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On the Self:

An existential-phenomenological-hermeneutic study

Towards a new understanding of the Self

par

Normand Gingras

Thèse soumise à l'École des Études Supérieures

de l'Université d'Ottawa

en vue de l'obtention du diplôme de Ph.D. en Psychologie



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En premier lieu: qui veut sérieusement devenir philosophe doit, au moins une fois dans sa vie, faire retour sur soi et chercher en lui-même à bouleverser toutes les sciences existantes et à en reconstruire l'édifice. La philosophie est l'affaire toute personnelle de celui qui philosophe.

Husserl

A mes parents, Simone et Raymond, pour m'avoir chacun légué des Sois aussi divers et intéressants les uns que les autres, et que je tente, tant bien que mal, de cerner à la fois leur détail et sa globalité.

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Abstract

This thesis aims to arrive at a *new understanding of the Self* by taking an existential-phenomenological-hermeneutic approach to critically analyse several conceptualisations of the Self developed during this century. Through the synthesis of their insights, we articulate our own *necessary dimensions of a conceptualisation of Self*.

In the first chapter, we articulate the basic notions of phenomenology, existential phenomenology and hermeneutics, as well as some of their limitations, following which we synthesise their opposite emphases, which we express respectively as those of *understanding* and *explanation*, taking place in an overall activity of *interpretation* within the context of the *existential-hermeneutic circle*. This synthesis is taken as the basis for a larger one between *psychology as a human science* and *psychology as a natural science*. This constitutes an initial contribution of the thesis, from which we establish the *selection and evaluation criteria* for the ensuing analysis of the conceptualisations of Self.

In the second chapter, we present each author's conceptualisation, followed by the critical analysis of its understanding and explanatory aspects.

In the third chapter, we articulate the necessary dimensions of a conceptualisation of Self, where an *embodied primordial Self*, as a conscious-embodied-subject-in-relationship-to-a-world-which-it-interprets, is at the centre of a constellation of *secondary Selves*, themselves seen as habitual crystallisations of lived experience in the primordial Self's four interrelated dimensions of *materiality*, *interrelationship*, *interpretation* and *affection*. Other aspects of Self, such as the Self/not-Self distinction, the Self-as-subject/Self-as-object distinction, Self-identity, and Self constancy are also incorporated.

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0. GENERAL INTRODUCTION

The writings of philosophy may be seen as a history of humanity's efforts to describe and understand itself. While many philosophers have attempted to deal with the issues surrounding the idea of human selfhood and self sameness, let us mention Aristotle, Augustine, Descartes, Rousseau, Kant, and Kierkegaard, one of the first formulations of the Self as a formal psychological entity dates back to the end of the previous century, with William James (1890) and his book *Principles of Psychology*, in which he articulates his notion of a multiple entity he called Self. In our view, James saw clearly with respect to many issues related to psychology in general and to the Self in particular. His is a highly insightful conceptualisation and as we shall see, his contribution remains pertinent to this day.

While Freud (1949/1927) didn't formally address the Self, some authors such as Symonds (1953) and Cole (1971), have argued that his tripartite conceptualisation of Superego, Ego and Id, as well as his division of psychic life into subconscious, preconscious and conscious factions, could be interpreted as a conceptualisation of Self. Our own initial consideration of Freud's conceptualisation goes against this view, for Freud clearly did not concern himself with conscious functioning but focused on the explanation, in mechanistic terms, of the unconscious.

Departing from Freud, Jung (1983/1951) provides us with a conceptualisation of Self that is detailed and complex. However, like Freud, Jung attributes the most importance to the unconscious aspects of psychic life, as the majority of his writings deal with the collective unconscious, more specifically the archetypes, those personifications residing deep within the unconscious and whose manifestations exert a tremendous influence upon psychic life.

Sullivan (1953a, 1953b, 1953c, 1953d, 1953e, 1953f, 1953g) is the first author within modern psychology to place considerable emphasis on interpersonal relationships as

an integral foundational aspect of the Self. Sullivan considers anxiety, coupled to the fact that it is experienced in the context of a interpersonal relationship, to be the central motivating factor responsible for all of personality development. Taking a phenomenological approach to the study of the Self in a context of child development, Sullivan's conceptualisation can be viewed as a reformulation of psychoanalysis into interrelational terms.

Kohut (1971, 1977) is to be credited for introducing Self psychology and distinguishing it from Freud's drive psychology (Ornstein, 1978). While not the first to introduce the Self as an adjunct to the structural model of the person, Kohut does make some novel contributions, namely with his emphasis on the subjective nature of the Self, as well as a careful examination of the specific ways in which the self-object relationship affects self-experience. We note that Kohut does not vouch for the wholesale dissolution of the Freudian conceptualisation, but proposes his model as an adjunct to it.

Laing (1960, 1961) can be credited with a thorough description of the world of the psychotic in his attempt to understand psychosis. Laing alleges strong phenomenological influences and he succeeds at revealing many important insights related to psychosis. His resulting conceptualisation, produced through his work with this population, espouses a fundamental tenet: that of division of the Self in multiple factions, such division being the result of deleterious relationships in childhood.

The humanistic movement, represented by Rogers (1959) and Bugental (1968, 1976, 1978, 1981, 1987, 1990), is a movement that developed in reaction to psychoanalysis and behaviourism. This "Third Force", largely influenced by continental existentialism and phenomenology, attempted to integrate these foundations, notably those related to meaning and understanding, in their own thinking. Rogers elaborates a conceptualisation of an individual Self that arises from the organism's symbolisation of that experience perceived as part of Self, to which is attributed an

affective value. Such valuing, which he terms Self-regard, forms the basis of Rogers' conceptualisation, a notion he developed through his therapeutic experience with clients. Rogers believes that humans are intrinsically forward-looking, optimistic and tend towards positive Self-growth, the source of which he deems to be the actualising tendency.

In a manner analogous to Rogers, Bugental developed his conceptualisation of Self as an adjunct to his theory of therapy, this clearly representing his major contribution to psychology. Also influenced by existential phenomenology, his conceptualisation focuses on the existence of a phenomenological 'I' which is subject to all of its experiences. This is in effect his major theoretical contribution.

Based on James' conceptualisation, Damon and Hart (1988) have elaborated a social-cognitive model of Self, focusing on the process by which the child comes to distinguish his own Self from that of the other. In their view, the Self is unified and multiple, relational and individualistic, objective and subjective. Their studies focus on interrelational as well as cognitive factors of Self-development, describing a developmental process where the Self attains, in successive steps, the state described by James. Their empirical research serves to confirm James' conceptualisation, it does not refute nor add to it.

Epstein (1990) has elaborated a Cognitive-Experiential Self Theory combining a rational (cognitive) system and emotional (experiential) system, the latter being a reformulation of the psychoanalytic unconscious. The theory posits four basic needs and individual differences in beliefs related to them, and explains maladjustment as dissociation between and within systems, as conflict between need fulfilment and/or as problematic beliefs.

For his part, Gergen (1991, 1994) offers a postmodern view of the Self based on the assumptions of postmodernism, in which he argues for the wholesale dissolution of

the individual Self and proposes a relational-narrative Self emerging from the myriad relationships harboured by persons throughout their lives.

Kerby (1991) distinguishes himself with a narrative conceptualisation of Self founded in Merleau-Ponty's (1945) phenomenology, the hermeneutics of Ricoeur (1981), and in language philosophy, chiefly represented by Saussure, Foucault and Derrida (Kerby, 1991). His is a tripartite conceptualisation where a *narrating speaking subject* constitutes a *subject of speech*, analogous to the character of a novel, appropriated by a *spoken subject* which takes on the role of audience to itself. For Kerby, the 'I' is a virtual entity generated by, and with no locus outside of, its narration. Kerby's conceptualisation is representative of a recent trend within postmodern philosophy and psychology, that of the narrative movement.

Working with a cognitive science model, Kihlstrom (1993) explores the question of how knowledge about the Self is encoded and stored into memory. Two types of representation, perception-based and meaning-based, are considered. Through their interpretation of certain experiments concerning cognitive tasks, they attempt to understand the memory structure representing the Self.

In a similar vein, Klein and Loftus (1993) consider the cognitive processes involved in deciding if certain personality traits and autobiographical knowledge are part of the Self. As such, they consider two methods of judgement, the first being pure exemplar judgement, the second being the dual/summary exemplar judgement. Their series of empirical tests refutes both models of judgement. In response to these findings they propose another model of Self judgement, evoking many observations and other experimental data relating to stored behavioural episodes, and how these are stored in memory separately from trait information. However, they do not themselves test their revised model.

From this cursory overview of some selected conceptualisations of Self, we note that the Self has been the subject of much thought and debate, these different

conceptualisations highlighting the inherent variety and complexity of the Self. It is our contention that some of these conceptualisations can serve as the starting point for fruitful analysis and reflection based on certain tenets of Husserl's phenomenology, Merleau-Ponty's existential phenomenology and Gadamer's and Ricoeur's hermeneutics. The work of these philosophers serves to delineate our epistemological position, from which we articulate our evaluation criteria. In this manner do we re-examine some current notions related to the Self, and attempt to articulate a deeper *understanding of the Self*, culminating in the articulation of the *necessary dimensions of the Self*.

With this aim in mind, we establish in Chapter One the philosophical foundations on which we will base our analysis. Here we articulate the basic notions of phenomenology, existential phenomenology and hermeneutics, with special emphasis on how these systems of thought build upon one another, and also on how they complement one another. We also point out some of their limitations, following which we integrate their opposite emphases, which we express respectively as those of *understanding* and *explanation*, taking place in an overall activity of *interpretation* within the context of the *existential-hermeneutic circle*. This integration is taken as the basis for a larger one between *psychology as a human science* and *psychology as a natural science*, where each is seen as complimentary to the other. This constitutes an initial contribution of the thesis, following which we establish the *selection and evaluation criteria* for the ensuing analyses of the conceptualisations of Self.

In Chapter two, we examine, in detail, several conceptualisations of Self that are amenable to the type of analysis we propose, beginning with that of William James (1890), followed by that of Carl Jung (1928), Harry S. Sullivan (1953), Carl Rogers (1959), Ronald D. Laing (1961), Kenneth Gergen (1971) and Anthony P. Kerby (1991). Here we present each author's conceptualisation, followed by the critical analysis of its understanding and explanatory aspects. Within the understanding aspects, we consider how each conceptualisation incorporates the notions of consciousness and

its attributes, of lived experience, of embodiment, of interrelationship, of interpretation and of other related notions. Within the explanatory aspects of Self, we consider the conceptualisation's internal coherence, comprehensiveness, refutability and parsimony. This analysis, supplemented by the existential-phenomenological-hermeneutic foundations articulated in Chapter One, serves to establish our own incipient formulation of the necessary dimensions of Self to be effected in the following chapter.

In Chapter Three we articulate the necessary dimensions of a conceptualisation of Self, where an *embodied primordial Self*, as a *conscious-embodied-subject-in-relationship-to-a-world-which-it-interprets*, is at the centre of a constellation of *secondary Selves*, themselves seen as habitual crystallisations of specific and repeated contexts of lived experience in the primordial Self's four interrelated dimensions of *materiality, interrelationship, interpretation* and *affectivity*. Other aspects of Self, such as the Self/not-Self distinction, the Self-as-subject/Self-as-object distinction, Self-identity, and Self constancy are also incorporated. This, in effect, is the main contribution of the thesis, where we synthesise the retained contributions of the previous authors.

Finally, in Chapter four, we offer our concluding remarks, highlighting some clinical implications and some of the limitations of our work.

While we consider the work represented by this thesis to contribute to a deeper understanding of the Self, we recognise that such work often raises more issues than are resolved, such issues having the potential to monopolise our reflections for a lifetime. While we may have brought some clarity to some of them, future research, with different emphases and nuances, may well go beyond our own understanding and propel us in new directions. It is our hope that this thesis will inspire further research whose aim is to continually expand and develop the understanding of that perennial enigma, that of our own Selves.

1. CHAPTER ONE: PHILOSOPHICAL FOUNDATIONS

1.1 Introduction to Chapter One

The aim of this chapter is to establish the epistemological foundations of this thesis, foundations which find their genesis in Husserl's phenomenology, in Merleau-Ponty's and Heidegger's existential phenomenologies and in Ricoeur's hermeneutics. Each of these related disciplines shall be introduced, followed by an outline of the concepts that we consider relevant to this dissertation. In the second instance, we shall discuss some limitations of these individual disciplines and argue for their integration into a proposed vision of human science as distinguished from natural science. The human science - natural science distinction shall in turn be criticised and integrated into a concept of science which incorporates understanding and explanation into an overarching process of interpretation, itself taking place within the context of the existential-hermeneutic circle. From this view of science shall follow the specific criteria for the selection and evaluation of conceptualisations of Self.

1.2 Phenomenology

1.2.1 Introduction to Phenomenology

In the 17th century, Descartes, in his search for indubitable knowledge, proceeded by methodical doubt about everything which was not the thinking subject himself. Descartes' reasoning led him to the only indubitable experience, that of the *cogito*, which remains certain in all instances. Descartes is best known for his renowned dualism between the mind and the body, a split based on his observation that the body is an object and belongs to the world of things perceived, and is thus to be doubted.

"Puis, examinant avec attention ce que j'étais, et voyant que je pouvais feindre que je n'avais aucun corps, et qu'il n'y avait aucun monde, ni aucun lieu où je fusse; mais que je ne pouvais pas feindre, pour cela, que je n'étais point; et qu'au contraire, de cela même que je pensais à douter de la vérité des autres choses, il suivait très évidemment et très certainement que j'étais ; au lieu que, si j'eusse seulement cessé de penser, encore que tout le reste de ce que j'avais jamais imaginé eût été vrai, je n'avais aucune raison de croire que j'eusse été: je connus de là que j'étais une substance dont toute l'essence ou la nature n'est que de penser et qui, pour être, n'a besoin d'aucun lieu, ni ne dépend d'aucune chose matérielle. En sorte que ce moi, c'est-à-dire *l'âme* par laquelle je suis ce que je suis, *est entièrement distincte du corps*, et même qu'elle est plus aisée à connaître que lui, et qu'encore qu'il ne fût point, elle ne laisserait pas d'être tout ce qu'elle est." (italics ours, Descartes R., 1637, p 602-604)

Descartes' dualism between mind and body makes these entities appear fundamentally irreconcilable, and their relationship becomes incommensurably problematic. As is well known, this split leads to two opposing epistemological positions, those of idealism and realism.

Phenomenology formally opposes such dualism, with Husserl (1991/1950, 1977/1925, 1962/1914, 1960/1950), phenomenology's founder, admonishing any reduction of consciousness to the status of object while arguing for the reinstatement of the human subject. By way of phenomenological bracketing (to be considered later in this chapter), Husserl attempts to return to the primacy of experience, that is he attempts to capture phenomena as they manifest themselves directly to consciousness, prior to any theoretical bias. In this attempt to elucidate the subject-world relationship, he discovers the *intentional character* of consciousness, that is its inherent property to always be *consciousness of something other than itself*. Husserl continues with a detailed study of consciousness, further elucidating its attributes and characteristics. Finally, Husserl's fundamental contribution is the elaboration of the *phenomenological method*, a rigorous, systematic method of investigating phenomena of consciousness. We shall consider these aspects of phenomenology later in this chapter.

1.2.2 Phenomenological foundations

Husserl's ambition is to establish a philosophical ground for all the sciences based on an absolute foundation. For Husserl, the world as it presents itself to the apprehending cogito through the bracketing of assumptions, or *epoché*, is the more fundamental reality, since from the point of view of consciousness, the existence of the de facto or natural world is inconsequential.

"Thus, the being of the pure ego and his cogitationes, as a being that is prior in itself, is antecedent to the natural being of the world - the world of which I always speak, the one of which I *can* speak. Natural being is a realm whose existential status [*Seinsgeltung*] is *secondary; it continually presupposes the realm of transcendental being.*" (italics ours, Husserl, 1960/1950, p 21).

The outcome of the epoché leads Husserl to the following conclusion: that the world is "for me absolutely nothing else but the world existing for and accepted by me in such a conscious *cogito.*" (italics by the author, Husserl, 1960, p 21). For Husserl, our ability to bracket the existence of the natural world makes its existence secondary to that of the cogito, the natural world gaining its status from the apprehending cogito. In this sense, the Ego-cogito gains the status of being *transcendental.*

"The Objective world... ...derives its whole sense and its existential status, which it has for me, from me myself, from *me as the transcendental Ego*, the Ego who comes to the fore only with transcendental-phenomenological epoché." (italics by the author, Husserl, 1960/1950, p 26).

Had he stopped his reflection at this point, Husserl's conclusion would have mirrored Descartes', with the *cogito*, or *transcendental Ego*, being the only certitude thus far explicated. However, Husserl attempts to ground such transcendence in

apodictic evidence and attempts to elucidate the "*universal apodictically experienceable structure of the Ego*" by means of his phenomenological method (italics by the author, Husserl, 1960, p 28). Husserl thus arrives at what he considers to be the essence of psychic life: the human subject is eventually reduced to the transcendental Ego: an abstract, intentional entity constituting a world of meanings derived from the concrete natural world.

Husserl never does commit himself with respect to the existential status of the natural world, rather, his investigations concern the nature of the phenomenal world, from which he progressively furthers his investigation of the nature of consciousness. His analysis of consciousness reveals many of its necessary attributes - these we shall consider presently.

1.2.2.1 The nature of consciousness

1.2.2.1.1 Intentionality

A first distinction to be made concerns the apprehending attribute of consciousness, or the *cogito*, and its object of consciousness, the *cogitatum*. Husserl notes that conscious processes are always *intentional* (from the Latin *intendo* or *intendere*, meaning to "tend towards"), this term signifying "nothing else than this universal fundamental property of consciousness: to be consciousness *of* something; as a *cogito* to bear within itself its *cogitatum*." (italics by the author, Husserl, 1960, p 33).

Following on the work of Brentano, Husserl saw intentionality as fundamental to all psychic life since it is immanent to all acts of consciousness. It is operative in all acts of perception, all thinking. In Husserl's opinion, it is consciousness' most fundamental attribute.

1.2.2.1.2 The subject-object relationship

For Husserl, it is due to the fundamental unity of the intentional relationship between the cogito and its cogitata that consciousness and perceived world are indissociably related, with each constituting the other. Thus in the study of any phenomenon, one must consider both the object of thought, and its correlate, the apprehending conscious subject.

What stands out for Husserl is the fundamentally interrelational nature of consciousness and its attributes. Through our consideration of intentionality, we discover consciousness, not as a passive recording apparatus, but as an active constitutive entity in relationship to its intended object. The ego is the entity *giving sense* to objects that are distinct from itself, and which are perceived as *having a sense*.

1.2.2.1.3 The unity of consciousness

A second attribute of consciousness is that each cogitatum is perceived as a unitary identical whole, what Husserl terms its *unitary nature*. In its most general manifestation, this applies to the entire perceived universe, which goes on " 'appearing' unitarily" despite our ability to distinguish an infinite number of particular entities which remain the constant backdrop of our conscious perceptions (Husserl, 1960/1950, p 37).

A cogitated object is a whole that does not lend itself to analysis on the basis of a correspondence between its parts and the parts of the de facto object, irrespective of the latter's composition and complexity. Unity of the cogitated object is thus discerned as a fundamental attribute of consciousness.

1.2.2.1.4 The noetic and the noematic

For Husserl, consciousness comprises two correlative dimensions, the noetic and the noematic. The first pertains to the cogito's apprehending acts which may take on different modalities (i.e., perception, recollection, imagination) while the *noematic* refers to the modalities pertaining to the cogitatum. For example, in the perception of a cube, each perception is perspectival results from a *noetic* act of consciousness, while the total perceived cube results from the synthesis of the individual perceived perspectives, such taking place according to the structural attributes of the cube itself, or the meaning that is attributed to the object, its *noema*.

Perception of an object is somewhat of a paradox, for we never in "reality" perceive more than what the present perspective reveals, yet we always implicitly "perceive" the object as a whole, despite being presented with only one of its perspectives. In some fashion, these perspectives are synthesised in time, or in a temporal streaming, "which has an immanent stretch of time as its form, a stretch which we can think of as structured in partial stretches and in time-phases, time-points as it were...", in which previous and anticipated perspectives are linked to the present one (Husserl, 1977/1925, p 153). In this sense, perception is inherently *spatio-temporal*.

1.2.2.2 The Self and the attributes of consciousness

In our view, consciousness and its attributes necessarily underlie all conceptualisations of Self, the Self being, in all cases, part of the things consciously perceived and thus entertaining an intentional relationship to an apprehending and constituting consciousness. In this dissertation we will examine how each presented conceptualisation of Self accounts for consciousness and its attributes. We also note

the need to distinguish and situate consciousness vis-à-vis the Self, with much emphasis on the subject-object relationship for it would seem that the Self can be both subject and object. This becomes salient when we consider the special problem of 'Self perception' where we must concern ourselves with 'what is being perceived by whom'. We also expect that only certain aspects of Self will be apprehensible at one time, such noetic aspects being constitutive of a noematic unitary whole. We shall thus consider these aspects of consciousness within each conceptualisation.

The phenomenological method and its limitations

Husserl arrived at his conclusions regarding the attributes of consciousness by way of the *transcendental-phenomenological reduction*, or *epoché*, which brackets, or puts into suspension, our naïve acceptance of the existence of the objective or natural world, or what he terms the *natural attitude*. For Husserl, phenomenology involves the systematic and full exploration, by way of thorough, disciplined and systematic description, of consciousness by use of his phenomenological method, the goal of which is to reach and grasp the *essences* of cogitata appearing in consciousness.

Without entering into a thorough description of the phenomenological method nor of its various adaptations in psychology (Giorgi, 1985), Husserl's claim is that the method permits the absolute *essential universality* and *essential necessity* of an object of consciousness to be apprehended, giving rise to a "universe of absolute freedom from prejudice" (Husserl, 1960/1950, p 35). The degree to which this is accomplished depends of course on the ability with which the researcher can apply the epoché.

The phenomenological method is considered the keystone of phenomenology and has been adapted to the study of many related fields, such as education, sociology, anthropology, psychology, and psychiatry (Keen, 1975). While this dissertation does

not constitute an application of the method *per se* to the phenomenon of the Self, the method remains of foundational importance to phenomenology.

While strong proponents of Husserl's phenomenological method and its necessity for bracketing, Heidegger (1996/1926) and Merleau-Ponty (1945) claim that a complete reduction, namely, bracketing of the existence of the world, is not possible. Their justification for such is based upon the givenness of our *existence*, a notion exposed in the following section dealing with existential phenomenology. Other authors (e.g., Carr, 1987; Ricoeur, 1981; Mohanty, 1987) have also considered some of the limits of the epoché. For example, Carr (1987) points out that while the epoché, in order to better apprehend the world, suspends its existential index, it does not do the same with respect to the existence of the mind and its intentional relationship to the world. In other words, while the object may be assumed not to exist, the same cannot be said of the mind-ego and its intentional relation to the said object. Thus the activity of the phenomenological reduction, in which the ontological conviction usually attributed to the existence of the world is suspended, requires that one ontological conviction remain intact, namely the belief in the existence of the mind and of its intentional character.

In summary, while Husserl grants to his phenomenological method the status of absolute certainty of truth by virtue of the epoché, other authors such as Carr, Mohanty, Merleau-Ponty, Heidegger and Ricoeur, are more reserved in their affirmations, arguing that the epoché lacks solid epistemological foundations. In addition, these authors contend that the *eidos*, or essence of a phenomenon, necessarily involves interpretation, taking place from within an undeniable and foundational context, that of our existence within a world. As such, the authors contend that, contrary to Husserl's affirmations, phenomenology cannot stand on its own, but it must find its foundations in ontology and interpretation. It is to these considerations that we now turn.

1.3 Existential phenomenology

1.3.1 Introduction to existential phenomenology

For Heidegger, Merleau-Ponty, and Ricoeur, human being is characterised by its *existence*, that is by the relationship between a *concrete existing subject* living in a *concrete existing world*. In this sense, they refuse the concept of a detached transcendental ego apprehending a world of meanings, itself detached from the existing world. However, they adopt Husserl's concept of intentionality, with the difference that human being does not only consist of a consciousness constituting its correlative world of meanings, but consists of an *embodied subject* apprehending a world of *existing* objects.

Existential phenomenology thus follows from phenomenology, with the difference that it founds itself on the notion of *existence*, that is to say embodied *Being-in-the-world*. Existential phenomenology holds that the world of experience is given to us before any analysis of it is possible. We find ourselves already thrown into a living world, and this world, together with its objects, is taken as real and palpable *before* we carry out any reflection upon its possible constitution. In Merleau-Ponty's words:

"Le monde est là avant toute analyse que je puisse en faire et il serait artificiel de le faire dériver d'une série de synthèses qui relieraient les sensations, puis les aspects perspectifs de l'objet, alors que les unes et les autres sont justement des produits de l'analyse et ne doivent pas être réalisés avant elle." (Merleau-Ponty, 1945, p iv).

The concept of existence finds its foundation in existential evidence. While it may be possible to state that "the world does not exist", and while such an assertion may have an unambiguous meaning, it is not possible to live out such an assertion. In

other words, it is not possible for one to pronounce such an assertion and be undergoing the very experience such an assertion implies. In the very pronouncement of this assertion, one is effectively living out its antithesis. In this sense, existence is irreducible, it cannot be founded upon any presupposition more foundational.

1.3.2 Existential-phenomenological foundations

1.3.2.1 Dasein and Being-in-the-world

We have noted that existential phenomenology takes as foundational our fundamental co-presence of our selves and the world, or *Being-in-the-world* (Heidegger, 1996/1926; Merleau-Ponty, 1945). For Heidegger (1996/1926), *Dasein* (literally in German, "there-being"), is the fundamental state in which we find ourselves and relates to our foundational 'thrownness' into a world. *Dasein* relates to our fundamental openness for the advent of being, with Being-in-the-world as its primary manifestation. Such being is *prereflective* in the sense that anterior to any reflection on our part, we find ourselves already immersed in a constituted world of existing objects and others.

For Merleau-Ponty (1945), *Being*, in its simplest expression, means being *present* to something presented within the horizon of consciousness. Such presence, in a manner of speaking, defines the world, for without any apprehending consciousness, there is no world perceived by any one or anything. On the other hand, the world also defines being, for without an object to be perceived, no single entity can be consciously apprehended.

If we return for a moment to the Cartesian cogito, we note that the same argument may be applied: that anterior to the cogito's affirmation of existence based on

reflection is the primordial fact of its existence, the necessary condition for thought to take place. Descartes himself affirms the primordial aspect of existence:

"Après cela, je considérai en général ce qui est requis à une proposition pour qu'elle soit vraie et certaine; car puisque je venais d'en trouver une que je savais être telle, je pensai que je devais aussi savoir en quoi consiste cette certitude. Et ayant remarqué qu'il n'y a rien du tout en ceci: *je pense donc je suis*, qui m'assure que je dis la vérité, sinon que je vois très clairement que, *pour penser, il faut être*." (italics by the author, Descartes, 1637, p 604).

Here Descartes notes the indubitability of his affirmation: "*Je pense donc je suis*", although through his method of systematic doubt, he can go no further than to the affirmation of his existence, "*pour penser, il faut être*". He notes also that there is no manner in which he may justify the certitude of his statement other than *by an appeal to the fact of existence*.

While not explicitly speaking of existence as a foundation, Dilthey (1977/1894) introduced the closely related concept of *lebenswelt* in which he argues for the foundational nature of *lived experience*. Dilthey's fundamental assumption lies in the fact that he considers lived experience as the ultimate datum of psychological knowledge. Such experience exists prior to our consideration of it, and prior to our reflection upon its nature. It is psychology's point of departure and its point of reference and in our view, mirrors the notion of 'world' in Heidegger's Being-in-the-world.

To summarise, for Merleau-Ponty and Heidegger, the fundamental and primordial position to be taken with respect to human living is *existence*, or Dasein. Dasein is characterised by our Being-in-the-world, such designating our foundational interrelationship to a world of existing objects and others.

1.3.2.2 The Self as Being-in-the-world

From our previous considerations it follows that the Self could also be characterised as *existing in a world* from which it distinguishes itself and with which it is in interrelationship. In a manner analogous to the distinction to be drawn between consciousness and Self, is the need for a distinction between Self and World, and the correlative need for distinguishing aspects of both Self and World. Our forthcoming analyses of each selected conceptualisation of Self will consider these aspects.

