.00
Total (n)	71,728	100.00	

Table B2. Distribution of immigrant respondents' religions

Religion	Freq.	Percent (%)	Cuml. %
Islam	760	5.76	5.76
Catholicism	3,347	25.37	31.13
Christianity	3,263	24.74	55.87
Other	5,821	44.13	100.00
Total (n)	13,191	100.00	

Table B3. Distribution of Arab respondents' religions

Religion	Freq.	Percent (%)	Cuml. %
Islam	263	41.16	41.16
Catholicism	158	24.73	65.88
Christianity	50	7.82	73.71
Other	168	26.29	100.00
Total (n)	639	100.00	

Table B4. Vote choice and religion crossed frequency table, Canadian dataset

Vote Choice	Religion				Total
	Islam	Catholicism	Christian	Other religion	
Liberal	235	8,025	5,401	8,953	22,614
Conservative	29	4,360	6,371	4,716	15,476
NDP	34	2,330	1,942	4,533	8,839
Other	17	3,576	956	3,076	7,625

¹⁹ Including Judaism, agnosticism, and atheism. This may also include Christianity, Catholicism, or Islam, if this was specified in a more specific and/or separate response.

Total (n)	315	18,291	14,670	21,278	54,554
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Table B5. Vote choice and religion crossed frequency table, immigrant dataset

Vote Choice	Religion				Total
	Islam	Catholicism	Christian	Other religion	
Liberal	301	1,055	883	1,713	3,952
Conservative	40	612	913	884	2,449
NDP	37	220	252	547	1,056
Other	14	274	129	335	752
Total (n)	392	2,161	2,177	3,479	8,209

Table B6. Vote choice and religion crossed frequency table, Arab dataset

Vote Choice	Religion				Total
	Islam	Catholicism	Christian	Other religion	
Liberal	116	61	17	60	254
Conservative	8	26	13	11	58
NDP	20	6	5	23	54
Other	3	11	2	10	26
Total (n)	147	104	37	104	392

Table B7. Left-right political ideology scale and religion crossed frequency table, Canadian dataset

Left-right	Religion				Total
	Islam	Catholicism	Christian	Other religion	
Left (0)	85	1,883	1,412	5,291	8,671
Center (1)	120	5,473	4,082	6,722	16,397
Right (2)	121	3,081	3,016	3,308	9,526
Total (n)	326	12,161	8,510	15,321	34,594

Table B8. Left-right political ideology scale and religion crossed frequency table, immigrant dataset

Left-right	Religion				Total
	Islam	Catholicism	Christian	Other religion	
Left (0)	77	245	249	891	1,462

Center (1)	170	739	710	1,441	3,060
Right (2)	131	515	609	818	2,073
Total (n)	378	1,499	1,568	3,150	6,595

Table B9. Left-right political ideology scale and religion crossed frequency table, Arab dataset

Left-right	Religion				Total
	Islam	Catholicism	Christian	Other religion	
Left (0)	24	14	8	29	75
Center (1)	28	20	8	36	92
Right (2)	27	26	9	13	75
Total (n)	79	60	25	78	242

Table B10. Vote choice and left-right political ideology crossed frequency table, Canadian dataset

Vote Choice	Left-right scale			Total
	Left (0)	Center (1)	Right (2)	
Liberal	3,664	5,679	2,358	11,701
Conservative	316	3,210	4,264	7,790
NDP	2,091	1,954	596	4,641
Other	1,274	2,153	854	4,281
Total (n)	7,345	12,996	8,072	28,413

Table B11. Vote choice and left-right political ideology crossed frequency table, immigrant dataset

Vote Choice	Left-right scale			Total
	Left (0)	Center (1)	Right (2)	
Liberal	562	1,066	471	2,099
Conservative	31	532	728	1,291
NDP	287	225	78	590
Other	119	198	94	411
Total (n)	999	2,021	1,371	4,391

Table B12. Vote choice and left-right political ideology crossed frequency table, Arab dataset

Vote Choice	Left-right scale			Total
	Left (0)	Center (1)	Right (2)	
Liberal	37	38	29	104

Conservative	2	5	16	23
NDP	12	6	6	24
Other	9	10	2	21
Total (n)	60	59	53	172

Table B13. Distribution of Canadian respondents' sex

Sex	Freq.	Percent (%)	Cuml. %
Male	31,651	43.37	43.37
Female	40,957	56.13	99.50
Other	365	0.50	100.00
Total (n)	72,973	100.00	

