

**Canada's Bread and Butter:
A Contradictory Approach to Agriculture and Food Security**

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Abstract

The present major research paper offers a policy analysis of Canada's domestic and foreign agri-food policies and discourse. It addresses this issue through the lens of food security and agricultural practices. This research studies government reports and documents, government official websites and programs, international organization or institution publications, official statistics, news articles, academic publications, and reference work. The analysis partly confirmed the initial research hypothesis: contradictions exist but do not align with the national/international divide as first thought. It finds that contradictions lie in 1) Canada's official declarations and 2) its policies and actions, both nationally and internationally. This paper also finds that these inconsistencies have important environmental and economic consequences not only for Canada but for the international agri-food system. It concludes with recommendations for Canada's policymakers. Given the limited information available for researchers on Canada's foreign approach to food security and agriculture, further research is crucial to paint a current and comprehensive picture, enabling the provision of valuable insights for policymakers in the future.

Keywords: agri-food system, food security, neoliberalism, Canada, policy

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List of Abbreviations

AAFC	Agriculture and Agri-food Canada
ADB	African Development Bank Group
APF	Agricultural Policy Framework
BRM	Business risk management programs
CFIA	Canadian Food Inspection Agency
CFS	United Nations Committee on World Food Security
CIDA	Canadian International Development Agency
ECCC	Environment and Climate Change Canada
EU	European Union
FAO	Food and Agriculture Organization
FPC	Food Policy for Canada
FPT	Federal, provincial and territorial
GAC	Global Affairs Canada
GATT	General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade
GEF	Global Environmental Facility
GDP	Gross domestic product
GHG	Greenhouse gas emissions
GIZ	German Society for International Cooperation
G7	Group of seven
G8	Group of eight (1997-2014)
HIC	High-income country
IBRD	International Bank for Reconstruction and Development Trust Funds
IDB	Inter-American Development Bank
IFAD	International Fund for Agriculture
IFC	International Finance Corporation
IMF	International Monetary Fund
IO	Intergovernmental organizations
IPCC	Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change
LMIC	Low- and middle-income country

NFE	Net-food exporter
NFI	Net-food importer
NGO	Non-governmental organization
OECD	Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development
SAP	Structural adjustment program
SAWP	Seasonal Agricultural Worker Program
SCAP	Sustainable Canadian Agricultural Partnership
TNC	Transnational corporation
TPW	Temporary foreign workers
UN	United Nations
US	United States of America
WB	World Bank
WFP	World Food Program
WTO	World Trade Organization

Introduction

In 2023, 1 in every 11 people worldwide experienced chronic hunger (World Food Programme, 2023). Despite the attention around the “ending hunger” goal of the United Nations (UN) Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) for 2030, adopted in 2015, global hunger is still on the rise. From 7.8% in 2014, more than 11.3% of the world’s population faced severe food insecurity in 2022 (FAO, 2023). The COVID-19 pandemic had tremendous consequences, especially on international food supply chains, which proved to be highly vulnerable when compared to non-perishable goods supply chains. A global food crisis ensued and decoupled with the invasion of Ukraine by Russia in January of 2022, disrupting the Ukrainian and Russian wheat industries, accounting for 25% of global wheat production (Terazono and Pooler, 2022). Both events triggered global efforts through massive aid and investment packages from governments and private actors to alleviate the impacts of this food crisis. However, the global push to alleviate the impacts of this food crisis recently started to dwindle and brought into light the true nature of the international agri-food system: a neoliberal system embedded in the “free-trade-for-food” security paradigm.

Canada is no exception: its national agri-food policies and discourses are inherently rooted in a neoliberal paradigm. On the other hand, at first sight, Canada’s foreign development and aid policies and discourses embrace *stable local food systems* and promote a sustainable transformation of the international agri-food system. There seems to be a profound contradiction between Canadian domestic agri-food policies and discourses and what Canada promotes on the international stage. At first glance, this contradiction appears to negatively impact international food security. On one side, Canada adopts an essentially neoliberal approach to food security and, on the other, this same approach is periodically challenged by Canada within its international

development programs focused on agriculture and food security. This research addresses this issue by answering the following questions: Is there inconsistency between Canada's domestic and foreign food security policies and actions? In other words, does the Canadian government's rhetoric and policies on food security outside its borders contradict its rhetoric and policies on Canadian soil? If contradictions exist, what are their environmental and economic impacts on a national and international scale?

This research is based on the analysis of primary sources¹ and secondary sources.² The first chapter introduces our conceptual framework based on a variety of theoretical approaches: constructivism, postcolonialism and neoliberalism. The second chapter presents the evolution of the international agri-food system since the end of the Second World War. The third chapter analyses Canada's agri-food system, national agri-food policies, international development and aid programs, and strategy within international forums. The last section answers our first research question: contradictions exist but do not align with the national/international divide as we first thought. This research finds that contradictions exist but are instead between 1) Canada's official declarations and 2) its policies and initiatives, both domestically and internationally. The fourth chapter answers our second research question by exploring the environmental and economic impacts of Canadian food security and agricultural policies. This research concludes with recommendations for Canada's policymakers to 1) address the root causes of food insecurity, 2) meet international sustainable development commitments and, 3) to position Canada as a global leader in environmentally and socially conscious agricultural practices contributing to food security.

¹ Government reports and documents, government official websites and programs, international organization or institution publications, official statistics, and news articles.

² Academic publications, reference work, international organization or institution publications, and news articles.

Chapter 1

Conceptual framework

This research does not aim to question or test theories or open ontological or epistemological debates. It adopts a conceptual framework rooted in various theories from different academic fields: Economics, Political Economy, Political Science, and International Relations. Two reasons explain this methodological choice. First, the scope of this research is limited: it aims to explore an apparent multifaceted issue and provide pragmatic solutions to policymakers in building the resilience and sustainability of agri-industrial food systems. Second, a holistic approach is essential to grasp the complexity of food security and cannot be limited to a single theory or approach. This section presents the definition of the central concepts applied to our analysis.

The *agri-food system* is a complex and daunting concept to define. It encompasses a multiplicity of actors, economic sectors, and dynamics. For the sake of this research, a short and general definition of this system is sufficient to tackle the issue at hand. Inside the agri-food system, we find actors (e.g. farmers, commodity brokers, investment funds, inputs – fertilizers, pesticides, etc. – companies, states, international organizations), economic sectors (e.g. shipping, packaging, marketing, agricultural machinery, etc.), and dynamics (e.g. food supply chain, food security, resilience, biodiversity, climate change, etc.). It makes a system that:

“[e]ncompass[es] the entire range of actors, and their interlinked value-adding activities, engaged in the primary production of food and non-food agricultural products, as well as in storage, aggregation, post-harvest handling, transportation, processing, distribution, marketing, disposal and consumption of all food products including those of non-agricultural origin.” (FAO, 2021, p. 2)

This means that *food systems* are a sub-system within agri-food systems, covering “crop and livestock production, forestry, fisheries and aquaculture [...] [and more recently] synthetic biology, that is meant for human consumption” (FAO, 2021, p. 2). Non-food agricultural production (e.g., ethanol) directly impacts food production by reducing the amount of arable land available for food agricultural products.

While the concept of *food security* is commonly seen in the media and academia, its definition is more of a rare sight. Food security is an evolving concept that is still debated today,³ opposing different interpretations serving different interests. However, all agree that the concept refers to the “availability, physical access, economic access (affordability), consumption, and utilization [of food]” (Foran et al., 2014, p. 86). The area of contention, in academia but also international deliberating bodies, regards the addition of agro-ecosystem sustainability and resilience of food systems. These additions are coherent with this research as they consider not only climate change but also the loss of biodiversity our world is facing. This holistic definition of food security helps us better understand Canada’s agri-food policies and their possible contradictions. Food security cannot be studied independently from the social, political, economic, and environmental contexts it evolves within.

Global South/North is a geopolitical concept categorizing countries worldwide based on economic, political, and social indicators. Broadly speaking, the *Global South* is a new version of the concept

³ For a thorough analysis of the epistemological debate on food security, see Foran et al. (2014). In their study, Foran et al. conduct an interdisciplinary analysis of four divergent conceptual frameworks on food insecurity in “developing countries”. They argue that future research should include divergent conceptual frameworks to grasp the full extent of the complexity of issues related to food security.

of ‘*Third World*’ referring to formerly colonized countries⁴ and the *Global North* usually refers to the Western world.⁵ This geopolitical concept is commonly employed by academics writing on food security as formerly colonized states are disproportionately the focus of their research. This disparity seems to result from an implicit assumption that the *Global North* is the teacher, and the *Global South* is the student. In other words, it reflects the legacy of a Eurocentric logic of White superiority and supremacy. While this geopolitical concept helps differentiate countries within the agri-food system, some academics have identified major issues.⁶ First, the Global South/North division omits the emergence of new agri-powers, the top three being China, Brazil, and India. This leads to the second major issue: it is not the Global North that is fixing the agri-food rules at the World Trade Organization (WTO), agri-powers are. To address this conceptual issue, this research adopts a division based on the balance of food trade for individual countries⁷ based on Margulis’s (2014) analysis. Countries are divided into two categories, net-food exporters (NFEs) and net-food importers (NFIs). This division captures the tensions at play within the international agri-food system where NFEs are dramatically less exposed to food insecurity than NFIs (Margulis, 2014).

Neoliberalism refers to anything that is or may be linked to capitalism or globalization and often has a pejorative popular meaning. Neoliberalism is a multidisciplinary concept linked to political economy, political science, and economics referring to the “return” to classical economics in the 1970s and 1980s. Classical economics can be summarized as: “[a]n economic theory based on the principles that both individuals and society prosper most with a minimum of political intervention,

⁴ Latin America and the Caribbean, Africa and Asia (this excludes countries listed below in footnote 10).

⁵ Usually referring to Europe, North America, Australia, New Zealand, Japan, South Korea and Israel.

⁶ See Canfield, M. et al. (2021); Margulis, M. E. (2014); Margulis, M. E. et al. (2023).; Sommerville, M. et al. (2014).

⁷ With the exception of the European Union, which is considered as a ‘single integrated food market’.

and that the allocation of a scarce resource is best decided through competition for supply and demand of goods and services in the marketplace.” (Park, 2007, n.p.). This “return” coincides with the second era of global food policy characterized notably by the adoption of the free trade paradigm.

