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THE KINGDOM OF GOD AS ULTIMATE CONTEXT FOR
HUMAN GROWTH

A THEOLOGICAL ANALYSIS OF ERIK H. ERIKSON'S
PSYCHOLOGY OF HUMAN GROWTH

by Mary Patricia McCarney, C.N.D.

Thesis submitted to the School of
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Mary Patricia McCarney, Ottawa, Canada, 1978.

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CURRICULUM STUDIORUM

Mary Patricia McCarney, C.N.D., was born May 30, 1929, in Burritt's Rapids, Ontario. She received her secondary education at Notre Dame Convent, Ottawa, her B.A. degree from the University of Ottawa in 1958, her H.S.A. from the Ontario College of Education in 1959. Following sixteen years of teaching at the secondary school level, she obtained her M.A. in Theology from the University of Notre Dame, Indiana, in 1967. From the Faculty of Theology at St. Francis Xavier University, Antigonish, Nova Scotia, she entered the Graduate School as candidate for Ph.D. in Religious Studies at the University of Ottawa. She is currently a full-time faculty member in the Department of Philosophy and Religious Studies, King's College, London, Ontario.

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INTRODUCTION

At the center of Christian life and belief is the person of Jesus Christ. Herein lies the uniqueness of the Christian view of life and response to it. The present work intends to bring together the experience of human growth and the teaching of Jesus; more specifically his proclamation of the Kingdom of God contained in the New Testament. Two questions underlie this study: Is it psychologically valid to respond to the call of the Christian way of life? Is Jesus Christ significant for the experience of human becoming? In other words, is a genuine Christian experience an authentic experience of human growth? And can a Christian theological view of human life be relevant in the lives of contemporary men and women?

These questions need to be raised forthrightly and realistically within the Christian Church today. The explicit mission assumed by Vatican II for the Church in the modern world is "to illuminate the mystery of man and to cooperate in finding the solution to the outstanding problems of our time."¹ These questions have a special urgency for the pastoral ministry and for religious education. They deal

¹ "Pastoral Constitution on the Church in the Modern World," Documents of Vatican II (Walter M. Abbott, Ed.; J. Gallagher, Trans.), New York, American Press, 1966, p. 209.

with expectations for self-actualization in an age when the human sciences purport to have opened the way to human fulfillment by their unprecedented insights into and control over the inner and outer depths and heights of human possibility. At the same time, individuals are trying to make sense out of themselves and their lives. Many deal with a deep sense of isolation, of personal futility and disintegration. Rollo May, among others, has concluded that the critical human anxiety in this age is fear of powerlessness.² Erik H. Erikson situates the human struggle in the quest for self-identity: Who am I? How can I become a fulfilled human being?³ Viktor Frankl has demonstrated the psychological necessity of a meaning for life,⁴ Paul Tillich, the struggle for courage to be.⁵ Erikson's comprehensive description of how human beings learn to actualize their lives has delivered the unambiguous imperative to ask what kind of world view can guarantee to each human that is born the fundamental

2 Rollo May, Existential Psychotherapy, Canada, CBC Publications, 1966, 1-62 p.

3 Erik H. Erikson, Life History and the Historical Moment, New York, Norton, 1975, Chap. I, "Identity Crisis in Autobiographic Perspective," p. 17-ff.

4 Viktor E. Frankl, Man's Search for Meaning, An Introduction to Logotherapy, New York, Washington Square Press, 1953, ix-222 p.

5 Paul Tillich, The Courage To Be, New Haven, Yale University Press, 1952, viii-197 p.

capacity to hope. Erikson also convincingly shows that questions about the possibilities and the limits, the meaning or futility of the human enterprise are critical in our world where resources for total self-destruction are readily at hand. Ernest Becker, however, concluding his synthesis of contemporary human sciences, feels bound to accept the tragic character of human life: "There is simply no way to transcend the limits of the human condition or to change the psychological structural conditions that make humanity possible."⁶ He adds:

A project as grand as the scientific mythical construction of victory over human limitation is not something that can be programmed by science. The most that any of us can seem to do is fashion something--an object or ourselves--and drop it into the confusion, make an offering of it, so to speak, to the life force.⁷

The purpose of this research is to establish what a theological view of existence has to say in this context. Does the dogma of Christian belief, the one pertaining to Jesus Christ, have anything humanly significant to speak into the real situation and the real crisis of human life enlightened, as it is, in this final quarter of the twentieth century? More specifically, can the Christian way of life be an appropriate option for one committed to the pursuit of human fulfillment?

⁶ Ernest Becker, The Denial of Death, New York, Free Press, 1973, p. 277.

⁷ Ibid., p. 285.

This work will be a comparative study in the form of a dialogue between theology and psychology. It will examine first the central theological data in the teaching of Jesus, his proclamation of the Kingdom of God, as found in the Synoptic Gospels. The intention is to surface the basic human dynamics that underlie and structure life when it is lived in response to what Christians believe Jesus taught about the Kingdom of God. Then will follow an enquiry into psychology's view of the processes of human growth as shown in the work of Erik H. Erikson. Again the study will focus on the dynamics structuring the fundamental development of human life. It will then be possible to draw a comparison between these two ways of conceptualizing human existence. This will be done by way of three descriptive categories--wholeness, mutuality, change: general concepts capable of embracing the dynamic realities of human experience that will be described by the partners in dialogue here--theology and psychology. The hypothesis of this work is that the call of the Kingdom of God given by Jesus is a call to authentic human growth. A consideration of the further question of theology's contribution to human self-understanding will conclude this research.

The psychoanalyst, Erik Erikson, has established the importance of the meaning systems of one's society in the process of human development. Psychology, recognizing the

significance of religious dogma in the structuring of personality, has shown the need to clarify and purify religious beliefs and practices. The psychologist of religion, Antoine Vergote, explains the importance of the religious message in the development of the religious attitude, which he defines as follows: that conscious, firm and lived grasp of beliefs resulting from the differentiation and personal organization of what is understood and accepted by the subject, the religious person.⁸ Critical, then, to the understanding of human life that includes the Christian religious response is the examination of the content and demands of the beliefs that shape it. Hence the present work presents a theological analysis of a significant symbol for Christian belief--Kingdom of God, in terms of its meaning for human growth as this is viewed by Erik H. Erikson. The study thus initiates a search for the possibilities inherent in this Christian symbol for the structuring of psychological energies.

Admittedly, at its inception, psychology related to Freud's analysis of religion as a universal compulsive neurosis to be cured in a therapeutic psychoanalysis of culture. At the same time, theology, recovering, under the

⁸ Antoine Vergote, The Religious Man, A Psychological Study of Religious Attitudes (Marie-Bernard Said, Trans.), Dublin, Gill and Macmillan, 1969, Chap. IV.

Barthian influence, from the inroads of Liberal Protestantism, and circumscribed by the Roman Catholic Anti-Modernist trends, considered the developing science of psychology as an arch enemy to religious belief in Revelation and to religious practice. Religion, theology insisted, is based on neither an illusion nor on a feeling of utter dependency. Its sources are divine revelation and faith, neither of which is proper data for psychology. Nevertheless, the developments that took place during the twentieth century in both psychology and theology have opened new doors to the kind of dialogue proposed for this work.

Christian theology in the twentieth century represents an attempt to bring the classical and orthodox in Christian thought together with the exalted view of man in the process of radical secularization.⁹ The earlier confident liberal theology was found wanting in the disasters of World War I, and Protestant efforts were the first to meet this failure. These had christological and ecclesiological emphases that were to liberate. Through the fifties they prepared for a theology that examined what God in Jesus Christ intended for human life, and what the Churches were called to be in a world where human attention was increasingly directed from the world beyond to this world and to

⁹ For an introductory review: Roger Lincoln Shinn, New Directions in Theology Today, Vol. VI. Man: The New Humanism, Philadelphia, Westminster Press, 1968, 207 p. Also New Theology, Vols. I-IV (Martin E. Marty, Ed.) New York; Macmillan, 1964-67.



this time.¹⁰ A new and radical theology emerged out of the early sixties, a theology prepared for by Dietrich Bonhoeffer's man come of age, by Rudolph Bultmann's demythologized Gospel for existential man, and by Paul Tillich's God, the ground of all being. A restatement of the meaning of Christian faith without reference to the transcendent was sought by the radical theologians. It was the period of the death-of-God talk, a kind of theological anarchy and confusion, a time of purging for the Christian Churches, all too slow to come to grips with the human dilemma. The late sixties saw a move beyond the wholly secular to combine the humanist and the theologian, an affirmation of man and the transcendence of God in theologies of hope and becoming. These themes continued into the seventies when the phenomena of oppression, of poverty and the poor, have given rise to a theology of liberation.¹¹ What is important here is that contemporary Christian theology has assumed the task of explaining that God's place in human life is not something extrinsic, but is constitutive of it. In the words of E. Schillebeeckx, the

¹⁰ This work includes, among others: K. Barth, Reinhold Niebuhr, D. Bonhoeffer, P. Tillich, J. Maritain, P. Teilhard de Chardin, K. Rahner, E. Schillebeeckx, Wm. Van der Marck, Vatican II.

¹¹ For example, the work of J. Moltmann, G. Baum, and G. Gutierrez.

human person is "a free being who must define himself in and towards the world in dialogue with God,"¹²

At the same time, psychology, after Freud, experienced a transformation that contains the implication of an openness to a complementation from theology. Alfred Adler, Carl Jung, and Otto Rank were among the initiators of this process of development.¹³ It has meant the freeing of psychoanalytic theory from the closed, reductive analysis, related only to libidinal drive, imposed by Freud, to enter, by psychoanalytic methods, into the intuitive, spontaneous and creative sources of human experience. Humanistic psychology today is characterized by dynamic, constructive, enlarged perspectives. Positing a natural tendency to self-actualization and to full human development, these psychologists seek to understand the processes of human actualization in those meaningful life experiences that lie beyond instinctual bondage, development and socialization.¹⁴ Abraham Maslow's psychology is one

12 Edward Schillebeeckx, God and Man (Edward Fitzgerald and Peter Tomlinson, Trans.), New York, Sheed & Ward, 1968, p. 214. Also, Robert O. Johann, Building the Human, New York, Seabury, 1968, p. 89-92.

13 Cf. Ira Progoff, The Death and Rebirth of Psychology, An Integrative Evaluation of Freud, Adler, Jung and Rank, and the Impact of Their Insights on Modern Man, New York, McGraw-Hill, 1959, viii-275 p.; Erikson, Life History and the Historical Moment, p. 48 ff.

14 Peter Homans judges this trend one that opens the religious dimension of life to psychological enquiry: "Toward a Psychology of Religion: By Way of Freud and Tillich," Zygon: Journal of Religion and Science, Vol. 2, No. 1, 1967, p. 109 ff.

example. It searches out the growing tip of human life experiencing such Being-cognition values as beauty, truth, goodness.¹⁵ Otto Rank explores the psychological dynamics of the spontaneity and creative impulses of the artist and of art.¹⁶ The utopia of humanistic psychology today resides in an understanding of the truth and possibility for human existence that is open to all reality.

These are some of the thrusts in contemporary theological and psychological enquiry. It would seem that dialogue is now possible, one that is realistic and meaningful.¹⁷ When, theology, out of its own sources--revelation and faith--describes what is theologically real in the life of the

15 Abraham H. Maslow, Toward a Psychology of Being (2nd ed.), New York, Van Nostrand, c. 1962, xiii-240 p.; Frank G. Goble, The Third Force, The Psychology of Abraham Maslow (Foreword by Abraham Maslow), New York, Pocket Books, c. 1970, xiv-208 p.

16 Otto Rank, Art and Artist, Creative Urge and Personality Development, New York, Knopf, 1932.

17 This dialogue is in fact occurring. E.g., E. Mark Stern and Bert G. Marino, Psychotheology, Paramus, Newman, 1970, 146 p.; David G. Duncombe, The Shape of the Christian Life, Nashville, Abingdon, 1969, 208 p.; T. A. McConnell, The Shattered Self: The Psychological and Religious Search for Selfhood, United Church Press, 1971; S. Doniger (Ed.), The Nature of Man in Theological and Psychological Perspectives, New York, Harper & Bro., 1962. Also, two doctoral theses at the University of Ottawa, Canada: James J. Forsyth, Faith as Transformation: A Comparative Study of the Dynamics of Human Growth and the Christian Act of Faith, 1972; Maureena P. Fritz, Revelation and Self-Understanding: A Comparative Study of Gabriel Moran and Carl Rogers, 1971; also, Paul Tillich, The Dynamics of Faith, New York, Harper, 1958, 134 p.; Homans, "Toward a Psychology of Religion: By Way of Freud and Tillich," p. 104-108.

believer, theology can then look to psychology for a critique of its psychological validity. That is to say, psychology, while abstracting from the question of the ontological reality of the object of belief, can offer a critique of the relevance of belief for authentic human growth. In other words, in this dialogue, psychology has something to say to theology: whether what theology says or implies about human existence (although not what it says about that which transcends human existence) is consistent with what psychology considers essential for growth and maturity. Therefore, the focus of the present work is not the Kingdom of God, as such, but the believer's experience of it. This aspect of the Kingdom of God is open to psychological analysis. On the other hand, the understanding of human existence which theology presents may well have insights to offer psychology regarding possibilities for human life that is open to theological reality. Hence this study will also focus on the fact that, for the believer, the theological reality of the Kingdom of God introduces into his experience a context for human growth which is consistent with the psychologically real, but transcends psychological verification. This added context, it will be argued, introduces new possibilities for that kind of human growth that psychology holds to be authentic.

The common ground in this dialogue is human experience. The task of psychology is to apply its own

methods to the resetting of dislocations occurring within the human processes. Its techniques are necessary to identify the sources of human unfreedom and alienation, its insights to guide creative planning for human development. Theology's task is to proclaim "the gracious process by which men are saved,"¹⁸ and so the possibilities for human life. Neither discipline has any human value unless it reveal and effectuate within the limits of its own being, the meaning and hope in human life.¹⁹ It must be very clear, however, that such a dialogue presupposes fidelity to the principles of methodology in each discipline. Theology has no commitment to prove the ontological reality of what is proposed. What may be possible, however, is a theological analysis of human life that is psychologically real. It is important to determine whether a theological understanding of life has insights for human self-understanding. Such is the purpose of the present work which seeks to explore the psychological validity in real life of the theological view of a believer's response to Christian faith in Jesus.

18 Gregory Baum, "Styles of Theological Reflection for the Future," Theology Today, Vol. 28, No. 3, October 1971, p. 358; cf. also, Henri Bouillard, "Human Experience as Starting-Point for Fundamental Theology," Concilium, Vol. 6, No. 1, June 1965, p. 42-49, a brief, convincing statement of this view.

19 So Ira Progoff, Erik H. Erikson.

This study will be confined to the Jesus of history of the Synoptic Gospels, reconstructed and available today by way of critical biblical scholarship.²⁰ This choice is not an arbitrary one. Christian theology does not hold that God's Revelation and Christian faith were secretly implanted into the world in its creation, nor are their origins to be found in a development of doctrine. Rather, they broke, so to speak, into history by way of the experience of Israel and the earthly Jesus of Nazareth. Theological documents, including the Bible, and theological dogmas are attempts to conceptualize and to unpack the experience of what was seen and heard and believed. Christians, however, especially Roman Christians, have become accustomed to the formulae and concepts that express their belief. Consequently, the experience to which these were intended to point is all too often lost, or was never known.²¹

²⁰ Christologies are available bringing together biblical critical scholarship and theology: e.g., Bruce Vawter, This Man Jesus, New York, Doubleday, 1973, 216 p.; Piët Schoonenberg, The Christ, London, Sheed & Ward, 1969, 191 p.; Oscar Cullman, The Christology of the New Testament (rev. ed.), Philadelphia, Westminster, 1963, c. 1959, 342 p. However, in line with the direction intended for this work, its foundations have been sought in what may be termed a biblical theology available in the work of Rudolf Schnackenburg, Gerhard Van Rad (where enlightening, also Joachim Jeremias, Norman Perrin, Walter Zimmerli).

²¹ A study of the problem of religious language and dogma is succinctly given by Wilhelmas Antonius Luijpen, What Can You Say About God Except "God", New York, Paulist 1971, vii-88 p.

The contemporaries of Jesus did not hear the Good News of Jesus in dogmatic formulations. They experienced him and heard what he had to say. An aim of this study is to allow the fundamental experience of Jesus' contemporaries to disclose itself, and with it the basic dynamics that structure Christian life. The Jesus of Easter and of the community of belief, the Church, are subsequent, although essentially related matters. Admittedly, the Synoptics cannot be theologically neutral, written as they were out of the faith experience of the Resurrection events. But belief in the Christ of the Easter proclamation of the Acts and Epistles, and belief in the Christ of Christian dogma are organically and dynamically grounded in the experience of Jesus of Nazareth. There can be no realistic Resurrection faith, and there is no Christological statement without the Jesus of history.

In the synoptic version of the Christ-event the center of interest is neither the personality of Jesus, nor Christological statements. It is the work and teaching of Jesus among the people. Further, contemporary biblical scholarship witnesses the fact that the central aspect of that work, its focal point, is the Kingdom of God. The description of Jesus as Proclaimer of the Kingdom of God, best describes his historical appearance. That Jesus should preach about the Kingdom was not in itself unique in his

time. What was unique is that it is his announcement of the Kingdom which gives to his teaching "its coherent basis, its significance and its urgency."²²

The synoptics also show that Jesus' teaching, his work and his person are subordinated to the dynamic reality of the Kingdom of God. The tradition shows that Jesus announced the Kingdom of God, related to it, defined himself and his work by this relation, and challenged others to do the same. Consequently, if Jesus is to be taken seriously, it is necessary, first of all, to comprehend what he meant by the Kingdom of God, and how one is expected to relate to it.

Accordingly, the purpose of Chapters I to IV is to explore Jesus' proclamation of the Kingdom of God. What is the fundamental reality to which this concept is to point? What are the human dynamics in the experience of relating to that reality? This will, therefore, be a rediscovery of fundamental aspects of Jesus' understanding of human life.²³

²² Rudolf Schnackenburg, God's Rule and Kingdom (John Murray, Trans.), Montreal, Palm, 1963, p. 78. This description of Jesus, attributed to Rudolf Bultmann, is generally accepted.

²³ However, this work does not intend a Jesus whose total meaning is in the new understanding he gives of human existence, i.e., the emphasis on his humanity does not exclude divinity. A continuity is affirmed between Jesus of history--Christ of faith.

Having delineated theology's view of the dynamic realities fundamental to human life when it is lived in relation to the Kingdom of God as announced by Jesus, this study will then turn to psychology's view of the basic dynamics operative in human growth. The work of the ego psychologist Erik H. Erikson will be the source here. His is a comprehensive theory of human growth that lends itself to the purpose of this enquiry. Some of the reasons for the selection of Erikson follow.

Erikson's conceptualization of human development represents an important synthesis of theories of personality and of insights into human experience from a variety of human sciences. His description of how a person takes hold of his humanity brings into one comprehensive system the enduring insights of the Freudian, the neo-Freudian and the self-deterministic existential viewpoints. It is a developmental and a normative study about the dynamic structuring of fully actualized human life.²⁴

Anna Freud once remarked to Erikson that perhaps what psychoanalysis needs is someone who can make others see.²⁵ That is exactly what Erikson has done. He refused

²⁴ Cf. Erikson, Life History and the Historical Moment, Part 1; also Robert Coles, Erik H. Erikson, The Growth of His Work, Boston, Little, 1970, xxi-440 p.

²⁵ Erikson, Life History and the Historical Moment, p. 30.

to be bound by an ideology or imprisoned by the letter of any system of thought, including Freud's theory about the mind. He immersed himself in the experience of human life to observe, question, reflect, and observe again. Then, tentatively but firmly Erikson painted what he saw in lectures, essays, monographs, and books.

In 1895, with the publication of Studies in Hysteria by Freud at the age of forty-three, the psychoanalytic movement was born.²⁶ By 1939 it had become a widespread intellectual movement and had undergone a major overhaul. By 1950 this movement had suffered both the inevitable fate of hard, narrow dogmatism and, conversely, a revitalization in the work of creatively faithful followers. Erikson is one of these. He has given new life to the psychoanalytic movement by means of its own method, Freud's method: observation, questions, tentative answers tested and re-tested.²⁷ By 1977 Erikson has confronted the psychoanalytic world with questions and data which, at times, few have dared to raise. In so doing, he has amplified psychoanalytic theory and now invites his colleagues to accept the ethical responsibility that arises when secrets about human life

26 Ernest Jones, Sigmund Freud, Life and Work (3 vols.), London, Hogarth, 1956-67, Vol. I, p. 277.

27 Some critical analysis of Freud's work is found in: Progoff, The Death and Rebirth of Psychology, Chap. 1 and 2; Erikson, Life History and the Historical Moment, Part I, Chap. II and III.

have been uncovered. His own continuing reflections on such contemporary issues as authority, sexuality, drugs, violence, youth, parents, women, the new American identity, these witness to the authenticity of his own ethical concerns. They also demonstrate the relevance of the psychoanalytic method of enquiry.

Erikson was especially gifted for his mandate to see. In his youth, an artist of no small talent, he was a wanderer, restless, looking to "measure man's spirit,"²⁸ yet unable to circumscribe his grasp of it within any one profession. He continued to "wander," with progressively clarifying purpose, into the world of Freud and psychoanalysis in Vienna, into the human dilemmas in the worlds of Harvard and Berkley, into the reserves of American Sioux and Yurok, into the submarines and internment camps of World War II, into the worlds of Hitler, Luther, Gandhi, and of America as it shapes a new identity. There he heard, saw, felt. He reflected, tested, and revealed human becoming.

Erikson situates his reader in that existential space where the concrete realities of the biology and of the psyche of individual human life, and the realities of society, culture, the world, and history intersect. There, human life

²⁸ Coles, Erik H. Erikson, The Growth of His Work, p. 15. For Erikson's own analysis of his identity, cf. Erikson, Life History and the Historical Moment, p. 17-47.

is experienced. In that space, one can observe what happens when the human being perceives, meets, and experiences the environment. What is seen is that in this meeting the life processes happen, the individual life happens, the mystery of the person happens. Erikson affirms these three contexts--the biological, the mental, the social, and absolutizes none. They are seen to be dynamically interlocking, and subordinated to--rather, they are transcended by--the reality of the mystery that takes place, the mystery of becoming a person. It is within the realities of this space that theology places human life.

Erikson paints as a clinician, an ego psychologist, an orthodox Freudian. But he is a clinician who brings his clinical knowledge and methods into the events, the history, the field of life forces in individual life, and asks what happens, and where and why. Erikson is a clinician who remains forever respectful before the ways that human life emerges, searching to see, without making those kinds of predictions that can too easily predetermine what will be seen. He is a clinician who demonstrates that the human is born with only the capacity to learn to hope. He challenges society to assume responsibility of making possible what can be hoped for. And, it is to be shown, Christian religious response pertains to these specifically human ways.

The relevance of Erikson's work for this study is further demonstrated in his study of two religious men, Luther and Gandhi.²⁹ Erikson does not share Freud's clinical analysis of religion--a collective neurosis to be cured. He views religion positively, as one of man's institutions, as he does those transferences and regressive trends that occur in religious life. He judges that these can be of service to healthy development. On the other hand, he is fully aware of the psychologically destructive potential in organized religion and practice. Erikson does not want to approach the psychoanalysis--religion dichotomy "like a man with a chip on each shoulder."³⁰ He makes it clear that, whereas psychology "endeavors to establish what is demonstrably true in human behavior,"³¹ and religion "elaborates on what feels profoundly true even though it is not demonstrable,"³² he will analyze, psychologically, any phenomena which his discipline recognizes to be "dependent on man's demonstrable psychic structure."³³ So, Erikson traces the

²⁹ Erik H. Erikson, Young Man Luther, A Study in Psychoanalysis and History, New York, Norton, 1958, 288 p.; Erik H. Erikson, Gandhi's Truth, On the Origins of Militant Nonviolence, New York, Norton, 1969, 476 p.

³⁰ Erikson, Young Man Luther, A Study in Psychoanalysis and History, p. 21.

³¹ Ibid.

³² Ibid.

³³ Ibid.

development in the person and in the work of Luther and Gandhi. They are case histories, so to speak, to verify Erikson's own conclusions about the complex, essential interrelatedness of the processes of growth and of society and of history. He calls this psycho-history. However, religion was an element in that history, and these studies show the possibility for meaningful dialogue between psychology and theology.

They demonstrate, first of all, how a clinician can explore the religious dimension in individual and cultural life without violating the principles of methodology. His preoccupation is not with the validity of dogma. It is, Erikson states, with the "spiritual and intellectual milieu which the isms of his [Luther's] time--and these isms had to be religious--offered to his passionate search."³⁴

These studies also establish an important concern for theology. A person's religious development does not arise out of a vacuum, nor do theologizing and the significant individual and cultural changes in religious directions. These are events that cannot occur independently of the facts of biology, psychic makeup and historical moment. These facts can never be considered secondary in religious life and development. So it is that Erikson's work can bring

34 Ibid., p. 22.

essential documentation to a theology that seeks to acknowledge divine action, not only in the great cosmic phenomena, but also in the human life processes. The developmental perspective he provides is an important one for theology's formulation of a doctrine of man that would respect the facts of the entire life span and offer insight into its critical moments.

The study of Luther raises another important issue: the influence on personal development that religion can have in its function as a source of ideology. Ideology, here, designates the psychological need for a world image that provides an integrated frame of reference intended to clarify and support a changing sense of identity. Ideologies are useful only insofar as they serve self-actualization. The impact on Luther of religion as ideology, experienced by way of the theological formulations and practices of his day, is closely analyzed by Erikson. And theology's responsibility is thereby surfaced. If theology is to be relevant for human life, its conceptualizations of reality need to be constantly under review. This is not a call from psychology for reductionist theology. It might be a plea addressed to theology to return to the experience to which its dogmas, practice, and symbols intend to point.

Chapter I will establish the fundamental nature of the reality announced by Jesus: the Kingdom of God is a

concept designating the dynamic of divine activity within the human situation. This is an element that is to be taken into account in human existence. Chapter II will show more specifically that Jesus intended his proclamation to identify the eschatological inbreak of the divine activity.

Chapters III and IV will then study the fundamental dynamics that structure human life when lived in relatedness to the Kingdom of God. Chapters V and VI will turn to the study of human growth in the psychology of Erik H. Erikson. First, a brief introduction of Erikson will show the development of his thought and method, and his place in the psychoanalytic movement. Then, Erikson's theory of human becoming will be studied to discover the basic dynamics that structure the processes of self-actualization and self-fulfillment.

Finally, in Chapter VII, a comparison will be made of these two ways of conceptualizing human experience, and conclusions established.

CHAPTER I

KINGDOM OF GOD: A CONCEPT OF DIVINE ACTIVITY

The activity of God in history is the very heart of the concept, Kingdom of God. In fact, within the religious tradition experienced by Jesus and to which he spoke, God's active presence in human affairs is the dynamic core of what this term embraces.

This chapter initiates an exploration into what Jesus meant by the Kingdom of God which he announced. First, a brief study of the term kingdom will point to a dynamic active meaning as it appears in relationship to God in the biblical texts. Kingdom designates the activity of God. This fact leads, in the second place, to a search for the matrix of this notion, the biblical view of God. It becomes clear that the God portrayed by the Old Testament is God involved in the life and events of Israel. In fact, the history of Israel's existence is a history of God's action in her life. Here is the focus of the Old Testament account which is in effect Israel's statement of faith about herself. Third, a brief account will be made of the emergence of this symbol in the religious consciousness of Israel giving expression to this understanding of God. Then will follow the clarification which Jesus brings to the concept, Kingdom of God. What emerges is that Jesus applied the notion to the

events of his own ministry and in this way demonstrated his understanding of them. In Jesus' view, a real dynamic is operative. It is the activity of God that he sees at work. For Jesus, the Kingdom of God is the reality of divine action in the human situation. Thence it is an element of that situation that requests being taken into account.

1. The Term, Kingdom.

The first question is: what is the biblical meaning of the term kingdom? In modern western idiom, kingdom primarily denotes a realm, a dominion governed by a king. On the other hand, in ancient and contemporary oriental thought, kingdom designates not a state, but a sovereignty, a rule over a given territory, not the territory itself.¹ Are we dealing, then, with realm, or rule, or both? Is kingdom, in the bible, a static or a dynamic reality?

The key to the biblical term kingdom lies in the denoted meaning of the Hebrew noun, malkuth, rendered kingship. A shift from the fundamental sense has occurred when malkuth connotes "the concrete sphere of power."² Further

1 Gustaf Dalman, The Words of Jesus [Words]*, (authorized Eng. version by D. M. Kay, trans. of Die Worte Jesus, c. 1898), Edinburgh, Clark, 1902, p. 24. *Abbreviations for citing titles of books or articles will appear in this form in the first complete citation in each chapter.

2 Gerhard Von Rad, "βασιλευς," [Basileus], in Theological Dictionary of the New Testament (Gerhard Kittel and Gerhard Friederich, Trans. & Eds.), Grand Rapids, Mich., Eerdmans, 1964-76 (10 vols.), Vol. I, p. 570.

the oldest designation of its Greek counterpart, basileia, is the nature and state, the dignity and power of the king. The secondary meaning is the sphere or realm where kingship extends.³

In the Old Testament,⁴ malkuth is ordinarily a secular concept, found in the later books, for example, 1 Samuel 20:31, 1 Kings 2:12, and rarely in post-biblical Jewish literature. Prior to Daniel there was little transference of this concept to the religious world. Occasionally the designation is the sphere of God's power, his empire. These, however, are found in descriptions that portray the kingly power and activity of God as king. Psalm 145:11 ff. is one such description.⁵ There God's kingdom is praised in statements about divine acts of power, of love, of saving. As Norman Perrin observes:

it [the Kingdom of God] is that which God does wherein it becomes evident that He is king. It is not a place or community ruled by God; it is not even the abstract idea of reign or kingship of God. It is quite concretely the activity of God as king.⁶

In apocalyptic and intertestamental writing, this religious expression is rare. When it does appear it designates

3 Schmidt, Basileus, p. 579.

4 Cf.: Von Rad, Basileus, p. 570-571; Dalman, Words, p. 94, 134-139; Kuhn, Basileus, p. 571-574.

5 Cited by Norman Perrin, Rediscovering the Teaching of Jesus [Rediscovering], New York, Harper, 1967, p. 55.

6 Ibid.

the reality and manifestations of the power and ruling activity of God.⁷

'In later Jewish literature the use of malkuth shamayim strikingly reveals the dynamic content of Kingdom of God. Rendered Kingdom of the Heavens, it is used there to replace God is King, and its variants. This is not a transfer of a secular usage to the religious world as in the case of king and kingdom. Rather, it is a theological construct, formed in later Judaism, to avoid the use of the divine name. K. G. Kuhn points out that this derivation of malkuth shamayim, which always retained its pure religious sense of God's kingly being,

makes it immediately apparent that (malkuth shamayim) can never mean the kingdom of God in the sense of territory ruled by Him. For the expression denotes the fact that God is King, i.e. His kingly being or kingship.⁸

The linguistic evidence is that Kingdom of God is an expression that would symbolize, for Jesus' audience, the divine

7 Norman Perrin, The Kingdom of God in The Teaching of Jesus [Kingdom], London, SCM Press, 1963, p. 168-170. Cf. p. 178-181 for a discussion of the seven, possibly nine, occurrences of Kingdom of God in apocalyptic literature. Perrin shows that in five, the content is God's intervention in history and human experience, in two, possibly four, it is the final state to which this intervention of God leads. This usage in apocalyptic surfaces the dynamic nature of the expression, Kingdom of God.

8 Kuhn, Basileus, p. 571-572.

activity in ruling unless Jesus were to change it.⁹ The evidence of the New Testament is that he did not.

The phrase Kingdom of God is characteristic of the Synoptics. Mark uses it 14 times, Luke 31, Matthew 3. The Jewish alternative, Kingdom of Heaven, is preferred in Matthew where it occurs 31 times. It is generally accepted by modern critical scholarship that the evangelists regard these terms as synonymous.¹⁰ Moreover, the primary meaning, God's sway or kingly power, is retained in the New Testament. A review of its use there reveals that this term is used in statements about the dynamic of the being and action of God in his kingly rule among man, or about the call and claim of that rule within the affairs of man.¹¹

9 Rudolf Schnackenburg, God's Rule and Kingdom [God's Rule], Freiburg, Herder, 1963, p. 13; for bibl. cf. Schmidt, Basileus, p. 580, n. 68; for e.g. from Old Testament [OT] and Jewish Literature, Dalman, Words, p. 94. A contrary view is, Sverre Aalen, "'Reign' and 'House' in the Kingdom of God in the Gospels," in New Testament Studies [NTS], Vol. 8, 1962, p. 215-240. Rejecting the dynamic view, his thesis is unconvincing--it absolutizes one aspect of the Kingdom (its 'present' reality), distorting the whole.

10 Raymond E. Brown and David M. Stanley, "Aspects of New Testament Thought," in Jerome Biblical Commentary [JBC] (R. E. Brown, et al., Eds.), Englewood Cliffs, N.J., Prentice-Hall, 1968, sec. 78:96; see also, Schmidt, Basileus, p. 582; and Joachim Jeremias, New Testament Theology [Theology], London, SCM Press, 1971, p. 31-35.

11 For such an analysis: Schmidt, Basileus, p. 581 ff. The present study maintains the term "Kingdom of God," rather than Schnackenburg's "God's Rule," cf. God's Rule, p. 354. This choice intends to stress one aim of the present work: to offer a clarification of the concept in its familiar usage.

In summary, scholarly opinion finds a predominance of the basic designation, rule, in the biblical application of kingdom to God. The concept, Kingdom of God, connotes God's active rule, the divine sovereignty in action. The question, what kind of God was the object of Israel's belief and confession, arises. The Kingdom of God in the teaching of Jesus plunges one into the very life stream of Israel's experience and view of God, the matrix of the notion.

2. Matrix of the Concept, Kingdom of God: Israel's View of God.

Before addressing the question of Israel's unique view of God, it is important to cite briefly a presupposition of this study, namely, the historical nature of the biblical record.

Through its encounter with the modern scientific method, biblical scholarship has come to acknowledge that the bible, as a body of literature, is a product of history. It cannot be intelligible without a full and scientific recognition of the deep significance of the historic facts which accompany its coming into existence. This is not a matter of choosing one of many possible perspectives from which to view these materials, for, what Martin Noth has said about the Old Testament is true of the entire Bible:

The real historical involvement is not just a garment to be taken off in order to unveil a hidden, timeless "content" of relevance; this involvement is rather part of the entire form.¹²

The historic nature of the bible extends, first of all, to the fact, today well established by modern scientific analysis and accepted by biblical scholars, that the compilation of the numerous and varied traditions within the bible has been subject to the historical process itself. Moreover, the individual books, the traditions within them, and the language used belong to their own time and history. The eighth century prophet cannot be understood against any historical environment except his own. The Deuteronomist may write about the same history as did the Elohist or Yahwist, but the conditions of Exile control the emphases. Wisdom is the product of a later Israel. Mark, John, Paul, each writes within his own historical moment.¹³

But, the historic nature of the bible extends to more than the origin of its parts and their compilation. The subject matter is concerned with history in its most ordinary sense. The bible is packed with historical information:

¹² Martin Noth, "The 'Re-presentation' of the Old Testament in Proclamation," in Essays on Old Testament Interpretation (James Luther Mays, Ed.), London, SCM Press, 1963, p. 79.

¹³ Ibid., p. 76. Cf. also, John L. McKenzie, The Two-Edged Sword, An Interpretation of the Old Testament, New York, Image Books, 1966 (c. 1956), 350 p.; Chap. I, "The Sacred Books."

it is a story of events that happened in the lives of a nation and of individuals. It recounts human hopes and despair, love and hate. It tells of a people being called, of a leaving, a wandering, and an arrival. It deals with centuries of wars and victories and defeat. The vicissitudes of the formation and government of a new nation are drawn in stark lines. Nor are the demise and resurgence and remnant existence of the nation omitted. The Old Testament tells of prophets who speak about those same events. The New Testament writers are likewise involved in the telling of events. The bible is a history book. But, as Roger Shinn observes, this is not "some esoteric history but [it is] about the mundane processes we might classify as political, military, economic and cultural history."¹⁴

The historic nature of the bible, however, does not end there. The twentieth century historian rightly uses the Old Testament as a source for a history of the linguistics, the institutions, the religion and faith of Israel. Scholars are ready to assign a certain scientific standing to the picture of Israel's history drawn there. But these are not the final and truest statements about the history it contains. In fact, with full acknowledgment of the validity of the

¹⁴ Roger L. Shinn, "To Wait and To Do: A Response to Roland Murphy," in Continuum, Vol. 7, No. 4, Winter 1970, p. 595.

historical critical method, biblical scholarship eventually had to part company with it to pose anew the theological question about the ultimate meaning of the biblical history. For this history is unique. Ultimately, it is the record of God's acts in Israel's history. The primary interest of the Old Testament writers resides with the action of God there.¹⁵

In the process of intensive critical analysis of the historical literature this subject matter has surfaced as fundamental. It is not merely that one of many possible interpretations has been brought to bear upon the texts. Scholars have recognized that the Old Testament record indeed centers about the life and history of the traditions of one people.¹⁶ But also, when the material is allowed to stand within the context and dialectic of its arrangement it becomes clear that this focus upon history is attention to facts about God.¹⁷ That is to say, the center and

¹⁵ Gerhard Von Rad, Old Testament Theology (2 vols.) [Theology], Edinburgh, Oliver & Boyd, 1962-1965, Vol. I, p. 111-112. So also, Noth, Zimmerli, Wright et al. On Von Rad's methodology, cf. his Theology I, Pt. 2, Sec. A.

¹⁶ This attention to historical tradition differentiates Israel's literature from other near Eastern writings. On this, G. Ernest Wright, God Who Acts, London, SCM Press, 1952, espec. Chap. 1, 5.

¹⁷ Whereas there is general scholarly agreement that the faith of Israel is fundamentally historical and calls for study that is methodologically historical, there is no consensus among OT scholars upon the way of union between theology and history. This study relies upon the work of Von Rad, who

starting-point of the Old Testament is the self-revelation of God in history. Israel's testimonies about history are her credal statements. They are the vehicle of her confessional utterances about the real God becoming manifest in history.¹⁸

Israel's statements about God are the concern here. The question is: what does Israel, speaking out of her history, say about God? The question admits of a variety of answers that are strewn through the Old Testament. But this study is about the characteristic and fundamental

critically enters into the world of Israel and attempts to let Israel speak her theology her way. Von Rad's method has been subjected to severe criticism, e.g. Walter Eichrodt in "The Excursus," p. 512-520, in his Theology of the Old Testament (Vol. I) [Theology], London, SCM Press, 1961-1967 (2 vols), particularly regarding Von Rad's assessment of historical facts. The discussion and the history of OT theology, espec. from Gabler, 1787, cannot be reviewed here. The validity of Von Rad's theological approach is not dependent upon his evaluation of the historical facts. The principle of biblical unity which he highlights, namely, continuing divine involvement in history, stands, at least implicitly, in all theology of the OT which posits the historical nature of Israel's belief. For example, the OT is a description of a "living process" (Eichrodt), a "relationship" (Vriezen), the breaking in of the Kingdom of God (Bright). On methodology, cf., John L. McKenzie, A Theology of the Old Testament [Theology], New York, Doubleday, 1974, p. 15-29: "Introduction, Principles, Methods and Structure"; and Von Rad, Theology II, Chap. E.

18 W. Eichrodt, Theology I, p. 15, 502; G. E. Wright, God Who Acts, Chap. 3: "What God Has Done"; for some critical observations, cf. Christopher R. North, The Old Testament Interpretation of History, London, Epworth, 1946, Chap 8: "God in History." A further assumption in this study is the revealed nature of Israelite belief, and the sacred character of these books. However, validation of these beliefs is not an issue at point.

aspect of Israel's understanding of God. The biblical text, Exodus 3:13-15, is central to this. It records the divine revelation of the divine name, Yahweh, to Moses, and the only attempt at an explicit explanation of its meaning in the Old Testament. Therefore it will be examined now.¹⁹

In the world of the Old Testament to give or request a name is a significant event.²⁰ In Hebrew speech the name replaces or, so to speak, contains its subject. In a manner foreign to western idiom, to know the name is to know the reality, or its power, and to enter into relationship with it. To confer a name is to confer identity, the way of being-in-the-world, thence to establish a form of claim or control over its bearer. To be without a name, or to have

¹⁹ This text ascribes the revelation and explanation of the sacred name to the time of the call of Moses. The Priestly document [Exodus 6:23] supports this view. The Yahwist claims that Yahweh was invoked at the beginnings of humanity (Gn. 4:26). The existence of this name before Moses is not yet conclusively proven. Cf. Roland de Vaux, "The Revelation of the Divine Name YHWH," [Revelation], in Proclamation and Presence (John I. Durham and J. R. Porter, Eds.), London, SCM Press, 1970, p. 48-56.

²⁰ On the idea of name: Joseph Ratzinger, Introduction to Christianity [Introduction], (trans. of Einführung in das Christentum by J. R. Foster), New York, Herder, 1970, p. 91-92; John L. McKenzie, "Name," in Dictionary of the Bible [DB], Milwaukee, Bruce, 1965, p. 1-11; Johs. Pedersen, Israel Its Life and Culture, London, Oxford University Press, 1946-1947 (c. 1926), on "Name," p. 245-259; John Courtney Murray, Problem of God, Yesterday and To-day, New Haven, Yale University Press, 1964, Chap. I; also Von Rad, Theology I, p. 181-183.

it destroyed, is to be worthless, non-existent, without reality.

A name is not a concept. The latter, a product of thought, designates the nature of a being, in itself, in its inner nature, without relation to the thinker. A name renders a reality invocable and accessible. Ratzinger explains: "The name signifies and effects the social incorporation, the inclusion in the structure of social relations."²¹ So, Israel's naming her God is an event of particular significance since her grasp of God is bound up with the name.

Exodus 3:13 recounts Moses' explicit request of God for his name:

Then Moses said to God, 'I am to go, then, to the sons of Israel and say to them, "The God of your fathers has sent me to you." But if they ask me what his name is, what am I to tell them.'²²

Significantly, an answer is forthcoming:

¹⁴ And God said to Moses, 'I Am who I Am. ['èhyèh' aser' èhyèh]. This ' he added ' is what you must say to the sons of Israel: "I Am ['èhyèh] has sent me to you." ' ¹⁵ And God also said to Moses, ' You are to say to the sons of Israel: "Yahweh [YHWH], the God of your fathers, the God of Abraham, the God of Isaac, and the God of Jacob, has sent me to you." This is my name for all time; by this name I shall be invoked for all generations to come.²³

²¹ Ratzinger, Introduction, p. 91.

²² Biblical quotations in this study are drawn from The Jerusalem Bible, New York, Doubleday, 1966. Biblical citations do not appear, as in exegetical works, in the main text. They are given in a note citing the biblical book, chapter, verse, e.g., Exodus 3:13.

²³ Exodus 3:14-15.

God has, in a way, given himself over, in his name, to Israel, and Israel is drawn, in a practical way, into relationship with who God is.

The narrator's intention here is to declare Yahweh to be the only name by which Israel is to invoke God, and to place the name in the beginnings of Israel's life as a covenanted people. It is, then, a basic text, yet one of many that contain a simple religious message that deepens and enlarges the understanding of God. Then the question arises: what is the content of the name Yahweh established here?²⁴

There are two attempts to give meaning to the name. First, by way of word play, in verse 14, the sense of the name YHWH (Yahweh) given in verse 15 is to be grasped. Second, the name Yahweh is identified with the God of the fathers.

The difficulties of this text, notwithstanding, it is generally accepted that the name Yahweh given in verse 15

²⁴ The difficulties presented by this text are well known. They involve philological, exegetical, and theological problems that need not be reviewed here. Biblical criticism has clarified many of the obscurities by uncovering unsound philosophical and etymological preoccupations that have arisen due to a misunderstanding of Hebrew thought patterns in the first place, and the inaccessibility of any certain knowledge of the ancient root words. Cf. de Vaux, Revelation, p. 63-75.

is to be related to the semitic root hwy, to be. A sense of the divine name given here may be found in the word play, "ehyeh aser ehyeh" of verse 14.²⁵ Accordingly, the Elohist is saying that the name Yahweh means the One Who is, the Existing One, the One Who Really Exists.²⁶

But, what did Israel hear in this text? Certainly not a metaphysical definition of the being of God, nor a theological formula normative for all time. Neither biblical preoccupation nor biblical thought structure would take these directions. Nor can the message be distilled in detailed etymological roots. The original roots are not known with certainty, and even if they were, biblical etymologies are casual with the inaccuracies of word plays. The meaning of the text does not lie there. It is to be grasped within the thought structure of its own time, from the text's own specific and general literary contexts, and against the background of a people differentiating its history and belief in a world of many gods.²⁷

25 The repeated use of the same root word, here the use of the same verb, in the same person in both the principle and relative clause. de Vaux, Revelation, p. 67.

26 de Vaux rules out a causative translation: "I cause to be what comes into existence," p. 62, 64; a future one: "I shall be who I shall be," p. 66; an indetermined one: "I am who I am," p. 68.

27 So also, Von Rad, Theology I, p. 179-187; Martin Noth, Exodus, A Commentary (J. S. Bowden, Trans.), Philadelphia, Westminster, 1962, p. 41-45.

First of all, in semitic terms, to be denotes to exist, here and now, active, present, being there. The issue is not the philosophical notion of essence or nature. I am conveys I am there for you. The immediate literary context supports this, and characterizes God's way of being present. The narrative motif of Exodus 3 is that God cares about, and intends to act for his people. In dialogue with Moses, Yahweh declares: "I have seen [...] I have heard [...] I am well aware of their sufferings."²⁸ It is Yahweh who continues: "'I mean to deliver them [...] I send you to Pharaoh to bring the sons of Israel, my people, out of Egypt'."²⁹ And, significantly, "'I shall be with you,' [...] 'and this is the sign by which you shall know that it is I who have sent you.'"³⁰ Yahweh, the One Who Is, is the One Who Is present, announcing, directing and actively engaging in plans to save his people. Here is a fundamental statement about the God who reveals his name and whom Israel is to claim as her own.³¹

The text, Exodus 3:13-15, also establishes continuity with the faith of Israel's fathers. The link is important

28 Exodus 3:7.

29 Exodus 3:8-10.

30 Exodus 3:11-12.

31 The Sinai tradition supports this sense. The proclamation of the Decalogue begins: "I am Yahweh your God who brought you out of the land of Egypt." Exodus 20:2

since with it the content of that faith is taken into the name by which, henceforth, Israel is to call upon God.³² The God of Abraham is a personal God unattached to any one place, distinct from nature and the cyclic recurrence of events. Abraham's God relates to no mythological history, but enters into dialogue with humans, directs them toward events in the future. The God of the fathers is a God of power, of nearness, of promise. The new element in Exodus 3 is the embracing of all this, together with the concreteness of saving, active, eruption and involvement in events.

In a sense, the answer is an elusive one. But it is one that defies objectification. Nor can it be mythologized, nor obscured in the realm of mystery or speculation. From the start, God's self-revelation remains his own, and free, to be found and understood only in history.³³ Here is a religious sense that is radically differentiated from the one known in Egypt, or to be found in Canaan.

32 For content of that faith, and comparison with contemporary views about the divinity, see R. A. F. Mackenzie, Faith and History in The Old Testament, New York, Macmillan, 1963, espec. Chap. 1, 2; T. J. Meek, Hebrew Origins, New York, Harper, 1960 (c. 1936), espec. Chap. 3, 6; Mircea Eliade, Cosmos and History, The Myth of the Eternal Return, New York, Harper, 1959, xvi-176 p.

33 Von Rad, Theology I, p. 180 ff.; de Vaux, Revelation, p. 68, also for bibl.

So, the answer given to Moses' request does not reveal the divine nature in itself. A reading of Exodus 3, that is free from preconceived philosophical and philological categories will show that Yahweh, the God of Israel, is the One Who is known through his action in history. It reveals that God is God for Israel. Furthermore, this text is paradigmatic of the entire biblical record. Whatever else may be said about God, and there are innumerable theological angles from which the Old Testament does speak, God is basically known and addressed in event, and in terms relating to man and human history. It is on the plane of religious existence, in the events of history, that the problem of God was met by biblical man.³⁴

The events which underscore the historical picture of Israel and constitute critical points of alignment for Israel's belief in, and sense of, God have been identified by biblical criticism and the history of tradition. The number of these is small: those of the earliest traditions are the promise to the patriarchs, the Exodus, the revelation of Yahweh at Sinai, the bestowal of the land of Canaan; those of the later tradition are the Davidic dynasty and the foundation of Sion. These are the events that produced the

³⁴ Cf. Eliade, Cosmos and History, Chap. 4: "The Terror History."

tradition and so reveal the primary features of Israel's unique view of God. It was to these that each age returned with its own experiences and traditions.

The crucial data, constitutive of Israel, are found in ancient formulae and summaries within the Hexateuch. The ancient Credo of Dt. 26:5-9, and the recall of history in Joshua 24:2 ff. span the first era from the patriarchs to the conquest. Here are objective facts of election, deliverance, rescue, conquest. These are confessional in character, it is true, of which only bare outlines of the historical event can be established, but the dynamic of these primary experiences is of the essence of Israel's sense of God. It is a dynamic of events transcending personal experience. It is the dynamic of existing and continuing to exist because God acted in history to form, lead and establish Israel. However this is conceptualized, Israel came to know God as he who chose to act, to constitute and preserve her. This fact of divine activity and intervention within history, witnessed to in these events, constitutes the core data and the organic center of Israel's early history.

In the era of the historical monarchy, Israel was to recognize new facets of God's real, abiding intervention into her history. This was a period of secularity, which seemed to be totally in the control of men. But the historian and the prophet saw differently. For them, Yahweh

controls and directs everything, moving even the hearts of men to accomplish his plans for history. Von Rad describes this view:

Jahweh's control takes in all that happens. It does not let itself be seen intermittently in holy miracles; it is as good as hidden from the natural eye: but it continuously permeates all departments of life, public and private, religious and secular alike.³⁵

In the Exile experience, Israel's history with God appears to be over. In the Deuteronomistic history she stands judged, having chosen her own death apart from God. But the prophetic voice, in the midst of historical annihilation, speaks of a new history, a new thing that God will do: a new entry into the promised land (Hosea), a new David and Zion (Isaiah), a new Covenant (Jeremiah), a new Exodus, and a new Moses (Second Isaiah).³⁶ Von Rad observes that the prophets "rang up the curtain of history [Israel's]," but, it was, he adds, "for a new action on his [God's] part with her."³⁷

The post-exilic community parted company with this divine history. It came to believe that God had withdrawn from her life and history. But rooted in belief in her God active in the pre-Exilic events and life, Israel awaited

35 Von Rad, Theology I, p. 316.

36 Isaiah 43:16-20; Jeremiah 31:3 ff.; Hosea 2:16 ff.

37 Von Rad, Theology I, p. 128.

a final intervention of God when all life would be transformed and faithful Israel saved. Out of this belief Judaism was born.

By way of summary, in Israel's earliest confessions the name of God is linked with an action in history. Divine activity is recognized in the existence of a people and the nation's development, as well as in the fortunes of world nations. Here is a new religious sense, for, as Eichrodt observes:

It is true that the ancient East recognized the action of the deity in isolated events and experienced these as judgment or succour; but it never occurred to them to identify the nerve of the historical process as the purposeful activity of God.³⁸

Israel was granted knowledge of God as he breaks into the life of his people and deals with them. Von Rad remarks that the theological radius of Israel's statements about God is amazingly restricted compared to the possibilities within the religious sphere. For,

Old Testament writers confine themselves to representing Jahweh's relationship to Israel and the world in one aspect only, namely, as a continuing divine activity in history.³⁹

Thus she views her God. The nerve of Israel's grasp of God is the nerve of her complicated experience of her history, the activity of God in that history.

³⁸ Eichrodt, Theology I, p. 41.

³⁹ Von Rad, Theology I, p. 106.

