

**THE STATE OF EUROPEAN DEFENCE POLICY AND
THE VALUE(S) OF INTERVENTION**

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Abstract

European security and defence policy has developed at a significant rate since the late 1990s. As a growing field of analysis, there have been few studies to date that have explored the foreign and domestic implications of the European Union's emerging security and defence policies. This thesis seeks to assess the quality and effectiveness of the present day defence policies of the European Union through an examination of its commitment to civilian and military missions abroad. In so doing, this thesis suggests that these missions stem from a misguided belief that the promotion of human rights, democracy, and the rule of law beyond its border is the most effective means by which to achieve security within Europe. This thesis concludes that the economic and political tools available to the European Union provide a better means by which to ensure security in Europe and around the world.

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List of Acronyms

CDI	Center for Defence Information
CFSP	Common Security and Foreign Policy
COO	Chief Operating Officer
CSDP	Common Security and Defence Policy
EC	European Community
ECFR	European Council on Foreign Relations (think-tank)
ECSC	European Coal and Steel Community
EDA	European Defence Agency
EDC	European Defence Community
EDCT	European Defence Community Treaty
EDI	European Defence Industry
EEAS	European External Action Service
EEC	European Economic Community
EFP	European Foreign Policy
ENP	European Neighbourhood Policy
EP	European Parliament
ERRF	European Rapid Reaction Force
ESDP	the European Security and Defence Policy
ESS	European Security Strategy
EU	European Union
EUNAVFOR SOM	European Union Naval Force Somalia
EURATOM	European Atomic Energy Community
EUPOL Afghanistan	European Union Police Mission in Afghanistan
FYROM	Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia
GDP	Gross Domestic Product
GFFO	German Foreign Federal Office
IED	Improvised Explosive Device
IGC	Intergovernmental Conference
NATO	North Atlantic Treaty Organization
NGO	Non-Governmental Organization
PSO	Peace Support Operation
QMV	Qualified Majority Voting
RUSI	Royal United Services Institute
UN	the United Nations
WEU	the Western European Union

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Introduction

The Emergence of European Security and Defence Policy

In 1992, at the Ministerial Council of the Western European Union (WEU), member-states of the WEU committed themselves, and agreed upon, a list of priorities for the new global order. These tasks, known as the Petersberg Tasks, listed in Article 17 of the Treaty on the European Union, commit EU member-states to undertaking humanitarian and rescue tasks; peace-keeping tasks; and tasks of combat forces in crisis-management, including peacemaking through either the WEU¹, the EU², or NATO. Since committing themselves to these tasks, European defence and security has undergone a series of transformations.

Until recently, security and defence policy has remained relatively impervious to the forces and pressures of European integration. Initial efforts to integrate security and defence were met with failure. The European Defence Community (EDC) proposed in 1950 did not materialize beyond the proposal stage. Jolyon Howorth (2005) notes that “any notion of an autonomous EU role in the field of security [...] was virtually unthinkable for most of the 1990s” (Howorth, 2005, p. 181) and that “anyone who had predicted in 1999 that the European Union (EU) would be mounting autonomous military missions by 2003 would probably have been laughed out of court” (ibid p. 201). The major shift in how member-states approached defence policy occurred in 1998 “when Great Britain, in the French-British ‘St. Malo Accord’ ended its longstanding opposition to the EU developing its own military and security identity” (Centre for Defence Information, 2000, p. 1). Since the St.

¹ The WEU, established in the Treaty of Brussels in 1954 will become obsolete in June 2011. Security and defence commitments through the WEU have since been transferred to the Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP).

² During the time of the cold war, the treaty that ratified the EU had not yet been signed and was known as either the European Community (EC) or the European Economic Community (EEC). Throughout this thesis the usage of EU encompasses all prior treaties/names, unless otherwise stated.

Malo Accord, European political leaders have made a concerted effort to create and develop an EU specific security and defence policy.

As a result of these developments, there have been numerous attempts made at assessing and describing the theoretical implications associated with European integration. The institutional arrangements that comprise the EU are unique in that many institutions operate at different levels of governance. Many theories have either failed to grasp the totality of the integration process or, in seeking to explain the EU as a political body, they have sought to mould the reality of institutional processes to align with preconceived belief systems (Hill & Smith, 2005, p. 19-21).

Much of the literature to date focuses primarily on explaining or identifying the forces responsible for the development of a European brand of security. In so doing, there have been many attempts seeking to explain the creation of the Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP)³ and the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) which includes the creation of civilian and military capabilities in Europe. Considerable attention has also been given to the new found possibilities that are associated with CSDP and the increasing role that the EU can and does have in the international realm. However, there have been few studies that have satisfactorily explored the forces responsible for the integration of military capabilities or that have critically assessed the logic and rationale that underscores European defence. CSDP has often been explained largely in the context of the EU-US relationship and the role that Atlantic Treaties play in forging the EU into a unified political body and now an international actor. Although there are many reasons why scholars

³ Prior to the ratification of the Lisbon Treaty in 2009, the Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP) was known as the European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP). CSDP will be used primarily in this thesis to encompass both ESDP and CSDP, unless otherwise stated.

have emphasized this relationship and their findings have greatly contributed to the knowledge of how the EU functions, the analytical focus may at times have been somewhat incomplete. Rather than focusing on the possibilities of joint EU security capabilities, one should first question the rationale underlying defence integration and whether CSDP and the undertaking of military and crisis management operations around the world is a logical and effective means by which to guarantee security in Europe.

One of the most significant military efforts undertaken by the EU occurred in March 2003, when the North Atlantic Treaty Organization's (NATO) mission in the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia ended and military control of the mission was given to the EU. This event was significant because it was the first time in history that the EU military was primarily responsible for overseeing operations in a foreign, non-EU member country. Although the forces deployed during the mission were rather modest and the scale of the operation was relatively small, it marked an important milestone in the development and implementation of an integrated European military capability. The successful change in command and the undertaking of Operation Concordia, the codename given to the EU mission in Macedonia, was made possible largely as a result of a series of negotiations that took place the previous year, in 2002, through the Berlin Plus Agreement (Giegrich & Wallace, 2004).

Operation Concordia exemplifies two important milestones in the integration of European defence policies. Firstly, it signifies an improvement in the military and institutional capabilities of the EU to respond to world events in real time. The EU's previous attempt at crisis prevention in the former Yugoslavia was itself a crisis, as member nations within the EU were politically paralyzed as a result of different national loyalties and

competing interests within the member states. The inability of EU leaders to mobilize resources affected the political leaders' capacity to prevent the humanitarian catastrophe that occurred in the former republics of Yugoslavia, most notably in Bosnia. The military and political non-action of the EU and the resulting humanitarian crisis was only resolved through direct US intervention.

Secondly, the undertaking of Operation Concordia demonstrates the speed at which integration among the EU member states can take place when there are willing and able actors dedicated to a particular cause. A combined security policy, at least in some sense, has arguably always been an interest of EU architects from the first few years of its inception. It has only been in the last decade that major strides have been made in integrating and creating military and civilian capabilities through CSDP and the CFSP. The EU's status as a major international actor raises several questions not only about the current and potential role that the EU may assume in the international realm but also about the nature of integration itself.

The EU integration process has historically been characterized by fast and slow developments. At various times, even the existence and future of the EU has been called into question. Often major tensions have existed involving the integration process and the willingness of member states to relinquish varying degrees of national sovereignty. This can be seen most notably with the UK and its refusal to adopt the unified currency of the EU, the Euro, which was created through the Maastricht Treaty.

Defence policy is arguably one of the most contentious areas of integration since it necessitates the relinquishing of national control, to some degree, over each nation's own security policies. In spite of the advancements made in CSDP, it remains the most intergovernmental, as opposed to communitarian, aspect of all EU institutions. Howard

Wiarda (2006), a Senior Associate for the Center for Strategic and International Studies notes, that European identity, once thought to be static, is undergoing tremendous changes with the latest expansion of the European Union in 2004. The 1 May 2004 expansion, sometimes referred to as the Big Bang Enlargement, saw the admittance of ten eastern and south-eastern European countries to the already diverse fifteen member states that had comprised the EU. In 2007, the further addition of Bulgaria and Romania saw the number of EU member states rise to twenty-seven.

As a result of its diverse membership, the EU has long been regarded as an economic giant. In spite of its economic output, however, it has also been seen as a political lightweight and a military mouse, and some EU leaders are now ready to challenge this description (Møller, 2003). Per Stig Møller, the Minister for Foreign Affairs for the Kingdom of Denmark stated in 2003 that enabling the "Union to become a credible and reliable global player is the number one priority for Europe following the [...] NATO and EU summits in Prague and Copenhagen" (Møller, 2003, p. 63). Møller's words voice an opinion that is consistently shared throughout the member states of the EU: that the EU needs to develop a strong, coherent, and more reliable foreign policy strategy so that the EU's influence in military and geo-strategic matters matches its economic output. Presently, the EU has a combined Gross Domestic Output (GDP) of roughly 16,447 trillion dollars, which is nearly 2,200 trillion dollars more than the GDP of the United States. The exact degree of influence that the EU is seeking to have on the international stage is anything but clear and remains a highly contested issue in the EU itself.

Møller (2003) states that, in spite of its Economic power, "Europe is not being built as a counterweight to the United States" (p. 63). However, the EU has always, in a sense,

served as a counter-weight to the United States. Although US interests were reflected in EU foreign policy, many EU member-states have been opposed to the more aggressive approach to security and defence that is championed by the US (Halper & Clarke, 2004). This is not to suggest that EU member-states are strictly non-interventionist, as both the UK and France have habitually intervened in multiple regions, most notably in the recent intervention in Libya. The EU itself, however, is widely recognized for its adherence to multilateralism and the use of soft-power capabilities. With the increase in both EU civilian and military missions conducted through EU institutions, the non-interventionist nature of the EU is likely coming to an end.

The creation of a set of EU specific civilian and military capabilities marks a change in the political psyche of European leaders and demonstrates a potential shift in the European commitment to non-intervention and the limitations they have historically placed upon themselves. While a concerted, Euro-centric foreign policy has arguably been a long term goal of EU architects, it resurfaced with much gusto in the early 1990s. The first attempts at an EU foreign policy began in 1952 with the drafting of the European Defence Community (EDC) Treaty with the aim of ensuring peace from outside aggressors. The main goal of the EDC was to solidify peace between France and Germany through a "combined defence force within a supranational European organization [...] consisting of common institutions, common armed forces, and a common budget" (European Defence Community Treaty, 1952, p. 167). Part of the reason for the failure of the EDCT may have been that members of the ECSC were unwilling and not yet prepared to relinquish that level of sovereignty to a supranational organization. This is not altogether surprising given that the integration process to this date is characterized by tension between member-states and the

EU regarding issues of sovereignty. Recent developments in security and defence policy indicate that the extent to which member-states are willing to relinquish sovereignty and to integrate certain policies is increasing.

Neil Winn argues that "traditionally the EU has been a 'civilian power' concerned with welfare generation and economic regulation" (Winn , 2003a, p. 149). The original purpose of the EU was not only to maintain peace through economic co-operation and market integration but also to help rebuild the war-torn continent and improve the lives of its citizenry. CSDP therefore denotes a shift from an inward looking EU to an EU that is looking increasingly outward. It is doing so through increased diplomatic relations and the undertaking of civilian and military missions abroad. The American experience has demonstrated, however, that a strong world presence, especially militarily, can draw resentment and disdain from many groups. Paul Robinson (2005) makes this point rather clearly in his assessment of the shifts in UK policy of late. He states that an over-expansion of the military can have a negative effect on the actual security of a particular country (Robinson, 2005). This sentiment is echoed by Kenneth Waltz who argues that the re-securitization of Europe will have negative consequences on the relationship that the EU has with Russia (Waltz 2000). Over-securitization and a movement towards pre-emptive planning is of primary concern given that one of the main provisions of the Amsterdam Treaty in 2000 calls for a build-up of military resources across EU nations and therefore increased development of the EU's military capacity (Winn 2003a, p. 154).

Perhaps the most striking example of the military build-up may be the creation of the European Rapid Reaction Force (ERRF) which requires the capability to deploy sixty-thousand soldiers to any part of the world within sixty days and the ability to sustain ongoing

operations, solely through EU resources, for a year. The stated purpose of the ERRF is mainly crisis-management and conflict prevention. 60,000 soldiers in this context may seem wholly arbitrary number given that the severity of a potential crisis is unknown and generally cannot be predicted

The demand and creation of military capabilities can therefore be seen as somewhat of a Catch 22. The ERRF itself was not created in response to a particular military crisis or catastrophe and it therefore only reflects a willingness to be militarily capable in certain areas. The ERRF can therefore be seen as either overkill, if the crisis emerging is minimal but enough to require some action, or as insufficient if a future crisis necessitates a much larger response. If the former is the case, there will be significant questions to answer regarding the rationale of the EU budget; however, if the latter is true, the EU will have to fall back to operating through NATO and relying on the United States for military leadership, or risk another humanitarian disaster as was seen in the former Yugoslavia.

Nonetheless, The EU is now firmly entrenched in the international realm. Euroskeptics no longer consider the possibility of a resurgence of authoritarianism and a return to the warring political landscape that dominated the early 20th century as being a credible threat. The great experiment, as the EU is often regarded, can be considered to be an astounding success. The integration of European economies and political life has been successful in its ability to pacify hostilities that had existed for hundreds of years and to create a peaceful forum where national interests and political concerns can be discussed and negotiated and tensions resolved. In spite of its existence and success, questions remain as to the direction of CSDP integration. Former British Prime Minister Tony Blair for example

has suggested that "the Union's goal is [...] to become a 'superpower, not a superstate'" (Golino, 2002, p. 68).

This thesis, will therefore seek to answer the question of whether European security and defence policy, as well as European foreign policy, is being formulated in a manner that is both conducive to, and effective in, preserving regional security in the EU. I argue that, on the whole, European security and defence policy does not actively contribute to creating or maintaining security because of the focus that is placed on civilian and military missions abroad. The logic of intervention that is informing European defence policy is well intentioned, but fundamentally misguided. I suggest that European defence policy is erroneously structured around the promotion values. While these values may in fact be an important factor in creating and maintaining security, they do not in general provide a suitable basis for defence policy and are better situated as a basis for foreign policy, insofar as member-states act consistently to uphold them. This thesis concludes that economic and political tools provide a better means by which to ensure security in Europe and around the world. The creation of the European External Action Service (EEAS), which will be discussed in the final chapter, offers the potential for Europe to create a consistent and coherent security dialogue with key regional and global powers. Thus, a continued adherence to diplomacy offers a viable alternative for creating and preserving security on the European continent and abroad.

Objectives and Methodology

In this thesis I seek to answer the question: “Is CSDP necessary and is it effective in generating security for the European Union?” I argue that CSDP in its present formulation does not meaningfully contribute to generating or preserving security for the EU or neighbouring countries. It is argued that the logic informing the EU’s crisis-management missions is misguided. The focus of this thesis is therefore three-fold. First, it seeks to describe and assess the current state of literature regarding European defence policy. Second, it attempts to analyze the quality and character of CSDP and assess whether the policies that have been adopted serve to promote security for the EU and its member-states. Last, this thesis seeks to provide a starting point to analyze why CSDP has taken the form that it has. It proposes that an analysis of the values of the EU, such as democracy, human rights, and the rule of law, can account, in part, for why CSDP is emerging with a focus on conducting civilian and military missions abroad.

Unlike many other studies to date concerning European integration, this thesis is less concerned with attempting to describe or theorize about the integration process and therefore does not utilize a single definition of what integration may be. Instead, it holds the assumption that the perspectives that are adopted and the theories that are utilized in analyzing the EU depend upon which policy areas and which processes are being examined, and at which level of governance. This methodological approach to EU integration theory stems from analysis conducted by Helen Wallace, William Wallace, and Mark A. Pollack (2005).