Neoclassical economics is not to be confused with neoliberalism. Neoclassical economics⁸ is the dominant theory in the field of economics and is essentially an updated version of classical economics developed by economists Adam Smith, David Ricardo, John Stuart Mill, and Thomas Robert Malthus in the 18th and 19th centuries. Understanding the role of neoclassical economics in the agri-food system is crucial since the economic logic behind the WTO’s agricultural framework is enshrined in the Agreement on Agriculture (AoA). More importantly, following the global food crisis of 2008, the WTO became one of the leading international actors in setting “the agenda and norms in the governance of food security” (Margulis, 2014, p. 335) pushing for the “free-trade-for-food” security framing of the food crisis, explicitly reflecting the dominance of *neoclassical economics* (Margulis, 2014; Shilomboleni & al., 2019). This argument can also be extended to other international economic institutions such as the World Bank (WB) and the International Monetary Fund (IMF) (Canfield et al., 2021; Margulis, 2014; Margulis, 2015; Margulis et al., 2023). Before 2008, the leading international references on agri-food matters were the Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO), the World Food Program (WFP) and academia (Margulis, 2014).

⁸ Neoclassical economics is: “[a] branch of economics that studies the allocation of scarce resources between competing uses and users, based on principles of market equilibrium and profit maximization”. Park, C. (2007). For a more detailed definition, see McLean, I., & McMillan, A. (2009).

Securitization is central in analyzing our main research topic: food security. Securitization takes its roots in the Copenhagen School of Security Studies. Now part of the constructivist school of thought in International Relations, securitization is defined as: “the move that takes politics beyond the established rules of the game and frames the issue as a special kind of politics or as above politics” (Buzan et al., 1998, p. 23). Said differently, securitization can be understood as the framing of a specific issue as particularly exceptional that requires an equally exceptional response. Drastic measures are justified and perceived as addressing the “urgency” of a situation. Environmental disasters, economic crises, military interventions and food problems are examples of issues commonly framed as “urgent” and that require “rapid” response. It is one thing to recognize the urgency of a situation, but it is another to securitize such a situation as to act “outside the normal bounds of political procedure” (Buzan et al. 1998, p. 24). According to the Copenhagen School of Security Studies, the study of *security* is based on three types of units: referent objects, securitizing actors, and functional actors. The first unit is the subject of the securitization process; a referent object is seen as existentially threatened. The second unit performs a “speech act” with the objective of securitizing a specific issue; this is done by “speaking” security and claiming that the referent object is existentially threatened. The third unit has an influence on a specific issue and has the potential to impact the securitization process. To summarize, successful securitization occurs when 1) an issue is presented as an existential threat by securitizing actors 2) an emergency response to an existential threat is implemented and 3) the rule-breaking nature of the emergency response is accepted by the targeted audience of the speech act (Buzan et al. 1998).

This analytical framework is particularly relevant when it comes to food security. Notwithstanding the semantic proximity of securitization and food security, this framework sheds light on the actors

and the origins of the framing of food security by the Canadian government and across Canada more broadly. This is best illustrated with an example: the COVID-19 pandemic's impact on Canadian farm labour. This example is taken from Weiler & Grez's (2022) article on the Canadian agricultural industry's framing of farm labour and food security during the COVID-19 pandemic. With the outbreak of COVID-19, the Canadian agri-food sector sounded the alarm bell on another potential existential threat: food shortages. While Canada is an NFE producing a large food surplus, its agri-food sector heavily relies on temporary migrant workers. On March 16th, 2020, the Prime Minister's Office issued international travel restrictions, suspending the entrance of migrant workers, such as the ones hired through the Canadian Seasonal Agricultural Worker Program (SAWP). On March 26, 2020, ten days after the announcement of the travel restrictions, an emergency order was issued by the federal government exempting migrant workers. Understanding the urgency behind this realignment and the underlying motives are made clear with the use of the securitization framework. First, the referent object is the possible materialization of a food crisis leading to severe food shortages across Canada. Second, the securitizing actors originate from the agri-food sector, particularly the sub-sectors dependent on the SAWP for their business. Performing speech acts, agricultural businesses framed the new Canadian international travel restrictions as an existential threat to Canada's food security (Weiler & Greiz, 2022). Third, the functional actors are the related businesses indirectly benefiting from migrant workers (food retailers, food processors, food exporters, transport, and logistics, etc.). The final step of the analysis is to confirm (or not) the success of the securitization process: 1) the issue was presented as an existential threat by securitizing actors, 2) the Canadian government answered with an emergency order exempting migrant workers from the international travel restrictions and 3) the rule-breaking nature of the emergency order was widely accepted by the targeted audience

of the speech act, both the Canadian government but also the Canadian public, worried about food shortage and its impact on Canadian food security. That said, the rule-breaking nature of the emergency order was not unanimous: researchers and migrant advocates cautioned the government against enacting such an order. The documented health, safety, and human rights violations of SAWP workers prior to the COVID-19 pandemic and the absence of a strong response from the federal and provincial governments worried researchers and migrant advocates; they were concerned that the already at-risk living conditions SAWP workers would only worsen with the COVID-19 pandemic and would lead to further human rights violations (Weiler & Greiz, 2022). The deliberate violation of quarantine measures by agri-food businesses and the high infection and death rates among migrant workers validated the fears of migrant advocacy groups and researchers (Weiler & Greiz, 2022).

Food security can also be securitized on a global scale, for example:

“where hunger is seen not only as a politically revolutionary force but also as a fount of secondary problems such as disease, terrorism, illicit drugs and refugees. In such framings, the dangers posed by hunger threaten to reach far beyond the low-income populations and countries in which hunger resides.” (Sommerville et al., 2014).

From a politicized issue, food security becomes a securitized issue requiring emergency measures outside of “regular policies” to protect the livelihoods of populations of high-income countries (HICs) at the expense of low to middle-income countries’ (LMICs) populations. The securitization of food security on a global scale is often based on neo-Malthusian discourse,⁹ further emphasizing

⁹ These discourses are explored in more details in Chapter. See footnotes below for in-dept analyses of neo-Malthusian discourse on specific issues (Hendrixson, A., & Hartmann, B., 2019; Maja, M. M., & Avano, S. F., 2021; Clapp, J. & Isakson, S. R., 2018; Grinin, L., & Korotavev, A., 2022).

the sense of urgency raised by concerns about overpopulation,¹⁰ scarce resources,¹¹ productivity issues,¹² and political turmoil.¹³

The relevance of securitization to the study of food security becomes clearer following the presentation of these two examples. What these securitization processes show us is that food scarcity is not the only variable impacting food security; a multiplicity of variables come into play and shape responses to “existential food security threats”. As explored in the next chapters, food security is often negatively securitized, leading to the reproduction of neo-colonial and extractivist practices within the international food system. This research acknowledges that the relationship between food and security is complex and does not exclusively rely on securitization. That said, securitization provides a holistic approach to food security with different angles (environmental, economic, societal, and political) to analyze issues, in line with our holistic definition of food security.

¹⁰ Such as China’s one-child policy from 1980-2016. For a more detailed review of this argument, see Hendrixson, A., & Hartmann, B. (2019).

¹¹ Such as global food crises linked to climate change and the loss of biodiversity. For a more detailed review of this argument, see Maja, M. M., & Ayano, S. F. (2021).

¹² Such as small-scale farmers not fully integrated into the global agri-food trade system. For a more detailed review of this argument, see Clapp, J., & Isakson, S. R. (2018).

¹³ Such as the Arab Spring. For a more detailed review of this argument, see Grinin, L., & Korotayev, A. (2022).

Chapter 2

The international agri-food system

Since 2014, the prevalence of moderate or severe food insecurity in the world population has been increasing each year, from 21.8% of the population in 2014 to 29.6% in 2022 (World Bank, 2023; FAO et al., 2023). The rising costs of agricultural commodities, agricultural inputs and supply chain maintenance show no signs of reprieve. While agri-food production levels are higher than what's needed to provide food security to the world population, food insecurity keeps increasing (Margulis et al., 2023). At the same time, climate change brings challenges (increasing occurrence of floods, droughts, wildfires, etc.) to the international agri-food system, both contributing to a catastrophic loss of biodiversity (Clapp and Isakson, 2018).

A general understanding of the guiding principles, history, and challenges of the international agri-food system is deemed essential to situate Canada's position within it. This chapter aims to historically situate the international agri-food system within the global security agenda by analyzing the development of this system and defining the concepts and principles that continue to guide agri-industrial production and global concerns relating to food in/security. Canada's agri-food system is the subject of Chapter 3.

International agri-food system

The international agri-food system is complex and distinguishes itself from other international trade sectors by its late adhesion to the free trade paradigm. Its guiding principles continue to reflect the neoliberal values of the Reagan-Thatcher era (Margulis et al., 2023). The return to

“19th-century policies” made its way into major international economic institutions, like the WB and the IMF. Agriculture became one of the core targeted sectors of aggressive deregulation measures led by Western democracies, including the WB and IMF’s now infamous structural adjustment programs (SAPs). Such principles were “force-fed” to formerly colonized states¹⁴ to ensure they would “open, liberalize, and deregulate their markets, including reducing tariffs and other import restrictions, dismantling agricultural cooperatives and marketing boards, and reducing or eliminating production and input subsidies” (Margulis et al., 2023, p. 219).

The imposition of SAPs by the IMF was perceived as the only viable solution for many states whose recent independence and strenuous post-colonization economic conditions left them with little options to rebuild their national economies: accept harsh conditions imposed by the IMF to relieve debt to international creditors or risk social and economic deterioration (Crisp and Kelly, 1990). For example, SAPs in Malawi imposed Western-like legal restrictions transforming agriculture into estates and smallholders, ultimately benefiting a minority of smallholders and impoverishing the majority of household farmers living below subsistence (Lele, 1990). In other words, SAPs under the IMF’s mandate imposed a neoliberal-extractivist agri-industrial model on several African, Asian, Latin American, and Caribbean countries with devastating consequences for food sovereignty,¹⁵ sustainability, and, as is demonstrate herein, global food security.

¹⁴ The epistemological choice of “formerly colonized state” is to dissociate our research from developmental studies. The use of “developing countries” and “developed countries” reproduces unequal dynamics and reinforces the implicit idea that the former needs to mimic the latter. When speaking strictly in economic terms, this research will refer to low-income, middle-income and high-income countries.

¹⁵ Food sovereignty is defined by Via Campesina (the biggest international farming and peasant movement) as follows: *Food sovereignty is the right of each nation to maintain and develop its own capacity to produce its basic foods respecting cultural and productive diversity. We have the right to produce our own food in our own territory. Food sovereignty is a precondition to genuine food security* (Via Campesina, 1996).

