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**LA THÈSE A ÉTÉ  
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THE PHILOSOPHICAL FOUNDATIONS OF ABRAHAM MASLOW'S PSYCHOLOGY:  
SOME IMPLICATIONS FOR THIRD FORCE PSYCHOLOGY

A Thesis

Presented to

The School of Graduate Studies and Research

of

The University of Ottawa

by

MICHAEL PETER LOEBEL

In partial fulfillment of requirements

for the degree of

Doctor of Philosophy

November, 1986

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ISBN 0-315-36528-5.



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| 202 Booth Street  |                                |
| Ottawa, Ontario K1R 7J4   |                                |
| GRADE-DIPLOME   | ANNÉE D'OBTENTION-YEAR GRANTED |
| Ph.D. (Philosophy)  | 1986                           |
| TITRE DE LA THÈSE-TITLE OF THESIS   |                                |
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| FOR THIRD FORCE PSYCHOLOGY  |                                |

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TITRE DE LA THÈSE-TITLE OF THE THESIS

THE PHILOSOPHICAL FOUNDATIONS OF ABRAHAM MASLOW'S  
PSYCHOLOGY: SOME IMPLICATIONS FOR  
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ABSTRACT

THE PHILOSOPHICAL FOUNDATIONS OF ABRAHAM MASLOW'S PSYCHOLOGY:  
SOME IMPLICATIONS FOR THIRD FORCE PSYCHOLOGY

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University of Ottawa, 1986

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Dr. Jacques Croteau

The purpose of this research study is to explicate and evaluate the foundations of Abraham Maslow's Third Force Psychology. These foundations are examined, evaluated, and discussed with regard to their epistemological, philosophical and psychological implications. The insights gained from this examination are applied to the broader question of the philosophical understanding of man and scientific methodology relevant for the human sciences in general and for psychological science in particular.

This is accomplished in the following manner. We first discuss, and attempt to situate Maslow in relation to, the three main schools of thought in psychology: behaviorism, psychoanalysis, and phenomenological psychology. Secondly, we present Maslow's position with regard to his conception of science, with a particular emphasis on psychological science, and discuss the consequent view of man which he developed. We also examine Maslow's psychology, with a special concern for his concept of self-actualization. Thirdly, we engage in a critical evaluation of Maslow's view of science and the psychology he developed.

Chapter I, entitled 'Introduction' provides a brief

statement of the objectives and proposed methodology of this research study.

Chapter II, entitled 'Context: Skinner, Freud, Binswanger' provides a general introduction to the three main psychologies of the day. Maslow's own intellectual development provides the structure for this chapter. The purpose for offering this material is to demonstrate just where Maslow felt his work should be situated. It emerged that Maslow rejects both behaviorism and psychoanalysis in favor of a position which he considers to be in the same field as phenomenological psychology.

Chapter III, entitled 'Abraham Maslow: Science and Psychology' provides an introduction to Maslow's conception of psychological science and his concept of man. It was found that Maslow has many serious doubts concerning the appropriateness of what may be called natural science as the only or best means of gaining knowledge, let alone a comprehensive understanding of man. In place of this natural science Maslow suggests a different view of science, one that is based on holistic analysis. We found that while Maslow is satisfied with stating that natural science is inadequate, he does not fully and adequately develop this idea. We therefore turn to the work of Maritain and Giorgi in order to complete and deepen Maslow's epistemology, which despite its many merits simply does not go deep enough on this matter. This work was done in Chapter V.

Chapter IV, entitled 'Third Force Psychology' is a presentation of the basic assumptions of his psychology, the specifics of his position, and the start of our examination of one of the central themes of Maslow's work, namely, self-actualization. In the process of doing this, we provide a discussion of Maslow's theory of motivation and the world-view he developed based on this conception. Again, we offer a preliminary indication of problem areas.

Chapter V, entitled 'Psychological Science' is an evaluation of the philosophical and epistemological adequacy of Maslow's conception of science and psychology. We found that contained within Maslow's position are various philosophical and epistemological stances which are basically acceptable, but nevertheless still need further clarification and elaboration. This further work was accomplished with the help of both Jacques Maritain and Amedeo Giorgi. Maritain's main contribution is in the field of epistemology where his distinction between the philosophy of nature (wherein is contained a philosophy of man, an ontology) and empiriological analysis is of profound significance. Giorgi's main contribution is in carrying out Maritain's basic intuitions all the while taking his inspiration more specifically from an existential phenomenological concept of man as being-in-the-world. By reading Maslow in the light of the work that Giorgi has done, Maslow's position is strengthened because it is now possible for the reader to situate Maslow's work within a

concrete and explicitly worked out phenomenological context. This has the desirable effect of tying the various insights together into a solid whole. We come to the conclusion that the overall impact of applying the work of Maritain and Giorgi to that of Maslow's is one of deepening and firmly grounding, both philosophically and epistemologically, Maslow's whole enterprise.

Chapter VI, entitled 'Self-Actualization: A Critique' provides an evaluation of Third Force Psychology, with a particular emphasis on the concept of self-actualization. Our evaluation demonstrates that there are a number of significant, and ultimately fatal, problems with Maslow's view of self-actualization. We saw that once again it is the case that Maslow's work would benefit greatly from contact with an explicit phenomenological viewpoint. In the second part of this chapter we turn to Viktor Frankl as a psychologist who will offer us a more solidly grounded, both philosophically and psychologically, theory of human motivation.

Chapter VII, entitled 'Summary and Conclusion' is a recapitulation and synthesis of the purposes, methods and findings of this research study.

A two-part annotated bibliography follows the main text. Part One consists of primary source materials, i.e., the cited works of Abraham Maslow, while Part Two is devoted to secondary sources and all other authors actually cited in

this study.

## ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

I would like to express my sincere appreciation to my Supervisory Committee, Dr. Jacques Croteau (Supervisor) and Dr. David Carr, for their suggestions, comments and patience. It is the caliber of these individuals which attracted me to the University of Ottawa, and I was not disappointed. I would also like to thank the other members of the examining board (Dr. Jean Bernabe, Dr. Ghyslain Charron and Dr. Amedeo Giorgi) for their responsible and challenging questions, which resulted in what was for me a stimulating and cordial defence. It may be an inanimate object, but nonetheless, I'm pleased that my Kaypro was up to the job. I can't imagine doing it any other way. I would like to acknowledge my wife's constancy and support throughout this long strange trip. I could not have done it without her.

Every time that wheel turn 'round,  
Bound to cover just a little more ground.  
The wheel is turning and you can't slow down  
You can't let go and you can't hold on  
You can't go back and you can't stand still;  
If the thunder don't get you, then the lightning will.

-Robert Hunter/Jerry Garcia

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## CHAPTER I

### INTRODUCTION

Within psychological science there are numerous, diverse and radically incompatible approaches and theories. In the midst of such diversity there is, however, the shared concern of attempting both to understand and explain man's behavior. Such a concern cannot, in the final analysis, escape contact with philosophy and all psychological understanding will contain either implicitly or explicitly an epistemological stance and an envisioning of man which guides and directs psychological research. It is the task of the philosopher to make clear and explicit the philosophical foundations of the theoretical constructs with which the psychologist works and to determine the epistemological and philosophical adequacy and appropriateness of such constructs.

Psychological science, as indeed is the case with the sciences of man in general, must be firmly grounded in a philosophy of man. The psychologist may wish to detach himself from all philosophical considerations, but will inevitably find that he is unable to do so. He will discover that he has in fact adopted a particular epistemology and ontology, albeit implicitly, as soon as he

articulates his understanding of man and his world. It is one of the tasks of the philosopher to provide and/or clarify the epistemology and the ontology which the psychologist is utilizing. The philosopher is ideally suited for this task of formulating the ground on which the psychologist can base his empirical investigations. This is the case because one of the prime concerns of the philosopher is precisely to lay bare the basic structures and conditions of human existence, and the relevant epistemological stance.

The psychologist, who is concerned with the ground of his science, will acquaint himself with the various ontological options and adopt one of them. This ontological foundation can then be utilized as a construct by the psychologist. That is, ontology can function as the ground and framework for the psychologist's empirical investigation of the human condition. In those cases where the psychologist has not explicitly clarified his own ontology and epistemology, it is the task of the philosopher to do so. The philosopher can clearly contribute to the science of psychology. This activity of the philosopher would seem to be of vital significance for the development and expansion of psychology's understanding of man's behavior.

It is the purpose of this research study to explicate and evaluate the foundations of Abraham Maslow's 'Third Force Psychology'. These underlying foundations will be

examined, evaluated, and discussed with regard to their philosophical and psychological implications. This study will attempt to accomplish this by engaging in a three-fold thrust. The first will be a general presentation of behaviorism, psychoanalysis, and phenomenological psychology in order to clarify the overall context of the area in which Maslow conceives himself to be working. The second will be an examination of the philosophical and epistemological character of the concept of psychological science with which Maslow operates. And thirdly, this study will address itself to a philosophical evaluation of Maslow's psychology.

The main contributions of this study will be as follows. It will make explicit and clear the philosophical and epistemological foundations of Third Force Psychology. It will offer a sustained, critical evaluation of Maslow's psychology in light of a systematically developed conception of psychological science. The value of this attempt will lie in providing a critical appraisal of Maslow's position, and in the anticipated insights concerning the areas in which psychological science must develop further in order to acquire a more adequate and comprehensive understanding of man's behavior.

Before proceeding directly to Maslow, it will be quite beneficial to have a general comprehension of the three main stances in psychological science and to have an indication

of how Maslow believes himself to be related to each. This study will therefore now turn to a brief examination of behaviorism, psychoanalysis and phenomenological psychology.

## CHAPTER II

### CONTEXT: SKINNER, FREUD, BINSWANGER

This chapter will have the primary aim of providing a general introduction to the three main psychologies of the day. These psychologies are, broadly speaking: behaviorism, psychoanalysis, and phenomenological psychology. In order to keep this discussion to a reasonable length this chapter will focus on one main proponent of each position. Hence, there will be a brief examination of the works of B. F. Skinner (behaviorism), Sigmund Freud (psychoanalysis), and Ludwig Binswanger (phenomenological psychology). This material will help to place the work of Abraham Maslow into its proper perspective. As will be seen later in this study, Maslow states that what he wants to do is take the best of both psychoanalysis and behaviorism and integrate them as a starting point for his own work. As well, Maslow certainly gives every indication that he believes himself to be within the perspective of phenomenological psychology. This is an issue which will receive critical attention in the latter parts of this study. This chapter will follow the progression of Maslow's own development, i.e., starting with behaviorism, moving on to psychoanalysis and finishing with phenomenological psychology.

I. Introduction

While we shall concentrate our attention on B. F. Skinner, it may be useful to first have a brief look at the work of J. B. Watson, who is generally acknowledged as the founder of modern behaviorism and whose work and aims Skinner took over as his own.

When psychology began to make its break from philosophy in the late 1800's it first attempted to change the subject matter of psychology. Psychology was now described as the study of consciousness, not as a study of the mind or of the soul. It was thought that since people would be able to readily report the contents of their consciousness, psychology would have plenty of empirical, and hopefully objective, data to work with. But things did not quite work out like this. What they found instead was that people could not always agree on the description and classification of the contents of consciousness. Psychology got sidetracked into endless debates concerning the status and definitions of sensations, feelings and emotions. Rather than leading to objective data, it was now thought that introspection could only yield subjective impressions which were of no interest to a proper science. It soon became clear that consciousness raised just as many philosophical problems as did the prior view of psychology as the study of

mind or soul.

One of the approaches to lifting this impasse was Watson's declaration that psychology should not be the study of mind, soul or consciousness, but rather, it was henceforth to be regarded as the study of behavior. Psychology now no longer had to rely on questionable introspective reports, but could simply observe behavior and report it. Behavior is, after all, easily observable for all if they only make the effort. It should be noted that at the time Watson was only making a methodological statement with regard to what he considered to be the proper subject matter for psychology. However as time went by, Watson's position went beyond the merely methodological and developed into one of ultimately rejecting a belief in consciousness as being pre-scientific.

There are two other noteworthy points to be made about Watson's new program. The first is the assertion that environment plays a greater role in determining behavior than does heredity. The second is the belief that learning takes place via the conditioning of reflexes which leads to the position of claiming that the behavior of man (and animals) is the result of conditioning effected by the environment.

It is this basic three point program, with some minor modifications, which Skinner adopted as his own and then

attempted to develop to its logical conclusion.

## II. Skinner's Behaviorism

Skinner is very explicit about the type of science that he believes psychology to be. He notes,

Behaviorism, with an accent on the last syllable, is not the scientific study of behavior but a philosophy of science concerned with the subject matter and methods of psychology. If psychology is a science of mental life--of the mind, of conscious experience--then it must develop and defend a special methodology, which it has not yet done successfully. If it is, on the other hand, a science of the behavior of organisms, human or otherwise, then it is part of biology, a natural science for which tested and highly successful methods are available. The basic issue is not the nature of the stuff of which the world is made or whether it is made of one stuff or two but rather the dimensions of the things studied by psychology and the methods relevant to them.[1]

Presumably this means that we can evaluate behaviorism as we should any other philosophy. Skinner believes that most objections to behaviorism still persist because we have either failed to understand behaviorism or we have looked at the wrong type of behaviorism. What we should look at is what he called the 'experimental analysis of behavior'. This type of analysis demands that the behavior of individual organisms is studied in carefully controlled environments (laboratories), and that the relation between

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1. B. F. Skinner, "Behaviorism at Fifty", T. W. Wann, ed. Behaviorism and Phenomenology: Contrasting Bases for Modern Psychology(Chicago, 1964), p. 79.

behavior and environment be formulated on the basis of this research. Therefore, "the task of a scientific analysis is to explain how the behavior of a person as a physical system is related to the conditions under which the human species evolved and the conditions under which the individual lives." [2] Skinner believes that while it is true that initially experiments simplify reality, eventually, as we learn more, the experiments will become less simple and artificial and more closely resemble reality (BF 151). For Skinner there is no doubt that "it is science or nothing" and consequently all other approaches are rejected (BF 153). It is, however, significant that science is here regarded as being exclusively natural science and thus we can say that the only viable approach to psychology as envisioned by Skinner is through science as understood by him. [3] Behavior and environmental modifications are seen as the best alternatives for improving the human condition.

Skinner offers us a list of the major problems confronting the human species. He notes that to date our hope that science and technology will solve these problems for us has not been justified. What we need now is a

-----  
2. B. F. Skinner, Beyond Freedom and Dignity (New York, 1972); hereafter designated as BF in this chapter, p. 12.

3. As will be seen in this and subsequent chapters, there are indeed many ways of understanding the basic character of science and even of the subject matter of psychology. These are both issues which will receive detailed attention throughout this study.

radical change in human behavior because all of these problems are human problems. As he notes, "young people drop out of school, refuse to get jobs, and associate only with others of their own age not because they feel alienated but because of defective social environments in homes, schools, factories, and churches"(BF 12). Skinner claims that once we examine the effect of environment on behavior we will forever reject the talk of mental entities or an inner life. All feelings or emotions will be explainable in terms of the environment. As he notes,

we can follow the path taken by physics and biology by turning directly to the relation between behavior and the environment and neglecting supposed mediating states of mind. Physics did not advance by looking more closely at the jubilation of a falling body, or biology by looking at the nature of vital spirits, and we do not need to try to discover what personalities, states of mind, feelings, traits of character, plans, purposes, intentions, or the other prerequisites of autonomous man really are in order to get on with a scientific analysis of behavior.(BF 12-13)

Skinner will clearly reject any concept of inner states or any talk of intentions, purposes, aims or goals as mental states in relation to behavior(BF 6). He speaks of this as a personification which has been rejected by all proper science. He will also reject any notion of a vital force which animates the individual(BF 7). All these ways of talking about man, including the idea that there are basic differences between people, are labelled as pre-scientific. This is why we don't have a proper science and technology of

behavior. However, in his more magnanimous moods, Skinner makes it evident that he does not reject an explanation simply because it is subjective or mental, but he nonetheless always manages to translate such explanations into terms of the environment, thus negating them as subjective or mental.

Skinner claims that we have failed to discard mentalistic explanations not because they are true or helpful but because we have yet to formulate a suitable alternative(BF 14). He radically rejects any concept of an 'inner man' or non-physical component to man. Instead, "it is now clear that we must take into account what the environment does to an organism not only before but after it responds. Behavior is shaped and maintained by its consequences. Once this fact is recognized, we can formulate the interaction between organism and environment in a much more comprehensive way"(BF 16). Thus, psychology should be a strictly empirical science in the sense that it will only concern itself with observable data, which preferably can be confirmed in the laboratory. Explanations that include non-observable entities will be deemed to be primitive, inadequate, inconclusive and in need of further

research.[4]

Man is, of course, not responsible for his actions according to Skinner. He thus receives no blame or praise. The environment is responsible and it gets the blame or praise(BF 19). This is a necessary assumption for proper scientific study.

A scientific analysis of behavior must, I believe, assume that a person's behavior is controlled by his genetic and environmental histories rather than by the person himself as an initiating, creative agent; but no part of the behavioristic position has raised more violent objections. We cannot prove, of course, that human behavior as a whole is fully determined, but the proposition becomes more plausible as facts accumulate, and I believe that a point has been reached at which its implications must be seriously considered.[5]

It would thus appear to be the case that he rejects the notion that we always have a choice and hence are always responsible for our actions. He goes on to claim that "the concept of responsibility offers little help. The issue is controllability"(BF 71). Hence, it becomes clear that what Skinner wants are ways and means of controlling people to ensure that they behave in an appropriate manner. In fact,

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4. One such concept is that of 'autonomous man'. This is a concept which Skinner believes must be rejected and replaced with a more adequate one because "autonomous man serves to explain only the things we are not yet able to explain in other ways. His existence depends on our ignorance, and he naturally loses status as we come to know more about behavior."(BF 12)

5. B. F. Skinner, About Behaviorism(New York, 1976), hereafter designated as AB in this chapter, p. 8.

Skinner's position leads one to the conclusion that as we learn more about the effects of the environment, we have less reason to attribute any part of human behavior to an autonomous controlling agent.

Behavior can be modified by operant conditioning and positive or negative reinforcers. Skinner is more concerned with rewarding 'good' behavior than with punishing unwanted behavior (BF 30-31). "The standard distinction between operant and reflex behavior is that one is voluntary and the other involuntary. Operant behavior is felt to be under the control of the behaving person... reflex behavior... is not under comparable control" (AB 44). Skinner would seem to be much more concerned with operant conditioning which reinforces behavior which has survival value. All behavior would seem to be based on either contingencies of survival or contingencies of reinforcement. The process of operant conditioning, either through positive or negative reinforcers

supplements natural selection. Important consequences of behavior which could not play a role in evolution because they were not sufficiently stable features of the environment are made effective through operant conditioning during the lifetime of the individual, whose power in dealing with his world is thus vastly increased. (AB 51-52)

So in order "to make the social environment as free as possible of aversive stimuli we do not need to destroy that environment or escape from it; we need to redesign it" (BF

39). As he notes, "man's struggle for freedom is not due to a will to be free, but to certain behavioral processes characteristic of the human organism, the chief effect of which is the avoidance of or escape from so-called 'aversive' features of the environment"(BF 39). Or, in other words, it is part of being human that we want freedom, i.e., we want exactly that which Skinner wants to deny us.

### III. Maslow and Behaviorism

Maslow first became interested in psychology through the work of John B. Watson because Watson's program indicated that progress on solid and reliable ground was possible. "It offered a technique (conditioning) which gave promise of solving all problems and a wonderfully convincing philosophy (positivism, objectivism) that was easy to understand and to apply, that protected us against all the mistakes of the past".[6] However, as time went by he discovered that this approach was of no help when dealing with the whole person.[7] Maslow found himself learning

6. Abraham Maslow, The Psychology of Science: A Reconnaissance (Southbend, Indiana, 1966), hereafter designated as PS in this chapter, p. 7.

7. Cf. Abraham Maslow, "A Theory of Human Motivation", Psychological Review, 50:1943, p. 392, where he indicates that he rejected the "old, naive, behaviorism which assumed that it was somehow necessary, or at least more 'scientific' to judge human beings by animal standards. One consequence of this belief was that the whole notion of purpose and goal was excluded from motivational psychology simply because one could not ask a white rat about his purposes."

much more from the work of people such as Freud and Adler (PS 8). As will be seen later in this study the insights he gained from these psychologies helped him to formulate his critique of orthodox science and to establish his own position.

Maslow is very critical of the behaviorists. He notes that positivists and behaviorists are the main groups among those who

feel values and the life of value to be none of their professional concern, and who casually renounce all consideration of poetry and art and of any of the religious or transcendent experiences. Indeed, the pure positivist rejects any inner experiences of any kind as being 'unscientific', as not in the realm of human knowledge, as not susceptible of study by a scientific method, because such data are not objective, that is to say, public and shared. This is a kind of 'reduction to the concrete', to the tangible, the visible, the audible, to that which can be recorded by a machine, to behavior. [8]

Moreover, another problem with the various behaviorisms is that they present "a passive image of a helpless man, one who (or should I say 'which'?) has little to say about his (its?) own fate, who doesn't decide anything" when what we really want is an active concept of man "as an initiator, a creator, a center of action, as one who does things rather than one who is done to" (PS 55). Thus, what we have to do is

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8. Abraham Maslow, Religion, Values, and Peak-Experiences (Middlesex, England, 1976), hereafter designated RV in this chapter, p. 6.

avoid "the tendency to get pious and metaphysical about these personal preferences and to exalt them into rules for everyone else" and instead leave ourselves open to actual experience(PS 57). This is precisely what Maslow went on to do. His concern became the person in his totality, and significantly, the person in the process of actualizing his full potential. Maslow thus turned to psychoanalysis in the attempt to find assistance in developing this new understanding of psychology and of man.

#### B. Sigmund Freud

In a very early paper Freud gives a clear statement of what kind of psychology he wants to develop. "The intention is to furnish a psychology that shall be a natural science; that is, to represent psychical processes as quantitatively determinate states of specifiable material particles, thus making those processes perspicuous and free from

contradiction." [9] Freud does not wish to utilize the approaches of intuition or introspection, but rather, he wants to develop a psychology that can take its place amongst the other natural sciences, such as zoology and botany. [10] For Freud the only 'true knowledge' is scientific knowledge and no other approach will be acceptable. [11] Freud wants to identify the various

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9. Sigmund Freud, "Project For a Scientific Psychology" (London, 1950), Vol. 1, p. 295. This is a neurological account of psychological processes which Freud drafted and sent to Wilhelm Fliess in 1895. This concern with quantitative questions is also evidenced by a discussion Freud conducts concerning neurotics. "Neurotics have approximately the same innate dispositions as other people, they have the same experiences and they have the same problems to solve. Why, then, do they live so much worse and with so much greater difficulty and suffer in the process so many more feelings of unpleasure, anxiety and pain? We have no need to feel at a loss for an answer to this question. It is quantitative disharmonies that must be held responsible for the inadequacies and sufferings of neurotics. The determining causes of all the varying forms of human mental life are to be looked for in the interplay between inherited disposition and accidental experiences... These quantitative differences are what will determine the variety of the results." Sigmund Freud, An Outline of Psycho-Analysis (New York, 1963), hereafter designated as OP in this chapter, pp. 49-50. For the convenience of the reader we will also provide the appropriate volume and page number from the Standard Edition for all of Freud's work. In this case, Vol. 23, 183-184.

10. In fact, Freud makes explicit mention of the relationship between psychology and biology. "The phenomena with which we have had to deal do not belong only to psychology; they have also an organic and biological aspect, and accordingly in the course of our efforts at building up psychoanalysis we have also made important biological discoveries and have not been able to avoid framing new biological hypotheses" (OP 64, Vol. 23, 195).

11. Cf. Roland Dalbiez, Psychoanalytical Method and the Doctrine of Freud, Volume II (Freeport, New York, 1941), p. 294.

psychical phenomena that constitute man and then discern their connections with one another.[12]

Psychoanalysis is merely a method of research, a tool, in the same way that the infinitesimal calculus is.[13] It is claimed to be a neutral and impartial approach that is not in the slightest concerned with making value judgments.[14] Freud also believes that the study of man's intellectual and emotional life will not necessitate a new conception of science.[15] There is only one approach to science, and it makes no difference what is being investigated. He is willing to admit, however, that "in psychology, unlike physics, we are not always concerned with things which can only arouse a cool scientific interest"(OP 54, Vol. 23, 197). Freud was deeply hurt by the fact that most people have not treated psychology just like any other natural science.[16]

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12. Cf. Sigmund Freud, A General Introduction to Psycho-Analysis(New York, 1963), hereafter designated as GI in this chapter, p. 90. Vol. 15, 100.

13. Cf. Sigmund Freud, "The Future of an Illusion", (London, 1962), Vol. 21, 36.

14. Cf. Sigmund Freud, An Autobiographical Study(New York, 1963), p. 72, Vol. 20, 38.

15. Cf. Sigmund Freud, New Introductory Lectures on Psychoanalysis(New York, 1965), p. 159, -Vol. 22, 159.

16. In fact, Freud will explicitly draw a parallel between psychoanalysis and physics in an attempt to demonstrate that psychology is a natural science. See the lengthy section in OP 65-66, Vol. 23, 196-197.

Perhaps the best road of access to Freud is through his theory of dream interpretation, in as much as dream interpretation is the methodological cornerstone of psychoanalysis. This section will therefore concentrate on this aspect of psychoanalysis in order to flesh out a picture of the whole.

### I. Mind and Personality

Before proceeding to a more comprehensive examination of Freud's theory and method of dream interpretation, it would be helpful to take a brief look at how he conceives mind and personality. Some understanding of his views on these matters will be beneficial in understanding the dream-work and his overall concept of human nature.

Freud conceives of mind as a psychical apparatus that operates on the basis of a reflex process since "reflex processes remain the model of every psychical function." [17] He also notes that this psychical apparatus may not be arranged in a spatial order as he has described it, but the functioning of the apparatus must coincide with the temporal order he indicated. "We have arrived at our knowledge of this psychical apparatus by studying the individual development of human beings" (OP 2, Vol. 23, 145).

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17. Sigmund Freud, The Interpretation of Dreams (Middlesex, England, 1976), hereafter designated as ID in this chapter, p. 686, Vol. 5, 537.

This apparatus is admittedly an hypothesis, but it is an hypothesis that Freud believes he has confirmed by the empirical results and indications of his psychoanalytical experiences.

The apparatus is a compound instrument that is comprised of a number of systems. At one end there is a sensory system 'Pcpt' and at the other end a motor system 'M'. "Psychical processes advance in general from the perceptual end to the motor end" (ID 686, Vol. 5, 537). The system 'Pcpt' does not retain any memories of the original stimulus but "behind it there lies a second system which transforms the momentary excitations of the first system into permanent traces" (ID 687, Vol. 5, 538). All of our perceptions are therefore linked in our memories and this forms associations. The 'Ucs' is the unconscious and the 'Pcs' is the preconscious. The impetus for the formation of dreams is to be located in the unconscious.

It is the function of the dream-work to modify the dream-thoughts sufficiently to pass the dream-censor and then into consciousness. The dream-censor will therefore be located between the 'Ucs' and the 'Pcs'. However, dreams do not follow the route taken by regular excitations. In the case of dream excitation, "instead of being transmitted towards the motor end of the apparatus it moves towards the sensory end and finally reaches the perceptual system" (ID 692, Vol. 5, 542). Dream interpretation will therefore

consist in a regressive analysis.

Freud's concept of personality consists of three elements. They are the 'id', 'ego', and 'super-ego'. The id "contains everything that is inherited, that is present at birth" and this includes the instincts(OP 2, Vol. 23, 145).[18] Because of the effects of the world a portion of the id has undergone a change and formed itself into a new structure. This new structure "acts as an intermediary between the id and the external world"(OP 2, Vol. 23, 145). This new structure is called the ego. The ego has the task of self-preservation, becoming aware of stimuli, memory, activity and controlling the instincts of the id. During the course of our early life, adults (particularly parents) leave a number of permanent impressions on us. One of these is the feeling of dependence that all children have. This experience "leaves behind it as a precipitate the formation in his ego of a special agency in which his parental

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18. The development of the instinct theory was a direct outcome of Freud's view of human nature, the question of freedom and Freud's general orientation. "Freud's instinct theory was an attempt to integrate biological, physiological, and psychological perspectives. Like the concept of primary process derived from the theory of reflex functioning, the concept of instinct was not intended to be one of essentially human meaning or motivation; it belonged to an independent systematic construct. Its ultimate reference was not to the purposes of the individual but to those of Nature; instinctual behavior was seen from the point of view of its biological function, an external perspective not logically congruent with the purposes of the individual." Gerald N. Izenberg, The Existentialist Critique of Freud: The Crisis of Autonomy(Princeton, 1976), p. 59.

influence is prolonged. It has received the name super-ego"(OP 3, Vol. 23, 146). The id and super-ego represent influences from the past (heredity and parents), while the ego is a result of the daily experiences we have. The ego does its job properly if it is able to balance the demands of the id, super-ego and reality, all at once.

## II. Theory and Method of Dream Interpretation

Since the meaning of certain dreams is not immediately evident, the analyst must have a method of uncovering their meaning. The basic approach will be to ask the dreamer what the dream means. The dreamer will undoubtedly begin by protesting that he does not know the meaning of the dream, but the analyst will "contradict him, press him to answer, assure him that he must have some idea"(GI 95, Vol. 15, 105). Eventually the dreamer will provide some explanation or association related to the dream. The analyst should not be concerned with what the dreamer says, as long as he says something(GI 95, Vol. 15, 106). In order to facilitate these associations it may be helpful to break the dream up into its component parts, or dream-elements. The analyst can then help the dreamer by providing lead-words relating to various dream-elements. The dreamer can then provide associations based on these lead-words. This is basically the method that Freud calls 'free-association'.

The patient is not to reflect on the dream, but rather,

he is to offer the spontaneous associations as they occur to him(GI 96, Vol. 15, 106-107). This means that the dreamer must not be self-critical, but open to whatever comes to him.

We pledge him to obey the fundamental rule of analysis, which is henceforth to govern his behavior towards us.—He is to tell us not only what he can say intentionally and willingly, what will give him relief like a confession, but everything else as well that his self-observation yields to him, everything that comes into his head, even if it is disagreeable for him to say it, even if it seems to him unimportant or actually nonsensical.(OP 31, Vol. 23, 174)

This elimination of self-criticism is of vital importance for the interpretation of the dream. By rigorously following this approach the dreamer will provide a great deal of information concerning the dream and about his unconscious, as this is the foundation of his dream(OP 31, Vol. 23, 174). It is only by uncovering these unconscious foundations that we can come to see the meaning of the dream.[19]

After examining a great many dreams Freud came to the conclusion that a dream is the fulfillment of a wish(ID 199,

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19. Even though the case is made that it is absolutely essential to have the dreamer's responses, it still seems possible to conduct an analysis without them. Notable examples of this are Freud's analysis of F. Dostoevsky in "Dostoevsky and Parricide"(London, 1961), Vol. 21, pp. 175-198, and his analysis of Leonardo Da Vinci in "Leonardo Da Vinci and a Memory of his Childhood"(London, 1957), Vol. 11, pp. 59-138. Ernest Jones, a devoted follower of Freud, has also published an analysis of Hamlet entitled, Hamlet and Oedipus(Garden City, New York, 1955).

