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
SARTRE'S PHILOSOPHY OF HUMAN FREEDOM

AND ITS HEIDEGGERIAN SOURCES

BY


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## PREFACE

It is undeniable that Sartre has very rarely referred to Martin Heidegger (under whom he had studied during his stay in Freiburg in 1933-34) as a source of inspiration for his philosophy of human freedom. Indeed we can point to only one such instance--in his essay "La liberté cartésienne" (Situations I--1947)--and here the major source referred to is not Heidegger but Descartes. But it is clear at least from this reference that Sartre had Heidegger's philosophy of Dasein in mind when he came to formulate his own understanding of human freedom. This is further evidenced within Sartre's major philosophical work, L'Être et le néant (1943), where he employs so many expressions such as "existence", "facticity", "transcendence", and "Being-in-the-world" which call to mind the early writings of Heidegger. While we concede a great deal of originality to Sartre's application of these expressions we, nevertheless, affirm that Sartre's philosophy of human freedom can be made more intelligible if a constant reference is made to the early writings of Martin Heidegger from which these expressions were taken (and which can therefore be said to represent a significant philosophical point de départ for Sartre's concept of human freedom).

On this basis we will set about analyzing Sartre's concept human freedom viewing it as an interpretation of Heidegger's philosophy of Dasein. While focussing mainly on the question

of dualism and its relative importance in their respective philosophical systems we expect thereby to discern their divergent points of view with regard to human freedom. In this way we hope to arrive at a better understanding of the fundamental issues which are at stake in the quest for human freedom.

## INTRODUCTION

## INTRODUCTION

Sartre's concept of human freedom in his L'Imaginaire and L'Etre et le néant<sup>1</sup> demonstrates the influence of Martin Heidegger's perspective of transcendence of Dasein towards the world as presented in Sein und Zeit, Vom Wesen des Grundes and Was ist Metaphysik?<sup>2</sup> For Sartre, as well as for Heidegger, this concept of human existence is a basis for the disclosure of the world as the total expression of the possibilities of Dasein (réalité humaine); but for Sartre it is also the basis for the negation of the world in so far as the world is considered as different from existing human reality as the very condition for its freedom. In this perspective he explains in his L'Imaginaire:

. . .poser le monde comme monde ou le "néantir", c'est une seule et même chose. En ce sens Heidegger peut dire que le néant est structure constitutive de l'existant. Pour savoir imaginer il suffit que la conscience puisse dépasser le réel en le constituant comme monde, puisque la néantisation du réel est toujours impliquée par sa constitution en monde.<sup>3</sup>

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<sup>1</sup>L'Imaginaire, psychologie phénoménologique de l'imagination, tion, (Paris, 1940); L'Etre et le néant, essai d'ontologie phénoménologique, (Paris, 1943).

<sup>2</sup>Sein und Zeit in Jahrbuch fuer Philosophie und phaenomenologische Forschung, VIII (Halle, 1927), 1-438; Vom Wesen des Grundes (Halle, 1929); Was ist Metaphysik? (Bonn, 1930).

<sup>3</sup>L'Imaginaire, p. 234.

It will be our concern to show how the transcendence of human reality as presented by Sartre in L'Etre et le néant involves a point of view of human freedom which is based upon a radical subject-object dualism constituted by the negating action within consciousness itself thus making the Sartrian concept of human freedom fundamentally different from a unifying Heideggerian perspective of human freedom which expresses itself as freedom for Dasein's authentic disclosive affirmation of Being. In L'Etre et le néant, Sartre has remarked on Heidegger's philosophy of Dasein:

Or, la caractéristique de la philosophie heideggerienne, c'est d'utiliser pour décrire le "Dasein" des termes positifs qui masquent tous des négations implicites. Le Dasein est "hors de soi, dans le monde", il est "un être les lointains", il est "souci", il est "ses propres possibilités", etc. Tout cela revient à dire que le Dasein "n'est pas" en soi, qu'il "n'est pas" à lui-même dans une proximité immédiate et qu'il "dépassé" le monde en tant qu'il se pose lui-même comme n'étant pas en soi et comme n'étant pas le monde.<sup>4</sup>

Generally speaking our efforts which follow will be directed at bringing out the dualism involved with Sartre's concept of freedom which led him to the above interpretation of Heidegger as well as which predisposed him to put forward as the distinguishing characteristic of primordial nothingness (also a Heideggerian theme) the following:

Le néant ne peut être néant que s'il néantise expressément comme néant du monde; c'est-à-dire

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<sup>4</sup>L'Etre et le néant, p. 54.

si dans sa néantisation il se dirige expressément vers ce monde pour se constituer comme refus du monde?

We will see that this involves a very personal interpretation by Sartre of the concept of nothingness as found in Heidegger's Was ist Metaphysik? and represents another example of the sort of transformation worked by Sartre on the philosophy of Martin Heidegger which has led to a present-day lack of clarity with regard to the precise relationship between Sartre and Heidegger.

Is Sartre a disciple of Heidegger? Did he follow Heidegger with only a few minor changes? According to some writers Sartre represents merely an extreme expression of the kind of "existentialist" philosophy which he is considered to have in common with Heidegger. This position is expressed by Robert G. Olson in his introduction to "Existentialism":

There is some question as to whether other existentialists would accept Sartre's views on freedom. This much, however, can be said with certainty. There is little in Sartre's theory which contradicts

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<sup>5</sup>L'Etre et le néant, ibid. The primordial nothingness, we will see later, will be given by Sartre as constituting the original structure of human freedom.

<sup>6</sup>An Introduction to Existentialism by Robert G. Olson (New York, 1962), p. 104. Even such respected authors as Frederick A. Olafson and Ludwig Landgrebe, in treating of Heidegger and Sartre, emphasize the points which they have in common thus leaving the impression that their thinking is very close. Ludwig Landgrebe, "Husserl, Heidegger, Sartre; trois aspects de la phénoménologie" in Revue de Métaphysique et de Morale (1969), pp. 365-80; Frederick A. Olafson, Principles and Persons, and Ethical Interpretation of Existentialism,

anything said on the subject by other existentialists, and there is nothing in it incompatible with the major premises of existentialists thinking.

It should be clear by now that we are planning to investigate the Heideggerian sources of Sartre's concept of freedom. In so far as we are studying this concept primarily as it is expressed in Sartre's work, L'Être et le néant, we will be dealing with the ontology of human freedom rather than its ontical comportment expressed in individual acts of choice (although we frankly admit that the latter has great significance in Sartre's concept of freedom, particularly in comparison to a Heideggerian concept of freedom). We will be dealing primarily with freedom as the fundamental constitution of being which is prior to all free acts providing them with their absolute precondition. We will study the various categories employed in this connection by both Sartre and Heidegger; anxiety, nothingness, authenticity, possibility and temporality comparing their different use by the two thinkers. It will be clear that our treatment of freedom in respect to these two thinkers will not attempt to "locate" freedom in a particular faculty (such as the will) in distinction from any other faculty of human reality. If anything

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(Baltimore, 1967), pp. 135-234. Pierre Thevenaz and Kurt F. Reinhardt, on the other hand, consider their approaches to be quite dissimilar. Pierre Thevenaz, What is Phenomenology?, (Chicago, 1962), pp. 53-87; Kurt F. Reinhardt, The Existentialist Revolt, (New York, 1967), pp. 175-76.

can be said to be held in common by Sartre and Heidegger it is their approach to the study of man as a total phenomenon who expresses himself in ways that can be considered from many points of view but who, nevertheless, expresses himself as a whole in all of his attitudes and actions.

Our efforts will not be so presumptuous as to attempt a definitive description of human freedom or the establishment of a set of criteria for criticizing all theories of human freedom. We propose simply to uncover Sartre's concept of freedom by studying it from the point of view of one thinker whom he claims to have influenced his thought. Nor is this to forget the various other sources of Sartre's concept of freedom such as Descartes, Hegel or Kierkegaard whom we frankly admit to having (collectively if not individually) greater influence on Sartre's over-all philosophical perspective than has had Martin Heidegger. Certainly we have enough indication from Sartre himself concerning the importance of Descartes' thought in the development of Sartre's philosophy of human freedom?<sup>7</sup> But simply in order to keep the scope of this study within bounds we choose to abstract from all these previous influences in order to determine the simple relationship of Sartre to Heidegger--or, more specifically, to determine (insofar as it is given us to do so) the particular transformation worked by Sartre on the philosophy of Martin Heidegger which he

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<sup>7</sup>"La liberté cartésienne" in Situations I (Paris, 1947), pp. 289-308.

found in the writings of the latter's earlier period, namely Sein und Zeit, Vom Wesen des Grundes and Was ist Metaphysik?<sup>8</sup>

That Sartre had been influenced by the thought of Martin Heidegger at an early stage of his career is not to be doubted. As a young agrégé of philosophy and professor of the Lycée of Le Havre he accepted a fellowship of the Insti-

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<sup>8</sup>We treat of these three works exclusively because they are the only ones to which Sartre refers in his major philosophical writings. Consequently we exclude from this list Heidegger's Kant und das Problem der Metaphysik. Vom Wesen der Wahrheit (1943) is a later publication of a lecture fragmentarily given since 1931. We cannot consider these texts as having influenced Sartre with the same degree of certitude as is possible in the case of Vom Wesen des Grundes for example. It is undeniable that any study which hopes to understand Heidegger's concept of freedom in its final development must take into consideration Vom Wesen der Wahrheit. However, in view of our primary concern to uncover Sartre's concept of freedom in terms of its Heideggerian background we choose to limit our study to those works which can be considered as being specifically involved with Sartre's earlier development.

It should be noted that Heidegger has indicated in his Brief ueber den Humanismus (1947) that he was consciously aware of his lack of agreement with the underlying Sartrian philosophical perspective. In this work Heidegger quotes Sartre's L'Existentialisme est un humanisme, p. 36, in order to establish the point of difference:

Précisément nous sommes sur un plan où il y a seulement des hommes. [Mais] si l'on pense à partir de Sein und Zeit, il faudrait plutôt dire: Précisément nous sommes sur un plan où il y a principalement l'Etre.

Lettre sur l'humanisme, trans. Roger Munier, (Paris, 1964), p.87.

In this thesis we abstract from the question of the later Heidegger and the later Sartre; therefore we have ordered our treatment of the relevant philosophical texts so as to establish the points of comparison and contrast which, in our view, seem to obtain between the early works of Heidegger and Sartre. Although we do not deny the possibility that a linguistic as well as philosophical barrier separates the two authors--since one is German and the other is French--nevertheless, we are of the opinion that the issue of dualism transcends linguistic differences so that we are able to determine the basic elements which distinguish Heidegger's philosophical program from that of Sartre at least with regard to this issue.

tut Français in Berlin where he came into contact with the writings of the German philosophers. According to Herbert Spiegelberg, there is a possibility that the young Sartre in his philosophic studies at the Ecole normale (1924-28) had at least become aware of the German phenomenological movement which was being developed by Heidegger and Husserl at the time-- which led to his interest in the fellowship.<sup>9</sup> The fellowship lasted for two years (October 1932 to 1934). The first year Sartre spent in Berlin studying the works of Husserl, Scheler, Heidegger and Jaspers. The second year he studied directly under Heidegger during the fateful winter semester (1933-34) at Freiburg when Heidegger was expressing his support for the Nazi party on the occasion of several of his public speeches.

According to Spiegelberg, it was initially Husserl and not Heidegger who made the greatest impression on Sartre through his doctrine of intentionality which gave the possibility (according to Sartre) of liberating consciousness from its intentional objects.<sup>10</sup> This was expressed in his small article

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<sup>9</sup>Cf. Herbert Spiegelberg, The Phenomenological Movement, A Historical Introduction, Vol. II, 2nd. ed. (The Hague, 1965), p. 462.

<sup>10</sup>Husserl had said in his Ideen that all consciousness is consciousness of something and this meant for Sartre that there was an absolute difference between the two regions of consciousness and being. Cf. Edmund Husserl, The Idea of Phenomenology, (The Hague, 1964), esp. pp. 1-12; James M. Edie, "Sartre and Existential Psychoanalysis" in Phenomenology and Existentialism, (Baltimore, 1967), pp. 147ff. Sartre writes: "La conscience est conscience de quelque chose; cela signifie que la transcendance est structure

"Une Idée fondamentale de la phénoménologie de Husserl" published in the Nouvelle Revue Française (1939).<sup>11</sup> Notwithstanding this attitude of admiration we have at the same time the vigorous criticism of Husserl's concept of the transcendental ego in La Transcendance de l'ego (1939)-- a criticism which significantly invokes Heidegger's conception of being-in-the-world.<sup>12</sup> Spiegelberg recognizes a gradual shift in Sartre's philosophical thought from its first expression in L'Imagination (1936) as a philosophical psychology (along the lines of Husserl's treatment of consciousness as constitutive of all experience) to its later expression in L'Etre et le néant as a phenomenological ontology

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constitutive de la conscience; c'est-à-dire que la conscience nait portée sur un être que n'est pas elle ... Dire que la conscience est conscience de quelque chose cela signifie qu'il n'y a pas d'être pour la conscience en dehors de cette obligation précise d'être intuition révélatrice de quelque chose, c'est-à-dire d'un être transcendant ... elle ne peut se qualifier que comme intuition révélatrice, si non elle n'est rien." L'Etre et le néant, pp. 28-29. But Husserl, according to Sartre, was unfaithful to his own insight in so far as he introduced the concept of the transcendental ego as an opaque ground of consciousness itself. La Transcendance de l'ego: esquisse d'une description phénoménologique in Recherches philosophiques, VI (1936-37). We are using the 2nd ed. (Paris, 1965), pp. 13-26. For Sartre, intentionality implies a fundamental dualism-- not a monism in which the noema, the pure essence, is constituted as an unreal correlate of the noesis, the intentional act. L'Etre et le néant, pp. 28, 38.

<sup>11</sup>Republished in Situations I, (Paris, 1947), pp. 29-32.

<sup>12</sup>La Transcendance de l'ego, p. 13.

in the pattern of Heidegger's Sein und Zeit.<sup>13</sup> Up until this latter work it seems that Sartre was absorbing Husserl's thought which was most sympathetic to his own interest in consciousness as manifesting a radical freedom of spontaneity. According to Spiegelberg, Sartre wishes to come to grips directly with the thought of Heidegger as expressed in his major writings from Sein und Zeit to to the first Hoelderlin lecture.<sup>14</sup> In L'Être et le néant his continued sympathy for the Husserlian approach to consciousness does not detract from the impression of Sartre's genuine respect carried over from his earlier works for Heidegger as a philosopher which, although qualified, nevertheless goes beyond that accorded to Heidegger by any previous philosopher.<sup>15</sup> At the same time we have in L'Être et le néant a fuller expression of Sartre's fundamental differences with Heidegger and Husserl. According to Spiegelberg, Sartre's interpretation of these philosophers is never made in isolation from a consistent effort to convey his own personal insight which, in the last analysis, makes Sartre's contribution to philosophy in L'Être

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<sup>13</sup>Spiegelberg, op. cit., p. 464.

<sup>14</sup>Ibid., pp. 452-53.

<sup>15</sup>Ibid., pp. 453-54.

et le néant uniquely his own.<sup>16</sup>

It is towards the end of putting into relief this unique insight that we have chosen to carry out a systematic comparison of Sartre and Heidegger in terms of their respective concepts of freedom. By shedding light upon their corresponding expression of this phenomenon, we hope to give some indication of the basic ontological principles which lie behind their respective approaches which, although they compare with each other generally speaking, nevertheless remain significantly different. In that regard our first step will be to study the underlying philosophical perspective which Sartre found in Heidegger's earlier writings in which man is presented as being-in-the-world whose fundamental constitution as transcendence surpasses itself into nothingness. In this immediately following part of our two part essay we will be concerned to find out in what way Heidegger seems to be speaking of freedom in Sein und Zeit and Vom Wesen des Grundes. We will see what this program (which is oriented in view of his ultimate concern for being) has to say in general about dualism before we compare it directly with Sartre's approach to human freedom. In Part Two we will consider Sartre's application of Heidegger's fundamental philosophical

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<sup>16</sup>Spiegelberg, pp. 452, 454.

concepts in view of his (Sartre's) concept of freedom. Here we will direct our analysis upon those texts which are particularly relevant to our thesis according to which a dualistic interpretation is attributable to a Sartrian concept of human freedom.

