

***A Contingency Approach to Public Sector
Performance Management: The Case of the
Canadian Intelligence Community***

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Abstract

Countries in the Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development have experienced a decline in citizens' trust in government in the last few decades. In response, public administration shifted from traditional public administration to New Public Management (NPM) with the goal of increasing trust in government by trying to make government more responsive, work better, and cost less. An important element of NPM is the reliance on managerialism's application of private sector solutions such as performance management whose assumed strength is that it can deliver on efficiency, effectiveness, and accountability. An underlining basis of private sector imports into the public sector environment is that they are based on universalism – the existence of general laws irrespective of the situation or circumstance. Often, referred to as a 'one-size-fits-all' approach. However, after a few decades of implementing performance management based on universalistic principles the evidence suggests that performance management has not fully met expectations.

Contrasting universalism is particularism – meaning that different rules and applications will depend on the situation, in other words, context matters. In short, 'no best way'. To explore the universalism vs particularism debate, this research uses the Management Accountability Framework (MAF) which is a Canadian government's long-standing performance management tool. The MAF serves as a proxy for a one-size-fits-all approach to performance management. With regards to particularism, this research employs a contingency approach as the theoretical basis to explore performance management. The contingency approach is premised on three core concepts: external contingent factors, internal contingent factors, and fit.

The Canadian Intelligence Community (IC) is used as the case study to explore the primary question of whether a universalism-based or a particularism-based approach is better suited for performance management in the public sector? In seeking an answer to this question, two additional sub-questions are explored. First, what makes the IC different from the other policy domains? Second, what is the fit between the MAF and the IC's contingent factors? To answer these questions, data collection consisted of content analysis of documents as well as interviews with senior officials.

Findings from this exploratory study reveal that universalism-based approaches to performance management should at the very least be complemented by particularism considerations. The IC was found to be different from other policy domains in terms of both external and internal contingent factors. The former consists of the threat environment, the legislative framework, and the external expectations of the IC. The latter consists of the intelligence process, the intelligence product, intelligence and secrecy, and the IC as a high reliability organization. It was found that there was more misfit than fit between the MAF and the IC's contingency factors.

In exploring these questions, this research contributes concurrently to the public administration and intelligence studies literature in a number of ways. For instance, evidence that universalism-based approach to performance management does not always deliver what it promises, being able to intersect intelligence studies and public administration which is currently lacking, examining the 'hidden' parts of the public sector (i.e., the IC) that tends to be ignored in public administration, peering into the 'black box'

of public sector organizations' management tools, the exploration of how practitioners use management tools, analyzing public sector organizations operating in a complex environment, adding to a limited non-historical contemporary Canadian IC literature, looking at the IC's performance-related issues that goes beyond the overwhelming intelligence failure literature. In addition to contributing to knowledge, the research highlights the importance of performance management and intelligence in relation to society.

Keywords:

Universalism, Particularism, New Public Management/Managerialism, Performance Management, Management Accountability Framework, Contingency Theory/Approach, and Canadian Intelligence Community

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“E Tenebris Lux”

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List of Abbreviations and Acronyms

ADM	Assistant Deputy Minister
AMAN	Israeli military intelligence
AoM	Areas of Management
ATA	Anti-Terrorism Act
CAF	Canadian Armed Forces
CBSA	Canada Border Services Agency
CDS	Chief of Defence Staff
CFINTCOM	Canadian Forces Intelligence Command
CIA	Central Intelligence Agency
CIMM	Standing Committee on Citizenship and Immigration
CISC	Criminal Intelligence Service Canada
CR	Core Responsibility
CSE	Communications Security Establishment
CSIS	Canadian Security Intelligence Service
CT	contingency theory
DFATD	Department of Foreign Affairs, Trade and International Development
DM	Deputy Minister
DND	Department of National Defence
DOJ	Department of Justice
DR	Departmental Results
DRF	Departmental Results Framework
DSD	Australian Defence Signals Directorate
DSP	Departmental Security Plan
EMS	Expenditure Management Sector
ETHI	Standing Committee on Access to Information, Privacy, and Ethics
FAAE	Standing Committee on Foreign Affairs and International Development
FBI	Federal Bureau of Investigations
FCC	Federal Court of Canada
FININT	financial intelligence
FINTRAC	Financial Transaction and Report Analysis Centre of Canada
FLQ	Front de libération du Québec
FVEY	Five Eyes
GAC	Global Affairs Canada
GCHQ	Government Communications Headquarters
GCSB	New Zealand Government Communications Security Bureau
HRO	High Reliability Organization
HUMINT	human intelligence
IAS	Intelligence Assessment Secretariat
IC	Intelligence Community
IMINT	imagery intelligence
IRG	Incident Response Group
ISA	International Studies Association

ISS	Intelligence Studies Section
IT	information technology
ITAC	Intelligence Terrorism Assessment Centre
JCS	Joint Chiefs of Staff
JUST	Standing Committee on Justice and Human Rights
MAF	Management Accountability Framework
NATO	North Atlantic Treaty Organization
NDDN	Standing Committee on National Defence
NPM	New Public Management
NSA	National Security Agency
NSC	National Security Council
NSIA	National Security and Intelligence Advisor
NSICOP	National Security and Intelligence Committee of Parliamentarians
NSIRA	National Security and Intelligence Review Agency
NS-TAG	National Security Transparency Advisory Group
OAG	Auditor General of Canada
OECD	Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development
OIC	Office of the Information Commissioner
OPC	Office of the Privacy Commissioner
OT	organizational theory
PCO	Privy Council Office
PI	Program Inventory
PM	Prime Minister
PMO	Prime Minister's Office
PSC	Public Safety Canada
PSEP	Department of Public Safety and Emergency Management
RCMP	Royal Canadian Mounted Police
RFC	Results for Canadians
S&I	security and intelligence
SECU	Standing Committee on Public Safety and National Security
SIGINT	signals intelligence
SIS	Security and Intelligence Secretariat
TB	Treasury Board
TBS	Treasury Board Secretariat
TC	Transport Canada
TECHINT	technical intelligence
WMD	weapons of mass destruction

CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION

The field of public administration has undergone drastic changes since the 1960s. A significant change has been the introduction and ever-increasing application of private sector management concepts such as performance management in the public sector that are based on a one-size-fits all approach. To reflect this new reality, the 1980s saw the popularization of 'public management', although a concrete definition has been elusive.

In examining the literature, one can observe three major interpretations of what is meant by public management. According to the first set of scholars, the adoption of the term signals a significant practical change from the pre-1980s (Aucoin, 1990; Hood, 1991, 2005; Lane 1994). A second set of scholars, disagree with the significance placed on the term (Lynn, 1996; Terry, 1998). For these scholars, it is believed that the term represents a lesser democratic view of public sector organizations given the preference for private sector thinking applied to a public sector context. Last, some scholars see no real difference between public management and public administration (Lynn, 2005; Pollitt and Bouckaert, 2011). Rather, it is a new label assigned to represent public administration in the 1980s onwards. Frederickson, et al., (2012), note that even though public management has become the 'in thing', public management has always been part of public administration.

Illustrative of the differences in how public management is positioned in academia, one can look at how it is reflected in universities. For instance, at the University of Ottawa it falls under the public administration program in the Department of Political Studies (Faculty of Social Sciences), at Dalhousie University it resides within the School of Public Administration (Faculty of Management), and at the University of Bergen it resides in the Department of Administration and Organization Theory. As correctly observed, the

“confusion is difficult to dismantle because the terms and their relationship are socially constructed by individuals possessing different values and assumptions. Thus, the confusion cannot be defined away by any single government or academic authority” (Yang, 2015: 103).

1.1 Research Problem

Against the backdrop of this shifting public administration landscape, elected officials and public sector organizations are still expected to meet the needs of their citizens and taxpayers. In other words, there is the expectation of performance. To meet this expectation, the Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) countries, including Canada, have and continue to embark on various public sector reforms with the goal of improving performance. A key consideration of these New Public Management (managerialism) inspired reform efforts has been the adoption of performance management as a practice to achieve performance (Kettl, 2000; Bouckaert and Halligan, 2008; van de Walle and van Doreen, 2008). However, after a few decades of implementing performance management based on universalistic principles, also known as a one-size-fits-all approach, the evidence suggests that performance management has not fully met expectations. For example, Hubbard and Paquet’s (2010) examination of the Canada’s federal public sector found that the performance management practices tend to be nothing more than a tick in the box exercise. Ohemeng’s (2010) study of one-size fits all performance management instruments in Ontario and Ghana found that in both jurisdictions the instruments fell short to deliver on their expectations. Last, Radin (2006) notes that the efforts to minimize the uniqueness of programs or organizations has not resulted in any meaningful performance management. The evidence originating from the

public sector itself does not fare any better. A continuous stream of reports from the Office of the Auditor General of Canada (OAG) have observed that performance management is still struggling in getting a proper foothold in the Canadian government (OAG, 1997, 2000, 2002, 2022). Similar findings are found in the OAG's American counterpart, the General Accountability Office's (GAO) own reports (GAO, 2010, 2023). On a final note, this researcher is a long-time serving employee of the Canadian federal public service, whose worked across a number of departments and agencies on performance management, the above noted observations are generally valid.

1.2 Purpose of the Study

The push for the implementation of universalism-based performance management instruments continues. At face value, it can be assumed that perhaps what is required is simply better implementation by public sector organizations. This is analogous to trying to stop cracks appearing on the walls of house by continuously repairing the cracks (implementation) when in actuality there is a need to examine the house's structure (foundation) – a need to differentiate between symptoms and root causes. This study argues that there is a need to critically examine the theoretical foundation of these performance management instruments, namely universalism. Contrary to universalism, the study will demonstrate that greater consideration should be given to particularism as the theoretical foundation to performance management. Thus, at a theoretical level, the study engages in the universalism (one best way) vs particularism (no best way) debate. Specifically, in this study particularism is represented by organizational theory's contingency approach, which arrived on the scene in the 1960s and 1970s debunking the dominance of classical organizational theory. Contingency approach consist of two key

features. First, it is representative of an open systems whereby there is a recognition of the environment-organization interaction. Second, organizational performance is dependent on the fit between the environment and organization (external contingent factors) and fit amongst an organization internal key considerations (internal contingent factors).

To make this study less abstract and anchored in a real public sector practice, the Canadian government's Management Accountability Framework (MAF), as a proxy for universalistic performance management, is used. Also, as a research setting the Canadian intelligence community (IC) provides the case study with regards to the application of the MAF on a segment of the federal public sector. At this time, it suffices to note that the Canadian IC consists of:

those agencies and units that collect, analyze and report security intelligence and foreign intelligence and those that co-ordinate or review their operations. In addition, it informs Parliament about the nature, extent and functioning of control and accountability arrangements in the intelligence community (OAG, 1996, paragraph, 27.4).

Why the IC as a case study? A public good of expected high performance by the public is with regards to safety and security. In addition to being kept safe and secure, there is the expectation that this will occur while respecting democratic values. A key constituent part of the public sector that contributes towards safety and security, within a democratic values framework, is the IC. Since 9/11 there have been many examples on the increased importance of this part of the public sector. In addition, given the very distinct nature of the IC, it serves as an extreme/deviant case. This type of case is, "well suited for getting a point across in an especially dramatic way...well suited for theory development, because it helps researchers understand the limits if existing theories and to develop new concepts, variables, and theories." (Flyvbjerg, 2011: 306-307).

Using the application of the MAF by the Canadian IC, the purpose of this study is to explore particularism-based performance management as an alternate approach to the currently dominant universalism-based performance management approach. The main argument of particularism-based approach to performance management is that there is no one best way – context matters (Pollitt, 2013).

1.3 Research Questions and Research Objectives

1.3.1 Research questions

In order to fulfill the purpose of this study, the primary research question: Is a universalism-based or a particularism-based approach better suited for performance management in the public sector?

In order to address this question, two sub-questions, within the context of the IC as the case study, are explored. They are:

1. What makes the IC different from other policy domains?
2. What is the fit between the MAF and the IC's contingency factors?

An underlying basis for these research questions is the belief that, “the internal operations of government have always been vitally important to the working of society, even though, most of the time, they barely capture the attention of the public mind” (Hughes, 2012: 1).

1.3.2 Research objectives

The goal of this exploratory research is to address the research questions through a ‘why’ and ‘how’ perspectives (Yin, 2009). The pursued objectives are:

- To increase our understanding of performance management within the broader context of public sector reform.

- To understand the appropriateness of universalism-based approaches in public administration, using the MAF as a proxy, and its application in the IC.
- To increase our understanding of the IC through the lens of performance management.

The research questions and objectives concurrently engages two epistemic communities – public administration and intelligence studies. An epistemic community is understood as, “a community of scholars who share a way of seeing and defining research problems and questions and a way of generating knowledge about these, as articulated in its theoretical or other research literature” (Schwartz-Shea and Yanow, 2012: 16). This research creates a bridge between these two epistemic communities which is lacking (Grey, 2009). In a sense, it responds to a call for disciplinary integration (Coulthart, et.al., 2019).

Given that public administration, “is both a practical and an academic enterprise and the link between practice and theory is stronger than in many other areas of the social sciences” (Peters, 2013: 103); there is the possibility that a byproduct of this research effort is being able to assist both government and citizens. As suggested by a leading scholar, “PA (*public administration*) research needs to remain connected to PA practice” (Boven, 2010: 227). For government officials, it offers the possibility of looking beyond a universalistic approach to performance management and/or implications with respect to the IC. For citizens, this research it might offer insights into the complex nature of performance management and/or the IC. In the humble opinion of this researcher, this study meets the threshold of, “something that citizens and policymakers care about or might care about (Gerring and Yesnowitz, 2006: 114). But, the researcher is aware that overall Canada lacks a national intelligence culture, meaning that intelligence is not part of the social-political discourse, which deserves studying but is beyond the scope of this research.

The objective of 'understanding' is identified within the tradition of *verstehen* (Raadschelders, 2011), which is, “intellectual inquiry conducted through an approach that encompasses a systematic consideration for values and meanings (Ongaro, 2020:17). The emphasis is on understanding because to know does not necessarily imply an understanding of public organizations and their management. Understanding implies, “perspective, experience, judgment, and the capacity to imagine” (Frederickson, 2000: 52).

1.4 Significance of the Study

It has been observed that, “public administration as an academic field can be intellectually detached from the world of practitioners it is meant to serve and has become focused on quantitative studies at the expense of rich, contextual understandings afforded by case studies” (Caceres-Rodriquez and Landon-Murray, 2019: 143). Taking this observation into consideration, this research uses the Canadian IC as a case study, which is examined in greater detail in subsequent chapters. The reason for selection the IC as a case study is twofold. First, to address potential knowledge gaps in intelligence studies, public administration, and performance management; and how they relate to each other. Second, to identify the importance of performance management and intelligence in relation to society. Together, they speak to King, et.al., (1994) theoretical and social relevance. The former consist of research that should make a scholarly contribution, whilst the latter consist of research that examines issues of importance in the real world.

1.4.1 Theoretical relevance - what are the knowledge gaps?

It is recognized that studying intelligence is never an easy journey, because they are, “hard-to-access research subjects” (Coulthart, et.al., 2019: 2) shrouded in secrecy and with limited access (Gup, 2004), resulting in publicly available information that is,

“notoriously sparse” (Davies, 2001: 73), thus it tends to be less studied. As a result, it is expected that the public may never see a complete picture of performance management within the IC. What this research attempts to do is look under the secrecy blanket and thus contribute towards reducing gaps in the literature. This speaks to the notion of making invisible organizations more visible (Grey and Sturdy, 2016).

The IC as part of the public sector will be influenced by the public administration that it resides within (Herman, 1996). Therefore, to properly examine and understand the IC there is a need to understand and examine the public administration that it operates in (Caceres-Rodriguez and Landon-Murray, 2019). Notwithstanding this truism, there has been no truly concerted effort to include intelligence studies into the public administration body of knowledge and vice-versa (Davies, 2010). Hence, when looking for potential gaps in the literature, one will need to consider both the intelligence studies AND public administration bodies of knowledge. Perhaps, the gap is more appropriately labelled a ‘glaring hole’ (Gentry, 2016).

- Intelligence Studies

Intelligence as an area of academic enquiry has been expanding since the 1970s. This expansion is most visible since the events of 11 September 2001, which has been described as a rupture between the ‘the before’ and ‘now on’ (Horn, 2013). The split is also observable in that, “researchers located in longer established disciplines such as politics, history, IR, criminology focusing on intelligence as a field of study was, prior to 9/11, largely ignored by mainstream social science” (Gill, 2009: 210). Despite this resurgence in studying intelligence, it is still deemed in its infancy (Varouhakis, 2013). A glance of the intelligence literature reveals that it is dominated by US scholars (Gill and

Phythian, 2012). A survey of two leading intelligence studies journals conducted in 2016, revealed that there is overwhelming geographical focus on the United States or United Kingdom, with Canada accounting for only 6% of the articles (Van Puyvelde and Curtis, 2016).

In terms of Canadian content, Lefebvre and Littlewood's (2012) review of Canadian intelligence literature reveals a focus on the historical and on accountability and oversight related issues; albeit the latter is important, it does not fully represent performance management. Not surprisingly, until very recently, the Canadian literature is mostly, "written by historians with some political scientists in the mix" (Michael and Kornbluth, 2019); meaning that the examination of the subject matter is limited by the lens through which it is examined. Within the extant intelligence literature, this research positions itself as adding to the non-historical literature.

On the issue of intelligence studies engaging public administration the overall situation leaves room for improvement. A study found only 6% of published articles in the *International Journal of Intelligence and Counterintelligence (IJIC)* and *Studies in Intelligence*, provided an organizational analysis (Varouhakis, 2013); whilst another study in the *IJIC* and *Intelligence and National Security*, the 'administrative' as a research topic was so miniscule that it did not warrant categorization (Van Puyvelde and Curtis, 2016). Notwithstanding, there is a growing literature that examines intelligence through the application of an interdisciplinary public administration lens (Davies, 2004; Grey and Sturdy, 2010; Hammond, 2010; Hastedt and Skelley, 2011; Whibley, 2014; Hastedt, 2015; Walsh, 2015; Hillebrand and Hughes, 2017; Cremasdes Guisada and Cancelado Franco, 2021).

Of note from this literature is the scholarly works of Amy Zegart, a professor with Stanford University's Hoover Institution, employs organizational theory to examine the American IC. In *Flawed by Design: The Evolution of the CIA, JCS, and NSC* (Zegart, 1999)¹, the author posits that the original organizational design of these three entities led to their poor performance. In arriving at this conclusion, the author used new institutionalist approach to diagnose the organizations. In *Spying Blind: The CIA, FBI and the Origins of 9/11* (Zegart, 2007a)², the book argues that institutional barriers are the primary cause to resistance to change, which can lead to poor performance. The author acknowledges the role that individuals have in organizational inertia; nevertheless, it deemed it an insufficient explanation. In both books, along with the other scholarly works (Zegart, 2005, 2006, 2007b, 2010, 2011a, 2011b, 2015) the main argument is that organizations matter. Thus, re-affirming the importance of organizational theory, as a constituent of an interdisciplinary public administration (Frederickson, 1980; Waldo, 1984; Raadschelders, 2011), when examining intelligence issues. Yet, organization theory, "might be a source of useful and well-verified theories, has surprisingly little to say about how to design large-scale organizations whose primary task is to collect and assess information" such as the IC (Hammond, 2010); its use has been limited. Overall, the current intelligence literature with a public administration nexus does not cover Canada as a locality of research. This research attempts to fill this gap. So, how does it look like if we examine the public administration literature?

- Public Administration

¹ CIA is Central Intelligence Agency, JCS is Joint Chiefs of Staff, and NSC is National Security Council.

² FBI is the Federal Bureau of Investigations.

The answer to the question is not promising. For instance, when looking at Canada's leading public administration journal, *Canadian Public Administration*, there is less than a handful of articles that speak directly about intelligence (Weller, 1988; Sutherland, 1991; Lagassé, 2021). Expanding our literature search area, the whole of public administration is quite limited in covering intelligence. This is not surprising because:

The public administration literature is focused on the general institutional machinery of government, both at central and devolved levels, and on issues of service delivery, and has neglected substantive policy fields. Where such fields have been studied, public administration researchers have mostly focused on the large spending services, such as education or social services (Laffin, 2015: 355).

A special mention is warranted for Davis (2010) as the guest editor to a special issue of *Public Policy and Administration* on 'Intelligence and Public Administration' and steadfast scholar who employs a public administration lens on intelligence. To this researcher's best of knowledge this is the only time a public administration journal has had a special issue examining intelligence, despite the potential impact that intelligence could have on society – expanded upon in the next section.

The lack of public administration literature in intelligence is similar to the lack of interest of public administration literature in engaging the military as a subject of study (Charbonneau, et.al., 2021), which by all accounts is more public and less secretive. Thus, there appears to be a reluctance for public administration scholars to engage the defence and national security apparatus as a subject of study (Vogel and Hattke, 2022). In addition, secrecy is rarely the subject of inclusion when examining complex government organizations (Erickson and Flynn, 1980). Even positioning public administration within the broader realm of Canadian political science, the *Canadian Journal of Political Science*

has no articles that could be found with an intelligence nexus. As a way of explanation for this absence, Zegart (2011b), makes the observation that political science tends to treat public sector organizations as inputs to policy outcomes and not as the subject of study. Furthermore, the lack of literature suggests that political scientists show no interest in studying the ‘black box’ of public sector organizations. Yet, public sector organizations have an important role in determining policy outcomes. Caceres-Rodriguez and Landon-Murray (2019), remark that public administration as a discipline would benefit by expanding the type of organizations that are examined. This research adds to a nearly invisible public administration literature by examining the IC through the lens of performance management.

- Performance Management

Bouckaert and Halligan (2008) observe that performance management is applied in almost every public sector area. However, that is not the case with respect to performance management and the IC. This is due, in part, because, “the study of intelligence has typically emphasized the operational activities of intelligence services, individually or in concert, on the one hand or the finished intelligence appreciations they produce” (Davies, 2013: 137). It has been noted that, “Little is said in public about the management of intelligence agencies and of the processes they use. However, their business is complex and requires careful management if they are to be effective, properly accountable and secure” (Pepper, 2010: 85).

It would not be an over reach to argue that the study of performance management of the IC and within it is severely under-researched. This observation goes beyond the confines of Canadian IC (Johnson, 2003-04; Treverton, et al., 2006; Betts, 2007; Faragone,

2009; Forcese, 2015; Caceres-Rodriquez and Landon-Murray, 2019). The exception regarding performance management and the IC has been the vast literature on ‘intelligence failure’³. Several scholars have articulated that intelligence failures will always occur thus having a binary approach to performance (failure / no failure) does not take into account the complex and uncertain nature of intelligence (Betts, 1978, 2007; Handel, 1989; Johnson, 2003-04; Andrew, 2004; Treverton, et al., 2006). Thus, making the binary approach an over simplistic approach to performance management within and of the IC. Hence, if we ignore the binary approach to the IC’s performance, we are left with no clear criteria for understanding the performance of the IC (Andrew, 2004). This has led Jones and Given (2010), to argue that there is a requirement for social science, excluding intelligence failures as a line of enquiry, to explore the IC more systematically and comprehensively than has been done to date.

An astute observation is made by Caceres-Rodriquez and Landon-Murray (2019), the intelligence failure literature is an after the fact examination – thus, performance management enters the conversation after a failure. Furthermore, Dahl (2010) notes that responding to intelligence failures will not always lead to performance improvement. Along similar thinking, it has been stated that the well-developed failure literature provides a, “Negative or descriptive theory - the empirical understanding of how intelligence systems make mistakes” (Betts, 2007: 20). According to the author, what is missing is a, “normative theory of intelligence, or a theory of how to make it succeed” (Ibid:20). Thus,

³ For instance, see Wasserman, 1960; Wohlstetter, 1962, 1965; DeWeerd, 1962; Knorr, 1964; Whaley, 1973; Herzog, 1975; Ben-Zvi, 1976, 1979, 1990; Shlaim, 1976; Handel 1977, 1979, 1980, 1984, 1989; Betts, 1978, 1982; Axelrod, 1979; Stein, 1980; Arnold, 1981; Vertzberger, 1982; Brody, 1983; Brady, 1993; Levite, 1987; Kam, 1988; Kahn, 1991/92; Wirtz, 1991a, 1991b, 2002; Grabo, 2002; Borch, 2003; Institute for the Study of Diplomacy, 2004; Seliktar, 2004; Whitney, 2005; 2004; Jervis 2006, 2010; Gentry, 2008; Dahl, 2013; Britten, 2018; Zenko, 2020; Office of the Auditor General of Canada, 2021

this researcher suggests that for performance management to make a valuable contribution to the literature (and practice), it needs to enter the conversation before the failure; in fact, performance management should be part of an on-going conversation and not crisis driven.

Within the broader and more specifically the Canadian context, excluding intelligence failure, this research contributes to a small performance-related scholarship, that is ever so slowly expanding (Faragone, 2009, 2012a, 2016, 2021; Brunatti, 2013; Barnes, 2020; Bordeleau, 2020; Carvin, et.al., 2021). By taking the performance management route, this research adds an additional data point that straddles Gill and Phythian's (2012) organizational functional and governance/policy categorization of intelligence studies research. Also, this research moves beyond Wark's (1993) approaches to studying intelligence, which lacks an 'administrative' dimension. Last, the study can contribute towards the development of a normative theory of intelligence by scholars.

It has been remarked that the public administration literature has very little in the way of how practitioners use management tools such as performance management and when research is conducted in this area, it tends to be focused on the US and UK local governments (George, et.al., 2019). In the Canadian context, there are a few studies that could be categorized as looking at how practitioners use management tools (Lindquist, 2009; Charko, 2013; Bourgeois, 2019). This research's in-depth examination of the MAF, as a management tool, and findings will add to this fledging area of research. As well, this research's focus on issues associated with universalism-based approach to performance management generates evidence demonstrating that alternate approaches maybe needed, namely, particularism-based approaches to performance management. Specifically, as outlined in greater detail in the next chapter, the use of the contingency approach as a

particularism theoretical basis for examining matters of intelligence. As rightly observed, the application of contingency theory in intelligence studies has been, “A minority interest amongst minority interests” (Davies, 2013: 145); although there is a small literature (Davies, 2004; Grey and Sturdy, 2010; Hastedt, and Skelley, 2011). It has been a decade since it was remarked that, “it has taken intelligence scholarship more than a decade to discover contingency theory” (Davies, 2010: 7). In more general terms, organizational theory, which is where contingency theory is disciplinarily housed in, has been primarily focused on private sector organizations (firms) resulting in its limited use to study public sector organizations note several scholars (Zegart, 2011b; Arellano, et.al., 2013; Andrews and Esteve, 2015; Charbonneau, et.al., 2020); although, there are excellent exceptions (Christensen, et.al.,2020).⁴

Moynihan and colleagues (2011) note that performance management tends to assume that public sector organization are throughput in nature, working in simple operating environments. However, this view of the operating environment does not fully capture the reality. This is especially true of the IC whose very existence is premised on understanding and operating in an environment that can be characterized as highly complex, filled with uncertainty. This research adds to the literature that examines the application of performance management in a complex operating environment context.

1.4.2 Social relevance - why should we care?

We start with a brief overview of performance management’s role in relation to society before examining intelligence’s role in relation to society. In the Canadian context,

⁴ There appears to be a Norwegian cluster involving Norway’s UIT’s Research Group in Organisation and Management (VIOLET), the University of Oslo’s Research Group on Policy, Bureaucracy, and Organization, and the University of Bergen’s Department of Administration and Organization Theory.

a key element of the *Results for Canadian* framework placed citizens at the apex. The citizen element was enabled by the results element, requiring management in all areas to focus on results, and the responsible spending element, requiring program to be assessed and supported by management frameworks (TBS, 2001). Within this framework, performance management contributes to connecting government with society. In theory, the MAF is designed to address both results and management framework.

- Performance Management and Society

One way of observing the connection between performance management and government connecting to society is through citizens' trust in government. The emphasis on trust is an essential factor of legitimacy, survival of the political system, and citizens' compliance to the rule of law and government decisions (Blind, 2007; Levi and Stoker, 2000). The general idea being that when performance management works well, there is a higher likelihood that government performs well and therefore it is expected that citizens will have a higher level of trust in government. In the literature, it has been noted that a well-managed public sector is a contributing factor in citizens having trust in the institutions that governs them (Christensen and Laegreid, 2005; Van Ryzin, 2007; Mizrahi, et., 2010; OECD, 2021). The issue of trust also comes up in intelligence, where it is suggested that, "national security today should be defined as a state of trust on the part of the citizen" (Omand, 2010: 9).

There are several examples demonstrating a link between performance management and citizens' trust in government. For example, a study by Andrews and Van de Walle (2013), found that performance management was positively related in terms of citizen satisfaction. According to the Environics Institute and Institute of Governance

(2014) public opinion survey of Canadians, several findings suggest a link between performance management-related topics and trust in government. It is recognized that government is important in ensuring quality of life, two important priorities for how government operates were accountability and providing cost-efficient public service, the top responses to why government is deemed broken were wasteful spending and not responsive to citizen needs, and the government rated low on matters of accountability and providing cost-effective services. Although, it is recognized that this linkage is not always direct (Cowell, et.al., 2012); as well, there are potential methodological challenges with assessing citizens satisfaction with government services (Andrews and Van de Walle, 2013). One of those challenges being the actual public sector performance versus citizens' perception of public sector performance.

- Intelligence and Society

In addition to the knowledge gaps, there are other reasons for selecting the IC as a case study that collectively fall under the rubric of the IC's role and relation with society. First, one of the government's most fundamental role is the preservation of public order and security. The ability of the government to carry out this fundamental role is dependent on intelligence (Lowenthal, 2006; Schreier, 2007), which is a part of its national security apparatus (Privy Council Office [PCO], 2004; Caparini, 2007; Gill and Phythian, 2012, Cappe, 2020). To the citizens of Canada, this was visibly demonstrated in the 2022 'convoy protest' where a portion of downtown Ottawa, including the Parliamentary Precinct, was taken over by protesters. Consequentially, for the first time ever, the government evoked the *Emergencies Act*; some national security experts were quick to call

it an intelligence failure (Lapointe, 2022), whilst others noted that it is premature to call it an intelligence failure (Gurski, 2022).

Second, the literature identifies various intertwining roles that the IC plays in support of national security with societal implications such as threat warning (Hulnick, 1999; Gentry, 2019), preventing surprise (Sims and Gerber, 2005), knowing (Herman, 1996), uncertainty reduction (National Research Council, 2011; Pateman, 2003), resource optimization (Kahn, 2009), risk shifting (Warner, 2009), and an instrument of governance (Horn, 2003). These are not dissimilar to the important role assigned to intelligence in earlier times as reflected in the classical works of Sun Tzu, Machiavelli, Clausewitz, Nizam al-Milk, al-Ansari, Montecuccoli, Musashi, Guan Zhong, Hobbes, Kautilya, Jomini, Ulysses, and Homer (Musco, 2016). Perhaps, there is a validity in describing intelligence as the world's second oldest profession (Knightley, 1986).

Third, Rudner (2004) argues that the events of 9/11 publicly moved the IC to the forefront of Canada's national security effort, which is no different than what has been observed in other western countries. One would be hard pressed to argue differently. However, if one were to briefly look at Canadian intelligence history between the end of the World War II and 9/11, there has been several intelligence-related episodes that have caught the attention of the public due to the potential societal impacts. For instance, Igor Gouzenko, a 1945 Soviet defector in Ottawa who warned of Soviet espionage in Canada, some have argued that in the public's opinion that was the start of the Cold War (Knight, 2005); Hugh Hambleton, a Université Laval economics professor who had previously worked at NATO was a Soviet spy for nearly three decades (Heaps, 1983) provided one more piece of justification (both before and after the fact) for the RCMP spying in Canadian

universities (Hewitt, 2002) and in countering the red threat also spied on women's liberation movement (Sethna and Hewitt, 2018); Hebert Norman, a Canadian diplomat and historian falsely accused of being a spy died by suicide in 1957 (Barros,1986) serves as a reminder of the state's power to impact mental health; the CIA activities in Canada during the 1960s, including brainwashing experiments at McGill University's Allan Memorial Institute (Mount, 1993) reaffirms the need for research ethics involving human subjects; the Munsinger Affair was a political sex scandal resulting in an inquiry as well perhaps being a factor in Lester Pearson being replaced as the leader of the Liberal Party – all due to the RCMP's initial assessment of the individual being deemed a security risk based on a 'profiling' perspective of the day (van Seters, 1998); and the issue of profiling contributed towards the security campaign against the LGBTQ workforce in the Canadian public service (Kinsman, 1995) – a manifestation of the dark side of identify politics.

Fourth, events of 9/11 ushered in a new era of threats to Canada inspired by Al Qaida and the Islamic State that the IC has had to content with. The IC's publicly acknowledged role or its implied role became visible due to several acts of actual or attempted terrorism and their legal prosecution. For instance, in June 2006, the arrest of the Al-Qaeda inspired "Toronto 18" who were planning attacks in major Canadian cities including the Canadian Security Intelligence Service regional office in Toronto and Parliament. In April 2013, the arrest of two individuals with potential links Al-Qaeda as part of the "Via Rail Plot" who were plotting to derail a train travelling between New York and Toronto. In October 2014, a Jihadism inspired vehicular attack in Quebec killing a Canadian soldier and wounding another. Also in October 2014, the killing of a Canadian soldier at the National War Memorial and the follow-on shooting on Parliament Hill,

including the breaching of Parliament itself. In August 2016, a Daesh supporter who intended to detonate a homemade explosive was killed by police in Strathroy. In June 2017, a woman was arrested in Toronto for trying to attack several people with a number of weapons in the name of ISIS. In September 2017, a man was arrested in Edmonton after crashing through a barricade at a football Armed Forces appreciation game, ran down and stabbed a police officer and while attempting to escape ran down four pedestrians. The individual had ISIS Levant flags in the vehicle. (Public Safety Canada, 2018a).

From 2001 to 2018, a total of 55 individuals were charged with terrorism offences under the Criminal Code (Public Safety Canada, 2018b). Of these 55 individuals, there have been several plots or attacks that have a strong nexus with diversity and multiculturalism (Public Safety Canada, 2018b). Within the Canadian polity, a distinct feature of its social justice system is the creation of a governance model of numerous ‘multi’ cultures by removing discriminatory and prejudicial impediments to advance the full participation of all Canadians (Fleras, 2014). This is supported by 85% of Canadians who believe that ethnic and cultural diversity is important (Statistic Canada, 2013). Also, by all accounts, Canada has a well-developed legislative and policy framework to advance diversity and multiculturalism – consisting of the *Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms* (1982), *Canadian Human Rights Act* (1985), *Canadian Multiculturalism Act* (1988), the *Official Languages Act* (1985) and the *Employment Equity Act* (1995). Notwithstanding all the good intentions and structures in place, a Quebec City mosque shooting in January 2017 resulted in six worshippers killed and 19 others injured by an individual who had far-right, white nationalist and anti-Muslim views, which is another growing concern of the IC.

So, we end up with the IC needing to counter the above types of threats, while concurrently meeting democratic values. For the IC to counter these threats, it needs to operate within multicultural communities. However, these same communities may react unfavourable to the IC's actions due to real or perceived circumstances. It has been argued that Muslims tend to be overly targeted by security and intelligence entities in their pursuit of the post 9/11 threat (Monaghan, 2014). It is recognized that there will always be a tension between the IC and the community where constituent members are under surveillance and investigation, as the pre-9/11 intelligence history suggests. However, if there is a lack of appropriate balance between safety and security and democratic values, the potential impact on society is one of further divisiveness. Hence, the IC can either contribute to the reduction or magnification of divisions in society.

Fifth, intelligence is recognized as playing a more prominent role in international politics since the start of the 21st century especially following the events of 9/11 and subsequent actions related to the global efforts against terrorism and evolving international order (Scott and Jackson, 2004a). For example, the United States invasion of Iraq in 2003 placed intelligence, even in its politicized form, at the forefront of the decision for the United States and its allies to invade Iraq. Since then, the decision to go to war has had unintended global consequences, including the rise of ISIS in the region and the subsequent further unintended consequences. If one were to simply look at the consequences through actual and anticipated expenditures, it is astronomical. The cost for fighting in Iraq is just under \$1 Trillion (Crawford, 2021), it is estimated that the long-term costs for veterans and their dependants through 2050 will be in the range of \$2.2 to \$2.5T (Bilmes, 2021)⁵, the

⁵ Figures include costs associated with both Iraq, Afghanistan, and related theatres.

United States State Department and the United States Agency for International Development have spent about \$59B (Crawford, 2021), and since the war effort was financed by borrowing, the interest payments are about \$444B (Crawford, 2021). These dollar amounts do not consider the direct loss of life or the physical and mental health injuries of military service person and their family or civilians caught up in the war zone. On the other hand, in Canada's case, intelligence was used by the government of the day to keep Canada from participating in the war in Iraq (Barnes, 2020). Therefore, the role that the IC can have on security with regards to difference between an intelligence failure or success can have tremendous impact on society and its public purse.

Last, the IC's need for secrecy and highly intrusive powers has a direct impact on transparency, individual rights and freedoms, and legality (Lefebvre, 2010); as a result, Chappuis (2016) makes the argument that the IC should be understood within the context of it having a place in the state's monopoly on the legitimate use of force. In the Canadian context, exemplary illustrations of the IC's monopolistic position were highlighted in the public inquiries regarding Maher Arar (Commission of Inquiry into the Actions of Canadian Officials in Relation to Maher Arar, 2006a, 2006b, 2006c) and Abdullah Almalki, Ahmed Abou-Elmaati, and Muayyed Nureddon (Internal Inquiry into the Actions of Canadian Officials in Relation to Abdullah Almalki, Ahmed Abou-Elmaati, and Muayyed Nureddon, 2008). In these cases, abuse and infringements of individual rights and freedoms occurred. In another instance, the Federal Court of Canada (FCC) ruled that the Canadian Security Intelligence Service (CSIS) was less than forthcoming about the existence of its Operational Data Analysis Center, which was used for big data surveillance activities; more specific, it was made public that a large segment of the collected metadata

was illegal (Laurin, 2020). As well, the CSIS was reprimanded by the FCC for breaking the law during a security investigation, even though CSIS was directed by the Minister of Public Safety and Emergency Preparedness to follow the law (Vigliotti, 2020). The purpose for pointing out these cases is not to argue that the IC is constantly working outside the rule of law due to their ability to hide behind secrecy. Rather, it is to make the point that the IC's secrecy and intrusive power are a significant contributing factor that can lead to undesirable situations. Hence, it is not surprising that the IC has been referred to as 'the state within the state' (Kristmanson, 2003) and 'the invisible government' (Wise and Ross, 1964). Given the IC's monopolistic position in a state's bureaucracy, it deserves to be studied and understood.

1.5 Organization of the Dissertation

In addition to this Introduction chapter, the dissertation has six chapters and a Conclusion. **Chapter 2 - Setting the Stage – From NPM to MAF** consists of two sections. Using the extensive literature, the first section identifies and examines three key concepts that are associated with the intent of the study. The three concepts are NPM, managerialism, and performance management. The second section hones in specifically to the Canadian context providing an historical overview of the various federal government public sector reform initiatives implemented over the last few decades. From these initiatives, an in-depth examination of the MAF is offered since it is essential in responding to the research questions.

Chapter 3 - Theoretical Considerations consisting of three sections engages in the theoretical considerations that underpins this research. The first section introduces and examines the universalism vs particularism debate. It outlines the key features of each

perspectives and its application in public administration. Building off particularism, the section that follows delves into organizational theory's contingency theory which forms the theoretical basis for the dissertation. Specifically, it examines the three core elements – external environment, contingent factors, and fit. The last section relates the contingency approach to performance management.

Chapter 4 - Research Design provides the foundation to address the research questions. The research design details the research's worldview, strategy of inquiry, research methods, challenges, limitations and remedies, and ethical considerations. This researcher's worldview in approaching the research topic is pragmatism, who's selection was influenced by pragmatism's emphasis on real world problematic situation while permitting the inclusion of lived experiences of a practicing public administrator. The strategy on inquiry resides within the qualitative (interpretive) paradigm because it allows for context-specific meaning as interpreted by this researcher, is favourable to the exploratory nature of this research, and there is a natural affinity to contingency theory's emphasis on context. Given the central role of the researcher, the positionality of this researcher is provided covering both positive aspects and potential biases. The research methods employed in this research is the case study (the IC), which was selected for both instrumental and intrinsic reasons. Another aspect of the research method is data collection consisting of both content analysis of documents and interviews. The last consideration for research method is data analysis based upon an interpretive approach. The challenges, limitations, and remedies are outlined through a qualitative perspective consisting of credibility, transferability, dependability and conformability. Given that the research speaks across the epistemic communities of public administration and intelligence studies,

this is also identified as a challenge. Last, ethical considerations are addressed for both ethical review process requirements as well as potential issues when researching intelligence.

Chapter 5 - Intelligence and the Canadian Intelligence Community explores the concept of intelligence, followed by a description of the Canadian IC. The chapter establishes that intelligence consists of four elements: intelligence process, intelligence product, secrecy, and policy/decision-making. Using this as the basis, the entities involved with the Canadian IC are discussed within the categories of direction and coordination, specifically mandated, non-specifically mandated, oversight and review, and supporting. As well, given the nature of the IC's work intelligence sharing is also examined.

Chapter 6 - How is the Intelligence Community Different? builds off Chapter 5 and seeks to answer the study's first sub-question "What Makes the IC different from other policy domains?". Using the contingency approach from Chapter 3 as the theoretical base, the IC's external contingent factors are the threat environment, legislative framework, and the external expectations of the IC. The IC's internal contingent factors are the intelligence process, intelligence product, intelligence and secrecy, and the IC as a high reliability organization.

Chapter 7 - Assessing 'Fit' Between the MAF and the Intelligence Community's Contingent Factors employs the results of Chapter 6 and assesses these against the MAF's six areas of management to answer the study's second sub-question "What is the fit between the MAF and the IC's contingency factors?" The findings suggest that the fit is both no and a yes but with limitations, with the internal contingent factors offering a better fit.

Chapter 8 - Conclusion brings closure to the study by providing a summary of the research, articulates the research's contribution in advancing knowledge and its social relevance, provides a reflection with regards to general observations, the research design , and limitations, and offers suggestions for future research and engagement.

CHAPTER 2: SETTING THE STAGE - FROM NPM TO MAF

Chapter 1 laid out the research problem with respect to performance management based on universalistic principles not delivering on its promise, which situated the purpose of this study – an examination of the universalism vs particularism debate as it relates to performance management using the MAF and the Canadian IC as the research setting. Collectively, this provided the frame for the research question and research objectives and outlined the significance of this study. The purpose of this chapter is to provide an in-depth examination of this study's core concepts and the Canadian context. The former consists of NPM, managerialism, and performance management. The latter consists of how NPM has ingrained itself into the federal public sector as reflected by the vast set of public sector reform initiatives, including the MAF.

2.1 Concepts

The concepts identified in this section were based on a review of the applicable literature relevant to the research problem, purpose of the study, research questions, and research objectives. It starts at the macro and drills down. Hence, the structure of the subsections: new public management, managerialism and performance management.

2.1.1 New Public Management

In Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) countries, the state of the citizen regime in the postwar period was considered relatively stable until the early 1980s at which time the citizen regime began a journey of fundamental change (Jenson and Phillips, 1996). A critical change was the increase in the lack of trust and legitimacy in the political institutions (Denhardt, 2002; Hecllo, 2007). This is important because the, “issue of public trust and confidence in the public institutions goes to the heart

of the debate about the role of government in society and its relationship with its citizenry” (Zussman, 1997: 234). The decline has occurred for a couple of reasons such as the growing debt load (Kroeger, 1995; Haque, 2004) and rising levels of citizen’s unmet expectations from their government (Hays, 2003). At the same time, the state and its ability to deliver was being perceived through an economic lens (Stigler, 1975; Friedman and Friedman, 1980; Hughes, 2012). Specifically, citizens were looking for increased efficiency but were convinced that government could not deliver this efficiency (Kettl, 2006a). While citizens increased their ‘demand’ on government for public goods, government could not provide a ‘supply’ to these demands. In other words, where government was once seen as the problem solver, it was now perceived as the problem. The result has been an increasingly democratic deficit – decreased legitimacy of political institutions (Durant, 1995; Lenard and Simeon, 2012). As such, we have entered, “ ‘an age of mistrust’ resulting in decision-making that is strained and neurotic” (Paquet, 2009: 118).

In response to the trust issue, OECD countries starting in the mid-1970s but gaining momentum in the 1980s onwards focussed on reforming their public sector (Caiden, 1991; Peters and Pierre, 2001; Radin, 2006; Bouckaert and Halligan, 2008). Public sector reform is understood to mean the significant change, redesign, transformation of ideas and instruments on a broad scope for the purpose of dealing with old or new problems faced by the public sector with the goal of making them run better (Good, 2003; Pollitt and Bouckaert, 2011; Vigoda-Gadot, et al., 2016; Van de Walle and Groeneveld, 2016). In part, reforms were initiated with the goal of reducing the lack of trust in government (Rosenbloom and Piotrowski, 2007). Research suggests that a well-managed public sector increases trust in government (Van Ryzin, 2011; Im and Lee, 2012; Morelock, 2020).

When viewed through this perspective, public sector reform can be quite powerful (Ingrams, et.al., 2020).

Collectively these reforms have acquired the nomenclature of New Public Management (NPM) (Hood, 1991; Hood and Jackson, 1991; Christensen and Laegreid, 2002, 2011; De Vries and Nemec, 2013), although other terms have been found in the literature such as market-based public administration (Lau and Rosenbloom, 1992), entrepreneurial government (Osborne and Gaebler, 1992), and post-bureaucratic model (Barzelay, 1992).

An examination of the extensive literature reveals that different scholars and advocates have advanced their own understanding of NPM (Hood, 1991; Osborne and Gaebler 1992; Borins, 1995; Ocampo, 1998; Jones and Thompson, 1999; Lane, 2000; Sahlin-Anderson, 2000; Behn, 2001; Christensen and Laegreid, 2002; Roberts and Bradley, 2002; Pollitt, 2003; Terry, 2006; Dienfenback, 2009; OECD, 2010; Pollitt and Bouckaert, 2011; Hughes, 2012). The lack of consensus is partially explained by the fact that, “NPM literature as a whole is amorphous, as might be expected of an interdisciplinary, policy-oriented field” (Barzelay, 2001: 4). Each of these scholars is offering a different model to understanding NPM (Ongaro, 2020). Lacking a common view of NPM, it is not surprising that NPM can be perceived as a buffet where governments can select the management instrument that best meets their need (Pollitt, et al., 2007). An instrument is a term used to mean a mechanism, technique, or tool used to achieve a public policy (Salamon, 2002).

Regardless of any understanding offered by a given scholar, it is important to note that NPM attempts to provide an answer to, “the question of how to implement policies,

strategies, programs and projects, using the market-type mechanisms, so that institutions of the state could achieve the desired results?" (Oehler-Sincai, 2008: 3). Hence, NPM's end state is, "improving government performance and accountability" (McNabb, 2010: 154) or "a government that works better and costs less" (Hood and Dixon, 2015: 265). Given this enduring end state, some scholars have argued that NPM has not looked back ever since its introduction in OECD countries (Pollitt, 1990, 2003; Clarke and Clegg, 1999; Dent and Barry, 2004; Adcroft and Willis, 2005; Islam, 2015) and developing countries (De Waal, 2007; Ohemeng, 2009; Rubakula, 2014). NPM's dominance is due in part because it was preached as a science-based best practice and thus should be accepted as universally applicable regardless of the local situation. This makes NPM a dominating concept in the public administration literature (Laffin, 2015).

On the other side of the ledger, there is growing body of evidence that suggests a push back on NPM's dominance because of its dysfunctional effects (De Bruijn and Van Helde, 2006; Speklé and Verbeeten, 2014; Osborne, et al., 2015; Visser, 2016), or that, "the NPM has been more an article of faith and politics than the application of empirically-based science or proven technique" (Rosenbloom and Piotrowski, 2007: 2). This push-back literature is suggestive that NPM is not an unstoppable force (Pollitt, 2003). Other scholars have observed that NPM is in decline (Lynn, 1998; Moynihan, 2008) or passed its best before date (Dunleavy, et al., 2006). Given these misgivings, there has also been a call for a return of bureaucracy (Dilulio, 2014) and valuing bureaucracy (Verkuil, 2017).

This should not come as a surprise, because:

New public management reforms are the products of old public administration problems. Nothing is ever permanently solved once and for all. Instead, at best, issues of public management are temporarily resolved under one form only to emerge later under another. Each new reform not

only begets new problems but also carries with it the seeds of its own decay. Reforms in public management involves a series of dichotomies and contradictions (Good, 2003: 9).

Alternatively, some have stated that NPM has been displaced by other forms of public management. These other displacement examples are whole-of government approach (Christensen and Laegreid, 2007), network governance (Rhodes 2007) New Public Governance (Osborne, 2010), New Public Service (Denhardt and Denhardt, 2000), digital era-governance (Dunleavy, et al., 2006) and New Weberian State (Drechsler, 2005), collaboration (O’Leary and Bingham, 2009), and evidence-based policy (Solesbury, 2001). In trying to ‘fix the next problem’, a long-time observer of public sector reforms is correct in stating that, “New types of reform are usually being added on to the NPM inheritance: they are not replacing it” (Pollitt, 2003: 50). Progress is assessed as to whether, “the problems created are smaller than the problems resolved” (Good, 2003: 15). Interestingly, despite the apparent decline of NPM, an examination of various public administration journals, reveals that NPM and its constituent concepts remain a topic of high research interest (Fitzpatrick, et.al., 2011; Vogel, 2014; Juliani and de Oliveira, 2016; Osborne, 2017; van Thiel and Bouwman, 2017; Vogel and Hattke, 2022).