1.3.2.2.1 The primacy of perception

Influenced by the writings of Husserl and those of Heidegger, Maurice Merleau-Ponty proceeds to broaden the epistemological foundations for the study of the human subject. In his first book, *La structure du comportement* (1967/1942), he largely critiques the prevailing empirical methods of psychological enquiry, especially the methods of the behavioural approaches, for their exaggerated reduction of behaviour into piecemeal components that lose their meaning when taken out of their contextual meaning structures. He also criticises experimental psychology and the behaviourists for their failure to consider the presence of a constituting consciousness. With the Gestaltists, he advocates a search for the immanent significance of behaviour, by way of the prospective analysis of its structure and form. However he also critiques the Gestaltists for not pushing their analysis far enough, failing to appreciate that the form and structure found in nature is not indigenous to it, but rather is attributed by a constituting consciousness.

In his second book, *La phénoménologie de la perception* (1945), Merleau-Ponty attempts to establish the grounds for a philosophy based on the *primacy of perception* in our Being-in-the-world.

"La perception n'est pas une science du monde, ce n'est pas même un acte, une prise de position délibérée, elle est le fond sur lequel tous les actes se détachent et elle est présumée par eux. Le monde n'est pas un objet dont je possède par devers moi la loi de constitution, il est le milieu naturel et le champ de toutes mes pensées et de toutes mes perceptions explicites." (Merleau-Ponty, 1945, p v).

Merleau-Ponty's reflections lead him to conclude that the first relation between the subject and the world is not a conceived relationship but an *ontological* one, one that is based upon our *corporeal presence to the world*. Any theories, any conceptualisations, are produced *after the fact of perception* and presuppose its existence. From these foundations he attempts to establish his own philosophy of consciousness, which emphasises prereflective consciousness (Madison, 1981).

"In Merleau-Ponty's phenomenology, consciousness, while it is always at the centre of his analyses, does not therefore possess an ontological and logical priority, for it grasps itself as the consciousness of preconsciousness and prereflective life which is its absolute beginning." (Madison, 1981, p 155).

1.3.2.2 Embodied subjectivity

Merleau-Ponty first considers the body as an object of consciousness that is fully integrated with the objective world.

"Le corps devient l'un des objets qui se constituent devant la conscience, il est intégré au monde objectif, et toute nature n'étant pensable que comme le corrélatif d'une connaissance naturante, il n'est plus question de traiter la connaissance comme un fait de nature. Sans doute la conscience reconnaît elle-même que des lois naturelles déterminent, en fonction de la position du corps et des phénomènes corporels, l'ordre de ses événements perceptifs." (Merleau-Ponty, 1967/1942, p 215-216).

However, we also experience its tightly woven relationship to the perceptions that assail us. We thus conclude to its constitutive role in the process of such perception, and correlatively, to that of the world. This mediative role for the most part, escapes us. We hardly notice for example, the "cuts" in perception that the beating of our eyelids impose on the images we experience in our vision. Neither does this knowledge prevent us from believing that we experience the "objects in themselves" rather than mere representations of them. Prior to perceiving the body as an object of perception to the same extent as other objects, we can state that the body is experienced as the *vehicle of our intentions*, a medium through which intentional acts are carried out.

"C'est que le corps propre et ses organes restent les points d'appui ou *les véhicules de mes intentions* (italics ours) et ne sont pas encore saisis comme des 'réalités physiologiques'." (Merleau-Ponty, 1967/1942, p 203).

Merleau-Ponty distinguishes the perception of the body from that of other objects by virtue of it being the permanent field or backdrop to the permanence of exterior objects and through which they are given meaning. The body is not just another percept in the field of perceptions, it is the one that, through its mediative role in presenting the world to us, permits us to understand it. One manner in which the body distinguishes itself from other perceptions is the single perspective from which we can perceive our body. We cannot see our legs, for example, from any perspective other than from eyes being located in the head. This differs from perceived objects which can be viewed from many perspectives.

Merleau-Ponty also rejects the separation of mind and body as distinct entities. The analogy of the pilot and his ship, criticised by Descartes, suggests that within the physiological body there is the mind as receiver of the body's perceptions and

executor of the body's movements. Merleau-Ponty notes that we don't experience ourselves as a mind-within-a-body, but rather as a living-body-in-motion, with our intentions finding their expression through the body:

"La conscience naïve ne voit pas en elle la *cause* des mouvements du corps et pas davantage elle ne la met en lui comme le pilote en son navire. (...) Nos intentions trouvent dans des mouvements leur vêtement naturel et leur incarnation et s'expriment en eux comme la chose s'exprime dans ses aspects perspectifs." (Merleau-Ponty, 1967/1942, p 203).

In this sense then, we experience ourselves as "embodied subjects", as corporeal *actors* and *recipients* of our *actions* and *perceptions*, respectively. Here we wish to highlight the *intentional-attentional* attributes of embodied living, where intended motor actions are perceived in mutual relationship with attended-to, or received, perceptions. The intentional - attentional attributes of lived experience are an aspect that shall be more deeply considered later in this chapter. Here, Merleau-Ponty highlights that the relationship to be studied is not the one between the mind and the physiological or objective body, but that between the mind and the *phenomenal* body, or body-as-perceived.

"Le problème n'est donc pas de savoir comment l'âme agit sur le corps objectif, puisque ce n'est pas sur lui qu'elle agit, mais sur le corps phénoménal." (Merleau-Ponty, 1945, p 123, note 1).

This phenomenal body is also "within the mind" so to speak, or can be conceived as a "body within a mind", as it is another of the perceptions present to consciousness. This goes against the popular notion that we are a "mind within a body", and that the mind is to be considered separate from the body, as proposed by Descartes and has been accepted by most of western philosophy and psychology since. From the existential-phenomenological point of view then, the separation of mind and body is artificial and unwarranted for it has no basis in experience.

1.3.2.2.3 The cogito

Merleau-Ponty notes that, prior to its expression as a thinking entity, the cogito is first and foremost an *existing* entity, in that underlying our conscious thoughts is the necessarily existing source of such thoughts. In this respect he notes that the cogito's thoughts emanate from an apperceived mass, a prereflective pool from which thought springs forth.

"La réflexion [du cogito] ne saisit donc elle-même son sens plein que si elle mentionne le fonds irréfléchi qu'elle présuppose, dont elle profite, et qui constitue pour elle comme un passé originel, un passé qui n'a jamais été présent." (parentheses ours, Merleau-Ponty, 1967/1942, p 280).

It is from this prereflective pool that we grasp the fringes of what we may call *consciousness of being*, for as we contemplate an object of consciousness, we are implicitly aware of our own conscious being, of our embodied being-in-the-world. In this sense, consciousness of being necessarily accompanies consciousness of the object. In Merleau-Ponty's words:

"Toute pensée de quelque chose est en même temps conscience de soi, faute de quoi elle ne pourrait pas avoir d'objet. A la racine de toutes nos expériences et de toutes nos réflexions, nous trouvons donc un être qui se reconnaît lui-même immédiatement, parce qu'il est son savoir de soi et de toutes choses et qui connaît sa propre existence non pas par constatation et comme un fait donné, ou par inférence à partir d'une idée de lui-même, mais par un contact direct avec elle. La conscience de soi est l'être même de l'esprit en exercice." (Merleau-Ponty, 1945, p 426).

Thus we are confronted with the fact that prior to any thought about self, there is experience of self, for the expressed cogito is expression about *an experience of being* which is *directly lived*, an experience which is simultaneous with its apprehension, but prior to its expression. The degree of certainty that can be attributed to this experience of self-being is no more and no less than that attributed to the existence of the world.

In a manner analogous to that of Husserl, Merleau-Ponty deepens our understanding of the thinking cogito, going past it, to that which underlies it or is presupposed by it. For prior to the cogito is the primary contact of being-with-myself in conjunction with being-in-the-world, or as an embodied-subject-in-the-world.

Merleau-Ponty also notes that inventive or creative thinking never espouses the form prescribed by formal logic, notwithstanding our ability, in retrospective, to oftentimes render explicit a succession of thoughts leading to the conclusion already arrived at by intuition. The source of such intuitive thinking must therefore be considered, for we are confronted with the necessary existence of an entity from which our thoughts emanate, an entity comprising our thoughts before they are thoughts, termed by Merleau-Ponty the *tacit cogito*.

"Par delà le *cogito* parlé, celui qui est converti en énoncé et en vérité d'essence, il a bien un *cogito* tacite, une épreuve de moi par moi. Mais cette subjectivité indéclinable n'a sur elle-même et sur le monde qu'une prise glissante. (Italics by the author, Merleau-Ponty, 1945, p 462).

For Merleau-Ponty, it is within the realm of the tacit cogito that our presence to ourselves is lived, that language is given its form, and that perceptions are constituted. As with the phenomenology of perceived time, the nature of our consciousness, while endowed with seemingly infinite reflexivity with respect to

past thoughts, when contemplating the present thought, confronts the limits of the recursiveness of its gaze. Nonetheless, for Merleau-Ponty, it is only through the cogito that we may understand the tacit cogito, through its attempt to put into words this nebulous, thoughtless and wordless realm.

"Le *Cogito* tacite, la présence de soi à soi, étant l'existence même, est antérieur à toute philosophie... ...La conscience qui conditionne le langage n'est qu'une saisie globale et inarticulée du monde... ...Le *Cogito* tacite n'est *Cogito* que lorsqu'il s'est exprimé lui-même."
(Italics by the author, Merleau-Ponty, 1945, p 462-463).

Merleau-Ponty demonstrates that there is an inherent ambiguity in the sources of thought, for every thought is based in perception, which itself has an inherent uncertainty because it has to do with figure-background structures whose perspectives cannot all be given simultaneously. This obscurity and ambiguity are not a defect of our thinking, but are a reality to be reckoned with. There is no realm of pure reflection, for all reflections find their genesis in perceptions.

Thus, contrary to Descartes, Merleau-Ponty's consideration of the cogito reveals a more primordial basis - the *tacit cogito* which is the well of unthought thoughts from which spring up our conscious thoughts, a pre-reflective consciousness which renders reflection possible.

1.3.2.2.4 Intersubjectivity

Husserl's reflection upon how the other is given to me phenomenologically leads him to the paradox surrounding the alter ego: the other is an intentional object for consciousness, but is at the same time an intentional subject, experiencing the same world as me. While I do not have direct access to the consciousness of the alter ego, I

appresent it from what is presented to me, that is from my experience of his or her body, actions and words, in relationship to myself and to the world. This world appears as a common world, and while individual appearances may differ, it appears that the alter ego's world and my own world are one and the same.

Furthermore, the apperceived alter ego presupposes a core of presentation, resulting in the fusing of the appresentation and the presentation with the implication that "... what this experience presents must belong to the unity of the very object appresented", in other words, the unity of the perceived and apperceived alter ego leads to the incontrovertible sense of experiencing an actual alter ego, not a mere representation (Husserl, 1960/1950, p 122). From this it follows that the world becomes not only a world for me, but a world for the other as well, these being one and the same. In this sense, there is a phenomenological "world-for-us", resulting in the establishment of the *w e* in common perception. For Husserl, this constitutes the simplest form of intersubjectivity and of community (Mook, 1989).

Husserl's account of intersubjectivity proceeds from phenomenal observation to a conclusion on the substantiality of the alter ego through *reflection by analogy*. For Merleau-Ponty, such reflection does not do justice to our experience of others during our childhood, where prior to any capacity for such an abstract level of reflection, we consider others as substantial beings.

For Merleau-Ponty, we find ourselves immersed in a physical and social, or intersubjective, world from birth onwards, prior to any reflection upon the nature of the world. In a manner similar to the co-constitution that takes place between consciousness and its cogitated object, a similar co-constitution takes place with respect to other subjects whereby we apprehend others by virtue of a direct, pre-reflective communication of body-subjects sharing a perceptual field. Thus, rather than stating that our apprehension of ourselves precedes the apprehension of

others, Merleau-Ponty asserts that the opposite actually occurs, with the young child being aware of others before being aware of himself. He notes that we are born into intersubjectivity and we find ourselves rooted within this primordial communicative matrix of embodied and interrelated intentional subjects, prior to our capacity to reflect upon such realities.

1.3.2.2.5 Consciousness, time and presence

With Heidegger, Merleau-Ponty notes that conscious being-in-the-world necessarily takes place in time, and in this sense is the a priori condition out of which time is constituted. As with the perception of objects, the perception of time is also perspectival, and this in two respects. The first is that we are ineluctably forced to view time through the lens of the present. The second is that time is invariably perceived as a duration linked to an experience. In this sense, the perception of time is variable, and is a function of the experience one is presently considering: this may involve the perspectival grasping of this moment, this hour, this day, this week, this year or this life.

We often speak of time in terms of past, present and future. The apprehension of time in terms of past, present and future is also profoundly paradoxical, for while we may argue that only the present is accessible to us, we also have the notion of a long-term and immediate past, and of an immediate and long-term future. A phenomenological consideration of time reveals that time, and in particular, the present, is not lived as a succession of discrete "now" moments, but rather as a duration, as a saddle-back spanning across the immediate future and immediate past. In this respect, Merleau-Ponty (1945) states that time is a series of intentionalities that overlap, a flowing series of durations comprised of acts where consciousness intentionally apprehends its object, indivisible from our being-in-the-world.

For Merleau-Ponty, the primordial experience of time takes place within a "field of presence" to a world, interrelating past, present and future (Langer, 1989, p 126). Lived or phenomenal time then emanates from our living presence to the world and is indivisible from it. Most importantly, time is not something we conceive, nor something we observe, rather it is constituted in the process of life itself, of our being in a world.

Temporality is thus inseparable from being-in-the-world. Our lived experience, or being in the world, incorporates with it an indissociable *presence* to objects of the world, taking place in unfolding time, itself described as the continuous flow of the future into the present. This, in its simplest expression, is *subjectivity*, the being/presence to something, such a presence occurring simultaneously with our perception of time.

The Self and existential phenomenology

In this dissertation, the concepts evoked above are seen to express essential aspects of our *existence as beings* and in this sense they are deemed *essential aspects of Selfhood*. The Self then is seen to *exist as a conscious, perceiving and embodied subject*, immersed in and relating to a spatio-temporal world of objects and other Selves. Our ensuing analysis will thus attempt to articulate how each selected conceptualisation accounts for these aspects.

1.3.3 Summary of phenomenology and existential phenomenology

Our review of Husserl's phenomenology and Merleau-Ponty's and Heidegger's existential phenomenology bring to light the nature of consciousness on the one hand, and the nature of being on the other. The first offers an analysis of consciousness and its attributes. Here we find ourselves within a series of mutually constitutive relationships, such as between consciousness and its intended object, between cogito and cogitatum, between noesis and noema, and between subject and object. We discover the unity of consciousness and of its object, the necessary synthesis of perceptions, or of psychic acts, which Husserl terms noesis, into a meaning structure, or noema, itself the meaning attributed to the perceived object of consciousness. Merleau-Ponty's reflections on the primacy and perspectivity of perception reveal that the perceived world and our perception of ourselves are inherently ambiguous, meaning that we can never seize an object in its entirety and the complete objects that we experience are the result of a pre-reflective synthesis of multitudinous perspectival views demanded by our perspectival situatedness. The perception of time is no exception as it also fails to escape from this ambiguous perspectivism. In likewise manner, the phenomenological analysis of the cogito reveals the existence of a more fundamental reality, that of the tacit cogito, that underlying well of unthought thoughts from which thought, language and all other forms of expression spring forth. The body is also considered, not as the reflection-derived object of physiological and biological theorising, but as the lived perception and expression of our attentions and intentions, the vehicle by which we not only apprehend the world, but by which our intentions find expression in the world. Finally, the relationship to others is considered, and reflection brings to light a pre-reflective 'world for us' in which others are apprehended as other subjects in a commonly perceived world.

These interrelationships are various articulations of the primary interrelationship occurring between being and world, such *being-in-the-world* being pre-given.

Correlative to our being-in-the-world is the notion of conscious (attentional - intentional) presence, along with the constitution and perception of immanent time, otherwise formulated as the emergence of subjectivity at its most primordial level. Our ability to apprehend any of these notions is limited by the perspectivity of our gaze; consequently we discover the ambiguity inherent in all knowledge of ourselves. Rather than circumvent or ignore this ambiguity, the existential phenomenology of Merleau-Ponty attempts to articulate it fully.

While the later Husserl touches upon the ontological foundations of his method with the concept of *lebenswelt*, Heidegger and Merleau-Ponty are largely responsible for the articulation of the concepts of *existence*, or *being-in-the-world* and *embodied-being-in-the-world* respectively. However, as underlined by Heidegger (1996/1926) and to a lesser extent by Merleau-Ponty (1945), our apprehension of our beingness is the result of an *interpretative* activity, one taking place within the confines of such beingness, itself taking place within a historical and social world serving as undeniable context to which we are often blind. From this perspective, Husserl's *epoché*, while concerning itself with the apprehension of meaning, incorporates a necessary and inescapable interpretative component. We shall reconsider this interpretative aspect of phenomenology later in this section.

Phenomenology concerns itself with the apprehension of lived experience, with its accurate and plenary expression into language, a designation by symbols of something other than symbols, that is to say lived experience. The discipline concerned with language and with the interpretation of meaning in general and to that of texts in particular, is *hermeneutics*. It is to this philosophical discipline that we now turn.

1.4 Hermeneutics

1.4.1 Introduction to hermeneutics

Hermeneutics takes its meaning from the Greek term, *hermeneia*, meaning "interpretation", or *hermeneuein*, "to interpret". Aristotle, in the *Organon*, considers the subject of interpretation in his chapter *Peri hermeneias*. Other ancient writings, such as those of Plato, Xenophon, and Plutarch, mention hermeneutics in various works (Palmer, 1969). Hermeneutics finds its etymological roots in the Greek god *Hermes*, charged with the task of translating to humans messages from the Gods.

From a cursory review of hermeneutics since Aristotle, Palmer (1969) discusses two basic orientations, that represented by Gadamer, who was influenced by Heidegger, and that espoused by Betti and Hirsch. This second hermeneutics emphasises the notion of the objective truth of a text, and the methods required to attain it. While they do not address the *experience of interpretation*, both Betti and Hirsch presuppose an interpreter's innate ability to interpret and the task then is one of validating this interpretation with the one gleaned from a thorough consideration of the author's life work.

Gadamer, on the other hand, focuses on the nature of understanding itself, attempting to seek out "what all ways of understanding have in common" and to show that understanding is never "a subjective procedure in relation to a given 'object' but that it belongs to the operative history - and this means, to the being - of what is understood." (Palmer, 1969, p 59). He notes that the particular meaning of a text can never be pinned down in a definitive manner, that meaning is subject to change as the historical events shape and delimit the context serving as horizon of meanings.

Paul Ricoeur, himself a phenomenological hermeneuticist, distinguishes himself as providing the necessary link between the phenomenological hermeneutics of Gadamer and the epistemological and methodological hermeneutics of Betti and Hirsch. Ricoeur (Howard, 1982), while not siding with Betti and Hirsch on the notion that interpretation must reveal the author's intention, opines that Gadamer's phenomenological hermeneutics provides an insufficient methodological foothold serving to arbitrate between competing interpretations, arguing that some kind of continuity must be evinced between the ontological and methodological conditions of truth. Ricoeur notes that linguistics and semiology suggest that anterior to any utterance there is the thing to which the text refers, "la chose du texte" that remains independent of the author's intentions and of the reader's interpretations (Howard, 1982, p 170). The task of unravelling the nature of the text belongs to semiotics, which provides us with an analysis of its different levels of meaning. Ricoeur's contention is that we must continue to search for a dialogical method that effectively links the ontological and the methodological. We shall see further below that his contribution will be towards an articulation of this method by effectively linking the concepts of explanation and understanding within an overarching process of interpretation.

Following this summary exposition of the development of hermeneutics, the form of hermeneutics that we shall espouse in this thesis shall be that of phenomenological hermeneutics, as developed by Gadamer and Ricoeur. We shall now address ourselves to the exposition of this philosophical discipline.

1.4.2 Understanding and the hermeneutic circle

According to Gadamer (Palmer, 1969), understanding is a referential operation, carried out by comparing aspects of what we are attempting to understand to what is already understood. These "chunks" of understanding can be represented by

individual parts within a circle which represents what is to be understood. For example, in a sentence the words have a meaning independent of the sentence, but they also gather their meaning from their arrangement within the sentence, that together they form. In a more general sense, concepts gather their meaning from their contextual horizons, these horizons in turn gather their meaning from the concepts which compose them. Meaning then is derived from the circular interaction, a dialectical relationship between the whole and its parts (Palmer, 1969). For understanding to be attained, there must, in the first place, exist an area of shared *preunderstanding*, a community of meaning shared between the reader and the text: a common perspective of language or culture, or at least, certain commonalities of language and culture.

Gadamer also argues for the linguisticity of all understanding. One aspect of language has to do with the formation of the universal, or of the formation of the general concept. Such formation of universals, Gadamer contends, cannot take place without interpretation, a putting into language, or a "coming to a stand", that at the same time refers to the experience and effectively goes beyond it, universalising it, for the words do not only designate the particular object, but also designate all similar objects (Gadamer, 1980, p 138). Understanding then, for Gadamer, is language-bound.

In the reading of texts, the interactions between the whole and its parts and between the reader and the text is a dialectical process where the interpreter, from his contextual horizon of preunderstanding, uses a partial understanding to understand further, to immerse himself within the contextual horizon of the text. Within the reading of the text, the interpreter actively engages in a dialectical process of moving between his own context, or horizon of meaning, to that delimited by the text. He is also involved in a parallel process of moving from the whole to its parts and vice versa. The reader's initial grasp of the meaning of the text is therefore biased and incomplete, but serves as a new basis of comparison when he or she returns to the

text to arrive at understanding. *Understanding is achieved when the horizon of meaning of the reader fuses with that of the text, or in other words, when the meaning as grasped corresponds very closely to the meaning as it is (re)read.* This may take several readings of the text, as well as the appropriation of other related knowledge. In each reading of the text, the reader deepens his understanding of it, especially if the text is complex and has multiple levels of meaning. In this sense, the circle can also be conceived as a spiral, for even though the reader may be reconsidering the initial or more superficial meaning of a text, his understanding is in effect deepened through his previous struggle with it. This twofold articulation of the dialectical interrelationship between the parts and the whole as well as between the reader and the text is referred to as the *hermeneutic circle* (Palmer, 1969).

Another aspect of hermeneutics concerns itself with the manner in which experience is apprehended and fixed into texts. Paul Ricoeur (1980, 1981, and 1983), who has made significant investigations in this area, contends that there exists a particular relationship between lived experience and its narration. We now turn to his deliberations.

1.4.3 The relationship between time and narrative

1.4.3.1 Mimesis and muthos

In his book *Temps et récit*, Ricoeur (1983) sets out to articulate the dialectical relationship between temporal experience and its narration. Departing from Augustine's reflections on the phenomenology of lived time and considering Aristotle's concepts of *mimesis* and *muthos*, Ricoeur details his own concept of the intricate interrelationship between lived experience and its narration. Here *muthos* is the process of composing an intrigue, in which is effected the interlinking of facts and the configuration of themes, while *mimesis*, meaning to mime, relates to the dynamic process of imitating or representing human action.

In general, for Ricoeur, narrative *configures* experience into a structure comprising beginning, middle and end, these attributes not being part of lived experience per se, but rather being added by narration:

"Or, si la succession peut ainsi être subordonnée à la connexion logique, c'est parce que les idées de commencement, de milieu et de fin ne sont pas prises de l'expérience: ce ne sont pas des traits de l'action effective, mais des effets de l'ordonnance du poème." (Ricoeur, 1983, p 67).

Ricoeur's reflections lead him to conceptualise narrative activity in three distinct moments of *mimesis I*, *mimesis II* and *mimesis III*. The first moment of mimetic activity, *mimesis I*, what Ricoeur (1983) also terms *prefiguration*, involves explicating the structural, symbolic and temporal features of action. Our ability to pre-reflectively tease a potential narrative out from the fabric of lived experience is anterior to our reflection and wording of it, and such corresponds, in Ricoeur's estimation, to a *pre-understanding* of lived experience. For Ricoeur, this pre-understanding attests to the *pre-narrative structure* of experience itself.

The second mimetic activity, *mimesis II*, involves the textual *configuration* per se. The configurational act is, through the presentation of characters and their situation, that by which the themes of experience are articulated. It is the act of *emplotment* which synthesises successive heterogeneous events into coherent wholes where goals, causes and fortuity are assembled within a temporal unity of integral action.

For Ricoeur, it is within *mimesis II* that narrative interweaves two complimentary concepts of time, the first being the linear representation of time, evidenced by the narrative activity: events both unfold and succeed themselves irreversibly in time. The configurative dimension correlatively transforms the sequence of events into a

significant totality, a configuration of themes or a summarising "thought". Such a configuration of themes, Ricoeur maintains, is not a-temporal, but manifests itself after the telling, or during a re-telling of the intrigue in which each event can be apprehended in light of the narrative's conclusion. In Ricoeur's opinion, a new quality of time emerges out of this comprehension, in as much as the retelling, governed in its totality by the conclusion, constitutes an alternative to representing time as flowing from past to future.

Finally, emplotment is carried out with an audience in mind. In this respect, the author must configure the narrative in light of the expectations and requirements of the audience. The minimal requirement is that the narrative be comprehensible to others. Other requirements may become manifest, such as amusing the audience, entertaining it, or motivating it to action. In this respect, narration must also take into account the *refiguration* to be carried out by the supposed audience.

Refiguration is necessary if the narrative is to have some application within the audience's world of experience and action. Such refiguration is the third constituent of the mimetic process, what Ricoeur terms *mimesis III*.

In brief, our explication of the mimetic processes highlights three attributes about the dialectical relationship between narrative and lived experience. The first is that while experience is structured by its narration, it is not amenable to just any structuration, but in fact it *calls for* basic narrative configuration in terms of beginning, middle and end. Secondly, emplotment, or narration, incorporates an addition to experience, by its formulation into syntactic format, bringing to light themes, events and causes that are not apparent until narrated. Such attributes as the delimitation of events in terms of beginning and ending, and the attribution of certain events as causal or quasi-causal to others, are added by the activity of narration, they are not part of experience per se. Here time is given substantiality through the process of narration, which in turn is effected within time. Time becomes human or lived time to the extent that it is articulated in narrative form,

and narrative attains its full significance when it becomes a condition of temporal existence. Finally, narration incorporates an intersubjective dimension, in that always it is effected in light of some actual or supposed audience, which is considered in light of a certain desired effect.

Ricoeur's reflections suggest an intricate synthesis between experience and its interpretation. It also provides the grounds for a synthesis between phenomenology and hermeneutics. This shall we shall consider presently.

1.4.4 Ricoeur's theory of interpretation: an integration of understanding and explanation

Dilthey (Palmer, 1969) was the first to distinguish *explanation* from *understanding*, the former concept he reserved for the natural sciences, while the latter concerned itself with how we come to apprehend human phenomena, that of the psychic realm. More specifically for Dilthey, understanding designates the operations of the mind in which it grasps the mind of another person.

According to Dilthey, the object of the human sciences is to understand life experience from categories intrinsic to it, using a system of categories that respects lived experience. Dilthey criticised the natural science explanatory methods for their inapplicability to the domain of the human sciences, for in his opinion, such methods leave out any reference to inner life. We shall reconsider Dilthey's and others' objections to the natural scientific paradigm in the next section.

Ricoeur (1981) undertakes to revise the relationship between understanding and explanation. In his opinion, Dilthey's distinction is an exaggerated one, being chiefly motivated by his concern to distinguish between two realms, that of the natural

sciences and that of the human sciences. Ricoeur contends that explanation is also applicable to the human realm, and is intimately linked to language and forms part of interpretation. As we have seen above, Ricoeur demonstrates the intimate relationship between narrative and temporal experience, one where he attributes to narrative the function of configuration into words, sentences and themes of lived experience, which in itself is inherently amenable to narration by way of its prenarrative structure. Language, by way of its internal structures, both horizontal and hierarchical, by its differentiations, its themes and its relationships, is in fact an abstraction of experience, teasing out its relevant elements, organising them into complex relationships, whereby we achieve meaning and sense. The structuring of experience effected by language is necessary and fruitful, for without it, no element of experience is discernible from another, for it is only through symbolisation, with language as its most widespread and articulated form, that meaning may be attributed to it.

