

## **The Madman and the Spider: Sacrifice and Metaphysics in Nietzsche and Girard**

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**Abstract:** This article examines René Girard's claim that Nietzsche foreshadowed Girard's scapegoat mechanism in his famous aphorism 125 on the death of God called *The Madman*. The role of rhetoric and interpretation in competition between ideas is explored through examining the ambiguity of 'sacrifice' and 'violence,' words which can be metaphorical or literal. Through a comparison of the views and contexts of Girard and Nietzsche I argue that their ideas spring from similar sources of human metaphysical need. However, Nietzsche has no literal conception of metaphysics; rather metaphysics exists only as experienced or constructed as conventions. Girard, on the other hand, tries to banish the metaphysical foundations of other religions as superstition while refounding the metaphysical certainty offered by Christianity. Girard 'sacrifices' Nietzsche as a rhetorical mechanism toward reestablishing this foundational truth and I place the sacrifice in the broader context of scapegoating that Girard's own theory demands, in the context of sacrifice as rhetorical tool, and in the German theological context from which the death of God as a metaphor springs.

### **The Madman**

Have you not heard of that madman who lit a lantern in the bright morning hours, ran to the marketplace, and cried incessantly, "I seek God! I seek God!" As many of those who do not believe in God were standing around just then, he provoked much laughter. "Why, did he get lost?" said one. "Did he lose his way like a child?" said another. "Or is he hiding?" "Is he afraid of us?" "Has he gone on a voyage?" "Has he emigrated?" Thus they yelled and laughed. The madman jumped into their midst

and pierced them with his glances.

“Whither is God?” he cried. “I shall tell you. *We have killed him*—you and I. All of us are his murderers. But how have we done this? How were we able to drink up the sea? Who gave us the sponge to wipe away the entire horizon? What did we do when we unchained this earth from its sun? Whither is it moving now? Whither are we moving now? Away from all the suns? Are we not plunging continually? Backward, sideward, forward, in all directions? Is there any up or down left? Are we not straying as through an infinite nothing? Do we not feel the breath of empty space? Has it not become colder? Is not night and more night coming on all the while? Must not lanterns be lit in the morning? Do we not hear anything yet of the grave diggers who are burying God? Do we not smell anything yet of God’s decomposition? Gods, too, decompose. God is dead. God remains dead. And we have killed him. How shall we the murderers of all murderers comfort ourselves? What was holiest and most powerful of all that the world has yet owned has bled to death under our knives. Who will wipe this blood off us? What water is there for us to clean ourselves? What festivals of atonement, what sacred games shall we have to invent? Is not the greatness of this deed too great for us? Must not we ourselves become gods simply to seem worthy of it? There has never been a greater deed; and whoever will be born after us—for the sake of this deed he will be part of a higher history than all history hitherto.”

Here the madman fell silent and looked again at his listeners; and they too were silent and stared at him in astonishment. At last he threw his lantern on the ground, and it broke and went out. “I come too early” he said then; “my time has not come yet. This tremendous event is still on its way, still wandering—it has not yet reached the ears of man. Lightning and thunder require time even after they are done, before they can be seen and heard. This deed is still more distant from them than the most distant stars — *and yet they have done it themselves.*”<sup>1</sup>

### **From *The Anti-Christ***

The god on the cross is a curse on life, a sign post to seek redemption from life; Dionysus cut to pieces is a promise of life: it will be eternally reborn and reborn and return again from destruction.<sup>2</sup>

In *The Founding Murder in the Philosophy of Nietzsche*, René Girard finds confirmation of his scapegoat theory of sacrifice and of Christianity as a non-sacrificial religion. According to Girard, Nietzsche saw that Judeo-Christianity exposes the victimization of the innocent found in all religions and their texts. Girard writes "...for Nietzsche this was a dreadful mistake...Nietzsche chose violence rather than peace; he chose the texts that mistook the victim for a culprit."<sup>3</sup> That is, according to Girard, Nietzsche saw the true nature of Christianity, but he perversely preferred the sacrificial economy that immolates the weak.<sup>4</sup>

Theories of sacrifice have a long history in religious studies and anthropology. Ideas range from simple propositions about the role of sacrifice in ritual communication and gift giving, to more integrated approaches (phenomenological, structural, and postmodern etc.) which assert sacrifice's central role in the human construction of meaning.