Irrespective of how NPM is understood or assessed, its theoretical foundation is economics (Walsh, 1995; Boston, et al., 1996, 2011).⁶ Specifically, neo-liberalism (Aucoin, 1988; Savoie, 1994; Lerner, 2000; Harvey, 2005; Steger and Roy, 2010), public choice theory (Tullock, 1965, 2002; Down, 1967; Niskanen, 1971; Ostrom and Ostrom. 1971; Mueller, 1997a, 1997b; Buchanan, 1984; McLean, 1987; Tullock, 2002), agency theory (Ross, 1973; Jensen and Meckling, 1976; Eisenhardt, 1989; Lane 2005),

⁶ It has been remarked that the rise of NPM is associated with the rise of the positivist behavioural science on the study of politics and government (Lynn, 1996).

transactional cost economics (Williamson, 1985; Heckathorn and Maser, 1987; Barney and Hesterly, 1996), and managerialism (Pollitt, 1990; Enteman, 1993; Dwivedi and Gow, 1999). To minimize stove-piping, some scholars have also bundled these various theoretical underpinnings to describe the situation as neomanagerial ideology or simply neomanagerial, which is a combination of liberation management and market-driven management (Terry, 2006). It is also recognized that there is some overlap between these five theoretical underpinnings by virtue of the fact that they fall under the ‘economic’ umbrella.

Notwithstanding NPM’s dominant economic-based approach in explaining public sector reform, scholars have suggested other viable theoretical explanations: institutional (March and Olsen, 1989; Olsen, 2010, 2016), transformative (Christensen and Laegreid, 2007, 2013), innovative (Osborne and Brown, 2013; Borins, 2014; Bekkers and Tummers, 2016), change management (Van der Voet, et al., 2016; By and Macleod, 2014; Kuipers, et al., 2014), cultural theory (Hofstede, 1980; Thompson, et al., 1990; Hood, 2016), and interpretive (Bevir and Rhodes, 2015; Rhodes, 2016; Reissner and Pagan, 2013).

A consequence of the rise of economic-based NPM is the displacement of public administration from one anchored on the principles of classical or traditional public administration to one based on economic principles (Gruening, 2001; Triantafillou, 2012). Various scholars have analysed and offered their versions on the differentiation between NPM and traditional public administration (Lynn, 1996; Kernagan, et al., 2000; Aroujo, 2001; Pollitt and Bouckaert, 2000; Good 2003; Hughes, 2012; Greener, 2013). In general terms, the key differences are summarized in Table 1. The differences fall within the themes of focus, primary mode of operations, socio-professional characteristics,

organizational cultures and politico-administrative structures (Rouillard, 2003). In short, the shift from traditional public administration to NPM is, “a more entrepreneurial market-based government and more scientific study of government” (Yang, 2015: 118).

Table 1 Differences between NPM and Traditional Public Administration

Themes	NPM	Traditional Public Administration
Focus	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Clients (individuals and groups) • Micro-relationships 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Citizens and communities • Collective relationships
Preferred means of development	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Program management and evaluation • Quality • Privatization • Employability • Accountability for results 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Public policy and design • Social equity • Procedural compliance • Career orientation • Procedural accountability
Socio-professional characteristics	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Intrapreneur (action) • Creativity 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Analyst (reflection) • Probity
Organizational cultures	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Managerial freedom • Flexibility • Risk-taking • Customer service • Political/administrative dichotomy 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Administrative prudence • Bureaucracy (hierarchy) • Transparency • Public interest • Political/administrative continuum
Politico-administrative structures	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Public service as organizational units • Simple and pared-down units • Decentralization and autonomy 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Public service as a large institution • Large, complex department • Centralization and co-ordination

Source: Rouillard (2003)

2.1.2 Managerialism

From NPM’s five economic theoretical foundations, we focus on managerialism since it is most relevant to this research. At a macro level, managerialism is a, “set of beliefs and practices, at the core of which burns the seldom-tested assumption that better management will prove an effective solvent for a wide range of economic and social ills” (Pollitt, 1990: 1). At a micro level, managerialism is, “the pursuit of results-oriented

systems of government management through streamlined processes of decision making designed to allow greater autonomy but also greater responsibility for the field of program manager” (Uhr, 1990: 22). Collectively, there is a sense of romanticism to the aura of private sector managerial thinking (Pollitt, 1990), the hallmark of public management reform (Halligan, 2020), and the allure of debureaucratisation (Savoie, 1994); whilst Enteman (1993) goes even further in stating that managerialism, as an ideology, offers a better depiction of what is happening in advanced industrialized societies than the ideologies of capitalism, socialism, and democracy.

Under a managerial understanding of the public sector, efficiency is elevated as a value that is much sought after (Gregory, 2004). If government fails, which cannot be avoided, as argued by public choice scholars (Tullock, et al., 2002) at the very least government should be efficient. The best approach to achieve efficiency (and effectiveness) is by bringing in private sector solutions to public sector problems. Although, it has been remarked that, “the data shows, however, that most businesses are not run like businesses” Zegart (2011b: 310). Cadigan (2006) notes that even Adam Smith observed that certain government activities should not be dictated by efficiency as its primary goal because some government outcomes will be inconsistent with democratic values. The concern for efficiency should be positioned to answer the question, “efficiency for what?” (Waldo, 1984: 9).

The argument that private sector practices are transposable to the public sector is the based on the simple assumption that management is management. There is the belief that, “there is a body of sound management practices applicable to the private sector that is generic in its scope and, thus, directly transferable to the public sector” (Dixon,

Kouzman, Korac-Kakabadse, 1998: 168). For instance, Pollitt (2003) notes that private sector techniques such as zero-based budgeting, Total Quality Management, and re-engineering are offered as ‘quick fixes’ to address public sector management issues. The belief that private sector practices being transferable to the public sector is not new and predates NPM by nearly a century. For instance, it was argued a long time ago that:

The field of administration is a field of business... The object of administrative study is to rescue executive methods from the confusion and costliness of empirical experiment and set them upon foundations laid deep in stable principle (Wilson, 1887: 209-210).

More specifically, the origins of managerialism can be traced back to late-nineteenth America, under the auspices of scientific management beginning with the works of Taylor (1911: 7), who claimed that:

...the best management is a true science, resting upon clearly defined laws, rules and principles...the fundamental principles of scientific management are applicable to all kinds of human activities, from our simplest individual acts to the work of our greatest corporations.

What managerialism has accomplished is place a spotlight once again on private sector practices as a way out of the public sector’s inefficiency malaise; whether the malaise is real or perceived is a completely different question. This has led some to refer to the renewed interest in managerialism as neo-Taylorism given its similarities to Taylor’s scientific management (Pollitt, 1990).

In essence, managerialism’s emphasis on the application of generic private sector management practices to the public sector is based on the notion of universalism – the existence of general laws irrespective of the situation or circumstance. Notwithstanding, those who argue that management is management; there are those who have argued that there are differences between the private and public sector (Rainey, et al., 1976; Allison, 1982; Ranson and Stewart, 1994; Rainey and Bozeman, 2000; Rainey, 2003). It has been

argued that the transferability from the private sector to the public sector is not realistic because government is different (Appleby, 1945), in that, “public and private managers are at least different as they are similar and that the differences are more important than the similarities” (Allison, 1982: 29). According to Dixon, Kouzman, Korac-Kakabadse (1998), the key differences are dispersed authority, a lack of a common set of goals by decision makers, and the inconsistent transfer of previous learnings to current issues as government agendas change. Whilst Savoie (1995) notes the differences in attitudes regarding risk taking, accountability, and the equating clients to citizens. Furthermore, the adoption of private sector practices is not possible due to the differences in circumstances and more important; the core values are different (Denhardt, 1993). Finally, the exportation of management practices cannot successfully occur from the private to the public sector due to the differences in organizational environments, goals, structures and managerial values (Boyne, 2002). The secrecy studies literature provides an interesting approach to differentiating between the public and private sector. The public sector uses secrecy to protect and serve its people, whilst the private sector uses secrecy to make money (Kapper, 1999).

In short, the public sector has to content with its ‘public’ context in terms of constitutional law, administrative law, and politics (Rosenbloom, 2015). Thus, managerialism directly conflicts with democratic theory (Terry, 2006). Given these observed differences between the public and private sectors, public sector reform should not be about making the public sector more *business-like* but more *government-like* (Ingstrup, 1995). Because:

Increased efficiency may be both admired and desired, but it cannot be traded-off against public trust – or, at least, not very far. Increased

efficiency will not even bring political legitimacy – the public are too smart to believe that making the trains run on time is a sufficient manifesto for government. Once the public official loses his or her ethical distinctiveness, there is no longer any reason for the public to regard the sector named after it as deserving of any particular respect, effort or loyalty (Pollitt, 2003: 24).

In sum, those who argue that the differences between the private and public sectors are sufficient, then management practices should not be transposed wholeheartedly from one sector into the other sector without any deference to each sector's circumstances. There is a need to appreciate the specific context of the public sector. Under this argument, practices should be based on particularism – the application of practices are situation dependant. A private sector practice that has found a comfortable home in the public sector is performance management.

2.1.3 Performance Management

In recent times, public organizations have been the recipient of, “a relentless emphasis on performance” (Stivers, 2008: 105). Although, the study of public organization's performance is not new. One can trace this interest back to several centuries (Talbot, 2010). However, performance management in its contemporary understanding traces its roots to the early 1900s (Williams, 2003; Lee, 2006). It is the emergence of managerialism in the 1980s that pushed performance management as an essential ‘modern’ feature public sector management to the forefront in western democracies (Kettl, 2000; van de Walle and van Doreen, 2008). Also, some scholars have observed that performance management has become a global phenomenon within public administration as reflected in its growing importance all over the world (Webb and Blandin, 2007); however, this position has been disputed (Pollitt, 2015). The continued strength of performance management is the idea that it can deliver on efficiency, effectiveness, and accountability (Ohemeng, 2011). This increase in importance has positioned performance management

at the pointy end of public sector reform and as an academic field of study (van de Walle and van Dooren, 2008; Thrope and Beasley, 2008; Talbot, 2010). As well, there is no indication that the requirement for performance management in the public sector is waning (Bouckaert and Halligan, 2008). The financial crisis of 2008 and COVID-19 has only accentuated the importance of performance management in the public sector. This is an affirmation that performance management addresses an identified issue within the public management literature (Behn, 1995; Holzer, Gabrielian, and Yang, 2006), an acknowledgment that management in the public sector matters (Hammond and Knott, 2000; Khademain, 2000; O'Toole, 2000), and that performance management contributes to better public sector performance (Meier and O'Toole, 2002). Notwithstanding the normative assumption that performance management can lead to positive change, we are reminded that it is not a panacea to public sector performance challenges (Radin, 2006).

Despite the recognized importance of performance management, there is no singular accepted definition in the literature. Speckbacher, et al., (2003) explain that lack of a clear definition is due to the complex nature of performance management. Instead, performance management is understood in various ways that leads to ambiguities if not confusion as to the very nature of performance management (Bouckaert and Halligan, 2008). The following are some examples on how the literature has understood performance management. Carroll and Dewar (2002) understand performance management along four components: a desired level of performance, measuring performance, reporting performance information, and using performance information to compare planned to actual performance. Wholey (2002) notes that performance-based management involves the specific use of resources, including information, to achieve and demonstrate progress

towards measurable program goals and agency outcomes. Moynihan (2008) understands performance management as a systemic approach that creates performance information through strategic planning and performance measurement processes and that this information influences decisions. Last, de Lancer Julnes (2009) understands performance management as an agreement on the goals and objectives of the program, agreement on the strategies for obtaining the goals, the appropriate performance measures, alignment of mission, goals, objectives and measures, existence of a quality measurement system, capacity for organizational learning, and risk taking by the organization. For the purpose of this research, de Lancer Julnes' definition will be used because of its comprehensiveness.

As a point of clarity, in certain instances, performance management has been equated with performance measurement (Boivard and Gregory, 1996), which is incorrect as noted by other scholars (Bouckaert and Halligan, 2008; Greener, 2013; Sangar, 2013). Performance measurement consists of, “systematically collecting data by observing and registering performance-related issues for some performance purpose” (Van Dooren, et al., 2010: 6). The end product of performance measurement is performance information (Van Dooren and Van de Walle, 2010). In simple terms, “performance *management* is the sum of planning and measurement (= adoption), on the one hand, and data use (=implementation), on the other hand” (Kroll, 2015: 11). Although, performance management places a premium on the performance measurement element, which has resulted in some instances performance management being referred to as performance measurement and management. In short, despite its various definitions and understandings, performance management is a practice that is predicated to produce anticipated effects (Ongaro, 2020).

Performance management offers many potential benefits to society and the management of government operations (Brown 2005; Lee, et al., 2009). From a societal perspective, it contributes towards improving society's welfare by connecting government organizations with the concerns of citizens. This connection is achieved by creating an engagement opportunity between the various segments of society both in public and private life. This opportunity allows for increasing the collective understanding of societal issues (Berman, 2006; Moynihan, 2008).

From a managing government operations perspective, performance management provides numerous benefits in various areas of organizational life (Brown, 2005). The most critical benefit is enhancing accountability (de Lancer Julnes, 2009). Moynihan (2008: 35) states that, "performance management doctrine claims it can facilitate a new approach to accountability in the public sector, one based on the achievement of measurable results". Specifically, accountability is understood in terms of government to the public and bureaucrats to elected officials (Moynihan, 2008). Accountability that works prevents the abuse of delegated power and ensures that power is employed to achieve a goal that as best as possible takes efficiency, effectiveness, probity, and prudence into consideration (Lambert Report, 1979). At the core, "accountability is what makes public management *public*" (Ingstrup, 1995: 17). In fulfilling the accountability function, performance management increases transparency in terms of results and costs (De Bruijn, 2007). In addition to accountability, there are other related benefits noted below.

However, before exploring these other benefits it would be wise to pay attention to the words of a few scholars who cast a doubt on the current understanding and practice of accountability. We are warned that the singular emphasis on accountability as the, "new

religion of accountabilism' which is understood as a set of beliefs and practices that bureaucratize morality with the goal of trying to make us think that individuals can control their lives by following specific rules is misleading and creating false expectations” (Weinberger, 2007: 54). In addition, others sound the alarm in that:

“Accountability” is a weasel word: it sells well to a crowd that has thrived on growing distrust and seems to want heads to roll, but it runs the risk of becoming a toxic idea when unintelligent accountability is inflicted upon a political system. Not all accountability systems are intelligence (Paquet, 2009: 120).

As well, a traditional understanding of accountability under a NPM paradigm is problematic because:

The central problem of accountability arises from the delegation of authority to a wide range of public and some private actors, through delegation, contracts or other mechanisms. Debates over accountability have to grapple with the uncomfortable dilemma of how to give sufficient autonomy to these actors for them to be able to achieve their tasks, while at the same time ensuring adequate degree of control (Scott, 2000: 39)

Returning to the benefits of performance management is its contribution to efficient allocation of resources (Moynihan, 2008). This is achieved through strategic focus (Jazayeri and Scapens, 2008) which strengthens decision-making (Tuomela, 2005). Also, performance management supports technical efficiency (Moynihan, 2008) by advancing management other practices such as cooperation, coordination, and participation amongst employees and sub-units (Butler et al., 1997; Mahama, 2006; Dossi and Patelli, 2010). As a result, this enhances employee motivation and job satisfaction (Hall 2008) which shapes organizational culture (Bitici, et al., 2006). Over the long-term, performance management improves organizational learning (Chenhall, 2005). Accordingly, “the future of organizational leadership lies in performance management” (Ingstrup, 1995: 17).

Despite the potential benefits and importance of performance management implementing it in the public sector remains a challenge (Wholey, 1999; Heinrich, 2002; Heintzman, 2009). One challenge is related to accountability because implementing performance management does not automatically assume that accountability has been achieved (Aucoin, 1990; Savoie, 2004). Thus, there appears to be contradictory findings in the literature regarding the contributive role that performance management with accountability. One reason is that accountability can be understood in various ways (Romzek and Dubnick, 1987; Keohane, 2002; Boven, 2006). Thus, if accountability is ambiguous as a concept any linkage to performance management starts from a position of ambiguity. Even adopting the popular agent theory approach to accountability does not diminish the issue because the agent theory approach has challenges of its own (Perrow, 1986).

Another challenge in implementing performances management are the technical problems associated putting theory into practice (Talbot, 2010). For instance, it is not possible to measure everything. Hence, there is a need to select a short list of measures. This leads to the question of who selects what measure? Defining the who and what are critical questions in that there are linked to the issue of identifying clear outcomes (Rainey, 1993; Chun and Rainey, 2005; Pandey and Rainey, 2006) especially in the face of competing interests (King and Zanetti, 2005; Radin, 2006). A second technical problem concerns the effects of measurement (Talbot, 2010). That is to say, once a light is shone on a specific area of performance other aspects of performance move into the shadows. Currently, the emphasis is on the outcome element of performance (Siegel and Summermatter, 2008). Consequently, other elements such as inputs, activity and outputs,

commonly referred as the 'black box', are no longer deemed as important aspects of performance. Yet, when expected outcomes are not achieved, it is likely due to the poor performance of the black box. Thus, the multidimensional aspect of performance management (Cameron, 1981; Rojas, 2000; Boyne, 2003; Bouckaert and Halligan, 2008) is ignored. As well, performance measures tend to be economic based at the expense of other considerations such as equity (Radin, 2006). Furthermore, technical errors entail human errors. This type of error can simply be incorrectly entering data into a system, or it can be intentional such as falsifying data for the purpose of misleading (Talbot, 2010). The latter can be a symptom of a public sector that is risk averse (Kaufman, 1981; Homer-Dixon, 2010).

A final concern regarding performance management is the extensive emphasis on performance targets leading to 'targetitis' (Pollitt, 2003). More specific, the extensive employment of quantitative methods or 'quantophobia' (Hubbard and Paquet, 2010). The authors suggest that the, "the problem arises when the use of such tools becomes the basis of a *cult* roughly captured by the motto that if it cannot be measured, it does not matter" (Ibid: 169). As well, the authors postulate that the bureaucracy wants to look scientific by preferring the quantitative to the qualitative in order to reduce the possibility of blame especially in the face of scandals. As it will be demonstrated in the next chapter, the Canadian federal government's Management Accountability Framework (MAF) is an example of quantophobia given that its original intent has been lost to an extensive collection of quantitative data.

Given the ever-expanding literature on public sector performance management, it is not feasible to cover in fullness within this research. Instead, a few final observations

will be provided. First, the performance management literature is not complete and therefore has many blind spots. Second, the literature on performance management, can be characterized as being eclectic, diffuse and confused (Smith and Goddard, 2002; Broadbent and Guthrie, 2008). Third, there is a general lack of interest by public administration scholars in theorizing about performance management (Kelman 2007; Pollitt, 2003). This characterization of performance management is mainly because the scholarly study and research in this field of study is new (Thrope and Beasley, 2008; Talbot, 2010). Although, there is scholarly interest in how to improve government performance (McNabb, 2010).

Notwithstanding these observations, it is also acknowledged that performance management, as a distinct body of knowledge, continues to grow (de Nahlik, 2008), including the examination of its application in almost every public sector area (Bouckaert and Halligan, 2008). Given performance management's forward trajectory, it is not surprising that there is a continued interest in performance management, making it one of the top ten topics in public administration (McConkey and Dutil, 2006), if not the public sector's ultimate challenge (Arnaboldi, et al., 2015). Furthermore, it has been stated that, "performance management should be central to the study of governance" (Moynihan (2010: 25) and not a mere technocratic topic. Finally, given the NPM context of this research, it is important to understand the consequences of private sector practices within a public sector context.

2.2 Canadian Context

The previous section established that globally the operationalization of NPM has taken place through various public sector reforms initiatives including the employment of

performance management (Ocampo, 1998; Pollitt and Bouckaert, 2000; Sahlin-Andersson, 2000; Martin and Jobin, 2004). Canada has not escaped NPM's grasp (Aucoin, 1995; Bouckaert and Pollitt, 2004). In keeping with Pollitt and Bouckaert's (2011) analytical framework, this section will focus on Canada's federal level. Specifically, an overview of NPM practices adopted by the federal government, with a focus on the MAF.

2.2.1 New Public Management Arrives in Ottawa

The Canadian government has over the years introduced a plethora of public sector reform initiatives with the goal of improving its performance, which is never an easy undertaking. Beyond the internal to the public sector view, improving the performance of the public sector is essential to the performance and competitiveness of the private sector (Ingstrup, 1995). Starting in the early 1960s, Canada slowly embarked on a public sector reform agenda. The initial emphasis was on budgeting, measurement and productivity. Early manifestations of this journey were the five Glassco Reports from 1962 to 1964, the introduction of Planning, Programming and Budgeting System in 1970, the Operational Performance Measurement System in 1974, the Lambert Report in 1979, the D'Avignon Committee's Report in 1979, and the implementation of system program evaluation in 1981 (Dwivedi and Gow, 1999). Cumulatively, these early years lay the foundation for the emergence of NPM in Canada. Although, the term NPM never truly rooted itself in the government's lexicon. Instead, terms such as 'public service reform', 'public sector reform', and 'deliverology' have been commonly used. Although, the last term appears to have short lived in 'official Ottawa'.

Reform initiatives quickened in their introduction and implementation starting in 1984 when:

a Progressive Conservative government swept to power in Canada. The public agenda of the new government was clear: attention to federal deficit reduction, less generous social programmes, cutbacks in spending, tax simplifications, deregulation and the privatization of many Crown corporations – all were components of a distinct philosophy to reduce the role of government in Canadian society (Wilson and Dwivedi, 1998: 94).

Moving forward from the 1980s, the focus intensified on public sector performance, becoming something of a mantra regardless of the political party in power.

Over the years, Ottawa has launched numerous initiatives. These are, but not limited to: *Public Service 2000*, *Public Service Reform Act* (1991), Improved Reporting to Parliament initiative (1994), Program Review I (1995), Expenditure Management System (1995), *First Annual President of the Treasury Board's Report on Review and Performance in Parliament* (1995), Getting Government Right (1996), Financial Information Strategy (1996), *Accounting For Results* (1997), *Le Rélevé* (1997), splitting of the Part III of the Main Estimates creating the Report on Plans and Priorities and the Departmental Performance Report (1997), Planning, Reporting and Accountability Structure (1997), Program Review II (1998), Modern Comptrollership Initiative (1998), *Results for Canadians: A Management Framework for the Government of Canada* (2001), Management Accountability Framework (2003), *Public Service Modernization Act* (2003), Management, Resources, and Results Structure (2005), *Federal Accountability Act* (2006), Strategic Reviews (2007), and most recently the *Policy on Results* (2016). In addition, various reports from the Office of the Auditor General, commission of inquiries, and scandals have also been responsible for the continuous introduction of new initiatives (Bourgault, 2011). In short, these represent the implementation phase of the public sector reform policy cycle. They are the means used by the Canadian government to achieve an end – a better performing public sector to meet the needs of citizens.

This non-exhaustive listing suggests that, “modern management did not hit Canada overnight, like a storm” (Bourgault, 2011: 254). However, it does reveal that initiatives are, “ongoing and relentless, which each new wave of administrative reform following previous reforms in rapid succession” (Good, 2003: 14). A similar observation has been made on NPM initiatives elsewhere, leading some to suggest that the launch of reform initiatives is anchored on a tendency rather than a clear public sector reform program (Hughes, 2012). In other words, there is no actual primary plan. Instead, what we have is an overarching theme whereby performance regimes and initiatives have been implemented with the aim of shifting the basic nature of governance, altering the culture, behavior, and actions of the public sector (Radin, 2006). In the Canadian context, there is little in the way of evidence that would imply the existence of a primary plan.

Are there plausible explanations for the breath and velocity on the introduction of these initiatives? The literature points us to three likely intertwined explanations. First, there is a specific set of historical events and ideological preferences (McCurdy, 2006). A plausible candidate is neoliberalism thinking which emphasizes a market-based approach to ideas – the more the better, some ideas may work, others will not, so keep introducing them. Second, public choice theory argues that individuals are characterized as self-interested, rational, and assume to adopt maximizing strategies (Ostrom and Ostrom, 1971). Bureaucrats are no different, they display the same characteristics (Buchanan, 1978).

In the Canadian context, in order for Assistant Deputy Ministers (ADM) and Deputy Ministers (DM) to be considered for promotion and obtain their performance pay, another private sector practice, Treasury Board Secretariat’s (TBS) leadership expectations

from senior officials are that they need to demonstrate innovation and guide change. Hence, there potentially exists a self-interest to push for more initiatives, not less. Depending on their level, the performance pay of senior officials can be substantial, up to 39% of their base salary, which ranges from \$160,000 to \$343,000. Third, when elected officials initiate reform initiatives, they may have little understanding of the implications for adopting a given practice. As with all individuals, individual perspective is based on their own experience and preferences (McCurdy, 2006). In Canada, a significant number of Members of Parliament come from a business background (Chan, 2014). Thus, bringing in use of private sector practices into government can easily occur without any due considerations on what makes the public sector different. In short, the adoption of an initiative and associated tools is not a simple rational act of choosing one over another. There exist philosophical reasons for the selection (Pollitt, 2013).

Adopting NPM-inspired ‘best practices’ has become the norm in public management (Pal and Clark, 2013). In Canada, many of the ideas initiated in Canadian public administration were initially introduced in the United States prior to being adapted in Canada as ‘best practices’. This occurs because:

there are few political traditions and even fewer academic traditions within the country to which practitioners and academics can turn for inspiration.... In the absence of any enduring historical references, Canadian public servants and professors have tended to follow debates elsewhere, particularly in the United States, to inform their thinking on Canadian public administration problems (Dwivedi and Gow, 1999: 55).

As a result, Canadian public administrative has over the years imported a certain philosophical preference, American neo-liberalism. In other words, public administration is also political theory (Waldo, 1948). If this is the reality, one is left wondering if this is

not a case of institutional isomorphism (DiMaggio and Powell, 1983), whereby practices are adopted even if these practices afford minimal value.

Canadian public sector reform initiatives have been described in a variety of ways, such as gradual and incremental, prudent, half-measures, lacking strategic focus and consistency, unmet expectations, overlapping and loosely coordinated, and impressive (Dwivedi and Gow, 1999; Good 2003; Clark and Swain, 2005). A notable concern has been the overall effects in the system causing observers to employ words such as cynicism (Fortier, 2003), disillusion (Rouillard, 2003), fictions trumping reality and Kafkaesque (Hubbard and Paquet, 2010), and the conflict between democratic accountability and private-sector management approaches (Kettl, 2006b). In summary, the various descriptors suggest that assessing the success of reform initiatives depends on who is doing the describing – too fast, too slow, or just about right – perhaps, public sector reform success is in the eye of the beholder. We now proceed with an in-depth examination of one of those initiatives, the MAF as an administrative practice.

2.2.2 Management Accountability Framework

The MAF was first introduced in 2003 and is deemed one of the government's key performance management instrument. It is selected for closer examination for three reasons. First, it can be very challenging, if not impossible, to systematically assess a country's complete set of public sector reform initiatives (Pollitt and Bouckaert, 2011). In other words, one cannot eat the whole elephant, but rather need to start with a piece of the elephant. In this instance, the MAF is a piece of the elephant and a proxy for the other initiatives. Second, from the list of federal government reform initiatives, the MAF is still in use, closing in on almost two decades. This is a rarity when it comes to a reform

initiative's longevity given that most of the initiatives identified earlier are no longer recognizable by name or intent. Third, and most important, the MAF falls within the universalism-based approach to performance management, sometimes referred as a 'one-size-fits all' in public administration (Radin, 2006). This means that the same mandated instrument is applied across the majority of departments and agencies (henceforth, we will use departments). From TBS' perspective, as a central agency, having a universalism-based instrument affords it the possibility of having a holistic view across the different departments providing it a government-wide assessment.


MAF's genesis is traced back to two other Government of Canada public sector reform initiatives. First, the late 1990s Modern Comptrollership Initiative aimed to strengthen the efficiency and effectiveness on how the federal government following Program Review. Second, the vision and framework established by the *Results for Canadians: A Management Framework for the Government of Canada* (RFC) (Dupuis, 2006). The RFC established the manner in which the federal government was going to manage itself. Specifically, there was a recognition that government must focus on citizens, the need for public service values, emphasis on results, and value for money (Treasury Board of Canada Secretariat [TBS], 2001). Given the RFC's four focus areas, the MAF's genesis was to assess service delivery in terms of whether the service deliverers were relatively happy with the service process and their part in it, and if those receiving the service were relatively satisfied with them (Hubbard and Paquet, 2010). The design of the MAF itself was based on the adaptation of several other previous management frameworks in existence such as the Canadian Excellence Framework and the Public Service Excellence Model (Heintzman, 2009). As well, as part of the global performance

management movement, the MAF has many similarities to its international counterparts such as the United Kingdom's Capability Review, the European Union's Capability Assessment Tool, and the United States' President Management Agenda (TBS, 2009).

The objective of the 2003 MAF was to provide, "deputy heads and all public service managers with a list of management expectations that reflect the different elements of current management responsibilities" (TBS, 2003: 1). Specifically, the MAF's raison d'être was to:

- Clarify management expectations for deputy heads to support them in managing their own organizations;
- Develop a comprehensive and integrated perspective on management issues and challenges and to guide TBS engagement with organizations; and
- Determine enterprise-wide trends and systemic issues in order to set priorities and focus efforts to address them. (TBS, 2009: 1).

As illustrated in Figure 1, the MAF consisted of ten elements: public service values, governance and strategic directions, policy and programs, people, citizen-focused service, risk management, stewardship, accountability, results and performance, learning, innovation and change management. (TBS, 2009: 15). The emphasis of these elements positioned the MAF as a management tool to assess the capability of public sector organizations to deliver on its mandate (Talbot, 2010).



Source: TBS (2003)


Figure 1 Management Accountability Framework

In response to a 2009 evaluation and 2013 review of the MAF, TBS in 2014 introduced a new version, MAF 2.0. Its raison d'être was expanded to include the following:

- To obtain an organizational and government-wide view of the state of management practices and performance;
- To inform Deputy Ministers and Heads of Agencies about their organizations' management capacity;
- To inform the Treasury Board of Canada Secretariat about the state of policy implementation and practices;
- To identify areas of management strength and any areas that require attention;
- To communicate and track progress on government-wide management priorities; and,
- To continuously improve management capabilities, effectiveness and efficiency government-wide (TBS, 2014).

As well, the MAF's 10 elements were reconstituted (Figure 2) to: leadership and strategic direction, results and accountability, public sector values, continuous learning and

innovation, governance and strategic management, people management, financial and asset management, information management, management of policy and programs, management of service delivery. In turn, these are broken down into six Areas of Managements (AoMs): Financial Management; Information Management, Information Technology and Service Management; Acquired Services and Assets Management; People Management, Results Management; and Security Management.



Source: TBS (2014)

Figure 2 Management Accountability Framework 2.0

The MAF process requires the participation of two stakeholders, TBS and the departments being assessed. For the MAF 2019-2020 assessment, within TBS, three key organizational areas are involved. First, the Expenditure Management Sector (EMS)⁷, which manages the overall process, performs a challenge function on methodologies and

⁷ The function has since moved to the Priorities and Planning Sector.

final reports, ensures that MAF remains relevant and useful, and is involved with capacity of building of internal and external stakeholders. Second, the AoM policy centers are responsible to develop the assessment methodologies and questionnaires, examine departmental evidentiary submissions, serve as a point of contact for departments, and conduct analysis of the respective AoM evidence from departments. Third, the Program Sectors that prepare introductory paragraph of the Departmental Report and review the departmental reports analysis (TBS, 2019a).

The MAF assessment occurs on an annual basis, referred to as a 'Round'. In the 2019-20 MAF cycle, 36 large departments and agencies and 27 small departments and agencies were assessed. Based on the 2019-20 Main Estimates Part I and II (TBS, 2019b), these 63 departments and agencies account for 96% of the federal government's expenditures. The process starts in the fall, ending with departments receiving their Departmental Report in the spring. In the original MAF, the assessment for each AoM was based on one of four rating scale: attention required, opportunity for improvement, acceptable, and strong. In MAF 2.0, this was replaced with a numeric score. Also, TBS produces a comparable report allowing departments to compare to each other. However, there is no ability of a department to know the specific context of the other departments thus comparing the results of a department with another department cannot be simply based on one score being higher or lower than another department's score. In terms of public reporting, at one point the complete individual Departmental Reports were posted on the Government of Canada website. That is no longer the case, instead a truncated government-wide report is publicly made available.

The MAF has distinct design characteristics. First, MAF is not concerned with organizational context nor environment. The MAF focuses on the internal ‘black box’ of departments. There is an underlining assumption that a department’s internal and external elements can easily be segregated into neat clear-cut boxes. This suggests that what happens externally will not have an impact on the internal. In essence, any poor or good MAF performance can only be attributable to internal considerations, this makes for a questionable assumption. In previous years, although no longer the case, the MAF Assessment did contain a brief ‘departmental context’ section. Interestingly, it was drafted by TBS officials with departments being left with the role of providing comments. What was not always clear was how the items covered in the context were selected. As a result, this section did not always directly make links between the context and what was being assessed. One is left wondering if there was the belief that TBS was in a better positioned to understand a department’s specific context and environment.

Second, MAF does not allow differentiating between departments. This is evident by the assessment methodology, which identifies a fixed set of lines of evidence (indicators) for each AoM. The AoM lines of evidence are organized into three categories: policy compliance indicators that assess the extent that specific requirements in TB policy instruments are met, performance indicators that determine whether or not a particular expectation was achieved, and baseline indicators that establishes a future measurement point of reference. In addition, there are core questions that assess performance over a defined period and surface/evolving questions that measures the success of a specific priority, practice, or activity (TBS, 2019a). In TBS’ 2017 evaluation of the MAF, two out of the four recommendations speak to this design characteristics, namely; increase MAF’s

relevance and usefulness by better understanding its audience and by targeting MAF to meet the diverse needs of TBS and organizations; and better reflect departmental contexts in MAF results and in its advice to increase the value and meaning of the results to organizations (TBS, 2017).

Third, the methodology overtly rewards departments for meeting the standardized checklist of requirements, and less about actual performance. Consequentially, the relevance of the MAF to deputy heads' remains unclear; going even further, the majority of deputy heads do not see the MAF as an essential instrument for decision-making. Yet, deputy heads are not ready to abandon it (TBS, 2017). Paradoxically, although its relevance is questionable, there has been and continues to be instances of manufactured and/or invented MAF evidence in order meet the checklist (Hubbard and Paquet, 2010); similar observations have been noted by insiders.

Given what we know, is MAF a success? According to Charko's (2013) assessment of Canadian government's management improvement initiatives between 1999 and 2010, the MAF is a clear success. The author notes that the OECD found the MAF as, "one of the most sophisticated tools in the world for assessing organizational performance" (Charko, 2013: 96). In this case, success appears to be based more on design instead of effectiveness. In Lindquist's (2009) review of the MAF, a more balanced perspective is offered by the author. Although the potential benefits are acknowledged, the review does note particular concerns regarding design, the operative goal for MAF, issues related to validity, measurement and scoring, and the cost benefit of managing MAF. Based on this research's own experience with the MAF and anecdotal hearsay, Lindquist's noted concerns are real, to the extent that it puts the value of MAF into question. According to

TBS' own evaluation of MAF, it could not have ascertained its effectiveness (TBS, 2009). In addition, other issues were identified by Baroni, et al. (2009). For instance, the MAF does not adequately capture information regarding the decision making environment and pressures, it does not have the same rigour of a program evaluation, it is silent on horizontal collaboration, it has overtime morphed away from performance management to one of management oversight and away from being a strategic tool to one of limited reporting, it creates the perception of providing high level accountability then is warranted, and the costs associated with implementing the MAF. These observations add credence to Merton's (1968: 260) remarks that:

Adherence to rules, originally conceived as a means, becomes transformed into an end-in-itself, there occurs the familiar process of displacement of goals whereby 'an instrumental value becomes a terminal value'. Discipline, readily interpreted as conformance with regulations, whatever the situation, is seen not as a measure designed for specific purposes but becomes an immediate value in the life-organization of the bureaucrat.

The MAF as a universalism-based performance management model has its admirers (Bouckaert and Halligan, 2008). In contrast, there are those who suggest that no research exists that would justify the application of universalism-based approaches to public sector organizations (Roberts, 2015). In order to increase our understanding of universalism-based, like the MAF, and particularism-based performance management the Canadian IC is used as a case study. This permits us to analyze the hidden parts of public sector reform policy implementation that is not all always visible (Bernier, 2021).

2.3 Summary

The purpose of this chapter was to set the stage for the subsequent chapters by identifying and examining three key concepts: NPM, managerialism, and performance management. As well as providing the Canadian context with respect to NPM initiatives

launched by the federal government. Specifically, an in-depth examination of the MAF as the federal government's longest standing performance management instrument.

It was established that NPM originated due to a decline in citizens trust in their government resulting in those same governments launching an array of neoliberalism inspired public sector reforms. Despite the fact that no singular definition of NPM exists, it has become a dominating idea displacing traditional public administration. From NPM's economic theoretical foundations, managerialism was selected given its applicability to this research. The hallmark of managerialism is the believe that private sector management practices can be exported into the public sector with the intent of making the public sector more efficient. This is based on the assumption that management is management, irrespective of the sector. Last, performance management as a management practice was examined. Its claim to fame is the belief that it can make the public sector more efficient, effective, and accountable. A number of potential benefits, pitfalls, and implementation challenges were examined.

In establishing the Canadian context, a list of public sector reform initiatives were identified beginning as early as the 1960s. Therefore, the arrival of NPM to Ottawa did not occur overnight. It was noted that the reform initiatives were introduced at a steady pace but not necessarily fitting well together. One of those initiatives was the MAF first introduced in 2003, followed by a newer version in 2014, and is considered one of the government's essential performance management instrument. The MAF has some distinct design characteristics: it is not concerned with organizational nor environment, does not allow differentiation between departments, and it rewards departments for meeting

standardized checklist requirements and less about actual performance. In short, the design is typical of a universalistic based approach to performance management.

CHAPTER 3: THEORETICAL CONSIDERATIONS

The end state of this chapter is the development of a contingency approach, premised on particularism, to performance management for application to the case study - the Canadian IC. The development of the contingency approach entails reviewing the appropriate contingency literature allowing for the identification of core concepts. However, prior to engaging the contingency literature, the chapter begins with the broader universalism versus particularism debate in order to situate the contingency approach within this broader debate.

3.1 Universalism vs Particularism Debate

At the very core of this research's premise, is the not so new dichotomous debate between universalism versus particularism approaches to knowledge and its application in day-to-day public administration. The debate has re-emergence in contemporary times, commencing in sociology with Parsons' (1951) particularism vs universalism pattern variables, followed by subsequent other sociological works (Merton, 1973). Not limited to sociology, the debate has since made its way into other disciplines, including public administration. For example, Mahina (1975) studied the bureaucratization of organization, Giauque, et al (2011) examined public service motivation, Brady and Burroway (2012) investigated social policy for single-mother poverty, Walker (2013) applied the debate in exploring human rights, and Corleto and Piñeiro (2017) analyzed Uruguayan public administration. This wide array of diverse studies offers but a peak into the dichotomous debate, which at its core is philosophical in nature (Ongaro, 2020).

3.1.1 Universalism

The concept of universalism or derivatives of the word such as universal and universalistic (used interchangeably) has been defined in different ways by various scholars. This should not come as a surprise given that concepts in social and political theory operate within a complex environment, taking on different meanings at different times, and are shaped within the confines of academic disciplines (Anttonen, et al., 2012). In terms of scientific knowledge, universalism-based theories, “aim at generalities, an avoidance of explanation that only holds in certain cases...ideal theories are free from the variety of factual context” (Virtanen, 2013: 11). Along similar thinking, Merton (1973) argues that universalism is an essential prerequisite to advance science; in that, scientific research must be validated based on impersonal criteria. In other words, knowledge within a universalism paradigm should not take the knowledge producers characteristics such as nationality, religion, political or any other factors into consideration (Daston, 1991; Somsen, 2008).

In another example, Merton (1968) argues that democracy is enabled by the application of universalism as an essential ingredient, without which a society cannot be considered a democracy if different laws apply to different segments of society. Walker (2013), in examining human rights characterizes universalism as the equal, uniform, and unlimited application regardless of situation. In Harmon’s (1986) discussion of subjectivist-objectivist dichotomy in public administration, universalism is understood as representing the objectivist perspective in terms of universal validity and ultimate foundations. Lastly, Anttonen, et al. (2012) frames universalism within a social policy construct characterizing it as the inclusion of all citizens with welfare needs. From these

various perspectives, universalism for the purpose of this research is understood to mean the same rule or application for all situations. This understanding of universalism carries with it the notions of general laws, wholeness, unity, and totality.

Beginning in public administration's "Progressive Era" period, universalism has been the dominant approach in knowledge generation and application (Melchior and Melchior, 2001). In its current incarnation, universalism is exemplified by NPM. Given that every era carries its own terminology, the current commonly used terms for universalism are 'one-size-fits-all' or 'one best way' (Radin, 2006; Al-Habeil, 2010; Ohemeng, 2010). The one-size-fits-all approach in public administration have three common characteristics (Radin, 2006: 36-37). First, these approaches employ a generic approach to organizations. Hence, there is minimal concern regarding differences between organizations because it is assumed that all organizations are the same. Thus, no concern for organizational differentiation. For instance, an organization responsible for public safety is deemed similar to an organization responsible for delivering recreational services. Second, there is a distinct emphasis on decision and control processes. The reason for emphasizing these two processes is the expectation that organizations can maximize efficiency and effectiveness simply through decisions and controls as a means of ensuring implementation. Other considerations that can contribute to organizational efficiency and effectiveness are disregarded or at best have a negligible role. Third, there is minimal focus on the policy or program results because one-size-fits-all approaches are designed with an emphasis on the mechanics and not the substance on actual policy or program. As long as the appropriate processes are followed, policy and program results are of a lesser concern.

Notwithstanding the dominance of the one-size-fits all approach, public administration scholars have criticized this approach. For instance, the one-size-fits-all's focus on the mechanics fails to consider that the public sector is, "a 'complex adaptive system' is therefore a set of ongoing relationships between people and organizations, governed by reactions to the environment and by mutual expectations" (Hubbard and Paquet, 2010: 68). Another criticism is based on the simple grounds of what is 'best' and who decides what is best (Bardach, 1994; Lynn, 1994; Löffler, 2000; Bretschneider, et al., 2005). What we have is that the 'best' and who decides what 'best' is, are usually established by an era's prominent thinking and the entities that have espoused the best. For example, NPM for the longest of time has been associated with neoliberal thinking, which is currently accepted as a near fait accompli. At the global level, NPM was adopted by entities such as the World Bank and OECD, which in turn have applied NPM thinking to countries seeking assistance from them. Interestingly, criticism against one-size-fits-all is not new in public administration (Appleby, 1945; Dahl, 1947; Waldo, 1948). We only need to consider Simon's *The Proverbs of Administration* (1946). In this seminal work, he critically examined some widely accepted universal principles of administrations and found that the principles were found lacking because, "one can find an equally plausible and acceptable contradictory principle." (Simon, 1946: 53).

Contrasting universalism, we have the approach based on particularism. However, prior to examining the former, a brief remark is offered regarding the 'one-best-way' implications on public administration research. According to Riccucci (2006), a one-best way approach is indicative of a logical positivist approach to understanding public administration. Furthermore, there is the expectation that the creation of administrative

theory is inductive, value-free, rationally based with a testable hypothesis. In addition, ideas, concepts, and theory are based on quantitative research methods and data. As well, White (1999) argues that the overemphasis on universalism-based approaches such as scientific management, administrative management and the general behavioural movement in the social sciences has led to an incomplete understanding of public administration. This has resulted in public administration research that is explanatory in nature at the detriment of interpretive and critical approaches.

3.1.2 Particularism

The concept of particularism or derivatives of the word such as particularistic, diversity and context (used interchangeably) have been defined in different ways for the same reasons noted for universalism. Continuing with Virtanen's (2013) diagnoses, in contrast to his description of universalism scientific knowledge, a particularistic notion of scientific knowledge is knowledge that is dependent on the factual context from within which it is created from. As such, particularistic scientific knowledge adds a richness of understanding, which is not the case with universalistic scientific knowledge. Candler (2002) offers another perspective on particularism in his writing about Brazilian public administration. He asks whether or not public administration literature originating in the North has any relevance in the South given the different context between the North and South. Thus, is Brazil different enough that the application of the North's understanding of public administration valid? In a study on public service motivation (PSM), Giauque, et al. (2011) argue that any research on PSM should contextualize the political and administrative contexts of public servants in order to fully appreciate PSM, or risk failing to fully understand PSM in different locations. In Tilly and Goodin's (2006) discussion

of contextual analysis, they point to the fact that this type of analysis is drastically different than the search for general laws, associated with the universalism. According to these two scholars, the contextualist approach is usually employed for helping us gain an understanding on some puzzling phenomena. This occurs because the contextualist account provides one or two keys, given to someone coming to the story from the outside will say, “Of course: *now* I get it!” (Ibid: 21).

From these various perspectives, particularism for the purpose of this research is understood to mean that different rules and applications will depend on the situation. The argument being that although different situations may be similar, they are still different – the uniqueness and richness resides in the differences. As such, “Context matters, and context often varies”, observes Tilly and Gooden (2006: 21). This is not really a eureka moment, literature going back to several decades has already made similar arguments (Dahl, 1949; March, 1997); as well, more recent literature (Pollitt, 2013; Castelnovo and Sorrentono, 2017; Demirciogly, 2019). Even international organizations that once pushed for universalistic public administration solutions have recognized the importance of particularism. Rather, it is a reaffirmation of the relevance of context that is at times ignored, forgotten, or simply taken for granted.

In short, at the risk of oversimplification, the debate comes down to the existence of two poles or logics. At one end is universalism, which argues for universal principles that are applicable regardless of context. At the other end, particularism argues that in order to understand a phenomenon, it is necessary to situate it within its respective context. These two poles provide conflicting logics. Whether one logic is better than the other depends on the issue under examination; ironically, it depends on the issue – sounds like

particularism. For instance, on the welfare state's social policy the jury is still out on whether universalism or particularism is better positioned to address social inequalities. On the other hand, in some instances universalism has become the dominant perspective, as is the case with human rights. Notwithstanding, the debate between these two logics can come down to an individual's philosophical lens, which means that accepting or rejecting one logic over the other can be distilled down to one's philosophical worldview.

As the debate relates to this research, the one-size-fits all falls under universalism, while the contingency approach falls under the particularism side of the debate. The latter should not come as a surprise given that, "context was key to the contingency theory movement developing in organizational studies and management science" (Hood, 2013: 117). However, when context is applied to the analysis of a public administration issue, i.e., performance management, there is the increased likelihood of complexification. Thus, the essential question is how to simplify? (Hood, 2013).

The contingency approach is selected for this research because without employing a context seeking theoretical lens, there is the danger that by including almost everything under the pretext of 'context', you can easily end up with little discriminatory power to discern between relevant and irrelevant context. In addressing the challenge of relevance within performance management the challenge for public administration researchers and practitioners alike is twofold. First, being able to identify those things that makes organization *A* different from organization *B*. Second, given the differences between *A* and *B*, being able to answer the 'so what' question. Along a similar vein, Virtanen (2013) encourages the usage of the contingency approach as a means of increasing our understanding of public organizations, which has been used by public administration

scholars (Ohemeng, 2010; Groeneveld and Van de Walle, 2010; Andrews, et.al., 2016; George, et al., 2019; Park, 2020). These are welcomed examples of overcoming a concern on using a contingency approach to public sector issues, which was not the case a quarter of a century ago when it was observed that the contingency approach was largely reserved for examining office-level workings and not agency performance at the macro level of government (Schafer, 1994).

3.2 Contingency Theory

Starting in the 1950s, systems thinking appeared on the scene (von Bertalanffy, 1950; Parsons, 1951; Boulding, 1956). A little later, it took root in organizational theory (OT) (Katz and Kahn, 1966; Thompson, 1967; Buckley, 1967). Systems thinking in OT was seen as a way to address shortcomings contained in classical universalistic OT schools of thought of scientific management (Taylor, 1911), administrative management (Gulick and Ulnick, 1937), and bureaucracy (Weber, 1947). Under systems thinking, modern organizations can be imaged as either being more prominently closed or prominently open (Scott, 2003); although it is highly unlikely that any organization can categorically be labeled as fully closed or fully open.

The closed system schools of thought, reminiscence of classic OT, primarily focuses on the internal workings of the organization, namely efficiency, stability, and internal rationality at the neglect of the environment-organization interaction. However, this organization has difficulties adjusting to environmental changes, which could threaten its very survival (Farazmand, 2002). More and more, there was an increased recognition that organizations needed to be understood working as an open system, where the environment-organization interaction is based on, “complex studies of dependency,

uncertainty, organizational structures, boundaries, and the symbolic interpretation of the environment” (Luhman and Cunliffe, 2013:60-61).

