

Building peace that lasts
A study of state-led peacebuilding in Kenya

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Abstract

The concept of peacebuilding evokes the image of international interventions in countries emerging from civil wars. Despite the visibility of this engagement, post-civil war peacebuilding is just one form of peacebuilding. As a response to smaller scale violent conflicts, ongoing peacebuilding interrupts cycles of violence and prevents the escalation of violent conflict. The 2007/8 post-election violence in Kenya captured international attention due to the scope and magnitude of the conflict. In 1992 and 1997, Kenya had experienced lower levels of electoral violence. The recurring and escalatory nature of violent conflict implies that peacebuilding should be a strategic response, earlier on, to prevent violence from reaching new levels. Since 2002, the Kenyan state has actively engaged in peacebuilding. This study on state-led peacebuilding in Kenya deviates from the typical post-war interventions to analyse peacebuilding as an ongoing preventative response by national actors to intermittent violence.

This thesis seeks to explain the impact of this state-led peacebuilding approach on the practice and prospect of peace. To do so, I first explore the multiple conceptions of peace held by those engaged in this approach to understand what type of peace is being built. Second, I analyse the paradox of the state in peacebuilding and how the role of the state has influenced the nature of peacebuilding and consequently the prospects for peace. The state in peacebuilding presents a paradox because of the state's direct and indirect involvement in violent conflict as well as the top-down nature of state engagement. Third, I interrogate the relationship between the institutionalisation of peacebuilding and the sustainability of peacebuilding and peace. I find that state-led peacebuilding in Kenya has raised the profile of peacebuilding, improved the synergy between peacebuilding actors and increased the inflow of resources available to build peace. This positive influence is countered by the negative implications of the state's role in promoting a

reductive conceptualisation of peace and unsustainably institutionalising peace building. I conclude that, though the state has a role to play in peacebuilding, the contradictory implications of state-led peacebuilding challenge the sustainability of peacebuilding and peace.

Key words: peacebuilding, peace, Kenya, violent conflict, infrastructure for peace

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Dedication

I dedicate this thesis to my parents, my first teachers. To my mother, Anna Githaiga and to the memory of my father, Jackson Githaiga. Your love for education got me here.

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List of Abbreviations

ASALs	Arid and semi-arid lands
CEWARN	Conflict Early Warning and Response Mechanism
CEWERU	Conflict Early Warning and Early Response Unit
DPC	District Peace Committee
DTF	District Task Force
IEBC	Independent Electoral and Boundaries Commission
IGAD	Inter-Governmental Authority on Development
I4P	Infrastructure for Peace
KNDR	Kenya National Dialogue and Reconciliation process
KNFP	Kenya National Focal Point on Small Arms and Light Weapons
NCIC	National Cohesion and Integration Commission
NGO	Non-governmental Organisation
NSC	National Steering Committee on Conflict Management and Peacebuilding
PEV	Post-Election Violence
SALWs	Small arms and light weapons
UN	United Nations
UNDP	United Nations Development Programme

Chapter 1: Violent conflict and peacebuilding in Kenya

1.1. Introduction

“IN PICTURES: Kenya's blood and tears” (Daily Nation, 2008), “Disputed vote plunges Kenya into bloodshed” (Gettleman, 2007), “Death toll nears 800 as post-election violence spirals out of control in Kenya” (Rice, 2008). As these breaking news headlines along with graphic images of the 2007/8 Kenyan post-election violence flashed repeatedly on my computer screen, I watched in utter disbelief and horror. People fleeing for their lives, people being beaten to death, corpses and severed limbs on the street, burnt property... ‘How?’ I kept wondering, ‘How could this happen in Kenya? In Nairobi?’ In retrospect, I recognise my naiveté. Long before this tragedy, violence had been a lived experience of many Kenyans in different parts of the country. I had lived in a bubble in the safety of my home town Nairobi, from where I would hear of violent conflicts in far flung parts of the country but never thought it would reach home. Now the bubble had burst.

Violent conflict has recurred in Kenya since the lead-up to independence. In this study I focus on political and pastoralist violence. State actors instigated violent conflict for political gain in the early 1960s (Ajulu, 2002; Atieno-Odhiambo, 2002) in the 1990s and in 2007/8 (Brown, 2003a, 2003b; Greiner, 2013; Klopp, 2001, 2012). Land and ethnicity were the mobilising factors in these violent conflicts that were often mischaracterised as ‘ethnic clashes’, diverting attention from the political origins of this violence (Brown, 2003a; Klopp, 2001). The political roots of the ‘ethnic clashes’ were evident in the timing of the violence around electoral processes and following inflammatory utterances by political leaders. This political motivated violence resulted

in the displacement of populations which disenfranchised voters and allowed for the forced redistribution of land and property.

Since 2001, state actors in Kenya have played an active role in peacebuilding. The role of the Kenyan state in peacebuilding introduces a double paradox. The first paradox is found in the involvement of the Kenyan state in political violence and upholding impunity, making the state an unlikely peacebuilding actor to effectively transform the violence surrounding the acquisition of political power in Kenya. The second paradox lies in the nature of peacebuilding. Empirical studies of peacebuilding contend that transformative peacebuilding is inspired from the local conflict-affected areas and that critical engagement of the local people ensures sustainable peacebuilding to ensure lasting peace. States however operate in a top-down manner which excludes the vital input of local agency required for successful peacebuilding.

1.2. Statement of the problem

Peacebuilding is an expansive concept that includes a variety of interventions to restore peace following violent conflict. The recurrent nature of violent conflict in Kenya highlights the need for peacebuilding but interrogates the efficacy of past interventions. Effective peacebuilding in Kenya is well illustrated by pastoralist women from Wajir who were frustrated by cycles of violent conflict in the 1990s. They began a conflict mediation process that was so successful that it informed the later adoption of a similar peace committee model across the country (Chuma & Ojielo, 2012). Despite successes in peacebuilding, the Kenyan experience indicates that not all peacebuilding interventions successfully break cycles of violence. The study of peacebuilding

practice is therefore essential to inform future peacebuilding strategies and ensure outcomes of sustainable peace.

Empirical studies on international peacebuilding interventions have ascribed unsuccessful interventions to shortcomings in the adopted approaches. For instance, international intervention in the Democratic Republic of Congo failed to deal with local violence because it did not use appropriate local peacebuilding strategies (Autesserre, 2010). This exclusion of the local is typical of a top-down approach to peacebuilding whereby external interveners with superior resources perceive residents of the conflict zone as recipients who can provide limited input, if at all (Mac Ginty & Richmond, 2013). The state, as an actor in peacebuilding, also tends to adopt a top-down approach. Following violent conflict, an agreement between political leaders precedes or follows a peace process. The dividends of this agreement supposedly trickle down to the rest of the population who implement aspects of the peace process. The state-led approach to peacebuilding in Kenya seems to diverge from this norm in its claim to be informed and implemented by multiple actors at all levels of society (Chuma & Ojielo, 2012).

My study focuses on the role of the state in peacebuilding. In chapter 5, I provide an in-depth look at three key state institutions, the National Steering Committee on Peacebuilding and Conflict Management (NSC), the Kenya National Focal Point on Small Arms and Light Weapons (KNFP) and the National Cohesion and Integration Commission (NCIC). NSC was established by state and non-state actors in 2001 with a secretariat operating in November 2002 (NSCPBCM, 2009). The creation of the NSC was inspired by the successful collaboration of state and non-state actors in the Wajir peace process of the 1990s. Initially, NSC was to

coordinate peace work addressing pastoralist conflict and to promote the formation of peace and development committees in other regions (Oxfam GB, 2003). Over the years the NSC has aligned more with state rather than non-state actors. This is partly an effect of institutionalisation as discussed in chapter 6. In 2002, the state established KNFP to carry out its obligation to the Nairobi Protocol. The Nairobi protocol is an agreement between 11 countries in the Great Lakes and Horn of Africa region to control the proliferation of small arms and light weapons (SALWs). KNFP coordinates the activities of state and non-state actors in addressing SALWs, including Kenya's obligations as a signatory to various other regional and international legal instruments (KNFP, n.d.-a). The third institution, NCIC, is a statutory body created by the 2008 National Cohesion and Integration Act. NCIC was a response to the 2007/8 post-election violence with the mandate to address issues of cohesion and integration. The secretariat became operational in September 2009. These three institutions are part of Kenya's infrastructure for peace (I4P). An infrastructure for peace is a comprehensive peacebuilding strategy that links peace actors at different levels of society to ensure coherent and sustainable interventions for peace. This concept is elaborated on in Chapter 2.

In theory, the use of the infrastructure for peace concept and peace committee models addresses three important elements that have impeded sustainable peace according to empirical peacebuilding studies discussed in Chapter 2. The first is the exclusion of the local, as previously highlighted. The peace committee model requires the integral involvement of local people as the primary resource for peacebuilding. Related to this is a second element believed to contribute to successful peacebuilding: the inclusion and coordination of multiple actors (Lederach, 1997). The NSC exemplifies this in its coordination role, integration of peace committees and

membership comprising nongovernmental organisations (NGOs) and international organisations (IOs). A third element is the time dimension of a peacebuilding approach, with short-term, project-type interventions failing to realise sustainable peace (Lederach, 2012). The infrastructure for peace is a relationship and skills-based infrastructure to ensure long-term support for the change processes required for sustainable peace (Lederach, 1997, 2012).

This study interrogates the implications of this state-led approach on the practice of peacebuilding in Kenya and the prospects for peace. The first avenue of investigation is the conceptualisation of peace by the multiple actors engaged in the infrastructure for peace. According to Lederach (1997), comprehensive peacebuilding involves the inclusion and collaboration of actors at multiple levels. However, if the different actors hold divergent or limited conceptualisations of peace, this will determine the type of peace produced. I explore the conceptions of peace held by these multiple actors against the kind of peace being built in this approach to analyse the prospects of lasting peace.

The second area of focus is the role of the state in peacebuilding. Peacebuilding by the state is usually closely linked to state building which may contradict the goals of peacebuilding, such as inclusion, strengthening local governance mechanisms and promoting reconciliation. The third focus of this study is the uneasy relationship between institutionalisation and sustainable peacebuilding. By institutionalisation, I refer to the process by which peacebuilding is being embedded through the ‘infrastructure for peace’ in Kenya. While the Kenyan approach seeks to build national capacities for peace through the ‘infrastructures for peace’, the process of institutionalising these infrastructures has a financial and technocratic imperative that may

impede the sustainability of peacebuilding and negatively affect prospects for peace. To investigate these three areas of study, I pose an overarching research question with three sub-questions.

1.3. Research questions and key findings

This study seeks to answer the overarching question: *How has state-led peacebuilding in Kenya impacted the practice of peacebuilding and prospects for peace in Kenya?*

In order to answer this question, I address three sub-questions. The first question seeks to conceptualise the kind of peace being built through this process and how it corresponds with the expressed expectations. This is crucial to understanding the correlation between the peace expected and the peace built and the prospects for sustainable peace. *What are the different conceptions of peace held by peacebuilders within this state-led peacebuilding approach and what kind of peace are they building?*

The second question investigates the role of the state in peacebuilding and the impact of this on the practice of peace in Kenya. *How has the role of the Kenyan state in peacebuilding influenced the nature of peacebuilding?*

The third question analysed the relationship between the institutionalisation and sustainability of peacebuilding, weighing the effects of institutionalisation from financial and technocratic imperatives, against the demands of sustainability in local ownership, increased capacities for peace and resources. *What are the effects of institutionalisation on the sustainability of peacebuilding?*

The first finding under sub-question 1 is that beyond the lack of clarity in conceptualising peace, the state-led peacebuilding efforts do not address substantive conceptions of peace critical for lasting peace. State and non-state actors within the Kenyan state-led approach to peacebuilding hold multiple conceptions of peace at the level of the individual, community and society. The state is best positioned to deliver society-level peace, which includes the provision of basic socio-economic needs, security, justice and more equal opportunities. While the state-led approach mainly builds peace as security, it fails to address the other three aspects of society-level peace which are essential for sustainable peace.

The second finding related to sub-question 2 is that the role of the state in peacebuilding has both positively and negatively impacted the nature of peacebuilding and consequently the prospects for peace. The state-led approach has improved peacebuilding practice through better coordination, creating synergy, enhancing legitimacy, formulating policy and promoting local approaches. However, the role of the state has adversely affected peacebuilding by co-opting and depressing local agency, promoting a reductive conceptualisation of peace and crowding out non-state actors. The negative impact of state-led peacebuilding outweighs the positive because of the exclusion of the vital role of local agency.

The third finding in answer to sub-question 3 is that while institutionalising the infrastructures for peace has created permanent capacities for peace, institutionalisation threatens sustainability in three major ways. First, though the infrastructure for peace was envisioned as sustainable by local resources, the state-led approach has been supported by external resources which are not locally sustainable. Second, the extensive use of technical expertise creates dependency even

while the experts are not readily absorbable as long term capacities for peace. In addition, institutionalisation has formalised volunteerism making it unsustainable. Third, institutionalisation threatens sustainability through formalisation which has increased the cost of peacebuilding activities, decreased the efficiency of building peace and decontextualized and bureaucratized peacebuilding.

Significance of the study

Research on peacebuilding in Africa concentrates on international interventions in post-conflict situations, with limited research on peacebuilding in non-civil war contexts. Kenya, where the scope of violent conflict has escalated intermittently over the past two decades, requires peacebuilding intervention earlier on in the cycle of violent conflict to prevent it from reaching a new level. Despite academic studies on UN peacebuilding, there is limited academic research on nationally led peacebuilding processes to prevent violent conflict. There is a particular gap in academic research examining the effect of the institutionalisation of peacebuilding, yet this remains critical to the attainment of sustainable peace. The main contribution of my research is to provide analysis on the role of the state and the effects of institutionalising Kenya's infrastructure for peace on peacebuilding practice and the prospect for sustainable peace. My research contributes to the limited knowledge on long-term peacebuilding and conflict prevention in non-civil war contexts. In addition, these findings could help to promote long-term peace in Kenya and potentially elsewhere.

1.4. A brief history of violent conflict in Kenya



Figure 1.1: Map of Kenya (©n.d. wordtravels.com, by permission)

Kenya is located in East Africa at the coast of the Indian Ocean and shares borders with Somalia, Ethiopia, South Sudan, Uganda and Tanzania. Kenya has an estimated population of 44.3 million and is the fifth largest economy in sub-Saharan Africa (World Bank, 2014). The periodic or protracted intra-state violent conflicts in Kenya and the neighbouring countries have adversely affected the population in the region. For example, Kenya hosts the second highest number of conflict-related refugees in sub-Saharan Africa with an estimated 551,400 refugees in 2014

(UNHCR, 2015). Kenya also has a significant number of its citizens displaced by political violence. Kamungi (2013) estimates the displaced populations after four successive elections as: 300,000 in 1992, 150,000 in 1997, 20,000 in 2002, and 660,000 in 2007. Even so, the numbers do not fully capture the brunt of violent conflict in the loss of human lives, psychological trauma, destruction/loss of property and environmental degradation. From the early 1990s, violent conflict in Kenya had been sporadic and localised. Violent conflict occurred around elections and in specific regions, such as the Rift Valley or the Coast. In the media and literature, electoral conflict in Kenya is also portrayed as ethnic conflict. In the Northern regions of Kenya, resources are a factor of endemic violent conflict between pastoralist communities. The historic marginalisation of the Northern regions provides a context for resource conflict which is often politically motivated to control access to territory. Pastoralist resource conflict in the North of Kenya involves communities at the borders with Ethiopia, South Sudan, Somalia and Uganda. The state's involvement in peacebuilding started with pastoralist conflict. In this section I discuss political violence as ethnic or resource conflict in reference to the usage in literature.

Ethnic conflict

The phenomenon of 'ethnic conflict' in Kenya can be traced back to the 1960s. Scholars argue that politics rather than ethnicity is the cause of 'ethnic conflict' (Ajulu, 2002; Atieno-Odhiambo, 2002; Brown, 2003b; Klopp, 2001). Brown (2003b) contends that even though ethnicity is used to mobilise for political conflict, the ethnic manifestation of political violence negatively crystallises ethnic identity and promotes the link between land and ethnicity. The association of land and identity dates back to a colonial strategy to nurture local politics with political parties at a district – not national – level (D. M. Anderson, 2005). Colonial

administration fixed regional boundaries to coincide with the distribution of ethnic groups so that district-level politics easily mobilised ethnicity. Klopp (2001) gives an example of the colonial administration declaring the Maasai reserve a ‘closed district’, thereby implying a firm ethnic boundary that was previously non-existent. This link between land and identity was not exclusive to ethnic identity.

The whites-only Federal Independent Party promoted a federalist system to retain control over what were referred to as the White Highlands (Ajulu, 2002). The idea of federalism to ensure political control over territory was popularly referred to in Kiswahili as *majimboism*. *Majimboism* emphasised the nexus of land, ethnic identity and political power. At the dawn of Kenya’s independence, the Kenya African National Union (KANU) and the Kenya African Democratic Union (KADU) were the two major political parties for Africans. KADU was created to represent the interests of smaller ethnic groups against domination from the larger groups who were represented by KANU (Ajulu, 2002; Atieno-Odhiambo, 2002). Anderson (2005) contends that KADU’s pre-independence political strategy of *majimboism* to protect smaller groups from political and economic exclusion still persists as a political idea. Indeed, ‘ethnic conflict’ in Kenya has been characterised by the expulsion of those deemed as ‘outsiders’ in a presumed ethnically determined political contest. Lonsdale highlights the political value of land, “Votes are among the territory’s greatest assets. Land is as much a political asset as an economic and social resource. Strangers on the land are blemishes, *madoadoa*, to be cleansed lest they vote the wrong way” (2008, p. 308).

In the early 1960s, KADU leaders instigated ‘ethnic conflict’ in Eastern Gem, Maseno, Rift Valley and Coast provinces to ensure KADU’s political strength by expelling ‘outsiders’ (Ajulu, 2002; Atieno-Odhiambo, 2002). For example, in 1962, a Kalenjin legislator, William Murgor, incited Kalenjins to drive non-Kalenjins from the Rift Valley area (Ajulu, 2002; Atieno-Odhiambo, 2002). This political violence resulted in population displacement and the burning of houses. After Kenya’s independence in 1963, the incidence of ‘ethnic conflict’ declined with the changed political dynamics of a one-party state.

At the advent of multi-party politics in the 1990s, ‘ethnic conflict’ re-emerged as a political strategy. Brown (2003b) explains that this ‘ethnic conflict’ served to punish and intimidate the perceived opposition, disenfranchise opposition voters, prevent opposition presidential candidates from garnering the requisite 25% popular vote in the conflict area, and punish those associated with the opposition after the elections. In 1991, prior to the 1992 elections, non-Kalenjins were expelled from Rift Valley and bordering districts in Western and Nyanza (Brown, 2003b). This form of political violence that killed hundreds and displaced thousands, also took place in 1992 to 1994, 1997 and 1998 (Brown, 2003b; Klopp, 2002). A Kenya Human Rights Commission report found that in every election since 1992 different communities have experienced political instigated insecurity and violence resulting in a trend of communities arming themselves because the state has failed to provide protection (KHRC, 2011). Of the official investigations into the 1990s violence, only the Kiliku Report by the Parliamentary Select Committee on the 1992 clashes provided an actual figure of 779 estimated deaths (CIPEV, 2008, p. 304). While the numbers illustrate the severity of the violence, the toll of violent conflict

far surpasses the figures. Apart from bodily harm, the impact of ‘ethnic conflict’ is evident in the destruction of property and infrastructure, loss of livelihoods and psychological trauma.

‘Ethnic conflict’ reached a peak immediately after the 2007 elections, which were characterised by violent protests contesting the results, targeted violence on members of certain ethnic groups by alleged ethnic-affiliated militia, and excessive use of force and suspected extra-judicial killings by government forces (Khadiagala, 2010). From 27 December 2007 to 29 February 2008, there was violence in five out of Kenya’s eight provinces, and the Commission of Inquiry on Post-Election Violence in Kenya (CIPEV) reported 1,133 deaths and 350,000 internal displaced (CIPEV, 2008, pp. 305, 351). The escalation of violence in the 2007/8 violence is partly a consequence of not addressing the causes of ‘ethnic conflict’ in the 1990s and instead allowing impunity to thrive. The state has not only been an actor in violent conflict in Kenya, but by granting impunity to perpetrators, the state has allowed the continued use of ‘ethnic conflict’ as a political strategy (Brown, 2003a; Brown & Sriram, 2012). The effects of ‘ethnic conflict’ still reverberate. As recently as the 2013 elections, people reportedly moved back to their ‘ancestral homes’ and internally displaced persons declined to return to their homes after multiple expulsions, to avoid being targeting again (Manson, 2013). The psychological effects of political violence persist and deepen social cleavages.

Resource conflict

Pastoralist communities in Northern regions of Kenya have frequently been in conflict over resources. Witsenburg and Adano define pastoralism as, “a traditional production system based on livestock and people who engage in various degrees of mobility” (2009, p. 516). Pastoralism

is the major livelihood choice of communities in the arid and semi-arid lands (ASALs) because it is environmentally viable. The migration of pastoralist communities is dictated by seasonal changes that affect the availability of water and pasture for their livestock. There are also violent trans-border conflicts between pastoralist communities from Uganda, Sudan, Ethiopia and Somalia. Violent pastoralist conflicts often start as disagreements over shared resources, such as water and pasture, and over cattle theft. Mkutu (2014) observes the political and economic marginalisation of Northern Kenya by the colonial administration which viewed it as an unprofitable region, with postcolonial governments upholding the marginalisation. The neglect of Northern Kenya by successive governments is a form of political violence in the perpetuation of systemic regional inequalities and structural injustice. In Kenya the relationship between political power and economic access is reflected in regional inequalities (Ajulu, 2002).

Variable rainfall and droughts decrease the availability of adequate water and pasture in the ASALs thereby increasing competition to access these resources. In the wet season, pastoralist communities only move small distances, but in the dry season, they move towards natural water catchment areas and during drought, they settle close to permanent water sources such as natural wells (Berger, 2003). From the first one in 1994, community-led peace agreements to address resource-linked violent conflict stipulate that before any migration, communities must seek the consent of elders in the community where they intend to take their livestock (NSCPBCM, n.d.). Despite these agreements violent conflict between communities persists. From September 2008 to February 2009, dozens of people in Mandera district and 40 people in Isiolo, Marsabit and Samburu districts died in violent conflicts over access to water and pasture (IRIN, 2009a). In 2012, several died in violent conflict between pastoralists and subsistence farmers, over the

destruction of crops by huge herds of migrating livestock (IRIN, 2012). In 2009, 354 people were killed in violent conflict between pastoralist communities (IRIN, 2009b). These media reports demonstrate how access to water and pasture in ASALs is a source of violent conflict in Kenya.

Another related cause of violence conflict amongst pastoralist communities is cattle raiding. Cattle raiding is the violent theft of livestock by members of one community from another community which triggers and intensifies violent conflict (Schilling, Opiyo, & Scheffran, 2012). The incidence of cattle raiding increases in the wet season when livestock are healthy and there is sufficient water and pasture to care for them (Eaton, 2007; Witsenburg & Adano, 2009). Raiding in the rainy season also means that young men are available (and not out searching for pasture), the rain will wash away tracks, and there is vegetation cover in which to hide (Witsenburg & Adano, 2009). In regions of Northern Kenya, the loss of livestock, destruction of property and sometimes killings during raiding, prompt retaliatory raiding attacks. Eaton (2007) contends that tackling the revenge motive of cattle raiding is vital to de-escalating violence rather than dealing with so-called root causes such as poverty, resource scarcity and arms proliferation.

While the revenge motive of cattle raiding does indeed escalate violent conflict in retaliatory raids, scholars provide additional explanations. Greiner (2013) contends that cattle raiding serves the purpose of territorial expansion which was impeded during the period of colonialism when ethnic/regional boundaries were fixed. An empirical study on raiding by the Pokot and Turkana found motivations include bride price, wealth accumulation, territory expansion, restocking after drought, political instigation and subsistence with links to commercialisation of raiding

(Schilling et al., 2012). Agade (2010) contests the popular explanation of cattle raiding as a cultural practice or traditional restocking mechanism as ignoring the complex dynamics surrounding the adaptation and transformation of cattle raiding. With the proliferation of illicit arms and the commercialisation of cattle raiding, the practice is no longer localised. Brown (2003a) observes that historically cattle raiding was a practice controlled by the community but it has evolved into a large scale, armed, commercial activity where raiders kill indiscriminately and destroy property. Raiding has also been linked to politics. Greiner (2013) illustrates the political instigation of cattle raiding where conflicts that have been sparked by politician statements, political campaigns financed by raids and when raids are used to displace population to control access to resources and contest boundaries. The shifting dynamics of cattle raiding enable its use as a tool of political violence.

1.5. An overview of peacebuilding in Kenya

Peacebuilding, as a response to violent conflict in Kenya, has had a measure of success. Peacebuilding actors include informal community organisations, non-governmental organisations (NGOs), religious institutions and state actors. This section is not a comprehensive account of peacebuilding in Kenya, but instead offers a brief overview of the types of peacebuilding in Kenya illustrated with specific examples. I begin with community peace agreements in response to violent conflicts between pastoralist communities in Northern Kenya. The next type of peacebuilding is relief and reconciliation work following the humanitarian crisis precipitated by ‘ethnic conflict’ in the 1990s. The last type of peacebuilding is the national peace process to end the 2007/8 post-election violence.

Community peace agreements

Community peacebuilding initiatives have responded to violent conflict triggered by cattle raiding, border disputes and competition for natural resources in the ASALs. The most notable community peace initiative was the 1992 response to violent conflict between three clans¹ in Wajir district in Northern Kenya. As the conflict deepened, two women intervened to stop fights between the marketplace women, while local professionals appealed to the elders to engage in a mediated discussion for peace (Oxfam GB, 2003). The discussions resulted in what was named the Al Fatah Declaration based on customary law. It stipulated compensation payments for murder and collective punishment for cattle raiding by the confiscation of clan livestock (Oxfam GB, 2003).

This peace process was successful enough to inspire other community peace agreements in the ASALs, such as the Auliyahan-Abdwak Peace Accord in 2000 between the two Ogaden sub-clans in Garissa and the peace agreement in 2010 between the Garre and Degodia in Banissa (NSCPBCM, 2011). The development of these agreements and their implementation involved community elders, NGOs and government officials. Due to the cross-border nature of some of the conflicts, state representatives from Kenya, Somali and Ethiopia were present. One successful peace agreement, the Modogashe Declaration, was endorsed by communities in North Eastern, Upper Eastern and Coast provinces in 2001 and was revalidated in 2005 and 2011 to incorporate more communities and resolve differing views (NSCPBCM, 2011a). As these agreements are based on customary laws, contradictions have arisen between the customary,

¹ A Somali 'clan' is a kinship group determined primarily by patrilineal descent but is not necessarily corporate, cohesive or localised (Abbink, 2009).

religious, cultural and legal precepts. For example, in response to cattle theft, customary law requires compensation payment and collective punishment while the legal system demands arrest, prosecution and individual punishment. Whereas the Al Fatah Declaration stipulated customary compensation and collective punishment, the later versions of the Modogashe Declaration included the legal justice system in the arrest and prosecution of perpetrators and emphasised individual punishment. Besides the contradiction between legal and customary precepts, there is also contradiction between cultural and religious precepts of the different communities. Some communities argued that the stipulated compensation of Modogashe Declaration was based solely on the Qur'an and Somali culture, and therefore not suitable for the communities with different cultural and religious values (NSCPBCM, 2011a).

Oxfam GB has played a critical peacebuilding role in conflict in the ASALs. In 1992 when the conflict in Wajir broke out, Oxfam GB supported the Wajir Peace and Development Committee (Oxfam GB, 2003). From 2000, Oxfam GB implemented a three-year project on behalf of the British government's Department for International Development (DFID) whose aim was "to reduce the vulnerability of pastoralist livelihood systems to conflict and insecurity by strengthening the capacity of communities, civil society, and government to respond to pastoral conflict and address its root causes" (Oxfam GB, 2003, p. 16). DFID provided 90% of the funding and Oxfam GB, the remaining 10% (Oxfam GB, 2003). As a project contracted and predominantly funded by the British government, it was a state (DFID) initiative implemented by non-state actors.

The question of funding is significant because it indicates the locus of accountability and control. To demonstrate the influence of funding on peacebuilding, Eaton argues that NGOs in the North Rift have had minimal peacebuilding impact because of tailoring their interventions to donor-prescribed criteria in order to secure funding. For example, Eaton (2008) contends that NGOs seek to be recognised in peace work through meetings that are usually held far away from the conflict, poorly timed, inappropriate and not responsive to the needs on the ground. External funding can create a bind where much needed resources are made available, but can only be used in prescribed ways such as trainings or specific interventions. The impact of external funds is discussed at length in chapter 6 on institutionalisation and sustainability. The dynamics of violent conflict demand a peacebuilding response that allows for flexibility and creativity in order to effectively transform the situation.

Relief and reconciliation

NGOs and religious institutions responded to 'ethnic conflict' in the 1990s with humanitarian relief accompanied by efforts at reconciliation. The state was complicit in the violence and prevented peacebuilding by non-state actors. However, providing humanitarian relief was an opportunity for peacebuilding actors to access some communities and build peace through mediation and reconciliation.

Religious institutions in Kenya have an elaborate countrywide network with places of worship in most rural and urban areas, and offices in major cities. The churches' reach across the country positions them to quickly respond to humanitarian needs on the ground. In 1993, the National Council of Churches of Kenya (NCCK) initiated the Community Peace Building and

Development project to implement peacebuilding activities (NPI-Africa & NCKK-CPBD, 2001). NCKK started peacebuilding with emergency relief for those affected by the 1992 violent conflict in the Rift Valley (Individual Interview 51, Nairobi, 2014). During the 1990s, the state perceived NCKK as part of the opposition but providing relief was a way for NCKK to gain access to the community for continued peacebuilding (Individual Interview 41, Eldoret, 2014). NCKK also supported local peace initiatives in pastoralist regions (Oxfam GB, 2003). The Roman Catholics have engaged in peacebuilding through the Catholic Justice and Peace Commission (CJPC), with activities such as humanitarian relief, counselling, capacity building and supporting peace connector projects for women and youth (Mwaura & Martinon, 2010; Sang, 2013). Other religious institutions have responded to violent conflict with relief assistance, advocacy and socio-economic support (Kilonzo, 2011; Mwaura & Martinon, 2010). Religious leaders have influence over their religious adherents in Kenya, who seek their leadership in times of political turmoil or violent conflict. Some religious leaders appealed for calm during the 2007 post-election violence and the church provided humanitarian assistance but citizens were disappointed at the overall lack of leadership from the church (Mwaura & Martinon, 2010). Indeed, Mwaura and Martinon (2010) argue that religious leaders were considered partisan and complicit in violent conflict according to a human rights report and the media.

An example of a local peacebuilding NGO is the Peace and Development Network Trust that serves as an umbrella organisation for member organisations and individuals. It is popularly known as PeaceNet Kenya but was initially the Ethnic Clashes Network formed in 1993 to coordinate relief and advocacy in response to the 1992 violent conflict in the Rift Valley (PeaceNet-Kenya, 2012). The member organisations of PeaceNet Kenya are involved in a wide

range of peacebuilding activities, including capacity building for peace practice, religious mediation and traditional peace dialogues, providing forums to discuss peace and conflict, and supporting inter-community activities for peace, such as sports, markets and schools (PeaceNet-Kenya, 2012).

National peace process

The 2007/8 post-election violence was the deadliest and most widespread in Kenya's post-colonial history. The Kenya National Dialogue and Reconciliation process (KNDR) was mediated by the African Union's (AU) Panel of Eminent African Personalities namely Mr Kofi Annan, Mr Benjamin Mkapa and Mrs Graca Machel (South Consulting, 2011). The KNDR concluded on 28 February 2008 with the signing of the National Peace and Reconciliation Accord by the two principal parties in conflict, the Party of National Unity (PNU) and the Orange Democratic Movement (ODM) (Wachira, Arendshorst, & Charles, 2010). The KNDR had four agenda items. The first agenda item was to end the violence; the second, to deal with the resulting humanitarian crisis and the need for reconciliation and healing; the third agenda item was the political crisis; and the fourth to tackle long-term issues such as poverty, inequality, reforms (judicial, constitutional, land), national unity and impunity (South Consulting, 2011). These four agendas captured the scope of peacebuilding by seeking to resolve the immediate crisis and progressively transforming violent conflict in the medium and long term.

Signing the National Peace and Reconciliation Accord successfully stopped the widespread violence, but did not significantly transform the structures of inequality and injustice. Klopp (2009) considers these four agendas only partially successful in light of continued localised

tensions, unmet humanitarian needs and failed reconciliation, the bloated costly power-sharing cabinet and the challenge of addressing long-term issues. Transforming the structures of inequality and injustice will significantly impact existing institutions and threaten the locus of state power. For example, transformation demands a significant reduction of the power of the Executive, an independent judiciary and redressing land injustice, all of which threaten the status quo. In Kenya, state power has allowed access to resources of the state such as land. Klopp (2009) contends that institutions formed under colonialism ensuring control of key resources by political centre have allowed massive corruption in post-colonial governments. Tackling agenda four issues means a fundamental transformation of the state in Kenya regarding the exercise of power and control of national resources. Ndegwa (2003) maintains that efforts at improving the efficiency of the state fall short of the needed transformation which demands re-thinking the role of the state in Kenya. The 2010 constitution seeks to address this needed transformation with reforms to structures such as governance, resource sharing, equality and justice. The recurrent violent conflict in Kenya indicates a need for deep rooted structural transformation and the faithful implementation of the 2010 constitution will be a positive contribution.

The KNDR process is the major national level response to violent conflict in Kenya and it was actively supported by non-state peacebuilding actors. Working closely with the KNDR process was the Concerned Citizens for Peace (CCP). CCP was formed at the onset of the violence by non-state peacebuilders and mediators who used their skills to engage Kenyans for peace and to actively contribute to the KNDR process (Wachira et al., 2010). CCP galvanised broad networks of state and non-state actors to respond to the post-election violence. Alongside the CCP process, other non-state actors responded to the 2007/8 violent conflict. One study found that the

universities in Kenya adjusted internal policies and practices to meet the needs of their staff and students affected by the 2007 post-election violence (Johnson, 2013). Some of the peacebuilding activities cited by Johnson are counselling, conflict resolution training, material support and encouraging a peace discourse. University staff and student leaders were also part of the CCP initiative for peace in 2008 (Wachira, Arendshorst, & Charles, 2010).

My study looks at state-led peacebuilding in Kenya through the infrastructure for peace. Despite the role of the state, non-state actors have played significant roles in NSC, KNFP and NCIC. The findings of my study significantly contribute to peacebuilding literature with the analysis of how peacebuilding theories on conflict transformation and infrastructures for peace intersect with the realities of implementation. Through the study of Kenya's innovative I4P, I investigate the practice of long-term, institutionalised and locally driven peacebuilding to understand how this approach has influenced outcomes for sustainable peacebuilding and peace.

1.6. Structure of the thesis

Chapter 1 sets the context for the case study with a brief history of political violence and an overview of the types of peacebuilding in Kenya. This chapter also contains the statement of the problem, the research questions, the key findings and the significance of the study.

Chapter 2 conducts a review of literature on peacebuilding, with the definition of key concepts used in this study namely peace, violent conflict and peacebuilding. This chapter gives an overview of liberal peacebuilding and critiques of its ideology and implementation. I review literature on peacebuilding approaches described as top-down, middle-out, bottom-up and infrastructure for peace. This chapter concludes with the theoretical framework which is

primarily based on the conflict transformation theory of John Paul Lederach which argues for the sustainability of peacebuilding and peace. I include additional scholars who provide relevant insights on the intersection of power and peacebuilding.

Chapter 3 presents the methodology of this study. This study used a qualitative approach and I collected data through semi-structured interviews, participant observation and documentary evidence. In this chapter I describe my pre-field work expectations, the field research process, and the research challenges.

Chapter 4 discusses the relationship between the conceptualisation of peace and the practice of peacebuilding. There are multiple conceptions and expectations of peace held by actors within the infrastructure for peace. While the state-led infrastructure meets some of these conceptions, fundamental elements of peace are left unaddressed. This chapter begins with conceptualisations of peace from interview respondents and concludes by looking at how the components in the state-led infrastructures address these expectations.

Chapter 5 analyses the state-led peacebuilding approach in Kenya, focusing on three state led components of the infrastructure for peace namely NSC, KNFP and NCIC. Critiques on peacebuilding studies lowly rank the top-down approaches in peacebuilding and the state typically acts in a top-down manner. While the state-led approach demonstrates known weaknesses of a top-down approach to peacebuilding, this case study analyses the role of the Kenyan state in peacebuilding especially in relation to local agents for peace.

Chapter 6 looks at the institutionalisation of the infrastructure for peace in Kenya. The motivation for institutionalisation is to embed an infrastructure for peace to enhance national

capacities to build peace in the long term. While institutionalisation seeks to create national capacities for peace to ensure sustainable peace practice, the goal of sustainability through an infrastructure for peace is threatened by three key issues: the funding imperative, human resources and the new ways of building peace.

Chapter 7 concludes with a brief summary of the findings, the contributions of this study to literature, implications of my study for peacebuilding practitioners and partners, limitations and recommendations for further study.

Chapter 2: The literature on peacebuilding

2.1. Introduction

The visibility of international peacebuilding interventions in post-war countries has likely influenced the prominence of this type of peacebuilding in literature. International peacebuilding is guided by the idea of liberal peace that emphasises democracy, free markets, rule of law and human rights as pillars for peace. My research on peacebuilding by national actors has significant overlap with international peacebuilding in the involvement of the UN and international organisations and through the common challenges faced by actors. This review will therefore include literature on international peacebuilding and liberal peace debates as a relevant context to my case study. It begins with a section defining violent conflict, peace and peacebuilding. I then review key liberal peace debates in peacebuilding theory. In the third section, I shift from peacebuilding theory to practice with a focus on top-down, middle-out and bottom-up peacebuilding approaches as described in literature.

In the next section, I concentrate on the infrastructures for peace model that is the peacebuilding approach in my case study. Although infrastructures for peace vary in implementation to suit the context, they were initially envisioned as a middle-out approach that would include peace actors from the national to local levels. The final section of this chapter is my theoretical framework. I highlight Lederach's conflict transformation theory of peacebuilding which emphasises the inclusion of multiple actors and the need for long term and dynamic engagement in peacebuilding to address the needs for change from the immediate to the structural. I supplement my theoretical framework with additional scholars who analyse aspects of power in relation to

the role of the state in peacebuilding and the impacts of institutionalisation on sustainable peacebuilding.

2.2. Defining key concepts

Peacebuilding is as a response to violent conflict. While I recognise that violence includes physical, psychological and structural elements, and conflict often involves an element of violence; I specifically use the term violent conflict in this study to distinguish political violence at a macro level. The focus of my study is state-led peacebuilding. I start with a definition of the state, followed by the concepts of violent conflict, peace and peacebuilding as will be used in this study.

The state

In comparative politics literature, definitions of the state often reflect the conceptualisation of the state by Weber. Weber's concept of the state provides important parameters vis-à-vis the nature of the state, its power and role. Mann (1984) describes the Weberian state as having a differentiated set of institutions and personnel, which operate outwards from a political centre, to control a definite territory where the state has the monopoly of rulemaking and violence. Violence is a major aspect of state construction and the strength of a state is demonstrated by its capacity to control violence within its territory. Tilly (1985) illustrates the role of violence in the construction of the early European states where violence was used to eliminate internal and external state rivals and protect citizens. He explains the symbiotic relationship between state, capital and coercion, where the state's monopoly of violence was predicated on the extraction of resources. The power of the state is therefore in its ability to successfully extract resources to

control its territory and population. Mann (1984) concurs with this idea of the state and its power and he argues that states are strong when societies are relatively territorialised and centralised. In these strong states, he argues that the state has infrastructural power in its ability to penetrate society and implement its political decisions. The state's power to penetrate society is motivated by the need to extract resources. Scott (1998) elaborates on how the state's efforts at legibility and standardisation are designed to enable the appropriation, manipulation and control of society and resources.

