

**Navigating Ethnic Identity in Neighbourhoods of Difference:  
Resident Perceptions of Urban Space in Ürümqi, China**

By

Leah Weiler

Thesis Presented to the Faculty of Graduate and Post-  
Doctoral Studies for the Completion of Requirements for  
the MA in Globalization and International Development

School of International Development and Global Studies

Faculty of Social Sciences

University of Ottawa

April 30, 2015

© Leah Weiler, Ottawa, Canada, 2015

## **Abstract**

Critical urban studies has shifted in recent years toward a focus on inequality and identity-based tension in developing countries. These theories have evolved alongside pressure for inclusive urban governance that recognizes a right to difference for minorities in cities.

In the rapidly urbanizing People's Republic of China, these complex issues threaten the inclusiveness of future development. Ürümqi, the capital city of Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region (XUAR), has been the site of social unrest between the Han Chinese majority and the Uyghur minority for more than a century. Economic growth and urbanization have resulted in increasing inequality and tensions between Han and Uyghur people that periodically erupt in violence, as did in Ürümqi in July of 2009. These tensions are complicated by the socio-economic marginalization of minorities, and the exclusion of the overall population from urban governance processes. Following the July 2009 riots, the Xinjiang government expressed willingness for more inclusive urban development; however the local government lacks the necessary tools to facilitate participation, and as such resident perceptions go unheard.

This study adapts critical urban theory and Chinese political thought for the non-democratic context of Ürümqi, China. The perceptions of local residents are evaluated using a questionnaire and focus groups, through which it is shown that resident perceptions and use of urban space are heavily affected by ethnic identity. This, coupled with the banning of Uyghur cultural practices and exclusion of residents from public affairs, exacerbates urban inequalities and identity-based tension. It is important that critical urban studies take residents' inability to participate in urban governance processes (particularly in non-democratic contexts) into account when studying the link between identity and urban space.

## Résumé

Les inégalités et les tensions identitaires sont présentement au coeur du débat dans les études urbaines critiques liées aux pays en développement. Ces théories ont été développées à cause des pressions croissantes de reconnaître le droit des minorités à participer à la gouvernance des villes. En Chine, ces problèmes menacent l'inclusion des citoyens aux développements futurs. Ürümqi, la capitale du Xinjiang, connaît des tensions entre la majorité chinoise han et la minorité ouïghour depuis plus qu'un siècle. La croissance économique effrénée des dernières années a contribué à l'augmentation des inégalités et des tensions ethniques, qui se traduisent parfois par la violence. Ces tensions sont accentuées par la marginalisation socioéconomique des minorités et l'exclusion de la population des processus de gouvernance urbains. Après les émeutes de juillet 2009 à Ürümqi, le gouvernement chinois s'est déclaré prêt à mettre en place un développement urbain inclusif. Cependant, les autorités manquent de moyens pour faciliter cette participation et à ce titre les perceptions des habitants sont laissées de côté.

Cette étude adapte la théorie urbaine critique à la pensée politique chinoise pour le contexte non-démocratique d'Ürümqi. Les perceptions des habitants ont été évaluées à l'aide d'un questionnaire et des groupes de discussion. Ces méthodologies nous ont permis d'établir que les perceptions des habitants et l'utilisation de l'espace urbain sont touchés par l'identité ethnique. Cette tendance, couplée à l'interdiction des pratiques culturelles des ouïghours et l'exclusion des habitants de la planification urbaine aggravent les tensions identitaires. Il est important que les études urbaines critiques prennent en compte l'incapacité des habitants à participer aux processus de gouvernance urbains (particulièrement dans des contextes non-démocratiques) lors de l'étude du lien entre l'identité et l'espace urbain.

## **Acknowledgements**

This thesis would not have been possible without the support of a number of fantastic people. I would first like to thank my supervisor Professor Huhua Cao, whose indefatigable spirit was an inspiration from start to finish. His supportive and enthusiastic involvement made for an unforgettable graduate experience. I would also like to thank my committee members Professors Jean-Philippe Leblond and Christoph Zürcher for their consistent feedback and suggestions for this thesis project.

I am particularly indebted to Ziwei Liu and Gaoxiang Li, both of whom were instrumental in translating and disseminating the questionnaires, and assisting in communications with students and professors at the local university in Ürümqi. This trilingual research project would not have been possible without the language assistance of students at the university regarding translation and communication with Uyghur-speaking residents. The full breadth of the data gathered would not have been realized without their dedication to the very detail-oriented work.

Thanks is also owed to the University of Ottawa, the Natural Sciences and Engineering Research Council (NSERC), and my thesis supervisor Huhua Cao for various scholarships, grants, and work opportunities over the course of my graduate degree. Their combined financial support allowed me to fully dedicate myself to the research project.

Finally, I would like to thank my family, friends, and John Sloat for providing a soft landing and much-needed distractions. Thank you for your inexhaustible love and support in the face of my caffeine-fueled ramblings over the years (and many more to come).

## Table of Contents

Abstract.....	ii
Résumé .....	iii
Acknowledgements.....	iv
Table of Contents.....	v
List of Tables.....	viii
List of Figures.....	viii
List of Acronyms .....	ix
<b>Chapter 1: Research Challenges and Objectives .....</b>	<b>1</b>
1.1 Context.....	2
1.2 Problem Statement.....	4
1.3 Thesis Structure .....	5
<b>Chapter 2: Literature Review .....</b>	<b>7</b>
2.1 Critical Urban Theory.....	7
2.1.1 The Right to the City .....	8
2.1.2 Spatial Justice .....	11
2.2 Contemporary Chinese Political Thought .....	13
2.2.1 The Dialectic of Chinese Political Thought .....	13
2.2.2 Post-Maoist Intellectual Thought .....	14
2.2.3 Confucianism .....	16
2.3 Research Questions and Conceptual Model .....	17
2.3.1 Research Questions .....	17
2.3.2 Conceptual Model .....	17
2.3.3 Research Justification .....	19
<b>Chapter 3: Socio-economic Transformation in China .....</b>	<b>20</b>
3.1 Post-Maoist Economic Reform .....	20
3.2 Housing Reforms.....	21
3.3.1 Danwei.....	22
3.3.2 Street offices and residents' committees.....	23
3.3 Hukou Liberalization .....	24
<b>Chapter 4: Research Design and Methodology .....</b>	<b>28</b>
4.1: Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region.....	28
4.2 Site Selection.....	34
4.2.1 Ürümqi.....	34
4.2.2 Changjie and Yuewan Neighbourhood.....	36
4.3 Questionnaire and Focus Group Design .....	37
4.3.1 Sample Selection .....	37
4.3.2 Questionnaire Development .....	38
4.3.3 Focus Group Development.....	39

4.4 Analytical Process .....	40
<b>Chapter 5: Data Collection and Analysis .....</b>	<b>42</b>
5.1 <i>Ürümqi Questionnaire</i> .....	42
5.1.1 Demographic Data .....	42
5.1.2 Resident Perceptions of Public Spaces: Markets and Green Spaces.....	50
5.1.3 General Community Perceptions .....	57
5.1.4 Synthesis: Community Homogeneity and Threat Perception .....	60
5.2 <i>Focus Group Data</i> .....	61
5.2.1 Focus Group #1: Changjie Neighbourhood .....	62
5.2.1.1 Declining quality of community.....	63
5.2.1.2 Declining trust among residents.....	64
5.2.1.3 Bilingualism and Uyghur-Han relations.....	65
5.2.2 Focus Group #2: Yuewan Neighbourhood .....	66
5.2.2.1 Decreasing bilingualism .....	66
5.2.2.2 Community cohesion and migratory populations.....	69
5.2.2.3 Lack of trust in government .....	70
5.2.3 Synthesis .....	70
5.2.3.1 Community homogeneity and threat perception .....	70
5.2.3.2 Ethnicity and Language.....	72
<b>Chapter 6: Building Inclusive Futures in Cities of Difference .....</b>	<b>73</b>
6.1 <i>An Inclusive Future for a City of Difference? Challenges for Ürümqi</i> .....	76
6.1.2 Role of institutional supports for reciprocal bilingualism .....	78
6.1.3 Creating safe spaces for public discussion .....	81
6.2: <i>Lessons Learned</i> .....	86
6.2.1 Protecting Difference in China .....	86
6.2.2 Identity-Based Conflict and Global Urbanism .....	87
6.3 <i>The Right to the City in China: Future Urban Trajectories</i> .....	88
6.3.1 Application of the Right to the City in China .....	89
6.3.2 Moving forward in theory: research contributions.....	91
<b>Chapter 7: Conclusions .....</b>	<b>94</b>
7.1 <i>Study Findings</i> .....	94
7.2 <i>Limitations and Future Directions</i> .....	96
References .....	99
Appendix I: Questionnaire (Mandarin) .....	114
Appendix II: Questionnaire (Uyghur) .....	122
Appendix III: Questionnaire (English) .....	130
Appendix IV: Focus Group Guide #1: Changjie Neighbourhood (English) .....	137
Appendix V: Focus Group Guide #2: Yuewan Neighbourhood (English) .....	138
Appendix VI: Focus Group Transcription: Changjie .....	139

Appendix VII: Focus Group Transcription: Yuewan .....	<b>143</b>
Appendix VIII: Select Data Tables .....	<b>148</b>
Appendix IX: Ethics Approval .....	<b>156</b>

## List of Tables

Table 4.1: Administrative Divisions in Ürümqi .....	35
Table 5.1: Number of Years Lived in Ürümqi .....	50

## List of Figures

Figure 2.1: Conceptual Model .....	18
Figure 3.1: Urban Population Growth in the PRC: a Comparison .....	21
Figure 3.2: <i>Hukou</i> Status and Social Stratification .....	25
Figure 3.3: China's Urban Population and Urban <i>Hukou</i> Population .....	26
Figure 4.1: Map of XUAR in China .....	29
Figure 5.1: Ethnicity of Respondents by Neighbourhood .....	43
Figure 5.2: Gender of Respondents by Neighbourhood .....	44
Figure 5.3: Religion of Respondents by Neighbourhood .....	45
Figure 5.4: Age of Respondents by Neighbourhood .....	46
Figure 5.5: Education of Respondents by .....	47
Figure 5.6: Employment of Respondents by Neighbourhood .....	48
Figure 5.7: Income of Respondents by Neighbourhood .....	48
Figure 5.8: <i>Hukou</i> Status of Respondents by Neighbourhood .....	49
Figure 5.9: "I belong to my community when I visit local green spaces" .....	51
Figure 5.10: "I belong to my community when I visit local market spaces" .....	51
Figure 5.11: "I feel safe when I visit local green spaces" .....	52
Figure 5.12: "I feel safe when I visit local markets" .....	53
Figure 5.13: "Crime is prevalent in my community's green spaces" .....	54
Figure 5.14: "Crime is prevalent in my community's markets" .....	54
Figure 5.15: "Green spaces contribute to cultural diversity in my community" .....	55
Figure 5.16: "Markets contribute to cultural diversity in my community" .....	55
Figure 5.17: Improvements for community green spaces .....	56
Figure 5.18: Improvements for community markets .....	57
Figure 5.19: Inclusive Community Factors .....	58
Figure 5.20: Exclusive Community Factors .....	59
Figure 5.21: Degree of Bilingualism in Public Signage .....	60
Figure 5.22: Changjie neighbourhood .....	62
Figure 5.23: Yuewan neighbourhood .....	66
Figure 5.24: Commercial signs near Yuewan neighbourhood .....	67

## List of Acronyms

ADP	Asian Development Bank
CCP	Chinese Communist Party
ETIM	East Turkistan Islamic Movement
ETLO	East Turkistan Liberation Organization
ETR	Eastern Turkistan Republic
GDP	Gross Domestic Product
NGO	Non-Governmental Organization
PPGIS	Public Participation Geographic Information Systems
PRC	People's Republic of China
USSR	Union of Soviet Socialist Republics
XUAR	Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region

## **Chapter 1: Research Challenges and Objectives**

Since economic reforms ushered in under the leadership of Deng Xiaoping in 1978, China has experienced rapid economic and urban growth, averaging over 10% annual GDP growth (World Bank 2013). This shift to a more open economy brought inevitable income inequality: China's GINI coefficient climbed from 29.1 in 1981 to a height of 42.6 in 2008, though the most recent data shows a slight decline since that point (World Bank 2014). These persistent inequalities can be seen today between between China's coastal and interior regions, urban and rural areas, and the Han Chinese majority and ethnic minority people (Cao 2009; Tsui 1991). In many cities but particularly those in interior regions, income disparities have contributed to social tension over lower quality of life for ethnic minority people and residents' lack of input into urban development processes. Frequently, discontent over economic inequalities feed into identity-based tension on the basis of language, religion, and territory. In China, struggles for political and cultural representation occur in a non-democratic context in which the ability of marginalized people to participate in urban governance processes is very limited. This is particularly the case in areas such as Xinjiang, an interior autonomous region in which inequalities between Turkic Uyghur and Han Chinese ethnicities have been heavily shaped by Xinjiang's history as a contested geography, and the central government's policies toward the region.

## 1.1 Context

Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region (XUAR) has received its current title in 1955, when the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) designated it an autonomous region in keeping with the Soviet institution of ethnofederalism<sup>1</sup> (Mandarin: *minzu*<sup>2</sup>) in an attempt to suppress ethno-nationalist tension in the region. In practice, however, this system of nominal self-rule and overarching CCP control gave credence to Uyghur political identity and generated further social unrest (Bovingdon 2010). In a divergence from the Soviet model, XUAR had no substantive right of secession, in spite of its autonomous status.

The suppression of public discussion and cultural expression that is different from or critical of Chinese communist society is an aggravating factor for unrest in the region. Repression of Islam in an effort to assimilate Uyghurs and other Muslim minorities in Xinjiang are part of other measures to ease social tensions in the region, including policies to encourage Han Chinese immigration (Hannum & Xie 1998; Potter 2003). These measures have instead increased discontent over the economic dominance of Han Chinese among Xinjiang's oil and gas sectors party bureaucracy, and have politicized Islam (Bovingdon 2004). There have been recurrent protests against the use of Xinjiang's southeastern Lop Nor region for nuclear weapons testing (Dillon 2004: 60, 155). Interethnic relations in the

---

<sup>1</sup> The Soviet state's institution of ethnofederalism allowed widespread cultural autonomy for minorities as a way of coopting non-Russian populations into the regime, and thus guarding against secession. In many cases, however, this system provided the opportunity for increased nationalist mobilization. For more information, see Beissinger 2002.

<sup>2</sup> The concept of *minzu* is treated as ethnic group (*zuqun*) by some Chinese scholars, but as a nationality group by others, especially Western scholars (Becquelin 2000; Cao & Morrell 2010; Gladney 1998/9). Yee (2005) prefers to treat it as part of an ethnicity-nationality continuum that groups move along toward a mature, nationality-based *minzu* with its own distinctive culture, language, history and racial identifiers, and identifies Uyghur people as on the nationality end of that continuum.

region remain tension-ridden, with recurrent riots such as those led by Uyghur residents in Ürümqi in July 2009, which escalated into attacks targeting Han people and ended with a heavy military response throughout XUAR. In their survey of Uyghur-Han relations in Ürümqi, Yee (2003) found a low degree of integration between the two ethnic groups and strong prejudices toward each other. In many instances (and as was found in this research project), these identity-based sources of discontent are linked to grievances over lack of involvement of local populations in development and planning processes.

Numerous academics have found evidence of daily resistance by Uyghur people against the Chinese central government in the form of sub rosa complaints and private noncompliance (Bovingdon 2002a; Dautcher 2000; Rudelson 1997; Smith 2000). Radio Free Asia, established in 1996 and blocked by Beijing, has a Uyghur service which broadcasts information critical of the Chinese state that Uyghur people use to complain of mistreatment (Gladney 2004a: 385). In an attempt to explain persistent distrust in Xinjiang between Han Chinese and Uyghur people, Yee (2005: 44) argued that the strong sense of Uyghur identity acts as a barrier to assimilation by the central government. Bovingdon (2004: ix) argues that recognition of “minimal principles of autonomy” by the Chinese central government could result in less conflict in Xinjiang. Unfortunately, the terrorist attacks in New York City on September 11, 2001 have eliminated incentives for Chinese leaders to enact more moderate policies, particularly in a region as strategic as Xinjiang (Christoffersen 2007). In particular, unrest in XUAR is emphasized on the international level to justify the government’s harsh policies toward Uyghur people (Bovingdon 2004; 23). Gladney (2004b: 112) points out that the internationalization of communications

technologies is putting strict limits on Chinese control over ethnic identity and politics in Xinjiang. Regardless, the cycle of sporadic violence committed by Uyghur people in Xinjiang and beyond, coupled with the central government's authoritarian policies (such as cutting internet access from Xinjiang region following the 2009 riots in Ürümqi) in reaction to these attacks, worsens the prospects for inclusive and socially sustainable urban development in the region.

## **1.2 Problem Statement**

Unresolved ethnic tensions in rapidly urbanizing XUAR are a significant barrier to sustainable development both in the region and in China more broadly. The context described above has resulted in increasing pressure on the government to allow for broader visions of cities that include minority histories and cultures. The Xinjiang and Chinese central governments have acknowledged the need for more inclusive urban development, but they lack the necessary tools and expertise to incorporate local resident views into urban planning. These perceptions are crucial for addressing inequality and ensuring inclusive urban governance in Ürümqi, especially given lower levels of education and income among minority people as compared to the Han majority. This research focuses on the relationship between ethnic identity, urban space and public participation in Ürümqi, Xinjiang, with the objective of understanding perceptions of ethnic tension and urban development among local residents.

The literature on the right to the city originated in a capitalist democratic context in which the rights of students and disadvantaged groups to use urban space was paramount.

At first glance, this body of literature seems hardly appropriate for exploring ethnic identity and urban development in nondemocratic China. However, the Marxist roots of Lefebvre's theory, which sought to transform the ability of local residents to appropriate and contribute to governance in cities, is consistent not only with China's communist political foundations but also its political thought. This research seeks to explore a case study of Ürümqi by engaging two areas of theory: 1) urban critical studies and 2) contemporary Chinese political thought. In doing so, this thesis aims to understand perceptions of urban space in Ürümqi, China among ethnic groups and contribute to the right to the city and spatial justice literature to better understand how ethnic tension is understood in urban, non-democratic areas, while exploring how urban development processes in a non-democratic context might include the perspectives of minority groups.

### **1.3 Thesis Structure**

This thesis will address the perspectives of local residents respecting ethnic tension and urban governance processes using a theoretical framework that draws on literature from the right to the city, spatial justice and contemporary Chinese political thought. Specifically, this will be achieved through an examination of local perceptions of social tension and participation in urban development in Ürümqi, China, a non-democratic context.

Chapter 2 will examine two previously unrelated bodies of literature relevant to this research, critical urban studies (specifically, literature on the right to the city and spatial justice) and contemporary Chinese political thought, to identify linkages for appropriate application of this research to the context of Ürümqi. Chapter 2 ends by presenting the

research questions, conceptual model and justifications underpinning the project. Chapter 3 provides an overview of socio-economic transformation in China, particularly economic reforms following the death of Mao Zedong and subsequent housing and *hukou* reforms to situate the theories introduced in the previous chapter in the Chinese context. Chapter 4 presents the research design used in the study, an overview of Xinjiang, the city of Ürümqi, and the two neighbourhoods selected. Chapter 4 also details the process undertaken to develop, implement and analyze the questionnaire and focus groups. Chapter 5 presents the data collected and a brief synthesis of the main themes explored in the focus groups, while Chapter 6 expands on these themes through a discussion of the results. These are followed by a summary of the study and its findings in Chapter 7, with suggestions for future engagements in this area. Limitations of the study will also be addressed here.

## **Chapter 2: Literature Review**

This chapter will review two bodies of literature to provide a basis for the research questions and methods applied to the general context provided above. Specifically an overview of the right to the city and spatial justice will be given that responds to the urban inequalities evident in the study area, in addition to contemporary Chinese political thought in the form of New Confucianism which provides a culturally appropriate body of theory to inform the previous, largely western body of theory.

### **2.1 Critical Urban Theory**

Critical urban theory is a field which emerged in the late 1960s and early 1970s through the work of authors such as Henri Lefebvre (1968), Manuel Castells (1977 [1972]), and David Harvey (1976). This area of study seeks "to understand the ways in which, under capitalism, cities operate as strategic sites for commodification processes" (Brenner et al. 2009: 177-178). In this manner, critical urban studies focus on cities as important sites both of capitalist power formation and of marginalization. This produces a continual conflict between profit-making and social motives that, rather than destroy urban areas, reproduces them through "implosion-explosion" (Lefebvre 1970) or "creative destruction" (Harvey 1989b). Thus, in spite of the conflict between capitalist and social imperatives, the former continues to drive the organization of urban space. Broadly speaking, critical urban studies is concerned with (a) the intersections between capitalism and urbanization; (b) the evolving power relations and institutional arrangements of capitalist urbanization; (c)

identity-based marginalization that is naturalized in urban systems; and (d) identifying and politicizing possibilities for more socially just urban systems (Brenner et al. 2009: 179).

### *2.1.1 The Right to the City*

The right to the city originates from Lefebvre (1968), a neo-Marxist sociologist who identified urban places as ones that embody the formation of capital and conceptualized it as a right for all residents to participate in decision-making processes regarding their urban development. The emergence of this concept coincides with and falls under critical urban theory. The right to the city as a focus of study has increased since the 2008 mortgage crisis, and in light of unprecedented levels of urbanization in developing parts of the world. The right to the city contains multiple understandings, including (1) the right to difference and ethnic enclaves (Fenster 2005; Knox & Pinch 2000; Sandercock 2000); (2) the legal implications of implementation (Attoh 2011; Fernandes 2007); (3) gendered experiences of urban space (Holtman 2013; Kholsa & Dhar 2013; Klodawsky et al. 2013); (4) urban planning (Cuthill 2010); and (5) emancipation from global capital's dominance over space (Harvey 2003; Marcuse 2009; Purcell 2003). Marcuse (2009) identifies the profit motive as the key drive both of the subprime mortgage crisis of 2008, and argues that this sense of greed is indicative of increasing unrest among people in urban areas. Most explorations of the right to the city are conducted in Western or democratic contexts (Mitchell 2003; Uitermark 2012), with very little application in East Asia. This research project will focus especially on the first stream in order to understand the perceptions of ethnic minority

groups with respect to the cities they inhabit, with application in the western Chinese city of Ürümqi (for more information, please see Chapter 4, section 4.2.1).

Lefebvre defined membership in the community, and consequently the right to affect decisions regarding the production of urban space, as being a literal inhabitant of the city (Lefebvre 1996: 158). The right to the city for Lefebvre entails two rights in particular: the right to participate in decision-making processes respecting the city, and the right to appropriate and use urban space (Purcell 2002: 103). Although Lefebvre's right to the city focuses on class identities, the concept can also be used to analyze gender, language, ethnicity and other identities (Fenster 2005; George-Abeyie 1989; Marcuse 2009).

Lefebvre's contributions were subsequently picked up by academics from a variety of ideological backgrounds, though many embraced a critical approach to development and urban planning more generally, concentrating on the ways in which capital accumulation have negatively impacted marginalized communities (Harvey 2009 [1973]; Rankin 2012). Nancy Fraser (1997) describes this problem by arguing that economic inequality are met with redistributive policies that result in eliminating differences between groups of people, while cultural differences demand policies of recognition that valorize difference. Injustice arises from both economic inequality and cultural difference; the challenge for urban studies, then, is to find solutions that support both redistribution and recognition, rather than either one in isolation (Fraser 1997). In order to appropriately respond to the double injustices of socioeconomic and cultural difference, actions employing the right to the city should target the wider processes which generate injustice in urban areas, rather than merely re-ordering urban spaces (Iveson 2011). Marcuse (2009: 191) describes the right to

the city as deriving from those who are “deprived of basic material and existing legal rights, and [are] discontented with life...[which they perceive] as limiting their own potentials for growth and creativity.” Marcuse notes that spatial conceptualizations of the city can be a source of hope among diverse populations of people to identify collaborative urban solutions (Marcuse 2009). Increasing levels of exclusion among urban residents creates fragmentation that is reflected in the spatial dynamics of cities – as such, the perceptions of minority residents become crucial (Harvey 1989). The right to the city, then, entails a far more transformative aim than more mainstream approaches, which aestheticize and depoliticize difference while ignoring the socioeconomic foundations of cultural difference (Rankin 2012).

Attoh (2011) notes that how the right to the city is manifested in practical terms is not always clear, although it is increasingly being used in reaction to inequitable urban planning policies. Sandercock’s (2000) examination of disputes between Aboriginal and non-Aboriginal people in Sydney (2000) highlights the importance of including indigenous people in urban development processes. Contributing to gendered analyses of the right to the city, Holtman (2013) discusses the impact of urban safety strategies on women in multiple contexts. Another application of the right to the city can be found in Fernandes (2007), who examines on the legal implementation of the concept in Brazil. All of these cases share a focus on cities as contested spaces among different groups of people. In democratic societies, the right to the city is used to demand (a) increasing democratic control over the surplus products of capitalism (by increasing taxes); and (b) lessening or eliminating the influence of corporate interests over the public (by reforming political

institutions) (Harvey 2012: 22 - 25). As such, most of the contexts in which the right to the city is applied are in countries with democratic political processes. It is not immediately clear exactly how the right to the city can or should be applied in nondemocratic contexts such as China.

### *2.1.2 Spatial Justice*

The focus on space as a source of tension falls under spatial justice, a concept which stems from the right to the city. Spatial justice refers to “an intentional and focused emphasis on the spatial or geographical aspects of justice and injustice” (Soja 2010: 62). It is a concept that is concerned with the ways in which social inequalities are reflected in the spatial dynamics of urban areas, including the ability to participate in urban life. As such, spatial justice is a concept that emphasizes the interdependence of space or geography and social context in producing inequalities (Harvey 2009, 1997; Polese & Stren 2000; Soja 1999, 1980). Spatial justice constitutes a call for the development of “cities that correspond to human social needs rather than to the capitalist imperative of profit-making” (Brenner et al. 2009: 176). As such, and in keeping with the concept of the right to the city, spatial justice responds to the decreased ability for residents to control governance in cities (Friedmann 1992; Isin 2000; Soja 2000). There is disagreement among scholars regarding what mechanisms can be used within spatial justice to practically study inequalities in urban spaces; however, many agree that it is collective in nature, and entails legal as well as moral claims for better urban systems (Brenner et al. 2009; Friedmann 1992; Marcuse 2009). While spatial justice has much potential for addressing inequalities in urban areas,

there is very little available literature on engagement with marginalized communities using this framework. As such, more extensive research needs to be done that places minority perceptions at the centre of the right to the city.

At first glance, these theoretical debates in critical urban theory have little relevance to the non-democratic Chinese context: the language of rights alone seems inappropriate for the very different conception of political participation in China. However, it is worth mentioning the critical urban theory and China's political ideology of Marxism-Leninism-Maoism were both influenced by Marxist thought<sup>3</sup>. And China's nondemocratic political system has been driven by a capitalist economy since 1978, which produces a unique relationship between profit-making and social imperatives in urban spaces. These factors, combined with increasing income inequality and numerous indigenous ethnic minorities throughout China, make the country an apt subject for critical urban studies. However, an overview of contemporary Chinese political thought will appropriately situate the right to the city and spatial justice in the Chinese context. The revival of Confucianism<sup>4</sup> and the liberalization of Chinese national politics has created a fertile political environment for the development of more inclusive and democratic institutions that are appropriate to the Chinese context and which improve on errors present in Western, liberal democratic states.

---

<sup>3</sup> For more information on economic reform, political ideology and urbanization in China, see Chapter 3.

<sup>4</sup> Confucius (551 - 479 BCE) was a Chinese philosopher and writer of many Chinese classical texts that have been very influential in Chinese thought. He emphasized strong family loyalty, ancestor worship, and virtue ethics, and argued that political leadership should be governed like a family structure.

## 2.2 Contemporary Chinese Political Thought

Unlike liberal Western political thought, Chinese intellectual debates since 1949 have been heavily informed by Chinese-style communism, a form of political thought that blends Marxism<sup>5</sup>, Leninism<sup>6</sup>, and Maoism<sup>7</sup>. They have also been formed in what has been described as a dialectic between pro- and anti-Western sentiment (Dallmayr & Tingyang 2012).

### 2.2.1 *The Dialectic of Chinese Political Thought*

Advocates of westernization, many of whom were influenced by the translation of classical liberal texts into Mandarin, emphasized the need to 'catch up' by adopting Western-style scientific and political institutions. One of the key proponents of this view was Hu Shi, the leader of the May Fourth Movement.<sup>8</sup>

Critics of pro-Westernization included Confucians, who were strongly influenced by Chinese nationalism and Chinese intellectual traditions. Following the ascension of the CCP

---

<sup>5</sup> Marxism is a large body of political, economic and philosophical theory developed by German philosophers Karl Marx and Friedrich Engels. It is premised on the idea that the global capitalist mode of production and concomitant hierarchical class structure will be overthrown by class struggle. Capitalism will be succeeded by a classless, stateless, more humane form of political organization characterized by common ownership known as communism.

<sup>6</sup> Leninism is a body of political and economic theories developed from Marxism and former Soviet premier Vladimir Lenin's (for whom Leninism is named after) interpretations of Marxist theory for application to the Russian Empire in the early 20th century. Following a revolution against the Empire led by the Bolshevik party, Leninism was the dominant version of Marxism in Russia from 1917 - 1922. Following the death of Vladimir Lenin, USSR leader Joseph Stalin developed Marxism-Leninism as the state ideology of the Soviet Union.

<sup>7</sup> Maoism, or Marxism-Leninism-Maoism, is named after Mao Zedong, founding member of the People's Republic of China and first Chairman of the Communist Party of China. This body of political and economic theory stems from Mao's application of Marxist-Leninist theories to China. The main Maoist components include the consolidation of the party through the popularisation of a mass ideology (or mass line), protracted people's war, a strategy for guerilla warfare, and New Democracy, the idea that the national bourgeois are a necessary evil in the long-term development of socialism.