An open system-type organization focuses its efforts on continuously adjusting to its environment. However, this does not mean that organizations should be exclusively focused on their environment, because replacing the extremes of a closed system with the extremes of an open system will not further advance an organization. A major point is that organizations need to find a balance between the closed and open system attributes (Thompson, 1967). Organizational success is achieved through, "internal integration and external adaptation" (Tompkins, 2005: 6). This balance can only be achieved when an organization's needs are examined from the point of view that each organization is unique, avoiding the use of universalistic approaches to solving organizational challenges. Thus, there is a need to differentiate between organizations in order to escape the universalistic trap that all organizations are deemed as being the same. Hence, a solution that works for one organization may not necessarily work for another organization. This is crucial because different organizations will interact with their environment differently and internally respond differently.

Over the years, various organizational differentiation classifications have been used to study the environment-organization interaction. For instance, organizational typology (Etzioni, 1961; Blau and Scott, 1962), organizational taxonomy (Hall, et.al., 1966), and organizational systematics (McKelvey, 1982). However, these approaches have not fulfilled their goal, causing a leading proponent of organizational classification to note that if a practical classification system did exist, then there would be no need for contingency

theory (McKelvey, 1975). This implies that contingency theory (CT) offers a potential way to differentiate organizations.

Theoretically, contingency theory (Thompson, 1967; Lawrence and Lorsch, 1967; Galbraith, 1977; Donaldson, 1996), is best positioned to account for the importance of contingent factors regarding organizational performance (Woodward, 1965; Pugh and Hickson, 1976; Hayes, 1977; Otley, 1980; Donaldson, 1995, 2001). Contingency theory was first developed in the 1960s, peaking in the 1970s in the field of OT (Demers, 2007). Since then, it has taken on various understandings and applications (Tompkins, 2005). For our purpose, a contingency theory means that, "the most effective approach is contingent on the situation" (Behn, 1993: 45). The implication is that no universal system, including management instruments, can be equally applied to all organizations in all situations (Rejc, 2004). An underlying principle in contingency theory is that the more a situation is complex, dynamic, and uncertain, the less chance there is of having a one best way (Donaldson, 1996).

Given the objectives of this research, CT provides the foundation for theorizing about what makes the IC different. At its core, CT is a dominant open system midrange theory whose focus is on the identification and matching of context settings with organizational settings (Hambrick, 1984; Scott, 1992). Thus, organizations are deemed as adaptive entities responding to environmental uncertainty (Donaldson, 1995). When a match occurs, referred to as 'fit' in the literature, it is assumed that the organization is performing well (Drazen and Van de Van, 1985). Furthermore, there is 'no best way' to achieve this fit, finding the appropriate fit depends on the environment-organization interaction.

Under a CT construct, organizational performance (P) is determined by a number of variables (V). For instance, the performance of an academic department is dependent on different variables such as funding, academic faculty, research grants, and student to faculty ratio. However, these V are in themselves tempered by contingency factors (C) which can be any variable that moderates, either positive or negative, the effect of a variable. For example, departmental funding could be contingent on governments' budget and the internal distribution of a university budget to a particular department, academic faculty could be contingent on the ability to attract high caliber academics based on salaries and the department's reputation, research grants could be contingent on the quality of the research grant application, and the student to faculty ratio could be contingent on a university's standards for class size.

In short, CT is based on the premise that the impact of one variable V on the performance P of an organization is influenced by a contingency C . Hence, CT postulates an association between the V , P and C . The challenge is determining which C s are the critical ones. In keeping with the purpose and research objectives, there will be no attempt to provide a weighting to the C s. In the above example of the academic department, it is likely to perform well (P) if there is an alignment between the variables (V) and the contingency factors (C). In this situation, the C is a moderator or conditioning variable of the relationship between P and V . However, when a fit between V , C and P does not exist, the organization is unlikely to perform well. Using the academic department example to illustrate, a department whose budget is significant reduced by government, low salaries for academics, poor research grants applications and a high student to faculty ratio are all C s that impact the variables of funding, academic faculty, research grants, and student to

faculty ratio. Given these circumstances, it is anticipated that the performance of the academic department will decrease. However, CT argues that an organization's performance does not have to negatively suffer if an organization can adapt to its *Cs*. For instance, an academic department can maintain its level of performance even in the face of reduce budgets, low salaries, lack of research grants and a high student to faculty ratio; if it finds a way to adapt to this specific context. Despite its simplicity, we are cautioned that, "the application of contingency theory is not as straightforward as some theorists maintain" (Schafer, 1994: 29); this will become evident as we proceed with the examination and application to performance management and the IC.

In examining CT in terms of *V*, *C* and *P*, one can extract three core concepts that this theoretical approach rests upon: external environment, contingency factors, and fit. It is these three core concepts that helps to differentiate contingency theory from other organizational theories.

3.2.1 External Environment

The literature on defining the environment is quite diverse (Rainey, 2003; Burton and Obel, 2004; Tompkins, 2005). For the purpose of this research, the environment is generally understood as all of the elements or influences that are external to an organization that can impact an organization's performance as a whole of parts of the organization (Hall, 1977; Daft, 2004; Meinhardt, Junge and Weiss, 2018; Valeri, 2021). Implied in this understanding of the environment is the idea that the environment cannot be defined and understood without reference to the organization's domain (Levine and White, 1961). Going further, when examining the environment two considerations arise: the elements of an organization's external environment and environmental uncertainty.

The first consideration evolves around the issue that the environment is by its very nature an abstract concept that can include an infinite list of influences on an organization. The critical question generated from this understanding is, what constitutes an organization's external environment? The premise behind this question is that an organization's performance is impacted by its external environmental elements. It is expected that organizations that have difficulties adjusting to their external environment will have poor performance. On the flip side, organizations that can adjust to their external environmental elements are expected to be performing well. This environment-organization relationship is deemed as an organization operating in an open-system construct. Whereas, a closed system construct consists of an organization that is not concerned with its external environment but are rather concerned with maintaining its internal organizational integrity (Scott, 2003).

Organizations operating in an open-system construct need to identify their external environmental elements in order to first understand them and second allow the organization to take decisions that ensures that organizational performance is not adversely affected by these elements. Overall, there are two potential approaches of classifying an organization's external environment: general environment and specific environment (Tillotson, 1980).

The general external environment consists of those elements that may not have a direct impact on the daily operations of an organization but will indirectly influence the organization. For example, common external elements that would be applicable to most organizations are political, economic, social cultural and technology. Given this macro perspective, the identified external elements are usually expressed as trends. The specific

external environment consists of those elements that will have a direct impact on the daily operations of an organization (Daft, 2004).

To illustrate the general versus specific external environment, let us look at cyber security. It can be assumed that most organizations have accepted cyber security as an ongoing concern to them. A cyber security trend is that as society becomes even more connected via the internet there is the expectation that organizations will increasingly experience cyber security incidents. From an intelligence organization's perspective, leaving the analysis at the trend level is insufficient because this provides very little valuable information to the intelligence organization to effectively carry out its mandate. A specific-type external environmental element would require a deeper level of understanding as it relates to the organizational domain. An intelligence organization would seek answers to several questions, for instance: who are the sources of cyber security threats?, what is being targeted by the threat source?, what are the threat source's cyber capabilities?, what is the current state of cyber security technology?, what cyber technology is currently under development and who is developing this technology?, and where is the intelligence's organization future cyber security workforce found? These questions are just a few examples of the types of specific questions and answers required by an intelligence organization to understand its specific external environment.

The second consideration of the external environment is uncertainty. Employing Duncan's (1972) framework (Figure 3), uncertainty results from the combination of environmental change (along a stable-unstable dimension) and environmental complexity (along a simple-complex dimension). Uncertainty is understood as the, "variable which makes the organization contingent upon the environment" (Nobre, et.al., 2010). The lowest

level of environmental uncertainty reflected in Quadrant I (QI), is found in a simple and stable environment consisting of a few similar environmental elements that tend to remain consistent or change very slow. A low to moderate environmental uncertainty found in Quadrant II (QII) consists of an external environment that has a significant number of external elements that are dissimilar to each other. However, the environmental elements tend to remain consistent or change very slow. A moderate to high environmental uncertainty illustrated in Quadrant III (QIII) consists of a few similar environmental elements. However, the environmental elements frequently change and in an unpredictable fashion. The highest level of environmental uncertainty found in Quadrant IV (QIV) consists of an external environment that has a significant number of external elements which are dissimilar to each other, and the environmental elements frequently change in an unpredictable fashion.

Environmental Change	Stable	<p>QI Simple + Stable = Low Uncertainty</p>	<p>QII Complex + Stable = Low-Moderate Uncertainty</p>
	Unstable	<p>QIII Simple + Unstable = High-Moderate Uncertainty</p>	<p>QIV Complex + Unstable = High Uncertainty</p>
		Simple	Complex
		Environmental Complexity	

Source: Duncan (1972)

Figure 3 Environmental Change and Environmental Complexity

In terms of organizational performance, it is expected that organizations in QI would have an easier time to achieve performance given a stable and simple external environment, when compared to organizations in QIV attempting to achieve performance

in an unstable and complex external environment. For instance, there is the expectation that a typical 'simple' organizations (QI) such as Service Canada working with fairly standardized processes would be in a better position to achieve performance expectations than national security organizations that operate within an environment of unknown unknowns (QIV).

Thus far, the environment has been presented as unidirectional – the environment impacts to the organization. It is also recognized that the environment-organization relationship operating in an open-systems construct implies that an organization also has the possibility of impacting the environment. The organization's capability to impact the environment is dependent on various considerations. For instance, the introduction of Facebook and other social media by various companies have forever changed the society-technology relationships. For government, they are able to influence the environment mainly through legislation, regulations and policy. To a lesser degree, the day-to-day actions of a government organization can also have an impact on the environment. For example, the Royal Canadian Mounted Police's Security Service questionable 1970s post Front de libération du Québec (FLQ) activities lead to the creation of the Canadian Security Intelligence Service with an ever-increasing call for accountability since than of the IC. This concludes our examination of an organization's external environment; the following section examines the internal perspective of an organization through contingent factors.

3.2.2 Contingent factors

Over the decades, the literature has identified a vast range of potential contingent factors (Jurkovich, 1974; Rainey, 2003; Tompkins, 2005; Daft, 2007), illustrating that contingency theorists have not developed a means of determining the right number of

essential contingent factors. This does not come as a surprise given that, “Contingency theorists differ widely in their definitions and in what they are studying” (Schafer, 1994: 68). As a result, despite many attempts there is no unified contingency theory (Shepard and Hougland, 1977). Thus, we are left with the practical question of which contingent factors do we consider? To address this issue in a manageable fashion, we employ Donaldson’s (2001) approach in understanding contingent factors. This scholar’s approach was selected given his ardent defense of contingency theory (Donaldson, 1995, 1996), his recognition as contingency theory’s leading scholar (Jackson, 2000; Turkulainen, 2008), and being the closest to combining a diverse and fragmented contingency theory literature. The author’s approach specifically focuses on the internal dimension of an organization. The external consideration of contingency theory was addressed in the previous section. Thus, by the end of this section, we will have covered both external and internal dimensions of contingency theory.

Donaldson’s approach groups contingent factors into two broad categories: task uncertainty and technology. The author’s approach taps into the intellectual background of other pioneering CT theorists works such as Burns and Stalker (1961), Hage (1965), Lawrence and Lorsch (1967), Woodward (1965) Perrow (1967), and Thompson (1967). In taking this approach, Donaldson is able to concurrently merge different contingents of the same organization, thus providing a different view of an organization without each contingent view nullifying each other.

Stinchcombe (1982) and Bartunek and Subi (2018), note that pioneering OT works are still relevant and continue to make valuable contribution to current OT issues. As well, these works lay the critical foundations for making CT a “normal science” (Jackson, 2000).

Hence, there is no need to being afraid of using ‘older’ works in relation to more novel works (Donaldson, 1995).

- Task uncertainty

Changes to an organization’s external and internal environment brings uncertainty to an organization including the tasks that it performs. Tasks are the key activities undertaken by an organization to deliver on its goals, resulting in performance. Therefore, changes in the environment can create a situation whereby an organization’s current tasks may no longer be sufficient to respond to the changing environment. As a result, an organization’s goals may not be achieved, hence, the organization in no longer performing well. Donaldson’s (2001) approach arrives at task uncertainty as a contingent factor by drawing from several seminal works whereby each of these respective works provides a distinct perspective.

One consideration from Donaldson’s approach to task uncertainty consists of understanding what makes organizations different. He draws from Burns and Stalker’s (1961) examination of the type of management that exists within an organization. There are two types of management within an organization: mechanistic and organic. A mechanistic organization is characterized by a clear hierarchy, the division of labour based on specialization leading to clear roles, follows a clear-detailed procedure, and has a formalized communication system. These characteristics resemble Weber’s ‘ideal-type’ bureaucracy. In contrast, an organic organization, in simple terms, represents the opposite characteristics of a mechanistic organization such as fewer formal structures, shifting roles and informal lateral communications.

The mechanistic organization is best suited for a situation consisting of a stable environment and task certainty. If the situation consists of an unstable environment and task uncertainty, an organic organization would be better suited. Finally, a purely mechanistic and purely organic organizational system occupy the two ends of a spectrum. An organization will be situated somewhere along this spectrum, based on the level of uncertainty and how an organization responds to this uncertainty. A key challenge for management is having the ability to foresee and understand the changing environment and its ability to align the organization along the mechanistic-organic continuum.

A second dimension of Donaldson's approach to task uncertainty accesses Hage's (1965) ideas about efficiency and structure and innovation. Efficiency is understood as using the minimal amount of resources to achieve a goal. That is to say, an organization is deemed more efficient if it can achieve the same goal using fewer resources. An organization's efficiency capacity is dependent on its structure. Efficiency is maximized under a structure characterized as having low complexity and a formalized centralized decision-making process. The notion of complexity refers to the extent of knowledge available within an organization. As such, it is deemed complex when it possesses a highly educated workforce and utilizes this knowledge to increase knowledge depth. Efficiency can also be achieved through innovation, which is understood as the rate of introduction of new ideas or products. It is assumed that the higher the rate of introducing new ideas or products leads to better efficiency and performance.

A third consideration of Donaldson's approach entails Lawrence and Lorsch's (1967) idea about understanding the environmental pressures, the external demands on various parts of an organization, which is premised on three notions: differentiation,

integration, and interdependence. The differentiation of an organization refers to the various internal units that collectively form an organization, but which are assigned specific tasks. Whilst, integration is concerned with the quality of collaboration that occurs between these units under the parent organizations that need to work together in order to achieve the organization's goal. Thus, the expectation is that the greater the differentiation between these units, a greater integration of the units is required. However, the need of these units working together will be reliant on the interdependence between the units. The greater the interdependence between the units, the greater the need for integration of the units. Hence, coordination between units takes on an important function given that greater coordination is required to achieve integration amongst the different units in addition to ensuring that the interdependencies are re-enforcing.

In summary, Donaldson's (2001) approach to task uncertainty consists of three considerations: the type of management used by an organization, the role of an organization's structure and innovation in contributing towards efficiency, and the impact of the external demands of various parts of an organization and the organization's ability to ensure that its units are all working together to achieve a common goal.

- Technology

Employing Donaldson's (2001) approach, technology represents his second group of contingent factors. Similar to his development of task uncertainty, he draws upon several seminal works. In the CT literature, technology has a wide range of conceptualizations. What Donaldson's approach does is that it takes into consideration

these various conceptualizations in order to provide a more comprehensive perspective than that offered by a single work.

In one conceptualization, Woodward (1965) does not explicitly define technology. Rather the author identifies two types of technology; the type of product produced and how many products are produced. These two types when combined together represent an organization's production line. In her research, she was able to identify three types of production lines based on the technical complexity required to create a product: unit and small batch production, large batch and mass production, and process production. The unit and small batch production requires the lowest technical competence and is representative of small shops similar to a cottage industry producing customized products or small quantities. The large batch and mass production requires more technical competence than the previous type and is representative of large-scale standardized products such as clothing manufacturing. Lastly, process production entails consistent production of a product that requires its continuous production and is highly technical in nature such as automobile manufacturing. It is surmised that the complexity of the technology has an impact on how the organization is managed. For an organization to achieve its goal there should be alignment between technology and the organization.

A sociological conceptualization of technology is offered by Perrow (1967) who believed that technology has less to do with tangibles and more with the cognitive process required to complete a task. From this perspective, he identified two situational dimensions of technology. First, the number of exceptions, which refers to the extent that a person carrying out a task encounters a new or unexpected situation. Second, the extent to which a task can be analyzed denotes the extent to which a person needs to search for a solution

to a problem associated with carrying out a task. When these two situational dimensions are combined together, a cross-classification emerges with four potential outcomes. First, routine technology consists of few exceptions and task can be easily analyzed such as a pulp and paper mill. Second, engineering technology results from many exceptions and task can be analyzed, exemplified by heavy industry production. Third, craft technology is arrived at by few exceptions and task cannot be analyzed, for instance, specialty products. Fourth, nonroutine technology occurs with many exceptions and task cannot be analyzed as illustrated by the social media industry.

Given these four types of technologies, it is posited that there is a need to align the two situational dimensions of technology to the organization. The outcome of this alignment would suggest that a routine technology requires a formal centralized structure characterized by central planning with technical experts directing those overseeing the production. The engineering technology needs a flexible centralized structure in that the technical experts manage the expectations and adjust accordingly, while operational staff oversees production. In a craft technology environment, it would benefit from a decentralized structure, where the technical expert would have a minimal role, but the worker would have an important role in making decisions. Lastly, a nonroutine technology entails a flexible polycentralized structure meaning that all those involved in the production have an active role, requiring collaboration amongst them.

Lastly, Donaldson's approach also draws upon the work of Thompson's (1967) three variations in technology. The first is mediating technology, which is based on pooled interdependences, that is to say, organizational sub-units are not directly linked but rather are interdependent to and rely upon each other to a common pool of resources. An

organization achieves its goal by combining the separate contributions made by each sub-unit. For example, a service organization needs to link the service it is providing to potential clients. While the goal of the service organization is to offer services, it does not mean that all sub-units within the organization are delivering services. However, the various sub-units are interdependent on each other in order for the parent organization to achieve its goal of providing services to clients.

Second, the long-linked technology variation consists of sequential interdependence where sub-system precedes another sub-system. An organization achieves its goal by ensuring minimal friction between sub-systems. For instance, a mass production automobile assembly line is illustrative of a long-linked technology. This example also highlights that a single product and standardization are beneficial for long-linked technology.

The last variation, the intensive technology refers to the free flow back and forth between sub-systems of an organization. The organization achieves its goal by ensuring that the collective efforts of each sub-systems work together. However, the sequencing of the sub-systems will depend on the feedback from the organization's goal objective. To demonstrate this, the admittance of a patient at a hospital is employed. In this case, the hospital will respond to the needs of the patient through the use of its various sub-systems such as Magnetic Resonance Imaging, x-ray, pharmacy, Intensive Care Unit, psychiatry, etc. The sequencing of the sub-systems will be very dependent on the need of the patient. The hospital achieves its goal of patient care when the patient's illness is addressed.

In summary, Donaldson's (2001) approach to technology takes into consideration several concepts drawn from other contingency theorists. From Woodward, it was

established that the utilization of technology in organizations is not constant but rather fluctuates based on the production mode of the organization. From Perrow, technology is sociological in nature and therefore assumes that the cognitive processing required to complete a task is essential. Finally, from Thompson, technology emphasizes the associated task interdependence between organizational sub-units.

3.2.3 Fit

In the two previous sections, we covered the concepts of external environmental element and contingent factors. Building on these two sections, this section examines contingency theory's third core concept – fit. Over the years, the concept of fit has been a constant fixture in the OT literature (Drazin and Van de Ven, 1985; Donaldson, 2001; Donaldson and Joffe, 2014; Nissen, 2014). Fit is the alignment between an organization with its external environment and contingent factors that result in a positive impact on the organization. However, if this alignment between an organization with its external environment and contingent factors leads to diminished organizational performance, this is referred to as a misfit (Donaldson, 2001). According to Miles and Snow (1984), the alignment between the organization and the external environment can be referred to as external fit, whereas internal fit refers to the alignment between the organization and the contingent factors. The following example illustrates the concept of fit in more practical terms. If the IC assesses Russia and China as potential adversaries, than the IC having Russian and Chinese linguists would be a good fit between the external environment and the IC. However, if the IC does not have Russian and Chinese linguists but a large number of Sango speaking linguists, than there would be a misfit between the IC's external environment and the IC itself.

Building on this understanding of fit, Van de Ven and Drazin's (1984) delve into a more nuanced understanding of fit that further incorporates clarification through the application of the selection, interaction, and systems lens. Fit as selection occurs at the lower levels of an organization such as decisions made by managers on behalf of the organization. The purpose of fit as selection is to determine how much of a specific factor is required to achieve a certain level of organizational performance. For instance, continuing with our cyber security example, managers will determine how much cyber hacking capability is required by their own organization to ensure that they can get into an adversary's cyber system. In this example, the organization is attempting to achieve a fit based on the selection of their organization's own cyber hacking capability in relation to the adversary's own cyber capability (an external factor). In this instance, the organization is said to be performing well if its own cyber capability allows cyber hacking into an adversary's cyber system. However, if the organization's cyber capability does not hack into an adversary's cyber system, the result is a misfit and poor performance.

Fit, as interaction is not overly concerned with the casual relationship between the organization and its external environment and/or contingent factors. Rather, the emphasis for fit as interaction is the understanding how variations in the organization under particular conditions impacts performance. Using our cyber security example, if an organization's existing cyber capability allows them to achieve a performance of X , what would happen to performance if the organization would decrease or increase their cyber capability by Y ? In this instance, we would have fit if the performance level would remain as is or improves and misfit if performance is negatively affected.

Thus far, the lens of selection and interaction have provided a simplistic understanding of fit and performance. The third lens, systems, offers a more complex and nuanced view of fit and performance. Fit, as viewed through a systems lens, suggests that performance expectations can be achieved when the various external environmental and contingent factors are holistically examined and understood as a system. Not surprisingly, the systems lens implies an increased level of difficulty and sophistication when compared to fit as selection or interaction. For a simple example of fit through a systems lens, we combine the earlier consideration of linguist with cyber capability. An organization would achieve a higher level of performance if it would have the cyber capability to hack into an adversary's systems in addition to being able to employ its linguists to actually understand the content found in the adversary's system.

3.3 Contingency Approach to Performance Management

A CT approach to performance management assumes that there is no universally appropriate performance management system that applies equally to all organizations in all conditions without taking into consideration the particularities of the organizations (Otley, 1980; Rejic, 2004; Ferrera and Otley, 2009). The purpose of this section is to put forth a contingency approach to performance management through the development of a framework that encapsulates CT's three core concepts; namely, external environment, contingent factors and fit. The proposed approach provides the basis for the identification of what makes the IC different – particularistic – in comparison to other federal entities (see Chapter 6). Overall, the resultant approach is a hybrid in nature, incorporating three different perspectives. First, Tillotson's (1980) notion of the general and specific environment, with the specific environment being the more critical of the two. Second,

Duncan's (1972) framework of environmental change and environmental complexity. Last, Donaldson's (2001) internal perspective of the organizations.

As you may recall, Duncan's (1972) approach explored the external environment along two axis, environmental change and environmental complexity. However, prior to proceeding any further there is a need to move towards some consistent language in light of stitching together two approaches, specifically in our discussion of the external environment, which used elements. Henceforth, in keeping with Donaldson and the contingency literature writ large, we refer to external environment 'elements' as external contingency factors. This will be in contrast to Donaldson's internal contingency factor. Thus, going forward the three core concepts are reconstituted as: external contingent factors, internal contingent factors, and fit. The proposed approach to CT for performance management builds upon CT's premise that organizational performance is influenced by both external and internal contingency factors.

3.3.1 External contingent factors

In terms of external contingent factors, the particularistic perspective of Duncan's approach is anticipated in QIII (unstable environment and simple environmental complexity) but strongly expected in QIV (unstable environment and complex environmental complexity). Whereas a universalistic perspective is expected in both QI and QII given a stable environment and a mix of simple environmental complexity for QI and complex environmental complexity in QII. In order for the particularistic perspective to hold true when applied to the IC, it will be necessary to demonstrate that the IC's external contingent factors would be reflective of QIII or QIV characteristics. In keeping with

Tillotson, the identification of the external contingent factors entails an in-depth analysis and understanding of the IC's external environment both general and specific.

3.3.2 Internal contingent factors

Donaldson's approach to understanding internal contingent factors hinges on two groupings: task uncertainty and technology. His approach suggests that task uncertainty entails three considerations: type of management; efficiency, structure and innovation; and organization response to external pressures. Concerning the IC demonstrating a particularistic tendency in terms of the type of management, there is an expectation that the IC would be more organic and less mechanistic on how it is managed. This expectation assumes that an organic type of management is associated with an unstable environment and task uncertainty. On his second dimension to task uncertainty regarding efficiency and innovation, one can expect the IC to show signs of particularism if efficiency is not a significant concern for the IC. The expectation that the IC is less concerned has to do with its' goal of public safety and security. One can posit that achieving this goal is more important than efficiency if goal versus efficiency were the two factors to consider. In terms of innovation, it is expected that the introduction of new ideas or products would be driven by goal achievement rather than efficiency. The last consideration of Donaldson's task uncertainty consists of how various elements of an organization work together to achieve a common goal. A particularistic understanding of this consideration when applied to the IC would suggest a high degree of differentiation amongst the various entities that make up the IC, a high level of integration in light of the fact that each entity within the IC has a specific function, and significant entity interdependence with each other.


Donaldson's second group of internal contingent factors is technology. In one conceptualization of technology, the production line, its' particularistic perspective is associated with the process production. This association occurs because process production tends to be associated with continuous production and highly technical in nature which are different from small or mass production. The IC would need to demonstrate process production characteristics in order to illustrate its particularism. Secondly, technology when examined as a cognitive process in terms of the number of exceptions and task analyzes provides a second perspective in Donaldson's approach. A particularistic perspective on this notion of technology would be characterized by a high occurrence of exceptions and tasks that are not readily analyzed. Hence, a particularistic view of the IC would need to demonstrate similar characteristics. Lastly, Donaldson's approach explores how task interdependence between organizational sub-units will be impacted by the level of particularism. The greater an organization's particularistic nature is, the greater the need for task interdependence in order to ensure that the various parts of an organization work together to achieve its goal. Thus, if the IC is deemed particularistic it is anticipated that it will have a high level of task interdependence.

3.3.3 Fit

An essential element of fit is the link to performance. A basic premise of the contingency approach is that as fit between the organizational variables and the contingent factors increases so does performance. On the other hand, as fit decreases (misfit increases) between the organizational variables and the contingent factors performance also decreases. This understanding of fit and misfit suggests that performance is relational in nature. In addition, the greater the degree of particularism, it is expected that the more

difficult it will be for an organization to achieve fit. Also, once fit is achieved it is anticipated fit will not be sustainable over the long-term due to the constant environmental uncertainty and complexity as well as the organization’s internal contingent factors interacting with each other and the external environment. As an organization shifts from fit to misfit, there is an expectation that poor performance will require an organization to shift back to fit.

A graphical depiction that encapsulates external and internal contingent factors as well as fit and misfit regarding organization performance under a contingency theory construct vs a non-contingency approach is illustrated in Figure 4.



Source: Author (2023)

Figure 4 Organizational Performance under a Contingency Theory Approach

An instrument that is available to an organization’s management team that will allow them to understand, achieve and maintain fit (good performance) is performance management. Hence, it is important for an organization to have a particularistic performance management instrument to ensure that both its external and internal

contingent factors are reflected in its performance management instrument because under a contingency approach, contingent factors impact organizational variables and inevitably performance.


In contrast, a universalism-based performance management instrument, such as the MAF which is applicable to the majority of federal departments, fails to incorporate an organization's respective contingent factors and is less likely to increase an organization's ability to fully understand what is causing poor performance. Without an organization being able to understand what is causing poor performance, it is less likely that it can transition from misfit to fit. It is posited that MAF may not serve as an effective performance management instrument due to its shortcomings of failing to take into consideration an organization's particularities.

3.4 Summary

The purpose of this chapter was the development of a contingency approach to performance management, which will be applied to the case study. The proposed approach is particularistic in nature and draws upon Tillotson's (1980) notions of general and specific environment, Duncan's (1972) framework for understanding the external environment (external contingent factors) and Donaldson's (2001) approach for understanding the internal contingent factors. In order for an organization to be performing well, there needs to be a fit between these contingent factors of an organization. To assist an organization, management can utilize performance management to make sense of all of this. However, organizations should avoid universalism-based performance management instruments because they tend to fail to consider these contingent factors. It is posited that the more complex and uncertainty that these contingent factors create, the greater the need to avoid

one-size-fits all approaches to performance management. The following Chapter outlines the research design used to carry out the research.

Using Ongaro’s (2020) approach to the conceptualization of tools along the potentiality – actuality spectrum whereby actuality refers to practices, while at the other end, potentiality refers to utopias, Figure 4 captures the ‘current’ mapping of the ‘as is’ situation with respect to the research topic. In the chapters that follow, this ‘as is’ will be questioned through the application of the contingency approach to performance management.




Source: Author (2023)

Figure 5 Gamut of ‘As Is’ Research Topics from Potentiality to Actuality

CHAPTER 4: RESEARCH DESIGN

This chapter presents the research design employed in the pursuit of researching and writing this dissertation. A research design is, “a plan and the procedures for research that span the decisions from broad assumptions to detailed methods of data collection and analysis” (Creswell, 2009: 3). Its goal is to provide the foundation for answering the research questions and meeting the research objectives (Schwartz-Shea and Yanow, 2012). As well, a research design also entails, “identifying a professional field, understanding the “rules of the game”, through language, practices, and informal knowledge” (Salter, 2013a: 4). This is true when researching domains that are shrouded in secrecy such as the IC (Gonzalez, 2012).

Employing Creswell’s (2009) research design framework, the choices that a researcher has to make entail three elements: the philosophical worldview or epistemological paradigm, the strategy of inquiry or research methodology, and the research methods. On the last two elements, there appears to be confusing language in the literature with respect to what they are. For our purpose, research methodology is, “the strategy, plan of action, process or design lying behind the choice of and use of particular methods, and linking the choice and use of methods to the desired outcomes” (Crotty, 1998: 3). Research methods are, “the techniques or procedures used to gather and analyse data related to the same research question” (Crotty, 1998: 3). In addition, the research design includes challenges, limitations, and remedies as well as ethical considerations. An illustration of the research design is depicted in Figure 6. The sections that follow provide an in-depth explanation for each element.



Source: Author (2023)

Figure 6 Research Design

Establishing the specifics within this framework was influenced by several factors. For instance, the research questions and research objectives, the researcher’s personal experience, and the audiences in terms of epistemic communities – public administration and intelligence studies. The material covered in the chapter, is in part, to address observations made by scholars regarding the lack or clear explanation of research design in public administration scholarship (Jensen and Rodgers, 2001; Dodge, et.al. 2005) and the inadequacy of addressing potential research dilemmas (Mackenzie and Knipe, 2006). As well, although the research design is linear as presented in this chapter, the conduct of this research was anything but linear. Rather, the research was iterative, recursive, and adaptive (Schwartz-Shea and Yanow, 2012).

4.1 *Worldview - Pragmatism*

The philosophical worldview provides the, “basis for subsequent choices regarding methodology, methods, literature or research design” (Mackenzie and Knipe, 2006: 193). The lack of a clearly articulated paradigm in public administration research has been identified as an area of concern (Long, 1988; White, 1999; Riccucci, 2006). In response to this concern, this researcher explicitly identifies pragmatism as the epistemological foundation of this research. This epistemology rests on the works of Charles S. Peirce (1878, 1958, 1958b, 1958c), William James (1907, 1959), and John Dewey (1910/1991, 1916, 1920/1948, 1927/1954, 1929, 1938, 1954). Pragmatism is understood as:

...the philosophy of common sense. That uses purposeful human inquiry as a focal point. Inquiry is viewed as a continuing process which acknowledges the qualitative nature of human experience as problematic situations emerged and are recognized. Recognition involves the doubt associated with questioning existing belief systems. Doubt is resolved through critical reasoning and ultimately tested in action. Inquiry is not limited to individuals but often incorporates a community of inquirers (Shields, 1998: 197).

In the public administration literature, it is observed that there had been minimal references to pragmatism prior to the early 1990s. Since then, its usage has steadily increased and has been defended by many who argue that public administration as a field of study is founded on pragmatism (Shields, 1998, 2003, 2004, 2005, 2008; Millar and King, 1998; Evans, 2000; Garrison, 2000; Zanetti and Carr, 2000; Brom and Shields, 2006; Fox and Millar, 2006; Riccucci, 2006, 2010; Waldo, 2007).

Pragmatism is based on four key tenets that when taken in their totality makes it a suitable epistemological approach for public administration research (Shields, 1998). The first tenet is the irrelevance of dualism (Joas, 1993; Zanetti and Carr, 2000) such as the false dichotomy of theory and practice (Evans, 2000; Shields 2004; Fox and Millar, 2006)

or facts and values (Snider 1997; Millar and King, 1998). In this research, for instance, the dichotomy between the theory and the practical application of the intelligence cycle.

The second tenet is that of moving from doubt to belief (Brom and Shields, 2006; Kuravilla and Dorstewitz, 2010). Within practical public administration, it should not come as a surprise that public administrators are continuously seeking to improve their domain given that public administration has historically been problem oriented (Allison, 1979; Ricucci, 2006). When practices are adopted and they work, we move from doubt to belief. A proponent of practice goes as far as stating that, “the only person who can judge whether a theory has anything to say to an ongoing practice is the practitioner, who has both the theory and practice at hand (Hummel, 1997: 375). In this research, if particularism is demonstrated to be well suited for the IC than particularism would move from doubt to belief.

The third tenet is the argument that there is no big "T" truth but only small "t" truth because there is no foundation for an individual taking a stand on certainty (Dobuzinskis, 1997; Hickman, 2004). This is even more so given that producers of knowledge have their own style, cultural traditions and education. Since truth is fallible (Kuravilla and Dorstewitz, 2010), there is no concern about finding absolutes (Evans, 2005). Rather, the goal is one of ameliorating a problematic situation (Frankel, 1977; Garrison, 2000; Stolcis, 2004). As well, the role of science is valued for its capacity of organizing inquiry and scientific attitude, learning from failure, and an ability to put judgements on hold and to listen to all who want to contribute to an in inquiry. Thus, science is employed as a means of understanding an issue from different perspectives (Garrison, 2000; Bogason, 2005; Ricucci, 2006). In this research, suspending universalism as the only ‘Truth’ to

performance management and exploring pragmatism as an alternative ‘truth’ exemplifies this tenet.

However, the idea of competing perspectives can raise issues of incommensurability, leading to potential barriers in advancing knowledge (Weaver and Gioia, 1994, Gerring, 2001; Fox and Millar, 2006). Pragmatism's response to the issue of incommensurability is twofold: first, what is the practical implication of the incommensurability; and second, let the different perspectives be judged within a community of inquiry. The nature of this research is to contribute towards ameliorating the current situation concerning performance management and its application in the intelligence domain. Given the concern with performance of the IC noted in both the literature and the real world, this research nicely fits into the pragmatic paradigm where the research follows an identified problem. This is consistent with the observation that, “For all the emphasis placed upon scientific management as a means of administrative verification, actual efforts at administrative reform remain distinctly pragmatic” (McCurdy and Rosenbloom, 2006: 210).

The fourth tenet is with respect to the means by which one arrives at a truth. The means at arriving at a truth is through the inquiry process based on the idea of a community of inquiry that utilizes a systematic scientific method (Dewey, 1938; Peirce, 1958; Brom and Shields, 2006). Consequentially, a community of inquiry entails bringing together various disciplines, thus making an inquiry a cross-disciplinary exercise (Putnam, 2010). This research used knowledge originating from various disciplines and sources such as literature, interviews, and experiential knowledge. As well, this research’s community

consisted of the thesis committee, other scholars and doctoral students, and professional colleagues.

In a nutshell, this researcher's preference for pragmatism is primarily its focus on problematic situations, allowing the inclusion of the lived experiences of practicing public administrators. In doing so ensures that the researcher does not isolate from practice, "the "how" of public administration" (Elías, 2021:67). Moreover, the pragmatist approach views, "human beings as participants and experimenters in a community of inquiry, breaking the Cartesian tradition that sees humans as "spectators" discovering foundations and then deriving more complex knowledge from these foundations" (Wolfe, 2012: 2).

4.2 Strategy of Inquiry – Qualitative (Interpretive) Research

This research's strategy of inquiry is based on a qualitative (interpretive) research design. Given the multitude ways of defining qualitative (interpretive) research, the following is adopted:

Qualitative research is a situated activity that locates the observer in the world. It consists of a set of interpretive, material practices that makes the world visible. These practices transform the world. They turn the world into a series of representations, including field notes, interviews, conversations, photographs, recordings, and memos to the self. At this level, qualitative research involves an interpretive, naturalistic approach to the world. This means that qualitative researchers study things in their natural settings, attempting to make sense of, or to interpret, phenomena in terms of the meanings people bring to them (Denzin & Lincoln, 2005: 3).

This strategy of inquiry was selected because of its attraction on findings ways to get a more complete understanding of some complex aspects by seeking context-specific meaning rather than seeking generalized abstraction from particular contexts (Schwartz-Shea and Yanow, 2012), nor attempt to quantitatively test a hypothesis from this abstraction (White, 1999). In addition, public administration, as an applied social science

and practice (McCracken, 1988; White, 1999; Higgs and Cherry, 2009), allows a researcher to meaningfully engage with practitioners when searching for knowledge (Luton, 2010). Furthermore, the research problem is favorable to this type of strategy of inquiry given the exploratory nature of the research in the form of a ‘what’-type research question (Wolcott, 1994). As well, given that one of the research objectives is to increase our *verstehen*, a qualitative approach is well positioned to achieve this (Hodges, 1944 and Weber, 1962). Last, with interpretive’s focus on context, there is a natural affinity to contingency theory.

This research meets many of Creswell’s (2009) characteristics associated with the qualitative research strategy of inquiry. First, there is a sense of natural setting in that interviews were carried out in the interviewees’ own environment. Second, the researcher is a key instrument implying that the researcher reviewed documents, conducted the interviews and developed the interview guide. Third, the research depended on multiple sources of data whereby the researcher made sense of the data and provided their interpretation of its meaning. Fourth, the research followed an abductive process, switching between the inductive and deductive. Fifth, the research was emergent i.e., as new knowledge and understanding was acquired; it forced changes in thinking about the research topic. Sixth, given the researcher’s interests in this topic as well as being a practitioner in the area of study for the past two decades, the research was impacted by this experience with respect to how the literature and data was interpreted. Last, the very nature of the research problem dealt with a complex issue. In short: a qualitative (interpretive) research strategy allows a researcher to be critical in their analysis of the phenomena being examined that can lead to the discovery of new information. Yet, this strategy of inquiry,

“falls short in its power to generalize and predict, as well as to establish cause-and-effect relationship. However, this is not what interpretivism aims to achieve” (Elías, 2021: 71).

It is abundantly clear that the researcher has a critical role in qualitative (interpretive) research. Hence, it is of utmost importance for a researcher to clarify and being open about their role in order to make their research credible (Unluer, 2012). The aim should not be to push a researcher to the background, but to the foreground, because the researcher is not merely a bystander in the research process. Rather, the researcher has a unique role given that the, “researcher himself, or herself, is the key ‘instrument’” (Wellington and Szczerbinski, 2007) who makes sense and provides context to the data (Truzzi, 1974; Behn, 1993), and has a central role in the theorizing process (Swedberg, 2014). That is to say, “the fact that theorizing will only be successful if one delves into one’s own self and experience. You have to know theory to theorize, but to theorize well you also need to relate it to it in a personal way” (Swedberg, 2014: 2). Thus, it is not possible to achieve the intent of qualitative (interpretive) research without utilizing one’s own experience, imagination, and intellect (Miles, 1979). This means that research is not void of the researcher’s personal values as this is an unrealistic expectation (Waldo, 1952; Hodgetts, 1997; Dwivedi and Gow, 1999; Gow and Wilson, 2014).

Given the central role held by the researcher, Yanow (2009) eloquently asks a simple question that needs to be addressed, “Where are *you*, Dear Author, in this research project?” The question is posed because:

The more readers know about researcher’s role, the circumstances under which they chose or acquired or developed the (truth claims), and advantages or problems presented by a situational role, the better able readers are able to evaluate evidence and truth claims (Yanow, 2009: 287).

Given the emphasis on interpretation, it is important that ‘I’, as the researcher, identify my positionality (Schwartz-Shea and Yanow, 2012) and explicitly identify potential implications for the research, which amounts to a ‘personal statement’ (Morse and McEvoy, 2014). This statement goes beyond the, “ritual incantation of the identities occupied by the author with little or no attempt to reflect on the significance of those positions for the research” (Gill, 1998: 32). The personal statement contributes to the credibility of this research in terms of the researcher’s interpretive voice and provides context to the reader on the researcher’s sense making throughout the research process (Patton, 2002; Schwartz-Shea, 2012). Furthermore, it is a simple acknowledgement that, “no one can claim to be free of all bias, it becomes important to work actively at putting on the table, as much as one can, as many as possible of the assumptions with which one is operating, and to put a premium on exposing the assumptions one is usually not aware of” (Paquet, 2009: 7).

I come into this research project wearing simultaneous hats. The wearing of these hats has allowed me to play the role of a *bricoleur* (Denzin and Lincoln, 2003). As a *bricoleur*, I have been able to bring together various perspectives and formulating a coherent picture by working through the, “complexity of meaning-making processes and the contradictions of the lived world” (Rogers, 2012: 4). I now discuss my hats.

First, I have been working in Canada’s federal public service for over two decades with a large segment of those years working and managing the performance management function at various organizational levels in several different departments and agencies. This has included Correctional Service of Canada, National Research Council, Department of National Defence, Defence Research and Development Canada, Natural Resources

Canada, and recently in a directors' capacity at the Public Health Agency of Canada, which included being the interim Head of Performance Measurement⁸ and responsible for coordinating the agency's response to TBS MAF assessment round. At the time of this writing, I am the senior policy advisor at the Treasury Board Secretariat responsible for leading the review of the Treasury Board Policy on Results. As well, I have and continue to work in the security and intelligence-related entities, including having managed a departmental intelligence program. This work experience is similar to a qualitative researcher being immersed in an organization being studied as, "a best way to understand what is going on...and experience what it is like to be part of it" (Krauss, 2005: 759-60)⁹. There are several advantages as well as disadvantages with this closeness. We begin with the advantages.

My experience has allowed me to get close to the subject of my research. In keeping with Fenno's (1990) idea of political scientists wanting to collect data on politicians through repeated interaction, this experience has allowed me to repeatedly collect data about public administrators' daily work; allowing me to acquire valuable inside knowledge and insights that may not be typically available to the non-practitioner. Kernaghan (2009) and Paquet (2009) have made a similar observation on the benefit of inside knowledge. Hence, there is support to the argument that practitioner knowledge or experiential knowledge is a valid form of knowledge production and accumulation to that

⁸ Under the Treasury Board Policy on Results, the Head of Performance Measurement is appointed by the Deputy Head and is responsible for establishing, implementing and maintaining a Program Inventory and overseeing Performance Information Profiles, and who demonstrates in his or her work the competencies set by the Secretary of the Treasury Board of Canada (TBS, 2016b).

⁹ A researcher working in the community under examination can be deemed a participant observer. However, I do not meet Yeager's (2007) expected roles of an observer, nor Martin's (1974) expectation of working in the community for the purpose of studying it.

of scholars (Hummel, 1991; Shotter, 1993); this knowledge can make it more socially useful than purely academic knowledge (Paquet, 2009).

Working in the federal public service also means that I am bounded by legislation such as the *Security of Information Act* (Justice Canada, 2019) and policies such as the *Policy on Government Security* (TBS, 2019c) and the *Policy on Communications and Federal Identity* (TBS, 2016a). I do not see this as a limitation but rather an accepted reality of a practitioner conducting research. The alternative is that public administration as a field of study foregoes insider knowledge and perspective.

Furthermore, I have approached my role and responsibility of a public administrator with a scholarly thrust, meaning that I have used scholarly literature to inform and advance my understanding of performance management for practical application. This approach has been described by some as ‘practitioner research’ (Wellington and Szczerbinski, 2000) or ‘reflexive dialogical action research’ (Ripamonti, et.al., 2016). My closeness to the research topic could be perceived as insider research (Naples, 2003; Loxley and Seery, 2008) meaning that I have been able to reflect and question my own practice (Ripamonti, et.al., 2016). A key element of carrying a practitioner researcher label is maintaining my currency with the literature. As well, my scholarly thrust comes from my previous graduate studies in public administration/public policy and war studies, presenting at several peer-reviewed conferences on topics related to this research¹⁰, and served as referee for peer-reviewed manuscripts.

The cumulative advantages are grouped into two broad categories: knowledge and conducting the research. On the first account, I did not begin the research with a blank

¹⁰ Faragone, 2009, 2012a, 2012b, 2013, 2016, 2019a, 2019b, 2021.

cognitive slate (Cetina, 2014), as I had pre-existing theoretical and practical knowledge of the subject matter and environment (Bell, 2005; Swedberg, 2014). Also, I understood the historical and practical reality of the IC domain, allowing one to conceptualize from the inside (Chavez, 2008). This amounts to me having ‘tacit knowledge’ (Polanyi, 1966) on the research topic. However, it is recognized that often knowing tacitly encounters considerable opposition in traditional academic circles, in that it will never be accepted or achieve the same level of acceptance as academically acquired knowledge (Paquet, 2009). For the second group, I was able to understand and provide context to bureaucratic practices (Salter, 2013c), being less surprised by the bureaucratic culture (Aguiler, 1981), being able to ask appropriate questions and read non-verbal communication during the interviews (Merriam, et.al., 2001), gaining easier access to bureaucrats (Merriam, et. al., 2001), and navigating secrecy and building a rapport with the interviewees (Schwartz-Shea and Yanow, 2012). This last advantage is critical given that conducting field research in security organizations can be difficult (Salter, 2013c, Coulthart, et.al., 2019).

Being an insider has provided me a strategy to enter the field in terms of suitability, feasibility, and suitable tactics (Schatzman and Strauss, 1973). As well, I have been able to bridge the ‘struggles for connectedness’ between the worlds of academia and practitioner (Newland, 2000). Given the current situation where the social sciences and its disciplinary construct is limiting the ability of useful knowledge transfer from academia to the real world, which Paquet (2009) equates to that of ‘mental prisons’. I see the bridging the gap as a positive attribute given that in Canada there are limited examples of public administration scholarly work being undertaken by practitioners or minimal levels of appreciation between these two solitudes (Good, 2003; Kernaghan, 2009; Gow and Wilson,

2014). This gap is even more pronounced within Canadian intelligence studies. It is interesting to note that the same lack of intermingling between the world of academia and practitioners is less pronounced in other countries (Eyal, 2002).

On the other side of the closeness ledger, there are potential disadvantages that are acknowledged and addressed. The literature identifies the potentiality of being subjective, which can impact objectivity and analysis (Aguiler, 1981; DeLyser, 2001), the risk of being inherently biased (Van Heugten, 2004), inadvertently gaining access to confidential information (Bell, 2005), and the inability to escape one's own knowledge and the limits of what is tacitly available to oneself (Turner, 2014). Given these potential pitfalls, there is a need to create some sense of distance through various techniques (McCracken, 1988).

Potential pitfalls associated with objectivity and analysis were addressed by employing the techniques of triangulation (Denzin, 1984), peer debriefing (Guba, 1981), interviewing oneself and speaking with others (Van Heugten, 2004), and the utilization of a thick description (Geertz, 1973; Guba, 1981). A thick description is necessary when employing a contingency approach because it is important to understand the particular context of the phenomena under examination. Only by truly understanding the contingent factors is one able to fully appreciate the nuances of the case study. This ensures that the reader is vicariously brought into the context being described (Erlandson, et.al., 1993). Also, a thick description provides the essential basis for the transferability of knowledge when an interpretive approach is used.

In addition to the above, in mitigating potential disadvantages, this research embodies both reflectivity and reflexivity that when combined together hopefully helped me avoid the trap of accepting basic assumptions that both researchers and practitioners

sometimes take for granted over time. Reflectivity is understood as thinking critically about the research process, how it was done and why, and how it could have been improved (Wellington and Szczerbinski, 2007). Reflexivity is understood as the self-questioning towards what might be taken for granted with respect to what is being said and not said and considering the impacts this has or might have (Cunliffe, 2016). There is an acknowledgement that we shape and make meaning about our world from within, as suggested by Ripamonti, et.al. (2016). The shaping and the making of meaning are influenced by a variety of factors such as, “gender, ethnicity, class, nationality, language, socio-cultural background, and beliefs and values” (Kunz, 2013: 64). Reflexivity when superimposed on the public administration landscape enables one to reconsider the rationalistic presuppositions of public administration (Cunliffe and Jun, 2005) and enhances one’s awareness to the scope and limitations of explaining organizational phenomena (Tuckermann and Rüegg-Stürm, 2010). My effort at reflectivity and reflexivity is demonstrated, in part, by having an extensive documented research design as recommended by Greene (2014); with an emphasis on the role of the researcher (Wellington and Szczerbinski, 2007). This makes the research as transparent as possible to the reader (Schwartz-Shea and Yanow, 2012).

Overall, I agree with Talbot (2010), that the opportunity to explore performance management from both as an insider (practitioner) and as an outsider (researcher) is a positive attribute given that public administration is an applied field and this mixed experience contributes towards keeping the theoretical grounded to the real world.