Based on Weber, Mann (1984), Tilly (1985) and Scott (1998) explain the Western concept of the state, its construction and from where it derives power. While the power of the state is seen its monopoly of violence and extraction of resources to control the population and territory, this control is not always centralised and it is based on societal perceptions of state legitimacy. Migdal (1998) qualifies Weber's power of the state in his assertion that the legitimacy of the state is not a given in every society, and in new states, social control is more fragmented and heterogeneous and determined by local perceptions of legitimacy. Lovemann (2005) also argues the state's ability to function militarily, politically, ideologically and economically is based on its use of symbolic power as recognition of legitimacy. This study will use the Weberian definition of the state with Migdal's recognition of the variations of social control in new states and Lovemann's concept of the symbolic power of the state.

Violent conflict

Conflict is part and parcel of human life. Lederach (2003) contends that conflict is normal in human interaction and is a force for change. Conflict can happen on a micro or macro level. It

can range from individually experienced inner conflict when expectations are unmet to conflict (usually armed) between communities and states. The use of conflict in this study is limited to the macro level. Ramsbotham et al (2011) describe the origins of conflict i.e. economic disparities, socio-cultural change and political organising, as essentially conflictual. The conflict may be latent or overt. The awareness level of the would-be conflict parties determines whether conflict will progress from a latent to an overt stage. Lederach (1997) uses Adam Curle's progression of conflict model to illustrate that when the awareness of the needs and interests of conflict is low the conflict remains latent. The conflict only moves to the stage of confrontation, i.e. overt conflict, when the awareness levels rise (Lederach, 1997). Therefore, a heightened awareness of conflicting political needs and interests increases the likelihood of electoral violence. Nonetheless, a lack of awareness does not negate the presence of conflict.

Conflict is distinguished from violence because whereas conflict does not necessarily become violent, conflict is the basis for violence. Conflict develops when two or more parties have, or perceive that they have, incompatible desires or needs, only realisable at the expense of each other; and violence is an extreme form of this conflict (Curle & Dugan, 1982). Though violence is the result of a failure to resolve conflict, it is not inevitable. Bose (1981) observes that violence is a negative form of communication that takes place after other constructive forms have failed, but Gandhi's principles of nonviolence can effectively confront injustice in moral and ethical ways. The term violence is often used in reference to conflict with physical manifestations, such as the destruction of property or attacks on individuals with the goal to injure or kill. Robben and Nordstrom state that "Violence is confusing and inconclusive" (1994, p. 4). Violence causes confusion not only to the direct victims but also to those associated with them and in so doing

disrupts and confounds daily life. Violence is inconclusive with psychological effects that take away a person's sense of wellbeing and/or safety. Violence is simultaneously both a physical and psychological phenomenon. Galtung (1969) shows the interlinkage between physical and psychological violence through an example of the English language where 'hurt' and 'hit' refer to both types of violence.

The popular association of violence with the physical is due to the visible nature of injury, death, population displacement and property destruction. However, invisible violence has manifest consequences in the effects of psychological violence. Galtung (1969) also discusses indirect and structural violence as forms of invisible violence. He provides an extended concept of violence "Violence is that which increases the distance between the potential and the actual, and that which impedes the decrease of this distance" (1969, p. 168). If it is avoidable, it is violence (Galtung, 1969). Galtung exemplifies this indirect violence in the case of people dying from diseases that are preventable by standards of modern medicine. Another type of violence that is invisible is structural violence. Galtung sees structural violence as a consequence of inequalities, especially of power, and uses the example of the hierarchical metropole-satellite relationships of feudal structures which were inherently violent. He notes that violence exists regardless of the actors in the structures or their awareness (1969, p. 178). Critics argue that Galtung's concept of structural violence is not quantifiable which has resulted in its limited use in the field of peace research (Gleditsch, Nordkvelle, & Strand, 2014). In this study, the concept of structural violence explains the invisible violence of the state in Kenya through marginalisation and discrimination that gave rise to existing inequalities between regions and ethnic groups.

There is no dichotomy between physical and structural violence. Galtung (1969) observes that incidences of physical violence, such as police brutality, are often rooted in a history of structural violence. Foucault illustrates how physical violence derives from structural violence: “in our societies, the systems of punishment are to be situated in a certain ‘political economy’ of the body: even if they do not make use of violent or bloody punishment, even when they use ‘lenient’ methods involving confinement or correction, it is always the body that is at issue” (1979, p. 25) The structural violence within a system is related to the manifestation of physical violence. For example, an analysis of colonial violence in Uganda demonstrates how the colonial authority used physical and psychological violence to establish order (Kabwegyere, 1972). Robben and Nordstrom (1994) note that because of the social and cultural particularities of violence, it manifests in diverse ways, making it difficult to conceptualise a singular theory on violence. The example of political violence in Kenya illustrates the connection between physical and structural violence when state actors perpetrate electoral violence in the context of structurally violent institutions. My study will consider both physical and structural violence, thereby embracing a broad concept of violent conflict.

Peace

There is no singular or simple definition of peace. The definition of peace is determined by the phase and nature of violent conflict. Peace is a process with different phases. In the context of armed war, the first phase of peace is the cessation of hostilities. The term *pact* describing an agreement to end a war has its roots in the Roman word *pax* (G. L. Anderson, 1985). At other phases, peace may refer to the processes of reconciliation, justice, development and other practices that seek to address the causes of violent conflict and prevent future violence. The

definition of peace is also determined by the nature of violent conflict experienced. Peace is conceptualised in civil war situations and in smaller scale intra-national violent conflicts. Smoker (1981) notes the importance of using insider criteria to understand the meanings and reality of a society on its own terms, though he observes that the culturally contextualised perspectives may not reflect the impact of social structures if participants are unaware of them. While peace may be often conceptualised at the scale of civil wars in international peacebuilding literature, peace is also defined in the context of more localised violent conflicts as in the case of Kenya. Primarily based on my field research, Chapter 4 of this dissertation analyses the conceptualisation of peace in Kenya.

The concept of peace often denotes a positive and beneficial ideal. Peace is perceived as a laudable social goal of high normative value (Bönisch, 1981). Goestchel and Hagmann discuss peacebuilding programs of donor countries and conclude that “they take the substance of peace as essentially given and uncontested” (2009, p. 61). Therefore peace has been linked to a wide spectrum of practices and this may create a bond of common purpose that is peace-producing (Galtung, 1969). Yet the risk of having a concept so elastic that it means everything may decrease its usefulness in informing targeted intervention to transform situations of violent conflict and prevent further outbreaks. Gleditsch, Nordkvelle and Strand illustrate this with the example of the concept of human security. The concept of security has expanded from its traditional state-centric definition to include human security. Human security included personal, community, environment and political security. These authors argue that initial encompassing notion of human security was later abandoned in favor of a narrower definition of violent threats to the individual (Gleditsch et al., 2014).

Sometimes peace is a negative concept because of the implication of power in war and peace. Gerwin (1991) contends that defining peace is ideologically subjective and so a negative conception of peace as merely the absence of war may legitimise systems of oppression that claim to 'keep the peace'. Another example is the 'victor's peace' that demonstrates the relative power of the victor over the vanquished (Gerwin, 1991). Violent conflict and peace contest asymmetries of power, affecting power relations. This poses a challenge for state-led peacebuilding. A critique of government-sponsored peacebuilding is that it depoliticises peacebuilding in a peace-by-bureaucratic-means approach (Goetschel & Hagmann, 2009). Here peacebuilding becomes a technical activity that seeks to end violence at the expense of confronting power inequalities.

Definitions of peace in intrastate and interstate contexts range from narrow to broad. Whereas a narrow concept of peace is simple, a narrower definition is not as sustainable as a broader, more complex concept of peace or as stable as an even more complex multiple definition (Richmond, 2014). For example, the most widely accepted narrow definition is negative peace as the absence of war. While negative peace may contribute to peace, this conception does not elaborate on what needs to be present in order to have peace (Wiberg, 1981). The concept of negative peace originated in peace studies in the 1950s where the focus was violence reduction and the threat of war (Gerwin, 1991; Gleditsch et al., 2014). Negative peace implies that peace and war are two sides of the same coin. If the conditions of war are eliminated or diminished, then there will be peace. But finding the conditions of war is not equivalent to finding the conditions for peace, because eliminating one condition of war will likely give rise to a new condition and not necessarily to peace (Wiberg, 1981). Wiberg (1981) suggests identifying factors that lead to

peace separately from those that lead to war and then increasing peace factors to hinder war factors. The focus on peace factors leads to the definition of positive peace.

The idea of positive peace has existed from early history as socio-economic progress and wellbeing (Bönisch, 1981). One such example is the Jewish concept of *shalom* as wholeness, justice and wellbeing, which describes positive peace (G. L. Anderson, 1985). In peace research, positive peace has been linked to integration and functional cooperation of human societies (Gleditsch et al., 2014; Wiberg, 1981). Galtung (1969) defined positive peace as the absence of structural violence and the presence of social justice in the equitable distribution of resources and power. Bönisch (1981) says that Galtung's (1969) concept of positive peace is utopian and that it does not consider social order, i.e., the relations of production and property. Adopting a Marxist perspective, he suggests that peace is an aim "which can only be achieved when antagonistic class structures have been abolished in the course of a long-term process of social changes, and thus after creating the necessary material and attitudinal prerequisites" (Bönisch, 1981, p. 172). However, Galtung's (1969) concept of positive peace is based on the absence of structural violence described in the previous section. Galtung (1969) recognises that hierarchy in structural inequality controls conflict which will emerge as the structures are equalized. So while Galtung does not directly address the inequalities of the class structures, he does recognise structural inequality as an impediment of positive peace and also notes the potential for conflict while creating structural equality. Therefore, Galtung's equitable distribution of resources and power does imply the upheaval of unjust social order.

Sustainability is an underlying factor for both negative and positive peace. The narrow definition of peace as the absence of war limits the parameters of peace to the cessation of wartime hostilities but fails to address other less visible forms of violence. The sustainability of peace can only be measured in the long term, when it “has been tested and found to be robust and resilient enough to withstand serious challenges” (de Coning, 2011, p. 121). Although negative peace is a temporary response to immediate visible violence, it can be sustained by constructive processes in the medium and long term that address underlying invisible causes of violent conflict. Lederach (1997) underlines the view of conflict as a progression and the need to sustain the transformation to peace. He argues, “Rather than seeing peace as a static ‘end-state’, conflict transformation views peace as continuously evolving and developing quality of relationships” (Lederach, 2003, p. 20). Lederach discusses reducing the violence and increasing the justice and equality in social, political economic and cultural relationships. The absence of war is a static descriptor of negative peace, while positive peace entails a progressive transformation of both visible and invisible violence. Definitions of peace are best determined by context and chapter 4 looks at the conceptualisation of peace in my Kenyan case study. I acknowledge that negative peace is an integral component of positive peace, but I adopt an expanded definition of peace to include positive peace. The process of moving from the different forms of violence to peace is known as peacebuilding.

Peacebuilding

Peacebuilding is an intervention following violent conflict to restore peace and prevent a return to violence. Like the definition of peace, the definition of peacebuilding is context-dependent. For example, the United Nations views peacebuilding as an activity to follow successful

peacekeeping and prevent a return of violence (Boutros-Ghali, 1992) The UN's *Agenda for Peace* defines peacebuilding as "action to identify and support structures which will tend to strengthen and solidify peace in order to avoid a relapse into conflict" (Boutros-Ghali, 1992, p. 6). Peacebuilding extends the UN mandate after peacekeeping as "activities undertaken on the far side of conflict to reassemble the foundations of peace and provide the tools for building on those foundations something that is more than just the absence of war" (United Nations, 2000, p. 3).

While violent conflict does not always necessitate peacekeeping, peacebuilding responds to violent conflict to forestall further violence. Given the wide range of violent conflicts to which peacebuilding responds, the definition of peacebuilding is broad. Schirch defines peacebuilding as "a wide range of efforts by diverse actors in government and civil society to address the root causes of violence before, during, and after conflict" (2013, p. xiii). Schirch (2013) adds that peacebuilding could either refer to direct interventions efforts for peace or indirect coordination of multi-sectoral efforts that independently may not be conceived as peacebuilding. This includes sectors like development, security and justice.

To explain the process of peacebuilding, Lederach (2003) adopts the conflict transformation theory of change. In conflict transformation, conflict is a progression from latent to overt, and peace is built through multiple activities in the different phases of conflict that transform cycles of violent conflict into sustainable peace. This is a long-term process that involves many actors. Ramsbotham et al challenge Lederach's preference for the term conflict transformation over the wider used conflict resolution. They argue that Lederach uses a distorted conception of conflict

resolution as being conflict-centred and immediate-term in comparison to conflict transformation as relationship-centred and long term (Ramsbotham et al., 2011). But Ramsbotham et al (2011) clarify the choice of term is not as important as the coherence of the substance implied by either resolution or transformation. However, Lederach's (2003) preference for conflict transformation is influenced by his field experience in Central America where he found conflict resolution implies co-optation or de-legitimisation of genuine grievances. Lederach defines conflict transformation as "constructive change efforts that include, and go beyond, the resolution of specific problems" (2003, p. 4). Peacebuilding is an ongoing activity that not only responds to immediate violence but seeks in the long term to transform underlying causes of violence (Lederach, 1997; Schirch, 2013).

Power is a critical element in conceptualising peace and peacebuilding. In the above comparison of conflict resolution and conflict transformation, Lederach observes that resolution may be perceived as not addressing the conflict needs of those aggrieved. By either co-optation or de-legitimisation, the power of the aggrieved is usurped or denied. In the section defining peace, I noted Bönisch's critique of Galtung's concept of positive peace which he argues does not address the abolition of class structures, though Galtung addresses structural inequality. The balance of power is a critical element determining conflict, peacebuilding and peace. In critiques of liberal peacebuilding discussed in the next section, the issue of power is a recurring theme. Based on empirical studies, the implementation of international peacebuilding has in some case reinforced inequalities of power, thereby hindering the sustainability of peacebuilding and peace. There are three main critiques on power from international interventions that are relevant to my study.

The first critique is that bureaucratic peacebuilding prioritises technocratic responses to conflict, thereby depoliticising peace by neglecting to conceptualise it from the needs of the aggrieved (Goetschel & Hagmann, 2009). Mac Ginty (2012) contends that technocracy frames conflict to demand a technocratic intervention which is coercive in imposing administrative procedures and excluding those who do not comply. Technocracy favours Western methods that emphasise the asymmetries of power with the Global North as the ‘experts’ and the South as the recipients of this expertise (Goetschel & Hagmann, 2009; Mac Ginty, 2012). The second critique is that international peacebuilding excludes critical local knowledge and local agency which is essential for the success of peacebuilding and peace. Autesserre (2010) argues that international peacebuilding in the Democratic Republic of Congo failed to deal with local violence because it did not use appropriate local peacebuilding strategies. In this case, the local is the conflict area. Mac Ginty and Richmond (2013) note that recognising the local is acknowledging that power is diffuse and circulates making local agency crucial to attaining peace. Richmond and Pogodda (2016) reiterate the circulation of power whether in resistance or domination and contend that local agency determines the outcome of peace and the state. The third related critique is that international peacebuilding uses a top-down approach in building peace with decisions on peace made at the top to filter down, with no substantial input of those affected by conflict. The top down approach is evident in technocratic peacebuilding and in the exclusion of local knowledge. These critiques are discussed further in the next two sections on liberal peacebuilding and approaches to peacebuilding.

The theory of conflict transformation describes the change process from violence to peace. Another theory of peace that has majorly informed peacebuilding is that of liberal peace. The

liberal peace ideology underpins international peacebuilding interventions. Due to the visibility of these interventions the theory of liberal peace dominates theoretical and empirical literature.

2.3. An overview of liberal peacebuilding

The liberal peace theory states that democracy ensures intra-state peace while free markets enable cooperation and trade that will safeguard inter-state peace (Richmond, 2014). The roots of the liberal peace theory can be traced back to Immanuel Kant's 1795 essay on perpetual peace that highlighted the role of democracy and economic interdependence in decreasing the probability of inter-state wars (Shermer, 2014). This theory gathered momentum in the 1990s after the Cold War when international institutions, including the United Nations, increasingly intervened in post-conflict countries (Paris, 2010; Richmond, 2014; van Leeuwen, Verkoren, & Boedeltje, 2012). UN peacebuilding is a post-conflict intervention subsequent to civil wars (Grey-Johnson, 2006; Lambourne & Herro, 2008). In Africa, UN peacekeeping missions, whose mandate is to provide security by military means, have often led to the cessation of hostilities but not necessarily resulted in lasting peace. For instance, in the Central African Republic, violence reoccurred once the peacekeepers left in 2000 (Grey-Johnson, 2006).

Liberal peacebuilding in a post-conflict environment seeks primarily to build state-level institutions that will promote democracy, rule of law, human rights protection and free markets (Paris, 2010; Richmond, 2014). Liberal peacebuilding is associated with interventions by international organisations that originate from countries that promote liberal peace ideals. Richmond (2014) argues that liberal peace has been used to explain the post-war stability of Europe. There are variations in the conceptualisation of liberal peace. For example, van Leeuwen

et al suggest three streams of liberal peace “a focus on liberal political systems; a focus on governance and civil society; and, most recently, a focus on strengthening the state” (2012, p. 296). They describe these three streams as follows. In the first stream, peace is achieved by establishing Western democratic systems that facilitate the participation of all citizens, a responsive government and free markets. In the second stream, peace comes through the idea of good governance and the role of civil society to deal with conflict and keep the government in check. Peace in the last stream derives from the ‘failed states’ debate with the idea that building states that can provide security and basic services would check state failure. Like the concepts of peace and peacebuilding, the definitions of liberal peace may vary depending on the emphasis but retain the basic tenets of democracy and free markets.

Another example of conceptualising liberal peace is Richmond’s (2014) four elements of the liberal peace framework. The first is the victor’s peace imposed in war. Second, a constitutional peace built on democracy and free trade. The third is an institutional peace that is built by international institutions according to international law. Fourth is a civil peace where non-governmental organisations deal with historic injustices to prevent war. Richmond’s definition of peace goes beyond the basic democracy and free market to even include a victor’s peace. Paris (2010) argues that liberal peace has been defined too broadly and says that Richmond wrongly associates a victor’s peace with liberal peace instead of realism. The relevance of Richmond’s fourth element also depends on how effectively liberal principles are applied in dealing with historic injustices. Paris (2010) notes that in spite of variations, the definitions of liberal peace must espouse liberalism in the universal values of political and economic freedoms. While this

sets a bottom line, the subjectivity of interpretation remains a challenge to the implementation of liberal peace.

The critiques of liberal peacebuilding relate to implementation and ideology. Critiques on implementation include its top-down nature, short duration, inadequate depth, insufficient resources, lack of political will of intervenors and driven by Western interests. The critiques on the practice of international peacebuilding hold true for other levels of peacebuilding because international, national and local levels influence and inevitably interact in the co-production of peace. Heathershaw (2013) underlines that it is critical to theorise the relationship of peacebuilding with the peace outcome in order to appreciate the co-constitutive nature of peacebuilding. The peace outcome is a result of multiple levels of peacebuilding whether they consciously collaborate or not. My case study of state-led peacebuilding in Kenya illustrates a collaborative peacebuilding effort. Even though, it is a national level peacebuilding process, the international and local levels are an integral part of the peacebuilding process.

The implementation critiques

The first critique of liberal peacebuilding is that, in a top-down manner, it imposes political and economic ideals without regard for the daily realities and values of locals, specific cultural contexts and the domestic institutional capacities required to sustain the liberal peace (Donais & Knorr, 2013; Paris, 2010; van Leeuwen et al., 2012). The predetermined values of liberal peacebuilding preclude the variations and dynamism of different post-conflict environments (van Leeuwen et al., 2012). The power is not just in the top-down nature of the peacebuilding interventions but the fact that international peacebuilders come with significant financing and

presumed superior peacebuilding skills and knowledge. However, Paris (2010) argues that the hypercritical scholarship on liberal peacebuilding is based on erroneous assumptions, exaggeration or oversimplification of liberal peacebuilding. He maintains that despite the failures of liberal peacebuilding, it has not been proved to do any harm, it has evolved through learning from intervention failures, and it is amenable to the needed variation and changes highlighted by critics.

As experts, international intervenors go into a post-conflict situation with pre-conceived ideas on how to build peace. This is well illustrated by the liberal peacebuilding preoccupation with elections as essential to furthering democratic growth. Paffenholz (2013) observes that elections are key to liberal democracies because they demonstrate a vibrant civil society. The UN underlines the role of elections in the description of peacebuilding activities to include “providing technical assistance for democratic development (including electoral assistance and support for free media)” (United Nations, 2000, p. 3). The problem is not the elections per se but more so the context-blind imposition of electoral processes that has proved to be counterproductive. Reflecting on elections in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC), Autesserre (2011b) contends that the elections were held prematurely without establishing sufficient freedom for the media and political campaigns. Further, van Leeuwen et al. (2012) argue that electoral procedures may conceal continued authoritarianism and deliver a disempowering rather than emancipatory effect. When context is ignored, the outcome of the elections will likely fall short of the envisioned liberal democratic goals.

Further evidence of the decontextualized application of liberal peacebuilding relates to institutional strengthening to safeguard peace. The unsustainable outcomes of liberal peacebuilding in countries such as Angola, Cambodia and Bosnia caused the UN to redesign peacebuilding approaches to ensure strategic exits and strengthen local institutions to sustain peace (Paris, 2010). The liberal peacebuilding strategy of strengthening the institution of the state is modelled on the Western rather than the local institutions. Institutions in post-conflict states are ‘strengthened’ to resemble Western institutions in the belief that pre-existing local institutions have failed in violence prevention or have been devastated by the conflict (van Leeuwen et al., 2012). Erasing the past creates a gap that threatens the viability of the post-conflict institutions

The critiques on a lack of political will and inadequate resources are interconnected. Autesserre (2011b) responds to critiques that argue that the international peacebuilding intervention could not focus on local peacebuilding due to material and financial constraints. She contends that it was not a matter of insufficient resources or international indifference, but a conscious decision to channel resources towards the liberal priority of holding elections over ending local violence. A lack of political will or inadequate resources demonstrate the particular priorities and choices of those building peace.

A final critique on method is that liberal peacebuilding serves to promote Western interests. Baranyi (2008) demonstrates a link between Western policy and peacebuilding with the post 9/11 US national security strategy to pre-emptively counter terrorism by intervening in Iraq as a so-called failed state. The emphasis is on curbing global terrorism to the extent that ‘weak’ states

are strengthened regardless that they may have neglected their citizens' human security (van Leeuwen et al., 2012). This strategy of bolstering 'weak' states responds to threats to the security of intervening states and not necessarily to the security threats experienced by the citizens of the host country. In economics, neoliberal reforms in post-conflict reconstruction benefit multinational companies at the expense of national reconstruction (van Leeuwen et al., 2012).

The ideology critique

The critiques raised on the implementation of liberal peacebuilding interrogate the ideology behind liberal peace. Liberal peacebuilding has been critiqued for its promotion of Western values as the normative values of liberal peacebuilding. The attempt to propagate the liberal approach universally has had mixed outcomes (Mac Ginty & Richmond, 2013).

The first critique is that the values of individualism and secularism in the Western worldview are not universally applicable, which creates a resistance to liberal peacebuilding (van Leeuwen et al., 2012). In societies that are more communal or religious, the imposition of individualism and secularism reflects the hegemonic position of liberal peacebuilding. The idea of hegemony is not just in the prevalent and uncritical implementation of liberal interventions as the only way to peace but the perception of Western-oriented liberal peace values as superior to non-Western values (van Leeuwen et al., 2012). Orientalism sets the context for hegemony. Van Leeuwen et al (2012) view this superiority through the lens of orientalism as conceptualised by Edward Said. Said (1980) describes orientalism as a Western discourse that produced political, social, military and ideological representations of the 'Orient' and contends that the West constructed its superiority against a constructed inferiority of the Orient so as to dominate, restructure and have

authority over the Orient. Liberal peacebuilding is often constructed as the superior option and in the best interest of the host country which is a hegemonic discourse. Paris concludes, “there seems to be no viable alternative to some version of liberal peacebuilding” (2010, p. 357). Paris’ assertion underlines a dominance of liberal peacebuilding that may impede the consideration of alternatives that may be more contextually applicable.

A hegemonic discourse not only prevents the discovery of more context-relevant peacebuilding approaches, but it also implies a false dichotomy that defines any alternative peacebuilding discourse from the perspective of liberal peacebuilding and not in its own right. Heathershaw (2013) says that binaries deny the connections between the two seemingly contradictory terms like liberal or local, which in fact are in a co-constitutive relationship. The term ‘local’ is often constructed in contrast to liberal or international.

Despite its usage, the term ‘local’ is seldom defined. Paffenholz (2013) calls for clearer definition of who is included in ‘local’, as she observes that financial support for peacebuilding goes mostly to urban elite NGOs and is not equitably allocated to the whole range of local actors. The word ‘local’ has been used to situate domestic actors in the context of international peacebuilding. ‘Local’ is used to describe those who are from the post-conflict region. Donais describes local ownership as “the degree of control that domestic actors wield over domestic political processes” (2012, p. 1). His concept of local ownership seeks to acknowledge the stake of local actors in peacebuilding, recognising them as peacebuilders (Donais, 2012). Donais uses ‘local’ to refer to a domestic group of actors in relation to the post-conflict environment but emphasises that there are multiple cleavages in the concept of local e.g. elite versus non-elite or

different ethnic groups and therefore local is neither singular nor homogenous. He also uses words like internal actors, local populations or insiders to refer to local actors. Donais (2012) describes the local elite who engage in high-level peace processes as most problematic and unreliable. Lederach (1997) distinguishes different types of local actors based on the kind of power they hold e.g. top level including political or religious leaders, middle level civil society actors and bottom level grassroots leaders. This study adopts Donais depiction of the local as those from the conflict-affected environment acknowledging the inherent heterogeneity and inequalities of power therein.

Lederach states, “the greatest resources for sustaining peace in the long term is always rooted in the local people and their culture” (1997, p. 94). The implication of Lederach’s statement is that the local is those from the conflict area. The concept of local actors is often used in relation to international actors (Donais, 2012; Lederach, 1997; Mac Ginty & Richmond, 2013). As the term ‘local’ was constructed as a contrast to the liberal or international, it seldom acknowledges the diversity inherent in the concept of ‘local’, or specify ‘who’ in the local would benefit from international peacebuilding. The concept of local is used to denote local agency or local ownership. In the first critique of the implementation of liberal peacebuilding, the top-down approach is argued to exclude local agency yet local ownership is essential to sustaining peace. Donais (2012) argues that while the communitarian perspective of local ownership entails a peace envisioned and shaped by local actors; local ownership in liberal peace building is the buy-in by local actors of an externally designed peace. Local ownership is determined by whether the local people designed the peace and not just that they accepted the idea of peace proposed by

international interveners. This creates a problem for international peacebuilding because the act of intervention is inevitably guided by a plan for peace that is time and resource bound.

Local ownership is also determined by the resources available to the local to design the peace. Hutchful (2012) discusses ownership in security sector reform noting the impact of asymmetric relations between internal and external actors. He argues that while ownership means leadership in decision making and priority setting, this is only possible if the internal actors commit their own resources to the process (Hutchful, 2012). In theory, this is a reasonable assessment. However, in reality, the security sector reform or the peacebuilding intervention proposed is significantly shaped by external actors and the needed resources may exceed what is locally available. Yet another aspect of local ownership is that it may reproduce pre-conflict inequalities. In a critique on the operationalisation of the concept of local ownership through state building in post-conflict contexts, Zaum (2012) contends that the structural inequalities from the conflict are inadvertently reinforced. He argues that local elites or government may not necessarily be representative of the diversity of actors who comprise the local. The concept of local ownership is as contested as the concept of the local.

The contrast of local versus international agency is a false dichotomy. Mac Ginty and Richmond observe: “A key descriptor of the ‘local’ is that it is differentiated from the national and international, although of course any boundaries are blurred by the fact that all agency is networked in an increasingly complex manner” (2013, p. 770). There is no clear distinction of where the local ends and the international begins because of the interactive and co-productive nature of agency. Mac Ginty uses the concept of hybridity to describe this networking between

different levels of agency. He explains hybridity as “the composite forms of social thinking and practice that emerge as the result of the interaction of different groups, practices and world-view” (2011, p. 210). Peacebuilding exemplifies hybridity because the initiatives towards peace at the local, national and international levels contribute to the peace outcome and cannot be viewed in isolation of each other. Baranyi & Powell (2008) acknowledge the importance of multidimensional peacebuilding that includes domestic and international actors in contributing to ending wars albeit not quite sustaining the peace.

A second critique on values centres on the negative impact of economic liberalism on the capacity of the state. Economic liberalism reduces the role of the state in the economy further hindering the state’s capacity to create employment and address inequality (van Leeuwen et al., 2012). The weakening of the state by economic liberalism is an unintended consequence which also undermines the ultimate goal of sustainable peace. In a third critique, van Leeuwen et al (2012) observe that the liberal focus on the state and formal institutions as the primary post-war change agents fails to recognise the crucial role of informal institutions, ignores the trans-border nature of conflict, and neglects the complicity of the global system in conflict. So even when liberal peacebuilding has a focus on strengthening the state, it does so at the cost of neglecting informal institutions and a state-focus may also obscure regional dimensions of conflict.

The critiques of the liberal peacebuilding ideology are useful in shifting the focus from the failures of operationalisation towards interrogating the assumed relevance of liberal peace as a universally applicable peacebuilding theory. In the next section, I look at different approaches to peacebuilding at the top, middle and bottom levels of leadership. While these approaches have

been described as top-down, middle-out and bottom-up in the context of national peacebuilding process, there are variations to these typologies in the context of localised peacebuilding. In addition, these approaches tend to incorporate elements of each other to different degrees. The success of a top-level approach is in part due to effective and complementary middle- and bottom-level strategies.

2.4. Approaches to peacebuilding

The implementation of peacebuilding can be classified as top-down, middle-out or bottom-up to correspond to the respective leadership levels at the top, middle and grassroots. Lederach (1997) illustrates these levels using a pyramid that has top leaders at the peak, followed by middle level leaders at the centre and grassroots leaders at the base. In the pyramid illustration, there are a fewer numbers of leaders at the peak and the leadership numbers increase towards the base of the pyramid. There are different types of peacebuilding activities in Lederach's three approaches. For instance, the top leaders engage in high-level negotiations, the mid-range in workshops and training and the grassroots in training and psychosocial work. This pyramid is helpful in describing national level peacebuilding approaches in the context of post-civil war or large scale violent conflict.

Violent conflicts in Kenya have been more localised and sporadic. The pyramid illustration works in two ways for Kenya. First, it identifies leadership from a national to local level as applicable in the peacebuilding context after the 2007 post-election violence. This pyramid can also describe local-level leadership in specific conflict zones. In Kenya, violent conflict and peacebuilding is mostly localised with few exceptions such as the widespread violent conflict

following the 2007 elections. For example, pastoralist conflicts directly affect pastoralist communities, and in some cases neighbouring agricultural communities, but the conflicts do not directly impact distant urban dwellers. Smoker (1981) contends that a global peace is a result of *small peaces* which may contain elements that appear not peaceful to those outside the small peace context. For example, a resource-sharing agreement between two pastoralist communities that stipulates a need to acquire permission before migrating to share water and pasture resources will secure peace between these communities. This restricted mobility would not be peace in an urban context. From 1971 there have been several peace agreements between pastoralist communities in Kenya as well as in bordering countries. The idea of *small peaces* captures the Kenyan reality of dispersed and sporadic violent conflict. In this context peace, initiatives at the bottom-level as conceived by Lederach (1997) directly target localised conflict in a way that cannot be described as typical bottom-up.

The manner of implementation rather than the leadership level of the actors defines whether a peacebuilding approach is top-down, middle-out or bottom-up. In peacebuilding in Kenya, international organisations have featured prominently. They have primarily worked with top, midrange and bottom levels of leadership by providing financial and technical support. Despite working with all the levels of leadership in what appears to be a middle-out approach, they often act top-down in regards to funding. Peacebuilding ideology and programmatic priorities guide the decision on which peacebuilding initiatives to support at the various levels. This support is conditional on the recipients' satisfactory accountability to ensure continued funding. It is top-down because the funding decisions are made at the top and implemented downwards while the accountability only flows upwards. However, international organisations have also facilitated

bottom-up processes for peace by providing material support that does not constitute a typical donor-recipient relationship. Examples of material support include refreshments during an event or access to a vehicle if transportation is required for an intervention. In the next section I look at the characteristics and critiques of the top-down, middle-out and bottom-up approaches to peacebuilding.

Top-down peacebuilding

The distinction of leadership levels as top, middle and bottom relate to political, military, economic or spiritual power. On a global scale, those at the top hold relatively greater power than those at the bottom. Relative in the sense that a national leader may represent greater power on a national scale than a community leader but at the community level, the local leader may have greater power. A top-down approach infers that actors with greater power impose the peacebuilding agenda. Lederach (1997) notes that this approach assumes a hierarchy whereby nationally recognised leaders are at the top level and they represent the bottom level masses at a formal peace agreement. The peace is then expected to trickle-down. This is in contrast to the *small peaces* discussed in the previous section. In the top-down approach, decisions are made at the top with the expectation that they will be implemented downwards while accountability flows in the reverse direction.

The critiques of liberal peacebuilding focus on the imposition of liberal political and economic values as being universally applicable and beneficial for all post-conflict situations. Top-down approaches impose values or practices perceived to be superior to locally defined mechanisms of dealing with violent conflict. The major critique of top-down approaches in peacebuilding is that

by imposing peacebuilding interventions, they exclude local agency. The technocratic manner of implementation further neglects contextual variations and depoliticises peace. An exclusive use of this approach seldom builds peace, as it overlooks local actors as key stakeholders in building relevant peace and sustaining it.

Liberal peacebuilding adopts a top-down approach in the implementation of macro-level strategies that do not address micro-level violence. The assumption that decisions reached at the top will be relevant on the ground is inaccurate because the conflict and peace dynamics at micro and macro levels differ significantly (Autesserre, 2011a). The disconnect between what happens at the different levels is also because once leaders at the top level are elected and/or recognised, their macro-level positioning may disconnect/insulate them from the micro-level needs and interests of those on the ground.

Autesserre (2011b) maintains that whereas there were distinct dynamics in the local versus the national/regional violence in the DRC conflict, the neglect of local violence jeopardized peace at a macro level. Like Autesserre, Orjuela finds that micro-level violence can impede macro-level peace, but also notes that peace at the macro-level has in many cases positively impacted micro-level peace (Orjuela, 2003). Therefore, although top-down peacebuilding can have positive trickle-down effects, the positive impact can be diminished by unaddressed micro-level violent conflict. Top-down approaches are useful in achieving initial peace through ceasefires and agreements (Lederach, 1997). In the case of Kenya, the 2008 peace accord was an essential first step in stemming the widespread violence but provisions were made for long-term peacebuilding in the fourth agenda item of the peace process.

Even though peacebuilding in Kenya does not attract the level of funding of the typical post-civil war international interventions, it still gets substantial peacebuilding funding from international organisations and Western governments. Therefore, if a liberal ideology guides the funders' decision-making, then the liberal peacebuilding critiques are also applicable to a certain extent in Kenyan state-led peacebuilding. The extent to which the critique applies depends in part on the agency of the state to implement contextualised peace practice to resonate with the Kenyan context. When top-down peacebuilding imposes decisions for downward implementation, it constrains the agency of those at a local level. Local agency in peacebuilding is important as the traditional top-down, security-focused and state-centric approach to peacebuilding has not resulted in the envisioned outcomes for lasting peace (Mac Ginty & Richmond, 2013). This study looks at state-led peacebuilding in Kenya where the state typically uses a top-down approach and the term 'local' is used geographically to denote the actors from the conflict area. Even at the local level, a top-down approach is used when community elders reach a peace agreement without substantially engaging the community at large.

Top-down peacebuilding depoliticises peace through the use of bureaucracy and technocracy that favour standardisation regardless of dissimilarities of the post-conflict contexts. Goetschel and Hagmann (2009) critique the bureaucratisation of peacebuilding and contend that the discourse and practices of government-sponsored peacebuilding have turned peace into an apolitical concept, with the drive for impact undermining the need to conceptualise peace in the context of power imbalances. In violent conflict where opponents wrestle for power, the negotiations for peace revolve around power sharing. However, the power-sharing agreement may not necessarily address structural conflict and therefore not result in substantial peace. Orjuela

demonstrates this tension in the following statement: “While Sinhalese want an end to the violence, Tamils want justice – not ‘peace’ with continued oppression” (2003, p. 200). In this case the peace agreement becomes a technical discussion on sharing power without addressing the underlying tensions that precipitated the conflict.

Prioritising technocracy or professionalism in peacebuilding depoliticises the notion of peace (Goetschel & Hagmann, 2009; Mac Ginty, 2012). The technocratic approach to peacebuilding infers that with the right set of technical tools peace can be obtained, but this oversimplifies the challenges and intricacies of building peace (de Coning, 2011). Paradoxically, while bureaucratised peacebuilding can depoliticise peace, it remains a political process. Through the conduit of technical and administrative systems, peacebuilding can mask a value-laden agenda. Technocracy is not just about facilitation. Mac Ginty contends that “it has become a major factor in determining the nature of the peace-building process, the actors involved and the ‘peace’ that it produces. It is highly political in that it favours ‘solutions’ that originate from, and perpetuate, particular ideological stances” (2012, p. 288). International peacebuilding’s support for elections over local peacebuilding initiatives is indicative of the liberal priority to establishing Western-style democratic institutions as pillars of violence prevention. Technocracy can also exacerbate the exclusion of the ‘local’ when standardisation seeks a uniformity that leaves no room for the heterogeneity of local approaches (Mac Ginty & Richmond, 2013). Despite its liberal leaning, technocracy is promoted as a neutral effective way of building peace thus precluding the need for contextualising.

Middle-out peacebuilding

Lederach (1997) argues that the middle level leaders are best placed to connect top- and bottom-level leaders in the middle-out approach. He considers the mid-range leaders as integral to creating an infrastructure to sustain peace through activities such as training, problem-solving workshops and peace commissions. The literature on the middle-out approach in Kenya includes peacebuilding by NGOs and faith-based organisations as discussed in Chapter 1. The prominence of NGOs as mid-range actors is based on the assumption that they have legitimacy with top- and bottom-level leadership that enables them to be a link for peacebuilding from all levels. Lederach presents mid-level leaders as recognised by the top level, cognisant of the struggles of ordinary citizens yet unrestrained by these challenges, flexible in their lower visibility, and part of networks that cross conflict divides. However, Orjuela (2003) finds that NGOs in Sri Lanka reflect the same ethnic polarisation and authoritarian tendencies found in the society. Although mid-range actors appear strategically placed to connect top and bottom levels of peacebuilding as emphasised by Lederach, the effectiveness of these actors may be limited by their context to positively or negatively influence their peacebuilding interventions.

Empirical studies of peacebuilding NGOs offer critiques on the middle-out approach. Reimann (2005) criticizes NGOs on the level of performance, accountability, dependency, commercialisation and ideology. His analysis distinguishes criticisms of NGOs according to the different fields of international development, humanitarian assistance and advocacy, which overlap with peacebuilding. NGOs are not always effective in peacebuilding and in some cases do more harm than good. In a study on peacebuilding NGOs operating at the border of Kenya and Uganda, Eaton (2007) concludes that NGOs failed to build peace as they did not understand

the nature of cattle raiding and the escalation of violence. Another study finds that while the church in Kenya responded commendably to humanitarian needs in the 2007 post-election crisis, it failed to act in a non-partisan way and to provide visionary leadership (Mwaura & Martinon, 2010). In Somalia, the Swedish Life and Peace Institute adopted a comprehensive approach and managed to work successfully with all levels of leadership towards peacebuilding, but failed to ensure sustainability of its peace work (Fisher, 2005). Though strategically placed to connect with the top and bottom, middle-out peacebuilding is not always effective and faces significant implementation challenges.

