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Hot Off the presses in the Cold War: Canadian Newspaper Editorial Coverage of the Korean War, 1950-1951

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Hot Off the Presses in the Cold War: Canadian Newspaper Editorial Coverage of the Korean War, 1950-1951

By:

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Thesis submitted to the Faculty of Graduate and Postdoctoral Studies in partial fulfillment of the requirement for the MA degree in History

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Abstract

Hot Off the Presses in the Cold War: Canadian Newspaper Editorial Coverage of the Korean War, 1950-1951

Andrea Quaiattini Dr. Jeff Keshen

A consistent theme throughout the Canadian historiography on the Korean War is that it is Canada's forgotten war. However, as evidenced by the newspaper editorials published during the first year and a half of the war, this was simply not the case. Editorialists were keen to disseminate their opinions about the war to the Canadian public. The purpose of this thesis is to provide a detailed examination of Canadian newspaper editorials pertaining to the Korean War between 1950 and 1951. This time period was the most active of the entire war, both on the battlefield, and with governments and organizations, where issues pertaining to the war were consistently discussed. Taking into account location, language, and political orientation, seven newspapers were selected to achieve a pan-Canadian understanding of the war: the *Vancouver Province*, *Winnipeg Free Press*, *Toronto Star*, *The Globe and Mail*, *Montreal Gazette*, *Le Devoir*, and *Halifax Chronicle-Herald*. This thesis focuses on three major themes highlighted in the seven newspapers' editorials: the role Canada played in the war, the apparent threat of Communism, and attitudes regarding the United Nations. The English-language editorials generally argued that Canada should play a meaningful role in the Korean War, while editorials in *Le Devoir* raised some concerns. Furthermore, English-language newspapers were critical of the federal government's response to the war, and Canada's unprepared military, which were portrayed as leaving Canada vulnerable to Communist influence and attack.

The threat of Communism was undeniable, though editorialists were unsure of its larger implications. The role the Soviet Union was playing in Korea, managing Communist China, and the influence of Communism in the United Nations were frequently debated in the newspaper editorials.

In contrast to the standard historical argument that Canada has consistently been a strong supporter of the United Nations, some editorialists questioned how effective the UN could be in the Korean War. Others, however, believed the UN showed great promise. Opinion also varied as to whether the UN could dispel concerns that it was simply a renamed League of Nations, and, if it could move past this epithet, how would this be achieved. Finally, it was discussed whether the UN could even bring a lasting peace to the Korean peninsula.

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Throughout this project, I have been so lucky and privileged to benefit from the wise words, assistance, kindness, and generosity of numerous individuals. First and foremost, I must thank my supervisor, Dr. Jeff Keshen for his guidance, patience, encouragement, and unwavering faith in my abilities while I completed this work. I learned a great deal both from his edits, and our conversations. The topic was his suggestion, and I hope I have done it justice. I must also thank Dr. Serge Durflinger, who took time out of his own busy schedule to critique, and comment on my work. Our talks, both thesis-related and otherwise, made a world of difference. Finally, I would like to thank my undergraduate supervisor, Dr. Patrick Brennan at the University of Calgary, for his continued friendship and assistance.

I would also like to thank Dr. Andrew Burtch at the Canadian War Museum for taking the time to discuss my thesis, and for providing me with some fascinating sources.

Like many students of Canadian military history, I would be remiss if I did not thank the Canadian Battlefield Foundation for selecting me to participate on the 2007 tour. While the beaches of Normandy are far from the hills of Korea, my time in France afforded me an even more profound appreciation of the sacrifices made by Canadians in all conflicts.

Many, many thanks go to my friends and colleagues at the University of Ottawa and back home in Calgary. Your friendship, advice, and humour kept me plugging through my newspapers. In particular, my dear friends Sarah Cozzi, Simon Theobald and

Sara Jenkins, Christie Tolsma, and Bridget Richardson have helped and supported in so many ways. Much love.

Finally, all the thanks and love in the world go to the people that matter the most, my family. I am very lucky to have been raised by a village. Firstly, my love to Pam and Roger Prior, and Bill, Diana, and Megan Paterson. Especial thanks to Mary Paterson and Jonathan Hood, and my niece Kaylee, for giving me a place to stay, helping me with my ideas, and for getting me started. It is so much appreciated. For my aunts, uncles, my grandparents, Stella and Zelio, and my sister, Jessie, all my thanks and love. However, there is simply no possible way I could have completed this project without the support and love of my parents, Denise and Bob. They have helped in ways innumerable and unimaginable, and for that, all I can say is thank you. It is nowhere near enough. Love you forever, love you for always.

List of Acronyms

CASF	Canadian Army Special Force
NKPA	North Korean People's Army
PLA	People's Liberation Army
PRC	People's Republic of China
1PPCLI	1st Battalion, Princess Patricia's Canadian Light Infantry
2PPCLI	2nd Battalion, Princess Patricia's Canadian Light Infantry
2R22eR	2nd Battalion, Royal 22e Regiment
2RCR	2nd Battalion, Royal Canadian Régiment
RCAMC	Royal Canadian Army Medical Corps
RCASC	Royal Canadian Army Service Corps
RCE	Royal Canadian Engineers
RCHA	Royal Canadian Horse Artillery
ROK	Republic of Korea
UNTCOK	United Nations Temporary Commission on Korea

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Introduction

Hot Off the Presses

On 15 November 1951, a small article buried on page ten of *The Globe and Mail* provided a telling assessment of Canadian perception and understanding of the Korean War. The Anglican archbishop of Edmonton, the Most Revered W. F. Barfoot, had just returned from the Far East, where he had visited Canadian military units in Korea and assisted chaplains stationed there with their duties. While the troops appeared to be properly equipped and well led, and their relationship with the South Koreans seemed excellent, Barfoot commented that one thing in particular troubled him. He explained:

> ... there is an ominous danger that the troops might 'become infected with the feeling that Canadians at home have relegated the Korean War to a position of unimportance.' An apathetic public knew 'little about the sharp end of the war.'[1]

The aim of this thesis is to provide an intensive and systematic analysis of press editorials connected to the Korean War from 1950 to 1951, a time period that covered the evolution of Canada's involvement there, and when issues pertaining to the war itself were most intensely discussed. In particular, this thesis will focus on three major themes: the role Canada played in the war, the perceived threat of Communism, and attitudes regarding the United Nations. These subjects were the most frequently discussed in the editorials, and as such, reflected much of the public discourse over the war. Each theme is organized sub-chronologically, so as to demonstrate any change over time. This methodical breakdown of the editorials allows for a detailed examination, and can thus provide insight into what was being discussed in Canadian newspapers, and what was being disseminated to the Canadian public. In order to achieve a pan-Canadian

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[1] "Primate Sorry Korea Forgotten War," *The Globe and Mail*, 15 November 1951.

understanding, seven newspapers were selected for analysis, with six published in English, and one in French. They are the: *Halifax Chronicle-Herald*, *Montreal Gazette*, *Le Devoir*, *Toronto Star*, *The Globe and Mail*, *Winnipeg Free Press*, and *Vancouver Province*. In addition to accounting for language differences, these newspapers were selected to achieve a representative cross-section of Canada, as they represent the various regions, and also account for differences in political affiliations or leanings. Furthermore, only editorials were studied as they are a blatant expression of a newspaper's opinion or position on a particular topic.[2] Supplementary archival materials were utilized when needed. However, the chief primary source of this thesis is the newspaper editorials themselves.

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Even today, Reverend Barfoot's comments ring true given the extant historiography on the Korean War. Steven Casey's monograph *Selling the Korean War: Propaganda, Politics, and Public Opinion in the United States, 1950-1953* is the only work that examines the role of the media during the Korean War, and "the government's efforts to sell the war at home."[3] As Casey notes, numerous historians have demonstrated that throughout the 1950s, both the Truman and Eisenhower administrations went to great lengths to reach out to individuals living behind the Iron Curtain, and also to those living in neutral states. However, comparatively little was written on the interaction between

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[2] While there was a great deal of front-page coverage of the Korean War in all the newspapers, the vast majority of published stories were issued by the various newswire services, such as Canadian Press, Reuters, Agence France-Presse, and others. The front page coverage simply recounted the events of the war, and offered no insight into the newspapers' opinions regarding the conflict.

[3] Steven Casey, *Selling the Korean War: Propaganda, Politics, and Public Opinion in the United States, 1950-1953* (New York: Oxford University Press, 2008), 5.

the government and key organizations and institutions which helped to bring the US into the Korean War, and what measures the government undertook on the home front to convince the American public that participation in the war was in America's national interest.[4] Robert Teigrob's *Warming Up to the Cold War: Canada and the United States' Coalition of the Willing, from Hiroshima to Korea* deals with press coverage of the Korean conflict, though not in a solely Canadian context, nor in a comprehensive manner.[5]

There are several books that study the Canadian military experience during the Korean War. In 1956, the Canadian army's historical section published a short work entitled *Canada's Army in Korea* to provide a summation of the army's work during the war, and was based on official records and some commentary from those who had served. The work was overseen by Captain R. F. McGuire of the Princess Patricia's Canadian Light Infantry, who served in Korea from 1952-1953 as the Historical Officer with the 25th Brigade.[6] In 1966, the historical section of the Department of National Defence published an official history, *Strange Battleground: The Operations in Korea and Their Effects on the Defence Policy of Canada.* Written by Lieutenant-Colonel Herbert Fairlie Wood, a former commanding officer of the 3rd Battalion, Princess Patricia's Canadian Light Infantry, its main goal was to provide an operational and policy history of the

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[4] Ibid., 3-16.
[5] Robert Teigrob, *Warming Up to the Cold War: Canada and the United States' Coalition of the Willing, from Hiroshima to Korea* (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2009), 168-224.
[6] Historical Section, General Staff, Army Headquarters, *Canada's Army in Korea: The United Nations Operations, 1950-1953, and Their Aftermath* (Ottawa: Queen's Printer, 1956).

conflict.[7] He offers only a brief examination of the press coverage, namely at the outset of the war. The first academic study of the Canadian experience in Korea was published by Dennis Stairs in 1974. In *The Diplomacy of Constraint: Canada, the Korean War, and the United States*, Stairs focuses on Canada's role in the United Nations, and the government's relationship with the United States. He concludes that policy makers in Ottawa wished to avoid both Canada and the US becoming embroiled in a long-term struggle in Korea. Canadian policy makers utilized the United Nations, and more specifically Canada's role as a member of the US-led United Nations military force, to "moderate and constrain the course of American decisions."[8] Robert Prince's article "The Limits of Constraint: Canadian-American Relations and the Korean War, 1950-51," reaches a somewhat different conclusion. He asserts that in some instances, Canada did want to limit the strong tack taken by the United States. However, because of shared interests between the two countries, namely offsetting Communism, and the need for Canada to maintain influence in Washington, similarities between Canadian and American policies during the Korean War remained more substantial and meaningful than the differences.[9]

John Melady's popular 1983 account *Korea: Canada's Forgotten War* stresses the lack of attention on the conflict since the signing of the armistice three decades earlier. Melady provides a narrative synopsis of the war's progress, interspersed with

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[7] Herbert Fairlie Wood, *Strange Battleground: The Operations in Korea and Their Effects on the Defence Policy of Canada* (Ottawa: Queen's Printer and Controller of Stationary, 1966), 16-26.
[8] Denis Stairs, *The Diplomacy of Constraint: Canada, the Korean Peninsula, and the United States* (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1974), xi.
[9] Robert Prince, "The Limits of Constraint: Canadian-American Relations and the Korean War, 1950-51," *Journal of Canadian Studies*, 27:4 (Winter 1992), 129-152.

personal recollections from numerous veterans.[10] The veterans' stories provide interesting insights into their reasons for enlisting, and combined with Melady's text, a picture of every-day Canadian life in the theatre of war is created. However, there is no discussion of what newspapers were saying during this period. Journalist Ted Barris's *Deadlock in Korea: Canadians at War, 1950-1953* continues in the vein, relying on oral testimony to recount Canadian soldiers' experiences in Korea. Barris does use newspapers as a source, though intermittently, and the articles quoted were published by the Canadian Press newswire service. He does not cite editorials to provide insight into the newspapers' position.[11]

David Bercuson's *Blood on the Hills: The Canadian Army in the Korean War* was the first attempt since *The Diplomacy of Constraint* to provide an academic examination of the army's participation in Korea. Bercuson makes the case that the soldiers who served in Korea "were ill-served by their government, by their coalition partners, and by much of their own high command. They were sent to Korea improperly armed, under-trained, and ill-prepared."[12] He examines seven newspapers, but like Barris, he uses them occasionally, and only to provide more general context.

Brent Watson's *Far Eastern Tour: The Canadian Infantry in Korea, 1950-1953* is the first book which examines Canadian news coverage of the Korean War in a substantial fashion. Watson samples seven English-Canadian newspapers, and notes that

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[10] John Melady, *Korea: Canada's Forgotten War* (Toronto: Macmillan of Canada), 1983.
[11] Ted Barris, *Deadlock in Korea: Canadians at War, 1950-1953* (Toronto: Macmillan Canada), 1999.
[12] David Bercuson, *Blood on the Hills: The Canadian Army in the Korean War* (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1999), xiii.

their editorials were unanimous in calling on the government to deploy troops to Korea.[13] However, his examination is only cursory, and does not delve into the nuances of opinion that were expressed on this and other key issues surrounding the conflict. The majority of his book is a detailed study of the soldiers' experiences in Korea, covering subjects that include uniforms and equipment, venereal disease rates, the relationship with the South Koreans, and, of course, combat experience. Far more centred on tactics is William Johnston's *A War of Patrols: Canadian Army Operations in Korea.* It provides an overview of the federal government's decision to deploy ground forces to the Korean peninsula, but the remainder of the monograph is devoted to a detailed study of the various operations in which Canadian soldiers participated.[14] Thor Thorgrimson's *Canadian Naval Operations in Korean Waters, 1950-1955* provides the official account of the Royal Canadian Navy's participation in the Korean War.[15] The less academic *Thunder in the Morning Calm: The Royal Canadian Navy in Korea 1950-1955* discusses the experiences of Canadian sailors.[16] Finally, Jeffrey Grey's *The Commonwealth Armies and the Korean War: An Alliance Study* discusses Canada's participation in Korea within the larger context of the Commonwealth, with particular focus on the workings of the 1st Commonwealth Division.[17]

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[13] Brent Byron Watson, *Far Eastern Tour: The Canadian Infantry in Korea, 1950-1953* (Montreal: McGill-Queen's University Press, 2002), 4-6.
[14] William Johnston, *A War of Patrols: Canadian Army Operations in Korea* (Vancouver: UBC Press, 2003), 20-28.
[15] Thor Thorgrimson, *Canadian Naval Operations in Korean Waters, 1950-1955* (Ottawa: Queen's Printer and Controller of Stationary, 1965).
[16] Edward C. Meyers, *Thunder in the Morning Calm: The Royal Canadian Navy in Korea 1950-1955* (St. Catharines: Vanwell Publishing Limited, 1992).
[17] Jeffrey Grey, *The Commonwealth Armies and the Korean War: An Alliance Study* (New York: Manchester University Press, 1988). The 1st Commonwealth Division was formed in July 1951. It was preceded by the 27th British Commonwealth Brigade, which

There are also works on twentieth-century Canadian political and military history that devote some space to the Korean War J. L. Granatstein and David Bercuson's *War and Peacekeeping: From South Africa to the Gulf – Canada's Limited Wars* devotes two chapters to an examination of Canadian soldiers' experience in the Korean War, but offers no insight into the situation on the home front.[18] Granatstein's *Canada's Army: Waging the War and Keeping the Peace* and Desmond Morton's *A Military History of Canada: From Champlain to the Gulf War* are similar, providing a narrative account of the army's participation in Korea.[19] More general survey texts, such as *The Forked Road: Canada 1939-1957*, and, *Empire to Umpire* discuss the Korean War within the larger political context of post-war Canada.[20] Robert Bothwell's *The Big Chill: Canada and the Cold War* surprisingly offers only brief coverage of the Korean War.[21] *Canada and the Early Cold War 1943-1957*, edited by Greg Donaghy, contains three articles of note. Robert Bothwell discusses the federal government's policies towards Asia

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was comprised of 3rd Battalion, Royal Australian Regiment and 2nd Battalion, Princess Patricia's Canadian Light Infantry. The brigade was then re-formed as the 28th Commonwealth Brigade in April 1951. With the addition of the 29th Independent Infantry Brigade, a South Korean infantry unit, and the 25th Canadian Infantry Brigade, the 28th Brigade the 1st Commonwealth Division came into being. See Wood, *Strange Battleground*, 117-118.

[18] J. L. Granatstein and David Bercuson, *War and Peacekeeping: From South Africa to the Gulf – Canada's Limited Wars* (Toronto: Key Porter Books Limited, 1991), 90-198.

[19] J. L. Granatstein, *Canada's Army: Waging War and Keeping the Peace* (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2002), 321-335; Desmond Morton, *A Military History of Canada: From Champlain to the Gulf War* (Toronto: McClellan and Stewart Inc., 1992), 232-239.

[20] Donald Creighton, *The Forked Road: Canada 1939-1957* (Toronto: McClelland and Stewart Limited, 1976), 195-225; Norman Hillmer and J. L. Granatstein, *Empire to Umpire* (Toronto: Irwin Publishing, 1994), 207-220.

[21] Robert Bothwell, *The Big Chill: Canada and the Cold War* (Concord: Irwin Publishing, 1998), 35-39.

throughout the Cold War,[22] John English examines Canada's attitude towards the United Nations from 1943 to 1957,[23] and Denis Stairs studies the transitions and problems Canadian politicians faced in going from the hot (the Second World War) to the Cold War.[24]

The biographies and memoirs of the major political players during the period, on the whole, offer little insight and analysis into Canadian involvement in the Korean War. Dale C. Thomson's biography, *Louis St. Laurent: Canadian* and J. W. Pickersgill's memoirs *My Years with Louis St. Laurent*, offer only piecemeal information as to how the Prime Minister himself felt about and addressed the Korean War.[25] David Bercuson's biography of Minister of National Defence Brooke Claxton offers more analysis regarding Claxton's feelings on Canadian participation in Korea, and the impact the war would have on Canada's military forces.[26] Lester B. Pearson's memoirs offer a significant amount of information about his attitudes and experiences during the Korean War, more so, in fact, than John English's biography *The Worldly Years: The Life of*

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[22] Robert Bothwell, "Eyes West: Canada and the Cold War in Asia," in *Canada and the Early Cold War 1943-1957*, ed. Greg Donaghy (Ottawa: Canadian Government Publishing – PWGSC, 1998), 59-70.
[23] John English, "'A Fine Romance': Canada and the United Nations, 1943-1957," in *Canada and the Early Cold War 1943-1957*, ed. Greg Donaghy (Ottawa: Canadian Government Publishing – PWGSC, 1998), 73-89.
[24] Denis Stairs, "Realists at Work: Canadian Policy Makers and the Politics of Transition from Hot War to Cold War," in *Canada and the Early Cold War 1943-1957*, ed. Greg Donaghy (Ottawa: Canadian Government Publishing – PWGSC, 1998), 91-116.
[25] Dale C. Thomson, *Louis St. Laurent: Canadian* (Toronto: Macmillan of Canada, 1967); J. W. Pickersgill, *My Years with Louis St. Laurent* (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1975).
[26] David Bercuson, *True Patriot: The Life of Brooke Claxton, 1898-1960* (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1993), 207-239.