First era

Adopting Clapp and Moseley's (2020) classification,¹⁶ three distinct food policy eras can be identified following the end of the Second World War. The first period extends from the 1950s to the 1970s and can be understood as the “food self-sufficiency” period when the first green revolution¹⁷ occurred. This period saw a sharp increase in agricultural yield, industrialization of the agri-food sector and increased reliance of formerly colonized states on food imports from major food producers, namely the United States of America (US), Canada, Australia and the European Union (EU) (Clapp and Moseley, 2020). The end of the “food self-sufficiency” period was marked by the food price crisis of 1972-1974 when prices tripled, which coincided with the energy crisis of 1973. Governments responded to this crisis by increasing their support for the rapid industrialization of the agricultural sector while high-income countries transitioned towards export-oriented surplus production. This led to a flooding of commodities on the global market and the emergence of “agri-powers” in the Global South such as Brazil, Thailand and Vietnam, which had now become major exporters of food products (Clapp and Moseley, 2020).

Second era

The period between the early 1980s to 2006 marked the second era of global food policy: the neoliberal food security period. As mentioned earlier, the late adhesion of the agri-food sector to a full free trade paradigm distinguished it from other sectors such as manufacturing or textile. The

¹⁶ Clapp and Moseley's classification is well documented and was reused or cited in more recent academic articles. See Leeuwis, C. et al. (2021); Margulis et al. (2023); Nemes, G. et al. (2021).

¹⁷ The first green revolution introduced high-yield varieties of cereal in some formerly colonized states. The revolution also saw the introduction of chemical fertilizers and pesticides on a big scale as the high-yield crops were dependent on this new input.

rationale behind this late adherence was driven by a neo-Malthusian¹⁸ logic: a government unable to feed its population is at risk of social disruption and food riots ultimately leading to its collapse. The neo-Malthusian discourse has dominated and continues to dominate food security geopolitics where a neoliberal economic model is the only way to mitigate risks and increase food production. In other words, neoliberalism and capitalism are “the only possible options” to ensure food security in a growing demographic scenario (Sommerville et al., 2014, p. 251). In policy terms, this rationale was translated into the partial or complete removal of trade barriers (e.g., tariffs, quotas), significant reductions or the elimination of agricultural subsidies and ultimately the implementation of the AoA in 1995 following intensive negotiations during the Uruguay Round (1986-1994) of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT). On the other hand, critics see this rationale as misleading and as one of “world politics (e.g., colonialism and the expansion of capitalism) [that] determine food security, not the contrary” (Sommerville et al., 2014, p. 253). Put simply:

“food insecurity has been caused not by lack of supply – which has been abundant and more than sufficient to meet the needs of the world population – but by unequal distribution and a lack of access among poor and vulnerable groups. The problem, in other words, has been one not of scarcity but of ‘hunger amidst abundance’” (Margulis et al., 2023, p. 224).

Following the Third World debt crisis and farm livelihood crisis in the late 1970s and early 1980s, the WB and the IMF introduced SAPs to “support” developing countries in dire need of debt relief. Initially seen as “supportive” programs, SAPs had the opposite effect in some developing countries, further exacerbating the precarious conditions of rural populations and increasing food

¹⁸ The neo-Malthusian logic is based on the misconception that population growth is a central cause of scarcity. See Hendrixson, A., & Hartmann, B. (2019).

insecurity. As mentioned earlier, this came with their economies' opening, liberalization, and deregulation. This culminated with the adoption of the AoA that came into force with the creation of the WTO in 1995. To this day, the core principles enshrined in the AoA are the basis of the international agri-food system. Countries from the Western World¹⁹ saw the AoA as a necessary means to “minimize possible economic distortions [...] [with the] progressive reduction of assistance to and protection of agriculture” (Margulis et al., 2023, p. 218). It was adopted with the long-term objective of letting the market guide the production of the agri-food sector. Blind faith in the market prompted combined deregulations, first with significant reductions or removals of government subsidies and second with dismantling trade barriers. This dual deregulation was directly aimed at preventing price distortions of agricultural commodities on international markets. However, subsequent food price crises (2007-2008, 2022-2023) proved devastating for farmers, particularly in LMICs, where agricultural support programs are non-existent or inadequate. On the other hand, farmers from high-income countries have access to such programs giving them the opportunity to absorb part of these price shocks and protect their livelihoods.

Critics of the AoA emphasized several issues behind the neoliberal logic, including (1) the asymmetric relations between WTO members caused by dominant agri-powers fixing the rules for agricultural trade and (2) the absence of climate change and the crisis of biodiversity loss within the past and ongoing AoA negotiations “despite overwhelming scientific evidence that climate change will upend global food systems and pose a significant threat to global food security” (Margulis et al., 2023, p. 219). These critics rightfully point out a profoundly preoccupying trend within the neoliberal logic, where the agri-food sector is rarely presented as a major contributor to

¹⁹ The vision of this new international agri-food regime was spearheaded by Canada, the European Union, Japan and the United States.

the climate crisis despite accounting for 22% of global well-mixed greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions and contributing to tremendous biodiversity loss in 2019 (IPCC, 2023).

The resulting consequences of the SAPs and the AoA on LMICs were far from the promises made by the IMF and the WB. On the contrary, the SAPs only increased the dependency of LMICS on foreign partners, consequently, making them more vulnerable to a volatile global market. This translated to acute vulnerabilities for an inherently vulnerable economic sector, especially in LMICS where agriculture accounts for large shares of the gross domestic product (GDP) and the employed labour force. In the event of international market shocks, these countries' food security suffered tremendously as they now relied heavily on food imports. Initially implemented as a response to the global food and debt crisis, multiple studies²⁰ confirm that SAPs “mandated by the IMF increas[ed] income inequality in borrowing countries” rather than fostering social and economic development (Forster & al., 2019, p. 83).

Third era

The third era (neo-productionism and the new green revolution) spanned the period from 2007 to 2020, with the COVID-19 pandemic marking its end (Clapp and Moseley, 2020). This era starts with the well-documented and studied food price crisis of 2007-08 that saw a sharp rise in commodity prices, including food. Serious concerns arose around global food supply while the world saw a sharp increase in hunger, disproportionately impacting formerly colonized states (Clapp and Moseley, 2020). The neo-productionist part of this era is better understood as the crystallization of “the private sector in directing global agricultural supply chains based on

²⁰ See Garuda (2000) Lang (2016), Oberdabernig (2013), Pastor (1987), and Vreeland (2002).

specialized, industrial food production for global markets” (Clapp and Moseley, 2020, p. 1398). This period saw a push from the private sector to invest in the agricultural sector helped by the financialization of agricultural products, farmlands turned into a commodity for investors. The New Green Revolution is essentially an updated version of the Green Revolution of the 1950s-70s with a greater focus on Africa. As a direct answer to the rising food crisis and the resulting increase in hunger, more severely affecting African countries, this “new” agricultural revolution had two guiding objectives: 1) increase food production in Africa and 2) integrate small farmers into global food supply chains. To achieve these ambitious objectives, the New Green Revolution should see the incorporation of the private sector, the purchase of commercial seeds and inputs, the integration of women in the agricultural sector, the industrialization of farming, and, most importantly, the removal of trade barriers (Clapp and Moseley, 2020). These objectives are based on the same WB and IMF’s neoliberal-extractivist playbook of the SAPs era but with an updated green-washed and gender-washed cover.

Fourth era?

The current post-COVID-19 era is characterized by the disruption of food supplies, major income losses, inflation of food prices in certain locations, exacerbated food insecurity, disrupted food supply chains, and increased risks for LMICs with food imports as their main food source (Clapp and Moseley, 2020; Margulis et al., 2023). The same period also saw the disruption of global food security with the Russian invasion of Ukraine, both countries accounting for 25% of global wheat supplies. The war destabilized food price markets with an increase of 50% in wheat prices, causing a global food crisis (Terazono and Pooler, 2022). This raises serious concerns as to the resilience of the global agri-food system in the face of another political, sanitary, or economic crisis,

especially in light of the severe loss of agricultural yields due to climate change (floods, droughts, wildfires, locust swarms, pandemics, etc.).

The international agri-food system significantly transformed since the end of the Second World War. Despite the prevalence of protectionist trade policies at the beginning of this transformation, the agri-food sector eventually followed other economic sectors' integration into the liberal international order. Industrialization, financialization, free trade, and the global integration of small-scale farmers in LMICs characterize today's international agri-food system. This system faces major challenges that the global food security governance has to address if it aims to meet the "ending hunger" SDG by 2030.

Chapter 3

Canada and food security: contradictions?

While the first chapter introduced general trends of the international agri-food system and defined our conceptual framework, this chapter focuses on the specifics of the Canadian approach to food security and agriculture nationally and internationally. To grasp the full picture of the Canadian approach, we will analyze the government's reports and documents, national policies, official statements, Global Affairs Canada's (GAC) international programs relating to food security and agriculture and the government's position within international forums. The last part of the chapter answers the first research question; are there contradictions between Canada's national and international food security policies and discourses? How can we explain Canada's position and approach to food security?

Canada's agri-food system

Canada's agri-food system is vast and at first sight, its structure can be confusing. Agriculture and Agri-Food Canada (AAFC) presents it as an "integrated supply chain" including 1) primary agriculture, 2) food and beverage processors, 3) food retailers and wholesalers and 4) food service providers (AAFC, 2023a). The Canadian agri-food system employed 2.3 million people and generated \$144 billion (7% of Canada's GDP) in 2022 (AAFC, 2023a). However, 249,900 farm operators worked on 189,874 farms across the whole country, testifying of the highly mechanized agricultural sector in Canada (a ratio of 1.32 farmers/farm) but also of an economic sector highly concentrated in the hands of a minority of farmers, where 10% of farms (18,987 farms) generated

more than 2/3 of all revenues (\$87.7 billion) in 2022 (AAFC, 2023a). This trend is not limited to Canada, major European agri-powers²¹ follow the same economic structure, but the concentration is particularly high in Canada (York University, 2023a). It is important to note that the number of farm operators does not include temporary foreign workers (TPW) hired through SAWP and the Canadian Agriculture Stream, accounting for 89,021 workers in 2022 (Employment and Social Development Canada, 2023).