PART ONE

THE HEIDEGGERIAN BACKGROUND

What we hope to accomplish in this first part of our paper is basically a disclosure of an implicit Heideggerian understanding of human freedom developed in the context of his general attack upon dualism which was originally set forth in Being and Time and later continued in his Essence of Reasons. In this regard Dasein's unified being-in-the-world will be studied with a view to establishing it as an appropriate foundation for a Heideggerian concept of freedom oriented primarily by ontological concerns. It is our intention thereby to facilitate the development of our thesis concerning Sartre's very pronounced dualistic tendency embodied in his concept of freedom. Heidegger's thought will thus be considered from the point of view of indicating certain aspects of it which can be developed in the direction of a dualistic interpretation. In this way we should be better able to discern the precise outlines of the dualistic framework contributed by Sartre within the realm of the Heideggerian influence; we expect to be able to appreciate more precisely what Sartre and Heidegger have in common in their treatment of freedom and where and to what extent they part company.

Our first question must be: what can Heidegger mean by human freedom? In the following section of our paper we will set forth systematically the basic elements of an answer to this question. We will develop the philosophy of human freedom

which Heidegger himself can be said to have expressed in his early writings, especially Sein und Zeit (Being and Time). Later we will get into a discussion of temporality as developed in Being and Time because we recognize this as having enormous influence on Sartre's ontological frame-work. We will consider this aspect of Heidegger's work in view of the general orientation of a Heideggerian concept of freedom. Finally, at the conclusion of this first part dealing with Heidegger we will touch on those aspects of Heidegger's analysis of Dasein, as brought out in Being and Time as well as Vom Wesen des Grundes (The Essence of Reasons) which give preliminary indications of a Sartrian concept of human freedom. In this way we hope to be better able to understand Heidegger from Sartre's point of view and thereby achieve a more illuminating transition from the thought of Heidegger to that of Sartre. From then on, in the second part, we will merely refer to Heidegger when such references are useful in situating such Sartrian concepts as nothingness, bad faith, choice, etc. Once all the differences and similarities have been uncovered we expect to be better able to arrive at a more precise awareness of the fundamental difference which, as we expressed at the beginning of this paper, distinguishes the Sartrian concept of human freedom from its Heideggerian counterpart.

## A. The Heideggerian Concept of Freedom.

In our introduction we saw that Sartre placed the world in opposition to human existence as that which was subject to transcending negation. In examining the language of Being and Time we note a peculiar aspect of its terminology which Sartre seems to have noted as well, namely, its manner of phenomenological description in so far as it involves dynamic temporal concepts. Besides those mentioned by Sartre we have such terms as 'involvement', 'disseverance', 'making present', 'historicize', 'ecstasis'. These are contrasted with other expressions which have a static temporal sense such as 'substance', 'objects-present-at-hand', 'factual' 'Reality', etc. We will see, however, that these different ways of describing the different phenomena reflect possible modes of being which are not a priori limited in their significance to a clear-cut distinction between the existing subject and the 'world' which it surpasses; we will see that for Heidegger the contrast is set up in terms of modes of interpretation of the Being of entities. Heidegger begins with being-in-the-world as an essentially unitary phenomenon. "Ontologically 'world' is not a way of characterizing those entities which Dasein is not, it is rather a characteristic of Dasein itself."<sup>17</sup> At the same time it embraces in itself the a priori character of world-hood in

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<sup>17</sup>Martin Heidegger, Being and Time, trans. John Macquarrie and Edward Robinson, (New York, 1962), p. 64; cf. p. 53. All page numbers are those of the seventh German edition.

general<sup>18</sup>

Heidegger's concern for the 'world' as a unitary phenomenon extends "beyond" the world to the Being of entities in the world; through this concept which he has of the world he proposes to arrive at the all-embracing question of the meaning of Being. "In the disclosure and explication of Being, entities [within the world] are our accompanying theme but our real theme is Being."<sup>19</sup>

Thus we can say that the underlying phenomenological-ontological thrust of Heidegger's analysis of human existence is oriented towards explicit ontological insights into the question of the meaning of Being on the basis of a total dynamic reality which is man-world. He takes as his point of departure the totality of involvements which characterize Dasein's concerned dealings with equipment-ready-to-hand-within-the-world. This he considers to be pre-ontological interpretation.<sup>20</sup> Within such subjective involvements explicit insights appropriate to the question of fundamental ontology are given:

If such possibilities of Being for Dasein can be exhibited within the concerned dealings, then the way lies open for studying the phenomenon which is thus lit up and for attempting to 'hold it a bay', as it were, and to interrogate it as to those structures which show themselves therein.<sup>21</sup>

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<sup>18</sup>Being and Time, p. 64.

<sup>19</sup>Ibid., p. 67.

<sup>20</sup>Ibid., p. 72.

<sup>21</sup>Ibid.,

Heidegger's concept of freedom can be discerned only very generally in Being and Time; this is understandable since it deals mainly with the unfolding of his 'hermeneutic' of Dasein in view of the question of the meaning of Being in general. But in so far as his ontological hermeneutic of Dasein involves a process of "freeing" Dasein for this question we are able to affirm an implicit concept of Dasein's freedom as indispensable in Heidegger's existential - phenomenological approach to the meaning of Being in general.<sup>22</sup>

By way of contrast to Sartre, this freedom is not limited to a concept of existence prior to the unfolding of the ontological question -- if only because of the importance of cognitive finality in Heidegger's existential-phenomenological analysis. This fundamental "goal-oriented" character of Heidegger's approach is exemplified in the following:

. . . The totality of involvements itself goes back ultimately to a "towards-which" in which there is no further involvement: this "towards-which" is not an entity with the kind of Being that belongs to what is ready-to-hand within a world; it is rather an entity whose Being is defined as Being-in-the-world. . . The primary "Towards-which" is a "for-the-sake-of-which". But the "for-the-sake-of" always pertains to the Being of Dasein for which, in its Being, that very Being is essentially an issue.<sup>23</sup>

In considering the above quotation from the point of view of our question about freedom we can readily infer a concept of freedom which is involved with a process of "freeing" indiv-

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<sup>22</sup>Cf. William J. Richardson, S.J., "Heidegger and the Quest of Freedom" in Theological Studies, XXVIII, (1967), 288ff.

<sup>23</sup>Being and Time, p. 84.

dual involvements in view of the totality of Dasein's being-in-the-world.<sup>24</sup> Such a concept of "freeing" might be seen to be merely an expression of Heidegger's phenomenology by which he develops his thought from a pre-ontological perspective of diversity to an ontological perspective of primordial totality of Being. He speaks of the "freeing" of a particular involvement of Dasein for the sake of the totality of involvements which is being-in-the-world.<sup>25</sup> Furthermore, such a "freeing" is viewed as intimately associated with the very process of disclosure of the totality of involvements since ". . . an involvement is itself discovered only on the basis of the prior discovery of a totality of involvements . . ."<sup>26</sup> However we view the status of Heidegger's concept of "freedom" in this regard, it is important to see that his ontological procedure of "uncovering" entities (involvements) in view of a prior totality introduces for the first time a concept of "freedom" as a function of ontological understanding (verstehen)--which gives the possibility of developing a comparison with Sartre's association of freedom with pure consciousness. But, as we have already pointed out, the cognitive finality taking Being as its object (necessarily involved with any "implicit" Heideggerian concept of freedom)

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<sup>24</sup>Cf. Being and Time, pp. 85-86.

<sup>25</sup>For a discussion of the different meanings of "freeing" given by Heidegger cf. William J. Richardson, S. J., Heidegger, Through Phenomenology to Thought, (The Hague, 1967), pp. 184-92.

<sup>26</sup>Being and Time, p. 85.

clearly distinguishes it from a Sartrean concept of freedom; this is manifest when we study the following statement which expresses the relationship of Heidegger's concept of "freeing" to his concept of understanding:

The previous disclosure of that for which what we encounter within-the-world is subsequently freed, amounts to nothing else than understanding the world--that world towards which Dasein as an entity always comports itself.<sup>27</sup>

In this statement we recognize the possibility of a dualistic interpretation in which the mere possibility of distinguishing the "understanding" from the "totality" would be considered sufficient grounds for attributing a pure freedom to the understanding without any consideration of the manner by which the understanding comports itself towards the whole. But it would seem that freedom for Heidegger must necessarily involve a very definite "subsequent" mode of understanding the world. This we will consider more thoroughly in our efforts to determine the various aspects of Heidegger's development of authentic temporality in view of Dasein's authentic potentiality-for-being-a-whole as well as in our considerations in the second part of this paper concerning the significance of the concept of nothingness for Heidegger and Sartre. At this point we can note a basic characteristic of Heidegger's preliminary phenomenological analysis of Dasein which has implications for his concept of freedom: namely that it involves a concept of the understanding as a disclosive re-

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<sup>27</sup>Being and Time, ibid.

lationship which frees by going back to a primordial unity as the unity of the "for-the-sake-of-which".

We are able to detect a basis for comparison with Sartre's concept of consciousness in terms of his distinction between reflective and reflecting consciousness in Heidegger's description of understanding. Sartre speaks of a clear-cut distinction which takes its origin from the analysis of consciousness as positional (objectifying) requiring an ontological basis in consciousness as non-positional.<sup>28</sup> This point of view finds its comparison in the following passage by Heidegger: "The kind of Being which Dasein has, as potentiality-for-Being lies existentially in understanding."<sup>29</sup> The Being of the "there" is identified by Heidegger with understanding.<sup>30</sup> This point will be studied further in Part Two of this essay when we study Sartre's concept of freedom directly. But as far as Heidegger is concerned we may say that there is no direct effort to draw a clear-cut distinction between "positional" and "non-positional" Dasein. His perspective might be simply expressed in the following description of a "non-positional" Dasein: ". . . Dasein, insofar as it is, has always submitted itself already to a "world" which it encoun-

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<sup>28</sup>L'Être et le néant, pp. 17-21.

<sup>29</sup>Being and Time, p. 143.

<sup>30</sup>Ibid., pp. 144, 212.

ters and this submission belongs essentially to its Being."<sup>31</sup>

For Heidegger to "free" is to give an ontological interpretation to the various existentiell modes of being-in-the-world. "Freeing" allows these apparently isolated tendencies--elements of a philosophical anthropology--to be understood in view of existential characteristics of Dasein--the latter comprising elements of an existentially a priori anthropology which is to provide access to the question of the meaning of Being.<sup>32</sup>

The existential-ontological analysis of Dasein is necessarily "circular"<sup>33</sup>. It necessarily starts with existentiell possibilities and projects these possibilities upon their ontological possibility.<sup>34</sup> This suggests to us that Heidegger's terminology cannot be divided up in so far as his aim is ". . . to proceed towards the Being of the totality of the structural whole . . ." <sup>35</sup> Heidegger, in seeking the most primordial existential-ontological state of Dasein, works toward the unitary structure of Dasein, as preliminary to the question of the meaning of Being as such.<sup>36</sup> Heidegger's analysis indicates that this is gained by a progressive appropriating understand-

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<sup>31</sup>Being and Time, p. 87.

<sup>32</sup>Ibid., pp. 184, 200.

<sup>33</sup>Ibid., p. 312.

<sup>34</sup>Ibid.; cf. 314-15.

<sup>35</sup>Ibid., p. 184; cf. p. 303.

<sup>36</sup>Ibid., p. 230.

ding which aims to achieve a more penetrating grasp of the phenomena by means of a primordial (ontological) characterization of existence.<sup>37</sup> Here "primordially" seems to provide the criterion governing the attainment of the existential-ontological a priori.<sup>38</sup>

With respect to our consideration of Heidegger's attitude towards dualism we can see that Heidegger's existential-ontological characterizations of Dasein beginning with being-in-the-world and culminating with the founding of truth on Dasein's Being express a unity of significance which crosses the traditional boundaries of subject and object.<sup>39</sup> His progressive effort to realize the prior disclosure of the totality of reality is not limited to "consciousness" but is sought precisely where the unity of consciousness and the phenomena coincide.

By placing the consideration of Dasein (human reality) at the beginning of the understanding of Being, Heidegger suggests that the meaning of Being as such discloses itself as the kind of meaning given with the meaning which Dasein can have in understanding its ownmost potentiality-for-being.<sup>40</sup> But in terms of the ontological problematic this understanding

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<sup>37</sup>Being and Time, pp. 184, 231-33.

<sup>38</sup>Ibid..

<sup>39</sup>Ibid..

<sup>40</sup>Ibid., p. 143.

as a primordial disclosure of the possibility of Dasein's Being is one that can fail to recognize itself or grasp itself ontologically as such.

. . . only because Dasein, in understanding, is its "there" can it go astray and fail to recognize itself. And insofar as understanding is accompanied by state-of-mind and as such is existentially surrendered to thrownness, Dasein has in every case already gone astray and failed to recognize itself. In its potentiality-for-Being it is therefore delivered over to the possibility<sup>41</sup> of first finding itself again in its possibilities.

If we accept this universal "failure" prior to all efforts to recover the meaning of the Being of one's ownmost potentiality-for-Being, we are unable to characterize as "freedom" the original unreflective state of human existence before the raising of the ontological question from the point of view of Heidegger. According to Heidegger, human existence is not originally pure freedom; rather it is ". . . the possibility of Being-free for its ownmost potentiality-for-Being"<sup>42</sup> The original state of Dasein is not pure freedom for Heidegger, but ". . . to the extent that this Being-toward-its-potentiality-for-Being is itself characterized by freedom Dasein can comport itself towards its possibilities, even unwillingly, it can be inauthentically"<sup>43</sup>.

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<sup>41</sup>Being and Time. p. 144.

<sup>42</sup>Ibid., Author's emphasis.

<sup>43</sup>Ibid., p. 193.

According to Heidegger "... proximally and for the most part Dasein is in a state of inauthenticity -- the authentic 'for-the-sake-of-which' has not been taken hold of ..."<sup>44</sup> In order to free Dasein for its ontological ground a process of re-interpretation is called for. Being-in-the-world-in the mode of average everydayness thus presents itself for indispensable analysis preliminary to the ontological task which Dasein can accept or pass over.

... by exhibiting the positive phenomenon of the closest everyday Being-in-the-world, we have made it possible to get an insight into the reason why an ontological interpretation of this state of Being has been missing. This very state of Being, in its everyday kind of Being, is what proximally misses itself and covers itself.<sup>45</sup>

Just as pure freedom is not an original characteristic of Dasein so perfect "luminosity" is not an original trait of understanding with regard to an understanding of Being; rather we are led to realize that the ontological 'hermeneutic' is something one has to work toward existentially. Dasein is initially "in truth" and "in untruth", disclosed and closed off.<sup>46</sup> At the same time entities are at once uncovered and covered. "It is therefore essential that Dasein should explicitly appropriate what has already been uncovered, defend it against semblance and disguise ... Truth (uncoveredness)

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<sup>44</sup>Being and Time, *ibid.*

<sup>45</sup>Ibid., p. 130

<sup>46</sup>Ibid., p. 222.

is something that must always first be wrested from entities."<sup>47</sup>

According to Heidegger, average everyday Dasein has in every case already gone astray and failed to recognize itself with regard to ~~its~~ authentic potentiality-for-being-a-whole. Its failure to achieve the freedom of pure disclosedness is expressed by such terms as fallenness, dispersion, absorption, surrender, etc.<sup>48</sup> Taking this in connection with the ultimate purpose put forward by Heidegger for carrying out his existential analytic of Dasein -- that is, as an indispensable preliminary to the fundamental question of Being in general<sup>49</sup> -- we are able to recognize freedom as essential not only in its role of distinguishing that disclosedness which relates Dasein authentically to its ownmost potentiality-for-being-a-whole but, as well, in its role of providing the necessary access to the question of the meaning of Being in general. This is because "in the unity of those characteristics of Dasein's Being which we have mentioned, this Being becomes something which it is possible for us to grasp as such ontologically."<sup>50</sup> In concluding this section of Heidegger's concept of freedom

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<sup>47</sup>Being and Time, ibid.

<sup>48</sup>Ibid., P. 144.

<sup>49</sup>Ibid., pp. 183-84.

<sup>50</sup>Ibid., p. 191.

in Being and Time we may summarize the basic elements of his approach as follows: by seeking the most primordial existential-ontological structure of Dasein, Heidegger proposes to work toward the unitary structure of human existence as preliminary to the question of the meaning of Being as such,<sup>51</sup> by placing Dasein (or human reality) at the beginning of the understanding of Being, Heidegger expects the meaning of Being as such to disclose itself as that meaning which can only be given when the individual existing human being begins to understand his own being-in-the-world aright -- that is, authentically. This ontological disclosedness is an originally unrealized possibility of Dasein which is only realized gradually via a progressive appropriating understanding actively seeking to free Dasein "for the sake of" a primordial totality.<sup>52</sup> The manner by which this is accomplished in the temporal life of Dasein will be considered in our next section dealing with Heidegger's concept of temporality. At this point we should simply note that in giving the name "care" to designate the primordial structural totality of human existence, Heidegger can not be proposing the independent condition of an isolated subject as his concept of Dasein.<sup>53</sup> Rather, he is indicating the unique character of that reality which is

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<sup>51</sup>Being and Time, p. 230

<sup>52</sup>Cf. Being and Time, p. 191.