The following is a summary of the chapters that comprise this thesis. Chapter one serves as an overview of some of the major theoretical approaches that are used to describe the integration process. Its purpose is to analyze and assess the current state of European integration literature in explaining the emergence of CSDP and CFSP. Some of the theories explored in chapter one include neofunctionalism, realism, and multilateralism and risk sharing. I suggest that while these theories are vital to understanding the emergence of European defence policy, they are mainly descriptive in nature rather than prescriptive. As a result these theories do not focus on the domestic and foreign implications of the EU as an emerging military actor. Emphasis in this chapter is placed on research conducted by Janne Matlary (2009), who suggests that missions undertaken by the EU and Western nations are undertaken optionally and are not vital to their survival. The research conducted by Janne Matlary serves as a starting point for my analysis of CSDP in subsequent chapters. The last section of chapter one is devoted to demonstrating the importance and need for examining the potential domestic implications based on a review of research regarding the democratic deficit and its relation to European security and defence policy.

In chapter two, a policy analysis approach is utilized to study CSDP by examining the impact that EU defence policies have on security. Building on the work and theories of Janne Matlary, this chapter serves to initiate critical discussion of the character and trajectory of CSDP by focusing on its foreign and domestic security implications. It is argued that the civilian and military missions undertaken by the EU are neither vital nor necessary to defend Europe. Consequently, it is suggested that the logic informing European defence policy is fundamentally misguided because it places defence outside of the territory of the EU. In so doing, it transforms defence policy into a policy of offence, a phrase used by Paul Robinson

(2005) to describe the current state of defence policy in the United Kingdom. The chapter concludes by suggesting that because the locus of European defence policy is territorially removed from its member-states it cannot logically be in defence of the EU's territorial integrity. Furthermore, since the civilian and military missions of CSDP are optional, they are also not necessary for the continued survival of the EU and its member-states.

The final chapter, in part, approaches the study of European defence policy from the perspective of political actors and suggests that the stated values and beliefs, as well as the actions of policy makers and politicians who make up the EU, have a direct impact on and serve to shape European defence policy. This chapter also seeks to examine why CSDP has taken on the form of civilian and military missions abroad. It is argued that the values which form the foundation of the EU, such as human rights, democracy, and the rule of law, are being mischaracterized as security goals that are inherently worth pursuing. It is proposed that although values such as democracy and the rule of law may be instrumental in promoting the welfare of individuals, which in turn can generate security, they are not a suitable basis upon which to build defence policy. The chapter concludes by demonstrating that the EU can generate security for its member-states through diplomatic and political, means with the aid of the newly established European External Action Service.

A variety of different research sources were used as references for this thesis. Chapter one is a literature review and uses mainly peer-reviewed journal articles and books published by EU scholars and former EU policy makers. Chapters two and three make use of primary sources such as speeches and lectures by EU officials and policy-makers, as well as government and think-tank publications. Primary sources form the bulk of the research material for chapters two and three because of the emphasis placed on analyzing the

implications of specific policies. Primary sources provided a first-hand account of the decision-making processes and rationales informing CSDP.

Chapter 1

1.1 - Developments in European Security and Defence

With the emergence of security and defence policies in the EU, numerous works have been published seeking to explain why security and defence is now being included in the integration project. However, critical analysis of European security policy has lagged behind. Often the questions being asked take the form of 'what forces can account for the growing interest in creating European defence policy' rather than 'are these policies worth pursuing and are they contributing meaningfully to security in Europe and around the world?' Despite the growing body of literature on European security, or perhaps a result of its growth, studies and analyses of the EU continue to be marked by significant disagreements regarding not only the trajectory of integration but also the main forces responsible for it. The literature on CSDP is characterized by the same types of disagreement that are found within the broader discussions of European integration. As a result, few conclusions have been reached that have been widely accepted among scholars. Walter Carlsnaeas (2004) explains that “the growth of European Foreign Policy (EFP) as a burgeoning field of analysis is characterized by a situation in which its major contemporary practitioners are pulling in different directions as a result of fundamentally different approaches to their subject matter” (2004, p. 507). Furthermore Sophie Vanhoonacker and An D. Jacobs (2010) suggest that “given the very recent character of European cooperation in the field of security, it is not surprising that research on ESDP’s domestic impact is only just starting” (2010, p. 561). The following chapter is devoted primarily to examining some of the major theoretical approaches to understanding European integration and how these

theoretical perspectives have attempted to explain the emergence of European defence policy.

The applicability and relevance of contemporary theories about European security will be explored first, beginning with neofunctionalism which seeks to explain European defence policy as being a logical extension of economics that is prompted by pressures of regional integration that are part of a recursive process. Realist theory and its account of European defence policy as a result of system level constraints placed upon member states will then be explored. An examination of social constructivist theories and their assessment of CSDP integration will follow. Social constructivists posit that European defence integration stems from the creation of a shared identity in which the concept of *Europe* is becoming increasingly more important for politicians. Multilateralism as a source of legitimacy and Janne Matlary's (2009) perspective that regards ESDP as a means of sharing risks and responsibilities in foreign operations will be explored. The literature on the democratic deficit and its relationship to European defence policy will then be examined, highlighting the importance of a greater need for policy scrutiny and analysis of the domestic implications of European defence. The final section is devoted to examining the normative power Europe debate and assesses the unique moral and normative position that the EU occupies in world politics. This final section also serves to provide insight into the motivations behind the EU's promotion of democracy abroad.

I contend that that while there are markedly different approaches to understanding developments regarding European security, they are not necessarily mutually exclusive in their findings. Consistently, the literature on CSDP has placed emphasis on identifying a causal chain to explain the emergence of European security. I argue that although this is both

necessary and important to the study of the EU, the literature on CSDP suffers from a significant lack of critical analysis of both the domestic and foreign implications for Europe as it assumes an increasingly more powerful role in the world. Furthermore, a disproportionate amount of research is directed towards examining why CSDP is emerging rather than focusing on why CSDP is emerging in its current form.

1.2 - Neofunctionalism

Neofunctionalism describes European integration as being the result of a process whereby integration in one area logically leads to the creation and re-organization of institutions in other areas. According to neofunctionalists, the establishment of the ECSC (European Coal and Steel Community) in 1952 through the Treaty of Paris set in motion the process of integration that eventually lead to the creation of the European Economic Community (EEC) and the European Atomic Energy Community (EURATOM), which resulted in further integration, or *spill-over*⁴, in other areas. The early explanatory power of neofunctionalism was found in its ability to theorize about a set of processes that had never been seen before in the political arena, namely the integration of national markets and, eventually, national economies. Neofunctionalism, as an emerging theory, was a direct response to the unique characteristics of European integration. Although neofunctionalism “offers no single authoritative definition of integration” (Niemann & Schmitter, 2009, p. 47)

⁴ Neofunctionalists do not agree on a single definition or usage of the term spill-over. Forsberg (2007) notes that there are multiple and competing logics that can be discerned from the usage of the term spill-over. He notes the usage of spill-over in four specific ways including: functional spill-over, exogenous spill-over, political spill-over, and social spill-over. For all intents and purposes, spill-over in the context of this thesis ought to be understood that integration in one policy area will spur integration in another area. The exact logic of spill-over is not of primary concern here because each usage of the term employs a different causal-mechanism.

one of the central tenants of neofunctionalism is that integration is seen as “a process as opposed to an outcome or (end-)state” (ibid, p. 47).

One interpretation of neofunctionalist theory states that “over time [...] groups would come to appreciate the benefits from integration, and would thereby transfer their demands, expectations, and even their loyalties from national governments to a new *center*” (Pollack, 2005, p. 16) [emphasis added]. In so doing the institutions of the new *center* would “possess or demand jurisdiction over the pre-existing national states” (Haas, 1958, p. 16) [quoted in Risse (2005)].

Although neofunctionalism was generally favoured for its explanatory power of integration in earlier years, the explanatory power of neofunctionalism seems to break down in light of the integration of European security. There is little empirical evidence to suggest that there is a new political center and that it is the EU, or *Europe*. Nor is there evidence to suggest that it commands similar, or even greater, loyalties to that of the nation state – at either national or sub-national levels. Matlary argues that “if we look at CFSP as a whole and not just at the ESDP, there is not much empirical indication of such a gradual development towards a common foreign policy” (Matlary, 2009, p. 83). In fact, while progress is being made in the integration of European security, CSDP remains strictly under the control of the Council, and therefore member-states, and there is nothing to indicate that this is likely to change.

One of the central problems that neofunctionalism encountered in its analysis of European security integration is that it always considered defence policy to be outside of the integration project. As Tuomas Forsberg (2007) notes “security and defence policy was

originally seen to occupy a policy realm that would remain unaffected by the pressures of integration” (2007, p. 7). He argues that “in the view of Ernst Haas, the spill-over effect that otherwise fostered integration in the area of low politics would not create pressure for defence integration” (ibid, p. 7). As well, neofunctionalists have predominantly theorized the EU as being only a civilian actor, a perspective that is being challenged with recent developments in CSDP and CFSP. As a result, neofunctionalist theory appears to lag behind recent developments in its ability to both theorize and assess some of the possible causes that have prompted defence integration.

The basic tenants of neofunctionalism can be salvaged if one accepts that the process of spill-over is re-constitutive⁵ whereby “the original goal can be assured only by taking further actions” (ibid, p. 7). In doing so, one could connect the adoption of the single currency to the establishment of a unified defence policy. As a result, the integration and creation of European security could be regarded as being a necessary and logical outcome of economic integration. Neofunctionalists might argue that “the common currency would collapse without common defence” (ibid, p. 7). Whether the common currency would collapse without a common defence policy seems unlikely at best and may in fact be an empirically unverifiable claim.

Richard Medley (1999) argues that CSDP is likely an extension of economic policy. He notes that “building a military union means building European-based weapons, aircraft, ships, and satellites - and that means jobs for a job-starved economy” (Medley, 1999, p. 24). This seems like a plausible argument; however, it does little to aid our understanding of European security for two reasons. First of all, Medley identifies economics as a motivation

⁵ Spill-over as a re-constitutive process is known as functional spill-over.

for integrating and creating European security forces, but he does not identify whose motivation it is – whether it is the governments’ or businesses’ motivation, or both. Second, the European Defence Industry (EDI) seems to be lagging behind defence integration. The EDI continues to be characterized by fragmentation and a lack of unified policy. As a result the EDI remains uncompetitive and will likely stay that way for the foreseeable future. The fragmentation of the EDI is in part due to the fact that research and design remains almost exclusively a national project. If it were true that economics was the primary motivator for ESDP/CSDP, one would expect that both businesses and states would have capitalized on this. There is little evidence to indicate that this is actually occurring, although progress has been made in making the EDI more competitive. Whether this stems from defence integration though has yet to be established.

In sum, the primary short-coming of neofunctionalism and its ability to theorize about CSDP is its removal of the nation-state as the locus of power and change in the EU. Neofunctionalism suggests that regional pressures build up to the point where they demand a grand-bargain from the nation state. As a result, neofunctionalists identify the state as being secondary to regional pressures. In the realm of ESDP and CFSP, which remains entirely intergovernmental, one cannot neglect the influence that member-states have. Alan Milward (1993), for example, argues that “neo-functionalism failed the test of history because it did not ask the crucial question of where the locus of power lay in the post-war system [...] and practically did away with the nation-state as the central unit of political organization” (Milward, 1993, p. 3). The exact degree of influence and power that regional and EU pressures exert over the nation state is still a point of major contention for many EU scholars.

1.3 - Realism and the European Union

Realists posit that anarchy, self-help behaviour, and power relations characterize the international system and dominate state interactions. The world, in sum, is “a domain without a sovereign” (Posen, 2004, p. 6). Realism places an almost exclusive emphasis and analytical focus on structural constraints. In doing so, realism is sometimes regarded as being ill-equipped for accurately conceptualizing European integration. Kenneth Waltz, a renowned realist, notes that “some students of international politics believe realism is obsolete. They argue that, although realism’s concepts of anarchy, self-help, and power balancing may have been appropriate to a bygone era, they have been displaced by changed conditions and eclipsed by better ideas” (Waltz, 2000, p. 1)

The EU, and more recently CSDP, are a source of considerable interest for many realists because European security policy is developing at a time when EU member are experiencing no immediate threats to their existence and remain largely under the protection of the US (Posen, 2004). Structural realists argue that the emergence of ESDP in the 1990s is directly connected to the end of the Cold War and the emergence of a unipolar balance of power. Barry Posen (2004) suggests that ESDP is a response, but not a challenge, to US hegemony. The emergence of the EU as a military actor is not necessarily an attempt to change the balance of power and is therefore not an attempt to create a bipolar world system where the EU rivals the US. Rather, it is an effort to restructure the EU-US relationship and therefore the power dynamics between the two actors. Posen (2004) suggests that the primary way in which Europeans are seeking to change this relationship is through minimizing the reliance that EU countries have on the US for security.

Posen notes that there are at least four reasons why the EU is seeking to devise military capabilities that are independent from the US and thus limit their reliance on the US for security. The first views ESDP as a “logical extension of the EU’s CFSP” and notes an EU desire to have a foreign policy that is not only supported by military capabilities but also reflects the relative position that the EU occupies in the international realm (Posen, 2004, p. 12). The second explanation posits that ESDP is motivated by Britain’s desire for an EU “that plays to its strengths” (ibid, p. 13). Britain is the largest defence spender of all the EU countries so it is perhaps logical to view ESDP as an instrument that helps to increase British military capabilities. The third explanation states that ESDP is “little more than a sales tool for NATO’s force goals” (ibid, p. 13) and is an attempt to bring to attention British and French defence issues. The fourth and final explanation offered by Posen is based on previous experiences in the Balkans and the EU’s failure to stem the ensuing crisis there. ESDP, in this sense, is an attempt to create the peacekeeping capabilities outlined in the Petersberg Tasks.

Seth G. Jones (2003) asserts that, at its core, ESDP is an attempt to institutionalize security within the European continent. He states that “substantial security cooperation has occurred, and it is caused by a desire to both enmesh Germany in an international security institution and to prevent future security competition among European powers” (Jones, 2003, p. 115). He attributes the success, and previous failings, of the EU to formulate a CFSP and CSDP to the other member states’ perceptions of German political power. Attempts to formulate a European brand of security and defence, for example, were only successful after the Cold-War because of the perceived threat posed by a unified Germany.

Jones' argument is persuasive, in part, because it is supported by historical evidence. Twice before, Germany sought to conquer the European continent; thus scepticism, at the state level, is partially justified. Concerns surrounding Germany are held not only by Jones, but also by many other realists. Several, for example, maintain that Germany is likely to be the next great power. Waltz, argues that, "the candidates for becoming a great power [...] are the European Union or Germany leading a coalition, China, Japan, and in a more distant future, Russia." (Waltz, 2000, p.30). Placing the rationale for creating ESDP squarely on Germany, however, is immensely problematic. The political culture of Germany is not in the least conducive to the pursuit of global or foreign ambitions. An analysis of German foreign policy paints a picture contrary to the one that Jones, along with many realists and neo-realists, portray.

James Duffield (1999) notes that, "as a theory of state behaviour, neorealism emphasizes the causal influence of a state's external environment and its position within the international system, especially its relative power" (Duffield, 1999, p. 766). Realism does not consider political culture in its analysis of state behaviour and it is for this reason that Germany seems to confound neorealist theory and predictions.⁶ Duffield argues that, "the dissolution of the Soviet bloc and of the Soviet Union itself swept away many of the external constraints that had straight jacketed German policy during the postwar era" (ibid, p. 766-767). Despite the removal of the structural constraints of the Cold-War, Germany has not exploded onto the international realm, as many realists falsely predicted. The European project has acted as "the ultimate proof" that "[Germany] has overcome its nationalist and

⁶ The title of James Duffield's article is 'Why Germany confounds neorealism' and its usage here is in reference to his article.

militarist past” (Risse, 2005, p. 11). If it is true that the main purpose of European security integration is to contain and prevent the re-emergence of a militarist Germany, it is arguably, under that logic, an entirely pointless endeavour.

For realists, international co-operation continues to be seen as having clear structural limits. Thomas Risse (2005), in a criticism of realism, notes that “realism – from Morgenthau to Waltz (Morgenthau 1948; Waltz 1979) – tells us that states are extremely unlikely to give up national sovereignty and the ultimate decision over war and peace” (p. 12) [citation found in original]. Risse offers two suggestions as to why ESDP is not consistent with realist arguments. Firstly, he contends that if the goal of states is to seek and increase their power, “then the unwillingness of EU member states to give up external sovereignty in foreign affairs and security is outright self-defeating” (ibid, p. 13). For many member states, the only way to thoroughly add strength to their international position is through co-operation in the EU, which in essence means integrating their defence capabilities in EU institutions. Secondly, and perhaps most importantly, Risse argues that the realist claim that states “are not prepared to give up sovereignty in the realm of security and defence” is entirely misleading (ibid, p. 13) citing NATO as an example of this.