A country may be producing considerable agricultural and food products (such as Egypt, Indonesia and the Islamic Republic of Iran)²² but may not be considered an agri-power if, for example, most of its production is domestically consumed. In the case of Canada, even with its relatively small population size, the country is a behemoth of agricultural and food product exports; it ranked as the fifth-largest exporter in 2022, behind the EU, the US, Brazil, and China (AAFC, 2023a). Canada's exports of agri-food and seafood products amounted to \$92 billion in 2022, accounting for 12% of total exports (\$779 billion) (AAFC, 2023a; Statistics Canada, 2023a). However, despite a significant increase in exports (in dollars), the quantity exported diminished by 9%, following a negative trend for a second consecutive year (Statistics Canada, 2023a). This raises serious questions regarding the resilience of the Canadian agri-food system in the short term, especially with the volatility of food prices since the onset of COVID-19, the invasion of Ukraine, and the increasing risks of weather-related agricultural losses due to climate change (Clapp and Isakson, 2018; Ker, 2020; Terazono and Pooler, 2022). We analyze the Canadian government's strategy to respond to these challenges further below.

²¹ The informal top three are France, Italy, and Spain when additioning the value of agriculture, forestry and fishing in 2022. See FAO (2022).

²² See FAO (2022).

According to the Canadian *Constitution*, agriculture falls under provincial and federal authorities. The federal government has paramount power regarding agriculture in case of conflict, and its powers cover the trade and commerce of agricultural and food products between provinces and on international markets (York University, 2023b). Other than trade and some exceptions, provinces have most of the remaining powers in agriculture. An exception worth mentioning relates to the status of food. Food can be considered a “natural resource” when its trade between provinces or on international markets is deemed a matter of national interest for the federal government. Falling under the “trade and commerce” power, the federal government has, in theory, the power to fix prices of such commodities, such as wheat, corn or canola (York University, 2023b).

In practice, the bureaucratic division of agri-food powers between federal/provincial-territorial governments is clear with the issuance of different types of food licenses. Provincial and territorial licenses are required for most agri-food businesses operating within their jurisdiction, while federal licenses issued by the Canadian Food Inspection Agency (CFIA) are required for activities between provinces and on international markets (Canadian Food Inspection Agency, 2023). On the other hand, in practice, some areas are more contentious, particularly when they overlap with other powers (e.g. economic development, relations with First Nations, resource extractions, waterways and fisheries, etc.) (York University, 2023b).

Two conclusions can be drawn from the Canada’s decentralized system. First, the shared authority over agriculture brings the agri-food sector into the federal-provincial relations dynamic, with its complexity and inherent political nature. This means that the federal government can move towards specific objectives in areas of provincial or territorial exclusivity (e.g. land ownership and

use, wildlife protection), while on the other hand, it might have a harder time pursuing other goals (e.g. environmental protection)²³. Second, federally licensed agri-food businesses are federally regulated and thus must comply with federal regulations (e.g. environmental regulations) to pursue their activities, while provincially or territorially licensed businesses do not fall under this legal regime. For several years, the government of Canada has been pushing for the harmonization of federal, provincial, and territorial (FPT) agri-food regulations, with little success (Government of Canada, 2023).

A wide array of programs exists and is funded exclusively by the federal government. Programs include trade and market expansion programs²⁴, innovation and sustainable growth²⁵, and inclusion, diversity and public trust²⁶ (AAFC, 2023b). Also, the federal business risk management programs (BRM) provide a wide array of protections²⁷ in case of income and production losses for agricultural producers in Canada (AAFC, 2023b). While these programs are essential for Canadian agri-food businesses, they are instrumental in our understanding of Canada’s approach to food security for two reasons. First, they represent only part of the overall picture of food security in Canada; the provincial and territorial powers and policies are absent. Second, their purpose is primarily to support the industry and producers in staying economically competitive, to mitigate risks related to income and production losses and to increase the visibility and positive image of the sector to the Canadian public. Obviously, these programs are focused on Canadian agri-food

²³ Environmental protection is constitutionally and primarily a provincial power. The recent judgement rendered by the Supreme Court of Canada References re *Greenhouse Gas Pollution Pricing Act* (2021 SCC 11) also known as the federal Carbon Tax, is a striking example of the complexity of the “overlapping” federal-provincial powers.

²⁴ Namely the AgriMarketing and AgriCompetitiveness programs.

²⁵ Namely the AgriInnovate and AgriScience programs.

²⁶ Namely the AgriDiversity and AgriAssurance programs

²⁷ The BRM programs include: 1- AgriStability, 2- AgriInvest, 3- AgriInsurance, and 4- AgriRecovery. For more information see: Agriculture and Agri-Food Canada, 2022b.

businesses' economics; they do not directly target Canadian and international *food security* according to our holistic approach introduced in the first chapter. With their strictly economic lens, the programs are not aimed at supporting or defining a common trajectory toward food security.

Food security

Officially, the government of Canada has no definition of *food security* (Deaton & Scholz, 2022). However, an official definition of *food insecurity* is provided by Health Canada and comes with well-established indicators²⁸ to measure the state of food insecurity within the Canadian population. It is defined as “the inability to acquire or consume an adequate diet quality or sufficient quantity of food in socially acceptable ways, or the uncertainty that one will be able to do so” (Health Canada, 2020, n.p.). The number of food-insecure households has kept rising since 2018 and shows no sign of respite, with 18.4% (vs. 16.8% in 2018) of households considered food insecure and 12.9% (vs. 11.6% in 2018) of households living moderate or severe food insecurity in 2021 in Canada (Statistics Canada, 2023b). As important as Health Canada’s definition and indicators are for researchers and policymakers, they limit our understanding of *food in/security* in Canada to strictly financial limitations of households. To address this issue, the government of Canada conducted public consultations in 2018 to develop a national food policy.

The government of Canada acknowledged the need for a holistic approach to *food* to address pressing issues such as food insecurity, food waste and food accessibility. In 2019, it published the

²⁸ The level of food insecurity in Canada is measured through the Household Food Security Survey Module of the Canadian Community Health Survey. A respondent is considered food insecure if it “indicates that their household’s food quality and quantity has been compromised due to financial limitations or the concern thereof” (Deaton and Scholz, 2022).

Food Policy for Canada (FPC), the first food policy in Canadian history. Identified as one of the four priorities, *food security* is presented as a situation where “all people in Canada are able to access a sufficient amount of safe, nutritious, and culturally diverse food” (AAFC, 2019, n.p.). This noble goal to attain food security for all brings the government of Canada’s approach closer to our holistic definition. Nevertheless, in line with Deaton & Scholz’s (2022) analysis, the FPC did not introduce new indicators to account for the access to culturally diverse food, education of healthy food habits, or the economic and social implications of food insecurity associated with poor health and high healthcare costs. The FPC recognizes the need for a “holistic approach [...] [where] food is more than a product” (AAFC, 2019, n.p.). In spite of this recognition, the holistic approach is limited to the Canadian reconciliation process with Indigenous peoples: “[food] is the medicine that ensures [Indigenous peoples’] wellbeing; it is a way of sustaining culture and community; and it is a way of reconnecting to the land” (AAFC, 2019). We consider that this latter formulation should guide the FPT governments’ approach to food security for all Canadians; it should not be limited to Indigenous peoples. If the Canadian agri-food system wants to gain public trust, reconnect people with their territory, address the increasing food insecurity of Canadian households and reduce the negative impact of the sector on climate change and biodiversity, it should learn from Indigenous knowledge and practices instead of limiting this holistic approach to its reconciliation process.

The government’s dual approach to food security, one for “Canadians” and one for Indigenous populations, gives evidence that Canada’s agri-food system is rooted in an inherently neoliberal logic. The profit-driven nature of the agri-food system since the 1970s can hardly be reconciled with a holistic approach that goes beyond a narrow conception of food security based on financial

constraints; it should consider the role of structural factors such as geographical access, biological and ecological factors, health and education as determinants of food in/security. We recognize that this is a strong statement, but our research supports it. At first glance, the FPC answers many of our concerns regarding the lack of a strong Canadian approach to food security and proposes a paradigm shift, also expressed by AAFC in its scientific approach²⁹ (AAFC, 2019; AAFC, 2022a). However, as our analysis underlines, FPT governments' vision of Canada's agri-food system conveys the impression that the paramount goal is the profitability of all actors within the agri-food system, instead of the attainment of food security for all Canadians and the reduction of the sector's contribution to climate change and biodiversity losses. For example, studies have shown that policies aimed at increasing food security through food supply (e.g. local food, circular economy, urban agriculture) fail to address food security because they do not target food prices, the only variable studied and proven (so far) to impact food security in Canada (Deaton & Scholz, 2022). We partly explain this by FPT governments' vision³⁰ of such policies and programs; they are considered "market development opportunities" for producers adapting to consumers' needs (AAFC, 2021a). This is exactly why the FPC has been supporting initiatives such as "community gardens, community kitchens, urban farms, greenhouses, or community freezers" (Deaton & Scholz, 2022) that marginally benefit the food insecure households, as they account for a very small portion of participants in these initiatives as shown Kirkpatrick & Tarasuk (2009) and Roncarolo et al. (2015). Insecure households are more inclined to use food banks to meet their food needs, a reality that is more and more common, particularly following the COVID-19 pandemic. The situation has worsened following the end of the Government of Canada's

²⁹ This will be analyzed further below under the section *Agricultural Policy Framework (APF)*.

³⁰ This idea is further developed below under the section *Agricultural Policy Framework (APF)*.

Emergency Food Security Fund³¹, cutting a significant part of food bank funds, now in demand more than ever with a 35% increase in food bank visits across Canada between 2019 and 2022 (Food Banks Canada, 2022). Future policies should focus on food bank support as a first step to address food insecurity.

There is an absence of credible indicators to evaluate the FPC's outcomes and targets, except for the already accounted-for economic indicator of household income. With this single indicator, food security is directly linked to household income and consumption of food products. To implement a fully fleshed-out holistic approach, the federal government claims, it should implement quantitative and qualitative objectives with clear indicators to evaluate FPC's success. Our policy analysis acknowledges the complexity of this goal, as the FPT power-sharing dynamic over agriculture and, to a lesser extent, health and healthcare makes it difficult to adopt a nationwide food policy agreed by all 14 FPT governments. In practice, this dynamic makes it so that the federal government sees food security in terms of food supply; it ensures that no food shortage arises across the country and supports agri-food businesses through trade and commerce programs. For their part, provincial and territorial governments see food security through a different lens; they focus on food accessibility and affordability for vulnerable individuals within their population, and healthcare (e.g. obesity, malnutrition, etc.). In spite of that, all 14 FPT governments' agriculture ministers meet annually and publish a joint statement on a five-year basis, giving a sense of an inter-governmental approach to food security.