<sup>8</sup> The May Fourth Movement was a social and political movement which originated in student protests in Beijing on May 4, 1919 in response to China's capitulation to the demands in the Treaty of Versailles. These demonstrations marked an upsurge in Chinese nationalism and radicalized Chinese intellectual debates.

and the formation of the People's Republic of China, pro-Western liberal thought became unpopular and subject to persecution.

It should be noted that the divide between protecting Chinese traditions and adopting Western institutions has been both highly contested and unclear. There are key Chinese historical figures that embody both views, such as Sun Zhongshan (Sun Yat-Sen), at once a progressive reformer and a defender of Chinese nationalism. Syncretism between Chinese tradition and Westernization has become increasingly common since the 1970s.

### *2.2.2 Post-Maoist Intellectual Thought*

Following the death of Mao Zedong in 1976, and facilitated by the economic reforms of 1978<sup>9</sup>, a post-Maoist New Leftism has emerged. New Leftism is a school of political thought that is critical both of capitalism and errors committed during the rule of Mao Zedong. This body of thought, which is seen as a response to mounting inequality in China following the economic reforms of 1978, re-embraces Confucianism and permits increased expression of liberal progressive politics in China. The relationship of New Leftism to capitalism and Maoism is complex, with adherents such as Cui Zhiyuan (2005) arguing that socialism and capitalism should not be viewed as mutually opposing systems. As such, new Leftism represents a body of political theory that, while critical of China's Maoist era, is still substantially different from Western political thought.

Chinese authors have used the term the "China Model" as a contrast to the "Beijing Consensus" to describe the country's combination of mixed ownership, individual property

---

<sup>9</sup> For more information, see Chapter 3.

rights, and heavy government intervention in the economy and politics (Zhou 2012: 28). This unique context is one that defies traditional theories of states, as its political system contains a blend of Marxism, Maoism, and a commercial economy. China's urban system is also distinguished by the separation of rural and urban residents through the *hukou* institution<sup>10</sup>, which originally restricted rural-urban migration. The *hukou* system has since been liberalized, allowing migration to and from cities, but rural migrants' access to services in urban areas remains limited, producing a large population of second-class citizens in China's cities (Chan 2014).

Following the pro-democracy protests in Tiananmen Square and the resulting violence in 1989, Chinese political thought became characterized by adherents of a gradual liberation of politics (including the New Left, with varying degrees of support for liberal individualism) on the one hand, and a return to studying classical texts (both Confucian and Western) on the other. In the absence of liberal electoral democracy, the Chinese Communist state has pursued performance-based legitimacy by increasing economic growth and the well-being of its citizens (Zhou 2012: 33). The push for greater economic growth has had multiple negative repercussions in cities, including forced migration to make way for housing developments, the disregard and erasure of the cultural traditions of indigenous groups, and further marginalization of people with rural *hukou* status (Li 2012; Wang & Murie 2000). In this manner, a strategy of "accumulation by dispossession" is being pursued in which marginalized people are displaced from urban spaces for capital accumulation (Harvey 2003a).

---

<sup>10</sup> China's *hukou* system is discussed further in Chapter 3, section 3.1

### *2.2.3 Confucianism*

Confucianism, an ancient strand of Chinese political thought emphasizing social harmony and family values, has seen a revival since the death of Mao Zedong. Although older Confucian thought emphasized the value of a sage-emperor as leader of a given society, New Confucian scholars argue that electoral democracy is preferable to traditional concentrations of power (Alitto 1986; Chen 2012; Cheng & Bunnin 2008; Liu 1996). In contrast to Western conceptions of political philosophy that are concerned with the individual, Confucian political philosophy focuses on how the government can best represent the will of the collective (Chen 2012: 113). Increasing levels of commercial activity and competition in modern society, however, necessitate forms of political governance that differ from the traditional imperial structures promoted by Confucius. Some New Confucians argue that Western conceptions of individual rights can and should be incorporated into Confucian political philosophy in order to remain relevant in modern Chinese society (Chen 2012). There remains debate as to the compatibility of democratic political systems and Confucian political philosophy, with some arguing that Confucianism and Chinese civilization are fundamentally incompatible with liberal democracy (Huntington, 1984), and others insisting that aspects of Confucian egalitarianism and tolerance can in fact promote democratic governance (Fukuyama 1995). He (2012: 141 - 142) suggests that Confucianism provides a critical lens through which to reform liberal democracy's preoccupation with individual rights and relative neglect of public morality. This is the common ground off which a Western theory such as the right to the city can

appropriately be applied in mainland China. What remains to be seen, however, is how studies of ethnic identity in urban settings have been conducted in China in the past.

The focus among the right to the city and spatial justice literature on the urban experiences of marginalized peoples, coupled with New Confucianism's orientation toward collective will and tolerance provide a common ground for exploring the perceptions of local residents in Ürümqi.

## **2.3 Research Questions and Conceptual Model**

### *2.3.1 Research Questions*


This research will address the following problems: How are ethnic identity and urban spaces understood by residents in Ürümqi? How do these perceptions compare by neighbourhood and ethnic group?

### *2.3.2 Conceptual Model*

My theoretical approach is informed by the right to the city (Lefebvre 1968) and more specifically its later conceptualizations in spatial justice (Marcuse 2009) in order to examine perceptions of urban space and ethnic tension among local residents. As such, this research will borrow heavily from Marcuse (2010: 1), who focuses on "the Just City as the ultimate goal of [urban] planning." It is a framework that is concerned not just with class identities (as in Lefebvre's original concept), but with supporting the development of all people in a given space, both individually and as a whole. This research borrows heavily from research on resident perceptions of urban development, such as those conducted by Jim & Shan

(2013), Karaman & Islam (2012), and Murdie & Teixeira (2011). Spatial justice is the best theoretical framework for this research, as it appropriately supports the use of participatory tools that will assist minority groups to identify sources of spatial conflict and shape their urban space. These largely Western theories will be complemented by Chinese political thought.

**Figure 2.1: Conceptual Model**



Multiple research methods, including a questionnaire and focus groups will be used to explore resident perceptions of specific sites in two neighbourhoods within Ürümqi. The research findings stemming from this research will allow for a greater understanding of the ways in which ethnic identity and social tensions are understood by urban residents.

### *2.3.3 Research Justification*

The central objectives and questions for this research arose out of the gaps identified in the literature. The body of literature on the right to the city and spatial justice originated in and for the most part focus on democratic states, in which citizen public participation is much more common. While these theories are maintained in reaction to increasing inequalities evident in urban systems and are concerned with creating just cities, there is very little research on engagement with marginalized communities in non-Western, non-democratic contexts. The Chinese context presents itself as an incredibly unique addition to this literature: It is a nondemocratic, rapidly growing state with mixed ownership and heavy state intervention into politics and the economy. The PRC also faces substantial problems with growing income inequality, social tension and separatist or nationalist sentiment, all of which are linked to ethnic identity. These issues intersect to create a lively but tension-ridden urban environment in the interior city of Ürümqi. New Confucianism's focus on the collective well-being of political communities provides an appropriate basis to situate the Western spatial justice literature in mainland China. The combination of the two bodies of literature allows for a novel application of the right to the city to Ürümqi.

Given the gaps identified in the literature, this study employed a questionnaire and focus groups in two neighbourhoods in Ürümqi to generate quantitative and qualitative data, with the objective of understanding resident perceptions of neighbourhood, ethnic identity and urban development in Ürümqi. The perceptions gathered provided an understanding of how urban space in Ürümqi is experienced differently by people of different ethnic identities.

## **Chapter 3: Socio-economic Transformation in China**

This chapter provides an overview of recent historical context relevant to China, including the country's economic transformation, *hukou* and housing reforms, and how these have driven rapid urbanization and increasing inequality through the PRC.


### **3.1 Post-Maoist Economic Reform**

In December 1978, following the death of Mao Zedong, reformists in the CPC led by Deng Xiaoping instituted a program of economic reforms that has been called "Socialism with Chinese characteristics" or the Open Door policy (Vogel 2011; Wei 1995). These reforms reduced government planning and introduced market mechanisms to China's national economy, including the decollectivization of agriculture, the inclusion of foreign investment, and the growth of entrepreneurial activity. These policies increased the productivity of multiple industries, resulting in a shift of large segments of the population from rural-based agriculture to manufacturing (Hu & Khan 1997). These shifts included a geographic movement from rural to urban areas as a result of the surplus of agricultural labour in the former. In the late 1980s and 1990s much of the PRC's state-owned industries were privatized and price controls and protectionist policies were lifted, though state monopolies in banking and petroleum were maintained. As such, China's current economic system blends features of socialist and capitalist economies.

These reforms caused substantial growth in the private sector and economic growth. In 2011 China surpassed Japan as the continent's largest economy and exceeded the world average urbanization level of 52%, up from a rate of less than 20% in 1980

(UNDES 2011; Xinhua 2012). The unprecedented speed of China's urbanization is illustrated in Figure 3.1. Much of this economic growth is borne on the backs of migrant labour - international advocates have increasingly noted "that the burden of [China's] economic development is being felt most by China's migrant workers" (Nielsen et al. 2007: 84). It has also resulted in large increases in income inequality, and has been critiqued by some as being capitalism with Chinese characteristics (Huang 2008).

**Figure 3.1: Urban Population Growth in the PRC: a Comparison**



Source: UNDES 2011

### 3.2 Housing Reforms

Prior to the land and housing reforms, there was no real estate market in China: housing was either directly managed by local government, or by state-owned enterprises for their employees (Gu et al. 2005). People's access to services and programs was determined by their *hukou*, a registration system instituted in 1958 to limit rural-urban migration (Chen et

al. 2011). The *hukou* system ties a person's citizenship to their place of birth, and restricts access to crucial services (such as healthcare, education, etc) outside the location of one's *hukou*. At the same time, the unit responsible for administering many if not all of these services were the employers, or *danwei*. These two processes allowed for state provision of programs including housing, education, and healthcare, while preventing migration within the country.

The state-controlled system suffered from housing shortages, heavy financial burdens, and urban zoning issues (Wang & Murie 1996). The economic reforms of 1978 caused a decentralization of urban administrative structures from the central government, further complicating these problems (Ma 2005). Housing reforms were introduced to create a market-oriented housing system that allowed for private rights to property. This liberalized housing policy increased housing construction across the country and both internal and international migration, which in turn reinforced rapid urbanization throughout China (Knox & McCarthy 2005). Three structures affected by the economic and subsequent housing reforms in China were the *danwei*, street offices, and residents' committees.

### 3.3.1 *Danwei*

The *danwei* or 'work unit,' has acted as the primary link between people and social services throughout the history of the PRC (Dittmer & Xiaobo 1996). Under the era of China's controlled economy, the *danwei* was a local organizational unit of workers that set production goals, slogans and educational mottos, and controlled the spatial distribution of

residents. Between 1957 and the housing reforms of the early 1990s, more than 90% of the population belonged to a *danwei* (Bray 2005). Since the economic reforms and as part of a broader retreat of the state from social welfare, the provision of social services historically offered by the *danweis* has declined significantly, as many of these services are now provided by the private sector (Schwartz & Shieh 2009; Shieh & Friedmann 2008). Today, *danweis* still remain in both state and private enterprises, but their role in local communities is much more limited. Because many of the services provided by the *danweis* were commercialized, costs for housing and other programs have increased, which has negatively impacted access for poor populations. As a result, more recent community building policies have been introduced to compensate for the withdrawal of the *danwei* from the daily lives of people in China (Shieh & Friedmann 2008), consisting of the street office and residents' committees.

### *3.3.2 Street offices and residents' committees*

The street offices and residents' committees were created mainly to provide social services for those populations not affiliated with a *danwei*. The street office represents the lowest level of government, while the residents' committee is a locally elected, sub-government organization that assists the street office in delivering social services and engaging in political mobilization (Shieh & Friedmann 2008). Since the economic reforms these two administrative units have been redesigned, with more state roles for the residents' committees that reinforces party power at the local level (Heberer & Göbel 2011). It is worth mentioning that, although the residents' committees are elected, they do not have a


final say over political matters, and as such their contributions to democratic governance are negligible (O'Brien & Li 2000: 488). The street offices and residents' committees are supervised by district level organizations, which in turn have policy passed down to them from the central government's Ministry of Civil Affairs (Yan & Gao 2007). Thus, over the last few decades, the street offices and residents' committees gradually replaced the *danweis'* political and cultural function. However, the success of these two institutions in replacing the *danwei* have been questioned by scholars who have found low levels of resident engagement and knowledge of committee activities (Heberer & Göbel 2011). The concurrence of economic reform with the decline both of the *danwei* and of resident political participation suggests a disconnect between the Chinese government and its citizens, which is worrying given the context of Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region, which will follow in Chapter 4.

### **3.3 Hukou Liberalization**

Prior to the 1990s, the *hukou* system tied a person's citizenship to their place of birth, and restricted access to crucial services (such as healthcare, education, etc) outside the location of one's *hukou*. Following the liberalization, people could theoretically live and access services in regions other than the location of their *hukou*. The prevalence of unstable agricultural jobs in rural areas coupled with rapid urbanization and housing reforms resulted in a mass influx of migrant workers with rural *hukou* statuses into urban areas. In spite of the liberalization policy, people with rural *hukou* status still have lesser access to services in cities than urban *hukou* citizens (Nielsen et al. 2007). The persistence of this

exclusion, especially given greater access to employment and higher income in urban areas, suggests that the *hukou* reforms of the 1990s have not done enough to prevent inequality across the country. See Figure 3.2 for an illustration of the *hukou* system during the Mao era and following the economic reforms of 1978.

**Figure 3.2: *Hukou* Status and Social Stratification**




**Source: Chan 2012**

Following the economic reforms of 1978 the institution was somewhat liberalized to allow migration to cities and thereby fill demand for urban labour (Lan 2008; Zhan 2011). However domestic citizenship remains bound to one's place of birth, and rural migrant workers and their families continue to face discrimination in cities. Thus, although *hukou*'s formal relevance has declined in recent decades following its liberalization, the system's privileging of urban residents can be reflected in inequalities between residents with rural and urban *hukou* statuses, most notably in terms of income (Cao 2010). Much of the literature on migrant workers in China argues that the *hukou* system remains the primary

barrier to access to social services for migrants (Chan 2010; Nielsen et al. 2007; Wang 2010). As such, although the physical rural-urban barriers have been largely removed for migrants, the *hukou* divide persists in terms of income and access to social services. As evident in Figure 3.3, the gap between total urban population and the urban population with urban *hukou* has widened since China's economic reforms.

**Figure 3.3: China's Urban Population and Urban *Hukou* Population**



Source: Chan 2014

The rapid pace of urbanization in China has progressed with inadequate attention to issues of social inclusion, leading to inequalities between urban and rural areas, and also between Han Chinese and ethnic minority groups (Cao 2010; 2009). The PRC's transition from a centrally-planned to a market-oriented economy has revealed alarming disparities between coastal and interior regions, urban and rural areas, and Han Chinese and minority

people. New housing mechanisms introduced in the 1990s created new forms of marginalization that reinforced income inequalities between people in China. In regions such as XUAR, this has contributed to increasing unrest, such as Uyghur-led riots against Han people which escalated into mass violence in July of 2009 in Ürümqi. The continued prevalence of social unrest and violence in XUAR and throughout China, undermine the success of economic development efforts. As such, ethnic identity is of crucial importance for socially sustainable urban governance and development in Ürümqi.

## **Chapter 4: Research Design and Methodology**

This chapter details the research context, design and methods. An overview of the region of Xinjiang is followed by a description of the specific design employed, the city itself, and the two neighbourhoods chosen for the sample. The study employed mixed methods (a questionnaire and focus groups) in two neighbourhoods of Ürümqi to explore resident perceptions of ethnic identity and urban space in the city. This chapter ends with an outline of how the questionnaire and focus groups were designed, conducted and analysed.

### **4.1: Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region**

The western-most region of China has been known as Xinjiang since the mid-eighteenth century, when the Qing empire used the term to mean 'new frontier' (Starr 2004). No Chinese dynasty had previously succeeded in controlling the entire territory of what is today known as Xinjiang: the region rarely constituted one political entity, but rather parts of it were controlled by different external rulers. As such, Xinjiang was an intercultural contact point between multiple civilizations in Central Asia throughout its history. Following several decades of military and diplomatic efforts in the region, in 1884 Xinjiang became a province of China, during which time it was maintained as a strategic frontier zone with military garrisons to protect against Russia and Central Asian states (Spence 1990: 98). Assimilationist policies were pursued in Xinjiang, including the implementation of a Chinese-style administration, replacement of Turkic headmen with Han officials, promotion of Han migration to and reclamation of land in Xinjiang, and use of Confucian education to sinicize local Uyghur populations (Starr 2004: 63). The planned resettlements

failed however, and Chinese settlers abandoned their new homes and returned to the interior. This prompted Uyghur people to fill in the fertile areas of southeastern and northern Xinjiang and establish farms, resulting in a more homogenously Uyghur population in the region than historically (Starr 2004: 67).

**Figure 4.1: Map of XUAR in China**



**Source: Pannell & Schmidt 2006: 329**

In the twentieth century, China's approach to Xinjiang has oscillated between pluralistic autonomy for local Uyghur populations and aggressive assimilation. Following the fall of the Qing dynasty in 1911, Turkic nationalism increased among Uyghur people as they came into contact with Turkic and Islamic movements elsewhere. This was further

encouraged by the establishment of ethnically defined socialist republics in Soviet Russia, resulting in a split among Turkic nationalists in Xinjiang between supporting or opposing Communist rule. During the warlord and Republican eras in Chinese politics, the governors of Xinjiang, appointed by the central government, wavered between assimilationist and pluralistic policies. This contributed to numerous rebellions against the Chinese administration on the part of local Turkic groups in Xinjiang during the 1930s, culminating in the declaration of the short-lived Eastern Turkistan Republic (ETR) in 1933.

Following a Soviet invasion, the ETR fell and Xinjiang became a Soviet satellite from 1934 to 1941, during which time fourteen ethnic groups were identified, Uyghur being chief among them (Starr 2004: 80). From 1941 to 1949 Xinjiang was governed by the Nationalist Kuomintang government, during which time a second ETR was declared in northern Xinjiang. The ETR dissolved, however, after the CCP ousted the Nationalist government and established military control of Xinjiang, killing ETR leaders in the process. As of the 1950s the majority of XUAR's population were of Uyghur identity, but soon afterward the central government increased migration measures to increase the population of Han Chinese people in the region.

In 1955 Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region (XUAR) received its current title from the CCP. Regional autonomy was imposed in keeping with the *minzu* concept of nationality, which provided nominal self-rule with overarching CCP control. Numerous scholars have argued that the *minzu* system does not allow for political autonomy (Dreyer 1976; Heberer 1989; Mackerass 1994; McMillen 1979; Moneyhon 2002; Stein 2003), and indeed, the system of regional autonomy in Xinjiang provided credence to a growing sense of Uyghur

political identity while generating grievances against heavy-handed CCP control in the area (Bovingdon 2010). Key among these was the fact that a number of smaller autonomies were allocated throughout the region in such a way that the overwhelming demographic weight of Uyghur people was minimized (Bovingdon 2004: 13).

Although the PRC was initially declared a multinational state, the Anti-Rightist Movement<sup>11</sup> opposed local nationalism among ethnic and religious minorities. Relatively tolerant attitudes toward regional autonomy in the 1950s (such as the *tongyi zhanxian* or 'united front' policy – Bovingdon 2004: 18) were replaced by more assimilationist policies after the Great Leap Forward<sup>12</sup> Uyghur and other minority groups denounced the *minzu* system, and in response the central government attempted to mobilize class against interests for greater local governance (Dreyer 1976: 150 – 157). In Xinjiang, the Great Leap Forward materialized as a call for cultural assimilation to facilitate economic growth, resulting in less official tolerance for ethnic and cultural difference (Bovingdon 2004: 19). This was in part influenced by XUAR's status as a security buffer in the northwest of the country, as well as its possession of mineral resources (Fenby 2013: 370). The famine that resulted from the Great Leap policies, poor weather and the export of grain to the Soviet Union facilitated widespread migration of Han and other people from the interior of China

---

<sup>11</sup> The Anti-Rightist Movement, which lasted from approximately 1957 to 1959, sought to purge alleged enemies ("rightists") within the Party and abroad. It was largely a reaction to the Hundred Flowers Campaign, also initiated by Mao Zedong, which promoted pluralism of expression and criticism of the government.

<sup>12</sup> The Great Leap Forward was a campaign by the CPC from 1958 to 1961 which aimed to industrialize the agrarian economy through collectivization. The campaign, which punished private farming practices, caused widespread famine throughout China, killed tens of millions of people, and resulted in negative economic growth.

to Xinjiang, further reducing the demographic weight of Uyghur people in the region (Hannum & Xie 1998: 324).

A return to moderate policies after the famine was reversed following China's Cultural Revolution<sup>13</sup>, increasing demands among the central government for cultural assimilation of non-Han people to their greatest level. This pattern of swerving between moderate and repressive policies continued onward, alienating the Uyghurs and other ethnic minorities through pressures to conform linguistically and culturally. During this period Uyghur people and other Muslim minorities throughout China saw religious texts and mosques destroyed, their religious leaders persecuted, and individual followers punished. The introduction of more tolerant policies in Xinjiang following China's Open Door policy of 1978 (including Party Secretary General Hu Yaobang's 'genuine autonomy' policies in Tibet and Xinjiang in 1980, Bovingdon 2004: 21) did not result in a loosening of political control, leading to riots in XUAR in the late 1980s. Additionally, the dissolution of the Soviet Union in 1991 stoked fears that the spirit of independence might spill over into Xinjiang and threaten CCP control of the region. The government's response resulted in new restrictions on culture and religion.

Since 2001, concerns about Uyghur separatism and their links with international jihadist groups have increased among the central government. However, Millward (2004)

---

<sup>13</sup> The Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution was a violent socio-political movement implemented by Mao Zedong in the PRC from 1966 to 1976 to purge enemies of the regime and re-impose Maoist ideology in the Party. This entailed the militarization of multiple organizations throughout the Party, the purge of senior officials, and the persecution of millions of people through public humiliation, torture, arbitrary imprisonment, seizure of property, and forcible displacement. Countless historical, cultural and religious sites and artifacts were destroyed during this period. Following the death of Mao Zedong, reformers led by Deng Xiaoping dismantled policies associated with the Cultural Revolution.

argues that the frequency and severity of violent Uyghur separatist attacks have in fact declined since the late 1990s. He examines official government documents that never explicitly state which organizations are responsible for which violent attacks, which are then translated in English media sources as though one large terrorist group is responsible for violence throughout all of XUAR (Millward 2004: 14). However, the apparent surge in unrest following the July 2009 riots in Ürümqi suggests an increase in extremist violence among Uyghur separatists. The primary targets of China's anti-terror efforts in Xinjiang are the East Turkistan Islamic Movement (ETIM) and the East Turkistan Liberation Organization (ETLO). The ETIM has been linked to terrorist activity in China and possibly beyond, with evidence suggesting the participation of Uyghur separatists in al-Qaeda training camps (Christoffersen 2007: 48; Millward 2004). These security concerns are frequently expressed by PRC officials as the "three evils of separatism, extremism and terrorism" (*People's Daily* 2004). Millward characterizes Uyghur separatism in Xinjiang as primarily ethno-nationalist rather than religious in nature, despite the region's inclusion in "the ongoing narrative of 'Islamic terror'" (2004: 28).

Attempts to counter unrest in Xinjiang have included heavy military presence and substantial economic development in the region, including transportation and infrastructure projects linking XUAR with Russia, Kazakhstan, Tajikistan and Pakistan (Glantz et al. 2001; Xinhua 2007). The underlying idea of these strategies is that sufficient economic development will quell social unrest in the region and reduce support for separatist sentiment. However, the continued use of heavy military and police response to support

for Uyghur peaceful resistance, such as the arrest of Uyghur professor Ilham Tohti for separatism, undermine such efforts.

## **4.2 Site Selection**

### *4.2.1 Ürümqi*

Field research was conducted in the city of Ürümqi, the capital of XUAR. In Ürümqi there are more than 40 nationalities, with Uyghur and Han Chinese representing the two largest ethnic groups. Ürümqi and XUAR are of strategic importance to the Uyghur people, who have no independent state to represent their nationality (Pannell & Schmidt 2006). The Chinese central government recognizes ethnic minority rights for Uyghur people in XUAR under the *minzu* system of regional autonomy, and Uyghur people are the largest represented ethnic group in the region (45% to Han's 42%), although in Ürümqi Han people make up 73% of the population (Dong & Zhang 2011: 118). Uyghur people have historically been the largest ethnic group in Xinjiang, but the demographic balance has shifted since legislation introduced by the central government to encourage the migration of Han Chinese to XUAR, and particularly to urban areas (Mackerass 2003). It is a region that has experienced unprecedented urbanization as well as increasing levels of income inequality, particularly between urban and rural areas (Cao 2010; Tsui 1991).

Ürümqi consists of seven districts and one county, with a population of 3.4 million people as of 2013, of which only 2.1 million have their *hukou* status in the city (see Table 4.1) (Ürümqi Statistics Bureau 2013). With a Gross Domestic Product of 200.174 billion RMB in 2012 (Ürümqi Statistics Bureau 2013), the city has experienced significant economic

growth in recent years. Data was collected from residents in two different neighbourhoods (Yuewan, which is a Uyghur majority neighbourhood, and Changjie, which has a mixed ethnic demography) in Ürümqi. A questionnaire was distributed in paper form in the two neighbourhoods in both the Mandarin and Uyghur languages, with local graduate students available should participants have questions. This was followed by a two focus groups with residents in each neighbourhood to further discuss some of the results and general perceptions of their neighbourhood, the city, and ethnic identity. This two-pronged strategy allowed for the collection of both quantitative and qualitative data, allowing for a more comprehensive understanding of the local situation in Changjie and Yuewan. Analysis of resident perceptions in each of the two neighbourhoods allowed for comparison of whether perceptions of the neighbourhood and city are affected by the demographic composition of the neighbourhood itself.

**Table 4.1: Administrative Divisions in Ürümqi**

District / County Name	Township Governments	Town governments	Sub-district offices	Resident committees	Villagers' committees
Tianshan	-	-	14	129	1
Saybark	-	-	10	117	1
Xinshi	2	-	11	84	5
Shuimogou	-	-	8	64	6
Toutunhe	-	-	5	38	1
Dabancheng	3	1	3	8	20
Midong	2	5	6	42	81
Ürümqi county	7	2	-	-	59

Source: Dong & Zhang 2011

#### 4.2.2 Changjie and Yuewan Neighbourhood

Changjie is a Han Chinese majority neighbourhood located in Yamakelishan district in southwestern Ürümqi. Although census data for the neighbourhood itself was not available, at the larger district level, Han Chinese people make up 79.77% of the population in Yamakelishan (See Figure 4.1). Under China's planned economy period Changjie neighbourhood was administered by the *danwei*<sup>14</sup> of a state-owned concrete factory; as such, all residents in the area were either employees or family members of employees at the factory. In general, the community consists of a series of residential buildings which surround several internal courtyards featuring green spaces, exercise and recreational equipment. Changjie also contained a cafeteria, pharmacy, library and other local services. Following economic reform the factory was privatized and relocated outside of the community, resulting in the deterioration of the original neighbourhood identity, including maintenance of common areas and many of the local services offered by the factory.

Today, Changjie consists of a mixed demography of elderly retired residents who worked in the concrete factory, and younger lower-income residents (including migrant workers and students) who live in the neighbourhood for the short-term. The close proximity of these different demographic profiles has resulted in diverging views about ethnic and neighbourhood identity, as will be seen in Chapter 6.

Yuewan is a majority Uyghur neighbourhood located in Shenglilu Jiedao district in southeastern Ürümqi. Unfortunately local level census data was not available for the neighbourhood itself, and the district-level data is not representative of Yuewan itself:

---

<sup>14</sup> For more information, see section 3.3.1

Shenglilu Jiedao district is reported as being approximately evenly distributed between Han Chinese and Uyghur people, with Uyghur people making up 50.39% of the population (See Figure 4.2 below). In comparison to Changjie, Yuewan is a much newer and ethnically more homogeneous neighbourhood, with a largely Uyghur population. This more united neighbourhood demographic is evident in respondent perceptions of public spaces, as will be presented in Chapter 5.

### **4.3 Questionnaire and Focus Group Design**

Below are details regarding the sample selection, and development and implementation of the questionnaire and focus groups. Assistance from University of Ottawa students Ziwei Liu and Gaoxiang Li, as well as several students from the local university in Ürümqi ensured that translation, distribution and collection of questionnaires, and the focus groups were conducted in a thorough, culturally appropriate manner.

#### *4.3.1 Sample Selection*

The sample of questionnaire participants was obtained through a mixture of convenience and snowball sampling in the two selected neighbourhoods in Ürümqi, with assistance from graduate students from the local university with competence in Mandarin and Uyghur. Because of my lack of language functionality, the inaccessibility of contact information and neighbourhood data, and the marginalized identities of potential respondents, this was the most appropriate form of sampling for this research (Brymen et al. 2009: 197). Yee's research on Uyghur-Han relations in Xinjiang similarly had to rely on convenience sampling

because of issues with local authorities ceasing questionnaire material or significantly altering the questions being asked (2003; 2005). The sample consisted of residents aged 18 and over living in either of the two neighbourhoods.

Every questionnaire participant was asked if they would be willing to participate in a focus group; as such, focus group participants were drawn from questionnaire respondents.

