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WILHELM DILTHEY'S CONCEPT OF ERLEBNIS:
THE EPISTEMOLOGICAL ARGUMENT FOR THE LEGITIMATION
OF THE HUMAN SCIENCES

A Thesis
Presented to
The School of Graduate Studies and Research
of
The University of Ottawa

by
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PREFACE

The centrality of the concept Erlebnis or lived experience in Dilthey's thought is unanimously acknowledged; it is also generally agreed that if Dilthey's work is to be properly understood, a thorough familiarity with this concept is essential. Furthermore, it is the conventional view that his singular philosophical project was to write a Critique of Historical Reason. However, the focus of Dilthey interpretation has pointedly been on his declaration of the methodological independence of the human from the natural sciences, rather than on his fundamental philosophical position with regards to the common nature of human and natural scientific knowledge. From this perspective, Dilthey is interpreted as wanting to put the human sciences outside "the range of science itself." It is also for this reason that Dilthey is discussed most often in connection with hermeneutics and the celebrated theory of Verstehen or understanding. As a result, Dilthey's pre-methodological and general critical philosophical position is obscured and the nature of the kind of grounding he sought for the human sciences is misunderstood. There are several reasons for this: 1) Dilthey's early epistemological writings have only recently appeared and been made accessible to the general academic community; 2) although efforts have been made to

show the continuity of Dilthey's writings concerning the human sciences, the view that he made three separate attempts (the most successful of which is attributed to his "hermeneutical turn") seems to be premised on the absence of a clear statement of and consistent position on what constitutes the ground of all science in Dilthey;

3) the ambivalent but authoritative interpretations and critiques of Husserl, Heidegger, and Gadamer have led to the dismissal of Dilthey on the grounds that he is to be understood as an adherent of psychologism, a promoter of life-philosophy, or a propagator of an invidious form of historicism.

Our aim in this dissertation is to re-introduce Dilthey's Einleitung and to redirect the focus of attention to his treatment of the fundamental nature and constitution of knowledge. More sharply defined, we examine Dilthey's concept of experience in light of the Diltheyan claim that all knowledge not only originates in experience, but also has its ground in it.

It has often been noted that Dilthey's inconsistent use of key terms prevents the reader from establishing a clear and univocal determination of basic Diltheyan concepts. The term Erlebnis is a case in point. The fact that this word is used sometimes to mean "lived experience" and sometimes to mean "immediate experience" is not simply a problem of style or of translation. What this shows, it is

argued, is a double-determination of Dilthey's understanding of experience as the ground of all science and knowledge. Accordingly, our task is conceived of as an explication of this "double-determination" of the Diltheyan concept of experience in relation to Dilthey's concern with providing the human sciences with an epistemological foundation that can legitimize their status as real sciences.

In Chapter I, we re-introduce the Diltheyan project of the Einleitung in light of an examination of the general philosophical orientation of Dilthey's thought as one that is at once "practical", "pragmatic", and "critical".

In Chapter II, we consider Dilthey's theory of knowledge as a general and enlarged theory of science which is developed according to the requirements of a consequent form of empiricism that is a naturalized epistemology.

In Chapter III, the Diltheyan concept of experience as the ground of science and knowledge is examined in terms of the foundational character and legitimizing force of Erlebnis understood as "immediate experience".

In Chapter IV, Erlebnis, its foundational character and legitimizing force, is examined in light of its wider determination as "lived experience".

In Chapter V, we conclude our investigation into Dilthey's treatment of the foundations of the human sciences with a summary of the main characteristics of ground as conceived by Dilthey.

CHAPTER I

DILTHEY AND THE PROBLEM OF THE LEGITIMATION OF THE HUMAN SCIENCES

What is the problem of the legitimation of the human sciences? Why is it a problem at all? A quick survey of the subjects taught in institutions of learning throughout the world would reveal a large variety of different disciplines. Philosophy, literature, history, religion, languages would be found as curricula as well as mathematics, physics, biology, and chemistry. However, the apparent peaceful coexistence of these two general types of human activities would belie the controversies surrounding the value or worth of philosophy, for example, over against the value of physics or mathematics. It is not an exaggeration to say that it is a common prejudice to think of the latter as being more valuable, more serious, truer than the former.¹ Although the disciplines that make up the humanities and the social sciences have existed in institutions for some time, it is as if they are regarded as the bastard offspring of the "Queen of all the sciences,"² who, because she strayed from the "secure path of a science,"³ was romanced in the dark by an ignoble and mean journeyman.

It is as if the human sciences are considered to be the illegitimate offspring of this sometimes careless and injudicious Queen, whereas the natural sciences enjoy the status of being her legitimate children.

Dilthey's early attempts to legitimate the human sciences are clearly formulated as an attempt to construct a logical-epistemological-methodological foundation.⁴ What is not clear, however, is that Dilthey's attempt to ground the human sciences both epistemologically and methodologically is intended to contest and to subvert the epistemic values and methodological practices of the natural sciences.⁵ It is also not clear that Dilthey's attempts to legitimate the human sciences involve an uncritical acceptance of the basic epistemological and methodological values and standards of the natural sciences, as Habermas, for example, would have us believe.⁶ Dilthey's position with regard to the status of the human sciences, as well as his position on the status of the natural sciences, is both ambivalent and ambiguous.

In light of the recent availability of some of Dilthey's early writings, which are to be found in the nineteenth volume of his Gesammelte Schriften and which constitute the second volume of the Einleitung in die Geisteswissenschaften, a new image of Dilthey has begun to take shape.⁷ From these writings, especially the sections known

as the Breslauer Ausarbeitung, Berliner Entwurf and the Althoff-Brief, it becomes evident that Dilthey's explicit treatment of the epistemological and methodological foundations of the human sciences is prepared by a critique of science in general. Central to this critique is Dilthey's inquiry into the identification of valid knowledge with the type of knowledge that is natural scientific. Accordingly, Dilthey postulates and attempts to show that human scientific and natural scientific knowledge are fundamentally coincidental. Natural scientific knowledge and practices are not the only legitimate modes of knowledge and behaviour. Consequently, we can interpret the Diltheyan problem concerning the legitimation of the Geisteswissenschaften as the problem of how to show that both the human and the natural sciences originate from the same source. The solution to this problem **prepares** the ground, as it were, for the construction of Dilthey's theory of the Geisteswissenschaften.

There are two metaphors that help to elucidate Dilthey's understanding of what is involved in the attempt to show that the Geistes- and Naturwissenschaften share a common origin. On the one hand, we are led by Dilthey to identify his task with the preliminary stages of the construction of a massive building that is designed to house the various disciplines of both the human and the natural sciences under one roof. Accordingly, Dilthey's task may be

understood as the excavation of the bedrock upon which and from which such an edifice is to be erected. There are two advantages to this metaphor. The first is that it gives us an idea of the sense in which Dilthey used the word "Einleitung"; i.e., it is used to designate a beginning, a solid beginning. The other advantage is that it allows us to make an easy connection between Dilthey's own critical project of a Critique of Historical Reason and the Kantian project of a Critique of Pure Reason insofar as both indicate their tasks to involve the attempt to arrive at the underlying principles of knowledge that is valid.⁸

On the other hand, the building metaphor occludes another aspect of Dilthey's general conception and understanding of what is involved in the attempt to ground the human sciences. It is also made clear in Dilthey's writings that he conceives of what lies at the bottom of such an edifice in terms of life. A building large enough to house all the human sciences and all the natural sciences would have to have an intricate and complex network of cables, pipes, tunnels, etc. that carry life-sustaining elements such as water and air. This underground network that supports life can be likened to a massive root system that is rarely ever seen, and by extension one can draw an analogy between such a building and a living organism. For Dilthey, science, human or natural, is something that lives and grows and thus has a history of development. Accordingly, Dilthey's treatment of the foundations of

both the human and the natural sciences can be read as a genetic or genealogical account of the origin of these sciences, the aim of which is to show their common parentage. The advantage of the biological metaphor is that it sets Dilthey's philosophical task apart from the Kantian project, while indicating a connection with Hegel. It is a basic Diltheyan view that in order to be able to understand the nature of any science we must remember its origins. Consequently, philosophy, for Dilthey, is Selbstbesinnung or self-reflection, and its aim is to retrieve what is common to all the sciences. Thus Dilthey's critique of the Kantian epistemological model embedded in the very concept of a legitimate science can be read as an attempt to recover the matrix or Lebenszusammenhang in which and from which all scientific achievements arise.

Dilthey's Theoretical and Practical Interests
in the Legitimation of the Human Sciences

Reflecting on the role and function of the philosopher in contemporary society, Hans-Georg Gadamer remarks:

However much he may be called to make radical inferences from everything, the role of prophet, of Cassandra, of preacher or even of know-all does not suit him.

What man needs is not only a persistent asking of ultimate questions, but the sense of what is feasible,

what is possible, what is correct, here and now. The philosopher, of all people, must, I think, be aware of the tension between what he claims to achieve and the reality in which he finds himself.⁹

For Gadamer, the aim of the knower or philosopher is to try to achieve harmony between logos (i.e., what and how one thinks and speaks) and ergon (i.e., what and the way one is and acts).¹⁰ In Richard Rorty's view, such a philosopher may be called a pragmatist, and a society composed of individuals who share this way of thinking and behaving can be imagined as being thus:

This would be a culture in which neither the priests nor the physicists nor the poets nor the Party were thought of as more "rational," or more "scientific" or "deeper" than one another. No particular portion of culture would be singled out as exemplifying (or signally failing to exemplify) the condition to which the rest aspired. There would be no sense that, beyond the current intra-disciplinary criteria, which, for example, good priests or good physicists obeyed, there were other, transdisciplinary, transcultural, ahistorical criteria, which they also obeyed. There would still be hero-worship in such a culture, but it would not be worship of heroes as children of the gods, as marked off from the rest of mankind by closeness to the immortal. It would simply be admiration of exceptional men and women who were very good at doing the quite diverse kinds of things they did. Such people would not be those who knew a Secret, who had won through to the Truth, but simply people who were good at being human.¹¹

If both Gadamer and Rorty are right in saying that the distinguishing mark of a philosopher is not an interest

in a holy mission, but rather an interest in a more profane and mundane project, then it is evident that Dilthey deserves to be called a "philosopher", and a "pragmatist". Dilthey himself characterizes this worldly philosophical orientation as the "Diesseitigkeit unseres Interesses"¹² and as the "Verweltlichung des Lebens".¹³ "Philosophy," writes Dilthey, "is the developing consciousness of what man does in his thinking, creating and acting."¹⁴ In relation to the task of preparing the ground for laying a foundation for the human sciences, this secularized philosophical orientation manifests itself in the fact that Dilthey, as Ludwig Landgrebe points out, "never treats it as a problem belonging merely to a theory of science."¹⁵ More specifically, the epistemological grounding sought for the human sciences is never just a theory of knowledge -- it is also a theory of man and of culture.¹⁶

Although Dilthey is commonly acknowledged as the philosopher or the pioneer of the human sciences, it is not altogether clear what these titles mean.¹⁷ To be sure, Dilthey's interests in grounding the human sciences are epistemological and methodological, nevertheless these concerns impose limits on Dilthey's thought that are too narrow. For example, Manfred Riedel explains:

What Dilthey's thought sets in motion and what his task expresses is not only the epistemological-

methodological grounding of the Geisteswissenschaften or the justification of historical-aesthetic consciousness connected with it, but rather the problematic of the relation of theoretical knowledge and practical Lebensgewissheit that starts with the beginning of modern science.¹⁸

Dilthey's logical, epistemological and methodological concerns are to be understood against the background of the practical exigencies of man understood as a social-historical being whose nature it is to strive to attain definite goals by means of Handeln or action.¹⁹ In Georg Lukacs' words: "Dilthey sensed that an epistemological solution to man's relationship with the objective world could only be elucidated by way of praxis."²⁰ In his own words, in the section of the Breslauer Ausarbeitung entitled "The Perception of the External World," Dilthey writes:

The reality in which we live, the activities according to which we strive to know, to enjoy, to depict, to change it, is contingent upon consciousness. What we are seeking in this exposition is the origin of our knowledge. But we would not find it, were we to isolate it and consequently to regard only the elements of knowledge as such and their relations as the object of investigation. A theory of knowledge that follows this path finds a world of theoretical understanding that stands in indissoluble opposition to the real. Quite certainly the dissolution of this opposition by virtue of a real apprehension of the whole state of affairs is the condition on which a foundation for the historical and social sciences can be laid.²¹

Thus Dilthey's epistemological writings may be read

as an attempt to overcome the oppositions between theory and practice, Geist and nature, subject and object, reason and unreason, science and non-science, the past and the present, etc. His wide range of interests and his openness to a variety of disciplines reflect his concern for the whole, full-blooded human being understood as a complex system of wants and desires, feelings and emotions, rather than a mere res cogitans. Dilthey was never just a philosopher; his writings deal with the history of ideas, historical biography, music and literature, education and politics not only from the standpoint of a theoretician, but above all from the standpoint of a practitioner.²² To label Dilthey a "theorist of history," as Theodore Plantinga does in his effort to characterize Dilthey as a historical thinker, is dangerously close to what Dilthey would call "mutilation".²³ To put a philosophical label on Dilthey is equally onerous. His opposition to transcendentalist and empiricist theories of knowledge is mounted in defense of a non-reductionist view of the nature of the subject. A human being, human subjectivity cannot be reduced to a philosophical subject -- be it the subject of Descartes, Kant, or Hegel. For this reason, Dilthey argues that Kant, for example, regards the human being and human intelligence as a factitious entity "in whose veins runs no real blood, rather the diluted juice of reason as mere intellectual activity,"²⁴ and elsewhere accuses Comte,

Mill and Spencer for reducing human intelligence to the "mechanical clatter of induction and deduction,"²⁵ and Hegel for developing the notion of Geist as a "subject without place and time, comparable to the mothers to whom Faust descends."²⁶

Nevertheless Dilthey's epistemology cannot be defined as a wholesale rejection of transcendentalist and empiricist theories of knowledge. The foundation of the human sciences cannot be arrived at by means of a theoretical contest between opposing schools of thought on the subject, but rather, as Charles Taylor puts it so simply and elegantly, by means of "undoing the process of forgetting."²⁷ Dilthey does not see the task of providing the human sciences with a foundation as a task that involves staking out new ground; on the contrary, it is the old ground that must be revisited and re-examined so as to demonstrate that it can bear the weight of both the human and natural sciences. "A new science," explains Dilthey, "is constituted by the discovery of important truths, but not by the staking out of a previously unoccupied terrain in the wide world of facts."²⁸

Neo-Kantian and Hegelian, positivist and historicist interpretations of Dilthey's writings on the legitimation of the human sciences are all possible inasmuch as each finds the reflection of itself in his writings taken as a whole. As Rickman correctly states:

Scholars . . . tended . . . to conclude that Dilthey was a Romantic, a Hegelian, a Positivist or a neo-Kantian because Dilthey tended to deal with any philosopher as sympathetically as he could and only qualified his agreement in a wider context.²⁹

This "wider context" of Dilthey's thought can be understood as a Critique of Historical Reason and within this context "historical reason" simply designates "the capacity of man to take cognizance of himself and the society and history created by him."³⁰

If one had to label Dilthey, then the less epigonal title of "crisis philosopher," or what Rorty, for example, calls a "reactive philosopher" would be more appropriate.³¹ In fact, one German commentator sees Dilthey's Critique of Historical Reason as the anticipation of a revolutionary theory of scientific investigation and theory of knowledge that warrants being called an "Einsteinian revolution" in contrast to the Kantian "Copernican revolution."³²

Dilthey's epistemological and methodological aim is to ground the human sciences and remain true to the simple yet very profound insight that human intelligence is social-historical. Dilthey enumerates four ideas that are central to his philosophy:

1, Intelligence is not a development in the particular individual and intelligible on account of him, rather it is a process in the development of mankind and this is

itself the subject in which the will to know exists.

2. In fact, it exists as reality in the life-acts of people, all of whom have the dimensions of will and feelings, and consequently, it only exists as reality in this totality of human nature.

3. The correlative principle to this is: abstract thought, knowledge, science is formed by a process of historical abstraction.

4. But this complete real intelligence also involves religion or metaphysics or the unconditioned as a dimension of its reality, and without this it is never real and never actual.

Philosophy understood in this way is the science of the real.³³

In addition to insisting on the fundamental social-historical nature of all science and knowledge, Dilthey also affirms the positive value of scientific thought as a liberating force. Dilthey's critique of traditional metaphysics is in effect the history of the secularization of human reason, a liberation from the power and control of transcendent forces or Jenseitigkeiten. For all that, Dilthey does not adopt the view that real or positive knowledge is or can be achieved on the basis of an unreflective understanding of science. The foundations of science must be remembered and reviewed. It is only on the basis of a critical re-appraisal and wider conception and understanding of science that the legitimacy of the human sciences can be shown. The possibility of demonstrating the legitimacy of the human sciences lies therefore in the very nature of science itself; i.e., it is fundamentally a fallible, finite, open-ended human activity. The conditions of the possibility of knowledge are clearly

not to be identified with the static and mechanical Kantian apriori, but rather with the changing yet actual processes of human intelligence in its relation to the world and the world's relation to it.³⁴ In this connection, Manfred Riedel is correct to point out that Dilthey does not practice traditional epistemology in the Breslauer Ausarbeitung, but rather engages in critical self-reflection that is intended to avoid "a false dogmatization of the cognitive process."³⁵ Thus the basic motive of Dilthey's epistemology can be understood as the attempt to provide a viable alternative to a pre-Kuhnian understanding, as it were, of science.³⁶

It has been argued that Dilthey's concerns about the project of grounding the human sciences focus on the differences rather than the similarities between them and the natural sciences. Rickman, for example, states: "It remains true, however, that the differences rather than the affinities between the human studies and the sciences were the focal points of Dilthey's interest."³⁷ And Plantinga, another commentator writing in English, informs us that "the idea of dividing the sciences on the basis of their subject-matter succeeded in maintaining the upperhand."³⁸

Although Dilthey seems to oppose the human sciences to the natural sciences on the basis of subject-matter (i.e., the former have to do with geistige or psychical things, whereas the latter deal with physical ones), it is made

sufficiently clear that Dilthey does not consider this difference as the basis of an adequate argument for the validity and legitimation of the human sciences. The Geistes- and Naturwissenschaften may have different object domains, yet share the same Erkenntnisfundament or cognitive foundation.³⁹ Helmut Johach, for example, correctly identifies Dilthey's interest in the relationship between the human and natural sciences as an interest in "mutual completion"⁴⁰ rather than one-sided demarcation.

What distinguishes the human from the natural sciences is the fact that different kinds of interests and intentionalities are operative in them. For Dilthey, the same reality can be viewed from different vantage points, or to use a Gadamerian term, according to different "prejudices."⁴¹ It is also Dilthey's view that the criterion of objectivity must be met by the human sciences and that they can and indeed do meet it. However, as Dilthey's epistemological writings indicate, this must be demonstrated. Historical research can help to show the common parentage of both the human and natural sciences but in itself it is not enough. It is therefore in the second volume of the Einleitung, especially Book Four, that Dilthey presents his epistemological case for the validity of human scientific knowledge. This part of the second volume of the Einleitung carries the title "Grundlegung der Erkenntnis" and contains, as Dilthey explains in the Althoff-Brief, part of the matrix or Grundstock of his entire

project.⁴²

Specifications of the Epistemological Task
of the Einleitung

"All science," asserts Dilthey, "all philosophy, is the science of experience."⁴³ For Dilthey, the project of an epistemological grounding for the human sciences involves the idea of a universally valid science. Accordingly, Dilthey merges the transcendental-epistemological question concerning the conditions of the possibility of knowledge and experience in general with the question concerning the nature of science itself inasmuch as he considers natural science to be but one category of possible knowledge. To clarify this most important point, it is helpful to turn to one of Habermas' studies of Dilthey in Knowledge and Human Interests:

The system of the sciences is one element of a comprehensive life context, and the latter is the object of the cultural sciences. If the pragmatist self-reflection of the natural sciences had been pursued in a logically consistent manner and had not stopped at the boundaries of the tacitly presupposed communications of scientists themselves, it would have brought to consciousness the difference between this object domain and the level of the natural-scientific object domain. It would have had to lead to an abandonment of the monopolistic claim of positivism that

identifies inquiry according to the logic exemplified by physics with knowledge as such. The cultural life context is formed on a level of intersubjectivity that is presupposed by the attitude of strictly empirical science but cannot be analyzed by it.⁴⁴

By way of seeking a foundation for the human sciences, Dilthey uncovers the tacit assumptions and hidden presuppositions that make natural scientific knowledge qua knowledge and as a paradigm of all knowledge possible. We can therefore interpret Dilthey's epistemological task against the background of a genealogy of science that seeks to legitimate the human sciences by remembering the origins of science in general. What Dilthey brings to light in his effort to retrieve the fundamentals of science is the richness and fullness of experience. Consequently, Dilthey's reflection on the nature of science is also a reflection on the nature of experience. Experience is what lies at the bottom of every science.

Dilthey's opposition to Anglo-French positivism--as exemplified by Mill and Comte--can therefore be read as a mise-en-question of the fundamental nature of Wissenschaft or science, rather than a mere polemic against the imposition of a natural scientific paradigm of what constitutes good science onto the human sciences. When Dilthey calls Comte's sociological universal science a "naturalistic metaphysics of history,"⁴⁵ this is meant to point out the uncritical, unreflective, unscientific nature of Comte's work in particular and

the positivist movement in general.⁴⁶

Nevertheless, the discussion of the methodological differences between the human and the natural sciences is taken up by Dilthey. However, even though Dilthey clearly accepts the fact that there is a difference between these two types of science, the general orientation of his early treatment of their relationship is towards explicating what they have in common. It is in this sense that Dilthey rises above the idea that a particular method by itself is enough to establish the scientificity of this or that human enterprise. Accordingly, Dilthey would surely have approved of the following caustic statement made by Paul Feyerabend in Against Method:

Scientists are not content with running their own playpens in accordance with what they regard as the rules of scientific method, they want to become a part of society at large and they use every means at their disposal--argument, propaganda, pressure tactics, intimidation, lobbying--to achieve their aims.⁴⁷

For Dilthey, the natural scientific paradigm of knowledge and of science as the exemplar of legitimate knowledge and science is achieved through a disavowal of Selbstbesinnung or self-reflection. The failure to be self-reflective allows the natural sciences to claim a false superiority inasmuch as they forget the original matrix of all scientific achievements. Dilthey identifies this matrix as the life-context or Lebenszusammenhang and discusses what

occurs within this context in terms of Erlebnisse.⁴⁸

The legitimation of the human sciences rests therefore on the important notion of self-reflection. Like Husserl, Dilthey demands a re-examination of the foundations of science; both seek the objective ground that can support scientific theory and legitimate the results of scientific practice. Epistemologically, for both this involves a return to the immediate data of experience. Dilthey's attempt "to understand life in terms of itself"⁴⁹ and Husserl's call for a return zu den Sachen both indicate a refusal to make theoretical concerns the central function of philosophy.⁵⁰

Consequently, Dilthey is a life-philosopher in the strict sense of someone who is concerned with the philosophico-scientific conditions of our objective knowledge of the world that is gained through experience. Dilthey's relation to Lebensphilosophie--as exemplified by Nietzsche, Kierkegaard, or Schopenhauer--is at best ambivalent. On the one hand, he recognizes the objective validity of the writings of the life-philosophers inasmuch as they are life-expressions; on the other hand, he criticizes them for being ahistorical and unscientific.⁵¹ For example, Dilthey writes:

For man does not understand himself through some kind of introspective brooding which only gives rise to the great Nietzschean misery of exaggerated subjectivity.

It is only by understanding the historical reality which he has produced that man becomes conscious of his power for good and evil.⁵²

Some of Dilthey's critics identify him as an irrationalist because they regard his treatment of life to be at variance with a natural scientific paradigm of Western rationalism. That is to say, life or Leben is taken to be the antithesis of intelligibility and positivistically restricted to that which is ineffable, mystical, or simply mysterious, as Wittgenstein, for example, takes it to be in the Tractatus.⁵³ Although Dilthey acknowledges the facticity of the irrational--as marked by ineffability and mysticism--in the history of the affairs of mankind, he restricts this to a feeling of and an expression of being dissatisfied with one's social and cultural lot.⁵⁴ Since it is presumed that Dilthey's numerous statements on the "impenetrability" and "unfathomableness" of life⁵⁵ have no bearing on the physical world, the epistemological importance of Dilthey's life concept is ignored. Dilthey's concept of life is used to demonstrate the Diesseitigkeit or worldliness of the only realm of philosophical-scientific inquiry open to us. Leben designates the boundaries within which questions about human knowledge of reality may be asked in a meaningful way. Dilthey explains:

Thinking cannot go back behind life whose function it is. Life always remains a precondition of knowledge, of the consciousness or awareness contained in that life. As a precondition of knowing, it is itself not open to analysis through knowledge. Thus the foundation of all knowing, in which its preconditions are inextricably contained, is life itself--in its totality and fullness and power.⁵⁶

Epistemologically, the Diltheyan principle of the Unergründlichkeit des Lebens speaks to the question of the conditions of the possibility of knowledge. As Frithjof Rodi has remarked:

This concept of Unergründlichkeit is not a metaphysical concept whereby a world is constructed which is bottomless and thus abysmal and fearful. Rather, it is a gnoseological concept which expresses the idea that reality can be rendered amenable and transparent to thought only to the extent that the preconditions of thought are given in life itself.⁵⁷

Furthermore, by linking thought and life, Dilthey **refuses to accept** the priority of thought over life and the notion of transcendental subjectivity, of a subject as mere mind. In this sense, the appellation "life-philosopher" helps to distinguish Dilthey's epistemology from the Cartesian-Kantian epistemological model inasmuch as Dilthey proposes alternative concepts of objectivity and subjectivity. Both Descartes and Kant, Dilthey would argue, **present** distorted and mutilated images of the subject because they abstract, they remove, they dislocate the subject as a human being from the world. Thus, although Dilthey takes up

the transcendental-philosophical question concerning the conditions of the possibility of experience and knowledge, it is with an understanding of the subject as a psycho-physical life-unit or Lebenseinheit.⁵⁸ A truly rigorous account of the real conditions of the possibility of experience must re-member--quite literally put back together again--the Lebenszusammenhang or life context which has become the forgotten matrix of knowledge and science. This "forgotten matrix" is characterized by Dilthey as a unified, coherent, complex whole which is "immediately possessed."⁵⁹ Accordingly, since "Philosophy analyzes, but does not produce."⁶⁰, the function of the so-called life-philosopher is merely "To reveal life as it is . . . To describe life"⁶¹ Life, for Dilthey, is reality--prescientific, prereflective, undoctored reality. Epistemologically, this leads to Dilthey's concept of experience as immediate and as lived.

The double-aspect of Dilthey's concept of experience may be seen as the result of his critique of both empiricist and transcendentalist accounts of how we know what we know with certainty. What distinguishes Dilthey's concept of experience from them is the idea of the ultimate inextricability of life from knowledge and science. Thus, Dilthey's attempt to legitimate the human sciences focuses on experience as the source of all knowledge and as the ground of all science.

The Principle of Phenomenality, Reflexive Awareness
and Self-Reflection

According to Dilthey, everything is a Fuer-mich-dasein.⁶²

The final court of appeal with respect to the question concerning the legitimacy of what constitutes valid knowledge of reality is not the tribunal of pure reason, but rather the Wirklichkeit of what actually occurs. Objects, things, and other persons exist for me as facts of consciousness. They exist for me in a mode of immediate givenness that is at the same time a mode of experience and a mode of consciousness. Dilthey calls this condition Innewerden or reflexive awareness.⁶³

Philosophy, as Selbstbesinnung or self-reflection, therefore has as its function the description and analysis of a psychophysical state of affairs that is defined as the immediate possession of life. In Dilthey's view, since consciousness is inextricably linked with life, the conditions of the possibility of all knowledge must be sought in the total nature of the knower as a life-unit. Any discussion of the possibility of knowledge necessarily involves the wants, desires, and feelings of the knower. Thus, although Dilthey speaks of the unity of consciousness as the condition of the possibility of experience and knowledge, it is to be understood that this unity is a totality that extends the concept of the knower as a

cogito to the concept of knower as a complex person. Dilthey's social-psychological sensibility prevents him from presenting a caricature of a human being as the starting-point of his epistemology. His characterization of the knower is clearly developed in opposition to theories of knowledge and of experience that denaturalize and depersonalize the knower. Correspondingly, the Diltheyan notion of philosophy as Selbstbesinnung or self-reflection may be regarded as a refusal of the view that philosophy in either its Cartesian or Kantian formulation can assume a sovereign role in the adjudication of the legitimacy of the human sciences. The philosophical justification of both the natural and the human sciences is a philosophical ~~enterprise~~ only to the extent that it is itself a scientifically oriented enterprise. For Dilthey, philosophy must produce nothing; it must restrict itself to a description and analysis of what there is and what there is is the experience of reality as it is immediately apprehended or appropriated in and through consciousness. When Dilthey criticizes Kant for ". . . never having taken experience, in its richness and fullness, as the basis of philosophizing . . ." ⁶⁴ and for not ". . . having cut deep enough into the body of human knowledge." ⁶⁵ he is in fact calling attention to a level of experience and a mode of knowledge that is presupposed by Kant.

The Kantian doctrine that experience is phenomenal is contested by Dilthey on the grounds that experience is fundamentally and initially real by virtue of the fact that consciousness originates as a reflexive awareness of itself in its connectedness with the world or external reality. Reflexive awareness is a state of consciousness that is also a mode of experience; consciousness is not set apart from the world, but rather is a part of the world itself--they are intertwined.

