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The Identity and Diversity of Attributes
In the Absolute Idealism of Spinoza

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Thesis submitted to
the School of Graduate Studies and Research
in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree
of doctor of philosophy

University of Ottawa



James A. Thomas, Ottawa, Canada, 1989



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Abstract

The issue addressed in this thesis is one in the absolute idealism of Spinoza. It is one of specifying an interpretation of substance-attribute identity as a solution to the problem of reconciling it with the diversity of the attributes and the oneness of substance. As a testing ground for any proposed solution, a list of questions is generated. Given the countable diversity of the attributes, can we conceive of the identity of each of them with the one substance? Why, if I am identical to a mode of each of infinite attributes, do I perceive only a body? What is the rational explanation for the infinite countable diversity of the attributes and our being directly acquainted with only two? In what manner can we reconcile the divisibility of substance with the activity of thought? How does one reconcile the order of extension seeming to be one of external relations with the essentially internal order of any finite thinking thing? How does one reconcile the independent being of modes of extension with the truth-functionality of ideas? In what manner is it possible to understand the appearance of the uniqueness of the one thing conceived under the idea of the body and the one-among-severalness of the same thing conceived under the idea of the individual's mind? In what manner can it be said that substance, consisting of infinite attributes, is accurately and completely conceived through any one of them while each is conceptually independent of every other? How can the one thing which is mind and body be wholly and accurately conceived to be a mode of either of their respective attributes while modes of differing attributes are also conceptually independent? The interpretations of substance-attribute identity given by John Clark Murray, T.L.S. Sprigge, and Errol E. Harris, in their writings in which they advocate reading Spinoza as an absolute idealist, are argued to be disadvantageous in dealing with the evident parallelism of the attributes. Finally, a proposed solution, offered by an alternative absolute idealist interpretation of substance-attribute identity, is developed in response to each of the above questions.

Preface

The issue addressed in this thesis is in the metaphysics of Spinoza. It will be treated with the dispassionate interest with which one may approach a chess problem, although insofar as it is central to Spinoza's philosophy, a resolution may be expected to give us a basis for a cogent understanding of his rational psychology. The nature of the study will be discussed further in the "Introduction". In these opening words, I wish to express my gratitude to Leslie Armour and Roch Bouchard for bringing me in recent years to a level of scholarly ability I could not otherwise have achieved. My thanks also go to Bob Rejall for providing me with a place where I could do some of my work in the country.

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Introduction

According to Spinoza, each of an infinite diversity of attributes is, in some sense of the term, 'identical' to his one God or substance. The problem of the identity and diversity of the attributes is one of reconciling their diversity with the identity of each with the one substance. What follows is an investigation of this problem. These preliminary remarks outline a method of investigation and the central features of a proposed solution.

The work is composed of two parts. In part I, the conditions of the problem in Spinoza's writings, especially the Ethics, are established. Several formulations of the problem are drawn from the traditional and modern literature. These are, perhaps, not the only formulations of the problem, but they are a suitable measure of the merit of any proposed solution. It may be considered plausible in proportion to the number of these problems it is able to solve, at least, provided it meets two other conditions.

The other conditions are: 1) that it be confirmed in the text, and 2) that it is not out of historical context.

Spinoza's text may contain ambiguities which force us to admit that we cannot be certain about the meaning of much of it; and his doctrine may appear unprecedented in some respects. Nevertheless, it remains possible to find a solution to the problem of the identity and diversity of the attributes. The issue is about substance-attribute identity in the absolute idealism of Spinoza.

To interpret Spinoza as an absolute idealist is to approach him with a certain charitable attitude toward his text in its historical context. The answer to the question why, and in what sense, Spinoza is an absolute idealist will be taken up in chapter 1) of part II). We get a preliminary picture of Spinoza's absolute idealism if it is understood that, for Spinoza, "the Mind's intellectual Love of God is part of the infinite Love by which God loves himself" (Pt. V, prop. 36)¹ and that this means, according to Spinoza, that

¹. Except if otherwise specified, the English translation of Spinoza employed in this work will be Collected Works of Spinoza, 2 Vols., trans. E.M. Curley (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton Univ. Press, 1985). I do not currently have access to the second volume. The only part of it which would be of use in the present investigation would be Curley's translation of the correspondence of Spinoza, after letter 28. But for that there is still the Correspondence of Spinoza, trans. A. Wolf (London: Frank Cass, 1928). For passages of the Latin, I am using the Carl Gebhardt edition of the Opera (Heidelberg: C. Winter, 1925) in four volumes, which in the case of the Ethica I am checking against the more recent edition in the Éthique, 2 Vols., 2nd ed., trans. Charles Appuhn (Paris: Garnier, 1934). Citations of the Ethics will be made in parentheses in the text, indicating, as in the above, for example, that the passage cited is Pt. V, prop. 36 or part V, proposition 36 of the Ethics.

God's love of us "and the Mind's intellectual Love of God are one and the same" (Pt. V, prop. 36, cor.). This is not to say Spinoza is altogether intelligible or correct if taken strictly and literally at his every sentence, nor to say that he was in every respect like Hegel, although the latter is a paradigm of the absolute idealist. Spinoza may be expected to reveal to us, under this reading, some otherwise unexpected possibilities for the development of the doctrine.

It is not, that is to say, as a distant historical phenomenon that we read Spinoza in this way, rather as someone who may still be able to help us to develop a reasonable understanding of ourselves. We will find that Spinoza is very much a Cartesian in the emphasis on the thinking subject, but that he rejects Cartesian dualism in a manner not entirely out of keeping with the contemporary rejection of the Cartesian concept of mind as reflecting an external nature. With the Spinozistic enclosure of infinite reality in the one order of subjectivity, it is assured that the external order of nature is a product of our ordering of our experience.

Spinoza's identification of the one substance and its attributes brings to bear on one reality definitive features of what the strict Cartesian understood to be the inner and outer worlds. The issue is historically one of reconciling an essentially religious view of ourselves with the success of the new astronomy and physics. One could illustrate the predicament by means of Dürer's Melancholia in which an

hermaphroditic figure appears in contemplation of a diversity of systems of symbols for which it would be difficult to find an overall, subjective conception not that of apathy or despair; and this is an aspect of the problem which I have not overlooked. However, it has seemed to me an issue relevant to our understanding of the absolute as, in turn, relevant to our grasp of Spinoza's rational psychology, and that in order to see the change it is supposed to make in the quality of our lives, one must lay some stress on the aesthetic and mystical aspects of even this problem.

It will be argued that significant leeway is allowed in the interpretation of the identity of substance and attribute, and that the solution to the problem is in a suitable interpretation of their identity. One is to say that substance is the one being and the attributes are its diverse orderings. By 'being' we may signify an intuition all-pervasive of experience and by 'order', a system or set of relations in being. According to this interpretation, which will be referred to as the one-being-diversely-ordered interpretation, the attributes are diverse orders in which substance is the one all-pervasive intuition.

The alternative I defend will be referred to as the one-order-diversely-constituted interpretation. According to it, the one complete order of experience is constituted by each of the attributes as a nuance on, or type of all-pervasive intuition. Spinoza changes the terms of the problem,

according to this alternative, by stressing attribute as intuition rather than order.

The unity of being and order is respected by either alternative view of substance-attribute identity. The potentiality of substance is natura naturans or being and its expression is natura naturata i.e. the order emerging out of this potentiality as a set or system of relations in being. Whether we take an attribute to be, on the side of its unity with substance, an order or an intuition, substance as conceived through one or another attribute is one and the same thing.

To develop the alternative proposed may seem at once anachronistic and irrelevant. It may seem anachronistic because one tends to think it is impossible to change the terms of the problem of the attributes from those of one concerning the relation of Descartes' extended and thinking substances as distinct orders. It may seem irrelevant because one tends to think that the important issue in question is one of reconciling the order of ideas or that of eternity and the order of extension as that of temporal or inadequate experience. The tendency, in other words, is to view the issue as one of reconciling the order of our experience with that of the absolute.

It is possible to focus on attribute as either order or intuition. With Spinoza we are only beginning to get an understanding of this insofar as Spinoza's development of the

system requires the concept of 'attribute' to function separately as intuition and order. We will see in what manner these separate functions are at work in the system. What the proposed alternative would imply about the history of the dispute is that Spinoza emphasized intuition as attribute, on the side of its diversity, and found that through it the order of the external world is related to that of the absolute as an ordering of appearances within centers of experience; one accompanied by a relatively low degree of the strength of intuition.

Once again, whether it is one order diversely intuited through its attributes or one intuition diversely ordered, the one reality is the order of the absolute and that of time and the external world is a reordering of it. However, whereas the one alternative makes extension the order of time and the external world, the other makes it one among other types of intuition all-pervasive, in varying degrees of strength, of this and the order of the absolute. Thought is the intuition of coherence among ideas reaching its height of intensity in the affirmation of the order of the absolute, extension is the intuition of spatiality. Like the coherence of ideas in thought, the need for a geometrically possible ordering of experience is inherent in the greater strength of the intuition of spatiality which reaches its height in the relative space characteristic of experience in a diversity of perspectives.

No attribute, on the side of its diversity, is, according to this interpretation, the order of the absolute, but any one of them is a means by which we come to know it. By 'attribute' Spinoza means what "intellectus de substantia percipit tanquam ejusdem essentiam constituens" or what the "intellect perceives of substance as constituting its essence" (Pt. I, def. 4). An attribute is, according to either interpretation, whatever it is which determines our experience of substance. The question at issue is whether it is determined by conformity to diverse orders or diverse nuances on intuition. One may say of the first, it is like the conformity of an endeavour to a plan; of the second, that it is like the conformity of a work of art to the limitations placed on it by the medium of its realization.

I) The Problem of the Identity
and Diversity of the Attributes

The following three claims appear to be irreconcilable in Spinoza's system: 1) that substance is unique; 2) that the attributes are each identical to substance, and 3) that the attributes are diverse.¹ The problem of the identity and diversity of the attributes is that of reconciling the identity of each of the attributes with the one substance and the diversity of the attributes.

In this first part of the thesis, the conditions of the problem are examined. The first chapter details the uniqueness of substance and, in the second, it will be shown that the identity of substance and attribute, while firmly enough entrenched in the Ethics, is open to interpretation and this opens the way to a solution to the problem by means of an interpretation. It will have to be an identity in

¹. The problem of the attributes is set up by Barker as the incompatibility of these three claims in "Notes on the Second Part of Spinoza's Ethics", Studies in Spinoza, ed. S. Paul Kashap (Los Angeles: Univ. of California Press, 1972) 125.

difference¹, since, as the third chapter will show in detail, the attributes are diverse. We will be considering the alternatives: 1) of regarding substance as one being diversely ordered, or 2) diversely constituted by its attributes as nuances on natura naturans.

¹. For the concept of 'identity in difference', see F.H. Bradley, Principles of Logic, 2 Vols., 2nd ed. (London: Oxford Univ. Press, 1922) 1: ch.V, sec. 1-9.

1) The Uniqueness of Substance

The claim that there is only one substance is an explicit theorem of the Ethics grounded on some of the basic premises of the system. The oneness of substance is not a one-among-manyness, but that of something wholly unique.¹ The thesis of the oneness or uniqueness of substance is a basis of the advantage Spinoza may understand himself to have over Descartes on the mind-body issue. The proof from the Ethics of the oneness of substance and the advantage it gives Spinoza over Descartes are examined in the first and second sections of this chapter, each as a reason for holding that the oneness of substance is a fundamental tenet of Spinoza's system.

¹. Spinoza, "Metaphysical Thoughts" Pt.I, ch. 6.

a) The Proof of the Uniqueness of Substance
in the Ethics

The Ethics, Pt. I, prop. 14 states that "except God, no substance can be or be conceived". In other words, there is only one substance and that substance is God. Our examination of the proof from the Ethics of this proposition will show that the oneness of substance is a fundamental tenet of Spinoza's system.

The proof employs as its first premise that every substance exists necessarily. Spinoza concludes from this that if there were a substance other than God then they would both have to exist. The second premise of the proof is that God is "an absolutely infinite being" or one of whom no attribute could be denied. No substance could exist if it did not have some attribute. Thus, another substance would have to share an attribute with God. The third and final premise is that two or more substances cannot share the same attribute. Hence, a contradiction arises on the supposition that a substance exists other than God and there "can be or be conceived" no other substance.

Uniqueness of Substance

The claim that there is only one substance is an explicit theorem of the Ethics. It is impossible to eliminate it from the system without also eliminating, at least, one of the premises on which it is based. But the premises are, themselves, explicit theorems or supported on some of the basic axioms and definitions in the system.

The first premise of the proof of the fourteenth proposition is that every substance exists necessarily. This is the corollary of the claim that it belongs to the nature of substance to exist (Pt. I, prop. 7, cor.). This proposition is derived from the claim according to which substance can have no "cause" or reason for its existence other than itself. The thesis that substance is the cause of itself is given on the basis of the doctrine that one substance cannot be the cause of another (Pt. I, prop. 6).

The proof of this is given in the two claims: 1) that one thing cannot be the cause of another if they have nothing in common, and 2) that two or more substances cannot share the same attribute. The second of these claims was also the third premise of the proof of the oneness of substance and they are each an explicit theorem of the Ethics. It follows from these two claims that one substance cannot be the cause of another, since "two substances having different attributes have nothing in common with one another" (Pt. I, prop. 2).

Proof from the Ethics

Uniqueness of Substance

The following is the proof of the very proposition that one thing cannot be the cause of another if they have nothing in common (Pt. I, prop. 3). The first premise of the proof is that things which have nothing in common cannot be understood by reference to each other. One can state the location of an object in space, for example, by reference to another object to which it bears some relation of distance or size, but only because they are both objects in space and have it in common. Or, one can understand the conclusion of an argument by reference to its premises, but only owing to their having a logic in common. The analogy is apt if inference is assumed to be synthetic, non-analytic i.e. a conclusion may be said to emerge in the logical development of our understanding of the premises.

The second premise of the proof is that if things cannot be understood by reference to each other then the one cannot be the cause of the other. It follows that things cannot be the cause of each other if they have nothing in common. The first and second premises of the argument are the fifth and fourth axioms of the Ethics, Pt. I or some of the basic premises of the system.

Taking now the second premise of the original proof of the oneness of substance, it is that God is "an absolutely infinite being" or one of whom no attribute could be denied. This is directly given in the sixth definition of the first

Proof from the Ethics

Uniqueness of Substance

part of the Ethics. It is, itself, basic and definitive of Spinoza's original intention in developing the system.

A question is raised by Bennett¹ about the diversity of attributes. Spinoza could be using 'infinite' in the sense "all" when he says that there are infinite attributes.² On this reading, the infinity of substance's attributes "does not entail that God exists other than as extended and as thinking, i.e. that there are more than two attributes".³ But the "negative principle of sufficient reason"⁴ has the implication in the system. Spinoza says that "for each thing there must be assigned a cause, or reason, as much for its existence as for its nonexistence" and that "a thing necessarily exists if there is no reason or cause which prevents it from existing" (Pt. I, prop. 11, pr. 2). But nothing could prevent the existence of a substance with an unlimited diversity of attributes.

Spinoza argues that the more reality a thing has, the more attributes (Pt. I, prop. 9) and "a being absolutely

¹. Jonathan Bennett, A Study of Spinoza's Ethics (New York: Hackett, 1984).

². Bennett, Study 75-6.

³. Bennett, Study 76.

⁴. An expression familiar to Leslie Armour's students of metaphysics.

Proof from the Ethics

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infinite must be defined (as we taught in D6) as a being that consists of infinite attributes" (Pt. I, prop. 10, sch.). Allison has proposed that "the claim that something possesses more reality than something else is equivalent to the claim that there are more perspectives from which it must be viewed".¹ To say the attributes are perspectives on substance is, he says, a worthwhile analogy.²

It is difficult not to suspect that Spinoza is using 'more reality' in an odd way. One can say an idea has more reality than another without thereby implying that it is other than a mode of thought. If it is said that someone has more strength than another, it can mean that the one can lift more than the other or that the one is not only physically capable, but also intellectually, whereas the other lacks in some degree one of these "strengths". The difference between saying "more reality" and "more attributes" is like that between saying "more strength" in this special sense and "more strengths". For substance's attributes are nuances on the infinite potentiality of God. They are each like the water in a pond which seems to be capable of producing spontaneously every order of life

¹. Henry E. Allison, Benedict de Spinoza: An Introduction, Revised ed., (New Haven: Yale Univ. Press, 1987) 57.

². Allison 50-1.

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compatible with its nature. What Spinoza is doing, in the scholium to the Ethics, Pt. I, prop. 10, is something very much like saying that since one has infinite strength, one must have unlimited types of strength as well as every abundance of each type. There should be infinitely many attributes of Spinoza's absolute substance.¹

The issue, as Bennett remarks, is complicated by developments owing to Cantor in the 19th-century.² We will not have to discuss Cantor in order to deal with the present issue. It is also complicated, however, by the fact that Spinoza did not think that an infinite number was conceivable, at least, not in the same way as a finite number.³ Spinoza's infinity of attributes may be understood as a countable infinity, if not a numerical infinity, even though the whole counting of a countable infinity might entail a complex or even an impossible task. Spinoza's God should be regarded as having a countable infinity of attributes like extension and thought.

¹. See also the recent discussion of this question in Arthur W. Collins, Thought and Nature (Notre Dame: Indiana Univ. Press, 1985) 86-95.

². Bennett, Study 76.

³. Letter 12.

Uniqueness of Substance

Now, a third claim on which the oneness of substance is based is, as it may be recalled, that two or more substances cannot share the same attribute (Pt. I, prop. 5). The argument Spinoza provides for this proposition depends on the absurdity of supposing that there are two or more substances sharing the same attribute. If there were then they would have to be distinguished by either a difference in their attributes or their "affections". That is to say, the difference would have to be found either in the essential nature of each or in terms of the "modifications" or modes within it. The basis for this inference is the proposition that two or more things can be distinguished only by a difference in their attributes or their affections (Pt. I, prop. 4). If the distinction is drawn in terms of their attributes then they could not share the same attribute after all. Thus, the distinction would have to be found in their affections. But the essence of a substance is "prior in nature to" its affections or is that from which they are derived (Pt. I, prop. 1). Since an attribute must be understood to be the essence of substance (Pt. I, def. 4), a difference could not be found in the affections unless in the attributes. It follows that between two or more substances sharing the same attribute a distinction cannot be drawn, and it is absurd to suppose that two or more substances could share the same attribute.

Proof from the Ethics

Uniqueness of Substance

The claim that the essence of substance is prior to its affections raises the question of how the essence of substance is related to the order of its modes i.e. natura naturata? The school of Spinoza is linked to that of Plotinus. Natura naturata is like the nous or intelligence in the first book of Plotinus' Enneads. Bréhier suggests that the intelligence of Plotinus "as the dator formarum" is "Aristotle's pure act, that is to say, Being realized in its full and complete perfection", since Plotinus does not think that one can draw a distinction between potential and actual being.¹ Spinoza also identifies potential and actual being, and holds that all potentiality is actualized (Pt. I, prop. 16). The "very" essence, as natura naturans, is prior to natura naturata only because the intuition of potentiality, which is the one, gives rise to, and is that in which emerges the order which is the other.

The proof of the claim that two or more substances cannot share the same attribute is based on two other explicit theorems of the Ethics and these are grounded, in turn, on more basic elements of the system.

The first basis of the proof is the proposition that two or more things can be distinguished only in their attributes or their affections (Pt. I, prop. 4). The proof

¹. É. Bréhier, Philosophy of Plotinus, trans. Joseph Thomas (Chicago, Univ. of Chicago Press, 1967) 89.

Proof from the Ethics

Uniqueness of Substance

of this proposition rests on the first axiom of the Ethics, Pt. I according to which everything that is, is either "in itself" or "in another". The concept of 'mode' is defined as "the affections of substance, or that which is in another through which it is also conceived" (Pt. I, def. 5). The concept of 'substance' is defined as "what is in itself and conceived through itself" (Pt. I, def. 3). The only things there are, then, in terms of which a distinction could be drawn are substances i.e. attributes (Pt. I, def. 4) or their affections. The argument is developed on the basis of no other than the first axiom of the Ethics, Pt. I and the definitions of 'substance', 'mode', and 'attribute'.

The proposition that substance is "prior in nature to" or the basis for inferring its nature is the second ground for the claim that two or more substances cannot share the same attribute. The proof rests on the definition of 'substance' according to which its nature is "contained in itself" and the definition of 'mode' according to which the modes are "contained in something else". Substance is that on the basis of which its own nature or order and connection of modes is the type of thing to be explained. It is the basis for the derivation and natural development of its affections. The proof is consistent with what was said above about the priority of the essence of substance if, as it seems, Scruton is correct to observe "Spinoza means by

Proof from the Ethics

Uniqueness of Substance

'in': 'B is in A' is another way of saying A is the explanation of B".¹ To be in substance, as are its modes, is for the existence or nature of a thing to be explained by substance, and to say that substance is in itself is to say that its existence is self-explanatory.

Its existence is grounded in its nature as defined by the negative principle of sufficient reason. Indeed, in the system of Spinoza everything must have a reason or cause either for its being or its non-being (Pt. I, prop. 11, pr. 2). The proof of the priority of substance over its modes is grounded, as ultimately are all the others cast in support of the oneness of substance, on the most fundamental principles of the system.

The theorem of the oneness of substance is directly or indirectly based on some of the earliest stated definitions and axioms of the Ethics. Thus, it could not be eliminated from the system without also eliminating, at least, one of these primary and basic elements. They could not be removed from the system unless one were willing to drastically alter the sense and purpose of the whole. This is one reason for saying that the oneness of substance is a fundamental tenet of Spinoza's system.

¹. Roger Scruton, Spinoza (New York: Oxford Univ. Press, 1986) 37.

b) The Uniqueness of Substance
and Cartesian Mind-Body Interactionism

Spinoza addresses the central issue posed by the philosophy of Descartes: how can the right distinction be drawn between the mind and the body? According to Descartes, mind and body are distinct substances, and yet they are capable of causal interaction. The problem with Descartes' doctrine of mind-body interaction is, according to Spinoza, that the relation of cause and effect cannot be established between entities so disparate as the mind and body. Spinoza solves this problem by making mind and body co-ordinate modes of one substance, and this is another reason for regarding the oneness of substance as a central tenet of his system.

The problem of mind-body interaction does not arise on Spinoza's account because mind and body are not distinct substances interacting. They are one and the same thing in substance as conceived through different attributes. The oneness of substance is, in this way, Spinoza's solution to the problem of mind-body interaction in Descartes. In this

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section it will be argued that this solution to the problem is an advantage of Spinoza's system over that of Descartes and that this is a reason for understanding the oneness of substance to be a fundamental doctrine of Spinoza.

They do not disagree on every point. There is much agreement between them on the concepts of 'substance', 'attribute', and 'mode'. "By substance" says Descartes:

we understand nothing other than a thing which exists in such a way as to depend on no other thing for its existence. And there is only one substance which can be understood to depend on no other thing whatsoever, namely God.¹

Spinoza believes that substance is the cause of itself or that, in another manner of speaking, it depends for its existence on itself alone (Pt. I, prop. 7, pr.). Spinoza also believes that there is, where 'substance' is understood in the strict sense of a wholly independent being, only one substance and that it is God (Pt. I, prop. 14). Spinoza and

¹. Descartes, "Principles of Philosophy", Philosophical Writings of Descartes, trans. Cottingham (New York: Cambridge Univ. Press, 1984) 1: Pt. I, sec. 51 (A.T. 8.1/24). In parentheses in the note (in this and in further references to Descartes) the volume and page will be for Descartes, Oeuvres de Descartes 12 Vols., eds. Charles Adam and Paul Tannery (Paris: J. Vrin, 1964).

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Descartes are very much in agreement in their use of 'substance' where the term is taken in its strict sense.

The concept of 'attribute' is also very much a point of agreement between Spinoza and Descartes. It is defined by Descartes much as it is in Spinoza's system. Descartes says that "each substance has one principal property which constitutes its nature and essence".¹ The essence of a substance is, according to Descartes, perceived by the intellect. This is evident from the conclusion he draws from the analogy of the wax and extended or "corporeal" substance: "the perception I have of it is a case not of vision or touch or imagination ... but of purely mental scrutiny".² This is because the changing qualities or affections of the wax or any extended substance, as perceived through the senses or as portrayed as such in the "imagination" is inessential to what remains throughout its affections or modifications. The attribute of a substance, that is to say, what constitutes its essence, is perceived by the intellect.

The concept of 'attribute' is defined by Spinoza, according to a viable translation, as "what the intellect

¹. Descartes, "Principles of Philosophy" Pt. I, sec. 53 (A.T. 8.1/25).

². Descartes, "Meditations on First Philosophy", trans. Cottingham 2: 2nd Meditation (A.T. 7/31).

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perceives of a substance, as constituting its essence" (Pt. I def. 4). There appears to be a very great deal of agreement between them on the concept of 'attribute'.

The relation between substance and its modes or affections is very much the same for Spinoza as for Descartes, and it is in terms of this relation that we understand the concept of 'mode'. The latter thinks it wise to allow that:

By mode ... we understand exactly the same as what is ... meant by an attribute or quality. But we employ the term mode when we are thinking of substance as being affected or modified; when the modification enables the substance to be designated as a substance of such and such a kind, we use the term quality; and finally, when we are simply thinking in a more general way of what is in a substance, we use the term attribute.¹

The essential attribute or overall quality of a substance can be modified or measured, interpreted in various ways while this overall quality remains the same. The modes are to the essence of substance as the various modifications of

¹. Descartes, "Principles of Philosophy" Pt. I, sec. 56 (A.T. 8.1/26).

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the wax are to that which in the wax remains stable throughout all of its modifications.

Spinoza also regards the modes of substance as modifications of that which remains of it throughout all of them. This is evident from the conclusion Spinoza draws from the analogy of substance and water: "water, insofar as it is water, is generated and corrupted, but insofar as it is substance, it is neither generated nor corrupted" (Pt. I, prop. 15, sch.). This is because substance is the stable point of reference by means of which is possible to understand such appearances and disappearances of things; a substance, as it is in itself, is its essential attribute which is the all-pervasive intuition or else the comprehensive order in which its modifications occur. 'Mode' is a dependent entity in relation to its substance for both Descartes and Spinoza - even defined by the latter as dependent on another thing through which it has to be conceived (Pt. I, def. 5).

The modes of respective attributes in Spinoza's system are also quite like those in Descartes'. The principal modes of thought for Descartes are those of a "thing that thinks" or of a substance which "doubts, understands, affirms, denies, is willing, is unwilling, and also imagines

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and has sensory perceptions".¹ The modes of extension are for Descartes the modifications of body or extended substance. Its principal modifications are "length, breadth and depth".² Spinoza also suggests that we may call the modes of extension "length, breadth, and depth". Spinoza is also very much a Cartesian in his use of 'idea' to refer to any mode of thought, as suggested by his definition of 'idea' in the Ethics (Pt. II, def. 3), and in his including among the modes of thought "willing, sensing, understanding, loving, ect."³

The relation of attributes to modes in Spinoza's system is like that of the One and the intelligible order of things in Plotinus. The one is just the simple quality of being, and intelligence is the ordering of being. The relation of the One to intelligence is like that of natura naturans to natura naturata. Bréhier says that the unity of the order is higher and anterior to the order itself and is that from which the order proceeds.⁴ In other words, the One has the

¹. Descartes, "Meditations on First Philosophy" 2nd Meditation (A.T. 7/28).