#### *4.3.2 Questionnaire Development*

The questionnaire was first developed in English almost a year prior to field research, and underwent revisions as I attempted to craft questions that would best complement both my research questions and the planned focus groups. Following that, and in collaboration with Ziwei Liu and Gaoxiang Li, the questionnaire was translated into Mandarin over the course of numerous very thorough drafts to ensure that the Mandarin version reflected as closely as possible my English draft while also being culturally and linguistically sensible to the context of China. Following that, the Mandarin version was sent to colleagues in Ürümqi who translated the questionnaire into Uyghur. Due to time, geographic and linguistic constraints, we were unable to vet more than three drafts of the questionnaire into the Uyghur language. This resulted in a few errors in translation that went unnoticed until field research was already being carried out. The most egregious omission is question B6 on the Uyghur version of the questionnaire, which has only 6 of the 8 possible responses to that question (for more information, see Appendix II): As such, no comparative analysis of that question could be undertaken, because all responses from the Uyghur language questionnaire were invalid. However pilot tests with the Mandarin and Uyghur versions

were carried out with a handful of residents in both neighbourhoods prior to the beginning of the field research, to ensure that the questionnaire was easily understandable by research participants.

A series of terrorist attacks and other incidents in XUAR during the period field research was to be conducted (BBC2014a; 2014b; Wee 2014) made for an uncertain security situation for field research. As such, field research was conducted in 5 days, rather than the 3 weeks originally planned. Due to these constraints a sample of 35 - 50 respondents per neighbourhood was desired, and was ultimately achieved. A total of 107 questionnaires were collected in total, with 51 from Changjie and 56 from Yuewan.

#### *4.3.3 Focus Group Development*

In the months leading up to field research a broad focus group guide was developed based off the questionnaire, and was translated into Mandarin. However it was revised substantially following the collection of questionnaires, as recurring themes became apparent in preliminary data analysis of the questionnaires (to be discussed further in the next section). Almost identical focus group guides were developed for each of the two neighbourhoods, with slight changes to reflect specific places mentioned by questionnaire respondents in Changjie and Yuewan. Gaoxiang Li conducted both focus groups in Mandarin, and Ziwei Liu provided translation throughout while I took notes during the sessions. For the Yuewan focus group, local students with Uyghur language proficiency were present to assist with translating when necessary.

Due to the time constraints explained above, only one focus group in each neighbourhood was organized, while at least two each for Changjie and Yuewan was desired to have separate groups for people of Han Chinese and Uyghur or other ethnicities. Fortunately all focus group participants for Changjie and Yuewan were Han Chinese and Uyghur respectively, and so the need for separate groups was mitigated. Focus group participants were drawn from questionnaire respondents on a voluntary basis.

The focus groups explored issues of ethnic identity, language and urban spaces in the neighbourhoods, and in Ürümqi more generally. The qualitative data gathered from these sessions complement the largely quantitative information obtained from the questionnaires by allowing participants to express their perceptions of urban governance and ethnic identity in Ürümqi in their own words. These groups also allowed for further exploration of some of the main trends observed in the questionnaire data, which unearthed more complex perceptions than the questionnaire data could convey. In a few cases, the data gathered in the focus groups provided an alternative and even contradictory data from what was gathered in the questionnaire.

#### **4.4 Analytical Process**

Analysis began by going over the questionnaires and eliminating those with a large number of unanswered or improperly answered questions. After going through all the questionnaires I found that the vast majority had at most 2 questions left unanswered; based on this, I defined any questionnaire with 3 or more non-responses as invalid. This

resulted in 94 valid questionnaires from the original 107, with 50 from the Changjie sample and 44 from Yuewan.

Following this, each question and response on the questionnaire was coded and the data from each valid questionnaire was entered on a Microsoft Excel spreadsheet. Each questionnaire was given an identifier consisting of a letter ('S' for Changjie and 'J' for Yuewan) corresponding with the spreadsheet, to make the coded data easily accessible. Following data entry, excel tables were drafted for responses to each question, both for each neighbourhood but also for the reported ethnicity of each respondent. Based on these data tables and graphs were then developed to represent the data visually. The results of these are presented in Chapter 5 and Appendix VIII.

Analysis of the two focus groups took place throughout the questionnaire process described above. My written notes (along with additional notes from Gaoxiang Li and Ziwei Liu) were fully transcribed as soon as possible following each focus group. With the data and some preliminary conclusions from the questionnaire data, it was possible to draw relevant connections and discrepancies between the questionnaire responses and focus group participant responses.

## **Chapter 5: Data Collection and Analysis**

This chapter presents the data collected from the questionnaire and focus groups carried out as described above. A description of the results from the questionnaire and a short synthesis will be followed by a description of the two focus groups conducted and their relationship to the questionnaire data.

### **5.1 Ürümqi Questionnaire**


#### *5.1.1 Demographic Data*

In total, 107 questionnaires were collected from the two neighbourhoods with 51 from Changjie and 56 from Yuewan. Of those, 1 from Changjie and 12 from Yuewan were judged incomplete (defined as more than 3 non-responses), resulting in a total of 94 valid questionnaires. The reason for a higher non-response rate among participants in the predominantly Uyghur neighbourhood of Yuewan are not entirely clear, although there were a few sensitive questions regarding identity and feelings of belonging that multiple Uyghur respondents declined to answer: these are explored more fully in sections 5.1.3 and 5.2.3. Among the valid questionnaires, 96% (48) in Changjie and 22.7% (10) in Yuewan were answered in Mandarin, and 4.5% (2) in Changjie and 77.3% (34) in Yuewan were answered in Uyghur.

In Changjie, 12% (6) respondents were Uyghur and 86% (43) were Han, with 1 respondent of another ethnicity (Hui, representing 2% of Changjie respondents). In Yuewan, 91% (40) of respondents were Uyghur and 9% (4) were Han Chinese, with no respondents identifying as any other ethnicity. These proportionalities reflect the intention


in choosing these two sample neighbourhoods, in obtaining one neighbourhood with more Han Chinese residents, and the other with a larger proportion of Uyghur residents.

**Figure 5.1: Ethnicity of Respondents by Neighbourhood**




In Changjie, 52% of respondents (26) identified as female and 40% (20) as male, with 8% (4) unspecified. This larger proportion of females was reversed among the 6 Uyghur respondents in the neighbourhood, with 5 of them identifying as male. Lastly, the one Hui respondent identified as female. Gender representation in Yuewan was less balanced, with 68.9% (31) of respondents identifying as female and only 26.7% (12) as male, with 4.5% (2) unspecified. Among the 4 Han respondents in the neighbourhood, however, gender as evenly balanced with 2 females and 2 males. Overall, in both neighbourhoods there were a larger number of female respondents than male.

**Figure 5.2: Gender of Respondents by Neighbourhood**




There appeared to be little religious diversity in either neighbourhood, which is not entirely surprising given the PRC's status as an atheist state. In Changjie, 60% (30) of respondents identified as Atheist, 16% (8) as Muslim, 8% (4) as Buddhist, 4% (2) as Christian, and 12% (6) as other or non-religious. The Muslim respondents include all 6 Uyghur respondents as well as the Hui resident and one Han Chinese person. In Yuewan, all 40 Uyghur residents (making up 91% of the sample) identified as Muslim, with 4.5% (2) each identifying as Atheist and other or non-religious, both of which were Han. In Yuewan, no one identified as Buddhist or Christian. No respondents in either of the two neighbourhoods surveyed identified as Taoist.

**Figure 5.3: Religion of Respondents by Neighbourhood**




The average age of respondents was between 30 and 40 years old. In both neighbourhoods, the largest bulk of respondents were aged 36-54, constituting 34% (17) and 31.8% (14) of respondents in Changjie and Yuewan, respectively. 18-25 year olds made up 30% (15) and 27.3% (12) of respondents in the two neighbourhoods, while 26-35 year olds constituted 18% (9) and 27.3% (12), respectively. Respondents of the minority ethnicity in each neighbourhood tended to be younger, with 4/6 Uyghur respondents in Changjie and 3/4 Han respondents in Yuewan identifying as being between the ages of 18 and 25. Finally, 18% (9) of respondents in Changjie and 13.6% (6) of respondents in Yuewan were aged 55 and older. Proportionality of different age groups appears to be fairly similar between the two neighbourhoods surveyed, although Changjie neighbourhood presents a slightly wider polarization between the young and the elderly.

**Figure 5.4: Age of Respondents by Neighbourhood**



Different distributions of educational outcomes were evident in each neighbourhood. In Changjie, 10% (5) of respondents had achieved primary school or less, 30% (15) each had completed middle school and secondary school, 18% (9) had completed a technical school, while 12% (6) completed graduate studies. 3 of the 6 Uyghur respondents in Changjie reported as having completed only secondary school, which is consistent with the fact that 4 of them identified as being under the age of 25. Yuewan respondents had higher educational achievements on average, with 4.5% (2) each having finished primary school or less, or middle school, 11.4% (5) with a secondary school degree, 36.3% having completed technical school, and 40.9% (18) with a graduate degree. The Han respondents in Yuewan tended to have higher educational achievements, with 2 having completed technical school and 2 having finished graduate degrees. One respondent in Yuewan declined to provide their educational background.


**Figure 5.5: Education of Respondents by Neighbourhood**




Employment was varied across both neighbourhoods, with 6% (3) of Changjie respondents and 15.9% (7) in Yuewan choosing "other". Among these, occupations as drivers and doctors were commonly identified. Changjie had a larger retired population, with 18% (9) of respondents (all of which were Han) identifying as retired, compared to only 4.5% (2) in Yuewan (both Uyghur); and a larger number of people employed in hard labour (16% or 8 respondents compared to 9.1% or 4 in Yuewan). These demographics are comparable to data gathered from the focus group of Changjie residents, in which participants described the neighbourhood as an aging one that was formerly organized around a local concrete factory. Yuewan had a larger proportion of people employed in academia and the civil service (25% or 11 for each) than in Changjie (16% and 4% respectively). Across both neighbourhoods, Uyghur respondents formed the bulk of civil servants (12 of the 13). The average income in Changjie was slightly less than that of Yuewan, though both neighbourhoods had an average annual income of between 2,000

and 4,000 RMB. However, Changjie had a higher proportion of respondents living on less than 3000 RMB annually (50% of respondents) than in Yuewan (38.6%). The Hui respondent in Changjie fell into the lowest income bracket of less than 1,000 RMB annually, which is unsurprising as they also reported as being unemployed. These results are appropriately comparable to the educational backgrounds of the respondents in each neighbourhood.

**Figure 5.6: Employment of Respondents by Neighbourhood**




**Figure 5.7: Income of Respondents by Neighbourhood**



The majority of respondents in both neighbourhoods reported possessing urban (rather than rural) hukou, with 78% (39) in Changjie and 91% (40) in Yuewan. Those reporting urban *hukou* included the Hui and all 6 Uyghur respondents in Changjie, and 3 of the 4 Han respondents in Yuewan. These results should be taken with a grain of salt however, as *hukou* status remains an important factor in identity in China and urban status entitles residents to better housing, education, and service provision compared to residents living in cities without urban *hukou*. Many of the respondents had lived in Ürümqi for more than 10 years, with 72% (36) in Changjie and 72.7% (32) in Yuewan, and with a similar number of respondents reporting living in Changjie for that same length of time. In Changjie, all 6 Uyghur respondents appear to be long-term residents of the community, having lived in the city for at least 10 years. However, it appears that more of the residents in Yuewan are newer, reflecting the younger age of the neighbourhood: 56.8% of the respondents had lived in that neighbourhood for fewer than 3 years, 3 of which were Han.

**Figure 5.8: *Hukou* Status of Respondents by Neighbourhood**



**Table 5.1: Number of Years Lived in Ürümqi**

	< 5	5 - 10	10 - 20	20+	Other	Total
<b>Changjie</b>	8 (16%)	6 (12%)	16 (32%)	20 (40%)	0	50
Uyghur	0	0	4	2	0	6
Han	8	5	12	18	0	43
Other	0	1	0	0	0	1
<b>Yuewan</b>	10 (22.73%)	1 (2.27%)	3 (6.82%)	29 (65.91%)	1 (2.27%)	44
Uyghur	7	1	3	28	1	0
Han	3	0	0	1	0	0


### 5.1.2 Resident Perceptions of Public Spaces: Markets and Green Spaces

In both neighbourhoods, participants reported visiting local markets and green spaces very frequently: 72% (36) of Changjie respondents and 72.7% (32) of Yuewan respondents visit local green spaces at least once a week, and 88% (44) of Changjie respondents and 84.1% (37) of Yuewan respondents stating that they visit local markets at least once a week. Among respondents in both neighbourhoods, recreation, exercise, and socio-cultural events were the most important attributes of local green spaces, although socio-cultural events achieved a greater degree of importance in Changjie (29) compared to Yuewan (11). The most important attributes of local markets for respondents in both neighbourhoods were retail, recreation, socio-cultural events, and exercise.


Local green spaces appear to develop a greater sense of belonging to a community in Yuewan than in Changjie. 63.6% (28) of respondents responded "strongly agree" to the statement "I feel like I belong to my community when I visit green spaces," compared to only 28% (14) in Changjie. In Changjie, 20% (10) of respondents strongly disagreed with the statement, including 4 of the 6 Uyghur respondents. The one Hui respondent in Changjie did not respond to the question. While Yuewan respondents felt that local markets

contributed to feelings of belonging to the community (with 63.6% strongly agreed), responses from Changjie residents were mixed: 20% strongly disagreed (4 of which were Uyghur), 20% remained neutral, and 28% strongly agreed. When viewing figures 5.10 and 5.11 together it becomes immediately apparent that responses among residents in the two neighbourhoods were nearly identical between the two questions. This is a tendency that remained true throughout further questions regarding local perceptions of green spaces and markets in Ürümqi.

**Figure 5.9: "I belong to my community when I visit local green spaces"**




**Figure 5.10: "I belong to my community when I visit local market spaces"**




More of Yuewan's respondents feel safe in local green spaces (with 61.4% strongly agreeing that they feel safe, compared to 34% in Changjie). Similarly, residents in both neighbourhoods claimed they felt safe in local markets (56% in Changjie and 68.2% in Yuewan agreed or strongly agreed) However, 4 of the 6 Uyghur respondents in Changjie strongly disagreed that they felt safe either in their community's green spaces or in markets, with one strongly agreeing and one non-response. This may be related to the weaker feelings of community cohesion evident in Changjie as compared to Yuewan in the previous question: It would appear that resident opinions of safety and belonging are much more divided in Changjie, and particularly for ethnic minority people.

**Figure 5.11: "I feel safe when I visit local green spaces"**




**Figure 5.12: "I feel safe when I visit local markets"**




Residents in both neighbourhoods strongly disagreed that crime is prevalent in local green spaces (with 56% in Changjie and 81.8% in Yuewan), as well as local markets areas (70% in Changjie and 79.5% in Yuewan disagreed or strongly disagreed). In Yuewan, the responses of the 4 Han respondents respecting safety and prevalence of crime tended to be evenly distributed from disagreeing to agreeing. Although respondents in both neighbourhoods reacted very negatively to the statement, Yuewan residents were much more united in their disagreement, which is consistent with the community's stronger sense of belonging and the more homogeneous demographics of the Uyghur majority neighbourhood.

**Figure 5.13: "Crime is prevalent in my community's green spaces"**




**Figure 5.14: "Crime is prevalent in my community's markets"**




Residents in both neighbourhoods reacted negatively to the notion that green spaces and markets increase cultural diversity (with 70% in Changjie and 63.7% in Yuewan disagreeing to the statement for the two kinds of spaces). Opinions about cultural diversity among minority groups in Changjie were somewhat divided, however, with 2 of the 6 Uyghur

respondents and the one Hui person disagreeing, and 3 of the Uyghur respondents strongly agreeing. One Uyghur respondent declined to answer the question. In Yuewan, the 4 Han respondents were all united in disagreeing that the community's green spaces contribute to cultural diversity.

**Figure 5.15: "Green spaces contribute to cultural diversity in my community"**




**Figure 5.16: "Markets contribute to cultural diversity in my community"**




Despite the very different uses local residents have for green spaces and markets, respondents' suggestions for improvements between the two kinds of public space were nearly identical. Among Changjie residents, increases in commercial activity, safety, and accessibility were fairly high priorities for both green spaces and markets. Yuewan respondents had similar priorities, although greater attention was paid to the physical quality or amount of space available in public spaces more generally.

**Figure 5.17: Improvements for community green spaces**



**Figure 5.18: Improvements for community markets**




Overall, the responses given to questions respecting green spaces and market areas were almost identical in both neighbourhoods. This suggests that local residents' perceptions of inclusion and exclusion have more to do with their local neighbourhood and relationship with fellow residents than it does with the quality of different areas surrounding the neighbourhoods: for example, questionnaire respondents in both Changjie and Yuewan did not view their local green spaces as any more or less safe than local market areas. Instead, their views regarding these spaces were more heavily affected by the neighbourhoods themselves.

### 5.1.3 General Community Perceptions

The questionnaire asked respondents to identify factors that they felt contributed to them feeling included in their communities. In the Han-dominated Changjie sample, respondents' most common choice were economic factors (such as affordability) that facilitated them in using areas of the city. In Yuewan, however, cultural, linguistic, and religious as well as

economic factors were identified by respondents as making them feel included in public areas. Given the predominance of Uyghur people in this neighbourhood and their linguistic, religious, and cultural difference from the Han Chinese people, this more comprehensive view is significant. Among respondents in Changjie, green spaces and vendor markets were frequently identified as spaces that fostered a sense of inclusivity among local residents. One inclusive area that was commonly identified by Yuewan respondents was a green space near the neighbourhood containing a lake feature with a Uyghur restaurant nearby, though several vendor markets were also mentioned. Thus, it seems that green spaces and outdoor market areas are two places where people of both ethnicities and neighbourhoods feel comparatively welcome and included.


**Figure 5.19: Inclusive Community Factors**



Respondents were then asked to identify factors which contribute to them feeling excluded in public spaces. Significantly, 11 respondents in Changjie and 21 in Yuewan declined to respond to this question. For both neighbourhoods, cultural factors ranked as the greatest


cause of exclusion according to respondents, while linguistic barriers were the least frequently identified factor. However all four factors (linguistic, religious, economic and cultural) were chosen, and there were no significant differences between neighbourhoods in responses to this question. Among the predominantly Han respondents of Changjie neighbourhood, markets and streets where ethnic minorities are more heavily concentrated were identified as places where they feel unwelcome, with many concerns about security, and theft particularly. Interestingly, a night market nearby Yuewan called Saimachang was frequently identified by different questionnaire respondents as fostering either inclusion or exclusion. The reasons for these divisive perceptions were explored further in a focus group of Yuewan residents (for more information, see below). In none of the comments was any mention made of terrorism, or any form of criminality exceeding that of theft.

**Figure 5.20: Exclusive Community Factors**



The questionnaire also asked respondents to what extent they felt that public signs in their city were bilingual. 30% (15) of respondents in Changjie and 43.2% of respondents in Uyghur-dominated Yuewan stated that signs were completely bilingual. Most respondents stated that signs were "somewhat" bilingual (with 60% and 41% in Changjie and Yuewan respectively), while 10% of respondents in Changjie (1 Uyghur, 4 Han) and 15.9% in Yuewan (all of which were Uyghur) said that signs were not at all bilingual. These results form an interesting comparison to the focus group data collected and described below.

**Figure 5.21: Degree of Bilingualism in Public Signage**



*5.1.4 Synthesis: Community Homogeneity and Threat Perception*

Differences in composition between the Changjie and Yuewan neighbourhoods account for many of the differences in resident responses. The combination of a younger, lower-income, shorter-term residents employed in hard labour and older, long-term residents who are retired or employed in the civil service resulted in polarization among resident perceptions of Ürümqi's public spaces in the neighbourhood. The most clear demonstration of this is the wide distribution of responses among Changjie residents when asked if they

felt that they belong to their community when visiting green spaces and markets. By contrast, Uyghur-dominated Yuewan is a much more homogeneous neighbourhood, with a largely Uyghur and Muslim population that have lived in the area for the same amount of time. This more united neighbourhood demographic is evident in respondent perceptions of public spaces, such as a common perception of community cohesion in public spaces: More than 60% of Yuewan respondents strongly agreed that they feel like they belong to their community when visiting public spaces.

## **5.2 Focus Group Data**

Although an acceptable response rate was achieved using questionnaires, there was a lot of data that was difficult (if not impossible) to achieve using these methods. Many of the questions pertaining to ethnic identity and its relationship to space had higher rates of non-response, and it is assumed that the sensitive nature of these questions resulted in very minimal responses from local residents. To compensate for this, focus groups were organized in each neighbourhood to collect more qualitative information to inform the largely quantitative data gleaned from the questionnaire. Due to time constraints related to the security situation at the time, only one focus group was organized for each neighbourhood, although ideally there would have been at least two per neighbourhood, separated by ethnicity and/or gender. Questionnaire respondents were asked by local Xinjiang University students (who were assisting in the distribution and collection of the questionnaires) whether they would be willing to participate in one discussion group to explore the topics raised in the questionnaire further. Ultimately 5 residents from Changjie

(4 female, 1 male; all Han Chinese) and 6 residents from Yuewan (4 male, 2 female; all Uyghur) agreed to participate.

### *5.2.1 Focus Group #1: Changjie Neighbourhood*

Focus group #1 took place on May 11, 2014 from 8:00 - 10:00pm Beijing time in the private room of a restaurant within walking distance of Changjie neighbourhood. The site, which was outside the neighbourhood and yet was easily accessible by residents, was chosen with assistance from local graduate students. Two of the women present attended with their children, who sat quietly during the discussion. Transcriptions were gathered from simultaneous translations from Mandarin to English given to me by Ziwei Liu, as well as from notes made independently from Gaoxiang Li, who facilitated the discussion in Mandarin.

**Figure 5.22: Changjie neighbourhood**



### 5.2.1.1 Declining quality of community

The participants began by explaining some of the history of the neighbourhood, much of which was already known among our team. Changjie is an aging neighbourhood that was originally a *danwei* organized round a concrete factory, now privatized. The original residents of the neighbourhood were almost entirely employees at the factory, and the community contains its own green spaces, recreational and exercise equipment, library, cafeteria, and medical facilities among other things. Over time (and particularly since the privatization of the factory and liberalization of *hukou* policy in the 1990s), maintenance of common areas in Han-dominated Changjie have declined considerably. In particular, discussion group respondents decried the deterioration of infrastructure such as security systems, lights and waste management, and the closure of some places such as the cafeteria and library. One participant, an elderly lady whose deceased husband was an administrator when the concrete factory was operational, attributes the overall decline of the neighbourhood to the transfer of administration to an authority that lives outside of Changjie.

Since the closure of the factory, the background of residents in the neighbourhood has become more mixed, with more shorter-term tenants than previously. All participants present characterized this as negative, and perceive this occurrence alongside increased reports of theft and drug dealing in the area. When asked about spaces in Changjie and Ürümqi more generally that they feel excluded from, participants expressed a lack of sense of security, particularly in the vendor markets around the neighbourhood such as xiaoximen and erdaoqiao streets. When prompted to explain further, the young male

participant explained that these areas are very crowded. Two other respondents (an elderly female and her middle-aged daughter) added that public sanitation in these areas are substandard, and that there is a lack of adequate infrastructure. These same women also dislike the underground poker and mah-jong clubs, in which gambling is rampant and they feel have a negative impact on family relationships.

#### *5.2.1.2 Declining trust among residents*

When asked about the relationship between Han Chinese and Uyghur people in Changjie, the first elderly female respondent answered that relations remain good between different ethnicities in the community. This positive relationship is largely the result of the factory management, because people of different ethnicities would work together in the factory and thus lived in close proximity to each other. The young male mentioned that there are roughly the same number of Han and Uyghur people, but that younger generations of all ethnicities have become more distant with each other over time. The middle-aged daughter attributed this reduced cross-cultural communication to physical separation of different ethnic groups, and the sporadic terrorist attacks throughout Xinjiang province. The elderly mother added that the Party organization, which fostered a sense of comradeship among all people, is crucial to improving the relationship between different ethnicities. A fifth participant, a middle-aged woman with her daughter, argued that the religion of Uyghur people has changed over time, such that they are now less friendly to cultural outsiders, and thus the relationship between Han and Uyghur people has declined over the years. Thus, despite an initially normative view of inter-ethnic relations in

Changjie, ethnic identity has become a more important factor contributing to tension in recent years.

#### *5.2.1.3 Bilingualism and Uyghur-Han relations*

The focus group facilitator raised the topic of bilingualism in the city, and all participants stated that bilingualism must be improved in order to increase communication among different ethnic groups. The middle-aged daughter stated that, in areas where ethnic minorities are concentrated, Han people should learn the Uyghur language. The middle-aged mother responded that, because Han youths have little contact with Uyghur people (and thus will not use the Uyghur language), it is not beneficial for them to learn Uyghur. Nonetheless, she feels that language is the biggest problem causing ethnic tension in Xinjiang. The views demonstrate an interesting variation from questionnaire data, in which most Changjie respondents stated that public signage in the city is somewhat or completely bilingual.

The discussion then returned to the relationship between residents of Changjie as compared to the past. The first elderly woman explained that there are many more short-term tenants as opposed to long-term residents, and so relations between residents have become more distant than they were previously. The privatization of the factory and decline of maintenance prompted many of the long-term residents to move out, leaving Changjie with a population split between elderly people and younger migrants from outside the city. The young male stated that most residents used to be co-workers in the nearby concrete factory. As more people migrate in (and following the liberalization of *hukou* policies), the majority of residents are now from other places in Xinjiang.

### 5.2.2 Focus Group #2: Yuewan Neighbourhood

Focus group #2 took place on May 12, 2014 from 8:00 - 10:00 pm Beijing time, and was also located in the private room of a restaurant nearby although outside of Yuewan neighbourhood. Transcriptions for this session were written with the assistance of a PhD candidate at the local university, who provided simultaneous translation during the focus group.

**Figure 5.23: Yuewan neighbourhood**



#### 5.2.2.1 Decreasing bilingualism

When asked about the level of bilingualism in their neighbourhood, a male respondent stated that the prominence of the Uyghur language in Ürümqi has decreased over time. A female respondent added that there are many translation errors in the Uyghur signs that do exist in public, but that they do not know of any mechanisms to provide feedback to local authorities. A second male stated that there used to be municipal bodies tasked with examining language issues, but that they have disappeared over the years.

Participants stated that the central government's bilingualism policy is good in theory, but because they are very far removed from Xinjiang, implementation at the local level does not reflect the original policy. The level of bilingualism has declined to the point that there are signs in which there is no Uyghur, only Mandarin; or when there is Uyghur, it is in a much smaller font size than the Mandarin. Additionally, government documents are only available in Mandarin. These issues become problematic because there are many Uyghur rural migrants who move into Ürümqi for work who do not understand Mandarin. Several participants expressed nostalgia for bilingualism policies under the leadership of Mao Zedong, during which time Uyghur was much more prominent and Han Chinese people in Xinjiang were given many incentives to learn the language. One male respondent stated that it is these smaller problems of language which contribute to larger expressions of discontent and even violence among Uyghur people.

**Figure 5.24: Commercial signs near Yuewan neighbourhood**



Participants were asked if Han people should be encouraged to learn Uyghur, at which point the discussion returned to bilingualism. Participants repeated their opinion that the policy of bilingualism in China was good in theory, but was implemented too quickly and with unqualified teachers. As such, there is not enough infrastructure in place for Han people to learn Uyghur to the same extent that Uyghur people are learning Mandarin. One male respondent stated that in rural areas, Han, Uyghur and Hui people co-exist and learn each others' languages, but this does not happen in urban areas. Another insisted that the relationship between Han Chinese and Uyghur people was better under the planned economy period (prior to 1978), and that economic competition worsened relations. One male respondent (who arrived late to the focus group) argued that Uyghur culture is not well suited to a competitive labour market, and added that the close proximity of karaoke bars to mosques is a relatively new phenomenon that would not have been allowed in the past.

On the subject of bilingualism, one respondent stated that there is no official incentive for residents to learn Uyghur: the exams necessary to become an officer in the government are all in Mandarin. There is no reason why Han people should learn Uyghur, at least in terms of employment prospects. Several other participants expressed the opinion that the central government wants to assimilate Uyghur people and enforce increased use of Mandarin language. The Uyghur language is becoming useless even for Uyghur people. One participant stated that the language problem is the largest in terms of contributing to recent inter-ethnic tension in Xinjiang.

One male participant is concerned that Uyghur children cannot compete against Han children in school tests and exams, because they are trying to learn two languages at once. In some Uyghur schools the quality of Mandarin language instruction is inferior; as such, Uyghur children underperform on school tests. As such, simply encouraging Uyghur people to learn Mandarin is not in keeping with a true bilingualism policy.

Participants continued to compare the current state of affairs to the past, when the older generation of Han people that migrated to Xinjiang could speak Uyghur. At the time, people needed to know the Uyghur language to communicate and access employment. This has decreased over time, and as such the Uyghur language has diminished in importance.

#### *5.2.2.2 Community cohesion and migratory populations*

Discussion turned to Saimachang, a night market near Yuewan that was identified by many questionnaire respondents as an exclusive or undesirable place. One male explained that it was originally a place for racing horses, but changed to an outdoor market. One female respondent added that many migrants from rural, southern Xinjiang live in Saimachang. The cost of housing in the area is low and so it is very crowded. However, several focus group participants stated that the area was not as bad as it was reputed to be.

It became apparent that Yuewan residents were equally as frustrated with the deterioration of infrastructure and maintenance as respondents in Changjie. One respondent stated that the community management has changed multiple times in the last 3 years, and as a result things are poorly managed and frequent thefts are reported in the community. One noted that there is a lack of accommodation for Uyghur burial rituals and other culture (need for a large elevator to fit coffins), which is unusual considering the

neighbourhood is largely Uyghur. Another participant stated that they think they are being neglected by the community management, and even discriminated against, because Yuewan is a predominantly Uyghur community. They fear complaining, because they think their complaints will be attributed to their ethnicity, and think that if this were a Han community the problems would have been solved long ago.

