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**Toward a World Society?:
An Assessment of Barry Buzan's reconceptualization of the English School of International Relations**

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Toward a World Society?:
An Assessment of Barry Buzan's reconceptualization
of the English School of International Relations

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Thesis submitted to the
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Abstract

The current international system has been in place since the Treaty of Westphalia. However, states are no longer the only actors in International Relations. Non-governmental organizations, multinational corporations and individuals also take the stage in international relations. This thesis will make use of the English School of International Relations and the reconceptualization of the School introduced by Barry Buzan in *From International to World Society?* because it offers richer explanatory possibilities for the interaction and role of both state and non-state actors. Using the United Nations Environment Program (UNEP) and the United Nations HIV/AIDS Program (UNAIDS), this thesis will assess Buzan's new model and answer the question that the title of his book asks: Is International Society moving toward a World Society?

Introduction: Toward a World Society?

In *The Lord of the Rings* by J.R.R. Tolkien, the Hobbits are beings that wish to simply go about their business in peace. In a word, we could describe the Hobbits as isolationist. They need not concern themselves with the affairs of Middle-earth, so long as they could simply continue living in peace and quiet. However, as Tolkien's tale unfolds, it becomes increasingly obvious that the fate of all the lands of Middle-earth are intertwined. As Gildor the Elf tells Frodo the Hobbit, "The wide world is all about you: you can fence yourselves in, but you cannot for ever fence it out."¹

For much of human history, the peoples of the world shared a similar mind set to that of the fictitious Hobbits. Since the birth of the modern state system, the idea that activities within a state will remain therein has only been reinforced in international relations through the doctrine of state sovereignty. In the contemporary world, while state sovereignty is still very much a reality in international relations, it has become quite evident that decisions made domestically can have global repercussions. For instance, pollution and disease do not recognize state boundaries and indiscriminately affect the lives of the world's population. Appropriately, intergovernmental organizations have duly been established in order to facilitate the cooperation of states.

Currently, a plethora of intergovernmental programs and organizations exist on the world stage. Some organizations may facilitate military alliances or trade relations, while others exist to coordinate international health, humanitarian or even environmental responses. Yet, despite the presence of so many intergovernmental organizations (IGOs), there is a lack of understanding as to the role they play in International Relations. For example, some International Relations scholars

¹J.R.R. Tolkien, *The Lord of the Rings: The Fellowship of the Ring*, (London, HarperCollins Publishers: 1991), 82.

tend to dismiss IGOs altogether, considering them to be no more than the tools of states², while others view the presence of IGOs as foundational in a function-based world society.³

This thesis will examine two entities that are IGOs and effectively determine the role they play in International Relations. For this analysis, a comparative study of the United Nations Environment Program (UNEP) and the United Nations HIV/AIDS Program (UNAIDS) will be undertaken. Essentially, the intent of this thesis is to assess the conceptual model advanced by Barry

²C. Glaser, "Structural Realism in a more complex world," *Review of International Studies* v.29 n.3 (July 2003): 403-414.

M. Naruzzaman, "Liberal Institutionalism and Cooperation in the Post-9/11 World" (Preliminary Draft, University of Alberta, 2006) cites the following scholars:

T. Evans and P. Wilson, "Regime Theory and the English School of International Relations: A Comparison," *Millennium: Journal of International Studies* v.21 n.3 (December 1992): 329-351.

J. Kirshner, "The Political Economy of Realism," in *Unipolar Politics: Realism and State Strategies after the Cold War*, eds. E.B Kapstein and M. Mastanduno, (New York: Columbia University Press, 1999)

J.J. Mearsheimer, "The False Promise of International Institutions," *International Security* v.19 n.3 (1994/1995): 5-49.

S.M. Walt, "The Progressive Power of Realism," *American Political Science Review* v.91 (1997): 931-935.

³D. Mitrany, *A Working Peace System* (Chicago: Quadrangle Books, 1966)

M. Naruzzaman, "Liberal Institutionalism." cites the following works:

R.O. Keohane, "International Institutions: Two Approaches," in *International Institutions and State Power*, ed. R.O. Keohane, (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1989).

R.O. Keohane and J.S. Nye, "Introduction," in *Governance in a Globalizing World*, ed. J.S. Nye and J.D. Donahue (Washington, DC: Brookings Institution Press, 2000)

R. Axelrod and R.O. Keohane, "Achieving Cooperation Under Anarchy: Strategies and Institutions," *World Politics* v.38 n.1 (October 1985): 226-254.

P.M. Haas, R.O. Keohane, and M.A. Levy eds, *Institutions for the Earth: Sources of Effective International Environmental Protection*, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1993)

C. Lipson, "International Cooperation in Economic and Security Affairs," *World Politics* v.37 n.1 (October 1984): 1-23.

H. Milner, "International Theories of Cooperation among Nations: Strengths and Weaknesses," *World Politics* v.44 n.3 (April 1992): 466-496.

Buzan in *From International to World Society?* and to determine if the question the title of his book poses is supported by trends seen in the UNEP and UNAIDS programs.

Responding to the global problems of the environment and HIV/AIDS, the United Nations (UN) established two separate programs as vehicles through which the UN could become engaged with these global issues. In 1972, through a UN General Assembly resolution, UNEP was created. Similarly, to deal with the HIV/AIDS pandemic, the United Nations Economic and Social Council (ECOSOC) passed a resolution to establish the UNAIDS program. These two programs are similar insofar as they were established in response to the growing global problems of increased environmental degradation and the increased spread of HIV/AIDS respectively.

UNEP was created to provide leadership and to facilitate cooperation in caring for the environment.⁴ States are the main actors involved in UNEP, evidenced by the fact that its governing body is composed solely of states. Nevertheless, UNEP has been successful in bringing attention to many areas of environmental concern, while also giving a voice to non-state actors through ad hoc means. Although it did not negotiate the Montreal or Kyoto Protocols directly,⁵ as that responsibility remained reserved for states only, it did play a role in highlighting on the problems of ozone layer depletion and global warming. Further, UNEP has effectively advocated for the protection of the environment through numerous protocols and other environmental projects.

Similar to UNEP, the UNAIDS program was established to be the leading advocate in the

⁴UNEP, "About UNEP: The Organization," [Online] 19 December 2006.
<<http://www.unep.org/Documents.Multilingual/Default.asp?DocumentID=43>>

⁵The Montreal Protocol was negotiated under the auspices of UNEP.

fight against HIV/AIDS.⁶ It was created as a joint program between several UN system organizations, like UNESCO, UNICEF and the World Bank among others, but it involves the participation of both state and non-state actors. In fact, it is the first time that Non-Governmental Organizations (NGOs) are given a place on the governing board of a United Nations program. Unlike UNEP, UNAIDS has not been involved in organizing negotiations of binding multilateral protocols or treaties. Moreover, until now there exist no binding protocols or treaties in the fight against HIV/AIDS. Nevertheless, UNAIDS has been active in securing funding and in getting various non-state actors involved in the fight against HIV/AIDS.

The choice to focus on UNEP and the UNAIDS program was made because of both their similarities and differences. In both cases, the programs focus on an issue that would not be considered by states to be on the same level as sovereignty or security, and they both exist to facilitate cooperation and to provide leadership in their specific areas of concern. Moreover, both UNEP and UNAIDS are UN programs rather than UN system organizations. Whereas as a UN system organization receives guaranteed funding annually, a UN program's budget is dependent on its donor contributions. In the cases of both UNEP and UNAIDS, the core contributors to their respective budgets are states. However, the major reason that UNEP and UNAIDS were chosen for this study is because of the uniqueness of the latter program. Examining the governing structures of the two programs and the actors found therein, UNEP is the typical case while UNAIDS is the critical case.

Due to the uniqueness of this study, examination of these programs will be using the

⁶UNAIDS, "Joint United Nations Programme on HIV/AIDS: Country Office Romania" [Online] 19 December 2006. <<http://www.un.ro/un aids.html>>

theoretical framework provided by the English School of International Relations with specific reference to the reconceptualized model that was advanced by Barry Buzan in his latest work: *From International to World Society?* The fact that the interstate actors UNEP and UNAIDS both have varying degrees of non-state actor participation, it was necessary to use a theoretical model that would examine non-state actors, yet would not trivialize the existence of states. Buzan's reconceptualized model is particularly useful for this study, because it actually gives international organizations, which he coins "secondary institutions," a defined and more precise role in international relations.

This study is an assessment of Buzan's reconceptualization of the English School using UNEP and UNAIDS as case studies. Buzan contends that the current International Society is moving toward a World Society, and the following analysis of UNEP and UNAIDS aims to determine if Buzan's assertion is supported. Although a more detailed explanation of International and World Societies will be given in the following chapter, it is nevertheless important to quickly define these two terms according to Buzan. The International Society can be understood simply as an international social structure that is determined by states, whereby individuals and transnational associations are given rights by these to interact within the structure.⁷ On the other hand, a World Society results when states, individuals and transnational associations are all in play together and no single actor dominates over the other two.⁸ Due to the differing foundational principles⁹ of these

⁷B. Buzan, *From International to World Society?: English School Theory and the Social Structure of Globalisation* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2004), xvii.

⁸*Ibid.*, xviii.

⁹The foundational principle of the International Society is state dominance, whereas that of the World Society is non-dominance of any actor.

two conceptions, it is evident that an International Society and a World Society cannot exist at the same time. Therefore, this thesis will argue that, although World Society does not yet exist, Buzan's contention that there is movement toward a World Society is supported by the analysis of the UNEP and UNAIDS programs.

In the first chapter, the English school will be presented and explained. In addition, a theoretical review of the literature based on the English school will give context to the argument. Selecting the English school as the relevant theoretical framework to found this research stems from the fact that it is a robust and holistic approach to International Relations. As Buzan states, "it is...an opportunity to...cultivate a more holistic, integrated approach to the study of international relations."¹⁰ Due to the fact that this thesis will focus on non-state actors and the behaviour of states in relation to them, it was important to adopt a theoretical framework that not only treated non-state actors as more than just tools of states, but also one that was not willing to discount the primacy of states either. Therefore, the English school was chosen as a starting point due to its comprehensive nature regarding both state and non-state actors. From within the English school, the reconceptualized model advanced by Barry Buzan will be used for the analysis, because it more aptly defines the role of states and non-state actors than previous traditional conceptualizations of the School. Unequivocally, Buzan's model gives a clearer picture of the relationship between states, the relationship between state and non-state actors, and the mixed play of all these actors upon the larger stage of International Relations.

The second chapter will deal specifically with UNEP and its contributions to the

¹⁰B. Buzan, "The English School: an underexploited resource in IR," *Review of International Studies* v.27 (July 2001): 472.

environment. There will be a brief explanation to define UNEP and how it fits into Buzan's observations of contemporary interstate society. The Montreal Protocol and the Kyoto Protocol will be used to examine the behaviour of states with regards to the environment. By examining state behaviour in regards to these two Protocols, one will remark that the evidence suggests that States act in their own best interests and essentially operate within a self-serving logic. The evidence will appear to show that states are the only actors that matter in international relations, but upon closer inspection, it will be made clearer that state interests may also equate to the interests of certain Transnational corporations.

In the third chapter, I will study the UNAIDS program by briefly examining its structure and by highlighting its projects and initiatives. An in-depth analysis of UNAIDS projects and initiatives will shed light on the interplay between the various state and non-state actors of International Society. It will be apparent that all actors have an effect on each other while the goals of each actor may differ substantially. Even while states continue to act with a self-serving logic their decisions can be affected and swayed by non-state actors. Pharmaceutical Transnational Corporations and Non-Governmental Organizations are both non-state actors that concern themselves with HIV/AIDS, yet their objectives tend to be diametrically opposed. The examination of their respective interaction with states, through various means of pressure, is evidence that states are not the only actors that matter on the world stage.

In the final chapter, UNEP and UNAIDS will be compared and contrasted, and conclusions will be drawn. We will see more distinctly then, by comparing the two programs, that states do only use IGOs for their own advantage, but there has been a movement toward a World Society nonetheless. Furthermore, due to the fact that UNEP was founded in 1972 and UNAIDS was

founded in 1994, it will be possible to trace the movement of International Society from the early 1970s to the mid 1990s. Based on these comparisons, conclusions about Buzan's presumption that International Society is heading towards a World Society will be drawn.

Chapter 1: Theoretical Approaches: The English School and Barry Buzan's Reconceptualization

The English School at a Glance

The modern state system has been in place since the treaty of Westphalia in 1648. Although the 17th century treaty defines the principles of state sovereignty that are currently still in use, transnational problems exist that do not respect state borders. Issues such as the environment and infectious disease are only but two examples of a widening array of transnational problems that not only transcend state borders, but will require a concerted effort on the part of all actors in the international sphere in order to solve. The nature of transnational problems is such that state autonomy may have to be limited in order to combat these problems. Although a state's autonomy will not be taken away per se, freedoms such as choice and decision-making may be constrained by the lack of options available to mediate and ostensibly conciliate transnational problems.

The United Nations Environment Program (UNEP) and the United Nations HIV/AIDS program (UNAIDS) are two examples of how states have organized themselves to resolve two particular transnational problems. Although both programs deal with transnational issues, the approach of each differs greatly one from the other. The similarities between the programs are not of primary interest in this thesis, but rather, the differences. By examining both UNEP and UNAIDS, we are able to see in a practical sense two distinct ways in which international relations responds to transnational problems. In fact, the inception and creation of these two UN programs could not have been more different.

International Relations is rich with theories and paradigms that attempt to explain state actions. I have chosen to use the English School of International Relations as the theoretical lens

through which I will analyse the UNEP and UNAIDS programs, specifically focussing on Barry Buzan's latest theorization in *From International to World Society?* which reconceptualizes the traditional English School. I believe that the English School offers richer explanatory possibilities than structural-realism, without discarding the notion of state centrality. English School Theorists, such as Hedley Bull, Martin Wight and Barry Buzan do not question the centrality of States, though they would question the scientific method used by structural-realists. As Eckert explains,

[Structural-realism's] model of international system is one in which the capabilities of member states are the dominant (if not the only) force in shaping international relations.¹¹

Thus structural-realism does not offer the same possibilities of research as the English School, because it is unable to explain developments in international relations that do not deal specifically with the state. It is important to maintain the centrality of states because both the UNEP and UNAIDS programs are from the United Nations system, which is an international organization of states. However it is equally important for any International Relations theory to be able to offer an explanation for all international developments, state-centred or otherwise. Buzan suggests that

The English School is not just another paradigm to throw into the tedious game of competing IR theories...[but] is, instead, an opportunity to step outside that game, and cultivate a more holistic, integrated approach to the study of international relations.¹²

He goes on to say that "the English School offers a basis for synthesizing that is both wide and deep

¹¹K.N. Waltz, "Political Structures," in *Neorealism and its Critics*, ed. R.O. Keohane (New York: Columbia University Press, 1986): 91, quoted in A.E. Eckert, "How the English School Can Learn to Stop Worrying and Love International Ethics"(paper prepared for the International Studies Association-West Annual Meeting, Las Vegas, 29-30 September 2006), 1.

¹²B. Buzan, "The English School: an underexploited resource in IR," *Review of International Studies*, v.27 n.3 (July 2001): 472.

enough to set up the foundations for a return to grand theory.”¹³

The foundations of the English School can be traced back to the founding of the British Committee in 1959, of which Hedley Bull was secretary and Martin Wight its most influential member.¹⁴ As we will see through the contributions of Wight and Bull, the English School views international relations as possessing three traditions. These traditions have been coined realist, rationalist and revolutionist; Machiavellian, Grotian and Kantian¹⁵ or as the International System, International Society or World Society.¹⁶ These three traditions, also known as the three pillars, are at the heart of the English School. Therefore, I will be using the terms realist, Machiavellian and International System; rationalist, Grotian and International Society; and revolutionist, Kantian and World Society interchangeably throughout this chapter.

Due to the very complex nature of the English School, it is important to understand the difference between the three traditions. Barry Buzan explains the differences between the three traditions in his work entitled, “The English School: an underexploited resource in IR.”

- International system (Hobbes/Machiavelli) is about power politics amongst states, and realism puts the structure and process of international anarchy at the centre of IR theory. This position is broadly parallel to mainstream realism and neorealism and is thus well developed and clearly understood.

¹³*Ibid.*

¹⁴T. Dunne, *Inventing International Society*, (Basingstoke: Macmillan, 1998), quoted in C. Brown, “World Society and the English School: An ‘International Society’ Perspective on World Society,” *European Journal of International Relations*, v.7 n.4 (December 2001), 424.

¹⁵S. Smith, “The Self-Images of a Discipline: A Genealogy of International Relations Theory,” in *International Relations Theory Today*, ed. K. Booth & S. Smith, (The Pennsylvania State University Press, 1995): 12.

¹⁶R.H. Jackson, “The Political Theory of International Society,” in *International Relations Theory Today*, ed. K. Booth & S. Smith, (The Pennsylvania State University Press, 1995): 110-111.

- International society (Grotius) is about the institutionalization of shared interest and identity amongst states, and rationalism puts the creation and maintenance of shared norms, rules and institutions at the centre of IR theory. This position has some parallels to regime theory, but is much deeper, having constitutive rather than merely instrumental implications. International society has been the main focus of English School thinking, and the concept is quite well developed and relatively clear.
- World society (Kant) takes individuals, non-state organizations and ultimately the global population as a whole as the focus of global societal identities and arrangements, and revolutionism puts transcendence of the state system at the centre of IR theory. Revolutionism is mostly about forms of universalist cosmopolitanism. It could include communism, but as Wæver notes, these days it is usually taken to mean liberalism. This position has some parallels to transnationalism, but carries a much more foundational link to normative political theory. It is the least well developed of the English School concepts, and has not yet been clearly or systematically articulated.¹⁷

It is important to grasp the basic concepts of the English School, because they are central to my thesis. Barry Buzan reconceptualizes the above mentioned three traditions, and it is with this reconceptualized model on which I base my thesis. Nevertheless, it is still useful to understand and appreciate the origin of these fundamental concepts of the English School prior to embarking upon how their reconceptualization develops. Understanding the shortcomings of the traditional English School will help to clarify Buzan's reconceptualization.

As mentioned above, Wight was arguably the most influential member of the British Committee. According to Steve Smith, "Martin Wight's threefold categorization has been particularly influential in the development of the 'English' school..."¹⁸ The three categories effectively classify all theoreticians in International Relations as realists, rationalists or revolutionists.¹⁹ According to Wight, the realists "are those who emphasize. . .the element of

¹⁷B. Buzan, "The English School: an underexploited resource in IR," 474-475.

¹⁸S. Smith, "The Self-Images of a Discipline," 11.

¹⁹*Ibid.*, 12.

anarchy, of power politics, and of warfare.”²⁰ They also tend to view human nature in a pessimistic fashion.

Realists tend to be pessimistic about human nature, or rather, if ‘pessimism’ suggests a regret about the badness of what is recognized to be bad, the consistent realist has no regrets; he sees human nature as plain bad.²¹

On the other hand, he describes revolutionists “...as cosmopolitan rather than ‘internationalist.’”²²

As Jackson clarifies, “[they] have in mind every member of the world’s population conceived as possessing equal rights as human beings - human rights - regardless of the country they happen to live in.”²³ Revolutionists focus on the idea of solidarity, or in other words, they see the commonality of all individuals or all states. Thus, states may still exist in a world society but their actions are limited by the solidarity of the global population. The difficulty that Buzan points out with the revolutionist category is that it contains so many actors with differing priorities²⁴ that it is practically impossible to give a concrete example of what the world society may look like or even how it functions. Non-governmental organizations, intergovernmental organizations, transnational corporations and individuals have all been considered part of the revolutionist category/world society. Finally, Wight describes the rationalists as “...those who concentrate on, and believe in the value of, the element of international intercourse in a condition predominantly of international

²⁰M. Wight, *International Theory: The Three Traditions* (Homes & Meier: New York, 1992): 15.

²¹*Ibid.*, 25.

²²*Ibid.*, 8.

²³R.H. Jackson, “The Political Theory of International Society,” 110-111.

²⁴B. Buzan, “The English School: an underexploited resource in IR,” 474.

anarchy.”²⁵ In other words, states cooperate and interact with each other, despite the presence of international anarchy.

The categorizations or “traditions,” introduced by Wight, are particularly important to the English School as they constitute its organizing principle. Essentially, the English School approaches international relations with these three traditions in mind, although rationalism is perhaps the principal focus of both supporters and critics alike.²⁶ As Smith points out, the problem with Wight’s three categories is that it is very difficult to accurately categorize all international relations thinkers.²⁷ For example, Kant is found in the revolutionist category but, as Harrison notes, his views on the nature of the international system could very well place him in the realist category.²⁸ Furthermore, by classifying all international relations thinkers into very broad categories, the categories themselves become mere caricatures of the system they are attempting to explain.

To further simplify the three traditions advanced by Wight, Hedley Bull offers an even more concise view of the three traditions:

The Hobbesian or realist tradition, which views international politics as a state of war; the Kantian or universalist tradition, which sees at work in international politics a potential community of mankind; and the Grotian or internationalist tradition,

²⁵M. Wight, *International Theory: The Three Traditions*, 13.

²⁶R. Little, “The English School vs. American Realism: a meeting of minds or divided by a common language?” *Review of International Studies* v.29 no.3 (July 2003): 456-457.

²⁷S. Smith, “The Self-Images of a Discipline,” 12-13.

²⁸E. Harrison, “Waltz, Kant and systemic approaches to international relations,” *Review of International Studies* v.28 (2002), 143-144.

which views international politics as taking place within an international society.²⁹

Although Bull's explanation of the three traditions is much simpler to grasp because it now equates a tradition to a specific scholar or theoretician, his major contribution lies with the explanation of the Grotian/rationalist tradition.

In Hedley Bull's essay "Society and Anarchy in International Relations," he advances the idea that there exists an international society of states within international relations. As Bull states:

In place of the Hobbesian view that states are not limited by legal or moral rules in their relations with one another, and the Kantian view that the rules to which appeal may be had derive from the higher morality of a cosmopolitan society and enjoin the overthrow of international society, there are asserted the duties and rights attaching to states as members of international society.³⁰

Therefore, the idea that Bull brings forward is that there exists a third view of International Relations which occupies the middle ground between the Hobbesian/realist and Kantian/revolutionist traditions. More importantly, however, is that this middle ground is not a system of states, but rather a society of states. Barry Buzan would later term this middle ground as the "*via media* between realism and liberalism/utopianism [revolutionism]."³¹ He goes on to mention that "the English School transcends the binary opposition between [realism and revolutionism] that for long plagued debates about IR theory."³² Moreover, the English School "transcends the assumption often made in the so-called inter-paradigm debate, that realist, liberal and Marxist approaches to IR theory are

²⁹B. Bull, *The Anarchical Society: A Study of Order in World Politics*, (London: Macmillan, 1977): 24.

³⁰H. Bull, "Society and Anarchy in International Relations," in *International Theory: Critical Investigations*, ed. J. Der Derian (New York: New York University Press, 1995): 79.

³¹B. Buzan, "The English School: an underexploited resource in IR," 476.

³²B. Buzan, "The English School: an underexploited resource in IR," 476.

incommensurable. Bull's theorization is of particular importance, because he is essentially defining a major characteristic of the English School of International Relations; that states are a part of an international society.

Bull explains that, "...states form a society without a government...[and the] international society must be understood in terms of its own, distinctive institutions."³³ Those institutions "...include international law, diplomacy and the system of balance of power."³⁴ Bull does not contest the supremacy of the state, though he does illustrate that while states are free to do as they please in the international system, they are constrained by institutions they have created themselves.

