

Palestinian Citizens of Israel: Agenda for Change

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Abstract

The State of Israel was established amid historic trauma experienced by both Jewish and Palestinian Arab people. These traumas included the repeated invasion of Palestine by various empires/countries, and the Jewish experience of anti-Semitism and the Holocaust. This culminated in the 1948 creation of the State of Israel. The newfound State has experienced turmoil since its inception as both identities clashed. The majority-minority power imbalance resulted in inequalities and discrimination against the Palestinian Citizens of Israel (PCI). Discussion of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict tends to assume that the issues of the PCIs are the same as the issues of the Palestinians in the Occupied Territories. I believe that the needs of the PCIs are different. Therefore, I have conducted a qualitative case study into possible ways the relationship between the PCIs and the State of Israel shall be improved. To this end, I provide a brief review of the history of the conflict. I explore themes of inequalities and models for change. I analyze the implications of the theories for PCIs and Israelis in the political, social, and economic dimensions. From all these dimensions, I identify opportunities for change. In proposing an “Agenda for Change,” it is my sincere hope that addressing the context of the Israeli-Palestinian relationship may lead to a change in attitude and behaviour that will avoid perpetuating the conflict and its human costs on both sides.

Keywords: Palestinian Citizens of Israel, Zionism, Jews, minority, equality, identity, discrimination, 1948 War, narratives, right, collective, individual

Table of Contents

Chapter One Introduction, Historical Background, Overview of the Political, Social and Economic Conditions, Research Design	1
1. Introduction.....	1
a. Labelling.....	1
b. Localities	2
c. Overview of Zionism and Palestinian Nationalism.....	3
d. The Future Vision Documents	6
2. Historical Background	7
a. Pre-1948 War	7
b. The 1948 War- 1967	10
c. The 1967/ Six-Day War - Present	12
d. Israel’s legal system	14
3. Elements of the Political Situation.....	16
a. Inequality.....	17
b. Political Structure.....	19
c. Impact of Policies.....	21
d. Citizenship.....	22
e. Political Mobilization.....	23
4. Research Design and Methodology	28
a. Research Question.....	28
b. Method of Approach	29
c. Limits of Analysis	30
d. Overview of Key Theories and Concepts	31
Outline of chapters	34
Summary of chapter	34
Chapter Two Collective Rights, Identity, Approaches to Improve Relationship Building.....	36
1. Collective Rights and Collective Narratives.....	36
a. Collective Rights.....	37
b. Collective narratives.....	39
2. Identity Issues	40
a. Collective identity	40
b. Social Identity Theory.....	44

c. Multi-ethnic states	45
d. Power Asymmetry in the Political, Social, and Economic Spheres	47
3. Approaches to Improve Relationship Building and the ABC Model	49
The ABC Triangle	52
Summary of chapter	54
Chapter Three Consequences in the Political, Social, and Economic Spheres	56
a. Human and Group Rights and Social Justice	56
b. Nationalism and Democracy	59
c. Representation and Recognition.....	61
d. Citizenship.....	64
e. Political Participation	69
f. Structural Marginalization.....	74
g. Discrimination & Social Inequality.....	78
h. Poverty and Land Confiscation	83
Summary of chapter	87
Chapter Four Agenda for Change	89
1. Consistent Application of Citizenship Law	91
2. Discrimination.....	92
3. Recognition	93
4. Health	94
5. Education.....	95
6. Language	97
7. Political Participation	98
8. Economy.....	101
Summary of chapter	102
Chapter Five Conclusion	103
Annexes.....	108
Annex A: BBC Timeline.....	108
Annex B: Representation in Government Ministries	114
Annex C: List of National Public Holidays of Israel in 2019	114
Annex D: Electoral Threshold.....	115
Annex E: Life Expectancy	115
Annex F: University Students	116
Annex G: Traditional Israeli and Palestinian Narratives	117

Annex H: Basic Laws.....	121
Annex I: Ordinary Laws.....	124
Annex J: Palestinian villages and cities prior to 1948	126
Annex K: Ratification of International Human Rights Treaties – Israel.....	127
References	131

Chapter One

Introduction, Historical Background, Overview of the Political, Social and Economic Conditions, Research Design

1. Introduction

The origins of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict can be traced back to the nineteenth century when political Zionism originated and Jews from around the world began moving to Palestine in large numbers with the hope of creating a Jewish state (Maoz, 2002). I will reference the historic timeline later in the document. However, the sole focus of this study will be the events following the establishment of the State of Israel in 1948. In particular, I will deal with the status of the Palestinian Citizens of Israel (PCI) who remained in what became Israel after the war of 1948 and thereby became a minority (Jabareen, 2015). The PCIs make up 20% of the approximately [nine million] citizens of the State of Israel (Hesketh, 2011) and have a different relationship to the State than those Palestinians living in the Occupied Territories of the West Bank, Gaza and East Jerusalem, who are not citizens of Israel. The PCIs belong to three religious communities: Muslim (almost 82%), Christian (9.5%), and Druze (8.5%). All of these are included in my definition of the PCIs (Hesketh, 2011, p. 4).

a. Labelling

Various terms are used to refer to the PCIs such as Israeli Palestinians, Palestinians living within the Green Line or the “1948 Arabs” (Arar & Haj-Yehia, 2016). Different scholars, authors, and journalists use different terms to refer to the PCIs. Some call them “Israeli Palestinians,” while others call them the “Palestinians living within the Green Line” or the “1948 Arabs”. In Chapter Two I will mention more about labelling and how the labels of the PCIs are bestowed upon the community by Israeli media and outside observers.

For the purpose of this study, I use the term ‘Palestinian Citizens of Israel’ (PCI) to refer to those Palestinians who are citizens of the State of Israel. The general term “Palestinians” will refer to all Palestinians who live within the State of Israel as well as in the Occupied Territories including the West Bank, Gaza, and East Jerusalem.

b. Localities

The Israeli-Arab conflict is over 100 years old and has been marked by periodic violence, hatred and dehumanization between the groups, “misperceptions, negative stereotyping, mutual de-legitimization, and severe miscommunication” (Maoz, 2002) which create an atmosphere of fear, suspicion and anger. With the exception of mixed cities, the most powerful outcomes of the conflict have been the alienation and physical separation of Israeli Jews and the PCIs due to frequent violent clashes. Today, the approximate 1.8 million PCIs are mostly concentrated in three areas in Israel: the Galilee¹, the Triangle Area², and the Negev³. These groups may live within a few kilometres distance of each other they are physically and psychologically separated from one another. Within Israel, the PCIs and the Jews also generally occupy separate spaces (Annex J), and contact between them is limited (Bekerman, 2007).

“...[the PCIs] are largely segregated from the mainstay of Jewish Israeli society as they reside largely in exclusively Palestinian villages, study in Arabic language schools, and are employed in a limited number of labour sectors” (Kook, 2017, p. 2046).

¹Galilee is a region in northern Israel.

²The Triangle is a concentration of Israeli Arab towns and villages adjacent to the Green Line, located in the eastern Sharon plain among the Samarian foothills; this area is located within the easternmost boundaries of both the Central District and Haifa District.

³The Negev is a large desert region in southern Israel.

c. Overview of Zionism and Palestinian Nationalism

Zionism and Palestinian nationalism come from different backgrounds but they both sought self-determination. Jews believe that they were expelled from their land over 2000 years ago (Beinin & Hajjar, 2014) and dreamed of return. Zionism is the nationalist extension of this belief that the Jewish people, like any other nation, have the right of self-determination in their homeland. Zionists do not consider the Palestinians as a genuine nation linked to the State of Israel but rather as a part of the broader Arab nation (Maoz, 2013).

The Old Testament⁴ commitment by God of a Promised Land, Zion⁵, for the Jewish people coalesced into a national movement that developed in the 19th Century into the recent modern Jewish national movement, Zionism. This was a period when contemporary ideas of nationalism and the growth of secular and self-determination philosophy of the Enlightenment were reaching the Jewish communities of Europe. The period gave rise to notions of human rights and equality that the Jewish people found existed only in formality as discrimination “against them continued both on the street and in public and private institutions”. As the century progressed anti-Semitism intensified and an extreme form of racism had arisen. “This form of anti-Semitism defined Jews as an inferior and destructive race of people whom it was permissible to kill” (Adwan, Bar-On, Naveh, & East, 2012). This motivated them to seek a homeland where they could better control the influences over them and experience the equality they sought (Adwan et al., 2012).

⁴ King James Bible, Numbers: 34 1-12.

⁵Zion is a place name often used as a synonym for Jerusalem as well as for the biblical Land of Israel as a whole.

The events of World War II created a sense of urgency in finding a homeland for the Jewish people as the world grappled with the consequences of the Holocaust. This hardened the attitudes towards those already in the area that is now Israel. But not all advocates of a Zionist homeland feel the same way:

“Even more surprising than the growing unanimity of opinion among Palestinian Jews on one hand and American Jews on the other is the fact that they are essentially in agreement on the following more or less roughly stated propositions: the moment has now come to get everything or nothing, victory or death; Arab and Jewish claims are irreconcilable and only a military decision can settle the issue; the Arabs—all Arabs—are our enemies and we accept this fact; only outmoded liberals believe in compromises, only philistines believe in justice, and only schlemiels prefer truth and negotiation to propaganda and machine guns” (Arendt, 2007, p. 391).

As a researcher, this illustrates that not all Zionist thinkers take the same hard line approach towards implementing Zionism. This provides motivation to believe there are influential leaders who are open to compromise to effect change.

The development of the Palestinian national movement can be traced back to the beginning of the 20th Century. Originally part of the Ottoman Empire, Palestinians began to form a national identity as the Empire crumbled and the area was occupied by a succession of countries. However, the drive for a national identity intensified quickly in response to Zionism and the immigration of large numbers of Jews to the land formerly known as Palestine:

“The first steps in the development of the Palestinian national movement were taken in the early Twentieth Century and were strongly influenced by the Zionist movement and the Jews aspirations to establish a State. They emerged from the Emir Feisal’s abortive attempt to establish a State of “greater Syria” and the subsequent institution of the British mandate over Palestine, as provided for by the Skypes-Picot agreement that allocated Syria and Lebanon to France and “southern Syria” (Jordan and Palestine) to Great Britain” (Ghanem, 2013, p. 12).

Palestinians also have a sense of sovereignty in relation to the land of Palestine, which is today Israel including the West Bank and Gaza. Palestinians view the land as their own. Further,

Palestinians argue that their combined demographic majority is an additional strong factor in their right of self-determination being recognized. Palestinians have argued that Zionism was a foreign colonialist movement that illegitimately occupied parts of Palestine, and consider the Israelis simply as another colonial power that will soon be short-lived. In fact, for them, Judaism does not constitute a nation; it is a religion and therefore, they claim that the Jews may live in a Palestinian state as equal citizens (Morris, 2009).

The PCIs are an indigenous minority with unique characteristics. They were a majority in the Palestine Mandate Territories before the establishment of Israel, and became a minority overnight in the new state as a result of the exodus of a large proportion of the Palestinian Arabs (Morris, 1987). When the state of Israel was established in 1948, not all Palestinians became refugees in the countries to which they fled. Some were unable to leave whereas others chose to stay behind and were soon granted Israeli citizenship. But these PCIs were relegated to second-class status and found themselves cut off from friends and relatives on the other side of the Green Line⁶, as well as from the broader Arab world (Nassar, 2017). During the Nakba⁷, Zionist forces expelled Palestinians from approximately 512 villages. Property such as houses, mosques, cattle and other possessions were confiscated and were either distributed among neighbouring Jewish settlements or withheld for later use in new Jewish settlements (Molavi, 2013).

⁶ The Green Line, or (pre-) 1967 border or 1949 Armistice border, is the demarcation line set out in the 1949 Armistice Agreements between the armies of Israel and those of its neighbors (Egypt, Jordan, Lebanon and Syria).

⁷ Al-Nakba is the Arabic term for the events of 1948, when many Palestinians were displaced from their homeland by the creation of the new State of Israel.

Consequently, the two movements deny the legitimate rights of each other for national self-determination in the land. Within the complex Israeli and Palestinian relationship, there are multiple narratives that explain the situation, however:

“...there are only two master narratives⁸. The Palestinian narrative illustrates a people unjustly deprived of its land by invaders. The Israeli narrative demonstrates a justified ‘return’ of those dispossessed many generations before. “All the rest,” as the first century (C.E.) Jewish sage Hillel said, “is commentary.” These are the essential concepts on which the huge edifice of each historical narrative has been erected”(Scham, Pogrund, & Ghanem, 2013, p. 2).

d. The Future Vision Documents

Numerous attempts have been made to resolve the relationship between the PCIs and the State of Israel. *The Future Vision Documents* is a series of seminal documents written in 2006 by leaders of the Palestinian community in Israel. The documents call for the state of Israel to shed its Jewish identity and become "a state of all its citizens". It brings out a new and even bold dialogue concerning the essential nature of the State. One of the demands the documents propose is a governmental structure in which both Arabs and Jews would have veto power over all legislation and decisions that affect them.

While the full implementation of the documents is untenable, there are some elements that should be considered as it will improve the relationship between the State and its PCIs. For example, the proposal to replace the Zionist version of history with an Arab one will only exacerbate the conflict rather than resolving it. This demand is so excessive and will only fuel the Jewish perception of the PCIs as hostile, even potentially subversive. Israel must recognize the inherent right of the PCIs who must accept Israel as well. Co-existence means that being able

⁸ For a further elaboration on the narratives, see Annex G.

to live in peace, cooperation, and equality side by side within a single political entity; this will need to address the conflict between the two collective narratives:

“Coexistence between people is unlikely as long as each side is living its own history alongside the other or in isolation from the other. To enable a real dialogue and coexistence, each side will have to assimilate the history of the other, even to make it its own. . .”(Salomon, 2004, p. 277).

Before I start with a brief historical background, I would like to mention that my Agenda for Change in chapter four is partially inspired by the recommendations made in the ‘Future Visions’ documents.

2. Historical Background⁹

a. Pre-1948 War

I mentioned above that the origins of the conflict can be traced back to the 19th century.

While my thesis tracks the situation of the PCIs since the 1948 war, it is important to understand the history of the events that led up to this war. I will touch briefly on the events of this period; a detailed timeline is provided in Annex A.

In the 19th century, following a trend that began earlier in Europe, people around the world started identifying themselves as nations and demanding the right of self-rule in their own home countries. Jews and Palestinians both began to develop a “national consciousness, and mobilized to achieve national goals” (Beinin & Hajjar, 2014, p. 1). Jews were spread across the world and therefore, Zionism entailed the identification of a place where Jews could come together through the process of immigration and settlement. Consequently “Palestine seemed the logical and optimal place since this was the site of Jewish origin” (Beinin & Hajjar, 2014). The

⁹ For a detailed list of important dates and events in the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, see Annex A.

spread of Jewish settlement in Palestine resulted in friction between neighboring Arab and Jewish communities. The First World War destroyed the Ottoman Empire and exacerbated regional nationalist hopes and fears and changed the face of the Middle East. Britain conquered Palestine in 1917-1918.

The Ottomans ruled in Palestine for four centuries. Palestine was a region of great importance for Muslims, Christians, and Jews where they all lived as fully autochthonous people:

“...it can be estimated that by the middle of the nineteenth century more than one-half million person lived in those provinces of the Ottoman Empire which later coalesced into the state of Palestine. Of these, more than 80 percent were Muslims, about 10 percent were Arabs whose families had remained Christian despite the massive conversion of the population to Islam between the seventh and the tenth centuries, and perhaps 5 to 7 percent were Jews, mostly those whose forebears had resisted the even earlier conversion to Christianity. While differing in religious beliefs, the three ‘communities of the book’ enjoyed much in common linguistically and culturally. Under Ottoman law each community retained internal autonomy in matters of personal status, but all were under the jurisdiction of the state in other matters... By 1900, some 50,000 Jews inhabited Palestine, *virtually all* concentrated as minorities in the urban areas of Jerusalem and Jaffa where they neither tilled the soil nor had claim to the land” (Abu-Lughod, 1971, p. 140).

This challenges the assertion that the area now known as Israel was the homeland of the Jewish people and thereby challenges the legitimacy of the State of Israel. Following the collapse of the Ottoman Empire and the massive immigration of Jews to Palestine, the British Mandate took over until the end of World War II when steps to create the State of Israel would begin:

“The League of Nations¹⁰ eventually sanctioned British Mandatory Rule in the country (and in Transjordan and Iraq) and French Mandates in Syria and Lebanon. The British issued the Balfour Declaration (1917)¹¹ undertaking to help establish in Palestine a ‘National Home for the

¹⁰ The League of Nations was an organisation created after World War I to provide a forum for resolving international disputes.

¹¹ The Balfour Declaration was a public statement issued by the British Government in 1917 announcing support for the establishment of a national home for the Jewish people in Palestine.

Jewish People' while promising to safeguard 'the civil and religious rights' of its majority Arab inhabitants" (Morris, 2008, p. 112).

Post-World War I troubles in Eastern Europe and the attraction of good British administration prompted new waves of Jewish immigration to Palestine. Clashes between Jewish and Arab national movements were rampant and Britain's commitment to fostering Jewish self-determination and safeguarding Arab rights was questioned by Zionists. Europe's Jews experiencing anti-Semitic violence, along with the Arab Revolt¹² against British Rule, and the Jewish pursuit of independent representation made Zionist leaders seek to establish a Jewish state. In 1937, a Royal Commission of Inquiry known as the Peel Commission came to Palestine from London to investigate the roots of the conflict between Arabs and Jews and to devise solutions. The report proposed splitting Palestine into two separate political entities – one for Jews and the other for Arabs. The Peel Commission recommendations also provided for the transfer, whether voluntary or not, of a large part of three hundred thousand Arabs because they were living on the Jewish side of the partition line, the territory earmarked for Jewish statehood (Morris, 2003). In 1947, at the end of the British Mandate there were 1,364,330 Palestinians living in the territory and 608, 230 Jews (Adwan et al., 2012).

The Zionist leaders agreed to the principle of partition set out in the Peel Commission. However, by May 1939, in the MacDonal White Paper on Palestine, it was decided that the idea of partition be disavowed. The Paper "charted a future, that, within ten years, would see the emergence of an independent Palestinian state governed by its majority Arab population" (Morris, 2003, p. 63). The White Paper was seen by the Jewish community as a revocation of the

¹²The 1936–1939 Arab revolt in Palestine, later came to be known as "The Great Revolt", was a nationalist uprising by Palestinian Arabs in Mandatory Palestine against the British administration of the Palestine Mandate.

Balfour Declaration of 1917. During this period it is estimated that between 1939 and 1948 approximately 110,000 Jewish immigrants had participated in what is known as Aliyah Bet¹³ by sailing to the territory of the British Mandate (Morris, 2008, p. 398).

A significant aspect of the conflict between the Jewish and Palestinian Arabs concerns the Holocaust. Hajj Amin al-Husayni, Palestinian Muslim nationalist leader, notoriously found common cause with Germany and the Nazis during World War II. He secured from Hitler a commitment to prevent a Jewish State in Palestine should Hitler win the war. “The collaboration of Arabs and Nazis during the Holocaust became a part of Israel’s narrative by equating Arab leaders and countries to Nazis and Nazi Germany, most famously in the case of Hajj Amin al-Husayni’s connections to the Nazis” (Schroeter, 2018, p. 1185). Despite Hajj Amin al-Husayni’s intentions not being realized, his ideology influenced Islamic movements and strengthened Palestinian nationalism:

“... the mandate of the new state was not to act as the guardian of its citizens, both Arab and Jewish, but to safeguard the interests of the Jewish people wherever they were. This fact, a priori, determined the moral and political duties of the state. Consequently, one could say that Israeli citizenship was deformed at birth, genetically flawed as it were, since Israeli citizenship per se was almost irrelevant. What determined the lives and fortunes of those residing in the country was not citizenship but ethnic-national affiliation” (Zreik, 2011, p. 24).

b. The 1948 War- 1967

On the eve of the 1948 War and the establishment of Israel, nearly two million persons lived within the borders of Palestine under British Mandate¹⁴, two-thirds of them Palestinian Arabs and one-third Jews (Ghanem, 2001). The Palestinian Arabs were a majority and became a

¹³Aliyah Bet was the code name given to illegal immigration by Jews, most of whom were Holocaust survivors and refugees from Nazi Germany, to Mandatory Palestine from 1934 to 1948, in violation of the restrictions laid out in the British White Paper of 1939.

¹⁴ British Mandate was established between 1920 and 1923 in Palestine as part of the Partition Agreement of the Ottoman Empire.

minority overnight in the new State as a result of the exodus of a large proportion of them. As mentioned earlier, in 1947 there were 1,364,330 Palestinians and 608,230 Jews in the area. After the 1948 War only 160,000 Palestinians remained (roughly 26% compared to the Jews) (Adwan et al., 2012, p. 113,139). The first major exodus occurred following announcement of the independence of the State of Israel. Confrontation began when Palestinians, who protested a recommendation by the U.N. General Assembly to partition Palestine, staged a commercial strike and street demonstrations. As a result, the Arab-Israeli War broke out and it is estimated that approximately 750,000 Palestinians fled their homes. The vast majority fled to the Gaza Strip (Gaza was under Egyptian occupation), the West Bank of the River Jordan (then under Jordanian rule), Lebanon, Jordan and Syria (Morris, 2008).

In 1950, two years after the State of Israel's establishment, its government appointed a Commission to study the handling of relations with the Arabs in Israel. Before that, the Israeli army had dealt directly with the Arab population in the areas it occupied, and within the State of Israel, as defined by the 1947 United Nations Partition Plan¹⁵ (Jiryis, 1976). The Government adopted the Commission's recommendation to institute a military apparatus to consistently manage relations with the Arab communities. All this is to say that between 1948 and 1966, the PCIs were subject to military rule but after 1966 martial law was lifted.

Relations between Israel and its neighbors were not fully normalized after the 1948 War. Israel reiterated its post-1956 position that the closure of the Straits of Tiran¹⁶ to Israeli shipping would be a cause for war. The Egyptian Air Force announced that the straits would be closed to

¹⁵The United Nations Partition Plan for Palestine was a proposal by the United Nations, which recommended a partition of Mandatory Palestine at the end of the British Mandate.

¹⁶The Straits of Tiran are the narrow sea passages between the Sinai and Arabian peninsulas which separate the Gulf of Aqaba from the Red Sea proper.

Israeli vessels and then mobilized its Egyptian forces along its border with Israel. Israel launched a ground offensive into the Gaza Strip and the Sinai. The Egyptian President ordered the evacuation of the Sinai and fighting began. Jordan had also entered into a defence-pact with Egypt a week before the war began (Morris, 2008). This conflict had the result of shifting the collective identity of the PCIs towards greater sympathy and alignment with the Palestinians in the Occupied Territories.

In terms of analyzing the right of Israel to exist, experts are divided as to what kind of right the State uses to justify its existence and behaviour towards the PCIs:

“To the Palestinians, the least acceptable of these would be that Israel had a moral right to come into existence. The least problematic would be that the existing state of Israel, under international law, has a legal right to live in peace and security. The first interpretation represents a highly controversial ideological assertion about the moral validity of Zionism, while the second represents a far less controversial assertion about the rights of all existing states under current international law” (Segal, 2008, p. 9).

In essence, the fact that the legitimacy of the State of Israel remains in question fuels the frustration of the PCIs that initially resulted in the Six-Day War and continues to this day.

c. The 1967/ Six-Day War - Present

In 1967, as a result of Soviet misinformation to the Syrians about the possibility of an Israeli attack, tension between the two states intensified. Within six days Israel would defeat the Jordanian forces on its eastern flank, the Egyptians on its southern and western flank and Syria to the north. Jordan was forced to relinquish its control of Jerusalem and the West Bank; King Hussein had effectively lost the Hashemite grip on the third most holy site in Islam. One significant, if not the most important, outcome of the Six-Day War was the territorial gains that Israel made in the region of historic Palestine: East Jerusalem including the old city, the West Bank and Gaza Strip. The Egyptian territory of the Sinai Peninsula and the Syrian lands of the

Golan Heights also came under Israeli control at the end of the war. With the exception of East Jerusalem, including the holy places of Islam, Judaism, and Christianity which was annexed by Israel, the other territories that came under its direct control became subject to military occupation (Milton-Edwards, 2009, p. 121). In addition, this war resulted in the flight or expulsion of 711,000 Palestinians from the territories which now became part of the State of Israel.