Vol. 4, 121). Freud found that dreams allowed the dreamer to solve certain problems, experience various emotions, or have certain experiences which he was not able to achieve in waking life. While children's dreams are relatively straightforward, this is not the case with a great number of dreams that adults have. In waking life we tend to suppress that which we find unpleasant, or feel that we should not do or think. We stop these elements from expressing themselves. They are, nonetheless, as much a part of us as those elements that we do express. These suppressed feelings, desires and thoughts do not go away, but are merely kept from becoming conscious. If this process of suppression were to go on indefinitely a great store of material would be accumulated in the unconscious. This would not be a healthy situation since these suppressed elements would be constantly pushing to get into consciousness. Dreams are a method of reducing this potential tension, although they cannot eliminate it entirely. The dream, by dissipating these potential sleep disturbing elements, is a guardian of sleep (OP 28, Vol. 23, 171). But even if these suppressed elements do force their way into consciousness as a dream, this does not negate the original feeling we had for them. They are still unpleasant.

Since we find these elements unpleasant we change and modify them in order to hide this aspect. These are the

dreams that are not seen as clear and obvious examples of wish-fulfillment. These dreams have been affected by the dream-censorship. The dream-censorship has the task of ensuring that our sleep is not disturbed by unpleasant thoughts or desires, and to see that these suppressed elements are safely dissipated during the dream. This type of dream is almost always distorted (ID 702, Vol. 5, 550-51). This led Freud to the further view that a dream is "a (disguised) fulfillment of a (suppressed or repressed) wish" (ID 244, Vol. 4, 160). The confusing and seemingly bizarre nature of these dreams is the work of the dream-censor.

The true meaning of the dream will be found in the dream material before it was distorted. "Let us call the dream as related the manifest dream-content, and the hidden meaning, which we should come by in following out the associations, the latent dream-thoughts" (GI 108, Vol. 15, 120). It is therefore the latent dream-thoughts that are most significant for the understanding of a dream and we come to these dream-thoughts by means of free association. This is one of the most important and innovative aspects of Freud's theory and method of dream interpretation. Before Freud it was a generally accepted practice to interpret the dream or judge the meaning of the dream solely on the basis of the manifest content. Freud rejects this approach and says we must look into the dream-thoughts instead.

It is from these dream-thoughts and not from a dream's manifest content that we disentangle its meaning. We are thus presented with a new task which had no previous existence: the task, that is, of investigating the relations between the manifest content of dreams and the latent dream thoughts, and of tracing out the processes by which the latter have been changed into the former. (ID 381, Vol. 4, 277)

This investigation is the work of interpretation.

Interpreting a dream "implies assigning a 'meaning' to it--that is, replacing it by something which fits into the chain of our mental acts as a link having a validity and importance equal to the rest" (ID 169, Vol. 4, 96). In order to facilitate this assigning of meaning we shall take the dream and divide it into its component parts. This will not damage the dream in any way since the manifest content is not a coherent whole in the first place, but rather, a jumble of diverse elements that have been put together. What the analyst wants to do is get behind these elements to the thoughts which ground them.

### III. Psychoanalysis

We have seen that dreams are grounded in wishes and the unconscious. The mind functions like a reflex apparatus and dreams are the result of various stimuli. We have seen that the manifest content of the dream is not the aspect with which we should be concerned. Instead, we should attempt to investigate the dream-thoughts. The latent dream-thoughts have been changed by the dream-censor which utilizes the

dream-work. The task of interpretation is to unravel the dream-work back to the latent thoughts. We have also seen that Freud's concept of mind and personality are seen in terms of stimulus/response systems, forces, drives and a generally mechanistic outlook. In dream-interpretation the patient is not asked to reflect on or contemplate his dreams, but is required to respond to certain 'lead' or 'stimulus words'. The belief is that the forthcoming associations are determined by the stimulus-word.

It has already been noted that the instincts are located in the id. These instincts are libido (the sexual energy force which drives man) and the death instinct.[20] Freud believes that man is guided, motivated and determined by these instincts and one principle (the pleasure principle).[21] Libido is the creative aspect of man while the death instinct is the destructive aspect. The pleasure principle is the guiding motive behind all of the actions of

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20. Cf. Sigmund Freud, Civilization and Its Discontents (London, 1963), hereafter designated as CD in this chapter, pp. 40-41, Vol. 21, 103-104.

21. Cf. Sigmund Freud, Beyond the Pleasure Principle (New York, 1961), hereafter designated as BPP in this chapter, p. 5, Vol. 18, 11.

man(BPP 4, Vol. 18, 10).[22]. "As we see, what decides the purpose of life is simply the programme of the pleasure principle"(CD 13, Vol. 21, 76). Everything that is good in man is libido and everything that is bad is death instinct. The purpose of human life has been reduced to that of the pleasure principle. "We have decided to relate pleasure and unpleasure to the quantity of excitation that is present in the mind but is not in any way 'bound'; and to relate them in such a manner that unpleasure corresponds to an increase in the quantity of excitation and pleasure to a diminution"(BPP 1-2, Vol. 18, 7-8). This type of view is, of course, clearly in line with his theory of dream-interpretation. These forces and drives are what stimulate the formation of wishes which lead to dreams. The whole process is based on the interaction of a number of forces and energy drives. Freud believes that this exhausts the intelligibility of man.

Freud's explicitly stated aim of establishing

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22. In BPP 3; Vol. 18, 9, Freud describes the pleasure principle in an analogous way to the concept of entropy in thermodynamics. "The facts which have caused us to believe in the dominance of the pleasure principle in mental life also find expression in the hypothesis that the mental apparatus endeavors to keep the quantity of excitation present in it as low as possible or at least to keep it constant. This latter hypothesis is only another way of stating the pleasure principle; for if the work of the mental apparatus is directed towards keeping the quantity of excitation low, then anything that is calculated to increase that quantity is bound to be felt as adverse to the functioning of the apparatus, that is as unpleasurable."

psychotherapy and psychology within the general realm of natural science would seem to have been accomplished. Psychoanalysis attempts to be concerned with the measurement of the intensities of repressions and suppressions; posits the analyst as a detached observer; accepts the general criteria and methodology of the natural sciences; method and theory would seem to dictate how the patient is understood, as opposed to understanding the patient the way he experiences himself; and man is quite fragmented. All of these are characteristics of psychology as natural science.

#### IV. Maslow and Psychoanalysis

While Freud certainly approaches the question from a perspective which is different from that of the behaviorists, he nonetheless ends up with a conclusion that Maslow cannot accept.

Freud came out of nineteenth-century, mechanistic, physical-chemical, reductionistic science: and there his more Talmudic followers remain, at least with respect to the theory of values and everything that has to do with values. Indeed this reductionism goes so far sometimes that the Freudians seem almost to say that the 'higher life' is just a set of 'defenses against the instincts', especially denial and reaction-formation. Were it not for the concept of sublimation, that is what they would have to be saying. Unfortunately, sublimation is so weak and unsatisfactory a concept that it simply cannot bear this huge responsibility. Thus, psychoanalysis often comes perilously close to being a nihilistic and value denying philosophy of man. (RV 7)

He goes on to note that it is the case that most analysts

usually ignore this philosophy. Thus, while many "see Freud as inheritor and as protagonist of 19-century positivistic, physical-chemical conception of science," it is the case that

his findings keep on contradicting and disproving his Weltanschauung. Freud never reconciled this contradiction. But I think I can today, and thereby unleash the full power of his findings...One could then ask what is the purport of Freud's findings and inventions when they are permitted to stand on their own feet instead of being made to be 'scientific' a la 1880. The whole of psychoanalysis becomes far more powerful if seen from a humanistic philosophy of science.[23]

Maslow is indicating the tension between the theoretical denial of freedom and the practical necessity of freedom inherent in psychoanalysis. "It must be said to Freud's credit that, though he was at his poorest with all the questions of transcendence, he is still to be preferred to the behaviorists who not only have no answers but who also deny the very questions themselves"(RV 8). Thus Maslow came away from his study of Freud with a healthy respect for psychoanalysis as a therapy. Maslow was particularly pleased with the concern psychoanalysis demonstrates in attempting to understand what is actually happening to the patient, that is, what is this person experiencing and how can we explain this. However, Maslow was of the opinion that Freud's conception of psychology as a science was too

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23. Abraham Maslow, The Journals of Abraham Maslow, 2 Volumes(Monterey, California, 1979), pp. 568-569.

narrow and hence was incapable of capturing the full extent of man's experiences. Maslow was also not particularly impressed with Freud's anthropology. As will be seen, Maslow did indeed expend a great deal of energy attempting to establish that there was a 'higher nature' in man and not only Freud's 'lower nature'. [24] Nonetheless, it was Maslow's encounter with psychoanalysis which set him off on his search for an adequate conception of both psychology and man. During the course of this search Maslow came to the conclusion (both explicitly and implicitly) that psychology would benefit from contact with phenomenology and existentialism.

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24. Cf. Abraham Maslow, Abraham Maslow: A Memorial Volume (Monterey, California, 1972), p. 71, where Maslow provides a capsule statement regarding his position on Freud. "I think I can sum up my feelings about psychoanalysis, pro and con, in the following statements. 1. Freud has supplied us with the best psychotherapy we have. Including its improvements in recent years, along with its revisions and variants, there is not even a near second available. 2. It is so far also our best system of psychopathology. This is true for pathogenesis and for classification as well as for dynamics. Even its characterology, though primitive and undeveloped, is useful for the therapist trying to cure psychological illness. 3. However, it is quite unsatisfactory as a general psychology of the whole human being, especially in his healthier and more admirable aspects. The picture of man it presents is a lop-sided, distorted puffing up of his weaknesses and shortcomings that purports then to describe him fully. This it clearly fails to do. Practically all the activities that man prides himself on, and that give meaning, richness, and value to his life, are either omitted or pathologized by Freud."

C. Ludwig Binswanger

As a student Ludwig Binswanger was deeply concerned with the question of the philosophical presuppositions which ground every science.[25] Initially he was very interested in neo-Kantianism and notes that "as a student I had been an enthusiastic admirer of the 'Critique of Pure Reason'"(SF 54). Later he did in fact move away from the neo-Kantian standpoint, but did not shed its influence. He was still concerned with the "search for the 'a priori' foundations in the very structure of man's being which make concrete experience, and ultimately Dasein, possible." [26] It is this search that led him to investigate phenomenology and Heidegger's existential analytic.

Binswanger was of the opinion that psychiatry should be conceived of as more than simply the treating of the insane, the psychotic and the neurotic. Fundamentally, psychiatry should be seen as a personal encounter between human beings. The roles or functions will certainly be those of 'analyst' and 'patient', but this should not be a relationship between analyst and 'other', rather, a

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25. Cf. Ludwig Binswanger, Sigmund Freud: Reminiscences of a Friendship(New York, 1957), hereafter designated as SF in this chapter, p. 54.

26. Herbert Spiegelberg, Phenomenology in Psychology and Psychiatry: A Historical Introduction(Evanston, 1972), p. 201.

relationship between man and man. This view requires that the psychiatrist be in possession of an understanding of man, both of his 'normal' and 'abnormal' modes of being.[27] It was mainly, but not solely for this reason that Binswanger was concerned with precisely those questions which hinged on an understanding of man as a whole.

He was also concerned with the emphasis that contemporary psychology placed on the deviation of the patient from the 'common world of experience'. He mentions Heraclitus,

who said that in the state of wakefulness we all have a common world, while in our sleep, as in passion, emotional states, sensuous lust, and drunkenness, each of us turns away from the common world toward his own. That common world--and Heraclitus recognized this, too--is one of phronesis, or rational deliberation and thinking. We psychiatrists have paid far too much attention to the deviation of our patients from life in the world which is common to all, instead of focusing primarily upon the patient's own private world, as was first systematically done by Freud.[28]

In order to investigate these private worlds, Binswanger considered that first one must have an understanding of the basic structure of human existence. Only then could the psychiatrist be in a position to understand how and why it is possible to form private worlds. This would be the first

27. Cf. Ibid., pp. 194-195.

28: Ludwig Binswanger, "The Existential Analysis School of Thought", Rollo May, et al., eds. Existence: A New Dimension in Psychiatry and Psychology (New York, 1958), hereafter designated as EAS in this chapter, pp. 196-197.

step towards understanding the patient's private world. This would also require that the psychologist work with a definite criterion, not some relative standards. "Subjective' criteria which vary from person to person and from culture to culture" will not be sufficient; what will be necessary is the "search for comparatively definite criteria." [29] Binswanger was of the opinion that philosophy could be a great aid in the task of developing these criteria.

#### I. Binswanger and Philosophy

Not surprisingly, Binswanger fully accepted the view that all sciences are ultimately grounded by a philosophical foundation. In fact, he states that

a science understands itself only when it...accounts for its interpretation (expressed in its basic concepts) of its particular region of being upon the background of that region's basic ontological structure. Such an accounting cannot be expected with methods of the particular science itself, but only with the aid of philosophical methods. [30]

Philosophy would also assist the psychiatrist in his

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29. Ludwig Binswanger, "Insanity as Life-Historical Phenomenon and as Mental Disease: The Case of Ilse", Rollo May, et al., eds. Existence: A New Dimension in Psychiatry and Psychology (New York, 1958), hereafter designated as IL in this chapter, p. 228.

30. Ludwig Binswanger, "Heidegger's Analytic of Existence and its Meaning for Psychiatry", Being-in-the-World: Selected Papers of Ludwig Binswanger (New York, 1963), hereafter designated as HA in this chapter, p. 208.

attempts to get away from and "overcome the dichotomy between empathizable and nonempathizable psychic life"(IL 226-227). It is precisely to obtain this aid that Binswanger turned to phenomenology and the existential analytics of Heidegger.

Binswanger went, initially, to the phenomenological methods of Edmund Husserl.[31] This approach was conceived by Binswanger as being basically descriptive in character. "As such its main contribution was the light it shed on intentionality as the basic structure of the psychological world, a new phenomenon which could not be accounted for in terms of 'naturalistic' science." [32] It was this concept of the intentional relationship between man and his world that provided Binswanger so many insights into the worlds of his patients.

Phenomenology, as Binswanger understood it, was to be an approach that is totally presuppositionless in as much as it was to avoid all dogmas and pre-established theories

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31. Cf. Binswanger's article "On the Relationship Between Husserl's Phenomenology and Psychological Insight", Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, II:1941-1942, pp. 199-210, for a more detailed discussion of his views on Husserl.

32. Spiegelberg, op. cit., p. 212.

concerning man.[33] Man was no longer to be seen in terms of a theory, but rather, the attempt was made, as far as it was possible, to see man as he experiences himself. The analyst must attempt to understand the patient and the patient's world as they are, not in terms of some theory that is imposed upon the patient. Binswanger would certainly have agreed that first one must understand the patient as he is 'given', and only then should the method of treatment be decided upon.

While his reading of Husserl was certainly beneficial, it still left him with some nagging questions. Binswanger soon came to believe that merely being able to describe adequately the 'given' was not sufficient. He wanted to be able to explain how and why it was even possible for the patient to have public and private worlds. That is, he wanted an ontology of man's existence which would be capable of grounding his investigation of man on the psychological level. Husserl was not able to provide this ontology, so Binswanger turned to Martin Heidegger for help.

Binswanger is quite clear and rather emphatic concerning the importance of Heidegger's thought for psychological science.

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33. Jacob Needleman, "A Critical Introduction to Ludwig Binswanger's Existential Psychoanalysis", Ludwig Binswanger, Being-in-the-World: Selected Papers of Ludwig Binswanger (New York, 1963), p. 32.

The new understanding of man, which we owe to Heidegger's analysis of existence, has its basis in the new conception that man is no longer understood in terms of some theory--be it a mechanistic, a biologic or a psychological one--but in terms of a purely phenomenological elucidation of the total structure or total articulation of existence as BEING-IN-THE-WORLD(In-der-Weltsein)." [34]

This structure of being-in-the-world was the conceptual tool which would afford psychiatrists the necessary insights into their patient's existence. Being-in-the-world primarily denotes the integral and primordial relationship between man and world. There is no man without world and no world without man. This basic structure was able to overcome the dichotomy between subject and object; a dichotomy which Binswanger considered was a primary flaw of modern science and psychology. That is, it would no longer be possible to speak of man as distinct from world or to posit man as subject in opposition to world as object.

By utilizing the concept of intentionality and the basic structure of being-in-the-world Binswanger thought that the psychiatrist now had "a key by means of which he can, free of the prejudice of any scientific theory, ascertain and describe the phenomena he investigates in their full phenomenal content and intrinsic context"(HA 206). Being-in-the-world provided Binswanger with the

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34. Ludwig Binswanger, "Existential Analysis and Psychotherapy", Hendrik Ruitenbeek, ed. Psychoanalysis and Existential Philosophy(New York, 1954), hereafter designated as EA in this chapter, p. 18.

explanation of how it was possible for the patient to have a world (and what this entails) and significantly, how this was structured.[35] The meaning of 'world' was now to be located within the patient. "The most important implication of the new conception was that for a real understanding of a person and particularly a mentally sick person, one had to study primarily his world, not his organism or personality in itself set apart from his world." [36] Binswanger's case studies provide ample evidence of the utilization of being-in-the-world (or at least the understanding this structure affords), as well as the fruitfulness of this approach.[37]

## II. Daseinsanalyse

Daseinsanalyse is "an empirical science, with its own method and particular ideal of exactness, namely with the method and ideal of exactness of the phenomenological empirical sciences" (EAS 192). There is no type of evidence

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35. Contrast this with Freud's view. "The idea of men's, receiving an intimation of their connection with the world around them through an immediate feeling which is from the outset directed to that purpose sounds so strange and fits in so badly with the fabric of our psychology that one is justified in attempting to discover a psycho-analytic--that is a genetic--explanation of such a feeling." CD 2, Vol. 21, 65.

36. Spiegelberg, op. cit., p. 221.

37. Cf. Binswanger's case studies of 'Lola Voss' in Needleman, op. cit., pp. 266-341; 'Ilse' in Rollo May, et al., eds., op. cit., pp. 214-236; and especially 'Ellen West' in Ibid., pp. 237-365.

or response that is granted a privileged status. The initial objective will be for the psychiatrist to view the patient not so much as patient, but rather, as man. To comprehend fully the particular mode of 'being' which a patient is adopting the psychiatrist will have to assure himself, continuously, that what he believes the patient to be saying is really what the patient is saying(EAS 202). Only the patient will be able to provide the necessary information required by the psychiatrist in order for him to understand the patient as a totality, that is, as being-in-the-world. In order to achieve this type of understanding it will be necessary for the psychiatrist to view the patient as a fellow existent being and not as an object to be studied(EA 21).[38] The encounter between psychiatrist and patient will therefore not be on the level of subject to object, but subject to subject. Daseinsanalyse will not attempt to 'objectify' man, but see man as he is, i.e., as another subject.

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38. This means that the analyst must adopt a different outlook from when he examines a thing or animal. "An object simply was, its attributes given, interacting mechanically with other objects; man existed, bringing a world into being for himself in terms of meanings through action and sustaining meaning only so long as a particular kind of involvement prevailed. An animal lived, pursuing a prescribed range of activities blindly, completely at one with them; man existed, choosing among possibilities, able to take an attitude even toward the inexorable demands of his own body, the necessity of death, and the unchangeable past, thus giving them different meanings and a degree of freedom in relation to them." Gerald N. Izenberg, op. cit., pp. 95-96.

Binswanger found that many patients felt that this approach was a very good one in as much as the patients felt that this approach truly captured their uniqueness (EA 20-21). This patient acceptance is, of course, an important aspect of any therapeutic endeavor. This ability of Daseinsanalyse to capture the uniqueness of the patient is certainly not accidental, for as we have seen, this is precisely the first step in Binswanger's approach. First understand the patient as a unity, then proceed to the specific therapy.

Mental illness is no longer conceived of as a disease of the brain, but as a modification of the fundamental elements of being-in-the-world (EAS 194). Mental illness is to be understood as a specific modification of the patient's world-design. A particular world-design has in fact over-powered the person's mode of being. Binswanger "spoke of several such worlds for the same person: the Umwelt, his non-personal environment; the Mitwelt, his social relations to others; and the Eigenwelt, his private world." [39] All of these together constitute 'world', not in the sense of a joining into a single world, but as "an expression for the general way in which 'world' forms itself in these three

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39. Spiegelberg, op. cit., p. 221.

world-regions." [40] Binswanger has been able to identify at least two ways in which our world-design may be altered. One is by what he calls 'leaping and whirling' (ordered and disorderly flight of ideas) and the other by a narrowing of existence down to 'swamp and earth' (replacing the freedom of letting 'world' occur with the unfreedom of being dominated by one particular world-design) (EAS 194-195).

By attempting to comprehend the world-design of the patient Binswanger was able to offer evaluations of the patient's problems based on the intentional structures of consciousness and the concept of being-in-the-world. A brief example should demonstrate this point. One of Binswanger's patients was a young woman who would suffer severe anxiety attacks whenever the heels of her shoe loosened or fell off. This response was first noted when she was a very young girl and a skate blade severed the heel from her shoe. Various ways of accounting for this response were offered: birth trauma and fantasy, separation of child from mother. Binswanger considered this to be inadequate so he looked instead to world-design.

What serves as a clue to the world-design of our little patient is the category of continuity, of continuous connection and containment. This entails a tremendous constriction, simplification,

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40. Ludwig Binswanger, "The Case of Ellen West: An Anthropological-Clinical Study", Rollo May, et al., eds. Existence: A New Dimension in Psychiatry and Psychology (New York, 1958), hereafter designated as EW in this chapter, p. 269.

and depletion of the 'world content', of the extremely complex totality of the patient's context of reference. Everything that makes the world significant is submitted to the rule of that one category which alone supports her 'world' and being. That is what causes the great anxiety about any disruption of continuity, any gap, tearing or separating, being separated or torn...the world suddenly changed its face, disclosing itself from the angle of suddenness, of something totally different, new, and unexpected. For that there was no place in this child's world; it could not enter into her world-design; it stayed, as it were, always outside; it could not be mastered. In other words, instead of being accepted by the inner life so that its meaning and content could be absorbed, it appeared and reappeared over and over again without having any meaning for the existence, in an ever-recurring invasion by the Sudden into the motionlessness of the world-clock.(EAS 203-204)

The task of the psychiatrist in this case will be to help the patient get back to the point where she is able to allow change and suddenness back into her life in a meaningful context. This type of analysis is only possible on the basis of concern with the 'world' of the patient.

It should be quite evident that there is an intimate relationship between Binswanger's concept of psychological science and his concept of man. Binswanger conceives of man's essential structure as that of being-in-the-world (the structure of human existence). That is, man finds himself in a world, a world in which man structures and determines meaning (intentionality). "Unlike the rat in the artificial maze, man does not find himself in a situation that is

strange-for-him and created by another being." [41] Man not only has world, but in a very real sense is able to choose world by leaving himself open to 'let world happen'; to allow for all of the existential possibilities that are available to him. This ability to structure and determine world is a basic constituent of man's essential freedom.

The aim of Daseinsanalyse is precisely to see man as he experiences himself and help him understand this experience. Only then will man be in a position to develop his project (himself). Man is not a mechanistic apparatus, a black box, or collection of instincts and principles. Daseinsanalyse will admit of no stereotyping with regard to human being. Each individual is to be seen as an individual, not as an example of a certain class of people. However, all human beings are grounded by or share in the same fundamental structure of being-in-the-world. For Binswanger, being-in-the-world is much more than a mere concept, it is an articulation of the essential features of 'human being', of what it means to be a man.

The therapeutic aspects of Daseinsanalyse reflect this view of man. First one must comprehend and describe the world-design of the patient, that is, to understand and make clear the particular mode of being-in-the-world that the

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41. Stephan Strasser, Phenomenology and the Human Sciences: A Contribution to a New Scientific Ideal (Pittsburgh, 1963), p. 24.

patient is. The patient is seen as a fellow human being, not as some sort of 'other'. The specific therapy will be decided upon on the basis of the particular world-design in question. In this Binswanger is an eclectic, adopting what therapy is required for the particular individual (be the therapy Freudian, Jungian, Adlerian, or whatever).

Since the relationship of Maslow's work to phenomenology and existentialism is a significant issue for this study, it will receive a detailed examination in a more appropriate chapter of this study. For the present it will suffice to have this general account of the type of psychology Maslow understands himself to be doing.

#### D. Summary

The aim of this chapter has been to provide a general introduction to the basics of the three main 'schools' of psychology. This was done in order to situate Maslow's work. Maslow started out within the behavioristic tradition but soon came to reject it because of its narrow definition of science and its inability to capture and account for what Maslow considered to be the fullness of man. He then moved on to psychoanalysis but also rejected this in turn because of what he felt to be its inadequate conception of man. Finally, he found himself within a tradition which, broadly construed, can be called phenomenological or existential psychology. This study will now move on to a consideration

of Maslow's conception of psychology as a science.

## CHAPTER III

### ABRAHAM MASLOW: SCIENCE AND PSYCHOLOGY

The primary purpose of this chapter will be to provide an introduction to Abraham Maslow's conception of psychological science and his concept of man. This will be accomplished in the following manner. We will provide a general introduction to Maslow's enterprise and then examine his critique of what he calls orthodox science, thereby facilitating a presentation of his conception of science in general and psychology in particular. }

#### A. Introduction

Maslow states that what he wants to do is integrate Freudianism and behaviorism as expressions of scientific (positivistic) psychology into a comprehensive truth. The end result of this will be a new conception of psychology as science. This will entail the rejection of "the traditional but unexamined conviction that orthodox science is the path to knowledge or even that it is the only reliable path."<sup>[1]</sup> It must be recognized that "science is only one means of access to knowledge of natural, social, and psychological

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1. Abraham Maslow, The Psychology of Science: A Reconnaissance (Southbend, Indiana, 1966), hereafter designated as PS in this chapter, p. 1.

reality." [2] The scientist, or anyone else who strives for knowledge, should therefore keep an open mind and use all the avenues that are available to him. There is no single royal road to knowledge and truth.

Maslow conceives of himself as being within the humanist tradition. He notes that this tradition will require, and allow for, the development of "new ways of perceiving and thinking, new images of man and of society, new conceptions of ethics and of values, new directions in which to move." [3] Maslow has been able to capture the basic essence of this endeavor in a few lines.

If I had to condense the thesis of this book into a single sentence, I would have to say that, in addition to what the psychologies of the time had to say about human nature, man also had a higher nature and that this was instinctoid, i.e., part of his essence. And if I could have had a second sentence, I would have stressed the profoundly holistic nature of human nature in contradiction to the analytic-dissecting-atomistic Newtonian approach of the behaviorisms and of Freudian psychoanalysis. (MP ix)

While he initially conceived of this as a discussion confined to the 'family' of psychology, Maslow has since come to see that his position transcends the bounds of psychology alone and verges on that of a genuine

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2. Abraham Maslow, Motivation and Personality (New York, 1970), hereafter designated MP in this chapter, p. 8.

3. Abraham Maslow, Toward a Psychology of Being (New York, 1968), hereafter designated TPB in this chapter, p. iii.

Weltanschauung.[4]

Maslow also claims that "one basic thesis which emerges from this approach is that the model of science in general, inherited from the impersonal sciences of things, objects, animals, and part-processes, is limited and inadequate when we attempt to know and to understand whole and individual persons and cultures"(PS xiii). He notes that an alternative model, as he comprehends it, has not been fully worked out and presented. He wants to present a start at this new science. Thus, the classical concept of science must be replaced by a new one that also includes the highest levels of human nature. Even though all previous attempts to accomplish this have failed, he feels that we now know enough to start such a system on firm ground. In fact, he goes on to note that he believes that Third Force Psychology will lead to a Fourth Force Psychology which will be "transpersonal, transhuman, centered in the cosmos rather -----

4. Cf. Abraham Maslow, Abraham Maslow: A Memorial Volume(Monterey, California, 1972), hereafter designated MV in this chapter, p. 60, where Maslow demonstrates his far-reaching ambition. This quote is taken from his last research contract. "My grand life-long plan is to construct and write the comprehensive and systematic psychology and philosophy of human nature and society, which is now already in process of formation. This humanist psychology is in the truest sense a general and comprehensive outlook on life, a world view or life philosophy that is not merely intellectual but is also a way of living; a system of ethics and values, of politics and economics, of education and religion; a philosophy of science, and so on. A new image of man and a new image of society generates changes in all aspects of human life and in all the social institutions that are, after all, products of human nature."

than in human needs and interests, going beyond humanness, identity, self-actualization, and the like" because we all "need something 'bigger than we are' to be awed by and to ~~commit~~ ourselves to in a new, naturalistic, empirical, non-churchlike sense..."(TPB iv).

Thus, it should come as no surprise that Maslow eventually came to the realization that his theories would probably not be amenable to laboratory confirmation. Nonetheless, as we shall see, this would still be his ideal goal.[5] He concluded that to speak of the needs of human beings is to speak of the essence of their lives and thus only the life situation of the person can act as the proving ground. That is, only actual human existence as lived can determine whether or not Maslow is right. These needs are actually a hierarchy of values which are to be found in the very essence of human nature. Maslow wants to demonstrate that there are indeed higher and lower needs in order to "establish that the organism itself dictates hierarchies of values, which the scientific observer reports rather than

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5. See Abraham Maslow, The Journals of Abraham Maslow, 2 Volumes (Monterey, California, 1979), hereafter designated as J in this chapter, p. 641 where Maslow gives an indication of this desire. "It is a big holistic theory about human beings in the life situation. How could it possibly be tested in a test tube? I realized that Andy Kay's factory was a laboratory test. And that's when I really got excited about McGregor and Drucker and all the rest. They were really putting my theory to the test. And they found it 'worked' after 'trying it out'...But how shall I phrase this kind of evidence? That's what it is, and I think that's the word for it--not proof, or even verification."

creates"(MP 97). This is to deny the contention that values are imposed by the researcher and thus can be ignored, instead of viewing them as really existing in their own right. Not only do all people want and desire these values, they are actually necessary for proper mental health.