Bruce Lincoln understands sacrifice in this latter, more foundational, way. His analysis integrates sacrifice into power construction and social epistemology, arguing that sacrifice is a mode of writing cosmological and political messages on bodies in which negation of one entity, identity, or idea elevates another in the hierarchy. This occurs not only in explicitly sacrificial rites but also in rituals around gender, politics *and ideas* thereby producing particular societal patterns or the privileging of some ideas over others. Such manipulation of the potency held by rival possibilities might also be called establishing control over the parameters of debate.<sup>5</sup> Lincoln writes:

...sacrifice is fundamentally a logic, language and practice of transformative negation, in which one entity...is given up for the benefit of some other species, group, god, or principle ...<sup>6</sup>

I adopt Lincoln's definition of sacrifice in this essay.<sup>7</sup> We can see this negation of one idea for the benefit of another in Girard's treatment of Nietzsche, but also in Nietzsche's understanding of his own role as polemical cultural critic where he aggrandizes the Dionysian by the sacrifice of the Apollonian. I argue Girard himself is ironically a prisoner of such metaphysically foundational behavior as he strives to change the parameters of debate by sacrificing Nietzsche and his text as a scapegoat.<sup>8</sup>

### **Ambiguous Sacrifice**

'Sacrifice' can be a literal blood offering or can refer to the general notion of giving up something, like food or comforts, for a higher purpose. For Nietzsche, metaphorical sacrifice, or giving up one mode of conceptuality for another, is more relevant than blood sacrifice or renouncing physical comfort, yet importantly, he plays with both levels of meaning. In ignoring these shifts and nuances in Nietzsche's work, Girard sacrifices the parabolic in favour of the literal.

For example, Girard quotes Nietzsche's *The Twilight of the Idols*:

(t)he individual...(in Christianity)...was positioned as such an absolute principle, that he could no longer be *sacrificed*: but the species only survives through human sacrifices...<sup>9</sup>

The full quotation shows that Nietzsche uses the notion of personal sacrifice and ritual sacrifice interchangeably.

Genuine charity demands sacrifice for the good of the species...; it is full *self-overcoming*, because it *needs human sacrifice*. And this pseudo-humanness called Christianity wants it established that no one should be sacrificed.<sup>10</sup>

Nietzsche clearly plays on the ambiguity between the ritual immolation of a victim vs. the metaphorical personal sacrifice of letting go of the certainty provided by the fiction of God. But

Girard writes as if there was never any such ambiguity. He writes, for instance: “(F)rom start to finish aphorism 125 is identical with the ‘victimage theory of religion’. The Nietzscheans will call me mad, but the letter of the text vindicates me.”<sup>11</sup>

Girard insists on the letter of the text but metaphor is omnipresent in Nietzsche, for whom ontology, metaphysics, and even empiricism are meta-languages which impose a hegemonic structure over reality. For Nietzsche, Platonic-Christian theology is the most powerful of these meta-languages, but he reminds us that even science, a surrogate for the certainty of theology, rests on faith<sup>12</sup>. In the metaphor of God’s murder Nietzsche is demonstrating the undermining of all absolute epistemologies including that of science.

Nietzsche insisted that even though the reality of God’s death or irrelevance has been realized, even he himself is “still pious”. By this he means that the mental habits of assuming an absolute do not go away just because conscious belief in that absolute has vanished: these mental habits are ingrained in us and in our language. The ‘Death of God’ has led to a transfer of faith in reason and science as if they can offer a replacement foundation of truth. Nietzsche argues they cannot. Rather, true freedom requires one to abandon substitute vestigial foundations and to sacrifice certainty.<sup>13</sup> The illusion of foundations can only be maintained by sacrifice of the truth, which is that there is no foundational truth. The sacrifice that he demands is not the killing of innocents, but a willingness to cut the foundation out from under oneself. This is the sacrifice required for the survival of the species.