3. Emergence of the Concept, Kingdom of God, in the Religious Consciousness of Israel.

Out of the experience of God who is active in history, a sense and delineation of God's sovereignty gradually emerged.⁴⁰ Israel's conceptualization of God assumed many forms throughout her history. One of these was God as King. This concept is not among the basic elements in Yahwistic faith. In fact, the tradition reveals a real reserve in its use. Explicit designation of God as King, a designation common to the ancient Orient, is of certain use in Israel only after the emergence of her historical monarchy. It was with Second-Isaiah that it became rooted in the tradition. However, the dynamics inherent in this symbol reside in the very origins of her belief.⁴¹ The early tradition is full of the sense, if not the explicitation, of God, the King. His dealings with Israel were described in terms of deliverance and leading, of power and conquest.

Nor was the monarchy a basic component in the religion of Yahweh. The historical monarchy was viewed in Israel in a dialectic of critique and adoption, as it was brought into relation with her already established belief.⁴²

⁴⁰ This development is drawn from Von Rad, Basileus, p. 565-570; Eichrodt, Theology I, p. 194-200.

⁴¹ Schnackenburg, God's Rule, p. 11 ff.

⁴² 1 and 11 Samuel, espec. 1 Sam 8, 10. For a succinct review of the anti- and pro-monarchic themes, see McKenzie, Theology, p. 244-257; Von Rad, Theology I, p. 306-347.

At the same time, the whole courtly style of the ancient East; its language and festivals in honor of the divine-human king, were there for Israel. These forms, with Israel's characteristic emphases, were taken into her expressions of belief and worship, and especially, of hope. They became: "a vessel into which Jahwism flowed, and in which it attained to a completely new expression of itself."⁴³

The attestations to Yahweh, King, in the Old Testament embrace Israel's lived experience with her God. So they reveal changing patterns inherent in the highly differentiated process that is growth in belief. A sense of delight in Yahweh's victory and deliverance of his people,⁴⁴ gives way in time to the great cosmic vision of Isaiah:

'Holy, holy, holy is Yahweh Sabaoth His glory fills the whole earth.' [...] and my eyes have looked at the King, Yahweh Sabaoth.⁴⁵

Whereas, the classical prophets spoke little of God, King, the sovereign rule of Yahweh was presupposed. It was Second-Isaiah who interpreted the concept in a magnificent synthesis of creation, history and God's saving rule and became the special prophet of God as King. Rooting the exodus from Babylon in the fundamental experience of God--the Exodus from

43 Von Rad, Theology I, p. 321.

44 E.g., Song of Victory, Exodus 15; Song of Deborah, Judges 5; Psalm 136.

45 Isaiah 6:3, 5.

Egypt--the prophet declares: "Thus says Israel's king and his redeemer, Yahweh Sabaoth: I am the first and the last."⁴⁶ In this prophetic word, God declared himself: "I am Yahweh, your Holy One, the creator of Israel, your king."⁴⁷ It is the dominant motif of Israel's view of God that perdures here. For Yahweh, the king, is the one who once "made a way through the sea, a path in the great waters";⁴⁸ and, it is he who is now making a new road in the wilderness.⁴⁹ In this time of a new Exodus it is Yahweh himself who leads her. God is always the God who is present and ruling in history.

But new ground was opened by the prophet. In the face of these marvels, all nations would have to acknowledge Yahweh as the only God.⁵⁰ The kingship of Yahweh now became associated with the new age, with the full manifestation of the rule of God. It embraced the full content of Israel's experience and knowledge and expectations of Yahweh. Walter Eichrodt observes that this prophet's use of the title King denotes an inner liberation in the belief of Israel faced with the powers of the historical rule under which she lived:

46 Isaiah 44:6.

47 Isaiah 43:15.

48 Isaiah 43:16.

49 Isaiah 43:19.

50 Isaiah 45:23b-24.

To the growing power of the earthly sovereign was now opposed, almost by way of a slogan, the certainty of a higher dispensation which in the end would triumph. Yahweh's title of King provided a shorthand expression summing up the assurance of the prophetic faith.⁵¹

Before this prophetic hope was taken up and interpreted by Jesus, the notion of God's rule had assumed many forms.⁵² Explicit statements about God's activity in ruling became infrequent. But its reality constitutes the ground for the ongoing hope in post-Exilic belief, a hope that gave expression to national and messianic, to cosmic and eschatological expectations. It rested with Jesus to deal with the resultant maze of expectations, and to surface the true inner reality of that rule, the effective intervention in human affairs of a God Who Acts.

4. The Concept, Kingdom of God, in the Teaching of Jesus: Divine Activity.

With Jesus' announcement of the Kingdom of God, Israel found herself once again in confrontation and adventure with God who acts in history. The rule of God was identified by Jesus as he related the Kingdom of God, which he announced, to his life and work. This is especially

⁵¹ Eichrodt, Theology I, p. 199.

⁵² For a review of the use of this concept in later Judaism see, Schnackenburg, God's Rule, p. 41-75; Perrin, Kingdom, p. 160-185.

clear in his attitude toward miracles which he linked, intimately and indissolubly, with his proclamation.

Miracle stories constitute an integral part of the Gospel message and belong to the faith life of the Church from the beginning. Modern biblical criticism, which has greatly reduced the content and uniqueness of these stories, has neither rejected the accounts from the earliest layers of the tradition, nor removed their historical nucleus.⁵³ The first conciliar statement of belief in the fact of miracles came only from the First Vatican Council, 1869-70, but the history of the theology of miracles begins with the early Fathers.⁵⁴ It will be useful to consider briefly the

⁵³ On modern criticism of Gospel miracles, cf., among others: Joachim Jeremias, New Testament Theology, New York, Scribner's Sons, 1971, p. 86-92, also bibl.; David Stanley and R. E. Brown, "The Gospel Miracles," in JBC, sec. 78:109-130.

⁵⁴ For a review of the history, see: Louis Monden, Signs and Wonders, A Study of the Miraculous Element in Religion [Signs and Wonders], New York, Desclée, 1966, Chap. 1, includes bibl. Also, H. Fries, "Signe/miracle," in Encyclopédie de la Foi (H. Fries, Ed.), Paris, Cerf, 1965-1967 (4 vols.), Vol. IV, p. 237-247; John A. Hardon, "The Concept of Miracle from St. Augustine to Modern Apologetics," in Theological Studies, Vol. 15, 1954, p. 229-237. For some modern views, Roger Lapointe, "Qu'en est-il des miracles?," in Église et théologie, Vol. 6, 1975, p. 77-96; Robert Gleason, "Miracles and Contemporary Theology," in Thought, Vol. 37, 1962, p. 12-34; A. Lefèvre, "Miracle," in Dictionnaire de la Bible, Supplement V, Paris, Librairie Letouzey et Ane, 1957, col. 1300. The apologetic thrust in this theology is being replaced today by one that seeks to understand their role in the Gospel tradition.

structure of the miracle itself, and the nature of biblical miracles, to grasp the significance of Jesus' miracles for these present considerations.

Within a religious understanding, the miraculous is constituted by three elements.⁵⁵ First, the prodigious, marvellous aspect of the occurrence which is perceived as surpassing the normal powers of nature or of human possibility. Consequent to this, the marvel necessarily finds its cause in an intervention into the natural course of things by some supernatural or superhuman power. If miracles occur, that is, if a phenomenon of nature or a human event transcends its own reality, effecting something beyond its own powers, this, beyond itself, necessarily originates in the intention and action of the divine. A miracle also functions as a sign, an aspect which needs a brief comment here.

The structure of miracle can be examined in relation to the ordinary understanding and use of signs and symbols. The function of a sign is to lead to knowledge. This, Monden explains, can happen in two ways. First, when some thing or event has been put into place and one reasons from it to an understanding of a reality. A simple example is a road sign. The perceived fact becomes a sign, a way to

⁵⁵ The following development is drawn from Monden, Signs and Wonders, espec. Chap. 1-3.

knowledge, by an act of reason following the perception of it. In this sense, sign, may be termed "sign-object."⁵⁶ Second, a sign can exist within the very dynamics of communication. It is found where what is to be made known, signified, can be recognized by way of the sign itself. The sign value, the relationship between the sign and the knowledge to be communicated, does not depend on the act of reason that follows. The thing itself makes it a sign, an event of communication. In Monden's words:

A sensible perceptible "thing" (res) becomes, in the philosophically formal sense, a "sign" only insofar as it is inserted into a spiritually dynamic relationship between subjects.⁵⁷

This is sign in its fullest sense and may be termed "sign-act."⁵⁸ A special form of sign-act is found in what can be termed "symbol-act."⁵⁹ Symbols are used to communicate, to render perceptible, some spiritual reality. They are selected for their readiness to point to the spiritual reality in question, which cannot be wholly contained in perceptible forms. An example is an embrace, a gesture that renders love recognizable. Symbols are sign-acts, for, by way of the symbol itself, the reality that is being conveyed, although itself greater than the symbolic sign, can be grasped, in a sense then, rendered perceptible.

56 Ibid., p. 37.

57 Ibid.

58 Ibid.

59 Ibid.

A miracle is a symbol-act, a sign-act, signifying in occurrences accessible to human perception, that which cannot be contained by those same natural or human realities, namely, a divine intervention into human experience. The fact of miracle, and the reality signified are intrinsically one. J. Metz observes that this identity is related to, although not reducible to the experience "in which persons encounter each other."⁶⁰ Miracles are symbolic, sign-acts. For, in a religious sense, a miracle is a lived confrontation, by way of the perceptible forms, between the divine activity breaking through, and the one who experiences this intervention.

The Christian Church's acceptance of the historical fact of the Gospel miracles meets a radical challenge in modern critical thought, scientific, historical, and philosophical.⁶¹ The question here is: can miracles, which represent an incursion into the laws of nature, happen? Arising out of a world that defines itself, methodologically, within the limits of empirical verification, or human reason, or human powers, the question necessarily receives a negative answer. Admission of the fact of miracles requires a view

⁶⁰ Johann B. Metz, "Miracle," in Sacramentum Mundi, An Encyclopedia of Theology (Karl Rahner et al., Eds.), London, Burnes and Oates, 1968-1970 (6 vols.), Vol. IV, p. 45.

⁶¹ Lapointe, "Qu'en est-il des miracles?," offers probing hermeneutical considerations.

of the world as open to another world beyond itself and to possibilities for human life that are inaccessible to human powers. More specifically, it requires openness to a Creator who can and wants to recreate the present world.⁶²

The starting-point for understanding the miracles of Jesus resides in the historical religious world of the bible witnessing to them in the Gospel tradition. There the world is open to another divine world, human life to relationship with the divine. In the biblical world view miracles can and do happen.

The uniqueness of the biblical miracles, including those of Jesus, lies not in the acts themselves for which there are extra-biblical parallels, but in the understanding of them characteristic of the biblical witness.⁶³ In pagan miracles stories, preoccupation is with the event as marvellous prodigy. In our contemporary popular concept, miracle is conceived to be a spectacular event contrary to nature. In the bible, it is otherwise. There the element of the marvellous is not prominent. Certainly, miracles are experienced as transcending the possibilities of man and nature. Witness the Exodus events, the victories and battles, the signs of the prophets, to say nothing of the awe and wonder

⁶² Ibid., p. 94.

⁶³ On extra-biblical miracles, see Monden, Signs and Wonders, p. 254, with bibl.; Reginald H. Fuller, Interpreting the Miracles, London, SCM Press, 1963, p. 20-24.

inspired by Jesus' miracles. However, the biblical focus is directed elsewhere. Attention is drawn from the note of transcendence, the wondrous which draws attention to the meaning of the divine intervention. For, in the bible, miracles are understood primarily as signs of the acts of God.⁶⁴ The pertinent question now is: how did Jesus view his miracles?

From its earliest chapters the Synoptic tradition identifies the ministry of Jesus as one of "teaching in their synagogues, proclaiming the Good News of the kingdom and curing all kinds of diseases and sickness among the people."⁶⁵ The miracles are essentially related to Jesus' proclamation of the Kingdom of God. The tradition does not allow, however, for a Jesus who sees himself as a wonder-worker performing spectacular acts to attract attention to

64 Biblical language is itself testimony here. The Hebrew terms mopheth and ot connote an ordinary event recognizable as a divine symbolic-act. The Greek and Latin translations teras and miraculum depart from the original sense by stressing the prodigious. The synoptic term is dynameis, act of power; teras is never a single designation there. Cf. Lefevre, "Miracle," col. 1300. For a language analysis, cf. S. V. McCasland, "Signs and Wonders," in Journal of Biblical Literature, Vol. 76, 1957, p. 149-152.

65 Matthew 4:23; Mark 1:21 ff; Luke 4, supported in Acts 10:36-38. Alan Richardson's work represented a real advance in bringing this to the fore. However, his "spiritual" interpretation of the miracles wrongly diminishes their historical reality: The Miracle--Stories of the Gospels, London, SCM Press, 1948, espec. Chap. 1-3.

himself or to compel acceptance of his message. The marvel of his works is well known and draws the praise and wonder of many. But Jesus often acts privately, usually by way of a simple word of command or gesture, and recurringly leaves the scene or forbids publication of the miraculous happening.⁶⁶ The accounts shift attention from himself and the spectacular. The critical issue does not lie there.

Nor does Jesus work miracles so that the unbelieving might verify his credentials. His refusal of these requests shows that something other than the production of authenticating proofs is at stake: "And with a sigh that came straight from the heart he said, 'why does this generation demand a sign?'"⁶⁷ For "it is an evil and unfaithful generation that asks for a sign!"⁶⁸ Jesus' miracles are not sign-objects. Their meaning belongs within the dynamics of belief not of reason, of his work not its authentication. Jesus' refusal to descend from the cross is the final word on this.

The miracles do not belong at the periphery of Jesus' ministry but to its essence. They are a means of entrance

⁶⁶ Among others: Mark 1:27 and Luke 5:26 (marvel): Mark 5:37 ff. (acts privately); Mark 1:25, Luke 8:24-25, Matthew 9:27 ff. (restraint); Mark 3:12, Matthew 9:30, Luke 8:56 (forbids publication).

⁶⁷ Mark 8:12 and 11's.

⁶⁸ Matthew 12:38.

of the Kingdom of God he announces. This point is strikingly made by Mark in his first chapter which also elucidates the meaning of the Kingdom of God. Following a brief introduction of Jesus, which includes the summary of the content of his proclamation, Mark portrays Jesus in open conflict with an unclean spirit who asks, "Have you come to destroy us?"⁶⁹ To which Jesus answers: "'Be quiet! Come out of him!'"⁷⁰ The account of other miracles which in one way or another represent triumphs over Satan's bondage of human life, and even of nature, follow, in Mark, and surface this encounter with Satan.⁷¹

Exorcisms, understood in the biblical world as an invasion of Satan's rule, are not unique in Jesus. The Beelzebub discussion is witness.⁷² But the meaning Jesus gave them is a unique one: "But if it is through the Spirit of God that I cast devils out, then know that the kingdom

69 Mark 1:24.

70 Mark 1:25.

71 Exegesis of many of the miracles, notably those of healing, raising the dead, and some of the nature miracles, reveals the underlying motif of overcoming the rule of Satan evidenced in the disorders in nature and human life. On this, Jeremias, *Theology*, p. 93-94; Raymond E. Brown, "The Gospel Miracles," in his *New Testament Essays*, Milwaukee, Bruce, 1967, p. 172-176, with bibl.; H. E. Kee, "The Terminology of Mark's Exorcism Stories," in *New Testament Studies*, Vol. 14, 1967, p. 243 ff.; James Kallas, *The Significance of the Synoptic Miracles*, London, S.P.C.K., 1961, Chap. 5, "The Demonic-Cosmic Motif in the New Testament."

72 Matthew 12:22 ff., par.

of God has overtaken you."⁷³ In these events two spheres of power meet in conflict. The miracles are signs of the victory of divine power. The Kingdom of God, identified by Jesus in these events, is recognized by him as divine action in human life.

The miracles are also acts of revelation. When John the Baptist, the spokesman of the Messianic expectations, asks whether the new age has come with Jesus, John's attention is drawn to the data: miraculous acts that were healing, freeing and life-giving.⁷⁴ The change that Isaiah spoke of had begun, and in the forms prophesied.⁷⁵ These miracles mark the simple, yet irrevocable, powerful presence of the Kingdom of God of prophetic hope. Recognizable by way of these "symbolic sign-acts,"⁷⁶ the Kingdom of God is divine activity at work in history.

Notwithstanding the differences in emphases and perspectives of the Johannine tradition, this fundamental sense

⁷³ Matthew 12:28. Cf. Jeremias, Theology, p. 95; Kee, "The Terminology of Mark's Exorcism Stories," p. 232-246; Edwyn Hoskyns and Noel Davey, The Riddle of the New Testament, London, Faber, 1947, p. 116-126, although from a Messianic perspective.

⁷⁴ Luke 7:18 ff., Matthew 11:2 ff.

⁷⁵ Isaiah 49:25-26; 35:4-6.

⁷⁶ To be effective, the power operative in them had to be seen and in this sense they are "signs." Cf. Brown, "The Gospel Miracles," p. 178.

of the miracles, and so of the Kingdom of God, perdures.⁷⁷ In John, Jesus refers to the miracles as "works" of the Father: "I glorified you on earth, and finished the work that you gave me to do."⁷⁸ And again, "It is the Father, living in me, who is doing this work."⁷⁹ These continue what God has been doing from creation: "'My Father goes on working and so do I'."⁸⁰ These works give testimony to what is going on: "The works my Father has given me to carry out, these same works of mine testify that the Father has sent me."⁸¹

John also designates Jesus' miracles as signs. They are sign-acts of what God is doing in human affairs. The Johannine use of "works" and "signs" is set in frequent Exodus motifs, where it is easy to recall the activity of the God of the Old Testament in the great work, the long miracle, the signs and wonders of the Exodus.⁸²

⁷⁷ The following relies on: Brown, "Appendix III: Signs and Works," p. 525-538, in his Gospel According to St. John; Fuller, Interpreting the Miracles, p. 88-109.

⁷⁸ John 17:4.

⁷⁹ John 14:10b.

⁸⁰ John 5:17.

⁸¹ John 5:36.

⁸² Hence, John's use of "sign" differs from the synoptic one. Brown, "The Gospel Miracles," p. 185, n. 59-60; also, "Signs and Works," p. 527 ff.

The Gospel tradition is that Jesus views his miracles as events in which the reality, revealed in the name Yahweh, erupts in a point of time. The Kingdom of God is experienced in interpersonal events that heal, that give life, that bring order into human experience. The being of God is known by way of his own free self-revelation within history. Indeed, the Kingdom of God that Jesus announces, and identifies by way of miracles, is the effective presence of the living God. And, as it is the intent of this work to show, the Kingdom of God renders human life more human.

Jesus' announcement of the Kingdom of God concerns, then, the reality of God's intervention cleaving the human situation constantly and purposefully. This divine activity was known by way of the Exodus and its sequels. It claimed recognition in the monarchy, the form through which Yahweh would be for his people. Through the prophets Israel learned that to choose any other ruler was to choose death, not life. In the great new miracle of deliverance from Exile she came to know again the activity of the Kingdom of God. Jesus proclaims a new occurrence of the divine action. It is important to further address the teaching of Jesus about the Kingdom of God to ask what is the nature of the dynamic symbolized by Kingdom of God.

CHAPTER II

KINGDOM OF GOD: ESCHATOLOGICAL EVENT

Jesus announced the Kingdom of God. In the light of the foregoing we might ask what was so unique about this proclamation. Why did it attract attention? The answer to these questions directs this study into the core of what Israel believed about God's activity, about the Kingdom of God, and about Jesus' message. Jesus' announcement of the Kingdom of God was event of eschatological proportion: the decisive saving event that Israel awaited from God.

This chapter will explore the eschatological dimension of Jesus' interpretation of his ministry. It will be important, first, to highlight the essence of the eschatological expectations of the Israel addressed by Jesus and, secondly, to show the place held by the concept Kingdom of God in these hopes. To this end the fundamental aspects of Old Testament hope, and the background for Jesus' use of the term Kingdom of God in relation to it, will be briefly sketched. The Israel of Jesus' time awaited a new, saving inbreak of God's action that would be decisive for her existence. That is, Israel expected an eschatological event of the Kingdom of God. Thirdly, the question of how Jesus spoke to these eschatological expectations will be raised. In this connection the eschatological flavor of

his message about the Kingdom of God will be noted. Then a brief review will be given of the theological consensus that Jesus intended a truly eschatological dimension: the Kingdom of God of his teaching is the free decisive inbreak of God expected by Israel. The further question of Jesus' view of this event as of prophetic or apocalyptic consciousness will be addressed. The way will then be open to elaborate the uniqueness of Jesus' eschatological teaching. This, it will be seen, rests in that he declared his ministry to be the event of the eschatological divine inbreak. Before proceeding to these matters, a short comment⁴ about eschatology is in order.

Considering the Kingdom of God in the teaching of Jesus as an eschatological concept opens a door into⁵ an arena of theological discussion of complex dimensions. The term eschatology, a latecomer to theological language, is derived from the Greek eschaton, literally, the doctrine of the last things. The content of this term is far from settled, for, in dogmatics and exegesis it has been a controversial one.¹ It is generally agreed that eschatology

¹ The term appeared in theology at the beginning of the 19th century. For critical study of its origin and problems inherent in its use, cf., Jean Carmignac, "Les dangers de l'eschatologie," in New Testament Studies [NTS], Vol. 17, No. 4, 1971, p. 365-390; Th. C. Vriezen, "Prophecy and Eschatology" [Prophecy], in Vetus Testamentum, Supplement I, Leiden, Brill, 1953, p. 199-229; T. Rast, "Eschatologie," in Bilan de la théologie du XXe siècle, 2 vols. (sous la direction de Robert Vander Gucht et Herbert Vorgrimler), Tournai, Casterman, 1970, Vol. II, p. 501-519.

connotes a turning toward the future, but there are scholars who insist that it ought to be used exclusively in connection with the last things in the absolute sense. They would restrict it to matters concerning the end of the world,² and exclude expectations to be fulfilled within time or history.³ In this perspective, hope is severed from this world and directed toward cosmic transformations and a transcendental world. These are notions of later Judaism, however, and especially of apocalyptic, and do not belong to early or genuine Israelite belief. This narrow sense may be formulated as: "the (dogmatically firmly established) doctrine of the (dramatically conceived) end of history and of the course of the universe and the beginning of eternal salvation."⁴

A broader view extends the radius of reference to any aspect that bears an eschatological perspective even though occurring within history. Here eschatology refers to:

2 Sigmund Mowinckel, He That Cometh, Oxford, Basil Blackwell, 1965, p. 125.

3 G. Foher and G. Holscher, cited with references by Gerhard Von Rad, in Old Testament Theology (2 vols.) [Theology I, II], Edinburgh, Oliver and Boyd, 1962, Vol. II, p. 114, n. 6.

4 E. Jenni, "Eschatology of the Old Testament," in Interpreter's Dictionary of the Bible (4 vols.), [IDB], (George Arthur Buttrick, Ed.), New York, Abingdon, 1962, Vol. II, p. 126.

a future in which circumstances of history are changed to such an extent that one can speak of a new entirely different state of things, without, in so doing necessarily leaving the framework of history.⁵

What, indeed, is eschatological? Does the term apply to what merely extends beyond the present, or to a last age? Does it designate a final goal, a final validity, an historic reality, or an absolute beyond and opposed to history? These questions arise out of the multitude of standpoints from which man has spoken of time, of experience, of history. They were not posed by biblical man. In this study, the concern is with the fundamentals of eschatological expectations in biblical faith, the new decisive intervention expected of God.

1. Israel's Expectations.

The God Israel claimed as her own was the God who would be active on her behalf and in her life. Intrinsic to such a belief is the human experience of expectation which, like human life itself, is ongoing and enmeshed in the realities of time, of history, of end. The question is, what did Israel expect?

It is all too true that the roots of Israel's eschatological expectations are lost in the mystery of

5 Ibid.

beginnings and of human experience. There have been various explanations offered assigning the origins of her hope to a body of complex mythical ideas common to the Ancient East;⁶ to the Sinai revelation itself;⁷ to the liturgical cult as it met the disillusionment in the face of history;⁸ to the exigencies of history that forced Israel's faith to change;⁹ finally, to the very nature of Israel's belief.¹⁰

Notwithstanding the complexities of this question in the biblical record, one fact is clear: Israel did not give

6 H. Gressman, Der Ursprung der israelitisch-jüdischen Eschatologie, 1905, cited by Mowinckel, He That Cometh, p. 127. Whereas, scholars recognize mythological ideas in the language of Israel's hope, this theory is generally discounted. For bibl., ibid.

7 E. Sellin, cited in Mowinckel, He That Cometh, p. 126, 461. Sellin represents an extreme traditionalism.

8 E.g., M. Buber, Königtum Gottes, 1936, p. x, and S. Mowinckel in his first work, Psalmstudien II, 1921, p. 324, both cited by Von Rad, Theology II, p. 116, n. 32. Psychological disillusionment is generally rejected as the proper evocative element or the root of eschatology. So, Mowinckel, He That Cometh, p. 153, although for him the cult remains a creative factor; also, Von Rad, Theology II, p. 116, and Vriezen, Prophecy, p. 228.

9 So, S. B. Frost, Old Testament Apocalyptic, Its Origins and Growth, London, Epworth, 1952, p. 39 ff. In one way or another, most admit the influence of history.

10. Among others, John Bright, "Faith and Destiny," in Interpretation, Vol. 5, No. 1, 1951, p. 3-26; Vriezen, Prophecy, p. 228; belief as expressed in prophetic criticism. Johannes Lindblom, Prophecy in Ancient Israel, Oxford, Blackwell, 1962, p. 360 ff.; Edmund Jacob, Theology of the Old Testament, London, Hodder, 1958 (c. 1955), p. 188 ff. Walter Eichrodt, Theology of the Old Testament, Vol. I, London, SCM Press, 1961, Chap. XI, p. 494 ff. offers an evaluation of these views.

up hope. The best explanation for this is that for Israel not to hope was to cease believing.¹¹ The eschatological expectations are of Israel's own faith existence and conceived of her unique view of history and of God. Within the experience of the facts of history, but out of her view that her history was the history of God with her, she could and did entrust her total existence to the fidelity of God who accompanied her and would act directly for her.¹²

¹¹ So, W. G. Kuhn, "βασιλεὺς," [Basileus], in Theological Dictionary of the New Testament [TDNT] (10 vols.; Kittel and Friedrich, Eds.), Grand Rapids, Eerdmans, 1964-76, Vol. I, p. 567. For an excellent, readable review of Israel's persevering hope, cf. John Bright, Kingdom of God, The Biblical Concept and Its Meaning for the Church [Kingdom of God], Nashville, Abingdon, 1953, 288 p.

¹² Von Rad situates the origins in the very nature of Israel's distinctive view of history (to be distinguished from "pressures" of history, yet concretely related to these) and so, within the dynamics of her belief. History was a subject in which the prophets were deeply engaged and to which they gave a new dimension. Von Rad reduces eschatology to "the extremely revolutionary fact that the prophets saw Jahweh approaching Israel with a new action [...]. The reason for this change in outlook is to be found primarily in history, [...] also to be found in the realization that Israel under the Kings had become quite detached from the old relationship to Jahweh," cf., Theology II, p. 118. The prophets believed in the constancy of Yahweh who had promised to be for Israel. In the midst of contradicting evidence eschatology is born. In the opinion of the present writer, this view is connatural with the view of God to which the biblical record confesses, and with the nature of the record itself. In sum, Von Rad states: "It [the eschatological message of the prophets] can only be understood from the point of view of the distinctive character of Israel's thought about history." Theology II, p. 116.

It is imperative to recall that the expectations of Old Testament man existed within a perception of time and history that varied fundamentally from that of Western man.¹³ For the latter, time is a category that represents an abstract line onto which he places the data of happenings in the lives of men or nations. From a point which is the present, this line stretches back through the past, and forward through the future, moving inexorably toward a climactic, either fulfillment or annihilation. That is to say, Western man's experience is with abstract time that is linear and eschatological.

This conception of time does not belong to the ancient world, was unknown within the Israelite experience, and is to be excluded from Old Testament exegesis.¹⁴ For primitive man in general, and Israel in particular, the essential category was not time as such, but events, their context and content. Israelite thought is concrete, practical, total, and existential. There is no distinction between time and event, for what characterizes time is the substance of events. Time is meaning-filled events, each assigned its own place.¹⁵

13 For the following: Von Rad, Theology II, p. 99-125; bibl., Bright, Faith and Destiny, p. 3, n. 2.

14 On the biblical view of history and time, cf. also, Karl Löwith, Meaning in History, the Theological Implications of the Philosophy of History, Chicago, University Press, 1949, Introduction and Chap. XI: "The Biblical View of History."

15 Cf. John L. McKenzie, "Time," in Dictionary of the Bible [DB], Milwaukee, Bruce, 1965, p. 891-892. The Hebrews did not divide the day by abstract equal measures, but according to the sun's changing impress on things: e.g., morning

Israel's faith was founded in history. Again, the modern concept of relative and transitory events on the time line does not apply here. The absolute data of history for Israel were the acts by which Yahweh dealt with and constituted her. These divine involvements she gradually specified, celebrated in the cultic forms of the festivals of her environment. She eventually came to see that Yahweh had acted on her behalf in a series of events. Israel stood alone in the ancient world in this awareness of being primarily bound, not to a cycle of nature in itself divine, but to events in which Yahweh had acted. The category, history, was born of belief in the continuity of Yahweh's personal intervention on her behalf, manifested in significant gestures full of divine purpose, non-repetitive but actual for each generation.¹⁶

The fundamental issue here is that Israel realized that she existed and her history existed because Yahweh was acting and directing her. The earliest records of the

included everything connected with the sun driving away darkness. Ecc. 3 is the classic OT example of this view of time. John. Pedersen, Israel, Its Life and Culture, London, Oxford University, 1946-1947 (c. 1926), p. 486-491

¹⁶ Concerning Israel's discovery of this view of history and her transformation of the pagan festivals: Von Rad, Theology II, p. 102-106; Mircea Eliade, Cosmos and History, The Myth of the Eternal Return, New York, Harper, 1959, xvi-176 p. Through her recognition that God founded and accompanied her, Israel broke through to a linear historical span unique in her world.

assembling of the saving data are found in Deuteronomy 26 and Joshua 24:22 ff. Gerhard Von Rad, demonstrating this thoroughly, says that "the fundamental thought that history can only exist as the times in which God performed his acts and gave guidance never altered."¹⁷ Within her experience of the facts of history, of her own fidelity and recurring infidelity to her God, and out of the ever reiterated insistence that her history was the history of God with her, Israel grounded her existence in God of the Exodus, Yahweh, who accompanied her and would act directly for her.

These considerations are of utmost importance for a grasp of Israel's expectations. Those events which modern thought might view abstractly as belonging to the normal historical process with or without any singular meaning, biblical thought conceives as God's being with and for Israel.

The question here remains: what did Israel expect? Although the total picture of her hopes cannot be traced here, the intention now is to delineate the fundamental coefficients of her eschatological expectations. To do this, three frontiers of Israel's religious life will be briefly considered: (a) the early one prior to classical prophecy,¹⁸

¹⁷ Von Rad, Theology II, p. 107.

¹⁸ This scans the vast period to the eighth century. Classical prophecy includes the eighth-sixth centuries, from Amos to Michai. The following development draws on Von Rad, Theology II.

(b) that of classical prophecy itself, and finally, (c) that of post-exilic Judaism.

A. Pre-prophetic

Out of the events of her history Israel's faith selected a small number as decisive for her existence--the Exodus, the Sinai covenant, the Conquest. As time passed, Israel came to rest in these past divine creative acts. Certain of her election in these former acts, confident that in these her present was secure, and expectant of their eventual fullness, Israel no longer awaited any new divine historical act. In this sense Israel's history with Yahweh came to a standstill. She did not lose faith in her actual relationship with Yahweh, nor in his control and involvement in all that happened. With the rise of the state, however, Israel gradually took events into her own hands and her faith became secularized. She became more and more oblivious of Yahweh's action in the arena of history and politics, and of her dependence upon him. Her hopes became political and national, her confidence idolatrous, and she forgot and even opposed Yahweh.¹⁹ This was the nation into whose life the classical prophets thrust their paradoxical message of judgment and salvation, that is of end and of beginning. This was the Israel called into eschatological hope.

¹⁹ This is the burden of the deuteronomistic theology of history written in the shadow of the catastrophes of 722 and 587. Cf. Von Rad, Theology II, p. 334 ff.; Bright, Faith and Destiny, p. 12; Eichrodt, Theology I, p. 382.

B. Prophetic

Standing within the events of their own day the prophets saw the end of Israel as a nation and declared the disastrous events of history to be the facts of God's judgment upon faithless Israel. But even more significantly, for it is altogether without basis in the tradition, the former saving acts were declared to be no longer any reason for security or rest. There had been former denunciations of Israel, but here in the word about judgment that is final, the right of appeal to the salvation offered in the past saving events was nullified. Israel's relationship with the election traditions was broken. Each prophet, in his own way, laid bare Israel's tendencies to forget that her ability to progress, to oppose God, to disregard God's absolute freedom in her regard had limits. Each prophet surfaced the inevitability of clash between the human endeavor divorced from God and the divine endeavor. In short, each affirmed the absoluteness of Yahweh's sovereign will and of his divine activity in the affairs of man.

But there is a paradoxical aspect to the message. Faced with the very demolition of Israel, the prophets knew, however fleetingly in the earlier period, that Yahweh did not intend to withdraw from history. They awaited a new action in favor of Israel and decisive for her life or death. These were not political calculations but constituted a revolutionary

shift in belief: the present is without safeguards from the past, the basis for hope was in a future, new, divine intervention. This is the heart of the message of the prophets. A new impetus was released by a new sense of the reality of Yahweh's dealings with Israel that was to become normative for her belief. This found consistent expression in Jeremiah, Ezechiel and Second-Isaiah.²⁰

The dynamic of expectation was altogether altered by this message. Von Rad observes that:

The only thing she [Israel] can hold on to is a new historical act on the part of Jahweh, [...] the prophetic message differs from all previous Israelite theology, which was based on the past saving history, in that the prophets looked for the decisive factor in Israel's whole existence,-- her life or her death--in some future event.²¹

This was a message that plunged Israel into a vacuum for it is a message about discontinuity in her very existence.²²

20 Von Rad, Theology II, p. 299.

21 Ibid., p. 117. The prophecy of Ezechiel over the dry bones is a vivid portrayal of this view. Between the present and future lay the dry bones of Israel. The only reason for hope was an absolutely new act of God. Ezech. 37.

22 Concerning the "discontinuity" and the "new" in events: It is true that the prophets spoke of future events analogous to past ones. For Von Rad, this projection was "the only possible way open to the prophets of making material statements about a future with God" (Theology II, p. 299). Prophets differ about the degree of completeness in the break. But the element of "newness" is there; differences are relative to the stage of religious development. Its fullness is found in Isaiah 43:18-19a: "No need to recall the past, [...] See, I am doing a new deed." Also, Bright, Kingdom of God, p. 140.

She stands judged, stripped of her securities and of her control, her saving history ruptured. Israel was invited, however, into the tension of expectation, of openness to Yahweh's action that was new and decisive for her. Israel was to have no rest, no security, no control. Her existence was God's own.²³ It is this element of real and radical discontinuity and shift of expectation within Israel that most scholars identify with the eschatological in the prophets.²⁴

23 Openness to the future does not constitute the radical newness, for hope in the future is an essential element of her belief. The radicality resides, rather, in the shift in the very basis for belief, from the events of the past to some future intervention--a shift that is discontinuity.

24 Von Rad speaks of eschatology wherever the historical basis of salvation is regarded to be null and void and is shifted to a future action of God: Theology II, p. 118, 185. For Von Rad, these statements are to be differentiated from general expressions of faith in the future, from pious hopes and confident statements. Lindblom, Prophecy in Ancient Israel, p. 360 ff., finds the essence of eschatology in the distinction made between this age and the age to come, since the latter implies a completely new order. He warns that this element is not as widespread in the prophets as the language might suggest (p. 362-363). He asserts that terminology may be of a later vintage (e.g., "this age--age to come" belongs to Jewish apocalyptic and Rabbinic literature), but the thought is already in the prophets. S. Mowinckel maintains a strict conception of the course of history: the present world order will be superseded by another of an essentially different kind (He That Cometh, p. 125). Stanley B. Frost speaks of eschatology wherever the conceptions are marked by a sense of "finality," i.e., the future event is "the effective End in the mind of the one using the term, [...] the ultimate thule of thought" (Old Testament Apocalyptic, p. 33). It seems to the present writer that eschatology, whether in the strict or broad sense, is about discontinuity and rupture in an annulment of the past, and about a future that is to be new, and God's own. Whether this occurs and terminates within history or not, the dynamics are the same: break with the past, tensions of discontinuity, expectation of a new event.

C. Post-exilic

Prophecy ceased to exist in this traditional form in the post-exilic period, but Israel continued to look into the future in expectation of a further and decisive action that would belong to God alone. This eschatological element of Israel's hope for the future underwent development as evidenced by a late form of literature known as apocalyptic.²⁵

The central preoccupation in apocalyptic writings was with the direct action of God, belonging to him alone, that was to be the final saving event for Israel. This specific prophetic content, and its logical corollary, the new age of the divine intervention, were taken into a strict eschatological dualism. A sharp distinction occurs in this literature between the present age and the age to come. It

²⁵ Hope in the future, assumes many forms in later Judaism. R. Schnackenburg succinctly reduces these to two fundamental ones: the national and messianic; the cosmic and eschatological, two currents that intermingle but never meet in complete harmony, cf. his God's Rule and Kingdom [God's Rule], Freiburg, Herder, 1963, p. 63. The formal characteristics and the rise of apocalyptic (Gk. Apokalypsis = revelation), a body of literature widespread from c. 200 BC-200 AD, are outside the limits of these considerations about the coefficients of Israel's hope expressed here. On this, cf. Frost, Old Testament Apocalyptic; Carrol Stuhlmueller, "Post-exilic Period: Spirit, Apocalyptic," in Jerome Biblical Commentary [JBC] (R. E. Brown et al., Eds.), Englewood Cliffs, N.J., 1968, sec. 20; M. Rist, "Apocalypticism," in IDB, Vol. I, p. 157 ff.; H. H. Rowley, Relevance of Apocalyptic, A Study of Jewish and Christian Apocalypses from Daniel to the Revelation, London, Lutterworth, 1963, espec. Chap. 1, 4, and bibl.; Bruce Vawter, "Apocalyptic: Its Relation to Prophecy," in Catholic Biblical Quarterly, Vol. 22, 1960, p. 33-46.

conceives of the event as the beginning of an age wholly different, apart from history. Prior to Daniel, history was the only stage for God's dealing with man.²⁶ Now, the eternal world of God above is set over against the reality below. The latter will be replaced by, or transformed into, an age of blessings already pre-existent in this totally other world of God. The divine is wholly transcendentalized. The unity between God and the world is broken, and the world is completely secularized.

This secularized view of the world embraces another dualism, that of good and evil. The world is viewed to be in the grip of evil, the power of which only God, in the saving event, can break and destroy, and in so doing give the new age to the religious man: the one faithful to the law, the righteous one. Meanwhile, the only alternative for him is to await the fullness of sinfulness. Apocalypticism may be described as:

the dualistic, cosmic and eschatological belief in two opposing cosmic powers, God and Satan (or his equivalent); and in two distinct ages--the present temporal and irretrievably evil age under Satan, who now oppresses the righteous but whose power God will soon act to overthrow; and the future, perfect and eternal age under God's own rule, when the righteous will be blessed forever.²⁷

²⁶ Daniel (c. 167-164 BC) is the one example of developed apocalyptic in the OT. Apocalyptic is foreshadowed in Isaiah 24-27; Joel 2:1-11, 4:1-21; Zechariah 12:4, but these are not classed as such: cf. John L. McKenzie, "Apocalyptic Literature," in DB, p. 41 ff.

²⁷ Rist, "Apocalypticism," p. 157.

This pessimistic, deterministic view of history and of man is far removed from the prophets' message of judgment and salvation. Here the approach by way of saving history is absent. History is no longer confessional, no longer the form of God's dealing with Israel. The world is totally secularized, quite given over to evil men, and God separated from both.²⁸ On the other hand, apocalyptic is utterly optimistic about the outcome, for it awaits God's action which will be in favor of the good, that is, of the religious man.

In apocalyptic, the prophet has been replaced by the seer. The genuine expectation of a radically new age by the intervention of God, becomes expressed in fantastic, unhistorical, and transcendent images. The apocalyptic gaze is fixed upon the final happening, the multiple dimensions of its execution, and the great blessings it will bestow upon the saved. Rudolf Schnackenburg observes that the noble sense of expectation in the prophet, and openness to God's future, are blurred by speculations tending to define and predict divine intervention. The all too human thrust toward security and control, by way of knowledge or of action, and the pettiness and narrowness of human expectations of God, are often betrayed in these writings whose:

28 Von Rad, Theology II, p. 304 ff.

apocalyptic excess of fervor and the way in which they calculate and reckon the advent of God's reign do serious damage to the genuine vision of transformation found in many places in their literature.²⁹

Nevertheless, there is in these writings unmistakable emphasis on God's absolutely free, independent action in a future intervention decisive for life or death. Everything revolves about this one basic factor. This expectation is fundamental to apocalyptic faith. The rejection of history in this literature may express an alteration of the traditional material.³⁰ It may also represent a flight before the reality of history into fantasy or transcendence.³¹ On the other hand, it was a way of professing that God is not limited by the dimensions of man's expectations or control. Apocalyptic is a true confession that man is indeed utterly unable to effect the fully human thing. The new age is to

29 Schnackenburg, God's Rule, p. 74.

30 Von Rad, Theology II, p. 301-308. The relationship between prophetic and apocalyptic eschatology is much discussed. Cf. P. Grech, "Interprophetic Re-Interpretation and O.T. Eschatology," in Augustinianum, Vol. 9, 1969, p. 236. Vriezen identifies four eschatological periods helpful in the ongoing discussion: pre-eschatological (before classical prophecy); proto-eschatological (Isaiah and his contemporaries); actual eschatological (being realized of Deutero-Isaiah and his contemporaries); transcendentalizing eschatology (salvation is not expected in this world but either spiritually in heaven or after a cosmic catastrophe in a new world): cf. Prophecy, p. 225

31 Roger L. Shinn, "'To Wait and to Do': A Response to Roland Murphy," in Dialogue, Vol. 7, No. 4, 1970, p. 598. Shinn considers this question to be unresolved by the OT.

be of God.³² Apocalyptic is certainly a message of belief that the fully human ~~will~~ be realized, but by God's own action.

These are the broad outlines of the eschatological expectations of Israel at the three major frontiers of her religious life: pre-prophetic, prophetic and, later Judaic. The genesis and evolution of these expectations constitute a complex area of study which need not be entered, since it is the intent to highlight the fundamental elements in the momentum of eschatological expectations.

In summary, the specific coefficient in the prophetic and apocalyptic eschatology is discontinuity with the past in a shift to a new future. The basic element in both is the further divine saving intervention, that is God's own--new and decisive--for Israel's existence. Eschatology was Israel's faith response before the questions of history and human experience, as Mircea Eliade suggests, "the terror of history."³³

With the prophets, Israel was sharply confronted by the events of God's action in present history and her own

³² So, Rowley, The Relevance of Apocalyptic, Chap. 4, p. 179-182, et al.; also G. E. Ladd, "Why Not Prophetic Apocalyptic?" in Journal of Biblical Literature [JBL]. Vol. 76, 1957, p. 197. For Von Rad, the real matrix of apocalyptic is Wisdom, easily recognizable, he asserts, in that its "nerve-centre" is "knowledge based on a universal Jahwism," cf. Theology II, p. 306.

³³ Eliade, Cosmos and History, p. 141.

responsibility for the terror of history. Israel was to shift from the known, that is, her history with God in the past, to the new, her history with God in the future. From a sense of security and control, that was closure upon herself and spelled death, she was invited into openness to a beyond herself that spelled life. The fundamentals of Israel's security and control, her very existence, were to be found, not within herself, but from God active in her life and history. Yahweh, who would be with her, offered promise that she could not control, but could receive.³⁴ Israel was called from within her present to expect God's decisive action and thence her own life.

Apocalyptic focused upon the specifics of that expectation and in so doing, the elements of Israel's present history were blurred, perhaps rejected, as irrelevant. Whether this represented an alteration of the prophetic tradition, or a confessional form of it, is for alternative discussion. Of importance to this study is the question what Jesus did with these eschatological expectations in his announcement of the Kingdom of God.

34 This is not to imply that Israel did not have an active response to make. In fact, self-activity is involved in the dynamics of a decision to open, to receive, and to integrate the reality of hope. The emphasis here is on the receptive side of this experience of God, or to put it differently, the horizon beyond herself which can be hers if she so move.

First, however, a brief enquiry about the place of the concept, Kingdom of God, in these eschatological expectations follows.

2. The Concept, Kingdom of God, in Israel's Expectations.

Kingdom of God has been established as a biblical symbol of the unique in Israel's faith, her view of God active in her affairs. It is not surprising that the expression of the kingship of Yahweh was drawn into her eschatological expectations. The idea of God's rule was prominent in the prophets for, although the expression is seldom used, their message of judgment and salvation presupposed that rule.³⁵

S. Mowinckel observes that: "Israel's future hope had a dominant idea which held misfortune and salvation together in organic unity."³⁶ He concludes that this idea was the kingly rule of Yahweh. The message of the prophets was a testimony to the divine sovereignty. Walther Eichrodt observes that all other ideas in the prophets were grouped around this central idea as their controlling factor.³⁷ In Second-Isaiah the eschatological rule of Yahweh found its fullest expression.³⁸ Jesus directly relates his own message to Second-Isaiah.

35 Schnackenburg, God's Rule, p. 31 ff.

36 Mowinckel, He That Cometh, p. 128, 143 ff.

37 Eichrodt, Theology I, p. 353, 386.

38 So. Von Rad, Theology II, p. 338 ff., and bibl.; Schnackenburg, God's Rule, p. 36-40.

The notion of God's rule continued in various forms, to pervade later Jewish eschatology. The idea became more sharply delineated in the apocalyptic distinction between the present and future ages, although here again the use of the expression was rare. This is not surprising since the focus of apocalyptic is upon the final event, and a vast complex of imagery is needed to depict the crises and the glories of the final intervention. When the expression does occur it is a designation either of God's activity in the final and decisive intervention in history and human affairs, or of the new age resulting from that intervention.³⁹

Dalman has shown that, in the Jewish literature, Kingdom of Heaven is never used to specify the locus of God's rule. It always denotes his power at work. Nor is this expression to be understood in terms of pre-existent realities emerging into this world, nor of any transcendent character of the new age. It is not the Kingdom that is designated transcendent, but the Ruler. The Kingdom of Heaven is the rule of the transcendent God.⁴⁰ In contrast with the ethical and anthropological thrusts in later Jewish literature,

³⁹ It occurs seven, possibly nine, times in apocalyptic literature. On this, cf. Norman Perrin, The Kingdom of God in the Teaching of Jesus [Kingdom], London, SCM Press, 1963, p. 168-185.

⁴⁰ G. Dalman, The Words of Jesus (authorized English version by D. M. Kay), Edinburgh, Clark, 1902 (c. 1898), p. 135, 93, 101.

apocalyptic retained the view that the Kingdom of God belongs to God's own free and independent decision and, in fact, strongly emphasized this.⁴¹

In summary, the Old Testament Kingdom of God is a purely religious and eschatological concept. It does not arise out of the processes of history, as did the notion, Messiah.⁴² Rather, Kingdom of God and its equivalents, Kingdom of Heaven and God is King, are symbols for what is most distinctive in Israel's belief: her view of God and of history, and ultimately, then, her expectations of a new and decisive intervention of that God in her history.

This is briefly the background for the usage of Kingdom of God in the teaching of Jesus. It rests, now, to address the question of how Jesus spoke to the eschatological expectation of his days.

3. The Message of Jesus in Relation to Israel's Expectations.

A. Eschatological Flavor of the Message of Jesus

Jesus always used the concept Kingdom of God in its eschatological sense. Nowhere in his message does the

⁴¹ So, Schmidt, Basileus, p. 576, Schnackenburg, God's Rule, p. 41 ff.

⁴² Kuhn, Basileus, p. 574. These two concepts, Messiah King and Kingdom of Heaven are heterogeneous.

Kingdom denote God's continuous power over the universe nor even his own special relationship with Israel. It was the future eschatological kingship that Jesus announced.⁴³ In fact, the frequency of time references to the future constitute this future Kingdom as a guiding star of Jesus' preaching.⁴⁴

There are numerous confirmations within the Gospels of Jesus' expectation of a future kingdom. Most striking perhaps was his teaching the disciples to pray for the coming of the Kingdom, and to expect its coming into existence in the future.⁴⁵ Moreover, sayings about entering the Kingdom, and being cast out designate a future event of eschatological judgment.⁴⁶ Jesus assumed with his

43 Schnackenburg, God's Rule, p. 81-82; Joachim Jeremias, New Testament Theology [Theology], London, SCM Press, 1971, p. 100-102. Israel's belief in God's activity in history does not exclude a view of his continuous government of the universe. In fact, the latter, along with her sense of a special relationship with God in history, really come to a head in the notion of the eschatological Kingdom.

44 This is not disputed in the contemporary discussion. The difficulties surround the interpretation of Jesus' teaching about the future kingdom.

45 Schnackenburg, God's Rule, p. 160; Jeremias, Theology, p. 100; Werner George Kümmel, Promise and Fulfillment, The Eschatological Message of Jesus [Promise], London, SCM Press, 1957, for authorities and counter opinions, p. 25, n. 19.

46 E.g., Mark 9:47, 10:15; Matthew 7:21-23, 25:14 ff., see Kümmel, Promise, p. 52, n. 107 on varying opinions.

contemporaries that salvation and judgment proper to God's eschatological action are something future. Examples are found in expressions of seeking,⁴⁷ inheriting,⁴⁸ readying⁴⁹ for the Kingdom. The Beatitudes and Woes⁵⁰ and many images describing the Kingdom as the saving benefit in the future of which God alone can and will dispose designate an eschatological event.⁵¹ A future eschatological Kingdom is also intended in the metaphor of the messianic meal which Jesus will share with the disciples, and with Abraham, Isaac and Jacob, and men from east, west, south and north.⁵² Jesus often spoke of the Kingdom of God in symbols and figures of current eschatology: harvest, wedding, vintage, the great supper, a wedding, new garment, new wine, and many others.

The tone of Jesus' proclamation is distinctly one of eschatological urgency. This resounds in his appeal to sinners, in the crisis parables, in the radical demands on each person, and in his association with the preaching of

47 Luke 12:31.

48 Matthew 25:34; Mark 10:17-27.

49 Luke 12:39.

50 Luke 6:20-25; Matthew 5:3 ff.

51 Schnackenburg, God's Rule, p. 85; for examples of "gives," "disposes," "promise," "banquet," "meal," et al.

52 Matthew 8:11, 26:29 and par.

John the Baptist. The eschatological urgency prompted the questioning and angry rejection by his enemies of the Messianic significance of his words. Joachim Jeremias summarizes these facts showing that the Kingdom of God, "had an eschatological significance in the sayings of Jesus and denoted the last, final revelation of the glory of God."⁵³ Contemporary theology has firmly established the eschatological nature of Jesus' message, through a long history, the outlines of which need to be traced now.

B. Intent of the Eschatological Elements:
Theological Consensus

It was precisely the eschatological tone and reference to a future coming of the Kingdom that provided modern critical scholarship with an explosive pièce de resistance. In an essay published posthumously in 1778, H. S. Reimarus, having sensed the significance of Jesus' eschatological thought, claimed that Jesus mistakenly identified himself with the Messianic hope of Israel.⁵⁴ Notwithstanding the

⁵³ Jeremias, Theology, p. 103; for detailed exegesis of future sayings, cf., ibid., p. 97-102, Kümmel, Promise, Chap. 1.