Table B14. Distribution of Canadian respondents' sex

Sex	Freq.	Percent (%)	Cuml. %
Male	6,339	47.19	47.19
Female	7,049	52.48	99.67
Other	45	0.33	100.00
Total (n)	13,433	100.00	

Table B15. Distribution of Arab Canadian respondents' sex

Sex	Freq.	Percent (%)	Cuml. %
Male	286	44.83	44.83
Female	352	55.17	100.00
Total (n)	638	100.00	

Table B16. Immigration status of Arab Canadian respondents

Immigration status	Freq.	Percent (%)	Cuml. %
Born in Canada	261	41.49	41.49
Immigrated	368	58.51	100.00
Total (n)	629	100.00	

Table B17. Party in power (incumbency) at the time of immigration of immigrant respondents not born in Canada

Incumbency ²⁰	Freq.	Percent (%)	Cuml. %
Liberal Party	7,936	66.59	66.59
Conservative Party	3,982	33.41	100.00
Total (n)	11,918	100.00	

Table B18. Party in power (incumbency) at the time of immigration of Arab respondents not born in Canada

Incumbency	Freq.	Percent (%)	Cuml. %
Liberal Party	208	60.29	60.29
Conservative Party	137	39.71	100.00
Total (n)	345	100.00	

Table B19. Summary statistics for ordinal variable religiosity, Canadian dataset

Religiosity	Obs.	Mean	Std. dev.	Min	Max.
	52,446	2.695496	.99706	1	4

Table B20. Summary statistics for ordinal variable religiosity, immigrant dataset

Religiosity	Obs.	Mean	Std. dev.	Min	Max.
	10,232	2.971267	.9888219	1	4

Table B21. Summary statistics for ordinal variable religiosity, Arab Canadian dataset

Religiosity	Obs.	Mean	Std. dev.	Min	Max.
	551	3.154265	0.9301881	1	4

Table B22. Summary statistics for ordinal variable left-right, Canadian dataset

Left-right	Obs.	Mean	Std. dev.	Min	Max.
	35,096	1.023194	.724259	0	2

Table B23. Summary statistics for ordinal variable left-right, immigrant dataset

Left-right	Obs.	Mean	Std. dev.	Min	Max.
	6,686	1.093329	.7264387	0	2

²⁰ Including old versions of each respective party but excluding the 1917-1920 Unionist Party government

Table B24. Summary statistics for ordinal variable left-right (scale of political ideology), Arab dataset

Left-right	Obs.	Mean	Std. dev.	Min	Max.
	242	1	0.7889275	0	2

Table B25. Summary statistics for interval-ratio variable age, Canadian dataset

Age	Obs.	Mean	Std. dev.	Min	Max.
	72,698	49.71144	16.8915	12	115

Table B26. Summary statistics for interval-ratio variable age, immigrant dataset

Age	Obs.	Mean	Std. dev.	Min	Max.
	13,312	50.23482	17.31691	13	115

Table B27. Summary statistics for interval-ratio variable age, Arab Canadian dataset

Age	Obs.	Mean	Std. dev.	Min	Max.
	636	41.50629	15.74316	18	99

Table B28. Vote choice and incumbency at the time of immigration crossed frequency table, immigrant dataset

Incumbency			
Vote Choice	Liberal	Conservative	Total
Liberal	2,612	1,148	3,760
Conservative	1,556	653	2,209
NDP	644	282	926
Other	421	149	570
Total (n)	5,233	2,232	7,465

Table B29. Vote choice and incumbency at the time of immigration crossed frequency table, Arab dataset

Incumbency			
Vote Choice	Liberals	Conservatives	Total
Liberal	83	57	140
Conservative	17	10	27
NDP	16	7	23
Other	4	2	6
Total (n)	120	76	196

Table B30. Vote choice and immigration status crossed frequency table, Arab dataset

Immigration status			
Vote Choice	BiC	Immigrated	Total
Liberal	108	140	248
Conservative	31	26	57
NDP	27	26	53
Other	20	6	26
Total (n)	186	198	384

Table B31. Left-right political ideology scale and religiosity crossed frequency table, Canadian dataset

