


THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN FRANKL'S "WILL TO MEANING" AND THE
DISCREPANCY BETWEEN THE ACTUAL SELF AND THE IDEAL SELF

by Michael E. Cavanagh

Thesis presented to the Faculty of
Psychology and Education of the
University of Ottawa as partial
fulfillment of the requirements
for the degree of Doctor of
Philosophy



Ottawa, Canada, 1966

UMI Number: DC54047

INFORMATION TO USERS

The quality of this reproduction is dependent upon the quality of the copy submitted. Broken or indistinct print, colored or poor quality illustrations and photographs, print bleed-through, substandard margins, and improper alignment can adversely affect reproduction.

In the unlikely event that the author did not send a complete manuscript and there are missing pages, these will be noted. Also, if unauthorized copyright material had to be removed, a note will indicate the deletion.

UMI[®]

UMI Microform DC54047
Copyright 2011 by ProQuest LLC
All rights reserved. This microform edition is protected against
unauthorized copying under Title 17, United States Code.

ProQuest LLC
789 East Eisenhower Parkway
P.O. Box 1346
Ann Arbor, MI 48106-1346

ACKNOWLEDGMENT

This thesis was prepared under the supervision of Assistant Professor Yvon Bourbonnais, O.M.I. of the Faculty of Psychology and Education of the University of Ottawa. Appreciation is expressed for his interest and encouragement.

CURRICULUM STUDIORUM

Michael E. Cavanagh was born April 27, 1937, in San Francisco, California. He received the Bachelor of Arts degree in Philosophy from Saint Patrick's College, Menlo Park, California in 1960 and a Master of Arts degree in Psychology from the University of Ottawa in 1964. The title of his thesis was The Validity of Some Qualitative Scoring Items on the Drawings of a House, Tree, and Person.

TABLE OF CONTENTS

| Chapter | page |
|---|------|
| INTRODUCTION. | vi |
| I.- REVIEW OF THE LITERATURE. | 1 |
| 1. The Development of Frankl's Theory of Logotherapy | 2 |
| 2. Basic Concepts of Logotherapy | 10 |
| 3. Logotherapy and Mental Illness | 26 |
| 4. Logotherapy as Treatment | 33 |
| 5. A Critique of Logotherapy | 41 |
| 6. Summary and Basic Hypothesis | 56 |
| II.- EXPERIMENTAL DESIGN | 59 |
| 1. Measuring Instruments | 59 |
| 2. The Sample | 74 |
| 3. Administration and Scoring | 76 |
| 4. Techniques of Analysis | 78 |
| III.- PRESENTATION AND DISCUSSION OF RESULTS. | 81 |
| 1. The Reliability of the Instruments | 81 |
| 2. Predictive Power of the <u>PIL</u> and <u>FQ</u> | 84 |
| 3. Results Concerning the Basic Hypothesis | 87 |
| 4. Discussion of Results | 90 |
| SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS | 98 |
| BIBLIOGRAPHY. | 101 |
| Appendix | |
| 1. <u>THE PURPOSE IN LIFE TEST AND ANSWER SHEET FORM.</u> . . . | 104 |
| 2. <u>THE FRANKL QUESTIONNAIRE AND ANSWER SHEET FORM.</u> . . . | 108 |
| 3. <u>THE SEMANTIC DIFFERENTIAL SCALES.</u> | 109 |
| 4. <u>THE DIRECTIONS FOR THE SEMANTIC DIFFERENTIAL.</u> . . . | 111 |
| 5. <u>ABSTRACT OF The Relationship between Frankl's "Will to Meaning" and the Discrepancy between the Actual Self and the Ideal Self.</u> | 113 |

LIST OF TABLES

| Table | page |
|--|------|
| I.- Factor Score Reliability of Semantic Differential Scales for the Concepts <u>I. MYSELF</u> and <u>AN IDEAL SELF</u> in Terms of Probability of Obtaining Given Deviations from Test to Retest on Factor Score Items for Individual Subjects. . . | 83 |
| II.- Means, Standard Deviations, and Standard Error of the Means for the Total Sample and Sub-Groups of the Sample on the Instruments Used to Measure Purpose in Life. | 85 |
| III.- Predictive Power of the Purpose in Life Instruments as Expressed by the Per Cent of Correct Classification of Subjects into "High Purpose" or "Low Purpose" in Life Group. | 86 |

INTRODUCTION

Although it has been long established in European philosophy, psychiatry, and theology, Existentialism has only recently become influential in American psychiatry and psychology. Existentialism was conceived and grew rapidly as a protest, primarily against determinism and logical positivism. The prevalent theories which emphasized feedback mechanisms, stimulus-response sequence, drives and habits were felt to be lacking in their attempts to describe man. The conviction developed among many philosophers and psychologists that positive science alone could not discover the totality of man and that it tended to ignore the most appropriate research tool--phenomenology.

Thus various Existentialist writers sought to cope with the problem of man by seeking one basic intentional theme in human life. A fairly wide range of proposals resulted, although they are complementary in many respects. Among these various attempts to establish a new psychology is Viktor E. Frankl's concept of Logotherapy, which is of particular interest to the psychologist because it presents the first systematic application of Existential philosophy to psychotherapy.

Underlying his theory, Frankl has postulated in man a primary motivational force which he calls the "will to meaning." This represents man's striving to find purpose

in his existence, to find a cause or sense of mission that is uniquely his own, thus giving his life direction. Most traditional psychodynamic theories view man's primary motivation either as the overcoming of psychological disequilibrium in an effort to attain homeostasis or as the actualization of potentialities within the self. Reacting against these concepts, Frankl states that man's search for meaning or purpose in life should arouse some inner tension rather than inner equilibrium and that a certain degree of this tension is an indispensable prerequisite for mental health. This tension stems from the unbridgeable gap between what one is and what one should be. On the basis of these statements by Frankl, the present study aims to investigate experimentally a possible relationship between the concept of "will to meaning" and the discrepancy between what one is (the actual self) and what one feels he should be (the ideal self). In thus attempting to contribute some evidence concerning Frankl's theory of "will to meaning", the study should have theoretical implications in that this concept of the actual-ideal self discrepancy is basic to Frankl's theory as the prerequisite for purpose or meaning in life and as the challenge of existence.

The first chapter of this thesis presents a review of the literature which gives the basic theoretical and experimental background of the present investigation.

Included in this chapter is a discussion of the development of Frankl's theory of Logotherapy, its basic concepts, and its relation to mental health and the treatment of mental illness. It concludes with a critique of these concepts and a presentation of the basic hypothesis of this study.

The experimental design, which includes a description of the measuring instruments, the procedure of test administration and scoring, and the techniques of data evaluation, is presented in the second chapter. The results of the study are presented and discussed in the third chapter. These results will be evaluated in terms of Frankl's theory, and implications for further research will be offered.

The appendices contain the tests which are used to measure "will to meaning" and the discrepancy between the actual self and the ideal self.

CHAPTER I

REVIEW OF THE LITERATURE

One of the Existential theories which is rapidly evoking interest and support in North America is that of Viktor E. Frankl. The school of Frankl is known by various names: Logotherapy, Existential Analysis, Medical Ministry, and the Third Vienna School. The term Logotherapy, which will be used in this paper, is derived from the Greek word "logos" which Frankl uses to denote "meaning", that is, the meaning of human existence as well as man's search for such a meaning. The name Logotherapy refers to the particular influences of Kierkegaard, Heidegger, and Jaspers. However, it is not to be identified withBinswanger's Daseinsanalysis nor with Sartre's Existential Psychoanalysis.

The purpose of this chapter is to present the theoretical foundations of Frankl's Logotherapy and the pioneer attempt to scrutinize these concepts experimentally. The first section will deal with the development of Frankl's theory of Logotherapy, viewing it as a reaction against the existing theories of personality dynamics. The next section deals with the basic concepts of Logotherapy, namely, its image of man and man's primary motivational force, the "will to meaning." In the third section a discussion of the logotherapeutic concept as it relates to mental illness

will be presented, and the following section will consider Logotherapy as a form of treatment. The fifth section, which offers an evaluation of some of Frankl's concepts, is followed by the final section which summarizes the review of the literature and states the hypothesis of this study.

1. The Development of Frankl's Theory of Logotherapy.

Many of Frankl's theoretical and practical concepts have arisen as a reaction against the traditional psychodynamic theories as represented by Freud's Psychoanalysis, Adler's Individual Psychology, and the self-actualization and self-realization theories of authors such as Goldstein, Maslow and Rogers.

Frankl feels that Freud has depersonalized man by reducing him to a mechanism driven by libidinal energy which is unconscious, amoral and primarily sexual in nature. According to Freud, man's sole motivation and goal is the reduction of tension which is accomplished through dynamics based on the pleasure principle. To the extent that man is able to attain pleasurable satisfaction through the reconciliation of the claims of the id and super-ego, inner equilibrium or homeostasis is achieved; to the extent that disequilibrium is present, there will be psychopathology. Hence Freud has viewed the psychological process as a closed system whose dynamics are patterned after the physics of

his day, the law of the conservation of energy.¹ The influence of this principle and the resulting belief that all drives which are not biological are at least derived from biological needs can be seen in Psychoanalysis and other major psychological orientations of today, such as learning theory and even functional autonomy.²

In discussing Freud's concept of man, Frankl states that it really presents a caricature of man and not a true image, since Freud considers man as nothing but a being that is driven to satisfy the often conflicting claims of the id and super-ego. Frankl has attempted in his Logotherapy to complete an image of man in all its dimensions, which he feels includes the spiritual dimension.³ Frankl thus sees his theory as supplementing and not supplanting psychoanalytic theory.⁴

Frankl vehemently opposes the idea of the pleasure principle on the basis that it has neither validity for the therapist, because it is not a therapeutic axiom, nor for

1 Viktor E. Frankl, "The Will to Meaning", The Christian Century: An Undenominational Weekly, Vol. 81, No. 17, April 22, 1964, p. 515-517.

2 James C. Crumbaugh and Leonard T. Maholick, "The Case for Frankl's 'Will to Meaning'", Journal of Existential Psychiatry, Vol. 4, No. 13, Summer 1963, p. 43-48.

3 Within the frame of reference of Logotherapy, "spiritual" does not have a primarily religious connotation, but refers to the specifically human dimension of man.

4 Viktor E. Frankl, "On Logotherapy and Existential Analysis", American Journal of Psychoanalysis, Vol. 16, No. 1, 1956, p. 28-37.

mankind in general, because it is a symptom of neurosis rather than a primary psychological principle of the normal man.⁵ While Freud states that pleasure and happiness should be a function of homeostasis, Frankl views them as ensuing from an actual disequilibrium. By this imbalance man is constantly pulled toward goals which are always beyond his grasp but which attract him and generate deep inner satisfaction as long as he experiences progress in their pursuit. Pleasure and happiness, according to Frankl, can never be aims in themselves, but are the by-products of the search for meaning.⁶

Frankl also feels that Freudian theory always sees something behind human volitions: unconscious motivation, sublimations, and defense mechanisms, never taking a human phenomenon at face value. Frankl considers it dangerous to compress man's search for meaning into such stereotyped constructs. It is his contention that man's search for meaning along with his spiritual questioning, aspirations, and frustrations should be accepted as such and not be tranquilized or analyzed away.⁷

⁵ Viktor E. Frankl, "Logos and Existence in Psychotherapy", American Journal of Psychotherapy, Vol. 7, No. 1, 1953, p. 8-15.

⁶ -----, The Doctor and the Soul: An Introduction to Logotherapy, New York, Knopf, 1957, p. 5.

⁷ -----, "Existential Dynamics and Neurotic Escapisms", Journal of Existential Psychiatry, Vol. 4, No. 13, Summer, 1963, p. 27-42.

It should be noted that Frankl repudiates neither the existence of the unconscious process in man nor its importance. He does deny that the unconscious is a purely instinctive sphere of activity. He feels that in addition to repressed instincts there also exists, more importantly, a spiritual unconsciousness in man. With this distinction in mind, Frankl believes that the popular "depth" psychology must give way to a "height" psychology--one which is concerned with man's spiritual nature, potentialities, and responsibilities.⁸

Frankl feels that Psychoanalysis devaluates man in two ways. First of all, it seems to objectify the subjective factor in man, that is, the spiritual factor. This is because it treats a person as if he were an object. Frankl feels that a person is a spiritual entity, a "subjective spirit", which does not lend itself to any form of "objectivization" or materialization.⁹ Secondly, Frankl feels that Psychoanalysis subjectifies objective factors, that is, objective values. A consequence of this subjectification is the equalizing or levelling of all values as they are

⁸ Viktor E. Frankl, Handbuch der Neurosenlehre und Psychotherapie, Wien, Urban-Schwarzenberg, 1957, p. 680, translated in Donald F. Tweedie Jr., Logotherapy and the Christian Faith, Grand Rapids, Michigan, Baker Book House, 1961, p. 49.

⁹ -----, "Logos and Existence in Psychotherapy", Op. Cit.

seen through the pleasure principle. All ethical precepts are destroyed and are no longer independent of the person, but are ethically relative and morally indifferent derivatives of unconscious, instinctive needs.¹⁰

Frankl's most severe criticism is of Freud's assumption of pan-determinism. By pan-determinism Frankl means the psychoanalytic view of man which disregards the intrinsically human capacity of free choice and interprets human existence in terms of mere dynamics. Frankl feels that man is not fully conditioned and determined, but chooses whether to give in to conditions or to face them. Man does not simply exist, in Frankl's view, but always decides what his existence will be, what he will become in the next moment. In the same manner, every human being has the freedom to change at any instant; the individual personality remains essentially unpredictable and ultimately self-determining.¹¹

Following the First Vienna School of Freud's psychoanalytic theory, evolved the Second Vienna School, that of Adler's Individual Psychology. Although Adler tried to avoid viewing man as a mechanism and to present him as

¹⁰ Viktor E. Frankl, Das Menschenbild der Seelenheilkunde, Stuttgart, Hippokrates-Verlag, 1959, p. 104-115, translated in Tweedie, Op. Cit., p. 45.

¹¹ -----, Man's Search for Meaning: An Introduction to Logotherapy, New York, Washington Square Press, 1963, p. 206.

functioning in terms of purpose, Frankl believes that Adler's innate social drive, the "will to power", is only slightly less deterministic than Freud's pleasure principle.¹² Frankl feels that Adler mistakes the "will to power" as an end in itself and that it is in reality only a prerequisite for the fulfillment of meaning in life.¹³

Both of these psychodynamic theories are criticized as narrow in scope. Frankl sees Freud's pleasure principle and Adler's drive for social status as complementary, but not complete aspects of human functioning since they describe only a portion of man. Frankl states that in these myopic psychodynamic approaches, instincts and dynamics alone are considered valid. Thus, meaning and value cannot be seen for the simple reason that values do not push a person but pull him.¹⁴

In summation of his criticism of Psychoanalysis and Individual Psychology as the major representatives of the psychodynamic schools, Frankl severely criticizes even the use of the term "will" in both the concepts of "will to pleasure" and "will to power." He feels that the concept

12 Viktor E. Frankl, Homo Patiens, Wien, Verlag Franz Deuticke, 1951, p. 43, translated in Tweedie, Op. Cit., p. 46.

13 -----, "The Will to Meaning", Op. Cit.

14 -----, The Doctor and the soul, p. 5-6.

REVIEW OF THE LITERATURE

of "will" contradicts their basic assumptions that man pursues goals unconsciously and unwillingly. It is inconceivable to Frankl that man can really be driven to striving; either he strives or he is driven.¹⁵

Though self-actualization and self-realization theories emphasize the conative or striving aspects of man, Frankl denies that they are cogent motivational theories. He feels that self-realization and self-actualization cannot be regarded as one's purpose in life. Man's concern is not to fulfill or to actualize himself, but to fulfill meaning and to realize value. Thus, Frankl feels that self-actualization is another phenomenon which can be attained only as a side-effect and which is frustrated to the extent to which it is made a goal. Man actualizes himself as a by-product of fulfilling meaning; it occurs by itself, not through intention. To illustrate this point, Frankl uses the example of a boomerang as a symbol of human existence. Generally one assumes that the boomerang returns to the thrower; in fact, it returns only when the thrower has missed his target. Likewise, man returns to himself, to being concerned with himself, only after he has missed his goal, only after he has failed to find some meaning in life.¹⁶

¹⁵ Ibid.

¹⁶ Viktor E. Frankl, "The Spiritual Dimension in Existential Analysis and Logotherapy", Journal of Individual Psychology, Vol. 15, No. 2, November 1959, p. 157-165.