Though martial law was lifted in 1966 the PCIs continue to suffer from widespread, systemic and institutionalized discrimination affecting everything from land ownership and employment opportunities to family reunification rights: “Israeli state institutions are not “color-blind” when it comes to issues of civil justice and citizenship. The nationalizing character of the state creates a range of burdens, barriers, stigmatizations and exclusions against the Arab indigenous minority for being Palestinian” (Jamal, 2011, p. 69).

I would like to point out that the relationship between the PCIs and the Jewish majority today is still tied irrevocably to the broad Israeli-Palestinian conflict:

“Having lost most of their urban elite and being subjected to military rule until 1966, Palestinians in Israel were extremely limited in their ability to develop independent institutions. If there was any hope for turning back the wheels of history, it was based on the promising pan-Arab momentum in the 1950s and 1960s. These hopes, however, were shattered with the Arab defeat in 1967” (Sorek, 2011, p. 468).

This war created a major change in the nature, level, and scope of political activity for the PCIs. This included political institution-building and participation and a willingness to put forward ideologies and positions that challenge the regime and the Jewish majority (Ghanem, 2001). The war also sparked an increased awareness of the issue of equality and of resolving the Palestinian problem:

“... [the PCIs] developed a broad consensus on the question of attaining civic equality with the Jewish majority on both the individual and collective planes and crystalized their

demand for the establishment of an independent Palestinian state alongside Israel (in the Gaza Strip, the West Bank, and Jerusalem) as a possible and appropriate resolution of the Israeli occupation of those West Bank and Gaza Strip and for the aspirations and demands of the Palestinian people” (Ghanem, 2001, p. 22).

The historical path to the creation of the State of Israel is at the heart of the Palestinian-Israeli conflict generally and therefore crucial to the relationship between the PCIs and the State. The Palestinians were not conquered by the Israeli Jews. Their subjugation they experience is the result of actions taken by the British with the support of the International Community. While the Jews coming to the former Palestine may have had some distant claim to the area as a homeland it does not outweigh the indigenous status of the Palestinians who lived on the land for centuries.

It was within this environment that the PCIs looked to how the new State of Israel would exercise this questionable authority over them. To consider this, I will examine elements of inequality, the impact of policy, aspects of citizenship, and the political environment facing the PCIs following a brief introduction to the legal system in Israel.

d. Israel’s legal system

The Israeli legal system is based on common law, which also incorporates facets of civil law. The political system of the State of Israel and its main principles are set out in eleven Basic Laws¹⁷; since Israel does not have a written Constitution, the Knesset was formed as a Sovereign Parliament, unbound by a codified Constitution, similar to the UK Parliament (Rahman, 2010). The Declaration of Independence of 1948 provided for temporary institutions, meant to serve until an elected Constituent Assembly adopted a constitution that would establish the permanent institutions of government. David Ben Gurion¹⁸ originally intended to organize a constitutional

¹⁷ A list of the Basic Laws and their descriptions are to be found in Annex H.

¹⁸David Ben-Gurion was the founder and first Prime Minister of the State of Israel.

committee after Israel declared independence, but the early days of the state called for different priorities such as fighting the War of Independence. In 1950, the Harari Decision¹⁹ determined that in lieu of a constitution, Basic Laws would be agreed upon that would serve as the foundational legal principles of the state (Goldfeder, 2013). The Decision came about because the governing coalition of the day opposed the enactment of a constitution out of “a fear of limits on the powers of government and the Legislature and a fear of Judicial Review over laws.” (Goldfeder, 2013, p. 70). They had the example from British Rule that a country could operate without a Constitution, as in the UK, and were reluctant to finalize a Constitution until the huge influx of citizens who would be governed by it settled in the land. The basic laws (Annex H) lay out the main legal principles and direction, and ordinary laws (Annex I) expand on these and cover items not directed by the Basic laws.

Raanan Cohen states that over the last two decades, the political orientation of the PCIs has followed two trends: “a political behaviour that represents parliamentary segregation and organizational patterns that represent institutional separatism” (Cohen, 2009, p. 103).

The PCIs’ voice has become increasingly delegitimized in the Israeli political and legislative process. According to recent polls, one-third of Jewish citizens agree that the PCIs should be “denied the rights to vote and to be elected to the Knesset, and more than half of Jewish teenagers would deprive [the PCIs] of the right to be elected to the Knesset” (Hesketh, 2011, p. 12).

¹⁹Harari is best known as initiator of the Harari Decision (also referred to as the Harari Proposal) of 13 June 1950, a landmark in Israeli constitutional law. According to this proposal "the First Knesset assigns to the Constitution, Law and Justice Committee the preparation of a proposed constitution for the State.

Most of the Basic Laws of Israel have a clear ethnic affiliation in the sense that they protect the Jewish character of the State and the interests of the Jewish people rather than those of the PCIs (Jamal, 2005).²⁰ In 1992 the Israeli Knesset passed the two Basic Laws of "Human Dignity and Liberty" and "Freedom of Occupation" intended to form the basis of a future constitution. The two laws would be major tools for safeguarding human rights and civil liberties in the State of Israel. However, the legislators added a purpose clause subjugating the liberal rights in these laws to the ethnic character of the State. The purpose clause of these two laws, which is identical in both cases, reads as follows:

“The purpose of this Basic Law is to protect human dignity and freedom [in the case of the other Basic Law], "to protect freedom of occupation" in order to anchor in a Basic Law the values of the State of Israel as a Jewish and democratic State” (Jamal, 2005, p. 4).

The two laws establish a strong linkage between protection of individual rights and the values of the State of Israel. Consequently, it seems to me, the ethnic character of the State undermines the liberal democratic principles of protecting the rights of all citizens. Laws function, in part, to codify the collective narratives of a State and proscribe limitations on how groups within a society are able to exercise their group-centered collective narrative.

3. Elements of the Political Situation

The literature reviewed in this study shall be briefly discussed under the following topics: inequality, political structure, impact of policies, citizenship, and political mobilization, to form an overview of how the PCIs are positioned in the Israeli political arena. The review introduces the systemic inequalities that pervade every aspect of the lives of the PCIs. I will apply these

²⁰There are eleven Basic Laws in Israel which are considered to have constitutional status. All of them emphasize the substantial Jewish character of the state of Israel or protect the interests and institutions of the Jewish people.

elements to the political, social, and economic dimensions of the PCIs situation in Chapter Three. My research led me to conclude there is a gap in the literature as to how the relationship between the PCIs and their State can be improved to alleviate those inequalities. Before I can suggest specific changes I sought to establish the political framework within any proposals would need to fit.

a. Inequality

Inequalities between the PCIs and the State take many forms. While the PCIs have experienced some material advancement and improved standards of living since the 1948 War, large inequalities continue between them and the Israeli citizens in most aspects of life. Research demonstrates that the issue Israel faces with regard to its PCIs is not only a material issue, which can be remedied through increased government funding, but is also an issue of identity which goes to the heart of Israel's self-definition. Therefore, the issues that PCIs face must not be overlooked. Literature is lacking in discussion as to how the State of Israel could effectively deal with this minority group. The PCIs are marginalized and discriminated against by the state of Israel on the basis of their national belonging and religious affiliation as non-Jews:

“...They are frequently and increasingly viewed as a ‘fifth column’ as a result of their Palestinian identity and national, religious, ethnic and cultural ties to their fellow Palestinians in the Occupied Palestinian Territory and surrounding Arab and Muslim states, a number of which are considered ‘enemy states’ by Israel” (Hesketh, 2011, p. 4).

The conditions in which the PCIs find themselves are a result of the historic and widespread anti-Semitic experiences of the Jewish people that have led them to seek extreme means of protecting themselves:

“...the emergence of political antisemitism at exactly the same moment in both Central Western Europe and the support, if not leadership, given it by sizable sections of the European

intelligentsia refuted beyond doubt the traditional liberal contention that Jew-hatred was only a remnant of the so-called Dark Ages” (Arendt, 2007, p. 379).

The PCIs want to attain equality with the majority Jewish group. In *Palestinian Minority in Israel: The 'Challenge' of the Jewish State and Its Implications*, Ghanem refers to a survey of the PCIs in 1994 that showed a strong commitment among the PCIs to achieve equality with the Jewish majority. In response to his question “To what extent is it important to achieve full equality in the State to advance the status of the PCIs as a group?” 93.8% responded that it was very important or important (Ghanem, 2000). In addition, recent literature shows that the PCIs are still not happy with the living conditions of their group and they demand the state serve them on an equal footing with the Jews. This includes providing them with equal resources, equal public services, and allocate appointments in the public sector jobs to name a few. Israel has not lived up to the principles enshrined in its own Declaration of Independence. As the state of the Jewish people, it has an obligation to correct the failings and injustices in its relationship with its PCIs.

Since the state is defined as Jewish and democratic, Hebrew is not only an official language in the state but also “the main dominant one”. Language is not only an expression of individual but also of collective identity:

“...it is the connecting foundation that relates individuals into being members in the same society. It is the key for social cohesion in Israel. Hebrew is a uniting force that brings us together as members of the same state. Hebrew is not owned by one or other group in Israel. The Hebrew language is the treasure of the whole nation...”(Jamal, 2011, p. 63).

There is a distinction between the functional languages of the State that impacts the status of Jews and the PCIs. Although Arabic and Hebrew are presented as equal, Hebrew is the official language and its use in official documents disadvantages Arabic speakers who do not understand

Hebrew in the pursuit of their rights. As I will discuss later, language is so important for the social cohesion of a people.

b. Political Structure

The Israeli governmental system is a parliamentary representative democracy divided into three branches: the Executive Branch, the Legislative Branch, and the Judicial Branch (Mahler, 1981). The Executive Branch's power lies in the hands of the Prime Minister, who gets elected by the President based on the legislative votes his party gets in the general elections. The President nominates a member of the Knesset²¹ to become Prime Minister after asking party leaders whom they support for the position. The Legislative Branch's electoral process is comprised of 120 members who serve for four-year terms. The number of seats a party holds in Parliament (the Knesset) is directly correspondent to the percentage of votes that party gets. Elections are based on nationwide proportional representation. There is a minimal threshold one must meet to get any seats in Parliament which will be further addressed in Chapter Three.

Israel is a parliamentary democracy with a 120-member unicameral legislature called the Knesset. The term of the Knesset is four years. Elections to the Knesset are proportional and take place in a single, nation-wide electoral district. It is a closed-list system, and each party designs its list of candidates according to a self-determined selection method. Only parties are allowed to compete, but they may add candidates with no party affiliation or join with other parties to create joint lists (Hazan, & Bloom, 2016).

²¹The Knesset (Israel's unicameral parliament) is the country's legislative body.

The electoral threshold for a party to be allocated a Knesset seat was only 1% until 1988. It was then raised to 1.5% and remained at that level until 2003, when it was again raised to 2%. The Israeli parliament passed the Governance Law on 14 March 2014, with a majority of 67 votes, thereby raising the electoral threshold from 2 per cent to 3.25 per cent – the rough equivalent of four parliamentary seats (Kook, 2017). Israel has a highly fragmented multiparty system and all of its governments have been coalition governments:

“Elections determine the number of seats that each party brings to the negotiations aimed at establishing a new government. Yet, other factors such as the parties’ location on the political spectrum, their leaders’ negotiations skills, and even personal considerations influence the way that election results are translated into government formation. Most but not all, coalition governments in Israel have been oversized, that is, they have included surplus parties above a legislative majority” (Rahat et al., 2016, p. 99).

No government has ever managed to establish a majority government on its own and therefore all thirty-four Israeli governments have been coalition governments (Mahler, 1981). Political governance that grants the PCI community non-territorial autonomy in education, culture, and religious affairs has not been developed. Self-rule in these areas would give the PCI minority a measure of self-determination within Israel.

Self-rule within the State proposes a system based on Consensual Democracy. It is a system that embodies the presence of two groups, the Jews and the PCIs. The system would also guarantee real resource, leadership and decision-making participation. The PCIs call for a Consensual Democratic system that enables them to be fully active in the decision-making process and guarantee their individual and collective civil, historic, and national rights. Israel was established as the state of the Jewish people with its aims, symbols and policies derived from that principal goal (Rouhana & Ghanem, 1998). Research indicates Israel overlooked the existence of its PCIs, often to a degree of denial. The PCIs are disproportionately represented in the Knesset (Jabareen, 2014) and thus unable to veto its decisions (Annex B).

c. Impact of Policies

Israel's policies toward the PCIs since the establishment of the State have not deviated greatly from the spirit of the traditional attitude adopted by the country's first Prime Minister, David Ben-Gurion. During the period when the PCIs were under Military Rule, policies were determined by a body known as the "Mapai Committee for Arab Matters" (Cohen, 2009, p. 15). This Committee discussed desirable policies vis-à-vis the PCIs and three options were raised: (1) Assimilation which would have consisted of "Israelizing" the PCIs and obscuring or erasing their Arab identity. (2) Liberalization which involved inviting the PCIs to participate in Israeli/Zionist institutions while keeping them as a separate entity. (3) Control and supervision that involved massive implementation of military law (Cohen, 2009).

The result of the Committee was that the PCIs were removed from positions of decision-making because Israeli politicians agreed that the integration of the PCIs is not a desirable one and that the Mapai Committee actually had no practical authority. To this day, "[the PCIs] have very little influence on the processes that determine their way of life, the upholding of their civil rights, their economic welfare and their future status..." (Cohen, 2009, p.16). Yair Bauml echoes this by indicating that while this Committee was short lived "its policies determined the economic, civilian, cultural and environmental placement of the Arab sector in the different systems of the State" (Bauml, 2011, p. 414).

Moreover, and as a result of the 1948 War, anti-Jewish Arab riots and pogroms demonstrated the growing hatred of the Jews. After crushing the Arab revolt, the British reconsidered their governing policies in an "effort to maintain order in an increasingly tense environment" (Beinin & Hajjar, 2014). In the period that lasted from 1948 until the abolition of the military government in 1966, the PCIs experienced severe discrimination, as I will show in

subsequent chapters, in every sphere of life. The establishment of the military government system was justified on security grounds, but its main purpose was actually to control the movement of the PCIs and to prevent them from accessing their confiscated lands. The period from the mid-1960's to the present day sparked an increased awareness by the International Community of the issue of equality and of resolving the Palestinian problem. Since its founding, Israel has conducted a policy of discriminatory against the PCIs and has been “concerned first and foremost with realizing the yearnings of the Jews and serving their interests” (Ghanem, 2001, p. 27).

d. Citizenship

Following passage of the 1952 Citizenship Law, a majority of Palestinians living in Israel received the status of citizen, though it was not of equal standing with that of Jewish Israelis. “And as the porous borders between Israel and its neighbors grew more impermeable, the dislocations, separations, and military rule that Palestinians had thought were temporary wartime measures became entrenched” (Nassar, 2017, p. 10). Consequently, the minority that remained within the new state underwent difficult political, social, and economic hardship (Arar & Haj-Yehia, 2016). Unlike many other minorities in the world, the PCIs are not a minority of migrants or immigrants; rather, “they are a sociologically distinct minority and an integral part of the Palestinian people and the Arab nation”(Arar & Haj-Yehia, 2016, p. 11). Although they have group-differentiated rights, they are also citizens of the State of Israel – they remained in their homeland following the establishment of the State of Israel in 1948, and therefore became an involuntary minority. The population of the PCI minority rose steadily from 1948, and by 2019, according to Israel’s Central Bureau of Statistics this indigenous minority numbered

approximately 1,800,000 persons (excluding the Arab Palestinian population in East Jerusalem and the Golan Heights), representing 20 % of the country's population of 9,080,000.

After the war, the PCIs were distinguished from other Palestinians by the fact that they had stayed on their land and became citizens of Israel (Ghanem, 2001). To be precise, after 1948, the other Palestinians were to some degree integrated into adjacent Arab host countries, socially, economically, or politically, as might be expected given the overlapping identities of the Palestinians with many of their neighbours. However, instead of absorbing into adjacent Arab countries, the PCIs remained and continued to carry the trauma of the 1948 War. This had the effect of reinforcing “pre-existing elements of identity, sustaining and strengthening a Palestinian self-definition that was already present” (Khalidi, 1997, p. 22).

e. Political Mobilization

As a consequence of the fighting between 1947 and 1949, nearly 80 percent of the Palestinian residents in the territories conquered by the Israeli military forces during the war were uprooted from their homes. Those who remained became a minority in a Jewish state “overnight”. Prior to the war, approximately 1,364,330 (Adwan et al., 2012, p. 113) Palestinians resided in the areas that became the state of Israel:

“A mere 160,000 of them remained within the state and later received Israeli citizenship. Thousands of Palestinians who remained within the jurisdiction of the state of Israel discovered that they were defined by the new state as “internal refugees” or “present absentees”, their property was confiscated, and they were denied the opportunity to return to their homes”(Korn, 2018, p. e-3).

The remaining 80 percent of the Arab inhabitants left or were expelled from their homes and villages. The cause for this is a subject of fundamental disagreement between historians. Factors involved in the exodus include Jewish military advances, destruction of Arab villages, psychological warfare, and fears of another massacre by Zionist militias after the Deir Yassin

massacre²² (Morris, 2003). Many Palestinians have claimed that most were expelled in accordance with a Zionist plan to rid the country of its non-Jewish inhabitants. However, the official Israeli position holds that the refugees fled on orders from Arab political and military leaders. While Jews and Palestinians each tell a ‘master narrative’ of history and identity “the Jewish narrative is most the widely heard” (Ross, 2014, p. 1).

Since 1948, the PCIs have developed various tools and adopted various forms of protest in order to express their dissatisfaction with the situation and their desire for change. These tools of resistance were intended to achieve several goals such as changing the character of the state and its governing principles. On the other hand, Palestinian intellectuals and other activists adopted several strategies of resistance that drew on strategies developed during the British Mandate period. In the aftermath of the 1948 Arab-Israeli War, the first strategy that the Communist Party of Israel (CPI) adopted was simply bringing people together, whether for protests or for cultural festivals. But such physical gatherings were difficult to hold given the tight restrictions on movement that the PCIs faced. Until 1967 the PCIs went almost entirely unnoticed in the Arab world. Most Arab intellectuals deemed them to be passive victims of Israeli tyranny at best and traitors to the Palestinians cause at worst. However, the 1967 War altered this perception when Israel occupied the remainder of historic Palestine and therefore the PCIs started getting support from Arab intellectuals. The PCIs often found that they still had an uneasy relationship with their Arab counterparts: “this tension continues to some extent to this

²²The Deir Yassin massacre took place on April 9, 1948, when around 120 fighters from the Zionist paramilitary groups Irgun and Lehi attacked Deir Yassin, a Palestinian Arab village of roughly 600 people near Jerusalem. The assault occurred as Jewish militia sought to relieve the blockade of Jerusalem during the civil war that preceded the end of British rule in Palestine.

day, and it is part of what makes this story so important for comprehending the transnational dynamics of the region” (Nassar, 2017, p. 12).

Since the establishment of Israel in 1948, Israeli politicians and leaders have emphasized the need to incorporate the PCIs into Israel. This was attempted by recommending rights and treatment equal to that of the Jewish majority. However, this process has proven itself to be easier said than done (Peretz, 1954). Historically, the Arabs in Israel were not always cognizant of their national minority status, and furthermore, despite many attempts, they have been unable to make significant change. Since the creation of the state of Israel in 1948, two factors made Arabs extremely dependent on the State, thus making Arab political activity near impossible. The first was the establishment of military rule over all Arab communities limiting their freedom of movement and travel up until 1966 (Peretz, 1954). The second factor is that existing and social structures within the Arab community changed to the point that it reinforced their dependency on the Jewish state authorities. With the end of the War, many Arab political leaders and elites fled the country which means the rest of the Arab minority in Israel was left in a state of confusion and havoc.

In general, the history of the PCIs can be divided into two distinct periods, each with its own characteristics which I will discuss briefly.

The first period represents the lost years between 1948 and 1966 and the second period represents the years of awakening starting in 1967 and remains to this day. During the first period, the PCIs experienced “severe discrimination in every sphere” (Ghanem, 2001, p. 17). They faced restrictions on freedom of movement, freedom of press and opinion, and suffered under legal confiscation of land and property. Travel from one place to another required a permit from the military governor (Morris, 2003). Under military law the PCIs faced the possibility of

deportations, illegal detentions without trial, curfews, house arrests etc. Subjective feelings of widespread mutual insecurity in the early years of the state influenced official attitudes toward the PCIs “even though very few of its Arab citizens were involved in terrorist activities or spying” (Frisch, 2011, p. 23). Before independence, Zionism and the various Jewish movements had not invested great efforts in defining the policies of the state toward an Arab minority. Therefore, the Jewish politicians and authorities had to adopt temporary and ad hoc policies to deal with the “problem”. In fact, military rule over the PCIs “served like wallpaper, hiding the messiness, even chaos, of a state dedicated to massive and non-selective immigration” (Frisch, 2011, p. 23) of Jews into Israel.

The outcome of the 1948 War created a unique and extremely complex situation for Jewish-Arab relations and the status of Arabs in Israel “Although Israel refused to recognize the PCIs as a national minority, several quasi-collective rights were anchored in its legal system” (Rekness, 2007, p. 4). The PCI minority is still not declared as a national minority in the Basic Laws²³ of Israel, as the State was established as a Jewish state which, by definition, “makes inequality a practical, political and ideological reality for the [PCI], who are marginalized and discriminated against by the state on the basis of their national belonging and religious affiliation as non-Jews” (Hesketh, 2011, p. 4).

During the second period, and since the mid-1960s, demands for equality and resolving the Palestinian problem were of utmost importance. The PCIs:

“developed a broad consensus on the question of attaining civic equality with the Jewish majority on both the individual and collective planes and crystallized their demand for the establishment of an independent Palestinian state along Israel... as a possible and appropriate

²³Basic Laws are the constitutional laws of the State of Israel, and can only be changed by a supermajority vote in the Knesset.

resolution of the Israeli occupation of those West Bank and Gaza Strip and for the aspirations and demands of the Palestinian people” (Ghanem, 2001, p. 22).

Formed under debatable legitimacy, the State of Israel and its PCIs have had a tumultuous history. The religious/ethnic based policy implementation Israel employs contradicts the principles of the multi-ethnic liberal democracy they present Israel to be. The PCIs chafe under these contradictions and the inequalities it brings. Both sides have used political and violent resistance to try and address their positions. The PCIs are disadvantaged in the fight due to the power imbalance between them and the State. The situation has not improved and is only likely to worsen. Hence, my efforts to understand the situation and propose possibilities for change.

4. Research Design and Methodology

a. Research Question

By examining the status of the PCIs based on a review of the academic literature, this research undertakes to examine: *How can the relationship between the State of Israel and its Palestinian citizens (PCI) be improved such that a designed intervention may contribute to resolving the wider Israeli-Palestinian conflict?*

When I began conducting my preliminary research on the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, I quickly learned that the conflict is always and widely thought to refer to the dire predicament of Palestinians of the West Bank (including East Jerusalem) and Gaza Strip; the territories occupied by Israel since the Six-Day war in 1967. Many scholars believe that the solution to this conflict lies in ending Israel's occupation of the territories through, for example, establishing an independent Palestinian State. Ultimately, there would be two established states, one Jewish and one Arab (Waxman, 2013).

However, the 'two-state solution' to the Palestinian problem only addresses the needs of Palestinians in the West Bank and Gaza and possibly those who are refugees elsewhere if they are granted permission to 'return' to a new Palestinian State. This may exacerbate the conflict for the PCIs as their fate would be unknown. They may be forced to choose between moving to the new Palestinian State or maintain their Israeli Citizenship in a State where they already feel less than welcome. There is considerably more literature that addresses the fate of the Palestinians at large than of the PCIs (Ghanem, 2000). Hence, the reason for choosing my research question.