Lester Pearson, 1949-1972.[27] Pearson discusses the role he played in the United Nations, his dealings with the United States, and his own personal feelings about the war.[28]

Canada's role in the United Nations during the Korean War years is covered to varying degrees in several of the monographs already mentioned. Stairs's *The Diplomacy of Constraint*, Prince's "The Limits of Constraint," Bothwell's *The Big Chill*, English's article "'A Fine Romance,'" and Pearson's memoirs highlight various aspects of Canada's participation in the UN during these years. In addition, Sean Maloney's *Canada and UN Peacekeeping: Cold War by Other Means, 1945-1970* highlights the role Canadian soldiers played, working within the confines of the UN, in establishing and maintaining peace in the Cold War era, but only briefly covers the Korean War.[29] Although the subject matter in Adam Chapnick's *The Middle Power Project: Canada and the Founding of the United Nations* is outside the purview of this thesis, its re-evaluation of how Canada saw itself and its role in the founding of the United Nations is useful in providing a better understanding of how the Canadian government later dealt with the UN within the context of the Korean War.[30] In *The Shaping of Peace: Canada and the Search for World Order 1943-1957*, John Holmes, Canada's acting permanent delegate to the UN during the Korean War, studies the policies of the Department of

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[27] John English, *The Worldly Years: The Life of Lester Pearson Volume II: 1949-1972* (Toronto: Vintage Books Canada, 1993), 42-63.
[28] Lester B. Pearson, *Mike: The Memoirs of the Right Honourable Lester B. Pearson, Volume 2, 1948-1957* (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1973), 135-190.
[29] Sean Maloney, *Canada and UN Peacekeeping: Cold War by Other Means* (St. Catharines: Vanwell Publishing Limited, 2002), 31-36.
[30] Adam Chapnick, *The Middle Power Project: Canada and the Forming of the United Nations* (Vancouver: UBC Press, 2005), 1-6.

External Affairs, and how it went about moulding Canada's role on the international stage during the early Cold War.[31]

There is not an extensive literature on international Communism and its impact on the Canadian government, Canadian policy, and the Canadian public. Denis Smith studies the deteriorating relationship the western democracies had with the Soviet Union from the beginning of the Second World War to the entrenchment of Cold War attitudes in 1948, and the impact this had on the Canadian government and its policies.[32] Although the Korean War itself is not discussed, this monograph provides an important contextual framework to examine the conflict. In *Cold War Canada: The Making of a National Insecurity State, 1945-1957*, Reg Whitaker and Gary Marcuse examine how the Cold War and prevalent anti-Communism sentiments destroyed many lives, though their case studies do not shed significant light on how this specifically related back to the Korean War.[33]

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As Jeff Keshen and Sylvie Perrier note in their introduction to *Building New Bridges: Sources, Methods and Interdiscliplinarity* "melding older, often traditional, disciplinary-based approaches and utilizing sources in novel ways" has led to significant changes within the various social sciences.[34] In using newspaper editorials as its primary source, this thesis attempts to highlight an innovative method of using a traditional primary

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[31] John W. Holmes, *The Shaping of Peace: Canada and the Search for World Order 1943-1957, Volume 2*, (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1982).
[32] Denis Smith, *Diplomacy of Fear: Canada and the Cold War, 1941-1948* (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1988), 3-8.
[33] Reg Whitaker and Gary Marcuse, *Cold War Canada: The Making of a National Insecurity State, 1945-1957* (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1994).
[34] Eds. Jeff Keshen and Sylvie Perrier, *Building New Bridges: Sources, Methods and Interdisciplinarity* (Ottawa: University of Ottawa Press, 2005), 1.

source for historians. Many historians rely on newspapers as a primary source; however, they are generally used to support or add to other archival research. By placing newspapers themselves in the proper context, they can provide historians with a detailed understanding of the past and "shed new light on old topics."[35]

As previously stated, the purpose of this thesis is to provide a detailed examination of Canadian newspaper editorials from the start of the Korean War in June 1950 to December 1951. Although the war continued for another year and half, 1950 and 1951 was the most active time of the entire conflict, especially in generating news coverage and debate over the goals of the mission and whether Canada should be involved. Throughout most of this time, the fighting was not static, as both United Nations forces and the North Korean People's Army (NKPA) waged battles up and down the entire Korean peninsula. However, by April 1951, the fighting was contained to the area surrounding the 38th parallel, its ferocity dwindled, and the conflict became characterized by stalemate. While there were some attempts to break the line by the North Korean and Chinese forces, none was successful, and the front remained relatively stagnant until the armistice was signed on 27 July 1953.[36]

The high level of activity during 1950 and 1951 consequently produced numerous newspaper editorials. As the fighting slowly declined, so did the editorial coverage. A random sampling of newspaper editorials from 1952 and 1953 yielded little commentary

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[35] Jeff Keshen, "Reporting the People's War Ottawa (1914-1918)," in Ibid., 183.
[36] "Map 1, Chinese Communist Intervention, October 1950," Wood, *Strange Battleground*, 12. Indeed, Wood entitles two chapters of the official history "The Static War." See Wood, *Strange Battleground*, 181-211. It is also important to note that of the 312 Canadian deaths which occurred in Korea from 1950 to 1956, 184 transpired between 1950 and 1951, or 59% of the total. See *The Korea Veterans Association of Canada Memorial Book, 1950-1956*, ed. Wall of Remembrance Committee, Unit 57 (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1997), 28-59.

on the Korean War. The aim of this thesis is to provide an intensive and systematic analysis of press opinions on three topics connected to the Korean War most often discussed in the editorials. This work also affords some insight into what Canadians themselves were discussing during the war. Due to the fact that public polling did not begin in earnest until the 1960s,[37] this makes newspapers a valuable source in understanding both a newspaper's opinion and the pattern of public discourse.

W. H. Kesterton's *A History of Journalism in Canada* provides one of the earliest examinations of newspapers in Canada, in particular, the substantial change newspapers underwent from 1900 to 1967. For Kesterton, the end date signified the consolidation of newspapers in urban areas.[38] A less academic study, *The Rise of the Canadian Newspaper*, by Douglas Fetherling, also discusses this change, albeit in less detail.[39] Patrick Brennan's *Reporting the Nation's Business: Press-Government Relations During the Liberal Years, 1937-1957* discusses the relationship forged between a prominent

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[37] Claude Emery, *Public Polling in Canada*, http://dsp-psd.communication.gc.ca.proxy.bib.uottawa.ca/Collection-R/LoPBdP/BP/bp371-e.htm (accessed 16 May 2010). Although American newspapers utilized polling techniques since the 1820s, national polls only began in Canada in the 1940s. The first national poll was conducted by the Liberal Party to gauge the outcome of the conscription plebiscite in 1942. See also Claire Hoy, *Margin of Error: Pollsters and the Manipulation of Canadian Politics* (Toronto: Key Porter Books Limited, 1989), 9-21. Indeed, according to Michael Adams's introduction in *Polling and the Public Opinion: A Canadian Perspective*, the modern era of public polling did not begin until 1970s and 1980s. Peter M. Butler, *Polling and Public Opinion: A Canadian Perspective* (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2007), xiv.

[38] W. H. Kesterton, *A History of Journalism in Canada* (Ottawa: Carleton University Press, 1967), 64-83. Although Canada boasted a large number of daily newspapers at the turn of the 20th century, by the 1920s, that number had sharply declined. While there was some minor growth, by 1967, there were fewer daily newspapers published than in 1913. The newspapers that did survive to 1967 were "... strikingly larger, far more heavily capitalized, far more dependent on an impressively massive technology."

[39] Douglas Fetherling, *The Rise of the Canadian Newspaper* (Toronto: Oxford University Press, 1990), 107-117.

group of five English-speaking journalists and the senior bureaucrats of the Liberal civil service.[40] As Brennan notes, these journalists believed "it was 'professional' to report public policy accurately, comment on it intelligently, and, in the process, exercise influence on the government and the public alike."[41] While partisan to some extent, this group of journalists were "independent Liberals," who were attracted to the fundamental ideas, style, and people that made up the Liberal Party during this time.[42] Although the Korean War itself is only briefly discussed, this book proves useful in understanding the larger relationship between the press and the government during the early Cold War. Finally, Robert Prince's Ph.D. dissertation "The Mythology of War: How the Canadian Daily Newspaper Depicted the Great War" is useful as a guide in utilizing newspapers as the primary source of historical analysis, and how newspapers themselves have the ability to shape public consciousness.[43]

This thesis relies on a three-pronged approach to justify how newspaper editorials can be utilized as a gauge for public opinion and discourse. Firstly, Paul Rutherford discusses in *The Making of the Canadian Media* the relationship between Canadian newspapers and their readers. Rutherford acknowledges that there are limits to the

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[40] The five journalists studied are: Grant Dexter, editor of the *Winnipeg Free Press*; Ken Wilson, editor of the *Financial Post*; Blair Fraser, editor of *Maclean's*; and journalists Bruce Hutchinson, and George Ferguson, the latter of whom later became editor of the *Montreal Star.*

[41] Patrick Brennan, *Reporting the Nation's Business: Press-Government Relations During the Liberal Years, 1935-1957* (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1994), x.

[42] Ibid., xi.

[43] Robert Prince, "The Mythology of War: How the Canadian Daily Newspaper Depicted the Great War," Ph.D. Diss., University of Toronto, 1998.

influence newspapers had on Canadians; still, as "a complete medium of mass communication,"[44] he contends:

> Whatever their origin, ... the values implicit in these messages acquired an independent existence by the very fact of production for and dissemination to all sorts of people. The enormous popularity of the messages made them an important force in Canadian life... The press acted as an agent of consensus: the habitual consumption of its messages united people otherwise divided by distance, religion, language, or class. People shared a common idiom.[45]

Secondly, in Roger Fowler's book *Language in the News: Discourse and Ideology in the Press*, he argues that news, rather than being an unbiased account of events, is socially constructed. The institutions which are responsible for reporting the news and its dissemination "... are socially, economically and politically situated."[46] As the news exists within a specific context, it is inherently impacted and influenced by the culture and ideals of that environment. Events are considered newsworthy because they have been selected, based on these social, political, or economic factors.[47] Because the news is created and constructed as a reflection of society's values and mores, this reinforces the fact that the news connects to, and reveals much about that society.

Finally, Minko Sotiron's book *From Politics to Profit: The Commercialization of Canadian Daily Newspapers, 1890-1920* discusses the drastic change that Canadian newspapers underwent during the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. Up until the turn of the century, the Canadian newspaper industry was extremely diverse, with numerous tracts. However, an economic boom, a growing urban population,

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[44] Paul Rutherford, *The Making of the Canadian Media* (Toronto: McGraw-Hill Ryerson Limited, 1978), 75.
[45] Ibid., 75.
[46] Roger Fowler, *Language in the News: Discourse and Ideology in the Press* (London: Routledge, 1991), 10.
[47] Ibid., 10-11.

improvements in education and literacy rates, and an expanding national market drastically altered newspapers. They gradually became businesses, driven by profit, rather than used for promulgating a political viewpoint.[48] As Sotiron states, "financial considerations, not political ones, came to dominate the newspaper business."[49] The vast majority of this new money came from advertising revenue. To attract advertisers, newspapers had to widen their appeal. They accomplished this by establishing new sections such as sports, introduced contests, and their news stories became more sensationalist in order to build readership. This growing readership, in turn, attracted more advertisers, which permitted continued growth. Indeed, "advertising and the related drive towards circulation growth and self-promotion became the chief engine of newspaper development."[50] It is this need to resonate with an expanding readership which further legitimizes the use of newspapers as an historical source. To ensure their own survival, newspapers had to attract a broad swath of readers, and thus on some level had to reflect a significant portion of public opinion, thus further cementing them as an important source for historical examination.

Although there is strong evidence for the validity of utilizing newspapers as an historical source and as a gauge of public opinion, such a gauge is not foolproof, and the limits of newspapers must be recognized. In order to utilize newspapers effectively, it is critical to ascertain their target readership, and consider their circulation numbers.[51] This thesis attempted to sample newspapers which were highly representative of Canada in the

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[48] Minko Sotiron, *From Politics to Profit: The Commercialization of Canadian Daily Newspapers, 1890-1920* (Montreal: McGill-Queen's University Press, 1997), 3-9.
[49] Ibid., 4.
[50] Ibid., 7.
[51] Keshen, "Reporting the People's War Ottawa (1914-1918)," *Building New Bridges: Sources, Methods and Interdisciplinarity*, 183.

1950s. This work consulted major, widely-distributed newspapers, published in either French or English, ensured that each region of the country was represented, that the cities in which the newspapers were published constituted the major urban centers within their region, and covered independent, as well as Liberal and Conservative-leaning sources.

According to the 1951 Census, the population of Canada was 14 009 429.[52] Halifax had a population of 85 589, Montreal, 1 021 520, Toronto, 675 754, Winnipeg, 235 710, and Vancouver, 344 833.[53] In 1950, there were 81 daily newspapers with a combined circulation of 2 913 438.[54] In Quebec, 11 daily French-language newspapers were published in 1950 and 1951, with a circulation of around 582,000.[55] The 1951 circulation number for the *Halifax Chronicle-Herald* was 61 765, *Le Devoir*, 19 470, the *Montreal Gazette*, 64 262, the *Toronto Star*, 421 121, *The Globe and Mail*, 236 595, the *Winnipeg Free Press*, 104 731, and the *Vancouver Province*, 101 040.[56] Three of the newspapers, the *Vancouver Province*, *The Globe and Mail*, and *Le Devoir* considered their political leanings as independent, while the *Winnipeg Free Press*, the *Toronto Star*, and the *Halifax Chronicle-Herald* considered themselves to be independent-Liberal.

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[52] "1.-Numerical Distribution of Population by Province, and Percentage Change From Preceding Census, Decennial Census Years 1901-51 and 1956," *Canada Yearbook 1961: Official Statistical Annual of the Resources, History, Institutions and Social and Economic Conditions of Canada* (Ottawa: Queen's Printer and Controller of Stationary, 1961), 146.

[53] "5.-Incorporated Cities with Populations Over 30, 000 at the 1956 Census, with Comparable Data for 1951," *Canada Yearbook 1961*, 151.

[54] "1-Estimated Number and Circulations of Reporting Daily and Weekly English-Language Newspapers, by Provinces, 1949-1951," *Canada Yearbook 1952-53: The Official Statistical Annual of the Resources, History, Institutions, and Social and Economic Conditions of Canada*, (Ottawa: Queen's Printer and Controller of Stationary, 1953), 860.

[55] "2-Estimated Numbers and Circulations of Reporting Daily and Weekly French-Language Newspapers, by Provinces, 1949-51," *Canada Yearbook 1952-53*, 861.

[56] Ibid., 800.

Only the *Montreal Gazette* labelled itself as independent-Conservative.[57] It is important to note, however, that while *Le Devoir* listed its political leanings as independent, it promulgated a strong Quebec nationalist, isolationist view. Consequently, this bias had a strong impact on the opinions expressed by the editorial writers.

In order to provide a comprehensive study, the vast majority of newspaper editorials from each newspaper published between June 1950 and December 1951 were examined.[58] Unlike *Le Devoir*, none of the English-language newspapers provided the names of the editorials' authors. However, as previously stated, all the newspapers had a political leaning, and consequently the editorialists themselves would write material in line with this bias. In addition, the editorialists covered a wide range of topics even within the broader main themes of Canada, Communism, and the United Nations selected for analysis. However, only those topics which were discussed four times or more in the editorials were studied to highlight both the similarities and differences of opinions among the newspapers. This explains why there are fewer editorials from *Le Devoir* and from 1951; while there were editorials, they simply did not fit in with the determined analytical criteria. Finally, despite the number of well-known reporters who went to report the Korean War from the front, such as Ross Munro, William (Bill) Boss, Blair Fraser, Pierre Berton, and René Lévesque, these articles were not utilized. While providing a fascinating look at the Canadian soldiers' lives in Korea, these stories ultimately fall outside the purview of this thesis.

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[57] All the newspapers' political affiliations can be found with their respective circulation numbers. See "Canadian Newspaper and Magazine Directory," *Canadian Almanac and Directory for 1952.*

[58] See Appendix A.

Chapter One provides a background of the Korean War, in particular, focusing on the United Nations' involvement and Canada's participation. Chapter Two examines the editorial reaction to Canada's entrance and involvement in the conflict. While editorialists for the French language newspaper *Le Devoir* voiced their concerns over Canada's participation in Korea, on the whole, English language newspapers believed that Canada had a duty to provide substantive military resources to aid the United Nations forces. Furthermore, the English language editorialists were extremely critical of the federal government's slow and indecisive response to the conflict. Finally, they were critical of the government's total lack of military preparedness, which was seen as leaving Canada open and vulnerable to Communist influences.

Chapter Three studies the role Communism played in the Korean War. While the editorialists reached a consensus regarding the threat of Communism, opinions varied as to the role the Soviet Union was playing in Korea, the larger implications of the war itself, questions regarding the role of Communist China, and the overall influence of Communism on the United Nations.

Finally, Chapter Four discusses the role of the United Nations. While the common historical argument has been that Canada has consistently been a strong supporter of the United Nations, during the Korean War, this support was called into question. Some editorialists blatantly questioned how effective the UN could be in the Korean War, while others still maintained that the organization could play a vital role in ending the conflict. Others wondered whether the UN could move past the League of Nations' legacy, and how it would go about doing this. Finally, questions were raised as

to whether the UN could even be effective in bringing about peace to Korea and how it would go about doing this.

Chapter One

Uninvited and Unannounced – Background to the Korean War

Due to its strategic location, the Korean peninsula has been riddled with conflict throughout its history. The peninsula had been controlled and influenced by China for thousands of years; however, in 1905, it became a protectorate of Japan following the conclusion of the Russo-Japanese War. Korea was then annexed by Japan in 1910, which imposed military rule.[1]

Koreans did not react favourably to the Japanese takeover, and throughout the twentieth century, groups on both the political right and left voiced their displeasure. On the left, the strongest opposition came from the Communists.[2] Among their most prominent leaders was Kim Il Sung, who had emerged as a major political player by 1945. Sung had developed close ties to Communists in the Soviet Union, and to the Chinese Communist Party, which gained power in China in 1949.[3] Despite the fractious nature of the Korean Communists, they were unified in their stalwart opposition to the Japanese.[4]

The political right was dominated by Conservative Nationalists, and was led by Dr. Syngman Rhee. Rhee gained supporters due to his singular vision of the kind of Korea he wished to create: completely independent from Japan, and the expulsion of the Communists.[5] However, Rhee was aware that nothing could come of his plans until the

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[1] Djun Kil Kim, *The History of Korea* (Westport: Greenwood Press, 2005), xv-xix.
[2] Peter Lowe, *The Origins of the Korean War* (London: Longman, 1997), 7-8.
[3] Ibid., 9-12. As Lowe discusses, Communists in Korea could be divided into four factions: Koreans who maintained their loyalty to Moscow, Koreans working with the Chinese Communist Party, indigenous Communists, and supporters of Kim Il Sung.
[4] Ibid., 12.
[5] Ibid., 8-9.