The criticism of accountability, dependency and commercialisation relate primarily to the financial aspect of NGO operations. NGOs receive funding from state and non-state actors. Reimann (2005) discusses financial corruption in NGOs, the proliferation of fake NGOs motivated by funding possibilities and the lack of national level regulations on NGO conduct. He observes how the dependence on external funding has led to a reduced legitimacy and autonomy of NGOs, which seek to satisfy donors over their constituencies. In addition, Reimann notes that the competition for funding has led to a corporatisation of NGOs run by elites who can tap into the funding market. Access to funding can compromise the nature of peacebuilding. Eaton (2008) asserts that peacebuilding has become a business for NGOs in the North Rift of Kenya, based on the growing numbers of NGOs that engage superficially just to secure further funding. The autonomy of NGOs can be compromised when they receive funding from their governments. In 2000, the UK's Department for International Development (DFID) funded up to 90% of Oxfam GB's project to address vulnerabilities of pastoralist livelihoods in Kenya (Oxfam

GB, 2003). In this case, Oxfam's autonomy is compromised by their extensive reliance and primary accountability to DFID.

Reimann's (2005) critiques do not address the challenge of the local population becoming dependent on NGOs to meet their needs. In Rwanda, the influx of NGOs after the genocide resulted in the population depending on NGOs to provide services and improve standards of living (Fisher, 2005). While useful in the aftermath of violent conflict, an unmoderated long-term use of this approach may usurp the role and responsibility of the state to provide public services, and further erode state-society relations. In a case from Haiti where the state's infrastructural power was limited, an NGO became the provider of the public service of sanitation (Donais & Knorr, 2013). In both the Rwanda and Haiti cases, the inordinate role of the NGOs in service provision actually undermines the goals of peacebuilding by unintentionally disrupting the relationship between the state and its citizens. Similarly, Zanotti (2010) contends that channelling aid through NGOs for service delivery further weakened state institutions in Haiti because the state no longer needed to account to constituents. This peace building strategy thus hindered the goal of sustainable institutions. Duffield (1999, 2007) argues that new international governance actors, including NGOs, have challenged traditional parameters of state sovereignty in usurping the power and authority of the state. Despite the strategic location of middle level actors in peacebuilding, there are significant challenges associated with the middle-out approach.

Bottom-level peacebuilding

Peacebuilding at the bottom level takes place in the context of national and localised violent conflict. Ideally, peacebuilding takes place simultaneously at the less visible bottom level

through localised peace initiatives and at the top level in high profile peace negotiations. Mitchell (2012) quotes Father Layson's description of the peace process in the Philippines as having a vertical aspect in the negotiations between the government and Moro Islamic Liberation Front (MILF) and a horizontal intra and inter communities peace process at the grassroots. Bottom-level peacebuilding also has vertical and horizontal dimensions that are evident in the context of localised violent conflict. In the vertical dimension, bottom-level peacebuilding seeks to influence the top level in a bottom-up manner. Examples of vertical peace would include community initiatives to prevent electoral violence on the ground, but ultimately contribute to an overall peaceful election. Or, in the case of pastoralist violence, bottom-level community initiatives for peace may be directed at getting the government's cooperation to enforce inter-community peace agreements. The focus of horizontal peacebuilding is local peace within or between communities by promoting positive and healthy interaction. I refer to the vertical approach as bottom-up peacebuilding and horizontal as bottom-level peacebuilding.

Using the examples of El Salvador, Ethiopia and the Philippines, Lederach (1997) makes a case for bottom-up peacebuilding by noting that these transitions to peace in the '90s were made possible by grassroots pressure. He concludes that bottom-level peacebuilding in Liberia, Mozambique and Somalia opened up space for grassroots leaders to work with organisations on the ground towards required peace and trauma healing. Leaders at the bottom level have the advantage of living in close quarters with those affected by violent conflict and are in interdependent relationships with others who may have perpetrated the violence (Lederach, 1997). The bottom level is where the impact of conflict is most dramatic, making peacebuilding process a crucial factor of sustainable peace.

Mitchell (2012) disagrees with Lederach's claim of a significant bottom-up influence on top-level peace processes. While it is possible to assess how a failure to broker top-level peace adversely affects the bottom level, the exact impact of bottom-level initiatives on micro/macro peace is not as apparent. Paffenholz (2013) also argues that the top level determines war or peace by creating a space that is either conducive or hostile to other levels of peacebuilding. She cites the example of how the Indian government's pressure on the Nepali king to negotiate with Maoists was effective where citizen mobilization had failed. Nonetheless, the debate over which level of peacebuilding is most influential is somewhat reductionist. Autesserre (2011a) cautions against studying interventions in isolation as she argues that reductionism falsely credits the increase or decrease of conflict to specific interventions, whereas in reality the outcome is a result of multiple efforts. Despite the fact that the top level plays a significant role in setting the context for war or peace, the bottom level has the power to disrupt or frustrate top-level peace agreements (Autesserre, 2010; Mitchell & Hancock, 2012).

Bottom-level peacebuilding is also a horizontal process. A major aspect of peacebuilding at the bottom level is relationships within and between kin groups. In Kenya, bottom-level initiatives grounded in precepts of customary law have dealt with violent conflict between clans and ethnic groups (Oxfam GB, 2003). Triggers of these conflicts include access to and control of natural resources, as well as security incidences. Oxfam (2003) found that although these local initiatives effectively address the immediate violence, they do not tackle the structural or political causes of the violent conflict. A major challenge with an overreliance on bottom-level peacebuilding is that the state can pass on its responsibilities for security or development to the community. In one case in Kenya, the state actors increasingly referred cases to the peace

committee, implicitly delegating its responsibility to provide security to the community (Oxfam GB, 2003). Donais and Knorr note the challenge of community-led development which, they say, “implicitly accepts a limited or even non-existent state role in social welfare and economic development, but also places an enormous – and quite possibly unfair – burden on communities to deliver a socio-economic peace dividend largely on their own” (2013, p. 63). This challenge is significant when state actors rely unduly on non-state actors for the provision of security, justice and other elements of peace.

Bottom-level peacebuilding interacts with the top and middle levels in two ways. First, it may be initiated by local leaders, after which it finds support or is co-opted by the other levels. Second, the top or middle level may initiate a bottom level peacebuilding strategy. The Kenya case provides good examples of both instances. The Wajir peace process was initiated by local women and initially funded by local businessmen, but eventually accepted financial support from international organisations (Oxfam GB, 2003). This process, which developed into a local peace committee model, was later used across the country by the Kenyan government (Chuma & Ojielo, 2012; NSCPBCM, 2009). In the replication of the local peace committee model, the government as a top-level actor implements a bottom-level strategy. Mitchell (2012) mentions the Peace Zones Policy Act in the Philippines that was designed for civilian protection in the hope, that as the number of zones increased, peace would cover a progressively larger geographic area and overcome the violence. He contends that the peace zones strategy contributed to a more comprehensive and wider-reaching type of peace.

The critique on the ‘local’ in liberal peacebuilding implies integrating the ‘local’ by engaging with bottom-level peacebuilding strategies. This is well illustrated in Autesserre’s (2011b) point about the need to complement international peacebuilding initiatives in DRC with local peacebuilding strategies. Timing is a critical aspect of integrating local strategies. Mitchell and Hancock conclude that the optimum timing for complementarity between top-down and bottom-up approaches is during the negotiation or implementation of a peace agreement and when it is upon the mutual initiative of both the top and bottom levels (2012, p. 176).

These three approaches emphasise that the method of building peace greatly impacts the potential for peace. However, each level faces implementation challenges in the peacebuilding approach. In response to the challenges encountered by the exclusive use of either of the approaches, Lederach proposed an *infrastructure for peace* as a comprehensive strategy to link the actors and peacebuilding activities at the three levels in order to achieve sustainable peace.

Infrastructures for peace

In the 1980s, John Paul Lederach (2012) conceptualised the *infrastructure for peace* to respond to what he saw as a need for long-term support in the process of conflict transformation. He contended, “Building peace in today’s conflicts calls for long-term commitment to establishing an infrastructure across levels of a society, an infrastructure that empowers the resources for reconciliation from within that society and maximises the contributions from the outside” (Lederach, 1997, p. xvi). A key peacebuilding challenge is the vertical gap between top and bottom-level peace processes; he therefore suggested an infrastructure to strategically link these processes for long-term peacebuilding (Lederach, 2012). The need to link different levels of

peacebuilding is echoed elsewhere in the literature (Autesserre, 2011b; Mitchell & Hancock, 2012; Richmond, 2013a; van Tongeren, 2013). Richmond's concept of peace formation captures the genesis and interface of formal and informal infrastructures. Formal or visible infrastructures are those linked to the Western legal state model, while the informal or hidden infrastructures emerge from non-state networks guided by socio-historical principles (Richmond, 2013a).

There is no specific design for infrastructures for peace as they reflect the varied contexts and dynamics from which they emerge (Odendaal, 2012; Ryan, 2012). Infrastructures for peace may include government ministries, peace commissions, peace committees, peace secretariats and conflict early warning and early response systems (Odendaal, 2012; Richmond, 2013a; Ryan, 2012; van Tongeren, 2013). The United Nations Development Programme defines an infrastructure for peace as "A network of interdependent systems, resources, values and skills held by government, civil society and community institutions that promote dialogue and consultation; prevent conflict and enable peaceful mediation when violence occurs in a society" (UNDP, 2013).

An infrastructure for peace should have a long-term vision; originate from the conflict setting and draw on and invest in local socio-cultural resources; link multiple levels in collaborative peacebuilding; and creatively adapt peace practice to ongoing learning (Lederach, 1997, 2012). Institutionalisation is implicit in the idea of an infrastructure for peace as the means to embed peacebuilding. The process of institutionalisation presents both promise and challenges. While institutionalisation guarantees a continued investment to peace in the long term, it adopts

bureaucratic methods that defy the creativity, interdependence and dynamism required to sustain peacebuilding (Lederach, 2012).

Two important aspects of institutionalisation are funding and standardising peace practice. Richmond (2013a) states that local-level peacebuilding is constrained without international support and international peacebuilding agency will not succeed without the collaboration of local agency. The United Nations Development Programme has provided financial and technical support to infrastructures for peace in over 30 countries (Ryan, 2012). Though the institutionalisation of infrastructures for peace demands the allocation of financial resources, human resources are critical for successful peacebuilding. Lederach (1997) emphasises that socio-cultural resources determine the sustainability of peace.

The second aspect in institutionalisation of the infrastructures is the standardisation of peace practice. This involves the development of peacebuilding tools to guide and evaluate implementation, which can be replicated by suitably trained peace professionals (Lederach, 2012). UNDP uses methods such as Conflict-Related Development Analysis, Post-Conflict Needs Analysis and Vulnerabilities Analysis to determine intervention strategies (Ryan, 2012). While standardisation relies on these tools to inform peacebuilding interventions, the focus on tools does not guarantee a better response or success (Lederach, 2012). In fact the attention to tools neglects deeper structural tensions and contradictions that impede the gains of peacebuilding (de Coning, 2011). The critique of standardisation is similar to that of technocracy in top-down peacebuilding.

2.5. Theoretical framework

My theoretical framework is based on Lederach's conflict transformation theory of peacebuilding. I use an expansive concept of peace that includes Johan Galtung's negative and positive peace. Specific to my study on state-led peacebuilding in Kenya, I refer to a variety of scholars to inform my analysis on the impact of institutionalisation on sustainability and the role of the state in peacebuilding. These include Donais (2012), Goestchel and Hagmann (2009), Mac Ginty (2012), Richmond (2013a), Mac Ginty and Richmond (2013) and Newman (2013).

Lederach's (1997) thesis is that the relationship between the approach to peacebuilding and an outcome of sustainable peace is contingent on timeframes that range from immediate to long-term strategies, integrated frameworks that link the multiple actors carrying out various peacebuilding activities and the local people as the greatest resource. Lederach's (1997) framework has five major concepts: structure, process, reconciliation, resources and coordination. Structure is a way of seeing the population in the conflict area and understanding how all the levels can potentially contribute to peace. The three levels of peacebuilding - top, middle and bottom - are discussed at length in Chapter 2. Structure also emphasises that comprehensive peacebuilding deals with conflict issues from the immediate, relational, subsystem to systemic levels and should therefore include short-to-long term interventions. The second concept, process, relates to the view of peacebuilding as a dynamic process that happens from the latent to overt phases of conflict and with different peacebuilding roles and activities to suit the different phases. For example, education might be relevant at the latent stage of conflict while mediation would be more useful in overt conflict.

Lederach underlines the third concept of reconciliation as central to sustaining peace. Reconciliation involves getting the aggrieved parties to look beyond the immediate conflict issues to acknowledge their interdependence and begin rebuilding relationships. The fourth concept of resources recognises that “The greatest resource for sustaining peace in the long term is always rooted in the local people and their culture” (Lederach, 1997, p. 94). Lederach observes that while financial and material resources are important in peacebuilding, socio-cultural resources are essential to sustaining the peace. Finally, the concept of strategic coordination of peacebuilding activities through a peace infrastructure will ensure maximal use of resources and create a synergy between the different levels and phases of peacebuilding.

Lederach’s (1997) framework is pertinent to my study for three reasons. First, his conception of peacebuilding as a process that goes beyond overt violent conflict is particularly relevant to my non-civil war case study of Kenya. Second, Lederach’s emphasis on the local and the inclusion of multiple actors in peacebuilding will enable me to analyse these factors in regards to the sustainability of peacebuilding and prospects for peace. Third, Lederach’s conflict transformation theory has greatly influenced peacebuilding practice and his idea for ‘infrastructures for peace’ has been widely implemented. During my field research, a number of interviewees specifically mentioned Lederach’s concepts of conflict transformation and comprehensive peacebuilding demonstrating the impact of this discourse on peacebuilding practice in Kenya.

This study adopts Lederach’s thesis that for an outcome of sustainable peace, peacebuilding needs to have local ownership, engage actors at all levels of the society, comprehensively deal

with conflict from the immediate to the systemic with short-to-long term engagement. Lederach proposes an infrastructure for peace as the means to long-term peacebuilding and later reflects on the promise and challenge of institutionalising these infrastructures for peace (Lederach, 1997, 2012). While the infrastructure for peace holds the promise of engaging peacebuilding resources for the long term, Lederach (2012) observes challenges in the bureaucratisation and professionalization of peacebuilding. The idea of an infrastructure to support long term peacebuilding is appealing but the reality of institutionalising this infrastructure challenges the very nature of sustainability that it strives for. Through this Kenya case study, I explore this tension by analysing the relationship between institutionalisation and sustainability.

Two key dynamics of power in my study relate to the state as an actor in peacebuilding and the impact of institutionalisation on peacebuilding. State efforts typically lie in the top-down category. Mac Ginty and Richmond (2013) argue that top-down state-centric approaches to peacebuilding have not resulted in peace that lasts. The Kenyan state led peacebuilding varies from the typical top-down approach in its inclusion of non-state actors. In chapter 5, I analyse the operationalisation of the state-led approach and the impact of this on peacebuilding. The state's role in peacebuilding is linked to state building. Newman (2013) contends that peacebuilding and state building are incompatible as the latter is inherently violent. In Kenya, the state has played a direct and indirect role in violence suggesting a paradox in state-led peacebuilding. In chapter 4, I investigate the conceptualisation of peace within the state-led approach and the kind of peace being built. The involvement of the state has enhanced the institutionalisation of peacebuilding in Kenya. State-led peacebuilding in Kenya is characterised by bureaucracy and technocracy which are critiqued by Goestchel and Hagmann (2009) for depoliticising peace. Peace is conceptualised

through the lenses of bureaucracy and technocracy without regard for the needs of the conflict-affected (Mac Ginty, 2012; Goetschel & Hagmann, 2009). Bureaucracy and technocracy not only reinforce the unequal state and society relations but also exclude local agency required to sustain peace.

Those intervening often perceive the local population as recipients rather than agents of their peace. This exclusion demonstrates the power held by the interveners relative to the power of those viewed as recipients. Exclusion is also apparent in elite capture. Mac Ginty (2012) describes elite capture in the central role that UNDP plays in influencing the nature of international peacebuilding seemingly at the behest of all UN members, but in reality on behalf of a few Western states. Through UNDP, these states influence not just the practice of peacebuilding but the conceptualisation of peace as constrained by the liberal peace ideology. He discusses how these peacebuilders exercise passive coercion by imposing administrative procedures and excluding non-conformists (Mac Ginty, 2012). The state-led peacebuilding approach in Kenya receives significant support from UNDP and Mac Ginty's argument on power will inform my analysis on the technocratic aspect of state-led peacebuilding in Kenya.

My case study on state-led peacebuilding in Kenya since 2001 presents three crucial areas of further study from peacebuilding literature. The first area of focus is the conceptualisation of peace. Goetschel and Hagmann (2009) argue that peacebuilders hardly define what they mean by peace in their programs and assume that the nature of peace is widely understood and undisputed. The state-led component of the infrastructure for peace in Kenya includes a broad spectrum of actors including community volunteers, representatives of NGO and international

organisations, civil servants and nationally appointed commissioners. In theory, they are all working together for peace. But what exactly do they mean by peace? I argue that it is important to understand the conceptualisation of peace within the peace practice of the I4P in order to analyse what kind of peace is being built and the implications.

Just as conflict is complex, peace is complex and cannot be boxed up into a neat and tidy dictionary definition. I intend to explore the messiness in the concept of peace through the multiple conceptions of peace held by the state and non-state actors with the I4P. From these, I will analyse the types of peace being built by the state-led infrastructure for peace, and through the theory of conflict transformation, establish the prospects of sustaining that kind of peace. The implication of different actors having different conceptualisations of peace is that their peacebuilding efforts may not be complementary and therefore not effectively build lasting peace. For example, if peace is primarily conceptualised as dealing with the immediate issue through short term intervention, then there will be a gap in long term peacebuilding to address systemic causes of conflict. While the multiple conceptions are valid, an infrastructure for peace must engage from the short to the long term in comprehensive peacebuilding to transform violent conflict at the immediate to systemic levels.

The second area of study is in the apparent paradoxical role of the state in peacebuilding. Security is at the nexus of the state's roles in peacebuilding and state building. The state's presumed monopoly of force mandate makes it an exclusive actor in security provision and this manner of engaging contradicts the collaborative and consultative process of peacebuilding. Security theory argues that conflict-prone states are a threat to international stability; therefore

peacebuilding is an agenda under state building to bolster weak or failing states (Newman, 2010). This is relevant to the case of Kenya where two components of the infrastructure for peace, the NSC and KNFP, are housed by the Ministry of State for Provincial Administration and Internal Security, plus the security mandate of KNFP regarding proliferation of illegal firearms (Chuma & Ojielo, 2012). Chopra (2009) argues that peacebuilding as state building has had contradictory results in Kenya because local justice mechanisms have undermined the goal of state building in establishing democratic institutions of justice and security. This clash of parallel customary and legal regimes was discussed in chapter 1. One advantage of peacebuilding as a function of state building is the allocation of greater resources for building peace, albeit through technocratic means (Mac Ginty, 2012; Newman, 2010). Though stability may contribute to preventing violent conflict (Newman, 2010), the effects of technocracy may not necessarily contribute to peacebuilding and this is an element of the following third area of study.

The third area of study is another paradox in the relationship between institutionalisation and sustainable peacebuilding. Institutionalisation in this case refers to the process by which peacebuilding is embedded in Kenya through the infrastructure for peace. Lederach (2012) observes the promise of institutionalisation of infrastructure as a commitment to invest in long-term peacebuilding against the challenge of bureaucratisation in seeking administrative efficiency that contradicts the integral values of creativity and interaction which are crucial to the sustainable peacebuilding. Whereas the infrastructures for peace in Kenya promote enhanced national capacities for long-term peacebuilding, the effects of institutionalisation may counter this.

Two negative effects of institutionalisation are the financial and technocratic imperatives. Financially, the institutionalisation process is dependent on unsustainable resources. For instance, UNDP had financially supported the establishment of over 300 peace committees and Chuma & Ojielo (2012) of UNDP claim they are too costly and should be disbanded in favour of other national priorities. There is also the danger of an overly technocratic and bureaucratic approach. In the literature review chapter, in the critiques on international peacebuilding, I discussed the way technocracy depoliticised and oversimplified the process of peacebuilding through bureaucratisation and standardisation. The technocracy and professionalization of peacebuilding may also neglect divergent local approaches (Mac Ginty, 2012; Mac Ginty & Richmond, 2013) and depoliticise peace to the extent that it loses its emancipatory capacity (Goetschel & Hagmann, 2009). This study analyses how the financial and technocratic imperatives of the institutionalisation of this state-led approach have impacted the sustainability aspect of peacebuilding and peace.

2.6. Conclusion

The literature on peacebuilding and peace is primarily from the context of international peacebuilding after civil wars. State-led peacebuilding in Kenya offers an atypical case of national actors building peace in response to recurrent violent conflict of a non-civil war nature. Although state actors take the lead, the approach is also atypical in the engagement of non-state actors. In my study, I use the term conflict in its extreme form of violent conflict. My concept of violence includes the visible/direct physical consequences and the invisible/indirect psychological and structural manifestations. I use an expansive definition of peace as both

negative and positive. Negative peace is the absence of war and positive peace is the presence of social justice. In this study, peacebuilding is the process that transforms violent conflict into negative peace and positive peace. This change happens through the theory of conflict transformation which goes beyond the scope of negative peace to include positive peace.

Liberal peace theory has greatly influenced international peacebuilding and impacted local peacebuilding due to the co-constitutive nature of peacebuilding. The relationship between local and international peacebuilding is evident through funding and technical support. Peacebuilding in the literature has been described as top-down, middle-out or bottom-up, and I discuss the strengths and weaknesses of these approaches. Empirical research shows that peacebuilding has failed when it imposes values or practices; excludes stakeholders at different levels; is overly dependent on external funding and bureaucracy. To address these weaknesses, the concept of infrastructures for peace is now being widely adopted as a more inclusive, context-relevant and sustainable model. However, there are still drawbacks to this model as institutionalisation threatens the envisioned inclusivity, sustainability and creativity of the infrastructure for peace.

My theoretical framework is informed by Lederach's theory that conflict is transformed by peacebuilding that is short to long term, comprehensive in dealing with proximate and roots causes of conflict, and includes actors from bottom to top levels in society with local people as the greatest resource. I supplement Lederach's theory with scholars who theorise on the implications of power in peacebuilding in regards to the role of the state and the impact of institutionalisation. In chapter 3, I discuss my methodology. This was a qualitative study and I collected data through in-depth interviews, participant observation and documentation.

Chapter 3: Methodology

3.1. Introduction

This research employs a qualitative approach that allows for an in-depth study of state-led peacebuilding in Kenya in what I refer to as Kenya's infrastructure for peace (I4P). Although I focus on the role of state actors in the I4P, there are also non-state actors within the I4P in Kenya. A qualitative approach is best suited to study the conceptualisation of peace and the peace practice of the I4P from the perspective of those within it. Qualitative methods can be based on an interpretative epistemology that assumes social reality to be dynamic, constructed and evolving (Marsh & Stoker, 2002) and primarily seek explanation of causes from individual cases (Mahoney & Goertz, 2006). From the constructivist perspective of qualitative research, this study seeks to investigate how Kenya's I4P is building peace by looking at the conceptualisation of peace, the role of the state and the implications of the institutionalisation of peacebuilding on the practice of peace. These three areas of study are explored at length in separate chapters.

3.2. Research design

I used a case study research design and collected data through interviews, participant observation and documentation. A case study is one strategy to respond to 'how' and 'why' questions and to tackle current phenomenon in a living context (Yin, 1994). I chose a case study approach because my research is guided by a 'how' question as I investigate how this state-led peacebuilding approach has impacted the practice of peacebuilding and prospect for lasting peace in Kenya. Empirical peacebuilding literature highlight the success of Kenya's I4P (Alihodžić, 2012; Chopra, 2009; Chuma & Ojielo, 2012; Kumar & De la Haye, 2012; Odendaal,

2013; Ryan, 2012; van Tongeren, 2013). While the literature emphasises the achievements of Kenya's I4P, there is insufficient analysis on the challenges and implications of this novel approach.

My choice to study Kenya's I4P is also based on its exceptionality. While infrastructures for peace were initially envisioned as a middle-out approach (Lederach, 1997; Paffenholz, 2013), in reality the infrastructures take different forms to accommodate local context and dynamics (Ryan, 2012). Kenya's I4P is state-led with significant involvement of non-state actors. Whereas state-led approaches are associated with a top-down/trickle-down style of intervention, Kenya's I4P includes middle and bottom level actors through member NGOs and peace committees. This inclusion implies an innovative approach by Kenya's I4P that avoids the exclusion typical of top-down approaches. In the context of local ownership, Kenya's I4P is an important case to analyse the dynamics of inclusion and the implications of this approach on peacebuilding.

Yin (1994) describes an embedded case study as one with multiple units of analysis. My case study is embedded because I analyse multiple units including the government, nongovernmental organisations (NGOs), international organisations (IOs) and local committees for peace. I used three techniques to collect my data i.e. semi-structured interviews, participant observation and document review. The use of multiple techniques allows for the process of triangulation whereby the multiple sources of evidence converge to enhance the validity of the case study findings (Yin, 1994).

The field

I did my field research in two sessions, from August 2014 to January 2015 and in October 2015. My first lesson was that things seldom go as planned. Prior to leaving Canada on 17 June 2014, I submitted a minimal risk ethics review application for my study which was to take 5-7 weeks. I assumed that by August, I would have ethics approval to start the interviews. However, as the University Research Ethics Board is closed in July, I only received conditional approval on 22 August 2014 pending approval of a Kenyan research permit. I received this permit on 11 September 2014 and got the full ethics approval on 16 September 2014. Without a research permit and ethics approval, I could not start doing interviews in August 2014 as planned. I could collect documentary evidence and I used this opportunity to make preliminary contact with organisations which gave me insight into the current dynamics and context of peacebuilding in Kenya and within the I4P. From 2000-2012, I worked in various capacities as a peacebuilder in Kenya and had therefore interacted with many individuals from the peacebuilding field. In 2011 while working for a think tank based in Nairobi, I was seconded to an NSC conflict-mapping project as the environmental security expert. My preliminary field research period was a good opportunity to reconnect with former networks and identify contacts relevant for my study.

Research site selection

When I left for my field research, I had limited finances and I had designed the data collection process to work optimally within my means. I chose Nairobi as my primary research location because it would give me access to most state and non-state actors. Informed by my past experiences working in peacebuilding, I was confident that I would still be able to access

individuals not resident to Nairobi, as many meetings are still held centrally in Nairobi. However, in August, I was delighted to learn that I had received a doctoral research award from the International Development Research Centre (IDRC). This grant allowed me to deliberately select strategic locations that would widen the scope of my research and enhance my findings.

Nairobi was my main research location as it is the headquarters for state and non-state actors within the I4P. Despite periodic violent conflict over the years in other areas in Kenya, Nairobi became a site of the 2007/8 post-election violence. So in addition to its strategic location, I was also able to study the post-2007/8 peacebuilding by the I4P in Nairobi. I selected Eldoret, Nakuru, Lodwar and Wajir as additional locations, based on their distinct conflict and peacebuilding experiences. Eldoret and Nakuru are located within the Rift Valley region and in previous electoral periods, they have been at the heart of politically motivated violence. The Rift Valley region is prone to political violence in part because of longstanding land issues. The concept of peace committees was implemented in Eldoret and Nakuru following the 2006/7 post-election violence and I looked at how the I4P had engaged in peacebuilding within these volatile contexts.

Lodwar and Wajir are both located in what is referred to as the arid and semi-arid lands (ASALs) of Kenya where violence has been caused primarily by conflict between pastoralist communities. Both locations have had local peace committee structures since the 1990s. In comparison to other regions in Kenya, the ASALs have limited infrastructural development and a leaner state presence. This meant that access and security to both locations would be a challenge, but one which I considered worthwhile. Though I was able to travel to Lodwar, I had to cancel my Wajir

trip for security reasons. Wajir was particularly significant as the location of the first successful peace committee in Kenya. However, in November 2014, there were mass killings and explosions targeting non-Muslims in Wajir and Mandera in North Eastern province. Due to the threat this posed to me as a non-Muslim, I cancelled my proposed trip. Nevertheless, I got to interview three key individuals from Wajir, in Nairobi, two of whom were involved in the initial Wajir peace process that led to the establishment of the country's first peace committee.

While the interviews were conducted in the urban centres of Lodwar, Eldoret, Nairobi and Nakuru, the interviewees were from different locations in the respective districts/counties. District Peace Committee members are often representative of different parts of the district/county. In addition, in Lodwar and Eldoret, my interview process coincided with meetings that brought peacebuilders in from across the districts/counties.

The consent process

I obtained ethics approval to seek only verbal consent from all interviewees because of the security context in which my field research took place. I gave interviewees beforehand a consent form detailing ethics matters on the interview conduct. Before beginning the interview, I sought their verbal consent, went over confidentiality aspects and stressed the voluntary nature of the interviews. All those I approached for an interview initially agreed but when it came to scheduling the interviews, a few repeatedly told me to call back while others failed to show up without explanation. I interpreted this as a refusal if they made no effort to contact me. This interpretation was based on my understanding, as a local, of cultural nuances regarding consent. Indirect refusals are sometimes perceived as being more polite than an outright refusal. Some

interviewees asked how I was going to use the information and were reassured by the printed consent information that I provided. I also received a few requests for interview transcripts from respondents who felt that this would help them in documenting the experiences they shared with me. These requests came from long-term peacebuilders who explained that they had no time to document their experiences which they felt contained valuable lessons for peacebuilding. For participant observation, I emailed my request to event organisers for permission to attend events and sent along the consent form.

Data collection

Interviews

I carried out semi-structured elite interviews with individuals well acquainted with the state-led approach to peacebuilding. These individuals either represented their organisations within the I4P in implementation, funding or advisory roles, or they had monitored and evaluated certain peacebuilding activities by the I4P. Kenya has two official languages, English and Kiswahili. Most of the interviewees were comfortable in English because of its official use in the organisations that they represent. I found that community volunteers were also at ease with English as they comprised retired civil servants, teachers or representatives from community based organisations. However, as a Kenyan, I was aware that we tend to unconsciously switch between English and Kiswahili and so I expected and experienced the use of both languages during interviews and events. I am fluent in both languages, as were my research assistants.

The use of the term elite to describe interviewees differs with some using it to denote socio-economic status, leadership or how the interviewer relates to the respondent (Leech, 2002). I use

elite in reference to the fact that the interviewees are individuals who have been involved in the I4P and possess contextual knowledge and expertise to inform this study. As the interviewees are experts, semi-structured interviews with open-ended questions allowed them to exhaustively share their perspectives and experience. Open-ended questions facilitate pertinent, wide-ranging discussions that enable the researcher to discern contextual nuances and probe for depth (Aberbach & Rockman, 2002).

I interviewed 68 individuals as a representative sample of key stakeholders in Kenya's I4P. The interviews included mid-ranking and high-level officials at NSC, KNFP and NCIC, members of local peace committees, representatives of national and international non-governmental organisations that are I4P members, funding partners and Kenyan academics.

I used a purposive sampling method to identify individuals through the technique of non-random stratified sampling. Stratified sampling is used when certain variables, in this case institutional affiliation, is necessary to identify the pool of respondents (Jones, 1996). It was non-random as the targets had to be mid- to high-level elites in the respective institutions who had engaged with the I4P. To identify interviewees outside the I4P, I used the snowballing technique. A limitation of the snowball technique is the tendency to get interviewees who are of like mind, as people are apt to recommend likeminded individuals. However, since I was interviewing a broad spectrum of elites, I was able to tap into a diverse sample.

As I previously observed, state-led peacebuilding in Kenya takes place in the context of national and regional security. I considered this while planning field research recognising that some interviewees may decline to have the interview digitally recorded and I would have to take notes

instead. Although this turned out to be the case, I was surprised by the type of interviewees who declined and those who accepted. I had assumed that most of the state actors would decline to be recorded while the community volunteers would be open to recording. However, most of those who declined were community volunteers from specific locations, while most state actors had no objection to being recorded. My perception is that while volunteers from the community are happy to work with the state, they still fear the state, deriving from Kenya's political history where the state seemed to have inordinate power and the threat of state reprisals kept people quiet. The state actors were likely more open to recording because the I4P work is publicly acknowledged by the state and the I4P achievements are a source of pride. State actors also have the protection and backing of the state in this I4P approach.

Aberbach & Rockman (2002) argue that digitally recording interviews is a good way to allow the conversation to flow freely as the interviewer can pay more attention and probe more effectively. However, I found this argument only partly true in my interview process. Although the interviews I recorded were longer, as I was able to probe deeper, I found that the conversation initially did not flow well because the recording made the interviewees self-conscious and it was only after a period of speaking that they would relax. To mitigate this I began by asking the interviewee how they got involved in peacebuilding and the chance to reflect on their personal experience eased the discomfort. The answers to this question also enabled me to appropriately frame the subsequent questions.

Recording interviews can be seen as intrusive, in which case note-taking is an option, taking care to verify any potential quotes with interviewees (Woliver, 2002). In the cases where interviewees

declined to be recorded, I took notes. I found that in my effort to capture all the salient points, the process was not as smooth and it was not as easy to probe initially. To ensure I did not lose the richness of the interview, I allocated time each day to transcribe the handwritten notes from these interviews while they were still fresh in my mind. The ongoing transcription process helped me to do preliminary analysis on emerging themes and note potential issues and gaps for deeper investigation.

I hired two research assistants to help me with the transcription as the frequency of interviews was greater towards the end of my research period, and the volume was more than I could transcribe on my own in the time that I needed to get it done. However, because I held a lot of the interviews outdoors or in restaurants, the recordings had a lot of background noise which meant that the transcribers had to take more time going over certain sections for clarity. When I got the transcriptions, I realised there remained several inaudible sections. In addition, the transcriptions reflected that interviewees used a lot of peacebuilding acronyms that were unfamiliar to the transcribers. For these reasons, I later went over the audio recordings and the transcriptions to fill in the inaudible sections with my interview notes and identify the acronyms. This was also an opportunity for me to refresh my recollection of key themes and get to know my data better.

Participant observation

My second technique was participant observation. Through participant observation I was able to gather supplementary data from nonverbal communication and interaction among stakeholders. This method requires the researchers extended presence in the situation under study, to discover

and understand through observation in a routine setting the perspectives and views held by participants as the meanings that underlie their actions (Jones, 1996). Jones notes the scientific goal is “to use what you have seen and heard to generate explicit and articulate abstractions” (1996, p. 44).

There are three types of participant observation. The complete participant who joins the group covertly leaving their status as a researcher unknown to the rest; the participant as observer who joins the group overtly but does not fully integrate to safeguard researcher role; and the observer as participant who observes openly with limited group contact (Burnham, Lutz, Grant, & Layton-Henry, 2004). I was the participant as observer. Covert (unobtrusive) observation has been credited for providing valid information because there is no behaviour modification as in overt (obtrusive) observation (Manheim, Rich, & Willnat, 2002). My only option in this case was overt as a participant as observer. This is because I had to obtain an official research permit which I needed to present to access state offices as a student.

I introduced myself as a student doing research. I had at first considered going in as a volunteer for the advantage of getting ‘insider’ information, but I also recognised the danger of getting too involved in the network to the extent that it might obscure my perspective. As a student doing research, I risked having less access to content considered sensitive for security reasons, but this was countered by my being a Kenyan and a familiar face within peacebuilding circles. Nevertheless, obtaining the mandatory research permit was essential to my accessing state actors and attending official peacebuilding events. The participant observation was concurrent with the interviews.

As a participant observer, I attended two state-led peace consultative forums that brought together state and non-state actors in Uasin Gishu and Turkana counties. These forums included a component of peacebuilding training. I also attended a consultative forum for peace committee members in one sub-location of Nairobi. This forum was convened by NGOs collaborating on a USAID-funded project that works with community-based organisations to reduce politically motivated conflict in informal settlements. For the opportunity of connecting with the wider peacebuilding network, I attended an international conference held in Nairobi on transitional justice in post-conflict societies in Africa. I was able to make additional interview contacts with state and non-state members of Kenya's I4P who attended the conference. I attended a meeting of the Conflict Analysis Group (CAG) convened by the NSC Secretariat. CAG meetings are held monthly and I had hoped to attend more. However, during the September 2014 meeting, I did not yet have my research permit and only one CAG meeting was held until the end of my research period.

To access the state-convened events, I needed to get formal permission, which I was readily granted. This challenged my pre-conception of the tight protocol I would have to circumvent to gain access. The fact that I had previously engaged with some of these actors may have contributed to their openness. However, this easy association had its challenges. In one instance, I was clearly introduced as a student but this was clarified by the description of me as a 'friend of the NSC' with a reference to my past engagement with the NSC. This qualified introduction was intended to dilute any tension that might arise from my presence as a stranger. It also clouded the boundary of my independent status as a researcher. The boundary was further blurred by the fact that in one case I travelled with staff from the NSC Secretariat and even conducted one training

session on conflict transformation upon request. I saw the effect of the unclear boundary when an individual approached me to help her child get a job with the government and another wanted me to help renegotiate their allowance with the event organisers. In spite of the unclear boundary, access to these events as a participant observer provided me with essential evidence that contributed to a richer analysis of my data.

Documentary evidence

The third technique was collecting documentary evidence, which I did all through the field work process. Given the bureaucracy of state I anticipated there would be policy documents, minutes of meetings, letters and programme reports. Yin (1994) notes that documents are important to either corroborate or contradict evidence from other sources, but there may be challenges of irretrievability, access or reporting bias. I had assumed that because NSC and NFP are hosted within the Office of the President of Internal Security, accessing documents would require going through official protocols which would mean delays as well as denied or partial access. Once again, I found that this was not the case. While I did have to formally request access and document what I had taken, it was not unduly complicated. In addition, I was also able to access many of the I4P programme documents from other non-state actors who jointly implemented these activities.

3.3. Research challenges and reflections on identity

As a Kenyan who has previously done research in Kenya and other African countries, I felt adequately prepared for all potential research challenges. I was confident that there would be no significant obstacles out of the scope of my past experience. On this note of bravado, I set off for my field work.

My confidence was partly sound. I accurately predicted the logistical challenges. As a Nairobiian, I understood the challenge of what we fondly call *jam*, short for traffic jam. Jam in Nairobi is crippling with traffic snarl ups that can turn a 20-minute drive into a three hour torturous stop and crawl. I knew that people would show up late for interviews or I might be late, but we could all find empathy by blaming it on the jam. It is such a widely accepted cause of delay that by just uttering the word “jam”, no further explanations are needed. I was not disappointed. People would show up for interviews up to two hours late or eventually cancel because they were stuck in traffic. For my part, I ensured that I would not miss the opportunity for an interview by avoiding the rush hour and getting to my venues before time. This however did not guarantee me an interview. In one instance, I had an interview scheduled at the UN complex in Gigiri at nine o'clock in the morning. The early morning traffic builds up as early as 6:30am so I had to be on the highway by 6:15am to avoid it. I got there at 6:45am, found a nearby coffee shop and worked on transcriptions as I waited patiently for 9am. Unfortunately for me, the interviewee cancelled at 9:30am, citing other work priorities. I took solace in the fact that I had productively spent my waiting hours. It was on many occasions that I was on the road by 6:15am to avoid the traffic in order to make it for an early appointment, or had to wait out the evening rush hour traffic after a

late afternoon appointment. Making it a working wait reduced the frustration. Being a Nairobiian enabled me to accurately anticipate and prepare for this logistical challenge.

