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THE PROVISIONING OF THE TEN THOUSAND

Master of Arts Thesis

Submitted to the School of Graduate Studies
University of Ottawa

by Alice Lang
Department of Classical Studies



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ABBREVIATIONS

<u>Full title</u>	<u>Abbreviation</u>
Arrian, the <u>History of Alexander and Indica</u>	Arr. <u>Anab.</u>
Diodorus Siculus, <u>The Library of History</u>	Diod.
Diogenes Laertius, <u>Lives of Eminent Philosophers</u>	Diog. Laert.
Hesiod, <u>Works and Days</u>	Hes. <u>Op.</u>
Hippocrates, <u>Airs Waters Places</u>	Hippoc. <u>Airs</u>
Hippocrates, <u>Regimen</u>	Hippoc. <u>Reg.</u>
Plutarch, <u>Life of Alexander</u>	Plut. <u>Vit. Alex.</u>
Plutarch, <u>Life of Artaxerxes</u>	Plut. <u>Vit. Artax.</u>
Polybius, <u>The Histories</u>	Polyb.
Quintilian, <u>The Institutio Oratoria</u>	Quint. <u>Inst.</u>
Theophrastos, <u>Historia Plantarum</u>	Theophr. <u>Hist. Pl.</u>
Xenophon, the <u>Anabasis</u>	Xen. <u>An.</u>
Xenophon, the <u>Cyropaedia</u>	Xen. <u>Cyr.</u>
Xenophon, <u>Economics</u>	Xen. <u>Oec.</u>
Xenophon, the <u>Hellenica</u>	Xen. <u>Hell.</u>

INTRODUCTION

Following the Peloponnesian War there were many mercenaries in the Greek world who found themselves essentially unemployed. It is not altogether surprising, therefore, that they should have been tempted to respond to new opportunities. Little did one group, however, imagine that an adventure on which it embarked would ultimately take Greeks far beyond the limits of any previous enterprise involving so many Hellenes or that it would culminate in a disaster that would test Greek ingenuity to its utmost.

On the international scene, the once mighty Persian empire was on the decline. In 404 B.C., Artaxerxes II had taken over the Persian monarchy upon the death of his father, Darius II. This had not been a completely smooth transition, because Artaxerxes' younger brother Cyrus was suspected of having designs on the throne, and their mother Parysatis was sympathetic to the ambitions of Cyrus.

While the plots in Susa simmered, there was trouble abroad, for in the same year, Egypt revolted and regained its independence from Persia. The central power of the government in Susa was also threatened by constant struggles between the satraps who had jurisdiction over the many Persian territories.

Artaxerxes, in an effort to keep Cyrus occupied, had given his brother authority over the satrapies of Greater Phrygia and Cappadocia. However, Cyrus' new responsibilities did not distract him from his former ambitions, and he began to gather secretly an army of barbarian¹ soldiers and Greek mercenaries upon whom he could call when the time was ripe.

In 401 B.C., Greek mercenary soldiers under the direction of Clearchus and other generals who had been recruited by the Persian prince Cyrus gathered in Sardis. The true intention of Cyrus was to march against his brother, King Artaxerxes, in order to take over his throne. However, he told the Greeks whom he had enlisted that he wished to march against the Pisidians. Along with the "Ten Thousand" Greeks, Cyrus had collected an army of one hundred thousand barbarians. They marched together into the interior, being supplied by a market which accompanied the army.

After traversing the land of the Pisidians, and continuing to march further inland, the Greeks began to suspect that Cyrus had motives other than the ones which he had previously stated. Cyrus finally admitted that his real intention was to confront his brother, King Artaxerxes. The Greeks were taken aback by this, but after the promise of more pay and other rewards, most of them were persuaded to continue their mission.

¹Throughout this thesis, the word barbarian is used in the ancient Greek sense, meaning anyone who did not speak Greek. It is not intended to be derogatory to the people whom it describes.

Artaxerxes had been forewarned by Tissaphernes, satrap of Lydia and Ionia, that Cyrus was advancing against him. In response, he gathered together a large army which greatly outnumbered that of Cyrus. After a 6 1/2 month journey, Cyrus and his army reached Cunaxa where they met Artaxerxes and his forces in battle.

The Ten Thousand Greeks performed with strength and courage and defeated the division which they faced. Unfortunately, Cyrus himself was killed when, with a small group of table companions,² he rode rashly into hand-to-hand combat with his brother, the King. However, the Greeks did not learn of the fate of Cyrus until the following day.

Artaxerxes believed that since he had killed Cyrus, and put his barbarians troops into disarray, the Greeks were automatically his prisoners of war. Clearchus and his Ten Thousand begged to differ, telling the envoys of Artaxerxes that they would have to take their weapons if they wanted them.

At first the Greeks made a pact of friendship with Ariaeus and the other Persian nobles who had fought with Cyrus. They also made a treaty with Tissaphernes by which he promised to provide a market

²Xen. An. I.viii.25-29. Xenophon describes these table companions as "the noblest of his [Cyrus'] attendants".

for them and lead them safely back to Greece. Unfortunately, both Ariaeus and Tissaphernes proved false to their oaths, and the end result was that Clearchus, four other generals, twenty captains, and two hundred Greek soldiers were murdered by Tissaphernes. The remaining Greeks, of whom Xenophon was one, had to regroup and elect new generals and officers.

Although they faced terrible odds, the Ten Thousand decided not to surrender to Tissaphernes, but were determined to find their way back to Greece. The return of these Greeks, which forms the main subject of Xenophon's Anabasis, "is a page of imperishable renown in the annals of Greek military history" (Bengtson 1988: 160).

The story of this adventure at the end of the fifth century B.C. has prompted generations of readers to admire the Ten Thousand stalwart Greeks who so bravely made their way back after having lost their leaders and finding themselves in hostile Persian territory with no provisions.³

Obtaining supplies was a crucial component of the retreat and it determined much of the strategy that went into it (Fuller 1960: 52). As Xenophon himself notes, the ability of a general to

³"Never has the military and moral superiority of Greeks over the far greater numbers of Asiatics become so clearly evident as in this march from Babylonia to the Black Sea. It is a feat which, in its psychological effects, can only be compared with Thermopylae" (Bengtson 1988: 160).

furnish provisions for his soldiers was perhaps the most important element in a successful march. Clearchus used this point in his efforts to convince the Greeks to continue marching with Cyrus, saying: "...for without provisions neither general nor private is of any use."⁴

Later, when the Greeks were debating their options after Cyrus had been killed by Artaxerxes, provisions continued to be a crucial part of the decision-making process. As Clearchus stated, "On the other hand it is not possible for us to stay where we are, for we cannot get provisions."⁵ Ariaeus stated further that:

If we should return by the way we came, we should perish utterly from starvation, for we now have no provisions whatever. For even on our way hither we were not able to get anything from the country during the last seventeen stages; and where there was anything we consumed it entirely on our march through....⁶

When Tissaphernes was offering to parley with the Greeks in order to conclude a truce, Clearchus emphasized that his men needed provisions and that he would be unwilling to negotiate until he had them in hand:

And Clearchus answered: 'Report to him, then, that we must have a battle first; for we have had no breakfast,

⁴Xen. An. I.iii.12.

⁵Xen. An. II.ii.3.

⁶Xen. An. II.ii.11.

and there is no man alive who will dare to talk to Greeks about a truce unless he provides them with a breakfast."⁷

After the Greeks had considered the proposals put forward by the Persians: "...it was thought best to conclude the truce speedily, so that they could go and get the provisions without being molested."⁸

Later on, after the truce had been concluded, and the Greeks were waiting for many days for Tissaphernes to return, some of the Greeks tried to convince Clearchus that they should flee the area. Clearchus persuaded them to remain, explaining that if they were to leave: "...no one will provide us a market or a place from which we can get provisions."⁹

In his eulogy, Xenophon praises Clearchus for having had the logistical skill of providing supplies: "For example, he was competent, if ever a man was, in devising ways by which his army might get provisions and in procuring them..."¹⁰

The search for provisions continued to be a driving force throughout the retreat. When Xenophon presents his proposals for

⁷Xen. An. II.iii.5.

⁸Xen. An. II.iii.8.

⁹Xen. An. II.iv.5.

¹⁰Xen. An. II.vi.8.

the direction of the march, he says: "It is clear that we must make our way to a place where we can get provisions."¹¹ Later, in describing the desperation of a particular march, he states: "On the next day there was a heavy storm, but they had to continue their march, for they had not an adequate supply of provisions..."¹²

The need for provisions not only influenced the direction of their marches, but it also guided their battle strategy. As Cheirisophus gladly receives the arrival of Xenophon with the rearguard of the procession, he notes: "You have come in the nick of time; for the place must be captured; for the army has no provisions unless we capture this place."¹³

The first-hand lessons which Xenophon had learned as a commander about the utmost importance of provisions can be seen in his work of fiction, the Cyropaedia¹⁴, which is modelled more on the Spartan form of tactics than those of the Persians (Miller 1914: ix). He puts the following words of advice into the mouth of Cambyses who was addressing his son Cyrus:

¹¹Xen. An. III.ii.34.

¹²Xen. An. IV.i.15.

¹³Xen. An. IV.vii.3.

¹⁴Fuller calls this work a "textbook on generalship" (Fuller 1960: 32).

For instance, you doubtless know that if your army does not receive its rations, your authority will soon come to naught. And above all I beg you to remember this: never postpone procuring supplies until want compels you to it, but when you have the greatest abundance, then take measures against want.¹⁵

Cambyes summed it all up by saying: "Tactics are no use to any army without provisions and health."¹⁶

Xenophon's logistical knowledge and brave actions have earned him a place in history. Diogenes Laertius says of Xenophon: "He was a worthy man in general, particularly fond of horses and hunting, an able tactician, as is clear from his writings..."¹⁷ One must keep in mind, however, the distinct possibility of personal bias in Xenophon's account. For example, his own role in the retreat may have been exaggerated, with the result that the leadership contributions of Cheirisophus and others are understated.

The importance of provisioning to the success of the retreat warrants closer investigation, especially since this has not hitherto received the attention it deserves. Indeed, to date an independent investigation into the provisioning of the Ten Thousand

¹⁵Xen. Cyr. I.v.9-10.

¹⁶Xen. Cyr. I.v.14.

¹⁷Diog. Laert. II.vi.56.

has not been undertaken.¹⁸ The subject is admittedly not without difficulties. The chief problem is doubtless the dearth of specific information on the subject. We possess only one main literary source for the journey, namely, Xenophon's account, and in that account he, not surprisingly, omits many details. This makes it necessary for scholars to use comparative sources as well as common sense in an attempt to advance plausible explanations as to how the provisioning was carried out. For instance, in his logistical study of the military expeditions of Alexander the Great, Donald Engels encountered some of the same problems but he did not let that discourage him.¹⁹

As already noted, our main source for this episode is Xenophon's Anabasis. His is in fact the only extant eye-witness account of the events.²⁰ But just how reliable is it?

¹⁸Specific studies on other aspects of the Anabasis which are related to provisioning include: the social structure of the Ten Thousand (Nussbaum 1967); and geography and topography (Hoffmeister 1911; Robiou 1973; Lendle 1984; and Manfredi 1986). Anderson included a chapter called "Commissariat and Camps" in his book (Anderson 1970), but it is concerned with the provisioning of Spartan troops in general.

¹⁹See below.

²⁰Brownson notes that in Xenophon's Hellenica (III.1.2), he (Xenophon) "refers his reader for fuller information to a history of the expedition by Themistogenes the Syracusan", thus indicating that at least one other account was written about the retreat, although it has not survived (Brownson 1922: xi). G. Cousin thinks that the first part of the Anabasis was written by Themistogenes and that the latter part was composed by Xenophon (Cousin 1904: xix). It should be kept in mind, however, that "Themistogenes" may have been merely a pseudonym for Xenophon himself. This is the view expressed by D. J. Mosley, that Xenophon composed the Anabasis in two parts, the first (I.i.1 to V.iii.6) just after 386 B.C.

Polybius, for instance, while describing the ideal qualifications of a historian, expresses the opinion that the best histories are written by men of action.²¹ According to this standard, Xenophon, a leader of the retreat of the Ten Thousand, should have been amply qualified as a historian of the events recorded in his Anabasis. Although Quintilian says that Xenophon should be regarded as a philosopher rather than a historian,²² Polybius calls him one of the "most learned of the ancient writers" and ranks him along with Ephorus, Callisthenes and Plato.²³

Plutarch praised Xenophon by saying that "the vigour of his description makes the reader always a participant in the emotions and perils of the struggle, as though it belonged, not to the past, but to the present..."²⁴ This is one of the aspects of the Anabasis which gives it such a wide appeal.

The views of modern scholars, however, have differed significantly in respect of Xenophon. But in an illuminating

under the pseudonym of Themistogenes, and the second part about 377 B.C. under his own name (Mosley 1984: 1142). Bengtson, who states that Xenophon plagiarized from Sophaenetos of Stymphalus (Bengtson 1988: 481-482), and Mather and Hewitt consider the Anabasis to have been written by Xenophon, but concur that an earlier work by someone called Themistogenes could have existed (Mather and Hewitt 1962: 30; cf. Breitenbach 1967: 1644-1647).

²¹Polyb. XII.28.3.

²²Quint. Inst. X.1.75.

²³Polyb. VI.45.1.

²⁴Plut. Vit. Artax. VIII.1.

inaugural lecture on Xenophon's Anabasis, delivered at the University of Tübingen on 12 December 1965, Hartmut Erbse (1966), taking up a theory initially advanced with typical ingenuity by Eduard Schwartz (1889), further refuted the negative approach to Xenophon at first championed by Barthold Georg Niebuhr (1828) and later amplified by Theodor Comperz (1903), and also refuted the resultant negative approach to Xenophon built up by generations of high school teachers. He went on to demonstrate the true intention behind Xenophon's Anabasis, namely, that it was a defense of Xenophon's involvement among the mercenaries who joined Cyrus' expedition. In doing so Erbse helped to establish a new respect for Xenophon.

In the year following the appearance of Erbse's thoughtful discussion, Breitenbach (1967) published his important study on Xenophon, which further established his significance (cf. Nickel 1979). More recently, Lendle (1984) and Manfredi (1986) have also contributed to this end.

But opinions have also differed on other aspects of Xenophon. Adcock, e.g., described the Anabasis as a "military document of great value...based on firsthand knowledge of events" (Adcock 1967: 100). By contrast, Anderson, while admitting that Xenophon is "our chief contemporary authority for the 4th century B.C.," called him an "inferior" historian as opposed to his predecessors because he left out important historical information (Anderson 1979: 9). But

their differences in opinion may arise because Adcock views Xenophon as a military historian, whereas Anderson refers to the inadequacies of the Anabasis as an example of political history. Grayson put forward the view that Xenophon never actually intended to write history, but that he was interested in notions of leadership in writing the Anabasis (Grayson 1975: 38).

We must, however, not be unaware of the particular problems involved for Xenophon in producing such an account. Most scholars support the idea that Xenophon, while journeying, took some notes e.g., on topics such as the distances travelled and the time taken to cover the distances (Cousin 1904: xx; Brownson 1922: xi; and Breitenbach 1967: 1649-1655).

But altogether his account certainly constitutes a remarkable feat, considering that, in his own words, he was constantly "on call" or available to be consulted by the soldiers²⁵, and had very little leisure time.²⁶ One is left to wonder how he managed to write by the light of small oil lamps, and on what materials he wrote. When he proceeded to write the Anabasis, he had to rely on these notes and his memory of the retreat. It is surprising, under these circumstances, that he included so many details, such as the names and cities of origin of officers and soldiers described in

²⁵Xen. An. IV.iii.10.

²⁶See the section in Chapter One entitled Preparing Camp.

various episodes of the retreat.²⁷

While keeping in mind the probability that Xenophon's original account contained inaccuracies, one must also bear in mind the distinct possibility that there were mistakes and omissions made in the transmission of this work as it was recopied by scribes through the centuries (Reynolds and Wilson 1968: 5). These types of mistakes were already recognized in antiquity by at least one ancient author.²⁸

The fact that we possess only one chief literary source may none the less (despite the circumstance that it is a first-hand account) appear as a deterrent to the type of study on which we are here embarking. On the contrary, with the information that Xenophon as eye-witness to the events does provide--as little as it may be--we can pursue a bolder path. As Engels noted in a similar context:

Much in this reconstruction of the Macedonian logistic system is hypothetical for there are many unknown variables that cannot be calculated. Nevertheless, if the solutions to the Macedonian army's logistic problems are ever to have a scientific basis, it is first necessary that hypotheses be advanced which explain the recorded events, however inaccurate they may later prove to be (Engels 1978: 25).

²⁷Xen. An. IV.i.27-28, ii.13, ii.28, and iii.22. In the Cyropaedia, Xenophon notes that it is very important for a general to know the names of his officers (Cyr. V.iii.46).

²⁸Polybius notes this as the cause of factual errors in the writings of Ephorus (Polyb. XII.4a.45).

It is hoped that this current study can serve as a further effort of this type.²⁹

The relevance of such a study as this is that by understanding the problems of provisioning which the Ten Thousand faced and overcame, one can gain an appreciation for the ingenuity of these Greeks and at the same time learn from their achievements.

In pursuing our goal, in addition to employing Xenophon's Anabasis as our chief source, we shall also consult the descriptions of provisioning in Xenophon's Cyropaedia which are very likely based on his own experiences in the retreat of the Ten Thousand, and, where relevant, draw upon similar information from the later campaigns of Alexander the Great.

Moreover, references by later authors to the retreat of the Ten Thousand will also be taken into account.³⁰ But it should be noted that the Anabasis of Xenophon has primary merit because it is

²⁹Borza noted in connection with his own research in ancient logistics, that he hoped "to set out some guidelines for future work, to report on work already underway and to discuss some critical standards for further study" (Borza 1977: 296). It is hoped that this study will accomplish some of the same goals.

³⁰Later sources which refer to the Anabasis include: Diod. XIV.19-31 and 37; Plut. Vit. Artax. 4, 6, 7, 8, 9, 18, and 20; Diog. Laert. II.49-51, 55 and 58; Polyb. III.6.10; and Arr. Anab. I.xii.3-4, II.iv.3, vii.8-9, viii.11 and IV.xi.9. This is not an exhaustive list of sources.

a first-hand account.³¹

The reader of the Anabasis cannot help but admire the courage of the Ten Thousand, who, in a time of extreme crisis, used their discipline and intelligence to outwit a group of Persian soldiers who enjoyed such advantages as superior numbers and knowledge of local conditions.³² Xenophon comments on the extreme nature of their predicament: "... [that] they were distant from Greece not less than ten thousand stadia, that they had no guide to show them the way, that they were cut off by impassable rivers which flowed across the homeward route..."³³

The major aspect of the Greek exploit was the inland retreat, from Cunaxa to Trapezus, as described by Xenophon in Books Two to Four of his Anabasis. For this reason, most of the discussion regarding the provisioning will focus on these books of the Anabasis.

The provisioning of the Ten Thousand was affected by the terrain through which they travelled and the weather which they

³¹By contrast, the extant histories of the campaigns of Alexander the Great were not written until several centuries after the event.

³²Phalinus, a spokesman for King Artaxerxes, reminds the Greeks of their precarious position while he tries to persuade them to surrender their weapons to the King (Xen. An. II.i.11).

³³Xen. An. III.i.2.

encountered.³⁴ The factors of the terrain and climate of their route could each easily constitute a major study. Questions related to the terrain have already been discussed in considerable detail (Manfredi 1986). Consequently, for the purposes of this thesis, only the most important aspects of terrain and climate will be considered, i.e., the degree to which they directly affected the problems of provisioning.

Although Xenophon gives a fairly detailed description of the march, not all elements of the story are completely clear. For one thing, it was uncharted terrain for the Greeks, as Clearchus notes to Tissaphernes, "...without you, all our road is through darkness--for none of it do we know--every river is hard to pass..."³⁵ Xenophon speaks of the Greeks not being well versed on the geography of the region: "Then remember the rivers--there may be others, for aught I know, that we must cross, but we know the Euphrates at any rate, that it cannot possibly be crossed in the face of an enemy."³⁶ In the absence of concrete evidence, various theories have been advanced as to the exact route which the Ten Thousand followed on their retreat from Cunaxa to Trapezus (Hoffmeister 1911; Robiou 1973; Lendle 1984; and Manfredi 1986).

³⁴Borza also notes the influence of topography and climate on the military expeditions of Alexander the Great (Borza 1977: 296).

³⁵Xen. An. II.v.9.

³⁶Xen. An. II.iv.6.

It should be pointed out that all the different possible routes still fall into the same basic region, and reflect a similar terrain and climate.³⁷ Admittedly, varying routes would in turn affect both the amount of food which was necessary and the amount available.³⁸ However, the information needed to determine what difference this would make would be difficult to collate, and in the long run, the minor variations that this would involve would not dramatically alter the results of this study.

Our principal object, then, will be to explore how the Greeks succeeded in acquiring provisions in the extraordinarily difficult circumstances which they encountered on the inland route between Cunaxa and Trapezus.

³⁷Borza notes that "the conditions of land travel in Greece and western Asia have remained essentially unchanged from ancient times until about one hundred years ago" (Borza 1977: 296).

³⁸In areas where the terrain was difficult to traverse, such as the mountains of Carduchia, the soldiers and camp-followers would have required more calories than they would have needed in places where the terrain was flat and easy to cross. The type of terrain also affected what type of provisions were available. For instance, in the flat plains, where the weather was more temperate, domesticated and wild plants grew in greater abundance than they did in the snow-covered mountains of Carduchia.