For Ricoeur, such structuration of experience through narrative incorporates an explanatory component. Thus, *explaining* a narrative equates to articulating the fleeting structure of interlaced actions, such units of action resulting from the combination of various smaller units such as themes, sentences, words, and phonemes. Ricoeur (1980, 1981) argues that there can be no generation of meaning without a minimum of structuration. Words are inherently polysemic and can stand for many things depending on the context. Structuration brings about an economy and order which sets limits on polysemic meaning, with symbols achieving their significance within a whole that simultaneously limits and articulates their meaning. With respect to such structuration, explanation corresponds to the *division of the literary work into elements and the articulation of the structural relationships between such elements*.

"to *explain* is to bring out the structure, that is, the internal relations of dependence which constitute the statics of the text;" (italics ours, Ricoeur, 1981, p 161-162).

For Ricoeur, structural analysis is a necessary stage in the understanding of a text. This is especially true in the case of complex texts where more than one meaning is possible. While a certain understanding may be gleaned from a cursory reading of a text, a deeper analysis of its structure, of its themes, characters and plots, in other words its *explanation*, will result in a deeper and more comprehensive understanding. Such deeper understanding in turn enriches the explanation. Thus for Ricoeur, *understanding and explanation are opposite but complimentary aspects of the overarching activity of interpretation.*

"If, on the contrary, we regard structural analysis as a stage - and a necessary one - between a naive and a critical interpretation, between a surface and a depth interpretation, then it seems possible to situate explanation and interpretation along a unique *hermeneutical arc* (italics by the author) and to *integrate the opposed attitudes of explanation and understanding within an overall conception of reading [interpretation] as the recovery of meaning* (italics and parentheses ours)." (Ricoeur, 1981, p 161).

While explanation involves the segmentation and reintegration of elements into a whole, Ricoeur notes that the elements singled out may not correspond to segments of psychic life that can be experienced.

"The task of structural analysis will be to carry out the segmentation of the work (horizontal aspect), then to establish the various levels of integration of the parts in the whole (hierarchical aspect). Thus the units of action isolated by the analyst *will not be psychological units capable of being experienced*, nor will they be units of behaviour which could be subsumed to a behaviourist psychology." (italics ours, Ricoeur, 1981, p 156).

Here we note that explanation incorporates the articulation of aspects of lived experience that *are beyond the phenomenally given*. We cannot, for example, experience themes or plots, such entities are abstracted from the narrative, itself

teased out from the fabric of lived experience. Neither are such elements normally apparent during the telling of lived experience, their manifestation is usually the fruit of their explanation, such involves the explication of elements and structures beyond the immediately given, otherwise expressed as the text's *hidden system of meanings* (Ricoeur, 1981).

In brief, Ricoeur's theory of interpretation involves the interplay of two opposing emphases, those of understanding and of explanation. Understanding, as defined by referral to the hermeneutic circle, is achieved via the narration of lived experience, which, while it includes its plenary and detailed description, also incorporates its structuration. For its part, explanation involves the consideration of the described experience, and more importantly, the analysis of the relationships between structural elements that lie beyond the phenomenally given. Explanation thus distinguishes itself from understanding but remains related to it in an overarching activity of interpretation. This mutual and dynamic dialectical interrelationship is another expression of the hermeneutic circle.

Finally, the circular nature of interpretation as defined by Ricoeur brings to the foreground the inherent uncertainty of our knowledge. As we have seen with Gadamer, understanding is inherently perspectival. The same may said for interpretation. Our knowledge is thus limited, no absolute knowledge is possible, and in most situations, there will be a conflict of interpretations.

"But the permanent return of this self-presentation to the event of speech in which, *ultimately*, interpretation is accomplished signifies that philosophy mourns the loss of absolute knowledge. It is because absolute knowledge is impossible that the conflict of interpretations is insurmountable and inescapable." (italics by the author, Ricoeur, 1981, p 193).

Thus the notion of a single truthful interpretation is replaced with the notion of multiple competing interpretations, with the most adequate interpretation being that which yields the most comprehensive understanding.

1.4.5 Summary of hermeneutics

From our articulation of Gadamer's hermeneutic circle, we moved to Ricoeur's theory of understanding explicating the relationships between experience, time and narrative. Next, we evoked Dilthey's formal opposition of explanation and understanding, following which we moved to Ricoeur's more conciliatory position where explanation is elaborated as an activity distinct from understanding, yet related to it in an overall activity of interpretation. As we have seen, explanation involves the differentiation of the text's structural relationships. This accesses a system of meanings hidden beyond the phenomenally given, permitting a deeper understanding of that to which the text refers, which is invariably some aspect of our world and of our beingness within it. Such deepened understanding in turn deepens explanation, constituting, in our opinion, another expression of the hermeneutic circle.

Given that all interpretation is effected from a particular contextual horizon, we find it always biased, in that it is always influenced by the prejudgement emanating from our social-cultural-individual situatedness. Thus, we are forced to concede to the limitations and ambiguity of our knowledge emanating from the "insurmountable and inescapable" conflict of interpretations (Ricoeur, 1981, p 193).

1.4.6 The relevance of hermeneutics to the study of the Self

From a hermeneutic point of view, we are constantly engaged in an attempt to understand ourselves and our world, and we find ourselves continually immersed in interpretation. While our later chapters will serve to articulate our position more clearly, here we propose that the Self can be seen as *both an interpreted and interpreting entity*, using symbols and language to understand and explain itself and its world.

Secondly, hermeneutics also provides some guiding principles with which we may undertake our exploratory study of the Self - we note that our study will be through the medium of texts describing each author's conceptualisation of Self. Our own reading of the texts will be guided by an explicit application of the hermeneutic circle to ensure some measure of validity. Such will be addressed at the end of this chapter in the section detailing the evaluation criteria.

1.5 Hermeneutics and existential phenomenology

1.5.1 The existential circle as basis to the hermeneutic circle

For Heidegger, Gadamer and Ricoeur, understanding is not only a mode of knowledge but also a mode of being. Contrary to Husserl, Ricoeur affirms that during description of phenomena, any categories that emerge, even the various 'existentials' arrived at by Heidegger in his categorisation of Dasein, are invariably the result of an interpretation (Ricoeur, 1981). Thus the meaning of Being is an interpretation which itself relies on our pre-reflective understanding of Being.

"Since Dasein is characterized by its understanding of Being, the meaning of Being can only be interpreted from within this pre-current understanding." (Bleicher, 1980, p 100).

With our understanding of a state so fundamental as that of Being - itself the result of interpretation, it follows that all other interpretations are, according to Heidegger, a derivative of this basic interpretation, this "hermeneutic of Dasein" (Bleicher, 1980, p 100).

"Hermeneutical theory, on this basis, can be no more than a derivative of the fundamental 'hermeneutic of Dasein', in which we try to explicate and clarify an already existing (pre)-understanding that is a structure of our 'Being-in-the-world'." (Bleicher, 1980, p 100).

This fundamental interpretative state Heidegger (Bleicher, 1980) terms the *ontological* or *existential circle* and it lies at the basis of the hermeneutic circle. Seen in this light, understanding is a fundamental way of Being, one of the basic characterisations, or *existentials*, of Dasein. This *Dasein as understanding* then becomes the basis from which all interpretation must take place, such interpretation applying not only to texts, but also to lived experience in the world.

1.5.2 The relationship between phenomenology and hermeneutics

Ricoeur (1981) maintains that there is an indissoluble interrelationship between phenomenology and hermeneutics. As we have seen with Merleau-Ponty (1945), description cannot be carried out from a transcendental, bird's eye point of view. The describing subject is already embodied and involved - incorporated - in the perceptual or experiential field. In brief, there can be no pure understanding through pure description, for description cannot take place without language introducing a minimal structuring of experience into word elements which relate to each other and to the context, as articulated within the metaphor of the hermeneutic circle. On the other hand, for Orth (1987b), interpretation not only always presupposes the description of the referred-to phenomenon, it is itself always

"interwoven with acts of description" (Orth, 1987b, p 82). Furthermore, description of new phenomena or of one of their novel features usually involves their interpretation. Thus, while the distinction between description and interpretation is made clear in order to facilitate their differences, in actual fact, they are correlative and indissoluble activities. The following excerpt by Orth (1987a), we believe, summarises this view:

"But our model, as a division of labor, separating description and interpretation, and arranging the one as successive to the other, turns out to be oversimplified. For description is never carried out without taking - more or less consciously - a certain point of view. But this means that description is preceded by an interpretation. Of course, interpretation for its part also presupposes description - i.e., not only the description of the described matter which is to be interpreted explicitly. Rather, interpretation itself is as such also interwoven with acts of description. Furthermore, the description of new phenomena or of new features of phenomena within a coherence is often an occasion motivating re-interpretations. Thus, what we have here is a correlation - indeed, a manifold interwovenness of description and interpretation which factually cannot be separated." (Orth, 1987a, p 82).

From Orth's point of view, because a total reduction is impossible, the essences arrived at via the phenomenological method cannot be endowed with certainty of truth, and while phenomenology appeals to bracketing to reduce the effect of context as much as possible, it is necessary for phenomenology to conceive of its method as "an exegesis, an explication, an interpretation." (Ricoeur, 1981, p 120). This does not invalidate the phenomenological method on the grounds that its ideal of attaining unbiased essences can never be reached, for in a manner similar to the comparison of theories in the natural sciences, we can only distinguish between poor descriptions and better ones. The phenomenological method is undeniably unsurpassed in its ability to provide 'better' descriptions (Mohanty, 1987).

On the other hand, while structuration brought about by language is necessary in order for meaning to occur, language must refer to something outside of itself, it must, in the final instance, exit from the syntactic system of referrals within itself. This of course goes against structuralism, which warrants that internal or syntactic relationships are sufficient for the creation of meaning. We thus note the complementary relationship between text and phenomena of lived experience, and between hermeneutics and phenomenology, with each of these disciplines relying on the other in order to define and constitute itself.

To summarise, from the initial phenomenological starting point, we have discovered the act of interpretation that description presupposes, without which phenomenology cannot articulate its essences. Conversely, all interpretation refers to something described, to phenomena taken as relatively fixed in their manifestations. It is thus necessary to carry out such description in as rigorous a manner as possible, and for this we have need of the phenomenological method.

Having moved from phenomenology to existential phenomenology, to hermeneutics, we now find ourselves engaged in a *phenomenological hermeneutics*, which can be conceived as the integration of these disciplines as we have rendered them here.

Phenomenology, existential phenomenology and phenomenological hermeneutics are some of the philosophical disciplines underlying an epistemology deemed appropriate to the study of the *human subject*, the centre of interest of those scientific disciplines, such as psychology, sociology, anthropology and criminology, composing a larger domain of *human science*. The research methods and assumptions of the human sciences are seen to largely oppose those of the *natural sciences*, which traditional psychology has largely adopted. We shall now examine the natural science approach and its applicability to psychology.

1.6 Natural science versus human science

1.6.1 Overview of the natural science approach

The natural science approach saw its beginnings in the renaissance and enlightenment periods spanning the 16th, 17th and 18th centuries. Boring (1957), in a thorough review of what he terms the "rise of modern science", outlines how brilliant men such as Descartes, Copernicus, Galileo, Kepler, Newton and Harvey spearheaded the developments within philosophy, physics, mathematics and physiology, progressively shaping the conception of science in respect of its subject matter and its methods. According to Boring, we can interpret this rise in scientific thinking and activity as a revolt against the stalwartness of the Church, interested in maintaining its influence over the populace through its dogma and traditions, consequently frowning severely at any attempt to challenge its version of truth.

These developments characterised the *modern age*, which began in the 18th century, giving rise to the modern view of science and to the progressive predominance of the *hypothetico-deductive* method of inquiry. Succinctly put, this method starts with the consideration of phenomena that are either unexplained or are not explained adequately by existing theory. The scientist, through intuition, creativity and insight into relationships, formulates a theory that attempts to better explain the phenomena. With respect to the domain of physics, theory is usually expressed mathematically, as a formula with various variables, such variables representing abstract attributes that apply to all physical bodies (e.g., mass, velocity, acceleration, energy), such a formula expressing the general behaviour of the entity considered. From the theory can be deduced certain consequences, many of them unforeseen prior to their deduction. Subsequent to the logical deduction of predictions from the general theory, the task then is to render such predictions amenable to empirical observation. If the predicted phenomenon doesn't materialise itself in the manner expected, the theory is refuted. If it does, the theory is corroborated until proven otherwise.

This model, derived largely from physics, became the prevailing scientific paradigm applicable to all sciences, especially to the hard sciences of physics, chemistry, and to a lesser extent, biology. With this development came the progressive severing from philosophy and its speculative introspective methods. The guarantor of truth was thus shifted from authority of the Church to that of empirical verification through experimentation, with its attendant requirement for precise, controlled quantification and measurement.

At precise, controlled observation, the Germans excelled, and in the early 17th century, we witness according to Boring (1957), their garnering of biology and physiology, disciplines requiring precise categorisations and thorough descriptions, serving to create a taxonomy of facts to be later explained by inductive theory. This set the stage for the budding science of psychology as it began in the late 19th century, largely as an offshoot of physiology and biology, to which the methods of science, especially those of physics, were applied. Thus took form the field of experimental psychology, expressed principally as psychophysics, where precise measurements were put into correspondence with detailed description of sensory impressions, and the relationship between the two expressed as general laws and principles.

Most of present-day psychology has continued with the same basic scientific paradigm, that is to say that of the hypothetico-deductive method with its consonant empirical refutation/verification through detailed measurement and experimentation.

Following Dilthey (Palmer, 1969), many proponents of the human sciences have long-standingly held that the natural science methods of enquiry are not applicable to the psychological realm. In their opinion, the human mind cannot be studied using the methods of natural science, methods they qualify as *explanatory* in the

sense that they attempt to account for psychological phenomena in terms of nomothetic theories which refer to causally related variables abstracted from lived experience. Rather, human science maintains that such experience must be *understood* by way of description, with the phenomenological method and its adaptations giving privileged access to such understanding. We shall presently consider some of the grounds for which these representatives of psychology as a human science oppose the natural science methods and suppositions.

1.6.2 Summary review of human science's criticism of the natural science assumptions and methods

Proponents of the human science community have traditionally opposed the use of explanatory natural science assumptions and methods on three principle grounds. These are its use of *reductionistic and elementalist conceptualisation and measurement* (Dilthey, 1977/1894; James, 1890; and DeBoer, 1983), with *erroneous classification of phenomena in deference to preconceived theoretical categories* (Merleau-Ponty, 1967/1942, 1945), and with *predictive nomological causal explanation* rather than *rational explanation or understanding* (DeBoer, 1983).

The first problem with the natural science methods is the requirement for reductionism, which inevitably incurs a loss of the richness and complexity of the phenomenon, resulting in quantitative variables that are more often than not of limited application and value. Reductionism is related to the second problem in that interpretation of phenomena is more often than not carried out in deference of the categories required by the theoretical abstractions that precede naturalistic observation. Existential phenomenology for its part, gives precedence to the lived world and asserts that this lived world is to be described, explored and understood in its richness and complexity, rather than reduced to the artificial categories demanded by an pre-conceived theoretical frame of reference and methodology.

A second criticism, that of elementalism, states that natural science has proceeded with its analysis by singling out elements of psychic life and attempting a conceptualisation by way of their synthesis. In psychology as a human science, thoughts are wholes that do not lend themselves to analysis on the basis of a correspondence between their parts and the parts of the de facto object. Thoughts are not experienced as elements, but are intentionally linked to entire objects, irrespective of the latter's composition and complexity.

A further assumption of natural science has to do with the postulate of nomothetism, that is, of law-governedness. In the natural sciences, there is an explicit attempt at finding relationships between variables that are law-like, repeatable and predictable, usually expressible in mathematical terms. Nomothetic theories invariably refer to causality, that is cause and effect relationships between entities formulated as variables.

DeBoer criticises the Kantian principle of "tout changement doit avoir une cause" (Kant, 1967/1781, p 33). His contention is that the principle of causality is so ingrained in everyday and in scientific thinking that it is never questioned. This has erroneously influenced our thinking to the point that causality becomes definitional of reality.

"Because events are viewed within a causal framework from the very outset, it is necessarily [and erroneously] true that every event has a cause. In such a context one might contend that the principle of sufficient ground is indeed an analytic statement. It is certainly necessary that every event has a ground if the event is conceived of right from the outset within a causal framework. That it has a sufficient ground is then true by definition." (parentheses ours, DeBoer, 1983, p 23).

Human science argues that our apprehension of lived experience is in the first instance pre-reflective, that is, prior to the attribution of relationships, causal or otherwise. Secondly, as beings intentionally related to the world of objects, we cannot be causally determined since the intentional relationship is not a causal one.

While these arguments have much merit, we believe that the human science proponents may have gone too far in their criticism of the natural science approach and may have not fully recognised the limits of their own approach. We would now like to examine their criticisms with a view of establishing a rapprochement between these two approaches.

While we agree that the natural sciences have been in a haste to proceed with reductionistic measurement, we are forced to recognise that the phenomenological reduction itself incurs a corresponding loss of richness, for it puts into language the meaning of lived experience but is not the experience itself, remaining always one step removed. Languaging necessitates a reduction and generalisation.

Notwithstanding, the strength of the phenomenological method lies in its attempt to understand, via rigorous description, the intricacies of human experience in as much detail and richness as possible. While there is, even by virtue of the method, an inevitable loss of richness of the original experience, we contend that the natural science's surge towards reduction for the purposes of measurement has occasioned a more glaring disregard of how such reduction is to be carried out. Thus, in our view, the error of the natural science approach in psychology is not the reduction of experience per se, but the manner in which such reduction is effected. In the first instance, the natural science approach invariably results in the reduction of experience to simple most-often unitary variables. In the second instance, we agree that such reduced variables are usually determined by the theoretical categories laid out in advance and do not respect the natural occurring ones deemed to result from the phenomenological reduction.

Thus in our view, the error of the natural science paradigm in the human realm is the *over-reduction* of experience into theoretical categories that do not respect lived experience. Here the natural science method in psychology may well profit from a fuller descriptive account of experience prior to engaging in an attempt to theorise. Phenomenology may conceivably serve as a prerequisite to all theorisation, and be given a place as a rigorous discipline and foundation to both natural and human sciences.

While James and Dilthey formally oppose elementalism on the grounds that it corresponds to an abstraction not in accord with lived experience, they also assert that reflection implies such abstractive ability. James, for his part, states:

"that any total impression made on the mind must be unanalyzable, whose elements are never experienced apart. (...) The act of singling out something from a whole is called abstraction and *the element disengaged is an abstract.*" (italics ours, James, 1890, p 505).

Here we draw also on Ricoeur (1981), noting that the elements and structures of language bear some similarity with those used by the natural sciences to explain phenomena. In both cases, there is a division into elements and structures, followed by the explication of the relationships between them. In both cases, the elements used to explain are not necessarily accessible as units of experience. Whereas for the natural sciences such elements will be dictated by theory and are usually expressed mathematically, in the case of the human sciences, the elements are those resident within language. Both sciences involve reflection, and reflection involves singling out elements from lived experience, drawing distinctions and similarities between them and noting their interrelationships. In our view then, the distinction to be made between natural and human science does not primarily lie in the former's use of elementalist thinking, but in its method of abstracting these elements from lived experience. We contend that here again, the phenomenological method, in its goal of intuiting essences, gives access to the most fruitful abstractions from experience.

As noted above, nomothetism invariably involves causality. To be considered a cause, an event must therefore not only precede its effect, it must also be able to fully account for the latter, i.e., the latter must necessarily follow from the former. From the phenomenological and hermeneutic points of view, events simply succeed themselves, causality is not part of lived experience, it is *attributed* through our reflection upon and narration of such experience.

In natural science, conceptualisation of events in the spatio-temporal world is best achieved by appeal to postulated causal relationships between entities, such relationships being subsequently subjected to empirical verification, with the best explanations having the best corroboration with experience, or the best resistance to refutation. Our confidence in our understanding of experience is greatest when our interpretation gives us a high degree of repeatability of experience; in hermeneutic terms, this is when there is stability of interpretation. However, as articulated by Ricoeur, such apparent repeatability of experience does not guarantee the truthfulness of our interpretation, for future experience may not corroborate the initial interpretation and may necessitate a reinterpretation. We note that this applies to both the human and natural scientific realms. Thus, while the natural sciences invoke causality and repeatability of experience, these do not ensure any certitude, with both approaches demanding openness to refutation and reinterpretation.

However, applying the notion of causality to the human realm has been fraught with difficulty. Merleau-Ponty states that thought, as expressed through language, draws its structures and relationships from (embodied) lived experience. This is highly reflected in language, where nouns, verbs and adjectives entertain relations between them that mirror relations in the natural world. Ricoeur's articulation of the intimate interwovenness between experience and its narration corroborates this view. In Merleau-Ponty's words:

"Qu'exprime donc le langage, s'il n'exprime pas des pensées?... ... Le terme de 'monde' n'est pas ici une manière de parler: il veut dire que *la vie 'mentale'* ou culturelle *emprunte à la vie naturelle ses structures* et que *le sujet pensant doit être fondé sur le sujet incarné*. Le geste phonétique réalise, pour le sujet parlant et pour ceux qui l'écotent, une certaine structuration de l'expérience, une certaine modulation de l'existence, *exactement comme un comportement de mon corps investit pour moi et pour autrui les objets qui m'entourent d'une certaine signification.*" (italics ours, Merleau-Ponty, 1945, p 225-226).

Based on Ricoeur's and Merleau-Ponty's observations, we note the similarity of structural relationships between the psychic and natural realms. However, in the psychic realm, there can be no strict application of causal relationships between psychic elements, as this goes against our experience of being able to make decisions that go against the perceived pressures implied by certain situational contexts. With this indeterminacy in mind, DeBoer (1983) argues for *rational explanation* as being applicable to the human sciences, with such explanation accounting for actions by a human agent who acts in accordance with certain *reasons*, such reasons differing from determinate causes. In this sense, relationships between psychic entities can be seen as quasi-causal at best.

While the human subject experiences his intentions as following from certain reasons, and while these do not have the attributes of strict causality, such intentions will be inevitably tied to his interpretation of the situation and its context, and while he may be free to change his actions following any reinterpretation of the contextual situation, we argue that the human subject cannot help but attribute himself as the *cause of his actions*, carried out for particular reasons, with the expectation of a particular effect. And so while we advocate rational explanation rather than causal explanation as more suitable for explaining one's intentions, such intentions are perceived by the individual to be causally related to their effects, with the human subject attributing himself as the sole cause of his actions in the world. Such attribution, in our view, is what accounts for our sense of *agency*.

Related to the notions of nomothetism and causality is that of *predictability*, itself related to action. In all sciences, there is usually a requirement to act. In the natural sciences, it is the predictive capability of the nomothetical theory that gives us the ability to act upon nature. Without exception, the technological innovations intended to augment our quality of life are the result of the predictive ability of theory.

DeBoer (1983) considers the more particular case of psychology, and notes that in the human sciences, there is also a requirement to act, with the most common imperative being the reduction of psychological suffering. While the human sciences have usually criticised the natural sciences in their endeavour of increased predictability, even in the human sciences, predictability is absolutely necessary if one is to act effectively.

While the human sciences have focused on the understanding of lived experience rather than its explanation, we note that understanding does not necessarily indicate what actions are necessary to effect desired changes. For example, Freud's (1949/1927) conceptualisation indicates that in order to render unconscious contents conscious, the defence mechanisms must be either removed, disabled or circumvented. Other than these general indications however, Freud's conceptualisation doesn't indicate what specific interventions need to be carried out by the analyst in order to effect these changes, and we note that Freud's therapeutic methods of free association and dream interpretation do not necessarily derive from his conceptualisation of the psyche. This being the case, any method thought to produce the desired effect becomes plausible, and the best method will be the one that produces the desired effect in the most efficacious manner possible. In this vein, the methods conjured will be either known to have certain effects, or if still unproved, will be expected to. It is only through their tentative use that they will be proven, subsequent to which the methods will be retained, refined or discarded.

We contend that such knowledge will invariably be understood as comprising a *rational relationship* between the action and its effect, that is that while the human subject may well perceive itself as cause of its own actions, and while he may also predict certain probable effects, these as we well know, are not always realised.

In brief, predictability is not applicable to the psychic realm with the same degree of certainty as in the natural world. While the human subject attributes itself as the causal agent of its own actions, these are related to his intentions, themselves tied to a rational consideration of different factors arising from the interpretation of lived experience. Thus, action intended to have a desired effect upon the actions of another subject require the rational explanation of his intentions, and in this sense imply what we here term *rational predictability*.

To summarise, while human scientific psychology has criticised natural scientific psychology for the inappropriateness of its assumptions and methods, we have argued that psychology as a human science also espouses these, although in most cases, to a lesser extent. In our consideration of elementalism and reductionism, we have demonstrated that the differences evoked are not as contradictory as they first appear, while in the case of nomothetism, we have demonstrated the necessity of such assumptions, although in altered form.

We have seen that while the human sciences' ontological and epistemological position has strong merit, it does not fully consider the limits of phenomenology, existential phenomenology and hermeneutics, as we have articulated them. We also demonstrated that the natural science paradigm and methods are not as radically opposed to the human science paradigm as is often upheld. On the other hand, the assumptions of psychology as a human science suggest that psychology as a natural science would profit from far more comprehensive and accurate descriptions of psychic life from which interpretation may be undertaken and to which they must constantly refer by way of empirical verification. In addition, the psychology as a

natural science would do well to seriously reconsider its own assumptions about psychic life and the manner in which it approaches its object of study.

In our view, what characterises the schism between human and natural science is their exaggerated focus, respectively, on the understanding and explanatory aspects of knowledge. Based on the preceding discussion, we thus propose a rapprochement between the two sciences, with the strengths of one complementing the weaknesses of the other. We turn to these considerations presently.

1.6.3 Towards a larger synthesis of understanding and explanation

We have seen that phenomenology contends that the goal of human science is to achieve understanding, that is, an apprehension of lived experience through the accurate description of its essential attributes, achieved in turn by the application of the phenomenological method. Moreover, we have seen that existential phenomenology and hermeneutics contend that while descriptive, human science is also interpretative.

While phenomenologists such as Husserl, Merleau-Ponty and Heidegger did not engage particularly into the understanding-explanation debate, our consideration of their deliberations has shown that the human sciences have moved progressively from Husserl's initial position of attempting to understand the presentation of pure phenomena to consciousness to that of our primordial engagement in a necessary and fundamental state of interpretation, as expressed by Merleau-Ponty and by Heidegger with his notion of Dasein as understanding. Ricoeur stands out as the first author to have articulated a new role for explanation within the human sciences as a pole within a more comprehensive theory of interpretation.

What we witness in this progression from phenomenology to existential phenomenology to phenomenological hermeneutics, is the movement from the articulation of human science as a purely descriptive endeavour, to that of human science as involving the intimate and indissociable interrelationship between description and interpretation. And while the distinction between human science and natural science is still maintained on epistemological grounds, Ricoeur has defined a new relationship between them by effectively articulating a necessary role for explanation within the activity of textual interpretation.

Here, based on our previous discussion, we extend Ricoeur's understanding-explanation distinction to the interpretation of *all of lived experience*.

Apprehension of all phenomena, whether in the human realm or the natural realm, involves interpretation of experience. We add that such interpretation invariably calls upon both understanding and explanation which, in the final instance, and in a manner analogous to description and interpretation, are mutually interrelated. While in the natural realm the essential attributes of phenomena are more straightforward to describe and one may focus on their explanation, the complexity of the human realm forces us to consider apprehension of phenomena in much greater detail. This involves, prior to focusing on their explanation, engaging in their thorough description in order to understand their essential attributes.

It is from this expanded understanding-explanatory conception of interpretation and knowledge that we wish to undertake our study of the Self. We view such a conception as directing our own reflections in two respects.

In the first respect, we shall undertake our review of the conceptualisations of the Self using the epistemological position here described, attempting to articulate both their understanding and explanatory aspects. In keeping with the human sciences' pre-eminent concern for the understanding of lived experience, we shall first

attempt to describe how each conceptualisation accounts for the basic dimensions of consciousness and beingness underscored through our consideration of phenomenology, existential phenomenology and to a lesser degree, hermeneutics. This understanding aspect shall be dealt with separately from the explanatory aspect, where we shall consider the structures and processes which, while not part of the phenomena of lived experience, attempt to account for them.