REVIEW OF THE LITERATURE

Frankl feels that these self-realization and self-actualization theories err in saying that man need not worry about ideals and values since they are nothing but "self expressions", and that man should therefore only be interested in actualizing his potentialities. It is Frankl's position that man must seek beyond himself; he must seek objective values.¹⁷

In summation of his dissatisfaction with past psychological concepts of man, Frankl states:

Those theories of man which are circumscribed by the individual himself, whether based upon the reduction of tension as in the homeostatic theory, or the fulfillment of the greatest number of immanent possibilities as in self-actualization, when weighed, are found wanting. It is the contention of the author that an adequate view of man can only be properly formulated when it goes beyond homeostasis, beyond self-actualization, even beyond man himself--to the transcendent sphere of human existence in which man can see what he will do and what he will be in the midst of an objective world of meanings and values.¹⁸

Frankl's attempt to formulate this more complete concept of man led to the development of the Third Vienna School, or Logotherapy, whose basic concepts will be discussed in the following section.

17 Ibid.

18 Viktor E. Frankl, "Beyond Self-Actualization and Self-Expression", Journal of Existential Psychiatry, Vol. 1, No. 1, Spring 1960, p. 5-20.

2. Basic Concepts of Logotherapy.

Frankl perceives the Freudian and Adlerian positions as viewing man in terms of "I must", that is, as driven by instincts and other factors such as heredity and environment; he says the self-actualization psychologies portray man's condition as one of "I am". It is Frankl's contention that the concept of "I ought", which complements the previous concepts, must be added to form a full-dimensional view of man. The "I ought" refers to "what I ought to do to fulfill the concrete meaning which challenges me in each situation of my life."¹⁹ The following discussion of the basic concepts of Frankl's theory will follow this underlying principle. The first section will encompass Frankl's concept of man and the second section will present his concept of "will to meaning".

A. The Concept of Man.- This discussion will be presented in two parts: the first will present Frankl's concept of the tripartite nature of the human person; the second will discuss the basic characteristics of man as presented in Frankl's theory.

Frankl copes with the psychophysical problem of man by an approach which he calls "dimensional ontology." This

¹⁹ Viktor E. Frankl, "Logotherapy and the Challenge of Suffering", Review of Existential Psychology and Psychiatry, Vol. 1, No. 1, January 1961, p. 3-7.

denotes Frankl's concept of man as comprised of three dimensions: the physical, the psychological, and the spiritual. These distinctive aspects of man are viewed not as separate elements or layers which can be separated, but as different dimensions of one and the same being. This differentiation is made in order to avoid parallelism in the sense of dualism and identity in the sense of monism. Frankl includes the spiritual dimension because he feels that neither the somatic nor psychic dimensions alone constitute the genuinely human.²⁰

Frankl's discussion of the body and the psyche are not of especial importance here since they adhere quite closely to traditional descriptions.²¹ However, the spiritual dimension is of basic importance, and its influence can be seen in all aspects of Frankl's theory.

According to Frankl, man's rise above his own psychophysical condition is an existential act²² by which

²⁰ Viktor E. Frankl, "The Spiritual Dimension in Existential Analysis and Logotherapy", Op. Cit.

²¹ -----, Der Unbedingte Mensch, Wien, Verlag Franz Deuticke, 1949, p. 39, 41ff, 60, translated in Tweedie, Op. Cit., p. 53-55.

²² The term "existential" may be used in three ways: to refer to (1) existence itself, i.e., the specifically human mode of being; (2) the meaning of existence; and (3) the striving to find a concrete meaning in personal existence, that is to say, the will to meaning. Viktor E. Frankl, Man's Search for Meaning, p. 159.

man achieves the spiritual dimension. He distinguishes himself from animals while not ceasing to be one; that is, man does not become detached from the psychophysical aspect of his being by entering the spiritual dimension. Instead, Frankl feels man can behave as a complete human being only when he is able to occupy the spiritual dimension. By this element man can objectify, transcend, and even oppose himself in the sense of mastering his instincts.²³

In discussing the spiritual dimension, Frankl avails himself of epistemology. In Logotherapy, the traditional distinction between the subject and object of knowledge is maintained, but the subject is not removed from its ontological relationship to the world of objects. Frankl states:

The subject by its cognitive acts is capable of approaching the object, and, thereby, establishing that cognitive closeness to the things of the world which I have called 'being with' [Beisein] the object.²⁴

In addition to the cognitive property of the spiritual dimension, there also exists the ability to firmly establish the reality of the objective world. Frankl states that every true cognitive act implies the objectivity of the object. While it is true that man can grasp only a

²³ Viktor E. Frankl, "On Logotherapy and Existential Analysis", Op. Cit.

²⁴ -----, "Beyond Self-Actualization and Self-Expression", Op. Cit., p. 15.

subjective segment of this world, he takes this segment from an objective order.²⁵ This spiritual dimension is most fully realized in man's life through three basic characteristics: spirituality, freedom, and responsibility.

Frankl states that spirituality is a basic human characteristic derived from the "spiritual unconscious."

Unconscious spirituality is the origin and root of all consciousness. In other words, we know and acknowledge, not only an instinctive unconscious, but rather, also a spiritual unconscious, and in it we see the supporting ground of all conscious spirituality. The ego is not governed by the id; but the spirit is borne by the unconscious.²⁶

From this phenomenon arise three aspects of man: conscience, which generates ethical principles which are idiosyncratic to each individual; love, which enables an individual to perceive the unique characteristics of the beloved; and aesthetic conscience, which guides artistic abilities. These essentially emotional and non-rational functions are unconscious in the sense that they cannot be reflected upon, objectified, or analyzed by the self.²⁷

Spirituality, although it is a basic human characteristic, may not manifest itself or function properly due to

25 Ibid.

26 Viktor E. Frankl, Handbuch der Neurosenlehre und Psychotherapie, p. 674, translated in Tweedie, Op. Cit., p. 57.

27 Ibid., p. 675-676.

some mental defect or disease. Ordinarily, however, it may be readily observed especially through man's other basic characteristics, his freedom and responsibility.

According to Frankl, one of the main features of human existence is freedom, that is, the capacity to emerge from instincts, environment, and heredity and to transcend them. It is by this capacity that man proves himself to be truly human.²⁵ Man determines not only how he will manipulate these conditions, but he also determines himself. Through his freedom, man is not only able to detach himself from the world, but he is also capable of self-detachment. This freedom is based on man's spirituality, for as a spiritual person, man can effect changes in his psychological character.²⁹

Frankl, however, insists that man is not only free from something, but more important he is free for something. This concept leads to the third attribute of man according to Logotherapy: responsibility.

Responsibility is viewed by Frankl as the objective aspect of a total phenomenon in which freedom is the subjective aspect. The freedom to take a stand must also

²⁵ Viktor E. Frankl, "Dynamics, Existence, and Values", Journal of Existential Psychiatry, Vol. 2, No. 5, Summer 1961, p. 5-16.

²⁹ -----, "Existential Dynamics and Neurotic Escapisms", Op. Cit.

include the freedom to take responsibility. The capacity to "will" has as its objective complement to "will what I ought."³⁰ Man is responsible; he "ought" to actualize and realize meaning and values in a world which contains not only tasks but opportunities. According to Frankl, man's responsibility is not dictated by his own arbitrary choice, but is a product of conscience. Conscience, for Frankl, is basically unconscious and non-rational; it is non-rational because it is pre-logical (prior to any rational reflection). It is an individual rather than a universal moral law and is dependent upon the unique individual in a particular situation.³¹

Frankl stresses the difference between freedom and responsibility. He states that freedom means freedom from something while responsibility involves a two-fold aspect: a responsibility for something and to something. What man is responsible for is the unique meaning and values to be realized by him; he is responsible to something or someone outside of himself, either another person, society, or God.³²

³⁰ Viktor E. Frankl, "Logotherapy and the Challenge of Suffering", Op. Cit.


³¹ -----, Der Unbewusste Gott, Wien, Amandus-Verlag, 1949, p. 83, translated in Tweedie, Op. Cit., p. 62.

³² -----, "On Logotherapy and Existential Analysis", Op. Cit.

Man's responsibility to realize the meaning of his life, the logos of his existence, is a basic cornerstone of Logotherapy. Man's striving to find his purpose in life, which Frankl calls "will to meaning", will be discussed in the following section.

B. The Concept of "Will to Meaning".- Central to Frankl's Logotherapy is the principle of "will to meaning" which represents a striving to find purpose in one's own existence, to find a cause or sense of mission that is uniquely one's own and that gives direction and understanding to life. It is the true primary motivational factor in man.³³

Purpose in life for Frankl does not mean seeking material goods, prestige, or power, but a looking beyond the self needs toward a broader purpose. These goals are always beyond man's reach, but their attraction provides inner satisfaction as long as the individual can experience progress in pursuing them. While man in the traditional psychodynamic theories moves only between the poles of success and failure, according to Frankl man also moves between the poles of meaning and despair. He diagrams this concept as follows:



33 Crumbaugh and Maholick, Op. Cit.

Hence, one might enjoy a life full of pleasure and power, that is, be located at the far right of the horizontal axis, and yet be caught in the feeling of its ultimate meaninglessness, that is, be at the bottom of the vertical axis. Conversely, an individual may be deprived of health and wealth and yet be willing to suffer for the sake of a loved one or for God.³⁴

Frankl speaks of a "will" to meaning rather than a "need for" or a "drive toward" meaning. He does so because he feels that if man were really driven to meaning he would embark on meaningful fulfillment only to rid himself of this drive, that is, to restore homeostasis. However, the person would then no longer be concerned with meaning, but with himself, and the attainment of homeostasis would terminate his search for meaning.³⁵

The emphasis on a will to meaning refers to the fact that Frankl feels that there is always freedom involved, man's freedom to choose between accepting or rejecting a possibility to find meaning in life. Frankl also clarifies his definition of the "will to meaning" by stating that there cannot exist in man any such thing as a moral drive, or even a religious drive, in the same manner as we speak of being determined by basic instincts. Man is never driven

³⁴ Viktor E. Frankl, "Existential Dynamics and Neurotic Escapisms", Op. Cit.

³⁵ -----, "The Will to Meaning", Op. Cit.

to his "will to meaning"; he decides to behave morally for a cause to which he is committed, for a person whom he loves, or for the sake of God.³⁶

Frankl states that meaning can be realized by discovering and actualizing three categories of existential values: creative values, experiential values, and attitudinal values.

Creative values refer to those of achieving and creating. The crucial thing is how man works and creates, whether he is filling the place in which he happens to be. The radius of his activity is not important; to achieve meaning man need only fill the circle of his own tasks.

Experiential values are defined by Frankl as what an individual takes from the world in terms of experiencing. Man may achieve meaning through the works of nature, or through culture, or by experiencing someone in all his uniqueness, that is, by love.

When an individual finds himself in great distress in which neither creativity nor experience gives meaning to his life, he can still find value by his attitude toward his fate, that is, by accepting his unavoidable suffering. Man's greatest possibility for achievement is the challenge

³⁶ Viktor E. Frankl, Man's Search for Meaning, p. 157-158.

to suffer bravely, by which man has the opportunity to give his life meaning literally to the end.³⁷

Frankl points out that these values are necessarily more than a mere self-expression of the subject himself. This is necessary to maintain the demanding force of these meanings and values. If they emerged from within man, they could not be a real challenge to him.³⁸

Frankl says that ultimately man should not ask what the meaning of life is, but rather must recognize that it is he who is questioned and is responsible to life. Frankl feels that the questioning of the purpose or meaning of the universe is wrong. Instead of speaking vaguely of "life", one should refer concretely to each person's own existence, responsibility, and "will to meaning."³⁹

Frankl's empirical evidence for the presence of purpose in life stems from his observations as a clinician and as a prisoner in a concentration camp for several years. Frankl cites what he feels is further evidence for the existence of this striving in man--a public opinion poll taken in France. The results showed that 89 per cent of the

37 Viktor E. Frankl, The Doctor and the Soul, p. 41-50.

38 -----, "Logotherapy and the Challenge of Suffering", Op. Cit.

39 -----, "The Search for Meaning", Saturday Review, September 13, 1953, p. 20.

people polled admitted that man needs "something" for the sake of which to live. Moreover 61 per cent conceded that there was something, or someone, in their own lives for whose sake they were even ready to die. Frankl, at his clinic in Vienna, repeated the poll among both the patients and the personnel. The outcome was practically the same as in the French poll, the difference being only 2 per cent.⁴⁰

Experimental evidence for the existence of the phenomenon of "will to meaning" in man must come from studies directly aimed at isolating this postulated striving. A pioneer attempt in this direction has been made by Crumbaugh and Maholick,⁴¹ whose efforts have been closely followed and supported by Frankl.⁴²

In 1964 these authors attempted to quantify the existential concept of "purpose" or "meaning in life." In particular, the aim of their study was three-fold: (1) to show that their instrument, The Purpose in Life Test, measures what Frankl refers to by "meaning in life"; (2) to show that

⁴⁰ Viktor E. Frankl, Man's Search for Meaning, p. 154.

⁴¹ James C. Crumbaugh and Leonard T. Maholick, "An Experimental Study in Existentialism: The Psychometric Approach to Frankl's Concept of Nodogenic Neurosis", Columbus, Ga., The Bradley Center, Inc., (mimeograph), (no date), p. 1-33.

⁴² Viktor E. Frankl, "Basic Concepts of Logotherapy", Journal of Existential Psychiatry, Vol. 3, No. 9, Summer-Fall, 1962, p. 111-118.

noögenic neurosis is qualitatively different from the usual neuroses as dynamically conceived; and (3) to identify noögenic neurosis as a distinguishing characteristic of pathological groups in contrast to normal populations.

The authors used a total of 225 subjects comprising five sub-groups: Group I, the 'high purpose' group, composed of six Junior League females and twenty-four graduate students (14 males and 16 females); Group II, undergraduate students (44 males and 31 females); Group III, psychiatric outpatients (25 males and 24 females) who were seen privately by psychiatrists; Group IV, outpatients of an outpatient psychiatric clinic (22 males and 28 females); Group V, hospitalized alcoholics (14 males and 7 females). The ages ranged from seventeen to over fifty.

The psychometric instruments used were: The Purpose in Life Test, The Frankl Questionnaire,⁴³ The Allport-Vernon-Lindzey Scale of Values, and the Minnesota Multiphasic Personality Inventory.

The authors feel that the results consistently support the noögenic hypothesis because: (1) the relationship between the Purpose in Life Test and The Frankl Questionnaire was high (.68), indicating that the Purpose in Life Test is measuring essentially the same functions which Frankl

⁴³ A description of these tests is presented in Chapter II of this paper.

describes as "will to meaning" or "purpose in life"; (2) the relationship of the Purpose in Life Test to the Minnesota Multiphasic Personality Inventory (used as an established measure of traditionally conceived psychopathology) was low (correlations of MMPI clinical scales and the Purpose in Life Test ranged from $-.30$ to $.13$); and (3) the scale distinguished significantly, (at the $.01$ level of confidence), between patient and non-patient samples, showing a predicted progressive drop in scores to match the level of pathology assumed by the nature of the group.

The fact that there was a low relationship between the Purpose in Life Test and the Minnesota Multiphasic Personality Inventory scales and that the Purpose in Life Test discriminated significantly between normal and pathological samples was taken as an indication that the Purpose in Life Test is not just another measure of the usual forms of pathology but of a qualitatively new type of pathology which adheres to Frankl's concept of noogenic neurosis. The low relationships between the Purpose in Life Test and the Allport-Vernon-Lindzey Scales of Values (correlations ranged from $-.15$ to $.14$) were taken to suggest that purpose or meaning in life is not just another name for values in the usual sense.

Thus Crumbaugh and Maholick's study presents some supportive evidence concerning some of Frankl's claims for

the existence of "will to meaning". Frankl also tries to further delineate this motivational aspect of man by describing its source, which he calls noodynamics.⁴⁴

Noodynamics is that kind of appropriate tension that stems from two sources and holds man steadily toward concrete values to be actualized.