If we understand Dilthey's inward turn to the contents of consciousness and to the psychical processes operative therein as a search for an indubitable and non-hypothetical starting-point for the grounding of science in general, we can also see the connection between Dilthey's Einleitung and his Ideen.⁶⁶ In the Einleitung, philosophy's mandate is restricted to and determined by what is experiential--philosophy must not be speculative; it must be an enterprise that is based on empirical evidence. Philosophy must restrict itself to experience and observation in compliance with the basic tenets of scientific procedure. In the Ideen, these basic principles are applied and practiced. In both cases, philosophy cannot dogmatically pronounce on the status of valid knowledge without an appeal to empirical evidence--without an appeal to what actually is the case. The parallel with Husserl is

apparent. Husserl's discussion of the actualization of the idea of genuine science in the Cartesian Meditations focuses on the certainty of self-evidence and for him, as for Dilthey, self-evidence refers to the apodicticity of immediate experience.⁶⁷

Dilthey's return to the Erlebnisse of the knower and their treatment in terms of the distinction between internal and external perception and experience should not be construed therefore as the construction of a new theory of knowledge that seeks to vindicate certain metaphysical differences between the objects of the human sciences and the natural sciences. What Dilthey does is radicalize the traditional questions concerning knowledge without presuming anything beyond the actual and factual psycho-**physical** processes and their results. Thus, Dilthey sees his epistemological concerns about the human sciences as having a direct bearing on the idea of science in general.⁶⁸ Similarly, Dilthey's criticisms of the use of expressions like "internal perception" and "**internal** experience" indicate that traditional theories of knowledge and experience have ignored the total nature of the knower with respect to the fundamental issue concerning the constitution of knowledge that is valid. For this reason, Dilthey calls for a critique of internal perception and considers this to be indispensable to the human sciences.⁶⁹

By combining the conception of philosophy as self-reflection or Selbstbesinnung with the finding that human consciousness is reflexive--thinking, feeling, wanting are as much instinctive responses as the activities which ensure self-preservation--Dilthey believes that he has found the level of experience and knowledge that underlies all speculative and theoretical accounts of the real nature of experience and knowledge. Reality, for Dilthey, is actuality or Wirklichkeit.⁷⁰

Although it would seem that Dilthey seeks to find the "pure phenomena"⁷¹ of consciousness by way of a phenomenological reduction in the manner of Husserl, this interpretation of Dilthey would not be entirely correct. Dilthey would have agreed with Merleau-Ponty that the lesson taught by the phenomenological reduction is that it is impossible to achieve.⁷² Dilthey's reflective turn to consciousness is only radical to the extent that the phenomena encountered are complex experiential wholes that are already structured and meaningful. Dilthey calls these experiential wholes Erlebnisse and, although they bear a relationship to innere Erfahrungen, they are not to be identified atomistically as a mere concatenation of sensations and perceptions. Erlebnisse are ". . . a combination of perceptions, thoughts, feelings and desires enriched by

memories and anticipations."⁷³ Because Dilthey understands the knower as a totality of diverse psychical processes, experience and knowledge that is based on experience are always more than the mere conceptual ordering of sensations. Somewhat melodramatically, Dilthey states that experience involves:

. . . pressure and counter-pressure, expending towards things which in turn respond, a vital power within and around us which is experienced in pleasure and pain, in fear and hope, in grief over burdens which cannot be shifted, in delight over what we receive from outside. So the I is not a spectator who sits in front of the world's stage, but is involved in actions and counter-actions in which the same actualities are overwhelmingly experienced whether kings figure in them or fools and clowns. This is why no philosopher could ever persuade those involved that everything was appearance or show and not reality.⁷⁴

Self-consciousness of the processes of consciousness which constitute experience and knowledge clearly indicates that there is more to knowing than mere representation-- consciousness is never just representational consciousness. To equate the act of knowing with the psychical activity of representation is to close off the possibility of understanding human actions and their effects. Every cognitive act is interlaced with wants and feelings because it is human. Consequently, Dilthey's treatment of Erlebnisse is intended to support the view that all knowledge and all science is human knowledge and science. In the broad sense of human

science understood as what real and ordinary people do, Dilthey's argument for the legitimation of the human sciences can be read as an attempt to secularize or to humanize our understanding of the natural sciences by showing their dependence on conditions that are social and historical. The natural and the human sciences are autochthonous; they spring from the ground they inhabit.

According to this secularized or humanized view of science, science is to be understood as the activities that scientists perform--the textbooks they read and write, the experiments they conduct in their laboratories, their participation in congresses, the conversations they have with colleagues, etc. In brief, science is an expression of life.⁷⁵

Dilthey's practical and pragmatic understanding of the epistemological questions concerning valid knowledge is also manifested in his recognition of the need for an objective grounding of the human sciences. Dilthey satisfies the requirement of an object inasmuch as experience is linked to expression understood in the sense of objectivation. Accordingly, Dilthey's treatment of the foundational role of Erlebnisse is limited to an understanding of the constitution of knowledge in relation to its objective manifestations. Erlebnisse are not private; they are the objective manifestations of the psychical and physical activities of thinking, willing and feeling, of an individual who is located in a world of complex relations with other individuals and changing situations.

Consequently, Dilthey's development of the idea that Verstehen or understanding is the central function of the human sciences is based on a hermeneutical theory of human intelligence. According to this view of human intelligence, thinking is a dynamic, continuous dialogical process of collaboration and approximation. The radical conclusion which can be drawn from this view is that because human intelligence operates in this way, knowledge, be it of the natural or of the cultural world, is never complete. If any science or philosophy claims to have found the final word (i.e., presents a theory or set of theories that explains everything once and for all time), it does so by forgetting what it is. Dilthey's argument for the legitimacy of the human sciences can be read therefore as a remembering that seeks to vitiate the hegemony of the Naturwissenschaften over the Geisteswissenschaften by recalling a common origin.

NOTES

1. For an oft-quoted, yet somewhat dated, discussion of this predicament, see C. P. Snow, The Two Cultures and the Scientific Revolution (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1959). The "prejudice" against the worth of the human sciences appears to stem from the dogmatic belief in the sovereignty of the natural sciences over reason, knowledge, and truth. For an account of the nature of the criticism of the sovereignty of the natural sciences, especially with respect to the notion of scientific objectivity, see Mary Hesse, Revolutions and Reconstructions in the Philosophy of Science (Bloomington and London: Indiana University Press, 1980), chap. 7. Currently, this prejudice is at the heart of the understanding-explanation controversy which is commonly regarded to have been initiated by Dilthey. See, for example, Charles Taylor, "Understanding in Human Science," Review of Metaphysics, vol. XXXIV, 1, 1980, pp. 25-38.
2. Immanuel Kant, Critique of Pure Reason, translated by Norman Kemp Smith (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1965), A viii, p.7.
3. Ibid., B xiv, pp. 20-21.
4. Cf. Frithjof Rodi und Hans-Ulrich Lessing, Materialien zur Philosophie Wilhelm Diltheys, herausgegeben und eingeleitet von Frithjof Rodi and Hans-Ulrich Lessing (Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp, 1984), p. 7.
5. See, for example, Rudolf Makkreel, "Dilthey and Universal Hermeneutics: The Status of the Human Sciences," The Journal of the British Society for Phenomenology, vol. 16, 3, 1985, pp. 236-249.
6. With the focus of his discussion on the Diltheyan position with regard to the relationship between life and science, Habermas writes: "This contraposition of a practical relation to life and scientific objectivity reveals Dilthey to be caught in a covert positivism. . . . Dilthey remains in the last analysis so much subject to the force of positivism that he leaves off the self-reflection of the cultural sciences just at the point where the practical cognitive interest is comprehended as the foundation of possible

hermeneutic knowledge and not its corruption. In so doing, he falls back into objectivism." Juergen Habermas, Knowledge and Human Interests, translated by Jeremy J. Shapiro (London: Heinemann, 1972), pp. 178-179.

7. See Bernard Jensen, "The Recent Trend in the Interpretation of Dilthey," Philosophy of the Social Sciences, vol. 8, 1978, pp. 419-438.
8. The analogy between Dilthey and Kant as "builders" can be misleading, for it is evident that Dilthey shares what has been called the "underlabourer conception" of philosophy. See Peter Winch, The Idea of a Social Science and Its Relation to Philosophy (London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1958), pp. 3-7.
9. Hans-Georg Gadamer, Truth and Method (New York: The Continuum Publishing Co., 1975), p. xxv.
10. See the "Translator's Introduction" in Hans-Georg Gadamer, Reason in the Age of Science, translated by Frederick G. Lawrence (Cambridge, Mass.: The MIT Press, 1981), p. xi.
11. Richard Rorty, Consequences of Pragmatism (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1982), pp. xxxviii-xxxix.
12. Wilhelm Dilthey, Gesammelte Schriften, vol. VIII (Goettingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 1966), p. 193.
13. Wilhelm Dilthey, Gesammelte Schriften, vol. XIV/2 (Goettingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 1966), p. 591.
14. Dilthey, vol. VIII, p. 38.
15. Ludwig Landgrebe, "Wilhelm Diltheys Theorie der Geisteswissenschaften" in Materialien zur Philosophie Wilhelm Diltheys, herausgegeben und eingeleitet von Frithjof Rodi und Hans-Ulrich Lessing (Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp, 1984), p. 201.
16. See Helmut Johach, Handelnder Mensch und objektiver Geist: Zur Theorie der Geistes- und Sozialwissenschaften bei Wilhelm Dilthey (Meisenheim am Glan: Verlag Anton Hain, 1974), passim.
17. See, for example, Theodore Plantinga, Historical Understanding in the Thought of Wilhelm Dilthey (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1980), p. 18, where it is stated that Dilthey

". . . was not simply a 'philosopher of history', and he did not seriously attempt to write a 'critique of historical reason' that would complete the work left undone by Kant. If we need a phrase to characterize Dilthey as a historical thinker, it would be best to simply call him a 'theorist of history'. Also, on the problem of pigeon-holing Dilthey, see Michael Ermarth, Wilhelm Dilthey: The Critique of Historical Reason (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1978), pp. 6-7.

18. Manfred Riedel, Verstehen oder Erklaren? Zur Theorie und Geschichte der hermeneutischen Wissenschaften (Stuttgart: Klett-Cotta, 1978), p. 65.
19. Johach, Handelnder Mensch und objektiver Geist, chap. 1 passim.
20. Georg Lukacs, The Destruction of Reason, translated by Peter Palmer (London: The Merlin Press, 1980), p. 419. Lukacs' appreciation of Dilthey is not a favorable one, eventhough this quotation would indicate that it is. For Lukacs' criticisms of Dilthey as the "founder of imperialistic vitalism," see chap. IV passim.
21. Wilhelm Dilthey, Gesammelte Schriften, vol. XIX (Goettingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 1982), p. 174.
22. See Rudolf Makkreel, Dilthey, Philosopher of the Human Studies (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1975), pp. 3-14 passim.
23. Mutilation is one of Dilthey's favorite tropes. The German substantive is Verstueummelung and the verb verstueummeln. For example, under the heading "Basic Ideas of My Philosophy," Dilthey, Gesammelte Schriften, vol. VIII, p. 171, we read: "Der Grundgedanke meiner Philosophie ist, dass bisher noch niemals die ganze, volle, unverstueummelte Erfahrung dem philosophieren zugrunde gelegt worden ist, mithin noch niemals die ganze und velle Wirklichkeit." (Emphasis mine.)
24. Wilhelm Dilthey, Gesammelte Schriften, vol. I (Stuttgart: B. G. Teubner and Goettingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 1966), p. xviii.
25. Dilthey, Gesammelte Schriften, vol. XIX, p. 44.
26. Dilthey, Gesammelte Schriften, vol. I, p. 104.

27. See Charles Taylor, "Philosophy and its history" in Philosophy in History, edited and introduced by Richard Rorty, J. B. Schneewind, Quentin Skinner (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1984), p. 24.
28. Dilthey, Gesammelte Schriften, vol. I, p. 85.
29. H. P. Rickman, Wilhelm Dilthey: Pioneer of the Human Studies (London: University of California Press, 1979), p. 20.
30. Dilthey, Gesammelte Schriften, vol. I, p. 116.
31. Richard Rorty, Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1979), p. 366. Rorty explains: "'Existentialism' is an intrinsically reactive movement of thought, one which has point only in opposition to the tradition. I want now to generalize this contrast between philosophers whose work is essentially reactive. I shall thereby develop a contrast between philosophy which centers in epistemology and the sort of philosophy which takes its point of departure from suspicion about the pretensions of epistemology."
32. Peter Krausser, "Dilthey's Revolution in the Theory of the Structure of Scientific Inquiry and Rational Behaviour," Review of Metaphysics, vol. 22, 2, 1968, p. 263.
33. Dilthey, Gesammelte Schriften, vol. VIII, p. 172.
34. Krausser, "Dilthey's Revolution," pp. 263-264.
35. Manfred Riedel, "Hermeneutik und Erkenntniskritik. Zum Verhaeltnis von theoretischem Wissen und praktischer Lebensgewissheit bei Wilhelm Dilthey" in Materialien zur Philosophie Wilhelm Diltheys, hrsg. u. eingeleitet von Frithjof Rodi u. Hans-Ulrich Lessing, p. 365.
36. By "pre-Kuhnian", I mean ahistorical. For an interesting discussion of the relationship between Dilthey's Weltanschauung theory and Kuhn's characterization of paradigms, see Rudolf Makkreel, "Dilthey and Universal Hermeneutics," pp. 245-246.
37. Rickman, Wilhelm Dilthey, p. 72.
38. Plantinga, Historical Understanding, p. 31.

39. See Johach, Handelnder Mensch, p. 55.
40. Ibid., p. 133; pp. 186-187.
41. For a clear and concise account of what Gadamer means by the term "prejudice", see Hans-Georg Gadamer, Philosophical Apprenticeships, translated and introduced by Robert R. Sullivan (Cambridge, Mass.: The MIT Press, 1985), p. vii.
42. Dilthey, Gesammelte Schriften, vol. XIX, pp. 390-391.
43. Ibid., p. 389.
44. Habermas, Knowledge and Human Interests, p. 140.
45. Dilthey, Gesammelte Schriften, vol. I, p. 105.
46. Wilhelm Dilthey, Gesammelte Schriften, vol. X (Stuttgart: B. G. Teubner and Goettingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 1965), pp. 15ff.
47. Paul Feyerabend, Against Method (London: Humanities Press, 1975), p. 220.
48. See Rudolf Makkreel, "Husserl, Dilthey and the Relation of the Life-World to History," Research in Phenomenology, vol. 12, 1982; also Habermas, Knowledge and Human Interests, p. 140.
49. Dilthey, Gesammelte Schriften, vol. XIX, p. 330.
50. See, for example, Herbert Spiegelberg, The Phenomenological Movement (The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1982), pp. 109-111. For more on the connection between Husserl and Dilthey, see Walter Biemel, "Introduction to The Dilthey-Husserl Correspondence," translated by Jeffner Allen, in Husserl: Shorter Works, edited by Peter McCormick and Frederick A. Elliston (Notre Dame, Indiana: University of Notre Dame Press, 1981), pp. 198-202. The actual correspondence is found on pp. 203-208 of Husserl: Shorter Works, McCormick and Elliston, eds. Also, see Rudolf Makkreel, Dilthey, Philosopher of the Human Studies, pp. 273-294.
51. Wilhelm Dilthey, Gesammelte Schriften, vol. III (Stuttgart: B. G. Teubner and Goettingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 1969), pp. 197ff.

52. Ibid., p. 210.
53. See Ludwig Wittgenstein, Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus, with a new translation by D. F. Pears and B. F. McGuinness and with the Introduction by Bertrand Russell (London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1961), propositions 6.4311-7. Note: Wittgenstein does not hold the view that life is mystical or mysterious, but rather he reacts to this view.
54. See Johach, Handelnder Mensch, pp. 91-106 passim.
55. Dilthey, Gesammelte Schriften, vol. XIX, p. 329.
56. Ibid.
57. Frithjof Rodi, "Dilthey, Gadamer and 'Traditional Hermeneutics'," Reports on Philosophy, vol. 7, 1983, p. 8.
58. Dilthey, Gesammelte Schriften, vol. XIX, pp. 75-82 passim.
59. Dilthey, Gesammelte Schriften, vol. I, p. xviii; vol. V, p. 6, pp. 200-213 passim; vol. VII, pp. 13-18, pp. 324-334 passim; vol. XIX, p. 320.
60. Dilthey, Gesammelte Schriften, vol. VIII, p. 172.
61. Dilthey, Gesammelte Schriften, vol. XIX, p. 330.
62. Ibid., pp. 58-75 passim.
63. Ibid.
64. Dilthey, Gesammelte Schriften, vol. VIII, p. 171.
65. Ibid., p. 174.
66. "Ideas concerning a Descriptive and Analytic Psychology (1894)," translated by Richard M. Zaner, originally appeared as: Wilhelm Dilthey, "Ideen ueber eine beschreibende und zergliedernde Psychologie," from Wilhelm Dilthey's Gesammelte Schriften, vol. V (Leipzig and Berlin: B. G. Teubner, 1924), pp. 139-240. For the English translation, see Wilhelm Dilthey, Descriptive Psychology and Historical Understanding, translated by Richard M. Zaner and Kenneth L. Heiges with an introduction by Rudolf Makkreel (The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1977), pp. 23-120.
67. See Edmund Husserl, Cartesian Meditations: An Introduction to Phenomenology, translated with an introduction by

- Dorion Cairns (The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1960), p. 13.
68. Dilthey, Gesammelte Schriften, vol. XIX, pp. 44-48.
 69. Ibid., p. 195.
 70. More will be said about Dilthey's concept of reality as Wirklichkeit in the following chapters.
 71. See Herbert Spiegelberg, The Phenomenological Movement, p. 112.
 72. Maurice Merleau-Ponty, Phenomenology of Perception, translated by Colin Smith (London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1962), p. xiv.
 73. Rickman, Wilhelm Dilthey, pp. 113-114.
 74. Ibid., p. 113. Rickman's translation.
 75. Dilthey, Gesammelte Schriften, vol. XIX, p. 44.

CHAPTER II

DILTHEY'S THEORY OF KNOWLEDGE AS A GENERAL THEORY OF SCIENCE

"Epistemology," writes Quine, "is concerned with the foundations of science."¹ Dilthey's epistemology is also concerned with the foundations of science. Yet, there is a critical aspect to Dilthey's theory of knowledge that is marked by his concern with the legitimation of the human sciences. For example, although Dilthey speaks to the need for a logical grounding for the human sciences, it is also quite clear that Dilthey thinks that the foundation sought for them cannot consist of a set of formal or metaphysical principles and rules. Dilthey explains:

Formal logic separates the form of thought from its contents and develops the former as a system of laws and elements that alone constitutes the task. Metaphysical logic defines knowledge as relation; [it] finds the highest law of thought, in which all particular laws are contained, in this relation. . . .

Metaphysical logic above all appears as the most natural expression for the fact of knowledge. . . . However, it is not given to withstanding a simple [reflection]. Being can never mean anything other than being-represented or being-said. Consequently, in reality we never go beyond that which is given in self-

consciousness, if we proceed from thought to being. Accordingly, there is no possibility of getting into the domain of being from that of thought. There isn't even an itinerary, therefore, also no rules for travelers.²

For Dilthey, the task of logic is to deliver the norms of thinking; however, since formal and metaphysical logic abstract the principles of reasoning from the domain of thinking in isolation from the domain of being, they falsely dichotomize and atomize the actual and real Denkzusammenhang or connectedness of human thought. Consequently, any logic that dissociates thinking from being does not have "the full reality of the cognitive process as object"³ which, according to Dilthey, is the "factual connectedness of the thought of human life and of history."⁴ Dilthey goes on to say that logic:

. . . constructs instead of proceeding with the analysis of the connectedness of thought. And it does not seek the connectedness of thought in the connection of science and of practice in their development, where it is at hand as reality. It is not historical.⁵

For that reason, Dilthey sees his epistemological task as an overcoming of this division "in a natural way," from a "natural standpoint."⁶

On the one hand, we have Dilthey's acknowledgement of the requirement of a logical grounding; on the other, we have the Diltheyan position, which is quite explicit, that a set

logical rules and directions cannot be adequate to the task of providing a foundation or acting as an organon for the human sciences.

What is interesting about the latter position is the reason why Dilthey thinks this to be true. It is not because there is a fundamental difference in the nature of human scientific thinking and therefore a different set of logical rules and standards of right thinking must be established. On the contrary, recognizing that logic and mathematics can and indeed do serve as the foundation of certain special disciplines or fields of research, Dilthey's argument is that such a foundation itself presupposes a ground, a substratum that is more basic and concrete. This ground or substratum that is the real foundation is the same for all the sciences--human or natural. Thus, we can understand the epistemological aim of the second volume of the Einleitung as an Erkenntniskritik which seeks to collapse the distinction between the human and the natural sciences by way of a critical reflection on and radical analysis of the legitimizing force of logic. Here too the critical orientation takes the form of Selbstbesinnung or self-reflection. Dilthey explains:

Thus self-reflection (epistemology) has science as the material for its presupposition. The truth, which we possess, is contained in the sciences. Self-reflection

is the living return of all propositions, which the sciences contain, to their legitimizing bases and presuppositions in order to ascertain their relative validity, limits by means of this reduction.⁷

Dilthey's return to the Rechtsgruende or legitimizing grounds of scientific knowledge can be interpreted as a further investigation into the conditions of the possibility of knowledge. Notwithstanding Dilthey's clearly identifiable Kantian philosophical orientation, it would be wrong to interpret Dilthey as a neo-Kantian. What Dilthey attempts to achieve is a mediation between Kantian apriorism and empiricism in an effort to redefine the limits of knowledge; he seeks to establish the real conditions of the possibility of knowledge on the basis of a "broadened empirical approach."⁸ In so doing, Dilthey relies on the idea of phenomenology inasmuch as he identifies the elementary logical operations of thinking to be modes of experience themselves.⁹

Taking the principle of phenomenality as his point of departure, Dilthey develops the theme of the irrevocable world-relatedness of the subject of knowledge or human intelligence. What emerges from the development of this principle is the view that the knower or researcher is a finite subject and that finitude is a real condition of the possibility of knowledge and science. Dilthey bases this view on the epistemic priority of immediate perception and experience. Consequently, Dilthey discusses the role of the body and the sense of touch in particular

as the immediate and primary source of our knowledge of the external world. But this is not all. By invoking the second principle of his critical philosophy, i.e., the principle of the seelischer Zusammenhang or psychical whole,¹⁰ Dilthey brings to attention the essential ambiguity of experience as the ground of knowledge. Dilthey's solution to the apparent "circularity involved in any attempt to arrive at the forms and laws of thought"¹¹ is not to accept either a transcendentalist or an empiricist account of the resolution of the aporia of immanence and transcendence, but rather to transform the traditional problematic so that it takes the form of a transcendental-pragmatic question, the answer to which must be evidenced by facts that are empirically verifiable.¹² What this amounts to is that Dilthey claims that consciousness is both empirical and transcendental and that because this is the case the oppositional structure of consciousness as a psychical whole constituted of parts is in fact the underlying ground of experience and of any activity that seeks knowledge of the world.

Empirical consciousness is found on the level of immediate experience; transcendental consciousness on the level of reflection. The former is the condition of the possibility of the latter, and the latter the condition of the possibility of the former. Together, in this relation of mutual implication,

they constitute our experiences of the world and our knowledge of it. Thus, Dilthey arrives at what is effectively a "naturalized" epistemology or a theory of knowledge that can be described oxymoronically as a transcendental pragmatic empiricism.¹³

Dilthey's Critical Reflection on and Radical Analysis
of the Legitimizing Bases of Logic

Among Dilthey's early writings (i.e., pre 1880) which deal with the epistemology and logic of the human sciences, in a treatise dealing with "Traditional Logic and the Study of Psychological Appearances," we read:

The extension of the Aristotelian organon by Bacon's theory of induction has remained the boundary of logical theories. The theory of abstraction then grew out of the Kantian school in order to explain the mathematical sciences in the spirit of the transcendental aesthetic. The testing of logical theories against facts thus remained within the boundaries of the natural sciences, but does its present form withstand the test of the sciences of Geist?¹⁴

The motive of this line of questioning by Dilthey is to test the soundness of the logic of the natural sciences. If the human sciences are to be grounded on the logic and the methods of the natural sciences, as Mill attempted to do,¹⁵ then it

must be shown that this foundation can support them.

According to Dilthey, the idea that the human sciences can be based on the logic of the natural sciences stems from a presupposition of the perfection or completeness of logic which is at best an illusion.¹⁶ Dilthey, however, does not merely argue for the incompleteness of traditional logic on historical grounds, but also on the grounds that there is very little knowledge about the actual processes of thinking that are called logical operations. For that reason, Dilthey calls for an investigation into the logical operations that are established as the ortho logos. For Dilthey, this means a return to the "Grundtatsachen unseres Denkens"¹⁷ in an effort to determine the nature of the mental processes of thinking. Consequently, in order to understand fully what is involved in Dilthey's argument for the legitimation of the human sciences, one must also understand the central importance of Dilthey's phenomenological treatment of the mental processes of thinking, which is developed within the framework of an empirical psychology¹⁸ that resembles Husserl's Logical Investigations.¹⁹ It is therefore helpful to turn to Husserl's own assessment of the task and significance of his Logical Investigations and of the idea of phenomenology at work in Dilthey's work. First, Husserl's reflections on the Logical Investigations:

In the year 1900-01 appeared my Logical Investigations which were the results of my ten year long efforts to clarify the Idea of pure logic by going back to the sense-bestowing or cognitive achievements being effected in the complex of lived experience of logical thinking. To put it exactly, the specific investigations of the second volume were concerned with the turning back of intuition upon the logical experiences which take place in us when we think but which we are not able to see, which we do not have in the field of attentive glance when we perform the act of thinking in the naturally original manner. . . . It was necessary to bring this hidden life of thought under our grasp through subsequent reflection and to identify it through faithfully descriptive concepts; . . .²⁰

Similarly, when Dilthey states that the "organons of science do not at all correspond to sensuous perceptions"²¹ and that the method of research aimed at determining the nature of the logical ground of science must correspond to the way in which perception is given, Dilthey is in fact calling for a phenomenological reduction, the aim of which is to describe-- in Husserl's words-- the actual "logical experiences which take place in us when we think."²² Dilthey's phenomenological orientation is attested to by Husserl himself. Husserl writes:

The more I have progressed in the development of the phenomenological method and the phenomenological analysis of the mental life, the more I have been led to recognize that Dilthey was right in his strange judgment on the inner unity of phenomenology and descriptive-analytical psychology. His writings contain a genial pre-view and a first stage of phenomenology. They are in no way antiquated, even today they are rich in most valuable concrete suggestions for work in Phenomenology which is methodologically advanced and, in its entire problematic,

differently structured. I would therefore very much recommend a study of all the writings of this extraordinary person.²³

Phenomenology as a phenomenological psychological description and analysis of logical processes as experiences lies at the very bottom of the Diltheyan program of legitimizing the human sciences. Dilthey's phenomenological point of departure is taken as a result of the inadequacies of traditional theories of knowledge--especially the Kantian--with regard to the question of presuppositionlessness.²⁴ Dilthey's descriptive-analytical redescriptions of thinking arise from the reformulation of the Kantian problematic of the conditions of the possibility of experience and knowledge; this reformulation demands that questions concerning the psycho-genesis of knowledge not be separated from those that deal with the validity of knowledge. Thus, Dilthey's argument for the legitimation of the human sciences con-fuses the empirical psychological with the epistemological, the empirical with the transcendental. The success or failure of Dilthey's argument would therefore seem to depend on how successful he is in showing that there is a theory of knowledge that is scientific and at the same time capable of answering questions regarding the conditions of its possibility. Correctly, Dilthey understood that mere psychological descriptions of the processes of thinking were no reply to questions of validity and legitimation. Dilthey

explains:

From perception onward up to the highest forms of knowledge, human intelligence stands under the conditions of consciousness, which present themselves as conditions for the construction of a science of facts. The system of these presuppositions, i.e., of the conditions of consciousness, forms, as that what Kant and his school called Transcendental Philosophy, the fundamental problem of human science. . . .

This understanding of the conditions of consciousness, which was equally at the bottom of Locke, Hume, Kant, Fichte, is nevertheless taken up in the context of the philosophy that follows here and its relationship to the full factualness of consciousness. The Kantian a priori is inflexible and mechanical; but the real conditions of consciousness, as I conceive them, are living historical process, development, they have their history, and the course of this history is adaptation to the multiplicity of experiences which is inductively recognized ever more precisely.²⁵

Dilthey's combination of the transcendental question with the phenomenological method or descriptive-analytical treatment of the "full factualness of consciousness" is in effect a transformation of the idea of philosophy as First Philosophy into the idea of philosophy as Erfahrungswissenschaft, or fundamental science.²⁶ The conditions of the possibility of experience and knowledge are to be sought therefore in what actually is the case. For Dilthey, this means that the problem of knowledge is always somebody's problem about something, and that the entire business of the sciences arises from the questions that are found "in the attentive and questioning

glance of an infant who sees objects move without knowing why and hears them make sounds without knowing what the reason is."²⁷

The apparent trivialization of the epistemological problematic in regard to the nature of scientific knowledge can be interpreted, as Krausser does in the Kritik der endlichen Vernunft,²⁸ as an attempt to arrive at a new epistemological model which corresponds more closely to the actual practices of scientific investigation. Accordingly, science is to be conceived of as a research activity as opposed to a body of doctrines or theories about the world. That this view of science is held by Dilthey is corroborated by Dilthey himself inasmuch as he claims that neither philosophy nor any one science can achieve absolute knowledge. Science, for Dilthey, is a process of development that demands the recognition of the presuppositions upon which it is based and the adaptation of these presuppositions to the changing world of practical exigencies. To know what science is entails the knowledge of what scientists do; to know what knowledge is also involves the knowledge of what knowers do. Thus we arrive at a central Diltheyan doctrine: all knowledge is the knowledge of experience.²⁹ Scientific knowledge, since it is fundamentally experiential, cannot be based on an epistemological model that allows one to reduce knowledge to uninvolved observation--the idea that an experimenter is not part of his experiment becomes an

unthought. Here, it is interesting to note the etymological connection between the words "experience" and "experiment"-- both have the same root. "All our actions," remarks Dilthey, "may be looked upon as experiments."³⁰ In the language of Heidegger, we can say that Dilthey takes experience to be the essence of science.³¹

Dilthey's conjoining of the epistemological with the ontological question concerning knowledge and science is not the result of muddled and unsystematic thinking. On the contrary, it is the result of an intentional analysis of the sense-bestowing achievements of human consciousness. By accepting and taking seriously the indubitable and irrevocable fact that knowledge is always knowledge of somebody about something, Dilthey takes up the theme of transcendentalist philosophy and presents it in a different register. Dilthey, like Quine, questions the traditional epistemological model's ontological innocence and at the same time endorses the epistemological efficacy of an empirical psychology.³² According to Dilthey, for a science to be really scientific, that science must recognize its presuppositions, the greatest of which is the presupposition of the independence of the external world and its spatio-temporal order.³³ Thus, Dilthey's real concern with the problem of the legitimation of the human sciences can be understood as a concern about the possibility of an empirically scientific theory of science. In brief, Dilthey can be understood as trying to answer the following question: Can the natural sciences account for their own standards of scientificity scientifically?