Realists argue that “NATO is first of all a treaty made by states “ and that “states determine its fate” (Waltz, 2000, p. 20). Risse suggests that this view fails to take into consideration the impact that NATO has on national sovereignty. He argues that “once decisions [in NATO] have been made with regard to war and peace, Germany and other NATO members are prepared to die under the command of U.S., British, or French Generals” (Risse, p. 13). One can see the applicability that this criticism of realism has, and extend it to ESDP. The realist claim that states are unwilling to relinquish sovereignty in

external security and defence does not take into consideration the fact that states have relinquished far more sovereignty through NATO than they have in the EU. NATO's Article-5⁷ is sufficient evidence to indicate that states in the past and present have and continue to give up sovereignty in the realm of security and defence.

In a body of literature that largely favours the deepening of European integration Realism does have its place (Forsburg, 2007). It is one of the few theories, for example, that has consistently sought to identify both the underlying logic of CSDP and its international implications, though doing so within a strictly realist framework. In spite of the changes that have taken place in the last two decades and the end of the cold-war and the emergence of a uni-polar balance of power, realists claim that the basic principles of the international realm – anarchy, self-help, and the balance of power - remain the same. This is due to the fact, as realists suggest, that the international system itself has not changed. Waltz (2000) asks “what sorts of changes would alter the international political system so profoundly that old ways of thinking would no longer be relevant?” (p. 5). He responds by saying that “changes *of* the system would do it; changes *in* the system would not” (ibid, p. 5)[italics found in original].

Waltz makes a valid point here. Despite the changes in the system since the end of the cold war, realist assumptions about the structure of the international system likely remain relevant. States, for example, continue to be the main actors in determining international

⁷ The full text of Article-5 reads: The Parties agree that an armed attack against one or more of them in Europe or North America shall be considered an attack against them all and consequently they agree that, if such an armed attack occurs, each of them, in exercise of the right of individual or collective self-defence recognised by Article 51 of the Charter of the United Nations, will assist the Party or Parties so attacked by taking forthwith, individually and in concert with the other Parties, such action as it deems necessary, including the use of armed force, to restore and maintain the security of the North Atlantic area. (See: North Atlantic Treaty Organization, 2008)

politics⁸. This should not be interpreted to mean that the state is the only actor that shapes international relations. Youth groups and civilian movements have demonstrated that they can act with effectiveness and power in altering the relationship that states have with both governments and their people as evidenced by the Arab Spring. Nonetheless, security dilemmas between states do continue to exist, although perhaps not to the extent to which they did during the cold war, and for this reason states should seek to minimize the occurrence of security dilemmas at every opportunity. CSDP is particularly problematic for realists in this regard, as it signifies a change in the EU's relative position in the world which inevitably means that its relationship *vis-a-vis* other states is also changing, for better or for worse. Russia, for example, has consistently voiced concerns and opposition to a militarized and internationally active EU. Russian Ambassador to the EU Dmitry Rogozin has stated that "we are for permanent and stable peace in Europe and it is only possible when there is no build-up of military potential in contact zones" (BBC Monitoring Service, 2010). Nonetheless, criticisms of European security integration by realists almost exclusively center around the impact that it has on the Atlantic relationship and should there look to include a broader scope of analysis

1.4 - Social Constructivism and Elite Socialization in CSDP

Many studies on European integration have often focused on conceptualizing the processes of integration from within the framework of Europeanization. Constructivist contributions to understanding European security policy often cite changing policy preferences that include a greater importance on *Europe*. They argue that a European

⁸ David A. Lake provides an in depth analysis of the hierarchy of international treaties and alliances. (See: Lake, 1996).

identity is developing through a process of learning and socialization in the upper echelons of government. Some constructivist literature, including research conducted by Eva Gross (2007) seeks to examine the possibility of a European identity as a starting point for explaining European defence integration. There is, however, significant disagreement in this area of EU literature and the notion of a European identity and its salience is deeply contested. Nonetheless, whether or not a European identity does exist, it is true that many European issues do have some salience in the political agenda of member states. Their importance in CSDP and CFSP may be less obvious.

Michael Smith (2000) argues that Europeanization is evident in four areas: elite socialization; bureaucratic re-organization; constitutional change; and, increased public support for European political co-operation. (Smith, 2000, p. 617) [quoted in (Gross, 2007)]. To measure Europeanization in these four areas Smith examines the bargaining models and negotiations of Intergovernmental Conferences (IGCs). He observes that a “problem-solving’, as opposed to [a] bargaining, style of decision making” (Smith, 2000, p. 615) has permeated the mindset of policy planners and decision makers, especially in relation to CFSP. Although security and defence policy remains by-and-large the most intergovernmental of all the areas of the EU, political officials are aware of the constraints that are placed upon them with the expectation that they are to act within a community model. The pursuit of one’s self-interest, without regard for its European implications, is therefore frowned upon and doing so, as Smith notes, “tends to be discouraged in CFSP” (ibid, p. 615). Smith argues that decision making in CFSP is more oriented toward problem-solving, which involves an appeal to common interests through the use of ostracism or peer-pressure to sanction potential defectors” (ibid, p. 615). Smith attributes this shift in

bargaining models as evidence of a change in norms and ideas regarding the importance of the role that the EU occupies. If one wishes to study the domestic impact of EU foreign policy co-operation, an appropriate start would be to examine these indicators of adaptation (ibid, p. 617). Indeed, Sophie Vanhoonacker and An D. Jacobs (2010) use this as a starting point in their examination of institutional change in Brussels as a result of the creation of ESDP.

Jonathan Slapin (2008) arrives at a similar conclusion as Smith but does not agree with the salience of Europeanization. Slapin posits that an institutional model best explains the organization and conduct of most IGCs in the EU. A wide range of important decisions surrounding EU affairs have been made during these IGCs.(Slapin, 2008). He contends that traditional analyses of negotiations suggest that “bargaining strength is related to all non-military resources, such as population size and economic might, and negotiations between large member states at IGCs have shaped the course of EU history” (Slapin, 2008, p. 132). This argument has been met with some criticism in other policy areas of the EU and some contend that small states have been integral in shaping the direction of integration. In the case of European security policy, however, it does not appear that this criticism is valid. It has only been the largest states – Britain and France mainly – who have both encouraged as well as prevented integration in this area. Without their willingness and involvement, European defence integration would likely not have taken place at all.

In the areas of policy where small states have a larger voice, Smith attributes their ability to initiate attempts at reform to the Europeanization of diplomats and policy-makers. Slapin, on the other hand, demonstrates that the ability of small EU states to have influence in policy areas is not the result of Europeanization or the willingness of larger states to act on

a level playing-field and therein give smaller states a louder voice (Slapin, 2008). Rather, Slapin concludes that it is the organizational and institutional makeup of the IGCs and the disproportionately weighted voting system to population size that is the main factor. Europeanization is therefore not a consideration in determining co-operation in a policy area where negotiations are based on consensus (ibid). In policy areas such as European defence where Qualified Majority Voting (QMV) is used as opposed to consensus, the ability of smaller states to influence policy is largely removed. Europeanization, or *Europe*, therefore does not seem to have a significant amount of importance in negotiations regarding European security.

Constructivist literature often comes under heavy fire from critics at both the institutional and intergovernmental levels for the lack of empirical evidence to back up constructivist claims regarding learned socialization and Europeanization. Matlary argues that “the literature on the ‘Europeanisation’ of national interests is not very convincing in its insistence that interests are changed through learning and socialisation” (Matlary, 2009, p. 81). The empirical evidence, at times, contradicts the claims found in constructivist literature. Smith (2000) argues that Europeanization plays a role in the decision making process and argues that reinforcing the concept of *Europe* is a central concern; however, this is not seen to be the case in security and defence policy. Eva Gross (2007) examines a possible link between a broadly defined process of Europeanization and the specific German foreign policy responses to two international crises. The first being in the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia (FYROM) and the second on 11 September 2001 with the attacks on the World Trade Center and Pentagon, of which resulted in the invasions of Iraq and Afghanistan. In both instances, Gross notes that the German government displayed a clear

preference for acting in a multilateral and cooperative manner and that domestic pressure had significantly more impact on decisions than did international pressures, even those from within the EU. The German Federal Foreign Office (GFFO) expressed a reluctance to apply the new civil and military tools that were created under the ESDP. They “emphasized restoring stability over the application of new instruments” (Gross, 2007, p. 508). She argues that in the case of FYROM many of the officials in the GFFO preferred a multilateral response through NATO rather than the EU. Gross suggests that “considerations of Europeanization did not apply when it came to military operations”(ibid, 517). As well, the German public expressed disapproval of Germany becoming involved in these conflicts. Part of the reason for this, as James Duffield suggests, stems from the shared German political culture towards anti-militarism which is pivotal to understanding the inability and reluctance of Germany to act on the international stage (Duffield, 1999).

Furthermore, the four areas in which Smith argued that Europeanization ought to be at least somewhat evident - bureaucratic reorganization, constitutional change, elite socialization and shifts in public opinion – were not evident when it came to the issue of military deployment (Gross, 2007). Domestic forces in Germany clearly outweighed international pressures. The GFFO, already constrained by significant disapproval of the potential deployment of troops was clearly unwilling to use new and untested civil and military instruments to try and resolve the emerging crisis in FYROM, even if these tools were *European* tools. The decision to act initially through NATO procedures and resources would suggest that the decision made by the GFFO was a strategic calculation geared to appeasing the potential for strong disagreement on the home-front and that doing so was a political decision. Gross (2007) notes that “NATO was conducting three active operations in

the Balkans at the time, and it was not considered useful to dislodge one of these operations in order to start an ESDP operation” (p. 511). NATO was therefore selected as the main venue through which FYROM crisis management was to operate because it offered the best probability for success. It also clearly demonstrates that in the case of Germany, domestic factors determine the extent to which Germany can operate in the international realm and the ways in which it does so. Despite the Constructivist argument of the salience of *Europe* permeating the mindsets of European politicians, in the case of European defence policy there is little empirical evidence to suggest that this is true.

Gross’ analysis also suggests that member states will generally choose to operate through institutions that have been previously established and which offer a greater guarantee of success. Strategic considerations therefore ought to be considered when analysing ESDP. In the German case, they opted to work through NATO and placed emphasis on the Atlantic relationship, to symbolically include the United States, and to conclude the “Berlin Plus agreement between NATO and the EU prior to launching an ESDP operation” (Gross, 2007, p. 510). The GFFO decision to use existing institutions is inconsistent with the adaptation indicators that Smith argues exists.

Social Constructivism fails in its ability to provide verifiable claims as to the nature of European defence policy. It may be true that there is a tendency towards a European identity and that Europeanization can account for developments in defence policy. To date, however, it has not been satisfactorily demonstrated that there is actually a link between these two political phenomena.

1.5 - Multilateralism: Threats and Risk Sharing

Matlary (2009) and King (2007) observe that the propensity to work through international organizations and institutions depends greatly upon the type of conflict into which states enter. This observation supports an inter-governmentalist model which suggests that the EU is not developing its own level of governance but rather that EU institutions are additional tools to be used to achieve national foreign policy goals. In terms of European defence policy, this would suggest that the creation of military and civilian capabilities is a way for Britain and France to assert their foreign policy goals while sharing the resources required for doing so. EU institutions can also act both as a source of legitimacy and a mechanism by which to share risk and responsibility.

Matlary (2009) suggests that developments in CSDP can be explained by examining recent trends regarding the ways in which wars are entered into. She argues that European defence policy is consistent with a broader trend in global politics that requires politicians to accrue legitimacy and support through international institutions. In doing so, a state is able to share the risks involved in a particular operation by joining together with other actors. An example of this is the UN which historically and in the present has served as a vehicle to provide a sense of legitimacy to foreign operations. The requirement that military operations have legitimacy can help to explain the integration and creation of European security and defence policies. The EU, noted for its multilateral and democratic nature may itself be a means with which to provide legitimacy to operations conducted through CSDP. It is important to recognize as well, that almost all civilian and military European operations have been conducted by way of UN mandates.

The types of threats that exist in the world today are markedly different from those that existed even a few decades ago. The emphasis that was placed upon existential security is no longer seen as being as relevant for many policy-makers. Matlary suggests that the threats that jeopardize the existence of the nation state have subsided and have been replaced by risks that are both diffused and de-territorialized. Often these risks are far away and do not pose any immediate or credible threat to the territorial integrity of its member states. Anthony King (2011) notes that the militaries of most European nations have begun a process of transformation that reflects this new reality and as a result emphasis is placed on the mobility and rapid deployment of forces. He argues that “Europe’s forces are being turned into deployable reaction forces, capable of rapid intervention in regions of ethnic and religious conflict and state failure” (King, 2011, p. 7).

Agreeing with King’s assessment, Matlary suggests that participation in wars has become almost entirely optional. As a result of this, states are increasingly looking towards multilateralism to gain legitimacy for foreign operations and wars, as they are no longer waged for national survival. In the post cold war era “European states typically engaged in wars of a new type, mostly optional ones that concern terror and/or humanitarian and human rights abuse” (Matlary, 2009, p. 1)

If Matlary is accurate in her assessment then the logic informing the national defence strategies of many states is highly questionable. If security is defined as a broad, non-existential issue then one may conclude that “it makes [the EU] one of the most important security actors of the post-Cold War world” through its ability “to coordinate diverse tools of security policy – economic, political, and military” (ibid, p. 4). In light of this, considerable

attention ought to be paid to CSDP and CFSP and the rationale for security that is underlying European defence policy.

Matlary (2009) argues that there are practical reasons in addition to ideational reasons that can account for the recent integration of European defence and security. She notes that in recent years, the military budgets of nearly all developed countries have been reduced⁹. In order to achieve the same goals that were once within the capability of a single country, states have become increasingly dependent upon alliances and in turn on integrating their capabilities. She argues that this has been the case because many citizens of European countries do not support large military budgets.

Although there has been a marked tendency towards integrating and increasing military capabilities, states in the EU often express reluctance to co-operate with one another when the risks associated with the conduct of a particular operation are seen as being too high. Thus, while CSDP may serve as a mechanism to legitimize operations and share risk, there are clear limits to the extent to which it can do so. When the risks of an operation become too high, there is a tendency to move away from the community model and to fall back on state-centric approaches. Matlary notes that “it seems clear no state wishes to lose national control over national military contributions or decision-making in this field, especially when risk increases” (Matlary, 2009, p. 30).

An example of this is found in the sharing of intelligence and expertise related to the disposal of Improvised Explosive Devices (IEDs) in Iraq and Afghanistan. During a November 2009 Sub-Committee question period between United Kingdom parliamentary

⁹ China is an exception to this trend as their defence spending has increased 12.7% to 56 billion GBP in 2011. China has also expressed ambitions to create a blue water fleet. See: (Branigan, 2011)

members and NATO representatives, the issue of IEDs was raised. Lord Anderson of Swansea asked the question “is there [...] scope for us to share some of that expertise more actively with our European partners through the EDA?” (United Kingdom, 2009, p. 21). The Minister of State for International Defence and Security responded by saying “whilst on operations we work very closely with our allies [...] it is quite difficult to share within a box [...] even if we allow people to use the box, we do not always want to share what is within the box” (ibid, p. 22). When asked to provide additional comments regarding the fact that allied soldiers were as likely to be killed by IEDs as were their own, the minister responded by saying that “they are [only] if they are operating in the same area. We do co-operate with those who are operating in the same areas. Many of them are not” (p. 22). As a result, despite a tendency towards working through a multilateral framework, issues deemed to be nationally sensitive remain the prerogative of individual states.