Japanese turned their attentions elsewhere. With the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor on 7 December 1941 and the entry of the United States into the Second World War, Rhee believed that it was only a matter of time before Korea would become an independent nation.[6] However, the conservative nationalists also encountered considerable difficulties, as many were not as vehement in their stance against the Japanese as Kim Il Sung and the Communists.[7] It was this dichotomy between the Communists and Conservative Nationalists that set the stage for the central role the Korean peninsula was to play during the early years of the Cold War.

The future of the Korean peninsula became a concern throughout the Second World War. When the United States declared war against Japan in December 1941, control of Korea became a worry of the Allies. It was determined that Japan could not go unpunished for its unprovoked attack and blatant militarism, and that Japan had to be stripped of its overseas possessions, such as the Korean peninsula. The resulting Cairo Declaration of 1943 made this sentiment abundantly clear:

> The aforesaid three great powers [Great Britain, the United States, and China], mindful of the enslavement of the people of Korea, are determined that in due course Korea shall become free and independent.[8]

With the end of the Second World War in August 1945, the responsibility of facilitating the disarmament of the Japanese forces fell to the United States and the Soviet Union, and the 38th parallel in Korea was chosen as the dividing line between north and south Korea. The reasons behind the division were purely administrative; the American

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[6] Ibid., 9.
[7] Ibid., 12.
[8] *Cairo Communiqué, December 1 1943*, http://www.ndl.go.jp/constitution/e/shiryo/01/002_46/002_46tx.html (accessed 6 May 2010).

military planners wanted two ports of entry, specifically Pusan and Inchon. Thus, the US gained control over the southern half of the peninsula, while the Soviet Union gained control over the north.[9]

Koreans believed that with the surrender of the Japanese would lead to their independence. However, this was not to be. At the Moscow Conference of Foreign Ministers in October 1945, it was determined that a four-power trusteeship, consisting of the United States, the Soviet Union, Great Britain, and China would be established.[10] At the suggestion of the Soviet Union, the trusteeship would then be supported by a Joint Commission of US and the Soviet Union representatives to aid in the governing of the peninsula.[11] The Soviet Union managed to keep any discontent from the North silent, and the United States turned to Syngman Rhee to aid them in gaining support in the South.[12] The trusteeship was not able to act as an effective governing body, and the 38th parallel quickly became representative of the growing separation between the US and the Soviet Union. Finally, on 6 May 1946, the American delegation to the Joint Commission stated that they were at an impasse, as the Soviet Union delegation had halted negotiations. Difficulties stemmed from the fact that the Joint Commission could not

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[9] Lowe, *The Origins of the Korean War*, 18-20.

[10] Herbert Fairlie Wood, *Strange Battleground: The Operations in Korea and Their Effects on the Defence Policy of Canada* (Ottawa: Queen's Printer and Controller of Stationary, 1966), 4. As early as November 1945, Canadian Prime Minister William Lyon Mackenzie King also endorsed this organizational plan.

[11] Ibid., 4.

[12] Ibid., 4-5. Syngman Rhee had been exiled by the Japanese in 1925 and returned in October 1945. Despite years of exile, Rhee remained popular among Koreans, and upon his return, he unified the various political parties in the South, with the exception of the Communists. His successes gained him additional support, and it quickly became evident to the United States that Rhee would be an important ally for their work on the trusteeship. This was especially apparent when after the trusteeship was established, Rhee helped to quell riots at the request of the United States. This further cemented Rhee's close relationship with the US.

agree on which Korean political parties should be consulted. The Soviet Union did not want any parties associated with the political right involved, nor did the US have any desire to deal with the Communists.[13] The impasse continued, and as 1946 drew to a close, Syngman Rhee finally appealed to the United Nations to assist in rectifying the situation in Korea.[14]

In September 1947, the United Nations Temporary Commission on Korea (UNTCOK) was established. Its mandate was to oversee and supervise a peninsula-wide election to be held in 1948. The elected officials could then establish a central administration, which would then acquire governmental control from US and the Soviet Union authorities. The ultimate goal was that the Korean peninsula would be united. Moreover, the involvement of the United Nations would afford the newly united country a sense of international legitimacy.[15] Despite its unification however, Korea would still remain under the control of either the US or the Soviet Union, a point which would create many future problems.

UNTCOK proved to be a source of contention among Canadian politicians, despite being a fairly routine commission. Following the Second World War, Prime Minister William Lyon Mackenzie King was worried about the possibility of Canada becoming embroiled in another conflict, or even becoming involved in international commitments that had the potential to lead Canada into war. This isolationist policy was particularly evident in how Mackenzie King responded to the possibility of Canada's participation on UNTCOK. John Foster Dulles, who had been dispatched to the UN by

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[13] Ibid., 5.
[14] Ibid., 5.
[15] Denis Stairs, *The Diplomacy of Constraint: Canada, the Korean Peninsula, and the United States*, (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1974), 6.

the American Secretary of State George Marshall, asked that Canada be a member of the commission. The Canadian delegates were surprised at the selection, however, as Stairs notes, Lester B. Pearson viewed UNTCOK as "simply another routine United Nations committee," although he did suggest that the Americans find "a nominee with more experience in the Far East."[16] Contrasted with this relative willingness to participate was Prime Minister Mackenzie King's resistance. He was so adamantly opposed to the idea that, according to Minister of National Defence Brooke Claxton, the prime minister "'blew a gasket and proceeded to give [Minister of External Affairs] St. Laurent [who favoured Canada's involvement] 'a going over as if he was a naughty little school-boy who had committed a sin against the Holy Ghost.'"[17] The resulting conflict between Mackenzie King, Secretary of State Louis St. Laurent, and the Deputy Minister for External Affairs, Lester B. Pearson, led to threats of resignation from both Mackenzie King and St. Laurent, and serious questions arose over whether Canada would even be a member of the commission. Ultimately, King relented, and Canada did have a representative on UNTCOK.[18] The Korean peninsula posed no significant issues for the federal government until 25 June 1950, with the outbreak of the Korean War.

By June 1950, the Canadian army had changed drastically in the five years since the Second World War. By the end of the war, Canada, a country of twelve million, had one out of every twelve people in the armed forces.[19] However, upon the conclusion of the war, the vast majority of the regiments, battalions and divisions were simply

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[16] Ibid., 8.
[17] Ibid., 9.
[18] Ibid., 17-28; John Price, "The 'Cat's Paw': Canada and the United Nations Temporary Commission on Korea," *Canadian Historical Review*, 85:2 (June 2004), 297-324.
[19] C. P. Stacey, *Arms, Men and Governments: The War Policies of Canada 1939-1945* (Ottawa: The Queen's Printer for Canada, 1970), 65-66.

disbanded, and the men who served in them returned to their pre-war lives. After 1945, Canada had no discernable enemies, and the Liberal Party was more preoccupied with building the welfare state than it was with maintaining Canada's peacetime army.[20] With the beginning of the Cold War, and the repercussions of the Gouzenko Affair, Canada was closely aligned with the United States, and was wary of the dangers posed by an increasingly aggressive Soviet Union. However, if conflict did occur, what role would the armed forces play? The government could afford to maintain a large standing army, but in order to maintain it, other areas of government spending would have to be cut back, which Canadians were not prepared to do. Ultimately, the roles of Canada's peacetime army were to defend the country, train the reserves, and prepare for possible mobilization.[21]

The initial cuts to the Canadian military were substantial. By the end of 1945, the government had determined that the army would be comprised of 27 000 troops, excluding the reserves, and have a total budget of $172 million.[22] By July 1947, the Active Force only had 13 985 men, and 32 610 men total ranks, despite assurances to the United States that Canada would continue to maintain, and eventually enhance, its military capabilities.[23] Furthermore, though in April 1949, Canada became a charter member of the anti-Communist North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), it did not significantly augment its military strength. Consequently, at the start of the Korean War,

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[20] David Bercuson, *Blood on the Hills: The Canadian Army in the Korean War* (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1999), 14.
[21] J. L. Granatstein, *Canada's Army: Waging War and Keeping the Peace* (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2002), 316.
[22] Ibid., 316. Although these numbers were less than what the army had wanted, this plan would have created the largest peacetime regular force in Canadian history.
[23] Ibid., 316, 319.

Canada was not well prepared. The 1949-1950 defence budget was still only $375 million, with $124 million allocated to the army, which was well below what was needed to fulfill its commitments. The Active Force's strength remained under 20 000, and Reserves numbered 38 500. Furthermore, weapons, vehicles, and other equipment had not yet been updated, and was not standardized.[24] As Prime Minister Louis St. Laurent admitted in a 7 August 1950 radio address:

> Since our wartime forces were demobilized, we have not attempted to maintain, in the Canadian Army, a fully trained expeditionary force available for immediate action outside of Canada. We wanted to get the best values we could for the Canadian taxpayer's defence dollars; and for the Army, the first requirements were for our immediate territorial defence and for a basic training establishment.[25]

War, quite simply, was not on the minds of Canadians in June 1950.

But war came when the North Korean People's Army (NKPA), armed and trained by the Soviet Union, attacked an unsuspecting South Korea, crossing the 38th parallel on 25 June 1950. Over the next month and a half, the NKPA quickly pushed south, capturing the South Korean capital of Seoul, and pushed Republic of Korea (ROK) and American soldiers, who had arrived not long after the invasion, to a south-eastern pocket around the port of Pusan. An amphibious counter-assault at the port of Inchon on 15 September 1950, and the breaking out of the Pusan pocket helped push the NKPA forces back well past the 38th parallel, and up to the Yalu River, the Korean peninsula's northern border with China, by November.[26] However, this triggered a massive offensive by the People's Liberation Army (PLA) that pushed ROK, American, and other UN troops back

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[24] Ibid., 319-320; Wood, *Strange Battleground*, 16-19.
[25] "Statement by the Prime Minister, August 7, 1950," *Canada and the Korean Crisis* (Ottawa: King's Printer and Controller of Stationary, 1950), 33.
[26] Wood, *Strange Battleground*, 12.

again across the 38th parallel. By 21 April 1951, the soldiers had regained the ground, and the fighting remained fairly concentrated around the 38th parallel until an armistice was established on 27 July 1953.[27]

On 25 June 1950, the United Nations Secretary General Trygve Lie called the Security Council for an emergency session at the request of the United States government. It was decided during this session that the North Korean invasion constituted a threat to international peace and security, and that it was the Security Council's duty to take the necessary steps to re-establish peace. On 27 June 1950, the Security Council passed Resolution 83 which called for the immediate cessation of hostilities, the withdrawal of the North Korean troops to the 38th parallel, that all UN member nations refrain from aiding North Korea, and that they do their upmost to ensure the resolution was enforced.[28] A second resolution passed on 7 July called on all member nations to provide ground forces to aid in the fight. These ground forces would work as part of a unified command led by the United States. It was the first time since the United Nations creation in 1945 that the principle of international collective security was invoked.[29] However, it is important to note that such swift and drastic action was made possible by the fact that the Soviet Union had been boycotting the United Nations since January 1950 due to the exclusion of the People's Republic of China (PRC) from the

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[27] Ibid., 12

[28] "*83 (1950). Resolution of 27 June 1950,*" 5. http://daccess-dds-ny.un.org/doc/RESOLUTION/GEN/NR0/064/97/IMG/NR006497.pdf?OpenElement (accessed 6 September 2010).

[29] "*84 (1950. Resolution of 7 July 1950,*" 5-6. http://daccess-dds-ny.un.org/doc/RESOLUTION/GEN/NR0/064/97/IMG/NR006497.pdf?OpenElement (accessed 6 September 2010).

organization.[30] Accordingly, no Soviet representative was present in the UN Security Council to cast a veto. It was these two resolutions that brought Canada into the Korean War.

From the very beginning of the Korean War, Canada's contribution to the conflict evolved and changed. Prime Minister Louis St. Laurent stated in a 30 June speech to the House of Commons:

> ... any participation by Canada in carrying out the UN resolution – and I wish to emphasize this strongly – would not be participation in war against any state. It would be our part in collective police action under the control and authority of the United Nations for the purpose of restoring peace ... It is only in such circumstances that this country would be involved in action of this kind.[31]

In the same speech, St. Laurent said that three naval destroyers, HMCS *Cayuga*, HMCS *Athabaskan*, and HMCS *Sioux*, would be dispatched to Korean waters as soon as possible.[32] At the end of July 1950, the war worsened for the United Nations' forces, and thus Canada placed at the disposal of the UN the Royal Canadian Air Force's 426 squadron of transport aircraft.[33] However, in keeping with the government's post-war isolationist tendencies and limited war policy, it resisted deploying any ground forces to the Korean peninsula.

On 14 July 1950, John W. Holmes, Canada's acting permanent delegate at the United Nations, received a telegram from Secretary Lie which stated:

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[30] Ibid., 37; Wood, *Strange Battleground*, 8-9.
[31] *Official Report of the Debates House of Commons, Second Session – Twenty-First Parliament, Volume IV* (Ottawa: King's Printer and Controller of Stationary, 1950), 4459.
[32] Wood, *Strange Battleground*, 13. On 5 July 1950, the destroyers left Esquimalt for Pearl Harbor.
[33] Ibid., 14.

> I have been informed that the Government of the United States which, under the resolution of 7 July 1950 has been given the responsibility for the Unified Command, is now prepared to engage in direct consultation with your Government with regard to the co-ordination of all assistance in a general plan for the attainment of the objectives set forth by the Security Council resolution. In this connection I have been advised that there is an urgent need for additional effective assistance. I should be grateful, therefore, if your Government would examine its capacity to provide an increased volume of combat forces, particularly ground forces.[34]

Given the state of the Canadian forces, the Chief of the General Staff, General Charles Foulkes, believed that the only way of getting enough troops was by creating a specially enlisted force. This brigade-size group would then operate within a yet-to-be-created Commonwealth division. On 19 July, the Cabinet Defence Committee decided that no forces would be sent immediately to Korea, but that if they were, they would be included in a Commonwealth formation. More importantly, however, was the fact that no troops would be deployed unless their formations were at full strength, and had adequate reinforcements.[35]

Throughout July, the federal government faced mounting pressure from the United States, the United Nations, and other Commonwealth countries such as Great Britain and Australia, to deploy ground forces to the Korean peninsula. On 7 August 1950, Prime Minister St. Laurent announced the decision to begin recruitment for the Canadian Army Special Force (CASF)[36] to be "'specially trained and equipped to be

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[34] "Telegram from the Secretary-General of the United Nations to the Acting Canadian Permanent Delegate to the United Nations, July 14, 1950," *Canada and the Korean Crisis*, 28.

[35] Wood, *Strange Battleground*, 19-21. According to Wood, this last point highlighted how truly unprepared Canada was for any substantial military action.

[36] When the Canadian Army Special Force was created, the term *Special Force* was used interchangeably with 25th Infantry Brigade. However, as CASF evolved, the term *Special Force* came to denote only those units, of whatever kind, which were devoted only to the Korean War. See Wood, *Strange Battleground*, 34.

available for use in carrying out Canada's obligations under the United Nations charter or the North Atlantic pact.'"[37] The new units were originally to be comprised of three infantry battalions which would then be attached to one of the permanent force battalions, plus one artillery regiment, a field ambulance, an infantry workshop, a transport company, and two light aid detachments. Approximately 4 960 men would fill all ranks, plus 2 105 men as additional reinforcements. The aim was to recruit Second World War veterans who had returned to civilian life, and members of the reserves, as they had previous military experience.[38] Soldiers in the Active Force would only be called upon to round out the CASF. However, this proved to be unnecessary. Even on 8 August, recruiting depots saw long line ups of young men willing and ready to enlist.[39] In choosing a commanding officer for the brigade, Claxton and his advisers turned to the former commanding officer of the Royal Hamilton Light Infantry, John M. Rockingham. His extensive combat experience during the Second World War made him an ideal candidate. The commanding officers of the three infantry units, Jacques Dextraze (2nd Battalion, Royal 22e Régiment), James R. Stone (2nd Battalion, Princess Patricia's Canadian Light Infantry), and Robert Keane (2nd Battalion, Royal Canadian Regiment), had also seen extensive action in the Second World War.[40]

To facilitate the training of the newly recruited Canadian Army Special Force, it was decided that its members would undergo basic training with the regular force, and then be transferred to Fort Lewis, Washington for additional training. With all the troops

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[37] Wood, *Strange Battleground*, 23.
[38] Ibid., 27. By November 1950, the CASF was made up of 7 500 men, all ranks. See Wood, *Strange Battleground*, 35.
[39] William Johnston, *A War of Patrols: Canadian Army Operations in Korea* (Vancouver: UBC Press, 2003), 25-27.
[40] Ibid., 27-28, 30.

of the CASF amalgamated at Fort Lewis, the Special Force nomenclature was dropped, and from then on the group was known as the 25th Canadian Infantry Brigade.[41] The original units which comprised the 25th Brigade were the second battalions of the Royal Canadian Regiment (2RCR), Princess Patricia's Canadian Light Infantry (2PPCLI), and Royal 22e Régiment (2R22eR), C Squadron of Lord Strathcona's Horse (Royal Canadians), 2nd Field Regiment, Royal Canadian Horse Artillery (RCHA), 57th Canadian Independent Field Squadron, Royal Canadian Engineers (RCE), 25th Canadian Infantry Brigade Signal Squadron, No. 54 Service Corps (RCASC), and No. 25 Field Ambulance, Royal Canadian Army Medical Corps (RCAMC).[42]

With the successful Inchon landings, the recapture of Seoul, and the breaking out of the Pusan pocket, it initially seemed that the 25th Brigade would not see combat. Thus, only a full complement from the 2nd Battalion, Princess Patricia's Canadian Light Infantry was deployed to Korea on 25 November, and arrived 18 December 1950. As the 2PPCLI had yet to complete any substantial training, it was thought that they would finish their preparation in Korea, and enter combat in mid-March 1951. However, with the surprise entry of Chinese Communist Forces in November, their full training schedule was cut short, and 2PPCLI entered combat on 19 February 1951 under the command of the 27th British Commonwealth Infantry Brigade.[43]

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[41] Wood, *Strange Battleground*, 47.

[42] Ibid., 271-279; Historical Section, General Staff, Army Headquarters, *Canada's Army in Korea: The United Nations Operations, 1950-1953, and Their Aftermath* (Ottawa: Queen's Printer, 1956), 3.

[43] Wood, *Strange Battleground*, 55, 61. It was initially thought that 2PPCLI would act as an occupying force instead of acting as combat unit. It is important to note that the commander of 2PPCLI, Lt-Col. Stone, insisted that his men receive eight weeks of training prior to entering into combat.

While 2PPCLI saw action at Hills 444 and 532, and captured objectives across the 38th parallel,[44] their most notable battle was at Kap'yong, from 23 to 25 April 1951. On the night of 22-23 April, the NKPA and CCF launched a strong attack against the UN troops, forcing the 9th US Corps and the 6th ROK Division to retreat. The 27th Commonwealth Brigade was ordered to take up a defensive position north of the village of Kap'yong, located north-east of Seoul. Over three days, the Patricias faced consistent enemy attacks to dislodge them from the high ground. The hills proved difficult to defend; the battalion was ultimately surrounded by the enemy, its supply lines were cut, and "B" and "D" Companies positions were partially overrun. However, the men of 2PPCLI persevered, and, on 25 April, the NKPA and the CCF departed the area.[45] For their brave stand at Kap'yong, 2nd Battalion received a US Presidential Citation, the first such recognition for Canadians, which read, "By their achievements, they have brought distinguished credit on themselves, their homelands, and freedom loving nations."[46] The battalion was the only Canadian unit to be so honoured during the war.