The first source of tension originates from the gap between what one has already achieved and what one still ought to accomplish, between what a person feels that he is and what he feels he should become. This tension between being and meaning is ineradicable in man because it is inherent in his human nature. It is also something beyond man himself; only thus can it exert upon a person that quality of imperativeness which yields itself to a phenomenological analysis of one's experience of existence.⁴⁵ By these dynamics man is rather pulled than pushed; instead of being determined by meaning, he decides whether his life is to be structured by the demand quality of a meaning for his existence.⁴⁶

⁴⁴ This term is derived from the Greek "noos" (mind) which has the logotherapeutic connotation of anything pertaining to the "spiritual" core of man. As previously mentioned, it does not have a primarily religious connotation but refers to the specifically human dimension of man.

⁴⁵ Viktor E. Frankl, "The Will to Meaning", Op. Cit.

⁴⁶ -----, "Existential Dynamics and Neurotic Escapisms", Op. Cit.

Frankl states that there is no conceivable condition in which man may be relieved of this tension. As a finite being, he can never perfectly complete his life task. Man must accept the burden of his incompleteness. This certain degree of tension between what a person is and what he would like to be is, in fact, a prerequisite for mental health. Neurotic conditions arise when this gap is perceived by the individual as too large, unrealistically small, or if there is no gap. Therefore Frankl feels that man needs not the discharge of tension at any cost, but the tension of a potential meaning waiting to be fulfilled by him; not homeostasis but *noodynamics*.⁴⁷

In addition to this source of tension, Frankl states that another polarity must be considered. This is the rift between the subject and object of cognition. This hiatus is also unbridgeable. While Frankl recognizes that in cognition the subject attains the object across the gap that separates them, he feels that the object which is reached by the subject is still an object and does not become a part of the subject itself through the cognitive process. This theory is posited as a criticism of other concepts which, according to Frankl, obscure the objectivity of the object by disregarding its intrinsic otherness and by assuming that

⁴⁷ Viktor E. Frankl, "Dynamics, Existence, and Values", Op. Cit.

the world is a mere self-expression or projection of the self. Frankl feels that each cognitive act is based indispensably on the polar field of tension between the subject and the object. The essential dynamic which constitutes human cognition has its source in this situation between man and the world in which he is. Frankl states that to view the world as a "design" of the individual's cognition is to do injustice to the most essential part of the cognitive act which is the self-transcendence of existence toward the world as an objective reality. Frankl acknowledges that man can only make an individual selection from the full spectrum of the world; however, he is always making a subjective selection of the objective world.⁴⁰

Frankl's image of man as a three-dimensional being and his concept of "will to meaning" are basic elements of Logotherapy. In some people the "will to meaning"--the search for purpose in life--is either unknown because it is in the unconscious, or attempts at its actualization have led to frustration. When either of these contingencies takes place, the result may often be a mental illness. The various factors in mental illness as seen in Logotherapy will be discussed in the following section.

⁴⁰ Viktor E. Frankl, "Beyond Self-Actualization and Self-Expression", Op. Cit.

3. Logotherapy and Mental Illness.

Although Logotherapy is initially interested in presenting an adequate view of man and his purpose in life, the resulting perspective is considered specifically with respect to the field of mental illness.

In speaking about mental illness, Frankl states that the initial and most important aspect is proper diagnosis. Proper diagnosis, according to Frankl, requires that one establish which of the three dimensions of personality, somatic, psychic, or spiritual, is the primary source of illness. Frankl cautions that there are no purely somatogenic, psychogenic, or noögenic neuroses; there exist only mixed cases in which one of these dimensions is salient.⁴⁹

Frankl views a physical examination as an integral part of the diagnostic procedure and expresses skepticism about psychodiagnostic testing instruments. He feels that a proper diagnosis requires a clear theoretical foundation and sets forth a general outline of pathology based on two factors: the etiological or genetic factor and the phenomenological or symptomatic factor. These two factors are, in turn, related to two personality dimensions, the psychic and the somatic. Thus, in Frankl's view, psychic symptomatology and

⁴⁹ Viktor E. Frankl, Theorie und Therapie der Neurosen, Wien, Urban-Schwarzenberg, 1956, Foreword, translated in Tweedie, Op. Cit., p. 74-75.

somatic etiology result in psychosis, while psychic symptomatology combined with psychic etiology leads to neurosis. If both etiology and symptomatology are somatic, physical diseases result, and somatic symptomatology in combination with psychic etiology leads to organ neurosis.⁵⁰

In dealing with psychosis, Frankl, like many European psychiatrists, sees the etiology as somatic. He has arrived at this conclusion on the basis of the lack of psychological factors, the impotence of psychological treatment methods in such cases, and the relative success of physical procedures in therapy. Hence, in the treatment of psychosis, Frankl views Logotherapy, or any type of psychotherapy, as a secondary and indirect choice which is used only to reduce the overlay of secondary psychological factors that often accompany psychosis.⁵¹

Frankl views manic-depressive psychosis as representing essentially a person's reaction to internal physical changes. He states that due to a structural deficiency the schizophrenic has insufficient self-directed activity and experiences his behavior as something done to him. Therefore, Frankl feels that the schizophrenic experiences himself as an object instead of as a responsible subject; consequently,

⁵⁰ Tweedie, Op. Cit., p. 75.

⁵¹ Viktor E. Frankl, "Logos and Existence in Psychotherapy", Op. Cit.

he is affected in his existence as a human being. However, both the schizophrenic and the manic-depressive have a residue of freedom with which they are able to confront their illness and progress toward finding meaning in life.⁵²

In the field of mental illness, the primary area of concern for Logotherapy is the neuroses, in which both the symptoms and the etiological factors are psychological. Frankl states that neuroses are not caused by psychological complexes, conflicts, or traumatic experiences but views the prime factor as an anticipatory anxiety which both originates and sustains the neurotic chain of events.⁵³ Anticipatory anxiety is caused by the fear that a previous anxiety producing situation will reoccur. This fear in itself triggers a reoccurrence of the anxiety. The secondary anxiety stimulates the person to flee from the object or situation identified with the primary anxiety of the original experience. Such flight causes a vicious circle in which the anxious expectation precipitates the feared experience and the experience of the symptoms, in turn, reinforces the anticipatory anxiety.⁵⁴

⁵² Viktor E. Frankl, Arztliche Seelsorge, Wien, Verlag Franz Deuticke, 1943, translated in Dagda Arnold and John A. Casson, The Human Person, New York, The Ronald Press, 1954, p. 477.

⁵³ -----, Handbuch der Neurosenlehre und Psychotherapie, p. 720, translated in Tweedie, Op. Cit., p. 51.

⁵⁴ -----, Man's Search for Meaning, p. 173-174.

Frankl indicates what he refers to as the three most important neurotic patterns: anxiety neurosis, obsessive-compulsive neurosis, and sexual neurosis. His theoretical treatment of these three syndromes does not differ markedly from the traditional psychodynamic theories.⁵⁵

Frankl's main contribution to the study of mental illness is his concept of a qualitatively different neurosis from the already established syndromes, that is the noögenic neurosis, which originates from value conflicts in the spiritual dimension of man.⁵⁶ Frankl states that this type of neurosis constitutes a repression of the individual's spiritual needs which results in spiritual starvation, since the needs cannot be satisfied. This prevents man from developing his sense of a meaning in life.⁵⁷

Frankl states that the relatively high incidence⁵⁸ of noögenic neurosis in modern times is a consequence, in

55 Tweedie, Op. Cit., p. 84-89.

56 Viktor E. Frankl, Man's Search for Meaning, p. 160.

57 Edith Weisskopf-Joelson, 'Some Comments on a Viennese School of Psychology', Journal of Abnormal and Social Psychology, Vol. 51, No. 3, November 1955, p. 701-703.

58 A consensus of three European clinics versed in the diagnosis and treatment of noögenic neurosis report an average of 15 per cent of their case load as being comprised of this type of neurosis. It is estimated that in North America, the percentage is a great deal higher. Tweedie, Op. Cit., p. 96.

part, of nihilism stemming from two prevalent theories of man, namely, the mechanistic and the subjectivist. If either the search for pleasure through tension release, or the striving for self-realization through the use of the world around us, is taken as the aim of life, then man becomes confused and demoralized.⁵⁹ The reason for this is manifested in the phenomenon which Frankl calls "existential frustration."

Existential frustration results from man's lack of knowledge about the meaning of existence. This frustration, which may be due to a moral conflict, a specific spiritual problem, or an existential crisis, is manifested in a feeling of the emptiness and pointlessness of life.⁶⁰ The effect of existential frustration is evident in a phenomenon called "existential vacuum", that is, inner emptiness caused by the feeling of having lost the meaning of existence. This feeling can permeate one's whole life.⁶¹ This vacuum appears in the state of boredom which, Frankl feels, is giving psychologists and psychiatrists more problems to solve than any drive, including the sexual drive. Where man lacks the certain degree of tension necessary for mental health and has

⁵⁹ Viktor E. Frankl, "Beyond Self-Actualization and Self-Expression", Op. Cit.

⁶⁰ -----, "On Logotherapy and Existential Analysis", Op. Cit.

⁶¹ -----, "The Spiritual Dimension in Existential Analysis and Logotherapy", Op. Cit.

managed to escape any significant stress situation, he may easily develop existential vacuum. Frankl believes that this phenomenon is particularly prevalent in modern times due to vast increases in leisure hours created by automation.⁶²

Although existential frustration and existential vacuum are capable of creating neurosis, Frankl holds that these conditions are not in themselves pathological, since the spiritual dimension in itself is not subject to pathological problems. According to Frankl, existential frustration is a human condition which is neither pathological nor pathogenic. A man's concern for, even his despair over, the value of life is a spiritual distress, but by no means a mental disease. It becomes productive of illness only when there is accompanying distress in the psychophysical organism, which "accommodates" the noögenic difficulty. The illness does not affect the spiritual dimension as such, but rather is manifest in the psychophysical system. Frankl states:

In cases of noögenic neuroses, we are dealing with psychological illnesses which are not, as the psychogenic neuroses, rooted in conflicts between different drives, or clashes of classic components such as the so-called id, ego, and superego. They are, rather, rooted in collisions between different values, or in unrewarded longing and groping of man for that hierarchically highest value--an ultimate meaning of his life.⁶³

62 Viktor E. Frankl, 'On Logotherapy and Existential Analysis', Op. Cit.

63 -----, 'Beyond Self-Actualization and Self-Expression', Op. Cit., p. 10-11.

The existential vacuum, Frankl states, is the mass or collective neurosis of the present time, and basically can be described as a private and personal form of nihilism, that is, the contention that being has no meaning.⁶⁴ This collective neurosis manifests several major symptoms. One of these is an ephemeral attitude toward life, in which people avoid long-range plans due to a feeling of the uncertainty of life. A second symptom is a fatalistic attitude toward life which asserts that it is not possible to plan one's life because man is a product of environment and drives. Man's attempts to deny his personality and avoid the burden of personal responsibility lead to the third symptom of collective neurosis--collectivist thinking. Through this symptom man allows group consensus to preempt his own goals and the means to them. These symptoms lead to a fourth, fanaticism, in which the personality of others is ignored.⁶⁵

Both noögenic neuroses and collective neuroses reveal a vacuum that must be filled with objective meaning and values in order to obviate the neurotic condition. The neuroses stemming from the spiritual dimension have Logotherapy as the indicated means of treatment. Logotherapy as a psychotherapeutic technique will be discussed in the following section.

64 Viktor E. Frankl, Man's Search for Meaning, p. 204.

65 Tweedie, Op. Cit., p. 77-78.

4. Logotherapy as Treatment.

In Logotherapy, the emphasis on a complete image of man is retained with regard to therapeutic activity. Due to this emphasis on viewing the patient as a unique person, techniques as such are deemphasized. However, certain specific techniques are mentioned by Frankl and will be presented following a section on the general considerations of treatment by the use of Logotherapy.

A. General Considerations.- Frankl's emphasis on the three-dimensional man leads him to state that a psychotherapy which merely restricts itself to interpretations of the patient's reactions, merely reflects ideas, or deals solely with fluctuations of psychic energy misinterprets the quiddity of a human being who is primarily concerned with meaning and value.⁶⁶ However, it must be noted that Logotherapy is not only applicable to cases of noogenic neurosis but also to psychogenic neuroses because they often offer symptoms that fulminate from a spiritual vacuum.⁶⁷ The general indications for using Logotherapy as the preferred treatment are: (1) whenever the patient is oppressed by

⁶⁶ Viktor E. Frankl, commenting in Critical Incidents in Psychotherapy, edited by S.W. Stendal and R.J. Corsini, Englewood Cliffs, N.J., Prentice Hall, 1959, p. 10.

⁶⁷ -----, "The Spiritual Dimension in Existential Analysis and Logotherapy", Op. Cit.

problems of living; (2) when emotional difficulties have forced him to a philosophical conviction which reinforces his original problem; (3) when a person is in a virtually irreversible situation, for example, suffering from incurable disease.⁶⁸

Traditional psychotherapy tries to make the patient aware of what he really longs for in the depth of his self by making him aware of his instinctual unconscious. Frankl offers Logotherapy not as a substitute for this psychotherapy but as a complement, treating man in his entirety, which includes the spiritual dimension.⁶⁹ Logotherapy thus attempts to do more than treat illness. Man, through this treatment, is led not so much out of disease as toward truth. This may lead to a temporary increase in tension, because it is often painful for the patient to be awakened from his metaphysical irresponsibility. Logotherapy aims beyond restoring the patient's capacity for work and enjoyment. It also enables the patient to learn how to suffer.⁷⁰

The aim of Logotherapy, therefore, is to assist the patient to make conscious the potential hidden meaning

⁶⁸ Viktor E. Frankl, Arztliche Seelsorge, translated in Arnold and Gasson, Op. Cit., p. 479.

⁶⁹ -----, "Existential Dynamics and Neurotic Escapisms", Op. Cit.

⁷⁰ -----, "Logos and Existence in Psychotherapy", Op. Cit.

in his existence as well as his 'will to meaning.' In comparison with psychotherapy, Logotherapy is less retrospective and less introspective; it focuses on the future, that is, on the tasks and meanings to be fulfilled by the patient. It attempts to make the patient fully aware of his own responsibility. Therefore, it must leave him free to choose what he is responsible for and to whom he is responsible. Frankl states that this is why a logotherapist is the least tempted of all psychotherapists to impose value judgments on the patient.⁷¹

The logotherapist must also be careful to see that the patient does not shift his responsibility onto the therapist.⁷² Logotherapy is ultimately education toward responsibility; the patient must push forward independently toward the concrete meaning of his own existence. The therapist's role consists in widening the visual field of the patient so that the whole spectrum of meaning and values becomes conscious and visible to him. Frankl feels that the logotherapist has no need to impose judgments on the patient, for truth imposes itself and needs no intervention.⁷³

⁷¹ Viktor E. Frankl, Man's Search for Meaning, p. 163, 152, 173.

⁷² -----, 'On Logotherapy and Existential Analysis', Op. Cit.

⁷³ -----, Man's Search for Meaning, p. 174-175.

The attitude of the therapist is seen as a very important part of the treatment. Frankl states:

In my opinion ethics and values are to be esteemed more highly than techniques and theoretical points of view. I would go so far as to state that as long as the therapist remains consistently non-directive and is unwilling under any circumstances to change his emotional balance; when he sees himself merely as a technician in relation to his patient, this proves only one thing, to me--he looks at the patient as a mechanism--and not as a human being.⁷⁴

However, a certain degree of detachment on the part of the therapist is indispensable. In fact, the human element must on occasion be disregarded in order to expedite treatment. Frankl feels that the therapeutic relationship develops in a polar field of tension in which the poles are represented by the extremes of human closeness on one hand and scientific detachment on the other. Frankl warns the therapist against either extreme--that is, being guided by mere sympathy and desire to help on one hand or dealing with the patient merely in terms of technique on the other.⁷⁵ Frankl uses Goethe's aphorism to sum up what the therapist's attitude toward the patient should be: when we regard people as they

⁷⁴ Viktor E. Frankl, commenting in Critical Incidents in Psychotherapy, p. 166.

⁷⁵ -----, "Paradoxical Intention: A Logotherapeutic Technique", American Journal of Psychotherapy, Vol. 14, No. 3, July 1960, p. 520-535.

are, we make them worse; but when we regard them as they should be, we make them what they can be.⁷⁶

Logotherapy is generally a short-term procedure. The average number of therapy sessions for a patient at Frankl's clinic is eight.⁷⁷

Frankl states that the choice of therapeutic method may be compared to the following algebraic equation: $\Psi = x + y$, where Ψ equals the therapeutic method, x equals the individuality of the patient, and y stands for the therapist involved. The equation highlights the fact that the crucial agency in Logotherapy is not so much the method but the relationship or encounter between the patient and the therapist.⁷⁸ However, Frankl does not ignore the importance of the psychotherapist being armed with every available scientific technique.⁷⁹ He also discusses some specific logotherapeutic methods.