The basic idea of international society is thus quite simple: just as human beings as individuals live in societies which they both shape and are shaped by, so also states live in an international society which they shape and are shaped.³⁵

Bull demonstrates that an international society exists despite the fact that states exist in an anarchical international system. It is in this vein that he is illustrating the International Society pillar or rationalist/Grotian tradition of the English School. According to both supporters and critics alike, this is the central feature of the English School.³⁶

In Jackson's essay "The Political Theory of International Society," it is evident that international society and the international system were discussed by Bull early on, but that he did

³³H. Bull, "Society and Anarchy in International Relations," 90.

³⁴H. Bull, "Society and Anarchy in International Relations," 90.

³⁵B. Buzan, "The English School: an underexploited resource in IR," 477.

³⁶D.C. Copeland, "A Realist critique of the English School," *Review of International Studies* v.29 (2003): 427.; B. Buzan, "The English School: an underexploited resource in IR," *Review of International Studies*, v.27 n.3 (July 2001): 476.

not consider world society as an alternative to international society until his later work.³⁷ This is not to say that the three traditions were not discussed by Wight or Bull, but simply that their main focus was upon the one tradition. Bull in fact mentions that Wight's writings emphasized the existence of the three traditions in international relations and that any theorization should not simply focus on one of the traditions while ignoring the other two.³⁸

Although both Wight and Bull advocated the existence of the three traditions in international relations and explained that one should not exclude any one of the traditions, they did exactly that. Wight and Bull do mention Machiavellian and Kantian views, but notably in an almost cursory fashion. Rather, their main focus tends to be on the Grotian view. Thus, it would appear that the English School was about finding a compromise that would incorporate ideas advanced by both realism and revolutionism, though this particular understanding of the English School's *raison d'être* would not occur until the arrival of the second generation of English School theorists. As Brown explains:

This second generation visualized the [English School] as distinctively ploughing a middle way between realist and utopian [revolutionist] formulations, with its key concept of 'international society' occupying a space between the 'international system' of realism and the 'world community' of utopianism [revolutionism].³⁹

Therefore, the English School is not about disproving either one of the theories of realism or

³⁷R.H. Jackson, "The Political Theory of International Society," 113.

³⁸H. Bull, "Martin Wight and the theory of international relations," in *International Theory: The Three Traditions*, ed. M. Wight, G. Wight and B. Porter (Homes & Meier: New York, 1992), xvii-xviii.

³⁹C. Brown, "International Theory and International Society: The Viability of the Middle Way," *Review of International Studies* v.21 n.2 (April 1995): 183–96, quoted in C. Brown, "World Society and the English School: An 'International Society' Perspective on World Society," *European Journal of International Relations*, v.7 n.4 (December 2001), 424.

liberalism, but rather to find a compromise between two theories which happen to be diametrically opposed to each other..

To summarize, the first tradition or pillar is that of the International System, in which the state is the only actor that matters in International Relations. Moreover, the state will pursue its own interests within an anarchical system. This view is the one most associated with realism.⁴⁰ The second pillar of the English school is the International Society and is closely identified with rationalism. In this pillar, states are still the main actors, but they act within an ordered international system and follow established norms and international laws.

International society (Grotius) is about the institutionalization of shared interest and identity amongst states, and rationalism puts the creation and maintenance of shared norms, rules and institutions at the centre of IR theory.⁴¹

The last pillar of the English school is the World Society model, where the state is no longer the main actor and the focus is on the global population and actions that would inevitably transcend the state system.⁴² This particular pillar is most associated with revolutionism. According to Buzan, the three pillars are interlinked in international relations and they should all be taken into account when examining the English School, though they are normally viewed as competing perspectives.⁴³

The three pillars have been at the centre of the English School from its inception, as demonstrated through the theoretical contributions of both Wight and Bull. So fundamental are the three pillars to the English School, that both supporters and critics alike will take the pillars for

⁴⁰B. Buzan, "The English School: an underexploited resource in IR," 474.

⁴¹*Ibid.*, 474-475.

⁴²B. Buzan, "The English School: an underexploited resource in IR," 474-475.

⁴³*Ibid.*, 476.

granted. As I mentioned above, the English School has had a tendency to focus on the international society pillars in its theorization. As Barry Buzan explains, “[the] main thrust of the English School’s work has been to uncover the nature and function of international societies, and to trace their history and development.”⁴⁴ However, he goes on to say that “[the English School’s] foundation has been the synthesis of realism and rationalism...[but] pursuit of this goal has obliged the English School to engage with the element of liberal revolutionism.”⁴⁵ In other words, the English School has had to speculate on the World Society pillar, though it has never been narrowly defined. In fact, Buzan has expressed that “...the concept of world society remains seriously underspecified, in some ways resembling [a] theoretical dustbin...”⁴⁶ Although there is a broad definition of the world society, as the Buzan citation above suggests, a more concise definition is lacking.

Perhaps one of the major reasons for the lack of such a concise definition is because of the all-encompassing nature of the English School. As Neumann explains, “[the] methodological and epistemological pluralism of the English School makes it possible to reach out to adjacent literatures in and out of IR...”⁴⁷ Therefore, the lack of a concise definition of the world society can be attributed to differing scholarly opinions on its composition. Certain major ideas repeat themselves in the various conceptions of world society, such as human solidarism, but details, such as the role or even the existence of the state in the world society repeatedly differ. The world society pillar is

⁴⁴*Ibid.*, 477.

⁴⁵*Ibid.*

⁴⁶*Ibid.*, 477.

⁴⁷I.B. Neumann, “The English School and the practices of world society,” *Review of International Studies* (2001), v.27, 503.

of interest because my research examines two interstate entities that are involved in International Relations. Out of the three traditions, the world society is the only one that does not maintain the centrality of the state.

Richard Little explains that realist critics of the English School, such as Copeland and Glaser, attack the theory for its lack of substantial empirical research, asserting that “almost every distinctive feature of the English School is left under-specified.”⁴⁸ Copeland takes his criticism even further by saying that the English School is unable to answer the defining questions in the field of International Relations, nor does it have a theory.⁴⁹ Copeland would prefer that the English School divorce the tradition of international society from the international system and world society traditions. He argues the English School is too broad and that “it is hard to know what would *not* be included in such an eclectic approach to theory building...[and that this grand theory would provide] no falsifiable theory to be tested.”⁵⁰ Though the international society is the most theorized aspect of the English School, what is most central to the School is the co-existence of the three traditions and their respective actors.⁵¹ One of the major shortcomings of the English School is that states as actors are comfortably found in two of the three pillars, whereas individuals and other non-state actors are lumped together in the world society pillar. On this topic, Barry Buzan’s point is worth noting:

If transnational firms and international non-governmental organizations are part of

⁴⁸R. Little, “The English School vs. American Realism,” 444.

⁴⁹D.C. Copeland, “A Realist critique of the English School,” *Review of International Studies* (2003), v.29, 427.

⁵⁰*Ibid.*, 439

⁵¹R. Little, “The English School vs. American Realism,” 444.

world society, it is far from clear how they relate to world society conceived in terms of shared identity at the individual level.⁵²

In the case of both international system and international society, the main actor is the state and its behaviour can be studied. Studying the world society and its relationship with the international system and international society is problematic because no single actor can be specified. Since transnational firms and international NGOs behave differently than individuals and shared identity communities, their relations with states would differ considerably.

In a practical sense, this poses a problem for exploring UNAIDS and UNEP, because as IGOs, UNAIDS and UNEP do not fit easily into the world society pillar, yet they are not simply reducible to state actors. To say that UNAIDS and UNEP behave similarly to transnational corporations, NGOs or individuals would be quite outlandish. Add to the fact that both UNAIDS and UNEP are composed of state actors, and the waters of the world society pillar are muddied even further because states would not only be actors within the world society, they would be members of another type of actor (IGO) within the world society.

It is interesting to note that, until Buzan's recent reconceptualization, the English School had changed very little from Wight and Bull. The English School was established at a time when there were fewer non-state actors operating at the international level, but the international scene has changed considerably over the 48 years since the School's inception. Non-state actors have become a more potent force than they had been at the inception of the English School.

Rethinking the English School

Recently, Barry Buzan reconceptualized the English School, in his book *From International*

⁵²B. Buzan, "The English School: an underexploited resource in IR.," 477.

to World Society? He changes the fundamental structure of the English School from the three pillars based on theoretical foundations,⁵³ to three societies based on the principal actors found within each society.⁵⁴ Under the traditional concept of the English School the three traditions or pillars co-existed in international relations. However, realist critics of the English School would attack the international society aspect of the theory rather than the theory as a whole. In a sense, because realism was incorporated in the English School as the international system pillar, it could be said that a civil war was taking place between the international system (realists) and the international society (English School scholars).

However, while this state-centric debate raged, the world society pillar and its non-state actors were being overlooked. Buzan, by eliminating the very clear theoretical divide among the three pillars, has created a model that critics and supporters alike must now consider as a whole rather than simply focus on one of the three theoretical components. Whereas the traditional conception of the English School had three pillars that were very explicitly divided between Hobbes/realism, Grotius/rationalism and Kant/revolutionism, in Buzan's reconceptualization, these theories or pillars are fused and through this fusion become more implicit. Buzan explains that "tying types of Interstate Society to Hobbes, Locke, Grotius and Kant has some appeal, but it is fundamentally Western-centric, and for non-Western cases easily gets in the way."⁵⁵

Redrawing the triadic structure

Buzan criticizes the traditional triadic structure of the English School because of the lack of

⁵³The theories are Realism, Rationalism and Revolutionism.

⁵⁴The principal actors are States, Transnationals and Individuals.

⁵⁵B. Buzan, *From International to World Society?: English School Theory and the Social Structure of Globalisation* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2004), 158.

development of the world society pillar and the role of non-state actors. The world society pillar contained all non-state actors, with no clear explanation of the relationship between the widely divergent types of non-state actors (from transnational actors to individuals). Therefore, Buzan redrew the triadic structure to better account for the differing types of non-state actors in international relations, and to better explain the relationships amongst them.

Buzan reconstitutes the traditional three pillars of the English School into three societies which have a specific and single actor-type attached to a particular society. Buzan shows the existence of two major divisions in International Relations in which one is state-based and the other, non-state based.⁵⁶ The three societies will be explained in greater detail later in this chapter, but briefly they can be understood in the following way: The state-based division is called the Interstate society, whereas the non-state division is divided between the Interhuman society, in which individuals are the main actors, and the Transnational society, in which transnational actors such as non-governmental organizations and multinational corporations are the main actors.

Buzan divided the non-state actors into two separate societies because individuals and transnational actors do not share the same the logic.⁵⁷ Other than the fact that Buzan's structure is also triadic, the realist/Hobbesian, rationalist/Grotian and revolutionist/Kantian understanding of the traditional triad of the English School have been rendered invisible. I use the word invisible because the three theoretical concepts espoused by each of the original pillars still exist in the reconceptualization, they simply do not occupy the same level of explicitness as they had originally. What this means in practice is that state behaviour can be better identified than it had been

⁵⁶*Ibid.*, 108-9.

⁵⁷*Ibid.*, 118-119.

previously under the International System/International Society/World Society triad. Essentially, under the old triadic structure state behaviour could only be identified under one of the three headings, and their actions could not be described in varying degrees of cooperation. For instance, a state could not be identified as working in an international society with “international system influences.” Under the new Buzan model, however, state behaviour can effectively be identified at varying degrees of cooperation.

During the reconceptualization process, Buzan takes the former International System and International Society Pillars, whose main actor was the state, and combines them to create the Interstate Society. The importance and position of the state as principal actor in International Relations was not being questioned in either the International System or International Society pillars, and thus their separation into separate pillars had been primarily based on their motivation and actions.⁵⁸ In other words, the theoretical assumptions of state behaviour formed the basis for having two separate pillars. The theoretical concepts of Hobbes, Grotius and Kant are still present, but in addition Buzan also introduces the notions of Pluralism and Solidarism.

Hobbesian/realist concepts would be very pluralist, whereas Kant/revolutionist concepts would be much more solidarist in nature. Under the old understanding of the International System-Society relationship, it was difficult to conceptualize the gradual movement from one pillar to the next. Even though the old system was considered a spectrum in its own right, there was no definition of the various points in the spectrum. In other words, there was no way of determining the degree to which a state was acting under the Hobbesian, Grotian or Kantian rubric. If it was impossible to show the degrees of belligerency or cooperativeness of states, it would appear as

⁵⁸*Ibid.*, 107.

though states acted in firmly Hobbesian, Grotian or Kantian ways, thus there would be no room for the nuances that make up state behaviour.

For example, the acceptance of the Agreement on Trade Related Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPS) by developing states seems to display cooperation and could be construed as the existence of an international society. However, developing states had not wanted to discuss intellectual property rights at all, but had been pressured into doing so.⁵⁹ Pressure tactics would suggest power politics on the part of states and thus in the realm of the international system. Therefore, a debate could be sparked about whether the actions of the developing states are found in an international system or an international society depending on how one interprets their actions.

Another problem was that it appeared as though the movement from the International System to the International Society was a major shift and dramatic change in the behaviour of states. As the above example demonstrates, a state's actions may determine neither a pure international society nor a pure international system. For example, France and Germany, who have gone to war twice during the twentieth century, did not immediately go from belligerent warring parties to cooperating members of the European Union. In the years following the Second World War, various economic and social ties were created and reinforced between France and Germany. It is important to note in this example that the movement from belligerency to cooperation is transitional rather than immediate. With the new Interstate Society, and indeed with the third dimension⁶⁰ that Buzan brings into play, it is much easier to see the transitional movement between Hobbesian and Grotian state

⁵⁹M. Heywood, "Drug access, patents and global health: 'chaffed and waxed sufficient,'" *Third World Quarterly* v.23, n.2 (April 2002): 224.

⁶⁰The third dimension of which I speak is based on the motivation behind State action. Buzan argues that state action is based on Coercion, Calculation or Belief. B. Buzan, *Ibid.*, 159.

behaviour. This concept is of particular importance for the study of the UNEP and UNAIDS programs in this thesis, because it is better able to explain and identify certain types of state behaviour.

Buzan's Interstate Society is described as a spectrum through which states move. It is this concept of a spectrum that is central to an understanding of this thesis. Non-state actors are also important to study, but because the state is still the major actor in International Relations, its importance cannot be overlooked. While examining UNEP and UNAIDS, the main focus will be upon the rationale behind state behaviour. Furthermore, based on state behaviour, it will be possible to situate the state within the Interstate Society spectrum, as described by Buzan. He describes six levels within the Interstate Society spectrum each with its own defining characteristics and institutions⁶¹. The Six levels are the following: asocial, power political, coexistence, cooperative, convergence and confederative. The asocial level is found when contact between states entails wars of extermination and no institutions exist. The power political level follows the Hobbesian model where states are motivated solely by survival, and institutions are "confined to rules of recognition and diplomacy."⁶² Coexistence is based on the Westphalian system of states where core institutions are "balance of power, sovereignty, territoriality, diplomacy, great power management, war and international law."⁶³ The cooperative level is similar to coexistence, admitting a greater degree of shared values. War is no longer considered an Institution and other Institutions such as

⁶¹Institutions, in a very simplified definition would be the common rules and norms that all actors within International Relations would follow. For example, diplomacy, State sovereignty and mutual recognition could be considered institutions. B. Buzan, *From International to World Society?*

⁶²B. Buzan, *From International to World Society?*, 160.

⁶³*Ibid.*, 160.

Environmental Issues may emerge. Convergence is characterized by substantial shared values amongst the states such that they opt to “adopt similar political, legal and economic forms.”⁶⁴ Finally, the confederative level is the point where states create a single political entity that is very similar to the convergence level with the inclusion of “significant intergovernmental organisations.”⁶⁵

Defining Institutions

Buzan describes Primary Institutions as “...durable and recognised patterns of shared practices rooted in values held commonly by the members of interstate societies, [and] embodying a mix of norms, rules and principles.”⁶⁶ Some examples of Primary Institutions, mentioned by Buzan, are Sovereignty, Territoriality, Diplomacy, the Market and Environmental stewardship. He explains that Primary Institutions are not permanent, but “...typically undergo a historical pattern of rise, evolution and decline...”⁶⁷ For example, Buzan uses the Primary Institution of colonialism to demonstrate a shared practice and belief amongst states that had declined to the point where it ceased in 1945.⁶⁸ However, Primary Institutions also give rise to more concrete structures, which Buzan coins as Secondary Institutions.

The concept of Secondary Institutions is highly relevant because under Buzan’s conceptualization UNEP and UNAIDS would both be considered as such institutions. Buzan cites

⁶⁴*Ibid.*

⁶⁵*Ibid.*, 159-60.

⁶⁶*Ibid.*, 181.

⁶⁷*Ibid.*

⁶⁸*Ibid.*, 183.

Hanks who defines a Secondary Institution as “an organisation or establishment [between states] founded for a specific purpose.”⁶⁹ These Secondary Institutions are fairly wide ranging, and include structures such as the United Nations, the North Atlantic Treaty Organization and the World Trade Organization. However, Embassies and the Kyoto Protocol are also identified as Secondary Institutions according to Buzan,⁷⁰ because they were created and established for a specific purpose, mainly to facilitate the Primary Institutions from which they were derived. In this case, Embassies are derived from the Primary Institution of Diplomacy, while the Kyoto Protocol is derived from the Primary Institution of Environmental Stewardship. Since UNEP and UNAIDS are both programs of the United Nations and were also established for specific purposes, they both fit into the category of Secondary Institution.

Pluralist and Solidarist movements

Stemming from the discussion of institutions is the idea that the level of International Society can be determined by the existing Primary Institutions. This appears to be the main argument that Buzan advances in his latest work. The reasoning behind the argument is that Primary Institutions can display varying degrees of pluralist to solidarist logic. Thus, when states were more hostile toward one another there may have been a lack or total absence of Primary Institutions. It follows to suggest that the argument was that states were operating with a purely pluralist or self-centred logic. Similarly, if a state were to fully integrate with other states in confederation, that is to say states namely surrendering their sovereignty and acting as one united entity, then it could be argued

⁶⁹P. Hanks, *Collins Dictionary of the English Language*, (London: Collins, 1986), quoted in B. Buzan, *From International to World Society?*, 164.

⁷⁰B. Buzan, *From International to World Society?*, 187.

that those states would be acting with a solidarist logic. The notion that there are varying levels of pluralist and solidarist logic is crucial in anticipating how UNEP, as a secondary institution, demonstrates a pluralist logic, whereas the UNAIDS program, again as a secondary institution, displays aspects of a solidarist logic.

Pluralism is not very difficult to grasp conceptually because there is strong evidence to illustrate the form it takes. Buzan described Pluralism in the following manner:

Pluralism generally stands for the familiar Westphalian model based on mutual recognition of sovereignty and non-intervention...and has easy referents in much modern European and world history.⁷¹

Thus, the current system in which contemporary Interstate Society operates displays aspects of pluralist logic. State sovereignty and non-intervention are prime examples of Pluralism in International Relations. Simply put, when a state operates solely in its own best interest it is using a pluralist logic.⁷² If all states were to operate with a purely pluralist logic, it is quite probable that their interests would eventually diverge and war would be used as means to achieve their own goals. Buzan explains that a more pluralist level of Interstate Society would have War as a Primary Institution.⁷³ When War is considered a Primary Institution the suggestion is that it is a legitimate means for a state to use in pursuit of a particular end.

In contrast to the pluralist logic is that of the solidarist logic. Buzan mentions that conceptualizing Solidarism is more difficult because scholars of the English School have only developed this concept in terms of human rights while introducing the notions of Transnational

⁷¹*Ibid.*, 141-142.

⁷²*Ibid.*, 152.

⁷³*Ibid.*, 190-191.

actors and individuals⁷⁴ However, Buzan maintains that “it is important to keep open the idea of solidarism as something that can happen purely within the state system”⁷⁵ This is a departure from traditional English School conceptions because Solidarism would be found in what these thinkers call the World Society, in which the state’s role and existence can be called into question. Buzan is suggesting that Solidarism can develop amongst states and consequently this development may impact the Interhuman and Transnational Societies.

Solidarism...rests on the idea that states share values that are beyond concerns about survival and coexistence, and significant enough to underpin the pursuit of joint projects and/or convergence.⁷⁶

Thus, depending on the joint project in question, which could be in areas such as the environment or human rights, there is likely to be considerable interaction between the Interhuman, Transnational and Interstate Societies.

The pluralist and solidarist conceptions advanced by Buzan constitute a movement in the spectrum that he constructed. Therefore, if a state is operating in a purely asocial fashion, fostering no relations with any other state, it is operating with a pluralist logic and is located on one end of the spectrum. Buzan explains that the only contact between completely asocial states would be “wars of extermination unaccompanied by diplomacy or any other form of social contact” and that such an occurrence is only to be found in science fiction.⁷⁷ For instance, if a state is operating with both elements of a pluralist and solidarist logic, defending state sovereignty (pluralist) but

⁷⁴*Ibid.*, 142.

⁷⁵*Ibid.*

⁷⁶*Ibid.*, 152.


⁷⁷*Ibid.*, 159.

cooperating on common issues of concern (solidarist), then it may be argued that the state is operating toward the centre of the spectrum at the level of coexistence or cooperation.⁷⁸ Canada is a state that upholds its own sovereignty with the existence of its armed forces, though it also participates in joint projects, as was the case when it played a key role in bringing about an international treaty to ban the use of anti-personnel landmines. Finally, a state operating with a pure solidarist logic would be found at the confederative level on the opposite end of the spectrum from the asocial state. Buzan explains that a state at the purely solidarist end of the spectrum would be bordering in the “zone between a solidarist Interstate Society and the creation of a single political entity.”⁷⁹ The European Union should be considered a fair example of such an occurrence in contemporary international relations. The members of the Union still maintain their sovereignty in many jurisdictions, yet in certain situations the European Union can also act as a single entity where its members will effectively act in concert.

⁷⁸These terms will be discussed in detail below.

⁷⁹B. Buzan, *From International to World Society?*, 160.

Figure 1: Buzan's reconceptualized triadic structure⁸⁰



⁸⁰Reproduced from B. Buzan, *From International to World Society?*, 159.

Contemporary International Society

Looking at figure 1, Buzan argues that contemporary Interstate Society has reached the cooperative level in the spectrum, but that states operate with a more pluralist logic than a solidarist one.⁸¹ Simply put, contemporary Interstate Society is found to the pluralist side of the cooperative level and therefore very close to the border of the coexistence level. Buzan mentions that there are a number Primary Institutions that have been “carried over from the coexistence model...and [that] some joint projects become a feature of shared values.”⁸² This indicates that since the coexistence level is more pluralist than the cooperative level, any Primary Institution carried over from the former will also be pluralist. Undoubtedly, the cooperative level will have Primary Institutions based on joint projects that encourage Solidarism, but there is also the presence of Primary Institutions that support Pluralism.

Buzan identifies Sovereignty, Territoriality and Diplomacy as some of the Primary Institutions of contemporary Interstate society.⁸³ I would argue that these particular Primary Institutions support the pluralist logic because they defend state interests. Buzan also states that the Equality of People, the Market and Environmental Stewardship are also contemporary Primary Institutions.⁸⁴ These Primary Institutions are naturally more solidarist because the Equality of People engages in questions of Human Rights which do not necessarily respect state boundaries, while the Market deals with questions of deregulation and state non-intervention in commerce,

⁸¹B. Buzan, *From International to World Society?*, 232.

⁸²*Ibid.*

⁸³*Ibid.*, 187.

⁸⁴*Ibid.*

whereas Environmental Stewardship concerns itself with an issue that does not respect state sovereignty or territoriality.

Before continuing with further explanations of various aspects of Buzan's model, it is necessary to mention that my thesis will focus mainly on the cooperative and coexistence levels of the Interstate Society. Since Buzan states that contemporary Interstate Society is cooperative with remnant influences from the coexistence level, focussing on these two levels will be more useful to illustrate the contributions his model makes to UNEP and UNAIDS. Therefore, it would be helpful to quickly explain the differences between the coexistence and cooperative levels of the Interstate Society.