². Descartes, "Principles of Philosophy" Pt. II, sec. 4 (A.T. 8.1/42).

³. Spinoza, "God, Man, and His Well-Being" Pt. I, ch.2.

⁴. Bréhier 46.

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same priority over intelligence as natura naturans has over natura naturata. "Intelligence or the intelligible world" Bréhier says "is ... none other than the very knowledge of the sensible world", that is, informed matter, and:

for the realization of order in matter and for the creation of a sensible world, an intermediary being is required which is active and mobile, extending between Intelligence and matter in so far as the latter is capable of receiving it. This third hypostasis is Soul.¹

The role of the Soul for Plotinus ought to be fulfilled in Spinoza's system as well. It is the centre of experience.

'Centre of experience' can apply within the external order of sensory experience insofar as it is a reordering of the wholly adequate and internal order of ourselves in the one centre in which the order of experience in every centre is explained. The external order of experience could be the attribute of extension, or Plotinus's sensible world; while its internal order, in which the external is known, would be the attribute of thought. The internal and the external order of our experience otherwise could be each pervaded by

¹. Bréhier 45-6.

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extension and thought and every other attribute as nuances on the intuition all-pervasive of these orders of experience.

In connection with both Plotinus and Descartes, 'matter' in Spinoza is of interest. Descartes insists that matter "can be moved in various ways, not by itself but by whatever else comes in contact with it".¹ Body can have motion imparted to it, then, only from without and ultimately from the hand of God directly or indirectly through the person of a "created" thinking substance. However, matter, in Spinoza's system, turns out to have a life of its own.

This comes out in Spinoza's response to one of Tschirnhaus's objections raised in one of his letters to Spinoza.² The objection is that it is difficult to understand how if extended substance is identified with extension, it can of itself give rise to its modifications. Spinoza admits by way of his response that:

from extension as Descartes conceives it, that is,
as a quiescent mass, it is not only as you say,

¹. Descartes, "Meditations on First Philosophy" 2nd Meditation (A.T.7/26).

². Letter 80.

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difficult to prove the existence of bodies, but absolutely impossible. For matter at rest will continue at rest as much as possible, and will not be set in motion except by some stronger external cause.¹

The objection seems to hold against one who like Descartes defines 'matter' as extension, but not against Spinoza. There is agreement between Spinoza and Descartes in allowing that from extension alone, regarded in its inertness, no modification can be derived. "Therefore matter" according to Spinoza "is badly defined by Descartes as Extension".²

Hampshire makes Spinoza out to be a kind of materialist, but "his was a materialism with a difference, if only because the word 'matter' normally suggests something solid and inert, and no such notion of matter is to found in his writing".³ It is the idea of the conatus which is, as Hampshire remarks, absent from Descartes' conception of matter, but is "exactly the concept which

¹. Letter 81.

². Letter 83.

³. Stuart Hampshire, Spinoza (Harmondsworth: Penguin, 1951) 79-80.

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biologists have often demanded as essential to the understanding of organic and living systems".¹

But matter or extended substance, as it is in itself, is the experience of extension as internally ordered; and the principle governing this order or activity of being is the negative principle of sufficient reason as in the case of thinking substance or substance as conceived through any other attribute. That is why extended substance is, itself, able to explain its modifications. In this way, Aristotelian and Gnostic conceptions of matter i.e. as the independent recipient of order drops out of the system and it begins to be understood as an expression of the one all-embracing order of the intellect. This is owing to the way in which Spinoza reduces extension and thought to attributes of the one absolute substance which is also, as Lewis remarks², the root of Spinoza's rejection of the traditional theistic and transcendent God (Pt. I, prop. 18).

In other words, the central disagreement between Spinoza and the preceding tradition as well as with Descartes is over the oneness of substance. 'Substance' is understood by Descartes both as independent entity and as

¹. Hampshire 78.

². Douglas Lewis, "Spinoza on Extension", Midwest Studies in Philosophy 1(1976).

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the bearer of properties or subject of predication, and this is why there appear to be as many substances, in the writings of Descartes, as there are things to be talked about. Thus, extension or corporeality is one substance and thought, or the generic character of thinking things, is another. What he says about thought or extension appears to be intended to apply to any body or any thinking thing. God is the only wholly independent substance and every other is dependent on God. However, some created substances are independent of each other.

Descartes says that we draw a "real distinction" between things or "we perceive that two substances are really distinct simply from the fact that we can clearly and distinctly understand the one apart from the other".¹ That is the ground for Descartes' concluding that the mind and body are distinct substances:

I have a clear and distinct idea of myself, in so far as I am simply a thinking, non-extended thing; and on the other hand I have a distinct idea of

¹. Descartes, "Principles of Philosophy" Pt. I, sec. 60 (A.T. 8.1/28).

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body, in so far as this is simply an extended, non-thinking thing.¹

Thus, it should be possible to conceive of Cartesian mind and body in the same way as Spinoza says it should be possible to conceive of the attributes of his one substance i.e. as "really distinct" or each one without the help of the conception of any other (Pt. I, prop. 10, sch.). There is perfect accord between them in holding that, in the strict sense, it is impossible that there be any more than one substance or God. The mind and body are created substances.

We are each a contingent mixer of mind and body, and each of these relates to the other causally. That is to say, our mental activity appears to bring about events in the body and the activity of the body appears to initiate events in, or states of the mind. The primary reason offered by Descartes for saying that the mind is causally related to an independent and extended substance has to do with the occurrence of certain modes of thinking. We experience pain, for example, signalling apparently an inappropriate functioning of the body. Descartes argues that these passive experiences of pain are owing to the

¹. Descartes, "Meditations on First Philosophy" 6th Meditation (A.T. 7/78).

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mind's interaction with an independent substance. Otherwise, we would have more control over our pains than we do. This is also the case with sensory impressions which acquire their objective (representational) reality from what is "formally or eminently" i.e. actually or potentially in the object of representation.

For occurrences of such modes of thought, the mind is an inadequate explanation and it could rather be explained by reference to the influence of the infinite intellect of God. But "God is not a deceiver" and, says Descartes, "since he has given me a great propensity to believe that they are produced by corporeal things" it seems to follow that the source of our sensations is an extended substance of which instances are particular bodies.¹ Illusions are suffered by the insane and those unconscious of the explanation for their illusory experience as Arthur Collier pointed out in his Clavis Universalis of 1713², and so the way seems clear for an account of the appearance of an external world in the one internal order of substance.

¹. Descartes, "Meditations on First Philosophy" 6th Meditation (A.T. 7/ 78-81).

². See Collier's discussion of Descartes' argument in "Clavis Universalis", Metaphysical Tracts by English Philosophers of the Eighteenth Century, ed. Samuel Parr (1837; New York: Georg Olms, 1974) 37-40.

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The problem with the thesis of mind-body interaction is, according to Spinoza, that between wholly disparate entities it is impossible to establish a relation of cause and effect. The mind and body are such wholly disparate entities. Descartes admits the effect should be contained in the cause: "it is manifest by the natural light that there must be at least as much <reality> in the efficient and total cause as in the effect of that cause".¹ The concept of 'cause' with which Descartes and Spinoza are dealing differs considerably from that of Hume's terms of regular temporal succession. The 'cause' in Spinoza's sense is the reason for or explanation of its effect. The reason for the effect is always the essence of the substance of which the effect is a mode. Descartes agrees with Spinoza in holding that "if things have nothing in common with one another, one of them cannot be the cause of the other" (Pt. I, prop. 3).² Indeed, if the effect must be in the cause

¹. Descartes, "Meditations on First Philosophy" 3rd Meditation (A.T. 7/40).

². Textual support is given to the ascription of a causal likeness principle to Descartes in Kenneth C. Clatterbaugh, "Descartes's Causal Likeness Principle", Philosophical Review 89.3 (1980) 380-82. Clatterbaugh cites Descartes, "Meditations on First Philosophy" 3rd Meditation (A.T. 7/40); "Objections and Replies", trans. Cottingham 2: 2nd Replies (A.T. 9.1/128 and 106); Philosophical Letters, trans. Anthony Kenny (London: Oxford Univ. Press, 1970) 91 (A.T. 3/274), 114 (A.T. 3/428), and A.T. 5/156.

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then it is as the conclusion is in the logical development of an argument. But "things that have nothing in common with one another also cannot be understood through one another, or the concept of the one does not involve the concept of the other" (Pt. I, ax. 5). One way of saying this is that things which have nothing in common cannot be involved in each other any more than a conclusion could be in an argument unless they had a logic in common.

The mind and body, as Descartes understands them, are really distinct substances, since they can each be conceived without the help of the conception of the other or of anything in the other. Thus, the modes of an extended substance cannot be thought to be involved in the mind or any thinking thing nor the modes of mind in any body; and so neither can the body be thought to be the cause of states of the mind nor the mind the cause of occurrences in the body.

The pineal gland is, it seems, at some time intended by Descartes to act as a bridge between the mind and body. "The soul has its principal seat" enjoins Descartes "in the small gland located in the middle of the brain. From there it radiates through the rest of the body by means of the animal spirits ...".¹ This gland is part of the body, but the mind's will appears in the movements of the gland. The

¹. Descartes, "Passions of the Soul", trans. Cottingham 1: Pt. I, art. 34 (A.T. 11/354).

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movements of the gland cause the "animal spirits" to stir throughout the nerves and muscles thereby transferring the mind's will to the rest of the body. The motions of the body are similarly reflected in the stirring of these spirits which, in turn, bring the effects of such bodily motions to the gland, there making themselves apparent to the mind in the form of perceptions, sensations and also passions evoked by the activity of the animal spirits within the body.

The problem of interaction is a difficulty also at the level of the pineal gland. This is where Spinoza raises the issue (Pt. V, Preface). The problem is again one of explaining the interaction of wholly disparate entities. The mind can no more interact with the pineal gland than with any portion of an extended substance.

The problem does not arise in Spinoza's system because thinking and extended substance are not separate entities, nor is the external distinct from the system of the internal. Mind and body are not substances, rather distinct modes of one substance. They are one and the same thing in substance "now comprehended under this attribute, now under that", and this means "expressed in two ways" (Pt. II, prop. 7, sch.). Accordingly, a mind and body are "one and the same individual which is conceived now under the attribute of Thought, now under the attribute of Extension" (Pt. II,

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prop. 21, sch.). The mind and body compose one entity shown alternately as a mode of thought and as a mode of extension.

The difficulty about mind-body interaction enters the way of ideas with Descartes. Watson diagnoses the "breakdown of Cartesian metaphysics" as in part due to its inability to resolve the difficulty¹, and he finds that none of the various attempts made by Descartes and others to resolve the issue can be made to work on the basis of a dualistic ontology.

The uniqueness of substance is the root of Spinoza's solution to the problem in Descartes; it represents the advantage of Spinoza's system over that of Descartes on the mind-body issue. Whether the solution brings with it other types of difficulty is another question. The fact remains that the oneness of substance could not be eliminated from the system without mis-representing its role in history, and this is a ground for asserting the centrality of the oneness of substance in Spinoza's system.

There are two reasons, indicated in the above, for concluding that the uniqueness of substance is a fundamental

¹. Richard Watson, Breakdown of Cartesian Metaphysics (Atlantic Highlands, N.J.: Humanities Press, 1987) 53-6.

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tenet of Spinoza's system. One is that it is grounded on some of the basic elements of the system. The other is that it is on the basis of this proposition that much of Spinoza's historical significance rests. This is one, and the next chapter will focus on the second basis of the problem of identity and diversity i.e. the identity of substance and attribute.

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2) The Identity of Substance and Attribute

It is clear from a number of passages in the Ethics that Spinoza intended the attributes to be each, in some sense, 'identical' to substance. The point will be evident from the discussion of these passages in this chapter. On this basis we will establish the second of the three conditions of the problem of identity and diversity. The following three sections each begins with a passage or passages from the Ethics and then offers some argumentation on their basis in favour of an identity of substance and attribute.

The result of this will be support for the contention that substance is identical to attribute, but leaving to a large extent open the question of the interpretation of this identity. Granted the reality of the diversity of the attributes, the options will be one-being-diversely-ordered, one-order-diversely-constituted. Each is a version of identity in difference and each is a possible solution to the problem of the identity and diversity of the attributes.

a) The Definition of 'Attribute' in the Ethics

Per attributum intelligo id, quod intellectus de substantia percipit tanquam ejusdem essentiam constituens (Pt. I, def. 4).

The above passage from the Ethics is quoted in the Latin, since the translation of Spinoza's definition of 'attribute' is a matter of controversy and one which centers around the relation of the attributes to substance. Haserot remarks on three sources of ambiguity in it and he develops a matrix of possible translations.¹

The central ambiguity is with tanquam which could be either 'as' or 'as if'. The definition may be translated, then, either as 'that which the intellect perceives of substance as' or 'as if constituting the essence of substance'. The issue is whether Spinoza intends each of the attributes actually or only apparently to constitute the essence of substance. Those who, like Hart, hold that

¹. Francis S. Haserot, "Spinoza's Definition of Attribute", Kashap Studies.

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Spinoza intends each of them actually to constitute its essence have an objectivist interpretation.¹ Wolfson adopts the view that each of the attributes is intended by Spinoza only apparently to constitute the essence of substance and Wolfson has a subjectivist reading. The diversity of the attributes is, on this view, merely in intellectu.² The 'as if' translation supports the subjectivist reading.

The question of whether the definition can be read as other than identifying each of the attributes and substance is answered in the negative if the 'as' translation holds; for on this translation the attributes are each in a sense 'identified' with substance. Either of the two absolute idealist interpretations of the identity of substance and attribute can satisfy the objectivist reading. There is a real diversity of attributes as substance's ways of being ordered or of being and yet, in either case, substance remains one and the same as the same being or the same order in each attribute.

Haserot notes that twenty-six of twenty-nine instances of the use of tanquam in the Ethics are clearly intended in the sense of 'as', and this offers a good deal of support

¹. Alan Hart, Spinoza's Ethics Part I and II: A Platonic Commentary Leiden: E.J. Brill, 1983) 18.

². Harry Austryn Wolfson, Philosophy of Spinoza, 2 Vols. (New York: Schocken Books, 1934) 1: 146.

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for the objectivist translation of it in the definition.¹ Hart remarks on additional support in the argument that the subjectivity of the intellect's perception of substance would be, for Spinoza, self-refuting.² Support for the objectivist reading is also confirmation of either absolute idealist interpretation of the identity of substance and attribute.

¹. Haserot 30.

². Hart 18; see also M. Gueroult, Spinoza, 2 Vols. (Hildesheim: Georg Olms, 1968) 1: App. 3.

Definition of Attribute

b) The Infinity of Substance and Attribute

By God I understand a being absolutely infinite, i.e., a substance consisting of an infinity of attributes, of which each one expresses an eternal and infinite essence (Pt. I, def. 6).

The above definition of 'God' in the Ethics can be cited in confirmation of the identity of substance and attribute. It ascribes 'infinity', in some sense, to both substance and each of its attributes. And it will be argued that the shared infinity of substance and attribute is compatible with either absolute idealist reading of substance-attribute identity.

In the explication, Spinoza says:

I say absolutely infinite, not infinite in its kind; for if something is only infinite in its own kind, we can deny infinite attributes of it; but if something is absolutely infinite, whatever

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expresses essence and involves no negation pertains to its essence (Pt. I, def. 6, exp.).

God is absolutely infinite while each of the attributes is infinite in its kind. This is also evident from a restatement of the definition: "divine nature has absolutely infinite attributes (by D6), each of which also expresses an essence infinite in its own kind" (Pt. I, prop. 16). Since each attribute is infinite in its kind, it is suggested that while substance and attribute are each infinite, God differs from each attribute in having infinite attributes.

In a letter to Oldenburg, Spinoza allows that "Extension" can be regarded as "...not infinite absolutely, but only insofar as it is Extension, i.e., in its own kind".¹ But if, as we will see, all the attributes enter into the system of any one then an attribute, as such, being infinite in its kind does not prevent its being absolutely infinite on the side of its unity with substance. For an attribute involves no negation of any kind (Pt. I, def. 6). With the negative principle of sufficient reason, it follows that nothing can prevent the emergence of infinite attributes in substance as conceived through any one.

¹. Letter 4.

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Caird counts as one and the same the infinity of substance and attribute, remarking that substance and each of its attributes could be limited neither within any attribute other than itself nor "within its own sphere".¹ For, indeed, Spinoza says not only that the attributes are each that which "expresses essence and involves no negation" (Pt. I, def. 6, exp.), but also that the attributes do not negate each other (Pt. I, def. 2).

In the letter to Meyer on infinity, Spinoza says "we separate the Affections of Substance from Substance itself and reduce them to classes [classes] so that as far as possible we may imagine them easily".² Spinoza then goes on to say that this process is the origin of our conception of numerical diversity, and he proceeds to argue that substance, as it is in itself, cannot be infinite in that way. "Measure, Time, and Number" are, according to Spinoza, only "Modes of thinking, or rather of imagining". Time, or the breaking up of duration into discrete moments, along with the others are "aids of the Imagination" or what we might term pragmatic fictions. They work to help us to organize our understanding of our experience in somewhat the

¹. John Caird, Spinoza (1888; Freeport, N.Y.: Books for Libraries Press, 1971) 149.

². Letter 12.

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same manner as placing over a vivid and articulate landscape a transparency with a graph drawn over it helps us to specify a particular point of interest. But the reality of substance is like the vivid landscape from which no element could be removed distorting, for whatever purpose, its real nature.

If substance, as it is in itself, is 'infinite' in the sense of a systematic incorporation of otherwise unlimited diversity, it makes sense of Spinoza's insistence, with respect to the impossibility of a void, that it is impossible for any part of substance to be removed unless substance is conceived as other than as it is in itself; and also the dependence on substance of any of its parts (Pt. I, prop. 15, sch.).

The term 'internal relation' can be used in many senses, as Ewing has shown¹, however, it will be used in what follows to indicate the dependence of the nature of anything on the relation it bears in the order of experience to every other; and 'external relation' is the sort that depends for its nature on its terms. The external order is one of discovery. The internal order of experience is the one in which everything is already discovered. It is like our own experience of ourselves insofar as we are the centre

¹. A.C. Ewing, Idealism: A Critical Survey (1934; Strand, W.C. 2: Methuen and Co., 1961) 117-42.

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and origin of the order of our experience, except it must be systematic unity¹ or a centre of experience in which the order of infinite centers of experience is ordered. This will satisfy the requirements of a self-contained and self-explanatory whole and the one of the internal relatedness of its parts. In it, the parts depend for their nature on the relation they bear to every other and the whole.

The infinity of substance, comprehended in terms of a system of internal relations², is readily seen to comply with the one-order-diversely-constituted interpretation. What is essential to the internality of the order of experience is the active or self-explanatory nature characteristic of the cogito, in Sprigge's view of it³, by analogy to which the 'being conceived through itself' of substance can be understood. Thus, it is as included in the order of experience of such a centre of experience that it is necessary to comprehend the systematic incorporation of otherwise unlimited diversity. The attributes, which

¹. See the discussion of "systematic unity" in Leslie Armour, Logic and Reality (Assen: Van Gorcum and Co., 1972) ch. 2.

². Errol E. Harris, "Finite and Infinite in Spinoza's System", Speculum Spinozanum 1677-1977, ed. S. Hessing (Boston: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1977) 199.

³. T.L.S. Sprigge, Theories of Existence (Harmondsworth: Penguin, 1984) 21.

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constitute the essence of substance, are nuances on the intuition which is the origin and stuff of the one complete and internal order of experience.

On the one-being-diversely-ordered interpretation, it is one such intuition which reaches its height of intensity in the completeness of the intellectual order of thought in which is explained the external order of extension. Confirmation of either position in the definition of 'God' depends on how one interprets the infinity of substance as it is in itself. Spinoza's objections to viewing substance as an infinity of discrete units or as divided into independent parts (Pt. I, prop. 12, pr.; prop. 13, pr.; prop. 15, sch., and Letter 12) can be met by either an internal order, as suggested above, or an undifferentiated unity.

Substance as undifferentiated unity supports Caird's subjectivist reading. To Caird, the attributes are so many complete and divers aspects of substance while it remains in itself without division, and so it seems to Caird the distinction between them is merely in the intellect.¹ This is the only possible response to the identity and diversity

¹. Caird 150-1.

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of the attributes given Caird's insistence on substance as undifferentiated unity.¹

This is why the infinity shared by substance and attribute can be cited in confirmation of either absolute idealist interpretation, that is to say, if the infinity of substance is on the side of the internality of the system. We have reason to adopt this interpretation of the infinity of substance, since it is the only alternative to one which leads inevitably to subjectivism and there are, as we have seen, independent grounds for rejecting the subjectivist reading.

¹. Caird 150.

c) Substance and Attribute as Each
Conceived Through Itself

Each attribute of a substance must be conceived through itself (Pt. I, prop. 10).

By substance I understand what is in itself and conceived through itself, i.e., that whose concept does not require the concept of another thing, from which it must be formed (Pt. I, def. 3).

One of the requirements for something's being "substance" is met by "each attribute of a substance" or, with the Shirley translation, simply "one substance".¹ There is really only one substance. The attributes are each like it in its being conceived through itself. Moreover, it can be argued that what is conceived through itself is also in itself. On the basis of such an argument, it can be concluded that the attributes each meet the other condition Spinoza lays down on something's being substance i.e. that

¹. Spinoza, Ethics and Selected Letters, trans. S. Shirley (Indianapolis: Hackett, 1982).

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it be in itself. Spinoza's system would involve an identity of substance and attribute.

Such an argument for the oneness of substance and attribute is put forward by Curley. He constructs the argument in favour of the objectivist interpretation of the attributes. "It is not difficult to construct a proof" Curley says:

that what is conceived through itself must exist in itself. For if it existed in something else, knowledge of it would depend on knowledge of that in which it existed ... and it would not be conceived through itself.¹

One can construct an argument like Curley's to show that the supposition that what is conceived through itself is not also in itself implies a contradiction. If something is not in itself then it has to be in something else, since everything in Spinoza's system is either in itself or in something else (Pt. I, ax. 1). Since Spinoza defines what is in something else as also conceived through it (Pt. I, def. 5) it follows, in his understanding, that if a thing is

¹. E.M. Curley, Spinoza's Metaphysics (Cambridge, Mass: Harvard Univ. Press, 1969) 17-18; and see also his Behind the Geometrical Method (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton Univ. Press, 1988) 29.

Each Conceived through Itself

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in something else then it cannot be conceived through itself. Thus, a thing cannot both be conceived through itself and not also be in itself. If a thing is conceived through itself then it must, in other words, be also in itself. The attributes, which are each of them conceived through itself, must each be in itself and, therefore, meet the definition of 'substance'.

Thus, it is necessary insofar as an argument like Curley's is sound to agree that the attributes are each identifiable with substance as in and conceived through itself. Moreover, in a letter to Oldenburg, Spinoza defines 'attribute' as "whatever is conceived through itself and in itself".¹ But the conclusion of the argument above is compatible with either version of the absolute idealist interpretation of the 'identity' of substance and attribute.

It shows that each attribute is in and conceived through itself as one and the same substance. So, it is order which is in and conceived through itself as being in the case of the one-order-diversely-constituted interpretation. Or, it is intuition in and conceived through itself as order in the case of one-being-diversely-ordered. Once again, it is shown that passages of the Ethics can be used in support of either interpretation of substance-attribute identity.

¹. Letter 2.

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The several passages from the Ethics, examined in this chapter, and the arguments based on them show that the system of Spinoza requires an identity of substance and attribute. The identity in question is open to interpretation.

Furthermore, it is arguable that the system cannot otherwise be interpreted than in terms of an identity in difference or a relative identity of substance and attribute. Although the objectivity of the intellect's perception of substance does not require an identity of substance and attribute which precludes difference, it requires, at least, a relative identity. It cannot be absolute, since the attributes differ among themselves. Consequently, identity in difference or a relative identity¹ is a requirement of the system.

In the above, I have decided not to cite another two possible grounds for the identity of substance and attribute. One is the parallelism of the attributes suggested by Spinoza's claim that "the order and connection of ideas is the same as the order and connection of things" (Pt. II, prop. 7) and its scholium. The parallelism of the

¹. See S.C. Martens, "Spinoza on Attributes", Synthese 37(1978).

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attributes will be examined, at a later stage, as what tends to undermine the credibility of the one-being-diversely-ordered interpretation in favour of one-order-diversely-constituted. The central difficulty for the former is making sense of this and related passages.

Another possible basis for confirmation of the identity of substance and attribute is in the area of the translation of competo in Spinoza's statement: "quo plus realitas aut esse unaqueque res habet, eo plura attributa ipsi competunt" (Pt. I, prop. 9). Hart's suggestion is that the "competunt" be taken in the sense of 'to coincide with' or 'to be equal to'.¹ 'To be equal to' would not do, since it suggests that substance and attribute be identified on the level of the imagination in terms of portions of discrete units. The alternative Hart understands to be opposed to his translation is 'to belong to' which he believes would distinguish substance and attribute, since it appears to give the attributes the status of modes. Hart takes the possibility of the 'to coincide with' translation to confirm the objectivist interpretation and equally as a ground of confirmation of an identity of substance and attribute.

Hart admits that in Latin up to the period of, at least, 600 A.D., the verb competo very likely means 'to belong to' where it takes the dative. The ipsi of the

¹. Hart 19.

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proposition is in the dative. But Hart thinks it is noteworthy that the Thomas Eliot dictionary of 1587 defines it to mean 'to be meet or convenient, to appertain', and that "the 'to be equal to' translation is from Livius, and Spinoza possessed a book written by him".¹

This evidence would have to be regarded as very weak if not for Hart's contention that it would make for a more coherent understanding of Spinoza if we went with it.² However, we do not need to abandon the natural translation of the verb as 'to belong to', since the proposition in question can be said to make the attributes belong to substance in the sense of their being like modes in the order of substance of which the attributes, however, are independently constitutive. It is still a problem to say how this is possible, but not one which it is necessary to solve by rejecting the 'to belong to' translation.

In the next chapter, I will be concerned to elicit from the text of the Ethics and the secondary literature several interpretations of the diversity of the attributes. This is intended to establish the third condition for the problem of the identity and diversity of the attributes which is that they are diverse; but also to develop a number of variations

¹. Hart 19.

². Hart 20.

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on the problem as a range of issues with which to determine the plausibility of any proposed solution.

3) The Diversity of the Attributes

The 'diversity' of the attributes can be taken in three senses at least: 1) their countable diversity; 2) the apparent incompatibility of thought and extension as attributes of one substance, and 3) the conceptual independence of the attributes. All this will be explained in this chapter in the course of showing that two or more versions of our problem can be generated using 'diverse' in one of these three senses.¹ There will be altogether three sections each of which will work with 'diverse' in one of these three senses, and in each of which there will be constructed two or more versions of the problem.