Religiosity (importance)					
Left-right	Not at all (1)	Not very (2)	Somewhat (3)	Very (4)	Total
Left (0)	1,313	1,445	1,523	817	5,098
Center (1)	2,097	3,258	4,378	2,434	12,167
Right (2)	910	1,685	2,698	2,355	7,648
Total (n)	4,320	6,388	8,599	5,606	24,913

Table B32. Left-right political ideology scale and religiosity crossed frequency table, immigrant dataset

Religiosity (importance)					
Left-right	Not at all (1)	Not very (2)	Somewhat (3)	Very (4)	Total
Left (0)	183	204	293	245	925
Center (1)	286	491	858	698	2,333
Right (2)	158	285	577	750	1,770
Total (n)	627	980	1,728	1,693	5,028

Table B33. Left-right political ideology scale and religiosity crossed frequency table, Arab Canadian dataset

Religiosity (importance)					
Left-right	Not at all (1)	Not very (2)	Somewhat (3)	Very (4)	Total
Left (0)	12	8	23	17	60
Center (1)	8	21	27	17	73
Right (2)	5	6	28	32	71
Total (n)	25	35	78	66	204

Table B34. Left-right political ideology scale and immigration status crossed frequency table, Arab Canadian dataset

Immigration status			
Left-right	BiC	Immigrated	Total
Left (0)	44	31	75
Center (1)	38	51	89
Right (2)	28	44	72
Total (n)	110	126	236

Table B35. Vote choice and religiosity crossed frequency table, Canadian dataset

Religiosity (importance)					
Vote choice	Not at all (1)	Not very (2)	Somewhat (3)	Very (4)	Total
Liberal	2,584	4,231	6,320	3,602	16,737
Conservative	1,385	2,672	4,578	3,884	12,519
NDP	1,073	1,530	2,046	1,114	5,763
Other	1,221	1,706	1,638	877	5,442
Total (n)	6,263	10,139	14,582	9,477	40,461

Table B36. Vote choice and religiosity crossed frequency table, Canadian dataset

Religiosity (importance)					
Vote choice	Not at all (1)	Not very (2)	Somewhat (3)	Very (4)	Total
Liberal	323	543	1,130	1,112	3,108
Conservative	190	351	710	740	1,991
NDP	115	149	243	229	736
Other	82	138	185	124	529
Total (n)	710	1,181	2,268	2,205	6,364

Table B37. Vote choice and religiosity crossed frequency table, Arab Canadian dataset

Religiosity (importance)					
Vote choice	Not at all (1)	Not very (2)	Somewhat (3)	Very (4)	Total
Liberal	22	30	83	87	222
Conservative	5	3	21	25	54
NDP	1	11	12	17	41
Other	4	5	4	6	19
Total (n)	32	49	120	135	336

Table 38. Respondents' age, across categories, Arab Canadian dataset

Age	Freq.	Percent (%)	Cuml. %
18-24	98	15.41	15.41
25-34	135	21.23	36.64
35-44	155	24.37	61.01
45-54	124	19.50	80.50
55-65	62	9.75	90.25
65+	62	9.75	100.00
Total (n)	636	100.00	

Table 39. Survey year participant/response breakdown, Canadian dataset

Survey year	Freq.	Percent (%)	Cuml. %
2000	3,133	4.29	4.29
2004	3,692	5.06	9.35
2005	919	1.26	10.61
2006	702	0.96	11.57
2008	2,553	3.50	15.07
2011	3,482	4.77	19.84
2015	9,456	12.96	32.80
2019	31,448	43.09	75.88
2021	17,602	24.12	100.00
Total (n)	72,987	100.00	

Table 40. Survey year participant/response breakdown, immigrant dataset

Survey year	Freq.	Percent (%)	Cuml. %
2000	465	3.46	3.46
2004	581	4.32	7.79
2005	178	1.32	9.11
2006	131	0.98	10.09
2008	675	5.02	15.11
2011	801	5.96	21.07
2015	1,540	11.46	32.54
2019	5,900	43.92	76.46
2021	3,163	23.54	100.00
Total (n)	13,434	100.00	

Table 41. Survey year participant/response breakdown, Arab dataset

Survey year	Freq.	Percent (%)	Cuml. %
2000	6	0.94	0.94

2004	17	2.66	3.60
2006	19	2.97	6.57
2008	29	4.54	11.11
2011	25	3.91	15.02
2015	82	12.83	27.86
2019	256	40.06	67.92
2021	205	32.08	100.00
Total (n)	639	100.00	

Appendix C: Substantive effects prediction model graphs

Below are the probability graphs for each religion voting for the NDP and 'other' parties, by each dataset; Canadian, immigrant, and Arab Canadian.