B. Specific Techniques.- In Logotherapy, the therapist's technique addresses itself neither to the symptoms

⁷⁶ Viktor E. Frankl, The Doctor and the Soul, p. 2.

⁷⁷ Tweedie, Op. Cit., p. 107.

⁷⁸ Viktor E. Frankl, "Paradoxical Intention: A Logotherapeutic Technique", Op. Cit.

⁷⁹ One of the basic tools of logotherapy is chemotherapy; electroshock therapy is often utilized in Frankl's logotherapeutic clinic, and psychosurgery is occasionally used. Tweedie, Op. Cit., p. 109-110.

themselves, nor to the developmental trauma which may have exacerbated the symptoms, but rather to the attitude of the patient toward his symptoms. Logotherapy is more "directive" than most theories--not in the sense that it is "direction giving"--but in the fact that a more active role is played by the therapist.⁸⁰ Based on his theory of anticipatory anxiety as instrumental in eliciting the feared experience in the neurosis, Frankl offers two therapeutic methods designed to break this neurotic feedback mechanism: paradoxical intention and de-reflection.

The technique of paradoxical intention is presented by Frankl as a procedure designed primarily to counteract anticipatory anxiety. In this approach the patient must concentrate on his anxiety and objectify it. Thus, it is basically a reversal of the patient's attitude toward his symptoms in which the patient is encouraged to wish for precisely the object of his fear. For example, the patient who stutters, when in anxiety-producing situations, would attempt to force himself to stutter--to be a 'better stutterer' than he had been previously.⁸¹

⁸⁰ Viktor F. Frankl, "On Logotherapy and Existential Analysis", Op. Cit.

⁸¹ -----, "Paradoxical Intention, A Logotherapeutic Technique", Op. Cit.

The use of paradoxical intention is based on the faculty of the human person to "defy" the psychic or physical factors in the neurosis. Thus, it is a true therapy "of the spirit", for through it, the patient transcends the psychophysical plane through what Frankl calls "psychonoetic antagonism." It makes use of the specifically human capacity for self-detachment inherent in a sense of humor. Frankl feels that nothing is so effective in putting distance between a person and his problems as a humorous experience.⁶²

Frankl states that paradoxical intention can be used in a variety of disorders such as those involving functional disturbances of speech and sleep, obsessive-compulsive character neuroses, and phobic conditions or any other situations where anticipatory anxiety is significant.⁶³ A study in the literature⁶⁴ reports that twenty-four phobic and obsessive-compulsive patients who had suffered from their symptoms for a period ranging from two weeks to more than twenty-four years were successfully treated with paradoxical intention in that their more disturbing symptoms were significantly decreased.

⁶² Viktor E. Frankl, "On Logotherapy and Existential Analysis", Op. Cit.

⁶³ -----, Man's Search for Meaning, p. 211.

⁶⁴ Hans O. Gers, "The Treatment of the Phobic and the Obsessive-Compulsive Patient Using Paradoxical Intention sec. Viktor L. Frankl", Journal of Neuropsychiatry, Vol. 3, No. 6, July-August 1962, p. 375-387.

Frankl feels that paradoxical intention is effective irrespective of the etiological basis of the disorder. He states that what are often regarded as the causes of neurosis are sometimes the symptoms instead and that feedback mechanisms as anticipatory anxiety seem to be a major pathogenic factor. A given symptom is responded to by a phobia, the phobia triggers the symptom, and the symptom, in turn, reinforces the phobia. When the patient can deal with the symptom by an ironical attitude, by applying paradoxical intention, the vicious circle is cut, and the symptom diminishes and finally disappears.⁸⁵

Whereas paradoxical intention is designed to counteract anticipatory anxiety, de-reflection is employed to neutralize the compulsive self-observation or hyperreflection which is a common factor in neurotic reactions. The primary aim is to divert the patient's attention from himself to the task at hand; that is, he ignores his symptoms. Actually the technique is not primarily the turning away from the symptoms, but rather turning to positive activity by redirecting the patient toward meaning in life.⁸⁶

While Frankl's general theory of Logotherapy is hailed by many as a fresh and more realistic view of man,

⁸⁵ Viktor E. Frankl, Man's Search for Meaning, p. 201-204.

⁸⁶ Ibid., p. 204.

some authors, even those who accept the majority of his teachings, have evaluated and criticized different aspects of Logotherapy. The next section will deal with a critique of some of Frankl's concepts.

5. A Critique of Logotherapy.

Having covered the basic theoretical concepts of Frankl's Logotherapy, it would seem appropriate to attempt to assess some of them. Though the term critique implies both positive and negative appraisal, only the latter sense of the term will be applied in this paper. This will be done because the cogent aspects of Frankl's theory are better known than the possible deficiencies. The critique will stem from two sources, that gleaned from the literature and that from the writer's observations in studying Frankl's theory.

In terms of criticism presented in the literature, some Adlerians fail to see that Frankl's Third Vienna School adds anything qualitatively different to Adler's Second Vienna School. In fact, they feel that Adler was the founder of the Existentialist movement and more concerned (especially in his later years) with the spiritual side of man than was Frankl. It is stated that Frankl's perception of Individual Psychology as merely a milieu psychology is nonveridical. Frankl's work is considered valuable

because it is concerned with ultimates and recognizes the psychotherapeutic problem as in reality an existential question. But Adlerians argue that basically Adler did this as well, and that in fact many of Adler's answers to life's questions are "more religious than Frankl's romantic answer."⁸⁷

A second area of criticism from some Adlerians is that while Frankl alludes to the inadequacy of the "will to power", one can find striking and repeated similarities to it in Frankl's work:

It is a peculiarity of man that he can live only by looking to the future--sub specie aeternitatis. [...] Life ultimately means taking responsibility to find the right answer to its problem and to fulfill the tasks which it constantly sets for each individual. [...] For what is demanded of man is [...] the actualization of specific tasks in his world--and only to the degree to which he accomplishes this actualization will he also fulfill himself.⁸⁸

Another source of criticism is Frankl's unfortunate lack of clarity in the presentation of his theory, a defect mentioned by many authors including those well acquainted with the German language.^{89,90} In an introduction to her

⁸⁷ Ferdinand Birnbaum, "Frankl's Existential Psychology from the Viewpoint of Individual Psychology", Journal of Individual Psychology, Vol. 17, No. 2, November 1961, p. 162-166.

⁸⁸ Rowena R. Ansbacher, "The Third Viennese School of Psychotherapy", Journal of Individual Psychology, Vol. 15, No. 2, November 1959, p. 236-237.

⁸⁹ Weisskopf-Joelson, Op. Cit.

⁹⁰ Arnold and Gasson, Op. Cit., p. 460.

article, one author states: "Some parts of Frankl's teaching are so mystical and confused that it would be without value to report them here."⁹¹

Perlin⁹² feels that Logotherapy is deficient in both theory and technique. He states that while Western belief holds that understanding follows technique, Logotherapy holds that technique follows understanding. Perlin feels that for understanding to be of use to psychology as a science it must be lawful understanding and thus available for formulation into a theory. He feels that Frankl's statement that a real human person is not subject to rigid prediction and that existence can not be reduced to, nor deduced from, a system is valid as a warning against unrealistic generalizations and abstractions. However, Perlin feels that because there are some things which all individuals have in common, scientific endeavor is possible in the understanding of patterned and lawful aspects of human behavior. Although the individual and the human must not be forgotten in abstractions, psychology must attempt a lawful understanding of man.

⁹¹ Weisskopf-Joelson, Op. Cit., p. 701.

⁹² Lawrence A. Perlin, "Existentialism, Psychology, and Psychotherapy", The American Psychologist, Vol. 15, No. 4, April 1960, p. 305-307.

Tweedie⁹³ takes exception to Frankl's diagnostic schema of Logotherapy in the sense that it does not include the pseudo-neuroses, a major diagnostic category. Tweedie feels that since both the diagnostic schema and the diagnostic category of pseudo-neurosis are presented as being significant in Logotherapy, to be logical one or both should be changed. He also adds that this diagnostic schema will probably be more suggestive than convincing to the average American therapist whose practice of diagnosis is almost exclusively symptomatological--the etiology being usually derived as an inference from the symptoms and reevaluated from the result of the treatment.

Another criticism by Tweedie is that Frankl obviously accepts a theory of psychophysical interactions in some phases of his writing and in others repudiates interaction in favor of a parallelism. However, Tweedie attempts to reconcile this by stating:

[...] in a heuristic system, these apparently contradictory theses are appropriate in their respective cases [...] He [Frankl] would, perhaps, in this respect, think Emerson's famous phrase concerning 'foolish consistency, the hobgoblin of little minds', quite apt.⁹⁴

It seems to this writer that Tweedie's reasoning is specious for two reasons. First, the fact that a theory is

⁹³ Tweedie, Op. Cit., p. 156.

⁹⁴ Ibid., p. 80-81.

heuristic does not mean that it has license to maintain diametrically opposed positions on a basic point. It would seem, on the contrary, that to the extent that an essential aspect of a theory is confused and contradictory, to this extent the theory lacks heuristic value. Second, Tweedie's appeal to Emerson raises the question as to whether consistency on basic philosophical concepts underlying a theory can truly be considered "foolish."

In criticizing Frankl's technique of paradoxical intention, Müller-Hegemann,⁹⁵ after exhaustive follow-up studies of patients who had been treated with paradoxical intention, concludes that although therapeutic results can on occasion be achieved with this technique, one cannot attribute any universal value to the procedure. He also takes exception to Frankl's recommendation for use of the method with intractable insomnia and anacastie syndromes. Müller-Hegemann states that such disturbances are too subtle to be overcome by paradoxical intention alone, because there appears to be a rather large physiological involvement in these disorders.

The lack of clarity, logic and cogency of some of the philosophical substratum of Frankl's theory is discussed

⁹⁵ D. Müller-Hegemann, "Methodological Approaches in Psychotherapy: Current Concepts in East Germany", American Journal of Psychotherapy, Vol. 17, No. 4, October 1963, p. 554-568.

by Arnold and Gasson³⁶ who present the most systematic and profound criticism in the literature.

In terms of general criticism, Arnold and Gasson present four reasons why it is difficult to be sure that one has penetrated to the core of Frankl's thought: (1) Frankl writes about the medical cure of souls. (2) He is principally concerned with stating the minimum essentials required of the patient for successful therapy. (3) Frankl's dialectical mode of expression and paradoxical literary style conceal a thought as often as they embellish it. (4) After following Frankl's thought process for a lengthy period with complete agreement and acquiescence, one becomes confused by the example employed in illustrating the principle.

Arnold and Gasson state that among the least clearly defined and systematically explained concepts are those concerned with responsibility, freedom and existence. They question whether an individual's responsibility to life is as self-evident as Frankl proposes. Arnold and Gasson are of the opinion that since no man has ever asked to be born or ever chosen his parents or environment--in this sense no man can be said to be responsible for his existence. If life gives existence to the human being, as Frankl's whole theory seems to imply, then the responsibility is not the

³⁶ Arnold and Gasson, Op. Cit., p. 400-402.

individual's; the responsibility is life's. According to Arnold and Gasson, man's responsibility does not stem from his existence, but from the fact that he was created for a purpose which involves the highest and truest perfection that man can achieve. Life gives only opportunity to the individual; it does not give life itself, nor is it its own purpose or meaning. Therefore man is not responsible to life, but to the Giver of Life, alone.

It is Arnold and Gasson's contention that Frankl calls forth the rationality of man only to frustrate it. If the important questions of life are answered by sheer recourse to existence and experience, rationality is not taken seriously:

Frankl tries to build 'golden bridges' not only to tempt the patient out of his neuroses, but also to tempt him to accept his responsibility, live with his life task. But even golden bridges must lead to something and not stop short in the fog of subjectivism.⁹⁷

In scrutinizing man's freedom, Arnold and Gasson feel that Frankl, in stating that freedom is the choice to realize creative, experiential, and attitudinal values, implies the existence of a moral law since these values are mentioned to the exclusion of power, pleasure, and prestige. The authors add to this evidence for an underlying assumption of a moral law, the fact that Frankl prefers the objective

⁹⁷ Ibid., p. 485.

rather than subjective values--that is, the self is enhanced only by transcending himself in work, love, or suffering. Arnold and Gasson state that if values are not only objective but absolute, as Frankl contends, someone must have created them. The conclusion of this line of reasoning is that someone also created man in His image and gave him the ability to work, enjoy life, and withstand sorrow.

The third cornerstone of Logotherapy, existence, is the challenge to bridge the gap between what a person is and what he ought to be. While Arnold and Gasson agree that challenge is a part of existence, they deny that it is existence. In terms of Frankl's conception of existence, Arnold and Gasson state that, while there is no doubt that there is challenge in life, challenge is not the material out of which life is made. They agree that man is unique and must go about life in his own idiosyncratic manner, but disagree that meaning is unattainable even though there is absolute meaning, that because each life task is relative, the challenge is absolute.

Arnold and Gasson feel that these basic weaknesses in Logotherapy stem from Frankl's attempt to find a common and minimum basis for dialogue among religious, irreligious, and non-religious people. In attempting to be philosophically democratic, he stretches the fragile fabric of his philosophy to the extent that holes appear.

Frankl himself admits that there is subject for criticism in his theoretical framework. However, he attempts to explain his viewpoint as follows:

I am, of course, aware of the fact that you may now reproach me with having produced a caricature of that image of man I have pretended to correct. And perhaps there is something in it. Perhaps I am onesided and perhaps I exaggerate when I sense the threatening design of nihilism, of homunculism, behind many a theory and unconscious philosophical system of modern psychotherapy. Perhaps I am hypersensitive to the slightest suggestion of nihilism. But if that is the case, please understand that I am so only because I have had to overcome nihilism within myself. And that is perhaps why I am so capable of finding it out, wherever it may hide.⁹⁸

There appear to be other criticisms of Logotherapy both as a theory and a technique which have not been dwelt on in the literature. The writer has divided these into three main areas.

The first aspect of Frankl's presentation which lends itself to criticism is his expenditure of time and space (in many instances one-half to three-fourths of an article) in refuting previous theories, especially Psychoanalysis, to the detriment of clarifying and expanding upon his present concepts. It is true that in the early 1930's when Frankl was constructing his theory, psychoanalytic theory pervaded not only psychology but most areas of man's life. However, the

⁹⁸ Viktor E. Frankl, "On Logotherapy and Existential Analysis", Op. Cit., p. 34.

psychoanalytic concept of Freud is no longer the intense threat to personalistic psychology; even Frankl states that the "dream [of Psychoanalysis] has been dreamt out."⁹⁹ Yet Frankl continues to exhume the body of orthodox Psychoanalysis only to dispose of it again. However, Psychoanalysis has progressed a great deal over the past thirty years, to the extent that many principles of psychoanalytic practice are based on existential contributions. Seven years ago, an article that won an award from the American Association for the Advancement of Psychoanalysis read in part:

It is the task of the analyst to perceive and comprehend the patient's specific mode of being-in-this-world, and, by helping him realize the implications, to enable him to make his own existential choices and decisions.

[...] It appears to be of great importance that the patient be given the opportunity to experience this ontic freedom so that he may assume the responsibility of deciding to accept his existential task out of his own free will.¹⁰⁰

These are not the concepts of the mechanistic, ahuman Psychoanalysis as Frankl knew it over a quarter of a century ago. To be sure, every psychoanalyst does not adhere to these new concepts, but certainly enough do for Frankl to move on now--to demonstrate more exactly what he means in

⁹⁹ Viktor E. Frankl, "Basic Concepts of Logotherapy", Op. Cit., p. 113.

¹⁰⁰ Thomas Horn, "Ontic Perspectives in Psychoanalysis", American Journal of Psychoanalysis, Vol. 17, No. 1, 1959, p. 135, 137. (The underlining is by the present writer.)

his own theory. It also seems noteworthy that Frankl all but ignores the important part the ego occupies as the rational copier in Freud's theory. Instead, Frankl merely stresses the irrational conflicts of the id and superego.

The second area of criticism comprises some comments on the philosophical substratum of Frankl's theory. In terms of epistemology Frankl seems to have constructed an ad hoc theory especially formulated to solve a particular problem. He states that the subject attains the object across the gap which separates them. However, the object which is reached by the subject is still the object and does not, through the cognitive process, become a part of the subject himself. It seems that Frankl's epistemology is more descriptive than explanatory; that is, Frankl does not explain how the subject attains the object.