There are four major characteristics of Buzan's coexistence level of society that are important to underline because these criteria will be used to evaluate Buzan's reconceptualized model of the international society.⁸⁵ Firstly, Buzan explains that Intergovernmental Organizations (IGO) exist to simplify and reduce inefficiencies in relations between states while not challenging or posing a threat to a state's sovereignty. Buzan uses the examples of intergovernmental organizations like the Universal Postal Union which smoothed "interoperability between states and peoples."⁸⁶ Secondly, states are motivated by self-interest and will only take action that will benefit themselves. Thirdly, states will focus on their differences and distinctiveness from one another, but will agree on certain basic principles in order to ensure their own survival and to avoid disorder in the international system. Finally, states will acknowledge and recognize the juridical equality of

⁸⁵In this instance, the term "international society" refers to the ensemble of Interstate, Transnational and Interhuman societies.

⁸⁶B. Buzan, *From International to World Society?*, 144.

other states.⁸⁷ When states find themselves within a coexistence society they will be operating with a more pluralist logic relative to states operating in the more solidarist cooperative society.

As for the cooperative Interstate Society, Buzan explains that the society is “based on developments that go significantly beyond coexistence, but short of extensive domestic convergence.”⁸⁸ Furthermore, “cooperative interstate societies will have more elaborate criteria for membership, more stringent institutions concerning the sanctity of agreements, and greater restraints on the use of force.”⁸⁹ He explains that the cooperative society will be identical to the coexistence society in that many institutions will carry over from the coexistence to the cooperative society, yet States will be operating with a slightly more solidarist logic than a pluralist one.⁹⁰ Buzan explains that Solidarism “ties together state and non-state actors, and draws on cosmopolitan notions of individual rights and a community of humankind...”⁹¹ Overall, the more that states operate with a solidarist logic, the greater the opportunity for cooperation between the various state and non-state actors. These actors, as demonstrated, are given a much clearer position in the Buzan reconceptualization.

Masters in their own House

As mentioned above, Buzan’s reconceptualization has two major divisions: the former in which states are the main actors and the latter in which non-state actors are the principal players.

⁸⁷*Ibid.*, 144-145.

⁸⁸*Ibid.*, 193.

⁸⁹*Ibid.*

⁹⁰*Ibid.*

⁹¹*Ibid.*, 48.

Previously, under the traditional English School banner all non-state actors were placed into the World Society pillar. However, as already mentioned, Buzan questioned placing individuals and transnational groups into the same pillar because their goals and motivation differed. Thus, in his reconceptualization, Buzan separates both individuals and transnational groups and places them into their own specific societies. These two non-state societies are labelled the Interhuman Society, where individuals are the principal actor, and the Transnational Society, where transnational groups such as international NGOs and TNCs are the principal actors. Buzan states, “that the individual and the transnational have such different ontological foundations that bundling them together as a collective ‘non-state’ or ‘world society’ category is not sustainable.” This is the logic fostering Buzan’s decision to separate the former world society pillar into two separate societies.

The Interhuman Society, as stated above, has the human individual as the main actor. According to Buzan, “...the individual level is very largely focussed on questions of identity and community.”⁹² However, Buzan recognizes the shortcoming of this new Interhuman Society concept. In the traditional English School’s World Society pillar,

...individuals are of primary interest as the carriers of moral rights. It is the individual that matters, whether singly as him or herself, or collectively as humankind. In the structural version of English School Theory [Buzan’s reconceptualization], the focus is not on the individual as such, but on the patterns of shared identity that group human beings into various forms of community.⁹³

Buzan does admit that his structural approach does not deal with individual units very well.⁹⁴ Nevertheless, by better defining the role and place of human beings he is pulling them from the

⁹²*Ibid.*, 127.

⁹³*Ibid.*, 127-8.

⁹⁴*Ibid.*, 128.

traditional English School's undefined World Society and giving them a distinct position in English School theorization.

Similar to the Interstate Society the Interhuman Society has three divisions reinforcing the idea that it is also a spectrum. On the one end of the Interhuman spectrum is what Buzan coins the Fragmented Interhuman Society. In this division, we find "...the basic family/clan unit necessary for reproduction."⁹⁵ The following level of Interhuman Society and occupying the middle ground is the Imagined Communities division. According to Buzan, groupings "...such as nations, religions and various kinds of functional networks"⁹⁶ would be found in this division. To simplify, the groupings of which Buzan speaks are, as Waever discusses of society, the communities to which individuals identify themselves in order to make the distinction between "us" and "them."⁹⁷ Finally, the third division in the Interhuman Society is that of Universal Identity. Buzan describes this division as one where "all humans [see] each other as like-units...to the advent of a world civilization linking all of humankind together in a complex web of shared values and elaborated identities."⁹⁸ Thus, on one end of the Interhuman Society spectrum one will find very separate and fragmented groups, and on the other one will find a universal identity.⁹⁹ Buzan also clarifies that many positions on the Interhuman Society spectrum can and do exist simultaneously.¹⁰⁰

⁹⁵*Ibid.*, 135.

⁹⁶*Ibid.*, 135.

⁹⁷O. Waever, B. Buzan, M. Kelstrup and P. Lemaitre with D. Carlton et al., *Identity, Migration and the New Security Agenda in Europe* (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1993), 5-6.

⁹⁸B. Buzan, *From International to World Society?* 135.

⁹⁹*Ibid.*

¹⁰⁰*Ibid.*

In the final portion of Buzan's new triad the Transnational Society has INGOs, TNCs and other transnational collectivities as the principal actor. Buzan underlines that "...the transnational level is mostly [focussed] on questions of society."¹⁰¹ He also adds that "[while] it is not impossible to think about community at the transnational level, the huge diversity of actor types among TNAs (Transnational Actors) tends to impose fairly strict limits on how far shared identity can go."¹⁰² In other words, because TNAs are so diverse, it is difficult to group many of them together. Evidently, a transnational corporation like Exxon-Mobil will not have the same goals as an international NGO such as Greenpeace. Moreover, in the Transnational Society, it would be more difficult than in the interstate and interhuman societies to form a community based on shared identities. Whereas states could recognize that they have more similarities than differences, just as human beings could, it is not readily apparent how a transnational corporation's goal to make profit could be reconciled with an international non-governmental organization's more humanitarian goal.

In spite of the fact that the Transnational Society can never have the same level of social cohesion as the Interstate and Interhuman societies, there are still sufficient similarities among transnational actors to group them into a single society. Buzan divides the Transnational society into four categories. In the first category there are no TNAs, and he explains that historical examples would be hard to find.¹⁰³ He mentions that if such a reality ever existed "[the] requirement would be a domineering Interstate Society in which the states either suppressed non-state actors altogether,

¹⁰¹ *Ibid.*, 127.

¹⁰² *Ibid.*

¹⁰³ *Ibid.*, 136.

or contained them tightly, each within its own borders.”¹⁰⁴ The following position in the spectrum would be “...fragmented transnational societies in which similar types of TNAs build up shared norms, rules, institutions and identities among themselves.”¹⁰⁵ According to Buzan, located in the middle of the Transnational society spectrum is the Coalitions of TNAs, in which

...one would find coalitions involving links among different types of TNAs, such as one often finds in peace movements that tie together ‘pure’ peace groups with religious, political and trade union organisations.¹⁰⁶

Finally, at the opposing end of the spectrum is Transnational Neomedievalism. In this division, TNAs “[recognize] each other on the basis of principles of functional differentiation amongst the different types of units, and agreements about the rights and responsibilities of different types of unit in relation to each other.”¹⁰⁷ In sum, the various transnational actors will play a specific role or function within the system.

Thus far, an overview of Buzan’s latest contribution to the English School has been given. Whereas before, the English School was divided into three pillars based on theoretical concepts by Hobbes, Grotius and Kant, the Buzan reconceptualization divides international relations into three societies based on the main unit found therein. However, the change to the English School’s traditional triadic structure was not the only adjustment. Another interesting aspect of Buzan’s reconceptualization is his introduction of a “depth” analysis, in which state actions could be measured. To encapsulate, rather than simply taking actors’ actions for granted, Buzan adds the

¹⁰⁴ *Ibid.*

¹⁰⁵ *Ibid.*

¹⁰⁶ *Ibid.*

¹⁰⁷ *Ibid.*

“how and why” dimension.

Explaining State Actions

The how and why dimension introduced by Buzan is based on the work of Alexander Wendt regarding types of society or social interaction.¹⁰⁸ Buzan explains that there are three levels of social interaction going from shallow to deep; coercion, calculation and belief.¹⁰⁹ Actors will have social relations with other actors at one of the three levels. At the shallow end one finds the Coercion level, where “the social structure is essentially imposed by an outside power... [and such] a social structure...is unlikely to survive the removal of its outside supporter.”¹¹⁰ In contemporary Interstate society human rights and humanitarian intervention would not retain their standing as global institutions if they were not continued to be upheld by the West.¹¹¹ At medium depth there is Calculation where actors are rational in their behaviour.¹¹² Buzan uses the example of the Market and explains that “while many states support [the market] out of belief, it could be argued that many others adhere to it because of calculation or soft forms of coercion.”¹¹³ Finally, at the deep end of the depth spectrum one finds Belief. At this level “actors support the social structure because they accept it as legitimate...”¹¹⁴ In the contemporary Interstate Society Buzan mentions that sovereignty,

¹⁰⁸*Ibid.*, 129.

¹⁰⁹*Ibid.*, 129-130.

¹¹⁰*Ibid.*, 103.

¹¹¹*Ibid.*, 234.

¹¹²*Ibid.*, 129-130.

¹¹³*Ibid.*, 235.

¹¹⁴*Ibid.*, 103.

territoriality and international law, are among some of the Primary Institutions that are held in place by belief.¹¹⁵

I have now presented the major contributions of Barry Buzan to the English School. Buzan has redrawn the traditional triadic structure of the English School by ensuring the three divisions are based on the specific actor-type found therein, rather than on the theoretical concepts of Hobbes, Grotius or Kant, as was the case with the traditional triad. As a consequence, the problem of pigeon-holing great numbers of theoreticians into only one of three major theoretical categories; Machiavellian, Grotian and Kantian, has effectively disappeared. Although Machiavellian, Grotian and Kantian paradigms are still present in the reconceptualization, their presence is no longer as explicit as it was before. In other words, an entire pillar/tradition/division is not dedicated to Machiavelli, to Grotius or to Kant as was the case under the traditional English School's triadic structure. Instead, their visions and theoretical understanding of international relations are incorporated into the spectrum of the newly developed Interstate society without giving them more prominence than other theoreticians. Whereas formerly literature that did not fit comfortably within the understandings of Machiavellian, Grotian or Kantian thought would be disregarded, Buzan's reconceptualization allows for a greater breadth of literature to be incorporated into the English School for synthesis.

Making the Analysis

In this chapter, I described how the traditional English School offers richer explanatory possibilities than structural realism while still maintaining the primacy of the state. With the view of analysing both UNEP and the UNAIDS programs, it was important to find a theory that could

¹¹⁵*Ibid.*, 234.

attempt to explain their existence rather than to disregard them as simply existing due to the will of states. In an overall synthesis, the shortcomings of the traditional English School as well as Barry Buzan's contribution to the School were presented. Through his reconceptualized vision of the triadic structure, various state and non-state actors were demonstrated to coexist in international relations with attention to explaining state behaviour in the Interstate Society. Furthermore, Buzan's introduction of the "depth" analysis will allow me to explain why states (and other actors) behave in particular ways.

While discussing the reconceptualized triadic structure, new terminology was created to better describe Buzan's three societies. However, despite the disappearance of the terms International Society and World Society as divisional labels, Buzan still uses them with a redefined meaning. As quickly described in the introduction, the redefined International Society refers to the arrangement "where the basic political and legal frame is set by the states-system, with individuals and TNAs being given rights by states within the order defined by Interstate Society."¹¹⁶ Essentially, Buzan states that the International Society is what currently exists in world politics.¹¹⁷ States are still the principal actors on the world stage, yet many non-state actors are also given rights in varying forms. For example, the World Trade Organization plays a major role in trade relations between states. Yet, despite the fact that the WTO contains a dispute mechanism, the more powerful states can effectively ignore the rulings of the WTO, as was the case of the United States with regards to its softwood lumber dispute with Canada.

In contrast to the International Society, the redefined World Society is where "no one of the

¹¹⁶*Ibid.*, 202.

¹¹⁷*Ibid.*, 260-261.

three domains or types of unit is dominant over the other two...”¹¹⁸ Moreover, the World Society “would be based on principles of functional differentiation amongst the various types of entities at play...[where] each type of unit would be acknowledged by the others as holding legal and political status independently, [and] not as a gift from either of the others.”¹¹⁹ The World Society, as described by Buzan, does not yet exist in world politics. However, Buzan does explain that in contemporary International Relations, the European Union is the closest example to a World Society.¹²⁰ Therefore, the World Society is a direction in which International Relations may go.

The concept that is most important to grasp with regards to the Buzan-defined International Society and World Society is that they describe the type of social structure in which the Interstate, Transnational and Interhuman societies interact. The International Society demonstrates state supremacy over the other two domains, whereas the World Society illustrates a structure where no one of the three domains is dominant. As previously mentioned, the World Society does not exist, though Buzan contends we are moving toward it. Therefore, the primary assumption is that the current structure in which Interstate, Transnational and Interhuman actors interact is the International Society. Within the International Society, according to Buzan, the Interstate Society is operating at a cooperative level. As states become more solidarist, the Interstate Society moves along the spectrum toward the confederative level. In short, the more solidarist the state, the more likely it is to recognize the legal or political status, and role of non-state actors in achieving a given solidarist objective.

¹¹⁸*Ibid.*, 202.

¹¹⁹*Ibid.*, 203.

¹²⁰*Ibid.*, 203.

UNEP and UNAIDS are Secondary Institutions that were created to achieve a particular solidarist objective. These two programs will be used to illustrate the presence of a coexistence level and cooperative level respectively. The pluralist-solidarist logic will also be used in order to illustrate the type of behaviour exhibited by states within UNEP and UNAIDS. The depth or the “how/why?” analysis will be used in order to explain why states behave in a particular manner. Motivation, or the binding forces, as Buzan terms it, is an important factor to measure because it will not only allow us to gain an advanced understanding of state behaviour, but it may also provide clues as to how non-state actors can influence states to act holistically and in solidarity with regards to global problems such as environmental degradation and HIV/AIDS. Through the comparative analysis of the two interstate programs we will be able to determine if international relations is becoming more solidarist and thus moving towards a World Society, or if it is simply staying the course.

Chapter 2 The United Nations Environment Program at the Coexistence level of Interstate Society

Environmental Stewardship and UNEP

In the last chapter, I described Buzan's reconceptualization of the English School and demonstrated some of the features that one could expect to find in contemporary Interstate Society. In this chapter, the focus will be on the United Nations Environment Program (UNEP) and it will illustrate how it effectively confirms Buzan's contention that the primary institution of Environmental Stewardship is operating at a coexistence level. What needs to be understood in this chapter is that the analysis of UNEP should be regarded as a starting point to compare to the following chapter's analysis of UNAIDS. As the introduction of this work contends, the main purpose is to determine if Buzan's assertion that the International Society is moving toward a World Society can be supported. However, before delving into the analysis of UNEP, it would be beneficial to briefly explain the history and the composition of the United Nations Environment Program. By explaining the history and composition of UNEP, a better understanding can be afforded concerning the type of state-logic the program supports and effectively perpetuates. The program's composition will essentially illustrate the interstate level at which states are operating. However, it is by examining the projects undertaken by UNEP that one can explain whether state logic assumes greater pluralist or solidarist tendencies.

The United Nations Environment Program was established in 1972 when the UN General Assembly adopted resolution 2997.

[UNEP's] mandate is to coordinate the development of environmental policy consensus by keeping the global environment under review and bringing emerging

issues to the attention of governments and the international community for action.¹²¹

According to Buzan, UNEP is considered a secondary institution because it is derived from the primary institution of environmental stewardship.¹²² As previously stated in the last chapter, Buzan defines primary institutions as “...durable and recognised patterns of shared practices rooted in values held commonly by the members of the interstate societies, embodying a mix of norms, rules and principles.”¹²³ Essentially, a primary institution is a broad framework in which states have an understanding amongst each other. A secondary institution is derived and constructed from a primary institution and its existence is more formalized. Thus, international organizations and programs would be considered secondary institutions.

Environmental Stewardship is considered a primary institution because there are shared norms and principles amongst states concerning the environment.¹²⁴ This does not mean that states are necessarily solidarist and operating at a cooperative level in Interstate Society. Buzan explains that it is possible for states to operate at a pluralist logic even while considering questions of protecting the global environment. He states that,

the measures taken to preserve the ozone layer fall comfortably within a logic of coexistence, where the emphasis is on measures necessary to maintain the conditions

¹²¹UNEP, *Resources for Government Officials*, [online] 28 August 2006.
<<http://www.unep.org/resources/gov/>>

¹²²B. Buzan, *From International to World Society?: English School Theory and the Social Structure of Globalisation* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2004), 187.

¹²³*Ibid.*, 181.

¹²⁴Buzan mentions that states have shared norms or interests in the environment. When there is a clear and present danger, states will take decisive action on the environmental front, as was the case with ozone layer depletion.

of existence for the members of the [interstate] society.¹²⁵

In this case, states effectively share common principles, in that they recognize that they must play a role in protecting the environment, but their reasons for doing so are ones of self-interest. Therefore, despite states committing haphazardly to environmental protection, they do recognize that they have a role and an interest in protecting the environment.

Founding UNEP

In 1968, the United Nations General Assembly recognized the relationship that existed between human development and the natural environment. Resolution 2398, arguably the first step towards the eventual creation of UNEP, was brought forth by the United Nations General Assembly. In the preamble, the General Assembly recognized the existence of a direct relationship between the environment and human beings and it resolved to take action. The resolution called on the UN to convene a conference on the human environment in the year 1972.¹²⁶ However, the General Assembly further resolved to ask ECOSOC for a report concerning the current work being done regarding the human environment and the problems that face the developing states with regards to economic and social development.¹²⁷

The preparation for the 1972 conference on the human environment was accomplished through a number of resolutions adopted by the UN General Assembly. Once the conference was completed, the UN General Assembly adopted Resolution 2994 which effectively expressed the

¹²⁵*Ibid.*, 145.

¹²⁶United Nations General Assembly, "Resolution 2398 [Problems of the human environment]"

¹²⁷*Ibid.*

need for the international community to take action in regard to the environment.¹²⁸ The relevant text of Resolution 2994 encouraging state action is as follows:

2. Draws the attention of Governments and the Governing Council of the United Nations Environment Programme to the Declaration of the United Nations Conference on the Human Environment and refers the Action Plan for the Human Environment to the Governing Council for appropriate action;
3. Draws the attention of Governments to the recommendations for action at the national level referred to them by the Conference for their consideration and such action as they might deem appropriate.¹²⁹

At the same plenary meeting, Resolution 2997, outlining the composition of UNEP is also adopted by the UN General Assembly. The details of Resolution 2997 and the subsequent resolutions concerning UNEP's creation will be discussed later, as they are particularly relevant in illustrating Buzan's contention that the primary institution of Environmental Stewardship is currently operating at a coexistence level. Again, by illustrating the coexistence level, we will be able to use UNEP as a benchmark from which to measure how far International Society has moved when held in comparison to UNAIDS.

According to Resolution 2997, UNEP would be directed by a Governing Council composed of 58 members elected by the General Assembly every three years, whereby sixteen seats are reserved for African states, thirteen for Asian states, six for Eastern European states, ten for Latin American states and thirteen for Western European and other states.¹³⁰ UNEP would also be

¹²⁸United Nations General Assembly, "Resolution 2994 [United Nations Conference on the Human Environment]"

¹²⁹*Ibid.*

¹³⁰United Nations General Assembly, "Resolution 2997 [Institutional and financial arrangements for international environmental co-operation]"

composed of a secretariat, an environment fund and an environment coordination board.¹³¹ According to Resolution 2997, the Governing Council will exist to promote international cooperation and to recommend policies with regards to the environment. It also has the role of guiding and coordinating environmental programs within the UN system.¹³² Following the Governing Council's establishment, the Environment Secretariat was created "to serve as a focal point for environmental action and co-ordination within the United Nations system. . .and to ensure a high degree of effective management."¹³³ The Secretariat would also be headed by an Executive Director, duly elected by the UN General Assembly.

UNEP and Buzan

Based on the creation of the structure of UNEP, it is not difficult to see how it would be considered a secondary institution. Again, a secondary institution is, as Buzan quotes Hanks, "an organisation...founded for a specific purpose..."¹³⁴ Moreover, they are "for the most part consciously designed by states."¹³⁵ Although viewing UNEP as a secondary institution is not in question, what is unclear is the type of Interstate Society its existence implies. It could be convincingly argued that UNEP demonstrates a cooperative level of Interstate Society, since environmental protection is a solidarist endeavour. However, as already stated above, Buzan has shown that it is possible for states to consider the environment in a more pluralist fashion.

¹³¹*Ibid.*

¹³²United Nations General Assembly, "Resolution 2997," Paragraph 2.

¹³³*Ibid.* Section II. Paragraph 1.

¹³⁴B. Buzan, *From International to World Society?*, 164.

¹³⁵*Ibid.*, xviii.

Buzan explains that contemporary International Society¹³⁶ is operating at a cooperative level.¹³⁷ As already stated in the previous chapter, an Interstate Society that operates at the cooperative level has more primary institutions that underpin interstate agreements. Furthermore, a cooperative Interstate Society reduces the ability of states to use force as a legitimate means in achieving their goals. Though contemporary International Society may be operating at a cooperative level in general, this does not signify that individual states cannot themselves operate at differing interstate levels. For example, a state member of the European Union may operate at a convergence level with other member states of the Union,¹³⁸ but may opt to interact with non-EU states at a cooperative or even at a coexistence level. This is of particular note because it shows that states are not confined to a specific point in the Interstate Society. That said, even though International Society may be operating at the cooperative level, Buzan states that the institution of environmental stewardship is operating, “more with a logic of coexistence than with the force of a joint project.”¹³⁹ To clarify, states are approaching the environment in a more distinctively pluralist fashion than the definition of cooperative society would avow.

In the last chapter, I mentioned four major characteristics of Buzan’s coexistence level of society that I would use in order to evaluate Buzan’s model. The first characteristic is that IGOs exist to simplify relations between states and not to hinder a state’s sovereignty. The second

¹³⁶International Society in this context, is the ensemble of the Interstate, Transnational and Interhuman Societies.

¹³⁷B. Buzan, *From International to World Society?*, 232.

¹³⁸Buzan mentions that the States of the EU operate at a convergence level amongst each other. B. Buzan, *From International to World Society?*, 194.

¹³⁹*Ibid.* 233.

characteristic of the coexistence level is that states are rational actors and only act in their own best interest. As a third characteristic, states will agree on certain principles, but will also uphold their differences and distinctiveness. Finally, the fourth identified characteristic is that states will recognize other state actors as being juridically equal among themselves. UNEP must be examined using these four characteristics as a benchmark to determine if Buzan's assumption about environmental stewardship's status being at a coexistence level is indeed correct, thus illustrating the utility of Buzan's reconceptualization.¹⁴⁰ Furthermore, establishing that UNEP is an illustration of the coexistence model will allow us to use it as a starting point from which to measure the movement of International Society.

Taking Buzan's definition of a secondary institution, it becomes evident that UNEP quite clearly fits the criteria. Once again, Buzan defines secondary institutions as "an organisation or establishment founded for a specific purpose,"¹⁴¹ and as already mentioned above, designed expressly by states. UNEP, as discussed above, was created by United Nations Resolution 2997 to coordinate the development of environmental policy. Because it was created by states for a specific purpose, UNEP is a secondary institution according to Buzan's definition. Furthermore, the way in which UNEP operates and the type of goals it has achieved in its history are evidence to support Buzan's claim that on environmental issues, the International Society operates at a coexistence level. A few of the environmental treaties that UNEP has spearheaded will now be examined, as will some of the decisions made by UNEP's governing council in order to further Buzan's view that there is

¹⁴⁰*Ibid.*, 144-145.