#### *5.2.2.3 Lack of trust in government*

When asked about the relationship between Uyghur and Han people, participants stated that the level of trust Uyghur people have in the government is very low. Uyghur people are disproportionately employed in industries that are less desirable among Han people, notably service sector work. They have a higher unemployment rate than Han people. One participant noted that the political environment is too sensitive for free speech among Uyghur people: they fear discrimination or distrust from Han people. Participants also insisted that we speak with Han people as well, to gain a more comprehensive understanding of inter-ethnic relationships in Ürümqi. One participant stated that if Han people complain about the state of Yuewan and the city more generally, change will come faster - but if Uyghur people complain, they will become politically suspect.

#### *5.2.3 Synthesis*

##### *5.2.3.1 Community homogeneity and threat perception*

Much like the data gathered from the questionnaires, a discrepancy was evident between neighbourhoods regarding resident perceptions of belonging to community. Focus group respondents from the Han-dominated Changjie neighbourhood expressed an association of

the newer and shorter-term residents with the general degradation of the neighbourhood over time, including increasing crime and theft in particular. During the focus group conducted with Yuewan residents, participants attributed their dissatisfaction with their neighbourhood (including problems similar to Changjie, such as the degradation of infrastructure and theft) to discrimination by the local community management. In this latter case, Yuewan residents feel that their concerns regarding their neighbourhood and city more generally are disregarded because of their identity as a Uyghur community.

The focus group conducted among Yuewan residents revealed that Uyghur people are hesitant to express their discontent at the public level, because they feel that their complaints are attributed to their race. This tendency was also evident in questionnaire responses from Yuewan, such as a non-response rate of more than 35% when respondents were asked what makes them feel unwelcome in local public spaces. This extends from local communities to wider regional and national politics, where Uyghur people worry that their calls for change will be associated with separatism or terrorism. Given the arrest of Uyghur academics such as Ilham Tohti for expressing dissent (Chin 2014), these concerns are well-founded. Uyghur participants in the Yuewan focus group stressed the importance of action among Han people in order for the living situations to improve between both ethnicities, because Han people's perspectives are taken more seriously by the government. This speaks to a general need expressed in both focus groups for solidarity between Han Chinese and Uyghur people in the city of Ürümqi, and in Xinjiang more generally.

### *5.2.3.2 Ethnicity and Language*

The focus groups conducted in Changjie and Yuewan both concluded that the relationship between Han Chinese and Uyghur people (and conflicts therein) is linked to language. Although 90% of respondents in Changjie and 84.1% of respondents in Yuewan reported public signage as being at least "somewhat bilingual," Uyghur focus group participants noted that there were many errors in Uyghur public signs, with much smaller font size for Uyghur sections of text. This slight discrepancy speaks to the limitations of survey methods for gathering qualitative perceptions, as well as of the aforementioned self-censorship among Uyghur people out of concern for discrimination. Han participants stated that more Han people need to learn the Uyghur language, but there are few official opportunities to learn Uyghur among non-Uyghur people. This, coupled with the fact that entrance exams for the Chinese civil service are only offered in Mandarin, contribute to an environment in which the social value of the Uyghur language is declining. Focus group participants in Yuewan neighbourhood expressed approval for bilingualism policies under the leadership of Chairman Mao Zedong, during which time Han Chinese migrants to XUAR had to know Uyghur in order to be employed in the region. They also stated that the current bilingualism policy in China is good in theory, but is applied inappropriately at the local level. This results in children being taught by teachers with inadequate knowledge of either Mandarin or Uyghur, which most heavily impacts Uyghur children coming from Uyghur-speaking households.

## Chapter 6: Building Inclusive Futures in Cities of Difference

What is immediately apparent from the data described in the previous chapter is that despite an expressed willingness among the central and regional governments to address inclusion in cities, and a strong desire among local residents to contribute to the betterment of their communities, substantial inequalities remain not only in socio-economic indicators, but also in the ways in which residents perceive urban space and participate in urban processes. These intersecting cultural and economic inequalities produce larger injustices that are evident in self-censorship among ethnic minority communities and unrest in the city more generally.

This research indicates that in Ürümqi, perceptions of urban space and participation in urban governance (which are very restricted in China) are affected by ethnic identity. For Han Chinese residents of Changjie and Yuewan, some urban spaces were associated with migrant and ethnic minority populations as well as with crime, and so were to be avoided. Even in the Han majority neighbourhood of Changjie, Han focus group participants stated that they no longer felt comfortable allowing their children to play in the neighbourhood unsupervised (as they had in the past) in part because of shorter-term residents now living in the area. The decline of the *danwei's* function of providing housing to groups of employees has contributed to much more complex demographics of residents in neighbourhoods such as Changjie. The commercialization of housing as a result of *hukou* liberalization policies facilitated extensive migration across the country and in Ürümqi, which in Changjie has led to lower levels of trust among residents and concerns of crime. This distrust is particularly directed toward migrant workers and students, who are of lower

socio-economic status and tend to live in the neighbourhood for shorter lengths of time. Because of this, as well as the privatization of the concrete factory, Changjie focus group participants felt that the quality of the neighbourhood had declined significantly in recent decades. The post-*danwei* Uyghur neighbourhood of Yuewan appeared to have a stronger community identity in comparison, with questionnaire respondents reporting much higher levels of safety and community belonging. This response can be explained by Yuewan's relatively more homogeneous demographics (with 72.7% of the Yuewan sample having lived there for more than 10 years), and the fact that most of the questionnaire participants have lived in the neighbourhood for the same length of time. And while questionnaire respondents of all ethnic groups reported little to no participation in public meetings of any sort, Uyghur focus group participants expressed reservations against speaking their opinions in public for fear of being branded terrorists.

In Ürümqi, cultural and economic inequalities between residents of different ethnic identities reveal that, while ability to participate in urban processes is limited for all people under China's current political system, it is that much more intangible for Uyghur and other ethnic minority people. Recurrent patterns of political liberalization followed by persecution of perceived enemies of the state (as during the Anti-Rightist Movement which followed the Hundred Flowers Campaign<sup>15</sup>) have produced a population that engages in substantial self-censorship to protect themselves from the state. The higher rate of non-response among Uyghur questionnaire participants to questions about ethnic and

---

<sup>15</sup> The Anti-Rightist Movement, which lasted from approximately 1957 to 1959, sought to purge alleged enemies within the Party and abroad. It was largely a reaction to the Hundred Flowers Campaign, also initiated by Mao Zedong, which promoted pluralism of expression and criticism of the government.

neighbourhood identity as compared to Han participants speaks to the disproportionate effect this has on Uyghur (and presumably other ethnic minority) people living in China. This is further reinforced by statements from Uyghur focus group participants about their non-participation (to the extent of silence) regarding urban and political issues. These acts of self-censorship among people of all ethnicities in the city of focus suggest that this is a collective problem produced by the PRC's political system, rather than behaviour that might be attributed to individual or group identity. As such, any solution to these challenges (which are not unique to Ürümqi or even to cities in China) must address these inequalities on a collective basis, rather than in a piecemeal fashion (Rankin 2012).

Although Ürümqi faces very specific conditions tied to the history of Xinjiang, it is not the only city facing problems related to ethnic identity and socioeconomic inequalities. China is home to 55 officially recognized ethnic minority groups, several of which possess autonomous status in their regions, such as the Tibetan and Mongol peoples. The predominance of intra-state identity-based conflicts and rapid urbanization in developing countries, coupled with Xinjiang's proximity to countries in Central Asia make this research context internationally relevant. Stemming from the work and data gathered, questions remain: Is it possible to build a more inclusive future for the city of Ürümqi? If so, how might it to be done? What lessons can this case impart to similar dynamics present in other cities in China? And finally, what do these findings say about identity-based conflicts in other parts of the world?

## **6.1 An Inclusive Future for a City of Difference? Challenges for Ürümqi**

Based on the data gathered in the questionnaire and focus groups, there are multiple challenges the regional and local governments face in Ürümqi with respect to the relationship between Uyghur and Han people. Some of these, such as the well-being of migrant workers, have already been addressed in the central government's national urbanization strategy, while others present longer-term problems for political stability in China.

### *6.1.1 Improving livelihoods for the most marginalized*

The first strategy is one that the PRC has pursued generally since the Open Door policy of 1978: increasing welfare by way of economic growth. The logic ascribed to these policies by Xiaoping Deng and fellow reformers, that rapid economic growth in some regions would spread to slower growth areas in the interior, were in line with the prevailing neoliberal ideology of many Western states. Unfortunately, economic liberalization has widened disparities, with an increase in the GINI coefficient from 29.1 in 1981 to 37 in 2011, across the country. Unfortunately, the government's shift to coastal development and urbanization have resulted in a dual citizenship system with privileged urban residents (most of which are Han, in the city of Ürümqi) and devalued, excluded residents with rural *hukou* status. In Ürümqi and throughout Xinjiang, Uyghur people and other ethnic minorities, who represent the majority among rural areas and as migrants in the city, systematically face lower levels of well-being compared to Han Chinese people (Cao 2010). What became apparent over the course of the focus groups is that local residents identify lower socio-economic neighbourhoods (such as Saimachang, which is heavily populated

with migrant workers) as the loci of unrest in the city. The concentration of migrant workers in specific neighbourhoods is partly the result of the liberalization of the *hukou* system, which led to increased rural-urban migration, and the Open Door Policy of 1978, which among other things increased the cost of housing. The combination of these two policy changes made access to affordable housing increasingly difficult for marginalized groups, particularly those with rural *hukou* status. Focus group participants suggested that lower socio-economic levels, coupled with larger forms of cultural exclusion such as unequal representation of the Uyghur language in public signage, combine to produce discontent in unstable neighbourhoods. As such, improving inequalities in income, education, housing and employment between ethnic groups in Ürümqi by targeting the most marginalized populations is one possible means to address tension in the city.

Inequalities in incomes and access to social services in urban areas, which contribute to China's economic competitiveness by supplying large amounts of cheap labour, are produced by the *hukou* household registration system.<sup>16</sup> In order to improve livelihoods among lower socio-economic neighbourhoods, it is apparent that another reform (if not a transformation) of the *hukou* system is needed. The PRC's first ever national urbanization plan, announced in March 2014, proposes to ameliorate some of the social and economic problems examined in this research by granting urban *hukou* status to 100 million people over the next six years (Chan 2014; *Guojia* 2014). This plan will increase access to healthcare, vocational training and social housing for people who currently have

---

<sup>16</sup> A form of domestic identification, the *hukou* household registration system was first implemented in 1958 to restrict rural to urban migration. For more information, see section 3.3.

rural *hukou*, with the more educated and longer-term migrants receiving priority for selection. However, as Chan (2014) indicates, the plan restricts access to urban *hukou* status in China's larger cities (in which the greatest number of migrant populations live), meaning that the majority of urban migrants are excluded from the national urbanization plan.

The national urbanization strategy's focus on human factors, and particularly its commitment to increase access to urban *hukou*, will improve the livelihoods of many migrants in urban areas, including Ürümqi. However, the plan's selective focus on well educated, longer-term migrants in China's smaller cities excludes the most marginalized populations. As such, increased access to urban *hukou* alone will be insufficient to ameliorate social and economic inequalities between ethnic groups in Ürümqi and other Chinese cities.

#### *6.1.2 Role of institutional supports for reciprocal bilingualism*

One theme explored in this thesis was the level of bilingualism in the city, and it became apparent over the course of the research that language was a source of tension in the two neighbourhoods. Although 90% of Changjie questionnaire respondents and 84% of Yuewan respondents stated that public signs in Ürümqi were at least somewhat bilingual, focus group respondents expressed concerns with the Uyghur language. Changjie focus group participants (all of whom were Han Chinese) associated the deterioration of Uyghur-Han relations with a declining level of bilingualism among residents, and a declining knowledge of Uyghur in particular. Changjie residents emphasized that more Han Chinese people should learn Uyghur. One Yuewan resident expressed admiration for the bilingualism

policies during the life of Mao Zedong (and prior to the economic reforms of 1978), under which knowledge of the Uyghur language was mandatory for anyone who wanted to work in the Xinjiang government. As a result, many of the Han Chinese people migrating to the region had strong institutional incentives to learn Uyghur. Today's bilingualism policies are good in theory, but are applied poorly at the local level, according to Yuewan residents. As such, there are far more bilingual Uyghur people than Han, and there remain large numbers of Uyghur migrants from rural Xinjiang who do not know Mandarin. As such, the marginalization and mistranslation of Uyghur in public signs noted by the Yuewan focus group are particularly problematic for migrant populations.

The overarching issue noted by one Yuewan focus group respondent is that the Uyghur language has been devalued because it is excluded from official processes. The *gaokao* (National University Entrance Examination) and exams for careers in the Xinjiang government are conducted in Mandarin only. This disadvantages Uyghur youth growing up in Uyghur language households, according to one focus group respondent, because their language abilities in Mandarin will be inferior compared to their unilingual Han counterparts. As such, even for young Uyghur people, the value of the Uyghur language is declining.

Xinjiang's current bilingualism policy was introduced in 2002, and mandated Mandarin as the language of instruction with a minority language to be taught as a subject (Strawbridge 2008). Each ethnic group has the right to develop and protect its own language, but at the same time standard Mandarin (*Putonghua*) is promoted as the common language to unify the country. The purpose of this policy was to improve fluency

in Mandarin among ethnic minority people and make them more competitive in the job market, while the exposure of Han people to the Uyghur language was neglected. This emphasis on the bilingualism of Uyghur people and not of Han supports the assimilation of ethnic minority people and the continued devaluation of the Uyghur language. These policies are treated as normative by Chinese scholars (Rong 2009), who regard lack of bilingualism among ethnic minorities as problematic for political stability, yet do not extend the same logic toward Han people living in minority regions such as Xinjiang. It is also worth noting that Uzbek, Tajik and Tartar people, all of whom live throughout Xinjiang, also speak the Uyghur language; as such, the singular focus on the spread of the Mandarin language marginalizes multiple ethnic minorities in addition to the autonomous Uyghur identity. Rong acknowledges that the combination of higher fertility rates and lower levels of standard Mandarin proficiency among Uyghur people is alarming in terms of future inequality across ethnic identity, but the solution prescribed increases the intensity of Mandarin language education at the cost of Uyghur language and culture. Following the harsh military response to the demonstrations of July 5, 2009 in Ürümqi, an international report condemned the deterioration of human rights in Xinjiang, including the Mandarin-focused education system which violates Chinese laws for the protection of the Uyghur language (CECC 2009).

As such, one central challenge the regional and local governments face in the future is the protection and promotion of the Uyghur language. This would require a substantial shift in the government's approach to XUAR toward reciprocal bilingualism (rather than merely promoting Mandarin proficiency among Uyghur people). There are several options

to increase the perceived value and use of the Uyghur language: the mainstreaming of Uyghur language instruction, the creation of a Mandarin-Uyghur translation industry, and the use of both Mandarin and Uyghur on official documents and tests.

Such a policy direction is not unprecedented, even in China: Under Mao Zedong's regime, Xinjiang was governed by a more stringent bilingualism policy than today. While a reciprocal bilingualism policy would increase the cultural value of the Uyghur language, and would support *hukou* reforms by improving access to education, employment and income for the most marginalized (under the assumption that the most marginalized in Ürümqi speak Uyghur), a much broader problem remains endemic throughout China: cultural and political freedoms.

### *6.1.3 Creating safe spaces for public discussion*

The final and most difficult challenge to inclusive urban development in Ürümqi and throughout Xinjiang is to create safe spaces for public discussion. Focus group participants in Yuewan stated that their concerns about their community were not being addressed because they are a Uyghur neighbourhood. Similarly, they stated that they do not voice their opinions about public matters for fear of having their views being attributed solely to their ethnic identity, or worse - to terrorist sentiment. One Uyghur focus group respondent in Yuewan emphasized the need for Han people to speak on behalf of Uyghur people in public settings, for their views will be taken seriously by the government. This perception is consistent with concerns among rights activists that the Chinese officials are conflating peaceful dissent in Xinjiang with terrorism (Human Rights Watch 2014; Branigan 2014). The

failure to differentiate between the two erodes the civil rights of Uyghur people, and produces a political environment antithetical to inclusive urbanization.

Throughout this research, it became apparent that residents avoided public participation (including providing their input into neighbourhood affairs at the street office level) because of the way their comments might be interpreted, given their ethnic and religious identity. The data gathered over the course of this research reveals very little with respect to religious expression in the city. However, Uyghur ethnic identity is tightly connected to Islamic religious identity, despite the fact that Uyghur people were not historically Muslim: every Uyghur questionnaire respondent identified as Muslim (see Appendix VIII). During the focus group in Yuewan, several participants expressed discomfort with the spread of commercial areas that contradict Muslim teachings against alcohol and gambling. Another participant noted that the organization of the Yuewan neighbourhood does not adequately take into account Muslim ceremonies, most notably funeral rites. These acts of self-censorship on the part of Uyghur people in Ürümqi, combined with the decreasing ability of all residents to participate in urban governance processes following the decline of the *danwei* institution, has produced an alarming disconnect between the local government and its citizens.

The latest annual report from the Congressional Executive Committee on China (CECC) suggests that controls on religious expression in Xinjiang have increased in the last year, which are justified by regional authorities with a need to fight religious extremism. These controls include restrictions on Uyghur marriage customs, rules preventing civil servants from participating in religious activities, and controls over religious practice during

Ramadan (CECC 2014; Long 2014). More recently, the regional Xinjiang government banned Islamic veils throughout the region (Wee 2014). These curbs on Uyghur culture and Islam in particular will only widen the divide between ethnic minority people and the government throughout the region.

Government restrictions on cultural expression further limit for Uyghur and other ethnic minority people the circumscribed means that residents have to participate in neighbourhood and urban development in Ürümqi. Questionnaire and focus group participants expressed enthusiasm in the participatory nature of the research, and many respondents commented that there should be more processes in place for residents to provide input and suggestions regarding their neighbourhoods and the city. There is a clear desire among residents in Changjie and Yuewan (and very likely beyond these two neighbourhoods) for more inclusive neighbourhood and urban planning, yet China's national urbanization plan does not include any specific measures designed to facilitate local participation.

Freedom of speech has been strictly circumscribed in China to such an extent that allowing local input into urban planning processes carries some political risk for the government. Critics of the regime have been persecuted in the past, most notably during the Cultural Revolution of the 1960s (Dittmer 1974; Yan & Gao 1996) and the clearing of Tiananmen Square in 1989<sup>17</sup> (Hung 2005). At the same time, demand from local

---

<sup>17</sup> On June 4, 1989, the Chinese military forcibly cleared a student-led popular demonstration in Tiananmen Square, Beijing that had been occupying the square for seven weeks. The protests, which the CCP condemned as a 'counter-revolutionary riot,' received mass support both people throughout China. The heavy military response, carried out against unarmed civilians, caused an unknown number of casualties due to heavy government censorship of the event that continues today.

populations for more inclusive governance, coupled with inter-ethnic tension, render these strict controls on political freedoms increasingly intolerable for China's citizens. The decentralization of regional and local administrations from the central government following economic reform allows for some flexibility for more inclusive governance at the local level (Ma 2005). Direct elections are held at the village and township levels, though assessments of the fairness of these elections vary substantially both among national and international observers, and the power that these elected committees possess is very limited, even at the local level (O'Brien & Li 2000). As such it appears that local elections, rather than providing institutional supports for more inclusive governance, serve to reinforce mass support for the CCP.

The above-noted limitations in the electoral system are reinforced by restrictions to freedom of expression in XUAR. The censorship of reporters and online forums following violent incidents in the region circumvent public discussion and information sharing (Denyer 2013). As a result, there has been a marked increase in the degree of government control and surveillance of online activity, particularly among Uyghur people, since July 2009 (Uyghur Human Rights Project 2014).

Given the current political context, what other possibilities exist that for local public participation in Ürümqi? The loosening of restrictions to cultural and political expression is impossible without the support of the central government, which is highly unlikely: the recurrent persecution of critics, both historically and today, render that solution impossible without substantial political reform in China. In the current political context, it appears that one of the only ways for residents to engage in public discussion about urban processes

without fear of persecution is by avoiding the government. The spread of virtual private networks, which allow internet users to securely access a private network and bypass government filters, are opening up possibilities for online engagement about issues relevant to urban residents.

Among virtual paths to local engagement, public participation geographic information systems (PPGIS) is a promising new area. PPGIS is an interactive mapping process which allows participants to identify the loci of various phenomena on a map and provide input (Schroeder 1996). The value of this process lies in its potential to include groups at a power disadvantage (Kyem 2001; Dunn 2007). Research has previously addressed topics such as mapping resident access to utilities, comparing local knowledge of perceived pollution sites, and conveying perceptions of crime prone areas. The use of PPGIS in urban planning has yielded positive outcomes linked to participation of marginalized populations in several contexts (Wang et al. 2008; Han & Pang 2003; Livengood & Kunte 2012). While it has been applied extensively in developed and democratic countries, this method is being used increasingly in developing country contexts.

Bottom-up approaches to using collaborative mapping projects have been used previously in China, most notably by the volunteer-based 'Blood-Stained Housing Map,'<sup>18</sup> which documents cases of housing evictions across the country (Chin & Ye 2010), but concerns remain regarding influence on local governance processes and protecting resident anonymity. The Blood-Stained Housing Map is hosted on Google Maps, a domain which is

---

<sup>18</sup> The revised version of the map, showing verified cases only, can be viewed here: <https://www.google.com/maps/d/u/0/viewer?ll=31.466154,121.992188&brcurrent=3,0x31508e64e5c642c1:0x951daa7c349f366f,0;5,0,0&ie=UTF8&msa=0&spn=25.282473,36.035156&z=5&hl=zh-CN&mid=zUNBnSib5DjY.kbszfFXBeAxM>.

blocked by censors in China and at the same time is accessible via virtual private networks, meaning that the government cannot block the project entirely. At the same time, this means that the mapping project's impact on public policy is negligible. In order for a PPGIS platform to be effective, it needs to effectively engage participants in dialogue and develop collaborative solutions while meeting an appropriate balance between influencing local policy on the one hand, and protecting participants from discrimination on the other (as were the concerns of Uyghur focus group participants). This is one particularly promising opportunity for civic engagement and insights for public policy, should the government choose to engage.

## **6.2: Lessons Learned**

### *6.2.1 Protecting Difference in China*

Xinjiang is not the only region with tensions between different identities. China is home to more than 50 ethnic minority groups, some of which have indigenous autonomous status under the PRC's *minzu* system of autonomy which follows Soviet-era ethnofederalism described in Chapter 1. Ethnic minority presence is particularly evident in China's five autonomous regions, which include Guangxi, Inner Mongolia, Ningxia, and Tibet (Xizang) in addition to Xinjiang. The indigenous ethnic groups in each of these regions possess their own languages with the exception of the Hui people, who speak Mandarin. All but one of these regions are located inland, and as such they are relatively excluded from the economic boom along China's coast. The presence of indigenous minorities with languages and cultures that are distinct from Han Chinese people, coupled with inequalities between

ethnicities and their autonomous designations make identity-based tension a common factor for these regions. In particular, the protection of indigenous languages in the long-term will increase the social value of minority cultures and address a key source of discontent.

Although the research context of Ürümqi possesses unique characteristics related to its geopolitical position in China and the region's historical and cultural importance more generally, many of the dynamics present in the city and autonomous regions are observable across the PRC. Rapid urbanization and economic growth, coupled with the liberalization of *hukou* have resulted in massive rural-urban migration of people looking for higher paying work than that of subsistence agriculture. The exclusion of migrants from access to urban services through the *hukou* system has revealed wide disparities in well-being between the coastal/urban and inland/rural regions, which parallel ethnic majority/minority differences. As such, the importance of increasing well-being by reducing *hukou*-based inequalities is equally strong for other cities in China. But the persistence of these inequalities and tension between ethnic groups, coupled with qualitative data from residents in Ürümqi speaks to the need for political reform to improve the connection between urban residents and local government.

### *6.2.2 Identity-Based Conflict and Global Urbanism*

As alluded to earlier, this research is significant for other contexts across the globe. In particular, post-Soviet states are facing similar tension between ethnic groups that was precipitated by the collapse of the Soviet Union. In some of these regions, the Union of Soviet Socialist Republic's (USSR) system of regional autonomy for areas of high ethnic

minority concentration resulted in differing levels of autonomy following the decline of the Soviet state (Beissinger 2002; Cornell 2002). And beyond states with socialist political systems, there are many developing countries with high ethnic heterogeneity, identity-based tensions and rapid urbanization. As such, the lessons learned for China with respect to inter-ethnic tension in Ürümqi have relevance for many different contexts. The need to reduce inequalities by targeting marginalized populations is a common development objective throughout the world regardless of identity-based tension. However, the different ways in which minority identities experience urban space and the importance of language and culture to these experiences bear further consideration.

### **6.3 The Right to the City in China: Future Urban Trajectories**

Henri Lefebvre's writings about cities called for a renewed urban society based fundamentally on the participation and decision-making of the people living in them. His Marxist influenced writings also recognized a need to embrace the increasing complexity of society and differences among people in urban areas (Lefebvre 1970; 1996). Lefebvre's contributions have increasing relevance today given the overshadowing of human interest by profit motive as a deciding factor for urban development, combined with inter-group tension in places with long histories of contestation (Brenner et al. 2012). The work of Lefebvre and other critical urban theorists, such as Manuel Castells (1977 [1972]) and David Harvey (1976) focus on cities as both sites for commodification processes, and commodities in and of themselves that (particularly within the context of capitalist economies) are constructed to enhance profitability. The construction of urban space, therefore, is formed out of a dynamic tension between the profit motive and the wellbeing interests of urban

residents. This tension was evident through the research conducted in Ürümqi, and particularly in the feeling of exclusion Uyghur residents described since changes in economic and cultural policies from the late 1970s onward.

### *6.3.1 Application of the Right to the City in China*

The focus in critical urban studies on democratic political processes make these bodies of literature appear incompatible with a communist state such as the PRC. In particular, it would be tempting for detractors to claim that the right to the city's emphasis on participatory politics is inappropriate for the Chinese context. However, as outlined in Chapter 2, the party's political ideology of Marxism-Leninism-Maoism claims Marx as a foundational influence. As such there is room for discussion of Marxist-influenced urban theory, at least at the conceptual level. Moreover, the opening of China's economy to foreign capital flows and the commercialization of housing and other processes has revealed inequalities similar to those in Western democratic states and that are increasingly evident in the rapid urbanization processes of developing countries. Increasing domestic pressures for more participatory governance, even with local elections in place, make China a relevant area for study using the right to the city and spatial justice. New Confucianism provides an appropriate frame within which to situate the sorts of political reforms that would be accepted in China.

The context of Ürümqi brings into stark relief the importance of political participation, broadly speaking, for bridging cultural inequalities in society. In China, inequalities between Han Chinese and ethnic minority people are underwritten by a housing institution and various cultural policies that devalue and, in some cases, punish

non-Han identities (whether they be rural, Muslim, non-Mandarin speaking, etc). Institutional barriers to political participation (including larger level elections, but extending to the broader disconnect between government and population) are made worse by a cultural and political environment in which people censor themselves for fear of unfair treatment by the authorities. In such a context, the silencing of much-needed public conversations about the complicated links between ethnic identity, economic growth and urbanization makes unrest and violent conflict more likely. The application of critical theory to this context adds value by identifying and linkages between institutions that, although taken as normative, contribute to ongoing inequality and social tension in China. In this sense, Henri Lefebvre's emphasis on the participation of residents in urban processes is all the more pressing to address the multiple inequalities present in Ürümqi, and throughout the country more generally.

The importance of urban space in reproducing patterns of injustice also adds value to this project. Throughout the study, it was apparent that resident perceptions and use of urban spaces (particularly surrounding personal safety) were affected by ethnic identity. These produced patterns of separation between Han and Uyghur identities that reflected tensions between ethnic groups. The potential impact of these spatial patterns on tension was not examined in this study, but bears further research. Thus, the theory of spatial justice complemented the right to the city by providing a local level characteristic to explore in the questionnaire and focus groups: That of space. Application of spatial justice made explicit the importance of urban space, both in the way it is perceived and used by

residents, in producing patterns that reflect prevailing social and cultural conditions in Ürümqi.

### *6.3.2 Moving forward in theory: research contributions*

Having established the relevance of the right to the city to the context of this research, it is worth revisiting some of the central propositions made in critical urban theory to move forward. It is clear that, despite the political system and ideological origins of the PRC, capitalist processes complement and orient the patterns of urbanization across the country. In Ürümqi, economic and cultural policy changes in the last four decades (including changes to *hukou* policies) have reinforced inequalities that cut across ethnic identity, producing tension among residents in the city. In this way, economic, cultural and political policies are viewed in their totality as producing tension in Ürümqi. As such, this research makes a contribution to the theory by assessing the impact of China's political system and ideology on inequality and tension in the city, rather than capitalist processes alone. Additionally, this research used the right to the city, which examines the impact of larger capitalist processes of urban life, and spatial justice, which is much more concerned with spatial patterns of justice and injustice at the local level, as complementary theories to explore resident perceptions in Ürümqi.

Marcuse's distinction between the *deprived* (who are immediately exploited and discriminated against in terms of employment, criminal justice, and other sectors) and the *discontented* (who are on a lesser level constrained in their ability to participate fully in public life) speaks to the fact that, while China's current political system prevents all residents from participating in governance processes, Uyghur and other and other ethnic

minority people face a disproportionate amount of discrimination under this system (2012). Within the city and neighbourhoods of focus for this research, it appears as though Han Chinese, Uyghur and other Turkic minorities have a common interest in influencing urban governance processes. By studying the perceptions of all residents of Ürümqi, this research is interested in the capacity of all residents to positively impact urban governance, rather than the classic Marxist focus on class identities as the loci of discontent and political change. The need for inter-ethnic solidarity was particularly evident in Uyghur focus group participants' emphasis on the need for Han people to speak on behalf of the minority in public matters. Unfortunately they constitute a very heterogeneous group, and in the absence of a common dialogue this interest is not immediately obvious.