A second philosophical point which is at least moot is Frankl's contention that conscience operates from an individual rather than a universal moral law and is dependent upon the unique individual in a particular situation. Though Frankl makes many attempts to escape subjectivism, it appears that in this concept he attains the apex of subjectivism. If an individual's purpose in life happens to be anything less than theocentric, it would appear that the means of attaining this purpose could be comfortably embedded in situational ethics. Thus, if an object or person intervened

between the individual and his attainment of his purpose in life, the object or person could "morally" be dealt with indiscriminately by the individual.

Moreover, it is difficult to see any radical or even slightly noticeable philosophical innovation in Frankl's theory of man. While his contribution of introducing a new image of man and concepts such as "value", "meaning", and "spirit" into psychology and psychiatry cannot be underestimated, it would appear that it is a "new" image only with respect to the positive sciences and not to philosophy. Frankl gives no credit or reference to men like Socrates, Aristotle, Augustine, Scotus, Suarez, Trendelenburg, or more current thinkers such as Stern, Dilthey, Schultz-Henke, Allers, von Gebattel, Daim, or Neidermeyer--sources that encompass Frankl's concept of man and much more.

Frankl's only mention of Aquinas is when he takes note of Aquinas' axiom: Agere sequitur esse. Frankl states that this is true, but that it is only a half-truth. He elaborates that man not only behaves according to what he is, he also becomes what he is according to how he behaves. Frankl adds, in light of Aquinas' statement, that it is time that the ability to make decisions be included in the definition of man. This statement seems to reflect a rather limited knowledge of Aquinas, in that Aquinas was quite explicit in his description of man as a being whose free

choice is an important factor in the actualization of his potentialities. There is no question, however, that in extending a more humanistic image of man to science, Frankl accomplished something that philosophers have enjoyed little success with over the centuries.

The last general area of criticism concerns Frankl's concepts of mental illness and treatment. Frankl states that, in Logotherapy, it is of central importance to discover the primary cause of a state of illness. While this is a laudable wish, one wonders how realistic it is. The surprising element is that Frankl does not offer this as an ideal but describes it as the prerequisite to any type of treatment. Psychodiagnosticians find it difficult enough to diagnose symptoms that stem from the body or psyche, such less from the spiritual dimension of man.

While one may agree with Frankl that a proper diagnosis must be based on a clear theoretical foundation, the question arises whether Frankl's theoretical foundations as presented in his diagnostic schema are not "too clear"--that is, so simple as to be presumptuous. Frankl states that when the etiology is somatic and the symptomatology is psychic, the result is psychosis. In viewing this equation of psychopathology, one might raise the question as to the scientific

correctness of such a position. Frankl's postulate that functional psychoses are somatogenic and his treatment of them as if they were, using psychotherapy as a secondary and indirect tool, seems to be premature. Perhaps the most formidable work in attempting to establish a somatic cause of mental illness is in the field of biochemistry, especially with the study of neurohormones.¹⁰¹ In light of this, Doctor Bernard B. Brodie, in an address to the American Association for the Advancement of Science, pointed out that despite ten years of study of the biochemical components of mental disease "the fact still remains that not a single biochemical defect in mental disease has been established."¹⁰²

In Frankl's concept of neurosis, he perceives anticipatory anxiety as the cause of neurosis. He states that neurotic illnesses are caused by the fear that a previous noxious psychological or physical experience will reoccur. The anxiety caused by anticipating the reoccurrence of this event is enough to trigger it. It would seem that this would be true only of post-traumatic neuroses in which an individual accurately perceived a real physical or

¹⁰¹ Theodore L. Sourkes, Biochemistry of Mental Disease, New York, Hoeber Medical Division, Harper and Row, 1962, p. 10.

¹⁰² Bernard B. Brodie, M.D., in a paper read at the meeting of the American Association for the Advancement of Science, Berkeley, California, December 30, 1965.

psychological threat and fears its reoccurrence. It would not appear to hold true for other types of neurosis in which the individual misperceived or distorted the initial somatic or psychological experience as threatening. In this case, the misperception or distortion would have its basis in an already present ego-weakness. In Frankl's concept of anticipatory anxiety as the cause of neurosis, he excludes the existence of developmental factors which inevitably leads to a vicious circle type of argument of anticipatory anxiety causing symptoms and symptoms, in turn, causing anticipatory anxiety. There is no doubt that anticipatory anxiety can precipitate a specific episode of anxiety and even sustain it, but there is little evidence, either experimentally or logically, that anticipatory anxiety causes neurosis.

Finally, it is difficult to understand how eight psychotherapy sessions (which is the average length of treatment at Frankl's clinic) are sufficient for a therapist to know his patient as a unique individual and for the patient to experience a meaningful existential encounter. One must agree with Frankl that the effectiveness of therapy is not directly proportional to the number of therapy hours; however, it seems that the ambitious task of the logotherapist requires more contact with the patient than a few hours could afford.

It seems worth pointing out that the negative criticisms, derived both from the literature and from the

writer's study, can only be hesitant and tentative for three reasons. First, the confusion of some of Frankl's concepts may lead to disagreement based on a lack of proper understanding. Second, it may be that, since only a few of Frankl's works have been translated into English, the English reader is not benefitting from the total perspective of Frankl's theory. Third, even though some works have been translated "authoritatively", it is possible the nuances of some of Frankl's concepts have been lost. In any case, the negative elements are far outweighed by the important contribution of Frankl's theory of Logotherapy to the field of psychology.

6. Summary and Basic Hypothesis

Viktor E. Frankl has presented in his Logotherapy various concepts concerned with a view of man which emphasizes his spiritual dimension and, in particular, his conscious search for meaning. In contradistinction to previous traditional theories which stress equilibrium or self-actualization as basic to man's mental health, Frankl has theorized that a certain degree of tension based on the gap between what man is and what he thinks he should be is necessary for mental health. Attempts to scrutinize the concept of "will to meaning" have led to some basic experimental research in Logotherapy. The place of this study in the

literature can be viewed as a pioneer effort following only one other previous study on Frankl's theory. The present study attempts to contribute to this theory by accumulating some evidence that may lend support to Frankl's theoretical concept. More specifically, it will investigate the relationship between "will to meaning" (purpose in life) and the gap between how a person consciously perceives himself (the actual self) and how he would like to be (the ideal self).

If the gap between the actual self and the ideal self is too large, the individual may feel completely inadequate or frustrated in attempting to diminish the gap and therefore discontinue his attempts to seek purpose in life (as occurs in states of depression). There is also the element that the greater the distance of the ideal self from the actual self, the less forceful the "pull" toward meaning. On the other hand, if there is little or no discrepancy between what a person is and what he thinks he should be, there will be little tension or "pull" generated, and the further search for meaning or purpose in life will seem unnecessary to the individual (as is often manifested in manic states). Either of these "extreme" discrepancies would seem to be related to low purpose in life, whereas individuals with a more "moderate" discrepancy should possess a higher degree of purpose in life. Thus the pull

hypothesis of the present study can be stated as follows:
There is no significant difference between individuals
obtaining high "purpose in life" scores and individuals
obtaining low "purpose in life" scores on a measure of the
discrepancy between the actual self and the ideal self. The
following experimental design was established to test this
hypothesis.

CHAPTER II

EXPERIMENTAL DESIGN

This chapter presents the procedures used to explore the hypothesis proposed in the preceding chapter. A description of the measuring instruments employed in the research will be followed by a section describing the sample. The third section of this chapter will present the procedure used in administering and scoring the research instruments. The final section describes the techniques of analysis applied to the data.

1. Measuring Instruments.

Three psychometric instruments were used in the study. The Purpose in Life Test (PIL)¹ and the Frankl Questionnaire (FQ)² were chosen as measures of purpose in life. Osgood's semantic differential technique³ was selected as the measure of the discrepancy between each subject's conscious or phenomenological perception of his actual self

1 James C. Crumbaugh and Leonard T. Maholick, "An Experimental Study in Existentialism: The Psychometric Approach to Frankl's Concept of Noogenic Neurosis", Columbus, Ga., The Bradley Center, Inc., (mimeograph), (no date), 1-33 p.

2 Ibid.

3 Charles E. Osgood et al., The Measurement of Meaning, Urbana, The University of Illinois Press, 1957, 1-342 p.

and of his ideal self. These self-report instruments were used rather than projective techniques because Frankl views "meaning in life" as a conscious experience.⁴

A. The Purpose in Life Test.- The PIL was devised by Crumbaugh and Maholick as a measure of Frankl's concept of "will to meaning". The items within this attitude scale were arrived at in an a priori manner from the Existential literature and particularly from Frankl's Logotherapy.

The structure of all items follows the pattern of a seven point scale as follows:

1. I am usually:

| | | | | | | |
|---------------------|---|---|-----------|---|---|----------------------------|
| 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 5 | 6 | 7 |
| completely bored | | | (neutral) | | | exuberant, enthusiastic |

The direction of magnitude was randomized for the twenty-five items in the original version of the PIL in order to minimize position preferences. An individual's score on the scale is the sum of the ratings he assigns to each of the items.

While theoretically a subject cannot accurately describe his real attitudes which must instead be elicited indirectly; in practice, he can and will give a reliable approximation of his consciously considered feelings. Using this basic principle the authors designed the PIL so that

⁴ Viktor E. Frankl, Man's Search for Meaning, New York, Washington Square Press, 1963, p. 154-155.

each item becomes a scale within a scale similar to the Likert technique. However, the quantitative extremes of each item are set by qualitative phrases which the authors state seemed to be a priori identified with quantitative extremes of attitudes.⁵

In the development of the PIL the first version along with the Frankl Questionnaire was administered by Frankl to a group of students. Twenty-two Austrian, Swiss, and German students and seventeen American students completed both the PIL and FQ. In this pilot study, the PIL correlated .69 with item number three on the FQ (the only part of the questionnaire quantified at that time).⁶

Crumbaugh and Maholick also administered the first version of the PIL to a small group of patients and non-patients. Preliminary evaluation led to the discarding of one-half of the original items. New items were substituted and reevaluated upon small samples; the results suggested that these were satisfactory,⁷ and they were used in Crumbaugh and Maholick's principle study which follows.

The administration of the revised version of the PIL was followed by an item analysis from a sample of 225.

5 Crumbaugh and Maholick, Op. Cit., p. 4-6.

6 Ibid., p. 7.

7 Ibid., p. 7.

Pearson r 's between the total score and the score on each item revealed a correlation range of $-.06$ to $.82$, seventeen items being above $.50$ and twenty items above $.40$. Of the five items that correlated less than $.40$, three were dropped, one was scored in the reverse direction of magnitude, and one was modified in order to strengthen it.⁸ The resulting twenty-two items were used in the statistics of Crumbaugh and Maholick's study; these items, which are presented in Appendix 1, are those used in the present study.

With the sample of 225 the reliability of the PIL revised total score determined by the odd-even method using the Pearson r was $.61$, Spearman-Brown corrected to $.70$.⁹

The norms for the PIL were arrived at by using means rounded to the nearest whole number and based on a sample of 47 female non-patients, 56 male non-patients, 59 female patients, and 61 male patients. The resulting norms were: non-patients, 119; patients, 99; females, 111 (non-patients 121, patients 102), males 107 (non-patients 121, patients 102).¹⁰ The variability of the groups expressed by standard deviations was: non-patient, 12.5; patient 19.04.¹¹

8 Ibid., p. c.

9 Ibid., p. 8.

10 Ibid., p. 8.

11 Ibid., p. 22.

The authors also studied the predictive power of the PIL scores in distinguishing which subjects would be patients and which non-patients. The results showed that for females classification was 67.2 per cent correct (36.4 per cent were patients, and 30.8 per cent were non-patients) while for males 75.4 per cent correct classification was found (35.6 per cent were patients; 39.8 per cent were non-patients).¹²

The authors state that neither sex nor age differences contributed significantly to the results, although extremes of age were not represented. Despite the fact that educational level was not controlled for in all sub-groups of the study, the authors feel that data examination shows it unlikely that group differences are due to education, socio-economic class, or intelligence.¹³

In discussing the possible relationship between PIL scores and social desirability, Crumbaugh and Maholick state that tests such as theirs show relatively little conscious distortion in noncompetitive situations. Unconscious distortion, if found, should be present more often in patients than in non-patients. This would account for the greater patient variability and suggests that the differences in patient and non-patient mean scores could have been affected by spuriously high scores among the patients. The authors

¹² Ibid., p. 7.

¹³ Ibid., p. 8-9, 13-14.

point out that such an effect would be on the side of "safety", however, in that the obtained difference would be reduced by such an effect. Despite this fact, significant differences were still found between the two groups.¹⁴

The authors also state that the two-fold fact that the PIL distinguished significantly between patient and non-patient groups and showed a consistent progression of scoring from the "high" purpose to the "low" purpose group is consistent with predictions from the orientation of construct validity. The high relationship ($r = .68$) between the PIL and the six quantified items on the Frankl Questionnaire also indicates that the PIL measures essentially the same functions which Frankl describes as purpose or meaning in life.¹⁵

B. The Frankl Questionnaire.- To demonstrate the presence of the phenomenon of purpose in life, Frankl utilized a rather informal series of questions which he evaluated qualitatively. Crumbaugh and Maholick quantified some of these questions by assigning a value of one to those item choices which seemed to represent the least degree of meaning or purpose in life, a value of two to intermediate responses, and of three to responses which appeared to

¹⁴ Ibid., p. 15.

¹⁵ Ibid., p. 10, 11.

involve the greatest degree of purpose in life.¹⁶ For example, item three reads:

Can unalterable or unavoidable suffering have a meaning?
 ¹ ² ³
 never seldom frequently

The total score is obtained from the sum of the six questions which are presented in Appendix 2. Total norms for the F₁ on Crumbaugh and Maholick's sample are 15.7 for non-patients and 13.7 for patients. The predictive power of the total score to differentiate between patients and non-patients was 66.9 per cent correct classification (of which 26.5 per cent were patients and 40.4 per cent were non-patients). When administered to 71 non-patients and 65 patients, the F₂ total score mean difference was significant at the .01 level of confidence.¹⁷

C. The Semantic Differential Technique.- Osgood, Suci, and Tannenbaum¹⁸ developed a technique, the semantic differential rating instrument, to secure a measure of the meaning of concepts. The hypothesis underlying the technique is that the meaning of an object for an individual includes not only the more obvious denotative meaning which he can readily state, but also more subtle connotative meanings

¹⁶ Ibid., p. 6.

¹⁷ Ibid., p. 7, 25.

¹⁸ Osgood et al., Op. Cit.

which he can less easily describe. The basic assumption of the technique is that some of the important connotative components of the meaning of a concept can be measured by a combination of controlled association scaling procedures. The subject is provided with a concept to be differentiated and a set of seven-point scales terminating in bipolar adjectives. He must then indicate for each item (which is the pairing of a concept with a scale), both the direction and intensity of his association on the scale. The "meaning" of the concept for the subject is the pattern or profile of his ratings on the different adjective scales.

The logic used in the development of the semantic differential technique begins with the postulation of a semantic space, a region of some unknown dimensionality and Euclidian in character. Each semantic scale is assumed to represent a straight line function that passes through the origin of this space so that a group of such scales represents a multidimensional space. In order to efficiently define this semantic space, Osgood et al. used Factor Analysis to determine the minimum number of independent orthogonal dimensions or axes which could be identified and measured reliably and which would exhaust the dimensionality of the space.¹⁹

¹⁹ Ibid., p. 25.

The meaning of a sign or concept is thus operationally defined by the authors as that point in the semantic space specified by a series of differentiating judgments. This space has two essential properties: (1) direction from the origin, which can be identified with the quality of meaning in learning theory, depends on the alternative polar terms selected; and (2) distance from the origin, which can be identified with the intensity of meaning in learning theory, depends on the extremeness of the scale positions checked. The authors assume that the coordinates in the measurement space are functionally equivalent with the components of the representational mediation process associated with the concept.²⁰

Through various factor analytic studies of many different concepts on such bipolar adjective scales, Osgood and Suci, in 1955, established three general factors or dimensions in the semantic space. The first is an evaluative factor which is most prominently identified by adjective scales such as good-bad, beautiful-ugly. The second is the potency factor. It is most prominently identified by such scales as strong-weak, large-small. The third is the activity factor, which is most prominent in the following scales: active-passive, hot-cold. Although these three

²⁰ Ibid., p. 30.

factors do not exhaust the semantic space, subsidiary factors are much less clearly defined, have not been checked for reliability, and account for relatively little of the total variance.²¹

The semantic differential is described by the authors as a highly generalized technique of measurement which must be adapted to the requirements of each research problem to which it is applied. The concepts and scales used in a particular study depend upon the purpose of the research. However, the authors indicate some general procedures in the selection of concepts and scales.²²

With regard to the selection of concepts, the investigator should try to select concepts (a) which should give considerable individual differences in order to increase the amount of information to be gained from a limited number of concepts; (b) which have a single unitary meaning for the individual; (c) which can be expected to be familiar to the subjects.