¹⁴¹P. Hanks, ed., *Collins Dictionary of the English Language*, (London: Collins, 1986), quoted in B. Buzan, *From International to World Society?*, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2004), 164.

indeed a coexistence logic on environmental issues.

UNEP has been at the forefront of various environmental treaties that states have signed and ratified. Generally speaking, in the case of international environmental treaties, adopting the proposals found in the treaties may not have any visible or concrete benefits. As Brown mentions, various domestic actors “want assurance that they will not be at a disadvantage with international competitors if they are required to meet high environmental standards.”¹⁴² As the former Secretary-General of the United Nations Conference on the Human Environment stated in 1972:

Questions of poverty and indignity, of economic underdevelopment and lack of opportunity, and of peace and war understandably weigh more heavily and urgently than a vaguer threat of ecological disaster.¹⁴³

Environmental issues are not perceived as a clear and present danger as is the case with other issues. Thus, it is safe to say that states will only cooperate and coordinate on environmental issues, should the negative impact of inaction outweigh the costs of coordinating an environmental response with other states. In other words, states are not only operating with a pluralist logic, but also with calculation, in a manner reminiscent of structural realism. This does not suggest that states do nothing for the environment within their borders, but simply that they may not coordinate their efforts with other states. Briefly, states are operating with a coexistence logic in regard to environmental issues, insofar as they operate independently from one another. Values and norms that are agreed upon regarding the environment may not necessarily be enforceable in any way.

¹⁴²J.W. Brown, “International Environmental Cooperation as a Contribution to World Society,” in *World Security: Challenges for a New Century*, ed. M.T. Klare and Y. Chandrani (New York: St. Martin’s Press, Inc., 1998), 319.

¹⁴³M.F. Strong, “The United Nations and the Environment,” *International Organization*, v.26 n.2 (Spring, 1972), 170.

However, there is also the possibility that states do not agree on the urgency of a particular situation and will choose to wait for more scientific studies before taking decisive action. This was the case which ensued after the effects of the ozone layer's depletion.

UNEP and the Depletion of the Ozone Layer

In the 1960s and 1970s, questions arose about the depletion of the ozone layer. According to Mullin, "the first major study that indicated a connection between CFCs and ozone depletion was done by Sherwood Rowland and Mario Molina at the University of California - Irvine."¹⁴⁴ However, though the Rowland-Molina article was published in 1974, there was very little in terms of a political response.¹⁴⁵ Yet, despite the absence of a political response, the Rowland-Molina study did spur the National Academy of Science¹⁴⁶ to undertake a major study on the impact of CFCs on stratospheric ozone between April 1975 and September 1976.¹⁴⁷ In 1977 UNEP was asked by the United States, Canada, Finland, Norway and Sweden "to consider international protection of the ozone layer."¹⁴⁸ At that time, UNEP convened experts on the ozone layer and "on the recommendation of this meeting, UNEP set up a Coordinating Committee of the Ozone Layer

¹⁴⁴R.P. Mullin, "What Can Be Learned from DuPont and the Freon Ban: A Case Study," *Journal of Business Ethics*, v.40 n.3 (Oct 2002), 208.

¹⁴⁵K.L. Clark, "A Montreal Protocol for POPs?" [Online] 13 October 2006. <<http://www.chem.unep.ch/pops/indxhtmls/manwg8.html>>

¹⁴⁶The National Academy of Science is one of four organizations that comprise the National Academies. The National Academies provide advice regarding science, medicine and engineering to both the US federal government and the public.

¹⁴⁷R.P. Mullin, "What Can Be Learned from DuPont," 208.

¹⁴⁸J.W. Brown, "International Environmental Cooperation.," 323.

(CCOL) in cooperation with the World Meteorological Organization (WMO).¹⁴⁹ It followed that the reports submitted by the CCOL

attracted international interest among the people and the Governments and UNEP provided the framework for harnessing this interest to promote international action. It marshalled the information, options and legal expertise needed for decision making.¹⁵⁰

Therefore, UNEP's overarching role was essentially to assist in the development of a plan of action amongst states.

In 1985, two major events occurred which had a tremendous impact on the future of ozone layer protection:

...the Vienna Convention for the Protection of the Ozone Layer was opened for signature in Vienna on 22 March...[and it] coincided with the first discovery of the ozone 'hole' over Antarctica.¹⁵¹

The Vienna Convention was essentially "a framework convention providing for the exchange of information and co-operation in scientific research relating to the ozone layer."¹⁵² The unexpected discovery of the ozone hole in 1985 resulted in relatively quick international action amongst states. However, the Vienna Convention only "established basic principles, [and] required no commitments to specific actions."¹⁵³ The limited cooperation of states on the issue of ozone layer, coupled with

¹⁴⁹K.M. Sarma, "Protection of the Ozone Layer," */linkages/journal*, v.3 n.3, (28 July 1998): 6.

¹⁵⁰*Ibid.*

¹⁵¹K.L. Clark, "A Montreal Protocol for POPs?"

¹⁵²P. Lawrence, "Technology Transfer Funds and the Law - Recent Amendments to the Montreal Protocol on Substances that Deplete the Ozone Layer," *Journal of Environmental Law*, v.4 n.1 (1992), 19.

¹⁵³J.W. Brown, "International Environmental Cooperation.," 324.

the fact that the Vienna Convention had no binding commitments over states is notable, because it demonstrates a coexistence logic. With limited cooperation and the absence of binding commitments, states could respond to the ozone layer situation within the context of their national interests.

In 1987, the Montreal Protocol on Substances that Deplete the Ozone Layer was signed by twenty-five states and entered into force on 1 January 1989.¹⁵⁴ Prior to the Montreal Protocol, no other protocol existed with regards to controlling such substances as Chlorofluorocarbons (CFCs), which are believed to deplete the ozone layer. As such, the Montreal Protocol was “an amendment to the 1985 Vienna Convention, [whereby] the industrial countries agreed to a 50-percent reduction of their 1986 levels of production of CFCs by 1999.”¹⁵⁵ Moreover, under the terms of the Montreal Protocol, developing states “would be allowed to increase production [of CFCs] modestly for ten years.”¹⁵⁶ Even still, the Montreal Protocol was quite modest in that it had no financial provision to assist developing states to make the transition from CFCs and penalties for non-compliance were not discussed.¹⁵⁷ It was only after reports of the growing hole in the ozone layer that in 1990, the major CFC-producing states changed their stance and “voted. . .for a complete phase out of CFCs by 2000.”¹⁵⁸ To ensure the adherence of developing states to the enhanced Montreal Protocol, a Multilateral Fund was established in order to financially assist developing states in the transition

¹⁵⁴P. Lawrence, “Technology Transfer Funds and the Law,” 16.

¹⁵⁵J.W. Brown, “International Environmental Cooperation,” 324.

¹⁵⁶*Ibid.*

¹⁵⁷*Ibid.*

¹⁵⁸*Ibid.*, 325.

from CFCs to safer substances. In fact, following the suggestion that a Multilateral Fund was to be established, “the Indian and Chinese delegations announced that they would advise their respective Governments to join the Montreal Protocol.”¹⁵⁹

The Multilateral Fund

Although at first glance it would appear that the developed states are acting altruistically in providing support to underdeveloped states, their actions are based more on calculation than on principles of fair play and equality. As mentioned earlier, in the coexistence model, states are motivated by self-interest and not by generosity. The Multilateral Fund, which was established to offset the cost of developing non-CFC technologies for developing states, “is managed by the Executive Committee with assistance from the World Bank, UNEP and...UNDP.”¹⁶⁰ Though states do not have a direct role in the disbursement of funds, the main “criticism made against the World Bank’s administration of the Multilateral Fund is that it has been effectively co-opted by chemical industry interests.”¹⁶¹ Clark goes on to claim:

[the] record of Fund disbursements indicates a disproportionate number of projects that provide markets for HCFCs and no funding at all for projects that propose not in kind alternatives (NIKAs).¹⁶²

In reality, the Fund is supporting projects that encourage the use of the less-harmful HCFCs, the officially sanctioned substitute of CFCs, rather than projects that would seek to eliminate the use of

¹⁵⁹P. Lawrence, “Technology Transfer Funds and the Law,” 18.

¹⁶⁰K.L. Clark, “A Montreal Protocol for POPs?”

¹⁶¹*Ibid.*

¹⁶²*Ibid.*

any kind of ozone-depleting products.¹⁶³ Lawrence underlines the fact that “the most significant worldwide producers of [Ozone Depleting Substances] substitutes are large multinational enterprises based in Western countries.”¹⁶⁴ Thus, the chemical industry would largely benefit from such a fund and the developed states in which are located these corporations would also stand to benefit indirectly through their domestic financial instruments.

In this instance, the issue of ozone layer depletion was not taken very seriously when the topic was first considered by UNEP in 1977. It was only in 1990 when a very tangible threat was discovered, the growing hole in the ozone layer, that action was taken by states. The more affluent states, which happened to be the highest producers of CFCs, also created a fund in order to get the support of less affluent states for the Montreal Protocol. According to UNEP,

a depleted ozone layer allows more UV-B radiation to reach the Earth’s surface. Risks include more melanoma and non melanoma skin cancers, more eye cataracts, weakened immune systems, reduced plant yields, damage to ocean eco systems, reduced fishing yields, adverse effects on animals, and more damage to plastics.¹⁶⁵

The risks associated with a depleted ozone layer coupled with the scientific evidence of a hole in the ozone layer may have contributed to the decision of developed states to provide funds to less developed states. Moreover, the strong possibility that investment in the Multilateral Fund would eventually benefit the developed states economically through the success of their chemical industries may also have been a deciding factor. Developing states would have been able to see a concrete benefit from the existence of the Multilateral Fund and thus would be more likely to adhere to and

¹⁶³*Ibid.*

¹⁶⁴P. Lawrence, “Technology Transfer Funds and the Law,” 19.

¹⁶⁵UNEP, “Press Release December 2005 - Governments Take Forward Fight to Save Ozone Layer” [Online] 12 December 2006
<http://www.unep.org/Documents.Multilingual/Default.asp?DocumentID=459&ArticleID=5094&l=en>

also accept the stipulations of the Montreal Protocol. According to Lawrence,

The notion of a fund was attractive for the developing countries and most developed states [because it] would enable developing countries to comply with Montreal Protocol standards, and would also provide an incentive for additional developing countries who [had] not...joined the Montreal Protocol to do so.¹⁶⁶

Therefore, the Multilateral Fund effectively satisfied both developed and developing states. The former would receive the participation of the developing states in the Montreal Protocol and the latter would receive financial compensation.

The participation of developing states was secured by the introduction of the Multilateral Fund because there were direct economic benefits for them, both through traditional financial mechanisms (grants) and through technology transfers. By creating a monetary fund for developing states, the economic burden of converting to newer non-CFC technology was much reduced and thus increased their likelihood to adhere to the stipulations of the Montreal Protocol. In the same vein, developed states would not lose out economically by contributing to the Multilateral Fund, because the primarily Western-based chemical industry would benefit financially by providing ODS substitutes for the new technology in the developing states. Despite their differences, both developed and underdeveloped states agreed on certain principles to ensure their respective survival, as Buzan suggested. Though it took a scientific report and the threat of ozone layer depletion to get states to take action, underdeveloped states would only accept the Montreal protocol with financial assistance from the developed states, while the latter ensured that such financial assistance would not hinder the economic viability of their chemical industries. This is a clear demonstration of states operating with a logic that is far too pluralist to be at a cooperative level of Interstate Society. In

¹⁶⁶P. Lawrence, "Technology Transfer Funds and the Law," 19.

this case states are demonstrating two of the identified criteria of a coexistence society. States are acting in their own self-interest and they are maintaining their differences while agreeing to certain principles to maintain their survival.

The Montreal Protocol was successful due to the ability of the United Nations Environment Program to mobilize attention and state action. As a secondary institution in a coexistence Interstate Society, its role is mainly to reduce inefficiencies in interstate relations while not posing a threat or challenging a state's sovereignty. With the Montreal Protocol, the role that UNEP played was one of facilitation.

The Kyoto Protocol and its Opponents

In contrast to the Montreal Protocol, the Kyoto Protocol on climate change had a much more difficult time reaching ratification. In 1992 at the Rio "Earth Summit," delegates attempted to deal with the issue of global warming. Although there appears to be a willingness on the part of states to lower Carbon Dioxide emissions interests still figured into their calculations to take action or not to take action. Although the United States was a signatory to the Kyoto protocol, it always had reservations about binding commitments to timetables and targets.¹⁶⁷ As the largest state to produce carbon dioxide emissions,

meeting the Kyoto Protocol on the basis of reduced emissions alone would necessitate a drop in the 2010 per capita carbon emission to a level not seen in the United States since World War II.¹⁶⁸

The view taken by the Bush administration of the United States is that with such a tremendous

¹⁶⁷J.W. Brown, "International Environmental Cooperation.," 328.

¹⁶⁸F.A.B. Meyerson, "Population, Carbon Emissions, and Global Warming: The Forgotten Relationship at Kyoto," *Population and Development Review*, v.24 n.1 (March 1998), 124

burden on the economy and no scientific consensus as to the effect of carbon dioxide emissions on the green house effect, the US would not ratify the Kyoto Protocol. In essence, the current US administration is arguing that a reduction in emissions is against the US national interest. In a letter to Senators, President Bush mentioned that he opposes the Kyoto Protocol because it exempts major polluting-states like China and India, and “would cause serious harm to the US economy.”¹⁶⁹ Kyoto Protocol critics who support President Bush’s stance mention that

Because the protocol imposes no binding reduction targets on [developing] countries...it will fail to reduce global emissions while causing harm to the economies of the developed world.¹⁷⁰

According to John Carlisle of the National Centre for Public Policy Research in the United States, “the Kyoto treaty would cost the US economy \$400 billion per year.”¹⁷¹ In an interview with Eileen Claussen of the Pew Centre on Global Climate Change, Schmidt reports that US critics of the Kyoto protocol underline the issue of fairness.¹⁷² By examining President Bush’s letter to the Senators, it is evident that the issue of fairness is one that he uses to justify his rejection of the Kyoto protocol. The explanation revolving around the issue of fairness touches on the principle of juridical equality of states. This is one of the criteria outlined by Buzan concerning the coexistence society. Since China and India are exempt from the Kyoto stipulations, the US testified to its juridical equality by

¹⁶⁹G.W. Bush to Senators Hagel, Helms, Craig and Roberts, 13 March 2001 [Online] <<http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2001/03/print/20010314.html>>

¹⁷⁰C.W. Schmidt, “The Kyoto Protocol: Just a Lot of Hot Air?” *Environmental Health Perspectives*, v.108, n.8 (August 2000), A364.

¹⁷¹J. Carlisle, “President Bush must kill the Kyoto Global Warming Treaty and Oppose Efforts to Regulate Carbon Dioxide,” *National Policy Analysis* n.328, (February 2001) [Online] <<http://www.nationalcenter.org/NPA328.html>>

¹⁷²C.W. Schmidt, “The Kyoto Protocol: Just a Lot of Hot Air?,” A364.

reaffirming its autonomy and exempting itself as well. Due to the fact that the Bush administration felt that the US was being penalized while states like China and India were not, the Kyoto Protocol was not ratified by the United States.

As Schmidt mentions, however, “developed countries are currently and historically responsible for more emissions than anyone else...[and] developed nations can afford to pay the associated costs.”¹⁷³ Although the Bush administration stated there was a lack of scientific consensus as to the actual impact of carbon dioxide emissions on global warming, the potential cost to the US economy for action may have outweighed maintaining the status quo. After all, the United States would have had to reduce its emissions while other states with economies that could challenge it, such as China and India, would not. The United States’ decision to reject Kyoto was based on calculations that were partly influenced by Exxon-Mobil and other industries, according to State Department documents received by The Guardian newspaper.¹⁷⁴ Exxon-Mobil, the most valuable US corporation, “[shares] the White House's unwavering scepticism of international efforts to address climate change.”¹⁷⁵ Furthermore, the Bush administration offered

[thanks to] Exxon executives for the company's "active involvement" in helping to determine climate change policy, and also [sought] its advice on what climate change policies the company might find acceptable.¹⁷⁶

Therefore, the evidence suggests that US calculations were influenced by a large oil producer and

¹⁷³ *Ibid.*

¹⁷⁴ J. Vidal, “Revealed: how oil giant influenced Bush,” *The Guardian*, 8 June 2005. [Online] 1 November 2006. <<http://www.guardian.co.uk/climatechange/story/0,12374,1501646,00.html>>

¹⁷⁵ *Ibid.*

¹⁷⁶ *Ibid.*

greenhouse gas (GHG) emitter and that ultimately the Kyoto protocol was deemed inappropriate to ratify. As Buzan states, non-state actors are “given rights by states within the order defined by Interstate Society.”¹⁷⁷ The fact that the United States has rejected Kyoto, due in part to pressure from Exxon-Mobil, not only illustrates the cooperation between a state and non-state actor, but also the protection of the rights of a non-state actor to maintain its current practices irrespective of the damage it may cause to the environment.

Kyoto in Danger

The withdrawal of the United States threatened the ratification of the Kyoto Protocol because it stated that, in order for the treaty to come into force, signatory states must make up at least 55% of GHG emissions. In order for the Kyoto protocol to be salvaged without the United States’ 36% emissions level, the Russian Federation, with 17.4% emissions, would have needed to ratify it.¹⁷⁸ The Russian Federation ratified the Kyoto protocol in November 2004 and the treaty entered into force in February 2005. What differentiates the United States and the Russian Federation is their respective emissions targets. Whereas the US would have to reduce emissions by seven percent, Russia would only need to maintain its current emissions levels.¹⁷⁹ In terms of state interest, as the Bush administration seems to suggest, the US would have to sacrifice its economy in order to reach its targets. On the other hand, Russia would only have to maintain its current emission levels. According to May

¹⁷⁷B. Buzan, *From International to World Society?*, 202.

¹⁷⁸UNFCCC, Kyoto Protocol Status of Ratification, last modified 27 May 2005.
<http://unfccc.int/files/essential_background/kyoto_protocol/application/pdf/kpstats.pdf>

¹⁷⁹UNFCCC, “Kyoto Protocol.” [Online] 15 June 2005.
<http://unfccc.int/essential_background/kyoto_protocol/items/3145.php>

Because the base year is 1990, when the USSR existed with a large and highly polluting economy, Russia can get credit for the collapse of its economy and resulting decline in [greenhouse gas]. Russia has met and exceeded its Kyoto targets.¹⁸⁰

This is not to say that economic growth and pollution are inextricably linked, but rather that the stance taken by the Bush administration is that the cost to industry and the economy in lowering greenhouse gases outweighed any foreseeable benefits. In fact, during the November 2001 round of negotiations, the pro-business magazine *The Economist* reported that

the EU had refused to accept the American arguments that the Kyoto targets should be met through the use of more flexible mechanisms...[and that] Some European ministers made it clear that they wanted Americans to feel some economic pain more than they wanted a workable agreement.¹⁸¹

Despite the source of the information, upon the basis of these comments made by certain European ministers, it would appear as though stipulations were placed in the Kyoto Protocol to be specifically punitive to the economy of the United States. Though some EU Ministers may have perceived an opportunity to force the Americans to feel some economic hardship, the US administration, in turn, behaved as though it had concluded that harm to the economy was inevitable if Kyoto was ratified. Moreover, having 1990 as the base year for the calculation of emission reduction is tremendously beneficial to Russia. Because the USSR existed in 1990, Russia is allowed to use the emission levels of the heavily polluting Soviet Union as its target level. The Russian Federation would thus have to maintain its GHG levels, while becoming the unlikely saviour of the Kyoto protocol through

¹⁸⁰E. May, "The Politics of Climate Change at the Montreal Conference: High Stakes for the Martin Government, the Kyoto Protocol and the Future of the Planet," *Policy Options*, v.27, n.1 (December 25 - January 2006), 30.

¹⁸¹"Oh no, Kyoto," *The Economist*, 5 April 2001. [Online] 13 October 2006. <http://www.economist.com/displaystory.cfm?story_id=561509>

its ratification. By no means is this an easy task according to Russian economists, such as Andrei Illarionov, having stated that ratifying Kyoto “would stifle economic growth.”¹⁸² However, the Russian decision to ratify the Kyoto protocol may still have been based on calculation. According to BBC correspondents, although the economic costs could be high, the international political benefits of Russian ratification may have been the deciding factor. “In particular, there has been talk of stronger European Union support for Russia's bid to join the World Trade Organization [WTO], in response to its ratification of the treaty.”¹⁸³ Therefore, although the Kyoto Protocol may stunt Russian economic growth initially, being granted membership into the WTO has the potential to significantly boost the Russian economy with possibly increased foreign direct investment.

“Made at Home” policies

Although the United States rejected the Kyoto Protocol, President Bush mentioned that he is committed to improving US air quality, though within the framework of already existing legislation.¹⁸⁴ Buzan suggests that states act at a level of coexistence with regards to the environment and the actions of the Bush administration in the United States supports this contention. The US rejected Kyoto which stands as evidence that it is reaffirming its autonomy and the idea of the juridical equality of states. Furthermore, the US has acted in its own best interest, choosing to reject Kyoto in favour of economic interests. The United States will work to better its own air quality, but it will not allow itself to be bound to any international commitments. However, the US is not the only state which has chosen to deal with the environment by rejecting Kyoto. Although

¹⁸²BBC, “Russia backs Kyoto climate treaty” [Online] 10 December 2006.
<<http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/europe/3702640.stm>>

¹⁸³*Ibid.*

¹⁸⁴G.W. Bush to Senators Hagel, Helms, Craig and Roberts.

Canada did ratify the treaty, the Conservative government of Prime Minister Harper has equally chosen to ignore the targets set by the Kyoto protocol.

When the Canadian Parliament ratified the Kyoto Protocol on 17 December 2002, it was under the leadership of then Prime Minister Jean Chrétien. By ratifying the Kyoto Protocol, Canada voluntarily bound itself by the stipulations of the agreement. However, the government was still free to determine the means and course of action in order to reach the Kyoto targets. In the same year, then Premier of Alberta, Ralph Klein, argued that his province should follow a “made in Alberta solution.” The action plan released by the Government of Alberta stated that “[it] needs an approach that will allow [its] economy to continue to flourish...”¹⁸⁵ Considering that the province of Alberta has a flourishing economy due in no small part to the heavily polluting oil and gas industry, it would be in the province’s best interest to shield that industry from any Canadian Federal government initiative that could potentially cause it harm. The reason Alberta is mentioned, is because in this case it effectively acts as a pressure or lobby group that favours economics above environmental protection. When the Kyoto protocol was ratified by Canada in 2002, its commitment was to decrease 1990 greenhouse gas emissions levels 6% by 2012. However, according to Environment Canada, greenhouse gas emissions rose from 740 million tonnes in 2002, to 750 million tonnes by 2004.¹⁸⁶ Prime Minister Stephen Harper’s government, during its first budget in 2006, did not introduce any new programs to reduce greenhouse gases, but simply reiterated that it would earmark

¹⁸⁵Government of Alberta, *Albertans and Climate Change: Taking Action!*, (Edmonton, October 2002), 12.