It seems that the PCIs are often, if not always, overlooked by the International Community. Consequently, I have decided to focus my thesis topic on the relationship of the PCIs as it "poses

a challenge to the future of the Jewish state that is as significant and urgent as that posed by Palestinians in the territories. The full nature of this challenge is only just becoming apparent” (Waxman, 2013, p. 215). The recognition of the Palestinians as a people is not limited to their current status. The United Nations has already established the historical bond they have with their homeland. In their partition plan of 29 November 1947 they recognized the Palestinians as a people, not only entitled to self-determination, but also to “genuine recognition as indigenous inhabitants of the land” (Jamal, 2011, p. 49).

b. Method of Approach

The method employed for this study is qualitative. Creswell argues that if a new concept or phenomenon needs to be understood because little research has been done on it, then it “merits a qualitative approach” (Creswell, 2009, p. 18). Further, this research adopts a case study methodology. Creswell cites Stake when advising the researcher that “... Case studies are a strategy of inquiry in which the researcher explores in depth a program, event, activity, process, or one or more individuals. Case studies are bounded by time and activity, and researchers collect detailed information using a variety of data collection procedures over a sustained period of time” (2009, p. 13). In addition, choosing an exploratory case study approach will be effective because this type of case study is used to examine the situations where there is no single set of outcomes (Yin, 2018) and the existing literature lacks the analysis. "The distinctive need for case studies arises out of the desire to understand complex social phenomena" (Yin, 2018, p. 2) because "the case study approach allows investigators to retain the holistic and meaningful characteristics of real-life events" (Yin, 2018, p. 4).

Analysis of the literature reviewed and its result will be employed throughout the thesis. The PCIs face, among others, political, social, and economic structures that institutionalize

discrimination against them such as in education and a lack of formal recognition by Israel as a national minority. The PCIs are struggling for equal civil and national rights, social progress and democracy in order to realize their just national rights. The first Arab-run Legal Centre for Arab Minority Rights, called ‘Adalah²⁴’, was established in 1996. It utilized litigation as a key strategy to promote equality between the PCIs and Jewish citizens of the state. Adalah carried out a range of legal actions in its struggle against discrimination and for minority rights protection for the PCIs (Jamal, 2011).

This thesis will present how the PCIs are continually balancing their national and civil identities while having doubts regarding the status of their citizenship in a state that is perceived as a state for the Jews only. As recently as March 10, 2019, the Associated Press reported that Prime Minister Netanyahu reminded the world that Israel “is the national state, not of all its citizens, but only of the Jewish people” (“Netanyahu says Israel is a state only of the Jewish people,” 2019)²⁵. The impact of this is detrimental, not only to the PCIs but also, in my opinion, to the State as a whole. Hence, my interests lie in the exploration of how the state of Israel can improve its relationship with its PCIs so that the conflict between the two may be transformed.

c. Limits of Analysis

I obtained my data from peer-reviewed articles and books written on the conflict. It is to be noted that my cultural background may produce personal bias. However, an awareness of the potential for bias, personal preference, empathy, and how it might impact the interpretation of meaning will allow for correction and checking of the same biases. In addition, taking a reflexive

²⁴ Adalah is an Arabic word meaning Justice.

²⁵<https://www.theglobeandmail.com/world/article-netanyahu-says-israel-is-a-state-only-of-the-jewish-people-not/>

approach involves removing myself mentally from the conflict in order to impart objectivity. Finally, I faced the problem of dealing with limited source material particularly being unable to conduct participatory interviews and surveys. Marc Trachtenberg recommends that one can overcome this issue by looking for whatever sources shed light “even indirect light” on the problem one is concerned with (Trachtenberg, 2006, p. 158). I pursued alternate sources such as conversations with Corey Gil-Shuster, Director of Conflict Studies at Tel-Aviv University who has conducted relevant participatory interviews and surveys.

The PCIs’ issues must not be totally separated from the wider Israeli-Palestinian conflict that is shared by the Palestinians in the Occupied Territories. That conflict could possibly prevent a peace agreement from ever being reached. Consequently, further investigation of the relationship between the Occupied Territories and the State of Israel is required. However, as it is outside the scope of this thesis, it will become the subject of my future studies.

d. Overview of Key Theories and Concepts

I will explore these theories and concepts in greater detail in the relevant sections in subsequent chapters. The relationship between Israelis and Palestinians is deeply complex and therefore lacks a simple explanation or solution. Peace talks between the two parties keep failing because they do not include the comprehensive needs of all involved. For example, the two-state solution, while essential, only addresses the needs of Palestinians in the West Bank and Gaza, and possibly of Palestinian refugees elsewhere if they are granted permission to ‘return’ to a new Palestinian state or receive compensation. However, resolving the issues of the PCIs is also paramount and I believe that it also ranks a high amount of attention.

My research is informed through the lens of the social identity theory as a way of understanding the dynamics of these two groups in conflict; particularly in context of the

categories of power asymmetry, communication and culture, and collective narratives. Social identity is a person's sense of who they are based on their group membership. Tajfel proposes that the groups (e.g. social class, family) to which people belong are an important source of pride and self-esteem. In addition, individuals can have multiple identities, multiple identifications, and multiple streams. Social identity is then defined as that part of an individual's self-concept which "derives from his knowledge of his membership of a social group together with the value and emotional significance attached to that membership" (Tajfel, 1981, p. 255).

The social identity theory is the main theoretical framework for my study as it gave me insight on how the PCIs and Israelis identify themselves and interact with one another based on their sense of belonging. As I mentioned in the introduction, the Israeli Jews has categorized themselves as the historically chosen people to whom the land was promised while the PCIs and other Palestinians has categorized themselves as the traditional occupants of the land. Due to their European experiences, the Jews categorized themselves also as victims and therefore were predisposed to perceive the Palestinian's resistance as further victimization rather than self-defense. Yet because the Israeli takeover of Palestine was mandated by international forces and decisions, the Palestinians could also lay claim to identification as victims while Israel categorized them as a threat. This crossovers in categorizations and identifications between the groups and within the groups was further complicated by the implementation of a citizenship that Israel identified as equal but the PCIs experienced as unequal by comparison to Jewish Israelis. From these categorizations and the unequal form of citizenship social and formal structures worked to keep the two in conflict.

This use of Social Identity Theory illustrated to me that simply changing the formal structures would be insufficient if they were not located within a model that also changes the

way each group conceived of the other and lead to a change in attitudes that could then give rise to different behaviours. This led me to the ABC triangle concept²⁶, also known as the violence triangle that has provided a process to mentally organize my research findings. It is a useful model to generate possible agenda action items to interrupt and help resolve the cycle of conflict.

There is a substantial power asymmetry in favour of Israel. Consequently, there are far-reaching psychological implications for collective identity and national narratives for the PCIs. Muhammad Amara and Izhak Schnell on analysing collective identity of ethnic PCIs, terms this phenomenon a “repertoire of identities to choose from each to be used when needed depending on the particular social context (Amara & Schnell, 2004). Collective identity is primarily wrapped in group or collective narratives. Collective narratives are the comprehensive collection of stories, aspirations, and histories that a group holds about itself and about the current situation in which it finds itself. “Collective narratives are social constructions that coherently interrelate a sequence of historical and current events; they are accounts of a community’s collective experiences, embodied in its belief system and represent the collective’s symbolically constructed shared identity” (Salomon, 2004, p. 188).

²⁶ The ABC Triangle is a simple framework for exploring the impact and causes of conflict based on the theory that conflict (behaviour) has its roots in people’s attitudes and the political-economic context.

Outline of chapters

Chapter One lays the foundation of the conflict of inequality between the PCIs and the State of Israel. I provide a brief historical background and an overview of the political, social, and economic conditions that arise from the conflict. I present my research design and an outline of the remainder of the document.

Chapter Two provides an overview of the theories and models that inform my understanding of the forms of inequalities experienced by the PCIs. The models explored, particularly the ABC Triangle, informed my approach to developing an Agenda for Change.

Chapter Three analyses the inequalities manifested in the life of the PCIs through the three spheres of political, social, and economic life.

Chapter Four provides my Agenda for Change based on my analysis of the situation in the areas of political, social, and economic conditions.

Chapter Five integrates the main conclusions drawn from the previous four chapters.

Summary of chapter

In this chapter I have provided an introduction of the tumultuous genesis of the conflict between the Palestinian people and the State of Israel that has led to the inequalities experienced by the PCIs. I have defined the population that I studied and situated them within both their historical and geographic locations. I have provided a historical background to the question of whether the State of Israel is legitimate in both its existence and behaviour. I have included an overview of the political environment in which the PCIs live. I have provided my research

methodology that led to my research question of how the relationship between the PCIs and the State of Israel can be improved. I have concluded by summarizing keys theories and concepts that informed my research.

Chapter Two

Collective Rights, Identity, Approaches to Improve Relationship Building

1. Collective Rights and Collective Narratives

As described in the previous chapter, the PCIs are an indigenous minority and citizens of a State which is embroiled in an intractable conflict. They share citizenship with the Jewish-Israeli collective as well as other major identity components with Palestinians at large. The literature on both groups shows the complexities of their identities. A brief examination of the different names and labels given to this group of Palestinians, by different scholars, reveals the confusing relationship between political ideology and scholarship. Israeli Arabs, Arabs in Israel, Israeli Palestinians, Arabs of the inside and Arabs of 1948, are all labels given to Palestinian citizens (Molavi, 2013).

The Israeli government, for example, prefers the term ‘Israeli Arabs’(Ghanem, 2000). Not only does the State of Israel prefer it but it actively discourages the use of the word ‘Palestinians’ to describe those who live within the borders of Israel. Surveys show that people who use the term ‘Palestinians’ for Arab citizens who live inside Israel stress that the Palestinians are one people, whether they live in Lebanon, Jordan, or Syria (Cohen, 2009).

Until the Oslo Accords²⁷ of 1993, expressing one’s Palestinian identity was illegal in Israel. The PCIs were not allowed to display the flag, sing nationalist songs, or recite national poetry (Torstrick, 2000). While there have been some minor changes since, there is still work to be done. Although these things are no longer illegal, this goes to the heart of the PCIs’ self-

²⁷The Oslo Accords are a set of agreements between the Government of Israel and the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO).

identity as it reinforces the efforts to integrate them within the State of Israel. This has implications for the collective identity that the Israelis attach to the PCIs and the collective rights they are willing to confer on them. Likewise this is part of the perception the PCI's have of their own collective identity they feel are due to them from the State of Israel.

a. Collective Rights

Collective rights are rights that stem from a special characteristic “which [can be] unique to a particular minority group. Examples for collective rights are freedom of language and other cultural rights, the right to a separate educational system, and the right for appropriate representation in different branches of government (including by means of affirmative action)” (Segal, 2010, p. 69). The PCIs are increasingly demanding collective rights, besides their traditional struggle for equal individual citizenship rights. However, rights are not absolute as they are subject to the rights of other individuals and in certain instances can be limited.

A recent decision, for example, to demote the status of Arabic from an official language to a “special status” is not just opposed by human rights organizations; it also goes against the recommendations of the Or Commission²⁸. According to a 2017 Pew Research Center poll, many people believe language is “the core of national identity” (Amara, 2016). That restriction, coming from the very own state that is in charge of its minority population, can be perceived by the PCI's as an attack on their collective rights. In Chapter three I will describe the pragmatic problems such a decision creates for the PCI's.

²⁸The Or Commission was a panel of inquiry appointed by the Israeli government to investigate the events of October 2000 in which thirteen PCIs were killed by Israeli police amid several demonstrations.

Collective rights should be viewed as a precondition for guaranteeing individual equality which entails the demand for self-government in several aspects of their lives such as education, communication, planning, and control over resources. The PCIs are not merely a disadvantaged group of citizens who require attention but rather this is mainly a community that has a very strong connection to the land. Therefore, protecting the indigeneity of their community makes granting them the collective right to govern some aspects of their common life an imperative. Which collective rights the PCIs might expect, and which ones the Israelis might agree to confer or limit arises in good part out of the collective narratives each group has of themselves and of the other.

The literature shows that there are three sub-categories of group-differentiated rights: accommodation rights, self-government rights, and special rights of representation and allocation (Saban, 2004). The PCIs have substantial rights in the sub-category of accommodation rights such as language rights and the law of the religious community to which the Palestinian individual is affiliated. However, the PCIs have fewer rights in the sub-categories of self-government rights and special rights of representation and allocation. This discrimination toward the PCIs is “long standing, especially in regard to land allocation and immigration quotas” (Waxman, 2011, p. 1000). There is a gap that calls for the inclusion of the PCIs in the area of self-government rights as the PCIs have only a partial degree of autonomy in the domain of the religious courts. In addition, the PCIs lack rights of special representation and allocation such as Ministerial level representation in the Israeli government (Saban, 2004).

The nature of the rights a group has, and perceives itself to have, influences their perception of themselves within the society in which they live. Sufficient accommodation rights may have the potential to make one feel tolerated or even welcome. But the rights of self-

government and special representation have the potential to make one feel in control of one's destiny and shape a very different story about one's place in society.

b. Collective narratives

Collective narratives are the comprehensive collection of stories, beliefs and current explanations that a group holds about itself and its surroundings. They are social constructions that "coherently interrelate a sequence of historical and current events" (Salomon, 2004, p. 274). To be regarded as a collective narrative, a narrative must pertain to the entire community. It should offer a defined identity in which the individuals and their actions are regarded as not autonomous but as members with particular roles (i.e. professor, nurse) in it.

"Collective narratives are prime devices for providing the backbone of a group's sense of shared identity, and therefore, to an individual's sense of social identity" (Salomon, 2004, p. 275). Collective narratives come out of the way the group constructs and construe its history. As such, collective narratives and collective historical memories are inseparable (Salomon, 2004).

Members of the group interpret current social and political events as an extension of their collective historical memory and form meaning based on past events (Steinberg, 2004). The relationship is reciprocal. Historical facts provide the roots for a group's collective narrative and the narrative frames the way the historical facts are told. Information is added or excluded to fit the narrative. Individuals form different narratives and the dominant group decides on what the collective narrative should be.

The repeated recitation of the various collective narratives gives form to the collective identity a group forms of itself or of the other. As mentioned in Chapter One, Israeli Jews have a collective narrative forged partially in anti-Semitism, Biblical prophecy, and the Diaspora. The PCIs have a narrative forged mainly in invasion, occupation, and division. When two groups

have collective narratives, whose context is heavily influenced by fear of the other, building a peaceful co-existence becomes difficult as collective identities harden around feelings of negative judgements, victimhood, power imbalances, and so forth.

2. Identity Issues

a. Collective identity

Collective identity is a shared sense of belonging to a group. An individual can have multiple collective identities when one identifies as belonging to another group outside of his or hers salient collective identity (Eder, 2009). Collective identities take many forms such as tribal, religious, family-based, class-based, racial, lingual, ethnic, national, and civic. Belonging to any of various groups has the potential of fulfilling the need for collective identity. Social identity theory, on the other hand, offers some insights into the relationship between group identity and the self and why group is formed. In fact, this theory stresses “the ease with which people categorize themselves and others in in-groups and out-groups” (Kimmerling, 1999, p. 11).

Nadim Rouhana developed a model to analyze collective identities through emotional attachments and political allegiances and aspirations. He argues that Palestinian collective identity is influenced by three dimensions. It is evolving in dynamic response to (1) “social and political forces that emanate from the state system itself”; (2) “forces that emerge as consequences of changes within the ethnonational group”; and finally (3) “forces that are rooted in relevant regional or international changes” (1997, p. 14).

The author further proposes a model of collective identity that focuses directly on the group rather than on the individual in relation to the group. More specifically, he focuses on how the structure and content of both the “cognitive and the affective aspects of an ethnonational group’s identity are generated and experienced” (Rouhana & Ghanem, 1998, p. 14). Rouhana’s

model helps explain the complex context in which the PCI's collective identity is forming. They are reacting to the forces of the State against them both as a group within the State and also as members of the larger group to which their fellow Palestinians in the Occupied Territories belong. Simultaneous to this they are balancing their connections to the Israelis with whom they live and work against their affiliation to the broader Palestinian and Arab world. In addition, the space in which they live is changing around them because of the activity of neighbouring nations and international interests in things like oil. Similarly, the Israeli collective identity is being formed in reaction to resistance against the PCIs. At the same time, the collective identity of Israelis born in Israel is being shaped by the immigration experience of their ancestors, as well as international political and financial influence.

The context from which the PCIs and Israelis view themselves and each other has layers of internal and external as well as historic and reactionary influences. Understanding these collective identities requires further models.

Earlier studies of collective identity have focused either on the self-identification label or on the salience of various components for the group. According to Ibrahim Makkawi's model, collective self-identification is the last component of the collective identity to develop and to be internalized. Furthermore, special importance should be given to the study and analysis of the labels that people choose to describe their collective identity. Two major models have been used in the study of collective identity among the PCI (Makkawi, 1999).

The *conflict model* assumes that the PCIs and Israeli sub-identities must be in conflict. In fact, this model is consistent with the fact that the State of Israel, being a Jewish State, does not offer the PCIs in its midst a true choice to adopt an Israeli identity (Rouhana, 1997). I find support in the research (Arar & Haj-Yehia, 2016) that the Palestinian Arab curricula, for

example, have been designed to achieve social and political control over the younger generation which runs against adopting an Israeli identity. Ismael Abu-Saad notes that in doing this, Israel is creating a ‘submissive’ minority forced to accept a position of inferiority vis-à-vis the Jewish majority (Abu-Saad, 2006). This is clearly contributing to legitimizing the Israeli ideology and making it difficult for the minority to control itself and achieve self-determination.

Furthermore, Ibrahim Makkawi distinguishes between instrumental and sentimental aspects of the collective identity. Instrumental identification refers to the fact that citizens depend on the state for basic services. Sentimental identification, however, includes the emotional attachment to the country, its people, and a sense of national pride. He argues that since Israel can offer only instrumental identification for its PCIs “there is no basis for the conflict between this identification and their sentimental identification with the Palestinian people at large” (Makkawi, 1999, p. 2).

When analysing the influences on the collective identity of the PCIs, scholars often identify two processes that they have labelled Israelization and Palestinization. Israelization refers to the adaptation of an egalitarian discourse of citizenship and the aspiration to be integrated as active and equal citizens of the State (Pinson, 2008). Palestinization, on the other hand, indicates the strengthening of a Palestinian national identity, which is associated with feelings such as pride and belonging (Makkawi, 1999). Many scholars understand these two processes to be mutually exclusive and conceptualise the relationship between the two as a ‘zero-sum game’. This led to a research agenda that focuses on determining what direction the identity of the PCIs takes, wherein Israelization is often seen as a shift towards integration and Palestinization as radicalisation (Sa’di, 2004). These dynamics are critical to the situation for Israel and the PCIs. If the PCIs form their collective identity in sympathy with the Arab

population in the Occupied Territories they represent a potential majority perspective. If they could exercise that perspective within the Israeli political, social, or economic spheres they could move contrary to Jewish interests; however, for the PCI who might wish to act in sympathy with 'Israeli citizens' they experience conflict between the sentimental and instrumental experiences of their existence.

Political violence was and still is an important tool in the struggle between the Palestinian national movement and the Zionist national movement, and later on the State of Israel. The national consciousness of the PCIs was significantly affected by the 1968 War. This period did indeed symbolize the national awakening of the PCIs and the process of 'Palestinization', "which was strongly influenced by their renewed contact with the Palestinians in the Occupied Territories and by the rise of the Palestinian national movement" (Rekhess, 2007, p. 2). The October 2000 events (Intifada) and previous violent episodes signify the use of violence as a method of resistance for the PCIs. They have been influenced by the violent methods of resistance used by the Palestinians in the occupied territories (Matza, 2018).

The *accommodation model* assumes that Palestinization and Israelization are not mutually exclusive and can develop within the PCI at the same time. The political struggle for equal rights within the Israeli system should not be mistaken for acceptance of the Israeli identity. The political developments and identity composition among the PCIs are largely influenced by the Palestinian-Israeli conflict as a whole. And yet the PCI's live with the reality of existing within the State of Israel and both depend on and benefit from their interaction with the political, social, and economic activity of Israel even if it is to a diminished degree. Since they do not wish to relocate to the Occupied Territories and do not wish to surrender all of their

collective identity an accommodation presents an attractive compromise but will take work given that Palestinization has, to some degree, formed.

b. Social Identity Theory

Social identity theory is a theory of dynamic social construction, a representation and expression of group membership and belongingness (Hogg, 1992). Social identity theory helps to predict which components of collective identity will gain salience in conflicts. According to Tajfel (1981), in a situation that involves more than one group, such as a minority-majority conflict, the boundaries of group identity are delineated by the presence of three determinants:

- “the criterion applied by the majority for the division it makes between a majority and a minority is such that it is impossible for a minority member to move individually from the minority to the majority group;
- the majority’s assignment of the minority to a separate group on the basis of that differentiating criterion, independent of individual differences or personal achievement, has social consequences for all members of the minority; and
- the group has traditionally been separate from the majority on cultural, historical, religious, ideological, and other bases” (Tajfel, 1981, p. 22).

According to this theory, group members of an in-group will seek to find negative aspects of an out-group to enhance their self-image. Groups give people a sense of social identity: a sense that they belong to a social world. Thus, people divide the world into ‘them’ and ‘us’. Hence, the PCIs feel that although they are citizens, they do not belong to the State.

For the PCIs the Israeli focus on a Jewish State eliminates all PCIs from easy identification with the State. For the PCIs, their ‘otherness’ is observable not only in instrumental ways but in social ways through social consequences such as holiday observances (Annex C) and

language preference. Despite sharing a distant indigenous common history, focusing on the Diaspora and anti-Semitic experiences of the Jewish people, as well as modern day conflicts, the Israeli State has been able to reinforce the ‘otherness’ of the PCI. In their educational and media strategies the Israelis have inculcated that ‘otherness’. In this way, instrumental tools of the State undermine a Palestinian social identity as ‘we’ and encourage a social identity as ‘the other’ that is ‘lesser than’ and ‘tolerated’ rather than equal and integrated.

While the historic elements of the situation between the PCIs and the State of Israel may be unique, Israel is not the only country to struggle with multiple populations. My research therefore included theory on multi-ethnic states and conflict.

c. Multi-ethnic states

The vast majority of states in international systems, democratic and non-democratic, are multi-ethnic. A liberal-democratic multi-ethnic state is intended to serve the collective needs of all its citizens regardless of their ethnic affiliation and citizenship. An ethnic state, on the other hand, is considered the homeland of one of its multi-ethnic groups and “the state serves the national goals of one ethnic group only to the exclusion of the other ethno-national groups within the state, regardless of their citizenship status” (Rouhana & Ghanem, 1998, p. 323).

Emerging out of the British Mandate and the interventions of post-World War II institutions such as the UN, Israel identified its new State as a democratic state. This created an identity consistent with the democratic USA that is home to the largest group of Diaspora Jews who are also a major financial supporter of the State of Israel. It also mirrored the European post-WWII move away from Fascist governments in Europe without alienating Russian or other Jews immigrating to Israel. However, the official designation as a democratic state laid the foundation

for the conflict between the Zionist interests for a Jewish state and the self-determinant interest of non-Jewish ethnic groups such as the PCIs.

Nadim Rouhana calls the component on which the division between groups is based the 'cleavage lines'. This can include "religion (in Lebanon, Northern Ireland, and present states of the former Yugoslav Federation), ethnic affiliation (in the former Soviet Union), race (in the United States and South Africa), and family affiliation or tribe (as in many traditional and tribal societies)" (Kimmerling, 1999, p. 22). If one ignores structure, and considers only the ethnic composition of its citizens, Israel could be seen as a bi-ethnic state whose cleavage line is religion. Israel was established as the homeland of the Jewish people only. Thus, when the term "Jewish State" is used to describe Israel; it is not merely applied descriptively to denote that Israel has a Jewish majority or that its culture is determined by its majority. It is used to indicate that not only are Jews to be preferred to Arabs in some of the laws and regulations of the State, but also to indicate that Israel is the state of the Jewish People.

To this, Rouhana and Ghanem argue that Israel embodies an ethnic state in "theory, ideology, and practice of ethnic exclusivity" (Rouhana & Ghanem, 1998, p. 322), in the sense that it is the state of the Jewish People only and not of its Arab citizens. Israel serves the broad range of civic needs of its non-Jewish citizen, regardless of citizenship or residency. However, inclusion in the state's identity is determined by belonging to the Jewish People, not to its citizenry (1998).

It is worth noting that Israel is a democracy where the PCIs do enjoy certain undeniable citizenship rights and opportunities of access to universal social services. They enjoy certain freedoms of speech, organisation or media information like anyone else in a democratic regime.

However, these rights and facilities remain limited so long as the Jewish definition of the State, as mentioned above, is retained and creates a tension with the democratic principle.