⁵⁴ H. S. Reimarus (1694-1768) a key figure in the history of NT criticism. First steps in recognizing the Gospel narratives as products of Christian belief and first breakthroughs to the historical Jesus are found in his works, published posthumously by Lessing (1774-1778). Cf. Herman Samuel Reimarus, The Goal of Jesus and His Disciples [Goal], (intro. and transl. by George Wesley Buchanan), Leiden, Brill, 1970, x-143 p.

intent of Reimarus to free believers for pure, rationalistic faith in God through a reconstruction of the beginnings of Christianity that declares it to be delusion, fantasy and deception, he did put his finger on the key elements of Jesus' ministry, namely, Jewish eschatological expectations.

It was David Strauss who resurrected Reimarus' views in his Life of Jesus⁵⁵ and argued that if, as the sources suggest, the eschatological announcement was genuinely attributable to Jesus, then Jesus was indeed an apocalyptic fanatic. Since the Kingdom announced by Jesus did not happen, then Jesus was deluded or was a pretender. Consequently, Strauss argued, Christianity rested on false grounds and Christian ways of thinking were gross deceptions of disappointed Jesus disciples. This charge remained the catalyst of nineteenth century theological literature. Eschatology had been rediscovered in the message of Jesus, but at the price, perhaps, of the integrity of Jesus.

Biblical scholarship was forced to the questions. What was the intent of Jesus in the eschatological elements

55 David Friederich Strauss, The Life of Jesus, Critically Examined (trans. from 4th German ed. by Marian Evans), New York, 1860 (republished 1970), Michigan, Scholarly Press (2 vols.). The problem of eschatology raised by Strauss was explosive. He recognized the role of myth in the Gospel narratives; the impossibility of writing a Life of Jesus from the sources; the significance of Jesus if his eschatology were taken seriously. Cf. John S. Kselman, "Modern New Testament Criticism," JBC, sec. 41: 3-7; Karl Barth, Protestant Thought: From Rousseau to Ritschl, New York, Harper, c. 1959, Chap. 10, "Strauss."

of his teaching? What of the future Kingdom that Jesus announced with eschatological urgency? Was Jesus an apocalyptic fanatic who went to his death to force the eschaton?⁵⁶ Was Christianity based on deceptions by the disciples about a deluded Jesus?⁵⁷ On the other hand, was there a serious eschatological dimension to what Jesus had to say, or were these eschatological elements merely the husks, the forms, the symbols of an essentially ethical or a pious spiritual message?⁵⁸ In short, what was the nature of the Kingdom of God announced by Jesus?

These questions were raised in theological terrain through the critical work of Reimarus and Strauss. The axis of this discussion about the eschatology of Jesus is the work of Johannes Weiss and Albert Schweitzer. Theological consensus affirmed the eschatological nature of the Kingdom in the teaching of Jesus after these theologians forced the issue. It is no longer seriously questioned that the Kingdom of God is absolutely God's own activity.⁵⁹

56 So, Albert Schweitzer, The Quest of the Historical Jesus, From Reimarus to Wrede, London, Adam and Charles Black, 1910, x-410 p.

57 Reimarus, Goal.

58 Adolf Harnack, What Is Christianity? (3rd rev. ed.), New York, William and Norgate, 1904, x-306 p.

59 The following development is drawn from Perrin, Kingdom, and Gosta Lundstrom, The Kingdom of God in the Teaching of Jesus, Edinburgh, Oliver and Boyd, 1963, xiv-300 p. For a brief work and bibl.: George E. Ladd, Jesus and the

Subsequent to Reimarus and Strauss, orthodoxy seemed faced with two alternatives: a naive, fundamentalist and supernatural interpretation of the sources, or the demise of Christianity in the face of critical studies. Serious eschatology was retained by some despite its apparent adverse implications for the Christian Jesus. For others, any evidence of eschatology had to be rejected. Again, others de-eschatologized the eschatology.⁶⁰ The question forced itself: what is the intention in the eschatological elements of the Gospel record of the teaching of Jesus?

A major theological development in the form of the liberal Protestant theology of the 1800's had significant implications for this question. Optimistic that critical scholarship would reveal and reinstate the historical Jesus, the task of careful historical biblical criticism was seriously undertaken there.⁶¹ The results were used to strip

Kingdom, The Eschatology of Biblical Realism, New York, Harper, 1964, xv-366 p.; also, G. R. Beasley-Murray, "A Century of Eschatological Discussion," in Expository Times, Vol. 64, 1952-1953, p. 312-316: a review from Reimarus; C. J. Cadoux, "The Historical Jesus: A Study of Schweitzer and After," in Expository Times, Vol. 46, 1934-1935, p. 406-416.

⁶⁰ On this, cf. Kselman, "Modern New Testament Criticism"; Beasley-Murray, "A Century of Eschatological Discussion."

⁶¹ J. B. Lightfoot (1829-1889), B. F. Westcott (1825-1901), A. Von Harnack (1851-1930) accepted, undertook and drew from the work of the historico-critical method in NT studies. These are cited as examples by Kselman, "A Century of Eschatological Discussion."

the texts of the dogmatic layers which Reimarus had uncovered. Nineteenth century work was preoccupied with the historical value and the theological meaning of the Gospel narratives. When attempts to write a life of Jesus gave way, in the latter half of that century, to discovery of the meaning of his message, the notion, Kingdom of God, became increasingly important. Friederick Schliermacher considered it the all-inclusive symbol for Christianity.⁶²

It was Albert Ritschl who centered this concept in theological interest by insisting on its centrality in the message of Jesus. His interpretation of the Kingdom went the way of liberal theology: he saw it as the moral task begun by Jesus, to be completed by man through love-inspired action, and a sociological entity which does indeed come from God, but rests on the independence and responsibility of men. This was a vision of humanity with an ethical purpose, more reflective of nineteenth century philosophical consciousness than of the mind of Jesus about the Kingdom he announced.⁶³ The results of liberal theology for the message

⁶² Friederick Schliermacher, The Christian Faith (H. R. Mackintosh and J. S. Steward, Eds.), Edinburgh, Clark, 1928, Section 9:2: for him this symbol is "the general expression of that fact that in Christianity all pain and all joy are religious only insofar as they are related to activity in the Kingdom of God," i.e., the activity to which all religious feeling moves (ibid.).

⁶³ Perrin, Kingdom, p. 14-16; also, Lundstrom, Kingdom, p. 3-9. By way of, e.g., "Jesus Himself [...] saw in the Kingdom of God the moral end of the religious

of Jesus are exemplified in the classical work of Adolph Harnack, What Is Christianity? According to Harnack, Christianity is a set of ethical truths preached by and exemplified in Jesus. The sense of Jesus' message, announcing something different in quality from all cultural values or human undertakings, was being completely de-eschatologized.

Knowledge of Jewish eschatology, the exegetical demands inherent in the texts, in short, the biblical realism of critical scholarship had given way to current theological views rooted in the idealist liberal philosophy of the century. The offensive aspect of eschatology, God's own decisive intervention, was blurred in a view of the Kingdom of God as man's inner spiritual communion with God, or his ethical goal, or the divine creative force depending on man's cooperation. Liberal theology had rediscovered the centrality of the notion in Jesus' teaching, but it had become liberal theology's kingdom. It was to this distortion that Weiss and Schweitzer⁶⁴ directed their attack.

In 1892, Johannes Weiss⁶⁴ drew attention to the liberal Protestant interpretations of the Kingdom of God

fellowship He had to found [...] the organization of humanity through action inspired by love: Albrecht Ritschl, The Christian Doctrine of Justification and Reconciliation, New Jersey, Reference Books, 1966, p. 12.

64 For the following: Perrin, Kingdom, p. 16-23; Lundstrom, Kingdom, p. 35-41, in reference to J. Weiss, Die Idie des Reiches Gottes in der Theologie (1900), and his early work, Die Predigt Jesu vom Reiche Gottes (1892, rev. in 1900).

taught by Jesus as originating more in the presuppositions of modern philosophical positions than in its own original historical form and in the teachings of Jesus. Weiss affirmed an essential relationship between Jesus' teachings and apocalyptic and prophetic teaching of Judaism about the Kingdom. He set for himself the task of interpreting the teaching of Jesus in the full light of this relationship.

Over all modern philosophical modifications, Weiss gave priority to the biblical texts. His interpretation was that Jesus expected the Kingdom of God in the imminent future. This would be the direct intervention of God alone, the final miracle that would be the fulfillment of Israel's hopes, was future, but very near. Its power was already experienced in the defeat of Satan.

The subjective, ethical and sociological Kingdom of liberal theology was upset here by a view of the Kingdom in terms of God's action as King, and of the Jewish expectation that the Kingdom of God would be manifest not by man but by God alone. God's action as king is unilateral and decisive. This, for Weiss, was the emphasis of the Old Testament and was to be maintained in interpreting Jesus. In his view, the Kingdom of God announced by Jesus was not intended by Jesus to mean the result of imminent development, or ethical endeavor. It comes about by the direct intervention of God. Weiss' insistence upon a critical historical study of this

concept in Jesus' teaching proved to be the final point of resistance to the de-eschatologizing work of the nineteenth century. It was Albert Schweitzer, however, by his popularization of Weiss' thesis, who opened the flood gates and forced, in one sense, final action in the discussion of Jesus' sense of eschatology.

Situated in the nineteenth-century attempts at writing a life of Jesus, Schweitzer presented his famous view of Jesus.⁶⁵ The key to this work was Weiss' thesis that Jesus' eschatological expectations must be interpreted in terms of Jewish eschatology. Applying this to Jesus' entire ministry, Schweitzer described Jesus' consciousness as that of a man who went to his death to force the eschatological kingdom, and died deceived and despairing. As might be expected, Schweitzer dominated the scene at the beginning of the twentieth century, for the world of New Testament scholarship had to come to grips with what was called consistent, or thoroughgoing eschatology. The question became: was the eschatology in Jesus' teaching genuine eschatology?

The discussion vacillated between affirmations and negations of an eschatological intent in Jesus' teaching.⁶⁶

⁶⁵ Albert Schweitzer, The Mystery of the Kingdom of God (Walter Lowrie, Trans.), London, A. & C. Black Ltd., 1925 (c. 1901), 275 p., which is a sketch of the "Life of Jesus."

⁶⁶ Perrin, Kingdom, p. 28 ff.; Lundstrom, Kingdom, Chap. 7.

For some, the relationship between the Kingdom of God in it and the eschatological hope of Israel was not important. Others maintained that Jesus introduced new meaning into the eschatological concepts he used rendering them non-eschatological in meaning. These found in the content of Jesus' teaching a message of spiritual and inner renewal; of decision; of communion with God and future hope; of simple piety and ethical enterprise.⁶⁷

The Social Gospel movement was a clear denial of any eschatology in Jesus' teaching about the Kingdom. This theology sought a rediscovery of the true nature of the Kingdom within an ideal transformed society, effected through a gradual growth, by a movement initiated by Jesus, sustained by God and effected by man's organization.⁶⁸

Operative in these positions was the ongoing clash between a totally ethical view of man, the idealism and liberalism of the nineteenth century, and a view of life

⁶⁷This constituted an acceptance of eschatological elements, but, by way of a "transformation or transmutation" of eschatology. E.g. J. H. Leckie (1918), Wm. Sanday (1907), E. C. Dewick (1912), W. Manson (1918). This tendency appears later in F. C. Grant (1940), John Knox (1941), Amos N. Wilder (1939-1950). Examples cited from Perrin, Kingdom.

⁶⁸Perrin, Kingdom, p. 46-49. Notably, the "American Social Gospel Movement" based on Walter Rauschenbusch, A Theology for the Social Gospel, New York, Macmillan, 1919, 279 p. These efforts to de-eschatologize the Kingdom of Jesus' teaching were significant in that the "present" element rejected by Schweitzer was brought into the discussion. The bind was there.

held in the Jewish hope that awaits God's creative inbreak. The focus was on man, on the eschatological order, not on the activity of God. To support these views, the present and ethical aspects of the Kingdom spoken of by Jesus were developed. These were viewed in terms of continuous ongoing development of the world order, or of man's responsible and independent involvement in the process. The question remained whether the emphases of Jesus were to be found there.

The conflict in these views was, as in Jesus' own milieu, between man's view of God and how he is to act, and God's view of it. The real weakness originated in unsound exegesis conveying interpretations of Jesus' consciousness that were irreconcilable with the whole of his teaching, life, and human sense.⁶⁹ As formerly happened in the work of Weiss, it was biblical criticism that broke through to the genuine meaning and intent of the texts, and to a significant theological consensus in the 1920's.

The Universal Christian Conference held in 1920 at Stockholm was witness to this achievement. Behind questions

⁶⁹ Perrin observes that to suggest that Jesus used language full of meaning for his audience, but with new content and without having made the change clear, i.e., that he spoke about the eschatological reality expected in the future while intending to refer merely to the present order, without clarifying the change, is a grave injustice to the historical picture of Jesus. Kingdom, p. 50 ff.

of practical Christianity raised there, was the theological problem of the nature and relevance of the Kingdom of God taught by Jesus. In the papers delivered by renowned German and English scholars, its eschatological nature was clearly exposed.⁷⁰ Over against any evolutionary or ethical view of God's activity, the Kingdom of God was affirmed as God's direct action. The Kingdom as principle of history, or physical dynamic, is rejected. Edward Hoskyns, for example, after claiming in his initial statements that eschatology is central to the earliest tradition, rejecting any view of Kingdom of God enunciated as immanent divine power, holds that: "Our New Testament is almost entirely controlled by the thought of God as active and powerful." He finds that not only do the New Testament writers "show no tendency to regard His activity as an activity within the sphere of a) developing history," but they also reject the idea that it is "the energy, which gives movement and life to the physical structure of the Universe."⁷¹

K. L. Schmidt agrees with Hoskyns that the Kingdom can only be established by the interference of God: "The negative sense that the kingdom of God is nothing else but a

⁷⁰ These papers are found in Theology, A Monthly Journal of Historic Christianity, Vol. 14, 1927, p. 247-295.

⁷¹ Ibid., p. 253.

miracle, must be kept in its absolute negativity."⁷²

Schmidt, however, reaffirms the essential relationship of Kingdom of God to the eschatology of Judaism. He continues:

Chiefly we have to deal with an eschatological conception which goes back to the prophets and is further developed by the apocalyptists, for which the expressions βασιλεια τοῦ Θεοῦ and βασιλεια τῶν οὐρανῶν are used.⁷³

Working from the premise of an essential relationship between the teaching of Jesus and the eschatology of his times, C. H. Dodd's paper dealt with this-worldly aspects of the Kingdom, his theory of Realized Eschatology. Gerhard Kittel pointed to Jesus' de-politicization of the Kingdom and spoke of it as the act of God alone.⁷⁴ In Kittel's view, it does not evolve, is not brought to pass, but breaks in upon the world.⁷⁵

Here is agreement that the Kingdom of God in Jesus' teaching is an eschatological concept about God's absolutely own active inbreak into human life. Here is rejection of those ethical and evolutionary ideas about the Kingdom that would relate it to political and social reform.⁷⁶ Moreover, this notion is held to be intrinsically related to the eschatological expectations of the prophets and apocalyptists.

⁷² Ibid., p. 257.

⁷³ Ibid., p. 256: Kingdom of God; Kingdom of Heaven.

⁷⁴ Ibid., p. 262.

⁷⁵ Ibid., p. 261.

⁷⁶ Perrin, Kingdom, p. 56.

With this acceptance of the nature of the Kingdom of Jesus' message, this question was resolved.⁷⁷ But it was not all laid to rest, for problems of interpretation remained and have been dealt with in a variety of ways. It was one thing to recognize that Jesus spoke to the Jewish eschatological expectations of God's own decisive action, but what of the reality? The offense of eschatology continued. Did Jesus consider the eschatological event to be in the future? If so, to what was it future? Was it present? If so, where? How did Jesus see man in relation to this decisive action? Did Jesus speak out of apocalyptic or prophetic eschatology? If Jesus' teaching was about the eschaton, these are important questions here. What was Jesus really saying to the eschatological expectations of Judaism?

Decisions concerning a fundamental starting-point, and definition of the Kingdom of God, were crucial in the ongoing discussion. Conflicts, resistances and paradoxes continued to bring the reality into relief. Is the Kingdom, in the teaching of Jesus, primarily a future eschatological era of salvation, or the power of God operative in and for that era? Is basis for definition of the Kingdom, God's activity or man's expectations of that activity? Is the

77 Ibid., p. 57; Lundstrom, Kingdom, p. 232.

Kingdom in relation to abstract time, or does its relation reside elsewhere?⁷⁸

These questions return the enquiry to the message of Jesus. He announced the Kingdom of God of Israel's eschatological expectations. Apocalyptic elements are in the Gospel tradition. So the question is to be posed: what was the eschatological consciousness of Jesus? Was it that of the prophets or of apocalyptic? This may not seem the important question. For, essentially, they are not mutually exclusive. The basic factor in apocalyptic is the necessity of God's own action to manifest his Kingdom. The axis of apocalyptic belief is the expectation of God's own transforming intervention that would be a new and decisive event for Israel. This was fundamentally the belief of the prophets. The concept, Kingdom of God, symbolized the dynamic of God's involvement in human experience and so belonged properly to eschatological belief. On the other hand, this question is crucial and must be raised. Apocalyptic literature shifts focus from the expectation of God's free, transforming action that is event, to its expectation corollary: life in the new age. But this emphasis is alien to genuine prophetic belief.

⁷⁸ To deal in depth with the problems in the ongoing discussion would lead too far afield. Some of these will be touched in what follows. For an indepth survey, cf. Lundstrom, Kingdom, and Perrin, Kingdom. The recurring hazard remained the attempt to overcome the offense of eschatology by philosophical modifications, rather than meet it head on with the persistence of biblical Realism.

Jesus did not offer a definition of the Kingdom of God.⁷⁹ What, then, is the meaning of the apocalyptic elements in Jesus' teaching? Is his eschatological announcement prophetic or apocalyptic? Is it a question of the future manifestation of God's intervention? Is his message to be simply fitted into Jewish apocalyptic with a prophetic call to readiness? These are the questions yet to be resolved here.

C. Eschatological Consciousness of Jesus:
Prophetic or Apocalyptic?

The Gospels certainly attribute to Jesus many apocalyptic conceptions. The future coming of the Kingdom of God with power,⁸⁰ the future judgment,⁸¹ general resurrection before the judgment,⁸² the angel-like nature of the blessed,⁸³ renewal of the world,⁸⁴ dramatic eschatological portents and events,⁸⁵ are but a few examples. However, the

⁷⁹ Thence contemporary theology has offered varied definitions. The position in the present study is that it is only in a biblical realism, free from philosophical modifications, that Jesus' meaning is to be found. The following relies on Schnackenburg, God's Rule. He remains faithful to the texts, and when questions remain he does not lightly cast aside the thrusts found in Tradition.

⁸⁰ Mark 9:1.

⁸¹ Mt. 5:21 ff., Mt. 7:1 ff. = Lk. 6:37 ff., Mk. 12:40.

⁸² Mt. 12:41 ff. = Lk. 11:31 ff.

⁸³ Mark 12:25, par.

⁸⁴ Mark 13:31, par.

⁸⁵ Mark 13, par. E.g.'s drawn from Kümmel, Promise, p. 43 ff., p. 88 ff.

critical evidence is that Jesus had no intention of being an apocalyptist. In fact, he rejected those elements of apocalyptic that overshadowed and blurred the genuine object of prophetic expectation, and spoke out of and to the view of God and of history found in the prophets. A few examples will be cited here.⁸⁶

Jesus showed no interest in estimating the point in time when the Kingdom of God would be manifest, and he invalidated any search for signs of its coming. A Lucan passage giving Jesus' response to questions concerning the End makes this certain. When the Pharisees asked Jesus when they could expect the Kingdom of God to come, he told them that there could be no signs to herald it.⁸⁷ Jesus stays clear of apocalyptic questions, repudiating premonitions of the end and dismissing methods of observation proposed by

86 For this, and the following development: Schnackenburg, God's Rule, p. 97-99, 160-214; Kümmel, Promise, Chap. 2: he demonstrates how Jesus' message, "stands in complete contrast to the Weltanschauung of Apocalyptic," p. 104; Perrin, Kingdom, p. 176 ff.; and Perrin, Rediscovering the Teaching of Jesus [Rediscovering], New York, SCM Press, 1967, p. 68 ff.; Jeremias, Theology, p. 122 ff.: for him the apocalyptic elements represent spiritual judgments about the present Kingdom of God, p. 139. Bultman views Jesus' message to be "free from all the learned and fanciful speculations of the apocalyptic writers [...]. Everything is swallowed up in the single thought that then God will rule," Theology of the New Testament (Vols. I and II), New York, Scribner, 1951, 1955, Vol. I, p. 4-5.

87 Luke 17:20.

apocalyptic seers. Significantly, he directs attention to current happenings.

'The coming of the Kingdom of God does not admit of observation and there will be no one to say, "Look here! Look there!" For, you must know, the Kingdom of God is among you.'⁸⁸

These sayings not only show Jesus' abstention from apocalyptic pastimes, but they also surface his negation of the view of history they presuppose. The coming of the Kingdom of God cannot be discerned in signs or calculations because history is not a predetermined whole moving toward an end. History is the locus of the divine activity, and that activity is wholly subject to God, his freedom and power.

Jesus admits of no knowledge about the eschatological event: "'But as for that day or hour nobody knows it, neither the angels of heaven, nor the Son; no one but the Father.'⁸⁹ The eschaton is beyond human speculation,

⁸⁸ Luke 17:20. A vast body of literature surrounds Luke 17:20-21, for careful exegesis of entos hymon (among you) see Kümmel, Promise, p. 33 ff.; also, Perrin, Rediscovery, p. 73 ff., with bibl.

⁸⁹ Mark 13:32 = Matthew 24:36. Scholarly discussion of the saying focuses on its genuineness and the reference to the Father and Son. Kümmel, Promise, p. 40-43, and Schnackenburg, God's Rule, p. 210-211 hold the traditional interpretation: Jesus left the time of the end event in complete obscurity because it is to be entirely God's; it is not the object of his message. Hence, Matthew 25:13, "So stay awake, because you do not know either the day or the hour." Also, Matthew 24:50 = Luke 12:46. The examples are cited from Schnackenburg, God's Rule.

uncertain in time, unexpected in its proceedings, because it is wholly God's: "but as for seats at my right hand or my left, these are not mine to grant; they belong to those to whom they have been allotted."⁹⁰ Categorization and prediction of God and his activity are ruled out.

These assertions may appear to be contradicted by the eschatological discourse of Mark 13 and parallels. Critical analysis and the history of traditions, however, show that Jesus' prophetic intention is the issue there.⁹¹ These passages are clearly predictive, but they do not reveal apocalyptic secrets. There are no clear dates, nor exact perceivable data. The meaning of the eschatology of Jesus is not to be sought in the strictly apocalyptic conceptions of cosmic signs⁹² and catastrophes,⁹³ but in the prophetic warnings about deception,⁹⁴ encouragement in the

⁹⁰ Mark 10:40 and par. Schnackenburg, commenting on these passages observes: "For Jesus the future Kingdom of God is a reality subject only to God himself over which God has sovereign control [...] it is wholly beyond the range of human curiosity and speculation." God's Rule, p. 99.

⁹¹ Exegetical conclusions that this is not apocalyptic instruction, but eschatological promise in line with prophecy, cf. Kümmel, Promise, p. 95 ff.; Schnackenburg, God's Rule, p. 201 ff.

⁹² Mark 13:7-8.

⁹³ Mark 13:14-20.

⁹⁴ Mark 13:5-6; 21-23.

face of persecution,⁹⁵ appeals for watchfulness,⁹⁶ and motives for comfort,⁹⁷ that were taken into the eschatology of the early Church.⁹⁸ This message is a practical one, situating the believer in his own history. Rudolph Schnackenburg affirms that: "The master is not revealing a cryptic apocalyptic doctrine to his disciples but arming them for what is to come."⁹⁹ The message also refers to God's free inbreak into history. Norman Perrin indicates the genuine teaching of Jesus which underlines the synoptic apocalypses:

This [...] puts the emphasis upon the sudden and unexpected manner of God's inbreaking into history and human experience and upon the responsibility of men to be prepared to respond to this crisis.¹⁰⁰

In this passage, Perrin reiterates the "prophetic rather than the apocalyptic emphases."¹⁰¹

The non-apocalyptic consciousness of Jesus is strikingly revealed in the eschatological passage about the

95 Mark 13:9-10.

96 Mark 13:33-37.

97 Mark 13:30.

98 These apocalyptic texts contain Jewish apocalyptic conceptions to embellish the eschatological message. They do not belong to the early Jesus tradition. So, Kümmel, Promise, p. 95 ff., Schnackenburg, God's Rule, p. 201 ff., although he examines them in terms of another question, namely, the nearness of the future Kingdom.

99 Schnackenburg, God's Rule, p. 201.

100 Perrin, Kingdom, p. 178.

101 Ibid.

last judgment in Matthew 25. Despite its clearly apocalyptic color, the significance of this description is not to convey eschatological data but to give a realistic statement of what is important. There are many critical questions concerning the authenticity of this pericope, but not its substance. Joachim Jeremias questions the authenticity of the details given there.¹⁰² He does admit, however, that it contains "features of such startling originality that it is difficult to credit them to anyone but the Master himself."¹⁰³

Matthew 25 is a realistic statement of the main issues of judgment. Jesus situates them in the concrete of present relationships with one's fellowman, and significantly, with Jesus himself. This is not apocalyptic consciousness. Passivity before the determinisms of history, confident expectation of vindication in terms of mere belief in God, descriptions of eschatological proceedings, are all absent. Jesus, like the prophets, confronts men with the realism of the present and their own active responsibility in time and history. The Kingdom of God is, simultaneously, a matter of God's own action. "It does not admit of observation."¹⁰⁴

¹⁰² Jeremias, The Parables of Jesus [Parables] (rev. ed.), London, SCM Press, 1963, p. 206-209. Also, Schnackenburg, God's Rule, p. 170-172.

¹⁰³ Jeremias, Parables, p. 209, quoting T. W. Manson.

¹⁰⁴ Luke 17:20.

The key to the discussion of the nature of Jesus' eschatology is the dynamic concept of the Kingdom of God.¹⁰⁵ It is abundantly clear that Jesus preferred this symbol to connote the eschatological age over against those preferred in apocalyptic. The latter spoke of the age to come, the consummation, the end times. It represented the future life in terms of its benefits such as lasting peace, long life, healing, return to the conditions of paradise. When Jesus does use these traditional images they designate the consummation of God's divine activity rather than representations of the future age. It is, then, significant that where Kingdom of God, in reference to the new age, does appear in apocalyptic literature, the issues are God's initiative and action in the blessedness of those times.

For example:

he will raise up his Kingdom for all ages over men,
he who once gave a holy law to godly men, to all
of whom he promised to open out the earth and
world, and the portals of the blessed, and all
joys, and everlasting sense and eternal gladness.¹⁰⁶

Jesus' preference for Kingdom of God to refer to the new age directs the attention of his hearers from myth, fantasy, and speculation about matters wholly beyond human possibility and human categories, to the action of the

¹⁰⁵ The following is drawn from Perrin, Kingdom, p. 160-185.

¹⁰⁶ Ibid., p. 179, citing Sib. Orac. 3:767-771.

living God within history. The real issues were not with men's definitions, with his control and the security of his own being, but with God, his free action within human affairs. His is a prophetic eschatology.

D. Uniqueness of Jesus' Eschatological Message

The prophetic message of Jesus about the future eschatological Kingdom of God stands within the context of Israel's expectations of a new, decisive action of God on her behalf. The question naturally arises: what was new, uniquely of Jesus in such a message? The answer lies in the certain, straightforward, simple, but, to Jewish ears, absolutely revolutionary assertion that: "'The time has come' [...] 'and the Kingdom of God is close at hand.'"¹⁰⁷ This basic and absolute message is without analogy in the expressions of Jewish expectations. Jesus is announcing, as present, the decisive intervention of God which, in them, implies the time of fulfillment and the shift of aeons. Joachim Jeremias insists that "he is 'the only Jew known to us from ancient times,' who proclaimed 'that the new age of salvation had already begun.'"¹⁰⁸

¹⁰⁷ Mark 1:15, and par. The text is Mark's summary of the intention and ministry of Jesus and not a direct logion.

¹⁰⁸ Jeremias, Theology, p. 108.

What was new about Jesus was his interpretation of contemporaneous happenings. He declared the purely eschatological Kingdom of God which was expected in the future to be already present.

This assertion was no abstract, authoritarian, dogmatic imposition. For it was in the events of his ministry that Jesus acknowledged the actual manifestation of divine power and action which is the eschatological Kingdom of God. The healing, life-giving and freeing works of his ministry were real events, and they were the Kingdom of God in action. Jesus' message was not a new prophetic call, or even an apocalyptic one to hope and readiness. It was an eschatological event. The realism of this assertion is evidenced by Jesus' own testimony to his ministry, and in particular to his healing exorcisms. This will now be examined.

It was his ministry that Jesus related to prophetic expectations for the eschatological era. His reply to the disciples of John the Baptist is fundamental here. Jesus explained himself by interpreting the Scripture in terms of what was transpiring. His message for John was, as Joachim Jeremias observes, a cry of exultation that the ancient prophetic promises for the era of salvation were fulfilled in his words and actions. The blind see, the lame walk, the deaf hear, the Good News is proclaimed to the poor, and, far beyond Isaiah, the lepers are cleansed

and the dead rise again.¹⁰⁹ This is eschatological happening.

Another text confirms this radical assertion about his ministry. In the discourse at Nazareth, which Luke significantly places at the beginning of the public life, Jesus personally identified with the eschatological era. He cites Isaiah 61:1-2:

The spirit of the Lord Yahweh has been given to me,
for Yahweh has appointed me.
He has sent me to bring good news to the poor,
to bind up hearts that are broken;
to proclaim liberty to captives,
freedom to those in prison;
to proclaim a year of favour from Yahweh,
a day of vengeance for our God.

He declares that: "This text is being fulfilled today even as you listen."¹¹⁰ In effect, Jesus considered his hearers eye-witnesses that the prophetic promises of God's future intervention were being fulfilled.

It is helpful to recall again here the role assigned the miracle stories by the Gospel tradition. In the developed literature certain apologetic and eulogistic elements can be discerned, but these do not properly belong to the earliest strata. Jesus' miracles were constitutive of his ministry and are to be viewed as external expressions and as a means

¹⁰⁹ Luke 7:21 ff. = Matthew 11:4 ff. Jeremias, Parables, 115 ff., Theology, p. 103-104; also, Schnackenburg, God's Rule, p. 119-120.

¹¹⁰ Luke 4:21. Schnackenburg argues the genuineness of this logion (God's Rule, p. 121-122).

of divine inbreak. R. E. Brown, speaking of this primary internal role, notes that the miracles of Jesus were "acts through which He gave revelation; side by side, the word and the miraculous deed gave expression to God's entrance into time."¹¹¹ The healing, freeing and life-giving events of his ministry were important to Jesus. He summed up his work in them, and posited a real unity between them and the eschatological era of salvation. They were the happening and manifestation of the divine intervention of prophetic hope. This is the reason for declaring his disciples blessed beyond prophets and kings.¹¹² With the ministry of Jesus the hope of prophets and kings became event, experienced by the disciples.

R. E. Brown also points out, however, that the miracles were one of the means of the divine inbreak.¹¹³ They were an invasion of Satan's power, and so the decisive divine intervention. It is useful here to situate the miracles within the experiential context of Jesus' own time.

Jesus interpreted his miracles as victories over Satan. This surfaces, for one example, where he answered the indignation of his critics before the cure of an arthritic

¹¹¹ R. E. Brown, "The Gospel Miracles," [Gospel Miracles], in his New Testament Essays, Milwaukee, Bruce, 1965, p. 169-170.

¹¹² Luke 10:23-24; Matthew 13:16-17.

¹¹³ Brown, Gospel Miracles, p. 171.

woman with a description of the healing in terms of Satan's bondage: "And this woman, a daughter of Abraham whom Satan has held bound these eighteen years--was it not right to untie her bonds."¹¹⁴ Physical and mental sickness, threatening natural phenomena, evils of every sort, were attributed to demons. Humans felt themselves to be in bondage, helpless and fearful within the power of countless evil spirits. Jesus' view was even more radical. He delineated a whole realm of evil where the many demons were envoys, the soldiers, indeed the multiple manifestations of the disrupter of creation, Satan.¹¹⁵

It was with Satan that Jesus was engaged in conflict. That the power of Satan was being broken in his works is intended in the images of the Beelzebub controversy sayings: a household divided, a strong man tied up, the household burgled.¹¹⁶ The miracles, and most explicitly the healing exorcisms, manifested and effected this. Jesus insists that "no one can make his way into a strong man's house and burgle his property unless he has tied up the strong man first."¹¹⁷

¹¹⁴ Luke 13:16.

¹¹⁵ Jeremias, Theology, p. 94. Kallas develops this aspect of miracles well, although he mistakenly sees in it the real significance of all the miracles: James Kallas, The Significance of the Synoptic Miracles, London, S.P.C.K., Chap. 4-6.

¹¹⁶ Mark 3:22-27, par.

¹¹⁷ Mark 3:27, par.

W. G. Kümmel, commenting on this passage, says that Jesus

sees the fight against Satan taking place in his exorcisms. But this fight has already been won, because Satan must be bound if he can be robbed of the children whom he dominated.¹¹⁸

Miracles and exorcisms were not, in themselves, unique to Jesus. But to assign this signification to them was without analogy in contemporary Judaism. Joachim Jeremias states that "neither the synagogue nor Qumran knows anything of a vanquishing of Satan that is already beginning in the present."¹¹⁹ By this view of the events, Jesus situated his activity within a crucial issue in the expectations of his day: that God, in his decisive intervention would break the power of Satan.¹²⁰ By claiming victories over Satan, Jesus acknowledged the real and active presence of the eschatological inbreak. This claim is explicit in the ancient logion: "But if it is through the finger of God that I cast out devils, then know that the Kingdom of God has overtaken you."¹²¹ As W. G. Kümmel observes:

¹¹⁸ Kümmel, Promise, p. 109.

¹¹⁹ Jeremias, Theology, p. 95. This point is argued by H. C. Kee, in "The Terminology of Mark's Exorcisms," in New Testament Studies, Vol. 14, 1967, p. 232-246.

¹²⁰ Qumran texts reveal the significance of this aspect of hope. The Qumran sect longs for the final visitation when the kingdom of Belial will be destroyed. Cf. Perrin, Kingdom, p. 76, 170 ff.

¹²¹ Luke 11:20, par. There are high claims for the authenticity of this logion. The ongoing discussion focuses on the interpretation as imminent or present, as drawing

It is the meaning and mission of Jesus, when announcing the approach of the Kingdom of God, to make this future at the same time already now a present reality.¹²²

Before the real facts of the exorcisms, Jesus declared that the Kingdom of God was at work, recognizable in the experience of those events. That is, God was actively engaged in the intervention decisive for Israel's life.

Accordingly, the Kingdom of God was revealed as the decisive and effective divine power, eschatological, so irrevocable, and occurring in present events. That is the meaning of these exorcisms, in itself not perceptible, but deduced and announced by Jesus. Rudolf Schnackenburg, among others, insists that "any attempt to tone down this note of fulfillment is unjustified."¹²³

Jesus' conviction that the eschatological Kingdom of God was present in his mission has been revealed here. The tradition portrays Jesus expressing this in ways, other than interpretation of his miracles, one of which is the striking simile of Mark 2:19. To the accusing judgments about the behavior of his disciples, by the Pharisees, Jesus replies:

near or actual. For Kümmel the Kingdom had already begun in Jesus' activity: Promise, p. 105-109; Perrin, Kingdom (cf. index on Matthew 12:28) and Schnackenburg, God's Rule, p. 124, argue that the text intends, has actually begun. The present writer agrees with Perrin that the question becomes wholly academic before the claim of the saying: the events are an experience of the Kingdom. Cf. Rediscovery, p. 67.

122 Kümmel, Promise, p. 109.

123 Schnackenburg, God's Rule, p. 124.

"Surely the bridegroom's attendants would never think of fasting while the bridegroom is still with them?"¹²⁴

Employing the religious symbolic language of the East where wedding connoted the day of salvation, Jesus is shown identifying his own times with the event of God's decisive action on man's behalf.

The original question here, asked what was new, uniquely of Jesus in his message about the future eschatological Kingdom of God. The response is the awesome and unbelievable, perhaps even ridiculous one: Jesus' declaration to his hearers that the saving eschatological intervention of God was already happening. It is this, Bornkamm observes, that explains the behavior of those around Jesus:

The Scribes and Pharisees rebel, because they see Jesus' teaching as a revolutionary attack upon law and tradition. [...] the demons cry out, because they sense an inroad upon their sphere of power "before the time" (Mt. Viii.29) his own people think him mad. (Mk. Iii.21) But this is also why the people marvel and the saved praise God.¹²⁵

For Jesus, present events and the eschatological Kingdom of God belong inextricably together. To this the Gospel record

¹²⁴ Mark 2:19a. This saying is considered highly authentic. Jeremias translates: "'Can the wedding guests fast during the wedding?'," Parables, p. 52, n. 14. References to parables is omitted in this discussion, due to exigencies of length. They will feature below in a discussion of present-future tension. It seems to this writer that the new, unique aspect of Jesus proclamation has been identified here.

¹²⁵ Gunther Bornkamm, Jesus of Nazareth, New York, Harper, 1960 (c. 1956), p. 62; an existential interpretation.

is witness. The preaching and miracles, especially the healing exorcisms were lived realities. Jesus is shown interpreting these healing, freeing and life-giving experiences of his ministry as realized expectations. The decisive, hoped-for event of Jewish belief is present event, and God, again and irrevocably, is offering life to his people.

What could Jesus mean when he proclaimed the present to be eschatological event? In what sense could he make this claim stating his own expectations of its future coming? How do scholars interpret the tension introduced by Jesus when he looks to the future for the coming of the eschatological event--seeing it to be already present? This question is to be examined in the following chapter. It is a vital one for this study, since its answer will open the way to a consideration of the experience of the believer before the message of Jesus.

CHAPTER III

KINGDOM OF GOD IN THE TEACHING OF JESUS: PROMISE-FULFILLMENT-CONSUMMATION

Nineteenth century theology set the stage for re-discovery of the eschatological nature of the Kingdom of God in the teaching of Jesus by beginning to investigate the relationship between the eschatology of Jesus and that of his contemporary Jewish world. Scholarly opinion no longer views the Kingdom announced by Jesus as merely an ethical or sociological movement begun by God in Jesus to be completed by believers. It cannot simply be identified with a community of people, or with the inner life of man. The Kingdom of Jesus' teaching is not of man's doing. It is the free and absolute intervention of God, expected eschatologically.

To rediscover the eschatological nature of the Kingdom announced by Jesus was important to theological study, but the issue of its temporal aspect remains crucial. Jesus announced that the decisive divine intervention, expected by his contemporaries and himself in the future was already present. Theology then questioned his intent in this view. In itself, Jesus' expectation of the future divine event would have presented no problem. Obviously the offense for theology has been, as it was for Jesus' hearers, the paradoxical assertion of the presence of divine

eschatological intervention within so clearly unsaved, unfulfilled human conditions. There are still the blind, the lame, the dead, the sinners. There are continuing victories by Satan. Certainly no cosmic nor even individual transformations of the expected eschatological quality have occurred.¹ The problematic of the temporal aspects of the eschatological message of Jesus is a constant.

As long as the theological emphasis was on the Kingdom as ethical and immanent, the idea of its presence prevailed and found ample support in the biblical texts. The rediscovery of the eschatology of Jesus brought into focus the transcendent and future aspects of his teaching. The discussion then ran the gamut from the wholly futuristic view of the Kingdom proposed by Johannes Weiss and Albert Schweitzer, to the wholly present of the realized eschatology of C. H. Dodd. Today, biblical criticism has firmly established that the teaching is that the Kingdom is both present and future.¹

It is accepted that the decisive factor of the Gospel tradition is the assertion that with Jesus the Kingdom had

¹ A history of this discussion is given by Norman Perrin, The Kingdom of God in the Teaching of Jesus [Kingdom], London, SCM Press, 1963, espec. Chap. V, X; Gosta Lundstrom, The Kingdom of God in the Teaching of Jesus [Kingdom], Edinburgh, Oliver and Boyd, 1963, Chap. IX ff.; Rudolph Schnackenburg, God's Rule and Kingdom [God's Rule], Freiburg, Herder, 1963, p. 114-214.

already come. Pervasive emphasis on the future coming is also admitted. The ongoing controversy deals with the difficult question of fitting together these contradictory views. The realism of this question is imperative, for the matrix of the problem is not the theoretical realm. The object under discussion is God's activity, an element of the human reality. More specifically, it concerns the decisive divine intervention in history proclaimed in relation to the events of Jesus' life. The problem is tension within an experience held to be present, eschatological, hence decisive, yet expected in the future. No one of the aspects of this event, divine, eschatological, present or future should be reduced to the others. This would mistake the object of Jesus' proclamation. The tension of present and future, the ambiguity in the announcement, in short, the offense of the message of Jesus, is not to be overcome. But the history of the discussion reflects the difficulty of avoiding this.²

An address to this problem is best made by way of the biblical record, allowing it to speak for itself out of its own witness. There the tension of present and future will be recognized as belonging to the structure of the biblical experience itself, promise-fulfillment. Jesus was interpreting what may be called the language of promise and fulfillment,

² E.g.: Karl Barth's wholly transcendent view in his early writings, and Rudolf Bultmann's existential one.

fundamental to the biblical records. Rudolph Schnackenburg, having posed the question of Jesus' teaching of the eschatological kingship of God as still future, or as a present force and reality, or both, states that: "The right method of interpretation is suggested by the Old Testament relation between promise and fulfillment, fulfillment and consummation."³ This means that Jesus placed the existence of the believer within the tension of promise and fulfillment. But he did this in an altogether new way, interpreting his ministry as the irrevocable, once-for-all, decisive event of the eschatological expectations of Israel. Promise has become present fulfillment. This promise-fulfillment aspect of Jesus' announcement will be the study of the present chapter.

The category, promise-fulfillment, belongs unmistakably to the New Testament, which itself designates the coming of Jesus Christ as the fulfillment of the hopes and expectations of Old Testament belief. The numerous New Testament references to Old Testament texts, persons, institutions, and events evidence this motif, built into the texts themselves. A significant case in point is that Psalm 22 provided a source for the portrayal of the death of Jesus.⁴ The New Testament

3 Schnackenburg, God's Rule, p. 116.

4 The example is from Gerhard Von Rad, "Typological Interpretation of the Old Testament" [Typological], p. 17-39, in Essays on Old Testament Interpretation [Essays], (Claus Westermann, Ed.), London, SCM Press, 1963, p. 27; bibl., 357-361. Von Rad shows that NT references to the typical go

writers understood the meaning of the event of Jesus from the pages of the Old Testament. On this point they were certainly unanimous: Jesus was born and lived and died and rose again according to the Scriptures.

This fulfillment of promise theme in the New Testament, the expression of a fundament in the structure of Christian belief and witness, need not be labored here. Moreover, recent Old Testament scholarship has elucidated the perception that promise and fulfillment properly belong also to the Old Testament. This has less generally been recognized in biblical theology. This is not a question of superimposing the New Testament perspective of fulfillment upon the whole Bible. Rather, this category belongs intrinsically and independently to the Old Testament. Promise and fulfillment represent the structural underpinnings of the experience to which the Old Testament gives witness. Walther Zimmerli observes: "When we survey the entire Old Testament, we find ourselves involved in a great movement from promise toward fulfillment."⁵

far beyond the use of actual citations. The NT often portrays a variety of the typological way of thinking ("theological-eschatological analogical") found in the OT that shows a "heightening" between type and antitype. NT writers were in no way bound by the limits of the type (Typological, p. 20 ff.).

5 Walther Zimmerli, "Promise and Fulfillment" [Promise], p. 89-122, in Essays, p. 111-112. This promise-fulfillment aspect has been effectively presented by Von Rad, Zimmerli, Westerman. Cf. their dialogue with divergent views on the topic in Essays, and in Bernard W. Anderson (Ed.), The Old Testament and Christian Faith, New York, Harper, 1963, bibl., p. 265-266.

The theme, promise-fulfillment, is also considered in biblical theology today to be one of supreme importance in assessing the relationship of the two Testaments.⁶ Claus Westermann considers it "the clearest and most important point of transition to the New Testament."⁷ Walther Zimmerli finds in the language of promise and fulfillment "a particularly striking way in which the New Testament conceives of the relationship of both testaments."⁸ For Wolfhart Pannenberg it is by means of the "bracket of promise and fulfillment" that the one history of God "binds together the eschatological community of Jesus Christ and ancient Israel."⁹ Gerhard Von Rad finds the key to the link between the Testaments in the historical importance of the New Testament event in the ceaseless movement of promise and fulfillment in the Old Testament.¹⁰

⁶ Roland E. Murphy, "The Relationship between the Testaments," in Catholic Biblical Quarterly, Vol. 26, 1964, p. 349-359, an evaluative survey of supporting opinions; Pieter A. Verhoef, "The Relationship between the Old and New Testaments," in New Perspectives on the Old Testament (Barton J. Payne, Ed.), Waco, Texas, Word Books, 1970, p. 280-303, surveys a number of formulae; G. Hasel, Old Testament Theology: Basic Issues in the Current Debate, Grand Rapids, Eerdmans, 1972, 103 p. In this excellent survey Hasel observes that this schema represents a prominent approach that modern scholarship is prepared to advance: Chap. IV, espec. p. 75.

⁷ Cf. Claus Westermann, "The Way of Promise through the Old Testament" [Way of Promise], in The Old Testament and Christian Faith, p. 200.

⁸ Zimmerli, Promise, p. 89.

⁹ Wolfhart Pannenberg, "Redemptive Event and History," in Essays, p. 323.

¹⁰ Gerhard Von Rad, Old Testament Theology (2 vols.), [Theology I, II], Edinburgh, Oliver and Boyd, 1962, Vol. II, p. 320 ff.

This understanding of the relationship of the two Testaments is not new. It is situated, in fact, in the New Testament period. But modern scholarship, following the leads of critical analysis, no longer seeks to establish static, mechanical, or apologetic systems of correspondence between prediction and fact. Rather, it sets the whole question into the larger dynamic context of an ongoing history. Actions, persons, institutions, predictions are recognized as deriving meaning from their existence within the total movement of events.¹¹

Certainly, a view of the experience portrayed by the two Testaments and their own connection in terms of promise-fulfillment is not all-embracing of the biblical reality. Its content cannot be so readily contained. But this relation does belong within, and emerge out of, the most fundamental line of connection between the Testaments, the history reported here. Roland Murphy states that:

This tension between promise and fulfillment is a dynamic characteristic of the Old Testament which provides the basis for the New Testament fulfillment [...] it seems [...] to be the basic kind of (interpreted) history which the Bible itself presents to us.¹²

It will be shown now that the category, promise-fulfillment, is intrinsic to the structure of the biblical record of that

11 Cf. Westermann, Way of Promise, p. 200-202.

12 Murphy, The Relationship between the Testaments, p. 358.

history. As such, it captures a significant dynamic of Israel's sense of human existence, and provides the vehicle for a realistic grasp of the experience of those who receive Jesus' message about fulfillment.

1. Promise-Fulfillment in the Old Testament.

Biblical language, as all of man's language, arises from the core of human life as attempts to name the reality of experience. Therefore, this section will proceed first by way of the Old Testament literature. Two of its characteristic forms will be briefly examined. These are: (1) the process of re-interpretation, and (2) the pervasive element of promise in its statement of belief. These will be seen to contain and reveal fundamental aspects of Israel's understanding of existence: a movement and an openness to the future, within the tension of promise and fulfillment.

A. The Process of Re-interpretation¹³

Biblical criticism has shown that the Old Testament literature is related through larger and smaller accumulations of traditions to a few saving deeds and institutions. These, few in number, are the events in which Israel's

¹³ This discussion draws on Von Rad, Theology I, p. 115-121; Theology II, p. 414 ff.

faith recognized the divine activity that gave her existence: the call of the patriarch, the Exodus, Sinai and Conquest events, the Davidic dynasty, the foundation of Zion. Fundamental to the biblical account is a process of re-interpretation of these traditions. It represents constant fresh re-actualization within the faith experience of Israel of these divine deeds to render them relevant and actual for each generation and for every day.

To speak schematically of this process, it may be said that ancient cultic celebrations of individual saving events crystallized into separate traditions at different times. Eventually these were amalgamated into literary units. Summaries and sequences of the saving history developed, the oldest being Deuteronomy 26:5 ff. and Joshua 24:2 ff. These basic materials were later reworked into larger literary units to throw light, each from its own standpoint, on Yahweh's activity over a long time-span. The work of Yahwist and the Elohist and the Priestly document are examples. The Deuteronomic survey of the history of the monarchy, and the Chronicler's interpretation of that history, further demonstrate the passing of materials from one age to another, over against the horizon of each and on the basis of new events in God's way with Israel.¹⁴

¹⁴ Cf. Norbert Lohfink, S.J., The Christian Meaning of the Old Testament, Milwaukee, Bruce, 1968, Chap. 1, for a brief overview of the entire process. The use of the "Nathan Prophecy" through the tradition is an example at point: cf. Von Rad, Theology II, p. 46 ff.

This constant reworking of the data reflects the development of critical thinking which learned to select and combine with varying emphasis. Something deeper was also operative there. This language of re-interpretation at all stages of her history is an expression of Israel's making actual the divine acts that give her existence. Ongoing events of history did not fall into an historical void but were grasped in relation to those fundamental divine interventions. At work was the belief that God not only gave Israel her existence, but was directly and actively engaged in her coming to full identity. The saving data, presented in new and different ways at different times contained a present reality, or a future one in the case of the great prophets, for Israel. Dependent upon the situation in which they were recalled, as before, during or after the Exile different contents of the core traditions were actualized. This gave expression to a real participation, within the new life situation in which they were heard, in the saving action of God that was being retold.¹⁵

The past historical data, in themselves, were not open to such a process. They had occurred and then slipped into the past. When the old tradition was actualized the saving action of Yahweh became present reality within the

¹⁵ Second-Isaiah's use of the Exodus tradition is one example.

new situation where Israel interpreted her existence.¹⁶ When Israel continued to re-actualize those same events it was to place her life within the dynamic reality of God's saving interventions. The specific historical moments were recognized as intrinsically related to the activity of God known in the saving data. That activity was acknowledged as an element to be reckoned with within the human reality. In this way Israel's present history was repeatedly taken up into the mighty acts of God.

This is not to infer a gradual unfolding of the meaning of traditions through the continuum of history. Nor was any event, past, present or future, considered a prototype, or a goal, that could be defined or secured by Israel for all time. These saving events defied manipulation, prediction, categorization, or closure of any sort, because they were wholly subject to the free action of God. This is why each generation had the task of re-actualizing the saving events. This process was really the witness to its own present experience of God's activity within history.¹⁷

¹⁶ Von Rad, Theology II, p. 414.

¹⁷ It is not pertinent to essay a philosophical explanation of this process. What is important is its presence in the OT, and the implications it has for Israel's understanding of history. Compare with Israel's contemporaries: Mircea Eliade, Cosmos and History, The Myth of the Eternal Return, New York, Harper, xvi-176 p.

This phenomenon of re-interpretation implies that both the saving data and ongoing history were experienced as open to a future.¹⁸ The ancient stories of patriarchal incidents were found capable of being taken up into the period of the conquest. The Mosaic and Davidic materials could be combined. The new life poured into the Exodus traditions by Deutero-Isaiah did not do violence to the earlier accounts and the history of the monarchy was adaptable to the viewpoint of both the Deuteronomist and the Chronicler. All this was possible because the traditions were predisposed to these fresh interpretations. In this context Von Rad remarks that: "All presentation of history in the Old Testament is in one form or another inherently open to a future." He elucidates this further:

This forward-looking is certainly not always the same. Sometimes it is more obvious, sometimes less: but it is present everywhere, for even the stories which were concerned only with their own day were adapted to a larger literary context, in whose light they are now to be interpreted, and this points them forward to the future.¹⁹

This language of re-actualization bears an understanding that existence is in constant motion. Life is experienced in a movement forward into the future, a being on the way toward a fulfillment not yet realized. But, this

18 R. E. Murphy, "History, Eschatology and the Old Testament," in Dialogue, Vol. 7, No. 4, Winter 1970, p. 590.

19 Von Rad, Theology II, p. 361.

dynamic is not some inner thrust of history or mere human impulse. Through biblical analysis another significant element has surfaced bringing into sharp relief the radicality of this openness to the future. It is the vital element of promise which constitutes Israel's future as a future released by God. This situates her existence within the tension between promise and fulfillment.