¹⁸⁶Environment Canada, *Canada’s Greenhouse Gas Inventory*. [Online] 28 October 2006. <http://www.ec.gc.ca/pdb/ghg/inventory_report/2003_report/ta8_4_e.cfm> <http://www.ec.gc.ca/pdb/GHG/newsrelease2006_e.cfm>

\$2 billion over five years for a “made-in-Canada” solution.¹⁸⁷ In October of 2006, the government introduced the Clean Air Act, which aimed at reducing greenhouse gas emissions by between 45% and 65% of 2003 levels by the year 2050.¹⁸⁸ The government would set out “short-term intensity based greenhouse gas reduction targets,”¹⁸⁹ which would effectively allow industries to increase their greenhouse gas emissions if they were to experience growth. According to the CBC, “Critics of intensity-based targets say the approach allows heavily polluting industries, such as Alberta’s oil sands, to continue to grow and pollute while remaining under government-imposed limitations.”¹⁹⁰ It would appear as though the Canadian Federal government had been inspired by the government of Alberta, as the idea of intensity-based targets is also included in Alberta’s Change and Emissions Management Act.¹⁹¹ In sum, the Canadian government’s Clean Air Act will protect the fossil fuel industry, provided that it continues to grow. Prime Minister Harper will make no attempt at achieving the goals as outlined in the Kyoto Protocol, but is however still committed to improving Canada’s natural environment, so long as it does not interfere with economic growth. With the examples of the United States and Canada, reluctance to adhere to the stipulations of Kyoto demonstrates how these states esteem their economies above and beyond the scope of the Kyoto

¹⁸⁷Canada. Department of Finance, *The Budget Speech 2006: Focussing on Priorities*, (Ottawa: Public Works and Government Services Canada, 2006), 12

¹⁸⁸Environment Canada, *Canada’s Clean Air Act delivered to Canadians*. [Online] 28 October 2006.
<http://www.ec.gc.ca/press/2006/061019_n_e.htm>

¹⁸⁹*Ibid.*

¹⁹⁰CBC, *CBC News In Depth: Kyoto and Beyond*, [Online] 28 October 2006.
<<http://www.cbc.ca/news/background/kyoto/>>

¹⁹¹R. Sheppard, *CBC News In Depth: Reality Check*, [Online] 28 October 2006.
<<http://www.cbc.ca/news/background/realitycheck/sheppard/20061019.html>>

protocol. However, by stating that they wish to find “made at home” solutions displays a willingness to better the environment, provided that they are able to protect their economies. As Buzan suggested, at the coexistence level states are motivated by self-interest, and the economic ramifications of the implementation of the Kyoto protocol were deemed too prohibitive by the United States through their rejection of the Protocol and through Canada’s choice to disregard attaining the shorter-term Kyoto targets.

Unlike the Montreal Protocol where the Multilateral Fund could serve to benefit both the developing and developed states economically, the Kyoto protocol provides nothing of the sort. In the case of CFCs, the chemical industries of the developed states could switch production to CFC substitutes. Because the Kyoto protocol aims at reducing GHGs, pollution levels have to decrease. As May explains, it is the sum of all human activity that is contributing to climate change.¹⁹² Therefore, if a state wishes to lower its GHG emissions, it must find a comprehensive solution that would affect all areas of human activity. The current administration in the US chose to reject the Kyoto Protocol, stating that it placed too much of a burden on its economy. In contrast, the EU ratified the Kyoto protocol, and by so doing became a champion in the climate change fight. That calculations were made by the EU before coming to their final decision is demonstrable. It is quite likely that economics played a role in the EU’s calculation, as the reduction of GHG across the Union would not be nearly as dramatic as US reduction would have been.

According to Meyerson, “the United States will be required to reduce its per capita emissions by 20.9 percent from 1990 levels, compared to reductions of only 10.5 percent for the European

¹⁹²E. May, “The Politics of Climate Change at the Montreal Conference,” 27.

Union.¹⁹³ However, as Volger and Bretherton discuss, because the EU was able to negotiate a Union-wide GHG target, it was able to implement an intra-EU burden sharing mechanism.¹⁹⁴ As a result, the burden sharing mechanism would allow certain member states, like Greece and Portugal to actually increase their GHG emissions by over 25% each.¹⁹⁵ Moreover, since 1990 was the base year for the Kyoto Protocol, Germany could reduce its GHG emissions considerably by simply shutting down inefficient communist-era East German installations, while the UK could do the same by restructuring its energy supply from coal to natural gas.¹⁹⁶ Thus, in 2005, where the US would have to reduce its emissions by 20% by 2012, the EU would only have to lower its emissions by about 5%.¹⁹⁷ Although the EU may wish to operate at a cooperative level with other states by setting common standards to achieve specific common environmental goals, states like the US, Australia and more recently, Canada, may wish to operate at the coexistence level and set their own agenda regarding the environment.

The Role of Transnational Society

NGOs also played a role in the Montreal protocol, although according to Buzan, at the coexistence level, states only recognize each other and not other players. Brown examined the Montreal protocol in a very state-centred fashion, focussing principally on diplomatic manoeuvring

¹⁹³F.A.B. Meyerson, "Population, Carbon Emmissions, and Global Warming," 122.

¹⁹⁴J. Vogler and C. Bretherton, "The European Union as a Protagonist to the United States on Climate Change," *International Studies Perspectives*, v.7 (2006), 16.

¹⁹⁵*Ibid.*, 11.

¹⁹⁶*Ibid.*

¹⁹⁷*Ibid.*, 16.

and concessions made between states.¹⁹⁸ Therefore, Brown equates success with the ability of states to agree on a treaty, while failing to examine the nature of state decisions. After all, Buzan explains that states are motivated by self-interest. It was reported that the treaty was inadequate and that it allowed for increased CFC production in the initial years before beginning a slow reduction, thereby allowing for further erosion of the ozone layer.¹⁹⁹ States may have chosen to adopt the Montreal protocol, albeit the clauses in the treaty were not as strong as they could have been. The weakening of the clauses illustrates that the IGO or, in this case, the intergovernmental agreement would not pose a threat to state sovereignty by being too difficult to achieve the targets and being pressured by possible penalties for non-compliance. This example again substantiates the coexistence level.

To further demonstrate the coexistence level in the environment, one needs to observe NGO participation. Raustiala explains that NGO participation was limited by one of the clauses set forth in the Montreal Protocol.

Any body or agency, whether national or international, governmental or non-governmental, qualified in fields relating to the protection of the ozone layer... may be admitted unless at least one third of the Parties present object. The admission and participation of the observers shall be subject to the rules of procedure adopted by the Parties.²⁰⁰

He explains that participation is limited to only qualified NGOs, thus barring perhaps radical “groups [only] seeking major changes to international law.”²⁰¹ He also underlines the fact that a

¹⁹⁸J.W. Brown, “International Environmental Cooperation.”

¹⁹⁹M. Crawford, “Landmark Ozone Treaty Negotiated,” *Science*, New Series, v. 237, n. 4822 (Sep. 25, 1987): 1557.

²⁰⁰Montreal Protocol, Article 1 I:5, quoted in K. Raustiala, “States, NGOs, and International Environmental Institutions,” *International Studies Quarterly*, v. 41, n.4. (Dec. 1997), 723.

²⁰¹*Ibid.*, 723

two-thirds majority is required if there is an objection to the participation of the NGOs.²⁰² The examples highlighted by Raustiala supports Buzan's claim that IGOs do not challenge or pose a threat to state sovereignty, and are in place to simplify the relations between states. However, the Raustiala examples provide evidence of states granting non-state actors the ability to participate at the interstate level, which suggests the existence of an International Society.

States do not operate in a vacuum and there will inevitably be pressure brought to bear on the governments by various non-state actors, whether they are NGOs or Multinational Corporations (MNCs). In the case of the Montreal Protocol, "the threat of ozone depletion was largely reduced when a single corporation, Dupont, switched from CFCs to safer alternatives."²⁰³ According to Mullen, Dupont was originally opposed to abandoning CFC production, but "in 1974, the Chairman of DuPont, Irving Shapiro, stated that if science ever shows that CFC's cannot be produced without harm to human health, DuPont would stop production."²⁰⁴ Once a scientifically proven link was made between the deterioration of the ozone layer and CFCs, Dupont had no choice but to cease its CFC production, lest its public image and long term reputation suffer.²⁰⁵ As Benedick points out, "a well-informed public was the prerequisite to mobilizing the political will of governments to weakening industry's resolve to defend chemicals."²⁰⁶ However, the path to banning CFCs and the ratification of the Montreal Protocol was made considerably easier, no doubt, by the acquiescence

²⁰²*Ibid.*

²⁰³E. May, "The Politics of Climate Change the Montreal Conference," 27.

²⁰⁴R.P. Mullin, "What Can Be Learned from DuPont," 210.

²⁰⁵R.E. Benedick, *Ozone Diplomacy: New Directions in Saving the Planet*, (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1991), 31.

²⁰⁶*Ibid.*, 5.

of the largest CFC producer in the world: Dupont.²⁰⁷

The Kyoto Protocol, as was mentioned earlier, had more difficulties in getting ratified. Like the Montreal Protocol, NGOs were invited to play a role in the negotiations. However, as Corell and Betsill mention, “[NGOs] ability to influence the outcome of the negotiations was constrained by the fact that most delegates were [focussed] on the economic implications of controlling GHG emissions...”²⁰⁸ As shown by the responses of the United States, Canada and the Canadian province of Alberta, there is reason to believe that economic issues continue to play a substantial role in taking action on Kyoto. Joseph Doucet, from the C.D. Howe Institute, suggests that abandoning Kyoto may be in the best interest for Canada, because it would put economic competitiveness at stake, since the USA rejected the Protocol and Mexico need not adopt GHG limits to achieve its obligations.²⁰⁹ Accordingly, the economy can be seen as an important factor of consideration for any choice to move forward on the environment. Although NGOs may influence national governments, as De Meyer explains, “...NGO resources and access to political power are considered pale in comparison to the forces driving environmental destruction.”²¹⁰ More significantly, the

²⁰⁷Other factors that Benedick points out were that CFC substitutes in aerosols were more economical than actual CFCs and major disagreements existed between the US and European chemical industries.

²⁰⁸E. Corell and M.M. Betsill, “A Comparative Look at NGO Influence in International Environmental Negotiations: Desertification and Climate Change,” *Global Environmental Politics*, v.1 n.4 (November 2001), 100.

²⁰⁹J.A. Doucet, “The Kyoto Conundrum: Why Abandoning the Protocol’s Targets in Favour of a More Sustainable Plan May be Best for Canada and the World,” *C.D. Howe Institute Backgrounder*, n.83 (May 2004), 8.

²¹⁰P. Newell, *Climate for Change, Non-State Actors and the Global Politics of the Greenhouse*, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2000) quoted in P. De Meyer, *NGOs and the European Climate Policy*, (Paper, Berlin Conference on the Human Dimensions of Global Environmental Change, 2004), 11.

polluting industries are the forces that drive environmental destruction and exert influence over state governments. According to a report by Andrew Buncombe, Mr. Chris Horner, senior official of the Exxon-Mobil-funded Competitive Enterprise Institute in Washington, attempted to establish an anti-Kyoto policy coalition to destroy European Union support for the Protocol.²¹¹ Buncombe goes on to claim that “Horner...is convinced that Europe could be successfully influenced by such a policy coalition just as the US government has been.”²¹² It would suffice to say, the lobbying efforts of the Competitive Enterprise Institute were successful, as the current administration in the US chose to reject the Kyoto protocol. However, what is perhaps the most remarkable is that Horner’s efforts in Europe were not successful at all.²¹³

Although determining the reasons behind European industries’ rejection of Horner’s approaches would be interesting, it falls beyond the scope of this thesis. European industries are not questioning the science behind global warming, and in turn their opposition to Kyoto mainly deals with implementation mechanisms,²¹⁴ whereas in the United States there has

been a united front of conservative officials and industry representatives who maintain that the science on global warming is inconclusive and that more study is needed to justify costly emissions reductions.²¹⁵

In order for the United States to attain its Kyoto targets, GHG emissions must be reduced to a level

²¹¹A. Buncombe, “How America Plotted to Stop Kyoto Deal,” *The Independent*, 8 December 2005.

²¹²*Ibid.*

²¹³*Ibid.*

²¹⁴Corporate Europe Observatory, “Greenhouse Market Mania.” [Online] 10 December 2006
<<http://www.corporateeurope.org/greenhouse/european.html>>

²¹⁵C.W. Schmidt, “The Kyoto Protocol: Just a Lot of Hot Air?,” A363.

that had not been seen since the end of the Second World War. Meyerson explains that for the European Union, GHG reductions would be much easier to attain because “the EU has not experienced a level of economic or carbon emissions growth similar to the growth in the US since 1990.”²¹⁶ It is important to underline that the European Union is not a traditional state actor, as it is an association of independent states. However, the EU has become increasingly more visible and as Vogler and Bretherton have put forth, “was routinely treated as an actor capable of autonomy and volition,” during climate negotiations.²¹⁷ Furthermore, “the EU’s espousal of the Kyoto Protocol has now given climate policy very much greater salience, such that success or failure will most definitely affect the Union’s external presence.”²¹⁸ Once again, as Vogler and Bretherton attest:

US rejection of the Kyoto Protocol has...provided the EU with a unique opportunity to capitalize on its economic and environmental presence and to assume a leadership role in the climate-change regime.²¹⁹

Thus, EU ratification of the Kyoto Protocol may have been a calculated way to rest the mantle of environmental leadership away from the US²²⁰, in which they have succeeded. The majority of the traditional supporters of the US, united in JUSCANZ (Japan, US, Canada, Australia and New Zealand), agreed with the EU in ratifying the Kyoto Protocol, leaving Australia as the United States’

²¹⁶F.A.B. Meyerson, “Population, Carbon Emissions, and Global Warming,” 123.

²¹⁷J. Vogler and C. Bretherton, “The European Union as a Protagonist,” 2.

²¹⁸*Ibid.*, 5.

²¹⁹*Ibid.*, 9.

²²⁰The US as an environmental leader is a title that can be disputed. However, in the Vogler and Bretherton piece, the assumption is that the US was an environmental leader. Furthermore, the environmental leadership of the US was illustrated with regards to the CFC phase out in: M. Crawford, “Landmark Ozone Treaty Negotiated,” *Science* New Series v.237 n.4822 (Sep. 25, 1987): 1557.

only supporter in opposition.²²¹

In terms of economic calculations, it is important to underline the fact that the European Union has very few oil deposits in relation to the United States or Canada. The EU must rely heavily on energy imports to meet the demands of its citizens. In fact, over a quarter of the EU's energy needs is supplied by Russia.²²² This reliance on foreign energy was underlined when Russia cut oil supplied through the Druzhba pipeline²²³ on 7 January 2007. Although the cutting of oil by Russian authorities was in response to a dispute with Belarus, the EU was the unintended victim.²²⁴ With foreign supplies of energy being unreliable, it would be in the EU's best interest to develop alternative energy sources,²²⁵ as stipulated by the Kyoto Protocol. Unlike the United States or Canada, the EU does not have a significant oil and gas industry to protect. Furthermore, its reliance on foreign imports of oil and gas places the EU in a vulnerable position, especially if a disruption like that of 7 January 2007 were to ever reoccur. The evidence suggests that the European Union's decision to ratify the Kyoto Protocol was based on calculations.

With regards to the negotiations of the Kyoto Protocol, the United Nations Environment

²²¹J. Vogler and C. Bretherton, "The European Union as a Protagonist," 15.

²²²J. Dempsey, "Russia gets tough on energy sales to Europe," *International Herald Tribune*, 12 December 2006. [Online] 12 January 2007.
<<http://www.iht.com/articles/2006/12/12/news/energy.php>>

²²³The Druzhba pipeline passes through Belarus and supplies oil to the European Union.

²²⁴BBC News. "Russia oil row hits Europe supply." [Online] 12 January 2007.
<<http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/business/6240473.stm>>

²²⁵"Dictators hate conservation," *Ottawa Citizen*, 13 January 2007, B6.

Program was absent in contrast to its involvement with the negotiations of the Montreal Protocol.²²⁶

As Ivanova states, UNEP

has been in a state of suspension since the Rio Earth Summit of 1992...[when] the El-Ashry-led [Global Environment Facility] GEF and the UN's Commission on Sustainable Development (CSD)...supplanted UNEP's leading role.²²⁷

Existing literature would seem to support Ivanova, as there is virtually no mention of UNEP in the negotiating process. At a coexistence level, secondary institutions like UNEP exist to simplify relations between states, but in the specific case of the Kyoto Protocol, it does not play a major role in facilitating interstate dialogue. Ivanova explained that the GEF provided resources and funding for global projects and the CSD provided a venue for environmental officials, whereas UNEP did not yet have an official forum established to gather environmental ministers from around the world. Accordingly, at the time, the CSD and GEF combined were more effective at facilitating the needs of states than UNEP had been.

The Analysis of Environmental Stewardship through UNEP

Buzan explained that Environmental Stewardship was found at a level of coexistence, whereas contemporary Interstate Society as a whole, is operating at a cooperative level. In the case of UNEP, I presented and contrasted the Montreal and Kyoto Protocols, as they were both sponsored in some way by the UN program. The very fact that UNEP was not actively involved in negotiating, but simply provided the data and forum for these environmental issues, holds up to view Buzan's first point that IGOs exist to simplify and reduce inefficiencies in relations between states without

²²⁶The United Nations General Assembly took over the climate change negotiations at their start in late 1990.

²²⁷A. Bisbort, "Critic of UN Environmental Program Offers Plan for Its Reform," *environment: YALE*, v.5 n.6 (Spring 2006), 32.

challenging or posing a threat to state sovereignty. UNEP facilitated the meeting of states to discuss the issues of Ozone Layer depletion and Climate Change. The lack of financial and political actions suggests its role was to reduce inefficiencies in interstate relations, as treated by the coexistence Society model of Buzan.

According to Buzan, states will focus on their differences, yet will agree on certain principles in order to ensure their own survival and to avoid disorder in the international system. Although the ratification of the Montreal and Kyoto protocols are poor examples of this particular point, it is the opposition to Kyoto and Montreal that demonstrates this particular principle most appropriately. Although the United States rejected Kyoto, its President never stated that the environment was not important. Rather, he stated that US air quality would be improved through already existing legislation. Therefore, just like the other states, the US acknowledges that there is a pollution problem. However, the US has chosen to approach the question of air quality with domestic solutions, rather than with the international solutions contained within the Kyoto Protocol. Similarly, the Canadian government, despite having already ratified the Kyoto Protocol, had branded the 2012 targets unattainable and had chosen to also follow a domestic solution. In January 2007, the Harper government gave the environment portfolio higher priority after a major cabinet shuffle took place. It is still unclear what, if any, changes will be made to the Harper-led Canadian government's Clean Air Act.

Although the Kyoto protocol does have punitive measures for non-compliance, these instruments will not be tested until 2012. Both the Montreal and Kyoto Protocols demonstrate that member states recognize each others sovereignty; another principle mentioned by Buzan with reference to the coexistence level. The President of the United States complained that the Kyoto

Protocol was unfair because it did not treat all states equally. The principle of juridical equality of the states is another key aspect touching the issue of state sovereignty, which the United States alluded to by underlining its perceived unfair treatment. Neither the Kyoto or Montreal Protocols have any enforcement mechanism which would punish states for non-compliance.²²⁸ The Montreal Protocol, through its Multilateral Fund, offers benefits to underdeveloped states who sign on to the agreement though does not contain any punitive mechanisms for non-compliance. The Kyoto protocol, conversely, does contain a punitive element that is markedly ineffective without an enforcement mechanism. Thus, it is up to the state to voluntarily comply with the Kyoto Protocol's targets and punitive measures. Allowing the state to voluntarily submit itself to these stipulations underlines the fact that states are sovereign entities.

Finally, before coming into force, the Kyoto Protocol experienced difficulties attaining the necessary number of states to ratify the agreement. Perhaps one of the reasons for the difficulties stems from the Kyoto Protocol's inability to be framed in a way that fulfills state self-interest. As the single largest producer of GHG, the U.S. rejection of the Kyoto Protocol serves as a perfect example of self-interested motivation on the part of a state. Protecting the economy was one of the central arguments in the United States' decision to reject Kyoto and one the realities that Canadian law makers have also had to face. The very fact that the Canadian federal government has chosen to beat the retreat on meeting its Kyoto targets in favour of a "made-in-Canada" solution, demonstrates a commitment to the environment should it be on Canada's terms. Even the Montreal Protocol, which is lauded as a tour de force in environmental circles, has trappings of state self-

²²⁸It is important to note, however, that the punitive measures in Kyoto enshrined in the enforcement mechanism have not yet been tested.

interest. The success of the Montreal Protocol is attributed to the creation of the Multilateral Fund which would provide financial support to underdeveloped states that develop non-CFC technologies.²²⁹ At first glance, it would appear as though developed states are acting benevolently, yet under closer inspection their economies would also be deriving a benefit from the Multilateral Fund. The Multilateral Fund encourages CFC-substitution technologies rather than technologies that eliminate the need for CFCs or CFC substitutes. Since CFC substitutes are being produced by the chemical industries found mainly in the developed states, CFC-substitution technologies may directly benefit the economies of these states.

The four principles that Buzan advances about the coexistence Society are indeed present in the institution of Environmental Stewardship. UNEP's role in focussing attention and mobilizing state action with regards to the ozone layer supports the idea that IGOs exist to simplify and reduce inefficiencies in relations between states, but do not challenge, nor pose a threat to a state's sovereignty. Although UNEP did not play the facilitation role in the Kyoto Protocol negotiations, the UN's Commission on Sustainable Development and the Global Environment Facility did. In both the negotiations for the Montreal and Kyoto Protocols, states displayed calculated actions, be it through the creation of financial mechanisms that would stand to financially benefit the providing and receiving states, or the outright rejection of ratifying a protocol. These actions display the principle that states are motivated by self-interest and will only take action that will be beneficial to themselves. The adoption of the Multilateral Fund illustrates the differences between states in

²²⁹The Multilateral Fund was negotiated after the Montreal Protocol as a means to entice developing states to participate. Although the Kyoto Protocol has the Clean Development Mechanism, it was negotiated as part of the agreement and not subsequently added to entice increased state participation.

addition to the common problem of ozone layer depletion that all states must face. Though the third principle mentions that states will focus on their differences and distinctiveness from one another, they will also agree on certain basic principles in order to ensure their own survival. Finally, the last principle mentions that states will acknowledge and recognize the juridical equality of other states. Noteworthy here is that all states are respecting each others sovereignty in the domain of the environment. States are not forcing other states to comply in reducing CFCs. Rather, in the place of coercion, they are encouraging them through incentives. The coexistence Society can clearly be seen through UNEP and the environmental treaties it advanced. The evidence suggests that although the environment is important, economics plays a decisive role in whether or not measures to protect the environment will be undertaken. In both the Montreal and Kyoto Protocol cases, economics were pivotal to the decisions made. Economics weighed heavily on the calculations that states made in determining their courses of action. If the state deemed the economic burden as too great, then implementation of a particular Protocol would not be approved. However, if the state determined the economic burden to be marginal along with the possibility of political gain or influence, state ratification of the Protocol was virtually guaranteed. The behaviour of states in these situations is not surprising, as it simply points to the fact that states will always act in their own best interest.

Chapter 3 The United Nations HIV/AIDS Program at the Cooperative Level of Interstate Society

UNAIDS and the Cooperative Level

In the last chapter, by using UNEP as an example, it was demonstrated how Buzan's argument that the Primary Institution of Environmental Stewardship operating at a coexistence level of Interstate Society is supported. In substance, it showed that states would act in their own best interest (pluralist), despite their actions appearing to be for common benefit (solidarist), as was the case with the Montreal Protocol. Therefore, Pluralism (when defined by the plurality of states recognizing themselves as separate but equal entities) appears to motivate states in UNEP and in matters dealing with the environment. In this next chapter, the focus will be on how the Primary Institution of Equality of Peoples operates at the cooperative level of the Interstate Society by using the UNAIDS program as an example.