Maslow contends that "being a human being--in the sense of being born to the human species--must be defined also in terms of becoming a human being. In this sense a baby is only potentially a human being, and must grow into humanness in the society and the culture, the family"(MP xviii). This, of course, makes it quite clear that the character of the society in which the child is brought up will strongly influence the child's development. Thus equal opportunity to develop to one's full potential must be of prime importance to society.

It is important to realize that as scientists, just like all human beings, we "are too prone to project our own tastes, prejudices, and hopes upon the universe"(MP 5). This indicates that the scientist must be on guard against dogmatics or other strongly held beliefs clouding his vision. Maslow is certainly concerned with 'the Truth', but he does emphasize that truth should be sought after in such a manner as to ensure that it is not altered to fit some a priori model or expectation(MP xxv). The truth, to the extent that it is possible, should be allowed to speak for itself. "However, the only way we know of preventing

contamination of our perceptions of nature, of society, or of ourselves, by human values, is to be very conscious of these values at all times, to understand their influences on perception, and with the aid of such understanding to make the necessary corrections"(MP 6). He also wants to emphasize that by leaving ourselves open to that which is, as it is, we will learn to become good knowers(PS 48). Part of being a good knower is having a certain degree of self-knowledge, which is seen as being a prior requisite for knowledge of the world in general. Thus, it is clear that the scientist will have to acquire a certain amount of self-knowledge.[6] He must know himself in order to ensure that he does not get in the way of his search for truth. Self-knowledge is necessary but not sufficient for being a good knower, we also need to have the appropriate skills.

The ideal of science may well be to reduce, to the extent this is possible, these human determinants of theory, but in order to achieve this it will be necessary to acknowledge and comprehend these influences, not simply deny them. It will also be important to recognize that just as there are laws that govern nature, so too, there are

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6. This notion has its counterpart in psychology as well. In his last public lecture, Maslow stated "that one of the paths to being a helper is to become a better and better person, in the psychotherapeutic sense, in the sense of maturing, evolving, becoming more fully human, and so on. If you want to help other people best, improve yourself. Cure yourself"(MV 46).

intrinsic laws which govern human beings. These two sets of laws are not identical in content (that is, natural laws concern such things as pebbles, wires or atoms, and human laws concern such matters as dreams, fears, and hopes) but may be so in terms of function, in the sense that they both govern and limit the parameters of possibility (MP 7). Both sets must be carefully delineated so as not to confuse the two and thereby either reduce man to the level of nature or raise nature to the level of man.

Maslow believes that experimental psychologists would derive a great deal of benefit from a study of the results and methods of psychotherapy. This is so because psychotherapy can effect so much in a person.

Any thorough study of the aims and goals of therapy must expose very quickly the inadequate development of current personality theory, call into question the basic scientific orthodoxy that values have no place in science, lay bare the limitations of medical notions of health, disease, therapy, and cure, and reveal clearly that our culture still lacks a useable value system. No wonder people are afraid of the problem. Many other examples could be adduced to prove that psychotherapy is an important department of general psychology. (MP 242)

Perhaps the insight of greatest value that can be learned from a study of psychotherapy is that it is an interpersonal relationship between two people. There is no question here of any disinterested observer or subject/object relationship. This difference of attitude will have an impact on the relational aspects of this therapy. A

psychology that is attempting to model itself in the light of natural science will tend toward viewing the patient as being 'other' in the same sense that a chemist might view the chemicals that he is analyzing as other. This type of psychology is usually only concerned with an 'objective' assessment of the problem leading to objective data. There is no concept of a personal involvement with what one is studying, no fundamental personal stake in the activity or the outcome of the activity.[7] Maslow objects to this lack of acknowledgement that this so-called 'other' is actually a fellow human being. Unlike the chemicals of the chemist, the therapist does indeed have something in common with his patient: his humanity. Hence, when the therapist works with a patient he is simultaneously working with himself in the sense that knowledge of being human applies to and concerns him as well. Maslow is of the opinion that this concern must be explicitly acknowledged and that it form one of the

7. Cf. PS 17. "There is a kind of 'law of amount of knowledge' that we might phrase so: the greater the distance from personal knowledge, the greater amount of scientific knowledge, the longer the history of the subject, the safer the study, the more mature the science, etc. And thus it comes about that we know (scientifically) far more about chemicals and metals and electricity than we do about prejudice or exploitation."

essential foundations of any therapy.[8]. Mutual trust and respect are key elements of psychotherapy(MP 247). "Indeed, I think it possible that we may soon even define therapy as a search for values, because ultimately the search for identity, is, in essence, the search for one's own intrinsic, authentic values"(TPB 177). It should also be quite obvious that different people will require different therapies and thus the therapist will need to remain flexible to the point of being able to utilize whatever method is appropriate(MP 250). Therapy is seen as a microcosm of society and hence can contribute to the improvement of society.

If it is clear that scientists are to some extent determined and influenced by their culture, it only follows that the same can be said of their products(MP 8). Hence a sociological analysis, an understanding of the man and his times, will be significant in comprehending the work of any particular person. There will be times when such an examination will shed light on the thoughts, actions and results of the person. For our purposes we need only engage

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8. Abraham Maslow, "Deficiency Motivation and Growth Motivation", Marshall, R. Jones, ed. Nebraska Symposium on Motivation(Lincoln, Nebraska, 1955), p. 1. "For one thing, I am not only the disinterested and impersonal seeker for pure cold truth for its own sake. I am also very definitely interested and concerned with man's fate, with his ends and goals and with his future. I would like to help improve him and to better his prospects. I hope to teach him how to be brotherly, cooperative, peaceful, courageous and just."

in a brief digression in order to highlight some of Maslow's basic character traits. It has been noted by both friends and commentators that Maslow was a very aggressive and determined man.[9] He made the following comment with regard to how he felt about the importance of his work in light of world developments.

In any case my reaction is that there is nothing else to do that is sensible but to proceed on the basis that the world will endure. Any other way of life means giving up and falling into depression and, in a sense, accepting death now. I think I can say it best this way: even if I knew that the world was coming to an end anyway, I'd still keep fighting. I think if I were dropped out of a plane into the ocean and told the nearest land was a thousand miles away, I'd still swim. And I'd despise the one who gave up.(MV 90)

Maslow's Journals are full of stories of his disappointment with colleagues, students, and friends because they were not rigorous and determined enough. It was his deep and personal commitment to his work that allowed him to put virtually all else aside. As he notes, "my own work, for that matter, has been a personal search for a personal answer to personally felt problems which I was trying to solve for myself and for the world at the same time"(J 26). This preoccupation with his work did tend to put a lot of

9. Cf. Richard J. Lowry, A. H. Maslow: An Intellectual Portrait(Monterey, California, 1973), p. 16. "His, for better or worse, was the style of a man who felt he had a great deal of truth to impart to the world and, who, perceiving that life is short, could scarcely take time out for the conventional amenities. Whatever might have been Maslow's virtues and shortcomings, he was in any case a man of great passion and honesty."

people off, especially those who could not share Maslow's sense of the importance of his endeavor. His reaction to this was quite simply that "one must expect to be unpopular with shits unless one wishes himself to become a shit"(J 729). Maslow's driving aim has always been practical and yet very idealistic.

I was first a philosophy student in CCNY and Cornell, or anyway wanted to be, thought myself to be that, and then got impatient with just talking and wanted to do something about these philosophical questions, solve them and move forward, and so turned to psychology as a kind of empirical scientific philosophy. (I remember that my main interest was social philosophy, to improve the world. It went along with my socialism and do-goodism and utopianism and 'idealism'.)(J 164)

It will therefore be very useful to keep in mind that Maslow is passionately concerned with understanding and explaining how human beings can become the best that they possibly can, and then develop the techniques and the understanding necessary for us to reach the ideal state of full and complete 'humaness'. This was Maslow's mission and he fought for it with all he had.

## B. Science and Psychology

### I. Science

Maslow speaks of science generally as "meaning all confirmable knowledge in all its stages of development"(RV 10). Indeed, Maslow has a broad and sweeping view of

science.[10] Hence, there can be no a priori limiting of the kind of data acceptable to science.[11] In the clinical (or any other relevant) setting, for example, we must be certain that what we understand and hear is what is being said, not a construction based on our prejudices or theories(PS 98-99). In order to avoid this problem, we must be able to ascertain, in some manner the reality of the experience.

This is why I can think that (1) most psychological problems do and should begin with phenomenology rather than with objective,

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10. Cf. PS 72 where Maslow gives an indication of just how broad his understanding of science is. "If there is any primary rule of science, it is, in my opinion, acceptance of the obligation to acknowledge and describe all of reality, all that exists, everything that is the case. Before all else science must be comprehensive and all-inclusive. It must accept within its jurisdiction even that which cannot be measured, predicted, controlled, or ordered. It must accept even contradictions and illogicalities and mysteries, the vague, the ambiguous, the archaic, the unconscious, and all other aspects of existence that are difficult to communicate."

11. Cf. J 276 where Maslow offers the following description of those who attempt to fit reality into a pre-determined form. "Had a dream in which a good phrase came to describe limited scientists: they are like the cameras of my youth which could take pictures only in bright sunshine. Or they are like the planes of my youth, which could fly only in clear, sunny, still weather. They defined as 'flying weather' only clear, still days, because that was the only weather they could fly in. Call this 'method-limited truth'. Like seeing the world thru a keyhole and calling it truth. After all, doesn't a psychoanalyst fit this description somewhat? Only that is really true, deeply true, which comes via the psychoanalytic method. Everything else is 'superficial', undynamic, etc. Here is the reductionism, too, if you don't watch out. Lay bare the roots and then define them as the only reality, the true real reality. The rosebush and its roses are 'superficial'."

experimental, behavioral laboratory techniques, and also (2) that we must usually press on from phenomenological beginnings toward objective, experimental, behavioral laboratory methods. This is I think a normal and usual path--from a less reliable beginning toward a more reliable level of knowledge.(PS 47)

That is, we must be concerned with the establishment of the inter-subjective validity of our data.[12] The question, as will be seen, becomes one of the method by which this is to be accomplished.

Maslow certainly does not wish to degrade nor deny the value and importance of abstract knowledge as opposed to experiential knowledge. "It is the dichotomized, solely abstract knowledge that is so dangerous, the abstractions and the systems that are opposed to or dichotomized from experience instead of being built upon it and integrated with it"(PS 66). Thus, what is rejected is abstract theorizing that has no foundation in actual lived

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12. Cf. J 80-81. "If, as I think, there's a good big element of introspection, self-analysis, self-therapy in these things, then there is always the possibility of overgeneralizing from one man's soul. How can I know when, in self-analysis, I have hit the universal or have only hit one character type, or even just one peculiar individual? And yet I approve of this approach to psychological knowledge. It's the best way--maybe the only way at the beginning. Therefore we must be courageous about exploring ourselves, write it out publicly, compare such personal theories with each other to see how general they are or how specific, and thus go toward a generalized phenomenology and general truth out of the varied personal truths."

experience.[13] Maslow states that there really is no substitute for direct, personal experience(PS 45). Thus, science must also take this experiential knowledge into account.[14] "My thesis is that experiential knowledge is prior to verbal-conceptual knowledge but that they are hierarchically-integrated and need each other. No human being dare specialize too much in either kind of knowing. Science with the psyche left in can be shown to be more powerful than the science which excludes experiential data"(PS 46-47). Hence, the scientist should exhibit a greater awareness of actual lived experience. The scientist should be more concerned with reality than with the construction of systems. "A scientist's first duty, then,

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13. This point will be familiar to all who have studied phenomenological-existentialism. Cf. J 166 where Maslow indicates that he too has been influenced by this movement. "Existential psychology and psychiatry is now having--or recently has had-- a huge effect on me. Not so much of teaching me new things (which it did some) but rather of making me realize that's where I belong. Have enjoyed their meetings more than any other, and I feel most at home with them. I've been writing existential psychology all the time and didn't know it." As will be seen in Chapter V, it is precisely a study of Maritain and Giorgi that will assist in an elucidation of exactly what Maslow had been doing without knowing it.

14. Cf. Abraham Maslow, "Deficiency Motivation and Growth Motivation", Marshall R. Jones, ed. Nebraska Symposium on Motivation(Lincoln, Nebraska, 1955), p. 5. "It is unfortunate that we cannot ask a rat to give subjective reports. Fortunately, however, we can ask the human being, and I see no reason in the world why we should refrain from doing so until we have a better source of data. If the 'objective' psychologists trying to define motivation sometimes seem to be staggering about in the dark, perhaps it is because they have voluntarily blind-folded themselves."

is to describe the facts. If these conflict with the demand for a 'good system', then out with the system. Systematizing and theorizing come after the facts. Or, to avoid ruminating over what a fact is, let us say that the first task of the scientist is to experience truly that which exists"(PS 79).

Maslow also cautions against identifying science exclusively with what is generally called natural science. [15] Physics is thus not the only model for scientific investigation, and in the case of psychology it is a particularly inappropriate one. The trend of orthodox science towards mechanization and dehumanization was quite necessary when dealing with rocks, plants, and animals, but it is becoming increasingly evident that one need not dehumanize the human being, nor deny him human purposes(PS 2). These two varying approaches now exist simultaneously,

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15. Cf. MP 15. "Such an attitude is especially dangerous for the psychological and social sciences. Here the injunction to be truly scientific is usually translated as: Use the techniques of the physical and life sciences. Hence we have the tendency among many psychologists and social scientists to imitate old techniques rather than to create and invent the new ones made necessary by the fact that their degree of development, their problems, and their data are intrinsically different from those of the physical sciences. Tradition in science can be a dangerous blessing. Loyalty is an unqualified peril."

but the point is to integrate them into a whole.[16] The assertion is not that orthodox science is incorrect, only that it is inadequate for dealing with a fully developed concept of 'person', and more significantly, it cannot account for the full phenomenal reality of lived experience.[17]

This brings us directly to the more general problem of what Maslow calls 'problem-centering vs. means-centering'. Maslow wants to demonstrate that many of the weaknesses of traditional science and psychology are the result of a technique-centered approach to the defining of science. In effect he is going to argue that some of the shortcomings of contemporary science are due to the fact that the essence of science is seen to lie in its hardware and procedures and not in its problems, questions and goals(MP 11). Maslow

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16. It is important to note that these significant questions and issues which Maslow raises are definitely in need of further clarification. That is, we need to establish the relationship between a philosophy of nature and a science of nature, and then we must discuss the relationship between a philosophy of man and a psychology of man. Maslow's insights and observations will have much more force when seen in this new light. This material will be dealt with in Chapter V.

17. Abraham Maslow, "Dynamics of Personality Organization I", Psychological Review, 50:1943, p. 515. "This conclusion exposes the essentially theoretical nature of the entire reductive effort. It must be understood that this effort is not of the essential nature of science in general. It is simply a reflection or implication in science of an atomistic, mechanical world view which we now have good reason to doubt. Attacking such reductive efforts is then not an attack on science in general, but rather on one of the possible attitudes towards science."

indicates that matters are in such a state that he has never seen any criticism in the literature of a paper being trivial. Rather, the criticism is always directed towards the procedures and techniques (MP 12). The message seems to be that the significance of your research does not matter as long as you do it well. [18] As Maslow notes, "in exchange for Freud, Adler, Jung, Fromm and Horney, we are offered beautifully executed, precise, elegant experiments which, in at least half the cases, have nothing to do with enduring human problems, and which are written primarily for other members of the guild" (PP 21). This criticism does not mean that technique is unimportant, but that technique should not overshadow the goals of science. Technique is important in as much as it helps the scientist to achieve his goals, but

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18. Cf. Abraham Maslow, "A Philosophy of Psychology", Frank T. Severin, ed. Humanistic Viewpoints in Psychology (New York, 1965), hereafter designated as PP in this chapter, pp. 20-21, where Maslow makes a similar comment with regard to psychology. "The sad thing is that most students come into psychology with humanistic interests. They want to find out about people; they want to understand love, hate, hope, fear, ecstasy, happiness, the meaning of life. But what is so often done for those high hopes and yearnings? Most graduate, and even undergraduate, training turns away from these subjects, which are called fuzzy, unscientific, tender-minded, mystical... Instead the student is offered dry bones, techniques, precision, and huge mountains of facts which have little relation to the interests which brought him into psychology. ~~Even worse~~, they try, often successfully, to make the student ashamed of his interests as somehow unscientific. Thus the fine impulses of youth are often lost, and with them, the creativeness, the daring, the boldness, the unorthodoxy, the sense of high mission, the humanistic dedication. Cynicism closes in, and the student settles down to being a member of the guild, with all its prejudices and orthodoxies."

technique should not be allowed to become an end in itself.

When we approach science from the perspective of means-centering, we find that quantification becomes an end in itself (MP 13). This is due to the fact that this approach places a great emphasis on 'how' something is said, instead of on 'what' is said. Quantified responses become the only accepted ones. More drastically, means-centering tends to limit the scope of science. The scientist will only feel comfortable with questions and problems that can be accommodated within the framework of the techniques and apparatus that he knows well and are available to him. As Maslow states, this makes the scientist seem much like "the famous drunk who looked for his wallet, not where he lost it, but under the street lamp, 'because the light is better there'..." (MP 13). A preoccupation with technique will have the result of drastically narrowing the scope of scientific investigation. Hence, many important questions and problems will be ignored because they cannot be studied by current

techniques and thus are unscientific.[19]

Means-centering tends to retard the development of new techniques and usually results in the scientist relying instead on the established ones. It also blocks the asking of certain questions, namely questions such as those concerning the subjective or values, simply because such questions do not arise, or cannot be answered, by the current techniques being employed. This, too, will have a limiting effect on the scope of science. A heavy emphasis on technique allows the scientist to believe that he is avoiding the question of values because "methods are ethically neutral; problems and questions may not be, for sooner or later, they involve all the knotty arguments about values. One way of avoiding the problem of values is to stress the techniques of science rather than the goals of science"(MP 17). However, this is not possible, for science as a human endeavor cannot be independent of human

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19. Cf. J 402 where Maslow offers the following comment. "Very useful thought also: compare mechanized science to Henry Ford-style assembly-line type of organization and style of work and worker. E.G., the whole man is not needed--just his hands, or a particular easily learned partial skill; the job is broken down into parts and bits not needing highly trained people; judgments, taste, idiosyncrasy, connoisseurship, professionalism, autonomy, pride--all these are minimized. It leads toward an entrepreneur or manager sitting in an office planning for a large organization of ad hoc trained, unskilled, interchangeable, anonymous people. The paradigm toward which this leads or points is automated science without people."

values.[20] Clearly, science, regardless of definition, cannot be value-free because it is always someone who designs, interprets and analyses.[21]

This problem of 'attitude' becomes manifestly evident in psychology. The psychologist may view an experience as unique or he may view it as typical and thus merely file it under the appropriate category(MP 203). The second reaction is called 'rubricizing' or 'abstracting' because the psychologist does not really properly examine the experience but takes in only enough to see what file to put it in. Maslow charges that "most American psychological activity proceeds as if reality were fixed and stable rather than

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20. Cf. Abraham Maslow, The Farther Reaches of Human Nature(Middlesex, England, 1976), p. 5 where Maslow notes that "I am convinced that the value-free, value-neutral, value-avoiding model of science that we inherited from physics, chemistry, and astronomy, where it was necessary and desirable to keep the data clean and also to keep the church out of scientific affairs, is quite unsuitable for the scientific study of life. Even more dramatically is this value-free philosophy of science unsuitable for human questions, where personal values, purposes and goals, intentions and plans are absolutely crucial for the understanding of any person, and even for the classical goals of science, prediction and control."

21. Cf. PS 122. "For one thing the whole scientific process is itself shot through with selectiveness, choice, and preference. We could even call it gambling if we wanted to, as well as good taste, judgment, and connoisseurship. No scientist is a mere camera eye or tape recorder. He is not indiscriminate in his activities. He doesn't do just anything. He works at problems that he characterizes as 'important' or as 'interesting', and he comes up with 'elegant' or 'beautiful' solutions. He does 'pretty' experiments, and prefers 'simpler' and 'clearer' results to confused or sloppy ones."

changing and developing (a state rather than a process), and as if it were discrete and additive rather than interconnected and patterned" (MP 204). In keeping with his dynamic view of man, Maslow argues that past experiences are not isolated, atomistic bits of data, but are all part of the process of character formation. Maslow would thus claim that with regard to a particular person "the influence of some tragic experience would be to change him from an immature person to a more mature adult, wiser, more tolerant, more humble, better able to solve any of the problems of adult life", while on the other hand, the contrasting theory of orthodox science "would be that he had changed in no way except by the ad hoc acquisition of a technique of managing or solving such and such a particular type of problem, e.g., the death of his mother" (MP 214). What Maslow states is that the whole person has been changed by this experience, not just part of him. He wants to argue that the two approaches need not diametrically oppose each other, but must nonetheless be differentiated. Both are needed in order to present the whole picture: there is both change and stability. [22]

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22. Cf. RV vii where Maslow indicates that holistic thinkers will have quite a problem convincing others of their analysis because "they learn inevitably that most people think atomistically, in terms of either-or, black-white, all in or all out, of mutual exclusiveness and separateness. A good example of what I mean is the mother who gave her son two ties for his birthday. As he put on one of them to please her, she asked sadly, 'And why do you hate the other tie?'"

While it is certainly the case that there are times when it is helpful to simply rubricize our experience, this is not generally the case for the psychologist. Instead, he should let reality speak for itself to its fullest extent in order to grasp a comprehensive picture. "This all amounts to saying that we must treat the experience as if it were unique and unlike anything else in the world and that our only effort must be to apprehend it in its own nature, rather than to try to see how it fits into our theories, our schemes, and our concepts"(MP 207-208). It is the hermeneutical position of not pre-determining the answer.[23] The implication of this is that, at the very least, scientists and psychologists should attempt to allow

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23. Cf. Abraham Maslow, "Cognition of the Particular and the Generic", Psychological Review, 50:1948 pp. 24-25 where Maslow notes that "The truest contrast with rubricizing attention is probably furnished by Freud's concept of 'free-floating attention'. Observe that Freud recommends passive rather than active attending on the grounds that active attention tends to be an imposition of a set of expectations upon the real world. Such expectations can drown out the voice of reality, if it be weak enough. Freud recommends that we be yielding, humble, passive, interested only in finding out what reality has to say to us, concerned only to allow the intrinsic structure of the material to determine that which we perceive. This all amounts to saying that we must treat the experience as if it were unique and unlike anything else in the world and that our only effort must be to apprehend it in its own nature, rather than to try to see how it fits into our theories, our schemes, and our concepts. This is in the most complete sense a recommendation to problem-centering and against ego-centering. To the fullest extent possible, the ego, its experiences and its pre-conceptions, its hopes and its fears are to be put aside if we are to apprehend the per se, intrinsic nature of the experience before us."

for more direct experience as it is given, instead of simply cataloguing it (MP 208). Again, the need for a new conception of science and the role of the scientist is called for. [24]

Another aspect of rubricizing is that because it tends to make everything into something familiar, stereotyping it, the psychologist will also find that "along with successful placing of the problem goes an automatically available set of techniques for handling the problem" (MP 219). Thus, there will be a definite tendency to interpret the unfamiliar into that which is familiar just to make the psychologist feel more comfortable with the data and the concomitant techniques. It would, of course, be much better if a thorough examination were carried out instead of this reductive abstracting. As well, this rubricizing and stereotyping will encourage the rationalization of conclusions instead of the actual discovery of conclusions (MP 220). This rationalization, regardless of how skillful it may be, must be distinguished from true creative thought and the lack of thought that is often hidden in the guise of belief.

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24. Maslow is, of course, correct in this assertion, but what must be emphasized is that such a new science cannot be obtained unless one realized the necessity of joining a philosophy of man with a psychology of man and then demonstrating the continuity between the two disciplines. This is not brought to light by Maslow to a sufficient degree and hence will be developed further in Chapter V.

## II. The Study of Man

In the beginning, so to speak, man was studied by the same methods used in biology and physics. The problem areas were those that these methods could accommodate (PS 102). Maslow notes that too many psychologists have simply accepted the philosophy and conceptions of the natural sciences merely because these sciences were successful in their own terms. However, he contends that psychology should not blindly accept any given model, but rather, attempt to develop a philosophy, a methodology, and a view of science which will be applicable for its concerns (PP 22). Hence, Maslow wants to reject the natural sciences as a model for psychology and suggests instead that we "take knowledge of the person as the model case from which to create paradigms or models of methodology, conceptualization, and Weltanschauung, of philosophy and epistemology" (PS 102-103). Maslow believes that we must be in 'love' with the object of study, i.e., that we must care, be concerned, interested and involved (PS 109). What Maslow suggests here is that we must be integrally involved with

the object of study, in this case man.[25] In orthodox science the preferred role model is that of the detached, non-participant observer. However, Maslow claims that this is a virtually impossible position to maintain, particularly in psychology. As he notes, "one trouble with classical science applied to psychology is that all it knows how to do well is to study people as objects, when what we need is to be able to study them also as subjects"(PS 54). This is a person to person relationship because when we study man, we also study ourselves, that is, in psychology we also deal

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25. Cf. Abraham Maslow, Eupsychian Management: A Journal (Homewood, Illinois, 1965), hereafter designated EM in this chapter, p. 201. "One of the sharp differences between the Freudian point of view and the existential point of view is the phrasing of the relationship between the therapist and the patient. The Freudians, at least officially, speak of transference and countertransference only; that is, there is no other kind of relationship which is systematically embedded in the theoretical structure. And it should be remembered that both transference and countertransference are defined as irrational, unreal, neurotic, attitudes which are to be analyzed away by insight, and which will disappear before insight. That is, truth will destroy them. The tendency probably is, therefore, for the normal gratitude that a patient may have for a person who has helped him out of his sickness, out of pain and misery, to be analyzed away under the head of transference. No possibility of friendship or of normal gratitude which a helped person ought to have for the one who helps him is possible theoretically. But in existential psychotherapy there can be a place for this aspect of the relationship of love between two human beings. And then, of course, we would turn the tables. I certainly would wonder what was wrong with a person who had been helped, e.g., out of a depression or an anxiety neurosis, by a therapist and who did not feel some gratitude, some affection, some desire to return the favor. Such a man would in fact be sick in a profound human way."

with the question of self-knowledge.[26]

This also highlights the question of the goals of science and knowledge. Maslow claims that the ultimate goals of knowledge about people are different from those of knowledge concerning things or animals(PS 40). As a rule we are usually more concerned with questions of prediction and control with regard to the latter. However, when it comes to people Maslow rejects this as a legitimate or desirable goal. Rather, what should be emphasized is knowledge in the form of understanding and self-understanding. Maslow goes on to make a rather significant observation regarding why we sometimes fear this type of knowledge, particularly self-knowledge. "While human beings love knowledge and seek it--they are curious--they also fear it. The closer to the personal it is, the more they fear it. So human knowledge is apt to be a kind of dialectic between this love and this fear"(PS 16). Thus, the psychoanalyst, for instance, will always have to be aware of this potent resistance to self-consciousness. Fear notwithstanding, Maslow wants to argue "that if we know our own biological nature, i.e., the intrinsic self, well enough, then this knowledge indicates

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26. Cf. EM 183. "Here the stress of the existential psychotherapists, as I interpret them, would be helpful, i.e., of brother human beings who are in the same boat, in the same human condition, helping each other as an older brother helps a younger brother out of love rather than out of condescension. We must certainly give up here in these groups any taint of the old medical paradigms in which a healthy man treated sick people, in an authoritative way."

to us our personal destiny. That is, it implies that we would love our own nature and would yield to it, enjoy it, and express it fully if only we know it well enough"(PS 41). He notes that most people resent being thought of as predictable and will at times act deliberately so as to be unpredictable.[27]

We can value knowledge not only for its own sake as a matter of personal growth, but also as a way to reduce anxiety(TPB 64). For example, we might be afraid of something that is unfamiliar to us, but by coming to 'know' it the fear will go away. We can also avoid knowledge as a way of reducing anxiety(TPB 66). There are times which dictate that we would be better off if we did not have any knowledge about the matter, that is, ignorance may indeed be bliss on certain occasions. This is also one way of avoiding making decisions and hence avoiding

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27. Cf. PS 43. "Freedom has now become Spinozistic, i.e., the freedom to embrace and to love one's own destiny, which is certainly determined at least in part by the discovery and the understanding of what and who one is, of one's Real Self (a la Horney), and of being eager to surrender to it. This is to let it control, to choose freely to be determined by it; thus it is to transcend the dichotomies 'freedom vs. determinism' or 'freedom vs. control', or 'understanding as a goal vs. prediction and control as goals'."

responsibility.[28]

Unlike some other sciences, it is difficult to say precisely exactly what the fundamental datum of psychology is. In fact, it seems to be far easier to say what it is not. As we go through the list of not's "we wind up with the paradoxical conclusion that the fundamental datum of psychology is the original complexity that psychologists had set themselves to analyze into elements or fundamental units"(MP 295). In other words, we find that the fundamental datum of psychology is man. In clinical psychology "the patient, it is now realized, must be approached as a single, unique person rather than as a member of a class;—that is, if the main purpose is psychotherapy. Understanding a person is not the same as classifying or rubricizing him. And understanding a person is the sine qua non for therapy." [29] It thus becomes somewhat improper to even search for a fundamental datum, as understood by natural science, simply because man as complex being cannot be

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28. Cf. Abraham Maslow, "The Need to Know and the Fear of Knowing", The Journal of General Psychology, 68:1963, p. 118 where Maslow once again acknowledges the value he places on understanding Freud, especially on this issue of self-knowledge. "From our point of view, Freud's greatest discovery, the one which lies at the root of psychodynamics, is that the great cause of much psychological illness is the fear of knowledge of oneself--of one's emotions, impulses, memories, capacities, potentialities, of one's destiny."

29. Abraham Maslow, "Resistance to Being Rubricized", Bernard Kaplan and Seymour Wapnes, eds. Perspectives in Psychological Theory: Essays in Honor of Heinz Werner (New York, 1960), p. 177.

reduced or redefined into simpler elements. In short, atomistic and reductionist models of science are not appropriate for psychology(MP 296).

In orthodox science the usual procedure is to investigate the particular in order to be able to generalize about the universal(PS 9). This is seen to be unacceptable when studying people because each one is unique and hence this type of empirical generalization will not suffice. People are not mere samples.[30] The problem is that people generally are unique and not interchangeable. Maslow contends that his work experience led him to the conclusion that the reductive and atomistic techniques of orthodox science are simply not appropriate for a study of the human person. Instead, a holistic approach is the only one that affords proper results(PS 11). It must be recalled that the goal here is knowledge of the whole person, not just some isolated aspects of the person. Initially Maslow had found that the techniques and general approach of the orthodox scientists were perfectly adequate for his purposes. "So long as I worked behaviorally with dogs and monkeys and

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30. Cf. PS 9. "Any one sample is just that, a sample; it is not itself. It stands for something. It is anonymous, expendable, not unique, not sacred, not sine qua non; it has no proper name all its own and is not worthwhile in itself as a particular instance. It is interesting only insofar as it represents something other than itself. This is what I mean when I say that orthodox, textbook science normally and centrally studies classes of things, or interchangeable objects. There are no individuals in a textbook of physics or chemistry, let alone mathematics."

experimented with learning and conditioning and with motivated behavior, the available methodological tools served me well"(PS 13). However, he indicates that he found problems when he started asking new and difficult questions concerning the higher aspects of human existence, aspects which could not be accommodated by orthodox science. "I discovered then that many scientists disdain what they cannot cope with, what they cannot do well"(PS 14). He notes that scientists will simply have to learn to live with imprecise data when they are engaged in the first efforts of a new research.