Girard’s theory aims at something quite different: he seeks to unmask the “erroneous” façade only to re-impose an ultimate Christian metaphysics. He argues, the

Cross...utterly discredits the notion that Christianity is...mythological. The world’s myths do not reveal a way to interpret the Gospels ...the Gospels reveal to us the way to interpret myth.<sup>14</sup>

The crucifixion is *non-sacrificial* in that it does not embrace the legitimacy of sacrifice but exposes the irrational scapegoating of

other religions. Girard characterises the ‘Sacred’ in the world’s religions as based on a victimising mechanism: conflict arising from mimetic rivalry (imitative competition) results in a sacrificial crisis which is resolved by focussing violence on a victim thereby preventing the contagion of violence throughout a society. When peace ensues there is a misunderstanding that the victim has been the supernatural harbinger of peace, leading to the victim’s deification thereby providing an external reference point for societal cohesion *and* differentiation. The Bible and the Gospels in particular show that this mechanism is an illusion which can be surpassed, ending the need for the sacrifice of innocents. The mode of Jesus’ death and his obvious innocence is meant to draw attention to this deeply repressed mechanism.<sup>15</sup>

It is clear that Girard is a theorist who uncovers the constructedness of metaphysics as a first step toward the elimination of violence. From the Nietzschean point of view however, Girard neglects to follow through to the logical consequences of this insight. That is, once identifying the fabrication and violence of metaphysics deriving from mimetic rivalry, Girard gives Christian metaphysics a privileged as position as *real* in which God has sent a message.

### **Parmenidean Spiders**

In *Philosophy in the Tragic Age of the Greeks* Nietzsche compares the spider to philosophers who like Parmenides or Plato spin an empty reality they call ‘Being’. The aphid trapped by the spider is a blood sacrifice to the matrix of the web just as the individual human’s ‘becoming,’ or real life, is sacrificed to the matrix of an ideal non-existent world of pure ‘Being’.<sup>16</sup> Nietzsche delivers a tirade against system building and rigid conceptuality in which ‘becoming’ is sacrificed to ‘Being’. He argues that this Platonic mode of conceptuality hypostatizes meaning beyond reach. This is obviously different from the way that Girard uses sacrifice where an actual victim is required. Yet these realms overlap, especially when we consider that ‘theory’ itself can be seen as an act of ritualistic interpretation that seeks to shape or refound the world in particular ways. I am drawing on J.Z. Smith’s insights regarding the “domestication of sacrifice”, in which repetition and rigid allocation to categories is germane to both literal ritual sacrifice and its theoretical

dissection.<sup>17</sup> In dual roles of cultural theorist and Christian apologist Girard employs this repetition and allocation in his scapegoat theory which gives him domesticating control over the phenomena. In this way he performs the sacrificial role of Nietzsche's Parmenidean philosopher-spider.

According to Nietzsche early Greek religion was pluralistic, agonistic, and fatalistic. Life was understood to be contextualized by death, creating a context of flux in which life implies death. Therefore the perception or experience of form (life) inexorably led to the perception of formlessness (death).<sup>18</sup> Confronting these limits or allowing these forces to remain in Heraclitean tension produced a plurality of deities representing the diversity inherent to authentic human experience. Christianity was for Nietzsche the anti-thesis of authenticity with its God who offers victory over death and formlessness; ironing out the agonistic wrinkles of creative tension.

The Dionysian and the Apollonian represent the tension between Olympus and the Underworld, articulated in Greek sacrifice and raised to art form in Greek tragedy. While both sides are equally important, Nietzsche emphasized the Dionysian not for its superiority, but because of its neglect in Western thought.<sup>19</sup> In particular, he blamed this neglect on the hermeneutical gap between the genre of Greek tragedy and those European academics who studied it.<sup>20</sup> By focussing on the 'form' of Apollonian art, to the exclusion of Dionysian formlessness, they created the perception that the Greeks were an inherently harmonious people.<sup>21</sup> According to Nietzsche, the classical ideals held by Europeans corresponded to only a small part of Greek culture as reflected in the sculpture and architecture of Athens around the fifth century B.C.E., while the discordant aspects of Greek sacrifice and tragedy were explained away as anomalies.<sup>22</sup> He contended that Platonism, by way of Christianity, provided a distorted filter of a transcendent realm with little room for immediate human experience. His view is nicely encapsulated in his statement: "My philosophy, Platonism overturned: the further one moves away from true being, the purer the more beautiful, the better life is."<sup>23</sup>