<sup>53</sup>Ibid., p. 57; cf. p. 192.

oriented in its very being towards its total potentiality-for-being-in-the-world.

B. **Heidegger on Freedom and Temporality**

As we remarked in the preceding section, many of the expressions which Heidegger uses to denote different ways of being-in-the-world reflect different modes of temporality wherein Dasein understands its own-most potentiality of Being and by which this Being is disclosed to it. This alone suggests the importance of temporality for Heidegger to which the title of the book, Being and Time, itself gives appropriate witness. From Heidegger's point of view temporality promises to provide the ontological basis for Dasein's existentiality. "Within the horizon of time the projection of the meaning Being in general can be accomplished."<sup>54</sup> The whole phenomenological analysis of Dasein is oriented towards "laying free" this horizon for an interpretation of the sense of Being itself.<sup>55</sup>

One of the most basic concepts among Heidegger's categories of thought is the concept of possibility -- it is with this concept that he carries out his analysis of the temporality of Dasein. Here possibility is conceived of as a revelation of the potentialities of human existence as being-in-the-

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<sup>54</sup>Being and Time, p. 235; cf. p. 234.

<sup>55</sup>Ibid., p. 17.

world. In so far as emphasis is placed on these potentialities as given potentialities they cannot be considered as simply referring Dasein back to the pure transcendence of consciousness.<sup>56</sup> According to Heidegger: "Dasein is the possibility of Being-free for its own-most potentiality for Being".<sup>57</sup> "But this is only because the ontological basis of Dasein ... is Being possible which has been delivered over ~~to~~ itself -- thrown possibility through and through."<sup>58</sup>

Let us repeat the significant phrase: "Dasein is the possibility of Being-free for its own-most potentiality for Being." This is indicative of a basic characteristic of Heidegger's concept of temporal freedom as a freedom for possibilities of being. We may thus point to a fundamental contrast with the concept of temporal freedom given by Sartre at the end of L'Etre et le néant:

Un liberté qui se veut liberté, c'est en effet ...  
 une liberté qui choisit, comme idéal d'être,  
 L'être-ce-qu'il-n'est-pas et le n'être-pas-ce-  
 qu'il-est. Il choisit donc non de se reprendre,

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<sup>56</sup>As in the Sartrian interpretation. Cf. L'Etre et le néant, pp. 21, 123-24; L'Imaginaire, pp. 234-37.

We will develop further the differences between Sartre's and Heidegger's respective concepts of possibility in the second part of this essay dealing with Sartre and again in the conclusion.

<sup>57</sup>Being and Time, p. 144.

<sup>58</sup>Ibid.

mais de se fuir, non de coïncider avec soi, mais  
d'être toujours à distance de soi.<sup>59</sup>

Heidegger, on the other hand, considers Dasein as that entity "... which, in its very Being, comports itself understandingly towards that Being".<sup>60</sup> Primordial temporality provides the ontological horizon in which the "for-the-sake-of-which" reveals to human existence the temporal possibility-of-being-itself.<sup>61</sup> Dasein's fundamental "disclosedness" is thus a temporal condition of its being delivered over to the possibility of recovering its own-most potentiality-for-being.<sup>62</sup> As we noted before, according to Heidegger human Dasein is defined by this original possibility which is freedom in so far as it gives to human existence the possibility of recovering its own-most potentiality-for-being and so freeing it for authentic existence.<sup>63</sup>

The question we now study is how Dasein's primordial relationship to its own potentiality-for-being actualizes itself -- or, more correctly in the Heideggerian view-point, temporalizes itself -- within the horizon of time. Our considerations thus far have given us enough to indicate that there is a fundamental basis of comparison and contrast of the respective

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<sup>59</sup>L'Être et le néant, p. 722.

<sup>60</sup>Being and Time, p. 53.

<sup>61</sup>Ibid., p. 297.

<sup>62</sup>Ibid.

<sup>63</sup>Ibid., pp. 143-44.

interpretations of temporality attributable to Sartre and Heidegger which correspond to their different conceptions of human freedom. Our following considerations will be directed at describing Heidegger's conception of time and temporality so as to make more explicit its relevance to his concept of freedom in terms of a further development of its general ontological orientation. What we should take note of first of all is that, according to Heidegger, a worldless subject is not what temporalizes -- what temporalizes (or historizes) is an entity which exists as being-in-the-world.<sup>64</sup> "Unifying temporality is the basis of Dasein's transcendence and is constitutive of Dasein's unified Being-in-the-world."<sup>65</sup> According to Heidegger, time is neither subjective nor objective -- it is the condition of the possibility of entities within the world; "... it is what first makes possible the Being of the factically existing self".<sup>66</sup> On this basis we are able to conceive of temporality as open to possible authentic or inauthentic interpretation because Dasein in its interpretation of temporality necessarily discloses itself to itself in regard to its own-most potentiality-for-being-as a preliminary condition for arriving at the fundamental question of the meaning of Being in general.<sup>67</sup> If

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<sup>64</sup>Being and Time, p. 388.

<sup>65</sup>Ibid., p. 364.

<sup>66</sup>Ibid., p. 419.

<sup>67</sup>Ibid., pp. 262, 265, 372, 436.

temporality is viewed by Heidegger first of all as the basis for the primordial whole of Dasein then the Being of entities discovered within-the-world which do not have the character of Dasein (such as Reality) has also been included even if it has not yet been made a theme of explicit investigation.<sup>68</sup>

As has already been pointed out, the initial condition of human-existence, according to Heidegger, is not one of total transparency as to its Being because Dasein is initially 'in truth' and 'untruth', disclosed and closed off. "Average everydayness" expresses a condition of inauthentic temporality in which the meaning of Being as well as truth itself gets covered up.<sup>69</sup> Via a pre-ontological analysis of the temporal being-in-the-world which is characterized by a "falling", an understanding is revealed of the inauthentic self which "loses" itself in its many involvements by concerned absorption in equipment ready-to-hand. "This very state of Being in its everyday kind of Being, is what proximally misses itself and covers itself up."<sup>70</sup> The "falling" which characterizes the inauthentic mode of being-in-the-world is described by Heidegger in terms of a deficient form of disclosedness. [It] ... manifests itself phenomenally in the fact that Dasein's fleeing in the face of itself ..."<sup>71</sup>

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<sup>68</sup>Being and Time, pp. 324, 436-37.

<sup>69</sup>Ibid., p. 130

<sup>70</sup>Ibid.

<sup>71</sup>Ibid., p. 184.

To be sure, that in the face of which it flees is not grasped in this turning away in falling nor is it experienced even in turning thither. Rather in turning away from it; it is disclosed 'there'. This existentiell-ontological turning away, by reason of its character of a disclosure makes it phenomenally possible to grasp existential-ontologically that in the face of which Dasein flees, and grasp it as such.<sup>72</sup>

Initially Dasein is "lost" in respect to its being-with-others; in its inauthentic self Dasein has given itself over completely to its they-self.<sup>73</sup> This is not anybody in particular but is simply the inauthentic mode of its social existence to which it has initially abandoned itself and so must find itself.<sup>74</sup>

A close parallel can be discerned between Heidegger's view in this regard and the Sartrean presentation of the limit placed on freedom by social relationships. Sartre expresses this in terms of a description of a freedom as an original "upsurge" which nihilates "the other" as a limit to my freedom.<sup>75</sup> Heidegger presents a concept of decisive resolution which calls the self out of the they-self -- but this freedom is not viewed as simply an ineradicable fact

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<sup>72</sup>Being and Time, p. 185.

<sup>73</sup>Ibid., pp. 127-29.

<sup>74</sup>Ibid.

<sup>75</sup>L'Être et le néant, pp. 343-64; 431-41; 606-15.

in the face of "the other" as is the case with Sartre's concept. According to Heidegger, it is involved with Dasein's total project of finding itself in its possibilities in view of which Dasein is first of all "lost" in its inauthentic self -- its they-self.

To this lostness, one's own Dasein can appeal and this appeal can be understood in the way of resoluteness. But in that case this authentic disclosedness modifies with equal primordially both the way in which the 'world' is discovered ... and the way in which the Dasein-with of Others is disclosed.<sup>76</sup>

Whereas Sartre affirms a radical dualism, Heidegger explicitly rejects the interpretation that the relationship -of-being which one has towards others is an isolated project of my being-towards.<sup>77</sup> Dasein's own-most potentiality-for-being does not exclude, but rather includes, its primordial structure of being-with-others.<sup>78</sup> Resoluteness as authentic disclosedness "... modifies with equal primordially both the way in which the Dasein-with of Others is disclosed". There is no implicit dualism here since ...

Resoluteness as authentic Being-one's self does not detach Dasein from its world, nor does it isolate it so that it becomes a free-floating "I". And how should it when resoluteness as authentic disclosedness, is authentically nothing else than Being-in-the-world.<sup>79</sup>

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<sup>76</sup>Being and Time, p. 298.

<sup>77</sup>Being and Time, pp. 124-25; cf. L'Être et le néant, pp. 303-8.

<sup>78</sup>Ibid., p. 126

<sup>79</sup>Ibid., p. 298.

Since resoluteness participates in the primordial disclosedness of Dasein it is also the basis for the totality of involvements of Dasein as the authentic attitude by which all these involvements are understood beforehand in the "for-the-sake-of-which".<sup>80</sup> "In the light of the 'for-the-sake-of-which' of one's self-chosen potentiality-for-Being, resolute Dasein frees itself for its world."<sup>81</sup>

According to Heidegger, resoluteness which is "anticipatory" means that Dasein decides itself towards what it 'can' be.<sup>82</sup> In this way he expresses the full scope of temporality as the coming towards one's own-most, distinctive potentiality-for-Being which makes authentic being-a-whole possible.<sup>83</sup>

Dasein discloses itself to itself as regards its uttermost possibility. But to project itself on its ownmost potentiality-for-Being means to be able to understand itself in the Being of the entity so revealed . . . Anticipation turns out to be the possibility of understanding one's ownmost and uttermost potentiality-for-Being -- that is to say, the possibility for authentic existence.<sup>84</sup>

According to Heidegger, unifying temporality is the basis of Dasein's transcendence and is constitutive of Dasein's unified being-in-the-world; it regulates the possible unity of all of Dasein's existential structures as " . . . the condition for the possibility that there can be an entity which exists

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<sup>80</sup>Being and Time, P. 297.

<sup>81</sup>Ibid., p. 298.

<sup>82</sup>Ibid., p. 306.

<sup>83</sup>Ibid., p. 325.

<sup>84</sup>Ibid., pp. 262-63.

as its 'there'."<sup>85</sup>

As we saw, Heidegger seeks the existential through the existentiell, the former being viewed "... as the condition for the possibility of such an existentiell potentiality-for-Being."<sup>84</sup> From this point of view, Heidegger studies such phenomena as death, conscience and guilt -- not as isolated realities -- but as fundamental conditions of existence. For example, Heidegger studies death; but the temporality involved in this case is considered as having a broader horizon than just the "end" which occurs with the death of Dasein.<sup>87</sup> Here it implies Dasein's ownmost and uttermost possibility-of-being.<sup>88</sup> Similarly, with regard to states of mind or moods, a particular disclosure of Dasein in its temporal existence is realized from the point of view of its "thrownness".<sup>89</sup> The primary example of this is the mood or state of mind of anxiety in which the being of Dasein is initially disclosed as a possibility of nullity.<sup>90</sup> In falling Dasein has first of all surrendered itself to thrownness;<sup>91</sup> It is anxiety which "... throws Dasein back

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<sup>85</sup>Being and Time, pp. 350-51, 364.

<sup>86</sup>Ibid., p. 317.

<sup>87</sup>Ibid., p. 374; cf. 329-30.

<sup>88</sup>Ibid., p. 263.

<sup>89</sup>Ibid., pp. 144ff.

<sup>90</sup>Ibid., p. 308.

<sup>91</sup>Ibid., p. 144.

upon that which it is anxious about -- its authentic potentiality-for-Being-in-the-world"<sup>92</sup>. We will see later the importance of anxiety for Sartre's doctrine of freedom. For the moment we simply refer to those passages which express the relationship of anxiety to freedom from the point of view of Heidegger:

Anxiety makes manifest in Dasein its Being towards its ownmost potentiality-for-Being -- that is, its Being-free for (propensio in ...) the authenticity of its Being, and for this authenticity as a possibility which it always is. But at the same time, this is the Being to which Dasein as Being-in-the-world has been delivered over.<sup>93</sup>

Anxiety precisely is that state of mind which discloses the possibility of freedom as the initial condition of Dasein in "average everydayness"; at the same time "... [it] provides the phenomenal basis for explicitly grasping Dasein's primordial totality of Being. [In it] Dasein's being reveals itself as care."<sup>94</sup>

In developing his concept of temporality, Heidegger indicates that he is concerned to go beyond a certain "ordinary" way of interpreting time: that is, as a pure series of "nows" from which any dynamic quality of temporality has been abstracted.

Time is what is 'counted'; that is to say, it is what is expressed and what we have in view,

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<sup>92</sup>Being and Time, p. 187.

<sup>93</sup>Ibid., pp. 188, 191.

<sup>94</sup>Ibid., p. 182.

even if unthematically, when the travelling pointer (or the shadow) is made present. When one makes present that which is moved in its movement, one says 'now here, now here, and so on'. The "nows" are what get counted.<sup>95</sup>

This is inauthentic "clock-time" in which the uniform application of mathematical measurement has attained precedence. It is also the pure discontinuous succession of abstract instants which Sartre will take over for the characterization of the temporality of being-in-itself.<sup>96</sup> Heidegger, on the other hand, will not concede that a region of abstract temporal succession has any justification as an ontological category in opposition to a region of pure "becoming".

If world-time thus belongs to the temporalizing of temporality, then it can neither be volatilized 'subjectivistically' nor 'reified' by a vicious 'Objectification'. These two possibilities can be avoided with a clear insight -- not just by wavering insecurely between them -- only if we can understand how everyday Dasein conceives of 'time' theoretically in terms of an understanding of time in the way which is closest to it, and if we can also understand to what extent this conception of time and the prevalence of this concept obstruct the possibility of our understanding in terms of primordial time what is meant by this conception -- that is, the possibility of understanding it as temporality.<sup>97</sup>

In a brilliantly original analysis of time Heidegger describes how primordial temporality is disclosed in anticipatory

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<sup>95</sup>Being and Time, p. 421; cf. 422ff.

<sup>96</sup>L'Être et le néant, pp. 147-88; cf. Being and Time, pp. 373, 424.

<sup>97</sup>Being and Time, p. 420; cf. p. 329.

resoluteness which transforms Dasein's thrownness as its having-been into a kind of letting-oneself-come-towards-oneself?<sup>98</sup> The meaning of temporality is here given as the projective convergence towards the self.<sup>99</sup> For Heidegger, the emphasis is on the future but not as an indefinite source of possibilities. Rather, it is seen as the source of fateful events which confront Dasein with its own potentiality-for-Being.<sup>100</sup> "The primordial and authentic future is the 'towards-oneself' ... as the possibility of nullity ... which is not to be outstripped."<sup>101</sup> "In the state of mind in which it finds itself Dasein is assailed by itself as the entity which it still is and already was -- that is to say, which it constantly is as having been."<sup>102</sup>

The ecstatic character of the primordial future lies precisely in the fact that the future closes one's potentiality-for-Being; that is to say the future itself is closed to one, and as such it makes possible the resolute existentiell understanding of nullity.<sup>103</sup>

The authentic future is viewed by Heidegger as the primordial phenomenon of primordial and authentic temporality because it is what first of all confronts Dasein with its ownmost

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<sup>98</sup>Being and Time, pp. 329-30.

<sup>99</sup>Ibid.,

<sup>100</sup>Ibid., p. 385.

<sup>101</sup>Ibid., p. 330

<sup>102</sup>Ibid., p. 328.

<sup>103</sup>Ibid., p. 330.

potentiality-for-being-a-whole and, therefore with the possibility of authentic disclosedness. "Primordial and authentic temporality temporalizes itself in terms of the authentic future ... in such a way that in having been futurally, it first of all awakens the Present."<sup>104</sup>

In the second part of this essay we will try to indicate in what way this conception of temporality reflects a fundamentally different point of view on the part of Heidegger in respect to Sartre in view of the latter's conception of temporality which emphasizes the phenomenon of the present rather than the future.

