

Beauty and Cabinet Nomination: Is there a Gender Bias?

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Abstract

In this thesis, I aim to answer the following questions: (1) is there a relationship between the gender of the nominator and the beauty of the ministers that he or she selected, and (2) do nominators select more attractive ministers of the opposite sex. I compare and contrast the physical beauty of ministers of three cabinets nominated by a male prime minister and three cabinets nominated by a female prime minister. My descriptive statistics and multivariate regression analysis, in which I control for the age of the nominator, the physical attractiveness of the nominator, the professional experience of the nominator, the age of the minister and the margin of victory of the nominator's party, reveal interesting results. I find that both male and female prime ministers nominate better-looking women, and that this tendency is even stronger and slightly more pronounced for female nominators than it is for male nominators.

Keywords: ministerial nomination, cabinet selection, physical attractiveness, gender

Table of Content

Chapter I. Introduction.....pg. 1

Chapter II. Overview of the literature.....pg. 5

 2.1. Physical attractiveness and personal outcome.....pg. 5

 2.2. Physical attractiveness and political outcome.....pg. 8

 2.3. Physical attractiveness, personal attributes, and cabinet selection.....pg. 12

 2.4. Women’s physical attractiveness and political representation.....pg. 17

Chapter III. Overview of the literature.....pg. 21

 3.1. Social control theories.....pg. 22

 3.2. Social psychology and social expectation theories.....pg. 24

 3.3. Evolutionary and mate selection theories.....pg. 27

Chapter IV. Study’s contribution to developing the literature concerning ministerial selection and cabinet appointment.....pg. 30

Chapter V. Research design and methodology.....pg. 32

Chapter VI. Variables.....	pg. 43
6.1. Dependent variables.....	pg. 43
6.2. Independent variable.....	pg. 43
6.3. Control variable.....	pg. 43
6.3.1. Age of the nominator.....	pg. 44
6.3.2. Physical attractiveness of the nominator.....	pg. 44
6.3.3. Age of the minister.....	pg. 44
6.3.4. Professional experience on the job.....	pg. 45
6.3.5. Margin of victory.....	pg. 45
Chapter VII. Data and coding.....	pg. 46
Chapter VIII. Results.....	pg. 47
Chapter IX. Conclusions.....	pg. 56

Chapter I. Introduction

Power, money, and physical attraction have been walking together hand in hand since immemorial times, as great leaders in history (e.g., Alexander the Great, Julius Caesar, Richard the Lionheart, and other great leaders) have been described as having the most attractive physical characteristics: handsome, strong, and of shapely and proportional built (Plutarh, 1919; Brewer, 2000). Suetonius Tranquillus (121) described the Caesar as having “*excelsa statura, colore candido, teretibus membris, ore paulo pleniore, nigris vegetisque oculis*”. This tendency of associating leadership with the positive physical attributes of the leaders prevails up to now (see Hoegg and Lewis, 2011).

In social sciences, there are a significant number of studies that discuss particular aspects of the advantages of good-looking people over the less attractive ones, emphasising the favourable association between higher physical attractiveness and better individual outcome (e.g., Efran and Patterson, 1974; Brewer and Archer, 2007; Ibroscheva, 2009; Tsfati, Elfassi, and Waismel-Manor, 2010; Hoegg and Lewis, 2011). Attractive individuals are often seen as more pleasant, friendly, and with more socially desirable personality traits than individuals with lower level of physical attractiveness (cf. Brewer and Archer, 2007), therefore they seem to gain more advantages than the less attractive ones. A meta-analysis by Langlois et al. (2000) evidences that attractive adults and children show behaviours that are more

positive and show that they are treated better in social interactions than unattractive children and adults. These findings would influence individuals, firstly from a societal perspective which instils the concept of “beautiful-is-good” (Dion, Berscheid & Walster, 1972; Eagly, Ashmore, Makhijani, & Longo, 1991), and secondly from an intrinsically biological, evolutionary driven perspective, that causes an individual to look more favourably at physically attractive people (Barber, 1995; Buss & Schmitt, 1993).

According to Barelds-Dijkstra et al. (2008), the “beautiful-is-good” effect would lead an individual to assign positive attributes to physically attractive people. Barelds-Dijkstra’s study also showed that, across cultures, beautiful people are thought to be good people. In addition, society in general assumes that attractive persons are happier and more successful than less attractive individuals (Dion, Berscheid & Walster, 1972; Hatfield & Sprecher, 1986; Eagly, Ashmore, Makhijani & Longo, 1991; Watkins & Johnston, 2000).

Economically, people that are more attractive are likely to advance faster in their careers and have wages up to ten per cent higher than the rest of the individuals (Hamermesh and Biddle, 1994). Better looking job interviewees have greater chances of success (Watkins and Johnson, 2000), while the appearance of Chief Executive Officers (CEO) influences the shareholder value, showing that more attractive CEOs are being associated with better stock returns (Halford, J. T., and Hsu, H. C., 2013).

The same appears to happen in politics, where good-looking candidates are more likely to get several percentages more from voters based solely on physical appearance (Hoegg and Lewis, 2011). A great deal of research associates attractive candidates with better coverage in television news (Tsfati, Elfassi, and Waismel-Manor, 2010). However, female politicians everywhere have accused that they benefit of a more negative media coverage than their male counterparts, or at least one that focuses more on beauty and appearances than on actual political matters, thus reinforcing gender stereotypes (Kahn, 1994, 1996; Herzog, 1998; Ross 2002; Robinson & Saint-Jean, 1991; Ross & Sreberny, 2000). This reality leads towards a growing gender bias in the media and the public opinion (Ibroscheva, 2009).

Efran & Patterson (1974) show a correlation between attractive politicians and higher votes. Attractive politicians seem to generally benefit their features, and they are more likely to be nominated to executive positions of high stakes within the national administration than the ones that are perceived as less or non-attractive (Ibroscheva, 2009). With appearance perceived as more important in females, and with more attractive politicians being nominated, the need to study the possibility of gender biased nominations arises.

Few empirical tests have been conducted on the matter of nominations and gender bias, and there is less research that looks at how gender may influence nominations that are based on beauty or that looks at whether attractive politicians are more likely to be nominated. In particular, the literature has not yet established if

male or female nominators choose better-looking candidates for ministerial positions.

Thus, this study will try to investigate the matter more closely and find out more about the ones that nominate high state officials and more about possible factors related to physical beauty that might influence their selection. Therefore, I will try to identify *(1) whether male heads of state nominate to cabinet more attractive females than female heads of state nominate, (2) whether female heads of state nominate more attractive males than male heads of state nominate, or (3) whether one gender generally nominates more beautiful people than the other gender.*

I will answer these questions in a bivariate and multivariate framework, in which I control for the age of the nominator, the physical attractiveness of the nominator, the professional experience of the nominator, the age of the minister and the margin of victory of the nominator's party. The results indicate that female cabinet ministers were better looking than male cabinet ministers. While this finding holds regardless of whether the nominator is a male or a female, women heads of state nominated to ministerial portfolios even more attractive female ministers than their male counterparts nominated.

This thesis proceeds as follows: firstly, I will situate this study in the literatures on physical appearance, personal, and political outcomes, cabinet selection, women's representation. Secondly, I will present the main theoretical framework and social psychology theories, which contribute to formulating my

hypotheses. Thirdly, I will present the research design, variables and methodology. Fourthly, I will show and discuss the results and interpretations. Finally, I will present my conclusion and provide some avenues to be considered for future research.

Chapter II. Overview of the literature

2.1. Physical attractiveness and personal outcome

In modern times, the favourable association between physical attractiveness and personal outcome has been the focus of several studies that discuss particular aspects of the advantages of good-looking people over the less attractive ones (Brewer and Archer, 2007, Hamermesh and Biddle, 1994, Hoegg and Lewis, 2011, Ibroscheva, 2009, Tsfati, Elfassi, and Waismel-Manor, 2010). Attractive individuals are often seen as more pleasant and friendly (Cf. Brewer and Archer, 2007), have higher monetary gains (Hamermesh and Biddle, 1994), and greater chances of career success (Watkins & Johnston, 2000).

Other researchers showed the “what is beautiful is good” stereotype as well. These researchers delved into the field of person perception and other concepts that derive from this such as trustworthiness, personal happiness, career success, and social desirability (see Dion et al., 1972, Eagly et al., 1991; Brewer and Archer, 2007).

Dion et al. (1972) looked into the way physical attractiveness influences people's beliefs regarding other individuals' personalities, level of happiness, career success, and their anticipated accomplishments in other various aspects of adult life. The researchers conclude that, when concerning peoples' perceptions of other individuals' qualities, their behaviour, and social desirability, individuals generally perceive that "what is beautiful is good" (1972, p. 285). Their findings showed a correlation between more physically attractive individuals and a higher level of projected happiness and general level of personal accomplishment, demonstrating that stereotyping based on beauty does occur and that a higher level of physical attractiveness was associated with more socially desirable individuals. Their experiment has led numerous following investigators to delve into the subject of physical beauty and facial attractiveness who agreed that this stereotype is a robust and generalizable phenomenon (see, for example, Adams, 1982; Berscheid, 1981; Patzer, 1983; Hatfield and Sprecher, 1986; Alley and Hildebrandt, 1988, Brewer and Archer, 2007).

Eagly and al. (1991) conducted a meta-analysis on the "what is beautiful is good" stereotype and, even though they found that this effect is found in a large number of studies they analysed in their review, its effect was relative and varied significantly between the studies they analysed. Their results reveal that the beauty-is-good stereotype varies fundamentally on the class of supposition the interpreter is required to make. Good looks stimulate better readings about social capabilities and

no so strong readings about potency, adjustment, and intellectual capabilities, and have limited impact on the reading regarding personal integrity and an individual's concern for others (pp. 124).

Brewer and Archer (2007) ran an interesting experiment in which they asked 74 males and 74 females to rate the facial attractiveness and rate the behavioural traits of 84 heterosexual women. They showed that both male and female coders evaluated attractive women as having more desirable personality traits. Brewer and Archer also demonstrated in their study that the women that were evaluated by male and female coders as more physically attractive were considered more promiscuous than less physically attractive women.

With respect to the labour market, Hamermesh and Biddle (2008) tested the influence of looks on remunerations by examining the interviewers' ratings of the interviewees' physical appearance. They categorised their subjects into plain looking, average looking, and good looking and concluded that the good-looking earn more than the average looking, who earn more than the plain looking. More interestingly, they showed that the penalty in earnings for the plain looking is slightly larger than the beauty premium of the better-looking individuals.

When investigating the chances for careers success, Watkins and Johnston (2000) studied the impact of beauty and the quality of the job application to measure their impact in the screening phase of a presumptive selection process. Their results

indicated that good looks had no impact when controlling for a qualitative application, however, attractiveness offered an advantage to candidates with mediocre applications, giving them a more positive evaluation than the one for the control, for which no photo was provided.

Given the multiple benefits of the more attractive people shown in these studies, it is essential to look yet into a deeper level and understand how do they apply into the political realm and candidate selection.