The Dionysian-Apollonian dichotomy also introduces Nietzsche's criticism of linear conceptuality upon which Christian historical revelation depends. Nietzsche critiques future orientation through his idea of 'mythic' time and that of

the Will to Power which mitigate life-denying eschatologies. Nietzsche protests uni-linear historical thought by way of this dialectic of the Will to Power (forward moving) and the Eternal Return (mythic recurrence). He creates a curative to Platonic-Christian linear time which hides meaning beyond reach in an as yet nonexistent time just as a hierarchical metaphysic of *Being* puts meaning in an unreachable or nonexistent place. There is a drive to *become* in the Will to Power but always constrained by the Eternal Return of *being*. Clearly, Nietzsche does not offer a literal theory of time but a critique of all eschatologies and the meta-narratives they construct. Girard, on the other hand, requires a linear and metaphysically hierarchical framework for his revelation to make sense.

Sacrifice is a manifestation of how people understand or manifest their understanding of metaphysical reality or *Being*. Both Girard and Nietzsche regard metaphysical thinking as basic to human experience. Despite the fact that Nietzsche is often considered a harbinger of the end of metaphysics, he saw the inevitability of metaphysics. Metaphysics for Nietzsche “is a falsification; but at the same time it is a symptom of deeply-seated needs.”<sup>24</sup> Put another way, the deconstruction of unarticulated assumptions is not necessarily the study of error, but the study of something useful and perhaps indispensable.<sup>25</sup> It is these needs that the Madman addresses and saying that ‘God is dead’ will not be enough to banish the mental habits of having believed He existed.

Girard restates the universal status of his theory as applicable to the full realm of cultural phenomena. He sardonically reminds us that he can find in any masterpiece the plot of mimetic rivalry and desire of sacrificial crisis and the collective murder of a deity. He feigns boredom with his own monomania and hopes that turning to Nietzsche will cure him.<sup>26</sup> After recapitulating the conventional interpretation of aphorism 125 as an exhortation to atheism Girard goes further into the text. There he finds the neglected lines “*We have killed him—you and I. All of us are his murderers.*” Nobody, it seems, has ever noticed this collective murder before, but Girard reads the text and “there it is, like the head of John the Baptist on its silver platter.”<sup>27</sup> No one reads anything but ‘God is dead,’ which he

calls the “Pavlovian reflex of modernity.”<sup>28</sup>

According to Girard’s theory, consciousness of the scapegoat mechanism is repressed to the extent of silencing the messenger. This phenomenon of denial is found in the rejection the Madman experiences in the aphorism and in all subsequent interpretations of it. The sacrifice Nietzsche endured in being the despised messenger drove him mad as he was largely ignored *and* because he did not embrace the reconciling message of Jesus, preferring the violence of sacrifice.

Girard reads the famous lines, “God is dead. God remains dead” and sarcastically rejoices at having found the uncontroversial atheist mantra which may cure him of his *idée fixe*. However, he continues and finds incontrovertible evidence of his obsession.

God is dead. God remains dead. And we have killed him. How shall we the murderers of all murderers comfort ourselves?

Nietzsche has made it graphically clear: it is no natural death, no senile fading into irrelevancy, but a guilt laden murder. He has done so because his readers are wily and will attempt to focus on the mantra of modernity ‘God is dead’. Girard now locates the *sacrificial crisis*. The Madman asks,

What did we do when we unchained this earth from its sun? Whither it is moving now? ...Away from all the suns? Is there any up or down left?

Here Girard finds his sacrificial crisis, characterized by a lack of differentiation: night is day, male is female, no order can be found and a sacrifice required to refound order. Girard finds the refounding mechanism in the words:

(h)ow shall we the murderers...comfort ourselves?...  
What festivals of atonement, what sacred games shall we have to invent?