In Dilthey's view, the answer to this question is linked to the idea that all science is basically human science. It would appear trivial to claim that physics and chemistry, for example, are at bottom human sciences or sciences of man. What is not trivial, however, is the idea that these sciences are but two of the many activities that human beings engage in; nor is it trivial to suggest that a theory of science must also take into account the positive material requirements of a particular science as a form of life or pattern of human behaviour that is socially and historically determined. As forms of life, physics, chemistry, literature, history, etc. may be regarded as different "ways of worldmaking"--to borrow a phrase from Nelson Goodman.³⁴ Furthermore, it is also not unimportant to suggest that the sovereignty of one form of life or kind of human practice over others is achieved through the benefices of social and political status.³⁵ Therefore, if it can be shown that at a fundamental level all forms of life are related by virtue of sharing a common origin, then it can also be argued that the lines of demarcation separating the human from the natural sciences are lines that do in fact exist, but this should not be taken to mean these different types of science are therefore unrelated. For Dilthey, this means that the epistemological roots of the different sciences share a common ground. Thus, Dilthey, accepting the division between the two types of sciences, also holds the view that the so-called epistemeological gap between the human and the natural sciences

is not necessarily an indication of an absolute diremption. Even though the human sciences are to be distinguished from the natural sciences, even though their differences are important, Dilthey sees them as having many things in common. Both volumes of the Einleitung are patently anti-metaphysical and anti-supernatural and clearly indicate a humanized and historicized vision of man, of philosophy, of science, and of the powers of reason. Thus, what lies at the very bottom of Dilthey's argument for the legitimacy of the human sciences is a new understanding of science--a historicized understanding of science--that has been described by a more recent author as "the dynamization of the traditional conception of science." ³⁶ According to Schnaedelbach, between 1831-1933, science, in Germany, came to be understood as

. . . an open and changeable system of knowledge, indeed one committed to change, in which systemization was subordinated to the ideal of innovation. It was a totality, the identity of which came principally from rules of procedure and standards of testing--which meant that the ideal of system, so long accepted as a regulative Idea, became increasingly dispensable. Finally, it was a system of actions and interactions, whose output, after the rejection of the ideal of system, was to be assessed primarily in terms of its functional achievements for the life of the species and no longer in terms of its degree of approximation to 'the' truth.³⁷

Thus we can understand Dilthey's epistemology as being in harmony with this changed conception of science. Dilthey's attempts to humanize and to historicize science are effectively expressions of the empiricization and temporalization of science.

Consequently, Dilthey does not attempt a rational reconstruction of the origin and the development of our knowledge of the external world, but rather he attempts to practice a new epistemology on the basis of a critical reappraisal of the culturally embedded intellectual standpoints of transcendentalism and empiricism within the context of a rehabilitation of philosophy and its legitimizing power. Dilthey's epistemology is not merely an admixture of idealist and realist elements, rather it is an attempt to investigate and to elucidate the basic presuppositions of these two principal standpoints as the traditional epistemological versions of the conditions of the possibility of all knowledge and of all science. "All science," affirms Dilthey, "is science of experience."³⁸ At the same time, he constantly affirms and reaffirms that "the entire vast external world as well as my self, which distinguishes itself from it, are first of all Erlebnis in my consciousness."³⁹ What connects these two fundamental epistemological principles is the idea of a "naturalized epistemology" that does not discriminate against the ontological value of so-called "geistige" objects.⁴⁰

For Dilthey, the ontological value of that which can be labelled "geistig" can never be in dispute. Instead of striking our foot against a stone or raising our hand, we need only point out the many cultural objects and activities present in everyday life. However, Dilthey is well aware that this is not enough. Dogmatism in the form of naive realism is no response--it perpetuates

the false problematization of the cognitive process. What is required is an answer to the fundamental question concerning the very conditions of the possibility of experience. Accordingly, Dilthey insists on the idea that one can never know all there is to know about knowledge on the basis of the actual processes of how we acquire knowledge--not because the necessary tools are lacking or the scientist is not equal to his task, but for the reason that science and the acquisition of knowledge are ongoing events. For Dilthey, even the answers to transcendental questions must be sought by means that do not distort what actually is the case. Here, as in Merleau-Ponty, we find the beginnings of a movement towards a new transcendental philosophy.⁴¹ In Dilthey's case, this new transcendental philosophy assumes the form of a transcendental pragmatism that is based on a broadened empirical approach and, in so doing, allows Dilthey to redefine the limits of knowledge and science. The Einleitung is an introduction in this sense of a new beginning--a new beginning that implies a return to the preconditions of the conditions of the possibility of experience and knowledge. We now need to examine more closely why Dilthey thought this necessary.

First, Dilthey claims that a presuppositionless science is an impossibility. Citing mathematics, mechanics, chemistry and physics as examples, Dilthey remarks:

All these sciences would have given only intellectual states as their objects, if they had not stood under certain preconditions which contain their relationship to reality.⁴²

According to Dilthey, the greatest presupposition of science in general is the independence of an external world which is spatio-temporally ordered. Even the most general of sciences, namely, philosophy rests on this presupposition.⁴³ Dilthey's strategy is clear--radicalize the epistemological task of providing the human sciences with a foundation by bringing all the sciences into play. Accordingly, Dilthey begins his investigation of the foundations of science in general with an inquiry into how the external world is known. It is not, however, an investigation into the theory or theories of knowledge of different schools of thought, but rather a description and analysis of experience in its facticity. To accept logic or mathematics as the basis of a science without investigating and elucidating the conditions of the possibility of logic and mathematics is to ground a science on presuppositions which need clarification. For Dilthey, the critical standpoint must be maintained even in the face of the absolute authority of an established means of legitimation. Consequently, Dilthey's main objection to transcendentalism and empiricism as offering the main accounts of the foundations of science is that both are dogmatic, i.e., they lack a self-critical, self-reflective understanding of what their real presuppositions are.⁴⁴

It is commonly recognized that Dilthey's criticisms of Mill's Logic⁴⁵ and Kant's Critique of Pure Reason⁴⁶ focus on the lack of a sense of history in these works. We can now understand this criticism of Mill and Kant as a rejection of the idea that science, even in its mathematicized form, is a closed, unchanging system. It is Dilthey's view that because science is a human activity, it is also open-ended inasmuch as the possibility of future research projects is always present. Moreover, inasmuch as science is a human activity it is also open to correction.⁴⁷ Thus, Dilthey rejects aprioristic accounts of knowledge because these imply absolute validity on the basis of necessity and immutability--requirements that threaten a historical understanding of the development and evolution of a science as a form of knowledge with closure. For Dilthey, the history of a science is an indicator of the changes in the internal structure of the science itself; history is never extraneous to science, but an auxiliary means of understanding it, and making progress.⁴⁸ In this view, the possibility of scientific revolutions is connected with historical understanding. Science is fundamentally research.

It is also Dilthey's view that the scientist or researcher must be conceived of as a finite, fallible human being who occupies himself or herself with an infinite task. In this light, we can add yet another layer of meaning to Dilthey's dictum

"Leben ist unerguendlich"⁴⁹, that is, the inexhaustibility of the scientist or researcher with respect to the solutions, problems and projects he or she is engaged in. For all this, Dilthey's characterization of the scientist or researcher in the above terms does not imply a wholesale rejection of the view that certain cognitive structures are necessary, i.e., that knowledge and science rest on certain conditions and presuppositions which are to be found in the nature of human intelligence. On the contrary, Dilthey's position is that not only is it necessary to recognize these conditions as presuppositions, but it is also necessary to eliminate them. Presuppositions are like hypotheses; conditions are never absolute. Thus, Dilthey gives an account of scientific knowledge and scientific consciousness as an elimination of presuppositions.⁵⁰ With respect to the Diltheyan rejection of apriorism, it now becomes clear that Dilthey's doctrine of the impossibility of a presuppositionlessness science is designed to show that questions concerning the conditions of the possibility of science and knowledge must be answered with evidence that is empirically verifiable, namely, experiential. What Dilthey demands is a new form of empiricism that takes the ideas of phenomenology and history seriously while maintaining the critical attitude of Kantian transcendental philosophy.

In an early essay entitled "Overview on the Possibility of a Consequent Form of Empiricism," Dilthey explains:

While I share the fundamental viewpoint of empiricism . . . nevertheless it is still necessary to take a few steps back to its foundation. I view the central task of a theory of science as the attainment of objectivism in the realization of the empirical standpoint . . . it is entirely necessary to possess objectivity in the immersion into the world of our phenomena.⁵¹

The general orientation of Dilthey's Wissenschaftslehre with respect to the concern with the foundations of science is towards the security of objectivity in its originary mode of givenness to the subject, i.e. in its phenomenality. Thus, Dilthey's investigation of subjectivity, consciousness and self-consciousness is undertaken with the aim of describing and analyzing psychical experiences as experiences of the world. Dilthey's deliberate empirical standpoint is assumed in relation to the actual processes of cognition and in opposition to the Kantian account of cognition in terms of a priori forms of intuition. Dilthey's critique of Kant is the attempt to rehabilitate or naturalize the nature and function of sensation, representation, the laws of thinking--the subject of knowledge, in general. Dilthey's critique of Kant is therefore effected on the basis of the requirement of an empirical science, namely, that "Empirie, nicht Empirismus"⁵² be the central and the abiding source of knowledge that is certain, but not absolute. The rehabilitation of the subject of knowledge and of the real nature of knowledge involves, for Dilthey, the

return to experience as a doing that is also a suffering.⁵³

The Doctrine of the Irrevocable World-Relatedness
of the Subject

The theme of an underlying unity between the subject and the object, the ego and the world, the individual and the community is central to Dilthey's epistemology. This basic unity is present in everyday experience inasmuch as it is manifest in the actions of people. Thus, Dilthey's theory of knowledge can be properly called a theory of action--there is no division of theory from praxis. Furthermore, within the context of this basic theme of Zusammenhang or connectedness, Dilthey discusses, describes and analyzes, the phenomena of intersubjectivity, ordinary consciousness, self-consciousness, and most importantly, the origin and development of theoretical or scientific consciousness.⁵⁴

For Dilthey, although the knower, the scientist or researcher, seems or appears to find the object of his or her research outside his or her self, there is evidence to indicate that the subject-object dichotomy as an epistemological model is false in a fundamental way. In Dilthey's view, the Cartesian and Kantian epistemological models are abstractions; i.e., they are quite literally a taking-something-out-of-context.⁵⁵

Since knowledge is always knowledge of somebody about something, the individual as knower must be examined as a finite subject and not as a pure mind or intellect or some form of artificial intelligence. The subject as a living, breathing, empirically identifiable human being, who has a name and an address, is therefore presented as a real condition of the possibility of experience and knowledge. Consequently, we find in Dilthey the development of the theme of the social-historical facticity of the subject. In a Heideggerian fashion, Dilthey's concerns with life are restricted to the conditions of human existence, for Dilthey rejects the bracketing of existence as a way to a theory of knowledge or science which has a rationalist, purely intellectual foundation.

The subject is not an anonymous or concealed entity existing inside the body, but is always a somebody, who, by virtue of being in the world, exists as a multi-relational being. The knower or scientist is not just a knower or scientist but at the same time a father or a mother, a brother or a sister, a lover, a citizen of a country, a member of a professional group, etc. The fact that the subject can be and in fact is often all of these may seem trivial and irrelevant when discussing cognition, reason or science. However, it is clear that Dilthey does not think that it is. Reflecting on the principle of phenomenality, Dilthey says

the following about the scope and limits of experience with respect to its fundamental and originary mode of givenness:

. . . this reality is given in a primary way only in the researcher himself, therefore, in an individual stamped with preferences and habits who has achieved maturity within the culture.⁵⁶

Precisely because it is a question of knowledge, human knowledge, Dilthey opposes the idea that the subject can be abstracted from his or her social-historical milieu and acquired pattern of behaviour. The irrevocable, inherent world-relatedness of the subject expresses, as a basic epistemological principle, Dilthey's sociological, psychological, and historical conception of the subject as finite. Accordingly, Dilthey's treatment of the conditions of the possibility of knowledge and experience is also restricted to the concrete, experiential and existential physical and psychical processes of human intelligence in connection with the world. As a critique of transcendental consciousness--of its role and function in the constitution of experience and knowledge--Dilthey's critical and material phenomenological reflection on and descriptive analysis of consciousness reveals the world-relatedness of the subject as an originary mode of being and knowing. That is to say, his analysis of consciousness seeks to show the fundamental empirical nature of consciousness. The Diltheyan concern about

the foundations of science may be interpreted therefore as a concern with the connection between consciousness and experience--with their co-emergence and development.

One way in which Dilthey shows the fundamental empirical nature of consciousness is his critique of thinking or knowing understood as representation.⁵⁷ Dilthey's argument against the view that thought or thinking is representational and the attendant claim that truth is correspondence is charming in its simplicity. Agreeing with Kant that there must be conditions or presuppositions without which representation would be impossible, Dilthey rejects the idea that these conditions are static, immutable forms of the human intellect on the grounds that this is an abstraction, i.e., one mode of consciousness considered in isolation from other modes of consciousness that are connected with it. Cognition or the cognitive life of the knower is not only dependent on representation, but also on feeling and on willing. Thus, Dilthey's criticism of representational consciousness as the model of knowledge of the world brings into play the affective and volitional dimensions of the human mind. In the section of the Breslauer Ausarbeitung dealing with the perception of the external world, Dilthey explains:

of affairs: we have to analyze first of all the real state of affairs that forms the basis of the sciences--in its

total breadth, without stint. But this does not consist in only those facts which are gained with the view to knowing. The three principal modes of our consciousness already distinguish themselves in the formation of perceptions or objectives--of facts. Indeed, already here we will recognize that the differentiation of these states is an abstract schema and that already in the formation of perceptions very manifold differences of human concern effectively manifest themselves. All that is built up in us from perceptions in such a way enters into the cognitive process.

In fact, our analysis never encounters perception as isolated in developed life; everywhere we find connected with it images produced by the imagination and relations between these and perceptions. Perception is therefore either to be defined in such a way that it contains these images within itself, or it is a fact only existing for analysis, not an immediate given.⁵⁸

For Dilthey, the Zustaende or states of consciousness are Bedingungen or conditions of experience and knowledge. Clearly, when Dilthey writes about the "energy of thinking and representing,"⁵⁹ the "orientation of attention,"⁶⁰ and the "direction of knowing"⁶¹ we are faced with an intentional theory of consciousness. Consciousness is always consciousness of something; it has a direction, and objects are constituted through intentional relatedness.⁶² By focusing on the volitional or purposive mode of consciousness as a condition of the possibility of representation, Dilthey seeks to show that perception and representation are themselves complex modes of consciousness. Furthermore, it is also Dilthey's view that cognition understood primarily as representation is a mistaken understanding of the origin and source of knowledge because it dispossesses feeling of a function and

role in the constitution of knowledge. Representation, according to Dilthey, only occurs after the fact; it is a higher, more complex, more refined level of psychical activity that presupposes some more basic state of consciousness, which is at the same time a state of physical and concrete existence.

Reality is directly experienced first by movement, the feeling of movement and the feeling of touch and resistance. And only because it is experienced, are the objects of our sense of sight real for us. To experience reality and resistance in one place--what was more often wrongly defined as materiality, but can be defined as Wirklichkeit--are identical.⁶³

The fundamental Diltheyan determination of reality is therefore Wirklichkeit or effectivity. Reality at a fundamental level is immediate experience. What Dilthey is saying is that one cannot begin with consciousness and then go outside, but one must begin with the inside-outside. Here, we can appreciate the importance of Dilthey's analysis of immediate experience and the relationship between inner and outer perception, inner and outer experience, and reflexive as opposed to reflective consciousness. It is in this sense that Dilthey's argument for the legitimation of the human sciences is presented as a consequent form of empiricism. Dilthey's foundationalism is not therefore of the type that seeks a body of apodictic truths, but rather of the kind that demands an openness and

return to experience. Consequently, Dilthey shifts the focus of attention away from representation as the singularly most important moment of cognitive activity and turns to what he considers to be the originary moment in which the world is constituted in and through experience.

In the resistance that the touching hand experiences, materiality originates not only as a determinate mode of the tactile sensation, rather resistance of the will is at the same time contained in the tactile feeling that is consequently also designated as a feeling as opposed to the mere sensations of sight and hearing. According to all evidence, what merely exists for our representation does not have the same volle Wirklichkeit for us, as that which exists for our ganzes erfuelltes Leben.⁶⁴

The foundation of our knowledge of the external world and therefore of science is materiality. Nevertheless, materiality is never a materiality in itself and for itself inasmuch as it is connected to and dependent upon the psychical activities of a consciousness that encompasses the entire range of psychical life. By virtue of the fact that consciousness can be justly described as more than an "I think", i.e., as an I think, I want, I fear, etc., Dilthey draws our attention to the different and complex intentionalities operative in consciousness. Yet, it is clear that there is a mode of consciousness which Dilthey finds most interesting and its analysis and description may be regarded as the best evidence presented by Dilthey in

support of the claim that the human and the natural sciences share a common origin. This mode of consciousness Dilthey calls Innewerden or reflexive awareness.⁶⁵

Dilthey's concept of Innewerden is intended to give an account of the nature of consciousness in its most basic form. Innewerden is a mode of consciousness that is a mode of being-in-the world. What this means is that the subject and the object, the self and the world, the inside and the outside originate at the same time--they are inextricably and irrevocably connected. Consequently, our knowledge of the world is grounded on and made possible by the fact that we have immediate access to the world because we are a part of it, not apart from it. It is for this reason that Dilthey maintains that the sense of touch is the Grundsinn or primary sense. Consciousness originates as a form of body-consciousness. Therefore, by calling attention to the sense of touch, Dilthey points out the somatic or material conditions of the possibility of experience and knowledge. In this view, sensations and perceptions are never merely physiological processes or stimuli, but rather are accompanied by an awareness of them. The subject is thus always more than a passive receiver of stimuli and the subject is more than a system of organizing principles and mechanisms which process data.

For Dilthey, the contents of consciousness cannot be separated or abstracted from the acts of consciousness, since

every content implies an act and every act a content inasmuch as the content is an object and not a thing.⁶⁶ Objectivity, materiality, the Tatsaechlichkeit and Dinglichkeit of the external world are not to be confounded with or substituted for subjectivity, spirituality, the inner world, but are to be regarded as co-founded. Dilthey's concept of Innewerden therefore demands that we take the materiality of the subject seriously and that we recognize the primary mode of consciousness, and of knowledge, as the experiences of the automaticity of the subject as a self-regulating life-system.⁶⁷ This level of psycho-physical activity is experience that is pre-logical, pre-thematized, pre-scientific, etc. That is to say, it is immediate, and quite literally, elementary.⁶⁸

Dilthey's Transcendental Pragmatic

Empiricism

For Dilthey, the scientific-theoretical world is a world of "artificially created analyses and syntheses, thus a world in which sense perceptions do not correspond to the organs of science."⁶⁹ Dilthey holds this position on the basis of his analysis and description of immediate experience and reflexive awareness, the purpose of which is to expose the fundamental presuppositions of both rationalist and empiricist

theories of knowledge. In both instances, Dilthey's major criticism is the same: empiricist and rationalist theories of knowledge of the world are not true to experience, i.e., immediate experience. What they do offer is a way of indirectly saying something about the world and the things in it--they supply a conceptual schema. Accordingly, Dilthey explains:

Empiricism does not have one hair more right than rationalism; the point of departure of experiences is no more certain of anything than the point of departure of self-evident truth.⁷⁰

A presuppositionlessness beginning is impossible on the grounds of the very nature of thinking as a mode of being that is complex. Since everything exists for us as facts of consciousness, the empirical data are never simple sense data, and since consciousness is at bottom never pure consciousness, but a consciousness limited and determined by the will and feeling, reality is never phenomenal--in the Kantian sense--but real, i.e., wirklich. Moreover,

The fact to which we attribute reality possesses a relationship to our practical life; it is included in the connectedness of having-an-effect-on [Wirken] and being-effected [Leiden]. . . .⁷¹

Indeed, the reality that is our experience is never unambiguous at its source. It is only upon reflection, which is a higher

order of mental activity, that the ambiguity that is experience is aufgehoben, is lost or forgotten, but yet remains the concrete floating foundation of all knowledge and science.

There is another level of ambiguity present in Dilthey's thought concerning the foundations of science. Recognizing the inevitable shortcomings of a critique of knowledge (e.g., the epistemological circle involved in any inquiry into the forms and laws of thought⁷²), Dilthey nevertheless finds it necessary to carry out such an inquiry. Why? Should we understand his critique as a reductio ad absurdum type of argument, namely, as a demonstration of the impossibility of learning anything more about how we know what we know? This is clearly not the case.

Even though it is Dilthey's basic contention that our knowledge of reality is the knowledge gained through immediate experience and the reflexive awareness accompanying the processes of acquisition, it is evident that Dilthey's description of this state of affairs does not satisfy the transcendental question that he himself considers to be critical, i.e., the question concerning the conditions of the possibility of a science of reality. It is in the face of this ambivalence that Dilthey's thought becomes most interesting. Recognizing full well that a scientific response to a philosophical question is not wholly adequate and at the same time holding that a philosophical response to a scientific question is

equally inadequate, Dilthey extricates himself from this dilemma by transforming the transcendental logical question into an empirical one.⁷³ In this respect, therefore, Dilthey's argument for the facticity of a level of experience and consciousness that underlies all knowledge and science is similar to the one used by Wittgenstein in the Tractatus in his attempt to establish determinate sense by way of the existence of simple objects.⁷⁴ Both are transcendental arguments that are designed to limit the knowable world to positive facts.

This transformation, which is demanded by Dilthey's call for a consequent form of empiricism, is evident in the therapeutic rehabilitation of the role and function of philosophy in Dilthey's writings.⁷⁵ Dilthey, like many thinkers of the twentieth century,⁷⁶ attempts to show that the real conditions of the possibility of knowledge and of science involve a discussion of the body, of language, and of history. Thus, we can interpret Dilthey's Critique of Historical Reason as based on an epistemological standpoint that does not, from the outset, separate an empirical consciousness from a transcendental consciousness. The connectedness of the two is not a speculative unity, nor is it hypothetical, but one that is real in the sense that both belong to the concrete whole of Erlebnisse or lived experiences. Unlike Kant, who holds that all knowledge begins with experience but does not have its ground in it, Dilthey holds that all knowledge begins with experience and has its ground in it.⁷⁷

Accordingly, it is through the idea of the Zusammenhang des

Lebens that Dilthey thematizes the Vergessenheit of the life-world as the concrete, material, social-historical matrix of knowledge and science. Empiricist and rationalist theories of knowledge are therefore criticized for their forgetfulness. In this sense, Dilthey's epistemological standpoint with respect to the psychogenesis of knowledge is a radical reflection on the conditions of the possibility of knowledge within the limits of a new transcendental philosophy that takes the materiality and social-historical situatedness of the subject seriously. By developing the distinction between the reflexivity of consciousness in contradistinction to reflection, and by focusing on the former as the real experiential source of our knowledge of the world, Dilthey attempts to show that logical principles, mathematical axioms, etc. are abstractions inasmuch as they are the effective products of human attempts to thematize and systematize our experiences in isolation from the context that makes such products and activities possible and meaningful.

Since Dilthey's epistemology is intended to serve as a justification of the legitimacy of the human sciences, Dilthey examines what he takes to be the very ground of science, namely, experience. From the point of view of the legitimation of the human sciences, this can be interpreted as Dilthey's recognition of the over-determination of science (i.e., natural science) with respect to the question of the validity of different forms of knowledge and practice. For this reason,

Dilthey's epistemological concerns are described by him as a theory of knowledge that has a "realistic or critically objective"⁷⁸ orientation. In the section of the nineteenth volume of Dilthey's Gesammelte Schriften entitled Leben und Erkennen, Dilthey clarifies his epistemological standpoint in this way:

Epistemology must also not be based on the unilateral, exclusive study of intellectual functions.

Consequently, we want to determine the given empirically. According to a descriptive method, we want to ascertain everything that can be ascertained about the genesis and thus the conditioned epistemic value of knowledge

Here a second error of prevailing epistemology confronts us. Knowledge is grounded on intellectual processes. . . .

In opposition to this, I have earlier already emphasized that one must proceed from the whole, full person in his vitality and fulness as the decisive point for the preparation of a real, natural epistemology corresponding to the facts and therefore satisfying the practical nature of people. . . .

Because, naturally, the function of thinking can only be conceived in its connection with the system or the structure of all the functions of life. Neither would I understand the performance of the retina of the eye, were I to view it only in its relation to the refractive medium of the eye or even in its relation to the muscles that turn the eyeball

Even more exclusively than epistemology, logic was constructed on the basis of intellectual processes. Logic requires a final criterion behind which one can go no further. The latter is chiefly logically formally the⁷⁹ evidence of the forms and of the value of laws. . . .

And defines the scope of the field of his epistemological investigations thus:

I take thinking or knowing in its entire compass, in

its broadest range. Where an impression of something real flashes, it is at hand. But how far do we understand its conception: everywhere it is a manifestation of life, tied to life. Here, the expression life expresses above all that which is most familiar, most intimate to all. What life is, is given in experience. We experience it, and it is nevertheless a puzzle. But we know how it appears and presents itself. It exists where a structure, which proceeds from stimulus to movement, exists. This progression from stimulus to movement is everywhere connected to the appearance of something organic. In this structure, which proceeds from stimulus to movement, the secret of life pulsates as it were.⁸⁰

It becomes clear, therefore, that science and knowledge are to be interpreted as a historical, social and even biologically adaptive form of human activity or behaviour. On the strength of this epistemological orientation, it would be just to describe, albeit oxymoronically, Dilthey's epistemology as an account of the foundations of science in terms of a transcendental pragmatic empiricism. It is transcendental because it is a reflection on and critical analysis of the conditions of the conditions of the possibility of experience and knowledge; it is pragmatic because it transforms the transcendental problem into a practical problem that has a scientific solution; finally, it is empiricist because it focuses on the evidence and foundational role of experience.

Science, for Dilthey, is an emancipation from metaphysics. Metaphysics is quite literally what comes after--at the end of actual scientific research; it is not the ground upon which

the sciences of reality are based. Thus, Dilthey's epistemology, as an argument for the legitimation of the human sciences, seeks to demonstrate the fundamental scientificity of all the sciences as grounded in life-practices. Negatively expressed, Dilthey's epistemology is an attempt at the Entdogmatisierung of an epistemological model of valid knowledge that is itself unscientific. In this regard, Dilthey's naturalized and historicized epistemology displays the tendency towards the Verwissenschaftlichung of basic philosophical problems, and in so doing is in harmony with the basic intellectual movements of the nineteenth and twentieth centuries. In a very literal sense, Dilthey considers the process of "scientification" as an emancipation that is as real and as concrete as the fight for the right to vote--to have one's voice heard. For Dilthey, science is positively embedded in the very nature of human beings. The human sciences, as well as the natural sciences, stem from this source.

NOTES

1. W. V. Quine, "Epistemology Naturalized," in Ontological Relativity and Other Essays (New York and London: Columbia University Press, 1969), p. 69.
2. Dilthey, Gesammelte Schriften, vol. XIX, p. 236.
3. Ibid., p. 235.
4. Ibid.
5. Ibid.
6. Ibid.
7. Ibid., pp. 300-301.
8. See part A of the nineteenth volume of Dilthey's Gesammelte Schriften, which bears the title "Early Sketches of the Epistemology and Logic of the Human Sciences (pre-1880)" and contains his presentation of a "broadened empirical approach." Dilthey, Gesammelte Schriften, vol. XIX, pp. 1-57.
9. In the section of the nineteenth volume known as the "Berliner Entwurf" (circa 1893), Dilthey writes: "Consequently, the theory of the presence of elementary logical functions in the entire nexus of human knowledge is the point of departure of epistemology and logic; correlatively, that these functions are equivalents of experience, . . ." Dilthey, Gesammelte Schriften, vol. XIX, p. 324.
10. See Rudolf Makkreel, "Husserl, Dilthey and the Relation of the Life-World to History," Research in Phenomenology, vol. 12, 1982, p. 43, where Makkreel explains very clearly that "Dilthey states as the 'second principle' of philosophy that consciousness must be understood in terms of the totality of our life-nexus. Consciousness has traditionally been interpreted as rooted in the idea of a subject and its representational awareness of objective content. But for Dilthey, consciousness is more fundamental than the idea of a subject and is not primarily representational. It must be considered in light of the fullness of our affective and volitional life as well."
11. Dilthey, Gesammelte Schriften, vol. XIX, p. 324. Here, under

the heading "The Circle in All Knowledge and the Beginning or Secure Ground of Any Foundation of Knowledge," Dilthey explains:

Thus the ancient disputed question whether there is an absolute beginning of knowledge and whether its foundation as a thinking does not presuppose thought and knowledge itself--that which it in fact seeks to establish--is also resolved.

The elementary logical operations as the forms, in which we raise our consciousness of facts to distinctness and clarity, are the presupposition and condition of all experience. But by means of them, we know about them that they themselves are ways of experiencing, consequently, that they have the same certainty that all inner perception has.

Thus the external relation of the form and of the matter of thought established by Kant and the presupposition of a pre-established harmony between Logismus and objects, further back, the entire metaphysical fundamental hypothesis of the unity of both in the Weltvernunft is resolved by means of the analytical knowledge that Logismus can be reduced to these fundamental operations as modes of experience.

This resolution achieves unconditional certainty through the capital principle that it is all the same if these operations really follow something that is last, if Logismus follows from them: we can reduce the latter to them, i.e., to experience, and thus for the logical connectedness of thinking, it is grounded on it, no matter what its genetic nexus is.

This resolution is at the same time the establishment of the sciences of experience.

12. Identifying the goal of epistemology as the derivation of "legitimizing grounds, presuppositions, . . . and the coherence of the rules of human action," Dilthey sees this as involving the combination of transcendental philosophy with positivism. Ibid., p. 301.
13. I will expand on this in the last section of this chapter.
14. Dilthey, Gesammelte Schriften, vol. XIX, p. 1.
15. See John Stuart Mill's Philosophy of Scientific Method, edited with an Introduction by Ernest Nagel (New York: Hafner Publishing Co., 1950, p. 307, where Mill's introductory

remarks to Book VI of the System of Logic begin with the following statement: "The backward state of the moral sciences can only be remedied by applying to them the methods of physical science, duly extended and generalized."

16. Dilthey, Gesammelte Schriften, vol. XIX, p. 2.
17. Ibid., p. 4.
18. Under the heading "The Psycho-Physical Unity of Life," Dilthey explains:

By empirical psychology I understand a psychology that describes in generalizations the facts of psychical life in their generic generality, makes provable causal connections within the individual groups of facts and between them, with the exclusion of hypotheses. The exclusion of hypotheses is the mark of empirical psychology. The latter can only attain its goal if it juxtaposes causal relations without pretension to combining them into a theoretical unity and deriving other phenomena from them. The possibility of such a science can, of course, only be tested in its execution. Its form is, of course, completely divergent from the usual psychology till now. But if it is possible, then it is, and it alone, the true foundation of the human sciences.