While 2PPCLI was fighting in the hills of Korea, the remainder of the 25th Brigade continued its training at Fort Lewis. It was uncertain whether the men would ultimately be deployed to Korea. However, on 21 February 1951, Minister of National Defence Brooke Claxton announced that the remainder of the 25th Brigade would be sent to Korea, and in mid-April, the men started their journey. The troops docked in Pusan on 4 May, and after a brief training period, joined the 28th British Commonwealth Brigade,

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[44] Ibid., 62-67, 70-72.
[45] Ibid., 72-79.
[46] Ibid., 164-166; Historical Section, General Staff, Army Headquarters, *Canada's Army in Korea*, 16. The 1st Gloucestershire Regiment and 3rd Battalion of the Royal Australian Regiment also received the citation.

which had begun to push towards the 38th parallel. On 24 May, the brigade was then placed under command of the 25th US Infantry Division and moved to an area north-east of Uijongbu. The first major action the 25th Brigade encountered was the 2RCR's fight at Kakhul-Bong (Hill 467) and at the abandoned town of Chail-li at the end of May 1951.[47]

For the first two weeks of June, the 25th Brigade patrolled a strategic salient formed by the conjunction of the Imjim and Hantan Rivers. It then moved to a 6 900 metre front southwest of Chornwon. The area was rugged and hilly, which made it prone to enemy infiltration. The men had to be constantly vigilant, ensuring the line was not broken. They were then moved into reserve from 28 June to September 1951. In July, the 25th Brigade was transferred to the newly created 1st Commonwealth Division under the command of Major-General J.H. Cassells.[48]

In September and October 1951, *Operations Minden* and *Commando* were carried out to protect and fortify the UN's supply lines between Chorwon and Seoul. The 25th Brigade did not play a central role in *Operation Minden,* but did aid in patrolling the area.[49] In *Operation Commando*, which lasted from 3-8 October 1951, a new front known as the Jamestown Line was established. The role of the 25th Brigade was to improve and protect the line's position through patrolling.[50]

The first rotation in the 25th Brigade was the replacement of 2PPCLI with the 1st Battalion, Princess Patricia's Canadian Light Infantry (1PPCLI) throughout October and November 1951. The rotation was done gradually to allow for the orientation of the new

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[47] Wood, *Strange Battleground: The Operations in Korea and Their Effects on the Defence Policy of Canada*, 82-84, 89-99, 101-106.
[48] Ibid., 106-112, 117-121.
[49] Ibid., 124-128.
[50] Ibid., 128-133.

soldiers.[51] However, within two weeks of their arrival, one company of 1PPCLI were involved in *Operation Pepperpot*, along with companies from 2R22^{e}R, 2RCR, RCE and Lord Strathcona's Horse.[52]

In response to *Operation Commando*, the PLA launched attacks against the UN forces in October 1951.[53] On 22 November, PLA forces began shelling the American held Hill 355. However, due to their proximity to the hill, "D" Company of 2R22^{e}R was also shelled. The next afternoon, the enemy attacked Hill 355 and the surrounding areas. Although 2R22^{e}R was able to hold their ground, the Americans lost the hill. The permanent loss of Hill 355 would have been a serious threat to UN forces, and 2R22^{e}R was in danger of being encircled by the PLA on Hills 355 and near by Hill 227. Throughout 23-25 November, the shelling and attacks against Hill 355 increased, as the hill was passed between the Chinese and American forces numerous times. On 25 November, the Americans finally gained control of the hill, and despite the constant shelling, 2R22^{e}R managed to hold its ground.[54] The year ended on a relatively quiet note, as cease-fire negotiations had been renewed on 27 November.[55]

As Korea was the first major conflict of the Cold War era Canadian newspapers provided extensive coverage, especially with the decision to involve the country militarily. The press commented and debated numerous issues. How would the government react? Would Canada deploy ground forces? How prepared were Canada's

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[51] Ibid., 146-147.
[52] Ibid., 148-149.
[53] Ibid., 149-152.
[54] Ibid., 153-160.
[55] Ibid., 171-174. A patrol from 2RCR did encounter some fire while out on patrol on 6-7 December. Also a raid was conducted on Hill 227 by D Company of 1PPCLI on 10 December.

own defences in this new age of conflict? Canadian newspaper editorialists were eager to share their opinions.

Chapter Two

Up In Arms – Editorial Reaction to Canada's Involvement

Throughout the Korean War, Canadian newspapers published editorials on the conflict that were wide ranging and expressed a variety of different opinions. Throughout 1950 and 1951, questions varied from how the conflict was progressing, to the larger ideological and strategic implications of the war itself, and expressions of hopes for peace all provided consistent fodder for editorialists. The role Canada was to play in the war was also frequently discussed by Canadian editorialists. While other editorial topics reflected a diverse range of opinions, this was not the case regarding Canada's role in the Korean War. With the exception of *Le Devoir*, and on occasion the *Toronto Star*, the press was supportive of Canada's full participation in the conflict. However, the press was also extremely critical of the federal government for its slow and inconsistent response to what was portrayed as a significant threat to Canadian security. Editorialists were critical of the government for not calling Parliament back into session when the war began, and for its lack of strong and decisive leadership. Criticisms were also expressed over the apparent deterioration of the army, navy, and air force due to the rapid demobilization following the Second World War, which, with the outbreak of the Korean War, called into question the country's national security in the face of an aggressive Communist threat.

Canadian editorialists were quick to respond to the North Korea People's Army (NKPA) invasion. Two days following the invasion, an editorialist for the *Vancouver Province* called for the western democracies to respond with "sanity, firmness and

action."[1] It was expected that the federal government would take a firm stand along with its democratic allies, and adopt whatever measures were necessary to stop such blatant Communist aggression. A *Montreal Gazette* editorialist echoed this sentiment, stating that Canada had a duty to provide assistance, and that the government should ensure that its policy reflected this obligation to help. Korea was seen as a test for the west; these nations had no alternative but to stand united against the Communist threat, or risk being undermined by being shown as "ineffective and irresolute,"[2] there by encouraging Communist aggression elsewhere, including Western Europe. Such a portrayal would further strengthen the Communist influence throughout the world. The Canadian government simply could not revert to its policy of appeasement and isolationism which it followed throughout the 1930s, and initially seemed to adopt after the Second World War.[3] Indeed, Secretary of State for External Affairs Lester B. Pearson had commented in February 1950 that "... Canada, which once may have seemed to be so remote from these matters ... will be deeply and directly affected by the outcome of what is going on now in Asia."[4] Canada had vested interest in Asia, and consequently, it was expected that the government would react accordingly.

In the days following the North Korean invasion, the Canadian government began to determine the extent to which Canada would be involved in the conflict.[5] Prime

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[1] "Time for Firmness and Action," *Vancouver Province*, 27 June 1950.
[2] "'Deeply and Directly Affected,'" *Montreal Gazette*, 29 June 1950.
[3] Denis Stairs, *The Diplomacy of Constraint: Canada, the Korean War, and the United States* (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1974), 9-13; John Price, "The 'Cat's Paw': Canada and the United Nations Temporary Commission on Korea," *The Canadian Historical Review*, 85:2, (2004), 307.
[4] "'Deeply and Directly Affected,'" *Montreal Gazette*, 29 June 1950.
[5] Stairs, *The Diplomacy of Constraint: Canada, the Korean War, and the United States*, 61.

Minister St. Laurent made a statement to the House of Commons on 30 June 1950 stating that the government had "a mandate to do its full duty within the measure of its power and ability, as a member of the United Nations ... to make the collective action of the United Nations effective, and to restore peace in Korea."[6] He announced that the government planned to send warships to Korea "where they might be of assistance to the United Nations and Korea if such assistance were required."[7] Editorials published in the days following this decision were supportive of this course of action. One in the *Winnipeg Free Press* believed that a stand had been taken against Communist aggression. Furthermore, such action demonstrated the government's commitment to the UN and the Security Council's decision to provide whatever aid necessary to assist South Korea.[8] An editorialist from the *Halifax Chronicle-Herald* described the deployment of the destroyers as "symbolic of Canadian determination to share the burdens and obligations of the day."[9] Its author took solace in the fact that numerous nations were willing to provide quick assistance, and act "as a sort of international police to put down aggression."[10]

In contrast to this supportive opinion, André Laurendeau, an editorialist for *Le Devoir*, was critical of the Korean War and the potential for substantial Canadian participation. He found it ironic that the most vehement support for Canada's participation in Korea did not come from the government, but from newspapers and

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[6] *Official Report of the Debates House of Commons, Second Session – Twenty-First Parliament, Volume IV* (Ottawa: King's Printer and Controller of Stationary, 1950), 4459.
[7] Ibid., 4460.
[8] "Canada and Korea," *Winnipeg Free Press*, 1 July 1950.
[9] "They Are Symbols," *Halifax Chronicle-Herald*, 5 July 1950. A similar opinion was expressed in "The Canadian Destroyers," *Winnipeg Free Press*, 13 July 1950.
[10] "They Are Symbols," *Halifax Chronicle-Herald*, 5 July 1950.

Canadians themselves. Indeed, the Canadian public was no better than "... ces petits chiens qui brûlent de montrer à leur maitre qui'ils l'adorent..."[11] Canada had no vested interest in Korea, he insisted. Why should Canadians have to pay for the mistakes made by the United States in their mismanagement of the peninsula? Furthermore, why would Canadians participate in a venture whose ultimate goal was to install a government that the population would not be happy with? If Canada did participate in Korea, it would set a dangerous precedent for the post-war period, where Canadian resources would be utilized in conflict and causes that were not in its interest.[12]

Throughout July 1950, North Korean forces continued to push through South Korea at an astonishing rate; the capital, Seoul, had been captured, and by early August, the NKPA had gained control of the whole peninsula, with the exception of a small pocket in the south-east corner around the city of Pusan.[13] With the outcome of the war in serious doubt, a *Winnipeg Free Press* editorialist commented that Canada had an obligation to provide additional assistance to the UN forces in Korea. Specifically what that assistance entailed, however, was negotiable. Korea was not the only area in the world under threat from Communist expansionism, and the western democracies had a duty to ensure they did not succumb to this pressure. The author of the editorial noted:

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[11] The translation is "... like small dogs yapping at their master for attention..." "Quelle cause défendons-nous en Corée?," *Le Devoir*, 4 July 1950.
[12] Ibid.
[13] Wood, *Strange Battleground: The Operations in Korea and their Effects on the Defence Policy of Canada* (Ottawa: Queen's Printer and Controller of Stationary, 1966), 8-15.

> Even if it were not a course fraught with dishonour and lasting disgrace, there is no safety for Canada or any other nation in isolation. Canada's immediate interests are involved in any attempt to halt aggression, just as any act of aggression immediately touches upon the security of this country.[14]

In another *Winnipeg Free Press* editorial, the author presented a unique opinion by focusing on how Canada's participation in the Korean War would ultimately serve its own security interests. Canada's geographical position between the Soviet Union and the United States put it at a substantial risk should hostilities break out between the two countries. With the Soviet Union's detonation of their atomic bomb in 1949, the risk intensified. Furthermore, the author acknowledged how dependent Canada was on the United States' own defences. On its own, Canada would simply be unable to fight off any Communist threat. However, with the United States' aid, the fight would not be so unbalanced. Finally, the author highlighted the importance of collective security for Canada's defence. As a large country, with a small population, this left Canada in a particularly vulnerable state, "a glittering prize for any conqueror." As such, collective security was presented as "... the only thing that stands today between Canada and destruction." The author believed that since Canada benefitted from collective security, it also had an obligation to other nations to provide that same security to them. Not to aid South Korea "... is to betray ourselves."[15] The Canadian government had both moral and strategic reasons to become involved in the Korean War.

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[14] "Canada's Duty," *Winnipeg Free Press*, 17 July 1950. An additional editorial entitled "Canada Must Do Her Share," *Winnipeg Free Press*, 27 July 1950 reiterated these sentiments.

[15] "Our Own Safety," *Winnipeg Free Press*, 31 July 1950.

Figure 2.1: "Buffer State," *Halifax Chronicle Herald*, 9 June 1950

Prior to the creation of the Canadian Army Special Force in August 1950, the *Vancouver Province* published an editorial praising the "young men thronging to the recruiting stations" who wished to join the Royal Canadian Navy.[16] The men's willingness demonstrated to the Soviet Union how committed Canada was to combating the Communist threat. The creation of the Special Force was an even more "decisively important part"[17] of Canada's contribution to this global menace. An editorialist from the *Winnipeg Free Press* also commented:

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[16] "Canada's Answer to Moscow," *Vancouver Province*, 24 July 1950.
[17] "Canada Steps Forward," *Winnipeg Free Press*, 8 August 1950.

> It is possible that the Canadian brigade may never see Korea. It may go elsewhere, as the international situation dictates. But wherever it goes, it will move as part of a great world effort to cut down aggression while aggression is still in its tentative and formative stage, before it has taken on the force which will turn the struggle from an isolated incident into a world war.[18]

The *Halifax Chronicle-Herald* added that the federal government could not respond to war and conflict in the same way it had in the past. The very nature of war itself had changed. Canada was no longer removed from the hostilities; with the invasion of South Korea, Canada was "right in the line of fire"[19] of the Soviet Union's atomic bomb range. The recruitment and deployment of the CASF was simply a necessary decision to protect Canada.

In contrast to the support for the deployment of the brigade to Korea expressed in the English-language editorials, *Le Devoir* editorialist Paul Sauriol did not believe this was a wise decision. He argued that given all the "propaganda" published in Canadian newspapers, it could be assumed that the Canadian public was supportive of its participation in the Korean War. However, this was not the case. In his opinion, French-Canadians did not believe it was necessary for Canada to deploy troops to Korea, and disagreed with the government's decision to establish the CASF. By providing ground forces, it meant that the government was endorsing an arbitrary, unequal and impractical system of governing and managing the Korean peninsula that brought harm to Koreans

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[18] Ibid.

[19] "Canada and the Crisis," *Halifax Chronicle-Herald*, 9 August 1950. A similar opinion was expressed in "Canada's Need and Duty," *Halifax Chronicle-Herald*, 14 August 1950. While editorial contended that Canada had to contribute to the larger "common cause," it also cautioned the federal government to find balance between providing aid on the international stage and ensuring that Canada itself was adequately protected and defended. Indeed, in a 6 January 1951 *Halifax Chronicle-Herald* editorial, the author voiced the concern that "Canada needs men."

themselves.[20] By sending troops to defend and protect such an illegitimate government, the author was unsure whether victory could be achieved.[21]

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While Canadian editorialists, with the exception of *Le Devoir*, believed Canada should participate in the Korean War, they were also extremely critical of the federal government's lack of response to the conflict. When the Korean War broke out many Parliamentarians were enjoying a quiet weekend at their cottages before heading back for the final week of Parliament before it was adjourned for the summer. When news of the conflict finally reached the senior government officials, they hurried back to Ottawa.[22] During those early days, Lester B. Pearson and others at External Affairs closely watched events unfold, both in Korea and in Washington D.C., assessing their implications on Canada's own policy. It was not until 28 June, that Pearson made his first lengthy statement to the House of Commons regarding the volatile situation in Korea.[23] He condemned the invasion and singled out the United States' "high courage and firm statesmanship"[24] because of its decision to militarily resist the North Korean People's Army. Over the next few days, there was very little debate in the House of Commons pertaining to Korea. Indeed, Parliament's opinion was unanimous to the point that "it placed a damper on serious debate,"[25] and politicians were simply "delivering stout

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[20] Sauriol's words were "arbitraire, injuste et impracticable," and the division of the two Koreas "artificielle." "Une brigade pour la Corée," *Le Devoir*, 8 August 1950.
[21] Ibid.
[22] Stairs, *The Diplomacy of Constraint*, 31-33.
[23] Ibid., 34-47.
[24] *Official Report of the Debates House of Commons, Second Session – Twenty-First Parliament, Volume IV*, 4251.
[25] Stairs, *The Diplomacy of Constraint*, 55.

declarations of piety and goodwill."[26] A press gallery member noted that any discussions in the House of Commons about Korea were attended by "barely a quorum throughout and most of the time the galleries were empty."[27] On 30 June, the last day the session, Prime Minister St. Laurent announced that the three destroyers would be deployed to assist the United Nations' action in Korea. However, he noted that if the situation in Korea deteriorated further after Parliament had been adjourned, the MPs would "immediately be summoned to give the new situation consideration."[28] This course of action was supported by the members, and Parliament was then prorogued for the summer holiday.

The Korean War did quickly deteriorate. On 1 July, forward elements of the American 24th Division landed at the port of Pusan, and headed north to provide reinforcements to the weakened and disorganized ROK army. The first battle between the NKPA and the newly landed Americans occurred on 5 July at Osan, which ultimately resulted in a victory for the NKPA.[29] Although the American forces quickly gained control over the skies, the same could not be said for the land war. As Herbert Fairlie Wood noted:

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[26] Ibid., 55.
[27] Ibid., 55. The only opposition came from the Jean-François Pouliot, a Liberal member from Temiscouata, PQ.
[28] *Official Report of the Debates House of Commons, Second Session – Twenty-First Parliament, Volume IV*, 4459.
[29] Wood, *Strange Battleground*, 13.