CHAPTER ONE

The Mechanics of Provisioning the Returning Greeks

Human beings require basic necessities in order to survive: water, food and shelter, usually in that order of importance. The amounts of water and food which are needed depend on a number of factors: the number of people; the size, age, sex and metabolism of these individuals; the activities in which the individuals are engaged; and the climate in which they are living. These factors must be taken into account in studies of provisioning.

The term "provisions" is defined in this context as supplies provided for the present and future. It can include water, food, clothing, fuel, and fodder for animals, but usually it refers specifically to food. For the purposes of this study, food and drink, the two most commonly cited types of provisions, will form the chief subject of our investigation.

(1) Needs of the Basic Soldier on Retreat

Besides the camp-followers (whose numbers and impact will be considered later), and the sick and wounded soldiers, the majority of the Ten Thousand were strong, healthy adult males in prime condition.¹ They had to march while carrying belongings, fight

¹Xen. An. III.i.22-23.

hostile tribes at almost every turn, and forage for food. The strenuous nature of their activities would have caused them to require a substantial number of calories in order to function.

D.W. Engels has calculated the average nutritional and caloric requirements of a soldier in the campaigns of Alexander the Great (Engels 1978: 18). He has also estimated consumption rates in terms of how much food could be carried by an army, based on how the baggage was distributed among the men and pack animals (Engels 1978: 19-22). These figures will be used and modified in order to correspond to the details of the retreat of the Ten Thousand.

A. The Number of People on the Retreat

There does not appear to be sufficient evidence to determine the exact number of people who were involved in the retreat. Numbers given by Xenophon indicate that the Greek army was comprised of approximately 13,900 soldiers before the battle of Cunaxa.² Between this episode and the arrival at Trapezus, the numbers were greatly diminished due to various causes.³ The "Ten Thousand", then, is used in this study in the 'literary' sense, since it is more or less representative of the average number of retreating Greek soldiers. These soldiers were accompanied by a

²See Table One.

³See Table Two.

large number of camp-followers.⁴

(i) Soldiers

In Book V of the Anabasis, Xenophon informs his readers that after the arrival in Trapezus, 8,600 troops remained.⁵ Some of the original Ten Thousand had perished in skirmishes⁶, frozen to death in the snow⁷, or died of exposure.⁸ Others had deserted to the enemy or had been captured.⁹ After the arrival at Trapezus, some of the soldiers had been sent away, namely the sick and older ones, on ships.¹⁰ This indicates that when the troops set out from Cunaxa, there were more than 8,600.

In Book IV, Xenophon describes a battle with the Colchians. He says that there were 80 companies of hoplites, with each company numbering about 100. This would add up to a figure of about 8,000 hoplites. He also says that there were 3 divisions of peltasts and bowmen, with each division numbering about six hundred men. This

⁴See Section (ii) below.

⁵Xen. An. V.iii.3.

⁶Xen. An. III.iv.1, iv.16, v.2, and IV.i.10.

⁷Xen. An. IV.v.4, V.viii.2-3, and viii.15.

⁸Xen. An. IV.v.11.

⁹See Table Two.

¹⁰Xen. An. V.iii.1.

would equal a total of 1,800 light-armed soldiers.¹¹

In the Cyropaedia, Xenophon describes the ranks of soldiers, which may be based on his own experience with the Ten Thousand. His description may be another indication that a company represented approximately 100 soldiers:

Private soldier	
Corporal	- Squad of 5
Sergeant	- Squad of 10
Lieutenant	- Platoon of 50
Captain	- Company of 100
Colonel	- Regiment of 1,000
General	- 1 brigade of 10,000 ¹²

By contrast, in the Anabasis, the ranks of officers listed are only generals and captains, and the generals command groups of soldiers substantially fewer than ten thousand.

By adding the two totals of 8,000 and 1,800 (mentioned in a previous paragraph) together, one arrives at a figure of 9,800 troops. If one used a formula of one captain for each 100 soldiers, a number of 98 captains would be attained. Evidence for using this figure comes from the passage concerning the events immediately following the murder of Clearchus and 24 of his officers:

¹¹Xen. An. IV.viii.15-16.

¹²Xen. Cyr. II.i.22.

When all had come together, they seated themselves at the front of the encampment, and the generals and captains thus assembled amounted in number to about one hundred.¹³

This seems to indicate that before the massacre, there were about 125 officers altogether.

In a later passage, Xenophon notes that "...they formed six companies of a hundred men each and put a captain at the head of each company...."¹⁴ When the number of officers is added, it brings the total of the soldiers up to a figure of 9,900 troops, which is not far from the arbitrary figure of ten thousand.

As was pointed out previously, before the Battle of Cunaxa, there were approximately 13,900 Greek mercenary soldiers in the army of Cyrus¹⁵. There is a discrepancy between this figure and Xenophon's figure of 12,900 (based on his estimates of 10,400 hoplites and 2,500 peltasts).¹⁶

The discrepancy of 1,000 troops may be explained in several ways. Perhaps Xenophon considers the 700 troops of Cheirisophus and the 400 troops who deserted to Cyrus from Abrocomas, to belong

¹³Xen. An. III.i.33.

¹⁴Xen. An. III.iv.21.

¹⁵See Table One.

¹⁶Xen. An. I.vii.10. Earlier in I.ii.9, Xenophon speaks of 11,000 hoplites and 2,000 peltasts. Plutarch (Vit. Artax. VI.4) says that there were nearly 13,000 Greek mercenaries.

directly to Cyrus' army.¹⁷ However, it is evident that later on, during the retreat, Cheirisophus was the chief general of the Ten Thousand. Cheirisophus ran the meetings at which the Greeks decided how best to save themselves after the murder of their officers,¹⁸ and he acted as their spokesperson with envoys sent by Tissaphernes.¹⁹ Cheirisophus was also selected to lead the advance troops.²⁰

Another possibility is that Xenophon simply left out the 700 or so light-armed troops and bowmen from his calculations. These first two possibilities seem much more feasible than the idea that 1,000 troops left with Xenias and Pasion when they departed in a hurry with only one ship.²¹

For these reasons, and the distinct possibility that Xenophon was somewhat sketchy with his use of figures, it seems appropriate to keep the figure of 13,900 troops as an original working number.

In connection with the numbers of Greek troops which Xenophon

¹⁷According to Brownson, "these seven hundred hoplites under Cheirisophus had been sent by the Lacedaemonian authorities to aid Cyrus, and were the only troops in his army which stood in any official connection with any Greek state" (Brownson 1922: 37, n. 1).

¹⁸Xen. An. III.i.45-46, ii.1-3 and ii.33.

¹⁹Xen. An. III.iii.3.

²⁰Xen. An. III.ii.37.

²¹Xen. An. I.iv.7-8. See Table Two.

quotes for the battle with the Colchians, if one subtracts 9,900 from 13,900, one is left with 4,000 soldiers. Table Two lists the specific instances where numbers of soldiers who were lost due to various causes are mentioned by Xenophon. The totals of those lost add up to 722. One is left to assume that the remaining 3,288 soldiers were lost on the various occasions on which Xenophon mentions losses but gives no numbers. (Even if one subtracts the original discrepancy of 1,000 troops, one is still left with 2,288 soldiers missing.)

It seems strange that such a large number of soldiers should be unaccounted for and that Xenophon does not attempt to explain this discrepancy. Perhaps this is a deliberate ploy by Xenophon to underplay the losses which the Greeks had suffered at the hands of their enemies.

Regardless of the above-mentioned discrepancies, it is necessary to choose an average number of soldiers in order to formulate theories about their provisioning. For the purposes of calculating the consumption rates of this army, it seems permissible and useful to use the figure of 9,900 soldiers as an average number.

Xenophon uses the figure ten thousand quite loosely throughout his account; for example, in his intended challenge to the Persians, he tells his fellow Greeks, "...for today they will

behold, not one Clearchus, but ten thousand, who will not suffer anybody to be a bad soldier."²² In a later reference he says: "...and I, who have done the deceiving, will be one lone man, while you, the deceived, will be close to ten thousand, with arms in your hands."²³

(ii) Camp-Followers

Xenophon gives no exact numbers for the camp-followers, but he indicates that there were many.²⁴ He says that after a battle with the Carduchians, the captives were so numerous that they slowed down the march, and they made it necessary for the soldiers to find and carry twice the usual amount of provisions.²⁵ This shows that on at least one occasion during the retreat there was a ratio of as many as one camp-follower for each soldier.

The group of camp-followers consisted of servants of the officers and soldiers, drivers of baggage animals, various other professionals,²⁶ captives²⁷, and women and children. Some of these

²²Xen. An. III.ii.32.

²³Xen. An. V.vii.9.

²⁴Xen. An. IV.iii.27: Xenophon notes that once they were separated from the baggage train and camp-followers, the remaining group of soldiers looked very small. In III.ii.36, Xenophon comments on the "great crowd of camp-followers".

²⁵Xen. An. IV.i.13.

²⁶See Chapter Two, Section 1 A (i).

camp-followers performed functions for the common good, while others were "companions" for the individual soldiers.²⁸ It is obvious that Xenophon was aware of this distinction when he ordered the soldiers to release all "unnecessary" captives in order to ease the difficulties of the march.²⁹

For calculating purposes, it is necessary to pick an arbitrary number to represent the camp-followers. If one were to choose an average of one camp-follower for every three soldiers, one would come up with a rough total of 3,300. This figure, based on a total of 9,900 soldiers, may be too low, but for now it will serve the purposes of this investigation. If one adds together the number of soldiers and camp-followers, one arrives at a grand total of 13,200 people on the retreat.³⁰

²⁷Xen. An. III.v.14.

²⁸Xen. An. IV.i.14, and vi.3.

²⁹Xen. An. IV.i.12. In the Cyropaedia (IV.iv.7), Cyrus proposes that they release the prisoners of war so that they do not have to watch for them or feed them. The difficulties caused by the presence of the camp-followers will be discussed in Chapter Two.

³⁰Lendle arrives at a considerably higher figure, suggesting that the total was approximately 20,000. He puts the total of camp-followers (shield-bearers of officers and hoplites, slaves, servants of officers, surgeons, priests, overseers, merchants, translators, herdsmen, etc.) at ca. 8,000 which he regards as a low figure (Lendle 1984: 207-209). I chose not to adopt Lendle's figures because they seemed too high given Xenophon's efforts throughout the retreat, to reduce the number of camp-followers in order to increase the mobility of the Ten Thousand. Also, in light of the enormous amounts of food which were required, as outlined in my research, it seemed implausible to me that there would have been enough food to support the number of camp-followers suggested by Lendle.

It may be useful also to note that there were many animals that accompanied the people on the retreat, some of which were used to carry baggage.³¹

B. Other Statistical Details Related to Provisioning

Now that some average numbers for the soldiers and camp-followers have been estimated, it is possible to look at the other statistical factors related to calculating the amount of food needed on the retreat.

(i) Soldiers

The size of the soldiers is not mentioned, so one must assume that they were, on average, the same size as the typical man of the Mediterranean type of that day. This means that they were probably shorter than the average male of today, if one takes into account the evidence of skeletal remains from mainland Greece (Angel 1945: 323-324).

As far as the age of the soldiers is concerned, they were adults, probably ranging in age from eighteen to the late forties. The age of individual soldiers is mentioned in only a few instances

³¹Xenophon mentions that at one point there were 2,000 skins available from sheep, goats, cattle and asses (Xen. An. III.v.9-10) (cf. Lendle 1984: 207-211).

by Xenophon. For instance, after the murder of the Greek leaders, Xenophon gives a eulogy for each of them. He mentions that Proxenus the Boeotian was thirty years old³², and that Agias the Arcadian and Socrates the Achaean were thirty-five years old.³³ He also notes that Clearchus was 50 years old at the time of his death³⁴ and was a veteran of the Peloponnesian War.³⁵ The ages cited by Xenophon should probably be viewed as approximations.

Scholars generally agree that Xenophon himself was about thirty years old at the time of the retreat (Brownson 1922: x; and Mather and Hewitt 1962: 23). In Book V, he says that after reaching Trapezus, soldiers over the age of forty were sent home on ships, along with women, children and the sick and wounded.³⁶ Perhaps this indicates that soldiers over the age of forty were considered to have been past their prime.³⁷ Some of these older soldiers were probably veterans of the Peloponnesian War (Brownson 1922: ix), like their former leader Clearchus.

³²Xen. An. II.vi.20.

³³Xen. An. II.vi.30.

³⁴Xen. An. II.vi.15.

³⁵Xen. An. II.v.2.

³⁶Xen. An. V.iii.1.

³⁷For example, on one occasion Xenophon notes that men under the age of 30 were asked to do the very strenuous work of building a bridge and the older men went to help **only after** they saw the need for haste (Xen. An. II.iii.12).

The Greek soldiers were male. The metabolism of the Greek soldiers is a factor for which no evidence is available; therefore, it cannot be calculated. However, there is a lot of information which indicates that the Greeks were involved in very rigorous activities during the retreat. After they reached Trapezus, Leon of Thurii described how weary he was of all the strenuous activities in which they had been engaged, and how he longed to sail home:

"Well, I, for my part, gentlemen," he said, am tired by this time of packing up and walking and running and carrying my arms and being in line and standing guard and fighting, and what I long for now is to be rid of these toils, since we have the sea, and to sail the rest of the way, and so reach Greece stretched out on my back, like Odysseus."³⁸

This has a ring of being genuine, and so may be taken as indicating that the soldiers would have required a substantial number of calories in order to function well.

The climate also would have affected their need for provisions. For example, in the instances when they encountered very hot weather³⁹, they would have required more water. When they encountered bitterly cold weather in Armenia⁴⁰, they would have needed more calories in order to maintain a healthy body

³⁸Xen. An. V.i.2.

³⁹Xen. An. I.v.5-7.

⁴⁰Xen. An. IV.iv.3-4 and v.12-14.

temperature.

(ii) Camp-Followers

The camp-followers, including numbers of women and children, would have been of smaller size, on average, than the Greek soldiers. The group of camp-followers was made up of children, young adults, and old people, so their ages varied more widely than those of the soldiers.

The camp-followers included both males and females. Their metabolism cannot be calculated, although it would be reasonable to assume that the teenage children would have had "growing appetites", while the old people would have required fewer calories than the younger adults.

The activities of the camp-followers were probably more sedentary than those of the soldiers, because the camp-followers for the most part were not required to engage in combat. However, they still had to walk and carry some baggage in fairly gruelling conditions of the retreat. The weaker individuals, including the sick and wounded, probably rode in wagons when these were available or were carried by other camp-followers or soldiers.⁴¹

The climate would have had a similar effect on the camp-

⁴¹Xen. An. II.ii.14, III.iv.31, IV.v.22, and V.viii.7-11.

followers to that already mentioned with regard to the soldiers. When all of the above factors are taken into consideration, it can reasonably be assumed that the average camp-follower would require fewer calories than the Greek soldier. This would mean that the camp-follower would require fewer provisions than the Greek soldier.

(C) Calculations of the Amount of Provisions Required

In accordance with the average numbers discussed previously, the chosen representative figures of 9,900 soldiers and 3,300 camp-followers (or one per 3 soldiers) adds up to a total of 13,200 people on the retreat. If one employs Engels' calculations of 1 baggage animal per 50 individuals (Engels 1978: 18), one comes up with the number of 264 baggage animals.

Engels has done research into the caloric and water requirements of soldiers on the march and his findings revealed that each soldier would require 3 lbs. (1.36 kg.) of grain and 2 qts. (1.89 l.) of water per day. He also has found that the baggage animals would require 10 lbs. (4.54 kg.) of grain and 8 gallons (30.31 l.) of water per day (Engels 1978: 18).

It should be noted that these are maximum figures which are founded on the base assumption that the soldiers were fully fed, a situation which was possible only under the best conditions.

It is very likely that the camp-followers received a smaller amount of daily rations than the soldiers. For calculating purposes, a figure of $\frac{2}{3}$ the soldiers' rations will be employed to represent the rations given to the camp-followers.⁴² This would equal a grain ration of 0.91 kg. for each camp-follower.

A group of 9,900 soldiers, each receiving a ration of 1.36 kg. of grain per day, would require a total of 13,464 kg. of grain for each day. A group of 3,300 camp-followers, each receiving 0.91 kg. of grain per day, would require a total of 3,003 kg. of grain for each day.

Using the above figures, it appears that the retreating Greeks would have required ca. 16,467 kg. of grain for the people and ca. 1,198.56 kg. of grain for the baggage animals. This makes a total of ca. 17,665.56 kg. of grain which would be needed for one day in order for the people and animals to be fully fed.

Assuming that they were in possession of this large amount of grain, how would they have transported it? According to the research done by Engels, each baggage animal would be able to carry

⁴²It is likely that there was also a distinction among the camp-followers as to how much grain each one received. For instance, the male, professional camp-followers probably received more food than the women and children. However, since there is no concrete evidence as to the numbers of professional camp-followers as opposed to the non-professional camp-followers, an average ration equal to $\frac{2}{3}$ of the soldiers' rations is used to represent the rations of the camp-followers as a group.

ca. 240 lbs (108.86 kg.) (Engels 1978: 19). If one divides 17,665.56 kg. of grain by 108.86, it emerges that 162 animals would have been able to carry one day's grain requirement.

Earlier, the average number of 1 baggage animal per 50 individuals was used to come up with a number of 264 baggage animals. If 162 of them were employed in carrying one day's grain, that would leave 102 pack animals to carry equipment. The soldiers and camp-followers were also able to carry their individual and collective belongings.⁴³ According to Engels' research, each soldier would have been able to carry 80 lbs. (36.29 kg.) of equipment (Engels 1978: 21, n. 31).

The amount of water necessary for survival also needs to be examined. Using the above-mentioned figures, the people on retreat would have needed ca. 24,948 litres of water, while the baggage animals would have required ca. 7,999.2 litres, making a total of ca. 32,947.2 litres of water each day for drinking alone. This does not include water for cooking or personal hygiene.

A few points need to be made regarding these calculations. It should be noted that there are different types of cereals and grains, including wheat, barley, spelt and corn. The amount of grain needed by the Ten Thousand would have varied according to the type which was available.

⁴³See Chapter Two, Transportation of Belongings.

Also, these calculations are based on a diet of "bread and water", and do not take into consideration the other forms of food of which the retreating Greeks partook.⁴⁴ It would not have been necessary for them to have 1.36 kg. of grain per day (or to carry that amount) at the times when they were in possession of herds of cattle, sheep, and goats. These "meals on heels" provided a supplement to the grain, which meant that they would need to eat less grain, and they did not add to the weight of baggage since the animals were able to move under their own power. Of course, these herds of animals also required fodder and water,⁴⁵ and they had to be tended by camp-followers or soldiers who were assigned to this duty.

As far as the water is concerned, for a large part of the retreat, the Greeks were travelling next to waterways, i.e. the Tigris, Phiscus, Zapatas, Centrites, Teleboas, Euphrates, Phasis, Araxes and Harpasus Rivers, which provided them with a fairly constant source, and meant that they did not have to carry their entire daily requirement with them. Also, they were able to use the villagers' local water sources, such as springs.⁴⁶

⁴⁴Studies done on the foods eaten by the Greeks during the Classical period conclude that their diets were comprised of 65 to 70% cereal products, 20 to 25% fruits, pulses and vegetables, and 5 to 15% oils, meats and wines (Gallant 1991: 68).

⁴⁵Xen. An. I.v.7.

⁴⁶Xen. An. IV.v.9.

What emerges from this discussion is an appreciation for the vast amount of food and water which this travelling army of people required each day.⁴⁷ One can also understand that their nutritional and caloric requirements would not have been able to be supplied solely by hunting wild animals or foraging for local plants. It seems highly unlikely that the regions through which they travelled would have had enough of these natural resources to feed a group of 13,200 people.⁴⁸

They had to depend on the stored provisions of agricultural products of the natives whose villages they occupied during their retreat. The location and numbers of the villages determined the route which they took, and the speed with which they travelled. For instance if they came to a village which was sparsely provisioned, they would not be able to stay there for long.⁴⁹ On the other hand, on the occasions when they arrived in villages that were well-stocked with food, they were able to spend a few days resting and feasting, and they were able to stock up for the next portion of the journey.⁵⁰

⁴⁷See the last section of Chapter One, Impact on the Environment.

⁴⁸Gallant notes that there are many types of wild foodstuffs to be found in the Mediterranean world; however, he also comments on the relatively low calorific content of this food, and he says that hunter gatherers in this region required 1.4 to 40 square miles of terrain per person in order to survive on wild foodstuffs alone (Gallant 1991: 115-118).

⁴⁹Xen. An. II.ii.3.

⁵⁰Xen. An. IV.v.22-36. See also Table Three.

(2) The Nature of the Provisions

The types of food which the Greeks were able to obtain during the retreat⁵¹ varied according to the source, i.e., the ethnic character of the villages which they plundered, as they travelled through different regions. The question of how this food corresponded to what the Greeks preferred to eat is another issue. According to Brownson, the Greeks did not like to eat much meat (Brownson 1922: 49, n.4), so it would have been a real hardship for them when they had to resort to this, but it was preferable to the alternative of fasting.⁵²

One can understand that meat would not be the food of first choice for soldiers on the move. It takes time and the proper tools in order to butcher animals, especially large ones, and it is a messy task. Also, once the animal has been butchered, one is faced with the problem of preserving whatever is not cooked and eaten immediately. An army such as the Ten Thousand would be capable of consuming many pigs, sheep, etc., so perhaps leftovers were not a problem. As we have seen above, the meat "on the hoof" represented a somewhat convenient way to transport provisions. Also, it was quite readily available from the villages, as on a representative occasion when "many herds of cattle had been

⁵¹See Table Three.