Heidegger has divided temporality into three "ecstasis": of the future, of the having been and of the Present -- all of which, however, reflect the one authentically primordial phenomenon of temporality.<sup>105</sup> In anticipatory resoluteness Dasein is enraptured by the "moment of vision"-- the authentic Present.<sup>106</sup> In this "rapture" of authentic temporality the "Being-there" is cleared in all the ways by which its "care" appropriates to itself the current factual situation: whether as concern for its practical involvements "along-side-of" equipment-ready-to-hand; or solicitude in its "being-with" others; or as ready for

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<sup>104</sup>Being and Time, p. 329.

<sup>105</sup>Ibid

<sup>106</sup>Ibid., p. 338.

anxiety in its coming towards its ownmost potentiality-for-being futurally.<sup>107</sup> Thus is regulated the possible unity of all of Dasein's existential structures -- as a temporal appropriation of its own primordial whole.<sup>108</sup>

In the concluding section of Being and Time as it now stands Heidegger reminds us that his basic concern is the question of the meaning of Being in general.<sup>109</sup> Temporality, insofar as it provides an ontological basis for the primordial whole of Dasein, seems to present the most satisfactory access to this question.<sup>110</sup> As a further development of Being and Time (which was merely to serve as an introduction) Heidegger proposes to ground even theoretically making present -- the pure intuition of essences in Husserl's sense -- in the "making present" of the total ecstatical unity of authentic temporality.<sup>111</sup> This proposed second part of Being and Time was never published but would have further explicitated what Heidegger has suggested already: namely, that an authentic understanding of Being does not exclude, but rather includes, the articulation of the attributes of entities

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<sup>107</sup>Being and Time, pp. 365-66.

<sup>108</sup>Ibid., p. 351.

<sup>109</sup>Ibid., pp. 436-37.

<sup>110</sup>Ibid.,

<sup>111</sup>Ibid., p. 363.

as the possible subject-matter of science.<sup>112</sup> "... only because [Being] is understandable in Dasein -- can Dasein also understand and conceptualize such characteristics of Being as independence, the 'in-it-self' and Reality in general."<sup>113</sup> According to Heidegger, the exactitude of the sciences merely brings home with greater precision the truth that all sciences disclose something that is a priori.<sup>114</sup>

In the next section of our paper we will deal with those aspects of the Heideggerian analysis of Dasein which give preliminary indications of a Sartrean concept of human freedom.

C. Elements of Sartre in the Heideggerian Synthesis.

We are able to detect in the following passage the fundamental "existentialism" of Heidegger: "Dasein is an entity which, in its very Being, comports itself understandingly towards that Being. In saying this we are calling attention to the conception of existence: Dasein exists."<sup>115</sup> In this passage as well we perceive the temporal basis which underlies human freedom in both the Heideggerian and Sartrean senses (although with altogether different ontological impli-

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<sup>112</sup>Being and Time, p. 362.

<sup>113</sup>Ibid.

<sup>114</sup>Ibid.

<sup>115</sup>Ibid., p. 53.

cations). The Sartrean view of the dynamic relationship between the for-itself and the in-itself, which is for Sartre an indication of non-identity, can be said to have been largely inspired by the Heideggerian temporal ecstasis of the self towards itself. Of course we will consider this question more thoroughly when we are treating specifically of Sartre's concept of temporality.

All of Sartre's terminology is defined in view of an ontology which divides the totality of reality into two fundamental regions of being.<sup>116</sup> The parallel with Heidegger can be conceived in the following terms: just as Sartre considers the in-itself as constituted conceptually by reflective consciousness (as different from that consciousness), so Heidegger considers "Reality" (defined in terms of independence and presence-at-hand) as a mode of interpreting Being arising from a pre-ontological understanding of the Being of care.<sup>117</sup> But as we have pointed out already, this does not express a permanent subject-object dualism which is attributable to Sartre's ontology.

A consideration of the Heideggerian concept of Dasein's disclosedness as perfected in the "moment of vision" in

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<sup>116</sup>L'Être et le néant, pp. 29-34.

<sup>117</sup>Being and Time, p. 212; L'Être et le néant, pp. 224-28.

in which Dasein is "cleared" as to its Being suggests a possible basis for comparison with the pure intentionality which Sartre considers to be the pure reflective condition of human consciousness constituting it as "free". Further study of this aspect of prior clarity of vision from the point of view of an ontological a priori of primordial nothingness will be attempted in the next part of this paper in order to further bring out how the two different conceptions of freedom can appear to share generally similar ontological pre-conditions. The relation of anxiety to this question as a revelatory state of mind will also be touched upon from the point of view of Sartre's concept of freedom.

In his Essence of Reasons Heidegger reaffirms the fundamental aspect of his analysis of the prior disclosive relationship to Being as providing the possibility of freedom on the foundation of Being.<sup>118</sup> It is this prior possibility which Heidegger emphasizes in this essay under the heading of "transcendence". Sartre refers to this essay in his essay, "La liberté cartésienne", as one of the sources of his concept of freedom -- leaving it up to us to decide the exact nature of this influence.<sup>119</sup>

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<sup>118</sup>Martin Heidegger, The Essence of Reasons. trans. Terrence Malik (Evanston, Ill., 1969).

<sup>119</sup>"La liberté cartésienne", in Situations I, pp. 290, 308.

However, considering the identification of freedom by Sartre with the immediate upsurge of the for-itself, the following description by Heidegger of transcendence is very illuminating:

"Dasein transcends" means: the essence of its Being is such that it "forms the world" in the sense that it lets the world happen and through the world provides itself with an original view (form) which does not grasp explicitly, yet serves as a model for all of manifest being Dasein included.<sup>120</sup>

As a further illustration of what we have already seen concerning how Sartre has reinterpreted Heidegger's terminology to fit his dualistic categories, in The Essence of Reasons we are able to recognize the basis of Sartre's concepts of Being-for-itself and Being-in-itself in the context of Heidegger's concept of transcendence:

In surpassing, Dasein first attains to the being that it is, what it attains to is its "self". Transcendence constitutes selfhood. On the other hand not only transcendence, but also surpassing, touches on a kind of being that Dasein itself is not.<sup>121</sup>

This seems to express the Heideggerian formulation of Sartre's concept of Being-in-itself. But, far from defining freedom or transcendence apart from Being-in-itself, Heidegger suggests that neither freedom nor transcendence have been fully defined unless its prior disclosive relation-

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<sup>120</sup>The Essence of Reasons, p. 89; cf. p. 35

<sup>121</sup>Ibid., p. 39

ship to "Being-in-itself" is taken into consideration:

Dasein's project of the world always returns to being in and through surpassing. The "for the sake of ..." projects in "throwing forth" and refers back to the whole being that can be disclosed in this world-horizon. No matter how permanent or explicit, both Daseinal and non-Daseinal being belong to this totality. But the project of the world is not enough to reveal non-Daseinal being in itself. Non-Daseinal being would necessarily remain concealed if in projecting Dasein were not already in the midst of it as projecting.<sup>122</sup>

According to Heidegger, we would be left in a position of essential dualism if we were not fundamentally involved with being "in the midst of ..." "being in itself" as an original unitary structure of intentionality.

We will return again to the concept of freedom as presented in The Essence of Reasons in the conclusion of this essay in order to complete our treatment of the idea of freedom presented here and to indicate more precisely the features which distinguish it from its Sartrean counterpart. We will now investigate the Sartrean synthesis which considers the original intentional structure of consciousness in terms of a sharply defined discontinuity--expressing his primary concern for freedom.

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The Essence of Reasons, p. 107

PART TWO

SARTRE'S PHILOSOPHY OF HUMAN FREEDOM

For Sartre the freedom of the for-itself is a fundamental condition of its existence which cannot be pre-determined in any way by its essence.<sup>123</sup> In this regard he seems to have borrowed, at least, from the language of Martin Heidegger as presented in Being and Time, The Essence of Reasons and What is Metaphysics? since he uses such terms as "existence", "transcendence" or "nothingness" which are found in these writings -- while, at the same time, showing he clearly understands them in view of his own ontological point of view. For example, Sartre agrees with Heidegger's concept of Dasein as a disclosing being in and through its possibilities of being. But for Sartre this has a special significance:

Cela signifie que la conscience n'est pas produite comme exemplaire singulier d'une possibilité abstraite, mais qu'en surgissant au sein de l'être crée et soutient son essence, c'est-à-dire l'agencement synthétique de ses possibilités. Cela veut dire aussi que le type d'être de la conscience est à l'inverse de celui que nous révèle la preuve ontologique ...<sup>124</sup>

In borrowing from Heidegger's Being and Time and The Essence of Reasons Sartre describes the transcendence of the for-itself towards itself as the manifestation of the nothingness as primordial freedom.<sup>125</sup> As early as 1936 in his essay, Transcendence de l'ego, Sartre describes consciousness

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<sup>123</sup>L'Être et le néant, p. 61.

<sup>124</sup>Ibid., p. 21.

<sup>125</sup>Ibid., pp. 53-55, 85.

as a nothingness because, "... tous les objets physiques, psychophysiques et psychiques, toutes les vérités, toutes les valeurs sont hors de lui ..." <sup>126</sup> And in his essay in L'Être et le néant, "L'Origine de négation", Sartre refers to Heidegger's concept of primordial nothingness -- the foundation of the "not" -- as providing a significant advance over previous theories of the origin of negation. <sup>127</sup> But since negation arises from an ontological nothingness conceived differently by Sartre from that of Heidegger, it might be very profitable to begin our study of Sartre by comparing his conception of nothingness with that of Heidegger in view of Sartre's very different view of human freedom.

#### A. The Origin of Nothingness in Sartre

Let us first follow the development of Sartre's thought which eventually led him to propose the being of consciousness as a nothingness. In Transcendance de l'ego, in the context of Sartre's debate with Husserl concerning the intentionality of consciousness and the status of the transcendental ego, we have indications of Sartre's fully developed thought on the ontology of human freedom as a nothingness as expressed in L'Être et le néant. It

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<sup>126</sup> Transcendance de l'ego, p. 74.

<sup>127</sup> L'Être et le néant, pp. 52-54.

is clear from the first chapter that the ontological question of the unity of experience has no special place in Sartre's thought. Generally speaking, we recognize an over-riding concern to expel from consciousness all "egological structures" -- including the transcendental ego, that structure by which Edmund Husserl, the "father" of Phenomenology, sought to found all experience. As Sartre puts it in his very first paragraph: "Nous voudrions montrer ici que l'Ego n'est ni formellement ni matériellement dans la conscience: il est dehors, dans le monde; c'est un être du monde, comme l'Ego d'autrui".<sup>128</sup> In this way we have the first Sartrian interpretation of Heidegger's concept of being-in-the-world as expressive of a dualism which would develop into the full fledged dualism of L'Etre et le néant.

Generally speaking the concern on the part of Sartre as expressed in the first chapter is to "free" consciousness of all content and of all possible objects. According to Sartre:

[La conscience] prend conscience de soi en tant qu'elle est conscience d'un objet transcendant.  
 Tout est donc clair et lucide dans la conscience: l'objet est en face d'elle avec son opacité caractéristique, mais elle, elle est purement et simplement conscience d'être conscience de cet objet, c'est la loi de son existence.<sup>129</sup>

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<sup>128</sup>La Transcendance de l'ego, p. 13.

<sup>129</sup>Ibid., p. 24.

Thus, as we noted in the introduction, Sartre's dualism develops from dualistic interpretation of intentionality. Consciousness always shows itself to be different from its object insofar as it is consciousness of that object. This does not conform to the Heideggerian understanding as we have studied it so far -- which reflects a prior unifying relationship with "being-in-itself" as the pre-condition of all disclosure of "being-in-itself" in transcendence.

As we have pointed out, the Sartrian ontological perspective of the for-itself and the in-itself developed in terms of a distinction within the consciousness itself which was inspired to some extent by the Heideggerian concept of understanding. This perspective is already present in its essentials within Transcendance de l'ego. Non-positional consciousness refers to the "being" of consciousness while positional consciousness involves reflective thought which, according to Sartre, makes possible the Cartesian Cogito as the attainment of the self "only" in full transcendence.<sup>130</sup> From this point of view, we are able to recognize a similarity between Sartre's criticism of the Cartesian Cogito and that of Heidegger who faults Descartes for having failed to investigate sufficiently the being of consciousness.<sup>131</sup>

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<sup>130</sup>Transcendance de l'ego, pp. 24-26, 28, 34.

<sup>131</sup>Ibid., p. 34; Being and Time, pp. 22, 24.

Sartre suggests that the "I" of the Cartesian Cogito is a fixed essence which is limited to pure reflective thought (positional consciousness). Sartre claims that it is a secondary expression of pre-reflective consciousness (non-positional consciousness) which is the "being" of consciousness.<sup>132</sup>

The ego is to be suspected as a foundation for experience, according to Sartre, precisely because, with the accomplishment of the "I think", it has already begun to exist on the transcendental plane.<sup>133</sup> The ego is a virtual locus of unity but "... ce qui est premier réellement, ce sont les consciences, à travers lesquelles se constituent les états, puis, à travers ceux-ci, l'Ego".<sup>134</sup> Furthermore:

L'Ego n'est pas directement unité des consciences réfléchies. Il existe une unité immanente de ces consciences, c'est le flux de la conscience se constituant lui-même -- et une unité transcendante: les états, les actions ...  
[L'Ego] est un pôle transcendant d'unité synthétique, comme le pôle-objet de l'attitude irréfléchie.  
Seulement ce pôle n'apparaît que dans le monde de la réflexion.<sup>135</sup>

At this point Sartre considers reflecting consciousness primarily in terms of its "objectifying" function. Even emotions are considered by him purely as "object" outside

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<sup>132</sup>L'Etre et le néant, p. 19-20.

<sup>133</sup>Transcendance de l'ego, pp. 34-37.

<sup>134</sup>Ibid., p. 63

<sup>135</sup>Ibid., p. 44.

of pure intentional consciousness.<sup>136</sup> This is not exactly the same view of "intentionality" held by Heidegger for whom understanding expresses a unifying relation to the "object" -- which, moreover, is not just any object at all but is that totality of meaning which consciousness as consciousness of something reveals. Sartre, on the other hand, does not consider the role of reflecting consciousness aside from its factual relationships to internal and external states, actions and objects "outside" of itself.<sup>137</sup>

As we noted in the first part of this essay, Heidegger's analysis of Dasein involves a primordial disclosedness, or unveiling, of the unitary structure of Dasein as being-in-the-world, a unitary structure which crosses the traditional boundaries of subject and object. Sartre, on the other hand, seems to be concerned to develop his theory of unity on the basis of the subject-object relationship. At one point in his Transcendence he says: "L'objet est transcendant aux consciences qui le saisissent et c'est en lui que se trouve leur unité".<sup>138</sup>

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<sup>136</sup>La Transcendance de l'ego, pp. 45-51.

<sup>137</sup>Ibid., pp. 42-43; 45-74.

<sup>138</sup>Ibid., p. 22

However, later on in his essay he suggests that the "object" of the intentional act is a questionable source of unity as well as the actual source of "degradation" of the purity of consciousness<sup>139</sup>— thereby calling into question what he had said earlier -- that "c'est dans l'object que se trouve leur unité".

In effect, Sartre is mainly concerned in Transcendance de l'ego with the purity of consciousness and, with this in mind, attempts to eliminate all "explanation" of the unity of consciousness. He describes how creative spontaneity manifests itself through the "ego" which itself is merely a contingent principle of unity.<sup>140</sup>

La véritable spontanéité doit être parfaitement claire: elle est ce qu'elle produit et ne peut rien être d'autre. Liée synthétiquement à autre chose qu'elle-même, elle envelopperait en effet quelque obscurité et même une certaine passivité dans la transformation.<sup>141</sup>

Elements of Sartre's later ontology are hinted at by the use of such terms as "nothing", "freedom" and "possibilities" in respect to consciousness.<sup>142</sup>

We find a similar approach to consciousness in Sartre's later writings L'Imaginaire and L'Être et le néant which

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<sup>139</sup>Transcendance de l'ego, pp. 57 ff.

<sup>140</sup>Ibid., pp. 54-74.

<sup>141</sup>Ibid., p. 62.

<sup>142</sup>Ibid., pp. 74 ff.

demonstrate a greater influence of Heidegger's ontological concepts than Transcendance. In L'Etre et le néant Sartre affirms:

La première démarche d'une philosophie doit donc être pour expulser les choses de la conscience et pour rétablir le vrai rapport de celle-ci avec le monde, à savoir que la conscience est conscience positionnelle du monde.<sup>143</sup>

The fundamental point that Sartre makes in L'Imaginaire and L'Etre et le néant is that there is no content such as an image, or a representation in consciousness.