> More American troops were hastily dispatched from occupation duties in Japan and thrown into action. These troops had been organized to act as constabulary, rather than as operational units; they were undertrained for war and under-equipped. ... The rearguard actions which ensued would have tested the stamina of the best trained units; for a few fantastic weeks the ground forces of the United States faced a better equipped and better trained army.[30]

The Canadian public received detailed accounts of how the war was progressing through extensive front page-coverage.[31] By 5 August, the UN forces had been pushed back to the Pusan pocket, and by 10 September, the front had been pushed back even further.[32] However, Parliament still remained prorogued for the summer. Canadian editorialists were soon criticizing the government for its lack of response. *The Globe and Mail* published a scathing editorial regarding the government's complete inaction following the United Nations' plea for additional assistance. While the war in Korea was "troubling to the Canadian public," the government "was hardly geared for action."[33] What was even more troubling for the author was the possibility that the government was not responding to the UN's demands because Canada simply could not offer anything substantial, especially in the way of ground forces, because it had allowed its military to quickly deteriorate following the Second World War. The author highlighted Australia's commitment of two armed ships, a squadron of fighter jets, in addition to fulfilling other commitments in Malaya, and claimed the Canadian government's silence and relative

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[30] Ibid., 14.
[31] All newspaper examined provided front page coverage of the war's progression.
[32] "Map 1, Chinese Communist Intervention, October 1950," Wood, *Strange Battleground: The Operations in Korea and Their Effects on the Defence Policy of Canada*, 12.
[33] "What Answer From Canada," *The Globe and Mail*, 15 July 1950.

inaction was an attempt to mitigate the problem and to avoid being accountable to the Canadian public.[34]

Figure 2.2: "Emergency Measures," *The Globe and Mail*, 7 August 1950

The *Vancouver Province* also published several editorials condemning the slow speed with which the government responded to the war. One entitled "Canada Should Be Ready" remarked on the difficulties experienced by the American troops already deployed to the Korean peninsula, and the fact that the US should not have to bear the brunt of defending peace and democracy; the Canadian government had a duty to do more. Government officials simply could not "bury their heads in the depths of

[34] Ibid.

diplomatic nonsense."[35] They had a duty, both to the electorate and to the larger international community to act swiftly and decisively. The author of the editorial argued that "every hour of our unpreparedness is an encouragement, and incitement to the aggressor."[36] Another piece insisted that as a member of the United Nations, Canada had an obligation to lend its full support to the conflict, both through diplomatic and military means.[37] The paper went so far as to state that "the record of the government, so far, in this Korean crisis, has been the most disgraceful episode in Canadian history, and a good many Canadians are becoming ashamed."[38] Other nations, such as Great Britain, which had military forces deployed elsewhere in the world, had somehow managed to make a substantial contribution to Korea. *The Globe and Mail* challenged Lester Pearson's claim in a Toronto speech that Canada had "a well-equipped nucleus of a powerful striking force."[39] A later editorial accused the government of manipulating the facts regarding the inadequate state of Canada's defences. The government had consistently been hiding behind a "sham," and now that the truth was coming to the fore, it was time for Canadians to respond with warranted anger.[40] The *Montreal Gazette* echoed these sentiments, insisting that the government had best "speak out with a clear voice," and be "prompt and vigorous"[41] in better supporting the US and UN.

Given the deteriorating situation in Korea, demands were made to immediately call Parliament back into session. *The Vancouver Province* said the issue was not only

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[35] "Canada Should Be Ready," *Vancouver Province*, 14 July 1950.
[36] Ibid.
[37] "Is Canada Doing Enough?" *Vancouver Province*, 15 July 1950.
[38] "Our Most Disgraceful Episode," *Vancouver Province*, 28 July 1950.
[39] "How Badly Were We Misled?" *The Globe and Mail*, 15 July 1950.
[40] "Our Tattered Defences," *The Globe and Mail*, 21 July 1950.
[41] "What Will Cabinet Say Today?," *Montreal Gazette*, 19 July 1950.

whether ground troops should be sent to Korea, but also "how ready this country is to meet the demands of half a dozen similar crises that may arise before the year is out."[42] Korea represented only the first serious challenge for the Canadian armed forces since the end of the Second World War. There were not enough men in uniform to deploy to Korea, let alone to any additional conflicts that could arise.[43] Another editorial in late July accused politicians of being complacent in their attitude towards Korea, arguing that an air of "why bring it up"[44] typified matters. Indeed, Korea represented "a situation graver than at any time since the end of the Second World War faces the democracies," and that "Ottawa does not sound as if it appreciated the fact. A one-day cabinet meeting, a bare announcement of decisions and some diplomatic gobbley-gook on the side is not good enough."[45]

With the death of former Prime Minister William Lyon Mackenzie King on 22 July 1950, Parliamentarians returned to Ottawa for his 26 July funeral. Despite King's persistent caution during his tenure as Prime Minister, and in particular his aversion to committing Canada's military to foreign wars, the *Vancouver Province* editorialist commended him for allowing Parliament to decide on matters, and initially accused St. Laurent of obfuscating on this need during this time of crisis.[46] By delaying calling Parliament back into session, the government was denying Canadians the "right to know what is going on."[47] In this new age of conflict, Parliament had a duty to be open and

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[42] "Call Parliament if Necessary," *Vancouver Province*, 17 July 1950.
[43] Ibid.
[44] "They Had Better Read the News," *Vancouver Province*, 25 July 1950.
[45] Ibid.
[46] "Parliament Should Meet," *Vancouver Province*, 26 July 1950.
[47] Ibid.

available for Canadians. The government's "pattern of shame"[48] was also demonstrated by the fact that hundreds of young men were being turned away from army recruiting stations, as the new government appeared to be standing by the commitment of destroyers and transport aircraft. By contrast, it was pointed out that the Australian government had decided to raise a division of ground forces to be deployed to Korea, something that should make Canadians "blush."[49] Lest this position be considered partisan, the *Province* also took the opposition parties to task for allowing the mockery to continue. Indeed, the *Province* even suggested that, given the new and more aggressive world in which Canadians now found themselves, that mandatory military training be implemented. Although the paper said that Canada was not a "soldiering" nation, if "they look around the world today they cannot shut their eyes to the [need] ... to discipline ourselves"[50] and properly prepare for war.

Not all sources were critical, however. A 21 July 1950 editorial from the more Liberal *Toronto Star* outlined the actions the government was taking, in particular the deployment of 426 squadron to aid in transporting materials for the UN forces. It also supported the government's decision not to send ground forces to fight in Korea, as the "international situation is too uncertain today to warrant any weakening of the tiny but efficient and hard striking-force."[51] It also expressed confidence that the federal government would offer its support to the United Nations should the need arise, whether in Korea or elsewhere.[52]

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[48] "The Pattern of Shame," *Vancouver Province*, 29 July 1950.
[49] Ibid.
[50] "The Narrowing Choice," *Vancouver Province*, 31 July 1950.
[51] "Canada to Do Her Share," *Toronto Star*, 21 July 1950.
[52] Ibid.

Other sources, however, also directed considerable criticism at the Department of External Affairs. The *Montreal Gazette* questioned its efficiency in the developing crisis. Paraphrasing a speech by the Under Secretary of State, A.P. Heeney, given on 30 January 1950, it stated that External Affairs was expected to "let the government know promptly and accurately, about events in other countries ... the knowledge and appreciation of which will enable our Government to make intelligent and informed decisions."[53] In the speech, Heeney remarked that External Affairs had a particularly elaborate system to gather information in Asia, specifically regarding issues pertaining to China, and the Far East in general. There were various offices in Nanking, Shanghai, Delhi, and Karachi, and constant communication between the officials stationed in Asia and the officials in Ottawa. Furthermore, it had long been policy that Canada had a vested interest in ensuring South Korea remained a strong democracy, or at least remain outside Communist influence, as evidenced by Canada's participation in the United Nations Temporary Commission on Korea. Also, the South Korean government had consistently believed that South Korea was at risk of being invaded by the North Korean People's Army. Indeed, the South Korean minister of national defence had made this claim only a few days before the attack. Despite all the resources and information, there was nothing that came out of External Affairs indicating North Korea's plan to attack. The editorialist placed a significant amount of blame on External Affairs, arguing:

> Certainly the measures now taken by the Government seems to have all the marks of hasty action taken after an unsuspected emergency, rather than actions based upon information furnished 'promptly and accurately' by a department which says that 'the task of reporting' is probably its 'most important work.'[54]

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[53] "Darkness in High Places," *Montreal Gazette*, 31 July 1950.
[54] Ibid.

Yet, once again, the *Toronto Star* came to the government's defence, in this case portraying Minister for External Affairs Lester B. Pearson as having a "clear grasp of the international situation" and as "caustic"[55] in his opinions of the Soviet Union and international Communism. Although vehemently against launching a preventative war against Communism, the editorialist supported Pearson's stance that Canada would back the United Nations, and that the UN was playing a vital role in its attempts to bring peace and stability to the Korean peninsula, and in preventing the spread of Communism elsewhere in the world.[56]

The Globe and Mail adopted a more conservative stance and continued the vehement criticisms of the federal government's response to the Korean War. In particular, it focused on Prime Minister Louis St. Laurent. St. Laurent, in comparison to the US's President Truman or Britain's Prime Minister Clement Atlee, had been "casual" in his response, and the "continued quibbling"[57] over Canada's contribution that he had allowed had become utterly embarrassing. Furthermore, the editorialist noted that St. Laurent's cavalier attitude was ironic because "he likes to be regarded as one of the builders, if not the originator, of the plan to stop war by confronting aggressors with overwhelming superiority of force"[58] by utilizing the powers of the Untied Nations. Canadians were "shamefacedly aware" of its government's under-performance, and the editorialist warned that St. Laurent's attitude would not go unpunished in a future election.[59]

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[55] "Canada and the World," *Toronto Star*, 2 September 1950.
[56] Ibid.
[57] "What Say Our Leaders," *The Globe and Mail*, 1 August 1950.
[58] Ibid.
[59] Ibid.

In the early weeks of August 1950, editorials from the *Vancouver Province* continued their vehement criticism of the federal government's lack of meaningful response to the Korean War. Due to its proximity to the Korean peninsula, particularly its west coast, Canada was cast as vulnerable to potential attack or sabotage, launched by the North Koreans, or another Communist force. However, contrasted with Canada's unpreparedness was Britain's readiness. Despite experiencing far greater hardships than Canada in the Second World War, "the mood of Britain had changed into higher gear."[60] Its ground forces were portrayed as well prepared, the Royal Navy was properly outfitted and modernized, and munitions factories were once again gearing up.[61]

When St. Laurent announced in a 7 August 1950 CBC radio address the government's decision to deploy ground forces to Korea, the majority of editorialists supported the government's decision, especially those writing for traditionally Liberal newspapers. The *Winnipeg Free Press* said that the willingness to deploy ground troops to Korea demonstrated that Canada was prepared to honour its international commitments. Indeed, the government's response was in direct proportion to how the war itself was progressing; as the situation in Korea became worse, the government quickly announced additional aid. Furthermore, such a position was in line with strengthening and maintaining collective security.[62] However, several sources continued to voice their discontent at the length of time it took to reach this decision. The *Vancouver Province* suggested that the government had been essentially shamed into action, due to quick action of the other United Nations members. Furthermore, St.

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[60] "Our House is in Danger, Too," *Vancouver Province*, 1 August 1950
[61] Ibid. Highlighting the government's continued inaction was a 2 August 1950 editorial also from the *Vancouver Province* entitled "Comfort for Moscow."
[62] "Mr. St. Laurent's Commitment," *Winnipeg Free Press*, 3 October 1950.

Laurent's words betrayed his reluctance for this decision.[63] A *Globe and Mail* editorialist expressed dissatisfaction with the government's decision to create two separate fighting forces, one to defend Canada proper, and one to go overseas to protect Canada's international interests, calling the move "thoroughly obnoxious on all counts."[64] . The editorialist likened the situation to the conscription crisis the government faced in the Second World War, which caused a great deal of animosity between the voluntary troops overseas and those who had been conscripted for home defence. Also, given the relative success of the North Korean People's Army against American troops, it called into question whether newly-recruited troops would receive adequate training before heading into battle. Moreover, if they did receive the appropriate training to turn them into an effective fighting force, they consequently would not be immediately available for combat, to the detriment of the forces already fighting in Korea. It was argued that if Canadian soldiers were going to be sent, it would be better that any new recruits be properly integrated into the existing Canadian army, which then would be deployed to Korea. In creating two separate units, the author argued that this was simply a continuation of the government's policy to keep Canada's involvement in Korea as limited and as casualty-free as possible.[65]

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[63] "This is Our Late Beginning," *Vancouver Province*, 9 August 1950.
[64] "Late and Obnoxious," *The Globe and Mail*, 9 August 1950.
[65] Ibid.

Figure 2.3: "Are We Back to This?," *The Globe and Mail*, 4 August 1950

The *Montreal Gazette*, while supportive of the government's decision to take bolder action, still argued that it "falls disturbingly short of what is demanded-and has been demanded."[66] Recent events were cast as bringing into sharper focus the government's lack of available resources to meaningfully address any sort of international conflict. A special editorial written by Charles Nichols from the *Vancouver Province*'s Washington bureau said that Americans had become increasingly frustrated with the Canadian government's actions pertaining to the Korean War, namely over the

[66] "Canada Caught Short by Crisis," *Montreal Gazette*, 8 August 1950.

fact that Canada had not acted "spontaneously and unreservedly"[67] in its attempts to provide aid and fulfill its obligations to the United Nations, and that it had consistently sought to minimize its contribution. Although now responding appropriately by authorizing ground troops, it was painfully obvious that the government was making up for lost time, and it this situation had cost Canada "an opportunity for leadership which could have been ... honourably attained."[68]

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As previously alluded to, the state of Canada's defences at the start of the Korean War were woefully inadequate to meet such serious challenges. This lack of preparedness led to a great deal of criticism in Canadian newspaper editorials, and a constant theme was the need for the government to dramatically alter its budgets, and increase defence spending. Only days after North Korea launched its attack, the *Halifax Chronicle-Herald* condemned the government for the lack of military preparedness, as clearly the invasion of South Korea proved how dangerous and aggressive Communism truly was.[69] The government had no choice but to increase its defence spending to protect the freedoms that Canadians cherished. It was understood that some sacrifices might have to be made in order to finance the project, but they were essential "... for it is our future and our children's future that is at stake."[70] The *Winnipeg Free Press* struck a similar note, claiming that Canada was barely capable of maintaining its own security, let alone providing aid in a war, and now had no other choice but to play catch-up, and hope that

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[67] "Canada 'From Where I Stand,'" *Vancouver Province*, 8 August 1950.
[68] Ibid.
[69] "We Must Be Strong," *Halifax Chronicle-Herald*, 29 June 1950.
[70] Ibid.

the international situation did not deteriorate even further.[71] It was pointed out that Communism had been a threat since the end of the Second World War, and the government had done relatively little to ensure that Canadians were protected. Instead, money had been spent on providing a high quality of life for Canadians. While this was understandably a major preoccupation for any government, it was also pointed out that "none of our social reforms, none of our hopes for a better life will be safe unless the free world as a whole is safe from the threat now poised against it. Military spending must be the first priority of every free government, ours included."[72] However, Le *Devoir* warned about the potential costs. Editorialist Gérard Filion pointed to the growing debt in the United States and warned that Canadians quality of life was being sacrificed for military purposes. He argued that the Soviet Union was in no position to fight a third world war, and that Korea was not a diversion being used by Moscow to prepare for a larger conflict. As such, the government needed to find a more equitable balance between military spending and creating a sustainable future for all Canadians.[73]

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[71] "Mr. St. Laurent's Statement," *Winnipeg Free Press*, 20 July 1950. A similar opinion was expressed in a *Montreal Gazette* editorial. The author argued that the government had been overly slow in developing Canada's defences for the post-war world. Korea brought these shortcomings to light. As such, the government had no choice but to push forward, and develop Canada's defences as quickly as possible. "Korea Shows Us What We Haven't," *Montreal Gazette*, 21 July 1950.

[72] "Time to Think Again," *Winnipeg Free Press*, 3 July 1950. This same sentiment was reiterated in another editorial, "Price of Safety," *Winnipeg Free Press*, 14 July 1950.

[73] "Un Guet-Apens," *Le Devoir*, 3 July 1950.

Figure 2 4 "Fashion for '51," *Halifax Chronicle-Herald*, 16 January 1951

Figure 2 5 "Approved By the Man Who Pays," *Halifax Chronicle Herald*, 17 July 1950



Figure 2.6: "Time to Shift Some of That Weight," *Montreal Gazette*, 10 August 1950

Figure 2.7: "But It Has!," *Montreal Gazette*, 9 September 1950

On the whole, English-language newspaper editorials demonstrated a surprising level of consensus regarding Canada's participation in the Korean War. While *Le Devoir* worried about the precedent of participating, English-language newspaper worried about the effects of not participating. Not only was Canada expected to participate, but in contrast to the federal government's feelings, its contribution should be meaningful and substantive. This strong show of force was needed to demonstrate Canada's commitment to combating the Communist threat. Communism had always been a worry to Canadians, but with North Korea's show of blatant aggression, what new concerns did it present?

Chapter Three

Seeing Red – Editorial Reaction to Communist Involvement

According to a pamphlet published by the Canadian Chamber of Commerce in 1947, Communists "are pledged to the destruction of political and economic freedom from within ... [it] is a dangerous force threatening the free existence of the Canadian people."[1] With the outbreak of the Korean War, this threat seemed even more real. Canadian newspapers were quick to publish numerous editorials pertaining to the role of Communism within the war itself, and the impact that this new belligerent Communism had on the international system. Canadian editorial coverage was decidedly negative towards Communism, and viewed it as a considerable threat. However, newspapers were unsure as to the extent this threat presented to Canada, and to the world at large, nor was there any consensus as to how to deal with it. The first part of this chapter will examine the varying opinions on the Communist threat during the Korean War. The discussion will then move on to the various methods the Western democracies, including Canada, utilized to deal with the substantial Communist threat.

Although it was the North Korean People's Army (NKPA) that attacked South Korea on 25 June 1950, editorialists vehemently argued that the Soviet Union was undoubtedly involved. One of the first editorials blaming the Soviet Union for having a hand in starting the war in Korea was published in the *Toronto Star* only a day after the invasion. The paper speculated that the reason for the Soviet Union's involvement was that its government wanted to test the "confidence and ability"[2] of the United States. If

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[1] *The Communist Threat to Canada*, (Montreal: The Canadian Chamber of Commerce, 1947), 5.

[2] "The War in Korea," *Toronto Star*, 26 June 1950.

the American government did not respond strongly and decisively to the invasion, Washington would be interpreted as weak and unwilling to enter into conflict, no matter how deliberate the attack, and potentially encourage Soviet expansionism elsewhere. Thus, the author concluded that the US had to respond strongly, regardless of the role to be played by United Nations, and demonstrate to the Soviet Union that such blatant aggression would not be tolerated.[3]

Figure 3.1: "Playing With Fire," *Montreal Gazette*, 27 June 1950

In the early weeks of the North Koreans' invasion of South Korea, the *Halifax Chronicle-Herald* consistently wrote that the Soviet Union was directly involved in aiding, if not orchestrating, the North Korean invasion. It did not matter that no Soviet

[3] Ibid.

troops were present in the invading force; according to the paper, "There is no doubt in anybody's mind that the aggression of Communist forces from North Korea is under Russian direction."[4] The editorialist commented that the Soviet Union was simply not ready to launch a full-scale war against the western democracies, and thus through North Korea, Moscow was attempting to further extend its sphere of influence throughout Asia. Furthermore, if all of Korea were to fall to the Communists, it was said that the Soviet Union would then be able to quickly threaten Japan with an attack, including the American military posts there and eventually move throughout the Pacific.[5] Another *Halifax Chronicle-Herald* editorial asserted that the Soviet Union viewed the world as its "chessboard,"[6] and that Korea was simply one aspect of its larger goal of exerting its influence throughout Asia. While it would be easy for the western democracies to simply allow the Communist forces to take control of Korea, readers were told that this was part of a larger geo-political struggle between the 'free world' and Communism.

> There is more than the freedom of Southern Korea at stake in the present struggle. We have to look also to the strengthening and stabilization of the whole of the Far East - a huge and expensive proposition, but one more economical and desirable, in the long run, than submission to the so-called "inevitability" of a third world war.[7]

However, if there was something positive to come out of this event, it was that it demonstrated to self-declared non-aligned countries, such as India, the need to take a stand against Communism.[8]

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[4] "Crisis in Korea," *Halifax Chronicle-Herald*, 27 June 1950.
[5] Ibid.
[6] "The World a Chessboard," *Halifax Chronicle-Herald*, 7 July 1950.
[7] Ibid. A similar sentiment was expressed "A Stabilizing Factor," *Halifax Chronicle-Herald*, 4 July 1950.
[8] "Russia Stands Indicted," *Halifax Chronicle-Herald*, 13 July 1950.