Pernille Rieker (2005), in a working paper on CSDP integration, explains that the debate regarding whether or not the EU possesses its own distinct security policy depends largely upon how one chooses to define ‘security’. He notes that “those who defend a traditional definition of security may tend to ignore the EU as a significant security actor [...] for those who understand security in a broader sense, however, the situation will look quite different” (Rierker, 2005, p. 4). This is an especially salient point that Rierker makes. If it is sufficient for the EU to satisfy its security contribution through economic and political means then the appropriation and procurement of military capabilities within the EU would be unnecessary. Guido Lenzo (1999) argues that there are significant pressures on the EU, both national and international, “to supplement its undeniable economic and social gravitational pull with a military projection capability of its own for crisis prevention,

conflict management and political stabilization purposes”, (Lenzo, 1999, p. 131) but the rationale behind the supposed need to create and project EU interests abroad, and to engage in crisis-management and Peace Support Operations (PSO) is questionable. As well, if the foreign policy goals and security ambitions of member-states cannot be justified under national budgets and instead require nations to band together, then the logic informing these goals ought to be questioned.

1.6 - CSDP and the Democratic Deficit

The literature on the democratic deficit of the EU perhaps best highlights the need for a critical assessment of the EU’s emerging role as a military actor. This is especially true given the fact that, as Matlary (2009) suggests, missions undertaken by the EU are largely optional. The democratic-deficit can be interpreted as being a lack of either oversight or democratic accountability in the daily operations and conduct of EU institutions. Traditionally, the democratic-deficit has generally been discussed in relation to the undemocratic nature of the integration process which, at times, is largely hidden from public scrutiny. The extent to which there is a democratic-deficit, or if there is one at all, is still in debate.

Andrew Moravcsik (2008) argues that the democratic-deficit is non-existent and that the EU is held "to the impossible standard of an idealized concept of Westminsterian or ancient-style democracy." (Moravcsik, 2008, p. 332). As evidence of this, he writes that EU institutions "generate as much or greater popular trust than national ones" (ibid, p. 338) and that "laws that originate in Brussels total no more than around 10-20%" of laws adopted by member-states (ibid, p. 333). Although national laws that originate from the EU account for

a relatively small percentage of total laws signed into effect, this criticism says nothing about the process by which those laws were made or whether or not sufficient oversight was expressed. And, even though the population places its trust in EU's institutions, this trust does not indicate that policies were formed, and that laws were enacted, in a democratically accountable way. It may simply indicate that the population approves of some of the policies being implemented and that, overall, they have a positive view of EU institutions.

Simon Hix and Andreas Follesdal (2006) have argued against Moravcsik stating that an essential component of any basic democracy, the presence of contestation on policy, is missing. Analysis of some of the decision-making procedures in the previous section supports Hix and Follesdal's argument, as many decisions surrounding ESDP were made behind closed doors at intergovernmental-conferences. While this thesis does not seek to resolve the debate surrounding the democratic-deficit, the purpose of this section is to demonstrate, by examining the way both the EU and member states oversee military and civilian operations, that, at the very least, there is space for improvement when it comes to democratic oversight of the EU's civilian and military capabilities.

With the creation of CSDP and CFSP; however, analysis of the democratic-deficit can be applied to the participation in and conduct of military and civilian missions abroad. CSDP is mandated to conduct three types of operations. They include (1) operations under a Community instrument, financed by the Community budget; (2) CFSP operations without military or defence implications, financed by the CFSP budget; and (3) ESDP operations with military implications financed by the Member States - outside of the EU budget. (Born, Anghel, Dowling, Fuior 2008, p. 10). The Community budget is only made available to member states when the mission falls within one of the first two categories. The third type of

mission is left to be funded by individual member states. Community resources are, however, made available through the use of the Athena Mechanism¹⁰ to fund common costs. Incidentally, common costs usually comprise “the bulk of the operational common costs” such as “the establishment of headquarters, transport costs, salaries of locally hired personnel, barracks and lodging/infrastructure, etc” (European Union, 2008a). The demarcation between common costs and national costs is at times unclear, and the question may arise as to whether EU resources are being used in areas that they were not intended for.

Issues concerning transparency and accountability are increased as member states begin to rely on international institutions to share risk when confronted with controversial deployments. This occurs not only on the battlefield by sharing the burden of security, but it also occurs on the home-front. The sharing of risk is directly connected to the sharing of accountability and in turn, of responsibility. Implications regarding accountability and democratic oversight of the control of the armed forces are worth considering at length. In response to a question regarding the likelihood that ESDP procedures would move beyond the intergovernmental sphere a British diplomat was quoted as saying “there has to be national control when national lives are at risk if there is to be any meaning to democratic accountability” (Matlary, p. 30). The EU has long been a target of criticism for its lack of transparency and accountability. This criticism has increased in recent years now that the EU is beginning to fashion its own foreign policy. At the same time, it is also developing tools that extend beyond those of soft power, such as the ability to deploy military resources for crisis management around the world, without having first created the necessary institutions for accountability for such actions.

¹⁰ The Athena Mechanism was established in 2004 as a means to finance and administer costs associated with missions undertake through CFSP.

Hans Born and Heiner Hänggi (2005) note that decisions that were once the providence of individual states are now entering into the domain of international and supranational organizations. Many of these lack the proper legal instruments and regulatory institutions for holding decision makers accountable for their actions. Born and Hänggi (2000) argue that the EU is no different. Decisions regarding ESDP, such as troop deployments, are relegated entirely to the Council. The IGCs wherein these decisions are made are often highly secretive and held behind closed-doors (Smith, 2000). Access to information regarding the decision making processes in these IGCs is highly restricted. Accountability for EU-mandated missions therefore rests in the individual member states' parliamentary or legal system. Born and Hänggi (2005), examine the oversight and accountability procedures for sixteen Western countries, including the United States, Canada, Germany, and France. He concludes that the majority of countries studied are ill-equipped to properly and effectively hold their respective governments accountable over declarations of war as well as the decision to deploy troops in either civilian and military missions. Born & Hänggi (2005) list five possible areas for parliamentary oversight of the armed forces: (1) legislative power – in the codification of new legal powers pertaining to the authorisation of the use of force; (2) budgetary – consisting of approval of expenditures on military missions; (3) elective – often involving a no-confidence vote in the case of a disagreement regarding troop deployment; (4) representative – the ability to channel opposition and disagreement with the government's decision to deploy forces; and (5) scrutiny and oversight – which involves the monitoring of information and the legality of troop deployments – both before and after decisions are taken (Born & Hänggi, 2005, p. 4).

These oversight powers reside in the parliamentary body of a particular member country; however, the EU parliament has no comparable jurisdiction over council decisions. Born notes that “the founding documents of the European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP) making provision *inter alia* for PSOs did not, however – and probably not by accident – make any new provision for parliamentary accountability.” (ibid. 2005, p. 16). National parliaments, as well, often play little role, if any, in the decision making process. A British Member of Parliament stated that “our involvement in the formation of the CFSP is negligible. As a Parliament we are informed after the event and there has been no occasion whatsoever since our arrangements for scrutiny of both pillars¹¹ were set up on which we have been consulted about any CFSP document or decision before it was finished.” (Neyts-Uyttebroeck, 1997, p. 14) [Quoted in Hill & Smith, 2005).

Oversight powers also vary from state to state depending upon the structure and relationship that parliament has to the government. Germany, for example, possesses stronger oversight instruments than most other EU member countries surveyed (Born, Anghel, Dowling & Fuor, 2008). The German Bundestag oversees all military missions and any military deployment requires authorisation from parliament as indicated by the Parliamentary Participation Law that was adopted in 2004 (Born et al, p. 21). In order for there to be approval of an ESDP mission, “parliament must be informed about [...] the mandate, geographical scope of operations, legal basis of the military deployment, maximum number of troops to be deployed, the capabilities of these troops, the duration of the mission and the estimated financial costs” (Born et al., 2008, p. 21]. The United Kingdom on the

¹¹ The pillar system was established in 1993 as a result of the Maastricht Treaty. The three pillars included the (1) European Communities, (2) The Common Foreign and Security Policy and (3) the Police and Judicial Co-operation in Criminal Matters. With the ratification of the Lisbon Treaty in 2009, the pillar system was abandoned in favor of a unified EU legal structure.

other hand expresses oversight "most actively through the European Union Select Committee of the House of Lords" (ibid, p. 27) but Parliament is not afforded any formal powers of approval of ESDP operations. Other EU countries surveyed by Born, including Greece and Slovakia, have few if any oversight powers for the deployment of troops. For four of the operations studied by Born, the Parliaments of Greece and Slovakia were not involved in any ESDP oversight whatsoever. In Romania "Parliament is neither consulted nor requested to approve national participation in ESDP operations. The decision to send troops on missions abroad belongs to the President, with the sole obligation to inform the Parliament of this decision within five days" (ibid p. 24).

As has been argued, national parliaments are responsible for scrutiny and oversight of military missions, but the European Parliament (EP), the institution perhaps most suitable for that role, has no such jurisdiction over Council decisions because of the intergovernmental provisions of the second pillar. The EP is therefore almost entirely removed from having oversight and is only included in the decision-making process when the Council seeks additional resources for missions that may have already been decided upon and may already be underway. Even in terms of budget, however, the EP possesses relatively little power. In the United States for example, while the President can give authorization to deploy troops to a combat setting, Congress has budgetary control and is able to withhold funding entirely. The EP possesses no such mechanisms. The loci of accountability and oversight powers in the EU are perhaps misplaced, as they remain within the national parliamentary bodies which are often ill-informed and removed from EU procedures and policies.

In a survey conducted by Born et. al (2008), a questionnaire was sent to various committees involved in defence, European affairs, and internal and foreign affairs: "11 respondents of the 39 [responses received] stated that ESDP matters are simply not discussed within their committees" (Born et al., 2008 p. 16), and most respondents "appeared to have some difficulty in pointing out exactly how their parliament scrutinized the four missions in question" (p. 16). In regards to the EU mission in Afghanistan, known as EUPOL Afghanistan, the "European Parliament complained through its Committee on Foreign Affairs (AFET), that neither Parliament nor its Committees have been fully informed of, or consulted on, the EU commitment for the planned ESDP mission" (Gya, 2007, p. 1). It is ironic in a sense that EU institutions that are tasked with initiating democratic reforms elsewhere are themselves lacking in democratic accountability and transparency. The EU is therefore confronted with a number of different options to address issues of accountability, and for it to continue to act as a source of legitimacy, it must take steps to reduce the democratic deficit especially as it continues to increase its international presence and build its military capabilities.

1.7 - The EU as a Normative Power

According to Ian Manners (2002) "the principles of democracy, rule of law, social justice, and respect for human rights were first made explicit in the 1973 Copenhagen declaration on European identity" (Manners, 2002, p. 241) Since then, and arguably even before the 1973 declaration, values such as these have formed a cornerstone of the EU's policies and institutions. Manners was one of the first EU scholars to suggest that the EU might occupy a unique space in international politics.. He argues that "by refocusing away from the debate over either civilian or military power, it is possible to think of the ideational

impact of the EU's international identity/role as a normative power" (ibid, p. 238). The concept of normative power and its inclusion in the debate necessarily extends analysis of the EU's international presence beyond its economic, civilian and military capabilities, to include the impact that EU ideas and values may have in its neighbourhood and around the world. This in turn broadens the discussion surrounding the EU's contribution to regional and global security, instead of limiting analysis of its role to coincide with traditional notions of physical incentives and military power.

The origin of the EU's normative power can be traced back to the end of World War Two. The EU was "created in a post-war historical environment which reviled the nationalisms that had led to barbarous war and genocide" (Manners, 2002, p. 240). Francois Duchene declared in the 1970s that "the people of Europe had largely formed 'amilitary' values" (Diez, 2005, p. 617). It is perhaps not surprising that the institutions and forms of governance of the post-war period would seek to minimize the recurrence of war through co-operation rather than competition.

Manners suggests that "simply by existing as different in a world of states and the relations between them, the European Union changes the normality of 'international relations'" (Manners, 2008, p. 65). It does so by demonstrating a shift away from an anarchic state-centric system towards a system of international politics that appears to be structured around supranational institutions and the rule of law. And, "in contrast to previous focus on material incentives or physical force, the concept of normative power emphasizes normative justification in world politics" (Manners, 2011, p. 76).

There is little disagreement in the literature that the EU itself appears to represent an ideational shift in world politics. Thomas Diez (2005), however, notes that even though the EU is regarded as a normative power, there is a greater need for reflection on this idea. Furthermore, he suggests that the normative power phenomenon is not unique to the EU, but that normative power in foreign policy can be traced back to United States' foreign policy. Based on his analysis of the normative power of the United States, Diez suggests that, there is a greater need for further analysis of the EU's normative power (Diez, 2005). Manners (2008) notes that being seen as a normative power and acting as one are not necessarily the same thing. Although Manners acknowledges that the EU, through CFSP, commits itself to the promotion of democracy in the world - which includes, social freedom, consensual democracy, associative human rights, the supranational rule of law, inclusive equality, social solidarity, sustainable development, and good governance – promotion of these values outside of the EU may not yield results similar to those achieved by promoting them within the EU. As well, Thomas Diez suggests that the EU is classified as a normative power due to the intentions of the policies that it pursues but not necessarily due to the results of these policies.

According to Michelle Pace (2009), the debate surrounding normative power Europe has failed to address "why liberal democracy has achieved normative status [as] a taken for granted state of [affairs], a 'naturalism'" (Pace, 2009, p. 40). Because the motivations behind promoting democracy through CFSP are at times unclear, the implementation of the EU's foreign policy goals has been contradictory (Pace, 2009 & Kotzian et. al, 2011). As a result it may be difficult to distinguish when the EU is seeking to promote its values and when it is seeking to promote its interests. Karen Smith (2007) notes that "it is difficult to specify a

'hierarchy' of European interests [as] the EU has tended not to set priorities among its various interests and policy objectives" (Smith, 2007, p. 130). Nonetheless, "as to the motivation underlying the promotion of democracy, the EU is - according to its own understanding - driven by the universal motive to foster liberal democracy in the world" (Kotzian, Knodt, & Urdze, 2011, p. 995). However, as Kotzian et. al note, "the commitment to fostering democracy - for whatever reason - is clearly not the only factor guiding the EU's activities in this domain" (ibid, p. 997).

Peter Kotzian identifies two motivations behind the EU's promotion of democracy in its neighbourhood and abroad. The first motivation, identified by Kotzian is centered around altruism and a normative conception of how world politics ought to be structured. The EU prefers to be surrounded by countries whose system of governance closely resemble its own and believes that there is instrumental and intrinsic value associated with the promotion of its values. Kotzian also indicates that the projection of the idea of 'normative power Europe' and a moral imperative based on the concept of having a 'responsibility to protect', also factor in to provide the basis for this motivation.

The second motivation stems from the idea that "being surrounded by democracies has its advantage: safety [...] and the avoidance of spill-over effects [from] instability and bad governance elsewhere" (Kotzian et. al, 2011, p. 996). The logic of the second motivation identified by Kotzian appears to be incomplete. If it is true that the EU's motivation for promoting democracy stems from security considerations regarding the spill-over and proliferation of crisis areas, then that motivation is only applicable in instances where, geographically, the potential for spill-over is a reasonable concern. That the EU conducts missions and employs instruments far beyond its borders and into areas where the risk of

spill-over into the European neighbourhood is minimal, or even non-existent, indicates that there can be no reasonable security interests motivating many of the EU's missions. While there may be *perceived* strategic interests informing the conduct of missions abroad, it is not entirely convincing to suggest that the EU's promotion of democracy is motivated by interests, whatever those may be, in areas of the world where there are no clearly identifiable interests to begin with.

In spite of the apparently altruistic nature of the EU's foreign policy, the problems associated with democracy promotion and the inconsistency by which this foreign policy approach is applied are well documented (Pace, 2009, Kotzian et. al, 2011 & Seeberg, 2009). Even utilizing instruments outside of CSDP for the promotion of its values yields uncertain results. In relation to foreign aid, for example:

the whole process of assigning funds is largely outside the control of governments, which is the main point of EIDHR (European Union Instrument for Democracy and Human Rights). [Its] intrusiveness becomes clear when one regards the situation in a non-democratic country. With the EIDHR, the EU is funding groups that are not supportive of - or openly opposing - the current government or the current institutional setting. From the viewpoint of the ruling elite in a non-democratic state, funding 'democracy-oriented' groups is funding the political opposition (Kotzian, et al., 2011, p. 1003).