Rather there is an image-consciousness which is totally directed toward the outside, toward the world.<sup>144</sup> In this way Sartre is led to the following conclusion: "... poser le monde comme monde ou le 'néantir', c'est une seule et même chose. En ce sens Heidegger peut dire que le néant est structure constitutive de l'existant."<sup>145</sup> At this point Sartre explicitly identifies freedom with the nothingness of the pure stream of intentionality which is constitutive of consciousness.<sup>146</sup>

We will now attempt to develop a preliminary understanding of the role of nothingness in Heidegger's thought in Being and Time which develops into the fully formed understanding in What is Metaphysics? -- as the primordially disclosive nothingness which is at the origin of negation -- so as to

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<sup>143</sup>L'Etre et le néant, p. 18.

<sup>144</sup>L'Imaginaire, pp. 27, 75-76; L'Etre et le néant, pp. 18-20

<sup>145</sup>L'Imaginaire, p. 234.

<sup>146</sup>Ibid.

compare it with the Sartrean interpretation. Let us keep in mind the statement of Sartre's which we quoted in the introduction to this paper in which Sartre contends that "Le néant ne peut être néant que s'il se néantise explicitement comme néant du monde ..." <sup>147</sup> Nothingness is placed in opposition to the world, because, in Sartre's view, it constitutes itself precisely as a "refus du monde". <sup>148</sup> Heidegger in Being and Time, on the other hand, considers nothingness as making its first appearance with the disclosure of the world as such. It appears as a "nothingness" which belongs essentially to Dasein's being-in-the-world. <sup>149</sup> Far from a refusal of the world, this nothingness constitutes a factual condition of that world which creates an issue for Dasein in its own potentiality-for-being. Thus it is evident that Heidegger does not conceive of nothingness as a purely "subjective" phenomenon by which it constitutes itself over and against a world.

Sartre views nothingness, not as a disclosed form of the world but rather as annihilating being in the midst of the world "... par qui le Néant vient au monde ..." <sup>150</sup>

According to Sartre, "... l'homme est l'être par qui le néant vient au monde". <sup>151</sup>

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<sup>147</sup> L'Être et le néant, p. 54.

<sup>148</sup> Ibid.

<sup>149</sup> Being and Time, p. 187.

<sup>150</sup> L'Être et le néant, p. 59.

<sup>151</sup> Ibid., p. 54.

Sartre suggests that "... Heidegger a raison d'insister sur le fait que la négation, tire son fondement du néant ..."; but then goes on to suggest that he will attempt to connect nothingness much more closely with the mental act of negation than has Heidegger.<sup>152</sup> With regard to Heidegger's point of view he claims:

... à quoi sert d'affirmer que le Néant fonde la négation, si c'est pour faire ensuite une théorie du non-être qui coupe, par hypothèse, le Néant de toute négation concrète? Si j'émerge dans le néant par delà le monde, comment ce néant extramondain peut-il fonder ces petits lacs de non-être que nous rencontrons à chaque instant au sein de l'être. Je dis que "Pierre n'est pas là" que "Je n'ai plus d'argent", etc. Fait-il vraiment dépasser le monde vers le néant et revenir ensuite jusqu'à l'être pour fonder ces jugements quotidiens?<sup>153</sup>

In order to properly situate this criticism we should consider in what way the need for an investigation into the ontological foundation of the "not" had been pointed out by Heidegger in Being and Time in preparation for the development in What is Metaphysics? to which Sartre is referring in his essay "L'Origine de la négation". He puts it in Being and Time in the form of a question:

Has anyone ever made a problem of the ontological source of notness, or prior to that, sought the mere conditions on the basis of which the problem of the "not" and its notness and the possibility of that notness can be raised? And how else are those conditions to be found except by taking the meaning of Being in general as a theme and clarifying it?<sup>154</sup>

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<sup>152</sup>L'Etre et le néant, pp. 54-55.

<sup>153</sup>Ibid., p. 55.

<sup>154</sup>Being and Time, p. 286.

As indicated in the above, the question of the origin of negation is already framed by Heidegger in view of his underlying concern for the meaning of Being in general. Thus we are provided already in Being and Time with an indication that the context of the investigation which takes place in What is Metaphysics? will transcend the categories of subject and object.

Sartre's outlook, clearly developed in view of his concept of freedom, follows a prior conceptual framework in which Being and Nothingness are defined in terms which clearly distinguish one from the other. The criterion which Sartre proposes for such an ontological schema is contained in the fundamental requirement that the individual have "... la possibilité permanente de se décrocher des séries causales qui constituent l'être et qui ne peuvent produire que de l'être".<sup>155</sup> Being-in-itself is "pleine positivité" without "la moindre trace du néant".<sup>156</sup>

Sartre admits that "... l'être est antérieur au néant et le fonde ..." and that "... c'est de l'être qu'il prend son être ..."<sup>157</sup> But "... en tant que le questionneur doit pouvoir opérer par rapport au questionné une sorte de recul néantisant, il échappe à l'ordre causal du monde, il se

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<sup>155</sup>L'Être et le néant, p. 59.

<sup>156</sup>Ibid., pp. 33, 52.

<sup>157</sup>Ibid., p. 52.

désenglué de l'Être."<sup>158</sup> Thus we are introduced to the philosophical presuppositions of Sartre's ontology which reflect a radical concept of freedom as autonomy.<sup>159</sup> In this regard we should recall that freedom for Heidegger is tied to a concept of disclosedness as a revealing relationship of understanding towards its ownmost potentiality-for-being in view of a preliminary disclosure of Being-in-itself. We will see how the Heideggerian concept of nothingness ties in with this concept of freedom so as to put in relief the Sartrean concept of nothingness in view of his concept of freedom.

The importance of the state-of-mind of anxiety for Heidegger as a disclosive existentiell possibility of Dasein has already been touched upon in the first part of this essay. As we pointed out, anxiety is that state of mind in which Dasein finds itself thrown back on its ownmost potentiality-for-being as a possibility of nullity which it can grasp or fail to grasp authentically.<sup>160</sup> "Anxiety liberates ... from possibilities which count for nothing (nichtegen) and lets [one] become free for those which are authentic."<sup>161</sup> "Anxiety makes manifest in Dasein its Being towards its ownmost potentiality-for-Being ..."<sup>162</sup>

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<sup>158</sup> L'Être et le néant, p. 59.

<sup>159</sup> Ibid., p. 60.

<sup>160</sup> Being and Time, pp. 342-43.

<sup>161</sup> Ibid., p. 344.

<sup>162</sup> Ibid., p. 188.

Sartre also considers anxiety (l'angoisse) a revelation of the being which is constitutive of the self -- but this anxiety is not undergone in conjunction with "throwness" as an expression of an original condition of being delivered over to the Being constitutive of being-in-the-world. Anxiety for Sartre points toward a pure contingency (or nothingness) immanent to consciousness as its very freedom.<sup>163</sup> On this basis the being of the original nothingness of the free subject is sharply distinguished from that of "transcendent" objects in respect to which one has fear and not anxiety.<sup>164</sup> In this sense, Sartre's concept of anxiety refers the subject back to himself as a nothingness in contrast to "transcendent" objects -- a point of view which prevents the apprehension of a nothingness "beyond" the world as a correlate of Being as such in the manner of Heidegger's interpretation.

In Being and Time Heidegger considers anguish or anxiety (angst) as the apprehension of nothingness as the ontological basis of thrownness. "The 'nothing' which which anxiety brings us face to face, unveils the nullity by which Dasein in its very basis is defined; and this basis itself is as thrownness into death."<sup>165</sup> But here "nothing", "death",

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<sup>163</sup>L'Être et le néant, pp. 65-72.

<sup>164</sup>Ibid., pp. 66-67.

<sup>165</sup>Being and Time, p. 308.

"nullity" are not simply limited to the signification of not being present-at-hand or not-subsisting.<sup>166</sup> What is involved as well is the "not" which constitutes the possibility of the authentic choice of Dasein in coming back to its own thrown "there".<sup>167</sup> As Heidegger points out:

The nullity we have in mind belongs to Dasein's Being free for its existential possibilities. Freedom, however, is only in the choice of one possibility -- that is, in tolerating one's not having chosen the others and one's not being able to choose them.<sup>168</sup>

What we have seen concerning Sartre's concept of consciousness as a nothingness prepares us to consider it from the point of view of the clarity of immediate apprehension as well as the basis of human freedom. We noted in our study of Transcendance de l'ego that Sartre viewed consciousness as a pure non-positional spontaneity in contrast to which all objects, actions and states are transcendent objects of positional consciousness.

Le Champ transcendantal, purifié de toute structure egologique, recouvre sa limpidité première. En un sens c'est un rien puisque tous les objets physiques, psycho-physiques et psychiques, toutes les vérités, toutes les valeurs sont hors de lui, ... Mais ce rien est tout puisqu'il est conscience de tous ces objets.<sup>169</sup>

Sartre goes on to describe this pure spontaneity, or nothingness, of consciousness as expressing an original freedom

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<sup>166</sup>Being and Time, p. 284.

<sup>167</sup>Ibid., p. 343.

<sup>168</sup>Ibid., p. 285.

<sup>169</sup>Transcendance de l'ego, p. 74.

of an infinity of possibilities of consciousness.<sup>170</sup>  
In L'Etre et le néant this freedom is further described as a primordial displacement in man which is prior to all transcendent objects, actions or motives which separates him from all such transcendent determinations.<sup>171</sup> The comparison with Heidegger in this regard is revealing in so far as Dasein exists understandingly towards its own-most possibility-of-being as a possibility of its own freely chosen authenticity. Rather than an attribution of discontinuity as the a priori condition of freedom as in the case of Sartre, an existential integration of Dasein with its possibilities is proposed as a "freedom" which makes the ontological inquiry into the meaning of Being possible. For the Heidegger of Being and Time freedom is not a condition of separation from transcendent Being in so far as it includes the idea of being free for the primordial totality in which the meaning of Being is revealed.

We note that the perspective of the separating function of primordial nothingness is touched upon by Heidegger in What is Metaphysics? in respect to its being the necessary condition of ontological disclosedness.

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<sup>170</sup>Transcendance de l'ego, pp. 80-81.

<sup>171</sup>L'Etre et le néant, pp. 60-72.

All disclosedness -- and therefore we may say all freedom -- in Heidegger's view is dependent on this openness before Being. He says:

Only in the clear night of dread's Nothingness is what is as such revealed in all its original overtness (Offenheit): that it "is" and is not Nothing. This verbal appendix "and not Nothing" is, however, not an a posteriori explanation but an a priori which alone makes possible any revelation of what-is. The essence of Nothing as original nihilation lies in this; that it alone brings Da-sein face-to-face with what-is as such.<sup>172</sup>

A little further on Heidegger writes: "Without the original manifest character of Nothingness there is no selfhood and no freedom."<sup>173</sup> But what this freedom means in terms of its nature and goal has already been suggested by Heidegger in an earlier statement in which he writes: "Only on the basis of the original manifest-ness of Nothing can our human Da-sein advance toward and enter into what is."<sup>174</sup> In this way Heidegger indicates that "Nothing" is in fact an original characteristic of human freedom as he sees it -- but this only in respect to his ontological concern. In What is Metaphysics? he also refers to a "being beyond" what-is in totality, but once again this is shown to have a special significance from his point of view:

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<sup>172</sup>What is Metaphysics?, trans. R.F.C. Hull and Alan Crick in Existence and Being (Chicago, Ill., 1967), p. 339.

<sup>173</sup>Ibid., pp. 339-340.

<sup>174</sup>Ibid., p. 339.

This "being beyond" (Hinaussein) what-is we call Transcendence. Were Da-sein not in its essential basis transcendent, that is to say, were it not projected from the start into Nothing, it could never relate to what-is hence could have no self-relationship.<sup>175</sup>

The resemblance of the "Nothing" of Heidegger with the pure intentional consciousness of Sartre is indeed very revealing; it is indicative of the similarity of ontological perspective of Sartre and Heidegger as well as of their fundamental difference. Where they appear to differ is not so much in the elements of their thought as in the different stress they place on those elements. While Heidegger emphasizes disclosedness as the primordial openness through which Dasein "advances towards" "what-is as such", Sartre considers it as a guarantee of the non-identity of Nothingness and Being -- and therefore of the freedom of human existence.

From his point of view, Heidegger indicates the intimate involvement of Nothing with Being:

Nothing is neither an object nor anything that "is" at all. Nothing occurs neither by itself nor "apart from" what-is as a sort of adjunct. Nothing is that which makes the revelation of what-is as such possible for our human existence. Nothing not merely provides the conceptual opposite of what-is but is also an original part of essence (Wesen). It is in the Being (Sein) of what-is that the nihilation of Nothing (das Nichten des Nichts) occurs.<sup>176</sup>

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<sup>175</sup>What is Metaphysics?, p. 339.

<sup>176</sup>Ibid., p. 340.

"Nothing" for Heidegger is a "being-beyond what-is in totality" which allows "... our human Da-sein to advance toward and enter into what-is".<sup>177</sup> On the other hand, "Nothing" for Sartre is primarily "... ce rien qui s'insinue entre les motifs et l'acte ..."<sup>178</sup> and therefore is the basis for "... la possibilité permanente de se décrocher des séries causales qui constituent l'être et qui ne peuvent produire que de l'être".<sup>179</sup> Furthermore we note that Heidegger does not separate Nothing from essence: "Nothing not merely provides the conceptual opposite of what-is but is an original part of essence (Wesen)".<sup>180</sup> Sartre, on the other hand, has a concept of essence by which the nothing in man is said to always precede his essence -- an essence which is conceived in terms of the infinite possibilities which human freedom as nothingness may take on.<sup>181</sup>

Sartre agrees with Heidegger's insistence that negation derives its foundation from nothingness.<sup>182</sup>

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<sup>177</sup>What is Metaphysics?, p. 339.

<sup>178</sup>L'Etre et le néant, p. 71.

<sup>179</sup>Ibid., p. 59

<sup>180</sup>What is Metaphysics?, p. 340.

<sup>181</sup>L'Etre et le néant, pp. 60, 72-76.

<sup>182</sup>Ibid., p. 54.

But, according to Sartre: «le néant est à l'origine du jugement négatif parce qu'il est lui-même négation».<sup>183</sup>

In this regard he would ask the following question of Heidegger: "Si la négation est la structure première de la transcendance, que doit être la structure première de la 'réalité humaine' pour qu'elle puisse transcender le monde?"<sup>184</sup> According to Sartre "... Heidegger ... fait du Néant une sorte de corrélatif intentionnel de la transcendance, sans voir qu'il l'a déjà inséré dans la transcendance même, comme sa structure originelle".<sup>185</sup> Thus Sartre comes much more closely than Heidegger to identify the original nothingness with the subjective transcendence of "human reality".<sup>186</sup>

Dira-t-on que chaque attribut refusé, chaque être nié est happé par un seul et même néant extramondain, que le non-être est comme le plein de ce qui n'est pas, que le monde est en suspens dans le non-être, comme le réel au sein des possibles? En ce cas, il faudrait que chaque négation eut pour origine un dépassement particulier: le dépassement de l'être vers l'autre.<sup>187</sup>

In the above statement we are presented once again with an example of how Sartre interprets Heidegger's categories from the point of view of a dualism. For him the surpassing

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<sup>183</sup>L'Être et le néant, ibid.

<sup>184</sup>Ibid., p. 55

<sup>185</sup>Ibid., .

<sup>186</sup>Cf. L'Être et le néant, p. 54.

<sup>187</sup>Ibid., p. 55.

(*dépassement*) of subjectivity is that which, in surpassing the world, expresses its original non-identity with the world. Nothingness for Heidegger does not constitute a differentiated "region" of Being in the sense that he considers Being as appropriately understood when one mode of being is abstracted from another mode of being; he refuses to consider his concept of Nothing as an abstraction from "Being as such". Indeed, in his later "Postscript" at the end of the present edition of What is Metaphysics? he suggests that "... this 'Nothing' functions as Being..." -- as a preliminary mediation by which Being makes its first appearance.<sup>188</sup> This is in complete harmony with the expressed goal and purpose of Heidegger's analysis right from Being and Time onwards -- to promote the inquiry into the meaning of Being, beginning with the clarification of the a priori conditions which make the understanding of Being possible.

To the extent that Dasein's original being-toward-its-potentiality-for-Being is characterized by "something like an understanding of Being" Dasein is also characterized by freedom -- "Dasein can comport itself towards its possibilities, even unwillingly, it can be inauthentically."<sup>189</sup> But, in Heidegger's view, this freedom is not limited to its pre-ontological condition for the same reason that primordial

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<sup>188</sup>What is Metaphysics?, pp. 353-54.