As already mentioned in previous chapters, the cooperative Interstate Society is based on many of the institutions found at the coexistence level but falls short of extensive domestic convergence. Moreover, "cooperative Interstate societies will have more elaborate criteria for membership, more stringent institutions concerning the sanctity of agreements, and greater restraints on the use of force."²³⁰ Admittedly then, states have responsibilities to more than just themselves at the cooperative level, and thus operate with a relatively more solidarist logic than that of the coexistence level. Buzan explains that Solidarism "ties together state and non-state actors, and draws on cosmopolitan notions of individual rights and a community of humankind..."²³¹

²³⁰Buzan, B. *From International to World Society?: English School Theory and the Social Structure of Globalisation* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2004), 193.

²³¹*Ibid.*, 48.

The cooperative Interstate Society will not have states operating exclusively with a solidarist logic. Buzan underlines that “the basic institutions of pluralist Interstate Society [would] have wide support among states, and pretty wide support amongst peoples and TNAs.”²³² He explains that

although these institutions were originally imposed coercively by the West... [even] if Western power declined, it does not seem unreasonable to think that most of these pluralist institutions would remain in place.²³³

However, he goes on to say that such “cannot be said for the more solidarist elements of contemporary International Society.”²³⁴ Essentially,

should the backing for human rights and humanitarian intervention by the West weaken for any reason, it does not seem likely that they would retain much standing as global institutions, even though they would retain strong constituencies of Interstate support regionally, and more widely in the Transnational and Interhuman domains.²³⁵

Therefore, the cooperative level of Interstate Society would have a mixture of both pluralist-leaning and solidarist-aimed primary institutions. For example, a pluralist primary institution would be that of Sovereignty, because states would be upholding one of their own interests, whereas the primary institution of Equality of People would be considered solidarist, as it pertains to an issue that could potentially spillover into the jurisdiction of states. With this definition, Environmental Stewardship would be considered a solidarist institution because of its goal. However, the behaviour of states will effectively determine the degree to which the Interstate Society is pluralist or solidarist. Therefore, it is possible that even in solidarist institutions, such as Equality of People (human

²³²*Ibid.*, 234.

²³³*Ibid.*

²³⁴*Ibid.*

²³⁵*Ibid.*

rights), the states themselves may operate with a pluralist logic to achieve a solidarist goal. With this given, the following chapter aims to discuss how UNAIDS program fits into the criteria that Buzan sets about the cooperative society by examining both the structure of UNAIDS and the programs it has undertaken.

HIV/AIDS: More than just a medical problem

When HIV/AIDS was first identified, it was treated like any other disease and was placed under the responsibility of the World Health Organization (WHO). However, by the mid-1990s it was realized that HIV/AIDS was more than just a simple health problem. The disease impacted areas beyond the realm of health care, having the ability to devastate areas such as the economy and even society as a whole.²³⁶ Therefore, in order to combat HIV/AIDS, a new program that reflected the multifaceted and global HIV/AIDS problem was developed. The creation of UNAIDS was accomplished through Resolution 1994/24 of the UN's Economic and Social Council (ECOSOC), in which six UN system organizations, such as the United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization (UNESCO), became cosponsors and co-owners of the joint program. Other UN system organizations that were initial cosponsors of UNAIDS also included the United Nations Development Program (UNDP), the United Nations Population Fund (UNFPA), the United Nations Children's fund (UNICEF), the World Health Organization (WHO) and the World Bank.²³⁷ According to Resolution 1994/24, the new program was essentially to provide global leadership with

²³⁶U. Kristoffersson, "HIV/AIDS as a human security issue: a gender perspective" (paper presented at the Expert Group Meeting on "The HIV/AIDS Pandemic and its Gender Implications," Windhoek, Namibia, 13-17 November 2000)
<<http://www.un.org/womenwatch/daw/csw/hivaids/kristoffersson.htm>>

²³⁷UNAIDS, "UNAIDS: A unique response," [Online] 10 March 2005
<http://www.unaids.org/en/about+unaids/what+is+unaids/unaids_a+unique+response.asp>

regards to HIV/AIDS.²³⁸ Although the resolution was passed in order to create a joint program amongst the cosponsoring organizations, it would be up to those same cosponsoring organizations to establish the program itself.

According to Resolution 1994/24, the cosponsors would form a Committee of Cosponsoring Organizations (CCO) that would also act as a permanent standing committee for the governing body of the new program. The resolution also stated that along with the President of ECOSOC, the CCO would work to specify the composition of the Program Coordinating Board (PCB); the governing body of the joint program.²³⁹ In the resolution, six objectives are stated for the new joint program:

- (a) Provide global leadership in response to the epidemic;
- (b) Achieve and promote global consensus on policy and programmatic approaches;
- (c) Strengthen the capacity of the United Nations system to monitor trends and ensure that appropriate and effective policies and strategies are implemented at the country level;
- (d) Strengthen the capacity of national Governments to develop comprehensive national strategies and implement effective HIV/AIDS activities at the country level;
- (e) Promote broad-based political and social mobilization to prevent and respond to HIV/AIDS within countries, ensuring that national responses involve a wide range of sectors and institutions;
- (f) Advocate greater political commitment in responding to the epidemic at the global and country levels, including the mobilization and allocation of adequate resources for HIV/AIDS-related activities.²⁴⁰

The objectives demonstrate that the UNAIDS program was created for a specific purpose in interstate relations and, like the United Nations Environment Program discussed in the last chapter,

²³⁸UN Economic and Social Council, 44th plenary meeting, "Resolution 1994/24 [Joint and co-sponsored United Nations programme on human immunodeficiency virus/acquired immunodeficiency syndrome (HIV/AIDS)]" (1994/24), 26 July 1994.

²³⁹*Ibid.*

²⁴⁰*Ibid.*

is considered a secondary institution according to Buzan. More importantly, however, is that the objectives themselves are broad enough to allow actors from both within the interstate and non-state societies to play a role in the new UNAIDS program.

As Buzan mentions, the current cooperative level of Interstate Society has “a lot of interplay between the three domains (Interstate, Interhuman, Transnational).”²⁴¹ He also mentions that “both individuals and, even more so TNAs of various kinds, are given substantial rights and standings within the secondary institutions of Interstate Society.”²⁴² What the examination of the UNAIDS program will show is that there is indeed a very active participation of individuals and TNAs (or NGOs) within the program itself.

According to ECOSOC report (E/1995/71), the Program Coordinating Board (PCB) would “represent the interests and responsibilities of the Governments, cosponsoring organizations and other interested parties of the joint programme.”²⁴³ This suggests that the governing body of the UNAIDS program would not only be composed of states; it may be composed by other interested parties as well. Although some details were presented at the time that report E/1995/71 was submitted, the exact composition, the meeting schedule, the rules and procedures, as well as the terms of appointment to the PCB had not yet been finalized. Nevertheless, the PCB of UNAIDS was to be unlike any other UN program governing bodies. In this specific UN program, states were not to be the sole actors within the governing body of the program.

In the subsequent ECOSOC Resolution 1995/2, details concerning the Program Coordinating

²⁴¹B. Buzan, *From International to World Society?*, 233.

²⁴²*Ibid.*

²⁴³*Ibid.*

Board (PCB) were agreed upon. In all, the PCB would be composed of 22 states, the six co-sponsoring organizations and five NGOs.²⁴⁴ The resolution goes on to define the role that NGOs will play on the PCB. To summarize, out of the five representatives that NGOs will have on the PCB, three will be from developing states and two from the developed states and states with economies in transition.²⁴⁵ The document continues by explaining that NGOs will be invited to take part in the work of the PCB, but they would not take part in the decision-making process. Despite not being able to vote, this was still particularly significant because it was the first time that NGO participation was formalized into the governing structure of a UN program.²⁴⁶ The inclusion of NGOs into the PCB, then, demonstrates Buzan's idea of a cooperative Interstate Society, as it formalizes the ability of both state and non-state actors to interact with each other within the secondary institution of UNAIDS.

Examining UNAIDS Projects

At first glance, it might appear that an in-depth examination of the structure of the UNAIDS program should reveal the presence of Solidarism among state actors and thus demonstrate the existence of the cooperative level of Interstate Society. However, examining the structure of the UNAIDS program would offer no more insight into whether or not a state is acting with a logic of Solidarism. The creation of the program itself is evidence to support the idea of Solidarism, in the sense that state actors would have had to agree with the scope and the governing structure of the

²⁴⁴UN Economic and Social Council, 21st plenary meeting, "Resolution 1995/2 [Joint and Co-sponsored United Nations Programme on Human Immunodeficiency Virus/Acquired Immunodeficiency Syndrome]" (1995/2), 3 July 1995.

²⁴⁵*Ibid.*

²⁴⁶UNAIDS, "Programme Coordinating Board," [Online] 15 June 2004.
<<http://www.unaids.org/en/about+unaids/governance/programme+coordinating+board.asp>>

program. Yet once the program is created, any state/non-state interaction that should take place is the result of the structure mandating such an interaction, not necessarily because of a state's desire to do so. Instead, the research regarding the UNAIDS program will focus mainly on the projects it has spearheaded. Examination of these projects will demonstrate how states are operating at a cooperative level.

Unlike the United Nations Environment Program, UNAIDS has not spearheaded any type of treaty or protocol. This is particularly telling, simply because the approach taken by UNEP and UNAIDS is quite different. UNEP has been involved in bringing attention to many issues concerning the environment, which eventually led to the interstate negotiations and ratification of various environmental treaties and protocols. Due to the fact that treaties and protocols are signed amongst states only, they are found distinctly in the realm of the Interstate Society. Despite the consulting of NGOs, the state-exclusivity of the environmental treaties displays the coexistence level. Though NGOs may play a role in pressuring states to ratify such agreements, only states are involved in the actual ratification of treaties and protocols. In contrast, UNAIDS has never spearheaded a treaty or protocol, nor has there ever been a similar type of binding agreement between states regarding HIV/AIDS. The approach that the UNAIDS program has taken is much more holistic. For instance, actors from the Interstate, Transnational and Interhuman societies have been involved in the fight against HIV/AIDS. It is clear that NGOs have been given a defined role to play in both UNAIDS governance and project development.

The holistic approach that is taken by UNAIDS can be explained by Altman, who states that “. . .the vulnerability of people to HIV varies greatly and is closely linked to their socioeconomic

status, [whereas] the response to AIDS is closely related to cultural and political factors.”²⁴⁷ Like UNAIDS, Altman recognizes that HIV/AIDS is beyond the scope of a health issue affecting many other areas. Therefore, for any global response to HIV/AIDS to be successful, it needs to consider the local element as well. Altman mentions that western rationalism conceptualized HIV/AIDS as exclusively biomedical while basing global responses on that single conceptualization would undermine the differing approaches to medicine as practised by traditional healers.²⁴⁸ A convincing argument on behalf of Altman is that the approach that is taken for a global response cannot be a single and rigid one. Unquestionably, a good global response will provide a framework with a common goal in which various state and non-state actors can adapt their responses to their own realities. The UNAIDS program has effectively developed a flexible framework where both state and non-state actors are able to not only adapt responses to their own realities, but where they are also able to interact and cooperate to achieve a common goal.

The cooperation between state and non-state actors suggests that state interaction within UNAIDS could not be at the coexistence level, as was the case with UNEP. In the latter case, the established structure was very state-centric, whereas the structure of UNAIDS could be seen as more conducive to interaction and cooperation between state and non-state actors. The cooperation of states and non-state actors to achieve a common goal, specifically the eradication of HIV/AIDS, suggests what Buzan terms as a “solidarist joint project.”²⁴⁹ If one refers back to figure 1 found in

²⁴⁷D. Altman, “Globalization, Political Economy, and HIV/AIDS,” *Theory and Society*, v.28, no.4 (August 1999), 576.

²⁴⁸*Ibid.*, 565.

²⁴⁹The term “solidarist joint project” refers to the undertaking of states and non-state actors to achieve a common goal. Joint projects could include environmentalism, joint economic gain, big science and human rights. *Ibid.*, 193.

the first chapter, solidarist joint projects are only found at the cooperative and more solidarist levels of interstate society. Therefore the simple presence of UNEP and UNAIDS illustrate the existence of a cooperative Interstate Society in international relations as a whole. However, it should be mentioned that the interaction amongst states in addition to the interaction between states and non-state actors determines how we label the UNEP or UNAIDS programs. As was already discussed with UNEP in the last chapter, states operate at a coexistence level with regards to the environment despite contemporary Interstate Society as a whole operating at a cooperative level.²⁵⁰ This attests that, it is the interaction of states within UNEP that determines that the program is found at the coexistence level. In this chapter, by examining various projects organized or supported by UNAIDS, it will become more evident how the UNAIDS program operates at the cooperative level of Interstate Society.

James Putzel conducted a study with regards to the multisectoral approach in fighting the HIV/AIDS pandemic. He examined the policy of requiring governments to establish stand-alone National AIDS commissions thereby following the “organizational template” set-up by the World Bank through interpretations of UNAIDS successes.²⁵¹ Although Putzel does not question the legitimacy of multisectoral approaches to HIV/AIDS, he explains that organizational responses, even ones that are multisectoral, may cause more problems than they solve. In the cases of Uganda, Senegal and Thailand, effective HIV/AIDS programs with multisectoral approaches, had already

²⁵⁰ Again, Buzan states that contemporary interstate society is found on the more pluralist side of the cooperative level, but it is also possible for a single state to be operating at various levels at the same time.

²⁵¹ J. Putzel, “The Global Fight Against AIDS: How Adequate are the National Commissions?,” *Journal of International Development*, 16 (2004).

been established. However, the World Bank, one of the co-sponsors of the UNAIDS program, had established very rigid parameters that needed to be followed by states hoping to receive funding from the Multi-Country AIDS Program (MAP). Briefly, the World Bank required that stand-alone national commissions be established by states that wished to have access to funds. However, there was no proof that national commissions had ever been effective.²⁵² Details surrounding the World Bank's initiative will be discussed below, but suffice to say, this example illustrates a situation where lesser developed states are coerced through funding by an IGO, whose most powerful members and donors are developed states. By detailing a major shortcoming of the World Bank's MAP, it will be possible to later contrast it to a more successful UNAIDS project.

The Cases of Uganda and Senegal

With regards to Uganda, President Museveni recognized that the government was limited in its ability to combat HIV/AIDS alone, and thus allowed NGOs to educate the citizenry on prevention.²⁵³ The government also allowed NGOs to administer entire programs, suggesting that some state autonomy had to be given up in order to fight the pandemic.²⁵⁴ Although there were successes attributed to Uganda's HIV/AIDS policies, there was no evidence that its national commission played any significant role at all. The national commission for Uganda was established at the urging of the World Bank and was preceded by a successful national committee created under the auspices of the Office of the President that worked closely with the Ugandan Ministry of

²⁵²*Ibid.*, 1132.

²⁵³P. Patel, "The Politics of AIDS in Africa," *International Relations*, v.15 no.4 (April 2001), 82.

²⁵⁴J.O. Parkhurst, "The Crisis of AIDS and the Politics of Response: The case of Uganda," *International Relations*, v.15 no.6 (December 2001), 79-80.

Health.²⁵⁵ Due to the success of Uganda's national committee in involving various stakeholders, the World Bank urged the government to formalize the coordinating role of the President's national committee, by creating an independent national commission.²⁵⁶ According to Putzel, the initial creation of the Uganda AIDS Commission (UAC) in 1992 caused problems due to its unclear mandate and its relationship vis-à-vis other ministries, and by 1997 it was placed back under the authority of the Ministry of Health.²⁵⁷ However, in order to access the new funding provided by the World Bank, the President of Uganda reestablished the national commission in 1999, this despite of its earlier failures.²⁵⁸ It was discovered that the UAC poorly duplicated what other ministries had the capacity to do much better. Similar occurrences were described in the case of Senegal causing even more problems. The "...Conseil National not only fomented discord between ministries, but also demanded that these ministries simply channel the new funds to local multisectoral initiatives."²⁵⁹ In this instance, the roles that actors played were not necessarily based on their strengths and cooperation between actors was evidently lacking. The various ministries, and in particular the ministries of health, were unable to perform their functions adequately because artificially created "multisectoral organizations" were prioritized. In order to receive funding, states were willing to adhere to the so-called successful "best practises" established by the World Bank, despite their own experiences to the contrary. The failure of the National Commissions in Uganda

²⁵⁵J. Putzel, "The Global Fight Against AIDS," 1133.

²⁵⁶*Ibid.*

²⁵⁷*Ibid.*, 1134.

²⁵⁸*Ibid.*, 1135.

²⁵⁹*Ibid.*, 1136.

and Senegal illustrates the ineffectiveness of imposed organizational templates, indirectly supporting the call for more flexible mechanisms in dealing with the HIV/AIDS pandemic.

Though the outcome of the MAP was shown to have had a negative impact in the cases of Senegal and Uganda, such an experience was mainly due to the rigidity of the projects' criteria in order to secure funding.²⁶⁰ In the case of the MAP, a report commissioned by the World Bank seems to acknowledge its shortcomings:

When a country has an advanced and strong decentralization system and/or a well functioning social fund system in place, using these existing structures can (a) facilitate the rapid scaling up of implementing the local response activities, and (b) eliminate the need to create a new framework.²⁶¹

Though the experiences of Uganda and Senegal with their National Commissions were not outlined in the report, there is an acknowledgement that if a working system is already in place, there is no need to duplicate efforts. The same report also goes on to show its support for multisectoral approaches in which all major stakeholders are involved. In fact, the criteria to receive funding from the MAP is all at once very specific, yet flexible.

The MAP funds are available to any low-income African country that meets the following eligibility criteria:

- Satisfactory evidence of a strategic approach to HIV/AIDS, developed in a participatory manner;
- Existence of a high-level HIV/AIDS coordinating body, with broad representation of key stakeholders from all sectors, including people living with HIV/AIDS;
- Government commitment to quick implementation arrangements, including channeling grant funds for HIV/AIDS activities directly to communities, civil

²⁶⁰J. Putzel, "The Global Fight Against AIDS," 1137-1138.

²⁶¹J. Delion et al., "Experience in Scaling up Support to Local Response in Multi-Country Aids Programs (map) in Africa.," *Africa Region Working Paper Series*, n.79 (December 2004), ii.

- society, and the private sector; and Agreement by the government to use multiple implementation agencies, especially NGOs/Community Based Organizations.²⁶²

This effectively illustrates structurally imposed solidarism, insofar as various stakeholders are expected to work together to combat the HIV/AIDS pandemic. However, as the cases of Uganda and Senegal reflect, such cooperation could very well be the result of calculation from a Pluralist logic following the framework in order to secure funding.

Although it may appear that the holistic approach failed with regards to the national commissions, it is crucial to understand that the project undertaken by the World Bank was not entirely holistic in the first place. Unlike UNAIDS, where the framework allows for the Interstate, Transnational and Interhuman societies to cooperate on a voluntary basis, the World Bank's criteria was not so much a framework, as it was a rigid plan of operation. The World Bank's actions effectively imposed a particular vision of holism and multisectoralism, without necessarily having the participation or cooperation of all the actors. To use Buzan's conceptualization, the state was coerced into adopting the organizational template as a means to receive funding and it did not act out of belief. Though Buzan mentions that it is not necessary that the binding force of a state be belief, he does mention that out of the binding forces of coercion, calculation and belief, belief would bring out the most stability.²⁶³ Though, in this case, the states calculated their response to HIV/AIDS in order to receive economic funding from outside sources. In effect, the hasty creation of national commissions caused confusion due to the absence of clearly defined roles for both the national commission itself and the actors that were to be coordinated by it. As Putzel puts it:

²⁶²*Ibid.*, 1.

²⁶³B. Buzan, *From International to World Society?*, 157.

The establishment of supra-ministerial bodies effectively ends up in inadequate attempts to reinvent government and to replace what is essentially a political challenge of prioritising HIV/AIDS in government and non-government sectors with an organizational fix.²⁶⁴

Consequently, successful HIV/AIDS strategies will not be achieved by the external imposition of an organizational template, but rather by the state performing its particular function within the broader HIV/AIDS strategy.

Assessing the Chilean Example

In the case of Chile, the main body of the Chilean government that deals with HIV/AIDS issues is CONASIDA, the National Commission on AIDS. Without going into much detail,²⁶⁵ the Chilean government created CONASIDA under the auspices of the Department of Health, in this case with an autonomous structure. The government, realizing that HIV/AIDS was a problem more complex with wider repercussions than a mere sexually transmitted disease, chose to deal with the issue by creating a multisectoral organization in 1990.²⁶⁶ Although it would appear to be very similar to the examples of Uganda and Senegal, Chile's experience differs in a very marked way. In the two African cases, the national commissions were created in order to meet funding criteria and not out of the government's own volition. In fact, with the case of Uganda, an earlier attempt at having a national commission resulted in a dismal failure. Therefore, it is safe to assume that the political will or belief was lacking on the parts of Senegal and Uganda when they created their national commissions: that they simply followed the template provided by the World Bank because

²⁶⁴J. Delion et al., "Experience in Scaling up Support," 1137.

²⁶⁵For further information, see: CONASIDA, "Politica de Prevencion y Control 2001," [Online] 5 May 2005. <<http://www.conasida.cl/quienes/polco/polco1.htm>>

²⁶⁶CONASIDA, "La Respuestas de Chile," [Online] 5 May 2005. <<http://www.conasida.cl/quienes/respuesta/resp02.htm>>

of financial calculation. Without being able to modify the templates to suit their particular realities, the national commissions were ineffective in the fight against HIV/AIDS. In the Chilean case, it was the government that chose to set up the national commission on its own, through belief²⁶⁷ and without external pressure or the use of an imposed external template.

In contrast to the World Bank's relatively rigid MAP, the Drug Access Initiative (DAI) implemented by UNAIDS was modified by the state to reflect Chilean realities. According to UNAIDS, the DAI "was designed to develop innovative, effective models to improve access to drugs to treat HIV and opportunistic infections."²⁶⁸ In sum, it was to increase access to Antiretroviral therapies (ART) for those living with AIDS. The DAI was implemented in Chile as of January 2000, yet it was not setup as an autonomous project. Rather, as Brousselle and Champagne state: "It was directly integrated into the national policy of access to HIV/AIDS therapies."²⁶⁹ Already, Chile modified the project in order to better the access of those infected. Instead of choosing a new cohort of patients that would receive ART, Chile simply expanded on their existing program to allow even greater access to the drugs. However, this was not to be the only modification made to UNAIDS' DAI project in Chile. According to UNAIDS, "drugs were supposed to be purchased at a subsidized rate by a non-profit company established in each

²⁶⁷Buzan explains that Belief is when a state believes in the values that it internalizes. B. Buzan, *From International to World Society?*, 157.

²⁶⁸UNAIDS, *Report of the Meeting on the Evaluation of the UNAIDS HIV Drug Access Initiative*, Geneva, 30-31 May 2000, 1.

²⁶⁹A. Brousselle and F. Champagne, "How was the UNAIDS drug access initiative implemented in Chile?," *Evaluation and Program Planning*, 27 (2004), 299.

participating country.”²⁷⁰ However, since a structure for price negotiation already existed in Chile, it was found to be unnecessary to implement the structure proposed by UNAIDS.²⁷¹ Again, the government adapted the project to suit the realities that existed in Chile. The DAI project, which was directly implemented by UNAIDS, was much more flexible than the World Bank initiative mentioned above. Due to this flexibility, duplication of services was avoided in Chile and access to treatment was increased. Through its participation in DAI, Chile was able to provide 46% of its affected population with ART.²⁷² Chile later participated in the UNAIDS Accelerated Initiative to Access to ART, which increased access to 86% by 2002 and according to Morales, once funding from the Global Fund to Fight AIDS, Tuberculosis and Malaria become available by the end of 2003, access should be near the 100% mark for those under the public health system.²⁷³ In a speech given before the UN General Assembly in September 2003, Dr. Arredondo, the Executive Director of CONUSIDA, stated that “Chile [had] succeeded in covering 100 per cent of the demand from public sector beneficiaries.”²⁷⁴

²⁷⁰UNAIDS, *Report of the Meeting on the Evaluation of the UNAIDS HIV Drug Access Initiative*, 2.