Funding grassroots organizations or democratic groups that are hostile to the ruling elite may draw resentment from the government. This may in turn result in tighter regulations or may cause a 'crackdown' on the groups receiving funds and thus stifle the potential for democracy in that country. Kotzian addresses this counter-argument, in part, by stating the EU has a propensity to issue more funds in states where "civil society and democracy is already on the road to success" (ibid, p. 1004).

Since there is no clear operational concept or security strategy that precisely outlines a hierarchy of interests and goals, the EU, whether motivated by altruism or not, runs the risk of inconsistently applying its security strategy. This could have the effect of undermining its credibility and threatening its normative power influence (Smith, 2002 & Kotzian, 2011). Indeed, Kotzian notes that one of the purposes of some missions and of some democracy building instruments includes "promoting the EU's image and standing in the third country" (Kotzian, et al. 2011, p. 1013). If the instruments used by the EU to promote democracy and its values prove to be ineffective or are applied in an inconsistent and half-hearted manner, the EU's reputation as a whole may be negatively affected.

The question of whether the conduct of civilian and military missions under CSDP are consistent with normative power Europe is of particular importance. Of course, it is not this author's intention to try and resolve the debate surrounding the EU being either a normative power or, with the emergence of CSDP and the concentration on military missions, a military power. While on the surface it appears that the conduct of these missions is consistent with the EU's support for "certain global ethical standards" (Smith, 2011, p. 144), this superficial conclusion presupposes that missions conducted under CSDP are not in practice detrimental to these standards.

1.8 - Conclusion

The literature on European defence policy has made significant progress in explaining the emergence of CSDP. Various theoretical perspectives, with greater or lesser success, provide varied accounts for the emergence of European security and defence. Neofunctionalists argue that European security extends from regional and economic

pressures. Realists assert that the time and place in which European security has evolved coincides with the end of the Cold War and the emergence of a unipolar balance of power. Social-constructivists argue, on the other hand, that a greater salience of the concept of Europe has permeated the mindsets of policy-makers and that Europeanization can account for the emergence of CSDP. Janne Matlary asserts that European countries have banded together and sought to integrate defence capabilities as a way to share risk and accountability in an age where national defence budgets continue to decline. It is not the intention of this thesis to assert that one theoretical perspective ought to be favoured absolutely over all others, but rather to suggest that to formulate an accurate picture of European defence, one should consider aspects from all theoretical positions. Despite the disagreements inherent within the literature, the research conducted so far does provide us with valuable tools for analyzing European security and defence policy.

One of the main shortcomings of CSDP literature to date, as has been noted, is that few theoretical perspectives offer a way to critically assess the domestic and foreign implications of Europe as an emerging military actor. The explanatory power of the theories discussed above seems to be limited to accounting for why integration, in a general sense, has occurred. These theories have not yet sought to explain why CSDP and CFSP are evolving into their current form. Studies of the democratic deficit have begun to take into consideration the domestic implications of a militarized Europe. There is also a growing body of research which examines the democratic implications for the control of the armed forces in Europe. Realism is one theory that does devote some attention to the international implications of a militarized Europe and the impact that it has had and may have on neighbouring countries, especially those which are located immediately beyond the borders

of NATO and the EU. The criticisms' raised by realists, however, appear to be somewhat misplaced at times. Analyzing CSDP strictly from a balance-of-power perspective is arguably too narrow a view point to accurately assess European defence policies.

The research on multilateralism, conducted by Janne Matlary (2009), and the analysis of the democratic deficit, together perhaps provide the best starting point for critically examining CSDP. Both approaches serve to highlight the importance of analyzing the efficiency and efficacy of CSDP. For example, if the EU is undertaking missions that are optional, as Matlary suggests they are, then these policies cannot logically be necessary for the defence of Europe as the quality of optionality negates that of necessity. The motivation for undertaking these missions, according to Kotzian (2011), Pace (2009), and Smith (2011) appears to stem from the EU's normative position in the world. Although they appear to be well intentioned, it is troubling that defence policies are not actually policies which defend. This is immensely problematic when coupled with the fact that there exists a lack of oversight regarding both the missions undertaken as well as the manner in which they are being funded. The following chapter will examine the logic and efficacy of the civilian and military missions undertaken by the EU.

Chapter 2

2.1 - Critically Assessing European Security

In the previous chapter, a review of the literature on CSDP indicated that the study of European security policy has flourished in the last decade; however, it has produced few conclusions that have been widely accepted. The study of CSDP has focused mainly on explaining the causes of, and factors responsible for, the creation of a common defence policy. In comparison, there has been little analysis of whether CSDP actually contributes meaningfully to security in Europe. Critical analysis of CSDP, to date, consists primarily of critiques of its practical implementation and presumes, in part, the necessity of its success. This chapter argues that CSDP capabilities are being created with the intent to protect and promote European values, such as human rights, democracy, and the rule of law both at home and abroad. It seeks to examine the ways in which the EU is currently contributing to global and regional security. In so doing, it also demonstrates that European defence policy is removed from the actual defence of Europe. Given the economic costs and despite the progress that has been made in creating EU civilian and military capabilities, it is not evident that CSDP, in focusing on civilian and military missions abroad, meaningfully contributes to security in the EU or elsewhere. This chapter serves to highlight some of the strategic problems that policy planners are experiencing in creating military and civilian capabilities, and questions the necessity of creating such capabilities in the first place.

The current nature of European defence policy represents a departure from a goal-oriented security policy in favour of a value-based security policy. The main purpose of European security policy is perceived by many to be to secure and promote the values

inherent within the European political landscape. A European Council on Foreign Relations (ECFR) report lead by Ivan Krastev (2010) on European security policy suggests that the main considerations of European security elites are based on post-modern fears “about defending their way of life” and preserving European values (Krastev, Leonard, Bechev, Kabzova & Wilson, 2010, p. 27). In the literature review, an analysis of Karen Smith (2007) and Peter Kotzian's (2011) work suggests while interests and values can intersect, the pursuit of strategic interests did not provide a compelling account for why the EU is conducting missions abroad. The fact that CSDP is formulated around the promotion of values demonstrates a complete absence of geo-strategic considerations within CSDP policy formulation. The lack of strategic considerations in CSDP is in and of itself a cause for concern as a defence policy without clear objectives is likely to falter. The European Security Strategy (ESS) written in 2003 is the central document outlining CSDP and European defence policy; however, it provides little insight into the exact manner in which European security policy will be conducted and in which circumstances its capabilities will be utilized.

Nick Witney, a policy analyst for the ECFR notes that while the ESS “is a good statement of principles [...] it offers little on how, when, or where, these principles should be applied” (Witney, 2008, p. 42). He states that in recent years there have been some attempts to revise the ESS and review its basic principles, but that these revisions have fallen short of rectifying the problems inherent within the ESS. French President Sarkozy’s decision to review the ESS is a step forward; however, “it will take more than the updating of one document to fix the real problem: the absence of any evident plan or priority in how the EU’s [...] crisis management capabilities are applied” (ibid, p. 42). It is clear that although

the underlying objective of CSDP is to provide Europe with its own brand of military and crisis-management capabilities, there is little consensus among policy planners and defence analysts as to what that entails.

Part of the reason that CSDP has not been based on strategic considerations is that, in the past, it has not necessarily needed to be. This is because the military capabilities and institutions that the EU has developed over recent years have arisen in quick response to particular crises. The EU, has in effect, become a victim of its own success. One may praise the EU's adaptive nature in its handling of crises which demonstrates that the EU can be extraordinarily adept at creating institutions and devising responses. Lieutenant-General (Lt. Gen.) Leakey¹² (2010) notes that "the EU is building something up from individual components and experiences. The six military operations which the EU has conducted so far are the building blocks from which the EU military capabilities are being developed" (Leakey, 2010). There remains however, a fundamental lack of discussion as to what strategic role the EU seeks to fill as it "has been inventing its capabilities and its responses not with some vision" but haphazardly as events progress (Leakey, 2010).

Many EU member-states are themselves experiencing problems with their own national military strategies, most notably the United Kingdom. This therefore adds to the difficulty of formulating a coherent and workable EU defence policy. Member-states are facing the need to rethink their own military spending and having to prioritize capabilities during a period of increasing fiscal austerity that tends to be especially unfriendly to large defence budgets. There are two main forces contributing to the reduction in defence

¹² Lieutenant-General Arundell David Leakey is a high-ranking officer in the British Army and former EU Commander of European Union Force Althea.

spending. Firstly, the general populace of many European countries is not willing to accept large defence budgets. Secondly, the economic crisis that is confronting many Western nations affects their ability to fund and sustain the broad spectrum of military capabilities. Thus many EU member-states, particularly Western European countries, are facing the necessity of having to reduce their defence budgets. This requires having to decide which military capabilities are vital and identifying those which are not. In so doing, militaries must determine the extent to which capabilities can be reduced before those capabilities are rendered entirely ineffective and not worth having in the first place. Another factor that is often cited that appears to add strain to defence budgets is inflation. Inflation within the defence sector is often viewed as being substantially higher than regular inflation (Kirkpatrick, 2009). However, according to David Kirkpatrick(2009), in a report published by the Royal United Services Institute (RUSI), he suggests that the conventional wisdom regarding defence inflation – that defence inflation exceeds normal inflation – may in fact be exaggerated. He argues that:

Rather than being the result of a global defence inflationary phenomenon over which [the Ministry of Defence (MoD)] has little control[...] its problems are the direct result of the mismatch between its limited resources and the ambitious commitments (to modernization and to operations) that it has made” (Kirkpatrick, 2009, p. 1).

While defence inflation may contribute to some of the economic strains that modern militaries are experiencing, its overall impact appears to be minimal. Decisions made by politicians and policy planners are perhaps more likely responsible for strained budgets.

The British insistence upon maintaining operational aircraft carriers as the flagships of the Royal Navy is a prime example of the erroneous prioritization of military capabilities. It also demonstrates that politics often trumps realistic strategic considerations in decision

making. The plan to maintain aircraft carriers reflects an overly ambitious military strategy that is neither sustainable nor vital to Britain's defence. Many military analysts recognize that aircraft carriers no longer fulfill an integral role in Britain's defence strategy. Lord Hesketh, for example, argues that "we are paying twice as much as we should to get half the capability" (Gilligan, 2010, para. 4), and that "one carrier will only operate for three years and will never carry aircraft. The second will not carry planes until at least 2020" (ibid, para. 1). Gen. Lord Charles Guthrie suggests that "they should be cut from the programme. It would be great to have them but we really cannot afford them. They will distort the defence budget for years. And they come under the 'nice to have' heading" (Guthrie, 2010, p. 5 [quotes found in original text]). He concludes by suggesting that "if we try to do everything, underfund, and avoid ruthless prioritization, we will be good at nothing" (ibid, p. 8).

Despite the need for prioritization, some politicians who are closely linked to the production of the carriers insist that having aircraft carrier capabilities is an essential component to ensuring the territorial defence of Great Britain. For instance, Penny Mordaunt MP¹³ suggests that "the Falklands conflict is a good example to show the importance of operational readiness and the stress that will be on the carriers" (Mordaunt, 2010, p. 2). Thomas Docherty MP¹⁴ agrees and states that "I believe that it is a matter of national importance that the United Kingdom retains the Royal Navy's flagship into operations" (Docherty, 2010, p. 2). It is not clear, however, how retaining the use of aircraft carriers and other such capabilities best serves and defends the United Kingdom's vital interest in any significant way other than the ability to project power abroad. One might argue that the

¹³ Penny Mordaunt is a British Conservative and Member of Parliament for the Portsmouth North constituency.

¹⁴ Thomas Docherty is part of the British Labour Party and a Member of Parliament for the Dunfermline and West Fife constituency.

justifications offered by Penny Mordaunt on the necessity of possessing aircraft carriers are influenced by the economic implications to her constituency, which is Portsmouth and is one of the cities where the construction of the aircraft carriers is taking place (Wilson, 2010).

British insistence on owning and operating aircraft carriers is an example that serves well to illustrate the reluctance of some policy makers to acknowledge the changing nature of security. It also demonstrates a failure to recognize that possessing a total range of capabilities to respond to a broad spectrum of threats is not a viable approach to defence spending or to security strategy. It also demonstrates how quickly changes can occur in the security environment where relevant capabilities are rendered obsolete within a relatively short period of time. Aircraft carriers were justifiably once a top priority but it is clear that this is no longer the case. It is in this environment amid national uncertainty that the EU is trying to carve out a role for CSDP.

Lt. Gen. David Leakey (2010) notes that as countries increasingly are being required to reduce military expenditures and to prioritize military capabilities, they are being forced to do so without any real sense of what the global security environment will look like and what it might require. Interstate conflict, which is what most modern militaries are best suited for, is perhaps becoming obsolete and state warfare no longer poses as real a threat as it used to. General (Gen.) Rupert Smith (2008)¹⁵ argues that historically wars have been fought between nations on an industrial-scale; the probability of industrialized warfare re-occurring at this level is diminishing. He suggests that wars in the future will likely be fought within

¹⁵ General Rupert Smith is a former high-ranking officer in the British Army.

nations and amongst their own people, rather than between nations¹⁶. This notion is echoed by many other high-ranking military officials. Gen. Richard Dannat, for example, asserts that in the future conflict will “be war among the people, about the people, and for the people” (Dannat, 2010, para. 17). These conclusions regarding the nature of conflict are debatable. It is true that at this time most wars are being fought within states rather than between them. Whether this trend persists in the future is uncertain. Security policy in Europe has not yet reflected this reality, as “according to the former Chief Executive of the [European Defence Agency] EDA, a massive seventy percent of Europe’s land forces remain unusable outside national territory” (Grevi & Keohane, 2009, p. 78) Further questions are raised by the fact that the EU currently has 1.8 million active duty soldiers with less than 80,000 soldiers currently deployed around the world. Military personnel expenditure also accounts for 53.1% of the EU’s total defence budget which is currently set at 250.1 billion USD. These numbers only reflect payment to active duty personnel and do not include the nearly 2.1 million reserve soldiers that the militaries of the EU have¹⁷ (European Defence Agency, 2008, p. 8). In contrast, the United States allocates roughly 19.9% of their defence budget to personnel expenditure (ibid, p. 8). The inability of policy planners to recognize and acknowledge the changing nature of conflict is one of the reasons that the EU failed to contain and manage the Bosnian crisis on its own. The potentially destabilising effect of unrest and war in the Balkans region signaled to European leaders that their predictions regarding the security environment in their own neighbourhood were fundamentally flawed.

¹⁶ Gen. Rupert Smith cites the Bosnia, Kosovo, Afghanistan, and Iraq as evidence of this. It is important to note that he does not outright dismiss the possibility of industrial warfare but concludes that the pattern of present-day conflicts points towards non-industrialized, asymmetrical warfare.

¹⁷ Numbers reflect defence expenditures and personnel numbers Dec 31st 2008.

The maintenance of non-deployable soldiers and equipment reflects a mode of thinking that dominated Cold War strategy. At the time, the threat of a Soviet invasion meant having to create and maintain military capabilities large enough to fend off an invasion consisting of twenty-two or more infantry and armoured divisions. The focus during the Cold War was not on the mobilization of forces to be sent outside of national territories (Witney, 2008, p. 29). If war was to erupt it would have involved fighting in areas where the majority of a nation's soldiers were already stationed. Armies "were based where they would fight" (ibid, p. 29). The fact that nearly seventy-percent of the soldiers within the EU currently lack mobility and cannot be deployed or sustained outside of their home country for any effective length of time is a remnant of the thinking of that era.

A large number of resources, therefore, are being wasted on maintaining unnecessary troop levels and capabilities. Despite the squandering of resources, however, it is perhaps in the best interest of all parties involved that these troops cannot be deployed elsewhere. If the EU and its member-states did indeed possess the capabilities to deploy such large troop levels, they could become more inclined to do so. Paul Robinson notes that "the first reason for military intervention is the existence of a capability to intervene and the lack of constraint against it" (Robinson, 2005, p. 21). Thus, rather than doing away entirely with outdated capabilities, the inability to deploy abroad is perhaps better than the alternative.