<sup>189</sup>Being and Time, p. 193; cf. pp. 143, 183.

nothingness can not be identified with the prior condition of a human consciousness capable of being conceived as separate from objects of consciousness "outside of" itself. Such a concept of freedom cannot be limited to its pre-ontological condition as long as it has before itself the possibility of choice of either authentic or inauthentic temporality.

In referring to temporality from Heidegger's point of view, of course, we are touching upon what Heidegger considered to be the primordial horizon within which the meaning of Being in general could be disclosed. Sartre too speaks of a process of temporalization which is essential to human reality as he understands it. Within the context of temporality he has endeavoured to fill out the dynamic characteristics of the for-itself as a pure nothingness -- which is what it is not and which is not what it is.<sup>190</sup> He says in his chapter on the origin of negation: "... la conscience est en face de son passé et de son avenir comme en face d'un soi qu'elle est sur le mode du n'être-pas. Cela nous renvoie à une structure néantisante de la temporalité ... Il suffit de marquer ici que l'explication définitive de la négation ne pourra être donnée en dehors d'une description de la conscience (de) soi et de la temporalité".<sup>191</sup>

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<sup>190</sup>L'Etre et le néant, p. 97.

<sup>191</sup>Ibid., p. 72

We will now study this aspect of Sartre's approach to freedom with the purpose of uncovering the underlying elements which distinguish his treatment from that of Heidegger. We will be on the outlook to see how the interpretation of temporality by Sartre further expresses the dualistic concepts of Being and Nothingness as the fundamental elements of his analysis.

B. Sartre on Freedom and Temporality

As already pointed out Sartre affirms his accordance with Heidegger's concept of Dasein as a disclosing being in and through its possibilities of being.<sup>192</sup> But, as we pointed out as well, the concept of possibility represents for Sartre a revelation of the fundamental dualism of human reality in so far as human reality projects its possibilities beyond itself as the correlate of its subjective indeterminacy. According to Sartre possibilities are important because they reveal a pre-reflective freedom spontaneously creative of values for human existence.

Nous nous découvrons donc dans un monde peuplé d'exigences, au sein de projets "en cours de réalisation": j'écris, je vais fumer, j'ai rendez-vous ce soir avec Pierre, il ne faut pas que j'oublie de répondre à Simon, je n'ai pas le droit de cacher plus longtemps la vérité à Claude. Toutes ces menues attentes passives du réel, toutes ces valeurs banales et quotidiennes tirent leur sens, à vrai dire, d'un premier

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<sup>192</sup>L'Être et le néant, p. 21.

projet de moi-même qui est comme mon choix de moi-même dans le monde. Mais précisément, ce projet de moi vers une possibilité première, qui fait qu'il y a des valeurs, des appels, des attentes et en général un monde ne m'apparaît qu'au delà du monde comme le sens et la signification abstraits et logiques de mes entreprises ... Mais dès qu'une entreprise s'éloigne de moi, ... je me découvre tout à coup comme celui qui donne son sens au réveil, celui qui s'interdit, à partir d'un écriteau, de marcher sur une plate-bande ou sur une pelouse, celui qui prête son urgence à l'ordre du chef, celui qui décide de l'intérêt du livre qu'il écrit, celui qui fait, enfin, que des valeurs existent pour déterminer son action par leurs exigences. J'émerge seul et dans l'angoisse en face du projet unique et premier qui constitue mon être, toutes les barrières, tous les garde-fou s'écroulent, néantisés par la conscience de ma liberté: je n'ai ni ne puis recours à aucune valeur contre le fait que c'est moi qui maintiens à l'être les valeurs ...<sup>193</sup>

Possibilities which, for Heidegger, constitute Dasein's possibilities as being-in-the-world -- which Dasein "finds" by involving itself in the world -- in Sartre's interpretation express "mon choix de moi-même dans le monde". Thus we have the basis for Sartre's concept of the being of value as the impossible goal of the for-itself which comes into existence with human freedom.<sup>194</sup>

The "being-in-itself" of value seems to correspond to the reflective "for-the-sake-of-which" of Heidegger's analysis of Dasein. At any rate, these two fundamental

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<sup>193</sup>L'Être et le néant, pp. 76-77.

<sup>194</sup>Ibid., p. 77

concepts have similar significance for both Heidegger and Sartre in view of their consideration of the temporality of 'human reality' as an effort to found its own being. Heidegger considers the impossibility of Dasein achieving full responsibility for its being a further revelation of Dasein's thrownness. He says:

As existent, [Dasein] never comes back behind its thrownness in such a way that it might first release this 'that-it-is-and-has-to-be' from its Being-its-self and lead it into the "there".<sup>195</sup>

Sartre considers the being of value to be the non-contingent being-in-itself brought into existence with the for-itself and which it has failed to be.<sup>196</sup>

Just as in the case of the Heideggerian "for-the-sake-of-which" (the Being of Dasein) the fundamental being of value for Sartre is the totality of human reality.<sup>197</sup> It is precisely the failure of the for-itself to found its own being which creates the possibility of dualism -- the lack of coincidence with itself as fully achieved totality.

La réalité humaine se saisit dans sa venue à l'existence comme être incomplet. Elle se saisit comme étant en tant qu'elle n'est pas, en présence de la totalité singulière qu'elle est sous forme de ne l'être pas et qui est ce qu'elle est. La réalité humaine est dépassement perpétuel vers une coïncidence avec soi qui n'est jamais donnée.<sup>198</sup>

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<sup>195</sup> Being and Time, p. 284.

<sup>196</sup> L'Être et le néant, p. 132.

<sup>197</sup> Ibid., pp. 132-33.

<sup>198</sup> Ibid.

For Sartre the failure of the for-itself to attain coincidence with itself is based on the requirement of the purity of translucency of consciousness.

C'est l'impossible synthèse du pour-soi et de l'en-soi: il serait son propre fondement non en tant que néant mais en tant qu'être et garderait en lui la translucidité nécessaire de la conscience en même temps que la coincidence avec soi de l'être en soi.<sup>199</sup>

Sartre speaks of the "révélanste-révélee" of Heidegger<sup>100</sup> -- which Heidegger takes to be the original relationship of Dasein to its own being. We saw that this was the basis of authentic temporality by which Dasein freed itself for its ownmost potentiality-for-being. While accepting the basic outline of this relationship Sartre criticizes the reflective orientation of Heidegger's interpretation in so far as it is aimed at achieving a reflective intuition of Being as such. From this point of view he says the following:

La motivation de la réflexion consiste en une double tentative simultanée d'objectivation et d'intériorisation. Et re à soi-même comme l'objet-en-soi dans l'unité absolue de l'intériorisation, voilà ce que l'être-réflexion a à être.

Cet effort, pour être à soi-même son propre fondement, pour reprendre et dominer sa propre fuite en intériorité, pour être enfin cette fuite, au lieu de la temporaliser comme fuite qui se fuit, doit aboutir à un échec et c'est précisément cet échec qu'est la réflexion.

En effet, cet être qui se perd, c'est lui-même

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<sup>199</sup> L'Être et le néant, p. 133.

<sup>100</sup> Ibid., p. 20.

qui a à le reprendre et il doit être cette reprise sur le mode d'être ce qui est le sien, c'est-à-dire, sur le mode du pour-soi, donc de la fuite.<sup>201</sup>

According to Sartre: "Par [la réflexion] aussi, l'écoulement tend à être comme un dehors esquissé dans l'immanence. Mais la réflexion pure ne découvre encore la temporalité que dans la non-substantialité originelle, dans son refus d'être en-soi ..."<sup>202</sup> Here we see Sartre favouring the pre-reflective immediacy of consciousness in so far as reflective understanding is, from Sartre's point of view, open to the danger of losing itself in the in-itself.<sup>203</sup> He criticizes Heidegger in this regard:

Heidegger dote la réalité humaine d'une compréhension de soi qu'il définit comme un "pro-jet ekstatique" de ses propres possibilités ... Mais que serait une compréhension qui, en soi-même, ne serait pas conscience (d')être compréhension? Ce caractère ek-statique de la réalité humaine retombe dans un en-soi chosiste et aveugle s'il ne surgit de la conscience d'ek-stase.<sup>204</sup>

There is some resemblance between Heidegger's concept of authentic and inauthentic temporality in Sartre's concept of good and bad faith which refers to the possibility of "human reality" to falsify or "cover up" its own being. According to Sartre, bad faith expresses anguish in order to flee the anguish of human freedom; it implies "...

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<sup>201</sup>L'Être et le néant, p. 200.

<sup>202</sup>Ibid., p. 204.

<sup>203</sup>Ibid., pp. 208-09.

<sup>204</sup>Ibid., pp. 115-16.

que je puis disposer d'un pouvoir néantisant au sein de l'angoisse même".<sup>205</sup> Sartre analyzes the "covering up" process involved here in somewhat the same fashion that Heidegger describes the fleeing of Dasein in the face of anxiety.

... je ne puis en effet vouloir "ne pas voir" un certain aspect de mon être que si je suis précisément au fait de l'aspect que je ne veux pas voir. Ce qui signifie qu'il faut que je l'indique dans mon être pour vouloir m'en détourner; mieux encore, il faut que j'y pense constamment pour prendre garde de n'y pas penser. ... En un mot, je fuis, pour ignorer mais je ne peux ignorer que je fuis et la fuite de l'angoisse n'est qu'un mode de prendre conscience de l'angoisse.<sup>206</sup>

Sartre's concept of bad faith differs from Heidegger's concept of inauthenticity in the sense that while Heidegger's concept of inauthenticity involves a perspective of the possible totality of Dasein -- a totality which inauthenticity consistently passes over in its absorption with objects present-at-hand -- Sartre's concept of bad faith seems to have a primary reference to an essence which the for-itself is not and yet must be in the mode of not being it.<sup>207</sup>

Both concepts involve the perspective of an original being of human reality which is not of reified objects. In order to bring out his conception of human reality "... comme un

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<sup>205</sup>L'Être et le néant, p. 82.

<sup>206</sup>Ibid.

<sup>207</sup>Ibid., pp. 105-08.

être qui est ce qu'il n'est pas et qui n'est pas ce qu'il est ...". Sartre employs Heidegger's distinction between being-in-the-midst-of-the-world among objects present-at-hand and being-in-the-world as a being of possibilities.<sup>208</sup> Nevertheless, Sartre limits his characterization of unrefined being (in respect to which bad faith is possible) strictly to human consciousness. Heidegger, on the other hand (as we pointed out), expressly allows the possible inclusion of the whole of Being which can be disclosed to Dasein -- including Being as such -- which Dasein in its state of inauthenticity passes over. Sartre considers Heidegger's concept of authenticity and inauthenticity to be an improper intrusion of ethics into the ontological question.<sup>209</sup> That as well as his complaint against Heidegger's application of reflective finality are brought out very clearly in the following skeptical comment which he makes with regard to the attitude of sincerity:

Je puis devenir sincère: voilà ce qu'impliquent mon devoir et mon effort de sincérité. Or, précisément, nous constatons que la structure originelle du "n'être pas ce qu'on est" rend d'avance impossible tout devenir vers l'être en soi ou "être ce qu'on est". Et cette impossibilité n'est masquée à la conscience: au contraire elle est l'étoffe même de la conscience. ... elle est cette nécessité qui veut que, dès que nous nous posons comme un certain être par

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<sup>208</sup>L'Être et le néant, pp. 97-100.

<sup>209</sup>Ibid., p. 122.

un jugement légitime, fondé sur l'expérience interne ou correctement déduit de prémisses a priori ou empiriques, par cette position même nous dépassons cet être -- et cela non vers un autre être: vers le vide, vers le rien.<sup>210</sup>

With the above statement we are further informed about Sartre's concept of nothingness which "... rend d'avance impossible tout devenir vers l'être en soi ...". In the place of Heidegger's distinguishing between being-present-at-hand of objects and Dasein's temporal whole, Sartre focusses in on the radical distinction between pure being-in-itself and the being-for-itself of pure dynamic temporal nothingness. Heidegger considers the process by which Dasein disengages itself from the ontical mode of interpreting reality as pure present-at-hand as simply a moment in the recovery of a more primordial, as well as more comprehensive, ontological interpretation of Being in general. Sartre, on the other hand, appears to remain on the ontical level in so far as he considers the denial of the present-at-hand (being-in-itself) as the most basic feature of the for-itself.

In a quotation which we considered in the first part of this paper we saw that Sartre has translated the Heideggerian ecstasis of temporality as a purely subjective project of the for-itself as it seeks itself in nihilating

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<sup>210</sup>L'Être et le néant, p. 102.

freedom at a distance from itself.<sup>211</sup> This concept of temporality finds its origin within Sartre's concept of consciousness as presented in his Transcendance de l'ego. This we are able to determine from the following statement in L'Etre et le néant:

L'Être pour-soi se fonde en tant qu'il nie de soi un certain être ou une manière d'être. Ce qu'il nie ou néantit, nous le savons, c'est l'être-en-soi. Mais non pas n'importe quel être-en-soi: la réalité humaine est avant tout son propre néant.<sup>212</sup>

The dualistic "scissiparity" of the reflecting and the reflected-upon constitute the basis for the temporality of the for-itself; it is never itself because it is always "outside" itself. The for-itself preserves a relation with itself as reflective consciousness which, however, always escapes any reflective objectivization of itself.<sup>213</sup> In Transcendance de l'ego temporality is given as "un jeu d'intentionnalités 'transversales'" which is the condition of the unity of reflective consciousness beyond the instantaneity of the pre-reflective cogito.<sup>214</sup>

Temporality for Sartre, as well as for Heidegger, means that human reality has a temporal relationship to itself. But Sartre's analysis of the temporality of the for-itself has just one main concern: namely, how the for-itself

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<sup>211</sup>L'Etre et le néant, p. 722.

<sup>212</sup>Ibid., pp. 131-32.

<sup>213</sup>Ibid., pp. 121-27; cf. Transcendance de l'ego, pp. 47-51.

<sup>214</sup>Transcendance de l'ego, p. 22.

escapes the reification of the in-itself. "... la conscience est en face de son passé et de son avenir comme en face d'un soi qu'elle est sur le mode du n'être pas."<sup>215</sup> In this context "... c'est ici qu'apparaît l'angoisse comme saisie du soi en tant qu'il existe comme mode perpétuel d'arrachement à ce qui est ..."<sup>216</sup> Temporality is, for Sartre, a flight from being. "Tout se passe en effet comme si notre conduite essentielle et immédiate vis-à-vis de l'angoisse, c'était la fuite."<sup>217</sup> The concept of the for-itself as that which by nature escapes itself points to the law of the being of the for-itself as a presence to self in the mode of non-identity.<sup>218</sup> "... toute 'présence à' implique dualité, donc séparation au moins virtuelle."<sup>219</sup> It is from this point of view that the past and the future are considered by Sartre as those elements of temporality which are referred to the for-itself as presence to its past and its future in the mode of not being them. This dualistic interpretation contrasts with Heidegger's triple ecstasis of the future, the Present and the "having been" in which unity is temporalized first from the future, from where the "having been"

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<sup>215</sup>L'Être et le néant, p. 72.

<sup>216</sup>Ibid., p. 73.

<sup>217</sup>Ibid., p. 78.

<sup>218</sup>Ibid., pp. 119-21.

<sup>219</sup>Ibid., p. 119.

of Dasein is revealed for the authentic Present. "Escaping" and "anticipating" constitute the two key attitudes on the part of Sartre and Heidegger respectively which explain their differing treatment of the past, present and future. We will consider this question in greater detail from the point of view Sartre's analysis of the past, present and future. Generally speaking, however, we may say that the emphasis on the temporal dynamism of the for-itself as "presence to" corresponds to Sartre's concern for freedom. Temporality is, for Sartre, the past, present and future ecstasis of the for-itself; objective Time only has cohesion on the basis of this original dynamism. "... le Temps est pur néant en-soi qui ne peut sembler avoir un être que par l'acte même dans lequel le pour-soi le franchit pour l'utiliser."<sup>220</sup>

Par [la réflexion] ... l'écoulement tend à être comme un dehors esquiss dans l'immanence. Mais la réflexion pure ne découvre encore la temporalité que dans sa non-substantialité originelle, dans son refus d'être en-soi, elle découvre les possibilités en tant que possibles, allégées par la liberté du pour-soi ... et si le passé lui apparaît comme en-soi, encore est-ce sur le fondement de la présence.<sup>221</sup>

We have already indicated that Sartre has developed his a priori concept of being-in-itself in contrast to being-for-itself partly as a radicalization of the temporal concepts

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<sup>220</sup> L'Être et le néant, p. 267.