As a Nairobiian and Kenyan, I also anticipated having appointments rescheduled or cancelled at the last minute. I was right about this too, but underestimated the scale with which it would happen. I had assumed that because I had interacted professionally with numerous individuals within the peacebuilding networks, I would be able to set up interviews with them and these would mostly take place as planned. However, my most notoriously rescheduled appointments were with individuals I had previously worked very well with. In one particular case, I needed to interview an individual who had been instrumental in establishing one of the components of the 14P. We already had a rapport from previous work engagements and he agreed to an interview though he said he was weary and wary of interviews with students from foreign universities who used his insights without acknowledgement. Still he agreed, set the date and time, then never showed up or called to cancel. From late September to December 23rd, it was a cat-and-mouse routine with this potential interviewee. I would not have persisted except that he would call later and reschedule or ask me to call back the next week for a new date. In another extreme case, the interviewee had previously rescheduled the interview date three times. Finally on the scheduled day, this individual changed the interview time thrice, the venue twice, tried to reschedule altogether but then finally granted me the interview.

What struck me most about the several delayed and rescheduled appointments is that they were all by men. A few men asked how I expected to get someone to marry me once I obtained a PhD. In one case, before I had even introduced the topic of my research, one interviewee informed me

that he had just obtained his doctorate and that I should be warned that it is a very rigorous and analytical process. It was the way that he said it that made me feel like he was already wondering if I was up to the task before I had even introduced my research. As a Kenyan, my experience is that the Kenyan society is still fairly patriarchal, though as a Nairobiian, I know that the attitudes in the city are often not as typically patriarchal. Nevertheless, I took the questioning of my intellectual aptitude with good grace and took advantage of the opportunity it afforded for me to be seen as a non-threatening and receptive interviewer. The downside of being perceived as intellectually challenged by virtue of gender was not being taken seriously enough. Being a woman, and a local (Nairobiian and Kenyan) made me so local that my interview agenda could be rescheduled to suit the emerging priorities of the interviewee. As a Kenyan, I know that culturally we tend to treat visitors with special respect. A foreign student from a foreign university would be viewed as a visitor whose appointment should be honoured. I was the local who would understand a change in schedule. In addition, having worked in the peacebuilding environment, I know that foreign students from Western universities are sometimes seen as a potential future link to Western donor networks where they might end up working. My being local in that sense meant I seemingly had nothing to offer (imagined or real) in exchange for the information I needed.

I observed two other points related to the impact of my identity as a woman. First, I had expected some women to be competitive and uncooperative to me as a doctoral researcher, but instead I was overwhelmed by the support I received from all the women. My wrong assumption of a negative response from women was based on stories I had heard though this had not been my experience. Several women I interviewed were enthusiastic about the fact that I was doing

doctoral research and showed their support by connecting me with previously inaccessible interviewees. Except for one, all the women honoured the interview schedule to the letter and gave me wonderfully in-depth interviews. With women credited for the first highly successful peace process in Wajir, I was very impressed to witness the level of professionalism and passion of some of the women building peace in Kenya.

Second, I observed that my interview question exploring gender was often met by men with hostility or outright challenge. I found it a difficult question to ask regardless of how I framed it. Some men were reluctant to engage with the issue and dismissed the question by referring me to the provisions of the new constitution on gender parity or the representation guidelines for the peace committees without critically reflecting on the actual situation. I think that part of the reluctance to engage with this question was my identity as a Kenyan woman. They perhaps felt I should know enough from my experience as a Kenyan woman in the peacebuilding field, so as not to have to ask that question. The fact that I was asking might have seemed like I was challenging them on the issue rather than seeking their views. One interviewee remarked that when I asked that question I sounded like a *mzungu*, which in Kenya can specifically mean a Caucasian or can also broadly translate to a person of Western culture. On this level, the pushback on gender had to do with culture. One woman interviewee, with extensive peacebuilding experience both at the community and national level, illustrated her perspective through this story:

I remember my first intervention when I worked with the youth, I couldn't speak, I couldn't speak at their meeting because I knew they could not listen to me being a young woman. So I listened behind the window and any time I came to give a point I came with a jug of water to serve them then to say something, till they accepted me. But now you will say, based on gender, I have to do this, speak it. Peacebuilding takes you low, as low

as you can, so long as it is what you want. Let the situation lead you, but not you leading the situation. (Individual Interview 56, Nairobi, 2014)

Despite the challenge of interrogating gender implications in interviews, with the concurrent participant observation, I was able to analyse the data that I received from the interviews. During my fieldwork, I read an article on the field experience in Kenya of a young Kenyan female doctoral researcher based at a foreign university. Wamai (2014) spoke of her dilemmas in negotiating her identity based on gender, ethnicity, age and the fact that she was an insider by being Kenyan and outsider based on ethnicity in her research locations. Her depiction was an uncanny reflection of my ongoing experience at the time. This is not surprising given that like her, I am a fairly young woman from the same ethnic group doing politically related research in the same research locations. Her experience particularly resonated with mine on the topic of ethnicity.

Ethnicity is a major identifier in Kenya. The Agĩkũyũ are the largest ethnic group and have been linked to historic land injustice, politically motivated violence and disproportionate political and economic power. Being a Mũgĩkũyũ (a person from the Agĩkũyũ group) automatically earns one friends and foes, especially in regions where the Agĩkũyũ are considered outsiders. I had this experience in one of my research locations. As my first and last names are ethnic identifiers, I noticed that from the first day, some participants began to talk to me exclusively in Gĩkũyũ (the language). Since I wanted to maintain neutrality as an ethnic outsider in that setting, I would respond in English or Kiswahili (the national language), but they would continue to speak to me in Gĩkũyũ. When consenting to an interview, one made reference to how we as co-ethnics must help each other because these people (the largest ethnic group in that area) do not like us. In

another incidence, one man asked me why I was only choosing ‘certain’ people for interviews. I asked him to clarify what he meant and he said that he had seen that I was only selecting people from the more populous ethnic groups in the region and ignoring people like him who represented the smaller ethnic groups. I had been trying to ensure representation on the basis of geography, gender and age, but given the context I did not dare ask for ethnic identification. I could not establish the ethnicity of potential interviewees by their physical features and some names were not ethnic identifiers, at least to me. In response to him, I just explained that ethnicity was not a factor of selection and I further requested an opportunity to interview him, which he accepted.

Later on in that location, while conducting a training session, I used the 2007/8 post-election violence (PEV) as an example of how the concept of conflict transformation would be relevant to that context. I quickly realised I had picked the wrong example because I was in a location that had experienced the brunt of the PEV. My ethnic group was seen as responsible for the stolen election that resulted in that chaos. Immediately I introduced the context, the participants became animated and an elderly man stood up and told me that the PEV was “our” fault for taking land that was not ours. I was guilty, but my charge was being born a Mũgĩkũyũ. It did not matter that I was born and bred in multi-ethnic Nairobi within a school system that forbade us from speaking our ethnic languages. I identify more as a Nairobiian than a Mũgĩkũyũ.

Regardless of my research challenges, I found my field experience very rewarding and productive for three main reasons. The first is that despite my initial planned single research location, I was able to conduct research in four locations with varied contexts of violent conflict

and peace. This provided me with a better understanding of the complexities of conflict and peace in Kenya. Second, I was impressed with the enthusiasm of state and non-state actors to be interviewed about this state-led peacebuilding approach and I exceeded my planned number of interviews to accommodate the variety and richness of their experience. Third, as a Kenyan and a former peacebuilder, it was a great learning experience and a chance to reflect on the promises and challenges of peacebuilding in Kenya.

3.4. Conclusion

I collected data for my qualitative study through interviews, participant observation and documentation from four research locations. The field research experience was full of opportunities and challenges. I was able to expand the scope of my research from an initial one location to add three more research locations and this enable me to conduct more interviews and participate in a variety of peacebuilding events. I faced expected logistic challenges but also experienced the impact of my ethnic and gender identity on the research process. Overall, my field research experience was more rewarding than challenging as it was rich source of data.

In the next three chapters, I explore the findings from my research process that was complemented by an ongoing review of the relevant literature before and after my fieldwork. Chapter 4 focuses on the conceptualisation of peace by interviewees engaged in the I4P and from the I4P documentation. Exploring the conceptualisation of peace was an exciting part of my research as I got to challenge my own, as well as interviewees', assumptions. In chapter 5, I analyse the implications of state-led peacebuilding and in chapter 6 I study the impact of institutionalisation on sustainability. In the three chapters, I used direct quotations from my

interviews which I cite as Individual Interview or Group Interview with the corresponding number, town and year. For confidentiality, I do not put the exact date of the interview since I conducted some of the interviews alongside peacebuilding events which might enable the identification of the interviewees. However, where relevant for analysis, I indicate the type of interviewee, e.g., peace committee member or government representative.

Chapter 4: Conceptualising Peace in Kenya

4.1. Introduction

The word ‘peace’ is used often in varied settings though what is meant by peace is not always apparent. When I was younger, I remember watching international beauty pageants on TV and being amused at the contestants who declared their wish for world peace. I dismissed that sentiment as unoriginal and utopic but I never paused to question the concept of world peace. More recently, as I reflected on state-led peacebuilding in Kenya, I began to realise that though the term peace is often used in peacebuilding literature, it is hardly ever defined. Goetschel and Hagmann argue that peace is under theorised and hardly defined by peace builders or donor countries who “take the substance of peace as essentially given and uncontested. Peace is declared as a major objective, but its substance remains largely undefined” (2009, p. 61). The underlying assumptions are that we all know what peace is, it is a good thing that should be sought by all and it is in the best interests of everyone. This was likely the assumption of those beauty contestants inspired by the idea of world peace.

During my field research in Kenya, I found that the peacebuilders I interviewed took the meaning of peace as so commonly understood that it needed no explanation. To test for the assumption that the definition of peace was taken as a given, I put the question on defining peace at the end of the interview. I wanted to see if the interviewees would take the initiative to define peace as they answered related questions on their involvement and/or knowledge of the state-led units of the peace infrastructure in Kenya. Each time I asked the question, the interviewees’ first response was either hesitation and/or protest after which they would answer. To a lesser extent,

the interviewees may have thought that with my education and experience I should know what peace is, thus making them suspicious that I may be asking a trick question. However, to a greater degree, I think the hesitation and protest underlines the reality that the meaning of peace is taken as a given. The majority of those I interviewed have worked in peacebuilding from two to twenty years. Yet when I asked them to describe the peace that they have been working towards, many said it was a difficult question, some asked how they could describe peace without using the word peace, and a few gave definitions from literature. I read in the hesitation and protest, an assumption that I was asking the obvious, but as they ventured to provide answers, the richness and variance in their descriptions convinced me that the meaning of peace differs according to experience and context.

Conceptualising peace is a critical part of my study because I need to understand what type of peace is being built in order to answer my overarching research question on how the state-led peacebuilding approach impacts the prospects for lasting peace in Kenya. My interviews with peacebuilders and information from the documents of different organisations allowed me to analyse the relationship between the conceptualisation of peace and the practice of peacebuilding. Goetschel and Hagmann suggest, “Researchers could also scrutinise the dialectical relationship and co-production of discourse—both by policy makers and researchers—and peace practices” (2009, pp. 67–68). While this suggestion is made in the context of reviving critical peace research, the study of the dialectic relationship of peace discourse and practice is important beyond the academic domain if the practice of peace is to benefit from and also impact the discourse of peace. The way that peace is conceptualised, explicitly or implicitly, influences the practice of peace; and what is presented as peacebuilding

practice likewise affects further conceptualisation of peace. For example, if peace is defined within the context of security, then peacebuilding practice is geared towards security imperatives, which reinforces the conceptualisation of peace as security.

Galtung (1969) argues that even when the concept of peace is used without clarity, the actual use of the term may serve as peace producing by promoting a sense of common purpose which may deepen with time. While that may be the case, a concept of peace that is too broad may lose its analytical utility. Kanchan Chandra illustrates the importance of conceptual clarity in her argument that ethnicity does not matter in explaining outcomes claimed to be causally linked, because comparative political scientists do not define ethnic identity and its corresponding properties before using the concept as the basis on which they stake their claims. Chandra states, “A definition provides an analytical basis for making this judgment” (Chandra, 2006, p. 398). In this study I analyse the multiple conceptions of peace in relation to the prospect of sustaining the resulting peace. In my literature review chapter, I introduce Lederach’s theory of conflict transformation. Lederach (2003), using a lens metaphor, describes conflict transformation as having three lenses. The first lens shows the immediate situation, the second lens shows the underlying patterns and context, and finally a third lens is a conceptual framework to connect the immediate and underlying issues in a way that informs comprehensive peacebuilding (Lederach, 2003). In conflict transformation peacebuilding seeks to stop immediate violence while ultimately seeking to resolve the underlying issues that caused the violent conflict.

This chapter presents the multiple conceptions of peace held by the various actors within the infrastructures for peace and the effect of this on the practice of peacebuilding. My research

seeks to answer the question: **What are the different conceptions of peace held by peacebuilders within this state-led peacebuilding approach and what kind of peace are they building?** To answer the first part of the question, I explore the multiple conceptions of peace through interviews with individuals working within the state-led peacebuilding approach. I also review documents from the three institutions to see how they conceptualise peace. From the interviews, I organised the definitions of peace at the level of the individual, community and society. These definitions included living free from the fear of random or targeted violence, living harmoniously in diversity, the right to reside, provision of basic socio-economic needs and security, the right to justice and more equal opportunities. Peace to NSC is security and harmonious co-existence, to KNFP it is security and to NCIC, it is cohesion and integration. The answer to the second part of the question is that the kind of peace being built in this approach is primarily security focused with a significant emphasis on living harmoniously in diversity.

I argue that while these multiple conceptions demonstrate a lack of conceptual clarity which may hinder the potential gains of peacebuilding, a greater problem lies in the fact that the state-led peacebuilding efforts do not address substantial conceptions of peace that are crucial for lasting peace. The state is well positioned to deliver peace at a society level which is peace as the provision of basic socio-economic needs, right to justice, more equal opportunities and security. The state-led peacebuilding approach prioritises peace as security but neglects the three other aspects of society-level peace. The four components of society-level peace are substantial because they correspond to the underlying issues that precipitated the immediate conflict. Building peace as justice, socio-economic development and more equal opportunities will enable an environment conducive to lasting peace. In answer to the third part of my question, the peace

being built primarily as security is not peace that will last. Whereas it is not possible for any peacebuilding approach to comprehensively address all conceptions of peace, the state is uniquely placed to ensure the structural conditions that would sustain peace. According to Lederach's conflict transformation theory, the peace outcome should consider both immediate and underlying causes of violent conflict. In the next section, I present the multiple conceptions of peace expressed by the peacebuilders I interviewed.

4.2. Peace in the Kenyan context

The descriptions of peace given by my interview respondents made it quickly clear that the conceptualisation of peace is determined by experience and context. Those who had been victims of violent conflict, framed peace from that experience. Closely linked to this is context. Context in this case refers to the setting, i.e., urban or rural pastoralist and the type of violent conflict related to that setting e.g. electoral violence or cattle raiding. Though both experience and context relate to the type of conflict, the distinction is in the direct or indirect experience of the violent conflict. If experience and context determine the conceptualisation of peace, then the conception of peace is bound to change as the experience and context change. For example, during ongoing violent conflict, an individual may see peace as the freedom from physical violence and/or the threat of it. In the aftermath of this conflict, the individual may think of peace as justice for harm suffered or reconciliation between warring groups. Long after the conflict, the individual may see peace as equal access to opportunities and resources. Peacebuilding in violent conflict would first focus on eliminating the threat of physical violence by securing ceasefire agreements, after which peacebuilding would entail reconciliation and justice processes, followed by a focus on the development of human potential. This does not mean that in the

throes of violent conflict, people are not aware of socio-economic inequalities, but the priorities that capture the concept of peace, alter with experience and context. The change is incremental in the conceptualisation of peace as equal access is added to peace as justice and reconciliation and added to peace as freedom from physical violence. An NGO representative offered this definition that demonstrates peace as determined by experience and context:

Peace is relative because peace is experienced. For me it is only experienced by the person that is looking for peace and the thing that destabilises that peace is only well understood by the people who see that peace destabilised. And so if you look, if you go to a community where resources [are] the cause of lack of peace, people are fighting and all that, when they see the water, when they see the health, the things that really they want to fulfil their needs, the needs that drive them, those drivers of conflict, then they'll see peace. (Individual Interview 51, Nairobi, 2014)

The conceptualisation of peace is a dynamic process that is determined by the shifting nature and experience of conflict. This dynamism of the conceptualisation process poses a challenge to peacebuilding, which is often structured within fixed durations. Many of my interview respondents reflected on how the fixed duration and scope of peace work hindered their capacity to adequately address emerging needs for peace. They noted that though they needed to build peace in both the latent and overt phases of conflict, funding was often only available following overt conflict. A good example is the experience of peacebuilding organisations following the 2007/8 and 2013 elections in Kenya. After the 2007/8 PEV, there was an abundance of funding for peacebuilding work. In comparison, following the relatively peaceful 2013 elections, funding for peacebuilding dropped so significantly that peacebuilders had to cut or limit the scope of their peacebuilding work. This indicates that those funding peacebuilding may conceptualise peace primarily as a response to violent conflict. Yet before the overt phase of violent conflict, there is a latent phase where peacebuilding may serve to avert a later outbreak of violence.

Limiting the conceptualisation of peace to a specific phase of conflict instead of as an evolving dynamic is like the difference between a snapshot that captures a moment in a time and a documentary that spans a period of time. I found that the different conceptions of peace from interviewees explained what peace means at the levels of the individual, community and society. In the next section, through the words of my interviewees, I delve into these three levels of peace.

Individual Peace

Even in the context of macro level conflict, the individual is the basic level at which peace is experienced and understood. Even when considering peace at the communal and societal levels, peace is experienced first by an individual before it is interpreted at other levels. I refer to individual peace as *felt peace* because of the psychological or emotional aspects. The importance of conceptualising peace as a feeling is that peace is only a reality if those who desired peace feel that they are at peace. While it is true that individual sentiments vary widely, there should be a level of felt peace to accompany any claim to the realisation of peace. One academic described peace in this way: “Peace to me is being content within the environment which you are in.” (Individual Interview 59, Nairobi, 2014). In this definition, peace is likened to the feeling of contentment. In the following quote, a member of a peace committee talks about peace as a feeling of freedom to act.

That inner feeling that makes me feel that I have the freedom to do what I want at the right time. Honestly I don’t know how I can put it. Because I would wish to go to a place, but unless peace would allow me to go... I want to talk to you but because you are not from my community I cannot talk to you. (Individual Interview 12, Nakuru, 2014)

Individual peace is defined in the context of violent conflict. Being able to live without fear is the major indicator of felt peace. I found that my interviewees mainly feared random or targeted violence. I differentiate between random and targeted violence to highlight the likelihood of being a victim. In widespread electoral violence or insecurity from crime, victimhood is mostly circumstantial. For example, unknowingly crossing paths with a mob of violent political protesters or being robbed at gunpoint in the city. In targeted violence, the victim is identified because of their perceived political views or ethnicity. Random and targeted violence overlap especially in the case of electoral violence where the presumption of ethnically determined political support is used to identify potential victims.

The first example of felt peace illustrates the link between random and targeted violence. In this illustration, the interviewee expressed the fear of random violence following the 2007 elections, but he sadly ended up a victim of targeted violence the next day. He later became a peace committee member. He described peace from his experience as follows,

You can go wherever you want; you can walk wherever you want without somebody asking you a question... that is very important. Because I saw it when it was in 2007, when just walking a space of 10 meters was very important. Because when there is no peace everything in your life is disorganized, even when you have food and you don't have peace you can't eat it, you can't eat it... When there is no peace you cannot sleep because I can remember before my attack, that very night the area that we were living was very much chaotic, houses were being burnt, people were being killed, people were crying. So with us, we were at the door over the night, fearing that we too will be next, will be the next target. (Individual Interview 15, Nakuru, 2014)

The individuals in communities that have witnessed recurring violent conflict will likely live in fear of its recurrence, whether or not they were direct victims. This is the lingering psychological effect of violence, where peace is not merely the absence of physical violence but living free from the fear of violence.

Another fear that hinders felt peace in Kenya is random violence from criminal insecurity. Although peace is often conceptualised in the context of widespread violent conflict, in Kenyan, peace is also defined in a context of insecurity arising from criminal activity. A former staff member at one of the secretariats of the infrastructure for peace said:

Peace is a state where individuals or people are able to do their things without fear. If it is a pastoralist in Turkana, they can herd livestock without fear; if it is in Nairobi, I can walk to Kibera without being mugged (Individual Interview 29, Nairobi, 2014).

This definition recognises both urban and rural insecurity as threats to felt peace. A representative of an international organisation provided the following vivid description of peace in the rural pastoralist context,

Peace is a complex thing. For us, peace is not just the absence of this conflict but it should be a totality of an individual or a community. I, as a member of a community, I have that freedom to walk to a water point to get water, I have that freedom to take my livestock to the pasture land, let them graze freely up to their limit, the animals will have pasture to their full, before I bring them home in the evening. Not like it is now where the livestock leave the homestead at around 10[am] and are driven rushfully at around 3pm because later than that you expect people to attack. Peace is when I can graze my livestock leisurely and let them have to their fill. Water... take them to the water point without having to look over my shoulder. Peace is when I can go to the market to sell my livestock without fear of being attacked on the way and get the money, walk back home, without having the fear of being attacked. Peace is when I say I can witness development, there is developmental infrastructure evident, that is if I need clean water, I can get it, all that. I think it is that total environment where I have all that pertaining the needs of a human being, get them, utilize them and everything around me is secure. So I think that's what peace should be if it is ideal. (Individual Interview 46, Lodwar, 2014)

The difference between the fear of episodic violent conflict and the fear of daily insecurity is one of degree. Violent conflict inspires a heightened fear while insecurity is a constant low grade fear. Whether high or low, the fear destroys psychological wellbeing. In both the urban and rural contexts, the pervasive sense of insecurity is prevalent enough to negate felt peace even if war or violent conflict is not a threat.

Felt peace is also conceptualised in the context of the fear of targeted violence linked to political oppression and ethnicity. During one-party rule in Kenya, political dissent was met with arrests, detention without trial, torture or charges of treason and this intimidation forced many individuals into hiding or exile (Atieno-Odhiambo, 2002). While political freedoms have gradually increased, there still lurks a fear of political reprisal. A state actor formerly at one of the secretariats said that peace will have been achieved when, “I know I can actually criticise what my representatives are doing without being victimised” (Individual Interview 27, Nairobi, 2014). Unlike the fear of random violence, the fear of political oppression is a fear of being targeted for political choices. This fear of political oppression negatively impacts agency so that individuals ‘hold their peace’ rather than face the potential consequences of political expression.

Closely linked to the fear of the targeted violence of political oppression is the fear of being a target of political violence on the basis of ethnicity. The instrumentalisation of ethnicity in Kenyan politics has created a deadly link between ethnic identity and perceived political affiliation. The assumption is that an individual’s vote is motivated by their ethnicity. In the 2007/8 election, individuals were attacked because they were seen as belonging to the same ethnic group as either of the presidential candidates in dispute thereby inadvertently placing them on one side of the conflict. The use of ethnicity as a political tool has had pervasive effects on Kenyan society, giving rise to the individual’s fear that they will be attacked because of their ethnic identity. A state representative defined peace with this scenario,

[Peace means] The absence of threats, the absence of anxiety, and trust of my neighbour... I mean that as a community we can lie in peace knowing there will not be a community planning to come and attack us. We can have floods, we can have earthquakes you know, as a disaster, but we do not expect to wake up one day and find that somebody has overrun our people and killed our children. And to me that is now, the

absence of that anxiety, where I don't have that anxiety, it is peace. (Individual Interview 31, Nairobi, 2014)

I have classified this as an individual fear despite the mention of community destruction because the fear is experienced at an individual level as anxiety. The individual fears they will be attacked for belonging to that community and even fears the destruction of the entire community. Due to past and recurring violent conflict between different ethnic groups, this fear may be pervasive even in the absence of a real threat.

Peace as living free from fears of random and targeted violence has an incremental aspect to it. The fears of physical violence, insecurity and ethnic attacks relate to being a victim of circumstances seemingly beyond one's control whereas the fear of political oppression is the fear of an agent who feels they have a right to act politically without consequences. When individuals are, as one respondent put it, "not walking around with my life in my hands" (Individual Interview 53, Nairobi, 2014), then in their newfound freedom from the fear of violent conflict, community destruction or insecurity, they may now be in a position to engage more fully in the political life of their society, which may precipitate the fear of political oppression.

Felt peace is incremental allowing for an individual to enjoy not just the basic necessities but even companionship and laughter. These last two quotations demonstrate the extent of peace.

For me peace is when there is a conducive environment that allows you to undertake your life, to go on with your life without feeling threatened, allows you to generate your own means of livelihood without being threatened and being able to interact and move around. That is peace, it is for me what peace is and being able to sort out your issues without going to war (Individual Interview 40, Nairobi, 2014).

Peace is about the dignity of a human being. If you are able to have all your basics met and if you are able to go out and you feel you can laugh, you can enjoy companionship with fellow human beings in an environment that allows you to do that, that is peace (Individual Interview 36, Nairobi, 2014).

The psychological aspects of felt peace correspond to the context of peace as living free from fear. Though not tangible, the characteristics of felt peace as freedom from the fears of random and targeted violence indicate an individual's capacity to engage positively and productively towards sustaining an environment that promotes peace.

Communal Peace

Peace at the community level is being able to live well together. I will refer to this as *shared peace*. The conceptualisation of peace at this level is informed by the history of violent conflict along ethnic lines in Kenya as discussed in Chapter 1. My interviewees used the term *community* to refer to the different ethno-linguistic groups in Kenya, which informs my use of the term community in this study. Community does not imply homogeneity or even unity, but refers to the descent determined belonging to a certain ethno-linguistic group. It is on this basis that individuals are targeted as victims or viewed as perpetrators in times of inter-ethnic conflict. Ethnicity is not a cause of violent conflict but it has been used by political entrepreneurs as a tool to mobilise for political gain in Kenya. This has often resulted in violent attacks on the basis of ethnic identity. People have been killed, displaced and had their property destroyed merely because they belong to a certain ethnic group which is associated with a particular political candidate or political party. This recurrent violent conflict with ethnic dimensions has resulted in broken or strained relationships between different communities with abiding fears of reprisal and threats of revenge.

The fear of inter-communal attacks and reprisals is linked to violence along ethnic lines during the 1992, 1997 and 2007 elections. One of my respondents put it this way,

When my neighbour is at peace I am at peace... Because when I attack my neighbour, the brother to my neighbour in Wajir will see my brother and he will attack my brother there (Individual Interview 15, Nakuru, 2014).

This statement shows that people live together with others from different communities (especially in the urban areas) and violence in one town can have widespread consequences. In the post-election violence of 2007/8, the attacks on the Agĩkũyũ in Western and Rift Valley provinces because of their ethnic affiliation to the incumbent President, led to reprisal attacks by the Agĩkũyũ on the Luo and Kalenjin in the Rift Valley town of Nakuru. In conceptualising peace at a community level, root causes of the conflict may be important but more so is the experience of that conflict. If the violence is carried out along an ethnic divide, then the conceptualisation of peace will be based on the inter-group relationships and not necessarily on causes such as historic land injustices which lie at the root of it. As a peace committee member said, “The definition of peace is to cross the borders of ethnicity” (Group Interview 2, Nairobi, 2014). Ethnic violence may be a façade for political violence but histories of inequitable distribution, discrimination and exclusion make it possible to mobilise ethnicity for political violence. Cycles of violence mask the underlying causes.

Shared peace is being able to live together with different ethnic groups with an emphasis on managing diversity. An NGO representative emphasised peace as the capacity to creatively deal with diversity not just regarding ethnicity but at multiple levels. She said,

When you're looking at peace, it is important that you look at first what kind of relationships do we have amongst ourselves? Are we able to manage our diversity? And managing our diversity in relationships means that whether we come from different ethnic groups, different religious backgrounds, different professions, different races, different nationalities, that we're able to manage our diversity in a creative way. (Individual Interview 48, Nairobi, 2014)

However in some extreme cases when the incidence of violent conflict between communities has spanned decades with increasing intensity, shared peace seems inconceivable. Members of the communities may feel that they cannot coexist at any cost and perceive peace as the exclusion of the other group. In this situation, histories of unresolved violent conflict between different ethnic groups may make peace seem like the freedom not to have to live with the other community. This creates a dilemma for peacebuilders. To build peace effectively requires the peacebuilders to engage the community in conceptualising and working towards peace. However, the relations between the communities may have deteriorated to the point that shared peace is inconceivable.

A state representative describes this dilemma,

Because in a situation where I know, like now what exists between the Pokot and the Turkana, you cannot call it peace. Where you ask one of them 'where do you think your solutions are?' They say 'if you got rid of that community we will have peace.' You go to that community 'If you get rid of that community we will have peace.' And since it is not possible to get rid of that community, then you know it is not possible to have peace, because the mere presence of that other community is a threat to the peace of that other community. (Individual Interview 31, Nairobi, 2014)

The above reflection demonstrates the relevance of ongoing peacebuilding even in the latent stages of conflict to prevent such deep divisions between groups that shared peace is unimaginable. Peacebuilding should develop the capacities within groups to resolve violent conflicts as they happen. An NGO representative underlined that peace requires the capacity to deal with conflict.

Peace is maybe when different communities or people of different ethnic backgrounds are able to coexist harmoniously. Of course for any peace to be achieved there must be some form of conflicts, you know, but when we're able to handle these issues amicably then I can say we enjoy some peace (Individual Interview 35, Nairobi, 2014).

Peace is therefore not the absence of conflict between different communities but the capacity to deal with conflict in a way that is acceptable to both sides. One of the key goals of an infrastructure for peace is to build national capacities for peace to ensure that across the country, there are individuals or groups that are equipped to deal with conflict in a way that would promote harmony amongst different individuals and communities who are living together. The strategy of peace committees has been effective in enhancing peacebuilding capacities in communities across the country. Peace committees are composed of volunteers who are residents in the area and ideally this ensures a local conceptualisation of peace that is relevant to the context. The peace committees strive to achieve shared peace as harmonious co-existence as explored by this definition from an NGO representative: “peace is not just about calmness, it is about a whole range of issues that you do to maintain that interaction of people in societies and communities to make sure they continuously enjoy living together” (Individual Interview 52, Nairobi, 2014).

The last aspect of shared peace is the right of residence, to live where one chooses. In Kenya, there is a perception that different ethnic groups “belong” to certain geographic regions (based on pre-colonial occupancy), hence the displacement of people from areas where their ethnic group supposedly does not belong. Displacement is through psychological intimidation or physical eviction. For example, during the PEV 2007/8, individuals from certain ethnic groups fled areas prone to ethnic-oriented political violence, to avoid violent attacks and returned to the region where their community is perceived to be from and are the majority. The constitutional provision granting citizens the freedom of movement and residence is overridden by the history of politically motivated population displacement based on ethnicity. In this setting, peace is

when individuals feel comfortable to live, work or buy property in any region of their choice. An academic gave his contextual definition of peace.

Peace for me is a state where everybody lives together without getting worried. Like presently I can say in Nakuru County there is some sense of peace. I'm not thinking about travelling at night, I'm not thinking about setting up a business when I want to set one, I'm not thinking about the problem that will happen if I go to a certain area. That for me is peace, if I can go and set up a shop in Molo, if I can go to do farming in Kuresoi, that for me is peace. Because previously we were very careful where you were buying a piece of land. We were very careful in Nakuru town where you live, some used to live this way, others this way, depending on the tribe, so now I know I can rent a house and live anywhere within the municipality (Individual Interview 61, Nakuru, 2014).

This interviewee qualified the above description of peace as likely to last only if current political alliances remained in place. In 2013, the winning Jubilee Party was a coalition of The National Party (TNA) led by Uhuru Kenyatta and the United Republican Party (URP) led by William Ruto. This political coalition between Kenyatta and Ruto is believed to have succeeded because of the united support from the Agĩkũyũ and the Kalenjin voters. My interviewee felt that this unity had finally brought peace to the Rift Valley which has been the site of recurrent violence between the two groups. Politics that uses ethnicity as a tool of mobilisation remains a threat to shared peace.

Shared peace is when members of the different communities feel comfortable to live together with others and enjoy the rights of residence. For lasting shared peace, there needs to be systems in place to safeguard the interaction between the communities and capacities to resolve conflicts as they arise in order to sustain this peace. The caveat to this definition of peace is that an individual from a majority community may experience the right of belonging but this may not be shared by members of minority communities in that same locality. I use majority and minority to indicate either the political power of a group or the population size of the group. Ideally in this

case, shared peace should be the experience of all members across the different ethnic communities.

Societal Peace

Peace at the level of the society is the product of well-functioning systems and structures that serve the individual and the community. Galtung's (1969) positive peace focuses on the absence of structural violence and the presence of social justice, including the egalitarian distribution of power and resources. Peace means different things to different societies at different points in time. From my interviews, the definitions of peace included peace as justice, more equal opportunities, provision of security and basic needs. At this level, peace is delivered by larger structures that serve the entire society and peace is seen by members of society as their right. For example, the state is a key provider of security and justice for its citizens. Societal peace is therefore *owed peace* because to a great extent, citizens expect the state to deliver these services. Societal peace is incremental such that once basic needs are met, peace is conceptualised around other needs. In Kenya today, there are areas where basic needs are still unmet to the point that this deprivation fuels conflict.

Owed peace is the uninterrupted equal access to amenities such as water, food, sanitation, education and health, to enable individuals to thrive in their environment. A representative of an international organisation described peace in this way,

To me peace is not the absence of war, peace is that situation whereby apart from not having war the basic needs of all the individuals in society are being provided in a sustainable manner. Sustainable meaning looking at the generation of today and that of tomorrow. (Individual Interview 24, Nairobi, 2014)

An NGO representative notes below that the provision and access must not accentuate barriers.

one would hope that whatever structures the government has in place, be it related to education, and basic infrastructure - water, electricity - how we are able to access resources or services for that matter, being able to access these resources in a manner that does not create barriers (Individual Interview 48, Nairobi, 2014)

From the first definition, peace is linked with sustainability so that the provision of basic needs is continuous in the long-term. In areas where basic resources and services are made available by the state, the second definition includes the need for them to be accessible without barriers. Peace is therefore not just a situation where basic needs are met, but where they are met sustainably and equally accessible to all.

Galtung describes violence as “that which increases the distance between the potential and the actual, and that which impedes the decrease of this distance” (1969, p. 168). He clarifies that violence is that which is avoidable, for example if health services are capable of preventing a death from tuberculosis, it is violence if they fail to do so. Therefore if the state has the capacity to provide water or basic infrastructure, but fails to do so, the lack of provision is violence. However, the challenge of applying this argument would be in accurately determining capacity, which would require an analysis of various factors like economic, political and historic factors. When I visited Turkana County in Kenya during my fieldwork, I had a glimpse of the harsh socio-economic conditions of that region in comparison to other parts of Kenya. The dusty, unpaved roads, constant power outages and lack of other social amenities were a stark contrast to what I had seen in other parts of the country. I wondered whether post-colonial governments have lacked the will and/or the capacity to address this disparity. Mutiga (2014) argues that successive post-independence governments upheld colonial economic policy that sought to

invest only in arable regions. If indeed the independence governments have merely lacked the will, then it is violence.

The link between infrastructure and peace is evident in Northern Kenya where the state's security presence is minimal. In November 2014 in Kapedo, 19 Administration Police officers were killed, and the army deployed to recover the officers' stolen weapons in raids which negatively impacted residents (Kipsang, 2014). The inaccessibility of the region due to the lack of roads and communication networks reflects marginalisation and further weakens state capacity to ensure security for residents. In this case, security forces were also unable to protect themselves. Insecurity has aggravated the endemic violent conflict between pastoralist communities. My conversations on peace with members of the pastoralist communities in Turkana revolved around inter-communal violent conflicts, exacerbated by inadequate water and pasture for their livestock. Chopra (2009) observes how informal initiatives to resolve violent conflict have often been given precedence over the formal legal justice system in the arid lands of Kenya. Chopra argues then that this is because state security actors are few on the ground and they have learnt that supporting informal community peace initiatives is a better guarantor for peace.

The second aspect of owed peace is when all citizens can enjoy more equal opportunities. An employee at one of the state-led units described peace, "It is an environment where I can exploit my God-given potential, with no discrimination or marginalisation" (Individual Interview 30, Nairobi, 2014). This definition compares peace as enjoying more equal opportunities to the negative experiences of marginalisation in development and discrimination. Marginalisation and

discrimination are implicitly linked because the continuous failure to allocate resources to certain areas reflects discrimination and/or neglect of those communities. It may be discrimination of those not seen as allied to the government of the day or neglect of a region seen as unworthy of development. Peace for members of society who live in these areas would therefore be envisioned in their ability to live fully in those areas without marginalisation and discrimination to limit their potential.

Peace as equal access to opportunities and resources is perceived differently in urban and rural settings. In urban areas where employment is often the sole source of income, peace is often seen as equal and fair access to jobs. An NGO representative expressed it this way,

because some communities feel they should have that and the other community feels it should belong to them. That has been the major challenge for peace, but if the distribution of resources was done well and if the resources is broad, including jobs, including everything, if there was no favouritism, if there was no all that stuff, I think we would be seeing little cases of violence. (Individual Interview 57, Nakuru, 2014)

In rural areas, peace tends to be equal access to other resources critical for rural livelihoods as explained by another NGO representative,

Positive peace is when communities are able to dialogue and agree to share resources so that that cannot cause conflict... you have pasture in your area and the other one has water in their area, how do you come together to share these resources – water and pasture... (Individual Interview 19, Lodwar, 2014)

Unequal access to resources and opportunities has caused tension and violent conflict in urban and rural Kenya. To elaborate on the first definition of equal access to employment in urban areas, I refer to a study by Kenya's National Cohesion and Integration Commission. This study demonstrated the inequitable access to state employment in what the report called a profile of exclusion. The report stated "Over 50 per cent of Kenya's ethnic groups are only marginally represented in the Civil Service – the country's largest employer. Only 20 out of over 40

listed Kenyan communities are statistically visible in the Civil Service. Some 23 communities have less than 1 per cent presence in the Civil Service” (NCIC, 2011, p. 2) This report observed that five out of Kenya’s 40 ethnic communities hold over 70% of civil service jobs in a disproportionate ratio to their population size. These figures evoke anxiety amongst individuals from minority groups by highlighting the barriers towards employment in the civil service. Peace at the societal level would demand that opportunities are equally open to all regardless of political or community affiliation. Sharing of pasture and water is particularly a concern in the arid and semi-arid lands of Kenya where scarcity has led to violent conflict between communities over the access to these resources. Peace in urban and rural Kenya is the equal access to opportunities and livelihood resources.

The third aspect of owed peace is the assurance of security for all. At the individual level, security was a major issue with peace being seen as living free from the fear of being attacked, robbed or killed. Interviewees described it as being able to live “without looking over my shoulder” (Individual Interview 51, Nairobi 2014) or “walking around with my life in my hands” (Individual Interview 53, Nairobi, 2014). The guarantee of security is definitely close to the hearts of many Kenyans, whether in rural or urban contexts, and so the state owes its citizens the provision of this security across the country for a safe environment for people to thrive.

The proliferation of illicit firearms is a major threat to the adequate provision of security which is peace at a societal level. A state official defined peace in relation to the flow of illicit arms,

Peace in Kenya directly relates to the issue of illicit firearms. Where there is less of an influx of firearms, there is peace. More arms, less peace. For example, compare the North Rift where there is proliferation of illicit firearms, there is rarely peace. There are incidences of clashes and tribal conflict and all manner of crimes and conflict compared

to an area like Central or Nyanza where there are less numbers. Go to Upper Eastern where the community is heavily armed and you find violence, clashes, lives and property being lost. (Individual Interview 28, Nairobi, 2014)

Firearms increase the negative impact of violent conflict or insecurity and the proliferation of illicit firearms is possible where security infrastructure is inadequate. This may create a demand in the community for arms to protect themselves and with inadequate security, illicit arms find a market. The above statement does not factor in the effect of insecurity in the proliferation of arms. Peace is therefore achieved when the security infrastructure is able to control threats like the proliferation of illicit arms and enable an environment where people live free from fears of insecurity. Another state official linked peace with security in this definition,

Peace and security go together. Peace is broader because security is to be free from unwanted and unwarranted interferences. Peace is bigger than that; it includes security, because peace is derived from an individual and social level. In many cases, insecurity is caused by a lack of peace. (Individual Interview 23, Nakuru, 2014)

According to this definition, security contributes to peace which is the broader concept. This relationship between security and peace is challenged by the subsequent assertion that insecurity is caused by a lack of peace. This then begs the question, what causes a lack of peace? The preceding definition argued that illicit firearms cause a lack of peace. However, illicit firearms are a symptom of insecurity where arms acquired either for self-protection in an insecure environment or to engage in crime. From these definitions, the causal relationship between a lack of peace and insecurity is not a simple one. Though the proliferation of illicit firearms intensifies a lack of peace or insecurity, it is unlikely to be a singular cause.