Secondly, from this conception, we can begin to articulate a preliminary view of the Self as constituted from the understanding-explanatory interpretation of lived experience. This we see as a consequence of our position, in that if indeed all knowledge is contingent upon the interpretation of lived experience, and if indeed the Self is part of lived experience, then we can conceive of the Self as the result of the understanding-explanation of some portion of the totality of lived experience, from which it is progressively distinguished. Thus the Self is fundamentally engaged in the interpretation of lived experience from which it is constituted and distinguished. This resonates with Heidegger's concept of pre-reflective understanding achieved through interpretation. However, while Heidegger stresses the pre-reflective aspect of Being, we propose that the Self will be engaged in both pre-reflective and reflective understanding. Here we call upon Merleau-Ponty (1945) who, through his articulation of the ambiguity related to perception and of embodied subjectivity, acknowledges both the reflective and pre-reflective aspects of our beingness, with the pre-reflective aspect referred to as the *tacit cogito*. Let us now consider this preliminary notion of the Self.

1.7 Towards a preliminary articulation of the Self

1.7.1 The relationship between understanding - explanation and lived experience

As we have seen with Merleau-Ponty, our lived experience is rooted in the body, via our sensory perception and our bodily motility. These aspects were only briefly mentioned in our consideration of existential phenomenology. Bénard (1999), in

her outline of a theoretical conceptualisation of Self, notes that perception and motility correspond to two modalities, those of *attending* and *intending*, on which she bases her notion of a corporeal Self. Intending here is not to be confused with the intentionality of consciousness discussed previously, but is used here to describe the phenomenological conviction that when we *intend*, we are in some respect *emitting outwards*, versus the opposite impression of *receiving inwards* when we *attend*.

In our own consideration of the senses, we note that vision, together with hearing, feeling by sense of touch, taste, smell, and pain are primarily attending senses. While all of these senses have an intending component in the sense that we can direct our attention onto a specific portion of their perceptual field, they are deemed to be primarily perceptive and attentive, in other words, *attentional*. Two modalities are chiefly *intentional*: our bodily motility and speech. Both involve actions directed 'outside' of ourselves, towards objects and/or other persons in the world.

However, while we deem some senses chiefly attentional and others chiefly intentional, closer inspection reveals that all senses involve the indissociable interrelationship of attention and intention. We are able to perceive (attend to) a moving object by our tracking (intending) it. We largely know if a (intended) particular bodily movement is the desired one by observing (attending to) the effect of our intention (as when we know we've properly executed a difficult piece of music by hearing it well played).

While many authors, such as James, Husserl and Merleau-Ponty, have recognised the indissociable relationship between intentional and attentional aspects of lived experience, Merleau-Ponty in particular asserts that *understanding* corresponds to the *experiencing* of this relationship:

"Comprendre, c'est éprouver l'accord entre ce que nous visons et ce qui est donné, entre l'intention et l'effectuation - et le corps est notre ancrage dans un monde." (italics ours, Merleau-Ponty, 1945, p 169).

We contend, with Merleau-Ponty and Bénard, that the intentional - attentional distinction characterises our corporeal anchoring-in-the-world. Lived experience comprises the constant interplay of both aspects, and with Merleau-Ponty, we deem that the experiencing of this interplay is what constitutes, in the phenomenological sense, *understanding of Self* . Here we also call on Heidegger's notion of understanding which involves the practical and cognitive experience of being a certain way:

"In understanding, as an *existentiale*, that which we have such competence over is not a 'what', but Being as existing." (Heidegger, 1996/1926, p 183).

Thus for Heidegger, understanding is associated with a certain mode of existence. In this sense, understanding how to hammer, or having competence over the hammer, relates to the (intentional - attentional) *experience* of using a hammer in a particular way. Such experience not only reveals to us the hammer as object, more importantly it reveals a *particular mode of existence* in which we experience ourselves as 'hammering beings'. Such experiencing of ourselves in a particular mode of 'Being as existing', is what we term *understanding of Self*.

Applying here Ricoeur's concept of explanation, we would argue that for the Self, *explanation* involves *reflection upon* the understood intentional - attentional experience, such reflection involving its putting into language, correlative with its abstraction, structuring and attribution of interrelationships.

In this sense, applied to the apprehension of our Selves, *the experiencing of the intentional - attentional relationship constitutes its understanding* while our *abstractive reflection upon this experience constitutes its explanation*, recalling of

course that neither of these activities may be carried out in complete isolation from the other.

1.7.2 The attentional-intentional distinction as core to a Primordial Self

From our discussion, we have asserted the intending-attending distinction to be ingrained in all of lived experience, in effect, reflection shows this distinction to be inescapably part of lived experience.

We contend that at a fundamental level, in accordance with existential phenomenology, that the first given is an embodied subject, in intimate interrelationship with the world. With Merleau-Ponty, the embodied subject, from the moment of birth, apprehends itself as the locus of its Beingness, or of its intentional - attentional lived experience. This intentional - attentional aspect we deem necessarily constitutive of the locus of what we shall term for the time being a *primordial Self*, this term we use to refer to a skeletal conceptualisation of Self to which we shall add specific characteristics subsequent to the upcoming analysis.

However, we also contend, in accordance with the notion of Dasein as understanding, that such a primordial Self will be involved with the prereflective and reflective *interpretation* of such lived experience, attempting, through understanding and explanation, to achieve a fuller knowledge of it.

While part of lived experience, the Self is not the totality of lived experience. An important distinction then, involves the demarcation between Self and non-Self. Such an activity goes hand in hand with our need for interpretation as an on-going activity where, correlated with our increasing knowledge of the world, will be the need for increasing knowledge of Self. Thus a fundamental state of the primordial Self will be its progressive distinction of aspects within itself, aspects within the world, as well as distinguishing itself from the world. This, in our view, involves

the necessary activity of interpretation. Interpretation thus seems to be a necessary dimension of the primordial Self.

Within the experience of Self, there are many further differentiations to be made which will inevitably correspond to certain aspects of lived experience. For instance, we anticipate that one important aspect will be the Self in interrelationship to other Selves. Further distinctions to the primordial Self will emerge from our analysis of the various conceptualisations.

1.7.3 Summary

Having completed this exposition, we wish to summarise several distinctions concerning our reflections in this chapter.

In a first instance, we consider *lived experience*, seen here as the foundational matrix from which all perceptions and knowledge emanate, such lived experience being characterised by a constant interplay of intending and attending aspects. *All* of lived experience is simultaneously intentional and attentional, with both aspects being equally primordial.

In the second instance is the primordial Self, a portion of lived experience perceived as its intentional - attentional locus of Being. The primordial Self as intentionally - attentionally embodied subject in the world, reflectively and pre-reflectively engaged in interpretation of lived experience, constitutes the topic of this thesis.

In the third instance are understanding and explanation, two complimentary aspects of interpretation. The integration of the understanding-explanation distinction, as articulated in this chapter, constitutes part of the epistemological foundation from which the analysis of our topic, the Self, shall be undertaken.

Fourth, are human science and natural science, this distinction emanating from the previous distinction opposing understanding and explanation, a dualism which was overcome by Ricoeur for the human sciences and which we extend to both domains. The synthesis of these two domains of study, we propose as desirable and profitable for the progression of all knowledge.

1.8 Evaluation and selection criteria for the conceptualisations of Self

Having articulated our existential-phenomenological-hermeneutic foundations we are now ready to articulate the evaluation and selection criteria for conceptualisations of the Self to be undertaken in the following chapter.

The *selection criteria* concern how the conceptualisations to be the object of the ensuing analysis were selected amongst the large number of conceptualisations elaborated by various authors since the beginning of the century.

The *evaluation criteria* concern how the analysis of the conceptualisations of Self shall be carried out, and are derived from the existential phenomenological-hermeneutic understanding-explanation integration elaborated herein.

1.8.1 Selection criteria for conceptualisations of Self

Given the wide breadth of literature addressing conceptualisations of Self from various perspectives, it is impossible to review all research dealing with the Self that has been effected since the beginning of the century. To limit our selection, we are forced to establish some guiding criteria.

Our primary interests constrain us to consider those theoretical and original contributions to the Self amenable to the type of analysis we propose. In this respect, we shall consider authors who have attempted to account for how the Self is experienced and lived as psychological phenomenon.

Within the domain of conceptualisations of Self that capture some of the richness and diversity of psychological experience, we are interested in seizing and integrating the largest possible repertoire of dimensions to the Self-as-experienced, and are thus interested in identifying conceptualisations that include novel aspects not dealt with by other authors. In this vein, our approach will be integrative and will thus consider the Self from a variety of approaches such as the psychoanalytic, the experiential-humanistic, the social-psychological, as well as the more recent social constructivist and narrative approaches.

It is recognised that these selection criteria are not highly restrictive and other conceptualisations could have been included. This of course could slightly alter the results of our study. We shall reconsider this limitation in chapter four.

Thus, the authors considered in our review are the following: James (1890), Jung (1928, 1957), Sullivan (1953), Rogers (1959), Laing (1960), Gergen (1971, 1991) and Kerby (1991). While it is repeated that not all conceptualisations of Self can be studied, at the same time a comprehensive review of several theoretical conceptualisations is sought.

To summarise, we are interested in achieving a deepened knowledge of the Self by studying several conceptualisations by a variety of authors who, over the course of this century, have considered the Self as experienced phenomenon, and who have made major theoretical contributions in this area.

1.8.2 Criteria for the evaluation of the selected conceptualisations of Self

Following the previous articulation of the philosophies underlying this thesis, we are now ready to articulate the criteria to be followed in the analysis of the conceptualisations of Self that will follow.

Our aim is to achieve, via our approach, an increased understanding of the Self through the rigorous analysis and critical evaluation of different theories or conceptualisations of Self. This, coupled with our interest in establishing the fundamental and necessary dimensions for any conceptualisation of Self, renders paramount an in-depth understanding and analysis of each conceptualisation, as appropriated through the reading of the author's text. We will concern ourselves with the author's own writings, and through the comprehensive survey of his original works, extract in sufficient thoroughness the essence of what has been said of the Self. During this hermeneutic activity, a conscious effort will be made to remain faithful to the text, to clearly articulate exactly what the author has stated, without additions nor omissions. While we may refer to interpretations by other authors, these will be subordinated to the original author's writings.

Following this reading, we will be interested in articulating each conceptualisation's understanding aspects as well as its explanatory aspects. This will include the attributes of consciousness (intentionality, unity, constitutive activity), the notions of the primacy of lived experience or being-in-the-world, of embodiment, of interrelationship, the Self-as-subject/Self-as-object distinction, the Self/not-Self (world and other) distinction, as well as the other distinctions made by the authors.

In the second instance, we will attempt to highlight the conceptualisation's explanatory aspects, that is, the processes and structures that while accounting for the conscious aspects of Self, operate out of conscious awareness. We will then attempt to critically review the comprehensiveness (depth and breadth of phenomena considered), logical and structural coherence, refutability, and parsimony, of each conceptualisation as need be.

Here, we recognise the limitation imposed by our method of study. Any level of generalisation achieved will be limited to the conceptualisations considered, with additional conceptualisations having the potential to shed new light on our own rendering of the necessary dimensions of Self. Additionally, while we believe our own approach more comprehensive than either the natural or human science paradigms taken singly, we also recognise that ours does not escape the inherent relativity of perspectives as we have articulated for both human and natural science, and this forces us to renounce any hope that our own analysis will render a set of definite and final criteria or a final and definite understanding of the Self, for our interpretation, like others, remains open to correction by a more powerful and comprehensive reinterpretation. It is within the context of such an epistemology that our upcoming critical analysis of the conceptualisations of Self is rendered. It is to this analysis that we now turn.

2. CHAPTER TWO: CRITICAL ANALYSIS OF SEVERAL CONCEPTUALISATIONS OF THE SELF

2.0.1 Introduction to Chapter Two

In this chapter we proceed with the analysis of seven conceptualisations of the Self, these being those of James (1890), Jung (1928), Sullivan (1953), Rogers (1959), Laing, (1961), Gergen (1971) and Kerby (1991). We begin by describing each conceptualisation in detail, followed by the critical analysis of its understanding and explanatory aspects. Under the understanding aspects, we begin by considering the notions of consciousness and its attributes, that is to say its intentionality, its unity and constitutive qualities. We also consider the notions of lived experience, of embodiment, of interrelationship, of interpretation and narrative, followed by many other related notions, these being the Self-as-subject/Self-as-object distinction, the Self/not-Self distinction, Self-identity, Self-esteem, and other distinctions within the Self.

Within the explanatory aspects of Self, we consider the conceptualisation's internal coherence, comprehensiveness, refutability and parsimony.

The results of this analysis will form the basis of our articulation of the necessary dimensions of Self in the third chapter.

2.1 The conceptualisation of Self according to William James

"(The self) who owns the last self owns the self before the last, for what possesses the possessor possesses the possessed."

William James (1890)

2.1.1 The Self according to James

James (1890) distinguishes himself as the first psychologist to conceive an elaborate conception of an entity he calls Self, one that distinguishes between the Self as centre of I-ness and the Self as object for the Self, these being parts of the Self to which the central Self refers to as 'Me' rather than 'I'. In its largest sense, the Self consists of that fluid yet distinguishable mass expressed as "the sum total of all that (a person) can call his" (James, 1890, p 291), i.e., this includes a person's body, family, accomplishments, mental faculties and sense of personal identity. James refers to the more peripheral parts of the self as the Empirical or Phenomenal Self, and in his opinion, it is composed of three parts: the Material Self, the Social Self and the Spiritual Self. These parts are empirical in the sense that they can be felt, for they are objects to an apprehending 'I'. The more central part of self, the part referred to when we say "I", he called the Pure Ego. The Material Self is constituted of several parts, the most significant and intimate of these being the body. Other parts of the Material Self which are less proximal, are the person's possessions, such as clothes, family, home, honours and accomplishments. He argues that each of these aspects harbours a sense of identity and a partial sense of self, a part of what we habitually call "me". He reasons that should a person be suddenly deprived of all his or her possessions, or should that person suffer the fate of having all their familial relations suddenly killed in some accident or other ill fate, the person would undoubtedly experience, in addition to any normal grief or sense of loss, the sense that a part of himself or herself had been suddenly removed or cut away.

The second constituent of the Empirical or Phenomenological Self is the Social Self, which is made up of persona we present in our manifold social relations. James believes that we have as many social selves as there are individuals who recognise us. But he also believes that a person's honour, fame and occupation are constitutive of his social self as these could, should they undergo changes due to a change in circumstances, greatly affect a person's sense of self. For example, a person's occupation could greatly dictate proper and improper behaviours in a particular social situation. During a situation of war, a doctor and a soldier would be expected to hold different views and would be expected to exhibit different behaviours in face of a dying enemy soldier. James also believes that the manifold social selves could be in conflict with each other, especially when different social relations are present simultaneously. For instance, a person would be subjected to rivalling feelings in situations where his different social selves are expected to act differently. In this sense, a judge during the act of sentencing, could feel the obligation to show no mercy to a criminal while other parts of him would act differently should he be involved with the same criminal in another social context.

The third constituent, the Spiritual Self, is the most elusive of the empirical Selves. For James it is the part of a person's inner subjective being, of his or her psychic faculties, and it is considered to be the most enduring and intimate part of the Empirical Self, or in James' own words, "the Self of all other [empirical] Selves" (parentheses ours, James, 1890, p 297). For James, the Spiritual Self is the "*active* element in all consciousness" (italics by the author, James, 1890, p 297), it goes out to meet the thoughts, welcomes or rejects them. It is that part which receives sensations, "to which painful and pleasurable speak" (James, 1890, p 298), and the source of effort and attention. James distinguishes two parts of the Spiritual Self, the first being the person's psychic abilities, such as the person's abilities to argue and discriminate, the person's values and his or her character of will; the second part being more central and elusive, related to that portion of awareness pertaining to the felt sensations that accompany the process of thinking. When we make an effort of

attending to something in particular, of concentration, of imagining a schematic in our mind's eye and then of moving about within this schematic, and even if our bodies remain absolutely still, we feel something moving within us, a bodily-felt sense of our thinking processes.

"In a sense, then, it may be truly said that, in one person at least, the 'Self of selves' when carefully examined, is found to consist mainly of the collection of these peculiar motions in the head or between the head and throat." (italics by the author, James, 1890, p 301).

While the postulated cause of this thinking process may be accounted for by some other entity, notably the Pure Ego, the Spiritual Self is necessarily correlated with it, as the latter is a felt awareness of the activity emanating from the former.

For James, the Pure Ego distinguishes itself from the empirical Self which is the Self as object, and is the seat of consciousness. While the constituents outlined above describe different facets of what we call "me", this is the part referred to when we say "I". In contradistinction with the parts of the empirical Self which are distinctly felt, the Pure Ego can only be speculated upon, deduced from careful observations about mental activity. Using the concept of the Pure Ego, James describes in great detail how such an entity would serve as the underlying foundational agent responsible for the felt sense of Self and of personal identity, as well as the accretion point for all of the Empirical Selves, however proximal or distal they should be. In contrast with Hume who argued that there was no central entity in addition to the empirical aspects of the Self, James argues convincingly that the empirically-felt sense of selfness, even if it be illusory, has to be generated by some entity. This entity would firstly recognise and compare the myriad elements of consciousness, and decide which of these belong to the Self and which do not. He concludes that the Pure Ego, or some entity reasonably similar, necessarily exists and in its simplest expression, is made up of nothing more than the Stream of Present Thought, this stream being made up of individual thoughts, each one emerging as the conscious owner of all other thoughts that have preceded it. In this sense, each thought emerges as the

knowing possessor of the previous thought, itself possessor of the previous one, and so on, ad infinitum. In analogous fashion, the sense of Self is ultimately a conclusion about those elements of consciousness that were and are still considered part of the Self, arrived at in the same manner that applies to any other phenomena. Or, in James's own words:

"The sense of our own personal identity then, is exactly like any one of our other perceptions of sameness among phenomena. It is a conclusion grounded either on the resemblance in a fundamental respect, or on the continuity before the mind, of the phenomena compared." (James, 1890, p 334).

James goes on and further delineates the relationship between the Pure Ego and the sense of Self, emphasising the Pure Ego's role not only of recognising those elements of consciousness it calls Self, but more importantly its role of somehow ascribing ownership to them in a way that makes them indubitably feel like they are part of Self. Our present active sense of Self is therefore a function of the Pure Ego which generates, with each new thought-pulse, a renewed sense of Self, related to the sense of Self felt in the immediate previous moment and continuous with it. By this hypothesis, James argues that there is no need to postulate the existence of a soul, or of an arch-ego, overseeing the transfer of ownership. It is the immediate present Thought that emerges as the present owner of the Self, appropriating in its emergence the previous Thought's owned sense of Self, this last thought being the owner of the previous sense of Self. In James' own words, the present thought is the

"...living hook from which the chain of past selves dangles, planted firmly in the Present, which alone passes for real, and thus keeping the chain from being a purely ideal thing. Anon the hook itself will drop in the past with all it carries, and then be treated as an object and appropriated by a new Thought in the new present which will serve as living hook in turn." (James, 1890, p 341).

James also recognised that persons harboured definite feelings towards the Empirical Self, these can be reduced to two basic ones, Self-satisfaction and Self-contempt. For

James, the notion of Self-esteem could be represented by a mathematical equation of one's pretensions divided by one's accomplishments. And so a person who had lofty ambitions and accomplished very few of them, would have lower self-esteem than the person who had more ordinary ambitions and accomplished a higher proportion of them. And while it seemed reasonable that such feelings were directly related to a person's accomplishments and failures, in actuality, such is not the case as he points out that many people, despite their obvious successes, seem filled with despair, self-loathing and self-dissatisfaction while other people harbour what appears to be unjustified pride and conceit. He concluded that some other factor seems responsible for a person's self-feelings, more than can be accounted for by simple compilation and weighting of the person's experiences.

James also distinguishes between actual and potential selves, with the potential social selves deemed the most interesting. In this respect, when one aspires to a certain social status, the foregoing of a previous self is sometimes necessary, but the interesting aspect, James contends, is that in every case, higher tribunals of judgement are substituted for the lower, meaning that the person who changes his social standing will now value the possible judgements of esteemed members of this new set, to the detriment of those of his former set.

James also believed that human behaviour could be summarised in two types: Self-seeking and Self-preservation. Related to the notion of Self-preservation is the popular notion of Self-love, which James addresses separately. He notes that it is not love for some "pure principle of conscious identity", but rather is love for the thing itself: the warm seat, the last piece of cake, the glory of victory, or the good feeling accompanying having given these things to others (James, 1890, p 323). He further divided self-seeking into three types: bodily self-seeking, social self-seeking and spiritual self-seeking. Actions such as hunting, home-constructing, pursuits of admiration and glory, the pursuit of intellectual and moral psychic progress were all examples of such behaviours. All of these activities have to do with the preservation and the aggrandisement of Self. This he saw as a natural tendency, as

we all seem from birth onwards, to want to extend our domain of personal, social and intellectual influence and control.

2.1.2 Critical analysis of James' conceptualisation of Self

2.1.2.1 The understanding aspects of James' conceptualisation

2.1.2.1.1 On the nature of consciousness and its attributes

James notes two fundamental attributes of consciousness, the first being, that whatever its form or object, "thought goes on" (James, 1890, p 224-225). Secondly, consciousness is forever preoccupied with an object of consciousness. Thoughts are always about something. In this respect, James is in agreement with Husserl on the notion of the intentionality of consciousness.

Additionally, James notes the constitutive role of consciousness in the perception of reality. He notes that regardless of the process used by consciousness, it is invariably selective, focusing on certain aspects of experience to the exclusion of others. This is firstly carried out by the senses themselves. We do not for instance perceive the infrared or ultraviolet bands of radiation, the band of what we call 'light' falling between these ranges. Such selection, that we deem common to the human species, is out of our conscious control. Further selection is made at the level of perceptions, where we deem some perceptions truer than others. For example, we deem a table to be a 'square' even though by virtue of perspective, it is usually seen as oblong. For some reason, the view as 'square', with the other views taken as perspectives of it, is deemed truer than the reverse. The same may be said for colours, with the 'true' colour being that seen under certain conditions of light, distance, and angle, with the colour of the object seen under different conditions being 'derivatives' of it. James thus speaks of perception as the most "exquisite example of selective industry" (James, 1890, p 286).

James acknowledges that the perceived object is rather a highly complicated construct, an interpretation which the selective activity of consciousness imposes upon the data of the stream of experience, the result of an elaborate process of selective interpretation of the passively pre-given elements of the stream of consciousness. For James, what is true of the pre-given sensible flux is a function of our interpretation, from first to last, a matter of our own creation. Thus for James, two complimentary factors interplay: the passively pre-structured flow of pure experience, and the selective interest of consciousness.

"Each act of conception results from our attention singling out some one part of the mass of matter for thought which the world presents and holding fast to it without confusion."
(James, 1890, p 461) .

For James the distinction between sensation and perception is one of degree, with sensation characterised by the extreme simplicity of its object or content, a mere acquaintance with a fact, while perception is knowledge about a fact. In analogous fashion, conceptions are built upon perceptions, themselves taken as mere facts. We note that James does not question here the degree of truth embedded within each sensation taken as fact, rather he asserts that regardless of being truthful or not, such sensations are taken as truths for the purposes of the building of perceptions, and the same may be said for the perceptions taken as truths for the purposes of building conceptions.

These three levels of knowledge, sensation, perception and conception, form a continuum characterised by an increasing awareness of relations. In this awareness recognition of sameness is primordial, and James states that progress in knowledge depends in large part on a fundamental constancy in the mind's meanings. For James, conception results from our capacity to perceive sameness in the flow of experience, such sameness being itself contingent upon the recognition of patterns of relationship, with perception providing the initial relational context from which conception operates, and to which it must return to maintain its relationship with

lived experience. Sameness is also essential to perception, where the apprehending of the same sensible totality serves as basis to the apprehending of objects, and permits, as also articulated by Husserl, the perception of the same object via a multitude of perspectival views.

At each transition in the three levels of knowledge, a single aspect is retained and considered as same, this in fact permits clarity of perception/conception, but at the same time results in a loss of richness. Without such clarity, experience cannot be rendered intelligible, it cannot be grafted with any meaning. Conceptions and perceptions permit us to better apprehend the data of sensation. In the final instance however, conceptions and perceptions are built upon and refer to lived experience, to the flux of sensible totals within it. The sensible total "colour blue", for example, cannot be understood unless the other has had the experience of it. No amount of conceptualisation will render this experience to another.

Thus, while rendering the relationships between sensation, perception and conception, James highlights the constitutive role of consciousness, notably its ability to select and perceive sameness at each level. While noting these attributes of consciousness, James re-emphasises the primacy of lived experience, the level of sensible totals from which perception and conception are construed. For James, lived experience is the absolute starting point from which the others find their foundation.

For James, in the final instance, consciousness does not exist as a substantial, reified entity. Yet James is equally adamant about the primacy of lived experience, in that however it may be constituted, it is evident that some type of thought goes on, always present to some type of lived experience. Again, lived experience is the ultimate datum, the primal stuff which we cannot escape, from which and in which, all sensations, perceptions, cognitions, relations and abstractions emanate and take place. For James notes that all form of abstractions, that we may call logical, metaphysical, or otherwise, are themselves experiences taking place within lived

experience. James makes no distinction between perceptions of 'outer' objects and perceptions of 'inner' objects, for both take place within lived experience, even if one may be characterised as being located within that domain of lived experience we label the 'spatio-temporal' world. James considered the existence of a reality outside of what manifests itself to consciousness, as inconsequential. The only object of study worthy of such, in his opinion, is lived experience. Thus James, with phenomenology, contends that there is no basis in lived experience for distinguishing between an 'outer' and 'inner' world.

The same may be said for the subject-object distinction formulated by Descartes and maintained since that time. Again, James argues that there is no subject and no object, there is only consciously lived experience. Our idea of subjectivity is one based on a faulty reasoning that when thought goes on, a conscious thinker must be behind it. James maintains his particular phenomenological stance: there is no thinker, only lived experience to which the thought is present, all presence is presence to lived experience. The Thinker we deem to perceive is that perceived in the portion of lived experience we call body.

2.1.2.1.2 On the primacy of lived experience

Like Husserl, James proposes a disciplined return to pure experience as it is given, prior to any theorising about it. For James, the "one primal stuff", the stuff of experience, is the first given, that which is self-containing and leans on nothing else. It is anterior to subject and object, to thought and thing. If we could isolate a unit of experience, it would, in James' opinion, be absolutely neutral. In this respect, James is aligned with phenomenology and the foundation articulated in this thesis.

If we compare James' rendering of lived experience to that espoused by phenomenology, we see a strong resemblance. James favours a return to brute experience, and his description of this world resembles the phenomenological world

which results from the application of the epoché to the natural world. Rather than naïvely accepting things as they first appear, his is a radical questioning and description of the attributes of our lived experience, attempting to render it as accurately as possible. And so while he lacks the systematic rigor of the phenomenological method and its terminology, James is effectively a 'natural phenomenologist' arguing for the return to pure experience, and achieves similar insights through a radical questioning of it.

James is not always clear if such a return is in fact possible for adults, stating that quite possibly, only new-born babes, or men in semi-coma from sleep, drugs and other similar experiences may be assumed to have such purity of experience, one not distant from that "... great blooming, buzzing confusion" he deems characteristic of the lived experience of the new-born (James, 1890, p 488). While we agree with James that adults don't spontaneously achieve such a return, we argue that while never complete, the return achieved by his method may approach pure experience, as evidenced by his own descriptions of some of its attributes. Such a return is nonetheless fruitful and necessary, as we have highlighted in our discussions on the limitations and strengths of the phenomenological epoché.

2.1.2.1.3 On embodiment

With his elaboration of the Pure Ego, James also accounts for the continuous felt-sense of embodiment, the sense of our being an embodied consciousness, a conscious subject apprehending an object within its field of consciousness. The Pure Ego, after appropriating it to itself, projects upon the body what it has just apprehended in its lived experience. It is through this projection, in concert with the appropriation from the body, that the Pure Ego endows the body with the felt sense of Self, as well as its sense of personal identity:

"Its appropriations are therefore less to itself than to the most intimately felt part of its present Object, the body, and the central adjustments, which accompany the act of

thinking, in the head. These are the real nucleus of our personal identity, and it is their actual existence, realised as a solid present fact, which makes us say 'as sure as I exist, those past facts were part of myself.' " (James, 1890, p 341).

Finally, James contends that our felt sense of Being is probably only attributable to this bodily felt sense of Being, resident within the body, but in continuous concerted interchange with the Pure Ego.

"The sense of my bodily existence, however obscurely recognised as such, *may* then be the absolute original [source] of my conscious selfhood, the fundamental perception that I *am*. All appropriations *may* be made *to it, by* a Thought not at the moment immediately cognised by itself. Whether these are only logical possibilities but actual facts is something not yet dogmatically decided in the text." (parentheses ours, italics by the author, James, 1890, p 341, footnote.)