³¹ AAFC launched this initiative in April 2020 to mitigate the impact of the COVID-19 pandemic on food-insecure households across Canada. Additional funds were provided throughout 2020 and 2021, totalling \$330 million in support for food aid distribution organizations and networks. See Agriculture and Agri-Food Canada, 2021b.

Agricultural Policy Framework

The orientation and guiding principles of the agri-food system are the result of negotiations and general understanding between FPT governments. Enacted on a five-year basis since 2001, the Agriculture Policy Framework (APF) combines the agricultural vision of the 14 Canadian jurisdictions. The latest APF, for 2023-2028, is constituted of two central initiatives, the Sustainable Canadian Agricultural Partnership (SCAP) and the *Guelph statement*. First, the SCAP is an FPT agreement on a financial framework to position “Canada's agriculture and agri-food sector for continued success as a world leader in economically, environmentally and socially sustainable agriculture” (AAFC, 2023b, n.p.). Totalling \$3.5 billion in investments over five years – \$1 billion in direct federal investment and \$2.5 billion with a 60/40 (federal/provincial-territorial) cost-sharing approach, the SCAP follows the key areas laid out in the *Guelph statement* (AAFC, 2023b). Second, the *Guelph statement* presents the 1- priorities, 2- guiding principles and 3- focus areas of FPT governments (AAFC, 2021a). This concerted vision of agriculture is highly relevant to our research since it encapsulates the decentralized Canadian approach to agriculture in a single document.

Guelph statement

The priorities and focus areas presented in this document can be summarized as follows: 1- tackle climate change and environmental protection, 2- invest in science research and innovation, 3- increase resiliency and public trust, 4- support sustainable agriculture to meet the domestic and global demand, and 5- build sector capacity, growth and competitiveness (AAFC, 2021a). Regarding guiding principles, they essentially cover the following: 1- ensure a sustainable agriculture and agri-food sector to compete globally, 2- Respect the shared jurisdiction of

agriculture and international trade obligations, 3- collaborate with stakeholders, 4- increase participation of underrepresented groups (e.g. youth and women) and strengthen relationships with Indigenous Peoples, 5- answer to producers' needs and reduce their regulation burden, and 6- achieve collective and measurable outcomes with the help of governments (AAFC, 2021a). Let's break down what this means in terms of food security.

Our analysis identified a neoliberal bias in part of the *Guelph statement* where the economy has precedence over the protection of the environment and biodiversity, going against the overarching balancing principle guiding the science department at AAFC and the published FPC in 2019. For example, in the *Guelph statement*, “buy local” is given as an example of a market development opportunity for the agri-food industry in Canada, not as a solution to 1- reduce GHG emissions caused by the transport sector, 2- (re)build trust between producers and consumers, or 3- increase food security in time of economic instability or food crises (AAFC, 2021a). Another example of this bias resides in the *statement* approach to climate change and the loss of biodiversity. The agri-food sector is portrayed as a “victim” of climate change that needs to adapt and reinforce its resiliency if it wants to remain competitive. Through our research, governments' official documents, policies and speeches tend to adopt a diluted perspective; they occasionally acknowledge the contribution of the agri-food sector to climate change and the loss of biodiversity due to industrial farming methods, globalized food supply chains, and the financialization of the sector. It can be advanced that this sporadic recognition is intrinsic to the political climate not only in Canada but also in most Western democracies. As mentioned earlier, a small number of farms dominates Canadian agri-food production. At AAFC, food insecurity is not the result of a distribution problem; the solution is to increase production in a “sustainable” way and thus reduce

the price of agricultural commodities while increasing market opportunities for the Canadian agri-food sector (Sarkar et al., 2018). The AAFC's approach to "sustainable growth" reproduces the neoliberal structure of the agri-food sector; it refrains from integrating and recognizing the benefits of alternative agricultural farming practices in mitigating climate change (Hu, 2020; IPCC, 2019).

Like any other business, we acknowledge that agri-food businesses wish to protect their interests and revenues. We also acknowledge the efforts deployed by AAFC in conjunction with the agri-food sector in tackling climate change and reducing its environmental footprint since the 1990s. Nevertheless, change is too slow. Canada needs to implement a new approach within the agri-food system, one that goes beyond a narrow conception of food security. While Canada saw a reduction of GHG emissions from cattle production by 14% between 1981 and 2011 (Sarkar et al., 2018), it also saw an increase of 54% in GHG emissions from the application of synthetic fertilizers between 2005 and 2019 (AAFC, 2022c). Overall, from 1990 to 2021, agricultural GHG emissions kept increasing from 45 to 60 Megatons (Mt), accounting for 8% to 10% of total Canadian GHG emissions over the whole period (ECCC, 2023). According to the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC), Canadian agriculture is the only economic sector with a positive increase in GHG emissions in Canada when compared to 2005 levels (ECCC, 2023). These numbers show that Canadian efforts are insufficient if the country wishes to meet its sustainable development goals and protect its agri-food system from future food and economic crises. In the end, the *Guelph statement* and AAFC's *Strategic Plan for Science* tell us that the sector is, as of 2023, not willing to compromise on profits, but is willing to postpone much-needed agricultural and food processing reforms required to protect the environment and biodiversity. This vision brings economic and environmental consequences to both Canada and the world. This is the focus of the next chapter.

Canada and food security abroad

With a clearer understanding of food security and the agri-food sector within Canada, we now turn to the country's global vision of food security and how it stands compared to its national approach. Is it different? If so, how different is it? How can we explain Canada's position? These are the questions explored in the remainder of this chapter.

Grasping the guiding principles of Canada's national agri-food system and its food security approach was rather straightforward with the help of official documents, a clear national legal regime and joint FPT governments' statements. On the other hand, defining Canada's global approach to food security through its international programs and officials' declarations is a more tedious task. We attribute these difficulties to a diversity of factors. First, the folding in 2013 of the Canadian International Development Agency (CIDA) into the Department of Foreign Affairs (today's Global Affairs Canada) subjected Canadian international development and aid policies to the broader Canadian foreign policy (Margulis, 2017a). Second, the Canadian government lacks an official foreign development and aid policy on food security. Third, Canada is one of many actors navigating the world stage of international food security: intergovernmental organizations³² (IOs), non-governmental organizations³³ (NGOs), states³⁴ and transnational corporations³⁵ (TNCs). Given the multiplicity of actors involved in defining a global food security agenda, Canada finds itself in a complex network and thus lacks clearly defined parameters for food security as is the case in its national context. Still, we can pin down general principles guiding

³² Including the Group of Seven (G7), FAO, IMF, UN, WB, and WFP.

³³ Including the Canadian Foodgrains Bank, Via Campesina.

³⁴ including the biggest food producers Brazil, China, the EU, India, Indonesia, the Islamic Republic of Iran and the US.

³⁵ Including Archer Daniels Midland Co, BASF SE, Bayer, Bunge Ltd, Cargill, and Willmar International Ltd.

Canada's international approach to food security in two ways: first, by tracing Canadian funding of international development and aid towards agriculture and food security; second, by studying the federal government's behaviour within international forums dedicated to food security.

Canada's funding for agriculture and food security

Despite the absence of an official approach to food security by GAC, the analysis of the funding of international development and aid towards agriculture and food security opens a window into GAC's priorities. With the help of the Project Browser published by GAC, we extracted GAC's international projects' data targeting two "sector category": 1) "agriculture" and 2) "developmental food aid/food security assistance". Filtering the results by "start date" we limited our scope of analysis to the projects that started on January 1, 2013 or later³⁶. This choice was made to capture the last 10 years of funding by GAC. Totalling \$5.6 billion³⁷ since 2013, GAC's funding for agriculture and developmental food aid/food security assistance supported 291 projects, with most of them still ongoing (90 closed out of 291 total). Each project is unique in its funding, approach and expected results. Although an in-depth analysis of the 291 projects exceeds the scope of this study, there are some overarching patterns that can be drawn from the last decade of federal funding into food aid/security.

³⁶ Projects were computed on November 13th, 2023. Please note that projects launched after November 13th, 2023 were not considered in the analysis. See Annex A for the computed data.

³⁷ This number was extracted from our computed data. See Annex A for a detailed overview of GAC's projects.

Table 1: Global Affairs Canada's funding of international development and aid for agriculture and food security 2013-2023 (Ranked by projects' funding in CAN\$)

Projects	Funding (\$)	% of total funding
Top 10	1,730,810,001.01	30.65
Top 15	2,130,747,529.62	37.74
Top 20	2,492,184,429.62	44.14
Top 25	2,750,775,862.35	48.72
Top 30	2,976,295,521.28	52.71
Total 291	5,646,494,114.99	100%

Source: Global Affairs Canada. (2023, November 13th). *Project Browser*. Government of Canada. <https://w05.international.gc.ca/projectbrowser-banqueprojets/?lang=eng>

The first pattern identified regards the collaboration type between GAC and its funding beneficiaries. Of the 30 largest projects (in terms of funding), 25 are multilateral projects piloted by IOs, including but not limited to the International Fund for Agriculture (IFAD), the International Finance Corporation (IFC), the Global Environmental Facility (GEF), the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development Trust Funds (IBRD), the Inter-American Development Bank (IDB), the African Development Bank Group (ADB) and the German Society for International Cooperation (GIZ). Accounting for 52% of total funding since 2013 (\$2.9 billion), the IOs receiving GAC's contribution and piloting 25 of the top 30 projects are locked in a neoliberal logic of development and aid (Canfield et al., 2021). Given the nature of IOs, their multilateral approach to food security cannot be dissociated from the agenda of its top contributors, which in this case is rooted in neoliberal principles (Clapp & Isakson, 2018; Shilomboleni et al., 2019).

The second pattern relates to similarities between Canada's approach to food security at the international level (i.e., projects funded by GAC) and its approach to food security at the national level. The international projects' approach to food security focuses on 1) increasing the purchasing power of LMICs' population, 2) delivering emergency aid to people facing an immediate threat of

hunger, 3) integrating NFIs into the international free trade agri-food system and 4) pushing for the “free-trade-for-food” securitization of food security. As mentioned earlier, in the Canadian context this narrow approach to food security translates as: 1) increasing Canadian households' income, 2) supporting food banks, 3) expanding federal programs to support industrial farmers while sidelining small-scale and alternative farming methods, and 4) securitizing the Canadian agri-food production as a necessity to tackle world hunger.