Ibid., p. 282.

19. Although the influence of Husserl's Logical Investigations is directly attested to by Dilthey himself (Dilthey, Gesammelte Schriften, vol. VII, p. 14) in a footnote in the Aufbau, it is evident that the idea of the intentionality of consciousness and of the methodological requirement of a factual actual description of the processes of thinking, willing, feeling, etc. are contained in Dilthey's early writings, especially in the "Breslauer Ausarbeitung."
20. Edmund Husserl, "The Task and the Significance of the Logical Investigations," trans. J. N. Mohanty in J. N. Mohanty, ed., Readings on Edmund Husserl's Logical Investigations (The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1977), p. 197.
21. Dilthey, Gesammelte Schriften, vol. XIX, p. 4.
22. Husserl, "The Task and the Significance of the Logical Investigations," in J. N. Mohanty, Readings on Edmund Husserl's Logical Investigations, p. 197.

23. Ibid., p. 208.

24. After making the oft-quoted statement that "Das a priori Kants ist starr und tot," Dilthey outlines his epistemological position as follows:

First: The conditions of consciousness must be conceived in their complete compass. The standpoint of epistemology must be taken within a genuine descriptive psychology that also contains the contentual psychical states of affairs.

Then: The conditions develop from this Inhaltlichkeit of consciousness; such a development, recognized as historical, naturally presupposes the historical multiplicity of individuals and therefore can only be proved there where the presuppositions of the real temporal succession and of the multiplicity of individuals are determined.

Finally: For a Locke, Hume, a Kant or Fichte, the present problem seemed absolutely soluble. But as soon as the true historical character of these facts of consciousness is recognized, the treatment of theory and of the history of intelligence is changed at once.

Ibid., p. 51.

25. Ibid., pp. 50-51.

26. Ibid., pp. 82-91 passim.

27. Ibid., p. 10.

28. Peter Krausser, Kritik der endlichen Vernunft. Diltheys Revolution der allgemeinen Wissenschafts- und Handlungstheorie (Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp, 1968). For a critical account of Krausser's interpretation of Dilthey, see Rudolf Makkreel, Dilthey, Philosopher of the Human Studies (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1975), pp. 333-335. Makkreel's main reason for disapproving of Krausser's interpretation is stated thus:

He [Krausser] claims that Dilthey sought to replace Kant's transcendental epistemology and its a priori categories with a comprehensive empirical epistemology, and points to the fact that Dilthey discusses all the sciences together in the Breslau draft. He notes with approval Dilthey's remarks that science and philosophy are alike in never being presuppositionless and that our presuppositions must be constantly clarified and

adapted to our experience. But Dilthey, at that point, is only giving a post-Kantian expression to some commonplace views reflecting his general empirical approach to philosophical problems. Whatever similarities he found between the natural sciences and the human studies, he always insisted that they required separate epistemological frameworks. His actual sketches for the Critique of Historical Reason were clearly meant to provide a foundation just for the Geisteswissenschaften, not also for the Naturwissenschaften. While he does explicitly deny Kant's conception of time as phenomenal and affirms its reality, he questions Kant's concept of space only to the extent that certain of the relations asserted between it and time stand in the way of the development of psychological knowledge. As for his more general reconsiderations of Kant's epistemology, they continue, in effect, the process of rethinking begun by Kant himself in the Critique of Judgment.

But, more interestingly, Makkreel goes on to say this about Krausser's interpretation:

Despite Krausser's questionable theses, his work serves to emphasize that Dilthey allowed the Naturwissenschaften and the Geisteswissenschaften to have much in common without thereby accepting the ideals of the natural sciences, or uncritically borrowing from them. All too often it has been assumed that in any contact between the two sets of disciplines, the lines of influence point in only one direction: from the natural sciences to the human studies.

Makkreel, Dilthey, p. 336.

29. Dilthey, Gesammelte Schriften, vol. XIX, p. 82.
30. In the treatise "Contributions to the Solution of the Question of the Origin of Our Belief in the Reality of the External World and Its Rightness" (1890) under the heading "The Reality of External Objects," Dilthey states that "Alle unsere Handlungen sind Experimenten zu vergleichen, die diesem induktiven Zusammenhang angehören." See Wilhelm Dilthey, Gesammelte Schriften, vol. V (Stuttgart: B. G. Teubner and Goettingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 1966), p. 115.
31. See Martin Heidegger, The Question Concerning Technology and Other Essays, translated and with an Introduction by

William Lovitt (New York: Harper & Row, 1977), especially the translator's notes on pp. 3-4, and p. 156.

32. See Quine, "Epistemology Naturalized," pp. 83-84.
33. See Dilthey, Gesammelte Schriften, vol. XIX, pp. 1-44 passim.
34. See Nelson Goodman, Ways of Worldmaking (Indianapolis: Hackett, 1978), especially the first two chapters in which he makes the critical point that there is no way to separate our descriptions of the world from our constructions of it. For example, in the penultimate paragraph of the first chapter, Goodman states:
- All the processes of worldmaking I have discussed enter into knowing. Perceiving motion, we have seen, often consists in producing it. Discovering laws involves drafting them. Recognizing patterns is very much a matter of inventing and imposing them. Comprehension and creation go on together.
- For Dilthey, as for Goodman, many descriptions of the same world exist.
35. For an indication of the connection between Dilthey's thought and the thought of M. Weber, T. Parsons, A. Gehlen, E. Durkheim, K. Marx, see Helmut Johach, Handelnder Mensch und objektiver Geist: Zur Theorie der Geistes- und Sozialwissenschaften bei Wilhelm Dilthey (Meisenheim am Glan: Verlag Anton Hain, 1975), pp. 185-186.
36. Herbert Schnaedelbach, Philosophy in Germany 1831-1933 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1984), p. 91.
37. Ibid., pp. 91-92.
38. Dilthey, Gesammelte Schriften, vol. XIX, p. 82.
39. Ibid., p. 59.
40. I see Dilthey's understanding of epistemology to be in accord with Quine's redescription of "the old epistemology" in his essay "Epistemology Naturalized," especially with the idea of epistemology as psychology. See Quine, "Epistemology Naturalized," pp. 82-84.
41. See Theodore F. Geraets, Vers une nouvelle philosophie transcendentale: La genèse de la philosophie de Maurice Merleau-Ponty jusqu'à la Phénoménologie de la Perception (La Haye: Martinus Nijhof, 1971).

42. Dilthey, Gesammelte Schriften, vol. XIX, p. 13.

43. Ibid.

44. Ibid., pp. 49-52.

45. In his copy of Mill's Logic, Dilthey notes:

The real empirical method instead of prejudiced dogmatic empiricism can only come out of Germany. Mill is dogmatic out of a lack of historical training (Bildung).

Quoted by Georg Misch in the "Vorbericht des Herausgebers" in Wilhelm Dilthey, Gesammelte Schriften, vol. V (B. G. Teubner: Stuttgart and Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht: Goettingen, 1966), p. LXXIV.

46. See n. 24 above.

47. I base this point on Peter Krausser's Dilthey interpretation. See Peter Krausser, "Dilthey's Revolution in the Theory of the Structure of Scientific Inquiry and Rational Behavior," Review of Metaphysics XXII (December 1968): pp. 262-280 passim.

48. See Dilthey, Gesammelte Schriften, vol. XIX, pp. 276-278.

49. Ibid., p. 329.

50. Dilthey, Gesammelte Schriften, vol. XIX, p. 36.

51. See Dilthey, Gesammelte Schriften, vol. V, p. 433. Also, see Peter Krausser, "Versuch einer systematischen Extrapolation zur Gewinnung eines hypothetischen Vorgriffs auf die zu erwartende 'neue Kritik'" in Materialien zur Philosophie Wilhelm Diltheys, hrsg. u. eingeleitet von Frithjof Rodi u. Hans-Ulrich Lessing (Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp, 1984), p. 343.

52. Dilthey, Gesammelte Schriften, vol. XIX, p. 17.

53. Ibid., p. 176. It is interesting to note that Dilthey's determination of experience as a "doing" and "suffering" and its relation to reason is very close to what John Dewey says in his chapter "Changed Conceptions of Experience and Reason" in Reconstruction in Philosophy. For example, Dewey writes:

The living creature undergoes, suffers, the consequences of its own behavior. This close connection between doing and suffering or undergoing forms what we call experience. Disconnected doing and disconnected suffering are neither of them experiences.

See John Dewey, Reconstruction in Philosophy (Boston: Beacon Press, 1948), p. 86.

54. See Manfred Riedel, Verstehen oder Erklaren? (Stuttgart: Klett-Cotta, 1978), pp. 66-71.
55. Ibid., pp. 71-75.
56. Dilthey, Gesammelte Schriften, vol. XIX, p. 34.
57. Ibid., pp. 174-180.
58. Ibid., p. 174.
59. Ibid., p. 10.
60. Ibid., p. 32.
61. Ibid., p. 10.
62. Here, it is interesting to note Husserl's unfair criticism of Dilthey with respect to the idea of intentionality. In his discussion of Brentano "as the pathfinder for investigations into inner experience" and the discovery of intentionality, Husserl states:

. . . the more general claim of a descriptive psychology as the most basic discipline within psychology found various supporters. Dilthey does not seem to have been influenced by Brentano in this matter. Rather he seems to have been led to the idea of a pure description entirely on his own, guided by his own area of interest in the Geisteswissenschaften. It is remarkable that the central significance of intentionality does not play any role in his thinking.

Edmund Husserl, "The Task and the Significance of the Logical Investigations," edited and translated by J. N. Mohanty, J. N. Mohanty, Readings on Edmund Husserl's Logical Investigations (The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1977), p. 207.

63. Dilthey, Gesammelte Schriften, vol. XIX, p. 22.
64. Ibid., p. 21.
65. For example, Dilthey explains:
 With the word Innewerden I signify a fact which

my self-observation always presents anew. There is a consciousness that does not place a content over against (vor-stellt) the subject, rather in which there is a content without differentiation. In it that which constitutes its content, and the act, are not at all of two kinds. That of which one is reflexively aware is not separated from that which constitutes the content of this reflexive awareness. That which constitutes the content of consciousness is not differentiated from consciousness itself. It is, as it were, a brightening and lumination of that which forms this content. By virtue of such a reflexive awareness, the feeling of weary displeasure that prevents the following of a train of thought, as well as the effort of the will to overcome this aversion, is there for me, whereby representations are combined with the reflexive awareness. Since in it the subject is not differentiated from its object, there is also no gegenstaendliches Vor-sich-stellen of that which is contained in it in the perception . . .

Ibid., pp. 66-67.

66. Objekt, Gegenstand, Ding are to be carefully distinguished from one another. "Objekt" is to be understood in the Cartesian sense of an idea understood as an object of thought inasmuch as it is thought--a representation of the spirit as it were; it is not an independent reality subsisting in itself. "Gegenstand" is to be taken as "resistance" or that which stands over against the subject, whereas "Ding" is used to designate trees, tables, chairs, etc. See the section "The Perception of the External World" in the Breslauer Ausarbeitung in Dilthey, Gesammelte Schriften, vol. XIX, pp. 174-195 passim.
67. Dilthey does not use the word "automaticity", but it is clear that the "reflexivity" of subject or of consciousness is used in this sense. See note 65 above.
68. "Elementary" can be taken in the ancient Greek sense of earth, air, fire, and water as the very stuff of the universe.
69. Dilthey, Gesammelte Schriften, vol. XIX, pp. 7-8.
70. Ibid., p. 13.
71. Ibid., p. 21.
72. Ibid., pp. 324-325.

73. Cf. Karl-Otto Apel, Towards a Transformation of Philosophy, translated by Glyn Adey and David Frisby (London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1980), especially his "transformation" or reinterpretation of the Kantian question of the transcendental presuppositions of the possibility and validity of science in the chapter entitled "The Communication Community as the Transcendental Presupposition for the Social Sciences," pp. 136-179.
74. See Ludwig Wittgenstein, Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus, translated by D. F. Pears and B. F. McGuinness with an Introduction by Bertrand Russell (London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1974), prop. 3.23.
75. For example, commenting on the project of his Einleitung in the "Althoff Brief," Dilthey explains:

All science, all philosophy is the science of experience. All experience has its coherency and thereby its conditioned validity within the context of human consciousness. The quarrel between idealism and realism is resolvable through psychological analysis; this can show that the reality which is given in experience is not a phenomenon of my representation. (My emphasis.)

Dilthey, Gesammelte Schriften, vol. XIX, p. 389. Also, compare with what John Dewey says about the "spectator model" of knowledge in his chapter "Changed Conceptions of the Ideal and the Real" in Reconstruction in Philosophy, pp. 103-131.

76. For example, Husserl, Heidegger, Merleau-Ponty.
77. See Dilthey, Gesammelte Schriften, vol. XIX, p. 24.
78. Dilthey makes this statement in connection with his discussion of the description and development of the concept of "psychical structure". Dilthey writes:

This descriptive part of the investigation is a further development of the standpoint taken in my earlier works. These works were intended to establish the possibility of an objective knowledge of reality and within this knowledge the gegenstaendliche objektive apprehension of psychical reality in particular. In so doing, in contrast to the idealistic theory of reason, I do not turn to an a priori of theoretical understanding or of practical reason, which would be grounded in a

pure ego, but to the structural relations, which are demonstrable, contained in the structural system. . . . Now, if I want to further develop the foundation of a realistic or critically objective oriented epistemology, then I must, once and for all, indicate how much I owe to the epoch-making Logical Investigations of Husserl (1900, 1901) with respect to the utilization of description for epistemology.

See Wilhelm Dilthey, Gesammelte Schriften, vol. VII (Stuttgart: B. G. Teubner and Goettingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 1966), n. 1, pp. 13-14.

79. Dilthey, Gesammelte Schriften, vol. XIX, p. 343.

80. Ibid., p. 344.

CHAPTER III

ERLEBNIS AS IMMEDIATE EXPERIENCE: REFLEXIVITY AND EFFECTIVITY

We have seen that one of the fundamental principles of Dilthey's theory of knowledge is that all knowledge arises from the interaction between the perceiving subject and the object of perception. Methodologically, the important implication of this principle is that human cognition can be studied objectively only insofar as we understand "objectively" to mean that the subject of knowledge cannot legitimately be separated from the object of knowledge. It is this principle of mutual elucidation that distinguishes Dilthey's theory of knowledge from the realist and idealist theories of knowledge he criticizes and, in fact, can be interpreted as the methodological basis of his theory of a rigorous or consequent empiricism. On this view, Dilthey's critical reflection on the employment of the scientific method arises from an interest in the experience that is the activity which we commonly call research.¹

Although Dilthey places no mean value on historical accounts of the origin and development of the several sciences,

it would be wrong to interpret Dilthey's argument for the legitimation of the human sciences as a virulent strain of historicism.² Dilthey's combination of scientific and phenomenological procedures for investigating our knowledge of reality demands that the question of knowledge and its validity be examined at its source, i.e., within the framework of the dynamic and creative interaction between subject and object, ego and world, etc. For Dilthey, the source of knowledge is to be found on the level of primary, immediate experience; its role in Dilthey's argument for the legitimation of the human sciences cannot be ignored in much the same way as it is difficult to ignore the importance of "the levels of experience doctrine"³ in contemporary philosophy. What, then, is Dilthey's concept of experience? What is the role of Dilthey's concept of Erlebnis in his argument for the legitimacy of the human sciences? Is there more than one concept of experience that is used by Dilthey to achieve his end? If so, what are they and how are they related?

In the Breslauer Ausarbeitung, Dilthey speaks of Erlebnisse in terms of our knowledge of the external world and its apodicticity. Notwithstanding the fact that Dilthey takes up the discussion of this fundamental epistemological question within the traditional framework of a distinction between the "inside" of the subject and the "outside" of the world, it is made sufficiently clear here that Erlebnisse are states of affairs which are wirklich or, what

we might do well to call "real effective immediacies".⁴ Furthermore, Erlebnisse, like Wittgenstein's "simples",⁵ are also presented as the irreducible building-blocks of the world--they are that behind which we cannot go.⁶ This, of course, is not to suggest that Dilthey is a logical atomist, empiricist, or positivist, but to underline the idea that in order for us to make sense of the world we must be able to arrive at certain unanalyzable parts or elements of our world-view.⁷ However, unlike the Wittgensteinian "simples", of which the nature is left indeterminate but determinable, Dilthey's basic elements are made perspicuous in his treatment of the epistemological problem concerning our perceptual knowledge of the external world.

For Dilthey, Erlebnisse are not restricted to a discussion of sensations and sense experience, even though his aim is to provide a really scientific account of the fundamental nature of objective knowledge. In other words, the step backwards, which Dilthey sees as necessary for the attainment of a consequent form of empiricism and which is his own version of the epoché,⁸ is never radical in that the experiential source of knowledge is not reduced to a mechanics or physiology of perception in a one-sided manner. As a phenomenologist or researcher assuming the phenomenological viewpoint,⁹ Dilthey maintains that it is of the utmost importance that the subject or "perceiving apparatus" by which and through which objectivities are perceived not be

taken for granted; the subject and the object must be viewed as whole. The empirical given is neither sense data nor self-contained mind, but mind in interaction with an object as a Gegenstand. Consequently, Dilthey reacts to the partiality of both empiricist and rationalist accounts of knowledge. For example, with respect to Berkeley's radical form of empiricism, Dilthey writes:

A double assertion is contained in perception, and precisely herein lies the problem: I can recognize the very perception as a process in my self and yet at the same time the datum in it is reality for me. And this constitutes the greatest puzzle, which is contained in all human knowledge.

Just as the reality of our own inside with its passions and its pains and pleasures is an immediate experience [unmittelbares Erlebnis], so too does the thing which is differentiated from us possess a kind of reality, which can never be reduced to a mere set of states of my self--to a mere percipi, precisely in the way in which it is given in consciousness. From the fact that the object is only there for me in the perceptual process, in the percipi, it does not follow, as Berkeley concluded, that its esse is absorbed into this percipi. From the fact that the percipi is the only way that esse exists for us, it does not follow that esse cannot be understood differently.¹⁰

And focusing on Kant's intellectualism with regard to its point of departure, Dilthey caustically states:

Of course, speculation is abstract; in opposition against the reigning Kant cult of today, I also include this great thinker; he came from scholastic metaphysics to Hume, and the psychical facts in their purity do not constitute his object, rather the empty forms of space, time, etc. hollowed

out by scholastic abstraction, and self-consciousness only forms the end--not the point of departure of his analysis. Indeed, abstract philosophy of the understanding resolved itself in Kant, he did not demolish it from outside, rather his fate was that this disintegration took place in him. But while the most profound point to which Kant strove was an abstract faculty of production, a form without content (corresponding to his point of departure), form could again give birth to form; and while in the three critiques the psychical faculties were isolated and developed according to form, intellectualism could arise again, form of pure thought as the place of origin of the absolute in us. In so doing, what a spectacle was presented in Kant's critiques! Thought destroys its own claim to an infinite and eternal figuration in order to rediscover it in the will; an illusion, since what is not in thought is sought in it, and what from the beginning only originated with its co-operation from the totality of our life as a higher worldview escapes to the will.¹¹

Accordingly, Dilthey defines his project as a critique of internal experience and perception, the necessity of which arises from Kant's failure to deal with what he himself had identified as the "inner sense", but had failed to develop.¹²

Thus, it is made clear that neither empiricist nor rationalist theories of knowledge proceed from the point of departure that is experience. Both distort what is given immediately and, according to Dilthey: "Were a man reduced to it [i.e., an empiricist or rationalist understanding of experience], he would not have the strength to live for a day!"¹³

The Category of Internal-External

In the second volume to the Einleitung, Dilthey presents his concept of experience within the context of the relationship between internal perception and experience on the one hand, and external perception and experience on the other.¹⁴ Moreover, Dilthey's treatment of the different kinds of perception and experience is circumscribed by the wider context of a determination of "inner life".¹⁵ What Dilthey calls "inner life" is to be understood as consciousness in general and "effective consciousness"¹⁶ in particular.

For Dilthey, inner life or consciousness in all its modes is inextricably connected with but not reducible to the body and its processes. "The relationship between the body and inner life," says Dilthey, "is given in experience as a belonging-to."¹⁷ Inner life as consciousness may be understood, therefore, as Dilthey's attempt to provide an alternative determination of consciousness conceived as pure or absolute. Consciousness can be distinguished from the external world only insofar as the self is first taken to be in interaction with this world, i.e., situated in it.¹⁸ Since consciousness is always consciousness of something, consciousness can properly be defined as "effective": consciousness is an awareness of the effects of the interaction between a subject and an object, a self and others, etc.

Dilthey's determination of the fundamental nature of consciousness and its structure in terms of inner life would therefore appear to rely on some of the principal tenets of biology or "the science of life"; namely, the principles of instinctual

drives such as adaptation, survival, and propagation.¹⁹ Thus, it is not surprising that Dilthey's discussion of the nature and structure of inner life as consciousness focuses on the notion of reflexivity. According to Dilthey, "we can think of this structure as a simple reflex mechanism."²⁰ That is to say, it is a brute fact for Dilthey that the so-called "inside" of the knower or perceiver is connected to the "outside" of external objects and the natural environment by means of a relationship that is dynamic and very complex. On the basis of a biological, therefore, natural scientific model, Dilthey takes up his investigations into the constitution of the object-domain of knowledge. For this reason, Dilthey often prefers to employ the term "psychical life" instead of the more traditional term "mind" or "spirit".²¹ Dilthey explains:

Here, the expression life signifies above all that which is most familiar and most intimate to everyone. What life is is the given in experience. We experience it and it is nevertheless a puzzle. But we know how it appears and presents itself. It is where a structure that proceeds from stimulus to response exists. The progression from stimulus to movement is connected everywhere to the appearance of something organic. In this structure, which proceeds from stimulus to movement, the secret of life pulsates. The unity of life is always within the context of this structure. ²²

Is "life", especially "psychical life", ultimately reducible to the activity of stimulus-response? Is the life of a knower a mere reflex action? And are the effects of this

activity the primary stuff of what we take objective reality to be? No. Dilthey does not subscribe to a materialistic-mechanistic theory of cognition, even though he does accept some of the basic physiological and biological principles implied by such a theory. What Dilthey does do is remain critical with respect to the metaphysical commitments he must make in accepting such a theory. Consequently, Dilthey judges the value or worth of a theory or overall conceptual scheme against the nature of what is under investigation. For Dilthey, when it is a question concerning the nature of our knowledge of the external world, a theory cannot attempt to explain this process on the basis of reduction or abstraction. Reality must be investigated in its primary mode of givenness and theories and conceptual schemes must assist in allowing things to be seen as they are--in their richness, fullness, and connectedness. Thus, we may interpret Dilthey's "biologism" as merely another expression, as it were, of Quine's dictum: "Don't venture farther from sensory evidence than you need to."²³ In the same vein, Dilthey asserts the following methodological principle:

I walk down from Sils Maria Maloja, or even from the summit of Rigi towards Gersau or towards charming Hertenstein. From the heights, where the winds prevent any continuous covering of vegetation or any tree to grow, to the valley in a few hours--at the bottom laurel, myrtle, vines and olive trees. The animal world also changes accordingly. The description of this multiplicity of the structures of life in its classification is independent of the various

hypothetical explanations of the origin of this taxonomy.²⁴

Different classes of plants and animals already exist in nature; they exist independently of the researcher who investigates them. Characteristically, Dilthey is reluctant to endow any particular science with the power to determine theoretically the primary nature of reality. At best, the several sciences can only present partial pictures or representations of what there really is--they can only provide pieces of the puzzle that is reality, of which the most puzzling aspect is the relation between "psychical life and the body."²⁵

Consequently, Dilthey confronts the assumption that there is something we call reality that exists outside of us. In effect, Dilthey seeks to show that this mistaken assumption is what lies at the bottom of the distinction between the human and the natural sciences. Since Dilthey does not accept this basic presupposition of natural science, it is not entirely correct to emphasize the role of any natural science in Dilthey's treatment of human knowledge.

Responding to the traditional epistemological model, according to which consciousness is primarily representational and knowledge a matter of correspondence, Dilthey develops the idea of the connectedness of the inside-outside. It is a basic Diltheyan postulate that the relationship between the

subject of knowledge and the object of knowledge is not dichotomous. For Dilthey, this relationship, which constitutes the source of knowledge and its ground, is characterized as an immediate, reflexive, continuous interaction. Consequently, Dilthey treats the question of the objective validity of knowledge as a question about the effects of such an interaction. To this end, Dilthey exploits the facticity and spontaneity of life in that he takes up the relationship between an organism and its environment as his epistemological exemplar. Thus, the perceiving subject and the perceived object are one inasmuch as both share the same ontological status, i.e., both belong to the world. For this reason, Dilthey says that "an outside without an inside are meaningless words."²⁶ In so doing, Dilthey temporarily renovates the traditional epistemological model by making a "biological turn". He explains:

Earlier I attempted to validate the psychological foundation in opposition to one-sided intellectualism. This view also acquired an ever increasing number of hangers-on. But since I recognized the foundation of psychology in the structure of life, I had to expand and deepen the psychological standpoint to the biological standpoint. The deepening of the investigation is the result of the widening. Inasmuch as we take the human being in the context of life, the decisive moves for the description of the life-nexus present themselves in it.²⁷

The "widening" mentioned by Dilthey in the above passage is his conception of a consequent form of empiricism,

the main aim of which is to show the objectivity of internal perception and experience, as well as external perception and experience, in its true light.²⁸ The route which Dilthey takes begins within the boundaries of a critique of internal perception and experience that is in fact a psychogenesis of knowledge and science. Epistemologically, Dilthey seeks to return to the origin of all types of knowledge by way of a return to immediate experience. Furthermore, the "biological turn" enables Dilthey to arrive, as it were, at the point where empiricism and rationalism part company. On this view, empiricist and rationalist theories of knowledge have the same point of origin, which must be revisited. Moreover, the central category of internal-external, as it is conceived of by such theories of knowledge, is a misconception. The correct understanding of the internal-external distinction, according to Dilthey's view, requires us to expand or widen the concept of subjectivity so as to include the body, while maintaining the position that a subject that is biologically and physiologically determined cannot be reduced to a mere machine. In the broadest of terms, we have identified this Diltheyan position with respect to the levelling of realist and idealist theories of knowledge and their relation to a theory of science as a transcendental pragmatic empiricism.²⁹ Now, we must examine more closely how Dilthey attempts to bridge the epistemological gap between realism and idealism.

Internal-External Perception
and Experience

In Konrad Lorenz's book Behind the Mirror: A Search for a Natural History of Human Knowledge, the subject of the book is delimited thus:

The realist persists in looking outwards only, unaware that he is a mirror. The idealist persists in only looking into this mirror, averting his eyes from the external world. Thus, both are inhibited from seeing that there is an obverse to every mirror. But the obverse does not reflect, and to this extent the mirror is in the same category as the objects that it reflects. The physiological mechanism whose function it is to understand the real world is no less real than the world itself. This very obverse is the subject of my book.³⁰

The subject of Dilthey's epistemological writings in the Breslauer Ausarbeitung and the Berliner Entwurf is basically the same as Lorenz's. That is, Dilthey's treatment of internal perception and internal experience is a description and analysis of the non-reflective dimension of human cognition as the fundament of human knowing.³¹ On this view, the primary processes of cognition, in which and by which objective knowledge is constituted, are identified as a basic mode of consciousness called Innewerden or reflexive awareness. Consequently, it is in and through the activity of reflexive awareness as a life-function that it is possible to give a better account of the origin, constitution, and nature of knowledge.

The non-reflective side of human cognition is the body--not a body that is set in opposition to the self or consciousness, but a body that is in an ordinary way an element of the self and the world at the same time.³² Thus, the body is a real condition of the possibility of knowledge; our picture of the world depends on it. Dilthey explains:

. . . our body is constantly present to us in perception and representation, and thus it constitutes a constantly present representational whole, which stands in a special relation to our will and our feelings, and which is governed by our will, and within which immediate feelings appear. The orientation of this body in space, its position considered in relation to the external world, the constant relations, which it has with the constant constituent parts of this external world, all this forms the framework of representation [Vorstellungsgestalt], within which we fix every single psychical situation, constitutes a net, as it were within which and with the aid of which we record the individual situation.³³

However, Dilthey's introduction of the body into his epistemological discourse does not signal a turn to a **physiology of perception** and experience.³⁴ Dilthey's concern is transcendental in that the body is considered as a condition of the possibility of knowledge that is representational.

According to Dilthey, the most important of all representations is the self. Self-consciousness and self-awareness arise as a form of primary consciousness by virtue of the interaction and connectedness with external reality which is made possible by the body.³⁵ Not only does our self depend on this real unity

between a body-consciousness and the external world, or the continuity of body-consciousness-world, but also our representation of that world. Thus, our representation of external reality is made possible by virtue of the fact that the mind or psyche is not an isolated faculty or entity that is complete and perfect in itself. Dilthey explains:

Indeed, the fact of self-consciousness has as its presupposition the fact that every psychical process, every psychical fact, every representation is connected with every other one in a real unity, and that this real unity is not a product of psychical development, but its precondition.³⁶

The self is a given; it develops from its connectedness with the external world that is experienced immediately. The numerous references to children and to animals, which Dilthey makes, indicate that he sees human cognition as a learning that is more than a mere physiological reaction to the environment, but less than some mysterious, purely rational or intellectual activity that is informed by transcendent principles which control and order the phenomena of life and development.³⁷

The relationship between internal perception and experience and external perception and experience is one of correlativity. Put succinctly, the psychical processes of cognition are correlative to the physiological processes of the human body. In this nexus, therefore, Dilthey sees the co-emergence of the self or consciousness and the world.³⁸

Consequently, Dilthey's epistemological standpoint is based on the reflexivity of consciousness or the idea of the real connectedness of internal and external perception and experience. For this reason, Dilthey sees his epistemological task as a description and analysis of Erlebnisse. However, within the context of his larger critical project concerning the legitimation of the human sciences, Dilthey's empirical phenomenology takes on the added dimension of a transcendental phenomenology.³⁹ That is to say, on the basis of the evidence obtained from an empirical phenomenological or descriptive psychological investigation of the constitution of knowledge, Dilthey argues for the legitimacy of human scientific knowledge.