Figure D1. Predicted probability graph for Canadians voting for the NDP, at each religion




Figure D2. Predicted probability graph for Canadians voting for 'other' parties, at each religion




Figure D3. Predicted probability graph for immigrants voting for the NDP, at each religion




Figure D4. Predicted probability graph for immigrants voting for 'other' parties, at each religion




Figure D5. Predicted probability graph for Arab Canadians voting the NDP, at each religion




Figure D6. Predicted probability graph for Arab Canadians voting for 'other' parties, at each religion

Appendix D: Interview questions template

1. How important is being Arab to you? What role does being Arab play in your life in Canada/as a Canadian specifically?
2. Do you feel that there is a difference between yourself as an Arab/Arab Canadian and the rest of the general population in Canada? If yes, how would you describe this difference(s), and what effect do they have?
3. What place does religion have in your life?
4. How would you describe your values? Would you describe these as more progressive or conservative/traditional?
5. If you think about what you consider ‘Canadian values’, do you consider your values, specifically as an Arab or someone with Arab ethnicity/ancestry, to be different from these Canadian values?
6. What do you need to live a fulfilling life? This can be value-based, life goals, economic, or social...specific or broad.
7. What are the three most important topics to you politically?
8. How closely do you keep up with politics and elections in Canada?
9. What level of politics are you the most concerned with or involved with (municipal, provincial, federal)?
10. Where do you generally obtain your information on politics? Which of these generally influences you the most?
 - a. Are there any topics where you obtain your information from only specific sources?
11. Which party did you vote for in the last FEDERAL election?

[If participant did not vote, or indicates that they have never voted/do not vote often]:

12. What was the reason that you did not vote/why do you not vote?
13. Which party have you usually voted for in the past?
14. How strongly do you support this party? Would anything make you question voting for them in the next election?

[If they indicate voting for and supporting a specific party strongly, if not do not ask]:

15. Why do you support this party? How did you start supporting them?
16. Which party do your parents or most family members traditionally support?
17. Do you think that you support your political party based on rhetoric, policies, or party values, all, some, or other?
18. Have you changed the party that you usually support? If so, why?
19. Who do you plan on voting for in the next federal election?
20. If the federal election was tomorrow, who would you vote for?
21. Leaving out political parties, do you consider yourself more right or left wing, or center?

You can place yourself from 0-10, with 0 being left and 10 being right if you would like.

I am going to ask you a few questions on how different parts of your identity affect your voting or political ideology, whether at the party level or certain politicians:

22. Do you feel that your ethnicity impacts your choices when voting, or deciding which party or politician to vote for or support?
23. Do you feel that your culture impacts your choices when voting, or deciding which party or politician to vote for or support?
24. Do you feel that your religion impacts your choices when voting, or deciding which party or politician to vote for or support?

[If participant is a Liberal or NDP voter]:

25. You mention having strong religious and traditional values, yet still vote for the Liberal Party? Why is this?

26. What changes to the Conservative party would make you vote for them or consider voting for them?

Demographic Questions:

- Age:
- Ethnicity/country of origin:
- Religion:
- Generation/immigration status:
 - o *If first or second:* What year did you or your parents immigrate here?
- Occupation
- City/Province

Appendix E: Interview Sample (Interview 8)

1. How important is being Arab to you? What role does being Arab play in your life in Canada/as a Canadian specifically?
 - a. I think it is very important and it does relate to a lot of things or it does affect a lot of things that I'm part of, I find, in different ways. I think my Arab identity, although is not apparent by my physical, the way I physically look like, once it is known, to my boss, my professors, my colleagues...it does change the way they interact with me I find. Through the lens of an Arab Canadian person.

2. Do you feel that there is a difference between yourself as an Arab/Arab Canadian and the rest of the general population in Canada? If yes, how would you describe this difference(s), and what effect do they have?
 - a. There is, definitely in my point of view, and I think it's reflected in how white Canadians-I'll just say white Canadians-feel entitled as a Canadian and feel like I'm an immigrant here, although I'm an Arab Canadian, I feel like that's how it is. Although they are, I guess, immigrants too, because they're not originally from here either.