2. 2. Physical attractiveness and political outcome

In politics, the favourable association between physical attractiveness of a candidate and a higher vote share has been first highlighted by Efran and Patterson (1974: 34); they showed a strong association between the share of votes and a candidate's physical attractiveness. This association has been reinforced later by the work of a number of social psychologists (see Todorov et al., 2005; Lenz and Lawson, 2010; Berggren, Jordahl, and Poutvaara, 2007, 2010; Lutz, 2010; Tsfati, Elfassi, and Waismel-Manor, 2010; Tsfati, Waismel-Manor, 2011; Hart, Ottati, Krumdick, 2011; Hoegg and Lewis, 2011; Herrick, Mendez, Thomas, Wilkerson, 2012; Rosar, Klein, and Beckers, 2012; White, Kenrick, and Neuberg, 2013).

As of 2014, more than three decades of political research supports the observation that attractive politicians seem to generally benefit from their physical beauty (Lutz, 2010; Hoegg and Lewis, 2011). Good-looking candidates are more

likely to acquire higher vote shares than their less attractive counterparts according to Hoegg and Lewis (2011), who studied analysed how suppositions related to personality features that are based on candidate looks interact with the political party brand image. Nevertheless, other research (White, Kenrick, and Neuberg, 2013) points out to the fact that voters choose the better looking candidates due to fear of disease, as good looks are a predictor of health and individuals with such concerns unconsciously choose the candidates that look healthful.

Candidates that are better looking benefit of better coverage and exposure in television news (Tsfati, Elfassi, and Waismel-Manor, 2010; Tsfati, and Waismel-Manor, 2011). These candidates are also more likely to be nominated to higher executive positions than the ones that are perceived as less or non-attractive (Ibroscheva, 2009).

This finding seems to hold across countries and types of election. For example, King and Leigh (2009: 591) use data on the share of votes of major party candidates in the 2004 Australian elections and analyse the relationship between the estimate of the attractiveness of a particular political candidate, as evaluated by the graders that volunteered for the study, and the vote-share received by that particular candidate in the respective election. They argue that there is a strong relationship between the aforementioned factors and show that those contestants who were perceived as being considerably more attractive than their counterparts were perceived had gained several percentage points more in votes.

Berggren, Jordahl, and Poutvaara (2007: 10-11) studied the Finnish municipal elections and confirmed these findings. More precisely, these scholars argue that an increase by one standard deviation in the rating of a candidate's physical attractiveness "was associated with an increase of 20 per cent in the number of votes for the average non-incumbent parliamentary candidate.

Rosar, Klein, and Beckers (2012) find that a comparable influence of physical attractiveness on candidates' share of the votes exists in major elections in Germany, in the federal state of North Rhine Westphalia and that this influence appears to be resistant to various constraints. Their investigations demonstrated the effect of attractiveness in multiple political contexts, as well as in different levels of the political system and in varying electoral laws.

However, adding another analytical level, the literature (e.g., Rosar, Klein and Beckers 2008) also agrees that physical attractiveness is, to some extent, a relative, and not an absolute feature. They noticed that voters tend to judge the physical attractiveness of a contestant in relation to his or her competitors (i.e., the more beautiful a candidate, the more he or she outperforms his or her opponent and, as such, the more additional votes he or she is likely to receive) (see Rosar, Klein and Beckers, 2008: 73-6).

Similar conclusions were demonstrated by the research of Praino, Stockemer, and Ratis, (2014) who showed that only the less informed voters would

rank higher the better looking candidates. These researchers demonstrated that, the more informed the electors were, the less a candidate's beauty mattered in their voting decisions.

Hart, Ottati, Krumdick, (2011) concluded that “some voters <<correct>> for the biasing influence of physical appearance”, even if in most cases the more attractive candidates receive more favourable evaluations. The voters that do “correct” for the looks bias are the ones, which possess a higher level of information and expertise (see Hart, Ottati, Krumdick, 2011:199).

This finding is reinforced by the research of Banducci et al. (2003; 2008), who report in their studies on elections to Community Partnership Boards in the United Kingdom that attractive candidates do not receive more votes per se, but they are more likely to win when they are evaluated against a less attractive opponent. These scholars claim that attractive candidates are more likely to be thought of as successful politicians and that the chances of a candidate winning an election increase by 70 per cent when the most beautiful candidate competes against the candidate perceived as the most unattractive.

Finally, recent studies focusing on the indirect influence of physical appearance on candidates' vote shares (e.g., Lawson et al., 2010; Rosar et al., 2012) have shown that the importance of attractiveness matters differently in different elections. Focusing on Brazil and Mexico, Lawson et al. (2010) found that it was

possible to predict the winners of an election in both countries solely based on the looks of the two contenders, with a 68 per cent certainty. More indirectly, recent literature points out that attractive candidates benefit disproportionately from television exposure; they are invited more often to television shows (Lenz and Lawson, 2011) and are less attacked with negative publicity by their opponents (Hoegg and Lewis, 2011).

2.3. Physical attractiveness, personal attributes, and cabinet selection

As shown above, in the case of party candidates, their beauty is evaluated by the electors and used by these electors in deciding which candidate they should vote for in the Election Day. Conversely, in the case of selecting and appointing cabinets, their ministers – who are the actual legislature and decision makers – are, in fact, not elected, but appointed by people’s elected representatives and/or their parties, without a truly transparent process.

When it comes to cabinet nomination or political nomination in general, the role of gender in the process of nomination with respect to physical beauty has not yet been studied. Instead, researchers have studied (1) the nominating process (Dowding and Dumont, 2009; Kerby, 2009, 2011), (2) socio-professional characteristics of nominees and their career path (e.g., Blondel, 1980, 1985, 1991), and (3) gender representation, with several studies discussing the selection process of cabinet members (Blondel, 1980, 1985, 1991; Mann, 1981, Tomita et al., 1981;

Carroll, 1984; Martin, 1989, 1991; Keman, 1991; Carter, 1994; Laver and Kenneth, 1994; Davis, 1997; Paxton, 1997; Reynolds, 1999; Siaroff, 2000; Bell, 2002; Borrelli, 2002, 2010; Bose and Perotti, 2002; Kobayashi, 2004; Escobar-Lemmon and Taylor-Robinson, 2005, 2009, 2011; Liswood, 2007; Whitford et al., 2007; Atchinson and Down, 2009; Paxton and Hughes, 2010).

Blondel (1980) wanted to make a cross sectional analysis of the background and career track of the top leaders in 138 countries, from 1945 to 1975. He finds that the average tenure of the post is three years and half but that Communist leaders tend to last much longer. He also notices that Communist countries have a sort of dual leadership in which generally leaders are males, with only five women reaching high leadership positions in the analysed period and only in the third world countries. However, in his analysis, Blondel does not test for statistical significance and makes assumptions that could be objectionable, such as assuming that each country is sovereign, that all 138 countries have equal capacity to chose their leadership, and that each head of state is also the de facto leader.

Many studies (Mann, 1981; Carroll, 1984; Martin, 1989, 1991; Davis, 1997; Studlar and Moncrief, 1997; Kobayashi, 2004; Dowding and Dumont, 2009; Escobar-Lemmon and Taylor-Robinson, 2005, 2009, 2011; Atkins, Heppel, and Theakston, 2013) search to identify what characteristics are considered for nomination, what is the rejection procedure and try to identify problems. Ministers are perceived by the public as leading figures in their respective fields, considered the highest

representatives of their sectors (see Blondel, 1980, 1985; Tomita et al., 1981; Blondel and Thiébault, 1991).

Mann (1981) discusses the patterns of recruitment and nomination to the US Cabinet, looking at the attributes that are important for such selection. Even though the authority for nomination belongs to the US President, the researcher identifies different patterns of nomination for various departments. The author notes that national government changes with each president and patterns transform gradually with each administration. He notices that prior political experience might be useful, but does not represent a prerequisite. Mann gives special weight in his analysis to the economic sector, geography, and previous political experience, but does not discuss and does not include in his study an analysis of the gender of the nominator and its influence on possibly selecting specific physical attributes / good looks of the possible candidates.

Martin (1989) looks into the appointment of women to high executive positions. The researcher wants to study women in the American national politics and their recruitment to the Presidential Cabinet. In order to explain which factors contribute to the gender imbalance that existed at the time, the study looked both at male and female candidates who have been selected and appointed to cabinet positions, trying to identify their background characteristics and previous job and political experience. This study also considers to nominations to sub-cabinet positions, asserting that they are made in the same manner as cabinet appointments.

(Martin, 1989: 162). Drawing its data from the data from the National Academy of Public Administration's comprehensive study of presidential appointees, this study concludes that there appears to be a symbolic attachment to the appointment of women to top government positions. As a conclusion, the study assumes that perhaps an increase in the number of women nominated to cabinet depends on an increase in the number of women that become part of the close advisors during the electoral campaign stage.

However, scholars argue that today's system focuses on the nominee's disqualifications rather than on the person's experience and merits (Carter, 1994). The same idea was expressed by Bose and Perotti (2002), who argue that even if 75 per cent of the nominations encounter significant opposition, a cabinet nomination will be rejected only if the appointee is definitely disqualified.

On a different level, Cohen Bell investigates the constitutional process that the U.S. Senate uses to endorse or reject the President's proposals for federal government positions. Based on data gathered between 1977 and 1998 at confirmation hearings and interviews with persons involved in the endorsing process, Cohen Bell argued that, although intended to be above partisan politics, the nomination process and the practice of endorsing or rejecting a candidate has become a competition field among rival groups of interest and senators (Cohen Bell, 2002).

The choice of nomination is influenced by many other personal factors. By analysing an original dataset of ministerial appointments to the Canadian government between 1935 and 2008, Kerby (2009) develops an event history analysis model that emphasizes causal mechanisms triggering the process of ministerial appointment. His results systematically confirm the common assumptions emphasizing that attributes such as gender and legal training, previous ministerial experience and leadership status are characteristics that are generally seen to accelerate the appointment to cabinet (Kerby, 2009: 593).

Later, when noticing that Canadian prime ministers stand out by appointing a large number of first-time ministers who have little to no previous parliamentary or political experience, Kerby (2011) explored this subject by approximating the probability of maintaining office of potential but not already appointed ministers. His results indicated a positive correlation between the predicted survivability of a ministerial appointee and the chance for cabinet nomination (Kerby, 2011: 609).

Outside Canada, U.S, and few other traditionally democratic countries, little is known about the job credentials, background, political experience, and group connections brought by cabinet members to their posts, and the subject of their physical beauty has barely been touched. Obviously, having so little information on ministerial executives is unfortunate, as cabinet members greatly influence their sector of appointment.

In the United Kingdom, researchers wanted to test if today's ministers are younger and less experienced than their predecessors. To test this assumption, Atkins, Heppel, and Theakston (2013) analysed data for the ministerial appointments of the Labour and Conservative parties starting with 1945. They found little evidence of a decline in age and previous experience, but noticed concluded that there was no significant tendency towards preferring younger, less experiences ministers.

Studies that look at the socio-professional characteristics of nominees and their career path (e.g., Keman, 1991; Laver and Kenneth, 1994; Escobar-Lemmon and Taylor-Robinson, 2009), establish that the appointees are publicly perceived as elites in their field, having strong political influence and links with the clients of the sector, and are usually asked to rule in their own area of expertise.