These several versions of the problem will provide us with a basis for determining the plausibility of a proposed solution. If it provides a reasonable response to each of the problems then it will have to be regarded as a plausible

¹. This tri-part categorization of formulations of the problem resembles the classification in R.J. Delahunty, Spinoza (Boston: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1985) 116-23. But the first category of Delahunty's classification is the problem of the indivisibility of substance or attribute and the multiplicity of its modes.

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solution. In order to render smooth, and unencumbered by needless repetition, the transition from the setting up of the issue in this chapter to the elaboration of its resolution later on, it will be convenient to summarize the difficulties in sets of questions at the end of each section. The questions alone will be reviewed briefly and dealt with in development of the solution.

a) Countable Diversity

The problem of the identity and diversity of the attributes is formulated in Leibniz's 1678 commentary on the Ethics.¹ Leibniz expresses difficulty understanding why anyone should take, as Spinoza apparently does:

the word 'nature' and the word 'attribute' as equivalent unless he means by attribute that which contains the whole nature. If this is assumed, I do not see how there can be many attributes ...²

If, as Leibniz appears willing to assume, substance and attribute are identical, it is difficult to understand how a countable diversity of attributes of the one substance is possible. There should be, as we have already seen, a countable diversity of attributes. But if each attribute is

¹. Leibniz, "On the Ethics of Benedict Spinoza", Philosophical Papers and Letters, trans. Loemker, 2nd ed. (Dordrecht: R. Reidel, 1963).

². Leibniz 198.

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identical to one substance, we should, if Leibniz is right, have only one attribute. What Leibniz raised in his early commentary on the Ethics was the problem of the identity and countable diversity of the attributes.

Tschirnhaus suggests the same question, on the level of our mind and body. The issue is developed on the level of the finite entity rather than, as in the case of Leibniz's formulation, on the level of infinite substance and attribute. If everything in the order of substance is given in each of infinite attributes then it follows that "that Modification which constitutes my Mind," as Tschirnhaus observes:

and that Modification which express my Body, although it is one and the same Modification, is yet expressed in infinite modes; in one mode through Thought, in another through Extension, in a third through an attribute of God unknown to me, and so on to infinity, because there are infinite attributes of God, and the Order and Connection of the Modifications seems to be the same in all. Hence, there arises the question, why the Mind which represents a certain Modification, which same Modification is expressed not only in Extension, but in infinite other modes, why, I say

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it perceives only that Modification expressed through Extension ... ¹

"The order and connection of ideas is the same" according to Spinoza "as the order and connection of things" (Pt. II, prop. 7). The attributes each express one and the same order and connection of modes of substance. In this way, it seems the mind and body are "one and the same Individual, which is conceived now under the attribute of Thought, now under the attribute of Extension" (Pt. II, prop. 21, sch.). Our awareness of ourselves is restricted to the mind's perception of the body (Pt. II, prop. 13).

The conflict between our existing as modes of infinite attributes and our awareness of ourselves as the mind's perception of body is derived by Tschirnhaus on the basis of substance-attribute identity and their countable diversity. So, it may be counted as a version of our problem with special attention to the issue as it arises on the level of our mind and body.

The issues raised in this section can be summarized in the form of the following list of questions. Given the countable diversity of the attributes, can we conceive of the identity of each with the one substance? We have seen,

¹ Letter 65.

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in this section, Tschirnhaus develop the question on the level of our mind and body. The question is why, if I am identical to modes of infinite attributes, do I perceive only a mind's body. A closely related question was raised by Tschirnhaus and conveyed to Spinoza in a letter from Schuller: "sir, will please convince us by some direct proof ... that we cannot know more attributes of God than thought and extension?".¹ What is the rational explanation for the infinite countable diversity of attributes and our being directly acquainted with only two?

¹. Letter 63.

b) The Incompatibility of Thought and Extension

The diversity of the attributes can be interpreted in a number of ways, and each corresponds to a unique way of formulating the issue of the identity and diversity of the attributes. On one such formulation, the problem is that thought and extension - the only two of the attributes with which we are directly acquainted - are incompatible as attributes of one substance. This version of the problem will be explored in this section.

The difficulty is stated in Cudworth's True Intellectual System of the Universe of 1678.¹ Cudworth does not attack Spinoza directly in this work, but does attack a doctrine very like Spinoza's or one on which thinking and extended substance are one and the same. He formulates two important objections to the thesis that extended substance can think and these are proofs of the incompatibility of thought and extension as attributes of one substance.

¹. Ralph Cudworth, True Intellectual System of the Universe (Stuttgart-Bad: F. Frommann, 1964).

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One of his proofs is a reduction to the absurd of the hypothesis that extended substance or matter can think. It would imply that each given particle of extended matter could think. That each particle of extended matter could think is a result from which Cudworth concludes "it would be impossible for any such Men and Animals as now are, to be compounded out of them, because every Man would be ... a Heap of Innumerable Animals and Percipients".¹ The question is how is the divisibility of extended substance to be reconciled with the activity of thought?

Another of Cudworth's objections is based on the premise that the existence, or, one may say even the possibility of a thinking substance implies a system or "Order to Ends".² But matter is essentially what is acted on for the sake of an end, and not the thing which acts for the sake of an end. The point Spinoza makes against those who do not think that matter can direct itself to a freely chosen end, and, therefore, cannot think is that neither does thinking substance direct itself toward an end freely chosen. The idea of a final cause or freely chosen end is, according to Spinoza, unintelligible. Spinoza insists that:

¹. Cudworth 72.

². Cudworth 172.

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men believe themselves free because they are conscious of their own actions, and ignorant of the causes by which they are determined ... decisions of the Mind are nothing more than the appetites [appetitus] themselves, which therefore vary as the disposition of the Body varies (Pt. III, prop. 2, sch.).

The appetites or appetitus are just the conatus or what in us is our share of natura naturans in the order of nature. Spinoza's position is that even when we are not conscious of it as will or desire, the potentiality of being or appetite within us accounts for the order of our experience in accordance with the negative principle of sufficient reason.

The idea of determination through appetite is broad enough, in other words, to cover all possible counter-examples. Even where the effort involved in developing the order of our experience seems least, this is only because, as Spinoza explains, the resistance in the world to a certain order of the development of our appetites is less than otherwise (Pt. I, "Appendix"). This is not, but not incompatible with the rejoinder which Yolton suggests is open to one who holds that matter thinks which is to argue that matter might be found capable of far more than we at present suspect. For example, "if matter should turn out

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not to be the inert, passive, sluggish stuff described by Cudworth - " Yolton says "if its nature should turn out to be closer to force than passive particles - then the possibilities for materialism change drastically".¹ Spinoza's response to Cudworth's objection is to deny the intelligibility of the teleological explanation for the behaviour of thinking or of any substance whatsoever, not the activity of thinking.

Spinoza's denial of all forms of teleological explanation was designed to settle some of the quandaries of those who found objectionable his doctrine of complete determinism. Spinoza states in the opening paragraph of the "Appendix" to the Ethics, Pt. I, that "all things have been predetermined by God, not from freedom of the will or absolute good pleasure, but from God's absolute nature, or infinite power". The duty of the "Appendix" is to deal with all the objections to Spinoza's doctrine which are based on the belief that the world is determined by God in accordance with an end or final cause, which presupposes a certain freedom of the will. However, its rejection should not be incompatible with the freedom which Spinoza allots to God absolutely and by degrees to ourselves.

¹. J.W. Yolton, Thinking Matter (Minneapolis: Univ. of Minnesota Press, 1983) 12.

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The explanation of God's or anyone's acts in terms of final causes is, as pointed out by Spinoza, incompatible with his qualified rejection of the freedom of the will. The "will cannot be called a free cause" according to Spinoza "but only a necessary one" (Pt. I, prop. 32, pr.). Spinoza proposes in favour of this proposition that the will is a "certain mode of thinking" (Pt. I, prop. 32), and if it is considered a finite mode then it has the character of a "singular thing, or any thing which is finite and has a determinate existence" (Pt. I, prop. 28). Every such singular thing, including the will if it is finite, must have its cause or the reason for its being in some other finite and determinate thing which has its reason in another and so on to infinity. If it is assumed that the will is infinite, the same conclusion follows, namely, that it is determined to act by something other than itself. For if it were infinite, it would still have to be an infinite mode of thought and it would have to be:

determined to exist and to produce an effect by God, not insofar as he is an absolutely infinite substance, but insofar as he has an attribute that expresses the infinite and eternal essence of Thought (Pt. I, prop. 32, pr.).

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Even as an infinite mode the will is still one step removed from the absolutely infinite God (Pt. I, prop. 23) and if it is one step removed then it cannot be an absolutely free cause, since only God is an absolutely free cause.

"God acts from the laws of his nature alone" says Spinoza "and is compelled by no one" (Pt. I, prop. 17). From this it follows that "God alone is a free cause" (Pt. I, prop. 17, cor. 2). For there can only be one substance and it is absolutely infinite (Pt. I, prop. 14, cor. 1); but substance exists necessarily (Pt. I, prop. 11) and God, the one necessarily existing substance is wholly self-determining (Pt. I, prop. 17). Thus, only one thing meets absolutely the condition Spinoza puts on something being a free cause i.e. that it "exists from the necessity of its nature alone, and is determined to act by itself alone" (Pt. I, def. 7). Only God then is an absolutely free cause and the ascription of 'freedom' to God, in this sense, is compatible with the doctrine of determinism, since it implies that God is determined according to the laws of his own nature as expressed through the attributes.

The infinite intellect of God is an infinite will, they are one and the same (Pt. II, prop. 49, cor.). God's will would have to be natura naturans or being while, as the infinite intellect, it has to have within it the complete

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and rational order of things (Pt. I, prop. 16).¹ The close union of order and being explains how Harris can regard the determinism of Spinoza as compatible with a certain sense of 'teleology' or teleological explanation of the activity of God.² The intellectual order can be seen as the 'end', in this special sense, as that in the direction of the understanding of which and in the order of which being is naturally and inevitably striving. However, if this means that one's reflection on one's self within the order of the whole is determined by its conformity to the order of the whole, it is contrary to the one-order-diversely-constituted interpretation. According to the latter, the self-reflective order of experience is determined by its conformity to a quality of intelligibility.

They are each a type of formal causation, which Benardete suggests is the least paradoxical candidate for the cause of itself in Spinoza's understanding.³ But the scholasticism which preceded Spinoza allowed that there are

¹. See also Spinoza, "Emendation of the Intellect" sec. 63.

². Errol E. Harris, Salvation From Despair (The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1973) 126-32.

³. J. Benardete, "Spinozistic Anomalies", Philosophy of Baruch Spinoza, ed. Richard Kennington (Washington, D.C.: Catholic Univ. Press, 1980) 58.

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two types of formal causation to be considered. "While the first type of formal causation" remarks Urban "concerns structural principles which are present in things and make them the kinds of things which they are, the second type concerns archetypes in the minds of intelligent beings to which they conform their artifacts".¹ The cause proposed by Harris as the 'end' in Spinoza's system and the alternative proposed fit, in some respects, into either category, while emphasizing or being more like one than the other. The emphasis on an "end" suggests that Harris's option is more like the type of formal cause which would be an idea of one's role in the absolute. Insofar as it was an ideal order of comprehension in which the value of the roles of others is taken into account, it might be understood to be a structural principle determining the order of one's experience and that of others, insofar as one is influential over it, as the coming-to-be of the absolute. It is through our conception of our selves within the order of the absolute, in other words, that this order is brought into being.

On the alternative proposed, the order of our experience is one with our conception, whether this order is conceived through one or other attribute. The order of the

¹. Linwood Urban, "Understanding St. Thomas's Fourth Way", History of Philosophy Quarterly 1.3 (1984) 282.

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absolute emerges out of any one of the attributes as a nuance on the intuition of potentiality distinguishable by a certain quality of intelligibility. In degrees of conformity to it, the absolute order of experience is allowed to emerge. Whether on the level of our highly limited perspectives or on the one on which their limitations are understood in an order of experience, it is characterized by a certain intensity of this intuition of intelligibility. We may find that the order of experience incorporates that of a world over which we, as individuals, are not very much influential. However, if, for example, we had an image of ourselves in community and influenced the order of our own and others' experience as if we had no such conception then the order of our experience would be still somewhat confused. Or, ours may be a fantastic conception of the world that brings us to influence our own and others' experience as if we had an adequate idea of ourselves in community.

This idea of ourselves constitutes an order of experience in which our influence is ordered as actively contributing to the nature of the whole, and it is characterized by a greater strength of an intuition of intelligibility. It is the greater strength of intuition which characterizes the real order of experience or the one in which the nature of those characterized by a lower

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strength of intuition are understood. In other words, the emphasis of this conception of the coming-to-be of substance is on conformity-to-intuition as a structural principle governing the order of our experience of the absolute. As progress is made in the direction of the order of an adequate idea, our experience gets to be less like one of confrontation of the conatus of our experience with its inherent limitations. It becomes more like one of developing the order of our experience in conformity with the greatest intensity of intuition. This coming-to-be of the absolute begins, in fact, to resemble the type of formal causation in terms of which substance is something in the direction of which we are striving.

The question of teleology in connection with finite minds and bodies like our own is suggested by Taylor's objection¹ to aligning the order and connection of thought and extension in the one causal series or the parallelism of the attributes. Taylor argues that the series of causal relations as discovered in extension cannot be identified with the explanation adequately developed of the goal-directed behaviour of any finite thinking thing. If sense can be given to an 'end', in Spinoza's system, as the order of the intellect then the second of Cudworth's objections

¹. A.E. Taylor, "Some Incoherences in Spinozism", Kashap, Studies 299.

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reduces to the first, for the issue is one of reconciling the external order of extension and the internal order of thought. In these terms, our question on the level of finite minds and bodies like our own, is how does one reconcile the order of extension seeming to be one of external relations with the essentially internal order of any finite thinking thing?

Still other lines of inquiry give rise to further questions of interest. Barker points to the principle that the physical, being the object of consciousness, is something entirely distinct from the subject. The subject or thinking substance has in its nature that which is true or false and its modes must depend for their truth or falsity on a relation they bear to some state of affairs which is their ground. Thus, modes of thought cannot be identified with those of extension, as the objects of these ideas, since extended substance, as object, has in its nature that which exists independently as the ground for the truth or falsity of ideas.¹ Our question is how does one reconcile the independent being of modes of extension with the truth-functionality of ideas?

Another version of the problem arises out of the controversy about Spinoza's identification of the idea of

¹. Barker 121.

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the body and the idea of the mind.¹ Spinoza argues that the idea of the mind is "united" to the mind in the same way as the mind to the body (Pt. II, prop. 21). Spinoza indicates (Pt. II, prop. 21, pr.) that this claim can be proven in the same way as his assertion that the object of the idea which is the mind is nothing else than the body (Pt. II, prop. 12, and 13). Barker puts this line of reasoning into question where he suggests that the order of one's experience has an appearance of uniqueness which is dissolved in the order of the idea of the individual's experience.² The question is in what manner is it possible to understand the appearance of the uniqueness of the one thing conceived under the idea of the body and the one-among-severalness of the same thing conceived under the idea of the individual's mind?

The various issues raised, in this section, with respect to the seeming incompatibility of thought and extension can be summarized. How is the divisibility of extended substance to be reconciled with the activity of thought? How does one reconcile the order of extension seeming to be one of external relations with the essentially internal order of any finite thinking thing? How does one

¹. See H.F. Hallett, "On a Reputed Equivoque in the Philosophy of Spinoza", Kashap Studies.

². Barker 143.

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reconcile the independent being of modes of extension with the truth-functionality of ideas? In what manner is it possible to understand the appearance of the uniqueness of the one thing conceived under the idea of the body and the one-among-severalness of the same thing conceived under the idea of the individual's mind?

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c) Conceptual Independence

One can take the diversity of the attributes to mean that they are "really distinct" or conceivable each one without the help of the conception of any other (Pt. I, prop. 10, sch.). Delahunty sets up the problem in this way and refers to it as the "gravest" of all the issues surrounding Spinoza's doctrine of the attributes.¹

The difficulty is closely related to the issue cited by Joachim in his Study of the Ethics of Spinoza² and to questions about the numerical diversity of the attributes and the incompatibility of extension and thought. The countable diversity of the attributes cannot be understood unless a rational explanation can be given of our being directly acquainted with only two of the infinite attributes. Such an explanation would involve a determination of the attributes within the order of thought. Indeed, the resolution of the issue of the incompatibility

¹. Delahunty 120.

². Harold H. Joachim, Study of the Ethics of Spinoza (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1901).

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of thought and extension is part and parcel of the program of making such a determination of the attributes within the intelligible order of thought, and the resolution of the difficulties about their incompatibility would be a vain enterprise if that determination were impossible.

It seems to be impossible because the infinity of substance and attribute is opposed directly to what is "finite in its own kind" or that which "can be limited by another of the same nature" (Pt. I, def. 2). "Being finite" says Spinoza "is in part, a negation" (Pt. I, prop. 8, sch. #1). Indeterminacy is an implication of the infinity of substance and attribute, but determination appears to be a requirement of the attributes entering into the intelligible order of thought. This opposition is set up by Joachim as the attributes-problem.

The attributes, "though complete or indeterminate in their own kind, are" as Joachim observes "not absolutely indeterminate or complete, for they are distinct from one another, and therefore involve a certain negation of reality".¹ The problem cited by Joachim really seems to cut the deepest of all, but it can be solved if Delahunty's issue of the independence of the attributes can be. For the latter is just that of reconciling the involvement of all

¹. Joachim 105.

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the attributes in the concept of substance as conceived through any one of the attributes and the conceptual independence of the attributes. If an intelligible concept can be constructed in which the attributes are included without contradicting their status as each 'conceived through itself', there should be no problem with their infinity or indeterminacy.

The issue of conceptual independence is a version of the problem of the identity and diversity of the attributes or of reconciling the identity of each of the attributes with the one substance and the diversity of the attributes. It is cited by Delahunty with an interpretation of the identity of substance and attribute as 'equivalence' in the sense of each attribute being necessary and sufficient for the nature and existence of substance. The oneness of each of the attributes with substance implies, according to Delahunty, that an absolutely infinite substance with infinite attributes is given with the conception of substance as conceived through any one of them. In other words, the infinite attributes of Spinoza's God or substance are involved in the conception of any one.

"The problem" says Delahunty "is to reconcile this result with EI, 10S which declares that the attributes are

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conceived of as really distinct from one another".¹ It has to be possible to conceive any one of the attributes without the help of the conception of any other (Pt. I, prop. 10, sch.). If the subjectivist interpretation is correct then it can be argued that there is no real diversity to be contended with. But this is not a solution open to one who adopts the objectivist reading.

In support for saying that the attributes are really distinct in Spinoza's system, Delahunty cites the scholium to the tenth proposition of the Ethics, Pt. I in which Spinoza suggests that it is part of the meaning of this proposition that the attributes be really distinct. Spinoza says in this proposition that "each attribute of a substance must be conceived through itself" (Pt. I, prop. 10). The proof of this, according to Spinoza, rests with the definitions of 'attribute' and 'substance' in the Ethics. Insofar as an attribute is the essence of substance (Pt. I, def. 4), it is also conceived through itself. For 'substance' is defined as that which is "conceived through itself" (Pt. I, def. 3).

It is part of the meaning of substance's being conceived through itself, as indicated in Spinoza's statement of the definition of 'substance', that it "not

¹. Delahunty 120.

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require the concept of another thing, from which it must be formed" (Pt. I, def. 3). Thus, Spinoza must say, as he does, that it is also part of the meaning of an attribute's being conceived through itself, that each attribute be conceivable without the help of the conception of any other (Pt. I, prop. 10, sch.). Delahunty admits that since, in the scholium, Spinoza says that they need only be independent in the sense of each being conceived without the help of the conception of any other, an opening is allowed for the subjectivist interpretation. The attributes might have to be conceived as independent of each other while not really being so. However, Delahunty cites several grounds for rejecting the subjectivist reading.¹ Furthermore, a passage can be cited from the early writings of Spinoza in which he "appears to have agreed" says Delahunty², with Descartes in allowing that "two substances are really distinct when each of them can exist without the other".³ But did Spinoza really agree and to what? The work on Descartes was to be an accurate exposition in an alternate form of presentation of the work of Descartes. And would

¹. Delahunty 116-17.

². Delahunty 120.

³. "Parts I and II of Descartes' 'Principles of Philosophy'" Pt. I, def. 10.

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Spinoza's agreeing with the above quoted definition give Delahunty the point he is seeking, namely, that the one substance cannot be conceived through differing attributes if they are really distinct? The definition states that a real distinction in conception follows from ontological diversity and not that an ontological distinction follows from a real distinction in conception.

The point is in Descartes's thought that those things which we can clearly and distinctly conceive one without the help of the other have just this ontological status as diverse and independent entities. "Strictly speaking" says Descartes "a real distinction exists only between two or more substances".¹ Suarez also insisted that a real distinction can be drawn only between diverse entities², and his work on the subject in the previous century should have been understood to have set a precedent for the use of the expression, any diversion from which Spinoza would have had to be expected to explain; and he provides no such account of his use of it. But the case is still too weak for Delahunty's contention, since if Spinoza agreed with

¹. Descartes, "Principles of Philosophy" Pt. I, sec. 60 (A.T. 8.1/28).

². Francis Suarez, On Various Kinds of Distinctions, trans. Cyril Vollert (Milwaukee 3, Wisconsin: Marquette Univ. Press, 1947) sec. 1, #12.

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Descartes and Suarez on the point then it would be too obviously opposed to his doctrine of the uniqueness of substance to go on to say in this scholium that it has really distinct attributes and to overlook the error.

The opening exists, if not for a subjectivist reading, at least, for something in line with the proposal made by Jarrett¹ that places Suarez's "distinction of the reasoned reason" between the attributes. It might be called a "real distinction" in the sense of its terms each being conceivable without the assistance of the conception of the other, although it is in each case a conception of one thing and the distinction is not merely in the intellect. Suarez distinguishes between a "distinction of the reasoning reason (distinctio rationis rationantis)" and a "distinction of the reasoned reason (distinctio rationis ratiocinatae)". The former is a distinction merely in the intellect. But the latter "type of mental distinction can be understood as pre-existing in reality, prior to the discriminating operation of the mind" according to Suarez "so as to be thought of as imposing itself, as it were, on the intellect, and require the intellect only to recognize it, and not to constitute it". This type of distinction can also be

¹. C.E. Jarrett, "Some Remarks on the 'Objective' and 'Subjective' Interpretations of the Attributes", Inquiry 20 (1977).

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understood to "have its origin in the mind; a distinction of the reasoned reason, because it arises not entirely from the sheer operation of the intellect' Suarez adds "but from the occasion [occassione] offered by the thing itself on which the mind is reflecting". With the former sense of a distinction of the reasoned reason it is a case of distinguishing facets of a thing present in it independently of the intellectual operation¹; with the latter, Suarez's description appears compatible with the distinction being one between diverse interpretations of one datum.

Either sense of the 'distinction of the reasoned reason' seems to Suarez to involve a certain limitation in the terms distinguished. "Although the same object is apprehended in each concept" Suarez insists that "the whole reality contained in the object is not adequately represented, nor is its entire essence and objective notion exhausted, by either of them".² We can understand what is meant by the failure of the terms of the distinction to exhaust individually the "entire essence and objective notion" in terms of Descartes's response to the proposal that Duns Scotus's formal distinction applies between the thinking and the extended substance. "This kind of

¹. Suarez sec. 1, #4.

². Suarez sec.1, #5.

distinction does not differ from a modal distinction" according to Descartes:

moreover, it applies only to incomplete entities, which I carefully distinguished from complete entities. It is sufficient for this kind of distinction that one thing be conceived distinctly and separately from another by an act of abstraction of the intellect which conceives the thing inadequately.¹

A modal distinction can be between modes of a substance which can each be conceived independently of the other, but neither independently of their substance.² The examples, Descartes uses, are the motion and shape of a given body or the mercy and justice of a given person. The principal attribute of a substance should, however, presuppose no other in order to be conceived.³ In other words, the

¹. Descartes, "Objections and Replies" 1st Replies (A.T. 9/94-5).

². Descartes, "Principles of Philosophy" Pt. I, art. 61 (A.T. 8.1/ 29).

³. Descartes, "Principles of Philosophy" Pt. I, art. 53 (A.T. 8.1/25).

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distinction does not seem to do the work required by Spinoza's conception of the relation between the attributes.

For it does not seem to allow for the one complete concept of substance to be given in any one of the terms distinguished. But the issue at hand is just that of saying how any of the attributes could provide the complete concept of substance in which there are infinite attributes (Pt. I, def. 6) and yet also be distinguishable as conceptually independent. The development of the idea of a formal distinction as one rather than another type of distinction of reasoned reason may be a solution to the problem in the context of Spinoza's system.

In an admirable study of Spinoza's doctrine of the attributes as a theory of expression, Deleuze develops the formal distinction of Duns Scotus in response to the attributes-problem.¹ Before exploring the suggestion, it is worth taking note that Donagan cites a text to show that Spinoza agreed with Descartes in rejecting such a distinction as viable.² In this place³ Spinoza refers to

¹. Gilles Deleuze, Spinoza et le Problème de L'Expression (Paris: Éditions de Minuit, 1968) 54-60.

². Alan Donagan, "Essence and the Distinction of Attributes", Spinoza: a Collection of Critical Essays ed., Marjorie Grene (Garden City, N.Y.: Anchor, 1973) 170.

³. Spinoza, "Metaphysical Thoughts" Pt. II, ch. 5.

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the Cartesian categorization of distinctions into real, modal and mental as complete. He also says in the same place that a "distinction is called real by which two substances are distinguished from one another, whether they have the same or different attributes". Spinoza must have changed his mind or developed his thought in this area some time after the publication of the "Metaphysical Thoughts" in 1663. Otherwise, a contradiction would be too glaringly obvious between 1) this definition of a 'real distinction' and its use in the Ethics, Pt. I, prop. 10, sch., and 2) the suggestion of this passage that two substances could share the same attribute and the Ethics, Pt. I, prop. 5; possibly also between the use of 'real distinction' in the Ethics, Pt. I, prop. 10, sch. and the claim made in this same place, again, in the "Metaphysical Thoughts" that "all distinctions we make between the attributes of God are only distinctions of reason". However, whether the propria rather than an attribute like thought or extension are referred to in this passage is debatable. So, we should not take this text to weigh too much against the use of the formal distinction to understand the system of Spinoza.

Deleuze applies the formal distinction between the attributes comparing them to Scotus's transcendental attributes of being which share in its univocity. They are coextensive with being on grounds that they are applicable

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both to the finite and the infinite e.g. unity, truth, goodness or the disjunctive categories such as necessary-or-possible. Suarez allows that the formal distinction of Scotus is a distinction of the reasoned reason, in his view, and he remarks on the difference between the type of formal distinction which is "mutual .. as between animal and rational" and the type which is "non-mutual" as between "animal and man".¹ That Deleuze has in view the mutual type is indicated by his own example of animal and rational.² The non-mutual type is emphasized by Bettoni in speaking of Scotus's formal distinction as that holding between the "soul and its faculties" or "being and its transcendental attributes".³

Suarez argued that the formal distinction reduces either to a modal or a real distinction (as between distinct entities) and that "no other relation between such extremes is intelligible ... For they imply an immediate opposition, as it were of contradiction, between themselves".⁴ This is

¹. Suarez sec. 1, #21.