It is also the case that a person, unlike another 'object' of knowledge, has to want to be known or at least allow himself to be known(PS. 17). Unlike physical science where it is generally conceded that the elimination of purpose is necessary, it is the case that when studying people "you must make your epistemological peace with the fact that people have purposes and goals of their own even though physical objects do not"(PS 18). It is "this simple fact, which is excluded systematically from the model of classical physical science, which automatically makes its methods less appropriate for studying most human behavior"(PS 18). The problem is further aggravated by the fact that these purposes may be unknown to the individual(PS 19).

We are then left with the obvious problem of exactly

how are we to study man in a scientific manner within the realm of psychology. Clearly some sort of alternative model of scientific investigation is required. We know that there are at least two ways of approaching any phenomena: we view it as self-contained, or we can situate it within the context of the whole (MP 296-297). These two approaches need not be in conflict as long as we realize that they provide different types of information. Thus, before we can ask any specific questions about the person, we must understand the person as a whole. We must grasp the whole before we can situate the particular. Maslow found that the problems increased when he went from the study of pathological people to nonpathological people (PS 14-15). The difficulty was the problem of values, norms and the meaning of health. These were questions which orthodox science is ill-equipped to confront (PS 15). The situation is very much like having a hammer as your only tool and thus treating everything as a nail (PS 15-16). As we have seen, "if you define 'science' as that which it is able to do, then that which it is not able to do becomes 'non-science', i.e., unscientific" (PS 16). This results in scientists restricting themselves to studying only that which can be accommodated by already existent techniques. By way of example he goes on to note that science and religion have been needlessly dichotomized, at least in a general sense. "My thesis is, in general, that new developments in psychology are forcing a profound change in our philosophy of science, a change so extensive

that we may be able to accept the basic religious questions as a proper part of the jurisdiction of science, once science is broadened and redefined"(RV 11). Maslow contends that science and religion can both address themselves to the question of values; this is not the exclusive domain of religion. This denial of values results from the view of science as merely being a tool or instrument(RV 12).

### C. Summary

The main goal of this chapter has been to explicate Maslow's conception of science in general and psychology in particular. We saw that Maslow had serious doubts concerning the appropriateness of what may be called orthodox, or natural, science as the only or best means of gaining knowledge, let alone a comprehensive understanding of man. Hence, he wanted to take the two main representatives of psychology as a natural science, psychoanalysis and behaviorism, and integrate their best aspects into a new vision of science and psychology. He particularly wanted to avoid the reductionism and the stereotyping that natural science inflicts on all that it studies, especially man. In place of this natural science Maslow suggests a different view of science, one that is based on holistic analysis. This is a crucial point which will receive more appropriate attention in Chapter V.

However, let us anticipate a little and indicate that Maslow seems to be satisfied with stating that orthodox science is inadequate, that there is indeed room for an enlarged concept of science. However, he does not fully and adequately develop this idea. With the aid of Maritain and Giorgi we will be able to complete and deepen Maslow's epistemology, which despite its many merits simply does not go deep enough on this matter.

His concern was with all the various aspects of man, especially the higher ones. This new science and psychology would be such that they allowed for an examination of man in a truly comprehensive and accurate manner. The concern would now be with the given as it is given and experienced, and with the individual as a unique individual.

We will now turn, in Chapter IV, to a basic presentation of Maslow's psychology. This will complete the expository part of this study and set the stage for our critical evaluation of Maslow's enterprise.

## CHAPTER IV

### THIRD FORCE PSYCHOLOGY

This chapter will, in a sense, be a continuation of the previous one. It is now possible for us to move on to a specific consideration of Maslow's own position called 'Third Force Psychology'. Hence, in this chapter we will look at the basic assumptions of his psychology, the specifics of his position, and start our examination of one of the central themes of Maslow's work, namely, self-actualization. We will also examine the broader implications of Third Force Psychology.

#### A. Prologue to a Theory of Motivation

Before proceeding directly to a presentation of Maslow's psychology it will be beneficial to consider a number of propositions and conditions concerning motivation which Maslow believes must be incorporated into any theory of motivation which is to be considered adequate and sound.

It will become evident that these pre-conditions, and the actual theory of motivation itself, revolve around a basic distinction between what Maslow sees as a holistic standpoint and what he sees as a mechanistic-causal model.

Put simply this is a difference between motivation based on 'pulls' (that is, goals, ends, purposes), and 'pushes' (that is, causes, forces, agencies, or structures, as described by behaviorism or psychoanalysis). As will also be seen, this entails differing concepts of the status and character of man. In brief, what we have here is the difference between a teleological view and a mechanistic one. On the one hand, the teleological view implies that man is a purposeful initiator, the author, of his actions; on the other hand, the mechanistic view presents man as acted upon, determined and controlled. Maslow will clearly adopt the holistic standpoint and rejects any type of mechanical causality as being inadequate for the task of accounting for the character of man.

The individual must be considered as "an integrated, organized whole" and not just as some atomistic collection of attributes.[1] In the specific case of motivation theory this entails that the actions of a person must be understood as an action or desire of the whole person and not just a part of him. "Individuals had best be studied as whole personalities in all their complexity and richness, and with all available techniques. There can, of course, be no stinting of time here. The aim should be to understand the individual as completely as possible rather than to restrict

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1. Abraham Maslow, Motivation and Personality (New York, 1970), hereafter designated as MP in this chapter, p. 19.

oneself to any limited research problem." [2] For instance, when a person is hungry it is the whole person who is hungry, not just his stomach which is hungry (MP 19). Hence, the approach to understanding motivation and behavior must be holistic, not atomistic, in character. [3] As Maslow notes, there is here a contrast of two differing world views. One is holistic, functional, dynamic and purposive; the other is atomistic, taxonomic, static, causal and simple-mechanical (MP 299). Usually we adopt one or the other, but it is possible for them to be complimentary as long as we keep in mind what questions are being asked.

Maslow contends that causality is the crux of the atomistic-reductive position. He therefore wants to give this concept some special attention. "If one sees the world as a collection of intrinsically independent entities, there remains to be solved the very obvious phenomenal fact that these entities nevertheless have to do with each other" (MP 300). The first attempt will be on the billiard ball model where things interact but still retain their essential

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2. Abraham Maslow, "Experimentalizing the Clinical Method", Journal of Clinical Psychology, 1:1945, p. 242.

3. Cf. Abraham Maslow, The Journals of Abraham Maslow, 2 Volumes (Monterey, California, 1979), hereafter designated as J in this chapter, p. 1073, where Maslow offers a description of what he understands as holistic technique. "Use the example of looking at a microscope slide. First, you look at it against the light, grossly, with the naked eye. Then you zero in with the lowest-power lens, then with the next higher power, and finally with your highest-power lens. Good holistic technique."

identity. Unfortunately modern physics has made this simple view untenable. The new causal position holds that there is a multiplicity of causes; however, we do not have a new theory, but simply the old one in a more complex form. They are basically the same world view. Maslow claims that causality simply cannot explain a personality syndrome because everything within the syndrome must be seen as a cause and effect of everything else (MP 300). He believes this to be an untenable position. Maslow's definition of a personality syndrome "is that it is a structured, organized complex of apparently diverse specificities (behaviors, thoughts, impulses to action, perceptions, etc.) which, however, when studied carefully and validly are found to have a common unity that may be phrased variously as a similar dynamic meaning, expression, 'flavor', function, or purpose" (MP 303). Thus a syndrome is like a stew, it has many different components that are identifiable but yet we are talking about a whole. [4]

4. Cf. Abraham Maslow, "The Dynamics of Psychological Security-Insecurity", Character and Personality, 10:1942, p. 332. "For the philosophically minded psychologist we may say that the notion of the syndrome and the technique of syndrome analysis arises from a dissatisfaction with the concept of causality and also represents an attempt to combine synthetic and analytic methodologies, so that both whole and specificities may be dealt with without doing violence to either. More specifically, we are trying to retain our respect for the wholeness and uniqueness of the human personality at the same time that we wish to study it analytically, dissecting it for the sake of a better ultimate understanding of its wholeness."

Physiological drives, such as hunger, are not the best model upon which to formulate a theory of motivation. Instead of concentrating on the physiological aspects, we should actually pay far more attention to what are usually considered as secondary drives, e.g., the desires "for clothes, automobiles, friendliness, company, praise, prestige, and the like...In actuality these are far more important for us and they are far more common. It would therefore be well to make one of them paradigm rather than the hunger drive"(MP, 20).

We must also recognize that the average desires of daily life are "usually means to an end rather than ends in themselves"(MP 21). These ends set the stage for a new desire that leads to a new end. We thus have a dynamic chain of desires leading to ends to desires and so on. However, there will come a stage when we reach our ultimate or absolute ends. Hence, any comprehensive study of motivation must keep in mind the fact that it is part of "the study of the ultimate human goals or desires or needs"(MP 22). A need is basic or instinctoid if it has the following characteristics: "its absence breeds illness; its presence prevents illness; its restoration cures illness, under certain (very complex) free choice situations, it is preferred by the deprived person over other satisfactions; it is found to be inactive, at a low ebb, or functionally

absent in the healthy person." [5] It may well be the case that many of these goals are unconscious in character, and as a result, to study only conscious motivational life will not be sufficient. "Psychoanalysis has often demonstrated that the relationship between a conscious desire and the ultimate unconscious aim that underlies it need not be at all direct... We may then assert that sound motivation theory cannot possibly afford to neglect the unconscious life" (MP 22). In the same vein it can be seen that overt behavior itself may be somewhat misleading. It is a question of meaning. Overt behavior such as going to church can mean a great many things to the person who is doing it. Only after we understand why he goes to church can we speak of whether or not he is a religious person. Another example would be that of political radicalism: some people hold this view for sincere personal commitment, and others just because they are poor or disadvantaged, or perhaps for any number of psychological reasons. The psychological analysis will naturally vary depending on the reason (MP 298).

While it is true that the appropriate means to achieve a particular end will vary from culture to culture, the ends aimed at are in fact reasonably consistent. That is, there are ultimate ends, such as self-esteem or belonging, that are shared by all human beings. They may be expressed

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5. Abraham Maslow, Toward a Psychology of Being (New York, 1968), hereafter designated as TPB in this chapter, p. 22.

differently, but they are still held in common. It would seem to be the case that human beings are actually more alike than one would think (MP 22-23):

Even though the expression of a particular desire may seem to indicate that one is acting for certain reasons, the actual motivation might indeed be something else. As Maslow notes, "we have learned from the study of psychopathology that a conscious desire or motivated behavior... may serve as a kind of channel through which other purposes may express themselves" (MP 23). That is, the same act for different people may well be motivated by divergent desires. "The main effort in holistic thinking is perceiving as clearly as possible the intrinsic nature of the problem with which one is confronted... It is examined carefully in its own right and in its own type almost as if no other such problem had been met before." [6] Thus, rigid a priori classification will not be feasible.

It must also be recognized that motivations are not isolated or static states of being, but rather, we should "assume that motivation is constant, never ending, fluctuating, and complex, and that it is an almost universal characteristic of practically every organismic state of affairs" (MP 24). Thus, motivation theory will have to

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6. Abraham Maslow, "Cognition of the Particular and the Generic", Psychological Review, 55:1948, p. 34.

capture and account for this essentially dynamic view of human behavior.

People are basically always desiring something and these desires are not isolated from one another but are integrally related. As was previously mentioned, we are to understand man holistically, not atomistically. When this is done it will become clear that "the human being is never satisfied except in a relative one-step-along-the-path fashion, and second, that wants seem to arrange themselves in some sort of hierarchy of prepotency" (MP 25). It is crucial for any sound motivational theory to incorporate these points, but Maslow claims that it rarely happens.

It is not possible to develop atomistic lists of drives or needs. This cannot be done because all drives are not equal in force or occurrence, nor do they apply to all individuals uniformly. Secondly, such a listing denies that these drives are all inter-related. Also, the completeness of such a list would always be dubious for one could challenge the criteria upon which the list was formulated. Lists will usually vary from researcher to researcher. What is needed is a universal classification that is not subject to the whims of individual researchers. "The weight of evidence now available seems to me to indicate that the only sound and fundamental basis on which any classification of motivational life may be constructed is that of the fundamental goals or needs, rather than on any listing of

drives in the ordinary sense of instigation (the 'pulls' rather than the 'pushes')" (MP 26).

Data gathered from animals, either experimentally or in the field, is certainly of value, but as Maslow notes there are certainly potential problems with relying too heavily on animal data.

Behaviorism originated in a sensible reaction against anthropomorphizing animal psychology, but the pendulum has swung too far, and instead it has rodentomorphized human psychology, studying the person as if he were just a complicated white rat. It is indeed a mistake to attribute human motives to laboratory animals, but is it a mistake to attribute human motives to humans? [7].

Thus, the prime emphasis must be placed on a study of the human being (MP 27).

Behavior does not, of course, manifest itself in a vacuum. "We must certainly grant at once that human motivation rarely actualizes itself in behavior except in relation to the situation and to other people. Any theory of motivation must of course take account of this fact, including not only in the environment but also in the organism itself, the role of cultural determination" (MP 28). We must acknowledge that environment and culture are certainly significant factors which must be taken into consideration, but "psychology should study the human being

7. Abraham Maslow, "A Philosophy of Psychology", Frank T. Severin, ed. Humanistic Viewpoints in Psychology (New York, 1965), hereafter designated as PP in this chapter, p. 30.

not just as passive clay, helplessly determined by outside forces. Man is, or should be, an active, autonomous, self-governing mover, chooser and center of his own life"(PP 31). Thus we must not make the mistake of over-emphasizing these external factors to the extent of reducing the individual to merely these aspects:

Motivation theory must be able to account for the fact that people usually do act as integrated wholes, but that there are indeed certain instances when they do not(MP 29). Flexibility in order to be faithful to lived experience will thus be important. The possibility of attaining these goals is another crucial factor that must be examined. "On the whole we yearn consciously for that which might conceivably be actually attained...Attention to this factor of possibility of attainment is crucial for understanding the differences in motivation between various classes and castes within our own population and between it and other poorer countries and cultures"(MP 31). This is something that Maslow believes is generally neglected by most psychologists.

We should consider the healthy in our society and not rely so heavily on the sick for our data concerning human motivation. "Any theory of motivation that is worthy of attention must deal with the highest capacities of the healthy and the strong man as well as with the defensive maneuvers of crippled spirits"(MP 33). We should learn from

the best we have to offer, not the worst. This does not mean to imply that the sick should be ignored, but rather, that the healthy individual will afford us a more comprehensive view of the proper course for human motivation. This can then be applied to the sick. We need to adopt a more positive attitude towards man.

It is these basic conditions which Maslow wants to incorporate into his theory of motivation. In effect, they provide us with the fundamentals of his theory.

#### B. Maslow's Theory of Human Motivation

This section will have the primary aim of formulating what Maslow calls a "positive theory of motivation that will satisfy the theoretical demands listed in the previous [section] and at the same time conform to the known facts, clinical and observational as well as experimental" (MP 35). Maslow states that his position is indeed a synthesis and integration of a number of different approaches and he views it as a 'holistic-dynamic' theory.

The primary point of departure for most motivational theories is that of the physiological needs. Maslow is of the opinion that this must be questioned and revised (MP 35). As has been indicated above, Maslow contends that it is impossible to make a proper list of such needs due to the

varying degree of specificity on the part of the different researchers. It is also the case that these physiological drives may not be entirely what they appear to be, i.e., "the person who thinks he is hungry may actually be seeking more for comfort, or dependence, than for vitamins or protein"(MP 36). This, of course, does not deny the significance of physiological needs. In fact, Maslow admits that they are "the most prepotent of all needs"(MP 36).

What this means is that if our basic needs are all unsatisfied then we will become dominated by the physiological needs(MP 37). The other needs will either take a diminished role or disappear altogether. Another thing that happens in this circumstance is that the person's whole outlook and thoughts of the future will be affected. For instance, a person who is hungry will tend to conceive of Utopia as a place of plentiful food(MP 37). Under normal circumstances this would not be the aspect that would be most strongly emphasized.

This leads us to what is wrong with the more traditional approach of developing a theory of motivation solely on the basis of physiological needs. In general we can say that this approach denies the existence of higher needs and the ways these needs are satisfied (or at least ignores them) and only admits of the lower ones. This does not do justice to the character of man. This approach also seems to be based on emergency conditions which are not

necessarily the lot of man. For instance, if starvation were to be eradicated, of what use would this physiological approach be in explaining subsequent behavior? Thus, it is the case that the specifics of the results of physiological research cannot be denied (i.e., the effects of hunger), but the generality of this approach can (MP 37). Further, the wide-spread use of rats for obtaining physiological data which is then applied to man is very misleading for the simple reason that to the best of our knowledge "rats have few motivations other than physiological ones" and hence do not really afford a viable mirror of man (MP 37-38).

It thus becomes clear that as long as motivational theory is thought of as being exclusively grounded by physiological needs, no other needs or concerns will enter the picture. But what would happen if the physiological needs were gratified? "At once other (and higher) needs emerge and these, rather than physiological hunger, dominate the organism. And when these in turn are satisfied, again new (and still higher) needs emerge, and so on. That is what we mean by saying that the basic human needs are organized into a hierarchy of relative prepotency" (MP 38). This realization provides us with the proper approach for a comprehensive and adequate theory of human motivation. It is also crucial to note that "gratification becomes as important a concept as deprivation in motivation theory, for it releases the organism from the domination of relatively

more physiological needs, permitting thereby the emergence of other more social goals"(MP 38).

Once the physiological needs are relatively gratified there emerge what Maslow calls the safety needs such as security, protection, need for structure, and so on (MP 39). Just as with the physiological needs it is possible that the individual may well become dominated by the safety needs. However, it is the case that most people in our society

feel safe enough from wild animals, extremes of temperatures, criminal assault, murder, chaos, and so on. Therefore, in a very real sense, he no longer has any safety needs as active motivators...If we wish to see these needs directly and clearly we must turn to neurotic and near-neurotic individuals, and to economic and social underdogs, or else to social chaos, revolution, or breakdown of authority.(MP 41)

All of which are less than ideal for proper human development.. Also included under safety needs are the more general preferences with the familiar rather than the unknown, and religious or world philosophies that help us to organize and structure the world(MP 41-42). It should be noted that safety needs are not the only motivating factors for science, religion or philosophy. This will be elaborated on shortly. Under the rubric of safety needs we can say that some neurotics, though by no means all, are

people who have not had these safety needs gratified.[8] Specifically, "the neurosis in which the search for safety takes its clearest form is in the comprehensive-obsessive neurosis. Comprehensive-obsessives try frantically to order and stabilize the world so that no unmanageable, unexpected, or unfamiliar dangers will ever appear"(MP 42).

If the physiological and safety needs are both gratified to a sufficient degree, then the next level of needs to emerge are the love and affection and belongingness needs(MP 43). These belonging needs are witnessed by the damaging effects "of the general over-mobility that is forced by industrialization; of being without roots, or of despising one's roots, one's origins, one's group; of being torn from one's home and family, and friends and neighbors; of being a transient or a newcomer rather than a native"(MP 43). Hence in order to fulfill these belonging needs we form and join various personal growth groups and communities partly because through these agencies we hope to overcome alienation from ourselves, others and the community at

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8. Cf. Abraham Maslow, "Deficiency Motivation and Growth Motivation", Marshall R. Jones, ed. Nebraska Symposium on Motivation(Lincoln, Nebraska), p. 21. "A major characteristic of people who seek psychotherapy is a former and/or present deficiency of basic-need gratification. To a larger extent than the Freudians are yet willing to admit, neurosis is a deficiency-disease. Because this is so, a basic necessity for cure is supplying what has been lacking or making it possible for the patient to do this himself. Since these supplies come from other people, ordinary therapy must be interpersonal."

large; the generation gap; the breakdown of the traditional family; and the de-personalizing effects of massive industrialization and its consequent urbanizing effect (MP 44). In short, by belonging and being loved we want to avoid the alienation of modern industrial society and the problems of modern living.

As these three levels of needs become gratified there emerge the esteem needs which can be classified into two basic sets. The first division is that of the "desire for strength, for achievement, for adequacy...for confidence in the face of the world, and for independence and freedom" (MP 45). The second is the desire for reputation, status, recognition, and so on. The gratification of the esteem needs leads to self-confidence and a feeling of worth, while the thwarting of these needs leads to feelings of inferiority and inadequacy, ultimately resulting in the development of some sort of compensatory neurosis (MP 45).

Although all four levels of needs have been relatively gratified, there still exists the need for a man to be all that he can be. This need is called the need and desire for self-actualization.

Even if all these needs are satisfied, we may still often (if not always) expect that a new discontent and restlessness will soon develop, unless the individual is doing what he is fitted for. A musician must make music, an artist must paint, a poet must write, if he is to be ultimately happy. What a man can be, he must be. This need we may call self-actualization. This term, first coined by Kurt Goldstein, is being

used in this paper in a much more specific and limited fashion. It refers to the desire for self-fulfillment, namely, to the tendency for him to become actualized in what he is potentially. This tendency might be phrased as the desire to become more and more what one is, to become everything that one is capable of becoming.[9]

This concept of self-actualization is sufficiently significant to warrant a section of its own. This will be presented later in this chapter.

Related to these basic needs are certain conditions which must be satisfied for these needs to be gratified. These preconditions consist of such states as freedom to speak, freedom to act, knowledge, justice, honesty, and so on. In fact, Maslow wishes to argue that the thwarting of these preconditions will produce virtually the same response as would the thwarting of a basic need and hence these preconditions are very important because "secrecy, censorship, dishonesty, blocking of communication threaten all basic needs"(MP 47). These preconditions are also necessary because they allow us to follow up on our basic desire to "search for knowledge, truth, wisdom, and the ever-persistent urge to solve the cosmic mysteries"(MP 47).

...I would maintain that the basic needs and the metaneeds that I have described are also in the strictest sense biological needs; that is, their deprivation produces disease or illness. It is for this reason that I have used the invented term 'instinctoid' to indicate my firm belief that these data have already proven sufficiently that

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9. Abraham Maslow, "A Theory of Human Motivation", Psychological Review, 50:1943, p. 382.

these needs are related to the fundamental structure of the human organism itself, that there is some genetic basis that is involved, however weak this may be. It also leads me to be very confident of the discovery one day of biochemical, neurological, endocrinological substrates or body machinery that will explain at the biological level these needs and these illnesses. [10]

It is now possible to assert that not only are the basic needs important, but also these conditions or acts which assist in the gratification of these needs.

These basic impulses, which Maslow considers to be a significant element of human behavior, are not generally captured by the traditional psychologies because these aspects do not usually turn up in clinical/laboratory studies and are not really related to getting rid of disease in the sense of the medical-therapeutic tradition (MP 48). Nonetheless, these basic impulses such as acquiring knowledge and the desire to systematize the universe are "in part, techniques for the achievement of basic safety in the world; or for the intelligent man, expressions of self-actualization" (MP 48). Maslow wants to suggest that not only are there these negative determinates for acquiring knowledge, that is, the relief of anxiety or fear, but significantly, there are also positive impulses. Among these positive determinates could be listed the fact that throughout history man has searched for such ultimate

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10. Abraham Maslow, The Farther Reaches of Human Nature (Middlesex, England, 1976), p. 22.

answers in spite of personal danger or ridicule; that psychologically healthy people gravitate towards the new and unknown; clinical cases which demonstrate that "intelligent people leading stupid lives in stupid jobs" often develop the pathology of those with frustrated cognitive needs, i.e., "(boredom, loss of zest in life, self-dislike, general depression of the bodily functions, steady deterioration of the intellectual life, of tastes, etc.)" (MP 49). These insights lead Maslow to "postulate a desire to understand, to systematize, to organize, to analyze, to look for relations and meanings, to construct a system of values", as being basic to human beings (MP 50). Thus the activity of science as the search for knowledge and understanding is basic to being human. Maslow contends that a person who has had a basic need thwarted is a sick person, or at least is less than fully human (MP 57). He notes,

if I were permitted this usage, I should then say simply that a healthy man is primarily motivated by his need to develop and actualize his fullest potentialities and capacities. If a man has any other basic needs in any active, chronic sense, he is simply an unhealthy man. He is as surely sick as if he had suddenly developed a strong salt hunger or calcium hunger. (MP 57-58)

Hence, biological health will not suffice for the full development of man.

This hierarchy of needs would appear to be in a fixed order, but this is not necessarily the case. It should come as no surprise that there are indeed exceptions to the

rule. For instance, Maslow found examples of people who wanted self-assertiveness and confidence not for esteem, but for love; some people are simply more creative than others and hence this becomes their driving motivation; "the person who has experienced life at a very low level, i.e., chronic unemployment, may continue to be satisfied for the rest of his life if only he can get enough food" (MP 52); psychopathic personality is an exhibition of the loss of the love needs. What these and other possible examples clearly indicate is that no structure, not even Maslow's, can be applied to all people in all circumstances like some sort of template. Maslow also states that a need must not be totally satisfied before the next one emerges, they seem to be somewhat simultaneous (MP 53-54). The basic needs are not necessarily conscious or unconscious, although for most people they are indeed unconscious (MP 54). They can, however, be brought to consciousness by means of therapy. "In any case, the conception of therapy as the elimination of symptoms and illnesses is too limited. We must learn to think of it more as a technique for fostering general growth, for encouraging self-actualization" (PP 29). None of these needs are to be understood as the exclusive determinant of a particular kind of behavior, and further, not all behavior is determined by these needs (MP 55).

He also seems to make a manifest/latent distinction when he writes that "everyday conscious desires are to be

regarded as symptoms, as surface indicators of more basic needs"(MP 56). It will therefore presumably be necessary to have some method of analyzing this overt behavior into terms of the basic needs. This distinction must be made because the two levels are not of equal importance in as much as the "thwarting of unimportant desires produces no psychopathological results; thwarting of basically important needs does produce such results"(MP 57). The attempt to suppress or repress the inner core can result in fatigue because this core exerts a force, a "'will to health', the urge to grow, the pressure to self-actualization, the quest for one's identity. It is this that makes psychotherapy, education and self-improvement possible in principle"(TPB 193). This is also significant because once a basic need has been satisfied it is no longer a need. It no longer functions like a need until it is once again unsatisfied. Maslow emphasizes this because he believes that all other motivational theories either ignore or contradict this insight(MP 57).

It may prove helpful to be able to visualize this hierarchy of basic needs along with the necessary meta-needs. It should be recalled that the thwarting of the meta-needs will be just as damaging as the thwarting of a basic need.

self-actualization



esteem



belongingness



safety



physiological

knowledge

truth

beauty

freedom of speech

justice

These are the main needs in Maslow's hierarchy of basic needs. As we have seen they emerge and develop, more or less, from bottom to top.

These are the types of necessary preconditions which Maslow calls meta-needs. They must be satisfied in order for the basic needs to emerge, particularly the higher ones.

### I. Self-Actualizing People

The findings which will be reported in this section will consist in an explication of Maslow's conclusions regarding his study of self-actualizing people. It should be recalled that self-actualization is the highest achievement of man according to Maslow.

To make this fact clearer, I could describe self-actualization as development of personality which frees the person from the deficiency problems of growth and from the neurotic (or infantile, or fantasy, or unnecessary, or "unreal") problems of life, so that he is able to face, endure and grapple with the 'real' problems of life (the intrinsically and ultimately human problems, the unavoidable, the 'existential' problems to which there is no perfect solution). That is, it is not an absence of problems but a moving from transitional or unreal problems to real problems.[11]

11. Abraham Maslow, "Critique of Self-Actualization I: Some Dangers of Being-Cognition", Journal of Individual Psychology, 15:1959, p. 24.

It is also the pinnacle of human psychological health. Hence, it is the case that by studying what Maslow has to say about self-actualization we will come to understand in a comprehensive manner Maslow's concept of man and his view of health.

A self-actualizing (SA) person is one who actualizes all of his possibilities and thus is becoming himself in the fullest possible way (MP 150). "Self-actualization" is intrinsic growth of what is already in the organism, or more accurately of what is the organism itself." [12] This indicates that these people have already gratified all their basic needs: safety, hunger, belongingness, love, respect, self-respect, and the cognitive needs for knowledge and understanding (MP 150). "This is to say that all subjects felt safe and unanxious, accepted, loved and loving, respect-worthy and respected, and that they had worked out their philosophical, religious, or axiological bearings" (MP 150-151). These are the basic characteristics of the people whom Maslow studied. It is important to keep in mind that Maslow is "describing an ideal type and then assuming that it may apply to all other human beings." [13] The following

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12. Abraham Maslow, "The Expressive Component of Behavior", Psychological Review, 56:1949, p. 263.

13. Abraham Maslow, Abraham Maslow: A Memorial Volume (Monterey, California, 1972), hereafter designated as MV in this chapter, p. 86.

are the results and conclusions of this study.

The more accurately we are able to grasp reality, the better we should be able to perceive truth and come to logical conclusions in an efficient manner (MP 154). SA people accept reality for what it is and the way it is. They accept natural things as being natural and thus things which must be accommodated in the best possible manner (MP 156). They change and improve what they can and accept the rest: Problems will only arise when there is a discrepancy between what is and what could be (MP 157). SA people strive to maximize potentiality.

SA people are often quite unconventional in their motivation and thought processes, and as a consequence feel the need to control their overt behavior in order to hide this (MP 157-158). Usually these people will prefer to associate with those who allow them to drop their shields and be themselves. Since these people generally shun the conventional, this applies to all areas including ethics. "Because of this alienation from ordinary conventions and from the ordinarily accepted hypocrisies, lies, and inconsistencies of social life, they sometimes feel like spies or aliens in a foreign land and sometimes behave so" (MP 158). It is clear that SA people are far more in touch with themselves than are normal people. The motivation for SA people is quite different from that of non-SA people. It is growth motivation and not deficiency

motivation(MP 159). It may well be the case that an entirely new motivational theory must be developed just for SA people. This may be understood as the difference between living and preparing to live.