In summary, James contends that our sense of Beingness and the felt sense of embodiment are both the result of the interrelatedness between the Pure Ego and the body, with the body serving as nucleus for all of the empirical Self. The sense of personal identity is also the result of this interrelationship. Both the felt sense of embodiment and the sense of personal identity have their locus within the body. While for the most part, James remains adamant about the Pure Ego's inability to perceive itself, this last quote testifies to some uncertainty on this issue. His notion of the specious present and its relationship to the activities of the Pure Ego attempt to account for the sense of beingness and embodiment, which for James, amount to the same thing. Yet the doubt expressed by James on this issue leads us to question further the relationship between the body and the Pure Ego.

We note that Kant contends that behind the empirical Ego, is a Transcendental Ego, an entity endowed with the only faculty of Be-ing, or being present to all lived experience, with no other attributes except for its Be-ing. James contests this view, and proposes, in the final instance that consciousness, as a reified entity, does not exist.

There is for James no evidence, in the empirical psychic world, of an actually present consciousness, for this entity remains conspicuously absent from our lived experience. We are never, according to James, present to our actual conscious thinking, for the best we can do is take the immediately previous thought as object of contemplation. For James, the return to lived experience shows us that there is no pure subject of consciousness available for our contemplation, rather we note a centralisation of lived experience about a functional centre, a phenomenon of corporeal activity along with its functional relationship to other contents of experience, a centre that we can distinguish by calling it 'here' in contradistinction with any perceived experience, a 'there'. This, for James, is our most primitive form of Self-awareness, analogous to Merleau-Ponty's tacit cogito, that unsoundable depth from which thoughts spring, prior to their being thoughts. In this sense, consciousness does not appear as a separate spiritual entity but as a particular centre of reference within the field of lived experience. He thus strongly opines that from the point of view of lived experience, we have no empirically felt sense of consciousness of Self, for careful observation shows that all our introspective glances reveal is some bodily felt sensation:

"Whenever my introspective glance succeeds in turning round quickly enough to catch one of these manifestations of spontaneity in the act, all it can ever feel distinctly is some bodily process, for the most part taking place within the head." (James, 1890, p 300).

Here again we return to the body as locus for what we perceive, or apperceive as consciousness. Yet James is equally adamant about the nature of lived experience, in that whatever our experience, it is evident that some type of thought goes on, with, in each case, the thought always being 'owned' by a person. Thoughts are thus always personal, and related to an identity, again located within the body. We shall return to James' notion of embodiment in our consideration of the distinctions within the Self.

2.1.2.1.4 On the interpersonal aspects of Self

2.1.2.1.4.1 The perception of the alter ego

For James, the problem of how we apperceive the alter ego as another embodied consciousness remains a paradox. He notes that thoughts are always personal and that we never directly perceive the thoughts of another, we can only perceive their bodies and interpret their actions, verbal and otherwise, yet we somehow know the other as an embodied consciousness identical to our own. James notes that if we are to avoid the problem of solipsism, i.e., if two consciousnesses are to perceive each other as consciousnesses, they must in the first instance be able to perceive the same objective world. In his consideration of our perception of objects within this world, James concludes to the impossibility of two persons having exactly the same perception, for we cannot ascertain that what we perceive, whether this be the other or any other object, is what is perceived by the other because we are never taking the same perspective as the other. Moreover, the perception of our own body is restricted to the perspective taken by our position within it and our perception of the other body in no way resembles the perception of our own.

The common, or naïve, solution to this problem is that we apperceive the other by analogy, with the perception of the relationship between our own consciousness and our own body as point of reference. However, this solution is problematic in that it requires reflection after the fact of perception, and this is in contradiction with our lived experience of pre-reflectively perceiving the other as conscious being.

James attempts to solve the difficulty by stating that rather than perceiving identical objects, what is perceived in common by both embodied consciousnesses is a similar spatio-temporal field. By my pointing to a particular object, and having the other confirm its position, my 'here' becomes the other's 'there', with both of us agreeing that the same place is being designated. This is especially true in the case of the body, where the body which the other feels and moves from within must be in the same place as the one which I can see or touch. James thus concludes to the necessity of

spatial co-ordinates being construed as public or common points of reference if we are to refer to a same object. Husserl takes a similar path by advocating for a process of imagination whereby one assumes the perspective of the other, taking as locus of reference the other's body position and intuitively referring to it as 'here'. All objects become a 'there' relative to this new position, one which I can imagine myself to be taking. We can construe this as taking a position similar to James', whereby what is put in common are the spatial co-ordinates, presenting an objective field. Both James and Husserl contend that this ability would be pre-reflective.

We note however that the perception of spatial-temporal co-ordinates is at par with the perception of objects, both are perceived simultaneously, all objects being perceived in space-time. The ability to cognise an object from a different perspective implies a change of position within the spatio-temporal field. Thus we contend that this ability, implying the relativity of perspectives, can only be the result of a similar reasoning by analogy. Moreover, Piaget's work has shown that children are unable to imagine the same object from another perspective until their later pre-adolescent years. This ability is at par with their empathic abilities, whereby they are unable to imagine themselves in the psychological situation of another. Yet, these same children seem to recognise others as their equals (i.e. as embodied consciousnesses) well before this time. Hence, both explanations, the analogical solution and the common spatio-temporal field solution, fail to account for our ability to pre-reflectively apprehend the other as embodied consciousness. This, we have seen, is corroborated by Merleau-Ponty (1964) who notes that we are born into intersubjectivity and are pre-reflectively aware of the other prior to being aware of ourselves. From an existential-phenomenological point of view, we find ourselves rooted within this primordial communicative matrix of embodied and interrelated intentional subjects, prior to our capacity to reflect upon such realities.

James' attempt to account for the pre-reflective apprehension of the alter ego is therefore incomplete in that it fails to resolve the difficulty inherent to the perception, within a personal consciousness, of the other as embodied

consciousness. We find no fault in his deliberations with respect to the commonality of the spatio-temporal co-ordinates, however we note that this does not solve the problem of how the other may be perceived pre-reflectively. We note that phenomenology, with contributions by Husserl and Merleau-Ponty, has not resolved the difficulty either, except it does point out our prereflective perception of the other body as alter ego. This James had recognised, and while his solution may be inadequate, we are especially surprised that James does not himself see the limitations of it, thorough as he is in all other respects.

2.1.2.1.4.2 The Other as constitutive of Self

While James has thoroughly considered the problem of the alter ego, and while the alter ego is implied in his concept of the social Self, he has not considered the contribution of the alter ego in the constitution of Self. In our consideration of embodiment, we saw that James considers all of the empirical Selves, in the final instance, to minister to the body, and in this respect the relationship to the other is no exception. Thus implied in his conceptualisation is that relating to the other takes place from the locus of the body. This is also evidenced in his consideration of the alter ego. He does not however grant to interpersonal relationships any foundational role in Self-constitution. We shall see that other authors, notably Sullivan, Laing and Gergen, differ in this respect.

2.1.2.1.5 General distinctions within the Self

2.1.2.1.5.1 The Self

We have seen that James divides the Self into two main factions, the Pure Ego, and the Empirical Self, itself composed of the material, social and spiritual Selves. Each of these empirical Selves can be further differentiated. What characterises the Empirical Self is its ability to be felt, in the sense that it is taken as object of consciousness. While he distinguishes within the material Self the body as a

separate entity, we note that all of the empirical Selves concern themselves with the body as centre of the field of lived experience. For instance, within the field of what he denotes as material Self, James includes, in addition to the body, such things as our material possessions, clothes, home, family, and products of our labour. He notes that some persons are ready to die in defence of such possessions, so much are they intimately tied to them. Their loss usually occasions great disturbances to our sense of Self. The loss of a loved one for instance occasions deeply felt grief, enduring bodily felt sensations that we cannot ignore such as heaviness in the chest and crying. James sees such possessions as direct extensions to the bodily sense of Self, in that they are ultimately related to our bodies, increasing our level of felt comfort, ensuring our physical survival, procuring us emotional and physical well-being, and ensuring the continuance of our hereditary line. Our natural inclination seems to be to preserve and to expand the extent of the material Self, and we note that a large proportion of our laws is dedicated to these very aims.

Within the field of the social Self, there is the desire for interpersonal contact, as well as the desire to be held in high esteem by others, especially those we love. Here again, James notes that what is valued in such contacts are the bodily felt feelings of pleasure derived from the attainment of these social goals, such as the satisfaction of having had an enjoyable outing with friends, and the felt pleasure related to having others speak highly of us.

It may be argued that James' description of the social Self is somewhat dated in that it is a reflection of the social context of his day. Some aspects mentioned by James, such as one's 'position in society' and one's 'honour' seem less pertinent to us living in a more pluralistic society where the distinction between 'distinguished' and 'common' folk is less articulate, and where attributes such as one's honour, are not valued as highly. In this respect, James' articulation of the social Self appears less definitive, and largely a reflection of his social context. However taking the point of view that the Self is essentially a crystallisation of lived experience, it follows that the social Self will be a reflection of the values and dimensions of

society that apply to the individual concerned. James' insistence on the primacy of lived experience allows his conceptualisation to account for such socio-cultural differences, and his conceptualisation is no way invalidated by this apparent contradiction.

James' spiritual Self, on the other hand, is more subtle. James describes it as the central empirical Self, as what is perceived as the centre of the field of experience, felt by all persons as the innermost centre of the empirical Self, a "sanctuary within the citadel" (James, 1890, p 297). Again, this Self is felt, and appears as the active element of consciousness, that "to which painful and pleasurable speak" (James, 1890, p 298). Yet while affording it with such a singular status, this Self clearly remains within the bounds of the body, consisting "mainly of the collection of these peculiar motions in the head or between the head and throat." (James, 1890, p 301). James himself gives more credence to this view in a later work:

"The 'I think' which Kant said must be able to accompany all my objects, is the 'I breathe' which actually accompanies them. There are other internal facts besides breathing (intracerebral muscular adjustments, of which I have said a word in my larger Psychology)... but breath, which was ever the original of 'spirit', breath moving outwards, between the glottis and the nostrils, is, I am persuaded, the essence out of which philosophers have constructed that entity known to them as consciousness. That entity is fictitious, while thoughts in the concrete are fully real." (James, 1967/1912, p 37).

Here James insists upon this bodily aspect of the spiritual Self, attributing to the realm of perceived bodily experience what many authors have mistakenly labelled our metaphysical 'perceived consciousness'. And it is thus that he distinguishes the spiritual Self from the Pure Ego, that subjective principle of the unity of consciousness. Precisely because it is perceived, the spiritual Self is necessarily an object of consciousness, since, in James' estimation, the perceiver cannot at the same time be the perceived. In this sense, what is perceived through our introspective gaze, cannot be the pure 'I' but an empirical Self, since for James, whatever is known

must be grasped as object. Thus, any felt sense of selfhood must be acquired through a subjective body, taken as its object:

"The individualised self, which I believe to be the only thing properly called self, is a part of the content of the world experienced. The world experienced (otherwise called the 'field of consciousness') comes at all times with our body as its centre, centre of vision, centre of action, centre of interest. Where the body is is 'here'; when the body acts is 'now'; what the body touches is 'this'; all other things are 'there' and 'then' and 'that'." (James, 1967/1912, p 170).

For James then, the body is analogous with the notion of embodied subjectivity developed in detail by Merleau-Ponty, where the body is perceived as the centre of a system of co-ordinates, the centre-of reference, so-to-speak:

"The body is the storm centre, the origin of co-ordinates, the constant place of stress in all that experience-train. Everything circles around it, and is felt from its point of view. The word 'I', then, is primarily a noun of position, just like 'this' and 'here'. Activities attached to 'this' position have prerogative emphasis." (James, 1967/1912, p 170).

Finally, James' description of the activities of Self-seeking, Self-preservation and Self-love leads him to conclude that what is actually sought, preserved or loved are things that minister to the body, and when compared to the "pure principle of conscious identity", are more superficial and transient (James, 1890, p 323). On the level of the Social Self, the same may be said for the images of ourselves we conjure in the minds of others, when we look for the expression on their faces, we are hoping to experience the bodily felt pleasure engendered by our perception of their approval. Again, these activities point to the bodily sense of Self underlying these aspects of the empirical Self.

We also note that James establishes a hierarchy of interest related to the various empirical Selves, with the "bodily Self at the bottom, the spiritual Self at the top, and the extracorporeal material selves and the various social selves between." (James,

1890, p 313). This hierarchy does not relate to their conceptual organisation but is one of degree of interest by the Pure Ego. Moreover, James contends that the Self-seeking tendency leads to an aggrandisement of all of the Selves, however, he also notes it is not possible to aggrandise all the Selves equally since some conflict with each other and moreover, the interest in each Self changes with maturity. A child will be supremely interested in his bodily Self, an adult in certain social Selves, and even these may change according to circumstances. Moral dictates will also lead us to value certain Selves to the detriment of others. In this sense, foregoing of food and drink (material Self) in order to get on in the world (social Self) is seen as a favourable and even necessary endeavour. In general then, the higher Selves are to be more esteemed than the lower, yet the lower ones, notably the material and the body Selves, are deemed more vital. In this hierarchy James notes how the potential social Selves play a role in our movement within the strata of society. We note that even within these potential social Selves, the imagined approval of others is what is sought, such approval ministering again to the body.

To conclude, we emphasise James' insistence on the embodied aspect of the empirical Self in its entirety, not just the aspect within the material Self where James includes the body. This aspect is the one we identify when we consciously apprehend our bodies, however a deeper consideration of all aspects of the empirical Self leads him to consider the sense of embodiment underlying all of its aspects. This in turn is very much akin to Merleau-Ponty's concept of embodied subjectivity. This attribute of embodiment applies just as well to the spiritual Self, the most elusive and intimate of the empirical selves, that which, in James' opinion, has befuddled many philosophers, including Kant, into thinking that we could actually directly perceive consciousness. James insists, on logical grounds, supported by astute observation, that we cannot. We shall discuss this question presently in our consideration of the Pure Ego.

2.1.2.1.5.2 The Pure Ego

For James, the Pure Ego is a logically necessary entity, and represents his answer to the question of who experiences the phenomenal, or empirical Self. It answers another question: that of the agent responsible for the felt sense of Self-identity. For James one question is clear: the self as perceived cannot simultaneously be the perceiving agent. At best, consciousness may perceive itself as it was a moment previously, for in his opinion, the present contemplating 'I' resists all contemplation and observation. As we have seen in the previous chapter, James conceives of perceived time as a duration, one he calls the specious present, the 'saddle back' of time spanning the immediate past and the immediate future. According to James, it is through the specious present that our idea of a conscious 'I' takes root, for careful observation lets us apperceive our fleeting consciousness, as part of its object is always the immediately preceding thought which has not yet faded from the present. The present thought, though inaccessible in itself, appropriates the preceding one, as itself will be appropriated by the succeeding one. In this manner, the unity of conscious subjectivity is maintained by succeeding appropriations.

"Each pulse of cognitive consciousness, each thought, dies away and is replaced by another. The other, among the things it knows, knows its own predecessor, and finding it 'warm', in the way we have described, greets it, saying, 'Thou art mine, and part of the same self with me.' " (James, 1890, p 339).

As is evidenced by this quote, this explanation not only addresses the phenomenon of continual conscious subjectivity, but also addresses the process by which the sense of personal identity is achieved and maintained, with the present thought serving as "the living hook from which the chain of past selves dangles" (James, 1890, p 341). James opines that no further explanation is needed in order to account for these two phenomena and argues that there is no need to postulate any arch or transcendental ego overseeing the transfer of 'ownership' of Self from one thought pulse to the next.

We note here that for James, the Pure Ego is 'pure process', is nothing more than the Present Stream of Thought yet it carries out all the activities related to the continual felt sense of conscious subjectivity and to the sense of identity, that is to say, perceiving, selecting, comparing, judging, and remembering the aspects of lived experience from which these are constituted. Both conscious subjectivity and sense of identity find their dwelling place in the intentional relationship between the Pure Ego and the body. The Pure Ego thus appropriates the bodily-felt sense of Self within its present thought and then projects it upon the body again, ready for the next appropriation. In this manner, James explains the living sense of continuity and identity of Self that accompany our every breath.

James touches here upon the core of our ambiguity as it relates to conscious presence. We all seem to be able to experience the fleeting sense of consciousness in our present lived experience, a felt sense of Be-ing as we are living. At the same time, we never apprehend this sense of Be-ing completely, as it is in the present thought pulse, itself inaccessible to our direct apprehension, that we find it constituted. Tightly woven with our Be-ing is the constitution of lived time, lived out as our presence to the world, as articulated by Husserl, Heidegger and Merleau-Ponty. We have also seen that Augustine discovered, by his consideration of the phenomenology of lived time, the fundamental aporia resident within the constituted present. Such ambiguity, according to Merleau-Ponty, is to be expected in all our investigations concerning our lived experience. James' account of the specious present addresses the same phenomenon, that of our conscious living out of the present moment. However, with his account of how such a specious present is in fact constituted, James in effect attempts an explanation of the specious present. The same explanation accounts for our sense of continued presence as well as our sense of personal identity. By his concept of the Pure Ego, James is in effect in explanatory mode, going beyond the given, into the realm of what he terms the metaphysical. It is in effect the Pure Ego that he postulates as cause of the successive appropriations and projections upon the empirical Ego.

In his deliberations, James considers other possible explanations for our felt sense of conscious presence, notably, Kant's elaboration of the transcendental Ego, that self-identical, substance-less and property-less entity responsible for nothing other than our beingness, telling us "not how we appear, not how we inwardly are, but only *that we are*" (italics by James, quoting Kant, 1890, p 362). James is in agreement with Kant as to the notion of a "simple and utterly empty idea: I; of which we cannot even say we have a notion, but only a consciousness which accompanies all notions." (James 1890, p 362). However he disagrees with Kant on how such a feeling of conscious presence may be accounted for. As we have already seen, James' account of the Pure Ego, combined with his notion of the specious present, allow him to account for our felt sense of conscious presence, without the invocation of another metaphysical entity such as Kant's Transcendental Ego. The key to James' conceptualisation is the notion of the Pure Ego being unable to apprehend itself in the present moment, but being able to nonetheless feel its own presence, without being able to articulate anything about this presence until it can be appropriated by the next Thought. James articulates this in the following quote:

"The present moment of consciousness is thus the darkest in the whole series. It may feel its own immediate existence - we have all along admitted the possibility of this, hard as it is by direct introspection to ascertain the fact - *but nothing can be known about it till it be dead and gone.*" (italics ours, James, 1890, p 341).

Thus for James, Kant's necessity for a transcendental Ego is unfounded, for his own explanation he deems more parsimonious. In addition, he admonishes Kant for conceptualising the mind as an "elaborate internal machine shop" (James 1890, p 363), combining elemental faculties such as intuition, apperception, imagination, apprehension and understanding, with the attendant requirement that the content of consciousness be 'transferred' to understanding by the other 'faculties'. James sees this complexity as unfounded and opts for his more simple view of the mind, advocating in his defence, the notion that whatever the complexity of their object,

thoughts are delivered to consciousness as single wholes. While in agreement with Kant that the synthesis of "the many known by the one" (James, 1890, p 364) is problematic, he argues that such synthesis is better done in 'reality' than within the mind, since, he opines, Kant's elaboration of these elements does not solve the problem.

2.1.2.1.5.3 The criterion for what within lived experience is to be appropriated as Self.

Another problem dealt with by James, is that of the criterion distinguishing between what in the field of consciousness is to be appropriated as Self. Simply put, the Pure Ego, in its determination of what constitutes the Self, must decide amongst the plethora of lived experience, what is to be constituted as 'Me', or 'Self', from what is to be constituted as 'not Me', or 'not Self'.

"The individualised self, which I believe to be the only thing properly called self, is a part of the content of the world experienced." (italics ours, James, 1912, p 170).

It follows then that some criterion must be applied by the Pure Ego in its selection of those parts of 'the world experienced' that will be labelled as 'Self'. James' first determination of this criterion is phrased as "the sum total of all that (a person) can call his" (James, 1890, p 291). Thus, in this initial determination, James asserts that the criterion of possession is the one to be applied. We note however that different aspects of what James determines as the empirical Self are endowed with different levels of possession. We 'own' our bodies in a different manner than we own our clothes or our other possessions, still different is the manner with which we 'own' our spouse, our children, or our friends. However, in his section on what constitutes Self-love, James clarifies his criterion of demarcation between Self and non-Self in the following quote:

"The words ME, then, and SELF, so far as they arouse feeling and connote emotional worth, are OBJECTIVE designations, meaning ALL THE THINGS which have the power to produce in a stream of consciousness excitement of a certain peculiar sort." (capitals by the author, James, 1890, p 319).

When James examines this 'peculiar sort of excitement' he finds that it relates to the bodily felt feelings that such objects may muster. The most interesting objects are those which arouse sensations within the body, with the supremely interesting objects being those associated with its survival. Such interest is instinctual or biologically determined, with a minimum amount of instinctual bodily self-seeking being absolutely vital to survival.

"My own body and what ministers to its needs are thus the primitive object, instinctively determined, of my egoistic interests. Other objects may become interesting derivatively through association with any of these things, either as means or as habitual concomitants; and so in a thousand ways the primitive sphere of egoistic emotions may enlarge and change its boundaries. This sort of interest is really the meaning of the word 'my'. Whatever has it is eo ipso a part of me." (italics by the author, James, 1890, p 324).

In addition, James notes that the Pure Ego, in choosing what is to be incorporated as Self, makes its judgements based on some fundamental type of resemblance of the things compared, this being the Self as apprehended in the past, and the Self as apprehended in the present moment. While no two moments of lived experience are exactly alike, the selection, by the Pure Ego, of similar attributes, makes possible the continuance of the Self.

We note again the central role played by the body in this demarcation between Self and non-Self. We also note that the activities, such as selection and comparison of lived experience, of the Pure Ego relating to the Self/not-Self criterion take place out of awareness. In this respect, James' conceptualisation is explanatory.

2.1.2.2 The explanatory aspects of James' conceptualisation of Self

Throughout this analysis of James' conceptualisation, we have attempted to articulate both its explicit and implied aspects. James explicitly addresses many aspects pertaining to Self: the empirical or felt Self, the multiple nature of Self, personal identity, Self-esteem, preservation and enhancement of Self, sense of consciousness, the Self/not-Self distinction, the alter ego, and the Pure Ego. By implication, he addresses other aspects that relate to Self: our sense of embodied consciousness, the intentional nature of consciousness, and its constitutive role in perception.

We note that James' account of the Self is largely, almost exclusively, descriptive. He notes, in fine detail and with lucid clarity, many aspects of lived experience which generally escape our attention and which we come to appreciate only through his descriptions conducted with utmost clarity of perception and thought. In his description of the empirical Self, James deliberately avoids any metaphysical analysis of the nature of consciousness. He attempts to render as accurately as possible the data of the primitive attributes of the stream of consciousness, prior to any theorising about it.

In his effort to thoroughly describe psychic life, we note his ability to remain very neutral, focusing entirely on his object of study, the mind, and more explicitly, lived experience. In this respect, his approach is very descriptive and phenomenological, for the manner in which he arrives at his intuitions resembles the phenomenological intuiting espoused by Husserl. In this respect, we can say that James' first attempt is deliberately one of understanding, through thorough description, of psychic life, especially of consciousness and more particularly, of consciousness of self, with a deliberate attempt at not going beyond the given. With his descriptions, he sounds the limits of what we can perceive consciously of ourselves, noting limitations, contradictions, and limits to understanding.

As noted above, it is with respect to the Pure Ego, that James' conceptualisation involves the explanation of the felt sense of Self, sense of identity, and sense of conscious embodiment. It is through his notion of the specious present that he articulates what, in his opinion, must account for these phenomena. The Pure Ego, is then conceptualised as the centre of the continuous appropriations and projections from and to the body, even though James does not grant to the Pure Ego the status of reified entity. It is rather an on-going process, consisting of nothing other than the present stream of Thought, otherwise addressed as simple presence to lived experience.

We note also that James is extremely prudent with respect to his interpretative explanation of the Pure Ego. This entity he justifies on several grounds, the main one being that our felt sense of conscious Selfhood being undeniably experienced, something must account for it. With this concept he describes the Pure Ego as that underlying foundational Stream of Thought accounting for the felt sense of Self and of personal identity, as well as the accretion point for all of the Empirical Selves. We note that the Pure Ego is not part of lived experience, what is commonly labelled as Pure or Transcendental Ego, James contends is in fact what he labels the spiritual Self, the Pure Ego's sensory correlate. Furthermore, within his elaboration of the Pure Ego, we sense the deliberate attempt to remain as parsimonious as possible, minimising the extension beyond lived experience, and returning to it often to ensure that the conceptualisation proposed adequately explains the phenomena. He compares his own explanation to those of others, notably Kant, and judges his own conceptualisation not only more parsimonious, but more importantly, able to better account for the phenomena of lived experience.

James classifies himself as Radical Empiricist, by this term he wishes to emphasise his insistence on the primacy of lived experience as fundamental datum of psychology. In all his deliberations, it is his starting point and the point to which he continuously returns. Lived experience, he contends, is that from which all sensations, perceptions and cognitions, regardless of their complexity or level of

abstraction, emanate. Regardless of any thoughts we may have about lived experience, regardless of any speculations or theories we may entertain about its genesis or constitution, in the first instance, lived experience simply is. All theories and notions not only emanate from it, and attempt to account for it, but they are also, in themselves, part of lived experience. Correlative to his insistence on the primacy of lived experience, James minimises the import of rational theorising, arguing that the abstract relations evoked in our thinking of them, is likewise part of lived experience, even though such relations do not figure within the perceived spatio-temporal world.

With the phenomenologists, James adamantly rejects atomism, that is the contention that parts of the 'outer' object correspond to parts within the perception of that object, with such perceived thoughts being separate but somehow linked to each other. Perceptions, thoughts, no matter of what object they be, are delivered to the mind as wholes, what he terms 'sensible totals' (James, 1890, p 487). Thus, there are no grounds in lived experience, for atomist thinking.

James justifies this assertion by noting the continuity, before the mind, of all lived experience. Thinking simply is a continuous, ceaseless and ever-changing flux, with the mind dwelling on some aspects more than others, giving us the false impression of gaps between thoughts. Just as each perspectival percept of an object has horizons of reference that foreshadow the upcoming percept, our thinking has similar horizons between those aspects on which it dwells, what James refers to as 'fringes'. While he notes that thinking is flux, James also notes how consciousness is incredibly selective, constituting a network of meaning. Such meaning invariably finds its origins within the primal field of experience, such flow of experience being anterior to all distinctions.

We have already seen that James argues for constancy in our perceptions and conceptualisations. James ignores just how the mind carries out its selections and 'holding' of similarities in order to abstract from lived experience the things we

define as objects and ideas, but notes that it does so, most naturally. Such constancy, or sameness, we interpret as a constancy of meaning, itself the result of a selection and abstraction from lived experience. We have previously seen that the determination of meaning essences, or what is invariant about a phenomenon, is the explicit aim of the phenomenological method. We opine that by his reference to sameness, James is in effect referring to sameness of meaning, or meaning essences, and in this respect remains aligned with Husserl's phenomenology. Furthermore, the tendency, for the mind, is always towards increasing levels of abstraction and complexity, or in other words towards increased knowledge and meaning. This tendency also resonates with Heidegger's notion of Dasein as understanding, and Dasein-as-interpretation, a tendency which we advocate as the foundational human state and activity.

So while James, labelling himself as Radical Empiricist, emphasises the disciplined return, by way of description, to lived experience, he himself resorts to rationalistic explanation in his account of the activities of the Pure Ego, even though his use of explanation is minimised to the utmost extent. In this respect, his conceptualisation is explanatory, for it goes beyond the immediately given. James himself admits that access to certain zones of truth is often made possible only by theoretically premature commitment on our part, where a necessary preliminary faith must exist in the coming of a fact. In this respect, he acknowledges the necessity for rational explanation as complement to the apprehension of lived experience, for it is only through the previous expectation of an event that it can be cognised as such. In this respect, James acknowledges the interrelationship between descriptive understanding and explanation. The same may be said for the relationship between sensation, perception and cognition, where the 'holding' of sameness, or the determining of essences, in an interpretative endeavour, going beyond the immediately given. Taking the sensation or perception as 'fact' for the purposes of constituting a subsequent perception or cognition, is in fact an interpretation that is biased or conjectural, for the mind could select, according to its interests, another

aspect to focus on and decree as 'fact'. In this respect then, James diverts from the phenomenological and effectively enters the explanatory mode of knowledge.