<sup>221</sup> Ibid., p. 204.

of Heidegger's analysis of Dasein. Sartre criticizes the psychological conception of temporality in somewhat the same way that Heidegger criticized the "ordinary" conception of time.

L'unité absolue de psychique; en effet, est la projection de l'unité ontologique et ek-statique du pour-soi. Mais comme cette projection se fait dans l'en-soi qui est ce qu'il est dans la proximité sans distance de l'identité, l'unité ek-statique se morcelle en une infinité de "maintenant" qui sont ce qu'ils sont et qui, précisément à cause de cela, tendent à s'isoler dans leur identité-en-soi. Ainsi, participant à la fois de l'en-soi et du pour-soi, la temporalité psychique<sup>222</sup> recèle une contradiction qui ne se surmonte pas.

The "nows" to which Sartre is referring are not traced back to their foundation in primordial temporality but are rather considered as subjective expression of the "abstract instant" by which Sartre characterizes the "temporality" of being-in-itself. But for Sartre temporality in its true sense is limited to the ecstatic transcendence of the for-itself which is opposed to the in-itself as a discontinuous stream of instants.<sup>223</sup>

L'être qui est s'épuisé tout entier à être; de ce qui n'est pas, de ce qui n'est plus il n'a rien à faire. Aucune négation, qu'elle soit radicale au adoucie en "ne plus" ne peut trouver place en cette densité absolue. Après cela le passé peut bien exister à sa façon: les ponts sont coupés.<sup>224</sup>

But, on the other hand:

... la temporalité ne peut que désigner le mode d'être qui est soi-même hors de soi. La temporalité doit avoir la structure de l'ipséité. C'est.

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<sup>222</sup>L'Être et la néant, p. 214; cf. pp. 212-13.

<sup>223</sup>Ibid., pp. 255, 181.

<sup>224</sup>Ibid., p. 153.

seulement en effet parce que le soi est soi là-bas hors de soi, dans son être qu'il peut être avant ou après soi, qu'il peut y avoir en général de l'avant et l'après. Il n'y a de temporalité que comme intrastucture d'un être qui a à être son être, c'est-à-dire comme intrastucture du Pour-soi.<sup>225</sup>

We will recall that this differs from Heidegger's conception of temporality which can neither be reduced to subjectivity nor to an abstract progression which can be considered "in itself".

Sartre sets up his temporal analysis in the context of the question of the origin of the continuity and multiplicity involved with the terms before and after.<sup>226</sup> This differs from the Heideggerian analysis of temporality which assumes no abstract multiplicity to be unified -- aside from the multiplicity of involvements which are given with the pre-ontological understanding of Dasein. In asking the origin of the cohesive power of continuity involved with the before and after, Sartre suggests that this continuity cannot be a solution but rather is a fact which must be accounted for.<sup>227</sup> In terms of this reasoning Sartre proposes his concept of the for-itself:

Si, donc, il n'y a aucune priorité de l'unité sur la multiplicité ni de la multiplicité sur l'unité, il faut concevoir la temporalité comme une unité qui se multiplie, c'est-à-dire que la temporalité

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<sup>225</sup>L'Être et le néant, p. 182.

<sup>226</sup>Ibid., pp. 174-80.

<sup>227</sup>Ibid., p. 180.

ne peut être qu'un rapport d'être au sein du même être. Nous ne pouvons l'envisager comme un contenant dont l'être serait donné car ce serait renoncer pour toujours à comprendre comment cet être en-soi peut se fragmenter en multiplicité ou comment l'en-soi des contenants minima ou instants peut se réunir dans l'unité d'un temps.<sup>228</sup>

Sartre's basic problematic of temporality is thus viewed originally as a conceptual problem of the unification of abstract instants in the unifying temporality of the for-itself. This expresses Sartre's characterization of the process of reflecting consciousness as a process of abstracting by which the for-itself refuses the instantaneous in-itself.

... c'est précisément son caractère de spontanéité qui constitue l'irréversibilité même de ses évasions puisque, précisément, dès qu'elle apparaît, c'est pour se refuser et que l'ordre "position-refus" ne peut être renversé. La position même, en effet, s'achève en refus sans atteindre jamais à la plénitude affirmative, sinon elle s'épuiserait dans un en-soi instantané et c'est seulement à titre de refusée qu'elle passe à l'être dans la totalité de son accomplissement.<sup>229</sup>

"La fuite du pour-soi est refus de la ~~contingence~~ par l'acte même qui le constitue comme étant fondement de son néant."<sup>230</sup>

But what applies to the in-itself of contingency applies as well the being of itself as a totality which it is seeking to be, in so far as this flight establishes it in contingency as that which is fled.

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<sup>228</sup> L'Être et le néant, p. 181.

<sup>229</sup> Ibid., p. 195.

<sup>230</sup> Ibid.

... Le pour-soi fui est laissé sur place. Il ne saurait s'anéantir puisque je le suis, mais il ne saurait non plus être comme fondement de son propre néant puisqu'il ne peut l'être que dans la fuite ... Cette totalité n'est jamais achevée, elle est totalité qui se refuse et qui se fuit, elle est arrachement à soi dans l'unité d'un même surgissement, totalité insaisissable qui au moment où elle se donne, est déjà par delà ce don de soi.<sup>231</sup>

The dualism implicit with this concept of temporality is further indicated by the following:

Cette totalité qui court après soi et se refuse à la fois, qui ne saurait trouver en elle-même aucun terme à son dépassement, parce qu'elle est son propre dépassement et qu'elle se dépasse vers elle-même, ne saurait, en aucun cas, exister dans les limites d'un instant. Il n'y a jamais d'instant où l'on puisse affirmer que le pour-soi est, parce que, précisément, le pour-soi n'est jamais. Et la temporalité, au contraire, se temporalise tout entière comme refus de l'instant.<sup>232</sup>

We can see that the end product of the unifying action of the for-itself is not what constitutes for Sartre the original goal of human freedom; it is rather the preservation of that freedom itself as pure indefinite spontaneity -- as flight.

Cet effort, pour être à soi-même son propre fondement, pour reprendre et dominer sa propre fuite en intériorité, pour être enfin cette fuite, au lieu de la temporaliser comme fuite qui se fuit, doit aboutir à un échec, et c'est précisément cet échec qui est la réflexion.<sup>233</sup>

Only if reflection seeks the "reflected on" as that which it has to be in the mode of not being it -- as the for-itself -- can it escape from itself in order to recover itself in the

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<sup>231</sup>L'Être et le néant, pp. 195-96.

<sup>232</sup>Ibid., p. 196.

<sup>233</sup>Ibid., p. 200.

purity of its self-nihilation.

La signification de la réflexion est donc son être-pour. En particulier, le réflexif est le réfléchi se néantisant lui-même pour se récupérer. En ce sens, le réflexif, en tant qu'il a à être le réfléchi, s'échappe du pour-soi qu'il est comme réflexif sous forme "d'avoir à l'être". Mais si c'était seulement pour être le réfléchi qu'il a à être, il échapperait au pour-soi pour le retrouver; partout, et de quelque manière qu'il s'affecte, le pour-soi est condamné à être-pour-soi. C'est bien là en effet, ce que découvre la réflexion pure.<sup>234</sup>

On the other hand, "impure reflection" is the spontaneous reflective movement of the for-itself which seeks to be the reflected-on as in-itself. "La réflexion impure n'est donc saisie du réfléchi comme tel que dans un circuit d'ipséité où elle se tient en rapport immédiat avec un en-soi qu'elle a à être."<sup>235</sup> The difference between this approach to being-in-itself and Heidegger's approach to Being as such is, of course quite evident. We will return to this striking difference in their points of view at the conclusion of this paper.

Let us now consider the Sartrean "ecstasis" of temporality: the past, present and future in the unifying "outside of itself" of the for-itself. We will consider how the priority of the present in Sartre's ontology of temporality reflects his fundamental concern to emphasize the dynamism

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<sup>234</sup>L'Être et le néant, p. 207.

<sup>235</sup>Ibid.

of the for-itself which, as presence to \_\_\_\_\_, refers to its past and to its future without being identified with them, while preserving its distance from them.

Sartre will refer everything to the present as a foundation which nihilates. This is illustrated by Sartre first of all with regard to the past.

Le passé peut bien alors être conçu comme étant dans le présent, mais on s'est ôté les moyens de présenter cette immanence autrement que comme celle d'une pierre au fond de la rivière. Le passé peut bien hanter le présent qui est son passé.<sup>236</sup>

Sartre concludes: L'être présent est donc le fondement de son propre passé; et c'est ce caractère de fondement que manifeste le "était".<sup>237</sup> For Sartre, the term "was" indicates an ontological leap from the present to the past as an original synthesis of these two modes. This is a synthesis which is at once a referring relationship and a separation.

Si je ne suis déjà ce que j'étais il faut pourtant que j'aie à l'être dans l'unité d'une synthèse néantisante que je soutiens moi-même à l'être, sinon je n'aurais aucune relation d'aucune sorte avec ce que je ne suis plus et ma ~~pleine~~ positivité serait exclusive du non-être essentiel au devenir.<sup>238</sup>

For Heidegger the past is expressed in the "having been" of Dasein's thrownness which creates an issue for Dasein

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<sup>236</sup>L'Être et le néant, p. 156

<sup>237</sup>Ibid., p. 158.

<sup>238</sup>Ibid., p. 161.

to correspond to the "there" as that which in existing it has to be.<sup>239</sup> In this regard, as we have noted, Sartre has followed Heidegger's apprehension of a fundamental incapacity of human reality to coincide with its own being. But the being of the for-itself which is its past is not this being of value in Sartre's point of view.

... le passé peut à la rigueur être l'objet visé par un pour-soi qui veut réaliser la valeur et fuir l'angoisse que lui donne la perpétuelle absence du soi. Mais il est radicalement distinct de la valeur par essence: il est précisément l'indicatif dont aucun impératif ne se peut déduire, il est le fait propre de chaque pour-soi, le fait contingent et inaltérable que j'étais.<sup>240</sup>

The past is pure contingent in-itself which the for-itself flees even as the for-itself becomes past.<sup>241</sup>

In death the for-itself becomes completely past although it becomes so only in the mode of flight.<sup>242</sup> This, of course, differs from Heidegger's view of death as a manifestation of the thrownness of Dasein -- which Dasein anticipates in attempting to correspond to its own thrown "there". The totality of being-in-itself which confronts being for-itself as the unalterable condition of its being-in-the-world -- which it flees -- constitutes the temporality of the for-itself as that which already is not what it was.

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<sup>239</sup>Being and Time, P. 300.

<sup>240</sup>L'Être et le néant, p. 164.

<sup>241</sup>Ibid., p. 164.

<sup>242</sup>Ibid., p. 159.

Mon passé est passé dans le monde, appartenance que je suis, que je suis à totalité de l'être passé. Cela signifie qu'il y a coïncidence pour une des dimensions temporelles entre la temporalité ek-statique que j'ai à être et le temps du monde comme pur néant donné. C'est par le Passé que j'appartiens à la temporalité universelle, c'est par le présent et le future que j'y échappe.<sup>243</sup>

Neither Heidegger nor Sartre considers the past (or, in Heidegger's case, "history") as an "object" of knowledge -- but rather as a general necessity of human reality as past. As Sartre puts it: "On ne peut "avoir" un passé comme on "a" une automobile ou une écurie de courses ... au sens où la possession exprime ordinairement un rapport externe de possédant au possédé ..." <sup>244</sup> And Heidegger points out: "Dasein factually has its 'history' and it can have something of the sort because the Being of this entity is constituted historically". <sup>245</sup> But, whereas Heidegger considers the "past" which Dasein authentically is as a self-chosen possibility, Sartre considers the past as that which the for-itself flees. "Le passé c'est l'en-soi que je suis en tant que dépassé." <sup>246</sup>

In contrast to the past which is in-itself, the Present is for-itself. <sup>247</sup> According to Sartre the meaning of the Present is "présence à \_\_\_\_\_."

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<sup>243</sup> L'Etre et le néant, p. 259; cf. pp. 192-93.

<sup>244</sup> Ibid., p; 156.

<sup>245</sup> Being and Time, p. 434.

<sup>246</sup> L'Etre et le néant, p. 162.

<sup>247</sup> Ibid.

La présence à \_\_\_\_\_ est un rapport interne de l'être qui est présent avec les êtres auxquels il est présent. En aucun cas, il ne peut s'agir de la simple relation externe de contiguïté. La présence à \_\_\_\_\_ signifie l'existence hors de soi près de \_\_\_\_\_. Ce qui peut être présent à \_\_\_\_\_ doit être tel dans son être qu'il y ait en celui-ci un rapport d'être avec les autres êtres ... Le Présent ne saurait ... être que présence du Pour-soi à l'être-en-soi.<sup>248</sup>

As we have already pointed out, the character of the for-itself as presence to \_\_\_\_\_ expresses a revelation of non-identity between the for-itself and the in-itself -- while for Heidegger the authentic Present involves the disclosure of Dasein in its primordial totality. The essential difference between Sartre's understanding of the Present and Heidegger's is further brought out if we consider the following aspects of the Sartrian Present as presence to \_\_\_\_\_. "... c'est à tout l'être-en-soi que le Pour-soi est présence. ... la présence du Pour-soi est ce qui fait qu'il y a une totalité de l'être-en-soi."<sup>249</sup> The for-itself is presence to being in so far as the for-itself is to itself its own witness in existence.<sup>250</sup> "... le pour-soi naît à soi dans une liaison originelle avec l'être: il est à soi-même témoin de soi comme n'étant pas cet être."<sup>251</sup>

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<sup>248</sup>L'Être et le néant, p. 165.

<sup>249</sup>Ibid., p. 166.

<sup>250</sup>Ibid., p. 167.

<sup>251</sup>Ibid.

The for-itself as presence expresses itself as a denial of the being to which it is present; as not being it.<sup>252</sup>

It refers back to the for-itself as the foundation of its own nothingness, and the being-in-itself as being all which the for-itself is not.<sup>253</sup>

The relation between presence to \_\_\_\_\_, nothingness and Sartre's interpretation of Heidegger are brought out in a section of the chapter entitled "La Transcendance".

Here we read the following:

La négation originelle, en effet, est négation radicale. Le pour-soi, qui se tient devant l'être comme sa propre totalité, étant lui-même le tout de la négation, est négation du tout.<sup>254</sup>

A little further on Sartre comments on Heidegger's approach in view of his own concept of presence to \_\_\_\_\_ as an expression of the difference which the for-itself as nothingness introduces into being.

"...pour parler comme Heidegger: le monde et, en dehors cela, rien. Seulement ce "rien" n'est pas originellement ce dans quoi émerge la réalité humaine. Ce rien est la réalité humaine elle-même, comme la négation radicale par laquelle le monde se dévoile. Et, certes, la seule appréhension du monde comme totalité fait apparaître du côté du monde un néant qui soutient et encadre cette totalité.

As we recall, Heidegger emphasizes the phenomenon of the future

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<sup>252</sup>L'Etre et le néant, *ibid.*

<sup>253</sup>Ibid., pp. 195-196; cf. p. 167.

<sup>254</sup>Ibid., p. 230.

<sup>255</sup>Ibid., p. 230.

as the origin of Dasein's possibilities and from which Dasein's ownmost potentiality-for-being first appears. According to Heidegger the authentic future is revealed as the "toward-onself ... as the possibility of nullity which is not to be outstripped."<sup>256</sup> Sartre has a comparable view of the future as suggested by the following:

Mais le Futur n'est pas uniquement présence du pour-soi à un être situé par delà l'être. Il est quelque chose qui attend le pour-soi que je suis. Ce quelque chose c'est moi-même: lorsque je dis que je serai heureux, il est bien entendu que c'est mon moi présent, trainant son Passé après soi qui sera heureux.<sup>257</sup>

It is toward the future that the project of the for-itself to be in-itself-for-itself is directed:

Je me projette vers le Futur pour m'y fondre avec ce dont je manque, c'est-à-dire ce dont l'adjonction synthétique à mon Présent ferait que je sois ce que je suis. Ainsi ce que le Pour-soi a à être comme présence à l'être par delà l'être, c'est sa propre possibilité. Le Futur est le point idéal où la compression subite et infinie de la facticité (Passé), du Pour-soi (Présent) et de son possible (Avenir) ferait surgir enfin le Soi comme existence en soi du Pour-soi ... En ce sens le Pour-Soi a à être son futur parce qu'il ne peut être le fondement de ce qu'il est que devant soi et par delà l'être: c'est la nature même du Pour-soi que de devoir être "un creux toujours futur."<sup>258</sup>

But, according to Sartre this future is never realized:

"Ce futur ne se réalise pas. Ce qui se réalise c'est un

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<sup>256</sup>Being and Time, P. 330.