². Deleuze 55.

³. Efrem Bettoni, Duns Scotus: the Basic Principles of his Philosophy, trans. Bernardine Bonansea (Washington, D.C.: Catholic Univ. Press, 1961) 80.

⁴. Suarez sec. 1, #21.

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the problem we are facing in connection with the attributes. Either the attributes are entities of reason and between them there is only a distinction in intellectu, as Aquilla sets up the alternatives, or else they are each grounded in real "states of affairs" distinguishable in substance. We may note with Aquilla that the proofs of the Ethics, Pt. I, prop. 4 and 5 require a "strict" identity.¹ Each must, in other words, provide its essence.

The difficulty seems to arise readily out of the application of the 'formal distinction' where it is taken in the first of Suarez's two senses of a 'distinction of the reasoned reason'. But the second sense of it appears compatible with a difference in two interpretations of the same datum. They are, as Deleuze proposes, numerically the same while qualitatively distinct. Nor is this to concede that the attributes do not provide essence. We may say with Deleuze that the essence of substance is its potentiality (puissance) and that the attributes are coextensive with a being with a potentiality of expressing itself in the infinite attributes.

The attributes could be differing interpretations of substance, each of them complete in that all orderings are ordered in each. Or, it could be argued that the one order

¹. See R.E. Aquilla, "States of Affairs and Identity of Attributes", Midwest Studies in Philosophy 8 (1983).

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of thought (or, perhaps, an order more concrete than any of the attributes taken alone) is the one complete, in that all the orderings of substance, which are the attributes, are incorporated in it. Either suggestion appears to contradict the independence of the attributes unless it can be made compatible with the interdependence of terms in the order of internal relations. That is to say, it is assumed that one, at least, of the orders in which the attributes are ordered is one of internal relations. Perhaps, it can be argued that they are rendered compatible through a difference in perspective. Systematic unity expresses itself in different perspectives on itself. Such broad differences should be possible within systematic unity so long as they are mediated through differing perspectives.¹

While taking the approach of one-being-diversely-ordered, Deleuze admits that there is, perhaps, a weakness in the historical precedent he cites for it, in a disanalogy between Scotus's transcendental attributes and Spinoza's attributes of substance. Scotus's transcendentals were originally more like Spinoza's conception of the propria i.e. essential to God, but not, like the attribute of thought or extension, constitutive of his essence. On the

¹. On this feature of systematic unity, see Leslie Armour, "Logic and the Concept of God", Proceedings of the Seventh Inter-American Congress of Philosophy 2 (1967).

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one-order-diversely-constituted interpretation, it is a difference which stands being emphasized. The attributes are nuances on being and it has, in the case of any attribute, the propria which turn out to be essential to being; as a type of being each attribute is applicable to both finite and infinite. But it is applicable to every category of the infinite including every attribute. It is coextensive with being, the system of the attributes and the modes within them.

It seems possible to regard the attributes as each an all-pervasive influence over the complete order of substance; an influence in the form of quality of intelligibility to which the order of experience must conform to the extent that it is the essential order of substance. The order derived through consideration of any one would be complete in that it contained all of the attributes on the side of their diversity. On the side of their unity with substance, each attribute would constitute, in its own way, the one independently derivable order of substance. While it is not so clear under which category of a real distinction, previously considered, this idea of the difference of attributes would fall, it can be shown to meet the conditions of the terms of the distinction each being conceivable without the assistance of the conception of the other and providing a concept of the complete nature of the

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one thing which is each; and it is a not incomprehensible development of Scotus's doctrine of being and its transcendentals, to something like which Spinoza may have been independently drawn accordingly as he opposed Cartesian dualism. This is the response to the issue which will be worked out in greater detail at the close of the thesis. That is to say, it might be the attributes are diverse orderings of one being or substance may be one order conceived through differing nuances on being, depending on the appropriateness of either approach for dealing with the problem in Spinoza's system.

The closest Delahunty says Spinoza comes to providing an answer to the problem of the conceptual independence of the attributes is in his response to De Vries' request for an example of how two different names can apply to one and the same thing. Spinoza says he will:

offer two: (i) I say that by Israel I understand the third Patriarch; I understand the same by Jacob, the name which was given him because he seized his brother's heel; (ii) by flat I mean what reflects all rays of light without any

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change; I understand the same by white in relation to a man looking at the flat ... ¹

The examples of the two names of the "third Patriarch" and the two ways of referring to that which reflects light of all perceivable wavelengths are, according to Delahunty, important analogies. They each bring out the two central points about the attributes in relation to substance: 1) they must be somehow one and the same thing in substance, and 2) they must differ to the extent that one can conceive of substance through any one attribute without the help of the conception of any other. One can know one name of the third Patriarch and not have to have prior knowledge of the other or the story behind it, or one can know that what is before one is white without first knowing that it reflects light of all perceivable wavelengths. But the examples serve only to illustrate the conditions of the problem. Thus, it is right to conclude with Delahunty that by means of his examples Spinoza only manages "to reiterate the position under attack; he does nothing to defend it".²

The problem occurs also on the level of the one thing which is both our 'mind' and 'body', in the sense of finite

¹. Letter 9.

². Delahunty 122-3.

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modes of their respective attributes. The relation between each of them and the one thing which is both must be identity. It cannot be the Leibnizian identity of indiscernibles or absolute identity, according to Delahunty, "or else interactionism could not be denied" or, in other words, they would have, according to this principle, to be two things and the explanation for their co-ordination would seem to have to be causal. He argues that they are each 'identical' to the one thing, in the sense of necessary and sufficient conditions for it and by transitivity of the relation, it seems, for each other. "The 'identity' interpretation," says Delahunty "in order to be faithful to Spinoza's leading ideas, must apparently hold that the corresponding modes are 'one and the same' in that each is a necessary and sufficient condition for the other".¹ The same problem, then, occurs on the level of the one thing which is both a finite thinking thing and extended. For our thinking and our extension should both be such that the conception of either involves the conception of a nature which is both thinking and extended. But these modes should be as really distinct as are the attributes. That the independence of the attributes carries down to the relation of modes of alternate attributes seems clear from a number

¹. Delahunty 121.

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of passages in the Ethics (Pt. I, def. 2; Pt. II, prop. 7, sch., and Pt. III, prop. 2).

The relation of equivalence or biconditionality which Delahunty insists on for either level of identity is open to question. It may be granted that being essential, the attributes in relation to substance and the modes of mind or body in relation to ourselves ought to be necessary and sufficient. For Spinoza indicates this clearly enough (Pt. II, def. 2). But the biconditionality need not be interpreted truth-functionally or as a relation among propositions; it may be a necessary relation among ideas, and this would be closest to what Spinoza seems to have in view.

Furthermore, although Delahunty rejects the ascription of the Leibnizian principle of identity to Spinoza's thinking about mind and body, a Leibnizian identity of substance and attribute or of either mind or body and the one thing which is both does appear to be involved in his criticism of Spinoza. In order for the criticism to work, it has to be the case that what is given when what pertains to the essence of a thing is given, is all of its properties without exception. Something can be said in favour of this aspect of the Leibnizian principle in Spinoza's system. In the first place, something like it is stated where Spinoza says that "in nature there cannot be

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two or more substances of the same nature" (Pt. I, prop. 5). But in the second place, our conception of a thing's nature could not be complete if it did not involve its every property. So, although there is more to the concept of identity in the system than this principle states it does appear to be necessary to have everything about substance or any finite thing involved in our conception of it through any attribute, since our conception of it through an attribute is supposed to provide us with its essence and the 'essence' of a thing should be defined in such a way as we could derive its every property¹ including those it has in virtue of being conceived through any other attribute.

The questions raised by Delahunty about the conceptual independence of the attributes are twofold. 1) In what manner can it be said that substance, consisting of infinite attributes, is accurately and completely conceived through any one of them while each is conceptually independent of every other? 2) How can the one thing which is mind and body be wholly and accurately conceived to be a mode of either of their respective attributes while modes of differing attributes are also conceptually independent?

¹. "Emendation of the Intellect" sec. 96.

II) One-Being-Diversely-Ordered
Or One-Order-Diversely-Constituted

In the preceding part I, it was shown that several passages in the Ethics provide evidence for saying that Spinoza regards substance as in a largely unspecified sense 'identical' to each of its attributes. While the interpretation of the identity of substance and attribute can be said to be, in some of its details, an open question it is, along with the diversity of the attributes and the uniqueness of substance, a given condition of the problem. We shall be looking now at alternative interpretations of their identity. In this second part, I will discuss two absolute idealist interpretations of the identity of substance and attribute to see which one of them most suitably reconciles the uniqueness of substance and the diversity of its attributes.

This latter part of the thesis contains two chapters. The one-being-diversely-ordered interpretation and its short-comings will be examined in the first i.e. the one so far advocated by those who have ascribed an absolute

idealism to Spinoza. This first chapter sets forth the outlines of the absolute idealist reading of Spinoza's metaphysics in order to situate the alternatives as alternative absolute idealist interpretations of substance-attribute identity. In the second, the one-order-diversely-constituted interpretation will be developed as the proposed solution.

1) The Absolute Idealist Interpretation

The aim of this chapter will be to establish the outlines of the absolute idealist interpretation of Spinoza's metaphysics and its former proponents' interpretation of the identity of substance and attribute. The arguments for the absolute idealist reading of the metaphysics of Spinoza will be examined to show that the grounds for it are compatible with the one-order-diversely-constituted interpretation. In this way, it will be shown that the solution I propose is compatible with the essential drift of the absolute idealist reading, and I will proceed to indicate further, at the end of this chapter in the "Concluding Remarks", that it is advantageous with respect to the neatness of fit to certain of the contours of Spinoza's system.

The absolute idealist interpretation ascribes to Spinoza a doctrine roughly the same as the absolute idealism outlined by Sprigge.¹ We get to be acquainted with some of the fundamental tenets and points of difference between

¹. T.L.S. Sprigge, Theories of Existence see ch. 3.

proponents of this reading by first of all reviewing some of what Sprigge has had to say about the doctrine.

"It is a leading principle of absolute idealism" Sprigge explains "that sentient experience, and what exists only as an element therein, is all that there really is or could be".¹ There are several contrasts by means of which this idea is explicated, but the principal one of these which Sprigge emphasizes is with the phenomenalist or sensationalist theories of those such as Hume who regard the elements of consciousness as externally ordered and the self as a mere collection of sensations or phenomena.

The difficulty with the phenomenalist theories, according to Sprigge, concerns the question of "what bundles all your sensations, images, feelings together in one group, and mine in another group".² Experience contains no inherent necessity by which the orders of experience are bound together in self-consciousness according to this view. The absolute idealist response to this question serves also to distinguish it from Berkley's idealism. According to it, the line circumscribing the ideas of a single mind is determined by reference to the self as distinct from its ideas. But the centre of experience is primary and given as the self-explanatory order of its experience in the absolute

¹. Sprigge, Theories of Existence 61-2.

². Sprigge, Theories of Existence 66.

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idealism of Sprigge's conception. The self does not have to be constructed out of its ideas as the totality of them, as on the sensationalist's view, since it precedes its ideas. It has primacy as the order of experience. This is why it is not other than its ideas (at least, on the level on which this order is itself an adequate idea), nor are they able to be adequately described other than as in this order.

A further question is about the relatedness of individuals. "These centers of experience, then, are at one level the ultimate constituents of the universe. All the same, there is something not quite real about their separate individuality".¹ The answer Sprigge gives is that a whole is greater or more real than its parts. Indeed, the reality of individual centers of experience depends on:

a kind of infinite centre of experience, of which all other, and in contrast to it finite, centers of experience figure as elements helping to make up the quality and pattern of its total way of feeling its own being. This infinite totality of experience is usually called the Absolute.²

The absolute centre of experience is the one in the order of

¹. Sprigge, Theories of Existence 67.

². Sprigge, Theories of Existence 69-70.

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whose experience the order of every other is ordered. This provides us with the contrast between absolute idealism and Kantian or transcendental idealism.

The thing-in-itself determines the order of our experience, according to Kantian idealism, while according to the absolute idealist it is a function of the absolute to explain the order of experience in every centre of experience. The exchange of the 'absolute' for Spinoza's 'substance' or 'God' effects the transition to the absolute idealist interpretation of Spinoza's metaphysics.

The proponents of the idealist interpretation are of differing sorts. Many are really exponents of the 'Hegelian interpretation' in the strictest sense. That is, some elements of Hegel's absolute idealism are located in Spinoza as a precursor to a more fully developed and coherent version of it in Hegel. This variety of absolute idealist interpretation is bolstered by remarking, as did Hegel, on apparent short-comings of Spinoza's own development of a shared starting point.¹ Some argue for Spinoza's commitment to some form of idealism on many of the same grounds² as explicitly absolute idealist interpreters cite

¹. Caird and Joachim take this line.

². For a brief summary of a wide array of considerations in favour of reading Spinoza's as an idealist, see J.G. Van der Bend, "Some Idealistic Tendencies in Spinoza", Spinoza on Knowing, Being and Freedom, ed. J.G. Van der Bend (Assen: Van Gorcum, 1974).

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in favour of their reading, but they hold that Spinoza developed this starting point as the hope of an impossible union of idealist and materialist tendencies.¹ Others like Murray² and Harris argue for a more full fledged Hegelianism in Spinoza than even Hegel recognized. Sprigge takes a similar view, however, he does not take it up so obviously or contentiously, since he merely uses Spinoza at points as a prime example of the type of thinker whose doctrine is in predominant respects like the one which Sprigge is developing.

Hegelian criticism of Spinoza should not be emphasized to the point of overlooking the similarity between Hegel and Spinoza. Hegel says that "thought must begin by placing itself at the standpoint of Spinozism; to be a follower of Spinoza is the essential commencement of all philosophy".³ Against the doctrine of the attributes Hegel charges that

¹. See Robert N. Beck, "Some Idealist Themes in the Ethics", Kennington; or Carroll R. Bowman, "Spinoza's Doctrine of Attributes", Southern Journal of Philosophy 5(1967).

². J. Clark Murray, "Idealism of Spinoza", Philosophical Review 5.4(1896).

³. G. Hegel, History of Philosophy, 3 Vols., trans. E.S. Haldane and F.H. Simpson (London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1986) 3:257.

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the "attributes are accepted empirically".¹ It is difficult to interpret this cryptic remark outside of the entire context of the work of Hegel, but Schmitz suggests that part of its meaning is that Spinoza failed to correctly incorporate into his development of the system what was implicit in it i.e. the dominance of thought as the one "determinate totality", or a self-generating order of internal relations, while the other attributes only appear to be in this way essential to substance.²

I have to think that this criticism relies on not distinguishing the attribute of thought from the internal order of the absolute, this unnecessary representation, as we will see, of Spinoza is reinforced by defenders of the absolute idealist Spinoza making it seem as if he recognized the dominance of thought as the internal order of substance. We will find that the internal order of thought is, in Spinoza's system, dominant, but that this is not the dominance of the attribute of thought because, as attribute on the side of diversity, it is distinguishable from the essential order of substance as one of its ways of being. Similarities are pointed out by Meyers between Hegel's

¹. G. Hegel, Science of Logic, 2 Vols., trans. W.H. Johnston and L.G. Struthers (London: George Allen and Urwin, 1965) 2:169.

². K.L. Schmitz, "Hegel's Assessment of Spinoza" Kennington 238.

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absolute and Spinoza's substance and he remarks on the necessity of the generation from substance of its parts and the dependence of each of the parts on every other and the whole.¹ These points regarding the relations of whole and part in Spinoza's absolute do have a basis in his text. In the Ethics, Spinoza says that "from the necessity of the divine nature there must follow infinitely many things in infinitely many modes (Pt. I, prop. 16) or, in other words, there is a necessary generation from the whole of its parts in Spinoza's system and substance is the cause of itself (Pt. I, prop. 7, pr.). Moreover, in the course of defending the thesis of complete determinism, Spinoza argues that a change in any one particular thing in nature would imply a change in God's nature as a whole (Pt. I, "Appendix"). This means that the order of all individuals would be changed by a change in any one or that each individual is dependent for its place in the order of the whole on every other. Thus, it appears the idea of a self-generating order of internal relations is in Spinoza's system.

The doctrine is one on which the "universe" is, as Murray says, an "evolution of intelligence".² Murray explains the development of the attributes and modes within

¹. H.A. Myers, Spinoza-Hegel Paradox (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell Univ. Press, 1944) 41.

². Murray 474.

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the system on the grounds of the impossibility of the concept of substance being thought in the absence of either attributes or modes.¹ They can be explained in this way as a function of God's potentiality and the requirement of being ordered in thought. Murray adopts the one-being-diversely-ordered interpretation, as is very apparent from the reservations he expresses about the parallelism of the attributes and his contention of knowledge necessarily ascending towards an internal order in favour of the dominance of thought among the attributes.²

The attribute of thought is, according to Murray, the order of internal relations. In the course of stating reservations about the parallelism of the attributes, Murray contrasts "an association of ideas which corresponds to the order of external nature" with the "order of the intellect" in order to deny that the modes of alternate attributes "are simply concurrent, each mode of one attribute being represented by a corresponding mode of the other".³ This indicates that Murray regards our understanding of extension in thought as one of a distinct order, one which Murray appears willing to count as the confused and inadequate

¹. Murray 477-9.

². Murray 481-2.

³. Murray 481.

order of the imagination.¹

The most readily acceptable position apparent to Murray and most of the recent absolute idealist interpreters is the one-being-diversely-ordered; and one which locates the passive order of the imagination in the system as the order of extension, and the active as that of thought. This is how we can understand Harris, as indicated by the examples he offers to illustrate "difference of attribute" in the case of the one thing which is both mind and body:

the entity which is both has two forms of being, just as (analogously) a triangle exists as three straight lines or a plane forming three angles, and as a distinctive three cornered shape ... as blotches of coloured paint on canvas are the same thing (res) as the picture of a landscape.²

The attributes of thought and extension are, on this view, distinct orderings of substance which is internally related in thought and externally related in extension.

The attributes are, also according to Sprigge, distinct ways in which substance is ordered. Thought is the

1. Murray 482-3.

2. Harris, Salvation 84.

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consciousness of the extended or physical world, and that "to which the physical world is displayed is not really a different reality from it, but another aspect of the same reality".¹ Moreover, even extension is characterized by "a kind of unified inner feeling of its own being".²

Thus, it is difficult to distinguish the attributes from certain centers of experience, not "what appears to us as inanimate nature" which Sprigge suggests the absolute idealist does well to hold "is really some kind of ocean of interacting low-level centers of experience, pulsing with dim emotion".³ Sprigge sympathizes with this panpsychist element in absolute idealism and this is a view on which these centers would be like us in their and our finitude, while the attributes would be more like what the absolute creates where it:

carves out for itself units in the world which are larger than ... finite centers, and smaller than itself, by taking certain further centers as the

¹. Sprigge, Theories of Existence 156.

². Sprigge, Theories of Existence 157.

³. Sprigge, Theories of Existence 65.

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summing up of the interaction of others.¹

Such "summatory ideas" as Sprigge calls them:

would be centers of experience, at the noumenal level, but at the phenomenal level they would be an aspect of the togetherness or relatedness of the phenomenal versions of the items in the system they helped to constitute.²

The attributes are, in other words, not in principle unconscious systems of interaction. They are, indeed, conscious of themselves as they are in themselves. However, we are conscious of them as a certain necessity in our own experience which we should properly conceive as the influence of an order of experience. Such is the necessity with which one's experience is developed by the requirements of the system of the physical sciences in which our minds are influenced through their involvement in our neurophysiological structures.³

These summatory ideas are aspects of substance and like

¹. T.L.S. Sprigge, Vindication of Absolute Idealism (Edinburgh: Univ. Press, 1983) 157.

². Sprigge, Vindication 158.

³. Sprigge, Theories of Existence 159.

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us they are orderings of the whole, however, as attributes they are neither incomplete nor in any way inaccurate. This is why Sprigge can say, in resistance to the subjectivist interpretation, that like all the attributes extension, in relation to substance, "represents one correct way of grasping it, showing us how it really is".¹ Sprigge allows, nevertheless, that the attributes are perspectives (albeit they are accurate) on, or orderings of substance.

The thesis that there are external relations in reality is one which Sprigge resists, and he suggests that Spinoza does as well.² Nevertheless, it should be possible, as Sprigge contends, to order as mental states in terms of a psychological account the same activity as is ordered as neurophysiological events in the physical sciences³; and this should appear in different relations in the one and the other. Although we will focus, in what follows, on the version of the one-being-diversely-ordered interpretation which makes extension an order of external relations, all that I have to say of significance about it will be intended to apply to any version.

¹. T.L.S. Sprigge, "Spinoza: His Identity Theory", Philosophy Through Its Past, ed. T. Honderich (Harmondsworth: Penguin, 1984) 154.

². Sprigge, Vindication 232-47.

³. Sprigge, Theories of Existence 160.

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The central body of this chapter will be devoted to examining Murray's and Harris's arguments in favour of the absolute idealist reading of Spinoza's metaphysics which are all designed to show that Spinoza's reality is the order of the absolute, although they are presented as proving that it is an order unique to thought, that is, in line with the one-being-diversely-ordered interpretation of the identity of substance and attribute. I will be showing that their textual bases are compatible with the alternative interpretation of substance-attribute identity. The arguments are all of one or other of two types. One can be called the ontological argument, for reasons to be explained; and this type of argument for this interpretation is examined in the first section.

The other type of argument may be called the epistemological for reasons, again, to be explained. This type is examined in the second section. In a separate conclusion, reasons will be given for considering an alternative interpretation of substance-attribute identity, while retaining the fundamental outlines of the absolute idealist reading.

a) Ontological Considerations

The ontological argument for the absolute idealist interpretation is formulated by Murray who says:

substance is defined to be, not merely that which is in itself, but also that which is conceived by itself; and, to make the meaning perfectly explicit, this latter predicate is more fully expanded into "that of which the concept does not require the concept of anything else, by which it has to be formed." Substance is, therefore, not an empirical idea taken simply as something which happens to be found among the natural furniture of our minds. It is a necessary concept of reason.¹

This may be called the ontological argument for the absolute idealist interpretation, since its major premise and conclusion parallel the ontological argument for the

¹. Murray 477-8.

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necessary existence of God in Harris's development of it.¹ The conclusion of the argument for the idealist reading is that Spinoza's reality is an order of internal relations like the reality proven by Harris's argument for God. The major premise in Harris's argument refers to the given character of phenomena, in the same way as Murray's points to the conceivability-within-itself of substance as Spinoza defines it (pt. I, def. 2), as unintelligible outside of the self-enclosed conception the absolute has of itself.

It should be remarked that Murray's contention is prompted by a wide range of similar considerations. However, some of them are clearly the oneness of substance and the diversity of the parts found within it, taken as theses in Spinoza's thought², in which case the analogy is even more striking. Murray's discussion of these concerns suggests the argument that Spinoza's monism and the diversity it incorporates are unintelligible except as the absolute idealist's conception of a systematic unity. The oneness of all things is unintelligible as a collection of disparate entities. The parts of substance must be tied together through a system of internal relations.

¹. Errol E. Harris, "Mr. Ryle and the Ontological Argument", Many-faced Argument, ed. John Hick (New York: Macmillan, 1967).

². Murray 474-8.

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This type of argument is like, in some respects, the one against which Mark raises objection¹, which would be Hampshire's construction of an argument in favour of a rationalist reading of Spinoza.² On this construction, a rationalist version of the coherence theory of truth is said to be involved in the monism of Spinoza, and there should be very little difference between a coherence theory of truth and of reality. The coherence theory of truth is defined by Mark in the following four conditions:

1) Truth (usually applied to ideas or judgments) is defined as coherence within the ordered system that constitutes reality.

2) The criterion, as well as the definition, of truth is coherence within the ordered system of reality.

3) Relations are internal; that is, a things's relations with other things are essential to its being what it is; indeed, they may constitute what

¹. Thomas Carson Mark, Spinoza's Theory of Truth (New York: Columbia Univ. Press, 1972) 46-51.

². Hampshire, Spinoza 102.

it is.

4) Truth admits of degrees.¹

These four conditions are in need of qualification if they are to define truth in absolute idealist terms, although it can be seen to involve features of a type of coherence theory. However, in the first place, it is questionable that the absolute idealist would use the term 'truth' solely in reference to a property of an idea or judgement, except in one limited sense, and only if it is that of an order of judgments making a necessary perspective on the whole.

Moreover, the system of judgments making up the whole is not a straightforwardly rational system in the sense of being a coherent body of judgments between which there are no distinctions of kind. Indeed, there must be sets of judgments which, if taken altogether, would be contradictory, but whose contradictoriness is mediated by standing in separate bodies of judgments representing each a necessary although distinct perspective on the whole.

The difference in the comprehensiveness of distinct bodies of judgments would be the exact sense in which the truth of judgments, in as much as they are true or form a coherent body of judgments, may be said to be subject to

¹. Mark 2.

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degrees. And there are degrees of the truth of ideas owing to the fact that there are degrees of reality, since degrees of reality emerge in the system of Spinoza and ideas are reality.¹ The degree of the truth of our ideas is directly proportionate to the objective reality or perfection of our ideas, even onto the infinite perfection objectively (or representatively) contained in our idea of God (Pt. I, prop. 11, pr. 2).

Furthermore, it is definitely not a requirement of the absolute idealist theory of truth that all relations be internal. Internal relations or those which determine the nature of their terms must have opposed to them some external or those dependent on the nature of their terms. For the entire system of internal relations cannot be intelligibly ascribed to reality unless the system is, thus, opposed to a set of external relations. The system of internal relations is the more fundamental of the two. The necessity with which the system of experience differentiates itself into orders of internal and external relations can be understood by reference to the negative principle of sufficient reason and the requirement of intelligibility.

¹. It can also be argued that if there are degrees of truth in the coherence theory then also degrees of reality. See Leslie Armour, Concept of Truth (Assen: Van Gorcum, 1969) 126.

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The ascription of both types of relations to substance is not necessarily incoherent. The difference would be one of complementary aspects. The system of absolute idealism does not, therefore, involve the third of Mark's claims respecting the coherence theory of truth. The claim should be modified to read that internal relations are one complete aspect of all things. The system of internal relations is one, a set of external relations another of two distinct, but necessary perspectives on the whole of substance.

While examining the effect of Mark's objection on the absolute idealist interpretation, it should be allowed that each of the above modifications has already been introduced into the definition of the theory of truth. His objection is opposed to certain of the presuppositions of the ontological argument. It leans on the failure of substance to be an intelligible order except as one of internal relations. This can be put into question either by showing that there is a viable alternative to the absolute idealist conception of substance or that the absolute idealist conception is also either incomprehensible or unknowable. Where Mark's objection is directed against the absolute idealist interpretation, it works in support of the latter.