James is to be commended for his outstanding contribution to the concept of Self at such an early stage in psychology's history. He writes with impressive thoroughness and clarity, especially on the concept of the Pure Ego and its relationship to the body. This we believe is due to his insistence on the painstaking and accurate description of lived experience prior to any attempt at theorisation.

There are however two aspects of the Self which we feel that James has not addressed. The first relates to the role of interpersonal relationships within the constitution of Self. The second relates to the problem of language and its place in the constitution of Self.

The second aspect, the problem of language, is not formally addressed by James as part of the Self, however he does indicate implicitly the relationship between language and thought. For James, thinking goes on mostly in linguistic terms, and notes that one's thought is not known to oneself prior to its articulation. While language is part of lived experience and takes place within it, it always designates something other than itself, invariably serving to make distinctions within lived experience, singling out aspects and relations within and between such distinctions. And so while affording to language an important place within the constitution of thought, he does not elaborate any distinct linguistic or narrative Self. We shall consider the possibility of a linguistic or narrative Self in our analysis of the subsequent authors as well as in Chapter 3.

2.1.3 Summary

James has articulated a highly elaborate and powerful conceptualisation of Self. Its strength lies in his ability to clearly articulate, by careful consideration of the

fundamental datum of lived experience, the relevant aspects of Self, and the relationships between them. In this respect, his conceptualisation gravitates heavily towards the understanding pole, with James consciously attempting the return to 'brute' experience by way of thorough description, in a manner very similar to the phenomenological method. With his concept of the Pure Ego, he accounts for many of the finer attributes of the Self, relating them to the notions of personal identity, sense of conscious being, sense of embodiment and others. In this respect, his conceptualisation becomes explanatory. We have also underscored in what respects James is in explanatory mode even within certain descriptions, notably, in his account of the relations between sensation, perception and cognition. Finally, we note that some aspects of Self remain problematic and could profit from more powerful explanations. These comments in no way minimise James' contribution, which remains, overall, outstanding. It is, even today, one of the most articulate, coherent and powerful conceptualisations of Self ever produced. For this and for his other contributions, we owe a tremendous debt to this brilliant man.

2.2 The conceptualisation of Self according to Carl Gustav Jung

"The self designates the whole range of psychic phenomena in man. It expresses the unity of personality as a whole."

(Jung, 1971)

"The collective unconscious, however, as the ancestral heritage of possibilities of representation, is not individual but common to all men, and perhaps even to all animals, and is the true basis of the individual psyche."

(Jung, 1971a)

2.2.1 The Self according to Jung

Jung (1983), uses the term *Self* to designate three different but related aspects of personality. The Self in its largest sense refers to the total personality; this entity, which we term the *Self-as-whole*, is formed of several distinct entities, including the conscious ego, that are, for the most part, in opposition to each other.

"Clearly, then, the *personality as a total phenomenon* does not coincide with the ego, that is with the conscious personality, but forms an entity that has to be distinguished from the ego.... I have suggested calling the total personality which, though present, cannot be fully known, the *self*. The ego is, by definition, subordinate to the self and is related to it like a part to the whole." (italics by the author, Jung, 1951, p 142).

One of the central entities is the Ego, which is the conscious part of personality, a complex entity to which all conscious contents accrue. It forms the centre of the field of consciousness and is the subject of all personal conscious acts. For Jung (1983), the criterion of consciousness is that the Ego be in direct relationship with some psychic content, that is to say that while there are different levels of unconsciousness, their conscious presence to the Ego is what distinguishes between those contents which form part of consciousness and those that do not. Jung also founds the Ego upon two distinct bases: the somatic and the psychic. The somatic base is deduced from

the totality of endosomatic sensations which in turn, become manifestly psychic and related to the Ego, to which they later become conscious as perceptions. While perceptions and sensations are experienced consciously, a significant proportion of the somatic base responsible for the perceptions (i.e., the body) has no possibility of ever becoming conscious. For this reason, Jung believes that the somatic base of the Ego is, by its constitution, made up of both conscious and extra-conscious, or unconscious, elements. By analogy, the same principle also applies to the psychic base. He therefore believes that while distinct from them both, the Ego is founded upon the total field of conscious as well as the field of extra-conscious contents. While these basic constituents are generic from the point of view of their formal definition, Jung postulates that they are infinitely varied as regards their clarity, emotional colouring and scope, such variation being what accounts for the individuality of each person's Ego personality.

Like Freud, Jung believes that a substantial part, if not the most important and most central part of personality, is attributable to what he terms extra-conscious functioning. Jung goes further than Freud by distinguishing different levels of the extra-conscious, the first of which he terms the *personal unconscious*, while the second he terms the *impersonal or collective unconscious*. The personal unconscious he regards as contents which are "integral components of the individual personality" (Jung, 1951, p 19), while the collective unconscious he considers as a condition, or basis, for the psyche. To this second part of the extra-conscious he attributes regularity and generality, as he considers it a foundation common to all humanity. He thus interpreted cultural and mystical symbols as empirical manifestations that proved the existence of the collective unconscious.

"The collective unconscious - so far as we can say anything about it at all - appears to consist of mythological motifs or primordial images, for which reason the myths of all nations are its real exponents. In fact, the whole of mythology could be taken as a sort of projection of the collective unconscious." (Jung, 1971a, p 39).

While the contents of the personal unconscious result from the individual's life experiences, Jung (1983) believes that those emanating from the collective unconscious have an a priori and permanent existence, manifesting themselves in the form of *archetypes*. While there are many archetypes, the most accessible are the Persona, the Shadow, the Animus and the Anima. Another archetype, which is the most central, is the archetype of the Self. While the Self-as-archetype, and Self-as-centre, will be dealt with later, at this point let us say that Jung considers the latter as the core of the psyche and grants to it a central mediating role between the opposing entities within the Self-as-whole (Samuels et al., 1986).

More than mere contents of the collective unconscious, the archetypes are dynamic entities, which can be interpreted and experienced as *personifications*, and which exert powerful influences upon the total person. While residing in the collective unconscious, they are vying for expression within the conscious Ego and within the Self-as-centre, and harbour tendencies which call for their acquaintance and integration amongst themselves and with the Ego.

Underlying the concept of Self, is that of psychic energy, or libido, a term which signifies not merely a sexual, but also a more global form of psychic energy. Such energy is manifest in the tension between the opposing dimensions that form the basis of Jung's conception of Self. Two principles are at work, the first being that of *equivalence*, which, analogously to the first law of thermodynamics, states that energy spent in one part of a system will not be lost but will be transferred to another part. From the point of view of the psyche, this means that a fixed amount of energy is available, and a portion spent for one psychic activity is not available to be spent on another. The second principle, that of *entropy*, this time analogous to the second law of thermodynamics, states that energy tends to a state of equilibrium. Just as heat flows from hot to cold, psychic energy will flow from the psychic function heavily imbued with energy, to the one with the lesser amount. In this sense, an internal conflict between two strongly opposed forces will create more psychological tension than another conflict with a lesser amount of energy involved. Jung's

model of the Self is thus a closed energy system, and includes opposing entities through which psychic energy is transferred from one to the other. Transfer of psychic energy, and loading of energy at one extreme of opposing tendencies, are thus the underlying fundamentals explaining all motivations, behaviours as well as thoughts and dreams.

The most accessible of the archetypes is that of the *Persona*. For Jung, the Persona represents a "more or less arbitrary and fortuitous segment of the collective psyche... .. a mask of the collective psyche, a mask that feigns individuality, making others and oneself believe that one is individual, whereas one is simply acting a role through which the collective psyche speaks" (Jung, 1971a, p 105). This part of the Self represents that part that we tend to "present" to others, especially in our social activities. While this part is the most conscious, and is oft-times erroneously identified as comprising the total contents of the Ego, Jung (1971a) contends that in fact, a substantial proportion of the Persona emanates from the collective unconscious.

"...that despite the exclusive identity of the ego-consciousness with the persona the unconscious self, one's real individuality, is always present and makes itself felt indirectly if not directly. Although the ego-consciousness is at first identical with the persona - that compromise role in which we parade before the community - yet the unconscious self can never be repressed to the point of extinction." (Jung, 1971a, p 106).

The *Shadow* is formed by the dark and hidden aspects of the collective unconscious. Such aspects are emotional in nature, and have a possessive quality. In its most dramatic form, the Shadow reveals those aspects of the person that are, in an affective sense, the most primitive, and they have the potential to render the person almost inept and incapable of any moral judgement. The most resistant to any moral control takes the form of *projections* (Jung, 1983), that is to say, the attribution onto others of qualities, usually negative, that belong to oneself.

Jung makes a further distinction between the portion of the Shadow associated with the personal unconscious and that associated with the collective unconscious. The former he conceives as "closer" to the Ego and is more accessible than the Animus or the Anima. The latter however is just as elusive as the other archetypes, and engenders the same level of resistance to being apprehended by the Ego.

"c'est précisément par son aptitude à se laisser plus aisément discerner et réaliser qu'elle (l'ombre) se différencie de l'animus et de l'anima, lesquels sont nettement plus éloignés de la conscience et ne sont donc, dans les circonstances habituelles, que rarement, sinon jamais perçus. L'ombre peut être pénétrée sans difficulté par une certaine autocritique en tant qu'elle est de nature personnelle. Mais là où elle est en question comme archétype, on rencontre les mêmes difficultés qu'avec l'animus et l'anima...." (parentheses ours, Jung, 1983, p 22-23).

The phenomenon of projection led Jung to believe that another part of the Self-as-whole, one with the attributes of the opposite sex, exercises its influence from the domain of the collective unconscious. For the man, this archetype is the feminine part of himself, which Jung calls the *Anima*, while for the woman, the archetype represents the masculine part of herself, which he calls the *Animus*. More than mere influences, these parts of the Self-as-whole are like personifications within it.

"Le facteur créant la projection est l'anima, c'est-à-dire l'inconscient représenté par l'anima. Là où elle apparaît, elle se présente comme *personnifiée* dans les rêves, les visions et les phantasmes, et atteste ainsi que le facteur qui est son fondement possède toutes les propriétés éminentes d'un *être féminin*." (italics ours, Jung, 1983, p 26-27).

The Anima however, is not merely the result of the man's interaction with his mother, even if she may have been the original target of his projections. As is the case with the other archetypes, the Anima has its roots in the history of the human race and in this sense the Anima represents the "collective" mother, with the

myriad of meanings that have been associated to the experience of mother through the ages.

Jung also believes and emphasises that these archetypal entities are more than mere speculations, and contends that the animus/anima are empirically verifiable and demonstrable.

As the Anima is the maternal *Eros* within a man, the Animus is the paternal *logos* within the woman. Jung refuses to give a more detailed description of these attributes however he states that his intention is to, by these opposing concepts, describe the relating nature of the Eros in contrast to the cognitive and discriminating nature of the logos (Jung, 1983).

Jung also believes that a man could take on, or become, the Animus to his own Anima. This becomes evident when, possessed by his Anima, he argues in a feminine manner, displaying in the process, his "vanity and susceptibility". For her part, the woman in the grips of her Animus, could become Anima, such an occurrence manifesting itself as a quest for "power of the truth" or of "justice" (Jung, 1983).

The Animus/Anima is also a mediator between the conscious and unconscious as well as a personification of the unconscious. In this sense, it exercises a definite and powerful influence upon the Ego, "taking over its personality" (Jung, 1951). Because this influence is so powerful, and also because of its projective nature, the process of becoming aware of their contents and influence is an arduous task, necessitating, in the first instance, an acquaintance with one's Shadow. In this sense, the Animus and Anima archetypes are "deeper" and more threatening to the person, and more difficult to access. While the Shadow may be accessed by one's own efforts, the Anima or Animus can only be encountered through a relationship with the opposite sex. This gives an opportunity for the projections to become manifest, allowing them to be subsequently worked through.

"L'ombre ne peut être réalisée que dans la relation avec un vis-à-vis, et l'animus et l'anima par la relation avec le sexe opposé, car c'est seulement là que leurs projections sont opérantes." (Jung, 1983, p 35).

While their effects may be rendered conscious and their contents at times integrated, Jung (1983) contends that the Animus/Anima archetypes are by their fundamental and collective nature inaccessible, transcendental and separate entities. Jung also ascribes a mysterious, numinous quality to these archetypes, describing them in a way which makes one's experiencing of them sound almost like a spiritual and mystical experience.

"Tandis que l'ombre est accompagnée le plus souvent d'une valeur affective claire et descriptible, l'anima aussi bien que l'animus évoquent, quant à eux, des qualités de cette nature plus difficiles à définir. Ils sont en effet ressentis la plupart du temps comme fascinants ou numineux. Une atmosphère les enveloppe souvent, faite de sensibilité, d'intangibilité, de mystère, d'intimité douloureuse et même d'absolu." (Jung, 1983, p 42).

Jung mentions two other major archetypes operating within the collective unconscious, these being the *Wise Old Man* within the man and within the woman, the *Chthonian Woman*. The first represents a source of wisdom, intuition, reflection, insight and cleverness within men, the second represents a source of critique, dissatisfaction and bitterness within women. These, Jung (1983) contends, are necessary to complete the quaternity which he qualifies as half-immanent and half-transcendent. Jung, in his treatise of the Self (Jung, 1983) does not further elaborate on these archetypes. He does however describe these and other archetypes extensively in other publications (Jung, 1944, 1957, 1971a, 1971b).

For Jung, the end result of the individuation process is not only an increased awareness (widened consciousness) of Self, but a better relationship with the outside world.

"...instead, it [the widened consciousness] is a function of the relationship to the world of objects, bringing the individual into absolute, binding and indissoluble communion with the world at large." (parentheses ours, Jung, 1971a, p 127).

Jung (1983) however, relegates the most importance to one archetype, that of the Self. According to Samuels et al., (1986) the Self-as-archetype is the "unifying principle within the human psyche" and "occupies the central position of authority in relation to psychological life and therefore the destiny of the individual" (Samuels et al., 1986). In Jung's own words:

"The self is not only the centre, but also the whole circumference which embraces both conscious and unconscious; it is the centre of this totality, just as ego is the centre of the conscious mind." (Jung, 1944a, p 41)

He believes that this archetype, related to the idea, or essence, of totality, is manifest in all monotheist and monist religions, and within Christianity is exemplified in the person of Christ.

"Le soi [as archetype, parenthesis ours] enfin se révèle, grâce à ses attributs empiriques, comme l'eidos (l'idée) de toutes les images de totalité et d'unité que contiennent principalement tous les systèmes monothéistes et monistes." (parentheses by the author, Jung, 1983, p 48)

"Le Christ illustre l'archétype du Soi. Il représente une totalité de nature divine ou céleste, un homme glorifié, un Fils de Dieu sine macula peccati [non souillé par le péché, parentheses ours]". (italics by the author, Jung, 1983, p 52).

Jung (1983) believes that the Self-as-archetype is manifest in a myriad of symbols, especially those that manifest themselves in dreams, as well as those used in most, if not all, religions. For instance, he sees in the Christian symbol of the fish an ostensible representation, transmitted through the ages, of the Self-archetype. He notes that this symbol is one of many that seem to have appeared independently in different cultures and during different eras, such multiple manifestations

confirming the existence of the collective unconscious. In this sense he attributes great significance to symbols (e.g., mandalas, crucifix, pentagrams), numbers (e.g., three, four, three plus one, four times three), to mythical figures (e.g., dragons, serpents, Greek gods), and to many of the signs used by the Hindus, by the Gnostics, and by the ancient alchemists. He expounds at great length on the relationships between these various symbols and on their significance to human Selfhood.

At the core of Jung's conceptualisation of Self-as-whole, is a conglomeration of opposing tendencies vying against each other. Examples of such tendencies are the Persona-Individual, the Anima-Animus, the Wise Old Man-Chthonian Woman, the Christ-Antichrist, the Conscious-Unconscious, the Extravert-Introvert, Feeling-Thinking, Sensation-Intuition and so on. The person, during a lifetime process called *individuation*, or of "becoming one's self", has the developmental task of reconciling these opposing archetypal forces (Jung, 1971a, p 120). This necessitates an acceptance and integration with the less-conscious side of these dualities, a task representing at best a daunting challenge, and at worst a trepidating and painful journey into the unknown depths of one's psyche, with the potential to bring one to the brink of neurosis or psychosis. Only once this "dark" side has been sounded, tamed and integrated could the Self reconcile the opposing forces in question. Jung believes that individuation is a necessary undertaking for persons if they are to make sense of their lives. Such integration of the "dark" sides, although painful and frightening, will always yield a new adjustment with overall positive results for the person.

At the core of the relationships between different parts of the Self-as-whole, is the emphasis on the relationship between the unconscious and the conscious. While Jung (1971c) clearly stresses the importance of the unconscious, he also points out the importance of the Ego in fostering the emergence of the unconscious content and giving meaning to its expression. This interplay between the unconscious and the conscious he terms the Transcendent Function. In Jung's own words:

"The psychological 'transcendent function' arises from the union of conscious and unconscious contents." (Jung, 1971c, p 273)

"The tendencies of the conscious and the unconscious are the two factors that together make up the transcendent function. It is called 'transcendent' because it makes the transition from one attitude to another organically possible, without loss of the unconscious. The constructive or synthetic method of treatment presupposes insights which are at least potentially present in the patient and can therefore be made conscious." (Jung, 1971c, p 279)

For Jung (1971c) the relationship between the unconscious and the conscious is one of complementarity. This function is not to be confused with the functions pertaining to the psychological types (Jung, 1971b), as it is related specifically to the synthesis of the unconscious and the conscious. While on the one hand, the transcendent function has the task of bringing the unconscious contents to conscious awareness, it also can not give free reign to the unconscious which would simply take over the personality. The mediated forces of consciousness require substantial structure and stability.

Another important aspect of personality developed by Jung is that of the *psychological types* (1971b). Jung believes that humans harbour four psychological functions, these functions are not to be confused with the Transcendent function dealt with previously, as they relate to traits that reside chiefly within the conscious part of the psyche. The first two of these psychological functions he calls perceptual, these being *sensation* and *intuition*, while the other two he calls the judging functions of *thinking* and *feeling*. In addition to these functions, he believes that there are two basic attitudes in which these functions may be expressed, that of the *extraverted* and the *introverted* attitudes. Sensation and intuition are both irrational or perceptual functions, while the thinking and feeling both are rational or judging functions. According to Jung (1971b), humans have a preference for one attitude and for one of the functions, be it irrational or rational. This results in eight

psychological types, four of which are introverted (e.g., introverted thinking type) and four of which are extraverted (e.g., extraverted intuition type). In distinguishing between the two attitudes, Jung (1971b) believes that in the extraverted attitude the object is perceived more objectively and is less coloured by the beliefs, values and desires of the perceiving person. In *Psychological Types* (Jung, 1971b), he states:

"The one [the extraverted type] allows himself to be oriented by the given facts, the other [the introverted type] holds in reserve a view which interposes itself between him and the objective data. Now, when orientation by the object predominates in such a way that decisions and actions are determined not by subjective views but by objective conditions, we speak of an extraverted attitude. When this is habitual, we speak of an extraverted type." (parentheses ours, Jung, 1971b, p 182).

"It [the introverted attitude] concentrates the libido on the subjective factor, that is, on all those needs and demands that are stifled or repressed by the conscious attitude." (parentheses ours, Jung, 1971b, p 187).

Each person has a principal function in his or her preferred attitude, but also has an auxiliary and other functions which are developed in the opposite attitude. Thus, if a person is of the extraverted rational feeling type, that person's principal function is that of feeling in the extraverted attitude. However this person's auxiliary function would be of the irrational type, that is sensation or intuition, expressed in the introverted attitude. The person's tertiary and least developed functions would also be directed in the introverted attitude.

The psychological functions are useful tools for Self-awareness and Self-knowledge. They dictate preferences in such aspect as career, academic interests, hobbies and conscious personality (Myers and Myers, 1980). Jung also believes that the functions vary as to their degree of embeddedness within the unconscious. As such, a person's most conscious function is the primary one, with the auxiliary being the second most conscious, and so on. For example, an extraverted feeling type's most

conscious function is feeling, followed by the irrational function of sensation or intuition, with the least conscious function being that of thinking.

To summarise, Jung uses the term "Self" in three differing but related aspects. The first has to do with describing the whole of the psyche or of personality, this is what we term the Self-as-whole. The Self-as-whole contains all aspects of the psyche, including the Ego, the individual unconscious, the collective unconscious, the archetypes, their images and their processes. The second has to do with what we term the Self-as-archetype, in this sense the Self is an archetype to the same extent as the others, but it is related to the idea of wholeness and completeness. Finally, while related to the Self-as-archetype, the Self-as-process, as mediated through the transcendent function, plays a central role in the dynamics of psychic functioning, being the mediator between the unconscious and the total Self, the integrator of the opposing archetypes. In this sense, more than a mere archetype, the Self-as-process is the centre of the total Self, this centre being largely part of the unconscious. We note that Jung is not always clear on what Self he is actually referring to. These three distinctions we opine, add clarity to Jung's conceptualisation.

2.2.2 Critical analysis of Jung's conceptualisation of the Self

Jung's system is complex, innovative, enlightening, deep. It is also very contradictory. He has explored and attempted to clarify many aspects of psychic functioning. His writings have treated facets as varied as love, war, religion and religious experience, UFOs, the symbolism of the catholic mass, rites and rituals, the books of the Bible, occult experience, dreams and mythology. His delving into history, anthropology, sociology, theology, and the occult sciences, have given his system of human Selfhood substantial depth and breadth. His vision is novel in that he does not believe that humans are intrinsically evil or good, but rather that they are a synthesis of both polarities from which he deduces that psychopathology is usually the result of preventing the "evil" tendency from becoming conscious, such

repression eventually resulting into the uncontrolled eruption of the tendency in its pathological form. In light of his model, psychopathology is not the result of some burgeoning instinct brought to the light of consciousness, but rather the result of an imbalance between opposing forces, some of which are perceived as acceptable, others not. Individuation comprises the proper expression of these tendencies, regardless of the sanctioning society may or may not be willing to bestow upon them. Such individuation is a life-long process which characterises psychological development, with a mature Self not being achieved until mid-life.

2.2.2.1 The understanding aspects of Jung's conceptualisation of the Self

2.2.2.1.1 On the nature of consciousness and its attributes

Jung attributes some importance to consciousness, one that mirrors that of phenomenology:

"Without consciousness, there would, practically speaking, be no world, for the world exists as such only in so far as it is consciously reflected and consciously expressed by a psyche. *Consciousness is a precondition of being.*" (italics by the author, Jung, 1957, p 46-47).

For Jung, the Ego is the centre of the field of consciousness and is the subject of all personal conscious acts, with the criterion of consciousness being that the Ego be *in direct relationship with some psychic content*. Implicit in his description of the Ego are its capacity to perceive, to select, to compare, and to act. While this is suggestive of the *intentional relationship* between consciousness and its object, we note that Jung restricts the notion of object to that of the inner world, and thus ignores the existential notion of consciousness-in-the-world. Neither does he address the other issues pertaining to consciousness, such as its unity or its constitutive processes. Thus, while not thoroughly exploring the attributes of consciousness, his basic assertion, that of our state as conscious beings, is compatible with our own position.

While somatically based, Jung's Ego is founded upon the total field of conscious as well as the field of extra-conscious contents. From the point of view of consciousness, Jung recognises the importance of the Ego's role with respect to the perception of lived experience however, he clearly relegates more importance to the Ego's role as partial mediator and integrator of the collective unconscious, this task being shared with the Self-as-centre.

From a phenomenological point of view, the 'Ego' is associated primarily with conscious experience. Brooke (1991) reformulates Jung's notion of the unconscious from a phenomenological point of view, to that of the '*unconscious*' being contained within the '*conscious*'. Since all conscious apprehension of objects and beings in the world is perspectival, some aspect or another is 'unconscious' in the sense that it is not immediately perceived. In this sense, unconsciousness is a manner of *being-in-the-world*, which necessarily accompanies conscious-being-in-the-world. Jung, we note, does not consider this unconscious aspect to conscious experience. The importance he affords to consciousness is clearly inferior to that afforded to the collective unconscious as expressed by the archetypes and their interrelationships, which he considers as "the true basis of the individual psyche" (Jung, 1971a, p 38). And so, while defining the Ego as primarily in relationship to conscious phenomena, with the Self-as-process being primarily in relationship to unconscious contents, Brooke's interpretation expands Jung's notion of the Ego to include its relationship to unconscious aspects of lived experience. This aspect is not addressed by Jung.

In his description of the psychological types, Jung touches upon other attributes of the Ego. We recall that the psychological functions represent two ways of perceiving and two ways of making judgements about the perceived world. These can occur in the introverted or extraverted attitude. These functions are descriptive of a perceiving and thinking consciousness, and Jung emphasises how certain functions are preferred to others, leading to their habitual use, which he labels a *psychological*

type. With Husserl and with James, we have already stressed consciousness' selectivity and maintenance of similarity, but here Jung adds a *habitual preference* for some aspects of lived experience. There would be then a habituation of consciousness that while generalised, finds different forms of expression within different individuals. It remains to be seen whether Jung's description of the functions encompasses all of our perceptual and thought experience, or if we can attribute other functions not intuited by Jung. It is not clear how Jung arrived at this insight, however a thorough phenomenological study of this aspect of his conceptualisation could possibly shed more light on this alleged attribute of consciousness. We can also question if such habituation should be attributed to consciousness, or to another entity within the Self. We shall reconsider this question in Chapter Three.

In brief, we conclude that Jung does partially articulate a notion of consciousness compatible with our own view, and while their exact location vis-à-vis consciousness remains to be considered, we note here his novel contribution of the psychological types. Finally, with his strong emphasis on the archetypes, Jung clearly relegates more importance to unconscious functioning than to conscious lived experience. Thus the Self, rather than being comprised of mostly conscious lived experience, finds its substance in the collective unconscious.

2.2.2.1.2 On the primacy of lived experience

In his initial writings, Jung states that the Self designates "the whole range of psychic phenomena in man" (Jung, 1971b, p 179). With this affirmation Jung appears to be highly consonant with a phenomenological position, in that he equates the psyche to the phenomenological notion of existence, or lived experience. However, Jung does not carry out a rigorous study of lived experience, rather his efforts focus on imaginative experiences, those he terms archetypal. Through the study of anthropology, mythology, occultism and the like, he attempts to find confirmation

of the unconscious intrapsychic entities he espouses, which in turn, would be seen as responsible for a part of conscious lived experience, which we term *archetypal experience*.

We also note that Jung's descriptions centre more about the archetypes per se, rather than the experiences they allegedly provoke, which he describes as numinous and mysterious. While much of this activity is descriptive, it centres around the postulated entity responsible for this archetypal experience, not the experience itself. We note that the archetype is not part of lived experience, but rather forms Jung's *explanation* for what constitutes this aspect of psychic life. In effect, the archetypes could be viewed as *abstractions* from certain aspects of lived experience, aspects that Jung found natural to ascribe to inner personifications, or Self-like entities. By his evocation of the lived experience allegedly provoked by a myriad of archetypes, we can say that Jung is effectively referring to many aspects of lived experience, which he considers in great breadth and depth, but not from a phenomenological point of view. And so, while he initially recognises the Self-as-whole first and foremost as phenomenon, that is, as part of lived experience, Jung attributes to entities outside of lived experience, those forming the collective unconscious, most of the constitution of the Self-as-whole.

Curiously, Jung saw these descriptions as empirical, meaning that he took them as descriptive of lived experience. He also asserted that the archetypes were empirically verifiable and demonstrable, however his proof consisted of finding, within mythology, archaeology, anthropology and occultism, similar symbols emanating from different cultures. The Christian symbol of the fish, for example, he took as the symbol, autonomously expressed in various cultures, of the Self archetype. We find his method of proof very tenuous, since Jung has no assurance that the same symbol was used to designate the same aspects of lived experience within different cultures. Moreover, regardless if the same symbol refers to the same experiences, it is possible that another explanation could be invoked to account for it. We argue that Jung is simply using his findings as confirmation of his theoretical suppositions,

augmenting their status to *projections* of the collective unconscious. He himself wrote that:

"In fact, the whole of mythology could be taken as a sort of projection of the collective unconscious." (Jung, 1971a, p 39).

We would be hard pressed to find counter examples to refute this belief, as all manifestations may be interpreted as productions of one archetype or another.

Brooke (1991) contends that while archetypal symbols indicate a thematic and structural unity of experience, they also indicate how Jung ignored the fundamental attribute of lived experience, that is our living relationship to a world, which we consciously apprehend, but of which many aspects remain unapprehended, or 'unconscious'. He contends that Jung failed to consider this fundamental relationship, analogous to the foundational subject-object relationship, and did not see that the images he was referring to emanate from our living relationship to a world.