In selecting scales, a small sample of closely related scales is chosen to represent each factor. Four criteria are mentioned by the authors as aids in the selection of scales. With regard to factorial composition, scales

21 Ibid., p. 74.

22 Ibid., p. 76-81.

are selected to represent each factor, these being maximally loaded on that factor and minimally on others. Scales should also be relevant to the concepts being judged in order to avoid too many neutral ratings; however, scales which are only relevant by metaphor may be used in order to get more valid data. A third criterion in selecting scales is their semantic stability for the concepts and subjects in a particular study. The scales should also be linear between polar opposites and pass through the origin; that is, for example, both adjectives should not be favorable in meaning. In conclusion the authors point out again that although there are standard factors of judgment, the particular scales which are best for any given study are variable and must be selected by the experimenter to suit his purposes.

A seven-point scale is recommended by the authors on the basis of experiments which show that with this number all scale values tend to be used with roughly equal frequency. The raw data obtained are a collection of check marks against the bipolar scales. A digit (1 to 7 or -3 to +3) is arbitrarily assigned to each position. A person's score on an item is the digit corresponding to the scale position he checks. Factor scores are derived from the average on each factor and are assumed by the authors to be more representative and reliable than scores on individual scales. The meaning of a concept is thus operationally

defined as the set of factor scores for that concept or as that point in the semantic space identified by its coordinates on several factors. In order to compare two profiles of scores and make quantitative statements regarding their similarity of meaning, the authors suggest the distance notion. This generalized distance formula, which takes into account both the profile covariation and the discrepancies between the means of the profiles on each factor is stated by the equation:

$$D_{il} = \sqrt{\sum_j d_{ij}^2}$$

where D_{il} is the linear distance between the points in the semantic space representing concepts "i" and "l" and " d_{ij} " is the algebraic difference between the coordinates of "i" and "l" on the same dimension or factor, "j". Summation is over the "k" dimensions. The "D" is found by taking the difference between the scores of the two concepts on each factor, squaring this difference, summing these squares, and taking the square root of the sum.²³

In terms of the reliability of the semantic differential the authors deal with three types of reliability: item reliability, factor-score reliability, and concept-meaning reliability. In terms of item reliability, they

²³ Ibid., p. 45-71.

carried out a study using forty different scales and twenty concepts, each rated twice by one hundred subjects. Test and retest were correlated across one hundred subjects and the forty items, producing an N of 4000. The resulting coefficient was .65.²⁴ This writer, in reviewing over twenty studies using a test and retest of the semantic differential, found that the reliability coefficients ranged from .72 to .97.

The average errors of measurement of the semantic differential scales have always been less than a single scale unit (approximately three-quarters of a scale unit) and for the evaluative scales averaged about a half of a scale unit. In terms of probability limits, a change of greater than two units on the average scale by the average subject would be expected to occur less than 5 per cent of the time by chance or random errors of measurement.²⁵

Regarding factor-score reliability, that is, the reliability of the reproducibility of the three factors (evaluative, activity, and potency), eight groups of twenty-five subjects each were tested. The results showed that a change in factor score of more than 1.00 for the evaluative factor, more than 1.50 for the potency factor, and more than 1.33 for the activity factor is significant at the .05 level

²⁴ Ibid., p. 127.

²⁵ Ibid., p. 131-132.

of confidence. They also found that cultural meanings of concepts prove to be very stable--for each factor, a shift of only about four-tenths of a scale unit is significant at the .05 level. The degree of stability holds despite the small sizes of the groups (about twenty-five in each).²⁶

In discussing the validity of the semantic differential technique, the authors state that ideally the scores should be correlated with some independent criterion of meaning--but no commonly accepted quantitative criterion of meaning exists. Hence, the authors fall back on "face validity" but state that, throughout their work with the semantic differential, they have found no reason to question the validity of the instrument on the basis of its correspondence with the results to be expected from common sense.²⁷

In terms of the validity of some of the scaling assumptions underlying the semantic differential, Messick states:

Considering this and the other indications of the present study, i.e., an approximate equality of corresponding interval lengths from scale to scale and a similar placement of origins across scales, it seems reasonable to conclude that the scaling properties implied by the semantic differential procedures have some basis other than mere assumption.²⁸

²⁶ Ibid., p. 138-140.

²⁷ Ibid., p. 141.

²⁸ Samuel J. Messick, "Metric Properties of the Semantic Differential", Educational and Psychological Measurement, Vol. 17, No. 2, Summer 1957, p. 206.

In several studies employing the semantic differential, no differences were found to be related to intelligence, sex, or age.^{29,30,31}

The present writer, following the criteria discussed by Osgood et al., established a set of bipolar scales by which the subjects in the sample could judge two separate concepts. The concepts chosen were: I, MYSELF and MY IDEAL SELF (WHAT I OUGHT TO BE). These concepts were each placed on a separate sheet of paper, with all of the judgments elicited successively. The scales representing the same factor were alternated in polarity direction (e.g., fair-unfair but worthless-valuable) to prevent the formation of position preferences, and the order of factors represented was rotated. The form of the semantic differential sheet was altered by this writer from that described by Osgood et al. in one respect: qualifying adverbs were placed beneath each of the seven points on the scale. This was

29 Charles Neuringer, "Effect of Intelligence Level and Neuropsychiatric Status on the Diversity of Intensity of Semantic Differential Ratings", Journal of Consulting Psychology, Vol. 27, No. 3, June 1963, p. 290.

30 L. Scott Moss and Thomas J. Waters, "Intensive Longitudinal Investigations of Anxiety in Hospitalized Juvenile Patients", Psychological Reports, Vol. 7, No. 2, October 1960, p. 379-380.

31 C. Gilbert Wrenn, "The Self-Concept in Counseling", Journal of Counseling Psychology, Vol. 5, No. 2, Summer 1958, p. 104-108.

done because it was found in the literature that this process makes the task less abstract and more reliable.³² The scales selected for the present study are presented in Appendix 3 as they appeared on the test form.

2. The Sample.

The three measuring instruments were administered to 231 subjects of which 210 completed all tests. The subjects tested were volunteers chosen primarily from six classifications based on the previous study on purpose in life,³³ as representative of the continuum of existential life situations. This was done in the present study in an attempt to obtain a greater variability on the test scores, especially with regard to the \bar{F}_1 and \bar{F}_2 .

The general classifications from which subjects were drawn are: seminarians, graduate students, undergraduate students, transients, psychiatric in-patients, and maximum security prison inmates.

The forty-one seminarians in the sample represented three religious orders, ranged in age from 18-31 with a mean age of 22.7, and were advanced in their training to the extent that they were studying philosophy or theology.

³² William D. Wells and Georgianna Smith, 'Four Semantic Rating Scales Compared', Journal of Applied Psychology, Vol. 44, No. 6, 1960, p. 393-397.

³³ Crumbaugh and Maholick, Op. Cit.

The graduate students in the sample numbered forty-seven (33 males and 14 females). They ranged in age from 21-47 years with a mean age of 26.4. All were full-time students in the second or third year of graduate study in psychology or education.

Undergraduates were chosen from the Faculty of Arts of a college where they were full-time students enrolled in an Introductory or Social Psychology course. Twenty-eight male and thirty-two female students were tested. They ranged in age from 16-52 with a mean age of 21.7 and represented all undergraduate years of study.

Transient volunteers were temporary inhabitants of a men's mission and ranged in age from 27-37 with a mean age of 32.5. Their educational level ranged from sixth to twelfth grade, the average being a tenth grade education. Of the fifteen transients to whom the test battery was administered, five did not complete all tests. Thus only the remaining ten records were used in the data analysis.

Psychiatric patients were chosen from the in-patient psychiatric service of a large general hospital. They represented mixed diagnoses and ranged in age from 24-56, the mean age being 34.2, and in education level from tenth grade to college graduate, the mean being grade twelve. Of the seven males and ten females tested, four males and seven females completed the three tests.

The fifty-one prison volunteers were incarcerated in a maximum security penitentiary and were all males. Their ages ranged from 16-52 (mean: 30.5) and their education from third grade to twelfth grade (mean: eighth grade). Forty-one of the fifty-one prisoners completed the entire test battery.

The total sample used in the statistical analysis contained 210 subjects of which 162 were males and 48 were females. Their ages ranged from 10-56 with a mean age of 26.2, and the education level ranged from third grade to third year graduate students with a mean of grade thirteen.

3. Administration and Scoring.

The three tests were administered to small groups, generally of about fifteen subjects each, who were seated with an appropriate distance between them to avoid the possibility of one subject influencing another.

Before the subjects entered the testing room, all test material had been placed face down on their desks. The test material included mimeographed copies of the directions for the semantic differential, the semantic differential sheets for the concepts I, Myself and My Ideal Self, and test booklets and answer sheets for the PIL and EQ.

The investigator introduced the task with a short talk stressing the importance of truthful reporting and

attempted to ensure this by informing the subjects that all information would be identified by number only and that the subjects were not to place their names on the tests.

The first part of the test administration consisted of the investigator reading a copy of the standard semantic differential directions³⁴ while the subjects followed the reading from their own copies.

The subjects were then asked to rate the I, myself concept. When this was completed by all subjects, it was collected, and the subjects were then asked to turn over and complete the rating scales for the concept My Ideal Self. This was done to ensure that the subjects would not check back to their actual-self ratings.

The directions for the PII were read in the same manner as had been done for the semantic differential scales. The directions read and provided each subject stated:

For each of the following statements, indicate beside the appropriate question number on your answer sheet, the number that would be most nearly true for you. Note that the numbers always extend from one extreme feeling to its opposite kind of feeling. "Neutral" implies no judgment either way. Try to use the rating as little as possible.

The same administration procedure was followed for the II as has been described for the PII.

³⁴ These directions are presented in Appendix 4.

The scoring of the semantic differential scales for each concept followed the procedure described by Osgood et al. For each of the 210 subjects, factor scores were first obtained. Stencils were designed to facilitate scoring of each of the three factors from among all the scales since the factors had been alternated among the various scales on the form. The mean for each factor was computed statistically, yielding three factor scores for each subject on each concept, that is, for I, myself and My Ideal Self. Following the formula described by Osgood et al., a D score was computed for each subject, using the factor scores based on the means for each factor.

The scores for the PIL and PI were computed by totaling each subject's score on the various items in each test. A combined PIL-PI score was also computed to be used in the attempt to establish whether these two tests together could give a more effective measure of purpose in life.

The three sums from the PIL and PI and the P scores from the semantic differential scales were used in the techniques of analysis which are described in the following section.

4. Techniques of Analysis.

This section presents a description of the various statistical techniques applied in the study.

In order to test the reliability of the measuring instruments, test-retest correlations were determined for the PIL score, the FQ score, the combined PIL and FQ score, and the semantic differential D score. Test-retest correlations were computed using the Pearson Product-Moment coefficient. Osgood³⁵ states, however, that with the semantic differential technique, a correlation coefficient does not take into account the absolute difference between the means of the two tests; that is, perfect reliability can occur when an absolute difference of several units exists between test and retest measurements. He then presents a method for establishing factor score reliability which is also used in the present study. First, the absolute deviation from test to retest was determined for each subject on each factor score. Then the number of instances of each size deviation was counted. The percentage of test-retest subjects giving each deviation was then determined as well as the associated probability limits of each size deviation. Factor scores were used rather than D scores in determining this measure of the stability of concept meanings because Osgood states that concept meanings and distances between them will be just as reliably determined as the factor scores on which they are based.³⁶

³⁵ Osgood et al., Op. Cit., p. 127.

³⁶ Ibid., p. 140.

The main statistic used in this study was the Chi Square Method. Since a four cell, 2 x 2 table was employed, the formula used is as follows:

$$\chi^2 = \frac{N(ad - bc)^2}{(a + b)(a + c)(b + d)(c + d)}$$

Contingency coefficients were determined for each χ^2 using the following formula:

$$C = \sqrt{\frac{\chi^2}{N + \chi^2}}$$

The results of these statistical procedures are discussed in the following chapter.

CHAPTER III

PRESENTATION AND DISCUSSION OF RESULTS

This chapter presents the results of the experiment described in the previous chapter. The first section deals with the reliability of the instruments and the second with the predictive power of the measures of purpose in life. The results pertaining to the experimental hypotheses are presented in the third section. In the final section the results of the study are discussed.

1. The Reliability of the Instruments.

The reliability of the two purpose in life tests and the semantic differential technique was established on twenty-nine subjects. The duration of time between tests was an arbitrary period of three weeks.

For the purpose in life tests, Pearson Product-Moment coefficients of correlation were computed from the original test and retest scores. The Frankl Questionnaire (FL) yielded a reliability coefficient of .63 and the Purpose in Life Test (PIL) a coefficient of .79. In an effort to establish whether these two measuring instruments combined could afford a more effective measure of purpose in life, they were first correlated employing the entire sample of 210 subjects. The Pearson r coefficient for this

relationship was .66. The test-retest coefficient for this combined PIL-EQ score was .80.

The reliability of the semantic differential was established by two methods. The Pearson r computed for the test-retest "D" scores was .82. Factor score reliability was established by the method suggested by Osgood et al., and described in the previous chapter. The results obtained in the present study are similar to those obtained by Osgood et al. and indicate that the factor score reliability of the semantic differential scales in the present study is very substantial. No deviations of more than 1.00 for the evaluative factor, 1.5 for the potency factor, or 1.33 for the activity factor, which are the deviations considered statistically significant at the .05 level of confidence by Osgood et al., were found. The results of the factor score reliability study also show that some slightly larger deviations in factor scores from test to retest measurements were present for the concept "MY IDEAL SELF" than for the concept "I, MYSELF". Complete results are presented in Table I.

In order to further describe the purpose in life instruments and the sample, the mean, standard deviation, and standard error of the mean were computed for the total sample on the PIL, EQ, and the combined PIL-EQ scores. These statistics were also computed for the different

Table I.-

Factor Score Reliability of Semantic Differential Scales for the Concepts
I. MYSELF and MY IDEAL SELF in Terms of Probability of Obtaining
 Given Deviations from Test to Retest on Factor Scored Items
 for Individual Subjects.

| Absolute Deviation | Evaluative Factor | | | Potency Factor | | | Activity Factor | | |
|-----------------------|-------------------|----------------|----------------|----------------|----------------|----------------|-----------------|----------------|----------------|
| | a ^a | b ^b | p ^c | a ^a | b ^b | p ^c | a ^a | b ^b | p ^c |
| <u>I. MYSELF</u> | | | | | | | | | |
| 0.00 | 10.4 | 1.000 | 1.000 | 24.1 | 1.000 | 1.000 | 10.4 | 1.000 | 1.000 |
| .25 | 65.5 | .896 | .645 | 51.7 | .725 | .651 | 51.7 | .896 | .635 |
| .33 | 00.0 | .241 | .333 | 10.4 | .242 | .651 | 3.4 | .379 | .535 |
| .50 | 13.7 | .241 | .324 | 10.4 | .130 | .347 | 17.2 | .345 | .338 |
| .67 | 10.4 | .104 | .148 | 00.0 | .034 | .321 | 10.4 | .173 | .258 |
| .75 | | | .146 | 00.0 | .034 | .174 | 00.0 | .069 | .155 |
| 1.00 | | | .062 | 3.4 | .134 | .171 | 6.9 | .069 | .127 |
| 1.25 | | | .029 | | | .001 | | | .059 |
| 1.33 | | | .013 | | | .031 | | | .054 |
| 1.50 | | | .012 | | | .051 | | | .033 |
| <u>Y IDEAL SELF</u> | | | | | | | | | |
| 0.00 | 10.4 | 1.000 | 1.000 | 27.5 | 1.000 | 1.000 | 27.5 | 1.000 | 1.000 |
| .25 | 55.3 | .896 | .645 | 34.5 | .725 | .651 | 31.0 | .725 | .635 |
| .33 | 13.7 | .343 | .333 | 10.4 | .300 | .651 | 3.5 | .415 | .535 |
| .50 | 3.4 | .206 | .324 | 17.2 | .276 | .347 | 13.0 | .300 | .330 |
| .67 | 0.9 | .172 | .148 | 00.0 | .104 | .321 | 13.0 | .242 | .258 |
| .75 | 3.4 | .103 | .146 | 3.5 | .104 | .174 | 00.0 | .104 | .155 |
| 1.00 | 6.9 | .069 | .062 | 0.9 | .069 | .174 | 3.5 | .104 | .127 |
| 1.25 | | | .029 | | | .001 | 0.9 | .069 | .059 |
| 1.33 | | | .013 | | | .031 | | | .054 |
| 1.50 | | | .012 | | | .051 | | | .033 |

a Percent of test-retest sample obtaining given deviation.

b Empirical probability limits from present study's statistics.

c Empirical probability limits found in Osgood's study.