In this sacrifice of the old god a new religion must be created, redirecting sacred energies into new religious forms.

Is not the greatness of this deed too great for us? Must not we ourselves become gods simply to seem worthy of it?

Girard tells us that the selfish religion of the ‘superman’ is what Nietzsche will offer as a surrogate.

Even the misrecognition or ignorance that Girard’s theory anticipates is present: the crowd fails to understand the epistemological message of the Madman and falls back to banal atheism. Yet the reason the text is so famous is that it contains this collective murder of God. The recitation of the mantra “God is dead” is a ritualistic repetition of the murder which uncannily thrills even the atheist because of the awe it evokes.<sup>29</sup>

### **Mimetic Rivalry over the Truth**

In the essay *Strategies of Madness: Nietzsche, Wagner, and Dostoevsky*, Girard situates Nietzsche in an unresolved rivalry with Richard Wagner. Rather than a protest against a reactionary and resentful ‘slave morality’, exemplified by Christianity, Girard argues that the concept of Will to Power is a gross overcompensation for his sense of inferiority in the face of Wagner his mimetic rival.<sup>30</sup> The ‘Will to Power’ is a perverse quixotic quest against the victors and a juvenile denial of powerlessness. Nor, according to Girard, is the Will to Power a mere description of how power relations work in society to shape conventional reality. Rather it advocates the right of the strong to sacrifice the weak. It is not a sympathetic portrait and we are reminded that Nietzsche’s ideas eventually drove him insane.

Girard’s representation neglects the heuristic of power of Nietzsche’s hyperbolic polemic in the direction of truth and the deeper level at which he advances an agonistic tension. Will to Power, is properly understood as *becoming* and a striving for excellence in the absence of a fiction of a transcendent *Being*. It must be considered in dialectic with the Eternal Return which provides a mechanism for balancing the false dichotomy of either pure *Being* or pure *becoming*. Both extremes are fictions of flawed but inevitable human conceptuality which can be mitigated only by not excluding one side or the other.<sup>31</sup>

Despite intuiting the truth of Christianity and the scapegoat mechanism, Nietzsche, according to Girard,

perversely chooses to embrace the religion of the victimizers.<sup>32</sup> Such a conclusion depends on a misrepresentation of Nietzsche as a heartless champion of oppression which does not coincide with the ‘facts’. But, Nietzsche famously said, “(T)here are no facts only interpretation and this too is only interpretation.”<sup>33</sup> If that is the case, then why should not Girard interpretively sacrifice Nietzsche as a John the Anti-Baptist of Christian truth? Girard’s attempt to swing the pendulum back toward Christian foundations is accomplished through a public evisceration of Nietzsche, analogous to Nietzsche’s polemics against Paul and Socrates. There is rivalry for Girard with Nietzsche as he undercuts Nietzsche’s prophetic role with his own messianic message.<sup>34</sup>

## Conclusion

Girard contends that aphorism 125 expresses the collective guilt of killing God whereas, I argue, it is better understood as a poetic expression of the complexity of secularisation and a meditation on the consequences of inevitable metaphysical thinking.

The “Death of God” must be considered in its German theological context in which for a person who feels alienated and sinful God is metaphorically dead. The cycle of Jesus’ impending birth, nativity, his crucifixion (with attending limbo period of living without God) and the resurrection is a cyclical metaphor of personal faith going back at least as far as Luther. The crisis of faith crystallized in Kant’s critiques placed God outside the realm of the knowable. It was a *de facto* execution of God leaving only absurd faith.<sup>35</sup> Hegel employed this cyclical metaphor in expressing the human relation to knowledge and tried to “resurrect” God through a historical dialectic of teleological perfection.<sup>36</sup> The death of God as a culture wide phenomenon was not new with Nietzsche but was expressed in 1844 in the words “man has killed God in order to become now—*sole* God on high.”<sup>37</sup>

This is the broader context in which Nietzsche wrote the aphorism. The death of faith in this cyclic framework demands it be replaced by something new. Clearly Hegel’s system of eschatological history can be seen as one of the most influential ‘games’ the Madman says we must play to comfort ourselves. Another such game might be the pagan-*volk*-nationalism of

Wagner; a consolation prize for epistemologically lonely Romantics missing God.