B. The Element of Promise

The element of promise constitutes one of the structural underpinnings of the biblical record. Gerhard Von Rad calls this the "bed-rock fact" about Israel's way of looking at that history.²⁰ The Old Testament writings conceived of Yahweh's actions in terms of promises made and fulfilled by him, where fulfillments are themselves promise and open to the future. This, according to the biblical language, is the meaning of Israel's re-actualization of God's constitutive workings.

This structural line of promise and fulfillment is found at the very core of Israel's Credo contained in the Hexateuch.²¹ The critical evidence shows that the Exodus

²⁰ Ibid, p. 426.

²¹ The sources here are mainly Von Rad, Theology I, p. 133-135, 165-175; Theology II, p. 425-426; and Zimmerli, Promise, p. 89-122.

tradition of God's constituting Israel in her existence has been grounded there in a secondary one, the election of the patriarchs. The texts insist that the call of Israel is one and the same as that of the patriarchs. But the ancient patriarchal tradition was originally wholly independent of the Exodus events, and consisting of highly disparate materials. Yet it appears in the finished form as a unified series, paralleling the events of the Exodus. Exegetical research testifies to considerable reworking of the patriarchal history to achieve this structural accommodation to the Exodus tradition, and to material from the post-Conquest period. It is significant, then, that this element of the patriarchal traditions, themselves independent of the Exodus themes, emerged with increasing vitality in the process of reshaping the tradition. Promise even became dominant and normative in the entire patriarchal narratives.²² /

The tradition of the promise of land and posterity is old, belonging to the time of the patriarchs. In its original content, the promise was made to a small group of worshippers and referred to the imminent fulfillment in Canaan. In final form in the Hexateuch, however, the promise has been appropriated by the whole of Israel and spans history from the ancient patriarchs to the conquest under Joshua.

²² Zimmerli, Promise, p. 91.

Von Rad explains that promise to the patriarchs is the "colossal arch spanning the time from [...] the ancient promise to the ancestors to the fulfillment of the same promise in the days of Joshua."²³ The question is why did the Old Testament writers so appropriate the patriarchal tradition? What theological purpose was operative?²⁴ What data of Israel's existence is to be so described?

The faith of Israel has evidently identified with the patriarchal experience of fulfilled promises. The witness here is that Israel came to view her presence in the land as the fulfillment of Yahweh's Promise. Over against mythical interpretations ready at hand in her environment, Israel rooted her existence in the faithfulness of Yahweh to his promises. Walther Zimmerli shows that:

In the language about promise, which in the patriarchal era already precedes the election of the historical Israel, the Israelite faith recognized a fully authentic, indeed necessary (from the point of view of content) exegesis of that which is properly intended in the Exodus Credo.²⁵

23 Von Rad, Theology I, p. 134.

24 With Zimmerli, Promise, p. 94 ff. Zimmerli holds that it is not sufficient to attribute this appropriation to the persistence of tradition or the congruent experiences of possession of land, so Alt and Noth. In view of the nature of the biblical record the theological purpose must be discerned.

25 Ibid., p. 95.

The Hexateuch, containing this picture of a history that begins in promise to the patriarch and moves through to conquest of land under Joshua, seems to end on this note of fulfillment. This, however, is far from the last word about promise and its fulfillment in the Old Testament. Von Rad characterizes Israel's history as "a way of looking at history." He recognizes "the specific sense (in which history) understands each period it surveys as a realm of tension between a promise revealed and its realization."²⁶

This view of history, firmly established in Israel's earliest attempts at forms of historical narratives, continues in the later histories of the Succession Document, the Deuteronomical work, and the Books of Chronicles. Von Rad has shown in detail that the Deuteronomic history of the entire monarchical period has been placed within the tension existing between God's promise, received in the word of the prophet which was always recurring, and its historical fulfillment. He states that "the Deuteronomist gave the historical course of events which he describes its inner rhythm and its theological proof." He shows the method-- "by means of a whole structure of constantly promulgated prophetic predictions and their corresponding fulfillments."²⁷ Written during the Babylonian captivity, a judgment upon

²⁶ Von Rad, Theology II, p. 426.

²⁷ Von Rad, Theology I, p. 340.

Israel, a confession of guilt for what has happened, the Books of Kings reveal a preoccupation with what has been the exact functioning in history of the word of promise delivered by the prophets.²⁸ This represents an extension of the language of promise and fulfillment beyond the constitutive divine events to penetrate the separate experiences of Israel's ongoing life. Zimmerli describes this secularization of divine history:

an exemplification worked out in individual cases, of the fact that the total history of God's people, also in many separate decisions, is stretched in an arc of tension from promise to fulfillment.²⁹

This life between promise and fulfillment is most openly expressed in the writings of the prophets. Their message was delivered to an Israel tempted to consider herself a completed entity, fully constituted and secured in the events of the past with God. The burden of the prophets' message was a call to the people to enter into the present of history through appropriation of promise. But there was a new element introduced there. Israel had to turn to a wholly new and future fulfillment. Grounded, certainly, in her experience of God's faithfulness, but cut off in her present existence from the action of God known in

²⁸ This history is full of episodes of ordinary history: the dynastic changes, the rebuilding of Jericho, Josiah's death, etc. Cf. Zimmerli, Promise, p. 98.

²⁹ Ibid.

past fulfillments, Israel was inserted, in a radically new way, into the tension between promise and fulfillment. She was to appropriate the present, with the prophetic promise spoken into it, in terms of a future event of eschatological proportions. The past acts of Yahweh held no further security for Israel. The promises end with the Exile and post-exilic Israel lives in their shadow. Apocalyptic literature, nevertheless, gives expression to the ongoing journey in the tension of the expectation of fulfillment.

These are some of the highlights of the witness of the entire Old Testament. The structural dynamic of the history reported there is a constant movement from promise to fulfillment. Von Rad states that, in a way determined by the specific tradition, "Israel was always placed in the vacuum between an election made manifest in history [...] and a fulfillment [...] in the future." He stipulates that each election "had a definite promise attached to it" to be fulfilled in the future.³⁰

There was nothing static or controllable in this life lived in promise. No one configuration emerged that could properly be called Israel's way of being in the world. Old Testament language about promise-fulfillment treats of

30 Von Rad, Theology II, p. 414. Although differently, Pannenberg identifies the same structure in Redemption Event and History, p. 314-335, espec. p. 317.

a forceful, change-producing dynamic in life. This idea infuses this book about new increments in Israel's life and hope, of ever-expanding promises, and of always being driven forward. Promises find historical realizations, but never fully, as fulfillments themselves become, altogether unexpectedly, the matrix of new promises. Historical fulfillment is placed in the tension of further expectation.³¹

Promise is not, however, a designation for some object of hope that continually moved on ahead of Israel to be redeemed at some end.³² The texts refer again and again to historical fulfillments. The Book of Joshua, for example, full-heartedly declares the historical realization of the promises of old: "So it was that Yahweh gave the Israelites all the land he had sworn to give their fathers." The emphasis is certain: "Of all the promises that Yahweh had made to the House of Israel, not one failed: all were fulfilled."³³ Having declared the land conquered and occupied,

31 Examples include: elaboration of the patriarchal promise; the life of the Nathan prophecy. Zimmerli notes that land, posterity, covenant may express a threefold hope. If so, the point under discussion is again substantiated: promise is vital, multidimensional, expansive reality. On the vitality and expansion of promise: Von Rad, Theology II, p. 358-387; Zimmerli, Promise, p. 92-94; Zimmerli, Man and His Hope in the Old Testament [Man], London, SCM Press, 1971, p. 56 ff.; Westermann, Way of Promise.

32 Von Rad develops this theme in Typological, p. 17-39, and Theology II, p. 319-336; 371-373.

33 Joshua 21:43-45.

all enemies overcome, and peace given by God on every side, it would now be expected that the promises would fall before history, their course completed. But this is not the case, and the evidence is the land had to be shared, that all nations were not delivered to Joshua.³⁴

It is the events that are significant. Each has its own reality, each is a fulfillment of promise: the conquest, the establishment of David as king, the events of the monarchical period, the exile, the post-exilic restorations. Yet each bears a quality of promise, a readiness for correction, so to speak. Von Rad summarizes:

Whether we take a text from the patriarchal narratives, or one from the Book of Joshua, or from the histories, we shall always notice that the event described stands in the shelter of a word of God that is pregnant with the future and points beyond itself to something yet to come.³⁵

Israel does not rest fulfilled in any one event. She is not to maintain a relationship with any one state of affairs. Recurring changes mark Israel's existence. Repeated breaks, fresh starts, new points of departure for new goals fill her history. The final era of promise turns Israel, through the prophetic preaching, to a decisive saving event in the future.

It must be emphasized that this understanding of human life supposes neither a principle given with and in the world, nor an existential element of human existence.

³⁴ Judges 2; 3.

³⁵ Von Rad, Theology II, p. 371-372.

The movement forward into a future is not a function of some anonymous promise present in history, nor of a mythological explanation of the environment, nor a mere stroke of fate. Israel's talk about promise is none of these. She is situated in the movement of her history because of a word of promise, delivered and received into her life.

Claus Westermann has observed that a history of God's acts, the subject of the Old Testament, has to be told in connection with the word of God. Witness to divine intervention, he argues, to say nothing about a basis for a creed, requests a reference base other than human feeling, speculation or conviction that God has acted. Belief in the presence of divine action within human experience can only mean that events are recognized as fulfillment of a word of promise. The acts of God are preceded by the word of God. As Westermann puts it: "a factum is recognized as a dictum."³⁶

The experience of the men of the Old Testament is of events that are wholly personal. They move always in the shadow of the word of Yahweh. The Old Testament reflects a firmly fixed conviction that "Yahweh indicated what he intended to do."³⁷ He is neither capricious nor irrational.

³⁶ Westermann, "The Interpretation of the Old Testament," in Essays, p. 48.

³⁷ John L. McKenzie, A Theology of the Old Testament [Theology], New York, Doubleday, 1974, p. 144. On these themes, cf., Chap. 3, "History," Chap. 4, "Nature." Complex problems about the word that is active in history, about

The question arises, however, what is this movement forward about? Detailed analysis of the content of the promises is not in order here, for the question admits of many levels. Suffice to say, promise is about salvation and judgment--salvation offered and salvation rejected by abandoning Yahweh. It is clear from the portrayal of the paradigmatic saving acts that salvation meant identity and security: existence as a people, land and progeny, charismatic heroes and mighty leaders, freedom from bondage and tyranny, manna in the wilderness and victory in war. In Second-Isaiah these elements of promise remain. Von Rad observes that they are the "stable givens" in the theological reflection of the earliest and latest periods:

In the Old Testament's view of the matter, it is for the sake of these things, that is, for their realization, that the Heilageschichte itself takes place.³⁸

The account of the saving history, portrays an Israel refrained from notions of mythological regenerations or mystical

prophecy and revelation, underlie these considerations. They are outside the scope of this work which seeks only to identify the fact of the tension between promise-fulfillment. Neither history, nor word delivered, can be considered absolute in revelation. They are vehicles, so to speak, of that which is beyond them--the divine action. Cf. Von Rad, Typological, Theology II, Pt. 3, Chap. C.; McKenzie, Theology, Chap. 2, "Revelation." On the word character of Israel's life, cf. Zimmerli, Promise, p. 92-97, 101-108, Man, p. 122-137; and Von Rad, Theology I, p. 306-347, Theology II, p. 80-97.

38 Von Rad, Typological, p. 31.

flights into a transcendental divine world. God's promises offer saving benefits to a this-worldly people in its own historical space.

There is no portrayal in the Old Testament of any closure of this movement constituted by promise and fulfillment. To the question, does all this end in a void, the New Testament offers one answer.

2. Promise-Fulfillment in the New Testament.

The New Testament writings give expression to the exultation of fulfillment. At their core is Jesus' proclamation of the today of fulfillment.³⁹ They are the witness of the early Christian Church to the historical event of Jesus' announcement of the long-awaited eschatological event. But the question posed at the beginning of this chapter remains: what did Jesus mean by this proclamation?

The facts of the situation of Jesus' ministry raise this problem. For, notwithstanding the interpretation of events that Jesus delivered, the times do not correspond to the ideas that Jesus' hearers held about the eschaton. The

³⁹ The NT witness goes beyond this to proclaim Jesus is Lord. But the experience of the historical Jesus and his proclamation grounds the "resurrection faith." The present study focuses on the preliminary experience.

opposition to him portrayed throughout the Gospel account was inevitable.

Jesus' firm response to the doubts and resistances before the dilemma of his interpretation of the times surfaces in many forms in the New Testament. By way of his teaching about the Kingdom, his appeals for belief, and ultimately by way of his firmness before the resistance that sent him to his death, Jesus stands by his understanding of events.⁴⁰ Significant here is a form of Jesus' teaching that has come to be known as the parables of growth. Jesus deals in these parables with the paradox of the announcement of the presence of the future Kingdom of God, and the ambiguities of the facts of his ministry. Since the parables of growth deal with the concrete question, is this the decisive time of fulfillment, and teach about the Kingdom of God, these will be studied now.⁴¹

40 Sebastian Moore, No Exit, Glen Rock, N.J., Newman, 1968, 151 p.: at the level of the complex of human events, Moore understands Jesus' death in this way. Moore contends that the Christian must, "by a great effort of imagination," come to understand "the impossibility of Jesus for the men who had to grapple with him" (p. 6).

41 These are the parables of the sower, Mk. 4:1-9; Lk. 8:4-8; Mt. 13:4-9; of the seed growing of itself, Mk. 4:26-29; of the mustard seed, Mk. 4:30-32; Lk. 13:18-10; Mt. 13:31-32; of the leaven, Lk. 13:20; Mt. 13:33; of the net of fish, Mt. 13:47-50; and of the wheat and the tares, Mt. 13:24-29. J. Dupont has remarked that there is question whether these properly form a group that can easily be designated as "parables of growth." He affirms their significance in the teaching about the kingdom. J. Dupont, "'La parabole de la semence qui pousse toute seule'" [La semence], in Recherches de science religieuse [RSR], Vol. 55, 1967, p. 367-392. Also, among others, Schnackenburg, God's Rule, p. 143.

A. The Parables of Growth

In the modern era of parable studies, A Jülicher (1899), C. H. Dodd (1935), and J. Jeremias (1947) have freed this form of Jesus' discourse from overlays of interpretation. Critical analysis has revealed these within the Gospel texts themselves, and in the Church's application of Jesus' teaching to Christian belief and life. A detailed review of this work is not pertinent here, but a few observations will clear the way for the teachings of the parables of growth.⁴²

The parable is a form of argumentation intended to provoke judgment and assent.⁴³ It is different from rational argument based on the analogy of being, or a mathematical deduction. It is not an allegory, nor an illustrated picture of reality. The parable is told, usually in a dialogue, to clarify some issue with the intention of moving the hearer

42 For a brief analysis of this work and bibl., David M. Stanley and R. E. Brown, "The Parables of Jesus," in Jerome Biblical Commentary [JBC], Englewood Cliffs, N.J., Prentice-Hall, 1968, sec. 78:131-145; N. A. Dahl, "The Parables of Growth" [Parables], in Theological Studies, Vol. 5, 1951, p. 132-140; Eta Linnemann, Jesus of the Parables [Parables], London, S.P.C.K., 1966, espec. Pt. I; and Schnackenburg, God's Rule, p. 143-149.

43 The following discussion is drawn from Linnemann, Parables, p. 3-47, and Dahl, Parables, p. 136-140. These works represent a synthesis of contemporary views about the parables.

to new insight. It is a way of meeting the difficulties or objections of one's audience or opponents, for the parable is an attempt to overcome resistance and cause one's own point of view to prevail.

What matters in a parable, and gives it force, is the one point of comparison. A metaphor or picture is drawn from the familiar life situation: this happens when a net of fish is caught, when leaven is added to flour, or seed is sown in a field. In the picture one aspect is accented and becomes the central element to illustrate the teaching for which the parable is formulated. For example, in the picture of the net full of fish,⁴⁴ it is the separation of the fish that receives attention. All other aspects of the situation are secondary, albeit not totally irrelevant. The narrator can then assert a correspondence between the picture given and the reality to which the parable is directed, and in so doing make a claim. In a successful parable, the accent will evoke those attitudes already held by the audience toward the problem addressed. The force of the parable arises when the correspondence between the reality of the life situation and the one described cannot be disputed. The hearing of the parable becomes a moment of truth.

Jesus' parables belong to this form of argumentative dialogue. He used them to clarify what was taking place

44 Matthew 13:47-50.

through his ministry, to deal with the difficulties and opposition he found in both his followers and enemies confronted by his message. The parables impart to their hearers something of Jesus' vision of the power of God at work in the experience of men faced by the reality of his proclamation.⁴⁵ Any interpretation of a parable, then, must be tested for its relevance to the situation of Jesus' auditors, and for its fidelity to the accent of the story.⁴⁶

The parables of growth carry another dynamic arising out of the biblical view of organic growth presupposed in the images drawn. N. A. Dahl has shown that the concept of an ordered process of organic growth was well known in biblical times.⁴⁷ There is a clear idea there of an unbroken

⁴⁵ Norman Perrin, Rediscovering the Teaching of Jesus, New York, Harper & Row, 1967, p. 91, on the parables and bibl., p. 82 ff.

⁴⁶ The burden of critical studies since C. H. Dodd has been to discern the life situation of Jesus and his original intention in the designing of each parable, over against the particular use made of them by the evangelists and later theological interpreters. The latter are not without value since they do maintain the original teaching in the new application. Cf. Schnackenburg, God's Rule, p. 145-146, and Joachim Jeremias, The Parables of Jesus [Parables], (rev. ed.), London, SCM Press, 1963, Chap. 1, 2.

⁴⁷ Dahl, Parables, p. 140-147. Dahl, among others, has taken the research, into the situation of Jesus and his hearers, beyond Jeremias, whose work, following that of C. H. Dodd, is well known. Dahl believes that better use can be made of the methodological principles established by Dodd and Jeremias: cf., p. 133-140. The crux of the problems addressed by Jesus in the parables is, in Dahl's view, the question of his personal relationship to the coming of the Kingdom--more

order in the natural processes. It is seen as an intended order, however, a planned continuity, not to be confused with a principle of immanent developmental necessity. These processes in their beginning, their development, their end are wholly subject to the creative activity of God which they manifest. In the parables, this view of growth is not the point being made, but it is operative as a presupposition.

B. The Teaching of Jesus: Message of Fulfillment-Consummation

The parables of growth are about the Kingdom of God. In vivid images and contrasts drawn from the world of nature Jesus teaches about the present reality of the eschatological era. Three of these parables are especially relevant here, the parables of the mustard seed, of the leaven, and of the seed growing secretly.

The parable of the mustard seed culminates with the image of a large shrub into whose branches birds came to nest:

'What can we say the Kingdom of God is like? What parable can we find for it? It is like a mustard seed which at the time of its sowing in the soil is the smallest of all the seeds on earth; yet once

specifically--the contrast between "the messianic expectations and the actual facts of the ministry of Jesus" (p. 156).

it is sown it grows into the biggest shrub of them all and puts out big branches so that the birds of the air can shelter in its shade.⁴⁸

The final metaphor is a classical one for depicting the king or his great kingdom and a traditional eschatological representation of the safety and security that king and kingdom will offer the people.⁴⁹ In Ezechiel 17, for example, the future coming of the Davidic kingdom is portrayed as a tender shoot that, planted on the mountain heights of Israel, grows into a majestic cedar where birds dwell in the shade of its boughs.

The concluding metaphor of the related parable of the leaven is also truly biblical:

'what shall I compare the Kingdom of God with? It is like the yeast a woman took and mixed in with three measures of flour till it was leavened all through.'⁵⁰

Here the three measures of flour evoke the notion of a biblical meal such as the one prepared by Sarah for the celestial visitors; or of the offering made by Hannah at the

48 Mk. 4:30-32, par., Lk. 13:18-19 (The "Q" source), Mt. 13:31-32. It is unnecessary to deal with the variants for the essential point of the parable is clear. These parables originally formed a pair--a complementary presentation of the same teaching. See, J. Dupont, "Les paraboles du sénévé et du levain": [Les paraboles], in Nouvelle revue théologique, Vol. 89, 1967, p. 897-913.

49 E.g., Dan. 4:11, 18; Ezech. 31:6, Judges 9:15 cited by Dahl, Parables, p. 147, n. 1; also by Dupont, Les paraboles, p. 904-905, and Jeremias, The Parables, p. 146-147.

50 Luke 13:20-21, par. Matthew 13:13.

dedication of Samuel.⁵¹ Besides, the quantity cited is enormous, capable of yielding food for over one hundred persons.

These are the metaphors that attract attention, the great shrub and the plenitude of food. Both extend far beyond the bounds of reality and, so, are fitting designations of a divine and eschatological reality. They indicate that these parables are teaching about the Kingdom of God.⁵²

The accent of both parables is the contrast between the beginning and the end, the greatness of the shrub and the yield over against the insignificance of the smallest of earth's seeds, the non-apparent activity of the leaven. Neither the process itself, nor the time it takes is at issue. The crucial point of correspondence, upon which the parables hinge, resides in the contrasts.

Jesus' depiction of what happens in these instances places his auditors on familiar ground. They can readily concede the natural reality. The start is miniscule and inconspicuous, the end by comparison is glorious, almost

⁵¹ Cf. Gen. 18:6, 1 Sam. 1:24, cited by Dupont in Les paraboles, p. 912-913.

⁵² These are new metaphors for the Kingdom of God: Schnackenburg, God's Rule, p. 155, et al. The interpretation of the parables here will follow that of R. Schnackenburg who, in the opinion of this writer, demonstrates a comprehensive fidelity to the whole of Jesus' teaching in his interpretation of the parables. At the same time he affirms the fundamental contributions of C. H. Dodd, J. Jeremias, N. A. Dahl, and others.

miraculous. The ends described here are organically related to the beginning, contained in them, and intended through the order of development. Beginning and end are not wholly heterogeneous events; there is direct and intrinsic continuity. But, as in all growth, everything is subject to the divine intention and power.

With these pictures, the way is open for the real argument: so it is with the eschatological Kingdom. The contrasts described are like another: the one constituting the real problem at hand, the modest facts of Jesus' ministry compared to the expected glorious realization of promise.

The teaching is a direct response to the felt confusion about the Kingdom which Jesus announces. The events of Jesus' ministry are related to the future eschatological Kingdom as the seed and the leaven are related to the tree and the yield. The present fulfillment of hope appears insignificant and seems to effect little change. But in it God has taken the decisive action. Moreover, just as the divine authority can effect the marvellous ends depicted in the examples, so the divine power can bring this eschatological event, so unimpressive in this start, into its glorious final stage. These beginnings are the promise and the guarantee of the end, the fully manifest Kingdom of God. The teaching does not bear on its greatness nor on its certain coming, for these were never the problem. Nor does it concern

matters of time. The intention is the clarification of the significance of the present experience of fulfillment of promise, and its intrinsic relationship to the coming consummation.⁵³

The parable of the seed developing by itself conveys another and related nuance in Jesus' teaching. This parable also teaches about the final manifest Kingdom of God:

'This is what the Kingdom of God is like. A man throws seed on the land. Night and day, while he sleeps, when he is awake, the seed is sprouting and growing; how, he does not know. Of its own accord the land produces first the shoot, then the ear, then the full grain in the ear. And when the crop is ready, he loses no time; he starts to reap because the harvest has come.⁵⁴

The concluding metaphor, the ready harvest and the reaping, directly alludes to Old Testament images of end and judgment in the eschatological event.⁵⁵ The point of the story is the development of the seed without the man knowing how it happens.⁵⁶ The process is an independent one. It is steady,

⁵³ Also, J. Jeremias, N. A. Dahl, J. Dupont. This interpretation of these parables is a common one.

⁵⁴ Mark 4:26-29.

⁵⁵ Specifically Joel 4:13: "Put the sickle in: the harvest is ripe"; thus, Dupont, Dahl.

⁵⁶ This interpretation is controversial. J. Jeremias and N. A. Dahl prefer to call it "the parable of the patient husbandman" and find the accent in the point of contrast in the behavior of the sower during the growth and at the time of harvest. Also, J. Dupont and others hold this view. Whereas, Eta Linnemann agrees with Schnackenburg. This latter view seems to remain more faithful to Jesus' own preoccupation with the Kingdom of God which he is announcing, as compared with a focus on questions about his own person. A

orderly, irrevocable, but wholly beyond the capacity of the sower until, finally, the time is ripe for harvest. All of this is familiar ground to his hearers.

The parable is saying that so it is with the Kingdom of God. In the present situation God is at work and, independently of human efforts, will bring about the full manifestation of what has begun. The end is related to the beginning as sown seed is to the harvest, not by an evolutionary necessity but by the plan and activity of God.

Delivered in the situation of his ministry Jesus may be rejecting forms of human activity implied in ideas about a political Messiah,⁵⁷ and teaching confidence while waiting for God to bring what he has begun to its consummation. But the central message of the parable is about the "mystery of the reign of God":⁵⁸ the hidden presence, the divine activity which alone brings about in its own time, ineluctably, and in its own way, the final glorious manifestation of the Kingdom of God.

The teaching of the parables of growth is that a polarity exists between the present and the eschatological

critical judgment is not called for here since both contain the view that man can do nothing to influence the process which, for Schnackenburg, is primary. For older views, see Dupont, La semence, p. 368-372.

⁵⁷ Thus, N. A. Dahl and J. Jeremias who hold that the point is the confident and patient certainty expected of the sower.

⁵⁸ Schnackenburg, God's Rule, p. 154.

future, between the divine activity at work in Jesus' time and a full revelation in the future of the decisive saving action. The present is grounded in the divine activity of God effective and discernible, and is in tension with a future. For, by the same divine power, what is happening in the present is dynamically, effectively, irresistibly related to the future as beginning is to end.

In summary, Jesus declared the presence of the Kingdom of God, and meant that God had broken into the human situation, to effect there, freely and unpredictably, the fulfillment of Israel's expectations for human life. Jesus invites his hearers to experience the fulfillment of Israel's hope, since the awaited intervention of God is now operative. By way of correction of Israel's view of the eschatological era, the fulfillment as Jesus sees it, places human existence once again within the tension of promise received, to be fulfilled. But, here, it is in a new way. The fulfillment is decisive. The promise it carries is about its full manifestation. To appropriate the fulfillment in the present is the only way to be involved in its eschatological consummation. The challenge of Jesus resides in the interpretation of the historical events of his ministry as the inbreak of the expected divine eschatological action. The further challenge is that one respond by appropriating the tension of promise-fulfillment in function of consummation.

To live in this tension, to experience history as promise fulfilled, and at the same time, as an interim awaiting the consummation means, in the words of Karl Lowith:

to live in a supreme tension between conflicting wills, running a "race," the goal of which is neither an airy ideal nor a massive reality but the promise of salvation.⁵⁹

Such is the experience of one who accepts Jesus' interpretation of what God is doing--the Kingdom of God.

The focus of concentration in this study has been, to this point, on the divine activity, an element within the human reality, and on its eschatological occurrence with Jesus. What is essential to the latter is the idea of a final intervention of God that is decisive for his people. The emphasis was intended to expose the realism of the Kingdom of God proclaimed in Christian belief. This opens the way to the concrete and humanly pertinent question: what does this mean for the experience of the believer, what is the significance of Jesus for human life? Jesus did not leave the fundamental answer to these questions to the imagination or logic of his hearers. The following chapter will study the dimensions of the Kingdom of God as it affects the life experience of a believer.

⁵⁹ Karl Löwith, Meaning in History, The Theological Implications of the Philosophy of History, Chicago, University of Chicago Press, 1949, p. 184.

CHAPTER IV

THE EXPERIENCE OF THE KINGDOM OF GOD AS FULFILLMENT-CONSUMMATION

Uncompromisingly Jesus proclaimed the Kingdom of God as present reality, and its consummation in the future. Just as uncompromisingly, he identified the eschatological gifts being offered, and delineated the way of life for those who, confronted with this reality, are faced with decisions about its demands upon their lives. A concretely specified profile of life in this new age is not found in the teaching of Jesus. The Gospels offer no detailed ethical system documented by his words for the person accepting his interpretation of the times. However, the texts do reveal structural lines, foundational dynamics of the way of being in the age of fulfillment. Intrinsic to Jesus' proclamation of the presence of the divine action are the demands of the decisive event. These are to be examined now in terms of classical biblical categories: salvation, conversion, belief.

1. Salvation.

Israel believed that she existed because Yahweh acted and directed her. For Israel, God is saviour forever, and ongoing existence depends upon learning that only Yahweh

saves. The Old Testament shows that for Israel to forget or abandon this realization is self-destructive.¹

Expectation assumed many forms in the post-exilic period, but into the time of Jesus a common element remained: God would act decisively for her in a saving event. The outcome of the Jewish nation's expectation of ultimate salvation remained, in its many forms, an open question until Jesus interpreted the events of his day. With his proclamation of the eschatological Kingdom of God the tension within Israel's history between promise and fulfillment is declared resolved. It was then up to Jesus to clarify his conception of the salvation offered, otherwise his audience was ready to supply data about it.

Accordingly, a reading of the New Testament reveals Jesus' preaching to be a direct offer of salvation. The Good News is the message of salvation, and Jesus is identified as the one who is to save his people.² Everything that Jesus proclaimed and achieved indicated that God's only intention is to save.³

1 E.g., Isaiah 7:9b, 9:7 ff. Chap. 1, 2 above.

2 E.g., Acts 16:7, Ephes. 1:13; Matthew 1:21, Luke 2:11, 2:30.

3 The development here is drawn from Rudolf Schnackenburg, God's Rule and Kingdom [God's Rule], Freiburg, Herder, 1963, p. 86-94. Cf. also, Joseph Bonsirven, Le règne de Dieu [Le règne], Paris, Aubier, 1957, Chap. 5, 6, 11--a more classical treatment. These views are held by N. Perrin, J. Jeremias, W. G. Kümmel, among others.

This presents a real contrast with the prophets, including John the Baptist, whose reprimands, warnings and calls for conversion form the matrix of a promise of salvation. In later Judaism, accomplished repentance offered grounds for hope of salvation in the end times. Apocalyptic views expected the destruction of those who had remained outside the Law. In Jesus' eschatological message salvation was now for all. Jesus also delivers warnings of judgment and perdition and calls to repentance, but these are an intrinsic consequence of his message. This is evident in his instruction to his disciples: only when men refuse their good news are they to shake the dust from their feet.⁴ Before all else, Jesus presents his hearers, without exception, with the reality of God's saving work. He is convinced that the divine intervention is a conferring of salvation, and the purpose of his ministry is to announce and offer the eschatological benefits to all. Neither vengeance nor the rewarding of merit is what God is about.⁵

In Jewish literature a general designation of the eschatological blessings is the world to come, or, life of the future age. Jesus prefers the concept, Kingdom of God,

4 Luke 10:8-10 and par.

5 E.g., Mark 1:35-39.

to announce salvation.⁶ By this Jesus directs attention to the divine action. In Jesus' view the essence of all the saving benefits God offers is linked directly and intrinsically to the divine inbreak he announces. In this respect the statement of the Beatitudes in the Sermon on the Mount is revealing. Here is an "explicitation of Jesus' religious message of salvation."⁷ The sermon begins with a series of blessings, all images of eschatological gifts: heritage, comfort, food and drink, mercy, the vision and sonship of God. Matthew has placed these between promises of possession of the Kingdom of God. Thus he clarifies the issue: it is eschatological salvation, and it is identified in the concept, the Kingdom of God. The ultimate promises are about participation in this Kingdom. The content of salvation, "its marrow"⁸ is divine activity. In the popular rabbinical view, salvation was expected as a consequence of the coming of the Kingdom. Here the eschatological divine inbreak, declared by Jesus to be present and effective, carrying

6 Schnackenburg, God's Rule, p. 92-94; also, Gustaf Dalman, The Words of Jesus [Words] (authorized Eng. version by D. M. Kay, trans. of Die Worte Jesus, c. 1898), Edinburgh, Clark, 1902, p. 135-136; Norman Perrin, The Kingdom of God in the Teaching of Jesus [Kingdom], London, SCM Press, 1963, p. 160-185.

7 Rudolf Schnackenburg, Christian Existence in the New Testament [Christian Existence] (2 vols.), Indiana, Notre Dame Press, 1968-1969, Vol. I, p. 143 ff. The development here, cf. Schnackenburg, God's Rule, p. 93-94.

8 Schnackenburg, God's Rule, p. 94.

promise of its manifest consummation in the future, is in itself salvation.

A similar identification appears in Mark where the concepts Kingdom of God, life, eternal life, and salvation are interchanged. Jesus is heard to declare: "It is better for you to enter into life lame," and then, "it is better for you to enter the kingdom of God with one eye."⁹ Again, in Mark's account of conversation with the rich young man, and Jesus' subsequent discussion with the disciples, the concepts "to inherit eternal life," "to enter the kingdom of God," "to be saved" are equated.¹⁰ To be saved, to have life, that is, to be delivered from whatever constricts,¹¹ has to do with the Kingdom of God, which Jesus understands to be,

9 Mark 9:45b, 47b.

10 Cf. Werner Foerster, Georg Fohrer, "σῶσω κτλ.," [sozein - save & der.], in Theological Dictionary of the New Testament [TDNT], (10 vols.; Kittel and Friedrich, Eds.), Grand Rapids, Mich., Eerdmans, 1964-1976, Vol. VII, p. 991; D. Stanley, R. Brown, "The Kingdom of God," in Jerome Biblical Commentary [JBC], (R. E. Brown et al., Eds.), Englewood Cliffs, N.J., Prentice-Hall, 1968, sec. 78:101; Bonsirven, Le règne, p. 203.

11 The Hebrew root, נָחַץ and der., signify "to be wide," "to have space," "unrestricted," hence, "the possession of space and the freedom and security which is gained by the removal of constriction." The NT Greek (sōzein, save; soter, saviour; soteria, salvation) usage is controlled by OT background and refers primarily to having life: John L. McKenzie, "Salvation," in Dictionary of the Bible [DB], Milwaukee, Bruce, 1965, p. 760-763; W. Trilling, O. Semmelroth, "Salut," in Encyclopédie de la foi (H. H. Fries, Ed.), Paris, Cerf, 1967, Vol. IV, p. 176.

not only an eschatological fact, an act of the saving God, but also the highest blessing of salvation, the essence of all the blessings of salvation.¹²

Jesus' choice of this concept to designate eschatological salvation is highly significant. By it he insists that human existence, both in its present and final form, is ultimately a religious reality. The hoped-for salvation is not man-made. It is subject to the absolutely free action of God. Salvation is achieved by God, and only by God.¹³

On the one hand, Jesus does not specify nor delineate the content of salvation. It has to do with the divine activity which does not submit to the boundaries of definition. On the other hand, the content is revealed in the events of his ministry. Luke's account of Jesus' visit to the synagogue at Nazareth, and of his reply to the Baptist's query about his identity, are again key passages.¹⁴ Jesus is shown to be a prophet, oriented towards others, towards their liberation and human well-being. By way of references to the Isaian imagery, Jesus directs attention to the blind,

¹² Rudolf Schnackenburg, The Moral Teaching of the New Testament [Moral Teaching], Freiburg, Herder, 1965, p. 145.

¹³ Of this, cf. Schnackenburg, God's Rule, p. 95 ff. Regarding the stress by Jesus on God's activity, cf. W. G. Kümmel, Promise and Fulment, The Eschatological Message of Jesus (3rd & rev. ed.), London, SCM Press, 1957 (c. 1956), p. 154.

¹⁴ Luke 4:14-30, 7:22.

the lame, the lepers, the deaf, the dead, the poor, for whom new dimensions of human wholeness are opened. Salvation is there, to be seen in the work which he claims he must do: "proclaim the Good News of the Kingdom of God."¹⁵ Its accomplishment turned him to, among others, the sick and the sinners.¹⁶ The Good News of salvation is to be recognized in the freeing, healing, life-giving acts which all can see. But what do these events of healing, and Jesus' ministry to the poor, reveal about the salvation being offered?

First, the miracles of Jesus are never directed solely to a physical organ or condition. Their matrix is always that of his mission and involves the recipient's belief in the power of God. They are signs of breaking the binding activity of Satan to release the person for a fuller life. Jesus' recurring comment that faith has saved you, or his inability to heal because of unbelief, suggests that the miracles, while involving physical life, concern the enrichment of the total person.¹⁷ Salvation is not, as for the Greeks, deliverance from the body.

¹⁵ Luke 4:43, par.

¹⁶ Mark 2:1-17; Luke 4:31-44; Matthew 4:23-25.

¹⁷ Foerster, sozein, p. 990; R. McL. Wilson, "Soteria," in Scottish Journal of Theology, Vol. 6, 1953, p. 413.

For those who heard Jesus, perhaps the greatest miracle of all, and certainly an original feature of his ministry, was Jesus' attitude toward the poor, the little ones, and sinners. Concern for these pervades his ministry illuminating both the unspecified nature of salvation and its essential quality. The content of salvation cannot be captured in definitions because it is event, and God's action. But salvation is clearly the liberating offer of new possibilities for human life. This fact is to be briefly considered now.¹⁸

In Jewish society, human suffering was thought to be a consequence of sin, the just payment of a just debt. Jesus thought differently. He intervenes, in the name of the Kingdom of God, and the leprous, the blind, the demonic are healed and freed. In Jesus' world the "little ones" are the uneducated, those judged to be backward or religiously illiterate, as well as the women and children. Jesus addressed these reputedly inferior members of the Jewish religious society as those who receive the revelation of God.¹⁹ He defends those oppressed by the circumstances of

¹⁸ For what follows: Schnackenburg, God's Rule, p. 87-92; Joachim Jeremias, New Testament Theology [Theology], London, SCM Press, 1971, p. 108-121; Norman Perrin, Rediscovering the Teaching of Jesus [Rediscovering], New York, Harper, 1967, p. 90-107.

¹⁹ Matthew 11:25, and par.

life, the defenseless, the desperate, those in need of any sort, who "labour and are heavily burdened."²⁰ These are the "poor" whom he received. And, Jesus turned directly to "sinners." In his milieu, sinners were held to be outside the reach of salvation. The prostitute and the adulterous, the drunkard and the tax-collector, the Samaritan and the Gentile, all are thought to be excluded from God's saving action. But it is to these that Jesus announces: you share in the Kingdom of God; salvation has come to you.

This attitude surfaces in many forms in the Gospel account: a publican is chosen as disciple;²¹ Jesus lodges with Zaccheus, the tax-collector, declaring that salvation had come to his house that day;²² hospitality is accepted from a prostitute who is praised for her belief.²³ In parables, the Kingdom of God is depicted in terms of remission of debt, the lost, the found, the prodigal received.²⁴ Finally, he welcomes sinners to his table.²⁵ In this action

20 Matthew 11:28.

21 Mark 2:15; Matthew 9:9, 10:3.

22 Luke 19:5, 9.

23 Luke 7:36 ff.

24 Luke 15.

25 Luke 15:3. Schnackenburg, Perrin, Jeremias, et al., see this as the unique decisive feature of his ministry: the call of the sinners, not the virtuous, Mt. 9:13b. Salvation is fundamentally deliverance from sin--this also implies, the fact being noted here, that salvation brings access to the good things that make real life possible: Joseph Bonsirven, Theology of the New Testament, London, Burns & Oates, 1963, p. 52-59.

God's saving intention is clear, for in the culture of his day the symbol is clear; the message unambiguous. Sharing at table means sharing the blessing. Table-fellowship with Jesus means fellowship before God. "

Günther Bornkamm has aptly observed that it is people "on the fringe of society,"²⁶ those who can have no further expectations of their human situations, who receive help from Jesus. Hence he reveals that "God waits beyond the limits, or rather he no longer waits but comes to those who wait for him."²⁷ And, at these limits of life Jesus offers, in the immediacy of his ministry, new possibilities.

In this direct revelation of the Kingdom of God as salvation, Jesus' ministry offers new horizons for human life. The reality Jesus envisions is not circumscribed by the then traditional boundaries.²⁸ He ignores man's accepted evaluations of man and enters relationships that annihilate differences. He rejects apocalyptic notions that separate sinners from the faithful, and receives in the name of the Kingdom all who come to him. Ideas of salvation

26 Günther Bornkamm, Jesus of Nazareth [Jesus], New York, Harper, 1960, p. 79.

27 Ibid., p. 76.

28 Schnackenburg, God's Rule, p. 95 ff. Also, see John L. McKenzie, The Power and the Wisdom, New York, Image Books, 1972 (c. 1965), Chap. 6, "The Saving Act of Jesus."

that bring political independence and prosperity fade as he directs attention to healing personal wounds incurred in the life situation, to restoring health and life. The divine action at work vivifies and enhances the human condition. It is the power that attacks and overcomes radical evil, rendering other evils impotent, to ground a new human reality.²⁹ R. McL. Wilson states this:

it [salvation] is well-being in all its forms, from soundness of body to the very highest ideal of spiritual health that can be conceived. It is not only 'salvation' in the future for our soul, whatever we may mean by that, but a renewal of life, a recreation for the whole man, a renewal of his relationships with God and his fellow-men, a life which is life indeed.³⁰

What this life, this new reality, is to be is not shown. For the salvation that Jesus identifies is rooted in the tension between the present fulfillment and the promise of its manifest consummation in the future. Moreover, while an understanding that salvation intends a more complete human identity emerges through the Gospels, it is also made clear that salvation belongs to the absolutely free action of God. This cannot be circumscribed in predicted models. This enhanced human life comes from resources beyond the human--the "gracious action of God."³¹ This is why saved

²⁹ McKenzie, The Power and the Wisdom, p. 128 ff. Also, above, p. 32-33, 83-86.

³⁰ McL. Wilson, "Soteria," p. 415.

³¹ Bornkamm, Jesus, p. 77.

existence defies specification. But it also enables man so to rejoice in the present that he sells all to possess this one treasure.³²

The Kingdom of God is the divine inbreak into human life. It is the experience of salvation that is God's own work. It must be recalled, however, that it is a reality operative within the tension of the historical present and the future. The Kingdom of God, eschatological salvation, is present and active in human history, but it is not yet fully manifest. Possession of its future consummation requires the appropriation of the present fulfillment. Although ultimate human salvation is achieved by God alone, this does not preclude man's own involvement. Nowhere does Jesus' teaching imply that one is merely a passive recipient of God's work. Nor is justification given to escape the concrete demands of one's situation, in a search beyond it, for salvation. The New Testament is clear that a real response is required to the divine activity recognized by Jesus. The future manifestation of the now hidden, but effective

32 Matthew 13:44-46. The saving aspect of the Kingdom corresponds to the notion of grace in classical theology. The limits of this study preclude analysis of wholeness = grace. It is the increment of "wholeness" operative in the way of life as Jesus sees it that is noted here. Cf. Karl Rahner, "Salvation," in Sacramentum Mundi, An Encyclopedia of Theology (Karl Rahner et al., Eds.; 6 vols.), London, Burnes & Oates, 1968-70, Vol. V, espec. p. 416 ff. which examines directions for a theology of salvation, also bibl.; and Ch. Baugartner, La grâce du Christ, Tournai, Desclée, 1963, espec. Chap. 1, "La doctrine de la grâce dans l'écriture," and bibl.

divine work, must be prepared for. As Schnackenburg shows, the tension between fulfillment and consummation, between present salvation and future salvation, "provides a fertile source of moral obligation."³³ The question is, what shape does human life take in one who would receive the eschatological power of God at work? What constitutes a proper response?³⁴

This question directs these considerations to the ethical teaching of Jesus which cannot be examined here in its entirety. The intention, however, is to identify structural elements in the experience of saved existence. First to be noted is the extent of one's commitment to the divine work. Jesus teaches that a person is to be ready to risk everything for the saving benefits. Secondly, the response expected by Jesus reaches into the depths of human experience. Finally, one's exterior actions must embrace the whole person as they contain corresponding interior elements.

33 Schnackenburg, Moral Teaching, p. 19, also Chap. 1, sec. 1 on the ground of moral obligation: "the perceptible saving action of God in Jesus' coming and activity" (p. 25). On questions surrounding "interim ethics," ibid., p. 24 and sec. 8; and Perrin, Kingdom, p. 201 ff. The ethic of Jesus is one of a new situation, not of the shortness of time.

34 Even response is ultimately the work of grace. This critical theological issue cannot be examined here. Sufficient to observe, analogically, that human response is itself initiated by the reality to which it is made.

In the twin parables of the hidden treasure and the costly pearl, Jesus teaches that the Kingdom of God requires radical commitment:

'The Kingdom of heaven is like a treasure hidden in a field which someone has found; he hides it again, goes off happy, sells everything he owns and buys the field.

'Again, the kingdom of heaven is like a merchant looking for fine pearls; when he finds one of great value he goes and sells everything he owns and buys it.³⁵

The picture in these stories is familiar in Jesus' setting. Every peasant ploughing and every merchant trading hopes to find treasure, to come upon a rare and valuable piece.³⁶ Here, the dream comes true, and the joy of the fortunate ones can be readily understood. The accent in these pictures, the point of comparison binding the two stories, is the behavior of the peasant and merchant. Each risks everything to own his find.³⁷ The point is clear: is it worthwhile for

35 Matthew 13:44-46. These belong to Matthew's parabolic discourse about the Kingdom of Heaven. Originally they were separate. The interpretation here follows Eta Linnemann, Jesus of the Parables [Parables], London, SPCK, 1966, p. 97-105, 168-173, which adheres closely to the motifs governing the narrative.

36 Cf. Joachim Jeremias, The Parables of Jesus (rev. ed.), London, SCM Press, 1963, p. 199, ff. for further analysis of the Palestinian setting.

37 Linnemann, Parables, p. 99, n. g; p. 170, n. 8-13. Linnemann holds that the accent is not on heroic sacrifices (Bultmann), the motive of surprise and joy (Jeremias, Perrin), value of the object (Bonsirven), a present reality (Dodd), although these themes also belong to the teaching.

these persons to risk everything they possess to secure what they had discovered? The answer is obvious.

By these stories Jesus intends to say: so it is for you who hear the Good News. Here is a unique opportunity, the Kingdom of God is offered, and one must act accordingly. No risk is too great to possess its saving benefits. The effect of the Good News should be a joy that is overwhelming, so that one's whole aim becomes acquiring, at whatever cost, the inestimable gift being offered.

The radical nature of the risks one must be prepared to take to receive salvation appears in many other Gospel passages. Jesus asks the rich young man for total material renunciation, for it is his possessions that keep him from experiencing the Kingdom.³⁸ Those who preach the Good News may be required to do likewise.³⁹ No engagement is too great: if necessary a hand or foot is to be cut off, an eye plucked.⁴⁰ The imagery is shocking, but the message is clear. Everything one has is to be at the service of one principle of action: "Set your hearts on his [your heavenly Father] Kingdom first."⁴¹

38 Matthew 19:21, par.

39 Matthew 4:22, 9:9, par.

40 Mark 9:42-47, par. These images belong to the radical ethical message of Mark 8:35-36 = Matthew 16:25-26 = Luke 9:24-25. A careful exegesis is given by Aloysius M. Ambrozic, The Hidden Kingdom, A Redactional Critical Study of the References to the Kingdom of God in Mark's Gospel [Hidden Kingdom], Washington, D.C., Catholic Biblical Assoc. of America, 1972, Chap. 3, espec. p. 171 ff.; also cf. Schnackenburg, God's Rule, p. 111-117.

41 Matthew 6:33.

Further implications of this directive are sharply drawn in Matthew's so-called Sermon on the Mount.⁴² In this classical example of an early Christian catechesis, separate sayings of Jesus have been assembled and condensed. The central theme is the quality of conduct expected in the present age of fulfillment. In three major developments, the dynamics of response emerge. Two of these pertain to the matter at hand.

The key to the Sermon's moral teaching is found in:

'For I tell you, if your virtue [justice, righteousness] goes no deeper [or does not greatly surpass] than that of the scribes and Pharisees, you will never get into the Kingdom of Heaven.'⁴³

This affirmation arches an entire development ending with:

"You must therefore be perfect just as your heavenly Father is perfect."⁴⁴ Between these a series of examples explicate

42 Matthew 5-7, Luke 6:20-49. Each version reflects the preoccupation of the evangelist. In Matthew it is a moral summons. On this, cf. Jacques Dupont, Les béatitudes (nouv. éd.), Bruges, Abbaye de Saint André, 1958-1973, 1^{ère} éd., 1954, Vol. I, Chap. 1, 2, also bibl., p. 9-16; Joachim Jeremias, The Sermon on the Mount, Philadelphia, Fortress, 1963, ix-38 p.; W. D. Davies, The Sermon on the Mount, London, Cambridge, 1966, 163 p.

43 Matthew 5:20. The Greek dikaiosune is variantly translated justice, righteousness, virtue. "Does not greatly surpass" is given as a variant in Jerusalem Bible, Matthew 5, n. 9.

44 Matthew 5:48. The following development depends on: Schnackenburg, Moral Teaching, p. 54-89; Dupont, Les béatitudes, Vol. III, p. 245-272; Bornkamm, Jesus, p. 96-109. On justice, cf. G. Quell, G. Schrenk, Righteousness, Bible Key Words from TDNT, Vol. IV, London, Black, 1951, xiii-82 p., and John L. McKenzie, "Righteousness," in DB, p. 739-743; Johs. Pedersen, Israel, I-II, London, Oxford, 1946-1947, p. 336-410.

the initial statement moving the thought to the final imperative. These verses contain profound implications for human life which are to be noted now.

The concept justice colors the entire Sermon in Matthew. The term serves a redactional purpose. Matthew uses it to compare, for a Jewish audience, the notion of justice in rabbinical theology with the one in Jesus' teaching. The Old Testament sense of justice is complex and found in many contexts. However, it does not equate with the Greek equivalent which implies a natural moral force unfolding in action. Nor does it carry, primarily, the rabbinical emphasis: human activity and good deeds. Justice in the Old Testament points to the concreteness of virtue, honesty, uprightness, to what opposes wickedness and deceit. It is the ground or presupposition for right conduct, and thus in some contexts establishes a right or a claim. Justice belongs to the language of relationship. He is just who "does justice to claims made upon him in the name of a relationship."⁴⁵ When a claim is recognized, or a vindication had, one experiences deliverance, which means personal salvation. It is here that its proper theological usage arises.

In the Old Testament, the just man is the one whom "God's verdict has justified."⁴⁶ Justice implies salvation,

45 Schrenk, Righteousness, p. 29.

46 Ibid., p. 7.

for it is God who establishes the verdict of rightness. Justice and salvation are often found in synonymous parallels. Matthew's use of the term justice is to be understood against this background. It carries the sense of "human behavior in harmony with God's will, and well-pleasing to him--uprightness of life--doing what is right in God's sight."⁴⁷ It is intrinsically bound up with God and his acts. Justice is gift, not merit. By extension, your justice refers to ways in which that attitude is actualized in daily life, or to the reality of the person who is claimed to be in a right relationship before God.⁴⁸

The crucial question for the pious Jew was: what must one do to be just before God? In Jesus' society the scribes and Pharisees were the teachers and exemplars of a style of life that professed to be in full accordance with the full will of God. They were searchers for true justice. In spite of their heroic fidelity to the letter of the law, Jesus asks for more. Justice must go deeper. Jesus is not engaging here in the rabbinical activity of adding new prescriptions which he then justifies from the Law. Rather, he teaches with authority about the fullness of God's intention for man, that demands an altogether new kind of life.⁴⁹

⁴⁷ Ibid., p. 35.

⁴⁸ Dupont, Les béatitudes, III, p. 246.

⁴⁹ Schnackenburg, Moral Teaching, p. 60-66. Cf. Wolfgang Trilling, The Gospel According to St. Matthew (Vol. I), London, Burns & Oates, 1969, espec. p. 77-105. Jesus' claim to announce God's complete and original will is a question that cannot be taken up here. Dupont and Schnackenburg place Matthew 5:20 ff. in the shadow of 5:17-19.