However, scholars that look at gender representation might have different conclusions. With respect to the influence of gender on political representation, scholars that look at women's representation within the political realm have interesting conclusions that need to be discussed. I will describe their research and address their conclusions and the importance of gender on political representation in the following section.

2. 4. Women's physical attractiveness and political representation

While generally agreeing that good looks are beneficial, scholars have measured consistent differences between the profiles of men ministers and women

ministers (e.g., Borrelli, 2002, 2010; Herrick et al., 2012). These researchers struggled to assess the causes that lead to such differences and their evolution and development over time.

Herrick, Mendez, Thomas, and Wilkerson, (2012) develop an original research that looks into the inferences regarding the capability of candidates based on pictures and associate those inferences with their success in elections. Additionally, they study the effects of candidates' gender and the effects of the gender of the coders/study subjects on the results. They conclude that, even though subjects generally preferred male candidates, there is a gender gap in the assessments of competence and maturity of candidates in favour of female candidates.

While researchers generally agree that the visibility of women in leading positions has significantly increased in recent years (e.g., Reynolds 1999, Paxton and Hughes 2007, Tremblay and Bauer 2011), studies established that there are significant differences across genders between the appointees (Borelli 2002, 2010, Escobar-Lemmon and Taylor-Robinson 2011). Some found that women are generally named outside their area of expertise as to be left unable to produce change (Borrelli, 2002), while other analyses seemed to rather invalidate this conclusion (Escobar-Lemmon and Taylor-Robinson, 2011).

Escobar-Lemmon and Taylor-Robinson (2011, 1) talk about the limited knowledge regarding the credentials and expertise that women bring along when

nominated to cabinet posts. When discussing ministerial nominations, the public's beliefs are that that ministers are not qualified for the job and are only nominated because of their political influence inside their parties and because of their high level of connections and influence. Scholars believe they are nominated as political rewards (Escobar-Lemmon and Taylor-Robinson 2011, 1) and that women who are appointed to ministerial positions are nominated outside their area of expertise, just to be shown off as evidence against discrimination (Borrelli, 2002).

Even though these theoretical assumptions might not always hold true, they affect the public's view over government efficiency and its ability to select in fair, unbiased way. Research in public policy indicates that the qualifications of public managers affect the outputs of government and the public perception (Meier and O'Toole 2002; Avellaneda 2009; Hicklin and Godwin 2009). As inclusiveness and diversity have become traits that presidents and cabinets are being judged upon by the public, presidents and prime ministers need to address this issue and appoint trustees that also have the policy expertise.

Since the 1980s, many studies (Carroll, 1984, Martin, 1991, Davis, 1997, Reynolds, 1999, Siaroff, 2000, Kobayashi, 2004, Paxton, 2007, Whitford, 2007, Atchinson and Down, 2009, Paxton and Hughes, 2010, Paxton and Painter, 2010, Borelli, 2002, 2010, Escobar-Lemmon and Taylor-Robinson, 2005, 2009, 2011, Liswood, 2007, Schwindt Bayer 2009) have been published on women's representation, gender inequalities, and gender discrimination.

These analyses focus mainly on: (1) factors that explain the descriptive representation of women (e.g., Darcy Welch and Clark 1994), on (2) the economic and socio-cultural profile of women who are elected to parliament (e.g., Thomas 1994; Tremblay and Trimble 2004, Atchinson et Down 2009), on (3) the linkage between descriptive and substantive representation (e.g., Reingold 2000; Rosenthal 1998, 2002, 2005), and show that (4) gender differences, gender inequalities, and gender discrimination exist (e.g., Borrelli, 2002, Escobar-Lemmon and Taylor-Robinson, 2005, 2009, 2011).

In comparison, less research has been conducted on women's participation in governments and the reasons behind their nominations. Several scholars take a bibliographical approach (e.g., Hoogensen and Solheim 2006; Liswood 2007) and only scarce analyses (e.g., Davis 1997) look at the factors that decide the female percentage amongst cabinet ministers.

The reduced number of women having ministerial responsibilities can no longer be invoked as an explanatory reason for the lack of studies, as this is no longer a reality today (Tremblay and Bauer, 2011). In fact, over the past few decades, the number of women ministers has increased globally and consistently, from 0.5 per cent in 1980 to 16.9 per cent in 2010 (Blondel 1980, Reynolds 1999, Paxton and Hughes 2007, Tremblay and Bauer 2011).

However, this greater visibility of women in governments over the past years has not yet generated studies that assess the possible effect of beauty on their nomination. Existing research has mainly looked at the increase in the number of female ministers (Tremblay and Bauer 2011), and at the pointing out differences between female and male nominations, considering and evaluating attributes such as experience (Escobar-Lemmon, Taylor Robinson, 2005, 2009, 2011), pointing towards gender differences and area of expertise (Borrelli, 2002, 2011).

Moreover, studies that look at both the nomination process and at the women who are nominated are few (e.g., Carroll, 1984, Borrelli, 2002, Escobar-Lemmon and Taylor-Robinson, 2011), and none of them isolates the independent variable that I will test in this thesis: the physical attraction level of the nominated ministers. Moreover, none of the above studies was able to test whether male premiers would nominate more beautiful women than female heads of state would.

Chapter III. Theoretical framework

In the following, I will present the main theories I considered which contributed to formulating the working hypotheses of this study. Therefore, this thesis will try to answer the following primary research question: *Does the nominator's gender have an effect on the physical attraction of selected cabinet members?* Subsequently, two specific hypotheses are formulated: *the gender of the nominator is*

an independent variable that influences the dependent variable, i.e. the physical attractiveness score of the study subjects or cabinet nominees (hypothesis #1).

However, I am assuming that *the gender of the nominator is an independent variable that does not influence the dependent variable, i.e., the physical attractiveness score of the study subjects or cabinet nominees if their gender is male (hypothesis #2).*

Although this thesis will present a set of theories as predictive and mapping tools, these theories are strongly interrelated and connected directly to explain the selection and choice mechanisms of cabinet nominations. The three sets of theories that are used in this study will be described below.

3.1. Social control theories

The social control theory states that, in order to meet an increasing social demand, leading political elites will try to avoid conflict by including members of the new social interest, but only select well established representatives (Coser 1964, Duke 1976). Kanter (1977) proposes the term “token” to describe group dynamics where the minority population is a very small proportion of the total group. In this respect, when women are “tokens”, the purpose for their appointment is to stand out and support public assessment that the government does not discriminate against women. As such, it is expected that women will differ only by gender, not credentials (Zimmer 1988, 65 referencing Hughes 1945). The literature about group dynamics

and inclusiveness of new groups into existing politics offers reasons for which we might expect women to be similar to men.

If the social control theory is correct, men do not want to share top political posts unless there would be high political pressure over them to do so (Mills 1957, Lukes 1974). As such, men will only share this resource if there would be a significant political cost in case they do not. Even so, women will receive only the smallest number of appointments that would be considered appropriate in order to show a government that does not discriminate against women. In their endeavour to maintain a good public image in respect to the appointed government, presidents are prone to select, in anticipation of such beliefs, only women that have in fact higher competencies than men, expecting people to doubt the correctness of the selection process and doubt the women's ability to perform at high standards (Escobar-Lemmon and Taylor-Robinson 2011, 2). They are not expected to select based on physical beauty but competences.

To summarize, Escobar-Lemmon and Taylor-Robinson (2011: 2) conclude that, in an overall cabinet evaluation, men and women ministers do look very similar. Yet, when they part the cabinet into three broad categories of ministries, they find significant differences in the backgrounds and experience of male and female ministers (Escobar-Lemmon, Taylor Robinson, 2011, 14:17). To pursue a more in depth analysis, these scholars divided the cabinet according to Keman (1991) into a) Economic Ministers (Agriculture, Commerce and Industry, Environment / Mining /

Energy, Finance / Treasury, Planning, Transportation & Public Works), b) Social Welfare Ministers (Education, Health, Housing & Urbanization, Labour & Social Security, Women's Issues), and c) Central Ministers (Defence, Foreign Relations, Justice & Security, Presidency & Communications) (Escobar-Lemmon, Taylor-Robinson 2011: 18). Their results showed that “gender is a determining factor in predicting the category of portfolio a person receives”, with women having more chances to be designated to a specific type of so-called pink portfolios (Escobar-Lemmon, Taylor-Robinson 2011, 2).

However, their overall analysis argues that, even though they do not see gender integration as complete, their data shows that women are becoming more integrated into presidential cabinets. Even though there are still gender-related issues, their evidence shows that such matters tend to fade and the overall report is positive (Escobar-Lemmon and Taylor Robinson, 2011, 31). In the case in which this paper's hypothesis is validated, it would only add to the literature and incline the balance in such overall reports, thus pointing out to more subtle gender inequalities.

3. 2. Social psychology and social expectation theories

Overall, the literature has established that the candidates' physical appearance matters, but it has not answered the question about its importance when candidates are not elected, but appointed to executive positions. To argument this theory, this thesis looks into the social psychology literature. At the core of these

theories lies the assumption that social stereotypes lead to a self-fulfilling prophecy (Snyder et al., 1977) through the norms of the culture that would affect the behaviour of both target and perceiver (Darley & Fazio, 1980; Zebrowitz, 1997). The “beauty is good” stereotype has been affirmed in the literature, with several meta-analyses conducted in that regard (Eagly et al., 1991; Feingold, 1992b; Langlois, 1986; Ritter, Casey, & Langlois, 1991; Snyder, Berscheid, & Glick, 1985).

From the nominator’s point of view, this theory predicts that, when controlling for all other factors, attractive candidates would have higher chances of cabinet nomination than lesser attractive ones. This might be explained by the social expectation theory from several perspectives: the “beautiful-is-good” effect on the part of the nominator, the “self-fulfilling prophecy” on the nominee, and the “political advertisement” in an attempt to introduce a more socially acceptable attractive cabinet that would be perceived as “good” by the society. Those factors might further predict which ministerial positions are more likely to have people that are more attractive, as high exposure ministerial positions (e.g., internal affairs, defence, health etc.) would most likely be the ones to receive more attractive candidates and not the low exposure positions (e.g., minister of state).

Some (Escobar-Lemmon and Taylor-Robinson 2011, 1) might argue that social expectation theories would lead to the fact that, should a position be traditionally filled by a male, then attractiveness would be a negative indicator for

female applicants. This would happen because of the fear that the nominator that the public would judge him for nominating a female particularly because of her beauty.

Previous research (see Escobar-Lemmon and Taylor-Robinson 2011, 2) shows that, in their endeavour to maintain a good public image with respect to the appointed government, nominators are prone to select only women that have, in fact, higher competencies than men. The researchers explain that nominators expect people to doubt the correctness of the selection process and doubt the women's ability to perform at high standards.

This “beauty is beastly” effect has been reported in few other studies (Heilman and Saruwatari, 1979. Cash, Gillen, and Burns, 1977). However, this hypothesis has lost some support after several recent articles and studies on the subject (Musumeci and Shahani, 1996. Podratz and Dipboye, 2002).