Nietzsche's Madman does not unwittingly presage Girard's scapegoat mechanism but employs a well-worn metaphor for the loss and reestablishment of faith to explain that the metaphorical death of God entails *real* loss with unrecognized epistemological consequences. Nietzsche welcomes the 'murder,' but God cannot be so easily dismissed, even if He is a fiction. This distinguishes his intention from the Christian use of the 'God is dead' metaphor and *also* from its use as a mantra by atheists, which Girard is correct to point out, is often simplistic.

For Nietzsche, truth does not transcend the flux of life but is forged in the moment.<sup>38</sup> He argued that the pure *Being* of Parmenides via Plato and Christianity are webs of stagnant domination, whereas tension, as found in Heraclitus, is a view conducive to creative life. Nietzsche presciently points out that when religion is removed Christian morality, epistemology, and eschatology are sublimated into other cultural spheres. He warns against surrogate Platonic higher goods that become new ideological systems of violent authority.

Nietzsche speaks metaphorically about embracing the flux and violence inherent to existence, while also recognizing the importance of Apollonian form. But Girard characterizes Nietzsche's embrace of violence as literal and total, ignoring his understanding of the necessity of form in the interest of sacrificing Nietzsche's insights to what Girard sees as the higher good of foundational truth. This is Girard's rhetorical way of re-instituting an external God, thereby rescuing humanity from ambiguity.

It has been asked whether Girard's "tone of brilliant self-confidence is merely the fruit of wide reading with a closed mind."<sup>39</sup> More positively, his work can be seen as an attempt to resist the more extreme forms of postmodern relativism. Nietzsche instigated, or first articulated, the modern sacrificial crisis (to put it in Girard's terms) and resulting disorientation. Girard is trying to mitigate the postmodern crisis through a ritualistic sacrifice of this influential text and its author.

It is ironic that Girard claims Christianity exposes the fallaciousness of the scapegoat mechanism as a basis of social-

metaphysical foundation, yet his treatment of Nietzsche employs exactly such sacrificial mechanisms. He projects his theory onto *The Madman* and attempts to shape intellectual discourse in a way that ironically re-enacts his scapegoat theory. Girard's oblation shows both the power of such sacrifice and why it is tempting to polemically employ scapegoating as a rhetorical tool in the realm of competing claims to truth. Girard may seem too easy a target for such criticism because of the way he mixes studying religion with being religious. However, I think this case is illustrative of the broader question of how polemics are integral to establishing the parameters of debate in cultural theory, even from perspectives not overtly religious like those of Girard.

## Notes

<sup>1</sup>Frederick Nietzsche. *Portable Nietzsche*. Trans. Walter Kaufmann. (New York; Viking Press, 1968), 95.

<sup>2</sup> Chris Fleming. *René Girard: Violence and Mimesis*. (Cambridge; Malden, MA: Polity, 2004), 126.

<sup>3</sup> Rene Girard. "Interview with René Girard: Comments on Christianity, Scapegoating, and Sacrifice." *Religion* (1997 27, 249–254), 251.

<sup>4</sup> Both Girard and Nietzsche set themselves up as sacrificial Christ-like figures. For instance, Girard writes in *The Scapegoat*, "My hypothesis has existed for centuries and...the transition from uncertainty to certainty in matters of demythification has already occurred once..."<sup>1</sup> It is difficult *not* to read something like a 'second coming' into such claims. The way that Nietzsche wrote of himself as Dionysus, the Crucified and the Anti-Christ is also obviously messianic, even if ironically so.

<sup>5</sup> Noam Chomsky. *Language and Politics*. (Montreal: Black Rose Books, 1988).

<sup>6</sup> Lincoln, Bruce. "Debreasting, Disarming, Beheading." In *Understanding Religious Sacrifice: a Reader*, Ed Jeffrey Carter 357-369. (London and New York: Continuum Press, 2003.), 367.