The justice Jesus proposes compared to that of the teachers of Israel goes deeper, surpasses, is more abundant. The nature of the more is clarified, by Matthew, in a series of six antitheses: The commandment you must not kill, is extended to include anger against one's brother, injuries, aversions, quarrels, divisions of any sort. Not only adultery, but also lust is forbidden. The positive law permitting divorce is abrogated. Laws concerning oaths are also to be replaced by a demand for integrity and honesty of life that has no need for swearing. Evil is not to be resisted by evil or vengeance, but overcome by good in ceding to the wicked. The commandment to love one's neighbor is extended to include all men, even the enemy. Hatred is to be conquered by love, which has no boundaries.

The radical law of human action as seen by Jesus is highlighted in this contrast with the law of Moses as it was taught in Jesus' time. These examples show that he calls forth the ultimate human powers for good. The extra required of those who would experience the Kingdom of God actualizes human life in its depths, its totality. Justice "pierces to the very marrow of the soul."⁵⁰ It calls for man liberated from the limits of self-interest as evil is overcome by good, man freed from mere fulfillment of the word of the Law to

50 Schnackenburg, Moral Teaching, p. 76.

a discovery of the depths of human life. Günther Bornkamm observes that Jesus:

liberates the will of God from its petrification in tables of stone, and reaches for the heart of man which seeks seclusion and safety behind the stronghold of observance of the law.⁵¹

It is from this point of view that the entire development concludes with the directive: "You must therefore be perfect just as your heavenly Father is perfect."⁵²

The adjective, perfect,⁵³ is twice found in the Gospels, both in Matthew. The Greek implies totality. This is not, primarily, about moral action. It describes a quality of being. To be perfect means that nothing of its own excellence is lacking in an object so described. It implies wholeness, completeness. As such, biblical thought would consider this an unfitting attributive term for God. The Septuagint gives this adjective a cultic reference using it to describe the sacrificial lamb--intact, sound. It also belongs there to the religious and moral spheres: the person

51 Bornkamm, Jesus, p. 105. An interesting study on the liberation of human life; Ernst Kasemann, Jesus Means Freedom, London, SCM Press, 1969 (c. 1968), 158 p., an existentialist view.

52 Matthew 5:48. In Luke 6:36: "Be compassionate [...]." Hence the "more than" of Mt. 5:20 is in relation to "love of enemies," v. 27--the same radical message from a different optic.

53 Cf. Gerhard Delling, "τέλειος," (tēleios = perfect and der.), in TDNT, Vol. VIII, p. 67-87; Schnackenburg, Christian Existence I, p. 159 ff. on Hebrew notion of perfection.

is perfect whose existence is firmly rooted in God, albeit not morally faultless. Abraham, David, Solomon are so described.⁵⁴

Hence, the injunction, "You must therefore be perfect," is a direct restatement of the quality of justice illustrated in the examples. It is a positive command. To be perfect carries the meaning of total commitment to the total will of God. It is the more abundant justice where no dimension is lacking in the response to those confronted by the Kingdom of God.

The second use of the adjective, perfect, in the story of the rich young man carries the same intent.⁵⁵ The issue is what is lacking to constitute totality in man's relation to God. Jesus tells him: "If you wish to be perfect, go and sell what you own [...], then come, follow me."⁵⁶ The same message is here; one must be ready to risk everything, to take radical means that reach into every level of one's existence. Schnackenburg states that by the repression

54 For the following: Schnackenburg, Moral Teaching, p. 108-109; Dupont, Les béatitudes III, p. 249-252; Dupont, "Soyez parfaits-soyez misericordieux," in Sacra Pagina, Paris, Lecoffre, 1959, Vol. II, p. 150-162; P. J. DuPlessis, The Idea of Perfection in the New Testament, Kok N. V. Kampen, J. H. Uitgaave, 1959, p. 65 ff.

55 Matthew 19:16-22. See also, Simon Légasse, L'appel du riche (Marc. 10, 17-31 et parallèles), Paris, Beauchesne, 1966, espec. Chap. 4-6; Dellings, téleos, p. 74.

56 Matthew 19:21.

expression, "if you wish to be perfect," Matthew condenses, for a Jewish audience, a new morality: "the morality demanded by Jesus, which exceeds all previous 'righteousness' (5:20), and which concerns the whole man and claims him wholly."⁵⁷

The total claim upon the person is the message of another major development in Matthew's Sermon.⁵⁸ It takes the form of an attack on the traditional religious observances of the pious, and is a rejection of hypocrisy. Justice exists in a relationship. In the present context, justice is the quality that properly disposes one before God. Actualized in human behavior, justice is the dynamic binding morality and religion, rather, man's life with God. From the perspective of Jewish law it constitutes the full intention of God for man that extends to every level of human experience. Here justice is described in relation to the inner dispositions of the person. True justice requires a life where exterior actions contain a corresponding interiority.

The theme of this development is caught in the opening admonition:

⁵⁷ Schnackenburg, Moral Teaching, p. 108. Dupont considers perfect a redaction of mercy in Luke. DuPlessis and Légasse reject this to relate 5:48 to 5:43-47. Both views imply a demand for a total response.

⁵⁸ Matthew 6:1-18. On this, Dupont, Les béatitudes III, p. 260-272; Schnackenburg, Moral Teaching, p. 65-72; W. Trilling, The Gospel According to St. Matthew, p. 107-119.

'Be careful not to parade your good deeds before men to attract their notice; by doing this you will lose all reward from your Father in heaven.'⁵⁹

It is then carried through by way of examples of the most important religious observances, almsgiving, prayer, fasting. The message is brought into focus in the behavior of the hypocrites under attack: when giving alms the hypocrites seek to trumpet their actions to win admiration; they love to pray where people can see them; they let men know when they are fasting.

The common issue is more than a vain mentality that seeks attention and praise from men. These are the observances proper to the Jew's relationship with God. The well-known scrupulous, self-demanding performance of religious obligations is not being called into question. However, performance is not enough. What these behaviors lack is an inner orientation toward God. They are empty of their essential content and there is only an appearance of justice. This hypocrisy is condemned here.⁶⁰ The decisive factor is a proper attitude in the heart of man. Schnackenburg notes that the teaching here is that the center of the moral personality is the heart. Action is to be the "fruit of disposition."⁶¹

⁵⁹ Matthew 6:1.

⁶⁰ Dupont, Les béatitudes III, p. 269.

⁶¹ Schnackenburg, Moral Teaching, p. 6, 79. The biblical notion of "heart" suggests itself here as an alternative theme of enquiry.

This teaching is developed and extended in numerous Gospel passages. Jesus never tolerates hypocrisy in its multiple forms. One need only refer to the great indictment where the imagery of hypocrisy is convincing:

'Alas for you, scribes and Pharisees, you hypocrites! You who are like whitewashed tombs that look handsome on the outside, but inside are full of dead men's bones and every kind of corruption. In the same way you appear to people from the outside like good honest men, but inside you are full of hypocrisy and lawlessness.⁶²

Those who give honor only with their lips, while "their hearts are far from me,"⁶³ are the hypocrites.

In the Sermon on the Mount the essential characteristics of the response envisioned by Jesus are identified. The concern here, as in the entire ethical teaching, is not with particulars of concrete life. It is about man himself, working out the details as one summoned by the proclamation. The Sermon calls forth a principle of action that actualizes all the dimensions and all the powers in human life. It proposes a way of life that penetrates to the depth of the heart, and makes intention and action one.

Jesus' ministry confronts man with what God is doing in history. It places him before new possibility for his life, and opens the way to their manifest consummation in the future. Jesus teaches that the Good News is not for

62 Matthew 23:27-28.

63 Matthew 15:8.

hearing only. The eschatological gift needs to be received. He insists that a proper response to his message will involve "the whole human being individually, interiorly and ineluctably."⁶⁴ Salvation is God's offer of a new human wholeness. It is for the person who will bring to the gift the totality of his personal being.

This way of life is defined by the full intention of God, and the full intention of the person. God's own decisive work in history, which is the offer of ultimate salvation to man, constitutes the former. A response that is willing to risk everything and engages one wholly in human life, where the divine action is operative, characterizes the full intention, required by God, of man. The foundation that sustains and grounds this lived response is a basic decision and lived attitude--one of being converted. For the person who would relate to the Kingdom of God, conversion is a fundamental demand, one contained in the programmatic statement of the evangelist: "'The time has come' he [Jesus] said 'and the Kingdom of God is close at hand. Repent, and believe the Good News.'"⁶⁵ The structural dynamics of the experience of conversion, as Jesus saw it, are to be examined next.

64 Schnackenburg, Moral Teaching, p. 51, concerning the commandment of love--a short formula for God's demands. The contemporary notion of fundamental option belongs here.

65. Mark 1:15, par. Matthew 4:13: "Repent for the kingdom is close at hand." The intrinsic relationship between faith and repentance will be seen below.

2. Conversion.

The call to conversion permeates the synoptic accounts of Jesus' teaching and is fundamental to the New Testament.⁶⁶ Addressed to everyone, it carries an unmistakable urgency. One of the instances where this can be felt is in Jesus' reproach of the towns where many of his miracles had been worked:

'Alas for you, Chorazin! Alas for you, Bethsaida!.
For if the miracles done in you had been done in
Tyre and Sidon, they would have repented long ago.'⁶⁷

Urgent and pervasive, the demand for conversion arises out of the situation of Jesus' ministry. It is no longer a matter of preparation for God's inbreak, the familiar thrust in the prophets' cry. The eschatological event is inaugurated, the response is conversion. So when the Twelve are sent to preach this Good News, as in the final commission given by Jesus, this is the call that must be raised.⁶⁸ This summons announces the response that God requires in the new situation. The question here is: how is the response—the decision for conversion, experienced? Or, what is the fundamental dynamic in it?

66 Cf. Schnackenburg, Moral Teaching, p. 25-33; Schnackenburg, God's Rule, p. 86-92; Schnackenburg, Christian Existence I, p. 33-50; Bernard Häring, "Conversion," in P. Delhaye et al., Pastoral Treatment of Sin, New York, Desclée, 1968, Chap. 2, p. 87-176; Yves Congar, "La conversion," in Parole et mission 3, 1960, p. 493-523.

67 Matthew 11:21.

68 Mark 6:12; Luke 24:46-47.

There is no definition of conversion in the Gospel accounts of Jesus' teaching. The Greek term conveys regret, a change of mind or purpose, the process of an ethical conversion.⁶⁹ The original Hebrew, from which the Greek is translated, refers, literally, to a turning or returning, the opposite to what already exists. An underlying image is the road, hence, conversion involves a new way.⁷⁰ The New Testament, metanoieite, translated, repent, convert, means that one is "turning away from his former path, now recognized as wrong, and striking out in a completely different direction."⁷¹

Conversion in Israel knew two forms. One consisted of cultic and ritual practices directed toward the avowal of sin and the request for God's assistance. The other was

⁶⁹ The Greek, metanoieite, metanoia, for the Hebrew sub (V), te suba(n). Cf. J. Behm, E. Würthwein, "μετανοεω, μετανοια" (metanoia = Conversion & der.) in TDNT, Vol. IV, p. 975-1008; also, P. Hoffman, "Conversion," in Encyclopedia de la foi (4 vols.; sous la direction de H. Fries), Paris, Cerf, 1965-1967, Vol. I, p. 266-272; Aloys H. Dirksen, The New Testament Concept of Metanoia, Washington, D.C., Catholic University, 1932, Part III: this work provides a history of the use of metanoia in theology to 1932, and the Jewish and Greek background for its use in the NT. The common translations, repent, do penance, etc., have obscured the meaning of repentance. The accent becomes acts of penance. The concept means more. Hence the term conversion is used here.

⁷⁰ Häring, "Conversion," p. 107.

⁷¹ Schnackenburg, Moral Teaching, p. 25.

the prophets' demand for a return in one's total life and being, to Yahweh. The issue in the latter was the relationship between man and Yahweh, which only Yahweh could bring about. In rabbinical Judaism the practical aspects of return to the Law and renunciation of transgressions against the Law took precedence. Conversion remained, however, the essential obligation because the Kingdom of God would be accomplished only when all Israel was truly converted. Moreover, only personal conversion, proven and sustained in a full return to the Law, was thought to be grounds for hope that God, in the final event, would act for one in a saving way. So, the question remains: what did Jesus intend by his demand for conversion?

Jesus' teaching about the nature of conversion occurs within the dialectic of his proclamation of the Kingdom and the reaction and response he receives. Its fundamental dynamics emerge in the drama of Jesus' encounter with his chief opponents, the Pharisees and scribes. Among his followers, for whom he claimed the saving benefits of the new age, were publicans and prostitutes, drunkards and tax-collectors. To the sinners he included at his table. They, with the many poor, sought his company and were received by him.⁷² Pharisees and scribes, however, rejected his claim and his actions. They considered Jesus a blasphemer, derided his disciples because he ate and drank with

72 Matthew 21:31-32; Luke 19:7, 5:27-28; Mark 2:17.

sinners,⁷³ and generally showered him with abuse. While the people were astonished and sought Jesus, the Pharisees and scribes were filled with incomprehension and dismay. The good news to sinners was, for them, a real stumbling block.⁷⁴

Jesus' fellowship with sinners was a genuine scandal for his opponents. For, in their view, one supported by the tradition they had received, and the purity for which they felt total responsibility, justice before the Law precedes salvation. Within the security of the Law, the Pharisees held that they knew the way to salvation. By following the Law, and drawing up accounts of good works, they had the right to hope for God's saving gifts in the eschatological event. Moreover, it was the religious duty of every faithful Jew to stay away from the unrepentant sinner, since "dealings with sinners put at risk the purity of the righteous and his membership within the realm of the holy and the divine."⁷⁵ A man's worth was judged in terms of the external Law. The just man was the one whose conformity to it overbalanced any infringements. Yet Jesus, in the name of eschatological salvation, mingled with the sinners, invited

73 Mark 2:7; 2:16; Matthew 11:19; Luke 7:34.

74 Mark 2:16, 1:37. This offense is part of the bedrock of the tradition: also, Jeremias, Theology, p. 118-121; Perrin, Rediscovering, p. 102 ff.

75 Jeremias, Theology, p. 118.

them to table, called them to discipleship, shared their abode.

Jesus reverses the order in the world of contemporary Judaism. His claim that salvation is for sinners is a scandal, and he is required to explain this deviation. One of the many answers he offered is found in the illustration of the Pharisee and the tax-collector.⁷⁶ In a concise but remarkable contrast his opponents are sharply confronted with Jesus' understanding of how God acts, and of the nature of the conversion he expects.

Two men present themselves in prayer before God. One of these is a Pharisee who gives thanks for having kept the Law in a manner that surpasses required limits. His service of God is truly commendable. He makes no claims upon God, and his prayer, a statement of his reality, is not necessarily spoken out of pride. The facts of the illustration are that he is grateful to God for having been able to serve so well. His prayer reflects the prayer tradition of his life.⁷⁷

The second man is a tax-collector, one who in the current view of things, is a confirmed sinner because of

⁷⁶ Luke 18:10-14. These parables about sinners are addressed to his critics, a defense of the Good News. The proclamation to sinners took the form of invitation. The following interpretation depends on Linnemann, Parables, p. 50 ff.

⁷⁷ Also, Jeremias, Parables, p. 140, 142-143.

his profession. He has no reason to hope that God will offer him salvation. In his prayer this man strikes his breast and, without daring to raise his eyes to God, as indeed, in his hearers' opinion, he ought not, he asks for mercy--salvation. For Jesus' hearers the case is a clear one: the Pharisee, of course, is acceptable to and received by God. The tax-collector can never be.

Jesus' understanding is shown in his final words. It is a clear verdict: "This man, [the tax-collector], I tell you, went home again at rights with God: the other, [the Pharisee] did not."⁷⁸ The tax-collector is the one who has the right attitude before God and to him God extends his favors. This conclusion would have left Jesus' hearers in total consternation. What fault could be found with the Pharisee? Is he not the just one? Here Jesus simply presents God's decision.⁷⁹

⁷⁸ Luke 18:14a.

⁷⁹ Jeremias, Parables, p. 144. Linnemann prefers to speak about Jesus' decision. The nuance raises the problem of revelation in Jesus' teaching. However, Jesus represents his own view of God and man which in Christian belief is God's view. Jeremias' accent suits the perspective here. Linnemann translates the judgment: "this man went [...] a righteous man" (p. 62), to stress the meaning for Jesus' hearers. The usual focus on forgiveness, gracious acceptance et al., does not hold here--justification is a verdict re "the integrity of the righteous (just) man" (p. 144, n. 11). The parable does not include a request for mercy by the Pharisee, so forgiveness is not the specific issue, nor is any moralizing intended.

This illustration puts the Pharisees in an unexpected position of decision. The contrast brings the real choice to light, for "the righteousness of the tax-collector and the righteousness of the Pharisee cannot be brought under a common heading."⁸⁰ In the Pharisee's scale of judgment there is no place for the tax-collector. But this scale has no further meaning when a man stands, as does this man, the recipient of God's salvation.

This illustration clarifies the essential nature of conversion. The tax-collector personifies what Jesus intends. Salvation is indeed a free divine gift, the Pharisee admits this. But to experience the saving action one must abandon previous standards of judgment, definitions of the way things are to be, acquired merit, saving gifts already received, courts of appeal about the rightness of one's life, however objectively valid all these may be. The attitude of the tax-collector, and of the sinners whom Jesus calls and receives, is the right one. When one turns to God, absolutely abandoning the presuppositions of one's own life, and opens unconditionally to receive the saving action, salvation is given. What Jesus says in this story about receiving the favors of God calls the Pharisee into a total shift of perspective, a new way, a radical leaving the known and secure in life, the

80 Linnemann, Parables, p. 61.

definitions and well tried human experiences, to move toward salvation that can only be received. In Eta Linnemann's words:

they [the Pharisees] can allow Jesus to be right only if they go through a radical conversion, and let God's grace be the final appeal for their lives.⁸¹

This story highlights the response required, the dynamics in the experience of conversion: one is to abandon the security of achievements and presuppositions, or the despair of guilt, or the hopelessness of need, in order to turn, without grounds for control and design, to receive the divine action. To do this is to replace hope with certainty, for God, Jesus says, offers eschatological salvation.⁸²

The same dynamics of repentance can be discerned in the parables of the lost sheep and the lost coin, which show God's joy in finding. In the midst of the furor which his associations are causing, Jesus invites the Pharisees, through these stories, to celebrate the salvation offered to the sinner, a being found, and God's joy in making the find. The other side of the illustration is the teaching that in the salvation experience one recognizes oneself as lost, without the personal resources necessary to remain in, or return to, the mainstream of life.⁸³

81 Ibid., p. 63.

82 Schnackenburg, Moral Teaching, p. 29.

83 Luke 15:4-7, 8-10.

The parable of the Prodigal Son depicting the initiative and joy of the father, and his invitation to the faithful son to rejoice, also portrays, in the attitude of the prodigal, the same essential elements of conversion: recognition of hopelessness in being lost, and a return, with no personal claim, to receive.⁸⁴ As R. Bultmann observes, however, Jesus' experience of his followers is that readiness to convert is found in the sinners. It seems that to such as these is salvation: "They who await God's reign aright, [...] knowing how poor they are--to them pertains the promise of salvation."⁸⁵

Another illustration of the dynamics of the attitude required is found in Jesus' image of the child: "I tell you solemnly, anyone who does not welcome the Kingdom of God like a little child will never enter it."⁸⁶ To welcome the Kingdom of God refers to the concrete response made to Jesus' message. "Welcome" suggests a biblical sapiential background that describes an understanding and willing acceptance of divine revelation, an ability to hear the

84 Luke 15:11-32. So, Schnackenburg, Jeremias, Perrin, Bultmann, among others.

85 Rudolf Bultmann, Theology of the New Testament I, II, New York, Scribner, 1951-1955, p. 22. Bultmann cites Luke 6:20 ff. with Matthew 5:3-6, so links this teaching to the Beatitude. Cf. also Dupont, Les béatitudes II, Chap. 1. An important related issue here is that even conversion is a power given by God (Mark 16:27).

86 Mark 10:15.

the message and to receive the new reality of the Kingdom of God.⁸⁷ To enter the kingdom carries a sense of inheriting the future age, or sharing in the life of the definitive kingdom that is to come. This paradoxical saying about both receiving and entering the Kingdom of God tells what is to be done to share in the divine saving action.⁸⁸ It will be seen in the following, that the active dispositions of conversion, discerned in Jesus' illustration of the Pharisee and tax-collector, are being required.

The saying of Jesus contained in Mark 10:15 is really the climax in the account to which it belongs:

13 People were bringing little children to him, for him to touch them. The disciples turned them away,¹⁴ but when Jesus saw this he was indignant and said to them, 'Let the little children come to me; do not stop them; for it is to such as these that the Kingdom of God belongs.¹⁵ I tell you solemnly, anyone who does not welcome the Kingdom of God like a little child will never enter it.'¹⁶ Then he put his arms around them, laid his hands on them and gave them his blessing.⁸⁹

The narrative structure here reveals that the primitive tradition of this pericope portrays Jesus' insistence that the children being kept away by the adults are to be brought

⁸⁷ Ambrozic, Hidden Kingdom, p. 146; Dupont, Les béatitudes II, p. 172-176; W. Grundmann, "Expositio," in TDNT, Vol. II, p. 50-52. Kümmel, Promise, p. 126, n. 7, suggests its origin in the missionary language of the Church.

⁸⁸ Ambrozic, Hidden Kingdom, p. 139, with ref. and variant opinions. The paradox, to receive - to enter, is related to the present-future aspect of the Kingdom.

⁸⁹ Mark 10:13-16. The following development draws on Dupont, Les béatitudes II, p. 143-181, and Ambrozic, Hidden Kingdom, p. 136-158.

to him. Then through word and gestures he declares that children indeed share in the Kingdom of God. Jesus' concern here is only with the children. "Such as," implying anyone who resembles the children, adults included, does not fit the further facts of the account, Jesus' embrace and blessing. "Such as" belongs to the redactionary work of the evangelist. In the primitive tradition the teaching is, the Kingdom of God does belong to children.

Commentators are generally agreed that Mark 10:15, a substantially genuine saying of Jesus, originally existed independently. The evangelists, finding in Jesus' conduct a lesson for adults, use it as climax in the story about Jesus receiving and blessing the children. In the same catechetical interests, the expression "to such as these" prepares the teaching of verse 15. Current scholarly opinion is that in the present Gospel form "to such as these" refers to those adults who in their inner dispositions resemble little children. This expression brings into focus the principal teaching deducible from Jesus' attention to children. To enter the Kingdom of God a person must receive the reality Jesus announces as would a child. The right attitude before God is that of a child.

The twentieth century reader must refer this teaching to its original context. A profile study of children does not exist in the literature of Jesus' contemporaries,

but it is known that children, in themselves, were viewed as insignificant. They were highly valued and desired for the survival of parents. But there is no evidence of valuing the intrinsic qualities of children, nor of viewing them in the light of their future maturity. Instead, children were the personification of insignificance and of undesirable ways. A. M. Ambrozic summarizes this view as follows:

The child was, to the Jews of Jesus' time, a prototype of insignificance, dependence, unimportance, helplessness, and immaturity; the child was looked upon as one who deserved no attention, who had nothing to offer, and therefore could make no claims. The child had to receive whatever it received as a pure gift.⁹⁰

It is against this background that the saying of Jesus, "anyone who does not welcome the Kingdom of God like a little child will never enter it," is to be understood. What Jesus' ministry is about, the Kingdom of God, is for those who in their inner dispositions resemble them. In other words, one must receive the divine activity as a gratuitous gift. To experience the eschatological benefits one must cease to rely on one's worth or power to bring about the saving action, and receive, in the manner of a child before his world, the divine action in the present reality.

⁹⁰ Ambrozic, Hidden Kingdom, p. 148. Others interpret "like a child" as openness, trust in the father, simplicity and trust. These, in the opinion of this writer, are secondary.

These illustrations address those who oppose Jesus, and those who are learning from him the way God acts in the new and present age. In this teaching the fundamental dynamics of what is to be done to receive the divine action can also be discerned. What, then, is being said about conversion through the contrast of the attitudes of the Pharisee and the tax-collector before God, through the image of the child as the prototype of those who receive the Kingdom of God, through the examples of the Prodigal Son, the Lost Sheep, and the Lost Coin?

Jesus' demand for conversion called his hearers into a radical reorientation of their ideas and their lives. For both his followers and his opponents, the terms for receiving the saving benefits of the Kingdom of God are so different from their own that one can speak of a "reversal of conditions."⁹¹ The announcement that the Kingdom of God is now present and active represents a fundamental shift for human life. Once again, this time with the decisiveness of fulfillment of the eschatological expectations, Israel is called into new existence. Jesus' demand for conversion marks the end of a manner of life that belonged to the waiting,⁹² and introduces his hearers into an experience of fundamental change: salvation now. Its manifest consummated experience

⁹¹ Jeremias, Theology, p. 117, cf. p. 117-121.

⁹² Ambrozic, Hidden Kingdom, p. 7.

in the future, depends on a willingness to shift the center, and the measure and purpose of one's existence from oneself, and from the future, to the gratuitous divine action in the present. This is conversion.⁹³ For Jesus' hearers such a decision carries critical implications. It involves salvation.

The decision to be made is whether the change which Jesus demands is a self-destructive one, or is it the only response "to an event in which the might of him who is greater than the world and its order breaks in"?⁹⁴ In the words of Rudolf Schnackenburg:

The preaching of conversion becomes fully intelligible only when a man is convinced that God's eschatological reign is operative in the words and deeds of Jesus and that it has the active power to bring about salvation now.⁹⁵

Thus, this study of the experience of the Kingdom of God is directed to another structural dynamic, belief.

3. Belief.

In the teaching of Jesus, belief is intrinsically linked with conversion. In fact, belief is the positive

⁹³ Häring, "Conversion," p. 100-125. The emphasis here on the dynamic does not preclude the idea of conversion understood as works of penance, etc.

⁹⁴ Linnemann, Parables, p. 81, in different context.

⁹⁵ Schnackenburg, God's Rule, p. 106. Also, Perrin, Rediscovery, p. 150 ff. Here the existential overtones require nuances: "men learn to live their lives in the context of their experience of the divine activity" (p. 153).

side of conversion--the dynamic counterpart.⁹⁶ Divorced from belief conversion remains a stoic renouncement of the self before an inevitable inbreak of unknown, if not impersonal, forces. The belief required by Jesus introduces into the crisis of conversion a listening by one who knows he is summoned into a relationship that empowers.⁹⁷ Belief is a basic increment constituting human life as envisioned by Jesus. Two of its fundamental aspects are: belief is directed to the person, Jesus, and belief empowers the believer.

The New Testament resounds with the call to believe. The explicit synoptic references, generally attached to the sayings of Jesus, often in relation to the miracles, reflect the evangelists' intention to present Jesus' own attitude towards belief:⁹⁸ he often requires belief; he praises belief when he meets it; and invites belief when he encounters good will.⁹⁹ He demands belief of those who seek his help,

⁹⁶ Schnackenburg, God's Rule, p. 106; Schnackenburg, Moral Teaching, p. 34.

⁹⁷ Gregory Baum, Faith and Doctrine, A Contemporary View, New York, Newman, 1969, p. 21-24; also, James P. Mackey, "Christian Faith as Personal Response [Christian Faith], in Faith: Its Nature and Meaning (Paul Surlis, Ed.), Dublin, Gil, 1972, p. 53-69.

⁹⁸ Jeremias, Theology, p. 165; the extensive, complex treatments of belief elsewhere in the NT, espec. in Paul and John, are always elaborations of the basic ideas found in the synoptics: McKenzie, Power and Wisdom, p. 170.

⁹⁹ Mark 5:34, par.; Luke 7:50; Mark 5:36, par.

and rebukes the disciples and those to whom he offers his ministry for their unbelief.¹⁰⁰

Jesus does not offer any definition for belief, nor is the term always in evidence when he speaks about it. This is appropriate to the nature of belief, for it is a concept that embraces a lived reality, the one to which the entire bible is witness, the relationship between man and God. The concept, belief, takes into itself the life and being, in its breadth and depth, of those who stand in this relationship. Hence it is not in definitions, but in the biblical telling of life, that the full meaning of this concept is to be found. Emerging most explicitly in the narration of life's critical moments, its structure is nonetheless discerned through its unfolding in history.

The New Testament Greek for belief identifies with the Hebrew word group that carries the Old Testament experience of belief into its fullest expression.¹⁰¹ The Hebrew participial form, ne'E man, can be rendered firm, secure, reliable, certain, true, faithful. As a modifier it implies that which the subject ought to be, and its specific content is determined by each one. The term established a relationship.

100 Matthew 9:28; Luke 8:25; Mark 16:14.

101 The Greek, pistis, pisteuein (belief, to believe); the Hebrew root 'mn and der. The word study here is drawn from A. Weiser, R. Bultmann, "πιστεω και" [pistis], in TDNT, Vol. 6, p. 174-228. Cf. also, J. L. McKenzie, "Faith," in DB, p. 267-271.

To describe an object as ne'^Eman states that those qualities properly belonging to and constituting the object do actually exist. Given the nature of the Hebrew mind, this stated connection is no abstraction. It is a felt experience of the object in its totality and carries practical implications for the life of the perceiver.

Applied religiously to man, faithful will correspond to whatever aspect of God is in question. For example, one's faithfulness will imply obedience where God is the one who gives Law, praise when he shows power, hope as God promises salvation.¹⁰²

The verbal adjective, 'amen, translated: so be it, amen, and the like, conveys the affirmation of a connection with reality of the claim inherent in the object conceptualized. To say Amen to a doxology for example, means that the subject has understood the claim being made in it, agrees with it, and in willing its fulfillment, accepts the personal obligations for its occurrence.¹⁰³

The verbal form he'^Eman, to believe, is a declaration in the Old Testament. As a formal concept it means to declare something to be ne'^Eman. To believe is to affirm as actual a claim that is made, and render the proper response. In the Old Testament it is used exclusively in relation to

102 Weiser, pistis, p. 185.

103 Ibid., p. 186.

persons. Amen presupposes a reciprocity, a dynamic essential to this biblical concept.¹⁰⁴

When used in relation to God the verb carries, albeit analogously, these same formal aspects. It means to pronounce God to be ne^E man. That is, the qualities properly attributed to him do exist in reality. It means to declare Amen to God, with the concomitant implications for one's own life. To believe is to be in relationship, the one specified in the claim, God. A. Weiser states, as an expression for man's relation to God, to believe,

is first found as a formal concept in the sense of recognizing and acknowledging the relation into which God enters with man, i.e. setting oneself in this relation, so that [...] the mutual relation between God and man is of the very essence of faith.¹⁰⁵

The term to believe can contain all the claims of God as God, and all the ways the believer expresses the consequences of these claims. In the light of the foregoing study of Israel's view of reality, the intrinsic relationship between the linguistic choice being considered here and the experience captured by the Old Testament writings needs little explication. These documents are a statement of a vision of reality where the basis for life is the mighty

¹⁰⁴ Ibid., p. 186 ff.; also, P. Antoine, "Foi," in Dictionnaire de la Bible, Supp. 3, p. 278.

¹⁰⁵ Weiser, pistis, p. 187.

deeds of God. The primary basis and content of the believing conduct portrayed there are, then, God's acts. The experience of belief is seen to vary according to what Israel thought were the claims of God, what God had done, was doing, and could be.¹⁰⁶ But Israel lives out of a consciousness of the dialogical structure of her existence. God's eruption into history is in promises delivered and promises fulfilled, the Word of God active in history. Israel's way is in relationship.

To believe, in the Old Testament view of human existence, is to live the consequences of these claims. Hence R. Schnackenburg can state: "Faith is the answer to God's redemptive action in history, in the life of the people as in that of the individual."¹⁰⁷ This means that in believing conduct it is God who is primary. The essence of belief is response, its matrix is God, his word and action: "In the face of God man is summoned directly and by believing makes his decision to answer God's claim on him."¹⁰⁸ Belief is experienced as response to the claim in the word and deeds of God. One of the dynamics of believing conduct is relationship.

106 Mackey, Christian Faith, p. 62.

107 Schnackenburg, Moral Teaching, p. 35.

108 Schnackenburg, Christian Existence I, p. 71. He notes the biblical predominance of the verbal form "to believe" noun "faith." This does not reject the aspect of "firm conviction of truth" of the Christian tradition. It does show the accent: believing response.

It was seen above that the content of this living relationship with God varies with the changing contexts of Israel's way forward through change. For example, Abraham's belief in the promise required that he honor the divine claim to be the power and the will to accomplish what was beyond Abraham's possibilities--his existence in a land and a posterity. For Israel of the desert wanderings, of the conquest, of survival in the land of promise, believing conduct took the form of vital allegiance to the God whose claim was that he chose Israel to be a people. As the circumstances changed so also the ways of allegiance changed. When God is acknowledged to be one who commands, belief is obedience. God who promises and who secures in mighty deeds elicits confident expectation. In later Judaism belief centered around the Law of God. Israel, then, believed she was to mediate God's Law through history, beyond which Israel awaited a new divine action. And believing conduct narrowed into obedience to that Law.

What endures throughout the tradition, however, is the fundamental conviction that to believe is to exist. This view of life is most directly articulated in the prophetic message and finds its ultimate expression in Isaiah.¹⁰⁹ The prophet, sent by God to King Ahaz who is about to seek

¹⁰⁹ Here, Schnackenburg, Christian Existence I, p. 75-77, citing Von Rad, Eichrodt; Weiser, pistis, p. 188.

foreign aid against the impending attacks of his enemies, throws down the gauntlet: "But if you [Ahaz] do not stand by me [Yahweh]- you will not stand at all."¹¹⁰ A. Weiser states:

The positive meaning of the saying (Is. 7:9b), [...] is that the particular mode of life and the permanence of the people of God are to be found in faith itself.¹¹¹

Belief and existence are identical. And when belief becomes eschatological expectation it is the same:

but those who hope in Yahweh renew their strength, they put out wings like eagles. They run and do not grow weary, walk and never tire.¹¹²

In the view of human existence portrayed in the Old Testament, to believe is to be empowered.

By its very nature believing conduct will embrace all the claims of God as God and extend to all the ways the believer expresses the consequences inherent in these claims. It is with reason, then, that the Old Testament view of belief can also be described by Weiser as "a relation to God which embraces the whole man in the totality of his external conduct and inner life."¹¹³ And Schnackenburg can say: "To have faith means [...] to submit one's whole person to

¹¹⁰ Isaiah 7:9b.

¹¹¹ Weiser, pistis, p. 189; McKenzie, Power and Wisdom, p. 169, cf. Is. 7:1 ff.

¹¹² Isaiah 40:31. Also 25:9.

¹¹³ Weiser, pistis, p. 188.

God."¹¹⁴ In the view of reality found in the Old Testament, to believe is to be empowered in the totality of existence, within the dynamics of response to God who has first addressed the believer.

Into this consciousness Jesus delivers the demand to believe. As with the concept of conversion, the content of this demand can best be known from the synoptic context.

What one is asked to believe in is Jesus' proclamation. This is the primary content of the synoptic accounts. The believing response possesses a complexity connatural to any instance of human behavior, and to the inexhaustible dimensions of the claims in the message delivered by Jesus. Two constitutive dynamics, however, clearly emerge there: to believe is to be empowered, and belief in the proclamation requires belief in himself.¹¹⁵

Jesus claims that the believer is drawn into divine power and experiences this power in effects that are beyond all human possibility. Jesus declares that where there is belief, "nothing would be impossible for you."¹¹⁶ His understanding of this is conveyed in the synoptics by sayings of remarkable vividness attributable to him: If a person who

¹¹⁴ Schnackenburg, Christian Existence I, p. 70.

¹¹⁵ Ibid., p. 79; McKenzie, Power and Wisdom, p. 168; McKenzie, "Faith," in DB, p. 268.

¹¹⁶ Matthew 17:20.

has faith, even as small as a mustard seed, gives an order to a mountain to move, or to a mulberry tree to uproot and plant in the sea, this will happen.¹¹⁷ Clearly, here is imagery for unusual acts of power. Joachim Jeremias observes eschatological overtones in the reference to the disappearance and reappearance of mountains.¹¹⁸ Belief is the link between the person and this power that exceeds all imagination. This teaching is also given, sensitively but forcefully, in the account of Jesus' response to the father of the epileptic demoniac. The father's plea, "But if you can do anything, have pity on us and help us," draws from Jesus the retort: "'If you can?' [...] 'Everything is possible for anyone who has faith.'"¹¹⁹ John L. McKenzie observes: "faith is certainly connected with power."¹²⁰

This conjunction between belief and power is realistically portrayed in the synoptic miracle tradition where more

¹¹⁷ Perrin, *Rediscovery*, p. 138, argues their authenticity; also Schnackenburg, McKenzie: Matthew 17:20, the context is Jesus' explanation of the disciples' inability to exorcise, 17:14-19; Luke 17:6. In Luke the meaning is in Jesus' reply to the apostles' request for an increase of faith, 17:5.

¹¹⁸ Jeremias, *Theology*, p. 165. This teaching appears again in the Mark and Matthew contexts of the disciples' astonishment before the withered fig tree. The teaching here is the relation between faith and power, faith and prayer. (Mt. 21:22; Mk. 11:24)

¹¹⁹ Mark 9:22b, 23.

¹²⁰ McKenzie, *Power and Wisdom*, p. 168.

than half of the occurrences of the word group, belief, to believe, are found. The synoptic miracles are acts of power, and locate miraculous power in Jesus: "and everyone in the crowd was trying to touch Him because power came out of Him that cured them all."¹²¹ Power in these contexts is not some impersonal force related to magical or ritual acts. It is not a neutral cosmic principle, nor a supply of miraculous energy into which some persons can connect. Such ideas are alien to the biblical thought world. Rather,

When we turn from the Greek and Hellenistic world to that of the OT, [...] In place of the neutral forces of nature we have the power and might of the personal God, which do not operate in terms of imminent law but which carry out the will of God according to this direction.¹²²

Power is not, in Jesus' thought world, an impersonal absolute. It is found in service of the divine and personal will.

It should not be surprising then that Jesus would understand his mighty acts of power as instances of the divine action. Unique to Jesus' view, however, is his declaration that the miracles are the present inbreak of the eschatological divine inbreak. These events are significant as the presence of fulfilled hopes which carries decisive implications for human possibility. But it is also Jesus'

¹²¹ Luke 6:19: (power = dynamis).

¹²² Walter Grundmann, "δύναμις/δυναμεις," (able) in TDNT, Vol. II, p. 290.

teaching that a person's communication in the eschatological divine activity is constituted by belief.¹²³

Jesus' miracles cannot be totally reconstructed from the Gospel tradition as it exists today. Yet one of the elements that sets that tradition apart from its Hellenistic and Judaic counterparts, and contributes to the critical consensus about its authenticity, is an emphasis upon the belief of the person helped. Jesus' verdict is not about his own power, nor the power of prayer or meritorious action. Rather, the evangelists recurringly register Jesus' judgment: your faith has saved you. Jairus is told that it is belief that is needed, a woman suffering with a hemorrhage, two blind men, a penitent woman, a paralytic and his friends, a grateful leper, the blind Bartimaeus, all are told that it is their faith that has saved them.¹²⁴ In fact, it appears in these accounts that over against privileges of race, wealth, religious observance, and personal moral virtue, it is belief that suffices. It is the same in the case of the Roman Centurion, the Canaanite woman, the woman who was a sinner, the Samaritan leper.¹²⁵ Even weak and under-developed

¹²³ McKenzie, Power and Wisdom, p. 169: faith is less submission to the power than a communication of the power, although the former is not excluded.

¹²⁴ Mark 5:36; Mark 5:34; Matthew 9:29; Luke 7:50; Matthew 9:2; Luke 17:19; Mark 10:52. Cited by Grundmann, Brown, Jeremias, et al.

¹²⁵ Luke 7:9; Matthew 15:28; Luke 7:50; Luke 17:19.

belief ties in with the power of Jesus: The father of the epileptic can only cry, "I do have faith. Help the little faith I have!"¹²⁶ The marvellous act of power is considered by Jesus to be the result of both his own action and the belief of the person. "Faith calls forth the dynamis of Jesus."¹²⁷

On the other hand, when Jesus encounters unbelief his mighty power is hindered. At home in Nazareth, the large audience registers astonishment at the miracles worked through him, but, "he could work no miracle there."¹²⁸ The evangelists' reflection that this was due to their unbelief reveals an awareness of Jesus' own attitude. Belief is not itself the power causing the miracles, "he cured a few sick people by laying his hands on them,"¹²⁹ but believing conduct is clearly a "sphere in which God's power comes to fruition, and this power is seriously hindered by unbelief."¹³⁰ The question, however, of the dynamics of the believer's response remains.

The interpretation Jesus gives to his mighty deeds, a distinguishing feature of the synoptic miracle tradition,

¹²⁶ Mark 9:24.

¹²⁷ Raymond E. Brown, "The Gospel Miracles," in New Testament Essays, Milwaukee, Bruce, 1965, p. 179.

¹²⁸ Mark 6:2, 6:5a.

¹²⁹ Mark 6:5b. Bornkamm, Jesus, p. 132.

¹³⁰ Brown, "The Gospel Miracles," p. 180.

eliminates a view of belief as being contrary to reason, or one that identifies with a psychological confidence in Jesus the wonder worker. The eschatological rule of God is the reality toward which the believer is referred, and in which he shares. According to the New Testament miracle stories, the view of Jesus is that the believer is experiencing, actively or passively, the wonderful power of that rule. Concretely, the focus is the miracle-working power of Jesus, and belief is acknowledgment of his claims. So, in its most basic experience, the belief required by Jesus is acceptance of himself, "One who believes accepts him as genuine."¹³¹ This demand is not explicitly found in the synoptics but it is everywhere implicit.¹³²

The miracle accounts themselves portray this aspect of belief by the choice of details about the encounters between the people and Jesus. The persistence shown by such persons as the Canaanite woman, the blind beggar, the paralytic and his friends, shows their deep expectation that it is Jesus who not only can but will want to act on their behalf. The miracles stories are meant to show that Jesus does not disappoint these hopes in him.¹³³

¹³¹ McKenzie, Power and Wisdom, p. 168.

¹³² Matthew 18:6, 27:42 seem to contradict this. However, Jeremias and Schnackenburg draw attention to the more accurate reading of the Greek in the parallel Mark 9:42. Cf. Jeremias, Theology, p. 161-162; Schnackenburg, Moral Teaching, p. 35.

¹³³ Bornkamm, Jesus, p. 130.

That belief is belief in Jesus is highlighted in two dramatic accounts of the disciples' failure to believe: Peter is reprimanded by Jesus for failing to walk on water although he knows Jesus is there, and the disciples are rebuked for their fear in the storm when he was with them in the boat. The reproach is that they did not believe: "'Why are you so frightened? How is it that you have no faith,' [...] 'Why did you doubt?'"¹³⁴ Jesus expects them to know that because of his nearness they will have the power of God's protection. One must also note that in these accounts the disciples' response to Jesus' miraculous saving action is directed to his person: "Who can this be that the wind and the sea obey him?" and, "Those who were in the boat showed him reverence."¹³⁵

From an altogether different sector of Jesus' audience, those who will not believe, the attention also focuses on the person of Jesus. At Nazareth the astonishment of the townspeople is directed to him: "'Where did this man get this wisdom and those miraculous powers?'"¹³⁶ Reminding one

134 Mark 4:40 par; Matthew 14:31.

135 Mark 4:41, par.; Matthew 14:33. Cf. Schnackenburg, Christian Existence I, p. 78; James Kallas, The Significance of the Synoptic Miracles, London, S.P.C.K., 1961, p. 91. The miracles force the questions of the identity of Jesus, Messiahship, Jesus' self-consciousness. The Gospels, espec. Mark, intend this. These questions are not within the limits of this study. On Jesus' claim to be Messiah, see Schnackenburg, God's Rule, p. 119-125.

136 Matthew 13:54, par..

another of his parentage: "they would not accept him."¹³⁷

In the synagogue at Capernaum, when the scribes are confronted with Jesus' action of forgiveness, it is Jesus

himself that they question: "How can this man talk like that?"¹³⁸

Before his enemies, who themselves witness the exorcisms, he rejects the accusation that the power of Beelzebub is operative.¹³⁹

And Jesus refuses to act as a mere wonder-worker by producing prodigious signs compelling belief.¹⁴⁰

These marvellous deeds are Jesus' own personal actions, evoked by his own word, in response to the believing expectations of him, in those who come for help. He

asks the blind man, "'Do you believe I can do this?'" and

the disciples, "'who do people, and who do you say I am?'"¹⁴¹

The tradition is that Jesus' ministry is accomplished in a wholly personal relationship. The object of belief is the reality itself, the saving reality--Jesus in history.

The challenge to believe arises out of the critical situation created by Jesus himself. The life-giving, freeing, healing ministry is his own. The announcement that this ministry is inextricably connected with the long-awaited

¹³⁷ Matthew 13:57, par.

¹³⁸ Mark 2:7, par.

¹³⁹ Mark 3:22-27.

¹⁴⁰ Mark 8:11.

¹⁴¹ Matthew 9:28; Mark 8:28, 29, par.

eschatological divine action is made by him.¹⁴² Confronted by these, belief for his hearers is not directed to future events, objects of thought, of hope or of fear bearing some significance for the present. Rather, a person's attitude toward the future that Jesus promises is determined in his attitude toward the present in Jesus' ministry. Fundamentally, the claim of belief is that Jesus, who declares, in order to reveal, the promises are now being fulfilled and are to be consummated, and confronts his hearers with what that means for human possibility. But Jesus is not passive in all of this:

His coming coincides with the provisional advent of the basileia. He announces it but it can be announced only through his advent and actions. [...] Both belong to God's salvific will which has associated the mission of Jesus with his eschatological kingship.¹⁴³

Believing conduct cannot pass him by. For, "he himself was the language in which God 'happened' in a decisive and unsurpassable way."¹⁴⁴ Jesus is the main condition for receiving the saving benefits because it is his work and his teaching, in fact, his person that declare the meaning

¹⁴² The following is based on Schnackenburg, God's Rule, p. 117-129.

¹⁴³ Ibid., p. 129: "To try to establish premises and consequences here is beside the point."

¹⁴⁴ Louis Monden, S.J., Faith: Can Modern Man Still Believe [Faith], New York, Sheed, 1970, p. 131, 133.

of the times. Jesus' demand is not about a general blind trust in God, nor the effect of some unreasonable urge, but it is about the Amen, however uninformed and immature, addressed, not only to what Jesus does, or to what Jesus claims, but to "that" Jesus.¹⁴⁵

Although the belief required by Jesus cannot be detached from his person, neither can it stop at him.¹⁴⁶ Those who hear the demand to believe are in no consciousness vacuum. Theirs is a heritage of believing conduct responsive to the acts and word of God in their ongoing history. The experience of Jesus takes place within an awareness of history as saving history with God, and within an expectation of eschatological consummation. The encounter with Jesus is disturbing. In him the action and word of God comes in an unpredictable way, and the nature of the present reality is not self-evident. It needs to be proclaimed, the Beelzebub controversy clearly shows. Belief is not about the factual

¹⁴⁵ Cf. Ambrozic, Hidden Kingdom, p. 22-23; Mackey, Christian Faith, p. 69; Werner Georg Kümmel, Promise and Fulfillment, The Eschatological Message of Jesus, London, SCM Press, 1957 (3rd rev. ed.), Chap. 4, espec. p. 151-155. Although differently, Schnackenburg, Moral Teaching, p. 38.

¹⁴⁶ Monden, Faith, p. 133. Monden observes this in relation to post-Easter belief but it is applicable here. The theological question to which this points, Jesus in the saving economy, cannot be reviewed here. Cf. Y. Congar, "Christ in the Economy of Salvation and Dogmatic Tracts," in Concilium, Vol. II, New York, Paulist, 1966, p. 5-25.

data of the events. Belief is the Amen, addressed to "that" Jesus, who is himself "the 'last' word spoken to mankind, the ultimate 'yes' to all the pledges ever made throughout history."¹⁴⁷ To believe is to make the radical decision of conversion, to abandon one's present existence, in the grounding and meaning one assigns to it, to be established by the eschatological inbreak of God, and to do so because of the personal summons by Jesus. As such, belief constitutes the believer in a way of mutuality that is empowering.¹⁴⁸

This chapter intended a study of the implications, as Jesus saw them, of the Kingdom of God for human experience. This was done in terms of Salvation, Conversion, Belief. Dynamics that give the basic structure to life when it is lived in relatedness to the Kingdom of God have been identified. They are principles of relationship, of change, of transformation

¹⁴⁷ Monden, Faith, p. 131.

¹⁴⁸ A complete delineation of the psychological dynamics involved in the decision regarding Jesus, albeit of immense practical importance, goes beyond the limits of this study, and of the NT. The identification of the two dynamics, mutuality (relationship) and empowering, are fundamental. Any analysis elaborates these. For a beginning, cf. McKenzie, Power and Wisdom, p. 172-174. Reflections on the existentialist view of belief in Jesus as "absolute faith" is also beyond the parameters here. The graced aspect of faith is not to be lost here. It is presupposed within a view of reality that is eschatological in the sense used here. Belief is, by its very nature response to God's action and summons. In the NT view of God's action it is, then, response to Jesus himself.

of the subject.¹⁴⁹ The impetus to live out the experiences described here is not one rooted in the nature of man. For the motivating dynamic is the absolutely free divine inbreak, hidden, but effectively present--the gift recognized and proclaimed by Jesus.

This study will now turn from theology's understanding of human life, to a study of psychology's view of the dynamics structuring human growth.

149 Themes for further study suggest themselves here: the commandment of love, the call to personal discipleship. The presupposition of Jesus' ethical teaching is that its application in life situations is to be found by those who embrace it. Likewise, the dynamics informing the experience of response to Jesus' proclamation, which are identified here, are to be given their unique "enfleshment" in each life.

CHAPTER V

HUMAN GROWTH IN THE PSYCHOLOGY OF ERIK H. ERIKSON

The psychological implications of human life which has been discussed in the preceding theological analysis of the Kingdom of God will be examined now, in the second phase of this present work. Erik H. Erikson has formulated a relevant psychosocial theory of human growth which can direct this study. His is a work that conveys the sense that wholeness characterizes human life and the awareness that relativity informs it. Erikson shows human life a process, open to all reality. Its portrayal captures the phenomenon which the conscious I means when it says "me" or "you," from any point in its existence. It brings into relief what the Self experiences reflecting on "myself" or "yourself" at any stage in the life cycle. Erikson describes how these come about, between the boundaries of birth and death, through the interpenetration of all life processes. Human life is seen, here, as a thrust toward wholeness, one constituted, however, by relativity. No one aspect of the experience of the I, no one self viewed by the Self, is the whole.

This is a psychoanalytic analysis presented in configurational descriptions of human growth, a quality of the work befitting the man, Erikson. He is artist, teacher,

analyst of children, with a special interest in observing children's play. Erikson's first access to the workings of man's inner life was by way of children's play. Dreams and free association yielded entrance to Freud.¹

Erikson's description of growth is congruent also with the quality of his professional life which developed within multidisciplinary environments and pursuits. The anthropological research which he did among the Sioux and Yurok Indians, for example, is known. Erikson, from the beginning, refused merely to speculate on the relationship between insights from psychoanalysis and anthropology or social history; between the facts of personal development and geography, economics, politics, religion, or history. For he believed the theorist needs to gain understanding of the total world where the human phenomenon occurs. He viewed an interchange between theory gleaned in the clinic and impressions arising from applied work necessary to the search and integration of all the facts. For often the analyst is thereby led to significant reformulations of premises and methods.² Hence,

1 Cf. Erik H. Erikson, Childhood and Society [Childhood], New York, Norton (2nd ed., rev. & enlarged), 1950 (c. 1963), Chap. 6. Erikson's first research project, Harvard, 1934-1936, demonstrated the value of experimental play situations. Cf. "Configurations in Play - Clinical Notes," in Psychoanalytic Quarterly, Vol. 6, 1937, p. 139-214.