Some critical urban theorists see room for optimism in the wake of the 2008 financial crisis for a transformation of urban processes. In particular, the criticisms levied on the financial sector also called into question the validity of neoliberal economics, and have led to what Harvey and Wachsmuth call a revival of the Keynesian focus on full employment (2012). As such, these authors see a path forward in building coalitions across classes based on the value of labour. However this ideological shift, however it is characterized, has not been uniform across the globe: The authors themselves recognize that China is "not in a revolutionary moment" (Harvey & Wachsmuth 2012: 273). At this moment in time, the impact of the 2008 financial crisis on political change in China appears minimal. As such, the current contributions of critical urban theory say little about the context of this research.

The institutions and processes that shape inequality and urban tension in China transcend the economic sphere. The disconnect between residents and various levels of government described in this research, which are reinforced by economically and culturally divisive policies, act as a fundamental barrier to more inclusive urban governance in the city of Ürümqi. There is some hope in the knowledge dissemination capabilities of international communications technologies and the CCP's language of inclusion in the national urbanization strategy. However, this optimism must be tempered by ongoing rhetoric of terrorism in relation to Islam expressed by the government, which does not bode well for the cultural expression of Uyghur or other Muslim people living in China. In the absence of political reform to address the distance between people and their government, tempered by guarantees against discrimination for politically critical perspectives, it appears as though residents of Ürümqi (majority and minorities alike) will have to continue this conversation outside of the public sphere.

## **Chapter 7: Conclusions**

This Master's thesis project applied critical urban studies and contemporary Chinese political thought to the city of Ürümqi to explore the relationship between ethnic identity and resident perceptions of urban space, and challenges for inclusive urban development in the city (see the conceptual model, Figure 2.1). In particular, this research sought to answer the following questions: how are ethnic identity and urban spaces understood by residents in Ürümqi? And how do these perceptions compare by neighbourhood and ethnic group?

This chapter concludes the thesis with an overview of the findings and limitations of the research, with an assessment of future directions for related research.

### **7.1 Study Findings**

Over the course of this research, it became apparent that among residents of Changjie and Yuewan neighbourhoods, ethnic identity strongly affected the ways in which research participants perceived and used urban space. Specific urban spaces were associated with either Han Chinese or Uyghur people, and as such were places to be avoided by other ethnic identities. This was particularly the case for Han Chinese residents, who were more vocal in their questionnaire responses regarding the instability of specific Uyghur-dominated streets and neighbourhoods.

Notions of safety and community belonging were similarly affected by the demographic composition of each neighbourhood surveyed: Residents in the majority Han neighbourhood of Changjie expressed a lot of distrust of other residents, while most questionnaire respondents in the Uyghur majority neighbourhood of Yuewan expressed

high levels of safety and community belonging. Greater feelings of community belonging in Yuewan were attributed to its more homogeneous demographic composition (consisting of highly educated Uyghur residents) and relatively new existence, having been created following the decline of the *danwei*. Although questionnaire and focus group respondents in both neighbourhoods expressed dissatisfaction with conditions in their communities, in Changjie this dissatisfaction was expressed in terms of the privatization of the *danwei*-managed concrete factory, while in Yuewan the deterioration of the neighbourhood was associated specifically with a discriminatory management authority. In the latter case, Uyghur focus group respondents expressed their belief that Yuewan was being neglected by the residents' committee because of its status as a Uyghur neighbourhood. This is troubling because although the residents' committee is elected and Yuewan neighbourhood is made up mostly of Uyghur people, the wider Shenglilu Jiedao district it is located in is much more dominated by Han Chinese, with Uyghur people making up 50.39% of the population (Figure 5.2). As such, it is probable that the committee would not view the concerns of Yuewan neighbourhood as a high priority.

Ultimately, this research project made clear the fundamental connection between ethnic and neighbourhood identity, and perceptions of and participation in urban processes. Members of the Han Chinese ethnic majority (within the city of Ürümqi and in the PRC more generally) were more likely to express concerns with crime, security and distrust of their neighbours, particularly in Changjie neighbourhood. Uyghur research participants, alternatively, couched their understanding of spaces of insecurity and high crime by identifying the marginalized identities of people living in relatively insecure spaces

in the city: The neighbourhood of Saimachang, in which many residents are lower-income ethnic minority people with rural *hukou* status, was one key example. These more complex perceptions from Uyghur research participants identify a link between public discontent and marginalization, which harkens to the need for public policy measures both to improve livelihoods for the most marginalized, and to create liberalize cultural and political expressions in Ürümqi and throughout the country.

## **7.2 Limitations and Future Directions**

The study was limited to the scope that a case study of urban, Western China can provide, and the constraint on focusing on local residents in Ürümqi without exploring branches of local government and urban planning. Because of the uncertain security situation at the time, research was conducted in four days rather than the three weeks that had been scheduled. More time would have allowed for a greater response rate in the questionnaires, preliminary data analysis prior to the focus groups to better guide discussion, and more in-depth discussion groups that could have been separated by ethnicity and gender in each neighbourhood. It also would have allowed for the possibility of further contact with researchers in Ürümqi to gather locally relevant data.

The sampling size and representativeness of the sample is another limitation that must be addressed. Given difficulties respecting access to data on Ürümqi's population and neighbourhoods, I was forced to rely heavily on the expertise of local partners at Xinjiang Normal University to access the local population. As such, my control over the representativeness of the sample was quite limited. This might have been improved by a closer working relationship with local partners. However, the security situation in Ürümqi

and Xinjiang more generally were tenuous at the time field research took place. As a result of time limitations, I was unable to communicate with local partners and residents as much as I would have liked, resulting in a less representative sample, and fewer focus groups than desired (a minimum of 2 per neighbourhood was planned for).

The western-oriented and heavily Marxist influenced critical urban theory was employed for this research, largely for its focus on urban space and participatory governance processes. Confucian political thought was also examined in order to ground the right to the city and spatial justice in the Chinese context. My language barriers prevented me from examining Chinese and Uyghur political thought, particularly as it relates to Xinjiang. Further examination of academics from the region studying Xinjiang, such as Ilham Tohti and Tian Guang. Inclusion of more theory and academic writings specific to Xinjiang and Uyghur identity would have better situated the Western literature.

The context of Ürümqi's urban development and Uyghur-Han ethnic relations are fundamentally bound to XUAR's geopolitical situation in relation to the PRC, and the cultural and political identity of Uyghur people in relation to that territory. As such, some of the issues examined in this research (particularly the specifics of bilingualism and central government policies applied in Xinjiang) are not strictly transferable to other contexts in China or internationally. However, the comprehensive dynamics around individual and neighbourhood identity, and their relationship with urban governance, bear further investigation in cities. The combination of a Western, democratic literature and Chinese political philosophy provided an appropriate theoretical foundation for studying ethnic minority people in Chinese cities. Future areas of research on this subject should further

explore the connection between ethnic identity and sense of place, particularly in local neighbourhoods. More work also needs to be done on resident public participation in nondemocratic settings such as China, as well as to assess how China's more recent "human-focused" urbanization strategy affects urban marginalized residents in practical terms.

The Chinese government's relationship with ethnic minority people continues to evolve alongside rapid urbanization and economic growth. The arrest of Uyghur academic Ilham Tohti for encouraging separatism continues to narrow the scope of permissible public discussion about Uyghur political identity in XUAR (Chin 2014). It remains to be seen whether the Chinese central government's human-focused urbanization strategy and other policies will have any positive effect on the social tension evident in Ürümqi and other cities in the region. Policies such as government payments to newly married interethnic couples (Wong 2014) may be interpreted by Uyghur people as yet another attempt by the government to counter the demographic dominance of minority people in Xinjiang.

## References

- Alitto, G. (1986). *The last Confucian: Liang Shu-ming and the Chinese dilemma of modernity*. University of California Press.
- Attoh, K. A. (2011). What Kind of Right is the Right to the City? *Progress in Human Geography* 35(5): 669-685.
- Becquelin, N. (2000). Xinjiang in the Nineties. *The China Journal* 44: 65 – 90.
- Beissinger, M.R. (2002). *Nationalist mobilization and the collapse of the Soviet State*. Cambridge.
- Bovingdon, G. (2002a). The not-so-silent majority: Uyghur resistance to Han rule in Xinjiang. *Modern China* 28(1): 39 – 78.
- Bovingdon, G. (2004). *Autonomy in Xinjiang: Han nationalist imperatives and Uyghur discontent*. Washington: East-West Center Washington.
- Bovingdon, G. (2010). *The Uyghurs: Strangers in their own land*. Columbia University Press.
- Branigan, T. (26 May 2014). China detains more than 200 suspected separatists in Xinjiang, state media says. *The Guardian*. Retrieved from <http://www.theguardian.com/world/2014/may/26/china-200-separatists-xinjiang-anti-terrorism-crackdown>.
- Bray, D. (2005). *Social space and governance in urban China: The danwei system from origins to reform*. Stanford University Press.
- Brenner, N. (2012). What is critical urban theory? In N. Brenner, P. Marcuse, & M. Mayer (eds.), *Cities for people, not for profit* (pp. 11 - 23). New York: Routledge.
- Brenner, N., Marcuse, P. & Mayer, M. (2009). Cities for people, not for profit. *Cities* 13(2-3): 176 – 184.
- Brenner, N., Marcuse, P. & Mayer, M. (eds.). (2012). *Cities for people, not for profit*. New York: Routledge.
- British Broadcasting Corporation [BBC]. (30 April 2014a). Deadly China blast at Xinjiang railway station. *BBC News China*. Retrieved from <http://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-china-27225308>.

- BBC. (23 May 2014b). Urumqi attack kills 31 in China's Xinjiang region. *BBC News China*. Retrieved from <http://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-china-27502652>.
- Bryman, A., Teevan J.T. & Bell, E. (2009). *Social research methods*. 2nd ed. Toronto: Oxford University Press.
- Cao, H. (ed). (2009). *Ethnic minorities and regional development in Asia: Reality and challenges*. The International Convention of Asia Scholars (ICAS) publication series. Amsterdam: Amsterdam University Press.
- Cao, H. (2010). Urban-rural income disparity and urbanization: What is the role of spatial distribution of ethnic groups? A case study of Xinjiang Uygur Autonomous Region in western China. *Regional Studies* 44(8): 965-982.
- Cao, H. & Bergeron, S. (2010). *Disparités régionales et inclusion des minorités : Les défis de la Chine de l'après Jeux Olympiques de Beijing*. Québec : Presses de l'Université du Québec.
- Cao, H. & Morrell, E. (2010). *Regional minorities and development in Asia*. New York: Routledge.
- Castells, M. (1977 [1972]). *The urban question: A Marxist approach*. London: Edward Arnold.
- Chan, K.W. (2010). A China paradox: migrant labor shortage amidst rural labor supply abundance. *Eurasian Geography and Economics* 51(4): 513 - 530.
- Chan, K.W. (2012). Crossing the 50 percent population rubicon: Can China urbanize to prosperity? *Eurasian Geography and Economics* 53(1): 63 - 86.
- Chan, K.W. (2014). China's urbanization 2020: a new blueprint and direction. *Eurasian Geography and Economics*. 55(1): 1 - 9.
- Chan, R.C.K., Yao, Y.M. & Zhao, S.X.B. (2003). Self-help housing strategy for temporary population in Guangzhou, China. *Habitat International* 27: 19-35.
- Chen, J., Guo, F., & Wu, Y. (2011). One decade of urban housing reform in China: Urban housing price dynamics and the role of migration and urbanization, 1995 - 2005. *Habitat International* 35: 1 - 8.
- Chen, M. (2012). Modernity and confucian political philosophy in a globalized world. In F. Dallmayr & T. Zhao (eds.), *Contemporary chinese political thought: Debates and perspectives* (pp. 110 - 130). Kentucky: The University Press of Kentucky.

- Cheng, C.Y. & Bunnin, N. (eds.). (2008). *Contemporary chinese philosophy*. John Wiley & Sons.
- Chin, J. (23 September 2014). Uighur scholar in China sentenced to life in prison: Court orders Ilham Tohti's assets seized, lawyer says. *The Wall Street Journal*. Retrieved from <http://online.wsj.com/articles/uighur-scholar-in-china-sentenced-to-life-in-prison-1411453864>.
- Chin, J. & Ye, J. (29 October 2010). China's blood-stained property map. *The Wall Street Journal*. Retrieved from <http://blogs.wsj.com/chinarealtime/2010/10/29/chinas-blood-stained-property-map/tab/comments/>.
- Christoffersen, G. (2007). Islam and ethnic minorities in central Asia: The Uyghurs. in E. Van Wie Davis & R. Azizian (eds.), *Islam, oil, and geopolitics: Central Asia after september 11* (pp. 45 - 60). Toronto: Rowman & Littlefield.
- Clarke, M. (2010). China, Xinjiang and the internationalisation of the Uyghur issue. *Global Change, Peace & Security* 22(2): 213 – 229.
- Congressional-Executive Commission on China [CECC] (2009). *2009 annual report*. Retrieved from <http://www.cecc.gov/publications/annual-reports/2009-annual-report#IV.Xinjiang>.
- CECC (2014). *2014 annual report*. Retrieved from <http://www.cecc.gov/publications/annual-reports/2014-annual-report>.
- Cornell, S.E. (2002). Autonomy as a source of conflict: Caucasian conflicts in theoretical perspective. *World Politics* 54(1): 245 - 276.
- Crow, T., Brown, T., & De Young, R. (2006). The Riverside and Berwyn experience: Contrasts in landscape structure, perception of the urban landscape, and their effects on people. *Landscape and Urban Planning* 75: 282 – 299.
- Csete, A.A. (1995). *A frontier minority in the Chinese world : The Li people of Hainan Island from the Han through the High Qing*. Ph.D Dissertation, State University of New York at Buffalo.
- Cuthill, M. (2010). Strengthening the 'social' in sustainable development: Developing a conceptual framework for social sustainability in a rapid urban growth region in Australia. *Sustainable Development* 18: 362-373.
- Dautcher, J.T. (2000). Reading out-of-print: Popular culture and protest on China's western frontier. In T.B. Weston & L.M. Jenson (eds.), *China beyond the headlines*. Lanham: Rowman and Littlefield.

- Dallmayr, F. & Zhao, T. (eds.). (2012). *Contemporary chinese political thought: Debates and perspectives*. Kentucky: University Press of Kentucky.
- Denyer, S. (28 October 2013). China censors news of an SUV plowing into a crowd in Tiananmen Square, killing five. *Washington Post*. Retrieved from [http://www.washingtonpost.com/world/china-censors-busy-as-jeep-plows-into-crowd-in-tiananmen-square-killing-five/2013/10/28/768f7b88-3fc2-11e3-b028-de922d7a3f47\\_story.html](http://www.washingtonpost.com/world/china-censors-busy-as-jeep-plows-into-crowd-in-tiananmen-square-killing-five/2013/10/28/768f7b88-3fc2-11e3-b028-de922d7a3f47_story.html).
- Dillon, M. (2004). *Xinjiang – China's muslim far northwest*. Durham East Asia Series. London: Routledge.
- Dittmer, L. (1974). *Liu Shao-Chi and the Chinese cultural revolution: The politics of mass criticism*. University of California Press.
- Dittmer, L. & Xiaobao, L. (1996). Personal politics in the Chinese danwei under reform. *Asian Survey* 36(3): 246 - 267.
- Dong, W. & Zhang, X. (2011). "Ürümqi." *Cities* 28: 115 – 125.
- Douglass, M., Wissink, B. & Kempen, R.V. (2012). Enclave urbanism in China: Consequence and interpretations. *Urban Geography* 33(2): 167-182.
- Dreyer, J.T. (1976). *China's forty millions: Minority nationalities and national integration in the People's Republic of China*. Cambridge: Harvard University Press.
- Dunn, E.C. (2007). Participatory GIS – a people's GIS? *Progress in Human Geography* 31(5): 616 – 637.
- Fenby, J. (2013). *History of modern China: The fall and rise of a great power 1850 to the present*. 2nd ed. Toronto: Penguin Books.
- Fenster T. (2005). The right to the gendered city: different formations of belonging in everyday life. *Journal of Gender Studies* 14(3): 213 – 231.
- Fernandes, E. (2007). Constructing the 'right to the city' in Brazil. *Social & Legal Studies* 16(2): 201-219.
- Foo, K., Martin, D., Wool, C., & Polsky, C. (2013). The production of urban vacant land: Relational placemaking in Boston, MA neighborhoods. *Cities* 35: 156 – 163.
- Fowler, F.J. (2002). *Survey research methods*. 3rd ed. Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage Publications.

- Fraser, N. (1997). *Justice interruptus: Critical reflections on the 'postsocialist' condition*. New York: Routledge.
- Friedmann, J. (1992). The right to the city. *Society and Nature* 1: 135 – 151.
- Fukuyama, F. (1995). Confucianism and democracy. *Journal of Democracy* 6(2): 20 - 33.
- George-Abeyie, D.E. (1989). Race, ethnicity, and the spatial dynamic: Toward a realistic study of black crime, crime victimization, and criminal justice processing of blacks. *Social Justice* 16(4): 35 – 54.
- Gladney, D.C. (1998/9). Whither the Uyghur: China's indigenous peoples and the politics of internal colonialism. *Harvard Asia Pacific Review* vol. 3(1): 11 – 15.
- Gladney, D.C. (1999). Making muslims in China: Education, islamicization and representation. *China's National Minority Education: Culture, Schooling, and Development*: 55-94.
- Gladney, D.C. (2004a). Responses to Chinese rule: Patterns of cooperation and opposition. In S.F. Starr (ed.), *Xinjiang: China's muslim borderland* (pp. 354 - 374). Armonk: M.E. Sharpe.
- Gladney, D.C. (2004b). The Chinese program of development and control, 1978 - 2001. In S.F. Starr (ed.), *Xinjiang: China's muslim borderland* (pp. 101 - 119). Armonk: M.E. Sharpe.
- Glantz, M.H., Ye, Q., & Ge, Quansheng (2001). China's western region development strategy and the urgent need to address creeping environmental problems." *Arid Lands Newsletter* 49(1).
- Gobster, P.H. (2002). Managing urban parks for a racially and ethnically diverse clientele. *Leisure Sciences* 24(2), 143-159.
- Godbey, G., Graefe, A. & James, S.W. (1992). *The benefits of local recreation and park services: A nationwide study of the perception of the American public*. Washington, DC: Leisure Studies Program, Pennsylvania State University for the National Recreation and Park Association.
- Gu, C.L. & Liu, H.Y. (2002). Social polarization and segregation in Beijing. In J.R. Logan (ed.), *The new Chinese city: Globalization and market reform* (pp. 198 - 211). Oxford: Blackwell Publishers.
- Gu, C.L., Wang, F., & Liu, G. (2005). The structure of social space in Beijing in 1998: a socialist city in transition. *Urban Geography* 26(2): 167 - 192.

- Guojia Xinxing Changzhenhua Guihua* (2014 - 2020) (*National New-type Urbanization Plan*) (17 March 2014). Accessed November 18, 2014: <http://politics.people.com.cn/n/2014/0317/c1001-24649809.html>.
- Han, S.S. & Peng, Z. (2003). Public participation GIS (PPGIS) for town council management in Singapore. *Environment and Planning B* 30(1): 89-111.
- Hannum, E. & Xie, Y. (1998). Ethnic stratification in Northwest China: Occupational differences between Han Chinese and national minorities in Xinjiang, 1982 – 1990. *Demography* 35(3): 323 – 333.
- Harvey, D. (1978). *Social justice and the city*. Cambridge, MA: Blackwell.
- Harvey, D. (1989a). From managerialism to entrepreneurialism: The transformation in urban governance in late capitalism. *Geografiska Annaler, Series B, Human Geography* 71(1): 3–17.
- Harvey, D. (1989b). *The urban experience*. Baltimore: John Hopkins University Press.
- Harvey, D. (1997). *Justice, nature and the geography of difference*. Malden, MA: Blackwell Publishers.
- Harvey, D. (2003a). *The new Imperialism*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- Harvey, D. (2003b). The right to the city. *International Journal of Urban and Regional Research* 27(4): 939-941.
- Harvey, D. (2009). *Social justice and the city*. Revised edition. Athens, GA: University of Georgia Press.
- Harvey, D. (2012). *Rebel cities: From the right to the city to the urban revolution*. New York: Verso.
- Harvey, D. & Wachsmuth, D. (2012). What is to be done? And who the hell is going to do it? In N. Brenner, P. Marcuse & M. Mayer (eds.), *Cities for people, not for profit* (pp. 264-274). New York: Routledge.
- He, B. (2012). Four models of the relationship between confucianism and democracy. In F. Dallmayr & T. Zhao (eds.), *Contemporary Chinese political thought: Debates and perspectives* (pp. 131 - 151). Kentucky: The University Press of Kentucky.
- Herberer, T. (1989). *China and its national minorities: Autonomy or assimilation?* Armonk: M.E. Sharpe.
- Heberer, T. and Göbel, C. (2011). *The politics of community building in urban China*. Taylor & Francis.

- Ho, C.H., Sasidharan, V., Elmendorf, W., Willits, F.K., Graefe, A. & Godbey, G. (2005). Gender and ethnic variations in urban parks preferences, visitations, and perceived benefits. *Journal of Leisure Research* 37(3): 281 – 306.
- Holtman, B. (2013). What it looks like when it's fixed: collaboration towards a shared vision of city safety. in C. Whitzman et al. (eds.), *Building inclusive cities : Women's safety and the right to the city* (pp. 103 - 116). New York: Routledge.
- Howell, A. & Fan, C.C. (2011). Migration and inequality in Xinjiang: A survey of Han and Uyghur migrants in Ürümqi. *Eurasian Geography and Economics* 52(1): 119-139.
- Hu, Z.F. & Khan, M.S. (1997). Why is China growing so fast? *Economic Issues* 8: 103 - 131. Retrieved from [http://jackson.com.np/documents/MBA\\_resource/Case3-GroupC-WhyisChinagrowingsofast.pdf](http://jackson.com.np/documents/MBA_resource/Case3-GroupC-WhyisChinagrowingsofast.pdf).
- Huang, Yasheng. (2008). *Capitalism with chinese characteristics: Entrepreneurship and the state*. New York: Cambridge University Press.
- Human Rights Watch (23 May 2014). China: Xinjiang bombing an atrocity, restraint needed. *Human Rights Watch*. Retrieved from <http://www.hrw.org/news/2014/05/23/china-xinjiang-bombing-atrocity-restraint-needed>.
- Huntington, S. (1984). Will more countries become democratic? *Political Science Quarterly* 99(2): 193 - 218.
- Insch, I. (2010). Managing residents' satisfaction with city life: Application of importance-satisfaction analysis. *Journal of Town & City Management* 1(2): 164 – 174.
- Isin, E (2000). Introduction: Democracy, citizenship and the city. In E. Isin (ed.), *Democracy, citizenship and the global city* (pp. 1 - 21). New York: Routledge.
- Iveson, K. (2011). Social or spatial justice? Marcuse and Soja on the right to the city. *City* 15(2), 250-259.
- Jim, C.Y. & Chen, W.Y. (2006). Perception of attitude of residents toward urban green spaces in Guangzhou, China. *Landscape and Urban Planning* 75: 81 – 96.
- Jim, C.Y. & Shan, X. (2013). Socioeconomic effect on perception of urban green spaces in Guangzhou, China. *Cities* 31: 123 – 131.
- Jorgensen, A., Hitchmough, J., & Calvert, T. (2002). Woodland spaces and edges: Their impact on perceptions of safety and preference. *Landscape and Urban Planning* 60: 135 – 150.
- Karaman, O. & Islam, T. (2012). On the dual nature of intra-urban borders: The case of a Romani neighbourhood in Istanbul. *Cities* 29: 234 – 243.

- Kholsa, P. & Dhar, S. (2013). Safe access to basic infrastructure: more than pipes and taps. in C. Whitzman et al. (eds.), *Building inclusive cities: Women's safety and the right to the city* (pp. 117 - 140). New York: Routledge.
- Klodawsky, F. et al. (2013). Conclusion : women's safety and the right to the city. in C. Whitzman et al. (eds.), *Building inclusive cities: Women's safety and the right to the city* (pp. 201 - 207). New York: Routledge.
- Knox, P. & McCarthy, L.M. (2005). *Urbanization: An introduction to urban geography*. 2nd ed. New Jersey: Prentice Hall.
- Knox, P. & Pinch., S. (eds.) (2000). *Urban social geography: An introduction* (4th ed.) US: Prentice Hall.
- Kyem, P.A.K. (2001). Public participation GIS applications and the community empowerment process: A review of concerns and challenges. *Cartographica* 38(374): 5 – 17.
- Lan, N. (2008). Is there new hope in labor rights protection for Chinese migrant workers. *Asian-Pacific Law & Policy Journal* 10: 482.
- Lee, J.H., Scott, D., & Floyd, M.F. (2001). Structural inequalities in outdoor recreation participation: A multiple hierarchy stratification perspective. *Journal of Leisure Research* 33(4): 427 – 449.
- Lees, E., Taylor, W.C., Hepworth, J.T., Feliz, K., Cassells, A., & Tobin, J.N. (2007). Environmental changes to increase physical activity: perceptions of older urban ethnic-minority women. *Journal of aging and physical activity* 15(4), 425-438.
- Lefebvre, H. (1968). *Le droit à la ville*. Paris: Éditions Anthropos.
- Lefebvre, H. (1970). *Le manifeste différentialiste*. Gallimard.
- Lefebvre, H. (1996). *Writings on cities* (E. Kofman & E. Lebas, Trans.). New Jersey: Blackwell Publishing.
- Levy, Y. (2006). The war of the peripheries: A social mapping of IDF casualties in the Al-Aqsa Intifada. *Social Identities* 12(3): 309-324.
- Li, C. & Gibson, J. (2013). Rising regional inequality in China: Fact or artifact? *World Development* 47: 16-29.
- Liu, S. (1996). Confucian ideals and the real world. in W. Tu (ed.), *Confucian traditions in east asian modernity* (pp. 92 - 112). Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.

- Li, S. (2012). Housing inequalities under market deepening: the case of Guangzhou, China. *Environment and Planning A* 44(12): 2852.
- Liu, Y.T. & He, S.J. (2010). Chinese urban villages as marginalized neighbourhoods under rapid urbanization. in F. Wu & C. Webster (eds.), *Marginalization in urban China* (pp. 177 - 200). UK: Palgrave Macmillan.
- Livengood, A. & Kunte, K. (2012). Enabling participatory planning with GIS: A case study of settlement mapping in Cuttack, India. *Environment and Urbanization* 24: 77-97.
- Llinares, C., Page, A. & Llinares, J. (2013). An approach to defining strategies for improving city perception: Case study of Valencia, Spain. *Cities* 35: 78 – 88.
- Ma, L.J.C. (2002). Urban transformation in China, 1949 – 2000: a review and research agenda. *Environment and planning A* 34(9): 1545 – 1570.
- Ma, L.J.C. (2005). Urban administrative restructuring, changing scale relations and local economic development in China. *Political Geography* 24(4): 477 - 497.
- Ma, L.J.C. (2007). From China's urban social space to social and environmental justice. *Eurasian Geography and Economics* 48(5): 555 – 566.
- Mackerras, C. (1994). *China's minorities: Integration and modernization in the twentieth century*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- Mackerras, C. (2003). *China's ethnic minorities and globalisation*. London: Routledge.
- Mans, G. (2006). Using PGIS to conduct community safety audits. *The Electronic Journal of Information Systems in Developing Countries* 25(7): 1-13.
- Marcuse, P. (2009). From critical urban theory to the right to the city. *Cities* 13(2-3): 185-197.
- Marcuse, P. (2010). Spatial justice: Derivative but causal of social justice. in B. Bret, O. Gervais-Lambony, C. Hancock & F. Landy (eds.), *Justice et injustices spatiales* (pp. 1 - 9). Paris: Presses Universitaires de Paris Ouest.
- Marcuse, P. (2012). Whose right(s) to what city? In N. Brenner, P. Marcuse & M. Mayer (eds.), *Cities for people, not for profit* (pp. 24 - 41). New York: Routledge.
- Mayoux, L. (2006). Quantitative, qualitative or participatory? Which method, for what and when? In Desai, V., & R. B. Potter (Eds.), *Doing development research* (pp. 115-128). London: SAGE Publications.