The last aspect of owed peace is the presence of justice. At this societal level, peace is in the perception of how accessible, reliable and fair the justice and legal systems are. In the following

definition, an NGO representative emphasised the need for the legal and justice systems to be mutually reinforcing justice for there to be peace.

Then when we look at how in the society our government structures are, institutions again are there structures that are in place that either maintain the status quo. If it is our judiciary systems, if it is our legislators, if it is our Executive, do we have a - I know we have a fantastic Constitution - are the way these structures are put in place and the systems that run them, do they promote injustices or do they enhance justice? Because if the structures are faulty and the systems that we are operating in are faulty, then we do not have peace. We have structural violence, we do not have peace. (Individual Interview 48, Nairobi, 2014)

This definition focuses on peace as justice from the formal legal and justice system. However in Kenya, there are informal justice systems which have been relatively successful in delivering peace as justice in areas where the formal justice system is not as effective. Despite the perception that these informal systems are the state sub-contracting non state actors to compensate for its incapacity, the informal systems have been successful in resolving situations of violent conflict (Chopra, 2009; Menkhaus, 2008). I discuss this further in chapter 5.

Justice is crucial in defining peace because of the role it plays in assuring satisfaction in the aftermath of violent conflict. In both the formal and informal legal and justice systems, peace as justice is not always satisfactory. A state official notes the dilemma in conceptualising peace as justice,

But in my understanding and in my interaction with a number of these communities, it is a situation whereby you feel and you believe you have addressed the root causes of conflict. But I want to add that it has to be equitable...So that even as you talk about having addressed the root causes, do you think everybody is satisfied? You may not satisfy every party, but to a larger extent you try and be equitable in providing solutions to the conflict. (Individual Interview 26, Nairobi, 2014)

This is particularly the case when dealing with cycles of violent conflict between communities. Resolving the immediate conflict may not meet the justice needs if the current guilty party was

the aggrieved party in preceding unresolved violent conflicts. The idea of equality in the provision of justice refers to the effort of going beyond the immediate incidence to understand the underlying context that informs the justice needs of conflict parties. Peace as justice has been elusive in instances of political violence. Brown and Sriram (2012) argue that in Kenya, attempts to obtain justice for the electoral violence from the 1990s to 2007, constantly failed because those responsible for the justice processes were implicated or associated with perpetrators of the violence. Equality is essential in peace as justice in Kenya because of the history of those with political power using the legal and justice systems for their vested interests. In Kenya, peace at the societal level will not be possible unless justice is achieved, not only in the daily workings of legal and justice systems, but also in dealing with perpetrators and beneficiaries of violent conflict.

Owed peace in Kenya is the equal access to basic needs, livelihood resources, justice and security. The different aspects of peace are relevant to specific segments of society according to the particular challenges to peace that they face. In the next section, I analyse the conceptualisation of peace by the three institutions that are a focus of my study.

4.3. Conceptions of peace by the state-led infrastructures for peace

In chapter 2, I introduced John Paul Lederach's concept of an infrastructure for peace (I4P) as a key element of a comprehensive peacebuilding approach to ensure long-term support for peace within the society. As noted in chapter 6 on institutionalisation and sustainability, there are different perceptions of what constitutes the infrastructure for peace in Kenya. Chuma and Ojielo (2012) refer to four components of the infrastructure for peace in Kenya but the three state-led

units are the National Steering Committee on Peacebuilding and Conflict Management (NSC), the National Focal Point on Small Arms and Light Weapons (NFP) and the National Cohesion and Integration Commission (NCIC). I will use this particular description of Kenya's I4P because it is mostly referred to in literature on peacebuilding in Kenya. When Chuma and Ojielo (2012) refer to the infrastructure for peace in Kenya as having four components, it may give the impression that the I4P was developed cohesively. However, these institutions were created at different times, through distinct processes to fulfil their various inter-related mandates. To understand how peace has been conceptualised within Kenya's infrastructure for peace, I will look at how the three state-led components have conceptualised and practiced peacebuilding.

National Steering Committee on Peacebuilding and Conflict Management (NSC)

The most striking thing about the NSC is that it began as a joint state and non-state actor initiative to coordinate peacebuilding work in Kenya but it has slowly evolved into a more state led institution. This chapter focuses on the conceptualisation of peace by NSC. Chapter 6 on institutionalisation and sustainability takes a deeper look at the evolution of the NSC. In 2004, the NSC began the process of developing a national policy on peacebuilding and conflict management. This policy was approved by the Kenyan Cabinet in 2012 (NSCPBCM, 2014b) and adopted by the parliament in 2015 (The National Assembly, 2015). According to this policy, peace is,

A state of harmony characterized by the absence of violent conflict and where people feel free of fear of violence. Peace is not just the absence of armed conflict/violent conflict: it presupposes the existence of healthy inter-personal and intercommunity relations, socio-economic prosperity, a working political order and the enjoyment of fundamental rights by all. These rights include those relating to physical integrity of individuals but also those relating to their social and economic welfare (Ministry of Interior and Co-ordination of National Government, 2014, p. 3)

This expansive definition includes aspects of peace conceptualised by respondents like freedom from fear of violence, harmonious co-existence, provision of basic needs and fundamental rights like equality and justice. While it substantially covers aspects of felt, shared and owed peace, it does not explicitly mention peace as security which was a major element of felt and owed peace.

Apart from the policy's definition of peace, the NSC's conceptualisation of peace can also be seen in the way that it seeks to build peace. The NSC mandate is primarily to coordinate peace activities in Kenya and to act as the national Conflict Early Warning and Early Response Unit (CEWERU), as required by the Conflict Early Warning and Response Mechanism, to which Kenya is a signatory (Ministry of Interior and Co-ordination of National Government, 2014). The CEWARN is a protocol to prevent violent cross-border pastoralist conflict and it is signed by seven countries in the Horn of Africa that are member states of the Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD). The NSC works through an elaborate network with activities coordinated by a Secretariat based in Nairobi, where the CEWERU Situation Room is located.

The NSC has contributed to building national capacities for peace by supporting the establishment of peace committees that ideally should be at every administrative level from the district to the village. I say "ideally" because several interview respondents observed that though peace committees were set up at the village, sub location, location and district level, in most places, only the district level peace committees were active. At each level, the relevant government administrator, e.g., the District Commissioner (DC), District Officer or Chief, acts as the patron of the peace committee. At the district level, the DC allocates office space for the use

of the peace committee. Despite the close association of NSC with the District Peace Committees (DPCs), the concept of peace committees existed before the establishment of the NSC. Initially the church and NGOs, then later NSC played an active role in replicating the peace committee concept that facilitates entry into local peacebuilding. The peace committees are discussed further in chapter 5 on the state in peacebuilding and in chapter 6 on institutionalisation and sustainability.

Conceptualising peace from the practice of the NSC can be seen best in its role as a CEWERU. From my interviews with those working at the NSC, the operationalisation of the conflict prevention mandate works as follows: The peace committees on the ground receive alerts from their community on any threats to security and peace. Once they have verified the validity of the alert, they then pass on the information to the local government administrator and to the peace monitor in that region. The administrator or peace monitor sends on the alert to the NSC Secretariat where the information is analysed for response. This system can be truncated. If the alert can be dealt with at the local level, then the local administrator, peace monitor and peace committee develop an appropriate response and send reports to the Secretariat in due course. Information flows upwards. Peace committee members and one peace monitor observed that once they have made their report, they are not privy to the NSC's response. The security orientation of this peacebuilding approach influences this dynamic of a one-way flow of information. The NSC Secretariat is housed within the Ministry of Interior and National Government, which also houses the department of national administration and security. This explains the close link of NSC with the different administrative levels like DC, DO and Chief and enables a security sector response to the alerts raised. Peace in this early warning early

response framework, is peace as security in relation to violent conflict. This system was especially useful during the 2010 referendum and 2013 elections.

The NSC also supports community dialogue and local peace processes by facilitating and documenting community initiatives, particularly amongst pastoralist communities in the arid and semi-arid lands of Kenya. An example of this is the 2001 Modogashe Declaration between communities in Kenya's North Eastern, Upper Eastern and Coast provinces, to diminish violent conflict in those regions (NSCPBCM, 2011a). This peace agreement was revalidated in 2005 and 2011. NSC's involvement and support of inter-community peace process is integral to shared peace because it enables communities to live together and resolve their differences.

In the NSC mandate and achievements, peace is primarily conceptualised as security and harmonious co-existence which resonates with aspects of the interviewees' conceptualisation of felt, shared and owed peace. To a certain extent, NSC builds peace as the provision of justice in the support of informal peace processes. What is not present in NSC peacebuilding practice is peace as the right of residence and peace as the provision of basic services, justice and equality opportunities.

Kenya National Focal Point on Small Arms and Light Weapons (KNFP)

KNFP gets its mandate from several regional and international agreements to which Kenya is a signatory. KNFP asserts that "Durable and sustainable peace and stability cannot be achieved in the region unless deliberate efforts are made to prevent, combat and eradicate illicit trafficking and trade in SALW" (NSCPBCM, 2011b, p. 6). In this report, KNFP acknowledges its close links with the NSC because of how illicit firearms intensify violent conflict, but notes that

though complementary, the mandates are separate. To facilitate their work on the ground, KNFP has established and trained 119 District Task Forces (DTFs), which should work closely with the peace committees in raising awareness in the community about the challenge of illicit firearms (NSCPBCM, 2014a). In reality, DTFs have not been successful. Interviewees gave various reasons for this. One reason was that they had an almost similar make up as the DPCs with the DC as the patron and often including a few members from the DPC. This meant more volunteer work for those involved. Another reason suggested was that the DTFs were mostly composed of security personnel posted to work in that area and who were often transferred elsewhere, thereby constantly affecting the composition of the DTF. In comparison, the DPC is primarily made up of area residents. Nevertheless, the close association of NSC and KNFP has meant that KNFP has access to the DPCs.

KNFP focuses exclusively on security by coordinating policy development and arms reduction activities of state and non-state actors to address the proliferation of small arms and light weapons. An informational brochure for KNFP notes that from 2003 to 2007, it enabled the collection and destruction of more than 20,000 small arms and light weapons (KNFP, n.d.-a). KNFP conceptualises peace as security from the angle of addressing the flow of illicit arms to reduce violence in conflict. The security angle corresponds to the conceptualisation of peace by interview respondents who emphasised peace as freedom from random violence in the context of conflict or crime. Controlling the proliferation of illicit arms is also an aspect of owed peace because it ensures a level of security for citizens. KNFP's concept of peace as security does not really address other aspects of societal peace such as the provision of basic needs, justice, equal access to opportunities and resources.

National Cohesion and Integration Commission (NCIC)

The NCIC began operating in 2009 as a statutory body established by the National Cohesion and Integration Act 12 of 2008. NCIC seeks to enhance national unity by eliminating discrimination on the basis of ethnicity determined by colour, race, religion, ethnic and/or national origins (Kenya Gazette Supplement No. 96 (Acts No. 12), 2008). Although NCIC is meant to devolve by opening offices around the country to work more effectively on the ground, by 2014 it was still operating solely from its headquarters in Nairobi (NCIC, 2014a). NCIC's mandate on cohesion and integration corresponds to shared peace where different communities are able to live together and have the right of residence. To fulfil its peacebuilding mandate, NCIC has monitored hate speech, supported dialogues for communities in conflict, promoted the incorporation of cohesion and integration values in primary and secondary school curricula and learning activities and engaged in research and policy development towards cohesion and integration (NCIC, 2012a, 2013, 2014a). NCIC also works together with NSC and KNFP towards preventing violent conflict around electoral periods in initiatives such as the Uwiano platform for peace that is discussed in chapter 5 on the state in peacebuilding. Peace as cohesion and integration also links to owed peace as equal access to opportunities and resources and indirectly impacts peace as the freedom from fear of violence particularly in the context of ethnic related violent conflict. Overall, the NCIC conceptualisation of peace is that of shared peace with slight emphasis on felt peace as freedom from fear of random and targeted violence and owed peace as the provision of security, justice and basic needs.

4.4. Conclusion

At the beginning of this chapter I observed that the word peace is often used but seldom defined. The conceptualisation of peace was critical to understanding how state-led peacebuilding in Kenya has impacted peacebuilding practice and the prospects for peace. The rich and vivid descriptions of peace by my interviewees were enlightening. While the multiple conceptualisations of peace are not novel per se, they characterise the Kenyan context and contribute to understanding peace in Kenya. In this chapter I argue that while multiple conceptions of peace may hinder effective peacebuilding within the infrastructure for peace, more significant is the fact that state-led peacebuilding fails to address substantial conceptions of peace.

I organised the conceptions of peace from my interviews at three levels as in Table 4.1 below. At the first level of the individual is felt peace which is a freedom to live free of the fear of random and targeted violence. At the second level of the community, is shared peace which is being able to live together as individuals from different communities and to have the right to reside anywhere in Kenya. At the third level of the society is owed peace that is the provision of basic needs, security, justice and equal access to opportunities and resources. Although peace is conceptualised at these three levels, they are not mutually exclusive and peace is simultaneously felt, shared and owed.

Table 4.1: Types of peace

Level	Type of peace	Properties
Individual	Felt	Freedom from fear Random violence Targeted violence
Communal	Shared	▪ Living harmoniously in diversity ▪ Right to reside
Societal	Owed	▪ Provision of basic socio-economic needs ▪ Right to justice ▪ More equal opportunities ▪ Security guarantee

To understand how the three state-led components of Kenya's infrastructure for peace conceptualise peace, I looked at documents from the three units, NSC, KNFP and NCIC to see how they defined peace explicitly in writing or implicitly through their peacebuilding activities. I found that NSC conceptualises peace as security and harmonious co-existence addressing aspects of felt, shared and owed peace. KNFP primarily conceptualises peace as security which correlates to aspects of felt and owed peace. NCIC conceives of peace as shared in their focus on cohesion and integration.

While no peacebuilding approach can respond to all the needs for peace conceptualised at the individual, communal and societal level, the state is best placed to address the need for owed peace. NSC and KNFP build peace as security which is a component of peace at the individual and societal level. NSC and NCIC build peace as harmonious coexistence which is shared peace for the community and partially peace as justice in regard to their support of the informal peace processes. In a limited way, NCIC delves into the aspect of societal peace as equal access to opportunities with an example of the NCIC study on ethnic representation in Kenya's civil

service. From their peacebuilding practice, the conceptualisation of peace by the three state-led components is significant yet some aspects such as peace as justice and more equal opportunities are not covered in substantive ways. NSC and NCIC support informal peace processes which are an aspect of peace as justice but they do not directly deal with peace through the formal justice sector operational in other parts of Kenya. Likewise in regards to equal access to opportunities and resources, NCIC builds peace through its role of research and advocacy to expose inequality but does not have the capacity to force a redress by state offices. In their peacebuilding practice, none of the state-led components conceptualises peace as the provision of basic needs. In addition, none of the three, NSC, KNFP nor NCIC, deal with the aspect of shared peace as the right to reside where one chooses, which is an aspect the state should enforce to uphold the constitutional provisions.

My study on state-led peacebuilding is restricted to the NSC, KNFP and NCIC within the infrastructure for peace. I recognise that the work of other state institutions contribute variously to building peace. However, I focus on the infrastructure for peace as a deliberate, coherent peacebuilding strategy, in which the state is a key actor. A state-led approach to peacebuilding should maximise on building the peace that the state is most strategically placed to deliver. The state's failure to build peace as justice, more equal opportunities and the provision of basic socio-economic needs, is a failure to address the structural conditions in which violent conflict thrives. Comprehensive peacebuilding requires the transformation of structural violence and inequalities to enable lasting peace.

Chapter 5: The state's role in peacebuilding

5.1. Introduction

In this chapter I analyse the role the state has played in peacebuilding through the three state-led components of Kenya's infrastructure for peace. My interest in the role of the state in peacebuilding was piqued by my experience as a researcher seconded to a conflict mapping project by the National Steering Committee on Conflict Management and Peacebuilding (NSC) in 2010-2011. Though NSC is officially a multiple agency forum of both state and non-state actors, I knew that the state was a major, if not the major, actor in NSC. With peacebuilding as the focus of NSC, I found the reality of a dominant state role to be incongruous to what I understood to be peacebuilding.

While previously working in peacebuilding from 2000, I had an impression of the state as a major cause of violence and an obstacle to peace. This was partly due to the role the state has played in political violence in Kenya, as discussed in chapter 1, and the failure to deliver peace as justice, as observed in chapter 4. Given Kenya's history of violent conflicts, where state or actors seeking political power played a role, what business does the state have in peace? From indirectly causing conflict through marginalisation and neglect of populations to directly fomenting violence for political gain, I thought the state really had no legitimate role in peacebuilding. Through my secondment experience with NSC, I began to observe the role the state played in peacebuilding and through this study I have deepened my understanding of the implications of state engagement in peacebuilding.

This chapter seeks to answer the following question: **How has the role of the Kenyan state in peacebuilding influenced the nature of peacebuilding?** I acknowledge the significant positive impact on the nature of peacebuilding from the role of the state in Kenya's infrastructure for peace. Nevertheless, I argue that the state role hinders the essential elements of sustainable peace such as local ownership and agency and fails to address structural violence as required in conflict transformation.

On the positive side, the involvement of the state in the infrastructure for peace has greatly improved the coordination of peacebuilding interventions by state and non-state actors; created synergy in successful collaboration between state and non-state actors; enhanced the legitimacy of peacebuilding; increased the state's accountability for peace through policy and contextualised peacebuilding by promoting local approaches. On the negative side, the role of the state has co-opted and depressed local agency; promoted a reductive concept of peace as security; and displaced the crucial role of non-state actors in peacebuilding. This chapter discusses how the involvement of the state in peacebuilding is required to a certain extent, but it should not supersede non-state actors' critical role in challenging the state to maintain a political and socio-economic environment that would foster peace.

This chapter has four sections. I start by introducing the paradox of the state in peacebuilding more generally in section 5.2. In Section 5.3 I analyse how the role of the state in the infrastructure for peace has positively influenced the nature of peacebuilding and prospects for peace in Kenya, while section 5.4 looks at the negative impacts. I conclude in section 5.5 by discussing what potentially remains as the essential role of the state in peacebuilding in Kenya.

5.2. The paradox of the state in peacebuilding

In this case study of Kenya's infrastructure for peace, the role of the state in peacebuilding has had significant positive effects. Despite this, the growing involvement of the state has altered the nature of peacebuilding with negative implications for its sustainability and the quality of the resultant peace. The violent conflicts that have been the focus of the infrastructure for peace partly have their roots in both Kenya's past and present day governance and politics. For example, Brown (2003a) observes that the 1991 so-called 'ethnic clashes' in Kenya, took place after the ruling party's political rallies that called for violence. The state should play a role in building peace in Kenya, but only to the extent that its involvement does not preclude its own structural transformation towards sustainable peace. The next section looks at views from literature on the state in Africa and specifically Kenya in relation to conflict and peace within its borders.

The state of the African state

The images in literature of the state in Africa are not peaceful. The following statement captures the image of state security in Africa as a system of patronage and impunity, "It is well known that in many African countries security institutions are, more often than elsewhere, an instrument for strengthening personal rule and are characterized by a culture of secrecy and impunity" (Bachmann & Honke, 2010, p. 109). Though the authors do not liken the negative image to any specific African country, with the word 'many', they just fall short of the generalisation typical to descriptions of Africa. Despite the varied political, social and economic experiences, Africa is

often described as though monolithic or homogenous. Though I acknowledge the diversity of countries in Africa, I will retain the concept of Africa as used in literature.

The story of modern African states began with the violence of colonialism that still thrives in post-colonial states. Authors explain state formation in Africa through the colonial processes that created political structures to dominate and control populations and exploitative economic systems to profit those in power rather than the population (Mamdani, 1996; Young, 1994). The colonial state was interventionist to ensure the extraction of resources and the growth of capitalism (Berman & Lonsdale, 1979). Berman (1990) argues that the colonial state was simultaneously strong and weak. He describes the colonial state was strong as a bureaucratic agent of imperialism but weak in its capacity to govern on the ground. Herbst (2000) discusses the challenge of hinterland penetration faced by the colonial state because of the large territories and scarce population which resulted in minimum penetration but pervasive violence. To mitigate this challenge, the colonial state used customary authority to establish its rule. The colonial state ensured social control by re-inventing traditional systems of customary rule to enabled forced labour, conscription and taxation (Mamdani, 1996).

Violent conflicts in Africa demonstrate the effect of the divide-and-rule colonial policies that accentuated boundaries between ethno-linguistic groups and the priority of export economies at the expense of local food security. Colonial and post-colonial politics made these reified ethno-linguistic groups into political identities. The policy of divide-and-rule fragmented and containerised African populations according to ethnically defined local administrative units which prevented African unity or resistance (Berman, 1990). Dunn (2009) describes the role of

state in the production and reproduction of political identities with violence as a tool to achieve certainty in identity discourse. In post-colonial countries like Kenya, ethnic identity has been used as a mobilising factor in political violence and electoral politics, as discussed in chapter 1.

The perpetuation of predatory colonial political and economic systems can be glimpsed in Bayart's (1989) 'politics of the belly', depicting contemporary African politics where a population is promised economic and social benefits in exchange for their support of a political leader's quest for power. The grim picture of the post-colonial state in Africa is painted with broad strokes of patronage, violence and predation, making it a most unsuitable actor in peacebuilding. While this pervasive negative perception of the African state partially derives from actual accounts of post-colonial state conduct, the negative image of African states is also a constructed representation. Said (1980) uses the concept of 'orientalism' in which the representation of the East is constructed as inferior to the West for purposes of domination. In the same vein, Richmond (2013b) argues that the perception of post-colonial states in Africa being formed through patronage to produce a predatory state is rooted in an orientalist perception that validates external intervention for state building and peacebuilding. The post-colonial state in Africa has displayed tendencies of patronage and predation but the power of representation blurs the extent to which this reality is an exceptionalism of African states. For instance, Bayart's 'politics of the belly' highlights the political loyalty for benefits exchange in African politics that lines up with the predatory African elite narrative, but is decontextualized from global electoral practices where politicians generally trade promises for support. Though the state in Africa is not often associated with peace, the link between the state and peacebuilding has become more visible in the nexus of state building and peacebuilding.

Building the state to build peace

To respond to violent conflicts, international interventions use state building as a strategy to consolidate peace. Zaum (2012) argues that the biggest contribution of state building is improving the vertical and horizontal legitimacy of the state. Zaum describes vertical legitimacy as the capacity to provide public service and be accountable to citizens while horizontal legitimacy is the state's capacity to manage the relationships of diverse groups. Zaum discusses legitimacy in a post-war context where state capacity is severely diminished. In a non-post-war context, state building does contribute to legitimacy but the state still has considerable legitimacy and symbolic power as demonstrated in this Kenyan case. Newman (2013) asserts that the state building strategy of international peacebuilding is premised on the assumption that the creation of liberal states is the means to ensure peace and stability in the international system. He says, "Beyond democracy and market economics, liberal peacebuilding embraces a broad range of practices and values including secular authority, capacity-building, centralised governance and institutions of justice" (Newman, 2013, p. 143). However, Newman then observes a paradox in the assumption that state building is compatible to peacebuilding because historically, state building has been an inherently violent process as territory and populations are forcibly controlled.

Violence is part of state formation. In looking at state formation in Europe, Tilly (1985) highlights the instrumental role of violence to control internal and external rivals to create centralised states that have a monopoly of force within their territory. The violence of postcolonial Kenya has its roots in the violence of colonialism and the struggle for independence. Branch (2009) discusses violence as a catalyst and product of the 1950s war between the Mau

Mau insurgents and the colonial administration. Echoes of the violent force used by the colonial state to suppress the insurgency are evident in the postcolonial state. In the 1990s, the Moi government used violence to resist Kenya's shift from a one-party to a multi-party state. The state initially used state security to quell the opposition but following the diplomatic backlash, including the suspension of bilateral aid, the state later used informal violence to suppress dissent (Rudbeck, Mukherjee & Nelson, 2016). Against the history of violence by the state in Kenya, how then can state building be part and parcel of peacebuilding? Liberal peacebuilding glosses over this contradiction by focusing on developing effective liberal state institutions as the answer to addressing violent conflict. Richmond says the mainstream context-blind application of liberal peacebuilding demonstrates a lack of understanding of critical issues such as inequality and injustice from structural, post-colonial and social accounts of state formation, leading to ill-designed states that perpetuate continued inequalities and injustice (2013b).

This international peacebuilding context is relevant to Kenya because the infrastructure for peace has significant support from international organisations that espouse a clear agenda to try to simultaneously build the liberal state through peacebuilding. The challenge of reconciling state building to peacebuilding is complex because, despite their seemingly contradictory nature, the two processes necessarily happen simultaneously in countries that have had violent conflict. In Kenya's post-colonial era, building the state and building peace have taken place concurrently with mixed results. I demonstrate this in the following subsection.

The state, state building and peacebuilding in Kenya

The state in Kenya began active peacebuilding in the early 2000s. Prior to this in the 1990s, non-state actors, particularly religious institutions dominated peacebuilding. For example, the National Council of Churches of Kenya (NCCCK) responded to the so-called ethnic violence surrounding the 1992 elections that created a crisis of internally displaced persons (IDPs) in the Rift Valley region. NCCCK provided emergency relief to the IDPs and although the government was officially hostile to its efforts, it found government administrators who unofficially supported its work with the IDPs (Individual Interview 56, Nairobi, 2014). Although the initial intervention was to offer emergency relief to IDPs, NCCCK soon expanded its objectives to reconciliation in order to resolve emerging tension between IDPs and their host communities whose scarce resources were strained by the sudden population influx (Individual Interview 41, Eldoret, 2014; Individual Interview 51, Nairobi, 2014). The state at that time did not engage in peacebuilding because the government was complicit in the political violence that manifested as ethnic clashes.

In the northern region of Kenya in the 1990s, government administrators were also unofficially engaged in peacebuilding through support to local community peace initiatives. The Wajir story is frequently told. Started by a group of women, the successful Wajir peace process later gained the support of government administrators who helped enforced the resulting Al Fatah Declaration (Odendaal, 2013; Oxfam GB, 2003). The Wajir peace process is credited for the peace committee model adopted in Kenya (Odendaal, 2013). This local process also inspired the establishment of the NSC which has been instrumental in the replication of the peace committee model (Chuma & Ojielo, 2012; Odendaal, 2013). Even though the state was previously hostile to

peacebuilding, it engaged through the NSC as a collaborative state and non-state forum that drew heavily on local peacebuilding achievements to inform its strategy. At NSC's inception, peacebuilding was mainly in the northern part of Kenya that had experienced decades of sporadic violent conflict amongst pastoralist communities. Interviewees mentioned that the early versions of Kenya's peace policy reflected the context of pastoralist conflict but this was later revised following the nationwide post-election violence in 2007/8 (Individual Interview 27, Nairobi, 2014; Individual Interview 58, Nakuru, 2014; Group Interview 3, Nairobi, 2014).

The state's support for the Wajir process involved the acknowledgment and use of customary practices preferred by the community to resolve violent conflict. In a discussion on how local traditional mechanisms are being effectively used in Wajir to resolve violent conflict, one of my interview respondents from Wajir explained the local attitude towards formal legal processes as follows: "In the old days... maybe you and me we have conflict somewhere, we used to rush to the police, have a lot of criminal issues, then we are taken to court, we waste a lot of money, we waste a lot of resources" (Individual Interview 17, Nairobi, 2014). In this statement, my interviewee alludes to the shift towards customary ways of resolving violent conflict such as the informal local peace agreements between communities that are based on cultural values and mediated by community elders. Chopra (2009) observes that some of the precepts of customary law contradict the legal regime such that these state-supported peacebuilding endeavours are actually detrimental to the strengthening of formal state institutions like the judiciary. For example, in the case of a killing or stolen cattle, the communities use a customary law system of compensation and will only resort to the official justice system when this fails. Chopra (2009) argues that while creating peace in the short term, the state's support of customary law over

official law will in the long term erode the authority of the judiciary and the police, thereby further weakening the state. Chopra's contention is constrained by the perception of the liberal state as the only viable type of state for post-conflict countries, as exemplified in this passage: "Interveners have to make possible trade-offs between security and peace in the short term (for which local structure may be applied) and the establishment of long-term justice and security sector institutions (which in a liberal state, ought to be based on a separation of powers and democratic principles)" (2009, p. 531). The problem of the liberal state debate is that it creates a dichotomy where any state model that does not qualify as liberal is consequently either liberal or illiberal. The reality is not as dichotomous because states fall along a continuum between liberal and illiberal

Some argue Kenya is a weak state because the government is not able to ensure security within its borders and has limited authority and governance capacity in areas like Northern Kenya where the state presence is thin on the ground (Bachmann & Honke, 2010; Chopra, 2009; Menkhaus, 2008). In the collaboration of state and non-state actors in peacebuilding, non-state actors support the state in fulfilling its obligation to citizens in the Northern Kenya. Menkhaus argues,

By viewing the current government-civic partnership to conduct core functions of the state in Kenya's border areas through the lens of the 'mediated state' model, we accord this hybrid governance approach the significance it is due. Though its initial purpose was to promote peacebuilding, the mediated state in Kenya has expanded into core functions of the state – the judiciary, police, cross-border diplomacy (2008, p. 32).

Menkhaus notes that the concept of the mediated state was used in reference to early state formation in Europe where weak monarchs lacking power to control the frontiers negotiated with local rivals to help control the frontiers, but this impeded state building. He contends that his

concept of a mediated state can be used to explain Kenya's strategy of working with informal authorities to control remote areas (Menkhaus, 2008). Menkhaus seeks to explain the efforts of the Kenya state in peacebuilding through the prism of European state formation. While this has explanatory value, it implies an underlying assumption of a path dependent process of state formation from traditional to modern or from a non-Western state model to a Western state model. Menkhaus argues that a mediated state strategy does not contribute to state building because the state essentially gives up its authority to non-state actors which in the long term will serve to weaken the state (2008). Yet again from this argument, peacebuilding and state building in Kenya appear incompatible.

Whereas the purpose of this chapter is not to reconcile the tensions between state building and peacebuilding in Kenya, the arguments of Chopra and Menkhaus are important because they identify state building as a motivation for the Kenyan state in peacebuilding. Even before the state was officially involved in peacebuilding, state actors unofficially supported peacebuilding efforts as complementary to their primary function of ensuring security. The precedence given to local peace processes sanctioned by official state engagement through peacebuilding underlines the fact of complementarity. This simultaneously demonstrates the state's challenged capacity to ensure security, but also the state's recognition of local mechanisms as sometimes more effective than the traditional use of force. While the state's need for non-state actors to enforce security may reveal its own weakness, it strengthens communities which benefits sustainable peacebuilding. Through this avenue of collaborative peacebuilding, the state may be able to fulfil its security obligation to the communities in a way that does not weaken the community's capacity to resolve its own problems. Migdal (1988) contends that Western state-centric

perspective assumes a legitimacy of the state that is challenged by the realities of new states where social control is more diversified. Migdal defines the strength of a state by its capacity to penetrate society, regulate social relations and extract resources for use. Migdal's argument of the realities of new states is not dissimilar to the Kenyan situation whereby the state invites collaboration of non-state actors in peace as security, which, according to the Western state model, is a role of the state.

In the case of Kenya, the collaboration of state and non-state actors to build peace does not mean that the state has lost authority, as in Menkhaus' claim of Kenya as a mediated state. The physical presence of state actors and their capacity to control the state territory is only one measure of state power. There is also the symbolic power of the state. In fact, Loveman (2005) contends that the state's capacity to exercise its other powers (political, military, ideology and economic) are based on its use of symbolic power, which is the acknowledgement by the population of the state's legitimacy to act like a state. The fact that non-state actors in Northern Kenya sought the collaboration of state actors to enforce their informal peace agreements is an acknowledgement of the symbolic power of the state in an area where there is a reduced physical presence of the state. For this state and non-state collaboration to qualify as a mediated state, it would require the non-state actors to have the capacity to enforce peace without the cooperation of the state. The continued state and non-state partnership in peacebuilding indicates recognition of the state's symbolic power.

The role of the state is clearly seen in KNFP and NCIC. KNFP derives its mandate as a focal point to implement inter-governmental protocols to tackle the problem of illicit small arms and

light weapons in the region. The KNFP Secretariat is headed by a state-appointed security official and staffed from the security sector and civil service, with technical experts from UNDP as needed. The NCIC was formed by the National Cohesion and Integration Act, 2008. The Chairperson is appointed by the president and the commissioners are nominated by the National Assembly. Despite the state role, both KNFP and NCIC work with non-state actors to implement their peacebuilding goals.

I consider NSC state-led because despite its genesis as a joint non-state and state actor initiative, it has evolved over time to become state-led. One of my non-state interviewees asked me why I referred to NSC as a state-led, despite it being established as an equal platform for both sets of actors (Individual Interview 34, Nairobi, 2014). The same respondent later commented on the frustration of working with government because it would not do what had been agreed upon around the NSC table. Several other respondents made observations on the delays or complexities of working through the bureaucracy of NSC as a government structure. One of my state interviewees said that NSC is closely associated with the state because of the location of its Secretariat in the Ministry of State for Provincial Administration and Internal Security. For this reason he had challenged non-state actors to offer space to host the Secretariat in a neutral venue but they made no offer (Individual Interview 26, Nairobi, 2014).

Apart from the location of the NSC Secretariat within a state ministry the fact that the Coordinator of the NSC Secretariat is a civil servant also indicates the dominance of the state in NSC. This is also evident in the set-up of the peace committees where the relevant level government administrator acts as a patron. As a patron the District Commissioner convenes the

District Peace Committee, gives approval to their funding proposals for peacebuilding activity and is a signatory to the bank account. The NSC Secretariat staff includes civil servants, technical experts from UNDP with occasional staff seconded from other civil society partners. Within the subcommittees at NSC, such as the Conflict Advisory Group, there is a wider representation of non-state actors. In the next two sections, I look in turn at the positive and negative effects of these three state-led units of the infrastructure for peace on the nature of peacebuilding in Kenya and the implications for peace.

5.3. The benefits of the state's involvement in peacebuilding

The state's involvement in Kenya's infrastructure for peace has had a measure of positive outcomes for peacebuilding and consequently for peace. NSC has been in existence the longest and also has the most extensive network of actors from the national to the village level. KNFP was not as successful as NSC in establishing a presence on the ground through district task forces, but it has worked through the peace committees where necessary. NCIC has the shortest tenure of the three and operates primarily from its headquarters in Nairobi. The five ways in which the state-led infrastructures have positively influenced the nature of peacebuilding in Kenya are coordination, synergy, legitimacy, policy and contextualising peacebuilding.

Coordinating peacebuilding

The involvement of the state in peacebuilding has resulted in improved coordination of peacebuilding activities across the country. Previously when peacebuilding was carried out largely by non-state actors, there was no consistent forum for coordination which increased the incidence of duplication and a lack of continuity with organisations operating in silos. This is in

part due to the fact that donor-funded NGOs are often in competition for a similar pool of funds, motivating them to pursue a competitive advantage. The state's role in peacebuilding demonstrates coordination between state and non-state actors in peacebuilding. The membership of NSC and KNFP includes state and non-state actors in advisory and implementation roles who collaboratively coordinate peacebuilding activities. For example, from 2010 to 2013, NSC coordinated state and non-state actors in a UNDP funded national peacebuilding initiative called Consolidating the Peace Process and Establishing Foundations for a Successful Political Transition (NSCPBCM, 2014a).

NSC coordinates at a national level through the Secretariat and on a local level, ideally through the peace committees. I established that there are other peace committees that are coordinated by various non-state actors such as the Catholic Justice and Peace Committees (Individual Interview 58, Nakuru, 2014). One of my interviewees described the DPC's coordination role in support of the Truth, Justice and Reconciliation Commission (TJRC) hearings: "DPC also added a great...I mean played a beautiful platform for TJRC, for TJRC to move from one place to the other, people now had the confidence to come and tell Tecla-Kiplagat² led TJRC what really happened to their place" (Individual Interview 54, Nairobi, 2014). As part of the NSC structure, the peace committees facilitate the linkage between the community and community-based organisations with local government administrators and they are also able to access the national-level government administrators through the NSC Secretariat (Individual Interview 57, Nakuru, 2014). Interviewees also clarified that the idea of a local committee is not unique to peacebuilding and

² Tecla-Kiplagat is in reference to the Chair of the TJRC, Ambassador Bethuel Kiplagat, and Tecla Wanjala who was an Acting Chair

has been used in sectors such as development or security because committees provide an entry point into the community (Individual Interviews 31 & 53, Nairobi, 2014; Individual Interview 41, Eldoret, 2014).

NSC, NCIC and KNFP have also coordinated their peacebuilding engagement due to the inter-relatedness of their mandates. KNFPs focus on small arms and NCIC on cohesion lie within the wider peacebuilding mandate that NSC coordinates. An example of the inter-unit coordination that I observed is that KNFP is represented on NSC committees and vice versa. In addition to coordinating peacebuilding activities, NSC has also mobilised resources from state and non-state actors to enable peace interventions. An example given in an interview was from 2005 following a mass killing in Turbi (Individual Interview 60, Nairobi, 2014). Non-state and state actors mobilised under the banner of NSC and secured a government helicopter and the necessary finances to send an intervention team.

The involvement of the state in the infrastructure for peace has greatly contributed to the coordination of peacebuilding because of the national scope of the state in comparison to non-state actors who engage locally or regionally. The state's coordination role has facilitated vertical and horizontal linkages between actors on a national, district and village level. Coordination is an important quality of peacebuilding to ensure the best use of available resources and to avoid exhausting the target communities with multiple, repetitive or incoherent interventions. The state's coordinating role in the infrastructure for peace has allowed for continuity because of its permanent presence. Non-state organisations' engagement in peacebuilding is usually constrained by fixed duration and externally funded programs.

Creating peacebuilding synergy

Closely related to coordination is the role of the state in facilitating robust engagement in peacebuilding. This is demonstrated in three ways: through connecting peace actors, providing a platform and supporting joint interventions for peacebuilding. The state's involvement in the I4P has created a synergy by providing a platform for state and non-state actors to continuously collaborate for peace. One NGO representative recounted an instance where NSC member organisations pooled resources to jointly implement a peacebuilding activity (Individual Interview 33, Nairobi, 2014). A particular NGO had received a small amount of funds for peace sensitisation training in preparation for the elections. The money was only enough to carry out two training sessions, too few to have a significant impact. This NGO representative approached other peacebuilding organisations under NSC who also had minimum funds for the same peace sensitisation purpose. The organisations pooled their funds and were able to jointly carry out several training sessions over a two and half year period. Synergy happens when state and non-state actors take advantage of their interconnectedness and leverage on each other's strengths to ensure a greater peacebuilding impact. This has worked particularly well at NSC.