4.3 Research Methods

This section discusses the research methods used, in particularly case study and case selection and data collection methods. For the purpose of this research, data collection and data analysis have been split in their presentation. It is acknowledged that within a qualitative (interpretive) research strategy, data collection and data analysis quite often occurs concurrently. This is in contrast to a quantitative research design where data collection and data analysis are distinct research processes (Schwartz-Shea and Yanow, 2012).

4.3.1 Case Study and Case Selection

A case study is a, "research strategy which focuses on the in-depth, holistic and in-context study of one or more cases will typically use multiple sources of data" (Punch, 2005: 289). Within public administration, the aim of the case study is to, "illuminate a decision or set of decisions and to understand why they were taken, and how they were implemented and with what results" (McNabb, 2010: xvii). A case study is excellent is assisting us, "understand practical situations with their own intricacies" (Elías, 2021: 77); allowing one to fill in the space between knowledge and its use in a given situation (Flyvberg, 2001). By focusing on a single case, the researcher seeks to discover the interaction of important factors characteristic of the phenomena (Merriam, 1998) that are complex and situated (Stake, 1995, 2006). However, what is gained in detail and richness results in a loss of generalizability (Jensen and Rodgers, 2001).

Case study selection is both instrumental and intrinsic. For the former, it is based on five reasons. First, to obtain a better understanding of a specific issue, in this instance it is performance management. Second, Ranstrop (2007) notes that given the complexity

of intelligence, the case study approach is essential. Third, the IC is distinct when compared to other government domains, thus a case study allows exploring this distinctiveness. Fourth, the case study should have value to both scholars and practitioners (Bailey, 1994). The former is applicable to public administration and intelligence studies scholars and the latter federal public service, including the IC. Fifth, I had access to research participants, which is an important consideration when the research objective is to enhance our understanding of a phenomenon (Schwartz-Shea and Yanow, 2012). In terms of being an intrinsic case study, I have an interest in the IC both from a scholarly and practitioner for reasons already outlined earlier.

4.3.2 Data Collection Methods

This research relies on a mixed method or methodological pragmatism (Schatzman and Strauss, 1973), using both unobtrusive and obtrusive methods of data collection. In simple terms, the unobtrusive method does not require direct elicitation of data from research subjects, while the obtrusive method requires direct elicitation (Lee, 2000). Unobtrusive method employed in this research is content analysis of documents, while interviews or field research represents the obtrusive method. A reason for employing different methods is to ensure the triangulation of the data collected (Yin, 2009). Triangulation is mainly a process of repetitious data collection and reassessment of what is being said in order to reduce misperceptions and the validity of a research's conclusions contributes to increasing the credibility of the research (Stake, 1995, 2006). In other words, "the same area of study is examined from more than one vantage point" (Wellington and Szczerbinski, 2007: 224). Although, we are reminded that, "the important feature of triangulation is not the simple combination of different kinds of data, but the attempt to

relate them so as to counteract the threats to validity in each” (Fielding and Fielding, 1986: 31).

4.3.2.1 Content analysis of documents

Documents are understood as the physical traces of social settings (Webb, et.al., 2000). As such, a document encompasses everything from an academic piece of scholarship such as a book or article to government records. As well, publicly available course syllabuses were used to assist in identifying the applicable literature. Content analysis is, “any technique for making inferences by objectivity and systematically identifying specific characteristics of messages” (Holsti, 1969: 14). This technique can be either qualitative (interpretative) or quantitative (numeric) (Schwandt, 1997). For this research, the qualitative approach was employed, allowing for the discovery of meaning for a phenomenon in a particular context (Von Wright, 1971). Furthermore, this method was used to assist in further understanding the research problem, answering the research questions and developing the interview guide. A specific outcome of this method was reviewing the literature, which is, “a systematic, explicit, and reproducible method for identifying, evaluating, and interpreting the existing body of recorded work produced by researchers, scholars, and practitioners” (Fink, 1998: 3). The reviewed literature consisted of several bodies of knowledge, namely; public sector reform and NPM, performance and performance management, organizational theory and contingency theory, intelligence, and research design with a focus on qualitative (interpretative) research.

It is noted that examined documents, “do not have a single, objective, inner, essential meaning. Its meaning depends on the intentions of the author(s) and the perspectives of the reader...searching for meaning, therefore...is a matter of interpretation”

(Wellington and Szczerbinski, 2007: 111). For example, when examining documents, I looked for their con-text, pre-text, sub-text, and inter-text (Usher, 1996). These four lenses greatly assisted in getting a better understanding of a document. As well, when reading the public sector-based literature, one needed to be careful because author(s) have interests, unspoken assumptions, in some instance academics also work in consultancy and advice roles to governments, and the reality that academics belong to competing and methodological camps (Pollitt and Bouckaert, 2011). Another body of knowledge that required paying particular attention to was the intelligence literature due to the particular challenges associated with this literature. For instance, the relationship between the writer and whether or not they have access to inside knowledge and the purpose behind their writing given that many documents are about how the IC gets things wrong and here is ‘the solution’ (Farson, 1989). In short, I did not take for granted that what the document reports is firm evidence (Coffey, 2014) or the ultimate authority (Tacheva, 2016).

4.3.2.2 Interviews

An interview is, "a conversation, the art of asking questions and listening" (Denzin and Lincoln, 2003: 48). A key reason for using interviews was to gain a different perspective and understanding that may not necessarily be available through other data collection methods such as documents (deMarrais, 2004; Glesne, 2006). In studying government and its administration, interviewing practitioners (officials) is a critical research method (Jiwani and Krawchenko, 2014). This criticality is enforced by Kernaghan’s (2009) observation that practitioners have knowledge that is not available to non-practitioner. As well, to better understand how and why practitioners behave a certain way, one must see the world through their eyes (Hecllo and Wildavsky, 1974).

Furthermore, interviews were employed to capture intentions, or the tacit knowledge of a practice (Salter, 2013b), in this case performance management and MAF. It is recognized that tacit knowledge is very unlikely to find its way into official government documents for a variety of political and bureaucratic reasons; at times known as the ‘public sector’s backstage’ (Brower, Abolafia, and Carr, 2000). Overall, practitioners’ stories are central to, “mean-making and re-interpreting the relationship among actors, events, and *contexts*” (Ripamonti, et.al., 2016: 56); allowing one to appreciate the informal institutions found within the bureaucracy (Helmke and Levitsky, 2004). Hence, interviews enabled one to obtain an insider’s perspective on the implementation of MAF within an interviewee’s respective organization. To be clear, the purpose of the interviews was to enrich the analysis and discussion of the data obtained via the literature and informed by experiential knowledge. Without the interviewees, the conduct of the research remained feasible, but its outcome less nuanced and interesting. Given the vastness of the IC, covered with the secrecy blanket, there is a need to set realistic expectations of what interviews were able to reveal. Thus, interviews might only provide a limited perspective into the world of intelligence (Van Puyvelde, 2019). This might probably explanation why only 15% of articles published in the intelligence studies flagship journal *Intelligence and National Security* between 1986 to 2016 referred to interviews; whilst a vast majority of social science research is interview dependent (Van Puyvelde, 2019).

Given the research objectives, a semi structured interview approach was used. This approach allowed me to, “purposefully pursue understanding (information and meaning), using predetermine of questions, improvisational probes, and responsive follow-up questions” (Luton, 2010: 23). The key elements of a semi-structured interview are the

interactional exchange of dialogue, a topic centered approach where the researcher has topics that they want to examine in a fluid and flexible manner, and the notion that knowledge is situated and contextual (Mason, 2002). The semi-structured interview was based on an interview guide, an example is found in Appendix A. The development of the guide and conduct of the interviews generally followed four stages: brainstorming, classifying and categorizing, interview guide, and interview schedule (Wellington and Szczerbinski, 2007).

In terms of the reliability of the interview guide, several steps noted in the literature were taken to strengthen its reliability and forming the basis of the interview protocol (Jacob and Furgerson, 2012; Castillo-Montoya, 2016). For instance, the alignment of the interview questions with the research questions and research objectives. This process was beneficial in three ways. First, it assisted with identifying gaps. Second, it aided with ensuring a balanced mix of interview questions to the research questions. Third, it helped with the ordering of the questions to ensure that the interview started with introductory questions before proceeding with key questions. Another step was ensuring that the interview questions were written in the language of the interviews. As well, the interview guide was piloted by two former members of the IC who held executive level positions. As a result of piloting, minor adjustments were made to the original interview guide.

Sampling for the interviews was purposeful or nonprobability because the research objectives do not require probability sampling. In terms of purposeful sampling strategies, the literature does not lack suggestions. For instance, Patton (2002) offers 16 different approaches. From this vast literature, this researcher selected elite interviews, which is a, “central tool in the study of intelligence and security services, not least because intelligence

is create by, and for the policy-forming and decision making elites of the national government (Davies, 2001: 76).

The elites consisted of senior officials who operate within the confines of the *Security of Information Act* (2019) and Treasury Board policies such as the Policy on Government Security (TBS, 2019c) and the *Policy on Communications and Federal Identity* (TBS, 2016a). I was cognizant that there was the possibility that elite interviews, given the positions that they occupy within the bureaucracy, would have provided me with responses along ‘official lines’. However, the interviewees were surprisingly fairly frank and I did not detect any significant ‘official line’ responses.

The literature is not in a position to agree upon as to what constitutes a ‘right’ sample size (Edwards and Holland, 2013); with the most reasonable advice being ‘it depends’ (Mason, 2010; Baker and Edwards, 2012). The ‘it depends’ for this research was the number of departments that fit the definition of the IC. Invitations were sent to senior officials in ten departments resulting in five interviews.

I paid particular attention to the timings of when to conduct interviews to ensure access and successful interview. Originally, I was considering conducting the interviews in the fall of 2015. However, I decided to defer my interviews because the government in power was not very receptive to being open in providing information to Canadians (Nature, 2016), in which I would include graduate students. As reported in the media and through personal observations, the bureaucracy was less than enthusiastic about being open as they were fully aware of the potential risks to their personal careers. As well, the fall of 2015 was when the federal general election was held. During election periods, the bureaucracy is terribly busy with preparing transitional material, which would have been another

potential obstacle to gaining access. After the election, which resulted in a change of government, I decided to further deter the interviews. This was because officials would have been very preoccupied with working on the new government's agenda priorities; meaning that I would have had limited success with gaining access. As well, my sense was that it would have taken some time for officials to gauge how much new openness was being allowed by the new government. A similar point was made by a former National Security Advisor at a conference in 2016. Cumulatively, given the above potential constraints, I decided to defer my interviews until spring 2017.

Elite interviewees were solicited with an introduction letter to an organization's senior management (ADM level). The introduction letter outlined the general purpose of the research and the type of research assistance being sought. A sample letter sent via e-mail is found in Appendix B. It was written with the intent that the letter would be 'pushed down' into the organization for advice and recommendation to senior management as to whether or not I should be given access for an interview. Surprisingly, the recipients of my introductory letter were actually those who were interviewed.

To increase the possibility of being positively received by the interviewees, efforts were made to ensure that I as the researcher paid attention to the 'presentation of self' (Schwartz-Shea and Yanow, 2012), in particularly my nonverbal communication. For instance, interviews were conducted wearing a conservative looking jacket and tie and using a working professional looking bag to carry my interview research material which is typical of the IC 'dress code'. As opposed to a more casual student wear using a backpack. As an observation, given my positive experience with the interview participants, I would question Pal and Clark's (2013) ascertain that senior officials would only participate in

interviews with researchers that have an equal status to people like themselves and that senior officials would not engage graduate students.

All interviews were kept within a one hour period¹¹ and conducted in person at their work location, which is, “considered the most valid form of data collection during the interview process” (Morse and McEvoy, 2014: 6). In view of the nature of the case study, interviewees were offered non-attribution; all opted in for non-attribution. As well, interviews were not recorded because of work location security requirements. Following the suggestion that the selection of the transcription method is driven by the purpose of the research project (Kowal and O’Connell, 2014), I did not verbatim transcribe the interviews. This decision was based on four considerations: coding is not conducive to ‘how’ questions, did not use a quantitative approach to content analysis, time, and lack of financial resource for transcription. Instead, notes based on key points were used to document the interviews.

To sum up: the interviews covered off three essential considerations – the what, why, and how of interviews (Kvale, 1996). The ‘what’ was with respect to the research topic, the application of performance management, specifically the MAF within in the IC. The ‘why’ is with respect to increasing our understanding of the research topic because of the interviewees’ position as elites. The ‘how’ as detailed in this section.

¹¹ One hour is a significant amount of time in a senior official’s daily schedule. For a better appreciation, meetings between DM and ADM’s usually last about 30 minutes and their schedules are booked weeks in advance.

4.4 Data Analysis

Data analysis is a critical phase in qualitative research (Flick, 2014). However, despite its importance, the literature cannot agree on what it exactly constitutes (Maxwell and Chmiel, 2014). For this research, data analysis is understood as an, “essential stepping-stone toward both gathering data and linking one’s findings with higher order concepts” (van den Hoonaard and van den Hoonaard, 2008: 187). The aim of data analysis is to describe a subject in detail, to explain the subject, and to theorize about the subject (Flick, 2014).

The literature identifies many prescriptive accounts for conducting data analysis (Maxwell and Chmiel, 2014a). I adopted an analytical process that is best described using Glasner’s (1998) ‘just do it’, along an interpretive approach based on my knowledge and understanding, using Wellington and Szczerbinski’s (2007) stages of data analysis. The stages being immersing oneself with the data, reflecting on the data by stepping back and allowing the data to speak, taking the data apart in order to analyze it which depends on the researcher’s judgement, recombining or synthesizing data by looking for patterns, themes and regularities as well as things that do not fit into the picture, relating and locating the data in relation to the existing knowledge base, knowing when to stop when a saturation point has been found, and presenting the data in a written format.

4.5 Challenges, Limitations, and Remedies

Every research design has challenges and limitations; this research is no different. In keeping with Flick’s (2007) notion of a ‘method-appropriate criteria’, it is more fitting to examine issues of challenges and limitations through a qualitative perspective than those of a quantitative persuasion (Creswell, 2009). Consequentially, the challenges and

limitations of this research or its trustworthiness are fourfold: credibility, transferability, dependability, and conformability (Lincoln and Guba, 1985). In addition, given the IC as the case study, there is the additional challenge of speaking across two epistemic communities: public administration and intelligence studies. Collectively, overcoming research challenges and limitations results in being able to tell a ‘good story’ (White, 1999).

4.5.1 Credibility

Credibility is the confidence in the truth value of the data and interpretations of them (Lincoln and Guba, 1985). There were several ways that credibility can be potentially challenged and limited. First, as a public administration practitioner, I inherently brought in interpretations partially based on this practitioner’s mindset. Being vigilant through self-reflection about my own bias assisted with mitigating this issue. Albeit, one accepts the reality that mitigating bias is not completely possible. Second, my familiarity with bureaucracy assisted in reducing potential cultural and organizational barriers in gaining access to officials. Particular attention was paid to ensure that the research did not take on the role of advocacy during or after the interviews (LeCompte and Preissle, 2003). Third, Strauss and Corbin (1998) warn that analyzing qualitative data can be challenging. This warning was well appreciated given the nature of this research, which involved a large amount of data from various disciplines and sources. Much effort went into remaining focused and avoided going outside the scope of the research questions and objectives. Finally, triangulation, understood as a process of bringing different perspectives to bear was utilized (Stake 2005; Merriam. 1998; Yin, 2009). This method was employed to ensure to the greatest extent possible that the most complete knowledge was used. Denzin (1984) identifies several different protocols for triangulation. The protocols that I used

were data source triangulation (making use of the literature, records and documents, and interviews), theory triangulation (employing reviewers with different theoretical viewpoints), and methodological triangulation (utilizing obtrusive and unobtrusive methods). However, it is readily acknowledged that triangulation will not always lead to a common destination. Rather, it can denote areas of divergence that in itself contributes to the research topic (Hammersley and Atkinson, 1983; Silverman, 1993).

4.5.2 Transferability

Transferability is concerned with generalizations (Lincoln and Guba, 1985). This is especially true with case studies that by their very nature are difficult to generalize (Jensen and Rodgers, 2001).¹² There are two major approaches to address issues associated with transferability. The first is providing a ‘thick description’ (Geertz, 1973; Wolcott, 1994) and second, collecting data from as many of its observable implications as possible (King, Keohane, and Verba, 1994). Both of these were utilized in the conduct of this research. Specifically, the research provides sufficient information and context that would allow a reader to judge as to whether or not there exists sufficient justification for being able to transfer the findings of this case study to other potential cases. Regardless, at the end of the day, “it is for the reader to make the connections to other similar contexts, to judge the ‘degree of “fit” ” (Rapley, 2014: 52).

¹² Jensen and Rodgers (2001), argue that the critics on the utilization of public administration case studies (Adams and White, 1994; McCurdy and Cleary, 1984) is inappropriate because of the inappropriate indicators of quality being used. Jensen and Rogers note that all of the 51 studies found in the *Classics of Public Administration* (Shafritz and Hyde, 1992) would fail if assessed against the critics’ quality expectations.

4.5.3 Dependability

Lincoln and Guba (1985) state that dependability refers to the research process as being logical, traceable, and documented. Similarly, King, Keohane, and Verba (1994) suggest that data quality is ensured by recording and reporting the process employed in generating the data. The research process and instruments were detailed throughout this chapter.

4.5.4 Conformability

Conformability is ensuring that the data and its interpretations by the researcher are grounded and not imagined (Lincoln and Guba, 1985). An approach used for increasing conformability was engaging in a dialogue through the semi-structured interviews. Another approach was peer engagement consisting of thesis committee members, fellow doctoral students, colleagues from work, feedback from presentations made at scholarly peer-reviewed conferences, and review of this manuscript by friends working in the fields of intelligence and public administration, and scholarly colleagues in both fields. The literature also identified another commonly used approach associated with qualitative research -- member checking (Stake 1995) or participant feedback (Lincoln and Guba, 1985). This involves providing drafts of the research to those who were interviewed for purpose of ensuring that their input has been appropriately reflected. This approach was not used because of the interviewees' limited availability.

4.5.5 Speaking Across Epistemic Communities

This research is disciplinarily housed in public administration, whilst the case study resides in intelligence studies. This creates a situation whereby the research overlaps at least two major epistemic communities whereby each having their own distinct

expectations. The reference to at least ‘two’ is conscientiously used because even within these two communities there are multiple sub-epistemic communities. For simplicity, we maintain the notion of two communities. This leads to the challenge of ‘speaking across epistemic communities’ (Schwartz-Shea and Yanow, 2012, Ch.8). To minimize potential friction, the public administration aspect of the research was reviewed by the public administration dissertation committee. Whilst, various aspects of this research’s case study were presented at intelligence studies peer-reviewed conferences. As well, a review was conducted by colleagues, that included both practitioners and scholars covering public administration and intelligence studies.

4.6 Ethical Considerations

There are two aspects of ethical considerations encapsulated in this research. The first consideration was ensuring that the research was conducted in accordance with the University of Ottawa’s ethical guidelines and applicable code of conduct (ethics review #05-16-04). This covered research governance that is meant to:

Safeguard research participants’ interests and rights, protect researchers from allegations of bad practice by providing a clear framework for them to work within and promote and enhance research quality. Systems of research governance have the merit on ensuring that researchers undertake a full and reflexive consideration of the process of conducting research, thinking through the implications of their plans and practice (Edwards and Holland, 2013: 24).

I did not experience any negative experience from the University’s ethics review process. However, I do agree with Schwartz-Shaw and Yanow’s (2012) comment that data archiving, as required by most University ethics bodies, does not make sense for interpretive research because replicability is not a research objective, and the notes relate

to a specific moment. Notwithstanding, the University's requirement on these matters were and will be respected.

In addition to the research governance laid out by the university, Schwartz-Shea and Yanow (2012) reminds us that meeting the requirements of an institutional ethical review board is not the same as engaging with ethical issues. The aspect of ethical issues are, "reembedded in the practices, politics, and presentation of research results" (Lincoln and Denzin, 2003: 5). Overall, potential ethical considerations were identified and mitigated throughout the planning, conduct and reporting of the research results. For instance, research is quite often influenced by institutional considerations such as research funding and career (Schatzman and Strauss, 1973). This research did not receive any funding assistance and therefore not an ethical consideration. As a public servant, this research was not influenced by career considerations because obtaining a PhD has no direct bearing on advancement in the federal public service. An institutional factor that did influence this research was my dissertation committee's advice and recommendations, which shaped the development and final written product. As well, no Wikileaks information was used, in part for legalities but also for ethical reasons in that data leaks within the realms of national security and intelligence put lives at risk (Goldman, 2018; Coulthart, et.al., 2019).

It has been argued that, "researchers have an ethical obligation to give serious consideration to what they are giving back to members of the communities in which they work" (Merten, 2014: 521). To meet this ethical obligation, I will be providing the interviewees with a pdf version of the Dissertation. As well, I will make an offer to provide them with a presentation to their organization if they so desire. In addition, respecting

anonymity and confidentiality are critical ethical considerations because a breach in the anonymity and confidentiality could affect other scholars from undertaking research involving Canada's federal public sector and the Canadian IC in particular. For example, future scholars and researchers could be denied access to officials by the officials.

4.7 Summary

This chapter described the research design used in the conduct of this research. The research design was based on Creswell's (2009) framework, consisted of three key elements: the worldview, the strategy of inquiry, and the research methods. The breadth and depth of this chapter in covering these three elements was, in part, to address considerations and concerns identified in the literature regarding public administration research methodology, research dilemmas, and qualitative (interpretive) research.

The adopted worldview was pragmatism, which consists of four key tenets: the irrelevance of dualism between theory and practice and between facts and values, moving from doubt to belief, the existence of small "T" truth and no big "T" truth, and truth is arrived through the notion of a community of inquiry that uses a systematic scientific method. It was noted that although the use of pragmatism in public administration is recent, it is nevertheless endorsed by numerous scholars.

The strategy of inquiry was qualitative with an interpretative twist. As a result, the research focuses on context specific meaning and does not propose to make generalizations based on specific situations. This makes for a natural affinity with the contingency theory approach. In addition, given the exploratory nature of the research question and research objectives, the qualitative research approach was a natural choice. Furthermore, given this researcher's central role played as the 'I', an extensive personal statement was provided,

including an examination of potential advantages and disadvantages. This ensures that the reader has an appreciation of my ‘baggage’ when I conducted data collection and data analysis. Especially, the interpretation of the data in terms of what did I hear and understand.

The research methods employed are case study and case study selection and data collection methods. A case study approach was chosen because in contingency theory there is the expectation that contingent factors are identified. In order to identify contingent factors, there is a requirement to define the contingent search area. Furthermore, the case study approach provides an excellent venue to explore research questions that are of a ‘why’ and ‘how’ in nature and explore complex situated issues. The selection of the case was driven by both instrumental and intrinsic considerations.

This research employed triangulation through the use of qualitative content analysis of documents and elite purposeful semi-structured data collection methods. A key interview consideration was the political and bureaucratic reality in Ottawa during the 2015 to 2017 timeframe. A conscientious decision was to defer my interviews until 2017 with the hope of increasing my access to the interviewees. Data analysis was based on two strategies – expanding and reducing the data. In other words, there was no right answer or approach until one got into the data. The analysis of the data was based on data collected as well my experiential knowledge. This resulted in an abductive analytical process that was iterative, requiring continuous integration and interpretation.

Given the qualitative interpretive nature of the research, challenges and limitations fell into one of four categories: credibility, transferability, dependability, conformability; plus speaking across two epistemic communities. A last consideration that this researcher

faced and addressed were ethical consideration on three fronts. First, meeting the University of Ottawa ethical guidelines and applicable code of conduct. Second, institutional considerations such as research funding and professional career. Last, ensuring that my research actions would not affect future researchers.

Overall, the research plan outlined in this chapter assisted in planning and executing the research. However, “research rarely goes according to plan – it can be messy, frustrating and unpredictable”, astutely note Wellington and Szczerbinski (2007: 3). Areas of messiness that I encountered were the literature, both in terms of the topic under examination as well as the research methods. Just as when it appeared that it was sufficiently covered, new avenues of inquiry presented themselves. This affected the initial research timelines. As a final thought, given the interpretative nature of this research, I can confirm Richardson and St. Pierre’s (2005) observation that during the course of extensive research, the researcher will learn more about themselves and the relationship with their research topic.

CHAPTER 5: INTELLIGENCE AND THE CANADIAN INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY

This chapter commences our journey of examining the IC as the case study. The goal of this chapter is twofold: to define intelligence and describe the Canadian IC including its intelligence sharing. Defining intelligence is necessary because depending on how it is defined, it will assist with the identification of the federal entities that constitute the IC. As well, establishing an understanding of intelligence assists with determining core concepts of intelligence that contribute towards the identification of the IC's contingent factors.

5.1 *Understanding Intelligence*

Nearly three decades ago, the Consortium for the Study of Intelligence published, *What is Intelligence?* At that time, the authors stated that, “The answer is not obvious, and its implications are not trivial.” (Shulsky and Sims, 1993: i). Fast forward to today and the same question remains as relevant today as it did back then. The literature reveals that intelligence, as a concept, remains an elusive word to define despite it being studied for several decades (Kent, 1949; Bimfort, 1958; Ransom, 1970; Godson, 1986; Herman, 1996; Warner, 2002; Gill and Phythian, 2012). This elusiveness is interesting given that, “intelligence has never been more important in world politics than it is now at the opening of the twenty-first century” (Scott and Jackson, 2004a: xi). It leaves one to ponder why this elusiveness?

As a start, there is no definite theory of intelligence that the scholarly community can agree upon (Shulsky and Sims, 1993; Warner, 2002; Treverton, et.al., 2006). This has occurred, in part, because, “the discipline of intelligence studies to date has spent relatively

little time on theorizing” (Gill, 2010: 43). This assertion is supported by others in the field (Der Derian, 1992; Fry and Hochstein, 1993; Johnson, 2003). This lack of theorizing about intelligence is, “not simply a problem for academic research. It also degrades much public discussion of the role of intelligence” (Andrew, 2004: 38). Although, there are some indications that this may be changing for the better (Marrin, 2018).

When attempts are made to define intelligence, it becomes contentious because, “different perspectives are included or excluded depending on the view of the scholar or practitioner” (Walsh, 2011: 9). For instance, western officials and scholars tend to group themselves into two camps, those that relate to the military nomenclature and those who associate intelligence with silent warfare (Warner, 2009: 16). Compounding this is the fact that the English intelligence literature is very Western-centric and male dominated (Van Puyvelde and Curtis, 2016). However, on a positive note there is a growing English literature that examines non-Anglo-American IC (Davies and Gustafson, 2013; Bruneau, 2015; Kobayashi, 2015; Cline, 2016; Crosston, 2016; De Graff and Nyce, 2016; Lefebvre, 2016; Matey, 2016; Yitzhak, 2016).¹³

If the scholarly literature is not in itself challenging, we can add the spy-thriller popular culture to the mix of conflagrating our understanding of intelligence (Wark, 1990; Price, 1996; Taylor, 2008). In recent times, on matters of intelligence writings, “fictional and nonfictional forms of writing increasingly tend to merge” (Horn, 2013: 354). As well, intelligence studies as a field has traditionally been seen as a sub-set of international

¹³ As a member of the International Studies Association (ISA), Intelligence Studies Section (ISS) participating in the ISS’ annual business meetings held during the ISA Annual Conventions the challenge of finding presenters/panels that do not cover the Anglo-American IC has been the topic of discussion for many years. Although, the situation has been steadily improving from year to year.

relations or international history, yet both fields have neglected intelligence as a concept in their respective theoretical understanding of their fields (Scott and Jackson, 2004b). This neglect has become to be known as the ‘missing dimension’ of government (Andrew and Dilks, 1984).

Given the difficulties with finding an acceptable definition of intelligence, the emphasis for our understanding of intelligence shifts towards that of identifying elements that constitute intelligence. The process used to identify these elements was based on a literature review of over a dozen intelligence studies thought leaders going back several decades; ensuring to reflect any temporal aspect to the contemporary understanding of intelligence. The literature review began with the examination of Kent’s *Strategic Intelligence for American World Policy* (1949); who is recognized as the ‘father of contemporary intelligence studies’. This work served as the baseline for the identification of the key elements that constitute intelligence. Afterwards, each additional scholarly work was compared to Kent’s work, resulting in either confirming or amending the listing of the key essential elements. As illustrated in Table 2 (below), intelligence is an “umbrella term” (Gill and Phythian, 2012: 11), that reflects five key elements: intelligence process, intelligence product, policy / decision-making, intelligence organization, and secrecy. If one were to adopt a definition statement for intelligence, it would read something like, ‘intelligence is an informative product achieved through a systematic approach conducted by an organization for the purpose of assisting decision-making bounded by secrecy’. This understanding of intelligence makes it an easy candidate to apply organizational theory, including contingency theory, for further exploration, which occurs in the remaining chapters.

An element that appeared in the literature but purposely excluded is covert action. This is due to two main reasons. First, covert action predominately appears in the American intelligence literature and is distinctively reflective of the American IC (Johnson, 2010). Second, covert action is excluded because of the, “obvious functional difference between the collection of information about the capabilities and intentions of other participants on the world stage, and operations undertaken to affect directly the course of events in other countries” (Laqueur, 1995:4). In addition, security is also being excluded because it is mainly concerned with internal security measures such as security clearances whose purpose is maintaining secrecy. Hence, this research subsumes security within the broader element of secrecy.

Table 2 Summary of Key Elements Contained in the Understanding of Intelligence

Intelligence Studies Thought Leaders	Key Elements				
	Intelligence Process	Intelligence Product	Policy/Decision-making	Intelligence Organization	Secrecy
Kent (1949)	X	X	X	X	
Bimfort (1958)	X	X	X	X	X
Ransom (1970)	X	X	X		
Godson (1986)	X	X	X		
Richelson (1985)	X	X	X		
Herman (1996)	X	X		X	
Davies (2002)	X	X	X	X	
Shulsky and Schmitt (2002)		X	X		
Scott and Jackson (2004b)		X	X		X
Gill and Phythian (2006)	X	X	X		
Moore (2006)	X	X	X		
Wheaton and Beerbower (2006)	X	X	X		
Sims (2009)	X	X	X		
Lahneman (2011)		X	X		
Walsh (2011)	X		X		

Source: Author (2023)

Prior to examining the individual elements, it is important to position our understanding of intelligence within one of the many available security school of thoughts (Katzenstein, 1996; Buzan and Hansen, 2009; Burgess, 2010; Williams, 2012; Collins,

2016). This is required because each school of thought has certain assumptions and implications for the structures and instruments that fall under it, including the IC. From the various schools of thought, this research adopts political realism as the foundation upon which the IC will be examined. Political realism asserts national security as, “threats to acquired values” (Wolfers, 1952: 485); whereby values are defined by government. In a sense, one’s understanding of intelligence resides within political theory in so far that intelligence is framed by different notions, in this case it is security and interests. In addition, those in power, define the roles and responsibilities of the IC (Marrin, 2019). In the Canadian context, legislatively recognized potential threats consist of:

- espionage or sabotage that is against Canada or is detrimental to the interests of Canada or activities directed toward or in support of such espionage or sabotage,
- foreign influenced activities within or relating to Canada that are detrimental to the interests of Canada and are clandestine or deceptive or involve a threat to any person,
- activities within or relating to Canada directed toward or in support of the threat or use of acts of serious violence against persons or property for the purpose of achieving a political, religious or ideological objective within Canada or a foreign state, and
- activities directed toward undermining by covert unlawful acts, or directed toward or intended ultimately to lead to the destruction or overthrow by violence of, the constitutionally established system of government in Canada (*Canadian Security Intelligence Service Act*).

Interestingly enough, there is no official Government of Canada definition of national security (Privy Council Office [PCO], 2004; *National Security and Intelligence Committee of Parliamentarians Act, 2017*). The rationale to anchor intelligence within a realist construct is based on the fact that national security as perceived by many of the actors in the Canadian security and intelligence community tend to perceive the world through a political realism prism. As well, this prism is not time bound. As the political context changes, so does the understanding of national security (McDonald Commission, 1979,

1981a, 1981b; Privy Council Office, 2004). In addition, the intelligence literature tends to be framed within the political realism school of thought. Although, this literature is ever so expanding its horizons by engaging different prisms (Rathmell; 2002; Marrin and Clemente, 2005; Bean, 2009; Hatlebrekke and Smith, 2010; McDermott, 2011; Gill and Phythian, 2012; Goldewijk, 2021).

5.1.1 Intelligence Process

The intelligence process used to generate intelligence is commonly referred to as the intelligence cycle. This concept is more entrenched than any other concept in the intelligence literature (Hulnick, 2006). The intelligence cycle, “like all models, it is a simplification of a more complex reality” (Gill and Phythian, 2012: 13). For the IC, the intelligence cycle, “offers a useful analytic construct for understanding how the secret agencies gather, interpret, and disseminate information” (Johnson, 2010: 12).

An examination of the literature reveals that there is no single accepted model with respect to the intelligence cycle (Faragone, 2009). For instance, Lowenthal (2006) employs an intelligence process consisting of seven phases: requirements, collection, processing and exploitation, analysis and production, dissemination, consumption and feedback. While Johnson (2010) identifies an intelligence process having six phases: planning and direction, collection, processing, analysis and production, dissemination, and new requirements. The situation is not any clearer within the Canadian IC as there is no single IC accepted intelligence cycle model. As an example, the Department of National Defence / Canadian Armed Forces has a four phase intelligence cycle consisting of direction, collection, processing; and dissemination. Whilst, the Canadian Security Intelligence Service employs a five phase intelligence cycle: government direction, planning,

collection, analysis, dissemination. The intelligence cycle adopted for this research is that of the Department of National Defence / Canadian Armed Forces due to the researcher's familiarity with this intelligence cycle. Each of the phases of this intelligence cycle are examined below.

- Phase One: Direction

The primary goal of direction is to respond to the threat environment. This occurs at two levels. The first level refers to the guidance provided by decision-makers to the IC. The guidance comes in the form of priority intelligence requirements (PIR). The notion that the IC waits for direction from policy makers is a held view within liberal-democratic countries (Gill and Phythian, 2012). As such, the PIR reflect the policy makers' agenda (Lowenthal, 2006). The second level of direction occurs within the intelligence organization themselves, which usually excludes policy makers' involvement unless collection, "involves political sensitivities" (Lowenthal, 2006: 180). In general terms, the intelligence organization's internal direction is the tasking for the collection of intelligence to respond to the PIR.

- Phase Two: Collection

Phase two of the intelligence cycle is collection, which entails the gathering of information either directly by an intelligence organization itself or collected from sources and other agencies. Sources are non-organizational collection assets that a requesting organization has access to. Other agencies are collection assets outside the authority of the organization requesting the information. Most often, there are information sharing protocols or agreements in place to manage organization-to-organization information sharing. Given the important function that collection has in the intelligence cycle, it has

been called the, “bedrock of intelligence” (Lowenthal, 2006: 68). The methods used to collect information falls under one of the following traditional collection disciplines: Human Intelligence (HUMINT), Imagery Intelligence (IMINT), Signals Intelligence (SIGINT), and Technical Intelligence (TECHINT) (Rivard and Faragone, 2007). A more recent arrival to the collection disciplines is Financial Intelligence (FININT) (Pyrik, 2020). The selection of the appropriate collection method will be based in the PIR itself, the availability of the collection assets, as well as the advantages and disadvantages of each collection method. Whenever possible, a triangulation strategy will be used to collect information in order to increase the validity and reliability of the information.

When it comes to collection, there are two key intertwined considerations, namely; technology and information sharing. The first consideration is the ever-increasing pace of change in technology. The challenge for the IC is one of keeping up with these changes both as a user of technology and in dealing with technology as a threat. The former is concerned mainly with keeping up with the latest technology, which comes with a hefty price tag, whilst the latter is concerned with being able to exploit the technology especially in the cyber domain. The second consideration is information sharing which is dependent on three factors: organizational culture, legal, and information technology. Culturally, there is a hesitancy not to share secrets between intelligence organizations. Legally, intelligence organizations operate within a legal framework in terms of legislated mandates that establishes boundaries around their collection activities. Across the IC, a significant consideration is balancing the right of the individual (rights and freedoms) versus collective rights (security). This balancing remains an on-going challenge. The last factor is having

the information technology systems that allows for efficient and effective sharing of intelligence amongst the IC.

- Phase Three: Processing

The third phase of the intelligence cycle is processing. It is within this phase of the cycle that related information from various agencies and sources is collated together. The information is then evaluated for source reliability and information validity. The information is then analyzed using a variety of analytical tools in order to identify significant facts, compared with other facts and conclusions drawn from them. Individual pieces of intelligence are then integrated with other pieces of intelligence in order to develop an intelligence picture. As a last step of the processing cycle, the question of “so what?” is posed. The intelligence is interpreted in order to try to understand and/or predict future events. The literature on analysis is extremely overwhelming which would be indicative of its importance in the intelligence cycle (Heuer, 1999; Marrin, 2011; Clark, 2004; Walsh, 2011; Walton, 2010; National Research Council, 2011). Not surprisingly, it has been argued that analysis is the mainstay of the processing phase (Lowenthal, 2006).

- Phase Four: Dissemination

The last phase of the intelligence cycle is dissemination. At this point in the intelligence cycle, the IC (producer) provides the intelligence product to the policy-makers (consumer). The dissemination of the intelligence product occurs within one or more forms: written text, verbal, and graphic. The written text has many labels - reports, assessments, summaries, bulletins, etc. The verbal form is usually that of a briefing, formal or informal. The graphic is an illustration that is either a stand-alone or is included as part of the written text or verbal. Regardless of the form, the IC needs to be able to address

several questions: what is important enough to report?, who should it be reported to?, how quickly should it be reported?, how much detail should be included?, and what is the best method of reporting it? (Lowenthal, 2006: 63-64).

This intelligence / policymaking nexus presumes that intelligence, "influences decision-making as a precursor to and foundation for policy" (Marrin, 2011: 182). There is an expectation from the IC of, "speaking 'truth unto power' " (Scott and Jackson, 2004: 10). In turn, the, "policy communities receive and evaluate intelligence, and judge its value" (Fry and Hochstein, 1998: 20). Given the nature of this asymmetrical transaction, dissemination is the, "crux of the intelligence process" (Gill and Pythian 2012: 111). Due to the nature of this nexus, dissemination is, "intelligence's Achilles' heel" (Herman, 1996: 45) because intelligence is at the mercy of policy-makers receptivity to what the IC has produced. For many years, this nexus has been the focus of a lively scholarly discussion within the intelligence studies literature (Yehoshafat, 1984; Betts, 1988; Hulnick, 1986; Gardiner, 1991; Lowenthal, 1992; Kerbel and Olcott, 2010; Rovner, 2011; Marrin, 2014).

5.1.2 Intelligence Product

Continuing from the above discussion on dissemination of the intelligence product, the following provides a more in-depth examination of the intelligence product. The product is examined based on the type of product (Kent, 1965) and associated characteristics (Gusatve de Valk, 2005). According to Kent, intelligence products can be grouped into three distinct types: basic-descriptive, current-reportorial, and speculative-evaluative. The basic second type consists of basic foundational information, akin to encyclopaedia type information. The current-reportorial consists of intelligence products that deal with the now, similar to news reporting. The speculative-evaluative class of

intelligence products is the high-value information that decision-makers give the most credence too and is sought after.

Using Gustave de Valk's (2005) characteristics as a starting point, this research reframes them as the extent of data collection triangulation used in the product, the products' time horizon, sensitivity of the information contained in the product, and the product's potential impact on decision-making. In addition, the following characteristics are included: time required to generate a product, volume by type of product, level of approval, and extent of dissemination. The extent of data collection triangulation speaks to the collection method(s) of the information that the intelligence product is based upon. As well, included under this characteristic is the disciplinary nature of information that goes into the product. The product's time horizon speaks to the timeframe that the product is attempting to foresee into. The sensitivity of the information is with respect to the origins of the intelligence and what is the intelligence assessment. The potential impact on decision-making refers to the product's ability to either conform or change a decision making from a current position. The time required to generate a product is simply how long does it take to draft a product, the volume by type of product speaks to an organization's total products that fall within Kent's three categories, the level of approval is who has the authority to release a product, and the extent of dissemination refers to who gets access to the products based on the duo principles of security classification of the product and consumer and the consumer's need to know.

The result of Kent's, Gustave de Valk's reframed characteristics, and additional characteristics are illustrated in Table 3. A precautionary note regarding drawing generalizations on the qualitative qualifiers is warranted on the interpretation of Table 3.

The qualifiers for each characteristic by intelligence product type are applicable in the majority of cases. However, there are situations where that may not always hold true. For instance, a speculative type of intelligence product based on a single source such as IMINT, HUMINT or SIGNINT information can be quickly generated and have a high impact on decision-making. There are historical examples where this was the case. For instance, Prime Minister Churchill not evacuating Coventry knowing that the city was in imminent danger of being bombed by the Germans, the Israel government having advance knowledge that the Arab countries were going to start the war on Yom Kippur but took no action, or President Kennedy's quick reaction in response to the Soviets deploying missiles in Cuba.

Table 3 Characteristics of Intelligence Product by Type

Type of Intelligence Product	Characteristics of Intelligence Product							
	extent of data collection triangulation	time horizon	sensitivity of the information	potential impact on decision-making	time required to generate a product	volume by type of product	level of approval	extent of dissemination
basic-descriptive	limited triangulation	past to current	low sensitivity	low impact	fast	large volume	low level	wide distribution
current – reportorial	some triangulation	current to near	medium sensitivity	medium impact	moderate	medium volume	medium level	medium distribution
speculative – evaluative	high triangulation	near to long-term	high sensitivity	high impact	slow	small volume	high level	limited distribution

Source: Author (2023) informed by Kent (1965) and Gustave de Valk (2005).

5.1.3 Secrecy

Secrecy has always existed as a feature of organizations (Lowry, 1980; Costas and Grey, 2016). However, its study has mainly occurred in anthropology or cultural studies and not necessarily in organizational theory or public administration (Birchall, 2011; Maret, 2011; Graham, 2014; Travers, M., et.al., 2014). Within the context of government, the literature reveals no single accepted definition of secrecy (Maret, 2011); rather, using the works of several ‘secrecy’ scholars (Simmel, 1906; Bok, 1983, 1989; Thompson, 1999; Costas and Grey, 2014), government secrecy is understood as the informal or formal intentional concealment of information by a governmental authority. It is employed when, “the interests of the individual, group, or organization is threaten by other individuals, groups, or organizations” (Tefft, 1980: 36). Therefore, the application of secrecy from a government’s perspective is both instrumental and indicative of rational behaviour (Tefft, 1980). The implication is that government secrecy is a tool for controlling information that is deemed valuable to government (Simmel, 1906). This implication is not any different then that of any other non-government organization withholding its information (Aftergood, 1999).

At the macro level, when secrecy is understood in terms of concealment, the notion of secrecy stands in contrast to government openness and transparency. Within this contrasting construct, secrecy encroaches, “on public trust of information, which in turn potentially undermines confidence in government” (Maret, 2011: xiii). Thus, any significant government secrecy will impact democracy (Rowat, 1965; Ellington, 2011). The resultant state secrecy has been described as a ‘pathology’ (Gibbs, 2011) or ‘culture of secrecy’ (Thompson, 1999). In some cases, secrecy can lead to creating or hiding

administrative evil (Adams, Balfour, and Reed, 2006; Adams and Balfour, 2009; Adams, 2011).

On the other side of the coin, there is the argument that secrecy, as concealment, should not always be perceived through a negative connotation (Dufresne and Offstein, 2008; Birchall, 2016). It has been argued that a certain amount of government secrecy is necessary in order to have a functioning government (Merton, 1942). For instance, secrecy positively contributes to decision advantage (Warner, 2012), foreign policy (Thompson, 1999), national security and science (Kapper, 1999), and the legitimate protection of national security secrets (Aftergood, 1999). From this secrecy versus open and transparent dichotomous debate, Rowat's (1965) question of over half a century ago is still relevant, "how much administrative secrecy?"

The ongoing challenge is determining, "how much secrecy and regulation are required and are tolerable in a mature democracy, in what specific areas they should be focussed, and for how long they should be maintained, also have to be looked at in a wider context of constitutional check and balances" (Wilkinson, 2011: 148). This researcher argues that there is no single enduring answer to Rowat's timeless question. Instead, we are left with a 'it depends' answer that pits two fundamental values against each other – secrecy and democracy (Rourke, 1966) for which, "there are no easy ways to resolve the problem" (Laqueur, 1985: 49). The secrecy versus democracy are reflected in the security instruments adopted by government bureaucracy's to protect state secrets. In Canada's federal bureaucracy, the foundational instrument is the *Policy on Government Security* whose objectives are:

To effectively manage government security controls in support of the trusted delivery of Government of Canada programs and services and in support of the protection of information, individuals and assets; and

To provide assurance to Canadians, partners, oversight bodies and other stakeholders regarding security management in the Government of Canada (TBS, 2019c).

As well, each department and agency can expand upon this Policy with their own additional security requirements. In addition, intelligence sharing agreements could also have security requirements.

5.1.4 Policy/Decision-Making

Our understanding of intelligence has an implied assumption that decision-making is informed by intelligence. Given that intelligence is framed within a national security construct, the decisions are security related. Intelligence has no or little value if it does not support decision-making, hence intelligence is a dependent phenomena (Gustav de Valk, 2005: 32). So how can intelligence support decision-making? First, intelligence can be used to inform decisions through an early warning function (Gentry and Gordon, 2019), which reduces potential unwanted surprises to decision-makers. Second, intelligence can also reduce decision-makers uncertainty (Jackson, 2005) by assessing the probability that a certain adverse scenario could come to fruition. Last, intelligence assists decision-makers with resource optimization (Kahn, 2010). If intelligence is able to assess a threat's capabilities and intentions, then decision-makers can mitigate a threat with the appropriate resources. Overall, intelligence has a contributing role to decisions regarding a country's security goals by assisting in providing input to answers addressing the following questions: security for whom?, security for which values?, how much security?, from what threats?, by what means?, at what costs?, and in what time period? (Baldwin, 1997: 13-17).

However, as rightly acknowledged in the literature, intelligence is but one of the many factors that decision-makers take into consideration when making a decision (Laqueur, 1995; Gookins, 2008; Rovner, 2011; Lowenthal, 2012; Marrin 2014). As well, intelligence is a junior partner in the realm of decision-making (Donovan, 1986). Not surprising, the acceptance of an IC's product by decision-makers has much to do with the decision-makers' selective attention, that is to say, "the interaction of signals with perceptual and organizational filters as central" (Yarhi-Milo, 2013: 46).

The level of decision-making under consideration is at the highest strategic levels of government both elected and non-elected. In the Canadian federal context, the decision-makers are the Prime Minister and the Prime Minister's Office, Cabinet, Ministers, the Privy Council Office, DM, and ADM level. This layer of government is given the label of 'national decision-makers' (Gustave de Valk, 2005). It is at these levels of government that public policy is developed and implemented.

5.2 Entities Involved with the Canadian Intelligence Community

Canadian government documentation and statements by public officials refer to the IC within the broader category of security and intelligence (S&I) community (PCO, 2001).

The intent of the S&I community is to:

...judge the growth or decline of particular threats, and provide political leaders with well-founded advice on appropriate prevention and enforcement action. The community works to add value to decision-making and policy-making on the full range of matters vital to Canada's interests in foreign relations, defence, economy and domestic security." which is the main existence of both communities (Fadden, 2001).

In order to focus our examination on the intelligence component of this collective community there is a requirement to separate security and intelligence. Notwithstanding

this separation, it is recognized that both components are necessary and whose core function is to contribute to the safety and security of Canadians. The nature of the IC in Canada evolves around four different categories of intelligence, namely, foreign intelligence, security intelligence, military (defence) intelligence¹⁴, and criminal intelligence. More specifically:

Foreign intelligence is information about the capabilities, activities or intentions of foreign states, organizations or individuals. The information is collected and used to support and protect Canada's political, economic, military, scientific, social and security interests. Security intelligence is information about activities that could threaten Canada's security. This includes not only terrorism but also espionage and foreign-influenced activities that would cause a threat to public safety or national security. Military intelligence includes tactical intelligence about military threats, capabilities and tactics that the military forces use to maximize their effectiveness. It also includes strategic assessments of what will happen next, where, and why. Criminal intelligence is gathered and developed primarily by police agencies. It is information about those persons and groups who commit crime, how they do it, and the broad trends in criminal activity and its impact on society (Fadden, 2001).

The departments and agencies that constitute the IC work both independently and together to safeguard Canada's security and to advance its interests (PCO, 2001). In this type of system, accountability rests at the ministerial level, more commonly referred as ministerial accountability, whereby:

Individual ministers have line department responsibilities for the activities of the sector, and are accountable to Parliament for these activities. At another level, some of these line ministers have a co-ordinating responsibilities for their parts of the community (Fadden, 2001).

Given the frequency that the term 'intelligence community' appears in the media and elsewhere, one could easily be left with the impression that most casual observers would have the same understanding of the specific organizations that fall under the Canadian IC

¹⁴ When speaking of military intelligence at Canada's national level, it has in recent years used the nomenclature of defence intelligence, allowing to reflect both the civilian and military aspects.

umbrella term. However, the truth is far from this assumption. This impression quickly evaporates if one were to examine the documentary evidence (National Security Policy, 2004; National Security and Intelligence Committee of Parliamentarians, 2020a). There is no single accepted understanding, a similar situation in the British IC but unlike the American IC which is defined by Presidential Executive Order. Given this lack of publicly documented evidence in framing the Canadian IC, interviews with officials were used as an opportunity to identify the organizations that constitute the Canadian IC.