3. What place does religion have in your life?
 - a. It's definitely there. Honestly I wish it was a stronger pull in my life, but it isn't. Mainly because of growing up here.

4. How would you describe your values? Would you describe these as more progressive or conservative/traditional?
 - a. Definitely somewhere in between. And it does depend on what it is, specifically. It's definitely contextual because some things I'm very traditional about and conservative and some of them I'm very progressive. [In political views] leaning

toward more conservative, I would have to say. Again, in the middle, but leaning towards more conservative. I don't think I have a lot of liberal political opinions liberal.

5. If you think about what you consider 'Canadian values', do you consider your values, specifically as an Arab or someone with Arab ethnicity/ancestry, to be different from these Canadian values?
 - a. I think I'm definitely leaning towards Arab Canadians, or Arab identity, more than Canadian, because my values are still familial, collective, I'm not very individualistic, I guess. There's definitely a difference, I was just talking to my friend today and she is Canadian, living in Italy, and we were just talking about that, and I told her there is a huge difference...I feel it right away if I meet someone that's not Arab Canadian. And I relate more to other-cultured people, like Chinese Canadians, Indian Canadians or anyone who's immigrated to here. I have a hard time and [friend] and I talk about it a lot, we have a hard time relating to just white people, they just don't understand.

6. What do you need to live a fulfilling life? This can be value-based, life goals, economic, or social...specific or broad.
 - a. This is a difficult question, because the answer that comes to my mind is more of an answer that I was raised with. So naturally as an Arab woman, you're taught that a fulfilled life is you're married and have your own home and have kids. But I'm at an age where I don't know if that's exactly what would fulfill me. I'm kind of still in that stage where I would like that, but I would also like a fulfilling career.

7. What are the three most important topics to you politically?
 - a. I think the one that I'm focused on when I'm in the stage of voting, when I'm looking at who I vote for, I do have an interest in education reform, the different ways that they change education, who gets available to education, what gets prioritized for classes, because I know that art is removed recently. Education is one. Sexual health, I think, is another one. Specifically, abortion and rights to abortion. The first one shows my conservative side and the second one is definitely my more liberal side. The third one is anything that has to do with Canadian ties to other the rest of the world, especially what's happening in Gaza. I think any connection to that. Right now I'm really interested in the fact that Canada does not see Palestine as a state, and I wonder next time I vote, next time we have a voting opportunity that is something that I would look for, if the person that I vote for has plans to change that.
8. How closely do you keep up with politics and elections in Canada?
 - a. While they're happening, pretty closely, but when they're not active, no. Like right now I'm more interested in American politics because with everything that's happening with Donald Trump I'm keeping very close tabs on that.
9. What level of politics are you the most concerned with or involved with (municipal, provincial, federal)?
 - a. Either provincial or federal
10. Where do you generally obtain your information on politics? Which of these generally influences you the most?

- a. The most accessible to me is what is being shared online, on Instagram, but that's not exactly...not that it's not accurate, but then I'm just seeing what people are seeing, but I do look at the News app a lot.
 - b. Are there any topics where you obtain your information from only specific sources?
 - i. No I look at all sources, but the number one that I've been really into, mainly because my friend works there, is CTV, and I'm just interested in the way she writes or how they write things.
11. Which party did you vote for in the last FEDERAL election?
- a. The last one I voted for NDP.

[If participant did not vote, or indicates that they have never voted/do not vote often]:

12. What was the reason that you did not vote/why do you not vote?
13. Which party have you usually voted for in the past?
- a. Definitely Liberal, that was the main one that I voted for before and it was only the last one that I voted NDP.
14. How strongly do you support this party? Would anything make you question voting for them in the next election?
- a. Both of them very very low. I think the next election, because I don't look at...I think people our age and our generation are very obsessed with the concept of being progressive and liberal, and so they naturally will promote the Liberal Party due to the word liberal. But the Liberal Party does not always stand for actual progressive means. There's sometimes anti-progressive means and that's why I made the switch to NDP last time. Do I stand completely with the NDP

party? No, absolutely not, there are things that I don't stand for. So whenever there is a new voting opportunity, I actually look at them separately. Just because I was Liberal or NDP before, doesn't mean [I will vote for them this time]...it really depends on who's running and what they're running for. Mainly on the three [important political topics discussed in question 8]...there are a few things that I look for. So very low on both of them, very disappointed always. [Questioning the party they previously voted for every election] especially in context to did they do what they said they would, and usually they didn't because it's always skewed.