<sup>7</sup> In fact Nietzsche is often seen as the progenitor of such modes of analysis.

<sup>8</sup> Nietzsche and Girard are both writers who sacrifice the comfortable distinction between the rhetoric of studying religion vs. the rhetoric of being religious and together provide an interesting sphere for examining how such a distinction is arbitrary.

<sup>9</sup> Renee Girard. *I see Satan Fall like Lightning*. Trans. James G. Williams. (Leominster, Herefordshire: Gracewing, 2001), 174.

<sup>10</sup> Bruce Ellis Benson. *Pious Nietzsche: Decadence and Dionysian Faith*. (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 2008), 245.

<sup>11</sup> *Ibid.*, 241.

<sup>12</sup> Tim Murphy. *Nietzsche, Metaphor and Religion*. (Albany: State University of New York Press 2001), 144.

<sup>13</sup> Nietzsche, Frederick. *The Portable Nietzsche*. Ed and Trans. Walter Kaufmann. (New York: Penguin Books, 1982), 200-201.

<sup>14</sup> Rene Girard. "Are the Gospels Mythical?" (*First Things* 27-31 April 1996), 29.

<sup>15</sup> Gianni Vattimo. *Beyond Interpretation: The Meaning of Hermeneutics for Philosophy*. (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1997), 50.

<sup>16</sup> Sarah Kofman. *Nietzsche and Metaphor*. (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1993), 71.

<sup>17</sup> J. Z. Smith. "The Domestication of Sacrifice." In *Violent Origins: Ritual Killing and Cultural Formation*. Robert G. Hammerton-Kelly Ed. (Stanford, California: Stanford University Press, 1987).

<sup>18</sup> Lawrence J. Hatab. "Apollo and Dionysus: Nietzschean Expressions of the Sacred," In *Nietzsche and the Gods*. 45-56, Editor Weaver Santaniello. (Albany: State University of New York Press, 2001), 48.

<sup>19</sup> *Ibid.*, 49.

<sup>20</sup> *Ibid.*, 10.

<sup>21</sup> *Ibid.*, 14.

<sup>22</sup> *Ibid.*, 3.

<sup>23</sup> Michel Haar. *Nietzsche and Metaphysics*. Trans. Michael Gendre, Albany: State University of New York Press, 1996), 47.

<sup>24</sup> Porter, James I. "The Invention of Dionysus and the Platonic Midwife: Nietzsche's Birth of Tragedy." *Journal of the History of Philosophy* (2004), 468.

<sup>25</sup> Gayatri Spivak. *A Critique of Postcolonial Reason: Toward a History of the Vanishing Present*. (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1999).

<sup>26</sup> Rene Girard. "The Founding Murder." In *Violence and Truth*, Ed Paul Dumouchel 227-245. Stanford, California: Stanford University Press, 1988), 228.

<sup>27</sup> Ibid., 231.

<sup>28</sup> Ibid., 232.

<sup>29</sup> Ibid., 242.

<sup>30</sup> Rene Girard. *To Double Business Bound*. (Baltimore: John Hopkins University Press. 1978), 68.

<sup>31</sup> Gianni Vattimo *Dialogue With Nietzsche*. Trans. William McCuiag. (New York: Columbia University Press, 2006), 35.

<sup>32</sup> Girard, *Founding Murder*, 243.

<sup>33</sup> Vattimo, *Dialogue*, 58.

<sup>34</sup> I do not imagine Girard is unaware that since he detects mimesis, rivalry and scapegoating in everything, it simply suggests itself to look for it in his writing.

<sup>35</sup> Eric Von der Luft. "Sources of Nietzsche's 'God is Dead' and it's Meaning for Heidegger." (*Journal of the History of Ideas*, 45 no 2 Ap-Je 1984), 263.

<sup>36</sup> Ibid., 265.

<sup>37</sup> Ibid., 264

<sup>38</sup> Hatab, 46.

<sup>39</sup> Chris Fleming. *René Girard: Violence and Mimesis*. (Cambridge; Malden, MA: Polity, 2004), 157.

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