⁵²At one point the Greeks had to subsist on cattle for a few days while other types of provisions were unavailable (Xen. An. IV.vii.17).

captured."⁵³

Even the other types of available food had to be prepared and preserved by the Greeks; therefore, grains, dried fruit and fermented drinks were the preferable types of provisions for them. Fortunately, these seem to be the types of food which were usually available.

A. The Nutritional Content of the Provisions

How do the provisions which the Greeks obtained correspond to the basic nutrients needed by human beings in order to remain healthy? In the previous section, the amount of grain and water necessary for survival was discussed. However, it is known that grain and water by themselves do not contain the total amount of vitamins and minerals necessary in the equation of proper nourishment.⁵⁴

According to the latest Canadian Food Guide, people need the following food groups in order to maintain a healthy diet: milk or milk products; meats or alternate forms of protein; grains and their products, such as breads and cereals; and fresh fruits and vegetables (Health and Welfare 1985: 4).

⁵³Xen. An. III.v.2.

⁵⁴Gallant notes that "the figures on the recommended daily caloric requirements produced by different international bodies vary" (Gallant 1991: 62).

If one takes into consideration all of the foods mentioned in Xenophon's account, the food group which seems to have been scarce was fresh fruit and vegetables. Dried fruits such as dates are mentioned,⁵⁵ and also the "crown of the palm"⁵⁶ which was probably vegetable matter of some type.

The absence of this food group would most likely have resulted in a deficiency of certain vitamins such as Vitamin C and some minerals. Depending on the length of time that the members of the retreat went without these vitamins, they may have been prone to weakness and possible disease, such as scurvy. However, Xenophon does not mention any symptoms which resemble those attributed to scurvy, i.e. bleeding gums.

Another area of deficiency appears to be in the scarcity of milk products in the diet of the Ten Thousand, which would have resulted in lack of calcium. Cheese is mentioned in reference to provisions.⁵⁷ The reader is also informed that sheep and cattle were acquired by the Ten Thousand,⁵⁸ and they could have supplied them with a source of milk. It should be noted that calcium is also available from other sources.

⁵⁵Xen. An. II.iii.15.

⁵⁶Xen. An. II.iii.16.

⁵⁷Xen. An. II.iv.28.

⁵⁸Xen. An. II.iv.27 and IV.iv.25-27.

It seems very likely that the lack of certain vitamins and minerals would have weakened the immune systems of the Ten Thousand, making them more susceptible to illnesses. Nutrition is based on a complex relationship between all of the vitamins, minerals, and other substances such as oils and sugars which one consumes. It is also affected by rates of metabolism and the chemical make-up of each individual.⁵⁹

Xenophon mentions snow blindness and frost-bite as conditions from which some of the soldiers suffered, but these were on specific occasions and they were caused by severely inclement weather.⁶⁰ Xenophon relates details of the occasions when large groups of the soldiers became ill after eating certain foods which did not agree with them.⁶¹ He also mentions the presence of sick members during the retreat, although he does not describe their various ailments,⁶² and in Book V, he says that some members of the retreat died as a result of disease.⁶³ However, there is no direct evidence of malnutrition among the Ten Thousand except that Xenophon mentions that soldiers were suffering from hunger-

⁵⁹"The definition of what constitutes proper nutrition or malnutrition has varied as advances in scientific techniques have occurred and as the issue of diet has been politicized with the increasing incidence of famine and its links to financial aid" (Gallant 1991: 62).

⁶⁰Xen. An. IV.v.13.

⁶¹Xen. An. IV.viii.20-21. See pp. 47 and 129.

⁶²Xen. An. V.iii.1.

⁶³Xen. An. V.iii.3.

faintness in one episode.⁶⁴

One point that must be made is that the food groups mentioned in the Canadian Food Guide are tailored to fit the forms of food preferences of the people of the modern Western World. Anthropologists have observed that people of other cultures derive their nourishment from many different types of food which do not necessarily conform to the food groups eaten by people of the modern Western World. Illnesses in the ancient world cannot be simply equated with sicknesses of today.

It should also be pointed out that on most occasions the Ten Thousand ate the food supplies from villages abandoned by their inhabitants.⁶⁵ In this case one can formulate two different scenarios. The first would be that because of the time of year that it was,⁶⁶ no fresh fruit or vegetables were available, so the villagers' diets would lack certain vitamins until the next harvest. (This may have been supplemented by dried fruit and pickled or preserved vegetables.⁶⁷) In this case they would have been subject to at least some form of malnutrition. The diets of the Ten Thousand, depending directly on the supplies of these

⁶⁴Xen. An. IV.v.7.

⁶⁵Xen. An. III.iv.18, iv.31, v.1-2, IV.1.8, and ii.22.

⁶⁶See Chapter One, Section 3 A, The Season of the Year.

⁶⁷Xen. An. V.iv.27-29. The Mossynoecians preserved dolphin meat and blubber in vessels.

villagers, would have reflected the same degrees of nutrition and/or malnutrition.

The second scenario would be that the supplies of the villagers actually contained all of the necessary nutrients for a healthy diet. It could be that the items of food from the "missing" food group actually were available, but simply are not mentioned by Xenophon. Given the probability that his account was composed some years after the retreat (Breitenbach 1967: 1639-1644), with references to notes which he had taken on the journey (another feat in itself when one considers all of the other tasks which he had to handle), it is not improbable that Xenophon simply forgot to mention some of the foods or that he felt it was unnecessary to go into such detail, in view of all of the other points which he wanted to relate.

B. Food Preferences of the Greeks

There is some evidence of the food preferences of the Greeks to be found in the Cyropaedia. The following passages indicate the importance of bread to their diet.

Now if any one thinks that they do not enjoy eating, when they have only cresses with their bread, or that they do not enjoy drinking when they drink only water, let him remember how sweet barley bread and wheaten bread taste when one is hungry, and how sweet water is to drink when

one is thirsty.⁶⁸

Of course they also enjoyed other delicacies when they were able to obtain them: "For meats, we must pack up and take along only such as are sharp, pungent, salty; for these not only stimulate the appetite but also afford the most lasting nourishment."⁶⁹

As far back as the time of Hesiod, in the eighth century B.C., the farming Greeks enjoyed a varied diet. The chart below lists some of the various types of foods which were eaten by the farmers of his day. (The verse number references [Hesiod] are in parentheses.)

<u>Meats</u>	<u>Vegetables</u>	<u>Fruits</u>	<u>Other</u>
Lamb (234)	Fennel (53)	Grapes (611)	Honey (233, 305)
Goat (543)	Artichoke (581)		Acorns (233)
Beef (591, 791 and 796)			Grain (237, 806)
Pork (790)			Bread (442)
			Wine (585, 744)
			Curd Cake (590)
			Goat Milk (590)

⁶⁸Xen. Cyr. I.ii.11. Other references to bread may be found in Cyr. IV.v.1; VI.ii.28, and ii.31.

⁶⁹Xen. Cyr. IV.ii.31.

These foods correspond closely with those mentioned in Xenophon's Anabasis.⁷⁰ It appears that the culinary preferences of the Greeks had not changed much in 400 years, and that people in ancient Armenia ate essentially the same diet as did the Greeks.⁷¹

⁷⁰Theophrastus, an ancient author from the 4th century B.C., can be consulted for precise details about wild and domesticated plants which grew in Greece and the Mediterranean region during the Classical period (Theophr. Hist. Pl.).

⁷¹"In the Mediterranean regions, peasants consistently cultivate in combination wheat, barley, a wide range of pulses including chickpeas, broad beans, lentils, kidney beans, peas, maize, millet, vines, olives and fruits" (Gallant 1991: 37).

(3) Methods of Obtaining Provisions

According to Xenophon, during the inland march with Cyrus, the barbarians provided a market from which individual soldiers could buy provisions.⁷² In Lycaonia⁷³ and Cilicia⁷⁴, Cyrus allowed the Greeks to plunder and gather their own supplies. We are also told that Cyrus had 400 wagons of flour and wine for the purpose of emergencies. These wagons were plundered by Artaxerxes' men after the battle of Cunaxa.⁷⁵

How did the Ten Thousand obtain vital provisions (after the battle of Cunaxa) during their retreat? Their methods included: buying from markets provided for them by Tissaphernes,⁷⁶ plundering and foraging, first by the permission of Tissaphernes,⁷⁷ and later on their own volition⁷⁸, and using the supplies from abandoned villages.⁷⁹ By this time, few of the Greeks had money left with

⁷²Xen. An. I.ii.18, iii.14, and v.6-7.

⁷³Xen. An. I.ii.19.

⁷⁴Xen. An. I.iii.14.

⁷⁵Xen. An. I.x.18-19.

⁷⁶Xen. An. II.iii.24 and iv.9.

⁷⁷Xen. An. II.iii.14, 26, and iv.27.

⁷⁸Xen. An. III.iv.18 and v.5-6. At this point they had passed the ruins of Nineveh, capital of the ancient Assyrian Empire.

⁷⁹Xen. An. III.iv.18 and iv.31.

which to buy provisions.³⁰

Xenophon describes the Greeks' methods of obtaining provisions as follows:

On the other hand, wherever we come, whether it be to a barbarian or to a Greek land, and have no market at which to buy, we take provisions, not out of wantonness, but from necessity. The Carduchians, for example, and the Taochians and Chaldaeans were not subjects of the King and were exceedingly formidable, yet, even so, we made enemies of them because of this necessity of taking provisions, inasmuch as they would not provide a market. The Macronians, however, provided us as good a market as they could, and we therefore regarded them as friends, barbarians though they were, and took by force not a thing that belonged to them.³¹

This passage comes from Book V, when the Greeks (those who had survived of the original "Ten Thousand") had reached the coastal town of Sinope on the southern shore of the Black Sea. However, it is relevant because it is Xenophon's own explanation of how the Ten Thousand managed to provide themselves with supplies during the retreat from Cunaxa to Trapezus.

In comparison, Alexander the Great had an ordered system for supplying his troops:

His headquarters were at Ephesus--the western terminus of the axial road--and there he collected supplies and

³⁰Xen. An. III.i.20, ii.21 and V.i.5-6.

³¹Xen. An. V.v.16-18.

reinforcements coming from Macedonia and Greece, and when required dispatched them in convoys to Alexander (Fuller 1960: 290).

Further inland, Alexander maintained "depots, at which supplies were collected from the surrounding country..." (Fuller 1960: 291).

The acquisition of provisions by the Ten Thousand was determined by a number of factors, including the season of the year, which affected what food had been harvested and how much of it would have remained from the harvest, the location of villages where supplies could be found, and whether or not the natives lived by subsistence agriculture or produced a surplus. Engels notes the relationship between these factors (Engels 1978: 28).

A. The Season of the Year

The time of year during which the retreat took place directly affected the availability of provisions. Using information mentioned in the Anabasis and statistics of local weather and agricultural patterns, it is possible to come up with a hypothesis as to the time of year in which the retreat took place. For instance, in Book II, Xenophon says: "It was not the proper time to be irrigating the plain."⁸² In other words, it was not during a regular growing season. This is confirmed later on in Book II,

⁸²Xen. An. II.iii.13.

when the Ten Thousand encounter heavy snowfall in Armenia,⁸³ and a "...north wind, which blew full in their faces, absolutely blasting everything and freezing the men."⁸⁴ This indicates that it was probably late fall or early winter (Brownson 1922: 292, n. 2).⁸⁵

Mather and Hewitt (1962: 44) stated that Xenophon left Sardis on March 6, 401 B.C. and arrived in Cunaxa on September 3rd of the same year, representing a journey of 182 days.⁸⁶

If one accepts the unit of one stage (σταθμός in Greek) as being equivalent to one day (Brownson 1922: 11, n. 2), it is possible to calculate the length of time taken up by the journey.⁸⁷ I made a study of this and came up with the total of 194 days or 6 1/2 months for the inland march.⁸⁸ This differs by 12 days from Mather and Hewitt's calculations (cf. Breitenbach 1967: 1650-1653).

Many scholars think that the inland retreat from Cunaxa to Trapezus took about five months. This fits with the calculations which I have listed in Table Five.

⁸³Xen. An. IV.iv.8-13, v.4 and vi.2.

⁸⁴Xen. An. IV.v.3.

⁸⁵Brownson believed that it was now later in November.

⁸⁶See Table Four for detailed calculations.

⁸⁷The distance covered in the stathmos is variable; whereas, the parasang is a specific measure of distance. See Grote 1852: 19, n. 3.

⁸⁸See Table Four.

For the retreat from Cunaxa to Trapezus, my calculations indicate that this portion of the journey was comprised of 154 days or 5 months.⁸⁹

If we use Mather and Hewitt's dates, the Greeks left Sardis on March 6, 401 B.C., and arrived in Cunaxa on September 15th. Some time was spent in battle and afterwards while they were waiting to make decisions.⁹⁰ According to Mather and Hewitt's dates, the Greeks would have reached Trapezus on February 16th, 400 B.C. How does this fit with the clues of weather which Xenophon describes?

According to evidence adduced by V. Manfredi and O. Lendle, the journey may have started at a later date, probably more than one month later.

Lendle has suggested that the old theory may need to be rethought in light of the following five points:

1. When crossing the Euphrates at Thapsacus there was low water.⁹¹ This usually happened only at the end of the dry period. It is Lendle's contention that this did not occur at the end of July, but instead in September (Lendle 1984: 210, n. 12).

⁸⁹See Table Five. This means that the total journey, from Sardis to Trapezus, represented 11 1/2 months, almost an entire year of travelling.

⁹⁰See Table Five.

⁹¹Xen. An. I.iv.17-18.

2. Four days after the battle of Cunaxa, the Greeks reached an area where dates were cultivated. Harvest was already finished, thus the dates were amber in colour.⁹² This could only have been at the end of October or the beginning of November (Lendle 1984: 210, n. 12), not early September as suggested by Mather and Hewitt.

3. At the first sighting of the sea from Mount Taches (50 km. from Trapezus), a soldier put up a monument of stones.⁹³ This area was 2,000 m high, and it would have had to have been free of snow in order to make the stones accessible.⁹⁴ Therefore, it had to have been the end of April or the beginning of May when they reached this spot (Lendle 1984: 210). By contrast, Mather and Hewitt's older theory places their arrival here at the middle of February.

4. During the two days march before Trapezus, the Greeks all became ill from the honeycombs upon which they gorged themselves.⁹⁵ Full honeycombs would have been available only in the late spring or the beginning of summer, not at the beginning of February (Mather and Hewitt's estimation), because the winter honey would have been eaten by the bees (Lendle 1984: 210; cf. Manfredi 1986:

⁹²Xen. An. II.ii.15.

⁹³Xen. An. IV.vii.24-26.

⁹⁴It should be noted that wind can blow snow away from stones and that it is possible to dig out stones from a pile of snow.

⁹⁵Xen. An. IV.viii.19-21.

212).

5. On the basis of a later reference in Book V, six weeks after their arrival in Trapezus, we know the Greeks found bread from the last year in the land of the Mossynoecians.⁹⁶ This could imply that the present year's grain crop had not yet been harvested and threshed (Lendle 1984: 210; cf. Manfredi 1986: 213). Xenophon does not state that the Greeks ate this old bread, but he merely notes that they found it.

Manfredi, following Gassener and Lendle, came to the conclusion that the march through Armenia could not have taken place during the dead of winter, but had to have been at the very end of winter or in the early spring, during which time there were some short recurrences of winter storms and some snow still on the ground (Manfredi 1986: 215; cf. Lendle 1984: 210).⁹⁷ According to Manfredi's calculations, the Ten Thousand left Cunaxa at the end of October 401, and travelled for seven months, arriving in Trapezus at the end of May 400. This contradicts the "traditional" five month figure of earlier scholars who calculated that the Carduchian march took place in February 400.

⁹⁶Xen. An. V.iv.27.

⁹⁷ As stated by Manfredi, according to Gassner, the Zigana Pass would have been impossible to cross during the middle of winter. Unfortunately, Gassener's study was unobtainable.

As has been shown, there are differing opinions as to the exact season of the year during which the retreat of the Ten Thousand took place; however, the main point which can be gleaned from Xenophon's text is that it was not during the harvest season. This means that the villagers were dependent on dwindling stocks of supplies, including dried fruits and nuts, and on livestock, which may have been leaner than during the warmer season when they had access to grass. The Ten Thousand had to rely on these dwindling supplies as the basis for their provisioning.

B. Plundering and Foraging

At the beginning of the retreat, in accordance with their treaty, Tissaphernes provided a market and allowed the Greeks to plunder certain villages.⁹⁸ However, after Tissaphernes betrayed the Greeks, they were hard pressed to find supplies, because the Persians burned many of the villages before the Greeks could plunder them.⁹⁹

Tissaphernes had previously warned Clearchus that the Persians

⁹⁸Xen. An. II.iii.26.

⁹⁹Xen. An. III.v.3. During the campaigns of Alexander the Great, when he was approaching the River Granicus, Memnon the Rhodian advised the Persians to destroy fodder, crops and villages, so that Alexander would not be able to stay in the land from lack of provisions. However, the Persians refused to destroy the villages. (Arr. Anab. I.xii.9-10).

were capable of doing this¹⁰⁰, but now they had actually put it into practice. Luckily, the Greek generals soon developed a strategy whereby they were able to reach the villages before the Persians managed to do so,¹⁰¹ and eventually, after a number of skirmishes, they left the Persians behind.¹⁰² Unfortunately, their troubles were not over because they had to face the local tribes, many of whom were very warlike, e.g., the Carduchians.¹⁰³ Later, after they had crossed the mountains of Armenia, more friendly tribes, such as the Macronians, provided markets or gave them gifts of food.¹⁰⁴

Besides food and drink for the human members of the retreat, fodder also had to be collected¹⁰⁵ for the pack animals¹⁰⁶ as well as firewood to use in the cooking of the food.¹⁰⁷ Besides food, fodder, and firewood, the Greeks also looked for military equipment to supplement their dwindling supplies. As Xenophon notes: "In the

¹⁰⁰Xen. An. II.v.19.

¹⁰¹Xen. An. IV.i.1.

¹⁰²Xen. An. IV.v.19.

¹⁰³Xen. An. III.v.16.

¹⁰⁴Xen. An. V.v.16-18.

¹⁰⁵ The Greeks found barley to feed the horses, Xen. An. III.iv.31.

¹⁰⁶ Many animals had died because of the lack of fodder when the army of Cyrus crossed the deserts en route to Cunaxa (Xen. An. I.v.5).

¹⁰⁷Xen. An. II.iv.10-11 and IV.iii.11.

villages, the Greeks found gut and lead for their slingers."¹⁰⁸

Foraging could prove to be a dangerous business, which exposed the soldiers to attack by the enemy.¹⁰⁹ In order to avert this danger, Xenophon, having learned from their previous experiences, suggested that the Greeks go out together in foraging parties and inform their leaders as to the composition of the group and what their intended locations were to be.¹¹⁰

In retrospect, Xenophon comments on the difficulties of foraging when he explains the economic reality which the Greeks faced after having completed the main part of the retreat:

For ourselves, men of Sinope, we have come back well content to have saved our bodies and our arms; for it was not possible at one and the same time to gather plunder and to fight with the enemy.¹¹¹

Alexander faced the same problem of the dangers of foraging when he was on the Baikan and Illyrian campaigns:

¹⁰⁸Xen. An. III.iv.18.

¹⁰⁹Xenophon describes one episode in which foraging soldiers came under enemy attack, and had to be rescued by a battalion of soldiers (Xen. An. III.v.2). Greediness regarding plunder cost captain Aeneas of Stymphalus his life! (Xen. An. IV.vii.13-14.) In the Cyropaedia, Xenophon notes that excessive plundering is useless (Xen. Cyr. IV.ii.25).

¹¹⁰Xen. An. V.i.8.

¹¹¹Xen. An. V.v.13.

Faced by Cleitus in Pelion, and threatened in the rear by Glaucias, not only was he outnumbered, but so short of supplies that he sent out Philotas with all the baggage animals and an escort of 200 horsemen to gather in what he could. But when Glaucias got wind of this, he swooped down on the foragers in the plain, who were only saved from destruction by the timely arrival of Alexander with a strong force of cavalry, Agrianians and archers (Fuller 1960: 224).

Having learned from experiences like this one, during another part of his campaign, Alexander "...sent Coenus to forage with the cavalry and a few foot-soldiers."¹¹²

C. Preparing Camp

Xenophon describes with contempt the Persian lack of order in their camping arrangements, illustrating yet another Greek military practice which was superior to that of the Persians: "for a Persian army at night is a sorry thing."¹¹³

While the majority of soldiers were out foraging for food, some, along with the camp followers, were left to prepare the camp. First of all, some type of shelter had to be devised. Early into the retreat Xenophon had ordered the burning of tents in order to reduce the amount of baggage and thereby increase the ease and speed of travelling.¹¹⁴ Alexander the Great did the same thing in

¹¹²Arr. Anab. III.xx.4.

¹¹³Xen. An. III.iv.35.