<sup>257</sup>L'Être et le néant, p. 172.

<sup>258</sup>Ibid., p. 172.

Pour-soi désigné par le Futur: et qui se constitue en liaison avec ce futur."<sup>259</sup> According to Sartre: "... le Pour-soi ne peut jamais être que problématiquement son Futur, car il est séparé de lui par un Néant qu'il est ... Ainsi le Futur n'a pas d'être en tant que Futur."<sup>260</sup> The future for Sartre is not "the possibility of nullity which is not to be outstripped"; rather it is the future in-itself-for-itself of self-identity which is never achieved. The attitude which Heidegger advocates towards the future as fate, or destiny, is one of acceptance; Sartre, on the other hand, cannot accept because he sees man as condemned to a freedom which must extend even to the rejection of the future possibility of integration with self.<sup>261</sup>

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<sup>259</sup>L'Être et le néant, p. 173.

<sup>260</sup>Ibid., p. 174.

<sup>261</sup>Ibid.; cf. Being and Time, pp. 384-86.

## CONCLUSION

The direct relationship which seems to prevail between Sartre's concept of freedom and his fundamental ontology has made it possible for us to compare his philosophy with Heidegger's on the basis of a philosophy of human freedom. In concluding this paper we will attempt to shed further light on our thesis that Sartre was influenced by Heidegger in his concept of human freedom while significantly transforming the meaning of those concepts employed by Heidegger to describe the existential-ontological characteristics of Dasein.<sup>262</sup> We will attempt to put into relevant perspective

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<sup>262</sup>Alphonse de Waelhens has touched upon the similarities and differences between Heidegger and Sartre in their earlier philosophical works in his essay, "Heidegger et Sartre" appearing in Deucalion I, (ed. J. Wahl, Paris -- 1946, pp. 15-37). In spite of his leaning towards Sartre's interpretation of freedom he seems to have put forward in a remarkably penetrating fashion the fundamental difference which holds between Heidegger and Sartre in regard to their concepts of freedom as well as in regard to their concepts of knowledge. This is expressed in the following:

...si la connaissance consiste à être ce que l'on connaît tout en ne l'étant pas, si la liberté est précisément ce pouvoir de décrochage, de néantisation (et est donc bien la condition de la connaissance vraie), il reste que Heidegger met l'accent sur la première partie de la définition, sur l'ouverture de l'existant; au lieu que Sartre est plus soucieux de la seconde, le recul néantisant. Aussi prolong-t-il son étude de la connaissance et de la liberté par une description qui s'efforce d'identifier ce pour-soi au Manque. On ne trouve pas l'équivalent de cette doctrine chez Heidegger... ("Heidegger et Sartre", in op. cit., p. 27)

At the same time he explains what he considers to be the fundamental experiences which underlie the basic differences between Heidegger's and Sartre's point of view:

...l'idée de mort, qui marque précisément la limite et la vanité de nos possibles, joue dans

the concept of possibility as a key notion in the ontology of freedom of Heidegger and Sartre. This will be followed with a summary treatment of freedom as put forward in Heidegger's Vom Wesen des Grundes (Essence of Reasons). Partly because of Sartre's own testimony in this regard we consider this essay as the focal point of comparison and contrast between Heidegger and Sartre in terms of their concepts of

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la philosophie de Sein und Zeit un rôle essentiel, ce rôle de "réactif" fondamental qui pour L'Etre et le néant est dévolu à l'oppression massive de l'En-soi ou la chair. A la Nausée qui exprime le pur contact de l'En-soi et le sentiment du corps comme pure facticité charnelle, répond dans la perspective de Heidegger, l'absurde du déploiement d'un complexe de projets qui ne tend à rien d'autre qu'à se détruire lui-même, encore qu'il soit l'unique sens dont puissent être dotés les existants aussi bien individuellement que dans leur ensemble. ("Heidegger et Sartre" in op. cit., p 23)

Needless to say this represents a very negative interpretation of Heidegger in view of what we have already seen in the first part of this paper.

De Waelhens has also pointed out the manner by which Sartre has applied his existential insight of the "oppression" of things to the fictional works written before and after L'Etre et le néant.

D'une façon générale, il est d'ailleurs très remarquable que la plupart des héros engendrés par le philosophe de la néantisation, apparaissent, une fois que l'expérience de la compression du réel ou celle de l'engluement et de la viscosité qui la préparent son abattues sur eux, comme obsédés et incapables à son égard de tout recul néantisant. Ni les personnages du Mur, ni Erostrate, ni l'héroïne d'Intimité, ni le Daniel des Chemins de la Liberté ces victimes d'un En-soi qui les happe sous la forme nauséuse de physiologique pur, n'ont encore la force de s'y dérober un seul instant. Ils sont figés. Il est en effet contradictoire que l'expérience de la congélation, si j'ose ainsi dire, dès lors qu'elle a été faite, puisse s'effacer jamais. Celui qui s'est senti une fois pris par la massivité écrasante de la chose et réduit à elle, nie la néantisation elle-même.

("Heidegger et Sartre" in op. cit., pp. 23-24.

freedom and, therefore, as the most explicit text illustrating our thesis. Finally, we will formulate the basic question of the relationship between Sartre's phenomenological ontology and his concept of freedom indicating in what way the latter enjoys pre-eminence in regard to the former and, therefore, to what extent a comprehension of Sartre requires a consideration of his concept of freedom before any serious investigation of his phenomenological or ontological conclusions.

The theme "being of possibilities" has different meanings for Heidegger and Sartre. Here we will consider this theme from the point of view of how it reflects their different conceptions of indeterminacy and of how this indeterminacy is attributable to human existence.

Possibility for Sartre indicates that human reality must necessarily be considered in view of an in-itself which it lacks.

... nous entrevoyons l'origine de la temporalité, puisque la soif est son possible en même temps qu'elle ne l'est pas. Ce néant qui sépare la réalité humaine d'elle-même est à la source du temps ... [Mais] ce qu'il faut noter c'est que le Pour-soi est séparé de la Présence à soi qui lui manque et qui <sup>est</sup> son possible propre, ... En ce sens, l'être par delà lequel le Pour-soi projette la coïncidence avec soi c'est le monde ou distance d'être infinie par delà laquelle l'homme doit se rejoindre à son possible?<sup>63</sup>

Possibility for Heidegger is not a lack of a being as

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<sup>263</sup>L'Être et le néant, p. 146.

"something still outstanding, as not yet present-at-hand".<sup>264</sup>

Rather, it belongs with the being of the "there" of Dasein.<sup>265</sup> Dasein seeks to recover its ownmost potentiality-for-being as a potentiality, or "possibility", into which it is already thrown and by which it is already given as primordially indeterminate in advance of any ontical relationship to things it might be lacking. According to Heidegger, this primordial indeterminacy of Dasein...

... has by no means the character of a privation, where something is lacking in comparison with an ideal which has been set up but does not get attained in Dasein: rather the Being of this entity is already null as projection; and it is null in advance of any of the things which it can project and which it mostly attains.<sup>266</sup>

The concept of possibility presented by Heidegger reflects a primordial indeterminacy but not, as in the case with the concept of possibility as presented by Sartre, contrasted to a co-existing "self". Although the Sartrian concept of the possible "...n'est pas conçu thématiquement par après comme moyen de rejoindre le soi. ..." <sup>267</sup> it is described as originally distinct from its co-existing self.

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<sup>264</sup>Being and Time, p. 144.

<sup>265</sup>Ibid. p. 285.

<sup>266</sup>Ibid.

<sup>267</sup>L'Être et le néant, p. 140.

... le surgissement du pour-soi comme néantisation de l'en-soi ... fait surgir le possible ... comme une manière d'être à distance de soi ce qu'on est.<sup>268</sup>

According to Sartre:

[Le Possible] n'existe pas comme une pure représentation, fût-elle niée, mais comme un réel manque d'être qui, à titre de manque, est par delà l'être ... il détermine par esquisse schématique un emplacement de néant que le Pour-soi est par delà lui-même.<sup>269</sup>

In Heidegger's The Essence of Reasons the transcendence of Dasein is considered in the context of the primordial indeterminacy of Dasein's projection of its possibilities. According to Heidegger, "... transcendence does not meet with the 'for the sake of ...' as a value or end, in itself present at hand".

Transcending and holding itself over against the "for the sake of ...", Dasein happens in man, so that he can be under obligation to himself in the essence of his existence, i.e. he can be a free self.<sup>270</sup>

In this sense we can speak of the primordial undetermined project of Dasein's freedom "... which makes bonds and obligations possible in the first place".<sup>271</sup> But it is not, as in the case of Sartre's concept of freedom, limited to a subject in which the nihilating upsurge is directed against a world which it opposes -- for, Heidegger continues:

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<sup>268</sup>L'Etre et le néant, *ibid.*

<sup>269</sup>Ibid., p. 147.

<sup>270</sup>The Essence of Reasons, p. 103.

<sup>271</sup>Ibid.

"Freedom alone can let a world govern and 'world' Dasein".<sup>272</sup>

Furthermore, Heidegger explicitly indicates that he wishes to offer a way of characterizing freedom that goes beyond the way of defining it as spontaneity -- as a type of causality.<sup>273</sup>

"To say that a free act is one that 'is initiated by itself' or 'begins with itself' is merely to offer a negative way of characterizing freedom. It is merely to say that no determining cause can be said to lie behind the free act."<sup>274</sup>

According to Heidegger:

In interpreting freedom as "causality", ... we work on a peculiar understanding of reasons that precedes and suggest the interpretation. As transcendence, freedom is not merely a particular "kind" of reason but the origin of reasons (grounds) in general. Freedom is freedom for grounds.<sup>275</sup>

Heidegger considers three types of grounding: grounding as establishing, grounding as obtaining footing and grounding as founding.<sup>276</sup> The first is the project of the "for the sake of..." which lets the world govern freely;<sup>277</sup> the second, which is simultaneous with it, is that in virtue of which Dasein has obtained a footing in being -- in virtue of a preoccupation with being which is part of transcendence.<sup>278</sup>

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<sup>273</sup>The Essence of Reasons, *ibid.*

<sup>274</sup>*Ibid.*

<sup>275</sup>*Ibid.*, p. 105.

<sup>276</sup>*Ibid.*, pp. 105-21.

<sup>277</sup>*Ibid.*, pp. 107-109.

<sup>278</sup>*Ibid.*, pp. 109-11.

In the unity of the first two the third way of grounding -- as founding -- arises. It is the transcendental founding "... which makes the question 'Why?' possible in the first place."<sup>279</sup> According to Heidegger, this transcendental founding is called the ontological truth and is that which is most often overlooked in the course of everyday events even though it "... lies 'at the basis' of every kind of behavior toward being".<sup>280</sup>

Because of the peculiar origin of founding, and so of proof, we sometimes overlook the freedom of Dasein-- however far the range of freedom is extended, and whether or not it is amenable to authentic founding, i.e to disclosure of its transcendental possibility.<sup>281</sup>

Thus freedom is not considered in isolation from ontological understanding but includes it in so far as the three ways of grounding correspond to the original unified totality of the understanding of Being which is Dasein's primordial freedom.

Dispersed in three ways, the grounding of transcendence alone produces and primordially unifies the totality in which a Dasein must be able to exist. Freedom is, in this threefold manner, freedom for grounds.<sup>282</sup>

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<sup>279</sup>The Essence of Reasons, pp. 113-119.

<sup>280</sup>Ibid., p. 117.

<sup>281</sup>Ibid., pp. 117-19.

<sup>282</sup>Ibid., p. 119.

Being and freedom are both considered by Heidegger as transcendental to Dasein as that which Dasein, in transcending, is founded. In this sense "... founding, expressing itself as ontological truth, is grounded in freedom ..." <sup>283</sup> and "... Being (the constitution of Being), as something that founds and as a transcendental obligation for Dasein, is rooted in Dasein's freedom." <sup>284</sup> According to Heidegger: "Freedom is the reason for reasons ..." and this is manifested in the threefold transcendental dispersion of grounding. <sup>285</sup> In this context, ontical truth is seen to have its origin in transcendence as the primordial condition of all "principles" and "reasons" and as "... the primordial 'move' which freedom makes with us... . [whereby it] gives us to understand' ...". <sup>286</sup> For Heidegger, freedom is not limited to subjective spontaneity but extends through all the ways of grounding to include its transcendental possibility in ontological truth as the condition of the possibility of that truth. This concept of freedom corresponds to what Heidegger has also attributed to the "Nothing" as the opening of Dasein before Being,

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<sup>283</sup>The Essence of Reasons, p. 125.

<sup>284</sup>Ibid.

<sup>285</sup>Ibid., p. 127.

<sup>286</sup>Ibid., pp. 117, 121, 127, 129.

as the "abyss" of Dasein before its absent ground<sup>287</sup> which reveals Dasein in its "... 'potentiality for being', with possibilities which gape open before its finite choice, i.e., in its destiny".<sup>288</sup>

The concept of choice mentioned above is not limited to "pre-reflective" upsurge of Dasein's factual self which is independant of a reflective choice of its own potentiality for being -- as it is for Sartre.<sup>289</sup> We gather this from the following: "For, in transcendence, the essence of the finitude of Dasein discloses itself as freedom for reasons".<sup>290</sup> We recall that there is no transcending over against a world but only a transcending by which the world "worlds"; but more importantly, from Heidegger's point of view, it is also a transcending which gives disclosive access to Being in general.

When transcendence happens as grounding, an entryway into being is formed for the factual behavior of factual Dasein in the midst of being in its totality.<sup>291</sup>

"Only through the primordial distances [Dasein] establishes toward all being in his transcendence does a true nearness

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<sup>287</sup>The Essence of Reasons, p. 129.

<sup>288</sup>Ibid.

<sup>289</sup>L'Etre et le néant, pp. 518-20, 539-40.

<sup>290</sup>Ibid., p. 131.

<sup>291</sup>The Essence of Reasons, p. 119.

to things flourish in him."<sup>292</sup>

Sartre developed his concept of freedom in view of a concept of the possible which is considered primarily as a lack of the for-itself with regard to itself. Sartre posited an "imperfect" being on the one hand and a "totality" on the other as original poles of the ontological structure of human reality.<sup>293</sup> Even the Hegelian solution which aimed at a resolution of opposites in a higher synthesis is excluded by Sartre as a possible interpretation since he places in question the ultimate realizability of the desired synthesis of the in-itself-for-itself.<sup>294</sup>

This is an unrealizable totality since, as Sartre puts it: "... le Pour-soi n'est pas un moment qui puisse être dépassé".<sup>295</sup>

Rather than focussing our attention upon the for-itself in its effort to realize the totality of its being-in-itself-for-itself, Sartre attempts to bring to light the infinite temporal possibilities which correspond to the subjective

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<sup>292</sup>The Essence of Reasons, p. 131.

<sup>293</sup>L'Être et le néant, pp. 129-39, 652.

<sup>294</sup>Ibid., p. 138

<sup>295</sup>Ibid.

indeterminacy of the for-itself. He illustrates this by referring to a hypothetical freedom of God as a pure indeterminacy prior to the determinations of a limited creation.<sup>296</sup> The corresponding Sartrean concept of human freedom is, of course, in direct contrast with the finite freedom of Heidegger's analysis which achieves authentic existence in and through an original choice -- that is, in and through a determination of reflective transcendence which allows itself to be "there" in the opening leading back to the unifying nothingness of Being. Insofar as the indeterminacy of human freedom is conceived of by Sartre as being prior to its own determinacy, as a subject is prior to its object, the fundamental question of a Sartrean "existentialism" must be how an ontological freedom flees itself in order to preserve itself in the purity of its nihilating freedom.<sup>297</sup>

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<sup>296</sup>L'Être et le néant, pp. 141-43; "La liberté cartésienne" in Situations I, pp. 292-308.

<sup>297</sup>Ibid., pp. 721-22.

We have come across two statements by Heidegger in Being and Time which might be taken into consideration in view of the above characterization of Sartre's problematic. They are:

- 1) The "problem of transcendence" cannot be brought around to the question of how a subject comes out to an Object, where the aggregate of Objects is identified with the idea of the world. Rather we must ask: what makes it ontologically possible for entities to be encountered within-the-world and Objectified as so encountered? p. 366.

- 2) ...if "idealism" signifies tracing back every entity to a subject or consciousness whose sole distinguishing features are that it remains indefinite in its Being and is best characterized negatively as "un-Thing-like", then this idealism is no less naive in its method than the most grossly militant realism. p. 208.

These two statements provide further indication that Heidegger would not be able to reconcile his approach with the main lines of Sartre's analysis to the extent that these conform to the schematic presentation of "regions" of being.

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