In line with the previous pattern, the third pattern covers the distribution of funds by the projects' managers; only a small portion of GAC's funding is allocated to agriculture. The bulk of the funds focuses on food aid/security, general economic sustainable growth, renewable energy resources, mitigating impacts of climate change and the reduction of GHG emissions. Furthermore, the small portion allocated to agriculture is almost entirely focused on integrating small-scale farms into the international agri-food system, all in line with the “free-trade-for-food” security neoliberal principle. Only a small fraction of the already small agricultural funds support small-scale projects that integrate agroecosystem sustainability and resilience of food systems, both proven to increase food security by 1) substantially reducing the agri-food sector impacts on climate change and the loss of biodiversity, and 2) by considerably mitigating the severity of food crises (Bezner Kerr et al., 2021; Canfield et al., 2021; Clapp and Moseley, 2020; Hu, 2020).

Despite these overarching patterns, GAC's projected image at home and abroad is one that is gender, climate, and environmentally conscious (Ostwald & Dierkes, 2018). We attribute GAC's positive image to a successful framing process focused on the visibility of small-scale projects where GAC is a major or the sole stakeholder. Gender-focused, environmentally sustainable and

empowering, these small-scale projects account for a fraction of GAC's funding for agriculture and food aid/security. Examples of such projects are listed under GAC's website "stories" section; they highlight GAC's funding in Kenya, Honduras and Nigeria through stories of individual beneficiaries (Global Affairs Canada, 2023). In other words, GAC's public relations successfully framed its approach to agriculture and food aid/security as being more holistic. The Government of Canada did not limit its framing efforts to these projects; it advances a similar public relations agenda within international organizations.

Canada's position within international forums

GAC's international agenda and negotiation strategies are kept a good secret for obvious reasons. Considering this reality, researchers have little to work with. That said, some scholars had access to insights into GAC's strategy inside international organizations. Building on Margulis' (2015, 2017a, 2017b) work, general trends³⁸ can be identified.

In the years following the 2008 food crisis, the Group of Eight³⁹ (G8) and the UN Committee on World Food Security (CFS), which Canada is still both a member of, presented renewed approaches to international food security and rural development. Welcomed at first by the international community, Canada's approach was quickly criticized for its "support for economic liberalism and its emphasis on production, productivity, and market access rather than increased participation and access to land" (Margulis, 2015, p. 168). NGOs, NFIs and the CFS decried

³⁸ These trends may have changed since the publication of Margulis' work and should be treated with caution. The absence of more recent scholarly work and of an official Canadian foreign development and aid policy on food security limits our capacity to draw conclusions on Canada's foreign strategy on food security since 2018.

³⁹ Please note that the Group of Eight (G8) is used here to refer to today's Group of Seven (G7). The suspension of Russia as a member of the G8 occurred following the invasion of Crimea in 2014, after Margulis' (2015) wrote its article but before its publication.

Canada's role as "an obstructive and negative actor" (Margulis, 2015, p. 174). Canada pushed for the G8 and its partnership with the WB to become the leading actor on global food security while delegitimizing the FAO, IFAD and CFS and the latter's efforts towards the harmonization of global food security governance (Margulis, 2015). This shows that Canada was adopting a "Janus-faced approach to global food security governance" (Margulis, 2015, p. 174).

Canada's instrumentalization of GAC's funding towards achieving international diplomatic goals is another trend identified with the help of Margulis' (2017a, 2017b) work. In the eyes of international projects officials, from 2005 to 2015, Canada was one of the worst contributing members of the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD). This bad reputation was not based on Canada's contributions amounts; it was attributable to its volatility. This had tremendous consequences for projects funded by GAC. Project officials could not do long-term programming and had to face significant "delays and bottlenecks in implementing projects" (Margulis, 2017b, n.p.). Despite these disadvantages, Canada continued to commit to short-term aid and funding. Margulis attributes this strategy to the Canadian government's objective of earning "a lot of good press at home and abroad [...] around high profile international events" (Margulis, 2017b, n.p.). With this positive image, Canada influences the debates within international forums to better represent its interests, and by extension the interests of the Canadian agri-food lobby at the expense of the programming of long-term international projects targeting food security and agriculture.

Applying the securitization framework to both trends helps us demystify Canada's foreign approach to food security. First, Canadian and international agri-food actors lobbied the Canadian

government to advance a neo-malthusian discourse framing international food security as an economic, social and political “threat” to Canadian interests and the broader international liberal order. Second, the Canadian government, mostly through GAC, funds international development projects targeting food security and agriculture. Third, GAC’s contribution to international projects is widely accepted by the Canadian population as it is presented through a humanitarian lens. While this securitization process does not meet the “rule-breaking nature” criteria of a successful securitized issue according to Buzan et al.’s (1998) security framework, it still shows a successful securitizing speech act, identifies the securitizing actors involved in maintaining the status quo and highlights the widely shared belief that all international development programs are noble humanitarian initiatives helping LMIC’s population. Not securitized, food security is nonetheless highly politicized, especially since the outbreak of COVID-19 and the food crisis that followed.

Contradictions?

Upon examining Canada's policies and discourses regarding food security and agriculture, it becomes evident that contradictions exist. However, these contradictions do not align with the national/international divide introduced in our hypothesis. Instead, our analysis sheds light on contradictions between Canada's official declarations and its policies and initiatives to address food security and agriculture, both domestically and internationally.

The contradictions within Canada’s national approach to food security and agriculture are multifold. Canada's agri-food system, praised as an integrated supply chain with vast economic contributions, reveals contradictions in its structure and policies. While employing millions of

Canadians and generating a substantial part of the GDP, the sector's concentration of wealth among a minority of farms and its dependence on TFW raises concerns about economic inequality and resilience in the event of food crises. Furthermore, despite being a major exporter, Canada's recent declines in exports, compounded by global events (e.g. COVID-19, invasion of Ukraine) and climate change, pose significant challenges. The federal-provincial division of powers complicates policy implementation, with federal programs primarily focusing on economic competitiveness rather than directly addressing food security. Also, the absence of a comprehensive government-defined food security strategy is evident, as highlighted earlier by the preoccupying rise in the number of food-insecure households. The FPC focuses attention on food security, with an emphasis on a holistic approach for Indigenous communities but lacks comprehensive measures to address diverse aspects of food insecurity for the rest of Canadians. This double standard of food security speaks of a contradiction between Canada's approach to food security and the reconciliation process with Indigenous communities. Furthermore, the contradictory nature of the APF vows for a sustainable future in agriculture while prioritizing economic success over environmental protection and biodiversity; this reflects a neoliberal inclination that favours profitability over a holistic approach to food security. Despite acknowledging the need for change, agricultural practices have been slow to adapt and the FPC is not addressing the root causes of food insecurity, resulting in insufficient efforts to tackle climate change and rising GHG emissions, ultimately posing economic and environmental consequences.

Internationally, contradictions within Canada's approach to food security share similarities with its national approach. While Canada possesses a clear domestic framework for food security, its international stance lacks clarity due to the absorption of international aid policies into broader

foreign agendas. The analysis of Canada's international funding since 2013 reveals a focus on multilateral projects led by international organizations that embrace a neoliberal approach akin to its national strategies, emphasizing income growth, emergency aid, and integration into the global free trade agri-food system. Despite projecting an image of gender equality, environmental protection and support to LMICs' small-scale farms, the majority of Canada's international funding is directed towards broader economic growth and food aid/security rather than supporting sustainable, small-scale farming methods, such as agroecology, proven to enhance food security. Moreover, in international forums, Canada's role prioritizes an economic neoliberal approach over the protection and accessibility of land and the reduction of the agri-food sector's impact on the environment and food insecurity, leading to challenges in implementing long-term international projects. This discrepancy underscores Canada's portrayal of food security as a politicized issue supporting short-term aid initiatives for public relations purposes.

Chapter 4

Environmental and economic impacts

This chapter analyses the environmental and economic impacts (real and potential) of Canadian food security and agricultural policies on a national and global scale. The environmental impacts of the Canadian agri-food sector are often overlooked in public debates about climate change, especially when compared to the energy sector (e.g. oil, gas, coal, etc.). While accounting for 8% to 10% of total Canadian GHG emissions between 1990 and 2021, the agricultural sector is the only sector that saw a positive increase in GHG emissions over that period (ECCC, 2023). The responsibility for the climate transition of this sector does not solely fall on farmers; TNCs share a substantial part of the responsibility but so far have failed to support this transition. Moreover, the Canadian government has so far failed to act as a leader in the climate transition of the agri-food sector; instead, it has been a facilitator for the expansion of TNCs' economic opportunities. According to recent reports, the federal government allegedly colluded (again) with numerous agri-food TNCs in the last few years (Gerbet, 2023). The recent revelation of the existence of a "Tiger Team", responsible for updating the Canadian agricultural regulatory framework, composed of Canadian public servants and lobbyists representing agri-food TNCs raises several concerns about the impartiality of the federal regulatory framework (Gerbet, 2023). These concerns are further validated by the well-documented biases and inaccuracies of TNCs' sponsored scientific research in agriculture that form part of the scientific pillars of the Canadian government policy-making process (Gerbet, 2023; Morrissey et al., 2023; Thurton, 2023). The Tiger Team's work led to the deregulation of certain pesticides, fertilizers and genetically modified organisms (GMOs) that were previously controlled and overseen by the Canadian government (Gerbet, 2023). The Canadian government acknowledges that agri-food research is dominated by

the private sector but fails to recognize the disproportionately negative implications it exerts on food security and the environment, both nationally and internationally (AAFC, 2022a). In Canada, the current status quo approach to food security accelerates the loss of biodiversity, environmental pollution, climate change and the spread of pathogens. The increased vulnerabilities and risks Canadian farmers are facing deepen their dependency on agricultural inputs to maintain a high level of production; now even more than before with the financialization of the agri-food sector leading to the concentration of wealth and higher indebtedness levels among farmers (Margulis et al., 2023; Statistics Canada, 2022).