¹¹⁴Xen. An. III.ii.27-28.

his campaigns, two generations later (Engels 1978: 13). It is reasonable to assume that the soldiers were billeted in groups according to their companies¹¹⁵ and that the camp followers for whom they were responsible were billeted with them.¹¹⁶ Xenophon talks in the Cyropaedia about camp organization as something which Cyrus implemented.¹¹⁷

At times they were lucky enough to be able to encamp in villages where permanent shelters already existed. Even in these cases, plans as to where the soldiers would be billeted had to be organized by a senior officer¹¹⁸; otherwise, chaos would have resulted if the soldiers had been left to argue over who would occupy the best "digs".¹¹⁹ Xenophon relates that the soldiers were usually assigned their quarters, and there was a system of picket duty for guarding the camp.¹²⁰

The baggage animals and the groups of livestock had to be fed and watered. They also had to be herded together and made secure so that they would not escape during the night and so that they

¹¹⁵Xen. Cyr. II.ii.25.

¹¹⁶Xen. Cyr. V.iii.39.

¹¹⁷Xen. Cyr. VIII.v.3.

¹¹⁸Xenophon stresses the importance of planning such things as billeting (Xen. Cyr. I.v.42-43).

¹¹⁹Xen. An. II.ii.17, IV.iv.14, v.22-24, and v.29.

¹²⁰Xen. An. II.iv.15, vi.10, III.i.40 and V.i.9.

would not be attacked by predators or stolen by local tribesmen.¹²¹ Probably they did not have to set many guards¹²² to watch them because their braying, neighing, mooing or baaing would wake the soldiers if something were amiss.

In the Cyropaedia, Xenophon notes the prudence of keeping fires burning at the front and back lines of the camp.¹²³ In the Anabasis, one soldier, Leon of Thurii, speaks of how tired he is of standing guard.¹²⁴ Most likely, there was a system of rotating duty for standing guard. Xenophon speaks about this at the beginning of Book V: "So it seems to me that we ought to have guards around our camp; supposing, then, that we take turns in standing guard and keeping watch, the enemy would be less able to harry us."¹²⁵

Confusion in one portion of the camp could alarm everyone, such as in one incident when the soldiers had to encamp quickly in the dark and they suddenly thought that the enemy was upon them. Clearchus acted quickly to dispel their fears by sending a message

¹²¹Xen. An. IV.vi.17. In this episode, the Greeks set an ambush and caught some of the "stealing rascals" who were following them, probably trying to retrieve their original property.

¹²²Xenophon notes the importance of setting guards who shared the night watches (Xen. Cyr. I.vi.43, III.iii.28, and V.iii.44). The baggage train always had to be guarded (Xen. Cyr., V.iv.45).

¹²³Xen. Cyr. III.iii.25.

¹²⁴Xen. An. V.i.2.

¹²⁵Xen. An. V.i.9.

out that a donkey had been loose among the troops. This calmed their fears and helped them to get settled for the night.¹²⁶

There was not much time for leisure or rest. After the shelter had been organized and the pack animals taken care of, the baggage, what little of it there was, had to be sorted out.¹²⁷ The weapons of the soldiers were stacked together in a central location.¹²⁸ In the Cyropaedia, Xenophon notes that the camp-followers packed their baggage before going to bed.¹²⁹ Packing up¹³⁰ was another chore which the aforementioned Leon of Thurii states that he detests.¹³¹ If a source of water, such as a stream or lake, was nearby, clothing could be washed, and personal hygiene such as bathing could be performed.¹³²

This would also have been the time to mend clothing and shoes,¹³³ to fix broken pots or tools, and to sharpen swords and do

¹²⁶Xen. An. II.ii.20-21. Speaking from his experience, in the Cyropaedia, Xenophon notes how bad it is to be thrown into confusion at night (Cyr. V.iii.43).

¹²⁷Xen. An. II.ii.4, iv.15, III.v.18 and Cyr. VI.ii.35.

¹²⁸Xen. An. II.iv.15.

¹²⁹Xen. Cyr. V.iii.39.

¹³⁰Xen. An. III.iv.36 and v.18.

¹³¹Xen. An. V.i.2.

¹³²Xen. Cyr. IV.v.4.

¹³³Xenophon says that the shoes of the soldiers had worn out, and make-shift ones had been constructed (Xen. An. IV.v.14).

maintenance on other weapons and armour.

Officers had to take the time to plan the next day's march.¹³⁴ As Xenophon notes in the Cyropaedia: "So never be careless, but think out at night what your men are to do for you when day comes, and in the daytime think out how the arrangements for the night may best be made."¹³⁵

Sanitation probably presented a problem.¹³⁶ One can imagine that a group of 9,900 - 13,200 people camping would certainly make an impression (literally a flattened expanse of ground) and an impact on the environment.¹³⁷ They would have made quite a mess with organic garbage (e.g. bones from cooked meat which may have been burnt), human wastes and animal dung as well as cast off objects such as pots or tools broken beyond repair.

D. The Distribution of Provisions

There does not seem to have been anything corresponding to the modern Quartermaster's Store in Xenophon's account of the

¹³⁴Xen. An. III.v.7.

¹³⁵Xen. Cyr. I.vi.42.

¹³⁶Xenophon notes the importance of finding a sanitary location for a camp (Xen. Cyr. I.vi.16).

¹³⁷See also Section 3 F, Impact on the Environment.

organization of the Ten Thousand.¹³⁸ As Lendle pointed out, individual soldiers had to look out for themselves, and it was only after they reached the Black Sea coast that Xenophon suggests that they have organized centres for food (Lendle 1984: 210). Each soldier was responsible for obtaining and preparing his own food. However, we know that not all soldiers were sent out to plunder and forage.¹³⁹ Some of them remained behind to stand guard. Others prepared the camp, while the officers plotted strategy. The camp-followers were not usually sent out to forage for supplies because they could not defend themselves. If they were sent out, they had to be guarded by soldiers.

It seems, therefore, that there must have been some type of distribution system to ensure that each person received a fair ration of the provisions.¹⁴⁰ Sharing food and other possessions between soldiers and camp followers was a common practice among the Ten Thousand.¹⁴¹ In one episode, Clearchus instructs his men to "go away and dine on whatever you severally have."¹⁴² It is also likely that the officers, at least, had a servant or servants who

¹³⁸Xenophon talks about quartermasters or purveyors of the army's stores in his idealistic account about Cyrus (Xen. Cyr. II.ii.31 and VI.ii.35).

¹³⁹Xen. An. II.v.37-38 and V.i.8.

¹⁴⁰Xenophon informs the reader that he oversaw the distribution of food to the sick [An. IV.v.7-8], and that the soldiers shared their food among themselves [An. IV.v.6].

¹⁴¹Xen. An. III.iii.1.

¹⁴²Xen. An. II.ii.4.

were responsible for cooking for them.¹⁴³ In the Cyropaedia, Xenophon speaks of attendants bringing food and drink to the officers.¹⁴⁴

E. Preparation of the Food

The soldiers, tired by a long day's march and the efforts of foraging and preparing camp, would have been interested in making the quickest and simplest meals possible. They also lacked fancy pots and utensils, and usually had to cook over an open fire. They probably prepared something which was simple and bland, but quick and nourishing, such as plain bread. Xenophon describes the soldiers baking bread in his narrative about Cyrus.¹⁴⁵

The Greeks usually ate two meals each day¹⁴⁶, one towards midday and one around sundown (Miller 1914: 19). Lendle noted that breakfast ("ariston") was not prepared immediately after rising (Lendle 1984: 222). Usually it was eaten during a break in the morning march¹⁴⁷, but sometimes it was not eaten until early

¹⁴³Xen. Cyr. IV.ii.34.

¹⁴⁴Xen. Cyr. VII.i.1.

¹⁴⁵Xen. Cyr. IV.v.1.

¹⁴⁶Xen. An. II.iv.15; and Xen. Cyr. I.ii.11. Hippocrates notes that some individuals benefited from taking only one meal per day (Hippoc. Ancient Medicine x) while others could do well on three meals each day (Hippoc. Regimen xxix).

¹⁴⁷Xen. An. I.x.19, IV.vi.8, i.12-14, V.v.3, VI.iii.24.

afternoon.¹⁴⁸ Of course, the schedule for food preparation and eating depended on circumstances of the availability of food, the location of the camp, how secure the camp was from the enemy, and whether or not they had fuel for building fires.

Grain was the main staple of their diet as soldiers because it was easy to carry and prepare. Even during the march inland with Cyrus, grain was the most important portion of their rations:

As for the troops, their supply of grain gave out, and it was not possible to buy any except in the Lydian market attached to the barbarian army of Cyrus, at the price of four sigli for a capithe of wheat flour or barley meal. The soldiers therefore managed to subsist by eating meat.¹⁴⁹

When they cooked, they used mostly barley flour, but occasionally, they had wheat flour or whole grain. They needed a fire to make their meals, which usually consisted of bread, flat cakes, soup or porridge (Lendle 1984: 222).

Their war diet was most likely more simple than the typical Greek diet during peace time. They probably had to be content with living by the Spartan adage about hunger being the best spice for food.¹⁵⁰ Occasionally they were fortunate enough to have a feast,

¹⁴⁸Xen. An. VII.3.9-10. Cf. Lendle 1984: 222.

¹⁴⁹Xen. An. I.v.6.

¹⁵⁰Xen. Cyr I.ii.11.

such as the one described by Xenophon after they had crossed into Armenia and camped in villages. He says that they partook of lamb, goat, piglet, veal, poultry, wheat bread, barley bread, legumes and fruit (dates, figs and grapes).¹⁵¹

The Ten Thousand would have required many camp fires and pots, dishes and utensils in order to accommodate the large number of people of the retreat.¹⁵²

F. Impact on the Environment

In light of all the suggestions and statistics which have been presented in Chapter One, a few things need to be said about the overall impact of the retreat upon the land through which they passed. For one thing, how much food was needed, over the time which elapsed and the distances which were travelled, for the number of people involved, and how does this correspond to the actual amounts recorded by Xenophon and the number of times he comments on this aspect?

Using all of the numbers which have been established up to this point in our research, for the retreat of 154 days, multiplying that by the amount of food (16,467 kg. of grain) needed per day by the Ten Thousand and their camp-followers (13,200 all

¹⁵¹Xen. An. IV.5.31.

¹⁵²See Chapter Two, Transportation of Belongings.

told) one comes up with the staggering amount of 2,535,918 kg. of grain. They would also have needed 184,578.24 kg. of grain for the baggage animals (using the figure of 264 baggage animals or one per 50 individuals). This does not take into account the needs of the herds of livestock. Added together, this makes a total of 2,720,496.24 kg. of grain.

It should also be noted that the baggage animals and livestock would have been able to feed on grass where this was available; however, as the winter season progressed and they travelled into the mountainous regions, i.e. Carduchia, these opportunities would have been limited.

It would be an understatement to say that their voracious needs must have taken an enormous toll on the villages through which they passed. One could compare the passage of the Ten Thousand to a plague of locusts moving through fields ripe with grain and leaving nothing but stubble behind.

We are told by Xenophon that the villages which resisted entry were taken by force, and many, at the beginning of the march, were burned.¹⁵³ This was not done as an act of malice, but rather in order to stop Tissaphernes' troops from being able to use the villages.

¹⁵³Xen. An. III.v.6.

The impact on the villagers must have been horrible. They could rebuild the homes, but from where would they obtain new breeding stock and seeds for planting? Perhaps they were saved by the kindness of neighbouring villagers which escaped the foraging of the Ten Thousand.

Later in the march, the Ten Thousand used the abandoned villages without destroying them, and usually left most of the household furniture and utensils because their loads were already so cumbersome and heavy. Also they did not want to antagonize the native people any more than was necessary. For example, Xenophon tells of an occasion when the Greeks entered villages from which the Carduchians had fled:

As for provisions, there was an abundance for the Greeks to take, and the houses were also supplied with bronze vessels in great numbers; the Greeks, however, did not carry off these, ... but they did take whatever they chanced upon in the way of provisioning for that was necessary.¹⁵⁴

We are told that they took from the villages certain choice articles, which they used for bartering or presented as gifts later on. For example, after they had ascended Mt. Taches, from which they were able to view the beloved sea, they rewarded their native guide with presents:

¹⁵⁴Xen. An. IV.i.8-9.

After this the Greeks dismissed the guide with gifts from the common stock--a horse, a silver cup, a Persian dress and ten darics; but what he particularly asked the men for was their rings, and he got a considerable number of them.¹⁵⁵

It should be noted that these gifts came from both the collective belongs (common stock) and their personal possessions. Also, besides giving away the booty, they were able to sell it in some places in order to buy provisions.¹⁵⁶

But even if they took only food, this must have left the villagers in a position of immediate starvation. Xenophon does not comment on this aspect of the retreat.

It would be interesting to know whether any of the descendants of local tribes retained any oral histories about the passage of Xenophon and the Ten Thousand.

¹⁵⁵Xen. An. IV.vii.27.

¹⁵⁶Xen. An. V.iii.4.

CHAPTER TWO

The Problems Involved in Provisioning

In Chapter One, the questions of the number of people on the retreat, the amount of provisions they required, and the nature of provisions which they preferred were discussed. Methods of obtaining these provisions, the circumstantial factors which affected their abilities to do this, and the distribution of provisions were examined.

Now it is necessary to examine the particular problems presented by the large number of camp-followers, the transporting of all of their belongings, and how the Greeks solved these problems. The fact that the retreating Greeks managed to handle both of these problems well is the key to the success of their march from Cunaxa to Trapezus.

(1) The Camp-Followers

How did the presence of the camp-followers complicate the problem of provisioning? Although one cannot determine the exact number of camp-followers,¹ it is possible to comment on the impact which they had on the retreat.

A. Definitions

¹See Chapter One, Section I.A.ii.

The Greek word for camp-followers used in the Anabasis is ἄχλος,² while in the Cyropaedia the word used is σκευοφόρος,³ someone who carries the baggage, along with the verb σκευάζειν, meaning packing up baggage.⁴ In Arrian's account of the inland journeys of Alexander the Great, he uses the word ὄμιλος⁵ to describe the camp-followers.

There is ample evidence in the Anabasis that the army was accompanied by a number of camp-followers during both the inland march and the retreat. The enormous size of the crowd of camp-followers, on at least one occasion, is illustrated by Xenophon's statement: "for without them [the camp-followers], the rearguard looked like a small body."⁶ These camp-followers are often mentioned by Xenophon only in passing, but occasionally individuals (as in the case of an interpreter [Pigres]⁷, a soothsayer [Silanus]⁸, and a herald [Tolmides]⁹) are identified by name.

These individuals can be divided into two main groups:

²Xen. An. III.ii.36.

³Xen. Cyr. III.i.42 and IV.ii.25.

⁴Xen. Cyr. IV.ii.28.

⁵Arr. Anab. III.xxiii.2.

⁶Xen. An. IV.iii.27.

⁷Xen. An. I.ii.17 and viii.12.

⁸Xen. An. I.vii.18.

⁹Xen. An. II.ii.20 and III.i.47.

(1) professional camp-followers who performed necessary services for the army, and (2) non-professional camp-followers who were dependents for various reasons.

(i) Professional Camp-Followers

The "professional" camp-followers who accompanied the Greek troops performed various important functions. These adult male civilians were, for the most part, able to take up arms and defend themselves if it were necessary. Their multiple roles also worked the other way, for sometimes soldiers played various roles, adopting new professional positions according to their skills and the needs at hand.

Xenophon says that after a battle with Tissaphernes' troops in the hills, which resulted in particularly high numbers of wounded soldiers, eight surgeons were appointed.¹⁰ It seems that they were chosen from the ranks of soldiers according to their skill for dressing wounds. Considering the many occasions on which the Greeks were wounded,¹¹ they would have needed medical assistance on a regular basis.

Soldiers who fell ill became part of the category of dependents. This meant that healthy soldiers had to be taken away

¹⁰Xen. An. III.iv.30.

¹¹See Table Two.

from their regular duties and marching order so that they could carry the sick and wounded:

For a large number of the Greeks were hors de combat, not only the wounded, but also those who were carrying them and the men who took in charge the arms of these carriers.¹²

The result of this was that the numbers of soldiers and baggage carriers fluctuated.

The most skilled members of the professional group of camp-followers included the aforementioned surgeons, and also soothsayers and priests, heralds, and interpreters. Soothsayers performed various religious functions, such as "offering a sacrifice to the river"¹³, and offering "sacrifice to the wind".¹⁴ They also presided over the sacrificing of animals for purposes of augury.¹⁵

Heralds, such as Tolmides, whom Xenophon calls "the best herald of his time"¹⁶, provided communication between the officers and troops and also contributed to the moral encouragement of the

¹²Xen. An. III.iv.32.

¹³Xen. An. IV.iii.17-18.

¹⁴Xen. An. IV.v.4.

¹⁵Xen. An. II.i.9.

¹⁶Xen. An. II.ii.20.

soldiers. Interpreters served the important purpose of enabling the Greek officers to communicate with Persians and the many foreign tribes which they encountered along the way.

The evidence as to how many foreign languages were involved, and how well the interpreters could speak these languages, or the skill with which the barbarians could speak Greek is not clear. However, a couple of examples in this regard can be given. Xenophon tells us that Tissaphernes spoke to the Greek generals through an interpreter.¹⁷ For another example, when the Greeks were happily encamped in bountiful villages in Armenia, they were served food by native youths. The Greeks managed to communicate with these young boys by using sign language:

Again when they reached Cheirisophus, they found his troops also feasting in their quarters, crowned with wreaths of hay and served by Armenian boys in their strange, foreign dress; and they were showing the boys what to do by signs, as if they were deaf and dumb.¹⁸

Further on in the journey, when they were marching through the land of the Macronians, they were lucky to have among them a native-born Macronian who had been taken to Greece as a slave when he was younger. He was able to act as an interpreter and enable the Greeks to make a treaty of friendship with the Macronians:

¹⁷Xen. An. II.iii.17-18.

¹⁸Xen. An. IV.v.33.

At this moment one of the peltasts came up to Xenophon, a man who said that he had been a slave at Athens, with a word that he knew the language of these people; 'I think,' he went on, 'that this is my native country, and if there is nothing to hinder, I should like to have a talk with them.'¹⁹

Those "lower on the totem pole" of professional camp-followers included sutlers (private businessmen), servants, and captives. When the Ten Thousand were travelling with Cyrus, there were sutlers who accompanied the army to provide a market.²⁰ What happened to them after the battle of Cunaxa is not known.

Captives often were able to serve the very useful function of acting as guides for the Greeks through the unfamiliar and harsh countryside.²¹ They were also important for intelligence purposes.²² Some of the officers had servants to carry their belongings and prepare their meals.²³ In one episode Xenophon said that he was: "deserted by the servant who was carrying his shield."²⁴

¹⁹Xen. An. IV.viii.4-5.

²⁰Xen. An. I.v.6.

²¹Xen. An. III.ii.20, v.14 IV.i.22, IV.vi.1 and vi.17.

²²Xen. Cyr. VI.ii.11. "...for this was another thing that Cyrus always looked out for--that prisoners should be taken, from whom he was likely to gain some intelligence." Xenophon probably speaks here of his own experience in the Anabasis.

²³Xen. Cyr. VII.i.1.

²⁴Xen. An. IV.ii.20-21. See II.i.9 for evidence that Clearchus had several servants.

In the Cyropaedia, Xenophon includes smiths, carpenters and cobblers as professionals who were needed to accompany an army.²⁵ In the army of Alexander the Great, there were many professional camp-followers including:

...bodyguards, older Macedonians exempt from combat duty, hostages, servants, seers, physicians, sophists, poets, a historian, a tutor, secretaries, surveyors, the transport guard, Egyptian and Babylonian sooth-sayers, Phoenician traders, courtesans, a harpist, a siege train, engineers... (Engels 1978: 11).

Of course, in comparing the different types of professional camp-followers in Xenophon's army and in that of Alexander the Great, it must be kept in mind that Alexander's expeditions were lengthy, planned, offensive marches supported by help from home. They were quite different, in logistical terms, from the defensive, self-supported retreat of Xenophon which was of comparatively short duration.

(ii) Non-Professional Camp-Followers

The non-professional camp-followers or civilians were not able to defend themselves, could not be sent out to forage (unless they were guarded from enemy attack), and could not carry as much baggage or face harsh conditions as well as could the regular troops. In short, these non-professional camp-followers were a net

²⁵Xen. Cyr. VI.ii.37.

drain on the entire operation, using up their share of supplies and adding extra work and worry for the soldiers, while providing little tangible service in return.

We include here a chart listing the different categories of non-professional camp-followers, along with information about the context and the references for these categories.

NON-PROFESSIONAL CAMP-FOLLOWERS

<u>Category</u>	<u>Reference</u>
(1) <u>Women</u>	
(a) Two mistresses of Cyrus	I.x.1
(b) Large number of women in the camp	IV.iii.19
(c) Women crossed river with baggage train	IV.iii.30
(d) Women sent away on ships	V.iii.1
(e) Women with the Greeks	V.iv.32
(f) Female dancer accompanying an Arcadian	VI.i.12
(2) <u>Children / Youths</u>	
(a) Son of the village chief	IV.vi.1
(b) Boys belonging to the captives	IV.viii.27
(c) Children sent home on ships	V.iii.1

- (3) Elderly people V.iii.1
- (4) Sick and Wounded (see also Table Two)
- (a) Wounded carried in wagons II.ii.14
- (b) Broken legs and ribs IV.vii.4
- (c) Sick men IV.v.17
- (d) Sick people put on ships V.iii.1
- (a) Women

Xenophon does not devote much space to details about the women who accompanied the Ten Thousand. He mentions that some of the soldiers, upon being asked to release all unnecessary camp-followers, were reluctant to give up certain women of whom they had become very fond.²⁶ Xenophon informs the reader that at one point there were a large number of women in the camp.²⁷

(b) Children / Youths

As far as young children are concerned, it is possible that children could have been conceived and born during the 11 and 1/2 month journey. Older boys or youths belonging to the captives

²⁶Xen. An. IV.i.14.