2 Erik H. Erikson, Identity and the Life Cycle, Selected Papers, New York, International Universities, 1959, p. 1.

careful to avoid any mere application of psychoanalytic theory to different life situations, Erikson utilized its insights and tools to observe human ways in fields outside the clinic. In this we witness a searcher of truth about human life; a theorist prepared to use and develop psychoanalytic insights; a researcher free from the restrictions of the scientific model of enquiry which early circumscribed his discipline, and free from rigid formulations capturing and binding its first creative insights. The result is "phenomenological - psychoanalytic - psychological"³ description of the configurations occurring through life and growth.

The present chapter includes an introduction to the work of Erik H. Erikson, and an elucidation of the focal concept and the basic dynamic principles which Erikson identifies in the experience of human growth. First, his relation to Freudian theory and to ego psychology is noted. Second, main thrusts in his theory are reviewed from the first complete systematic statement in Childhood and Society. Third, some indications are cited of elements differentiating Erikson's theory from Freud's, of the specific elaboration he gives ego psychology, and of the challenge he offers his

³ Ibid., p. 16. Cited from David Rapaport's description of Erikson's work in a brief history of ego psychology, in ibid., p. 5-17.

discipline. To each of these he brings change, greater wholeness, and a social dimension. Then a study follows of the concept, identity, and the dynamic principles informing human growth.

1. Erik H. Erikson: The Psychologist and His Work.

Erikson is a psychoanalyst grounded in and faithful to the basic insights of Freud to which, however, he brings an "organic extension."⁴ The years 1927-1933 mark Erikson's immersion into the world of Freud in Vienna. There he taught children in a school designed for free, responsible learning. He lived in the intellectual atmosphere and exchange of the Freudian circle, eventually trained as a psychoanalyst of children with guidance from Anna Freud and August Aichorn. Erikson acknowledges the influence at this time of Heinz Hartmann, a leading theoretician in ego psychology.⁵ And studies of the Montessori method are reflected in his later work. Graduated in 1933, Erikson came to America to become, at Harvard University, Boston's first analyst of children.⁶

⁴ This is Rapaport's judgment, cf. ibid., p. 16.

⁵ Cf. Erik H. Erikson, Life History and the Historical Moment [Life History], New York, Norton, 1975, p. 37. In Chapter I, Erikson gives his work historical perspective.

⁶ Cf. Robert Coles, Erik H. Erikson, The Growth of His Work, Boston, Little, 1970, xxi-440 p. A thorough study, also bibl.

Erikson's professional education coincided with the period following the birth and early development of psychoanalytic theory. By 1923, a widespread, although turmoil-ridden movement had begun.⁷ From 1923-1937, Freud was developing formulations of ego psychology which it would be the task of his followers to complete.

Within his educative milieu, Erikson recognized trends towards dogmatic orthodoxy, intolerance of deviants, and hero worship of the founder.⁸ He, however, judged Freud's work to be the basis of a revolutionary theory of human motivation and the source of invaluable tools for the discovery of further knowledge of human behavior and growth. He also discerned, in Freud's theories, openings to new insights. He found in Freud himself the spirit of the philosopher—one who tries out patterns of thought to seek a new truth. Freud was also the physician, a clinical investigator bound by the theories and methods of science in his

7 Cf. Erikson, Life History, Pt. I, Chap. 2, where Erikson reviews Freud's Posthumous Publications--letters that reflect the beginnings of psychoanalysis; also, Erikson, Insight and Responsibility [Insight], New York, Norton, 1964, Chap. 1: "The First Psychoanalyst," a paper on Freud and his discovery, delivered in 1956; also, Ira Progoff, The Death and Rebirth of Psychology, An Integrative Evaluation of Freud, Adler, Jung and Rank, and the Impact of Their Insights on Modern Man [Death & Rebirth], New York, McGraw-Hill, 1973, Chaps. 1 and 2 review these problems.

8 It is well to note here the departure dates of Adler (1911), Jung (1913), Rank (1924). Cf. Progoff, Death & Rebirth, Chaps. 3-7.

own historical period. Early psychoanalytic research bears these marks.⁹ Early psychology, it seemed to Freud, had to be reconciled with science to be reputable. The heretofore unknown regions of the human mind, the unconscious, had to be submitted to the same laws of enquiry as the physical world. Freud experimented with ideas and intuitions. He was dominated by the scientist and rationalist who must prove.

Erikson chose not to identify with Freud the scientist who insisted on concepts for observing "transformable quantities of drive enlivening inner structures."¹⁰ He looked to Freud the "discerner of verbal and visual configurations which revealed what consciousness wanted to enlarge upon, [...] attempted to disguise--and revealed."¹¹

Erikson realized that Freud brought about a significant breakthrough to what lies behind human behavior. This had led "inward" to man's inner world, "backward" to the origins of each mind and its disturbances, "downward" to

⁹ E.g., attempts to search for laws of inner equilibrium; to identify the demonstrable physical and chemical forces; to reach quantitative formulations of psychic energy; to trace charge and discharge of transformable energy; to demonstrate cause and effect, et al. Erikson discusses the relation between Freud's work and his historical moment and personal constitution in Life History, Chap. 2.

¹⁰ Erikson, Life History, p. 39.

¹¹ Ibid., p. 39-40.

instincts repressed or denied. Yet Erikson dimly felt, and found implicit in Freud, that psychoanalysis must also look "outward" to mutual love, "forward" to new possibilities, "upward" to consciousness.¹² Recognizing the true spirit of Freud's creative, searching genius, remaining faithful to his basic insights and method, Erikson set out to do what had to be done: understand the processes of adaptation between the individual and social reality which is the work of the unconscious ego.

The forces by which humans defensively adapt to threatening elements from external reality was a question in psychoanalytic enquiry from the beginning. These were called ego forces. At first the ego was identified with the person, the self, or consciousness. Later it was considered a differentiation of the instinctual drives. In Freud's final model for the structure of man's unconscious life, he included the ego--one of its divisions, with inborn roots, independent of the instinctual id--a second division, and with autonomous functions to handle anxiety arising from relations with external reality. Hence, a process of ego development through life was implied. By Freud's death in 1939, attention could be directed to the principle of psychic organization; the unconscious ego, to the significance of its work handling relations with the outer world,

12. Ibid., p. 39.

hence, to the normal, adaptive power of man. Erikson is one who took these beginnings of ego theory into account and gave it significant development.¹³ He traced the epigenetic development of the ego through the entire life cycle, a first in psychological theories of growth. He provided a comprehensive and necessary analysis of the role of the social reality in ego growth.

Childhood and Society, published in 1950, is pivotal to Erikson's work. It is the culmination of its first stage, containing themes he continued to revisit and rework. In the second edition appearing in 1963, Erikson writes: "like many first voyages it provides impressions which on revisiting prove resistant to undoing or doing over."¹⁴ Accordingly, he revised merely to clarify original intentions and to add materials from the period of first publication.

This is a psychoanalytic work about childhood, about historical processes, about the ego's relation to society. Its subject is "the interpenetration of the biological, cultural, and psychological."¹⁵ Chapter one states the

¹³ Cf. the historical survey of ego psychology by David Rapaport, in Erikson, Identity and the Life Cycle, p. 5-17. For a brief summary of the ego theory of Freud and Hartmann, cf. Don S. Browning, Generative Man, Psychoanalytic Perspectives, New York, Dell, 1973, Chap. 4.

¹⁴ Erikson, Childhood, p. 12.

¹⁵ Ibid., p. 108, 16.

therapeutic and theoretical bias: recognition of a "relativity in human existence."¹⁶ Erikson chooses to deal with the relevance of all aspects in a life situation. From the beginning this theorist intends to open his profession to the whole of life. The theoretical direction is set in a restatement of Freud's theory of libido development which he first put forward in 1940.¹⁷ Erikson relates, here, to Freud's theory of instincts and psychosexual development and situates it in the social context. He describes the laws and dynamics of human growth that, given its total reality, is psychosocial. Such focus effects a significant shift in psychoanalytic theory.

Research data from field trips among American Indians precedes, in Part Two of this work, a description of the growth of the individual ego through the significant periods of a life cycle: the "Eight Ages of Man."¹⁸ The latter reviews the psychological side of what happens when one becomes, or fails to become a competent member of his own world. It is a systematic formulation of the ego's specific

¹⁶ Ibid., p. 37.

¹⁷ E. Erikson, "Problems of Infancy and Early Childhood," in Cyclopaedia of Medicine, Surgery and Specialties, Philadelphia, Davis, 1940, p. 714-730. Also in G. Murphy, A. J. Bachrach (Eds.), Outline of Abnormal Psychology, New York, Medical Library, 1954, p. 3-36.

¹⁸ Erikson, Childhood, Chap. 7.

task at each stage of life, and of how it is to be accomplished for vital experience through the life cycle.

Erikson's eight ages sketch the personal individuation of human life itself. The theoretical basis of this aspect of the work was proposed in the paper Ego Development and Historical Change in 1946.¹⁹ The intention is to offer:

a collection of observations which may help to prepare the way for a new formulation of the ego's relation to the social order.²⁰

With this study of the ego's relation to social life Erikson staked out his future.

The broader question of the historical rationale for the study of human life is introduced in the final chapters of Childhood and Society. The evolution of identity from adolescence to adulthood is examined in relation to the conditions of change through industrialization in America, Germany, Russia. The theme of a 1942 article, "Hitler's Imagery and German Youth,"²¹ is being developed here. Erikson searches the intrinsic relatedness of the life and identity of an historical figure with the patterns characteristic of the childhood of his lifetime. The judgment is that life and history are constituted by more than

¹⁹ This paper was published in The Psychoanalytic Study of the Child, Vol. II, New York, International Universities, 1946. It is revised in Erik H. Erikson, Identity Youth and Crisis [Identity], New York, Norton, 1968, Chap. 2.

²⁰ Erikson, Identity, p. 45.

²¹ Published in Psychiatry, Vol. 5, 1942, p. 475-493.

inner conflicts. This was a decisive thrust, marking its author a psychoanalyst who would use the tools of history and political science to gain more enlightened understanding of human motivation and growth. And it put to work an ethical concern that pervades his work:

in our time man must decide whether he can afford to continue the exploitation of childhood as an arsenal of irrational fears, or whether the relationships of adult and child, like other inequalities, can be raised to a position of partnership in a more reasonable order of things.²²

Thus, from 1933-1950 Erikson placed his professional being within the world outside the clinic. He observed. This is his method. His perspective encompassed politics, geography, history.

Continuing to rework these major thrusts to elucidate the mind's life in the body and the world outside, Erikson's focal concept remained the ego quality, identity. In Young Man Luther,²³ which he calls a study in psychoanalysis and history, Erikson put this concept and his own bias to the test. He had turned to history to show that behavior is not wholly explainable in terms of childhood experiences. In Erikson's words:

22 Erikson, Childhood, p. 47.

23 Erik H. Erikson, Young Man Luther, A Study in Psychoanalysis and History, New York, Norton, 1962 (c. 1958), 288 p.

I used Luther's childhood and youth to show that reformer and his childhood and the to-be-reformed and their childhoods, as well as the political actuality which brings them together in one decisive historical deed, are all aspects of an epoch's style of adaptation and readaptation.²⁴

Nor does he hesitate to consider theology a psychological datum, here the source of Luther's ideology. This work qualifies as a study of psychology of religion.²⁵ Erikson's method is far-reaching, freeing psychology from a pre-defined and closed world. A psychology of religion, one can add, likewise frees theology for relevance in solving problems of human and religious motivation and growth.

The structure of Erikson's work was completed with Young Man Luther in 1958, and Identity and the Life Cycle published in 1959.²⁶ Subsequently, continuing explorations into the implications of his theory for life in the second half of the twentieth century continued to reveal the richness, depth and challenge of this psychoanalytic vision of human life.²⁷ The year 1962 saw a definitive statement on

²⁴ Erikson, Insight, p. 102. The underlining is the present writer's.

²⁵ Thus, Paul W. Pruyser, "From Freud to Erikson: Developments in Psychology of Religion," in Roger A. Johnson (Ed.), Psychohistory and Religion, The Case of Young Man Luther, Philadelphia, Fortress, 1977, p. 95. This volume of essays offers historical, psychoanalytic, and religious assessments of Young Man Luther.

²⁶ Erikson, Identity and the Life Cycle contains reprints of "Ego Development and Historical Change" (1946); "Growth Crisis in Healthy Personality" (1950); "Problem of Ego Identity" (1956). These are revised in Erikson, Identity.

²⁷ The collection of essays on Identity (writings from 1951-67), and Insight (writings from 1957-62) witness this.

identity,²⁸ and a shift in emphasis culminating in Gandhi's Truth in 1969.²⁹ Reflections on womanhood, race relations, a new American identity, mark out points in this shift.

They articulate the mature Erikson's more explicit ethical concern in every man's right to become what he is, a fully human person; (in) every man's responsibility for each child born to find his own style of integrity. He also continues to re-examine his theoretical system to relate it to a developing psychological field, to contemporary life, to the historical moment.³⁰

Erikson's writings reveal the psychoanalytic theorist, social observer, biographer. But he is first of all a clinician, with a way of seeing that informed everything he does. The method was present from the beginning in his search for his own identity. The thought grew with the man and reflected the spirit of his mind:

its dialectic and programmatic quality, and its diverse concerns for the biological, the social, the aesthetic, and finally the ethical problems human beings face.³¹

28 Erik H. Erikson, "Youth, Fidelity and Diversity," in Daedalus, Vol. 91, 1962, p. 5-27, revised in Erikson, Identity.

29 Erik H. Erikson, Gandhi's Truth, On the Origins of Militant Nonviolence, New York, Norton, 1969, 476 p.

30 E.g., Erikson, Life History; also In Search of Common Ground, Conversations with Erik H. Erikson and Huey P. Newton (introduced by Kai T. Erikson), New York, Dell, 1973, 144 p. Erikson acknowledges the assistance of theoreticians, e.g., Rapaport, in formulating the conceptual status of his work.

31 Coles, Erik H. Erikson, The Growth of His Work, p. 261.

Through all of this Erikson elaborated and extended Freudian theory, ego psychology, and the psychoanalytic task. It will be useful to specify, briefly, some of the differentiations this implies.

First, identity is the central concept in Erikson's theory of human growth. He describes the processes of identity formation in terms of recurring dynamic configuration of parts where the sum is greater than any part and the period of childhood, significant. Freud describes libidinal development from infancy to genital maturity in the same way. However, Erikson's concept of identity belongs to an entirely different plane of reference. For Freud, identity is psychosexual. Healing is a matter of self-knowledge. Erikson's view is that life is constituted by more than instinctual energies and rational self-knowledge is not the whole of therapy. Identity is the work of the ego and a psychosocial matter.

Second, Erikson accepts Freud's theory of libidinal development describing an epigenetic series of transformations in sexual energy from birth to adolescence. But, he takes the psychosexual series beyond itself at each stage to describe growth as psychosocial. Moreover, for the first time in psychoanalytic theory, identity development is acknowledged and described through the entire life cycle. Restating Freud's theory of infantile sexuality, Erikson's

interest is how all life comes together: body, mind, society; childhood and old age. There are significant shifts in Freudian theory here: emphasis is directed from the goal of genitality to the wholeness of psychological integrity--the result of the ego states and libidinal phases in the total life cycle; a break is made with the Freudian analogy for psychological life--a closed energy system where instinctual energy is transferred, displaced, transformed, to find the place of the libido in the totality of life; studies move beyond enslavement by the id and superego, and ego defense mechanisms to consider the ego's developing capacity to adapt life to human needs.

Third, Erikson posits an inherent thrust towards life and human possibility in every child born and states the correlative responsibility to provide the context to free it. This view contrasts with the pessimistic Freudian view of inevitable victory of the death instinct. A greater dimension of wholeness is introduced into the psychoanalytic understanding of life.

Fourth, Freud and Erikson both hold that personal growth and individuation occur by way of change and crises. Erikson, however, brings further insights to this view. Freud, the first theorist to emphasize development in psychological life, considered it a function of response to tension arising in the physiological growth processes.

Frustrations, conflicts and threats in instinctual life force a person to learn new methods of tension reduction.

In this view these are the increments of personality change, growth and individuation. Erikson expands here. No crisis is wholly congruent with conflicts of libidinal energy. Each originates in the coming together of all the processes: instinctual, mental, social. Change is not a matter of the transformation of quantities of instinctual energy. It is a function of energies deriving from the total context of human behavior, motivation, life.

Fifth, Freud's was a deterministic view of development after age five. Erikson identifies occurrences of new increments of growth to the end of the life cycle. Adolescent and adult life are not mere repetitions of behavior patterns achieved in infancy and childhood. At each stage both the low and the high come together: from the instincts to the highest levels of human life; from the first stage to the final one. Each stage has its own specific crisis and developmental task. Erikson offers freedom to man in adult stages by revealing them to be new sources of human possibility, to the final boundary, death. He discerns a reciprocal contribution to be made by childhood and adult life, by adults and the developing child.

Sixth, preoccupation with the discovered unconscious caused Freud to direct enquiry to the human instincts, urges

and mental conflicts. Search of the significance of external influences and individual differences was absent. Freud recognized that history and culture also rooted and qualified human life,³² but he was neither social historian nor anthropologist. Moreover, he minimized the influence of culture from theoretical ground. His work carries these limitations, and those of the scientific model of life and enquiry of his time. Among Freud's followers, some focused attention on the mental processes of adaptation with the outer world. For example, Anna Freud outlined the ego's work of defense against danger situations. Heinz Hartmann extended Freud's notions of the ego's independent origin, functional autonomy, and task of adaptation. Erikson complemented and integrated these conceptions by bringing hard data to theory, and systematizing the psychological implications of the external world. He insisted upon the concrete, constitutive relevance of social reality within the dynamics of growth. And he provided tools for psychological investigation of adult life, heretofore considered an adult form of

32 E.g., Sigmund Freud, Civilization and Its Discontents (Trans. & Ed., James Strachey), New York, Norton, 1961, 109 p.; Sigmund Freud, Totem and Taboo, Resemblances between the Psychic Life of Savages and Neurotics (Trans., A. A. Brill), New York, Vintage Books, Random, 1946 (c. 1918), xv-207 p.; Sigmund Freud, The Future of an Illusion (Trans., W. D. Robson-Scott; rev. & ed. by James Strachey), Garden City, New York, Anchor, Doubleday, 1964, x-105 p.; Sigmund Freud, Moses and Monotheism (Trans., K. B. Jones), New York, Vintage Books, Random, 1967 (c. 1939), viii-178 p.

sexual identity achieved in adolescence. Erikson affirms the traditional goal of therapy: a simultaneous increase in the mobility of the id; the tolerance of the superego; the synthesizing power of the ego.³³ But he also states a need for theory and analysis that includes:

the individual's ego identity in relation to the historical changes which dominated his childhood, his adolescent crisis, and his mature adjustment.³⁴

Through this study of the human project--the realization of individual and collective humanity, Erikson identifies with the psychoanalytic world and helps to transform it. The roots of his work are in Freud and ego psychology. His method led him to direct observation of human becoming and provided evolving ego theory with factual data and realistic insights to give it vitality and actuality.

Finally, having understood the spirit of Freud's creative genius, having gained new insights into the origins of conflicts and pathology in the earliest years of life, having revealed the specific possibilities and tasks of adulthood, Erikson states in the final pages of Childhood and Society:

33 Erikson, Identity, p. 74.

34 Ibid.

I have emphasized [...] the possible implications of both theory and practice for a more judicious orientation in the unlimited prospects and dangers of our technological age.³⁵

Here is a clear indication of the personal stance of this man. The clinician and theorist is an ethically concerned citizen immersed in contemporary events. This ethical concern brings relevance and power to psychoanalytic thought and practice and a challenge to the psychoanalytic world. Since Freud's death in 1939, many have tended to overlook the greatness of his work--the creative genius in his insights into man's unconscious life. Others closed ranks around his ideas and turned them into a rigid, static view of the mind, distorting the spirit, if not the letter, of their originator.

These seemed to forget the limitations of the man Freud: clinical investigator making his observations and discovering one of the chains of cause and effect in the life of the mind, without intending to make it the whole story. Nor did they respect the limitations imposed upon Freud by the interests, language, and categories of a nineteenth-century scientist, and upon a German physician for whom categorical and historical modes of thinking are imperative. The birthplace of psychoanalysis, the pathology of the clinic, was also often overlooked. Consequently, a

³⁵ Erikson, Childhood, p. 424.

tendency developed to bar the minds of the healthy from enquiry, to submit all forms of behavior to easy psychoanalytic labelling, to consider genuine variations of human behavior forms of pathology, and to reduce human situations to infantile origins. Erikson challenges this use by enlightened psychoanalytic man of what easily becomes a new system of scientific superstition. He seems to have realized from the beginning that truth in science and history is changing, since no fact can be immune to new information. What remains is a method of enquiry.

Erikson insists that no human should be "robbed" of the "fruits of a lifetime" in "man-made patienthoods" masked in theories and ideologies as "inevitabilities."³⁶ This is not a deterministic view. Rather, insight derived from psychoanalytic knowledge carries its correlative ethical responsibility to determine which opportunities are available for an individual or a nation, and which make the most sense. He observes over and over that, whereas psychoanalysis can and has served a drive for power, it can also be a major humanistic critique of both the dangers and discontinuities which civilization imposes on human life, and of the human illusion concerning the prospects or the limits of the human project. Erikson, in his mature years,

36 Erikson, Insight, p. 106.

writes:

I have become increasingly convinced that psychoanalysis, not if judged by its physicalistic terminology and theory but if understood as it is practiced and lived according to the rules and the intentions of its originator, amounts to a truth method, with all the implications which the word truth has in Satyagraha.³⁷

This man's work demonstrates both the relevance and the responsibility today of the psychoanalytic method: to lead towards renewing insight into the way man pursues his humanity in the world, and towards effecting change in each historical moment that will make full human life a possibility.³⁸

The present study, therefore, elects to examine human growth in the psychology of Erik H. Erikson. It searches, there, the dynamic structuring in the complex process of human becoming. It discerns three principles at work in human individuation: an epigenetic principle of wholeness; a social principle of mutuality; a principle of change through crises. These will be studied and their work in the human life cycle described. First, however, it will be useful to make several preliminary observations related to Erikson's perspectives.

37 Erikson, Gandhi's Truth, p. 244-245.

38 This task of psychology is the theme developed by Progoff, Death and Rebirth.

Man is the being who both experiences his own becoming and reflectively describes the experience. It is man who can say "I." The object of the conscious, aware "I" is My Self--a composite Self:

What the "I" reflects on when it sees or contemplates the body, the personality, and the roles to which it is attached [...] are the various selves which make up our composite self.³⁹

But the "I" also says "You." There are, then, the "others" with whom the I compares the "selves." Given the complexities of the human conditions of life, only a healthy personality allows the I to speak out of a coherent Self. The inner agency that effects this inner order, essential for human life, is the unconscious ego.

The ego is one of three elements in the psychoanalytic model of the structure of man's inner life. It works between the id--sum total of instinctual life, and the superego--the "autocratic governor"⁴⁰ imposing demands on the id. Id, superego, ego--a manner of speaking about the workings of psychic life. The ego represents "the central principle of organization in man's experience and action."⁴¹ This description of human growth is about the growth and work of

39 Erikson, Identity, p. 217.

40 Erikson, Childhood, p. 193.

41 Ibid., p. 415.

the unconscious ego through the human life cycle, in accomplishing a strong identity necessary for vital human life.

The conscious I, in its relation to its existence, is not ignored or denied in Erikson's work. He observes that to do this would "delete the core of human self-awareness, the capacity which, after all, makes self-analysis possible."⁴² The category, self, has become an important object of study for contemporary humanistic psychology.⁴³ It intends to analyze the subjective experience, the felt process of an onward, or upward, movement that is the self. The judgment in the present study is that Erikson's analysis of the work of the ego, by which an individual is able to achieve humanity given with life, is critical and fundamental to self-understanding and self-realization. For it describes the psychosocial processes by which the Self is grounded. This theory examines, then, laws governing self-realization. The thrusts towards life and death are identified, showing that actual life is a balance of these.⁴⁴

42 Erikson, Identity, p. 218.

43 E.g., Clark E. Moustakas (Ed.), The Self, Explorations in Personal Growth, New York, Harper, 1956, xviii-284 p. Cf. also, Gordon Allport, Becoming, Basic Considerations for a Psychology of Personality, New Haven, Yale University Press, 1955, espec. Chap. 10, "Is the Concept of Self Necessary?"

44 Hence, this theory gives account of "evil"—a dimension of human life needing recognition. Some recent examples of studies of Erikson's thought are: Browning, Generative Man, Psychoanalytic Perspectives, a study of

To follow now is a study of the concept from which Erikson works, identity, and of three principles which, in his view, inform the task of personal individuation. Chapter VI will show the application of these in the eight ages of man.

2. Erik H. Erikson's View of Human Growth.

A. Concept of Identity

Since the term identity was first used by Erikson it has acquired its own life in the popular language and cultural patterns of the day. It has taken on a wide range of meanings to describe matters as varied as personal, professional, social, or national. Usages such as self-identity, sexual identity, student identity, Canadian identity, the identity crisis of the Church, of parenthood, of education, are familiar and current. Each is an attempt to circumscribe and to investigate some observable item of human life. The so-called identity questions, Who am I? Who are we? are no longer confined to the adolescent-adult

society and the good man based on Erikson's notion "generativity"; Walter H. Capps, "Ideology, Ego, and Ethos: A Comment on Erickson[sic]," in Humanitas, Vol. 5, No. 3, Winter 1970, p. 255-263--a re-examination of the role of "ideology"; William W. Meissner, "Erikson's Search: The Search for Ethical Identity," in Theological Studies, Vol. 31, 1970, p. 310-319; William W. Meissner, "Erik Erikson on Human Strength," in his Foundations for a Psychology of Grace, Glen Rock, Paulist, 1966, Chap. 9. A volume by Peter Homans on Erikson is forthcoming in the fall of 1977.

encounters at home and school. They are more often than not deliberate, collective, sometimes ritualized attempts to demonstrate or resolve what each person or group is supposed to initiate: an anguished quest for, or noisy witness to, a search for identity.

Erikson observes that this expanding use of the term and the more conscious awareness of the experience of crisis which it connotes do not necessarily register greater clarity about the nature of identity itself. In his opinion, these may altogether miss the really vital implications of identity, as well as its darker, more unmanageable aspects.⁴⁵

Definition is difficult. Identity is used by Erikson to designate the interlocking of complex and varied dynamic phenomena in the inner world of man--the psyche, in the biological one--the body, and in the outer social one. Identity is a quality of the total human process, itself subject to the changing components of the historical moment. But identity must be sensed and observed and then described. Erikson is satisfied to leave the concept undefined, circumscribing as it does a wide range of phenomena, which nonetheless do belong together. Then he used it with varying connotations that arise when observational perspectives change. Among the more specific meanings are: "a conscious

⁴⁵ Erikson, Life History, p. 17-18; Erikson, Identity, p. 15-17.

sense of individual uniqueness; [...] an unconscious striving for a continuity of experience; [...] a solidarity with a group's ideals."⁴⁶ These represent the three contemporaneous dimensions of the ongoing human experience that Erikson names a sense of identity.

In its subjective sense, that is, the conscious feeling of having an identity, there is a recognition of "individual uniqueness," accompanied by a sense of "the selfsameness and continuity of one's existence in time and space."⁴⁷ Erikson finds that William James captured the feeling of identity in the following description of what James calls character:

A man's character is discernible in the mental and moral attitude in which, when it came upon him, he felt himself most deeply and intensely active and alive. At such moments there is a voice inside which speaks and says: "This is the real me!"⁴⁸

This description does not portray a state of paralyzed self-question or of strenuous and loud quest. Identity is found at the core of the person. It is recognized, it comes upon one and invigorates.⁴⁹

46 Erikson, Identity, p. 208. On the problem of definition, and for a brief glossary of the main aspects of identity, cf. Erikson, Life History, p. 17-22.

47 Erikson, Identity, p. 208, 50.

48 Ibid., p. 19.

49 Ibid., p. 22.

Identity, however, is not a passive experience. It involves inner subjective activity and willingness to risk. James includes:

an element of active tension, of holding my own, as it were, and trusting outward things to perform their part so as to make it a full harmony, but without any guarantee that they will.⁵⁰

Identity embraces individual activity. But it cannot be blueprinted, manipulated or guaranteed. As Erikson explains, this feeling of individual existence, of sameness and historical continuity is dynamically linked with another perceived reality: the recognition of these by others.⁵¹ There is a social dimension here. It will be seen that Erikson intends by this a real interliving of the psychic and the social processes.⁵² The outer world introduces real increments into the structure of personal identity. For Erikson, identity is psychosocial.

Erikson also locates the conceptual basis of his own thinking about identity in a statement made by Freud. Freud explains that he had remained bound to his Jewish ancestry by "many obscure emotional forces," and also by

⁵⁰ Ibid., p. 19.

⁵¹ Ibid., p. 50.

⁵² Erikson, Insight, p. 114; cf. below, "Social Principle."

"a clear consciousness of inner identity, the safe privacy of a common mental construction."⁵³

These two statements help perceive some of the dimensions of identity for Erikson. It is not a wholly individual matter, nor a wholly conscious one. It is a sense of one's own unique, familiar and vital existence in its historical continuity, and its deep communality.⁵⁴

Another component of the sense of identity is awareness that the experience of being and of becoming is by way of inner central control organizing for effective movement into a real and shared future.⁵⁵ The conscious feeling of the alive self is itself related to the inner capacity to maintain a unique and continuous existence. Psychoanalytically conceived, this differentiation in subjective awareness represents the ego quality of identity, since it is the specific work of the ego's synthesizing function. Consequently, while the feeling of capacity to achieve an integrated and unique existence can be a conscious one, in fact a real self-consciousness, the unconscious is by no means inoperative. Hence Erikson speaks of ego identity.

⁵³ Erikson, Identity, p. 20.

⁵⁴ Ibid., p. 21.

⁵⁵ Cf., ibid., p. 49-50, and Erikson, Life History, p. 20-22.

In Erikson's description of human growth, the self-delineation implied in the sense of identity belongs properly to adolescence, that period in the individual life span that ends childhood.⁵⁶ But the quality of existence that is named identity is to be transcended since, in Erikson's model of development, integrity, not identity, is the psychological goal of human becoming. Subordinate though identity is to late maturity, an assured sense of identity is prerequisite for the latter. For identity firmly anchors the individual in the present, and provides the base for significant adult experiences of love, marriage, creativity, and old age. Indeed, these sustain, enhance and change the sense of identity of the adolescent period. But, without the latter, the adult experiences become blurred attempts to repair the deficit.

On the other hand, identity reaches backwards. A firm, clear sense of identity is dependent upon the rudiments which crystallize in each of the early stages of infancy and childhood to undergo new synthesis in the process of identity formation. This process begins, in Erikson's view, when all childhood identifications and self-images lose their usefulness.

⁵⁶ Cf. Erikson, Identity, p. 158-161; Richard S. Evans, Dialogue with Erik Erikson [Dialogue], New York; Harper, 1967, p. 30, 36-39. In the present work the terms, human growth, personal individuation, self-realization, self-actualization are used loosely and synonymously. They refer to the total complex reality of an individual's task of achieving personal humanness--a process organized in the ego.

Then the ego selects, changes and assimilates these to structure a new configuration, and identity is achieved.

The synthesizing function of the ego constantly works on subsuming in fewer and fewer images and personified Gestalten the fragments and loose ends of all infantile identifications.⁵⁷

The unique identification that results in adolescence and young adulthood is a dynamic gestalt, itself greater than the sum of its parts, assembled to meet an anticipated personal and collective future. Erikson names the specific process of identity formation, the identity crisis. Its quality is dependent upon the strength of childhood identifications, and upon the quality of the milieu in which it occurs. The process is also conditioned by the recognition and acknowledgment granted the emerging individual from the collective identity communicated by significant persons.⁵⁸

Although integrity, not identity, is for Erikson the final goal in psychological development, his work nonetheless converges on this particular ego achievement. He accounts for this conceptual focus.

First, a certain dynamic pattern in psychic functioning began to impress itself upon him in the course of

⁵⁷ Erikson, Identity, p. 59.

⁵⁸ This account resembles Freud's description of development from childhood - genitality - adult sexuality. Erikson acknowledges that Freud provided the tools for this study; he presupposes Freud's Theory of Infantile Sexuality, then expands the view of development. Cf. Erikson, Childhood, Chap. 2.

personal, clinical and anthropological observations.⁵⁹

Working with veterans of World War II, and with confused, conflicted young people, for example, it became clear that these persons had lost, or never achieved a "sense of personal sameness and historical continuity."⁶⁰ And the confusion was without any central control. So, the veterans knew who they were, but had a sense that their lives were not and could not hang together. Similar observations and extended enquiry into patterns of human behavior allowed Erikson to determine that to the period of adolescence belongs an identity crisis: the normative psychic processes marked by confusion and the inner assembling of a sense of what he called identity. Erikson's subsequent work was an attempt to demonstrate the significance within the life cycle of this experience and its concomitant problems.

Second, Erikson holds that problems of identity formation surfaced because of the nature of the present historical period.⁶¹ Recurring experiences of inner confusion, repeated demands for new self-identification within the period of one's life, that is, the problems of identity, are con-natural to this century. For it is one of radical change

59 Cf. Erikson, Childhood, p. 38-42, Pt. 2.4; Erikson, Identity, p. 16-19; Erikson, Life History, Chap. 1.

60 Erikson, Identity, p. 17.

61 This is a theme revisited by Erikson in Life History.

in unprecedented events: world wars, development of a potential for cosmic annihilation, human mobility that extends even into space, ongoing technical advances in every area of life. The critical issue for human growth has become: "the capacity of the ego to sustain sameness and continuity in the face of changing fate."⁶² It is the identity issue that pervades human concerns.

Erikson addressed this problem. He focused on the "genetic continuity"⁶³ of the sense of identity which is the work of the ego. He described how the ego must pursue its task through the elements of change that occur in the course of one's life. Here is an account of how a person can experience a vital sense of a real self, and in the strength of this, grow through a life cycle. The process will be outlined now. First, three basic laws governing it will be identified: the epigenetic principle; the social principle; the principle of change. It will become clear that human growth in Erikson's view is a way of wholeness, of mutuality, of change. Then will follow a delineation of the significant moments in growth, the Eight Ages of Man. The intention is to identify in each the fundamental dynamics

62 Erikson, Insight, p. 96.

63 Erikson, Identity, p. 209.

of human growth; a thrust toward wholeness, mutuality, change through crises.⁶⁴

B. Epigenetic Principle

Fundamental to Erikson's description of human growth is the epigenetic principle.⁶⁵ Derived from the Greek epi, upon, and genesis, emergence, epigenetic refers to that form of development where each item belonging to the fully matured entity arises in its own time, according to a given sequence, on top of what is already there. The physiological growth of a fetus is an example.

It is readily seen there, that epigenetic growth progresses through time in an ordered, step-by-step unfolding of structural elements or patterns present from the beginning. It is really a "differentiation of parts."⁶⁶ Accordingly, where growth is epigenetic, each constituent element has its own time and place of origin, its own period for dominance,

64 The term, "a sense of [...]," will recur frequently in the following. It connotes an experience that pervades the person: "surface and depth, consciousness and unconsciousness" (Erikson, Childhood, p. 251). It is, then, "way(s) of experiencing accessible to introspection; way(s) of behaving, observable by others; and unconscious inner states determinable by test and analysis" (ibid.). For the purposes of this study these three dimensions should be kept in mind, but they need not be examined in full detail. The interest here is to identify three basic dynamics, wholeness, mutuality, change

65 Evans, Dialogue, p. 21-22; Erikson, Childhood, p. 64-67; Erikson, Identity, p. 92-95.

66 Erikson, Childhood, p. 271.

and its own continued existence through the life of the organism. The end result is a functioning whole and its perfection dependent upon all its parts. Each part already exists in some form before it emerges at its own assigned moment in the sequence of growth to take on its full reality within the developing organism. The emergence of each, however, effects a change of form in the whole: a metamorphic integration of what is already achieved, and qualification of what is yet to arise. Time and sequence are critical here. If these are disturbed to cause variations of the prescribed size, strength or function, the result is a disordered organism.

Modern descriptions of fetal development have rendered the epigenetic principle familiar. It is likewise discernible in the patterns that govern the evolution of inborn capacities for locomotor, sensory, cognitive and social functioning after birth. Erikson identifies this law in the processes whereby one becomes a distinct person with a unique personality. He holds that personal individuation is also a progression through time, a sequential differentiation of parts. A human person takes hold of his humanity in his unique way within a wide range of physical and cultural variables. However, this aspect of human growth, the emergence of a unique person, occurs in obedience to the inner dynamic of epigenetic development which creates "a series of

potentialities for significant interaction with those around."⁶⁷

Erikson traces the progression and differentiation that characterize the complex process by which a healthy personality can develop through the experiences of life.⁶⁸ He first restates Freud's Theory of Infantile Sexuality: a delineation of the work of the libido as it empowers the individual through the first five years of physiological growth. Erikson does this in order to establish the basic biological realities that ground a psychoanalytical view of growth. This is a description of an epigenetic process that involves the convergence of developments in the erogeneous body zones and their corresponding modes of approach to the world. For example, the organic focus of the new-born's experience of the world is the oral zone, the mouth and senses. The general mode of approach in this stage of growth is one of incorporation, although there is a general interplay of the other modes present in an auxiliary fashion. These are the biting, eliminative, retentive, and oral-intrusive modes, each with its own period for dominance in the sequence of five stages. Freud considers these stages of growth, which he calls pregenital, to be decisive for mature genitality and thence for the formation of personality.

⁶⁷ Ibid., p. 67.

⁶⁸ On this, ibid., Chap. 2, p. 72-97, Chap. 7.

Erikson, however, considers this accounting inadequate.⁶⁹ His clinical experience and extended research into ways the biological givens of life are worked out in different cultures, led Erikson to acknowledge a larger matrix for personal growth. The process of human development and individuation is governed by three "interliving"⁷⁰ processes--the somatic, the psychic, the societal. No instance of human growth is constituted by only one of these. Each, subject to its own laws and observable only by its own scientific method, is contemporaneous with the other two in any human experience at any given moment. Hence, Erikson observes a relativity in human life. For, "an item [experience] in one process [located there] gains relevance by giving significance to and receiving significance from items in the others."⁷¹ Consequently, understanding of how a person specifies and activates his life requires an accounting of how one lives through all three processes at once: the biological, the societal, the inner world of the ego.

The perspective from which Erikson has chosen to observe human growth is, then, the configurational nature of

⁶⁹ Cf. *ibid.*, Chap. 1, espec. p. 34-38; Chap. 2, p. 48-72, Pt. 2.

⁷⁰ Evans, *Dialogue*, p. 114.

⁷¹ Erikson, *Childhood*, p. 37.

behavior: "observable behavior in different aspects."⁷²

He accounts for the choice:

I think my basic apprenticeship was watching children play, and observing effects appear in changing contexts, and studying how fundamental human attitudes emerge and grow.⁷³

Erikson was in pursuit of the predetermined laws of growth whereby human potentialities for life in this world and with others can be actualized. From his chosen perspective Erikson offers a description of an epigenetic process of eight stages. These represent eight dynamic ensembles, which arise with their parts, the three processes in eight consecutive periods in the hierarchical sequence that constitutes the individual life cycle. From his observational standpoint Erikson thinks it useless to ask which part comes first, the somatic, the social, or the psychic. For he remarks that:

the ensemble arises with its parts and the parts with the ensemble; even though each part when first revealed by a new method may impress its finder as being the cause and the beginning of all other parts.⁷⁴

The result of Erikson's search for the laws of human growth is this series of configurations, descriptions of the eight ages of man: infancy, early childhood, childhood, school age, adolescence, young adulthood, maturity, old age.

⁷² Evans, Dialogue, p. 86.

⁷³ Ibid.

⁷⁴ Erikson, Insight, p. 141, stated in relation to the emergence of the basic virtues.

In the epigenetic viewpoint which characterizes this description of human growth, each of these eight stages is identified because it is, in itself, a wholeness. Something fundamental to human life emerges there. Moreover, each stage intends a new wholeness to what has preceded and prepares the wholeness in what follows. Thus, for example, to the extent that the stage of identity formation, adolescence, has been deficient, the mature adult, although structurally an adult and not an adolescent, is correspondingly less an adult. In Erikson's words, the adult "forfeits to that extent the claim of an adult structural unity."⁷⁵

Erikson offers a second schedule: a list of what he names virtues, relating them in a hierarchical order to the eight stages. His choice of the term virtue is deliberate. Its old English meaning, "does admirably," states Erikson, for: "It meant inherent strength or active quality, and was used, for example, for the undiminished potency of well preserved medicines and liquors."⁷⁶ Virtue, here, means basic human strength. It denotes inherent wholeness.

The virtues are not merely attitudes, even deep ones, which one arbitrarily selects to nourish at will. Erikson judges them to be essential elements in the structural basis

⁷⁵ Ibid., p. 138, drawn analogously by Erikson from Piaget.

⁷⁶ Ibid., p. 113. On Erikson's formulation of the basic strengths, cf. ibid., Chap. 4, p. 111-157.

of the functioning unity characteristic of the strong person. At each stage one of the virtues constitutes the inherent strength of the growing personality. The disorder and dysfunctioning of psychological weakness are observed when the sequence is interrupted. Hence, the schedule of virtues points to a principle of cohesion in the human process, that assures the inherent strength, in changing forms, by which "human beings steer themselves and others through life."⁷⁷

The basic strengths develop epigenetically. The sequence is: hope, will, purpose, competence, fidelity, love, care, and wisdom. Each emerges in one stage of the life cycle, and, characteristic of epigenetic growth, the emergence of each spells a metamorphosis in those that preceded and a new existence for those not yet ascended. The ensemble of strengths at any given stage constitutes the structure of the unified personality; it is the ego strength of each stage, the quality of the psychological wholeness of the person. So, the question arises: what is the principle of activation guaranteeing the successful emergence of the strengths for human life, to be whole at each stage and whole at its completion?

⁷⁷ Ibid., p. 115.

Erikson's address to this question avoids an "energetic viewpoint,"⁷⁸ which attempts to account for development in terms of a specific form of energy engaged in activating the organism. Libido, in Freud's system, the will to power in Adler's, are examples. Erikson argues that these energies cannot be demonstrated or localized, so cannot be named as the fundamental cause of growth. He also excludes one-dimensional accounts that view development to be wholly activated and determined by physiological facts, or by the instinctual conflicts and demands of the unconscious, or by the social environment. For him, the contemporaneous involvement of three observable dynamic fields must be affirmed.

Erikson acknowledges that Freud's "economic" point of view based on his model of the preservation of instinctual energy within a closed system of transfers, displacements and transformations of energy was "a step of inestimable import,"⁷⁹ in psychoanalytic theory, and diagnostically useful in the clinical treatment of symptoms. However, in Erikson's view, Freud's structural analysis is rendered inadequate by new evidence arising from multidisciplinary observations of

78 Evans, Dialogue, p. 86.

79 Erikson, Identity, p. 50; also, Erikson, Life History, p. 103; Evans, Dialogue, p. 86.

the human person as he grows in his social setting. The facts reveal that the interliving of the ego and social processes generates a "greater energy potential"⁸⁰ for both.

Erikson postulates a "built-in developmental aim of adult maturity."⁸¹ He claims that the answer to how a person is activated to use his potential and realize wholeness in his one life is to be sought at "the nexus of social images and of organismic forces."⁸² This premise represented an important new insight for psychoanalytic theory about human growth. He then directs attention to the work of the ego itself, "the apparent measure of all things, somatic and social, [...] from its formless beginning to the formulated consciousness of its self."⁸³ This brought Erikson to recognize and describe the Eight Ages of Man.

The experience of human growth that Erikson describes here is characterized by "wholeness," which he distinguishes from "totality."⁸⁴ Wholeness is the quality that pervades

80 Erikson, Identity, p. 50.

81 Erikson, Life History, p. 259. He also postulates "an intrinsic socio-evolutionary goal of one specieshood for mankind." The parameters of this study do not permit detailed examination here beyond the fact of the social principle operative in individual growth. Cf. below.

82 Erikson, Identity, p. 50.

83 Erikson, Childhood, p. 186.

84 This distinction is developed in Erikson, Identity, p. 74-90.

when the dynamic boundaries of experience are "open and fluid, ready for more inclusive entirety."⁸⁵ They are ready to circumscribe whatever belongs together effecting "a sound, organic, progressive mutuality between diversified parts."⁸⁶ An individual life or experience may be temporarily or permanently a totality. This happens when functions and parts are arbitrarily contained by a fixed boundary. Hence, the experience becomes an absolutely inclusive and absolutely exclusive entirety. Totality exists at the cost of wholeness and so of growth.

In summary, Erikson's theory about human growth concerns the inner laws governing the developmental aim in each human life. It claims that every human being, ontogenetically fulfills or fails to fulfill the potentialities for human life that are at the core of his being, by way of an epigenetic process of growth. Eight dynamic configurations that come about, sequentially, through the life span are identified. These are the essential stages in the development of a healthy personality. Each carries its own quality of ego strength. Each promises, to the extent it is guaranteed emergence, the psychological goal of human life: full actualization of potentialities belonging to each stage

85 Ibid., p. 80.

86 Ibid.

in the life cycle, and wholeness at its finish. The dynamic linking of the organism and its social milieu accounts for the activation of the entire process. Hence, this study will now turn to the social principle, fundamental to the epigenetic development by Erikson.

C. Social Principle

Environment is an important category in psycho-analytical theory of human growth. As a general concept, environment designates what is usually understood by society, or social organization, or even civilization. It embraces the complex of human interrelatedness in and by which several generations of human beings, sharing the one physical universe, grow from childhood into adulthood into old age. In the process, each becomes an element of the history and the human organization there upon arrival, and each continues to reshape that order, making history for the generations yet to be born. The term, society, embraces, then, the orderings of people contemporary in an historical era. These orderings are as varied as familial, tribal, ethnic or national groupings, rural or urban ones, groups of professions or laborers. Each of these social orders is constituted and guided, however consciously, by goals, models, human pursuits and ways of doing things that are common to all who belong or would belong within it. The life of each is characterized by a greater

or lesser wholeness or totality.— Social orders are themselves interrelated by cooperative and competitive engagement in the development, possession, and enjoyment of the innumerable objects of human desire. One might say, then, that environment, as human environment, refers to the people and their organization of human life and human pursuits in time and space, in whatever form these may be found within a given circumference of human life in a given historical period.

In Freud's model of human life, the human environment is one of the counterplayers of the ego. The superego or ego ideal is assigned the task of internalizing the environmental influences experienced by the growing individual. The ego ideal represents, then, the social aspect of the work of the ego in the process of human growth. In Freud's view, the constitutive elements of the superego are the internalized positive ideals and the internalized prohibitions originating from the social order of the child. Significantly, these internalizations occur by way of the rudimentary capacities of early childhood.

From Freud's structural analysis of the workings of the human mind, the environment became identified, in the psychoanalytic framework, with the restrictive elements forced upon the developing ego by parents and educators.⁸⁷

⁸⁷ Cf. Erikson, Identity, p. 45-47, 221-231; Erikson, Life History, Chap. 3.

These are judged to be the source of crippling or binding, sadistic-masochistic burdens imposed by the superego upon the ego for the rest of life.

This emphasis in the early Freudian portrayal of human life can be accounted for and relativized. The historical period in which Freud applied his new method of introspection and self-knowledge to the cure of neuroses was the Victorian age. It was clear to him that the disorders he treated were related to the restrictive, repressive and hypocritical mores of that era.

Freud also linked the concept of environment with the term, masses, found in sociological analyses of the French Revolution. Hence, as counterplayer of the ego, environment is conceived as a shapeless multitude of human beings. In its midst egos are burdened by blind pressures, or wholly dissipated within it, and individuals are crushed or lost in the crowd.

In psychoanalytic theory, these formulations led to conceptualizations of the environment as those all-pervasive, but vague supports, unidentifiable pressures and imperative conventions with which the ego had to structure its own compromises. It is the world impeding ego development. It is the inevitability of others who had to be put up with by whatever adaptive measures could be found.

Within these conceptual parameters the psychological task was identified. It is to recognize and adapt to reality, as it is. In psychoanalytic language, this is the reality principle: the "tendency to take into account in an adaptive way [...] whatever we consider the real features of an object or situation."⁸⁸ Reality is "the world of things really existing in the outer world."⁸⁹ The criteria for judgment are those of physical science. Hence, what is verifiable by methods collectively agreed upon as scientific are considered to be real. So, in this view, realities are objective and shared; reality is the outer world stripped of all fantasy and illusion by rational and detached viewing; human action is "action vis à vis reality," and "acting in the outer world";⁹⁰ the psychological imperative is "face up to reality." Reality viewed in this way is categorized by Erikson as factuality.

Erikson observes that the traditional psychoanalytic understanding of the environment seems to imply that a

⁸⁸ Erikson, Insight, p. 163, quoting H. Hartmann, in "On Rational and Irrational Actions," in Psychoanalysis and the Social Sciences, Vol. I, New York, International Universities Press, 1947.

⁸⁹ Ibid., quoting H. Loewold, in "Ego and Reality," International Journal of Psychoanalysis, Vol. 32, 1951, p. 10-18.

⁹⁰ Ibid., quoting Hartmann, "On Rational and Irrational Actions," n. 164; and H. Hartmann, in "Notes of the Reality Principle," in Psychoanalytic Study of the Child, Vol. XI, New York, International Universities Press, 1956.

specifically human environment is something that one could very well do without or oppose.⁹¹ His study of man led him, however, to reject this evaluation. Erikson judges the social order as contributor to the ego development of both the growing and the grown individual. In his model of human growth, the social order is a "constructive necessity"⁹² in the origins and the vital development of the work of the ego. He clarifies what it contributes to the individual's task of actualizing life that has been given him. Erikson requires of psychoanalytic theory, and in fact offers, a systematic analysis of the "mutual complementation"⁹³ of the environment and the nature of ego synthesis. This will be outlined now.

Fundamental to Erikson's analysis of man's relationship with his environment is the clarification he brings to the concept of reality. He distinguishes between reality as factuality and reality as actuality.⁹⁴ Reality, he claims, cannot be wholly known by way of the outer world of facts verified by scientific methods. That is, reality is not only

91 Erikson, Identity, p. 222.

92 Ibid., p. 47.

93 Ibid., p. 53, 47, 223; also, Erikson, Life History, p. 100.

94 The development to follow is drawn from Erikson, Insight, p. 161-215; also, Erikson, Life History, p. 103-104.

factuality. It is also the world verified through the intuitive and active participation that represents the greater portion of human living. Erikson states: "The world becomes real to you not only because you recognize it as existing but also because you 'realize' it in action."⁹⁵

This aspect of reality, arrived at through immediate immersion and interaction in the outer world, by being present and actual and immediate to the world, Erikson calls actuality.⁹⁶ It is the work of the ego to engage not only in defenses and compromises with reality, but in "selective involvement in actualities." So, Erikson refers to ego actuality.⁹⁷

Actuality is shared with other participants. It is known in the complex processes by which at his own level of development, with his own specific capacities, each individual meets others with theirs, and is himself encountered by them. Significantly, it is in the sharing of actualities that mutual activation occurs.

⁹⁵ Evans, Dialogue, p. 91-92.

⁹⁶ The term actuality implies activation, a meaning that has been better preserved by the verbal forms, to activate, to actuate. Cf. Erikson, Insight, p. 164. Erikson grounds this distinction in the German Wirklichkeit, which he states is "often implied in Freud's use of the word Realität" (ibid., p. 164); also, Erikson, Life History, p. 103.

⁹⁷ Erikson, Insight, p. 166.

The experience of mutual activation by way of shared actuality is readily attested to in human life. For example, the newborn's participation in the realities of the family sets it in motion. The newborn actuates the mother to care for his needs, even as that caring inspires the infant to make them known, and each set into motion the actuation of all the others in the related social processes. Or, the smile of the infant inspires the mother to return that smile, and in the exchange both are inspired by a new sense of trust in the world. One can say that even as the infant grows within the family, each member of the family is being changed by the child. This is mutual activation. Individual activation, hence, human growth depends on it.