The Canadian approach to food security embraced the financialization of the agri-food sector (Rotz et al., 2019). Starting in the 1970s, the financialization of the agri-food sector followed the reduction trend in the number of farms across Canada; there were 318 361 farms in 1981 compared to 189 874 farms in 2021 (AAFC, 2023a; Public Services and Procurement Canada, 1981). This trend is accelerating and carries important implications. According to Clapp and Isakson (2018), it “contributes to the concentration of power and wealth in ways that exacerbate existing inequalities in food systems” (p. 438). It also increases the already existing vulnerabilities of Canada's biodiversity and environment. Furthermore, it hinders and diminishes collective calls for change, creating challenges in implementing policies and regulations that mitigate the impacts of financialization (Clapp and Isakson, 2018). These trends of financialization within the agri-food sector have broader consequences, posing a direct threat to the capacity of food systems to provide livelihoods and ensure long-term food security (Clapp and Isakson, 2018). Internationally, Canada's approach to food security has economic consequences by supporting market expansion and overly focusing on increasing production and export revenues for agri-food businesses. This

approach aligns with Canada's broader economic approach and can potentially impact LMICs negatively. Farmers from HICs have an advantage over small-scale farmers in LMICs, who account for a large share of the world's agricultural production. There is a:

“consensus among agricultural trade policy experts [...] that developed countries agricultural policies, especially producer subsidies, can distort trade and lead to an uneven playing field for farmers in the developing world that reduces their ability to benefit from local, regional, and international market opportunities” (Margulis, 2017, p. 40).

In a neoliberal agri-food system, farmers depend on TNCs for their livelihoods; TNCs are the buyers of raw agricultural commodities (corn, grains, soybeans, etc.) and the sellers of farming inputs (seeds, chemical fertilizers, pesticides, machinery, etc.). This dependency has major consequences for the environment. First, it is reflected in Canada's approach to food security: ensure food security by increasing agricultural production and thus the “availability of food” (Margulis, 2015; Sarkar et al., 2018). However, as underlined in this research, food in/security is not an issue of production but of distribution (Bezner Kerr et al., 2021; Buzan et al., 1998; Clapp and Isakson, 2018; Margulis et al., 2023; Sommerville et al., 2014). The securitization of food scarcity as an existential neo-malthusian threat reinforces the idea that Canada, as one of the major NFE of agricultural products, needs to increase its agricultural production to meet the global “growing demand for food”. This reaffirms the need for TNCs' products (seeds, chemical fertilizers, pesticides) to maintain industrial farming with high-yield production. Dependent on these private actors, the Canadian agri-food sector is locked in an environmentally exploitative dynamic that contributes to climate change, the loss of biodiversity and increased vulnerabilities to pests and pathogens. The recent financialization of the agri-food sector further exacerbates this phenomenon and heightens the sector's exposure to economic and environmental shocks (Clapp

and Isakson, 2018). While farmers are the heart of the agri-food system, they have a hard time making their voices heard within the agri-food sector; the Canadian agricultural sector is the least unionized industry sector across the country with 2.7% of unionized workers in 2022 (compared to 4.4% in 2019) (Statistics Canada, 2023c). There is a willingness among farmers to transition towards more sustainable and environmentally conscious farming methods to address food insecurity and climate change, but no worthwhile alternatives have been put forward by the Canadian government or the dominant players in the agri-food sector. Farmers are the central force of this pivotal climate transition but find their hands tied in this dependency dynamic.

Conclusion

This research showed that Canada's approach to food security suffers from major deficiencies. The holistic conceptual framework applied in this research allowed a more thorough analysis of the complex issues that are food security and the sustainability of agri-food systems. Our preliminary hypothesis on the existence of contradictions between Canada's domestic and international policies and discourses is partly confirmed: contradictions exist but do not align with the national/international divide. Instead, Canada's approach to food security and agriculture is deeply contradictory on a national and international level. This has environmental and economic impacts not only for Canada: as one of the world's top exporters of food products, Canada's actions directly impact global food security, the environment and biodiversity, social inequalities, peoples' health and political stability.

We consider that a paradigm shift is essential if Canada (1) wants to address the root causes of food insecurity, (2) wishes to meet its international sustainable development commitments and (3) aspires to become a global leader in environmentally and socially conscious agricultural practices. As the fifth-largest exporter of food products in 2022, behind the EU, the US, Brazil, and China, Canada is an agri-food powerhouse on international markets and can leverage its position to instigate change within the international agri-food system. Through international forums such as the WTO, the WB or the UN, Canada can exert influence to stir the debate on the future of food systems. Canada is in an advantageous position to advance an environmentally conscious, socially inclusive, economically fair, and health-aware approach to food security; in other words, a holistic approach that recognizes food and agriculture as the essence of our societies; not as a need that can be addressed independently from other needs. Canada took a step in the right direction by

recognizing the need for a holistic approach to food security in its FPC (AAFC, 2019). Instead of limiting this approach to its reconciliation process with Indigenous peoples, Canada should extend its application to 1) its FPC for all Canadians and 2) its international funding of agri-food projects. The following are recommendations for Canadian policymakers.

Recommendations

- 1- Define clear and measurable objectives to achieve “an agri-food sector for continued success as a world leader in economically, environmentally and socially sustainable agriculture” as presented in Canada’s Agricultural Policy Framework (AAFC, 2023b).
- 2- Limit the impact of the financialization of the agri-food sector by adopting a federal, provincial, and territorial firm position 1) against turning farmlands into a commodity for investors and 2) strongly regulating farmlands acquisitions and mergers.
- 3- Build a Canadian policy on food security defining, measuring, and assessing food security through a holistic lens and integrating such policy into a whole-of-government approach tackling climate change and protecting the environment and biodiversity.
- 4- Include food security as one of Canada’s foreign policy top priorities, with a special focus on supporting agroecology in low- to middle-income countries. This serves the dual purpose of safeguarding the environment and increasing food security.
- 5- Review Canada’s foreign policy positions at the World Trade Organization and the UN Committee on World Food Security to align with the harmonization of global food security governance put forward by the Food and Agriculture Organization, the International Fund for Agriculture and the UN Committee on World Food Security.

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Annex A

Project Number	Title	Start	Agriculture	Maximum Contribution (CAN\$)	Region
CA-3-D004328001	Canada-International Finance Corporation Blended Climate Finance Program	2018-43	Agricultural alternative development: 10.00%;Energy generation renewable sources - multiple technologies: 30.00%;Solar energy: 45.00%;Solar energy for isolated grids and standalone systems: 15.00%	\$250,000,000.00	Africa regional: 30.00% West Indies regional: 9.20% America regional: 20.80% Asia regional: 30.00% Europe regional: 10.00%
CA-3-D004327001	Canadian Climate Fund for the Private Sector in the Americas II	2019-44	Energy conservation and demand-side efficiency: 10.00%;Solar energy: 45.00%;Public transport services: 1.00%;Agricultural development: 10.00%;Forestry development: 1.00%;Wind energy: 15.00%;Biofuel-fired power plants: 2.00%;Energy generation renewable sources - multiple technologies: 10.00%;Hydro-electric power plants: 5.00%;Electric power transmission and distribution: 1.00%	\$223,500,000.00	West Indies regional: 19.00% North and Central America regional: 31.00% South America regional: 50.00%
CA-3-D004279001	Seventh Replenishment (2018-2022) - Global Environment Facility (GEF)	2019-22	Agricultural land resources: 5.90%;Forestry development: 5.90%;Bio-diversity: 31.90%;Nonferrous metals: 4.90%;Waste management/disposal: 4.90%;Energy generation renewable sources - multiple technologies: 19.80%;Agricultural water resources: 3.80%;Water resources conservation (including data collection): 3.80%;Chemicals: 4.90%;Multisector aid: 10.40%;Fishing policy and administrative management: 3.80%	\$216,570,000.00	Africa regional: 33.00% America regional: 27.00% Asia regional: 30.00% Europe regional: 10.00%
CA-3-M013882002	Support to the African Development Fund - 13th Replenishment - II	2014-17	Electric power transmission and distribution: 20.00%;Road transport: 20.00%;Agricultural development: 13.00%;Water supply - large systems: 10.00%;Higher education: 7.00%;Sanitation - large systems: 10.00%;Public sector policy and administrative management: 20.00%	\$206,200,000.01	Africa regional: 100.00%

CA-3- P006240002	Additional Support to IFAD Climate Finance Loan 2019-2021	2021-45	Rural development: 10.00%;Rural land policy and management: 10.00%;Agricultural education/training: 10.00%;Environmental policy and administrative management: 10.00%;Agricultural land resources: 10.00%;Agricultural development: 10.00%;Food crop production: 10.00%;Agricultural co-operatives: 10.00%;Agricultural water resources: 10.00%;Disaster Risk Reduction: 10.00%	\$190,000,000.00	Africa regional: 50.00% North and Central America regional: 15.00% South America regional: 10.00% South and Central Asia regional: 8.00% Far East Asia regional: 17.00%
CA-3- P006240001	IFAD Climate Finance Loan 2019-2021	2019-21	Agricultural development: 10.00%;Agricultural education/training: 10.00%;Rural development: 10.00%;Food crop production: 10.00%;Rural land policy and management: 10.00%;Agricultural land resources: 10.00%;Agricultural water resources: 10.00%;Disaster Risk Reduction: 10.00%;Agricultural co-operatives: 10.00%;Environmental policy and administrative management: 10.00%	\$150,000,000.00	Africa regional: 50.00% North and Central America regional: 15.00% South America regional: 10.00% South and Central Asia regional: 8.00% Far East Asia regional: 17.00%
CA-3- D000081001	Modernizing Agriculture in Ghana	2017-23	Agricultural extension: 50.00%;Basic nutrition: 5.00%;Agricultural development: 10.00%;Agricultural policy and administrative management: 28.00%;Agricultural research: 4.00%;Agricultural education/training: 3.00%	\$135,000,001.00	Ghana: 100.00%