Recognizing the paradox in his principle of phenomenality (i.e., objectivity only exists for a subjectivity), Dilthey does not try to transcend and then negate the difference between mind and nature, but rather he seeks to investigate it at its source without recourse to unnecessary presuppositions. One of the finest examples of Dilthey's constant effort to not make more or less of the subject and object of knowledge than they really, effectively are is his concept of Erlebnis. Moreover, given the nature of Dilthey's critical epistemological task, it is not surprising to be able to discern at least two important determinations of this concept that are central.⁴⁰ The first is Erlebnis understood in the narrow sense of "immediate experience"; the second is Erlebnis in the wide sense of "lived experience".

Erlebnis as Immediate Experience

The history of the use of both the word and the concept Erlebnis prior to Dilthey is of little help to us in our efforts to understand Dilthey's development of Erlebnis in terms of "immediate experience".⁴¹ Even Gadamer's reconstruction of the word and the concept Erlebnis cannot help us here.⁴²

Dilthey's concept of Erlebnis as immediate experience may be seen to emerge from his attempt to arrive at a consequent form of empiricism, which is summed up in his slogan "Empirie, nicht Empirismus".⁴³ Rejecting Locke's, Hume's, Mill's accounts of the basis of knowledge as phenomenalist, as reducing the subject to a machine that merely processes sense data, as atomistically sensationalist, Dilthey turns to an examination and description of the originary moment of the co-emergence of consciousness and the world.⁴⁴ This is not to say Dilthey is concerned with establishing the first day of the appearance of the world and human beings; hardly, Dilthey is concerned with how we acquire and develop our knowledge--especially so-called objective knowledge--of the world and of ourselves as parts of this world.

The beginning of the world and of our selves, the very beginning of our ideas of objectivity and subjectivity, can be fixed in Dilthey as the moment at which resistance or opposition is suffered.⁴⁵ Accordingly, Dilthey considers

touching, movement, the feeling of movement to be primary and immediate modes of experience.⁴⁶ At this level, we experience an outside and at the same time we are reflexively aware that we are experiencing an outside. Thus, it is this reflexive awareness as an immediate mode of consciousness and experience of the external world that is the beginning of our selves and our knowledge of the world. Reflexive awareness is the basic form of psychical activity or the life of the mind; it is consciousness that is effective, but not reflective; it is what philosophers have identified and discussed as pre-linguistic, pre-theoretical, pre-discursive, silent or invisible dimensions of human knowing--especially, Merleau-Ponty.⁴⁷ What Dilthey identifies as reflexive awareness has also been termed "participatory consciousness" where "participation" signifies "the identification of self and not-self at the moment of experience."⁴⁸ In all these determinations of our knowledge of self and of the world, one idea is of signal importance: we cannot separate ourselves from what is happening to us while it is happening. Not only does this idea help to understand Dilthey's concept of experience, but it also serves as the basis for Dilthey's treatment of the distinction between the Geistes- and Naturwissenschaften.⁴⁹

Even today, the question of when human life begins or at which point of embryological development can we properly identify life as human remains an open question.⁵⁰ In Dilthey's case, it would not be wrong to say that psycho-physical life

is to be found where an organism, simple or complex, can be observed to be in interaction with its environment; i.e., when organisms display what Dilthey calls a Zweckszusammenhang or purposive system that is an immanent teleology inasmuch as the actions are goal-oriented.⁵¹ It is therefore within the context of this minimal, yet very large, definition of life that we can situate Dilthey's concept of Erlebnis as immediate experience, the most outstanding aspect of which is the originary, concrete connectedness of the subject of knowledge and its external reality or environment. Furthermore, in light of the above, we can also gain a further understanding of Dilthey's criticisms of Kant in general and with regard to the traditional model of consciousness as representational in particular.

We have identified Erlebnis as immediate experience on the basis of Dilthey's account of the originary moment at which consciousness and world co-emerge through the feeling of resistance. On this view, it would appear that consciousness is considered by Dilthey from an evolutionary, biological standpoint, since reflexive awareness as the primary mode of consciousness would appear to be a function of organism-environment adaptation. What is interesting about Dilthey's "biological turn" is that he uses it to mount an attack on the view that human intelligence, therefore human knowledge, is primarily a matter of representational activity. In so doing, Dilthey rejects the "mirror-model" of human intellection in favor of a natural

scientific model that is biological. "At the core, man is a bundle of drives."⁵² This rejection indicates an important methodological shift from speculative self-observation to empirical psychological description and analysis. What Dilthey rejects is the idea that consciousness and self-consciousness can be examined on the basis of an analogy with seeing. For example, Dilthey writes:

We all speak of internal experience; most assume that they can look into their own inside in the same way that one might look into a transparent stream and see right down to the bottom.⁵³

I am asked by my doctor if I have pains when mountaineering. These pains are feeling; I direct my attention to them. This only means that I intensify the consciousness of this process in the nexus of the representations and impulses stimulated in this way. For this, no separation of subject and object is required. This false semblance arises from the analogy with the process of seeing.⁵⁴

Consequently, when Dilthey writes that "visual perception is an abstraction when it is a question of das an mir selber auffassbare Leben,"⁵⁵ we can understand this as a criticism of the traditional characterization of the nature of human intelligence and the method by which it is examined. Past accounts are decidedly partial to the sense of sight to the extent that sight in itself and by itself can account for human knowledge. In short, the sense of sight is hypostazized; it becomes metaphysical.

The exaggeration of the importance of the sense of sight in traditional philosophical accounts of knowledge obscures the importance of the physiological, concrete connectedness of the knower and external reality. Thus, the real conditions of the possibility of the representability of objective knowledge are overlooked. Subjectivity cannot be reduced to a condition of objectivity and of representation; the categories of thought (e.g., space, time, causality) cannot be identified as the ultimate means by which knowledge of external reality is made possible. For example, Dilthey writes:

We determine the location of every other thing in space from our location not by means of the spatial intuition of the eye . . . but by means of movements, feeling of movement, the feeling of touch. 56

The underlying unity that is the condition of the possibility of experience is experience itself; it is the source of both subjective and objective knowledge, of the self as well as the world. Consequently, we can understand Dilthey's treatment of the distinction between internal perception and experience and external perception and experience as an attempt to collapse this distinction. In Dilthey, it is never a question of attempting to establish the primacy of one over the other; he seeks to show that there is a mode of consciousness that is a mode of experience that is indissoluble. Neither perception and sensation in themselves, nor intellectual or reflective categories in themselves

are foundational. Consciousness must be examined as self-consciousness where the "self" is a changing, adapting, psychophysical Lebenseinheit continuous with the rest of nature.

Perceptions, sensations, ideas as well as concepts are, for Dilthey, psychical facts and "every psychical fact as such involves an Innewerden."⁵⁷ Since it is this complex state of affairs in which a subject and object are "given" (i.e., we do not perceive the world and then identify with it), we are given to understand that consciousness is at bottom an awareness that is a "gift" inasmuch as all activities of psychical life "involve an Innewerden or Gewahrwerden of the selfsame in and for themselves."⁵⁸ This suggests that Dilthey's treatment of the distinction between internal perception and experience and external perception and experience is intended to collapse the two into a single state of affairs that is characterized by immediacy and reflexivity. Thus, the cognitive act qua psychical activity and the perceptual act qua physical activity are the same inasmuch as they have the same "fundedness"⁵⁹ of experience. All processes, psychical or physical, are accompanied by an awareness that these processes are happening. At this point, however, Dilthey makes a point that is most crucial to the entire project of epistemologically grounding the human sciences. Dilthey writes:

The direction of attention towards a perception or a representation or a concept is one with the direction

towards the Gewahrwerden of the psychical process of sense perceiving, representation or logical affirmation, for here the psychical process and the fact fall together in the whole. That by which the former distinguishes itself from the latter--apperception from the viewpoint of an external fact instead of from the viewpoint of self-consciousness--cannot be apprehended in this process. Thus, in the event of such an observation, the factuality becomes for us a perceptual or representational process. Here is an important limit of our internal perception: only in recollection, not in the observation of our self, do we possess the object in its factuality.⁶⁰

Any attempt to present evidence for the objectivity of the products of psycho-physical activities is limited by the fact that the objects of knowledge are not static, inert copies of things. We cannot separate the contents of consciousness from the processes through which they are constituted. Thus, any evidence for the objectivity of knowledge must perforce face the question concerning the conditions of the possibility of the appearance of the objects of knowledge in their phenomenality. Furthermore, since we cannot distinguish consciousness as a process or complex of processes, which are interconnected, from its acts and functions, it is wrong to assume that we can observe our inside in the same way that is wrong to assume that someone can speak to me about what he is speaking as he is speaking it.⁶¹ Dilthey's critique of Comte, for example, seeks to extirpate the metaphysical characterization of the subject by means of a redefinition of the self and self-observation.⁶² Dilthey achieves this end by employing the phenomenological

principles of intentionality and Abschattung.

Observation is a perception whose direction is determined by the will of the research; this direction that is determined is attention. Attention cannot occur simultaneously in different directions. Accordingly, it is impossible that a certain state which involves a definite orientation of attention or of the will can become the object of the observation. Thus, we can observe ourselves neither in the state of anger, nor in the activity of concentrated reflection.⁶³

Thus, recollection not introspection is the means by which internal perceptions and experiences are examinable. Self-observation is possible to the extent that it is a form of Selbstbesinnung understood as a "gathering of one's senses" or a "collecting or composing oneself."⁶⁴ Thinking is at bottom a form of remembering; it is connected with the processes of hearing, touching, smelling, seeing, etc. Furthermore, since what occurs in consciousness is never just a mechanical processing of data but is also accompanied by an immediate awareness of the processes of the collection of the data, consciousness and its contents depend on the unity provided for by remembering the subject as a total organ of sense.⁶⁵ Accordingly, self-observation and self-reflection exist originally as a body-consciousness which is an awareness of a seeing and of that which is being seen, of a hearing and of that which is being heard, of a touching and of that which is being touched, etc. Instead of looking for a "self", we need only recollect the sights, sounds, smells, feelings of the self as a psycho-physical

Lebenseinheit. "These facts of consciousness," writes Dilthey, "constitute the content of internal as well as external experience."⁶⁶ Internal perceptions in conjunction with an awareness of them not only constitute experience that is internal, but also constitute experience that is external. The latter does not exist without the former and vice versa; they belong together and their relationship is one of determinateness-indeterminateness.

This double-aspect or ambiguous nature of experience is the primary, irreducible state of affairs that is a state of consciousness and a physical human condition. The belief in the existence or non-existence of the external world, in something existing entirely dependent or independent of consciousness, can be questioned only insofar as this primary state of affairs is forgotten. What is given originally is given immediately--it is a gift. Dilthey explains:

By positing the object as existing without me, I in fact only repeat what lies in my consciousness, defend and ground it perhaps; it is a fact of my consciousness that I posit objects. But precisely insofar as consciousness accomplishes this act, it exceeds the boundaries of the immediately given. I rejoice, I am sad, I hear a symphony, this symphony resounds, I see the blue of the sky, the sky is blue: these are only different expressions of that which is in me--that I think, I rejoice, hear, see; this state of affairs exists immediately without any mediation given.⁶⁷

Immediate experience is the gateway to reality and as

such provides research with its Archimedean point--its dos moi pou sto.⁶⁸ Thus, Dilthey arrives at a "broadened" concept of experience that is a result of a "deepening."⁶⁹ What at first appeared to be a transcendental-phenomenological reduction aimed at stripping away the theoretical layers of non-empirical evidence of rationalist and empiricist theories of experience and knowledge is not a reduction at all. What it is is a recollection or remembering of what Dilthey calls a "fulfilled moment of life" in which the "double-direction of knowing is preserved."⁷⁰

As an empirical psychologist whose critical task is to solve the puzzle of human knowing, Dilthey constantly refrains from pronouncing on the ultimate nature of what is. In a decidedly anti-metaphysical passage, Dilthey remarks that:

Being is not consciously contained in Innewerden. Yet it is locked up in it in such a way that at any instant it can be developed from it. Then it is a representation, which has developed on the basis of the immediate evidence of perception, as an expression for the occurrence of the immediate experience that is hidden by the rules of thinking. Therefore the existential judgment, which posits the very condition of which I became reflexively aware as existing, is only the turning back, so to speak, of this concept to its origin.⁷¹

Immediate experience, not concepts which are developed or derived from it, is the primitive, open and inexact source of knowledge. The reduction of the source of knowledge to either perceiving or conceptualizing, which are but different modes of being taken

as the originally given concrete conjunction between the self and the world, is an intellectualization that is a "false dogmatization of the cognitive process."⁷²

Immediate Experience and the Temporal

Priority of the Present

Despite Dilthey's terminological inconsistencies with respect to a preferred word to designate "experience" and the fact that there is no fundamental ontological difference between internal and external experience with respect to their origin, the numerous illustrations of what Dilthey takes an Erlebnis as an immediate experience to mean are quite clear and consistent. For example:

I open the window in the early morning and discover that the blossoms of the lilac bush have opened: its fragrance presses into my chamber and now I remember that at the same time yesterday I found its blossoms still closed. To be sure, all this occurs as an Erlebnis in my consciousness and I am immediately certain of it as such. The visual image of my body and its surroundings, the feeling of being dazzled by the first light of day, the pressure of the hand on the window and connected with this the change of the visual image, the accompanying muscular feelings and then the onrushing fragrance of the lilac bush, finally the occurrence of a similar recollection that is nevertheless not totally fused with the present impression: all this is an Erlebnis, a fact of my consciousness. 73

And illustrates an internal perception as follows:

I look up in my study. A total perception [Gesamtwahrnehmung], grasped with minimal attention, without interest. From this background emerges the oil painting of Goethe that hangs opposite me. Sunbeams, in which motes glimmer, pass over it diagonally. A pleasant, aesthetic mood comes over me. Suddenly, I see the painting hanging in the parlour in my father's house.⁷⁴

There appears to be no difference between what Dilthey calls an Erlebnis and what is described as an internal perception. Both are structured wholes that are not reducible to either mere atoms of sensation or mere representations of objects whose order of appearance is governed certain fixed and immutable laws. Both are delimited by a mode of consciousness by which and in which what occurs to the subject taken as a psycho-physical whole bears the mark of an immediate awareness that is also connected with other modes of consciousness, memory, for example. This would suggest that perception is itself a mode of experience that is also a mode of consciousness. For Dilthey, then, levels of experience are in fact levels of consciousness that are life understood in the broadest sense of psycho-physical activity.

Dilthey's treatment of the temporality of internal perception and experience offers us a more precise determination of what he understands the fundamental nature of experience to be. Focusing on Kant's treatment of time in the Transcendental Aesthetic, Dilthey's criticism points out that the Kantian analysis of time overlooks one important feature; i.e., the present is not merely an Ablauf or an elapse, but a Vorruicken

or advance as well. Dilthey writes:

The present pushes forward, so to say, in succession. That which is present falls backwards to the past. This advance of the present in time is the fact which cannot be explained by any order system of an internal sense. From the complex processes, which constitute the present, something is lost drop by drop, as it were, into the sea of the past; forward what is expected, what is to come becomes the present.⁷⁵

Time, as it is experienced, is a primitive, composite state of affairs, not an intellectual construction restricted to linear temporal succession. Likewise internal perceptions and experiences as well as external perceptions and experiences as facts of consciousness do not have an order of appearance that is limited to linear temporal succession. In brief, what has been termed "human" time in the fields of phenomenology and existential philosophy is distinguished from "objective" time as it is understood in the eminent domain of physics.⁷⁶ For Dilthey, "objective" time is an abstraction inasmuch as the temporal directionality of time is conceived of as obtaining to the invariable structure of an irreversible, unidirectional before and after of the phenomena that appear in consciousness. As an abstraction or construct, "objective" time is alienated from its context which is its ground; i.e., it is separated from the immediate experience of the connectedness of the multiplicity of ways in which the self relates to the world.

If we can take this concept of context to mean the Lebenswelt or life-world understood as the world that is "perceived

indeterminately, relatively to a subject,"⁷⁷ or as a "universal pre-given horizon within which any world-experience at all is to be possible,"⁷⁸ and accept the idea that this concept is aimed at reminding us that "the sciences are rooted in prescientific life-experience, and that their theoretical results must be evaluated accordingly,"⁷⁹ as Rudolf Makkreel does, then we are in a position to understand Dilthey's criticism of the Kantian analysis of time as a criticism that is directed at Kant's failure to recognize the empiricity of consciousness. On this view, Dilthey is seen to find fault with Kant's critical project concerning our knowledge of the world in that Kant's philosophical reflections on cognition are not a presentation or description of the actual psycho-physical processes of cognition, or of an actual state of affairs in its factuality. Accordingly, when Dilthey states that "the consciousness or awareness of the flow of time can be thought only in connection with our self-consciousness and memory,"⁸⁰ we can take this to mean that time is not "a mere fact of intelligence"⁸¹ in the sense that the self is more than a container of categories and cognition is more than representational activity. Again, Dilthey's objection is that Kant is too metaphysical. The following quotation clearly indicates Dilthey's distaste of Kantian over-intellectualization.

The all-pulverizing Kant, as his contemporaries called him,

did not destroy metaphysics after all; moreover we see around us even today the systems which sprouted from the roots of his thoughts. Metaphysics is everything which has been operative in Germany since his time. In bitter combat, Herbart and Hegel and Schopenhauer accused each other of dogmatism. They were all dogmatists. And where does this come from? Kant failed to recognize the significance of internal experience; that is why he condemned criticism to sterility. Schleiermacher's great dictum Wissenwollen is the answer to this violent closure of Geist from its life-conditions, the suppression of the vital impulse residing in it. On the other hand, in connection with this he did not recognize the true nature of all metaphysics. For it is visible only when the viewing [der Blick] returns to experience and history from implicative argument [Schluessen]. Such an enormous fact has living roots in human feelings. Kant studied the metaphysical Geist by way of preparations, not by way of life. He does not feel the living heartbeat which can still be felt in the most abstract conclusions of a Wolffian compendium when it is grasped in its historical context.⁸²

Briefly, Dilthey again points out that Kant's analysis of human knowledge does not take into account certain empirical psychological facts about the self or consciousness and thus is at best incomplete. For Dilthey, self-knowledge is real and belongs to the natural world of social-historical, finite human beings whose intelligence is not purely and not originarily a matter of a priori forms of intuition and a priori concepts. Since we have immediate access to the world, it is not necessary to have abstract accounts of the conditions of the possibility of experience and knowledge. The factualness of feeling and volition as constituent parts of consciousness must not be divested of its significance in the constitution of our knowledge of objective reality. Moreover, since Dilthey's concern about knowledge can

be identified as its psycho-physical genesis, we can understand his criticisms of Kant as an attempt to thematize the pre-conditions of the conditions of the possibility of experience and knowledge inasmuch as the self-evidence of the disconnectedness of the subject and object or the self and the world is a presupposition based on a more fundamental fact.

Consequently, there appears to be a point of convergence between the thought of Dilthey and Heidegger with regard to the metaphysical nature of Kant's treatment of knowledge. In opposition to the Kantian account of time as an a priori form of intuition, Dilthey treats time as an existential, as a character of Dasein's Being, as a mode of being-in-the-world. Commenting on the ontological status of the past, the present, and the future, Dilthey states:

The past and the future are only formed by representation [Vorstellung]; in fact, they exist only in internal representation, partly as recollection, partly as images of something that will become reality [Wirklichkeit] in the after. The present, which is the fulfilled totality of life, not just the representation of such, is distinguished from the above. The present is the fulfilled self-consciousness in which we are found as reality [Wirklichkeit]. It is ultimately nothing other than the reality [Wirklichkeit] of our self, i.e., Dasein that is given in experience.⁸³

To be sure, to say that Dilthey's philosophical project is to be interpreted as an "Analytic of Dasein" in the sense of a radical, fundamental ontology would be to say too much.

Dilthey's self-professed project is in the main an epistemological one that does not accord with the general philosophical orientation of Heidegger. This is not to say that Dilthey does not make any existential-ontological claims, but merely to point out that the ones that he does make are not "fundamental" in the Heideggerian sense. Dilthey's aim is to rehabilitate our understanding of science by means of a genetic epistemology and in so doing make room for the Geisteswissenschaften. Heidegger's ambivalent assessment of Dilthey's work in the section of Being and Time entitled "How the Analytic of Dasein is to be Distinguished from Anthropology, Psychology, and Biology" can assist us however in identifying Dilthey's equally ambivalent philosophical attitude and standpoint as scientific and existential-phenomenological. Heidegger writes:

The researches of Wilhelm Dilthey were stimulated by the perennial questions of 'life'. Starting from 'life' itself as a whole, he tried to understand its 'Experiences' in their structural and developmental inter-connections. His 'geisteswissenschaftliche Psychologie' is one which no longer seeks to be oriented to psychical elements and atoms or to piece the life of the soul together, but aims rather at 'Gestalten' and 'life as a whole'. Its philosophical relevance, however, is not to be sought here, but rather in the fact that in all this he was, above all, on his way towards the question of 'life'. To be sure, we can also see here very plainly how limited were both his problematic and the set of concepts with which it had to be put into words. 84

According to Heidegger, Dilthey was only "on his way towards the question of 'life'." That is to say, from the

standpoint of what Heidegger himself considers to be philosophically relevant, Dilthey was on his way to an analytic of Dasein, but never reached his destination. Indeed, compared to the radical Heideggerian problematic "and the set of concepts with which it had to be put into words,"⁸⁵ Dilthey's problematic, concepts and words are quite mundane. However, that this should ~~and~~ can be regarded as a shortcoming is not at all evident. For Dilthey, what is philosophically relevant is the legitimation of the Geisteswissenschaften by means of a description and analysis of the objective manifestation of all forms of knowledge at their source. This is important because it is precisely within the context of the scientification of philosophy that life, Dasein, or Geist can be talked about within the framework of of a reality that is at bottom the same, but also in terms of one that manifests itself in a variety of ways. Dilthey limits his treatment of the question of the objective validity of different kinds of knowledge of reality to a social-historical and biological framework. It is within the limits of such a framework or delimitation of reality that we can distinguish between Erlebnisse as immediate experiences and Erlebnisse as lived experiences. Whereas the former are to be considered as the empirical ground or source of any science, the latter are to be interpreted as more highly developed and differently articulated forms of life that are achieved on the basis of a reflection on what is experienced immediately. The origin of

all science and philosophy is immediate experience; the origin of reflection is reflexivity.

By identifying Erlebnis as immediate experience as it pertains to the empirical, positive realm of what occurs effectively in the interaction between an organism and its environment, we can better understand Dilthey's provocative conclusion that "the present alone is real."⁸⁶ On this view, the past and the future are representations of what occurs in the present. The representation of a past state of affairs is possible only on the basis of being found in a present; the future is also a representation in that it is a Vorbild that is projected from the vantage-ground of the present. Strictly speaking, therefore, the present alone is Wirklichkeit. Now, according to Rudolf Makkreel, in his excellent paper "The Overcoming of Linear Time in Kant, Dilthey, and Heidegger," the Diltheyan treatment of time leaves us in an awkward situation. Makkreel explains:

The present is equated with lived experience and the other moments of time can only be represented, as in memory or expectation. Yet paradoxically this most real mode of time, the present, never is. It cannot be reified or fixed. It is to be conceived dynamically as a living presence, for as soon as the future becomes present, it already begins to sink into the past. The paradox is that the present (die Gegenwart) is lived experience but what is present (das Gegenwaertige) can not as such be experienced. 87

To be sure, when Makkreel says that "the present is lived experience

but what is present can not as such be experienced,"⁸⁸ then we are faced with an aporia. However, it is precisely through an understanding of this paradox or "double-bind"⁸⁹ that we can gain an understanding of Dilthey's epistemological attempt to ground the Geisteswissenschaften. It is also for this reason that we must distinguish Erlebnis as "lived experience" from Erlebnis as "immediate experience."

The development of the concept of Erlebnis as immediate experience is related to a genetic epistemological approach and to the findings of an empirical psychology. On this view, reflection, recollection or memory, and even willing arise and develop from a reflexive awareness that is simultaneously a mode of experience and of consciousness that expresses itself as life. Accordingly, reflexive awareness, as a mode of experience and of consciousness, constitutes the fund of perceptions and experiences and the means by which the objects of our knowledge are constituted. The outstanding characteristic of this psychophysical occurrence is described in terms of immediacy, automaticity, or reflexivity. Consequently, knowledge is to be conceived as "now-ledge", so to say.⁹⁰

If we accept the fact that "lived" experiences can not be experienced immediately, in the now, as it were, because they have already been accomplished in a present that is past and thus are there for us only as representations and recollections, we can say that "immediate" experiences are the fundament upon which and from which lived experiences are constituted. Thus,

despite the fact that lived experiences are at bottom immediate experiences, lived experiences are never really real, i.e., they are never spontaneous, originary, Wirklichkeiten or "effectivities."

The relation of the sameness and difference of immediate and lived experience is important for it is on the basis of this fundamental indeterminacy of a clear-cut distinction that we can interpret Dilthey as contesting the special status of natural scientific knowledge with respect to the question of what constitutes objective, valid knowledge. On this view, both the human sciences and the natural sciences are grounded on a level of experience that is as mysterious and unfathomable to the natural scientist as it is to the human scientist. Thus, we can also interpret Dilthey's doctrine of the "unfathomability of life" ⁹¹ along the same lines as Heisenberg's "uncertainty principle" ⁹² or even Quine's principle of the "indeterminacy of translation." ⁹³ Immediate experience can never be fully and totally exhausted and yet it remains the concrete foundation of all science. Both the natural and the human sciences are indeterminate insofar as they make an appeal to experience for the corroboration of their objective validity. It is also for this reason that "lived experience" can not be judged to be a deficient source of knowledge; it can be judged deficient only in relation to its connectedness with or disconnectedness from

immediate experience. Lived experience becomes a meta-physical concept that obtains to immediate experience in the same way that the past follows the present. Alternatively, lived experience becomes a metaphysical concept when it is distanced from its source that is a Lebenszusammenhang or life-system that is also a Wirkungszusammenhang or productive system.

Accordingly, it is by interpreting time through the category of immediate experience and not by interpreting it through the category of lived experience, as Makkreel holds,⁹⁴ that we have in Dilthey a theory of time where the present is central. Thus, lived experience as a meta-physical concept that presupposes and involves what Michael Polanyi, for example, identified as the "tacit dimension"⁹⁵ of human knowledge rests on a biological basis and on the affective order of the knower. Neither Polanyi, nor Dilthey, however, consider this "dimension" of human knowing to be reducible to mere mechanical physiological processes.⁹⁶ At the level of immediate experience, i.e. the tacit dimension, or what Merleau-Ponty termed "brute" experience,⁹⁷ there are no explicit formal categories, rather existential or "real categories", as Dilthey called them.⁹⁸ It is on the level of immediate experience, or within the "bounds of sense",⁹⁹ as a mode of being-in-the-world that is at the same time a mode of experience and a mode of consciousness that we also find the connection between theory and practice, appearance and reality, etc. Theories of the world, just like reflections of it, are possible by virtue of a mode of experience and of knowledge that is consistent

with how children and animals relate to the world. Under the heading "Self-Consciousness and the Consciousness of External objects," Dilthey explains:

The self is there for us only by distinguishing itself from the external world, and the latter only when it is delimited from the self. Consequently, the process in which my I [Ich] is there for me is only the obverse of the process in which a surrounding world is placed over against this I. Naturally, a reflexive awareness of psychical processes is required to constitute a self, of sense perceptions to constitute objects; . . .

Above all, it is noteworthy that animals or children distinguish themselves from objects just as energetically as the adult human being: self-confidence, self-esteem, the tendency to self-preservation as the life-force that separates them from other persons and objects are as developed as in the developed human being; it is only the slightest education [Ausbildung] of internal awareness, of the exercise of the senses, of associations, that separates our coherent and clear object-image, our undivided I from the object of resistance that is indeterminate in its limits, not seized in a fixed unity, not inwardly drawn or from the obscure feeling of an inside, circumscribed by the skin, of the developed animal or the one-year old child. 100

The close relationship between immediate experience and Innewerden or reflexive awareness is an ontological claim that is used to delimit the boundaries of experience and consciousness, and as such also serves a transcendental function with respect to Dilthey's critical project.

Furthermore, it is clear that when Erlebnis as immediate experience is placed at the core of Dilthey's epistemology we are faced with an epistemological fallibilism.

The present as the temporal mode of immediacy and its connection with Erlebnis as immediate experience is therefore distinguished from the past and its connection with Erlebnis as lived experience according to the distinction between the present as a Lebenszustand or life-condition "which expresses itself in noticing, feeling and wanting"¹⁰¹ and the past as a Bewusstseinszustand or condition of consciousness that is essentially recollective.¹⁰² This is not to say that the immediate experience of reality is not a state of consciousness as well, since every life-act is, according to Dilthey, bound up with a reflexive awareness of a doing-suffering. In fact, it is by virtue of the immediate experience of the present that time-past and time-future as realities and modes of consciousness come to be. The conditions of the possibility of experience and knowledge are also grounded in the present whose reality is to be understood as Wirklichkeit or effectivity. Thus, questions about the possibility of knowledge are to be answered by means of researching the actual practices of the knower; the conditions of the possibility of knowledge are transformed into the conditions of the actuality of knowledge. As such, the immediate experiences of the present become central to Dilthey's conception of a Critique of Historical Reason and its relation to the problem of how we acquire objective and valid knowledge of the external world and the soi-disant world of Geist.

Consequently, by emphasizing the relationship between Erlebnis as immediate experience and Innewerden as reflexive

awareness, we can read Dilthey as breaking with the practices of traditional epistemology inasmuch as this involves a critical self-reflection that is a phenomenological self-description as well. Erlebnis as immediate experience is presupposed and at the basis of all knowledge. At this level, "the false problematization of the reality of the external natural world and the human world"¹⁰³ is exposed. Self-reflection, Kantian, Humean or Cartesian, is now only possible on the basis of the experiences of a self that is conceived of as a "substantial Mine."¹⁰⁴

Summary Remarks on the Concept of Erlebnis as
Immediate Experience

In sum, we may conclude the following:

1. Within the context of Dilthey's concern about the foundations of the human sciences, this concept indicates that what is sought as a foundation is not a body of apodictic truths, but rather a foundation that is the phenomenological evidence of experience conceived of as an ongoing process.

2. Because Dilthey does not begin with a sublimated ego, then work his way to the outside but begins with the connectedness of the inside-outside, the internal-external, subject-object relation is not a speculative connectedness for Dilthey but one that is real. Moreover, it is on the basis of this principle that Dilthey attempts to arrive at a consequent form of empiricism; that is,

one that takes into account the concrete whole of experience.