Unlike many species of animals, human culture emphasises attractiveness on women. This has been the human social norm, which would reflect more prominently on female cabinet nomination than on male, thus we should be also able to see, according to this theory, that physical attractiveness might be more influential in female cabinet members' nomination than in their male counterparts. This is the reason for which, in this study, I will look into the attractiveness ranking of female ministers and compare it with the attractiveness ranking of male ministers.

3. 3. Evolutionary and mate selection theories

An intrinsic and instinctive part of every human being is to judge the suitability of the opposite sex based on morphologic characteristics, with the resultant attraction to good morphological characters. Attractiveness, as such, would be an indicator of well being, longevity, and reproduction ability, thus making physical attraction an essential part in human behaviour (Barber, 1995; Buss & Schmitt, 1993; Daly & Wilson, 1995).

Mate-selection is one of the most important theories established in this field. According to this theory, men seek attractive women for the indicators of health, fitness, and reproduction (Buss, 1998, 1999; Thornhill, 1998). In contrast, women would seek for resources from men that could be offered to the offspring rather than attractiveness (Buss, 1998).

If this theory were to be applied, then it would indicate that attractiveness, since it is much more important in women, would play a more significant role in choosing female candidates by male nominators than male candidates by male or female nominators. As shown in the previous section, the social norm emphasises attractiveness on women. L. A. Jackson confirmed in his study (1992) that attractiveness ratings are higher when judging females than when judging males. As such, it proves more important to study the impact of physical attractiveness over the selection of female ministers and compare it to the one of male ministers.

The main drawback of mating theory is its focus on sexual attractiveness between partners of different genders, failing to explain non-sexual physical attractiveness that can occur between people of the same gender. To treat this point, the “*Good genes*” theory offers a plausible explanation to such phenomenon.

A significant number of publications argue that physical attractiveness is an honest indicator of health, quality, and prosperity (Barber, 1995; Gangestad & Buss, 1993; Gangestad & Thornhill, 1997; Shackelford & Larsen, 1999; Thornhill, 1998; Thornhill & Gangestad, 1993). Therefore, the “*good gene*” theory would predict favourable treatment to attractive people because individuals have evolved to appreciate and prefer to rely on attractive people for their good health and fitness.

Unlike mate selection theory, attractiveness in good gene theory is equally important for both men and women, as it is essential for humans’ survival. If this theory were to be applied, it would predict that attractiveness is equally important for male and female candidates regardless of the gender of the nominator.

As shown above, a great deal of research associates attractive candidates with higher votes therefore it is only logical to assume that the same applies to the nomination of a cabinet member. Many factors influence the choice of nominations, and gender, legal training, previous ministerial experience, and leadership challenger status are characteristics generally seen to accelerate the appointment to cabinet (Kerby, 2009, p. 593). The predicted survivability and probability to maintain office

of the appointee also has a positive correlation with the chance for cabinet appointment (Kerby, 2011, 609).

The attractiveness of the cabinet nominee, however, has never been well studied and, while the literature that analyses the effect of physical appearance over politics is abundant, few empirical tests have been conducted on the matter and scholars have yet to determine a possible association between beauty and the nominating process. Thus, in this thesis I will try to investigate this matter more closely, and find out more about the role of physical appearance in selecting, nominating, and appointing cabinet members.

While it is very likely that each of the theories mentioned above plays an effect in the extent that attractiveness influences the nomination of a candidate, it makes sense that each can explain a view and make predictions that could not be accomplished otherwise. Social expectation theories would explain why attractive candidates might be more successful in their careers than less attractive ones, it would also explain why the nominator would prefer them, and how the stereotype of attractive people might be used as means of political marketing. Evolutionary theories on the other side, delve deep into the reasons for which individuals feel attracted to certain people and to certain sexes (Barber, 1995; Buss & Schmitt, 1993). It also introduces sexual attraction as a possible influence over nominations, even if not necessarily in a conscious way.

Chapter IV. Study's contribution to developing the literature concerning ministerial selection and cabinet appointment

In this section, I will present the modalities in which my thesis will contribute to the development of scholarly literature in the fields of cabinet nomination, gender and women's representation, and physical attractiveness outcomes. Furthermore, I will try to bridge and diminish the existing research gap, which is that none of the above studies looked into the influence of the nominator's gender on selecting and appointing more physically attractive ministerial executives.

The above literature and theories should account for both external and internal factors that determine and shape predilections, pointing towards the modalities in which gendered preference for physical attractiveness would affect candidate nominations. Thus, it is only logical to assume that the same type of gendered partiality could apply to the selection of cabinet members, whose attractiveness and its dependence on the gender of the nominator has yet not been studied thoroughly.

We know so far that female cabinet ministers are more attractive (Uzun, 2014), yet less represented in governmental positions (Tremblay and Trimble, 2004; Borelli, 2002, 2010; Tremblay and Bauer 2011). With women being less represented in governmental positions (Tremblay and Bauer 2011) and with them being usually designated to specific *woman-portfolios* (Escobar-Lemmon, M. and Taylor-Robinson,

M. M., 2005, 2009, 2011), the attractiveness of the cabinet appointees as well as its effect over cabinet nomination needs further analysis. Besides, several other gender-related aspects need advanced examination and require additional and more methodologically sophisticated investigation.

In this thesis, I will try to examine if a relationship between the gender of the prime minister and the physical attraction of the nominated cabinet members can be established. I will search to identify whether male prime ministers would nominate to cabinet more attractive women than female prime ministers would nominate, or whether female prime ministers would nominate to cabinet more attractive men than male prime ministers would nominate.

The hypotheses that I will test are: 1) *the gender of the nominator is an independent variable that is related to the dependent variable, i.e. the physical attractiveness score of the study subjects or cabinet nominees (hypothesis #1)*, and 2) *the gender of the nominator an independent variable that is not related to the dependent variable, i.e. the physical attractiveness score of the study subjects or cabinet nominees if their gender is male (hypothesis #2)*. To investigate whether such significant correlations exist, a two-step experiment will be performed in a multivariate framework.

Chapter V. Research design and methodology

To determine whether or not female or male cabinet members are more physically attractive, and whether or not male heads of the government nominate better looking women, while female heads of the government nominate better looking men, I have engaged in a multi-stage research process. To test these research questions, I evaluate and compare the physical beauty of cabinet members (study subjects) and prime ministers (nominators) in countries with female nominators, and then I contrast the outcome with the results measured in countries having a male nominator.

This research will be conducted through a *nested cross-sectional retrospective cohort study*. In essence, I will perform a *cross-sectional analysis* of several individual cases and their controlled counterparts. Subsequently, I pool the results of the individual cross-sectional studies and apply these results into a retrospective cohort design to produce a strong and statistically sound answer to the proposed research questions.

I will start by identifying countries with a nominator of female gender and then identifying countries with a nominator of the male gender that would be of similar in terms demographical, political, and cultural factors (i.e., the country cases have been controlled to avoid selection bias), and ranking the dependent variables of the physical attractiveness of their respective cabinet ministers. Since this will be

conducted over all the cabinet ministers, it can be assumed that I would have captured the physical attractiveness variable for all population in question (i.e., the big N). Adding to the fact that I am looking at both dependent and independent variables at the same point of time, I can call this step a cross-sectional study for each of the individual countries analysed.

However, unlike in conventional cross-sectional analyses, in which one cannot ascertain a temporal association between the variables in question, the physical nature of the process of cabinet selection and nomination dictates that the gender of the nominators precedes the physical attractiveness of the cabinet ministers that were selected. This would allow to add a temporal association to a research design that otherwise could not have established such associations, and this will furthermore permit to proceed in a retrospective cohort design in order to establish a meaningful analysis between the two main variables in question.


After obtaining the data and the results of each individual country through a cross-sectional study design of each case, I will pool this data, look at the independent variable (*the gender of the nominator*), and study its association with the dependent variable (the physical attractiveness of the ministers that were selected to cabinet). Since I am looking at the independent variables and studying their association to the dependent variable for a group of nominators, this will be conducted in a retrospective cohort study design.

To test these research questions, I evaluate and compare the physical beauty of cabinet members (study subjects) and prime ministers (nominators) in countries with female nominators, and then I contrast the outcome with the results measured in countries having a male nominator. To determine whether nominators appointed better looking ministers of one or the other gender and to determine whether the sex of the appointer had a mediating influence, I engage in a three-step process.

Firstly, I calculate an independent samples' t-test to determine whether or not there is a difference in the overall beauty of any of the two genders. *Secondly*, I compute two separate independent t-tests, to determine if male nominators appoint better looking women, whereas female nominators appoint better looking men. The first of these t-test features only ministers appointed by men, while the second one only includes cabinet members selected by a female head of the government.


Since physical attractiveness can be assumed to follow a normal distribution curve, Student's t-test is an appropriate tool of investigation for the previous two steps. Indeed, as with most other biological variables (Huxley, J. S., 1932), physical attractiveness can be safely assumed to follow a normal distribution curve. The actual distribution of my sample confirms this, as shown below.

Table 1a. Dependent variable, density distribution curve



As resented in Table 1a above and Table 1b below, my sample size follows a t-distribution, both in density and in frequency. It thus allows me the calculations of population inferences through the sample size.

Table 1b. Dependent variable, frequency distribution curve



Therefore, the t-test will finally allow me to conclude if there is a statistically significant difference between the physical attractiveness score among nominators and nominees, thus answering the research question and providing a possible association between the gender of the nominator and the physical attractiveness of the nominated cabinet members.


In a third and final step, and in order to test if there are any confounders that might affect the outcome of my previous analysis, I run a *multivariate regression model*. This will not only help in the verification of the association between gender of the nominators and the physical attractiveness of the nominees, but will also help to better understand the robust and complex factors associated with the physical attractiveness of the nominees, who are usually qualified for a ministerial position through a long career in politics and public affairs. In this regression model, on the left hand side there is the dependent variable, the average beauty ranking of candidates.

On the right hand side, there is the independent variable of interest, the gender of the nominator, as well as the five theoretically informed control-variables (e.g., the political experience of the nominator, the age of the nominator, the beauty of the prime minister, the age of the selected cabinet minister, the gender of the appointee and the margin of victory of nominator's party). These variables have been chosen as control variables due to their possible association with the decision of cabinet nomination as has been mentioned and reviewed previously in my "variables" section.

Since the data follows a normal distribution curve, I run this regression model as an *Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) model*, allowing me to map a clear line representing the result and the relationship between the independent variables and the dependent one. It is expected, however, that most observations will have

varying variances in disturbances with regard to the regression model, meaning they will be considered heteroskedastic in nature. The White test confirmed this assumption. Thus, and in order to address this issue in an accurate way, I will use heteroskedasticity-consistent (HC) standard errors. The heteroskedasticity-consistent (HC) standard errors proposed are also known as the Huber-White Standard Errors (1980). This method will allow me to fit these heteroskedastic observations into a linear regression model.

Table 2. Symmetry plot



These three steps presented above will be sufficient to accurately answer the research question in a clear and simple quantitative method that allows for the determination of the significance of the result and for possible significance in the area of gender bias and political representation. Hereafter, I present the development of the study and explain in detail each phase.