"... it is accepted that Jung noticed a thematic and structural consistency within a range of images that stretched across space and time from the consulting room to Greek mythology to aboriginal ritual. But having forgotten the constitutive power of our incarnate relation to the world which these images reveal, Jung felt obliged as an empiricist to hypothesise something to explain their thematic unity." (Brooke, 1991, p 149).

In support of this argument, Brooke outlines that certain archetypal phenomena contradict Jung's conjecture. For instance, if archetypes are in fact responsible for the manifestation of archetypal images, then there must be a one-to-one relationship between the archetype and its images. This violates experience, as it becomes problematic to explain how a child experiences the world in terms of say, Mother images. Brooke contends that another interpretation is more tenable, proposed by Boss (Brooke, 1991), that the child lives in a world of mother images, the unity of such images being given in the *structure of childlikeness*. Thus, there is no need to

postulate the existence of a structuring mother archetype, as the primordial structure is rather the mother-child relationship, not one pole or the other of this relation. And thus the *potential-for-being-childlike*, such potential being called forth by the consciously lived world of being-with-the-mother, is what structures and unifies the child-mother images.

2.2.2.1.3 On embodiment

According to Brooke (1991), Jung's notion of the psyche doesn't exclude the body, but rather swallows it. Since all of lived experience is included in the psyche, the body is itself part of such experience, however Jung doesn't thematise the body, that is, he doesn't give it any special consideration. However, Jung also says:

"Thus the psyche is endowed with the dignity of a cosmic principle, which philosophically and in fact gives it a position *coequal with the principle of physical being*." (italics ours, Jung, 1957, p 46-47).

While he states that the Ego has a somatic base, Jung doesn't elaborate on this issue. Nor does he elaborate on the sense of Self that may be harboured by the body. While the relationship between the Ego and the body is not made clear, Jung contends that the Ego is the centre of the field of consciousness, and by virtue of having a significant portion of itself attributed to the task of perceptual consciousness, is that entity mediating the relationship between the body and the psyche.

However, Jung does not go beyond such general assertions, and doesn't elaborate further on the nature of the relationship between the body and the Ego. In summary, within Jung's conceptualisation, the body is hardly thematised beyond acknowledging the existence of a somatic basis.

2.2.2.1.4 On the interpersonal aspects of Self

Jung doesn't seriously consider the interpersonal aspects to Self, and while he does not consider the problem of the perception of the other as alter ego, he deems it to take place. He does attribute a minor role to the other in the constitution of Self, whereby the Anima or Animus is brought to light in the relationship with a member of the opposite sex. This is the limit of Jung's consideration of the other.

2.2.2.1.5 The subject-object distinction, the Self/not-Self distinction, Self-identity, general distinctions within the Self

While Jung distinguishes the Ego from the Self, his distinction does not concern the Ego as perceiving agent vs. the Self as perceived, but relates to the distinction between the Ego as conscious entity vs. the Self as an entity larger than the Ego and outside of what can be apprehended consciously.

"Clearly, then, *the personality as a total phenomenon* does not coincide with the ego, that is with the *conscious personality*, but forms an entity that has to be *distinguished from the ego* (italics ours)... ... I have suggested calling the total personality which, though present, *cannot be fully known* (italics ours), the *self*." (italics by the author, Jung, 1951, p 142).

While Jung does not explicitly address what entity does the perceiving, we would surmise this to be the Ego, the only conscious entity within his conceptualisation. However, we note that the Ego is not alone in its involvement with the perception of the Self. The Self-as-process, concerned with the integration of the opposite archetypes, need also be endowed with certain capabilities if it is to be the integrator, for it must necessarily perceive, select and integrate those aspects of the archetype to be included as part of the Self. Moreover, Jung contends that such integration takes place out of awareness. Thus for Jung, there are two loci of perception, the Ego and the Self-as-archetype, which communicate by virtue of the transcendent function. Thus Jung recognises that perception and integration of the Self takes place at an unconscious level. This is analogous to James' notion of the Pure Ego's continuous

appropriations and projections of the Self from and to the body. Jung's conceptualisation, while more explicitly acknowledging the unconscious aspect to Self-constitution, is more complex than James', who hypothesises that this function be carried out by the Pure Ego. Furthermore, these entities differ greatly in what they perceive and integrate. James concerns himself with the perception, selection and comparison of lived experience necessary for the continuance of Self-identity, while Jung's Self-as-centre is focused on the integration of unconscious archetypal entities and forces.

Jung does not address how consciousness, or any other entity, selects amongst the plethora of perceived sensations, perceptions and objects, distinguishing what belongs to Self from what doesn't. Jung does not establish any criterion to distinguish between Self and not-Self.

With his concept of individuation, Jung contended that the task of every person is that of "becoming one's self", meaning the acquaintance with and the integration of opposing polarities, whether this be at the level of the psychological functions or at the level of the opposing archetypes (Jung, 1971a, p 120). For Jung then, the Self is not selected from conscious/unconscious lived experience but from inner unconscious experience which needs to be rendered conscious and integrated, this being effected by the transcendent function. Since Jung asserts that the archetypes represent collective attributes transmitted through the ages, the distinction between what constitutes Self from what doesn't becomes ambiguous since all of the Self is already contained within the unconscious of the person. However, it doesn't follow that all the contents of the archetypes are de facto part of the conscious Self, and a necessary selection is to take place. But even at this level, Jung does not specify a criterion to distinguish what, from the myriad potential archetypal experiences available, will be integrated as Self. We contend that one criterion be that the experience provided by the archetype *be somehow recognised as part of the Self's own lived experience*. In other words, for the Ego (or an other entity) to accept a part of an archetypal experience as constitutive of its own Self, that Ego must recognise

the experience as already being its own, even if hitherto unavowed. And so with Jung, the Self/not-Self distinction becomes rather blurred, and this at two levels, the first being that selection takes place within what is already encompassed by the Self, the other being that no overt criterion is specified.

Moreover, Jung does not address how the sense of being a same Self is attained. With his concept of Self-as-process, he does allude to an entity responsible for the integration of the opposing archetypes, following which the Self-as-whole is transformed. However this accounts for how the Self is transformed, not how it remains identical.

While Jung attributes to the Self-as-archetype the idea of wholeness, an *idea* of wholeness and a *felt sense* of identity, to which would we could attribute the felt sense of wholeness, are not the same from the point of view of lived experience. However, if the Self-as-archetype is to be constituted solely from the collective unconscious, this implies a very limited importance to conscious spatio-temporal experience, as mediated through the body.

And so, while Self-identity is not addressed by Jung, it appears that it would be constituted more so through the integration of unconscious archetypal experiences, which in turn are brought to the awareness of consciousness. This, as exposed above, is problematic, and we propose a constitution of Self-identity based on a constant attentional-intentional interaction with conscious lived experience.

Finally, we note that Jung's conceptualisation comprises a multiplicity of distinctions within the Self, such distinctions corresponding to the various archetypes and their manifestations. While we surmise that Jung did consider the lived experience of his clients, not to mention his own, we contend from our readings that his writings chiefly concern the description of the archetypes per se, not the experiences they allegedly produce. In this respect, his attribution of multiplicity to the Self is not consonant with lived experience, but consonant rather

with the entities that he believed to populate the collective unconscious. Furthermore, we believe that Jung felt obliged to invent some of the archetypes to maintain his principle of oppositive duality. For example, we note his comments with respect to the archetype of the Antichrist:

"La théologie désigne le Christ comme totalement bon et spirituel; il faut donc que naisse de l'autre côté un élément 'mauvais' et 'chthonien' ou 'naturel', ce qui désigne l'antéchrist. De là sort un *quaternion d'opposés* qui est unifié sur le plan psychologique par le fait que le Soi n'est pas seulement 'bon' et 'spirituel'; il en résulte que l'ombre de ce dernier est beaucoup moins noire. Ce quaternion caractérise le Soi psychologique, car, en tant que totalité, *il doit par définition* inclure les aspects clairs et obscurs, de même que le Soi comprend le masculin et le féminin, ce qui le fait symboliser par le quaternion nuptial." (italics ours, Jung, 1983, p 77).

Recalling that Jung afforded great significance to mythological, anthropological and occult symbols and numbers such as four, seven and three, we note here his tendency to conceive of the archetypes in oppositive pairs and quaternions, a principle not necessarily respecting the primacy of lived experience, but emanating largely from his a priori commitment to duality and symmetry.

We note in passing, the difficulty most persons have in identifying with such archetypes. Most of us do not consciously experience ourselves as 'Antichrists'. This points to the difficulty of accepting the archetypes and their images as genuine and applicable to persons' lives in general. Since such archetypes, by Jung's contention, are highly evasive to our conscious apprehension, it becomes impossible to prove or disprove their existence based on our study of lived experience, since it could always be asserted that they are too deeply repressed. Such irrefutability effectively circumvents any verificative attempts of Jung's conceptualisation.

2.2.2.2 The explanatory aspects of Jung's conceptualisation of Self

While Jung's conceptualisation incorporates some understanding aspects, we find his conceptualisation highly explanatory, in that it refers largely to entities not part of conscious lived experience. We have addressed many explanatory aspects in the previous section. Here we shall address ourselves to other explanatory aspects not yet addressed.

In a manner similar to Freud, Jung evokes thermodynamic principles of libido and its distribution, such notions not being in accord with lived experience, but being meant to account for it. As evoked in our first chapter, we refer to the notions of Being-in-the-world and Dasein as understanding as describing the fundamental state in which we find ourselves. From the phenomenological point of view, we are not 'driven' to act by some underlying force, energy or motivation. Rather we *act* in a world with which we are engaged in a constant activity of understanding and interpretation, otherwise expressed as Dasein as understanding. Phenomenology contends that causal factors such as libido are postulated after the fact, they are not contained within our lived experience. Thus we see no need for postulating libido or any other form of energy, as the primary and underlying motivation to the Self.

While the archetypal images are descriptive and may be seen as corresponding to themes of lived experience, the archetypes themselves, while deemed to account for certain aspects of lived experience, are not themselves part of it. We noted that Jung's categorisation of such archetypes stem largely from the need for symmetry and quaternity, such a principle, while conceptually pleasing, is not in accord with lived experience, which is sometimes chaotic and uncategorisable. Here we contend, with Brooke (1991), that a phenomenological study of lived experience would have led Jung to many of the themes he attributed to archetypes, but rather than formulate them as parts of the collective unconscious, he would have expressed them as unconscious aspects of our being-in-the-world.

We note also that the Self-as-archetype, the Self-as-process and the Transcendent function are explanatory notions for they do not correspond to aspects of lived experience and are deemed to operate outside of awareness. We have pointed out some of the problems with these notions as they suppose their ability to perceive, select and integrate, aspects not elaborated by Jung. We point out that James only calls upon one entity, the Pure Ego, to account for the explanatory aspects of his conceptualisation, while Jung calls upon many, and in this respect is less parsimonious.

2.2.3 Summary

In light of our discussion, while we find Jung's conceptualisation of Self interesting and enriching, we also find it to be very problematic. We note that Jung does not address many aspects we find important, such as the Self-as-subject/Self-as-object, Self/not-Self distinctions, Self-identity and Self-constancy. In our view, each of these aspects calls for an elaborate articulation of conscious lived experience. Jung's focus is clearly on the unconscious. However, many of his notions of consciousness bear some affinity with those espoused in this thesis. In this respect, we find his concept of psychological types, which would relate to certain habitualities of consciousness, to be a novel and original contribution to the understanding aspects of the Self.

We have seen that many aspects of Jung's notion of the unconscious are rather complex, contradictory and irrefutable. While his numerous archetypes may be seen to account for the multiple and contradictory aspects of our own lives, we have highlighted the difficulty we have identifying with many of the 'deeper and darker' entities he evokes.

From the hermeneutic position, Jung's conceptualisation is definitely rich and novel, with his concept of the archetypes being his most significant contribution.

However, we contend that it would have been much more powerful had he afforded more importance to the phenomenological description of lived experience, rather than focusing so much on the reading of literary works which he interpreted in a manner that didn't necessarily respect lived experience. We note also the inherent irrefutability to this aspect of his conceptualisation.

Finally, we situate Jung clearly within the explanatory camp, as his conceptualisation is largely based on forces and entities operating out of conscious awareness.

2.3 The conceptualisation of Self according to Harry Stack Sullivan

"... in situations involving the increasingly significant other person, there comes into being the start of an exceedingly important, as it were, secondary dynamism, which is purely the product of interpersonal experience arising from anxiety encountered in the pursuit of the satisfaction of general and zonal needs. This secondary dynamism I call the self system."

Sullivan, 1953a, p 164

"... a personality can never be isolated from the complex of interpersonal relations in which the person lives and has his being."

Sullivan, 1953f, p 10

2.3.1 The Self according to Sullivan

Sullivan (1953a) has elaborated a conceptualisation of Self to which he gives the term Self system. This Self system is defined as a secondary dynamism which emerges in response to the necessity of the primary dynamism to avoid or to minimise anxiety. Sullivan assigns to anxiety a primordial role in the development of the Self and of personality, and this will be outlined further below. For now, suffice it to say that Sullivan considers anxiety, coupled to the fact that it is experienced in the context of a interpersonal relationship, to be the central motivating factor responsible for all of personality development.

By dynamism, Sullivan means "a relatively enduring configuration of energy which manifests itself in characterisable processes in interpersonal relations." (Mullahy, 1953). In Mullahy's (1953) opinion, Sullivan uses the terms *self dynamism*, *self system*, and *self* to refer to the same psychological entity: a configuration of interpersonal processes which spring up from restraints placed on the child's freedom. In Sullivan's own words: "The self-dynamism is built up out of this

experience of approbation and disapproval, of reward and punishment." (Sullivan, 1953f, p 20).

The primary dynamism is the term given to the conglomerate of learning experiences that coalesce to form an initial personification of what the infant calls *me*, such a personification being a quasi-entity, an internal representation of Self, of "that which is invariably connected with the sentience of *my body*" (italics by the author, Sullivan, 1953a, p 161). This basic personification of me develops into a secondary dynamism, comprising three phases, the first being the good-me, the second being the bad-me and the last being the not-me. The relationship between personifications and what they personify are complex and may incorporate many facets. In Sullivan's own words:

"Among the things this conception explains is something that can be described as a quasi-entity, the personification of the self. The personification of the self is what you are talking about when you talk about yourself as "I", and what you are often, if not invariably, referring to when you talk about "me" and "my". But I would like to make it forever clear that *the relation of personifications to that which is personified is always complex and sometimes multiple: and that personifications are not adequate descriptions of that which is personified.*" (italics by the author, Sullivan, 1953a, p 167).

Fundamental are the personifications related to the mothering figure. Sullivan believes that all infants have a personification of the mothering one as all are necessarily engaged with some type of mothering figure to ensure their survival. The infant's first experiences then, are those of being nurtured by the mother, or by the mothering person. From the conglomeration of these experiences, the infant develops a personification of the mother, or an "elaborate organization of (his/her) experience (of her)" (parentheses by the author, Sullivan, 1953b, p 112). Invariably, Sullivan contends, the infant organises this information into two factions, one representing what he calls the good mother and the other representing the bad mother. We note that these personifications occur earlier in the developmental process and are therefore more primal than those of the good-me/bad-me/not-me

cluster, which develop out of and in response to the anxiety provoked through the need satisfaction relationship with the mothering figure.

In the very early stages of infant life, the mothering figure is normally preoccupied with meeting all of the infant's sundry physical needs such as warmth, feeding and hygiene. This she usually does generously and with little need for prompting. From these multiple experiences develops within the child the personification of the good mother, that is to say the one who gives satisfaction to the infant. In the young infant, such personifications are rudimentary, and may limit themselves to the sensations of being held, talked to and fed by his mother's breast. However, as the mother starts to impose restrictions on the infant's behaviour, she induces tension and anxiety within the infant. These negative experiences result in another personification, that of the bad mother, which is an inner representation of the one who induces tension and anxiety.

Underlying these fundamental and initially rudimentary personifications, is the factor to which Sullivan (1953a) attributes the most importance, that of anxiety, which exercises a primordial role in the learning of social behaviour. For example, the mother, as she allows the infant to do certain things and forbids him others, provokes within the infant a certain amount of anxiety. She may also be the one to remove or greatly reduce the anxiety when she offers tender nurturing and understanding. Thus the infant, in its attempt to have its needs satisfied, learns to avoid anxiety-provoking behaviours as much as possible.

Such learning, Sullivan (1953a) believes, may take place in three ways. The first is learning through the administration of rewards, the second being through the induction of different levels of anxiety, or of what Sullivan refers to as the anxiety gradient, and the third being the administration of severe anxiety. At this highest level, anxiety in effect prohibits learning (Sullivan, 1953a). These three levels are present in varying degrees during the upbringing of every child and are instrumental not only to childhood learning, but to the well-being of the child

become adult. Through the experience of learning through anxiety, the child develops a relationship with it, and this relationship has a determining effect on adult functioning.

The tripartite conglomeration of good-me/bad-me/not-me develops in response to the three types of learning outlined above. The good-me is the "beginning personification which organizes experience in which satisfactions have been enhanced by rewarding increments of tenderness" (Sullivan 1953a, p 162), and develops into what we usually mean when we address ourselves as "I" (Sullivan, 1953a).

The bad-me, on the other hand, is the "beginning personification which organizes experience in which increasing degrees of anxiety are associated with behaviour involving the mothering one in its more-or-less clearly prehended interpersonal setting" (Sullivan, 1953a, p 162). As the mother forbids certain behaviours, this increases the tension and the anxiety experienced by the infant. Such experiences, Sullivan believes, are conglomerated into the rudimentary personification of the "bad-me".

The rudimentary personification of the "not-me" results from those occasions where the infant has experienced severe anxiety, the effect of such levels of anxiety being the inhibition of most, if not all, learning that may take place. Such experiences, marked by uncanny emotion such as awe, terror, loathing or dread, are largely truncated, making it difficult for the infant to know what they are largely about. Thus, the experiences composing the personification of the not-me are less clear than the other two, as in many instances they cannot be connected with cause and effect; such experiences persisting as relatively primitive, unelaborated, what Sullivan terms "parataxic" symbols (Sullivan, 1953a).

These three entities together come to form the Self-system, which Sullivan (1953a) describes as a dynamism central to interpersonal relations, responsible for the quasi-entity he calls the personification of the Self.

To summarise then, the Self system is a secondary dynamism which develops out of primitive personifications that themselves have taken their genesis in the learning processes taking place during childhood development, in the context of an interpersonal relationship with a mothering figure. The necessity to meet societal demands forces the mothering one to impose restrictions on the infant, such instances giving rise to anxiety in various degrees. The Self system then can be seen as the infant's patterned methods of behavioural response to the gradient of anxiety, as "the part of personality which is central in the experience of anxiety" (Sullivan, 1953g, p 217). The Self system can be subdivided into three main sub-entities, that of the good-me, the bad-me and the not-me, each of these resulting more or less directly from three respective learning processes imposed by the mothering one: those of rewards, those of punishments and privations, and those of severe anxiety. Before the reification of the Self-system has taken place, earlier personifications, those of the good-mother and bad-mother, have gelled as primitive representations of the experience-conglomerate with the mothering figure. These incipient personifications form the basis of the primary dynamism.

Within the complex system of processes and personifications that make up the Self system, Sullivan (1953e) speaks of supervisory patterns, such patterns amounting to subpersonalities manifesting themselves as " 'really' imaginary people who are always with one" (Sullivan, 1953e, p 239). As an example of such imaginary people, Sullivan cites the imagined reader of someone who is writing a novel. The writer "puts himself into" the Self of this imagined reader who will judge the quality of the writer's work based on its coherence, interest, etc. Such supervisory patterns Sullivan believes normally come into being in the juvenile era.

The Self is also made up of reflected appraisals (Sullivan, 1953f), meaning that the child appraises itself as it is appraised by the significant adults, the child having little choice but to passively accept the adults' judgements as to his worth.

While the Self system is the major entity, it is not alone within the larger entity of personality. Roughly stated, the Self system corresponds to the conscious aspects of personality; more precisely, it is comprised of the conglomeration of dynamisms that the personified Self accepts into awareness (Sullivan, 1953f). This does not mean however that the Self dynamism is synonymous with Self-awareness, for numerous aspects of the Self, without being attributed to unhealthy functioning, are held out of awareness. In a relatively healthy person, the Self is equivalent to what is accessible to awareness. Personality is thus larger than the Self, and is a hypothesised entity meant to account for behaviour and conscious experience:

"Personality is the hypothetical entity postulated to account for the doings of people, one with another, and with more or less personified objects. It is made manifest in interpersonal situations, and not otherwise." (italics by the author, Sullivan, 1953f, p 121.)

Other dynamisms, those outside of awareness, comprise, together with the Self system, the larger entity of total personality. In the ideal person, the number and extent of such other dynamisms are minimal. For such persons, the Self "is coterminous with personality" (Sullivan, 1953f, p 184) and in this sense, it can be said that the personality also forms the outer potential limit of the Self-system. Mullahy (1953) interprets Sullivan's description, adding:

"It [the personality] is the most inclusive category of interpersonal behavior, including not only the self system, with its multiple "me-you patterns", but also what exists outside awareness because of selective inattention or dissociation.... ...From the personality, the self system can, under appropriate circumstances, obtain enrichment for a deeper and wider awareness." (italics and parentheses ours, Mullahy, 1953, p 272-273).

Examples of such dynamisms are the dissociation dynamism and the dynamism of selective inattention. Dissociations, are "dynamisms to which the self refuses awareness and recognition, except under the impact of extraordinary influences" (Mullahy, 1953, p 264). The latter dynamism is a process whereby certain experiences and actions are not clearly noted or appraised, or may not be noted at all. In both cases, this is due to their threatening anxiety-provoking nature which the Self system deals with by restricting its own attention, thereby effectively thwarting any potential confrontation that may necessitate change. What distinguishes these two dynamisms is one of degree, the latter being more threatening and almost impossible for the Self to integrate, than the former.

Sullivan places significant emphasis on the fundamental role played by tension and anxiety in the creation and maintenance of interpersonal relationships, notably the one involving the mothering figure. Felt anxiety, which accompanies the felt tension evoked by what Sullivan calls "unmet physico-chemical needs" (Sullivan, 1953f), is potentially present from birth onwards, and the infant's efforts at eliciting a satisfactory response from the mothering one are geared exclusively to satisfying these unmet needs and to reducing such felt anxiety. The reduction of tension is therefore experienced as the satisfaction of needs. Anxiety then is the underlying motor or prime motivator, whose effect is determinate on the development of the Self system.

"The self-system is a product of educative experience, part of which is of the character of reward, and a very important part of which has the graded anxiety element that we have spoken of. But quite early in life, anxiety is also a very conspicuous aspect of the self-dynamism *function*." (italics by the author, Sullivan, 1953a, p 171).

Such need satisfaction however necessarily takes place in the context of a relationship with the mothering person, as the child is unable to relieve this tension on its own. Further, Sullivan believes that the tension evoked within the child is

transferred to the mother as another tension, that of wanting to meet the child's needs and reduce the child's tension. In his own words:

"The observed activity of the infant arising from the tension of needs induces tension in the mothering one, which tension is experienced as tenderness and as an impulsion to activities toward the relief of the infant's needs." (Sullivan, 1953c, p 39).

Sullivan notes that from the very beginning, the child's tensions and needs as well as the response to the child's needs, that of providing tenderness, spring from within the context of an interpersonal relationship, and can thus be termed an interpersonal need.

For Sullivan (1953g), the mind is phenomenologically coterminous with consciousness. Of the myriad things that may enter our consciousness, one of the most interesting is the perceived sense of I-ness, which usually becomes manifest when one makes statements such as "I-believe-such-and-such". Sullivan believed that from a developmental perspective, the child's use of "I" is a marker to a significant shift in the child, one where the child comes to believe in his/her individuality. In Sullivan's words:

"... the almost unassailable conviction develops, partly based on the lack of information of our parents and others, that each of us, as defined by the animal organism that we were at birth, are unique, isolated individuals in the human world, as our bodies are - very figuratively- unique and individual in the biological world." (italics by the author, Sullivan 1953g, p 219).

To support his statement, Sullivan uses the analogy of the interrelationship between the body and the myriad physico-chemical processes between it and the environment, pointing out the tenuous but vital necessity for continuous interplay if the body is to survive. According to Sullivan, the chiselling out of the body from its environment is an abstractive process that may be necessary for study and thought, but is nowhere to be found in nature. From the psychological point of view, and for the purposes of the study of personality, it may be useful to consider

personality as an isolated entity, but Sullivan notes that nowhere does this occur in our socialised, acculturated living.

"What personality does, which can be observed and studied only in relations between personalities or among personalities, is truly and terribly marvellous, and is human, and is the function of creatures living in indissoluble contact with the world of culture and of people. In that field it is preposterous to talk about individuals and to go on deceiving oneself with the idea of uniqueness, of single entity, of simple, central being." (Sullivan, 1953g, p 220).

Sullivan goes on to state that the person, separated from the world of culture, begins to deteriorate in his/her attributes as a person. The interpersonal world, the world of relating to other persons, is absolutely vital to the psychological well-being of the person (Sullivan, 1953g).

While Sullivan does not elaborate profusely on the unconscious, he concedes to the genius of Freud and readily admits its usefulness as a means to explain the unexplainable aspects of consciousness, aspects he refers to as "gaps" (Sullivan, 1953g, p 204). By definition, such aspects are out of experiential awareness. For example, while we may be conscious of our stream of thought, with one thought being replaced by the other, we are not privy to how these thoughts become present to our consciousness, how they are retrieved from what we call "memory" or how they are "stored" there.

Finally, Sullivan attaches great importance to the Self's use of symbol activity, such activity taking place in three ways. The first is through the use of prototaxic symbols, these are used by the infant to represent his or her experience which is, Sullivan contends, largely truncated, undifferentiated, undefined, not delimited. For example, the mothering one can only be "prehended" by the infant, her nipple representing a "vaguely demarcated, 'complex image' or proto-concept with very wide reference" (Sullivan, 1953f, p 33). In this sense, the nipple comes to represent, in a vague way, the Good mother, while another "complexus of impressions"

(Sullivan, 1953f, p 79) may represent the Bad mother. This primitive type of symbolic activity gradually fades from waking life as the infant grows older. In his introduction to the works of Sullivan, Cohen (1953) interprets Sullivan's use of the term prototaxic experience to refer to experience that is not symbolised. For Sullivan, such discrete, unconnected, instantaneous and momentary experiences comprise the basis of memory in the form of patterns related to the totality of how the organism and the significant environment existed at the moment. They also serve as the building blocks of all subsequent experience. Prototaxic experience therefore has a determining effect upon subsequent experience.

Parataxic symbolisation, which follows prototaxic symbolisation, refers to symbols usage where some differentiation and discrimination between the Self and the environment take place but the "diverse aspects, the various kinds of experience are not related or connected in any logical fashion... .. but are felt to be concomitant." (Mullahy, 1953, p 253). In this form of symbolisation, symbols, in particular, words, have a highly personal and individual meaning (Sullivan, 1953f), that is to say that their meaning is determined, not by the society from which they emanate, but rather by the personal experience of the child. In the specific case of language, Sullivan contends that at the parataxic level of symbol usage, the use of language is characterised as autistic, this expression emphasising the individual and private meaning attributed to language. The language of the child, the symbolisation related to art and dreams, the language of the schizophrenic, are examples of the parataxic level of expression (Sullivan, 1953f).

Finally, we come to syntactic symbolisation, where the symbols used have a shared consensual meaning within the socio-cultural environment to which one belongs. For experience to be communicated to others, one must use conventional expressions, such expressions using symbols that have explicit and unambiguous meanings, and that are understood by others and by one's Self (Mullahy, 1953). Syntactic symbolisation refers to the language of the adult.

While the syntactic is the most highly developed level of symbol activity, it is common for one to return to earlier modes of symbol expression. These modes contain a richness of emotional content that the syntactic level lacks (Mullahy, 1953). Dreams, fantasy, creative thinking, all heavily involve the prototaxic and parataxic levels of symbol activity.

The Self system is largely the domain of syntactic symbol activity whereas the primary dynamism, the dissociated dynamism and the dynamism of selected inattention are primarily associated with parataxic and prototaxic symbol activity.