3. Since thought and knowledge are considered in their actuality, the constitution of our objects of knowledge is dependent on a multiplicity of intentionalities and not just on representation.

4. By virtue of the determinate-indeterminate, exact-inexact nature of the evidence of immediate experience, the Archimedean point of Dilthey's epistemology and thus of his argument for the legitimation of the human sciences is an opening to the world inasmuch as a multiplicity of ways of relating to the world is a real experiential fact.

5. There is no spiritualized foundation of knowledge, rather Dilthey focuses on the facticity of the natural conditions of an empirical consciousness, i.e., a desublimated I.

6. Innewerden or reflexive awareness, Wirklichkeit or effectivity, and Erlebnis as immediate experience are determinations of empirical consciousness; i.e., scientific consciousness.

For all this, an interpretation of Dilthey's argument for the legitimation of the human sciences that is based on an evolutionary-biological or natural scientific understanding of human cognition only presents one side of the coin as it were. Although the Diltheyan concept of Erlebnis as immediate experience, its constant conjunction with the concept of Innewerden and the redefinition of reality as Wirklichkeit or effectivity are critical to Dilthey's project of legitimation, there is more

to Dilthey's argument than this, i.e. there is more to Dilthey's concept of Erlebnis than its narrow definition as immediate experience and its connection with Innewerden or reflexive awareness and reality defined as Wirklichkeit. In the next chapter, therefore, we shall consider Dilthey's concept of Erlebnis in terms of its "wide" definition, i.e., as lived experience and its relation to reflection and reality defined as the specificum of the human sciences.

NOTES

1. Dilthey's conception of method is consistent with his "naturalized epistemology". For example, under the heading "The Two Elementary Forms of Method," Dilthey explains:

The procedure before the consciousness about methods is twofold in relation to the employment of thinking. On the one hand, we are receiving in perception; on the other hand, acting on the basis of the perceptions.

However, the perception is determined while it is analyzed; the fundamental relations of the given bring forth similar relations, elements and combinations. Thus analysis and induction cohere in the elementary perceptual processes.

The ordering of natural components according to ends has perception as its presupposition. We thereby count on a procedure that is conceived by us. The expectation of its return is already embedded in this. Consequently, elements which are capable of being presented must be conceived generally and the return of their relations must be awaited. Consequently, analysis and induction in their elementary form are at the bottom of procedure in action and this is carried out on the one hand by analysis in reality (experiment); on the other hand it combines anew (construction, synthesis).

The central idea here is that the empirical is the genetic source of method. See, Dilthey, Gesammelte Schriften, vol. XIX, p. 265.

2. Here, my interpretation coincides with Hans-Ulrich Lessing's. For example, Lessing writes:

The standpoint from which Dilthey undertakes to solve his stated problem . . . is the epistemological one, the only one that, as he writes, can be recognized by modern science.

In the modern philosophy of consciousness Dilthey finds "a solid anchorage" for his thought "exclusively in internal experience, in the facts of consciousness". Since all science is the science of experience, the conditions of consciousness as the basis of the constitution and validity of experience form the starting point, behind which we can not go, of philosophical questions concerning science. The

recognition of the "impossibility (. . .), of getting behind these conditions, of seeing without eyes, as it were, or of focusing the vision of knowledge behind the eye itself", is the epistemological standpoint.

See Hans-Ulrich Lessing, Die Idee einer Kritik der historischen Vernunft: Wilhelm Diltheys erkenntnistheoretisch-logisch-methodologische Grundlegung der Geisteswissenschaften (Freiburg/Muenchen: Verlag Karl Alber, 1984), pp. 136-137.

3. See Paul Tibbetts, "The 'Levels of Experience' Doctrine in Modern Philosophy of Mind," Dialectica, vol. 25, 2, 1971, pp. 131-151. Tibbetts' discussion of the "levels of experience" doctrine in relation to the revival of pragmatism is of special interest in that it helps identify the general character of Dilthey's philosophical orientation.
4. I have used the phrase "real effective immediacies" as an English rendering of the German word Wirklichkeiten.
5. See Ludwig Wittgenstein, Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus, with a new translation by D. F. Pears and B. F. McGuinness and with the Introduction by Bertrand Russell (London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1961), propositions
6. Dilthey's "unfathomability of life" thesis and Wittgenstein's "ineffability thesis", i.e., the distinction between what can be said and that which can only be shown, are similar in that both circumscribe the limits of the world. To be sure, Dilthey's transformation of the epistemological problematic should not be construed as an outright rejection of epistemology as is the case in Wittgenstein's Tractatus.
7. For some interesting discussions on the connection between Dilthey's and Wittgenstein's thought, see Karl-Otto Apel, Towards a Transformation of Philosophy, translated by Glyn Adey and David Frisby (London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1980), especially the following three chapters: "Wittgenstein and the Problem of Hermeneutic Understanding," pp. 1-45, which is an attempt to establish a connection between the Diltheyan problem of hermeneutic or "human scientific" understanding and the problem, Wittgenstein's, of the understanding of meaning; "Scientifics, Hermeneutics and the Critique of Ideology: Outline of a Theory of Science from a Cognitive-Anthropological Standpoint," pp. 46-76, which is relevant to our discussion since it deals with the idea of an enlargement of the concept of science by means of an enlargement of traditional epistemology to a "cognitive anthropology"; "The Communication Community

as the Transcendental Presupposition for the Social Sciences," pp. 136-179, which also discusses the Diltheyan notion that any philosophical theory of science must answer the Kantian question concerning the transcendental presuppositions of the possibility and validity of science.

8. The "natural attitude", according to Dilthey, must be suspended. For example, Dilthey says that "the real is my representation" must be transformed into "the real, which distinguishes itself from my self as a thing or object, is given to me only in my consciousness, in my self." Dilthey, Gesammelte Schriften, vol. XIX, p. 17.
9. I.e., someone who accepts the connectedness between the perceiving subject and the perceived object, but rejects the postulate that "objective" reality exists independently of the observer. For example, Dilthey states: "The object exists only for a subject; the thing for a consciousness." Dilthey, Gesammelte Schriften, vol. XIX, p. 61.
10. Ibid., p. 74.
11. Dilthey, Gesammelte Schriften, vol. VIII, p. 171.
12. See Immanuel Kant, Critique of Pure Reason, translated by Norman Kemp Smith (New York: Macmillan & Co. Ltd. 1965), B 50, p. 77; B 155-156, pp. 167-168, for example. For Kant, self-knowledge is only phenomenal; on the other hand, for Dilthey, self-knowledge is real. See Dilthey, Gesammelte Schriften, vol. XIX, pp. 195-198. For a short but interesting and relevant discussion of Kant's inadequate treatment of self-knowledge, see W. H. Walsh, Kant's Criticism of Metaphysics (Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 1975), pp. 183-189.
13. Dilthey, Gesammelte Schriften, vol. VIII, p. 171.
14. This forms the third section of Book Four of the Einleitung and bears the title "Internal Perception and the Experiences of Psychical Life". See Dilthey, Gesammelte Schriften, vol. XIX, pp. 195-227.
15. The expression "inner life" is to be understood as circumscribing the organic realm as well as the realm of consciousness. For a discussion of Dilthey's use of the expression in the Breslauer Ausarbeitung, see Hans Ineichen, Erkenntnistheorie und Geschichtlich-Gesellschaftliche Welt: Diltheys Logik der Geisteswissenschaften (Frankfurt am Main: Vittorio Klostermann, 1975), p. 169; also Lessing, Die Idee einer Kritik, pp. 211-213.
16. Dilthey, Gesammelte Schriften, vol. XIX, p. 176.

17. Ibid., p. 309.
18. Ibid.
19. Ibid.
21. The connection with Hegel is obvious; however, Dilthey's and Hegel's identification of life and spirit differ in a significant way. For example, Herbert Schnaedelbach explains:

The dialectic of the living which introduces the chapter on 'Self-Consciousness' and so the famous chapter on 'Lordship and Bondage', leads to a structure of which Hegel says: 'In that a self-consciousness is the object, it is as much an I as an object. With this, the concept of the spirit is already present for us i.e. for those who philosophize--H. S. .' The fact that 'life' in itself already exemplifies the spirit is then expressed in the Science of Logic by saying that life is the 'immediate Idea' and that the 'soul of life' is the concept. Finally, in the philosophy of nature, life is a form of the Idea in its otherness: spirit in the state of nature. Wilhelm Dilthey, on the other hand, who edited Hegel's early writings and did research into his intellectual development, defines the relation of life and spirit in exactly the opposite way. Life is not a deficient mode of spirit: rather, spirit is an objectification of life. It is only in this way that it is also objective spirit and a possible object of the human sciences.

Herbert Schnaedelbach, Philosophy in Germany 1831-1933, trans. by Eric Matthews (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1984), pp. 141-142.

22. Dilthey, Gesammelte Schriften, vol. XIX, p. 344.
23. W. V. Quine, The Roots of Reference (Lasalle, Ill.: Open Court, 1973), p. 138.
24. Dilthey, Gesammelte Schriften, vol. XIX, p. 310.
25. Ibid., p. 331.
26. Ibid., p. 338.
27. Ibid., pp. 345-346. Also, see Helmut Johach, Handelnder Mensch und objektiver Geist (Meisenheim am Glan: Anton Hain, 1974), pp. 28-29.

28. See Dilthey, Gesammelte Schriften, vol. XIX, pp. 347-348.
29. See above Chap. II, pp. 65-72
30. Konrad Lorenz, Behind the Mirror: A Search for a Natural History of Human Knowledge, translated by Ronald Taylor (New York and London: Harcourt Brace Jovanovich, 1977), p. 19.
31. For example, Dilthey writes: "What we call reality is something other than . . . mechanical and passive objectivity that is like the picture in a mirror." See Dilthey, Gesammelte Schriften, vol. XIX, p. 163.
32. Dilthey explains:
- For this is what is decisive now: what we are reflexively aware of through internal perception is what is also given to our senses from outside and presents itself to them in always new combinations as a body among bodies, as a component of the external world; while the hand now encloses a part of the body, within which a feeling is localized or a muscular tension is sensed, the eye now follows the movement, internal states and sensory representations are linked together in a solid framework of that combined intuition which is at the same time of our self and of our body.
- Ibid., pp. 166-167.
33. Ibid., p. 167.
34. For example, see Dilthey's criticism of Johannes Mueller and Hermann Lotze on the subject of the origin of our intuition of space. Ibid., pp. 192-195.
35. Ibid., p. 168.
36. Ibid., p. 169.
37. Ibid., pp. 19-20; p. 45; pp. 104-105; pp. 180-182; pp. 226-227; p. 229; p. 232.
38. See the section entitled "The Experience of Self and External World," ibid., pp. 178-180.
39. Cf. Edmund Husserl, The Crisis of European Sciences and Transcendental Phenomenology, translated with an Introduction by David Carr (Evanston: Northwestern University Press, 1970), pp. 97-100.

40. Cf. in particular: Ineichen, Erkenntnistheorie, pp. 202-216; Lessing, Die Idee einer Kritik, p. 213; n. 352, pp. 345-346; Makkreel, Dilthey, Part Three, chaps. 5-8.
41. Cf. K. Cramer, "Erleben, Erlebnis," in J. Ritter (Hrsg.), Historisches Woerterbuch der Philosophie, Band 2 (Basel/Stuttgart: Schwabe, 1972); Kurt Mueller-Vollmer, Towards a Phenomenological Theory of Literature: A Study of Wilhelm Dilthey's Poetik (The Hague: Mouton & Co., 1963), especially pp. 33-38; Frithjof Rodi, Morphologie und Hermeneutik: Zur Methode von Dilthey's Aesthetik (Stuttgart: Kohlhammer, 1969), pp. 80-86.
42. Hans-Georg Gadamer, Truth and Method (New York: Continuum, 1975), pp. 55-63. I make this statement on the basis of the unavailability of Dilthey's second volume of the Einleitung which was first published in the German in 1982 as the nineteenth volume of the Gesammelte Schriften.
43. Dilthey, Gesammelte Schriften, vol. XIX, p. 17.
44. Dilthey writes:
- The reflexive awareness of the act is something totally different than the philosophical reflection by virtue of which the object given in it is recognized as a mere fact of consciousness. A child or a laborer is just as certain of the objects that surround him as he is of his self. And their confident "yes, I see it," with which they ground this factuality and thingness, does not mean that they trace back the fact to a perceptual process for which a reason would have to be assumed; on the contrary, it contains the indication that in and with the act the thing is given to them. No one consciously reasons from the act of seeing to an external stimulus that has caused it; . . .
- Ibid., p. 70.
45. Ibid., pp. 175-176.
46. Ibid., p. 22.
47. For example, see Maurice Merleau-Ponty, The Visible and the Invisible, edited by Claude Lefort and translated by Alphonso Lingis (Evanston: Northwestern University Press, 1968), in particular the chapter "The Intertwining--The Chiasm," pp. 130-155.
48. Morris Berman, The Reenchantment of the World (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1981), p. 76.

49. I.e., epistemologically, Dilthey's distinction between the human and the natural sciences focuses on their sameness and difference. On this view, Dilthey is interpreted as asking natural scientists to let human scientists in on the game, as it were; however, in order for this to be possible, the boundaries of the playing field and the ground rules must be adjusted so as to accommodate the new players. For a discussion of Dilthey's "positive" contrasts of the human sciences with the natural sciences, see Rudolf Makkreel, "Dilthey and Universal Hermeneutics: The Status of the Human Sciences," The Journal of the British Society for Phenomenology, vol. 16, 3, 1985, pp. 236-249.
50. This is obvious in the case of abortion issues; for example, one author states that "the central difficulty in the controversy is the question of when human life begins." Paul Sachdev, ed., Abortion: Readings and Research (Toronto: Butterworths, 1981), p. ix.
51. Cf. Peter Krausser, "Dilthey's philosophische Anthropologie," Journal of the History of Philosophy, vol. 1, 2, 1963, pp. 211- 221. This article is an excellent discussion and analysis of what Dilthey means by "immanent teleology". Working with a cybernetic model, Krausser argues that Dilthey's concerns with the structure of life are fundamental to an understanding of the project of the foundation of the human sciences.
52. Reacting to the Enlightenment conception of man, Dilthey states:
- At the core, man is a bundle of drives; sensory stimulation, representation on the one hand, the process of movement on the other, are only, as it were, the tentacles, by means of which this system of drives sucks in sensations, to which it reacts externally, grasping, appropriating or repulsing. Never has human nature been more misunderstood than by the schoenselige aesthetic or intellectualistic conception.
- Wilhelm Dilthey, Gesammelte Schriften, vol. X (Stuttgart: B. G. Teubner and Goettingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 1965), p. 50.
53. Dilthey, Gesammelte Schriften, vol. XIX, p. 195.
54. Ibid., p. 207.
55. Ibid., p. 22.
56. Ibid., p. 23.
57. Ibid., p. 31.

58. Ibid.

59. The appropriateness of this Deweyan term arises from Dewey's own position on the importance of the relationship between an organism and its environment as the experiential basis of knowledge and thought. For example, Dewey writes:

. . . the interaction of organism and environment, resulting in some adaptation which secures utilization of the latter, is the primary fact, the basic category. Knowledge is relegated to a derived position, secondary in origin, even if its importance, when once it is established, is overshadowing. Knowledge is not something separate and self-sufficing, but is involved in the process by which life is sustained and evolved.

John Dewey, Reconstruction in Philosophy (Boston: Beacon Press, 1948), p. 87. The term "funded" is used on p. 101.

60. Dilthey, Gesammelte Schriften, vol. XIX, p. 32.

61. Dilthey explains:

. . . consciousness and Innehaben or Innewerden are merely different expressions for the same elementary fact. Intelligence is therefore assuredly immediately perceived by itself, if by this one understands: activities of consciousness contain an Innewerden or Gewahrwerden of the selfsame in and for themselves in themselves. This is precisely the difference of the process of consciousness from the natural process unknown to us; in the latter in fact the image in the eye, in order to be seen, would require a second eye; on the other hand, in the former, the process of consciousness as such contains a Gewahrwerden of itself thereby not requiring a Gewahrwerden outside itself. Then isn't the Gewahrwerden of an object also equally an Innewerden of a psychical fact? . . . If this Innewerden or consciousness were not to exist, this Gewahrwerden by itself, then perception would be altogether impossible since an eye would be found behind the eye but neither could arrive at seeing.

Ibid., p. 31.

62. Ibid., pp. 30-31.

63. Ibid.

64. Cf. Augustine, Confessions, Book X, Section XI, Par. 18, where

the word cogito is rendered as "re-collect".

65. Reacting to the Kantian notions of the transcendental unity of apperception, the inner sense, and the nature of internal experience, Dilthey states:

What there is here [i.e. in inner experience] is according to Kant merely phenomenon, i.e., psychical fact grasped in the form of the inner sense or of time and connected by the forms of the understanding. Consequently, the Critique of Pure Reason only arrives at an analysis of what is given in the inner sense as appearance . . . the concept of the a priori is only the expression for the intuition of time and of causal relation, and only within this does this concept have a meaning. Consequently, the Critique of Pure Reason itself is, in all that it finds, only an analysis of appearances. Apperception is no more a real psychical fact than the a priori or the Ideas: they all are the final elements of analyzed phenomenality which appears in the inner sense. Grasped in this way they are boundary concepts of the investigation of the phenomenality of the inner sense.

Dilthey, Gesammelte Schriften, vol. XIX, p. 33.

66. Ibid., p. 53.
67. Ibid., p. 55
68. Ibid.
69. Ibid., pp. 345-346.
70. Ibid., p. 56.
71. Ibid., p. 75.
72. Manfred Riedel, "Hermeneutik und Erkenntniskritik," in Materialien zur Philosophie Wilhelm Diltheys, Herausgegeben und eingeleitet von Frithjof Rodi und Hans-Ulrich Lessing (Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp, 1984), p. 365.
73. Dilthey, Gesammelte Schriften, vol. XIX, p. 65.
74. Ibid., p. 197.
75. Ibid., p. 211
76. Cf., for example, Edmund Husserl, The Phenomenology of Internal

Time-Consciousness, Edited by Martin Heidegger, translated by James S. Churchill, Introduction by Calvin O. Schrag (Bloomington & London: Indiana University Press, 1964), pp. 22-27.

77. J. N. Mohanty, quoted by Rudolf Makkreel, "Husserl, Dilthey and the Relation of the Life-World to History," Research in Phenomenology, vol. 12, 1982, p. 39.
78. Ibid.
79. Makkreel, "Husserl, Dilthey and the Relation of the Life-World to History," p. 40.
80. Dilthey, Gesammelte Schriften, vol. XIX, p. 221.
81. Ibid., p. 217.
82. Ibid., p. 437, n. 5.
83. Ibid., p. 221.
84. Martin Heidegger, Being and Time, translated by John Macquarrie & Edward Robinson (New York: Harper & Row, 1962), pp. 72-73.
85. Ibid.
86. Dilthey, Gesammelte Schriften, vol. XIX, p. 222.
87. Rudolf Makkreel, "The Overcoming of Linear Time in Kant, Dilthey, and Heidegger," paper delivered at a conference dedicated to the thought of Dilthey at Pennsylvania State University in July of 1983, pp. 4-5.
88. Ibid.
89. In concise terms, the double-bind predicament is described thus:
 Rule A: Don't. Rule A.1: Rule A does not exist. Rule A.2: Do not discuss the existence or nonexistence of Rules A, A.1, or A.2.
- R. D. Laing, quoted by Morris Berman, The Reenchantment of the World, p. 228. Following this model, we can sum up the predicament in which we are found as a result of Dilthey's analysis of time thus: A: Don't think that the present is real. A.1: Rule A does not exist. Rule A.2: Do not discuss the existence or nonexistence of what is most real.
90. Cf. G. W. F. Hegel, Phenomenology of Spirit, translated by A. V.

Miller with Analysis of the Text and Foreword by J. N. Findlay (New York: Oxford University Press, 1979), Part A, Section I, paragraphs 95 & 96, where Hegel writes:

To the question: 'What is Now?', let us answer, e.g. 'Now is Night.' In order to test the truth of this sense-certainty a simple experiment will suffice. We write down this truth; a truth cannot lose anything by being written down, any more than it can lose anything through our preserving it. If now, this noon, we look again at the written truth we shall have to say that it has become stale.

The Now that is Night is preserved, i.e. it is treated as what it professes to be, as something that is; but it proves itself to be, on the contrary, something that is not Night; equally, it preserves itself in face of the Day that it now is, as something that also is not Day, in other words, as a negative in general. This self-preserving Now is, therefore, not immediate but mediated; for it is determined as a permanent and self-preserving Now through the fact that something else, viz. Day and Night, is not.

For Dilthey, sense-certainty does not receive its "universality" from that which it is not; the truth of the statement "Now is night." ultimately rests on what actually is or was the case.

91. Dilthey, Gesammelte Schriften, vol. XIX, p. 329.

92. For example, Morris Berman explains:

The major philosophical implication of quantum mechanics is that there is no such thing as an independent observer. One of its founders, Werner Heisenberg, summarized this point in popular form in 1927 when he formulated his Uncertainty Principle. Imagine, he said, a microscope powerful enough to observe an atomic particle, such as an electron. We shine light down the instrument to enable observation, only to discover that the light possesses enough energy to knock the electron out of position. We can never see that particular electron, for the experiment itself alters its own results. Our consciousness, our behavior, becomes part of the experiment, and there is no clear boundary here between subject and object. We are sensuous participants in the very world we seek to describe.

Berman, The Reenchantment of the World, p. 144.

93. See W. V. Quine, "Speaking of Objects" in Ontological Relativity and Other Essays (New York and London: Columbia University Press, 1969), pp. 1-25.

94. Makkreel, "The Overcoming of Linear Time in Kant, Dilthey and Heidegger," forthcoming.
95. See Michael Polanyi, The Tacit Dimension (New York: Doubleday, 1966). It is interesting to note that Polanyi, like Dilthey, places a great deal of importance on the human body in relation to the question of our knowledge of the external world. For example, on pp. 16-17, Polanyi writes:

Our body is the ultimate instrument of all our external knowledge, whether intellectual or practical. In all our waking moments we are relying on our awareness of contacts of our body with things outside for attending to these things. Our own body is the only thing in the world which we normally never experience as an object, but experience always in terms of the world to which we are attending from our body. It is by making this intelligent use of our body that we feel it to be our body, and not a thing outside.

Cf. Dilthey, Gesammelte Schriften, vol. XIX, p. 167. It is also interesting to note that Polanyi is closer to Dilthey than he believes. Given our treatment of Dilthey's concept of immediate experience, it can be argued that Dilthey did not "sharply" distinguish the humanities from the natural sciences, as Polanyi thinks. For Polanyi's brief criticism of Dilthey, see Polanyi, The Tacit Dimension, pp. 16-17.

96. Michael Polanyi, Personal Knowledge: Towards a Post-Critical Philosophy (New York and Evanston: Harper Torchbooks, 1964) p. 101.
97. Merleau-Ponty, The Invisible and the Visible, p. 157. There is a striking similarity between the philosophical positions of Dilthey and Merleau-Ponty in relation to the question of the source of knowledge. For example, Merleau-Ponty asserts:

The physicist's atoms will always appear more real than the historical and qualitative face of the world, the physico-chemical processes more real than the organic forms, the psychological atoms of empiricism more real than perceived phenomena, the intellectual atoms represented by the 'significations' of the Vienna Circle more real than consciousness, as long as the attempt is made to build up the shape of the world (life, perception, mind) instead of recognizing, as the source which stares us in the face and as the ultimate court of appeal in our knowledge of these things, our experience of them.

Maurice Merleau-Ponty, Phenomenology of Perception, translated

by Colin Smith (London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1962), p. 23.

98. Dilthey explains the distinction between "formal" and "real" categories in the following way:

The dominant view now is that the nexus, which the category contains, is established in reason, in the uniform nature of intelligence. According to Kant the category is therefore the formula for a unity-function of thought. This view can very easily be placed in agreement with Aristotle's. A nexus in reality is then grasped as correlative and corresponding to the nexus in the intelligence. . . .

In opposition to this conception, the existing statements yield a completely different fundamental view. Also, we do not deny that there are categories which are founded in reason as such. The concepts of identity, of sameness, of difference are such categories. They signify relations which thoroughly permeate all reality. But, according to the nature of their origin, these categories are eternally formal. They only signify relations by which thought illuminates what is real. These relations take place in thought. There is, of course, no sameness outside of us, rather there are only two facts, in relation to which thought undertakes an operation which illuminates their nature. There is no universality outside, rather there are only facts, which thinking in them arranges and thus clarifies itself. I call categories of this kind formal. But the real categories are completely different from these. They are not at all founded in reason, but in the life-nexus itself. The distinguishing mark of the former formal categories is their complete transparency and clarity. This points to their origin in thought. The distinguishing mark of the real categories is the Unergruendlichkeit of their content by thought. They are the nexus of life. This is certain and conscious for reflexive awareness. But for the understanding it is unergruendlich. (My emphasis.)

Dilthey, Gesammelte Schriften, vol. XIX, p. 361.

99. Cf. P. F. Strawson, The Bounds of Sense: An Essay on Kant's Critique of Pure Reason (London: Methuen, 1966).
100. Dilthey, Gesammelte Schriften, vol. XIX, pp. 180-181.
101. Ibid., p. 211.
102. Ibid.
103. Manfred Riedel, Verstehen oder Erklaren?: Zur Theorie und Geschichte der hermeneutischen Wissenschaften (Stuttgart: Klett-Cotta, 1978), p. 71.

104. See Dilthey, Gesammelte Schriften, vol. XIX, p. 197, where he writes:

Der einzelne psychische Vorgang lebt in diesem Element, in dieser See von Innesein, unmittelbarem Wissen von Enthaltensein mit allen meinen anderen psychischen Vorgaengen in einem Ich, einem Selbst, genauer einem substantiellen Mein. (My emphasis.)

CHAPTER IV

ERLEBNIS AS LIVED EXPERIENCE: REFLECTIVE REALISM AND THE LIVED NATURE OF KNOWLEDGE

We have noted how Dilthey's determination of the primitive nature of consciousness and experience is developed in relation to the question concerning the origin of our knowledge of the reality of the external world. By focusing on the reflexive character of consciousness and experience, Dilthey underscores the non-representational, pre-reflective, non-mirroring dimension of the constitution of all knowledge. Vorstellen presupposes a Vorhaben;¹ knowledge as representation is possible by virtue of an originary subject-object nexus that is delimited as the realm of immediate experience. Dilthey calls this mode of consciousness which at the same time is a mode of experience Innewerden or reflexive awareness.

We have also identified Dilthey's epistemological orientation as an attempt to secure a theory of knowledge which is a "consequent form of empiricism."² Eschewing the metaphysics of the rationalist tradition of philosophy, especially its religious component, the parameters of Dilthey's epistemology reveal themselves within the context of a life-oriented and evolutionary Weltanschauung or world-view. "Life is what is

first and what is always present, the abstractions of knowledge are second and only bear a relation to life."³ On the basis of our explication of Dilthey's concept of Erlebnis as immediate experience, it is possible to interpret Dilthey as holding the view that the constitution of all knowledge has its basis in the natural history of the subject as a member of the human species.⁴ And because Dilthey affirms man's biological and evolutionary nature, his epistemology is to be understood as emphasizing the empirical, finite, and corruptible character of all knowledge that is specified as human. Knowledge has its source in a pre-conceptualized state of affairs that is immediate experience--in the spontaneity and automaticity of life. That is, life is "gnoseomorphic".⁵

In light of the above interpretation of Dilthey's epistemology as naturalistic, certain important and critical questions arise. Don't the human sciences specify their objects and goals of inquiry in opposition to those of the natural sciences? Don't the human sciences claim to understand the human world, whereas the natural sciences limit their task to an explanation of the physical world?⁶ By arguing that all knowledge arises from and has its basis in a primitive, non-intellectualized, psycho-physical state of affairs, hasn't Dilthey only shown that all knowledge is basically a matter of stimulus-response? Therefore, isn't Habermas, for example, right to criticize Dilthey for succumbing to the "illusion of objectivism"⁷ and for being scientistic?

To be sure, if we accept Dilthey's naturalistic epistemology as a levelling of the difference between the human and natural sciences on the basis of their common origin, are we not led to conclude that the human sciences are to be absorbed by the natural sciences? Or, as Rudolf Makkreel has recently argued in "Dilthey and Universal Hermeneutics: The Status of the Human Sciences,"⁸ is Dilthey to be understood as moving in the opposite direction, i.e. as saying "instead of seeing the natural and human sciences as standing side by side, and gradually becoming more alike, we could regard the human sciences as coming once again to encompass the natural sciences in their view."⁹ Or is it possible to interpret Dilthey as holding yet another view according to which the human sciences are to be grounded without establishing the ascendancy and priority of the one kind of science over the other? Accordingly, it is now important to see whether Dilthey does in fact cast the problem of the Grundlegung of the human sciences in terms of this latter viewpoint and whether his earlier determination of what we can know and how remains true to the spirit of the human sciences. We therefore find it necessary to turn to Dilthey's views on the "relative independence"¹⁰ of the human and the natural sciences, to his views on the reflective nature of consciousness and experience in relation to its function in the constitution of knowledge, and lastly, to his concept of Erlebnis understood as "lived" experience.

The Relative Independence of the Human
and the Natural Sciences

Among the current controversies in philosophy, Dilthey is generally regarded as the originator of the Verstehen-Erklaeren or understanding-explanation debate. This dispute is said to have started with Dilthey's insistence on the following distinction between the human and the natural sciences: "We explain nature, but we understand psychical life."¹¹ Understood as a declaration of the methodological independence of the human sciences from the natural sciences, Charles Taylor, for example, explains the consequences of this position as follows:

The claim is that there is something special about the subject matter of the latter [i.e. the human sciences] which forbids us simply to carry over the method elaborated in natural science to the study of man. But to many, this distinction has seemed unjustified, even obscurantist. One of the important traits of modern science has been its concern about method, ever since Descartes' great discourse on the subject. To put the sciences of man outside the ban of the methods of natural science seems to be to put them outside the range of science itself. On this view, science must involve a set of démarches which are the same without discrimination to the object studied.¹²

Does Dilthey, in fact, claim that there is something so special about the subject matter of the Geisteswissenschaften that these sciences must be banned from the realm of science? Is the subject matter of the human sciences, on Dilthey's view, so strange and so foreign that its authorship must be ascribed

to something or someone supernatural or extraterrestrial? This is clearly not the case. Dilthey's overall philosophical standpoint is a combination of naturalism and phenomenology. In the case of the former element, we need only direct our attention to Dilthey's organic conception of life.¹³ In the case of the latter, we need only point to Dilthey's explicit denial of the idea of an "in itself" in favor of a "for us" as his basic epistemological standpoint.¹⁴ In both cases, i.e. cosmologically and epistemologically, Dilthey makes no ontological discrimination between man and nature, subject and object, or the subject matter of the human and the natural sciences. What there is and what can be known in the human world is not unrelated to what is and what can be known in the natural world. For example, Dilthey states:

The facts of mind are the upper limits of the facts of nature which, in turn, are the underlying conditions of mental life. The human, that is human society and history, is the highest phenomenon of the empirical world. Therefore, to understand this human world, we must know about the system of the physical conditions which constantly determines its development.