Figure 3.2: "Test Tube," *Montreal Gazette*, 12 August 1950

The *Vancouver Province* also commented on how Soviet war mongering helped unite much of the world against Communism. Not only did Canada and other western democracies have an obligation to aid South Korea in its fight, but they also had to stand together to demonstrate to Moscow that their overt aggression would not be tolerated. While war was not wanted, the attack was viewed as sparking greater unity and resolve among the western democracies in opposing the spread of Communism.[9]

Several editorials, rather than focusing on the Soviet Union, concluded that the war was caused by a coalescence of Communist nations – namely the Soviet Union, Communist China, and North Korea – and escalating tensions between themselves and

[9] "Time for Firmness and Sanity," *Vancouver Province*, 27 June 1950.

democratic countries. An editorialist for the *Winnipeg Free Press*, who was not terribly surprised by the June 1950 invasion, cast it as the culmination of increasingly antagonistic events between the Communist and free world that had occurred following the Second World War, such as the Greek civil war, the Berlin Blockade, and the Chinese civil war. Furthermore, the situation was exacerbated by the fact that the United States had withdrawn their forces from South Korea in June 1949, leaving the country vulnerable to an attack. According to the *Free Press*, the "open defiance" of the attack clearly demonstrated to the world "the attitude of Communism to an international authority."[10]

Figure 3.3 A Stooge of a Stooge of a Stooge, Etc.," *Vancouver Province*, 28 December 1950

[10] "Aggression in Korea," *Winnipeg Free Press*, 27 June 1950.

In another editorial entitled "Resort to Thuggery," the *Halifax Chronicle-Herald* commented that the invasion marked a significant change in how the Communists promulgated their message. Instead of their usual "exaggerated propaganda," they were now relying on "sheer thuggery and dacoity."[11] The author outlined numerous previous attempts made by Moscow since the end of the Second World War to spread Communism, though not by overtly violent means. The editorial saw this change as designed to test western resolve, and as such, it was cast as imperative that appeasement or other signs of weakness not be shown.[12]

The Globe and Mail, *Toronto Star*, and *Montreal Gazette* also argued that Korea cemented the antagonistic role the Communist movement had adopted since the end of the Second World War. *The Globe and Mail* also presented South Korea as a tempting target for the Communists due to its weak and corrupt government, and apparent lack of defence commitment from the United States. The attack by the North Koreans was portrayed as inevitable; the Communist regimes knew how weak and unstable the South Korean government was and they were capitalizing on a situation afforded to them by the Western democracies, particularly the United States. In addition to criticizing America for initially pulling out of South Korea so soon after the Second World War, the *Globe*'s editorialist went so far as to comment that the South Korean people could not be blamed for being "taken in by communism, with its gaudy promises of reform and a better life."[13]

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[11] "Resort to Thuggery," *Halifax Chronicle-Herald*, 30 June 1950. Dacoity is defined as an "armed robbery by dacdoits," who are "members of an Indian or Burmese gang of armed robbers." See *The New Lexicon Webester's Encyclopedic Dictionary of the English Language, Canadian Edition*, (New York: Lexicon Publications, Inc., 1988), 241.

[12] "Resort to Thuggery," *Halifax Chronicle-Herald*, 30 June 1950.

[13] "Lessons of Korea," *The Globe and Mail*, 3 July 1950.

The *Halifax Chronicle-Herald* criticized both the American and British defence forces for not being prepared at first to repel the attack on South Korea. Given the early rapid success of the North Korean troops, it was postulated that the North Koreans had been preparing for their attack for some time, something that also led to criticisms of the American intelligence services. The paper also reiterated the view that should South Korea fall to Communist forces, a real possibility existed that they would use the south as a launching pad to attack Japan. Thus, given the strategic importance of Japan, consideration had to be given as to whether it was necessary to allow it to rearm in contravention of the new constitution imposed on it by the Americans after the Second World War.[14]

The *Montreal Gazette* expressed the view in September 1950 that international Communism represented a system of sabotage. This idea stemmed, at least in part, from a statement made by British Minister of Labour George Isaacs, who worried that Communist agents were going to take action to try and subvert Britain's rearmament program, and its transportation of materials to Korea. It was reported that Isaacs believed that in order for Communist nations to expand their international influence, they would first have to sabotage and weaken democratic ones. It was also asserted that the west had facilitated this by not reacting strongly enough to Communism, including the fact that democratic governments afforded Communism too much political freedom.[15] The real "... test of the Communist danger is not only how many Communists there are or how many votes they are getting," wrote the *Gazette*. "The test is also what they are in a

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[14] "'Too Little, Too Late?,'" *Halifax Chronicle-Herald*, 12 July 1950.
[15] "Seizing the Privilege of Sabotage," *Montreal Gazette*, 19 September 1950.

position to do."[16] The *Gazette* also charged that the Communists had been planning an attack on South Korea ever since it was first partitioned after the Second World War.

Editorials in the *Toronto Star* highlighted the entry of China into the Korean War in November as further proof of dangerous Communist aggression.[17] It was maintained that some inroads were being made at the United Nations to get Communist China admitted as a member, something that their 'surprise entrance' into the conflict utterly negated. The *Star* quoted General Douglas MacArthur, the supreme commander of the UN forces, who called China's actions "one of the most offensive acts of international lawlessness of historic record" and was "of gravest international concern."[18]



Figure 3.4: *The Globe and Mail*, 31 July 1950

[16] Ibid.
[17] "Chin Intervenes in Korea," *Toronto Star*, 4 November 1950; "MacArthur Warns China," *Toronto Star*, 6 November 1950.
[18] "MacArthur Warns China," *Toronto Star*, 6 November 1950.

In a *Montreal Gazette* editorial, the author argued that, while United States President Harry Truman had declared a national state of emergency, "there is no real reason whatever to believe now that the situation was not essentially as bad five years ago."[19] The Communists' plans since the end of the Second World War, it was said, had always been to launch an attack against the western democracies, and to ensure the spread of Communist thought throughout the world. This had not changed. Since the end of the Second World War, the Communists had gradually moved closer to the realization of their overall goals. An example of their achievement was the attack on South Korea. The author noted that "communism today is no more malignant or restless."[20] The author also cautioned readers that the Korean War had to be put into proper perspective, stating that:

> The United States is not being placed in a state of national emergency because of its Korean reverses. Korea is no more than a particularly virulent symptom, giving warning that the general disease is far advanced. The milder Communist symptoms of seizure by guile have been supplanted in Korea by seizure by armed invasion.[21]

Any response to the Korean War had to be devised and placed within a larger context of the rising power of international Communism. The author believed that the worse the war in Korea became, its particular importance would actually decline. This was due to the fact that it would become apparent how many other forces and countries were somehow involved in aiding the North Koreans with their attacks, thus indicating the broader threat. While the current situation appeared bleak, the editorialist took some

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[19] "Making Room for Dictatorship," *Montreal Gazette*, 18 December 1950.
[20] Ibid.
[21] Ibid.

solace from the notion that once armed with this broader knowledge, the west would become more vigilant and effective in stemming Communism's growth and influence.[22]

The *Halifax Chronicle-Herald* also focused on the increasing anxiety regarding China's entry into the Korean War. Indeed, people had become so pessimistic about the situation that they concluded, "... the Communists will drive the United Nations out of Korea,"[23] though the *Chronicle-Herald* held to the view that the UN forces would eventually triumph. Still, it was maintained that Korea marked a turning point in international affairs, as due to the blatantly aggressive nature of the Communists, the western democracies had a duty to ensure their armed forces were properly equipped and prepared to defend democratic ideals and principles.[24]

Even during the early weeks of the Korean War several editorials worried that the conflict had the potential to explode into a full-blown world war. In an editorial from the *Halifax Chronicle-Herald* it was feared the Soviet Union would become extensively and directly involved to aid in the spread of Communism.[25] The *Montreal Gazette* expressed the view that, in a sense, this global struggle was already underway, one for which the western democracies had not properly prepared themselves. In planning for the possibility of a nuclear conflagration, it was claimed that the resources used to fight limited and regional warfare were falling into disrepair. Any future world war, it was asserted, would not be fought like the First and Second World Wars. Although fought all over the globe, this new type of war would consist of frequent and smaller conflicts, like that in Korea. While easy to ignore, the democracies would have to show resolve as

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[22] Ibid.
[23] "Screeching Does Not Win Wars," *Halifax Chronicle-Herald*, 5 January 1951.
[24] Ibid.
[25] "What are the Odds?," *Halifax Chronicle-Herald*, 17 July 1950.

these conflicts were part of a larger and potentially cataclysmic struggle to protect and advance freedom.[26] The *Toronto Star* added that China's entry into the war in December 1950 dramatically escalated the stakes and potential scope of the Korean War, as it was cast as an ally of the Soviet Union, and the only way to prevent a direct confrontation with the United States and "third world war"[27] was by utilizing the United Nations.

Figure 3.5: "Unwanted 'Hit' Tune," *The Globe and Mail*, 21 August 1950

To more effectively stem the spread of Communism, the *Winnipeg Free Press* also promoted an economic approach. Turning to the strategy adopted in Europe under the Marshall Plan, the paper argued that "one of the first lessons ... is that the western world must be prepared to give the unconquered countries of Asia economic aid, by investment, trade and otherwise, on a scale and at a cost which so far has not been

[26] "A New Type of World War?," *Montreal Gazette*, 26 July 1950.
[27] "U.N.'s Search for Peace," *Toronto Star*, 16 December 1950.

faced."[28] However, it also cautioned that the west had to ensure that the groups to which it lent its support were not going to "suppress Asia's true progress and turn back the clock."[29] The western democracies had a unique opportunity to spread democracy and freedom throughout Asia. However, to accomplish this goal, they had to demonstrate that their motives were honourable, and their commitment unwavering. The *Montreal Gazette* also stressed that making inroads in poverty-stricken countries required that they be provided with adequate aid to raise their standard of living. The Communists also preyed on poorer nations by promising improved living conditions; the western democracies had to do the same. However, this source went a step further, saying that the western democracies had to ensure that improving standards were maintained by providing military assistance to deter any possible Communist aggression.[30] The *Toronto Star* also expressed this line of thinking, outlining for its readers the various organizations and actions that had been taken by the western democracies to assist recovery overseas to mitigate the Communist threat.

Another method of countering Communism, wrote the *Halifax Chronicle-Herald*, was through the United Nations. The editorialist supported the UN's decision to impose an embargo against Communist China. The author acknowledged that this was a difficult decision, especially for nations like Great Britain, who maintained control of Hong Kong. There was also legitimate worry that by enforcing the embargo, the Chinese government would become more aggressive, or at the very least drive it further into the Soviet orbit.[31] Still, the paper maintained the costs of inaction were potentially too high. The *Toronto*

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[28] "The Lesson of Korea," *Winnipeg Free Press*, 10 July 1950.
[29] Ibid.
[30] "How to Fight Communism," *Montreal Gazette*, 28 February 1951.
[31] "A Significant Unanimous Vote," *Halifax Chronicle-Herald*, 21 May 1951.

Star, meanwhile, approvingly quoted from Lester Pearson's strong stance against Communism, specifically his opinion on China. Pearson believed that until the Chinese forces withdrew from the Korean peninsula, China should not be permitted membership to the United Nations. What was regrettable, the *Star* also stated, was the fact that not all democratic nations had adopted such a strong position, such as Great Britain and India which were singled out for their choice to recognize the legitimacy of the Communist Chinese government. This validation undermined much of the work to stem the influence of international Communism.[32]

Throughout 1950 and 1951, newspapers published multiple articles regarding the role the Chinese were playing in the Korean War. A November 1950 *Globe and Mail* editorial, it was commented that one of the most "tragic"[33] developments since the end of the Second World War was the involvement of China in aiding the North Korean forces. The situation was cast as especially worrisome because it was the first time since the Second World War that two major international powers had fought each other, albeit in a limited manner. Debate again swirled as to whether the People's Republic of China (PRC) should be admitted as a UN member, even replacing the Republic of China (Formosa), which was already a member. The *Winnipeg Free Press* appeared to grow open to accepting the PRC, lest its continuing isolation drive it closer to the Soviet Union. Furthermore, as an international organization, the UN could not simply ignore a nation that wielded such power in Asia, and with such a large population. However, due to the lack of support from the United States government, and the US's veto power on the Security Council, the author understood that getting China admitted would be a difficult

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[32] "An Aroused Free World," *Toronto Star*, 12 August 1950.
[33] "Red China and the UN," *The Globe and Mail*, 11 November 1950.

battle.[34] Canada was portrayed as relatively open on this matter, though there were cautionary voices like that of the *Halifax Chronicle-Herald* that agreed with the US-sponsored UN resolution declaring and condemning Communist China as an aggressor and that wrote that, if the PRC was allowed into the UN, it would "... leave the UN in somewhat the position in which the old League [of Nations] founded itself."[35]

Concerns also arose in Canadian press editorials regarding the Soviet Union's increasing attempts at utilizing the offer of peace to appease and placate the western democracies. *Le Devoir* believed that Communism was inherently aggressive and antagonistic. Its rejection of religion and dictatorial ways meant that Communists were inherently "... ennemis de la paix," despite their attempts to portray themselves otherwise.[36] According to this source, the Communists were seeking to lull the west into a sense of complacency which would lead to far-reaching consequences.[37] The *Montreal Gazette* expressed similar sentiments, stating that Soviet peace overtures were designed only to gain an agreement to favour the Communists, and that any agreements were "likely to be written on highly flammable material."[38] The *Toronto Star* maintained that every avenue for peace had to be pursued. However, with lack of tangible progress, it also came to accuse the Communists of using offers of peace as a tool of manipulation

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[34] "Decision on China," *Winnipeg Free Press*, 3 November 1950.
[35] "Tones – and Overtones," *Halifax Chronicle-Herald*, 1 February 1951.
[36] "Avant qu'il soit trop tard," *Le Devoir*, 29 June 1950.
[37] Ibid.
[38] "Pacts on Inflammable Paper," *Montreal Gazette*, 4 December 1950. A similar sentiment was expressed in "Using Peace for Aggression," *Montreal Gazette*, 30 September 1950.

designed to provide time to further build their military strength and wear down the West in a war of attrition.[39]

Figure 3.6: "Your Gun is Still Showing, Joe," *Montreal Gazette*, 25 October 1950

[39] "The Craving for Peace," *Toronto Star*, 10 October 1950. "Pacts on Inflammable Paper," *Montreal Gazette*, 4 December 1950.

Figure 3 7 "Hand me some more of those olive branches," *Winnipeg Free Press*, 11 July 1950

It was evident to all that Communism represented a serious threat to Canada, to the western democracies, and to international peace and security. Whether the threat came from North Korea, Communist China, or the Soviet Union itself, how would the west respond? As soon as the war began, the United Nations' had been enlisted by the United States to assist in coordinating the west's efforts in staving off North Korea's aggression. However, as evidenced in the newspaper editorials, issues regarding the potential for Communist influence in the UN were a serious problem. Indeed, the UN had been dealing with this conundrum well before the conflict in Korea began. As a young organization with a dark legacy, Korea afforded the United Nations a unique

opportunity to define itself. Although the historiography argues that Canada has consistently been a strong supporter of the UN as a means to further and protect its own international interests, what did those at the time think?

Chapter Four

Being UNeighbourly – Editorial Reaction to the United Nations' Involvement

Lester B. Pearson stated in his memoirs that:

> The main and very real threat during the first years of the Cold War was the armed might, the aggressive ideology, and the totalitarian despotism of the communist empire of the USSR and its satellite states under the iron hand of one of these most ruthless tyrants of all time. To ignore this danger, or to refuse to accept any commitments for collective action to meet it, while playing our part in positive action in the United Nations or elsewhere to bring about a better state of affairs, would have been demonstrably wrong and perilously short-sighted.[1]

The argument that Canada has consistently been a strong, unequivocal supporter of the United Nations dominates contemporary opinion and much of the historiography. However, during the Korean War, this was not the case. The opinions expressed in Canadian newspaper editorials demonstrated that opinion was quite varied, with some editorials expressing a deep concern regarding the United Nations' ability to successfully respond to the conflict. Others, however, were staunch in their support, believing that the UN had all the tools needed to assist the South Koreans against the invasion and maintain world peace. Furthermore, the Korean War afforded the UN the opportunity to dispel any concerns that it was simply a reincarnation of the failed League of Nations; the UN could make itself into a viable and influential international organization. However, editorial opinion varied as to how to go about achieving this goal, especially with the serious suspicions of Communist influences within the organization. Finally, questions were raised regarding just how the UN was going to bring about peace in Korea.

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[1] Lester B. Pearson, *Mike: The Memoirs of the Right Honourable Lester B. Pearson, Volume 2, 1948-1957* (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1973), 25.

In the early months of the war, the *Montreal Gazette* and the *Halifax Chronicle-Herald* were both highly sceptical of the UN's ability to deal with the war in a forthright fashion. In general, the editorials' criticism stemmed from the fact that they did not believe that nations, fundamentally split along ideological lines, could possibly set aside enough of their differences to come together and devise a solution. An editorial published in the *Montreal Gazette* days following the initial invasion of South Korea, clearly demonstrated this sentiment. The author blatantly expressed doubts as to "...whether the United Nations by collective action can provide South Korea with moral and material support that will be of much practical help."[2] Moreover, the author directly attributed this to Communist influence on the Security Council.[3]



Figure 4.1 "End of the Line," *Montreal Gazette*, 28 July 1950

[2] "Reds Invade South Korea," *Montreal Gazette*, 26 June 1950.
[3] Ibid.

A short editorial by André Laurendeau in *Le Devoir* acknowledged that Canada had placed a great deal of faith in the United Nations and its abilities to bring about international peace. However, he wondered if the support was a little premature. The Soviet Union's use of its veto obviously posed some difficulties. However, Laurendeau was more concerned with the fact that the UN was becoming more of an alliance of western democracies rather than a truly international organization. He wondered how the UN could effectively respond to any international incident if was not truly international?[4]

In an editorial entitled "East or West or Both?," a writer with the *Halifax Chronicle-Herald* echoed the frustration of the United States government, which was growing increasingly annoyed at the slow response from other western UN member countries. The Canadian government, the writer argued, had adopted a "cautious policy"[5] by only initially offering three destroyers and transport aircraft as its contribution to the war effort. The British and the French governments had instituted rearmament policies which, the author argued, would take three years before any major significant impact would be seen. The potential of a full-scale conflict erupting before the UN was properly prepared was cast as a distinct possibility.[6] Given this fact, the editorialist believed that the only solution was for the United States to become "the policeman to the earth."[7] However, this meant that the US would have to be especially vigilant, a task which the author believed was neither safe nor fair. However, the editorialist made no suggestions as to how to rectify this problem, most notably a potential reform of the United Nations.

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[4] "Politique de Caniche," *Le Devoir*, 14 July 1950.
[5] "East or West or Both?," *Halifax Chronicle-Herald*, 23 August 1950.
[6] Ibid.
[7] Ibid.