SA people are problem-centered and not ego-centered(MP 159). These people are concerned with the 'big questions', not their own personal ones. They have the ability to keep everything in perspective(MP 160). SA people can handle being alone better than the average person, and indeed crave it more than the average person(MP 160). These people tend to be so 'objective' and detached that this sometimes even applies to their own personal problems(MP 161). They have a great degree of independence of thought and consequently make up their own minds rather than rely on other sources for their interpretations.

Since SA people are so basically autonomous it is only natural that this should carry over to an independence from the physical and social environment(MP 162). These people do not need any outside stimulus and get all they need from themselves. These people also experience the normalness and mundaneness of life in a fresh and new way some of the time. Many things are experienced as if for the first time(MP 163). They get their basic inspiration from life experiences, not wealth or partying(MP 163).

Mystical, or peak, experiences also seem to be a common

characteristic of SA people (MP 164). Peak-experiences are "moments of highest happiness and fulfillment" such as the "basic cognitive happenings in the B-love experience, the parental experience, the mystic, or oceanic, or nature experience, the aesthetic perception, the creative moment, the therapeutic or intellectual insight, the orgasmic experience, certain forms of athletic fulfillment, etc." (TPB 73). Thus, the "peak experience is a tremendous intensification of any of the experiences in which there is loss of self or transcendence of it, e.g., problem centering, intense concentration, munga behavior... intense sensuous experience, self-forgetful and intense enjoyment of music or art" (MP 165). The psychology of peak-experiences is the psychology of healthy, well-rounded, fulfilled individuals, i.e., self-actualizers. We are in a position to offer a redefinition of self-actualization now that we know about the relationship between peak-experiences and self-actualizing.

We may define it as an episode, or spurt in which the powers of the person come together in a particularly efficient and intensely enjoyable way, and in which he is more integrated and less split, more open for experience, more idiosyncratic, more perfectly expressive or spontaneous, more fully functioning, more creative, more humorous, more ego-transcending, more independent of his lower needs, etc. He becomes in these episodes more truly himself, more perfectly actualizing his potentialities, closer to the core of his Being, more fully human. (TPB 97)

Nonetheless, within SA people as a group there are peakers

and non-peakers: Non-peakers are "the social world improvers, the politicians, the workers in society, the reformers, the crusaders, whereas the transcending peakers are more apt to write the poetry, the music, the philosophies, and the religions" (MP 165). Hence, while all peakers are self-actualizers, not all self-actualizers are peakers.

SA people are very much possessed of a feeling of brotherly love (MP 165). They have a desire to help the human race. They tend to have few friends, but the ones they do have are real friends (MP 167). They realize their limitations in the Socratic sense of knowing that they do not know (MP 168). These people are strongly ethical and they do what is right and do not do what is wrong (MP 168). This, of course, has nothing to do with conventional concepts of right and wrong. Very few are religious in as much as they do not accept God as a supernatural personal figure, nor do they accept institutional orthodoxy; but rather, they describe God as more of a metaphysical concept (MP 169). These people can easily distinguish between means and ends, and are usually more concerned with ends (MP 169).

SA people are creative, but creative with certain peculiar characteristics (MP 170). It is not a special-talent creativeness but is the ability to be spontaneous and innovative in a naive or child-like manner in full accordance with the real. SA people avoid enculturation and

thus can maintain a global perspective as opposed to a nationalistic one (MP 171). It is important to realize that these people are not perfect. [14] They too have bad habits and basic human foibles (MP 175). These people clearly have certain traits and characteristics in common, but they are all definitely unique individuals.

A result of this study is that the commonly accepted polarities between heart/head, instinct/reason, self/society, acceptance/rebellion, etc., are seen to disappear in these psychologically healthy people (MP 179).

In this, as in other ways healthy people are so different from average ones, not only in degree but in kind as well, that they generate two very different kinds of psychology. It becomes more and more clear that the study of crippled, stunted, immature, and unhealthy specimens can yield only a cripple psychology, and a cripple philosophy. The study of self actualizing people must be the basis for a more universal science of psychology. (MP 179-189)

Thus, we can see that Maslow's concept of the psychologically healthy man contains the following components: a clearly identifiable psychological structure (essential nature); that he has basic needs and tendencies which are more or less gratified; full health consists in

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14. Cf. Richard J. Lowry, A. H. Maslow: An Intellectual Portrait (Monterey, California, 1973), p. 36. "The self-actualizing person, therefore, is not so much an ordinary man 'with something added' as he is an ordinary man 'with nothing taken away'... Thus, as Maslow saw it, to know self-actualization is to know human nature as it truly is and to know that it is basically good."

the actualization of this essence with all its potential; that psychopathology is the frustration of this actualization(MP 269-270).

The concern is not only with what man is, but with what he can become(MP 271). "One must respond to one's fate or one's destiny or pay a heavy price. One must yield to it; one must surrender to it. One must permit one's self to be chosen." [15] In short, what Maslow argues for is a conception of man as motivated by growth needs, not deficiency needs. Growth is simply a normal part of life(TPB 44). This is especially true of children who do not plan for growth or do not actively seek it. It just happens." This, of course, does not mean that everything is smooth sailing. Some people have trouble with growth. "Here we must become fully aware of the fixative and regressive power of ungratified deficiency-needs, of the attractions of safety and security, of the functions of defense and protection against pain, fear, loss, and threat, of the need for courage in order to grow ahead"(TPB 46). He speaks of having a conflicting pull between being afraid of growth and craving it.

Therefore we can consider the process of healthy growth to be a never ending series of free choice situations, confronting each individual at every point throughout his life, in which he must

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15. Abraham Maslow, Eupsychian Management: A Journal(Homewood, Illinois, 1965), hereafter designated as EM in this chapter, p. 10.

choose between the delights of safety and growth, dependence and independence, regression and progression, immaturity and maturity. Safety has both anxieties and delights; growth has both anxieties and delights. We grow forward when the delights of growth and anxieties of safety are greater than the anxieties of growth and delights of safety. (TPB 47)

The person must choose for himself. No one can do this for him. The individual thus has responsibility for himself (TPB 49-50). Growth cannot be forced and indeed there are times when it is better to retreat than to go forward (TPB 54).

What Maslow desperately wants to avoid is the

resurgence, in new and more sophisticated forms, of the old identification of psychological health with adjustment, adjustment to reality, adjustment to society, adjustment to other people. That is, the authentic or healthy person may be defined not in his own right, not in his autonomy, not by his own intra-psychic and non-environmental laws, not as different from the environment, independent of it or opposed to it, but rather in environment-centered terms, e.g., of ability to master the environment, to be capable, adequate, effective, competent in relation to it, to do a good job, to perceive it well, to be in good relation to it, to be successful in its terms. (TPB 179)

Rather, Maslow wants to assert that normality or health should be associated with the full actualization of the person, being the best that they are capable of (MP 279).

This concept of self-actualization will be given a critical examination in Chapter VI.

## II. Eupsychia

Maslow's Third Force Psychology, and particularly his emphasis on self-actualization, have some definite social and political implications. We will discuss a few of the major ones in this section. This will offer further evidence that Maslow did indeed wish to go beyond science and psychology and establish a comprehensive Weltanschauung.

As we have seen, Maslow rejects both psychoanalysis and behaviorism as being inadequate conceptualizations of the character of man. These two approaches certainly have their differences, but they do have at least one significant similarity, i.e., "their resounding denials--each in its own way--of the assertion that 'people are all decent underneath'". [16] This is an assertion that Maslow vehemently wishes to uphold. Maslow wants to claim that "both good and bad human nature exist in one and the same person, that both are or can be equally real" (J 503). It is, however, crucial to realize that Maslow is of the opinion that man is basically good and that when man acts otherwise he is either stupid, mistaken, or operating at a very low

16. Richard J. Lowry, op. cit., p. 21.

level.[17] Since man is basically good, the actualizing of this basic character should be what we aim for, and this is precisely what self-actualization is all about. "There is too much sneering at perfectibility. Man is imperfectable but strives toward perfection anyway. And he does for occasional moments achieve it in the peak-experiences. And anyway he is, at least, improvable"(J. 12). It is this positive, and uplifting, bent in his work that has lead some to call Maslow a utopian.[18]

Maslow himself talked about building 'Eupsychia'; that

17. Cf. Abraham Maslow, "Personality Problems and Personality Growth", Clark C. Moustaka, ed. The Self: Explorations in Personal Growth(New York, 1956), p. 233 where he notes that "this inner nature, as much as we know of it so far, seems not to be intrinsically evil, but rather either neutral or positively 'good'. What we call evil appears most often to be a secondary reaction to frustration of this intrinsic nature. Since this inner nature is good rather than bad, it is best to bring it out and to encourage it rather than to suppress it. If it is permitted to guide our life, we grow healthy, fruitful, and happy." See also MV 94 where Maslow states that "men are not evil, they are schlemiels. Most of the evil gets done without malice. I think what I'm groping toward as an insight is again that evil comes less from malice and sadism than from good intentions that are stupid and low-level."

18. Cf. MV 8-9 where Frank Manuel, at Maslow's memorial service, states that "Abe liked to be called a utopian, because for him the word had positive, not negative, connotations. He was utopian not only in his way of thinking, but in his central preoccupation with psychological needs and the attempt to define them. We may or may not agree with Abe's theory of the hierarchy of needs. But the basic matter of the distinction between authentic and inauthentic human needs--one of the major problems of Western utopian thinkers--was for him, as it remains for us, a primary question, growing more rather than less acute as our technological civilization becomes more complex."

is, the idea that man can improve, can grow and develop to heights not yet fully understood, and that man will survive (EM xi). As he notes,

I've coined the word Eupsychia and defined it as the culture that would be generated by 1000 self-actualizing people on some sheltered island where they would not be interfered with. But the word, Eupsychia, can also be taken in other ways. It can mean 'moving toward psychological health' or 'health-ward'. It can imply the actions taken to foster and encourage such a movement, whether by a psychotherapist or a teacher. It can refer to the mental or social conditions which make health more likely. Or it can be taken as an ideal limit, i.e., the far goals of therapy, education, or work. (EM xi)

As with Maslow's previous insistence that we should study the healthy, not the sick, to learn about being fully human, so too should we remember that Eupsychia, and its principles, are the result of healthy people operating under good conditions. Hence, we are dealing here with self-actualizing people who live in nurturing

conditions.[19] It is nonetheless important to realize that we should not make the mistake of thinking "that good conditions inevitably make all human beings into growing, self-actualizing, people"(EM 243). Good conditions only allow for the possibility of such development, they do not cause it, nor do they necessitate it.

Since the ultimate goal of Maslow's endeavor would seem to be the development of an ideal society, it is not surprising to find that he realized that this could not be accomplished solely by dealing with people on an individual level. "I gave up long ago the possibility of improving the world or the whole human species via individual psychotherapy. This is impracticable. As a matter of fact it is impossible quantitatively"(EM 1). We therefore require a more global approach to the development of full human

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19. Cf. J 51 where Maslow offers an example of how different conditions can, and do, result in different need levels and different expressions of these needs. "Democracy of Western sort is OK for rich and well-organized, educated society, and capitalism then can work fairly well. For people with lower basic needs satisfied, higher needs emerge and we can talk about freedom for self-fulfillment, autonomy, encouragement of growth, humanitarianism, justice, democracy, etc. The Marxian theory is then transcended, especially where labor unions are strong. But in Mexico I learned that where there is overpopulation and no birth control, venality and bribery, where there is no 'patriotism' in the sense of rich Mexicans caring for poor Mexicans, no civic feeling, no unselfishness and humanitarianism, where there are the very rich and the very poor and the rich exploit the poor and have contempt for them, then the Marxian theory does apply, and socialism is the answer. And where democracy is phony, then the class struggle of the Communists does apply."

potential. Hence, the individual must not only grow as an individual, but also as part of the community, the team, the group and the organization (EM 3). Maslow views this type of growth to be part and parcel of man's overall development. "The truth is that everything in the world is related to everything else and everybody in the world is related to everybody else and everybody now living is related to everybody who is going to live in the future, and in this way we will influence one another, and we might as well know this scientifically" (EM 115). We thus arrive at the concept of the synergetic society.

Synergy can be defined as the resolution of the dichotomy between selfishness and unselfishness, or between selfishness and altruism... It is possible to set up society so that when I am pursuing my own self-interest, I automatically benefit everyone else, whether I mean to or not. Under the same arrangement, when I try to be altruistic and philanthropic, I cannot help benefiting myself or advancing my own self-interest. (EM 20)

The opposition between self and society has now faded away. The good of the individual and the good of society - as a whole are now synonymous (EM 111). It is this vision of 'life' that Third Force Psychology points towards; one in which man is able to transcend all the basic dichotomies and create a unity out of opposition.

In this new society, work, or to be more precise, fulfilling work will be a crucial element. The only real path to salvation is "the path set forth in the Japanese

movie 'Ikiru', i.e., salvation via hard work and total commitment to doing well the job that fate or personal destiny calls you to do, or any important job that 'calls for' doing"(EM 6). Work will indeed become very significant, in Maslow's view, because he also equates fulfilling work with happiness and a meaningful life(EM 6, 29).

Education will also play a crucial role in this new society. Maslow is of the opinion that the goals of education are obvious and clear. "Here we must be very bold; the goals of democratic education, once we leave aside the question of technological training, can be nothing else but development toward psychological health"(EM 65). We have here a vision of a society and an educational system in which all effort is placed on creating the conditions which foster the possibility for the complete self-actualization of the individual.

### C. Summary

This chapter has had one overriding emphasis, namely, to explicate the basic elements of Maslow's Third Force Psychology. In doing so we saw that what is suggested here is a holistic approach and not an atomistic one. We have seen that traditional motivational theory bases itself on physiological considerations, and that this basis is rejected as being inadequate for a comprehensive

understanding of man's behavior. We are offered instead an integrated hierarchy of basic needs: physiological, safety, belonging, esteem, self-actualization. Along with these basic needs, Maslow also argues for certain meta-needs such as the need for knowledge, and the ability to acquire this knowledge in a free and democratic manner. The basic need of self-actualization is understood to be of crucial importance not only for the individual, but for society at large.

This concludes the second part of this research study, namely, the basically expository presentation of Abraham Maslow's views of science and psychology with their concomitant impact on the conceptualization of the fundamental character of man. We will now turn, in Chapter V, to a critical evaluation of the philosophical and epistemological foundations of Maslow's view of science and psychology.

## CHAPTER V

### PSYCHOLOGICAL SCIENCE

This chapter will have the primary aim of engaging in an evaluation of the philosophical and epistemological adequacy of Maslow's conception of science and psychology. As we have seen, Maslow was of the opinion that natural science should not, and indeed could not, act as a model for an adequate psychology. He believed that a different conception, one which emphasized a holistic outlook with a concern for the meaning of lived experience, would be required. He wanted to place a premium on the study of human existence as lived, and not existence based on a priori assumptions or privileged methodologies. He offers the recognition that there is a basic difference between man and nature, particularly in terms of the kind of information we want about each, and how we can come to give this data. There are two basic issues involved here: man as understood in contrast to nature, and the impact of this understanding on therapy. As a consequence of this new understanding the therapeutic situation is seen as being one of a reciprocal relationship between two people, not a subject-object dichotomy.

Contained within Maslow's position are various

philosophical and epistemological stances which, while basically acceptable, nevertheless still need further clarification and elaboration. This work will be accomplished with the help of both Jacques Maritain and Amedeo Giorgi. These two have been chosen because between them they provide what this research study considers is a philosophically and epistemologically sound foundation for psychology. Maritain's main contribution is in the field of epistemology where his distinction between the philosophy of nature (wherein is contained a philosophy of man, an ontology) and empiriological analysis is of profound significance. Giorgi's main contribution is in carrying out Maritain's basic intuitions all the while taking his inspiration more specifically from an existential phenomenological concept of man as being-in-the-world.

The main themes of this evaluation will revolve around the concepts of approach and method, the relationship between a philosophy of nature and a science of nature, and the relationship between a philosophy of man and a psychology of man.

#### A. Approach and Method: Definitions

A great deal of this chapter will be concerned with an elucidation of the concept of approach and its implications. Amedeo Giorgi defines approach as "the fundamental viewpoint toward man and the world that the

scientist brings, or adopts, with respect to his work as a scientist, whether his viewpoint is made explicit or remains implicit." [1] In other words, when one speaks of approach one means the mode of conceptualizing the reality at issue, whether it be physical nature or a human being. The basic questions before us are 'what is the proper approach for the study of physical nature' and 'what is the proper approach for the study of the human being'. Of crucial concern is the question of whether these approaches are the same or are different. It is precisely at this point that Jacques Maritain makes his great contribution, for his epistemological work specifically addresses this question and provides us with a very clear and concise answer.

This question of approach is of specific concern for psychology because, as Giorgi contends, psychology must become more aware of and concerned with its foundations, even though this consideration will bring psychology into the realm of philosophy (PHS 127). After all, philosophy is the discipline which is primarily concerned with the foundations and basic presuppositions of all human endeavor. Hence, it will be necessary to examine the relationship between a philosophy of man and a psychology of man.

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1. Amedeo Giorgi, Psychology as a Human Science: A Phenomenologically Based Approach (New York, 1970), hereafter designated as PHS in this chapter, p. 126.

Another general reason why an examination of approach is crucial is that psychology has attempted to avoid this concern by postulating what can be called a 'neutral' attitude. However, a neutral attitude is still a human attitude and all that has really occurred is that the psychologist has adopted a neutral attitude instead of a 'personal' attitude (PHS 131). In short, it is quite impossible for the psychologist to avoid taking a position, either implicitly or explicitly, and it is this position and the basis for choosing that are highlighted by an examination of approach.

The concept of method is a very straight forward one. Methods are the specific techniques that one develops and utilizes to explore and explain one's subject matter. A basic question here is whether or not methods vary with approach. Strasser offers the following answer to this question. "According to the original meaning of the Greek term, 'method' means the road to be taken if one wants to reach the desired goal. In other words, the purpose determines which road should be taken." [2] Thus, the methods will indeed vary according to which approach is adopted. It also seems likely that certain methods will be more appropriate in the context of certain approaches. It

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2. Stephan Strasser, Phenomenology and the Human Sciences: A Contribution to a New Scientific Ideal (Pittsburgh, 1963), p. 22.

thus becomes clear that different approaches will yield different information and hence it becomes vitally important to operate within the most appropriate approach for the subject matter in question.

Let us now turn to the epistemological work of Maritain in order to clarify this question of the proper approach for a science of nature and the approach proper to a philosophy of nature, keeping in mind that the latter contains as a crucial element a philosophy of man.

#### B. Jacques Maritain: Epistemological Foundations

Jacques Maritain, when discussing the realm of speculative knowledge, argues that there are three basic divisions in this realm. They are called Physica, Mathematica and Metaphysica. These divisions are the three degrees of abstraction. Corresponding to these three degrees of abstraction are three universes of intelligibility. They are called the sensible real, the praeter real and the trans-sensible.

The first degree of abstraction, Physica, consists of the principles and laws of sensible and mobile nature. The universe of intelligibility of Physica is the sensible real, that is, knowledge of objects which can only be realized in sensible or empirical existence. These objects can neither exist nor be conceived of without matter and the qualities

bound up with matter.[3] While our main concern will be with Physica, it may indeed prove helpful to provide a brief indication of the character of the other two divisions just to situate Physica in its proper context.

The second degree of abstraction, Mathematica, consists of knowledge of <sup>of</sup> quantity as such. The universe of intelligibility of Mathematica is the praeter real, that is, knowledge of objects which can only be realized (if it is indeed possible to realize them) in sensible existence, but which can however be conceived without sensible matter, e.g., "nothing sensible or experimental enters into the definition of the ellipse or of square root"(DK 35-36, 137).

The third degree of abstraction, Metaphysica, consists of knowledge of being qua being. "These are objects of thought which not only can be conceived without matter, but which can even exist without it, whether they never exist in matter, as in the case of God and pure spirits, or whether they exist in material as well as in immaterial things, for example, substance, quality, act and potency, beauty, goodness, etc."(DK 36). The universe of intelligibility of Metaphysica is the trans-sensible(DK 137).

Physica and Metaphysica, while clearly concerned with different types of knowledge, do have in common the fact

3. Jacques Maritain, The Degrees of Knowledge(London, 1959), hereafter designated as DK in this chapter, pp. 35, 137.

"that they deal only with intelligible objects which can exist in things, let us say real beings, insofar as the word real not only designates actual existence but possible existence outside the mind as well"(DK 38). Mathematica, on the other hand, is concerned with objects that are not necessarily real, they may indeed be quite imaginary, "or fictive being (permissive, the ancients said), a being of reason as well as a real being"(DK 40). This difference indicates that rather than the three degrees of abstraction following each other one after the other in a straight line, it is the case that "the first and third, on the one side, the second on the other, require opposite ways of approaching things"(DK 40).

#### I. Natural Science and Philosophy of Nature: Approach

We are now in a position to address the question of the similarities and differences of the the two divisions of Physica. Maritain notes that within Physica there are two basic divisions. There are "sciences of observation (sciences which are above all inductive and which we may call empirical sciences of sensible nature), and a properly explanatory science of corporeal being (the philosophy of

sensible nature)" (DK 37-38). [4] The first is called empiriological analysis or natural science and the second is called ontological analysis or the philosophy of nature. Empiriological knowledge is further subdivided into empiriometric knowledge (natural science which has been mathematized, physico-mathematical science) and empirioschematic knowledge (natural science which has not been totally mathematized and is still largely experimental) (DK 148-149). Both the philosophy of nature and the empirical sciences of nature study the same object, namely, sensible and mobile nature, but with a different approach, that is, a different way of conceptualizing that which they study. [5]

Maritain describes this situation by using the example of a person who is on a botanical excursion and discovers a plant that he was not previously aware of. There are two

4. Cf. Jacques Maritain, Philosophy of Nature (New York, 1951), hereafter designated as PN in this chapter, p. 74. "When you observe any material object, that object is, during your observation of it, as the meeting-place of two kinds of knowledge: sense knowledge and intellectual knowledge. You are in the presence of a sort of sensible flux stabilized by an idea, by a concept: in other words you are in the presence of an ontological or thinkable core which is manifested by an ensemble of qualities perceived hic et nunc. I do not mean thought qualities but sensed qualities, objects of actual perception and observation."

5. Cf. PN p. 136. "And the philosophy of nature and the natural sciences are specifically different. What then is the source of this difference? The difference comes from the objective light, the formal perspective of conceptualization, the way of conversing with the object."

basic questions that he can ask with regard to this plant. They are: 'what is a vegetative living thing' and 'how will I classify it in my catalogue of plants' (DK 147). The first is a question from the perspective of the philosophy of nature in as much as it aims towards the intelligible being, or essence of what it is to be a plant. The second is from the perspective of the empirical sciences of nature because it aims towards an understanding of the sensible and observable in as much as it is sensible and observable and hence tends to lend itself more or less to measurement.

Thus, we can say that the approach of the natural sciences is to view reality in such terms as to make it amenable to examination and explanation in terms of data that is obtainable through observation, measurement and experimentation. On the other hand, the approach of the philosophy of nature is to concentrate on that which is intelligible in that which it studies. It is also the case that both approaches are valid in the realm of Physica and hence may be used to study sensible and mobile reality, although it is probable that one would adopt only one stance at a time with regard to any particular investigation.

In the Philosophy of Nature Maritain expresses this point in the following manner:

Think on the one hand of the definition of a geosynclinal in geology, of verbal blindness in psychology, of a chemical species in chemistry, of mass or energy in physics; and on the other hand think of the philosophical definitions of the four

causes, of transitive action and immanent action, of corporeal substance and operative powers. If you compare these two groups of definitions, you will find that they are arrived at by wholly different analyses and from different intellectual directions: in one case the definition is sought by means of possibilities of observation and measurement, by effectuable physical operations; in the other it is sought by means of ontological characteristics, of elements that constitute a nature or intelligible essence, however obscurely this essence may sometimes be attained. (PN 75)[6]

It must be stressed that ontology is certainly present in empiriological explanation, for without Being there would be no thought, but only indirectly in as much as empiriological science is not so much concerned with what things are in themselves, but "what is important are the possibilities of empirical observation and measurement which those things represent, as well as the possibility of linking together according to stable laws the data furnished by these observations and measurements... So, for such knowledge, the possibility of observation and measurement replace the

6. Cf. PN 80 where Maritain gives another helpful example to explain this point. "Take the notion which is nearest to sense experience, the notion of color, for example; as the object of a concept, as the object of an abstract idea (the idea of color) this object does not correspond to any physical operation to be done; it has reference to experienced sensations but insofar as it is an intelligible object it is not an object of sensation. Wherefore we may say that, in ontological analysis carried on at the first degree of abstractive visualization, being is considered in reference to sensible and observable data, but the mind consults this data in order to seek in it intelligible reasons that transcend the sense... There is no possible image of color (which is neither white, red, green, nor any particular color). Such is the typical opposition between ontological and empiriological analysis."

essence or quiddity which philosophy seeks in things..."(DK 149).[7]

## II. Implications

Now that we can see that the natural sciences and the philosophy of nature do not share the same approach, it is reasonable to ask what the implications of this insight are. Maritain is able to draw a significant conclusion from the above analysis of the degrees of knowledge.

If the preceding analyses are correct, we can see that the central error of modern philosophy in the domain of the knowledge of nature has been to give the value of an ontological explanation to the type of mechanist attraction immanent in physico-mathematical knowledge, and to take the latter for a philosophy of nature. It is not a philosophy of nature. It is an empiriological analysis of nature, mathematical in form and control (an 'empiriometric' analysis). If it is true that an analysis of this type must inevitably construct a world of explicative entities destined to sustain mathematical deduction, it is clear, on the one hand, that this world will be... a pseudo-ontological world in which beings of reason will abound, and, on the other, that it will be orientated towards mechanism as to its ideal limit (never achieved, however, since all the 'irrationals' which science is bound to admit are opposed to an effective mechanistic reduction). (DK 184)

7. Cf. PN 85. "And this is where the ontological notion is opposed to the empiriological notion, which does not primarily designate an intelligible essence, but especially designates concrete possibilities of observation and measurement. For ontological analysis, sensible data are mere, albeit indispensable means, a means of designating the essence; they are not the essential element of the definition and of the notion as they are for empiriological analysis."

In effect, Maritain is claiming that modern philosophy and orthodox science have erred to the extent that they have depended too much on only one type of philosophy and one type of science. This "is to confuse that which is true (with certain restrictions) of the science of phenomena, and that which is true of all science and of all knowledge in general, of all scientific knowing. It is to apply universally to all human knowledge that which is valid only in one of its particular spheres." [8] That is, the empiriological sciences are concerned with a content that is based on what is available through sensation and measurement. The philosophy of nature, on the other hand, is concerned with a content that is purely intelligible, a content that cannot be pinpointed in terms of sensation or measurement, but which can nonetheless be grasped. [9] In short, it is Maritain's contention that because the

8. Jacques Maritain, "Science, Philosophy and Faith", A Maritain Reader, Donald and Idella Gallagher, eds. (Garden City, New York, 1966), p. 65.

9. Cf. PN 139-140. "Now it is easier for us to define the object of the philosophy of nature. Its intelligibility-appeal... is the moving, or mutability; its objective light... is an ontological mode of analysis and conceptualization, a way of abstracting and defining which, the while it refers intrinsically to sensory perception, aims at the intelligible essence; in this it differs specifically from the natural sciences. The object of the philosophy of nature in all sensible things is not the detail of phenomena but intelligible being itself as mutable, or again, the differences of being which it can detect, -- in aiming at the intelligible nature but without eliminating reference to sense data, -- in the world of ontological mutability."

approaches of the two are different it is the case that the content of the philosophy of nature is radically non-translatable into the terms of the comprehension of the empiriological sciences.

### III. Philosophy of Man

As was noted earlier, the philosophy of nature encompasses a philosophy of man. This now becomes a significant point because this will have a fundamental impact on the manner in which we are to develop and understand an adequate philosophy of the human being. It can be seen that a concern with man qua man, that is with the intelligible aspects of the human being, will be more properly situated within the approach of the philosophy of nature. As long as we are prepared to agree that psychology should be the study of man as man then we can see that philosophical and psychological anthropology will be situated within the philosophy of nature and not the empiriological sciences.[10] This has dramatic consequences for psychological science in as much as it is now not

10. It is important to keep in mind that on the one hand there is a continuity of approach between philosophical and psychological anthropology which means that psychology cannot be located amongst the natural sciences. However, on the other hand, it is also the case that there is a discontinuity between philosophical and psychological anthropology in terms of method, namely that anthropological psychology will be concerned with the empirical details of human behavior and hence will, in that sense, belong to empiriological science.

possible to consider a psychology which lays claim to an understanding of the human in man as a natural science. Hence the reductive, mechanistic, quantificational and positivistic psychologies can now be understood as the error of collapsing the philosophy of nature, more specifically the philosophy of man, into empiriological natural science. It thus becomes necessary to develop a conception of psychology, and man, which can take its place within the context of the philosophy of nature.

### C. Psychology: Natural Science or Philosophy of Nature

It will be recalled that Maritain spoke of the 'objective light' of both the philosophy of nature and natural science being different from each other. Another way of saying this is that each of these forms of analysis utilize differing conceptualizations of reality, that is they have differing approaches.[11] It may indeed prove helpful to clarify this issue by briefly examining this question as it pertains to psychology. This will achieve two desirable results: the first is that we will have a

11. Cf. Stephan Strasser, op. cit., p. 125 where he makes a similar point. Strasser writes of all investigation being based on some sort of 'methodic idea'. "Without such a guiding principle produced by the mind it would be impossible to assemble an orderly whole of facts and to incorporate every particular fact into a whole of factual knowledge. This assertion is valid with respect to human science as well as physical science. The 'fact' is always an aspect of reality seized in accordance with a definite methodic idea; reversely, a methodic idea is that which enables us to discover certain features of reality."

graphic demonstration of the significance of Maritain's distinction between philosophy of nature and empiriological science, and secondly, this will help to set the stage for our discussion of the appropriate character of psychological science.

We know that the approach of the natural sciences will be one that centers on data that can be gleaned through observation and measurement. That, in and by itself, is not problematic. What does cause concern, though, is the fact that supporters of the view that psychology is an empiriological science (i.e., natural science) typically claim that there is only one valid approach to science, and hence only one valid road to knowledge.[12] This means that all sciences are viewed as being basically the same in terms of approach. Hence psychology, if it is to be considered as a natural science, must adopt this same approach. This entails that psychology, generally speaking, must adopt the outlooks, methods, techniques, the established truths and

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12. Cf. Gordon Allport, Becoming: Basic Considerations for a Psychology of Personality (New Haven, 1955), p. 8. He notes that in modern times the supporters of psychology as natural science can be found "in associationism of all types, including environmentalism, behaviorism, stimulus-response (familarly abbreviated as S-R) psychology, and all other stimulus-oriented psychologies, in animal and genetic psychology, in positivism and operationalism, in mathematical models--in short, in most of what today is cherished in our laboratories as truly 'scientific' psychology."

the criteria of the natural sciences (PHS 1). [13]. Specifically this means "the elimination of all considerations of human action in terms of subjective intentions and beliefs and their conceptualization as passive functions of antecedent causes--environmental, mechanistic, or biological." [14] That is, human behavior is understood in terms of laws and mechanistic structures. This attitude is readily discernable in Universities, for example, where courses such as 'Statistics' and 'Experimental Methods' are very prominent in psychology departments.