2.2 - A Secure Europe Without Security

A criticism voiced by many EU and US analysts and politicians is that Europe continues to underperform in the area of security. As a result, they argue that the EU needs to increase its commitment to security and defence. In February 2010, for example, the

United States' Secretary of Defence Robert Gates criticized the EU's security approach stating that "the demilitarization of Europe [...] has gone from a blessing in the 20th century to an impediment to achieving real security and lasting peace in the 21st century" (Krastev et al., 2010, p. 24). This criticism offered by Gates, however, is perhaps ill informed. Gates' criticism suggests that the demilitarization of Europe was at one time something to be praised, but that now the demilitarization of the EU and the EU's general reluctance to engage in wars is counter-productive to achieving real and lasting security in the world. Sean Kay, a former policy analyst in the U.S. Department of Defence, notes "if it is true that Europe is demilitarized and at peace then mission accomplished" (Kay, 2010).

Gates' criticism is problematic for two reasons. Firstly, it appears to neglect the fact that the EU, at least in part, facilitates peaceful relations between twenty-seven different countries. The fact that the EU is sometimes considered a unified entity is indicative of the EU's contribution to peace and stability in the world. Beyond that, the EU has also facilitated the peaceful reunification of Germany as well as the entrance of three former Soviet countries¹⁸ into the EU that at one time were considered to be enemies. Secondly, Gates' argument hinges on the assumption that engaging in wars and deploying military personnel is not only a desirable and effective means to contributing to peace and security, but also that it is the most effective means of doing so. There is little reason to believe, however, that this is the case, as the logic of engaging in conflict in order to promote peace is inherently self-defeating. It is far from clear that willingness, coupled with the capability, to engage in missions abroad will actually contribute to peace and security in a meaningful way. If one considers the economic contribution to peace that the EU has made and

¹⁸ Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania joined the EU in 2004.

continues to make, one may argue that the EU is in reality already contributing its fair share towards maintaining global peace and stability.

The EU's under-representation in most of the major security institutions may be part of the reason why some argue that the EU is underperforming in security. Mark Leonard (Walton, 2010a) observes that the EU "is not represented in any of the main security institutions, it is the member states that are represented in NATO and the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE) and the EU even though it has an incredible gamut of hard and soft power tools that it can deploy to enhance Europe's security it is never actually represented at the table" (Walton, 2010a). As a result, the security that the EU brings through its economic stability and its ability to promote development at home may often be neglected. The main strategic document of CSDP posits a different view suggesting that "security is a pre-condition for development" (European Security Strategy, 2003, p. 2). While this is true, development and economic prosperity are not just pre-requisites for security but may themselves be a means for achieving lasting security and durable peace. Despite the EU's economic contributions to security, the fact remains that sometimes the deployment of soldiers or personnel into a crisis area may be an unavoidable necessity. Necessity should, after all, be the deciding factor in determining whether or not to deploy soldiers.

Sean Kay (2010) argues that a civilian dimension in resolving conflict is necessary in order to ensure the success of any foreign operation because civilian missions often focus on the development and reform aspect of security. He cites the war in Afghanistan as being a prime illustration of the dangers of pursuing military action without a strong civilian dimension being present. He argues that the key to successfully ending an insurgency is to

commit large troop levels to an area along with a strong civilian element to help spur economic development. As noted previously, however, whether civilian missions are effective in fulfilling their goals is contested. At present the EU does not have “standing civilian forces and so relies on member states to round up personnel for its missions. Ten years into CSDP’s life, most governments are failing in this task” (Korski & Gowan, 2009, p. 43). The shortfall to date “across all twelve ongoing CSDP missions [...] is probably at least 1500 [personnel]” (ibid, p. 44). Military capabilities within CSDP perhaps should not be sought after and created at the expense of civilian capabilities as there may be times where a civilian response may be necessary and is justifiable. Kay’s statement regarding the need for civilian missions may be questionable; however, as civilian missions can also prove to be completely ineffective.

The EU mission in Guinea-Bissau, for example, was a civilian mission that highlights many of the issues associated with undertaking civilian operations abroad. The EU mission in Guinea-Bissau, known as EU SSR (Security Sector Reform) Guinea-Bissau, which began in 2008 was tasked with creating a legal framework through which democratic reforms of the military could take place. The EU states that “the country’s weak points are its oversized military and administration, its inefficient legal system and corruption”, and sought to address these points through a civilian mission (European Union, 2011a). The EU thus committed itself to the “opening of consultations aimed at assessing the situation and possible ways of safeguarding the essential elements referred to in Article 9(2) of the Agreement, namely human rights, democratic principles and the rule of law” (European Union, 2011b, p. 1).

During this mission, in excess of 100 million Euros was allocated to Guinea-Bissau from 2008 until 2010 with the priority being placed on conflict prevention¹⁹. Other areas that would receive funding would include the building of energy and water infrastructure, and economic stabilisation. Two years into the mission, however, the EU expressed disappointment “at the mutiny of 1 April 2010 and the subsequent appointment of [the] main instigators to high-ranking posts in the military hierarchy” (ibid, p.1). After the assassination of President Joao Bernardo Vieira months earlier, on 30 September, 2010 the EU declared that the mission’s mandate had been fulfilled and officials chose not to extend the mission. The overall benefits of having undertaken the mission in Guinea-Bissau are not immediately obvious as EU officials cited that “political instability and the lack of respect for the rule of law [...] makes it impossible for the EU to deploy a follow-up mission,” (BBC News, 2010, para. 2). The success of any mission therefore depends on the willingness and co-operation of all parties involved. This is especially true when missions seek to utilize diplomacy and soft-power capabilities

2.3 - Which Capabilities and Why? Protection vs. Promotion

European defence policy appears to be guided by the objective of protecting and promoting European values rather than being based on a strategy or vision of the strategic role that the EU should play in the modern era. Lt. Gen Leakey (2010) argues that there are two different ideologies behind CSDP: the *promotion* of EU interests and the *protection* of EU interests. Lt. Gen. Leakey states that these two approaches to defence policy are not separate in their ends but that they do require the development of different capabilities. The

¹⁹ The 100 million Euros were given through Europeaid and were therefore separate from, but important to EU SSR Guinea-Bissau mandate.

EU at the present moment cannot afford to create and maintain capabilities for both the protection and promotion of its interests. The protection of EU interests would entail establishing a defence policy that seeks to minimize threats to its territories and its economy. He states unequivocally that the stability and security in the EU predominately comes from the common market and the wealth and resources that it provides to its member-states. Mark Leonard appears to concur with Lt. Gen. Leakey when he suggests that the European Union is probably one of the most important providers of stability and security in Europe (Walton, 2010a). This sentiment is echoed by Carl Bildt (2010), the Swedish Minister of Foreign Affairs, who maintains that it is the economy, first and foremost, that guarantees security and determines the relative distribution of power in the world. Changes in the strength of the economy will ultimately result in changes and shifts in the balance of power, which is what he argues is being witnessed now with the rise of Eastern economies, most notably China (Carl Bildt, 2010). What remains unclear is the precise nature of the threats that may potentially pose a risk to the stability of the EU economy.

Bildt (2010) suggests that *flows* will dominate and shape the security landscape and refers to this as *flow-security*. Flows can be defined as the exchange, transfer, movement and/or displacement of people, commodities, information, ideas, threats, etc. For example, an influx of people into a certain area can be seen as a population-flow, whereas the trading of commodities can be regarded as trade-flows. He argues that the economies of the western world, mainly capitalist economies, are characterized by flows of trade commodities, people, and ideas (Bildt, 2010, para. 7). These flows can contribute to both the security and insecurity of the EU. The ease of imports and exports into and out of the EU is vital to the prosperity and to the stability and functionality of the common-market. Threats that pose a

risk to trade flows, such as piracy in the maritime region, ought to be the focus of the EU's defence policy.

The primary goal and resultant strategy of European defence policy must therefore be to provide security and stability to the European economy and common-market. This entails structuring a defence policy to address threats that may pose a threat to the economic stability of the EU. One may argue that threats that pose a risk to the integrity of the EU are few and far between. Lt. Gen. Leakey (2010) argues that a framework of necessity should inform CSDP so that any policies that are forged within this framework protect the vital interests of the EU.

The second ideology that is informing CSDP is the concept of promotion. Policy, at present, is tailored towards satisfying the goal of promoting EU interests abroad. These non-vital missions take place based on the logic that the EU has a fundamental duty to promote the rule of law and human rights in countries abroad and is required to reduce suffering wherever it is able to do. Lt. Gen. Leakey notes that these types of missions are not conducted out of necessity, and whether the EU chooses to deploy soldiers or civilians under this rationale is entirely discretionary. This is in part what Janne Matlary (2009) has stated, suggesting that many of the wars being fought in the modern age are not necessary but optional.

There are two specific problems associated with this type of approach to defence. First, while the EU is choosing to conduct these missions there is evidence to indicate that the EU and its member-states cannot afford to adopt and engage both discretionary and non-discretionary policies at the same time, lest they do so at the expense of one another.

Secondly, unless the EU commits itself to crisis-management operations in all areas, which it cannot viably do, the EU runs the risk of applying its approach to defence in an inconsistent manner. The recent interventions in Libya and the Ivory Coast, for example, serve to illustrate this point well, as member-states chose to intervene in those countries while choosing not to intervene in Syria and Yemen, where similar events are occurring. Lt. Gen. Leakey notes that the EU, unlike the US, does not possess the resources in its defence budget to equip itself to be capable to respond to a broad spectrum of potential threats, as each threat requires a unique response and a distinct set of capabilities.

2.4 - CSDP and Humanitarian Intervention

CSDP in its current formulation is geographically and geo-strategically removed from the actual defence of Europe. An ECFR report headed by Nick Witney notes that:

The EU's security and defence policy is based on the recognition that security is no longer a matter of preparing to resist invasion. It is about trying to contain, or suppress, violence elsewhere in the world before it erupts into Europe [...] and it is about doing these things not only because they are in the interests of Europe's citizens, but because Europeans share strong humanitarian values (Witney, 2008, p. 10).

CSDP and European defence policy are not, therefore, about the defence of European territory, but rather about the protection of European values within the EU as well as outside of it.

Historically, the EU has sought to achieve this through the use of soft-power diplomacy because “dialogue and trade constituted better tools of leverage for dealing with undesirable regimes” (Halper, 2004, p. 96). As well, until recently the EU has mainly focused on the deployment of civilian missions abroad. However, if the Lisbon Treaty is a strong indication of the future role of CSDP, then one may argue that this pattern of civilian

oriented missions may be ending. The Lisbon Treaty thus “constitutes a major paradox: despite the fact that the majority of CSDP missions are civilian, it mostly commits member states to undertake measures in order to improve only their military capabilities, whereas there is no equivalent measure regarding civilian capabilities” (Margaras, 2010, p. 7). Italian Ambassador to Canada Andrea Meloni (2010) confirms this shift away from civilian instruments by suggesting that the current goal of the defence planners is to see CSDP utilize only military capabilities. Many officers in the British army, however, place emphasis on the importance of developing civilian and political capabilities to address threats and note that there are dangers associated with addressing political issues with non-political instruments. It could be to the detriment of the EU if greater emphasis is placed on the military aspect of CSDP while ignoring the equally important civilian dimension. This is especially true if the EU continues to base its defence policy on the idea of crisis-management and humanitarian intervention. Paul Robinson notes a range of both philosophical and practical objections to the UK’s approach to defence policy, which might be particularly relevant to the CSDP. He suggests “that British defence policy is now based around military intervention overseas” (Robinson, 2005, p. 16) and that “it is a policy not of defence, but of offence” (ibid, p. 11). Many EU member-states have often engaged in military intervention and peace-keeping missions and the EU now seems to be following suite with this trend.

Until the ratification of the Lisbon Treaty, the EU had focused primarily upon civilian missions. In spite of there being agreement among many military leaders that strictly military responses to crises are inadequate, the Lisbon Treaty does not reflect this. Given a long history of engaging only in civilian missions and emphasizing the use of soft-power

diplomacy, it is unclear why the Lisbon Treaty does not seek to establish an institutional framework for creating a strong and cohesive civilian force. Part of the problem, may reside within the civilian recruitment policies of the states themselves. Dan Korski and Richard Gowan note that the civilian recruitment process in many member-states is excessively bureaucratic and at times non-existent. As evidence of this the report cites the case of Spain, where there is no officially established procedure for recruiting civilians to partake in CSDP missions (Korski and Gowan, 2010, p. 50). In this respect, Spain is not unique as many other member-states are similarly affected with an overly complicated civilian recruitment process.

In addition to engaging in civilian missions, as outlined in the Lisbon Treaty, CSDP is tasked with carrying out a wide variety of other functions. These include:

“... joint disarmament operations, humanitarian and rescue tasks, military advice and assistance tasks, conflict prevention and peace-keeping tasks, tasks of combat forces in crisis management, including peace-making and post-conflict stabilisation. All these tasks may contribute to the fight against terrorism, including by supporting third countries in combating terrorism in their territories” (Lisbon Treaty, 2009, Article 28).

This is an impressive and highly ambitious list of tasks, which is to be carried out by a relatively small military and an even smaller civilian force, especially in the face of budget cuts. More important, is the fact that none of these tasks appear to be related to the actual defence of Europe itself. Instead, it appears that the objectives outlined by the Petersberg Tasks²⁰, actually seek to provide security and defence everywhere in the world but Europe. The underlying rationale can perhaps be described by the following concept: the rest of the world must be secure in order for Europe to be secure. This seems to be a sound argument,

²⁰ The Petersberg Tasks were agreed upon in 1992 and set forth the authority for the EU to conduct peacemaking and crisis-management missions.

however, the improbability of the EU being able to carry out such a task renders it unsuitable to be the underlying premise of CSDP. It is unlikely that the EU can and will seek to resolve every conflict that occurs in the world and there is an element of locality that needs to be considered when determining whether or not to intervene. Lawrence Freedman (2007) notes that political support for intervention is usually stronger when the potential for conflict is territorially closer to the intervening state. It is not clear that location is a legitimate criterion for intervention, especially in an increasingly globalized world where distances can be easily overcome. Presently, there is no overarching framework to determine which conflicts are suitable for intervention and which are not. The decision to intervene is largely determined by the relationship that member-states have with other countries, as evidenced by current military interventions in the Ivory Coast and Libya.

CSDP as outlined in the Lisbon Treaty is therefore based upon the need to carry out peace-making and stabilizing missions abroad in order to ensure peace in Europe. Witney affirms that “CSDP therefore envisages not just peace-keeping but if necessary peace-making – the separation of warring factions by force ” (Witney, 2008, p.12). The separation of warring factions, however, is not always, and in fact rarely is, an easy or straight-forward task and the end result is usually “an engagement in a complex local struggle” (Freedman, 2007, p. 248). The risks associated with intervention involve “entering others’ quarrels without paying due care and attention to the nature of the dispute and its likely course might not make things better and could make them worse” (ibid, p. 245). As the cases of Afghanistan and Iraq have illustrated, “one’s own forces might be sucked into a messy and apparently interminable conflict” (ibid, p. 245) potentially resulting in an escalated conflict that doesn’t have a clear strategy. Military intervention, which the Lisbon Treaty primarily

focuses upon, arguably does not contribute to establishing regional peace, as the process of intervention can itself prove detrimental to the end goal.

This raises another important question, if military intervention and the procurement and creation of military capabilities are not the most efficient way to secure peace and stability, why should one bother with those capabilities in the first place? In a 2001 EU publication entitled *Military Intervention and the European Union*, Martin Ortega (2001) suggests that one of the key factors to consider when evaluating the EU's approach to intervention is to first determine whether or not the EU itself adds any value to the proposed mission at hand. He observes, for example, that member-states have routinely undertaken military interventions outside of the EU in the past which have resulted in varying degrees of success. It is not altogether clear that an EU mandate adds actual value to a mission other than providing it with a degree of international legitimacy. Whether a mission has legitimacy or not, can be entirely irrelevant. It is unimportant, for example, if a mission has the legitimacy of the EU or the United Nations (UN) if the outcome results in increased suffering and decreased security. It should be first and foremost the outcome of the mission that is the most important factor to be considered.