CA-3- D000166002	Sixth Replenishment (2014-2018) - Global Environment Facility (GEF) - II	2015-18	Industrial crops/export crops: 0.14%;Flood prevention/control: 0.11%;Fishery development: 0.02%;Agricultural water resources: 0.34%;Rural development: 0.42%;[...];Agro-industries: 0.26%;[...];Agricultural land resources: 0.52%;Energy generation renewable sources - multiple technologies: 4.56%;Solar energy: 0.35%;[...];Environmental policy and administrative management: 38.82%;[...];Forestry development: 0.27%;[...];Agricultural research: 0.08%;[...];Bio-diversity: 10.42%;Water resources conservation (including data collection): 1.41%;[...];Biosphere protection: 4.89%;Biofuel-fired power plants: 0.50%;[...];Agricultural policy and administrative management: 1.65%;Food crop production: 0.04%;Agricultural development: 0.20%;Waste management/disposal: 1.28%;Water supply - large systems: [...];Forestry policy and administrative management: 2.03%;Fishing policy and administrative management: 1.74%;[...];Livestock: 0.13%	\$134,540,000.00	Africa regional: 25.19% America regional: 24.63% Asia regional: 24.81% Europe regional: 21.65% Developing countries unspecified: 3.72%
CA-3- D002938001	Rural Social Protection: Productive Safety Net Program 2016-2021	2016-20	Agricultural services: 25.00%; Food aid/food security programs: 75.00%	\$115,000,000.00	Ethiopia: 100.00%
CA-3- P008176002	Green Climate Fund Replenishment Loan	2022-47	Disaster Risk Reduction: 7.72%;Energy conservation and demand-side efficiency: 7.69%;Rural land policy and management: 7.69%;Environmental policy and administrative management: 7.69%;Urban land policy and management: 7.69%;Bio-diversity: 7.69%;Energy generation renewable sources - multiple technologies: 7.69%;Technological research and development: 7.69%;Transport policy planning and administration: 7.69%;Energy sector policy planning and administration: 7.69%;Forestry policy and administrative	\$110,000,000.00	Africa regional: 30.00% America regional: 20.00% Asia regional: 30.00% Oceania regional: 10.00% Europe regional: 10.00%

management: 7.69%;Agricultural policy and administrative management: 7.69%;Biosphere protection: 7.69%

CA-3- D004901001	Support to the Inter-American Investment Corporation (IIC) - IDB Invest 2016-2025	2016-25	[...];Environmental policy and administrative management: 0.02%;[...];Agricultural development: 0.03%;Fertilizer plants: 0.03%;[...];Agricultural extension: 0.05%;[...];Agricultural financial services: 3.55%;Agricultural research: 0.08%;[...];Water transport: 1.70%;Forestry policy and administrative management: 4.04%;Water supply - large systems: 0.39%;[...]	\$87,907,528.19	America regional: 100.00%
CA-3- D000166001	Sixth Replenishment (2014-2018) - Global Environment Facility (GEF) - I	2015-18	[...];Agricultural development: 0.08%;Sanitation - large systems: 0.14%;Agricultural policy and administrative management: 0.68%;[...];Bio-diversity: 9.64%;[...];Biosphere protection: 2.00%;[...];Food crop production: 0.02%;[...];4.24%;Environmental policy and administrative management: 15.86%;Biofuel-fired power plants: 0.20%;[...];Rural development: 0.17%;Agricultural land resources: 0.98%;[...];Agro-industries: 0.11%;[...];Agricultural research: 0.03%;[...];Multisector aid: 34.94%;Forestry development: 0.01%;Livestock: 0.05%;Industrial crops/export crops: 0.06%;Flood prevention/control: 0.04%;Agricultural water resources: 0.00%;Water supply - large systems: 0.01%;Fishery development: 0.01%;[...];Forestry policy and administrative management: 1.70%;Fishing policy and administrative management: 0.57%;[...]	\$82,030,000.00	Africa regional: 25.67% America regional: 23.67% Asia regional: 24.33% Europe regional: 12.99% Developing countries unspecified: 13.34%

CA-3- P010883001	Agri-Food Small- and Medium-sized Enterprises Catalytic Financing Mechanism	2022-42	Agricultural development: 10.00%;Agricultural financial services: 40.00%;Small and medium-sized enterprises (SME) development: 50.00%	\$80,000,000.00	Africa regional: 100.00%
CA-3- A035436001	Strengthening Irrigated Agriculture in Mali (REAGIR)	2014-21	Agricultural services: 5.00%;Agricultural policy and administrative management: 2.00%;Food crop production: 15.00%;Agricultural land resources: 10.00%;Agricultural water resources: 55.00%;Agricultural extension: 13.00%	\$75,000,000.42	Mali: 100.00%
CA-3- D000926001	Tenth Replenishment of the International Fund for Agricultural Development 2016-2018	2015-19	Agricultural development: 100.00%	\$75,000,000.00	Africa regional: 60.00% America regional: 10.00% Asia regional: 25.00% Europe regional: 5.00%
CA-3- P005214001	Eleventh Replenishment of the International Fund for Agricultural Development 2019-2021	2018-21	Food crop production: 25.00%;Agricultural development: 30.00%;Agricultural education/training: 25.00%;Agricultural policy and administrative management: 20.00%	\$75,000,000.00	Africa regional: 50.00% North and Central America regional: 15.00% South America regional: 10.00% South and Central Asia regional: 8.00% Far East Asia regional: 17.00%
CA-3- P010096001	Urban Productive Safety Net and Jobs Project	2022-25	Social services (incl youth development and women+ children): 20.00%;Food aid/food security programs: 30.00%;Agricultural services: 10.00%;Social protection and welfare services policy planning and administration: 40.00%	\$75,000,000.00	Ethiopia: 100.00%
CA-3- P009571001	Twelfth Replenishment of the International Fund for Agricultural Development 2022-2024	2021-24	Agricultural development: 20.00%;Food crop production: 25.00%;Agricultural policy and administrative management: 25.00%;Agricultural education/training: 30.00%	\$75,000,000.00	Africa regional: 55.00% North and Central America regional: 14.00% South America regional: 7.00% South and Central Asia

					regional: 8.00% Far East Asia regional: 16.00%
CA-3- D001073001	Uniterra - CECI & WUSC - Volunteer Sending 2015- 2020	2015-20	Business support services and institutions: 15.00%;Agro- industries: 10.00%;Small and medium-sized enterprises (SME) development: 15.00%;Promotion of development awareness: 5.94%;Food crop production: 44.06%;Industrial crops/export crops: 10.00%	\$73,936,900.00	Burkina Faso: 10.51% Mali: 4.02% Malawi: 7.98% Nepal: 8.83% Tanzania: 3.18% Senegal: 10.52% Haiti: 7.27% Vietnam: 8.85% Canada: 2.99% Peru: 6.57% Ghana: 8.12% Bolivia: 6.57% Guatemala: 6.54% Sri Lanka: 4.87% Mongolia: 3.18%
CA-3- P011187001	Climate Support to IFAD	2022-26	Agricultural education/training: 30.00%;Agricultural policy and administrative management: 25.00%;Food crop production: 25.00%;Agricultural development: 20.00%	\$62,500,000.00	Africa regional: 55.00% North and Central America regional: 14.00% South America regional: 7.00% South and Central Asia regional: 8.00% Far East Asia regional: 16.00%

CA-3- D001076001	Innovative Access: Increase Capacity for Economic and Social Growth Through Innovation	2015-20	Promotion of development awareness: 9.88%;Agricultural development: 34.12%;Small and medium-sized enterprises (SME) development: 56.00%	\$54,291,997.73	Bolivia: 9.88% Jordan: 5.29% Haiti: 9.25% Congo Democratic Republic: 8.23% Peru: 10.61% Canada: 4.44% Honduras: 9.32% Colombia: 7.56% West Bank Gaza: 9.08% Burkina Faso: 11.93% Mali: 7.47% Benin: 6.94%
CA-3- P007844001	Land Degradation Neutrality Fund	2021-36	Agricultural land resources: 30.00%;Forestry services: 5.00%;Water resources conservation (including data collection): 5.00%;Forestry development: 25.00%;Agricultural services: 5.00%;Agricultural development: 10.00%;Bio-diversity: 10.00%;Biosphere protection: 10.00%	\$53,900,000.00	Africa regional: 40.00% North and Central America regional: 15.00% South America regional: 15.00% Asia regional: 30.00%
CA-3- P011856001	Facility for Resilient Food Systems	2023-43	Agricultural financial services: 100.00%	\$50,900,000.00	Africa regional: 25.00% America regional: 25.00% Asia regional: 25.00% Europe regional: 25.00%
CA-3- P007317001	Centre for International Studies and Cooperation - Volunteer Cooperation 2020-2027	2020-26	Multi-hazard response preparedness: 1.00%;Business support services and institutions: 30.00%;Human rights: 8.00%;Women's rights organisations and movements and government institutions: 35.00%;Environmental policy and administrative management: 4.00%;Agricultural co-operatives: 7.00%;Democratic participation and civil society: 8.00%;Promotion of development awareness: 7.00%	\$49,999,435.00	Bolivia: 15.00% Myanmar: 4.00% Guatemala: 8.00% Haiti: 6.00% Côte d'Ivoire: 6.00% Benin: 16.00% Burkina Faso: 7.00%

					Nepal: 14.00% Rwanda: 5.00% Senegal: 19.00%
CA-3- P007572001	Targeted Support for Irrigated Land and Nutrition Opportunities	2021-25	Food crop production: 30.00%;Agricultural water resources: 60.00%;Agricultural extension: 10.00%	\$49,500,000.00	Mali: 100.00%
CA-3- D001661001	Budgetary Support to the Plan for an Emerging Senegal	2016-22	Public finance management: 30.00%;Mineral/mining policy and administrative management: 5.00%;Agricultural policy and administrative management: 45.00%;Basic nutrition: 20.00%	\$49,212,658.93	Senegal: 100.00%
CA-3- S065756001	Canadian International Food Security Research Fund - Phase II	2013-18	Basic nutrition: 25.00%;Agricultural research: 75.00%	\$49,007,000.00	Kenya: 21.92% South Africa: 5.36% Cambodia: 9.56% Bolivia: 10.72% Uganda: 1.06% Nigeria: 4.77% Tanzania: 15.06% Nepal: 4.70% Ethiopia: 8.14% Ghana: 2.75% Benin: 4.77% Côte d'Ivoire: 2.75% Trinidad And Tobago: 1.80% India: 4.84% Sri Lanka: 1.80%
CA-3- P011856003	The Facility for Resilient Food Systems	2023-43	Agricultural financial services: 100.00%	\$44,100,000.00	Africa regional: 25.00% America regional: 25.00% Asia regional: 25.00% Europe regional: 25.00%

CA-3- P011044001	Climate Smart Agriculture and Food Systems Fund	2023-32	Agricultural development: 50.00%; Agricultural financial services: 50.00%	\$42,200,000.00	Africa regional: 20.00% West Indies regional: 5.00% North and Central America regional: 10.00% South America regional: 25.00% Asia regional: 40.00%
CA-3- P006741001	Building Resilience Through Safety Nets in South Sudan	2019-24	Agricultural inputs: 5.00%; Education/training in banking and financial services: 5.00%;Agricultural water resources: 5.00%;Civilian peace-building conflict prevention and resolution: 5.00%;Agricultural extension: 15.00%;Food aid/food security programs: 60.00%;Plant and post-harvest protection and pest control: 5.00%	\$41,000,000.00	South Sudan: 100.00%