The objection depends on a supposed implication of the coherence theory. The theory is supposed to imply that the criterion and the definition of truth is the coherence of an

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idea or judgment with a body of other ideas or judgments. But this would be at variance with two points of Spinoza's conception of truth as stated in his writings. In the first place, it would commit one to an infinite regress in any attempt to justify or prove the truth of one's idea or judgment. This is because the justification for the truth of any idea would have to be its coherence with a set of ideas distinct from it; and its truth could be determined only in relation to a further set of ideas and so on.

However, as Mark points out, Spinoza recognizes a problem in any conception of truth on which we are committed to an infinite regress in the attempt to establish the truth of a given idea or judgment. The problem is discussed in terms of the tool analogy in the Tractatus de Intellectus Emendatione where Spinoza argues that the right concept of method or, in other words, the one true idea which is the standard for all others, should not have to rely on another standard of its truth. Spinoza says with regard to the search for the right method of finding knowledge of the truth that:

we must consider ... that there is no infinite regress here. That is, to find the best Method of seeking the truth, there is no need of another Method to seek the Method of seeking the truth, or

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a third Method to seek the second, and so on to infinity. For in that way we shall never arrive at knowledge of the truth, or indeed at any knowledge.

Matters here stand as they do with corporeal tools, where someone might argue in the same way. For to forge iron a hammer is need; and to have a hammer, it must be made; for this another hammer, and other tools are needed; and to have these tools too, other tools will be needed, and so on to infinity ... ¹

The tool analogy illustrates the absurdity of the reasoning which bases the explanation for a thing in something of the sort to require yet the same type of explanation, since by means of such reasoning we could prove that we cannot do what we already commonly do, which is to forge iron.

The first point Mark makes against the ascription of the coherence theory to Spinoza is that it would leave him open to the objection which he, himself, raised against just such forms of reasoning. The coherence theory appears to make the criterion for the truth of a idea a relation it bears to yet another true idea. Thus, an explanation for a

¹. Spinoza, "Emendation of the Intellect" sec. 29.

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true idea, according to the coherence theory, appears to be open to Spinoza's criticism.

The other point Mark cites is developed from the conclusion Spinoza draws from his criticism of this problematic form of reasoning. Spinoza concludes that beyond the certainty which a true idea possesses in itself "no other sign is needed. ... For as we have shown, in order for me to know, it is not necessary for me to know that I know".¹ So long as in our own nature, in other words, there is found a true idea, it is enough to have this idea to possess a standard of truth. Mark draws the conclusion that the theory of truth ascribed to Spinoza cannot be one on which the criterion of truth is any relation an idea might bear to any other, but holds this is the criterion of truth according to the coherence theory.² Mark cites this point on which the coherence theory appears to be at variance with any conception of truth which could plausibly be ascribed to Spinoza. The other, we have already seen, is the infinite regress apparently involved in any attempt to account for the truth of an idea on the coherence theory.

But there is a move open, and it does not involve holding that in order to know the idea of the whole of

¹. Spinoza, "Emendation of the Intellect" sec. 35.

². Mark 46-7.

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substance, it would be necessary to conceive directly an infinity of ideas. The impossibility of our doing so is cited by Mark in order to forestall a move on the part of any defender of ascribing the coherence theory to Spinoza, a move which consists in pointing to our idea of substance as one whose truth does not depend on its relation to any other than itself.¹ It is a move which consists in following out Spinoza's own solution to the problem of method. Spinoza's solution to the problem of establishing a method for acquiring knowledge of the truth rests on discovering in ourselves a true idea.

The exemplar of a true idea is any which cannot fail to count as true i.e. agree with its object (Pt. II, def. 4, exp.) because it has for its objective reality its own formal reality.² It is a self-referential idea; and the 'adequate idea' bears an important relation, in Spinoza's system, to the 'true idea'. The adequate idea is one which "considered in itself, without relation to an object [sine relatione ad objectum], has all the properties, or intrinsic denominations of a true idea" (Pt. II, def. 4). The sine relatione ad objectum helps to emphasize, in a way the

¹. Mark 48-9.

². Spinoza, "Emendation of the Intellect" sec. 34 and 35.

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English fails to, and the explication especially clarifies, it is with respect to the internality of the order of a true idea, as opposed to the external order involved in it insofar as it is inadequate, that Spinoza understands it to be adequate. The adequacy of an idea is the internality or self-certain actuality of an idea; and for this reason, Spinoza describes the idea of idea, in respect to its adequacy, as "nothing but the form of the idea insofar as this is considered as a mode of thinking without relation to the object [absque relatione ad objectum]" (Pt. II, prop. 21, sch.).

The idea which Spinoza decides would be the most suitable standard of (i.e. method for finding) truth is the idea of God.¹ This is because, although any self-affirmative idea processes self-certain actuality, our idea of God has infinite objective reality and so it is also the standard of completeness of truth. Descartes argued that our idea of God has infinite objective reality and that the cause of an idea must have at least as much formal reality as the idea has objective. God as the cause of our idea must, therefore, actually exist. In other words, it has to be innate or given to us by God. For it can be neither adventitious nor factitious, since each of these options

¹. Spinoza, "Emendation of the Intellect" sec. 38 and 49.

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involves a cause which does not have the most complete degree of perfection.¹

The Spinozistic version of this argument runs as follows. The cause of an idea is the adequate idea in terms of which the order of experience which is the idea is explained. This premise conforms to Spinoza's claim that the knowledge of an effect is given in and involves the knowledge of its cause (Pt. I, ax. 3 and 4). Thus, a cause of an idea must be an order of experience at least as perfect as the one which it explains. Curley raises objection to the Cartesian argument that the concept of the objective reality of an idea and of the formal reality of its object is unclear² which is answerable if the objective reality of ideas is taken to coincide with the 'degree of their truth' in the above explained sense.³

To the extent that we adequately conceive the nature of God, it is possible to realize the experience of a dual-

¹. Descartes, "Meditations on First Philosophy" 3rd Meditation (A.T. 7/40-45, 4951).

². E.M. Curley, Descartes Against the Sceptics (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard Univ. Press, 1978) 129-35.

³. There is the suggestion of a dimension like this of the reality of ideas in Leslie Armour, "ideas, Causes and God", Sophia 19.1 (1980).

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subject¹, the order of the one explained and traversed through the other; nor is one's uniqueness given up in the transition, since the finite-infinite distinction is preserved in the idea we have of substance in which we are uniquely distinguishable perspectives within the systematic unity of the whole.

Insofar as our idea is adequate, it possesses the same self-certain actuality as the cogito. Such an idea of ourselves in the infinite subjectivity of God is a presupposition of our own²; it is in us as well as we in it, and it is neither adventitious nor factitious, since it explains the very limitations which distinguish such ideas; it has to be an innate idea in a sense "given to us by God" just as our existence is given in God. However, it is not the idea of passive existence, rather one of a self-ordering

¹. Leslie Armour, "Experience and the Concept of God", Sophia 38.3 (1986) see 352-4.

². See E. Sherman, "Spinoza and the Divine Cogito: God as 'Self-Performance'", ed. James B. Wilbur, Spinoza's Metaphysics (Amsterdam: Van Gorcum, 1976).

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of consciousness which could be expected to promote its reflecting itself positively in the experience of others.

One's adequate idea of one's self in God enters into one's self as "conatus or practical urge which demands realization of the unity and wholeness of experience" as according to Harris.¹ Such an idea meets Spinoza's requirement that the essence of substance should be defined in such a way as, with world enough and time, one could derive its every property.² More importantly, it allows us to have an adequate idea of substance, whose truth depends on its intelligibility, without having to actually affirm an infinity of judgments. If the order of this idea is aligned with thought, it is the order unique to thought that the ontological argument demonstrates. But since the increasing adequacy of our idea could be also characterized, as Rice suggests, by a greater intensity of feeling³ and this intuition could be nuanced by each of the attributes, the ontological argument does not show

¹. Errol E. Harris, "Essence of Man and the Subject of Consciousness", Spinoza's Philosophy of Man, ed. Jon Wetlesen (Universitets Forlaget, 1978) 134.

². Spinoza "Emendation of the Intellect" sec. 96.

³. This is the central drift of Lee C. Rice, "Continuity of 'Mens' in Spinoza", New Scholasticism 43 (1969).

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that the order of reality it insists on is or is not unique to thought. It is compatible with this order residing in each of the attributes.

The epistemological argument is constructed in various versions by Murray and Harris, and it will be the topic of the next section. It will indicate that Harris and Murray present no unquestionable version of it, incompatible with the alternative interpretation of substance-attribute identity. Thus, it will be shown that the arguments constructed by Murray and Harris work in a manner supportive of this alternative as well. This should help to dispel some of the doubts of those sympathetic to this reading about the shift to the one-order-diversely-constituted interpretation.

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b) Epistemological Considerations

In the previous section it was argued that the ontological argument for the absolute idealist reading is workable with either absolute idealist interpretation of substance-attribute identity. The epistemological argument is found in Murray and Harris where they contend that being thought is a necessary condition, in the system of Spinoza, for anything being real. They find reasons for this in various places in the text. This section will be divided into three subsections each dealing with a version of this argument.

This type of argument may be called epistemological because it is like the type of argument found in Berkeley which works on considerations of the character of knowledge of reality in order to show that it cannot be conceived to be other than as ordered in thought. But it is not until the period of the Siris, or the later writings, when it is admitted that Berkeley's doctrine starts to resemble absolute idealism in the important respect of the tenet that

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ideas must really occur in a certain intellectual order¹ which is a tenet of Spinoza established by the epistemological argument for the absolute idealist reading.

¹. A.C. Ewing, Idealist Tradition (Glencoe, Ill.: Free Press, 1957) 5.

i) The Unity of Thought and Substance

One version of the epistemological argument is based on Spinoza's insistence on the unity of substance and the knowledge of it in thought. One could adopt in support of this claim any one of the bases for substance-attribute identity discussed in the second chapter of part I, but Murray uses only the scholium to the tenth proposition of the Ethics, Pt. I. Spinoza is, according to Murray:

at pains to explain that there is no absurdity in supposing a substance to possess several different attributes (I, 10, schol.). But there is another connection between the two attributes of thought and extension. Thought is conscious of itself, but it is conscious of extension as well. Inferentially we may add that thought must be conscious of all the attributes of substance.¹

¹. Murray 479-80.

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The argument appears to work in the following way. Spinoza says that "it is far from absurd to attribute many attributes to one substance" (Pt. I, prop. 10, sch.). But it may be supposed that all the modes of thought are ordered in the system of thought because their ascription to substance involves no absurdity and if, as seems natural in the system of Spinoza, all the modes or attributes ascribed to substance on grounds of it involving no absurdity are modes ordered in thought. Moreover, since Spinoza seems to see no absurdity in the notion of a substance with infinite attributes, it follows that infinite attributes are in this order.

Murray considers this argument qualifiedly significant. It is weaker than others for identifying substance and attribute, but stronger for Murray's purposes. For example, the scholium to Ethics, Pt. I, prop. 10 was not cited in the second chapter, since it is not strong enough to work in favour of identifying substance and any attribute other than thought. The purpose of the chapter was to show that substance could be identified with any of its attributes. However, arguments for identifying substance and attribute might be said to include the force of one for identifying substance and the attribute of thought. Murray wants to deny the conclusion of any argument for identifying substance and just any of its attributes, at least, he

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denies explicitly the parallelism of the attributes¹, since he intends his argument to reduce substance to thought in a way which excludes the same degree of perfection given in any other attribute. Thought is supposed to be dominant in the system, and rightly so if it were the system of internal relations.

The problem is in the ambivalence of the phrase, 'the system of thought'. It could designate either the system which is constituted in a different way by each of the attributes or the order of substance which is uniquely characteristic of thought. So, the data of Murray's argument for the unity of substance and the knowledge of it in the order of thought is compatible with either interpretation of substance-attribute identity.

¹. Murray 482.

ii) Intellectual Knowledge

The three kinds of knowledge Spinoza talks about in the Ethics (Pt. II, prop. 40, sch. 2) are a basis for a version of the epistemological argument. The argument is that although the first kind of knowledge or non-rational, empirical knowledge may be part of our experience of substance, what we have when we know substance, as it is in itself, is a certain ordering of ideas in thought i.e. the order of an adequate idea characteristic of the second and third kinds of knowledge. In this subsection, I will explain Spinoza's theory of the three kinds of knowledge in sufficient detail to show how these considerations might work as much in favour of saying that the system is essentially the intellectual order of thought as any other attribute.

These are considerations employed by Murray¹ and Harris.² The emphasis of Murray's construction of the

¹. Murray 484.

². Harris, Salvation 105.

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argument is on the motive for the adequate comprehension of substance which is the aim of the rational psychology in which this understanding of God is so much involved. Harris emphasizes the ability of the order of an adequate idea to offer an explanation of not only itself, but also what is happening on the level of the first kind of knowledge. With the latter emphasis, the argument is more convincing, since the former is compatible with an indifference to the structure of the reality which makes the satisfaction of the motive possible. However, if the conclusion is good then the order of experience in which substance is known more completely will, perhaps, also be the most satisfying realization of our striving.

The central epistemological concept, in Spinoza's system, is that of 'idea'. The idea constitutes the form of any and all knowledge. The first type of idea, Spinoza refers to as "universal notions (notiones universalis)" (Pt. II, prop. 40, sch. 2), is described with reference to the objects of sense experience which are what these ideas are about and also their cause insofar as they influence the order of our experience. And this is not to say that the mind is entirely passive in the formation of this type of idea. Spinoza says that in order to form this type of idea "we perceive many things and form universal notions ... from

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individual objects presented to us through the senses" (Pt. II, prop. 40, sch. 2).

The second type of idea is derived as the intention of the thinking subject, i.e. a mind, or an attitude of concern is held to be this type of idea. While it is a product of the imagination, it is not an image or one of Hume's faint copies of an impression. Spinoza says of such products of the imagination as seem characteristic of this type of idea that they are "affections of the human body" or emotions and they "set forth external bodies as if they were present to us, although they do not represent shapes" (Pt. II, prop. 17, sch.). The imagery accompanying the second type of idea appears to play an inessential role along side the function of the second type of idea as an attitude of concern.

The idea of the second type may appear to fulfill the function of interpretation, which an indirect realist requires. Once more, we cannot assume anything except our ideas. However, since sensory perception as imagination can only be an externally related or inadequate ordering of substance and the second type of idea is a product of the imagination, it can be said to determine by means of the first type of idea a partial and disjointed perspective which can only be completely understood in the complete and systematic ordering of substance in which the order of experience in every centre of experience is ordered. The

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first type of knowledge is, nevertheless, a product of the first and second type of idea insofar as there is the system and there is our unique contribution.

This type of knowledge, which is a product of the first and second types of idea, is referred to as "opinion or imagination" (Pt. II, prop. 40, sch. 2). The first and second types of idea are equally at work in the explanation of our sensory experience, memory and the emotional phenomena of a sensationalist psychology, and the first kind of knowledge is the only source of falsehood (Pt. II, prop. 41).

By the 'truth' of an idea, Spinoza understands its agreement with its ideatum or that of which it is an idea (Pt. II, def. 4, exp.). Our holding of false ideas is explained by reference to a certain randomness or passivity of the order of experience in which they occur or the "privation of knowledge which inadequate, or mutilated and confused, ideas involve" (Pt. II, prop. 35). Where Spinoza says that all falsehood is in the first kind of knowledge, he evidently means that the second and third kinds of knowledge are the sources of our essential knowledge of substance.

The second kind of knowledge is based on the third type of idea. This type of idea is an adequate or true idea. The grounds for rejecting the first kind of knowledge as

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inadequate to the essence of substance are already given by Spinoza in the order of his text. In the first place, "universal notions [notiones universalis]" abstract from the individual nature of a range of particulars a characterization of which is supposed to represent them all, but it is really only somewhat like any real individual. This is Spinoza's nominalism which appears incompatible with the objectivist interpretation if it is the denial of the reality of anything common to individuals like substance in relation to its attributes or attribute in relation to the diversity of its modes. We can distinguish, however, a nominalism which denies the reality of universals from one which merely denies any non-individual reality.

Universality in Spinoza's system is in an order in which each member of a diversity is uniquely defined. Our adequate idea of substance is one order or "thing" in which is ordered all our unique perspectives. Any one of these is an adequate idea of substance insofar as it defines itself in the order of the whole. Yet, it is one idea in which each is defined for itself and others in its uniqueness.

In the second place, involvement of intention or the second type of idea tends to make the first kind of knowledge differ for one and another (Pt. II, prop. 40, sch. 1). This is a version of the argument from intentionality against the attempt to give an empirical explanation for the

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meaning of an abstract universal.¹ If intention explains the focus of abstraction, whatever explains intention and the objectivity of individuals on which alone the process of abstraction can work will have to be a more complete form of knowledge. The second and third kinds of knowledge are based on the "fact that we have common notions (notiones communes) and adequate ideas" (Pt. II, prop. 40, sch. 2) by which Spinoza appears to mean our innate ideas or our perspective in and on God, by means of which we fill in the missing pieces in the puzzles created by the activity of the first and second type of idea.

The knowledge of the third kind is also derived from an idea of the third type, since it "proceeds from an adequate idea of the formal essence of certain attributes of God" according to Spinoza "to an adequate knowledge of the essence of things" (Pt. II, prop. 40, sch. 2). In connection with the third kind of knowledge, Saw examines the analogy of the fourth proportional Spinoza cites (Pt. II, prop. 40, sch. 2) in explanation of this kind of knowledge: knowing that 6 is the "fourth proportional of the ratio 2:3::4" is an example of the first kind of knowledge; knowing it by means of the principle that one can "multiply

¹. For a contemporary example of this type of reasoning, see Edward T. Bartlett and Leslie Armour, Conceptualization of the Inner Life (Atlantic Highlands, N.J.: Humanities Press, 1980) 290-1.

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the second by the third number, and divide by the first" is an example of the second kind of knowledge, but:

the mathematician - that is, the one who knows - would perceive the answer within the terms of the problem; he would produce it neither by memory, nor by arithmetic, but by intuition, which is knowledge of the third kind.¹

She raises the difficulty in respect to the fact that "the second case fits better what Spinoza has said about proceeding by definition than does the third" and that in the third case the "kind of knowledge he has in mind is not the kind that can be expressed in definition, possibly not by words at all".² A possible answer to the difficulty is in making reference to the conatus of God's being, which Saw suggests would provide ill-footing for any "practical account of thinking".³

It is a problem for the proponent of the one-being-diversely-ordered interpretation, since, given this

¹. Ruth Lydia Saw, Vindication of Metaphysics (London: Macmillan, 1951) 45.

². Saw 45.

³. Saw 46.

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interpretation, reference cannot be made to natura naturans except as simply the other of any ordering of it. Harris says that unless a thing is "a unit in some structure, it dissolves away into nothing. ... a blank undifferentiated unity is not a whole and is strictly inconceivable".¹ With the one-order-diversely-constituted interpretation, reference can be made to intuition within the system of the attributes as nuances on the intuition of being; reasoning explained by the negative principle of sufficient reason together with the requirement of order conforming to intuition. This solves the problem for the proponent of the one-order-diversely-constituted interpretation.

One can argue that the appropriate response is a deeper understanding of the order of thought. To put the point in terms of Spinoza's analogy, one simply sees, as Parkinson suggests, the fourth proportional bearing the same relation to the third number as the first does to the second.² This may solve the problem for the proponent of the one-being-diversely-ordered interpretation. It is difficult to understand how the third kind of knowledge can be read

¹. Errol E. Harris, Formal, Transcendental, and Dialectical Reasoning (New York: State Univ. of New York Press, 1987) 144.

². G.H.R. Parkinson, "'Truth Is Its Own Standard': Aspects of Spinoza's Theory of Truth", Shahan and Biro 50.

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unless the difference between the second and the third kinds of knowledge is one of our recognition of, and our living in the idea of ourselves in God. That is to say, it is difficult to understand how we are to know substance as intuition except as the conatus of this and our being.

The second and third kinds of knowledge are apparently two sides of one and the same idea; it is the second insofar as it is the recognition of the order of systematic unity, and it is the third insofar as it is the intuition of striving within it. The question is whether this order is unique to thought rather than the order of every attribute? Until this question is resolved, the argument does not support either absolute idealist interpretation of substance-attribute identity at the expense of the other.

iii) The Predominance of Thought in the System
Of the Attributes

The third and final version of the epistemological argument will be discussed in this subsection. This is constructed on the evidence of the predominance of thought among the attributes for saying that knowledge of all the attributes and every mode of them is in the order of thought. The evidence which has been used primarily in the literature is the definition of 'attribute' in the Ethics as what the intellect perceives as the essence of substance and Spinoza's admission to Tschirnhaus that the modes of every attribute are in God's understanding of them as modes of thought. It works by showing that the entire system is ordered by the infinite intellect of God. But is this intellectual order unique to the attribute of thought?

In the search for the answer to this question, Spinoza's admission to Tschirnhaus will make a good starting point. The argument, on this formulation, is that the series of the series of corresponding modes in each attributes must have all of its terms ordered as ideas in the infinite intellect of God. The order of substance is in

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each of the attributes (Pt. II, prop. 7, sch.); such that any one thing in this infinite order should be expressed by a mode in each of infinite attributes. But there appears to be a mode of thought uniquely specifying every member of this latter series. Thus, it appears that the order of thought is predominant in the system of the attributes. Tschirnhaus suggests that there is a contradiction in Spinoza's system in the identity of one's self with modes of infinite attributes and our perceiving only a body.¹ Spinoza's response was that, not in the finite mind, but only in the infinite intellect is the infinite series of the corresponding modes expressed, and they are there expressed as an infinity of minds.² Harris says "mind (or idea)", and draws the conclusion that the parallelism of the attributes ought to be rejected because the attribute of thought is more comprehensive than the others.³

One can hold that thought and extension are distinct orderings of substance, apparently, and that substance is essentially as ordered through the attribute of thought. The way, according to Harris, of doing this seems to be to

¹. Letter 65.

². Letter 66.

³. Harris, Salvation 70-1.

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allow that the attributes are not independent, but rather they are internally related in substance as conceived through thought. It is predominant among the attributes. Every individual thing is related to every other in each of the attributes, but only in thought is every other attribute related to each other and to thought. The move to reduce the entire system of the attributes to thought is supposedly supported by the epistemological argument. But it seems to contradict the independence and the parallelism of the attributes. Harris admits that it does.¹ However, in a situation like this, one can argue, as does Murray, that one simply has to make the most consistent choice about which of Spinoza's propositions to reject.² The procedure of trimming down the doctrine of Spinoza to arrive at answers to problems in his system may be the only viable one.

Murray uses the evidence of the definition of 'attribute' in the Ethics in the following way:

all attributes are defined to be what they are in themselves by what the intellect conceives them essentially to be. That is to say, they are defined by their relation to thought; and thus, thought becomes

¹. Harris, Salvation 74.

². Murray 473.

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the supreme attribute or category, by relation to which all else must be interpreted.¹

Spinoza defines 'attribute' as "that which the intellect perceives of substance as constituting its essence" (Pt. I, def. 4). The definition supports Murray's claim that the attributes are ordered in the intellect. The additional assumption is the intellect - and since we are talking about all the attributes, Murray must be referring to the infinite intellect - is the order unique to thought. Once again, it seems necessary to deny the independence and the parallelism of the attributes while providing support for saying substance is essentially the absolute idealist's conception of systematic unity.

However, it is open to question whether its alternative represents the absurdity of its denial or the limits of our comprehension. In support of the latter, Hallett responds in the following way to the suggestion that thought has a "status superior to that of all other Attributes". "The primacy of thought" according to Hallett "reflects only the relativity of the attributes to intellect as far as the

¹. Murray 479.

philosophic quest for understanding is concerned".¹ Yet, this does not turn out to be a subjectivism of the attributes because the order of the intellect is necessary to the complete reality of substance.²

The objection from Hallett to the epistemological argument is that it overlooks the limited role of thought in the overall being of substance. The objection developed by Hallett to the argument's first variation, discussed above, is found in a footnote where Hallett says that the relation of the human mind to the infinite diversity of corresponding modes in other attributes "necessarily transcend the competence of the philosopher as such (i.e.) as intellect". It cannot be concluded, therefore, "that the result is rightly described as giving 'superior status' - or indeed that it can be 'described', 'description' being an intellectual process".³ The relation between the human mind and the infinite diversity of corresponding modes in other attributes is not a comprehensible one to us, according to Hallett's response.

¹. H.F. Hallett, Creation, Emanation and Salvation (The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1962) 45.

². Hallett, Creation 44.

³. Hallett, Creation 45 n. 2.

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The absolute idealist can agree with Hallett's remark that the attributes are "infinite potency-inact as reflectively apprehended by intellect which is itself an actualization of potency - and one that is implicitly self-transcendent".¹ The agreement is in regard to the claim that the intellect is actively self-comprehending. The disagreement is about the extent of its activity. The absolute idealist does not want to allow that the activity of the intellect has its source in an agency which transcends the order of thought. The absolute idealist maintains a unity of thought and reality.

The proponent of the absolute idealist interpretation can argue against Hallett's claim that to the infinite intellect "the infinite Attributes are ... indiscernible".² The example of the dog which barks and the one made of stars in the sky, which Spinoza uses to illustrate the disparity between the finite and infinite intellect, does not suggest a difference so great that it does not allow for a sameness in difference (Pt. I, 17, sch.). The relation of the two is not that of the comprehensible to the incomprehensible, as Hallett suggests, but the relation of the lesser to the more, indeed, the most comprehensive understanding.

¹. Hallett, Creation 46.

². Hallett 47.

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Otherwise, if the finite intellect has a perception of the character of the essence of substance, i.e. its attributes, different from the infinite in kind rather than degree, it is difficult not to wonder whether we know anything at all about the nature of substance. As we will see in the remainder of this chapter, Murray and Harris can assure the comensurability of God's understanding and our own by the special way in which they deny the parallelism of the attributes, situating our experience of the external order as an idea of a relatively low degree of adequacy in the internal order of the intellect in which our experience is explained. We can also answer Hallett by situating this relation in each of the attributes as a nuance on the intuition constitutive or all-pervasive of the complete and internal order of experience.

The question is open whether the order of the intellect, that the argument proves predominant in the system of the attributes, is one unique to thought? It could be intellect to the extent that it is thought, but an order which is as much constituted by each of the attributes. So, the evidence could support also the absolute idealist interpretation on which substance is one order diversely constituted by its attributes.

Epistemological Considerations

Concluding Remarks: a Weakness
In the One-Being-Diversely-Ordered Reading

It has been shown in the above that the argument from leading exponents of the absolute idealist interpretation do not force a one-being-diversely-ordered reading of substance-attribute identity, rather than one-order-diversely-constituted. In what remains of this chapter, the latter is shown to be advantageous in dealing with the parallelism of the attributes suggested by the following:

The order and connection of ideas is the same as the order and connection of things (Pt. II, prop. 7).