Man, because of his position in the causal context of nature, is conditioned by a double relationship to it.¹⁵

Phenomenologically, a perceptual image, a scientific theory, a mathematical problem, or the contents of a novel are all objects, i.e. something that can be distinguished from the subject and something that exists for the subject. The subject matter of the human sciences is objective in this sense, but

there is more. We not only experience objects, i.e. "the resistance they exert, the space they occupy, their painfully felt impact, as well as their benign contact,"¹⁶ but we also express our experience of objects. According to Dilthey's theory of Lebensaeusserungen or life-expressions, experience is objectivated in language, actions, and gestures.¹⁷ For every action, there is a reaction which manifests itself in a number of visible ways. Therefore, to insist on the facticity of what is known immediately does not entail a disavowal of the empiricity of what can be known. To be sure, the opposite is true. Facts of nature and facts of Geist arise within the same consciousness understood as a complex psycho-physical Lebenseinheit or life-unit; they have the same matrix. When viewed from the perspective of their objectivated or manifest nature, these facts also have something in common, i.e. both can be and are expressed in language. There is no metaphysical difference, merely a classificatory one.¹⁸ For example, in Dilthey's early epistemological writings (i.e. pre-1880), the common ground and the difference between the two kinds of sciences is identified as follows:

We combine life-moments in the continuity of consciousness, compare them, etc., and thus a coherent whole arises which is formed by inner experience; its object is the self of man, for itself and in its factual connections; its science is the science of Geist.¹⁹

Whereas,

On the other hand, we combine the images of the external world with one another not from the point of view of their nexus in self-consciousness, but from the point of view of an objective nexus in an external world. The science, which proceeds from this point of view, is natural science. 20

And concludes:

Here it is the same experience that is viewed from a different point of view. 21

What distinguishes the human from the natural sciences is a difference in points of view. The former are concerned with "how things hang together" where "things" are to be understood as life-moments, i.e. as human actions and reactions; the latter are concerned with "how things hang together" where "things" are to be understood as physical nature.²² What connects both kinds of sciences, according to Dilthey, is experience which must be interpreted by us to mean some form of original experience, or what Merleau-Ponty calls "brute" experience.²³ Dilthey's concept of Erlebnis as immediate experience provides the link in that at the very moment of perception, the mind goes to work. However, the mind of man "goes to work" from a certain perspective. This suggests Habermas' distinction between the human and the natural sciences on the basis of different interests, i.e. both kinds of sciences arise within the same matrix but are to be distinguished by virtue of their different general orientations. To be sure, when Dilthey speaks of different viewpoints, he is drawing our attention to the

important distinction between "practical interests" and "technical interests."²⁴

For Dilthey, practical interests identify a natural human concern about the meaning, value and purpose of our actions as individuals and members of a society. In the broadest of terms, practical concerns are ethical concerns.²⁵ This is what delimits the human from the natural sciences. Technical interests, on the other hand, identify a concern about the natural physical workings of the universe including man as a part of it. In the broadest of terms, technical concerns are mechanical.²⁶ This is what delimits the natural from the human sciences. The relationship between the two kinds of sciences or two kinds of attitudes is described by Dilthey as a symbiotic partnership. Epistemologically, no priority is given to either of the sciences as a group. Dilthey explains:

Where man affects nature he does so characteristically in the form of actions guided by purposes. On the one hand, the course of nature with its specific characteristics can influence man's purposes; on the other, it helps to determine the means for the achievement of these ends. And so, even when we affect nature, because we are creatures of will reflecting on our purposes and not blind forces, we are still dependent on nature. So man is doubly dependent on nature. As a causal chain starting from the position of the earth in the cosmos it determines social-historical reality; hence, for the empirical researcher, the great problem of the relation between the order of nature and freedom subdivides into innumerable specific questions about relations between specific facts of the mind and the influences of nature. On the other hand, the purposes of the human world react on nature and on the earth which man, in this sense, considers his abode and where he is busily

making himself comfortable; these reactions, too, are dependent on using the laws of nature. All purposes lie within man's mental sphere for only there is anything real to him, but the purpose seeks its means in nature. The change in the external world which the creative power of mind has produced is often insignificant; and yet only through it does the value thus created exist for other people. So a few pages, the material remains of deep thought in which ancient thinkers moved towards the assumption that the earth moved, fell into the hands of Copernicus and precipitated a revolution in our world view. 27

If, because of man's position in the universe, there is no ontologically and epistemologically privileged original position, then it is clear that the human sciences and the natural sciences cannot be dissociated. In all cases, knowledge is constituted within a Naturzusammenhang which is also a Lebenszusammenhang through the activities of thinking, feeling and willing. To be sure, the possibility of human scientific and natural scientific knowledge need not be based on a two-world theory. On Dilthey's view, the same reality can be considered, for example, as "earth" or as "world", i.e. as part of the physical universe or as the place where we live and try to make ourselves comfortable.²⁸ In either case, however, knowledge is ultimately dependent on the actuality of the life-acts of individuals as complex organisms that respond to their environment. Indeed, the physical environment is no more or no less real than the social or cultural (geistige) one.

Where science is explainable as a human phenomenon which involves interests and purposes, the correspondence between hypothetical rules and principles of the mind and the

order of the physical universe does not eo ipso reveal the whole nature of what science is. What the natural sciences claim for themselves, the human sciences can say of themselves. The natural causal nexus cannot be separated from the purposive systems of human beings. Thus, as delimitations of the conditions of the possibility of knowledge and experience, a complexity of systems operates as a synergetic system which captures the overall Weltzusammenhang or structure of the world. Human actions and their effects cannot be wholly explained by appealing to the mechanics of nature. Dilthey explains:

Here we can see how relative the delimitation of the two classes of disciplines is . . . At the two points of transition between the study of nature and that of the mind--where nature affects the development of mind and where it is affected by mind or forms the bridge for affecting other minds--knowledge of both the sciences and the human studies mingles. This knowledge of how nature shapes human beings is combined with insight into how it provides us with material for action

At this point we can see that knowledge of the conditions which are part of nature and the subject-matter of the sciences, forms the basis for the study of mental facts. The spread of mankind over the whole of the earth and man's destiny in history is, like the development of the individual, conditioned by the whole cosmic process. For example, wars are one of the main ingredients of history; they are the result of political decisions but they are fought and won with weapons. So the theory of war depends, primarily, on knowledge of the physical conditions which are the basis and means for the conflict of wills.²⁹

Our position or situatedness in the universe is ambiguous, i.e. we are at once earthbound by virtue of the fact that we participate in the Naturzusammenhang and we are "free" to the extent that our actions refer to a system of individual

wants and desires. All science originates within this overall Weltzusammenhang. This view, it must be added, is thoroughly consistent with and at the bottom of recent "new" trends in the history and philosophy of science.³⁰

Dilthey's early thematization of the knowledge-constitutive importance of the interconnectedness of the Naturzusammenhang and the Lebenszusammenhang cannot be interpreted as an attempt to ground the human sciences in opposition to the natural sciences. The idea of "knowledge-constitutive interests" is not developed by Dilthey with the view to establish the psychological and hypothetical peculiarities of the I or the first person as the basis of knowledge and science. On the contrary, Dilthey's treatment of the relative independence of the human and the natural sciences implies a transformation of the traditional empiricist and rationalist versions of the problems of knowledge. For Dilthey, the problems of knowledge are a communicative and intersubjective affair of a social-historical nature. Where knowledge is technically and mechanistically treated in terms of invariable laws of nature and a priori rules and principles in conformity with the criteria of necessity and universality, its "total" or "complete" nature is ignored, i.e. its social-historical or cultural dimension is overlooked. On the other hand, where knowledge is not wholly explainable in terms of invariable laws, etc., the social-historical or cultural dimension gains constitutive importance. In the same sense that Dilthey considers it preposterous to think of man existing before or outside of history, it is absurd to consider science

as existing prior to or outside of its social-historical matrix.³¹ There is no presuppositionless science--not even philosophy can lay claim to an origin and development that is not socially and historically determinable.³²

Epistemologically, the requirement that experience be the basis of knowledge and science is extended to include man's social-historical mode of being in the world. Questions about what can be known and how are themselves only possible on the basis of human experience. To remove man from his social-historical context and then to situate the problems of knowledge in logical or geometrical space is to volatilize the reality of the experiences which occur in a world which is an Umwelt, Mitwelt, or more generally, a Lebenswelt. For Dilthey, questions concerning what can be known and how cannot be answered through the transmutation of "the world into an apperceiving subject."³³

Dilthey's arguments for the insufficiency or "incompleteness" of idealized accounts of knowledge are best articulated as social-psychological descriptions. It is through these descriptions that Dilthey's position on the relative independence of the human and the natural sciences is clarified. What is true of the natural scientist is also true of the human scientist. For example, Dilthey writes:

The particular individual is a point of intersection of a multiplicity of systems that are ever more finely specialized in the course of a developing culture. In fact, the same

life-act of an individual can show this many-sidedness. When a scholar writes a work, this process can constitute a link in the chain of truths that constitute science; at the same time, he is the most important member of the economic process that is executed in the production and sale of copies; further, he has a legal side, the fulfillment of a contract³⁴

And

An individual is . . . not the isolated existence which is contained in the concept of ego, rather the individual is a complex that involves feelings of life, of other individuals, of society, indeed, of nature.³⁵

Both the human and the natural scientist are this kind of individual--philosophers included. The "demytification" and "demythologization" of the nature of the cognizing subject is central to Dilthey's project of grounding the human sciences.³⁶ From this perspective, the truths contained in an authoritative text which serves as the articulation of the basic principles and aims of a given discipline is to be regarded as being more than the product of an individual's relationship to the physical world.³⁷ To illustrate this, let us consider Descartes' Discourse on Method.

On Dilthey's view, the authority of Descartes' Discourse is established within and by means of a social-historical matrix which is as much a reality as the physical world whose material parts interact lawfully. We need not speculate about this, for the autobiographical sections of the Discourse, in which Descartes recalls how and why his method came to be, refer to the constitutive importance of this context. Startling in his

honesty with respect to his rejection of what he had read and what he had been taught, Descartes sketches the social-historical matrix in which and from out of which his ideas on truth and science arose.

From my childhood I lived in a world of books, and since I was taught that by their help I could gain a clear and assured knowledge of everything useful in life, I was eager to learn from them. But as soon as I had finished the course of studies which usually admits one to the ranks of the learned, I changed my opinion completely. For I found myself saddled with so many doubts and errors that I seemed to have gained nothing in trying to educate myself unless it was to discover more and more fully how ignorant I was.

Nevertheless I had been in one of the most celebrated schools in all of Europe, where I thought there should be wise men if wise men existed anywhere on earth. I had learned there everything that others learned, and, not satisfied with merely the knowledge that was taught, I had perused as many books as I could find which contained more unusual and recondite knowledge. I also knew the opinions of others about myself, and that I was in no way judged inferior to my fellow students, even though several of them were preparing to become professors. And finally, it did not seem to me that our own times were less flourishing and fertile than were any of the earlier periods. 38

To be sure, Descartes' heterodoxy is a rejection of the "truths" he had acquired from the books he had read and from the lessons of his professors. This rejection occurs within a social-historical context; it is a reaction to his environment. On this level, there is no distinction between an "inside" and an "outside" world; there is no theory of knowledge, only the description of life-experiences and the explanation of their importance. Descartes goes on to say:

I then spent a few years traveling, seeing courts and armies, living with people of diverse types and stations of life, acquiring varied experience, testing myself in the episodes which fortune sent me, and, above all, thinking about the things around me so that I could derive some profit from them. For it seemed to me that I might find much more of the truth in the cogitations which each man made on things which were important to him, and where he would be the loser if he judged badly, than in the cogitations of a man of letters in his study, concerned with speculations which produce no effect, and which have no consequences to him except perhaps that the farther they are removed from common sense, the more they titillate his vanity, since then he needs so much more wit and skill to make them seem plausible. Besides, I was always eager to learn to distinguish truth from falsehood, so that I could make intelligent decisions about the affairs of this life and act with greater confidence.³⁹

Descartes' retelling of how and why he was motivated to follow a certain line of thinking that would lead to the articulation of the fundamental rules and principles of reasoning and truth in the sciences enunciates the preparatory significance of, as he himself says, "building up a fund of experiences which should serve afterwards as the raw material of my reasoning."⁴⁰ On Dilthey's view, Descartes reflects on his Erlebnisse or lived experiences, on his travels, trials and tribulations,⁴¹ and, in so doing, reveals the real, the human basis of his thought. For this reason, Dilthey calls Descartes a "true metaphysician."⁴² We might add that Dilthey considers Descartes to be a "true metaphysician" inasmuch as Descartes recognizes the knowledge-constitutive importance of "practical interests". But what connection is there between Descartes' "practical interests" and his "technical interests"? What is the relevance of his lived experiences in relation to methodical doubt and mathematics?

Why does Descartes reflect on his past? Why does he find it necessary to give the reader so much autobiographical information? The very framing of these questions articulates the Diltheyan position on the relative independence of the human and the natural sciences, on the connection between theory and practice, on the distinction between understanding and explanation. On Dilthey's view, questions and answers concerning scientific knowledge and the correct method by which truth can be attained in the domain of science arise and only are meaningful within a Lebenszusammenhang or life-nexus. Without this context, there would be no problem for Descartes, epistemological or other. Without "a fund of experiences", to use Descartes' words, without some determination of Descartes' position in human space and time, the products of his labors would have to be regarded as the products of something or somebody that isn't human. Without the background of Erlebnisse, Descartes would not have existed.

To say that it is of no consequence that Descartes tells us about his life, that he gives us his curriculum vitae as an introduction to his methodical and systematic presentation of the principles and rules required for the acquisition of truth in the sciences is to abstract his thought from his life. For Dilthey, this is tantamount to suppressing or forgetting the real empirical conditions of the possibility of knowledge and science. To learn about Descartes' life, especially

autobiographically, is to learn something about the origins of his ideas and their meaning, value and purpose.

To be sure, a system of logic or a set of rules and principles which guides our minds to certain conclusions can be learned and used effectively without an appeal to its background, i.e. without learning about the history of its origin and development. However, if one wants to know something about why this system and not another one is the considered means of arriving at the truth in the face of other possibilities, it is clearly not enough to merely refer to the rules and principles themselves. It is clear that a technical explanation, for example, if you do this, then this will happen, you can not do this and that, do this or that, assign this variable the value x, is not an adequate response to questions about its origin or its status as a standard practice. What is required in order to answer such questions is to situate the purely technical, self-referential and self-justificatory realm of a method or system of logic as an "in itself" within the wider context of its usefulness for us. For Dilthey, this wider context of practical concerns provides the motivation necessary for the pursuit of goals and as such also allows us to give reasons for why and how something came to be without referring to the thing as an "in itself". By extension, the relevance of any system of truths is gained by virtue of its belonging to a wider "external" context. We can thus interpret Dilthey as saying that the relationship between the natural and the human sciences is one

which is based on an internal-external schema, where "internal" merely refers to any science's self-definition and "external" to the Lebenszusammenhang or socio-cultural matrix of which it is a part.

For this kind of understanding of the relationship between the natural and the human sciences, no epistemological and no ontological priority has to be claimed on behalf of either group of disciplines. On this view, science, human or natural, is but a feature of our living culture and as such has a history which is a record of its growth and development. Nowhere does Dilthey say that man cannot learn about himself from the natural sciences; what he does say is that man can learn about himself by studying what he himself has produced.⁴³ By studying nature, man learns more about himself; this is only possible to the extent that science is itself a product of man and man a part of nature. Consequently, our image of science depends on our image of man and vice versa. The relationship is one of symbiotic partnership. Ultimately, both the human and the natural sciences display a concern for what is most proximate: man and nature.

By stressing the wider context of the ground of all forms of knowledge, Dilthey remains true to his naturalistic epistemology. Dilthey's identification of the proper objects of the human sciences as the objectifications of Geist⁴⁴ is clearly anti-metaphysical and anti-spiritualist. For all that, Dilthey's pro-scientific orientation is adopted critically and reflectively.

Dilthey's critical project of grounding the human sciences is motivated by a concern for an understanding of science and knowledge which can cut across the artificial lines of demarcation between the two general classes of science. As Manfred Riedel points out, the Critique of Historical Reason has a twofold purpose.

The Critique of Historical Reason is on the one hand the critique of man's capacity to know himself and the society and history created by him, and it is on the other hand-- what as a rule is overlooked--the critique of that pure reason which has its historical reality in the systems of metaphysics 45

Dilthey's understanding of his critical project demands that problems of knowledge be dealt with pragmatically. Metaphysical accounts of the basic nature of science and scientific knowledge must be seen for what they are, i.e. human products or what Michel Foucault calls "figurations of finitude."⁴⁶ The movement of Dilthey's critical thought is, like in Richard Rorty,⁴⁷ towards a trivialization of our concepts of Truth, Reality, Science, Philosophy, Rationality, etc. The Grundlegung of the human sciences ultimately depends on this.

This is clearly, yet paradoxically, evident in Dilthey's epistemological undertaking, since in it we encounter a definite movement towards what Habermas, in characterizing the "prehistory of modern positivism",⁴⁸ has called "the dissolution of epistemology."⁴⁹ Dilthey's call for a descriptive and analytical psychology, which should serve as a Grundwissenschaft, is an expression of this anti-epistemological orientation. However, this

pro-science and anti-philosophy-cum-epistemology orientation of Dilthey's thought plays itself out within the wider conceptual framework of an historical world-view. For this reason, it would be proper to characterize Dilthey's "dissolution of epistemology" as the emergence, not of a philosophy of science per se, but rather of a philosophy of scientific culture.⁵⁰ From the perspective of Dilthey's own historical world-view, which reveals the constitutive importance of having a world-view,⁵¹ a particular science is but one aspect of the development of human culture in general. The salient feature of any science, philosophical system, or religion, is that it never remains unchanged; they are all historical.⁵² It is therefore no surprise that as early as the Einleitung Dilthey announces the limited value of epistemology with respect to his stated task.⁵³ What is required is no longer a transcendental self-reflection on the conditions of the possibility of experience and knowledge, but rather an orientation of thought that proceeds from "life to thought, to reason, and not from reason to thought to life."⁵⁴ From this perspective, "historical self-reflection"⁵⁵ must complement, if not take the place of, epistemology, and the idea of history as Geistesgeschichte must be dropped in favor of an understanding of history as Wirkungsgeschichte or effective history.⁵⁶ In this way, it is possible to treat questions about science and knowledge as questions concerning human actions and products. In this way, what the human and the natural sciences have in common reveals itself: they are productive and reactive

forms of life whose products considered as actions and reactions are relative to their position in space and time, where space and time are not conceptual or ideal constructs, but concrete life-conditions. For Dilthey, the failure by idealists to appreciate the resistance of reality leads to a form of sublimated reason, an "intellectualist hoax"⁵⁷ in the form of an epistemology which dissolves, "in the alembic of idealism"⁵⁸, the real nature of human thought, the real nature of nature, and their original connectedness.

The Reflectivity of Consciousness
and the Reality of Reflection

In the first volume of the Einleitung, Dilthey refers to epistemology as an activity which seeks to uncover the "roots of the tree of knowledge."⁵⁹ But given Dilthey's own epistemology as presented in the second volume of the Einleitung, it is made evident that the "roots" of the tree of knowledge cannot be considered in isolation from the "biosphere". Accordingly, Dilthey modifies his position with regard to his foundational task. Dilthey writes:

In the historical world itself, understood by the living self, lies an answer to the question concerning the nature of what is real . . . to verify it scientifically univocal as causal relations of nature is impossible. On the other

hand, neither is it dependent on good will and belief in the form of religious convictions. It is a question concerning an objective apprehension of the value of particular processes for the historical life of mankind. . . . The metaphysics of history as so-called philosophy of history and encroachments by scientific method are therefore the worst enemies of the natural development of the human sciences. These need nothing save to remain undisturbed.⁶⁰

From this perspective, historical self-reflection, not epistemology, is given a foundational role. Dilthey explains:

. . . self-reflection as foundation is something totally different from epistemology as foundation. The latter standpoint originated from the progressive separation of the theoretical from the practical. Thus the foundation of knowledge detached itself from the foundation of ethics. Precisely this foundation should be different.⁶¹

And self-reflection is necessary because:

It seeks the conditions which give evidence to statements about something real as well as those which lend the will and its rules correctness (a significant expression) in contradistinction to the truth

Within the context of this Einleitung, this self-reflection must lay bare, as it were, the foundation which supports the edifice of the sciences.⁶²

Whereas Dilthey's epistemology speaks to the question concerning our knowledge of the reality of the external world with the view to establishing the empiricity and positivity of the source of all knowledge, the standpoint of Selbstbesinnung or self-reflection is intended to supplement his epistemology by way of a further, but equally phenomenological, description

and analysis of consciousness. The epistemological subject is conceived as an empirical I; its salient feature is its reflexive nature; the kind of knowledge acquired here is immediate. The "self-reflective" subject, on the other hand, is conceived as an enculturated, multi-relational, multi-intentional, mature and fully developed person; the salient feature of this subject is its reflective nature; the kind of knowledge acquired here is mediate. In both cases, the subject is empirical, positive, and finite, or to use Dilthey's signature, the subject is geistig.

For Dilthey, Selbstbesinnung or self-reflection is a form of reflective self-awareness that is to be distinguished from Innewerden or reflexive self-awareness. Although both are descriptions of consciousness comprehended in its entirety (i.e. a consciousness which not only thinks and represents, but also feels and wills), Selbstbesinnung is used to designate a "fuller"⁶³ state of awareness both qualitatively and quantitatively. Qualitatively, Selbstbesinnung is a fuller state of consciousness because it ultimately refers to the subject as an adult, i.e. to a higher level and degree of psycho-physical development. Selbstbesinnung is to Innewerden what an adult is to a child. Quantitatively, Selbstbesinnung is a fuller state of consciousness because more has been lived through, i.e. the activity of self-reflection has more material with which to work. Thus, the connection between epistemology as foundational and self-reflection as foundational, i.e. as exposing the common ground of the human

and the natural sciences, is a natural developmental link.⁶⁴ Self-reflection and reflexive awareness are life-processes; both are natural ways in which the human being responds to his or her environment . Whereas Innewerden is used by Dilthey to indicate the "brute" character of consciousness and experience, Selbstbesinnung is used to identify the "historical" and human character of consciousness and experience. Self-reflection is merely a more developed and articulated form of reflexive awareness. Dilthey explains:

Life in conformity with its structure is teleologically limited in its performance by the increase of the consciousness of external objects according to their nature of constitution, their modes of effectivity, the means to call them forth or to displace them. It is on the other hand conditioned by the strengthening of the reflection on the values and the aims which appear in the internal perception.⁶⁵

By "internal perception" we can understand a moment of awareness in which the activity and structure of knowing reveals itself as more than a mere awareness of the reality of the external world. For Dilthey, self-reflection complements the picture of man as machine; it identifies a mode of conscious activity which permits cognition to appear as a "multiplex"⁶⁶ process in which valuations and motives for action are involved. Thus the movement of self-reflection is towards Erlebnisse or lived experiences in relation to a life-nexus which is constituted within the social-historical world

as a dynamic, living system of thinking, feeling, and wanting. Self-reflection encompasses more than epistemology; it permits us to comprehend experience and knowledge in its complex wholeness, rather than as a concatenation of sensibilia and static psychological structures. Self-reflection, not epistemology, allows the contents of consciousness to appear as ordinary experience. Thus, self-reflection, because of the breadth of its scope and function, is ultimately conceived by Dilthey as an attitude or orientation of consciousness. For example, Dilthey writes:

Life requires an orientation of consciousness in order to endure sickness, death, exile, etc. If this leads most people to religion, then what is needed by the educated classes after the dissolution of dogmas is a form of the same, which, religious or philosophical, originates from reflection.

Historically and presently, the philosophies, which today surround us as the satisfaction of this need, are insipid. The contemplative pantheism, which emerges everywhere, is the expression of the modern preoccupation with the natural nexus of human beings. 67

Self-reflection is not a method; however, it does have a purpose, i.e. to bring unity and coherence to life. For Dilthey, self-reflection is a natural, one could even say "biological", attitude that is built into the very nature of human beings. Thus, Dilthey's concept of self-reflection complements his epistemology to the extent that questions concerning what is or what is not and what can be known and how are to be answered without an appeal to what is beyond experience. Selbstbesinnung is as much a reflex as Innewerden; Selbstbesinnung is a human response to a world that is experienced directly, even though it is not understood

immediately. Accordingly, it is by virtue of such a reaction as a response that we produce explanations which may take a variety of forms, but which fall into two main classes: natural scientific and human scientific.

Psychologically, the Diltheyan account of Selbstbesinnung or self-reflection identifies the reflective nature of human consciousness as the source of the need for scientific and non-scientific explanations of how things hang together in the world as a whole. Natural scientific and human scientific concerns about the coherence of the physical and the social-historical world are ultimately regarded as responses to "disturbances of the understanding."⁶⁸ At this level of description and analysis of human consciousness and experience, there is no fundamental difference between the bases of human and natural scientific knowledge. The human and the natural sciences are ultimately to be regarded as hanging together by virtue of their origins in the common motivational impulses of human beings.

The Foundational Function of Erlebnis
as Lived Experience

Through our interpretation of Erlebnis as immediate experience and Innewerden as reflexive awareness, Dilthey is seen to develop a naturalistic theory of knowledge. Though this characterization of experience and consciousness squares

with the Diltheyan program of developing a consequent form of empiricism or a theory of fundamental science as Erfahrungswissenschaft, it remains clear, on the evidence of Dilthey's own testimony, no theory of knowledge is considered to be adequate to the task of grounding the human sciences in particular and all science in general. This requires us to consider the introduction of the concept of Selbstbesinnung in association with another determination of experience. To be sure, the concepts of Innewerden and Erlebnis as immediate experience are developed with the view to describe and to analyze how we directly experience the world and not how we conceptualize about it. For all this, we are left with a theory of experience and consciousness which merely emphasizes the pre-reflective or unreflected character of experience and consciousness. Consequently, it is hard for us to understand how such an account of experience and consciousness can serve Dilthey's foundational interests with respect to the historical sciences in particular and the human sciences in general. More pointedly, it is hard to understand the premise upon which Dilthey initiates a critique of historical reason as a historification or historicization of reason. Why is this so?

As we have seen, if we take Innewerden as reflexive awareness and Erlebnis as immediate experience to be Dilthey's account of the primitive nature of human experience and consciousness, then we are forced to take seriously Dilthey's claim that "only the present is real."⁶⁹ Here, Erlebnis as the "most primitive

embryo"⁷⁰ or as the embryonic form of all knowledge, is described, as in Husserl,⁷¹ in terms of internal perceivedness and immediacy. However, given the postulated foundational function of Selbstbesinnung, it is also clear that Dilthey's determination of the foundational character of experience is developed in terms of the "lived" and reflective character of experience. That is, whereas the concept of Innewerden draws our attention to experience in its nascent state, the concept of Selbstbesinnung directs our attention to the already-having-been-established character of experience. Accordingly, we must distinguish between the foundational function of experience as immediate experience and some other form of experience, since the experiential concept associated with the concept of Innewerden only establishes the reflexive, i.e. pre-reflective and immediate character of experience and consciousness. Clearly, experience as "immediate" and as "lived" must be distinguished in a manner which permits Dilthey to complement epistemology with a form of self-reflection which has an experiential basis. By separating epistemology as foundation from self-reflection as foundation, we are faced with two basic concepts of experience, which together provide a clearer picture of what Dilthey presents as the ground of the human sciences.

In his paper "The Overcoming of Linear Time in Kant, Dilthey, and Heidegger," Rudolf Makkreel provides an important insight into the complexity of the key Diltheyan experiential concepts. He writes:

Although Dilthey had suggested in his early writings that Innewerden and lived experience are synonymous, there are reasons to doubt that Dilthey continued to hold that position. In fact, I would like to distinguish between Innewerden as reflexive and immediate, and lived experience as reflective and mediate. Near the end of his life, Dilthey claims that lived experience is a qualitative mode of being that "cannot be defined by Innewerden but rather goes over into what is not distinctly possessed." Everything in Innewerden is distinctly possessed but not everything in lived experience is. Only that which is indubitably certain can be said to be possessed reflexively by consciousness. 72

Innewerden is not merely a mode of consciousness, but also a mode of experience. Reflexive awareness and immediate experience are correlatives and as correlatives they share the characteristics of a qualitative mode of being that is reflexive and immediate. When contrasting "lived experience" with Innewerden, it must be remembered that Innewerden has two sides: it designates a mode of experience and a mode of consciousness. It would therefore seem that "lived experience" also has two sides, one of which designates a mode of experience, the other a mode of consciousness. Indeed, this must be the case if we are to understand lived experience as being reflective and mediate, for the reflective character of lived experience can only be established through its association with a mode of consciousness which is distinguishable from Innewerden. Lived experience can only be identified as a mode of consciousness by virtue of its connection with self-reflection. In the case of our example of Descartes' reflections on his lived experiences, the lived quality of his experiences is established by their belonging to the past, i.e. they occupy a place in memory. The reflective character of his recollected

experiences lived through as a student, traveler, and seeker of truth in the sciences is established by virtue of the fact that these experiences are associated with a particular mode of consciousness which is retrospective. For this reason, it would appear to be less perplexing to consider Selbstbesinnung or self-reflection, which is essentially recollective, as the counterpoint to Innewerden or reflexive awareness, which is essentially "collective", i.e. appropriative. Similarly, lived experiences, which are basically experiences of the past, can be regarded as the counterpoint to immediate experiences, which are basically experiences of the present. Here, "experiences of the past" and "experiences of the present" have to be understood in two ways: as subjective genitive and as objective genitive.⁷³ Taken as subjective genitive, "experiences of the past" signifies those experiences which belong to a particular period of time in the course of one's life. Taken as objective genitive, "experiences of the past" signifies those experiences which occurred in the past but which are made the object of reflection in the present by virtue of having been remembered. Likewise, taken as subjective genitive, "experiences of the present" signifies those experiences which properly belong to the period of time designated as a "now". Taken as objective genitive, "experiences of the present" designates those experiences which are investigated as belonging to the present.