Within the approach of the natural sciences the scientist (chemist or psychologist) is only concerned with hard objective facts, not intellectual ontological insights and unquantifiable data. In order to facilitate this concern, psychology as natural science has to fragmentize the object of its research (human beings). For instance, it

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13. It is worth while to emphasize once again that we must distinguish between the empiriological sciences which are synonymous with natural science, and empirical science which refers to the way of exploring the empirical details. The empirical sciences may indeed adopt or borrow some techniques from the natural sciences, albeit in an adapted form, but they will also have to develop new techniques specifically for their own concerns, such as critical phenomenological descriptions.

14. Gerald N. Izenberg, The Existentialist Critique of Freud: The Crisis of Autonomy (Princeton, 1976), p. 181. See also Allport, op. cit. where a distinction is made based upon psychology which views man as 'acted upon' or as 'acting'.

has to reduce people into component parts such as brain, body, nervous system, forces, drives and conditioned reflexes.[15] Separate and distinct parts are more readily understood in as much as they can be measured (sometimes), catalogued and analysed in great depth. This is considered necessary for proper scientific study, but it is also a result of such study. Human beings are seen, not as a unity, but as a combination of discrete elements. "In the modern day, human personality is regarded as a concatenation of reflexes or of habits." [16] The scientist likes to concentrate all his attention and research on one particular aspect and then explore it thoroughly.[17] By applying this data to people the physiologist, for example, hopes to be able to predict and control the learning process.

This approach to psychology has gained wide acceptance because it has been very successful in producing data acceptable to the natural sciences. Psychologists, "by means of research with animals and the use of 'objective'

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15. Cf. Rollo May, "The Origins and Significance of the Existential Movement in Psychology", Rollo May, et al., eds. Existence: A New Dimension in Psychiatry and Psychology (New York, 1958), p. 20.

16. Allport, op. cit., p. 10.

17. Cf. Strasser, op. cit., p. 10 where he indicates a drawback to this approach. "One of the consequences of modern specialization is the frequent restriction to a very limited realm of experience, a restriction which far too often is accompanied by a kind of narrow-mindedness in theoretical interests."

procedures on humans, ...were accumulating data on learning and motivation, etc. Furthermore their data could be expressed quantitatively and it was not confused by more esoteric 'introspective reports'" (PHS 46). [18] This is the nature of psychology when seen as a natural science. Psychology views the person as a collection of separate entities that can be studied, molded, controlled, measured and analysed. This is a psychology which provides technically utilizable information that is developed under controlled conditions, is reproducible and hence empirically verifiable, deals with objective facts not subjective states, allows for a quantifiable expression of its data, and functions within the general framework of accepted natural sciences. In short, this is a psychology which attempts to function on the empiriological, or more specifically, the natural science level: it deals with sensible and mobile nature, it is concerned with the quantifiable expression of this nature (empiriometric knowledge) and is to a large extent experimental (empirioschematic knowledge).

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18. Cf. Allport, op. cit., p. 10. "This view says that every basic feature of human nature can be studied without essential loss among lower species. Since man is an animal, why not take animals that are simpler--the rat for instance--as a prototype of the more complicated animal? Species equivalence is widely accepted in contemporary psychology..." Cf. also Sigmund Freud, Beyond the Pleasure Principle (New York, 1961), p. 36, Vol. 18, p. 42 of the Standard Edition. "The present development of human beings requires, it seems to me, no different explanation from that of animals."

## I. Implications

The implications of adopting this approach in the field of psychology are quite striking and profound. It has--been noted that psychology, when conceived as an empiriological science, adopts the approach of the natural sciences in general. That is, in its determined effort to be accepted as a science, psychology takes over the approach of sciences such as biology and chemistry, with the significant result that the approach limits the area of concern for the psychologist. Approach will now determine what will be studied, how it will be studied, and what questions can legitimately be asked. That is to say, the psychologist, armed with his approach and its concomitant methods and theories, will examine his questions and concerns in light of these tools. It is a matter of making the question fit the approach rather than making the approach fit the question. It is in this manner that psychology limits itself. Whenever a question arises for which the approach is inappropriate, the question will either be ignored or recast to fit the approach.

It is worth noting that virtually any approach will set limits of some sort. It's not so much that limits are set that is at question here, but more precisely, the exact character of what is included and what is left out. Hence, the question before us is whether or not the approach of the

natural sciences pays attention to the appropriate qualities in its investigation of man. This would not seem to be the case. The question of the emotions is a good example of this. Within the context of psychology as natural science, emotions are seen mainly in physiological or quantitative terms. For example, Freud notes that "it is not easy to deal scientifically with feelings. One can attempt to describe their physiological signs." [19] The reason for this is quite simply that the only aspects of emotions that this approach can accommodate are whatever physiological or hormonal changes occur during such emotions as love or hate. Emotions are certainly experienced as consisting of more than physiological changes, and many psychologists would admit this, but emotions must be recast into a reduced form in order to facilitate measurement and quantification. All other questions are either ignored, deemed irrelevant, or translated into terms amenable to the natural

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19. Sigmund Freud, Civilization and its Discontents (London, 1963), p. 2, Volume 21, p. 65 of the Standard Edition.

sciences.[20]

The emphasis on measurement or quantification that is provided by the approach of the natural sciences will also have an effect in psychology. Thus, like other natural scientists, psychologists consider that "a thing or experience is not real if we cannot make it mathematical.

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20. See Strasser, op. cit., pp. 14-15 where he presents a discussion of 'purpose' in relation to sociology. The two sociologists involved are R. M. MacIver and George A. Lundberg. "According to the sociologist R. M. MacIver, 'there is an essential difference between a paper flying before the wind and a man flying from a pursuing crowd. The paper knows no fear and the wind no hate, but without fear and hate the man would not fly nor the crowd pursue'. For MacIver there is explicitly question of emotional purposes, an anxiously tending toward safety and a hateful tending to get rid of their opponent...Lundberg, however, who is more positivistically orientated:..objects to the latter's description because 'fear' and 'hatred' are subjective terms. It is not absolutely certain that several independent observers would equally speak of 'anxious flight' and 'hateful pursuit' and for this reason the use of such terms harms the objectivity of the sociological investigation...What Lundberg proposes here is apparently a kind of reduction. For him, it is an objective fact that the fleeing man has gone from point A to point B. In addition, it is objectively observable that the velocity of the pursuing crowd had increased from  $V_1$  to  $V_2$ . But when we speak of a 'fleeing man' and a 'pursuing crowd' we still use subjective terms. The fact, conceived in the sense of physical science, does not say anything at all about fleeing or pursuing. It is possible, of course, that the fact has arisen from a flight and pursuit, but this is something that cannot be determined through the methods of physical science...The objectivist does not at all intend to doubt the reality of freedom, motivation, evaluation, or purpose. He would not even be able to do so, for this reality constitutes the basis of his entire 'personal' life. However, he does not make use of this reality in his scientific descriptions." Instead, as Strasser goes on to point out, he will attempt to 'methodically and systematically reduce all experiences to the kind of experience which can be described accurately by the language of the natural sciences'.

and somehow it must be real if we can reduce it to number." [21] This means that the psychologist will be most comfortable with problems and questions that lend themselves to measurement and quantification. If a thing or experience can be measured or quantified then it can be dealt with. "If it is not measurable, then it does not enter the psychological domain. It remains pre-scientific and therefore psychologically irrelevant" (PHS: 65). The prime concern is not so much with the status, or nature, or reality of the problem, but rather, with the question of whether or not it can be measured or put on a graph. That is, the natural psychologist is not concerned with what Maritain has called the purely intelligible aspects of the 'object of research'. The natural psychologist is mainly concerned with what is knowable through sense observation, measurement, and related techniques. However, little regard is exhibited for the meaning of the behavior that is being investigated. This emphasis on measurement is a direct result of psychology's attempt to integrate itself with the natural sciences, particularly when it models itself after physics. Psychology has also modelled itself after biology, and here the emphasis on quantification, while still present, is not so obvious or as predominant. The psychologist is of the opinion that natural science,

21. Rollo May, "Contributions of Existential Psychotherapy" / Rollo May, et al. eds, Existence: A New Dimension in Psychiatry and Psychology (New York, 1958), p. 39.

concerned with observation and measurement, is able to solve all the problems of the world and man. What cannot be dealt with in the 'scientific' framework is considered insignificant or irrelevant. It is therefore of no concern.

This is precisely what Maritain was concerned with when detailing the empiriological sciences. In effect, the empiriological sciences are one way of what Maritain calls 'conceptualizing reality' and as such are perfectly valid so long as it is explicitly recognized that this way of conceptualizing reality does not exhaust the intelligibility of reality. Unfortunately this has not always been recognized. The empiriological sciences, which function within the categories of observation, measurement, and mechanistic explanation, have extended their view of reality to include all of reality. At least that part of reality that is deemed 'knowable', meaning knowable through observation and measurement.

## II. Psychology as a Human Science

Psychology as a human science is an approach that arose, in part, in protest against the tendency of psychology as natural science to remake the human person into an object that fits its methods. Instead, psychology as human science suggests that the psychologist should first investigate the person and then develop methods and

techniques based on what is found. That is, this approach to psychology wants to emphasize that which is "purely intelligible" (as opposed to what is observable or mathematizable) in man, his essence. It is an approach which operates within the basic concerns of the philosophy of nature presented by Maritain. The psychologist is not going back to speculation or to theories that impose themselves on the individual, but to the individual himself, that is, the psychologist should "endeavor to understand man as experiencing, as the one to whom the experiences happen." [22] These psychologists believe that the individual must be studied before the development of any theories or any techniques. They want to deal with the person, not as a fragmented or compartmentalized observable entity, but as an integral unity. That is, the individual as he experiences himself, not as seen in the light of the approach of the natural sciences.

During our discussion of psychology as natural science we noted that approach was a limiting factor. To be more precise, phenomena such as aesthetic experience, the experience of meaning, purpose, love and hate, cannot be studied by the approach and methods of psychology as natural science. It is not possible to quantify these phenomena, nor is it possible to investigate or comprehend their

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22. Ibid., p. 9.

meaning purely in terms of what is available through sense observation. Yet they are a fact of the everyday life of any person. One might quantify and measure the heartbeat of two people making love, but then one has measured only one aspect of this experience and cannot say much about what this experience means to the two people involved. Some psychologists contend that an adequate psychology must be able to accommodate and explain such phenomena. They are of the opinion that new techniques, methods, and above all a different approach will be necessary if psychology is to be able to do its job properly. These psychologists are not "anti-scientific but believe that science was made for man rather than man for science." [23]

As has been noted, in order to facilitate this concern they turned to phenomenological philosophy. Phenomenology is a way of looking at phenomena of all kinds just as they are given. The significance of this approach for clinical psychology is very clear. "It is the disciplined effort to clear one's mind of the presuppositions that so often cause us to see in the patient only our own theories or the dogmas of our own system. It is the effort to experience instead the phenomena in their full reality as they present

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23. Rollo May, "The Emergence of Existential Psychology", Rollo May, ed. Existential Psychology (New York, 1969), p. 5.

themselves." [24]. This is in direct contrast to the approach of psychology as natural science which attempts to force the phenomena to conform to the requirements of pre-constituted approach and method. Phenomenology allows the psychologist to start with the phenomena as given and then formulate methods and theories to suit the phenomena.

Psychology as a human science is thus another way of 'conceptualizing reality' (an approach), but unlike empiriological science, it does not truncate reality in an a priori manner. Instead, psychology when conceived of as a human science allows for the full expression of reality as it is given. The categories that are operative here are those of subjectivity, intentionality, freedom and responsibility. This, then, is a fundamentally different way of conceptualizing reality from that of one which confines itself only to observation and measurement. Maritain's distinction between empiriological science and philosophy of nature, and his warning concerning the attempt to collapse the latter into the former now take on a bold significance. It highlights the fact that observation and measurement, by themselves, while certainly necessary, are not sufficient for a comprehensive understanding of man. We

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24. Ibid., pp. 20-21.

must always keep in mind that an adequate psychology of man will demonstrate a concern for the purely intelligible aspects of man. As we have seen, the character of psychology will be quite different depending on which conceptualization one adopts. Giorgi's work on the question of approach as it pertains to psychology will bring this matter into sharp relief.

#### D. Amedeo Giorgi: Psychological Foundations

Now that we have established that the approach of psychology as a human science is different from the approach of psychology as a natural science, it would be quite useful to further contrast these approaches in greater detail. This will help to establish some of the basic foundations of an adequate psychology. To aid us in this task we will turn to the detailed work of Amedeo Giorgi on the question of the proper approach for psychology. However, before proceeding directly to the question of approach, it will prove helpful to provide the context in which Giorgi conducts this discussion.

##### I. Giorgi and Phenomenology

Giorgi's entire enterprise is developed within a phenomenological perspective. Rather than become involved in the various debates and discussions concerning the many

intricacies and variations of phenomenology, Giorgi has decided to cull out the main aspects which he feels will be most beneficial for psychology. Hence, an awareness of how Giorgi understands phenomenology will assist in comprehending and clarifying his work on approach,

Giorgi has identified five main aspects of phenomenology which deserve attention because of their potential impact on psychology. They are as follows: 1) the study of phenomenon, 2) consciousness understood as intentionality, 3) presuppositionless description, 4) the life-world, and 5) the emphasis on meaning. We will now examine each of these aspects.

The first point that Giorgi wishes to emphasize about phenomenology is that it is both a study of the phenomenon of the world and a method for studying these phenomena. "When a phenomenologist uses the term phenomenon, he means that whatever is given in experience is to be understood simply as the correlate of awareness, of an act of consciousness. No other attribute is to be assigned to the given except the meanings that derive explicitly from what is presented in the concrete experience." [25] That is, we are to accept and describe whatever we encounter in the

25. Amedeo Giorgi, "Phenomenology and the Foundations of Psychology", James K. Cole and William J. Arnold, eds. Nebraska Symposium on Motivation, 1975: Conceptual Foundations of Psychology, Vol. 23 (Lincoln, Nebraska, 1976), hereafter designated PFP in this chapter, p. 309.

world just as it is given, without, at least initially, adding anything. We are here attempting to determine the meaning of the given. Once the initial description is completed, it will then be possible to compare this experience with past ones. What this means in concrete terms is that we should attempt to develop a complete and accurate description of the phenomenon presented just as it is presented to us, and not interpret it in light of pre-constituted theories or personal biases. This point about phenomenon also highlights man's essential relatedness with world.

This is a concept which is made very explicit when examining consciousness. "For phenomenology, consciousness is always consciousness of something that is not consciousness itself--and this is what is known as intentionality" (PFP 310). This 'something' that is not consciousness itself is precisely the phenomena which constitute world, more particularly our world. Due to man's intentional relationship with world, it will not be possible to speak of man without world, or world without man. Consciousness, and hence man, cannot be understood without reference to their relationship to world. It is in this way that we get the comprehension of man as a being-in-the-world. This has a very specific impact on psychology because "ultimately this means that the concrete situation constituted by the intentional relationships

between man and his world becomes the basic unit for psychological analysis"(PFP 311): That is, psychology will have to study man on the basis of his essential character as being-in-the-world.

Implicit in the above discussion of the investigation of phenomena as given is the problem of just how this is to be accomplished. The traditional answer of the phenomenologist is that this is meant to be a presuppositionless description. This raises the issue of whether one can indeed be presuppositionless. Giorgi states that rather than get involved in this philosophical argument, the psychologist should adopt the more concretely attainable attitude of full disclosure of all ones presuppositions(PFP 312). Once this has been done it will be possible to determine the context in which the description is being offered. This is a point which will receive more attention in his discussion of approach.

This brings us to another point which will prove to be of prime significance in the examination of approach, that of the life-world. "The life-world, for phenomenologists, is the everyday world we all spontaneously live and experience in the course of normal living"(PFP 312). This is the world as we primordially experience it, prior to any theorizing or interpretation. This is our basic reality. Thus it is the case that all other formulations of world are derivative of the life-world and are ultimately grounded by

it. Hence all understandings, regardless of how specialized, will by necessity have to have a reference back to the life-world in order to situate it properly.

Giorgi also wants to point out that it is not possible, nor desirable, to maintain the traditional divorce between facts and meanings because "facts are important insofar as they are meaningful and meanings are derived with the help of facts"(PFP 312-313). Both are required for the full picture and hence science and phenomenology need not be seen as antagonistic.

Hence, for Giorgi, the value and significance of the phenomenological attitude is that it aids in the movement "toward a new understanding of science developed in dialogue with the phenomena rather than prior to them"(PFP 314). This is precisely the goal that his work on the question of approach is meant to help facilitate. As we shall also see later in this chapter, this is a prime contribution of Giorgi towards providing the philosophical and epistemological foundation that Maslow's work requires. Now that the general context has been clarified, it is possible to move on to a consideration of what Giorgi has to say about the very important issue of approach.

## II. Giorgi and Approach

Giorgi notes that there are four specific, and significant, reasons why psychology must clarify the

question of approach.

First of all, as shown before, it is always present anyway, and it is better to acknowledge its presence than ignore it. Secondly, by reflecting on the problems that are characteristic of approach--viz., purposes, presuppositions, biases of researcher, theoretical viewpoints, criteria, etc.--one may uncover hidden factors that have been stumbling blocks to progress in the field. Thirdly, one may also clarify operational procedures that have been fruitful without understanding why. Lastly, one may also discover ways of clarifying and describing procedures for tackling new problems and new research projects. (PHS 131)

Giorgi contends that five basic considerations come to the fore when examining approach. They are, 1) that the point of departure should not be the view of the natural sciences, but rather, that of the life-world; 2) that the phenomena of psychology are not object-like or thing-like, a rejection of the natural attitude; 3) that human behavior must be understood in terms of intentionality and meaning; 4) the clarification and adequacy of basic presuppositions; and 5) that the role of the scientist in science must be acknowledged. These five areas will now be individually examined.

1. Traditional psychology, which is generally within the approach of empiriological science, "places the natural scientific conception of the world in the privileged position. By privileged position is meant that the ultimate criteria by which the reality and validity of psychological phenomena are tested are drawn from the way in which the

natural sciences conceive the world"(PHS 132). That is, the world is understood from the perspective of that which can be known by observation and measurement. However, the world that is known from the perspective of the natural sciences is not the world as it is experienced by the individual. Rather, it is a world which is a specialized construction in light of the basic approach of natural science(PHS 140). This 'natural' world is not a primary datum, but a secondary one. The primary datum is "the world as we encounter it in everyday experience, the world in which we pursue our goals and our objectives, the world as the scene of all our human activities"(PHS 134). This is what is called the 'life-world'. This life-world is the primary datum because the natural world always presupposes the existence of it as its own basis, although usually in an implicit manner. The life-world is prior in our experience. The world as conceived by natural science is a specific, and narrower, view of the life-world. So long as psychology continues to function within the framework of the natural world the essential data of the life-world will be hidden from it and consequently psychology will be unable to formulate an accurate comprehension of the individual as he experiences himself and his world.

2. Psychology as a natural science does not pay very much attention to phenomena as given. This view of psychology adopts, implicitly, what is called the constancy

hypothesis, that is "that there is a point-by-point correspondence and constant connection between the stimulus and elementary perception"(PHS 144). Thus psychology will exhibit a great concern with the functioning of stimulus receptors. As a result "many psychologists ignore the investigation of the phenomena as such" and concentrate instead on "the functioning of the underlying receptors or organs, real or presumed"(PHS 145). These psychologists are not concerned with what is experienced, but rather, with the measureable and observable elements of how it is experienced. They are concerned with the physiology of the experience and not with the meaning of the experience. The phenomena themselves, the primary data of experience, are not allowed to emerge as they are experienced, but are translated into terms of receptors, stimulus, and so on.

This is within what Giorgi calls the 'natural attitude', that is the view that the common 'fact-world' which we find to be there and whatever it contains is really all that exists and this existence is simply taken for granted(PHS 146)..[26] There is no real investigation of the primary datum, it is just accepted. In the natural attitude people are conceived of as objects just like all other objects.

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26. It should be noted that the use of the term 'natural attitude' is somewhat confusing at this point. What Giorgi is really dealing with here is what is more generally called the 'naturalistic attitude'.

The perceptual world, which comprises whatever exists, comprises our body and its interactions with other bodies and things, and since we know that physical systems come to be substituted for perceptual things as known in common experience, this also holds for the human body. Thus, a special physical system, the organism as conceived in anatomy and physiology, is substituted for the body as given and the way we are familiar with it in the immediate experience of everyday life. (PHS 146)

This is a reduction of the individual's experience into the language of the natural sciences (recall Strasser's example of the crowd/man, wind/paper[see page 136]). This attitude is more concerned with its goals than with the way in which phenomena are given. It is an attitude that essentially hides the character of the phenomena and substitutes for them objects of natural science (PHS 147-148).

The corrective for this is to effect a change in attitude, to reject the natural attitude, and "go back to the phenomenal level in order to rediscover there how the world appears to man, and then to learn how to ask a question about this appearance that will help in understanding how man experiences and behaves in and with respect to the world" (PHS 153). In this manner what is taken for granted under the natural attitude now becomes the topic of a reflective analysis. Hence, we must adopt a different attitude in order to avoid the tendency of the natural attitude to distort our immediate experiences of ourselves, of others, and of the world. As was the case with Giorgi's first point, psychology "must go back to the phenomenal

realm and then move toward the form of closure that will best define psychological reality. Our point is that this type of closure will not turn out to be thing, or object, or idea, etc., but something entirely different" (PHS 155). It is thus the case that we must go back to the world of immediate lived experience as a proper ground for psychology.

3. It is essential that psychology be able to deal adequately with the phenomena of consciousness and experience. Traditional psychologists have attempted to understand these phenomena in their relations to the world and in their mutual relations on the basis of cause-effect relations and as a result have found them to be extremely difficult to comprehend (PHS 158). The reason for this is really quite simple: consciousness and experience cannot be grasped by cause-effect relations, but, require that the psychologist utilize the concepts of intentionality and meaning (PHS 156). "Intentionality refers to the fact that all consciousness is consciousness of something that is not consciousness itself... As such, it can also be understood as describing man's openness for, his orientation towards, or his essential directedness to the world" (PHS 156, 158). There is no cause-effect relationship because there is no question here of the movement of a thing or object, or the response of an organism, but rather, there is a "relation between man and world of which behavior is but an expression

or manifestation"(PHS 159). This is a statement of the primary datum of how the individual experiences himself and his world, that is as being-in-the-world.

The individual both finds meaning in and gives meaning to the world. This meaning cannot be quantified (although some have tried, PHS 159), but must be understood in different terms.

Meaning is the result of the encounter between man and the world, an encounter in which both are essentially involved. Moreover, implied in the notion of encounter is the dialogue of the lived-body and the world. Thus, as consciously living human beings, we find certain meanings, i.e., we find colors, oriented space, sexual meanings, etc. However, it is because of man's intentionality that these meanings are present, and to be understood properly, they must be referred back to that relation.(PHS 160)

Therefore the main questions for understanding behavior are ones of meaning and not of measurement. In order to ask these questions it will be necessary for the psychologist to "see how meanings are experienced and lived" and then see what perspective will be most suitable for understanding them as they are lived and experienced"(PHS 159). This will be much more preferable than imposing values on the experiences simply to make them fit some pre-determined concept or criteria.

4. Since it is the case that all psychological investigation will be within the framework of some kind of approach, it follows that all such investigation will rest

on a set of presuppositions. It would be best if the psychologist could function without any presuppositions and thereby experience phenomena in their purity, but as this is quite clearly impossible, the next best thing is to make explicit the presuppositions with which one is working (PHS 162). By making the presuppositions clear and explicit, the psychologist can ensure that he is not unwittingly being led astray by them and that his presuppositions are indeed appropriate and adequate for the phenomena he is investigating. Giorgi's main point here is that the psychologist should be aware of the perspective from which he views phenomena in order to ensure that he does not, as far as possible, distort or re-interpret the phenomena into some pre-constituted schema. The phenomena should be allowed to 'speak' for themselves.

5. The last consideration presented by Giorgi is that the role of the investigator in his investigation must not be overlooked. Most traditional psychologists are of the opinion that the psychologist should be 'independent' and 'objective'. This is spoken of as a sort of 'non-presence' (PHS 166). Of course, as has been noted, the psychologist is present regardless of what attitude he adopts. This is one reason why the question of presuppositions is significant. It is in the realm of experimental psychology that the strongest claim for non-presence is made. However, this claim does not stand up

to investigation. The laboratory situation is

more than an everyday situation, (it is) the result of a single human person's intervention. Surely, the experimenter draws upon general principles and accumulated knowledge, but the specific variables that are chosen are still selected by him, the procedures used to analyze the data are determined by him, and so on. In other words, rather than being independent of the researcher, the artificiality of the laboratory situation means that more so than many other situations, it represents the viewpoint of one other person using the media and knowledge of a community of persons. (PHS 167)

The presence of the psychologist in clinical therapy is somewhat more obvious, although there is still a tendency, especially in psychology as natural science, to view the relationship between therapist and patient as one of researcher and object of research. This is an imposition of the approach of the natural sciences on what is essentially an encounter between two human beings. Giorgi's point is quite emphatic. Psychology is a human endeavor and should be understood in those terms, that is, there must be a concern with the intelligible aspects of the behavior investigated. As well, every effort must be made to comprehend phenomena as they are given instead of attempting to reduce or translate them into imposed or preferred structures.

#### E. Summary

It has emerged that the character of psychology is quite different when one or another approach is adopted.

What has become quite evident is that Maritain's distinction between empiriological science and philosophy of nature is truly a significant one. It has also become quite evident that empiriological science cannot possibly do justice to human behavior as it is experienced and lived. Philosophy of nature, more particularly the philosophy of man, on the other hand, is precisely concerned to elucidate behavior as experienced. It is concerned with what it means to be human. It will therefore be the case that the philosophy of nature is the more adequate framework when one wants to develop a truly human psychology.

More generally stated, it is the case that psychology as a natural science attempts to model itself after such natural sciences as biology and chemistry. Such an approach to psychology will therefore adopt the basic methods and concerns of the natural sciences. This entails a great emphasis on measurement, quantification and an understanding of man which is based on mechanistic functioning. Psychology as natural science views man as a complex of various 'aspects' which must be separated from one another, studied, and then somehow unified. This work is done on the basis of a theory and method which pre-determine and re-interpret the phenomena to be investigated. The result of such an examination is a truncated and drastically reduced conception of the individual.

Psychology as a human science, on the other hand,

explicitly rejects the natural sciences as the ultimate model for psychology. This approach to psychology claims that a new conception of science is required in order adequately to investigate man. The concern is not with man as related to the exigence of the natural scientific methods, but rather, with the individual as he experiences himself. Psychology as human science grounds its investigation of man not in the solely observable and measureable, but on the intelligibility of man as expressed by the fundamental structure of human existence as being-in-the-world (which formulation includes the concept of intentionality, meaning and world-design). Such an approach to psychology investigates the individual within a phenomenological and existential framework. This avoids the truncation and reduction of man that is found in psychology as natural science.

We are now in a position to delineate in an explicit fashion the assistance which Maritain and Giorgi offer for Maslow's work. At the end of Chapter III we noted that Maslow was of the opinion that the natural sciences should not act as a model for psychology, and that instead a new and more appropriate, conception of science needs to be developed. As was noted at the time, this is basically as far as Maslow takes the point. He seems content with stating that orthodox science is an inadequate model for psychology and that another model needs to be developed.

However, he does not develop this idea in any comprehensive manner. Instead, Maslow merely offers various suggestions about the character and need of this science and never really gets down to developing the foundations of such a conception of science and psychology.

This is precisely the significance of the work of Jacques Maritain and Amedeo Giorgi for this research study. Their work offers support to Maslow's effort in a number of specific ways. Maritain has developed an epistemological stance which is capable of providing the foundation upon which Maslow can build his vision of psychology. Maslow is concerned to demonstrate that the natural sciences are not an appropriate model upon which to develop psychology as a study of man. Maritain's work in epistemology provides a sound foundation for this position. We have seen that the distinction between the approach of the empiriological sciences and that of the philosophy of nature indicates that if psychology is truly to be a study of man qua man then it must situate itself within the bounds of the philosophy of nature, which, as should be clear by now, contains the philosophy of man. In effect, if we read Maslow in light of Maritain's epistemology we find that what Maslow has to say is more compelling and has more force because he now has a solid and explicit epistemological foundation upon which to ground his observations, insights and objectives. On the whole, this has the effect of strengthening Maslow's

position on both, the philosophical and epistemological levels:

The work of Giorgi also has such an ameliorating impact. It has been noted that Maslow implies that he is favourably disposed towards phenomenology, particularly as it applies to the development of psychology. However, Maslow has virtually nothing explicit to say on this subject. He just leaves the reader with the impression that he operates within a stance, which, if not identical with phenomenology, is at least strongly influenced by it. While it is certainly true that many of his insights are compatible with a phenomenological outlook, they would clearly have more force if situated within an explicitly worked out conception of both phenomenology and a psychology informed by this phenomenology. This is precisely what Giorgi has to offer Maslow. Giorgi has developed a conception of psychology which addresses Maslow's major concerns and insights, while at the same time taking his inspiration from an unabashedly phenomenological perspective. This has the effect of once again providing Maslow with some badly needed foundations when it comes to his insights concerning the character of psychology as a human science and the character of man. By reading Maslow in the light of the work that Giorgi has done, Maslow's position is strengthened because it is now possible for the reader to situate Maslow's work within a concrete and

explicitly worked out phenomenological context. This has the desirable effect of tying the various insights together into a solid whole.

Hence, the overall impact of applying the work of Maritain and Giorgi to that of Maslow's is one of deepening and firmly grounding, both philosophically and epistemologically, Maslow's whole enterprise. This brings to a close our discussion of the proper character of psychology as a science. We will now turn our attention to an examination of the specifics of Third Force Psychology, with a particular emphasis on the concept of self-actualization.