²⁷Xen. An. IV.iii.19. In V.iv.34, Xenophon says that there were woman accompanying the Greeks.

participated in a stadium race which was part of the athletic games held to celebrate the success of the retreat.²⁸

(c) Elderly

This category probably consisted mostly of captives and hostages because the elderly would have had little reason for making the journey voluntarily. The army of Alexander the Great had included old army veterans (Engels 1978: 11).

(d) Sick and Wounded

If their afflictions were not too severe, the sick and wounded soldiers, who had had sufficient time to recover from their illnesses and be healed from their wounds, could become productive again.

Upon reaching Trapezus, the dependent, non-professional camp-followers were given the first opportunity to go home by ship. They, including the sick, those over forty years of age, and some of the women and children, were sent away with the excess baggage.²⁹ This enabled the army as a whole to be a leaner, trimmer and more mobile group.

²⁸Xen. An. IV.viii.27.

²⁹Xen. An. V.iii.1.

B. Protection

The soldiers were responsible for guarding from enemy attack the camp-followers, and the extra baggage which they generated. This was a full-time occupation, which required much thought and planning, because it was necessary to guard the baggage train at all times.³⁰

During marching, formations were made with the protection of the camp-followers in mind. Xenophon worries that the enemy might "attack the baggage train as it passed and the train stretched out a long way because of the narrowness of the road it was following..."³¹

One way in which they handled the problem was by mixing the camp-followers with the light-armed troops while they were marching. Unfortunately this practice rendered these soldiers useless for battle duties.³² This was done in situations when the generals feared an attack on the baggage train.

In a similar instance, they employed the practice of putting the baggage train in the middle of the troops.³³ For example, when

³⁰Xen. An. I.x.3.

³¹Xen. An. IV.ii.13.

³²Xen. An. III.iv.26.

³³Xen. An. II.ii.4-5, III.ii.36, iii.6 and IV.iii.15.

they crossed a river, the camp-followers were placed between the front and rear guards. On another occasion, the order was given to keep "the beasts of burden on the side next to the river and the hoplites outside."³⁴

Another way in which they tried to lessen their problems was by reducing the number of camp-followers:

At daybreak, the generals and captains of the Greeks came together and resolved to keep with them on the march only the indispensable and most powerful baggage animals and to leave the rest behind; likewise, to let go all the newly-taken captives that were in the army, to the last man. For the baggage animals and the captives, numerous as they were, made the march slow, and the large number of men who had charge of them were thus taken out of the fighting line.³⁵

In the Cyropaedia, Cyrus proposes that they release their captives so that they do not have to guard against possible attacks by them, watch over them, or feed them.³⁶ Evidently, they were not worth the trouble of keeping, no matter how much money they might bring at the slave markets further down the line.

The safety of the camp-followers was pre-eminent in the soldiers' minds, as can be seen when the Greeks were crossing a river and "...those who were left were by this time few in number

³⁴Xen. An. II.ii.5.

³⁵Xen. An. IV.i.13. For a similar example see IV.iii.30.

³⁶Xen. Cyr. IV.iv.7.

(for many even of those detailed to stay had gone off to look after pack animals or baggage or women, as the case might be)...³⁷

The camp-followers were generally treated well. One may take as a comparison what happened to the women and children accompanying the army of Alexander the Great: "In the Gedrosian Desert, the army encamped by a dry river bed--this in the rainy season--and a torrent of water swept away most of the women, children and pack animals" (Engels 1978: 13, n. 8; cf. Arr. Anab. VI.xxv.4-6). There is some controversy as to whether or not Alexander was directly responsible for this tragedy.³⁸

Alexander's attitude toward the camp-follower on one occasion is illustrated in the following passage. In this circumstance, he considered them to be an extra burden:

On receiving this information from the captured Persian scouts, Alexander stopped where he had received it, for four days; he rested his army after their march and strengthened his camp by a ditch and a palisade. For he had decided to leave behind the baggage animals and any non-combatants among his men, and himself with the combatant troops to advance to the battle burdened with nothing but their arms.³⁹

³⁷Xen. An. IV.iii.30.

³⁸"It is difficult to understand Alexander's decision to encamp here, but the possibility that it was done deliberately cannot be eliminated. There was a serious shortage of provisions in the desert, and Alexander may have been forced to decide who would survive, the women and children or his soldiers." (Engels 1978: 13, n. 8).

³⁹Arr. Anab. III.ix.1-2.

C. Choosing the Routes

In Chapter One, it was noted that the more camp-followers and people in general who were involved in the march, the greater the number of pack animals that would be required. The presence of large numbers of pack animals meant that the generals had to choose roads which would be wide enough to accommodate them:

But Xenophon with half the rearguard set out by the same route which the party with the guide had followed, because this was the easiest route for the baggage animals; and behind the baggage animals he posted the other half of the rearguard.⁴⁰

The numbers of camp-followers and pack animals restricted the routes which the Ten Thousand could take, and sometimes forced them to take the longer way to reach their next destination. On one occasion, Xenophon notes that "...the baggage animals could not get through by any other road than this one..."⁴¹ And on another occasion, a prisoner who served as their guide promised "that he would lead the Greeks by a road that could be traversed even by baggage animals."⁴²

A comparative example of this comes from Alexander's expedition into Hyrcania:

⁴⁰Xen. An. IV.ii.9. For a similar example see IV.vi.18-19.

⁴¹Xen. An. IV.ii.11.

⁴²Xen. An. IV.i.24-25.

...and he [Alexander] ordered Erigyius to take the Grecian mercenaries and the rest of the cavalry, and lead the way by the public thoroughfare, though it was longer, conducting the wagons, the baggage, and the crowd of camp-followers.⁴³

In order to alleviate the problem of so many baggage animals, Xenophon makes the following suggestion:

I think we should burn up the wagons which we have, so that our cattle may not be our captains, but we can take whatever route may be best for the army.⁴⁴

By reducing the weight of the baggage and eliminating the wagons, Xenophon hoped that the Greeks would become more mobile.

An example of the merits of travelling with light burdens is related by Arrian concerning the campaigns of Alexander the Great. Upon hearing the news that Darius had been taken prisoner by his royal companions, Alexander marched right away:

He did not even wait for Coenus to return from the foraging expedition; but placed Craterus over the men left behind, with instructions to follow in short marches. His own men took with them nothing but their arms and provisions for two days.⁴⁵

Harsh conditions limited the routes which the Ten Thousand

⁴³Arr. Anab. III.xxiii.2.

⁴⁴Xen. An. III.ii.27.

⁴⁵Arr. Anab. III.xxi.2-3.

were able to take.⁴⁶ For example, the camp-followers and pack animals were not able to climb very steep passes which the soldiers would have been able to manage had they been travelling without the civilians. Generals had to take into account the lesser abilities of the camp-followers to handle exposure and other hardships. This influenced which routes they chose.

Alexander the Great chose his routes in a similar manner, keeping the needs of the camp-followers and other members of the baggage train in mind. In one instance, he sent Parmenio with the baggage to Persepolis by the carriage road⁴⁷:

When he started from the Euphrates he did not march to Babylon by the direct road; because by going the other route, he found all things easier for the march of his army, and it was also possible to obtain fodder for the horses and provisions for the men from the country. Besides this the heat was not so scorching on the indirect route.⁴⁸

The weather certainly played havoc with their marching plans. It is interesting, however, that Xenophon does not explain how the camp-followers were protected during such episodes as the huge snowfall, when the soldiers were suffering from frostbite and snow blindness.⁴⁹ The harsh weather conditions which they faced

⁴⁶Xen. An. IV.v.3-4 and vi.18.

⁴⁷Arr. Anab. III.xviii.1.

⁴⁸Arr. Anab. III.vii.3.

⁴⁹Xen. An. IV.v.12-14.

included heavy rain storms,⁵⁰ severe snow storms,⁵¹ and freezing blasts of wind.⁵² They also faced difficulties in crossing fast flowing rivers, some of which had water of a depth which was waist-high for the soldiers, and at that time of year the water must have been very cold!⁵³

One is left to hypothesize that perhaps the camp-followers were sometimes given extra clothing, the best lodgings and the first opportunity to have whatever provisions were available. Perhaps, on occasion, they practised the custom of "women and children first" when considering safety, shelter and the distribution of provisions. On other occasions, some of the camp-followers were considered to be expendable, and were left behind with excess baggage.

There is ample evidence that the sick and wounded were given special attention. After battles in which many soldiers had been wounded, the unharmed soldiers were responsible for carrying their comrades.⁵⁴ These soldiers, in turn, had to pass on their own belongings to be carried by a camp-follower or another soldier,⁵⁵

⁵⁰Xen. An. IV.ii.2.

⁵¹Xen. An. IV.iv.8-13, v.4 and vi.2.

⁵²Xen. An. IV.v.3.

⁵³Xen. An. IV.v.2.

⁵⁴Xen. An. III.iv.32 and IV.v.22.

⁵⁵Xen. An. III.iv.32.

thus increasing the per capita weight of baggage which had to be carried.⁵⁶

It is evident that the Ten Thousand sometimes placed the safety and well-being of their camp-followers above other considerations. In an effort to organize their travel plans, the generals used captives as guides⁵⁷ so that they could find the best routes to accommodate the special needs of the camp-followers.

D. Communications

The large number of people travelling together on the retreat also complicated the procedures of communications. Xenophon mentions that there was a herald, Tolmides the Elean, among the Greeks. His purpose was to convey messages between officers and soldiers.⁵⁸

Even with the presence of at least one individual to carry messages, the large number of people and the length of the soldiers' formations, complicated matters of communication. Xenophon describes the problems of numbers and formations in several places. For example, when he was preparing to lead a frontal attack, he asked Cheirisophus to send some troops from the

⁵⁶Xen. An. III.iv.31.

⁵⁷Xen. An. III.ii.20 and v.14-15.

⁵⁸Xen. An. II.ii.20 and III.i.47.

front lines with him because "it would have been too long a journey to bring up men from the rear."⁵⁹

In another instance, Xenophon tells his readers that on a narrow road, the ascent and descent of the army lasted an entire day!⁶⁰ It should be noted, however, that at this point their numbers were swelled by many extra baggage animals and prisoners which they soon decided to abandon.⁶¹ Before the retreat had begun, the Greeks' fair-weather friend Ariaeus had made mention of the fact that a large group of people makes it impossible to march quickly.⁶²

Not only were there logistical problems of communication among the Ten Thousand. They also had difficulties communicating with the various tribes whom they encountered. In these cases, they had to find interpreters to assist them. Below is a chart listing examples of interpreters mentioned by Xenophon in the Anabasis.

⁵⁹Xen. An. III.iv.42.

⁶⁰Xen. An. IV.i.10 and ii.13.

⁶¹Xen. An. IV.i.12 and ii.13.

⁶²Xen. An. II.ii.12.

Interpreters

<u>Examples</u>	<u>Reference</u>
(a) Pigres, Cyrus' interpreter	I.ii.17 I.viii.12
(b) The interpreter of the Greeks	II.v.35
(c) The interpreter between Xenophon and the barbarians	IV.ii.18
(d) An interpreter	IV.v.10
(e) Peltast who acts as interpreter	IV.viii.4
(f) Xenophon sends an interpreter to Seuthes	VII.iv.19

It has been shown that the presence of the camp-followers caused many problems for the retreating Ten Thousand. The fact that they needed to be protected was a drain on manpower, while their need to use wide roads and safe routes made the journey slower.

The great number of camp-followers also complicated the normal procedures of communication. The Ten Thousand, however, handled these problems with great ingenuity and aplomb. In the concluding section of Chapter Two, the problems of transporting the belongings of the soldiers and camp-followers will be examined.

(2) Transportation of Belongings

How did the Ten Thousand handle the transportation of provisions and belongings? This section will cover the following areas: What items and which people were transported by the retreating Greeks, and which individuals or animals were involved in doing the actual carrying? We shall also discuss the methods which were used by the Greeks to make the retreat a success.

A. Items Carried

First, it is necessary to determine the nature of the material belongings of the Greeks. It can be divided into two groups, individual possessions and collective belongings. To begin with, let us examine the former category:

(i) Individual Possessions

Each soldier had personal belongings which he was responsible for carrying. Some of the officers and soldiers had servants who helped them to carry the gear, but for the most part, the soldiers were responsible for their own things. For example, in one instance, Xenophon says that the order was given that "every man should pack up his belongings and go to rest..."⁶³ They probably had some form of backpack for carrying possessions. Individual

⁶³Xen. An. III.v.18.

possessions included personal armour and weapons, clothing, cooking pots and utensils, and booty.

(a) Personal Armour and Weapons

Greek personal armour which had to be carried consisted of a bronze helmet, a tunic, greaves and a shield.⁶⁴ Breastplates are also mentioned.⁶⁵ Altogether, this armour must have weighed a considerable amount. Engels described the armour, carried by the soldiers of Alexander the Great, in the following way:

Each soldier on Alexander's campaigns carried his helmet, shield, leather breastplate, greaves, spear or sarissa, and utensils, and the heavily armoured troops carried in addition a cuirass and wore a kilt of leather strips covered with bronze. An estimate of 50 lb. carried by each soldier and attendant does not seem unrealistic when one remembers that the weight of a metal breastplate alone is 50 lbs (Engels 1978: 21, n. 31).

Xenophon describes how heavy the armour of The Thousand was during one episode in which soldiers were trying to run up a steep hill, while carrying their arms, in order to gain the advantage of the enemy:

But Soteridas the Sicyonian said: 'We are not on an equality, Xenophon; you are riding on horseback, while

⁶⁴Xen. An. I.ii.16, viii.18 and IV.v.18.

⁶⁵Xen. An. IV.ii.28.

I am desperately tired with carrying my shield.' When Xenophon heard that, he leaped down from his horse and pushed Soteridas out of his place in the line, then took his shield away from him and marched on with it as fast as he could; he had on also, as it happened, his cavalry breastplate, and the result was that he was heavily burdened.⁶⁶

The weapons mentioned in the Anabasis include spears⁶⁷, bows⁶⁸ and arrows⁶⁹, slings⁷⁰, javelins,⁷¹ daggers⁷² and lances⁷³. Each soldier was specialized either as a hoplite, peltast, bowman or slinger, and carried the appropriate weapons.

During at least part of the journey, the arms and accoutrements of the soldiers were carried in wagons and on pack animals.⁷⁴ But after the wagons were burnt, at the suggestion of Xenophon, this could no longer be done.⁷⁵

⁶⁶Xen. An. III.iv.47-48.

⁶⁷Xen. An. I.viii.18, II.iii.11, III.v.7-8, IV.ii.8-9 and v.18.

⁶⁸Xen. An. I.ii.9, III.iii.7 and iii.15.

⁶⁹Xen. An. III.v.15-17 and IV.iii.28.

⁷⁰Xen. An. III.iii.16-19, iv.15-18 and IV.iii.29.

⁷¹Xen. An. I.x.7, III.iii.7, iii.15, IV.ii.28 and iii.28.

⁷²Xen. An. IV.iii.12.

⁷³Xen. An. IV.viii.7.

⁷⁴Xen. An. I.vii.20 and III.iii.19.

⁷⁵Xen. An. III.ii.27.

(b) Clothing

Individuals would have required at least one change of clothes⁷⁶ so that they could wash and mend them, and in order to be able to change from wet to dry clothes.⁷⁷ The wealthier individuals probably had more than one change of clothes, for we read that on one occasion, Xenophon presents himself in "his finest dress."⁷⁸

Each soldier would have needed blankets or some type of sleeping bag, especially after the tents had been burnt.⁷⁹ They must have bemoaned the loss of the tents and longed for thick, woollen clothing when they encountered the heavy snow storms in Armenia.⁸⁰

Specific mention of clothing is made by Xenophon in terms of cloaks and shoes. He speaks on several occasions about the

⁷⁶Xen. Cyr. IV.v.4. "Then the Medes and Tigranes and his men bathed, changed their clothes (for they were provided with a change) and went to dinner." This would have been a treat for the footsore and weary Ten Thousand. They must have looked forward to "cleaning up" when they found villages in which to encamp.

⁷⁷Xen. Cyr. VI.ii.30. Cyrus advises his soldiers to bring lots of clothes with them on the journey.

⁷⁸Xen. An. III.ii.7.

⁷⁹Xen. An. III.iii.1.

⁸⁰Xen. An. IV.v.4-6.

officers having cloaks.⁸¹ He also describes how the shoes and other clothing which they possessed proved to be woefully inadequate for the harsh conditions of snow storms in the mountains of Armenia, resulting in frost bite, and the loss of toes:

...but in all cases where men slept with their shoes on, the straps sank into their flesh and the shoes froze on their feet; for what they were wearing, since their old shoes had given out, were brogues made of freshly flayed ox-hides.⁸²

Perhaps on occasion they were able to resupply themselves with clothes which were left in the abandoned villages in which they encamped, although Xenophon does not mention this happening.

(c) Cooking Pots and Utensils

The basic requirements for food preparation and eating would have been a cooking pot, a ladle for serving hot liquids like soups, a bowl out of which to eat, and a drinking vessel. Knives for cutting meat and grinders for grain would also have been useful.⁸³ It is possible that they would have managed without bowls by eating from the cooking pots after they had cooled. Also, their swords or daggers could have been used to cut meat.

⁸¹Xen. An. IV.iii.17 and iv.12.

⁸²Xen. An. IV.v.14.

⁸³Xen. Cyr. VI.ii.31. "...we must then have hand-mills ready made with which to prepare food, for these are the lightest of implements used in making bread."

(d) Booty

The soldiers continued to carry booty throughout the retreat,⁸⁴ despite the fact that they had burned a lot towards the beginning of it.⁸⁵ This was evident towards the end of the march when they gave gifts such as a silver cup and the Persian clothing to a guide who had served them well by leading them to the mountain from which they were able to view the sea. While they were there, they made offerings of some booty to the gods. "Therein they placed as offerings a quantity of raw oxhides and walking sticks and the captured wicker shields..."⁸⁶

Xenophon describes several occasions on which the Greeks captured booty from the enemy. After fighting their way across a river, the advance troops of the Greeks had driven the enemy away from the bluffs above the river:

...and Lycius, venturing a pursuit with his small squadron, had captured the stragglers of the enemy's baggage train, and with it fine apparel and drinking cups.⁸⁷

After coming upon the enemy's camp in the Armenian mountains and

⁸⁴Xen. An. IV.vii.26-27.

⁸⁵Xen. An. III.iii.1.

⁸⁶Ibid.

⁸⁷Xen. An. IV.iii.25-26.

catching them unawares, the Greeks were able to recover the booty abandoned by the enemy in their haste to escape:

...about twenty horses were captured, and likewise Tiribazus' tent, with silver footed couches in it, and drinking cups, and people who said they were his bakers and cup bearers.⁸⁸

(ii) Collective Possessions

The Ten Thousand and their camp-followers were a group of people with one main purpose in mind, to escape the clutches of the Persian King Artaxerxes and return home safely to Greece. This meant that they had to share and utilize their collective possessions in order to accomplish this. These collective possessions included medical equipment, tools, and food.

(a) Medical Equipment

Although specific medical equipment is not mentioned by Xenophon, there must have been bandages, medicines/herbs and simple operating tools for the eight surgeons to use.⁸⁹

⁸⁸Xen. An. IV.iv.21.

⁸⁹Xen. An. III.iv.30.

(b) Tools

As to what type of equipment, aside from weapons and armour which the Ten Thousand were likely to have been carrying, one can extrapolate from the lists of gear mentioned in the Cyropaedia:

Medical equipment;
 Straps for packs;
 Rasps for whetting spears;
 Lumber for spare parts of wagons and chariots;
 Tools for making repairs;
 Shovels and mattocks (one for each wagon);
 Axes and sickles (one for each pack animal).⁹⁰

Axes were used by the Ten Thousand for splitting wood,⁹¹ which was needed for the camp fires (and on one occasion to demonstrate anger!).⁹²

(c) Food

It has already been noted in Chapter One that the Greeks carried provisions on the journey. In Section 1 C, the required weight of grain, the main staple of their diet, was calculated. It was shown that even one day's ration would be a very considerable amount, requiring order and planning to transport it.

⁹⁰Xen. Cyr. VI.ii.32.

⁹¹Xen. An. IV.iv.12-13.

⁹²Xen. An. I.v.12.

All of the baggage listed, both individual and collective, created a great burden (both literally and figuratively) for the Greeks. They were more mobile than the Persian army which carried furniture and luxuries for the Persian nobility,⁹³ but they were less agile than the native people with whom they fought.

There was a great difference between the amount of equipment which the Greek and the Carduchian men carried: "... for their men [Carduchians] were so agile that even if they took to flight from close at hand, they could escape; for they had nothing to carry except bows and slings."⁹⁴

Xenophon had suggested towards the beginning of the retreat that they also burn tents (which were a bother to carry and no help in fighting or obtaining provisions), abandon superfluous baggage, except items for war, eating and drinking, and that they reduce the number of baggage carriers.⁹⁵ This illustrates that their most important functions for survival were providing food, protecting themselves from enemy troops, and keeping on the move with the greatest possible speed.

⁹³Xen. Cyr. IV.ii.2. "For, as we know, most Asiatic peoples take the field accompanied by their entire households."

⁹⁴Xen. An. IV.ii.27-28.

⁹⁵Xen. An. III.iii.1.