Therefore, discrimination against the PCIs is more or less openly stated by the authorities. Justified on grounds of security (Coursen-Neff, 2005), even though they are contrary to democratic principles, it serves as a pretext for maintaining or implementing control over the PCIs. Moreover, deprivation and discrimination unavoidably fuel the PCIs' resentment vis-à-vis the Israeli State. In turn, the manifestations of this resentment fuels the negative attitude of the Jews towards the Palestinians (Sultany, 2012).

In fact, the PCIs are “caught between the illusion of inclusion derived from Israel's democratic regime and its discriminative characteristics embedded in its definition as a Jewish state” (Pinson, 2008, p. 204). Up until 1966, they were subjected to a military regime that was used to expropriate land, control movement, and suppress political activity. They still face routine political repression and discrimination in many aspects of their lives. One law, for example, blocks family reunification in the sense that husbands and wives are separated on the basis of national origin (Hesketh, 2011). Caught in this tension, they are expected to accept their inferior status and to adopt a civic identity that politically rejects them and their collective memory.

A little further in this chapter I will offer a model that illustrates how these dynamics interact to create a cycle that needs to be broken if change is to happen.

d. Power Asymmetry in the Political, Social, and Economic Spheres

The political developments and identity composition among the PCIs are largely influenced by the Palestinian-Israeli conflict as a whole. Parties to conflict, whether interpersonal, professional, or racial, are often than not unequal in their power. In particular, in

inter-ethnic conflicts, especially those in multi-ethnic states, parties do not enjoy the same power nor do they show the same sense of threat or security. Power asymmetry between Israelis and the PCIs and how this affects group dynamics is a major focus in the literature. Although Jewish citizens and the PCIs have many equal rights by law, Jewish Israelis enjoy more benefits from government, non-government institutions, and foreign charities. Additionally, because of the conflict with West Bank and Gazan Palestinians, Israeli Jews tend to be suspicious of the PCIs. Still true today are the observations of Professor Sammy Smooha's 2006 Index of Arab-Jewish relations in Israel that "separation exists today between Jews and Arabs in places of residence, in schools, in institutions and in family and friendship networks" (Smooha, 2006). The PCIs have a harder time finding jobs because of lower education levels, a lack of employment opportunities where they live, and discrimination by Jewish Israeli employers. The result is that almost 50% of the PCIs live below the poverty line (Burchett, 2014). It is evident then that systemic structural inequalities are at the roots of this conflict and are the causes of injustice and oppression. A recent extensive study by Eran Yashiv, head of Tel Aviv University's Department of Public Policy, and Nitza Kasir, of the Bank of Israel's Research Department, investigated the participation of the PCIs in the Israeli market. The study pointed out urgent problems:

"Israel essentially has within it two separate states, [one Arab and one Jewish] with different standards of living, incomes, quality of education, and employment rates. On the one hand the Jewish state of Israel is a developed Western nation, and on the other the Arab minority is a Third World Country"(Arar & Haj-Yehia, 2016, p. 142).

The literature on rights, identity, and multi-ethnic states reinforce conclusions that began to emerge in Chapter 1. The way in which the State of Israel was created, and the way in which it has implemented its approach to the PCIs, is flawed in that it has not provided the Israeli Jews with the secure homeland they intended. A successful liberal democracy in a multi-ethnic state

cannot be built on a religious or ethnic base. Attempting to do so has created the current situation and forced both sides into difficult positions from which to change. In an effort to find a way to a possible solution, I investigated models for relationship change.

3. Approaches to Improve Relationship Building and the ABC Model

In the previous portions of this Chapter, I have introduced some of the theories, models, and elements of the Israeli-PCI relationship that helped me to form an understanding of the structure, dynamics, and complexities in that relationship. While the relationship is highly conflictual it is not, in my opinion, without hope for change.

Saul Newman points out that there are four approaches that seek to explain conditions under which the Israelis might be willing to support negotiated solutions (2012). These approaches are the trust approach, the economic opportunity approach, the religious approach, and the ethnic approach.

In terms of trust, Palestinian terror is perceived by Israelis as an attempt to destroy Israel and this makes Israelis less likely to make concessions. This mistrust has been justified by past events perpetrated by Palestinian extremists and the PCIs who support them.

For the economic approach, Israel protects the economic interests of Jews through the creation of protected labour markets. These labour markets guarantee economic dominance for the national majority. Economic success becomes the motivating factor for negotiating peace. The recent strength of the Israeli economy, particularly in high technology, makes this incentive less pressing for many Israelis over time, influencing them to remain opposed to political compromise.

In terms of the religious approach, religion played a crucial role in perpetuating dominant national identities in countries such as Northern Ireland. In Israel's case, the political role of religion was strengthened in the wake of the 1967 War and Israel's capture of sacred Biblical territory which the Jews consider "land granted through the covenant between God and the ancient Israelites" (Newman, 2012, p. 348). This certainly reflects the scholarly and popular literature that sees the Israeli attitudes toward concessions closely dependent on levels of religiosity (Newman, 2012).

As for the ethnicity approach, an ethnic group that has been singled out for special attention is the post-Soviet Russian immigrants to Israel. Despite the fact that these immigrants from all parts of the former Soviet Empire are overwhelmingly secular, and in some cases not even Jewish, Newman points out that these voters appear to support right-wing parties in disproportionately higher numbers than other Israelis and much more extensively than their secularism should predict (Newman, 2012). This illustrates that Israel can be open to collaboration with ethnic groups whose political ideology aligns with theirs despite religious differences.

From this, I conclude that the Israeli State may have thought it was being strategic in establishing itself as a religious state because it is easy to identify who is in-group and out-group. However, as I have established earlier, it was a flawed direction and further aggravates the decades-long conflict.

This four-part approach, however, does provide a potential direction for change by focusing on areas of trust and economic activity over issues of ethnicity and religion. Thus far simply adjusting the instruments of political, social, and economic interaction have not resolved the relationship successfully.

Israel has an important motivation to reconsider its approach; demography. Demography plays a powerful role in understanding the Israeli society and the changes it has experienced over time. Demographic factors are central elements that distinguish between the Jewish and Arab communities. Since the beginning of the State, the relative size of the Jewish and Arab population has been of central political importance to the Israeli authorities: "...the Jewish numerical dominance was needed to assure the social, political and economic dominance of the Jewish majority in the country, and to maintain the Jewish-Zionist character of the state" (Stypinska, 2007, p. 106). Both Israelis and the PCIs have very similar security needs with the Jews having suffered collective threats in the past and the PCIs currently being threatened. For the PCIs, the trauma of the 1948 Nakba still impacts their collective consciousness (Sonnenschein & Bekerman, 2010).

Stypinska captures the essence of the demographic question in her research on the minority-majority issue when she says:

"The two main tools in managing the demographic problems are: the immigration policies and population growth due to increased fertility rate. In Israel, these two elements were counterbalancing each other for many decades, but recently the Jewish immigration to Israel has lowered, and the population growth of the Arab communities is still relatively high. Therefore, the Jewish authorities and public opinion perceive the Arab population growth as "demographic threat," which if not adequately controlled will cause plethora of serious social, An issue of the fundamental meaning to the Jewish-Israel is the loss of Jewish" (Stypinska, 2007).

If the State of Israel does not develop a more equitable political, social, and economic relationship with the PCIs they may be facing a hostile Palestinian majority whose learned experience under the Israeli government will not bode well for them. One possible approach to creating this change can be found in the ABC Triangle.


The ABC Triangle

The ABC triangle, also known as the violence triangle and originally designed by Johan Galtung (Darweish, 2010), illustrates the important circular influences and dynamics between the three main dimensions of rights-based conflicts.

- Attitudes (A) are the feelings and values that serve as a source of discrimination and justification of oppression- meaning that they represent the values and views about the other side which lie in our minds and hearts;
- The Behaviour (B) or symptoms are the manifestation of human rights violations, such as visible direct violence, oppression and intimidation; and
- Finally, the Context (C) is represented by the structures and systems in the state and society that “institutionalise inequality and control through law, regulations and policies which are used to practice discrimination, exclusion and oppression in regards to both civic and national collective rights” (Darweish, 2010, p. 86). These practices maintain inequality in terms of education, employment, health care, economic investments, allocation of resources, denial of national and civil rights and liberties, or laws promoting segregation and separation.

The three aspects of the triangle are interconnected; they support and reinforce each other. The top of the triangle, as in an iceberg, is the visible behaviour and symptom of violence, whereas the context and attitudes are the less visible causes of violence. While it is necessary to address visible violence by reducing or stopping it, it is equally critical to acknowledge and address the context and attitudes as root causes of the conflict (Darweish, 2010).

Figure 1 – Beyond Causes and Symptoms: Circularity and Dynamism



Source: Building on Fisher et al. 2000, 9-10; Galtung 1990.

In applying the ABC model to the situation of the PCIs and specifically to the relationship between the Jewish majority and the PCI minority it must be recognized that both sides have reached their present state through historic as well as recent ABC cycles. As mentioned earlier, Israel came into statehood out of a context of a God-granted status as a Chosen People promised a homeland in the Middle East. Coupled with the experiences of anti-Semitism and the Holocaust, an attitude of distrust of others can logically give rise to the choices (behaviour) made in creating the State of Israel. The operating context of risk has been reinforced by acts of aggression by various Palestinian factions; validating an attitude that the Palestinians are a danger that must be contained through the military, political, social, and economic means at Israel's disposal.

The PCIs have witnessed the destruction of their economic infrastructure and the expulsion of their political and social elite (Rouhana & Ghanem, 1998). They have been described by Sami Mari as “emotionally wounded, social rural, politically lost, economically

poverty stricken and nationally hurt. They suddenly became a minority ruled by a powerful, sophisticated majority against whom they fought to retain their country and land” (Mar’i, 1978, p. 18). For their part the Palestinian people were a proud indigenous people of the land who experienced invasion and colonial control from various external powers. Conceiving of themselves as rightful occupants who must defend their territory they have acted out of threat and insult exciting Israeli fears of extermination and distrust of the ‘other’.

In order to craft an Agenda for Change that will be meaningful and specific it is necessary to look at the elements of political, social, and economic interaction between the Israeli’s and the PCIs in order formulate my recommendations. The State of Israel is a complex and dynamic society and there is not scope enough in this study to look at all the possible political, social, and economic elements at play. Therefore, Chapter Three highlights some of those elements that illustrate the types of problems that drive the conflict and how the ABC Triangle could structure an approach to change..

Summary of chapter

Chapter Two sheds light on the various forms of inequalities faced by the PCIs. While they are considered a national, ethnic, linguistic, and religious minority under international human rights law, they are not declared as a national minority in the Basic Laws of Israel. The way in which people see themselves and each other dictates their relationship. Collective identity and social identity theory were discussed to set the stage for the various narratives each party in the conflict believes about itself and the other party. Examining the power asymmetry within the actions of the state of Israel provided concrete examples of the inequalities faced by the PCIs. My research findings reinforced the conclusion that the State of Israel, in creating religious based cleavage lines, is failing to meet the standard of a genuine multi-ethnic liberal democracy.

The costs of this conflict are significant and left on its present course will only get worse. This led me to investigate approaches to improve relationship building. Analyzed through the lens of the ABC model, it is clear to see how the context of these inequities lead to defeated and frustrated attitudes that logically result in behaviours that perpetuate and exacerbate the conflict and justify the actions taken on both sides of the situation. Further, the model suggests that simply changing structural elements of the situation will be insufficient if the context and attitudes do not also realign. A series of consequences of these inequalities, identified through my research, is discussed in Chapter Three.

Chapter Three

Consequences in the Political, Social, and Economic Spheres

In this chapter, I will examine various ways in which the decisions of the State of Israel have consequences of inequality for the PCIs. The choices may originate in policy in the political, social, or economic sphere of governance but have consequences across dimensions. Decisions in education policy, for example, impact equality in job opportunities and poverty levels. Decisions on political representation have consequences on how the PCIs may perceive their position in and obligations to society at large. The behavioural manifestations of such decisions can be plainly seen in the streets of the PCI towns and villages. They suffer from poor infrastructure, poverty, unemployment and poor services (Darweish, 2010).

The State of Israel is a robust and complex entity. Analysis of all the political, social, and economic elements and their individual and collective impacts on the PCIs would be beyond the scope of this research. Therefore I have selected a sample of areas to investigate whose analysis could be applied to any number of specific elements. This examination will give rise, in Chapter Four to specific items for the Agenda for Change.

a. Human and Group Rights and Social Justice

Despite Israel's ratification of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR) and its guarantee to protect all of its citizens against discrimination (Nikfar, 2005), the PCIs are discriminated against in a variety of forms and denied equal individual rights because of their national belonging. Regarding the context of institutional violations, an examination of Israel's legal system and state structures reveals systemic discrimination and violation of the human rights of its PCIs. Israel defines itself as the state of the Jewish people, and the term

“Jewish state” defines the collective narrative through which Israel seeks to serve the Jews in Israel and throughout the world (Hesketh, 2011).

Guaranteeing equality before the law and equal protection of the law for the PCIs is imperative. The principles of equality and non-discrimination are a cornerstone of international human rights law. A pre-requisite to achieving substantial equality is the participatory sharing in a society’s resources. This theory of participatory equality is grounded in “the universal concepts of human rights, justice, dignity and inclusion for all (Jabareen, 2008a, p. 347). *The 2007 Declaration on Indigenous Rights* recognizes the significance of this issue for minority groups and calls on the states to take active steps to combat discrimination against minorities.

Human and civil rights organizations have long used litigation as an attempt to advance a particular cause and to bring about social change and equality. The PCIs have attempted to achieve, through legal action, three different kinds of collective rights: the right to political representation, linguistic rights and equitable allocation of public resources. However, several examples in the literature have demonstrated that this litigation venue seems to be an insufficient tool for protecting the collective rights of the PCIs. While the outcome was a success, the judgements failed to achieve the substantive equality and group-based rights that the petitioners sought. The State has demonstrated a lack of interest in implementing the Court’s judgements. However, the Court also failed to use all the tools at its disposal to ensure that the implementations of the rulings are translated into action on the ground:

“This oversight on the part of the Court appears even more negligent-and perhaps even deliberate-as more and more cases regarding [the PCIs] were heard before the Court and resulted in lack of implementation” (Jabareen, 2013, p. 53).

Under international human rights instruments²⁹ to which Israel is a State party, the PCIs are “a national, ethnic, linguistic and religious minority” (Hesketh, 2011, p. 4). However, despite this status, the PCIs are not declared as a national minority in the Basic Laws of Israel (Hesketh, 2011). The PCIs are one of twelve different recognized religious communities whereas Israel is a Jewish nation state. Furthermore, a basic code was adopted for the country: Israel is a “Jewish and democratic state” (Karayanni, 2012, p. 12). Annex K provides a full list of international conventions on human rights to which Israel is a signatory.

Researchers describe two distinct concepts of group rights in respect to the PCIs that have been constructed under the legal definition of Israel as a Jewish and democratic State. The first concept of group rights is the ‘thin’ concept and pertains to the PCIs as a single national group. According to this concept, the democratic values of the State of Israel will accommodate the PCIs as long as this accommodation does not undermine the “hegemonic status of collective Jewish interests” (Karayanni, 2012). Such accommodations are relative and limited as they are only permitted to the extent that they do not threaten the dominant status of Jewish rights (Hager & Jabareen, 2016).

The second concept is the ‘thick’ concept which pertains to the PCIs as a cluster of religious communities rather than as a national group. Israel’s dual identity, as a Jewish and democratic state, has successfully strengthened the religious-group identity of the PCIs in the mind of Israelis and supporters. However, because the State identified itself as a Jewish state, it “compensated for this bias by according recognition to the PCIs (Karayanni, 2012). This power asymmetry limits the full gamut of rights of the PCIs.

²⁹International human rights instruments are treaties and other international documents relevant to international human rights law and the protection of human rights in general.

The concepts explain how complicated the situation is when it comes to balancing the interests of the Jewish State and the interests of the PCIs. As per the thin concept the PCIs are told to live as full citizens but when they are perceived to threaten the State's interests it responds to whatever the PCIs have done with an approach based on a 'thick' concept. This is indicative of my impression that the State of Israel is genuinely motivated to treat all its citizens democratically but is constrained by an engrained perception of the PCIs as a threat.

Human and group rights are the foundation of social justice in a country. Social justice is the foundation of equality. Even though, there are varying definitions of this concept, there is no doubt that the advocates of social justice fight for fair and just relations of individuals and the society. In such relations, one cannot disregard the role played by the law and institutions that are established to uphold the law. Looking at the PCIs' case, I am mindful of how the legal systems contribute to the societal perceptions towards the PCIs and limit their opportunities for equality. D. Harvey, in his book *Justice, Nature and the Geography of Difference*, argues that the post-modern critique of universalism has made any application of social justice problematic. When countries and societies do not acknowledge the universality of human rights and decide to limit them for certain groups, it is unimaginable how they can then live by the standards of social justice (Smith, 1997).

b. Nationalism and Democracy

The nationalism of Israel is not a state-nationalism but rather Zionism. By this, we understand Israel to have an 'ethnic constitutional order' based on and primarily concerned with the needs of the Jewish people. Israel is clearly not a liberal democracy, then, and therefore cannot, by definition, be a multi-cultural democracy either (Peled & Navot, 2005).

"While [the PCIs] have separate institutions in the spheres of education, culture, mass media, and religion, most of these institutions are not autonomous but are under the control of

the state. Nor are Jews and [PCIs] are treated equally as collectivities. Thus, Smooha reasons, Israel cannot qualify as a consociational democracy, either... The Israeli case requires, then, that a new class of democracy be defined" (Peled & Navot, 2005, p. 6).

Growing awareness of tensions between Jewish and democratic elements of Israel's regime abounds in the scholarship of Israeli society of the last two decades. There are at least three different, independent but inter-related, sources of these tensions. (1) One refers to the fact that Israel, a state defined and structured as the locus of Jewish self-determination, has a 20 percent PCI minority within its borders. (2) The second is the inter-Jewish debate about the meaning of the Jewishness of the state, with a fierce competition between religious and secular-cultural-historical conceptions of Jewish identity. (3) The third is the deep political debate in Israel concerning its borders and its nature: while most Jewish Israelis want Israel to remain a Jewish state in some sense, positions on what are, or should constitute, Israel's border move between the 1967 lines and the whole region of Israel/Palestine (Gavison, 1999, p. 45).

Smooha concludes that Israel, while broadly considered a democracy, cannot be fitted into any of these types of democracy:

"as the constitution- ally defined "state of the Jewish people," which nonetheless has a substantial ...non- Jewish citizen- [PCI] minority, Israel is not neutral with respect to the ethnic/religious identity of its citizens. Rather, it is... a "nationalizing state," and ...an "ethnic constitutional order," in that it actively and openly fosters the interests of those it defines as Jews" (Peled & Navot, 2005, p. 6).

The material on rights and the nature of democracy in Israel illustrates the tension between what Israel could do as a liberal democracy and what they actually implement in response to the context in which they perceive the PCI. This tension manifests itself in the PCIs reactions which, in turn, heighten Israeli concern. In particular, these issues directly impact the systems Israel puts in place to limit both recognition of the PCIs and their ability to represent

their issues and needs. A change in the context through which the PCIs and the Israeli State view themselves and each other achieving the liberal democracy will be needed.

c. Representation and Recognition

Inadequate representation is another source of inequality for PCIs. “Appropriate representation” of minorities is a term used in Israeli legislation for anti-discrimination and affirmative action policies. During the 1970s and 1980s, the PCIs established political organizations intended to provide appropriate representation to all the political, social, and ideological streams among the PCIs (Rouhana & Ghanem, 1998). Ilan Saban argues that there are two types of appropriate representation. The first one is the ‘classic’ appropriate representation that benefits members of minority communities without directly involving the community to which the targeted individuals belong. An example of this would be when a state sets employment policy. According to the Inequality Report³⁰, unemployment rates remain significantly higher among the PCIs than among Jewish citizens. “The rate of labour-force participation among female PCIs, at just about 20%, is among the lowest in the world” (Hesketh, 2011, p. 9). The experience of state programs aimed at equity that do not in fact deliver equity feeds the perception of systemic discrimination.

The second type of *appropriate representation* involves the minority communities directly. This is where the community determines who benefits and how. This type is known as the ‘dense’ appropriate representation. An example of this type can be seen when the Israeli Supreme Court ordered that the PCIs be given ‘appropriate representation’ on the Council of the Israeli Land Administration, “which ‘manages huge tracts on behalf of the state’” (Saban, 2006,

³⁰The Inequality Report The Palestinian Arab Minority in Israel, Katie Hesketh, March 2011.

p. 564). The decision was unfairly implemented as the Court did not specify who from the PCI community can be deemed a ‘representative’. Some PCI petitioners voiced a complaint over the Palestinian representative chosen by the State as they believed him to be affiliated with a Jewish party. Therefore, notwithstanding its contribution to advancing the rights of the PCIs, the Supreme Court’s decision left unanswered critical questions regarding the application of an ‘appropriate representation’ for the PCI minority members (Saban, 2006).

This illustrates the importance of defining the implementation of this type of appropriate representation to avoid misapplication of the intent or undermining the confidence in the action. Power is only genuine if it authentically reflects the collective identity of the group. The PCIs are seeking a ‘thick’ involvement but more often experience a ‘thin’ one.

Rebecca Kook distinguishes between ideological and identity-based representation or as it is commonly known, between substantive and descriptive representation. The ideological approach to representation implies that voters elect parties on the basis of their position on major issues facing the country. The identity-based approach to representation, on the other hand, implies that representatives reflect the “social composition of the electorate in terms of descriptive qualities” (Kook, 2017, p. 2042). According to the “ideological” model, a parliament is representative when it adequately reflects the spectrum of positions held by populations and according to the “identity” model; a parliament is representative when it includes the same proportion of each relevant subgroup. The electoral system in Israel has become increasingly fragmented with up to thirty-two political parties (Kook, 2017).

In 2014, the Israeli parliament passed the Governance Law raising the electoral threshold from 2 per cent to 3.25 percent- the rough equivalent of four parliamentary seats in a House of 120 seats (Friedman, 2015). Despite that increase in the seats gained by Palestinian

representatives, they are still not proportionally represented in the Israeli parliament. Therefore, there continues to be power asymmetry with respect to identity-based representation leaving the PCIs to try to form coalitions to create balanced, ideologically-based, representation with the various non-Jewish factions.

This illustrates the tension in the Israeli-PCI relationship created when the State identifies itself as a liberal democracy, in which people would reasonably expect ideological representation, but have implemented an identity-based process to structure the political participation of those who do not share their ideology.

Since Israel was established as the State of the Jewish people its aims, symbols, and policies derive from that principal identity. Throughout the years it has tended to overlook the presence of the PCI minority within it. In some ways, the State often goes so far as to deny their existence. Both the principal goal of maintaining a Jewish state and the denial of the PCI minority are clearly demonstrated in the Knesset debate prior to the passage of an amendment to the Basic Laws in 1985. The amendment stated that the Knesset:

“... bans political parties that explicitly or implicitly reject the existence of Israel as the state of the Jewish people. In that debate, alternative wordings, to the effect that Israel is the 'state of the Jewish people and its Arab citizens', or to ban parties that reject just 'the existence of Israel' were defeated by large majorities. This indicates that the choice of words was wilful” (Ghanem & Rouhana, 2001, p. 69).

There is a mixed approach to responding to the PCIs' needs for recognition and representation. On the one hand, the surface reflects principles of equality. But on the other hand, conditional clauses, amendments and flawed implementation are obstacles. These undermine the PCIs' faith in the State and perpetuate the feeling of not being true citizens of Israel.

d. Citizenship

A liberal theory of citizenship emphasises the equality of rights which each citizen holds, and how these rights enable the individual to pursue their aims and goals (Biletzki, 2011). Emphasizing liberal citizenship is used by Israel to portray an image of equality and fairness. However, this image seems to be artificial as it is implemented in ways that block the PCIs from becoming fully integrated in the Israeli political community.

Some scholars argue that the PCIs are undergoing an accelerated process of modernization that permeates all strata of society. This process brings about the “ gradual adoption of modern values and norms which differ from those held by the community in the past and from the values held by Arab society in the Arab world” (Smootha, 1990, p. 325). Until this process is successfully completed, the PCIs will not be challenged to fully integrate into the Israeli society. This includes the espousal of cultural values similar to those prevalent in the Jewish community.