Human ego strength, while employing all means of testing reality, depends [...] upon a network of mutual influences within which the person actuates others even as he is actuated, and within which the person is "inspired with active properties," even as he so inspires others.⁹⁸

Erikson's view is that a sense of reality combines factuality and actuality. Humans do not live by what is verifiable as fact in the narrow sense of reality testing. They also share actualities and that, too, is reality. "Even

⁹⁸ Ibid., p. 165.

the most gifted minds," Erikson observes, "must experience verifiable fact by way of mutual actualization."⁹⁹

The newborn may not be able to test and grasp factuality, which our general concept of reality usually implies, but the newborn is competent in his actuality. Throughout an individual's life-span this competency develops to include an ever-increasing number of persons, and an ever-expanding field of interaction, of mutual activation, and of participation in the world. This competency ends only when the individual's powers for participation, interaction, and activation cease in sickness and old age. At the same time, an individual grasps this aspect of reality only by participating in it with other participants. Through shared participation each person is activated. Shakespeare captured something of what mutual activation feels like in this passage which Erikson cites: Man

feels not what he owns, but by reflection
As when his virtues shining upon others
Heat them, and they retort that heat again
to the first given.¹⁰⁰

⁹⁹ Erikson, Life History, p. 104. Erikson observes that Freud's use of "reality" combines these: "The German word Wirklichkeit, often implied in Freud's use of the word Realität, does combine Wirkung, that is activity and efficacy, with reality." Freud's original term for what is translated as "immediacy" was "Actualitaet" (ibid., p. 164).

¹⁰⁰ Erikson, Insight, p. 166, from Troilus and Cressida.

Actuality implies, then, shared participation in reality which becomes meaningful by providing or denying activation.

Erikson admits that what he identifies as actuality may indeed be already implicit in what is called reality testing. However, he insists on surfacing this way of knowing reality because it is essential to understand how ego strength develops. It is not enough to identify, objectively, facts and forces that underlie human existence and human growth. Human growth is not a function of factuality. For the development of individual ego strength depends upon the activation that occurs in sharing actualities. Psychoanalytic theory, Erikson holds, must deal with the question of the dynamic at work when persons activate others, and are activated by them. The answers here will raise further questions about human development. In what kind of actualizations does a human person become whole, and what kind of world does this wholeness require?¹⁰¹

Activation is effected, Erikson claims, in what he calls mutuality.¹⁰² By mutuality, he means the mutual

¹⁰¹ These are questions beyond the limits of this study. Erikson raises them in the course of his study of youth, women, race, identity, American identity, et al. Cf. Erikson, Identity, Chap. 6-8; Erikson, Life History, Pt. 3.

¹⁰² Erikson, Identity, p. 219. On the following, cf. Erikson, Life History, p. 209; Erikson, Insight, p. 231-243; Erikson, Childhood, p. 68 ff.; Evans, Dialogue, p. 101-103.

communication of affirmation which occurs in countless forms and at all levels of consciousness. This dynamic is operative when

My whole being perceives in them [others] a hospitality for the way in which my inner world is ordered and includes them, which makes me, in turn, hospitable to the way they order the world and include me.¹⁰³

Mutual affirmation is the dynamic effecting mutual activation. Mutuality, then, makes partners of participants in actuality. Dependent on one another for growth, the one who acts, activates and strengthens the others, even as he is strengthened. Mutuality renders participants in actuality, significant participants.

By way of example, the child in his earliest actuality is sustained by the maternal environment. The capacity to take nourishment, then to reach out and to grasp, and succeeding early achievements, are each met by the maternal response. Using the instance of smiling, Erikson observes:

While the baby initially smiles at a mere configuration resembling the human face, the adult cannot help smiling back, filled with expectations of a "recognition" which he needs to secure from the new being as surely as it needs him.¹⁰⁴

This is mutuality in action between significant partners in actuality.

¹⁰³ Erikson, Identity, p. 219.

¹⁰⁴ Erikson, Insight, p. 231.

The denial of mutuality, the refusal to take one's place in another's way of sharing in the world, or refusing the other his place in one's own, is called, here, reciprocal negation.¹⁰⁵ It is a fact of life, and it would seem, a necessity of life, that both mutuality and negation are experienced in human interactions. A proper ratio of mutuality-negation must be established, however, for excessive failure in mutuality undercuts ego vitality and development.

Mutuality is essential, then, for individual growth. In the early encounters the child needs to develop an invigorating sense of reality and a feeling of self-esteem. For these he is dependent upon the sensual and encouraging ministrations of the maternal person. But, growth requires affirmation that it is good to be alive where he finds himself. For example, as the child discovers that he is able to walk, it seems that the activation to perfect this capacity derives not only from the sense of libidinal pleasure or the need for mastery. It depends on the social recognition of being "one who can walk,"¹⁰⁶ whatever that may mean in the given milieu. In adolescence, infantile self-esteem has become more mature and ready to ground a firm sense of identity. The individual then needs

¹⁰⁵ Erikson, Identity, p. 219.

¹⁰⁶ Ibid., p. 49.

the message from others in his milieu that his unique way of organizing, sharing and experiencing reality is accepted. The recognition that his is a successful variant of their own is the dynamic that activates. This is mutuality. It can be described as:

a process of simultaneous reflection and observation, taking place on all levels of mental functioning, by which the individual judges himself in the light of what he perceives to be the way in which others judge him in comparison to themselves and to a typology significant to them; while he judges their way of judging him in the light of how he perceives himself in comparison to them and to types that have become relevant to him.¹⁰⁷

A person moves forward in his development because maturing capacities evoke hospitable responses. Where there is no place for developing potentialities, energies are blocked or short-circuited, and growth impeded. Where mutuality breaks down the dynamic of mutual control takes over. The individual replaces self-control and mutuality of functioning with control of others or exclusion of them. Thus, the parent may seek alternate modes of control in work or social life, the child in self-absorbed body control, the adolescent in identification with an alien ideology. Lack of mutuality means being against the self or against others. Whether it be the ability to grasp an object, to walk, to learn the technology of one's environment, to take

¹⁰⁷ Ibid., p. 23.

an active place in one's society, it is only where these potentialities are welcomed and given a chance to be realized that love of life wins out.¹⁰⁸

Mutuality changes. It begins in the mother-newborn interaction and extends as the circle of participants increases. The infant arrives organized for life outside the womb. He is ready to develop through a predetermined sequence of locomotor, sensory, and social capacities. This readiness is "a series of potentialities for changing patterns of mutual regulation."¹⁰⁹ Mutuality occurs with the persons and institutions that receive him, care for him, and respond to him. It ends only when "a man's power of mutual affirmation wanes,"¹¹⁰ thus Erikson can state:

Personality can be said to develop according to steps predetermined in the human organism's readiness to be driven toward, to be aware of, and to interact with a widening radius of significant individuals and institutions.¹¹¹

Two further observations about mutuality at work follow here. The first concerns the relationship between inner development and the outer social structures that qualify it. The second identifies the generational principle.

108 Evans, Dialogue, p. 69.

109 Erikson, Childhood, p. 69.

110 Erikson, Identity, p. 23.

111 Ibid., p. 93.

First, the readiness and fundamental need of the newborn to develop by epigenetic steps, to move toward and to interact with an increasing variation of persons, lay claim to a series of "average expectable environments."¹¹²

Erikson states:

his [the human infant] environment must provide the outer wholeness and continuity which, like a second womb, permits the child to develop his separate capacities in distinct steps.¹¹³

This is a bio-social statement, that the ever-expanding capacities of the developing child must be met and supported by expanding fields for human interaction. It is not a question here of social factors that may, more or less, be taken into account in human growth. It is a recognition that social processes, along with the individual biological givens, are essential to ego vitality. For no one instance of mutuality can be complete in itself. Thus, the infant-mother, the child-school, the adolescent-community, the young adult-chosen persons--each of these relationships depends for its survival and development upon complex social processes which structure and support them. The human

¹¹² Erikson, Identity, p. 222, the term is taken by Erikson from H. Hartmann, Ego Psychology and the Problem of Adaptation, New York, International Universities Press, 1958. Cf. espec. Erikson, Identity, p. 221-224, Erikson, Insight, p. 111-157.

¹¹³ Erikson, Insight, p. 114.

environment as a whole must permit and safeguard human growth. Hence, expectable environments constitute a societal issue.

It might seem easy, for example, to interpret child development and child care as a predetermined sequence of instinctual drives and complementary responses between the mother and the child. But, Erikson observes, human drives are not in themselves complete or self-preserving interactions with nature. Rather:

Man's "inborn instincts" are drive fragments to be assembled, given meaning, and organized [...] by methods [...] which vary from culture to culture and are determined by tradition.¹¹⁴

The maternal instincts, for example, are themselves guided by the cultural patterns and traditions of the generations of mothers and by the social processes that have organized them. These are transmitted to the child by innumerable modes of maternal communication in which he learns what his world really considers important. Hence, an intrinsic relationship exists between one's personal growth and the social system in which one lives.

This is not meant to imply that child development is a matter of domestication, analogous to animal training. Nor is it an autocratic molding of human instincts by a system of cultural traditions and societal processes. Rather, the environment which the child meets, which is conveyed to him

¹¹⁴ Erikson, Childhood, p. 95.

and makes demands on him, represents the effort of the grown generations to create the conditions and provide a series of expectable environments necessary to vital ego actuality.

Erikson maintains:

from a psychosocial point of view [...], basic social and cultural processes can only be viewed as the joint endeavour of adult egos to develop and maintain, through joint organization, a maximum of conflict-free energy in a mutually supportive psychosocial equilibrium.¹¹⁵

Human growth is made possible and promise of human strength given by way of the achievements of the societal processes:

This task of the adult generation to provide expectable environments must be persistent, even perpetual. For mutuality can break down within families, within societal groupings and nations, and within the entire world community. Moreover, environments are shaped within the world of nature, of technology, and of history in constant and radical change. Man is the creature who can grow in a variety of environments. He also has the capacity to change these and himself, even radically, and does so. Genetic therapy, eugenics, test-tube babies, technological prolongation of life, and inducement of altered states of consciousness, behavior modification, massive urbanization, mass annihilation of peoples, nuclear armament, these represent but a few of the changes effected by man and in man today. By these he can render himself sick, can deplete

¹¹⁵ Erikson, Identity, p. 223.

vitality in himself, and deny sources of strength to those yet to be born. In fact, man can destroy himself as a species. But he can also diagnose and change. Hence, traditional life patterns need to be re-evaluated, and social processes monitored, or adjusted, to effect an essential condition for full human growth: the "optimum relation of inborn potentialities to the structure of the environment."¹¹⁶ This relation is the right of every individual who is caused to be born. But no individual can do it by himself for himself, nor for others by himself. Erikson recognizes the paradox:

a man's collective power to create his own environment although each individual is born with a naked vulnerability extending into a prolonged infantile dependence.¹¹⁷

However, early vulnerability is relative. It is the vulnerability of the growing newborn or child or adolescent that wields power over the grown to provide the average expectable environments.

Human growth depends upon the mutuality operative between the growing and the grown. This is what Erikson calls the generational principle, which "would tend to perpetuate a series of vital virtues from hope in infancy to

¹¹⁶ Ibid., p. 233.

¹¹⁷ Erikson, Insight, p. 113.

wisdom in old age."¹¹⁸ It has been observed that Erikson identifies basic and indispensable strengths to be achieved by each individual of each generation as he develops his own human potential. These qualify specific stages in the life cycle, but they, like the life cycle itself, are not automatically come by. They are increments of growth, hence achieved in mutuality. That is, they are psychosocial strengths. Human strength depends upon multiple forms of mutuality occurring within the societal processes by which average expectable environments are recreated for each generation by every other generation. This is a total process; a sequence of generations each motivating the other and being motivated. The adult man must be needed if he is to be strong and give strength to his community, and himself needs the challenge from the young who need to be cared for and provided with the sources of their vital strength. Here is mutual activation, which Erikson calls "cog-wheeling with the stages of others which move him along as he moves from them."¹¹⁹ The strength of any individual at any stage of life depends upon this cogwheeling. This is the generational principle at work.

¹¹⁸ Erikson, Identity, p. 233.

¹¹⁹ Erikson, Insight, p. 114.



Erikson points out that in the interplay between personal structure and social structures, basic elements of social organization, institutions, have been evolved. These are found within the framework of the family, education, politics, economics, religion. They are value centers, sources of the vital strengths for the growing. If the grown are ready to shape them to serve wholeness of life within the ongoing demands of change, the institutions are enabled to bestow strength on the growing. Only then can the young verify and revitalize them by their own investment. In mutuality fundamental human strength is possible from generation to generation. Without it the vitality of the grown and the growing is at stake. Human growth, human strength, is a psychosocial, generational reality. Mutuality is the key.

To summarize, in Erikson's theory of human growth the environment is not merely the objective reality outside, it is also pervasive actuality. It is social, constituted by other participants sharing the world of actuality. The human environment is the outer world of the ego made up of the egos of others. And ego activation and ego strength are relative to the experience of mutuality and negation qualifying one's sharing of actuality. This view of the human environment represents a significant corrective of the concept of an outer world over against which the individual has to learn to survive.

Here human growth is seen to be psychosocial. It takes place in the interliving of the ego processes and the social processes. Citing Erikson:

One can only conclude that the functioning ego, while guarding individuality, is far from isolated, for a kind of communality links egos in a mutual activation. Something in the ego process, then, and something in the social process is--well, identical.¹²⁰

And, just as the concept of reality seems to imply "an optimum correspondence between mind and the structure of the environment," so Erikson claims that "a tendency toward optimum mutual activation exists in the ego and in the society."¹²¹ However, mutuality is the key--the critical dynamic--by which "my whole being perceives [...] a hospitality [...] which makes me [...] hospitable." Mutuality is, then, "a mutual affirmation."¹²² Mutuality is the dynamic core that activates and qualifies the development of human potentialities. Here is the nexus of organismic forces and social images in which human strength is possible. Hence, Erikson holds, mutuality is the secret of love.¹²³

Mere causality does not account for human individuation. Individual human growth is an epigenetic, psychosocial process

¹²⁰ Erikson, Identity, p. 224.

¹²¹ Erikson, Insight, p. 175.

¹²² Erikson, Identity, p. 219.

¹²³ Erikson formulates his "Golden Rule" upon this fundamental dynamic, cf. Erikson, Insight, Chap. 6.

that spans the life cycle. Development of the core of individuality, given with each child that is born, is the work of the individual ego. Its task is to organize experience in order to live with a sense of aliveness, of sameness and continuity which Erikson names sense of identity. Having recognized a basic structure in the functional unity of the growing personality and the genetic continuity in the sense of identity through the life cycle, Erikson identifies the criteria of growth. They are the emergence in a series of psychosocial conflicts, of the vital ego strengths. Human growth occurs through a series of changes which he calls psychosocial developmental crises.¹²⁴ This law of change in the process of personal growth will be examined now. It will be seen that human growth is a way of change through crises.

D. Principle of Change

During the prenatal period of human life, inner laws of development are operative in the formation of one organ after another. Following birth these laws continue to direct growth that is marked by differentiation and maturation of inborn capacities and accompanied by shifts and increases of

¹²⁴ Erikson does not hold that all development is by way of crises, but psychosocial development proceeds by "critical steps." Cf. Erikson, Childhood, p. 270.

instinctual energy. The changes represent new potentialities for individual functioning.

Growth is psychosocial, occurring in relation to continual expansions of the horizon of human life. These present new possibilities and demands for sharing actuality with others. The process of personal individuation occurs through changes in personal readiness for participation in the social processes within a widening spectrum of reality.

Erikson identifies eight significant periods in human growth and personal individuation. The first five are established in Freud's Theory of Infantile Sexuality: infancy, early childhood, childhood, school age, adolescence, and three complete the life cycle: young adulthood, adulthood, maturity. Each is a time of "heightened potentials" evoked by new perspective gained from the maturational elements, and of "increased vulnerability"¹²⁵ arising from the need to manage new and significant encounters. In each period the individual experiences a sense of discontinuity in the relationship he has learned between his inner and outer worlds. This is a feeling of estrangement from the known self; from assured ways of experiencing oneself and others.

Erikson judges each of these experiences decisive for growth or regression, integration or retardation, wholeness or totality. The task is to attain a renewed sense of

125 Erikson, Identity, p. 96.

continuity and sameness in the midst of, and including the new maturation and the new social realities. The temptation is to remain with the tried and secure; to opt for the well-defined structures of a totality rather than the fluidity and openness of new wholeness. Erikson speaks, then, of nuclear conflicts, developmental crises, by which he means critical turning points that are moments of decision: "crucial moments when development must move one way or another, marshalling sources of growth, recovery and further differentiation."¹²⁶

Psychosocial development proceeds by way of change. A brief, highly simplified account of the first nuclear conflict will help to identify the basic components and dynamics of developmental change: "new elements of maturation, new social demands, discontinuity and estrangement, and the ego's task in significant encounters."¹²⁷

Immediately after birth the infant meets and is totally dependent upon the maternal person and/or the environment for survival and vitality. At this stage the infant lives and experiences the world, through his mouth, and increasingly, by way of the receptive sensory capacities of his entire body. Food and other bodily comforts are brought directly to these.

¹²⁶ Ibid., p. 16; also, Erikson, Childhood, p. 270-271.

¹²⁷ Cf. Erikson, Childhood, p. 72 ff., p. 247 ff.; Erikson, Identity, p. 96 ff.

The quality of experience of himself and his world is, at this time, a function of mutual regulation between the receiving infant and the giving environment. For the infant, this is the total situation. In it he learns to trust his world and himself, to feel alive and well. That is, he manages a relationship between his inner and outer world with a sense that it is good to be himself, and to be where he is. In psychoanalytic language, this is the oral stage, its mode of approach to other organisms and the world of things, incorporation.

However, a second incorporative mode of approach evolves. This one is more active and direct. Teeth grow, and bite, and hold on. Eyes and ears focus to isolate objects and sounds. About the same time significant changes occur in the infant's social reality: for example, the mother begins to withdraw due to the weaning process and renewed social involvements. These events represent the "earliest catastrophe in the individual's relation to himself and to the world."¹²⁸ Breaking the first postnatal physiological unity with the mother marks the unavoidable entrance of "evil"¹²⁹ into experience, and evokes what Erikson means by a developmental crisis. The consistency, continuity, and sameness of

¹²⁸ Erikson, Childhood, p. 79. Exclusive of the birth trauma unexamined here.

¹²⁹ Ibid.

experience, the sense of feeling alive and at home in one's world are threatened. The earliest, most rudimentary sense of identity, dependent upon the developed correlation of one's bodily needs and one's outer world, is challenged. The infant ego has to deal with her functional capacities and the changing quality of social encounters. It must free the mother "without anxiety or rage."¹³⁰ The infant's experience is, so to speak, a deep fundamental tension between trust and mistrust. Healthy resolution of the tension transforms it into an active vitalizing dynamic, and effects the basic ego strength that Erikson calls basic trust. This means that the ego, by managing the conflict of this particular social encounter, established an active ratio of trust-mistrust. Success here guarantees the ego capacity to meet the ensuing challenges to correlations worked out between one's inner and outer worlds. In each testing fundamental ego strength undergoes change. The issue is that vitality which each man desires as he lives through his life cycle. Hope is the basic human strength that develops in the first crisis. Erikson describes it as follows: "the enduring predisposition to believe in the attainability of primal wishes in spite of the anarchic urges and rages of dependency."¹³¹

¹³⁰ Ibid., p. 247.

¹³¹ Erikson, Identity, p. 106.

The dynamic structure of the first developmental crises is paradigmatic of the seven that follow. The sequence is a series of significant encounters: the new functional capacities grounded in the somatic processes create new perspectives in the individual for new encounters within the social milieu; the latter, in turn, lays its own claims upon him. Each encounter is a turning point in personal growth. In it the individual sorts out the critical alternatives for taking hold of his humanity within the environment. Each stage provides the basis for new, distinct components of ego identity, in a new configuration of a distinct personality. Each is a moment of decision that guarantees, or hinders a basic human strength needed for vital human life.

Psychoanalytic theory related the critical stages of development with the unconscious instinctual wishes, the corresponding unconscious inhibitions and the defense mechanisms that evolve during childhood. Because of their deep conflictual nature and the effects of their resolution on adult social functions the crises were isolated as "typical danger situations."¹³² Erikson states:

¹³² Ibid., p. 161. The term is cited by Erikson from H. Hartmann, Ego Psychology and the Problems of Adaptation, New York, International Universities Press, 1958. On this, cf. Erikson, Childhood, Chap. 2; Erikson, Identity, p. 161 ff.

Psychoanalysis has concerned itself more with the encroachment of psychosexual crises on psychosocial (and other) functions than with the specific crisis created by the maturation of each function.¹³³

Freud's Theory of Infantile Sexuality maintains a series of five critical conflicts evolving around instinctual reactions in developing body zones. In the first three stages, the oral, the anal, and the phallic, the regions of instinctual conflict are, respectively, the mouth, the eliminative functions, and the sex organs. These stages constitute the first five years of life and are identified as pregenital. There follows a latency period, during which the instinctual conflicts are more or less stable and repressed. Then full maturation of genital powers in adolescence reactivates the early conflicts. To the extent that the adolescent crisis is successfully managed, the individual achieves the final stage of sexual maturity marked by genitality: the capacity to consummate the sexual act.

In Freud's theory of personal development these early years are decisive. Each crisis is significant for mature genitality. During them the modes of approach to the parts of the organism, to other organisms and the world of things are established. Mechanisms of sublimation, repression and displacement of instinctual energy are learned and provide the basis for personal character traits. The psychosexual

¹³³ Erikson, Identity, p. 161.

resolution achieved in these stages becomes diffused in adult genitality, or sublimated in other forms of adult experience. Adult life is, in this view, the elaboration of a basic structure laid in the solutions of psychosexual conflict in infancy and childhood. Here, pregenitality exists for genitality, and "What man, at a given stage, had wanted unconsciously became that stage and the sum of such stages, man."¹³⁴

Erikson brings his own observations to Freud's analysis of the developmental crisis. First, psychosocial elements are intrinsically related to the psychosexual. He accepts the basic biological schedule formulated by Freud, but considers it a series of "potentialities for changing patterns of mutual regulation."¹³⁵ For example, the oral libido identified by Freud does inform the early experiences out of which basic trust arises. The integration of oral libido into the developing personality will not happen, however, where a state of trust does not exist. And, the capacity to trust itself depends on the quality of mutuality experienced by the growing person within the social processes. Thus, Erikson locates the developmental crises within the total situation in which the ego must do its work: those decisive encounters occurring when the maturing functions and the opportunities and claims

¹³⁴ Erikson, Insight, p. 138.

¹³⁵ Erikson, Childhood, p. 69.

of the social milieu meet. In his words:

What we must try to chart [...] is the approximate sequence of stages when according to clinical and common knowledge the nervous excitability as well as the coordination of the "erogenous" organs and the selective reactivity of significant people in the environment are apt to produce decisive encounters.¹³⁶

Here, mutuality, not instinctual drives, is the critical dynamic in personal activation and individuation. The significant encounters with the changing milieu evoke the developmental crisis. Functional unity, which is the strength of each stage, is a function of the interliving of the psychosocial and psychosexual schedules. Human strength is superordinated to both.¹³⁷

Second, pregenitality does not exist only for genitality. The modes of approach achieved in early instinctual conflicts qualify all forms of human intercourse. This is Erikson's conclusion from observing the dynamics of each crisis within the total life situation. He holds that:

¹³⁶ Ibid., p. 71.

¹³⁷ Erikson, Insight, p. 141. Erikson intends the chart as an aid in comparing Freud's psychosexual schedule with other schedules, e.g., cognitive, physical. At the same time he observes that one chart delimits one schedule only. So it should not be presumed that the psychosocial schedule implies obscure generalities about other aspects of development. Cf. Erikson, Childhood, p. 270 ff.

the very essence of pregenitality seems to be the absorption of libidinal interests in the early encounter of the maturing organism with a particular style of child care and in the transformation of its inborn forms of approach [...] into the social modalities of the culture.¹³⁸

Thirdly, psychosocial identity, not genitality, is the focus in Erikson's theory. But, unlike Freud's genitality, identity is not utopia. Identity has its critical period of ascendance in adolescence. Here the ego must manage the encounter as genital and physical maturation, and expanding mental capacities meet the demands of the adult social milieu. A firm sense of identity becomes the individual's need and the ego's task in the adolescent crisis. Identity, itself, will be transcended, however, in the series of crises that encompasses the remainder of the individual life span.

Erikson judges human growth a life project. Adult behavior and personality are not merely recurrences in adult forms of earlier resolutions of instinctual conflicts. Personality is a total, changing process where the identity strength dominating one stage has its own form of presence throughout the life cycle. That is not to say it merely accompanies, or is impervious to, the inner conflicts in new encounters. Erikson states: "The personality is engaged with the hazards of existence continuously."¹³⁹ Hope acquired

138 Erikson, Childhood, p. 97.

139 Ibid., p. 274.

in infancy will undergo change at each stage, into old age. There, Erikson names trust, faith and mistrust, realism. He leaves open the question of what faith and realism look like in that final stage where the dominant ego need is integrity, and to be strong is to be wise.

Although the shape of identity in adolescence is pivotal in what precedes and follows, a sense of identity pervades the life cycle. In each crisis the individual manages a unique identity configuration qualified by a specific sense of aliveness and continuity. Each stage is its own. Each is a unique whole, and in its own time, ultimately significant; the child is child, the adolescent is adolescent, the mature individual is mature. Psychosocial growth is an experience of change, however, in which the strength of the present will be transcended in the strength of the future. And fixation in any one stage represents a failure in growth. Erikson remarks:

the strength acquired at any given stage is tested by the necessity to transcend it in such a way that the individual can take chances in the next stage with what was vulnerably precious in the previous one.¹⁴⁰

At the epigenetically determined time, each ego quality enters an experience of "critical opposition,"¹⁴¹

¹⁴⁰ Ibid., p. 263.

¹⁴¹ Ibid., p. 271. On this also, Erikson, *Identity*, p. 81, 161 ff.; Erikson, *Insight*, p. 139 ff. The dark, negative aspects of identity--the sum of submerged identifica-

for example, trust versus mistrust, identity versus identity confusion, integrity-despair. Erikson's use of double terms points to the dynamic tension in which the ego is involved. It identifies the positive potentials that are criteria for change, hence, growth. These terms also help ground a realistic understanding of human development as they identify the negative potential in human life. Erikson insists:

for each psychosocial step I posit a crisis and a specific conflict denoting, [...] a lifelong anxiety (basic mistrust, shame, guilt, self-doubt, confusion, isolation, stagnation, disgust, despair) and this not merely because I must concede its existence but because there is no human strength without it.¹⁴²

The identity increment of each stage is a function of tension between opposing dynamic alternatives. In the first nuclear conflict the individual is polarized in a positive sense of trust and a negative sense of mistrust, in the second in autonomy and dependence, and so forth. The dominance of trust, then autonomy, in active tension between the opposites, represents the transcendence of earlier identity configurations and indicates growth and vitality. When the negative potential, here, mistrust or dependence pervades, the person has opted for totality that ~~retards or regresses~~. The negative potential,

tions, unresolved anxiety, elements unaccepted in the emerging identity--are suggested here in the forms of negative poles: mistrust, despair, et al.

¹⁴² Erikson, Life History, p. 259. Erikson rightly rejects a wholly optimistic view of growth; the reality of "evil" needs to be affirmed.

however, is not merely the dynamic counterpart of the positive. It is essential to psychosocial development.

Erikson remarks: "A person devoid of the capacity to mistrust would be as unable to live as one without trust."

It is the resolution of the conflict in favor of the positive that constitutes "a predisposition toward the sources of vitality."¹⁴³ Erikson's schedule of psychosocial development is a description of the dynamics of these conflictual decisive encounters in which human growth, personal individuation and character occur and are qualified.


In summary: Psychosocial growth is a way of change. The criteria for development are a series of crises evoked by a series of significant encounters. These are critical turning points when the ego must manage, in its individual way, a fundamental human strength. With each new strength the growing person experiences himself as alive and well in a new way. This means that to live one's life cycle is to be in a way of human wholeness, a way characterized by mutuality and change.

It remains now to trace the ego's work from the time of one's early physiological unity with the mother, into old age. This will take the form of a brief elaboration of the

¹⁴³ Erikson, Identity, p. 325, n. 8.

eight configurations of personal life which Erikson views, the Eight Ages of Man. The intent is to identify the thrust towards wholeness and the dynamics of mutuality and crisis in each decisive period of human growth.¹⁴⁴

¹⁴⁴ Erikson, Childhood, Chap. 7. An indepth psycho-analytic analysis is unnecessary to the needs of this study. Patterns of pathology, of defenses, sublimations, regressions, etc., are not included.



CHAPTER VI

THE EIGHT STAGES OF MAN: WAY OF WHOLENESS, WAY OF MUTUALITY, WAY OF CHANGE

Three basic dynamics underlie the eight significant personal configurations of human growth from three inter-living human processes. The somatic, social and self-realization processes converge through a persistent thrust towards increasing wholeness; recurring discontinuity and novelty in change; and an actualizing mutuality.

Exploring these concomitants, three stances will be maintained. First, the biological or somatic basis for human growth will be postulated. These are the steps by which each individual comes to exist in space and time. These include functions, mechanisms and capacities, differentiated and developed into possibilities for personal wholeness. Second, the average expectable environment will be investigated. Here the changing social radius will be traced as it extends and encompasses new demands upon the growing individual. The form of mutuality significant for new wholeness will then be identified. Third, the crisis of wholeness will be discerned. The turning point, critical for human growth, is reached from the combination of the developmental exponents and the contemporary necessity of managing new encounters. The focus, here, is on the particular form of discontinuity and conflict. This will recount

the ego's task to deal with change in risks that transcend acquired integration, to achieve new human wholeness in functional unity. Finally, to situate the process of self-realization in its total context of mutuality, the relationship of each stage to the societal institutions will be observed.

First Age of Man¹

The first stage in psychosocial human growth occurs during the first year of life and corresponds to Freud's conception of the oral stage. During this period the infant lives through its mouth and tactile senses. It takes in whatever feels good by sucking, swallowing and receiving the body comforts offered the newborn. Psychoanalytically stated: the libido directs itself into these needs. This approach is called incorporation. In this way the infant organism learns the basic mode of social organization: to get, in the sense of to receive and to accept. Erikson concurs:

It is clear that oral eroticism and the development of social modalities of "getting" and "taking" are based on the need to breathe, to drink, to eat, and to grow by absorption.²

He names this the oral-respiratory sensory stage.

¹ Erik H. Erikson, Childhood and Society [Childhood] (2nd ed., rev. & enlarged), New York, Norton, 1950 (c. 1963), 445 p.; Erik H. Erikson, Insight and Responsibility, Lectures on the Ethical Implications of Psychoanalytic Insights [Insights], New York, Norton, 1964, 256 p.; Erik H. Erikson, Identity Youth and Crisis [Identity], New York, Norton, 1968, 336 p.

² Erikson, Childhood, p. 80-81.

Mutuality here is grounded in the regulation of the infant and the maternal persons.³ It is a function of the infant's readiness to get what is given, and the mother's readiness and willingness to give. The latter depends upon the mother's self-esteem, the way her milieu provides and sustains the maternal environment, and the infant's responses. When timing and intensity are proper and the infant's inner control and the behavior of the mother are adequate, both organisms experience a high level of pleasure.

The infant develops a sense of dependency upon the maternal person who becomes an "inner certainty" and an "outer predictability."⁴ This sense constitutes the basis for the primary and fundamental component of the sense of identity: the sense of being all right, the sense of basic trust.

A new form of incorporation: biting, eventually dominates the infant organism. It accompanies the growth of teeth and increasing ability in all the senses to approach things more actively and directly. This approach is the basis for learning the second social modality: to take, to hold on to.

³ The maternal person is the mother or mother substitute. In this text the reference is to the principal care-taking person(s).

⁴ Erikson, Childhood, p. 247.

The elements of mutuality also change in the second oral stages. The infant's mouth, originally the source of pleasure, becomes a source of pain. In the natural course of things, the mother begins to withdraw into a normal routine broken by pregnancy and childhood. Pleasure becomes elusive and the basic unity of the original mutuality is broken. Inner urges and frustrations, accompanied by anger and confusion are felt; the sense of being deprived, abandoned and divided develops. Thus begin the psychosocial sense of basic mistrust and the lifelong anxiety that accompanies growth.

The most basic strength in human life depends now on the ego's capacity to manage trust. It is Hope that is to emerge out of the anxiety of mistrust. Erikson defines primal Hope as:

The enduring predisposition to believe in the attainability of primal wishes in spite of the anarchic urges and rages of dependency.⁵

The oral stage, then, provides the materials for experiences of discontinuity and the emergence of trust and mistrust. Out of this nuclear conflict must emerge the first basal human strength in the form of primal hope. Clearly hope is the earliest and most indispensable strength in human life.

5 Erikson, Identity, p. 106; Erikson, Insight, p. 118.

In this context the quality of mutuality is critical.⁶ The processes of inevitable change need to be managed with minimal loss of the quality of the original mutuality. For hope is grounded in an individual's first knowledge and testing of his coherent rootedness in his universe. Moreover, the human's earliest self-image and self-verification are those experienced in the recognition of himself as good by those who care for him.

Hope undergoes change throughout the epigenetic process of psychosocial growth. Once its beginnings are secured it is no longer dependent on the verification of expectations and begins to widen into new hopefulness. Without primal hope, however, there is no grounding in human reality, no self-verification, and no vitality for the human process of development. Erikson states that:

All the self-verifications [...] begin in that inner light of the mother-child-world, [...] so exclusive and so secure; [...] such light must continue to shine through the chaos of many crises, maturational and accidental.⁷

Hope is the human strength that constitutes the wholeness of the First Age of Man. It depends on the mutual recognition between the child and the maternal person(s).

6 Erikson, Insight, p. 116-117; Erikson, Identity, p. 103-107.

7 Erikson, Insight, p. 117.

Ontogenetic Hope is qualified, however, by the adult faith that informs the care-taking processes. Maternal care is not merely a series of instinctual responses to the infant's needs and development. It is also the medium imparting such sense of meaning and trustworthiness as is possible in this early stage. This sense is somatically pervasive of the care-taking processes. Its components are inherent in those of the vision of self and the world by which the caring person(s) live. The beliefs that are held by the adults, about the meaning and value of human life which are crystallized in the patterns of child-care, inform the early sense of hope.

Adult faith, in turn, seeks its source of vitality in the societal expressions of a shared cosmic vision of life. Traditionally, religion has been the basic institution that supports and renews adult hope. Whatever the institution, the development of human hope requires the safeguard and renewal that comes from adult faith.⁸ From its beginnings hope is a generational issue.

Basic trust in oneself and in one's world is judged by Erikson to be the lasting treasure, the basic optimism, saved from the anxiety and conflicts of the first year of life. Trust becomes the capacity for faith, and mistrust,

⁸ Erikson observes that religion has, on occasion, been hope's greatest enemy, Childhood, p. 250.

for realism, through the maturation of primal hope in the critical experience of the life cycle. Hope is the ontogenetic basis of adult faith. In the earliest period of life in this world, human identity can be defined as: "I am what hope I have and give."⁹

The wholeness identified here is the identity increment, basic trust, the strength, hope. These derive from the changes that cause conflict between trust and mistrust. Vital growth depends, at this stage, on the mutuality between the child and maternal environment, supported by the institution, religion, or its substitute.

Second Age of Man¹⁰

The second and third years of life constitute the Second Age of Man corresponding to the anal stage in Freud's schema. Maturation of the eliminative organs in particular, and of the muscular system in general, provides the organic basis for new and opposing approaches: retention and elimination. Alternative behaviors, letting go and holding on, arise from these developments together with increasing verbalization

⁹ Erikson, Identity, p. 107. Again, this is not an "idealistic" theory; negative identity formation is not excluded in this view. Cf. above, Chap. 5, n. 141.

¹⁰ Cf. Erikson, Childhood, p. 80-85, 251-255; Erikson, Identity, p. 107-114; Erikson, Insight, p. 118-120.

and sensory discrimination. Grasping appropriation and voluntary release arising suddenly and consecutively are patterns in child development.

These experiences give rise to deep conflict and anxiety. The ambivalence of inner forces challenge the highly dependent child to coordinate conflicting urges while dealing with the powerlessness of his own body. At the same time the environment imposes control and direction of behavior, and therefore of these inner forces. The experience can be one of inner powerlessness and a sense of impotence in confronting outside forces.

In these conflictual experiences the imperfect beginning of an autonomous will are gounded. The struggle concerns a sense of inner satisfaction and goodness in making one's own choices over against a sense of inner discomfort and badness in ambivalent urges, powerlessness, rebellion and defeat.

The crisis of these poles of conflict marks the second critical turning-point in human growth where the ego must resolve the conflict between autonomy, shame and doubt. Shame is a sense of exposure; of being looked at when one is not yet ready to be visible. Doubt is a new form of mistrust, now of the self. It is a feeling that one does not qualify for new beginnings.¹¹ An overbalance of shame and

¹¹ Erikson, Childhood, p. 252 ff.

doubt depletes the courage to choose, guide, and live one's own life out of a knowledge that it is good to be onself where one is. It affects the capacity "to will" one's own life, to move through change to new strengths. To will here implies "to gain gradually the power of increased judgment and decision in the application of drive."¹² Like primal hope, it is fundamental to human vitality.

Emergence of will is a function of a delicate mutuality between child and parent. Developmental changes offer new ways of approach to things generally described as retentive-eliminative. Hence, new patterns of behavior involve holding on and letting go. At the same time the child is unifying a variety of experiences of awareness and attention, manipulation, verbalization, and locomotion.¹³ The parent must control and restrict. The child requires protection from his undeveloped judgment that would urge him into meaningless, arbitrary, sometimes harmful activities. Parental controls are required to offset unnecessary defeats and rejections: the roots of a sense of shame and self-doubt. The controlling parent must know, however, how to support and affirm the child's own readiness to exercise an emerging freedom of choice.

¹² Erikson, Insight, p. 118.

¹³ Ibid.

The ego's task, now, is to organize experience and gain control of the self without loss of self-esteem. This is the ontogenetic source of free will which depends on the vital emergence of the human strength which Erikson names Will, and describes as:

the unbroken determination to exercise free choice as well as self-restraint, in spite of the unavoidable experience of shame and doubt in infancy.¹⁴

The elements of mutuality between parent and child are again significant. The child evidently requires firm and prudent parenthood in learning self-control. The conflicts of this stage and its anxiety are informed by the parents' sense of law, and their understanding of the limits of autonomy. These set important qualifications of growth.

Traditionally, parents found support and protection for this in the institutions, law and order. These provide the necessary suprapersonal quality that protects the child from a righteous parental arbitrariness.¹⁵ A child's developing sense of self-control also reflects the quality of personal dignity and independence by which the parents direct their own lives. From comparative studies Erikson concludes that:

¹⁴ Erikson, Insight, p. 119; also, Erikson, Identity, p. 109.

¹⁵ Erikson, Identity, p. 113.

no matter what we do in detail the child will primarily feel what it is we live by as loving, cooperative and firm beings, and what makes us hateful, anxious, and divided in ourselves.¹⁶

The child's self image is reflected to him at this stage by these controlling parents. Here an inner division is at work. "The ambivalently loved image of the controlling parent correspond(s) to an ambivalently lived self, or rather, selves."¹⁷ This inner split, inevitable in the course of human growth, operative in the anxiety of shame and doubt is inherent in the ego's achievement of autonomy in the Second Age of Man. Identity, now, is described: "I am what I can will freely."¹⁸

The wholeness in the second stage of growth is the capacity for autonomy. The strength is that of will. These depend on the mutuality of child and parents. The institution, law and order, is their protection and support. Conflict with shame and doubt accompanies changes in development and constitutes the explosive crisis of this increment of human wholeness.

¹⁶ Ibid.

¹⁷ Erikson, Insight, p. 120.

¹⁸ Erikson, Identity, p. 114.

Third Age of Man¹⁹

A sense of initiative is the critical increment of the third stage of identity formation. Initiative must gain dominance over the anxiety arising from a sense of guilt so the ego can do its work with "a realistic sense of ambition and purpose."²⁰

The changes effecting this crisis are the powers of movement, language, imagination, and the activity of the genitals.²¹ The child walks and runs about freely and vigorously, as one having discovered that the "sense of gravity"²² is within. An entire universe of space and objects opens to him now. New areas are to be entered, goals claimed and objects attacked. The child directs a boundless curiosity into the unknown and into the lives of others. Imagination seems to have no limits and nothing appears impossible. Thus he is introduced into the wonderful world of fantasy and play.

Freud's schema specifies this as the phallic stage. This is the time of infantile genitality. A rudimentary

¹⁹ Cf. Erikson, Childhood, p. 85-97, 255-258; Erikson, Identity, p. 115-122; Erikson, Insight, p. 120-122.

²⁰ Erikson, Identity, p. 115.

²¹ The sexual aspect of the stages is not detailed here since the focus is not the progression and regression of libidinal life. However, Erikson's stages presuppose Freud's schema

²² Erikson, Childhood, p. 85.

genitality is marked by genital excitability, awareness of sex differences and sex roles, preoccupation with and curiosity about the genitals and sexual matters. This pre-genital period ends with the rise and repression of the oedipal conflict.

Learning, in this period, is intrusive movement from limitation into possibility, from the self into objective facts and activities.²³ Social behavior is characterized by attack, persistent pursuit of goals, competition. Erikson comments that these are all ways generally described as "being on the move," "making," "being on the make."²⁴ Behavior is directed toward selecting and attaining goals. It is the basis for initiative and purpose in a period of new hope.

In the natural course of events, the child, caught by the excitement and energies of these developments experiences blocks to his hopes, failure in his projects. He is often required to put unmanageable actions to a stop. He suffers many defeats in rivalry with adults who occupy the

²³ Ibid., p. 86. Erikson adds a male/female differentiation to Freud's schema--intrusion/inception, inclusion, and a final generative mode that anticipates the procreative function of genitality, *ibid.*, p. 91. For development of this, *ibid.*, p. 86-108; Erikson, *Identity*, p. 116-118.

²⁴ Erikson, *Childhood*, p. 255; Erikson, *Identity*, p. 118. The male/female differentiation here is phallic-intrusive/teasing, provoking.

space he wants. Terror frequently seizes him from the world of fantasy. These blocks, defeats and terrors give rise to a new estrangement. This is a sense of guilt: the fear of having his goals discovered.²⁵

Freud analyzes the failures and guilt of this period in terms of the sexual core of behavior. In the psychoanalytical language of sexual development this final contest with the big people is termed the oedipal conflict: the frustrated attempt to gain one parent from the other. Fear and defeat are centered around the loss of the male genital and called the castration complex.

Along with the fears of this period the child senses an inner voice engaged in "self-observation, self-guidance and self-punishment."²⁶ The sense of guilt is a new and powerful estrangement, a fearful sense of division within oneself. Erikson describes what occurs as: "the most fateful split and transformation in the emotional powerhouse [...], a split between potential glory and potential destruction."²⁷

The child is divided within the same drive that had carried it into new and wonderful exploits. The division is

25 Erikson, Childhood, p. 255; Erikson, Identity, p. 119.

26 Erikson, Identity, p. 119.

27 Erikson, Childhood, p. 256.

between two sets of drives: an infantile set and a parental set of prohibitions. The former "perpetuate the exuberance of growth potential." the latter supports and increases the functions of the "inner voice."²⁸ Here are beginnings of the super ego or conscience. It is primitive, undifferentiated, cruel, uncompromising.

The anxiety of the conflict between initiative and guilt drives initiative into actions that are possible and pleasurable. Hence, a new configuration of human strength begins to emerge in Purpose: "a temporal perspective giving direction and focus to concerted striving."²⁹ A developing sense of purpose is the issue of the third nuclear conflict. It gives the strength to work through paralyzing withdrawals, anxiety and guilt.

Purpose is actualized and qualified in the encounters with the basic family unit. The child continues to require protection in the conflicts of opposing dynamics. Abundant energy from new powers impel one set of actions, against the restrictions and prohibitions designating another. Fear of destruction and the inner voice of conscience confront a sense of initiative leaving a sense of guilt.³⁰ The need

²⁸ Ibid.

²⁹ Erikson, Insight, p. 120.

³⁰ Erikson, Childhood, p. 256. In Freudian categories: infantile sexuality and incest taboo; castration complex and superego.

here is for the unity in the inner voice that is the ingegration of conscience. To achieve this the child must learn the limits of play and fantasy. The beginnings of purpose should lead him to pursue a course once taken and accept the limits and burdens of reality. At this stage the horizon of the tangible, the permissible, the possible must be delineated.³¹

The infantile superego, however, has an all-or-nothing quality. When these beginnings of conscience are overburdened by parental demands ego initiative is easily aborted. The infantile ego may impose upon itself excessive inhibitions, restrictions or absolute obedience.

Excessive parental demands, not operative for the parents themselves, may initiate destructive anxiety. Should the conscience accept parental demands which are hypocritically dismissed for the parents the potential is set for resentment and hate. These destructive drives are directed by the ego against the self, against the child-become-adult, and against the adult world. This response leads to depleted vitality. From these observations Erikson rightly concludes:

if we should choose to overlook or belittle the phenomena of childhood, [...] we shall have failed to recognize one of the eternal sources of human anxiety and strife.³²

31 Erikson, Insight, p. 121; also, Erikson, Identity, p. 121.

32. Erikson, Identity, p. 120.

On the other hand, the child is increasingly ready to learn to direct his energies from early sources of pleasure and the world of fantasy towards real and pleasurable goals where guilt is dispelled. He will identify with the parent of the same sex and imitate ideal types. He will join others in new fields of initiative and so learn the rudiments of the culture, its techniques and tasks. But the child remains dependent upon the readiness and willingness of the basic family unit. Erikson holds that the inner freedom to move on requires a family purposefully united in its own pursuits.³³

The family finds support for this in those social institutions by which adults introduce the child into the culture by way of ideal types. The familiar sight of the child anticipating roles as he attaches a developing sense of initiative to the types, techniques and goals shown by adults carries a seriousness that is often overlooked. As Erikson expresses it:

The outcome of this [...] completion of drive patterns by tradition--glorious as it is in its cooperative achievements and in its inventive specializations and refinements--forever ties the individual to the traditions and to the institutions of his childhood milieu, and exposes it to the--not always logical and just--autocracy of his inner governor, his conscience.³⁴

33 Erikson, Insight, p. 122.

34 Erikson, Childhood, p. 97.

In summary, the wholeness of the third age of life, between the ages of three and five, is a sense of Purpose defined by Erikson as:

courage to envisage and pursue valued goals uninhibited by the defeat of infantile fantasies, by guilt and by the foiling fear of punishment.³⁵

The quality of this courage is critically dependent upon the mutuality between parent (basic family) - child as the child resolves the conflict between initiative and guilt. The identity increment in this stage can be stated: "I am what I can imagine I will be."³⁶

Fourth Age of Man³⁷

The instinctual energy output during the first three stages of human growth is intense and vitalized. The returns, however, are limited. To maintain vitality the individual now learns to work. He must acquire the skills and logic of the culture and direct them into practical, lasting achievements. A new sense of the self is now ready for ascendance. It is "a sense of being able to make things and make them well and even perfectly."³⁸ Erikson names this identity

35 Erikson, Insight, p. 122.

36 Erikson, Identity, p. 122.

37 Cf. Erikson, Childhood, p. 258-261; Erikson, Identity, p. 122-128; Erikson, Insight, p. 122-124.

38 Erikson, Identity, p. 123.

increment, industry, and describes its contribution to the self in the words: "I am what I can learn to make work."³⁹ This ego quality is the basis of productivity essential to individual vitality in adult life, and for the sustaining and shaping of a shared life.

The fourth stage in human development corresponds to the psychosexual period of latency ending in puberty. The demands for gratification from libidinal, instinctual energy become tempered. They can now be directed from the early sources of pleasure of parents, home, play, fantasy, towards new ones. These are to be derived from the processes of learning to make things and the recognition gained from tasks well done. The child's intelligence and capacities are now ready to be "put to work."⁴⁰

A sense of industry requires a period of systematic instruction. At the conclusion of the third age of life the human child is highly unspecialized and needs to be shown the elements and methods of his culture. Ideals of play and fantasy require concrete and realistic outlets. Thus the learned correlation of the inner and outer worlds is challenged again. This is a period of new testing--a "self verification of lasting importance." Erikson describes

³⁹ Ibid., p. 127.

⁴⁰ Erikson, Insight, p. 123.

the process:

what "works" in the fabric of one's thought and in the use of one's physical coordination can be found to work in materials and in cooperative encounters.⁴¹

The fourth stage of self-realization takes place in the mutuality of the home, the school, the wider society. In this period the child needs peers to share activity and adults to bring direction to hopes already formulated. This will lead to discovery of realistic goals and their achievement. Failing adequate support, a child feels circumscribed by his inability to meet the demands of his culture and interprets himself as inferior. The learned self feels inadequate for the tasks at hand.

The basic approach in the school system is significant.⁴² Should a rigid sense of duty and obedience pervade mutuality, the child may relate only to prescribed tasks. This dependency may ultimately shift to dominant cultural roles and self-realization be severely restrained and limited. When mutuality is wholly undirected the child is deprived of participation in actualities he cannot discover alone, and of early introduction to the practical and the logical.

The wider society becomes more directly significant as it admits the child to a vision of future roles. Through

⁴¹ Ibid.

⁴² Erikson, Identity, p. 127 ff.

its representatives society imposes the indices for judging self-worth. Exploitation and excessive constriction, or unrestrained idealism are dangers here. If sharing actualities depends on criteria other than the child's readiness and desire to learn the propensity towards inferiority is aggravated.

The dominant culture is the institution protecting the learning and teaching processes. Patterns and skills of its "prevailing technology"⁴³ reach into the child's home, school and wider society providing contact and support for the emerging sense of industry. Again, human growth is seen to be a generational issue.

A sense of industry does not occur without a struggle. A new form of anxiety--inferiority--arises in experiences of estrangement. Discontinuity with the learned self brings "the feeling that one will never be 'any good'."⁴⁴ The tension between a sense of industry and one of inferiority brings another turning point in a thrust towards a vital whole experience of life. At stake in this conflict is the human strength which Erikson names Competence and defines as "the free exercise of dexterity and intelligence in the completion of tasks unimpaired by infantile inferiority."⁴⁵

43 Ibid., p. 126.

44 Ibid., p. 125.

45 Erikson, Insight, p. 124.

In the fourth stage of life wholeness is an issue of mutuality with the adults who teach the ethos of productivity governing the culture. It is the freedom and strength of a sense of industry which the ego develops to overcome inferiority, in a time of new possibilities learned in direct encounters with the wider societal processes. The beginnings of competence in shared work essential to life together characterizes the new configuration of self.

Fifth Age of Man⁴⁶

The Fifth Age of Man is a highly significant pivotal period in the life cycle. Beginning with puberty it advances through the adollescing processes to effect the firm delineation of identity establishing life in time and space. It provides the basis of strength for adulthood about to impose itself upon the individual. Ideally, with the adolescent period each of the earlier identity conflicts would be resettled and concluded.

The young person now finds himself in the arena of rapid physical growth and genital maturation accompanied by turbulent impulses in the body and imagination. New social realities also press into the act. These include intimacy with the opposite sex and adult societal roles.

⁴⁶ Cf. Erikson, Childhood, p. 261-263; Erikson, Identity, p. 128-135, chap. 4-6; Erikson, Insight, p. 124-127.

The crisis of self-realization in adolescence revolves around a double uncertainty. One arises from the changes of physical and sexual maturation. The other derives from the necessity of making one's own place in the adult order of things. Problems about the future center around sexual matters and adult responsibility. Sexual differences seek direction and elaboration. Taking charge of one's life requires learning a delicate ratio between leading and following.⁴⁷

Decisions exacted by many alternatives and encounters require the ego to draw upon the components of psychosocial strength acquired through infancy and childhood.⁴⁸ Hence anxieties of prior conflicts also converge upon the adolescent ego. Early trust shifts about for new ground, persons and ideals worthy of more nearly final trust. Fear of empty commitment threatens hope that would become fidelity. The early sense of the importance of defining one's own approach to life is tested now by the complexities of adult life. The self-consciousness common in youth, inhibiting action and forcing conformity, is the new form of self-doubt as Will becomes Fidelity.

⁴⁷ Erikson designates this psychosexual and psychosocial unreadiness the "psychosocial moratorium." Erikson, Identity, p. 156, cf. p. 186-187.