## CHAPTER VI

### SELF-ACTUALIZATION: A CRITIQUE

This chapter will have as its primary concern an evaluation of Third Force Psychology, with a particular emphasis on the concept of self-actualization. It should be noted at the outset that this study is generally sympathetic to a theory of motivation or an accounting of human behavior which includes the notion that man should strive towards some goal of perfection or full "humaness". However, whatever form such a theory will take, it will probably not be the one proposed by Abraham Maslow. As will be seen in the course of this chapter, there are a number of significant problems with Maslow's version of self-actualization. As was seen in the last chapter, Maslow's foundation in, and use of insights gained through phenomenological analysis leaves something to be desired. The same can be said in regard to his work on self-actualization. Hence, in the second part of this chapter we will turn to a psychologist who might perhaps offer us a more solidly grounded, both philosophically and psychologically, theory of human motivation: i.e., Viktor Frankl. But first we will examine and discuss Maslow's theory of self-actualization.

## A. Introduction

Certainly the basic concept of self-actualization, i.e., that one should strive to be the best possible person that one can, and that this striving has the possibility of being successful, is one which undoubtedly generates a great deal of support. After all, who would seriously wish to suggest that we should not attempt to improve ourselves to the utmost limit. Also, self-actualization, particularly in the form presented by Maslow, acts as a beacon of light and hope "at a time when hope is an anachronism, when ethical and religious skepticism is dominant, when disillusionment with social and political institutions is rampant, and when human relationships and personal identity are in deep crisis." [1] Self-actualization theories offer this hope in various ways.

For one thing, self-actualization theories resurrect the moral optimism of our enlightenment heritage by affirming the positive and good-promoting potentialities of human nature. For another, they provide a normative theory for the guidance and direction of human life. Finally, they present a clear and unambiguous view of what it means to be human and how this humanity can be best developed. (FSA 57)

Another important factor is that this type of self-improvement or growth was supposedly available to

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1. Leonard Geller, "The Failure of Self-Actualization Theory: A Critique of Carl Rogers and Abraham Maslow", Journal of Humanistic Psychology, 22:2 Spring 1982, hereafter designated as FSA in this chapter, p. 57.

almost everyone.

Certainly anyone with sufficient disposable income could purchase this type of help through the lucrative "growth industries" generated by the Human Potential Movement as a whole. That is,

the Human Potential Movement, with its emphasis on spontaneity and the goodness of impulses, echoed the hedonistic message of the consumer culture. No less important to its success was that the new psychology offered its own critique of the consumer culture: it was right to want 'something more out of life,' and that 'something more' could itself be purchased as one of many commoditized therapeutic experiences, including, by the late '60s, Gestalt therapy, nude therapy, encounter groups, primal scream therapy and transactional analysis, plus their combinations and improved versions.[2]

It should thus come as no surprise to learn that it is basically the middle class which engages in these therapies and experiences. This is not a major cause for concern in and by itself, but it does tend to put in doubt the universal nature of self-actualization.

This problem is even more graphically highlighted when one considers the effects of concentrating almost exclusively on the individual, to the detriment of an examination of the societal context. That is, an emphasis on the individual without taking into account the society in which the individual lives tends to eliminate questions

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2. Barbara Ehrenreich, "The Male Revolt", Mother Jones, 8:3 April 1983, pp. 33,41.

about that society and its structures.[3] Such questions could be very significant, particularly once it is acknowledged that one's role and place in society has a definite impact on what one is able to do or not do. Thus it is important that Maslow's

theory is ahistorical and indeed apolitical, especially in the sense that it appears divorced from any awareness of class and ideological domination as a continuing state of affairs in North American life. Maslow's theory of needs thereby attains a peculiarly abstract, Wonderland quality, as if the members of the human species in a given society were all equally capable of developing their individual potentialities, regardless of economic, social, or educational circumstances.[4]

It should be clear that this type of critique applies to all theories of human behavior or motivation that do not apply sufficient attention to the social conditions in which the person finds himself. More than mere lip service must be paid to the fact that the individual does not live in some sort of idealized vacuum, but rather, lives within certain social conditions which will influence and determine, to a certain extent, which potentialities can be developed or actualized. As will be seen shortly, Maslow will run into

3. Allan R. Buss, "Humanistic Psychology as Liberal Ideology: The Socio-Historical Roots of Maslow's Theory of Self-Actualization", Journal of Humanistic Psychology, 19:3 Summer 1979, hereafter designated as HPL in this chapter, pp. 146-47.

4. Christian Bay, "Human Needs, Wants, and Politics: Abraham Maslow, Meet Karl Marx", Social Praxis, 7:3/4 1980, hereafter designated as HNW in this chapter, p. 224.

similar problems when we consider the question of the relationship between the individual, the environment and evil.

However, for the moment we will content ourselves with the observation that Maslow demonstrated a marked naivety concerning such matters as class, social relations and their impact on the individual.[5] He did address himself to these questions, but only in a rather limited manner. He did offer some suggestions on how to achieve social change in order to bring about the ideal type of society discussed in Chapter IV. These recommendations are generally to be found in his discussions concerning the appropriate face of industry. Maslow saw industry as being in the vanguard of positive social change. Maslow's suggestion here is simply one of developing enlightened management attitudes in order to "humanize" the workplace(MCH 82). These changes would not occur on a grand scale; but in keeping with his general outlook, would develop on the local level. Maslow always

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5. Cf. Walter Nord, "A Marxist Critique of Humanistic Psychology", Journal of Humanistic Psychology, 17:1 Winter 1977, hereafter designated as MCH in this chapter, p. 80 where Nord points out matters which Maslow clearly did not pay enough attention to, i.e., that "social classes, private property, the 'competitive' and consumption-oriented economy, and the distribution of social power are all major, interrelated factors which help define the social relationships in which individuals function. These forces influence the real social goals (i.e., those goals to which resources are devoted) and are reflected in all elements of the social system including the processes of socialization, education, and work."

places a great emphasis on gradual change done within the system and on a small scale. This point will be discussed further later in this chapter. While no one would wish to suggest that 'enlightened management attitudes' are a bad thing, it is quite another to suggest that a mere change in attitude will alleviate the problems of society. This solution does not address the reality nor the complexity of social dynamics in our time.

Maslow's attitude is further demonstrated by the fact that

Not only was he in his academic work not preoccupied with problems of socioeconomic oppression or ideological domination as sources of pathologies in human behavior and development; he gradually became less interested in people with pathologies than in people blessed with the best possible mental health. He came increasingly to see his work as quite different from Freud's in that Maslow's main concern was with studying healthy personalities and how to facilitate their development; and increasingly Maslow tended to take the present social order for granted. (HNW 235)

This taking of the social order for granted should come as no surprise, for who else but those who are best able to cope and develop within society will be able to achieve the highest degree of self-actualization. Thus Maslow's lack of awareness concerning various aspects of social dynamics leads him, in part, to develop a version of self-actualization which ends up extolling the values and mores of contemporary society. This is an issue which will also receive more attention later in this chapter.

We will now turn to our major examination of Maslow's concept of self-actualization which will include such topics as the relationship between the individual/environment/evil, the criteria and content of self-actualization, the democratic and aristocratic versions of self-actualization and the inherent liberalism of Maslow's position.

## B. Self-Actualization: A Critique

### I. Self-Actualization: Good and Bad

Let us recall some of the basic attributes of self-actualization. To develop and activate our potential as human beings, our basic inner nature, leads to health, growth and fulfillment. Failure to do this leads to illness, a state of 'lessened humanness' and possibly neurosis. It must also be emphasized that this inner nature is presented by Maslow as being 'good' or 'positive' in character and consequently something that should definitely be expressed and not repressed. This inner nature is not good because "it conforms to an external moral standard, but because it forms a consistent and harmonious whole whose expression and development creates a vital and dynamic unity in the life of the subject. The touchstone of value is intrinsic, not extrinsic, to the subject" (FSA 62). Maslow considers this unfolding of our inner nature to be the ultimate goal of human existence, a goal towards which we

naturally gravitate.[6]

This position invites one to question whether or not basic human character is indeed exclusively of a positive nature. It does not require a great deal of introspection or reflection on one's life to come to the conclusion that people are capable of both good and bad, and further, that

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6. Cf. Isaac Franck, "Self Realization as Ethical Norm: A Critique", The Philosophical Forum, IX, 1977, hereafter designated as SR in this chapter, pp. 8-9 where he sums up this point quite nicely. "The logical structure of the argument implicit in the claim of these psychologists that ethical norms can be inferred from self-actualization is approximately as follows:

1. Man has an inner nature, with inherent potentialities and capacities.

2. Part of man's inner nature is the tendency to, the pressure or propensity toward, self-actualization, i.e., toward fulfilling his potentialities and capacities.

3. Therefore, self-actualization, the fulfillment of man's potentialities and capacities is good, whereas the denial of self-actualization, i.e., the frustration or denial of the fulfillment of man's capacities, is bad; and therefore, also, people ought to actualize themselves, and ought to seek the establishment of a social order in which self-actualization is facilitated and encouraged. The principal step in the argument, then, is the inference from the alleged fact that the need to self-actualize is a central propensity in man's behavior, to the conclusion that self-actualization and its products and consequences are morally good and ought to be pursued and encouraged. The ethical norm, the criterion for ethical judgment, is thus allegedly contained in or built into the phenomenon and pursuit of self-actualization, and the logical guarantee of the correctness of the ethical judgment is allegedly contained within this propensity itself. From the descriptive psychological premise, 'Man has a tendency toward self-actualization,' is inferred the normative and prescriptive proposition, 'All self-actualizing is by virtue of its being an instance of self-actualizing, good, and ought to be encouraged.'"

these actions arise quite naturally from our basic selves. Hence, it would be better to adopt a view which more accurately reflects our actual lived experience such as one which maintains that "human nature is multipotential. A dazzling choice of options is available. There is no cosmic requirement, nor biological necessity, that our choices be well balanced." [7] In his own defence Maslow can only offer us selected 'success stories' which certainly back him up, but fail to convince because they strike one as being very unrepresentative of people in general. Even when he does talk about people who come across as more graspable, he presents a one sided view of them which whitewashes them and leaves out everything that does not fit well with his

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7. Brewster Smith, "On Self-Actualization Theory: A Transambivalent Examination of a Focal Theme in Maslow's Psychology", Journal of Humanistic Psychology, 13:2 Spring 1973, hereafter designated as OSA in this chapter, p. 27.

theory.[8] Just look at what he says about self-actualizers and at the list of people he offers as examples. These people have no faults, never seem to do anything wrong and always appear to be in control of the situation. This is certainly not a description of what life is really like. The fact that Maslow's view of life does not correspond with what most of us experience is only one problem with his argument.

Maslow, it will be recalled, also insists that the environment does not play any major role in determining the content of our inner nature, that is to say, the attributes which constitute our basic character exist a priori and do not depend on the environment for their existence. What the environment does do, however, is influence the extent to which we can develop this content. For instance, the

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8. Cf. OSA p. 24 where Smith offers what seems to be the most plausible explanation for this situation. "The crucial flaw, one that I noted in 1959, and so far as I am aware Maslow never acknowledged, has to do with the boot-strap operation by which he selected his 'sample' of self-actualizing people. In effect, Maslow eliminated people with gross pathology--the Dostoyevskis and Van Goghs--and selected people for whom, after close scrutiny, he had the highest admiration as human specimens. His empirical definition of psychological health or self-actualization thus rests, at root, on his own implicit values that underlie this global judgment. The array of characteristics that he reports must then be regarded not as an empirical description of the fully human (the value-laden facts that he claims to have established), but rather as an explication of his implicit conception of the fully human, of his orienting frame of human values. This is still interesting because of our respect for Maslow's discriminations of human quality, but it is not the factual foundations for humanistic values that he claims it to be."

environment can play a crucial role in such matters as facilitating or hindering the gratification of our lower order deficit needs. Hence the individual alone is responsible for the way he is. He cannot point to external circumstances in order to excuse or explain away aspects about himself or his situation that he does not like. "Just as the acorn will unfold into a mature and healthy oak tree, so our inner nature will unfold into a mature and healthy human being (provided the environment does not inhibit this unfolding)"(FSA 66). This position is fine as long as one assumes that this inner character is indeed of a positive nature. However, as has already been suggested the evidence indicates that this assumption is untenable. This is further and graphically demonstrated if we examine the question of the existence of evil.

As we have seen, the environment only plays a part in the development or hinderance of deficit needs. That is, it concerns us only when considering needs which depend on something outside of ourselves. "But if a need is not dependent upon others for gratification, then the environment can have no responsibility for its satisfaction or frustration. This is precisely what growth needs are. Neither their gratification nor their frustration depends upon the presence or absence of anything in the environment"(FSA 65). Thus, since the environment does not have any role in the development of our higher order needs,

it also has no role in determining what attributes we develop. Since we know that evil and wrong-doing exist, at the very least based on empirical evidence, this means that the only possible source for evil is the individual.

This view is in keeping with our own experiences. People are capable of both good and bad, and both types of actions come from people all the time. However, as far as Maslow's position is concerned, this is disastrous for it means that evil must be one of the possible attributes that can be self-actualized. He must accept this if he is to remain consistent with his view of the role of the environment. Thus, it is the case that if Maslow is to be true to his theory, he must accept that people may be bad, good, or any combination of the two and still be self-actualizers. After all, they are only doing what Maslow exhorts them towards, that is, being all that they are.

capable of.[9] It is clear that Maslow does not remain consistent to his own position for he only speaks of the good in man. In fact, as we saw in Chapter IV he attempts to gloss over evil or wrong-doing by attributing them to misguided or mistaken, but essentially good, intentions. This simply will not do. No matter how much Maslow would wish to deny it, his position does indeed allow the names of people like Hitler and Stalin to be placed on his list of people who perhaps achieved a great degree of self-actualization.

This entails that it will not be possible to accept Maslow's version of self-actualization as a normative ideal. What really needs to be done is that we must examine ourselves, try to determine what characteristics we wish to

9. Cf. SR p. 14 where Franck provides us with a clear example of this problem. "Now, the logical problem arises because it is not at all clear what exactly is meant by Maslow's position. Are all cases of a muscular man's use of his muscles ethically 'good' in Maslow's view? What about the muscular man who exercises his muscles by frequently provoking fights with people, in which he beats them up? What about the exercise of their muscles by muscular 'goons' and 'muscle men' in the employ of racketeers, etc? Such illustrations can be multiplied out of the long annals of human history, and out of the more recent use of muscular men by totalitarian regimes. Clearly Maslow would agree that such use of their muscles by muscular men is not 'good.' However, since many of these muscle men obviously 'feel good,' and have 'a subjective feeling of...successful, uninhibited functioning' in this exercise of their muscles, Maslow's thesis would require him to call this exercise ethically good. If he rejects the proposition that this kind of use of one's muscles is good, then it follows that he is employing a criterion other than self-actualization by which to pass ethical judgment over a case of self-actualizing behavior."

develop and enhance, and then attempt to become like that. Of course, it will always be possible to change one's mind along the way and try another path. It will also be necessary that we have the attributes we wish to develop. The main point to be made here is that we cannot just allow any tendency or attribute to develop, for we cannot be sure that everything we do will be good. The growth process for man will be punctuated with decisions which must constantly be evaluated. Growth will not simply be the natural development of all that we are, but rather, the attempted expression of those aspects of ourselves that we want and have the opportunity to develop. This will also entail a different conception of the role the environment plays in personal development.

We have just seen that Maslow's theory of motivation as exemplified by his concept of self-actualization runs into difficulties because it generally fails to take into account the concrete social/economic/political situation in which the individual finds himself. We have also seen that Maslow's insistence that 'all that we are and will become comes from inside us' and his consequent view of the non-influence of the environment leads him into difficulties when he tries to account for evil or wrong-doing. That is, his presentation of the basic character of man as good is flawed and leads Maslow into contradictions which undermine his whole endeavour.

The suggestion was made that a particular difficulty with Maslow's view of self-actualization is that the basic character of self-actualization is defined in terms of Maslow's likes and dislikes, his personal values. However, he advanced the claim that these were universal and normative values. We will now turn our attention to a practical example of what self-actualization could be like in order to highlight the consequences of Maslow's personal choices. We will then explore the implications of this and attempt to explain why Maslow developed the view he did.

## II. Democracy or Elitism

The example that we will examine will be that of the so-called 'hippies' of the middle to late 1960's. The best representative community of these people was that of the Haight-Ashbury in San Francisco.[10] The hippies are a good example for our purposes, because as shall be seen, they graphically demonstrate why Maslow moved from a democratic vision of self-actualization to an elitist one. That is, the hippies offer concrete evidence for what Maslow (independently) eventually realized, i.e., that the democratic model does not work.

While it is true that most hippies probably never heard

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10. Cf. Charles Perry, The Haight-Ashbury: A History, (New York, 1984) for an excellent chronology and explanation of the development of this community and its eventual decline.

of Maslow, much less read him, this study nonetheless concurs with the following position.

That the hippies should have sought the very thing that Maslow claims to have found is a mere coincidence--not a deliberate plot or self-conscious effort. But the very fact that they ventured into the realm of self-actualization means that they set foot on territory where Maslow reigns as king; and as all who enter there become ipso facto Maslovian subjects, it is conceptually useful, if technically inaccurate, to view the hippies as followers of Maslow. Since the hippie experience is above all a quest for the kinds of peak experiences that Maslow describes, and since every person who aspires to or achieves the sort of thing that Maslow terms self-actualization moves wittingly or unwittingly onto Maslow's turf, the hippies, whether or not they know it or like it, must be considered Maslovians..[11].

The hippies did indeed attempt to develop a community, based on drugs and music, which would incorporate all the main ingredients Maslow wanted: compassion, toleration, non-judgmental loving reciprocal relations, the fusion of West and East, and the establishment of an environment in which all would be free to 'do their own thing', to develop and explore themselves to their utmost capacity. Ultimately, they failed, but their failure is very instructive.

The hippies are a very good example of Maslow's early thinking on self-actualization. They represent the results of following what has been called Maslow's 'democratic

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11. Adrienne Aron, "Maslow's Other Child", Journal of Humanistic Psychology, 17:2 Spring 1977, hereafter designated as MOC in this chapter, p. 11.

premise'

so named for its recognition of the right of every individual to his or her tastes, opinions, values, etc., and its admission to an equality of rights with respect to these preferences. According to this view, each person has an uncontestable right to his unique choices, whether he prefers things which Maslow would consider bad, or things which he would approve. With respect to their right to decide for themselves what they like, all people are equal, and therefore it follows that all must be given equal opportunity to make and act on their own decisions. That is to say, there must be toleration.(MOC 13)

Toleration of others and their ideas would seem to be a key point here.

Hippies attempted to fight intolerance, and thereby promote tolerance, by being non-judgmental in their relations with others. This means that other people are not meant to conform to your ideal behavior, but rather, are free to do as they please.[12] It is the assertion that

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12. Cf. MOC 18-19. "As a consequence of their reactiveness against the dominant culture the early hippies fixed on the theme of 'do your own thing,' for they perceived America as a place where everyone was under pressure to do someone else's thing. Thus, hippie 'things' often constituted an assault on convention, so that there was no costume too bizarre for the hippie, no style too far out. Just as sexual practices outlawed or considered perverse by straight society were casually accepted, so it was possible for people to live in strangely furnished houses, eat unusual foods, smoke exotic weeds, and belong to weird religious cults, without anyone minding in the least. Sexual freedom, political freedom, religious freedom--all these were tolerated by the movement and protected by the people in it. But the hippies carried their toleration a step beyond the civil libertarianism which grants people the right to do their various things, to the point where they acknowledged the validity of a multitude of 'things,' each of which has an equal right to free expression."

their 'thing' is just as valid and appropriate as yours. Hence, everyone is free to develop and expand their interests and personality to the extent they wish. While being non-judgmental did indeed provide a situation in which people could pursue self-actualization to any extent at all (for many drugs such as LSD were the golden road to this new level of being), the fact that people were so flexible and broad-minded in what they viewed as acceptable meant that it was therefore impossible to pass judgment on anyone or anything. This leaves one without the ability to assign responsibility or blame and also no way to differentiate between good and bad(MOC 20). This is precisely where this democratic model falls apart. If everything is of equal value, if the distinction of right and wrong disappears, if no one is really responsible for anything, there can clearly be no normative standards or ideals. This is precisely what befell the hippie community of Haight-Ashbury. What they accomplished was not the development of the anticipated 'new man', but a community of people who had no real basis for making or evaluating decisions and who eventually drifted not into self-actualization but base self-indulgence. After all, the only touchstone they had was themselves and the only thing they could be sure of was what would be of benefit to themselves. This led not only to self-indulgence but also, for the more naive and trusting people of the community, to a situation where exploitation became rampant. Bad quality drugs, the adverse and hurtful effects

of a 'free love' mentality, poor living quarters and a lack of proper nutrition were just some of the problems of this community.

The Haight-Ashbury certainly does not exemplify the type of society Maslow thought would be best. This may at first appear to be something of a contradiction because this section starting out by claiming that the hippies did represent Maslow's democratic version of self-actualization. This they do, but along the way Maslow found that he could not accept this position. (It is important to note that Maslow changed his mind for theoretical and personal reasons, not because of the hippies. In fact, he had changed his position before there even were any hippies.) Maslow found it impossible to live with a view which dictated that everything was of equal value, or that one choice was just as good as another.

This led him to formulate what has been called the 'aristocratic premise' of self-actualization.

The second premise, on the other hand (with its concomitant view of the self), focuses on the distinctions between good choices and bad choices, between what is lofty and what base, what superior and what inferior, what noble and what common, and admits a preference for the former in every case. Here Maslow is not content to celebrate the fact that every human being is unique and will show a unique set of preferences when allowed to make choices, but is intent on showing that some choices are better than others, and some people better choosers. Here the equality of rights advanced in the democratic premise is overtaken by a powerful inequality of things and persons which, while not denying the dignity and worth of the

individual person, holds that some people are more dignified and worthy than others. Indeed, it goes so far as to say that some are more human than others, and deserve therefore to lead the rest. (MOC 14)

This is the position which is put forward by Maslow in his later works. It is this view which is exemplified in the description of self-actualization given in Chapter IV. This shift from the democratic to the aristocratic view clearly has profound implications for how we are to understand self-actualization.

What we now have is a position which, in essence, states that the ideal person or what is to be considered 'ultimate humanness' is defined in terms of what Maslow likes, wants and believes. Self-actualization thus becomes a way for Maslow to put forth his own preferences in the guise of normative and universal characteristics. For instance, Maslow was of the opinion that the music of Beethoven was on a lofty plane while the music of Elvis Presley was base. Therefore, according to Maslow's aristocratic view, "all superior (i.e., self-actualized) people will agree that the music of Beethoven is greater than that of Elvis Presley, assuring us that if only we were self-actualized then we too would agree" (MOC 14-15). Hence, Maslow is no longer allowing us to pick and choose for ourselves, nor allowing for a free and creative expression of our inner selves, but rather, he is dictating what will and what will not be acceptable views if we want to join his

club of self-actualizers. And what's worse, our choices are dictated on something no more profound than Maslow's personal preferences. — This is clearly not a good enough ground upon which to base a position which attempts to spell out the ultimate goal for man.

Before leaving Maslow, and turning for help to Frankl, it may prove both interesting and useful to briefly examine why Maslow shifted from one view to the other. Significantly, the reasons suggested here indicate the importance of understanding the societal context in which one finds oneself, something which we have seen Maslow does not do.

### III. Maslow's Liberalism

Many commentators, including the person who first emphasized this shift in Maslow's thought (Aron), have treated this shift as some sort of contradiction in thought, or a conceptual/logical error.[13] However, another commentator (Buss) has come along who offers a very plausible and convincing explanation of why Maslow would move from the democratic to the aristocratic versions of self-actualization. We believe that a brief statement of Buss' position would be beneficial in as much as it would

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13. Cf. MOC p. 14 "Maslow committed an error in reasoning that cannot be rectified" or p. 15 "Where in this wild dialectic is the real Maslow?"

add to our understanding of the development of Maslow's thought.

It is the contention of Buss that Maslow is not guilty of committing a logical error, but that the contradiction in his work is a real contradiction. "It is an historical contradiction rooted in a concrete social reality. Maslow's contradiction is part of a larger contradiction--the contradiction between democratic theory and democratic practice within modern liberal society"(HPL 50). It thus becomes clear that in order to understand this contradiction we have to examine the social and historical origins of Maslow's thought.

That Maslow was a thinker in the liberal tradition is evidenced by the fact that the main themes of his psychology echo the major tenets of liberalism.[14] In accordance with his basic outlook Maslow chose people as examples of self-actualizers, at least partly, because they embodied liberal values. That is, these were people who "were democratic, autonomous, individualistic, and, true to the liberal penchant for piecemeal progress, preferred to work from within rather than from without the system on matters

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14. Cf. HPL p. 47. "Such themes in his writings as growth, becoming, self-actualization, individual freedom, and tolerance, are all the psychological embodiment of the liberal frame of mind which emphasizes optimism, pluralism, individual freedom, piecemeal progress, and the gradual development toward perfection."

relating to social injustice" (HPL 48). As we have already seen these are values which Maslow also held, along with the shared liberal emphasis on the 'good' in man instead of the 'bad'. Hence there is indeed ample evidence that Maslow's thought can be placed within a traditional liberal framework.

It is instructive to see what happened to the liberal outlook in the last half century, because the changes in liberal theory appear in Maslow's view of self-actualization. As the governing of nations became more complex, this governing was left less and less in the hands of the general masses and tended to be taken over by what has developed into a social/political elite. To keep pace with this development, liberalism also changed from its strong emphasis on direct participatory democracy to a position which stressed leaders showing the way for the masses. As we have seen, this same shift occurs when Maslow goes from the democratic to the aristocratic view of self-actualization. He no longer speaks of everyone having the right to choose, but leaders or his elite self-actualizers deciding what is best and proper for all. Very much in the mould of a rejection of the 'unwashed masses' as governing their own destiny and having instead the enlightened leadership of those 'who know'. It is also quite likely that the social and political upheavals which occurred during Maslow's life influenced him, along with

many other liberals.[15] This was a very disillusioning time for liberals and democrats who relied on the common man as the foundation of society. Something similar to this happened to the New Left in the late 1960's with regard to its view of the working class.

In any event

We are now in a position to understand better the social basis of Maslow's theory of self-actualization, and the historical roots of the contradiction between the democratic and elitist views of self. Maslow's elite--the one percent of the general population who define and thus control what is meant by self-actualization--are the psychological embodiment of the social elite who are society's decision-makers. The structure of Maslow's psychological theory can be seen as incorporating the structure of his society. Maslow's hierarchical or 'class' theory of self-actualization consists of social categories projected onto the individual. His is a liberal psychological theory that contains the real

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15. Cf. HPL p. 51. Maslow's major works were "written over a period of time which witnessed some very significant political events revolving around the undermining of classical democratic theory. Several mass movements, all of which took a totalitarian turn (e.g., Nazism, Fascism, and McCarthyism), shook the very foundations of a classical liberal democratic theory which had considered the masses as the protectors of freedom and liberty. The growing post-war proletariat support for Communist parties in such western countries as France and Italy posed somewhat of a threat to classical liberal democratic theory. Rather than seeing the franchise and the further delegation of power to the masses as guaranteeing the preservation of democracy, there developed a growing realization that perhaps the masses could not be trusted to exercise such increased responsibility in a way which was consistent with preserving liberal values. During the early 1950's the lack of political sophistication of the common person was being increasingly documented by social scientists. Such findings helped to fuel the growing disillusionment amongst certain thinkers with classical liberal democratic theory, and the acceptance of elitist theories of democracy."

socio-historical contradiction between democracy and elitism--the contradiction that had evolved within the modern liberal democratic state. The tension in Maslow's theory of self-actualization between democracy and elitism--between the nonactualized masses and the actualized few--is part of the tension that liberal theorists were experiencing and trying to resolve in the 1940's and 50's. (HPL 53)

Therefore, the short explanation of why Maslow moved from the democratic version of self-actualization to the aristocratic one revolves around the general development of liberalism away from a belief in the sanctity of the masses to a reliance on an elite to keep things going properly.

This aside, while an interesting one, is now completed. So far in this chapter we have not been commenting favourably on Maslow's theory of self-actualization. In fact, we have demonstrated that it is indeed a very flawed and untenable position. However, we do accept that it is possible and necessary to speak of a higher calling for man, one which emphasizes man's humanness and his being-in-the-world. To this end we will now turn to Viktor Frankl for help in developing such a position.

#### C. Beyond Self-Actualization: Frankl and Meaning

As we have seen throughout this chapter, there are a great many problems with Maslow's theory of human motivation, specifically with regard to his concept of self-actualization as the ultimate goal of man. So far our criticism has centered on direct comments concerning

Maslow's work which have emphasized both the internal contradictions of his work and the generally untenable character of his view. We will now move on from Maslow to consider, briefly, a position which also addresses itself to this question of a conception of man and a motivational theory which truly captures the character of the ultimate goal of man. The intention is to further demonstrate the inadequacy of Maslow's position, while also indicating a possible alternate route for a more comprehensive and adequate view on this matter.

#### I. Introduction

Viktor Frankl has developed a position which he calls Logotherapy. Within this view is presented a conception of man which is based on three dimensions: the somatic, the psychic, the noological. For our purposes we will only concern ourselves with the noological dimension (the dimension of noetic phenomena) for it is here that which is uniquely human is located. [16]. This noological dimension is further divided into three elements which are grouped by Frankl under the general heading of 'Logotherapy's three pillars of man', i.e., the freedom of will, the will to

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16. Cf. Viktor Frankl, The Will to Meaning: Foundations and Applications of Logotherapy (New York, 1969), hereafter designated as WTM in this chapter, p. 17.

meaning, and the meaning of life.[17] Within this triad, the will to meaning is the most important aspect, both for Frankl and for this study.

This is the case for two basic reasons. Firstly, both freedom of the will and the meaning of life are prerequisites for the will to meaning. That is, one would not be persuaded to actualize one's will to meaning if one were not convinced that man is endowed with freedom of will. Also, if there were no meaning in life, it would be useless to call on man's actualization of his will to meaning. Hence, it simply does not make sense to speak of a will to meaning unless we first accept that man has freedom of will and that life has a meaning. The second reason it is so important is that the will to meaning is the motivational force of human existence. It is this second reason which will receive our attention for the remainder of this chapter.

In general terms, as will be seen, we can say that

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17. Cf. WTM p. 16 where Frankl offers this clarification of what he means by freedom of the will. "The first of them, the freedom of will, is opposed to a principle that characterizes most current approaches to man, namely, determinism. Really, however, it is only opposed to what I am used to calling pan-determinism, because speaking of the freedom of will does not in any way imply any a priori indeterminism. After all, the freedom of will means the freedom of human will, and human will is the will of a finite being. Man's freedom is no freedom from conditions but rather freedom to take a stand on whatever conditions might confront him."