[If they indicate voting for and supporting a specific party strongly, if not do not ask]:

15. Why do you support this party? How did you start supporting them?

- a. For the reason that I told you, it was, at the beginning, I didn't have a lot of understanding, or my own personal opinions, so I was definitely voting for what I thought was the right thing, or what I was constructed to think was the right thing. Then once I had like my own values, as I grew up, I started voting for things I actually believed in. So like I said, I voted for Liberal because I thought it stood for more progressive things, but always was disappointed...and I don't like Trudeau.

16. Which party do your parents or most family members traditionally support?

- a. I have no clue, we don't talk about politics that much.

17. Do you think that you support your political party based on rhetoric, policies, or party values, all, some, or other?

- a. Probably the policies that they stood for.

18. Have you changed the party that you usually support? If so, why?

- a. Yeah I have recently, but it will change depending on what their policies are each time.

19. Who do you plan on voting for in the next federal election?

- a. Undecided.

20. If the federal election was tomorrow, who would you vote for?

- a. Probably NDP again.

21. Leaving out political parties, do you consider yourself more right or left wing, or center?

You can place yourself from 0-10, with 0 being left and 10 being right if you would like.

- a. Right-wing, but not entirely.

I am going to ask you a few questions on how different parts of your identity affect your voting or political ideology, whether at the party level or certain politicians:

22. Do you feel that your ethnicity impacts your choices when voting, or deciding which party or politician to vote for or support?

- a. I guess to an extent, because I care a lot about the values, and international affairs.
I think I would say yes.

23. Do you feel that your culture impacts your choices when voting, or deciding which party or politician to vote for or support?

- a. Yes, because culturally, as a Libyan, we've had a lot of political changes in the last 15 years, and we've learned a lot from them and I think that trickles down to how I vote here.

24. Do you feel that your religion impacts your choices when voting, or deciding which party or politician to vote for or support?

- a. Yes it does because I think religion is very like about morals and values, and so sometimes you vote based on your morals and values too. So for example, the abortion ban, I obviously am pro-choice, but then my religion is not exactly correlated with that. So I think to some things I am choosing based in relation to my religion and some things I'm not.

[If participant is a Liberal or NDP voter]:

25. You mention having strong religious and traditional values, yet still vote for the Liberal Party? Why is this?

- a. I think in the last three or four years I have become more conservative. I think that's not surprising, as you get older, you do become a little bit more conservative. And like I mentioned before, I was voting for Liberal because the people that I was surrounded with were pushing towards the Liberal Party, because I was taught to think Liberal means progressive, when it isn't. And that's been apparent with the recent prime ministers' leadership.

[On reconciling conservative values with liberal views and voting]:

- In a day-to-day context, I don't think I'm very bothered by it because I think we're all very multifaceted and have differing opinions. We can agree on some things or different things, but when it comes to voting and politics and looking through different candidates, it is difficult because sometimes what I agree with, fits in all of them, but they all do things that are anti what I agree with. And so when it comes to voting, I think it should be taken a lot more seriously. I just don't think not voting is an option though.

26. What changes to the Conservative party would make you vote for them or consider voting for them?

- a. Yeah, I've never voted for them and I don't see myself, although I said that I'm more right-wing...I am, truly in my core, but I just refuse to vote for [certain] things...you can't vote for Conservative because they're anti-abortion, and that's just something I truly stand for. I think that's the leading thing. Maybe that's the first one I should have picked before education, or sexual health. Although, again with sexuality, about like what they're being taught in academics, I am not with the Liberals or Conservatives. I don't think it should be completely removed, but I don't think it should be taught so much, like they're [Liberals] teaching it right away. I don't know, it really depends. Maybe next time I will, I just don't know. I'm really the type, and I guess I was taught that at school, to really read all the policies and it's mainly a pros and cons list. I just know that the people that I've surrounded myself with tend to vote Liberal, mainly because it's cooler to say that you're liberal or just feels right to say that, as someone who's in millennial or Gen. Z, but that's not exactly aligned with my values because I don't think I would choose [who to vote for] because it's cool or it's what's the socially right thing to do.