The mission in Afghanistan, for example, had the support of both the UN and the EU and carried with it international legitimacy accrued through multilateral and multinational institutions. Despite the initial surge of international support, there is little indication that the intervention and invasion of Afghanistan has contributed to stability and peace in the region. Many military officers, including Gen. Richard Dannat (2010) notes that there is growing consensus among officers that the war in Afghanistan is not only unwinnable but that it has been detrimental to security and stability in the region. The ESS, for example, explicitly

states that the illicit drug trade is a tremendous source of insecurity in Europe. Since the invasion of Afghanistan in 2001, the total amount of land dedicated to the production and cultivation of opium has increased from eight-thousand hectares in 2001 to one-hundred and ninety-thousand hectares in 2007. As well, Afghanistan now accounts for eighty-two percent of the world's opium (United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime, 2007, p. 3). Thus, by that one measure, the invasion of Afghanistan has greatly contributed to the insecurity of the region as well as to Europe.

Military intervention is far from being a guaranteed success. Indeed, Paul Robinson (2005) observes that the prospect of intervention may even promote the types of atrocities that intervention is seeking to prevent. He cites the actions of the Kosovo Liberation Army as evidence of this, noting that they:

carried out regular attacks on Serbian civilians within Kosovo, killing and maiming innocent people in large numbers. The purpose of these attacks was to incite a Serbian crackdown, which in due course would encourage NATO to intervene (Robinson, 2005, p. 34).

As well, Robert H. Kimball notes that "far from preventing or ameliorating the ethnic cleansing of Kosovo, the NATO intervention actually accelerated and increased it; probably no lives were saved by the intervention, and many were lost that otherwise would not have been" (Kimball, 2004, p. 117). While it is not helpful to declare moral absolutes - e.g. that intervention in all instances is unacceptable - in the context of highly-diverse situational conflicts, there is ample evidence to demonstrate that the current commitment to humanitarian intervention, in spite of a very appealing and easily justifiable moral principle, is rarely effective in producing morally acceptable consequences or outcomes. Time and

again it has been demonstrated that this is the case: in Kosovo; the bombing of civilian and military targets throughout Serbia; and in the "United States-led, United Nations-sanctioned humanitarian intervention in Somalia in 1992-1993. (ibid, p. 117). That these missions are undertaken optionally and that they rarely produce their intended consequences is cause for concern. Even if there are some instances wherein humanitarian intervention has been successful in stemming conflict and reducing harm, the apparent successes of a few missions should not validate a policy that has produced a disproportionate amount of increased suffering.

While intervention may be justifiable in principle, it cannot generally be justified in practice. Intervention, especially military intervention, should not be the basis for the EU in its conduct of security. If it is inevitable that CSDP should be tasked primarily with carrying out foreign intervention, greater emphasis ought to be placed upon creating a strong civilian force and thus limiting the potential harm from undertaking these missions.

A civilian or political response, however, does not guarantee success in the targeted region either. Andrew Wilder of Tufts University published an article entitled *Losing Hearts and Minds in Afghanistan*. He suggests that even foreign aid can have a detrimental effect upon security in a region and notes that in Afghanistan "the zero-sum nature of Afghan society, where one group's gain is often perceived as another's loss, contributed to aid projects generating complaints that 'they got more than we did'" (Wilder, 2009, p. 145). He concludes that foreign aid can sometimes exacerbate tensions between tribes. The result of providing foreign aid is sometimes an increase in insecurity and distrust, especially when portions of the populace are of a different ethnic background from the governing party (ibid, p. 145). These conclusions are particularly troubling for the EU given that under CSDP, the

EU is tasked with “helping to rebuild failed states and conflict-ravaged regions” (Witney, 2008, p. 10).

There is also reason to believe that engaging in economic development and military intervention are based on mutually exclusive logic and that there may be little sense in pursuing them in tandem. The Tufts University report on human rights and military intervention also argues that while military intervention demarcates a populace into two distinct groups – combatants and non-combatants – humanitarian intervention necessarily blurs those lines.

2.5 - Conclusion

European security is characterized by civilian and military intervention overseas in order to protect and promote values and interests inherent within the European political landscape. By engaging in missions abroad in order to root out potential threats, the EU has adopted a defence policy based upon pre-emptive action, assuming a necessity to intervene because of the values that the missions are based upon. The capabilities being created under CSDP do not guarantee or help to effectively generate security, and they may in fact be responsible for contributing to increased insecurity. In the following chapter I argue that the misinterpretation of values as interests can account for why the EU has chosen to develop a defence policy based on foreign missions. EU defence policy therefore, at present, is without clear direction or strategic vision and is far removed from the actual defence of Europe

Chapter 3

3.1 - CSDP and EU Values

In the previous chapter it was argued that CSDP has moved away from the territorial defence of Europe in favour of carrying out civilian and military missions abroad. The efficacy of these missions and whether they contribute meaningfully to the security and defence of Europe remains unclear. It was also argued that both civilian and military interventions are not necessarily guaranteed to be successful and the historically complex situations into which soldiers and civilian members are now entering present additional challenges. The objective of missions of late has shifted from defeating the enemy by conventional military means in favour of seeking to win populations with the promise of peace and stability through economic development. As a result, radically different solutions from previous conventional means may be required. The aim of being able to successfully control conflicts before they emerge is unlikely to be achieved, meaning that CSDP is both overly ambitious and logistically impractical. In large part this impracticality stems from CSDP's focus on missions being conducted abroad rather than on securing Europe domestically.

The current chapter seeks to explore the origins of the EU's interventionist and value-centric policies. It is argued that the EU's willingness to commit resources to missions abroad, in part, originates from a desire to protect and promote European values in the international realm. The willingness to do so emanates partly from the apparent success which resulted from using these same principles to rebuild the European continent in the post-WWII era. The values which were most often espoused include the concepts of

universal human rights, democracy, and the rule of law²¹ (Ross, 2004 & ESS 2003). Values such as those listed, however, have tended to be fundamentally mischaracterized and misinterpreted by policy makers who have tended to portray them as goals whose moral dimensions make them inherently worth pursuing. Cast in this light, they have erroneously been used as the foundation for European defence policy. The argument being put forward is not that these values may not be instrumental in increasing the well-being of people in the world, but rather that they do not belong as part of defence policy.

Although the EU seemingly acts with noble and altruistic intentions, the resistance of many countries to adopt these values is not always matched by the willingness of the EU to build on them. Resistance to them, is at times greater than the willingness to promote them. Indeed, Andrew Sherriff and Eleonora Koeb have noted a consistent lack of political will in the EU missions in Africa (Sherriff & Koeb, 2009). This stems from the changing nature of the international realm with the emergence of new global powers and competing ideologies. As a result of this, the EU's legitimacy as a source of stability is in decline as new political powers emerge that challenge the EU's promise of stability. This new reality makes the EU's

²¹Article 13 of the Lisbon Treaty outlines the creation of the EEAS. Copied verbatim from Lisbon Treaty 2009. Article 13 reads as follows:

ARTICLE 13a.

The High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy, who shall chair the Foreign Affairs Council, shall contribute through his proposals towards the preparation of the common foreign and security policy and shall ensure implementation of the decisions adopted by the European Council and the Council.

2. The High Representative shall represent the Union for matters relating to the common foreign and security policy. He shall conduct political dialogue with third parties on the Union's behalf and shall express the Union's position in international organisations and at international conferences.

3. In fulfilling his mandate, the High Representative shall be assisted by a European External Action Service. This service shall work in cooperation with the diplomatic services of the Member States and shall comprise officials from relevant departments of the General Secretariat of the Council and of the Commission as well as staff seconded from national diplomatic services of the Member States. The organisation and functioning of the European External Action Service shall be established by a decision of the Council. The Council shall act on a proposal from the High Representative after consulting the European Parliament and after obtaining the consent of the Commission."

goals of promoting values all the more challenging. As a result, the EU may need to secure itself by reinstating an emphasis on defence within the EU. The European External Action Service (EEAS) provides an opportunity for doing so. Acting with a unified European voice can help to increase the EU's soft-power capabilities by allowing member-states to collectively pool their resources. Doing so offers a way to strengthen and secure Europe on the international stage without expressly needing to engage in crisis prevention or crisis management in different parts of the world.

3.2 - Morality and the Values of CSDP

A distinct sense of morality has begun to appear in the dialogue and speeches of some EU and CSDP officials. For example, in a recent speech given by Baroness Catherine Ashton, the High-Representative for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy and the head of the EEAS, she states that the EU ought:

to have an impact on the world, based on the values that we hold, challenging on human rights, supporting development, ensuring countries can stand tall and with who we can trade, negotiate and discuss, having helped them become the political leaders in their own area(Ashton, 2010e).

Ms. Ashton has long been noted for her support on issues of human rights; however, many other high-ranking political officials share similar viewpoints. David O'Sullivan (2010), who is the Chief Operating Officer (COO) of the EEAS, argues that the primary goal of the EU ought to be finding "ways of being able to act [...] which is commensurate with our economic and trading strength in order to be a force for good in the world" (O'Sullivan,

2010). This is not the first time that the phrase ‘a force for good’ has appeared in defence rhetoric.

Paul Robinson (2005) notes in his analysis of British defence policy that utilizing phrases such as ‘being a force for good’ serves to provide a “moral gloss to the policy” (p. 17). He states (in reference to British defence policy) that saying one is a force for good “is entirely unnecessary. After all, what is the alternative? – being a ‘force for bad’? Whose ‘good’ are we talking about?”(ibid, p. 17). If the planning architecture of the missions undertaken by the EU is any indication, civilian missions and PSOs are identified as being a global good. Suggesting that these missions are a global good; however, is a dubious assertion. Along with the questions raised by Robinson (2005), another important question that needs to be asked, and one that serves to highlight the lack of strategy inherent within these missions, is determining exactly ‘how much good’ or in the context of CSDP, to what extent democracy, the rule of law, and human rights ought to be promoted? These are values specific to the EU and the West and are representative of societal ideals which reflect a belief in how a society ought to function. From a strategic standpoint this is immensely problematic, since there is no way to precisely determine when the promotion of these values has reached a sufficient level. As well, there may be numerous reasons for why human rights abuses are taking place or why democratic institutions are absent in certain countries.

In seeking to answer this question, one could perhaps argue that the EU ought to undertake missions where its presence will be most effective in defending these values. Even this approach appears to be devoid of strategic considerations. Values, because they reflect societal ideals, can always be promoted further and institutions can be improved upon to better reflect these values. The logic that is informing this approach to defence, therefore

implies that wherever democratic institutions are absent or human rights are being violated the EU has a supposed moral obligation to intervene. This represents an entirely unrealistic approach to defence policy. Declaring oneself as a ‘force for good’ is an entirely arbitrary statement. As well, doing so may also seek to denote a set of intentions with a ‘moral glossing’ that may also serve as a distraction from assessing outcomes. It does so, in part, by placing a moral dimension on the means by which a goal is sought, rather than on the ends that are achieved. Furthermore, declaring oneself a ‘force for good’ suggests that the values one holds are inherently good while the outcomes that are produced are of secondary importance. Indeed, it may well be true that the values the EU wishes to espouse are in fact *good*; however, the effectiveness of the policies that embody them still need to be assessed on their own merits, rather than through generalized declarations.

It is also clear that good intentions do not always translate into positive outcomes. One ought to forgo the rhetoric of being a ‘force for good’ and, instead, focus on the resulting outcomes of actions. Since it is defence policy that is being examined, the outcomes that need to be considered are whether or not the actions undertaken help to increase security for Europe. If the ultimate measure of success is preserving peace and mitigating or preventing conflict, then the actual act of intervention is inherently self-defeating. Arguably, this may not always appear to be the case because the interventions are seen as being based upon good intentions and thus serves to exonerate them from public debate. Good intentions and the willingness to promote one’s own values may act as viable diplomatic strategies, but they do not really provide a suitable basis for directing security and defence policy. It is therefore troubling that a large portion of the discourse emanating from some CSDP officials appears to be increasingly dominated by this value-based approach.

There are some elements of CSDP that do stray from this value-centric approach, however. They are the elements that have underpinned some of the most successful missions undertaken by the EU to date. For instance, the anti-piracy missions off the coast of Somalia, named the European Union Naval Force Somalia or EU NAVFOR SOM, provides a clear example of how future EU missions ought to be structured and conducted. These anti-piracy missions are markedly different from other CSDP missions to date in that EU NAVFOR SOM has been provided with a clear mandate in combination with tangible objectives. EU NAVFOR SOM is primarily tasked with protecting cargo and merchant ships from ocean pirates and as a result defends against clearly identifiable threats. The anti-piracy missions help to secure merchant seaways thereby allowing the free and unrestricted flow of cargo into and out of the EU. They also establish a sense of security by providing a military presence in otherwise unsafe and uncertain waters. These anti-piracy missions thus help to protect civilians as well as ensure the territorial integrity of the EU and international trading waters. This is precisely what defence policy should aim to do. As noted in the previous chapter, defence policy ought to be about defence and not offence, regardless of intentions. The missions also demonstrate that any actions undertaken need not be pre-emptive. They are in response to situations as they emerge rather than prior to them emerging, and they serve to secure economic interests that are vital to the stability and prosperity of the EU.

Recent events in the Middle East and Africa for example, clearly demonstrate the rapidity with which events can transpire. This fluidity makes strategic and logistical planning to achieve goals similar to those which CSDP is tasked with a near impossibility. Institutions in ideal circumstances are often slow to react. A central tenant of CSDP is a focus on fluidity and the ability of the EU to rapidly respond to crisis in an attempt to stem volatile situations

before they escalate. One of the Helsinki Headline Goals²², saw the establishment of the European Rapid Reaction Force (ERRF) in 2003, which has the capability of deploying sixty-thousand soldiers within sixty days time and of sustaining this force for a year. The ERRF is impressive in its ability to deploy that many soldiers in a relatively brief amount of time and to sustain them over time. Sixty days, however, may seem like an eternity when events on the ground are measured in hours and even minutes. Also, merely placing soldiers into a crisis situation or conflict area does not guarantee that their presence will radically alter the situation for the better. This is especially true when the grievances between factions are characterized by complex and long standing power struggles that are deeply rooted in culture, religion, and history (Freedman, 2007 & Wilder, 2009).

Having the ability to deploy conventional forces in order to respond to non-conventional crises makes little strategic sense. Instead of focusing on the prevention and management of crises abroad, Europe can best keep itself secure by making its domestic institutions more adaptable and capable of responding to uncertainty. In addition, if EU member-states are truly looking to increase stability in other parts of the world – as they are now seeking to do in both Libya and the Ivory Coast – then perhaps it should also reconsider its position on selling weapons and military hardware to those countries²³.

Ultimately defence policy needs to refocus away from abroad back to circumstances in Europe itself. Some European leaders already seem to be aware of this reality. For example, the former German Minister of Defence, Karl Theodor zu-Guttenberg, notes that

²²The Helsinki Headline Goals were a list of goals of military capabilities that were to be created by 2003. Among the goals included the creation of a unified European military force. The creation of the European Rapid Reaction Force achieved this goal.

²³Total EU arms sales to Libya exceeded 800 billion Euros since 2004. See: (Rogers, 2011). The EU does have an embargo on arms exports to the Ivory Coast.

“today it seems that financial obligations and especially over-indebtedness of states can jeopardise their national security and stability more seriously than changes in the traditional military balance” (zu Guttenberg, 2010, para. 9).

3.3 - Power and Legitimacy

CSDP is still in its infancy and the exact form it will take as it matures remains to be seen. Whether the EU chooses to build solely upon its military capabilities and thereby turn CSDP into a military instrument as was suggested by Andrea Meloni (2010) is unknown²⁴. The EU has, in the past, been noted for its use of soft-power tactics in international diplomacy, unlike some of its members-states who have often relied upon utilizing hard-power tactics²⁵ (Krastev, et al., 2010 & Giegrich 2004). If the Ambassador is accurate in his predictions, the EU may in the future be more inclined to use hard-power instruments. It is important to precisely define what these terms mean. In this context, hard-power does not necessarily mean the use of force nor does soft-power necessarily denote diplomacy. The distinction between the two is perhaps more inclusive. Joseph Nye (2004) has explained hard-power as forcing an actor, whether it be a state or otherwise, to adopt a position that you want them to take. This can be done in many ways, including the use of military force, coercion, or economic sanctions. Soft-power, on the other hand, denotes a means of convincing an actor to adopt a position in a non-coercive manner with the result of that actor doing something because they have decided that they want to do it. The difference lies in

²⁴This statement was issued by Ambassador Andrea Meloni at a conference on European security and defence policy at the University of Ottawa in November of 2010.