Several officials representing different intelligence organizations were asked for their understanding of the Canadian IC, specifically which organizations constitute this community? Consistent with the documentary evidence, different listings were offered. In one response, the official observed that having worked in the IC for many years, they were not aware of any official document (public or otherwise) that clearly articulates which organizations make up the IC. Rather, the official indicated that people working in the IC simply know that they belong to it. Another official, when asked if not having an official document outlining the IC was an issue, responded that not having it documented was not an issue because work carries on. To both officials, it was inquired about how does one manage for performance of the IC, if it is not clear on who's in and who's not? Both officials' answers could be interpreted that they were not concerned about community performance since the departments and agencies are accountable for performance to their minister and not the wider IC.

The interview conversation moved to the idea that the IC has many moving parts and a failure by one part can have a cascading effect elsewhere in the system, as the now infamous failure to connect the dots hypothesis resulting in the events of September 11,

2001. Interestingly, when the performance of the IC was framed through this perspective, the officials did acknowledge that not having an IC approach to performance management could become quite problematic. There is an implied assumption that the constituent parts of the IC would need to be identified in order to comprehend performance management of the IC. One official did offer the insight that years ago, there was an initial attempt to develop an IC approach to performance management. However, it never materialized due to the lack of senior management interest and therefore no funding was allocated to the initiative. This interaction with the officials reveals that as a minimum there exists the need to define the IC in order to manage its performance.

As it has been observed thus far, the IC is too vast and complex to being understood as a monolithic entity. In order to better understand the IC, there is a need to at the very least determine its structure and identify the organizations that fall under the umbrella. To establish structure and organizations, the research employs classification which is understood as, “the ordering of entities into groups or classes on the base of their similiarity” (Bailey, 1994: 1). If the contingency approach holds true, then from a performance management perspective, as a minimum one can expect variations in performance management needs based on the groupings.

We begin our exploration by reviewing some of the diverse literature regarding the classification of government organizations. For instance, according to Chester (1951), there are three main categories: departments that establish the control core of government, local authorities, and entities that operate with a particular level of autonomy, decentralized, and functional. Hood and Dunshire (1981) examined the British departments across an array of variables such as size, location, function, and so forth.

Peters and Peters (2001) identified four organization categories: by area served, by process, by clientele, and by purpose. In another case, Peters (2001), offers several approaches: machinery, growth of government, organizational theory, social action theory, political economy and policy analysis, theories of the state, and management. In a back-to-basics approach, Thynne (2003) suggests a different set characteristics: state and non-state organizations that are established by legal instruments and have an apex, the establishment of organizations in terms of control and accountability, centralization and decentralization, and autonomy and integration.

Looking at the Canadian federal government, Johnson (2007) categorizes organizations into service departments, support departments, crown corporations, regulatory agencies, and special agencies. Still within the Canadian context, according to the *Briefing Book for the Prime Minister of Canada* (PCO, 2019), the federal government is organized by ministerial portfolio containing a number of potential different entities: department, department-like entities, adjudicative regulatory / oversight, adjudicative / regulatory / oversight entities not covered under the *Financial Administrative Act*, department corporation, crown corporation or similar, agents of parliament, ombudsman, and special operating agencies. Collectively, in the Canadian federal officialdom, the structure of the government is commonly referred to as the machinery of government. Within the Privy Council Office, there is an Assistant Secretary to the Cabinet for Machinery of Government that administers and manages the machine.

Moving on to the intelligence literature, it is a rarity to find any discussion that goes beyond the traditional wire diagram. One exception is Lowenthal (2012) who provides three approaches to how to potentially classify the IC. First, the traditional organizational

view (wire diagram) which is representative of hierarchy and bureaucratic vertical lines of authority. Second, the functional view which breaks down the IC into two areas – management and execution. Under management there is requirements, resources, and collection and production. Execution consists of development of collection systems, collection and production, intelligence operations, and sustainability of the infrastructure. Straddling these two areas is the evaluation function. Last, the budget process view divides the intelligence program into the civilian, defense, and community-wide components. On the whole, it becomes obvious that, “classifying public sector organizations never was an easy exercise, and it is likely that the field is more complex now than it ever has been in the past” (Wettenhall, 2003: 238).

Tapping into the above literatures, the classification of organizations involved with the Canadian IC is multidimensional in nature. The considered selected dimensions are an organization’s enacting legislation, its organizational mandate, and the relational relationship between the organizations. These dimensions were selected because the IC exists within a Westminster-type governance system. In this type of system accountability rests at the ministerial level, more commonly referred to as ministerial accountability, whereby, “Individual ministers have line department responsibilities for the activities of the sector, and are accountable to Parliament for these activities” (Fadden, 2001). As a general observation, the day-to-day conduct of the intelligence function is delegated to the administrative branch of government or bureaucracy, that is to say, the various departments and agencies. In Canada, the IC is based on a decentralized model of governance, whereby it is spread throughout the structure of the federal government in which there is no single cabinet minister responsible for the IC. The lack of a single cabinet minister for

intelligence is mainly due to the arrangement of the Canadian government's ministries that is based on historical precedence (Wark, 2002). The departments and agencies that constitute the IC work both independently and together to safeguard Canada's security and to advance its interests (PCO, 2001).


Based on these dimensions, the organizations involved with the Canadian IC are classified into five broad categories: direction and coordination, specifically mandated, non-specifically mandated, oversight and review, and supporting (Fragone, 2009). The various organizations reviewed in the following pages function within a specific category or provide support to one or more category. By organization this research goes beyond the commonly understanding such as a department. The research encapsulates other entities, for example, parliamentary committees. This is done to avoid getting into an extended definitional conversation of what is an organization, thus side stepping a potential quagmire. For these reasons, entities will be used instead of organizations.

The first category covers those entities whose primary function is providing direction and coordination, of which there are three – Prime Minister and Prime Minister's Office, the Privy Council Office and the Department of Public Safety and Emergency Preparedness. The second category includes those entities specifically mandated for intelligence - the Canadian Security Intelligence Service with its embedded Integrated Terrorism Assessment Centre, the Communications Security Establishment, and the Financial Transactions and Reports Analysis Centre of Canada. A third category entails those entities not specifically mandated but which have sub-units specifically designated to perform an intelligence function. This category would include the Department of National Defence and the Canadian Armed Forces, the Department of Foreign Affairs,

Trade and Development, the Royal Canadian Mounted Police, the Canada Border Services Agency, and Transport Canada. In addition to these there are many other federal departments and agencies that have an intelligence / intelligence-type capability. However, as noted earlier, we are defining intelligence within a specific security parameter. For that reason, they are excluded from this study, although they merit examination elsewhere.¹⁵

The fourth category includes those entities which, although are not directly involved in delivering an intelligence capability, provide an intelligence oversight and review capacity to the federal government. The key issue being addressed by these entities is, “whether the intelligence community is properly carrying out its function” (Lowenthal, 2006: 191). Entities belonging in this category include the Parliamentary committee system, Officers of Parliament, the Intelligence Commissioner, the National Security and Intelligence Review Agency, the National Security and Intelligence Committee of Parliamentarians, and Treasury Board Secretariat. The final category includes an entity that provides direct support to the IC - Department of Justice. In addition to these entities, one needs to factor in Canada’s membership in the exclusive international Five Eyes community. The configuration of these entities involved with the intelligence community is illustrated in Figure 5.

¹⁵ Other federal entities with an intelligence / intelligence-type capability: Canada Post Corporation, Correctional Service of Canada, Environment and Climate Change Canada, Export Development Canada, Fisheries and Oceans Canada, Innovation, Science and Economic Development Canada, National Research Council of Canada, Natural Resources Canada, Public Health Agency of Canada, Immigration, Refugees, and Citizenship Canada.



Source: Author (2021)

Figure 7 Entities Involved with the Canadian Intelligence Community

5.2.1 Direction and Coordination

5.2.1.1 Prime Minister and the Prime Minister's Office

The Prime Minister (PM), as head of government, has ultimate responsibility and accountability for setting overall government direction. This involves oversight of the national security of Canada and its accompanying apparatus, including the intelligence function. In this endeavour, the PM receives support, in terms of advice, from the Prime Minister's Office (PMO). The PMO is wholly political and staffed through the political appointment process, therefore are not public servants. The PMO plays a key role in decision-making with increasing influence over the last couple of decades (Savoie, 1999); although Brodie (2018) offers a less centralized perspective on the role of the PMO. In either case, the publicly available information regarding the PMO and intelligence matters is extremely limited. An exception to this is the work of Lilly (2020) who was an advisor to a Prime Minister working in the PMO. Some of the authors observations regarding intelligence are worth mentioning. The author states that:

The PMO is involved in the full range of national security and intelligence functions, which affect a range of files: domestic security and border control; foreign and domestic terrorism and counterterrorism; emergency preparedness and response; health pandemics; national defence; critical infrastructure; foreign investment and trade; and espionage and foreign political interference (Lilly, 2020: 30).

In terms of the intelligence products arriving at the PMO, they consisted for the most part as written assessment. As well, in-person verbal briefings were provided, but it was noted that this was carefully prioritized given the tight schedules of PMO staff. In both cases, the author emphasized the need of the intelligence products being able to differentiate between the important, the interesting, and the nice to know. In addition to content, it was

remarked that timeliness and classification designation of the products were also key considerations. A late intelligence product reduces its value to decision-making. Also, if an intelligence product is too highly classified, its ability to being distributed and considered in informing decision-making is limited (Lilly, 2020: 31-33).

In addition to the PMO, the PM is supported by the Cabinet Committee on Global Affairs and Public Security. This committee considers, “issues concerning Canada’s engagement with and participation in the international community, including trade promotion and diversification. Responsible for issues related to domestic and global security” (Prime Minister’s Office [PMO], 2020). The committee consists of a chair, co-chair and ten cabinet members that represent the ministries associated with global affairs and public security, including national security. In addition, in the event of a national crisis, the Prime Minister is assisted by the Incident Response Group (IRG). The IRG serves as a, “dedicated, emergency committee in the event of a national crisis or during incidents elsewhere that have major implications for Canada. Responsible for coordinating a prompt federal response to an incident, and making fast, effective decisions to keep Canadians safe and secure, at home and abroad” (PMO, 2020). The IRG consists of a working group of ministers, there is no set membership; rather, membership is dictated by the nature of the incident.

5.2.1.2 Privy Council Office

The PM is directly supported by his department, the Privy Council Office (PCO), which is led by the Clerk of the PCO. The PCO is enabled through Order in Council P.C. 1940-1121, its mandate is:

to serve Canada and Canadians by providing professional, non-partisan advice and support to the Prime Minister, the ministers within the Prime

Minister's portfolio and Cabinet. The Prime Minister is responsible for this organization. PCO supports the development of the Government of Canada's policy and legislative agendas, coordinates responses to issues facing the Government and the country, and supports the effective operation of Cabinet (GCInfobase, 2020).

The PCO's core responsibility (CR)¹⁶ is to serve the Prime Minister and Cabinet. The PCO has four Departmental Results (DR) consisting of Cabinet and its committees focus on priorities, Cabinet receives high quality advice, government's priorities are achieved, and public service priorities are achieved. The PCO has seven Programs in its Program Inventory (PI) from which one is related to intelligence - International Affairs and National Security. The intended result of this Program is to ensure that the Prime Minister is informed, advised and supported with respect to national security files (GCInfobase, 2020).

Reporting to the Clerk of the PCO, is the National Security and Intelligence Advisor (NSIA), a DM level position that serves as the principal advisor to the PM. The NSIA is responsible for coordinating and providing leadership to the S&I community. Perhaps, the most important function of is assisting with the Government's overall priority setting efforts. Next is the conduct of strategic trends analysis, which is critical to the central role of the PCO. This entails on-going monitoring of the operating environment with respect to emerging and evolving trends that could have an impact on Canadian security. That is

¹⁶ Under the Treasury Board Policy on Results (TBS, 2016b) and the Treasury Board Secretariat Directive on Results (TBS, 2016c), each department and agency will have a Departmental Results Framework (DRF) consisting of three parts: (1) the Core Responsibilities (CR) is an enduring function or role performed by a department; (2) the Departmental Results (DR) represents the changes departments seek to influence that are often outside their immediate control, but are influenced by Program-level outcomes; and (3) the Departmental Results Indicator (DRI) is a factor or variable that provides a valid and reliable means to measure or describe progress on a DR. In addition, there is also the Program Inventory (PI), which identifies all of the department's programs and describes how resources are organized to contribute to the department's CR and DR. Specifically, a Program is an individual or groups of services, activities or combinations thereof that are managed together within the department and focus on a specific set of outputs, outcomes or service levels. Information pertaining to the DRF and PI is derived from GCInfobase, a searchable Government of Canada database (<https://www.tbs-sct.gc.ca/ems-sgd/edb-bdd/index-eng.html>). Unless otherwise stated, GCInfobase is extracted for actual results fiscal year 2019-20.

not to say that the other members of the IC do not do their own monitoring from their own perspective, but the PCO ensures that a balanced perspective is provided for purpose of providing an overview at a government-wide level. As a coordinating body, the PCO can ask key questions about how the different intelligence functions can help each other and how to deal with the ethical, legal organizational questions that occur within the IC. Since many of the toughest issues in the security and intelligence sector are multi-faceted, wide ranging and horizontal in nature, issues management is a third responsibility of the PCO. Finally, the PCO has a relationship with international intelligence partners (Fadden, 2001).

In terms of machinery, the NSIA oversees three PCO organizations: the Foreign and Defence Policy Secretariat, the Security and Intelligence Secretariat (SIS), and the Intelligence Assessment Secretariat (IAS). These organizations work directly with the PM, who is briefed on a weekly basis or as required, and the PMO. Both the SIS and the IAS work close with the PMO staff to keep them on top of situational awareness on topics of concern. Specifically, the SIS manages current files of important or operational issues, supports Cabinet committees, provides overall community coordination, and policy development. The IAS is the intelligence product generator in the PCO. It issues daily intelligence summary to the IC, provides a weekly summary to the PM, coordinates the production of the IC's assessments, and leads delegations to allied assessment meetings. Also, it manages on behalf of the IC, the Intelligence Analysts Learning Program, although different entities have their own analytical training and professional development to meet their specific needs (Fyffe, 2020: 22-23). The PCO in addition to supporting cabinet committees, also is responsible for the DM Committee on National Security, which considers current and emerging issues affecting Canada's national security, including

implications for Canada's economy, and whose membership consists of about a sixteen DMs (PCO, 2021).

5.2.1.3 Department of Public Safety and Emergency Preparedness

The Department of Public Safety and Emergency Management (PSEP), often referred to as Public Safety Canada (PSC), falls under the authority of the Minister of Public Safety and Emergency Management. PSEP is enabled by *Department of Public Safety and Emergency Preparedness Act*, S.C. 2005, c. 10 and the *Emergency Management Act* (2007). Its mandate is to:

discharge the Government's fundamental responsibility for the safety and security of its citizens. The Minister of PSEP is responsible for the Department. Legislation governing the Department sets out three essential roles: (i) support the Minister's responsibility for all matters related to public safety and emergency management not assigned to another federal organization; (ii) exercise leadership at the national level for national security and emergency preparedness; and (iii) support the Minister's responsibility for the coordination of Public Safety's Portfolio entities and for setting their strategic priorities. The Department provides strategic policy advice and support to the Minister of PSEP on a range of issues including: national security, border strategies, countering crime, emergency management and interoperability. The Department also delivers a number of grant and contribution programs related to emergency management, national security and community safety (GCInfobase, 2020).

As well, PSEP oversees portfolio management on behalf of the Minister. Portfolio management, through PSEP's DM in their portfolio manager role, is about:

encouraging all organizations to work together in the most appropriate and effective fashion, consistent with statute. It is a tool to secure coherence in developing and implementing the Government's policy and programs to accomplish its objectives and effectively deliver services to Canadians. It is a means of achieving better governance, ensuring better policy, legislation and program coordination, and supporting Ministers in their oversight of their portfolios by giving them the best public service advice (PCO, 1999).

However, it does not change the formal accountabilities between the Minister and the deputy heads of the entities that they are responsible for. In regards to this research, these

entities are the Canadian Security Intelligence Service, the Royal Canadian Mounted Police, and the Canada Border Service Agency.

The PSEP's has three CRs: community safety, emergency management and national security. Germane to this research is the last CR. Overall, PSEP has 17 DR of which one is relevant, national security threats are understood and reduced. Three of PSEP's twelve Programs are associated with national security: the Critical Infrastructure Program, which strives to ensure that Canada's critical infrastructure is secure and resilient. Second, the Cyber Security Program, designed to ensure that national security threats are understood and reduced. Last, the National Security Leadership Program, which also aims to ensure that national security threats are understood and reduced. The national security element of PSEP is led by the Senior ADM, National and Cyber Security Branch. Also, the PSEP DM leads a DM committee on cyber issues.

In addition, under PSEP resides the National Security Transparency Advisory Group (NS-TAG), whose goal is to enhance democratic accountability of Canada's national security departments and agencies. Its mandate is to advise the DM of PSEP and federal entities with security and intelligence responsibilities on how to:

Infuse transparency into Canada's national security policies, programs, best practices, and activities in a way that will increase democratic accountability;

Increase public knowledge, engagement, and awareness of national security and related intelligence matters, while continuing to protect sensitive information as required;

Balance transparency with the Government's commitment to protecting the safety and security of Canadians and the nation. This also includes protecting Canada's national security, national defence, international affairs, and operational effectiveness, as well as the safety or security of individuals working in these areas (Government of Canada, 2022).

To date, NS-TAG has produced two reports - *National Security Transparency Advisory Group Initial Report: What We Heard In Our First Year* (Government of Canada, 2020) and *The Definition, Measurement and Institutionalization of Transparency in National Security* (Government of Canada, 2021).

5.2.2 Specifically Mandated

5.2.2.1 Canadian Security Intelligence Service

The Canadian Security Intelligence Service (CSIS) is accountable to the Minister of Public Safety and Emergency Management and is enabled by the *Canadian Security Intelligence Service Act, R.S.C. 1985, c. C-23*. It is mandated to:

investigate activities suspected of constituting threats to the security of Canada, and to report on these to the Government of Canada. CSIS may also take measures to reduce threats to the security of Canada in accordance with well-defined legal requirements and Ministerial Direction. CSIS also provides security assessments and advice to Government of Canada partners in support of government security screening and immigration screening (GCInfobase, 2020).

Although Canada does not possess a foreign intelligence service, CSIS can collect information concerning foreign states and persons. In particular, subject to section 16 of the *CSIS Act*:

...the Service may, in relation to the defence of Canada or the conduct of the international affairs of Canada, assist the Minister of National Defence or the Secretary of State for External Affairs, within Canada, in the collection of information or intelligence relating to the capabilities, intentions or activities of...

Under the DRF, CSIS has four DR: “obtains relevant information and intelligence to carry out its national security activities, intelligence informs government decisions and actions relating to Canada’s security and national interests, threat reduction measures diminish threats to the security and safety of Canada and Canadians, and the assessments of the

Integrated Terrorism Assessment Centre (ITAC) inform Government of Canada's decisions and actions relating to the terrorism threat" (Canadian Security Intelligence Service [CSIS], 2020: 8). These four DR are delivered through six Programs: Operational Program Management, Regional Collection, Operations Enablement, Intelligence Assessment and Dissemination, Security Screening, and ITAC (CSIS, 2020: 8). ITAC is subject to the *CSIS Act* and housed within CSIS. It is the only federal entity that is tasked specifically to analyze the terrorism threat to Canada and Canadian interests abroad and is staffed by secondees from the federal S&I community as well as from provincial police services. The Centre's contributes to the prevention and reduction of the effects of terrorist incidents by distributing threat and risk assessments to members of the federal IC, provincial emergency authorities, first responders, and the private sector. In addition, it sets the National Terrorism Threat Level, which is the likelihood of an act of terrorism occurring in Canada (Carvin, 2020). Furthermore, ITAC also shares and receives security assessments from its international partners. On the issue of CSIS accountability and oversight, the Minister of PSEP receives an annual classified report from CSIS as well an unclassified annual report that the Minister tables in Parliament.

5.2.2.2 Communications Security Establishment

The Communications Security Establishment Canada (CSE) is accountable to the Minister of National Defence. It's powers are derived from *Communications Security Establishment Act* (*S.C. 2019, c. 13, s. 76*). Under the act, CSE's mandate has five aspects: foreign intelligence (*Part A*), cybersecurity and information assurance (*Part B*)¹⁷, technical and operational assistance (*Part C*), and defensive cyber operations and active cyber

¹⁷ Part A, B, C, and D are at times referred to as Mandate A, B, C, and D.

operations (*Part D*) (*CSE Act, 2019, sections 16-21*).¹⁸ The Agency reports to its minister through an annual report and to Cabinet through the intelligence priority process.

In delivering on its Part A, CSE is guided by the National SIGINT Priority List, which includes the Canadian Armed Forces requirements related to operational and tactical SIGINT needs. In addition, CSE responds to requests originating from other Canadian federal entities and international partners. Its intelligence product, referred to as EPRs, are short documents that report on single items, which may include a brief commentary but no assessment given the nature of SIGINT. On average the annually generated 10,000 reports are distributed to over 2,100 clients across the federal government. This does not mean that each client gets the full amount. Rather, the clients receive only those EPRs that are relevant to them (Robinson, 2020: 74-76).

On matters related to Part B, the focus is on information technology security of the federal government's systems, the protection of electronic information and information infrastructure outside of the federal government that it deems critical. However, for the latter it is only possible if the owner or operator of the infrastructure provides a written request (Robinson, 2020: 76).

For Part C, support can be provided to federal law enforcement, security agencies, and entities with a regulatory enforcement mandate. Examples on this kind of support could be linguistic support and decrypting a hard drive. However, from the federal family, the primary recipients of CSE's services under this Part are CSIS and the RCMP (Robinson, 2020: 77).

¹⁸ Given the sensitive nature of CSE, there is no entry in GCInfoBase.

Last, Part D is a very recent addition to CSE mandate, only since 2019. Given the nature of this authority and likely consequences, cyber operations activities can only be conducted if approved by the Minister of National Defence post consultation with Minister of Foreign Affairs due to potential international relations implications to Canada. An even tighter control exists for active cyber operations in that it requires a request or consent by the Minister of Foreign Affairs (Robinson, 2020: 77-78).

5.2.2.3 Financial Transactions and Reports Analysis Centre of Canada

The Financial Transactions and Reports Analysis Centre of (FINTRAC) is accountable to the Minister of Finance. FINTRAC is enabled by the *Proceeds of Crime (Money Laundering) and Terrorist Financing Act, S.C. 2000, c. 17*. As Canada's federal financial intelligence organization, it is mandated to:

assist in the detection, prevention and deterrence of money laundering and the financing of terrorist activities, while ensuring the protection of personal information under its control....to disrupt the ability of criminals and terrorist groups that seek to abuse Canada's financial system and to reduce the profit incentive of crime... operates at arm's length from the law enforcement agencies and other entities to which it is authorized to disclose financial intelligence. (GCInfobase, 2020).

The Centre has two CRs, both related to intelligence: compliance with anti-money laundering and anti-terrorism financing legislation and regulations; and production and dissemination of financial intelligence. Overall, all of its three DRs are relevant which consist of reporting entities are compliant with their anti-money laundering and anti-terrorism financing obligations and requirements, strategic financial intelligence informs policy and decision making, and tactical financial intelligence informs investigative actions. The intelligence elements are achieved through the Financial Intelligence Program which endeavors to ensure that tactical finance intelligence informs investigative actions

and the Strategic Intelligence, Research and Analytics Program which seeks to ensure that strategic financial intelligence informs policy and decision making (GCInfobase, 2020). The agency disseminates money laundering or terrorism financing information to authorized domestic and international entities. It also produces and distributes strategic intelligence about trends to both types of entities, some of which are posted on the agency's website (Pyrik, 2020). In terms of public reporting, the *Act* requires the Director of FINTRAC to submit an annual report to the Minister, which is made public (Financial Transactions and Reports Analysis Centre, 2020).

5.2.3 Non-specifically Mandated

5.2.3.1 Department of National Defence and the Canadian Armed Forces

Both the Department of National Defence (DND) and the Canadian Armed Forces (CAF) are accountable to the Minister of Defence. Working jointly, DND is led by the DM who is responsible for policy, resources, interdepartmental coordination and international defence relations. The CAF is led by the Chief of Defence Staff (CDS) who is responsible for command, control and administration of the CAF and military strategy, plans and requirements. DND/CAF are enabled by the *National Defence Act, R.S.C. 1985, c. N-5*. Their mandate is to:

stand ready to perform three key roles: Protecting Canada and defending our sovereignty; Defending North America in cooperation with the United States, Canada's closest ally; and Contributing to international peace and security through operations around the world, most often in partnership with allies from other countries (GCInfobase, 2020).

The department has the responsibility for overseeing the DRF. In all, DND has six CRs, of which two are relevant to intelligence: future force design and ready forces. In terms of DRs, the future force design aims to ensure that defence and security challenges are

addressed through innovative solutions and that defence capabilities are designed to meet future threats. The Intelligence Force Development Program contributes to these two DRs by making sure that the Canadian Forces Intelligence Command (CFINTCOM) provides near real-time support to operations and senior decision-makers. The DR for the ready forces CR is ensuring that CAF is ready to conduct concurrent operations. This result is delivered through the Ready Intelligence Forces Program whereby CFINTCOM elements meet force posture and readiness requirements (GCInfobase, 2020). CFINTCOM, is DND/CAF's lead organization for the intelligence function. Notwithstanding the DRF construct and CFINTCOM, intelligence elements within DND/CAF are also found in the army, navy, air force, special operations, Canadian Joint Operations Command, the Canadian Forces Information Operations Group, and the North American Aerospace Defence Command. The functional authority for DND/CAF intelligence resides with the Chief of Defence Intelligence (National Security and Intelligence Committee of Parliamentarians, 2020a).

5.2.3.2 Department of Foreign Affairs, Trade and Development

The Department of Foreign Affairs, Trade and International Development (DFATD), or better known as Global Affairs Canada (GAC), is responsible to the Minister of Foreign Affairs, the Minister of Small Business, Export Promotion and International Trade, and the Minister of International Development. The department is enabled by the *Department of Foreign Affairs, Trade and Development Act, S.C. 2013, c. 33, s. 174*. It is mandated to:

conduct of Canada's international relations, including foreign affairs, international trade and commerce, and international development. GAC advances Canada's values and interests internationally, delivers international programs, and administers Canada's international aid program to alleviate poverty in the developing world and provide humanitarian

assistance. The department provides commercial and consular services to Canadians at home and abroad, and manages the government of Canada's global network of missions (GCInfobase, 2020).

The intelligence function at GAC enables all of GAC's five CRs: development, peace and security programming; help for Canadians abroad; international advocacy and diplomacy; support for Canada's presence abroad; and trade and investment. In terms of GAC's sixteen DRs, a read of publicly available information would suggest that the following nine have an intelligence nexus: improved peace and security in countries and regions where Canada engages, Canadians have timely access to information and services that keeps them safer abroad, Canada builds and maintains constructive relationships that advance Canada's interests, Canada helps build strong international institutions and respect for international law, Canada's leadership on global issues contributes to a just and inclusive world, Canada's global influence is expanded and strengthened, personnel are safe, missions are more secure and government and partner assets and information are protected, and Canada helps to build and safeguard an open and inclusive rules-based global trading system. From GAC's 42 Programs, approximately half contribute towards the above identified DRs. Specific to intelligence, the International Security Policy and Diplomacy Program serves senior leadership within the Government of Canada through the provision of evidence-based intelligence and analysis to support decision-making on issues of peace and security, and provides policy guidance to ensure coherence between Canadian policy objectives and programming engagement (GCInfobase, 2020). Based on the CRs and DRs, the International Security Branch is most likely associated with GAC's overall intelligence function. The branch generates reports associated with national security and conflict, international security, and international trade and investment (Nesbitt, 2020).

5.2.3.3 Royal Canadian Mounted Police

The Royal Canadian Mounted Police (RCMP) reports to the Minister of Public Safety and Emergency Preparedness. It is enabled by the *Royal Canadian Mounted Police Act, R.S.C. 1985, c. R-10*, which mandates it to:

...preventing and investigating crime; maintaining peace and order; enforcing laws; contributing to national security; ensuring the safety of state officials, visiting dignitaries and foreign missions; and providing vital operational support services to other police and law enforcement agencies within Canada and abroad (GCInfobase, 2020).

From the RCMP's three CRs, two have a direct intelligence function: federal policing and national police service. These CRs are expected to deliver on two associated DRs: threats to the safety and security of the people of Canada and Canadian interests are detected, prevented, denied and responded to, and Canadian criminal investigations are enabled by specialized scientific, technical and investigative services. These expected results are delivered through the Intelligence Program that aims to enhance the RCMP's ability to advance operations and the Criminal Intelligence Service Canada (CISC) Programs which endeavors to generate actionable intelligence (GCInfobase, 2020). Although a RCMP Program, CISC is also a collaborative effort between Canada's 400 law enforcement agencies in order to detect, reduce, disrupt and prevent organized and serious crime through the production and sharing of intelligence (RCMP, 2019). Within the RCMP, the intelligence function is primarily carried out by the Federal Policing and Specialized Policing Services.

5.2.3.4 Canada Border Services Agency

The Canada Border Services Agency (CBSA) is accountable to the Minister of Public Safety and Emergency Preparedness. It is enabled by the *Canada Border Services*

Agency Act, S.C. 2005, c. 38 and Order-in-Council P.C. 2003-2066, providing its mandate to:

administering legislation that governs the admissibility of people and goods into and out of Canada; identifying, detaining, and removing people who are inadmissible to Canada; interdicting illegal goods at Canada's border; protecting food safety, plant and animal health, and Canada's resource base; administering trade legislation and agreements, including the enforcement of trade remedies that protect Canadian industry; administering a fair and impartial redress mechanism; and collecting duties and taxes on imported goods (GCInfobase, 2020).

CBSA has two CRs: border management and border enforcement, both rely on intelligence. However, it is within the enforcement responsibility that intelligence activities endeavor to identify and intercept high-risk people, goods, and conveyances that pose a threat to the security of Canadians. Specifically, the Targeting Program identifies people, goods and conveyances bound for Canada that may pose a threat to the security and safety of Canada and the Intelligence Collection and Analysis Program collects, interprets, and analyzes information and intelligence to produce border-related intelligence on people, goods and/or conveyances that may be inadmissible or pose a threat to the security of Canada, as well as on other border threats (GCInfobase, 2020). Within CBSA, the Intelligence and Enforcement Branch has primary responsibility for the intelligence function.

5.2.3.5 Transport Canada

The Department of Transport Canada (TC) is responsible to the Minister of Transportation. It receives its legislative authority through the *Department of Transport Act, R.S.C. 1985, c. T-18*. It is mandated to deliver on the:

Government of Canada's transportation policies and programs. The Department develops legislative and regulatory frameworks, and conducts transportation oversight through legislative, regulatory, surveillance and enforcement activities. While not directly responsible for all aspects or modes of transportation, the department plays a leadership role to ensure

that all parts of the transportation system across Canada work together effectively (GCInfobase, 2020).

TC has three CRs, including a safe and secure transportation system. The most relevant DR under this CR is a secure transportation system. There are about nine Programs that could potentially have a nexus to intelligence. Within TC, intelligence related activities primarily fall within the Safety and Security Group, in addition the areas that cover off aviation, marine, rail and multimodal/road security.

5.2.4 Oversight and Review

In addition to the individual departments and agencies of the IC being held accountable through Ministerial accountability, the government over the years has established several other means of providing external oversight and review of the IC in order to answer the question of, “Who guards the guardian?” (Gill and Phythian, 2012: 170). Although the words are at times used interchangeable, they perform different functions (Rempel, 2004; Shore, 2006). Review refers to an after-the-fact assessment, while oversight refers to an on-going assessment of the facts. The focus of the IC’s oversight and review bodies is in relation to compliance of legislation, regulations and policy. This focus conforms to western democratic concerns for a law-abiding IC because of the capability to intrude into the privacy of citizens, and the clandestine manner in which many intelligence organizations function. Oversight and review of the IC is provided by parliamentary committee system, Officers of Parliament, specifically designated entities, and central agencies.

5.2.4.1 Parliamentary Committee System

The parliamentary committee system regarding the IC directly and IC-related matters includes both House of Commons Committees and Senate Committees. The Standing Committee on Public Safety and National Security (SECU):

reviews legislation policies, programs and expenditure plans of government departments and agencies responsible for public safety and national security, policing and law enforcement, corrections and conditional release of federal offenders, emergency management, crime prevention and the protection of Canada's borders (SECU, 2020).

Recent examples of this committee's work includes the reviewing the *Annual Report of the National Security and Intelligence Committee of Parliamentarians*, studying *Bill C-59, An Act respecting national security matters*, and *Report 9: Protecting Canadians and their Rights: A New Road Map for Canada's National Security* (SECU, 2020).

The Standing Committee on National Defence (NDDN), "studies the Department of National Defence and the Canadian Armed Forces, as well as the domestic, continental and international security environment (Standing Committee on National Defence, 2020). Recent activities include reviewing *Main Estimates 2020-21: Vote 1 under Communications Security Establishment, Votes 1, 5, 10 and 15 under Department of National Defence, Vote 1 under Military Grievances External Review Committee, Vote 1 under Military Police Complaints Commission, Vote 1 under Office of the Intelligence Commissioner* (NDDN, 2020).

The Standing Committee on Foreign Affairs and International Development (FAAE), "studies matters related to international affairs, including Canada's foreign policy and development assistance. The government department under the Committee's scrutiny is the Department of Foreign Affairs, Trade and Development" (FAAE, 2020). Of interest is *Report 30 - Democratic Strain and Popular Discontent in Europe: Responding to the*

Challenges Facing Liberal Democracies and *Report 33: The Human Rights Situation in Iran* (FAAE, 2020).

The Standing Committee on Access to Information, Privacy and Ethics (ETHI), “studies matters related to the Office of the Information Commissioner of Canada, the Office of the Privacy Commissioner of Canada and the Office of the Commissioner of Lobbying of Canada, and certain issues related to the Office of the Conflict of Interest and Ethics Commissioner” (ETHI, 2020). Germane to the IC are *Report 17 - Democracy under Threat: Risks and Solutions in the Era of Disinformation and Data Monopoly* and *Report 5 - Safeguarding Canada's National Security While Protecting Canadians' Privacy Rights: Review of the Security of Canada Information Sharing Act (SCISA)* (ETHI, 2020).

The Standing Committee on Justice and Human Rights (JUST), “studies the bills, policies, programs and spending of the Department of Justice and the six federal agencies related to its portfolio” (JUST, 2020). Of interest is *Report 24 - Moving Forward in the Fight Against Human Trafficking in Canada* (JUST, 2020). The Standing Committee on Citizenship and Immigration (CIMM), “studies matters related to immigration and citizenship. It has oversight of Citizenship and Immigration Canada and the Immigration and Refugee Board of Canada, and monitors federal multiculturalism policy (CIMM, 2020). A review of their recent studies and activities suggests no work related to the IC.

5.2.4.2 Officers of Parliament

The **Auditor General of Canada** is supported by the Office of the Auditor General (OAG), which is the legislative audit office of the federal government. It is established under the *Auditor General Act, R.S.C. 1985, c. A-17* and the *Financial Administration Act, R.S.C. 1985, c. F-11*. It is mandated to conduct independent audits and studies that provide objective information, advice, and assurance to Parliament, territorial legislatures,

governments, and Canadians. OAG reports, tabled by the Minister of Finance, and testimony at parliamentary hearings assists Parliament in their work on the authorization and oversight of government spending and operations. This effort contributes to better-managed government programs and better accountability to Parliament (GCInfobase, 2020). Over the years, it has tabled several IC-related reports in Parliament. For instance, *Chapter 1 - National Security: Intelligence and Information Sharing* (Office of the Auditor General of Canada [OAG], 2009), *Chapter 3 - National Security in Canada—The 2001 Anti-Terrorism Initiative* (OAG, 2004), *Chapter 10 - Other Audit Observations - independent reviews of security and intelligence agencies* (OAG, 2003), *Chapter 28 - Follow-up of Recommendations in Previous Reports* (1998), and *Chapter 27 - The Canadian Intelligence Community - Control and Accountability* (OAG, 1996).

The **Information Commissioner of Canada** is served by the Office of the Information Commissioner (OIC), which is enabled by the *Access to Information Act, R.S.C., 1985, c. A-1*. The OIC is mandated to, “ensure that the rights conferred by the *Access to Information Act* are respected, which ultimately enhances transparency and accountability across the federal government” (GCInfobase, 2020). A key element of this mandate is tabling two annual reports through the Minister of Justice. The *OIC Annual Report* identifies deficiencies including those from the IC, such as nearly 20% of all complaints in early 2020 were associated with national security-related information (Office of the Information Commissioner [OIC], 2020a). The *Annual Report on the Administration of the Access to Information Act* reviews the OIC’s access to information activities (OIC, 2020b). Lastly, the OIC engages in awareness and recommendations activities such as the *A Declassification strategy for national security and intelligence records* (OIC, 2020c).

The **Privacy Commissioner of Canada** delivers their function through the Office of the Privacy Commissioner (OPC), which is enabled by the *Privacy Act, R.S.C. 1985 c. P-21* and the *Personal Information Protection and Electronic Documents Act, S.C. 2000, c. 5*. The OPC's mandate is to, “oversee compliance with both the *Privacy Act*, which covers the personal information-handling practices of federal government departments and agencies, and the *Personal Information Protection and Electronic Documents Act*, Canada's private-sector privacy law, along with some aspects of Canada's anti-spam law” (GCInfobase, 2020). As with the OIC, the Minister of Finance tables the *Annual Report to Parliament on the Privacy Act and the Personal Information Protection and Electronic Documents Act* (Office of the Privacy Commissioner [OPC], 2019). In addition, the OPC undertakes research projects including those of with a link to intelligence, for example, *Electronic Communications Interception and Privacy: Can the Imperatives of Privacy and National Security be Reconciled?* (OPC, 2012) and *Personal Information Protection in the Face of Crime and Terror: Information Sharing by Private Enterprises for National Security and Law Enforcement Purposes* (OPC, 2008).

5.2.4.3 Intelligence Commissioner

The Intelligence Commissioner heads the Office of the Intelligence Commissioner, which is an independent oversight body. Enabled by the *Intelligence Commissioner Act, S.C. 2019, c. 13, s. 50*, its mandate is, “performing an independent quasi-judicial review of the conclusions reached by Ministers in issuing certain ministerial authorizations and determinations for both the Communications Security Establishment and the Canadian Security Intelligence Service, concerning intelligence activities before they can be carried out” (GCInfobase, 2020).

5.2.4.4 National Security and Intelligence Review Agency

The National Security and Intelligence Review Agency (NSIRA) enabled by the *National Security and Intelligence Review Agency Act (S.C. 2019, c. 13, s. 2)*, is mandated as an, “independent and external review body that reports to Parliament. NSIRA reviews all Government of Canada national security and intelligence activities to ensure that they are lawful, reasonable and necessary. NSIRA also hears public complaints regarding key national security agencies and activities” (GCInfobase, 2020). The day-to-day work is conducted through the NSIRA Secretariat, which administratively falls under the PCO.

5.2.4.5 National Security and Intelligence Committee of Parliamentarians

The National Security and Intelligence Committee of Parliamentarians (NSICOP) is not a statutory parliamentary committee. Rather, it is an executive body whose membership consists of sitting parliamentarians that reports to the Leader of the Government in the House of Commons. It was created via the *National Security and Intelligence Committee of Parliamentarians Act (S.C. 2017, c. 15)* and is mandated to review:

- (a) the legislative, regulatory, policy, administrative and financial framework for national security and intelligence;
- (b) any activity carried out by a department that relates to national security or intelligence, unless the activity is an ongoing operation and the appropriate Minister determines that the review would be injurious to national security; and
- (c) any matter relating to national security or intelligence that a minister of the Crown refers to the Committee (GCInfobase, 2020).

On an annual basis, NSICOP tables its report in Parliament. As well, the committee can also table special reports, such as the *Special Report on the Collection, Use, Retention and Dissemination of Information on Canadians in the context of the Department of National Defence and the Canadian Armed Forces Defence Intelligence Activities* (National

Security and Intelligence Committee of Parliamentarians, 2020b). The committee is supported by the Secretariat of the NSICOP, which administratively resides in the PCO.

5.2.4.6 Treasury Board Secretariat

In terms of central agencies, pertinent to his research is the PCO, previously discussed, and the Treasury Board Secretariat (TBS). TBS is the organization that supports the President of the Treasury Board (TB). TBS is enabled by the *Financial Administration Act, R.S.C. 1985, c. F-11*. TBS has two concurrent mandates; first, as the administrative arm of the TB supports the Board as a committee of ministers; second, fulfils the statutory responsibilities of a central government agency. These two mandates are reflected in its four CRs, of which two are of interest to this research. Administrative leadership includes the DR of ensuring Canadians have timely access to government information. This is supported by the MAF Program which aims to ensure that departments across the GC have institutionalized modern management practices in support of the effective and efficient design and delivery of policies, programs and services to Canadians. The spending oversight CR corresponds to the DRs of reporting on government spending is clear and TB proposals contain information that helps Cabinet ministers make decisions. This CR is achieved via three programs. The Expenditure Data, Analysis, Results, and Reviews Programs seeks that government organizations measure and evaluate their programs' performance, government organizations use results and expenditure information to improve programs and allocate resources, so that Parliamentarians and the public can understand what government achieves and the resources used. The Government-Wide Funds Program' goal is to ensure that central funds contribute to timely spending as required. The Oversight and Treasury Board Support Program has an anticipated result that TBS provide timely feedback on submissions (GCInfobase, 2020). Within TBS, as it

relates to this research, the three areas have a direct implication: the Expenditure Management Sector (EMS) supports TBS' role in the government's broader expenditure management system, the International Affairs, Security and Justice Sector is the program sector for the national security and intelligence entities, and the Office of the Chief Information Officer, which is responsible for TB's Policy on Security.

5.2.5 Supporting

5.2.5.1 Department of Justice

The Department of Justice (DOJ) falls under the responsibility of the Minister of Justice and Attorney General of Canada. The Department operates within the confines of the *Department of Justice Act (R.S.C., 1985, c. J-2)*. It has an extensive mandate, relevant to this chapter is, “the provision of legal advice to the Government and federal government departments and agencies, represents the Crown in civil litigation and before administrative tribunals, and drafts legislation and regulations” (GCInfobase, 2020). This corresponds to its CRs of justice system support and legal services with the DRs of laws and policies abide by the rule of law and promote respect for rights and a fair, accessible; and relevant legal framework in Canada. departments and agencies receive high quality legal services. Collectively, the Legal Policies, Laws and Governance Program, Advisory Service Program, Legislative Services Program, Program contribute towards achieving this CR (GCInfobase, 2020). Within the Department, the provision of legal service on matters of national security and intelligence fall to the Public Safety, Defence and Immigration Portfolio Branch; whilst, on matters of human rights law, constitutional and administrative law, information law and privacy, and international public and private law resides within the Public Law and Legislative Services Branch. In addition, the department also

undertakes relevant research, for example *The Views of Canadian Scholars on the Impact of the Anti-Terrorism Act* (Department of Justice, 2005).

5.2.6 Intelligence Sharing

This section examines the elusive intelligence sharing, which consists of intelligence that is shared among the IC. Also, sharing can include other domestic and international partners that may or may not work within their respective IC. In terms of the intelligence cycle, intelligence sharing usually occurs at two phases. The originator of the intelligence shares with others in the dissemination phase. The recipient of the intelligence receives intelligence in the collection phase.

A quick observation on the usage of intelligence sharing as a term. In the literature, other terms have been interchangeably used, for example, intelligence liaison, intelligence co-operation, and intelligence exchange (Svendsen, 2009). As well, in some instances information sharing has been used in place of intelligence sharing (Roach, 2012). A key differentiation between the use of information and intelligence is that the former consists of the raw data, while the latter consists of analyzed information. In other words, facts versus the interpretation of the facts. Given that in the public domain, it is not always possible to make the distinction on the type of sharing both intelligence and information forms of sharing are deemed interchangeable.

If understanding the IC is sufficiently challenging on its own, understanding the nature of sharing intelligence adds a new layer of challenges given the secrecy surrounding the actual content that is shared. As well, there are the actual arrangements, formal and informal, allowing the sharing that are in almost all cases are out of bounds to the general public (Roach, 2012). This is not surprising because in the Canadian context, and likely

elsewhere, intelligence sharing tends to be a sensitive area as suggested by the limited scholarship on the topic. Perhaps, the exception being when information sharing contributes to things going sideways resulting in public inquiries. Furthermore, this sensitivity is also observable in Canada's *Access to Information Act* (1985) section 13(1) in that:

Subject to subsection (2), the head of a government institution shall refuse to disclose any record requested under this Part that contains information that was obtained in confidence from

- (a) the government of a foreign state or an institution thereof;
- (b) an international organization of states or an institution thereof;
- (c) the government of a province or an institution thereof;
- (d) a municipal or regional government established by or pursuant to an Act of the legislature of a province or an institution of such a government; or
- (e) an aboriginal government.

The Canadian IC, like those of other western countries, has always been in the business of information sharing (Lefebvre, 2003), although the sharing has increased since 9/11. This is in response to an ever-increasing complex operating environment and the transnational nature of threats. More than ever before, the reason for sharing intelligence is because the IC' entities are dependent on intelligence that might be held elsewhere in order to be successful.

The sharing of intelligence occurs at four different levels. First, between the federal entities themselves. Second, between the federal entities and those of other levels of government - provinces, territories, and municipalities. Third, between the federal level and Canadian non-governmental entities such as the private sector. Fourth, between Canada and other countries through bilateral and multilateral arrangements. In sharing intelligence, there are several considerations: why share?, what is shared?, how much is shared?, and the frequency of sharing?. In determining whether or not to share intelligence,

scholars suggest that an IC goes through a type of cost/benefit analysis (Richelson, 1990; Aldrich, 2002).

A potential cost for intelligence sharing is the notion of defection. This refers to the idea that the recipient of intelligence is further shared to an unauthorized party which can lead to operational and/or political consequences to the originator of the intelligence. Another potential cost is the provision of inaccurate, incomplete, or fabricated intelligence (Walsh, 2007). In terms of severity, the inaccurate and incomplete intelligence are lesser in that it can be expected that intelligence is rarely accurate or complete. However, the fabrication of intelligence has a nefarious tone in that the provider of intelligence is likely attempting to influence the recipient's perspective towards one that is favorable to the provider. Another cost is that it is not always possible to monitor and assess whether the parties follow the terms of the arrangements.

Notwithstanding the potential costs, there exist potential benefits. A primary reason for sharing intelligence is that no intelligence entity can realistically have access to all the intelligence that it requires (Walsh, 2007). This includes the United States with its global intelligence reach that a \$84 billion IC budget affords it (Office of the Director of National Intelligence, 2021). Under this condition of intelligence sharing, intelligence gaps are reduced by using somebody else's intelligence. However, intelligence sharing is generally driven by a country's national interests (Lefebvre, 2003). Another reason for intelligence sharing is that it allows each party in an arrangement to specialize (Walsh, 2007). The specialization can take many forms such as geographical area of coverage or type of collection discipline. However, specialization can have a cost, for instance if for reason x the party responsible for specialization in y does not deliver, then the other party has no

access to specialization y generated intelligence. A third benefit of intelligence sharing is that it can readily accommodate unequal partners (Walsh, 2007) – where a party constantly has the overwhelming intelligence. In this situation, the intelligence provider can exchange intelligence for political support on matters that are deemed important to them – something of a ‘I scratch your back and you scratch my back’. It becomes quite obvious that a major underlying principle to intelligence sharing is trust. Hence, in as much as there are operational rationales for intelligence sharing, there are also political rationales.

To gain an appreciation of what goes into information sharing, including sharing methods, we will use the Canadian policing community, which deals mainly with criminal intelligence, as a proxy because it is less hidden behind secrecy. As background, policing in Canada is administered on three levels municipal, provincial, and federal. At the municipal level, there were 137 stand-alone police services and 36 First Nations self-administered services. At the provincial level, there is the Royal Newfoundland Constabulary covering St. John's, Corner Brook and Labrador West, the Ontario Provincial Police with 183 detachments across Ontario, and the Sûreté du Québec with 87 detachments across Québec. Federally and in providing contract policing, the RCMP consists of 672 detachments across Canada (Statistics Canada, 2019). These basic facts quickly shine the light on the need to share information across a broad community in order for policing to protect and serve.

A study by LeBeuf and Paré (2005) illuminates the realities of information sharing through their examination of police sharing information in Canada. On matters of how information is shared, their survey found that face-to-face was the primary method (96%) for sharing within the organization, while the telephone was the primary approach (96%)

for sharing outside their organization. In terms of granting outsiders access to one's own database, the rate dropped to 23%. The study noted that the content of the information shared significantly impact on how they shared information (over 90% at the federal level and nearly 80% at the municipal level). The frequency of always sharing information was highest within their unit (68%) and organization (51%), with a drastic drop to those outside the organization (13%). There was high trust (87%) in the IT security, although the level of trust dropped with regards to email (61%). Sharing entails a recipient, knowing the recipient was identified as in important factor to sharing information outside the organization (65%). The survey found that there was an exceedingly high degree of abiding to legal rules and policies (95%), thus police are self-censoring who will not share until permission is formally granted. The research found that the main reason for sharing information was to be more efficient (95%) with sharing only when receiving a request at a low 10%. The study's findings suggest that police mostly share what they think might be useful (58%), followed by what is requested (26%), and everything that they have (16%). The authors draw three conclusions from their study:

1. Personal human contact is the preferred mode of information sharing
2. Knowledge of and trust in the recipient and information technology increases rates of information transfer
3. Support in the form of clear guidance for when, how and if information can be shared and give permission to do so (LeBeuf and Paré, 2005: 23).