To proceed with the study, I firstly select all countries having (1) *an established democratic system* and (2) *a female prime minister* in office as of January 1st, 2014. There were only three countries having a female nominator among the established democracies as of January 1st, 2014 (The Kingdom of Denmark, The Federal Republic of Germany, and The Kingdom of Norway) forming country group A. Consequently, I will analyse countries with an established democratic system that have male-nominators holding office at the same data of analysis.

In a second phase, I matched these three countries with three most similar countries with male nominators forming country group B. In order to find matching countries for the three countries having a female nominator, I searched for other three countries which have a similar geographical location, similar cultural and socio-economic attributes, as well as political systems. The countries with a male nominator that were selected with consideration to the attributes described above were The Kingdom of Netherlands, The Kingdom of Sweden, and United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland. This gives us a total sample of six established democracies, with similar demographic, cultural, and socio-economic characteristics.

Because of their entrenchment in the Western world, I also assume that, the beauty ideal in these countries should not differ.

In total, I code the physical beauty of all 122 ministers in these six countries of investigation, as well as the physical beauty of the six prime ministers of the analysed countries. The male prime ministers of Netherlands, Sweden, and UK nominated in total a number of 66 ministers, while the female premiers of Denmark, Germany, and Norway nominated in total a number of 56 ministers.

In a third stage, I ask 150 coders represented by students at the University of Ottawa to rate, on a scale from one (extremely unattractive) to ten (extremely attractive) the physical attractiveness/beauty of the nominator (prime minister), and the beauty of the study subjects (i.e., cabinet members). Each student rated nine ministers and each minister was rated ten times. We presented the coloured picture of the ministers in random order to the student coders. Since the coders were Canadian students, they were rather not familiar with the images of the European politicians they coded, therefore, they were less likely to be influenced by such prior knowledge and hence unbiased when coding them. The only information that was given to the student coders was the coloured photo of the face of the minister and the instruction that he or she should rank the physical beauty of these persons.

The facial image was chosen since previous literature is generally considering the face when performing physical attractiveness analyses (e.g.,

Berscheid, 1981; Alley and Hildebrandt, 1988; Ritter, Casey, and Langlois, 1991; Thornhill and Gangestad, 1993; Zebrowitz, 1997; Shackelford and Larsen, 1999; Winston, Strange, O'Doherty, and Dolan, 2002; Todorov, Mandisodza, Goren, and Hall, 2005; Willis and Todorov, 2006; Brewer and Archer, 2007).

The photos to be coded, (representing the faces of the candidates) were presented to the coders for evaluation on paper sheets, each sheet containing nine pictures, and each study subject being rated ten times by the volunteer coders. Based on the responses of the volunteer coders, an average attractiveness score is calculated for each person and then all results are collected and interpreted.

In a fourth phase, in order to assign a physical attractiveness score, I will rank all observations in ascending order and then calculate the mean and median of these attractiveness scores for each politician. These attractiveness scores serve as the dependent variable. The independent variable analysed in this study is the gender of the nominator.

In a fifth phase, a multivariate regression analysis will be completed, in order to include other control variables that could account for the possible different results. In this multivariate analysis, I also control for several factors, which I deem likely to also influence whether or not the nominator selects good-looking individuals. These controls are the age of the nominator, the physical attractiveness

of the nominator, the professional experience of the nominator, the age of the minister and the margin of victory of the nominator`s party.

A detailed description of all the selected countries, describing their socio-economic attributes, political and governmental organisation and specific attributes, electoral system and party system, and lastly describing the development of gender equality and women`s political and governmental representation for each of the countries included in the study can be found in Appendix A.

For these six countries presented above, I retrieved from the Internet a facial photograph of all cabinet members that were holding office as of January 1st, 2014. I deem the facial picture appropriate for an indication of cabinet members` beauty, as it is the public is largely exposed mainly to the face of these politicians, as they appear on TV shows and interviews, in newspaper articles, and in commercials ads and banners. Moreover, the facial image was chosen for analysis by previous literature that delved into the implications of physical attractiveness on public and individual perception. The face of an individual is generally considered the most important aspect that the public is using in order to evaluate another individual (e.g., Berscheid, 1981; Alley and Hildebrandt, 1988; Ritter, Casey, and Langlois, 1991; Thornhill and Gangestad, 1993; Zebrowitz, 1997; Shackelford and Larsen, 1999; Winston, Strange, O`Doherty, and Dolan, 2002; Todorov, Mandisodza, Goren, and Hall, 2005; Willisand Todorov, 2006; Brewer and Archer, 2007).

Chapter VI. Variables

6. 1. Dependent variables

The dependent variable examined by this research is the *average attractiveness score* and the *median attractiveness score* of the study subjects. This study will try to determine whether there is a relationship between the gender of the nominator and the attractiveness score, which serves as the dependent variable.

6. 2. Independent variable

In this thesis, I will assess whether ministers selected by a male nominator have a statistically significant variation in the *average attractiveness score* and in the *median attractiveness score* when compared to the ones selected by female nominators. Hence, the independent variable analysed in this study is the *gender of the nominator*.

6. 3. Control variables

As shown above, in a second step of the study, several control variables will be introduced and analysed in a multivariate regression model, in order to test their possible influence on cabinet nomination. The control variables that will be considered for the analysis are related to individual factors, such as the *age of the nominator*, the *physical attractiveness of the nominator*, *professional experience on the job*, and *margin of victory*.

6.3.1. Age of the nominator

I include the first variable, the age of the nominator, because the beauty ideals might change with age. This variable is analysed as a control in many studies that delve into nomination processes (see for example Carol, 1984; Davis 1997; Kerby, 2009; Escobar-lemon and Taylor-Robinson, 2011), since beauty might be a less important factor for older individuals as compared to younger ones. By introducing this control, I want to make sure that possible differences in the average beauty score are not a mere result of the difference between how nominators select at different ages.

6.3.2. Physical attractiveness of the nominator

The literature covers various aspects of self-selection bias (see Whitehead, 1991). By controlling for the physical attractiveness of the nominator, I want to investigate whether better looking prime ministers would nominate better looking ministers not because their gender influences them to chose more attractive future ministers, but because they prefer to work with people that look more like themselves.

6.3.3. Age of the minister

Beauty is often a sign of youth. Hence, I assume that younger candidates should be perceived as more beautiful. In particular, this should apply for this study,

as the coders that rated the subjects of this study are all university students.

6.3.4. Professional experience on the job

I expect more experienced prime ministers to make their nominations more with respect to merit. I expect prime ministers to concentrate on getting the job done the more they cumulate professional experience on the job, and thus giving other confounders such as physical attractiveness a lesser degree of influence in the selection process of a cabinet minister.

6.3.5. Margin of victory

A prime minister coming from a party that won the elections with a higher margin of victory is expected to act more freely and at ease when selecting his or her cabinet. The higher the margin of victory, I expect a prime minister to nominate the ministers more based on personal preference and less based on gender, legal training, previous ministerial experience or leadership status as Kerby found in his study (2009), showing that these are characteristics that are generally seen as to accelerate the appointment of politicians to cabinet.

The control variables presented above are considered important since the variation within such factors may indicate that variables other than gender may contribute to the fact that a nominator selects more attractive ministers of the opposite

sex, or perhaps just more attractive individuals in general. These variables will be individually coded and then they will be added to a multivariate regression.

Chapter VII. Data and coding

Henceforward, I will try to determine whether the gender of the nominator has significantly influenced his or her selection of cabinet members with respect to considering the nominees' physical attractiveness as a selection factor, or whether the nominators' choices were made solely with respect to the control variables presented in this study. To proceed further, I will engage in coding and calculating each control variable that describes each nominee and each nominator, as shown above.

Afterwards, a physical attractiveness score for the nominees, as well as for the nominators will be established based on the mean of the attractiveness score as ranked by the volunteer evaluators/coders. The coders will only rank, on a scale from one (extremely unattractive) to ten (extremely attractive), photos representing the faces of the ministers and prime ministers included in this study. The names or functions of the rated persons will not be revealed to the volunteer coders.

The study will rank then cabinet ministers and cabinet nominators on multiple dimensions. I code the control variables as follows: the first control, the age of the nominator, is the actual age of the nominator. The second control variable, the

average physical attractiveness score of the nominator, is coded in the same way as my independent variable of interest; that is, physical attractiveness of the head of the government is the average of ten attractiveness scores given by the volunteer student coders. Third, I calculate the professional experience of the prime ministers by the number of years the respective person has been in office as of January 2014. I express the last variable, the margin of victory of the prime ministers party, by the difference between the votes of the prime minister's party and the second party. In case of a minority government where there is a larger opposition party than the prime-ministers party, this number can be negative. In the end, the outcomes will be added into a multivariate model based on which this study will assess whether the gender of the nominator influences the beauty scores of the ministers he or she selects.

Chapter VIII. Results

I run the set of statistical analyses, the T-tests and multivariate regression (OSL) for the mean value of the coders' beauty rankings as central tendency value. I present these results in the following pages.

Table 3 presents an independent sample's t-test by gender, where the dependent variable is calculated as the mean of the coder's assigned marks for each coded politician. Table 4 presents an independent Samples' T-test by male prime minister and by gender where the dependent variable is calculated as the mean of the coder's assigned marks for each coded politician. Table 5 presents an independent

Samples` T-test by female prime minister and by gender where the dependent variable is calculated as the mean of the coder's assigned marks for each coded politician.

Table 6 shows the multivariate regression model, which analyses the influence of the independent variable, e.g., the gender of the nominator, on the dependent variable, e.g., the physical beauty of the study subjects. The dependent variable is calculated as the mean of the coder's assigned marks for each coded politician. The model takes into consideration the possible influence of the confounders presented in detail in Chapter 6.3 (age of the nominator, the physical attractiveness of the nominator, professional experience on the job, and margin of victory).