²⁵Giegrich argues that the labeling of the EU as a soft-power is misleading. He notes that the increase in scale and diversity of CSDP missions has increased greatly in the last several years, but recognition of these missions has not yet entered into the public debate. See: Giegrich (2004)

forcing them to do something, as opposed to demonstrating to them why it is worthwhile to do it (Nye, 2004).

The EU, in the past, has been especially adept at using soft-power tools to achieve its foreign policy objectives. This is in part evidenced by the sheer number of countries who are now member-states of the EU. The Union is itself a source of pressure and influence in the world and has successfully persuaded various countries to realign their internal and external politics. In the 1980s and 1990s, for example, the threat of being excluded from adopting the Euro, prompted Italian technocrats and economists to pursue a radical period of fiscal austerity in order to bring the nation's deficit under control (Hellman, 2008). As a result they were able to successfully meet the economic and currency requirements of the Maastricht Treaty and were allowed to adopt the Euro. The EU wields considerable soft-power over a country's policies when trade and economics are concerned. The source of the EU's soft-power resides in its sheer economic size and the potential for growth and development that it promises. The EU, for this reason, ought to be primarily focused on safeguarding the legitimacy that it has accrued over the years through its economic strength and stability. In so doing, it would increase its ability to persuade other nations to want to replicate the EU as a model of how a society and economy ought to be organized. Ana Palacio, Spain's former Minister of Foreign Affairs, notes that:

Europe is not only a geographical space, but also one based on values such as democracy, rule of law, [and] respect for human rights [...] enlargement is the practical application of the outward projection of the EU as a community of democracy, solidarity, freedom, and prosperity (Palacio, 2003, p. 75).

The prospect of entrance into that space is the EU's most valuable source of soft-power. The EU's strategy towards Turkey is a prime example of this. Because Turkey wants to join the EU, they have adopted many Western friendly policies over the years which has helped to promote democracy in the country. This has resulted in the adoption of some European values by Turkish society and illustrates well the effectiveness that a soft-power strategy may have.

The EU's strategy towards Turkey is not without risk. The EU does run a strong risk of alienating Turkey and losing its strategic influence over parts of the Middle East if it continues to offer no clear signs that Turkey will one day be allowed to join. The "acceptance and rejection impasse" that Gulnur Abyet (Baychev, 2010) says characterizes the EU-Turkey relationship carries with it serious strategic consequences if the impasse cannot be overcome. She states that "it's time that the EU saw the bigger picture and the bigger regional picture where Turkey is and how that figures into the strategic relationship" (Baychev, 2010). Losing strategic influence in a key area is a very real risk. A similar situation had unfolded in 2010 which resulted in the Ukraine formally abandoning its bid to join NATO.

With the emergence of new global powers, the EU needs to be thinking strategically, especially as the legitimacy that it has accrued through its economic development begins to decline and instead starts to shift to other regions in the world. This should be of critical importance and consideration for the EU as its soft-power and its source of influence in the world, is contingent upon its economic power. Thus if the EU is truly committed to playing a role in the growth and development in different parts of the world, economic and trading

policies offer a far better avenue for promoting democracy and the rule of law than does CSDP.

Part of the reason that the EU was so successful in championing its values in the past can be attributed to the remarkable economic growth that the continent experienced after World War II. The EU often presents itself as a model for others to base their economic and social policies on. Some have argued that the EU's greatest guarantor of security is the offer of prosperity to other countries through membership. Arguably the best way to secure the continent from potential rivalries is not through policies that exclude and isolate, but rather through those that seek to include. It is a policy of inclusion rather than exclusion and the EU's ability to utilize such strategies that results in the perception of the EU as being a source of prosperity. As economic growth in the West stagnates, however, prospects for capital growth and economic stability can increasingly be found in other political systems. Often such opportunities, such as those in China, are increasingly being found in political systems that are antagonistic to the European and Western view of human rights and values (Dennison & Dworkin, 2010).

Susi Dennison and Anthony Dworkin (2010) note that the effectiveness of EU civilian and military missions abroad is at least partly linked to global and regional perceptions of the EU. One may expect that the success of missions where the emphasis is placed upon human rights and the rule of law will only diminish in the future as a result of the changing spheres of influence within the international realm. The EU, for example remains "committed to putting democracy, human rights, and the rule of law at the center of its foreign policy. But as the west loses its political and economic dominance [...] it must increasingly compete for influence with rising powers" (Dennison & Dworkin, 2010, p. 1).

Countries such as China and India have gained considerable influence in international affairs over the last decade and while it has been customary in the past to view these states as emerging powers, it is perhaps more accurate now to describe them as powers that have emerged with considerable global, or at least regional, influence (ibid, p. 1-2). The international realm, particularly in the West, has not yet acknowledged this reality and often conducts its foreign and defence policy with the assumption that the West still remains the center of international politics. Dennison and Dworkin note that “these global trends have created an environment in which it is much more difficult to support human rights [...] as the EU aspires to do” (ibid, p. 4). Attempts to “persuade countries to adopt European views of global values are weakened by the declining power and authority of the West” (ibid, p. 4). Mark Leonard (Walton, 2010b) notes that “power has structurally and decisively shifted as a result of the economic and financial crisis and its leading to a much more assertive Chinese foreign policy” (Walton, 2010b).

The EEAS provides a way to mitigate the damaging effects that the financial crisis has had on EU member-states. Member-states will be able to collectively pool their diplomatic resources in favour of a unified policy. This pooling of resources is reminiscent of the theory presented by Janne Matlary (2009), who suggests that the necessity of member-states to pool military capabilities could potentially account for the creation of CSDP. So too, the necessity of member-states to pool diplomatic capabilities and create a unified strategy may account for the creation of the EEAS. Nonetheless, if the EU is set, on promoting its values abroad, a much more appropriate and effective means of doing so would be through its economic capacity and soft-power capabilities. This means removing

the promotion of values from its defence policy where, as has been argued, they do not belong in the first place.

3.4 - The European External Action Service: Defence Beyond Defence Policy

Member-states, on foreign policy issues, have often acted alone and as a result have consistently undermined their unity in favour of short-term unilateral goals (Krastev, et al., 2010). With the ratification of the Lisbon Treaty in 2009, this may change in the near future as a result of the creation of the EEAS. The role of the newly created EEAS and its relationship to CSDP is an important institutional development in the EU's ability to overcome a key threat that it faces which is institutional fragmentation in its foreign policies.

The EEAS was established on 1st December 2009 with the ratification of the Lisbon Treaty by member-states. The creation of the EEAS signifies an important milestone in not only the development and future of CSDP but also European integration in general. The ratification of the Lisbon Treaty “creates a new environment for CSDP, and enhances the EU’s potential in the field of public diplomacy” (Sturm, 2010, p. 4). As noted in chapter two, European integration has historically been characterized by tensions between member-states and the EU. Most often sovereignty has been at the centre of these tensions. This is especially true in relation to security and defence concerns, which until the 1990s had been generally seen as being off-limits to the integration project. The creation of the EEAS is particularly significant within this historical context because it, in part, helps to bridge the gap that exists between the European Council, whose authority lies in the member-states, and the European Commission, which is staffed by appointed officials. The EEAS will act in

a capacity similar to that of a Ministry of Foreign Affairs for all of Europe. The mandate of the EEAS is to act to facilitate greater flows of information between the foreign ministries of member-states. It is hoped that by helping to resolve diplomatic fragmentation, the EEAS will help to initiate greater domestic security for the EU by allowing member-states both to act with a unified voice and to create a foreign policy that does not undermine the EU's unity. The EEAS is tasked with carrying out three main objectives of the CSDP: crisis prevention, crisis management, and engaging with strategic partners. Forging strategic partnerships is particularly important in the context of the EU's relations with Russia and China. Catherine Ashton (2010a) states that the EEAS is "a once-in a generation opportunity to build something that finally brings together all the instruments of our engagement – economic and political instruments, development and crisis management tools – in support of a single political strategy" (Ashton, 2010a, para. 6). Ashton is correct in her optimism for the EEAS, especially if the capabilities which it provides are utilized properly.

A source of tension exists between the conduct and actions of the EU, most notably between the council, which is comprised of ambassador level diplomats and heads of states, and the commission which is made up entirely of EU personnel. The council retains absolute authority over issues deemed sensitive to national interest, most notably, national defence. The EEAS seeks to bridge these two institutions by streamlining decision making processes and ensuring that all member-states are on the same page when it comes to specific policy areas. It does so by acting as a diplomatic service to each of the member-states wherein inconsistencies among member-states' positions can be resolved and negotiated. The EEAS is thus a true hybrid in its institutional structure. It may help to bridge the divide and seek to

resolve tensions that exist between the Council and European Commission by aligning European interests with national interests.

The creation of the EEAS sees the removal of the old pillar system, founded under Maastricht, and merges the positions of External Relations Commissioner and the High Representative for CFSP into the High-Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy. The External Relations Commissioner, until the ratification of the Lisbon Treaty was a member of the European Commission. The High-Representative for CFSP on the other hand was appointed by Council members. By merging these two positions into one, the newly created post of High-Representative bridges the gap that exists between the two institutions. As a result, the High-Representative will be better positioned to consolidate conflicting interests that emerge from the Commission and the Council.

It is important to note, as some MPs in the United Kingdom already have, that the EEAS does not seek to replace any current institutions but to act as a service to facilitate greater cooperation between the Commission and the Council (Gavas & Maxwell, 2010).. Doing so will have a direct impact on the manner and regions in which CSDP operates in. Unification on key policy areas is perhaps the most important outcome of the EEAS, allowing member-states to operate on a unified front.

Strategic relationship building is of critical concern for the EU. Although the EU does have a well established trading relationship with many countries, there is a significant lack of strategic dialogue taking place between the EU and other world powers. David O'Sullivan (2010) states that "we have frankly a very developed trade and economic relationship and an extremely undeveloped political and strategic relationship" (O'Sullivan,

2010). This can, in part, be attributed to the fact that until recently, matters concerning foreign policy were the jurisdiction of member-states. Indeed, many member-states often preferred to engage in unilateral and bilateral trading partnerships with non-member states. The lack of a unified European voice in the international realm is a source of significant insecurity for both the EU as a whole and its individual member-states.

A report published by the United Kingdom House of Lords assessing Chinese perceptions of the EU indicate that many Chinese officials and non-member states view the EU as a fragmented entity. The report sampled the answers of a wide range of Chinese business professionals, professors and academics, as well as politicians and military leaders. Many respondents noted that there is considerable confusion when dealing with the EU. A range of officials reported feeling unsure of how to engage with the EU and experience uncertainty as to whether or not specific policies ought to be negotiated at the European level or bilaterally and multilaterally with specific member-states. Others noted that in China's dealings with the EU, the institutional organization of the Union allowed for member-states to be easily positioned against one another. In so doing, negotiations often ended with results that weighed in favour of Chinese interests (United Kingdom, 2010a). A strong image of stability and coherency and an EU that can be engaged with is therefore immensely important for the EU, especially if it is to use its economic power to promote its values.

Acting in a unified manner on issues of trade is not sufficient. Perhaps the greatest contribution that the EEAS will make is by allowing the EU to establish a concrete security dialogue with other global powers. Although "China recognised that the EU was important [they] were uncertain about its influence and effectiveness as a political entity" (ibid, p. 17). It is clear that unless there are direct lines of communication, an effective security dialogue

simply cannot take place. Pierre Hassner (Walton, 2010c) notes that despite the opportunities afforded to the EU with the creation of the EEAS, whether the EEAS succeeds depends upon the willingness of member-states to see it succeed. Due, in part, to the economic crisis, member-states are beginning to increasingly view security as a domestic issue rather than an EU or European issue (Walton, 2010c). This is to be expected in times of economic crisis, as member-states tend to focus more on domestic issues rather than on European issues. As a result, in an era where the survival of the EU is increasingly determined by co-operation, member-states are attempting to solve European wide problems unilaterally and by doing so they are “mistaking the urgent for the important” with regard to their security objectives (O’Sullivan, 2010).

Growth and development are usually suggested to be an effective way to generating and preserving security. This is evidenced by the fact that the EU is involved in numerous development projects, despite the efficacy of these projects being called into question. “Europe has lost influence to emerging powers that emphasize sovereignty over human rights, and there is resistance to any idea of the West exporting its model to the rest of the world (Dennison & Dworkin, 2010, p. 1). The economic crisis has thus strongly affected the EU and its ability to act as a legitimate actor in the international realm. This is somewhat ironic in light of the creation of the EEAS. At a time when the EU is most institutionally able to act as a unified voice, member-states are increasingly looking inward when they need to be looking at the long term.

3.5 - Conclusion

Values provide an unsuitable basis upon which to establish security and defence policy. If it is the unwavering strategy of the EU to promote its values abroad in an effort to prevent conflicts then it should not be done through CSDP. Instead, the EU should engage its diplomatic avenues, aided by the EEAS, to help spur growth and development elsewhere in the world by continuing to act as a model upon which other societies should base their economic policies. Despite the relative decline in the power and legitimacy that the EU has, this decline can perhaps be overcome by seeking to align national and European interests for the mutual long term benefit of all its member-states. Member-states, however, continue to devise short-term strategies without considering the long-term consequences.

Conclusion

4.1 Summary of Objectives

This thesis had three objectives. First, it aimed to examine and assess the current state of literature concerning the integration and creation of military and civilian capabilities through CSDP. A review of the literature indicated the existence of research gaps in many of the contemporary theories and approaches to integration. The analytical focus of many of these theories was found to be limited to either describing or identifying possible causes for the current integration and creation of European defence policies. They did not address the effectiveness of the policies being created nor did they analyze the rationale under which defence capabilities were being created.

In an attempt to fill this identified gap, the second objective of this thesis was to critically examine the underlying rationale informing the EU's commitment to global security and its undertaking of civilian and military missions abroad. An analysis of the logic of these policies and missions revealed that a defence policy based upon civilian and military missions abroad, as a means to promote values such as human rights, democracy, and the rule of law, is neither viable nor an effective means for generating security in Europe or around the world. The third objective was to examine why the EU and its member-states have committed themselves to conducting civilian and military missions abroad. An analysis of the rhetoric surrounding, and justifications made for undertaking, these missions demonstrated that, in part, missions are undertaken because of a willingness and desire to promote European values abroad. This in turn stems from a perceived moral obligation on the part of the EU to act in crisis areas. The undertaking of civilian and military missions

abroad, which is a key component of CSDP, does not appear to constitute a sound basis upon which to develop defence policy in Europe. The economic and political tools available to the EU provide a better means by which to ensure security in Europe and around the world.

4.2 Prospects for Future Research

While this thesis does not attempt to unify theories of European integration specifically regarding European defence policy, it does, hopefully, provide a starting point for future discussions and research regarding the quality and effectiveness of defence policies found in Europe and the West. Future researchers may hopefully seek to utilize the philosophical and practical objections raised in this thesis as a basis for assessing past, current, and future missions undertaken through CSDP. Despite the soft-power approach that the EU has towards international relations, further analysis is required to assess how resources are being used in the CSDP's civilian and military missions. As well, future research may wish to analyze and assess the effectiveness of both the planning stages and architecture of CSDP missions by surveying a variety of missions that have been either successful or not, and to determine which factors contributed their success or failure.

Additional research is also required regarding the impact that CSDP and the EEAS may be having on security relations with Russia, China, and other developing and global powers. Fragmentation of policies, especially in the area of energy security, remains a significant source of insecurity for the EU. This is a key concern and poses an institutional threat to the stability and prosperity of the EU. Member states routinely sign bilateral trade agreements with Russia. This is especially true with regard to energy imports, and countries

that have a favourable energy agreement with Russia will be more inclined to approach Russia positively. Future research may also seek to consider the implications of an increasingly military and internationally present EU and its relations with Russia and China. EU-Russian relations are further complicated by the fact that many countries in the EU hold different and sometimes conflicting relationships with Russia. Research in this area has already been started by the European Council on Foreign Relations, but more is required.

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