Indeed, although the PCI political parties and movements in Israel share an endeavour to alter the boundaries of citizenship in Israel, none has proposed a ‘non-citizen’ politics that would advocate abandoning Israeli citizenship altogether or ignoring the Israeli law. Evidently, all attempts to reframe Israeli citizenship also use that citizenship as a tool: a manoeuvring space for resistance, a structure of opportunity and a resource for political mobilization. The events of October 2000, in which 13 PCIs were killed by Israeli police forces, reminded the PCIs in Israel that despite peace talks, the harsh realities of state control were still in place (Ghanem & Mustafa, 2007).

While recognition of the PCIs as a national minority is an eminently reasonable demand, it would be difficult for the Jewish majority to accept it so long as their national rights are

simultaneously denied by the PCIs. It is not what the PCI minority demands for itself that is the only problem; rather the rights it seeks to deny the Jewish majority. Because of this, the PCIs' motives are always questioned. After having citizenship "forced" upon them, they desire even fuller exercise of this unwelcome citizenship in a state whose fundamental legitimacy they do not accept. PCI leaders need to implement policies that do not discriminate against Israel and instead work with them in order to find suitable solutions that meet their needs. Because of the mistrust, Palestinians are perceived by Israelis as seeking a greater share in a State that they essentially wish to deconstruct.

Polarization of relations disrupts possibilities for peaceful coexistence. National and religious extremism has erupted on both sides from time to time, making it almost impossible to achieve integration and a pluralist society (Arar& Haj-Yehia, 2016). The tension between belonging to the homeland and being alienated from the state has always been a major underlying dynamic for the PCIs. Over the years, Israel has intentionally utilized multiple citizenship discourses that vary according to the political interests of the Jewish majority. Whereas Jews were "granted a selective republican citizenship based on ethnic affiliation...[PCIs] remained limited to partial and selective liberal citizenship" (Jamal, 2007, p. 270).

The future political orientation of the PCIs could improve once the integration process is on its way. The PCIs would not integrate into the state's fabric, if they focus only on effecting changes in the governmental policies that discriminate against them using democratic tools. Integration has to come from both groups' willingness to work together on making concessions so that they both enjoy full citizenship.

Both groups must define their concept of citizenship. The key challenge that nations face is determining who is a citizen and who are not or, in other words, the 'us' and the 'we':

“The paradox between the inclusionary and exclusionary nature of citizenship also lies at the assumption that the principle of universality grants marginal groups entrance to citizenship. However, at the same time, using the same argument of universality, the 'otherness' of these marginal groups is denied entrance, excluded from what is assumed to be universal, and pushed into the so-called private sphere” (Pinson, 2008, p. 202).

Immigration of Jewish people was the fundamental goal of the Zionist movement since the beginning of the early 20th century when there was no Jewish country in the world and immigration to Palestine had only started. In the early statehood, the main objective of the State of Israel was to attract as many Jews as possible (Morris, 2008). This policy was known as Aliyah. David Ben-Gurion, the then Israeli Prime Minister, expressed this goal in the following words:

“The main thing is the absorption of the immigrants (...) for many years, until (...) a regime takes hold in the [Arab] world that does not threaten our existence. (...) The state's fate is dependent upon 'Aliyah. (...) 'Aliyah must determine our policy in negotiations” (Stypinska, 2007, p. 106).

In order to support Jewish immigration to Israel, both a special government and a special permanent Knesset ministerial committee were established for the absorption of immigrants. Although they must undergo a long and difficult citizenship process, non-Jewish spouses of Israeli citizens may also receive Israeli citizenship. An amendment to the Law of Return was passed in 2008 that precludes the naturalization of citizens based only on their origins and many human rights advocates argued that the Israeli citizenship law is racist: "...no other country in the world prevents people from exercising the right to family life based on national or ethnic belonging, as Israel does” (Herzog, 2010, p. 58).

Experiencing citizenship is more significant than its mere formal existence. Citizenship is not only about a set of rights but also about the ability of the citizen to use these rights. Various

groups in society, such as minorities, tend to be marginalized even in societies with long liberal traditions (Sa'di, 2000). In the case of Israel, the PCIs were awarded civil and political rights but these rights were and are compromised or violated through various inequalities. The root cause of these inequalities stems from a scheme of formal citizenship that aims, first and foremost, at bolstering the dominance of the majority and the legitimacy of its regime (Sa'di, 2000, p. 32). Since November 1947, Zionist leaders had pledged repeatedly to promulgate a democratic approach that would guarantee the provision of universal citizenship in accordance with their obligations under the UN Partition Plan (Robinson, 2013).

However while the PCIs experienced material advancement and improving standards of living since 1947, there has always been and continues to be a large inequality between them and the Jews in most aspects of life in Israel. One of these inequalities manifests itself in the application of citizenship. From the outset the PCIs were offered 'full citizenship'; yet they were simultaneously excluded from it, due to the formal definition of Israel's national collective as the state of the Jewish people (Rekness, 2014).

Minorities struggle in various situations against discrimination in order to achieve equality with the majority. When they are deprived of power they may not view citizenship as a form of attachment to the state but rather as a framework that gives them legal power to challenge state policies. In fact, the PCIs' trust in the state plummeted after Israeli security forces killed thirteen PCIs during protests in October 2000³¹ and a sharp decline in PCI support of Jewish-Zionist parties began (Kook, 2017):

³¹ The October 2000 events were a series of protests in Arab cities and towns in northern Israel that turned violent, escalating into rioting by Israeli Arabs throughout Israel, which led to counter-rioting by Israeli Jews and clashes with the Israeli Police.

“Certain groups in the Jewish population mistrust the Arab population because of their identification with the Palestinian struggle for a Palestinian state alongside the State of Israel. One expression of this feeling of mistrust is the call made by parts of the Jewish majority to deprive the Arab citizens of their right to participate in some of the crucial political and public decisions, such as the decision regarding the future of Judah and Samaria [...] It is important to state that these views contradict the democratic nature of the State of Israel” (Pinson, 2007, p. 342).

The PCIs are afforded differential and unequal treatment under Israeli law in the field of citizenship rights. The most important immigration and nationality laws –The Law of Return (1950) and the Citizenship Law (1952) –allow every Jew in the world to immigrate freely and to automatically become an Israeli citizen.

However, the same laws that privilege Jews excludes Palestinians who were forced to flee their homes between 1947-1952, stripping them of their former status and denying them the internationally recognized right of return. Since the establishment of this Law, there have been constant debates over its legitimacy, possible social and political consequences. Gouldman suggests that Israel's nationality law is the reflection of the prevailing national ideology “which is inextricably bound up with the notion of Israel as a Jewish State (Stypinska, 2007, p. 107).

The Citizenship and Entry into Israel Law was passed in July 2003 and was extended in June 2016. The law makes inhabitants of the West Bank and Gaza Strip ineligible for the automatic granting of Israeli citizenship. A citizen of Israel who chooses or has chosen to marry a Palestinian resident of the Gaza Strip or the West Bank is faced with either to leave Israel and go to the place of one's spouse, or to leave one's spouse behind in order to stay in Israel (Saban, 2004, p. 962). Once children are involved, the ramifications are even more dreadful. Research shows that Israel justifies laws such as this as a temporary measure of security. This arises from a lack of trust in the Palestinian people from the inception of the State. Early hopes of integration

were hindered by the constant vigilance made necessary by the armed Jewish-Arab conflicts, and suspicions that the PCI presented a security risk to the new state:

“Israel was in danger from espionage, terrorism and sabotage, guerrilla warfare and political struggle on the part of its Arab population. With such an attitude, the only possible action was continued military administration in densely populated Arab areas, together with a land development policy that demanded the expropriation of Arab lands in order to serve the new Jewish towns and regional administration, industrial zones and infrastructure” (Cohen, 2009, p. 29).

This immigration process also bears significant economic benefits, to which only Jewish immigrants and their non-Jewish immigrant relatives are entitled to, including tax breaks, housing subsidies, special mortgage rates, free higher education, and subsidized vocational studies.

Both the issues discussed under representation and recognition and those under citizenship speak to the ways in which the PCIs see themselves, and are seen, as citizens. Next, I will explore how that perception is reflected in actual participation in the political process.

e. Political Participation

The PCI's political participation and parliamentary politics are not as effective as those of Jewish citizens. In recent years, moreover, the voting behaviour of the PCIs reflects the deep-rooted predicament of their relationship with the State. The PCIs are divided between two opposing political directions: integrative and confrontational; based mainly on the dilemma surrounding issues relating to their loyalty to the State and their identity as PCIs. On the one hand, they are citizens of a sovereign state, which is involved in an ongoing war with the ethnic group to which they belong. On the other hand, they must adapt themselves to the reality of being a minority community within a majority Jewish state that distrusts them (Cohen, 2009, p. 184). Their potential for equal and effective political representation in the power centres of the state is “thwarted by ethnic policies that give preference to the Jewish majority in the distribution

of symbolic and material resources and in the state structure itself' (Rouhana& Ghanem, 2001, p. 67).

From the perspective of the ethnic composition of its citizenry, Israel is a bi-ethnic state, namely Jewish and Arab. The Israeli electoral system encourages proliferation of parties. Knesset elections are proportional, countrywide, and free. Every sector and organization aspires to be represented at the government table as the best way to reap benefits or advance causes they deem important: "while some Arab [Members of the Knesset] have been appointed deputy ministers and put in charge of matters concerning 'minorities', they have almost never been authorized to deal with issues of concerns to the population as a whole" (Ghanem & Rouhana, 2001, p. 77). In addition, there is a decrease in the number of PCIs voting as they feel they are a marginal factor in Israel's political system and could never become full partners within the present system. On the other hand, the Arab parties have demonstrated very little in resolving the predicaments of their communities and their relationship with the state. Consequently, the PCIs have little confidence in the candidates from among whom they could vote.

Palestinian politics in Israel have witnessed three major phases of development since the events of October 2000: (1) a gradual decline in the PCIs participation in Israeli Knesset elections; (2) the PCIs who did vote, tended to prefer Palestinian parties; and (3) a dramatic decline in the PCIs support for Jewish parties (Ghanem & Mustafa, 2007). One of the key findings in a survey conducted by the Yafa Research Institute which specializes in studying political trends in Arab society is that worsening racism in Israeli society has increased the desire of PCIs to vote. However, only half of the PCIs surveyed were aware of the electoral threshold. The threshold is the percent of total eligible votes a list of electoral candidates must receive to be included in the allocation of Knesset seats. The threshold was raised from 2% to 3.25% as part of

the Governability Law (Barzilai&Shain, 1991). As shown in Annex D, reaction to the move by those surveyed was negative and the change had the far-reaching effect of pushing the PCI parties to stand in a united list of candidates.

While the PCIs are citizens of the State, their political participation is much weaker than that of the Jewish citizens. In June 2008, the Knesset approved an amendment to Article 7A of The Basic Law: The Knesset. The amendment denies any citizen the right to stand for election if they have visited any “enemy” states without permission from the Interior Minister, during the seven years preceding submission of a list of candidates for election (Hesketh, 2011). Although this amendment applies to all citizens in theory it is, in practice, intended to deter travel by the PCIs to Arab States.

The strategies for political and social change used by minority groups and the nature of their political participation both among the elites and the general public, reflect factors at two levels: (a) the group level and (b) the state or regime level. Group level factors are internal in that they exist within the minority group. State or regime level factors are external to the group. They characterize the state/regime with which the minority group must contend (Ghanem, 2010).

On the group level, Asad Ghanem states, that there are four factors that have critical implications for the distribution of power relations and the allocation of resources between the minority and the majority. The first factor is in respect to the status of being indigenous versus being immigrant. He argues that minority groups who are considered indigenous usually have a sense of belonging and self-confidence that helps raise demands related to their collective status. On the other hand, minorities who immigrate to a new country in search of economic opportunities usually intend to become integrated into the new society. Therefore, their collective demands are absent or limited. PCIs’ expectations are based on their perception of themselves as

indigenous. However, Israel ignores their indigenous identity in favour of their own historic link to the land.

The second factor concerns demographic weight and geographic concentration. This factor has a decisive impact on power relations and resource allocation for a minority group vis-à-vis the majority group: the greater the demographic weight of the minority, the greater its ability to exert pressure on the political system. Likewise, geographic concentration influences what the minority group is able to achieve (Ghanem, 2010). Ghanem points to the fact that the dispersion of a group into various parts of the country can weaken its voice and its ability to mobilize or organize effective political action.

Here in Canada, for example, the concentration of Francophones in Quebec proved invaluable in enabling them to achieve its goals or make significant progress toward those goals (Ghanem, 2010). Complicating this situation for the Israelis is not just the PCIs but the number of Palestinians in the Occupied Territories. Any move that grants additional power to the PCIs may draw more Palestinians into Israel and shift the delicate balance of control within the State.

The ability of a minority group to function as a consolidated ethnic or national group is a third factor that shapes the demands and political expression of the group. Consolidated minority groups have a single main program for achieving balance or equality with the majority. Asad Ghanem states, minorities in hegemonic ethnic systems are “generally subject to a regime of control via which the state endeavours to divide them in order to weaken their action and bargaining power” (2010, p. 4).

The fourth, and most important factor, is in respect to group leadership. This factor shapes the demands and political expression of a minority group. Unless there is an effective

leadership body that is capable of providing effective guidance, the minority group will achieve few of its goals.

As for factors at the State level, Ghanem presents two principal models that can be used to describe how states and regimes deal with ethnic problems and the interaction that occurs between ethnicity and state. (1) The Democratic model structurally and essentially prefers equality over ethnic considerations in the treatment of citizens. (2) The Ethnic model, on the other hand, structurally and essentially prefers ethnic affiliation as the criterion for the treatment of citizens and determination of their rights “with one group and its members being preferred over others within the state” (Ghanem, 1998, p. 429). In another work he emphasizes the importance of the ethnic state by stating that:

“the ethnic state is a reflection of the “hegemonic ethnic project” of the majority; it gives primacy to ethnic affiliation over citizenship in dealing with citizens and their rights; it “displays favouritism for one group and its members over other groups that make up the state population” (Ghanem, 2010, p. 7).

The clear advantage to Israel in choosing an ethnic approach to contain its minority citizens lies in the difficulty at changing one’s ethnicity. Even if a few PCIs convert to Judaism a large-scale conversion of the PCIs is improbable.

As far as the PCIs are concerned, the country is not their own in the same way, and their prospects for achieving equality in a state that defines itself “in a way that excludes them are virtually nil” (Ghanem & Rouhana, 2001, p. 69). Thus, the strategic predicament of the PCIs emanates from the fact that equality cannot be achieved in the present constitutional structure either as Arab individual or collective. Most Arabs perceive clearly that in the current State of Israel, as it is presently constituted, they cannot achieve equality for themselves or for the future generations, nor would they be considered equal citizens in a shared homeland.

The literature on political participation describes a situation that on the surface may look promising for Israeli dominance. The PCIs' voter turnout is low, they lack confidence in their PCI representatives, and they are sceptical about the process but as Stypinska noted about demography, the numbers are shifting potentially in favour of the PCIs (Stypinska, 2007). They have research on their side as to what other minorities worldwide have done to assert their rights. It is my interpretation that the time is therefore ripe for building a new approach between the PCIs and the Israelis. Can these two groups see themselves as eventual collaborators? Does their present perception of identities foster such a collaboration?

f. Structural Marginalization

The multifaceted separation between the PCIs and Jewish citizens, at the level of national symbols, narratives, institutions, structures and discourses, generates two distinct and unrelated collective identities. Working from Rouhana's assessment that the PCIs are "partial Israelis and partial Palestinians" and that both identities are "incomplete," Asad Ghanem's book examines what he calls the "distressed development" as opposed to the "normal development" of political and social activity (Ghanem, 2001, p. 175).

It is not that the Israeli and the PCIs' identities are necessarily contradictory or that one has to be premised on the rejection of the other. They both seem to be incomplete and deficient in different ways. This, in turn, prevents either of them from fully solidifying as a meaningful and accessible identity (Molavi, 2013). The ethnic reality in Israel forces the PCIs to develop as a minority in distress, always heading for a crisis. It prevents them from experiencing normal development, and the people will continue to suffer distress and crisis as long as there is no change in the structure of the relationship (Molavi, 2013).

The PCIs often feel excluded not once but twice. Once by the Jewish majority in Israel and once by the majority of Palestinians who are not Israelis. Halleli Pinson uses the term ‘trapped minority’ to describe their double marginalisation (2008) and Dan Rabinowitz identifies two elements which characterize the predicament of trapped minorities. (1) the process of disastrous ‘entrapment’ usually begins at the “very historical juncture which the dominant majority associates with victory, redemption and the joyful dawning of a new age” (Rabinowitz, 2001, p. 76). The second element of entrapment is the sense of being marginal twice over. This is where the dominant group that hegemonizes the new state treats the minority as less than equal citizens. A minority group may demand expanded autonomy in addition to the equal liberal rights to which members of the majority are entitled and full partnership in management of the affairs of state. Asad Ghanem argues that the fullest development of this turns the state into a bi-national state:

“...this is a system whose essence is the recognition of groups as the prime component of the public order and the division of power, benefits and rights on a group basis, in addition to granting equality to all citizens on an individual basis. A prominent example of this is the arrangement between Flemings and Walloons in Belgium, the situation in Switzerland and that in Canada” (2000, p. 88).

The Israeli State developed an extensive system for marginalization and controlling the PCIs based on segmentation. The government policy of segmentation involved keeping the PCIs separate from Jews socially, politically, and administratively (Hager & Jabareen, 2016). Unlike the experiences of many other indigenous peoples worldwide, the PCIs were not subjected to ‘assimilationist’ policies because the new Jewish immigrants “were not interested in assimilating non-Jews into their society” (Abu-Saad, 2006, p. 1087). The advantage to this is that no attempts were ever made to obliterate the PCIs’ language or religion. As well, children were not removed from their families to be “civilized” and integrated into Jewish society.

However, the disadvantage of this approach is that, despite having nominal civil rights, the PCIs are forever considered as “outsiders, foreigners, and an illegitimate and unwanted presence within “the Jewish State” (Abu-Saad, 2006, p. 1087). They are excluded from the national identity of the State but not allowed to develop a national identity of their own, nor are they allowed any collective or treaty rights (Jabareen, 2008).

Maintaining the religious divide between the different Palestinian-Arab religious communities assisted the Israeli establishment to better control the PCIs and to maintain its agenda as a non-assimilative state (Karayanni, 2012). There is growing national friction in their majority-minority relations. “Continuous denial of the problem may well deepen the divide between the two groups, the growing sense of separatism of the part of the Arabs, and an overall sense of alienation that may lead to an explosion” (Rekhess, 2007, p. 121).

Due to government marginalization policies, the representation of the PCIs in academic and white-collar careers is very low: “...they constitute 2% to 3% of academic faculty members employed by Israeli universities. Statistics indicate the representation of only 6% of civil service employees in 2013” (Arar & Haj-Yehia, 2016, p. 14). This means that the PCIs have been concentrating in blue-collar jobs. Ahmad Sa’di explains that this is a result of two processes. The first one is that PCIs were gradually being incorporated into the Jewish labour and therefore it is taking them a long time for this gap to close. Secondly, the author believes that it is the result of a reproduction of a strong division of labour within a split labour market.

Unemployment rates were high because of the Jewish immigration during the first three years of the statehood and economic difficulties. To prevent competitions, the new Israeli government regulated the entrance of PCI workers into the Jewish labour market and thus they were compelled to rely on local agriculture for their livelihood (Sa’di, 1995).

According to Shourideh Molavi, the channelling of rights through Israel's policy of Jewish dominance can be analyzed at three different levels: the declarative level, the structural level, and the operational level (Molavi, 2013).

(1) At the formal and declarative levels, the preference of Jews over others is both tangible and indisputable. An example of this would be the official state holidays and language (Annex C) which are built upon the social and political dominance of the Jewish people and completely dismissive of the PCI (Molavi, 2013):

“...the status of Arabic is vastly inferior to that of Hebrew in terms of the resources dedicated to its use, despite Israel's duty under international human rights law to protect the language rights of the Arab national minority in Israel” (Hesketh, 2011, p. 11).

As a result, while Jews are provided legally enshrined rights both as a collective and as individual citizens, the PCIs lack clear and official legal and formal status in Israel as a collective and fail to identify with the intrinsically Jewish and Zionist symbols of the state at an individual level.

(2) At the structural level, PCIs are excluded from Israeli institutions: “these are considered by the official ideology of Zionism and the Jewish élites to belong to the Jews and to serve Israeli Jewish or general Jewish purposes rather than broad Israeli purposes” (Ghanem, 2000, p. 433). There are many methods of exclusion at the structural level; for example, exclusion of Arabs from the political decision-making centers, exemption from compulsory military service, non-employment of Arabs in senior positions, special institutions to deal with Arabs, and discrimination in the broadcast media (Ghanem, 1998).

Finally, at the operative level, the PCIs are denied equality in the realms of budget, land allocation and legislation. Liberal citizenship in an ethnic state leads to a problematic pattern of allocation of state resources. Amal Jamal describes an example: an Arab family sought to buy a house in a Jewish town neighboring its village, and constructed on land confiscated, in the past,

by the State. The request to buy the house was rejected based on the fact that the land of the township belongs to a Jewish institution that is “entitled to promote the interests of the Jewish people only” (Jamal, 2007, p. 271).

g. Discrimination & Social Inequality

There are many statutes that give preference to Jewish citizens without the explicit use of the word 'Jewish'. This leaves the PCIs in a position of inferior citizenship because they do not acquire the same rights and privileges as the Jewish citizens:

“It has been argued that Israel is a nation-state and that all nation-states give preference to the nation associated with the state. Thus, both the preference given to Jews over non-Jews and the exclusivity in the state's superstructure are seen to be justifiable as the normal preference given by nation-states to their members over non-members. As nation-states give privileges to their members, Israel gives privileges to the Jewish nation” (Saabneh, 2016).

In general terms, Jewish persons who remained in Israel after its establishment were granted Israeli nationality either by return or by residence. As for the Arab population, those who decided to stay in the new Israeli State were granted citizenship. However, the Law of Return did not apply to them, since they were not Jews. Stypinska adds it is certainly easier to acquire Israeli nationality for Jews than to any other ethnic group, and as such the Israeli Nationality Law and the Law of Return are open to charge for discriminating on ethnic grounds in favor of Jews (Stypinska, 2007).

As mentioned earlier, formal discrimination exists in Israeli law with respect to immigration and citizenship, as established in the Law of Return of 1950, in the Citizenship Law of 1952, and in the Entry into Israel Law of 1952. Under these laws, Jews and their families may obtain Israeli citizenship virtually automatically by virtue of the principle of “return”. The entitlement applies to Jews and non-Jewish relatives regardless of whether they have been persecuted as Jews or for being relatives thereof.

Social inequality refers to “relatively long-standing differences among individuals or groups of people that have implications for individual lives, especially for the rights or opportunities they exercise and the rewards or privileges they enjoy” (McMullin, 2010, p. 7). For example, people who are a part of the working class do not have the same educational opportunities and tend to have worse health than the elite. At the individual level, the PCIs experienced of inequality is reflected in unequal life conditions such as obtaining affordable housing, attaining higher education, and being underrepresented in state institutions.

A combination of studies show that PCIs can expect to live shorter lives than Jewish citizens and face significantly higher mortality (Daoud, Shankardass, O’Campo, Anderson, & Agbaria, 2012). PCIs were internally displaced following the Nakba of 1948 (Palestinian Catastrophe) and these internal displacements, resulting from political violence, have had adverse long-term health impacts. A study was conducted between 1970 and 2010 to examine changes in the life expectancy gap among the PCIs and the Jewish majority in Israel (Annex E). Mortality inequalities are found between the PCIs and Jews, such as in old-age cancer or diabetes mortality, and these health inequalities were most likely caused by social inequalities:

“By the end of 2008, at least 7.1 million (67 percent) of 10.6 million Palestinians worldwide were forcibly displaced persons. Among them are at least 6.6 million Palestinian refugees and 427,000 internally displaced persons (IDPs). Palestinians are one of the largest displaced populations in the world today, constituting half of all refugees worldwide” (Saabneh, 2016).

While Israeli law provides that equitable, high-quality health services should be provided to all residents of Israel “Palestinian citizens [PCI] are frequently unable to exercise their right to the highest sustainable standard of health” (Hesketh, 2011, p. 11). This is due to various barriers such as the lack of clinics and hospitals close to them as well as limitations on mobility.