- McGranahan, G., Mitlin, D. & Satterthwaite, D. (2012). Land and services for the urban poor in rapidly urbanizing countries. In G. Martine, G. McGranahan, M. Montgomery & R. Fernandez-Castilla (eds.), *The new global frontier* (pp. 77 - 98). UK: Earthscan.
- McMillen, D.H. (1979). *Chinese communist power and policy in Xinjiang, 1949 – 1977*. Boulder: Westview Press.
- Millington, G. (ed.). (2011). *'Race,' culture and the right to the city*. UK: Palgrave Macmillan.
- Millward, J. (2004). *Violent separatism in Xinjiang: A critical assessment*. Washington: East-West Center Washington.
- Mitchell, D. (2003). *The right to the city: Social justice and the fight for public space*. New York: The Guilford Press.
- Moneyhon, M. (2002). Controlling Xinjiang: Autonomy on China's new frontier. *Asia-Pacific Law & Policy Journal* 3(1): 120 – 152.
- Murdie, R. & Teixeira, C. (2011). The impact of gentrification on ethnic neighbourhoods in Toronto: A case study of little Portugal. *Urban Studies* 48(1): 61 – 83.
- Nielsen, I., Smyth, R., & Vicziany, M. (eds.). (2007). *Globalisation and labour mobility in China*. Monash Asia Institute.
- O'Brien, K., & Li, L. (2000). Accommodating 'democracy' in a one-party state: Introducing village elections in China. *The China Quarterly* 162: 465 - 489.
- O'Brien, K., & Liu, L. (2007). *Rightful resistance in rural China*. New York: Cambridge University Press.
- Pannell, C. & P. Schmidt (2006). Structural change and regional disparities in Xinjiang, China. *Eurasian Geography and Economics* 47(3): 329 – 352.
- Payne, L.L., Mowen, A.J., & Orsega-Smith, E. (2002). An examination of park preferences and behaviors among urban residents: The role of residential location, race and age. *Leisure Sciences* 24(2): 181 – 198.
- Peng, G.C. & Nunes, M.B. (2008). Issues and difficulties in doing participative research in China: Lessons learned from a survey in information systems research. *7th European Conference on Research Methodology for Business and Management Studies*. Retrieved from <http://ssrn.com/abstract=1416872>
- People's Daily (18 June 2004). Chinese president calls for joint efforts in fighting terrorism in Central Asia. *People's Daily*. Retrieved from [http://english.people.com.cn/200406/18/eng20040618\\_146718.html](http://english.people.com.cn/200406/18/eng20040618_146718.html)

- Phillips, D., Davis, C. & Ratcliffe, P. (2007). British Asian narratives of urban space. *Transactions of the Institute of British Geographers* 32(2): 217 – 234.
- Polese, M. & Stren, R. (2000). *The social sustainability of cities: diversity and the management of change*. Toronto: University of Toronto Press.
- Potter, P.B. (2003). Belief in control: Regulation of religion in China. *The China Quarterly* 174: 317 - 337.
- Purcell, M. (2002). Excavating Lefebvre: The right to the city and its urban politics of the inhabitant. *GeoJournal* 58: 99 – 108.
- Purcell, M. (2003). Citizenship and the right to the global city: Reimagining the capitalist world order. *International Journal of Urban & Regional Research* 27(3), 564 – 590.
- Long, W.Q. (30 October 2014). Uyghur civil servants forced to sign pledge regarding political stance. *Radio Free Asia*. Retrieved from <http://www.rfa.org/english/news/uyghur/underage-10302014120731.html>.
- Rankin, K. (2012). The praxis of planning and the contributions of critical development studies. In N. Brenner, P. Marcuse & M. Mayer (eds.), *Cities for people, not for profit: critical urban theory and the right to the city* (pp. 102 - 116). New York: Routledge.
- Rishbeth, C. (2001). Ethnic minority groups and the design of public open space: an inclusive landscape? *Landscape Research* 26(4), 351-366.
- Rishbeth, C. (2004). Ethno-cultural representation in the urban landscape. *Journal of Urban Design* 9(3), 311-333.
- Rong, M.A. (2008). The development of minority education and the practice of bilingual education in Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region. (L. Zhang, Trans.). *Peking University Education Review* 2: 2 - 41.
- Rudelson, J.J. (1997). *Oasis identities: Uyghur nationalism along China's silk road*. New York: Columbia University Press.
- Sack, R.D. (1986). *Human territoriality: its theory and history*. New York: Cambridge University Press.
- Sandercock, L. (2000). When strangers become neighbours: Managing cities of difference. *Planning Theory & Practice* 1(1): 13 – 30.
- Schroeder, P. (1996). Criteria for the design of a GIS/2. *National Center for Geographic Information and Analysis*. Retrieved from <http://www.commoncoordinates.com/ppgis/ppgishom.html>.

- Schwartz, J., & Shieh, S. (eds.). (2009). *State and society responses to social welfare needs in China: serving the people*. Routledge.
- Sevilla-Buitrago, A. (2013). Debating contemporary urban conflicts: A survey of selected scholars. *Cities* 31: 454 – 468.
- Shieh, L., & Friedmann, J. (2008). Restructuring urban governance: Community construction in contemporary China. *City* 12(2): 183 - 195.
- Shin, H.B. (2011) Right to the city and critical reflections on property rights activism in China's urban renewal contexts. *Centre for Analysis of Social Exclusion*. London: London School of Economics. Retrieved from <http://sticerd.lse.ac.uk/dps/case/cp/CASEpaper156.pdf>.
- Smith, J. (2000). Four generations of Uyghurs: The shift towards ethno-political ideologies among Xinjiang's youth. *Inner Asia* 2(2): 195 – 224.
- Smith, T., Nelischer, M., & Perkins, M. (1997). Quality of an urban community: A framework for understanding the relationship between quality and physical form. *Landscape and Urban Planning* 39(2–3): 229–241.
- Soja, E. (1980). The socio-spatial dialectic. *Annals of the Association of American Geographers* 70(2): 207 – 225.
- Soja, E. (1999). Thirdspace: expanding the scope of the geographical imagination. In D. Massey, J. Allen & O. Sarre (eds.) *Human geography today* (pp. 260 - 278). Cambridge, MA: Polity Press.
- Soja, E. (2010). The city and spatial justice. In B. Bret, O. Gervais-Lambony, C. Hancock & F. Landy (eds). *Justices et injustices spatiales* (pp. 55 – 74). Paris: Presses Universitaires de Paris Ouest.
- Spence, J.D. (1990). *The search for modern China*. New York: W.W. Norton & Company.
- Starr, S.F. (ed.). (2004). *Xinjiang: China's muslim borderland*. New York: M.E. Sharpe.
- Stein, J.J. (2003). Taking the deliberative turn in China: International law, minority rights, and the case of Xinjiang. *Journal of Public and International Affairs* 14: 1 – 25.
- Strawbridge, D. (2008). The challenges of bilingual education in the Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region People's Republic of China. *Save the Children*. Retrieved from [http://www.seameo.org/\\_ld2008/documents/presentation\\_document/strawbridge\\_xinjiang\\_challenges\\_of\\_bilingual\\_education.pdf](http://www.seameo.org/_ld2008/documents/presentation_document/strawbridge_xinjiang_challenges_of_bilingual_education.pdf).
- Streiner, D.L. (2003). Starting at the beginning: An introduction to coefficient alpha and internal consistency. *Journal of personality assessment* 80.1: 99 – 103.

- Sun, M.T.W., Tsai, Y.T., Shih, M.C. & Lin, J.Y.W. (2009). Public participation and the concept of space in environmental governance: An application of PPGIS. *Public Administration and Development* 29: 250-261
- Tsui, K. (1991). China's regional inequality, 1952 – 1985. *Journal of Comparative Economics* 15, 1 – 21.
- Uitermark, J. (2012). An actually existing just city? The fight for the right to the city in Amsterdam. In N. Brenner, P. Marcuse & M. Mayer (eds.), *Cities for people, not for profit: critical urban theory and the right to the city* (pp. 197 - 214). New York: Routledge.
- United Nations Habitat. (2010). *State of the world's cities 2010/2011 - Cities for all: Bridging the urban divide*. Nairobi, Kenya.
- United Nations Department of Economic and Social Affairs [UNDESA] (2014). *World urbanization prospects: The 2014 revision, highlights*. Retrieved from <http://esa.un.org/unpd/wup/Highlights/WUP2014-Highlights.pdf>.
- Ürümqi Statistics Bureau (2011). *Ürümqi statistics yearbook 2011*. Beijing, China: China Statistics Press.
- Ürümqi Statistics Bureau (2013). *Ürümqi statistics yearbook 2013*. Beijing, China: China Statistics Press.
- Uyghur Human Rights Project (16 June 2014). *Trapped in a virtual cage: chinese state repression of Uyghurs online*. retrieved from <http://docs.uyghuramerican.org/Trapped-in-A-Virtual-Cage.pdf>.
- Vogel, E. (2011). *Deng Xiaoping and the transformation of China*. Harvard University Press.
- Wang, M. (2010). Impact of the global economic crisis on China's migrant workers: A survey of 2,700 in 2009. *Eurasian Geography and Economics* 51(2): 18 - 235.
- Wang, X., Zhenrong, Y., Cinderby, S., & Forrester, J. (2008). Enhancing participation: Experiences of participatory geographic information systems in Shanxi province, China. *Applied Geography* 28(1): 96 – 109.
- Wang, Y.P. & Murie, A. (1996). The process of commercialisation of housing in China. *Urban Studies* 33(6): 971 - 989.
- Wang, Y.P. & Murie, A. (2000). Social and spatial implications of housing reform in China. *International Journal of Urban and Regional Research* 24(2): 397 - 417.

- Wee, S. Chinese police blame separatist group for Urumqi bombing: Xinhua. *Reuters*. Accessed December 12, 2014 from: <http://www.reuters.com/article/2014/05/18/us-china-xinjiang-idUSBREA4H01O20140518>.
- Wei, S. (1995). Open door policy and China's rapid growth: evidence from city-level data. In T. Ito & A.O. Krueger (eds.), *Growth Theories in Light of the East Asian Experience* (pp. 73 - 98). Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
- Weinstein, L. & Ren, X. (2009). The changing right to the city: Urban renewal and housing rights in globalizing Shanghai and Mumbai. *City & Community* 8(4): 407-432.
- Westover, T.N. (1985). Perception of crime and safety in three midwestern parks. *Professional Geographer* 37(4) 410 – 420.
- Wong, E. (2 September 2014) To temper unrest in western China, officials offer money for intermarriage. *The New York Times*. Retrieved from <http://www.nytimes.com/2014/09/03/world/asia/to-temper-unrest-china-pushes-interethnic-marriage-between-han-and-minorities.html?smid=fb-share>.
- World Bank (2013). China overview. Retrieved from <http://www.worldbank.org/en/country/china/overview>
- World Bank (2014). GINI index (World Bank estimate). Retrieved from <http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/SI.POV.GINI>.
- Xinhua (6 April 2007). China to build twelve new highways linking its west region with central Asia. *Xinhua*. Retrieved from <http://www.chinagate.cn/english/develop/50682.htm>
- Xinhua (2012, September). China's urbanization lacks quality, requires huge investment: Green paper. *Xinhuanet*. Retrieved from [http://news.xinhuanet.com/english/indepth/2012-09/15/c\\_131852575.htm](http://news.xinhuanet.com/english/indepth/2012-09/15/c_131852575.htm)
- Xinhua (16 March 2014). China unveils landmark urbanization plan. *Xinhuanet*. Retrieved from [http://news.xinhuanet.com/english/china/2014-03/16/c\\_133190495.htm](http://news.xinhuanet.com/english/china/2014-03/16/c_133190495.htm)
- Yan, J. & Kwok, D.W.Y (eds.). (1996). *Turbulent decade: A history of the cultural revolution*. University of Hawaii Press.
- Yan, J. & Gao, G. (2007). Social engineering of community building: Examination of policy process and characteristics of community construction in China. *Community Development Journal* 42(2): 222 - 236.
- Yee, H.S. (2003). Ethnic relations in Xinjiang: a survey of Uyghur-Han relations in Ürümqi. *Journal of Contemporary China* 12(36): 431 – 452.

- Yee, H.S. (2005). Ethnic consciousness and identity: A research report on Uyghur-Han Relations in Xinjiang. *Asian Ethnicity* 6(1): 35 – 50.
- Yuen, B. & Hien, W.N. (2005). Resident perception and expectations of rooftop gardens in Singapore. *Landscape and Urban Planning* 73: 263 – 276.
- Zang, X. (2007). Minority ethnicity, social status and Uyghur community involvement in urban Xinjiang. *Asian Ethnicity* 8(1): 25-42.
- Zang, X. (2011). Uyghur-Han earnings differentials in Urumchi. *The China Journal* 65: 141 – 155.
- Zhan, S. (2011). What determines migrant workers' life chances in contemporary China? Hukou, social exclusion, and the market. *Modern China* 37(3): 243 - 285.
- Zhang, L. (2008). Ethnic congregation in a globalizing city: The case of Guangzhou, China. *Cities* 25: 383 – 395.
- Zhiyuan, C. & Cao, T.Y. (eds.). (2005). *The Chinese model of modern development*. New York: Routledge.
- Zhou, L. (2012). The debates in contemporary chinese political thought. In F. Dallmayr & T. Zhao (eds.), *Contemporary chinese political thought: debates and perspectives*. Kentucky: The University Press of Kentucky.

## Appendix I: Questionnaire (Mandarin)

问卷号#:

日期:

语言: 维 汉

性别: 男 女

社区: 景月湾

天山建材小区

### 乌鲁木齐市社区满意度调查问卷

您好！真诚地感谢您在百忙之中抽出时间，参与我们关于乌鲁木齐社区的问卷调查。本次调查旨在理解新疆乌鲁木齐城市居民参与社区共建的情况。此问卷只为**学术研究所用**，不做任何商业用途；本次调查严格实行匿名性和保密性原则，我们承诺将保证您的隐私安全，希望您可以提供准确信息。感谢您的参与！

#### 您的基本信息

##### 年龄

18 - 25

26 - 35

36 - 54

55 或以上

##### 民族

汉族

维吾尔族

其他: \_\_\_\_\_

##### 您在乌鲁木齐市居住时间?

小于 5 年

5 - 10 年

10 - 20 年

20 年以上

**3.1. 您在现居住地居住时间?**

- 小于 1 年
- 1-3 年
- 3-5 年
- 5-10 年
- 10 年以上

**4. 您是否为城镇户口?**

- 是
- 否

**4.1(如为城市户口) 您户口所在地为**

- 乌鲁木齐市
- 其他城市: \_\_\_\_\_

**5. 您是否全年都居住在乌鲁木齐市?**

- 是
- 否

**6. 您的学历**

- 小学
- 初中
- 高中
- 职业高中或大专
- 本科或以上

**7. 您的宗教信仰**

- 道教

- 佛教
- 伊斯兰教
- 基督或天主教
- 无神论者/未皈依宗教
- 其他/不方便说\_\_\_\_\_

**8.您的职业**

- 产业工人
- 务农
- 商人
- 教师
- 学生
- 行政人员或机关干部
- 退休
- 待业
- 其他\_\_\_\_\_

**9.您的月收入（元）**

- 1, 000 或以下
- 1, 001 - 3, 000
- 3, 001 - 5, 000
- 5, 001 - 7, 500
- 7, 500 或以上

**满意度调查**

请您对您居住社区内及附近的以下公共活动场所进行评价

**场所 1 (绿地: 如公园、街心花园、儿童游乐场等)**

**A1.天气好的时候, 您光顾场所 1 的频率为?**

- 每天一次或更多
- 一周一次或更多
- 一月一次或更多
- 一年去几次 (小于 12 次)

**A2.请在场所 1 的以下职能中选出您认为对您个人最重要的选项 (仅限三项, 不分先后)**

- 放松娱乐
- 身体锻炼
- 商业零售或小规模商业活动
- 提供就业 (绿地管理人员或园林相关职业)
- 社会活动或者社区集会场所
- 鼓励和保护多元文化 (促进不同民族文化共存)
- 保护文化遗产, 包括物质文化遗产 (如古迹) 和精神文化遗产 (如民俗)

**A3. 您是否赞成下列观点 (1 为“很不赞同” 5 是“非常赞同”)**

我在场所 1 有归属感, 觉得自己是社区的一员

- 1       2       3       4       5

光顾场所 1 的大部分是汉族群众

- 1       2       3       4       5

光顾场所 1 时候很安全

- 1       2       3       4       5

场所 1 发生过很多犯罪案件

- 1       2       3       4       5

场所 1 有助于保护文化遗产

- 1       2       3       4       5

**A4.根据您的观察，请您为下列人群光顾场所 1 的频率排序？**

儿童\_\_\_\_\_

妇女\_\_\_\_\_

老年人\_\_\_\_\_

少数民族\_\_\_\_\_

**A5. 请您为场所 1 的总体满意度进行评价 (1 为很不满，5 为很满意)**

1       2       3       4       5

**A6. 请选出您认为能有助于改善场所 1 质量的选项（可多选）**

- 增加绿地零售或其他商业活动
- 增加绿地社会文化活动
- 增强绿地治安管理（如增加照明设施、警力等）
- 增强绿地景观建设
- 扩大绿地面积
- 增强绿地无障碍化建设，方便残疾人出行
- 增加文化包容性，尊重多元文化
- 加强保护文化遗产

**场所 2（公共商业场所：自由市场、集市或超市等）**

**B1.您光顾场所 2 的频率为？**

- 每天一次或更多
- 一周一次或更多
- 一月一次或更多
- 一年去几次（小于 12 次）

**B2.请在场所 2 的以下职能中选出您认为对您个人最重要的 3 项（不分先后）**

- 放松娱乐
- 身体锻炼
- 商业零售或小规模商业活动

- 提供就业（绿地管理人员或园林相关职业）
- 社会活动或者社区集会场所
- 鼓励和保护多元文化（保护和促进民族文化交流）
- 保护文化遗产，包括物质文化遗产（如古迹）和精神文化遗产（如民俗）

**B3. 您是否赞成下列观点 (1 为“很不赞同” 5 是“非常赞同”)**

我在场 2 有归属感，觉得自己是社区的一员

- 1       2       3       4       5

光顾场所 2 的大部分是汉族群众

- 1       2       3       4       5

光顾场所 2 时候很安全.

- 1       2       3       4       5

场所 2 发生过很多犯罪案件.

- 1       2       3       4       5

场所 2 有助于保护文化遗产.

- 1       2       3       4       5

**B4. 根据您的观察，请您为下列人群光顾场所 2 的频率排序？**

儿童\_\_\_\_\_

妇女\_\_\_\_\_

老年人\_\_\_\_\_

少数民族\_\_\_\_\_

**B5. 请您为场所 2 的总体满意度进行评价 (1 为很不满，5 为很满意)**

- 1       2       3       4       5

**B6. 请选出您认为能有助于改善场所 2 质量的选项（可多选）**

- 强化卫生和基础设施
- 扩大面积
- 增强治安管理（如增加照明设施、警力等）

- 增加社会文化活动
- 加强保护文化遗产
- 增强无障碍化建设，方便残疾人出行
- 增加文化包容性，尊重多元文化
- 增加零售或其他商业活动

**III. 对城市与社区未来发展规划的建议**

以下是关于您居住社区附近的一些总体问题

**请您列出并在地图上标示出在您居住的社区附近您喜欢光顾的公共场所**

- \_\_\_\_\_
- \_\_\_\_\_
- \_\_\_\_\_

1.1 下列哪些为您喜欢光顾上述公共场所的原因? (可多选)

- 多语言环境 (如该场所使用的语言文字理解无障碍)
- 信仰自由 (如信仰及宗教自由被充分尊重)
- 经济因素 (如消费水平亲民)
- 文化因素 (如个人文化习俗被充分包容与尊重);
- 其他

**请您列出并在地图上标示出在您居住的社区附近您不愿光顾的公共场所**

- \_\_\_\_\_
- \_\_\_\_\_
- \_\_\_\_\_

2.1 下列哪些为您不愿光顾上述公共场所的原因? (可多选)

- 语言障碍 (如人们在该场所用来交流的语言使我理解起来有障碍)
- 宗教不同 (如信仰的宗教与那里的主流宗教不同)
- 经济原因 (如该场所消费偏高)
- 文化因素 (如认为个人的文化习惯在该场所会造成异见)

其他 (比如):

---

请您对居住社区附近公共标识的双语程度 (汉语/维吾尔语) 作出评价

全为双语                       部分为双语                       无双语

您之前是否参与过关于您居住社区或乌鲁木齐市未来发展规划的会议?

是

否

4.1 如果您没有参与过类似会议, 是因为下列何种原因?

没有相关的讨论或者会议

会议或讨论的时间地点不方便

对本地事物不感兴趣

其它 \_\_\_\_\_

如有机会参与类似会议, 您希望通过下列何种方式参与 (针对所有受访者)

网上匿名讨论 (以电子邮件形式)

通过邮政信函 (以调查问卷形式)

参与由社区举办的讨论会

入户调查

其它 \_\_\_\_\_

**感谢您对本次调查的配合! 祝您身体健康, 事业有成!**

感谢您对此次调查问卷的宝贵意见和建议

---

---

---

---

## Appendix II: Questionnaire (Uyghur)

سۇئال ۋارىقى رەت نۇمۇرى:

ۋاقىت:

تىلى: ئۇيغۇرچە

جىنسى:

مەھەللە:

ئۈرۈمچى شەھەرلىك مەھەللە رازىمەنلىك ئىشلىرىنى تەكشۈرۈش سۇئال ۋارىقى

ئەسسالامۇ ئەلەيكۇم! ياخشىمۇسىز! ئالدى بىلەن سىزنىڭ قىممەتلىك ۋاقتىڭىزنى چىقىرىپ بىزنىڭ بۇ قېتىملىق ئۈرۈمچى رايونلىرىنى تەكشۈرۈش پائالىيىتىمىزگە قاتنىشىپ بەرگىنىڭىزگە چىن كۆڭلىمىزدىن رەھمەت ئېيتىمىز. بۇ قېتىملىق تەكشۈرۈشىمىز ئاساسەن ئۈرۈمچى شەھەرلىك ئاھالىلىرىنىڭ ئۆزى ئولتۇرۇشلۇق رايون قۇرۇلىشىغا قاتنىشىش ئەھۋالىنى قىسقىچە ئىگەللەشتۈر. بۇ تەكشۈرۈش ۋارىقى پەقەتلا ئوقۇ-ئوقۇتۇش تەتقىقاتى ئۈچۈن ئىشلىتىدۇ، تەكشۈرۈشىمىز پۈتۈنلەي نامسىز ۋە شەخسىي سىرىڭىزنى قوغدىغان پىرىنسىپ بويىچە ئېلىپ بېرىلىدۇ. بىز سىزنىڭ ھەرقانداق مەخپىيەتلىك بىخەتەرلىكىڭىزنى قوغداشقا كاپالەتلىك قىلىمىز ھەم سىزنىڭ چىن ھەقىقىي بولغان ئۇچۇرلار بىلەن تەمىنلىشىڭىزنى ئۈمۈد قىلىمىز. ھەمكارلاشقىنىڭىزغا رەھمەت.

سىزنىڭ ئاساسىي ئۇچۇرىڭىز: I

1. يېشىڭىز:

25-18

35-26

54-36

55 ۋە ياكى ئۇنىڭدىن يۇقىرىلار

2. مىللىتىڭىز:

خەنزۇ

ئۇيغۇر

باشقا: \_\_\_\_\_

3. سىزنىڭ ئۈرۈمچى شەھىرىدە ئولتۇراقلاشقىنىڭىزغا قانچىلىك ۋاقىت بولدى؟

5 يىلدىن تۆۋەن

10-5 يىل

20-10 يىل

20 يىلدىن كۆپ

3.1. سىزنىڭ ھازىر ئولتۇراقلاشقان رايونىڭىزدا تۇرغىلى قانچىلىك ۋاقىت بولدى؟

1 يىلدىن تۆۋەن

1-3 يىل

5-10 يىل

10 يىلدىن كۆپ

4. سىز شەھەر نوپۇسىمۇ؟

شۇنداق

ياق

4.1. (ئەگەر شەھەر نوپۇسى بولسىڭىز) سىزنىڭ نوپۇسىڭىز قەيەرگە قاراشلىق؟

ئۈرۈمچى

باشقا شەھەر: \_\_\_\_\_

5. سىز پۈتۈن يىل ئۈرۈمچىدە تۇرامسىز؟

شۇنداق

ياق

6. سىزنىڭ ئوقۇش تارىخىڭىز؟

باشلانغۇچ سەۋىيە

تولۇقسىز سەۋىيە

تولۇق ئوتتۇرا سەۋىيە

كەسپىي تولۇق ئوتتۇرا ياكى ئالىي تېخنىكوم (مەخسۇس كۇرس)

تولۇق كۇرۇس ياكى ئۇنىڭدىن يۇقىرى

7. سىزنىڭ دىنىي ئېتىقادىڭىز:

تەرىقەتچىلەر ئېقىمى

بۇددا دىنى

ئىسلام دىنى

خىرىستىئان دىنى

ئىلاھسىز دىن

باشقا ياكى دېيىشكە ئەپسىز: \_\_\_\_\_

8. سىزنىڭ كەسپىڭىز:

- ئىشلەپچىقىرىش خىزمەتچىسى
- دېھقان
- سودىگەر
- ئوقۇتقۇچى
- ئوقۇغۇچى
- مەمۇرىي خىزمەتچى ياكى ئورگان كادىرى
- پىنسىيە
- ئىش كۈتۈپ تۇرغۇچى
- باشقا: \_\_\_\_\_

9. سىزنىڭ ئايلىق كىرىمىڭىز:

- 1000 يۈەن ياكى ئۇنىڭدىن تۆۋەن
- 1001-3000 يۈەنگىچە
- 3001-5000 يۈەنگىچە
- 5001-7500 يۈەنگىچە
- 7500 يۈەندىن يۇقىرى

II. رازىمەنلىك دەرىجىسىنى تەكشۈرۈش:

\* سىزنىڭ ئۆزىڭىز تۇرۇشلۇق رايون ئىچى ۋە تېشى ئەتراپىدىكى تۆۋەندىكىدەك ناممىۋى پائالىيەت ئورۇنلىرىغا بولغان باھارىڭىز:

- ناممىۋى سورۇنلار 1. (كۆكەرتىش باغچا، كوچا گۈللۈكى، بالىلار ئويۇن رايونى قاتارلىقلار)
- A1. ھاۋا ياخشى ۋاقىتلاردا سىزنىڭ يۇقارقى ناممىۋى سورۇن 1 نى ئايلىنىش قېتىم سانىڭىز؟
- بىر كۈندە بىر قېتىم ياكى ئۇنىڭدىن كۆپ
  - بىر ھەپتەدە بىر قېتىم ياكى ئۇنىڭدىن كۆپ
  - بىر ئايدا بىر قېتىم ياكى ئۇنىڭدىن كۆپ
  - بىر يىلدا بىر قېتىم ياكى بىر نەچچە قېتىم (12 قېتىمدىن تۆۋەن)

A2. يۇقارقى ناممىۋى سورۇنلارنىڭ 1 سىزگە ئەڭ مۇھىم بولغان رولى؟ (ئۈچ تۈرنى تاللىسىڭىز بولىدۇ)

- ئەركىن كۆڭۈل ئېچىش، ئازادە بولۇش
- بەدەن چېنىقتۇرۇش
- پارچە-پۇرات سودا-سېتىق ياكى كىچىك تىپتىكى سودا پائالىيەتلىرى
- خىزمەت بىلەن تەمىنلەش، ئىشقا ئورۇنلاشتۇرۇش (كۆكەرتىشنى باشقۇرۇش خادىمى ياكى باغۋەنچىلىك، باغ-ئورمان باشقۇرۇش قاتارلىق كەسىپلەر)
- ئىجدىمائىي پائالىيەت ياكى مەھەللە يىغىلىش سورۇنى

- كۆپ خىل مەدەنىيەتنى قوغداش ۋە جانلاندىرۇش(ھەرقايسى مىللەتلەر مەدەنىيىتىنىڭ ئۆزئارا قوبۇل قىلىنىشى ۋە گۈللىنىشى)
- مەدەنىيەت مىراسلىرىنى قوغداش.مەسىلەن:ماددىي مەدەنىيەت مىراسلىرى(قەدىمىي يادىكارلىقلار)ۋە جىسمانىي مەدەنىيەت مىراسلىرى(خەلق ئۆرپ-ئادەتلىرى)

A3.سىز تۆۋەندىكى قاراشلارغا قوشۇلالمىسىز؟(1 رەقىمى <ئىنتايىن قوللىماسلىق>، 5 رەقىمى <ئىنتايىن قوللاش>)

1. مەندە ئاممىۋى سورۇن 1 گە بولغان تەۋەلىك ھېسسىياتى بار، ئۆزۈمنى مەھەللىنىڭ بىر ئەزاسى ھېسابلايمەن.

5□4□3□2□1□

2.يۇقارقى ئاممىۋى سورۇن 1دىكى كۆپ قىسمى خەنزۇ يولداشلار توپى.

5□4□3□2□1□

3.يۇقارقى ئاممىۋى سورۇن 1 ئىنتايىن بىخەتەر.

5□4□3□2□1□

4.ئاممىۋى سورۇن 1دە كۆپ قېتىم قانۇنغا خىلاپ دېلۇلار كۆپ يۈز بەرگەن.

5□4□3□2□1□

5.ئاممىۋى سورۇن 1 نىڭ مەدەنىيەت مىراسلىرى قوغداشقا كۆپ رولى بار.

5□4□3□2□1□

A4.ئۆزىڭىزنىڭ كۈزىتىشىگە ئاساسەن،ئاممىۋى سورۇن 1دە كۆپ پائالىيەت قىلىدىغان كىشىلەرنى رەتكە تۇرغۇزۇڭ.