Another aspect of synergy is how the state has served as a platform for state and non-state actors to connect in different ways for peace. At national level, the state-led NSC and KNFP provide a common table for state and non-state actors to work together in peacebuilding. The I4P has a well-established conflict early warning and early response mechanism with a situation room at NSC headquarters that receives alerts on potential conflict situations across the country. While this mechanism is part of the Conflict Early Warning and Response Mechanism (CEWARN) of the Inter-Government Authority on Development (IGAD), the early warning information also

informs peacebuilding initiatives of NSC and KNFP. This overlap between the NSC's national and the CEWERU's regional mandate is particularly important in the border regions of Kenya, where there is conflict between communities on different sides of the border. Cross-border violent conflict necessitates state involvement to engage state actors across the border to find a peacebuilding solution. Non-state actors cannot effectively intervene in cross-border conflict without the collaboration of state actors and NSC and KNFP provided a platform for this type of peace initiative. Within this peacebuilding approach, the state is uniquely placed to provide non-state actors with crucial information that would inform their interventions while being a conduit for joint interventions of a national and/or cross-border nature.

The state also provides a platform for peace actors at the community level. When government administrators convene public forums, they often allow local peace actors to engage with the community. This is the experience of peace committee interviewees. As these administrators are patrons of the peace committees at their local level, they open up the public forums for activities such as electing new peace committee members, pre-election peace sensitisation forums by the peace committees and non-state peace workers or other peace interventions as needed (Individual Interviews 1 & 5, Eldoret, 2014; Individual Interviews 14 & 15, Nakuru, 2014). These public forums allowed both state and non-state actors to engage the community in analysis of conflicts and what peace would mean in those contexts. Besides the public forums, the peace committees also organised community forums to discuss issues of peace.

Although the peace committee members are local volunteers, their close association with the local government administrator through the peace committee makes them a bridge between the

community and the state. The gap between the state and the community in Kenya can be partially explained by the political history. Colonial and post-colonial governments have viewed communities as objects of their power rather than agents whose consent to be governed must be sought. At the district level, the state provides an office space for the peace committee on the grounds of the District Commissioner's office and this is a visible illustration of the state-community link. The peace committees use this office space to bring state and non-state actors to work together for peace. For some peace committees, like in Nakuru, the government administrators have provided internet, printers and office maintenance support to coordinate local peacebuilding work. This support has enabled the peace committees to engage effectively with different stakeholders in the community and create a momentum for peacebuilding at a local level.

A notable illustration of the synergy created by the state as an actor in the infrastructure for peace is the Uwiano Platform for Peace. This was a collective state and non-state actor strategy to prevent violent conflict around the 2010 constitutional referendum and the 2013 elections. *Uwiano* is a Swahili word used to connote cohesion (Uwiano Joint Secretariat, 2012). The first phase of Uwiano included NSC, NCIC, PeaceNet (an umbrella organisation for civil society organisations countrywide) and UNDP; the second phase was expanded to include Partnerships for Peace and Security, UN Women and Independent Electoral and Boundaries Commission (IEBC) (Uwiano Joint Secretariat, 2012). Uwiano partners set up a temporary joint Secretariat hosted by NSC and staffed by partner organisations to monitor threats to peace and recommend appropriate responses (Uwiano Joint Secretariat, 2012). The early warning information came in from those on the ground, including NSC's peace committees, peace monitors, member agencies,

NCIC cohesion monitors and PeaceNet member organisations. In addition there was a free text messaging system for the public to send in alerts on potentially violent situations. These alerts would be verified and analysed by the joint secretariat which would make a decision on the appropriate response. During the 2010 referendum process, the messaging system was only available to subscribers of one mobile phone network but Uwiano rectified this problem for the 2013 elections so that the public could send messages from any network (Uwiano Platform for Peace, 2012).

The Uwiano platform for peace has claimed success in harnessing financial and human resources towards a joint early warning and early response system. In reference to a 2012 Uwiano report, Chuma and Ojielo (2012) state that out of 20,000 messages received, Uwiano responded with 364 interventions and no violence was reported during the referendum. In another report, Uwiano describes a successful response to an alert received from Chebarus village and in addition observes that 70,000 police officers were deployed to potential conflict areas which helped in keeping the peace (Uwiano Platform for Peace, 2012). According to this report, the state acted to prevent violence and the police presence was a deterrent. Those involved in Uwiano highlighted the high-level of collaboration between state and non-state actors which enhanced the early warning and early response (Individual Interviews: 26, 30, 36 & 50, Nairobi, 2014; Individual Interview 37, Nairobi, 2015). The state's involvement in Uwiano granted non-state partners direct access to high state security officials who shared relevant intelligence information and mobilised state security actors to respond as needed (Individual Interview 36, Nairobi, 2014; Individual Interview 37, Nairobi, 2015).

Creating synergy between state and non-state actors is important because joint interventions optimise the use of financial and human resources in peacebuilding. The state's involvement in the infrastructures for peace has positively influenced peacebuilding in demonstrating that partnering in peacebuilding is not only a good use of resources with a potentially greater impact, but that working together for peace is both the goal and the nature of building peace.

Legitimacy effects

There is a dual effect of legitimacy. The state has given legitimacy to non-state actors for peacebuilding in the infrastructure for peace but the non-state actors have also conveyed legitimacy to the state in peacebuilding. Loveman's (2005) conception of symbolic power is useful in understanding how the state's engagement in the infrastructures for peace has been a source of legitimacy for non-state actors in peacebuilding. Despite the limited presence of state security in the North of Kenya, citizens still see the state as a legitimate provider of security. The overlap between peace and security in Kenya makes the state an essential stakeholder in peacebuilding. The state's legitimacy for security translates into a legitimacy to build peace when the immediate goals for peace overlap with security. The state's involvement in peacebuilding alongside non-state actors transfers legitimacy to non-state actors to engage in peacebuilding. Peace committee members said they had gained the confidence of the public through this association.

Legitimacy does not always have positive connotations. Though the population may view the state as a legitimate actor, this legitimacy may derive from a negative experience of the force of the state in exacting this legitimacy. For example, the Jomo Kenyatta and Moi governments did

not tolerate popular dissent and used force to control the population which often silenced alternative voices. Partly through the use of force, the state gained legitimacy as the main security actor, a legitimacy it enjoys to date.

One of the ways in which the non-state actors have benefitted from the legitimacy of the state can be seen in the rising role of peace committees in Kenya. Peace committees are made up of members of the community who volunteer their time to ensure peace in their communities. As residents of the community in which they serve, they have become the go-to people when there is a threat of violence in the community as captured in the following observation of a peace committee member: “When we go to the community, somebody can tell me there is something that I should tell the chief. They trust us even more than the government” (Individual Interview 11, Nairobi, 2014). Although the claim that the community trusts the peace committees more than the government seems to contradict the benefit of state legitimacy, the peace committee’s position as a community contact is based on their connection to the state, where the committee gets the legitimacy to engage in security.

All the peace committee members I interviewed confirmed that the community regularly contacts them with information on threats of violence/conflict because the committee is seen as having direct access to government administrators on the ground who can respond accordingly after the needed verification. The legitimacy of the peace committees is enhanced by their vertical links through NSC enabling them to pass on information both to government administrators at their level, but also to the NSC Secretariat through the regional peace monitor or directly. This vertical link was valuable in one instance where the community felt that their local government

administrators may be complicit in the violent conflict (Individual Interview 15, Nakuru, 2014). They did not trust them to take appropriate action and used the peace committees to reach other levels of government administration. Even though the community fears the force of the state, they report potential violence that they feel can be prevented by state security. They likely perceive that the state will act for them to alleviate their security fears and not cause them further insecurity. The peace committees also act as a needed filter since they are representing the community and will protect their informants while seeking the best response for peace in their area.

Non-state actors have also given the state legitimacy in peacebuilding through the infrastructure for peace. While the state involvement in the I4Ps has granted legitimacy to non-state actors in this peacebuilding approach, the state has also gained legitimacy through this partnership. In one of my interviews, a government administrator observed that in some cases the chief (a government administrator appointed at the location level) will issue a directive to the community but they will ignore it until the peace committee members step in to validate what has been said (Individual Interview 23, Nakuru, 2014). When the local government administrators recognise the credibility of peace committee members as representatives of their community and work well with them, the legitimacy of the state is also increased (Individual Interviews: 15, 22 & 23, Nakuru, Nairobi). The legitimacy of the state in matters of peace and security is particularly useful in helping non-local non-state actors to gain initial access to the community for peacebuilding. This does not apply to non-state actors such as peace committee members who are residents of the communities and presumably have that legitimacy to build peace.

Policies for peace

The involvement of the state has enabled the development of policies related to peacebuilding. The peace policy adopted by the National Assembly on 27 August 2015 was the culmination of a decade-long process set in motion by state and non-state actors through NSC. Over this period of time, the draft policy went through significant revisions to reflect the full breadth of violent conflict in Kenya beyond the original focus on pastoralist conflict and the structural changes envisioned in the 2010 constitution. The main purpose of the policy is to provide guidelines for the government to coordinate peacebuilding in Kenya with the stated mission: “To promote sustainable peace through collaborative institutional framework between state, non-state actors and Kenyan communities” (Ministry of Interior and Co-ordination of National Government, 2014, p. 11). The peace policy indicates a state recognition of peacebuilding as a response to violent conflict and demonstrates the commitment of government to engage in and support peacebuilding alongside non-state actors. While non-state actors were instrumental in the drafting and validation process, the cooperation of state actors within the infrastructure for peace helped to move the draft policy through the bureaucracy to its final stage.

KNFP and NCIC derive their mandates from the state thus entrenching the role of the state in those aspects of peacebuilding. KNFP is supporting the passing of a draft for the National Policy on Small Arms Control and Management and a review of the Firearm Act to ensure penalties have a deterrent effect (Individual Interview 28, Nairobi, 2014). NCIC seeks to implement the hate speech law contained in section 13 of the National Cohesion and Integration Act, 2008 and has been very active in curbing hate speech. Despite the visible efforts of NCIC, there had been no successful hate speech prosecution by 2014 and NCIC was facing a new challenge of dealing

with hate speech online (Individual Interview 30, Nairobi, 2014). Through the formulation of policy and implementation of laws related to peacebuilding, the role of the state has clearly supported the development of policy to provide legal frameworks for building peace by both state and non-state actors in Kenya.

Contextualizing peacebuilding

In chapter 2, I discuss how peacebuilding strategies need to be informed by the local context in order to be effective. Chuma and Ojielo (2012) observe that state actors in Kenya have collaborated with non-state actors to build peace according to their customary laws. The role of state actors in supporting locally appropriate approaches to peacebuilding in Kenya has encouraged peace for certain communities. Peace committee members gave examples of how enforcing community peace agreements had kept or restored peace following violent conflict between communities. A peace committee member narrated how in Wajir, the peace committees have actively followed the stipulations in the Modogashe declaration on the seasonal movement of pastoralists and their camels for grazing purposes. The peace committees have found that by communicating in advance with the peace committee in the area to which pastoralists from their community are moving, they are able to secure protection for their migrating members (Individual Interview 17, Nairobi, 2014). The potential host peace committee informs the District Commissioner about the incoming pastoralists to ensure adequate security and safeguard peace in the community.

When local approaches have proved effective in resolving or preventing cases of violent conflict in some regions of Kenya, the state's support of these approaches has made the nature of

peacebuilding within the infrastructures for peace contextually relevant, increasing the prospects for lasting peace. As the preceding discussion demonstrates, there have been significant positive outcomes for peacebuilding from the state's active engagement in the infrastructures for peace. Nevertheless, there are also critical ways in which it has negatively affected the nature of peacebuilding in Kenya.

5.4. The drawbacks of the state's role in peacebuilding

When I began this study, the role of the state in this inclusive peacebuilding approach seemed incompatible with what I perceived to be the typical exclusive top-down operational style of the state in Kenya. As discussed in Chapter 2, the top-down approach has not been as successful in peacebuilding because it often fails to consider local knowledge as an essential component of a comprehensive peacebuilding strategy. Although I found definite benefits to the role of the state through the infrastructure for peace, the state role has also negatively affected the nature of peacebuilding in three ways. First, it has co-opted local agency and depressed local initiative. Secondly, the involvement of the state has resulted in a minimalist conceptualisation of peace as security within this peacebuilding approach. Third, as the state's engagement in peacebuilding has increased through the number of institutions, it has crowded out key non-state actors in peacebuilding.

In this section, the distinction I make between local actors and non-state actors is on the basis of residency and occupation. While local actors are non-state actors who reside in the communities where they volunteer, non-state actors are not necessarily residents of the areas in which they

work. In this study, local actors are peace committee members and non-state actors are local and national NGO workers.

Local matters

The state builds peace to build the state. While the peacebuilding approach in the infrastructure for peace has been deliberately inclusive, the role of the state has impacted the nature of local engagement in peacebuilding by co-opting agency and depressing local initiative.

Co-opting local agency

Local agency is one of the most remarkable features of this peacebuilding approach particularly because the state is often associated with top-down approaches to peacebuilding which do not significantly engage local agency. On the contrary, local actors are significantly involved in this approach. The conceptualisation of NSC was inspired by the successful Wajir peace process led by local agents and supported by state actors. In Wajir, the community was initially mobilised through a group of women, then youth and elders. This later became a peace committee with representation from the different social groups. The concept of a peace committee has since been extensively replicated by state and non-state actors as a means to ensure local agency in peacebuilding. Despite its strong local roots in Wajir, the peace committee idea does not necessarily reflect the traditional conflict-resolution mechanism in other communities, but it has been applied, in the words of one my interview respondent, as a “one-size-fits-all” strategy (Individual Interview 49, Nairobi, 2014). The term ‘peace committee’ has become synonymous with local agency. In one respect this accurately reflects the fact that members are residents working for peace in their area on a voluntary basis. In another respect, though the peace

committee model implies a local approach, it may not resonate as authentic local agency in every community. The state has played a major role in expanding the use of peace committees attached to local government administrators to the extent that some of my NGO interviewees referred to them as government structures (Individual Interviews 42 & 43, Lodwar, 2014).

Apart from the context-blind application of the peace committee strategy, the establishment of peace committees has been strongly influenced by the external actors. In my interviews, several respondents indicated that peace committee representatives are meant to be selected by their respective communities. The guidelines on the formation of peace committees state that the selection modalities should suit the local context and indicate that the committee should hold re-constitution elections every three years (NSCPBCM, 2009). From the interviews I found that some peace committee members were appointed to fulfil equality requirements while other members were handpicked based on the local government administrator's perception of them as leaders (Individual Interviews 14 & 58, Nakuru, 2014; Group Interview 2, Nairobi, 2014). The state co-opts local agency when it appoints peace committee members as it subverts the very idea of local agency, which implies a community-driven process. An interviewee claimed that some peace committee appointments are a reward for loyalty to the government (Individual Interview 49, Nairobi, 2014). When the state appoints peace committee members, the community may not see them as representative and they may not even be from the conflict-affected area.

State involvement in this peacebuilding approach has co-opted the local agency peace committee strategy. Local actors are so closely connected to the government administrators that they appear

to be acting for the state. This is not unique to NSC, as peace committees started by non-state actors have also been referred to by association to the supporting NGO or religious institution such as the National Council of Churches of Kenya, the Catholic Justice and Peace Commission, Oxfam or World Vision. The challenge of a close association of peace committees with the state is that whatever attitudes are held about the state are mirrored in how the community views the peace committees. For example, a fear of state surveillance may instil fear that peace committees will be used by the state to give information about community members that would get them in trouble with the state. One interviewee reflected this in the statement: “DPC also faced the challenge of some resistance, some resistance from some quarters because it was said it is a government watchdog meant to extract information from the people for a purpose best known to the government” (Individual Interview 58, Nakuru, 2014). Some peace committee members have been threatened and intimidated by their communities who perceive them as betrayers, whistle blowers or informers. A peace committee member shared a reaction by the community at the news that a DPC was being formed in the area:

So many community members saw us as betrayers. ‘Being Luos, you are forming a peace committee. Where will you operate with this peace committee structure? We will harm you. We will follow you up to your house.’ We were intimidated very much into this...forming this thing” (Individual Interview 10, Nairobi, 2014).

A community’s perception of peace committee members directly affects how it will engage through this peacebuilding mechanism. So whereas the peace committees have been a valuable resource when the community requires access to state actors, the committee members have also been a target for those who would distrust the state. When the peace committee members are labelled as betrayers or informers, it is a judgement on their perceived allegiance to the state

rather than to the community. This compromises the power of local agency for peacebuilding. One interviewee remarked that sometimes peace committee members get confused about their roles:

They become more of informers for the government than community mediators. They were the ones who were telling government this; then they are the ones telling people, ‘the government will not accept this’, some of them forgot their role (Individual Interview 51, Nairobi, 2014).

The unclear boundary between state and non-state actors in the infrastructure for peace has sometimes resulted in the peace committees operating as an extension of the state’s administration in service delivery. Peace committees require the goodwill of the respective government administrator, e.g., at district level, in order to carry out their activities. For instance, peace committee members explained that once the committee has developed a funding proposal it has to be approved by the government administrator, who is also a co-signatory to its bank account (Individual Interview 4 & 43, Lodwar, 2014; Individual Interview 22, Nairobi, 2014; Individual Interview 20, Nakuru, 2014). The interconnectedness with the state has led to the community perception that peace committees can act for the state in delivering services. My peace committee interviewees listed the vast array of intervention requests from the community including domestic quarrels, child abuse, rape, lost children, home break-ins, settling hospital debts and accompanying community members to court (Group Interview 1, Eldoret, 2014; Group Interview 2, Nairobi, 2014). The range of these requests considerably stretches the committee’s peace mandate and reflects the community’s perception of the peace committees as an extension of the state in providing these social services.

The state has also co-opted local agency by using elders to respond to conflict. In one case, a government administrator delegated his role by requesting the peace committee to mobilise

elders to intervene, in his absence, in a particular conflict situation. Elders are also used to add legitimacy to peacebuilding processes. One of my interview respondents observed,

Somebody can just think in this office, I think I will need several elders like this to come and agree, then you write in the report, 'community participation, pastoralists participated' but they just came to take tea for two days in the seminar and you say there were involved, that is what I mean, they are hardly involved. (Individual Interview 44, Lodwar, 2014)

Coercion happens when elders or community members are brought in to validate a process yet they were not involved development or the implementation. Co-opting local agency is one aspect of local matters. The other aspect of state engagement in this peacebuilding approach has depressed local initiative.

Depressing local initiative

The top-down style of state operations has negatively impacted local initiative either through a failure to communicate or by deliberate efforts to frustrate the peace committees. In the infrastructure for peace, particularly in the well-established NSC structure, information flows up from those on the ground for a decision on the required response by the top. The top does not necessarily refer to the NSC Secretariat where all the information is received, but rather to the respective level of government administration where the decision is made e.g. the district commissioner at the district level or the chief at the location level. Local actors on the ground said that they felt demoralised because they regularly sent in information but did not receive any acknowledgement. They also were not always informed of the planned response and, on occasion, they found out that the government failed to respond despite their information. One peace committee interviewee observed "it demoralises you the person who has reported, because

when you give a report and you see nothing is done about it, so you feel like you are now wasting your time” (Individual Interview 15, Nakuru, 2014). Another interviewee noted that though the committee received thanks for the information received by NSC, the committee was not told how this information was used to avert violence. The security focus of this state-led peacebuilding approach is characterised by a hierarchal one-way flow of information, from the bottom up, which reinforces the inequality between the state and non-state actors.

Sometimes the government administrators deliberately frustrate the efforts of local actors to coordinate peacebuilding actors by dealing directly with non-state actors to emphasize their authority. One interviewee expressed frustration at how the state actors sometimes behaved towards the peace committee:

At times you come into this office [DPC], and then you walk into the office of the chief they will tell you ‘if you went to the DPC why are you coming here again? Why don’t they finish dealing with your problem’...Then we feel belittled by these guys. Maybe because we don’t have the pay slip, you see? As much as they might be respecting us in other avenues, it reaches a time, it’s like they have drawn a line. (Individual Interview 10, Nairobi, 2014)

There is an uneasy tension created by expectations of state and local actors working together in the infrastructure for peace. The local actors see themselves as a critical component because they represent the community and they are committed to peace. They expect the state actors to accord them due recognition through adequate communication and inclusion on peacebuilding decision making. The state on the other hand has security as its priority and while it expects information from the local actors, it does not necessarily communicate back to them. In this way, the state has depressed local initiative by excluding or frustrating local actors and used local initiative for state

purposes. The state has instrumentalised communities through the function of security and this has also resulted in a reductive conceptualisation of peace within this peacebuilding approach.

Reducing the conceptualisation of peace

The primary focus of the state in peacebuilding is security and this has been its major contribution to the achievements of the infrastructures for peace. Chapter 4 analyses the concept of peace as security. Richmond (2013b) discusses security as one of the basic functions of the state and says that a state is described as predatory, security-focused or liberal, depending on how it carries out its functions of sovereignty, security and public service. These three functions are not mutually exclusive, but each function reflects a phase in state making. This does not imply a linear progression where sovereignty and security are the predominant goals of weak states and public service of strong states. With the shifting global security dynamics of terrorism, security is an enduring focus of both old and new states. A government administrator described the link between peace and security in this way:

Peace and security go together. Peace is broader because security is to be free from unwanted and unwarranted interferences. Peace is bigger than that. It includes that security because peace is derived from an individual and social level. In many cases, insecurity is caused by a lack of peace. Insecurity is why peace committees were created, we needed an alternative way to maintain and restore peace (Individual Interview 23, Nakuru, 2014).

Due to the nature of the state's engagement in the infrastructures for peace, security has often become the end and not just the immediate goal. In NSC's early warning and early response system, the peace committees relay security threats from a community level for action by government administrators. KNFP focuses on disarmament to reduce violence caused by illegal small arms and light weapons. NCIC addresses the verbal violence of hate speech that can incite

violent conflict. All three largely emphasise the prevention of physical violence as conflict prevention and therefore peace. Even though the security focus is most apparent in the work of NSC and KNFP, NCIC also tackles cohesion from a security angle. NCIC's prominence in curbing hate speech is with the goal of preventing violence but not as much emphasis is evident in transformative reconciliation activities. In reflecting on the successes of the I4P, Chuma and Ojielo (2012) note that 364 interventions were made to avert violent conflict. While security is an essential element of peace as discussed in chapter 4, building peace that lasts requires a more comprehensive conceptualisation of peace as noted in Lederach's (1997) conflict transformation theory. From a security perspective, the government responds only when there is an immediate threat to peace, but from a peacebuilding perspective, interventions should go deeper to transform violent structures and relationships that undergird violent conflict.

Having the state as a major actor in peacebuilding has served as a barrier to a comprehensive approach to peace by limiting peacebuilding to the confines of traditional state security. In one case, a peace committee member said that a state security officer, instead of giving his contact information, gave the community the phone numbers of peace committee members as the contact to report any security threats (Group Interview 2, Nairobi, 2014). In the interviews, peace committee members said they have been involved in security-related interventions that include rescuing kidnapped women, recovering arms during disarmament, recovering stolen cattle and returning stolen property after the 2007/8 electoral violence (Individual Interviews 4 & 10, Lodwar, 2014; Individual Interviews 14 & 15, Nakuru, 2014; Individual Interview 51, Nairobi, 2014). Security is an important aspect of peace but state-led peacebuilding should address other substantive conceptualisations of peace in Kenya as discussed in chapter 4. The state's

engagement in the infrastructure for peace has shifted the nature of peace to focus on security and this limits the scope of peacebuilding with consequent negative impacts on the prospects for sustainable peace.

Crowding out non-state peace actors

Whereas the engagement of the state in peacebuilding has greatly enhanced coordination and collaboration between state and non-state actors through the infrastructures for peace, the progressively active role of the state in peace is gradually crowding out non-state actors. This has happened in three main ways. The first is in the competition for resources (financial and human); second in the changing role of the state in peacebuilding from coordination to implementation; and finally in the introduction of multiple state structures in peacebuilding.

The competition between the state and non-state actor for peacebuilding funding is a major factor for the declining engagement of non-state actors in Kenya's infrastructure for peace. In its initial stage, non-state actors played a key role in the establishment of NSC with the support of organisations such as Oxfam. Non-state actors have since provided considerable financial and human resource support for the peacebuilding activities of the NSC, KNFP and NCIC. Following the violence of the 2007 elections, UNDP increased financial support for the three state-led units in peacebuilding to become the key funding partner in comparison to the existing I4P non-state actors and this resulted in a steady decline of non-state actor engagement. From actively being a multiple stakeholder forum of state and non-state actors, NSC has slowly evolved into a state and UNDP collaboration with episodic collaboration with other non-state actors.

Some non-state actors expressed that the competition for resources has reduced the trust between state and non-state actors because the state is now competing for the same pool of limited resources in peacebuilding (Individual Interviews 25, 52, 55 & 60, Nairobi, 2014). In addition to financial resources, UNDP has also boosted the human resource capacity of NSC and KNFP with seconded UNDP technical experts. Previously the state received financial and human resource support from different non-state actors³ for peacebuilding interventions, which allowed diverse actors to engage in a more critical way. Now with the state and UNDP partnership, the state has reduced its level of interdependence with the wider group of non-state actors, some of who now feel that they are there just to validate what the state wants to do through the I4P (Individual Interviews 54 & 55, Nairobi, 2014).

The state's access to increased resources for peacebuilding has coincided with a perceived changing role of the state in the infrastructure for peace. Structures like NSC and the peace committees were originally created to coordinate peacebuilding actors, but now also directly implement peacebuilding activities. For example in building capacities for peace, NSC Secretariat staff now directly conduct peacebuilding training rather than coordinating non-state actors to train (Individual Interviews 49 & 60, Nairobi, 2014; Individual Interview 61, Nakuru, 2014). This shift from coordination to implementation means that state actors no longer require the collaboration of non-state actors to carry out peacebuilding activities, but by implementing, the state loses the objective distance to effectively coordinate peacebuilding. A stronger implementation role has also increased the visibility of the state as an actor in peacebuilding,

³ KNFP, NSC and NCIC have received financial and human resource support from organisations including the German Technical Cooperation Agency (GTZ), Institute for Security Studies, Oxfam, PACT Kenya, Saferworld

which inadvertently reinforces the inequality of power between state and non-state actors. One of the interviewees reflected on the power dynamic between state and non-state actors with these words: “you will still find that deeply ingrained in the minds of government officials is the whole idea that they are the ones in charge and peace therefore is their preserve” (Individual Interview 48, Nairobi, 2014).

The link between peace and security in state-led peacebuilding in Kenya means that the heightened visibility of state actors threatens the envisioned partnership with non-state actors in a structure like NSC. The Uwiano initiative provides an example of this disequilibrium. Despite the success claimed by Uwiano, a non-state actor complained that the state-led structures took all the credit, even though non-state actors had played a significant role in mobilising the communities on the ground for peace (Individual Interview 52, Nairobi, 2014).

The third aspect of crowding out non-state actors is by creating multiple state structures dealing with peacebuilding. Chapter 6 discusses the multiplicity of state structures as a by-product of institutionalisation. Though I have noted the complementarity of these institutions in their collaborative efforts for peace, there is duplication in the similarity of their mandates. In 2001, state and non-state actors formed the NSC as the first peacebuilding institution that involved the state. In 2003, state actors established KNFP in fulfilment of an inter-state protocol to reduce the proliferation of illegal arms in the region, a mandate closely intertwined with the conflict management and peacebuilding mandate of NSC. In 2008, the enactment of the National Cohesion and Integration Act created NCIC to deal with issues of cohesion and integration,

which is part of NSC's peacebuilding mandate. One interviewee gave what he claimed would be a contested opinion,

The conception and formation of the NCIC was an indictment of the NSC's effectiveness. That in post-election violence, the aftermath of that, had NSC been present enough, visible enough, in strategic times, politically recognisable by the leaders and all the actors, then talk of the NCIC would not have arisen in the first place. They would have probably said yeah, expand the mandate of this, we do not have an act covering this. Why don't we have an act to cover the structure that already exists?" (Individual Interview 60, Nairobi, 2014)

The existence of three state-led units with similar mandates has sometimes led to turf wars or duplication of peacebuilding activities (Individual Interviews 27, 48 & 52, Nairobi, 2014). One non-state actor mentioned that during the final stages of developing the peace policy in Kenya, there was a debate between state and non-state actors to merge NSC and NCIC to avoid the duplication of mandates but this was met with resistance by state actors and later dismissed (Individual Interview 52, Nairobi, 2014). The KNFP mandate is directly part of the NSC mandate and because of the physical proximity of their offices, there has been close collaboration between the two. Nonetheless, this did not prevent the creation of district task forces (DTFs) to mirror NSC district peace committees (DPCs). Though DTFs varied in composition to DPCs, they were both convened by the same District Commissioner. The overlap of peacebuilding mandates has also led to duplicating human resource capacity. In preparation for the 2013 elections, NCIC had cohesion monitors in each district on the ground for eight months, in addition to the regular NSC district peace monitors and the IGAD field monitors of the CEWERU (Individual Interviews 30 & 32, Nairobi, 2014). These were alongside the 49 NSC-recruited peace and data analysts supported by UN Women and the PeaceNet-trained mediators and monitors (Individual Interviews 52 & 60, Nairobi, 2014). The government has

also created a Department of Cohesion which has a similar mandate to NCIC and the confusion between the two is often reflected in media reports that wrongly associate activities of the Department of Cohesion with those of NCIC and vice versa (Individual Interview 30, Nairobi, 2014).

The growing role of the state in peacebuilding has crowded out the valuable role of non-state actors in peacebuilding. The state has successfully acquired sufficient resources for peacebuilding, adjusted its role towards implementation and created multiple structures for peace at different levels. Non-state actors have in the past played a critical peacebuilding role by challenging state structures contributing to violence and their declining engagement negatively impacts the depth of peacebuilding required for conflict transformation.

5.5. Conclusion

The role of the state in peacebuilding is contentious because of the close link to state building which is generally a violent process. In Kenya the state has contributed to violence both directly and indirectly. Therefore, how effectively can the state build peace if it means dismantling structures and relationships on which state power has been built? Before the state's active involvement in peacebuilding, non-state actors said that while they were able to deal with some aspects of violent conflict such as building relationships, they were unable to stop direct violence or put into place long-term infrastructures that would sustain peace. The state and non-state actor collaboration addressed these gaps. To a certain extent, the peacebuilding partnership between state and non-state actors within the infrastructure for peace has enabled both sets of actors to realise successes beyond what they would have been able to accomplish independently.

The nexus between peace and security underlines the need for a role of the state in peacebuilding. Within Kenya's infrastructure for peace, the state has developed a system to receive and analyse early warning information on threats to peace and security, and has further played a valuable role in facilitating appropriate security response to prevent violence and conflict. The early warning and early response system has worked particularly well because of the contribution of non-state actors such as the peace committees on the ground. The state has also played a critical role in the aspect of disarmament for conflict prevention. Furthermore because of the permanency of the state, structures linked to the state can undertake long-term peacebuilding. Despite these achievements, the growing role of the state in peacebuilding has negatively impacted local ownership, crowded out other non-state actors and limited the conceptualisation of peace to security.

Yet there is still a role for the state in peacebuilding. Apart from the basic function of protecting life and property, the state is in an optimal position to address some of the roots of violent conflict, such as contentious borders or crime-related violent conflict like cattle raiding. The sustainability of peace is facilitated by a favourable socio-economic environment and the state is best placed to ensure needed infrastructure such as roads and communication services that would promote social-economic growth. Even in the arid lands where pastoralism is the major livelihood source, the state can put in place adequate mechanisms to protect the mobility of pastoralists, prevent cattle theft and increase the profitability of this livelihood by guaranteeing access to markets. Whereas state presence is minimal in the arid lands, the symbolic power of the state has legitimised traditional conflict resolution mechanisms and also gained legitimacy from the cooperation of non-state actors to keep peace. The responsibility of the state to provide

access to justice and deal with cross-border violence underscores the need for a continued role of the state in peacebuilding. Kenya's peace policy acknowledges this: "The concern to promote peace and stability in Kenya has been with policy makers and stakeholders for decades. This is reflected in active and continuous engagements with local and national peace initiatives over the years" (Government of Kenya, 2014, p. 9).

The state in Kenya has positively contributed to the peacebuilding achievements of the infrastructure for peace especially in the domain of security. Yet the negative impact of the state's engagement on the nature of peacebuilding and the prospects for peace raises important questions on the viability of this collaborative approach of state and non-state actors in peacebuilding. The state does have a role to play in peacebuilding, but this must not be at the expense of the critical engagement of non-state actors in a comprehensive peacebuilding strategy. If the state maintained its role of coordinating peacebuilding, it would not crowd out non-state actors in implementing peace building activities. The state then needs to take up aspects of peacebuilding that it is best placed to do as discussed in chapter 4. The impact of the state in peacebuilding has also led to the institutionalisation of peacebuilding. In the next chapter, I focus on how institutionalisation affects long term peacebuilding and the prospects for peace.

Chapter 6: The Institutionalisation and Sustainability Nexus

6.1. Introduction

The institutionalisation of peacebuilding aims to ensure the permanent availability of peacebuilding capacities at the national and local levels. I use institutionalisation in my study to refer to the process through which peacebuilding networks and structures are embedded within the state. In Kenya, the state has played a major role in institutionalising peacebuilding as discussed in chapter 5. The promise of institutionalisation is the sustainability of peacebuilding in the creation of permanent structures to build peace. Sustainable peacebuilding will safeguard peace gains by ensuring capacities to build and sustain peace in the long term. Institutionalising peacebuilding means that after the immediate response to violent conflict there will be the capacity to engage in the long term and address conflictual structures and relationships that caused the conflict. Scholars and practitioners of peacebuilding argue that due to the complex and dynamic nature of violent conflict, a longer term process is best for building lasting peace (Chuma & Ojielo, 2012; Kumar & De la Haye, 2012; Lederach, 1997, 2012; van Tongeren, 2013). Infrastructures for peace or peace architectures are terms used to refer to structures designed to accomplish this long-term peacebuilding. The actual structures vary depending on the specific context and dynamics (Ryan, 2012). In this study I will use the term infrastructure for peace (I4P) because of its usage in the Kenya case and related literature.

While the term infrastructure for peace may evoke the image of the deliberate and concerted effort of a unified set of actors to establish the different components of an infrastructure, reality is less tidy. Van Tongeren (2013) aptly describes an I4P as an aspiration or a vision for a long-

term process, as opposed to a precise concept. Nevertheless, the term infrastructure often refers to formal structures. Odendaal describes an I4P as “a structure that links institutions and organisations at all levels of society to optimise the peacebuilding capacity of that society” (2012, p. 40). While Odendaal refers to I4Ps from the perspective of national peace committees established to implement a peace agreement, I4Ps are not limited to typical post-conflict settings. I introduce the infrastructure for peace concept in chapter 2 and discuss the components of Kenya’s infrastructure for peace in chapter 5.

In Kenya, the various units described as the I4P were established at different times with independent mandates. The Kenyan I4P has three state-led components established in this order: the National Steering Committee on Conflict Management and Peacebuilding (NSC), 2001; the Kenya National Focal Point on small arms and light weapons (KNFP), 2003; and the National Cohesion and Integration Commission (NCIC), 2008. NSC, KNFP and NCIC have formal links to enhance collaborative peacebuilding between state and non-state actors. Peace practitioners have commended the success of Kenya’s infrastructure for peace particularly in preventing election related violence (Alihodžić, 2012; Chuma & Ojielo, 2012; Kumar & De la Haye, 2012; Ryan, 2012; van Tongeren, 2013).

In this chapter, I analyse the impact of institutionalisation through the research question: **What are the effects of institutionalisation on the sustainability of peacebuilding?** I find that institutionalising peacebuilding through NSC, KNFP and NCIC has negatively impacted the sustainability of peacebuilding and consequently, the prospects for peace. I argue that there are three threats to sustainability from institutionalisation. The first threat is that institutionalisation

demands financial resources that exceed what is locally available which means that peacebuilding will not be sustainable. The second threat is from a human resource angle. Institutionalisation has relied on the use of externally supplied technical experts who fulfil short-term capacity demands but do not necessarily contribute to long-term capacities. In addition, institutionalising peacebuilding has adversely affected the role of volunteers thereby compromising the critical role of local agents. The third threat is from the new ways of building peace through meetings and by professionalising and bureaucratising peacebuilding, which has negative implications on the sustainability of peace practice. This chapter has three sections. In the first section I provide an overview of the institutionalisation of peacebuilding in general and the second section focuses on the case of Kenya. The final section looks at how institutionalisation has impacted sustainability in Kenya.

6.2. Background to institutionalising peacebuilding

The institutionalisation of peacebuilding is evident in the 1992 United Nations (UN) Agenda for Peace that identified peacebuilding as a post-conflict activity where the UN will “identify and support structures which will tend to strengthen and solidify peace in order to avoid a relapse into conflict” (Boutros-Ghali, 1992, para. 21). The term “structure” implies an institutional approach. During the 1990s bilateral funding for peacebuilding increased. Goetschel and Hagmann observe: “Throughout the 1990s OECD countries substantially augmented funding for peacebuilding in addition to existing budgets for overseas development assistance” (2009, p. 59). This bilateral funding aided the institutionalisation of peacebuilding as governments in post-conflict countries sought to integrate peacebuilding alongside development. In 2005, UN

Resolution 1645 established the UN Peacebuilding Commission as a global advisory body on peacebuilding.

In contrast to this idea of peacebuilding as a post-conflict activity, Lederach (2012) conceptualises peacebuilding as an essential activity before, during and after conflict to ensure conflict transformation and violence prevention. Lederach (1997) introduces the concept of an infrastructure for peace as part of a comprehensive peacebuilding strategy as discussed in chapter 2. Lederach (2012) argues that an infrastructure for peace responds to three challenges in peacebuilding. The first challenge is that peacebuilding intervenes through short term projects that only address the immediate post-conflict needs. An I4P enables strategic long-term engagement to transform structural and relational roots of conflict. The second challenge the I4Ps address is sustainability, as they are rooted in the local context and cultures. As described by Lederach, “At its core, infrastructure suggested that change unfolds over time and requires a quality of presence rooted in the setting with a capacity for generative responses to emergent crises and a longer term, shared vision of desired change” (2012, p. 10). The third challenge is going beyond ending conflict and the I4P also seeks to build what is desirable post-conflict. Lederach contends that the I4P promotes sustainability because it is embedded in local context and culture, which have often been overlooked in the international peacebuilding interventions (Lederach, 1997, 2012). Conversely, institutionalising the I4P in Kenya has negatively affected sustainability. While the Kenyan I4P is debatably grounded in the local context and culture, institutionalisation has created demands that have surpassed locally available resources. External resources have met the deficit in a way that threatens sustainability of peacebuilding.

The United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) has supported the development of I4Ps around the world. UNDP links peacebuilding to development in transforming a society from fragility to resilience. Fragile societies differ from resilient societies in limited state functions, unmet social contract and conflict vulnerability (Ryan, 2012; UNDP, 2013). Ryan contends, “To support the development process in fragile settings in a sustainable way, there is a need to build the internal capacities of societies to manage conflict in a non-violent manner while enhancing their resilience to internal and external shocks” (2012, p. 20). UNDP identifies I4Ps as a means to support this transition from fragility to resilience and recommends institutionalising these structures (Ryan, 2012). According to Ryan, “To support the transformation from fragility to resilience, it is necessary to institutionalise mechanisms and systematically build capabilities to deal with challenges in an inclusive and peaceful manner” (2012, p. 14). The concept of an I4P as a standing capacity for peacebuilding and conflict prevention implies the permanence of the infrastructure (Alihodžić, 2012; Chuma & Ojielo, 2012; Kumar & De la Haye, 2012). UNDP seeks to accomplish this permanence by supporting the institutionalisation of I4Ps such as Kenya’s.