To better appreciate potential impediments to information sharing, we rely on a survey-based study of three Canadian police forces in which respondents replied to the question, "In my agency, the greatest impediment(s) to the sharing of valid information and knowledge is/are..." (Abrahamson and Goodman-Delahunty, 2014: 6). In descending order of impediment factor, the results are contained in Table 4.

Table 4 Impediment Factors to Information Sharing

Impediment Factor	Definition	Survey Results (%)
Processes and technology	Internal and external information sharing processes, systems, policies, and/or technologies.	24
Individual unwillingness	Individual unwillingness to share information/knowledge due to personal attitudes, values, beliefs or actions.	21
Organizational unwillingness	Unit, department, or agency level unwillingness to share information with other units or departments internally and/or externally.	15
Workload/overload	Shortage of time, work overload, or general inability to deal with the information/workload.	12
Physical location/structure	The way the organization or policing generally is structured or located in the area or region.	10
None-unknown	No perceived or known barrier.	7
Leadership	Lack of direction, feedback, or support from the senior management team about information and knowledge sharing.	6
Risk management	Investigative or organizational risk management.	4

Source: Based on Abrahamson and Goodman-Delahunty, 2014.

According to Abrahamson and Goodman-Delahunty's (2014) approach, the relationship between impediments and organizational considerations are illustrated in Figure 6. The three key groupings are organizational technology, organizational structure, and organizational culture. The one change that this researcher proposes is the link between the organizational culture and the organizational technology and structure, respectively (represented by the dashed line arrow). The rationale for the addition is that organizational culture is a determinant factor on the two other groupings.



Source: Based on Abrahamson and Goodman-Delahunty (2014).

Figure 8 Relationship between Impediment Factors to Information Sharing and Organizational Considerations

Given the sensitivities and legal consideration associated with information sharing, Shore and colleagues (2016) undertook a constitutional and legislative analysis to examine the interjurisdictional consideration to information sharing and national security. On constitutional matters, “both federal and provincial governments have legitimate constitutional interest in public safety and security” (Shore, et.al., 2016: 238). Specifically, section 91 coverage of “Laws for the Peace, Order, and good Government of Canada” and subsection 91(7) provision for “Militia, Military and Naval Service, and Defence” makes national security primarily a federal matter. As well, to a much lesser extend a provincial matter under subsection 92(14) “The Administration of Justice in the Province”. In other words, co-operative federalism provides both levels of government an active co-operative role on matters of national security (Ibid, 214), including the sharing of intelligence to carry out national security activities.

There are also several pieces of legislation that permit the sharing of information, according to legal scholars (Shore, et.al., 2016). In their examination of the *Canada Evidence Act*, the *Immigration and Refugee Protection Act*, the *Privacy Act*, they assessed that yes, they limit the public disclosure of information that has a nexus to national security. However, these pieces of legislation do not limit the sharing of said information between jurisdictions. In addition, they examined three additional pieces of legislation - the *Department of Public Safety and Emergency Preparedness Act*, the *Emergency Management Act*, and the *CSIS Act* - that by their very nature actually encourage the cooperation, including information sharing, between jurisdictions.

It is remarked that the narrowest interpretation of the law is likely an outcome of cultural and institutional factors and its manifestation on how people and organizations relate to one another (Shore, et.al., 2016: 229-234). If that is the case, then there is support to the findings noted above with regards to the policing studies. When each factor is taken on its own or combined together, three potential rationales for not sharing emerge. First, the ‘mosaic effect’ is when one piece of information is combined with other pieces of information that over a time period and sufficient pieces of information a complete picture surfaces – hence just like a mosaic which is an assemblage of many small pieces. Hence, if small pieces of information are shared, somebody can piece them together, so best not to share any piece of information. Second, an overemphasis on an entity’s mandate, in particular the RCMP and CSIS. For years, it has been argued that law enforcement and intelligence have different rationales for not sharing (i.e., the possibility of making methods and sources public in a court of law and potentially harming future intelligence collection). In this case, it has been stated that this is an overly legalistic and technical interpretation of

the respective legislative authorities. Third, the need-to-know principle. In short, the owner of a piece of information determines whether another party needs to know that piece of information. This raises the simple question of how does one know what somebody else might require in order to protect citizens from potential threats and harm? In the pursuit of this rationale, there is a tendency for compartmentalization that naturally increases silos – sometimes even within an entity itself. Although, it has been suggested that the IC should move towards a need-to-share model (Jones, 2007). When efforts are made to share, there is a tendency for process to slow things down to ensure that the need-to-know barrier is not justified. This third rationale is quite often associated with the connect the dots problem.

In addition to the above legislative authorities and those mandating the IC entities, the *Security of Canada Information Disclosure Act (SCIDA)* is an essential piece of legislation that encourages and authorizes the disclosure of information applicable to 17 entities identified in Schedule 3 of the *Act*, while protecting the privacy of Canadians. The shared information has to be linked to activities that undermine security, thus excluding lawful advocacy, protest, or dissent. Notwithstanding the specific named entities, the *Act* does not limit other federal entities from disclosing information on their own or in response to a request from the named entities under the *Act*. Furthermore, it does not change or provide an additional authority to collect, use or retain information. Also, it does not extend any authority to information sharing beyond those identified entities such as provinces, territories, municipalities, private sector or international. Of note is the private sector, given that elements of Canada's critical infrastructure¹⁹ resides in the private sector. A

¹⁹ For example: energy and utilities, finance, food, information and communication technology, manufacturing, and transportation.

recent consideration are universities given the knowledge that resides in these institutions and foreign countries' interest in illegally acquiring that knowledge.

The Act's sections collectively work towards balancing national security and privacy. Section 5 covers the disclosure of information, consisting of several elements. First, the information received by an entity contributes to their jurisdiction or carrying out their responsibilities. Second, the disclosing entity is satisfied that the released information does not impinge on a person's privacy. Third, the disclosing entity needs to provide a statement regarding the accuracy and reliability of the information. Last, there is a requirement to destroy or return the information to the originator if the information is not required by the recipient to carry out their mandate. To note, CSIS cannot use *SCIDA* to disclose information to other entities. As well, a request for disclosure can consist of bulk data. Therefore, one request may not necessarily relate to one individual. In addition, the disclosing entity can place caveats on the information with regards to the use of the information. Last, Section 4 provides for the use of information sharing agreements especially for entities that regularly share information in order to achieve greater efficacy and the protection of a person's privacy. TBS provides guidance on such agreements through its *Guidance on Preparing Information Sharing Agreements Involving Personal Information*.

Section 9 covers the requirements for record keeping, with the exception of CSIS which is exempted from this requirement. The disclosing entity needs to describe the information, name the individual who authorized the disclosure, name the recipient entity, the disclosure date, a description of the information that the disclosure relied upon, and any other relevant information. The recipient entity needs to record the description of the

information, the name of the disclosing entity, the name or position of the recipient, the date of receiving the information, the status of the information – including destruction or returned information with date of action taken, and any other relevant information. A key record keeping requirement is that both the originator and recipient provide the NSIRA with a copies of their records within a set timeframe.

NSIRA, along with the NSICOP, both provide an oversight function on the use of the *SCIDA*. In 2021, the NSIRA and the OPC undertook a joint review of the federal institutions' disclosures of information under the *Act*. Table 5 includes the last six months of 2019 and all of 2020.²⁰ The main disclosing entity during this time period was the Immigration, Refugee and Citizenship Canada (66%) followed by DFATD (25%). The primary recipients were CSIS (39%) and the RCMP (33%). It does not come as a surprise with CSIS and the RCMP being the primary recipient of disclosed information due to the nature of their mandates. Last, to assist with capacity building and efficacy in the sharing of information, the PSEP has a Strategic Coordination Centre on Information.

²⁰ For 2019, only the last six months are reflected due to *SCIDA* coming into effect mid-2019.

Table 5 Disclosing Entity and Recipient Entity

Disclosing Entity	Recipient Entity										
	CRA	CSIS	CSE	DFATD	FINTRAC	IRCC	PSEP	RCMP	TC	CAF	Totals
Canada Border Service Agency (CBSA)		2						5			7
Canada Revenue Agency (CRA)											
Canadian Armed Forces (CAF)											
Dept Foreign Affairs, Trade and Int'l Development (DFATD)		48	1			4	1	28			82
Financial Transaction and Report Analysis Report Centre of Canada (FINTRAC)											
Immigration, Refugees, and Citizenship Canada (IRCC)		78	65					73	1	1	218
Public Safety and Emergency Preparedness (PSEP)											
Royal Canadian Mounted Police (RCMP)	4			6	1	6				1	18
Transport Canada (TC)								3			3
Other Entity not covered under SCIDA		1									1
Total	4	129	66	6	1	10	1	109	1	2	329

Source: Compiled from NSIRA (2020) and NSIRA and OPC (2021)

In the examination of the domestic information sharing landscape one can make the generalization that it is not easy one to navigate. As we move to the international information sharing scene, the challenges posed by crossing the border is only magnified. The analysis of the international dimension to information sharing can be explored from two perspectives: Canada as the originator and Canada as the recipient. When Canada shares information with another country or supranational entity, who receives the information is critical. For instance, if the recipient is a western country that has a strong rule of law in place, there is less concern with respect to the information resulting in abuse, breach of privacy, violation of human rights, torture, or death (Roach, 2012). The same

cannot be said for sharing information with a country whose human rights record and adherence to the rule of law is questionable. The Arar case is one such example where information provided by Canadian authorities indirectly contributed to the torture of a Canadian citizen (Roach, 2012). There are many factors that goes into determining whether Canada should share information with doubtful regimes – some of these are practical, while others are political. As was the case with the Arar case, when the sharing goes askew and secrecy cannot contain the consequences, a political issue arises. To mitigate the misuse of the shared information, Canadian authorities may add caveats on how the information and shared. However, there is no guarantee that the recipient will follow the caveats. Complicating matters even further is that at times it is not always possible to monitor and assess whether the recipient is abiding by the sharing arrangement (Roach, 2012).

On the flip side, Canada being the recipient also has its potential pitfalls. For example, Canada may not always be fully aware on how the information was collected – was the information extracted through abuse, breach of privacy, violation of human rights, or torture. In some instances, the other country is unlikely to divulge the methods or sources of the information. In other cases, trying to assess the method and source of the information may not always be possible (Roach, 2012). Canadian authorities either as an originator or as a recipient appear to constantly be operating in an environment of constant ‘what if’ – what if Canada does not share and an event of mass casualties occurs abroad, and it becomes public knowledge that Canada could have prevented it or what if we don’t accept information that originated through questionable method by another country, and an event of mass casualties occurs in Canada, and it becomes public knowledge that

Canadian authorities could have prevented the event. In both hypothetical examples – the decision resides in politics, legalities, and ethics. What is definitely clear is the distortion of accountability associated with information sharing – not clear, nor concise (Roach, 2012).

The following are offered as examples of publicly available information sharing practices in place by the various entities of the IC. The RCMP shares information through the Criminal Intelligence Service and the Canadian Police Information Centre; CBSA has information sharing agreements with CSIS, IRCC, and the RCMP; the CRA and the RCMP had a memorandum of understanding in 2012; the CSIS and DFATD had a memorandum of understanding in 2016; and 16 of the 17 entities under SCIDA have frameworks in place (National Security Intelligence Review Agency and Office of the Privacy Commissioner of Canada, 2020); CSIS has more than 300 foreign relationships in 150 countries and territories (CSIS, 2021); and CSE entered into new partnerships with the 16 critical infrastructure sectors²¹ (Communications Security Establishment, 2022). However, a most critical and unique international information sharing relationship is the of the Five Eyes community.

On matters of foreign intelligence, Canada has long been dependent on other countries' intelligence. A key contributing factor for this situation, is the lack of a dedicated foreign intelligence entity such as the American Central Intelligence Agency or the British Secret Intelligence Service. According to Clément (2018), Canada's integration into the global intelligence-sharing networks were primarily driven by two events. The

²¹ Health, safety, food, water, energy, transport, finance, manufacturing, information and communications technology, academia, innovation, federal government, provincial / territorial / municipal government, democratic institutions, small and medium organizations, and Canadian citizens.

first was the Gouzenko affair right after the end of World War II, which was enveloped within the West's anti-communist efforts. This opened the way for Canada's formal integration into the Americana and British intelligence network. Second, the Montreal Olympics in 1976 but precluded by the October 1970 FLQ situation, saw a shift from anti-communism to anti-terrorism due to the acts of terrorism at the Munich Olympics four years earlier. This event resulted in new programs to adjust to the reality – Quiet Diplomacy program, Overseas Liaison program, and the Threat Assessment Infrastructure program – collectively these programs assisted in Canada connecting to a broader intelligence network.

The Five Eyes community originated in 1946 as a result of a SIGINT agreement between the British, represented by the Government Communications Headquarters (GCHQ) and the US, represented by the National Security Agency (NSA) resulting in the BRUSA Agreement, afterwards becoming UKUSA. In 1949, Canada (via CSE) and the USA SIGINT authorities undertook a formal intelligence sharing based on a seven-page document that came to be known as CANUSA Agreement. Key to note with respect to the document was the full dissemination principle, the technology behind the collection, traffic analysis, and the targets communications techniques (Wark, 2020). This arrangement was expanded to include the Australian Defence Signals Directorate (DSD) and New Zealand's Government Communications Security Bureau (GCSB) in 1956. Since its origins, the sharing of intelligence has moved beyond SIGINT, it now includes a number of other INTs represented by national intelligence entities beyond the NSA, GCHQ, CSE, DSD, and GCSB. The Five Eyes (FVEY), as it is more commonly known instead of the longer

AUS/CAN/NZ/UK/US EYES ONLY (Pfluke, 2019), has become an intelligence-sharing supra-national entity of immense reach and capability.

The FVEY arrangement is totally dependent on trust, in that intelligence provided by one party and used by another party will not result in the originator being revealed without prior authorization (Pfluke, 2019). Another distinct aspect of the arrangement is that each country is assigned an area of coverage: Australia covers South and east Asia; New Zealand covers South pacific and Southwest Asia; the UK covers all of Europe and Western Russia; the US covers Eastern Russia, Latin America, the North Atlantic and Pacific; and Canada covers the Arctic (Cox, 2012). Within this arrangement, Canada is a junior partner within the FVEY who receives more intelligence than it puts into the system. Last, there appears to be a no-spy pact in that the five countries do not collect intelligence about the citizens of the other country (Pfluke, 2019).

This arrangement was so secret that it was not until 1999 that it was made public by the Australian due to the revelation of the NSA's managed ECHELON system. It is an interception system which differs from other intelligence systems due to two distinct features:

The first such feature attributed to it is the capacity to carry out quasi-total surveillance. Satellite receiver stations and spy satellites in particular are alleged to give it the ability to intercept any telephone, fax, Internet or e-mail message sent by any individual and thus to inspect its contents. The second unusual feature of ECHELON is said to be that the system operates worldwide on the basis of cooperation proportionate to their capabilities among several states (the UK, the USA, Canada, Australia and New Zealand), giving it an added value in comparison to national systems: the states participating in ECHELON (UKUSA states) can place their interception systems at each other's disposal, share the cost and make joint use of the resulting information (European Parliament, 2001: 23).

Notwithstanding the various arrangements with their respective protocols and safeguards in place, they at times do create noise due to security breaches and leaks. In Canada, there are two recent events that illustrate consequences of security breaches. First, sub-lieutenant Delisle had spied for the Russians by accessing and selling intelligence material to them. The intelligence was apparently taken from Stoneghost (FVEY network), Spartan (DND network), and Mandrake (Canadian intra-government network) (Cox, 2012). According to public reporting, the damage assessment from this security breach was assessed as ‘severe and irreparable’ by CSIS, ‘high’ by CSE, and ‘exceptionally grave’ by DND (Freeze and Taber, 2012). Second, Cameron Ortis who was the RCMP’s Director General for the National Intelligence Coordination Centre was charged with sharing operational information and preparing to share sensitive information with a foreign entity or terrorist organization. The information related to Canadian national security assets with wider implications to Canadian relations with its allies (Tunney, 2020).

On the question of leaks, an example par excellence is Wikileaks²² created by Julian Assange and the material provided to it by former US army intelligence analyst Chelsea Manning who had leaked classified information - 380,000 military incident reports in Iraq, 90,000 battlefield logs from Afghanistan, and 250,000 State Department messages (Thanh Ha, 2013). Of potential concern to Canada was the material related to Afghanistan given Canada’s military operation in that country. Another example is Edward Snowden, a former computer intelligence consultant, who leaked NSA information and FVEY global

²² Interesting to note that, “there is evidence that students and academics have been advised against informing themselves through primary sources documents found on skites such as WikiLeaks. In 2010, several US universities warned their student bodies via email that future careers might be jeopardized by looking at “sensitive material” on the WikiLeaks website... In 2015, former US Senator Cynthia McKinney was forced to remove all references to WikiLeaks-derived materials in order to complete her dissertation (Ruby, et.al., 2017: 359).

surveillance systems through *The Washington Post* and *The Guardian*. Of concern to the IC was the leak of collection methods such as PRISM, which permits the collection of all sources of digital information (e.g., e-mails, social media) both metadata and content (Walsh and Miller, 2016) or MUSCULAR which allows access to Yahoo and Google's data centers worldwide (Gellman and Soltani, 2013).

The leaks directly implicated Canada in number of ways. It was publicly reported that CSE used Wi-Fi at airports to track Canadian travellers – although under CSE's mandate it is illegal to collect on Canadians in Canada, at the request of the NSA CSE established espionage posts in approximately 20 countries, Canada allowed the NSA to conduct operations in Canada during G8 and G20 summits, Canadian embassies are used to eavesdrop, and Canada collected metadata of phone and emails to and from Brazil's Mines and Energy Ministry (CBC News, 2014). These illustrations speak directly to operating outside legislative mandates, privacy breaches, and negatively impacting foreign relations. As well, it shines a spotlight on the ethical dimension of intelligence practice for both the entities and its employees (Walsh and Miller, 2016) in terms of complicity regarding the problem of intent, the problem of power, the problem of choice, and the problem of identity (Manjikian, 2015).

5.3 Summary

This chapter examined the notion of intelligence and the composition of the Canadian IC, and intelligence sharing. In terms of understanding intelligence, it was established that the function encompasses five key concepts: First, the intelligence process or intelligence cycle consist of four major phases: direction, collection, processing, and dissemination. Although, giving the appearance of an ordered reality, the day-to-day

reality is not as clear-cut. Second, the intelligence product was explored in terms of type and characteristics (Table 3). Third, it was established that some level of secrecy exists in most organizations. Within the context of intelligence, the key issue is finding an appropriate balance between the need for national security secrecy versus the need for transparency in a democracy; it is not a zero-sum proposition. Fourth, intelligence's primary *raison d'être* is to support policy/decision-making, with the acceptance that intelligence is an important but at times a junior partner in this endeavor. Fifth, determining which organizations constitute the Canadian IC is not an easy task given the lack of an official decree. The selection of the entities that constitute the IC was based on an understanding of community as a concept, examining enabling legislation and mandates, and the researcher's experiential knowledge.

The entities of the IC were classified into five categories: direction and coordination, specifically mandated, non-specifically mandated, oversight and review, and supporting. Also, an analysis of intelligence sharing was offered including the FVEY relationship. The specific entities that fall under each category are summarized in Table 6. In addition, the table summarizes by entity, if applicable, the categories of intelligence and collection discipline associated.

Within the government there exists a classified National Intelligence Expenditure Report, which is limited to the IC's intelligence priorities and does not capture the full expenditures. However, there is no publicly available expenditure information (dollars and Full-Time Employees (FTEs²³)) for the IC, an attempt is made to determine this

²³ FTEs (Full-Time Equivalent) are active employees (i.e., employees who are not on leave without pay) full-time and part-time employees of all employment tenures (indeterminate, term, casual and student), Governor-in-Council appointees, deputy ministers, and federal judges. It is calculated as a ratio of assigned

information. To the best of this researcher's knowledge, no previous attempt has been made to estimate the IC's expenditures and FTEs. The intent is to provide a level of magnitude and not precision.

Some general observations can be drawn from the estimated expenditure and FTE information. The total IC budget is estimated at \$1.826B. If we apply a 10% minus / plus range, the budget falls between \$1.643B and \$2.009B. The expenditures by category as a percentage consists of direction and coordination (1.9%), specifically mandated (62.5%), non-specifically mandated (34.2%), oversight and review (0.8%), and supporting (0.7%). In terms of FTEs, it is estimated at 8,211, applying the same 10% range, FTEs falls between 7,390 and 9,032. The FTEs by category as a percentage consists of direction and coordination (2.2%), specifically mandated (60.7%), non-specifically mandated (33.9%), oversight and review (1.2%), and supporting (2.0%). It is not surprising that the largest segments of expenditures and FTEs are allocated to the mandatory entities. An interesting observation is that 0.8% of expenditures and 1.2% of FTEs are assigned to the oversight and review role. This can raise the issue of whether there exists sufficient capacity within the system to effectively watch the IC.

Our understanding of intelligence provides a natural springboard into the next chapter, which examines what makes the IC different from other policy domains. This examination will be anchored on the contingency approach developed in Chapter 3.

hours of work to scheduled hours of work. Scheduled hours of work are set out in collective agreements, where applicable (GCInfobase, 2020).

Table 6 Summary of the Canadian Intelligence Community

IC Categories	Category of Intelligence	Collection Disciplines	Fiscal Year 2019-20 ¹	
			\$Millions	FTEs
Direction and Coordination				
PM and PMO ²	-----	-----	10	-----
PCO	Foreign, Military (Defence), Security, Criminal	-----	13	94
PSEP	Security, Criminal	-----	11 ³	90 ⁴
sub-total			34	184
Specifically Mandated				
CSIS	Security	HUMINT, TECHINT	501 ⁵	2,625 ⁶
CSE	Foreign, Military (Defence), Security, Criminal	SIGINT, TECHINT	624 ⁷	2,257 ⁸
FINTRAC	Security, Criminal	FININT	16	102
sub-total			1,141	4,984
Non-specifically Mandated				
DND / CAF	Military(Defence), Security	IMINT, HUMINT, SIGINT, TECHINT	240 ⁹	1,054 ¹⁰
DFATD	Foreign, Security	HUMINT	108	54
RCMP	Security, Criminal	HUMINT, SIGINT, TECHINT	105 ¹¹	594 ¹²
RCMP/CISC	Criminal	-----	8	46
CBSA	Security, Criminal	HUMINT	155	900
TC	Security	-----	8 ¹³	134 ¹⁴
sub-total			624	2,782
Oversight and Review				
Parliamentary Committees	-----	-----	-----	-----
Officers of Parliament				
OAG	-----	-----	2 ¹⁵	10 ¹⁶
Information and Privacy Commissioner	-----	-----	2 ¹⁷	14 ¹⁸
Intelligence Commissioner	-----	-----	1	6
NSIRA	-----	-----	3	22
NSICOP	-----	-----	2	9
TBS	-----	-----	21 ¹⁹	15 ²⁰
TBS/MAF	-----	-----	2	20
sub-total			14	96
Supporting				
DOJ	-----	-----	13 ²¹	165 ²²
TOTAL			1,826	8,211

Source: Author (2023)

Notes:

¹ Unless noted below, these figures reflect rounded off actuals for fiscal year 2019-20 (GCInfobase, 2020). The notes (3 to 23) outline the assumptions for estimate figures for the respective entity.

² Ministers' exempt staff are excluded from the FTE count (GCInfobase, 2020).

³ 50% of actual resources (\$22.1M), to represent approximately a 50% split between the S&I functions within the respective PSEP Programs.

⁴ 50% of actual FTEs (181 FTEs), to represent approximately a 50% split between the S&I functions within the respective PSEP Programs.

⁵ Actuals (\$611M) minus 18% which represents those resources assigned to internal services. On average entities will have between 15-20% of allocated resources go towards internal services. The internal services are management and oversight services, communications services, legal services, human resources management services, financial management services, information management services, information technology services, real property services, materiel services, acquisition services, and travel and other administrative services (GCInfobase, 2020).

⁶ FTEs are not identified in GCInfobase (2020) because the entity's employee data is not available in the regional or Phoenix pay system. As well, Littlewood (2020), notes that CSIS use to publicly provide a precise count but now only public states 'over 3,200'. Using 3,200 as the basis, 18% is subtracted to represent internal services.

⁷ Actuals (\$761M) minus 18% which represents those resources assigned to internal services.

⁸ Actuals (2,752 FTEs) minus 18% which represents those resources assigned to internal services.

⁹ To the actuals (\$218.3M) an additional 10% has been added to account for intelligence budgets that is dispersed throughout the remainder of DND/CAF that may not necessarily be captured in the intelligence associated Programs.

¹⁰ To the actuals (958 FTEs) an additional 10% has been added to account for intelligence personnel that is dispersed throughout the remainder of DND/CAF that may not necessarily be captured in the intelligence associated Programs.

¹¹ To the actuals (\$95.4M) an additional 10% has been added to account for the incorporation of intelligence-led policing throughout the entity that may not neatly fall within the identified Programs.

¹² To the actuals (\$540 FTEs) an additional 10% has been added to account for the incorporation of intelligence-led policing throughout the entity that may not neatly fall within the identified Programs.

¹³ Actuals (\$82M) minus 90% to reflect very all encompassing Programs of which intelligence-like activities is likely a small portion of the Programs.

¹⁴ Actuals (1,337 FTEs) minus 90% to reflect very all encompassing Programs of which intelligence-like activities is likely a small portion of the Programs.

¹⁵ Actuals (\$87.7M) represents the full Program. However, if no audit is conducted the amount would be \$0. A typical audit team is from 5-10 employees. Estimate expenditures includes salary plus audit related expenses (\$2M).

¹⁶ Actuals (567 FTEs) represents the full Program. However, if no audit is conducted the associated FTEs is 0. A typical audit team is from 5-10 employees.

¹⁷ Actuals (\$21.4M) minus 90% to reflect very all encompassing Program of which intelligence related activities is likely a small portion of the Program.

¹⁸ Actuals (138 FTEs) minus 90% to reflect very all encompassing Programs of which intelligence related activities is likely a small portion of the Programs.

¹⁹ Actuals (\$40.6M) minus 95% to reflect very all encompassing Programs of which intelligence-like activities is likely a small portion of the Programs.

²⁰ Actuals (297FTEs) minus 95% to reflect very all encompassing Programs of which intelligence-like activities is likely a small portion of the Programs.

²¹ Actuals (\$259M) minus 95% to reflect very all encompassing Programs of which intelligence-like activities is likely a small portion of the Programs.

²² Actuals (3.290 7FTEs) minus 95% to reflect very all encompassing Programs of which intelligence-like activities is likely a small portion of the Programs.

CHAPTER 6: HOW IS THE INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY DIFFERENT?

The purpose of this chapter is to seek answers to the first of the two research sub-questions posed in Chapter 1, what makes the IC different from other policy domains? The answer to this question is addressed using the contingency approach developed in Chapter 3. It is highly suggestive that a contingency approach is reasonable when seeking differences i.e., contingent factors. Although, it is recognized that the various considerations for the identification of contingent factors is by its very nature open-ended. This approach may make readers, expecting a clear-cut approach, less than broadly comfortable. However, as Thompson (2003) wisely observed, “there are differences among organizations, and hope to account for some of them. But I also assume that there is not a one-to-one correspondence between significant organizational differences” (xxvi).

As a brief recap, the contingency approach entailed three contingent factors: external contingent factors, internal contingent factors and fit. This chapter focusses on the external and internal contingent factors. The fit factor is examined in the subsequent chapter. The data sources that informs this chapter are the literature, interviews with senior officials, and this researcher’s knowledge and experience.

6.1 External Contingent Factors

The external contingent factors are environmental factors that occur outside an organization that have an impact on an organization. The impact can be described as either positive, neutral or negative. The external contingent factors of the IC that are worth examination are the threat environment, the legislative framework and the external expectations of the IC. Each of these factors are explored in the pages that follow. This

section closes with an analysis of these external contingent factors vis-a vis the contingency approach.

6.1.1 Threat Environment

In the interviews with the senior government officials, there was a consensus that the ICs' operating environment, specifically the threat environment was a significant consideration in understanding what makes the IC different from the other government's policy domains. As described by the senior officials, the IC tends to conceptualize threats as the combination of an actor's intention and capability, which is consistent with the common understanding of the term (Singer, 1958; Sfectu, 2019; NATO Terminology Database, 2020). Although, variations of this have been offered by other scholars, for instance, Howard and Sawyer (2003) conceptualize threat as the combination of vulnerability, capability and intent; whilst, Vandepeer (2011) adjusts the threat formula entailing a combination of intent, capability, and opportunity.

In terms of the threat environment, a few senior officials remarked that it is particularly important for the IC to be aware of and understanding the threats facing Canada and its allies. Prior to the end of the Cold War, there was agreement amongst the senior officials that the threat was relatively stable and somewhat predictable. A senior official succinctly summarized it as, "there was us (the West) and there was them (the Soviet Union and her friends)." However, the end of the Cold War has ushered in threats that go beyond the simplistic us versus them construct.

In terms of official government documentation, according to the *CSIS Annual Report* (CSIS, 2020), the four key threats to the Canada's security are terrorism and violent extremism, espionage and sabotage, foreign influenced activities, and subversion of government. The Report further breaks down violent extremism into three types:

religiously motivated violent extremism consists of ideologies that often cast an individual as part of a spiritual struggle with an uncompromising structure of immorality; politically motivated violent extremism use violence to establish new political systems – or new structures and norms within existing systems; and ideologically motivated violent extremism often driven by a range of grievances and ideas from across the traditional ideological spectrum. Terrorism as a threat is also the focus of the Public Safety Canada’s public report (Public Safety Canada, 2019a), which covered low-sophistication tactics with high impacts, threats to transportation infrastructure, chemical and biological weapons, terrorist financing, and terrorist use of the internet and cyber capabilities. The *Strong, Secure, Engaged: Canada's Defence Policy* (2017), identifies several threats to security and stability including global terrorism, climate change, grey zone conflict areas and hybrid warfare, weapons proliferation and the cyber and space domains.

These documented threats to Canada are not dissimilar to those of its allies. For instance, the UK Government is concerned about electronic attacks, attacks on transportation, attacks on crowded places, non-conventional attacks, and attacks on critical infrastructure. (Cabinet Office, 2017). For the United States, the areas of concern are traditional adversaries such as Russia, China, North Korea; evolving threats related to space, cyber, computing and other disruptive technologies; and violent extremist groups (Director of National Intelligence, 2019).

Another perspective that came up during the interviews with the senior officials was the idea that the threat environment is not static by rather evolving, dynamic, uncertainty, and complex. One senior official observed that just when one thinks that we have figured it out, it changes on you and you have to start refiguring it out. Some of the

senior officials alluded to 9/11 and the shadow it still casts on the IC. In particular, the worry is that no matter how hard the IC tries to anticipate and manage the threats, there is always the danger of a black swan event – an unexpected event with significant consequences.

Based on the senior officials' view and government documentation of the threat environment, it would be a fair statement in that the current and foreseeable threat environment can be understood through the lens of a wicked problem (Rittel and Webber, 1973). A wicked problem is a complex societal problem that is poorly defined. As a result, wicked problems are never really solved. Rather, they become ongoing issues that the field of public administration and public administrators alike needs to contend with (Pesch and Vermass, 2020). A consequence of this wickedness is a, “diminishing capacity of governments to protect their citizens” (Hubbard and Paquet, 2010: 111). An instrument available to government to mitigate this wickedness and protect the state and society is legislation.

6.1.2 Legislative Framework

A common theme that the interviews with the senior officials revealed was the importance of ensuring that their organizations respected the rule of law as is expected from a democratic country like Canada. Specific references were made to the legislation that provides their respective organizations their mandate and legitimacy to Canadians. This is consistent with Schreier (2007) who argues that the IC's legislative framework does provide the basis for the IC's legitimacy with respect to its citizens. Hence, one can infer that the legislative framework is a critical external consideration for the IC. This is critical on two accounts. First, as noted by the interviewees, it provides the basis for the rule of

law which is a critical element of democracy in light of the IC's need for secrecy and its highly intrusive powers that directly impact transparency and individual rights and freedoms. Second, it provides the legislative mandates for the organizations that fall under the umbrella of the IC. The former is explored below, whilst the latter was covered in the previous Chapter.

Some of the senior officials did remark the importance of the rule of law is even more critical given the wide-array of potential threats and the IC's intrusiveness to counter these threats, including issues related to the issue of security versus privacy. One can reasonably make the argument that no other government policy domain has such an extensive and complex legislative landscape with a direct impact on individual rights. Illustrative of the IC's powers and implications were well established in the *Internal Inquiry into the Actions of Canadian Officials in Relation to Abdullah Almalki, Ahmad Abou-Elmaati and Muayyed Nureddin* (2008), the *Commission of Inquiry into the Actions of Canadian Officials in Relation to Maher Arar* (2006a, 2006b, and 2006c), and the *Commission of Inquiry into the Investigations of the Bombing of Air India Flight 182* (2010). The consequences of the government's action can in part be quantified based on the payments to the individuals and victims involved. For instance, Abdullah Almalki, Ahmad Abou-Elmaati and Muayyed Nureddin collectively received \$31.25 million (Pillay, 2017), Maher Arar received \$11.5 million (Sallot, 2007), and the victims of the Air India bombing collectively received \$7.9 million (Grewal, 2011). Many of the senior officials did make reference to one or more of the above as examples of the consequences when the rule of law is infringed by government. They also remarked that as a result of these inquiries organization that may have been involved did undergo their own internal reviews in an

attempt to minimize similar events repeating themselves signalling the impact of these external pressures (inquiries) on an organization. The interviewees did not go any further into specifics as this would have moved the interviews into potentially classified operational issues.

The keystone of the Canadian legislative landscape for the IC is the *Canadian Constitution*. The Constitution entrusts the government with the responsibility of peace, order and good government (Constitution Act of 1867, Section 91). This gives the government tremendous powers and responsibility to protect the country and its citizens. The counterbalance to the state's powers are found in the *Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms* (Constitution Act of 1867, Part 1), which are deemed non-negotiable (Hubbard and Paquet, 2010). Specifically, given the nature of the IC and the implication of this community exercising its legislated mandate, the following sections of the Charter are crucial: Section 1 (rights and freedoms in Canada), Section 2 (fundamental freedoms), Sections 7-14 (legal rights), and Section 24 (enforcement). Cumulatively these sections are at the heart of the historical and contemporary security versus rights debate. These sections are weaved throughout the findings of the above-mentioned inquiries.

Given that the scope of this research is post 9/11, the other key legislation of significance to the IC is the *Anti-Terrorism Act 2001* (ATA).²⁴ The ATA is an omnibus Act having received royal assent December 2001. This was an *Act* to:

to amend the Criminal Code, the Official Secrets Act, the Canada Evidence Act, the Proceeds of Crime (Money Laundering) Act and other Acts, and to

²⁴ Other legislation with a security and intelligence consideration are the *Public Safety Act* (2004), *Justice for Victims of Terrorism Act* (2012), *Combating Terrorism Act* (2013), *Nuclear Terrorism Act* (2013), and the *Protection of Canada from Terrorists Act* (2015).

enact measures respecting the registration of charities, in order to combat terrorism (preamble).

Overall, the *Criminal Code* was amended with a focus on terrorism by defining a terrorist activity and terrorist group. As well, a long list of terrorism offences was created in the *Code*. The *Official Secrets Act* became the Security of Information Act. The *Canada Evidence Act* gave power to the Attorney General to issue a certificate that keeps information secret. The Proceeds of Crime (Money Laundering) Act expanded the mandate of the Financial Transactions and Reports Analysis Centre of Canada to include the detection and deterrence of terrorist financing. Finally, the *National Defence Act* was amended to officially acknowledge the existence of the Communications Security Establishment by giving the organization a legislated mandate.²⁵

Some of the senior officials did remark that given the very heavy legislative-dependent ability for their organization to carry out their mandate, the legal services offered by the Department of Justice is important in ensuring that laws and regulations are being abided by their organizations. However, these observations are in contrast to a Federal Court decision, which found that CSIS breached its obligations to the court by failing to proactively disclose illegally collected information and that the Department of Justice was too enthusiastic in defending legally questionable activities by CSIS. Furthermore, CSIS disregarded direction from the Minister of Public Safety to ensure compliance with the rule of law by continuing to engage in illegal activities (Federal Court, 2020, FC 616).

Given the nature of the IC and the concerns with the rule of law and secrecy, “access to government records and information is an essential requirement for developing and

²⁵ An in-depth analysis and implications of the ATA is provided by Macklem, et.al., (2001), Paciocco (2002), Jenkins (2003), Kent (2005), and Lefebvre (2010).

maintaining a civil and democratic society. It provides an important guard against abuses, mismanagement and corruption” (Banisar, 2007: 218). Along similar thoughts, a previous Minister of Public Safety remarked that:

Canadians must know what the Government does to protect national security, how the Government does it, and why it’s important. Providing information to Canadians on what the government does to protect their national security is essential to demonstrate that their values are being upheld (Public Safety Canada, 2019b).

The *Access to Information and Privacy Act* is the legislation that provides Canadian citizens the right to access government records and information. As noted by Leigh (1997), these two acts attempt to balance the need for open government, while maintaining government secrecy. However, it appears that we have an imbalance given that, “a significant proportion of security and intelligence records meet the threshold for exclusion under the *Access to Information Act*, some of this information may be proactively released, or, released, in response to an ATIP (Access to Information and Privacy) request” (German, 2020: 2).

The majority of the IC’s exclusion are related to security, defense, or international affairs. Specifically, there is recognition of the importance of the international intelligence networks and information sharing arrangements, noted several senior officials, and their potential impacts on individuals as founded in the above mentioned inquires. International sharing arrangements are in practical terms exempted under the *Act* because it is highly unlikely that a foreign government would provide consent (Roberts, 2006). How extensive is the gaining access to information problem? The Information Commissioner of Canada noted that:

My office currently has an inventory of over 5,000 complaints. Almost 20% of this workload involves complaints related to national security-related information sought through access to information requests. Of this, our

refusal investigations, where we review the reasonableness of the searches conducted, or the appropriateness of the exemptions applied, total about 45,000 pages of classified information. However, we have been told that other records related to administrative investigations, where the government hasn't yet responded to the access requests, could potentially represent additional millions of pages of classified documents. In short, the task involved in investigating these types of file is immense (Information Commissioner of Canada, 2020a).

The inability for the government to release national security documents, places Canada way behind its allies in terms of literature on national security and intelligence; causing a history professor to state that, "it would be unconscionable to allow one of his graduate students to choose an intelligence topic for a thesis or dissertation. The documents might arrive seven, eight or nine years after requested, if they were ever come at all" (Bronskill, 2020).

There was a consensus amongst the senior officials that in keeping with the letter and spirit of the *Act*, Canadians are entitled to access the information held by government. However, they noted that a key determining factor in being able to meet the expectations of Canadians was a lack of resources and the complexity on some of the requests that quite often entails seeking permission from multiple owners of the information, including those from outside of the federal government. The issue of insufficient resources allocated to implementing the *Act* is not a new phenomenon in Ottawa. It has been reported that the federal government was looking into establishing a structure to declassify historical documents pertaining to national security and intelligence (CBC News, November 1, 2020).

6.1.3 External Expectations of the Intelligence Community

A common theme found in the intelligence literature concerns the expectations of the IC (Gentry and Gordon, 2019, Jackson, 2005, Kahn, 2010). In other words, what do citizens and elected officials expect from their IC? A common expectation for the IC is its ability to predict external events of significant importance to a country. The goal of this expectation is avoiding a strategic surprise for its country (Betts, 1982; Handel, 1984; Kam, 1988). When a strategic surprise occurs, the IC fails to achieve some level of the performance standard, quickly earning the ‘intelligence failure’ label from academia, media and politicians.

Contemporary history and recent events provide ample examples of surprises that have been assigned this label. For instance, the 1941 Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor, North Korea invading South Korea in 1951, Soviet Union’s launch of Sputnik in 1957, the Soviet Union deploying missiles in Cuba in 1962, the 1968 Tet Offensive in South Vietnam, Israel being attacked by Arab countries starting the 1973 Yom Kippur War, the fall of the Shah leading to the start of the Iranian Revolution in 1978-79, the Soviet Union’s 1979 invasion of Afghanistan, Argentina invading the Falklands Islands in 1980, the 1989 fall of the Berlin Wall, the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991, Iraq invading Kuwait in 1990, India-Pakistan nuclear testing in 1998, Iraq’s missing weapons of mass destruction in 2003, the Norway attacks in 2011), the Paris attacks in 2015, and the COVID-19 pandemic of 2019. To this list, one could add any number of potential future surprises with the potential intelligence failure label. As history has shown us, these surprises have had significant implications at the domestic and international levels.

The oversimplification of the IC not being able to predict has caused the label of intelligence failure to be overused or at least misapplied (Lowenthal, 1985). This expectation is unrealistic from both a practical and theoretical perspective. The mythical expectation that surprise can be constantly predicted by intelligence has been dismantled by scholars. For instance:

Observers who see notorious intelligence failures as egregious often infer that disasters can be avoided by perfecting norms and procedures for analysis and argumentation. This belief is illusory (Betts, 1978: 61).

Furthermore, “Intelligence failures are not only inevitable, they are natural” (Betts, 1978: 88). This argument is supported others, for instance:

The study of strategic surprise can be rather disappointing for those who have always assumed that a better *theoretical* understanding of the subject at hand would logically lead to the discovery of more effective *practical* means to anticipate strategic surprise and alleviate its impact...If anything, the scrutiny of this phenomena in recent years has chiefly served to explain why surprise is almost always unavoidable – and will continue to be so in the foreseeable future – despite all efforts to the contrary (Handel, 1989: 227).

Therefore, the expectation that intelligence can crystal ball all surprises is an inappropriate expectation from intelligence.²⁶ It has been noted that, “the Intelligence service is an institution more for the giving of answers than for sounding warnings” (Harkabi, 1984: 127). However, a country’s citizenry, who also happens to be the taxpayer, could easily have difficulties accepting this basic fact since large budgets are allocated to the IC with the expectation that surprises will not occur. The continued maintenance in such an

²⁶The inability to predict is an issue with the social sciences writ large. For instance, scholars such as Seymour Lipset has stated that, “none of the social sciences can predict worth a damn. It’s not just economics, but political science, in sociology, we tried to make predictions, and they didn’t work out” (Winkler, 1985: 5).

expectation could in the long run prove very detrimental. An extreme case was Israeli decision makers accepting Israel's military intelligence (AMAN) belief that it could provide 48 hours of warning allowing for sufficient time to call up the reserves and deny success to the enemy. However, the Yom Kippur War in 1973 proved this expectation wrong in every possible sense (Doron, 1988).

Furthermore, it is understood that complete understanding of whatever is being observed cannot always be 'interpreted correctly'. In addition, the task of trying to interpret an opponent's intentions becomes even more complicated, especially when the opposition has based its actions on miscalculations. As such, the IC has the additional burden of attempting to determine intentions of an adversary who has based its decisions on miscalculations (Wirtz, 1991a). Decision-makers and intelligence alike will have to be satisfied with, "improving the batting average, rather than to do away with surprise" (Betts, 1978: 85).

From an epistemological perspective, the IC cannot as a primary role be concerned with predicting all surprises for this would go against the well-established theories of knowledge in which judgement plays a critical element. For instance:

An act of judgement must be added to the rational concept which contains a rule and it is by this act of judgement that the practitioner can decide whether something is to be subsumed under the rule or not. Since there cannot again be rules for judgement on how a subsumption is to be achieved, for this would go into the infinite, there will be theoreticians who, in their whole lives, can never become practical because they lack judgement (Kant, 2001: 417).

In a similar fashion, Tuchman writes:

Mankind, it seems, makes a poorer performance of government than of almost any other human activity. In this sphere, wisdom, which may be defined as the exercise of judgement acting on common sense and available information, is less operative and more frustrated than it should be. Why do holders of high office so often act contrary to the way reason points and

enlightened self-interest suggests? Why do intelligent mental processes seem so often not to function? (Tuchman, 2014: 5).

The interviews with the senior officials confirmed the literature. One of the senior officials noted that an intelligence failure is not about avoiding surprises because surprises will always occur. Instead, an intelligence failure should be understood as a failure to understand what is happening. Although nuanced, the differences between avoiding surprises and understanding create completely different expectations from the IC. A more precise explanation was offered by another senior official who noted that the intelligence failure label should be reserved for when the IC draws the wrong conclusion from existing evidence or the existing evidence is ignored. It was suggested that one needs to be careful when applying the label in circumstances where the IC is not able to get the evidence. Another senior official concurred that intelligence failures have and will continue to occur. The important thing is the IC learns from failures, adjusts and carries on with its mission. One senior official was adamant that the IC should not be in the forecasting business because they will more than likely get it wrong. As an unrealistic expectation, it almost always puts the IC in the loss column from the start. On the issue of real versus perceived intelligence failure and expectations, there was unanimity that once the label is applied, the truth becomes almost irrelevant in trying to get the label removed. Given the interviews' time constraint, it was not possible to further explore this issue – is it because of the media? Politics?

6.1.4 Connecting with the Contingency Approach

The interviews with the senior officials, the literature, and this researcher's own knowledge and experience support the notion that the external environment is an important consideration when examining the question of what makes the IC different from the other

government policy domains. There is evidence that a contingency approach, given its emphasis on the external environment, is insightful in numerous ways to this research.

First, threats, legislation, and expectations clearly demonstrate that they have an impact on the IC and vice-versa the IC can impact its environment. For instance, as the IC figures out the threat, the threat can respond by trying to make itself harder to be figured out. Taking the cyber domain, the IC can hack into the threat actors' systems, those same threat actors change their IT systems and operating environment. For example, it has been publicly reported that the Russian government has returned to the use of manual typewriters to work on the most classified documents (Irvine, 2013). Or, that terrorists change how they communicate once it was revealed in WikiLeaks that the IC had the capability to intercept their communications (Dozier, 2013). Overall, this is representative of an open system that emphasizes the environment-organization interaction, illustrating the complex nature of an evolving relationship between the environment and organization as well as within the environment and organization themselves.

Second, superimposing the IC's external environment on Duncan's (1972) framework, the IC squarely fits into Quadrant IV. As you may recall, Quadrant IV consists of an unstable environmental change and complex environmental complexity resulting in a highly uncertain environment. The unstable environment is reflected by the dynamic and fluid threat environment and the external expectations of the IC. The environmental complexity is captured by all three contingent factors examined above. Even the legislative framework, as perhaps the least complex of the three contingent factors, is not always straightforward. The IC operating within the legal world requires daily interpretation of

how the rules of the game are to be applied. Given the results of the inquiries and the court ruling noted earlier, the real world often clashes with the codified world.

The remaining observations are based Donaldson's (2001) framework, specifically task uncertainty. Third, the IC's external environment has implication on the IC's type of management. Against this backdrop, the IC is both mechanistic and organic. The IC is deemed mechanistic in that there is a formal long-term structure to this community, where roles and responsibilities are defined by legislation, mandate and core responsibilities (see Chapter 5). Concurrently, the IC is also deemed organic in that there are less formalized and short-term structures within the community. These structures take the form of task forces, working groups, committees, and so forth. In the majority of cases, these types of structures are established to manage specific issues. The less permanent issue based nature of these structures are well suited for responding to a dynamic and evolving threat environment and the uncertainty that accompanies such an environment.

Fourth, the IC's operating environment brings out the idea of complexity in relation to the knowledge that exists within the IC. The more complex the environment is, the more knowledge an organization would need to generate in order to being able to efficiently operate within this environment. The IC's current and anticipated future operating environment has forced the IC to increase its knowledge in order to properly respond to its environment. In turn, this additional knowledge generation occurs with an increase in allocated resources and corresponding capabilities. Correspondingly, an increase in the IC's capabilities also results to an increase in its structures.

Fifth, the IC's operating environment is reflected on the IC itself in terms of differentiation, integration, and interdependence. The differentiation of the IC are reflected

in two ways. First, the differentiation is codified in legislation (see Chapter 5). Second, closely aligned to the first, is the specific intelligence function that each distinct entity undertakes. For instance, CSE is responsible for SIGINT whilst CSIS is heavily invested in HUMINT. The integration element of the IC is simply the fact that each intelligence entity on its own does not constitute the IC, albeit the fact that there is no single formalized IC. As well, integration would also cover the notion that the IC brings together the different intelligence functions. For example, SIGINT and HUMINT are most often complementary to each other. HUMINT can assist in the identification of potential SIGINT targets and vice versa. Each working on their own is less effective than when combined together. Last, interdependence captures the idea that each entity of the IC relies on the other to carry out their roles and responsibilities. The extent of their interdependency is quite often dependent on the intelligence problem. The more complex the intelligence problem, the more likely that there is a need for heightened interdependency. For instance, working on a domestic terrorism intelligence problem would require multiple intelligence entities such as CSIS, RCMP, FINTRAC, and CSE.

6.2 *Internal Contingent Factors*

In the previous pages, key external contingent factors that assist with differentiating the IC from the other policy domains were examined. In the following pages, the key internal contingent factors that differentiate the IC are analyzed, namely the intelligence process, the intelligence product, secrecy, and the IC as a High Reliability Organization. These factors originate from our understanding of intelligence explored in Chapter 5.