Although the Diltheyan distinction between Innewerden and Selbstbesinnung presents us with a basis for the kind of

distinction between primary and secondary memory which Husserl makes in The Phenomenology of Internal Time-Consciousness,⁷⁴ it is clear that Dilthey does not develop this distinction in any detail. What remains important, however, is the idea that in Innewerden what is made perspicuous is the immediate and reflexive character of the I-world relationship, whereas in Selbstbesinnung it is the "lived" or historical dimension of the I-world relationship which is highlighted. In the case of the former, experience reveals itself as phenomena which are not reflected upon but of which there is an awareness; in the case of the latter, experience is reflected-upon phenomena which have already been constituted on the basis of the former. For Dilthey, both modes of consciousness and both modes of experience are ultimately what Dilthey conceives as the ground of all knowledge, that is, they are descriptions and determinations of life. Whereas the Diltheyan concept of Innewerden offers us a minimally conceived determination of the psycho-physical basis of knowledge, the concept of Selbstbesinnung seeks to exhibit its culturally mediated, historical or recollective basis. Furthermore, the former without the latter is only foundational in a restricted way, i.e. it is incomplete in that it necessarily distorts the full foundational character of life taken in the widest and fullest sense of the term. Yet it does serve a function and that is to prevent the latter from leading to the hypostasization of life. Innewerden and Selbstbesinnung are mutually regulatory concepts which, when taken together, circumscribe the limits of what can be known and how.

The Diltheyan life-concept is susceptible to a number of different determinations, each of which, however, identifies, describes and analyzes different facets of experience and consciousness. For example, as Helmut Johach and Frithjof Rodi, the editors of the materials which constitute the second volume of the Einleitung, remark:

Life is on the one hand the totality of the facts of consciousness structured in a whole by the unity of self-consciousness, behind which we cannot go in the epistemological foundation; secondly, it is the (not intellectually distorted) actuality relation of the "totality of our self", which not only thinks and represents, but also feels and wills; and it is ultimately the continuity and coherence of the life-process taking place in time, which not only displays an elapse, but development and articulation and thereby also guarantees the historical dimension of the knowing intelligence.⁷⁵

We might add that life is also what Descartes, for example, tells us of his past. Narrowly defined, i.e. within the context of a theory of knowledge which seeks to be empirically consequent, our understanding of Dilthey's concept of experience is restricted to immediate experience and reflexive awareness. Broadly defined, i.e. within the context of the postulated insufficiency of epistemology as foundation, our understanding of the Diltheyan concept of experience must be expanded so as to include a level of experience and consciousness which corresponds to everyday life. In either case, the justificatory force of the evidence offered by these two levels of analyses is derived from their closeness to life as "what is first and present."⁷⁶ For example, reflecting on his philosophical beginnings and on his life-work,

Dilthey explains:

If the reality of the geistige world was to be vindicated, what was required above all was a critique of Kant's theory which made time and thereby life itself a mere appearance. Lotze's later theory, which was based on this theory of time, showed me the consequence as clearly as possible. I began with the critique of this theory. Thus arose the principle: thought cannot go back behind life. To view life as appearance is a contradictio in adjecto, for in the course of life, in the growth from out of the past and the extending into the future, lie the realities which form our productive system and the value of our life. Were there something timeless behind life, which runs its course in the past, present and future, then this would be an antecedent of life; whereupon it would then be the condition for the course of life in its entire nexus; this antecedent would then be what we precisely did not experience and therefore a region of the dead.⁷⁷

Notwithstanding Dilthey's more detailed critique of the Kantian theory of time,⁷⁸ the premise of Dilthey's critical thought is that life in its fullness and completeness, i.e. in its immediate and lived, reflexive and reflective character, is the ground behind which we cannot go. Thus, even though life as immediate experience and reflexive awareness displays a fundamental state of affairs, it alone is only a partial account of the total character of human experience and consciousness. The insufficiency of an epistemological grounding of any science hangs together with the unfathomability of life thesis in Dilthey. The desideratum of a consequent form of empiricism cannot ~~assume~~ a narrow form to the exclusion of its wide form. We acquire knowledge not only through our immediate and direct contact with the world, but also through our reflections on our actions and the actions of others. Consequently, the Diltheyan concepts

of Innewerden and Selbstbesinnung indicate two complementary concepts of experience. The foundational function of Erlebnis understood as immediate experience is therefore conditioned by its relationship to the supporting concept of Erlebnis understood as lived experience. Both modes of experience and their correlative modes of consciousness are modulations of life, as it were, and determinations of the Diltheyan life-concept. Ultimately, they are the ground of the human sciences and the crux of Dilthey's argument for their legitimacy.

Summary Remarks on the Concept of Erlebnis as
Lived Experience

On the basis of the evidence provided in the Breslauer Ausarbeitung and the Berliner Entwurf as integral parts of the Einleitung, Dilthey's Grundlegung der Geisteswissenschaften appears to be premised on the requirement of a consequent form of empiricism which must have both a narrow and a wide form. The result is the development of two concepts of experience which correspond to two basic orientations of consciousness. Postulating their connectedness, Dilthey in effect seeks to demonstrate the continuity between natural and human science on the basis of a better understanding of experience, i.e. an understanding which neither distorts the immediate and reflexive, nor the lived and reflective nature of experience. To this end, Dilthey complements

his conception of Erlebnis as immediate experience with a conception of Erlebnis as lived experience. On the basis of the foregoing, our treatment of Dilthey's concept of Erlebnis as lived experience admits of the following summary remarks:

1. From the perspective of the requirement of a consequent form of empiricism and within the context of the postulated insufficiency of epistemology as foundation, Erlebnis as lived experience is used to complete Dilthey's determination of the ground of all knowledge and of all science.

2. Erlebnis as lived experience and the correlative mode of consciousness that is Selbstbesinnung or reflective self-awareness are intended to account for the constitution of knowledge that is specifically human scientific, but which nevertheless is dependent on and occurs within a Naturzusammenhang.

3. Erlebnis as lived and as immediate experience and consciousness as reflective and reflexive constitute a double-determination of the whole ground of all science.

4. The concepts of Erlebnis as lived experience and Selbstbsinnung or self-reflection seek to establish the knowledge-constitutive importance of the practical interests of knowers and of scientists as individuals and as members of a society or of a culture; they are ultimately determinations of historical consciousness or finite reason.

NOTES

1. For a discussion of the concept (Heideggerian) Vorhabe in relation to the connectedness of the natural and the human sciences, see Hubert L. Dreyfus, "Holism and Hermeneutics," Review of Metaphysics, vol. 34, 1, 1980, pp. 9-12; also, for a discussion of Dreyfus' treatment of the concept Vorhabe in relation to the thought of Dilthey, see Rudolf A. Makkreel, "Dilthey and Universal Hermeneutics: The Status of the Human Sciences," The Journal of the British Society for Phenomenology, vol. 16, 3, 1985, pp. 246-249.
2. See above, chap. II, pp. 55-57.
3. Wilhelm Dilthey, Gesammelte Schriften, vol. I (Stuttgart: B. G. Teubner and Goettingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 1966), p.148.
4. Cf. Juergen Habermas, Knowledge and Human Interests, trans. by Jeremy J. Shapiro (Boston: Beacon Press, 1971), p. 312.
5. I use the term "gnoseomorphic" in C. F. Von Weizsaecker's sense. That is:

Science is an element in human history. Human history is a late product of organic evolution. Evolution itself is gnoseomorphic. It has a form or structure in common with cognition. Translating evolution into Greek as physis (which literally means growth) we may as well say that cognition is physiomorphic. We try to learn something on the structure of both cognition and evolution by comparing them.

See C. F. Von Weizsaecker, "The Preconditions of Experience and the Unity of Physics," in Transcendental Arguments and Science, edited by Peter Bieri, Rolf-Peter Horstmann and Lorenz Krueger (Dordrecht, Holland: D. Reidel Publishing Co., 1979), pp. 133-134.

6. The importance of this distinction for contemporary philosophy cannot be overemphasized. For an examination of Dilthey's role in the origin of the problem which is currently identified as the understanding-explanation controversy, see R.J. Howard, Three Faces of Hermeneutics: An Introduction to Current Theories of Understanding (Berkeley & Los Angeles: University of Calif. Press, 1982), esp. pp. 8-23 and the "Selected Bibliography" on pp. 177-184 for an indication of how pervasive this problem is among philosophers of different fields of specialization.
7. In Chapter Eight "The Self-Reflection of the Cultural Sciences:

The Historicism Critique of Meaning," Habermas comes to the following conclusion:

Like Peirce, Dilthey remains in the last analysis so much subject to the force of positivism that he leaves off the self-reflection of the cultural sciences just at the point where the practical cognitive interest is comprehended as the foundation of possible hermeneutic knowledge and not as its corruption. In so doing, he falls back into objectivism.

Habermas, Knowledge and Human Interests, p. 179. For a response to Habermas' charges that Dilthey is guilty of a covert positivism and objectivism, see Helmut Johach, Handelnder Mensch und objektiver Geist (Meisenheim am Glan: Verlag Anton Hain, 1974), p. 51. Johach, providing evidence drawn from Dilthey's early writings (Breslauer Ausarbeitung and Berliner Entwurf) to which Habermas makes no reference, shows Dilthey to attribute to self-reflection a critical function which is consistent with Habermas' own understanding of the critical function of self-reflection.

8. Makkreel, "Dilthey and Universal Hermeneutics," pp. 236-249.
9. Ibid., p. 249.
10. Wilhelm Dilthey, Gesammelte Schriften, vol. I (Stuttgart: B. G. Teubner and Goettingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 1966), p. 17.
11. Wilhelm Dilthey, Gesammelte Schriften, vol. V (Stuttgart: B. G. Teubner and Goettingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 1968), p. 144.
12. Charles Taylor, "Understanding in Human Science," Review of Metaphysics, vol. 34, 1, 1980, p. 25. My emphasis.
13. It must be noted that "biology" can be translated into the German as "Lebenslehre." Dilthey employs terms such as "Keim", which can mean "germ", "origin", "embryo", or "nucleus"; "Urzelle", "ovum" or "primitive cell"; etc. This suggests an equivocal use of the word "life" in Dilthey; on the one hand, the term is used "organically", on the other, as indicating the Lebenslauf, curriculum vitae or career, of Lebenseinheiten or life-units understood as real, full-blooded, social-historical figures. In both cases, the general conception of life is formed by Dilthey in opposition to mechanistic-atomistic reductionism. See Wilhelm Dilthey, Gesammelte Schriften, vol. XIX (Goettingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 1980), especially the section "Leben und Erkennen," pp. 333-359.
14. Ibid., p. 58.

15. Dilthey, Gesammelte Schriften, vol. I, p. 17. This translation is drawn from Dilthey: Selected Writings, edited, translated and introduced by H. P. Rickman (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1976), p. 165.
16. Dilthey, Gesammelte Schriften, vol. XIX, p. 58.
17. See Rickman, Dilthey: Selected Writings, pp. 218-220.
18. For the identification of a "classificatory circle" as opposed to the famous "hermeneutic circle" in Dilthey's thought, see Makkreel, "Dilthey and Universal Hermeneutics," pp. 240-241. Within the context of a discussion of what all sciences have in common, Makkreel shows how Dilthey's idea of a "classificatory circle" is in basic agreement with the central tenets of theoretical holism, i.e. facts are theory-laden and observations paradigm-dependent. However, the point I would like to make here is simply that natural and human scientific facts are ontologically related.
19. Dilthey, Gesammelte Schriften, vol. XIX, p. 25.
20. Ibid.
21. Ibid.
22. Apart from its technical usage in Dilthey, the term "Zusammenhang" indicates Dilthey's overall understanding of what philosophy seeks to achieve. That is, as Wilfrid Sellars defines it, it is "an attempt to see how things, in the broadest possible sense of the term, hang together, in the broadest possible sense of the term." Quoted by Richard Rorty in Consequences of Pragmatism (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1982), p. xiv.
23. Merleau-Ponty writes:

We will not admit a preconstituted world, a logic, except for having seen them arise from our experience of brute being, which is as it were the umbilical cord of our knowledge and the source of meaning for us.

See Maurice Merleau-Ponty, The Visible and the Invisible, trans. by Alphonso Lingis (Evanston: Northwestern University Press, 1968), p. 157. My emphasis.
24. For Habermas' use of these terms, see Knowledge and Human Interests, pp. 308-317. For a good discussion of Dilthey's practical philosophical orientation and its relation to scientific knowledge, see Manfred Riedel, "Hermeneutik und Erkenntniskritik: Zum Verhaeltnis von theoretischem Wissen und praktischer Lebensgewissheit bei Wilhelm Dilthey," in Materialien

zur Philosophie Wilhelm Diltheys, hrsg. u. eingeleitet von Frithjof Rodi u. Hans-Ulrich Lessing (Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp, 1984), pp. 359-384.

25. Dilthey distinguishes between "Sitte" "als die Regel, das Wiederkehrende, die Form des Stetigen und Allgemeinen in Handlungen" and "Sittlichkeit" as an "einziges Idealsystem". Ethics, for Dilthey, involve the actions of the "whole" human being, not an intellectualized and distorted version of him or her. See, Dilthey, Gesammelte Schriften, vol. I, p. 61.
26. I.e. display a cognitive interest consistent with the type of knowledge sought by Galileo, Copernicus, Kepler, Newton, etc. See Dilthey, Gesammelte Schriften, vol. I, pp. 361-373.
27. Dilthey, Selected Writings, ed., trans. and introduced by H. P. Rickman, p. 166.
28. Cf. Lewis Thomas, Late Night Thoughts on Listening to Mahler's Ninth Symphony (New York: Bantam Books, 1984), especially the essay "The Corner of the Eye", p. 14, where in a Heideggerian fashion, Thomas writes:

The word "earth" is used to name the ground we walk on, the soil in which we grow plants or dig clams, and the planet itself; we also use it to describe all of humanity ("the whole earth responds to the beauty of a child," we say to each other).

The earliest word for earth in our language was the Indo-European root dhghem, and look what we did with it.
29. Dilthey, Selected Writings, ed., trans. and introduced by H. P. Rickman, pp. 166-167.
30. For example, see the "Introduction" in Natural Order: Historical Studies of Scientific Culture, edited by Barry Barnes and Steven Shapin (Beverly Hills, Calif. and London, England: Sage Publications, 1979), pp. 9-13.
31. Dilthey, Gesammelte Schriften, vol. I, p. 31.
32. See Dilthey, Gesammelte Schriften, vol. XIX, pp. 296-307.
33. Ibid., p. 405.
34. Dilthey, Gesammelte Schriften, vol. I, p. 51.
35. Wilhelm Dilthey, Gesammelte Schriften, vol. XVIII (Stuttgart: B. G. Teubner and Goettingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 1977), p. 177.

36. See Manfred Riedel, "Einleitung des Herausgebers," in W. Dilthey: Der Aufbau der geschichtlichen Welt in den Geisteswissenschaften (Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp, 1970), pp. 9-86.
37. The image of science and scientific knowledge which is being opposed here is clearly described by Mary Hesse as follows:
- . . . there is an external world which can in principle be exhaustively described in scientific language. The scientist, as both observer and language-user, can capture the external facts of the world in propositions that are true if they correspond to the facts and false if they do not. Science is ideally a linguistic system in which true propositions are in one-to-one relation to facts, including facts that are not directly observed because they involve hidden entities or properties, or past events or far distant events. These hidden events are described in theories, and theories can be inferred from observation, that is, the hidden explanatory mechanism of the world can be discovered from what is open to observation. Man as scientist is regarded as standing apart from the world and able to experiment and theorize about it objectively and dispassionately.
- See Mary Hesse, Revolutions and Reconstructions in the Philosophy of Science (Bloomington and London: Indiana University Press, 1980), p. vii.
38. René Descartes, Discourse on the Method of Rightly Conducting the Reason and Seeking Truth in the Field of Science, trans. with an Introduction by Laurence J. Lafleur (Indianapolis: Bobbs-Merrill, 1960), p. 5.
39. Ibid., pp. 8-9.
40. Ibid., pp. 17-18.
41. It is interesting to note that Gadamer says that the first use of the word Erlebnis appears in one of Hegel's letters which describes a journey. See Hans-Georg Gadamer, Truth and Method (New York: Continuum Books, 1975), p. 55 and n. 108 on p. 505. For an interesting short account of Descartes' Discourse as "a piece of travel literature", see Wolf Lepenies, "'Interesting questions' in the history of philosophy and elsewhere," in Philosophy in History, edited by Richard Rorty, J. B. Schneewind and Quentin Skinner (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1984), pp. 146-147.
42. Dilthey, Gesammelte Schriften, vol. I, p. 358.

43. This is implied in Dilthey's own definition of a Critique of Historical Reason as a critique of "man's capacity to know himself and the society and history created by him." See Dilthey, Gesammelte Schriften, vol. I, p. 116. It is thoroughly consistent with Dilthey's thought to say that we are first of all social-historical beings before we are researchers in any particular field.
44. Although the term "objektiver Geist" is only introduced in Dilthey's later writings, the concept is already established in the Einleitung. See Johach, Handelnder Mensch und objektiver Geist, pp. 111-112 and pp. 156-165.
45. Manfred Riedel, Verstehen oder Erklären? (Stuttgart: Klett-Kotta, 1978), p. 45.
46. See Michel Foucault, The Order of Things: An Archaeology of the Human Sciences (New York: Random House, 1970), p. 318.
47. See Rorty, Consequences of Pragmatism, pp. xiii-xlvii.
48. Habermas, Knowledge and Human Interests, p. vii.
49. Ibid.
50. See Barnes and Shapin, Natural Order: Historical Studies of Scientific Culture, p. 9, where the authors make the following statement which is reminiscent of Dilthey: "There is now a real interest in our natural knowledge as a product of our way of life, as something we have constructed rather than something which has been, so to speak, revealed to us."
51. See Dilthey, Gesammelte Schriften, vol. V, p. 9.
52. Ibid.
53. Dilthey, Gesammelte Schriften, vol. XIX, p. 79.
54. Ibid., p. 214.
55. It must be remembered that Dilthey's whole project of grounding the human sciences involves more than epistemology. The historical part of the Einleitung, i.e. Book Two, arose, as Dilthey explains in the "Vorrede" to the first volume of the Einleitung, "not only from the practical need of an introduction, but also from my conviction of the value of historical self-reflection in addition to epistemological[self-reflection]. See Dilthey, Gesammelte Schriften, vol. I, p. xix.
56. Rudolf Makkreel identifies Dilthey's "theory that historical life must be analyzed in terms of Wirkungszusammenhaenge or

systems of effects" as "the background for Gadamer's notion of Wirkungsgeschichte (effective history). Focusing on the Diltheyan concept of Erlebnis or lived experience, Makkreel explains:

Biologically life is future oriented and teleological. It can be analyzed in terms of Zweckszusammenhaenge or purposive systems. In this sense time begins with the potential of the future and runs down in Ablauf. The Vorruecken of concrete time can only come from our reflective ability to preserve the historical past and make it productive and effective in our present experience. Thus lived experience reconceives Zweckszusammenhaenge (purposive systems) of biological life as Wirkungszusammenhaenge (systems of effects) of historical life.

See Rudolf A. Makkreel, "The Overcoming of Linear Time in Kant, Dilthey, and Heidegger," which is to appear in a forthcoming collection of essays on Dilthey entitled Dilthey and Phenomenology, edited by Rudolf Makkreel and John Scanlon, which is to be published by the Center for Advanced Research in Phenomenology.

57. Dilthey, Gesammelte Schriften, vol. XIX, p. 176.

58. Ibid.

59. Dilthey, Gesammelte Schriften, vol. I, p. xx. Cf. Schleiermacher's statement:

We are earthbound . . . all operations of thought, even our whole systematic effort of the formation of concepts, must have its roots in the earth."

Quoted by Michael Ermarth in Wilhelm Dilthey: The Critique of Historical Reason (Chicago and London: University of Chicago Press, 1978), p. 361, n. 5.

60. Dilthey, Gesammelte Schriften, vol. XIX, p. 278.

61. Ibid., p. 305. My emphasis.

62. Ibid., p. 79.

63. For example, Dilthey writes:

For a millenium mankind grew accustomed to expecting the solution to transcendent questions from philosophy. Like religion, it is supposed to build a bridge to a land beyond. In vain, one expects offices from it which it cannot fulfil, and it does not participate in positive and truly creative work, even though it is indispensable to it. For it alone

can guarantee particular human works continuity, ultimate understanding, a foundation, however not by means of the solution to transcendent questions, but rather only through a fuller, more mature consciousness of reality.

Ibid., p. 306.

64. Cf. Wilhelm Dilthey, Gesammelte Schriften, vol. VI (Stuttgart: B. G. Teubner and Goettingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 1968), p. 67, where Dilthey explains:

Ultimately, the character of life, which springs from this teleological nature of the psyche, presents itself as development. Just as organic nature works towards enhancement, the historical world [works towards] expansion and development. The elementary subsoil [Untergrund] of this development lies in the ways of reaction of instinctive and affective life. The mechanical interpretation of development, as accomplished by Montesquieu, Helvetius and Buckle, explains the perfection of the human race from the appearance of more and more impressions from the external world, which expand the knowledge of peoples and determine it naturally. The theory of development of German Idealism, as carried out by Schelling, Wilhelm von Humboldt and Hegel, seeks the improvement of the human being in the ascending order of ideas. Both views misconstrue the elementary forces, which as feelings and instincts make up the powerful center of psychic life.

65. Dilthey, Gesammelte Schriften, vol. XIX, p. 320.
66. In recent advances in computer technology and telecommunications, "multiplex" refers to a mode of transmission which permits the same medium to carry voice, data, and pictures at the same time.
67. Dilthey, Gesammelte Schriften, vol. XIX, p. 304.
68. See Rudolf A. Makkreel, "Dilthey and Universal Hermeneutics," p. 243.
69. Dilthey, Gesammelte Schriften, vol. XIX, p. 222.
70. Quoted in Helmut Johach, Handelnder Mensch, p. 59.
71. Cf. Edmund Husserl, The Phenomenology of Internal Time-Consciousness, edited by Martin Heidegger, trans. by James S. Churchill, introduction by Calvin O. Schrag (Bloomington & London: Indiana University Press, 1964), pp. 175-181.
72. Makkreel, "The Overcoming of Linear Time in Kant, Dilthey, and Heidegger," forthcoming.

73. For an application of the distinction between the subjective genitive and the objective genitive in relation to the Heideggerian concept of a "hermeneutics of Dasein", see Ernst Wolfgang Orth, "Historical and Systematic Remarks on the Relation Between Description and Hermeneutics in Phenomenology: A Critique of the Enlarged Use of Hermeneutics," Research in Phenomenology, vol. XIV, 1984, p. 1. Also, it is interesting to note that on p. 11 Orth states that the Diltheyan concept of Innewerden designates both a fundamental-ontological and a transcendental-phenomenological function.
74. For a brief discussion of Husserl's distinction between primary and secondary recollection within the wider context of a discussion of how Husserl, Heidegger, and Dilthey focus on the different modes of time, see David Carr, "The Future Perfect: Temporality and Priority in Husserl, Heidegger and Dilthey," which is to appear in the forthcoming volume Dilthey and Phenomenology, edited by Rudolf Makkreel and John Scanlon.
75. See the "Vorbericht der Herausgeber" in Dilthey, Gesammelte Schriften, vol. XIX, p. XLIV.
76. Dilthey, Gesammelte Schriften, vol. I, p. 148.
77. This statement by Dilthey was made on the occasion of his seventieth birthday in 1903. See Dilthey, Gesammelte Schriften vol. V, p. 9.
78. See Dilthey, Gesammelte Schriften, vol. XIX, pp. 210-222.

CHAPTER V

CONCLUSION

By focusing on Dilthey's early epistemological writings, we have attempted to elucidate Dilthey's position on the status of the human sciences as science. The Diltheyan project of providing the human sciences with a foundation has been shown to depend on Dilthey's treatment of and views on what there is or is not and what can be known and how. It is by virtue of this radical form of questioning that Dilthey arrives at something akin to a genealogy of human and natural science in that the origin and development of all knowledge is put into question and then accounted for. This Dilthey does by ignoring the cosmogonical question about the origin of the physical world and human life and by assuming a naturalistic attitude which reveals itself as a worldview according to which man and nature are originally and inextricably connected. Accordingly, Dilthey's philosophical orientation is towards the development of a theory of knowledge that can support the view that there is a fundamental continuity between man and nature. On this view, Dilthey's treatment of the foundations of the human sciences is as much a philosophy of man as it is philosophy of nature and it is by demonstrating this link between man and nature that the human and the natural sciences are shown to have a common matrix.

It is also important to note that although Dilthey himself assumes the epistemological standpoint, it is with an understanding and critical awareness of the fact that such a standpoint presupposes certain conditions which must be recognized and discussed in terms of the social-historical, human, or "lived" quality of knowledge and its possibility. Bearing this in mind, our examination of Dilthey's treatment of the legitimation of the human sciences by means of an epistemological grounding leads us to conclude that the ground which Dilthey sought is necessarily doubly determined. This is not to say that there are two grounds--one which serves as the epistemological basis of the natural sciences and one which is the epistemological basis of the human sciences. On the contrary, Dilthey is to be understood as saying that in either case the one depends on the other and together they account for the basis of all knowledge and science that is human and natural. For Dilthey, the one without the other is incomplete, since both share what is common to both, i.e. an origin in and development from experience.

For this reason, experience as ground is conceived both as immediate and reflexive and as lived and reflective in tandem with a double-determination of consciousness as an Innewerden or reflexive awareness and as a Selbstbesinnung or reflective self-awareness. From the perspective of a naturalized epistemological standpoint, two aspects of the knowledge-constitutive character of subjectivity reveal themselves. According to the narrow

determination of consciousness as Innewerden and its correlative experiential concept of Erlebnis as immediate experience as the ground, we are led to consider subjectivity in terms of appropriation and a sense of self consistent with a developmental epistemology. However, recognizing the inadequacy of the empirical subject, as it were, Dilthey also defines subjectivity as a reflective awareness and points out the re-appropriative, historical nature of the constitution of knowledge in terms of a sense of self that is consistent with adults as members of a society, professional group, etc.

Accordingly, whereas life is conceived naturalistically, i.e, minimally or in the case of the narrow determination of the ground of all science and knowledge, it is conceived socially and historically in the case of its wider determination. Nevertheless, in both cases the I-world relationship is seen to be one of symbiotic partnership circumscribed by a Weltzusammenhang that is a Naturzusammenhang as well as a Geisteszusammenhang. Within the context of the Naturzusammenhang, knowledge is shown to have its nascent form; within the context of the Geistes-zusammenhang, knowledge is discussed in terms of its development as a feature of human actions, reactions and constructs, all of which constitute a culture.

Immediate experience as ground is ultimately seen to derive its legitimizing force from the fact that it is life itself; immediate experience provides the indubitable evidence of a reality behind which we cannot go. Likewise, lived experience

is life itself; its legitimizing force ultimately derives from the evidence of experience as acts that have already been accomplished.

Thus the foundational function of Erlebnis as immediate experience is to restrict what can be known and how, to "this side" of nature, while the foundational function of Erlebnis as lived experience, in addition to performing this function as well, is to allow "this side" to include everyday or ordinary experience.

Although Erlebnis as immediate experience is presented as a determination of the ground of all knowledge and of all science, it is inadequate. This inadequacy derives from cognitive interests which are purely mechanical and technical. For this reason, Erlebnis as lived experience is regarded as the necessary completion of the former determination of the ground of knowledge, i.e. it allows one to give an account of the constitutive importance of life-practical interests.

For all this, from the perspective of Dilthey's unfathomability of life thesis as it relates to the question of ground, it would appear that we are left on the edge of an abyss. This, however, is not the consequence of Dilthey's treatment of the foundations of the human sciences. The right conclusion that must be drawn is one that is expressed in the following passage taken from the Preface of the Encyclopedia of Physics:

Research in physics has been compared to an attempt to tidy up the basement of a house, only to find a trapdoor leading to a sub-basement. When the sub-

basement is cleaned out, one finds a trapdoor leading to yet another sub-basement, and so forth, ad infinitum. Therefore, this volume describes physics only as of this moment in time, as we attempt to understand and organize our knowledge of the physical world.¹

We might add that the human sciences, according to Dilthey, find themselves in the same house with physics; they are co-habitants. To extend this analogy and in so doing to return to our previous characterization of Dilthey's project of a Grundlegung der Geisteswissenschaften as an attempt to construct a building large enough to house both the human and the natural sciences under one roof, we can say that Dilthey is a wise and experienced builder. That is, before Dilthey sets out to construct his theory of the Geisteswissenschaften, he tests the ground upon which it is to be constructed. However, Dilthey goes further, since he not only recognizes that the materials used in the construction of any building originate from the very ground upon which it is to be founded, but also that the constructors themselves originate from this selfsame source.

To conclude: although Dilthey develops a double-concept of experience, he remains true to the essence of both the natural and the human sciences. "All human knowledge is only the analysis of experience."² Experience is that which we cannot go behind.

NOTES

1. Rita G. Lerner and George L. Trigg (Eds.), Encyclopedia of Physics (Reading Massachusetts: Addison-Wesley Publishing Co. Inc., 1981), p. xi.
2. Wilhelm Dilthey, Gesammelte Schriften, vol. XVIII (Goettingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 1977), p. 193.

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- Vol. V. Translations: "Ideas Concerning a Descriptive and Analytic Psychology," pp. 139-240. Trans. by Richard M. Zaner in Descriptive Psychology and Historical Understanding. Trans. by Richard M. Zaner and Kenneth L. Heiges with an Introduction by Rudolf A. Makkreel. The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1977, pp. 23-120; The Essence of Philosophy, pp. 339-416. Trans. by Stephen A. and William T. Emery. University of North Carolina Studies in the Germanic Languages and Literatures. No. 13. New York: AMS Press, 1969. Selected passages in translation are also found in: Rickman, Dilthey, Selected Writings, pp. 88-97, and Hodges, Wilhelm Dilthey: An Introduction, pp. 109-156.
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Vol. XIII/1. Translated selections from Leben Schleiermachers: pp. xxxv-xlv, pp. 183-207, pp. 208-228. In Rickman, Dilthey, Selected Writings, pp. 37-77.

Note: Under the general editorship of Rudolf A. Makkreel and Frithjof Rodi, a six volume edition of Dilthey's Selected Works in English translation is presently being prepared and is to be published by Princeton University Press. The fifth volume has recently appeared as the first of six and contains Dilthey's principal writings on aesthetics.

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