6.3. Institutionalising peacebuilding in Kenya

The state has created institutions and developed policy to embed peacebuilding in Kenya. The I4P includes state and non-state actors that have formalised their engagement and devoted technical and financial resources towards enhancing peacebuilding capacities at local and national levels. The term I4P is used in different ways in Kenya. One view is that the I4P in Kenya includes civil society and three state-led components (Chuma & Ojielo, 2012). The state-led are NSC, KNFP and NCIC. NSC refers to the peace committees as the I4P (NSCPBCM,

2013). Kenya's 2015 peace policy proposes an I4P that includes a National Peace Council with a secretariat and a peace fund, County Peace Secretariat, national and county peace fora, local peace committees and a mediation support unit (Government of Kenya, 2014). Despite a singular conception of what the I4P means in Kenya, the different views demonstrate an appreciation of the I4P concept in peacebuilding in Kenya. I confine my I4P study to the state-led components to investigate the role of the state in peacebuilding, which also has a distinct contribution to institutionalisation. NSC, KNFP and NCIC have institutionalised peacebuilding to different extents. The extent of institutionalisation through the state led approach is demonstrated by the level of embeddedness of peacebuilding in Kenya. Figure 6.1 below illustrates the connections between the three state-led units with the broken lines indicating a partial link or an inactive unit.




Figure 6.1: Infrastructure for peace

The institutionalisation of peacebuilding in Kenya began in 2001 with the creation of NSC which established a secretariat in November 2002 (NSCPBCM, 2009). Although NSC was originally an

initiative by both state and non-state actors, over time it has become more state driven as discussed in Chapter 5. The dominance of the state is a result of the institutionalisation of peacebuilding. The NSC Secretariat is housed in the Ministry of Interior and Coordination of National Government and the NSC coordinator is a state actor. NSC is Kenya's Conflict Early Warning Early Response Unit (CEWERU) of the Inter-Governmental Authority on Development (IGAD). As the CEWERU, NSC fulfils Kenya's obligation as a signatory to the Conflict Early Warning and Early Response Network (CEWARN) protocol of the IGAD region member states. NSC has institutionalised peacebuilding through the conflict prevention mandate of the CEWERU. To carry out the CEWERU duty, NSC has acquired staff, funds and established a technologically equipped situation room at the NSC Secretariat.

The NSC has further institutionalised peacebuilding through the creation of local peace committees across the country. Prior to the 2007/8 PEV, local peace committees were predominantly in northern Kenya to respond to violent conflict between pastoralist communities. Some argue that it was because of the presence of these committees that there was no violence in these regions during the 2007/8 PEV as committees quickly resolved threats to peace (Alihodžić, 2012; Chuma & Ojielo, 2012). However, the dynamics of violent conflict and electoral politics in different regions in Kenya vary significantly enough to challenge this argument. While the peace committees may be an explanatory factor for peace in the northern parts of Kenya, this argument would have to be substantiated against a comparative contextual analysis of the electoral and political dynamics in the northern regions vis-à-vis other regions during and following the 2007 elections.

The 2008 National Accord and Reconciliation Act endorsed the replication of the local peace committee model across the country to ensure enhanced national capacities for peacebuilding (Chuma & Ojielo, 2012; Magotsi, 2014; van Tongeren, 2013). NSC describes the local peace committees as, “community representative institutions based at the various administrative levels. They bring together traditional dispute resolution mechanisms involving traditional elders, women and religious leaders on the one hand and formal mechanisms for conflict resolution including those by the Government administrative and security agencies and Non-Governmental Organization (NGO) initiatives on the other” (NSCPBCM, 2009, p. 12).

From the initial informal 1990s Wajir peace committee, the local peace committee structure is now formalised and institutionalised by the state. In chapter 5, I demonstrated how the peace committees have formal links to state administration. An NSC report notes, “The District Commissioners and District Officers shall serve as the Patrons of the DPCs at the District and Divisional levels respectively” (NSCPBCM, 2009, p. 14). This report does not explain the role of the patron but my interviewees did so. A peace committee interviewee said that the DPC had to seek the DC’s approval on a proposal before it was submitted to NSC (Individual Interview 17, Nairobi, 2014). Another interviewee from an international organisation (IO) confirmed this DC role in the assertion that it only considered funding DPC projects that had been endorsed by the DC in order to ensure coordination and accountability (Individual Interview 43, Lodwar, 2014). A third interviewee explained,

The controller of the money was the district administrator. He received what we call AIE, authority to incur expenditure. So every time they received the AIE, just like government funds, he was supposed to be the signatory together with the chairman of the peace committee (Individual Interview 61, Nakuru, 2014).

Formalising peace committees within state administrative structures has institutionalised peacebuilding. The level of institutionalisation of peace committees in Kenya corresponds to the degree of formalisation. van Tongeren (2013) classifies informal local peace committees as those that do not have political or financial support from their government. Peace committees in Kenya enjoy political support from government but do not receive regular financial support. UNDP has provided funding for peace committees through its support for state-led peacebuilding by NSC, which can be seen as indirect support from the government. According to van Tongeren's classification, the peace committee structure in Kenya is therefore semi-formal or partially institutionalised.

Magotsi (2014) contends that the institutionalisation of peace committees is to ensure that peace is owned and driven by the community. Empirical studies on peacebuilding have found local ownership to be a factor in the sustainability of peacebuilding and peace (Chuma & Ojielo, 2012; Lederach, 1997; Odendaal, 2013; van Tongeren, 2013). However, institutionalising peace committees has had mixed results on local ownership, as will be discussed in this chapter's section on human resources. Chapter 5 also looks at the negative impacts of state-led peacebuilding on local agency and the engagement of non-state actors. In addition to the peace committees as non-state actors within NSC, NSC has substantially engaged with nongovernmental organisations (NGOs) and international organisations (IOs). The NGOs and IOs act in an advisory capacity, offer technical and/or financial support and collaborate in implementing peace activities.

From its inception, the KNFP has had close links to NSC because of their complementary mandates and both secretariats are located in the same ministry. Created in 2002, NFP started operations in 2003 as the structure to carry out Kenya's responsibilities as a signatory of sub-regional, regional and international legal frameworks (KNFP, n.d.-b). For example, Article 16 of the Nairobi Protocol states, "State parties undertake to: (a) establish National Focal Points to, inter alia, facilitate the rapid information exchange to combat cross-border small arms and light weapons trafficking" ('Nairobi Protocol', 2004, p. 11). The Nairobi Protocol is an agreement between 11 countries in the Great Lakes and Horn of Africa region to prevent, control and reduce SALWs in the region. Like the NSC, the NFP coordinates action by state and non-state actors to address the threat of illicit SALWs. A KNFP promotional brochure lists 15 government ministries and departments, one intergovernmental organisation and six nongovernmental/international organisations (KNFP, n.d.-b). State actors constitute the majority of the membership. The issue of SALWs is particularly linked with violent conflict in the northern border regions where illicit SALWs are used in pastoralist conflicts. KNFP activities in SALWs eradication are an aspect of violence prevention related to peacebuilding.

An evaluation found KNFP only partially institutionalised, citing inadequate personnel, financial resources and delayed domestication of its guiding protocols (KNFP, n.d.-b). In addition, the provincial and district task forces set up by the KNFP have had debatable success on the ground. KNFP established provincial and district task forces (DTFs) in 22 districts (KNFP, n.d.-b, p. 4). Interviewees said the DTFs have not been very successful because of their fluctuating membership with regular transfers of security officers; the reluctance of security officers to engage with civilians on security matters; and the added role for the DC as patron of DTFs as

well as DPCs. Despite the challenges to fully institutionalising KNFP, it is still institutionalised to a significant degree as it was established to fulfil the state's obligation to eradicate SALWs in the region.

In 2010, NSC and KNFP merged into a directorate, as two separate divisions, with the NSC Coordinator as the Directorate Head (Chuma & Ojielo, 2012). As NSC and KNFP became directorates, this was evidence of progressive institutionalisation within the state structure. The Permanent Secretary of the Ministry of State for Provincial Administration referred to NSC and KNFP as the Department for Peacebuilding and Conflict Management (Kimemia, 2011). Though the letter did not explicitly mention NSC and KNFP, it highlighted the achievements of NSC and KNFP as the accomplishments of the department and recommended the creation of new staff positions (Kimemia, 2011). In addition to more staff, this request also included a draft scheme of service that would enable a budgetary allocation from the Ministry of Provincial Administration and Internal Security (Iringo, 2012). As NSC and KNFP become increasingly embedded within the state structures, peacebuilding is also further institutionalised.

The logic for institutionalising peacebuilding in Kenya is supported by related national policy frameworks. The most pertinent is Kenya's 2015 peace policy developed by state and non-state actors and this is discussed in chapter 5. Peacebuilding is mentioned as a national agenda in the Constitution, in the political pillar of the country's Vision 2030, and in legal frameworks to guide the sustainable use of natural resources (Magotsi, 2014). Vision 2030 is Kenya's development programme launched in 2008. KNFP is developing a draft bill on small arms and a

review of the Firearms Act. These policy frameworks provide impetus for the institutionalisation of peacebuilding.

The final state-led unit of the I4P is the NCIC which is a statutory body created by the 2008 National Cohesion and Integration Act in response to the electoral violence in 2007/8. The justification for establishing the NCIC was “that long lasting peace, sustainable development and harmonious co-existence among Kenyans requires deliberative normative, institutional and attitudinal process of constructing nationhood, national cohesion and integration” (NCIC, 2012, p. 1). The NCIC became operational in September 2009 (NCIC, 2012). The level of institutionalisation of the NCIC is both strong and weak. It is strong because it is legally enshrined as an advisory body to the state on matters of cohesion and integration. Yet at the same time, it is weak because it remains a Nairobi-based institution, despite the option of opening up nationwide branches as stipulated in article 16 of the 2008 Act (Individual Interview 30, Nairobi, 2014). The NCIC attributes the failure to open field offices to a lack of finances and acknowledges that this has constrained its effectiveness (NCIC, 2013, 2014). The NCIC has eight commissioners nominated by the National Assembly and appointed by the president; and from these eight, the president appoints a chairperson (*The National Cohesion and Integration Act*, 2008). According to the same Act, there also 3 ex-officio members representing institutions on human rights, gender equality and administrative justice. By June 2013 the NCIC had 84 technical and non-technical staff (NCIC, 2014).

Media coverage of the role of NCIC in conflict mediation, monitoring hate speech and research on discrimination has enhanced its visibility (Gitonga, 2015; Otieno, 2014; Wafula & Odunga,

2015). This has further institutionalised the cohesion and integration aspects of peacebuilding. However, the perception of NCIC as strongly institutionalised because of its legal grounding is negated by the reality of budgetary constraints and competing institutional mandates. NCIC observes that it has inadequate human, financial and material resources to effectively engage as envisioned (NCIC, 2012, NCIC, 2014). Chuma and Ojielo argue that despite its legal grounding NCIC may lack full recognition from the government which overlooked it and set up an elders council to do what NCIC does and then allocated NCIC-allotted funds to this council (2012, p. 31).

Lederach (2012) associates the infrastructure for peace with sustainability. Peacebuilding in Kenya has been institutionalised through the infrastructure for peace. As detailed in the next section, the effects of institutionalisation on peacebuilding threaten the prospect of sustainable peacebuilding and peace.

6.4. How institutionalisation impacts sustainability

My study on state-led peacebuilding in Kenya reveals three threats to sustainability from institutionalisation. The first threat is the funding imperative of institutionalisation, which has affected the nature of peacebuilding. Closely linked to this is a second threat in the demand for human resources to institutionalise peace and how this has negatively impacted local agency. The third threat from institutionalisation is the building peace through meetings, professionalization and bureaucracy. In this section I argue that these three threats from institutionalisation of peacebuilding in Kenya significantly impede the sustainability of peacebuilding.

All about the money

An infrastructure for peace ensures sustainable peacebuilding if it relies on local rather than external resources (Lederach, 1997; Odendaal, 2013). Institutionalising peacebuilding in Kenya has been enabled by substantial external resources from state and non-state actors. Lederach contends that while international peacebuilding interventions neglected local peacebuilding agency, he found that, “abundant resources in the form of people and intriguingly different cultural modalities and understandings existed within the setting, but often did not fit or were seen as problematic by outside expertise” (2012, p. 10). Accordingly to Lederach, the local resources that sustain peacebuilding are found in the local context and culture. Although this section focuses on the impact of external funding, I also view the state’s contribution to the I4P as an external resource because it comes from outside of the community to influence how peacebuilding is implemented locally. The government has contributed significant resources to the I4P. For example the state has allocated the NSC and KNFP office space at the Ministry of Interior and National Coordination. The state has provided these secretariats with administrative and technical staff and equipment such as vehicles. As noted earlier, at district level, the peace committees have office space on the grounds of District Commissioner’s office and in some cases equipment and internet access. A state interviewee observed that the government contribution to the operational budget of the NSC had steadily declined in the previous eight years, but in 2014 the government agreed to match funding from UNDP with a contribution equivalent to 10% of UNDP funding to NSC (Individual Interview 26, Nairobi, 2014). The state’s provision of financial, human and material resources demonstrates the political will to support the institutionalisation of peacebuilding. In chapter 5, I analyse the adverse impact of

state-led peacebuilding on local agency which demonstrates that the state can be an external actor in local peacebuilding. Peacebuilding in Kenya has been institutionalised within the state structure which means that the I4P is reliant to an extent on the state as an external actor. If the sustainability of peacebuilding is the local context and culture, then the I4P dependence on the state will compromise the prospect of sustainable peacebuilding.

The institutionalisation of peacebuilding in Kenya has been supported by external funds. Chuma & Ojielo, both UNDP staff, illustrate the role of external funds in the statement, “The government should abolish the 300 district peace committees, which have existed mainly with UNDP funding, because maintaining them is expensive compared to other national priorities, and therefore unsustainable” (2012, p. 36). However, the DPCs are an essential component of the I4P because they represent local agency and contextualise peacebuilding. It is through the DPCs that local resources are engaged for sustainability. Conversely, UNDP has funded the institutionalisation of the DPC structure and this has compromised sustainability. Local agency in peacebuilding existed before institutionalisation, as exemplified in the Wajir peace process referred to in previous chapters. The funding imperative of institutionalisation in Kenya’s I4P is a threat to local agency and subsequently to sustainable peacebuilding.

UNDP is major supporter of the institutionalisation of peacebuilding in Kenya. As mentioned in chapter 5, the NSC, KNFP and NCIC have received and do receive financial and human resource support from different organisations but UNDP is now the key partner. UNDP provides technical support and program funding to NSC, KNFP and NCIC. UNDP support has influenced the nature of peacebuilding by promoting a joint intervention approach where multiple institutions

receive joint funding to fulfil various components of a project or program. UNDP describes its 2014-2018 strategic engagement in Kenya as guided by the United Nations Development Assistance Framework (UNDAF) under the principle of ‘Delivering as One’ that determines how best the UN system can promote government ownership and support the recipient government to meet its goals (UNDP, 2015).

Past peacebuilding initiatives of state and non-state actors supported by UNDP and the government demonstrate a similar strategy. To deliver as one requires one institution to act as the lead in the implementing and reporting role, and the other institutions implement relevant aspects of the project/program according to their expertise. For example, from 2006 to 2013, UNDP and the government supported a Conflict Prevention and Transformation project (CTP) that involved NSC as the implementing partner working alongside the KNFP and the National Drought Management Authority (NDMA). The overall objective of this project was to “strengthen the capacity of national and community peace structures to effectively prevent and reduce levels of armed violence in order to nurture peace and enhance development opportunities in Kenya” (NSCPBCM, 2013, p. 1). NSC reports the development and institutionalisation of an I4P through the operationalisation of peace committees as one of the project achievements (NSCPBCM, 2013). In this partnership, NSC role is complemented by the expertise of KNFP on arms control and NDMA’s regional focus on the arid and semi-arid regions of Kenya.

Another example is the 2010-2013 Consolidating the Peace Process and Establishing Foundations for a Successful Political Transition (CPP). The CPP is described as a programme that builds on previous projects including CTP (NSCPBCM Secretariat, 2014). This shift from

project to program indicates a greater commitment from UNDP to engage substantially in peacebuilding over a longer period (Individual Interview 36, Nairobi, 2015). In the CPP, the NSC was the implementing partner working with the KNFP, the NCIC and other state and non-state actors. The CPP's objective was to enhance peacebuilding capacities of state and non-state actors with each of the partners playing specific roles, e.g., NCIC on cohesion and integration and KNFP on the proliferation of SALWs (NSCPBCM Secretariat, 2014). The CTP and CPP illustrate UNDP's strategic support to the Kenyan government to institutionalise peacebuilding.

As these institutions engage collaboratively in peacebuilding, they develop their respective niches. While this may prevent duplication of interventions, it may also limit the depth and scope of peacebuilding to the niches of the collaborative institutions. For instance, if the niche of an institution is proximate causes of violence, such as reducing illicit arms or ethnic tensions, it will not address underlying issues like human security or land injustice. Lederach's theory of conflict transformation, discussed in chapter 3, argues that both the proximate and underlying causes of violent conflict must be addressed for sustainable peace.

I will analyse the effects of external funding in three parts. In the first part I look at the broader implications of externally funded peacebuilding. Second, I discuss how external funding has created the incentive to make peace fundable. Third, I look at what happens when these funds run out. The effects of external funds for institutionalisation not only threatens sustainability but has also influenced the nature of peacebuilding.

He who pays the piper picks the tune

The English proverb of the piper illustrates the power of the external donors over the recipients. My interviewees from funding organisations emphasised that they are partners and not donors suggesting an equal partnership. But interviewees from recipient organisations elaborated the challenges of accessing funds indicating inequities of the donor-recipient relationship. I will use term donor or funding organisation interchangeably.

To explore the donor-recipient power relationship, I use the example of UNDP which emphasises its supportive role to enable the government to fulfil its obligations to citizens. The name UNDP evokes a neutral image of a representative international body working for the good of its member countries around the world. Mac Ginty (2012) argues that though UNDP ideally represents the interests of all its members, in reality it demonstrates elite capture and primarily reflects the liberal peace ideology of the small group of key states that fund it. This negates the neutral image of UNDP and subsequently the support it provides. The pertinence of external funding in institutionalisation is that it is driven by different interests that will influence peacebuilding. For example, Brown and Raddatz (2014) contend that the influence Western donors are willing to exert for democracy, justice and peace in Kenya is constrained by their particular security and economic interests. The implication of this for peacebuilding is that donors' priorities are informed by their respective country interests.

Another example of this is in counter-terrorism. Bachmann and Honke explained, "Development and security policies merged into an agenda of conflict prevention and peacekeeping in which stable states such as Kenya received new strategic importance as regional anchor states" (2010,

p. 101). They illustrate this through the experience of a Danish bilateral counter-terrorism project which was met with resistance by non-state actors unwilling to engage in counter-terrorism. This led to the project being renamed 'peace, security and development' (Bachmann & Honke, 2010, p. 111). Two interviewees from organisations that have funded the I4P observed that after the consultative process to determine peacebuilding support, they fund initiatives in line with their organisation's priorities which are aligned to funding sources (Individual Interview 36, Nairobi, 2014; Individual Interview 39, Nairobi, 2015). For instance, in 2000, Oxfam received 90% of the funding required for a conflict reduction project in Kenya's arid lands, from the Department of International Development (Oxfam GB, 2003). The Oxfam project priorities reflected the interests of DFID. Any local support given by Oxfam was in line with its priorities and DFID interests. The pertinence of the external donors' agenda is directly proportional to the amount of funding given. The greater the percentage, the more influence the donor has on what peace is built and how.

External funding entrenches uneven power relations between donor and recipient countries. Goetschel and Hagmann contend that, "Bureaucratic peacebuilding reproduces a division of labour in which the global North - represented by international organisations, donor agencies and NGOs - defines and finances peace, while the global South - local communities, NGOs, and governments - is expected to absorb and implement these peace ideas and projects" (2009, p. 65). While this statement highlights the power imbalance in the donor-recipient relationship, it fails to recognise any agency in recipient countries. For example the process of determining UNDP support to the Kenyan government is informed by Kenya's priorities. The UN specifies that the four results areas of the UNDAF for Kenya are aligned to the three pillars of Kenya's Vision

2030 agenda (UNDP, 2015). Brown and Raddatz (2014) also observe that despite Kenya's extensive links to the West and high level of leverage the West has on Kenya, political leaders in Kenya have effectively used their agency to resist Western pressure for democracy, peace and justice.

Despite the progress towards a more balanced funding relationship, equality is not yet a reality. The earlier recommendation from Chuma and Ojielo (2012) for the government to abolish the 300 district peace committees, created mostly with UNDP support, demonstrates how the power balance can change over time. Initially UNDP supported the government in institutionalising peace committees but now declares the support is unsustainable. The peace committee structure represents the local agency required for sustainable peacebuilding. However, if the survival of peace committees is dependent on external funding, this is a threat to sustainability. An interview respondent observed that Western donor officials are accountable to their governments and not to funding recipients, which undermines the notion of equality that partnership implies (Individual Interview 50, Nairobi, 2014). Another interviewee reflected on donor-driven peacebuilding activities:

But now the thing is you find most of these programs, you find the donor has said 'we have this amount of money available for conflict management and only for this corridor'. You find everyone, every peace actor, has developed a proposal to respond to that corridor, do you see how it is? Because there is a kitty, there is a pool available, there is this money available for your taking, and all you have to do is bring us a proposal on peace. (Individual Interview 47, Lodwar, 2014)

While the availability of funds may drive the creation of peacebuilding activities, in the next section I examine how the incentive to get funding has influenced peacebuilding in Kenya.

Making peace fundable

The funding imperative impacts institutionalisation in two ways. One way is the funding recipient who tailors peacebuilding to improve chances of acquiring funds. An interviewee from a local membership organisation explained the role of the head office in relation to its local partners,

So actually the partners on the ground are the ones who say ‘these are the kind of programs that we need to do’...we then refine it so that it is something that is actually fundable (Individual Interview 50, Nairobi, 2014)

Funding recipients need to present a program that is fundable. The implication is that the donors have a certain criteria to determine what requests are eligible for funding. The problem is not in establishing funding eligibility criteria, but that meeting the requirements means reducing peacebuilding activities to what is fundable. Respondents generally agreed that while simple local peacebuilding activities may take place without any external funding, more complex national-level peacebuilding requires funding. One interviewee explained the tension between needing funds and not wanting peacebuilding to be about money and the challenge of sustainable peacebuilding is to achieve this equilibrium:

It is the financial resource that will make these things work. The unfortunate thing is that if people make it like it must be money to make peace, that’s when things begin not to take root properly. But financial support that facilitates these people to get peace and to own it is really needed (Individual Interview 44, Lodwar, 2014)

To access funding, interview respondents explained how they frame peacebuilding proposals to capture shifting donor priorities using buzz words like governance, gender, citizen participation or psychosocial trauma. The pressure on organisations seeking funding to reflect the donors priorities likens peacebuilding to an industry where the demand for funds is greater than the supply, so organisations must be creative and strategic in competing to avoid being excluded.

The second impact of the funding imperative is the donor's vested interests and continued availability of external funding. Mac Ginty (2012) deliberates on the technocratic turn in peacebuilding and identifies two forms of passive coercion in the imposition of administrative procedures and exclusion of those who do not conform. Imposition and exclusion are both factors of the external funding for institutionalised peacebuilding in Kenya. External funding comes with administrative requirements that must be met in order to secure funding. Failure to meet this imposed standards results in exclusion. Chuma and Ojielo (2012) explained that one reason the civil society component of Kenya's I4P failed to meet its ideals was because it was unable to resolve funding modalities with UNDP, whose strict accountability requirements for non-state actors had led to delayed disbursements. This implies that it was dependent on UNDP's funds to implement its program. Respondents from local and international organisations said they often give material, rather than financial, support to DPCs because DPC did not have the capacity to manage funds.

Peace committees have attempted to jump this funding hurdle by registering as civil society organisations. The guidelines for peace structures in Kenya stipulates: "Peace committees may have the discretion to register (as a civil society) organisation for purposes of fundraising from non-government sources" (NSCPBCM, 2009, p. 15). The first peace committee, the Wajir Peace and Development Committee, now serves as a registered umbrella organisation that supports other peace committees in Wajir. Peace monitors can also fundraise for the peace committees. Registration to gain access to funding has sometimes not worked well. One interviewee gave examples of networks, including one within the I4P, which lost members upon registration as the networks were now competing for the same pool of funds as their member organisations

(Individual Interview 52, Nairobi, 2014). Funding has created a peacebuilding industry fuelled by external funds.

The peacebuilding industry

The institutionalisation of peacebuilding has nurtured a peacebuilding industry in Kenya with external funding for short projects or multiple year programs. For example, there is usually an upsurge in peacebuilding funding for conflict prevention prior to elections in Kenya. This is best illustrated in the hiring of contract staff for specific conflict prevention. During the 2013 election period, UN Women funded the hiring of approximately 50 peace and gender data analysts on five month contracts. In the same period, NCIC hired at least 47 cohesion monitors (one per county) on eight month contracts. The short contracts provide a legitimate employment opportunity, but absorbing these contractors after their tenure is unlikely and therefore may not contribute significantly to permanent capacities for peace. One of my interviewees reflected on this aspect,

We started in 2013 prior the elections, during and after the elections. It was a five months program. So that five months program when it ended the data analysts stopped working. But I have not stopped working. We found out that the process was a very good one and that time information would flow very well. So right now, the peace monitor decided to sustain the analyst and even if I am not paid I will still do it as a volunteer. (Individual Interview 21, Nakuru, 2014)

While this response displayed a commitment to peacebuilding beyond the gains of a short term contract, the section on human resources discussed in greater detail the challenges of volunteerism within the I4P. The availability of short-term contracts around elections makes peacebuilding not just a target industry for quick money, but also emphasises a limited conceptualisation of peacebuilding as primarily a response to violent conflict. The terms of

employment can also be a sticking point. For instance, respondents noted the tension caused by the disparity in pay between IGAD CEWERU field monitors and the NSC peace monitors, despite their similar roles and reporting arrangements (Individual Interviews 18 & 19, Lodwar, 2014; Individual Interview 32, Nairobi, 2014). The subsequent section on the human resource angle delves into the remuneration tensions from institutionalisation and how it affects sustainability.

Funding has also changed the relationship between state and non-state actors within the I4P. The NSC provides an example of this. Non-state actors were actively involved in setting up the NSC to harmonise local peace structures, but over time their involvement has diminished. Interviewees argued that UNDP support gives NSC independence from its non-state actors while negatively affecting collaborative peacebuilding by increasing competition to access resources (Individual Interviews 34, 52 & 60, Nairobi, 2014). The ebb and flow of financial resources impedes long term planning and consequently the sustainability of peacebuilding.

When the funding runs out

A significant portion of funding for the I4P has come from external donors such as German Technical Cooperation Agency (GIZ), Oxfam, Saferworld and UNDP. Ideally, the sustainability of an I4P should be from local resources with external resources as a complement (Lederach, 1997; Odendaal, 2013). However, the process of institutionalisation has overturned this balance. External funding might be necessary in the initial stages of institutionalising peacebuilding and later local resources may sustain the I4P. From this perspective, it is not a question of what happens when external funds run out, because the assumption is that they will eventually be

replaced by internal resources. Indeed, external funds have run out or been reduced significantly. My interviewees linked declining funds to ‘peaceful’ elections, project cycles, and shifts in donor priorities or funding strategies.

After the ‘peaceful’ 2013 elections peacebuilding funding declined so significantly that it led to program and personnel cuts (Individual Interview 26, Nairobi, 2014). The link between ‘peaceful’ elections and peacebuilding funding reveals the conceptualisation of peacebuilding as primarily a response to violent conflict. Yet as discussed in chapter 2, effective peacebuilding also addresses latent conflict to prevent an escalation to overt violence. So ‘peaceful’ elections characterised by an absence of violence do not necessarily indicate peace at a structural or systemic level. The 2007/8 post-election violence led to abundant peacebuilding funding, contrary to the 2013 funding decline. One interviewee described the funding scenario as firefighting with funds given to avert the crisis but seldom a strategy to address underlying issues (Individual Interview 41, Eldoret, 2014).

Funding runs out according to project cycles. Funding cycles end and while recipients are aware of this, appropriate exit strategies are not always factored in by the funder and recipients do not always plan adequately for sustainability. The duration of external funding has implications on what the interviewees describe as funding dependency. Dependency may result from long-term funding that is not well phased out or from repeated short-term funding. For example, many interviewees claimed the peace committees are dependent on non-state actors for survival even though the support is material rather than financial. When I asked for views on the appropriate duration for funding peacebuilding in a long-term approach, responses ranged from three to ten

years. Other interviewees discussed the challenge of short-term funding for three months to a year, within which time they were expected to implement and report on the impact of their intervention. One interviewee complained that short-term funding creates a pressure to spend and this might be in spite of delayed disbursement, all which compromise the sustainability of peacebuilding. Although major donors such as UNDP have shifted to longer-term support, smaller funding organisations still give short-term funding. According to my respondents, this limited duration funding impedes the process of relationship building and accompaniment which is important in a comprehensive peacebuilding strategy.

The end or decline of external funding for the I4Ps has often resulted in a reduced scope and duration of peacebuilding, highlighting dependency. One respondent shared the impact of the end of funding for their DPC,

DPC was supported by a USAID initiative and I think when they ran out of funds, they left it to the provincial administration. They supported it for how long? It was two years, yes, it was two years I think so. And since then no funding, we are just being called to preach peace and that is the end of it (Individual Interview 15, Nakuru, 2014)

In this case, the loss of funding altered the DPC's perception of its role by imposing limits on what they felt capable of doing. Peace committee interviewees reflected on committees that had become dormant or members had left when funding ceased. The adverse impact of a loss of funds for peacebuilding means that institutionalised peacebuilding will not be sustainable. Institutionalisation demands more resources than are locally available to cater for the I4P's vertical and horizontal networking. The effect of funding in institutionalisation is pervasive. Funding is also a factor in the following sections on how institutionalisation has impacted human resources and the nature of peacebuilding.

Building capacities – the human resource angle

The main objective of the infrastructure for peace is to enhance capacities for peace in local conflict settings and in the country as a whole. Formalising the I4P through institutionalisation has built the human resource capacity of both state and non-state actors. In this section I focus on two major categories of actors in the I4P institutionalisation: the externally supplied technical experts and the volunteers. I argue that although institutionalisation seeks to build national capacities for peace and has done so to some extent, the use of experts and volunteers negatively affects sustainability. Experts temporarily boost human resources but may undermine local capacities in the long term. In addition, formalising informal peace committees has introduced a compensation dilemma that compromises sustainability.

The experts are the actors brought in to provide technical support for peacebuilding interventions. UNDP and other international organisations second experts to the I4P. Mac Ginty observes that the rise in the use of technical support for peacebuilding can be traced back to the UN Agenda for Peace, which spelt out the obligation of the UN to develop and provide technical assistance (2012, p. 293). Odendaal argues that the success of an I4P is determined by the kind of technical support it gets from a bureaucratic system and peacebuilding experts (2012, p. 47). In Kenya, UNDP has supplied most of the longer-term experts to the I4P and international organisations have provided experts on a short-term basis. An example of the short-term technical support is the 49 gender and conflict analysts contracted for five months and the 47 cohesion monitors contracted for eight months to boost peacebuilding capacity during the 2013 elections. In addition, NSC increased technical support for peace committees with the hire of 21 short term peace monitors to add to the existing 89 peace monitors around the country

(NSCPBCM, 2013). On a longer-term basis, UNDP in particular has seconded technical staff to NSC and KNFP to support program implementation. UNDP is the largest contributor of technical support by assigning longer-term program experts to the I4P and allocating funds to contract short-term experts. Non-state members of the NSC have also seconded staff for specific program activities, e.g., my secondment as a researcher by the Institute of Security Studies, to the NSC for a conflict mapping process in 2010/11.

The boon of technical expertise within the I4P has helped to fulfil the I4P's human resource demands at critical points, such as during high stakes electoral process often accompanied by threats of violence. Yet as I alluded to previously, the challenge is that despite the cost of hiring experts on short-term contracts, the expertise may not necessarily translate in to building national capacities for peace because of absorption challenges. When it comes to long-term experts, dependency is the problem. The logic behind technical support is to bolster capacity while simultaneously enhancing existing capacities. The UN Agenda for Peace states the goal of technical assistance as “support for the transformation of deficient national structures and capabilities, and for the strengthening of new democratic institutions” (Boutros-Ghali, 1992, para. 59). The terms *support* and *strengthening* imply that technical assistance temporarily helps to build and improve until national capacities are sufficiently strong. The advantage of the UNDP-seconded technical experts is that they are Kenyan nationals and therefore constitute national capacities for peace. The disadvantage of the long-term experts is that their expertise and availability are bound to UNDP support of the state-led peacebuilding. In this context, they are not a locally sustainable resource. The continued supply of long-term experts also raises the question of why the demand is not diminishing. Mac Ginty contends that technocracy is self-

perpetuating, “In a sense it is a supply-led demand that reinforces the ‘expertise’ and primacy of elites” (2012, p. 289). This means that as long as UNDP believe technical experts are a solution to peacebuilding in Kenya, it will create a demand in order to supply technical experts to the I4P.

The sustainability of long-term experts is dependent on external resources. If the organisations providing the experts re-prioritise or re-allocate funds for the experts, there is no guarantee that existing capacities will have been sufficiently enhanced to enable a smooth transition. The idea of technical support sounds innocuous enough, but if not strategically employed it could impede the goal of sustainability by creating dependency. In addition, it undermines confidence in local agency by promoting the perception of externally supplied technical support as ‘expert’ and superior to local capacities.

The second group of actors is the volunteers. Lederach considers the I4P sustainable if it takes a high view of culture by valuing the embedded resources in the conflict setting, i.e., the people and culture as crucial to effectively build peace (2012). From Lederach’s perspective, the volunteers who comprise the peace committees are the embedded resources needed for the I4P. The first peace committee that started in Wajir was an informal arrangement that involved members from the community working voluntarily for peace. In my interview with former members of the first peace committee, they explained that in the beginning the committee preferred support from local businesses so that the peace process was not unduly associated with a specific NGO. Although the committee did accept some funds from the NGOs that some of them worked for, the emphasis was to ensure local support.

Before institutionalisation, the peace committee idea was based on volunteerism. NSC institutionalised the concept by starting peace committee across the country as integral part of the I4P as discussed in section 6.3 of this chapter and in chapter 5. The institutionalisation of the peace committee structure has frustrated the spirit of volunteerism in the demands placed on peace committee members who argue they have been given responsibilities without resources. But remunerated state and non-state actors feel that the peace committee members should remain fully volunteers because it is the peace of their own communities that they seek. For the volunteers, the prospect of sustaining volunteerism is greatly challenged by the institutionalisation of the peace committee structure. I examine the impact of institutionalisation first from the perspectives of the peace committees, as the volunteers, followed by the perspectives of the non-volunteers within the I4P. I will conclude with the implications the two perspectives.

The volunteers' perspective

I interviewed peace committee members from five regions in Kenya that have diverse conflict histories, as well as political and socio-economic contexts. The one recurring feature in every interview was the expressed frustration that they were expected to fulfil certain roles with no recompense. Though most committees had received some funds between 2008 and 2012 for administrative expenses and specific peacebuilding interventions, these allocations were minimal, irregular and had ceased by 2013. The volunteers particularly noted having to pay out of pocket for telephone and transport costs incurred related to their peace committee responsibilities. One peace committee member expressed it as follows:

Because sometimes we make a lot of phone calls, people in the community have to get in touch with us. Somebody will tell you this is happening here, just call me I want to tell you something and you will call them back. You relate with people, relationships today can't work without phones. Using a phone means money so it is important for them to consider that these are different times, the times we are living now are different. Money is a key factor, it is a key factor. People may not say it but they said it in meetings so I think they should consider that (Individual Interview 14, Nakuru, 2014)

Others reflected on how volunteerism had negatively affected their family life. One peace committee member said:

So you can leave here to go and preach peace in Bahati, Solai. When you finish the meeting you are given 200 shillings each and one soda each. So the whole day you have wasted, you come back home, your children want money, they want food, and you cannot take care of anything, so people saw it like it was time wasting (Individual Interview 15, Nakuru, 2014).

The volunteers stressed that it is not that they wanted to make money from their role as peace committee members. Nevertheless they were expected to fulfil certain obligations like making phone calls or travelling to an area to verify information for early warning purposes and the I4P should meet these costs in principle as appreciation for their efforts.

The dynamics of institutionalisation have greatly altered the context in which peace committees now operate. From my interviews, the volunteers believe that sustaining the current peace committee structure on volunteerism is untenable. Here are two statements from interviewees illustrating this.

We signed to say we are doing this as volunteers but it has its limit for example those meetings, you find yourself having to finance it from your personal pocket...so I cannot do it full time, I do it when there is time, when there is conflict" (Individual Interview 16, Nakuru, 2014).

We have had situations where people use their own money, but you cannot use your own money continuously for that kind of exercise (Individual Interview 13, Nakuru, 2014).

The word *continuously* in the second statement underlines the frustration faced by volunteers. The peace committee structure ideally represents a permanent capacity for peace, but the challenge of volunteering indefinitely appears daunting to the current volunteers given the demands placed on them. Volunteerism worked well in its initial informal setting in Wajir, when local agents steered the process. However, institutionalisation has formalised the informal to ensure sustainability, but does not cater for the emerging needs of peace committee members. Volunteering is becoming difficult and this directly threatens the prospect of sustainability.

The non-volunteers perspective

The non-volunteers are the employees of state and non-state organisations that are members of the I4P. In this category, the majority view is that volunteers should remain volunteers but there are a few who hold the alternative perspective to rethink volunteerism in light of the changing dynamics.

The non-volunteers base the dominant view defending volunteerism, on tradition. They argue that traditionally people served their communities on a voluntary basis and therefore volunteerism is a cultural value to be upheld. One interviewee captured the sentiment:

No, they have to be voluntary. Those are local community members so the moment again we start giving them incentives to do what they are actually supposed to do as elders of a community then we will be losing it completely. Yeah so... but probably just as a motivation you are offering them more trainings, organising exchange visits for them, those kinds of things would motivate them to continue being part of the process. But otherwise coordinating peace activities is purely their role, those who are not interested then cannot be part of DPC. Let those who are interested in peace then be part of the DPC. It is their community, yes, and they are the gatekeepers (Individual Interview 32, Nairobi, 2014)

In an article on local peace committees (LPCs), van Tongeren concurs with this view. He contends that LPC members should remain volunteers based on observations from varied country experiences where introducing payment led to competition and a perception of the LPC as source of income (van Tongeren, 2013). He also states that dispute resolution was done voluntarily in traditional systems but now if the demand for remuneration is not met, some members quit informal LPCs (van Tongeren, 2013). The argument that volunteerism worked in traditional systems and is the more authentic motivation than compensation ignores the contemporary reality of LPCs. In traditional systems the LPCs controlled the parameters of their peacebuilding engagement. In Kenya's I4P, the LPCs are part of a larger peacebuilding system that has greater demands on their time.

Related to the non-volunteers argument in favour of volunteerism is the perspective that the introduction of money to peacebuilding killed local initiative and the spirit of volunteerism in the community. One respondent captured the tension of the impact of money on peace volunteerism:

I think the introduction of money was a problem in itself because I think there should be a way of getting people to come up with their own ideas on how they are going to solve...they used to sort out the issues even before, so why is it that its different now? Maybe we played a role in distorting the economy there, so that peacebuilding becomes an income generating project as opposed to a value-based activity (Individual Interview 40, Nairobi, 2014)

As noted earlier, a double standard is evident whereby the sincerity of local peacebuilders is viewed as directly proportional to their spirit of volunteerism, while the remunerated professional peacebuilders motives appear to be held to a different standard.

The alternative perspective of the non-volunteers is that the duties of peace committee members often take them away from productive enterprise or require them to spend their own money.

Peace committee members should be compensated for this loss of income or out-of-pocket expenses. The volunteers are expected to attend meetings, trainings and telephone in early warning alerts. In the words of the same interviewee who argued money has killed volunteerism:

But you are taking them away from their core duties. If somebody is sitting in the district peace committee, it depends on how much time you expect them to be in that committee. If they are leaving work that is generating income for them to come and sit here, then you want to compensate for that time (Individual Interview 40, Nairobi, 2014)

The two preceding statements by the same interviewee demonstrate the dilemma that money has posed to volunteerism. On the one hand, local peacebuilding used to be done voluntarily but on the other hand, institutionalisation has changed the way local peacebuilding is done, creating a need to consider compensating volunteers. Institutionalisation introduces new demands on volunteers that should be met by the I4P if volunteerism is to be sustainable. However meeting these demands with resources external to the context will also be unsustainable. In this case, the institutionalisation of peacebuilding has produced a catch-22 situation regarding sustainability. If the I4P continues to make the same demands on the volunteers without considering the cost to them, it is unlikely they will be able to sustain these voluntary structures. If they begin to compensate the volunteers with funding external to the local context, it will also be unsustainable.