Osgood et al., Op. cit., p. 130-137.

sub-groups of the sample: seminarians, graduate students, undergraduate students, prison inmates, psychiatric patients, and transients. With the measure of purpose in life, a progression of means was noted, the transients, inmates and psychiatric patients showing the lowest mean scores. The undergraduate sub-group mean was nearest to the mean for the total sample. The graduate student mean was the next highest, and the seminarian mean was the highest found in any of the sub-groups. These statistics, which are presented in Table II, led to a further analysis of the predictive power of the PIL and FQ. The results of this analysis are presented in the following section.

2. Predictive Power of the PIL and FQ.

As the preliminary step in establishing the predictive power of the instruments, it was necessary to obtain cut-off points. For the PIL, the FQ, and the combined PIL-FQ scores, the median was considered as the cut-off point that separated the high purpose in life subjects from those possessing low purpose in life. These cut-off scores were also used in establishing cell frequencies for the statistical analysis of the basic hypothesis. Although the semantic differential "D" scores were not involved in the study of the predictive power of the instruments, cut-off scores were established at this time to be used in the main statistical analysis. Since the purpose of the "D" scores was to distinguish subjects according to the discrepancy between their actual self and their ideal self, the following division was made. "Extreme" subjects, that

Table II.-

Means, Standard Deviations, and Standard Error of the Means
for the Total Sample and Sub-Groups of the Sample on the
Instruments Used to Measure Purpose in Life.

| Measuring Instrument | Statistic | | | |
|--|-----------|-------|-------|----------|
| | Group | N | Mean | σ |
| <u>Purpose in Life Test</u> | | | | |
| Transients | 10 | 60.3 | 12.43 | 4.14 |
| Prison Inmates | 41 | 93.1 | 22.59 | 3.57 |
| Psychiatric Patients | 11 | 102.0 | 17.55 | 5.60 |
| Undergraduate Students | 60 | 112.1 | 16.52 | 2.15 |
| Graduate Students | 47 | 110.1 | 12.11 | 1.70 |
| Seminarians | 41 | 119.2 | 16.44 | 1.65 |
| Total Sample | 210 | 110.0 | 19.20 | 1.30 |
| <u>Frankl Questionnaire</u> | | | | |
| Transients | 10 | 14.0 | 2.03 | .66 |
| Prison Inmates | 41 | 14.3 | 2.17 | .34 |
| Psychiatric Patients | 11 | 14.0 | 2.10 | .66 |
| Undergraduate Students | 60 | 15.6 | 1.69 | .22 |
| Graduate Students | 47 | 16.1 | 1.36 | .20 |
| Seminarians | 41 | 16.6 | 1.60 | .16 |
| Total Sample | 210 | 15.5 | 1.90 | .10 |
| <u>Combined Score on Purpose in Life Test and Frankl Questionnaire</u> | | | | |
| Transients | 10 | 102.3 | 13.74 | 4.50 |
| Prison Inmates | 41 | 100.2 | 23.43 | 3.71 |
| Psychiatric Patients | 11 | 116.0 | 18.54 | 6.07 |
| Undergraduate Students | 60 | 127.6 | 17.16 | 2.29 |
| Graduate Students | 47 | 134.3 | 12.53 | 1.05 |
| Seminarians | 41 | 137.7 | 12.10 | 1.93 |
| Total Sample | 210 | 125.6 | 20.50 | 1.40 |

is, subjects with an extreme discrepancy between the actual self and the ideal self, were those who fell into the top one-sixth or bottom one-sixth of the distribution of 'D' scores, while the "moderate" subjects were those who fell within the middle two-thirds of the distribution.

In the second step for establishing the predictive power of the purpose in life instruments, the sample was divided into a 'high purpose' group and a 'low purpose' group according to existential life situations. Thus, graduate students and seminarians were considered the 'high purpose' subjects while the inmates, psychiatric patients, and transients constituted the 'low purpose' group. Undergraduate students were excluded because their purpose in life scores showed them to be in the more moderate range of the purpose in life continuum, and their omission resulted in numerically more balanced groups of subjects.

The ability of the purpose in life tests to classify subjects into "high purpose" or 'low purpose' groups was then established. These percentages ranged from 60 per cent to 100 per cent correct classification. For the "low purpose" group, classification was correct in 81 per cent of the cases using the PIL score, 69 per cent with the E score, and 61 per cent with the combined PIL-E score. For the 'high purpose' group, the per cent of correct classification was as follows: with the PIL, 70 per cent; with the

FL, 81 per cent; with the combined PIL-FQ score, 72 per cent. The predictive power of each of the instruments for each sub-group is presented in Table III.

Means and "t" tests of the significance of the difference between means were also computed for these "high purpose" and "low purpose" groups on the purpose in life instruments. On the PIL, the difference between the "high purpose" mean (118.6) and the "low purpose" mean (93.9) was found to be significant at the .001 level of confidence. For the FL, the "high purpose" group mean was 16.3 and the "low purpose" group mean was 14.2; the difference between these means was not significant at the .05 level of confidence. The combined PIL-FQ means were 135.9 for the "high purpose" group and 108.6 for the "low purpose" group. A "t" test found this difference to be significant at the .001 level of confidence.

The pertinent information regarding the effectiveness of the measuring instruments having been presented, the results pertaining to the experimental hypothesis will be presented in the following section.

3. Results Concerning the Basic Hypothesis.

In testing to establish if there is a significant difference between those subjects with high purpose in life and those with low purpose in life on a measure of

Table III.-

Predictive Power of the Purpose in Life Instruments as Expressed by the Per Cent of Correct Classification of Subjects into "High Purpose" or "Low Purpose" in Life Group.

| Group | N | Per Cent of Correct Classification | | |
|-----------------------------|----|------------------------------------|----|--------|
| | | PIL | PQ | PIL-PQ |
| Transients | 10 | 100 | 70 | 100 |
| Prison Inmates | 41 | 78 | 66 | 73 |
| Psychiatric Patients | 11 | 73 | 82 | 73 |
| Graduate Students | 47 | 60 | 74 | 62 |
| Seminarians | 41 | 83 | 36 | 83 |
| "Low Purpose" ^a | 62 | 51 | 69 | 51 |
| "High Purpose" ^b | 86 | 70 | 61 | 72 |

a "Low Purpose" classification: Transients, Prison Inmates, and Psychiatric Patients.

b "High Purpose" classification: Graduate Students and Seminarians.

the discrepancy between the actual self and the ideal self, the Chi Square method was used. The cut-off scores previously mentioned were the basis for describing subjects as having high or low purpose in life and as possessing a moderate or extreme discrepancy between their actual self and their ideal self.

Three Chi Squares were computed, using each of the three purpose in life scores (PIL, EQ, and combined PIL-EQ) as the criterion of purpose in life and the semantic differential "D" score as the criterion of the actual-ideal self discrepancy. None of the resulting Chi Squares indicated significant differences between the groups at the .05 level of confidence. Thus, the null hypothesis cannot be rejected in this study.

Contingency coefficients with appropriate corrections were also computed using each of the three obtained Chi Squares. The results were as follows: for the PIL and "D" score, $C = .091$; for the EQ and "D" score, $C = .019$; and for the combined PIL-EQ and "D" score, $C = .099$.

The results of the statistical analysis presented in the previous sections will be discussed in the following section.

4. Discussion of Results.

The reliability of the purpose in life tests appears to be sufficiently high to indicate that they are reliable instruments, especially when the abstract nature of the phenomenon which they are measuring is considered. This would indicate that "will to meaning" or purpose in life can be measured in a consistent manner. The fact that there was a high test-retest reliability might indicate that purpose in life is not as susceptible to instantaneous changes as Frankl has postulated. Both the similarity of the test-retest data on the PIL and FQ and the obtained correlation between them lend support to the position that the two instruments measure approximately the same phenomenon.

With regard to the semantic differential scales used in this study, the test-retest correlation coefficient was high enough to suggest that these particular scales are consistent measures of the actual self-ideal self discrepancy. This high correlation was borne out by the factor score reliability.

The validity of the purpose in life criteria seems to be supported by the progression of mean scores which was found for the various sub-groups of the sample and by the ability of these instruments to classify subjects into 'high purpose' or 'low purpose' groups.

The results indicate that the predictive power of the PIL is, in general, more effective than that of the FQ. The PIL appears to be more effective in predicting "low purpose" classification, whereas the FQ seems to be more efficient in classifying subjects into the "high purpose" group. One basic explanation of this finding could be found in the content of the test items. Three of the six questions on the FQ deal directly with suicide and could be regarded as threatening to individuals whose purpose in life is low. If this threat caused denial by the subjects, their test scores would automatically be spuriously high. On the other hand, the "high purpose" subjects would be very likely to get high scores on the FQ because, if they never had suicidal thought, their answers to the questions on suicidal intention or attempt would be in the same direction.

The wider range of possible scores and the greater subtlety of the items on the PIL may account for its more accurate classification of "low purpose" individuals. The "high purpose" subjects would seem more likely to check items on this instrument in a direction which might place them in a "low purpose" category. The advantage of the PIL is seen in its discriminating power as compared to that of the FQ. The PIL and the combined PIL-FQ mean scores discriminate very significantly (at the .001 level) between

the "high purpose" and "low purpose" classifications, whereas the FM does not reach the level of significance.

The semantic differential, despite its good reliability, is difficult to evaluate in terms of its validity, as Osgood has pointed out. One element that would cast some doubt upon the effectiveness of the technique in the present study is that subjects with the lowest intellectual levels (as determined by level of education) seemed to find the abstract nature of this instrument difficult to grasp. Despite evidence to the contrary in the literature, the subjects in this study whose educational level was quite low, e.g., those with a third or fourth grade education, found the task a difficult one. This was brought to the experimenter's attention in two ways. First, all of the test protocols which had to be discarded, either because of incompleteness or obvious misunderstanding of the semantic differential technique, were primarily from subjects of the lowest educational levels. This would lead one to question how many subjects misunderstood the nature of the technique in a less obvious and therefore undetected manner. A second indication of the difficulty of the semantic differential technique was that at least ninety per cent of the questions asked of the investigator during the administration of the test battery concerned this instrument.

There is also some indication in the literature that the three dimensions of Osgood's technique do not exhaust the possible semantic space. Hence, it is possible that one or more dimensions of meaning, particularly appropriate to the concepts in this study, may have been excluded.

In terms of the sample employed in the study, the prison inmates and psychiatric patients showed the greatest variability on the purpose in life tests. This finding may suggest that incarceration evokes extreme reactions in terms of purpose in life. For example, it may diminish or constrict an individual's search for meaning, whereas for others the same situation may present an opportunity for the unfolding or regeneration of purpose in life. The undergraduate students' variability of scores on the purpose in life tests was also relatively large. This fact might reflect the large variation among adolescents and post-adolescents in almost all areas of personality development. The graduate students and seminarians showed the least variability, a finding which might be expected in light of their relatively strong commitment to a life purpose. The low variability of the transient sub-group might also be expected in that possession of high purpose would, with rare exception, preclude their being in their current life situation.

The failure to obtain positive results in this study, as evidenced by the fact that the obtained Chi Squares did not approach the level of significance and that the contingency coefficients did not indicate a relationship between the two variables, may have its basis in several factors. With any self-report instruments such as those used in this study, the problem arises as to how the subject's intent and response habits, as well as other situational and methodological factors, may have influenced the responses obtained. On all the criteria, the subject's mode of reporting is somewhat circumscribed. As a consequence, one has no way of knowing to what extent the external limits imposed by the measuring instruments prevented the subject from giving an accurate report of his conscious cognition or feelings.

It would seem that in subjects with emotional disturbances, especially psychiatric patients, some prison inmates, and some transients, a degree of distortion of the sense of self may cause an imbalance between inaccurate reporting on the semantic differential and more or less accurate reporting on the purpose in life tests. For example, some personality theorists feel that psychopaths do not possess a "self"; therefore, on this assumption, evaluating the self would be theoretically a meaningless

task. These same subjects, on the other hand, might be capable of accurate reporting on the PIL and EQ.

There is the added possibility that some personality types, even within the normal range, when confronted with an evaluative task, tend to overestimate or underestimate it. This could cause confounding results in that the purpose in life tests seem to be largely evaluative and one of the three factors on the semantic differential is evaluative. Hence, if there is a subject error caused by incorrect estimation, it is not constant within the test battery.

Another possible source for the lack of positive results might be the cut-off scores chosen in the study. Although several cut-off methods were employed in addition to the one reported in this text, it could be possible that an untried combination would have rendered positive results. Thus, the operational definition of "high purpose" and "low purpose", "moderate discrepancy" and "extreme discrepancy" may require modification.

In light of the results which were obtained in the study, some theoretical implications arise concerning the relationship of Frankl's concept of "will to meaning" and the discrepancy between the actual self and the ideal self. The basic question which arises is whether the discrepancy between what one is and what one feels he ought to be is indeed related to "will to meaning" or purpose in life. In

other words, it would appear quite possible that an individual may have a large discrepancy between his actual self and his ideal self, which would create more than a "certain" or "appropriate" amount of tension, and still be able to maintain a relatively high purpose in life. If this is true, it would demonstrate that man in his spiritual dimension may possess more resiliency and more potential for meeting hardship than Frankl attributes to him. It was also demonstrated in this study that individuals with a minimal discrepancy, and therefore little tension, were also capable of possessing high purpose in life. This may well indicate, as Arnold and Casson have argued, that the challenge in life may stem from something other than the gap between what a man is and what he feels he ought to be.

It is also possible that the terms used by Frankl with regard to the actual self and the ideal self are too broad in scope and should be redefined in a more limited sense. It could possibly be that the discrepancy which may be related to purpose in life is that between what a person is and what he ought to be within the spiritual dimension alone. In this case, both phenomena being measured would be on the same ontological plane.

From another standpoint, it would seem possible for an individual to have a clear idea of his purpose in life and to participate intensely in achieving this purpose to

the extent that his ego-involvement overshadows his conscious sense of self. For this individual, the discrepancy between the actual self and the ideal self might not be of sufficient moment to be a "pulling" force.

An additional consideration from the results of this study is that a person may possess more than one purpose in life, and these purposes could be in conflict. This could result in moderate or severe psychological tension, and the individual would exhibit high purpose in life and a large discrepancy between the actual self and the ideal self. On the other hand, a person may have one clear purpose in life and be in conflict as to the manner of attaining it (i.e., by attitudinal, creative or experiential values). This might, in turn, cause the individual to have a confused picture of what he ought to be and result in an inaccurate description of his ideal self.

Finally, as Frankl himself states, there are times when the individual's concern with values could be a camouflage for inner conflicts. Therefore, a person may exhibit high purpose in life but, due to his inner conflict, show a marked discrepancy between his actual self and his ideal self. It appears from these results that further work is called for to establish more sensitive instruments and to further clarify the underlying theoretical basis of this study.

SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS

This paper reported on an aspect of Viktor E. Frankl's concept of "will to meaning", namely, its relationship to the discrepancy between what a person thinks he is (the actual self) and what he feels he ought to be (the ideal self). A review of the literature, which discussed the basic concepts of Frankl's theory of logotherapy and presented a critique of some of these concepts, was followed by a statement of the theoretical foundation of the present study. The problem was defined in terms of the hypothesis that there is no significant difference between those subjects with high purpose in life and those with low purpose in life on a measure of the discrepancy between the actual self and the ideal self. The method used to test this hypothesis, a description of the sample, and the statistical techniques were presented in the context of the experimental design.