1.بالىلار\_\_\_\_\_

2.ئاياللار\_\_\_\_\_

3.ياشاغانلار\_\_\_\_\_

4.ئاز سانلىق مىللەتلەر\_\_\_\_\_

A5.ئاممىۋى سورۇن 1نىڭ ئومۇمىي ئەھۋالىغا ئاساسەن باھا بېرىڭ.(<1>رەقىمى ئىنتايىن رازى

ئەمەس،<5>رەقىمى ئىنتايىن رازى)

5□4□3□2□1□

A6.سىزچە تۆۋەندىكى ئامىللارنىڭ قايسىلىرى ئاممىۋى سورۇن 1نىڭ تېخىمۇ مۇكەممەللىشىگە

ياخشى شارائىتلارنى ھازىرلاپ بېرەلەيدۇ؟(كۆپ تاللاشقا بولىدۇ)

يېشىل يەرلەرنى پارچە سېتىش ياكى باشقا سودا پائالىيەتلەرنى كېڭەيتىش

مەھەللە كۆكەرتىش پائالىيەتلەرنى كېڭەيتىش

يېشىللىقنى باشقۇرۇش خىزمىتىنى كۈچەيتىش

- بېشىل رايون بەرپا قىلىش قۇرۇلىشىنى كۈچەيتىش
- كۆكەرتىش كۈلىمىنى چوڭايتىش
- توسالغۇسىز كۆكەرتىش قۇرۇلىشىنى كۈچەيتىپ، مېيپىلارنىڭ يول يۈرۈشىگە قولايلىق يارىتىش
- مەدەنىيەتنىڭ ئۆزئارا سىڭىشىنى كۈچەيتىپ، كۆپ خىل مەدەنىيەتنى ھۆرمەتلەش
- مەدەنىيەت مىراسلىرى قوغداشنى كۈچەيتىش

ئاممىۋى سورۇن 2 (ئاممىۋى سودا سورۇنلىرى: ئەركىن بازار، قەررەللىك بازار ياكى تاللا بازار قاتارلىقلار)

B1. سىزنىڭ ئاممىۋى سورۇن 2 گە بېرىش قېتىم سانىڭىز؟

- بىر كۈندە بىر قېتىم ياكى ئۇنىڭدىن كۆپ
- بىر ھەپتەدە بىر قېتىم ياكى ئۇنىڭدىن كۆپ
- بىر ئايدا بىر قېتىم ياكى ئۇنىڭدىن كۆپ
- بىر يىلدا بىر قېتىم ياكى بىر نەچچە قېتىم (12 قېتىمدىن تۆۋەن)

B2. يۇقارقى ئاممىۋى سورۇنلارنىڭ 2 سىزگە ئەڭ مۇھىم بولغان رولى؟ (ئۈچ تۈرنى تاللىشىڭىز بولىدۇ)

- ئەركىن كۆڭۈل ئېچىش، ئازادە بولۇش
- بەدەن چېنىقتۇرۇش
- پارچە-پۇرات سودا-سېتىق ياكى كىچىك تىپتىكى سودا پائالىيەتلىرى
- خىزمەت بىلەن تەمىنلەش، ئىشقا ئورۇنلاشتۇرۇش (كۆكەرتىشنى باشقۇرۇش خادىمى ياكى باغۋەنچىلىك، باغ-ئورمان باشقۇرۇش قاتارلىق كەسىپلەر)
- ئىجدىمائىي پائالىيەت ياكى مەھەللە يىغىلىش سورۇنى
- كۆپ خىل مەدەنىيەتنى قوغداش ۋە جانلاندىرۇش (ھەرقايسى مىللەتلەر مەدەنىيىتىنىڭ ئۆزئارا قوبۇل قىلىنىشى ۋە گۈللىنىشى)
- مەدەنىيەت مىراسلىرىنى قوغداش. مەسىلەن: ماددىي مەدەنىيەت مىراسلىرى (قەدىمىي يادىكارلىقلار) ۋە جىسمانىي مەدەنىيەت مىراسلىرى (خەلق ئۆرپ-ئادەتلىرى)

B3. سىز تۆۋەندىكى قاراشلارغا قوشۇلالمىسىز؟ (1 رەقىمى <ئىنتايىن قوللىماسلىق>، 5 رەقىمى <ئىنتايىن قوللاش>)

1. مەندە ئاممىۋى سورۇن 2 گە بولغان تەۋەلىك ھېسسىياتى بار، ئۆزۈمنى مەھەللىنىڭ بىر ئەزاسى

ھېسابلايمەن.

5□4□3□2□1□

2. يۇقارقى ئاممىۋى سورۇن 2 دىكى كۆپ قىسمى خەنزۇ يولداشلار توپى.

5□4□3□2□1□

3. يۇقارقى ئاممىۋى سورۇن 2 ئىنتايىن بىخەتەر.

5□4□3□2□1□

4. ئاممىۋى سورۇن 2دە كۆپ قېتىم قانۇنغا خىلاپ دېلولار كۆپ يۈز بەرگەن.

5□4□3□2□1□

5. ئاممىۋى سورۇن 2 نىڭ مەدەنىيەت مىراسلىرى قوغداشقا كۆپ رولى بار.

5□4□3□2□1□

B4. ئۆزىڭىزنىڭ كۈزىتىشىگە ئاساسەن، ئاممىۋى سورۇن 2دە كۆپ پائالىيەت قىلىدىغان كىشىلەرنى رەتكە تۇرغۇزۇڭ.

1. بالىلار \_\_\_\_\_

2. ئاياللار \_\_\_\_\_

3. ياشانغانلار \_\_\_\_\_

4. ئاز سانلىق مىللەتلەر \_\_\_\_\_

B5. ئاممىۋى سورۇن 2نىڭ ئومۇمىي ئەھۋالىغا ئاساسەن باھا بېرىڭ. (<1>رەقىمى ئىنتايىن رازى

ئەمەس، <5>رەقىمى ئىنتايىن رازى)

5□4□3□2□1□

B6. سىزچە تۆۋەندىكى ئامىللارنىڭ قايسىلىرى ئاممىۋى سورۇن 2نىڭ تېخىمۇ مۇكەممەللىشىگە

ياخشى شارائىتلارنى ھازىرلاپ بېرەلەيدۇ؟ (كۆپ تاللاشقا بولىدۇ)

□ تازىلىقنى ۋە ئاساسىي ئەسپەلەرنى كۈچەيتىش

□ ئىجىمائىي تەرتىپ باشقۇرۇش كۈچەيتىش (يورۇتۇش ئەسپەلىرى، ساقچى ئىشلىرى)

□ مەدەنىيەت پائالىيەتلىرىنى كۈچەيتىش

□ توسالغۇسىز قۇرۇلۇشنى كۈچەيتىش، مىيپلارنىڭ يول يۈرۈشىگە قولايلىق يارىتىش

□ مەدەنىيەتكە ئۆزئارا سىڭىشىنى كۈچەيتىپ، كۆپ خىل مەدەنىيەتنى ھۆرمەتلەش

□ پارچە سودىنى ياكى باشقا سودا پائالىيەتلىرىنى كۈچەيتىش

شەھەر ۋە مەھەللە رايونلىرىنىڭ كېيىنكى تەرەققىيات پىلانىغا بولغان تەكلىپ-پىكىر III

تۆۋەندىكىلەر سىزنىڭ ئولتۇراق رايونىڭىزنىڭ ئەتراپىگە دائىر بەزىبىر ئومۇميۈزلۈك مەسىلىلەر:

1. ئولتۇراق رايونىڭىز ئەتراپىدىكى ئۆزىڭىز ياقىتىدىغان، كۆپ پائالىيەت ئېلىپ بېرىشنى خالايدىغان ئاممىۋى

سورۇنلاردىن بىر قانچىنى مىسالغا كەلتۈرۈڭ ياكى خەرىتىدىن كۆرسىتىپ بېرىڭ.

\_\_\_\_\_.

\_\_\_\_\_.

\_\_\_\_\_.

1.1. تۆۋەندىكى ئاممىلاردىن قايسىلىرى سىزنىڭ بۇ ئاممىۋى سورۇنلارنى ياقۇرۇپ ئايلىنىشىڭىزغا

سەۋەب بولدى؟ (كۆپ تاللاشقا بولىدۇ)

كۆپ تىللىق شارائىت (شۇ ئاممىۋى سورۇندىكى تىل-يېزىقلارنى چۈشىنىش، ئىشلىتىش،

توسالغۇسىز، ئاسان، چۈشىنىشلىك)

ئېتىقاد ئەركىنلىكى (دىن ۋە ئېتىقاد ئەركىنلىكىڭىز يېتەرلىك ھۆرمەتلىنىدۇ)

ئىقتىساد ئامىلى (ئىستىمال سەۋىيىسى مۇۋاپىق)

مەدەنىيەت ئامىلى (ئۆز مەدەنىيىتىڭىز يېتەرلىك ھۆرمەتلىنىدۇ ۋە سىغىدۇ)

باشقىلار

---

---

2. ئولتۇراق رايونىڭىز ئەتراپىدىكى ئۆزىڭىز ياقۇرمىغان ئاممىۋى سورۇنلاردىن بىر نەچچىنى مىسال

كەلتۈرۈڭ ياكى خەرىتىدە كۆرسىتىڭ.

\_\_\_\_\_.

\_\_\_\_\_.

\_\_\_\_\_.

2.1. تۆۋەندىكىلەردىن سىزنىڭ بۇ ئاممىۋى سورۇنلارنى ياقۇرماسلىقىڭىزغا سەۋەب بولغان ئاممىلار قايسىلار؟

تىل توسالغۇسى (ئاممىۋى سورۇندا تىل ئالاقە جەھەتتە توسالغۇغا ئۇچراش)

ئېتىقاد ئوخشىماسلىقى (ئاممىۋى سورۇندىكى ئاساسلىق دىن بىلەن ئۆزىڭىزنى دىننىڭ

بىردەك بولماسلىقى)

ئىقتىساد ئامىلى (ئاممىۋى سورۇننىڭ ئىستىمال سەۋىيىسى يۇقىرى)

مەدەنىيەت ئامىلى (ئۆزىڭىزگە تەۋە بولغان مەدەنىيەت ئادىتىڭىزنىڭ شۇ ئاممىۋى

سورۇندا ئوخشىمايدىغان قاراش پەيدا قىلىشى)

باشقىلار (مەسىلەن) \_\_\_\_\_

3. ئولتۇراق رايونىڭىز ئەتراپىدىكى ئاممىۋى كۆرسەتمە بەلگىلەرنىڭ قوش تىللىشىشى

دەرىجىسىگە (خەنزۇچە\ئۇيغۇرچە) باھا بېرىڭ.

قىسمەنلىرى قوش تىل  پەقەتلا قوش تىل  ھەممىسى خەنزۇچە

4. سىز ئۆزىڭىزنىڭ ياكى ئۈرۈمچى شەھەرنىڭ كەلگۈسى تەرەققىيات پىلان يىغىنلىرىغا قاتنىشىپ باققانمۇ؟

قاتناشقان

قاتناشمىغان

4.1. سىزنىڭ يۇقارقى تۈردىكى يىغىنلارغا قاتنىشىپ باقماسلىقىڭىزغا سەۋەب بولغان ئاممىلار قايسىلار؟

بۇ تۈرگە ئالاقىدار مۇزاكىرە ياكى يىغىنلار يوق.

- بۇ تۈردىكى يىغىنلارنىڭ ئېچىلىش ۋاقتى ياكى ئورنى قولايلىق ئەمەس.
- يەرلىك خىزمەت، ئىشلارغا قىزىقىشىم يوق.
- باشقىلار \_\_\_\_\_

5. ئەگەردە شۇنداق يىغىنلارغا قاتنىشىش پۇرسىتى بولۇپ قالسا، سىز قايسى يول ئارقىلىق قاتنىشىشنى خالايسىز؟

- تورا نامسىز مۇزاكىرە قىلىش ئارقىلىق (ئېلېكترونلۇق پوچتا ئارقىلىق)
- پوچتا خەت-ئالاقىسى ئارقىلىق (سوئال ۋارىقى ئارقىلىق)
- مەھەللە ئويۇشتۇرغان مۇزاكىرە يىغىنلىرىغا قاتنىشىش ئارقىلىق
- نوپۇس تەكشۈرۈش ئارقىلىق
- باشقىلار \_\_\_\_\_

بۇ قېتىملىق تەكشۈرۈشىمىزگە ماسلىشىپ بەرگىنىڭىزگە كۆپتىن-كۆپ رەھمەت! تېنىڭىزگە سالامەتلىك، ئىشلىرىڭىزغا ئۇتۇق تىلەيمىز

## Appendix III: Questionnaire (English)

Questionnaire # \_\_\_\_\_

Date \_\_\_\_\_

Gender : \_\_\_\_\_

Language : \_\_\_\_\_

### URUMQI QUESTIONNAIRE

Thank you for your participation in this 15 minute questionnaire conducted by Dr. Cao of the University of Ottawa and funded by the International Development Research Council of Canada (IDRC). This questionnaire aims to explore the positive contributions residents can make for community building in Urumqi's neighbourhoods.

Please remember that *your participation in this questionnaire is completely confidential, and your responses will not be associated with your identity in any way.* Additionally, your perceptions in this questionnaire *will be used for research purposes only.* We ask that you respond as accurately as possible to the questions posed in this questionnaire. It will be possible for you to add details and comments to the questions. Thank you for your participation.

### DEMOGRAPHIC INFORMATION

Which of the following ethnic groups do you belong to?

- Han
- Uyghur
- Other (specify): \_\_\_\_\_

In which age group do you belong?

- 18 - 25
- 26 -35
- 36 - 54
- 55 or above

How long have you lived in Urumqi?

- Less than 5 years
- 5 – 10 years
- 10 – 20 years
- more than 20 years

3.1 How long have you lived in your current neighbourhood?

- Less than 1 year
- 1 – 3 years
- 3 - 5 years
- 5 – 10 years
- More than 10 years

Do you have an urban hukou?

- Yes
- No

4.1(if yes) is your hukou located in...

- Urumqi
- Another city (please specify): \_\_\_\_\_

Do you live in Urumqi all year round?

- Yes
- No

What is the highest degree, certificate or diploma you have obtained?

- Primary school or less
- Middle school
- High school
- Technical school diploma
- Post-secondary diploma or greater

Do you practice any of the following religions?

- Taoism
- Buddhism
- Christianity
- Islam
- Atheist / I am not religious
- Other/prefer not to say

Which of the following best describes your current occupation?

- Factory workers
- Farmers
- Business people
- Student
- Intellectuals/teachers/researchers
- Civil servants (cadres)
- Retired
- Other

What is your monthly personal income (Yuan RMB)?

- less than 1,000 *yuan*
- 1,001 - 3,000 *yuan*
- 3,001 – 5,000 *yuan*
- 5,001 – 7,500 *yuan*
- 7,500 *yuan* or more

#### **VISITOR PERCEPTION**

In the following section, we will ask for your input on various qualities of three different sites in your neighbourhood.

GREEN SPACES

A1. How often do you visit green spaces in your community?

- Once a day or more
- Once or more a week
- Once or more a month
- A few times a year or less

A2. What are the most important attributes of green spaces for you? (Choose a maximum of 3 from below)

- Relaxation/Recreation
- Exercise/Physical health
- Retail
- Employment
- Community/social events
- Encouraging cultural diversity
- Protecting cultural heritage
- Other (please specify): \_\_\_\_\_

A3. Based on your perception, do the following demographic groups visit green spaces often (please check all that apply)?

- Women
- Han people
- Children
- Uyghur people
- Seniors
- Other ethnic minorities

A4. Please indicate your level of satisfaction with the following attributes of green spaces on a scale from 1 to 5, where 1 is "very dissatisfied" and 5 is "excellent."

- |                                       |   |                          |   |                          |   |                          |   |                          |   |
|---------------------------------------|---|--------------------------|---|--------------------------|---|--------------------------|---|--------------------------|---|
| <b>Retail</b>                         | 1 | <input type="checkbox"/> | 2 | <input type="checkbox"/> | 3 | <input type="checkbox"/> | 4 | <input type="checkbox"/> | 5 |
| <input type="checkbox"/>              |   |                          |   |                          |   |                          |   |                          |   |
| <b>Employment</b>                     | 1 | <input type="checkbox"/> | 2 | <input type="checkbox"/> | 3 | <input type="checkbox"/> | 4 | <input type="checkbox"/> | 5 |
| <input type="checkbox"/>              |   |                          |   |                          |   |                          |   |                          |   |
| <b>Community/social events</b>        | 1 | <input type="checkbox"/> | 2 | <input type="checkbox"/> | 3 | <input type="checkbox"/> | 4 | <input type="checkbox"/> | 5 |
| <input type="checkbox"/>              |   |                          |   |                          |   |                          |   |                          |   |
| <b>Encouraging cultural diversity</b> | 1 | <input type="checkbox"/> | 2 | <input type="checkbox"/> | 3 | <input type="checkbox"/> | 4 | <input type="checkbox"/> | 5 |
| <input type="checkbox"/>              |   |                          |   |                          |   |                          |   |                          |   |
| <b>Protecting cultural heritage</b>   | 1 | <input type="checkbox"/> | 2 | <input type="checkbox"/> | 3 | <input type="checkbox"/> | 4 | <input type="checkbox"/> | 5 |
| <input type="checkbox"/>              |   |                          |   |                          |   |                          |   |                          |   |
| <b>Accessibility</b>                  | 1 | <input type="checkbox"/> | 2 | <input type="checkbox"/> | 3 | <input type="checkbox"/> | 4 | <input type="checkbox"/> | 5 |
| <input type="checkbox"/>              |   |                          |   |                          |   |                          |   |                          |   |
| <b>Safety</b>                         | 1 | <input type="checkbox"/> | 2 | <input type="checkbox"/> | 3 | <input type="checkbox"/> | 4 | <input type="checkbox"/> | 5 |
| <input type="checkbox"/>              |   |                          |   |                          |   |                          |   |                          |   |

A5. In general, on a scale from 1 to 5, how satisfied are you with green spaces in your community?

- 1       2       3       4       5

A6. On a scale from 1 to 5 (where 1 is “strongly disagree” and 5 is “strongly agree,” please evaluate your opinion on the following statements.

I am part of a community when I visit the green spaces in my community.

1  2  3  4  5

The presence of green spaces encourages greater cultural diversity between people.

1  2  3  4  5

I am safe when I visit the green spaces in my community.

1  2  3  4  5

Green spaces in my community are mostly visited by Han people.

1  2  3  4  5

The presence of green spaces protects cultural heritage.

1  2  3  4  5

There is a lot of crime in the green spaces in my community.

1  2  3  4  5

A7. Please choose from the following options those that you feel might help improve the quality of green spaces in your community. Please choose a maximum of three.

- Increase commercial activities
- Increase cultural/social events
- Increase safety (lighting, police presence, etc)
- Increase physical quality (cleanliness, decor)
- Increase physical space (less crowded)
- Increase accessibility/service provision (for people with disabilities, etc)
- Increase cultural inclusiveness
- Increase protection for cultural heritage

#### MARKET SPACES

B1. How often do you visit market areas in your community?

- Once a day or more
- Once or more a week
- Once or more a month
- A few times a year or less

B2. What are the most important attributes of these market areas for you? (Choose a maximum of 3 from below)

- Relaxation/Recreation
- Exercise/Physical health
- Retail
- Employment
- Community/social events
- Encouraging cultural diversity
- Protecting cultural heritage

B3. Based on your perception, do the following demographic groups visit market areas often (please check all that apply)?

- Women

- Han people
- Children
- Uyghur people
- Seniors
- Other ethnic minorities

B4. Please indicate your level of satisfaction with the following attributes of market areas in your community on a scale from 1 to 5, where 1 is “very dissatisfied” and 5 is “excellent.”

<b>Retail</b>	1	<input type="checkbox"/>	2	<input type="checkbox"/>	3	<input type="checkbox"/>	4	<input type="checkbox"/>	5
<input type="checkbox"/>									
<b>Employment</b>	1	<input type="checkbox"/>	2	<input type="checkbox"/>	3	<input type="checkbox"/>	4	<input type="checkbox"/>	5
<input type="checkbox"/>									
<b>Community/social events</b>	1	<input type="checkbox"/>	2	<input type="checkbox"/>	3	<input type="checkbox"/>	4	<input type="checkbox"/>	5
<input type="checkbox"/>									
<b>Encouraging cultural diversity</b>	1	<input type="checkbox"/>	2	<input type="checkbox"/>	3	<input type="checkbox"/>	4	<input type="checkbox"/>	5
<input type="checkbox"/>									
<b>Protecting cultural heritage</b>	1	<input type="checkbox"/>	2	<input type="checkbox"/>	3	<input type="checkbox"/>	4	<input type="checkbox"/>	5
<input type="checkbox"/>									
<b>Accessibility</b>	1	<input type="checkbox"/>	2	<input type="checkbox"/>	3	<input type="checkbox"/>	4	<input type="checkbox"/>	5
<input type="checkbox"/>									
<b>Safety</b>	1	<input type="checkbox"/>	2	<input type="checkbox"/>	3	<input type="checkbox"/>	4	<input type="checkbox"/>	5
<input type="checkbox"/>									

B5. In general, on a scale from 1 to 5, how satisfied are you with market areas in your community?

1       2       3       4       5

B6. On a scale from 1 to 5 (where 1 is “strongly disagree” and 5 is “strongly agree,” please evaluate your opinion on the following statements.

I am part of a community when I visit market areas in my community.

1       2       3       4       5

The presence of market areas encourages greater cultural diversity between people.

1       2       3       4       5

I am safe when I visit market areas in my community.

1       2       3       4       5

Market areas are mostly visited by Han people.

1       2       3       4       5

The presence of market areas protects cultural heritage.

1       2       3       4       5

There is a lot of crime in the market areas in my community.

1       2       3       4       5

B7. Please choose from the following options those that you feel might help improve the quality of market areas. Please choose a maximum of three.

- Increase commercial activities
- Increase cultural/social events
- Increase safety (lighting, police presence, etc)
- Increase physical quality (cleanliness, decor)
- Increase physical space (less crowded)

- Increase accessibility/service provision (people with disabilities, etc)
- Increase cultural inclusiveness
- Increase protection for cultural heritage

**PARTICIPATION IN URBAN DEVELOPMENT**

In the following section, we will ask you general questions about your neighbourhood overall.

Could you identify any public areas in your neighbourhood that you think are **exclusive spaces** (i.e., spaces where you feel unwelcome)?

---



---

1.1 What makes these places exclusive (please check all that apply)?

- Linguistic barriers (i.e., I cannot read/speak the language in these areas);
- Religious barriers (i.e., my religious practices are not included in these areas);
- Economic barriers (i.e., I cannot afford to go to these places);
- Cultural barriers (i.e., I feel unwelcome in these areas because of my cultural identity);
- Other (please specify):

---



---

Could you identify any public areas in your neighbourhood that you think are **inclusive spaces** (i.e., spaces where you feel welcome)?

---



---

2.1 What makes these places inclusive (please check all that apply)?

- Linguistic factors (i.e., I can read/speak the language in these areas);
- Religious barriers (i.e., my religious symbols/practices are included in these areas);
- Economic barriers (i.e., I can afford to go to these places);
- Cultural barriers (i.e., I feel welcome in these areas because of my cultural identity);
- Other (please specify):

---



---

According to your perception, how bilingual is the public signage in your neighbourhood?

- Completely       Somewhat       Not at all

Have you attended local government meetings regarding the future of urban development in your neighbourhood or Urumqi?

- Yes
- No

(if no) Why not?

- There are no local government meetings
- I have no interest in local affairs
- The meetings are at inconvenient times/locations

Other (please elaborate):

---

---

---

Would you be interested in participating more regarding the future development of sites such as these in your neighbourhood?

Yes

No

(If yes) How would you prefer to participate (please check all that apply)?

Online/by email (anonymously)

By mail (Responding to flyers, questionnaires, etc)

Attending meetings/discussion groups

Responding to house calls

## THANK YOU!

In this last section, you may add any commentary that you feel is relevant to the questionnaire.

---

---

---

---

We are looking for people in your neighbourhood to participate in a discussion group on [insert date here] at [insert time here] at [insert location here] regarding urban development in Urumqi. **Your participation in this focus group, which will allow you to discuss your perceptions of the future of your neighbourhood, is completely voluntary and will only be used for research purposes.** If you are interested in participating, please contact our coordinator [insert name here] at [insert email address here] for more information. If you would like, please provide a way we can contact you as well as your preferred time of day below.

**Name:** \_\_\_\_\_

**Phone Number:** \_\_\_\_\_

**Email Address:** \_\_\_\_\_

## Appendix IV: Focus Group Guide #1: Changjie Neighbourhood (English)

Facilitator: Gaoxiang Li

May 11, 2014

8:00 - 10:00pm

*[Thank participants for responding to the questionnaire, and agreeing to attend the focus group tonight. Explain confidentiality and attain verbal consent. Introduce facilitators.]*

1. What changes have you noticed in the area since you first moved there? Have these changes been largely positive or negative, in your view?
2. One resident stated that it was a relationship of "comradeship" that allows for positive relationships between Han and Uyghur people in Urumqi. What do you think of this idea?
3. Do you think there should be more opportunities for Han people to learn Uyghur? Why or why not?
4. How satisfied are you with the level of bilingualism in the public signs in your neighbourhood?
5. Do you recognize when strangers enter your neighbourhood? Does it make you feel uncomfortable? Why or why not?
6. Are you satisfied with the local government unit in your neighbourhood? Do you think there should be more consultation with local people?

## Appendix V: Focus Group Guide #2: Yuewan Neighbourhood (English)

Facilitator: Gaoxiang Li

May 12, 2014

8:00 - 10:00pm

*[Thank participants for responding to the questionnaire, and agreeing to attend the focus group tonight. Explain confidentiality and attain verbal consent. Introduce facilitators.]*

1. Some respondents listed Saimachang (a night market) as one place in your neighbourhood that was generally disliked. What do you think makes that area undesirable?  
- What should or could be done to improve that area?
2. What changes have you noticed in the area since you first moved there? Have these changes been largely positive or negative, in your view?
3. One resident stated that it was a relationship of "comradeship" that allows for positive relationships between Han and Uyghur people in Urumqi. What do you think of this idea?
4. Do you think there should be more opportunities for Han people to learn Uyghur? Why or why not?
5. How satisfied are you with the level of bilingualism in the public signs in your neighbourhood?
6. Do you recognize when strangers enter your neighbourhood? Does it make you feel uncomfortable? Why or why not?
7. Are you satisfied with the local government unit in your neighbourhood? Do you think there should be more consultation with local people?

## Appendix VI: Focus Group Transcription: Changjie

Facilitator: Gaoxiang Li

May 11, 2014

8:00 - 10:00pm

Participant 1: Elderly female, Han

Participant 2: Young male, Han

Participant 3: Elderly female, with one daughter and grandson, Han

Participant 4: Middle-aged female with mother and son, Han

Participant 5: Middle-aged female with daughter, Han

**1:** I've been living in the neighbourhood since 1951. My deceased husband was once the main administrator of the concrete factory. My daughters are no longer living with me.

### *Room for improvement in the neighbourhood*

**1:** The infrastructure in this neighbourhood used to be good, but now it is maintained improperly and so the infrastructure has deteriorated. There used to be a cafeteria and library managed by the concrete factory: Now they are all gone.

**1:** The infrastructure in this community has deteriorated, because the new factory administration does not live in the neighbourhood any longer - they all moved out. Because they do not live here, they do not care about the infrastructure in this neighbourhood. The old factory was shut down and moved out of the city, and so there is no longer any investment from the concrete factory.

**1:** Peoples' like or dislike of specific sites are linked to their personal preferences.

**1:** I would like to increase recreational activities (for example: library) in the neighbourhood.

**2:** Infrastructure in the neighbourhood is very outdated (for example, benches in public spaces, garbage bins, and the lawn).

**2:** Strangers in this neighbourhood can still access the different condos, because the security system on the doors have been nonfunctional for years.

**2:** The security status inside the neighbourhood is okay. In some cases, theft is reported.

**2:** I seldomly go to the markets around the neighbourhood, because the sanitation and management of these areas (public sanitation, too many vendor stores, the general environment in the markets) are unacceptable to me.

**2:** Equipment for exercise should be improved in both quantity and quality.

**2:** The gardens, especially the lawn, have undergone serious degradation.

**2:** The buzzing system for the door is barely functional any more.

**2:** Pedestrian sidewalks along the roads are improperly built; it is inconvenient and risky for local residents.

**2:** The markets nearby (especially the vendor markets) must improve their public sanitation and management.

**2:** The community management is of poor quality (the administration is building other communities elsewhere; the older communities are neglected as a result.).

**3/4:** There is no pedestrian skywalk - we are in desperate need of one.

**3/4:** Infrastructure in the neighbourhood has been deteriorating for years, especially the lights along the roads, green spaces, and exercise equipment.

**3/4:** Most houses in the neighbourhood are rented from people outside the neighbourhood. Some illegal activity (drug dealing) are reported in the neighbourhood.

**3/4:** Security is worrying. There are not enough janitors or security personnel. A lot of theft is reported.

**3/4:** The local community administration is inefficient. They have a very bad attitude toward residents.

**3/4:** The pensions and social welfare supports must be improved: Elderly, retired people form the core of the community.

**3/4:** Introduce a new management style from eastern China into the local administration

**3/4:** Increase the quantity of greenspace and exercise equipment in the neighbourhood for exercise purposes.

**3/4:** Reopen the public bathroom, cafeteria, theatre, and libraries.

**3/4:** We need a public space, especially for children.

**3/4:** Please increase the number of social/cultural activities in the neighbourhood (for example: Basketball match, dancing).

**5:** Many older women dance in front of my apartment. It is too loud for me to open my window during the summer time.

**5:** There is no activity/recreation centre for children in the community.

**5:** The neighbourhood lacks proper infrastructure. We have a problem in dealing with older people in the community: There is no commitment to deal with the aging of people living in the neighbourhood.

**5:** This community used to belong to a factory, and used to have a cafeteria, a library and a theatre, but now they are gone. We really need these services.

**5:** The market is very messy; people come from very mixed backgrounds, and so I don't want my children to go there alone. It is not safe.

#### *Exclusive and inclusive areas in the neighbourhood*

**2:** Inclusive spaces: The internet cafes, pool clubs, karaoke bars, and cinemas. Exclusive spaces: The free vendor markets, xiaoximen street, erdaoqiao street, and where there are high concentrations of people.

**3/4:** The vendor markets outside the neighbourhood: The public sanitation is terrible; it is overcrowded; there is a lack of infrastructure; it is not very accessible.

**3/4:** The underground poker/mah-jong clubs: Gambling is constantly reported from these areas, and it has a negative effect on family relationships.

**3/4:** The internet cafes around the neighbourhood: Young men and kids may get obsessed by the internet; negative effect on family relationships.

#### *Relationship of "comradeship" between Han people and ethnic minorities.*

**1:** The relationship between ethnic minorities and Han people have not changed so much; we are still in very good relations.

**2:** the ethnic minorities and Han people are approximately equal in quantity. Ethnic minorities used to work in the concrete factory.