Focusing on the topic of discrimination, language constitutes a core feature of cultural rights, and linguistic preservation holds particular significance for national and indigenous minorities. Language is often embedded in religious and cultural practice and is instrumental for the preservation of these traditions. Furthermore, linguistic recognition and the right to use native languages in public forums provides “minorities, who frequently face severe and prolonged discrimination, with the tools to access social and economic rights and services, thus aiding in equalizing the status of majority and minority groups” (Rouhana & Ghanem, 1998, p. 329). Although Arabic is officially on par with Hebrew, it is not granted anything close to equal status in practice, and is almost ignored (Amara, 2016). In fact, in 2018, Israel amended the Basic Law demoting Arabic from an official language to a special status (Holmes, 2018).

The PCIs require linguistic equality in order to compete fairly in the job market and in national networks of higher education, both of which are essential for the social and economic advancement individually and collectively. Further, linguistic rights are also critical for promoting a sense of belonging, which contributes to social cohesion and stability: “...preservation of a minority's language contributes to the group's ability to compete on equal footing socially and economically and promotes the cultivation of a shared society” (Jabareen, 2013, p. 40).

In July 2009, the Transport Minister made the decision to ‘Hebraize’ all road signs in Israel by removing the Arabic names of places written in Arabic letters. For the PCIs the Arabic name of the town is an integral part of their culture. Since Arabic was at the time an official language Israel had a legal and moral duty to maintain it for them. Nimer Sultany argues that Israel’s ‘basic structure’ (i.e., the main political, social, and economic institutions) subjects the PCIs to a process of ghettoization that relegates them to a separate and unequal status. This basic

structure is particularly unjust, as it does not provide these citizens with the minimal conditions of a decent life (Sultany, 2012).

In an examination of the state education system, researchers found that the PCIs live in what they termed an ‘ethnic’ state or ‘ethnocracy’ in which national identity is not inclusive of all of the state’s citizens but rather is limited to the members of one ethnic group. Therefore, access to centers of power, government resources, and full political participation are also limited to the dominant ethnic group. When an ethnic state is not structurally able to meet the indigenous people’s basic human needs for identity, the state must then deal with the indigenous people by developing “system of control, based on varying degrees of force, depending on the state’s claim to be “democratic” as well as “ethnic” (Abu-Saad, 2006).

“The Palestinians ...demand that the state serve them on an equal footing with the Jews, provide them with equal resources and equal public services, allocate appointments in the public sector on a fair basis to members of their group, permit them full partnership in government and the government coalition, and grant them parity in determining the nature and objectives of the state. In their eyes, the state should serve its citizens equally. In essence they are demanding that the state be the state of its citizens and not a state that serves the interests of one group (Jews) more favourably than those of other groups of its citizens” (Ghanem, 2000, p. 90).

An example of the level of inequality that the minority group faces can be seen in education. The physical differences between Jewish and Arab schools are significant “the lack of auxiliary facilities in Arab schools....compared with those in Jewish schools are striking” (Abu-Saad, 2006). Abu-Saad also notes that Arab schools have less educational and psychological counselling and disabled children get less funding and fewer services.

The PCIs have been underrepresented in Israeli institutions of higher education since the establishment of the State. As discussed earlier, the representation of the PCIs in academic and white-collar careers is very low (Arar & Haj-Yehia, 2016, p. 14).

Annex F shows the falling percentages of Arab students at first, second and third degree level in four key subjects (Hesketh, 2011, p. 43).

Israel's government has discriminated against the PCI population by allocating fewer resources for education. The Israeli economy is advanced in technology and ranks high among modern global economies, but the PCIs lag behind. This is attributed to the inability of the education system as they are disadvantaged by, amongst others, discriminatory budgetary allocations (Arar & Haj-Yehia, 2016). It is clear that the separate school system, together with other mechanisms of control and discrimination, has succeeded in keeping the vast majority of the PCIs in subordinate, marginal positions in the Jewish Israeli society. As a former advisor on Arab affairs to the Prime Minister of Israel explained: "Our policy towards the Arabs is to keep them illiterate by preventing the Arab students from reaching the universities. If they were educated, it would be difficult to rule them. We should make them wood-cutters and water-carriers" (Abu-Saad, 2006, p. 1095).

While Israeli government policies promoted diversification, privatization and internationalization of higher educational institutions, these policies were not specifically tailored to accommodate the access and development needs of the PCIs. Studies of Israeli Jewish textbooks and children's literature often find the PCIs to be portrayed in many instances as "suspicious" or "rioters" and how the history of the land is presented as the history of the Jewish People only:

"Our books basically tell us that everything the Jews do is fine and legitimate and Arabs are wrong and violent and are trying to exterminate us. . . . We are accustomed to hearing the same thing, only one side of the story. They teach us that Israel became a state in 1948 and that the Arabs started a war. They don't mention what happened to the Arabs—they never mention anything about refugees or Arabs having to leave their towns and homes. . . . Instead of tolerance and reconciliation, the books and some teachers' attitudes are increasing hatred for Arabs" (Abu-Saad, 2006, p. 1090).

The absence of dynamic participation by the PCIs in Israeli politics, coupled with structural and systemic discrimination against them has resulted in significant inequalities in all

the major areas of social existence. Without relief from these hardships, the PCIs cannot take on their full potential in Israeli society and must be either ‘cared for’ by the State or contained when harsh conditions lead to frustrated rebellion and revolt. No one wins at that game in the long-run.

These social conditions have economic impacts in addition to the toll they take on individuals and their hope for a better future.

h. Poverty and Land Confiscation

The PCIs suffer a far higher risk of poverty than the vast majority of Jewish citizens (Shalev & Lazarus, 2016). The loss of land, the lack of decent employment and education opportunities are major causes of the high poverty rates among the PCIs. These rates have significantly increased over time among families and children as “while 34.5 percent of the Palestinian [PCI] families were under the poverty line in 1990, 53.5 percent of them were poor in 2009” (Sultany, 2012, p. 193). In addition, PCI’s families are greatly over-represented among Israel’s poor:

“...over half of Arab families in Israel are classified as poor, compared to an average poverty rate of one-fifth among all families in Israel. Arab towns and villages are heavily over-represented in the lowest socio-economic rankings, and the unrecognized Arab Bedouin villages in the Naqab are the poorest communities in the state” (Hesketh, 2011, p. 8).

A study was done in 2009 and found that 53.5% of PCI families in Israel were classified as poor compared to an average of 20.5% among all families in Israel. According to Israel’s National Insurance Institute, there is a large, almost threefold gap between “the Palestinian [PCI] families’ share of the entire population and their share of the poor population” (Hesketh, 2011, p. 20).

Gender inequalities are also present in areas such as wage conditions and labor force participation rates. Even though Israel has an advanced economy, labor participation among

Arab females in the country is nonetheless extremely low, standing at 21.1% in 2008 (Jabareen, 2015). Employment rates for women PCIs are lower than those of Jewish women in Israel but they are also lower than Arab women's employment rates elsewhere in the region:

“the lack of sufficient employment opportunities in Palestinian [PCI] towns, the inadequacy of the public transportation system serving Palestinian communities, the extremely low number of state-funded daycare institutions in Palestinian towns compared with Jewish towns, and an ailing education system are all contributing factors” (Sultany, 2012, p. 192).

As demonstrated, women PCIs face the harshest consequences of this discrimination – as members of a national minority group, and as women in general. There is a dire lack of available professional jobs for PCI's graduates in their community or in towns and areas that are geographically close to their villages.

Yosef Jabareen argues that there are several factors that explain why the PCIs tend to have poorer outcomes on a range of economic measures. These factors include structural issues such as differences in education systems, regional differences in infrastructure investment and mistrust between communities arising from the Israeli-Palestinian conflict (Jabareen, 2008). He conducted a case study of female PCIs to provide insights regarding culture, gender and employment in an advanced economy as the employment prospects of women have captured the attention of many scholars. His findings indicate that one-fifth of the participants argued they did not work because of a lack of qualifications. He calls this a 'deficiency in human capital'. To reduce poverty, there is a need to increase women's participation in the labour market and their access to decent work (Jabareen, 2008).

Currently, the PCIs have unequal access to land resources, land rights, and “the ability to use the resource of land to develop their communities” (Hesketh, 2011, p. 31). Since the 1948 War, the State of Israel has enacted a series of laws to institutionalize the dispossession of

displaced PCIs. Over two thirds of the total of the lands, cultivated prior to the 1948 War “were confiscated and transferred to exclusive Jewish cultivation” (Elrazik, Amin, & Davis, 1978, p. 32). This shows that the PCIs’ economy was virtually destroyed from the beginning and rectifying this problem may need a complete transformation of Israel’s geography.

Land confiscations have continued and building permits have been withheld despite growth in the population of PCIs. The land confiscation policy, along with competitive modern farming methods, has led the PCIs to abandon their tradition of farming. Although many of their young work in Jewish towns to establish their economic independence their socio-economic status is very low comparing to their Jewish counterparts. This is a technique employed by the Israeli government to control the PCIs by marginalizing them economically and make them as dependent as possible on the majority Jewish infrastructure (Abu-Saad, 2006); a further illustration of power asymmetry in this region.

The economic situation of the PCIs differs from that of the rest of the population because it is directly dependent on two sectors of the Israeli economy: (1) agriculture and (2) wage labour. Traditionally the Palestinian people were an agricultural people and as late as the end of 1955 more than half of them were still living off agriculture (Jiryis, 1976). With suitable farmland severely diminished “the average family property-holding in the Arab villages, which had been 67.3 dunums³² in 1944, was reduced to 38.5 in 1949-50 and 26.9 in 1963, a decrease of about 60 percent” (Jiryis, 1976, p. 214).

³²A dunam was the Ottoman unit of area equivalent to the Greek *stremma* or English acre, representing the amount of land that could be ploughed by a team of oxen in a day.

Following the 1948 War, the Israeli government instituted a series of mandatory laws and regulations to 'legalise' the acquisition of PCI refugees' land property. The PCIs, not able to depend on themselves, are forced to seek work as wage-labourers and therefore, are primarily dependent on the Israeli economy (Hesketh, 2011). In addition, these shifts have cost the PCIs their collective identity as an agricultural people and the social cohesion that comes with that.

The Israeli government generally uses other or additional criteria to allocate education-related subsidies and tax benefits, under the Economic Efficiency Law. The law designates certain areas as priority areas. Of the "553 towns and villages that were previously awarded the status of NPAs by the government [they] included only four small Arab villages, despite the relative poverty of Arab towns and villages" (Hesketh, 2011, p. 23). This law extends government permission to use sweeping discretion to classify towns, villages and areas as "National Priority Areas" (NPAs) and to allocate enormous state resources without criteria. In February 2006, the Supreme Court ruled that the government's decision of allocating NPA status in the field of education constituted illegal discrimination against Arab citizens and ordered the state to cancel it. While the new NPAs were revised in 2009 to include villages with Arab populations, "towns and villages located in these areas are not automatically entitled to additional budgetary allocations; rather, the decision on whether or not they receive NPA benefits is subject to the discretion of government ministers" (Hesketh, 2011, p. 23).

The prevalence of poverty and the erasure of their traditional way of life prevents the PCIs from lifting themselves out of their situation on their own. As their conditions worsen, international attention will increase on their situation and Israelis may face sanctions for the choices they have made. Equally, they may find a lack of sympathy for the resistance and violence provoked by the inequality they created. This may be particularly true if a State for

Palestinians were created, that would come to the aid of the PCIs, and ultimately exacerbate the relationship between the PCIs and the State of Israel. This provides yet another reason to abandon the current policy in favour of a healthier relationship between Israelis and the PCIs.

Summary of chapter

This chapter has examined the import of citizenship for the PCIs when it comes to functioning under a majority-minority State. Exploring the three main interconnected areas of political, social, and economic life, it becomes evident that there are both immediate and long-term demands for action to improve the relationship between the PCIs and the State of Israel. I observed that elements of the three areas are interconnected such that improvements in one area will have ripple effects in the others. The chapter also shows how inequalities, instead of solely levelling status differences, can actually function as a tool of stratification. This creates frustration among people, for it is unclear how they should be able to engage as a citizen under the actual limits of their power and freedom. The inequalities that the PCIs face have engendered further frustration that led to an increase of mistrust, control measures, and a resistance to change.

An analysis through the lens of the various dimensions informs the specifics of the Agenda for Change presented in the next chapter. A key finding that emerged in this chapter is the interconnections between the various elements of inequality. For example, confiscation of land led to a change in the kind of work available to PCIs. Manipulation of the educational system limits the work skills PCIs can acquire. At the same time control of language laws limit the PCIs' ability to influence the educational system. My examination of these areas confirms that each of these area of inequality arise from the interactions between the context in which one group perceives the other to operate, the attitudes through which one interprets that context, and

the reactions one has to the behaviours of the other. Thus, the ABC model provides the best strategy for dealing with this cycle.

Chapter Four

Agenda for Change

The relationship between the Israelis and the PCIs has been a long unresolved source of tension and conflict. The PCIs are politically marginalized, socially underprivileged, and economically disadvantaged. My study demonstrates that discrimination against the PCIs pervades at every level of Israeli society, from the private to the public sphere. The State of Israel is systematically failing to adopt effective measures to redress the gaps that exist between the PCIs and the Jewish citizens. For its part, the State of Israel is seeking to protect its interests in response to both historical experiences as well as the ongoing contemporary actions of the PCIs and Palestinians generally.

Without a change in direction, this situation will continue to exact a significant human cost for both the PCIs and the Israelis. I recognize that change will be neither easy nor simple. Both groups have significant obstacles to overcome in addressing past wounds and developing a sustainable trust in each other within the broader ongoing conflict involving the Occupied Territories.

In an effort to re-set the discussion, the PCIs and the Israelis need a shared context from which to build a new platform of change. One powerful ideology the two groups share is religion and its call to Muslims, Jews, and Christians to live in peaceful co-existence. Focusing on this shared context will create space in which to develop new attitudes and behaviours that lead to a cycle of new healthier relationships.

In crafting my specific Agenda-for-Change items I have been mindful that, even under the best of conditions, not everything can be done nor done all at once. Likewise, the interconnections between political, social, and economic change means that action in one area

may require or effect change in another. Therefore, acknowledging that I am not of the land nor in the land, I chose eight themes for change as a starting place toward concrete reform:

Consistent Application of the Law, Discrimination, Recognition, Health, Education, Language, Political Participation, and the Economy. In each area I suggest a small number of specific possible actions; some new, and some of which build on efforts that have begun but languish.

1. Consistent Application of Citizenship Law	
THEME	Inconsistency between International Law, Basic Laws, and Ordinary Laws
ISSUE	<p>Israel has violated its promise [International Convention on the Elimination for All Form of Racial Discrimination (ICERD)] to “prohibit and to eliminate racial discrimination in all its forms and guarantee the rights of everyone, without distinction as to race, colour, or national, or ethnic origin, to equality before the law” (Nikfar, 2005, p. 20). The Israeli ordinary law that prevents Palestinians from the Occupied Territories to reunite with their families in Israel violates the ICERD and also violates its own Basic Law of: Human Dignity and Liberty which recognizes that “all persons have the right to privacy and intimacy”. For example, marriage represents the core of intimate relationships and any restriction on marriage thus contravenes the Basic Law.</p>
PROPOSED CHANGE	<p>Israel should revise its laws and policies to ensure consistency between its international obligations and their domestic laws in order to eliminate inequality and discrimination against the PCIs. Israel could look to other jurisdictions with multi-ethnic societies that manifested successful integration of their laws.</p> <p>With respect to the specific example above: Israeli and the PCIs need to collaborate on a solution so that Palestinians from the Occupied Territories are able to connect with their families and relatives in Israel.</p>

	<p>Israel could relax this law by putting in place, for example, a strict screening process so that security is ensured. This can be done by enacting laws that allow these Palestinians a temporary entry into Israel and gradually granting them permanent stay and addressing security risks on a case-by-case basis.</p>
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<p style="text-align: center;">2. Discrimination</p>	
<p>THEME</p>	<p>Structural discrimination in various aspects of Israeli policies</p>
<p>ISSUE</p>	<p>There are a number of laws and social policies that give preference to Jews over the PCIs without the explicit use of the word ‘Jewish’. When court decisions have attempted to remedy certain instances, the State’s implementation did not respect the spirit of the rulings.</p>
<p>PROPOSED CHANGE</p>	<p>Israel should revise its policies that are indirectly discriminating against its PCIs. In addition, when the court renders a decision on a matter the State should appoint an independent body to monitor that the decision is implemented free of discrimination.</p> <p>For example, following the October 2000 events, the government appointed an official commission of inquiry to investigate the protests and the police response to them. In its final report issued in 2003, the Or Commission strongly criticized the discrimination endured by the PCIs and called for the State to immediately rectify this. To this end, Israel should provide updates on the recommendations stated in the report and</p>

	collaborate with the PCIs to put in place plans that work for both parties.
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3. Recognition	
THEME	Historically-based narratives that perpetuate a dysfunctional relationship
ISSUE	Identity construction among both Jews and the PCIs has been partially based on the negation of the other. Both groups have built their identity and culture through a closed dialogue that negates the other’s presence and legitimacy. The PCIs’ ability to feel safe and equal within the majority-Jewish society has been undermined by threat from Jewish movements because of trust issues. The same goes for Jewish Israelis because of the constant denial of Israel’s legitimacy by/within the Palestinian national movement.
PROPOSED CHANGE	Ending this requires a new conversation on peace between the PCIs and Jewish Israelis. This conversation could build on the work of Corey Gil-Shuster’s ‘Reflexive Approach to Israeli-Palestinian Encounter Groups’ ³³ (Gil-Shuster, 2011) which encourages participants to see the impacts of the conflict from both perspectives. The approach helps them understand each other’s behaviours in a way that leads to change in

³³The more common form of contact between Palestinian Citizens of Israel and Israeli Jews is through what is called the encounter group setting where both groups are brought together to talk or take part in a group activity. These groups have existed since the 1970s but the impacts of these groups point to mixed results in terms of the stated goals of encounter groups.

	<p>attitudes by changing their contextual understanding of each other. This process could be further enhanced with the support and participation of the international community especially of those countries that are pursuing reconciliation processes within their multi-ethnic communities.</p>
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<p style="text-align: center;">4. Health</p>	
<p>THEME</p>	<p>Insufficient resources to address the determinants of health</p>
<p>ISSUE</p>	<p>Groups with lower social status have fewer social and material resources for dealing with risk and disease. The PCIs have relatively limited resources with which to deal with new health challenges. They occupy the lowest strata of the socioeconomic hierarchy and are acutely residentially segregated from the Jewish majority. Providing basic healthcare is a human rights issue.</p>
<p>PROPOSED CHANGE</p>	<p>Israel needs to recognize its obligations to meet the healthcare needs of the PCIs in the same way and to the same extent it cares for the Jewish citizens. An expansion of primary health care centers and services among the PCIs’ towns and villages would address immediate concerns. Improvements in environmental and socioeconomic conditions are necessary in order to bring about a significant improvement in the overall determinants of health. This includes issues of trauma resulting from the 1948 War, internal displacement, and the consequences of poverty, lack of education, and underemployment.</p>

5. Education	
THEME	While Israeli government policies promoted diversification, privatization and internationalization of higher educational institutions, these policies were not specifically tailored to accommodate the access and development needs of the Palestinian citizens.
ISSUE #1	The PCIs cannot exercise control over the education system. This presents a number of challenges such as mutually distorted image of each other's history, denial of access to teaching opportunities and other educational resources, and segregation of students.
PROPOSED CHANGE	The State of Israel has the opportunity to grant its PCIs full self-administration of its curriculum in the education system. This would address the issue of misrepresentation of each other's culture, history, and role in contemporary Israeli society. This must be accompanied by sufficient financial resources to bring the system on par with the Israeli schools.
ISSUE #2	Studies of Israeli Jewish textbooks and children's literature often find Palestinians to be portrayed in many instances as 'suspicious' or 'rioters' and that the history of the land is presented as the history of the Jewish People.
PROPOSED CHANGE	Both the PCIs and the Israelis should conduct a comprehensive review of their educational materials to replace misconceptions of their narratives with a more balanced historical and contemporary

	<p>representation of each other. Such an undertaking would create an opportunity to change the context in which future generations would perceive each other.</p>
ISSUE #3	<p>Although Israeli Higher Education Institutions (HEI) have aspired to include marginal underprivileged segments of Israeli society, the PCIs still have a lower rate of acceptance in HEI than the Jewish students do.</p> <p>The Planning and Budgeting Committee of the Council of Higher Education set up two committees to investigate ways to improve access to Higher Education Institutions for the PCI students. Despite the promise voiced in the Committee's recommendations the State did not allocate the necessary resources for the realization of the recommended policies.</p>
PROPOSED CHANGE	<p>The State should revisit the report and propose an action plan to allocate additional funding to realize the Committee's recommendations including changes to the admission process that impedes the PCI students from being accepted for enrolment.</p>

6. Language	
THEME	The collective right to a distinct language
ISSUE	The 2018 decision that demoted Arabic to a ‘Special Status’ perpetuated the PCIs’ feeling of being discriminated against. This can also impact the availability of educational and employment opportunities for Arabic speakers. This may also limit access to certain information such as official documents.
PROPOSED CHANGE	<p>While this law should be repealed, Israel should take some concrete action to ensure that its minority citizens’ language needs are met.</p> <p>Israel should commit to issuing official documents in the Arabic language specifically those that involve matters concerning the PCIs. For example, more than 200 major principle decisions issued by the Supreme Court were translated into English and published on the court’s website along with the Hebrew originals. Since these decisions matter to the PCIs, they should be available to them in their own language.</p> <p>Using the Canadian example, Israel may work towards achieving a functional bilingual society. This will forge a stronger relationship between the PCIs and the Jews by enhancing their abilities to communicate with one another, pursue education and employment opportunities, and promote integration into the Israeli society.</p>

7. Political Participation	
THEME	Obstacles to participating in the political process
ISSUE #1	<p>Since the creation of Israel in 1948, around 600 ministers have served in 33 governments and only two of them have been non-Jews. Currently, there is no Palestinian Minister. The newly revised electoral threshold went from 2 per cent to 3.25 per cent (the rough equivalent of four parliamentary seats). The amendment to increase the threshold undermines the parliamentary representation of the PCIs as the enactment of the law will compel them to enter into a forced political coalition in order to prevent their disappearance from political life in the Knesset. This is a two-edged sword in that it could promote collaboration between the PCIs and like-minded non-Jewish politicians. It does not; however; guarantee representation of the PCIs' ideology.</p>
PROPOSED CHANGE	<p>The current system which pressures non-Jewish politicians to form coalitions should be abandoned for a process that provides proportional representation. This would increase the possibility of the PCIs becoming Ministers of the Government.</p> <p>One option could be a hybrid system where seats are identified for specific minority groups and a threshold system is retained for determining which of the parties within each minority obtain the seats.</p> <p>At the time of this writing, the Government has not formed a Cabinet from the April 9, 2019 Elections. This provides Israel an immediate opportunity to address representation in the Knesset by appointing a</p>

	Minister from the PCI community.
ISSUE # 2	<p>There has been a low participation rate in voting by the PCIs as they feel they do not see the parliamentary processes as able to effect change. Instead, the PCIs have turned to other means such as extra-parliamentary organization that is independent of the Israeli parliamentary structure in order to achieve their demands. Extra-parliamentary activity includes, but is not limited to, non-governmental organizations, grassroots activities and social movements.</p>
PROPOSED CHANGE	<p>Leaders among the PCIs need to undertake campaigns aimed at increasing voter participation in elections. This will demonstrate to the Israeli government the seriousness of their desire to participate in the parliamentary process while increasing their chances of electing candidates committed to their needs within the coalition process.</p> <p>Elected PCI leaders need to deliver an effective media campaign that informs their citizens of voting age on the nature and legitimate impact of the work being done by their elected officials. This is intended to increase voter confidence in their leaders as well as in the electoral process. Within the Israeli threshold system the more voters turn out the greater the change of electing a PCI coalition.</p>
ISSUE #3	<p>The PCIs remain sorely underrepresented in the civil service. This limits their ability to participate in the machinery of government with respect to the processes of policy development and the delivery of government</p>

	services.
PROPOSED CHANGE	Previously described proposed change that improves the education of the PCIs will lead to an increase in qualified candidates for government positions. Hand in hand with those developments, the government should gradually introduce an affirmative action program that increases the participation rate of the PCIs. In particular, women’s representation should be targeted.