6.2.1 Intelligence Process

The interviews with the senior officials confirmed the publicly available information with regarding that there is no single Government of Canada intelligence process. Instead, as suggested by the public information, each entity within the IC has their own intelligence process. The research was not able to confirm in a definite manner whether or not every entity has a documented intelligence process. The senior officials were queried if not having single intelligence process posed an issue in terms of having a common understanding amongst the IC. The senior officials did not observe any issue created by the lack of a common codified government-wide intelligence process. The general consensus from the senior officials was that in all likelihood the practitioners within the IC are able to understand the links between their own intelligence process and that of their counterparts in the other entities. One of the senior officials remarked that the intelligence cycle is perhaps more of theoretical academic concern and less of an issue for employees within the IC. Perhaps, there is some truth to this, given the large volume of literature surrounding the intelligence process debate.

Another observation was that for the senior officials, the direction and dissemination phases were important to them. An explanation for this is perhaps that senior officials are engaged more in these phases than the other phases. For the direction phase, senior officials would be involved with recommending government-wide intelligence requirements. As well, senior officials would be involved with providing direction within their respective organization. In addition, depending on the direction, potential additional resources could be allocated. On the importance assigned to dissemination, they would also be engaged in ensuring that decision-makers are informed. This means being able to explain to decision-makers what is known and what is not known, which can be just as

important. Overall, there was not much interest with collection and the production phases. In part, this could be explained that within the intelligence process, these two phases represent the more technical aspects of the process that may not always get the attention from senior officials on a regular basis. Although, a senior official did comment that collection was important to them, which could be explained by the role assigned to their entity.

6.2.2 Intelligence Product

The senior officials concurred that regardless of which intelligence process any specific entity of the IC might use, the intelligence product is what really matters to decision-makers. Of utmost importance to the senior officials was the accuracy of the products. These observations from the senior officials should not come as a surprise given that from the consumer's perspective, it's the product that matters and not the process that leads to the production of the product. This provides a different perspective than that from the IC's frontline employees who often view collection and/or the production as the important considerations. The acceptability of the intelligence product by the consumer is quite often perceived as a distinct event that they have no control over. This brings to light the fact that even within the IC, or for that matter within a single intelligence entity, there exists different perspectives of what is deemed as important.

A couple of the senior officials explained that they have a very elaborate internal process to review and approve an intelligence product prior to it being released to other members of the IC, domestic or international, and decision-makers. From the interviews, two key drivers were identified. First, the increased attention were issues associated with what was happening internationally with intelligence products, resulting in significant

consequences. One example that was offered by a senior official was the faulty intelligence leading to the 2003 invasion of Iraq where it has since been established that the pretext of weapons of mass destruction were incorrect. Second, intricately linked to the first, was the risk of circular reporting. This is when one entity uses information from another entity and eventually the original information gets back into the originating entity with slight differentiation in the wording; sufficiently enough that it appears like a new piece of intelligence. As a result, it may end up looking like multiple independent products are supporting a given assessment, which could influence decision-makers in a different way. To address both drivers, some of the officials noted that the intelligence products now consist of sourcing where the information originates, without necessarily citing the specific methodology, which still offers protection of collection assets.

Some of the senior officials noted that increasingly there is demand for infographic-type products. It was indicated that this is reflective of an intelligence product consumer that has changed from years, moving away from long written reports to shorter snappier products. A senior official observed that one should not be surprised given that people in general are changing on how they receive information. The individual remarked that long gone are the days where a decision-maker will have the time or take the time to read a 10-15 page report. Nowadays, decision-makers having grown up in the era of social media, are looking for intelligence products that resemble their unclassified world. The same senior official remarked that given this new expectation from decision-makers regarding the intelligence products, there is a new capability requirement within their organization that is lacking.

In terms of receptivity, a long time serving IC senior official acknowledged that over the last couple of decades, decision-makers have become more receptive to using intelligence as part of their decision-making deliberations. Specifically, there is interest in the speculative-evaluative type of intelligence product. It was remarked that this type of intelligence product is most valued because the basic-descriptive and current-reportorial type information can easily be searched via the internet. However, it was remarked that although the internet can provide a quick snapshot on a policy issue, this information often lacks the insights that is provided in a speculative-evaluative intelligence product. A good example is whether or not Iraq had weapons of mass destruction (WMD). The United States and the United Kingdom assessed that Iraq was in possession of WMD, which provided the initial justification for the invasion of Iraq in 2003. However, the Canadian IC assessed that there was insufficient evidence indicating that Iraq possessed WMD. The intelligence was influential in keeping Canada from going to war in Iraq in 2003 (Barnes, 2020).

6.2.3 Intelligence and Secrecy

The senior officials unanimously noted that secrecy is definitely a significant characteristic that sets the IC apart from the other policy domains. They did remark that the IC's standards for secrecy is much higher than what is normally required from the majority of the other departments. Specifically, the need for this heightened secrecy is to protect the information itself as well as the collection assets. The leak of information can cause harm to individual and national interest in a variety of ways. For example, in terms of individual harm, it can identify potential terrorists under investigation, which would tip off these potential terrorists or if they were not terrorists would put them under unnecessary

suspicion and repercussions from society. On the concern regarding collection assets, for instance, revealing the identify of a confidential informant can place the individual in a precarious situation. In terms of information sharing between countries, unauthorized release of another country's intelligence can reduce the future availability of intelligence and a loss of trust. In addition, the exposure of intelligence collection techniques, tactics and procedures would allow threat actors to develop countermeasures against them.

A senior official did remark that at times, secrecy can be counterproductive. The example of limiting intelligence sharing between entities of the IC or between countries' was noted. The Air India incident where intelligence was not shared between CSIS and the RCMP was brought up as an example when secrecy can have negative consequences. Publicly available information on the Air India incident reveals different explanations for the excessive secrecy including competing legislation, organizational cultures, and personalities.

A senior official observed that maintaining secrecy does not come cheap. Whereas non-IC entities have the basic Policy on Government Security (TBS, 2019c) to follow, many of the IC entities have additional security measures in place to enhance secrecy. For instance, CSIS and CSE conduct regular polygraphs of their employees. The physical facilities of many of the IC entities have security features related to Sensitive Compartmented Information Facility. The information technology infrastructure is designed to handle Top Secret and higher information, both domestically and internationally. These are but a few examples that exemplifies the security measures put in place to secure classified information from various threats; whose overall aim is to maintain secrecy within the IC. On the question of polygraphing employees, a senior

official did state that it does make it more difficult to attract potential employees as there might be a hesitation by potential employees to work in an organization that from the outside can be perceived as untrusting towards its employees.

Several senior officials did concur that secrecy is a necessary evil that does impact public accountability because of the IC's inability to being open and transparent about what they do. This limits the IC's ability to tell their side of an issue when a negative story becomes a news headline. It was remarked that this can be frustrating to the organization as well as the employees involved with the issue. However, the interviewees did acknowledge that it is part of the package for working within the IC. It was also noted that part of this package is also not being able to tell their positive story when a potential adverse action has been stopped – unless it becomes a court case such as the 2006 Toronto 18. Furthermore, a senior official did clearly make the distinction between public accountability and accountability. The intent in their explanation was that public accountability will always remain limited due to secrecy. However, secrecy does not impact accountability when it comes to responding to ministerial accountability. The interviewee was very adamant that their organization is very attentive to ministerial direction. Another senior official explained the concept of secrecy and openness of the IC as resting on a sliding scale. Depending on the circumstances and context, the marker may slide towards increased secrecy, whilst at other times the same marker can slide towards increased openness. An observation that I would make is that after a negative incident becomes public, there appears to be a move towards more openness until the story fades away and the marker moves back towards more secrecy. This would suggest that perhaps, the IC does have a pathology for secrecy and not openness. The debate on whether this is

good for democracy and accountability remains an open question, that likely has no definite answer.

6.2.4 Intelligence Community as a High Reliability Organization

The data thus far demonstrates that the IC is a complex endeavour whose main goal is the protection of citizens. Failure in achieving this goal can result in the loss of lives. The literature suggests that complex organizations whose task is to protect citizens from danger where failure is unacceptable are deemed High-Reliability Organization (HRO) (Roberts, 1990; Bigley and Roberts, 2001; LaPorte and Frederickson, 2006; Weick and Sutcliffe, 2007; Bourrier, 2011; Casler, 2014; Cantu, et.al., 2020). To the best of this researcher's knowledge, the IC has not been examined exclusively through the HRO lens.

A HRO consists of five characteristics:

(1) preoccupation with failures rather than successes, (2) reluctance to simplify interpretations, (3) sensitivity to operations, (4) commitment to resilience and (5) deference to expertise, as exhibited by encouragement of a fluid decision-making system" (Weick and Sutcliffe, 2001: v).

It has been demonstrated that the IC operates within a dangerous environment. This suggestion is true if one were to take an intelligence failure as a starting point exemplifying the dangerous environment because failures can bring about serious consequences. Illustrative cases include Germany's invasion of Russia (Whaley, 1973), Japanese attack on Pearl Harbour (Wohlstetter, 1962), the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan (Arnold, 1981), the Yom Kippur War (Herzog, 1975; Shlaim, 1976), the fall of the Shah in Iran (Seliktar, 2000), Iraq's missing weapons of mass destruction (Whitney, 2005), and the 9/11 attacks in the United States (National Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States, 2004).

The first characteristic of a HRO is, "preoccupation with failures rather than successes" (Weick and Sutcliffe, 2001: v). A HRO is focussed on reducing the likelihood of a failure to as close as possible to zero. This particular focus exists because the consequence of a failure can have very severe impacts at the societal level both in terms of lives and resources. This characteristic applies to the IC on several fronts. First, the continuous attempt at examining and understanding why there was an intelligence failure. This preoccupation with failures is reflected in the scholarly literature (Zegart 1999, 2007a; Odom, 2003; Wirtz, 2007; Bar-Joseph and McDermott, 2008; Kerbel and Olcott, 2010) and in the officialdom (National Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States, 2004; Commission of Inquiry into the Investigations of the Bombing of Air India Flight 182, 2010; The Report of the Iraq Inquiry, Volumes I to XII, 2016). In the case of the United States, Hammond's (2005) extensive examination of American governmental review bodies reveals the government's extensive preoccupation with intelligence failures since Pearl Harbour. The interviews with the senior officials did remark that there is always a preoccupation about an intelligence failure on their watch. One official noted that intelligence failures tend to become public when the consequences are visible to the public, while intelligence successes don't sell newspapers. What is generally lacking is literature that speaks to intelligence successes, which would provide a different perspective on the issue of the performance of the IC (Dahl, 2013).

Second, the IC seek remedies that would minimize the potential risk that could lead to an intelligence failure from occurring. There is no lack of literature that provides solutions to the IC in avoiding intelligence failures (Wilson, 1992; Rowen, 1993; Hedley, 1996; Berkowitz, 2001; Betts, 2002; Posner, 2005; Gentry, 2008). A large portion of the

'fix' literature, re-enforced by actual government action, tends to be reorganization (Hammond, 2005). According to LaPorte (2006), reorganizations are a key attribute of an HRO. In recent years, the American IC constituted part of the creation of the Department of Homeland Security. In the Canadian context, the IC has not had any significant reorganizations since the creation of CSIS in 1984. A possible explanation for the lack of any major reorganizations, at times known as machinery of government, of the Canadian IC can simply be that the changes would not meet one or more of the following considerations. The IC has not occupied the political agenda in the past several decades, the IC has not warranted any changes for the sake of changes in itself in order to demonstrate that government is taking action in response to a situation (or failure), and the IC has not been perceived as requiring special attention to achieve greater efficiency or lessen the administrative burden.

Third, the employment of various mechanisms are employed to review the IC's undertakings both external and internal. The important external mechanisms have already been examined in the previous chapter. In addition to the formal governmental structures, one could include non-governmental entities such as the media (Hillebrand, 2012), academia (Tiernan, 2017), and think tanks (Centre for International Governance Innovation, 2021). On the issue of internal mechanisms, the IC can employ wide range of mechanisms such as red teaming and formalized review process for assessments prior to being released to policy-makers. The latter was noted by the senior officials as a mechanism to ensure that the intelligence product is accurate. Last, the IC's constant requirement to separate the wheat from the chaff or the signal from the noise (Wohlstetter, 1962). Within the IC, finding the information that is relevant and valuable is an essential

element of intelligence and is achieved through the intelligence process, which has already be covered earlier in this research.

The second characteristic of a HRO is the, "reluctance to simplify interpretations" (Weick and Sutcliffe, 2001: v). In other words, complex situations should be recognized as such and not fall to reductionism. There is a requirement to avoid taking a complex situation and redefining it as a simple situation for the purpose of increasing its understanding. The attempt to go from the complex to the simple actually increases the likelihood that the actual situation is misdiagnosed because the small important nuances get deleted through the simplification process. This reluctance in the IC would be most visible in the processing phase of the intelligence cycle. A success factor of intelligence is the ability of ensuring corroboration between pieces of information. A potential danger of not seeking this 'triangulation' of information is that intelligence can fall to deception. An example of intelligence falling to deception is that of the United States relying on a single source of information, codenamed Curveball, which formed a basis for the American invasion of Iraq in 2003 (Prados, 2007).

The third characteristic of a HRO is, "sensitivity to operations" (Weick and Sutcliffe, 2001: v). This characteristic stipulates that organizations, especially very large ones, need to ensure that the whole organization is fully aware of what is occurring throughout its sub-parts. A problem for not having the whole organization working with the same situational awareness is that key pieces of information found in one part of the organization may not be available to another part of the organization. This phenomenon has commonly been referred to as stove piping. Thus, an incomplete picture of a situation is created. One method for ensuring enhancing situational awareness is the sharing of

information in order to, " maintain situational awareness, or sensitivity to operations, that is they strive to remain as aware as possible of the current state of operations" (Hopkins, 2007: 9).

The equivalent in the IC exists in terms of the lack of information sharing. This has a direct impact on being able to connect the dots, which has been identified as being a key contributor in intelligence failures (Gladwell, 2003). However, there are valid considerations for not always being able to share information within the IC. For example, some of the information is highly sensitive and there are valid operational considerations for placing limitation on the distribution of the information such as ULTRA during World War II (Winterbotham, 1974). After the attacks of 9/11, the pendulum swung the other way – connect all the dots. However, the over connecting by reducing security safeguards led to unintended consequences as exemplified by Wikileaks. In other circumstances, there are legal frameworks that impose limitations that cannot be overridden without breaking the law (Lefebvre, 2010). In short, the challenge for the IC under a HRO construct is to ensure that information is shared while concurrently ensuring that the information is also protected.

The fourth characteristic of a HRO is, "commitment to resilience" (Weick and Sutcliffe, 2001: v). Commitment to organizational resiliency is necessary due to two truths. First, no operation is error-free despite all attempts by humans to strive towards zero-error operations. Second, humans do not have the capability to accurately predict events. This is especially true for events that have a very low likelihood but which can have significant consequences, the so called 'black swans' (Taleb, 2007). In the IC, the equivalent of a black swan is a surprise, which can lead to an intelligence failure. Given the proven track record

of reoccurring black swans, public organizations need the capability to survive the consequences of a negative event and continue to deliver their missions despite setbacks. This is especially true if the public organization is providing a unique public good that is mandated with the safety and security of its citizens. The inability to survive the consequences can have severe impacts to both the organizations and citizens.

Taking the intelligence failures identified earlier in this research, generally the IC has demonstrated that it has been able to respond to an intelligence failure and recover from such a failure. It could also be suggested that the response and recovery occurs with a heightened sense of urgency. As well, both occur under an increased level of external scrutiny. It can be argued that an increased level of external scrutiny can have a negative effect of increasing an organization's risk aversion of not willing to make even minor errors. Given the general IC's performance after major setbacks, it can be concluded that there is a commitment to resilience by the IC. However, what remains unclear in the literature is the explanation as to why the IC is able to bounce back within a relatively short timeframe even under increased external scrutiny? This is clearly an area that requires further research because the exploration of this area will contribute towards advancing our understanding of the factors that permits an organization to becoming resilient.

The last characteristic of a HRO is, "deference to expertise" (Weick and Sutcliffe, 2001: v). This implies that entities, people or organizations, with the expertise are given a lead role. They are assigned a key role because it is assumed that those closest to the issue are in the best position to understand and resolve the issue. It is acknowledged that the expertise within an organization is not necessarily aligned to the hierarchy. In other words, the highest level of expertise may exist at the lower levels of an organization. However,

this does not mean that decisions are made at the lower levels of the hierarchy, rather decision-makers take into account the advice and recommendations provided to them by the experts. This notion has significant similarities with evidence-based policy-making (Shaxson, 2005). However, there is a growing body of literature that questions the role of experts (Tetlock, 2006; Freedman, 2010).

In the IC, this characteristic of a HRO is quite evident in some circumstances but not so in other circumstance. With respect to the former, the IC is recognized for having subject-matter experts. This is not a surprise given that it can take many years to generate an intelligence analyst with solid working level knowledge. For instance, Moore (2002) and Moore and Krizan (2001) identify a large set of core competencies required to conduct intelligence analysis. Also, the IC investments in training, learning, and development are generally more than what other organizations in the public sector invest in. The senior officials noted that the IC investments are needed in order to keep their workforce's competencies current. In addition, the officials remarked that diversity of their workforce contributes to the IC having highly qualified employees. The benefits of diversity have been noted elsewhere (Callum, 2010; Quicios, 2018; Faragone, 2019b). Regarding the latter, although the IC possesses a very extensive knowledge base, it is not always employed by policy-makers for a variety of reasons already well documented in the literature (Wirtz, 2007; Kerbel and Olcott, 2010; Rovner, 2011). Hence, deference to expertise is somewhat of a half-full/half-empty characteristic when applied to the IC.

6.2.5 Connecting with the Contingency Approach

The interviews with senior officials, the literature, and this researcher's own knowledge and experience have revealed that internal contingent factors, like their external

counterparts, are essential considerations in advancing our understanding of how to differentiate the IC from other government policy domains. This suggests that the application of a contingency approach is warranted. The remainder of this section examines the internal contingent factors against Donaldson's (2001) approach.

The intelligence process is explored as an issue of task uncertainty and technology. The intelligence process, through the lens of task uncertainty, is reflective of a mechanistic structure because the implementation of the intelligence process is procedural in nature, based on the specific mandates and core responsibilities assigned to each entity of the IC, with a formalized communication structure in disseminating the intelligence product to decision-makers. However, mechanistic structures are typically best suited for stable environments, which is not the case of the IC. What we have in this case is a mechanistic approach superimposed on an unstable and complex environment. At a first glance, it would appear to contradict the expectation under a contingency approach construct. However, it could be suggested that the IC's mechanistic approach might be a helpful way for the IC to navigate this murky environment. The intelligence failure literature has noted that unclear demarcations has contributed to the failures. Concurrently, the literature has also remarked that silos are partially to blame for intelligence failures. Perhaps, the perception of the intelligence process lies somewhere along the mechanistic-organic spectrum. From hindsight, the intelligence failure literature reveals that the intelligence process occurs within either a too mechanistic or too organic construct.

The intelligence process can also be examined as a technology. Specifically, it has similarities to the notion of process production stage of technology. This is based on the premise that the purpose of the intelligence process is the production of the intelligence

product. In addition, the intelligence process could be taken as a routine technology because the intelligence process could be perceived as having few exceptions and the task can be easily analyzed. However, when a closer view into the intelligence process is taken, it would be more appropriate to consider the intelligence process as a craft technology given that there are really few exceptions on the intelligence process itself. Yet, the task cannot be fully analyzed, as evidenced by the many post-mortem examinations of an intelligence failure, which when attempting to dissect the task cannot really pinpoint a specific reason for an intelligence failure. Not surprisingly, many have referred to intelligence as a craft or as an art. It is assessed that the intelligence process does not meet the expectation of a mediating technology because the full implementation of the intelligence process is dependent on the various organizations within the IC to work together. As well, the intelligence process is deemed a long-linked technology, given that the intelligence process is generally sequential in nature. For example, an intelligence organization or a sub-unit within an intelligence entity, responsible for intelligence analysis cannot complete their task if the organization, or a sub-unit within an intelligence entity, responsible for intelligence collection have not collected the intelligence.

The intelligence product contributes towards setting the IC apart from other government policy domains. The intelligence product is assessed against both the task uncertainty and technology elements of Donaldson's approach. As a task uncertainty, there could be the appearance that by following a process, a product is simply efficiently generated. The truth is far from this. The development of an intelligence product is a complex undertaking that entails intelligence collection efforts, followed by interpretation by a highly skilled workforce. In other words, the IC's intelligence products are reflective

of complexity in that the knowledge available within the IC is complex and its truthfulness always questionable to various degrees. Part of this complexity is the notion that the IC may also lack the requisite knowledge to complete an intelligence product that minimizes the likelihood of an intelligence failure - what is known and why? and what is not known and why not?

As a technology, the intelligence product given that it is the output of a complex process is deemed a process production. This production has been characterized as being a continuous on-going process that is dependent on a knowledge that is highly subject-matter based. In addition, an intelligence product is considered a craft technology because it is very much dependent on the drafter – a human endeavor that entails various considerations, including a slew of potential biases. As such, it becomes quite a challenge to dissect a drafter’s specific considerations in determining why an intelligence product ends up the way it does. Hence, the reason why the IC has put in place various structures to mitigate a drafter’s potential blind spots.

Furthermore, the intelligence product is reflective of an intensive technology in that the development of an intelligence product requires the free flow back and forth between various sub-systems within the IC. For instance, some of these sub-systems could be different collection sources and agencies and engagement of different subject-matter experts residing within the IC as well as outside the IC. In addition, there is no consistent pre-determined plan (sequencing) as to when the drafter of an intelligence product will interact with the different sub-systems. More than likely, the drafter’s engagement of these sub-systems will be dictated by the intelligence problem and whether or not it has been adequately addressed in the development of the intelligence product.

The dominating theme of secrecy is compared against task uncertainty and technology. The measures put in place to ensure secrecy are deemed as mechanistic in that specific organizations have been identified for implementing the instruments of secrecy. For instance, the TB Policy on Government Security identifies CSIS, CSE, DND, Public Safety Canada, Public Services and Procurement Canada, RCMP, Shared Services Canada, and TBS with organizational-specific roles and responsibilities. The implementation of security measures covers a very wide-range from the simple building pass allowing access to government buildings to complex IT security measures, which quite often entails innovation in order to counter IT threats. As well, by default maintaining secrecy minimizes the need for integration as illustrated by the mandatory procedures outlined in the TBS Directive on Security Management (TBS, 2019d). On occasion, there are conflicts between security requirements ensuring secrecy and an organization being able to deliver on its mandate and core responsibilities. In this case, secrecy is counterproductive in allowing an organization to integrate within itself and other organizations.

Secrecy as a technology is considered representative of a large batch or mass production. As noted above, achieving secrecy entails the employment of a large number of standardized security measures procedures, which are significantly increased when they occur in the IC. As well, secrecy's security measures is consistent with the application of routine-type technologies in that there are very few expectations on how secrecy is achieved. For example, either an employee has the security clearance to access a document or they lack the security clearance and therefore cannot access a document. Lastly, maintaining secrecy is reflective of long-link technology in that the security measures are sequential in nature and that the various measures work in tandem to ensure overall secrecy.

A common thread in the contingency approach is complexity due to the uncertainty caused concurrently by the external and internal pressures. When complexity is applied on an organization that has a safety and security function we end up with an HRO. As an approach, HRO can stand on its own. However, as it will be demonstrated, the application of the HRO approach can be complementary to the contingency approach in its adaptability with regards to the contingency approach's task uncertainty and technology. This adaptability is exemplified by the links between the contingent factors and the HRO's characteristics.

The preoccupation with failures rather than successes characteristic speaks to many of the considerations outlined under task uncertainty and technology. For instance, the IC given its legislative structures is mechanistic in concept. However, the IC also recognizes that based on the threat and the associated intelligence problem has also adopted organic approaches to how it organizes itself in terms of temporary structures such as committees, working groups and so forth. These non-legislative structures have been put in place to decrease the likelihood of an intelligence failure caused by potentially not working together via formalized structures.

The reluctant to simply interpretation characteristic contradicts the idea of efficiency because the triangulation of information from different sources and agencies means using a number of resources. The greater the call for efficiency quite often translates as being satisfied with the bare minimum bits of information. However, in doing so, the interpretation of existing information may not be accurate because there is always the potential of a golden nugget being missed. The challenge remains that of how much information is required to have an appropriate interpretation.

The sensitivity to operations characteristic is most appropriately aligned to integration of different organizations and within each distinct entity. This speaks directly to the issue of intelligence sharing for the purpose of ensuring that no dot remains unconnected. As well, this HRO characteristic shares commonality with a non-routine technology whereby the ‘operation’ or intelligence problem is the centerpiece with the expectation that all those in answering the intelligence problem have an active role and collaborate amongst each other.

The commitment to resilience characteristic is a difficult one to point to a single or multiple corresponding task uncertainty and technology contingent factor. For instance, is resilience an outcome of a legislated mechanistic structure that regardless of failure or success will always hold its current structure? As previously observed, the Canadian IC has not had any significant structural changes in nearly 40 years. Or, is resilience the result of the IC being a craft and therefore is malleable to its environment.

The deference to expertise characteristic has a clear path to the notion of an engineering technology in that the technical experts, the intelligence analyst, manages the expectations in terms of the final intelligence product. This of course does not necessarily negate potential interference between the analyst and their intelligence product. In addition, there is a potential link to the intensive technology if the expert would be the person that would determine where and how to engage the various elements of the IC in order to generate the ‘neutral’ intelligence product.

6.3 Summary

The purpose of this chapter was to answer the first of the two research sub-questions posed in Chapter 1, ‘what makes the IC different from other policy domains?’ The

identification of the differences were determined based on the literature, interviews with senior officials and this researcher's knowledge and experience. In keeping with the contingency approach outlined in Chapter 3, the significant differences were categorized into external and internal contingent factors. The identified essential external contingent factors were the threat environment, the legislative framework, and the external expectations of the IC. The threat environment was understood as being dynamic, complex, unstable and unpredictable. The legislative framework revealed that several pieces of legislation are important within the context of the state's power in relation to society. Not surprising, the *Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms* is pinnacle, which when ignored or abused can lead to significant infringements on individuals as noted in the various inquires. Also identified was the *Anti-Terrorism Act (2001)*. This Act has had sweeping changes to the state's relationship with its citizenry. Last, the *Access to Information and Privacy Act* was revealed as important for it has an essential role in keeping government honest on matters of national security and intelligence. On the issue of one's expectation of the IC, it was determined that the IC, regardless of best efforts, cannot avoid having an intelligence failure of various degrees – history has proven this point over and over. Another consideration was with respect to when is the intelligence failure label truly warranted.


The key identified internal contingent factors were the intelligence process, the intelligence product, secrecy, and the IC as an HRO. The intelligence process was noted as providing a general understanding on the intelligence function is conducted across the IC. The intelligence product was identified as the critical output valued by decision-makers. Specifically, the value of the product is dependent on its accuracy regarding its

speculative-evaluative nature. Of all of the contingent factors, secrecy is perhaps the most overwhelming distinct characterization of the IC. Both its pros and cons were discussed. However, in its totality, secrecy is a necessary evil in order to protect the country's and individuals from potential harm. Secrecy does not occur on its own, it was established that an extensive security apparatus is in place to ensure the maintenance of secrecy – in other words, secrecy does not come cheap. Finally, the IC was deemed as being an HRO. It was argued that the IC meets all of the five characteristics of a HRO, namely; preoccupation with failures rather than successes, reluctance to simplify interpretations, sensitivity to operations, commitment to resilience, and deference to expertise.

This chapter also examined the above noted contingent factors against Donaldson's (2001) elements of task uncertainty and technology. In all instances, it was possible to demonstrate linkages between the contingent factors that differentiate the IC from the other policy domains and the two elements of task uncertainty and technology. This ability to demonstrate the linkages validates Donaldson's (2001) contingency approach as a reasonable way to delineate differences between organizations and policy domains. Furthermore, an initial analysis of the IC's contingent factors against the contingency approach suggests that a particularistic approach to performance management may be better suited than a universalistic approach. This suggestion forms the basis of the following chapter.

CHAPTER 7: ASSESSING 'FIT' BETWEEN THE MAF AND THE INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY'S CONTINGENT FACTORS

The previous chapter provided an answer to the first of the two research sub-questions – what makes the IC different from other policy domains? Using a contingency approach, it was established that the essential external contingent factors were the threat environment, the legislative framework, and the external expectations of the IC. The essential internal contingent factors were the intelligence process, the intelligence product, secrecy, and the IC as an HRO. Building on these findings, this chapter explores the second of the two research sub-questions – What is the fit between the MAF and the IC's contingency factors? As a reminder, the MAF is used as representing a universalistic approach to performance management. In keeping with the contingency approach, there is an expectation of fit between the IC's contingent factors and the MAF. Assessing for fit or misfit consisted of comparing the external and internal contingent factors against the MAF's 109 methodology questions spread across the six areas of management outlined in Chapter 2, illustrated below in Figure 9.



Source: Author (2023)

Figure 9 Process for Assessing for Fit / Misfit

7.1 External Contingent Factors

The MAF does not explicitly examine a department’s external environment. Although, prior to the 2019-20 MAF assessment round the final departmental MAF Assessment did provide one to two pages describing the departmental context. The aim of this departmental context was to situate the MAF results in relation to this context. However, a limiting factor with this approach was that the departmental context was restricted to the MAF areas of management. Given this restriction in the scope of the departmental context, the broader departmental context was lacking. If the MAF does not overtly capture the external environment, does the MAF indirectly capture elements of a department’s external environment? The response to this question requires an in-depth of each MAF area of management methodologies questions. What follows is an examination of the MAF in relation to the IC’s external contingent factors.

7.1.1 Threat Environment

From all of the MAF's areas of management, the security management area of management is perhaps the most relevant in examining the issue of the IC's threat environment. This area of management methodology has questions that could be perceived as speaking to the threat environment. For instance, a methodology question asks if the department reports to its deputy head or senior executive committee on the effectiveness of the Departmental Security Plan (DSP), including implementation of planned activities (TBS, 2019e). The development of the DSP generally consists of four key steps: setting the context, security risk assessment, security threat assessment, and implement, monitor and update. Within the DSP, the threat environment is examined in the setting the context step. Specifically, a properly conducted 'setting the context' effort would take into consideration a department's business context, organizational context, and security context. Although this methodology question does not directly speak of threat environment, there is an implied assumption that the DSP is based on a department's threat environment. Therefore, from a performance management perspective the MAF does not directly address the issue of whether or not the threat environment is addressed via the DSP. In essence, from a performance management perspective, this methodology question's reliance on the DSP partially addresses the issue of a department's threat environment.

There are several other questions in the security management area of management that have a similar implied assumption that the threat environment is a consideration. For example, a methodology question asks what percentage of activities identified in the DSP approved by the Deputy Head were completed as planned (TBS, 2019e). An assumption

of this methodology question is that if the threat environment changes, the activities under the DSP would be adjusted accordingly. Another methodology question asks if employees who travelled on government business were provided with a travel security briefing (TBS, 2019e). The purpose of the travel security briefing is to ensure that employees are aware of the threat to both government information and their own personal safety from potential adversaries. There is an assumption that the travel security briefings are tailored to the location that the employee is travelling to in order to take into consideration specificities of the travel location. In addition, the area of management has several methodology questions covering information technology (IT) security (TBS, 2019e). The methodology questions concerns are with respect to the protection of the government's IT infrastructure. The relation to the threat environment is limited to how this external threat environment may influence the government's IT. Overall, from a performance management perspective, the threat environment is taken into consideration indirectly through numerous assumptions that may not always hold true or be validated.

Perhaps, given the numerous implied assumptions between the threat environment and the MAF methodology questions identified above, the senior officials did not shed any particular insights on this. Excluding the MAF, an observation was made by a senior official on the threat environment as it relates to performance management. It was noted that the threat environment has had a significant role in determining the resources assigned to their organization. The senior official remarked that the IC's resources were reduced as part of the government's overall budget reduction efforts prior to the 9/11 attacks in the United States. Immediately afterwards, the IC's budget was increased as reflected in the 2002 National Security Budget. The interview was not able to ascertain whether budget

increases was because of a real increase in the threat level or whether it was government simply being seen as taking action. Although, various governmental public statements and documents have noted an increased threat level (Public Safety Canada, 2018a; 2018b). It is not unheard of for the bureaucracy not to waste a good crisis and take advantage of it. If this is the case, there is some truth to public choice's perspective of the maximizing bureaucrat. This inability to ascertain linkages between threat environment and resources was mainly because revealing such information would have spoken directly to classified intelligence.

7.1.2 Legislative Framework

The MAF is very limited on matters regarding the legislative framework that is relevant to the IC. None of the areas of management methodology questions covers matters of legislative concern. Even the *Access to Information and Privacy Act*, which is the most administrative type legislation identified in the previous chapter is not covered in the MAF. The closest that MAF comes directly to the *Act* is the Information Management / Information Technology and Service methodology question regarding the percentage of releasable Departmental Results Framework (DRF) datasets released on Open.Canada.ca (TBS, 2019f). The Open.Canada.ca is the Canadian government's attempt at increasing citizen's access to government. The basis of this methodology question is that by releasing the DRF datasets, citizens can gain insights into a department's operations and reduce the need for Canadians putting in access to information requests. From a performance management perspective, the MAF does very little in addressing the IC's legislative framework.

7.1.3 External expectations of the IC

The MAF's results management methodology questions have some relevance regarding the external expectations of the IC. The intent of this area of management is to demonstrate that government programs are effective, achieve results and provide good value to Canadians. In this instance, programs refers to those programs contained in a department or agency's Program Inventory (PI). Specifically, the methodology questions focuses on performance measurement and evaluation. Collectively, there two functions should be able to inform whether or not the IC' programs are meeting expectations. Embedded in this assumption is the expectation that results from the benefactors of the programs are reflected in the PI. The benefactors of the IC being, in part, the decision-makers.

One question in the methodology assesses the quality of the Performance Information Profile (PIP). The PIP is a management tool that holds a significant amount of performance management information. For instance, one methodology question asks about the quality of the PIP measurement information, which entails the quality of the outcomes and performance indicators, the state of the program logic and the completion of essential performance indicators data fields. At the core, the program logic illustrates how a department's activities create outputs that leads to outcomes. The essential performance indicators data fields are data source, frequency of data collection, the expected target, and the date to achieve the target. Each MAF assessment round only examines about one third of a department's PI (TBS, 2019g). Thus, it takes a few years to fully assess a department's PI, assuming that the PI does not change too often. If frequent changes do occur, it becomes

more difficult to assess continued performance over a longer period, since the introduction of a new program requires starting over.

Two additional methodology questions relate to the state of Treasury Board Submissions with respect to the completion of essential performance indicators data fields including actual results (TBS, 2019g). Treasury Board Submissions are an element of the government's expenditure management system that allows departments to seek approval of funds to create, expand or modify programs. Hence, only a segment of a department's resources and associated programming are examined through these questions. Another methodology question assesses the completion of evaluation management action plans (TBS, 2019g). The intent of evaluations are to provide insights into a program's relevance and performance. The assumption is that the higher the completion rate, the greater the department is expected to improve its performance.

From a performance management perspective, the MAF does offer limited insights into whether or not external expectation of the IC can be understood. The publicly available performance indicators and actual performance are mainly found on GCInfobase and the annual Departmental Plan and Departmental Results Report. For instance, the PCO monitors whether or not the Prime Minister/Prime Minister's Office staff are provided with time and relevant material on matters of national security (GCInfobase, 2020). However, the full array of performance indicators and actual results performance (expectations) are contained in the non-public PIPs.

7.2 Internal Contingent Factors

In contrast to the MAF and its limited applicability to the IC's external contingent factors, the MAF appears to be better suited for the IC's internal contingent factors, given

its emphasis on assessing a department's internal capabilities. The internal contingent factors examined below are the intelligence process, intelligence product, secrecy, and high reliability organization.

7.2.1 Intelligence Process

The intelligence process consists of four phases: direction, collection, processing, and dissemination. As demonstrated below, some of the phases are more receptive to the MAF than others, namely the collection and processing phases. The direction phase has potential links to the results management and security management areas of management methodologies. For the results management, there is the link to the methodology question regarding the quality of the PIPs. There is an expectation that within the IC, there are PIPs or elements within PIPs that reflect direction (TBS, 2019g). For instance, it is anticipated that an activity or output would identify the establishment of intelligence requirements. For security management, the direction element maybe implied in the DSP, which is captured in two methodology questions that assess the implementation of the DSP that should address the threat environment. As well, direction maybe reflected in two methodology questions that assess facilities with higher security requirements, both domestic and international government facilities (TBS, 2019e). For the four security management methodology questions, there is an assumption that direction is given concerning the safeguard of government assets from domestic and international threats. Admittedly, the security management is a loosely coupled link between performance management and direction.

However, the MAF is not well positioned to examine several issues associated with the direction phase of the intelligence cycle that have a direct implication with respect to

performance management. One issue is who establishes the PIR and what happens if they are not established (Lowenthal, 2006). This equates to ambiguity in goal setting (Chun and Rainey, 2005). A second related issue is what happens if policy makers fail to identify the PIRs or if an intelligence organization establishes its own PIR (Lowenthal, 2006) This situation leads Gill and Phythian (2012) to question the exercise of accountability or if the lack of direction leads to a failure, then the blame game begins (Hood, 2010). A third issue is one of conflicting or competing PIR in terms of who and how are they resolved (Lowenthal, 2006). This is closely linked to the issue of resourcing. There is nothing in the literature that would suggest that the IC is resourced to the extent that it can address all of the policy makers PIRs. It has been noted that there is insufficient resources to meet demands placed on the IC (Crelinsten, 2014). This speaks to the issue of resource allocation (Moynihan, 2008b). A fourth issue is one of the quality about the relationship between the policy-makers and the IC. In the past, it has been noted that the IC was generally disregarded by the policy-makers (Faragone, 2009). Lastly, given the current threat and policy environment, a challenge faced by both policy makers and the IC is 'priority creep' (Lowenthal, 2006). That is to say, when a threat or policy issues becomes more important than previously considered, it will have a corresponding impact on the making the 'new' issue a priority over other priorities. The challenge is twofold: first, is the PIR process sufficient flexible to allow for this; two; if PIRs are constantly changing, is it possible to have PIR? In public administration, this is linked to the issue of competing interests (King and Zanetti, 2005).

The collection phase has potential links to the results management, people management, and acquired services and assets management areas of management

methodologies. For the results management, there is the link to the methodology question that assesses the quality of the PIPs. Similar to the above, there is an expectation that the PIPs or elements within PIPs reflect the various collection disciplines (TBS, 2019g). In this phase of the intelligence process, the expectation is guided towards collection considerations in the PIPs. In the people management methodology, several methodology questions can be used to assess the HUMINT collection discipline. For example, one question assesses the department's employees having completed annual written performance assessments, which includes employees' meeting their work objectives as well as demonstrating expected behaviours (TBS, 2019h). This implies that employees' performance carrying out the HUMINT function is assessed. Also, two questions touch on a very limited aspect of diversity, namely official languages and employment equity (TBS, 2019h). It is recognized that diversity of the IC is beneficial, especially in conducting HUMINT, where having an in-depth understanding of the target and being able to engage the target at their social-cultural level is an advantage. These two questions may not precisely get at this understanding, but is a step in the right direction for including diversity within a performance management construct.

In examining the technical aspect of collection, there are several applicable IT/IM methodology questions. One question assesses the level of maturity of IT application management (TBS, 2019f). As noted earlier in the research, technology is constantly evolving, so the IC's technology also needs to evolve accordingly in order to stay relevant. Another methodology question looks at IT service standards (TBS, 2019f). This takes into consideration whether or not service standards have been established. Thus, for technical IT collection means, there is an expectation that the clients of the technical collection

means are being met. In addition, there are four methodology questions that examine the strategic management of information, data, service and technology (TBS, 2019f). Collectively, these questions consider whether the department's IT is part of its performance management structures, including the incorporation of IT related risks.

Lastly, we examine investment planning, real property, and material management. These four considerations fall within the acquired services and assets methodology. Given the ever-increasing technical nature of intelligence collection, these three areas are important considerations in ensuring that technical means and their enablers are identified, acquired and implemented with efficacy. There are three methodology questions that contribute towards this efficacy. Specifically, these questions examine the level of governance robustness, that is to say, there are clear objectives and accountabilities (TBS, 2019i). From a performance management lens, the robustness of the governance is important given that these three areas in the majority of cases entails long-term resource commitments. In other words, if efficacy is not managed from the start, the required investments, real property and assets may not be there in the future when they would be required, thus potential impeding a department to fulfill its mandate.

There are several issues identified in the literature with respect to the collection phase that have implications to performance management but MAF is silent on. The first issue is whether more collection results is better intelligence (Lowenthal, 2006). The literature notes that the existing collection means outweigh the capability of the intelligence analysts to actually utilize what is collected (Lowenthal, 2006). This is especially true with intelligence that is collected via technical means such as IMINT and SIGINT. A second issue concerns about having the appropriate resources to being able to collect against the

PIR. It has been observed that the collection phase is, “also the first-and perhaps the most important-facet of intelligence where budgets and resources come into play in precise terms” (Lowenthal, 2006: 59). In addressing these issues, a performance management framework should be able to assess the quality of intelligence in relation to the source of the intelligence and have the capacity to prioritize.

The processing phase of the intelligence process in terms of the MAF is reflected in examining the people management and IT/IM management areas of management. For people management, in particular intelligence analysts, similar methodology questions as with the collection phase are deemed appropriate. For example, the methodology question regarding the department’s employees having completed annual written performance assessments which includes employees’ meeting their work objectives as well as demonstrating expected behaviours (TBS, 2019h). However, the MAF does permit exploring the distinctive competencies required by intelligence analysts give the, “tension between current intelligence and long-term intelligence” (Lowenthal, 2006: 64). The former is at the forefront of the minds of policy makers, whilst the latter becomes concern only when policy makers are considering trends and things down the road. The implication is that these two focus of intelligence require very distinct skill sets that directly affects recruiting, training, developing and retaining. The distinct skill sets is made even clearer employing Moore and Krizan’s (2001) human resources competencies framework. The authors’ framework identifies four core competencies for intelligence analysts: characteristics, skills, knowledge and abilities. Within each of these core competencies, they have been further broken down into subsets. Furthermore, the authors put forth the notion that different competencies are required for different types of intelligence analysis

- descriptive, explanatory, interpretative and estimative. In a nutshell, the authors argue that each type of analysis will require a different set of competencies of varying complexity.

Homogeneity within an IC has not served it well, thus making diversity an essential dimension of the people management. The very nature of intelligence work requires having a comprehension of the world that usually falls outside of one's own perspective. The large volume of post-failure assessments have continuously pointed out that a lack of different perspectives has been a contributing factor to the intelligence failure. Diversification brings along an understanding of the world from different perspectives allowing a better chance to reducing shared biases. It increases the chances of reducing mirror-imaging and ethnocentrism, as was the case:

...before Pearl Harbor, during Vietnam, and in Iran before the Shah's fall. More recently, a report assessing IC [intelligence community] performance in the wake of the India/Pakistan nuclear tests affirmed that the "everybody-thinks-like-us mindset" was a major cause of the "failure" to predict the resumption of underground testing (Callum, 2001: 32).

The rationale for having a diversified workforce is because it makes good operational sense. The motivation for diversity is no longer legal or ethical concerns but rather a realization that people from many different backgrounds and cultures can be more effective than a homogenous workforce (Callum, 2001). Given the importance assigned to diversity, especially the analytical element of the IC, the MAF's examination of diversity is very limited to two methodology questions, namely official languages and employment equity (TBS, 2019h).

In examining the technical aspect of processing, there are multiple applicable IT/IM methodology questions. This is the case because increasingly the analytical element of the intelligence process is being automated. For instance, the question that assesses the level

of maturity of IT application management (TBS, 2019f) and the question that examines the IT service standards (TBS, 2019f). As well, there are four methodology questions that examine the strategic management of information, data, service and technology (TBS, 2019f). Collectively, these questions consider whether or not the department's IT is part of its performance management structures, including the incorporation of IT related risks, as an enabler of the intelligence processing function.

The last phase of the intelligence process is dissemination, which closes the intelligence cycle loop. Thus, as with the direction phase, the results management methodology question regarding the quality of the PIPs (TBS, 2019g). There is an expectation that the PIPs or elements within PIPs captures the dissemination of the intelligence product to the end-users. A consideration that MAF does not understandably reflect, but which is extensively noted in the literature is the idea of 'politization' of intelligence. It is a term that has ever-increasingly been used to describe the relationship between producer and consumer (Rovner, 2011; Bar-Joseph, 2013). It has been stated that there are five different types of politization: direct pressure, cherry-picking, house line, question asking, and shared mindset (Treverton, 2008). In part, the issue of politization can be explained by the simple fact that the IC and policy-makers have different expectations. This should not come as a surprise because the government is not a monolithic organization (Lowenthal, 2006).

Another approach to understanding the issue of politization is with respect to how the IC and policymakers relationship is construed in terms of a traditional or activist approach to intelligence (Gustave de Valk, 2005). Under a traditional approach in which the IC and policy-makers are kept separate then politization can potentially be observed

when these silos are breached. On the other hand, under an activist approach where there is more of an exchange of information between the IC and policy-makers, then the potential for applying the politicization label is less given that there is an expectation that the silos are purposely breached. Regardless, of the approach used to understand the relationship between policy-makers and the IC, the quality of the intelligence product plays an important role.

When the dissemination phase of the intelligence cycle is assessed against expectations from a performance management perspective two considerations arise. First, accountability in terms of what do policy-makers expect from the IC and vice versa. Secondly, the impact that intelligence has on decision-making. As noted earlier, MAF may be equipped to address the first through the PIPs. However, the MAF is highly unlikely to address the second.

7.2.2 Intelligence Product

Continuing from the dissemination phase of the intelligence cycle, the intelligence product represents the output of the process. This is a critical consideration because if the intelligence product does not meet the needs of the decision-makers, its value is potentially reduced; meaning that the resources and efforts used within all four phases may have been squandered. Since the product closes the intelligence cycle loop with the direction phase, as with direction phase, the results management methodology question regarding the quality of the PIPs is most applicable (TBS, 2019g). There is an expectation that the PIPs or elements (output) within PIPs captures the intelligence product. Within the PIPs, one would find assessment of the intelligence product against a number of criteria:

High quality intelligence designates information that is clear because it is understandable to those who must use it; timely because it gets to them

when they need it; reliable because diverse observers using the same procedures see it in the same way; valid because it is cast in the form of concepts and measures that capture reality (the tests include logical consistency, successful prediction, congruence with established knowledge or independent sources); adequate because the account is full (the context of the act, event, or life of the person or group is described) (Wilensky, 1967: viii-ix).

Employing Wilensky's criteria, the consumer of the intelligence product would have a significant say in determining whether the intelligence product is of high quality. This could be challenging when the consumer is not fully understanding of intelligence, does not see the need for intelligence, or intelligence occurs in a politicized environment.

7.2.3 Secrecy

From a MAF perspective, the applicable methodology and questions for secrecy are very similar to the threat environment, namely the security management area of management. For instance, one question examines whether the deputy head or senior executive committee have been advised on the effectiveness of the DSP. Another question asks what percentage of the DSP's activities were achieved as planned (TBS, 2019e). The DSP would have identified potentials risks and mitigating strategies associated with secrecy. As well, the question on employees receiving a travel security briefing is also applicable (TBS, 2019e). In a sense, from a performance management perspective, there is a strong link between secrecy, focussed on the protection of information, and MAF.

However, the MAF is ill equipped to examine secrecy in relation to democratic values. In this sense, bureaucracy secrecy speaks to the, "tendency of all organizations to limit the information that they release outside to outsiders so as to control perceptions of the organization" (Aftergood, 1999: 20). In particular, "information about the legality of a decision; the knowledge that lies behind a particular decision; and the political basis of a

decision (Robertson, 1982: 4). It has been suggested that the level of government secrecy depends on the kind of authority elected officials have over unelected officials. As well, the level of control of information is determined by the perception that it is deemed essential to the political struggle for power (Robertson, 1982). Notwithstanding the application of bureaucratic secrecy, there is an expectation that democratic countries will disclose information. According to Robertson (1982), the justification is based on the right to know which forms the basis of accountability, disclosure of the information is good because it encourages public participation into the polity, and disclosure assures that government actions represents the public interest. Secrecy, in addition to impacting democracy, open government, transparency and accountability also has ‘other costs’. These are cost associated with the administration of the access laws, regulations and policies. As well, there are costs linked to keeping things secret in terms of the physical and cyber security requirements.

7.2.2 High Reliability Organization

A high reliability organization has five characteristics. In turn, each characteristic is examined against the MAF areas of management methodologies. In several instances, there maybe some overlap with the internal contingent factors analyzed above. The first characteristic is preoccupation with failure rather than successes. Elements of this characteristic are reflected in the results management area of management, specifically in several questions. The first methodology question being the quality of the PIP (TBS, 2019g). If the PIPs are properly maintained, failures should be noted and addressed. Another methodology question assesses the performance indicators included in Treasury Board submission results appendices have actual results data available on schedule (TBS,

2019g). If properly managed, Treasury Board submissions that do not achieve intended results would trigger a response towards one of trying to achieve the intended result. As well, the methodology question regarding the percentage of the evaluation management action plan implemented has application in that action plans are by their nature implemented to address a shortcoming (TBS, 2019g). Last, there are two methodology questions that assess the commitment to the *Experimentation Direction for Deputy Heads* (Privy Council Office, 2016). The intent of experimentation is to employ different methods to explore possible different solutions to an issue. Collectively, the results management methodology questions are designed to ensure that failures are identified and addressed. From a performance management perspective, the MAF's results management area of management does a reasonable job at reflecting preoccupation with failures if the department actively manages using the PIPs, implements evaluation management action plans, and supports experimentation. An area that is difficult to more directly ascertain is the link between performance management and intelligence's ability to separate the 'signal from the noise'.