The results of the study were then reported, including the reliability of the measuring instruments, the predictive power of the purpose in life instruments, and the results pertaining to the basic hypothesis. The null hypothesis was not rejected in the study, and the findings were then discussed.

All of the measuring instruments employed in the study appear to be sufficiently reliable. The validity of the purpose in life tests also seems to be supported by the

results of this study, as well as the predictive and discriminatory power of the Purpose in Life Test. However, the validity of the semantic differential technique, which was used to measure the actual self-ideal self discrepancy, is more difficult to discuss. One problem which may affect validity with this instrument is the difficulty which the abstract nature of the task seems to present to some subjects.

The lack of positive results with regard to the basic hypothesis indicates that the relationship postulated by Frankl is not experimentally demonstrable within the framework of the present study. Various factors, inherent in self-report instruments, may have contributed to this lack of positive results. The effect of some personality disturbances on the sense of self and the difficulty other personality types may experience with evaluative tasks could have confounded the results in this experiment.

The more basic considerations arise concerning the theoretical foundation of the study, that is, the relationship of "will to meaning" to the discrepancy between what a person is and what he feels he ought to be. Various possibilities arise; among these are the consideration that the challenge of life may stem from something other than the self or that the concepts of actual-self and ideal-self as defined by Frankl are too vague and should be redefined in a more limited sense, perhaps in light of man's spiritual

dimension alone. It appears that a reevaluation of the theoretical assumption of this study, especially with regard to the concepts of "what a man is" and "what he ought to be", is necessary.

Some implications for further research arise from this study of Frankl's theory. It may be of interest to relate purpose in life solely to an individual's "spiritual self", that is, how an individual views himself in terms of his values, aspirations, and intentions. A second area for further study would lie in relating the degree of one's purpose in life to the central object of that purpose. For example, one could investigate Frankl's postulate that the nature of one's purpose in life is not important as long as there is purpose. It may be interesting to see if individuals who have God, society, another person, or a cause as their purpose in life differ in degree of purpose in life. A third implication for further research would be to relate the degree of tension which an individual experiences to his level of purpose in life. This would be done to establish whether, as Frankl states, a "certain degree" of tension is indispensable for purpose in life.

BIBLIOGRAPHY

Arnold, Magda B and John A. Gasson, The Human Person, New York, The Ronald Press Company, 1955, x-193 p. (Chapter 16: "Logotherapy and Existential Analysis", p. 462-492.)

This work contains a translation of one of Frankl's major works which encompasses the basic theoretical foundations of logotherapy. It is followed by a systematic and comprehensive criticism of Logotherapy which is the reference's major source of value.

Crumbaugh, James C. and Leonard T. Maholick. "The Case for Frankl's 'Will to Meaning'". Journal of Existential Psychiatry, Vol. 4, No. 13, Summer 1963, p. 43-48.

This article presents the accumulation of theoretical evidence drawn from various psychological theories, especially Gestalt psychology, for the existence of Frankl's concept of "will to meaning".

-----, "An Experimental Study in Existentialism: The Psychometric Approach to Frankl's Concept of Noögenic Neurosis", Columbus, Ga., The Bradley Center, Inc., (mimeograph) (no date), 1-33 p. Also in Journal of Clinical Psychology, Vol. 20, No. 2, April 1964, p. 200-207.

The first published experimental study dealing with Frankl's theory of Logotherapy in which "will to meaning" was quantified and noögenic neurosis was found to be functionally independent of classic pathologies.

Frankl, Viktor E., "Logic and Existence in Psychotherapy", American Journal of Psychotherapy, Vol. 7, No. 1, January 1953, p. 8-15.

In this work, Frankl applies his theoretical construct of man to the therapy situation and demonstrates that Logotherapy is not merely an abstract theory of man but an effective instrument in psychotherapy.

-----, The Doctor and the Soul: An Introduction to Logotherapy, New York, Knopf, 1957, vii-208 p.

This volume contains Frankl's most comprehensive exposition of his theory translated into English; in it he deals with the development of Existential Analysis, its view of man, and its view of mental illness.

Frankl, Viktor E., "The Spiritual Dimension in Existential Analysis and Logotherapy", Journal of Individual Psychology, Vol. 11, No. 2, November 1959, p. 157-165.

Frankl describes in detail the "third dimension" of man that has been generally ignored by psychologists--the philosophical substratum of Logotherapy.

-----, "Contributions", in Critical Incidents in Psychotherapy, edited by S.W. Standal and R.J. Corsani, Englewood Cliffs, N.J., Prentice-Hall, 1959, xx-396 p.

This reference is composed of several therapy cases to which Frankl comments in terms of the logotherapeutic view of handling the patient. It is a valuable source in that it offers many practical applications of Logotherapy in specific situations.

-----, 'Beyond Self-actualization and Self-Expression', Journal of Existential Psychiatry, Vol. 1, No. 1, Spring 1960, p. 5-20.

Frankl demonstrates how even more "personalistic" theories than Psychoanalysis fail to describe man in his entirety. It is of value in that it portrays, in part, the historical evolution of Logotherapy and its reaction against previous theories.

-----, "Paradoxical Intention: A Logotherapeutic Technique", American Journal of Psychotherapy, Vol. 14, No. 3, July 1960, p. 520-535.

In this source, Frankl delineates one of the two techniques of Logotherapy which can be used in a therapy setting; he discusses the theoretical reasoning behind the technique and its effectiveness in practice.

-----, "Dynamics, Existence, and Values", Journal of Existential Psychiatry, Vol. 2, No. 5, Summer 1961, p. 5-16.

Frankl offers his theory that, despite the orientation of psychology at present, values have not only a legitimate place in psychology but are an integral part in discussing man theoretically and helping him therapeutically. It is of value in that it introduces a new aspect of man into the psychological literature.

-----, Man's Search for Meaning: An Introduction to Logotherapy, New York, Washington Square Press, 1963, ix-222 p.

Although this is Frankl's latest book in English, it is a short summary of what was presented in more detail in The Doctor and the Soul. The only "new" content is a description of Frankl's concentration camp experiences.

Frankl, Viktor E., "Existential Dynamics and Neurotic Escapisms", Journal of Existential Psychiatry, Vol. 4, No. 13, Summer 1963, p. 27-42.

Frankl discusses how human suffering can be channeled from leading to neurosis to strengthening the purpose of an individual. He contrasts psychiatry with religion and demonstrates how, in some aspects, they are similar.

Fervin, Lawrence A., 'Existentialism, Psychology and Psychotherapy', The American Psychologist, Vol. 15, No. 4, April 1960, p. 305-307.

A general overview of the Existential movement with emphasis on Frankl's Logotherapy, followed by a criticism of some of Frankl's concepts. One of the very few sources of negative criticism of Frankl's theory.

Tweddle, Donald F. Jr., Logotherapy and the Christian Faith, Grand Rapids, Michigan, Baker Book House, 1961, 11-183 p.

The only book on Logotherapy in English written by someone other than Frankl. It delineates Logotherapy with observations and criticisms by the author. A major source of translations from Frankl's works written in German.

APPENDIX 1

THE PURPOSE IN LIFE TEST AND
ANSWER SHEET FORM

APPENDIX 1

THE PURPOSE IN LIFE TEST AND ANSWER SHEET FORM

The following statements were presented to the subjects in a mimeographed test booklet. The subjects were directed to indicate their response by number on the answer sheet form presented below.

- | | | | | | | | |
|---|---|---|-----------|---|---|---|---|
| 1. I am usually: | 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 5 | 6 | 7 |
| completely bored | | | (neutral) | | | | exuberant, enthusiastic |
| 2. Life to me seems: | 7 | 6 | 5 | 4 | 3 | 2 | 1 |
| always exciting | | | (neutral) | | | | completely routine |
| 3. In life I have: | 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 5 | 6 | 7 |
| no goals or aims at all | | | (neutral) | | | | very clear goals and aims |
| 4. My personal existence is: | 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 5 | 6 | 7 |
| utterly meaningless, without purpose | | | (neutral) | | | | very purposeful and meaningful |
| 5. Every day is: | 7 | 6 | 5 | 4 | 3 | 2 | 1 |
| constantly new and different | | | (neutral) | | | | exactly the same |
| 6. If I could choose, I would: | 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 5 | 6 | 7 |
| prefer never to have been born | | | (neutral) | | | | like nine more lives just like this one |
| 7. After retiring, I would: | 7 | 6 | 5 | 4 | 3 | 2 | 1 |
| do some of the exciting things I always wanted to | | | (neutral) | | | | lead completely the rest of my life |

8. In achieving life goals I have:
 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
 made no progress (neutral) progressed to
 whatever complete ful-
 fillment
9. My life is:
 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
 empty, filled (neutral) running over
 only with with exciting
 despair good things
10. If I should die today, I would feel that my life has been:
 7 6 5 4 3 2 1
 very worthwhile (neutral) completely
 worthless
11. In thinking of my life, I:
 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
 often wonder (neutral) always see a
 why I exist reason for my
 being here
12. As I view the world in relation to my life, the world:
 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
 completely con- (neutral) fits meaning-
 fuses me fully with my life
13. I am a:
 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
 very irrespon- (neutral) very responsible
 sible person person
14. Concerning man's freedom to make his own choices, I believe
 man is:
 7 6 5 4 3 2 1
 absolutely free (neutral) completely bound
 to make all by limits of
 life choices heredity and
 environment
15. With regard to death, I am:
 7 6 5 4 3 2 1
 prepared and (neutral) unprepared and
 unafraid frightened
16. With regard to suicide, I have:
 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
 thought of it (neutral) never given it
 seriously as a second
 a way out thought

APPENDIX 1

INDEX

| | | | |
|-----|-------|----|-------|
| 10. | _____ | | |
| 1 | _____ | 12 | _____ |
| 2 | _____ | 13 | _____ |
| 3 | _____ | 14 | _____ |
| 4 | _____ | 15 | _____ |
| 5 | _____ | 16 | _____ |
| 6 | _____ | 17 | _____ |
| 7 | _____ | 18 | _____ |
| 8 | _____ | 19 | _____ |
| 9 | _____ | 20 | _____ |
| 10 | _____ | 21 | _____ |
| 11 | _____ | 22 | _____ |

APPENDIX 2

THE FRANKL QUESTIONNAIRE AND ANSWER SHEET FORM

APPENDIX 2

THE FRANKL QUESTIONNAIRE AND ANSWER SHEET FORM

The following statements were presented to the subjects on a mimeographed sheet. The subjects were directed to indicate their response by number on the answer sheet form also presented below.

- 1B. Has your life a purpose?
 3 2 1
 frequently seldom never
- 2B. Do you feel that your life is without purpose?
 1 2 3
 frequently seldom never
- 3B. Can unalterable or unavoidable suffering have a meaning?
 1 2 3
 never seldom frequently
- 4B. Have you ever had suicidal thoughts?
 3 2 1
 never seldom frequently
- 5B. Have you ever entertained suicidal intentions?
 1 2 3
 frequently seldom never
- 6B. Have you ever attempted suicide?
 3 2 1
 never seldom frequently

Answer Sheet II

No. _____

1B _____

2B _____

3B _____

4B _____

5B _____

6B _____

APPENDIX 3

THE SEMANTIC DIFFERENTIAL SCALES

APPENDIX 3

THE SEMANTIC DIFFERENTIAL SCALES

The following scales were presented to the subjects on two mimeographed sheets; the first was headed by the concept "I, (SELF)", the second by the concept "MY IDEAL SELF (WHAT I COUGHT I BE)".

| | | | | | | | |
|-----------|------|--------|------------|--------|------|-----------|----------|
| kind | : | : | : | : | : | : | cruel |
| shallow | : | : | : | : | : | : | deep |
| active | : | : | : | : | : | : | passive |
| pleasant | : | : | : | : | : | : | pleasant |
| sweet | : | : | : | : | : | : | sour |
| masculine | : | : | : | : | : | : | feminine |
| extremely | very | fairly | don't know | fairly | very | extremely | |
| dull | : | : | : | : | : | : | sharp |
| clean | : | : | : | : | : | : | dirty |
| large | : | : | : | : | : | : | small |
| cold | : | : | : | : | : | : | hot |
| good | : | : | : | : | : | : | bad |
| extremely | very | fairly | don't know | fairly | very | extremely | |
| worthless | : | : | : | : | : | : | valuable |
| strong | : | : | : | : | : | : | weak |
| slow | : | : | : | : | : | : | fast |
| beautiful | : | : | : | : | : | : | ugly |
| hard | : | : | : | : | : | : | soft |
| extremely | very | fairly | don't know | fairly | very | extremely | |

relaxed _____ : _____ : _____ : _____ : _____ : _____ : _____ tense
unfair _____ : _____ : _____ : _____ : _____ : _____ : _____ fair
light _____ : _____ : _____ : _____ : _____ : _____ : _____ heavy
excitable _____ : _____ : _____ : _____ : _____ : _____ : _____ calm
extremely very fairly don't fairly very extremely
know

APPENDIX 4

THE DIRECTIONS FOR THE SEMANTIC DIFFERENTIAL

IMPORTANT: (1) Place your check-marks in the middle of the spaces,
not on the boundaries.

THIS

NOT THIS

_____ : X : _____ : _____ : _____ : _____

- (2) Be sure you check every scale for every concept--
do not omit any.
- (3) Never put more than one check-mark on a single
scale.

Sometimes you may feel as though you've had the same item before on the test. This will not be the case, so do not look back and forth through the items. Do not try to remember how you checked similar items earlier in the test. Make each item a separate and independent judgment. Work at fairly high speed through this test. Do not worry or puzzle over individual items. It is your first impressions, the immediate 'feelings' about the items, that we want. On the other hand, please do not be careless, because we want your true impressions.

APPENDIX 9

ABSTRACT OF

THE Relationship between Frankl's "Will to Meaning" and the
Discrepancy between the Actual Self and the Ideal Self

APPENDIX 5

ABSTRACT OF

The Relationship between Frankl's "Will to Meaning" and the Discrepancy between the Actual Self and the Ideal Self¹

Viktor E. Frankl's theory of Logotherapy centers around the concept of man as a three-dimensional being whose "will to meaning" leads him to search for a purpose to his existence. In refutation of the traditional psychodynamic theories which view man as being pushed by his basic drives in an effort to maintain homeostasis, Frankl considers this "will to meaning" as a primary motivational force which constantly pulls man and results in a certain degree of tension. According to Frankl, this tension, which is indispensable to mental well-being, stems from the gap between what one is and what one thinks he should be. Within the framework of these concepts, this study investigated a possible relationship between Frankl's concept of "will to meaning" and the discrepancy between what a person consciously perceives himself to be (the actual self) and what he thinks he ought to be (the ideal self). Frankl's statements lead one to expect that persons with low purpose in life will exhibit either a very large or a very small

¹ Michael E. Cavanagh, doctoral thesis presented to the Faculty of Psychology and Education of the University of Ottawa, Ontario, 1966, vi-115 p.

discrepancy between the actual self and the ideal self, while persons with high purpose in life will have the more moderate discrepancies.

The "will to meaning" or "purpose in life" of each of the 210 subjects was measured by the use of two instruments: Crumbaugh and Asholick's Purpose in Life Test and the Frankl questionnaire. Semantic differential scales were employed to obtain a measure of the discrepancy between each subject's concept of his actual self and of his ideal self. The discrepancy was shown by a "D" score which quantitatively described this gap.

The results indicate that no statistically significant relationship exists between "will to meaning" and the discrepancy between the actual self and the ideal self.

Several factors could account for the lack of positive results in the study. The difficulty which some subjects seemed to experience with the semantic differential technique may have affected the results. Personality variables within the sample which may have confounded the results include the effect of some personality disturbances on the sense of self and the difficulty which some personality types experience when confronted with evaluative tasks.

Theoretically, the basic implication of this study is that "will to meaning" or the challenge of life may stem from something other than the discrepancy between the actual self

and the ideal self. A redefinition of these concepts may be necessary. Although Frankl implies only a general definition of the actual self and of the ideal self, it may be that "will to meaning" is related to the gap between what a person is and what he should be in his spiritual dimension alone.

The indications from this study are that various areas exist for further research regarding the relationship between "will to meaning" and the discrepancy between the actual self and the ideal self. The relationship of one's purpose in life to a measure of his "spiritual self" could be of particular interest and value. The further exploration of "will to meaning" could extend to an interest in the central object of an individual's purpose in life as it relates to the degree of purpose which he exhibits. A third area suggested for research concerns the further definition of a "certain degree" of tension, which could be studied by relating the degree of tension which an individual experiences to his degree of purpose in life.