Table 3. Independent Samples` mean T-test by gender

Gender	Observations	Mean	Std. Error	Std. Deviation
Female	50	5.986	0.166	1.172
Male	72	4.808	0.152	1.293
Combined	122	5.291	0.124	1.370
Difference		1.178	0.229	

Difference = mean (female) - mean (male)
Ho: Difference = 0
Ha: Difference < 0
Pr (T < t) = 1.0000

Ha Difference != 0
Pr(|T| > |t|) = 0.0000

t = 5.1423
Degrees of freedom = 120
Ha: Difference > 0
Pr (T > t) = 0.0000

Table 4. Independent Samples` mean T-test by male prime minister and by gender

Gender	Observations	Mean	Std. Error	Std. Deviation
Female	25	5.827	0.198	0.992
Male	41	4.702	0.208	1.334
Combined	66	5.128	0.163	1.327
Difference		1.125	0.309	

Difference = mean (female) - mean (male)
Ho: Difference = 0
Ha: Difference < 0
Pr (T < t) = 0.9997

Ha Difference != 0
Pr(|T| > |t|) = 0.0005

t = 3.6402
Degrees of freedom = 64
Ha: Difference > 0
Pr (T > t) = 0.0003

Table 5. Independent Samples` mean T-test by female prime minister and by gender

Gender	Observations	Mean	Std. Error	Std. Deviation
Female	25	6.146	0.266	1.329
Male	31	4.947	0.224	1.245
Combined	56	5.482	0.188	1.406
Difference		1.199	0.345	

Difference = mean (female) - mean (male)
Ho: Difference = 0
Ha: Difference < 0
Pr (T < t) = 0.9995

Ha Difference != 0
Pr(|T| > |t|) = 0.0010

t = 3.4768
Degrees of freedom = 54
Ha: Difference > 0
Pr (T > t) = 0.0005

Table 6. Multivariate linear regression (Ordinary Least Squares), mean

Average	Coefficient	Robust Std. Err.	t	P > T
Time in office	0.1173052	0.0591967	1.98	0.050
PM gender	-1.078339	0.3473514	-3.10	0.002
Age of PM	-0.1665995	0.0635128	-2.62	0.010
Age of minister	-0.585614	0.126268	-4.64	0.000
Beauty of PM	-0.1005136	0.1236965	-0.81	0.418
Gender	-1.011849	0.2040259	-4.96	0.000
Margin of victory	0.311785	0.0255426	1.22	0.225
Constant	16.88278	3.278652	5.15	0.000

The three t-tests above (see Table 3, 4, and 5) provide interesting results, as predicted by the social expectations theories and by the evolutionary theories. Firstly, and most importantly, the results indicate that the average attractiveness score of female ministers is 1.18 points higher when we do not differentiate by the gender of the prime minister. This difference is statistically significant at the 99 per cent level. Quite surprisingly, by comparing table 4 to table 5, I also find that females seem to select for cabinet positions even better looking females than male heads of state do.

The multivariate regression model (see Table 6) confirms the findings from the t-tests. Even when controlling for a host of other independent variables, female ministers are better looking than their male counterparts are. The gender dummy is not only statistically significant at the 99 per cent level, but also substantively relevant. The regression weight indicates that on a scale from 0 to 10, female ministers are predicted to be more beautiful by 1 point. Therefore, it seems that physical beauty matters more for women who want to gain ministerial duties than it does for the corresponding men. Rather surprisingly, and contrary to the initial hypothesis, the multivariate regression model confirms as well that women nominate better-looking women than men do.

Three of the five control variables are statistically significant and show the expected sign. As expected, physical beauty seems to become less of a factor with age, as older prime ministers or heads of the government generally nominate less good looking ministers than younger prime ministers do. The regression results also indicate that older ministers are judged as less good looking than the younger ones by our coders. It thus seems that beauty is a sign of youth.

While beauty might help younger ministers, it might be that it is the experience that counts for older prime ministers, since they tend to nominate less attractive ministers than younger prime ministers do. Finally, and rather unexpectedly, the time in office that the nominator has served increases his or her tendency to nominate good looking ministers. The act of serving longer as the head of

the government might render the respective politician as more powerful and freer to nominate candidates of his or her own preference. Beauty may play a role in this calculation. The two remaining control variables – the margin of victory of the nominator's party as well as the beauty of the prime minister, do not influence the tendency of the heads of governments to nominate good looking or not so physically beautiful candidates.

There are repercussions for theory. Mainly, it seems that physical beauty is a facilitating factor for women to advance their political careers. The median woman minister is of above average beauty, while the same does not apply for men. Hence, by barring entry to less attractive female politicians, the beauty factor might be an additional hurdle for women politicians to be nominated to high echelon political positions such as ministers.

I run the same set of analyses, T-tests and the multivariate regression (OSL), and investigate the median value of the coders' beauty rankings as central tendency value. I present these results in the following pages, in Tables 7, 8, 9, and 10.

Table 7 presents an independent sample's t-test by gender, where the dependent variable is calculated as the median of the coder's assigned marks for each coded politician. Table 8 presents an independent Samples' T-test by male prime minister and by gender where the dependent variable is calculated as the median of the coder's assigned marks for each coded politician. Table 9 presents an independent

Samples` T-test by female prime minister and by gender where the dependent variable is calculated as the median of the coder's assigned marks for each coded politician.

Table 10 shows the multivariate regression model, which analyses the influence of the independent variable, e.g., the gender of the nominator, on the dependent variable, e.g., the physical beauty of the study subjects. The dependent variable is calculated as the median of the coder's assigned marks for each coded politician. The regression model takes into consideration the possible influence of the confounders presented in detail in Chapter 6.3 (age of the nominator, the physical attractiveness of the nominator, professional experience on the job, and margin of victory) over the dependent variable.

Table 7. Independent Samples` median T-test by gender

Gender	Observations	Mean	Std. Error	Std. Deviation
Female	50	6.080	0.180	1.275
Male	72	4.813	0.173	1.469
Combined	122	5.332	0.138	1.522
Difference		1.268	0.256	

Difference = mean (female) - mean (male)
Ho: Difference = 0
Ha: Difference < 0
Pr (T < t) = 1.0000

Ha Difference != 0
Pr(|T| > |t|) = 0.0000

t = 4.9423
Degrees of freedom = 120
Ha: Difference > 0
Pr (T > t) = 0.0000

Table 8. Independent Samples` median T-test by male prime minister and by gender

Gender	Observations	Mean	Std. Error	Std. Deviation
Female	25	5.940	0.233	1.167
Male	41	4.671	0.236	1.510
Combined	66	5.152	0.186	1.514
Difference		1.269	0.353	

Difference = mean (female) - mean (male)
Ho: Difference = 0
Ha: Difference < 0
Pr (T < t) = 0.9997

Ha Difference != 0
Pr(|T| > |t|) = 0.0006

t = 3.5940
Degrees of freedom = 64
Ha: Difference > 0
Pr (T > t) = 0.0003

Table 9. Independent Samples` median T-test by female prime minister & by gender

Gender	Observations	Mean	Std. Error	Std. Deviation
Female	25	6.220	0.277	1.385
Male	31	5.000	0.254	1.414
Combined	56	5.545	0.202	1.517
Difference		1.220	0.377	

Difference = mean (female) - mean (male)
Ho: Difference = 0
Ha: Difference < 0
Pr (T < t) = 0.9990

Ha Difference != 0
Pr(|T| > |t|) = 0.0021

t = 3.2388
Degrees of freedom = 54
Ha: Difference > 0
Pr (T > t) = 0.0010

Table 10. Multivariate linear regression (Ordinary Least Squares), median

Average	Coefficient	Robust Std. Err.	t	P > T
Time in office	0.1287166	0.0641646	2.01	0.047
PM gender	-1.062089	0.4090376	-2.60	0.011
Age of PM	-0.1618121	0.0691476	-2.34	0.021
Age of minister	-0.0712355	0.1374390	-5.18	0.000
Beauty of PM	-0.0813543	0.1325838	-0.61	0.541
Gender	-1.079940	0.2216956	-4.87	0.000
Margin of victory	0.0296439	0.0302329	0.98	0.329
Constant	17.22591	3.5230270	4.89	0.000

When interpreting the above tables, we can see that the results I obtained were vastly similar. The T-tests and the regression model presented above showed no statistical significant differences between the values obtained when analysing the median value that the initial results obtained when analysing the mean value.

Chapter IX. Conclusions

This research constitutes the beginning of a new chapter of research into the effect of physical beauty in the cabinet nomination process. While previous work (e.g., Lenz and Lawson, 2011) has shown that good looking candidates get a vote premium of several percentage points in elections, our study suggests that physical beauty not only matters for elections, but also for cabinet nomination. In particular, physical appearance turns out to matter for female candidates. Using three comparable established democracies with a male head of state and three comparable western democracies with a female head of state as cases, I have shown that female ministers are significantly better looking than male cabinet ministers are. On a zero to ten scale, female ministers are also significantly better looking than the average person is, which would have a ranking of five. In addition, and rather surprisingly, the results also indicate that the tendency to nominate better-looking women is more pronounced amid female prime ministers than amongst male prime ministers. Future research should further look into this intriguing finding.

This analysis could also be further refined. For example, it might be interesting to compare the pool of possible candidates with the ministers who are finally selected as cabinet members. Are those appointed more physically attractive than those not selected? For example, it could be possible that the women elected as MPs, who constitute the pool of selection are already more beautiful, thus leading to

our results that show more beautiful female ministers are nominated. Evolutionary and mate selection theories would suggest such an outcome (e.g., Buss, 1998, 1999; Thornhill, 1998). More broadly, it would be interesting to find out, whether the apparently higher female ministers' attractiveness has an impact on the success and efficacy of these administrations. To answer these questions, researchers could use parliamentary systems, where normally the ministers are selected from the MPs of the governing party or coalition, and compare the physical beauty of cabinet ministers to that of representatives of the governing coalition or party. In addition, to establish any correlation between physical beauty and cabinet selection, we need more studies that could also look at various governmental levels. In this sense, I hope that this study is a start into a new field of research and I intend to continue this investigation in my future doctoral research.

Annex A

The detailed descriptions of the selected countries can be found below.

Denmark

Denmark or The Kingdom of Denmark, which comprises the Faeroe Islands and Greenland, is a sovereign state in Northern Europe neighbouring Germany, Netherlands, Norway, and Sweden. Denmark has adhered to the European Union in 1973 but chose to stay out of the Euro zone, while Greenland and the Faeroe Islands chose to completely stay out of the Euro zone. Denmark is a founding member of the United Nations (UN), North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO), and the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) and a member of the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE) and of the Schengen Area. Denmark has a capitalistic economy and enjoys significant state assistance and a high level of income equality and a very low level of corruption.

The current form of government is the constitutional monarchy, taking the form of a parliamentary democracy, and its monarch is Queen Margrethe II. The monarch is the chief of state however, the powers of the monarch have are rather symbolic, being restricted to signing the laws that are passed by the parliament, which goes by the name “Folketinget”. In 1849 when the Danish Constitution was born, Denmark had a bicameral parliamentary system, with a chamber representative

of the people, and a chamber representative of the aristocracy. These two chambers were united into one with the Constitution of 1953. Danish citizens elect the members of the “Folketinget” and every citizen who is at least 18 years of age is eligible to cast a ballot.

The electoral system in Denmark comprises parliamentary elections, local elections, elections to the European Parliament, and a strong multi-party system. The elections to the national parliament are called by the Monarch at the request of the Prime Minister, while the local elections and the ones to the European Parliament take place at specific dates. The parliamentary elections use a party-list proportional representation system, which favours a multi-party system with an abundant number of political parties. These parties are often forced to enter coalitions in order to be able to form governments, since it is difficult for one party alone to gain the majority of citizens’ votes. In order to be eligible to vote, one must be a Danish. However, for the local elections, permanent residents are allowed to vote as well.

With respect to women’s representation, there have major movements in support of women in Denmark, leading to the revision of the Constitution in 1915, which gave women the right to vote. In 1920 the equal opportunities laws were passed, influencing the modern legislative measures and granting women equal access to education, healthcare, work, equal marital rights, etc.