Throughout July and August, with United States troops getting pushed further and further back down the peninsula towards Pusan, an editorialist in the *Montreal Gazette* observed that the chances of the forces securing a perimeter around the city were growing less and less likely. Despite valiant counter-attacks, the author was extremely sceptical of the possibility that the line would hold, never mind the potential for the troops to launch any form of counter attack. Lack of manpower, the author argued, was the chief reason why the US troops had been so unsuccessful in the war thus far. Furthermore, it was contended that this situation was likely to remain for quite some time due to the slow responses from other UN member countries. It was believed that the latter were "... caught unprepared to a degree which is frightening,"[8] and had neglected their obligations to the UN by allowing their armies to deteriorate considerably. Given the dire consequences should the North Koreans win, the writer concluded with the assertion that western countries, including Canada, had to quickly address their problems regarding military preparedness, and that not to do so would pose serious difficulties for the United Nations.[9]

While the *Montreal Gazette* attributed many of the difficulties the UN experienced in Korea to the lack of military manpower, another editorial in the *Halifax Chronicle-Herald* linked the problem to a lack of leadership demonstrated by the western democracies in the United Nations. The author argued that while Korea may not have been the most exciting conflict, it still deserved and required the attention of members of the United Nations. However, focusing this attention would be difficult to attain, since all the countries had their own agendas regarding their own participation in the war.

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[8] "No Counter Blow Likely Soon in Korea," *Montreal Gazette*, 18 August 1950.
[9] Ibid.

Such indecision would ultimately weaken the UN. Consequently, a strong leader was required "to solidify UN confidence"[10] and help to unite the western democracies in the organization. By showing other nations that Korea was part of the democracies' national interests, the former would be more willing to aid the UN in halting the North Korean invasion. This would ultimately help to strengthen the UN's influence and authority in the international community, and in effectively dealing with other crises.



Figure 4.2: "Yours, Partner!," *The Globe and Mail*, 8 August 1950

[10] "The Time Element," *Halifax Chronicle-Herald*, 14 October 1950.

One of the most blatant examples of the Canadian editorial press questioning the United Nations' abilities to effectively address the problems in Korea was published by the *Montreal Gazette* in late September 1950. The author doubted the UN would be able to accomplish anything meaningful in Korea due to the ideological differences on the Security Council. These differences, it was argued, were exacerbated by the five permanent members of the Security Council having the ability to veto any resolution from the General Assembly. The editorialist singled out the Soviet Union as especially prone to abusing this veto power, thus creating a deadlock on the Security Council. Consequently, this situation caused a feeling of pessimism among the other nations. The author drew readers' attention to comments made by Minister of External Affairs Lester B. Pearson, who, despite being regarded as an internationalist and supporter of the UN, had also become sceptical of the UN's ability to meaningfully address any form of major armed conflict. The editorial highlighted a speech made by Pearson in the House of Commons, during which he explained that Canada had not made preparations to aid the United Nations in combating aggression because it was thought highly unlikely that the UN would ever become involved in such a situation, due to differences between member states.[11] This complete lack of faith of member countries explained, according to the editorialist, why the United States was the only country prepared to take a stand against the North Koreans' aggression. This situation, however, could prove to be dangerous. The author argued that the Soviet Union might try to spin the US's central role in Korea as that of a war monger, thus isolating any potential support from its normal allies, such as Britain, France, and Canada. Thus, this explained why the US government was

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[11] "Effective Action by Accident," *Montreal Gazette*, 27 September 1950.

making such a concerted effort to obtain military support from the United Nations. However, such actions would be immediately stopped by the Soviet Union's veto, which had its delegates return to the organization in August 1950. The editorialist believed that the ultimate choice facing the UN was either the Soviet Union's continued participation on the Security Council or its exclusion and, as a result, the organization's ability to act as an effective body for maintaining peace. The author summed up by stating:

> Otherwise, the United Nations may again be paralyzed, not only by the veto, but by the attitude that it would not be realistic, nor would it be wise, for any government to base its military planning on the assumption that the United Nations will ever be able to act again.[12]

In addition to the problems and pressures on the United Nations that came from within the organization itself, an editorialist for the *Halifax Chronicle-Herald* pointed out that potentially difficult challenges also came from the western democracies. One editorial in the paper even expressed fear that the UN could be hijacked by a western democracy to promote its own national interests. In particular, the author singled out the United States, and argued "... the American tendency seems to be to lay upon the UN tasks the US itself is not capable of achieving."[13] The editorialist further commented:

> Therefore, before we submit to American enthusiasm – or is it hysteria? – and pull down the Iron Curtain irrevocably, it might be worth-while to weigh the advantages and disadvantages of such an act with some care and deliberation.[14]

Furthermore, the editorialist worried that with the additional strain the United States might place on the UN, the UN itself could become bogged down, and essentially be rendered ineffective, just like the League of Nations before the Second World War.

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[12] Ibid.
[13] "The Brand of Aggression," *Halifax Chronicle-Herald*, 19 January 1951.
[14] Ibid.

While the *Montreal Gazette* and the *Halifax Chronicle-Herald* were rather sceptical of the United Nations' ability to meaningfully respond to the conflict in Korea, the *Winnipeg Free Press* and the *Vancouver Province* argued that the Korean War was a vital test for the organization, and adopted a somewhat more optimistic outlook on its ability to play a constructive role. In the early days of the war the *Winnipeg Free Press* argued that the free nations of the world had a duty to support the United Nations and the "moral authority"[15] it commanded. However, the editorialist was quick to point out that the power afforded to the UN was purely subjective; its effectiveness would ultimately be dictated by "... only what the free peoples of the world are determined it will do. The UN is only as strong as the collective will of its members."[16] The writer pointed out that achieving a consensus on the Security Council would be easier due to the continued boycott of the Soviet Union. However, the Soviet absence would not be a long-term situation, especially if the conflict escalated. The true test of the United Nations, the writer concluded, would be when the Soviet Union delegate returned to the Security Council. It would be only then that the UN could either prove to be a meaningful force on the international stage, or become, once again, bogged down in bureaucracy and infighting.

An editorialist writing for the *Vancouver Province* believed that the war in Korea presented the United Nations with a unique opportunity. Up until that point, it was argued, the UN had simply been a dream or a theory. It was all well and good to talk about collective security and a unified response, but in reality there was no guarantee that

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[15] "The Security Council Acts," *Winnipeg Free Press*, 28 June 1950.
[16] Ibid.

these principles could work; they would have to be put into practice.[17] The UN was inevitably going to be tested by some international incident. However, this test was needed, for without it, the UN would only remain a theory, and "... a dream until we who support it materialize it into a living force in the world."[18] The author was supportive of the central role the United States was taking in combating the North Koreans on behalf of the UN, but still noted some irony in the situation. The writer reminded readers how vehemently the US had been criticized for its lack of support for the League of Nations, and how other nations had had to carry the burden. Now the situation was reversed, with the US playing a central role, and other nations balking at providing assistance. This was especially true of Canada, which the author felt was completely unacceptable. Uncertain as to whether the United Nations, in its present form, would be able to withstand the pressures being exerted on it because of the war, the author contended that this did not mean that the idea of such an international organization playing a fundamental role in world governance should be abandoned. It was concluded that:

> ... The ideal of countries getting along together will persist. Nations, like individuals, do not sit idle for ever, while a bully runs loose in the neighbourhood. The bully may find even at second hand, that the rest of us may dream, but we are not quite dead asleep.[19]

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[17] "The Test of a Dream," *Vancouver Province*, 6 July 1950.
[18] Ibid.
[19] Ibid.

Figure 4 3 "Tank Trap," *Montreal Gazette*, 19 July 1950

Writers also focused on how the war represented a test for the principle of collective security, and what the role UN would play in Korea once the war ended. In a *Toronto Star* editorial entitled "Moral Failure in Korea," the author lamented the generally pessimistic view Canadian journalists had taken regarding the effectiveness of the United Nations, and what it could ultimately accomplish in Korea. For most of the journalists, the UN had "all but lost it,"[20] and was incapable of staving off the influence and power of Communism. It was noted that many argued that the UN forces "won't

[20] "Moral Failure in Korea," *Toronto Star*, 7 September 1951.

leave behind a pretty picture of Western democracy,"[21] and the people, in their despair, would revert to Communism. Still, this editorialist contended that should the UN succeed in deterring and punishing the aggressive behaviour exhibited by the North Koreans, it would "clearly be a momentous achievement."[22] Moreover, if the UN made a meaningful and concerted effort to aid the Korean people rebuild their country, such a demonstration of friendship and assistance could have far reaching impact in staving off the Communist threat in many parts of the world.

In an editorial entitled "The War in Korea," the *Winnipeg Free Press* outlined the tactics and strategy employed by the UN forces, drawing comparisons to the battles in the Pacific islands during the Second World War. The writer praised the US-dominated UN force for their successful landing at Inchon on 15 September, and believed that their success would lead to a quick end to the conflict. Yet, according to the author, these were simply "incidents of war;"[23] the most important part of the Korean conflict, it was argued, was that this was the first time a campaign had been conducted under the auspices of collective security. The writer was very supportive of the idea, as it represented a fundamental change in how countries interacted and worked with each other. The editorialist believed quite strongly that an important, positive precedent was being established by the fact that the United States, and other western democracies, were willing to undertake the sacrifices associated with collective security "on behalf of a

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[21] Ibid.
[22] Ibid.
[23] "The War in Korea," *Winnipeg Free Press*, 23 September 1950

small Asiatic country, only recently liberated from the tyranny of another Asiatic power."[24]

In late September 1950, the *Vancouver Province* published an editorial entitled "Another Peace to Win." The writer argued that though the United Nations' participation in the conflict was an important test for the organization, it was simply the tip of the iceberg. The editorialist had great faith that the western democracies would defeat the North Koreans, but defeating them in battle was only the first step, as it was stressed that there was also a duty to assist in the rehabilitation of the Korean peninsula, the failure of which could have grave ramifications. The author argued:

> Now, the United Nations has to devise a process whereby Korea as a whole can be reorganized for peace. It is a test that will react all over the world, but especially in Asia. Asia is currently that part of the world into which Russia is injecting its largest stream of propaganda. A successful solution of the rehabilitation of Korea would be the strongest antidote that could be used by the democracies. In a small way we are faced with the old problem: having won a war, we have to win a peace.[25]

Establishing a stable, viable peace, the author concluded, was the true test of the United Nations. Peace would demonstrate to the world that the principles on which the UN had been founded were strong enough to withstand international pressures and conflict, and that the UN was a strong enough body to fulfill the mandate established in 1945. A lasting peace, not simply victory in war, would determine the UN's long-term viability.

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[24] Ibid.
[25] "Another Peace to Win," *Vancouver Province*, 28 September 1950.

Figure 4 4 "The Flag of Embattled Democracy," *Halifax Chronicle Herald*, 19 July 1950

In addition to arguing that creating a stable peace was going to be the true test of the United Nations, an editorialist with the *Vancouver Province* also argued the manner in which peace was established was a significant problem that the United Nations would have to overcome In December 1950, the UN General Assembly voted overwhelmingly that negotiations for a cease-fire commence, with the hope of establishing a quick peace However, it was apparent that the Soviet Union would not agree to an armistice unless this somehow benefitted its interests The Communists, the author argued, were holding

the UN, hostage, but that relenting to this was not an option, for "The UN is not some vague, distant organization. UN means us."[26]

Figure 4.5: "'U S --- That Spells 'US,'" *Vancouver Province*, 31 July 1950

Throughout 1950 and 1951, editorialists for various newspapers drew parallels between the situation for the United Nations in Korea, and the roles of the defunct League of Nations and its failed policy of appeasement following the First World War. Several editorials concluded that lessons had been learned from the shortcomings of the League of Nations. The *Toronto Star* argued that because the League of Nations did not have any form of armed forces to deal with any sort of international violence, such as Japan's annexation of Manchuria in 1931 or the Italian invasion of Abyssinia in 1935, it could not adopt a strong position in countering such aggression, thus discrediting its

[26] "A Bigger Test for the UN," *Vancouver Province*, 16 December 1950.

power and influence. Indeed, the author argued that because of these two events, the disastrous outcome of the Munich Agreement in 1938 was inevitable. However, the strong, united stance adopted by the United Nations in response to the North Korean invasion demonstrated how different the UN was from the League, and how "the organized world will not go down without a struggle."[27] While it would be a struggle, the author firmly believed that freedom would prevail over the Communist threat.[28]

The *Halifax Chronicle-Herald* also contended that the UN had learned from past mistakes and was applying those lessons to how it was dealing with the conflict in Korea. The failures of the League of Nations were still fresh in many people's minds, and according to this source the UN would not repeat such costly errors. Korea would not "be another Rhineland, another Munich, nor another Spain."[29] Korea afforded the UN the opportunity to distance itself from past mistakes, and to create a bright future for itself.

Continuing in this vein, an editorial in the *Winnipeg Free Press* entitled "Appeasement is Out," outlined for the readers Lester B. Pearson's attempts, along with three other UN negotiators, to establish a truce with the North Koreans. However, their continued aggression convinced Pearson that at this juncture a diplomatic resolution would not work, and that the UN should focus its energies on the military solution. The author endorsed a tough stand, telling readers that the only way a truce could be established was if the North Koreans immediately stopped their aggression; appeasement was not a viable option. The *Free Press* maintained that the UN's goal in Korea was not

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[27] "The U.N.'s Call to Arms," *Toronto Star*, 4 July 1950.
[28] Ibid.
[29] "The Job in Korea," *Halifax Chronicle-Herald*, 5 August 1950.

to interfere with the internal politics of the peninsula, but to stop aggression and to prevent further hostilities. Paraphrasing famed American columnist Walter Lippman, Pearson said such a limited objective could be achieved by a limited war, as was being pursued in Korea.[30] The *Montreal Gazette* also lauded the UN by comparing its robust response in Korea to the unwillingness of the League of Nations to even impose economic sanctions on Italy for its brutal invasion of Abyssinia[31]

On United Nations Day, 23 October 1950, an editorialist for the *Winnipeg Free Press* wrote a glowing commentary on the organization. By remaining firm to the principles outlined in its Charter, especially by imposing collective security, the UN was portrayed as having become an important force on the international stage. Indeed, the author endorsed the idea of providing the UN with the resources necessary to respond to conflicts with its own international police force. Although establishing an international peace was going to be a long, drawn-out affair, the author had no doubt that the UN was up to the task.[32]

The *Toronto Star* also expressed optimism that the United Nations would play a vital role in bringing peace back to the Korean peninsula. The amalgamation of international forces "... under the light blue flag of the United Nations on which olive branches embrace the world" would afford the UN "... more prestige and authority than the old League of Nations ever possessed."[33]

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[30] "Appeasement is Out," *Winnipeg Free Press*, 26 May 1951.
[31] "The Disturbing Echoes," *Montreal Gazette*, 5 December 1950.
[32] "United Nations Day," *Winnipeg Free Press*, 23 October 1950.
[33] "Fighting Under the United Nations' Blue Flag," *Toronto Star*, 11 July 1950.

Figure 4.6: "The New Crusade," *Winnipeg Free Press*, 12 July 1950

The Globe and Mail argued that for a young organization, it was impressive that the UN had succeeded in confronting the conflict head on by deploying troops from numerous countries, and the fact that such an exercise of the UN's power had never before been attempted. However, the writer did question what the UN would have been able to do if the Soviet delegate had been present, and believed that this would be a determining factor in any future involvement.[34]

A stronger endorsement of the United Nations was published by *The Globe and Mail* a few weeks later. Korea had allowed the UN to move beyond "... a pious hope and

[34] "An Opportunity for UN," *The Globe and Mail*, 12 July 1950.

debating society," and demonstrated that it "... is capable of action and can command universal backing ... outside the Communist bloc."[35] However, to firmly cement the UN's influence and power on the international stage, the editorialist argued that the UN might have to re-evaluate its goals in Korea. As it stood, the United Nations' final objective was to push the North Korean troops back over the 38th parallel, and establish a lasting cease-fire. However, the author believed that more was required. By allowing the Korean peninsula to be divided, the UN ran the risk of further attacks against the south. Allowing the Americans to take complete control of the peninsula was also not advisable, as it could be interpreted that they were going to use the area as a jumping off point to invade Communist territory. Thus, the writer believed that Korea should become a ward of the UN – an independent country, but protected by a UN military force. By taking such a leading role, it would help cement the UN's status as a central player on the international stage. Member nations clearly had faith in the organization; the question remained whether that momentum could continue into the future.[36]

The liberal *Winnipeg Free Press* was arguably the most passionate in its support of the UN. In an editorial entitled "The Security Council Moves Again," it assured readers that they had nothing to fear if the Canadian government decided to become more concretely involved in the war effort. Any contribution the government would make would fall under the auspices of the UN, not as an individual contribution from Canada. Moreover, these resources would only be put to use in operations sanctioned by the UN, and not to serve any one nation's interest. The editorialist continued by commending the member nations of the UN for presenting a unified front against the Communist threat,

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[35] "UN and its Future," *The Globe and Mail*, 27 July 1950.
[36] Ibid.

and thus avoiding the downfalls that had plagued the League of Nations.[37] The writer concluded by presenting the UN, more than any other body, as "promis[ing] the hope of peace."[38]

An editorial published in the *Toronto Star* highlighted the central role the South Korean people and the Republic of Korea (ROK) Army were playing in aiding the United Nations liberate their country. Because of their willingness to fight, the author told readers to avoid referring to Koreans as "gooks," because "in every possible way the United Nations forces should show that they are pleased to be associated with the South Koreans in their fight for independence, and value and desire their co-operation."[39] Furthermore, the author cautioned readers against assuming that Korean people could not be trusted. Despite the fact that some members of the North Korea People's Army (NKPA) had infiltrated UN lines by dressing in civilian clothing and launching guerrilla attacks from the rear, it would be a "tragic mistake" if all Koreans were viewed as "treacherous and untrustworthy."[40] South Koreans were "a fine, intelligent and courageous people,"[41] it was asserted, and it would be to the detriment of the UN forces if its troops did not respect the South Koreans. It was also argued that even though there had been numerous reports of South Korean troops fleeing the invasion by the NKPA, this was not because the South Koreans were a cowardly people; rather, it was because they faced a massive onslaught, and were burdened with poor and outdated equipment. American troops had also retreated before overwhelming numbers of the enemy, it was

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[37] "The Security Council Moves Again," *Winnipeg Free Press*, 8 July 1950.
[38] Ibid.
[39] "In Korea as Liberators," *Toronto Star*, 28 July 1950.
[40] Ibid.
[41] Ibid.

pointed out, but the writer insisted that the UN force would turn the tide and establish a lasting peace on the peninsula.