8. Economy	
THEME	Insufficient access to economic resources
ISSUE #1	The current level of economic development between the PCIs and the Jews is very unequal. Having lower labour force participation and employment rates compared to Jews is detrimental and has a negative impact on the economic well-being of the PCIs.
PROPOSED CHANGE	<p>The Israeli government approved a five-year economic development plan for the Arab sector with the aim of tackling the major gaps between Jews and the PCIs in various fields such as education, transportation, welfare services, employment and housing.</p> <p>The PCIs should collaborate with the State and strengthen their skill-base as they play a key role in the success of this five-year plan. The PCIs should reach out to governments, non-profit organizations, and educational facilities to acquire the knowledge, skills, and abilities needed to support the implementation of the Israeli Plan.</p>
ISSUE #2	The PCIs represent 20% of the Israeli population but only four small villages are awarded National Priority Area (NPA) status out of 553.
PROPOSED CHANGE	Israel should further review its NPAs to address the objections that have been previously raised so as to better allocate resources equally and equitably. In addition, the State should ensure equitable land distribution and planning.

Summary of chapter

This chapter provides an Agenda for Change with the goal of helping the PCIs and Israeli Jews to move beyond the impasse that has kept them in the state of constant conflict. I have chosen these themes because I believe they embody a spectrum of equality. One of the most important principles in a democracy is to protect the minority against the tyranny of the majority. The contradiction between a liberal democracy and a religious-based implementation of laws and regulations go against democratic principles. Implementing a power-based approach to the PCIs has heightened the sense of alienation and mistrust among them.

My themes address areas for improvement to help the State of Israel function as democratic for all its citizens.

It is my position that implementing my recommendations will strengthen the State's pluralistic political, social, and economic structures and improve the engagement of the PCIs in their Israeli citizenship. I recognize that my propositions, informed by both my research and pursuit in Conflict Studies, are easier to propose than to implement.

Chapter Five

Conclusion

After the dissolution of the Ottoman Empire at the end of the First World War, Israel - then called Palestine - became a mandate of the British Empire. Britain signed the Balfour Declaration stating its desire to create a homeland in Palestine for the Jews who experienced a long history of anti-Semitism in Europe and the Holocaust. In 1947, the United Nations (UN) adopted a Partition Plan for Palestine recommending the creation of independent Arab and Jewish states. The plan was accepted by the Jewish Agency, and rejected by Arab leaders.

The two parties have been in conflict since then beginning with the 1948 War of Independence. The broad conflict with the Palestinians in the Occupied Territories has already received much research attention. However, the smaller group of Palestinians who remained behind in Israel and became citizens has received less attention. Yet, they have unique issues and any success in reducing the conflict with group may have applications for the broader conflict and so I focused my research on this group. In addition, my mother and her family were part of the exodus that took place in 1948 and they were never allowed to go back. I have a curiosity about the conditions she might have lived under had she been able to return to her original home area.

In Chapter One I identified the population of my research as the Palestinian Citizens of Israel (PCI). The PCIs belong to three religious communities: Muslim (82%), Christian (9.5%) and Druze (8.5%) and my research includes all of them. In the aftermath of the war, a significant number of Palestinian Arabs remained within the borders of the newly established State of Israel and were granted citizenship (now PCIs). Since then, this population has grown to represent 20% of the Israeli citizenry. The chapter summarizes the historic creation and development of the

State of Israel and gives an overview of the elements of the relationship between the State and its PCIs. The chapter culminates in my research question of how the relationship between the two parties could be improved such that it could contribute to a larger resolution of conflict in the region. The research approach I will take to address this question is described.

In Chapter Two I have investigated the key dynamics that underlie each party's position in the conflict from the perspective of the rights they feel should be afforded them and the identities and narratives by which they describe themselves and the other. I explore additional theories that frame the structure of the conflict between them. My focus is on the resulting inequities that can arise from these variables. I propose that the conflict centres of the tension created between Israel positioning itself as a liberal democracy but using a religious perspective to systemically discriminate and disadvantage the PCIs. My research led to the conclusion that instrumental changes will be insufficient and I propose the ABC Triangle model as a framework for changing the relationship between the PCIs and the State.

In Chapter Three I have provided some of the consequences of inequalities stem in the political, social, and economic spheres to illustrate specific ways the PCIs experience inequity. These will form the direction for change I will suggest in Chapter Four. I have chosen a limited illustrative number of areas to explore. The areas dynamic in that activity in one leads to consequences in another; such that, for example, change in the education system produces impacts in employment.

In Chapter Four I have provided recommendations in eight areas of activity focusing on key areas where improvements can be made to alleviate inequalities experienced by this minority group. The recommendations are not intended to be exhaustive but rather to demonstrate how a change in context, attitude, or behaviour can be used to break the cycle of inequality and conflict

between the PCIs and the State of Israel. The recommendations are made in full knowledge of the difficulty and complexity of the situation. The recommendations are meant to give direction for change rather than be prescriptive. Chapter five concludes my main argument.

The PCIs experienced neglect and are discriminated against by the State, particularly on issues of land ownership, resource allocation, and political representation. They are largely cut off from the geographical, cultural, economic, and political mainstream. Today, the structure of the State enables the Jewish majority to sustain its national institutions. However as I have presented in my paper, this is not the case for the PCIs. Following the establishment of Israel, a Military Government, which lasted until 1966, was imposed on the Palestinian populated areas. Under this regime the PCIs were not allowed to leave their localities without a special permit. The massive Jewish immigration during the first three years of the statehood led to the creation of higher rates of unemployment among the PCIs. While some aspects have improved, inequities continue to this day.

My research theories and models helped me analyze the current political, social, and economic situations that are situated at the core of creating an impasse between the two groups. I chose the ABC Triangle as its analysis is based on the premise that conflicts have three major components: the context or situation, the behaviour of those involved and their attitudes. In the case of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, these three factors influence one another and so if one component gets transformed the others will be impacted.

Over the course of my study I potentially identified much that needed to be addressed. However, in crafting an Agenda for Change I recognized that not everything can be fixed nor fixed all at once. Therefore, I focused on eight areas of political, social, and economic activities and proposed a few examples of corrective action to improve the relationship.

I also conclude from the research that inclusiveness in political settlements is a critical requirement for a sustainable exit from this conflict and international actors can influence the outcome of it positively. For example, the two-state solution, while essential, only addresses the needs of Palestinians in the West Bank and Gaza and possibly of Palestinian refugees elsewhere, if they are granted permission to 'return' to a new Palestinian state or receive compensation. However, resolving the issues of the PCIs is also paramount and I believe that it ranks at a higher priority as the PCIs are overlooked by international observers and improvements in the relationship with the PCIs could have positive impacts for the broader Israeli-Palestinian conflict.

What would motivate either party to change after such a long time? Both groups have arrived at today's situation feeling they were once indigenous to this land and have been forced to disperse. This shared grievance is not easily resolved and recognized. However, they both share religious values that are compatible to seeking peace. By focusing on teachings from the monotheistic religions, they share a desire to live peacefully and without violence. Using this as their frame of reference, committing to recognizing, respecting, and seeking reconciliation with each other can only serve the common good. In turn, if successful, the better life they will bring to their people will result in great productivity for them all. In pursuit of this, it will be important that they treat their compromises and the inherent costs of progress as investments in their shared future.

Finally, seventy years have passed after the establishment of the State of Israel, and while some things have improved, the ceaseless conflict is in its fourth generation. The relationship between Israelis and Palestinians is deeply complex and therefore lacks a simple explanation or solution. Peace talks between the two parties keep failing because they do not include the

comprehensive needs of all involved. In the absence of a new approach to resolve this internal issue, a third intifada would not be a surprise.

Annexes

Annex A: BBC Timeline

Source: <https://www.bbc.com/news/world-middle-east-29362505>

TIMELINE	DESCRIPTION
1917	Britain conquers Palestine from Ottomans. Gives support to "national home for the Jewish people" in Palestine through the Balfour Declaration, along with an insistence that "nothing shall be done which may prejudice the civil and religious rights of existing non-Jewish communities".
1918	First significant Palestinian Arab nationalist organisations emerge - the mainly cultural Muntada al-Adabi and the Damascus-based Nadi al-Arabi.
1920	San Remo Allied Powers conference grants Palestine to Britain as a mandate, to prepare it for self-rule. Jerusalem riots against Balfour Declaration assert distinct Palestinian Arab identity. Image copyright Getty Images Image caption Britain's Lord Balfour, pointing to a feature in Jerusalem, became known for his declaration supporting a national home for Jewish people
1921	Britain appoints Mohammed Amin al-Husseini, a member of a leading Palestinian Arab family, as Grand Mufti of Jerusalem and leader of the Muslim community. He rallies the Arabs and Muslims against any further concessions to the Jews.
1922	Palestinian Arab delegation rejects British proposal for Legislative Council, saying inclusion of terms of the Balfour Declaration in draft constitution not acceptable.
1929	Arab rioters kill about 200 Jews in Jerusalem's Old City and Hebron. British troops kill 116 Arabs in suppression of riots in Jerusalem.
1930	British White Paper and Royal Commission recommend limiting Jewish immigration.
1930-35	The Black Hand Islamist group led by Sheikh Izz al-Din al-Qassam launches campaign of violence against Jewish community and British rule.
1935	Palestinian Arab leadership accepts British High Commissioner's proposal for Legislative Assembly, but the British House of Commons rejects it the following year.
1936-39	Arab revolt begins with a general strike in Jaffa. Britain declares martial law and dissolves Grand Mufti Al-Husseini's Arab Higher Committee. More than 5,000 Arabs killed and 15,000 injured in suppression of revolt, Al-Husseini flees to French-run Syria to avoid arrest.
1947	United Nations recommends partition of Palestine into separate Jewish and Arab states after Britain signals end to Mandate, with international control over Jerusalem and its environs. Arab High Committee rejects partition.

1948	<p>Israel declares independence as British mandate ends.</p> <p>Arab armies fail to defeat new Jewish state of Israel after Britain withdraws. Jordan occupies West Bank and East Jerusalem, Egypt occupies Gaza, and Israel holds the rest of Mandate Palestine including West Jerusalem.</p> <p>At least 750,000 Palestinian Arabs either flee or are expelled. Disputes over the nature of their departure endure to this day.</p> <p>United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East (UNRWA) set up to cater to the educational and health needs of Palestinian refugees and their descendants throughout the Middle East.</p>
1949-1950s	Fedayeen Palestinian guerrillas based in Egypt and Gaza carry out raids into Israel with Egyptian encouragement. This increases after pan-Arab officers seize power in Cairo in 1952.
1956-1957	Israel colludes with Britain and France to invade Egypt during the Suez Crisis, partly to end Fedayeen incursions. UN buffer force in Sinai and Gaza drastically reduces raids.
1959	Yasser Arafat forms Fatah fighting group in Egypt to carry out raids into Israel.
1964	Arab League sets up Palestine Liberation Organisation (PLO) and Palestine Liberation Army under Ahmad Shukeiri.
1967 June	Six-Day War leaves Israel occupying East Jerusalem, all of West Bank, Gaza, Golan Heights and Sinai. Jewish settlements are set up in all of these areas in coming years, with government approval.
1969	Yasser Arafat takes over PLO leadership after debut as military leader in clashes with Israeli forces in Jordan in 1968, and asserts the group's independence from Egyptian control.
1970	Increasing tension over the strength of the PLO in Jordan leads to the Black September clashes with Jordanian forces, driving the PLO into exile in southern Lebanon.
1970s-1980s	PLO and other armed Palestinian groups turn to airline hijackings and attacks on Israeli soldiers, officials and civilians within Israel and abroad to highlight their cause.
1972	Palestinian "Black September" gunmen take the Israeli team hostage at the Munich Olympics. Two of the athletes are murdered at the site and nine more killed during a failed rescue attempt by the German authorities. Israel launches a series of reprisal assassinations.
1973	Israel raids PLO bases in Beirut and southern Lebanon before and during the October Yom Kippur/Ramadan War.
1974 April-May	Two hardline factions, the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine General Command and Democratic Front for the Liberation of Palestine, carry out raids into northern Israel and kill 43 civilians, including many children, in a block of flats in KiryatShmona and a school in Maalot.
1974 June - After 1973	Yom Kippur/Ramada war, PLO adopts Ten-Point Programme allowing compromise with Israel on the way to establishing complete Palestinian

	control over historic Palestine, including the territory of Israel. Some hardline factions split away to form the Rejectionist Front and step up attacks on Israeli soldiers and civilians.
1974 October	Arab League recognises PLO as the "sole legitimate representative of the Palestinian people" and it admits it to full membership of the League.
1974 November	Yasser Arafat becomes first non-state leader to address the United Nations General Assembly, delivers "olive branch... and freedom fighter's gun" speech.
1975	Rejectionist Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine and German far-left armed group hijack Air France plane en route from Israel to France, divert it to Entebbe in Uganda. Israel commandos rescue most of passengers and crew, kill hijackers.
1977 May	The right-wing Likud party wins surprise election victory in Israel and encourages settlements policy on West Bank and Gaza.
1978 March	PLO attack kills 38 civilians on Israel's coastal road. Israel carries out first major incursion into southern Lebanon, driving PLO and other Palestinian groups out of the area.
1978 September	Israel pledges to expand Palestinian self-government in the West Bank and Gaza as part of the Camp David Accords establishing diplomatic relations with Egypt.
1982 June	Israel invades Lebanon again to expel PLO leadership from Beirut after assassination attempt by Palestinian faction on Israeli ambassador to London.
1982 September	Massacre of Palestinians in the Beirut Sabra and Shatila camps by Israel's Christian Phalangist allies. PLO leadership moves to Tunisia, where it remains until it moves to Gaza in 1994.
1985 October	Israeli air force strikes PLO headquarters in Tunis after PLO group kills three Israeli tourists on a yacht. Palestine Liberation Front PLO faction hijacks AchilleLauro cruise ship, demanding release of 50 Palestinians from Israeli prisons. Hijackers kill elderly American wheelchair user Leon Klinghoffer.
1987 December	First Palestinian Intifada uprising begins in Palestinian Territories. Muslim Brotherhood in Gaza forms the Hamas movement, which rapidly turns to violence against Israel.
1988	Jordan abandons claim to West Bank, ceding it to PLO. Palestinian National Council meeting in Algiers proclaims State of Palestine.
1990	PLO backs Iraq over its annexation of Kuwait, which severs ties with the PLO and subsequently expels about 400,000 Palestinians.
1991 October	US-Soviet sponsored conference in Madrid brings Israeli and Palestinian representatives together for the first time since 1949.
1992	Israeli Labour government of Yitzhak Rabin pledges to halt settlement expansion programme and begins secret talks with PLO.
1993 September	Yitzhak Rabin and Yasser Arafat sign Oslo Declaration to plot Palestinian self-government and formally end the First Intifada, which had been running out of steam since the Madrid Conference. Violence by various Palestinian

	groups that reject the Oslo Declaration continues.
1994 February	Baruch Goldstein of the extremist Jewish Kach movement kills 29 Palestinians at prayer at the Cave of the Patriarchs shrine in Hebron on the West Bank.
Progress towards self-rule	
1992 May- July	Israel withdraws from most of Gaza and the West Bank city of Jericho, allowing Yasser Arafat to move his PLO administration from Tunis and set up the Palestinian National Authority.
1992 December	Yasser Arafat, along with Yitzhak Rabin and Israeli Foreign Minister Shimon Peres, are jointly awarded the Nobel Peace Prize.
1995	Interim Agreement sets out path for transfer of further power and territory to Palestinian National Authority. Forms basis of 1997 Hebron Protocol, Wye River Memorandum of 1998 and internationally-sponsored "Road Map for Peace" of 2003.
2000-2001	Talks between Israeli Labour Prime Minister Ehud Barak and Yasser Arafat break down over the timing and extent of a proposed further Israeli withdrawal from the West Bank. Palestinian protests escalate into new Intifada.
2001	December - Israel sends troops to encircle Ramallah after series of deadly Palestinian attacks inside Israel. Yasser Arafat is unable to leave his government compound.
2002 March	Israeli army launches Operation Defensive Shield on the West Bank and begins building barrier there to stop armed Palestinian entering Israel. The route of the barrier is controversial as it frequently deviates from the pre-1967 ceasefire line into the West Bank.
2002 March	Arab League meeting in Beirut offers to recognise Israel in return for its full withdrawal from all territories occupied since 1967, agreement to a Palestinian state with East Jerusalem as its capital and "fair solution" to refugee question - the "Arab League Peace Plan".
2003 March	Yasser Arafat establishes post of prime minister and appoints Fatah veteran Mahmoud Abbas to lead contacts with US and Israel, both of which refuse to deal with Arafat.
2003 May	Israeli Prime Minister Ariel Sharon says the occupation of Palestinian territories cannot continue indefinitely.
2003 June	Arab League meeting in Egypt expresses support for "road map" proposed by US, European Union, Russia and UN and accepted by Palestinian National Authority and Israel, positing an independent Palestinian state and a freeze on West Bank Jewish settlements.
2003 September	Mahmoud Abbas resigns as prime minister, citing US and Israeli intransigence as well as internal Palestinian opposition to his government. Succeeded by Fatah veteran Ahmed Qurei.
2004 March	Israeli forces kill Sheikh Yassin, the founder and leader of Hamas, and his successor Abd al-Aziz al-Rantissi, the following month.
2004 July	International Court of Justice issues advisory opinion that the Israeli separation barrier violates international law and must be removed.
2004	Yasser Arafat dies in hospital in France, where he went for urgent medical

November	treatment in October.
2005 January	Mahmoud Abbas elected Mr Arafat's successor as head of the Palestinian National Authority.
2005 September	Israel withdraws all Jewish settlements and military personnel from Gaza, while retaining control over airspace, ports and border crossings.
2006 March	Hamas Islamist group's Ismail Haniyeh forms government after winning parliamentary elections in January. Struggle for primacy with Fatah begins. United States and European Union suspend aid, and Israel ends tax transfers, because of Hamas's refusal to recognise Israel, renounce violence and accept previous peace accords.
2006 June	Hamas militants from Gaza seize Israeli soldier Gilad Shalit near border crossing and hold him hostage for five years, demanding release of Palestinian prisoners. Major clashes between Israel and Hamas forces in Gaza follow. Israel imposes restrictions on Gaza.
2006 September	Clashes break out between Fatah and Hamas supporters in Gaza. Various Arab states and Palestinian groups seek to mediate between them in coming months in order to avert civil war.
2007 March	Fatah and Hamas form national unity government to end months of intermittent clashes in Gaza.
2007 June	Unity government founders. Hamas ousts Fatah from Gaza and reinforces its control of the territory. Israel tightens blockade after increase in rocket attacks from Gaza; Egypt closes border with Gaza. Mahmoud Abbas appoints Salam Fayyad as prime minister, but Hamas refuses to recognise him. Two rival governments in West Bank and Gaza emerge. US and European Union resume aid to the Fayyad government.
2007 November	US-hosted Annapolis Conference for the first time establishes the "two-state solution" as the basis for future talks between Israel and the Palestinian Authority.
2008 March	Efforts at reconciliation between Fatah and Hamas begin in Yemen, but next round in Cairo in November stalls when Hamas objects to Fatah arrest of its West Bank activists.
2008 November	Israel launches incursion into Gaza, seen by Hamas as a ceasefire violation. Hamas responds by launching rockets.
2008 December	Israel launches Operation Cast Lead month-long invasion of Gaza to stop Hamas and other militant groups firing rockets into Israel.
2010 February	Fatah and Hamas resume talks on national reconciliation. Direct talks resume between Israel and the Palestinian Authority, only to falter over the question of settlements.
2010 May	Nine Turkish pro-Palestinian activists killed in Israeli capture of ships attempting to break maritime blockade of Gaza.
2011 April-May	Fatah and Hamas agree at talks in Cairo to reform a unity government and hold fresh elections, but no practical implementation follows.
2011	Palestinian National Authority launches campaign for UN membership of "State of Palestine", as means of highlighting stalled talks with Israel. Bid

	fails, but UNESCO cultural agency accepts Palestine as member in October.
2012 May	After preliminary talks in Qatar, Fatah and Hamas sign Cairo Agreement pledging to maintain non-violent resistance to Israeli occupation in pursuit of an independent state within the 1967 ceasefire lines.
2012 October	Local elections on West Bank undermine Fatah's position, as it wins only two-fifths of the seats contested on a turnout of 55%. Lists led by Fatah rebels win four of the 11 major towns and cities, and independents and leftists take control of a fifth. Hamas boycotts the poll and allows no elections in Gaza.
2012 November	UN upgrades Palestinian representation to that of "non-member observer state", allowing it to take part in General Assembly debates and improving chances of joining UN agencies.
2012 December	Fatah allows Hamas celebration rally on West Bank over UN status upgrade, a gesture reciprocated by Hamas in Gaza the following month.
2013 April	Prime Minister Fayyad resigns after long-standing dispute with Palestinian Authority Chairman Mahmoud Abbas. He is succeeded by academic Rami Hamdallah in May.
2013	Newly appointed US Secretary of State launches a series of Israeli-Palestinian talks aimed at reaching a framework peace deal by April 2014. Palestinian officials say continuing Israeli approval of Jewish housing in occupied East Jerusalem undermines progress. Israel accuses the Palestinians of incitement.
2013 July	Fall of Morsi government in Egypt dashes Palestinian hopes for lifting of Egyptian blockade of border with Gaza, and suspends Egyptian mediation in the Fatah-Hamas reconciliation process.
2013 December	Israel, Jordan and Palestinian Authority sign water-sharing pact to halt and eventually reverse the drying-out of the Dead Sea by laying pipeline to carry brine from Red Sea desalination plant while providing drinking water to region.
2014 March	Egypt bans Hamas activities and seizes its assets because of links to Egypt's illegal Muslim Brotherhood.
2014 April	Fatah and Hamas agree to form unity government, which takes office in June. Fatah complains that separate Hamas cabinet continues to rule Gaza.
2014 July-August	Israel responds to attacks from armed groups in Gaza with a military campaign by air and land to knock out missile launching sites and attack tunnels. Clashes end in uneasy Egyptian-brokered ceasefire in August.
2014 December	Minister Without Portfolio Ziad Abu Ein dies at clash with Israeli troops at West Bank protest.
2017 October	Hamas signs a reconciliation deal intended to administrative control of Gaza transferred to the Palestinian Authority, but disputes stalled the deal's implementation.
2017 December	US President Donald Trump recognizes Jerusalem as the capital of Israel, upsetting the Arab world and some Western allies.
2018 March	Prime Minister Rami Hamdallah visits Gaza, where his convoy survives a roadside bomb attack.
2018 July-August	UN and Egypt attempt to broker a long-term ceasefire between Israel and Hamas amid an upsurge in violence on the Gaza border from March.

Annex B: Representation in Government Ministries

Arab representation in Israeli government ministries, 2006

Ministry	Arab employees	Total employees	% Arab employees
Health	1,935	26,753	7.2
Education	126	2,031	6.2
Justice	99	2,497	3.9
Industry, Trade and Labor	45	1,326	3.4
Transport	21	881	2.3
Housing	10	730	1.3
Finance	12	954	1.2

Source: Inequality Report: The Palestinian Arab Minority in Israel, Katie Hesketh

Annex C: List of National Public Holidays of Israel in 2019

List of National Public holidays of Israel in 2019

Day	Date	Holiday	Comments
Thursday	March 21	Purim	
Tuesday	April 09	Public Holiday	Allow voting in national elections
Saturday	April 20	Passover (begins)	Pesach
Friday	April 26	Passover (ends)	Pesach
Thursday	May 09	Independence Day	Yom HaAtzmaut
Thursday	May 09	Victory Day	
Sunday	June 02	Jerusalem Day	Marks the reunification of Jerusalem after the Six-Day War
Monday	June 10	Pentecost	Shavuot
Sunday	August 11	Fast of Ninth of Av	Commemorates the destruction of the First and Second Temples in Jerusalem
Monday	September 30	New Year	Rosh HaShana
Tuesday	October 01	New Year	Rosh HaShana
Wednesday	October 09	Day of Atonement	Yom Kippur
Monday	October 14	Sukkot	Feast of Tabernacles
Tuesday	October 22	Simchat Torah	Celebrates the end of the annual cycle of Torah readings
Monday	December 23	Chanukah	The festival of Chanukah is a holiday period, but it is not a national holiday

Source: <https://www.officeholidays.com/index.php>

Annex D: Electoral Threshold


Have you heard that the electoral threshold has been raised to 3.25% of the votes?