B. People Carried

Aside from the material items carried, some people on the retreat also became burdens at one time or another for the Greeks. These included the sick and wounded soldiers, and the weaker camp-followers, such as the elderly and the very young children.

(i) Sick and Wounded

The sick and wounded people rode in wagons as long as they were available,⁹⁶ but later they had to be carried or helped along by the soldiers or camp-followers.

Most of the Greeks considered the carrying of wounded comrades and unwell camp-followers to be their duty. Xenophon relates one story about having to command a mule driver to carry a sick man. This mule driver was subsequently caught in the process of burying him alive.⁹⁷ This mule driver was an exception to the rule, as can be seen in the following example of Greeks carrying the sick:

Meanwhile Cheirisophus sent some of the troops quartered in the village to find out how the people at the rear were faring. Xenophon's party were glad enough to see them, and turned over the invalids to them to carry on to the camp, while they themselves

⁹⁶Xenophon says that Ariaeus "was making the journey in a wagon because he was wounded..." (Xen. An. II.ii.14).

⁹⁷Xen. An. V.viii.8-11.

continued their journey...⁹⁸

This devotion to duty complicated matters of transportation because the weapons of these "carriers" had to be taken up by others.⁹⁹

(ii) Old and Young

Of the healthy camp-followers, the group consisting of the old and very young needed the most help to make the journey with the Ten Thousand. Possibly they were carried through difficult terrain or during the times when they were too tired to keep up with the fit soldiers.

The Greeks lived up to their duty in this regard, even though, as was noted previously, the result was that some regular soldiers were taken out of readiness for combat.

C. Carriers

Those responsible for doing the carrying can be divided into two main types: the ones with four feet, who had to be guided, and the ones with two feet, who did the guiding. Xenophon does not specify which ones were more sure-footed.

⁹⁸Xen. An. IV.v.22.

⁹⁹Xen. An. III.iv.32.

(i) Baggage Animals

Wagons, as a vehicle of transportation, are mentioned in numerous places in the Anabasis--i.e., up to the time when Xenophon asks his men to burn their wagons, tents and superfluous possessions.¹⁰⁰ Alexander was later to take a similar action.¹⁰¹

After this, the Greeks were dependent on using beasts of burden (those which they had not already eaten when they succumbed to hunger) and their own men as baggage carriers.

A familiar order given to the soldiers was: "Load your baggage upon the beasts of burden."¹⁰² They needed a constant supply of new pack animals to replenish their dwindling stock because these creatures often grew weary on the strenuous journey.¹⁰³ The soldiers of Alexander the Great killed many of the beasts of burden for food.¹⁰⁴ This made it hard to transport the sick and wounded soldiers, because the wagons had been knocked to pieces because of

¹⁰⁰Xen. An. III.ii.27 and iii.1.

¹⁰¹ "At Sousa, before marching through the Kara Kum Desert on his aborted campaign of 330, he [Alexander the Great] ordered all wagons and excess baggage to be burned, beginning with his own" (Engels 1978: 13).

¹⁰²Xen. An. II.ii.4.

¹⁰³Xen. An. IV.v.12.

¹⁰⁴Arr. Anab. VI.xxv.1. "Of the transport animals there was then a great loss, even caused deliberately by the army; for whenever their provisions began to fail them, they clubbed together and gradually killed off most of their horses and mules and ate their flesh, giving out that they had perished from thirst or had collapsed from fatigue..."

the depth of the sand and there was a shortage of animals to carry soldiers and baggage.¹⁰⁵

The Ten Thousand lost some of their baggage animals when they converted the pack horses into cavalry horses:

I observe that there are horses in the army--a few at my own quarters, others that made part of Clearchus' troop and were left behind, and many others that have been taken from the enemy and are used as pack-animals. If, then, we should pick out all these horses, replacing them with mules, and should equip them for cavalry, it may be that this cavalry also will cause some annoyance to the enemy when they are in flight.¹⁰⁶

After the murder of Clearchus and the other generals, the Greeks "were left alone, without even a single horseman to support them..."¹⁰⁷ As a result, they decided to select 50 horses for use in the cavalry, and provided jerkins and cuirasses.¹⁰⁸

The number of baggage animals determined which routes were taken, because they required special types of roads.¹⁰⁹ For instance, they were very hampered by the deep snow which they

¹⁰⁵Arr. Anab. VI.xxv.2.

¹⁰⁶Xen. An. III.iii.19.

¹⁰⁷Xen. An. III.i.2. See also, III.iii.9.

¹⁰⁸Xen. An. III.iii.20.

¹⁰⁹Xen. An. IV.i.24-25, ii.9-13 and vi.18.

encountered in the mountains of Armenia.¹¹⁰ We know that these animals were used to carry part of the luggage¹¹¹, but there was still plenty left to be managed by people.

(ii) People

As was noted in Chapter One, soldiers were able to carry about 80 lbs. of equipment. The camp-followers were probably not able to carry quite as much.

(a) Soldiers

The soldiers were required to carry their personal weapons and armour, clothing, cooking pots and utensils and their own food. At times, they also had to carry the extra provisions for the numerous sick and wounded comrades.¹¹² When times were hard, the soldiers might be asked to play more lowly roles as in the case of one recruit who "...had been detailed by his messmates, although he was a free man, to drive a mule."¹¹³

¹¹⁰Xen. An. IV.iv.11.

¹¹¹Xen. An. II.ii.4-5, Clearchus instructs the men to put packed baggage onto the beasts of burden.

¹¹²Xen. An. IV.i.13.

¹¹³Xen. An. V.viii.5-6.

(b) Servants

At least some of the officers had servants who helped them to carry their belongings.¹¹⁴ The baggage carriers were not regarded very highly. This is illustrated by Xenophon's comments about Apollonides:

In my opinion, gentlemen, we should not simply refuse to admit this fellow to companionship with us, but we should deprive him of his captaincy, lay packs on his back, and treat him as that sort of creature.¹¹⁵

If one considers all of the evidence which has been examined so far, it is evident that the Ten Thousand were faced with enormous problems in transporting their belongings. They were travelling through wild, mountainous areas, with narrow trails, and they had to brave inclement weather. They had no maps with which to navigate their passage.

Adding to these odds against them, they had many camp-followers to transport and protect, and all of the extra baggage which they generated, as well as their own belongings. So how did the Ten Thousand manage to overcome these staggering problems?

¹¹⁴Xen. An. IV.ii.20-21. Xenophon is deserted by the servant who was carrying his shield.

¹¹⁵Xen. An. III.i.30.

CHAPTER THREE

Solving Daily Problems of Provisioning

Each day of the retreat brought new and different challenges as the Greeks faced rapidly changing terrain, harsh weather and terrifying enemy tribes. In this chapter, using all of the tables of data and the evidence which has been presented so far, we shall travel with the Greeks. We shall describe the daily details of their provisioning, beginning in Book Two, when they started travelling from Cunaxa under the protection of Tissaphernes and follow them northwards as their fortunes waxed and waned, until they reached Trapezus.

Book Two begins the day after the battle of Cunaxa with the Greeks being informed of the death of Cyrus.¹ They had already been travelling for 6 1/2 months, during which time a market had been provided for them, from which they were able to procure supplies, using their pay. Cyrus had taken along 400 wagons of flour and wine as reserve supplies, but unfortunately, during the battle of Cunaxa, these wagons had been plundered by the victorious Persians, so that the Greeks were left with no provisions.

The Greeks had had no breakfast or supper on the day of battle. On the following day, after being told of the demise of Cyrus, they resorted to killing oxen and asses which had served as

¹Xen. An. II.i.3.

baggage animals and boiling them over camp fires, using wooden arrows and wicker shields of enemies for fuel.

DAY 2 - After unsatisfactory talks with Phalinus, an envoy of the King, Clearchus decided to lead the Greeks to the place where Ariaeus was waiting with the troops who had been under his control. The plan was for the two groups to travel back to Ionia together.

Clearchus informed his soldiers of the plan, and instructed them to share out the meagre provisions, presumably the left-overs from the cooked oxen and asses, among themselves: "This, then, is what you are to do: go away and dine on whatever you severally have..."²

At this point, fortunately, they had not eaten all of their baggage animals, for Clearchus further instructed them: "...when the horn gives the signal for going to rest, pack up; when the second signal is given, load your baggage upon the beasts of burden..."³

Then they marched to meet Ariaeus, joining him at midnight. They took an oath to be allies, and then decided not to take the same route home as the one by which they had marched inland because of considerations of provisioning:

²Xen. An. II.ii.4.

³Xen. An. II.ii.4.

If we should return by the way we came, we should perish utterly from starvation, for we now have **no provisions whatever**. For even on our way hither we were not able to get anything from the country during the last seventeen stages; and where there was anything, we consumed it entirely on our march through. Now accordingly, we intend to take a route that is longer, to be sure, but one where we shall not lack provisions.⁴

At this point they were in a desperate position with no provisions, and no chance of obtaining any, unless they took another route home.

DAY 3 - At dawn they set out from the environs of Cunaxa, probably dining on a meagre breakfast, if they were lucky enough to have anything at all, and headed north, "keeping the sun on their right".⁵ Towards the evening, they came across pack animals of the Persian army and realized that the enemy camp could not be far away. Clearchus decided not to meet the enemy in battle: "...for he knew that his troops were not only tired out, but without food..."⁶

They camped in the nearest villages, where no food was available because the troops of the King had taken everything, "...even the very timbers of the houses."⁷

⁴Xen. An. II.ii.11.

⁵Xen. An. II.ii.13.

⁶Xen. An. II.ii.16.

⁷Xen. An. II.ii.16.

DAYS 4 TO 29 - The King sent heralds to the Greeks in order to negotiate a truce. Clearchus, having thousands of hungry soldiers to contend with,⁸ replied to the messengers that they had had no breakfast, and if the King did not supply food for them, they would not agree to talk about a truce.⁹

Clearchus had to have been in a desperate position in order to have revealed his weakness, in terms of his lack of provisions, to the enemy. The messengers rode away, but soon returned, stating that the King had agreed to their terms and they would lead the Greeks "to a place where they could get provisions."¹⁰

Clearchus and his officers then took counsel together: "and it was thought best to conclude the truce speedily, so that they could go and get provisions without being molested."¹¹ This was an important aspect, as has already been pointed out in Chapter One, Section 3 B, Plundering and Foraging.

After agreeing to completing a truce, the Greeks followed their Persian guides, and reached villages in which there was an

⁸Keep in mind that they had not had a proper meal, aside from the cooked baggage animals, since the day before the battle of Cunaxa, four days previously.

⁹Xen. An. II.iii.5. For the full quotation, see p. 5.

¹⁰Xen. An. II.iii.6-7.

¹¹Xen. An. II.iii.8.

abundance of grain, palm wine, dates, and the crown of the palm.¹² There was enough food to last them for the three days they stayed there. During this time, Tissaphernes negotiated with the Greeks through an interpreter.

Afterwards, Tissaphernes told them that he would go back to the King for further instructions, and while the truce continued, he promised to provide a market for the Greeks from which they could purchase provisions.¹³ By this time, the Greeks had not much money left, so the amount of food which they were able to buy was paltry.¹⁴

Tissaphernes was gone for 3 days. When he returned, he promised to lead the Ten Thousand back to Greece. His proposals concerning provisioning were as follows:

And now you may receive pledges from us that in very truth the territory you shall pass through shall be friendly and that we will lead you back to Greece without treachery, providing you with a market; and wherever it is impossible to buy provisions, we will allow you to take them from the country. And you, on your side, will have to swear to us that in very truth you will proceed as you would through a friendly country, doing no damage and taking food and drink from the country only when we do not provide a market, but that, if we do provide a market, you

¹²Xen. An. II.iii.14-16.

¹³Xen. An. III.iii.24.

¹⁴Xen. An. III.i.20. For the full quotation, see p. 109.

will obtain provisions by purchase.¹⁵

Then the Greeks, camped near Ariaeus, waited for 20 days while Tissaphernes went off to make preparations for the journey. Presumably, during this time, the Greeks finished the supplies from the villages in which they were encamped and then bought provisions from the barbarian market. While they were waiting for Tissaphernes to return, it seemed as if Ariaeus was considering a reconciliation with the King, and the Greeks felt more and more alienated.

As a result, the Greeks began to debate among themselves as to whether or not they should leave and try to make it home on their own; however, Clearchus pointed out that one of the obstacles was that they did not have the provisions necessary to embark on such a venture: "And then, in the first place, no one will provide us a market or a place from which we can get provisions..."¹⁶

DAYS 30 TO 32 - Finally Tissaphernes returned from making his preparations. One month had passed since the battle of Cunaxa. They began to march, with Tissaphernes providing a market for the Greeks.¹⁷ They camped separately from Ariaeus who had "chummed up" with the army of Tissaphernes. The two groups were suspicious of

¹⁵Xen. An. II.iii.26-28.

¹⁶Xen. An. II.iv.5.

¹⁷Xen. An. II.iv.9.

each other and came to blows when collecting firewood for cooking or fodder for the pack animals.¹⁸

They travelled for 3 days until they reached the wall of Media. Presumably they were furnished with provisions by Tissaphernes during the journey either by a market or by permitted foraging.¹⁹

DAYS 33 TO 34 - From there they travelled for two days, until they reached a section of the Tigris River, not far from the large city of Sittace. The Persians crossed over to the east side of the river, while the Greeks encamped near the western shore.

DAYS 35 TO 38 - After crossing the Tigris river to the eastern side, the Greeks followed the Persians northward for four days until they reached the city of Opis on the Phycus River.

DAYS 39 TO 44 - From the Phycus River, they marched north-eastward through Media for six days to villages belonging to Parysatis (the mother of Artaxerxes and the deceased Cyrus). Here a different provisioning procedure was followed:

And Tissaphernes, by way of insulting Cyrus, gave over those villages--save only the slaves they contained--

¹⁸Xen. An. II.iv.11-12.

¹⁹Keep in mind their daily requirements listed in Chapter One, Section 1 C, Calculations of the Amount of Provisions Required.

to the Greeks to plunder. In them was grain in abundance and cattle and other property.²⁰

DAYS 45 TO 48 - More than six weeks had passed since the battle of Cunaxa. The Greeks marched northwards, with the Tigris River on their left, and on the first day they passed by the large city of Caenae, "from which the barbarians brought over loaves, cheeses and wine, crossing upon rafts made of skins."²¹ Obviously, these barbarians had a surplus of food from their harvests, and hoped to profit from the thousands of hungry soldiers.

DAYS 49 TO 53 - After marching for four days altogether, they reached the Zapatas River where they stayed for three days. There was still a lot of suspicion between the Greek and the barbarian soldiers, so Clearchus resolved to have a meeting with Tissaphernes in order to clear the air. He thanked Tissaphernes for leading them well and providing them with sufficient supplies. Clearchus told Tissaphernes that the Ten Thousand had no intention of breaking their vows.

Tissaphernes, in turn, reassured Clearchus that his motives were pure and while explaining that the Persians were doing the Greeks a big favour, he described the difficulties of the terrain through which they were passing: "...these vast plains, which even

²⁰Xen. An. II.iv.27-28.

²¹Xen. An. II.iv.28.

now, although they are friendly, it is costing you a deal of labour to traverse."²² Tissaphernes also notes that they still have great mountains and rivers which they have to cross.

Clearchus agrees to return the next day for a dinner with some of his officers. He arrived with 5 generals and 20 captains and was accompanied by 200 soldiers. Unfortunately for them, this was to be their last supper. All of them were seized and eventually killed by the Persians, save Nicarchus the Arcadian who "reached the camp in flight, wounded in his belly and holding his bowels in his hands, and told all that had happened."²³

The leaders of the Persians approached the camp of the Greeks and asked to speak to their leaders. Two generals, Cleanor and Sophaenetus, came forward, along with Xenophon, a private soldier at the time, who was anxious to know what had happened to his friend Proxenus. At the same time, "Cheirisophus, however, chanced to be away in a village in company with others who were getting provisions."²⁴

Xenophon proceeds to give eulogies of the five murdered generals. All of them were favourable except that of Menon the Thessalian who was suspected of betraying the Greeks. Xenophon

²²Xen. An. II.v.18.

²³Xen. An. II.v.33.

²⁴Xen. An. II.v.37-38.

singles out Clearchus for being "...competent, if ever a man was, in devising ways by which his army might get provisions and in procuring them..."²⁵ He stresses the difficulties and crucial importance of this job and how it takes lots of thought and skill to accomplish. So ends Book Two of the Anabasis.

Book Three opens with the Greeks faced with a huge dilemma. Once again, they were facing danger and seemingly certain death. They were dejected and perplexed as to what to do. Xenophon describes their situation as follows:

the Greeks were naturally in great perplexity, reflecting that they were at the King's gates, that round them on every side were many hostile tribes and cities, that no one would provide them a market any longer, that they were distant from Greece not less than ten thousand stadia, that they had no guide to show them the way...²⁶

So despondent were they, that on the first evening of the tragedy, most had lost their appetite and could not sleep.

Xenophon, who up to this point has played a minor role in the retreat, is one of those having difficulty sleeping, but upon awakening from a dream, he decides that the Greeks must take action in order to save themselves.

²⁵Xen. An. II.vi.8.

²⁶Xen. An. III.i.2.

First he calls together the captains who had served with Proxenus. He reiterates their situation and says that although the pact has been useful, the necessity of having to buy most of their provisions has been difficult:

...but whenever I took thought of the situation of our own soldiers, I saw that we had no share in these good things, except that we bought them, I knew there were but few of us who still had money wherewith to buy, and I knew that our oaths restrained us from getting provisions in any other way than by purchase.²⁷

He encourages them to fight for their freedom, noting that since they have been faithful to their oaths, the gods will be on their side. When one soldier, Apollonides, tries to counsel them to negotiate with the Persians, Xenophon replies that the only way to deal reasonably with the situation is to adopt an aggressive stance from the start.

The Greeks gathered together the remaining one hundred officers at midnight. They were exhorted by Xenophon to be strong hearted, to take the initiative for leadership, to regroup and to encourage one another.

DAY 54 - They elect new generals to replace the ones who have been murdered, and at daybreak, they call an assembly of the soldiers. The generals explain their situation and outline their

²⁷Xen. An. III.i.20.

plans for escape. They remind them of the wondrous deeds of their ancestors in beating the Persians, and note that they had done this recently in the battle of Cunaxa.

As Xenophon notes, although Tissaphernes will no longer provide a market for the Greeks, they will still be able to have the upper hand:

And as for provisions, is it the better plan to buy from the market which these barbarians have provided--small measures for large prices, when we have no money left, either--or to appropriate for ourselves, in case we are victorious, and to use as large a measure as each one of us pleases?²⁸

It is clear that the market system had not been ideal, and that the Greeks preferred to take their chances at appropriating their own supplies.

Xenophon suggests that they set their hearts to return home. He says that to do so most expeditiously they should burn wagons, tents, and all superfluous baggage, "...keeping only such articles as we use for war, or in eating and drinking..."²⁹

After organization, the first priority was obtaining supplies, as Xenophon states: "It is clear that we must make our way to a

²⁸Xen. An. III.ii.21.

²⁹Xen. An. III.ii.28.

place where we can get provisions..."³⁰ After burning the wagons and extra baggage, they had breakfast and departed, first crossing the Zapatas River. They were followed by Mithradates and 200 horsemen, as well as bowmen and slingers, who attacked them from the rear all along the route. The result was that they were able to travel only 25 stadia. In the evening they arrived at some villages.

At that point, they decide to re-appoint some soldiers to bow and sling duty and to convert pack horses into cavalry so that they can be better prepared for the enemy's next attack.

DAY 55 - The next day they rested, presumably stocked up on whatever provisions were available in the villages, and prepared for the next day's journey.

DAY 56 - The next morning they set off early, but were soon intercepted by Mithradates who had returned with a larger force. The Greeks with their newly equipped slingers, bowmen and cavalry got the best of the Persians and sent them packing. Then they marched northwards to the Tigris River near the deserted city of Larisa. Presumably they dined on the provisions carried from the villages in which they had encamped the night before.

DAY 57 - The next day they continued marching along the

³⁰Xen. An. III.ii.34.

Tigris, further northwards to the deserted city of Mespila. Once again, they had to make do with the provisions which they had carried.

DAY 58 - They continued the next day, during which Tissaphernes appeared with a large contingent of troops. He pursued them as they marched. In the evening the Greeks encamped in villages from which they were able to obtain provisions and ammunition for their weapons.

DAY 59 - "The following day the Greeks remained quiet and collected supplies, for there was an abundance of corn in the villages."³¹

DAYS 60 TO 63 - They took off and travelled for four days, presumably living off the collected supplies. Xenophon does not mention where they encamped. They were now leaving the flat terrain and climbing low foothills of mountains.

DAYS 64 TO 67 - On this day, as they continued travelling, they saw in the distance a village complex, at the base of a mountain, leading up to a palace on top of the mountain. They fought their way along and finally reached the villages where they appointed 8 surgeons to care for the many wounded soldiers:

³¹Xen. An. III.iv.18.

In these villages they remained for three days, not only for the sake of the wounded, but likewise because they had provisions in abundance--flour, wine and great stores of barley that had been collected for horses, all these supplies having been gathered together by the acting satrap of the district.³²

DAY 68 - They marched to another village, while being pursued by Tissaphernes. It was difficult because they were bogged down, carrying many wounded soldiers:

...Necessity taught them to encamp in the first village they caught sight of, and not to continue the plan of marching and fighting at the same time..."³³

DAYS 69 TO 70 - From thence, they marched 3 days, managing to put quite a distance between them and the Persians. Either there were more villages along the way from which they were able to obtain provisions or they were carrying enough to keep them supplied. Xenophon does not specify the distance which they covered in this particular section of the march, but it can be estimated at 15 parasangs, based on their average speed of 5 parasangs per day.³⁴

DAYS 71 TO 72 - By now, they were in mountainous terrain, broken up by plains. Tissaphernes had managed to get ahead of them

³²Xen. An. III.iv.31.