This is actually not a statement of the parallelism of the attributes, but of a certain unity of the order of ideas and reality. Wise notices the ambiguity in 'things' in the proposition. It could refer to modes of substance or to whatever is essentially real about substance.¹ The proof

¹. R.R.A. Wise, "Parallelism of the Attributes", Philosophical Papers 11 (1982) 27.

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refers only to the axiom that "knowledge [cognitio] of an effect depends on, and involves, knowledge [cognitione] of its cause" (Pt. I, ax. 4) which suggests that in thought the idea of the external order of our experience must be contained in, and presuppose the order of the adequate idea in which it is explained. It is the internal order in which the external is given an explanation which is only later shown to be paralleled in each of the attributes.

In the scholium to this proposition, Spinoza goes on to argue for the parallelism of the attributes. The same order and connection of things as conceived through thought to be one of ideas in thought is also conceived to be one of modes in every attribute, since any attribute constitutes the essence of substance (Pt. I, def. 4) from which the one order of its modes is generated (Pt. I, prop. 1, see also prop. 4, pr.). Spinoza goes on to explain that the point is partially seen by those who say that things understood by God, God and the intellect of God are one and the same, since it is through the attribute of thought that things are understood to be in the order of God's intellect, the expression in thought of the essence of God. Thought is an intuition out of which the order of things is evolved. This is why the idea of a circle and the circle in nature are one and the same i.e. the circle in nature is conceivable through this as other attributes. And so (et ideo), says Spinoza, the order of nature is as conceived through thought

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and the other attributes from any one of which it is possible to derive the order of substance. The parallelism of the attributes suggests a certain identity of substance and attribute.

The sense of 'identity' suggested is that of one-order-diversely-constituted. But those who defend the alternative may be expected to explore another reading. One sees Harris¹ agree with Murray² in reading the seventh proposition to affirm that the one order of thought is present throughout. Extension merely represents it confusedly. Sprigge insists on the unique internality of extension and every other attribute as it is in itself, but he suggests that the order and connection specified by the proposition is one more concrete than any of the attributes.³ Again, it is not the parallelism of the attributes.

However, it is explicitly stated in Spinoza's text that

¹. Errol E. Harris, "Order and Connection of Things", Van der Bend, Spinoza on Knowing 107-8; see also Harris, Salvation 84-5.

². Murray 480-82.

³. Sprigge, "Spinoza: His Identity Theory" sec. 6, especially 168-9; and his Vindication 158.

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there is only one order¹, and that it is the same one of which we are conscious in the case of any attribute. "The laws and rules of nature ... are always and everywhere the same" says Spinoza, and "so the way of understanding the nature of anything, of whatever kind, must be the same, viz. through the universal laws and rules of nature" (Pt. III, "Preface"). And "the order, or connection, of things is one, whether nature is conceived under this attribute or that" (Pt. III, prop. 2, sch.). But most important of all:

whether we conceive [concipiamus] nature under the attribute of Extension, or under the attribute of Thought, or under any other attribute, we shall find [reperiemus] one and the same order, or one and the same connection of causes, i.e., that the same things follow one another (Pt. II, prop. 7, sch.).

It is unnecessary to base the thesis entirely on this passage. That the one-order-diversely-constituted interpretation is a defensible alternative to the one-being-diversely-ordered is grounded on its ability to make sense of passages from the Ethics dealing with the attributes and

¹. Scruton uses the one-order-doctrine as an objection to the doctrine of the attributes, as if it could only be seen with a one-being-diversely-ordered interpretation; see Scruton 54-9, 107.

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to offer a reasonable solution to the problem in a manner not obviously anachronistic. This passage does indicate that what we find (reperiemus) in our conception of substance i.e. substance as we conceive it (concipiamus) through any attribute is the same order or (sive) what is the same thing, connection of causes. We conceive the essential order of substance in any attribute. It is not that the one order is a transcendent one only dimly or abstractly perceived through extension or any other attribute. Nor is the order of the attributes each as real or essential to substance while different orders. The passages cited above indicate clearly enough that Spinoza thinks there is only one essential order. Moreover, it seems that the order we conceive to be essential to substance is one and the same whether we conceive it through one or other attribute.

Spinoza says "sive Naturam sub attributo Extensionis, sive sub attributo Cogitationis, sive sub alio quocunque" we encounter in conception the same order (Pt. II, prop. 7, sch.). The sive does not indicate a mere preference of wording. Nor is it the same order reordered from a unique point of view when conceived through one or another attribute; this would be a unique order. What differs while the order remains the same is the intuition of the one essential order.

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Spinoza speaks in subjective terms. One sense of reperio, for example, is 'to invent, devise'. Even in the most apt expression, Spinoza need not be expected to take account of every connotation of a term. In this case, aptness of expression is preserved. For it is part of the meaning of what the conatus does when it gives rise to the order of experience that it is as much invention as discovery. That is not to say we invent the order of experience subsequently testing it by reference to things ordered in experience, rather it is strength of intuition which determines the reality of our ordering of things in experience. Creation and discovery are the two sides of the same activity. The ordering of substance is not an activity of infinite caprice. It determines itself in accordance with the attributes of substance as the quality of coherence among ideas in the case of thought, the quality of geometrical possibility in the case of extension and the others which our ordering of our experience does not yet enable us to discern.

In the same scholium (to Pt. II, prop. 7), Spinoza goes on to warn against thinking the oneness of the order is in conflict with our having to conceive it through a given attribute independently of any other; and he concludes with the seemingly paradoxical remark to the effect that the essential order of things involves all of the attributes,

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not just any one. The attribute through which the order of experience is independently developed is any one of them on the side of its unity with substance. On the side of unity, it is a nuance on natura naturans uniquely specified by the type of restriction it places on the order which may emerge in it. The attributes are all in the order which any one of them allows to emerge, but on the side of their diversity and they are, on this side, further restrictions inherent to the development of natura naturans. There will be discussion of these points which may seem at this juncture obscure in the development of the proposed solution in the next chapter. At this stage, it is important that it be recognized that the above passages, quoted from the Ethics, indicate that Spinoza thinks there is one essential order and it is the same which we understand it to be when we conceive it under any attribute.

The absolute idealist interpretation offered by Murray, Sprigge or Harris does not deal with these passages, but the one-order-diversely-constituted interpretation is supported directly by them. That is to say, it is supported by passages suggesting a parallelism of the attributes. Whether the independence of the attributes can or cannot be made sense of in terms of the one-being-diversely-ordered interpretation is also questionable, however, it is enough

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to have found one principal weakness in it in order to shift attention to its alternative.

In short, the one-order-diversely-constituted interpretation is confirmed in that part of the text where its alternative is weak. It is a preferable version of the absolute idealist interpretation if it can be shown to be in other respects plausible. To show this is the task of the next and final chapter of the thesis.

2) The Proposed Solution

So far the investigation has brought us to the conclusion that if there is a solution to the problem of the attributes then it is worthwhile looking for it in an alternative to the one-being-diversely-ordered interpretation. In this chapter, it will be shown how a solution defined along the lines of the one-order-diversely-constituted reading works in response to the several questions generated in the third chapter of part I. In this way, it will be shown that the solution proposed is not only advantageous in the way already indicated, but also that it is in other respects a plausible solution to the problem.

In the third chapter of part I, three ways of formulating the issue were considered. It was in each case a problem of showing how the identity of substance and attribute and the oneness of substance could be reconciled with the 'diversity' of the attributes, in one of three senses. This was 'diversity': 1) in the sense of countable diversity; 2) in the sense in which thought and extension are understood to be incompatible as attributes of one

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substance, and 3) in that in which it is emphasized that the attributes are conceptually independent. This chapter will be broken down into three sections in each of which one of these will be dealt with. Each section will begin with a brief review of the questions raised under the corresponding section-heading in the original setting out of the problem.

a) Countable Diversity

In this section, the proposed solution to the problem of the attributes is developed in response to the problem as formulated in the first section of the third chapter of part I. This category is the one under which the difficulty is one of reconciling the identity of each of the attributes with the one substance and the countable diversity of the attributes. I will quickly restate the questions and then develop the proposed solution in response.

The central issue is, given the countable diversity of the attributes, can we conceive of the identity of each of them with the one substance? We have seen, in the third chapter of part I. how Tschirnhaus developed the question on the level of our mind and body. The question is why, if I am identical to a mode of each of infinite attributes, do I perceive only a body? The closely related question is what is the rational explanation for the infinite countable diversity of the attributes and of our being directly acquainted with only two?

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Substance is one order constituted in a countable diversity of ways. The difficulty only arises if the identity of substance and attribute excludes difference. The concept of the 'identity' of substance and attribute at work in saying that substance is one order diversely constituted is one which is compatible with a countable diversity among attributes. This response to the central question can be applied in answer to Tschirnhaus's version of the difficulty. We will profit by leading into it through the explanation of what could be said to be Spinoza's adverbial theory of substance.

Substance is not merely an order, but an ordering or activity. Thus, 'substance' is like a verb. The term 'attribute' might be said to designate a class of adverbs. The adverb 'quickly' may describe a running and if it does then it is like a quality which pervades that action. 'Quick' is not the same as 'uphill', but they may both describe the running. Similarly, attributes differ one from another while they are each all-pervasive of the ordering of modes and properties in substance.

In keeping with the analogy of the adverbial theory, it could also be said that the ordering of substance is again like running, but with certain adverbs which necessarily apply. If 'quick' and 'uphill' were necessary to running then this activity could vary in many ways, but in none

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which were incompatible with quick and uphill running. Similarly an attribute imposes a limitation on substance and everything existing or ordered in substance.

The attributes are ontological conditions on the order of experience and not merely, as according to Aldrich's conception of the attributes, logical constraints on the ascription of properties.¹ Each attribute is a type of being, as such, and a limitation on the order which may emerge in being. Imaginary or confused orderings of experience cannot emerge except in the wholly coherent order in which their occurrence is explained. Thought is the intuition of coherence among ideas and the conformity of the order of experience to it prevents the order of our experience ultimately being one of one's believing what one does not believe. Conformity to extension prevents the order of experience actually involving geometrically impossible juxtapositionings of objects.

It is useful to remark, as does Bennett, that the verb constituo, translated as 'to constitute' substance in the definition of 'attribute' in the Ethics, carries with it the sense of "'fix', 'define', 'determine'".² It is part of the

¹. See V. Aldrich, "Categories and Spinoza's Attributes", Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 61(1980).

². Bennett, Study 65.

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meaning of the relation of substance to attribute, since each attribute influences the ordering of modes or properties.

Properties cannot be ordered in every way in substance, although it orders all properties and orderings of them. Being ordered in certain ways is incompatible with thought or extension or some other attribute with which we are not directly acquainted. These orders of experience are characterized by an inferior degree of the strength of intuition which is proportionate to the adequacy of ideas or some other intuition of intelligibility i.e. attribute, but these appearances of disorder or the incompleteness of the order of our experience must be, as such, explicable within the appropriate order of the absolute. (I say 'incompatible' rather than 'impossible', since although the latter term may be used in preference to the former to indicate the relation of being prevented from being in any way, rather than a mere logical or conceptual opposition, it is unnecessary and, perhaps, owing to its use in Leibniz, misleading to have recourse to the latter term in this context.) The influence of thought over substance insures that the order of experience is ultimately coherent, and without any real conceptual tensions.

In response to Tschirnhaus's question why, if I am

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identical to modes of each of infinite attributes, do I perceive myself only as a body, Spinoza replies that:

although each thing is expressed in infinite modes in the infinite understanding of God, yet the infinite ideas by which it is expressed cannot constitute one and the same mind of an individual thing, but an infinity of minds ... ¹

The infinity of modes in alternate attributes, by which each thing is expressed, has to be understood as an infinity of minds or ideas in the "understanding [intellectus]" of God. Each thing "is expressed [expressa sit]" by infinite modes (in finitis modis) and these are "ideas by which it is expressed [quibus exprimitur]". The verb exprimo plays a key role in Spinoza's thinking about the attributes and it is worthwhile exploring its meaning.

The primary metaphysical uses of the term are those where Spinoza says that the attributes, or their modes in a certain, determinate manner, express the nature of substance or some ideas express, with varying degrees of success, the nature of an entity within substance. The verb exprimo can mean 'to produce (a likeness)'. If likeness is taken to be

¹. Letter 66.

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whatever counts as the relation of idea to its object, this understanding of the verb supports Gueroult's proposal that the formal reality of the idea of other attributes or of modes of other attributes remains infinite in its kind, but the objective reality is absolutely infinite.¹

In response to this proposal, Harris argues that it contradicts the impossibility of our knowing any other attributes, a point he sees as obvious from Letter 64 and 66. He also argues, against the proposal, that it wrongly suggests a correspondence of the ideas of modes in other attributes with the infinite and reflexive series of ideas of idea (Pt. II, prop. 21, sch.).

Harris points out that "the ideatum of the idea ideae is explicitly said by Spinoza to be the idea of the body, and the idea ideae is itself ideatum to a further idea ideae ideae".² In other words, the object of the idea ideae is not a mode of another attribute, but an idea again in thought. Moreover, the "human mind" remarks Harris "has this idea of itself and comprehends (or is in principle capable of comprehending) the whole infinite reflexive series of ideas, whereas it has, and can have, no idea of ".

¹. Gueroult 2: 78-84.

². Errol E. Harris, "Infinity of Attributes" Neue Hefte für Philosophie 12 (1977) 15.

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any mode in any attribute than Extension and Thought".¹ That is to say, it cannot be that the idea ideae have as object, the modes of unknown attributes because we already know the series of idea ideae.

Spinoza says both that in knowing something, one already knows that one knows and that one knows that one knows that one knows, and so on to infinity, and that knowing something obviates the necessity of knowing that one knows, ect..² This is for the reason that "the mode by which we are aware of the formal essence [modus, quo sentimus essentiam formalem] is certainty itself".³ An intuition characteristic of the self-certain actuality of the cogito is what is meant by certainty.

The point is recalled in the Ethics, Pt. II, prop. 21, sch. in order to forestall a possible misunderstanding. It would be a misunderstanding if one reasoned as follows. The order of my experience is constituted by an idea which is incomplete and to some extent inadequate. And the idea of idea is God's idea of my experience wholly explained. But the idea of idea is the real object of my idea, not the

¹. Harris, "Infinity of Attributes" 15-16.

². Spinoza, "Emendation of the Intellect" sec. 34.

³. Spinoza, "Emendation of the Intellect" sec. 35.

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external object that I might take to be its cause. Thus, it appears I cannot really know anything.

The misunderstanding would be rooted in supposing that knowledge in the order of our experience depends on our having the idea God has of it i.e. an order in which the order of our experience is completely explained. The point about the self-certainty of adequate ideas is raised later on in the Ethics where it is said that "he who has a true idea at the same time knows that he has a true idea and cannot doubt the truth of the thing" (Pt. II, prop. 43). This is because one's idea will be in one's mind in the same way as it is in God's nature (i.e. it will be true or agree with its object (Pt. I, ax. 6)) insofar as it has the self-certain actuality of an adequate idea (Pt. II, prop. 43, pr.). What is it that adequate ideas all have in common with any one which is "to serve as a standard" unless it is an intuition which varies in intensity with the adequacy of an idea? How is it that "as the light makes both itself and the darkness plain, so truth is the standard both of itself and of the false" unless it is the intensity of the intuition characteristic of the order of experience or its being which determines the degree of its truth or, with attention to falsehood, the lack of its adequacy? Spinoza assures us that the order of our experience in as much as it is characterized by a quality of intelligibility is not

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contradicted, but augmented by the further development of it. "Our Mind" says Spinoza "insofar as it perceives things truly, is part of the infinite intellect of God" and consequently "it is as necessary that the mind's clear and distinct ideas are true as that God's ideas are" (Pt. II, prop. 43, sch.). Clarity and distinctness of ideas comprise the quality of intelligibility in thought. The formal reality of an idea is this intelligibility of the order of experience, and its intensity is proportionate to its objective reality.

It should be an infinite series of idea ideae through which the order of our experience would be explained in the mind of God (Pt. II, prop. 9) with the emphasis on the order which an idea constitutes. The intuition would remain the same except in intensity. They would be self-referential ideas determining themselves according to a focusing of attention on the increasing of the strength of intuition. The other attributes may enter into the order of such experience as a successive taking into account of the influence of other attributes in the determination of order.

These would be "minds", to use the term suggested by Spinoza's letter 66, because they are not merely ideas in centers of experience, rather centers considered insofar as the order of their experience is conceived through thought. Insofar as the idea we have of our experience approaches the

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greatest intensity it has to be expected to take account of the influence of other attributes. The attributes cannot be prevented from adding themselves to the order as wholly adequately conceived through any one.

They enter into this order as intuitions with an intensity proportionate to the adequacy of the idea which constitutes as much as the others that order. Outside of an intelligible order, the attributes are simply given as something the ordering activity either conforms to, or confronts. But they are intelligible within the order of experience as conceived through any attribute.

An attribute is what it really is, as ordered in the order of experience as conceived through any one. Conceived through thought this ordering is an activity of a thinking thing (Pt. II, def. 3, and exp.). The attributes retain their status as distinct types of all-pervasive intuition while in the order of experience as conceived through thought. Nevertheless, in it, they are ideas. Each of these modes of different attributes ordered in this order of ideas will have equally to constitute or be, in same varying degrees, all-pervasive of it. There will be this likeness of order among them.

However, a wholly adequate idea would constitute an order in which each of the attributes contributed to the nature of the order of the whole. The order derived from

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one of the attributes is what it is only because in its fullest development it comprehends within itself the influence of all of the attributes. This is why it can be said to be the same order as conceived through any one. We do not have recourse, nor can we have recourse to an archetypical order to which its expressions are compared. It is its expression and nothing over and above it. This is why exprimo, in the sense of 'to produce (a likeness)', is only used metaphorically to say what the attributes do to substance or what the infinite series of modes in alternate attributes do to the one thing which is each. But it does come close enough to what is going on in this activity to be part of the intended connotation of the term.

It also has connotations derived from its sense of various types of pushing or wringing out of liquids, or, more like its English cognate, to put in the words of one or another language. Spinoza cannot intend literally any of these, although something like a pushing or wringing out is suggested by defining the relation of being to order by the negative principle of sufficient reason. We should allow that this primitive sense of the term is part of its intended connotation or what it is intended to suggest insofar as its use is metaphorical. It is correct to assert that natura naturans, as Kaufmann puts it "expresses itself

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in the natura naturata".¹ Each attribute expresses substance as a variant on its being or its self-determining potentiality. One can, otherwise, view the attributes as distinct orderings of the whole.

This is the approach of Deleuze. "Les attributs sont comme des points de vue sur la substance" he says "mais, dans l'absolu, les points de vue cessent d'être extérieurs, la substance comprend en soi l'infinité de ses propres points de vue".² The attributes are points of view on substance, according to Deleuze, although, in the absolute, points of view cease to be exterior, substance comprehends in itself the infinity of its own points of view. Ways of ordering the whole are perspectives in and on systematic unity.

It is enlightening to compare the triad of expression, remarked on by Deleuze in accordance with his version of the one-being-diversely-ordered interpretation, and the way it is set up in accordance with the one-order-diversely-constituted. "Nous retrouvons toujours la nécessité de distinguer ces trois termes" says Deleuze "la substance qui s'exprime, les attributs qui sont des expressions, l'essence

¹. Fritz Kaufmann, "Spinoza's System as Theory of Expression", Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 1.1 (1984) 84.

². Deleuze 18.

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exprimée".¹ This is how the triad might be set up if the attributes were distinct orderings of the whole. But in the very next sentence, Deleuze admits that "les attributs expriment l'essence de la substance", then passing right over this glaring contradiction to discuss another issue.

The attributes express the essence of substance. They are what does the expressing; essence is what is expressed, and the one order of substance is in every case the expression. We shall find that to express is to explain or involve; an attribute, as a type of being, is that out of which the order of substance emerges. It explains the order of substance and itself. For it is within the order which emerges out of it. Nevertheless, we can agree with Deleuze that the activity of expression is one of immanent causation (Pt. I, prop. 18), and that this, as Deleuze observes, is a type of Neoplatonic emanative causation. The order of substance does not emerge out from the one into another, but it remains within itself.² It is a process, again speaking metaphorically, of the self-articulation of the one.

One might be inclined to allow that the term is used by Spinoza metaphorically in its linguistic sense i.e. as meaning 'to reproduce in another language, translate' or 'to

¹. Deleuze 35.

². Deleuze 153-69.

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express (ideas, facts, ect.) in words' or 'to articulate precisely'. Spinoza uses it literally in its linguistic sense where speaking of a definition, word or explanation expressing the concept of one thing or another (Pt. I, prop. 8, sch. 2; Pt. II, def. 3, exp.; prop. 40, sch. 1; Pt. II, prop. 56, pr.; def. of emotion 6, exp.). Spinoza says, for example, that "the definition of those authors who define Love as a will of the lover to join himself to the thing loved expresses a property of Love, not its essence" (Pt. II, def. of emotion 6, exp.).

The language analogy has its drawbacks, but it is instructive. The analogy takes, at least, the two forms on which Allison remarks. One is a comparison of the attributes in relation to substance with translations in different languages of one matter of fact. The other says that the attributes are differing expressions of substance as "a geometrical curve and its algebraic equation" are differing expressions of one and the same thing. The drawback to the language analogy, pointed out by Allison, is that it does not take account of the 'what the intellect perceives' in the definition of 'attribute'. He proposes the analogy of differing visual perspectives.¹

¹. Allison 50.

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The use of the language analogy is slightly different from the point of view of the one-order-diversely-constituted interpretation. One might say, in accordance with its alternative, it is like describing one state of affairs in different languages where the difference is in the way in which languages are said to "cut up the world". They would be two orderings of the same state of affairs. In using the analogy to illustrate the one-order-diversely-constituted interpretation, one would be better to say that the symbols used to signify grammatical categories differed for one and the other language while the grammar remained the same, since it is one order expressed by each of the attributes.

The verb is sometimes used in ways which suggest synonymy with 'to explain' or 'to involve' (Pt. I, prop. 14, pr.; prop. 20 pr.). Spinoza says that the attributes "express" the essence of substance "i.e., what pertains to substance. The attributes themselves, I say, must involve it itself" (Pt., prop. 19, pr.). In other words, 'to express' in Spinoza's understanding might mean to explain or involve whatever is expressed. To explain or involve is to express.

This way of understanding exprimo makes sense of the metaphysical uses of the term in the Ethics. Where the attributes are said to express the essence or some component

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in the nature of substance or God (Pt. I, def. 6; def. 6, exp.; prop. 10, sch.; prop. 14, pr.; prop. 19, pr.; prop. 20, pr.; prop. 23, pr.; prop. 29, sch.; prop. 31, pr.; prop. 32, pr.; Pt. II, prop. 1, pr.) it can be understood to mean that an attribute is something out of which the order of substance and everything in the order of absolutely infinite substance can be said to emerge. For example, Spinoza defines 'God' as "a being absolutely infinite, i.e., a substance consisting of infinite attributes, of which each one expresses an eternal and infinite essence" (Pt. I, def. 6). We may say simply "substance" and "eternal and infinite essence". In the Shirley translation, it reads "an absolutely infinite being; that is, substance consisting of infinite attributes, each of which expresses eternal and infinite essence".¹ The article is not required by the Latin. There is only one substance and its essence is being, while the attributes are its nuances which we perceive as being.

Or, again, Spinoza says that "each of his [God's] attributes expresses existence" (Pt. I, prop. 20, pr.). This is the existence we intuit in the order of experience as any one of the attributes insofar as it characterizes this order; and it is also the necessary existence within

¹. Spinoza, Ethics and Selected Letters.

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the nature of substance (Pt. I, prop. 7). For attribute is a nuance on the infinite potentiality of substance or its power. "Its expression" as Kaufmann observes "is inevitable; it can neither be obstructed nor can it be withheld".¹ Since the order of substance is, on the side of intuition, its existence, Spinoza can also speak of attribute as constituting the essence of substance. The attribute is its being.

It is on the side of order that the attributes are expressions of substance distinguishable by one or another type of intuition as its constitutive element. That Spinoza is stressing 'to explain' or 'to put in order' with the verb 'to express' is confirmed by his use of exprimo in saying what the imagination does to affects in it. Spinoza says our "imagination will express an affection of our Body" (Pt. III, prop. 27, pr.). The product of imagination is the external order in which things are given an inadequate explanation. This should not be taken to weigh against the one-order-diversely-constituted interpretation; as if the occurrence of a use of the verb to describe what produces other than the essential order of substance could do so. Or, it may be suspected that the imagination's order is that of the attribute of extension. We have already seen the

¹. Kaufmann 85.

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term is used in a number of ways in the Ethics. It does not describe only the relation of an attribute to substance. And neither the imagination nor its product is an attribute, but it is a limited function of the essential order of substance as intuited by way of any of its attributes.

The story differs slightly where Spinoza uses 'to express' to indicate what by means of a thing or body or whatever entity is done to the essence of substance; or to any attribute by a mode of that attribute, in a certain, determinate way (Pt. I, prop. 25, cor.; prop. 36, pr.; Pt. II, def. 1; prop. 1, pr.; prop. 5, pr.; prop. 10, cor. pr.; prop. 36, pr.; Pt. III, prop. 6, pr.). Spinoza maintains that "particular things are nothing but affections of God's attributes, or modes by which God's attributes are expressed in a certain and determinate way" (Pt. I, prop. 25, cor.). To express an attribute is simply to do what it does, namely, express the essence of substance, only it involves specifying the attribute under which this is accomplished, and its being accomplished in a certain, determinate way. The difficulty is one and the same whether it is one of explaining what Spinoza means by saying that a thing is used to express the essence of substance or the attribute of which the thing is a mode.

The ordering of properties within experience which is a particular thing is also the conatus with which it persists

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in its existence, or an intuition as attributively nuanced. This order of the particular thing plays natura naturata to the natura naturans of its outpouring of being.

Furthermore, anything within the nature of substance is essentially the order of experience in which it is appropriately explained. In itself, the order of a thing, whether the table in front of me or the order of my experience in which this is the focus of attention, is wholly explicable only in the complete order of substance and the complete explanation of any thing must involve it (Pt. II, prop. 45). So, it is by means of the particular thing that the essence of substance or any attribute of it is expressed. It is an expression accomplished in a certain, determinate way, owing to the fact that the order of the absolute is developed from the focal point of the particular thing. This is the sense in which a mode of any attribute may be said to be the means to the expression of substance or the mode's respective attribute.

The same connection with the whole of its parts is suggested by passages where Spinoza uses 'to express' to describe what ideas do or fail, to some extent, to do to the nature, essence or existence of a mind or body (Pt. II, prop. 29, pr.; Pr. III, gen. def. of emotion, exp.; Pt. V, prop. 21, pr.; prop. 22; prop. 23, pr., sch.). To illustrate, Spinoza says that the "idea of an affection of

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the human Body" apart from the knowledge of the external body and the human Body affected "does not express its nature adequately" and that "the idea of this idea does not express the nature of the human mind adequately" (Pt. II, prop. 29, pr.). Not all ideas of idea are adequate. They could be inadequate if they explain the occurrence of an idea in an imaginative order. The point is that there are ideas capable of expressing adequately the nature of an order of experience.