Frankl envisages the will to meaning as a way to either discard or supercede other bases for human motivation such as the will to power, the will to pleasure, the will to happiness, or self-actualization. For Frankl, man's will to meaning is the same as saying man's will to a life-goal. Specifically, the will to meaning is to be understood as man's will to actualize values. This indicates that man's goal does not consist of actualizing himself, but rather, in transcending himself. Frankl will even claim that the essence of man lies in his self-transcendence, that the actualization of values through the will to meaning requires this self-transcendence. This will be the defining characteristic of what it is to be human. We will now look at this in greater detail.

## II. Meaning, Values, Self-Transcendence

What needs to be clarified here is the relationship between actualizing values and man's self-transcendence, that is, to understand that for man to actualize values is for man to transcend himself. Frankl holds this position because of the way in which he comprehends man's basic ontological structure, i.e., as being-in-the-world. "Man is reaching out for, and actually reaching, finally attaining, the world--a world, that is, which is replete with other beings to encounter, and meanings to fulfill" (WTM 31). Thus, for Frankl, the key to man's essential nature is that it is a relationship with the world, a relationship which revolves

around the discovery and fulfillment of meanings in the world.

Man is structurally and essentially self-transcendent because he is a being-in-the-world, and he is a being-in-the-world by virtue of his being conscious and free. Man as a conscious or knowing being is first of all opened on and to the world. Man is, at least initially and primordially, an embodied consciousness directed to the world, not directed towards his self. "Therefore man is originally characterized by his 'search for meaning' rather than his 'search for himself'. The more one forgets oneself...the more human he is. And the more one is immersed and absorbed in something or someone other than oneself the more he really becomes himself".[18] This directedness is called intentionality. Intentionality refers to the fact that man's consciousness is essentially consciousness of something other than the psychic acts of consciousness, than the self itself.

It is in this sense that Frankl speaks of man as self-transcendent, for by having an intentional consciousness man is, technically speaking, self-transcendent. That is, "meaning must not coincide with being; meaning must be ahead of being. Meaning sets the

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18. Viktor Frankl, The Unconscious God (New York, 1975), hereafter designated as UG in this chapter, p. 79.

pace for being. Existence falters unless it is lived in terms of transcendence toward something beyond itself." [19] Man is already directed beyond himself towards the world in the attempt to fulfill meaning. The failure to fulfill meanings results in a feeling of purposelessness or what Frankl calls 'existential vacuum'. [20]

It should, however, be made clear that these meanings are discovered, not invented, by the individual.

A person's will to meaning can only be elicited if meaning itself can be elucidated as something which is essentially more than his mere self-expression. This implies a certain degree of objectiveness, and without a minimum amount of objectiveness meaning would never be worth fulfilling. We do not just attach and attribute meanings to things, but rather find them; we do not invent them, we detect them. (No more than this is meant when I speak of the objectiveness of meaning.) On the other hand, however, an unbiased investigation would also reveal a certain subjectiveness inherent in meaning. The meaning of life must be conceived in terms of the specific meaning of a personal life in a given situation. Each man is unique and each man's life is singular; no one is replaceable nor is his life repeatable. This twofold uniqueness adds to man's

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19. Viktor Frankl, Psychotherapy and Existentialism: Selected Papers on Logotherapy (New York, 1967), hereafter designated as PE in this chapter, p. 12.

20. Cf. UG p. 91. "If asked for a brief explanation, I would say that the existential vacuum derives from the following conditions. Unlike an animal, man is no longer told by drives and instincts what he must do. And in contrast to man in former times, he is no longer told by traditions and values what he should do. Now, knowing neither what he must do nor what he should do, he sometimes does not even know what he basically wishes to do. Instead, he wishes to do what other people do--which is conformism--or he does what other people wish him to do--which is totalitarianism."

responsibility. Ultimately, this responsibility derives from the existential fact that life is a chain of questions which man has to answer by answering for life, to which he has to respond by being responsible; by making decisions, by deciding which answers to give to the individual questions. (PE 16-17)

This brings us directly to the the second aspect of man's self-transcendence, namely his freedom. This freedom is highlighted by man's responsibility for his existence.[21] By virtue of his freedom and his free actions in and on the world, and himself, man is able to posit himself in new and various modes of existence.[22] He stands out and moves beyond his former modes of existence towards new ones. In

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21. Cf. PE pp. 12-13. "Once meaning orientation turns into meaning confrontation, that stage of maturation and development is reached in which freedom--that concept much emphasized by existentialist philosophy-- becomes responsibility. Man is responsible for the fulfillment of the specific meaning of his personal life. But he is also responsible before something, or to something, be it society, or humanity, or mankind, or his own conscience. However, there is a significant number of people who interpret their own existence not just in terms of being responsible to something but rather to someone, namely to God."

22. Cf. PE pp. 46-47. "The potentialities of life are not indifferent possibilities; they must be seen in the light of meaning and values. At any given time only one of the possible choices of the individual fulfills the necessity of his life task. Herein is involved the challenge of each life situation--the challenge to responsibility. Man must make his choice concerning the mass of present potentials: which will be condemned to non-being and which will be actualized and thus rescued for eternity. Decisions are final, for the only really transitory aspects of life are the potentialities. When a potentiality is actualized, it is actualized forever and can never be destroyed. Man, therefore, must face the responsibility for these immortal 'footprints in the sands of time'. He must decide, for weal or for woe, what will be the monument of his existence."

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this way man also demonstrates his essential character as self-transcendent.

We have just said that by virtue of his ontological structure man is essentially and primarily self-transcendent. This does not, however, imply that in terms of praxis man will actually and fully act in accordance with the complete self-transcendent quality of his being. For instance, he does not do it when he sets pleasure, power, happiness, or self-realization as the ultimate motive of his actions. In that case the good he may find in the world of things and persons is not desired or willed for its own sake, but for the self's sake.[23] In other words, the world and the goods it contains are not then made the object of his direct intention. In order for man to act actually, effectively and fully in accordance with the self-transcendent quality of his ontological structure, man must have as his direct goal the actualization of values and not derivative goods such as pleasure, power, happiness or self-actualization. Let us have a closer look at this position.

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23. Cf. PE p. 9. "In fact, it is my conviction that man should not, indeed cannot, struggle for identity in a direct way; he rather finds identity to the extent to which he commits himself to something beyond himself, to a cause greater than himself."

### III. Self-Transcendence or Self-Actualization?

We are now faced with the question of whether or not self-actualization and self-transcendence are essentially the same phenomena, as Maslow has suggested [24], or if not, what is their precise relationship. It should certainly be clear that Maslow was mistaken in this. Self-transcendence and self-actualization do not denote the same phenomena nor do they imply the same meaning. It is true that both are concerned with man's ultimate motivation and fulfillment, but at the same time it is also the case that they are very different answers to this question. Frankl is quite clear on this point.

So now we must pose the crucial question of whether or not man's primary intention, or even his ultimate destination, could ever be properly described by the term self-actualization. I would venture a strictly negative response to this question. It appears to me to be quite obvious that self-actualization is an effect and cannot be the object of intention. Mirrored in this fact is the fundamental anthropological truth that self-transcendence is one of the basic features of human existence. Only as man withdraws from himself in the sense of releasing self-centered interest and attention will he gain an authentic mode of existence. (PE 45-46)

Frankl holds the same view with regard to what may be termed the will to power and the will to pleasure, that is, that they are effects of the will to meaning and therefore cannot

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24. Cf. Abraham Maslow, "Comments on Dr. Frankl's Paper", Journal of Humanistic Psychology, 6:2, Fall 1966, pp. 107-112.

be aimed at directly. [25]

The problem is that by aiming directly at them, thereby making pleasure, power or self-actualization the main motivational force for man, we end up reducing and devaluing the world and its objects to the status of merely being a means to an end. Within such a view

there is no place for any true encounter between man on the one hand and the world and its objects on the other. The objects in the world are no longer seen in their objective essence but, instead, only as more or less useful tools for the maintenance of homeostasis. There is no room left for anything such as commitment to a cause for its own sake or participation with a partner for the partner's sake. Instead, causes and partners are devaluated to the level of mere means to an end--the end of restoring certain conditions in the subject's psychic system. As means they appear to the subject to have no value in themselves but to be only of use to him. (PE 48-49)

So, not only is it not possible to strive, successfully, directly for such aspects as pleasure or the ultimate self, but to do this would also be to act in such a manner as to be untrue to man as being-in-the-world. It would be to

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25. Cf. WTM 34 where Frankl explains this by using the example of pleasure. "Normally pleasure is never the goal of human strivings but rather is, and must remain, an effect, more specifically, the side effect of attaining a goal. Attaining the goal constitutes a reason for being happy. In other words, if there is a reason for happiness, happiness ensues, automatically and spontaneously, as it were. And that is why one need not pursue happiness, one need not care for it once there is a reason for it. But, even more, one cannot pursue it. The extent to which one makes happiness the objective of his motivation, he necessarily makes it the object of his attention. But precisely by so doing he loses sight of the reason for happiness, and happiness itself must fade away."

admit failure in discovering and attaining meaning both in the world and in ones' life. [26<sup>4</sup>]

Frankl also offers us a criticism of self-actualization as the ultimate goal of man in terms which we have seen before in this chapter. It is worth mentioning again simply to drive home the nature of this profound weakness in Maslow's position.

Since self-actualization refers to the fulfillment of the available possibilities, or potentialities, within the subject, one might well call it potentialism. Here the life task of the individual is conceived of as the actualizing of potentialities which will fulfill his personality to the greatest possible degree. Therefore, the degree of self-actualization depends on the number of potentialities realized. But what would be the result if a man should merely actualize the potentials within himself? An answer comes to mind in the case of Socrates. He confessed to the potentiality within him to become a criminal and, therefore, if he had succeeded in fully developing his potentialities, the great defender of law and justice would have been a common law breaker! (PE 46)

We have seen that Maslow will attempt to avoid problems such as this by positing his 'aristocratic' version of self-actualization, but as has already been demonstrated,

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26. Cf. Viktor Frankl, "Self-Transcendence as a Human Phenomenon", Journal of Humanistic Psychology, 6:2 Fall 1966, hereafter designated as ST in this chapter, p. 99. "Here let me only add that excessive concern with self-actualization may be traced to a frustration of the will to meaning. As the boomerang comes back to the hunter who has thrown it only if it has missed its target, in the same way man also returns to himself, reflects upon himself, and is intent upon self-actualization only if he has missed his mission and if his search for meaning is frustrated."

this does not help.

Frankl, on the other hand, has shown us that if we understand the essential character of man correctly, we realize that the ultimate goal is to find and fulfill meaning both in terms of the world and life. Along the way, we will quite naturally achieve happiness, attain pleasure, and eventually come to realize that through the actualization of meaning we are properly actualizing ourselves. Frankl has presented this view in a developmental aspect when he writes that "it would be justified to assume...that the Freudian pleasure principle is the guiding principle of the small child, the Adlerian power principle is that of the adolescent, and the will to meaning is the guiding principle for the mature adult"(ST 99). In Frankl we are offered an alternative view of human motivation, one which clearly avoids the difficulties and contradictions inherent in Maslow's position. It is also the case that Frankl's view is more solidly grounded in an adequate philosophical base than is Maslow's. Maslow speaks of an uncovering or unfolding of a 'real self' which is complete unto itself and hence basically independent of the world, while Frankl speaks of the completion of the self, as a being-in-the-world, by self-transcendence through the discovery and fulfillment of meaning.

#### D. Summary

The major concern of this chapter has been to examine and discuss Maslow's concept of self-actualization. In doing so we found that there are many serious problems with his view. By concentrating so narrowly on the individual, Maslow tends to ignore or distort the social/economic/political situation of the individual. As we saw this leads Maslow to a point where he is unable or unwilling to acknowledge the dynamic relationship between man and his circumstances. This view is carried over into Maslow's discussion of the role of the environment in behavior. Since all that man can be comes from inside himself, the environment plays no direct role in character formation. We are then left with the question of the existence of evil. From where does it arise? The only answer open to Maslow is to either deny evil or admit that it must come from the individual. To do the latter is highly damaging for Maslow, for this indicates that perhaps there are certain aspects of man that should not be actualized. This admission, which Maslow does not make, would leave his theory of self-actualization in ruins. Nonetheless he would not appear to have any way out of this dilemma. Maslow does make an attempt, though, by shifting his position from the so-called democratic view to the aristocratic one. However, all this would seem to accomplish is to make his position even more untenable by

reducing it to one based almost exclusively on nothing more substantial or profound than Maslow's personal beliefs. This will certainly not be acceptable.

Hence we can safely say that Maslow's view of self-actualization is far too flawed to be of much use. We therefore turned to Viktor Frankl for a theory of motivation which avoids the problems of Maslow, and hopefully provides us with a more adequate view. We saw that Frankl's starting point is with his conception of man as being-in-the-world, as a being who searches for meaning both within himself and his world. Thus the will to meaning is understood to be the defining characteristic of man. Within this context, we saw that self-actualization as properly understood is actually a by-product of meaning actualization. Hence the ultimate goal for man is not a concern with the fulfillment of the self, but rather the fulfillment of meaning, which will also include the self. Man is therefore not to be seen as attempting the more narrow goal of self betterment, but man is self-transcendent in that he strives to develop beyond himself through the fulfillment of meaning in the world. While this could easily be the subject of another study, we would suggest that this is the direction that must be followed if we wish to develop a truly adequate and comprehensive understanding of man.

## CHAPTER VII

### SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION

Our purpose in this study has been to explicate and evaluate the foundations of Abraham Maslow's Third Force Psychology. The foundations were examined, evaluated, and discussed with regard to their epistemological, philosophical and psychological implications. This was done by following three basic threads. Firstly, we discussed, and attempted to situate Maslow in relation to, the three main schools of thought in psychology: behaviorism, psychoanalysis, and phenomenological psychology. Secondly, we presented Maslow's position with regard to his conception of science, with a particular emphasis on psychological science, and discussed the consequent view of man which he developed. We also examined Maslow's psychology, with a special concern for his concept of self-actualization. Thirdly, we engaged in a critical evaluation of Maslow's view of science and the psychology he developed. It will be the purpose of this, our last chapter, to offer a summary and synthesis of this study, as well as an indication of where more work needs to be done in order for psychological science to acquire a more adequate and comprehensive understanding of man's behavior.

In Chapter II we provided a general introduction to the

three main psychologies of the day. These psychologies are, broadly speaking, behaviorism, psychoanalysis, and phenomenological psychology. We offered a brief examination of the works of B.F. Skinner (behaviorism), Sigmund Freud (psychoanalysis), and Ludwig Binswanger (phenomenological psychology). We followed the progression of Maslow's own development, i.e., starting with behaviorism, moving on to psychoanalysis and finishing with phenomenological psychology. The purpose for offering this material was the desire to demonstrate just where Maslow felt his work should be situated. We saw that Maslow will ultimately reject both behaviorism and psychoanalysis in favor of a position which he considers to be in the same field as phenomenological psychology.

Maslow rejects behaviorism because he found it denies values and all inner experience in general. Behaviorism also adopts a passive conception of man, rather than a view of man as actor, as initiator. It is this latter view which Maslow supports. Maslow also found behaviorism lacking in terms of its understanding of science, which basically consists of the narrow view of science as only natural science. This line of criticism will be elaborated on in our summary of Chapter III. Maslow also rejects psychoanalysis, even though he makes it clear that he believes it to be far superior to behaviorism. Maslow was concerned with the obvious tension in psychoanalysis between

theory and practice and found himself rejecting the theory but supporting most of the therapeutic aspects of psychoanalysis. Maslow approved of the attempt in psychoanalysis to understand the experiences of the patient, the attempt to discover meaning in the patient's existence, but he found that he could not accept the anthropology suggested by psychoanalysis because this anthropology did not allow room for what Maslow considered to be the most significant aspects of being human, i.e., the higher needs and attributes of man. In the end, Maslow states that what he wants to do is take the best of both psychoanalysis and behaviorism and integrate them as a starting point for his own work.

Significantly, from our perspective at least, Maslow certainly gives every indication that he believes himself to be within the perspective of what he understands to be a phenomenological or existential psychology. This is an issue which received some critical attention in the latter parts of the study. We can, however, indicate now that one can only accept this view if one adopts a superficial and very general understanding of phenomenology and existentialism. Maslow does not function within an explicit phenomenological framework and as was discovered in Chapters V and VI, his position would greatly benefit if he had adopted this perspective. In essence, we would suggest that it would indeed be quite misleading to situate Maslow within

this tradition.

In Chapter III the purpose was to provide an introduction to Maslow's conception of psychological science and his concept of man. We started with a general introduction to Maslow's enterprise and then moved on to examine his critique of what he calls orthodox science, thereby facilitating a presentation of his conception of science in general and psychology in particular. We saw that Maslow had serious doubts concerning the appropriateness of what may be called orthodox, or, natural, science as the only or best means of gaining knowledge, let alone a comprehensive understanding of man. Hence, he wanted to take the two main representatives of psychology as a natural science, psychoanalysis and behaviorism, and integrate their best aspects into a new vision of science and psychology.

He particularly wanted to avoid the reductionism and the stereotyping that natural science inflicts on all that it studies, especially man. He found that the perspective of natural science was not an appropriate one for the study of man. He felt that science in general, and psychology in particular, must move away from the mechanistic/quantificational/biological stance of the natural sciences and start instead with actual lived experience. He wanted to move away from a means centered view towards a problem centered one in order to open both

psychology and science up to the development of new techniques and the asking of new questions. In place of this natural science Maslow suggests a different view of science, one that is based on holistic analysis. Our theories and methods should be developed after the establishment of the primary data, not before it. Maslow's concern was with all the various aspects of man, especially the higher ones. This new science and psychology would be such that they allowed for an examination of man in a truly comprehensive and accurate manner. The concern would now be with the given as it is given and experienced, and with the individual as a unique individual.

This crucial point, concerning an adequate conception of science, received more appropriate attention when we devoted all of Chapter V to a discussion of it. However, let us once again anticipate a little and indicate that Maslow seems to be satisfied with stating that orthodox science is inadequate, that there is indeed room for an enlarged concept of science. However, he does not fully and adequately develop this idea. We were of the opinion that with the aid of Maritain and Giorgi we would be able to complete and deepen Maslow's epistemology, which despite its many merits simply does not go deep enough on this matter. An examination of Chapter V will hopefully establish that we were successful in this endeavour.

In Chapter IV we moved on to a specific consideration

of Maslow's own position called 'Third Force Psychology', that is, we looked at the basic assumptions of his psychology, the specifics of his position, and started our examination of one of the central themes of Maslow's work, namely, self-actualization. We also examined the broader implications of Third Force Psychology. In doing so we saw that what is suggested here is a holistic approach and not an atomistic one. More specifically, Maslow argues for what may be called a teleological position in that he presents a conception of man as a purposeful initiator, the author of his actions. This is in contrast to a mechanistic view which presents an understanding of man as acted upon, determined and controlled.

We discovered that traditional motivational theories are usually based on physiological considerations, and that this basis should be rejected as being inadequate for a comprehensive understanding of man's behavior. Maslow offers us instead an integrated hierarchy of basic needs: physiological, safety, belonging, esteem, self-actualization. This would be a good point at which to indicate that Maslow will create problems for himself here due to his position on the relation between the individual and the environment. Maslow states that these needs, particularly the higher ones, are all inner dependent, that is, they are not affected in any meaningful way by the environment. This view led to serious problems, as

discussed in Chapter VI, when we went into a detailed examination of his central concept of self-actualization. We found that this problem was only one among many reasons why his view of self-actualization is ultimately untenable. One gets the clear impression that Maslow was reacting so strongly against behaviorism with its total emphasis on the external that he went a little overboard.

Along with these basic needs, Maslow also argues for certain meta-needs such as the need for knowledge, and the ability to acquire this knowledge in a free and democratic manner. The basic need of self-actualization is understood to be the highest aspiration of man, as well as the ideal toward which he should aim. Coupled with this notion, is Maslow's further conception of human character as basically good. As we found in Chapter VI, all of this is very problematic, but we will leave our final discussion of this material for our section on that chapter.

In Chapter V the primary purpose was to engage in an evaluation of the philosophical and epistemological adequacy of Maslow's conception of science and psychology. As we have already discussed, Maslow was of the opinion that natural science should not, and indeed could not, act as a model for an adequate psychology. He believed that a different conception, one which emphasized a holistic outlook with a concern for the meaning of lived experience, would be required. He wanted to place a premium on the

study of human existence as lived, and not existence based on a priori assumptions or privileged methodologies. He offers the recognition that there is a basic difference between man and nature, particularly in terms of the kind of information we want about each, and how we can come to give this data. There are two basic issues involved here: man as understood in contrast to nature, and the impact of this understanding on therapy. As a consequence of this new understanding the therapeutic situation is seen as being one of a reciprocal relationship between two people, not a subject-object dichotomy.

We found that contained within Maslow's position are various philosophical and epistemological stances which, as we have already indicated, are basically acceptable, but nevertheless still need further clarification and elaboration. We decided that this work would best be accomplished with the help of both Jacques Maritain and Amedeo Giorgi. These two were chosen because we are of the opinion that between them they provide, particularly in the context of this research study, what we consider is a philosophically and epistemologically sound foundation for psychology. Maritain's main contribution is in the field of epistemology where his distinction between the philosophy of nature (wherein is contained a philosophy of man, an ontology) and empiriological analysis is of profound significance. Giorgi's main contribution is in carrying out

Maritain's basic intuitions all the while taking his inspiration more specifically from an existential phenomenological concept of man as being-in-the-world. The main concerns of our evaluation revolved around the concepts of approach and method, the relationship between a philosophy of nature and a science of nature, and the relationship between a philosophy of man and a psychology of man.

We cannot avoid the issue of approach, even if we opt for a so-called neutral stance, so the best way to proceed would be to make clear and explicit the approach within which we are working and also, this is crucial, the basis upon which we made our choice. During our discussion it emerged that the character of psychology is quite different when one or another approach is adopted. This should not be totally surprising because the methods we adopt will be determined, to an extent, by the approach we choose. Hence the information sought and provided by differing approaches will also vary. This indicates that we should be careful to ensure that we utilize an approach which is suitable for what we want to study and understand.

What became quite evident was that Maritain's distinction between empiriological science and philosophy of nature is truly a significant one. We found that both the philosophy of nature and the empirical sciences of nature study the same object, namely sensible and mobile nature.

However, they do so with a differing approach, that is, a different way of conceptualizing what which they study. Philosophy of nature aims at an understanding of intelligible being while empiriological science aims at the sensible and observable precisely in as much as it is merely sensible and observable. On the basis of this distinction it also became quite clear that empiriological science cannot possibly do justice to human behavior as it is experienced and lived. Philosophy of nature, more particularly the philosophy of man, on the other hand, is precisely concerned to elucidate behavior as experienced. It is concerned with what it means to be human. We therefore found it to be the case that the philosophy of nature is the more adequate framework when one wants to develop a truly human psychology.

More generally stated, we found it to be the case that psychology as a natural science attempts to model itself after such natural sciences as biology and chemistry. Such an approach to psychology will therefore adopt the basic methods and concerns of the natural sciences. This entails a great emphasis on measurement, quantification and an understanding of man which is based on mechanistic functioning. Psychology as natural science views man as a complex of various 'aspects' which must be separated from one another, studied, and then somehow unified. This work is done on the basis of a theory and method which

pre-determine and re-interpret the phenomena to be investigated. The result of such an examination is a truncated and drastically reduced conception of the individual and science, but one which nonetheless purports to exhaust the possibilities of our understanding.

Psychology as a human science, on the other hand, explicitly rejects the natural sciences as the ultimate model for psychology. This approach to psychology claims that a new conception of science is required in order adequately to investigate man. As we saw the concern is not with man as related to the exigence of the natural scientific methods, but rather, with the individual as he experiences himself. Psychology as human science grounds its investigation of man not in the solely observable and measureable, but on the intelligibility of man as expressed by the fundamental structure of human existence as being-in-the-world (which formulation includes the concept of intentionality, meaning and world-design). Such an approach to psychology investigates the individual within a phenomenological and existential framework. This avoids the truncation and reduction of man that is found in psychology as natural science.

It is at this point that we are in a position to turn to the assistance which Maritain and Giorgi offer us in our attempt to clarify both our own understanding of science in general and psychology in particular, and Maslow's attempt

to work out this issue. At the end of Chapter III we noted Maslow was of the opinion that the natural sciences should not act as a model for psychology, and that instead a new and more appropriate conception of science needs to be developed. As was noted at the time, this is basically as far as Maslow takes the point. He seems content with stating that orthodox science is an inadequate model for psychology and that another model needs to be developed. However, he does not develop this idea in any comprehensive manner. Instead, Maslow merely offers various suggestions about the character and need of this science and never really gets down to developing the foundations of such a conception of science and psychology.

This is precisely the significance of the work of Jacques Maritain and Amedeo Giorgi for this research study. Their work offers support to Maslow's effort in a number of specific ways. Maritain has developed an epistemological stance which is capable of providing the foundation upon which Maslow, or anyone else, can build his vision of psychology. Maslow is concerned to demonstrate that the natural sciences are not an appropriate model upon which to develop psychology as a study of man. Maritain's work in epistemology provides a sound foundation for this position. We have seen that the distinction between the approach of the empiriological sciences and that of the philosophy of nature indicates that if psychology is truly to be a study

of man qua man then it must situate itself within the bounds of the philosophy of nature, which, as should be clear by now, contains the philosophy of man. In effect, we found that if we read Maslow in light of Maritain's epistemology we find that what Maslow has to say is more compelling and has more force because he now has a solid and explicit epistemological foundation upon which to ground his observations, insights and objectives. On the whole, this has the effect of strengthening Maslow's position on both the philosophical and epistemological levels.

The work of Giorgi also has such an ameliorating impact. It has been noted that Maslow implies that he is favourably disposed towards phenomenology, particularly as it applies to the development of psychology. However, as we saw, Maslow has virtually nothing explicit to say on this subject. He just leaves the reader with the impression that he operates within a stance, which, if not identical with phenomenology, is at least strongly influenced by it. While it is certainly true that many of his insights are compatible with a phenomenological outlook, they would clearly have more force if situated within an explicitly worked out conception of both phenomenology and a psychology informed by this phenomenology.

This is precisely what Giorgi has to offer Maslow. Giorgi has developed a conception of psychology which addresses Maslow's major concerns and insights, while at the

same time taking his inspiration from an unabashedly phenomenological perspective. Giorgi's discussion of such issues as the life-world and intentionality has the effect of once again providing Maslow with some badly needed foundations when it comes to his insights concerning the character of psychology as a human science and the character of man. By reading Maslow in the light of the work that Giorgi has done, Maslow's position is strengthened, because it is now possible for the reader to situate Maslow's work within a concrete and explicitly worked out phenomenological context. This has the desirable effect of tying the various insights together into a solid whole. Hence, we came to the conclusion that the overall impact of applying the work of Maritain and Giorgi to that of Maslow's is one of deepening and firmly grounding, both philosophically and epistemologically, Maslow's whole enterprise.

In Chapter VI the main purpose was an evaluation of Third Force Psychology, with a particular emphasis on the concept of self-actualization. We started out by indicating that we were generally in favour of any theory, or understanding, of motivation or an accounting of human behavior which includes the notion that man should strive towards some goal of perfection or ideal state of being. However, we also made it quite clear that we were of the opinion that whatever form such a theory will take, it would not be the one proposed by Abraham Maslow. Our evaluation of

Maslow's version of self-actualization demonstrated that there are a number of significant, and ultimately fatal, problems with it. Also, as was the case in Chapter V, we found that Maslow's foundation in, and use of insights gained through phenomenological analysis, as it would pertain to his work on self-actualization, leaves something to be desired. It is again our view that Maslow's work could only benefit in significant ways if he had indeed adopted an explicit phenomenological viewpoint. We therefore decided that in the second part of this chapter we should turn to a psychologist who might perhaps offer us a more solidly grounded, both philosophically and psychologically, theory of human motivation: i.e., Viktor Frankl.

In the course of our evaluation of self-actualization we came to the realization that there are many serious problems with his view. Firstly, by concentrating so narrowly on the individual, we saw that Maslow tends to ignore or distort the social/economic/political situation of the individual. This leads Maslow to a point where he is unable or unwilling to acknowledge the dynamic relationship between man and his circumstances. Secondly, we suggested that this view is carried over into Maslow's discussion of the role of the environment in behavior. Since all that man can be, according to Maslow, comes from inside himself, the environment plays no direct role in character formation. We

are then left with the question of the existence of evil. From where does it arise? The only answer open to Maslow is to either deny evil or admit that it must come from the individual. To do the latter is highly damaging for Maslow, for this indicates that perhaps there are certain aspects of man that should not be actualized. This admission, which Maslow does not make, would leave his theory of self-actualization in ruins. Nonetheless he would not appear to have any way out of this dilemma.

In spite of this, Maslow does make an attempt to help himself by shifting his position from the so-called democratic view to the aristocratic one. However, we ascertained that all this seemed to accomplish was to make his position even more untenable by reducing it to one based almost exclusively on nothing more substantial or profound than Maslow's personal beliefs. This will certainly not be acceptable. Hence we can safely say that Maslow's view of self-actualization is far too flawed to be of much use.

We therefore decided that it was time to turn to Viktor Frankl for a theory of motivation which avoids the problems of Maslow, and hopefully provides us with a more adequate view. We were not disappointed in this effort. Frankl starts with a basic conception and understanding of man based on freedom of the will, the will to meaning, and the meaning of life. The freedom of the will and the meaning of life can be seen as prerequisites for the will to meaning

because unless one believes that one has freedom of the will and that there is meaning in life, then the will to meaning is pointless. We saw that Frankl operates with a conception of man as being-in-the-world, as a being who searches for meaning both within himself and His world. Thus the will to meaning is understood to be the defining characteristic of man. It is also the prime motivational factor. That is, man searches not for himself, but for the actualization of meaning and values in the world. It is in this sense that an essential characteristic of man is understood as that of self-transcendence. It is through this search for meaning that man finds himself and is responsible for his decisions as he moves forward through self-transcendence. Within this context, we saw that self-actualization as properly understood is actually a by-product of meaning actualization. Hence the ultimate goal for man is not a concern with the fulfillment of the self, but rather the fulfillment of meaning, which will also include the self. Man is therefore not to be seen as attempting the more narrow goal of self betterment, but man is self-transcendent in that he strives to develop beyond himself through the fulfillment of meaning in the world.

This view presented by Frankl, coupled with the work of Maritain and Giorgi, could easily be the subject of another study. Nevertheless we would suggest that this is the direction that must be followed if we wish to develop a

truly adequate and comprehensive understanding of man. We need to start here and follow the analysis further until more of the whole is unravelled. We believe that this task will be all the more achievable if we start with a solid epistemological and philosophical foundation, and this is exactly what a synthesis of Maritain, Giorgi and Frankl will provide for us.

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