³³Xen. An. III.iv.32.

³⁴See Tables Four and Five.

by marching through the previous night, and was now holding a mountain spur above them. The Greeks then were successful in racing the enemy for the attainment of the summit. After this, the enemy turned and fled:

...and the army under Cheirisophus descended into the plain and proceeded to encamp in a village stored with abundant supplies. There were likewise many other villages richly stored with supplies in this plain on the banks of the Tigris.³⁵

But some of the Greeks who went out plundering after herds of cattle were killed by enemy troops who descended upon them. Also, Tissaphernes and his followers tried to burn the villages which the Greeks intended to enter. As a result, "...some of the Greeks got exceedingly despondent, out of apprehension that they would not have a place from which to get provisions in case the enemy should succeed in this attempt."³⁶ Then Xenophon spoke to the Greeks who had returned from plundering:

Do you observe, men of Greece, that they admit the country is now ours? For while they stipulated when they made the treaty that there should be no burning of the King's territory, now they are doing that very thing themselves, as though the land were another's. At any rate, if they leave supplies anywhere for their own use, they shall behold us also proceeding to that spot.³⁷

³⁵Xen. An. III.v.1-2.

³⁶Xen. An. III.v.3-4.

³⁷Xen. An. III.v.5.

While the troops were "busy about provisions" the generals gathered to discuss their situation, for the present terrain would make their journey more difficult:

For on one side of them were exceedingly high mountains and on the other side a river so deep that not even their spears reached above water when they tried its depth.³⁸

At this point, a Rhodian offered to build a type of pontoon bridge to transport the soldiers, four thousand at one time, across the river. His plan involved using the skins of 2,000 of the animals which were accompanying the Greeks, but at the time it was not feasible because the other side of the river was being guarded by enemy troops.³⁹

Given the circumstances, they decided to march back to the unburned villages. That evening, while the soldiers collected provisions, the generals met together and spoke with captives in order to learn about the surrounding countryside. From them they discovered that to the north lay the mountainous country of the Carduchians, a warlike people who had not been subjugated to the Persian King. Book Three ends with their decision to head north and pass through Carduchia in an effort to reach Armenia.

³⁸Xen. An. III.v.7-8.

³⁹Xen. An. III.v.8-12.

As Book Four opens, it should be noted that six weeks have passed since the battle of Cunaxa, so it is now winter. Since they were betrayed by Tissaphernes, they have had to fight their way northwards, following the Tigris River, and subsisting on the supplies which they were able to collect from villages which they passed along the way. When the distance between villages was more than one day's march, they had to subsist on carried provisions or fresh meat from the many herds of animals (remember the 2,000 which the Rhodian had counted) which were with them.

The terrain had varied from flat plains to low hills and some mountains, but now the Greeks were facing perhaps the most arduous portion of the retreat, through the rugged mountains which were inhabited by the fierce Carduchians.

DAYS 73 TO 79 - For the next seven days they traversed the land of the Carduchians. In the early morning of the first day, they crossed the plain while it was still dark, and by daybreak they had reached the mountain. As they climbed upwards, they came upon villages abandoned by the Carduchians. Here they camped for the night. "As for provisions, there was an abundance for the Greeks to take..."⁴⁰

At dawn on the following day, the Greeks, having found it difficult to travel quickly on the previous day: "...resolved to

⁴⁰Xen. An. IV.i.8.

keep with them on the march only the indispensable and most powerful baggage animals and to leave the rest behind..."⁴¹ They also decided to release all of the new captives because they slowed down the pace, they required soldiers to watch them, and they needed a large amount of supplies.

On the next day, they were hit with a heavy storm, "...but they had to continue their march for they had not any adequate supply of provisions..."⁴² They had a very difficult time climbing through the mountains while they were constantly being attacked by the nimble Carduchians who had the advantage of knowing all of the surrounding countryside.

In the late afternoon, after having been fortunate enough to capture some natives who gave them information, a group of volunteers set out to try to capture the height ahead of them.⁴³ It was still raining heavily. In the meantime, the rest of the army was divided up into different groups, and each one tried to advance to the heights by a different way in order to confuse the Carduchians.

The Carduchians responded by rolling down stones, both large and small, while the captains continued to try their ascent. When

⁴¹Xen. An. IV.i.12.

⁴²Xen. An. IV.i.15.

⁴³Xen. An. IV.ii.1.

darkness fell, and they knew that they could retreat unobserved, "...they went back to dinner--and it chanced that they had had no breakfast either."⁴⁴ It was not possible to fight and eat at the same time.

While the enemy rolled the stones down throughout the night, one party of the Greeks proceeded up by a "roundabout" route. They camped for the night, after reaching a spot which they supposed to be the summit.

On the morning of the next day, they were fortunate to be greeted with a thick fog; therefore, they were able to march unobserved for some time, until they were almost upon the enemy higher up. This allowed them to get the better of those enemy troops. Finally, after a series of skirmishes at various levels of the ascent, the Greeks gained the upper hand.

Then Xenophon, through an interpreter, held a meeting in order to have a truce so that they could exchange the bodies of their dead. The Carduchians agreed on the condition that the Greeks would promise not to burn their houses.⁴⁵ The truce did not last for long. As soon as Xenophon and his troops went down the hill to reunite with the rest of the Greeks, the Carduchians went on the offensive once again and began to roll down more stones.

⁴⁴Xen. An. IV.ii.4.

⁴⁵Xen. An. IV.ii.19.

However, the Greeks managed to get together and encamped in the houses of the Carduchians, "in the midst of abundant supplies"⁴⁶, including wine in cisterns made of cement.

On the following day, they continued to march, this time without a guide, while the Carduchians tried to block their every advance. The Greeks managed to continue moving by always trying to send small groups of volunteers ahead, so that they could reach higher positions, above the points where the enemy was stationed.

In this situation, the Carduchians had military advantages over the Greeks thanks to their weapons and mobility:

There were times, indeed, when the barbarians caused a great deal of trouble even to the troops who had climbed to a higher position, when they were coming down again; for their men were so agile that even if they took to flight from close at hand, they could escape; for they had nothing to carry except bows and slings. As bowmen they were most excellent; they had bows nearly three cubits long and their arrows were more than two cubits, and when they shot, they would draw their strings by pressing with the left foot against the lower end of the bow; and their arrows would go straight through shields and breastplates.⁴⁷

That day, they were fortunate to find quarters in villages above the plain near the Centrites River. The Greeks were overjoyed to see flat land and a flowing source of water:

⁴⁶Xen. An. IV.ii.23.

⁴⁷Xen. An. IV.ii.28.

At the time, then, they went into their quarters very happily, for they had provisions and likewise many recollections of the hardships that were now past. For during all the seven days of their march through the land of the Carduchians they were continually fighting, and they suffered more evils than all which they had suffered taken together at the hands of the King and Tissaphernes.⁴⁸

DAYS 80 TO 81 - Their joy was short-lived. At dawn of the next day, they saw that horsemen had gathered on the other side of the river in order to block their passage. These horsemen included troops led by Orontas and Artuchas, as well as Armenian, Mardian and Chaldaean mercenaries. The Greeks spent the whole day and night, trying to decide how to cross the river, but the next morning at breakfast, two young men informed Xenophon that they had discovered a part of the river which was shallow enough for them all to cross.⁴⁹

Matters were complicated by the fact that the Carduchians were still pursuing them from behind. However, they used their tactical prowess and managed to cross the river without many losses, and once the enemy on the Armenian side saw their success, they fled in such a hurry that part of their baggage train was left behind, and the Greeks were able to obtain more booty as a result.⁵⁰

⁴⁸Xen. An. IV.iii.2.

⁴⁹Xen. An. IV.iii.10-12.

⁵⁰Xen. An. IV.iii.24-26.

After accomplishing a safe crossing, the Greeks began marching through Armenia, over level plains and rolling hills. There were no villages near the river, but after marching five parasangs, they reached a large village where the provisions were plentiful.

DAYS 82 TO 84 - From there they continued marching for two days, and passed the headwaters of the Tigris River.

DAYS 85 TO 87 - They continued to march through Armenia for three days and reached the Teleboas River which was in Western Armenia. The satrap of the area, Tiribazus, sent an interpreter to the Greeks, and said that if the Greeks would promise not to burn the villages, he would allow them to take all the provisions which they needed. Both sides agreed to a truce, and the matter was resolved.

DAY 88 - From there, they marched for three more days, through flat countryside, and reached a palace surrounded by villages filled with provisions, including grain, old wines, dried grapes, and beans. The generals decided that it was unwise to leave the troops divided among the various villages, knowing that the enemy was nearby, so they gathered them all together outside of the villages. While they were camped, there was a major snow-fall during the night. This caused great discomfort for the Greeks. One must recall that they had burned their tents, which left them at the mercy of the elements.

The next morning, the generals decided that the need for shelter was more crucial than the possibility of attack from the enemy, so they sent the troops back into the villages. This was good news for all except those who had wantonly burned the villages in which they had been foraging the day before.⁵¹ They probably believed that they had the right to do this, since Tiribazus had not been acting in a peaceful manner according to the terms of the truce.

DAYS 89 TO 91 - On the next day, they decided to march as quickly as possible in order to gain the narrow passes of the mountains before the enemy could reach them. They were led through deep snow by a number of guides and managed to cross the summit before camping for the night.

DAYS 92 TO 94 - Then they marched for three days through a desert region until they reached the Euphrates River. It was not very deep at this point, for when they crossed, the water reached only their navels.⁵² However, even this depth must have made it difficult for the camp-followers to cross.

DAY 95 - The terrain continued to bring more surprises. During the next three days, they passed through a plain, and on the third day they marched through deep snow, while a blustery north

⁵¹Xen. An. IV.iv.14.

⁵²Xen. An. IV.v.2.

wind blew directly into their faces. "Moreover, the depth of the snow was a fathom, so that many of the baggage animals and slaves perished, and about thirty of the soldiers."⁵³

They managed to survive during the night by keeping fires, using wood which was readily available, and sharing wheat or whatever scraps of food they had remaining. By now 7 days had passed since they were last able to stock up on provisions. Their possession of herds of livestock must have been the key to their survival in this instance.

DAY 96 - They marched through the snow all of the following day, but by this time, many of the men were suffering from hunger-faintness. Xenophon realized that he must take measures to save these men:

...he went around among the baggage animals, and wherever he saw anything that was edible, he would distribute it among the sick men, or send hither and thither people who had the strength to run along the lines, to give it to them. And when they had eaten something, they would get up and continue the march.⁵⁴

Cheirisophus and the advance troops who had the strength managed to reach a village where they spent the night, "but such of the others as were unable to complete the journey spent the night in the open

⁵³Xen. An. IV.v.4-5.

⁵⁴Xen. An. IV.v.8-9.

without food or fire; and in this way some of the soldiers perished."⁵⁵ Their plight was made worse by the fact that they were being followed by the enemy, and weakened by hunger, snow-blindness and frostbite. Xenophon managed to save many of the men by frightening away the enemy troops who were following behind:

Thereupon Xenophon also and his party bivouacked where they were, without a fire and without dinner, after stationing such guards as they could.⁵⁶

DAYS 97 TO 103 - The next morning, Cheirisophus sent troops to find out what had happened to the rearguard. They helped the rearguard to carry the ailing soldiers, and after travelling twenty stadia, they all reached the villages and were reunited. The generals decided that it was safe enough to divide the troops among the various neighbouring villages.

In the houses were goats, sheep, cattle, fowl, and their young;...Here were also wheat, barley, and beans, and barley-wine in large bowls. Floating on top of this drink were the barley grains...⁵⁷

Here, the Greeks were also able to replenish their stock of horses, for the villagers had many colts which they raised as a tribute for the King. The village chief told the Greeks how to

⁵⁵Xen. An. IV.v.11.

⁵⁶Xen. An. IV.v.21.

⁵⁷Xen. An. IV.v.25-26.

wrap bags around the feet of the baggage animals in order to prevent them from sinking into the snow.⁵⁸

DAYS 104 TO 106 - After spending seven days, resting and feasting in the villages, the Greeks, having had the opportunity to replenish their stores of provisions, began travelling again. They had as their guide, the village head chief.

DAYS 107 TO 113 - They lost their guide, however, three days later as a result of Cheirisophus' being cruel to him. Cheirisophus had been angry that the chief had not led them to villages. His anger is understandable, for Cheirisophus knew that his authority and ability to lead the soldiers was dependent on his ability to supply them with provisions.

After this, they marched for seven days until they reached the Phasis River.

DAYS 114 TO 115 - Xenophon does not say how they managed to feed themselves, but it seems unlikely that they could carry ten days' worth of food, unless they had large herds of livestock, which could travel under their own steam. From there they marched for two days.

DAY 116 - As they were approaching a mountain pass, they saw

⁵⁸Xen. An. IV.v.36.

a host of enemy soldiers. They decided to make an offensive move after breakfast. They used their habitual practice of dividing the army, and having it go separate ways in order to confuse the enemy. As a result, one section of the Greek army managed to gain a good position by evening.

DAYS 117 TO 121 - On the next day, the Greeks were victorious in putting the enemy to flight, and after attaining the pass, they descended into the plain on the other side, where, as their reward, they found villages stocked with provisions.⁵⁹ This was a relief, as it had been 13 days since they were last in a village supplied with provisions.

After stocking up on provisions once more, they proceeded for five days into the territory of the Taochians. The Taochians lived in well-fortified villages, so the Greeks did not have an easy time obtaining provisions.

DAYS 122 TO 128 - Towards the end of the five days, they were driven by hunger to attack one of the strongholds. As Cheirisophus explains to Xenophon: "You have come in the nick of time; for the place must be captured; for the army has no provisions unless we capture this place."⁶⁰

⁵⁹Xen. An. IV.vi.27.

⁶⁰Xen. An. IV.vii.3-4.

It turned out to be a very difficult village to take. Like their Carduchian counterparts, the Taochian people rolled stones down, and inflicted many broken bones on the Greek soldiers, until the Greeks managed to outwit them. "In this stronghold only a very few human beings were captured, but they secured cattle and asses in large numbers and sheep."⁶¹ Although they required much more preparation than supplies of grain would have needed, these livestock were ideal for taking along on extended marches because they moved under their own power. The only real drawback about them was that they required people to drive them along, and in some places, like the snow-filled passes, they had difficulty making the crossing.

From there they travelled seven days through the territory of the Chalybians. Like the Taochians, they lived in strongholds, from which the Greeks were unable to get provisions: "...hence the Greeks could get nothing in this country, but they subsisted on the cattle they had taken from the Taochians."⁶²

DAYS 129 TO 132 - Fortunately, the next four days of their journey took them through the flat terrain of the Scythian people.

DAYS 133 TO 135 - At the end of this march, they found some villages, and rested there for three days while they collected

⁶¹Xen. An. IV.vii.14.

⁶²Xen. An. IV.vii.17.

provisions.

DAYS 136 TO 139 - Their next march of four days brought them to a large city called Gymnias.

DAYS 140 TO 144 - The local ruler sent a guide with the Greeks. This guide promised that within the space of five days he would lead them to a place from which they could view the sea.

DAYS 145 TO 147 - He proved to be true to his word, for on the fifth day of the march, when they reached the top of Mount Theches, they were rewarded with a sight most beautiful to their eyes: the Black Sea. This is perhaps one of the most moving parts of the account:

...and in a moment they heard the soldiers shouting, 'The Sea! The Sea!' and passing the word along. Then all the troops of the rearguard likewise broke into a run, and the pack animals began racing ahead and the horses. And when all had reached the summit, then indeed they fell to embracing one another, and generals and captains as well, with tears in their eyes.⁶³

From there, with lighter hearts and a clear road ahead, the Greeks marched three days through the land of the Macronians. They managed to make a truce with them on the first day, so they were able to march without fighting. The Macronians provided a market for the Greeks, the first one they had received since their ill-

⁶³Xen. An. IV.vii.24-26.

fated truce with Tissaphernes had dissolved. They also led the Greeks safely through their territory.

DAYS 148 TO 151 - The troubles of the Greeks were not quite over. After leaving the land of the Macronians, they entered the territory of the hostile Colchians. The Greeks, now numbering 9,800 soldiers⁶⁴ managed to get the better of the Colchians, and ascended into the villages which they had abandoned. Here there were provisions in abundance. But many of the soldiers became ill after eating honey from the local bee hives. They were very fortunate that the enemy did not come upon them when they were in this condition, for they would have been unable to defend themselves. However, they recovered after three or four days.

DAYS 152 TO 153 - Then they had only a short, two-day march between them and the Greek city of Trapezus on the Black Sea. One can only imagine the delight of the Greeks at finding themselves in a city of their own race of people.

And the Trapezuntians supplied a market for the army, received the Greeks kindly, and gave them oxen, barley-meal, and wine as gifts of hospitality. They likewise took part in negotiations with the Greeks on behalf of the near-by Colchians, who dwelt for the most part on the plain, and from these people also the Greeks received hospitable gifts of oxen.⁶⁵

⁶⁴Xen. An. IV.viii.15.

⁶⁵Xen. An. IV.viii.23-24.

DAY 154 - Now it was time for the Greeks to give thanks to the gods, and celebrate their successful retreat with athletic games. The retreat of the Ten Thousand had just been completed and another page in the history of the Greeks, one which would lead to the campaigns of Alexander the Great, had been turned.

CONCLUSION

Throughout the discussion, we have looked at details regarding the provisioning of the Ten Thousand. In the Introduction, a background summary of the plot of the Anabasis and the 'raison d'etre' for this study were given.

Chapter One examined the issues of the number of people on the retreat, how much food and water was needed, methods of obtaining provisions, and explanations of daily activities. As a result, the reader was able to appreciate the realities of the logistics involved in feeding and moving such a large group of people through areas of difficult terrain and periods of harsh weather.

Chapter Two described the types of camp-followers on the retreat and highlighted the problems caused by their presence. It also included details about the difficulties involved in the transporting of belongings of the soldiers and camp-followers. The reader was given the opportunity to think about the different types of individuals who travelled together, and to consider how each of them contributed to the overall success of the retreat.

In Chapter Three, a sequential, step-by-step description of the retreat was given in terms of how provisioning was handled according to each situation which the Ten Thousand encountered.

From Chapter Three, a number of relevant points can be gleaned as to details of provisioning:

(1) While travelling with Cyrus on the inland journey from Sardis to Cunaxa, the Ten Thousand were provided with a market from which they were able to buy supplies. This meant that they were often at the mercy of sutlers who charged high prices for their wares. Cyrus also had with him 400 wagons of flour and wine as a reserve.

(2) After the battle of Cunaxa, the 400 wagons were plundered by the enemy, and the Greeks, who had not eaten since the day before the battle, were forced to kill some of the oxen and asses of the baggage train in order to have food. They had to subsist on this meat until a few days later when a truce was established with Tissaphernes, a Persian satrap.

(3) While the truce was in force, Tissaphernes provided a market from which the Greeks could purchase provisions, and on occasion, such as when they reached the villages of Parysatis, he allowed them to plunder provisions from native villages.

(4) After Tissaphernes had broken the truce by murdering Clearchus and some officers and soldiers, the Ten Thousand were left without a sure source of provisions. Their problems were exacerbated by the fact that they were travelling through unknown

territory without knowing the location of villages which were now their primary potential food source. Also, they were constantly harried by the Persians, who pursued them relentlessly, and the native people through whose territory they travelled.

(5) The Ten Thousand handled these problems by encamping whenever they came upon suitable villages. This gave them a defensible position from which they could ward off attacks by the enemy, and also afforded them an opportunity to stock up on provisions. They would have been able to carry several days' worth of food. It was also possible for them to take along herds of livestock which were able to move under their own power. Their acquisition of these livestock made it possible for them to survive when they had long marches between villages.

In Chapter Three, a number of examples were shown of occasions during which the Ten Thousand had to travel many days between villages. For example, from Days 89 to 96 of the march, they had to survive for seven days on provisions which they carried with them. Considering the calculation of grain requirements described in Chapter One, it seems highly unlikely that they would have been able to carry seven days worth of food with them. In this case, the livestock which they had with them must have been their main source of food.

This was also the situation on a later occasion, from Days 107 to 117, when the Ten Thousand marched for ten days without being able to procure a fresh store of provisions. Therefore, it seems evident that the herds of livestock which they possessed were a crucial component of the provisioning.

(6) Even with the acquisition of livestock, there were some days when the Ten Thousand had to subsist on a minimal amount of food when their provisions ran out before they reached the next village. In one sense, however, their hunger was not a bad thing because it drove them to make quick marches between villages and also gave them an extra reason to conquer the villages which were particularly difficult to win.

The key element in explaining how the Ten Thousand managed their retreat successfully is that they all looked out for each other's needs: "...in this way, they continually aided one another and took zealous care for one another."¹ Included in their methods of coping were: taking personal responsibility, making democratic decisions, borrowing native wisdom and customs, relying on training and discipline, and thinking positively.