A mind or body, on the side of an order of experience, is completely explicable only in a certain self-explanatory order of experience in which it is related to everything else and the intuition of thought through which this order can be derived has to be said to express its nature. This sense of exprimo is reflected in Spinoza's use of it to indicate what the ideas God has of the infinite modes of alternate attributes do to the one thing which is each. First of all it is the previous use of the verb which pertains directly to the relation of these modes to the one thing expressed. This is the sense in which a mode of any attribute might be said to be the means to the expression, in a certain, determinate manner, of the essence of substance or the mode's respective attribute.

To develop, in this way, the order of substance is for it to be conceived through that attribute. But these modes

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of the alternate attributes, through which it is conceived, then can be said to enter, as such, into the order of the thing as conceived through the attribute of thought. They enter into the order of experience as conceived through thought to the extent that the idea is adequate. To the extent that it is the order of our experience as constituted by an adequate idea, all of them will be discerned there and it will be, at one and the same time, a unique development of the order of the absolute as well as the way it has of intuiting itself in thought. This idea is an expression in which are ordered the other ways of expressing this one thing as well as itself. This idea, as much as we can understand it, is the finite intellect in the understanding of God. It is there no longer a question of a limitation on the intelligibility of the finite intellect's comprehension of itself in the order of the whole.

Any one of these completely and adequately self-comprehending centers of experience would be God's consciousness of himself through one complete perspective in and on systematic unity. In this understanding, each of us is expressed by a mode of each of infinite attributes. Of each of these modes, there is an idea insofar as the whole order is an expression of a mode of thought. This is why God can have an idea of each of these modes insofar as he has an idea of any one of us.

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This idea is the finite intellect in the order of which the limitations of the more limited order of our experience are explained. The latter is in its formal reality the idea which Spinoza calls the human mind (Mens). But the object of this idea is not 'body', as such, a mode of extension, rather the eternal body¹ which is the order of the finite intellect intuitable as extended, but also in a diversity of other ways. What Tschirnhaus appears to do is confuse 'body' in this and the sense of intuition of extension, a confusion promoted by assuming the object of the idea to be the external world rather than the internal order in which the appearance of it is explained. However it is correctly understood, there is only one object of the mind's perception and this is compatible with a diversity of ways, such as extension, of its being intuited.

The question remains of our acquaintance with only one attribute other than thought. But this state of affairs, although we cannot altogether understand it under present circumstances, is one of which it may be said it is, in principle, open to rational explanation. Spinoza is saying that, although in God's consciousness the infinite diversity of attributes which determine our nature is comprehended, this order of comprehension "cannot constitute one and the

¹. There will be more said about this distinction in the second section of this chapter.

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same mind of an individual thing [rei singularis]"¹. Spinoza defines res singularis as finite things having a determinate existence (Pt. II, def. 7). What Spinoza means, in other words, is that nothing short of a complete expression of the absolutely infinite nature may suffice. Our experience is comprehensible by means of the idea in which is ordered the diversity of modes which determine our nature.

This eternal order of our experience is related to its modes in the same way as substance is related to its attributes i.e. expressed by each. But the more limited order of our experience is the finite mind which constitutes the order of an idea less adequate than the idea of it in God's understanding which constitutes the order of its object. It is 'object' in the sense of what one's quest for self-understanding has as its object. On one level, the mind is an order in which only two attributes are ordered, but the intellect is the one in which its limitations are explained through infinite attributes.

Now, an answer can be given to the question, how is it possible to provide a rational explanation for the infinity of the attributes and of our being directly acquainted with only extension and thought? For even given we are unable to conceive of this order as an ordering of any less than every possible order of experience (Pt. I, prop. 16), the order of experience in which only thought and extension are ordered

¹. Letter 66.

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must be possible, and the order of experience in each of us is it. No further explanation can or need be given for our being what we are.

In the return letter to Schuller (through whom Tschirnhaus's question about our acquaintance with only two attributes was conveyed) Spinoza responds awkwardly. Owing to our essential nature, our experience is limited to ordering only extension and thought. But the direct acquaintance with the other attributes required for any further explanation cannot be forthcoming as what "follows from" these two. Spinoza explains that "(by Proposition X, Part I) no other attribute can be deduced or conceived from these two attributes or their modifications".¹ But Spinoza says in a footnote in the Short Treatise that "so far ... only two of all these attributes are known to us through their essence: Thought and Extension".² Later, it will be argued that it is on the side of the order of the absolute that the attributes are each conceived through itself, but it is as ways intuiting it that they are all implicated in

¹. Letter 64.

². Spinoza, "Short Treatise on God, Man, and His Well-Being" Pt. I, ch. 7, n. a.

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that order.¹ We should be able to say what it might be like to become aware of the nature of other attributes.

In the same letter to Schuller, Spinoza warns against trying to understand the attributes by an analogy of alternate worlds. The suggestion gains plausibility if one assumes, as Tschirnhaus seemed to, that the idea which is one's mind provides a view of the external world, and that this is distinctive of the attribute of extension. If this is assumed, it seems plausible that other ideas would provide us with views of other worlds if there were these ideas of other attributes.

However, as we will see in the section coming up next, the idea only appears to look out to an external nature as it sets things up in an imaginative order. What is distinctive about the attribute of extension is not this order or world, but a certain nuance on intuition. We should become acquainted with other attributes if our idea of substance were more adequate; it might be, if one may conjecture, a question of ordering our experience in a way which enables us to discern subtle nuances on intuition.

¹. Second chapter of Part I, third section.

b) The Incompatibility of Thought and Extension

The previous section dealt with the questions arising out of reflection on the apparent incompatibility of substance-attribute identity with the countable diversity of the attributes. This was the first problem of the attributes talked about in the third chapter of part I. This section examines the problem in the second. The issues generated there were ones arising if 'diversity' is taken in the sense of the incompatibility of thought and extension as attributes of one substance.

One of these is the question, in what manner we can reconcile the divisibility of extended substance with the activity of thought? How does one reconcile the order of extension seeming to be one of external relations with the essentially internal order of any finite thinking thing? How does one reconcile the independent being of modes of extension with the truth-functionality of ideas? In what manner is it possible to understand the appearance of the uniqueness of the one thing conceived under the idea of the body and the one-among-severalness of the same thing

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conceived under the idea of the individual's mind? These difficulties arise out of taking the internal and external orders to play the role of attributes i.e. each the one self-explanatory order of substance.

The blanket solution relies on distinguishing the identity in being of the external and internal orders from the identity in order of the attributes. These two types of identity correspond to relations appearing among any of what are diverse in the one-being-diversely-ordered and one-order-diversely-constituted interpretations of substance-attribute identity. Orders are united through being and nuances on being are united through order.

The questions are unproblematic when it is recognized that they are about the unity in being of the internal and external orders of the system as distinct from the unity in order of the attributes. Only the internal order intends itself to be the one self-explanatory order of substance as does each of the attributes; and the order of external relations is not incompatible with the system of internal relations as something explicable within the order of the latter. It is through any one of the attributes, as it will be understood, that the external order is related to the internal. I will shortly be applying this solution to the above questions in subsections which follow.

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In these introductory remarks, I wish to defend the ascription of this distinction to Spinoza. This distinction appears in the system as the identity in being of the external order of the imagination and the internal order of the intellect as opposed to the parallelism of the attributes or the identity in order of differing nuances on all-pervasive intuition, and it appears as the identity in being of the orders of idea and object as opposed to the identity in order of the modes of alternate attributes. In support of ascribing the distinction between the two types of identity to Spinoza, it will be argued that it not only acts as a basis on which the above questions can be answered, but it also enables us to resolve difficulties in understanding the twenty-first proposition in the Ethics, Pt. II; Spinoza's doctrine of the mind's eternity; the controversy about the formalist interpretation of the attribute of thought, and objections to Spinoza's doctrine of the animateness of all things.

The twenty-first proposition of the Ethics, Pt. II refers immediately back to the twentieth, which states that "there is also in God an 'idea [idea], or knowledge [cognitio] of the human Mind" (Pt. II, prop. 20). This idea is the finite intellect. "This idea" according to the twenty-first proposition "of the Mind is united to the Mind in the same way as the Mind is united to the Body [Corpori]"

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(Pt. II, prop. 21). The body is, according to Spinoza's proof of the twenty-first proposition, related to the mind as its "object [objectum]" (Pt. II, prop. 21, pr.). The support for this claim is the twelfth and the thirteenth propositions of the Ethics, Pt. II. The twelfth proposition states that "whatever happens in the object of the idea constituting the human Mind must be perceived by the human Mind" (Pt. II, prop. 12), and the thirteenth says that the "object of the idea constituting the human Mind is the Body, or a certain mode of Extension which actually exists, and nothing else" (Pt. II, prop. 13).

From this proposition, Wernham draws the conclusion, not as Spinoza puts it, that "man consists of a Mind and a Body" (Pt. II, prop. 13, cor.), but "(only) of a mind and a body".¹ The conclusion is validly drawn, since the proposition states that the object of the idea constituting the human mind is nothing else than the body. But this is an absurdity if the identity of this idea and its object is taken to be the identity in order of modes of thought, extension and the other attributes. It is the identity in being of the order of the idea and of its object. The object of the external order of the idea which is the mind is the

¹. S.G. Wernham, "Spinoza's Account of Cognition in the Ethics Part II, Prop. 9-13", Van der Bend, Spinoza on Knowing 160.

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eternal body or the internal order of the intellect or idea of idea insofar as it is extended. This is what the external order of this idea which is our experience is essentially, and the self-referential or internal order of the idea of idea has the external order of the idea as its object, although thoroughly understood to be what it is essentially.

Otherwise, it is difficult to take account of what Steinberg observes where she points out that the eternity of the mind in God and the temporality of the body (Pt. V, prop. 23) conflicts with the parallelism of the attributes.¹ The parallelism suggests that there is nothing of body, including its temporality, which could be left out of any state of the mind. Jarret remarks on this difficulty, and suggests that the proof of the eternity of the mind is a carry over from a dualism of mind and body which Jarret thinks he has found in Spinoza's early writings as one which is incompatible with the later doctrine of the parallelism of the attributes.²

¹. Dianne Steinberg, "Spinoza's Theory of the Eternity of the Mind", Canadian Journal of Philosophy 11/1(1981).

². C.J. Jarret, "On the Rejection of Spinozistic Dualism in the Ethics", Southern Journal of Philosophy 20 (1982) 174.

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But whether Spinoza was more Cartesian in the outlook of the early writings, two types of body are required in order to render the eternity of the mind compatible with the parallelism of the attributes. The eternal and temporal bodies are two ways of ordering experience all-pervaded by the intuition of extension; in thought they correspond to mind or idea of the body and the intellect or idea of idea. (One must be careful in reading Spinoza to distinguish 'body' as intuition or order and 'mind' or 'idea' or 'intellect' as intuition or order.) We can understand how the mind as intellect discards the temporality of the body as the imaginative order of experience, and still see how the parallelism of the attributes is preserved through the eternal body.

In other words, the thesis provides us with an intelligible concept of the mind eternity, compatible with its being the case that "we feel and know by experience that we are eternal" (Pt. V, prop. 23, sch.). It is also one which is of importance to our understanding of Spinoza's rational psychology, explaining what it is which changes where it is said that the degree of one's "eternity" does so in proportion to the adequacy of one's ideas or "insofar as it conceives things under a species of eternity" (Pt. V. prop. 31, sch.). Intuition is what is present in consciousness, as its

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eternity, and the intensity of intuition is what changes by degrees in proportion to the adequacy of our ideas.

We are also able to understand the controversy about the formalist interpretation of thought. The dispute is between those like Balz and Curley whose formalism emphasizes the order constituted by an idea, and those like Bennett whose panpsychist reading places emphasis on the animateness of all things or the idea as psychical.¹ Balz designates idea as "logical essence" and the corresponding mode extension as the same essence made actual.² For Curley the parallelism of the attributes is one of "true proposition and fact" and:

... To talk about a mode as a proposition or idea, bearing logical relations to other propositions, is to conceive the mode under the attribute of thought. To talk about it as a fact, having causal relations

¹. Bennett, Study 128, and 138.

². Albert G.A. Balz, Idea and Essence in the Philosophies of Hobbes and Spinoza (1917; New York: A.M.S., 1967) 44.

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with other facts, is to conceive it under the attribute of extension.¹

Spinoza uses ax. 4 of the Ethics, Pt. I sometimes it seems with the force of cognitio regarded as 'idea' in the sense of psychical entity, sometimes in the sense of logical entity, as Bennett remarks², the former giving weight to his own reading and the latter giving weight to the formalist. However, what is not recognized by either party in the dispute is that an idea is logical in as much as it is a psychical entity.

It is the intuition characteristic of ideas as we experience them and the order constituted by an idea is one of an individual's mind to the extent that the experience constituted by an idea is internally related or the order of experience in relation to a centre of experience. This intuition is also one of the coherence of ideas, such that the order of experience which they constitute is determined through conformity to it to be the essential or logical order

¹. Curley, Spinoza's Metaphysics 123-4. Curley's more recent work is a more historical account than the earlier logical atomist reading, but the emphasis is still on the order of omniscience as the order of thought; see his Behind the Geometrical Method 67.

². Bennett, Study 127-8.

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of things. Yet, Spinoza's panpsychism is not one on which tables and chairs or any of those things we normally and rightly regard as inanimate are animate.

Wilson remarks that all bodies have minds (Pt. II, prop. 13, sch.), and that minds are aware of everything happening in their bodies (Pt. II, prop. 13, cor.). But not all bodies have minds, and we are not aware of everything happening in our bodies.¹ As to the first point, things are systems of appearances in the order of experience and to the extent that it is extended or thought, they are bodies or minds. They are animate to the extent that they enter as ideas into the mind of God or the internal order of substance i.e. a function of the life and activity of God, but they are equally inanimate to the extent that they occur in the external order. As to the second, the 'body' to which Wilson makes reference is the neuro-physiological complex which is not the order of our experience or any mode which constitutes it. It is, as are other external objects, an orderly arrangement of appearances in systematic unity.

What Spinoza means by saying that minds are aware of everything happening in their bodies can be explained as follows. Spinoza says that the "human Body exists, as [prout]

¹. Margaret Wilson, "Objects, Ideas and Minds: Comments on Spinoza's Theory of Mind", Kennington.

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we sense it" (Pt.II, prop. 13, cor.). We can allow that the relation, which we have seen readers of the absolute idealist Spinoza situate between extension and thought, holds between the external order of the idea and the internal order of its object, the eternal body. In other words, Spinoza is saying that we do confront intelligible reality as inadequately as we may comprehend it in the order of our experience.

In enabling us to resolve such difficulties the distinction between the identity in being of inadequate and adequate orderings of experience and the identity in order of attributes is made to appear a very plausible doctrine of Spinoza. It will put us in a position to answer the questions about the apparent incompatibility of thought and extension, in the following subsections and concluding remarks. The necessity for building up a different background in order to pose as opposed to answer questions justifies our posing them in the order in which they are given above and answering them in the reverse.

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i) The Uniqueness of the Idea of the Body
and the One-Among-Severalness of the Same Thing
Conceived Under the Idea of the Mind

The last of the questions to be posed and first to be answered will be in what manner shall the appearance of the uniqueness of the one thing conceived under the idea of the body be reconciled with the one-among-severalness of the same thing conceived under the idea of the individual's mind? We can view the former as the order of experience from the point of view of any limited centre of experience like our own insofar as it is limited and the latter as the order of the experience of the one centre in which the order of every other is ordered or our own insofar as we understand it. The object of the idea of the body is not anything outside of our experience, rather it is just the experience of the microcosm on its own, determined by the conatus of the whole system as a part of the unfolding process of its actualization of the order of the whole. The undertaking of the mind to conceive adequately its own experience in the order of the one absolutely infinite

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centre of experience is what Hallett understands by the "emendation" or the conceptual process through which the microcosm determines itself in the order of the macrocosm.¹

The question does not actually even arise with reference to the identity in order of the body and mind. For the identity in order of the body and mind is not the unity of the one unique thing with one among several. This is not, then, a question respecting the relation of modes of differing attributes, which would be a special case of the attributes-problem, since the identity in order of the attributes is one of differing intuitions all-pervasive of the whole order of experience.

It is a question really about the uniqueness of the mind's perspective and its one-among-severalness from the point of view of the intellect. The finite mind and the idea of it are each of them perspectives on the whole of substance, although the former is inadequate, imaginative. Insofar as we have an adequate idea of ourselves in God (Pt. II, prop. 47) we correctly conceive of our selves as always having been 'unique' in the sense of the individuality of each of our perspectives and 'one-among-several' in the sense in which we each may be counted in the infinite diversity of unique perspectives in God. The inadequate,

¹. Hallett, "On a Reputed" 180; see also Hallett, Creation 49-58.

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imaginative order of our experience is explained in God's adequate idea of it, and so they cannot really be incompatible. To the extent that we acquire an idea of our experience, we are able to rise above the level of experience on which the conception we have of it is conditioned entirely by our unique perspective.

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ii) The Truth-Functionality of Ideas
and the Independent Being of Modes
of Extension

The next question is how are we to reconcile the truth-functionality of ideas and the independent being of the modes of extension? The difficulty only appears to be one of the independent being of modes of extension and the truth-functionality of ideas as modes of thought. It is in the external order where ideas are truth-functional, and it is in the internal order of intelligible reality where they are no longer distinguishable from their objects, but their independent being is apparent. Insofar as it is extended, this independent order of existence is body. This is not incompatible with the truth-functionality of ideas, since the external order in which truth-functional ideas occur is a function of the intelligible order of things.

In order to explain further this resolution of the difficulty, we can begin by getting a deeper understanding of the truth-functionality of ideas in the system of Spinoza. They are truth-functional in respect to their

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agreement or disagreement with their objects. The agreement of a true idea with its object (Pt. II, ax. 6) is only in the external order (Pt. II, def. 4).¹ Moreover, an extrinsic or external relation between idea and object is only possible on the level of inadequate or imaginative experience where we organize our partial acquaintance with the system of appearances of an object around the pragmatic fiction an external thing as independently existing or where a distinction might be drawn in intellectu between the adequate idea and the order which it constitutes.

To the extent that it is on the level of the inadequate, the mind does not understand the order it constitutes to follow in the system of ideas in God. But the order of the illusory or inadequate ordering of our experience is comprehended in the adequate. The external order of our experience is reordered through internal relations in the one centre of experience which is absolute or our own insofar as we understand it. If we can coherently explain the appearance of the external world in the order of systematic unity, it will be possible to conclude that the truth-functionality of ideas is not incompatible with the independent being of intelligible reality; and it will not be difficult to explain how modes

¹. See also Letter 60.

of extension constitutive of things in the external world have the appearance of the independent being of the intelligible order of experience.

"Spinoza's proof of an external world" is what Hansen thinks he can locate in the demonstration of the thirteenth proposition of the Ethics, Pt. II. The claim of this proposition is that the object of the human mind is nothing else than a body actually existing. The proof that the body which is its object actually exists is that if it did not then the ideas of its modifications would not be in God through our minds being in God. But they are in our minds. So the body actually exists. Hansen's "concentrated formulation" of this as a proof of an external world is that since our thinking is part of God's thinking and it is necessarily accurate, it follows that "reality must correspond to our thinking of reality. So we must have a physical body corresponding to our idea of it".¹ Spinoza does say that "we feel (sentimus) that a certain body is affected in many ways" (Pt. II, ax. 4). But Hansen does not answer the question of whether this feeling or perception is ordered wholly adequately as one of an external world or even if the passage has the meaning required for the argument? He seems to fail to consider the distinction

¹. Oskar Hansen, "Spinoza's Proof of an External World", Van der Bend, Spinoza on Knowing 100.

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between the finite mind and intellect, the latter of which is the idea in God's mind in which our experience is ordered in the comprehensive and internal order of experience. So, it might be argued that the argument Hansen focuses on is not Spinoza's proof of an external world (everything is really internal to the mind of God), but for the proposition that the order of capricious and imaginative experience must be explicable in terms of an intelligible reality.

We are confronted with intelligible reality in our lived experience in whatever degree we comprehend it. It is the order of experience in the mind of God in which the order of the experience in each centre is explained. One's tendency may be to think that God is self-conscious only insofar as a finite centre of experience in community has an idea of it. This is for the reason that finitude or one's reflection on one's self within a greater whole seems to be a precondition of consciousness.¹ But this is compatible with the absolute being a centre of unconscious experience or a subject the order in which is governed by attributes in the same way as the order of our own subjectivity. On this basis, it could be argued that perspectives in the absolute

¹. On the question of the self-consciousness of God, see James B. Wilbur, "Is Spinoza's God Self-Conscious?", Wilbur, Spinoza's Metaphysics and also S. Paul Kashap, Spinoza and Moral Freedom (New York: State Univ. of New York Press, 1987) 47-8.

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could not differ, at least, not insofar as their ideas were adequate to the extent that they were not perspectives on a coherent and geometrically possible world. For if perspectives in systematic unity were more disunited, it could only be to the extent that there was in the order of the absolute a contradiction or a geometrical impossibility.

Moreover, it is in our nature to abstract from the differences in our own and others' experience what is common to each, and in this way we may be said to focus on an external world. In turn, our focus of attention is directed by abstracting from differences among external things to what is common to each. In this way, a quality or mode ordered in God through the individual centre of experience is ordered as the abstract universal (Pt. II, prop. 40, sch. 1). We notice that things which fall under the universal differ among themselves in having some similarity which the others do not have, and if this process of the division of classes into classes is carried on then it seems we could at some point define something as wholly unique.

But this way of trying to capture the uniqueness of things will fail to define their uniqueness; it is in the order of experience where they emerge according to the negative principle of sufficient reason and the striving, conatus of things with and against one another. A definition in terms of genus and species may never define

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the uniqueness of a thing, since this form of definition relies on a class and not an individual for the species, and it presupposes the given order of experience in terms of which discernment of similarity and difference is possible.

Things are usefully ordered in terms of classes insofar as reasoning pertains to what is common in our experience in which case an external thing serves as a principle of order governing an order of appearances in our experience. In such terms, we can understand the references to external bodies in passages in the Ethics which Bennett cites (Pt. II, prop. 16, cor. 1,2; prop. 17, scholium) to show that Spinoza's essential drift was in the direction of indirect realism.¹ We are also able to understand, in such terms, the meanings of the axioms of physics and the lemmas Spinoza introduces into the argument of the Ethics after Pt. II, prop. 13. Such reasoning is pernicious to the extent that it leads us to overlook the type of principle which governs an order of experience inclusive of a person's own self-conception.

The arbitrary segmentation of duration or the order of time² is like the order of natural kinds which is the order

¹. Jonathan Bennett, "Spinoza on Error", Philosophical Papers and Letters 15.1 (1986) 62.

². Letter 12.

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of categorial logic, imposed on the reality of nature. They are in God through ourselves and our limited perspective, while feeling our way around the intelligible order; and they are pragmatic fictions insofar as they succeed in picking out regularities among features of the real order of things, and in relation to the common order of experience such ideas are truth-functional. The truth-functionality of ideas in relation to external things is in this way explicable coherently as an appearance within systematic unity, and the truth-functionality of ideas is compatible with the independent being of intelligible reality.

One such external thing is one's neuro-physiological body. Like other external things, it is a principle of order among appearances in one's own and others' experience. One cannot, oneself, influence the order of experience in any manner it seems which overrides it. Thus, one's neuro-physiological body can be said to interact with the order of one's experience and be used in the empirical explanation of the emergence in it of ideas which are truth-functional (Pt. II, prop. 40, sch. 2). Insofar as the orders of such external things are extended they are modes of extension which have an independent being acquired from intelligible reality. It is as if this were a stone out of which they were carved by a sculptor who had detached and discarded

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from it what he took to be superfluous, but who could not discard the stone.

The independent being of intelligible reality is in a way very like the independence or self-reliance of the artist's conception. Spinoza's analogy of the architect's conception of a building indicates that he has in view this conception of the adequacy of ideas.¹ The truth of an adequate idea depends on nothing outside of itself. The craftsman does work according to design or pre-established end, but the architect, the genuine artist freely develops material in accordance with a certain regional quality. The reality which is the truth of an adequate idea is the order of experience insofar as it is without discontinuity within itself or a failure of the conatus of being as thinking or as any other attribute.

The adequate idea constitutes an order of experience which is in this way characterized by its perfection and it is a perfection, not of an object external to the order of experience or pre-given, rather one developed through the confrontation of striving or the conatus of being with the limitations it places on itself through its attributes. It is an order characterized in varying degrees by a feeling corresponding to the satisfaction of a concern with the

¹. Spinoza, "Emendation of the Intellect" sec. 69.

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ordering as much as possible of experience in conformity with certain nuances on all-pervasive intuition, such as when one arranges one's thoughts and affairs to promote a certain mood in one's experience; while the discontinuities in experience are accompanied by a sense of the frustration of the same type of concern. For this reason it can be said that the order of experience constituted by an adequate idea depends for its truth as an idea on itself alone as an order of experience which determines itself in accordance with intuition.

It will be unnecessary to devote subsections to the remaining two questions. One of the remaining questions is how is one to reconcile the order of extension seeming to be one of external relations with the essentially internal order of any thinking thing? The finite mind and intellect are distinct orderings of one being. It is one being ordered through internally relations in the mind of God or in our own insofar as we understand it and otherwise external relations in the finite mind. The same internal and external orders are constituted by extension as thought,

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and so it is not a problem especially of the attributes. But there is no incompatibility of the internal and external orderings of one being.

How can the divisibility of extended substance be reconciled with the activity of thinking substance? Substance as it is in itself is not divisible in Spinoza's understanding (Pt. I, prop. 12 and 13). To say that substance is imaginatively divisible, as Spinoza allows, is to affirm that the parts of substance ordered internally can be ordered externally where the parts taken independently of every other appear foremost rather than, as in the internal order, the whole of which they are parts. Recall that it seemed to Cudworth absurd to claim that thinking substance could be extended, for extension is divisible and it seemed to follow that each of its parts would think, and not the whole. In the activity of thinking, ideas are internally ordered. The activity of thought is the internality of the order of ideas and the imaginary division of extension need no more nullify this activity than disrelated ideas in thought; in itself extended substance shares in the internality which characterizes the activity of thinking while it differs only in the type of intuition in which this is embodied. Since it is a problem of reconciling the internal and external orders, it is answerable in the same way as any of those in the above.

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These questions all pertain to the issue of the apparent incompatibility of thought and extension as attributes of one substance. They all turn out to rest on a confusion. It amounts to mistaking the order of the intellect to be one characteristic solely of a thinking substance, and the order of discovery or of external relations to be one uniquely characteristic of extension. The order of the imagination and of the intellect seem to be opposed thus, since they are confusedly taken to be essential to substance in the way an attribute should be i.e. as the one self-explanatory order of substance.