⁴⁸ Ibid., p. 128-129, 181-185.

The choice of an occupation focuses a crucial and difficult conflict, for a sense of excellence in one's own kind of achievement is needed. For promise of vital life the adolescent must be free in the choice of an adult role. Hence the need to experiment with all imaginable and available possibilities is reactivated. The adolescent form of the age of play appearing in these thrusts toward free initiative is beset with its own form of guilt. It seeks relief in extremes of role fixation and noisy accusation of those who make demands or deceive him.

Experimentation with work roles renews fear about abilities and past achievements. This period of testing may also be aggravated by the real lack of a place for one's unique capacities, or paralyzed by the imposition of unrealistic ideals by himself or others. In all of this the ego is restructuring the crystallized identity increments of infancy and childhood towards a new sense of identity--the ego identity of the adolescent.

The healthy individual does what he must: risk the self of childhood to find his own way of living his one life with others. The adolescent processes are concluded when one has clearly delineated, affirmed, and committed oneself to one's self and to those who have become significant and affirming. In this achievement new functional strength is detected: "the ability to sustain loyalties

freely pledged in spite of the inevitable contradictions of value systems."⁴⁹ Erikson names this human strength Fidelity. By it the adolescent become young adult can move forward with wholeness.

The adolescent task is formidable. The trustworthiness of everything that has been is called into question and tested. Whole universes, inner and outer, now revealed, must be explored. This developmental period gives a kind of existential focus of the life cycle, its past and future. The danger is that identity confusion may dominate when demands of adult life can wait no longer. Erikson illustrates the estrangement of this stage by citing Biff's formulation in Arthur Miller's Death of a Salesman: "I just can't take hold, Mom, I can't take hold of some kind of life."⁵⁰ Without a clear sense of one's identity, and the resolution of anxiety in favor of the capacity for fidelity, the experiences of adult life become new attempts of the adult ego to complete the work of adolescence. To that extent adult life is devitalized.

In this crisis of self-realization, as in each previous one, the developing person cannot find in himself

⁴⁹ Erikson, Insight, p. 125; also, Erikson, Identity, Chap. 6.

⁵⁰ Erikson, Identity, p. 130. Erikson replaces the psychoanalytic term, "identity diffusion," with "identity confusion," since the former suggests a loss of center. Cf. ibid., p. 212, Chap. 4.

all that is necessary to deal with the discontinuities and estrangements experienced. To resolve the confusion about who the self is, can be, and wants to be, the person needs companions to affirm, and adults to confirm, developing capacities. Erikson warns:

it is of great relevance to the young individual's identity formation that he be responded to and be given function and status as a person whose gradual growth and transformation make sense to those who begin to make sense to him.⁵¹

In fact, he judges this recognition indispensable to the maturing ego.

The adolescent needs adults ready to provide models and ideals that can be trusted in a closer approximation to total trust. He relies upon the grown to point out avenues to activities, without forcing their pursuit. He looks for leaders imaginative enough to lend scope to realistic purpose and willing to wait assuringly, while he finds his own form of expression and commitment in work.

Youth is really questing for a world view that provides content for identity, and support in change. It seeks to know what is possible, when and by what means it can be attained. It searches for a unified set of values, a coherent order of roles. Erikson recognizes here an ideological seeking by the adolescent mind. He uses "ideology" in its wide sense, considering that:

⁵¹ Ibid., p. 156, cf. also, p. 128-129; Erikson, Insight, p. 125.

an ideological system is a coherent body of shared images, ideas, and ideals which [...] provides for the participants a coherent, if systematically simplified, over-all orientation in space and time, in means and ends.⁵²

Adults provide this support by way of institutions: the dominant culture, religion, powerful ideological movements, any societal concretization of a specific world view and set of values.

In the last analysis, then, what is critical for wholeness in the fifth age is which societies recognize the young adult and which are recognized by him. The healthy youth in a healthy society tests the ideological view for its relevance to what seems to be emerging as his own vital sense of identity. On the other hand, unscrupulous adults can, all too easily, exploit the adolescent's need of relief from confusion. Unaware or lazy adults may deceive or fail youth by default.

In summary, wholeness in the young adult is the capacity to commit himself to adult tasks, in the midst of change and conflicting world views, free from the anxiety of confusion. This is the strength, Fidelity. It develops as the adolescent delineates a clear sense of identity.

⁵² Erikson, Identity, p. 189-190, on this also, p. 187-196, 225-231. Ideologies do not merely give or mirror content for identity. They are used as materials by the formation processes. Cf. Walter H. Capps, "Ideology, Ego and Ethos: A Comment on Erickson [sic]," in Humanitas, Vol. 5, No. 3, Winter 1970, p. 255-263.

Mutuality with selected companions and adults is indispensable. The Fifth Age of Man has special significance. This depends upon the wholeness achieved in each preceding life stage. It allows the individual to move into the adult stage with vitality. Erikson believes that:

only when fidelity has found its field of manifestation is the human as ready as, say, the nestling in nature when it can rely on its own wings and take its adult place in the ecological order.⁵³

Truly, here is a vital strength for which each individual needs to be granted the opportunity: "to develop, to employ, to evoke--and to die for."⁵⁴

Sixth Age of Man⁵⁵

Identity and fidelity gained through successful adolescent growth ready the young adult for a new shared identity. There now appear new priorities related to entering affiliations and partnerships, forming close associations with friends, colleagues and mates, and responding to his

⁵³ Ibid., p. 248.

⁵⁴ Ibid., p. 233. Erikson believes that it is in adolescence that the "I" is perceived existentially--as one becomes involved in states of fear of others, anxiety about selfhood, dread about the end of existence. Cf. Erik H. Erikson, Life History and the Historical Moment, New York, Norton, 1975, p. 107 ff.

⁵⁵ Cf. Erikson, Childhood, p. 263-266; Erikson, Identity, p. 135-138, Chap. 4-6; Erikson, Insight, p. 127-130, Chap. 6.

own inspirations and those of others. The young adult seeks and enters situations joining him with others in mutual commitment.

Shared life, however, involves the identity in a "counterpointing" and "fusion" with the identities of others.⁵⁶ The ego must be able to manage this fusion without loss to itself and with commitment to the tasks involved. Self-abandon only will enable the individual to take chances with and transcend his identity. This risk engages the ego in the anxiety of a new turning point.

Growth presupposes that each nuclear conflict operative in the previous identity processes is now well under the control of the ego.⁵⁷ The young adult's gain in self-realization emerges in a new identity increment, intimacy, and the development of human strengths, love.

Failure to manage fear of losing one's identity, and anxiety over commitments ensuing from engagement with others may lead to escapes into isolation. These can render this developmental stage the core of fomentation for highly destructive forces. Its fears crystallize in prejudices, and in a readiness to destroy, producing a high potential for all forms of exploitation. Even affiliations can become

⁵⁶ Erikson, Identity, p. 135.

⁵⁷ Erikson, Childhood, p. 263.

joint escapes into isolation, social exclusivities that will be defended at all costs.⁵⁸ Erikson designates this ego alternative, distantiation, and defines it as:

the readiness to repudiate, isolate, and, if necessary, destroy those forces and people⁵⁹ whose essence seems dangerous to one's own.

Erotic attraction and sexual intimacy marked by genitality are aspects of adult psychosocial intimacy but do not fully constitute it. Sexual maturity implies a true genitality: "the capacity for a full and mutual consummation of the sexual act."⁶⁰ Erikson observes that this requires sexual intimacy "free of pregenital interferences."⁶¹ Mutual regulation in sexual activity is only possible, then, in a stage no longer dominated by adolescent identity demands. The mutuality of shared identity between partners and mates, actualized in the sixth stage, is characterized, however, by "selectivity of 'love'."⁶² This is the mutuality of shared identity between mates.

⁵⁸ Erikson, Identity, p. 136; Erikson, Insight, p. 130.

⁵⁹ Erikson, Identity, p. 136.

⁶⁰ Erikson, Insight, p. 128-129.

⁶¹ Erikson, Childhood, p. 265. Erikson gives six goals for adult genitality. He also holds that sex differences have their psychosocial crisis in this state, effecting a polarization of the sexes for the shared life of adulthood. He suggests an evolutionary rationale for sex differentiation in this stage: "competence and fidelity permit the division to be one of polarization." Insight, p. 129.

⁶² Erikson, Identity, p. 137; also, Erikson, Insight, p. 128.

This stage intends a transformation in mutuality. In the earlier stages, care was received in whatever milieu the individual found himself. Now, care is given in affiliations actively chosen and developed with mutual concern.

Erikson considers love the anchor and power of commitment between adults, where identity is risked for the counterpointing and fusing of intimacy. Selfless devotedness is given in the strength of fidelity. Love proves identity as one risks one's identity in another. This experience, Erikson remarks, is one of "finding oneself, as one loses oneself, in another."⁶³

Clearly, the potential for adult love depends upon the quality of earlier experiences of mutuality. It derives especially from identity and fidelity developed in the mutuality of adolescence. Insofar as the ego achieved healthy freedom from anxiety in the fifth stage of development, the young adult stands an optimistic chance of growing steadily towards the wholeness of love, by which Erikson means: "the mutuality of devotion forever subduing the antagonisms inherent in divided function."⁶⁴ This strength, needed in young adulthood, is now ready to emerge.

63 Erikson, Insight, p. 128.

64 Ibid., p. 129.

Adult love, the active commitment with mutual concern between partners, is the basis for ethical concerns. These replace the moralistic and ideological ones of childhood and adolescence. The definition of ethics, for Erikson, conveys "an insightful assent to human values."⁶⁵ Its issue is the Golden Rule interpreted now by Erikson as: "Do to another what will strengthen you even as it will strengthen him--that is, what will develop his best potential, even as it develops your own."⁶⁶ In childhood and adolescence moralistic and ideological obedience provided escape from anxiety. Now, ethical concerns offer strength for realization of the self and others in the sharing of actualities. This is the fruit of adult love.

The social guardians of love are various forms of affiliations in marriage, economics, politics, in cooperation and competition, production and procreation. Conversely, when love is operative, the power of psychosocial evolution is protected. This is defined by Erikson as:

the power of cultural and personal style, which gives and demands conviction in the shared patterns of living, guarantees individual identity in joint intimacy, and binds into a "way of life" the affiliations of procreation and production.⁶⁷

65 Erik H. Erikson, Gandhi's Truth, On the Origins of Militant Non-violence, New York, Norton, 1969, p. 251.

66 Erikson, Insight, p. 233. On Erikson's views about ethical concerns, cf. ibid., Chap. 6.

67 Ibid., p. 128.

Erikson rightly considers love to be the greatest of human virtues.

In summary, the mutuality upon which adult strength depends is found in affiliations with others who are ready and able to share in the tasks of giving care. Love can grow where the ego, in conflict with a sense of isolation, achieves the capacity for intimacy, the identity increment that Erikson describes as "We are what we love."⁶⁸

Seventh Age of Man⁶⁹

Erikson recognizes the occurrence of a developmental crisis following the young adult's achievement of mature genitality, intimacy, and the capacity for love. It is the crisis of generativity. The human strength to come out of it is Care.

Ideally, the young adult realized a new configuration of self-identity--a shared one. And ego interests found expansion within the affiliations of body, mind, and work entered during the stage of intimacy and shared identity. The thrust towards full personal individuation then searches

⁶⁸ Erikson, Identity, p. 138.

⁶⁹ Erikson, Childhood, p. 266-268; Erikson, Identity, p. 138-139; Erikson, Insight, p. 130-132; Erikson, Gandhi's Truth--this is a study of the ethics of generativity.

fulfillment in what is to be brought into existence, namely, the products of the chosen forms of "altruistic concern and creativity."⁷⁰ The effects of one's shared life are now the intended objects of energy and love.

The young depend upon adults, the products of work upon the worker. But the dependency is reciprocal. Such is the mutuality of the seventh stage in the life cycle. The dependent and the adult, the learner and the teacher, the works and the worker are reciprocally activators of actualization and verification. In Erikson's view, however, mere productivity or creativity does not activate developmental change. The adult ego, enriched by a shared identity, is directed to a new challenge. It comes from what one has made. The fruits of shared affiliations and work request to "be brought up," guarded, preserved--and eventually transcended."⁷¹ Herein lies the significant encounter and the developmental turning point in the seventh age.

Erikson believes, then, that adult ego strength derives from the capacity to be concerned about what one brings into being. This dynamic qualifies identity with a generative sense:

⁷⁰ Erikson, Identity, p. 135. Erikson does not restrict this stage to parenthood only. He observes: "The perpetuation of mankind challenges the generative ingenuity of workers and thinkers of many kinds" (Insight, p. 130-131). This is a presupposition in the following development.

⁷¹ Erikson, Insight, p. 131.

"the concern for establishing and guiding the next generation."⁷² For only the adult who is able and willing to establish, guide, and provide for the vital life of what he is responsible for generating becomes himself a new wholeness, characterized by strength which Erikson calls Care:

the widening concern for what has been generated by love, necessity, or accident; it overcomes the ambivalence of adhering to irreversible obligation.⁷³

Anxiety, the normal counterpart of identity strengths, threatens the ego as it meets the call to generative life. It may come from a variety of past experiences: failure in true love; poor identity models; prolonged preoccupation with shaping one's self-identity; absence of faith in the trustworthiness of the human process. Insofar as unresolved identity needs dominate experience, the ego endures a sense of stagnation: a feeling of emptiness, boredom, deprivation in mutual relationships. When the adult ego is able to resolve the anxiety of stagnation to engage generative concern, a new, alive sense of identity is achieved.

The psychosocial fact of the "cogwheeling"⁷⁴ of generations is readily identified in the process of growth

72 Erikson, Identity, p. 138.

73 Erikson, Insight, p. 131.

74 See above, "Social Principle."

at this stage. The human child needs the adult, and adults are dependent upon that need. The human begins life as a learner. The adults who teach are themselves shaped by those whom they teach and by the material taught. Vital human growth is a generational issue of mutuality. The learner needs to learn, and the teacher to teach.⁷⁵ These are realities of psychosocial identity.

The tasks of Care are to be served by all the human institutions. These must concretize adult responsibility to provide for the full development of potential in each human being brought into the adult world. They also intend to guide adults while protecting the young from individualistic and self-serving patterns of adult care. Where institutions fail in direction and support and the mature generation abdicates and stagnates, psychosocial development is withheld from the individual and society. Human self-realization continues, in the age of generative Care, a function of mutuality and change.

⁷⁵ Erikson observes the need to teach is both the need man has to teach and the need to keep facts, logic and truth alive by teaching (Insight, p. 131).

Eighth Age of Man⁷⁶

The final stage of the life cycle is the time for human maturity. It is a period when all the fruits developed in the previous stages ripen, and the quality of human wholeness of one's natural life is met. The completion of personal development is immediately prepared for in the adult experiences of caring for people and things. This stage arises out of the developmental processes, physical and social, that bring into view the end of one's life in death. A radical shift in perspective now develops and with it the fundamental problem and challenge in old age. Over against the realization that the "boundary" of one's natural life cycle is the unknown experience of death, and that the "frame" of that one life is "fate,"⁷⁷ the actuality of one's life presents itself as a totality. One knows now that "an individual life is the accidental coincidence of but one life cycle with but one segment of history."⁷⁸ The question about what is possible for human achievement comes sharply into focus. The eighth age concludes when the decline of physical and mental powers preclude further human activation.

⁷⁶ Cf. Erikson, Childhood, p. 268-269; Erikson, Identity, p. 139-141; Erikson, Insight, p. 132-134.

⁷⁷ Erikson, Identity, p. 140.

⁷⁸ Ibid.

There is a double aspect to the experience of the end of life. The individual is faced with "ultimate concerns"⁷⁹ about his unique existence: what are the possibilities of transcending the boundaries and the frame and the experiences of one's only life cycle? Erikson turns from the abyss to which one is brought by death, and from the psychology of ultimate concerns, to consider the second aspect of the end of life. It is the psychosocial one, the ending of one generation in the next.

The work of the ego now is to achieve in the midst of these realizations a final dynamic unity, a new configuration of all the interliving human processes. This requires yet another vital resynthesis of the ego strengths achieved through life. At stake, as one anticipates the end in death, is a vital sense of life, the possibility of declaring, still, that it is good to be alive where one is. One seeks life's personal portion, so to speak, a feeling of personal soundness and enduring worth that Erikson designates ego integrity. As with the notion of identity, this achievement of ego integration defies definition. These are some of the attributes Erikson includes: a love for the ego as an experience that is reliable for conveying order and meaning, whatever the cost; an awareness of the relativity of all meaningful

⁷⁹ Ibid., p. 141.

life styles, and a readiness to defend one's own.⁸⁰ Ego integrity is the freedom from the wish that people and circumstances had been different, to accept the responsibility for one's own life. Integrity assumes the total perspective on life, which effects a feeling of comradeship with persons of distant times and of different pursuits, all of whom have added dignity and love to human life.

However, in the need to effect this kind of integration, the ego meets the ultimate test of itself: "existence at the entrance to that valley which he must cross alone."⁸¹ Can the limits of one's identity, of one's life span be transcended?

The ego is threatened by the experience of discontinuity and estrangement from its total existence. It is a feeling of despair, the sense that it is too late for alternative life choices, since one's life cycle is coincident with but one historical period. Despair, in a variety of forms of disgust, tends to turn against the people and institutions that have accompanied one through life. Erikson observes that this attack is really against oneself, unless it is contained by "a vision of a superior life."⁸²

80 Ibid., p. 139; also, Erikson, Childhood, p. 268.

81 Erikson, Insight, p. 133.

82 Erikson, Identity, p. 140. "Superior life" here implies any vision of life that exceeds the boundaries of one's own experience of life.

In this crisis of wholeness the burden is upon the ego to deal with the problems of existence in their entirety. The capacity to do this is ego integrity. Only the acceptance of death and fate, of one's life cycle as the ultimate of natural life, of its historical moment as the necessary one, guarantees vitality to the experience of maturation and closure of life. The human strength that can emerge takes the form of "detached concern with life itself, in the face of death."⁸³ This is the dynamic core of the human wholeness, Wisdom. Its forms are found in the many variations of accumulated knowledge and judgments about human existence.

In no developmental crisis has the individual ego been sufficient unto itself. Each new ego strength is a function of significant, actualizing mutuality. So it is with ego integrity. It depends, in this final stage, on the mutualities of the lifetime, through which hope has become the capacity to care, and now, to be wise. But, what if there had been nothing to hope for? And, what if there was no hope to give.

It has been seen that hope, as it becomes will, purpose, competence, fidelity, love and care, is nourished by the strength of the generations. The patterns of mutuality are themselves directed and strengthened by the culture that

83 Erikson, Insight, p. 133.

permeates by way of the possibilities and vision of life it brings and the prohibitions it imposes. And, a society's living tradition is contained and conveyed through its institutions and their leaders. Through the experience of a lifetime one learns both to follow these and, responsibly, to lead. Now at the end of life, it is the whole living tradition that must be able to gain the participation of the individual, and itself be enriched in the process. This is the mutuality in which, freed from the relativity of time, one must be able to make sense of one's life. To participate in the living tradition about human life, and to view human problems in their entirety, with a sense that it is good to be alive when and where one is, this is ego integrity and Wisdom.

Human strength, at each stage, is a generational issue. From the experience of ending life is to come the evidence that life at each stage, including the end, has its own vital meaning. That means, each mature generation needs to arrive at its own form of integrity and Wisdom. It is this Wisdom that reaches into the coming generations. It is needed by those who follow, for it alone provides them with the possibility of meeting the ultimate individual questions with strength. Spanning the entire life process, Erikson observes,

"healthy children will not fear life if their elders have integrity enough not to fear death."⁸⁴

So, the psychosocial identity crisis at the end of life can be described as, "I am what survives me."⁸⁵ At each stage in one's life a person participates in the societal processes. In this mutuality one revitalizes its institutions, the guardians and conveyors of human strength for all stages.

Whatever answer individual man may bring to the question about his one identity, his psychosocial identity is transcended in the cycle of generations. For Erikson, the "actuality" of this cycle, and the great Nothingness of death, constitute an "existential complementarity."⁸⁶

In conclusion, out of the total complexity of Erikson's analysis of human growth, identity remains the grid, so to speak, from which he develops the reality that is human becoming. He pictures human life as a process of identity formation that involves conflicts and responses of three major process systems: biological, mental, and social. The picture is a realistic one. Situated in the entire process are the epigenetic and social principles, submitting it to both possibility and limit, and also to a pervading relativity.

84 Erikson, Childhood, p. 269; Erikson, Identity, p. 141.

85 Erikson, Identity, p. 141.

86 Erikson, Insight, p. 133.

Life is a given, thence, gift. For, operative in man is an inner law of development, a nature which, within the relativities of existence, is to be obeyed. It reveals itself in an epigenetic life cycle through which man has evolved and, by way of the generational principle, that perpetuates a series of strengths from hope in infancy to wisdom in old age. Given also is the life environment, the space and time factors of identity. The strengths, values, and forces of cultural and historic life with all their heterogeneity and changeability are, with the life cycle, coordinates for identity formation. The milieu is crucial; its content spells limit and possibility. But life is also openness; an invitation to move beyond the now. It is a matter of ever-new awareness and ever-new readiness to allow and to set into motion a configuration where what has been achieved, receiving new elements, effects, a novum. Identity itself emerges only to move beyond itself, and possibly beyond even the life span. The life process possesses the quality of transcendence. It consistently awaits the novum.

Life is a process that is actualized only in mutuality. Within the actualities of the present, man moves towards, and is met by, others. The quality of the meeting determines, that both frees and limits, the experience of becoming.

Developing readiness requests a call from the outside, from the other, that correlates with and gives strength to self-actualization.

Human life is a series of changes in which one must choose what one will do within the givens of life; decisions which set the coefficient of vitality; decisions which can be freedom. This exists where man accepts the reality of the historic now, its offer of new wholeness, and his own sense of who and what he is and may become, in short, the givens and the invitations.

Anxiety, then, is essential to the human process. Its outcome is dependent upon many factors, inner and outer, and upon the mystery of psychological human choice. Clearly, life is a crisis of wholeness. The struggle in each turning point is between changing forms of trust and mistrust. The option is for wholeness or totality. Wholeness connotes an organic mutuality of diverse parts that is open and fluid. Totality is inclusive and exclusive, a closing, an abortive gesture. Total solutions breed psychological need. Man's basic thrust is towards wholeness.

Erikson shows how social institutions safeguard and maintain the vital identity strengths accrued by collective man. They also provide reassurance and protection against the threatening remnants of negative increments. We cite here, because relevant to our purposes, two of these institutions: ideology and religion. Ideology, a world view convincing enough to offer the ego the strength necessary to organize its multiple awareness and support its identity, is

a psychological necessity for identity formation. Religion is that institution which traditionally has socialized the first and deepest conflict in life.

Wisdom that is faith and realism, informs the mature experience. As an individual weathers the storms of one life cycle he can come to know the goodness of life, of his own life, and that, within the very realism of the many paradoxes that are to be experienced: the given/open; the here/not yet; wholeness/totality; discovery/response; giftness/choice; - find one's life/lose one's life. This is because, psychologically, man is born with only the capacity to hope.

CHAPTER VII

BEYOND IDENTITY: CONCLUSIONS

This research began with the question: what is the significance of Jesus Christ for the experience of human becoming? It was suggested that the key to an answer lies in the concept of the Kingdom of God announced by Jesus. Accordingly, a study has been made of theology's understanding of Jesus' view of human life when it is lived in relatedness to the Kingdom of God. Psychology's view of how human growth is to occur has been examined in the work of Erik H. Erikson. It is time now to bring together these two ways of conceptualizing the experience of human life.

This study is a dialogue in which two disciplines have something to say. Hence the conclusion is twofold:

1. The believer's response to the Kingdom of God is one of human growth.
2. The theology of the Kingdom of God is relevant to a psychological understanding of human development.

1. The Believer's Response to the Kingdom of God
Is One of Human Growth.

This is the reply of the present work to the question: what can psychology say to theology? Since, it has been seen, psychology can legitimately evaluate, within its own terms of reference, what theology says about human

experience, the psychology of Erikson has been used here to evaluate the experience involved in relating to the Kingdom of God. The first conclusion, therefore, is based on the argument that Erikson's description of human growth, and the theological description of the believer's experience of the Kingdom of God, both point to the same type of human experience--a way of human existence involving the simultaneous basic dynamic principles of wholeness, change, and mutuality. This will be demonstrated now by way of a brief comparative summary of these two views.

A. Way of Wholeness

The theological study established that when Jesus declares the Kingdom of God to be at hand, he is recognizing the eschatological inbreak of divine activity into the human situation. Jesus says that the final divine event toward which the faith of Israel had been directed since the time of the prophets is to be released now by God. He is stating that the reality of the decisive inbreak of divine activity now belongs with the total reality of human life. Israel's time of waiting for the intervention of God is over; the human situation now includes this. God is at work and doing what only he can do. From a theological perspective, then, divine activity is a reality, a context for human life, a dynamic element to be taken into account.

Jesus makes this claim among a people who attribute their existence and the possibility of achieving their full stature to the divine activity. Moreover, the prophets taught this people that God would act on their behalf in the future event of eschatological dimensions which they promised. This intervention would be a decisive one for life--an event that is both end and beginning. It was to be the end of Israel's limited existence and the beginning of fulfilled life, establishing God's irrevocable fidelity to his ultimate promise of salvation to Israel.

Addressing this eschatological consciousness Jesus taught that the experience of fulfillment expected by Israel is released into the present by God. He announces a direct offer of eschatological salvation to all persons--no one is excluded. He links this to the Kingdom of God, present and effective--itself the offer, the marrow, the actualization of eschatological salvation. In theology's view, then, ultimate human fulfillment is a function of the eschatological divine activity within the human situation.

Jesus does not specify what saved existence looks like. The divine work does not admit of such containment. However, the events of his ministry and his teaching witness that fulfillment is about the actualization of human possibilities. The proclamation of Jesus concerns new horizons for human life that vivify and enhance. The Kingdom of God

that he recognizes as present is salvation: power over evil, ultimate human possibility, and personal identity. It is theology's view, then, that eschatological fulfillment is linked to the dynamic principle at work in the human situation--the present Kingdom of God.

The believer, however, is in no way a passive recipient of the saving fulfilling benefits. Acceptance of the Kingdom of God, it has been seen, engages the total person, with all the realities of his life situation. The extent of one's involvement suffers no limits: a person must be ready to direct everything to the interests of the Kingdom--possessions, bodily integrity, in fact all aspects of one's life. Response to the transforming divine action at work calls for one's ultimate powers for good and touches the deepest recesses of the human heart. The Kingdom of God engages the whole human being.

Jesus teaches that the experience of ultimate fulfillment is a function of accepting the saving realities in the present. But he situates the believer in a movement forward into the future. For, the saving divine work, while present and effective, is not yet fully manifest. Present fulfillment is not completeness; it bears its own promise of consummation in the future. However, appropriation of the fulfillment offered in the present is the only way to be involved in its future eschatological consummation.

Hence, one who would relate to the Kingdom of God lives within the tension of commitment to the present fulfillment of the saving action, and of movement forward in the promise of an experience of fulfillment in the future.

Thus theology describes the experience of the believer as one that is informed by the dynamic principle of the divine action, engaging the total reality of the person, within the tension of life lived in the present fulfillment, yet open and moving toward a new future.

Erik Erikson's psychoanalytic model views human life and growth to be the contemporaneous interliving of three vital human processes. Three contexts of operation come together in the experience of possessing one's life. These are the biological or somatic processes which ground the human in reality of time and space; the social processes whereby each person is situated in a network of interrelatedness and of patterns of mutual actualization; the psychic or mental processes, both conscious and unconscious which constitute the human in its specific kind of awareness.

Erikson identifies a thrust toward life and vitality in this interliving of processes. It is a developmental aim given with human life. This dynamic principle informs the experience whereby the human seeks full actualization within these three contexts as the potentialities given with them unfold epigenetically.

As inborn bodily capacities develop, for which the average environment provides correspondingly different expectations, new configurations of a person's experience of himself in his world must be managed. These configurations are each marked by functional unity or wholeness. They are the capacity, achieved at any stage of human life, for organizing and directing one's experience through the changing circumstances of inner and outer life, with a sense that it is good to be alive where and when one is. These ego qualities Erikson names identity increments, changing senses in the ways an individual experiences his life: trust, autonomy, initiative, industry, identity, intimacy, generativity, and integrity.

Here is a description of human growth as total process, the interliving of the somatic, personal and social orders. At each stage in the individual life cycle, human wholeness is a function of the ego's integration of these by way of its own unique organization of experience.

Psychology here describes the individual's management of each configuration as an actualization or fulfillment of the potentialities given with birth. This is, however, a movement from one experience of wholeness toward a new one, where each experience contains the openness to a further one. Each experience contains the possibility of a new combination of functional capacity, a new sense of ego

identity, new human vitality, new human strength. For example, with a sense of identity and the capacity for fidelity, the individual can move into the experience of adult intimacy and the possibilities of Love. These, in turn, allow one to move into the experience of Care. The functional wholeness that marks the end of the individual life cycle is properly named ego integrity, the human strength Wisdom. Ego integrity is the integration of all acquired ego strengths from trust through to generativity. Wisdom is Hope become whole.

A comparison of Erikson's psychoanalytic description of human growth and the theological understanding of the Kingdom of God shows that the believer's experience of relating to the Kingdom is informed by the same basic dynamics identified in psychological life. Both posit a dynamic principle at work: the developmental aim; the divine activity. Both function for the actualization of full human potential, while engaging the totality of the person's existence. Moreover, psychology situates human experience within tension between present and future wholeness. Human life, psychology says, is, at each stage, to be open to even more inclusiveness. And theology claims a movement toward a manifest consummation in the future of the divine saving work operative and to be appropriated in the present. The psychological dynamics of growth are

operative in the believer's experience. Both human growth and the believer's experience of salvation can be described as a Way of Wholeness.

B. Way of Change

The believer's experience of the Way of Wholeness is grounded and sustained by yet another dynamic aspect of the response required by the Kingdom of God. A fundamental attitude which must inform a life, to receive the saving effects of the divine inbreak, is described by Jesus in a variety of ways, including the Pharisee and the Tax-Collector. This disposition, theology names conversion.

The necessity for conversion arises out of the new perspective for life revealed in the situation created by Jesus' ministry--the inauguration of the eschatological event of salvation. The possibility for saved existence is offered. Hence, theology asserts, what is required is the decision to admit into one's present experience, the pure gift of the Kingdom of God.

When this decision is operative a radical reorientation governs the management of one's life. There is a change in the terms of ultimate relatedness. For while life continues to be lived by way of the processes of natural existence, this present divine reality is claimed there, as the ultimate context for life. Conversion is the lived

acknowledgement that ultimate fulfillment is a function of the Kingdom of God. This means that, for theology, the last word about the possibility or impossibility of personal wholeness is no longer considered to be contained in the natural life processes. It is contained, rather, in the divine action breaking into these, as free gift. Ultimate hopes for one's life are related to the Kingdom of God. Theology teaches that the manifest consummation of salvation--ultimate human possibility, is a function of the willingness to effect, in the present, this shift in the ground and relatedness of one's life, and thereby admit the Kingdom of God into one's life.

Conversion, then, implies discontinuity in the way the believer organizes life. When one lives out of the perspective offered by theology, personal achievements alone can no longer ground a sense of personal security. This was the mistake of the Pharisee in Jesus' parable. The benefits of the Kingdom of God admit of no claims; they are gratuitous gift to be received in the manner of children. Nor does a sense of ultimate control over one's life arise out of the experience of success or of failure in the management of it. So, the sinners, the lost, the prodigal reflect the disposition required of recipients of the saving divine action. The Kingdom of God is free divine activity subject to neither prediction nor control. In

this respect, also, the Pharisee was in error. When life is lived in relation to the Kingdom of God, the criteria for shaping the ideal self and the ideal destiny are no longer in the tried and the known, or even in the imaginable. These give way to the inscrutable designs of the Kingdom of God in their present, although imperceptible fulfillment, and in their consummation, their future manifestation.

Theology's demand for conversion is a call, then, into new existence. Life is to be lived with the new perspective, in terms of the new relatedness revealed by Jesus: the present Kingdom of God. To convert is to risk the abandonment of the known and tried criteria for securing life, to admit the divine action. The stakes are ultimate personal fulfillment. These are the dynamics of change, identified by psychology as necessary for human growth.

In Erikson's description of human growth he posits the necessity of recurring radical changes. In fact, the criteria for development are found to be a series of crises--conflicts that are critical turning points, moments of personal decision about growth. These occur when new perspectives are delivered by developmental and societal processes requiring one to integrate these into the management of life. The crises arise when, in the maturation process, heightened potentialities open new ways for existence in relation to the world and to others--one is ready

to walk, or to select an occupation, for example. At the same time new significant encounters are both expected and offered from the milieu.

Discontinuity is introduced into one's experience by the new perspectives. The new terms of relatedness challenge one to transcend, and so to risk past achievements in an integration of what is arising developmentally and socially. So the child's fantasy world must be left behind when growth shows the way to the Competent self; the risk of one's Identity is a prerequisite of the experience and strength of human Love. The possibility of a new experience of personal wholeness depends on the decision, in the present, to effect change.

This decision is effected by a resolution of tension. In each crisis a positive sense of trust to risk beyond the tried and secured vies with mistrust of the new and unknown. Trust must win out if one is to experience oneself as alive and well.

Both the theological and psychological modes of human life relate transcendence of present experience to the emergence of new perspectives for personal relatedness and existence. Erikson sees them arise out of the unfolding of maturational and societal elements in the coincidence of the individual life cycle and a given segment of human history. Theology views the emergence of new

perspectives from the proclamation of Jesus. Both views recognize that discontinuity is experienced between the possibilities within the known, assured ways of managing life, and the yet unknown experience revealed in the new way of viewing reality. Both human growth and Christian conversion point to the need to let go of the old and the known. This implies a shift in the center, the criteria and the purpose of existence. It is a shift from pre-occupation with the self to what is offered. It is this freedom from the self that spells new possibility. The decision to risk achieved security and control is the decision to change. It effects a vital actualization of new dimensions of one's life.

In Erikson's view a risking of one's acquired sense of identity allows the ego to integrate new realities and effect a more fulfilled psychosocial Identity. In theology's analysis of human existence, the risk involved to relate to the Kingdom of God allows for the eschatological fulfillment--ultimate Identity. While unique in each individual, the general lines of identity formation can be predicted and identified through the life cycle. By the free inbreak of divine activity the eschatological Identity is effected in the present, to be fully manifest in a future consummation. It can be said then that the basic dynamic of change posited by psychology as necessary

for growth, is operative in the believer relating to the Kingdom of God. Both human growth and the believer's experience of conversion is a Way of Change.

C. Way of Mutuality

There is another response to the Kingdom of God described by theology. It is belief, the lived attitude that complements, personalizes, and actualizes the unselfing of conversion. It is belief that frees, so to speak, the divine activity, to effect in the believer eschatological fulfillment.

The research here has shown that in the biblical understanding belief occurs in relationship with persons. By believing one accepts as actual the claims being made by the object of belief. This is no mere rational assent to facts presented. Rather, it is existential involvement with the reality, with the implications it carries for one's real life. In other words, what is at work in belief is actual participation in, or connection with the reality that is being acknowledged. For example, belief in the presence of the Kingdom of God leads the believer to discern and appropriate the divine activity, its plan and demands. Belief is a decision about existential participation in and commitment to reality.

The evidence of the New Testament is that belief is acceptance of Jesus, an acknowledgment that he and the claims he makes are genuine. It is a readiness to participate in the human situation as he recognizes it and shares in it. The believer, then, must deal with whether the human situation, as Jesus understands it, resonates with his own deepest hopes and expectations for his life. This was the Pharisee's struggle. Moreover, to believe one must sense a being addressed by this Jesus, that is, invited into the experience which he announces. Here was the source of the deep joy of the sinner, the maimed, the poor.

The Gospels show Jesus inviting everyone to accept himself as he came to be known in his ministry and teaching--the one who announces the fulfillment of Israel's hopes. Jesus is also shown inviting his hearers to accept acceptance, that is, to acknowledge that the fulfillment he announces and participates in is, in fact, offered to them. Psychology names this quality of relatedness--this mutual hospitality, mutuality, and sees in it the key to personal actualization. Theology names it belief.

The further evidence of the New Testament is that Jesus understood acceptance and trust in himself to be the dynamic, linking a person and the divine work. Belief is that which actualizes the saving activity and empowers.

Hence it is the vitalizing core in the actualization of eschatological life.

Theological belief, then, is not merely a matter of truths--facticity, needing rational assent. It is an active sharing in reality--actuality, here, the Kingdom of God, present and effecting human fulfillment. Belief, which empowers, arises with the experience of Jesus--one of mutuality, the key to eschatological life.

The comparison now moves from the theological importance of belief to psychology's view of a critical dynamic in human growth. Erikson, it has been seen, demonstrates that human change, necessary for development, is actualized in mutuality: the experience of hospitality and affirmation which occurs within the world with others who convey their understanding of life and their promise of strength. Human change does not happen as a mere acceptance of the fact of new developmental and social elements. Nor is it just the unfolding of potentialities, a simple cause-and-effect operation.

The actualization of emerging human potentialities is a psychosocial reality, occurring in the sharing of actualities with others. In other words, activation of the developmental aim, of the entire process of human growth, occurs in the dynamic interliving of organismic and societal processes. Activation of one's personal life takes place

in the experience of intuitive and active immersion in the realities of the human situation where one finds oneself and with the persons there. However, psychology also establishes that one may be denied human fulfillment. The critical dynamic here is mutuality, since actualization of the readiness for a new experience of the self depends upon this vital sense of mutual affirmation: the mutual welcoming of the priorities and the ways by which one orders one's existence where one is.

The capacity to change, to transcend one's achieved sense of identity, is necessary to free the inherent thrust toward personal wholeness. Erikson demonstrates that this capacity is actualized, and qualified, in the experience of affirmation--mutuality. His further preoccupation is with the significant encounters: those that have meaning or take on meaning in the experience of mutuality through the life cycle.

Here again the same type of human experience is being described by psychology and theology. In Erikson's view, the experience of personal fulfillment is dependent upon active participation in the reality of the human situation. Theology requires a lived acknowledgement of the claims of the Kingdom of God present in human life. The dynamic key to the actualization of human potentialities is in both views the experience of mutuality. In this

regard Erikson accounts for the encounters critical in psychological growth; theology posits the significance of Jesus. The experience of psychological growth and the experience of belief can be described as a Way of Mutuality.

By way of summary, a theological description of the ways by which one relates to the Kingdom of God and a psychological description of the experience of human growth show a convergence. What is theologically crucial is found to be also psychologically crucial. Hence psychology's statement in the present dialogue with theology is: The believer's response to the Kingdom of God is one of human growth.

Human life lived in relatedness to the Kingdom of God is a response to human growth, since it involves the believer in the same dynamics that Erikson sees necessary in psychological development. These are described here as a thrust toward wholeness, by way of change and mutuality. The Christian response, psychology affirms, is consistent with psychological developmental processes.

This is not to say that the two experiences, the response of the believer and human growth, are considered to be identical. Psychology cannot define the call to human growth as a call to the Kingdom of God. For the reality, Kingdom of God, qua reality, is one posited and named, from its own sources--revelation and faith--by theology. As

such, this theological reality does not constitute the proper object of psychological verification and analysis. However, following its own scientific method and without attempting to establish the ontological reality of the Kingdom of God, psychology can analyze the believer's experience in relating to this theological reality. And theology can ask about the psychologically real in so relating. The common ground in this dialogue is human experience of growth, specifically: the freeing of the dynamic thrust toward wholeness, through change in mutuality.

The first conclusion of this study pertains to the relationship that exists between the response of the believer who relates to the Kingdom of God and the experience of human growth. It is psychology's statement to theology of the psychological reality and validity of this response. The question remains whether theology has anything of its own to say to psychology. In other words, is life lived in relatedness to the Kingdom of God identical with self-actualizing psychological life? Does theology have its own contribution for a psychological understanding of human possibility? This is the burden of the second conclusion.

2. The Theology of the Kingdom of God Is Relevant
to a Psychological Understanding of Human
Development

This conclusion represents the answer of the present study to the question: What can theology say to psychology?

It has been seen that a theological understanding of human existence introduces a new element into the reality to which the believer responds. Here this new reality is theologically described as the Kingdom of God. The second conclusion is based on the judgment that in speaking of this added dimension of reality, theology posits a more ultimate context for human growth and thereby opens up new possibilities for the kind of human fulfillment described by psychology. In other words, theology identifies a fourth process at work in the total human situation, in addition to the three named by psychology. For theology, then, the basic dynamics of growth--wholeness, change, mutuality, are actualized in the interliving of four contexts: the somatic, the mental and the social ones described by psychology, and the Kingdom of God. From this perspective on human reality theology points to new possibilities for psychological freedom. This conclusion will be examined now.

The proclamation of Jesus concerns the reality of the inbreak of divine activity within the human situation. Hence theology posits a fourth process at work there. Besides the basic interliving processes examined by psychology--the somatic, mental and societal ones, theology recognizes that of the eschatological divine activity. Its intention is human completedness; its locus of operation is the human situation where individuals live and grow

together. Theology holds that, while operative within present human reality, and received by way of genuine psychological dynamics, the work, in itself, the Kingdom of God, is not bound by the designs men may envision for it. The divine work of human wholeness is God's own, subject to himself. The lineaments of eschatological Integrity cannot be traced. The eschatological action of God, effecting ultimate human wholeness, can only be received.

What is being said here is that the individual achievement of human wholeness in each stage of life occurs within the interliving of human resources and the inbreaking divine activity. Moreover, whatever human achievement is effected by way of the former is itself open to a more ultimate dimension, by way of the free work of the latter, offered, to be received, into the present of one's life experience. This is so, then, in the experience of each stage of the life cycle, including the final one. Where Erikson can say that psychological integrity is possible when an individual accepts the coincidence of his one life cycle and one segment of human history, theology can speak of theological integrity when an individual admits into the processes of identity formation the action of God freely at work there. In other words, within the process of formation of Identity that can be described by psychology, theology posits the actualization of "eschatological Identity" that is the work of divine action, offered and

received. In the interests of the strength of ultimate Wisdom, it would seem that one will incorporate the view that Jesus gives of what is necessary to receive the Kingdom of God.

Erikson describes what is to happen so that an individual can appropriate fully the humanity that is given with existence. He shows that the inherent thrust toward human wholeness needs to be freed from the anxieties arising in the process of growth. Psychological freedom is a function of the ego's resolution of the various forms of conflict between mistrust and trust recurring through the life cycle. Development requires a constructive resolution in favor of trust so that psychological energies can be freed to identify with the developing sense of identity, and to learn to adapt to what is required within the givens of individual existence.

A basic human dilemma, however, is at work here. Whereas psychology delineates the intimate relationship between the constructive freeing work of the ego at each stage of personal development and the given components of individual biology, society and history, personal growth is a relativity. It depends on the availability of inherent strength to form one's identity which, in turn, depends on the givens of adult identities who love and care and convey values. These the individual can never

guarantee. As Erikson observes, it is only in utopian schemes that the bodily, social and mental orders are wholly supportive of each other. In real life one strives constantly to correct the accruing dangers from one or all of them.

To suggest that there is no single nuclear conflict that is resolved in a wholly constructive way is to point to a real, but often overlooked fact of life. It is easier to overlook it since its admission is to condemn individual life to incompleteness in the project of becoming what one is within the potentialities for human life where one is. The human is condemned, however, to relative self-actualization and fulfillment. One needs actualizing contact with a world ready to contribute to developmental dynamisms. On the other hand, the human is born into a world that will fail him both passively and actively. A psychological utopia of a fully mutually activating human order is just that, a utopia, albeit a necessary and responsible one.

To clarify, the less than expectable environments and the psychological crises that develop because of them is not the only issue here. These are elements open to psychological diagnosis and societal correction. At point here are those inevitable limitations given with an individual's life situation. These may include facts that

belong to race, class, creed, geography, genes, sickness. They also pertain to those failures in the generational process, remediable or not, that are basic realities in any one life. These are matters beyond the adaptation and management described by psychology. They are increments of incompleteness forever imposing their own closure upon the individual's experience of growth. They belong to the tragic aspect, psychologically speaking, of human existence.

This element of relativity in the process of self-actualization and fulfillment is a psychologically critical one. It situates the entire quest for wholeness within a conflict of despair-hope to which psychology cannot address itself. Psychology does not provide the milieu for psychological balance and human wholeness. Acceptance of reality that cannot be changed can only be experienced as an unfair, although real limit upon self-transcendence and growth. Whether the facts of the relativity governing one's self-project are repressed or acknowledged, the related conflict of despair-hope is yet another experience of unfreedom needing to be resolved.

Paradigmatic of this dimension of psychological anxiety and unfreedom is its experience in the final stage of life. Growth through life has been marked by recurring experiences of transcendence beyond achieved sense of

identity. As death approaches one sharply recognizes the boundaries of biological development, of the events, persons and history in which life has been lived, and of one's achieved sense of identity. The human thrust toward a new experience of transcendence of identity through the events of old age and of death raises questions of ultimate concern. Erikson does not examine the psychological management of anxiety about the possibilities of self-transcendence over against the closures imposed by individual death. To do so would require an outline of human growth incorporating aspects of reality that are psychologically unverifiable: life beyond death and human society and human history. He does account for psychological wholeness possible through old age. This, he shows, depends upon acceptance of the coincidence of one's life cycle and the period of history given with it.

For psychology, the problem of final freedom from the anxiety of despair-hope finds a psychosocial solution in the achievement of psychosocial identity, described as: "I am what survives me." It occurs within the final mutuality with the entire living tradition in which one has shared. It is the doing of the ultimate psychological task: offering some cause to hope to succeeding generations by way of the evidence of a vital old age. For psychology the actuality of the cycle of generations is

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the ultimate reality to stand over against the "Great Nothingness." The ultimate possibility for individual life before the closure of personal death is the psychosocial one.

This final experience of closure by death and its concomitant anxiety is paradigmatic of the conflict between despair-hope as the boundaries for self-transcendence and personal wholeness are experienced at each stage in life. Psychology describes the possibilities for whole psychosocial identity. It leaves open the question: how does the individual person deal with the closures imposed by life upon the actuality of individual identity at each stage? Yet psychology demonstrates that human life is a quest for wholeness, and that the freedom needed to transcend the limits of one's own experience comes in the resolution of anxiety.

It is here that theology brings its own creative insights to psychology. They are about the closures and relativity imposed by the life processes and the possibility of new freedom within these. Theology does this, affirming these processes in human life, while giving God place there. For, to repeat, theology posits a fourth dynamic context where human life is being lived: the free divine inbreak into the present human situation. It identifies the divine work as the eschatological fulfillment of human life. Thus

theology claims for the actuality of identity at each stage of growth, a dimension of wholeness that transcends what is achieved in psychosocial identity formation. This is a new increment--present eschatological fulfillment in individual life, imperceptible but effective, and its manifest consummation in the future. Theology requires that one respond, by way of dynamics consistent with those of psychological life: appropriation of the present human situation that involves the whole person in change, mutuality, and wholeness.

The theology of the Kingdom of God offers psychological man a new experience of freedom through acknowledgment and acceptance of the divine inbreak. Admittedly, the personal completedness to be effected in the divine work can be neither specified nor verified by psychological methods. Its affirmation, in a response that is itself an authentic psychological response, constitutes one in a new dimension of freedom from the anxiety of despair-hope. The response is being made to present resources and possibilities for human life beyond those described by psychology and beyond the limiting control of man. Can it not be said, then, that the awareness of these is new possibility for freedom from despair before the determinants and limitations in the experience of the self and the world? Theology brings new perspective, new relatedness to man's self-

understanding, hence new power and strength in his capacity for self-transcendence through the recurring resolution, essential for growth, of the anxiety of despair-hope.

To conclude, a theology of the Kingdom of God, when it asserts that human completedness is a function of divine activity, renders a new experience of human freedom a real possibility. This completedness, beyond Identity, is gift offered. It transcends, yet is consistent with psychological experience that calls one to wholeness in change through mutuality. In Christian life human growth occurs in the interliving of the somatic, psychic, and social processes, and the eschatological divine inbreak. Theology affirms the Kingdom of God is present for everyone. It needs only to be received. Failing the divine work, human wholeness remains an ideal fiction, a scientific myth ready to be dashed on the rocks of man's own limits. The Kingdom of God constitutes ultimate context for authentic human growth.



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APPENDIX

ABSTRACT OF

The Kingdom of God as Ultimate Context for
Human Growth

A Theological Analysis of Erik H. Erikson's
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The Kingdom of God as Ultimate Context for Human Growth

A Theological Analysis of Erik H. Erikson's Psychology of Human Growth

The purpose of this work is to examine the relationship between the human experience of life lived within a Christian perspective and the psychological experience of growth. Two questions underlie the study: Is the christian experience one of authentic human development? Does a theological analysis of life contribute to human self-understanding? The research brings together the teaching of Jesus about the Kingdom of God which he proclaimed, and the description of identity formation given by the psychoanalyst, Erik H. Erikson.

The intention in Chapters I - IV is to surface the dynamics that structure the experience of life lived in relation to the Kingdom of God as Jesus understood it. The theological research of Chapters I - III, drawing primarily from the work of Gerhard Von Rad and Rudolf Schnackenburg, reveals the fundamental nature of the Kingdom of God. It

1 Mary Patricia McCarney, doctoral thesis presented to the Department of Religious Studies of the University of Ottawa, Ontario, Canada, October 1977, xxvii-348 p.

is eschatological event of divine activity, fulfilling promise and containing promise. Chapter IV searches the human dynamics which, according to Jesus, are involved in relating to the event of the Kingdom of God. These emerge by way of fundamental themes in the teaching of Jesus: salvation, conversion, belief. It becomes clear that the christian is invited into an experience of life that is a thrust toward human wholeness, by way of change through mutuality.

The enquiry turns, in Chapters V - VI, to the psychological processes in self-actualization and self-fulfillment as they are understood by Erikson. The intent here is to identify essential dynamics operative in human growth. These are found to be principles of wholeness, of change, of mutuality.

Chapter VII brings together these two ways of conceptualizing human experience. The points of comparison emerging from the research show a convergence of the two experiences described. Here is a statement that Jesus' proclamation of the Kingdom of God calls to authentic human growth in new psychological freedom. In both views the same psychological dynamics are involved: the present is to be an appropriation of human wholeness, through decisions for change, in mutuality. Response to the Kingdom of God brings about the kind of growth that Erikson talks about. A further

conclusion is that this theological view of life, one consistent with psychology, has its own insights about the human phenomenon of growth. These concern eschatological Identity, actualized when life, described by Erikson, is lived in relation to its ultimate context, the Kingdom of God.

A number of implications for further research in Religious Studies follow upon this work and its conclusions. First, it is demonstrated here that theology and psychology can engage in a dialogue free from reductionism or psychologism, and fruitful for both disciplines. An ongoing dialogue is crucial for a theology that would guard itself from hostility towards, or separation from, human life and growth phenomena.

Second, the study shows the possibility of elucidating the reality which theological concepts intend to convey. This frees the experience captured in religious language for integration within a contemporary understanding of human growth. Similar analyses of traditional statements of christian belief, for example, those of the Apostles' Creed need to be made.

Third, the conclusions imply a critique of any theology--moral, or dogmatic--claiming an identity between christian growth and human growth. It also invalidates any view of christian life proposing a "two-world mentality," or

an "experiential dichotomy." Here also is the theoretical basis for respect of the experience of, among others, the humanist, the marxist. Ultimate concerns are related to fundamental structures of human personality and to realities identified in the human situation by theology.

Fourth, a theoretical basis is provided for dealing with a number of critical issues in the Christian Church today. These include: approaches in religious education to the difficult task of bringing theological content to bear upon human experience in ways that are not artificial, inauthentic, or dogmatic; the construction and celebration of liturgy; the choice and training of persons for ministry; approaches to prayer that is realistic, growth-producing, and non-reductionist; the shaping of a social order conducive to the actualization of eschatological Identity; the relevance of a christian view of life in moral theology.

Fifth, a basis is offered here for a view of life that is both free and humble.