The reluctance to simplify interpretation characteristics can be mapped to the results management area of management; but more specifically to the methodology question that evaluates the quality of the PIP (TBS, 2019g). By its very nature, the PIP cannot fully capture the complexity of the Program it perpetuates to capture. Consequentially, the PIP by design reduces complex by capturing the significant essential elements. In doing so, the PIP's simplification of reality may inadvertently neglect important elements of a program or reality. In terms of performance management, the MAF does not allow one to drill down to a granular level that this characteristic is aimed

specifically at intelligence. Rather, the MAF is better designed to examine at the macro level. As such, the MAF does not provide a certain level of analytical examination of this characteristic.

Also, beyond the MAF construct, performance management under NPM demands optimal efficiency at all cost (Hood 1991), the IC should be reluctant to strive for optimal efficiency at all cost. This drive for efficiency is based on the NPM doctrine that the public sector should be managed as the private sector, implying that there is no substantial difference between the public and private sectors. A closely associated consideration to efficiency would be the need for the IC to have organizational slack, understood as:

that cushion of actual or potential resources, which allows an organization to adapt successfully to internal pressures for adjustment or to external pressures for change in policy, as well as to initiate changes in strategy with respect to the external environment (Bourgeois, 1981: 30).

Several scholars have noted that systems that have built-in redundancy, duplication and overlap have a higher likelihood of being able to absorb a system failure (Laudau, 1969; Bendor, 1985; Heimann, 1993). The IC would require organizational slack or surge capacity in order to appropriately understand and respond to a dynamic and complex environment, which has become the new reality for intelligence over the last few decades (Lahneman, 2011). Hence, maintaining a surge capacity in order to anticipate and react to this complex and dynamic environment is the antithesis of efficiency. All too often, when a surge requirement occurs resources are shifted from one area to another area of the IC. This incorrectly suggests that the 'losing area' is no longer important. What actually happens is that the losing area becomes a potential future blind spot to the IC. The immediate concern overtakes the long-term, and perhaps the strategic need. For example,

one wonders if the immediate focus on terrorism after 9/11 affected the IC's focus on other previous intelligence priorities such as weapons of mass destruction and espionage.

The sensitivity to operations characteristic stipulates that the whole organization should be aware of what is occurring throughout its constituent parts. By its very nature, the MAF in itself serves as an instrument to assess various parts of the organization. The MAF report provides a holistic perspective on the organizational against the various areas of management. If the report is widely shared within an organization, then the different parts of the organization would be aware of what is happening throughout the organization. Even within the areas of management, several methodology questions provide a broad view of the respective area of management. For security management, the methodology question that assesses the percentage of the DSP's activities were achieved as planned, provides a certain level of organizational performance management awareness and assurance (TBS, 2019e). The results management methodology question that assesses the quality of the PIPs provides an organizational perspective (TBS, 2019g). However, as previously noted, only approximately one-third of the PIPs are assessed any given year. In matters related to people management, the methodology question that assesses the activities or initiatives undertaken by the organization to keep pace with its environment contributes to understanding organizational readiness (TBS, 2019h). There is an assumption that in keeping with environment, the organization's operations remain sensitive.

On the technical aspect of 'connecting the dots', there are several methodology questions from the IM/IT area of management that could contribute towards sensitivity to operations. For example, the methodology question that assesses the level of management

maturity of IT plans, aims to ensure that there is a link between IT and the organization's programs (TBS, 2019f). Another methodology question assesses the department's level of overall IT maturity that intends to provide the organization's senior management with an overview of the strategic management of IT. It is expected that a higher level of maturity would technically increase the probability of connecting the dots. Last, the methodology question that assesses the extent to which department's data strategy enables the strategic management of data. This is a very encompassing assessment that looks at a number of items such as governance structures, plans, data inventories, data literacy, and data quality (TBS, 2019f). Two key considerations regarding connecting the dots is organizational culture and individual behaviour. The MAF is not equipped to examine these two considerations.

The acquired services and assets area of management examines a department's capacity in making informed investment ensuring that the department has the necessary assets to deliver on its mandate. In terms of methodology questions there are several questions that examine specific aspects such as investment planning, procurement, real property, material management concerning governance. The overall intent of governance in these specific areas is to ensure that clear objectives and expectations are identified (TBS, 2019i). There is an implied assumption that the objectives and expectations are linked (i.e., sensitive) to a department's key operational considerations.

The commitment to resilience characteristic suggests that organizations should be able to continue to operate despite a significant setback. Within the MAF, the security management area of management there are two methodology questions regarding business continuity management, which are the closest that come to commitment to resilience. The

idea behind business continuity management is that a department can maintain an acceptable level of delivery of critical services and activities, and achieve the timely recovery of other services and activities (TBS, 2019e). However, the methodology questions partially address the issues associated with recovery from an intelligence failure. They do not necessarily deal with intelligence failure directly but rather with organizational failures. Although, in some instances an organizational failure can contribute to an intelligence failure.

The deference to expertise characteristic implies that the department's expertise are given a lead role. In terms of the MAF, the notion of expertise is reflected in the people management area of management. There are several methodology questions that cover the notion of expertise. For instance, investment in talent management, where talent implies knowledge and experiential expertise (TBS, 2019h). In addition, the methodology question that assesses a department preparing its workforce to meet emerging trends (TBS, 2019h). In addition, the results management area of management methodology questions regarding the PIPs is applicable, if a PIP can demonstrate how expertise is generated and how this expertise contributes to decision-making (TBS, 2019g).

7.3 'Fit' bringing the elements together

The contingency approach to performance management presented in Chapter 3 consisted of three essential elements: external contingent factors, internal contingent factors, and fit. The contingent factors, both external and internal, was the subject of examination in the previous chapter. We now examine the remaining element – fit. Conceptually fit is the alignment between the organization's contingent factors. A positive alignment implies that an organization is performing well. When there is a misalignment,

there is an implied assumption that an organization's performance decreases. Transposing this conceptual thinking of fit to performance management, there is the argument that a performance management instrument, i.e., the MAF, that takes into account an organization's external and internal contingent factors is a performance management instrument that has utility. Conversely, a performance management instrument that fails to account for an organization's external and internal contingent factors is a performance management instrument whose utility is questioned.

Employing Chapter 6's external and internal contingent factors, the previous section sought to address the question of whether or not the MAF, as a universalism-based performance management instrument, is appropriate. In short, the answer is both no and yes. But, how can it concurrently be both a no and yes? We begin our examination with the no. The MAF has a limited ability to take into account the IC's external contingent factors. In the instances where it was able to do so, MAF's ability to address was dependant on other instruments that departments are expected to have implemented. In doing so, the MAF serves as an umbrella instrument. However, the MAF takes it for granted that these other instruments are effectively being employed by departments. To note, the MAF does not get into the quality of these other management instruments as demonstrated by the type of methodology questions posed across MAF's areas of management. Rather, the MAF assumes that these other instruments are being properly implemented. However, it is recognized that the MAF's focus is internally focussed, thus one's assessment of whether the MAF excels at capturing the external contingent factors should be tempered accordingly. In applying the MAF on the IC's internal contingent factors, there were several instances where the MAF would fall short. The MAF had mixed results with

respect to the intelligence process, the intelligence product, secrecy and the IC as an HRO. A similar observation to the external contingent factor can be made here; the MAF in many instances relies heavily on other management instruments being adequately implemented. Consequently, the MAF keeps the performance management discussion at a macro level, reducing the ability to get into the granular.

The above examination may leave the reader disheartened on the efficacy of the MAF as a viable performance management instrument for the IC. It may lead one to conclude that because the MAF does not completely address the particularities of the IC's external and internal contingent factors, it makes for a poor performance management instrument. Going further, the MAF's universalism-based approach can be interpreted as a failure and thus there is a need for a particularism-based approach to performance management of the IC. If this is the argument, then the story ends here. However, drawing this conclusion may be premature.

Let us now consider the benefits of the MAF (the yes), as a universalism-based approach to performance management. As a starter, the IC is exactly that, it is a community – so how can one examine a community if each constituent had its own particularism-based approach to performance management? This inevitably takes the examination into the realm of comparability. For instance, are there differences within the IC? How do we account for those differences in terms of performance management? The answer to the first question is yes. The differences have already been noted in Chapter 5, which described each entity of the Canadian IC. On matters related to the second question, there would be an expectation that entity-specific performance management issues would be embedded

within their respective performance management structures. So, if differences are important why even have a debate between universalism and particularism.

Let us return to the notion of the IC, as a community. A community implies that there are commonalities that draws certain entities into the community. This commonality can be understood in terms of membership, influence, integration and fulfillment of needs, and shared emotional connection (McMillan and Chavis, 1986). Thus, the entities that constitute the IC share the majority of not all of these elements to various degrees. In keeping with our understanding of a community, from a performance management perspective there is also a need to examine performance management at a community level. By default, there is an expectation that each entity of this community will have common performance management considerations. Given this expectation, the application of a universalism-based performance management approach is desired if not expected. There are a few benefits for employing a universalism-based approach to performance management. First, it contributes to systems thinking in that a common approach can assist with the identification of common performance issues and interdependency across the community. Second, a common approach can contribute to reflective thinking in that one entity can explore performance issued and ask why other entities within the community may or may not be having a similar experience. Third, if the community is facing a common performance issue, a common approach provides the entities with an analytical tool to conduct cross-entity analysis.

These benefits are also applicable on a government-wide scale. The government, through TBS who is responsible for the MAF, is given a basic capability to examine, analyze and consider performance management across the whole of government. This can

only occur using an instrument like the MAF. An important reminder when using MAF is that government-wide MAF results provide a general gauge of how well departments are performing according to the expectations outlined in each of the areas of management the methodology questions. There is a need to recognize and manage performance management expectations accordingly. These words of caution would be equally applied to other performance management instruments because no reasonable performance management can account for everything – this is a simple reality. To conclude this section, the MAF provides a less than adequate fit between the IC and its external and internal contingent factors in terms of performance management for the reasons discussed above.

7.4 Summary

The purpose of this chapter was to answer the second of the two research sub-questions, posed in Chapter 1, “What is the fit between the MAF and the IC’s contingency factors?” The MAF was employed as a proxy for a universalistic approach to performance management. The examination of this question was based on documents and the researcher’s knowledge and experience, following the contingency approach that consists of external contingent factors and internal contingent factors.

The analysis of the external contingent factors revealed that the MAF is ill equipped from a performance management perspective to appropriately reflect the threat environment. In this instance, the methodology questions were internal focussed. On matters of legislative framework, the MAF was completely irrelevant. Where the MAF demonstrated some relevance was with regards to the external expectations of the IC, in particular the results management area of management.

Moving on to the internal contingent factors, overall, the MAF was better suited to demonstrate its utility with respect to performance management. Albeit, the MAF's utility was uneven across the four internal contingent factors. In examining the intelligence process, the MAF was able to provide a very basic relevance to the direction phase. For the collection phase, the MAF was able to demonstrate a reasonable relevance to the performance management expectations for this phase. The MAF had a weak demonstration of its utility with respect to the processing phase. This was mainly due to the MAF not being able to better account for the crucial element of the workforce's analytical capability. Last, the MAF did demonstrate an accepted level of relevance regarding the dissemination phase of the intelligence cycle.

In exploring the intelligence product, the MAF was able to demonstrate its relevance on the assumption that the PIPs do capture the essential criteria of clarity, timeliness, reliability, validity, and adequacy. Not having access to the internal PIPs, one would be providing a certain level of assumption given that these are the generic criteria commonly identified in the literature on matters of expectations from an intelligence product. On the internal contingent factor of secrecy, the MAF is well suited to address concerns regarding secrecy's internal focus, in other words, protecting secrets. However, the MAF does a very poor job at examining secrecy's external focus – secrecy in relation to democratic values. Given the nature of intelligence and its powers and reach into society and individuals, this is a critical dimension of secrecy that performance management would need to account for.

Overall, the MAF achieves an acceptable level of utility when it was examined against the internal contingent factor of a high-reliability organization. The MAF

comfortable captures preoccupation with failures rather than successes especially within the results management area of management. There were several methodology questions that explored this dimension. However, given that the MAF, for practical reasons, assesses only a portion of a department's PIPs and Treasury Board Submissions it is not as strong as it can be. There is the expectation that what is assessed is representative of the full array of PIPs and Treasury Board Submissions. Based on the literature, the MAF does not fully reflect many noted considerations regarding the reluctance to simplify interpretations. As a result, the MAF is partially successful on this characteristic. On matters related to sensitivity to operations, the MAF has perhaps its strongest showing given that the MAF by its very nature is designed to assess various elements of an organization and brings them together. In addition, the MAF has a good showing concerning the commitment to resilience characteristic, in particular, the methodology questions related to business continuity management. However, the MAF does not directly address resilience to an intelligence failure. Last, the MAF does a fair job at demonstrating deference to expertise.

Prior to moving to the concluding chapter of this research, one is reminded that the analysis of the MAF as a proxy for a universalistic approach to performance management was based on the set of methodology questions used in FY 2019-20. As the methodology questions may change from year to year, the analysis may vary accordingly. Notwithstanding any future potential variations, this chapter has provided an approach by which the IC's particularities in terms of external and internal contingent factors can be analyzed for their implications on performance management.

CHAPTER 8: CONCLUSION

The purpose of this closing chapter is to reflect upon this study in terms of the research questions, my contribution to advancing knowledge and the topic's social relevance, varied reflections, and potential future research and engagement endeavours.

8.1 *Summary of the Research*

As articulated in Chapter 1, the research problem that this exploratory study examined pertained to the demonstrated shortfall of the Canadian government's continuous implementation of universalism or one-size fits all approach to performance management instruments such as the MAF. Hence, the purpose of this study was to explore the consideration for a particularism approach to performance management, using the Canadian IC as the research setting. In theoretical terms, it boils down to the universalism vs particularism debate. To address the problem and meet the purpose of the study, a contingency approach was used in seeking answers to a primary research question and two sub-questions:

Primary Question:

- Is a universalism-based or a particularism-based approach better suited for performance management in the public sector?

Sub-questions:

- What makes the IC different from other policy domains?
- What is the fit between the MAF and the IC's contingency factors?

The answers to these questions, in a nutshell are: first, the universalism based approaches to performance management should at the very least be complemented by particularism considerations, if not replaced wholesale, Second, the IC was found to be

different from other policy domains in terms of both external and internal contingent factors. The former consists of the threat environment, the legislative framework, and the external expectations of the IC. The latter consists of the intelligence process, the intelligence product, intelligence and secrecy, and the IC as a HRO. Third, it was found that there was more misfit than fit between the MAF and the IC's contingency factors.

8.2 Contribution to Advancing Knowledge and Social Relevance

In Chapter 1, the significance of the study was outlined in keeping with King's et.al (1994), two relevancies: theoretical and social within both fields of public administration and intelligence studies. The following outlines my contribution on both accounts.

8.2.1 Theoretical relevance

This study adds evidence to the literature with regards to universalism-based approaches to performance management as limiting. This was illustrated through the assessment of the MAF, as a proxy for a one-size-fits-all approach. Consequentially, it challenges managerialism's argument that private sector practices can be transposed into the public sector based on the simple assumption that management is management. The research findings further validates previous literature making a similar argument (Dixon, Kouzman, Korac-Kakabadse, 1998; Boyne, 2002, Rosenbloom, 2015). In particular, this study also adds affirmation to Pollitt's (2013) argument that context is the missing link in public policy and management. On the flip side, it contests the hard held position of scientific management's belief in clearly defined laws, rules, and principles or its more recent variation of neo-Taylorism.

If managerialism is undermined, then it also contributes in undermining NPM's claim of improving government performance. In the case of MAF, it leaves itself open to

criticism that it may not be well positioned to inform TBS about the state of policy implementation and practices nor to identify areas of management strengths and areas that require attention, which are two of the MAF's stated goals. Instead, what we end up with is a performance management instrument that can lead to dysfunctional effects. The MAF's dysfunction being all of the resources and efforts dedicated to its implementation, maintenance, inappropriate response to assessment findings, and the potential gaming that goes along with it. Hence, this study supports existing literature which argues that NPM inspired reforms can lead to dysfunctional effects (De Bruijn and Van Helde, 2006; Hubbard and Paquet, 2010; Speklé and Verbeeten, 2014; Osborne, et al., 2015; Visser, 2016).

Given the issues identified in this study, one is left wondering if universalistic-based approaches to performance management will ever allow performance management to achieve the benefits identified in the literature – connecting government to citizens (Berman, 2006; Moynihan, 2008), enhancing accountability (de Lancer Julnes, 2009), increase transparency (De Bruijn, 2007), efficient resource allocation (Moynihan, 2008), strengthening decision-making (Tuomela, 2005), enhancing cooperation, coordination, and participation between employees and work units (Dossi and Patelli, 2010), enhance employee motivation and job satisfaction (Hall, 2008), and improve organizational learning (Chenhall, 2005). From this study's perspective, literature that identifies the benefits of performance management may need to be nuanced in terms of the specific design of the performance management instruments. Otherwise, one may be left with the impression that performance management has minimal utility, excluding the symbolic framing of performance management (Dobija, et.al., 2019), which is not the case. The

potential benefits of performance management as outlined above are real but its design needs to account for context.

This study's use of the Canadian government's MAF adds to the limited literature that examines how practitioners use performance management tools given that the existing scholarly body of knowledge focuses on the US and UK local governments that generally examine education and health services (George, et.al., 2019). In short: this study expands the investigative research setting, namely Canada and the IC. More broadly, by using the contingency approach with origins in organizational theory, this study demonstrates that it is possible to use 'older classic' theory to explore phenomena in more recent complex settings – confirming Donaldson's (1995) observation that there is not always need to chase the latest fad. In essence, this study applied an older classic theoretical thinking to a more recent setting. In addition, this study used organizational theory (contingency approach) in a public sector context, instead of the more traditional private sector setting which tends to be the usual setting for applying organizational theory (Zegart, 2011b; Arellano, et. al., 2013; Andrews and Esteve, 2015; Charbonneau, et.al., 2020). Last, in using the IC as the case study, this research adds to the minuscule performance management literature that employs a complex, fluid, and secretive operating environment, whereas performance management studies tend to focus on public sector organizations that work in simple environments observes Moynihan and colleagues (2011).

As a Canadian researcher, I was able to bring a non-US scholar perspective to intelligence studies which is the dominating perspective, note Gill and Phythian (2012). In addition to the scholarly perspective, my lived experience as a practitioner also contributed to this perspective. In using the Canadian IC as the case study, this research adds to a very

limited Canadian intelligence studies literature as observed by Van Puyvelde and Curtis (2016).

By approaching this study through a public administration lens, it avoids the more traditional historical approach in examining the IC. Hence, this research contributes to the non-historical intelligence studies literature which is generally lacking in the scholarship (Michael and Kornbluth, 2019; Varaouhakis, 2013; and Van Puyvelde and Curtis, 2016). Given that this intelligence focused research is anchored in public administration, it adds to a near invisible topic of study in Canadian public administration or otherwise thus addressing a known gap (Grey, 2009; Davies, 2010; Gentry, 2016; Vogel and Hattke, 2022). Furthermore, this research combines performance management and intelligence studies thus addressing another deficiency in the literature, which has been remarked by many over a couple of decades (Johnson 2002-04; Betts, 2007; Pepper, 2010; Forcese, 2015; Caceres-Rodriquez and Landon-Murray, 2019). To the best of this researcher's knowledge, it is the first time that the Canadian IC has been examined through a public administration lens.

A distinct contribution of this study was the identification of key features that differentiates the IC from other policy domains and placing them within a single framework. By applying a contingency approach in examining what makes the IC different, this research identified the IC's external and internal contingent factors. With regards to the external contingent factors, the IC has an external environment that is 'threat' based. By threat, we are referring to the potential of actual harm to citizens and national interests. On the issue of legislative framework, the IC operates within a potentially highly charged legislative context with direct implications on citizens' constitutional rights and freedoms. Abuses of individual rights and freedoms have a direct negative impact on

individuals and society. The margin of error on getting it right or wrong is thin. There is a constant need to balance the security versus rights and freedoms scale. This is but one consideration placed on the expectations from the IC. The IC getting it right is quite often viewed as a zero-sum game – there is success or there is failure. This yes / no approach to the performance of the IC fails to take into account the intrigues of the IC with its external and to a lesser extent its internal contingent factors.

Regarding the internal contingent factors, this research suggests four of them. The intelligence process consisting of the direction, collection, processing, and dissemination phases was a distinctive factor. Although, variations of the intelligence process exist within the IC, there was a general common understanding of how direction from the senior officials of government results in the same senior officials receiving a finished intelligence product. The quality of the intelligence product and its receptivity by decision-makers is dependent on a number of factors that are additional attributes of the internal contingent factors. Another internal contingent factor examined was secrecy, which is not limited to the IC in government. However, the scope and scale of the application of secrecy to the IC does easily set it apart from other policy domains. As well, the IC and secrecy has other implications, most notably that of public accountability – an important consideration of performance management. By its very nature public accountability creates an expectation of government providing a public account of performance. However, when it comes to the IC, secrecy tends to smother public accountability. Last, the IC was deemed an HRO which is an organization (or community in this case) whose task is to protect citizens from danger where failure is unacceptable. In doing so, the IC easily met the five characteristics of a HRO. To the best of this researcher's knowledge neither the intelligence studies nor the

HRO literatures have considered the IC as a HRO. The analysis presented in this study clearly demonstrated how the IC met each of Weick and Sutcliffe’s (2001) five characteristics of a HRO – see Table 7.

Table 7 Summary of HRO Characteristics Applied to the IC

HRO Characteristic	Application to the IC
1. Preoccupation with Failures Rather than Successes	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ continuous attempt at examining and understanding why there was an intelligence failure ▪ seek remedies that would minimize the potential risk that could lead to a critical intelligence failure from occurring ▪ extensive use of various mechanisms to review or challenge the work undertaken by the IC. ▪ constant requirement to separate the wheat from the chaff or the signal from the noise
2. Reluctance to Simplify Interpretations	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ reluctance to strive for optimal efficiency at all cost – require triangulation from multiple collection assets ▪ need for organizational slack to deal with surge requirements
3. Sensitivity to Operations	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ lack of information sharing ▪ need to balance protection and sharing of information
4. Commitment to Resilience	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ ability to recover from intelligence failures ▪ recovery occurs with a heightened sense of urgency under an increased level of external scrutiny
5. Deference to expertise	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ recognized for having subject-matter experts ▪ large set of core competencies required to conduct intelligence analysis ▪ investments in training, learning, and development ▪ extensive knowledge base but it is not always employed by policy-makers for a variety of reasons

Source: Author (2023)

The performance management approach developed in this study – consisting of external and internal contingent factors – moves the performance of the IC conversation beyond the very typical and overwhelming binary intelligence failure approach, which many have observed that this has failed to reflect the complex and uncertain nature of intelligence (Betts, 1978; 2007; Andrew, 2004; Treverton, et.al., 2006). Perhaps, more important is that this study’s contingency factors approach can offer a way forward to move the intelligence performance discussion from a negative or descriptive theory of

intelligence failure to a normative theory of intelligence that emphasizes success as called by Dahl (2010). Hence, this research provides the opportunity to consider the performance of the IC from an *ex ante* instead of the overwhelming *ex post* perspective.

In its totality, the combined external and internal contingent factors support Gill and Phythian (2012) ascertain that intelligence is an umbrella term. What this research demonstrated is that the contingency approach to the performance of the IC can provide the basis to explore, examine and or even develop a theory of intelligence. The last of this opportunities has to date has been elusive perhaps because most of the theorizing has been influenced by *ex-post* intelligence failure thinking.

On a final note, as the contingency approach continues to evolve, it continues providing an analytical tool to explore issues of importance to public sector organizations and the citizens that fund it. In short – organizational theory, as the basis for CT, has much to offer to public administration, public management, performance management, and intelligence studies as has been illustrate in this research.

8.2.2 Social relevance

It has been documented that a well-managed public sector is a contributing factor in citizens trust in government (Christensen and Laegreid, 2005; Van Ryzin, 2007; Mizrahi, et.al., 2010; OECD, 2021), which in part depends on the implementation of performance management instruments. There is evidence suggesting a positive link between performance management and citizens trust (Andrews and Van de Walle, 2013; Environics Institute and Institute of Governance, 2014). Based on this, there is an expectation that performance management instruments such as the MAF are properly developed and implemented. The findings from this study suggests that the MAF's potential contribution

is significantly reduced due to its misfit with the specificities of the IC. This study points to the importance of ensuring that government efforts in implementing performance management instruments can actually contribute to increasing citizens trust in government.

The importance of the IC is well established in the literature. For instance, the preservation of public order and security depends on intelligence (Lowenthal, 2006; Schreier, 2007; Caparini, 2007; Gill and Phythian, 2012; Cappe, 2020), the IC supports national security with societal implications (Herman, 1996; Hulnick, 1999; Horn, 2003; Pateman, 2003; Sims and Gerber, 2005; Kahn, 2009; Warner, 2009; Gentry, 2019), the implied role of the IC in countering emerging threats to society (Public Safety Canada, 2018a, 2018b), and the IC's increased role in international politics (Scott and Jackson, 2004a, Barnes, 2020). Another dimension of social relevance is the IC's need for secrecy and its intrusive powers in contrast to the democratic expectations that it operates in (Lefebvre, 2010; Monaghan, 2014; Chappuis, 2016; Laurin, 2020; Vigliotti, 2020). Given the IC's monopolistic position within the bureaucracy, this part of the public sector requires examination. More specifically, in selecting the IC as the case study this research contributes to the examination of the IC's role in society via the performance management lens.

One can argue that given the potential impact of the IC on society, performance management within this context can not simply be perceived as an internal to bureaucracy management instrument. Rather, performance management should be understood within a broader context – one that encapsulates political and democratic values. Thus, it is being suggested that public management should fall under the public administration umbrella, and not be relegated to the realm of a purely management instrument. This is consistent with

Frederickson's et. al., (2012) perspective that public management is a constituent of the public administration family. Otherwise, there is the real danger that performance management becomes nothing more than a management instrument disconnected with its main purpose of improving public sector performance – to often performance management instruments become a means to an end onto itself. It is being suggested that performance management instruments should be subsumed within democratic values system and not operate outside of it.

8.3 Other Observations and Remarks

Quite often research on public sector organizations deems them as being monolithic. This research demonstrated that the contingency approach provides an appropriate theoretical lens for differentiating between organizations. Our knowledge and understanding of public sector organizations would be further advanced if future research on public sector organization research would employ a similar lens. In addition, the dominant universalistic performance management approach has been shown to be limiting both theoretical and in practice. This research showed that in addition to the universalistic perspective, there is the opportunity to employ a particularistic perspective as a complementary approach. The understanding of real world public administration issues would be enhanced by considering the particularistic lens. Furthermore, Donaldson's (2010) approach to examining internal contingent factors coupled with Duncan's (1972) environmental change and environmental complexity proved useful in determining what makes the IC different from the other policy domains.

While this research contributed in advancing our knowledge of the federal public administration and performance management within the context of intelligence studies by

applying a contingency approach. The in-depth examination of the MAF and its application to federal entities, in particular the IC as the case study, confirms that the concepts of performance and performance management are deeply embedded in the federal public administration. There is little evidence to suggest that the Canadian government will do an about turn on a trend that has taken root and has been evolving over the past few decades. However, talking about and implementing performance management instruments may not always in practical terms translate to delivering on their expected benefits to government and society as suggested by this study.

This raises the issue of why maintain a performance management instrument like the MAF, if its potential benefit is lacking? Some initial thoughts are offered based on the existing literature and this researcher's experience. There is the potential explanation that changes to performance management instruments are kept to a minimal in order to ensure that progress towards an expected level of performance can be ascertained. With the passage of time, the instrument's utility may have passed its expiration date, yet it is maintained because it has become institutionalized into the system. There are several likely contributing factors that aid the institutionalization of performance management instruments – staff turnover leading to the loss of organizational memory on why the performance management instrument was introduced, inadequate records management that fails to capture the documentation that explains why something is being introduced, and the lack of understanding of the theoretical underpinnings of a performance management instrument. On the last account, quite often performance management instruments are introduced because it is what the private sector does or it is deemed a best practice elsewhere, while disregarding any organizational context for potential applicability.

Another probably explanation resides in public choice. This theoretical lens argues that individuals are assumed to be self-interested, individuals are assumed to be rational, individuals are assumed to adopt maximizing strategies, and explicit assumption needs to be stated concerning the level of information possessed by a representative individual (Ostrom and Ostrom, 1971). Bureaucrats, according to Buchanan (1978) are no different, they display the same characteristics noted by Ostrom and Ostrom. In other words, senior officials have rationalized that the MAF, despite a less than over convincing evidence of its value, have opted to keep it – better to keep the devil that you know, than the devil that you do not know. Over the MAF’s evolution, senior officials have learned to game this performance management system, which is not new and had been observed elsewhere (Bevan and Hood, 2006). The potential for gaming partially speaks to the issue of managerialism’s emphasis on pay for performance.

Another illustration of MAF’s managerialism foundation is that it has many characteristics espoused by managerialism with its focus on quantitative type lines of evidence. Specifically, the methodology questions found within each of the different areas of management are heavily weighted towards ‘efficiency’ type lines of evidence. The MAF is limited in its capacity to assess for effectiveness or equity, which greatly reduces the MAF’s ability to inform decision-makers on whether results or fairness is being achieved.

Furthermore, the MAF’s methodology questions indirectly revealed a layering approach to performance management instruments in the federal public administration. There were several instances where the data source to respond to a methodology question made reference to another instrument. This is representative of the current state of affairs,

where performance has become overly dependent on multiple layers of various performance management instruments. In some instances, these various elements fit together, while in other instances, they create contradictions. In addition, these multiple layers require resources to design, implement, monitor and report. An open-ended question is how many performance management instruments are required to assist with delivering performance? Given that performance management, in its various forms, has been around for many decades, it can safely be assumed that this basic question has no simply solution. This speaks to the notion that public administration and public management is an on-going endeavour – as the context changes so does the solution. In keeping with pragmatism philosophy, the best one can hope is the amelioration of a given situation.

The MAF has its origins in NPM and managerialism thought. At its core, MAF is concerned with improving management with the federal bureaucracy. The intent is that by improving the management of the federal bureaucracy, this will contribute towards Canadians increased trust in government institutions – one of the main drivers of introducing NPM and managerialism thinking into the bureaucracy. There is some truth to this line of thinking, if one were to consider the negative impacts of scandals has had on Canadians trust in their institutions. The sponsorship scandal detailed in the Office of the Auditor General report (OAG, 2003b) and the subsequent Gomery Commission (Gomery Commission, 2005a, 2005b) illustrate this point. In this instance, the existing performance management instruments were not the issue. Rather, it was the people working in the system that were the cause of the scandal. Related to the issue of trust in one's institutions is the notion of transparency. Interesting to note that in the early years of the MAF, the individual department and agency assessments were posted on the government of Canada

website. However, in subsequent years a decision was taken to no longer post the individual assessment reports. Perhaps, a reposting of the MAF assessment reports can inspire transparency.

This study confirmed that it is feasible to research the management of the IC, despite the research challenges associated with researching the commonly believed ‘out of bounds’ elements of the bureaucracy that are shrouded in secrecy. As well, this study did not treat the public sector organizations as a monolithic entity. If the current situation does not ameliorate itself, the scholarly world is denying itself the IC as an interesting and important area of study. As well, the practitioner world is denied theoretical based insights that researchers can bring to bear on issues of importance to the IC and society. Along a similar vein, performance management within the confines of the IC is nearly non-existing with the exception of intelligence failures – much *ex post*, but no *ex anti*. There exists a real need to shift the focus to the latter. Last, intelligence studies can greatly benefit from have public administration scholars peering into their world and offer different perspectives on ongoing intelligence studies related issues. The situation is much worse when examining these gaps within the Canadian context.

This research avoided the pitfall of looking at the performance of the IC from the usual binary yes / no of an intelligence failure. This research confirmed that there are many numerous potential points that can contribute to an intelligence failure. For example, the MAF’s areas of management are some of those potential considerations that if underperforming can lead to an intelligence failure. Speaking of intelligence failure, it is unlikely the IC, decision-makers, and society will lose their angst with the idea of an intelligence failure leading to mass casualties. Thus, the IC’s performance will remain

always be of a concern, albeit not always making the headlines until something goes astray. Concurrently, it would be presumptuous to assume that performance management will avoid the IC having an intelligence failure. The world of an intelligence failure is complex. This complexity is nicely framed using Bar-Joseph and Sheaffer's (1998) intelligence failures factors approach. This approach identifies a number of factors, that individual or working in combination can lead to an intelligence failure. The factors being psychological, organizational, political, and strategic interaction and warning-response related factors. Therefore, it is an unrealistic expectation that any conceptualization of performance management will be able to take into account all of these factors.

Finally, this study demonstrated the importance and feasibility of undertaking a case study approach to Canadian public administration research that delves into the 'black box' issues of public management. In particular, many other potential HRO-type entities could be considered as potential candidates for future research such as the public health domain given the impact of COVID 19 has had on public management, public administration, and society.

8.4 Reflections on Research Design

This study's research design was based on Creswell's (2009) framework consisting of the philosophical worldview, strategy of inquiry, and research methods. This framework provided an excellent approach about thinking on how to think about research design. As the study came to its conclusion, this researcher found the inclusion of the philosophical worldview in this study's overall research design as beneficial, which most other sources on research design tend to quickly gloss over. Its inclusion forced this researcher to think about epistemological considerations throughout the study. In doing so, it forced this

researcher to explore the essential question of how do we know? As well, other notions related to truth, belief, and justification. The philosophical worldview addressed an area of concern with public administration research, namely the lack of not explicitly declaring a research's epistemology (Ricucci, 2006).

In adopting pragmatism as the worldview, it enabled the study in terms of truth, inquiry, experience and pluralism. On the issue of truth, it allowed this researcher to navigate through potential different understanding of ideas. In keeping with pragmatism, this researcher accepted that some versions of truth are truer than others. As well, truth was not defined a priori but rather came about through the process of seeking the truth. For instance, the identification of the external and internal contingent factors as truths. That being said, any future research exploring these factors may find a new truth that amends the current factors – it does not invalidate the current findings but rather future findings may provide a better guide to action. In terms of inquiry, pragmatism rests on the notion of a community of inquiry. Given the nature of a PhD dissertation, it is challenging employing a true form of community of inquiry. Instead, the notion of a community of inquiry was fulfilled through this researcher engaging other graduate students, engaging academics by presenting papers at various scholarly conference, directly sought out review from academics and practitioners, and feedback from the members of the examining committee. Pragmatism's notion of experience occurred throughout this study in that this researcher is also a practitioner, meaning that experience-based knowledge was incorporated throughout the conduct of this study. Last, pluralism was reflected through this researcher's reflexivity meaning that an abductive approach to knowledge was employed with the intent of seeking a solution to the study's problem noted in Chapter 1.

The outcome of this is most visible in the identification of the IC's external and internal contingent factors, which could form the basis for future research of the IC and the intelligence function itself. A final thought on pragmatism is that it provides a convenient neutral ground for both academia and practitioners to engage each other by allowing each party to focus on problem solving without each side having to give up on their own distinct requirements of academic rigor and implementation feasibility. Therefore, this researcher can only encourage other public administration academics to consider pragmatism as their foundation to knowledge.

The qualitative (interpretive) strategy of inquiry allowed this researcher's knowledge and experience to interpret the data forming the basis of the study's findings. The benefits of this approach is supported by others (Wellington and Szczerbinski, 2007; Yanow 2009; Schwartz-Shea and Yanow, 2012). Of note is Swedberg's (2014) distinction between pre-study and main study. This researcher's arrival to this study entailed plenty of pre-study observation of performance management and intelligence in addition to intuitionist theorizing which is information processing at the unconscious level. My reflection is that the nature and quality of this study would have been different if a different strategy of inquiry was used. This researcher encourages public administration researchers to consider taking this approach to their inquiry. Also, there is an implied call for practitioners with their lived experiences and knowledge to engage themselves into the scholarly world given that it would benefit the advancement of knowledge generation and understanding in an applied field such as public administration. Although, practitioners may require some nudging from academia, including intake into graduate public administration programs.

The third element consist of the research methods. The IC as the case study was chosen for instrumental and intrinsic reasons. In addition, this case study can be classified as extreme/deviant (Flyvbjerg, 2011). Upon reflection, the study has demonstrated that extreme/deviant case study offers a unique perspective to generating public administration knowledge and understanding of lesser examined elements of the public sector. Related to the IC, the broader national security apparatus comes to mind as an area of bureaucracy that could benefit from further examination given the limited literature in this domain.

When considering data collection methods, an element that caused pause and additional thought was Usher's (1996) notions of con-text, pre-text, sub-text, and inter-text. The con-text reminded this researcher to consider the authors' background. It was quite revealing in terms of the scholarly diversity that exists, including interesting areas of research that were not directly relevant to this study but something that I may want to go back to for future research consideration. The pre-text consists of the language before the text was something that this researcher did not always pay attention prior to this research, but has since started to pay attention to. The sub-text is the worldview that the text rests upon, which caused this researcher to question on the extent of being able to incorporate different texts based on different worldviews. Last, the inter-text speaks to where the text falls into the history of production. This brief description of Usher's work does not to it justice but is suffice to point to the importance of reflexivity. One is left wondering, can there ever be enough reflexivity?

On reflecting on the conduct of interviews with employees of the Canadian federal public sector the issue of timing (i.e., busy fall schedule following the summer leave season, budget development and immediate post-budget tabling) and political

considerations (i.e., election cycle, the party in power, the potential political nature of the research topic) come to mind. The former can be anticipated, whilst the latter is less predictable. This can have implications to public administration research if the intent is to interview public sector employees as part of data collection. This was the situation with regards to this study as previously noted. This affirms what some public administration scholars have mentioned to this researcher as a primary reason for staying away from the Canadian federal public sector as a research setting. Perhaps, efforts to close the academic-practitioner gap can ameliorate this specific research challenge.

As a final reflection on the research design, building on Creswell's research design framework this researcher would suggest making challenges, limitations, and remedies and ethical considerations more visible as elements of the framework as was done in this research (see Chapter 4, Figure 6). A more visible inclusion would ensure that these concerns are not pushed to the background, since they are integral and applicable to the worldview, strategy of inquiry, and research methods.

8.5 *Limitations of the Research*

There are five limitations that necessitate a brief discussion. First, the research has a narrow focus on the Canadian federal public sector. As a result, the transferable of this research can be limited. Although, it does represent a case bounded by the Canadian context – it can be compared to other OECD countries, federal states, or Westminster systems. Second, the study uses a single performance management instrument – the MAF – to explore universalistic-based performance management instrument. One can argue that a single instrument may not be a fair representation of the performance management instruments. However, the thick description provided in the research does allow for

comparability to other performance management instruments used in other jurisdictions or within the Canadian federal public sector. As well, the MAF has been in place for two decades. Third, this research is based on a single case study, the Canadian IC, thus reducing transferability of knowledge. However, what is lost in transferability is gained in shining a light a hidden part of the Canadian federal public sector. Fourth, the small number of interviews may have limited accessing additional perspectives. Although, there was a real possibility of not being able to access any senior officials for interviews. One must be grateful of being able to access senior officials in the IC even if it is not the optimal number – assuming that an optimal number can be determined in qualitative research. Fifth, related to the interviews was the inability to gain access to working level officials as their perspective may differ from those of senior officials. This is based on the researcher’s experience as a practitioner within the Canadian federal public sector where each level within an entity’s hierarchy tend to have different perspectives. Knowing the limitation of accessing working level officials in the IC, no attempt was made.

8.6 Potential Future Research and Engagement

As we arrive at the end of this journey, where do we go from here? This study has provided the basis to conduct further research in public administration and performance management, including as it relates to the IC. For instance, the contingent factors can provide the basis for the development of a performance measurement framework for the IC. As you may recall, performance measurement is a key element of performance management. Thus, it would only be a natural progression to go to the next step. Also, using the approach developed in this study, there exists the possibility of examining which of the contingent factors have the greatest and/or least impact on performance. This study’s

focus was the identification and examination of the contingent factors with the assumption that they were all deemed as carrying equal weight, which may not necessarily hold true.

Another potential area of exploration is employing the contingency approach to examine issues related to the IC's tasks and structures. After all, contingency theory originated in studying private enterprise's tasks and structures. In more concrete terms, using an example to illustrate this, what structures are more appropriate for CSE as a highly technological organization, when compared to the PCO which is relatively less technological dependent? Contingency approaches content that structures should match organizational tasks. Research along this line of enquiry would further advance of knowledge of how government organizations structure themselves. It is just as important to determine why they are structured the way they are. In other words, was it informed design or simply management's preference based on any number of reasons.

In addition to MAF, the Canadian government's Treasury Board Policy on Results, is another key performance management instrument, would make an excellent candidate for examination via the contingency approach. The examination of the policy would entail assessing whether it provides sufficient flexibility to departments and agencies in terms for allowing organizational contexts to be taken into consideration when implementing the policy requirements to achieve the policy's intent. Although, within the confines of the IC this research would likely be more challenging than the examination of the MAF because it would require access to performance measurement related information. This information would highly likely be deemed classified as it may reveal targets, techniques and methods.

There are several other broader potential lines on enquiry that this research has shined a light upon. For instance, it may be worthwhile exploring why public

administration scholars have ignored the IC as an area of research given that public administration has much to offer such as the study of organizations, collaboration, and governance. Perhaps, there is more to this reluctance than the idea that the IC is a challenging area of government to gain access to. Another potential question seeking an answer is to what extent has economic-based thinking impacted the public sector's design and delivery of policies, programs, and services to its citizens? The rationale for this future research consideration is that economic thinking's emphasis on economy, effectiveness, and efficiency may inadvertently be neglecting other key considerations such as diversity, equality, inclusion, and less traditional perspectives. Related to the dominant economic-based approach, one can question whether an overemphasis on the quantitative aspect of performance management has come at a cost to the qualitative aspect. If yes, what has been the cost? Last, has managerialism irrespective of the performance management instruments employed actually resulted in a better managed public sector? It is recognized that this last potential research question can be quite all-encompassing.

As previously noted, the literature on intelligence failures has generally focused on one or two items that led to the failure, quite often lacking a theoretical base or the assessment being based on the researcher's preference. It may be worthwhile to re-examine a perceived or real intelligence failure through the external and internal contingent factors model presented in this research with the intent of seeing whether one arrives at a similar failure explanation. This effort may provide a further means of strengthening or refining the performance management model offered in this research. As well, this kind of research would add to a theory-driven approach to intelligence studies, which has often been described as being under theorized.

From an intelligence perspective, the external and internal contingent factors approach proposed in this study can be used to examine the IC other countries. The potential benefits of this kind of research are twofold. First, it would contribute towards the comparative study of different ICs, which still remains a fledging area of research. Second, by studying other countries' IC, the findings can be used to valid this study's approach or put into question the approach. In either case, it would make a worthwhile contribution to further advancing knowledge with respect to intelligence studies.

In addition to potential future research, this study has an engagement element as well. As a practitioner, I will be using this knowledge within the federal public sector whenever I develop or implement performance management instruments. Also, this researcher can transfer knowledge by educating officials on the administrative history of performance management and the theoretical foundations (and limitations) of the current performance management instruments – bridge the theory / practical gap. Last, this researcher made a commitment to share the study with those senior officials who volunteered to be interviewed. As well, this researcher will explore other avenues to share this study within the federal security and intelligence community.

8.7 Concluding Remarks

Seeking answers to the three research questions allowed meeting the three research objectives of increasing our understanding of performance management within the broader context of public sector reform, understanding the appropriateness of universalism-based approaches in public administration and its application in the IC, and increasing our understanding of the IC through the lens of performance management. In combining the

research questions and objectives, this research engaged two epistemic communities – public administration and intelligence studies.

This researcher's final thoughts are the continued need to be critical of NPM inspired reforms and management instruments, performance management is not going away but they should be designed to ensure that they add value to the system that they purport to enable, and researching the IC through a public administration lens is challenging, at times frustrating, but the effort is worth it and rewarding.

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Appendices

Appendix A: Semi-Structured Interview Guide

A. General

1. Defining the 'object' under examination is a standard expectation in academic research.
 - Does your organization have an official definition of intelligence?
 - If yes, what is it? In what document is it promulgated?
 - If no, why not? In the absence of an official definition how would you define intelligence.
2. What is your understanding of the 'Canadian intelligence community'?

B. Assessing for Distinctiveness of the Intelligence Community

3. An organization's 'operating environment' is constantly changing.
 - What are some of the characteristics that could be used to define/describe this constant change.
 - How do these characteristics impact your organization's work?
 - How is this environment reflected in your performance management approach?
NOTE: performance management approach understood as the 'framework/model' that incorporates the goals and objectives of the program, agreement on the strategies for obtaining the goals, the appropriate performance measures, alignment of mission, goals, objectives and measures, existence of a quality measurement system, capacity for organizational learning, risk taking by the organization.
4. Do you consider your organization to be similar to other federal government organizations, such as HRSDC or Parks Canada?
 - If yes, why? What do you deem to be the 'similar' characteristics?
 - If no, why not? What do you deem to be the 'unique' characteristics?
5. The literature and real life cases suggest that intelligence failure is a concern for the intelligence community.
 - How would you define an intelligence failure?
 - To what extent does your organization consider an intelligence failure to be importance?
 - What mechanisms does your organization have in place to learn and adjust?
 - How is the concern of an intelligence failure reflected in your performance management approach?
6. Given that intelligence deals with unknowns:
 - How much 'surge' capacity does your organization have to respond to new challenges while addressing older challenges?

- How is this 'surge' capacity reflected in your performance management approach?
7. Intelligence collection is about collecting from various sources.
 - How much of your resources/efforts go towards collection efforts?
 - Are most of your collection efforts technical or non-technical in nature?
 - What are some of the high-level challenges with your collection management?
 - How is collection management reflected in your performance management approach?
 8. The literature and recent events suggest that information sharing is a concern.
 - What are some of the challenges your organization faces with respect to information sharing?
 - How is the need for sharing information balanced with information protection?
 - How is information sharing reflected in your performance management approach?
 9. The literature and recent events suggest that review and oversight are important components of the intelligence community.
 - What kind of review and overview does your organization undergo?
 - How is review and oversight reflected in your performance management approach?
 10. The literature suggests that the intelligence cycle is a distinct process of an intelligence organization.
 - Would you agree with this statement? Why/why not?
 - Does your organization have an intelligence cycle? Where is it promulgated?
 - What are the key phases of the intelligence cycle?
 - How is the intelligence cycle reflected your performance management approach?
 11. How does intelligence feed into decision-making?
 - To what extent is intelligence used to inform decision-making? What is the level of decision-makers that uses intelligence?
 - How often is intelligence provided to decision-makers?
 - What feedback is provided by decision-makers on the intelligence?
 - How is this feeding reflected into your performance management approach?
 12. Human resources are an important enabler for any organization including intelligence.
 - Is there a recognition that intelligence possesses certain subject-matter experts that are perhaps not readily available elsewhere?
 - o If yes, how do you know?
 - o If no, why not?
 - What are some of the core competencies that intelligence staff should have?
 - How many resources are put towards in training, learning, and development?

C. Assessing the Application of the Management Accountability Framework?

13. How is the MAF used as a performance management approach in your organization?

- If no, why not?

14. Does the MAF have benefits?

- If yes, what are they?
- If no, why not?

15. Are there any challenges in implementing the MAF in your organization?

- If yes, what are these challenges?
- If no, why not?

16. How are 'intelligence' results reported through the MAF?

17. Other than the MAF, does your organization use another performance management approach(s)?

- If yes, why is the MAF not employed?
- What are the key components of your performance management approach?
- How were these components developed?
- Can you explain these components?
- Was this approach adopted from somewhere else?
- What are the benefits of your performance management approach?
- What are the challenges of implementing your performance management approach?

Appendix B: Sample Letter via E-Mail

Hello,

I am a PhD candidate in Public Administration at the University of Ottawa. I am working on my dissertation which is examining public sector performance as reflected through performance management instruments within the Federal public service. Specifically, I am exploring performance management instruments used within the intelligence community which is my case study.

My research to date has been based on scholarly work and information contained in public government documents. However, what is lacking in these documents is the bureaucratic perspective which provides a unique perspective and insight that is not easily documented.

The purpose of this letter is to request an interview to gain a better understanding of the performance management instruments used within your organization. Fully aware of your busy schedule, I am requesting an interview that will not last longer than 60 minutes. The questions that will be asked are general in nature. I am not seeking protected nor classified information. As well, the questions will not be touching on government policy nor actual performance information. The focus is on the instruments used by your organization. Furthermore, the name of the individuals and the organization will be withheld. Any direct or indirect quotes will be cited as, “according to a senior government official” or words to that effect.

If you have any questions, please feel free to contact me at () - (e-mail at)
or my supervisor Geneviève Tellier at () - ext. (e-mail at).

I would like to thank you in advance for your assistance.

Regards,

Joe Faragone, CD, MPPPA, MA
PhD Candidate