In another editorial, the *Winnipeg Free Press* said that victory in Korea could only be achieved by working through the United Nations. The optics of the United States playing a fundamental role in the governance of an Asian country was simply unacceptable, and would actually undermine inroads the US government wished to make in the region. Thus, the United Nations had a central role to play in the creation of a free and democratic Korea, and its leadership was presented as securing the support of other Asian countries and curbing the influence of Communism in the region.[42] However, the powers of the UN could not be used solely at the behest of the western democracies. The role of the United Nations was to ensure international peace and stop aggression. It was only by maintaining and securing peace that democratic values and beliefs had the opportunity to spread and potentially take hold, as "democracy ... needs peace for its growth."[43] Peace transcended all political and cultural ideologies. The purpose of the UN was to also transcend those ideologies, thus encouraging the development and growth of democracy and non-aggression. The author concluded:

> Upon that proposition the United Nations Charter was founded. It did not ask it signatories to accept any particular form of government. It asked them only to foreswear aggression, to combine against any aggressor... This is the fact to be remembered in Korea. While the western democracies must strive always to support the progressive elements in Asia, where there are such elements to support, disputes about the character of various governments must be postponed until peace is enforced, for so long as aggression is loose in the world no human progress, under any system, will be secure.[44]

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[42] "Beyond Victory," *Winnipeg Free Press*, 5 August 1950.
[43] "The Simple Issue," *Winnipeg Free Press*, 16 August 1950.
[44] "The Simple Issue," *Winnipeg Free Press*, 16 August 1950.

Like the *Winnipeg Free Press*, the *Vancouver Province* lauded the UN for its accomplishments, and stressed its vital role in ensuring international peace.[45] The *Montreal Gazette* also praised the organization for fulfilling the large expectations that had been placed upon it in Korea, and further commended the organization for being willing to modify the veto vote so as to ensure that the Security Council could not be deadlocked by the Soviet Union.[46]

The *Toronto Star* also published an editorial extolling the virtues of the United Nations on the fifth anniversary of its founding. The paper wrote that the UN's strong action in Korea provided "... a definite hope that world peace can be maintained."[47] It is important to note, however, that the editorialist also underlined the central role the United States played in ensuring the ultimate success of the UN, asserting that:

> The United Nations has done better, for which most of the credit must be given to the United States, which had boycotted the former collective security organizations. The American-backed United Nations today, more than ever, is the hope of a peace-loving world.[48]

As early as October 1950, several editorials discussed what would become of the Korean peninsula, and the role of the United Nations there once the war was over. The Korean War had provided the UN with a clear purpose, but could it be maintained once peace was established? The *Halifax Chronicle-Herald* insisted that the United Nations would continue to have a central role to play in maintaining international peace.[49] The Korean War had heightened its presence on the international stage, and that "reputation

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[45] "The Hope of the World," *Vancouver Province*, 24 October 1950. A similar sentiment was expressed in "United Nations Day," *Winnipeg Free Press*, 23 October 1950.
[46] "The Power to Veto Peace," *Montreal Gazette*, 24 October 1950.
[47] "U.N. the World's Hope," *Toronto Star*, 24 October 1950.
[48] Ibid.
[49] "A Posture of Defence," *Halifax Chronicle-Herald*, 25 October 1950.

and responsibility"[50] meant a great deal of work in the future, including continuing to protect democratic nations from the threat of Communism.

This sentiment continued into 1951. In an editorial entitled "Peace Through Strength," the *Chronicle-Herald* reaffirmed that peace would only be brought about by ensuring that the United Nations remained a strong and influential player on the international stage. However, the author had an additional reason for making a case for the UN: the presence of a "volatile element" within the United States government which believed that a "preventative war"[51] with the Soviet Union was the only way that the Communist threat could be addressed. The paper reassured readers that the US government was fully against this idea. However it also argued that the United States, in concert with the United Nations, should demonstrate a strong and united front to deter the USSR from carrying out any major attacks. It also concluded that the Canadian government and public should lend their support to this policy, as members of a democratic, peace-loving nation.[52]

While many editorials expressed the view that the United Nations should play an important role in establishing a strong and viable international peace, they also recognized that there were fundamental difficulties the organization had to face in order to achieve this goal. Editorialists for the *Montreal Gazette* and the *Halifax Chronicle-Herald* focused their attention on Communist influence in both the Security Council and the General Assembly. This threat that had to addressed. If it was not, they feared the UN would become mired in stalemate, and unable to fulfill its mandate. This fear was

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[50] Ibid.
[51] "Peace Through Strength," *Halifax Chronicle-Herald*, 3 March 1951.
[52] Ibid.

expressed only a month following the initial attack by the North Korean army. In an editorial in the *Gazette*, the author voiced concern over the potential of the Soviet Union's delegate to return to the Security Council, and once again use the veto power to cripple the body. This could potentially thwart continued UN assistance in Korea and make it "...a mirror for the world's troubles, but not a solution."[53] In August 1950, Jacob Malik, the Soviet Union's UN delegate returned to the UN and assumed the position of chairperson of the Security Council. An editorialist for the *Halifax Chronicle-Herald* vehemently opposed this decision, and argued that the UN could be turned into a sounding board for Communist propaganda. The paper suggested that the Soviet Union be expelled outright from the UN for undermining the UN to suit its narrow interests.[54] An editorial published in the *Montreal Gazette* only a few days later echoed the sentiment that the UN was being used, rather effectively, by the Soviet Union delegate to promote Communist propaganda. This author was especially worried as Malik focused much of his attention on convincing other Asian countries that it was the United States, aided by the United Nations, who were the true aggressors in Korea. Only by allying with the other Communist nations could Korea ever hope to be free of these imperialist aggressors. While the editorialist praised the western nations for standing strong against these continued attacks, worry was expressed that should this continue for an extended period of time, irrevocable damage could result.[55]

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[53] "The Return of the Veto," *Montreal Gazette*, 28 July 1950.
[54] "Why Tolerate Malik?" *Halifax Chronicle-Herald*, 11 August 1950.
[55] "West Endure Propaganda Test," *Montreal Gazette*, 17 August 1950.

Figure 4.7: "Return of the 'Peace' Apostle," *The Globe and Mail*, 31 July 1950

While editorialists for the *Halifax Chronicle-Herald* argued that the United Nations had a role in maintaining peace, even once the Korean War was over, writers for the *Montreal Gazette* stressed the challenge of Communist China over the long term. In particular, it brought up the point that the Korean War highlighted the matter of "de facto governments,"[56] namely that weak and unstable governments, while not only more likely to deny their people basic democratic rights, were also quite likely to become puppets of more powerful nations. This, the author believed, was the case of North Korea, acting simply on behalf of the Soviet government in Moscow. As the editorialist pointed out, while the UN was fighting a war against the de facto North Koreans, it was also

[56] "More Than a Military Decision," *Montreal Gazette*, 10 October 1950.

considering the potential admittance of Communist China into the organization. According to the writer, it was unclear what type of government existed in China, namely its degree of legitimacy with its population and how deeply it was tied to other Communist governments, in particular the Soviet Union. According to the UN Charter, the two main conditions for entry into the UN were sovereignty and independence. As the UN was unsure whether these qualifications could be met, the paper believed that the UN had a duty to investigate the authenticity of the Chinese government to see if it was a puppet of the Soviet Union. Indeed, for the UN to remain influential, it was maintained that it had to remain true to its founding principles, including the rules for granting membership.[57]



Figure 4.8 "The Bear That Walks Like a Dragon," *Montreal Gazette*, 5 January 1951

[57] Ibid.

The *Halifax Chronicle-Herald* also recognized the potential destruction of relations between the Asiatic nations and western countries. It identified the need to improve the UN's relationship with Communist China as a method of ameliorating the situation. When the idea was first broached in the UN by Malik, the paper commented that many of the other countries simply saw this as a way of distracting them from Korea. However, for lasting peace to become a true possibility, some rapprochement between the western democracies and China was portrayed as necessary, and this might include admitting China into the UN. It was a calculated risk, the author acknowledged, but it could potentially lessen the influence of the Soviet Union, including on the Security Council.[58] Explaining its position further, the paper commented:

> The UN cannot get along indefinitely without the cooperation of the Oriental world. Orientals may bring with them subtleties and obstructionist tactics of their own. Yet, so far, the Oriental world, and the Chinese in particular, have not proved inept tools of Moscow. It would be a triumph if they could be brought into some condition of collaboration with the Democracies in the general search for a formula for world peace.[59]

In order to guard the UN from excessive Communist influences, in the fall of 1950, the US Secretary of State Dean Acheson proposed a plan – named after him – whereby the General Assembly could be summoned to vote on a motion to over-ride the Council. *The Globe and Mail*, while supportive of reforming the UN, did not endorse the plan. The paper worried that it would not be effective in the case of an emergency. If a motion went to the General Assembly, the chances of it becoming bogged down were

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[58] "Diplomatic Opportunity?" *Halifax Chronicle-Herald*, 17 October 1950.
[59] Ibid.

quite high. Moreover, even if the measure was passed, there were no guarantees that the UN could respond more quickly and decisively.[60]

However, the *Winnipeg Free Press* and the *Vancouver Province* were unequivocal in their support. In a September 1950 editorial, the *Winnipeg Free Press* provided, in great detail, what sort of reforms Secretary Acheson was proposing for the UN. The writer highlighted how this plan would assist the UN, especially in the area of collective security. Without some way of subverting the Soviet Union's veto on the Security Council, it argued that enforcing peace through collective security simply could not happen. The author also highlighted the fact that Acheson's plan did not contravene the UN's Charter. Acheson argued that Article 24 of the UN Charter dictated that the Security Council's main purpose was to ensure peace. However, if it was not able to do that, then the General Assembly had an obligation to become an active and full participant in bringing about peace, according to Articles 10, 11, and 14. Indeed, the paper stressed that Acheson was trying to protect the Charter from being nullified by the Soviet Union.[61] The *Vancouver Province* said that adopting Acheson's plan would mean "the UN would have a bite to match its bark."[62] The paper even argued that this reform was the most significant proposal to ensure international peace and security since the inception of the UN.[63]

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[60] "A Plan to Save UN," *The Globe and Mail*, 22 September 1950.
[61] "Strengthening the Charter," *Winnipeg Free Press*, 27 September 1950.
[62] "Giving UN Some Power," *Vancouver Province*, 22 September 1950. A similar sentiment was expressed in "The Acheson Plan," *Winnipeg Free Press*, 12 October 1950.
[63] Ibid.

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Editorials discussing the end of the war and the inevitable peace talks were addressed as early as October 1950. That month, an editorial was published by the *Winnipeg Free Press* stating its hope that the war in Korea would soon end, and focused on the United Nations' role in reconstructing the peninsula. The editorialist praised the UN for allowing the Koreans to "settle their own destiny"[64] by aiding with the organization of a general election, and by pledging its respect for the result. The writer also praised the UN for not allowing the South Koreans to run roughshod over the North Koreans. If this occurred, it would simply foster further animosity between the two nations. The paper lauded the UN because it appeared that the values which had guided it in the war would also guide its actions in establishing peace.[65]

The *Montreal Gazette*, however, was quite sceptical of how successful establishing peace in Korea would be, as it argued that the Communists simply could not be trusted to remain faithful to any agreement.[66] Furthermore, any agreement would invariable involve numerous, and excessive, concessions in favour of the Chinese. This too would give the upper hand to the Communists, and leave the other nations in the region vulnerable to their influence. Although establishing peace was of the foremost importance, the editorialist also stressed that the western democracies had to be mindful of the fact entering into any agreement with the Communists was fraught with uncertainty; that they had to "plan for peace, yet be prepared for war."[67]

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[64] "Korea's Peace Settlement," *Winnipeg Free Press*, 20 October 1950.
[65] Ibid.
[66] "Pacts on Inflammable Paper," *Montreal Gazette*, 4 December 1950.
[67] Ibid.

Figure 4 9 "A Vital Conference," *Halifax Chronicle-Herald*, 27 June 1951

A June 1951 *Toronto Star* editorial discussed how the western democracies should deal with the Communist desire for peace in Korea. While the author acknowledged the west should be wary, it was also said that the Communists wanted peace and that "... every possible avenue must be fully and carefully explored."[68] Furthermore, the negotiations could aid the west in gauging the true intentions of the Soviet Union The author noted, "It is important for the whole world to know what the Russians really mean by peace. This is an opportunity to find out."[69]

This initial idealism faded by Christmas 1951. In a 13 December 1951 editorial, the *Star* remarked that there was no possibility of the Korean War ending by Christmas,

[68] "A Truce in Korea," *Toronto Star*, 30 June 1951.
[69] Ibid

and the blame lay entirely with the Communists. The author speculated that the reason for the original call for a truce was that it would allow the Chinese to rebuild and reorganize their military forces, and then launch stronger attacks against the United Nations forces. Although it was unlikely that the Communist forces could defeat the UN troops, they certainly had the ability to substantially weaken them, thus drawing out the Korean War out even more, and forcing the United States to commit more resources.[70]

The United Nations' role in Korea proved to be one of the most divisive and complex issues addressed by Canadian newspaper editorialist between 1950 and 1951. While some editorialists placed their faith in the UN's abilities to deal with the influences of Communism and to bring about peace in Korea, others remained firmly rooted in what they saw as disappointing realities. After a year and a half of war, and no ceasefire reached, could the UN be seen as a success? And with a static front on the 38th parallel, and no end in sight, would Korea ultimately result in victory in Asia and more broadly against the spread of Communism?

[70] "Christmas and the Korean War," *Toronto Star*, 13 December 1951.

Conclusion

Lest We Forget?

The Korean War ended on 27 July 1953. Or at least the shooting had stopped. While the war had remained a relatively consistent topic for editorialists throughout the first six months of the war, 1951 saw a marked decline in the number of editorials published about the war. Yet, despite the decline, editorialists remained generally supportive of Canada's participation in the war, the role that the western democracies were playing in mitigating the influence of Communism, and the role of the United Nations in Korea. On the first anniversary of the start of the war, the *Halifax Chronicle-Herald* acknowledged that Korea had been a costly affair; it wrote, "many lives have been lost, vast sums have been spent, terrible damage has been wrought."[1] However, in its view, such a sacrifice had been warranted. Even though the conflict was not coming to an end as soon as was initially hoped, Korea:

> ... stands as a worthwhile effort in the cause of decency and a milestone in the history of mankind. ... Here is aggression which has been met, not by pious utterances and shameful evasions, but by united effort of the part of nations who want peace. And that noble effort transcends all else in the Korean struggle.[2]

Although Korea did not touch the Canadian public to the same degree as the First or Second World Wars, it remained important to Canada, and the sacrifice of its troops fighting far from home was the same for the earlier wars.

The Korean War continued for another year and half, but by the time the armistice was signed, opinions had changed. The 2nd Battalion, Princess Patricia's Canadian Light

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[1] Korea: One Year Later," *Halifax Chronicle-Herald*, 25 June 1951
[2] Ibid.

Infantry received no praise for its brave stand at Kap'yong in April 1951.[3] In October 1952, 1st Battalion, Royal Canadian Regiment experienced some of that year's most heavy fighting at Hill 355; again, there was little mention in newspapers of their success in holding their position.[4] During the last months of the war, news coverage was primarily limited to brief stories pertaining to the peace talks.[5] When the armistice was signed, the front pages of the newspapers proclaimed the peace, but did not convey enthusiasm. As *The Globe and Mail* stated, "the main thing to be said about this armistice is that is can accomplish nothing whatsoever except a cessation of the shooting on one Far Eastern front." Korea had become "... a waste of life and material."[6] The war had not resolved any of the issues which had plagued the western democracies since the beginning of the conflict. The admittance of Communist China to the United Nations, Canada's own diplomatic relationship with Communist China, and the perception of Communism as the most a significant threat to international peace remained predominant topics. The west had to remain vigilant, for "only by increasing" the pressure against

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[3] *The Globe and Mail* published a fairly detailed account of the battle entitled "Winning Their Spurs: Cut Off and Encircle in Hills, Pats Hold Steady as Rocks" on 26 April 1951, written by William (Bill) Boss. No editorial was published praising the battalion's efforts. An even smaller article was published in the 25 April 1951 edition of the *Toronto Star*.

[4] *The Globe and Mail* had a brief account of the battle, written by Bill Boss, published on the front page of the 24 October 1952 edition, entitled "Canadians Retake Hill in Short, Sharp Fight." Like Kap'yong, no editorial was published praising the Canadians' efforts. There was no mention of the battle in the *Toronto Star*.

[5] "Truce May Be In For More Delay," *Halifax Chronicle-Herald*, 14 July 1953; "Reds Agree to Go Ahead With Plans for Armistice in Korea," *Halifax Chronicle-Herald*, 20 July 1953. A few editorials were published which harshly criticized South Korea's President Syngman Rhee for his lack of cooperation at the peace talks. "Dr. Rhee's New Terms," *The Globe and Mail*, 14 July 1953; "Dr. Rhee Remains Obdurate," *The Globe and Mail*, 24 July 1953.

[6] "No Time to Relax," *The Globe and Mail*, 27 July 1953

Communism could it "win the Cold War."[7] With no decisive victory, and no concrete proof that the Communist threat had been abated, the Korean War quickly passed from Canadian consciousness, relegated as one of the many struggles between democracy and Communism during the Cold War.

While the Korean War may have slipped from the editorial pages over the course of the war, this thesis has shown that in its early days, it remained in the forefront of public discourse. English-language newspapers published substantially more editorials pertaining to the war than did *Le Devoir*. While the *Le Devoir* editorialists voiced their concerns over Canada's participation in the war, English-language papers generally believed that Canada had a duty to provide substantial military resources to aid the United Nations' forces. Moreover, the English-language editorials were extremely critical of the federal government's slow and indecisive response to the Korean conflict, and for the government's utter lack of military preparations, which were viewed as leaving Canada open and vulnerable to international Communist aggression.

The threat of Communism was an undeniable fact for Canadian newspaper editorialists. However, opinions varied as to the role the Soviet Union was playing in Korea, the larger implications of the war, how to deal with Communist China, and the overall influence of Communism on the United Nations.

In contrast to the standard historical argument that Canada has consistently been a strong supporter of the UN, some editorialists blatantly questioned how effective the UN was in the Korean War, while other still believed the UN could play a central role in ending the conflict. Others questioned whether the organization could overcome the

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[7] "No Time to Relax," *The Globe and Mail*, 27 July 1953; "The Korean Cease-fire," *Toronto Star*, 27 July 1953.

legacy of failure bequeathed by its predecessor organization, and how it would go about accomplishing this task. Finally, questions were raised as to whether the UN could even be an effective method of bringing peace to the Korean peninsula.

This thesis highlights an often overlooked and oversimplified period in Canadian history. While current historiography often paints the Korean War as largely forgotten, as one of Canada's first major forays into the Cold War, it certainly warrants detailed examination and study. It is hoped this thesis also contributes to our understanding of this period by demonstrating the vigorous debates that consumed the Canadian press with respect to Korea, a story that also expands knowledge on Canada's perceptions of Communism, the United Nations and its international responsibilities in the early post-war years. Even today, efforts are still being made to more significantly understand and appreciate Canada's contribution to the Korean War. The first National Korean War Veterans Armistice Day was marked on 27 July 2010. As Canadian veteran Joe Sweeney remarked, "Matter of fact, I felt ashamed when I came home. The Legion didn't want us. Nobody did. They ridiculed us. It wasn't good. That changed today."[8]

[8] "Korean War Day Honours Veterans." http://www.cbc.ca/canada/story/2010/07/27/korean-war-day.html (accessed 27 July 2010).

Appendix A

Table 1: Total Number of Newspaper Editorials Divided by Theme

	Total Number of Editorials	**Percentage of Total (%)**
Canada	101	31.5
Communism	90	28.1
United Nations	129	40.3
Total	**320**	

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