**2:** The relationship between ethnic minorities and Han people are pretty good (They used to be co-workers in the factories and are familiar with each other).

**2:** Local residents are rearranged by their nationality.

**2:** The modern way of life makes people in the neighbourhoods distant with each other.

**2:** Younger generations of all ethnicities have become more distant among each other (Different ethnicities are more concerned about their religion and cultures).

**2:** For younger generations, the Han and ethnic minorities have less communication.

**2:** The ethnic minorities speak better Mandarin in the places where there is better developed economically.

**3/4:** Different ethnicities are still in good relations with each other, but, because of the sense of cultural/religious identity, the fact that ethnicities are separated from each other, and sporadic terrorist attacks in Xinjiang, the communication between different ethnic groups has been somewhat reduced.

**3/4:** Improving inter-ethnic relations is best done at the entrepreneurial level or the administrative level.

**3/4:** The Party organization and comradeship is very important in improving the relationship between ethnicities.

**5:** When I was a child, the relationship between ethnic groups was very good - we all grew up together and played together. Now, many migrants come to the community, and people become more mixed in a way that this relationship has declined over the years. The religion of the Uyghur people has changed: They are more insulated to each other, and less friendly toward cultural/religious outsiders. The relationship between Han people and minority people has deteriorated compared to the past.

**5:** Modern lifestyle is not good for the Uyghur culture: Social problems lead to tension in the community. Modern technology prevents people from contacting each other face to face; this may contribute to ethnic problems, because now there is less interaction between Uyghur and Han people.

**5:** Recently, people from other provinces in China are prejudiced toward Uyghur people.

#### *Bilingualism in Urumqi*

All participants think the bilingualism must be improved among all languages to improve communication among different ethnic groups.

**2:** The level of bilingualism is highly dependent on peoples' income level.

**3/4:** In areas where ethnic minorities are concentrated, Han people should learn the Uyghur language, because this is the key for communication.

**5:** Younger people now have little contact with ethnic minority/Uyghur people, and so it is not good for Han people to learn Uyghur as they do not live in an environment where they will use it.

**5:** It is necessary to let Han people in Urumqi learn Uyghur. That way inter-ethnic communications and relationships might improve.

**5:** I hope the education bureau can let Uyghur people learn Mandarin, while Han people learn Uyghur. I think the language problem is the biggest problem that causes ethnic tension in Xinjiang.

#### *Changes in the neighbourhood as compared to the past*

**1:** There are many more people in the neighbourhood who rent rather than own their housing in this neighbourhood: Because of this, the relationship between residents is more distant.

**2:** In the early stages of the local community history, most residents here were workers or the staff of the factories nearby, especially the concrete factory. As more people migrated in, the majority of residents are now actually from other places in Xinjiang.

**2:** Residents feel distant toward each other. In only rare cases to neighbours talk to each other.

**3/4:** This community was constructed and managed by the state-owned concrete factory. It was in very good condition and perfectly managed. After the concrete factory was privatized, greater emphasis was placed on profit margins. As such, management of the neighbourhood became neglected. In recent years, management/maintenance/other services have been privatized, and the management company, which is responsible for local services, are paid by local residents yet do not fulfill their duties. As the infrastructure deteriorates, many residents move out, leaving their empty houses for rent. The influx of migrant workers from outside complicates the situation in the

neighbourhood/relations between neighbours. The elderly have thus become the majority demographic. Residents are separated based on their ethnic identity, which has increased the social distance between ethnic groups. The younger generation at the administrative level is not as dedicated as their predecessors.

**3/4:** Tenants consume a lot of social resources which are supposed to be for the people who live here. Because tenants lack a sense of community, they may not respect infrastructure as much as long-term residents. They are also less aware of local community affairs. The backgrounds of the tenants are complicated; some of them conduct illegal activities in the neighbourhood.

**5:** The green space in the community was managed well in the past, but now no one is responsible for it. The community management do things only for profit these days, leading to a decline in maintenance. The community management in the past paid better attention to cultural activities among factory workers: There were many activities, but now they are all gone.

**5:** In the community, in one subsection, there are 1-2 buildings for ethnic minorities. Many migrants have moved to the neighbourhood recently. My building used to have 18 apartments, but now only 4 remain from the older residents.

**5:** The community management has moved into a higher quality neighbourhood nearby, and so our community has become neglected as a result.

**5:** The biggest concern is about the safety in the community: If nothing else can be solved, we want to enhance the safety management. Many strangers come into the community, and now we do not know each other very well. I no longer feel comfortable leaving my daughter alone in the neighbourhood as I did in the past.

**5:** Things have been stolen out of the basement numerous times. The construction of a high speed railway near the neighbourhood has negatively affected the community. **5:** In the past factory, we had our own television station/broadcast company. One of this stations helped Han people learn one sentence in the Uyghur language every day. But now it is all gone.

**5:** The gap between Uyghur and Han people has grown wider and wider.

## Appendix VII: Focus Group Transcription: Yuewan

Facilitator: Gaoxiang Li

May 12, 2014

8:00 - 10:00pm

*Based on simultaneous translation from a local PhD candidate during the focus group.*

sn = side note

Participant 1: Female, Uyghur

Participant 2: Female, Uyghur

Participant 3: Male, Uyghur

Participant 4: Male, Uyghur

Participant 5: Male, Uyghur

Participant 6: Male, Uyghur (arrived late)

*How satisfied are you with the level of bilingualism in the public signs in your neighbourhood?*

**5:** Over time, the prominence of the Uyghur language has decreased.

**1:** There are mistakes in Uyghur signage, with many translation problems in public messages.

**4:** We do not know how to give feedback to local authorities. There is no local body that we are aware of in charge of local administration we can speak to. There used to be bodies in charge of examining language issues, but it disappeared over time.

Uyghur people should learn their own language first.

The central government's bilingualism policy is good, but because they are very far removed from Xinjiang, implementation at the local level does not properly reflect the original policy.

The bilingualism of signs has deteriorated: Some high speed railways do not have Uyghur signage.

In the past, almost all public signs were bilingual, but it has decreased over time. There are mistakes in the Uyghur language signs. We have not gotten any response from the city in this regard. It shows disrespect to the Uyghur language: A tiny mistake can entirely change the meaning of the restaurant.

Official government documents are not available in Uyghur, only Mandarin.

Some signs even have English, but not Uyghur.

The size of Mandarin font on bilingual signs is too big; the Uyghur signage is too small.

*Some respondents listed xxx (a night market) as one place in your neighbourhood that was generally disliked. What do you think makes that area undesirable?*

*- What should or could be done to improve that area?*

**4:** People no longer go to xxx. It was originally a place for racing horses, but it changed over time to an outdoor market.

**2:** There are many rural migrants from southern Xinjiang living in xxx.

**4:** The cost of housing is low in that area, making it very crowded. However, it is not as unstable as some people perceive it to be.

**3:** Management of the community has deteriorated over time. Maintenance of parking, etc.

**1:** People are parking in places designated for fire routes/trucks.

**3, 4:** The elevators are too small to accommodate our burial rituals [sn: involves carrying coffins]. Because of this, we need to carry coffins down the stairs.

**3:** There is a lack of public areas for our funeral rights and public cultural events. However, the local community organization is very good for holding festivals celebrating both Uyghur and Han culture - a party was held when the community was first established, so inter-ethnic relations are very good among neighbours.

**3, 1:** Infrastructure is not very well managed.

**3, 4:** People are angry about deteriorating infrastructure, and theft from unknown thieves from outside the community. CCTV is unable to apprehend them.

**4:** People in the community are very well educated. They want better/more exercise facilities. In the last 3 years, the head of the community management has changed 7 - 8 times.

*Do you think there should be more opportunities for Han people to learn Uyghur? Why or why not?*

**4:** It is more important for groups to learn their native language first, Han and Uyghur people alike. However, there are no schools for just learning the Uyghur.

**1, 2, 3, 4, 5:** The current policy of Chinese bilingualism is good in theory, but it was implemented too fast, with unqualified teachers.

**5:** Han people are not learning Uyghur as well as Uyghur people are learning Mandarin.

**4:** Under Mao Zedong, much of the public signage was fully bilingual, but the situation has deteriorated. Rural migrants coming from southern Xinjiang cannot understand traffic signs, as there is no Uyghur signage. These smaller problems contribute to larger expressions of discontent and violence among Uyghur people.

**3, 4:** In rural areas, Han, Uyghur, and Hui people co-exist peacefully and learn each others' languages; it is natural. But this does not take place in urban areas.

**3:** The policy to send Han people to rural areas is a good idea, because it establishes positive contact between Uyghur and Han people.

**4:** The planned economy period had a better relationship between Han people and ethnic minorities. However, competition following the economic reforms of 1978 worsened relations.

**6:** Official documents today are only in Mandarin. The bilingualism policy was developed too fast, although it was good in theory. Employment is a large problem for Uyghur people - Uyghur culture is not well suited to a competitive labour market. Karaoke bars are now in close proximity to mosques: this would not have been the case in the past. All official languages should be in Uyghur and Mandarin. Uyghurs are not inherently Muslim; they were originally Buddhist.

**3:** The main language of instruction in my school was Uyghur.

**6:** Ethnic minority development of industry has been encouraged by the government - but mostly restaurants and cafes, not factories (which are located in coastal areas).

**5:** Local government policies need to take cultural context into greater account. Han people selling pork makes Uyghur people uncomfortable.

There is no difference between Xinjiang and other provinces: The exams necessary to become an officer in the government are all in Mandarin - thus, in order to get a job in the government, you need to know Mandarin. There is no official incentive for residents to learn Uyghur.

The central government wants to assimilate Uyghur people, and just wants to use Mandarin/Han language rather than respecting Uyghur culture.

In the schools in Xinjiang, Uyghur teachers are required to speak Mandarin; but Han teachers are not required to speak Uyghur. As such, the Uyghur language is becoming increasingly useless (for the government, teaching, university, etc).

The central government should make incentives for the Uyghur language: allow for a Uyghur-language exam, for example.

The language problem is the largest in terms of causing recent inter-ethnic tension in Urumqi/Xinjiang.

In our community, peoples' relationships are very good, and there is no difference between Han and Uyghur people.

Uyghur peoples' level of Mandarin will definitely be inferior to Han people, because they are learning both Uyghur and Mandarin growing up, while Han people only learn Mandarin. As such, they cannot compete properly for jobs.

**6:** I'm optimistic for the future relations between Uyghur and Han people. Uyghur people have their own spring festival, albeit later than the Han one, because Xinjiang is a colder region.

**1:** Han and Uyghur people should learn each other's languages.

The government forced the school to teach students Mandarin: In some schools, teachers' Mandarin is worse than in the Han schools. As such, when students take the Mandarin-language standardized exams, they cannot compete with Han people.

Just encouraging Uyghur people to learn Mandarin is not in keeping with a true bilingualism policy.

In the past, the older generations that moved from other provinces to Xinjiang could speak Uyghur: At that time, people needed Uyghur to communicate/be employed. this has decreased now, as Uyghur is not as important any more.

**6:** If you don't respect your own culture (learn your own language), how can you expect other people to respect you?

There used to be a Uyghur-language high school; now they are all Mandarin.

#### *Room for improvement in the community*

The security camera is not adequate in preventing theft/crime in the community. The community management needs to cooperate with the police station to ensure the safety of the community. Our water is controlled by the management so we cannot refuse to pay our dues - if we refuse, they will cut our access to water.

Our requests and suggestions for improvement have not been met with any response from the community management.

Our community is fairly high income, and we pay high fees to the community management. Yet we have inferior infrastructure/exercise equipment, compared to other communities.

We think that we are being neglected by the community management because this is a Uyghur community. We are being discriminated against. They are worried about complaining, because they think their complaints will be attributed to their ethnicity - if this were a Han community, these issues would have been resolved a long time ago.

There is no morning market near the community and so it is not easy to buy things; the supermarket is far away.

The community has become worse since we moved in. The parking lot has become a garbage lot. The parking lot is not large enough; the community has become a parking lot. Parked cars are blocking the fire truck route.

The central government can create a more fair, competitive environment for jobs.

The community management has exercise equipment, but they have not installed them in the community.

*The relationship between Uyghur and Han people*

The level of trust that Uyghur people have in the country/government is very low.

Uyghur people always end up employed in the sectors/industries that are generally undesirable among Han people - ie, restaurants.

The Uyghur employment rate is much lower than Han people.

Uyghur people don't dare to speak freely in public, because they fear discrimination or distrust from Han people. The environment is too sensitive for free speech among Uyghur people.

Our community is 90% Uyghur, but the management did not consider Uyghur cultural values/practices - it was built as a Han community.

We want a space where people can hold meetings regarding the future development of the community and hold public discussions.

The community management did not pay the security workers on time, so they are dissatisfied with the management and have not been working very well.

We have reported the poor management of the community, but have heard nothing back.

We need to interview Han people: They know the reality of inter-ethnic relationships. If Han people feel comfortable around Uyghur people, then the relationship is better.

If Han people complain actively about the community, change will come; If Uyghur people complain, they will become politically suspect.

Han people have some culture and customs that are different from Uyghur people and are offensive, but both sides respect each other.

Uyghur people are not satisfied with the government. At first, Uyghur people constrained themselves, and over time they have become increasingly discontent - this will make society unstable.

There used to be mosques in the community. After economic reforms, many things around the mosques (bars, karaoke) are very offensive to our religious sites.

## Appendix VIII: Select Data Tables

ETHNICITY				
	Uyghur	Han	Other	Total
Changjie	6	43	1	50
	12.0%	86.0%	2.0%	
Yuewan	40	4	0	44
	90.9%	9.1%	0.0%	
<b>Global</b>	94			

HUKOU			
	Urban	Rural	Total
Changjie	39	11	50
	78.0%	22.0%	
Uyghur	6	0	6
	15.4%	0.0%	

COMPLETION STATS					
	Complete	Partial	Incomp	Total	Valid
Changjie	30	20	1	51	50
Yuewan	13	31	12	56	44
<b>Global</b>	43	51	13	107	94

GENDER				
	Female	Male	Unspec	Total
Changjie	26	20	4	50
	52.0%	40.0%	8.0%	
Uyghur	1	5	0	6
	3.8%	25.0%	0.0%	
Han	24	15	4	43
	92.3%	75.0%	100.0%	
Other	1	0	0	1
	3.8%	0.0%	0.0%	
Yuewan	30	12	2	44
	68.2%	27.3%	4.5%	
Uyghur	28	10	2	40
	93.3%	83.3%	100.0%	
Han	2	2	0	4
	6.7%	16.7%	0.0%	
<b>Global</b>	94			

RELIGION						
	Buddhist	Muslim	Christian	Atheist	Other	Total
Changjie	4	8	2	30	6	50
	8.0%	16.0%	4.0%	60.0%	12.0%	
Uyghur	0	6	0	0	0	6
	0.0%	75.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	
Han	4	1	2	30	6	43
	100.0%	12.5%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	
Other	0	1	0	0	0	1
	0.0%	12.5%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	
Yuewan	0	40	0	2	2	44
	0.0%	90.9%	0.0%	4.5%	4.5%	
Uyghur	0	40	0	0	0	40
	0.0%	100.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	
Han	0	0	0	2	2	4
	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	100.0%	100.0%	
<b>Global</b>	94					

### AGE

	18-25	26 - 35	36 - 54	55+	Total
Changjie	15 30.0%	9 18.0%	17 34.0%	9 18.0%	50
Uyghur	4 26.7%	0 0.0%	2 11.8%	0 0.0%	6
Han	11 73.3%	9 100.0%	14 82.4%	9 100.0%	43
Other	0 0.0%	0 0.0%	1 100.0%	0 0.0%	1
Yuewan	12 27.3%	12 27.3%	14 31.8%	6 13.6%	44
Uyghur	9 75.0%	12 100.0%	14 100.0%	5 83.3%	40
Han	3 33.3%	0 0.0%	0 0.0%	1 20.0%	4
<b>Global</b>	94				

EDUCATION							
	Primary sc	Middle sc	High Sc	Tech Sc	Grad Sc	Unspec	Total
Changjie	5 10.0%	15 30.0%	15 30.0%	9 18.0%	6 12.0%	0 0.0%	50
Uyghur	0 0.0%	0 0.0%	3 20.0%	1 11.1%	2 33.3%	0 0.0%	6
Han	5 100.0%	14 93.3%	12 80.0%	8 88.9%	4 66.7%	0 0.0%	43
Other	0 0.0%	1 6.7%	0 0.0%	0 0.0%	0 0.0%	0 0.0%	1
Yuewan	2 4.55%	2 4.55%	5 11.36%	16 36.36%	18 40.91%	1 2.27%	44
Uyghur	2 100.0%	2 100.0%	5 100.0%	14 87.50%	16 88.89%	1 100.00%	40
Han	0 0.00%	0 0.00%	0 0.00%	2 12.50%	2 11.11%	0 0.00%	4
<b>Global</b>	94						

EMPLOYMENT								
	Factory	Farm	Business	Teacher	Student	Civil servant	Retired	Unemployed
Changjie	8 16.0%	0 0.0%	14 28.0%	2 4.0%	6 12.0%	2 4.0%	9 18.0%	6 12.0%
Uyghur	1 12.5%	0 0.0%	0 0.0%	0 0.0%	2 33.3%	2 100.0%	0 0.0%	0 0.0%
Han	7 87.5%	0 0.0%	14 100.0%	2 100.0%	4 66.7%	0 0.0%	9 100.0%	5 83.3%

Other	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1
	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	16.7%
Yuewan	3	1	3	8	3	11	2	6
	6.8%	2.3%	6.8%	18.2%	6.8%	25.0%	4.5%	13.6%
Uyghur	3	1	3	7	3	10	2	5
	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	87.5%	100.0%	90.9%	100.0%	83.3%
Han	0	0	0	1	0	1	0	1
	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	12.5%	0.0%	9.1%	0.0%	16.7%
<b>Global</b>	94							
	<b>INCOME</b>							
	<1000	1001-3000	3001-5000	5001-7500	7500+	Unspec	<b>Total</b>	
Changjie	4	21	13	1	2	9	50	
	8.0%	42.0%	26.0%	2.0%	4.0%	18.0%		
Uyghur	0	3	0	1	0	2	6	
	0.0%	14.3%	0.0%	100.0%	0.0%	22.2%		
Han	3	18	13	0	2	7	43	
	75.0%	85.7%	100.0%	0.0%	100.0%	77.8%		
Other	1	0	0	0	0	0	1	
	25.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%		
Yuewan	4	13	16	4	0	7	44	
	9.1%	29.5%	36.4%	9.1%	0.0%	15.9%		
Uyghur	4	12	16	2	0	6	40	
	100.0%	92.3%	100.0%	50.0%	0.0%	85.7%		
Han	0	1	0	2	0	1	4	
	0.0%	0.9%	0.0%	50.0%	0.0%	14.3%		
<b>Global</b>	94							

LANGUAGE		
Mandarin	Uyghur	<b>Total</b>

Changjie	48	2	50
	96.0%	4.0%	
Uyghur	4	2	6
	8.3%	100.0%	
Han	43	0	43
	89.6%	0.0%	
Other	1	0	1
	2.1%	0.0%	
Yuewan	11	33	44
	25.0%	75.0%	
Uyghur	6	34	40
	54.5%	103.0%	
Han	4	0	4
	36.4%	0.0%	
<b>Global</b>	94		

# OF YEARS LIVED IN URUMQI						
	< 5	5 - 10	10 - 20	20+	Other	Total
Changjie	8	6	16	20	0	50
	16.00%	12.00%	32.00%	40.00%	0.00%	
Uyghur	0	0	4	2	0	6
	0.00%	0.00%	25.00%	10.00%	0.00%	
Han	8	5	12	18	0	43
	100.00%	83.33%	75.00%	90.00%	0.00%	
Other	0	1	0	0	0	1
	0.00%	16.67%	0.00%	0.00%	0.00%	
Yuewan	10	1	3	29	1	44
	22.73%	2.27%	6.82%	65.91%	2.27%	
Uyghur	7	1	3	28	1	0
	70.00%	100.00%	100.00%	96.55%	100.00%	
Han	3	0	0	1	0	0
	30.00%	0.00%	0.00%	3.45%	0.00%	
<b>Global</b>	94					

# OF YEARS LIVED IN NEIGHBOURHOOD						
	<1	1 -3	3 - 5	5 - 10	10+	Total
Changjie	4	6	4	6	30	50

	8.00%	12.00%	8.00%	12.00%	60.00%	
Uyghur	0	0	4	2	0	6
	0.00%	0.00%	100.00%	33.33%	0.00%	
Han	4	6	0	3	30	43
	100.00%	100.00%	0.00%	50.00%	100.00%	
Other	0	0	0	1	0	1
	0.00%	0.00%	0.00%	16.67%	0.00%	
Yuewan	3	22	11	6	2	44
	6.82%	50.00%	25.00%	13.64%	4.55%	
Uyghur	1	21	10	6	2	40
	33.33%	95.45%	90.91%	100.00%	100.00%	
Han	2	1	1	0	0	4
	66.67%	4.55%	9.09%	0.00%	0.00%	
<b>Global</b>	94					

GREEN SPACES: BELONGING TO COMMUNITY							
	strongly disagree	disagree	neutral	agree	strongly agree	unspecified	Total
Changjie	10	4	10	9	14	3	50
	20.0%	8.0%	20.0%	18.0%	28.0%	6.0%	
Uyghur	4	0	0	0	2	0	6
	40.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	14.3%	0.0%	
Han	6	4	10	9	12	2	43
	60.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	85.7%	66.7%	
Other	0	0	0	0	0	1	1
	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	33.3%	
Yuewan	3	1	8	3	28	1	44
	6.8%	2.3%	18.2%	6.8%	63.6%	2.3%	
Uyghur	2	1	5	3	28	1	40
	66.7%	100.0%	62.5%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	
Han	1	0	3	0	0	0	4
	33.3%	0.0%	37.5%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	
<b>Global</b>	94						

GREEN SPACES: SAFETY							
	strongly disagree	disagree	neutral	agree	strongly agree	unspecified	Total
Changjie	8	5	11	8	17	1	50
	16.0%	10.0%	22.0%	16.0%	34.0%	2.0%	
Uyghur	4	0	0	0	1	1	6
	50.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	5.9%	100.0%	
Han	4	5	11	8	15	0	43
	50.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	88.2%	0.0%	
Other	0	0	0	0	1	0	1
	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	5.9%	0.0%	
Yuewan	3	5	6	3	27	0	44

	6.8%	11.4%	13.6%	6.8%	61.4%	0.0%	
Uyghur	2	4	5	3	26	0	40
	66.7%	80.0%	83.3%	100.0%	96.3%	0.0%	
Han	1	1	1	0	1	0	4
	33.3%	20.0%	16.7%	0.0%	3.7%	0.0%	
<b>Global</b>	94						

#### GREEN SPACES: PREVALENCE OF CRIME

	strongly disagree	disagree	neutral	agree	strongly agree	unspecified	Total
Changjie	28	7	5	8	1	1	50
	56.0%	14.0%	10.0%	16.0%	2.0%	2.0%	
Uyghur	3	0	0	1	1	1	6
	10.7%	0.0%	0.0%	12.5%	100.0%	100.0%	
Han	24	7	5	7	0	0	43
	85.7%	100.0%	100.0%	87.5%	0.0%	0.0%	
Other	1	0	0	0	0	0	1
	3.6%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	
Yuewan	36	2	2	0	4	0	44
	81.8%	4.5%	4.5%	0.0%	9.1%	0.0%	
Uyghur	35	2	0	0	3	0	40
	97.2%	100.0%	0.0%	0.0%	75.0%	0.0%	
Han	1	0	2	0	1	0	4
	2.8%	0.0%	100.0%	0.0%	25.0%	0.0%	
<b>Global</b>	94						

#### GREEN SPACES: CULTURAL DIVERSITY

	strongly disagree	disagree	neutral	agree	strongly agree	unspecified	Total
Changjie	27	8	4	3	5	3	50
	54.0%	16.0%	8.0%	6.0%	10.0%	6.0%	
Uyghur	2	0	0	0	3	1	6
	7.4%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	60.0%	33.3%	
Han	25	7	4	3	2	2	43
	92.6%	87.5%	100.0%	100.0%	40.0%	66.7%	
Other	0	1	0	0	0	0	1
	0.0%	12.5%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	
Yuewan	23	5	4	2	10	0	44
	52.3%	11.4%	9.1%	4.5%	22.7%	0.0%	
Uyghur	20	4	4	2	10	0	40
	87.0%	80.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	0.0%	
Han	3	1	0	0	0	0	4
	13.0%	20.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	
<b>Global</b>	94						

#### MARKETS: MOST IMPORTANT ATTRIBUTES (MAX 3)

	Recreation	Exercise	Retail	Employment	Social events	culture	heritage	unspec	Total
Changjie	19	15	41	10	14	4	4	0	107
Uyghur	2	4	2	2	2	2	1	0	15

Han	16	10	38	8	12	2	3	0	89
Other	1	1	1	0	0	0	0	0	3
Yuewan	15	15	23	6	9	4	4	4	80
Uyghur	12	12	21	6	9	4	3	4	71
Han	3	3	2	0	0	0	1	0	9
<b>Global</b>	187								

MARKETS: BELONGING TO COMMUNITY							
	strongly disagree	disagree	neutral	agree	strongly agree	unspecified	Total
Changjie	10	4	10	9	14	3	50
	20.0%	8.0%	20.0%	18.0%	28.0%	6.0%	
Uyghur	4	0	0	0	2	0	6
	40.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	14.3%	0.0%	
Han	6	4	10	9	12	2	43
	60.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	85.7%	66.7%	
Other	0	0	0	0	0	1	1
	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	33.3%	
Yuewan	3	1	8	3	28	1	44
	6.8%	2.3%	18.2%	6.8%	63.6%	2.3%	
Uyghur	2	1	5	3	28	1	40
	66.7%	100.0%	62.5%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	
Han	1	0	3	0	0	0	4
	33.3%	0.0%	37.5%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	
<b>Global</b>	94						

MARKETS: SAFETY							
	strongly disagree	disagree	neutral	agree	strongly agree	unspecified	Total
Changjie	8	5	8	11	17	1	50
	16.0%	10.0%	16.0%	22.0%	34.0%	2.0%	
Uyghur	4	0	0	0	1	1	6
	50.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	5.9%	100.0%	
Han	4	5	8	11	15	0	43
	50.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	88.2%	0.0%	
Other	0	0	0	0	1	0	1
	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	5.9%	0.0%	
Yuewan	3	5	6	3	27	0	44
	6.8%	11.4%	13.6%	6.8%	61.4%	0.0%	
Uyghur	2	4	5	3	26	0	40
	66.7%	80.0%	83.3%	100.0%	96.3%	0.0%	
Han	1	1	1	0	1	0	4
	33.3%	20.0%	16.7%	0.0%	3.7%	0.0%	
<b>Global</b>	94						

MARKETS: PREVALENCE OF CRIME							
	strongly disagree	disagree	neutral	agree	strongly agree	unspecified	Total
Changjie	28	7	5	8	1	1	50

	56.0%	14.0%	10.0%	16.0%	2.0%	2.0%	
Uyghur	3	0	0	1	1	1	6
	10.7%	0.0%	0.0%	12.5%	100.0%	100.0%	
Han	24	7	5	7	0	0	43
	85.7%	100.0%	100.0%	87.5%	0.0%	0.0%	
Other	1	0	0	0	0	0	1
	3.6%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	
Yuewan	34	1	6	0	3	0	44
	77.3%	2.3%	13.6%	0.0%	6.8%	0.0%	
Uyghur	33	1	4	0	2	0	40
	97.1%	100.0%	66.7%	0.0%	66.7%	0.0%	
Han	1	0	2	0	1	0	4
	2.9%	0.0%	33.3%	0.0%	33.3%	0.0%	
<b>Global</b>							94

<b>MARKETS: CULTURAL DIVERSITY</b>							
	strongly disagree	disagree	neutral	agree	strongly agree	unspecified	<b>Total</b>
Changjie	27	8	4	3	5	3	50
	54.0%	16.0%	8.0%	6.0%	10.0%	6.0%	
Uyghur	2	0	0	0	3	1	6
	7.4%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	60.0%	33.3%	
Han	25	7	4	3	2	2	43
	92.6%	87.5%	100.0%	100.0%	40.0%	66.7%	
Other	0	1	0	0	0	0	1
	0.0%	12.5%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	
Yuewan	23	5	4	2	10	0	44
	52.3%	11.4%	9.1%	4.5%	22.7%	0.0%	
Uyghur	20	4	4	2	10	0	40
	87.0%	80.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	0.0%	
Han	3	1	0	0	0	0	4
	13.0%	20.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	
<b>Global</b>	94						

## Appendix IX: Ethics Approval

File Number: 04-13-32B



Date (mm/dd/yyyy): 03/21/2014

**Université d'Ottawa** **University of Ottawa**  
Bureau d'éthique et d'intégrité de la recherche Office of Research Ethics and Integrity

### Ethics Approval Notice Social Science and Humanities REB

#### Principal Investigator / Supervisor / Co-investigator(s) / Student(s)

<u>First Name</u>	<u>Last Name</u>	<u>Affiliation</u>	<u>Role</u>
Huhua	Cao	Arts / Geography	Principal Investigator
Anawer	Maimaitiming	Arts / Geography	Co-investigator
Leah	Weiler	Social Sciences / Others	Co-investigator

File Number: 04-13-32B

Type of Project: Professor

Title: Sharing Knowledge on PPGIS: Engaging Urban Indigenous Minorities in Western China

<u>Approval Date (mm/dd/yyyy)</u>	<u>Expiry Date (mm/dd/yyyy)</u>	<u>Approval Type</u>
03/21/2014	03/20/2015	Ia

(Ia: Approval, Ib: Approval for initial stage only)

Special Conditions / Comments:

N/A