Following these developments, the first woman was elected as a member of

the parliament in 1918, when elected women represented only 3 per cent of all the members of the parliament, as opposed to 2011 when they represent 39.1 per cent (www.ipu.org/wmn-e/classif.htm). The first woman in government was Nina Bang who worked for the Ministry of Education in 1924-1925. She was also the world's first senior minister and the first woman to become a prime minister was Helle Thorning-Schmidt in 2011.

Germany

Officially, named The Federal Republic of Germany or Bundesrepublik Deutschland is organised as a federal parliamentary representative democratic republic in Western Europe and consists of 16 states with limited sovereignty, which are referred to as Länder. Each state/ Länder has an individual constitution and a large autonomy with respect to the way it is organised internally.

Germany was a founding member of the European Community in 1957, it is a member of the United Nations (UN), North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO), the G8, the G20, the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) and the Council of Europe and is one of the world's great powers. Germany is also part of the Schengen Area and it has adhered to the Euro zone in 1999. Germany has a capitalistic economy with significant state assistance, state health care, a high level of income equality, and a very low level of corruption.

The Constitution or Grundgesetz was founded in 1949 and it emphasizes

fundamental principles such as the separation of powers, guaranteeing human dignity, guaranteeing federal powers, and stipulating gender equality between men and women. The parliament is formed of two chambers and constitutional amendments require a majority of two thirds in both chambers of the parliament.

The highest state hierarchy includes the President who is elected as the head of state with representative powers by the federal convention or *Bundesversammlung*. This federal convention consists of members of the parliament or *Bundestag* and an identical number of state delegates. The second highest ranked person in the state is the President of the Bundestag or *Bundestagspräsident*, who is also elected by the Bundestag and has the responsibility of supervising the daily sessions of the body. The third highest ranked official in the German order of precedence is the *Chancellor*, who is also elected by the Bundestag and afterwards appointed by the *Bundestagspräsident*. The Chancellor has powers similar to the ones of a Prime Minister and exercises a similar role.

Germany has a strong multi-party system and universal suffrage, entitling to vote any person who is over 18 years of age. The elections in Germany are comprised of federal elections, provincial elections in the various states, local elections, and elections to the European parliament. The elections are general, direct, free, equal, and secret. The federal elections are held every four years on a Sunday or public holiday, with the specific date selected by the President. The voting system is a mixed proportional representation with a 5 per cent threshold, with every voter having two

votes: a vote for person and a vote for list. This is conjoining the benefits of both the plurality and the proportional voting system.

In terms of gender equality in the German politics, women were firstly allowed to exercise their power to vote in 1918 and one year later, in 1919, Marie Juchacz was the first woman to be elected in parliament. The first woman in government came much later, in 1961, in the name of Elisabeth Schwarzhaupt who was appointed in the Ministry of Health. In 2013, Germany had a percentage of 36,5 women in Bundestag. When the greens held power for a short period, from 1980 until 1988, Germany introduced a gender balance and embraced a strict 50 per cent gender quota. However, the following party amended the rule and changed it to a flexible quota.

Norway

Officially the Kingdom of Norway, this country is a Scandinavian unitary constitutional monarchy, which comprises territories in the Scandinavian Peninsula, the Arctic archipelago of Svalbard, the sub-Antarctic Bouvet Island, and the volcanic island of Jan Mayen located in the Arctic Ocean. Norway is a founding member of the United Nations (UN), North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO), the Council of Europe, and the Nordic Council. It is also a member of the European Economic Area, the World Trade Organization (WTO), the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD), and part of the Schengen Area; however, it rejected a full

membership in the European Union in two referenda. Maintaining a comprehensive social security system, the country conserves a welfare model, which includes universal health care and free public education, regardless of nationality.

Inspired from the French Revolutions of 1776 and 1789 and from United States' Declaration of Independence, the Constitution of Norway was adopted in 1814 and serves as the country's utmost document. Norway is governed in the form of a parliamentary system, where the King of Norway is acting as the Head of State and the Prime Minister acts as the Head of Government. The constitution stipulates the separation of powers among the legislative, executive, and judicial branches.

The Monarch of Norway preserves executive power however, the duties of the Monarch limit to a representative and ceremonial role after the introduction of the parliamentary system in 1814. Norway is administratively structured as a representative democracy with the executive power being exerted by the Prime Minister. The position of Head of Government is assigned to a Member of the Parliament who is invested with the confidence of the majority of the parliament. The Prime Minister nominates the Cabinet and forms the government.

A particularity for Norway is the fact that there is no separation between the church and the state. Established initially under the Lutheran Church of Norway, it remains organised in this form until present days and it reflects in the formation of its government. The Prime Minister has the obligation to nominate more than half of the

ministers from the Lutheran Church of Norway, which continues to be the state church. The issue of separation of powers between the state and church is facing a progressively contentious debate, as more and more people consider that this system does not reflect the nowadays reality and the increasing population diversity.

The legislative power is assigned to both the government and the parliament, with the latter being the supreme legislature, which ratifies the national treaties generated by the executive branch. The parliament or *Stortinget* (*Great Assembly*) was established by the Constitution of Norway in 1814 in the form of qualified unicameralism. Even though the Storting was always unicameral, before 2009 it was divided into two departments: the *Lagting* and the *Odelsting*. Initially, the *Lagting* constituted a form of the upper house, and the most experienced members of the parliament were selected to form it. In modern days, the composition of the two departments was similar, with 25 per cent of the members of the Storting being elected to form the *Lagting*, and with the remaining 75 per cent constituting the *Odelsting*. This form of organisation was abolished in 2009 and the system was changed into simple unicameralism.

Norway enacts universal suffrage for every citizen turning 18 years of age during the year the elections are held. As a particularity, the King of Norway is not consider a citizen for this purpose and is not allowed to vote. Moreover, even though the queen and crown prince are able to vote, traditionally they have chosen not to exert this right. The constitutional monarchy displays a multi-party system and

alternates national and local elections every two years, with each of them being held every four years. The electoral system is the same for both local and national elections and uses the principle of mathematical fairness and the modified Sainte-Lague method, whose principle is a party should get a number of seats, which is as close as possible to the relative number of votes that the party received during the elections. This type of electoral system favours a multi-party system with an numerous political parties, which are often forced to enter coalitions of government, since it is difficult for one party alone to gain the majority of citizens' votes.

With respect to gender equality and women's representation in the politics of Norway, women were given the right to vote for the first time in 1885. The first woman was elected to parliament in 1911 and the first woman to ever be nominated for a ministerial position was Aaslaug Aasland in 1948 for the Ministry of Health and Social Affairs. In 2013, Norway had a percentage of 39.6 of women in parliament.

Netherlands

The Netherlands, a name used for the first time in the fifteenth century, which literally means *the low country*, is the European part and the main component of the Kingdom of the Netherlands, which also includes three other small islands situated in the Caribbean Sea. The kingdom in its entirety is often referred to as "Holland" and error coming from the fact that the term of Holland only refers to the two provinces of North and South Holland.

The Netherlands is a founding member of the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO), and of the European Union (EU). Economically, it is a founding member the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD), and the economic Group of Ten (G-10). It is also part of the trilateral Benelux union comprised of Belgium, The Netherlands, and Luxembourg. Benelux was a name that was initially used to establish a customs agreement between the three countries but that has gained multiple cultural, social, and economic valences of its members. The Netherlands runs a market-based mixed economy, achieving high international rankings in terms of per capita income. The country's high quality of life was mirrored by attaining the fourth place among the world's happiest nations in a 2013 survey.

Nicknamed "the world's legal capital", the country is host to five international courts: the Permanent Court of Arbitration, the International Court of Justice, the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia, the International Criminal Court and the Special Tribunal for Lebanon. The Hague, where these courts are situated, also hosts the European Union's criminal intelligence agency Europol and the judicial co-operation agency Eurojust. The country is also home for the Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons.

The Netherlands has been a constitutional monarchy since 1815 and it has been organised and governed as a parliamentary democracy since 1848, having been ruled as a unitary state ever since. Described as a consociational democracy, the

kingdom is putting a lot of effort into reaching a large consensus with both the society and the political sector with respect to the country's significant matters.

The head of state is the monarch, presently King Willem-Alexander who became King of The Netherlands on April 30th, 2013. His constitutional powers are representative and include his right to be consulted periodically concerning governmental politics. The cabinet and council of ministers hold the executive power. The Prime Minister, currently Mark Rutte, is the head of the government and has no other powers beyond the ones of the ministers, being just a *primus inter pares* or the first among his peers.

The legislative powers are divided inside the States General, which is the bicameral parliament, comprised of the House of Representatives (the Lower House) and the Senate (the Upper House). The House of Representatives is composed of 150 members and has the power to supervise the Government and the responsibility to propose and amend laws. The members of the provincial assemblies have the obligation to select the 75 members that comprise the Senate. The Senate has the power to veto and reject the laws proposed or amended by the Lower House.

The electoral system of the Netherlands is based on a party-list proportional representation and direct elections held every four years in which the voters elect the members of The House of Representatives. There are also State Provincial elections held every four years, in which voters elect the members of provincial assemblies.

The threshold is set to 1/150th of the valid votes. Besides Israel, The Netherlands is the only country in the world to have direct elections. Because of this particular type of electoral system, there is a multi-party system in Netherlands with numerous political parties. Generally, the government resulting from elections is a coalition government, since no party can attract the majority of the votes. The elections in Netherlands are conducted on six levels: The European Union elections, the state elections, the provincial elections, the water boards, the 418 municipalities, and 2 cities. In addition to the elections, referenda, which are the traditional form of public consultation in a consociational democracy, are an increasing form of involving the public into the governmental decisions.

With the history of being one of the first countries in the world to have ever elected a parliament, The Netherlands was also the first country in the world to have legalised same sex marriage, thus allowing equal marital rights to individuals from the LGBT community. The country is commonly viewed as a truly liberal country, having also legalised euthanasia, abortion, and prostitution, and having had a long history of social acceptance and tolerance.

With respect to women's representation in Netherlands, women could first actively exercise their right to vote in 1919. The first woman was elected to parliament in 1946, and the first woman in governmental position was Dr. Marga Klompè, who was nominated for the position of Ministry of Social Affairs. In 2012, there were 38.7 per cent women in the Lower House and 36% in the Upper House.

There is no legally set quota for the percentage of women, however, the political entities will not endanger their public image by not putting enough women on their lists, having established their own internal quotas to assure a more equal representation among genders. However, there is one party in the Netherlands, the Reformed Political Party (the *Staatkundig Gereformeerde Partij* or SGP), which is a radical Protestant conservative party that vehemently opposes women as part of the public sector and the work force. This orthodox protestant Calvinist political party is the oldest political party in Netherlands in its current form and has been in opposition during its entire political presence. Owing to its traditionalist religious orthodox political views, the party refuses to cooperate in any cabinet, strongly opposing the presence of women in any realm of the public and political sphere and does not allow females to hold any position in the party.

Sweden

Officially, the Kingdom of Sweden or *Konungariket Sverige*, Sweden is a Scandinavian country bordering Norway and Finland in Northern Europe. There are assumptions concerning the formation of the kingdom, however a clear date is not known. Nonetheless, the first Swedish monarchs beginning with Eric the Victorious are supposed to have ruled over both Svealand (Sweden) and Gotaland (Gothia) as a single province. Today it is a constitutional monarchy ruled by the monarch Carl XVI Gustaf. Sweden is organised as unitary state separated into twenty-one counties

and politically is organised as a parliamentary democracy where the parliament has legislative attributions and the government holds the executive power, currently exercised by the cabinet and its Prime Minister, Fredrik Reinfeldt.