Reply	Distribution
	Percent
Yes	47.8
No	51.4
Don't know / no answer	0.8
Total	100.0
N	512

Source: The Political Participation of Arab Citizens in Israel, The Abraham Fund Initiatives

Annex E: Life Expectancy

Life expectancy at birth for Arabs and Jews in Israel (left axis) and the gap in life expectancy at birth (right axis), by sex group, 1975–2010



Source: Arab–Jewish gap in life expectancy in Israel (Ameed M. Saabneh)

Annex F: University Students

University students by degree, field of study, and population group

Degree	Engineering and architecture		Sciences and mathematics		Medicine		Law	
	Jews %	Arabs %	Jews %	Arabs %	Jews %	Arabs %	Jews %	Arabs %
First degree	90.0%	6.0%	85.3%	9.5%	79.3%	19.7%	92.4%	6.7%
Second degree	91.6%	3.1%	92.9%	3.3%	86.6%	12.3%	94.8%	4.7%
Third degree	91.7%	2.5%	95.1%	2.1%	93.1%	4.1%	96.9%	3.1%

Source: Inequality Report: The Palestinian Arab Minority in Israel, Katie Hesketh

Annex G: Traditional Israeli and Palestinian Narratives

<p style="text-align: center;">TRADITIONAL ISRAELI NARRATIVE (1882-1949)</p>	<p style="text-align: center;">TRADITIONAL PALESTINIAN NARRATIVE (1882-1949)</p>
<p>a) The legitimacy of the Zionist enterprise of returning Jews to EretzYisrael is based on Jewish descent from the ancient Israelites. The Jewish people has inherited their right to the land, religiously, legally, and historically. Jews have always looked and prayed toward Zion (Jerusalem), never relinquished their relationship to the land, and have always maintained a presence since ancient times, despite expulsions. Jews were treated as foreigners and persecuted wherever they were during their long Exile.</p>	<p>a) Judaism is a religion of revelation, like Christianity, and has no inherent tie to a particular land. Jews are not a nation but rather a community of believers. In any case, any Israelite presence was a short period in the long history of Palestine. Ultimately, religious myths, without presence and possession, are incapable of creating an ownership right. Palestinians are in fact, descendants of all previous inhabitants, including Israelites. Those Jews living in Palestine and the Muslim world before 1882 were well treated by Muslim neighbors and rulers.</p>
<p>b) Zionism was an authentic response to the persecution of Jews over millennia around the world. Jews did not come as colonizers, but rather as pioneers and redeemers of the land, and did not intend to disrupt the lives of the current inhabitants of the Land of Israel. All land for Jewish settlement was legally bought and paid for, often at inflated prices.</p>	<p>b) Zionism was a European colonialist enterprise like many in the late 19th century and was a European ideology superimposed on the Middle East. Moreover, it is an ideology of expansion directed towards robbing Arabs of their ancestral land. Arabs were systematically expelled by Zionist settlers from the beginning.</p>
<p>c) The Arabs of Palestine were not a national group and never had been. They were largely undifferentiated from the inhabitants of much of Syria, Lebanon and Jordan. They had no authentic tie to the Land of Israel. Many only came for economic opportunity after the Zionist movement began to make the land fruitful and the economy thrive. In all the years of Arab and Muslim control from the 7th century, Palestine was never a separate state and Jerusalem was never a capital.</p>	<p>c) The ancestors of today’s Palestinians (Canaanites, Jebusites, and others mentioned in the Bible) were there before the Israelites, as shown by both biblical and archaeological evidence. Palestinians have lived continuously in the land since then. Certainly by the 1920s and likely much earlier, there was a Palestinian identity and nationality that differed fundamentally from other Levantine Arab peoples.</p>

<p>d) Zionist diplomacy legitimately sought a Great Power patron since Herzl, and found one in Great Britain. True, Britain had its own imperial agenda, but this does not detract from the righteousness of the Zionist cause. The Balfour Declaration was ratified by the League of Nations, constituting a statement of international law approving a Jewish homeland in Palestine.</p>	<p>d) The British foisted Zionism on the Palestinians beginning with the Balfour Declaration as part of their imperial strategy, with no right whatsoever in international law, and this was illegally ratified by the League of Nations.” He who did not own gave a promise to those who did not deserve.” Zionists worked hand in glove with Britain to subjugate the Palestinian people.</p>
<p>e) The riots of 1920, 1929 and 1936 were instigated by unscrupulous Arab leaders for their own nefarious purposes, particularly the Mufti of Jerusalem, Hajj Amin Al Husseini. The “Palestinian” population had increased rapidly through immigration of Arabs who were attracted by Zionist economic successes, and the Arab population’s living standards rose rapidly during this period. The British frequently stood aside when Arabs murdered Jews.</p>	<p>e) All the disturbances were justified and spontaneous revolts by the Palestinian people against the British/Zionist alliance and increasing immigration. The increasing Jewish immigration, facilitated by the British, created the resentment that led to the revolts. The British backed the Zionists, who were responsible for and had provoked the disturbances, and punished Palestinians harshly and illegitimately.</p>
<p>f) The British, who had been initially supportive of the Zionist enterprise through the Balfour Declaration and the early mandate, began to backtrack early, as reflected in the splitting off of Transjordan in 1922, the Passfield White Paper of 1930, and many other incidents. They definitively repudiated the Balfour Declaration with the White Paper of 1939, and were unabashedly pro-Arab after that point.</p>	<p>f) The British were always pro-Zionist, except when occasionally forced otherwise by Arab pressure. They conspired with the Zionists to destroy Palestinian leadership in the 1936-39 revolt, thus making it impossible for Palestinians to prepare for the coming war with the Zionists. The White Paper of 1939 had no effect as it was not enforced. The British deliberately trained Zionist soldiers during the 1936-39 revolt and World War II.</p>
<p>g) The Zionist movement accepted the UN partition resolution of 1947 in good faith, albeit reluctantly, as it had the 1937 Peel Commission Report recommending partition. War was forced on the Yishuv (Jewish national community) by the Arabs. Solely in self-defense,</p>	<p>g) The UN partition resolution of 1947 was illegitimate, as the UN had no right to give away the homeland of the Palestinians. The Palestinians cannot be blamed for trying to hold on to what was rightfully theirs. Compromise was out of the question. The Jewish leadership never</p>

<p>the Haganah (later the Israeli Army) took over more land than had been allotted in the Partition Resolution and was justified in holding it, as it would have inevitably become a base for attacks on Israel.</p>	<p>genuinely accepted the idea of partition; in any case, expulsion (transfer) was always the plan.</p>
<p>h) The Yishuv was numerically vastly inferior to the combined Arab population, and it bordered on a miracle that Israeli survived the war (“the few against the many”). All Jews realized they would be massacred if they lost, and fought with absolute determination to prevent another Holocaust. Arab atrocities proved they had no other choice.</p>	<p>h) The Jews had planned for the war, had organized both politically and militarily, had strong support abroad and were in a much more favorable position when war came. Their armed forces outnumbered all the Arab armies. Palestinians had no infrastructure and no military training, and were attacked and massacred repeatedly by Jewish gangs. Arab “aid” consisted primarily of attempted land grabs by other Arab countries of Palestinian land.</p>
<p>i) The Palestinians were not expelled. They fled, in most cases, because they were ordered and cajoled by their leaders and the Arab states, in order to make room for conquering Arab armies. In many cases Jewish officials pleaded with the refugees to stay. The Israeli decision to prevent refugees from returning was justified, as otherwise Israel would be destroyed by a hostile Arab internal majority. Ultimately, the responsibility and blame rests with the Arab leadership for rejecting the partition resolution.</p>	<p>i) Beginning soon after the adoption of the partition resolution in November 1947 the Zionists began to expel Palestinians from their homes, almost certainly according to a plan (Plan Dalet). DeirYasin was a planned massacre that succeeded in stampeding Palestinians to leave. The Nakba was planned and carried out as ethnic cleansing. The Zionists recognized that a Jewish state could not exist until most Arabs were expelled, and history proves this was the plan that was carried out.</p>
<p>j) The refugee issue was artificially kept alive by the Arab states, who deliberately used the refugees as pawns against Israel. The real reason for the continuation of the conflict was the refusal of the Arab states to recognize Israeli’s existence. Israel has repeatedly offered peace, but not at the price of the destruction of Israel as a Jewish state, which has been the Arab goal since 1948.</p>	<p>j) The Palestinian people have never ceased to protest against the illegality and immorality of their expulsion, and Palestinians continue to identify themselves as belonging to their real homes in Palestine. The Arab states have repeatedly betrayed the Palestinians, and only grudgingly gave them space in refugee camps. There can never be a settlement without Israel recognizing its guilt and providing appropriate redress.</p>

	Palestinians in other Arab countries are as much in exile as anywhere else.
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Sources: Revised and excerpted from “Shared Histories: A Palestinian-Israeli Dialogue,” edited by Paul Scham, Walid Salem and Benjamin Pogrund.

Annex H: Basic Laws

BASIC LAW	DESCRIPTION
<p>Basic Law: the Knesset</p> <p>Passed on February 12, 1958, by the Third Knesset</p>	<p>The first basic law passed by the Knesset. The law determines that the Knesset is the house of representatives of the State of Israel, that its seat is in Jerusalem and that upon election it should include 120 members. The law then deals with the electoral system, the right to vote and be elected, the Knesset's term of office, the principles relating to the Knesset elections, the service of Knesset members, the parliamentary immunity of the Knesset members and the Knesset buildings, the work of the Knesset and its committees, and more. The law does not define the authorities of the Knesset. Article 4 of the law, which states that the Knesset shall be elected by general, national, direct, equal, secret and proportional elections, can only be amended by a majority of 61 Knesset members. Article 44, which prevents the amendment of the law by means of the Emergency Regulation, can only be amended by a majority of 80 Knesset members. The law further states that the Knesset shall not extend its term except by law passed by a majority of 80 members of the Knesset and only if special circumstances exist that prevent holding the elections at their proper time. The law also determines the date of the general elections for the Knesset.</p>
<p>Basic Law: Israel Lands</p> <p>Passed on July 25, 1960, by the Fourth Knesset</p>	<p>The law prohibits the transfer of ownership over lands owned by the state, the Development Authority or the Jewish National Fund, either by sale or by any other means, with the exception of types of land or transactions that have been specified in the law. The law does not contain any entrenched clauses.</p>
<p>Basic Law: The President of the State (1964)</p> <p>Passed on June 16, 1964, by the Fifth Knesset.</p>	<p>The law, which includes instructions that were previously scattered in other laws, determines that the President shall stand at the head of the State and that the place of residence of the President shall be Jerusalem. It further states that the President shall be elected by the Knesset for a period of seven years and will serve for one term only. The law also deals with the President's qualifications and powers, and the procedures of the President's work.</p>
<p>Basic Law: The Government (2001)</p> <p>Passed initially on August 13, 1968, by the Sixth Knesset</p>	<p>On March 18, 1992, the 12th Knesset replaced the law in order to change the electoral system, with the purpose of creating a direct prime ministerial elections system from the 14th Knesset and onward. The law, in its amended version, was approved by the 15th Knesset on March 7, 2001. It went into effect on the day of the elections for the 16th Knesset and repealed the direct election of the Prime Minister. The current version of the law determines that the seat of the Government is Jerusalem and that the Government holds office by virtue of the confidence of the Knesset and is collectively responsible to the Knesset. The law</p>

	also determines the manner in which a government is formed, as well as its functions and powers. The law can only be amended by a vote of the majority of the Knesset members.
<p>Basic Law: The State Economy (1975)</p> <p>Passed on July 21, 1975, by the Eighth Knesset</p>	The law determines the procedures for the imposition of taxes and fees, as well as the guidelines for conducting transactions in State property. It also determines the guidelines for setting the State budget and additional legislation related to the budget, as well as for the printing of legal tender currency notes and the minting of legal tender coins.
<p>Basic Law: The Army (1976)</p> <p>Passed on March 31, 1976, by the Eighth Knesset</p>	Until the law was passed, the constitutional and legal basis for the operation of the Israel Defense Forces was to be found in the IDF Ordinance of 1948. The law is based on the said ordinance and determines that the IDF is the army of the State and that it is forbidden to form or maintain an armed force other than the IDF, save by law. The law also deals with mandatory service and enlistment, as well as with instructions and orders in the army. It further states that the army is subject to the authority of the Government and that the Minister of Defense is in charge of the army on behalf of the Government. The law determines the procedure for appointing the Chief of Staff and includes guidelines related to issues that were addressed by the Agranat Commission, which investigated the circumstances of the outbreak of the Yom Kippur War.
<p>Basic Law: Jerusalem, the Capital of Israel (1980)</p> <p>Passed on December 13, 1980, by the Ninth Knesset</p>	The intention of the law is to establish the status of Jerusalem as the capital of Israel and secure its integrity and unity. It determines that Jerusalem is the seat of the President of the State, the Knesset, the Government and the Supreme Court. The law also deals with the status of the holy sites, secures the rights of people of all religions, and states that Jerusalem shall be given special priority in the activities of the authorities of the State so as to further its development in economic and other matters. There are no entrenched clauses in this law.
<p>Basic Law: The Judiciary (1984)</p> <p>Passed on February 28, 1984, by the Tenth Knesset</p>	The law establishes the authority of the courts in criminal and disciplinary proceedings, as well as the independence of the judiciary and the openness of judicial proceedings. It also determines the procedures for the appointment of judges. The law includes an instruction regarding its permanence and protection from changes by means of emergency regulations.
<p>Basic Law: The State Comptroller (1988)</p> <p>Passed on February 15, 1988, by the Twelfth Knesset</p>	The law, a collection of instructions which had previously been scattered in other laws, determines the powers, tasks and duties of the State Comptroller, who also functions as Ombudsman. It also determines the manner in which the State Comptroller is elected and states that he/she is responsible solely to the Knesset.
<p>Basic Law: Freedom of Occupation (1994)</p> <p>The law was passed in its</p>	The second version of the law was passed on March 9, 1994, by the Thirteenth Knesset. The law established the right of every citizen or inhabitant to engage in any occupation, profession or

<p>original version on March 3, 1992, by the Twelfth Knesset.</p>	<p>trade unless a law which corresponds to the values of the State of Israel, and which serves an appropriate purpose, determines otherwise. The law includes an instruction regarding its permanence and protection from changes by means of emergency regulations. Only a majority of at least 61 Knesset members can amend the law. However, the text states that the Knesset may pass a regular law that violates the freedom of occupation, with a majority of at least 61 Knesset members, if it explicitly states that it is valid "despite what is stated in this Basic Law." The validity of such a law shall expire at the end of four years from its inception, unless an earlier date was prescribed in it.</p>
<p>Basic Law: Human Dignity and Liberty (1992)</p> <p>Passed on March 17, 1992, by the Twelfth Knesset</p>	<p>The law determines that the basic human rights in Israel are based on the recognition of the value of the human being, the sanctity of his life, and his being a free person. The purpose of the law is to protect human dignity and liberty, in order to anchor the values of the State of Israel as a Jewish and democratic state, in a basic law. The law defines human freedom in Israel as being the right to leave the country and enter it, as well as the right to privacy and intimacy, refrainment from searches relating to one's private property, body and possessions, and avoidance of violations of the privacy of one's speech, writings and notes. Violations of the dignity or freedom of man is permitted only in accordance with the law. The law includes an instruction regarding its permanence and protection from changes by means of emergency regulations.</p>
<p>Basic Law: Referendum (2014)</p> <p>Passed on March 12, 2014, by the Nineteenth Knesset</p>	<p>The law determines that should the Government decide to ratify an agreement, or sign an agreement, according to which the law, jurisdiction and administration of the State of Israel shall no longer apply to territory in which they currently apply, including an agreement that involves a future undertaking, and a conditioned undertaking, after the agreement has been approved by the Knesset by an absolute majority, it shall require approval in a referendum, unless it has been approved by a majority of 80 Members of the Knesset. This law can only be changed by means of a basic law adopted by an absolute majority of the Knesset members.</p>
<p>Basic Law: Israel - the Nation State of the Jewish People</p> <p>Passed on July 19, 2018, by the Twentieth Knesset</p>	<p>The law determines, among other things, that the Land of Israel is the historical homeland of the Jewish people; the State of Israel is the nation state of the Jewish People, in which it realizes its natural, cultural, religious and historical right to self-determination; and that exercising the right to national self-determination in the State of Israel is unique to the Jewish People. The law also deals with the State's symbols and official language, the status of Jerusalem, the State's connection with the Jewish People and the Ingathering of Exiles.</p>

Source: <https://main.knesset.gov.il/EN/Pages/default.aspx>

Annex I: Ordinary Laws

- ▶ The Citizenship and Entry into Israel Law (temporary provision) 5763 - 2003
- ▶ Decision Regarding Knesset Salaries (Payments & Grants) - 2001
- ▶ Memorial Day Laws
- ▶ Independence Day Law - 5709 (1949)
- ▶ Jerusalem Day Law - 5758 (1998)
- ▶ Law of Return - 5710 (1950)
- ▶ Protection of Holy Places Law - 5727 (1967)

ORDINARY LAW	BRIEF DESCRIPTION
The Citizenship and Entry into Israel Law (temporary provision) 5763 - 2003	The Citizenship and Entry into Israel Law (Temporary Order) 5763 is an Israeli law first passed on 31 July 2003 and most recently extended in June 2016. The law makes inhabitants of the West Bank and Gaza Strip ineligible for the automatic granting of Israeli citizenship and residency permits that are usually available through marriage to an Israeli citizen (i.e. family reunification).
Law of Return - 5710 (1950)	The Law of Return is an Israeli law, passed on 5 July 1950, which gives Jews the right to come and live in Israel and to gain Israeli citizenship. Section 1 of the Law of Return declares: "every Jew has the right to come to this country as an oleh [immigrant]."In the Law of Return, the State of Israel gave effect to the Zionist movement's "credo" which called for

	the establishment of Israel as a Jewish state.
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Source: <https://knesset.gov.il/laws/special/eng/laws.htm>

Other laws (in Hebrew only):

https://main.knesset.gov.il/Activity/Legislation/Laws/Pages/lawlaws.aspx?t=lawlaws&st=lawlaws&fbclid=IwAR2W107gyJtbQU1ojv6kNnl8L9FiYxHhGkb_32zPh3VgRngFoLPj6rS_W9w

Annex K: Ratification of International Human Rights Treaties – Israel

International Bill of Human Rights	Signature
International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights	19 Dec 1966
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights	19 Dec 1966
Optional Protocol to the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights	Not signed
Second Optional Protocol to the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, aiming at the abolition of the death penalty	Not signed
Prevention of Discrimination on the Basis of Race, Religion, or Belief; and Protection of Minorities	Signature
International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination	7 Mar 1966
Women's Human Rights	Signature
Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women	17 Jul 1980
Optional Protocol to the Convention on the Elimination of Discrimination against Women	Not signed
United Nations Convention against Transnational Organized Crime	13 Dec 2000
Protocol to Prevent, Suppress and Punish Trafficking in Persons, Especially Women and Children, supplementing the United Nations Convention against Transnational Organized Crime Preamble, supplementing the United Nations Convention against Transnational Organized Crime	14 Nov 2001
Protocol against the Smuggling of Migrants by Land, Sea and Air, supplementing the United Nations Convention against Transnational Organized Crime	Not signed
Slavery and Slavery-Like Practices	Signature
Slavery Convention	
Protocol amending the Slavery Convention	
Supplementary Convention on the Abolition of Slavery, the Slave Trade, and Institutions and Practices Similar to Slavery	7 Sep 1956
Convention for the Suppression of the Traffic in Persons and of the Exploitation of the Prostitution of Others	
Protection from Torture, Ill-Treatment and Disappearance	Signature
European Convention for the Prevention of Torture and Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment	Not signed
Protocol No. 1 to the European Convention for the Prevention of Torture and Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment	Not signed
Protocol No. 2 to the European Convention for the Prevention of Torture and inhuman or Degrading Treatment of Punishment	Not signed
Convention against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment	22 Oct 1986
Rights of the Child	Signature
Convention on the Rights of the Child	30 Jul 1990

Optional Protocol to the Convention on the Rights of the Child on the involvement of children in armed conflicts	14 Nov 2001
Convention concerning the Prohibition and Immediate Action for the Elimination of the Worst Forms of Child Labour	Not signed
Freedom of Association	Signature
Freedom of Association and Protection of the Right to Organise Convention	
Right to Organise and Collective Bargaining Convention	
Employment and Forced Labour	Signature
Convention concerning Forced or Compulsory Labour	
Equal Remuneration Convention	
Abolition of Forced Labour Convention	
Discrimination (Employment and Occupation) Convention	
Employment Policy Convention	
Convention concerning Occupational Safety and Health and the Working Environment	Not signed
Convention on the Protection of the Rights of All Migrant Workers and Members of Their Families	Not signed
Education	Signature
Convention against Discrimination in Education	Ratified
Refugees and Asylum	Signature
Convention relating to the Status of Refugees	1 Aug 1951
Protocol Relating to the Status of Refugees	
Nationality, Statelessness, and the Rights of Aliens	Signature
Convention on the Reduction of Statelessness	10 Aug 1961
Convention relating to the Status of Stateless Persons	1 Oct 1954
War Crimes and Crimes Against Humanity, Genocide, and Terrorism	Signature
Convention on the Non-Applicability of Statutory Limitations to War Crimes and Crimes Against Humanity	Not signed
Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide	17 Aug 1949
Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court	31 Dec 2000
Law of Armed Conflict	Signature
Geneva Convention for the Amelioration of the Condition of the Wounded and Sick in Armed Forces in the Field	8 Dec 1949
Geneva Convention for the Amelioration of the Condition of Wounded, Sick and Shipwrecked Members of Armed Forces at Sea	8 Dec 1949
Geneva Convention relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War	8 Dec 1949
Geneva Convention relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War	8 Dec 1949
Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and Relating to the Protection of Victims of International Armed Conflicts (Protocol I)	Not signed
Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and	Not signed

Relating to the Protection of Victims on Non-International Armed Conflicts (Protocol II)	
Terrorism and Human Rights	Signature
International Convention Against the Taking of Hostages	19 Nov 1980
International Convention for the Suppression of Terrorist Bombing	22 Jan 1999
International Convention for the Suppression of the Financing of Terrorism	11 Jul 2000
International Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Seizure of Aircraft	16 Dec 1970
International Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of Crimes Against International Protected Persons	
U.N. Activities and Employees	Signature
Convention on the Privileges and Immunities of the United Nations	
Convention on the Safety of United Nations and Associated Personnel	Not signed
Regional Conventions	Signature
[European] Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms	Not signed
Protocol to the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms	Not signed
Protocol No.2 to the 1950 European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms	Not signed
Protocol No.3 to the 1950 European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms	Not signed
Protocol No.4 to the 1950 European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms	Not signed
Protocol No.5 to the 1950 European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms	Not signed
Protocol No.6 to the 1950 European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms	Not signed
Protocol No.7 to the 1950 European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms	Not signed
Protocol No. 8 to the 1950 European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms	Not signed
Protocol No. 9 to the 1950 European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms	Not signed
Protocol No. 10 to the 1950 European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms	Not signed
Protocol No. 11 to the 1950 European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms	Not signed
Protocol No. 12 to the 1950 European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms	Not signed
European Convention for the Prevention of Torture and Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment	Not signed
Protocol No. 1 to the European Convention for the Prevention of Torture and Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment	Not signed

Protocol No. 2 to the European Convention for the Prevention of Torture and inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment	Not signed
African Regional Conventions	Signature
African [Banjul] Charter on Human and Peoples' Rights *	Not signed
Convention Governing the Specific Aspects of Refugee Problems in Africa *	Not signed
Protocol to the African Charter on Human and Peoples' Rights on the Rights of Women in Africa *	Not signed
Protocol to the African Charter on Human and Peoples' Rights on the Establishment of an African Court on Human and Peoples' Rights *	Not signed
African Charter on the Rights and Welfare of the Child *	Not signed

Source: <http://hrlibrary.umn.edu/research/ratification-israel.html>

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