The Ten Thousand took upon themselves the responsibility for leadership. A good example of this can be seen in Xenophon's attitude upon reflecting (after waking from a dream) about the

¹Xen. An. IV.ii.26-27.

dangerous situation and gloomy prospects of the Greeks, following the murder of their generals by Tissaphernes:

As for defending ourselves, however, no one is making preparations or taking thought for that, but we lie here just as if it were possible for us to enjoy our ease. What about myself, then? From what state am I expecting the general to come who is to perform these duties? And what age must I myself wait to attain? For surely, I shall never be any older, if this day I give myself up to the enemy.²

If Xenophon and the Ten Thousand had not responded positively to the challenges at hand, they would not have lived to tell their story!

Democracy was the order of the day. The Ten Thousand called numerous assemblies during the retreat in order to consult with and inform the soldiers,³ and they voted by a show of hands of all who were present.⁴

The Ten Thousand used native wisdom and customs in order to survive. For example, they were unaccustomed to travelling through huge drifts of snow and as a result, were having serious difficulty in keeping their baggage animals going--i.e., until they were able to get some advice from a local village leader:

²Xen. An. III.i.14.

³Xen. An. III.ii.1.

⁴Xen. An. III.ii.9, ii.33 and ii.38-39.

It was here also that the village chief instructed them about wrapping small bags round the feet of their horses and beasts of burden when they were going through the snow; for without these bags the animals would sink in up to their bellies.⁵

The training and discipline of the Greeks is what saved them from perishing under insurmountable odds. Xenophon was aware of the massive problems facing them, but he believed in the strength of training and discipline as being the way for them to overcome the odds. As he states:

For without leaders nothing fine or useful can be accomplished in any field, to put it broadly, and certainly not in warfare. For discipline, it seems, keeps men in safety, while the lack of it has brought many ere now to destruction.⁶

Discipline had to be enforced by Xenophon and the other officers. As he states, without this discipline, many of the troops "would leave the ranks and run on ahead in the desire to secure plunder and to enjoy an advantage over you. For if all of us had behaved in this way, all of us alike would have perished."⁷

Their training influenced all of their behaviour. Like citizens of a miniature polis, they met to discuss strategy and

⁵Xen. An. IV.v.36.

⁶Xen. An. III.i.38.

⁷Xen. An. V.viii.13-14.

tactics, and even in the most dire situations, they acted with a sense of duty, i.e., they took care of their sick and wounded instead of abandoning them, and they did their best to bury their dead honourably.⁸

The Greeks were proud of their background and knew that their training gave them an advantage over their enemies. Xenophon uses this cultural pride when he exhorts his men not to give up, and he reminds them that their bodies have been hardened by exposure to harsh weather and hard work, as compared to the effeminate Persians who are spoiled by luxurious conditions at home.⁹

Of course, not only their bodies, but also their minds had been honed to be in top shape. As Cyrus says to Cyraxes in the Cyropaedia: "And my father always says, and so do you, and all the rest agree, that battles are decided more by men's souls than by the strength of their bodies."¹⁰

Of all the above mentioned aspects, positive thinking was probably the most important, for it is this which gave the Ten Thousand the courage and confidence to continue marching when they had little food and did not know where they were going.

⁸Xen. An. IV.ii.23.

⁹Xen. An. III.i.23.

¹⁰Xen. Cyr. III.iii.19.

Xenophon stresses that the officers must "turn the current of their minds" in order to encourage the soldiers:¹¹

For you understand, I am sure, that it is neither numbers nor strength which wins victories in war; but whichever of the two sides it be whose troops, by blessing of the gods, advance to the attack with stouter hearts, against those troops their adversaries generally refuse to stand."¹²

In the same vein of thought, Xenophon exhorts the captains of Proxenus:

And now, since it may be that others also have these same thoughts in mind, let us not, in the name of the gods, wait for others to come to us and summon us to the noblest deeds, but let us take the lead ourselves and arouse the rest to valour.¹³

They had a long and distinguished history of victories over the Persians. Xenophon recounts these and emphasizes the fact that they are free men:

As tokens of these victories we may, indeed, still behold the trophies, but the strongest witness to them is the freedom of the states in which you were born and bred; for to no human creature do you pay homage as master, but to the gods alone. It is from such ancestors, then, that you are sprung.¹⁴

¹¹Xen. An. III.i.41.

¹²Xen. An. III.i.42.

¹³Xen. An. III.i.24.

¹⁴Xen. An. III.ii.13.

According to Arrian, before the battle at Issus, Alexander encouraged his troops with a speech referring to the Anabasis:

He alluded, we are told, to Xenophon and his Ten Thousand, far below themselves in number or in repute, with no cavalry, neither Boeotian nor Peloponnesian, neither Macedonian nor Thracian, nor such other horse as they now had; no archers nor slingers, save a few Cretans and Rhodians, and those hastily scraped together by Xenophon when in sore straits. Yet the Ten Thousand turned to flight the Great King himself at the very gates of Babylon, and marched victoriously against the various tribes which barred their way as they descended to the Euxine Sea...¹⁵

As mentioned in the Introduction, Plutarch lauded Xenophon for his vivid style of writing which brings the story home to the reader even though it took place hundreds of years beforehand.¹⁶ But even more important is the observation by Diogenes Laertius who wrote the following epigram regarding Xenophon:

Up the steep path to fame toiled Xenophon
In that long march of glorious memories;
In deeds of Greece, how bright his lesson shone!
How fair was wisdom seen in Socrates!¹⁷

The main lesson that we can learn from Xenophon and the Ten Thousand is that through cooperation, many difficult problems can be overcome. It is also evident that if a person has the proper

¹⁵Arr. Anab. II.vii.8-9.

¹⁶Plut. Vit. Artax. VIII.1.

¹⁷Diog. Laert. II.vi.58.

training of the mind, he or she can cope with almost any situation which presents itself. After all, the mind is the most effective tool which we possess.

TABLE ONE

ORIGINAL NUMBER OF GREEK TROOPS

<u>Ref.</u>	<u>Hoplites</u>	<u>Light-armed</u>	<u>Bowmen</u>	<u>Peltasts</u>
I.ii.3				
Xenias (Arcadian)	4,000			
Proxenus (Boeotian)	1,500	500		
Sophaenetus (Stymphalian)	1,000			
Socrates (Achaean)	500			
Pasion (Megarian)	<u>300</u>	<u>—</u>		<u>300</u>
	<u>7,300</u>	<u>500</u>		<u>300</u>
RUNNING TOTAL: 8,100 TROOPS (at Sardis)				
I.ii.6				
Menon (Thessalian)	<u>1,000</u>	<u>—</u>		<u>500</u>
	<u>8,300</u>	<u>500</u>		<u>800</u>
RUNNING TOTAL: 9,600 TROOPS (at Colossae)				
I.ii.9				
Clearchus (Spartan)	1,000		200	800
Sosis (Syracusan)	300			
Agius (Arcadian)	<u>1,000</u>	<u>—</u>	<u>—</u>	<u>—</u>
	<u>10,600</u>	<u>500</u>	<u>200</u>	<u>1,600</u>
RUNNING TOTAL: 12,900 TROOPS (at Celaenae)				

Xenophon uses round numbers and says that there were 11,000 hoplites and 2,000 peltasts, making a total of 13,000 troops (I.ii.9).

<u>Ref.</u>	<u>Hoplites</u>
I.iv.3	
Chcirisophus (Spartan)	700
Greek soldiers desert from Abrocomas	<u>400</u>
	<u>1,100</u>

RUNNING TOTAL: 14,000 TROOPS (at Issus)

Note: In I.ii.25 (see Table Two), Xenophon mentioned that 100 hoplites (of the original 1,000 under Menon's command) were lost while escorting the Cilician queen, Epyaxa. When this figure of 100 hoplites is subtracted from the running total of 14,000 troops (above), it leaves a total of 13,900 Greek mercenary troops who went into battle with Cyrus at Cunaxa.

TABLE TWO
LOSS OF TROOPS

<u>Ref.</u>	<u>Context</u>	<u>Numbers</u>
I.ii.25	Two companies of Menon's troops	100
I.iv.8	Xenias & Pasion sail away on a ship (may have taken soldiers with them)	2
I.viii.20	Xenophon says that no Greeks were killed at the Battle of Cunaxa, and only one was injured.	
I.x.3	Some Greeks guarding baggage train were killed. No numbers are given.	
II.ii.7-8	After the Battle of Cunaxa Miltocythes the Thracian deserted to the King with 40 horsemen and 300 foot soldiers.	340
II.v.30	5 generals, 20 captains and 200 soldiers murdered by Tissaphernes.	225
III.iii.5	Captain Nicarchus the Arcadian deserted to the enemy with 20 men.	20
III.iv.1	Fight with Mithradates did a great deal of harm. No numbers given for the dead or injured.	
III.iv.16	Skirmishing with Tissaphernes No deaths mentioned.	
III.iv.25-30	Skirmish with barbarian natives. Many Greeks injured, 8 surgeons appointed. No deaths mentioned.	
III.v.2	King's men killed some Greeks who were plundering. No numbers given.	
IV.i.10	Carduchians attacked and killed some Greeks and wounded others with stones and arrows. No numbers given.	
IV.i.18	Leonymus the Laconian and Basias the Arcadian were killed (bodies left behind).	2

<u>Ref.</u>	<u>Context</u>	<u>Numbers</u>
IV.ii.17	Cephisodorus the Athenian and Ampicrates the Athenian killed as well as others.	2
IV.ii.20	One man's leg broken	
IV.iii.1	Completed 7 days of marching through the land of the Carduchians and suffered many evils (lost more men?)	
IV.iii.33-34	Some Greeks wounded while crossing the river	
IV.v.4	30 soldiers died in the snow	30
IV.v.11	Soldiers perished (no numbers given)	
IV.vii.4	Soldiers injured (broken legs and ribs)	
IV.vii.14	Aeneas of Stymphalus is killed	1
	Number of dead specifically mentioned	<u>722</u>

TABLE THREE
FOOD AND DRINK

<u>Ref.</u>	<u>Sustenance</u>	<u>Context</u>
II.i.6	Oxen and asses (baggage train)	Boiled meat for 1 day (Battle of Cunaxa)
II.iii. 14,15,16	Grain Palm Wine Boiled sour drink Dates of Palm Crown of the Palm	Stores from villages (Persian truce)
II.iv.27	Grain Cattle	Parysatis' villages plundered by Greeks
II.iv.28	Loaves (Bread) Cheeses Wine	Caenae - supplies from barbarians
III.iv.18	Corn	From villages
III.iv.31	Flour Wine Barley (for horses)	" "
IV.ii.23	Wine	In village cisterns
IV.iv.8-9	Grain Old Wines Dried grapes Beans	Villages
IV.v.25- 27	Goats Sheep Cattle Fowl Wheat & Barley Beans Barley Wine	Villages in Armenia

<u>Ref.</u>	<u>Sustenance</u>	<u>Context</u>
IV.v.31- 32	Lamb Kid Pork Veal Poultry Wheat Barley Loaves	Villages in Armenia
IV.vii.14	Cattle Donkeys Sheep	Country of the Taochians
IV.vii.17	Cattle	Secured from Taochians
IV.viii. 19-29	Honey	Villages in the country of the Macronians
IV.viii.23	Oxen Barley-meal Wine	Gift from Trapezuntians

TABLE FOUR

THE INLAND MARCH: FROM SARDIS TO CUNAXA
DISTANCES TRAVELLED AND TIME ELAPSED

Cumulative Days	Point of Origin	Time	Distance	Destination
3	Sardis (Lydia)	3 Stages	22 parasangs	Maeander R.
4	Maeander R.	1 Stage	8 parasangs	Colossae (Phrygia)
11	STAYED FOR 7 DAYS			
14	Colossae (Phrygia)	3 Stages	20 parasangs	Celaenae (Phrygia)
44	STAYED FOR 30 DAYS			
46	Celaenae (Phrygia)	2 Stages	10 parasangs	Peltae
49	STAYED FOR 3 DAYS			
51	Peltae	2 Stages	12 parasangs	Ceramon- agora
54	Ceramon- agora	3 Stages	30 parasangs	Caystru- Pedion
59	STAYED FOR 5 DAYS			
61	Caystru- Pedion	2 Stages	10 parasangs	Thymbrium
63	Thymbrium	2 Stages	10 parasangs	Tyriaeum
66	STAYED FOR 3 DAYS			
69	Tyriaeum	3 Stages	20 parasangs	Iconium
72	STAYED FOR 3 DAYS			
77	Iconium	5 Stages	30 parasangs	through Lycaonia
81	through Cappadocia	4 Stages	25 parasangs	Dana

Cumulative Days	Point of Origin	Time	Distance	Destination
84		STAYED FOR 3 DAYS		
85		STAYED 1 DAY ON THE PLAIN		
86		1 EXTRA DAY THROUGH THE MOUNTAINS		
90	into Cilicia	4 Stages	25 parasangs	Tarsus
110		STAYED FOR 20 DAYS		
112	Tarsus	2 Stages	10 parasangs	Psarus R.
113	Psarus R.	1 Stage	5 parasangs	Pyramus R.
115	Pyramus R.	2 Stages	15 parasangs	Issus
118		STAYED FOR 3 DAYS		
119	Issus	1 Stage	5 parasangs	Gates of Cilicia & Syria
120	Cilician Gates	1 Stage	5 parasangs	Myriandus
127		STAYED FOR 7 DAYS		
131	Myriandus	4 Stages	20 parasangs	Chalus R.
136	Chalus R.	5 Stages	30 parasangs	Sources of Dardas R.
139	Sources of Dardus R.	3 Stages	15 parasangs	Thapsacus
144		STAYED FOR 5 DAYS		
153	Thapsacus	9 Stages	50 parasangs	Araxes R.
156		STAYED FOR 3 DAYS		
161	Araxes R.	5 Stages	35 parasangs	Mascas R.
164		STAYED FOR 3 DAYS		

Cumulative Days	Point of Origin	Time	Distance	Destination
177	Mascas	13 Stages	90 parasangs	Pylae
CYRUS MADE LONG STAGES THROUGH THE DESERT				
187*	Pylae	10 Stages*	50 parasangs*	Charmande
190*	Charmande	3 Stages	12 parasangs	
191*		1 Stage	3 parasangs	
194*		3 Stages	15 parasangs*	Cunaxa

TOTALS194 days97 Stages582 parasangs

* Indicates that Xenophon's information is not clear on this point, so this is an estimate, based on the average time and distance covered.

Note from Xen., An. II.ii.6: "The length of the journey they had made from Ephesus, in Ionia, to the battlefield was ninety-three stages, five hundred and thirty-five parasangs or sixteen thousand and fifty stadia; and the distance from the battlefield to Babylon was said to be three hundred and sixty stadia." (Brownson, p. 117, n. 1) These figures are close to the ones which are listed in this table.

TABLE FIVE

FROM CUNAXA TO TRAPEZUS
DISTANCES TRAVELLED AND TIME ELAPSED

Cumulative Days	Point of Origin	Time	Distance	Destination
1	Cunaxa	DAY OF BATTLE		
2		TALKS WITH TISSAPHERNES		
3		TRAVEL WITH ARIAIEUS		
4		NEGOTIATED A TRUCE		
7		STAYED FOR 3 DAYS		Villages
10		WAITED 3 DAYS FOR TISSAPHERNES		
30		GREEKS WAITED 20 DAYS WITH ARIAIEUS		
33	Villages	3 Stages	15 parasangs*	Wall of Media
35	Wall of Media	2 Stages	8 parasangs	Tigris R. (Sittace)
39	Tigris R. (Sittace)	4 Stages	20 parasangs	Phycus R. (Opis)
45	Opis	6 Stages	30 parasangs	Villages of Parysatis
49	Villages of Parysatis	4 Stages	20 parasangs	Through Caenae to Zapatas R.
52		STAYED FOR 3 DAYS		
53		1 DAY OF DEBATING & PREPARING		
54	Zapatas R.	1 Stage	5 parasangs*	Villages
55		STAYED FOR 1 DAY		
56	Villages	1 Stage	5 parasangs*	Tigris R. (Larissa)
57	Larissa	1 Stage	6 parasangs	Mespila

Cumulative Days	Point of Origin	Time	Distance	Destination
58	Mespila	1 Stage	4 parasangs	Villages
59		STAYED FOR 1 DAY		
64	Villages	5 stages	25 parasangs*	New villages
67		STAYED FOR 3 DAYS		
68	New villages	1 Stage	5 parasangs*	Village
71		3 DAYS OF MARCHING (15 parasangs*)		
72		1 Stage	5 parasangs*	Village in the plain
73		RETREATED TO UNBURNED VILLAGES		
74	Mountains of Carduchia	1 Stage	5 parasangs*	Villages
76		2 DAY MARCH (10 parasangs*)		
77		1 DAY MARCH UP HILLS (5 parasangs*)		
78		1 DAY IN MOUNTAINS (5 parasangs*)		
79		1 DAY DECIDING HOW TO CROSS RIVER		
80	Mountains of Armenia	1 Stage	5 parasangs	Large village
82	Large village	2 Stages	10 parasangs	Headwaters of Tigris R.
85	Headwaters of Tigris R.	3 Stages	15 parasangs	Teleboas R.
88	Teleboas R.	3 Stages	15 parasangs	Palace with villages
89	Palace with villages	1 Stage	5 parasangs*	Summit camp
92	Summit camp	3 stages	15 parasangs	Euphrates R.
95	Euphrates R.	3 stages	13 parasangs	Camp in snow
96	Camp in snow	1 Stage	5 parasangs*	Village

Cumulative Days	Point of Origin	Time	Distance	Destination
97	Villages	1 Stage	5 parasangs*	
104		STAYED FOR 7 DAYS		
107	Villages	3 Stages	15 parasangs*	
114		7 stages	35 parasangs	Phasis R.
116	Phasis R.	2 stages	10 parasangs	Mountain pass
117	Mountain pass	1 Stage	5 parasangs*	Villages
122	Villages	5 stages	30 parasangs	Taochian country
129	Taochian country	7 stages	50 parasangs	Land of the Chalybians
133	Harpasus R.	4 stages	20 parasangs	Land of the Scythians
136		STAYED 3 DAYS IN VILLAGES		
140	Scythian villages	4 stages	20 parasangs	Gymnias
145	Gymnias	5 Stages	25 parasangs*	Mt. Theches
148	Mt. Theches	3 stages	10 parasangs	Boundaries of the Colchians
152		STAYED 4 DAYS IN THE VILLAGES		
154	Colchian villages	2 stages	7 parasangs	Trapezus

TOTALS

154 days99 Stages 503 parasangs

* Indicates that Xenophon's information is not clear on this point, so this is an estimate, based on the average time and distance covered.

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THE PROVISIONING OF THE TEN THOUSAND
by Alice Lang

Abstract

Imagine finding yourself and a group of thousands of fellow citizens stranded in the middle of a strange country, thousands of kilometres away from home. You have just lost your military leader in a battle. You have no provisions and little hope of finding any.

There are no maps available and none of you have knowledge as to what type of terrain lies ahead. To complicate matters, you are surrounded by the army of the King whose territory you came to conquer. You are badly outnumbered and you have no cavalry to support you.

This is exactly the situation in which the Ten Thousand found themselves in 401 B.C. These Greek mercenary soldiers had been hired by the Persian prince Cyrus on the pretext of helping him to control a troublesome local tribe called the Pisidians. Halfway through their march inland from Sardis, the Greeks learned the true intention of Cyrus, which was to march against his brother, King Artaxerxes, in order to gain his throne.

At that point, most of the Ten Thousand felt obligated to keep marching with their employer, so they continued on to Cunaxa, a 6 1/2 month journey altogether. Unfortunately, the ultimate battle between the army of Cyrus and the much larger one of Artaxerxes

resulted in the death of Cyrus.

Faced with the terrible situation described above, they made a treaty with the Persian satrap Tissaphernes, who promised to lead them safely home to Ionia and provide a market from which they could purchase provisions along the way. The truce was short-lived, and ended with treachery by Tissaphernes, who murdered the Greek leader Clearchus, four other generals, twenty officers and two hundred soldiers.

The Greeks had to regroup, elect new generals and officers, and make plans to try to travel home by a different route from the one by which they had marched inland. Using their training and discipline, this group of approximately 13,200 people, including soldiers and camp-followers, managed to overcome terrible odds, including harsh weather, difficult terrain, and hostile native tribes--and arrive in Trapezus on the Black Sea after more than five months of travelling.

The account of the courage and success of the Ten Thousand is told by Xenophon in his Anabasis. This book has served as a text for learning Greek for generations of students, because of the clear and simple style in which it is written. However, it has abundant merit as a military textbook and as a source of inspiration to Greeks and all others who have read it in the ensuing centuries since it was written.

While much has been written in terms of literary criticism of Xenophon and his Anabasis, not much has been produced regarding the actual logistics of the retreat of the Ten Thousand. The purpose of this thesis is to address that lack by examining one aspect of the Anabasis, namely, the provisioning of the Ten Thousand.

Xenophon's Anabasis is used as the main source, with frequent references also being made to his Cyropaedia and to Arrian's History of Alexander. In Chapter One, the numbers of soldiers and camp-followers are estimated, and their provisional needs are calculated. Methods of obtaining provisions, along with the circumstances which affected this, are examined. Explanations are given of their daily activities, such as preparing camp. All of this is done with the intention of making the story come alive for the reader.

In Chapter Two, particular problems such as how the presence of many camp-followers affected the march, how the soldiers transported their belongings, and how these problems were solved, are illustrated. Chapter Three follows the Ten Thousand through the entire retreat, and highlights how provisioning was handled in each different situation.

The conclusion aims to make the reader aware of the amazing feat which the Ten Thousand accomplished and gives an opinion as to why the Greeks were so successful.