²⁷¹A. Brousselle and F. Champagne, “How was the UNAIDS drug access initiative implemented in Chile?,” 300.

²⁷²C. Morales et al., “Expanding Access to Antiretroviral Therapies in Chile: Economic and Financial Issues for Patients and the Health System,” *Economics of AIDS and Access to HIV/AIDS Care in Developing Countries, Issues and Challenges*, ed. Agence Nationale de Recherches sur le SIDA. (2003), 439.

²⁷³*Ibid.* 440.

²⁷⁴A. Arredondo, Statement, High-level plenary meeting devoted to the follow-up to the Declaration of Commitment on HIV/AIDS, 58th Session of the General Assembly, New York, 22 September 2003. [Online] <<http://www.un.int/chile/Statements/speech20030922.htm>>

With the Chilean example, the UNAIDS program administered the DAI project directly, unlike with the cases of Uganda and Senegal, where the World Bank had administered the MAP. Rather than impose its project framework on Chile, as was the case with the World Bank in Uganda and Senegal, UNAIDS simply allowed the DAI to be adaptable. The documentation makes no mention of Chile having been punished for modifying the DAI and in fact, in the UNAIDS report evaluating the DAI, amendments made to the project were outlined and accompanied by their justification.²⁷⁵ The flexibility of the UNAIDS program shows a spirit of openness that is necessary for cooperation between the Interstate, Transnational and Interhuman societies. By not forcing states to adhere to organizational templates, particularly when those templates are ineffective or superfluous within a country, UNAIDS is not only respecting state sovereignty, but is also allowing the state to cooperate freely. As mentioned in the first chapter, Buzan explained that contemporary interstate society was found at the pluralist side of the cooperative level, or simply closer to the border with the coexistence society. Since IGOs at the coexistence level act to facilitate and reduce inefficiencies between states but not to pose a threat to state sovereignty, it is possible that UNAIDS operates with state interests in mind in order to maintain their support. At the same time, UNAIDS is also listening to HIV/AIDS centred NGOs as it develops further projects. In fact, the DAI was launched by UNAIDS in response to demands from various NGOs and some states.²⁷⁶

Despite powerful reluctance to introduce ART in the South, various non-governmental organizations (NGOs) and some governments of developing countries

²⁷⁵UNAIDS, *Report of the Meeting on the Evaluation of the UNAIDS HIV Drug Access Initiative*.

²⁷⁶D. Katzenstein, et al., "The evaluation of the HIV/AIDS Drug Access Initiatives in Côte D'Ivoire, Senegal and Uganda: how access to antiretroviral treatment can become feasible in Africa," *AIDS 2003*, v.17 (suppl 3), S1.

moved quickly to address access to effective treatments for HIV infection...[and] responding to their demands, the UNAIDS secretariat launched the so-called Drug Access Initiative (DAI) in November 1997.²⁷⁷

Buzan mentions that at the cooperative level of Interstate Society NGOs are given substantial rights within Secondary Institutions (International Organizations).²⁷⁸ Therefore, as Turner points out, NGOs can push for state action through their participation in international organizations. In the case of Chile, NGOs played a role in pressuring government to affect social change, as was the case with Vivo Positivo, which “played a significant role in the adoption of the non-discrimination law.”²⁷⁹ With regards to ART access, CONASIDA played a significant role in administering the DAI, while it also benefited from its partnership with UNAIDS. As Brousselle and Champagne state,

CONASIDA derived prestige from an alliance with UNAIDS at international and national levels (media, credit for negotiations with governmental institutions, etc.)...[and] this clearly had an effect on negotiations with the pharmaceutical companies.²⁸⁰

Therefore, despite having applied no pressure or other means of coercion, UNAIDS was able to have an impact in Chile through the DAI and lending its name to its national partner in Chile, CONASIDA. Evidently, the cases presented illustrate NGO successes within Chile. Nonetheless, it is a considerable fact that UNAIDS is not only multisectoral in its governance, but encourages multisectoral approaches in combatting HIV/AIDS at the state level.²⁸¹

²⁷⁷ *Ibid.*

²⁷⁸ B. Buzan, *From International to World Society?*, 233.

²⁷⁹ A. Brousselle and F. Champagne, “How was the UNAIDS drug access initiative implemented in Chile?,” 299.

²⁸⁰ *Ibid.*, 306

²⁸¹ UNAIDS, “Fact Sheet: UNAIDS 10-year anniversary,” 2006.

In this case, Chile was operating with a pluralist logic: it chose not to follow the DAI guidelines to the letter and in its place chose to modify it to match its needs. Thus, we see an example of a state operating with a pluralist logic regardless of its solidarist goal, as was the case with UNEP and the environment. Nevertheless, reducing HIV/AIDS prevalence in any one state will still contribute to the overall statistical reduction of the spread of HIV/AIDS.²⁸² Though this may be a cold comfort to those living in the most heavily affected regions of the globe, the experience of Chile can only help contribute to the development of best practices in the fight against HIV/AIDS. Although the actions of receiving states are important to underline, it is also important to examine the actions of both donor states and other important non-state actors in order to assess the solidarist aspect of the DAI.

Pharmaceutical Giants and HIV/AIDS

Although the success of the DAI in Chile should be lauded for the sheer fact that more people living with HIV/AIDS have access to life-sustaining drugs, its creation and development are not without their fair share of critics. As mentioned above, the DAI was developed to ensure that a greater number of people living with HIV/AIDS had access to the Antiretroviral therapies (ART) that would prolong and sustain their life. Although the goal of the DAI is not criticized, one of its major components has received a tremendous amount of criticism. In an effort to get ART to those who are in need of the treatment, UNAIDS entered into negotiations with the multinational pharmaceutical industry. The outcome was that on 11 May 2000, “five of the largest global pharmaceutical companies had agreed to ‘slash the cost of their AIDS treatment drugs for the

²⁸²S. Turner, “Global Civil Society, Anarchy and Governance: Assessing an Emerging Paradigm,” *Journal of Peace Research*, v.35 n.1 (January 1998), 31.

developing world.”²⁸³ The Health GAP (Global Access Project) coalition has criticized the DAI because

the initiative as executed by UNAIDS and the pharmaceutical industry has not made substantial progress in achieving the goal of broad, sustainable access to HIV medication in developing countries.²⁸⁴

Due to the fact that the initiative allows for bilateral agreements to be conducted between the affected state and the pharmaceutical company, GAP alleges that the pharmaceutical companies “cannot be expected to negotiate in good faith with poor countries”²⁸⁵ because “the pharmaceutical industry is explicitly driven to protect its intellectual property, and to protect and increase its profits.”²⁸⁶ The problem is not so much that large multinational pharmaceutical companies are reducing prices, it is rather that generic manufacturers “are being kept from negotiating drug price reductions as part of the UNAIDS initiative.”²⁸⁷

To illustrate the role of generic manufacturers in price reduction, one need only look at the case of the patented AIDS drug, *flucanazole* in Table 1. *Flucanazole* was developed by Pfizer, the pharmaceutical company which holds the patent to the drug. The other manufacturers mentioned in the table are generic drug manufacturers. In Thailand, *Biolab* is able to produce and sell its generic form of *flucanazole* for \$US 0.29, whereas the *Pfizer* patented version would cost \$US 6.20.

²⁸³N.K. Poku, “The Global AIDS Fund: Context and Opportunity,” *Third World Quarterly*, v.23, n.2 (April 2002), 293.

²⁸⁴Health GAP Coalition, *Questioning the UNAIDS/Pharmaceutical Industry Initiative: Seven months and counting...*, (Philadelphia: Health GAP Coalition, 2000).

²⁸⁵*Ibid.*

²⁸⁶*Ibid.*

²⁸⁷*Ibid.*

In Guatemala, the negotiated price of the generic drug from Colombia's *Bussie*, would cost \$US 3.00, while the non-negotiated *Pfizer* price for the patented version would be \$US 27.60. Although the DAI would allow states to enter into bilateral negotiations with the pharmaceutical companies, the Guatemala example clearly illustrates that even the negotiated price of \$US 11.84, for *Pfizer*'s patented *flucanazole* is still almost three times more expensive than using the generic version. Similarly, *Glaxo Wellcome* stated that it would cost \$US 2409.00 per patient per year to provide its patented *Trizivir*, while Indian pharmaceutical company, *Cipla*, would be able to provide *Triomune*, a generic version, for \$US 350.00 per patient per year.²⁸⁸ Unfortunately, as Heywood mentions, in certain countries like South Africa, "if doctors put Triomune in people's mouths, they are breaking [patent] law."²⁸⁹

²⁸⁸M. Heywood, "Drug Access, Patents and Global Health: 'Chaffed and Waxed Sufficient,'" *Third World Quarterly*, v.23, n.2 (April 2002), 223.

²⁸⁹*Ibid.*

TABLE 1

MSF comparative study of generic and patented flucanazole: wholesale prices 200mg capsules, June 2000²⁹⁰

<i>Manufacturer</i>	<i>Country of production</i>	<i>Country of distribution</i>	<i>Price per unit (US\$)</i>
<i>Biolab</i>	<i>Thailand</i>	<i>Thailand</i>	0.29
<i>Cipla</i>	<i>India</i>	<i>India</i>	0.64
<i>Bussie</i>	<i>Colombia</i>	<i>Guatemala (negotiated)</i>	3.00
<i>Pfizer</i>		<i>Thailand</i>	6.20
<i>Vita</i>	<i>Spain</i>	<i>Spain</i>	6.29
<i>Pfizer</i>		<i>South Africa</i>	8.25
<i>Pfizer</i>		<i>Kenya</i>	10.50
<i>Pfizer</i>		<i>Spain</i>	10.57
<i>Pfizer</i>		<i>Guatemala (negotiated)</i>	11.84
<i>Pfizer</i>		<i>USA</i>	12.20
<i>Pfizer</i>		<i>Guatemala</i>	27.60

The examples of *Trizovir* and *Flucanazole* demonstrate the enormous disparity in price between patented and generic drugs. The reason why UNAIDS was criticized for its role in negotiating with the Pharmaceutical MNCs was because, as Poku contends, “UNAIDS had unwittingly provided legitimacy for the pharmaceutical companies to put profits before life.”²⁹¹ However, this demonstrates both a pluralist and solidarist logic all at once. The solidarist logic is evident with regards to UNAIDS from the time it acknowledged the role that pharmaceutical MNCs had to play in the global fight against AIDS. Buzan mentions that the Market is an important

²⁹⁰C. Thomas, “Trade Policy and the Politics of Access to Drugs,” *Third World Quarterly*, v.23, n.2 (April 2002), 253.

²⁹¹N.K. Poku, “The Global AIDS Fund,” 294.

primary institution in the current cooperative Interstate Society being held in place by Western power.²⁹² Due to the primacy of the Market and economic interests, it is not surprising that UNAIDS entered into negotiations with MNCs. In a case described below, the pharmaceutical industry, with developed state assistance, can effectively obstruct the distribution of antiretroviral drugs to those who most need them. According to Thomas,

the efforts of a few developing countries to pursue legitimate strategies to secure drugs for their people at affordable prices have been obstructed by the combined might of the pharmaceutical industry, and the US government.²⁹³

The pharmaceutical industry is operating in its own best interest. Due to their incredibly powerful lobbies, they can easily “exert pressure on the US government to promote and defend their interests abroad.”²⁹⁴

The Role of NGOs in UNAIDS

Although the cooperation that is taking place between the state and the pharmaceutical industry represents cooperation between the Interstate and Transnational societies, the outcome is not particularly positive for those living and dying of HIV/AIDS. However, although pharmaceutical MNCs are members of Transnational Society, they are not the only ones. Also found within the Transnational Society are NGOs, that have been particularly vociferous in bringing to light the ties between the pharmaceutical MNCs and the state. Having already mentioned the structural integration of NGOs on the PCB of UNAIDS, it is likely to appear that with only five representatives, NGO participation is minuscule at best. Despite their small representation, NGOs

²⁹²B. Buzan, *From International to World Society*, 235.

²⁹³C. Thomas, “Trade Policy and the Politics of Access to Drugs,” 254.

²⁹⁴*Ibid.*, 257.

are still able to submit reports and recommendations to be considered by the PCB. For example, the NGO PCB delegation submitted a report that highlighted the fact that only the forty-two original signatory states had signed the Paris Declaration²⁹⁵ since 1994, and that greater action had to be taken in order to increase the involvement of people living with HIV/AIDS.²⁹⁶ Thus, the PCB was made aware of the problem and was provided with recommendations. Due to their work and experience, NGOs can provide information and recommendations that may be overlooked by the traditional state actors, and thus their contributions on the PCB are important. However, the PCB is not the only forum in which NGOs can express their concerns. In fact, in March 2005, a meeting took place where thirty-one international NGOs were able “to provide input into the development of the UNAIDS Strategy for HIV Prevention.”²⁹⁷ In this case, through an organized consultation, a greater number of NGOs were able to make recommendations to the UNAIDS program.

With the case of the DAI, it would appear as though the NGOs in UNAIDS failed, since only patented drugs were part of the final deal. And although the Health GAP coalition deplored the stance taken by UNAIDS, effectively accusing the program of acquiescing to the interests of Pharmaceutical MNCs,²⁹⁸ UNAIDS had to calculate what actions would be the most beneficial in providing drugs to those who most needed them. Because many of the Pharmaceutical MNCs are

²⁹⁵The Paris Declaration was a commitment to increase action to fight the HIV/AIDS pandemic. Among the topics covered the Paris Declaration was state support for the creation of the UNAIDS program and support for greater involvement of people living with HIV/AIDS. The list of signatories can be seen in Annex 1 at the end of this document.

²⁹⁶UNAIDS, *NGO PCB Delegation: GIPA Document*.

²⁹⁷ International HIV/AIDS Alliance, *International NGO Consultation Meeting: Input into the Development of the UNAIDS HIV Prevention Strategy*, (Brighton, UK: Queensberry House, 2005), 3.

²⁹⁸Health GAP Coalition, *Questioning the UNAIDS/Pharmaceutical Industry Initiative*.

located in the developed states and the majority of HIV/AIDS and UNAIDS funding comes from those states, it was wise to keep their interests in mind. The total core contributions to the UNAIDS program between 1995 and 2005 was \$US 909 442 559, out of which \$US 302 450 863²⁹⁹ was contributed by the states in which are headquartered the five Pharmaceutical MNCs that initially participated in the DAI.³⁰⁰ Furthermore, UNAIDS and the developing states hardest hit by the HIV/AIDS pandemic must respect the Trade Related Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPS) of the World Trade Organization (WTO).

Although developing countries 'wanted no part of reforms to intellectual property laws' a range of pressures was brought to bear to bring about their submission and a further shift of power was effected to industrialised countries.³⁰¹

According to Heywood, with TRIPS in place, pharmaceutical companies encouraged industrialized states to accuse several countries including Thailand, Brazil, Ghana, the Philippines and Kenya, of violating intellectual property rights through the use or production of generic drugs.³⁰² Thus, UNAIDS would not have been able to simply develop a drug access initiative that considered generic drug manufacturers. On the one hand, UNAIDS would have to contend with International Law and the highly litigious nature of the pharmaceutical MNCs and on the other the pharmaceutical industry could lobby states to apply pressure on UNAIDS.

²⁹⁹UNAIDS, *Donor Contribution Table - 1995 - 2005*. [Online] 15 November 2006. <http://data.unaids.org/Governance/PCB01/Core_1995-2005_en.pdf?preview=true>

³⁰⁰UNAIDS, *Report of the Meeting of the Evaluation of the UNAIDS HIV Drug Access Initiative*, (Geneva, 30-31 May 2000), 4.

³⁰¹M.P. Ryan, *Knowledge Diplomacy: Global Competition and the Politics of Intellectual Property*, (Washington, DC: Brookings Institution Press, 1998), 12, quoted in M. Heywood, "Drug Access, Patents and Global Health: 'Chaffed and Waxed Sufficient,'" *Third World Quarterly*, v.23, n.2 (April 2002), 224.

³⁰²M. Heywood, "Drug Access, Patents and Global Health," 226.

The destructiveness of TRIPS and specifically the effect that the patent laws are having on the fight against HIV/AIDS has mobilized both the NGO side of the Transnational Society and the Interhuman Society. In 1998, the Pharmaceutical Manufacturers Association (PMA) launched legal action against the government of South Africa for a piece of legislation it had introduced, not through the dispute resolution mechanism of the WTO,³⁰³ but through the Pretoria High Court in South Africa.

In effect, the legal action was an attempt by the PMA to try to use property rights in the *Constitution of the Republic of South Africa* to annex additional powers and safeguards for intellectual property (that are not part of TRIPS); to fill in some of the ambiguities in TRIPS...³⁰⁴

The consequence of having this legal challenge introduced was that the South African Ministry of Health was ill prepared to answer certain questions and concerns posed by the PMA, which led to the delay in bringing the legislation into force and providing wider access to HIV/AIDS medication to affected South African citizens.³⁰⁵ In addition to the litigation, other pressures were brought on the government of South Africa to reverse the legislation that was being disputed by the PMA in the High Court.

Although litigation had commenced, much of the substance of the dispute was thrashed out outside of the courts. For example, in 1998 pharmaceutical company lobbying was successful in having South Africa placed on the United States Trade Representatives' (USTR) 301 Watch List.³⁰⁶

³⁰³ *Ibid.*

³⁰⁴ *Ibid.*

³⁰⁵ M. Heywood, "Debunking 'Conglomo-talk': A Case Study of the *Amicus Curiae* as an Instrument for Advocacy, Investigation and Mobilisation" (paper presented at *Health, Law and Human Rights: Exploring the Connections*, An International Cross-Disciplinary Conference Honoring Jonathan M. Mann, Philadelphia, September 29 – October 1, 2001), 7.

³⁰⁶ *Ibid.*, 6.

Ultimately, being placed on the USTR 301 Watch List, was the first step in bringing about US trade sanctions on the target country. NGOs campaigned fiercely against the move, which led to the removal of South Africa from the USTR 301 Watch List a year later.³⁰⁷ In addition, NGO pressure resulted in an Executive Order from US President Bill Clinton in May 2000, which effectively prohibited the US government from applying trade sanctions on sub-Saharan states if their legislation concerning HIV/AIDS pharmaceuticals or medication are in accordance with the TRIPS agreement.³⁰⁸ In other words, a sub-Saharan African state need not go above and beyond the requirements of TRIPS and would not be pressured through the threat of trade sanctions, as was the case with South Africa.

The NGO wing of Transnational Society played a role in pressuring the Interstate Society, as was witnessed in the United States' decision to withdraw from bringing about trade sanctions on South Africa and sub-Saharan African states. Activists were involved in politicizing the issue of access during an election year in the United States.³⁰⁹ Heywood mentioned that a number of NGOs ranging from consumer, development and charity groups have been "successful in stimulating an international debate on the morality of the international patent system in its current form."³¹⁰ With mounting criticism from NGOs toward the pharmaceutical MNCs, the Interhuman Society also involved itself.

Under a barrage of criticism that led to questioning by shareholders, politicians and prominent authors such as John Le Carré, the pharmaceutical companies withdrew

³⁰⁷*Ibid.*

³⁰⁸C. Thomas, "Trade Policy and the Politics of Access to Drugs," 257.

³⁰⁹*Ibid.*, 260.

³¹⁰M. Heywood, "Drug Access, Patents and Global Health," 226.

their case against the South African government on 18 April 2001.³¹¹

Thus, with pressure from NGOs, the loss of support from states and the questioning of the pharmaceutical MNCs by elements within Interhuman Society, it led to the PMA's withdrawal of legal action.

Although the above example has very little to do with UNAIDS itself, it was pertinent to demonstrate the type of environment in which UNAIDS is operating. In order for UNAIDS to function a delicate balance between the interests of Interstate, Transnational and Interhuman societies is required. They do not, of course, always speak with one united voice. NGO participation on the PCB shows that the UNAIDS program recognizes their importance in the overall strategy. Again, Turner suggests that global civil society, of which NGOs are a part, is challenging the monopoly of authority currently held by states.³¹² Within the context described by Turner, it is likely that states would choose to reassert their authority and perhaps choose not to cooperate with NGOs with the impending menace of threat to state power states may come to suspect. Yet, despite UNAIDS empowering NGOs through their formal recognition within the program, states are still cooperating. As Buzan explains, at the cooperative level states may undertake a joint solidarist project, in which they will work together toward a common goal.³¹³ In the case of UNAIDS, the common goal is to mitigate the effects of HIV/AIDS on the global population. As stated in the Declaration of Commitment on HIV/AIDS passed by the UN General Assembly, the five priorities are :

³¹¹*Ibid.*

³¹²S. Turner, "Global Civil Society, Anarchy and Governance," 33.

³¹³B. Buzan, *From International to World Society?*, 193.

- First, to ensure that people everywhere — particularly the young — know what to do to avoid infection;
- Second, to stop perhaps the most tragic of all forms of HIV transmission — from mother to child;
- Third, to provide treatment to all those infected;
- Fourth, to redouble the search for a vaccine, as well as a cure; and
- Fifth, to care for all whose lives have been devastated by AIDS, particularly more than 13 million orphans.³¹⁴

Thus, states are cooperating not simply because they may have a vested interest in curbing the spread of HIV/AIDS, but because the disease is a common threat to all states and people. The view that HIV/AIDS is a threat to states seems to have resonated with UNAIDS, as it has chosen to adopt a more security-centred stance with regards to HIV/AIDS.

The Securitization of HIV/AIDS

Until 2001, HIV/AIDS was not widely acknowledged or publicized as a security threat. Compellingly, after examining all UNAIDS Executive Director Reports, AIDS is first referred to as a Security threat in the year 2000,³¹⁵ following the special session of the Security Council which discussed HIV/AIDS within the security context. The year that HIV/AIDS was securitized also happened to coincide with the year that the USA also began to view HIV/AIDS as a security threat.³¹⁶ The United States' declaration occurred following American intelligence reports that "the disease could trigger ethnic wars and genocide and undermine democratic governments."³¹⁷ By

³¹⁴United Nations General Assembly Special Session on HIV/AIDS, "Declaration of Commitment on HIV/AIDS," 25-27 June 2001, 1-2.

³¹⁵UNAIDS PCB, 9th Meeting, "Report of the Executive Director" UNAIDS/PCB(9)/00.2, 2 May 2000.

³¹⁶BBC News, "US: AIDS is security threat," 1 May 2000. [Online] <<http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/americas/731706.stm>>

³¹⁷*Ibid.*

adapting the language and focus of HIV/AIDS into the realm of security, UNAIDS has drawn greater attention from states. The intention behind a mention of the securitization of HIV/AIDS is made in light of the effect that such a reconceptualization had on the UNAIDS program. Examination of financial contributions to UNAIDS shows that, with the exception of a sharp decrease in 1997, funding between 1996 and 1999 are relatively stable, but increases considerably in 2000 and continues to rise every year thereafter.³¹⁸ Funding is an important factor for UNAIDS to consider in its calculations and states are the primary funding bodies for the program. States play both the role of decision-maker and financier within the UNAIDS structure, therefore it is in the program's best interest to maintain the interest of states. If state interest in HIV/AIDS wanes, there is the possibility that cuts to funding would be made. What this example demonstrates is that states are primarily concerned with their own interests. However, it also illustrates the ability of the UNAIDS program to adapt its language to suit the more pluralist logic of states for the benefit of its solidarist goal.