Remaining neutral ever since 1814, Sweden declined membership in the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO). A member of the European Union since 1995, Sweden chose not to enter the financial Euro zone. Sweden is also a member of the Nordic Council of Europe, of the United Nations (UN), of the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD), and of the World Trade Organisation (WTO).

Similar to other Nordic countries, Sweden provides a social welfare system for its citizens, offering them universal health care and free tertiary education. Economically, it ranks amongst the countries with the highest per capita income, prosperity, and economical competitiveness. It also scores high in various studies looking into the quality of life, education, health, defendant of freedom and civil liberties, with significant human development and social equality.

With respect to the political system, the duties of the monarch are strictly limited and of ceremonial and representative nature. He used to appoint the Prime Minister but today that falls under the duties of the Speaker of the Parliament (*Riksdag*). The Riksdag is the national legislative body of Sweden, maintaining supreme decision-making responsibilities. Since 1971, the parliament operates under

a unicameral structure and, since 1994, the 349 members serve on a fixed four-year term. There are four constitutional laws in Sweden: the Act of Royal Succession, the Instrument of Government, the Fundamental Law on Freedom of Expression, and the Freedom of the Press Act.

The Swedish elections are held every four years and they call citizens to elect legislative bodies on two local administrative levels: national, provincial. At the national level, these elections select the seats in the Riksdag. The provincial elections select the members of the twenty county councils and the members of the 290 municipalities. The elections to the European Parliament are held once every five years. The elections are based on a party-list proportional representation system and the seats are determined using a modified form of the Sainte-Laguë allocation method, changing the proportion formula for the parties that haven't received any seats yet from (1, 3, 5, 7, ...) to (1.4, 3, 5, 7, ...). This modified formula favours bigger and medium parties over the ones that would earn just one seat using the unmodified Sainte-Laguë allocation method. Regardless, the system remains largely proportional, with a close correlation between the number of votes and the number of seats that a party receives.

In Sweden, each party has separate ballot papers and open lists and the citizens can choose between three special types of ballot papers: the party ballot paper, the name ballot paper, or alternatively, the blank ballot on which the voter can write the name of an arbitrary candidate. In order to be eligible, a voter must be a citizen,

must have been at least once a registered resident, and must have reached 18 years of age in the Election Day. Consequently, foreign-born Swedish citizens who have never lived in Sweden do not have the right to vote prior to residing in the country.

With respect to women's representation, women exerted the unrestricted right to vote in 1921 for the first time. However, women had a restricted local suffrage since 1862 and a passive suffrage since 1919. The first woman was elected to parliament in 1921, when five women were elected, holding 1.3 per cent of the seats. This number increased to 45% in 2010, even though there is no legal quota for women's representation. The first woman to be nominated to a governmental position was Karin Koch-Lindberg, who was appointed as Minister without Portfolio for Economy.

United Kingdom

Officially the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Island yet more commonly known as the United Kingdom or Great Britain, this country is a European sovereign state located in the Atlantic Ocean, close to the north western coast of the continental Europe. The country includes in its territories the island of Great Britain constituted of three countries (England, Scotland, and Wales), the northern part of the island of Ireland, and the British Overseas Territories. The component territories are separate countries with delegated self-government however, they are not considered as sovereign states.

The United Kingdom, together with fifteen other Commonwealth monarchies that have sworn allegiance to the same monarch, is called the Commonwealth realm. The term *of British monarch* is still use frequently to refer to the shared monarch. Nonetheless, each country in the Commonwealth realm is sovereign and independent of the others. The British monarch has a different, but mostly ceremonial function specific to each realm. The countries constituting the Commonwealth realm are Antigua and Barbuda, Australia, The Bahamas, Barbados, Belize, Canada, Grenada, Jamaica, New Zealand, Papua New Guinea, Saint Kitts and Nevis, Saint Lucia, Saint Vincent and the Grenadines, Solomon Islands, Tuvalu, and The United Kingdom.

The British monarch, currently Queen Elizabeth II, is the commander-in-chief of the British Armed Forces. The monarch and his or her immediate family have several official, ceremonial, diplomatic, and representational responsibilities. The role of the monarch is limited to non-partisan functions and the appointment of the British Prime Minister. Even though the monarch has the decisive official executive authority over the government through royal prerogatives, such powers may only be used in agreement with unambiguous laws ratified by the Parliament.

One of the world's largest economies by both its gross domestic product and its purchasing power parity, the UK is the world's first industrialised country and one of the world's greatest power. It is also one of the world's recognised nuclear powers with high military expenditures. It has been a founding member of the United Nations

Security Council, a founding member of the European Union (EU) and a member of the European Economic Community (EEC) since 1973, which preceded the EU. The United Kingdom is also a member of the Council of Europe, of the Group of Seven, Group of Eight, Group of Twenty, North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO), Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD), and the World Trade Organisation (WTO).

Governed as a constitutional monarchy with a parliamentary system, the UK separates the powers between the government, which has executive powers, and the parliament, with legislative powers. Named after the Palace of Westminster, the British democratic parliamentary system of government has created a term used all around the world to determine this particular type of democracy: the Westminster System, commonly used in most Commonwealth countries. The key characteristics of the Westminster system include a head of state with executive powers, even though lately these are usually restricted to ceremonial and diplomatic ones, a head of government, an executive branch or Cabinet, a parliamentary opposition, and a parliament usually bicameral and constituted from a lower and an upper house, though unicameral systems do exist. The Westminster electoral system is usually a single member plurality (SMP) or first-past-the-post (FPP), however there are exceptions amongst the Commonwealth countries. Such exceptions are New Zealand, which introduces a mixed-member proportional system to allow for a more proportional representation of the electorate's choices, and Australia, which uses a

ranked voting system or preferential voting, in which voters rank candidates.

The Government is led by a Prime Minister who is selected by the Monarch as the leader of the party that obtained the majority of the votes or as the leader of the main coalition party. The Government has the authority to nominate all Ministers and Secretaries of State and to form the Cabinet. The Cabinet is formed by the Prime Minister and senior ministers, who are all nominated from the Members of the Parliament. The premier, must have the support of a political majority in the House of Representatives, and must be able to ensure the existence of no absolute majority against the government. If the case that the parliament would pass a resolution of no confidence, or refuses to pass the budget, then the government must either resign and consequently another government could be appointed or pursue parliamentary dissolution in order to hold new general elections, which would allow for different majorities to be enacted.

Under the British constitution, the Monarch has the executive authority, yet such authority is only employed on the advice of the Prime Minister and the Cabinet, whose members advise the Monarch as members of Her Majesty's Most Honourable Privy Council. The Privy Council is a formal body of advisors to the Monarch and it is formed by senior political figures that have been members of the British Parliament in either of the houses. The government is accountable to the British parliament.

Besides the Government, The United Kingdom has three other devolved

authorities in Northern Ireland, Scotland, and Wales. Each of these countries has their own devolved executive and their own devolved unicameral legislature. The Northern Ireland executive and the Assembly have powers over a large array of matters that are not currently reserved to the UK parliament including education, health care, and provincial governing. The Scottish government and Parliament have similar powers to those of the Northern Ireland. Additionally, the Scottish government has signed the Edinburgh Agreement in October 2012 setting out the conditions for holding a Scottish independence referendum in the year of 2014, whose outcomes are yet to come. The Welsh Government and National Assembly for Wales have more narrow powers and attributes than the Irish and Scottish devolved authorities, being able to produce legislation through the Acts of the Assembly.

The British legislature is comprised of two chambers, the lower house or *House of Representatives*, and the upper house or *House of Lords*. The House of Commons is an elected body of 650 representatives known as Members of the parliament. The House of Commons operates under the Parliament Acts and has the responsibility of introducing bills, being able to present some of these for Royal Assent without having to pass them through the House of Lords.

The House of Lords is the upper house of the British Parliament and is comprised of Lords Spiritual and Lords Temporal. The Lords Spiritual are the clerical representatives who sit there in virtue of their ecclesiastical offices, such as Bishops and Archbishops. The Lords Temporal are the most numerous members in the House

of Lords and members can sit in this house by virtue of hereditary peerage and are elected for life. The number of peers that party can choose mirrors the quota of hereditary peers that belongs to that party. When a member of the House of Lords perishes, the House of Lords holds by-elections and uses an Alternative Vote system. This indicates that, if the former member was selected by the entire house, then the replacing member will be selected by the house, while in case a former member was selected by a party, another hereditary peer is elected by that party from the hereditary peers belonging to that party. Out of the 92 members comprising the House of Lords, two remain in office due to their royal offices, 14 members are elected by the entire House, and 74 are hereditary peers chosen by parties.

The United Kingdom's electoral system is a single member plurality (SMP) or first-past-the-post system (FPP), commonly referred to as the "winner takes all" system. Within this type of electoral system, a candidate who receives the highest number of votes and not necessarily the majority of votes is elected. The United Kingdom holds six types of elections: the general elections, the elections to devolved authorities, local elections, mayoral elections, Police and Crime Commissioner elections, and the Elections to the European Parliament.

Concerning voter eligibility, in the UK voters can cast ballots in person at a polling station. Alternatively, the UK allows voting by post or by proxy (through another selected person). British resident citizens are eligible to vote if they are 18 years of age and cast their votes (personally, by an eligible to vote proxy, or by mail)

only in the constituency where they are enrolled in the United Kingdom.

The type of electoral system favours large parties, therefore historically, the United Kingdom has had effectively a two party system: the Tories (Conservatives) and the Whigs (the Liberal Party). After the Second World War, the dominant parties were the Conservative and the Labour. The Liberal Democrats performed better in the 2005 elections and won 62 seats, leading press analysts to name it a “two and a half” party system.

In smaller elections where a proportional representation system is used (i.e., elections for the European Parliament, regional elections for the London Assembly, Northern Ireland Assembly, Scottish Parliament, and Welsh Assembly) a number of smaller parties (such as Scottish National Party, United Kingdom Independence Party, and the Green Party of England and Wales) are receiving an increasing proportion of votes. Therefore, it can be argued that in these elections there is an effective multi-party system.

With respect to women’s representation in the political realm, the unrestricted suffrage was accorded to women for the first time in 1928. Suffrage with some restrictions was however allowed since 1918. The Viscountess Nancy Astor was the first woman to be elected to the British Parliament in 1919. The first woman to be nominated to a governmental position was Margaret Bondfield who held office as the Minister of Labour between 1929 and 1931. The United Kingdom has

designated its first female Prime Minister in 1979 in the person of Baroness Margaret Hilda Thatcher, commonly referred to as The Iron Lady. Currently, the United Kingdom has elected 22.6 per cent females in its House of Representatives and 23.4 per cent females in the House of Lords, scoring rather low in the ranking of female representation including developed democracies of the world (see <http://www.ipu.org/wmn-e/classif.htm>).

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