Implications

Institutionalisation has impacted the human resource aspect of peacebuilding in a way that calls into question the very goal of sustainability it sought to achieve. Having attended some forums convened for peace committees, I noticed that there was always tension on the day that participants were to be compensated for their travel and lodging expenses related to the meeting.

The meeting convenors seemed suspicious and denied some claims while some volunteers felt short-changed by what they received. This issue of money can breed mistrust within the I4P and negatively impact how the volunteers and professional peacebuilders work together. One interviewee remarked that the expectation of volunteers and non-volunteers to collaboratively build peace in the I4P has resulted in the volunteers feeling used. This sentiment emphasises how the financial imperative of institutionalisation has influenced the way that the two categories of peacebuilders interact and measure their roles in building peace. One respondent aptly said “peace is not cheap, it must cost us something” (Individual Interview 31, Nairobi, 2014). Institutionalisation has fixed this cost as financial.

How we build peace

Institutionalisation has changed the nature of peacebuilding through the I4P. In this section I argue that institutionalisation has led to meetings as a major strategy for peacebuilding but the flood of meetings has disrupted local peacebuilding agency and introduced financial costs that are unsustainable. I also argue that professionalising and bureaucratising peacebuilding overlooks local resources for peace and creates hurdles to local peacebuilding.

The road to peace is paved with meetings

The institutionalisation of peacebuilding through the I4Ps has been characterised by meetings, meetings and more meetings. Meetings is a general term that encompasses peace dialogues, training, workshops, consultative forums or any organised peacebuilding gathering with a budget that brings together the different actors for peace. One interviewee commented,

I have asked myself why is it that there is so much money poured into peace meetings, peace dialogue, but it never quite holds (Individual Interview 40, Nairobi, 2014).

Several respondents observed that these meetings are often held in pricey hotels in big towns, while they could have just as easily been held in basic venues in locations more accessible to the participants. Meetings in big hotels seem to be popular because they give the funding organisations visibility and lures the participants with the prospect of a small allowance for attending. One interviewee from an international organisation compared the funders' need for visibility to peace branding such that recipient organisations can attribute peacebuilding meetings as their tangible output (Individual Interview 36, Nairobi, 2014).

Eaton (2008) illustrates the failure of two prominent NGOs that organised a peace meeting in Kenya's North Rift region in order to link their NGOs to already locally made peace but instead this poorly planned meeting inflamed tension between the communities. Eaton concludes that despite the money spent for peace meetings, they have had negligible impact on peace in the North Rift. In their analysis of the Africa's AIDS industry, Watkins and Swidler (2013) discuss the different motivations of donors, brokers and villagers in accepting the prevalent practice of trainings. The donors see training as a sustainable way to equip a few to teach other villagers while the brokers and villagers seek the material benefit of the training per diems. Watkins and Swidler further observe that while the trainings are a budget item, the content of the training is not explicit because what matters to the donors is measurable output in the number of people trained and to the training proposers what counts is how many will receive per diems.

Several NGO interviewees claimed that that peace committee members use meetings as an opportunity to get allowances and sometimes end up attending too many meetings. One respondent described this way:

It will be very good if civil society can harmonise their approach because what happens in some cases is that some of those district peace committee people, there is nothing else they do because they are ever in meetings. Because today this group has come, they want them for women empowerment; tomorrow they come, another group needs them for youth empowerment, the other day they come – elders’ role; the other day they come – oh, understanding dynamics of peace. So eventually they become like they are employed to attend these meetings (Individual Interview 31, Nairobi, 2014).

The above quote demonstrates that the need for meetings is both on the part of those who convene the meetings and those who attend. Meetings are a deliverable for the organisers and potential revenue for the participants. The actual impact of the meeting is not immediately apparent. Building peace by meetings introduces the dynamics of financial resources that consequently hinders the goal of sustainability for the I4P.

Professionalising peacebuilding

Institutionalisation has professionalised peacebuilding in Kenya through the tools for peace, training, literacy and financial accountability. While professionalising peacebuilding establishes a standard for peace practice, it inadvertently excludes the contextual richness that should inform conflict transformation and sustainable peacebuilding.

The tools for peace are the specific techniques promoted for conflict analysis and peacebuilding. These tools are mostly taught through trainings. This tools-for-peace strategy focuses disproportionately on the role of the peacebuilder implying that peace is only a matter of the right technique, and this ignores the complex dynamics of the conflict setting (de Coning, 2011;

Goetschel & Hagmann, 2009; Lederach, 2012). Mac Ginty emphasises the power dynamic because most of these tools are developed in the global North which has the power to frame peacebuilding discourse (2012, p. 298). As a participant observer at peace committee trainings during my fieldwork, I recognised the peacebuilding tools as developed mostly in the UK and the US. The use of tools is informed by bureaucratic rationality that prefers specific tool to fix a certain problem. In peacebuilding, the dynamics of violent conflict and modalities of culture are so diverse that generic tools may not be useful and would need to be contextualised or developed locally.

Trainings within the I4P are conducted by government institutions, NGOs, IOs and consultants. Both state and non-state actors in the I4P value training as a way to build national capacities for peace. One respondent gave this illustration:

You cannot use one knife to slaughter 15 cows. Surely the knife will go blunt and when the knife goes blunt, what do you do? You have to sharpen it. So these people who are expected to deliver, but they are not even being given opportunity to learn how they should be able to. Yeah, they are not given tools how they can do their work, they are just waiting, waiting. They were trained once by NSC (Individual Interview 51, Nairobi, 2014)

The notion that formal peacebuilding training is the only way to equip peacebuilders does not consider the embedded resources factor. If peacebuilding values the local people and their culture, there should be space for informal ways of equipping peacebuilders and trainings should reflect the wealth of local conflict transformation strategies. Formal trainings are a threat to sustainability because they require funding to cater for transport, meals, accommodation and often an honorarium if not consultancy fee for the trainer. The duration of training sessions range from half a day, to a number of days. If training does not utilise embedded resources of the local

context and relies on external funding, it contributes to the unsustainability of institutionalised peacebuilding.

Literacy and financial accountability are two effects of professionalising peace that particularly impact the volunteers. This poses a challenge because while the volunteers may lack the professional skills their expertise lies in the knowledge of their context and their capacity to engage with their community. The guidelines for peace structures note that, “illiteracy should not be used to lock out potential peace builders” (NSCPBCM, 2009, p. 17). However, the documentation required within the I4P necessitates a level of literacy, especially for the role of secretary. Often volunteers elected or selected for the peace committees are able to read, write and communicate well, for example, retired teachers and retired civil servants. Linked to literacy is the accountability requirement of peace committees for funds disbursed. One peace committee member recounted an incident where he received funds as the secretary of the peace committee and gave them to the elders for a peace intervention (Individual Interview 17, Nairobi, 2014). The elders did not see the need to account for what they referred to as little money. As it was culturally unacceptable for him as a younger man to demand accountability from elders, he was not able to account on behalf of the DPC, which was then barred from obtaining future funds. Other interviewees agreed that if accountability requirements were not met, the peace committee could not access future funds. Professionalising peacebuilding through literacy and financial accountability adds a hurdle that can exclude local expertise in favour of standardising peace practice. Institutionalisation introduces formal procedures that can oppress local initiative, diminished local ownership for peacebuilding thereby inhibiting sustainability.

The bureaucratic grind

The state's involvement in the institutionalisation of peacebuilding through the I4P has resulted in the transfer of bureaucratic practice to the I4P. A significant effect of this has been the often delayed disbursement of funds. For instance, the peace committees can make requests to the IGAD Rapid Response Fund for emergency interventions. However, since the committee has to get the DC's approval for the funds which may take 2-3 days, the funds are often not timely and the conflict may have escalated by then. Several interviewees commented on how the bureaucracy of government administration has slowed down peacebuilding initiatives in the I4P, e.g., the development of the peace policy. Nonetheless, bureaucracy has on occasion been countered by the agency of a government official in support of peacebuilding. While government bureaucracy has on the whole slowed down the peacebuilding work of the I4P, peacebuilding agency from dedicated government officials demonstrates that institutionalisation of these structures is not complete.

Institutionalising peacebuilding has led to the creation of multiple institutions such as NSC, KNFP and NCIC, all with such similar objectives that there are instances of duplication. The effect of multiple institutions for peacebuilding is analysed in chapter 5. As discussed previously one interviewee observed how the media wrongly attributes the activities of NCIC and the government's Department of Cohesion. Despite this multiplicity of institutions in the I4P with overlapping mandates, Chuma and Ojielo (2012) recommended that the Kenyan government create yet another institution with a clear conflict prevention mandate and also institutionalise the collaborative Uwiano platform for peaceful elections discussed in chapter 5. Chuma and Ojielo

are UN staff and their recommendation reflects the UNDP support for institutionalisation as the way to sustain peacebuilding. Mac Ginty (2012) observes that the persistent clamour for more or better institutions assumes without critique, the viability of the institutional approach. The three state-led institutions within the I4P have similar mandates which have resulted in collaborative engagement. Nonetheless, as I noted in chapter 4, the mandates of these institutions have a narrow conceptualisation of peace, largely as security and harmonious co-existence. In spite of the multiplicity of institutions in peacebuilding, the scope of peacebuilding is not comprehensive and as demonstrated chapter 4 and 5, the state neglects its role to build peace as the provision of basic needs, more equal opportunities and justice. Finally, the challenge of financially sustaining these institutions will negatively impact peacebuilding and the prospects for peace.

6.5. Conclusion

The rationale for institutionalisation is that embedding peacebuilding will enable permanent national capacities for peace to sustain peacebuilding through the different stages of latent and overt conflict. My research question in this chapter sought to establish how institutionalisation has impacted peacebuilding and the prospects for peace in Kenya. While institutionalisation has contributed to the prominence of peacebuilding as a response to violent conflict and enhanced national capacities for peace, institutionalising peacebuilding threatens sustainability. I argue that institutionalisation has negatively impacted peacebuilding by introducing a financial imperative, changing the human resource context and affecting the way peace is built in Kenya.

Lederach (2012) reflects on the promise and challenge of institutionalisation noting that whereas it has increased resources for I4Ps in the long term, bureaucratisation and professionalization of

peacebuilding has negatively impacted the nature of peacebuilding. According to Lederach (1997), the sustainability of I4Ps is rooted in the local context and cultures. Institutionalisation challenges sustainability because it generates needs that cannot be met locally. The financial imperative for institutionalising peacebuilding has been met extensively by resources external to the local context. Already this has proved to be unsustainable. The use of technical experts in peacebuilding has been supported by external resources. This expertise does not necessarily contribute to permanent capacities for peacebuilding, either because of the limited duration or because of resulting dependency from long term support. From a human resource perspective, the biggest threat to sustainability from institutionalising peacebuilding is the changing context for volunteers who, despite the rising financial demands of the formal system, are expected to continue to volunteer at their own expense. The volunteers are a visible representation of the local context and culture in the I4P such that if institutionalisation makes volunteerism unsustainable, the Kenyan I4P will lose its most celebrated aspect of local agency and sustainability.

The final threat to the sustainability is the bureaucracy and professionalising effects of institutionalising peacebuilding that standardise the practice but have decontextualized the practice of peace and added hurdles for local peacebuilding. The threat to how peace is built is well illustrated in meetings as the major activity of peacebuilding regardless of the financial costs entailed against the negligible success of meetings as a strategy to secure peace. Institutionalising peacebuilding has adversely impacted the sustainability of peacebuilding and consequently the prospects for peace.

Chapter 7: Building peace that lasts

The peacebuilding literature predominantly addresses international interventions in post-war countries. While international peacebuilding is significant, peacebuilding is an important activity at the national and local levels as well. Empirical studies on peacebuilding underline the crucial role of local actors in sustaining peace. Beyond international interventions, peacebuilding is an ongoing strategic response to lesser scales of violent conflict, seeking to prevent the recurrence or escalation of violence. This thesis contributes to closing the gap in the existing peacebuilding literature on nationally led peacebuilding in a non-war context. My study on state-led peacebuilding in Kenya offers insights into the role of the state in peacebuilding and the impact of institutionalisation on sustainable peacebuilding and peace.

The theoretical framework guiding this study focuses on the actors, duration, and scope of peacebuilding. Effective peacebuilding includes state and non-state actors from the local to the national level. Peacebuilding activities should range from the short to the long term and target both latent and overt conflict to resolve the immediate and the systemic causes of violent conflict. In this study I investigated how state-led peacebuilding has influenced the practice of peacebuilding and prospects for lasting peace in Kenya. The focus of my study was the three state-led components of Kenya's infrastructure for peace, namely the National Steering Committee on Peacebuilding and Conflict Management (NSC), the Kenya National Focal Point (KNFP) and the National Commission for Cohesion and Integration (NCIC). My study involved two sessions of field research in Kenya, from August 2014 to January 2015 and in October 2015. The main research site was Nairobi, the location of most offices for state and non-state actors. I

also selected Eldoret, Nakuru and Lodwar as research locations because of their distinct conflict and peacebuilding experiences.

7.1. Research findings

My study on state-led peacebuilding in Kenya was guided by the overarching research question, ‘How has the Kenyan government-steered approach impacted peacebuilding and prospects for peace in Kenya?’ To answer this question, I posed the following three sub-questions:

- What are the different conceptions of peace held by peacebuilders within this state-led peacebuilding approach and what kind of peace are they building?
- How has the role of the state in peacebuilding in Kenya influenced the nature of peacebuilding and consequently the prospects for sustainable peace?
- How has institutionalisation impacted the sustainability of peacebuilding and prospect for peace in Kenya?

State-led peacebuilding has influenced the practice of peacebuilding in Kenya with implications for the prospects for peace. In chapter 4, I focus on the conceptualisation of peace within the state-led infrastructure for peace (I4P) and the implications of this on sustainable peace. I analyse the paradox of the state in peacebuilding in Chapter 5, and how the role of the state has impacted peacebuilding and peace. The state enabled the institutionalisation of peacebuilding and, in chapter 6, I study how institutionalisation affects sustainable peacebuilding and peace. The following section presents a summary of the key findings.

Conceptualising Peace

To understand how this state-led approach to peacebuilding has influenced the prospects for peace, I explored the conceptualisation of peace to establish the type of peace being built. In peacebuilding practice and literature, the concept of peace is often assumed and left undefined. However, the explicit and implicit conceptualisation of peace determines the nature of peacebuilding which, in turn determines the prospects for peace. Conceptualising peace from the perspectives of actors and official documents of the state-led approach was important in order to establish what type of peace was being built. People actively engaged in the state-led approach hold multiple conceptions. I organised the conceptualisation of peace at three levels: individual, community and society. These levels of peace are summarised in Table 4.1 in chapter 4. The first type of peace, individual peace, is the freedom to live free from the fear of random and targeted violence. At an individual level peace must be felt. Peace as a feeling captured individual fears of random electoral violence and insecurity and fears of targeted violence on the basis of political and ethnic affiliation. The history and experience of violent conflict in Kenya informs the fear of insecurity, electoral violence or being targeted for one's political and ethnic identity. Of these fears, the fear of insecurity surprised me. I was focused on macro conflict therefore expected political violence-related fears but not insecurity from crime. Yet I found that in both rural and urban setting, there was a widely held fear of insecurity even though the type of insecurity differed, e.g., cattle theft versus mugging.

At a communal level, I found the conceptualisation of peace reflects the history of violent conflict linked to communal ethnic identity. I discuss communal peace as shared peace. Shared

peace has two components. The first is living harmoniously in spite of ethnic diversity and the second is to have the right to live in any part of Kenya regardless of the ethnic identity. Ethnicity has been a defining factor of political violence in Kenya, particularly evident around elections. This has led to the displacement of individuals whose ethnic identity is perceived as being an outsider. The link between land and ethnicity in Kenya is based on the view that ethnic groups “belong” to specific pre-colonial locations. On these grounds, instigators of political violence use the idea of ethnic outsiders to mobilise for the displacement of individuals who might vote the “wrong” way. Politicizing the link between land and ethnicity has had deadly consequences. In spite of the constitutional provision for freedom of movement, political violence has undermined the right of Kenyans to live in whatever part of Kenya they wish. People fear being displaced for political reasons which informs their decision on where to buy property or which places are safe for them to be in during election time.

At the society level, peace is “owed”. Owed peace is an expectation that the state will provide basic socio-economic needs, security, the right to justice and more equal opportunities. Interviewees indicated an expectation that the state would deliver this kind of peace. From the documents of the state-led components of the I4P, I found that state-led peacebuilding has sought to build peace in the provision of security, harmonious co-existence and, to a lesser extent, the right to more equal opportunities. From the state’s perspective, peace is conceptualised primarily as security and the work of NSC and KNFP reflect this bias. Security is an aspect of state building. Interviewees cited security as a major conceptualisation of peace but undue focus on security is to the detriment of other elements of owed peace. The state is best placed to deliver owed peace. While it builds peace as security, the state-led approach does not deal with other

substantive aspects of owed peace, such as justice, provision of socio-economic needs and more equal opportunities. Owed peace requires the transformation of structures of inequality and injustice to allow for lasting peace.

The state in peacebuilding

The role of the state in peacebuilding is a paradox in two ways. First, the state has had a direct role in violent conflict in Kenya and also an indirect role through structures that promote marginalisation and discrimination. The conflict transformation theory of peacebuilding, discussed in my theoretical framework (see chapter 3), requires the transformation of structural violence for lasting peace. The state's role in indirect violence raises doubts on whether it can engage in peacebuilding that seeks to transform the very structures on which the state is based. Second, the state typically operates in a top-down manner. According to the empirical peacebuilding literature discussed in chapter 2, a top-down approach is ineffective in peacebuilding. Despite the paradox of the state in peacebuilding, I found that the state-led approach in Kenya has positively influenced peacebuilding in Kenya. The state's role in peacebuilding has improved the coordination of peacebuilding activities by both state and non-state actors and has created a synergy through collaborative peace engagement. State and non-state actors established NSC to coordinate peacebuilding activities for all actors. State actors created KNFP with a similar model to NSC to coordinate activities against the proliferation of illicit small arms and light weapons. Non-state actors observed that, prior to NSC, peacebuilding coordination amongst non-state actors had been problematic because organisations had similar activities and were competing for the resources. NSC's coordination role resolved this tension

because it represented state and non-state actors, and was solely in existence to coordinate. The state role has also created synergy by facilitating joint peacebuilding implementation by state and non-state actors, such as the successful Uwiano Platform for Peace towards a peaceful election.

Contrary to my assumption that the weak presence of the state in regions such as Northern Kenya indicated limited power and legitimacy of the state, I found that the state still has symbolic power that has positively influenced peacebuilding. The symbolic power of the state has given credence to the peacebuilding of non-state actors in the infrastructures for peace. Interviewees observed that the communities had confidence in the interventions of peace committees because of their access to state actors to deal with threats of violence and insecurity. Non-state actors have also been able to expand the scope of their peacebuilding. Prior to the involvement of state actors, non-state actors limited their peacebuilding to reconciliation in areas where there was low risk of violence, but alongside state actors, they benefit from the protection of security officers if needed. The state has also used its power to promote the development of policies on peace and the use of traditional peacebuilding methods. Many interviewees discussed Kenya's peace policy that was developed through state and non-state actor consultations over a decade-long process and they felt that it validated the work they had been doing. The peace policy is important because it demonstrates a commitment to peace by the state and provides a framework for peacebuilding. This policy mentions the peace committee structure which was inspired by traditional peacebuilding in Northern Kenya. NSC replicated the peace committee model across Kenya. The state-led approach has also supported peace agreements on pastoralist violence informed by the customary system as complementary to the legal justice system.

In spite of the benefits from state-led peacebuilding, there have been drawbacks to the involvement of the state. An unintended consequence of promoting traditional peacebuilding is the co-optation of local agency. The local peace committees in the infrastructure for peace are part of the NSC's conflict early warning early response system. The role of the community volunteers who make up the peace committee is to send out alerts to the local government administrators or the NSC situation room. Some peace committee members found that their role has sometimes made the community doubt if the committee is acting as informers for the state or peacebuilders for the community. Co-opting local agents has also had the effect of depressing local agency. Peace committee members articulated their frustration at the top-down style of the early warning early response system. Their role is to provide early conflict warning alerts but while the information travels from the bottom up, they were not always privy to what actions were taken to deal with their alerts, if any. In this way, local agents now have more responsibilities to provide information but at the same time have diminishing autonomy and control of local peacebuilding.

Another drawback of the state role is that the implicit conceptualisation of peace as security has limited the conceptualisation of peace to security. Although the more recent role of NCIC in cohesion and integration broadens the security conceptualisation of peace, the state-led approach does not address substantive elements of owed peace, discussed above. A narrow conceptualisation of peace limits the scope of peacebuilding to a goal of peace as security and fails to address other integral conceptualisations of peace. The failure to transform structural violence and inequalities that cause conflict diminishes the prospects for sustainable peace. Finally, the state role in peacebuilding has progressively crowded out non-state actors. Through

the process of institutionalisation, the state has created multiple peacebuilding institutions and decreased the active engagement of non-state actors. NSC is a good example. NSC was created jointly by state and non-state actors to coordinate peacebuilding. However, over time, it has become embedded within the state, playing more of an implementation role with less significant involvement of non-state actors. The diminishing role of non-state actors means the loss of the critical voice needed to challenge the state to deliver owed peace.

The institutionalisation and sustainability nexus

The third focus of my study was how the institutionalisation of peacebuilding has affected the sustainability of peacebuilding and the prospects for peace. Institutionalisation is the process by which peacebuilding has become embedded in Kenya. The state's engagement in peacebuilding has advanced the institutionalisation of peacebuilding which in theory should enable the sustainability of peacebuilding by creating permanent capacities for peace. As discussed in the theoretical framework, the establishment of I4Ps is premised on the idea that building permanent national capacities for peace will sustain peacebuilding and peace. In this case, I found that while institutionalisation has indeed built capacities for peace, it has adversely affected the sustainability of peacebuilding and peace in three ways.

The first negative effect of institutionalisation on sustainability is the funding imperative. Although the sustainability of infrastructures for peace was envisioned to be from local resources, the infrastructure for peace in Kenya has received significant support from external actors. Non state actors and external donors have support the costs of institutionalisation with financial and technical support. Despite the donor preference to be perceived as partners, the

influence they have as the funders only emphasises the old inequalities of power in the donors-recipient relationship. The donor influence has determined the nature of peacebuilding activities such that recipients have to tailor their peacebuilding engagement to access donor funds. This has given potential recipients the incentive to frame peacebuilding activities to appeal to donor interests. This means using the current donor ‘buzz words’ and proposing activities that are of a fixed duration with measurable outcomes, e.g., trainings or peace meetings. Peacebuilding activities are therefore limited to what donors perceived as fundable and not necessarily to what is most appropriate for the peacebuilding context. I also found that the flow of donor funds especially around election time simulates a peacebuilding industry with a glut of short-term employment opportunities. These short-term contractors do not significantly contribute to building permanent capacities for peace because most cannot be absorbed for long-term peacebuilding within the existing organisations. The peacebuilding industry also necessitates the competition of state and non-state organisations for the same pool of external resources. Finally, the cessation of external funds has resulted in the decrease of peacebuilding activities or the end of peace work. Although external funds are limited to project duration, the loss of funding in a structure dependent on external funds will impede the sustainability of the infrastructure for peace.

The second way institutionalisation has adversely affected sustainability is in human resources. Institutionalisation seeks to enhance permanent national capacities for peace and has done so to an extent. I focus on technical experts and volunteers as two categories of human resource within the infrastructure for peace. The use of technical experts to improve peacebuilding capacity has contributed to effectively institutionalising peacebuilding in the short term. Technical experts

have short to long-term contracts. The challenge with short-term experts, as noted earlier, is the absorption of this expertise to enhance peacebuilding capacities in the long term. Although longer-term experts, seconded mostly from UNDP are Kenyans, their availability is based on UNDP support, which makes them a locally unsustainable resource. The long duration of their engagement also reflects the self-perpetuating nature of technocracy as supply driven.

The second category of human resource is the volunteers who are the peace committee members. I found that institutionalisation has formalised the informal peace committee structure, yet community volunteers are still expected to operate informally. Institutionalising peace committees within the infrastructure for peace creates responsibilities for the volunteers such as communicating conflict early warning alerts. The peace committee members have to use their own resources to fulfil their responsibilities because they are volunteers and there is no provision for their expenses. The reflections of the cost of being a volunteer came up in every interview with peace committee members in answer to the question on peacebuilding challenges. The emphasis on this matter led me to ask non-volunteers whether the I4P should meet the costs for the volunteers. Some non-volunteers within the infrastructure for peace strongly rejected this suggestion and argued that meeting these expenses creates incentives, as was the case with reimbursing costs for attending meetings. These non-volunteers argued that peace committee members were seeking peace for their communities and would be benefit from the peace and that was enough. A few non-volunteers recognised that the responsibilities of volunteers had changed and the I4P should cover the expenses peace committee members incurred while fulfilling their peacebuilding obligations to the I4P. Institutionalisation has negatively impacted the sustainability of human resources in the infrastructure for peace.

The third negative effect of institutionalisation on sustainability is in the practice of peacebuilding. The formalisation of peacebuilding has resulted in meetings as the major peacebuilding activity, including consultative forums, trainings, seminars and planning sessions. For the organisations, meetings are a fundable and visible way to engage in peacebuilding. For the community and volunteers, meetings are an opportunity to learn, network and on occasion get a small allowance (per diem). As a peacebuilding activity, meetings are a source of funding for the organisers and attendees, but meetings are not always appropriate or effective way to build peace. Institutionalisation has professionalised peacebuilding through formal training sessions that are developed outside of the conflict-affect context and require funds to carry out. The impact on volunteers of professionalising peacebuilding is the responsibility of documentation which demands literacy to write the proposals and reports and the ability to account for expenditure. Literacy is a challenge in areas where education has not been as accessible as in major cities in towns. The expectations for accountability sometimes conflict with local norms, e.g., a young committee member seeking accountability from elders who participated in an intervention. Institutionalising peacebuilding has also led to bureaucratisation, which has slowed down the processes of peacebuilding and has also resulted in the creation of multiple institutions to build peace.

7.2. Contributions of this study

This research makes four contributions to knowledge on peacebuilding. First, this study offers insights on peacebuilding by national-level actors. The dominant peacebuilding literature is based on empirical studies of international post-war interventions while recognising the role local actors should play in peacebuilding and to sustain the peace. The concepts of local agency

and local ownership in literature are developed in the context of international peacebuilding interventions. This study emphasises the importance of national peacebuilding processes while offering an analysis of the tensions of local agency and local ownership from a national perspective.

Second, this research contributes to literature on peacebuilding as an ongoing activity in response to intermittent conflict to prevent the escalation and reoccurrence of violence. The findings of this research are particularly useful for peacebuilding in countries that have had periodic localised violent conflict. Building national capacities for peace will enable comprehensive peacebuilding for sustainable peace. The lessons from peacebuilding in Kenya are applicable in developing countries that face the challenge of episodic violence.

The third contribution of this study is to literature on the institutionalisation and sustainability of peacebuilding. Critiques of international peacebuilding argue that effective peacebuilding should be longer term for a deeper engagement that would sustain peace. Infrastructures for peace seek to establish permanent capacities for peace. This research on Kenya's infrastructure for peace confirms that the institutionalisation effects of bureaucracy and professionalising peace negatively affect local agency and sustainability. If institutionalisation depends on external resources because the demands surpass what is locally available, it will not be sustainable. This interrogates the assumption that institutionalisation creates permanent capacities for peace, whereas the process of institutionalisation has created needs that threaten sustainability.

The fourth contribution is to literature on the role of the state in peacebuilding. Empirical peacebuilding studies in post-war contexts have found that neglecting the role of the state in

post-war reconstruction is detrimental to state capacity and state-society relations. In the same context, the literature presents state building as a strategy of peace consolidation, although critics argue that state building and peacebuilding are incompatible. Unlike post-war contexts where state power and legitimacy are fundamentally diminished, this study looks at the role of a state that has symbolic power and legitimacy despite its arguably weak infrastructural reach. This study contributes a nuanced argument for the role of the state in peacebuilding by establishing that while the state can positively influence peacebuilding, the negative impacts from an unchecked state-led process can outweigh the benefits.

7.3. Theoretical implications

The theoretical framework in this study was primarily based on Lederach's (1997, 2003) conflict transformation theory. Peacebuilding that is guided by conflict transformation as a theory of change seeks to deal with the immediate to systemic causes of violent conflict with short to long term interventions carried out in coordination by multiple actors. Local people are the greatest resource for conflict transformative peacebuilding. Lederach (1997, 2012) envisioned an infrastructure for peace (I4P) as a framework through which to ensure that peacebuilding can sustainably engage through immediate to systemic interventions. Against this theoretical background, my study analyses how the state-led components of Kenya's infrastructure for peace have contributed to the sustainability of peacebuilding in Kenya.

My findings challenge the sustainability outcome envisioned in the institutionalisation of peacebuilding through the infrastructure for peace. First, the process of institutionalisation has created financial demands that are not locally sustainable while decontextualizing peacebuilding

to reflect standardised peacebuilding methods. Second, the formalisation of peacebuilding has had adverse effects on the local volunteer structure which is the critical resource for sustainable peacebuilding. In addition, formalisation has led to the dominance of the state in the infrastructure for peace as the state takes over implementation roles previously undertaken by non-state actors. While Lederach's conflict transformation framework provides a comprehensive strategy towards sustainable peacebuilding, the reality of the state-led approach in Kenya interrogates the effect of institutionalisation on sustainability.

Power was an essential element of analysis in my study on state-led peacebuilding in Kenya. MacGinty and Richmond (2013) argue that state-centric approaches are top-down and have failed to effectively build peace. Goestchel and Hagmann (2009) also critique a state approach to peacebuilding and contend that bureaucratic peacebuilding depoliticises peace. MacGinty (2012) further demonstrates how imposing administrative procedures and repercussions of exclusion for non-compliance, as evident in this peacebuilding approach, is passive coercion. My findings do corroborate the observations of these scholars that the state acts in a top-down manner that has frustrated the peacebuilding efforts of local volunteers which compromises the efficacy of this approach in the long term. I also find that the state-led peacebuilding depoliticises peace in its predominant focus on security with little emphasis on building the kind of peace that would threaten the status quo of state elites e.g. peace as justice or peace as more equal opportunities. However, I also find that despite the impact of power in the role of the state in peacebuilding, there have been positive significant outcomes from this approach. The state's power has improved the coordination of peacebuilding, galvanised peacebuilding actors to intervene

coherently, enacted peacebuilding policy, legitimised non-state peacebuilding actors and promoted traditional peacebuilding methods.

Despite the weight of the negative impact of state-led peacebuilding in Kenya, there remains a role for the state in peacebuilding. State-led peacebuilding should seek to establish society-level peace by better coordinating peacebuilding through relevant state institutions charged with meeting the peace as justice, equal opportunities and socio-economic provision. The test for state-led peacebuilding remains in tackling systemic conflict issues which are at the heart of state power in the control of resources such as land or delinking ethnic identity and electoral politics. Peacebuilding should remain a joint state and non-state activity in order to mitigate the limitations and boundaries that each set of actors faces in effectively building peace.

7.4. Practical implications

This study has three practical implications for peacebuilding. The first relates to the infrastructure for peace approach to peacebuilding. The I4P provides a permanent capacity for collaborative peacebuilding that enables long-term engagement. However the process of institutionalising I4Ps can impede sustainability. The negative effects in Kenya underline the danger of external resource dependency, which are already known. From this study, the negative effects of institutionalisation compromise its goal to create permanent capacities for peace. The funding imperative can be mitigated if institutionalisation is determined by locally available resources from state and non-state actors. For example, the formalisation of peace committees was significantly supported by UNDP. If the state and non-state actors were not able to sustain this level of institutionalisation, these structures did not need to be formalised. As the Wajir

experience demonstrates, the concept of a peace committee was successful before institutionalisation and non-state actors still collaborated with the state. If peace committees are informal, members will engage in peacebuilding voluntarily and collaborate with the state without being instrumentalised. The process of institutionalisation threatens sustainable peacebuilding and, from my study, it is not apparent that it is necessary for effective peacebuilding or even that it is equally desired by state and non-state actors. This study is relevant to countries that have infrastructures for peace. Even though the infrastructures vary in composition, the institutionalisation process is likely to have strong enough similarities for the applicability of this study's findings to other cases. Understanding how institutionalisation impacts sustainability is important in designing comprehensive peacebuilding strategies that are sustainable and contribute to lasting peace.

The second implication of this study is in conceptualising peace as it relates to peacebuilding within the infrastructure for peace in Kenya. This responds to the observation in the literature that peace is seldom defined in the practice of peacebuilding. Although the meaning of peace is context-determined, this study highlights the importance of explicitly describing peace to ensure effective peacebuilding. Peacebuilders should engage conflict-affected people in conceptualising the parameters of peace in order for peacebuilding to be relevant in addressing the short- to long-term needs for peace. Conceptualising peace is particularly important in collaborative peacebuilding such as in the 14P, because there are multiple actors involved for a long period of time.

The third implication of this study is that the state has an important role to play in peacebuilding, albeit a nuanced and checked role. The state's role in peacebuilding in Kenya has benefitted the practice of peacebuilding, but the drawbacks to state-led peacebuilding imply that the role of the state should not supersede that of non-state actors or co-opt local agency. The state is well positioned to deliver owed peace and should concentrate on peacebuilding that conceptualises peace as security, the provision of basic socio-economic needs, justice and more equal opportunities. When building peace with non-state actors, the state must retain its role of coordinating non-state actors and offer a platform for continued state and non-state actor collaboration in peacebuilding.

7.5. Limitations and recommendations for further research

This study had two limitations that inform areas for further research. The first limitation of this research is that infrastructures for peace vary according to the country contexts which confine the applicability of these findings to similar I4Ps in as far as the role of the state is concerned. Nevertheless, the need to conceptualise peace and the processes of institutionalisation is likely to be more widely shared by different I4Ps. Further research on how peace is conceptualised in other I4Ps will promote the explicit conceptualisation of peace which will tailor peacebuilding more effectively towards the kind of peace desired by the people in the conflict-affected area. Additional studies on the impact of the institutionalisation on sustainability will provide useful insights from other contexts on whether institutionalisation promotes long-term peacebuilding. This case presents the negative implications of institutionalisation and further research may reveal similar effects or cases where institutionalisation has positively impacted sustainability.

This knowledge would inform the practice of peacebuilding and the empirical and theoretical literature on peacebuilding.

The second limitation of my study is that I was only able to conceptualise peace from the perspective of those engaged in the infrastructure for peace, since my goal was to establish the conceptualisation of peace by the multiple actors involved. However, members of peace committees as community volunteers were from conflict-affected areas and their perspectives are representative to an extent. It would have been enlightening to conceptualise peace based on the perspectives of non-peacebuilders affected by violent conflict. A broader process of conceptualising peace would contribute to analysis on whether the kind of peace being built is the kind of peace locally desired.

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Appendices

Appendix 1: List of key documents

Annual reports

National Cohesion and Integration Commission: 2010-2011, 2011-2012, 2012-2013

UNDP. Towards Transformational Change: 2011 Annual Report.

Brochures

Kenya National Focal Point

National Steering Committee on Peacebuilding and Conflict Management

National Cohesion and Integration Commission

UNDP Issue brief: Infrastructure for Peace.

Program/project proposals

Kenya National Focal Point on Small Arms & Light Weapons Strategic Plan 2010/2011/2014-2015

UNDP. Project Document: Consolidating the Peace Process and Establishing Foundations for a Successful Political Transition, 2010-2013.

Program/Project reports

National Steering Committee on Peacebuilding and Conflict Management:

- Interventions in Peacebuilding and Arms Reduction. 2007
- Nairobi Provincial Peace Forum. Peacebuilding, Conflict Management and Security Strategy: Incorporating Report of Stakeholders Training and Sensitization. 2009
- Training of Administrative and Law Enforcement Officers in Peacebuilding and Conflict Management. Consolidated Report. 2008-2010
- “Consolidating Early Warning and Early Response Capacity in Kenya Towards 2012 and Beyond”. Forum Report. 2011
- Kenya’s Infrastructure for Peace: Re-Thinking the Peace Agenda: A Report of the County Consultations. 2013
- Strengthening National Capacities for Conflict Prevention and Transformation, 2006-2013
- Annual Progress Report for 2011: Consolidating the Peace Process and Establishing Foundations for a Successful Political Transition, 2010-2013.

- Annual Progress Report for 2012: Consolidating the Peace Process and Establishing Foundations for a Successful Political Transition, 2010-2013

Uwiano Platform for Peace:

- Uwiano Platform for Peace: A Conflict Prevention and Response Initiative
- Uwiano Platform for Peace: Experiences and Lessons Learned

UN Conceptual Framework for Peacebuilding and Conflict Prevention in Kenya: Delivering as One

UNDP

- 2012: CPAP Outcome Evaluation: KEN Outcome 49 – Effectiveness of Emergency Response and Early Recovery
- Annual UNDAF Report 2014-2015

Documents and research reports

- Kenya Human Rights Commission. *Recurrent Ethnic Violence and Claims of Communities Arming Ahead of the 2012 General Elections*.
- Kenya National Focal Point.
 - *Monitoring and Evaluation Framework* (UNDP/GOK Conflict Prevention and Transformation Project). 2011
 - *Reference Operation Manual (ROM 3) for District Task Forces*
- Nakuru DPC. A Friendship Reborn. Documentation and Evaluation of the Establishment of the Nakuru District Peace Committee. 2009.
- National Cohesion and Integration Commission
 - Towards National Cohesion and Unity in Kenya: Ethnic Diversity and Audit of the Civil Service. 2011
 - Ethnic Interaction and Tolerance among Kenyans, 2012
 - Road to Cohesion: Grassroots Conversations about Ethnicity and Nationalism in Kenya on National Television
 - Building a Cohesive Kenyan Society: The NCIC Experience
- NPI-Africa, & NCK-CPBD. *Strategic and responsive evaluation of peacebuilding: Towards a learning model* (Seminar report). 2001

- NPI-Africa. Building Peace, Sustaining Hope. Activity Report 2003.
- National Steering Committee on Peacebuilding and Conflict Management:
 - Consultative Forum on Peace and Security for Members of Parliament from Arid and Semi-Arid Areas, 2008
 - Standard Guidelines and Terms of Reference for Peace Structures in Kenya. 2009
 - Standard Guidelines and Terms of Reference for District Peace Committee: A Report of the District Peace Committees' TORs Harmonisation Workshop and Recommendations from Regional Workshops, 2005-2007
 - Modogashe Declaration III. 2011
 - The Modogashe-Garissa Declarations
 - Peace committees in Kenya: A report on mapping of existing peace structures
 - Practical Experience on Conflict EWER in Kenya: Report of the Reflection Forum, 2014
- Oxfam GB. Oxfam GB-funded peace building initiatives in the arid districts of Kenya: Lessons and challenges. 2003
- PeaceNet-Kenya. Peace building best practices in Kenya (Sikika Campaign). 2012

Appendix 2: Breakdown of interviews

	Peace committee members	Secretariat and field staff	Non-state actors in I4P	Academics	Funders
Eldoret	5		1		
Lodwar	5	2	6		
Nairobi	6	12	9	2	5
Nakuru	5	4	2	1	
Wajir	1		2		
Totals	22	18	20	3	5

Note - Out of the 68 interviewees, there were 22 women and 46 men as follows:

- Peace committee members: 9 women, 13 men
- I4P staff: 4 women, 14 men
- Non-state actors: 7 women, 13 men
- Academics: 3 men
- Funders: 1 woman, 4 men