Thus far, I have attempted to demonstrate state solidarist logic with regards to the UNAIDS program, but the last example regarding the securitization of HIV/AIDS can really only be interpreted as pluralist. Though this might seem contrary to the argument that states are operating at a cooperative level, since it was mentioned that its major difference from the coexistence level was that it used a solidarist logic, it actually reinforces it. Buzan explains that the coexistence level flows into the cooperative level,³¹⁹ thus logically states will slowly move away from the pluralist and

³¹⁸UNAIDS, *Donor Contribution Table- 1995-2005*. Refer to Annex 2 at the end of this document.

³¹⁹B. Buzan, *From International to World Society*, 145-146.

towards the solidarist logic. Accordingly, states will not abruptly abandon Pluralism for Solidarism, they will gradually move towards the latter over time. In the case of the securitization of HIV/AIDS, states may be acting in a pluralist fashion, because they are concerned for their own security. However, as was the case with UNEP, in spite of the pluralist behaviour of states, their participation in UNAIDS demonstrates the existence of a solidarist joint project. More importantly, the ambiguity of whether a pluralist or solidarist logic is being used by states identifies that the Interstate Society has not travelled far beyond the border between the coexistence and cooperative levels. Regarding the current International Society, Buzan explains that “although this is a modestly cooperative International Society, its coexistence elements are quite deep-rooted and stable, whereas its cooperative ones as yet have shallower roots...”³²⁰

Throughout this chapter UNAIDS was used to demonstrate a cooperative level of Interstate Society. Again, the cooperative level of Interstate Society is very similar to the coexistence level, but states tend to be more solidarist. After detailed examination of state behaviour regarding a variety of HIV/AIDS projects, it is not very difficult to conclude that states act with a pluralist logic. Although this may appear to refute the claim that states interact at a cooperative level within UNAIDS and with regards to HIV/AIDS projects, it is equally justifiable to consider the role of non-state actors within the program before drawing any conclusions.

The role of non-state actors was defined and formalized within the UNAIDS program, as NGOs were given five seats on its governing body. States did not protest the formal inclusion of NGOs on the governing body, which suggests a willingness on the part of states to cooperate with non-state actors toward a solidarist project. Therefore, UNAIDS effectively established a

³²⁰*Ibid.*, 235.

framework in which both state and non-state actors could cooperate, and which would carry over into other areas concerning HIV/AIDS. Thus, the formal interaction and cooperation that states undertake with NGOs to achieve a solidarist joint project displays a cooperative level of Interstate Society.

Conclusion: Heading Towards a World Society

Drawing Conclusions through Comparison

In the last two chapters, I described in detail how both UNEP and UNAIDS figure into the model advanced by Barry Buzan in his latest work, *From International to World Society?* With both UN programs, I explained how they met the criteria of Secondary Institution as described and defined by Buzan. Both programs were created to serve a purpose in interstate relations and are effectively intergovernmental organizations.³²¹ The similarities continue with respect to the fact that both UNEP and UNAIDS were established to focus efforts on particular global problems and to mitigate the impact of Environmental degradation and HIV/AIDS respectively. However, this is where the similarities between these two programs end.

Buzan mentioned that although contemporary Interstate Society is found at the cooperative level, states act at a coexistence level when it comes to the environment. Using UNEP as an example, it was demonstrated that through its structure and the projects it undertook, states act at the level of a coexistence interstate society. States were the only actors involved in the establishment of UNEP and in negotiating the Montreal and Kyoto Protocols. Moreover, the fact that non-state actors were not given a defined role in UNEP illustrates the state-centric nature of the program. At the coexistence level, as the name suggests, states coexist and are pluralist. In a similar vein, the same methods were used to illustrate how the UNAIDS program exemplifies the cooperative interstate society. Several UN system organizations established the UNAIDS program and all of its projects have encouraged the participation of interstate, transnational and interhuman

³²¹B. Buzan, *From International to World Society?: English School Theory and the Social Structure of Globalisation* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2004), 164-165.

societies. In addition, the structure of the UNAIDS program recognized and defined the role of non-state actors by allowing them to be members of the governing body of the program. Although the role that non-state actors play in UNAIDS was not specifically granted by the states themselves, the fact that they have not protested non-state involvement illustrates that states have effectively given their permission. At the cooperative level, the behaviour of states is more solidarist than it is at the coexistence level. With this in mind, the two programs will be directly compared so that one may better grasp the subtle differences between UNEP and UNAIDS.

In terms of creation, the two programs were established in very different ways. For UNEP, it was through a series of resolutions at the UN General Assembly which brought about the program's creation. It is pertinent because states were involved in the very establishment of the program. In effect, the United Nations Environment Program seemed to have been established by the states for the use of states. With a very state-centred premise established for the program, UNEP played a major role in facilitating the negotiation of the Montreal Protocol and identifying the major issues that eventually brought about the Kyoto Protocol; two major multilateral agreements between states.

In contrast to UNEP, the UNAIDS program was created through an ECOSOC resolution and thus, not all member states of the United Nations voted directly for its creation. Furthermore the UNAIDS program was, in part, created to supplement the work of existing UN system organizations such as UNESCO, the World Bank and UNICEF among others on the question of HIV/AIDS. Effectively, UNAIDS was created to be a joint program for the UN system organizations, while it also encouraged the participation of various stakeholders, such as NGOs, by promoting broad-based, multi-sectoral approaches in dealing with HIV/AIDS. The holistic nature of UNAIDS is not limited

to its creation, it is propagated through the projects it has undertaken as well. Unlike UNEP, the UNAIDS program has never been involved in negotiating multilateral agreements between states. Rather, UNAIDS has administered various projects involving various stakeholders that include, but are not limited to, states.

As far as state actions are concerned, with regards to the environment, the evidence from Chapter 2 would suggest that developing states signed on to the Montreal Protocol because they would benefit financially from the Multilateral Fund. Despite developed states contributing to the Fund, their chemical industries stood to benefit from such an arrangement, as they would be supplying the chemical substitutes for CFCs. Concerning the Kyoto Protocol, the United States pulled out of the agreement because of the impact the protocol would have had on its economic growth, whereas the European Union's acceptance of the Protocol effectively vaulted the EU to an international environmental leadership position. These examples demonstrate calculation on the part of states. Moreover, because states are calculating what is in their own best interest, they are operating with a pluralist logic.

In the case of HIV/AIDS, UNAIDS was not involved in spearheading negotiations for binding treaties or protocols between states. In fact, there are no binding interstate treaties or protocols that currently exist to reduce global HIV/AIDS prevalence rates. Despite the absence of binding commitments, states have voluntarily participated in projects that aimed to reduce HIV/AIDS prevalence rates. However, as I pointed out in the last chapter, state participation in HIV/AIDS projects have been based on calculation. In the cases of Uganda and Senegal, their governments created structures that had been previously shown to be ineffective in order to obtain funding from one of the UNAIDS cosponsoring organizations; the World Bank. Chile obtained

funding through a UNAIDS project, but effectively ignored the project guidelines and simply incorporated the new funding into an already existing national HIV/AIDS program. Developed states, like the USA, used international trade pressures in order to protect the HIV/AIDS drug patents held by their pharmaceutical industry. Like the UNEP examples above, these examples clearly admit calculation on the part of states, as well as a very pluralist logic.

By comparing the UNEP and UNAIDS examples, it is clear that states are using calculation to determine their actions. Since the binding force behind state behaviour does not differ when examining either of the two programs, this illustrates that the binding force behind a state's behaviour does not determine the type of interstate society that is found. As mentioned in chapter 1, a cooperative society resembles a coexistence society but is more solidarist. In the above examples, states have been acting in calculated ways, thus it would seem that they could not be acting with much solidarism. However, Buzan offers an explanation to reconcile the seemingly conflicting view. He states that "the key to solidarism is what values are shared, not how/why they are shared, which will always be a mix of coercion, calculation and belief."³²² Therefore, it is indeed possible for the interstate society to be operating at a cooperative level, while individual states are using a calculating logic for self-serving purposes. So long as the solidarist goal is respected, state behaviour can be driven by pluralist objectives. For example, in the case of global warming, if the ultimate goal is to reduce GHG emissions over time, a state need not follow the Kyoto Protocol to work toward that solidarist goal. Canada's government under the Conservative leadership of Prime Minister Stephen Harper has chosen a plan of action that would see GHG emissions reduced over

³²²*Ibid.*, 153.

the next 43 years.³²³ On the one hand, the Clean Air Act would allow Canada to protect its economic interests by shielding heavily polluting industries that experience growth, while simultaneously working toward the goal of reducing GHG emissions over an extended long-term period. That said, the determining factor of whether interstate society is operating at a coexistence or cooperative level ultimately lies in the behaviour of states and not the binding forces behind state behaviour. In other words, the interstate society can be more solidarist, even if the states themselves are not.

To summarize, if a solidarist project exists, regardless of how the individual states choose to work toward that goal, interstate society is found at the cooperative level. Although the concept is perhaps difficult to comprehend, the logic lies in Buzan's quote "states live in an international society which they shape and are shaped by."³²⁴ If we take the new definition of International Society, as advanced by Buzan, then interstate society is found within it, alongside the Transnational and Interhuman societies. Buzan explains that because the interstate society is liberal, as opposed to communist or another totalitarian ideology, it is "ideologically disposed to give political and legal space to individuals and TNAs."³²⁵ Therefore, individuals and TNAs may play a role in shaping interstate society through their interactions with states.

At the outset of this thesis, I expected to use UNEP and UNAIDS as vehicles to demonstrate that states were acting at a coexistence or cooperative level, respectively. However, upon closer

³²³The government introduced its plan for GHG reductions under the name of "The Clean Air Act."

³²⁴B. Buzan, "The English School: an underexploited resource in IR.," 477.

³²⁵B. Buzan, *From International to World Society?*, 259.

examination, the binding forces³²⁶ that push states to act do not seem to change significantly when comparing the two programs. In both the UNEP and UNAIDS cases, states used calculation in order to determine their actions. Nevertheless, even in the absence of any significant change in the binding forces that drive state action, the actual behaviour of the state does in fact differ.

I support Buzan's argument that states operate with a pluralist logic and at a coexistence level with regards to the environment. My examples have shown that states do operate with a pluralist, self-serving logic. As for proving that they are operating at a coexistence level, one only needs to look at the behaviour of states by examining the role non-state actors play in UNEP. In the case of both the Montreal and Kyoto Protocols, non-state actors played no official role. Non-state actors which were tied directly to sectors of economic growth, namely the chemical and petroleum industries, may have had the ability to sway governments through lobbying efforts, but they played no defined role within UNEP or at the negotiating tables of the Protocols. The same held true for the non-state actors, such as environmental NGOs, whose goals may not have been in step with the short-term interests of the state. Although it was specified in a previous chapter that non-state actors were consulted in an advisory way, their role was never guaranteed nor codified in the establishment of UNEP. Moreover, the role of non-state actors was limited at the structural level of UNEP, and this limitation carried over into the program's aims and objectives; environmental treaties signed and ratified by states. The way in which non-state actors were treated illustrates a very state-centred approach in dealing with the environmental solidarist project. To further illustrate the state-centric approach to the environmental solidarist project is the ease with which the United States and Canada

³²⁶ According to Buzan, the term "binding forces" refers to coercion, calculation and belief. *Ibid.*, xvii.

either rejected or ignored the Kyoto Protocol. Although both the US and Canada have effectively turned their backs on the Kyoto Protocol, both states have declared their commitment to reducing air pollution based on “made at home” solutions. These two states may still be committed to the environmental solidarist project, but they have chosen to be more pluralist by setting their own goals and timetables.

In contrast to UNEP and the environment, UNAIDS exists at a different level of interstate society; that of the cooperative level. In terms of structure, the very establishment of the UNAIDS program was not done by the states themselves but by the original UN cosponsoring organizations. Furthermore, states were not recognized to be the only stakeholders. Non-state actors were not only invited for consultation, but were also given seats on the governing body of the UNAIDS program. The fact that non-state actors were given a place alongside states on the governing body of the UNAIDS program illustrates a movement away from the more pluralist coexistence society, where states are the only actors to discuss and deliberate, toward the more solidarist cooperative society, where states continue to work together despite the presence of non-state actors. Buzan explains that the movement toward the Confederative level of interstate society³²⁷ effectively creates more room for the non-state actors found in the interhuman and transnational societies.³²⁸ In other words, the more solidarist the interstate society, the greater its interaction will be with the non-state domains of transnational and interhuman societies. As I have already shown, states are acting in a pluralist and self-serving manner when it comes to the solidarist project of HIV/AIDS. However, state

³²⁷If you refer back to Figure 1 of this document, the Confederative level is the most solidarist level of interstate society.

³²⁸*Ibid.*, 198.

behaviour coupled with the increased presence of non-state actors illustrates greater solidarism as it pertains to HIV/AIDS, in comparison to that found in the area of the environment.

The presence of a solidarist project is a major tangible factor in differentiating between the very similar coexistence and cooperative interstate societies. Although both UNEP and UNAIDS are effectively solidarist projects in their own right, the terms coexistence and cooperative are used to describe the level of interaction between states. Furthermore, the increased presence and role of non-state actors displays the existence of a more solidarist interstate society. I must remind the reader that in the first chapter I stated that contemporary interstate society as a whole is found at the pluralist side of the cooperative society. The increased presence of non-state actors, alongside the fact that states continue to work together despite their presence, illustrates a more solidarist interstate society. However, the fact that states continue to work independently (pluralistically) toward a solidarist goal, effectively eliminates the possibility that contemporary interstate society is found at the Convergence or Confederate levels.

General Conclusions

The English school was used to study UNEP and UNAIDS because it offered richer explanatory possibilities for non-state actors.³²⁹ The Buzan model was specifically used, because unlike other English School models, the role of non-state actors in international relations was better defined. By creating distinct domains for states, individuals and TNAs, one could better see how the various actors interacted amongst themselves and amongst each other. While using the theoretical framework developed by Buzan, UNEP and UNAIDS were considered secondary

³²⁹UNEP and UNAIDS are not non-state actors. They were used to explore the relationship between the state and non-state actors that operated within their respective programs.

institutions. To specify, UNEP and UNAIDS were found within interstate society, established for the use of states, in order to facilitate interaction. Meanwhile, non-state actors were divided into an interhuman society, where large scale communities based on individuals' shared identities would be found, and a transnational society where NGOs and TNCs would be found.

While examining UNEP, it was outlined that interstate society was found at the coexistence level. Throughout the second chapter, the structure of UNEP as well as the projects it advanced were expanded upon. It was demonstrated that states were operating with a coexistence logic with regards to the environment, and that state actions were pluralistic and self-serving. States were shown to be calculating in determining their course of action, be it to ratify or reject a treaty, or to provide funds to a UNEP project. The absence of a defined role for non-state actors in UNEP and its projects illustrated that states were very much the only actors that matter on questions of the environment. All the evidence suggests that states do indeed operate with a coexistence logic with regards to the environment.

In the third chapter of this work, the UNAIDS program was examined in very much the same way UNEP had been. The UNAIDS structure displayed a more holistic approach to the global problem of HIV/AIDS and was specified as more solidarist than its environmental counterpart. As already mentioned, non-state actors were given a defined role on the governing body of the UNAIDS program, thus demonstrating a less state-centred approach than had been seen with UNEP. Yet, despite the relatively more solidarist behaviour of states, demonstrated through their interaction with both state and non-state actors, the binding force behind their actions were still self-serving and pluralistic. Not only did developed states uphold their economic interests by defending their pharmaceutical industries, their financial contributions to the UNAIDS program increased

considerably when HIV/AIDS was framed in the language of security. Effectively, the securitization of HIV/AIDS increased the resolve of states in combatting the pandemic, but it also displayed acts of pluralism in that states increased financial contributions when the disease was viewed as a threat to their security.

Having examined both the UNEP and UNAIDS program, an interesting and somewhat surprising observation was made. Regardless of whether the interstate society was at a coexistence or a cooperative level, states still acted in their own best interest. The binding force behind state behaviour was always calculation. Nevertheless, the assertion that the interstate society was moving in a solidarist direction could still be made. What came to be realized was that UNEP and UNAIDS display distinct time periods in the development of interstate society and by extension, international society. In the case of UNEP, which was established in 1972, states are more pluralist and operate with the assumption that solutions to environmental problems lay exclusively with the state. UNAIDS, on the other hand, was established in a more holistic way in 1994 bringing together both state and non-state actors, illustrating that solutions to the HIV/AIDS pandemic were to be found through the cooperation of various stakeholders. The differences between UNEP and UNAIDS displays a movement of the interstate society toward the more solidarist side of Buzan's model.

The title of Buzan's latest work, essentially asks the question if we are moving *From International to World Society*? In his understanding, the international society is a legal and political framework that is set by states where individuals and TNAs may participate, provided they are granted rights by the states themselves.³³⁰ In contrast, the world society is where the three domains are recognized as each having their own distinct role to play and where none are

³³⁰*Ibid.*, 201.

subordinate to the other.³³¹ By using the examples of UNEP and UNAIDS, one can see that the interstate society has moved in a solidarist direction and more importantly that non-state actors have been granted a greater role, as demonstrated in their increased presence in the latter program. In 1972, non-state actors were consulted and were recognized as being able to make important contributions to the environment, yet their participation was on an *ad hoc* basis. By 1994, non-state actors were given a voice and a defined role to play in the governance of UNAIDS. Moreover, with respect to the environment we saw that TNCs could influence states to defend their interests, whereas with regards to HIV/AIDS, TNCs were not only able to influence states, they were also able to pursue national governments through legal means. These non-state actors were given increased rights. Although the contemporary interstate society is nowhere near being considered the less than dominant domain, it is apparent that non-state actors are being recognized and given a more prominent role to play in the international society. Thus, by comparing the international society of 1972 to that of today, one can say that the general trend seems to be a movement in the direction from international to world society.

³³¹*Ibid.*, 202.

Annex 1³³²
Signatory Countries to the Paris Declaration

Argentina
Australia
Bahamas
Belgium
Brazil
Burundi
Cambodia
Cameroon
Canada
China
Côte d'Ivoire
Denmark
Djibouti
Finland
France
Germany
India
Indonesia
Italy
Japan
Mexico
Morocco
Mozambique
Netherlands
Norway
Philippines
Portugal
Romania
Russia
Senegal
Spain
Switzerland
Tanzania
Thailand
Tunisia
Uganda
United Kingdom
Vietnam
Zambia
Zimbabwe

³³²UNAIDS, *NGO PCB Delegation: GIPA Document*, 12.

Annex 2 ³²⁵DONOR CONTRIBUTION TABLE - 1995-2005
The Unified Budget (Core, in US Dollars)

Rank	DONOR	1995	1996	1997	1998	1999	2000	2001	2002	2003	2004	2005	Total
1	USA	1,500,000	18,588,500	15,430,500	15,000,000	15,000,000	15,000,000	15,000,000	18,000,000	17,800,000	25,800,000	27,150,000	182,398,000
2	Netherlands	310,559	5,847,953	5,118,162	4,875,164	6,301,800	14,964,376	20,215,871	15,478,411	41,725,287	30,187,350	29,195,542	174,233,545
3	Norway	1,128,132	2,822,882	2,315,048	3,754,585	6,920,307	7,591,031	10,752,457	15,078,962	13,877,802	16,345,878	19,078,600	97,633,986
4	United Kingdom	-	5,630,432	5,446,237	4,811,582	4,639,968	4,622,419	4,318,558	4,716,300	4,935,300	14,176,000	29,640,200	82,939,686
5	Sweden	-	6,749,142	4,533,010	4,428,941	4,411,197	4,010,584	4,595,828	7,120,062	7,244,222	18,891,100	22,768,784	82,778,960
6	Denmark	3,048,017	6,750,183	3,752,587	3,395,959	3,174,934	3,013,468	2,968,436	3,158,566	3,623,188	5,238,900	5,663,430	43,820,377
7	Japan	-	3,300,000	2,900,000	3,200,000	3,600,000	4,800,000	-	5,608,245	4,808,245	3,100,000	3,100,000	34,416,490
8	Canada	1,305,970	2,564,535	2,432,689	2,390,500	2,244,428	2,290,320	2,165,578	3,377,571	3,873,441	6,955,597	4,615,395	34,006,414
9	Belgium	1,009,671	1,895,810	1,565,128	1,799,481	1,538,526	2,669,736	3,406,866	2,252,195	3,205,444	4,263,088	4,527,808	28,294,575
10	Finland	-	228,378	582,702	365,683	710,618	1,242,125	2,500,000	6,406,947	3,456,221	4,813,478	7,017,644	27,327,706
11	Switzerland	347,828	1,705,426	1,549,286	1,841,791	1,383,948	1,271,876	2,325,581	2,868,087	3,030,303	3,200,000	3,255,814	22,378,028
12	Germany	419,580	2,291,057	1,398,844	648,409	1,633,972	884,510	828,330	2,091,708	1,421,174	1,707,875	1,421,380	14,742,539
13	Ireland	-	-	-	105,485	98,947	159,350	310,698	2,490,869	2,874,133	3,812,448	3,624,308	13,456,014
14	France	3,413,687	1,139,223	1,666,667	1,735,327	1,676,398	321,622	33,938	431,779	524,146	553,493	536,791	12,237,881
15	Italy	186,335	132,650	175,953	180,180	382,866	1,719,885	1,791,279	1,848,443	1,851,473	2,513,704	1,254,705	11,828,936
16	Australia	369,000	1,132,650	1,248,320	1,012,650	981,711	852,920	927,540	986,840	1,237,878	1,465,000	1,297,710	11,502,288
17	Luxembourg	-	272,436	278,707	316,584	425,588	427,812	424,839	582,160	704,060	939,024	1,068,812	5,479,832
18	Spain	-	520,855	167,586	171,568	515,140	184,709	323,971	297,622	339,331	408,819	353,165	3,303,595
19	Russian Federation	-	-	-	500,000	500,000	500,000	164,000	500,000	500,000	300,000	299,672	3,263,872
20	New Zealand	-	-	-	-	298,701	255,556	457,317	-	712,971	628,600	1,430,368	2,772,940
21	Switzerland (Canton de Genève)	-	368,000	328,241	302,632	298,701	-	-	-	351,145	-	-	2,359,592
22	Flanders, Belgium	-	-	-	-	-	-	390,979	255,948	333,928	863,486	-	1,844,351
23	China	-	99,985	58,985	99,979	99,985	100,000	98,980	100,000	100,000	100,000	100,000	999,914
24	Extremadura, Spain	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	606,796	-	606,796
25	Portugal	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	150,000	-	-	150,000
26	NIH (USA)	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	514,715
27	Thailand	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	504,000
28	Brazil	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	387,796
29	Austria	67,230	63,416	-	49,715	49,980	48,090	43,825	46,465	49,875	49,973	49,973	300,000
30	South Africa	-	100,000	-	-	-	100,000	-	50,000	50,000	100,000	-	255,000
31	Czech Republic	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	124,834	-	179,137
32	Andorra	-	5,000	8,000	9,000	9,450	10,000	10,570	11,627	14,432	131,022	-	131,022
33	Greece	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	17,898	25,522	121,499
34	Poland	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	106,101	-	106,101
35	South Korea	-	-	-	-	-	-	100,000	20,000	40,000	20,000	20,000	100,000
36	Monaco	-	-	5,103	4,918	7,055	7,000	7,000	10,000	10,000	10,000	-	61,076
37	Liechtenstein	-	-	-	-	-	10,000	10,000	6,311	7,862	7,813	9,475	48,281
38	Congo	-	-	-	-	-	8,000	-	-	-	-	-	8,000
39	Uganda	-	-	-	-	-	-	1,500	-	-	-	-	1,500
40	World Bank	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	12,000,000
TOTAL		13,096,007	60,192,576	51,011,063	50,685,247	57,003,289	67,215,179	74,674,761	91,948,663	122,541,891	149,509,874	171,544,099	969,422,559

³²⁵UNAIDS. "Donor Contribution Table - 1995-2005." [Online] 9 September 2006.
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