In response to these issues, we have explored the view that substance is the development of experience in the direction of internality through the increased strength of the intuition which is any one of the attributes. Each thing is in the order uniquely related to everything else and the whole in conformity with conceptual or geometrical possibility and the negative principle of sufficient reason. Otherwise, distinct entities would be one in a way which was conceptually absurd or geometrically impossible; similarly, with the absurdities and impossibilities of any attempt to conceive the whole except in terms of infinite subjectivity. The attributes are intuitions of necessity which bind terms into internal relations and determine the order of the

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greatest perfection in which every order of experience is adequately comprehended in systematic unity.

c) Conceptual Independence

The remaining few of the questions generated in part I, chapter 3, are about the conceptual independence of the attributes. The questions will be, as in previous sections of this chapter, reviewed briefly and answered in turn. They are only two. 1) In what manner can it be said that substance, consisting of infinite attributes, is accurately and completely conceived through any one of them while each is conceptually independent of every other? 2) How can the one thing which is mind and body be wholly and accurately conceived to be a mode of either of their respective attributes while modes of differing attributes are also conceptually independent?

In order to have answers, we say, on the side of its unity with substance, an attribute is the infinite potentiality of being realized in the order of systematic unity. On the side of diversity, an attribute is a nuance on this same being as a quality all-pervasive of experience in degrees of conformity to which the real order can alone emerge.

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Spinoza says that "of things as they are in themselves, God is really the cause insofar as he consists of infinite attributes" (Pt. II, prop. 7, sch.). The order of anything is the result of the influence of infinite attributes. The explanation of a thing can be had through any attribute, therefore, only insofar as the influence of other attributes can emerge in experience as conceived through that attribute. If in thought, for example, I deduce the nature of substance according to the infinite potentiality of being and the requirement of coherence among ideas, it is necessary for me to posit the other attributes within the intelligible order of substance. Order emerges in an attribute as determined by all these other influences as well as that of the attribute through which the whole is conceived. Thus, it is one order of experience as conceived through any attribute.

Spinoza identifies substance and attribute in essence and he does say that one substance cannot be the cause of another (Pt. I, prop. 6) or be derivable from another.¹ This is for the reason that they can have nothing in common (Pt. I, prop. 5 and 2) and things which have nothing in common cannot be the cause one of the other (Pt. I, prop. 3). "Substances having different attributes [duae

¹. Letter 64.

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substantiae, diversa attributa habentes]" says Spinoza "have nothing in common" (Pt. I, prop. 2) because substance is conceived through itself (Pt. I, prop. 2, pr.). The proof is not intended to apply to attributes of one substance; insofar as attributes are on the side of their unity with substance, it is impossible for there to be anything different about them and if identity is absolute there cannot be terms in relation. On the side of their diversity, every attribute emerges in any one on the side of its unity with substance.

To be in experience as conceived through an attribute is to be allowed to emerge in the order of experience as conditioned by the specific limitation imposed by that attribute. But "the Body cannot determine the Mind to thinking, and the Mind cannot determine the Body to motion or rest" (Pt. III, prop. 2). This is why "a body is not limited by a thought, nor a thought by a body" (Pt. I, def. 2, exp.). That is to say, one attribute can be in experience as conceived through another without its being negated or determined by the other. Each attribute is in the order of experience as conceived through any one as all-pervasive of it. It's field and horizon is intuition and it has within it the spectrum of the attributes. There is a conceivable order of experience in which nuances on

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intuition all-pervasive of this order are distinguishable, but not limited in intensity.

On the side of diversity, an attribute is uniquely defined as a specific nuance on natura naturans within the order of natura naturata, and it is that with which it is given and without which it can neither be nor be conceived, it is also something which can neither be nor be conceived without this order. On the side of unity, an attribute is the emerging order of experience unity conceived through itself as a specific nuance on intuition all-pervasive of it. The 'being conceived through itself' of substance and attribute does not stand in the way of the attributes being in the order of substance. We are able, in other words, to provide an answer to the first question: in what manner can it be said that substance, consisting of infinite attributes, is accurately and completely conceived through any one of them while each is conceptually independent of every other? Only on the side of their unity with substance are the attributes each conceived through itself, but it is on the side of their diversity that they are all in the order of experience conceived through any one i.e. thought or extension or any other.

We readily speak of having an idea of extension, an affirmation of extension as such. In order to understand how the influence of thought gets into experience as

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conceived through extension, we can start by pointing out that if extension is to be the one internal order of substance, it must pervade the contours of systematic unity as the intuition of spaciality. Colour-areas are modes of extension of this type, similarly with textures and scents. This is not the case with Cartesian extension, which is not only inert, but purely geometrical i.e. there cannot be a mode of extension with a certain colour, hardness ect..¹ Spinozistic extension is closer to the qualities experienced, filling out the relative space which is the absolute of extension.

Thought does not get into the order of extension as something with a certain shape. The attributes enter into the order of each as qualities or types of all-pervasive intuition. The qualitatively distinguishable intuition of the intelligibility of ideas enters into the order of our experience as much as into the extension which is all-pervasive of it. Thought is a condition we achieve with a certain ordering of our ideas and the quality of necessity we confront in any attempt to believe what we do not believe.

The attributes can be understood to be in the order of substance as their own immediate infinite modes. Spinoza

¹. Descartes, "Principles of Philosophy" Pt. II, sec. 11.

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says that the immediate infinite mode of extension is "motion and rest" which is the intuition of spaciality as it appears in the confrontation and striving which determines the experiential order. The order of experience as conceived through an attribute can be seen to be the mediate infinite mode. The order of extension is the "face of the whole universe" or the same intuition as constitutive of the order of systematic unity. Spinoza says that "although it varies in infinite modes ... remains always the same".¹ It remains always the same, Spinoza then indicates, as the organic whole which is the order of substance. In the same letter, Spinoza says that the immediate infinite mode of thought is the intellect of God. It is, perhaps, worthwhile supposing it to be the affirmation and denial that determine the experiential order insofar as thinking is constitutive.

The well-ordered thinking of ourselves locate us as limited perspectives on, or orderings of the order of the system of experience in which our own is ordered i.e. substance or the absolute. Conceiving of ourselves as limited perspectives in and on the whole, the order of our self-conception is pervaded by extension as a body and by thought as a mind. They are the same extension or thought as that through which we conceive the whole of substance;

¹ Letter 64.

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insofar as our idea is adequate. they will be related to the finite centre of consciousness in the same way as the attributes are related to substance i.e. as in and independently explanatory of the order of the whole. The one-order-diversely-constituted interpretation answers, in this way, our second of the difficulties, the one about the conceptual independence of our mind and body, and the ability of either to explain or express our entire nature.

This reading of substance-attribute identity is a way of dealing with the difficulties respecting the conceptual independence of the attributes. It has also been useful in responding to those encountered in consideration of their numerical diversity and the incompatibility of thought and extension. One may suspect that it will be in terms of intuition as any one of reality's essential attributes, that we will be able to understand the aims and means of Spinoza's rational psychology.

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Recent defence of the absolute idealist Spinoza. Significant for the emphasis it places on completeness of knowledge in its development of arguments for this reading and responses to questions like the parallelism of the attributes and Spinoza's denial of teleology.

- - - . "Order and Connection of Things". Van der Bend, Spinoza on Knowing, Being and Freedom 103-13.

Interprets Pt. II, prop. 7 in favour of the one-being-diversely-ordered reading of substance-attribute identity. Important for its statement of the type of response it seems necessary for a reader like Harris to take up in the direction of the parallelism of the attributes.

- - - . "Spinoza's Theory of Human Immortality". Freeman and Mandelbaum 245-62. First pr. 1971.

Examines the problem of the eternity of the mind, temporality of the body, and the identity of mind and body. Of worth for pointing out that it is only in the form of an adequate idea that the mind is eternal.

- - - . "Mind-Body Relation in Spinoza's Philosophy". Wilbur, Spinoza's Metaphysics 13-28.

On the reality of body in Spinoza's doctrine. See Bowman (1971). Of value for making clear that it is not the neuro-physiological body which is in question.

- - - . "Infinity of Attributes and Idea Ideae". Neue Hefte für Philosophie. 12 (1977): 9-20.

Study of the Tschirnhaus problems with emphasis on Gueroult and the possibility that the series of the modes, corresponding to the one thing which is the human mind in differing attributes, is the series of idea ideae. Of value for its critical remarks; admission that it seems no perfect solution is possible, and its supposition that some of the unknown attributes turned out to be displayed by chemistry

and biology as these sciences developed after Spinoza's time.

- - - . "Finite and Infinite in Spinoza's System". Hessing 197-221.

Questions about infinity in Spinoza's system dealt with in absolute idealist terms. Useful for pointing out the systematic incorporation of unlimited diversity in the system as the alternative to the type of infinity Spinoza regards as imaginary.

- - - . "Essence of Man and the Subject of Consciousness". Wetlesen 119-35.

Study of self-knowledge. Of importance for Harris's remark that the infinite enters into the order of the finite subject of consciousness as "conatus or practical urge which demands realization of the unity and wholeness of experience" (p. 134).

- - - . Formal, Transcendental and Dialectical Thinking. New York: State Univ. of New York Press, 1987.

Contentious study of reasoning in Spinozistic terms. Of interest for conditions set on intelligible unity.

Hart, Alan. Spinoza's Ethics Part I and II: A Platonic Commentary. Leiden: E.J. Brill, 1983.

Attributes as the great kinds of Plato's doctrine; important for its refutation of the subjectivist interpretation.

Haserot, Francis S. "Spinoza's Definition of Attribute". Kashap, Studies in Spinoza 28-42.

Close examination of Pt. I, def. 4, and defence of the objectivist interpretation. Of value for its revealing of numerous ambiguities in the definition and its analysis of tanquam.

- - - . "Spinoza and the Status of Universals", Kashap, Studies in Spinoza 43-67.

Substance and attribute as types of universal acceptable to Spinoza. Of value for its complete study of the question of Spinoza's nominalism.

Hegel, G. Science of Logic. 2 Vols. Trans. W.H. Johnston and L.G. Struthers. London: George Allen and Unwin, 1956.

- - - . Hegel's Lectures on the History of Philosophy. 3 Vols. Trans. E.S. Haldane and F.H. Simpson. London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1896.

Hessing, S. ed. Speculum Spinozanum 1677-1977. Boston: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1978.

Jarrett, C.E. "Some Remarks on the 'Objective' and 'Subjective' Interpretations of the Attributes". Inquiry. 20 (1977): 447-56.

Places Suarez's "distinction of reasoned reason" between the attributes. Of value for its bring to light the grounding in the historical context for this type of response to the subjectivity-question.

- - - . "On the Rejection of Spinozistic Dualism in the 'Ethics'". Southern Journal of Philosophy. 20 (1982): 153-75.

Explains the doctrine of the eternity of the mind in the Ethics on the supposition of a mind-body dualism carried over from the early writings on Descartes.

Jaspers, Karl. Great Philosophers. 2 Vols. Trans. Ralf Mannheim. 1957. New York: Harcourt, 1962.

The part of this work, entitled, "Spinoza" situates him in the tradition of Cuse and Anaximander.

Joachim, Harold H. Study of the Ethics of Spinoza. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1901.

General study of value for its statement of key issues still unmatched in precision e.g. the question of the derivation of the part from the whole seeming to require a greater whole by which it is defined. Of value for its statement of the attributes-problem as one of the determinacy of the attributes implied by their diversity and the indeterminacy of attribute implied by substance-attribute identity.

Jonas, Hans. "Parallelism and Complimentarity: The Psycho-Physical Problem in the Succession of Niels Bohr". Kennington 121-30.

Explores an analogy of the relation of the attributes to substance with Niels Bohr's complimentarity of wave and particle descriptions of matter. Of value for its pointing out of disanalogies.

Kashap, S. Paul, ed. Studies in Spinoza. Los Angeles: Univ. of California Press, 1972.

- - - . "Spinoza's Use of 'Idea'". Shahan and Biro 57-70.

Early development of Kashap's formalist interpretation of thought.

- - - . Spinoza and Moral Freedom. New York: State Univ. of New York, 1987.

Study of the question of freedom and determinism in Spinoza's system. Of value for its elaboration of Kashap's formalist interpretation of thought, and for bringing out the relation of the question of the self-consciousness of God to the nature of this attribute.

Kaufmann, Fritz. "Spinoza's System as Theory of Expression". Philosophy and Phenomenological Research. 1.1 (1940): 83-97.

Kennington, Richard ed. Philosophy of Baruch Spinoza. Washington, D.C.: Catholic Univ. of America Press, 1980.

Kessler, Warren. "A Note on Spinoza's Concept of Attribute". Freeman and Mandelbaum 191-94.

Cites the percipit of Pt. I, def. 4, Pt. II, def. 3, exp.; also the necessity and maximal reality of substance (Short Treatise) for the objectivist interpretation. Interesting with respect to the subjectivity-question.

Kline, George L. "On the Infinity of Spinoza's Attributes". Hessing 333-52.

Uses the ambiguity in 'infinite' to soften the problem of the unknown attributes. Of value for its detailed and contentious elaboration of Wolf's thesis.

Lascola, R.A. "Spinoza's Super Attribute". Modern Schoolman. 52 (1975): 199-206.

Argues that thought is form and formal cause of all the other attributes. Of value for its historical approach to the dominance of the intellectual order.

Leibniz, G. Philosophical Papers and Letters. 2nd ed. Trans. L.E. Loemker. Dordrecht: D. Reidel, 1969.

Contains "On the Ethics of Spinoza" (1678) in which a version of the attributes problem is stated, with emphasis on countable diversity.

Lewis, Douglas. "Spinoza on Extension". Midwest Studies in Philosophy. 1 (1976): 26-31.

On Spinoza's rejection of Cartesian substance pluralism and traditional Christian theism. Of value for its highlighting of the historical significance of the uniqueness of substance in Spinoza's doctrine of the attributes. See Donagan's comment in the same volume.

Lucash, Frank S. "Mind's Body: the Body's Mind". Dialogue. 23.4 (1984):

Summary of issues in Spinoza's philosophy of mind. Of worth for this and its distinction of mind and intellect.

Mark, Thomas Carson. Spinoza's Theory of Truth. New York: Columbia Univ. Press, 1972.

Contains an objection to the ascription of the coherence theory to Spinoza which is of use in eliciting the concept of 'truth' in the absolute idealist Spinoza and the strength of ontological considerations in favour of it as an interpretation of Spinoza's metaphysics.

- - - . "Spinozistic Attributes". Philosophia. 7 (1977): 55-82.

Important for its drawing attention to the passivity of the intellect in relation to attribute implied by the percipit of Pt. I, def. 4 and the explication of Pt. II, def. 3.

Martineau, James. Study of Spinoza. 3rd ed. 1895. New York: Books for Libraries Press, 1971.

Against a subjectivist interpretation: "No prae-Kantian reader could have put such a construction on Spinoza's language"(p. 184). Of value for this and its development of the equivocal objection.

Martens, S.C. "Spinoza on Attributes". Synthese. 37 (1978): 107-11.

Of value for its remarking on the implicit relative identity of substance and attribute.

Matson, Wallace I. "Spinoza's Theory of Mind". Freeman and Mandelbaum 49-60. First pr. 1971.

Of interest for its functionalist interpretation of mind-body and attributes: "a functional but not a causal relation between attributes" also mind and body (p. 56).

Mays, M. Attributes in Spinoza's Treatment of God. American dissertation. Petersburg, Va., 1949.

On the dispute between the subjectivist and the objectivist interpretation: of interest for the thesis that substance is argued to be perceived (extra intellectum) as distinct attributes, but its "constitutive essence" or concept is one, and for its remarking that being in the intellect does not imply something's not being also outside of it.

Murray, John Clark. "Idealism of Spinoza". Philosophical Review. 5.4 (1896):

Early defence of the absolute idealist Spinoza. Of special interest for its apologetic about the seeming non-idealism of Spinoza; the argument based on conceivability as determinative of the order of substance, and its emphasis on the rational psychology.

Myers, H.A. Spinoza-Hegel Paradox. Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell Univ. Press, 1944.

Of value as historical study and for its revealing points of agreement between Hegel and Spinoza on the nature of the absolute as a self-generating system of internal relations.

Odegard, Douglas. "Body Identical With the Human Mind: A Problem in Spinoza's Philosophy". Freeman and Mandelbaum 61-83. First pr. 1971.

Of value for remarking on the need for an identity in difference of mind and intellect in Spinoza's system.

Offenberg, A.K. "Spinoza's Library. The Story of a Reconstruction". Quaerendo. 3 (1973): 309-21.

Contains a list of works in Spinoza's library.

Parkinson, G.H.R. "'Truth is Its Own Standard': Aspects of Spinoza's Theory of Truth". Shahan and Biro 35-55.

Suggests that the truth of an idea resides in its completeness. Of use for its expression of the role of intuition in the third kind of knowledge.

Pollock, Fredrick. Spinoza: his Life and Philosophy. London: C. Kegan Paul, 1880.

Of value as biography and for its recognition of thought's dominance in the system; aspect theory of the attributes, and the problem of equivocal language in the argument for the unity of the idea of the body and of the idea.

Radner, Daisy. "Spinoza's Theory of Ideas". Philosophical Review. 80 (1971): 3338-59.

Explores some of the consequences of a realist interpretation of Spinoza on perception.

Rice, Lee C. "Continuity of 'Mens' in Spinoza". New Scholasticism. 43 (1969): 75-103.

Proposes a continuity of mens in Spinoza's levels of knowledge in intuition or feeling.

Savan, D. "Spinoza and Language". Grene 60-72.

Argues with a lot of hard textual evidence that "the positive task of the Ethics is to show that once the limitations of language are recognized we can conceive of substance and its modes through their own living ideas" (71).

- - - . "Spinoza on Death and the Emotions". Wetlesen 192-203.

On the temporal and eternal parts of the mind; death and passion. Argues that "Spinoza's resolution ... to free himself from sickness onto death, had only a qualified success" (202).

Saw, Ruth Lydia. Vindication of Metaphysics. London: Macmillan, 1951.

Study of Spinoza: contains an objection to explaining the 3rd kind of knowledge as intuition, of use in the elaboration of Spinoza's concepts of the 2nd, 3rd kinds of knowledge.

Scruton, Roger. Spinoza. New York: Oxford Univ. Press, 1986.

General study. Of value for its criticism of the doctrine of the attributes on grounds that there can be only one order of substance and the attributes appear to have to be distinct orders, and its account of Spinoza's concept of inclusion as in the self-inclusion of substance.

Schmitz, K.L. "Hegel's Assessment of Spinoza". Kennington 229-43.

Of use for its critical explication of Hegel's criticism of Spinoza and the secondary literature, and its summary of the secondary literature.

Shahan, Robert W. and Biro, J.I. ed. Spinoza: New Perspectives. Norman: Univ. of Oklahoma Press, 1978.

Sherman, Ernest. "Spinoza and the Divine Cogito: God as 'Self-Performance'". Wilbur, Spinoza's Metaphysics 36-43.

Self-reflection is said to give rise to the infinite intellect as the presupposition of the finite.

Shmueli, Efraim. "Geometrical Method, Personal Caution, and the Ideal of Tolerance". Shahan and Biro 197-216.

Certain facets of the Ethics are said to foster caution and tolerance as attitudes of the reader towards reality. Significant for its drawing attention to this influence over the way we respond to reality and live.

Spinoza, B. Opera. 4 Vols. Ed. Carl Gebhardt. Heidelberg: C. Winter. 1925.

- - - . Correspondance of Spinoza. Trans. A. Wolf. London: Frank Cass, 1928.

- - - . Éthique with the Latin text. 2 Vols. Trans. Charles Appuhn. Paris: Garnier, 1934.

- - - . Ethics and Selected Letters. Trans. Samuel Shirley. Indianapolis: Hackett, 1982.

- - - . Collected Works. 2 Vols. Trans. E.M. Curley. Princeton, N.J.: Princeton Univ. Press, 1985.

Sprigge, T.L.S. Vindication of Absolute Idealism. Edinburgh: Univ. Press, 1983.

Contains useful elaboration of points in Sprigge's reading of Spinoza's doctrine as absolute idealism.

- - - . "Spinoza: His Identity Theory". Philosophy Through Its Past. Ed. Ted Honderich. Harmondsworth: Penguin, 1984. 149-74.

Of use in understanding Sprigge's interpretation in respect to Pt. II, prop.7 and the doctrine of the attributes, with its emphasis on an order of substance more concrete than that of any of the attributes.

- - - . Theories of Existence. Harmondsworth: Penguin, 1984.

Contains chapters on absolute idealism and Sprigge's interpretation of Spinoza's doctrine as absolute idealism with emphasis on a panpsychist reading.

Steinberg, D.B. "Spinoza's Theory of the Eternity of the Mind". Canadian Journal of Philosophy. 11 (1981): 35-68.

Of value for its formulation of the problem of reconciling the eternity of the mind, the temporality of the body and the parallelism of the attributes.

- - - . "A Note on Bennett's Transattribute Differentiae and Spinoza's Substance Monism". Southern Journal of Philosophy. 24 (1986): 431-35.

Critical of Bennett's account of the parallelism of the attributes (1984). Of value for its remarking that the attributes-problem arises on the level of the transattribute differentiae.

Suarez, F. On Various Kinds of Distinctions. Trans. Cyril Vollert. Milwaukee 3, Wis.: Marquett Univ. Press, 1947.

Of importance for its translation of Disp. 7 of Disputationes Metaphysicae in which definitions are given for 'modal distinction', 'real distinction', 'distinction of reason' and 'distinction of reasoned reason' which are all of importance in understanding the Cartesian elements in Spinoza's doctrine of the attributes.

Taylor, A.E. "Some Incoherencies in Spinozism". Kashap, Studies in Spinoza 189-211 and 289-309.

Critical remarks on principle Spinozistic doctrines.

Teo, Wesley K.H. "Relation of Substance to Attributes in Spinoza". Kinesis. 1 (1968): 15-21.

Study of the central difficulty as a version of the problem of the one and the many. Of interest for its citation of numerous objections to the subjectivist interpretation; and its emphasis on unlimited activity as the origin of the attributes' diversity.

Trompetter, L. "Spinoza: a Response to De Vries". Canadian Journal of Philosophy. 11 (1981): 525-37.

Of value for its suggestion that De Vries' question is answerable if any one attribute is merely an "essential property" of substance "uniquely individuated" only by the totality of its attributes.

Urban, Linwood. "Understanding St. Thomas's Fourth Way". History of Philosophy Quarterly. 1.3 (1984): 281-95.

Study of causation in St. Thomas. Of Value for its remarking on the scholastic distinction between two types of formal causation i.e. "inherent and extrinsic exemplary formal causation. While the first type of formal causation concerns structural principles which are present in things and make them the kinds of things which they are, the second type concerns archetypes in the minds of intelligent beings to which they conform their artifacts" (282).

Urmson, J.O. "Ideas", Encyclopedia of Philosophy. 8 Vols. Ed. Paul Edwards. New York: Macmillan, 1967. 118-21.

Thorough history of the use of 'idea' in traditional philosophical literature with the interesting proposal that the central difficulty presented by the way of ideas is a confusion of idea as mode and object of representation.

Van der Bend, J.G. ed. Spinoza on Knowing, Being and Freedom. Assen: Van Gorcum, 1974.

- - - . "Some Idealistic Tendencies in Spinoza". Van der Bend, Spinoza on Knowing, Being and Freedom 1-5.

Significant for its summary of arguments for the idealistic aspect of Spinoza's system.

Van Zandt, Joe D. "Res Extensa and the Space-Time Continuum". Spinoza and the Sciences. Ed. Margorie Grene and Debra Nails. Dordrecht: D. Reidel, 1986. 249-66.

Space and time are argued to depend on the order of nature in Spinoza in a way suggesting a relational view of them as in Leibniz rather than Newton i.e. a pre-Kantian and pre-Newtonian conception, and that the attribute of extension is close enough to the space-time continuum of

modern physics for there to be profitable elaboration; also contains the interesting suggestion that metaphysics is the study of presuppositions of our investigation of nature.

Vater, M.G. "Human Mind as 'Idea' in the Platonic Tradition and in Spinoza". Diotima. 8 (1980): 134-43.

Of value for its comparison of the Spinozistic and Platonic idea of idea.

Watson, Richard A. Breakdown of Cartesian Metaphysics. Atlantic Highlands, N.J.: Humanities Press, 1987.

Of importance for its critical study of the relation of ideas to the external world from Descartes to Hume.

Wernham, A.G. "Spinoza's Account of Cognition in the Ethics, Part II, prop. 9-13". Van der Bend, Spinoza on Knowing, Being and Freedom 156-61.

Wernham's statement of the corollary to Pt. II, prop. 13 i.e. "man consists (only) of mind and body" is valid and, as such, it helps to underpin the distinction between the identity in order of modes of infinite attributes and the identity in being of the subject and object of consciousness.

Wetlesen, Jon ed. Spinoza's Philosophy of Man. Oslo: Universitets forlaget, 1978.

Wilbur, James B. ed. Spinoza's Metaphysics. Assen: Van Gorcum, 1976.

Wilson, M.D. "Objects, Ideas, and 'Minds': Comments on Spinoza's Theory of Mind". Kennington 103-120.

Critical of the panpsychism of Spinoza. Significant for its bringing to bear on the question of Spinoza's mind-body identity thesis our ordinary understanding that we are not aware of everything happening in our bodies and that not all bodies have minds.

- - - . "Notes on Modes and Attributes". Journal of Philosophy. 78 (1981): 584-86.

Critical remarks on Bennett on mind-body and attribute (1981). Of value for its suggesting the possibility of an error in reversing the ordinarily expected order of explanation in favour of the modes of substance.

Wise, R.B.A. "Parallelism of the Attributes". Philosophical Papers. 11 (1982): 23-37.

Important for its remarking on the ambiguity of "things [res]" in Pt. II, prop. 7 between reference to general reality and physical reality.

Wolf, A. "Spinoza's Conception of the Attributes of Substance". Kashap, Studies in Spinoza 16-27. First pr. 1927.

One of the most complete and concise studies of the doctrine of the attributes. Of value for the contentions Wolf develops on principle issues in the doctrine of the attributes: a) substance is their totality; b) to be in intellectu is to be real for Spinoza; c) dynamic as opposed to logico-deductive character of the order of substance; d) 'infinite' is used by Spinoza in the sense of "all" and need not imply any more than two attributes, e) we might be unaware of any other, partly, owing to its being in the nature of an idea to have only one object.

Wolfson, Harry Austryn. Philosophy of Spinoza. 2 Vols. 1934. New York: Schocken, 1969.

Well-known defence of the subjectivist reading.

- - - . "Spinoza's Mechanism, Attributes and Panpsychism". Philosophical Review. 46 (1937): 307-14.

Valuable summary of Wolfson's position on the subjectivist reading.

Yolton, J.W. Thinking Matter. Minneapolis: Univ. of Minnesota Press, 1983.

Of interest for its defence of the materialism Cudworth seems to ascribe to Spinoza against Cudworth's objections.

Zellner, Harold. "Spinoza's Causal Likeness Principle". Philosophical Research Archives. 11 (1985): 453-61.

Pt. I, ax. 4 is interpreted as the principle of the transmission theory of causation. Of use in gaining an understanding of what might be involved in Spinoza's insistence on the non-interaction of distinct substances as based on the causal likeness principle.