2.3.2 Critical analysis of Sullivan's conceptualisation of Self

2.3.2.1 The understanding aspects of Sullivan's conceptualisation of the Self

2.3.2.1.1 On the nature of consciousness and its attributes

While he sees the mind as coterminous with consciousness, Sullivan does not explicitly address the notions of consciousness we articulated in the previous chapter. In effect, he notes that consciousness has "gaps" associated with experiences taking place out of awareness (Sullivan, 1953g, p 204). This goes against our notion of the unity of consciousness. However, Sullivan does note that an experience cannot take place out of awareness, for it then ceases to be experience. This is not to deny that some aspects of experience, those not being attended to, remain inarticulated, or in other words, unconscious.

While he does not equate the Self with what can be apprehended consciously, he affirms that the Self, at least in the healthy person, is coterminous with personality and is mostly conscious. We contend that the Self, being in the first instance a part of lived experience, can be consciously apprehended, even though not all of its facets may be attended to at one time. These, in a manner similar to those aspects of lived experience not being attended to, remain to be articulated.

We also note that for Sullivan the locus of consciousness resides within the personifications of the Self-system. However, he does not refer to any definite locus of consciousness within the Self-system. Sullivan asserts that his notion of Self-system and the psychoanalytic ego may be similar, but he considered unproductive the attempt to establish correspondences between various theoretical conceptualisations of personality.

"I surmise that there is some noticeable relationship, perhaps in the realm of cousins or closer, between what I describe as the personification of the self and what is often considered to be the psychoanalytic ego. But if you are wise, you will dismiss that as facetious, because I am not at all sure of it; it has been so many years since I found anything but headaches in trying to discover parallels between various theoretical systems that I have left that for the diligent and scholarly, neither of which includes me". (Note 3 to the reader, Sullivan, 1953a, p 167).

Thus, for Sullivan consciousness resides in the various Self-personifications, themselves emanating from and expressed within the context of various interpersonal relationships. While we shall consider the interpersonal aspects of Sullivan's conceptualisation below, at this point we reassert the need for an apprehending and constituting Self-as-subject as locus of consciousness, with its various attributes. To this aspect of lived experience, we contend that Sullivan did not devote sufficient effort.

2.3.2.1.2 On the primacy of lived experience

Sullivan's point of departure is the highly detailed description of the child's lived experience as expressed within the context of an interpersonal relationship. We note that Sullivan's description results from taking an approach much resembling the phenomenological method, with detailed observations and descriptions. However, the child's thoughts being unavailable to our inspection, the study of the

child's experience becomes subject to the researcher's interpretation of the child's behaviour in the relational context. And so while we credit Sullivan with detailed and lucid descriptions of what may constitute the child's lived experience, such is inferred from his necessarily interpretative stance, which leaves more room for uncertainty.

In this vein, we note the primordial place given to anxiety in the lived experience of the child. In fact, Sullivan argues that anxiety, or its lack, is the ruling theme of the child's early lived experience. Moreover, this seems to be the ruling theme of adult life. From the point of view of existential phenomenology, our primal stance is that of our need to understand (Dasein as understanding). While it may be that Sullivan's description of lived anxiety corresponds well with the lived experience of the child, we argue that it cannot be the primary theme of lived experience. In addition to the satisfaction of physical and interrelational needs, we evoke the infant's progressive need to explore, to discover its own body, to play; and the adult's progressive need to establish and pursue goals, each of these activities expressing the existential stance of understanding the world. In fact, with his evocation of interpersonal learning as the reason for invoking anxiety, Sullivan hints at the need for understanding as being more foundational, however he explicitly affords it with secondary importance relative to anxiety. Also, while he defines the primary dynamism as a conglomerate of learning experiences that coalesce to form an initial personification of what the infant calls me, we note also Sullivan's emphasis on the Self-system as a "product of educative experience" (Sullivan, 1953a, p 171), whereby the child learns to cope with anxiety, just as, we contend, he is actively involved with the understanding of other aspects of lived experience. Finally, with his evocation of the activity of prototaxic, parataxic and syntaxic symbolisation, Sullivan again refers to our need to understand the world by way of its symbolisation.

In summary, while Sullivan affords considerable importance to the lived experience of the child, his articulation of it in the terms of anxiety and its polar opposite,

euphoria, is incomplete. While anxiety may be given an important role during infancy, we argue for Dasein as understanding as a more foundational state of being, and we note Sullivan's implicit evocation of this notion in his conceptualisation.

2.3.2.1.3 On embodiment

Sullivan's primary dynamism, what the infant calls me, is a personification which is "invariably connected with the sentience of my body" (italics by the author, Sullivan, 1953a, p 161). With this assertion, Sullivan notes a primary relationship to the lived body ('my body'), one of identification and personification. For Sullivan, "the sentience of my body", or felt sense of embodiment, by its connection to the primary dynamism, becomes an initial datum upon which the primary dynamism, followed by the secondary dynamism, or Self-system, is based.

With anxiety as fundamental motivation for the establishment of the Self-system, Sullivan is again giving some precedence to the lived body, since anxiety is experienced as a bodily discomfort or tension. We note also that anxiety develops from a state of unmet needs, these needs are primarily bodily needs of shelter, nourishment, general care and the need for interpersonal contact. Thus, more primordial than anxiety, is the lived body with its sundry needs.

Rather than a direct relationship, we note that the Self-system is related to the body through the medium of the primary dynamism. It is the primary dynamism, not the body, which develops into the Self-system. It thus becomes difficult to account for any felt sense of embodiment, since the Self-system, that which harbours our sense of 'I'-ness, is, according to Sullivan, distinct from the body. Such a sense of 'I'-ness, or sense of unity of Self, we contend to be in the first instance, harboured by the body. In this sense, from our point of view, Sullivan's conceptualisation differs from a phenomenological approach.

In summary, while Sullivan explicitly gives to the body some importance as foundation for the primary dynamism, our interpretation of his conceptualisation credits it with more importance than he himself acknowledges. While the body may be the underlying basis for the Self-structure, this basis is mediated through the primary dynamism, in this respect we note the difficulty with accounting for the bodily-felt sense of Self within the tripartite Self-system of good me/bad me/not me.

2.3.2.1.4 On the interpersonal aspects of Self

Sullivan affords considerable importance to the interpersonal aspects to the constitution of Self. In the first instance, he notes that all persons are born into relationship, in that all persons have had a mothering figure that ensured their survival as infants. He also notes how the interactions between the mother and infant are interpersonal, with the physical needs of the infant soliciting the care of the mother. In addition, he notes that to isolate personality from its interpersonal context, while useful for abstractive purposes, in fact doesn't respect lived experience.

Sullivan doesn't address the problem of how the alter ego is perceived or constituted, but his conceptualisation presupposes its prereflective perception. Since the Self-dynamism develops in response to the "experience of approbation and disapproval, of reward and punishment" (Sullivan, 1953f, p 20), the Self is essentially a configuration of interpersonal processes taking place within the context of a relationship. While not part of the Self-system per se, the good mother/bad mother entities composing the primary dynamism are gelled representations of the real mother which form the basis of personality and occur prior to the crystallisation of the Self-system. Thus within Sullivan's conceptualisation, awareness of the other takes place prior to the awareness of Self. This we note is consonant with Merleau-Ponty's observations.

Since the primary dynamism is connected with the "sentience of my body", there is, we note, a bodily aspect of personality not fully articulated in the good mother/bad mother primary dynamism (Sullivan, 1953a, p 161). We note that since the mother is perceived as the entity taking care of the child, it is through her interaction with the body that the primary dynamism of good mother/bad mother is constituted. Thus while Sullivan fails to articulate a more primordial place for the body within his conceptualisation, we note that the body is itself implied in the interpersonal relationship. We contend that this 'sensation of my body' corresponds to an embodied dimension of Self in interaction with the mother. Out of this interaction would emerge the primary dynamism.

With respect to prototaxic-parataxic-syntactic symbolisation, we note the importance of interpersonal relationships, firstly in the learning of the language from the mothering one (and others) and secondly in the larger context of society's role in the establishment of consensual meanings and usage within language. In this respect, symbolic activity cannot take place outside the context of interpersonal experience.

We note also that the Self-system, comprised of the good me/bad me/not me, emerges from the interpersonal relationship, with each of these dimensions corresponding to a conglomerate of typical experiences with the mothering one. Thus the interpersonal relationship governs not only the constitution of the primary dynamism but that of the secondary dynamism as well, with little other aspects of lived experience figuring in the constitution of the Self-system. Thus, from Sullivan's point of view, the Self is constituted almost exclusively from interpersonal relationships. Psychopathology, he notes, results from the severance from such relationships or from their defective (i.e., anxiety-provoking) nature.

While we view the interpersonal dimensions to Self as primordial, we believe that the Self in relationship to the world (where this world contains objects and alter egos) is more fundamental, with the child making a distinction between Self and not-Self in conjunction with the Self/alter ego distinction, with the alter ego being

only a part of the what is not-Self. Thus a deeper consideration of lived experience brings out more than just its interpersonal aspects, which Sullivan has focused on exclusively.

However Sullivan's focus reveals the extreme importance of the interpersonal situation to the development of Self, for it is true that without the relationship to the mothering person, no person could survive. We note also that deprivation of caring relationships in infancy have detrimental effects on present and future psychological functioning. We can view this as having a detrimental effect on the constitution of Self.

Sullivan's insight into the relationship to other as a foundational and integral component to the composition and development of Self and personality is to be commended. He is the first author to place such emphasis on interpersonal relationships as an integral foundational concept to the conceptualisation of Self. However, by focusing exclusively on the relationship, he ignores other aspects of lived experience that would be incorporated as part of the Self, notably the body and the Self in relation to other objects.

2.3.2.1.5 Subject-Object distinction, Self/not-Self distinction, Self-identity, general distinctions within the Self

A first distinction not addressed by Sullivan is that of distinguishing the part of the person apprehending the objective Self, the 'Me', from that of the subjective Self, the 'I'. We note that Sullivan collapses this distinction into the same entity, with the personification of the Self being what he addresses as 'I', in contradistinction with "what you are often, if not invariably, referring to when you talk about 'me' and 'my' " (Sullivan, 1953a, p 167). We have previously discussed the need for distinguishing between the apprehending consciousness from the Self taken as object of consciousness. Furthermore, Sullivan attributes the term 'I' to two entities, the first being the primary dynamism, the second being the good me. It is not clear if

this is an oversight on Sullivan's part or if the attribution of 'I' moves from the primary dynamism to the good me during development. In this respect, there is need of clarification.

Sullivan conceives of the not-me as being part of the Self-system. We note that this distinction refers to experiences associated with severe anxiety where learning has been largely prohibited, and which have been excluded from what the person labels as Me, notably by the dissociation and selective inattention dynamisms. This part of the Self, we note, develops from the interactions between the primary dynamism and the mothering one. We argue that in conjunction with this distinction, an equally primordial one needs to take place, distinguishing between Self and not-Self in a sense more general than that of negative experiences taking place in the context of an interpersonal relationship. We also note here the contradiction in Sullivan's use of the term not me: it refers to part of the Self-system, yet is not felt as 'Me' by the person.

In this more general sense, we note that Sullivan does not make explicit how the Self distinguishes itself from the not-Self. In this respect his conceptualisation is problematic, for while there may be constitution in the matrix of interpersonal relationships, we progressively experience ourselves as distinct from the world of objects and others. There is thus a need to distinguish how the Self is distinguished from this other by whom it is constituted. We contend to the necessity of such a criterion. Sullivan notes that in his consideration of lived experience, there is in effect no demarcation between the body and its environment, that we are creatures "living in indissoluble contact with the world of culture and of people", and that it is preposterous "to go on deceiving oneself with the idea of uniqueness, of single entity, of simple, central being" and that such a distinction is an abstractive process useful for study of personality (Sullivan, 1953g, p 220). While we commend Sullivan for this highly phenomenological insight, we also contend that consciousness distinguishes between Self and World, just as there is a distinction to be made between consciousness and its object. We contend that the Self cannot be

understood without making this distinction, through the continued understanding-explanatory activity of interpretation.

While Sullivan notes the sense of identity associated with the use of the term 'I', he sees this as being based on an erroneous though "unassailable conviction" based on our perceived uniqueness in the biological world (Sullivan 1953g, p 219). We contend, against Sullivan, that the body constitutes a primary dimension to Selfhood and that the use of the term 'I' refers to this experience of embodiment. Identity, we argue, is indissolubly linked to the totality of Self as experienced, which finds its basis in the experience of the body, but which also extends to other aspects. Furthermore, Sullivan contends that our attribution of 'I'-ness is based on reasoning by analogy, itself referring to our uniqueness in the biological sense. We note that the child pre-reflectively perceives itself as 'I' prior to any ability to reason by way of analogy. We contend that had Sullivan given a more phenomenological consideration to the reality of the lived body, he would have granted more importance to embodiment as fundamental dimension of Selfhood.

Within the Self-system, Sullivan makes three distinctions, the *good me*, *bad me* and *not me*, the last two emerging from the rapport with anxiety in the context of a mothering relationship. While he excludes it from the Self-system, the primary dynamism is conceptualised as good mother/bad mother in relationship to the body. We note that these entities correspond to the lived experience of the child in relationship, where the mother especially has a significant role to play in everyday life. We should not be surprised then of a conceptualisation that invokes such entities, as these are dimensions highly related to the lived experience of the child. However, by restricting himself to the lived experience of the child, other aspects of the adult Self, such as that related to our profession or to our mental abilities and talents, are not considered by Sullivan. So while we contend that Sullivan's Self-system corresponds more to that of the infant or young child, Sullivan himself asserts that his conceptualisation is also applicable to adults. We know that prior to his publications, Sullivan had considerable experience with schizophrenics. It

would seem that his observations of this population led him to formulate a primordial role for anxiety in the make up of the adult Self, with particular emphasis on its role during childhood. While this leads to highly valuable insights, it may be that it biased his thinking too heavily, leading him to place too much emphasis on a single aspect of lived experience.

The conceptualisation of anxiety as the sole motivator for growth and Self-development also seems inadequate and unidimensional. While it may be an important factor, especially in infancy and childhood, Sullivan seems to ignore that there may be other important motivating factors, such as the establishment of goals and the pursuance of goal-oriented activity, different from the anxiety - euphoria rapport. We have sufficiently argued for Dasein as understanding as primordial state of being from the existential-phenomenological point of view.

In summary, Sullivan does not consider the basic distinctions to be made within the Self as experienced, these distinctions we contend would be as central to the Self of the developing infant as to that of the adult. From the point of view of the general distinctions to be made within the Self, his focus on the lived experience of the infant and child biases his conceptualisation to the point that the entities comprising his conceptualisation refer exclusively to aspects of the child's lived experience. As such, his conceptualisation, while it may more appropriately reflect the Self of the child, appears to lack many important aspects relating to the adult Self.

2.3.2.2 The explanatory aspects of Sullivan's conceptualisation of Self

While Sullivan doesn't equate awareness with the Self system, he states that in the healthy person, they are reasonably coterminous. However, he also contends that there are aspects that take place outside of awareness and he terms personality "the hypothetical entity" evoked to account for them (Sullivan, 1953f, p 121). In this respect, Sullivan is aware of the difference between lived experience which is

understood, and entities evoked to account for it, which form part of the explanation for such experience.

While personality is larger than what he discerns as Self, the explanatory aspects of Sullivan's conceptualisation include the dissociation and selective inattention dynamisms, as well as those aspects of lived experience not admitted to awareness. With perception being perspectival, we agree with Sullivan's evocation of unconscious aspects of lived experience. However we have difficulty with Sullivan's concepts of dissociation and selective inattention.

Here we point out that such dynamisms have to be effected by some entity that is aware of the threatening aspects of lived experience and is able to effectively 'dissociate' or be 'selectively inattentive' towards them, all the while not admitting these aspects, or the dynamisms, to awareness. Sullivan we note, proposes that the Self system is the entity which (to the dynamisms) "refuses awareness and recognition" (Mullahy, 1953, p 264); here we point out its logical impossibility, the reason being that the Self system cannot actively repress contents of which it is not aware, since repression requires knowledge of that which is repressed. Thus there is a need to postulate an entity within personality, outside of the Self system, to carry out such activity.

With his evocation of prototaxic, parataxic and syntaxic symbolisation, Sullivan points to some important insights. The first is that symbolisation is required to achieve understanding of experience. By prototaxic, Sullivan signifies a more primordial type of symbolisation, one that refers to experience that is largely truncated, undifferentiated, undefined and undelimited. This we contend corresponds to undifferentiated lived experience as it manifests itself prior to our ability to make certain distinctions other than very basic ones such as Self/not Self, figure/ground, satisfaction/dissatisfaction, pain/well-being, etc. Parataxic symbolisation refers to symbols used in a private manner, where meanings are highly personal and individual, and are based more on personal experience than on

the societal conventions from which they emanate, while syntactic symbolisation refers to the language of the adult, where meanings are consensually determined.

We see a problem with these definitions for we note that apprehension of experience is not possible without symbolisation. If, as Cohen (1953) contends, prototaxic symbolisation refers to experience prior to its symbolisation, there is a problem not only in a definitional sense, but also that without symbolisation, no distinctions may be made within lived experience, which presents itself as an undifferentiated flux. The selection, by the mind, of certain aspects of lived experience, the assumption of their stability in time and in movement, the assumption of their permanence, are all the products of symbolic activity. We contend that for experience to be recognised as experience, or stored in memory, such a 'complexus of impressions' (Sullivan, 1953f, p 79) requires that certain basic distinctions be made, at least to distinguish one complexus from another. This in turn requires its symbolisation.

In the case of parataxic symbolisation, we contend that if Sullivan is referring to words that are used in a particular language, then some measure of consensus is required, otherwise no communication is possible with the child. Words, even if heavily imbued with a private meaning, are first learned from a particular language and culture, and forcibly carry this meaning, even if just partially due to the distortions incurred by the child's usage.

Finally, with syntactic symbolisation there is a usage of language in its consensual form, with accepted and clear meanings and usage, as determined by society.

In our view, the prototaxic-parataxic-syntactic distinction refers to increasing degrees of clarity of language, in both its definitional and usage aspects, correlated with increasing level of clarity and distinctions within the lived experience language refers to. Thus, we note that symbolisation moves progressively from the prototaxic to the syntactic, from gross and basic distinctions to those which are more refined and

distinctive, permitting one to articulate more distinct and subtle aspects of lived experience, all the while using a language that is more precise and subtle, with its meanings more largely accepted by others in society. We note, contrary to Cohen's interpretation of Sullivan, that the prototaxic does not exclude symbolisation, just as the syntactic does not exclude lived experience, for in the previous chapter we have highlighted the constant interrelationship between the phenomena of lived experience and their interpretation, which implies their symbolisation. Rather, we see the progression from prototaxic to parataxic to syntactic as corresponding to a progressive increase in the use of symbolisation by the child, with symbol usage becoming more detailed, refined and abstract, enabling a more refined, detailed and abstract apprehension and understanding of lived experience. In summary, while we note some difficulties with Sullivan's definitions of these terms, we are in agreement with the phenomenon of progressive increase of symbolisation by the child.

Sullivan asserts that the Self-system is largely the domain of syntactic activity, itself corresponding largely to the language of the adult. While he provides little detail on this issue, we see here a role for symbolisation, and more notably for language, in the process of constitution of Self. From our phenomenological hermeneutic position we have argued for the Self as an interpreted entity, this being largely done through language, but with constant reference to the phenomenon of Self, that is the Self as part of embodied lived experience. While he deems the Self-system largely within the domain of syntactic symbolisation, Sullivan doesn't exclude prototaxic and parataxic symbolisation. These, we contend to be related to the Self as lived phenomenon, notably those aspects of Self related to embodiment.

In brief, we view Sullivan's notion of symbolisation as largely consonant with the foundations articulated in the previous chapter. Through this notion, Sullivan touches upon several key aspects of the Self, notably those that relate to the articulation of experience with embodiment as foundation to the Self, progressing, through symbolisation and language, to more articulate interpretations of the Self in

the context of interpersonal relationships. In conclusion, we can state that this aspect of his conceptualisation is not solely explanatory as it refers to the intimate relationship between lived experience and its interpretation via symbolisation.

Overall, Sullivan has effectively minimised the explanatory aspects of his conceptualisation, and we note his reluctance to stray far from conscious lived experience of the child as he understands it. While he acknowledges that personality is larger than the Self-system, he is cautious in his attribution of entities underlying conscious lived experience, limiting himself to very few entities, such as the dissociation and selective attention dynamisms. We have highlighted the problems with these entities, demonstrating lack of coherence in their formulation. Furthermore, we note the need for an apprehending Self-as-subject, or conscious subject, able to apprehend the Self-system as object of consciousness. Finally, with respect to symbolisation, we note several discrepancies but acknowledge the insights relating to the Self as constituted through interpretation.

2.3.3 Summary

Sullivan's conceptualisation is largely phenomenological, in that his first activity is a thorough description of lived experience from the child's point of view in the context of his first interpersonal relationships. From this understanding of the child's life he proceeds to identify corresponding aspects of Self, leading to a tripartite conceptualisation exclusively focused on the interrelational aspects of this lived experience. His conceptualisation is thoroughly interpersonal and this is consonant with the existential-phenomenological approach where we view the person as a Being-in-the-world (of objects and others) with which it is indissociably related.

While he may have overstressed the role of anxiety and may have excluded many aspects of lived experience encountered by the adult, his rendering of the lived

experience of the child is highly detailed and articulate. For this reason alone his contribution is significant.

Sullivan has minimised explanatory aspects of his conceptualisation, however we note some problems with the entities he has formulated.

Overall, we situate Sullivan's conceptualisation clearly in the understanding camp, and this is where lies most of its strengths.

2.4 The conceptualisation of Self according to Carl R. Rogers

"The self-structure is an organized configuration of perceptions of the self which are admissible to awareness. It is composed of such elements as the perceptions of one's characteristics and abilities; the percepts and concepts of the self in relation to others and to the environment; the value qualities which are perceived as associated with experiences and objects; and the goals and ideals which are perceived as having positive or negative valence. It is then, the organized picture, existing in awareness either as figure or ground, of the self and the self-in-relationship, together with the positive or negative values which are associated with those qualities and relationships, as they are perceived as existing in the past, present, or future."

(Rogers, 1951, p 501)

2.4.1 The Self according to Rogers

Rogers defines the *concept of Self*, or *Self*, as being related to the organised, consistent conceptual gestalt composed of perceptions of what the person characterises as the "I" or "me" and its relationships. While the concept of Self and Self refer to the individual's perception of him or herself, the Self-structure refers to a more abstract structure of the individual's Self, as conceptualised by the researcher or therapist. For Rogers, the Self corresponds to that part of experience which the person characterises as his own awareness of being:

"a portion of the individual's experience becomes differentiated and symbolized in an awareness of being, awareness of functioning. Such awareness may be described as self-experience." (italics by the author, Rogers, 1959, p 223).

The Self or the me or the I, is that part of experience that the individual calls Self, or any experience related to it. In his own words, the Self is defined as being:

"any event or entity in the phenomenal field discriminated by the individual which is also discriminated as 'self', 'me', 'I', or related thereto" (Rogers, 1959, p 200).

As the child develops, a portion of his or her perceptions becomes recognised as "me" or "I" or "myself". As the differentiation between organism and environment is not a sharp one, it is similarly so with the distinction between Self and not-Self.

"This representation in awareness of being and functioning, becomes elaborated, through interaction with the environment, particularly the environment composed of significant others, into a *concept of self*, a perceptual object in his *experiential field*" (italics by the author, Rogers, 1959, p 223).

Rogers also notes that the Self is that part of the organism which can be placed under conscious control:

"Whether or not an object or an experience is regarded as a part of the self depends to a considerable extent upon whether or not it is perceived as within control of the self." (Rogers, 1951, p 497).

Rogers points out that the conscious Self is not necessarily coterminous with the physical organism, rather it has a more restricted sense, namely, the awareness of being, or functioning. And so for Rogers, the physical organism, meaning the body, is a larger entity within which is contained the boundaries of the Self.

Rogers (1951) defines the total personality as the union between the Self-structure and organismic experience. These two entities can be represented by overlapping circles. The area of intersection between the circle of Self-structure and that of organismic experience represents the part of the Self-structure congruent with experience. The part of the Self-structure not included in the area of experience is that part of the Self which is based on distorted experiences. Likewise, the area of experience not included in the Self-structure corresponds to that part of experience denied or not yet brought to awareness. The larger the area of intersection, or overlap, the more congruent, integrated and psychologically adjusted the individual.

For Rogers (1976) the most fundamental part, or centre, of personality is naturally positive, socialised, forward-looking, rational and realistic. Like Maslow, he (Rogers, 1976) believes that antisocial emotions and behaviour result from the frustrations of normal positive needs and wants such as love, freedom and security.

Finally, the ideal Self denotes the concept of Self that the individual would like to possess, one which he finds most valuable for himself. While Rogers elaborates very little on the formal definition of this concept, or on the relationship to the other entities contained within the Self-structure, he assigns to the ideal Self a central function within the process of psychotherapeutic change (Rogers, 1976). In this vein, Rogers asserts that as therapeutic change takes place, the discrepancy between the ideal Self and the Self is reduced, such reduction taking place in two ways. The first is by modification of the Self-structure whereby the Self is restructured to correspond more closely to the ideal Self. The second is by redefinition of the ideal Self such that it is more in accordance with the "real" desires of the Self, or those that are tributary of the organism's experiential field. The ideal Self thus becomes a more realistic and accessible goal for the Self.

For Rogers (1959), the single, basic, underlying force giving the impetus to all of the organism's activities is that of the actualising tendency. Rogers postulates the actualising tendency as the sole source of the organism's biological and psychological energy. This tendency is not only responsible for meeting the deficiency needs such as food, water and the like, but is also responsible for growth-related activities such as tendencies towards creativity, pleasure, autonomy and socialisation. Rogers (1951) believes that the organism actualises itself in the direction of greater differentiation, greater independence, Self-responsibility, Self-regulation, autonomy, and away from control by external forces. Self-actualisation refers to actualisation related to "that portion of experience of the organism which is symbolised in the self" (Rogers, 1959, p 196). To the extent that the Self is congruent with the experience of the organism, there will be congruence between the actualising tendency and the Self's actualisation.

Rogers believes that persons are born with the actualising tendency intact, and they use this tendency to interact with their environment as it is perceived. Rogers emphasises that reality for the child, or for any individual, is reality as it is experienced, not as it may be perceived by some "objective" other. As a complementary feedback function, the person engages in an organismic valuing process, whereby it evaluates and values experiences based on their tendency to maintain and enhance, or constrain and negate, the organism.

Central to Rogers' conceptualisation is the concept of congruence between Self and experience. It is possible that the individual experiences things that run contrary to his or her concept of Self, that is to say that the experience reveals aspects of the person that he or she has not accepted. An example may be a young woman's unavowed anger for her father, the admission of such anger being somehow unacceptable for her. If there is to be a state of congruence between her concept of Self and the experience, she must either modify her concept of Self to include this hitherto unknown anger, or alternatively, deny the experience or alter her perception of it, which will result in the suppression of the felt feelings of anger. In these latter cases, there is said to exist a state of incongruence between the Self and experience, which leads to tension and internal confusion, which, if the incongruence is considerable, render the person vulnerable to anxiety, threat and disorganisation. If the new experience brings out the incongruence to the point where the individual perceives it, then he or she will feel threatened and his or her concept of Self will be disorganised by the experience, which will be perceived as contradictory and unassimilable. In cases where the discrepancy is great but is not admitted to awareness, this leads to discordant and incomprehensible behaviours, such as neurotic behaviour which may be perplexing even to the neurotic person himself.

On the other hand, Rogers sees behaviour as a normal effort of the organism to actualise itself based on its perceptual field. In his own words: "Behavior is basically

the goal-directed attempt of the organism to satisfy its needs as experienced, in the field as perceived" (Rogers, 1951, p 491). Rogers notes that the make-up of the Self-structure will have a determining effect upon the organism's perception of its needs and also its elaboration of methods likely to achieve them.

As such, most of the behaviours adopted by the organism will be those which are consistent with the concept of Self. To illustrate, if a person views himself as basically honest, such a person will find it difficult to achieve aims using means which he views as dishonest.

However, in other instances, a person's behaviour may be brought about by organic experiences and needs which have not been symbolised, such behaviour being inconsistent with the Self. In such instances the behaviour is not likely to be owned by the individual. This explains many eccentricities of behaviour by certain individuals of presumably high moral character who have denied certain needs to awareness. For example, a boy who has denied feelings of sexual attraction because these are "base" and "below him", but who ends up being arrested for lifting girls' skirts will assert "that he was not himself" or was otherwise "out of control", such needs not having been integrated within his concept of Self (Rogers, 1951). When the discrepancy between experience and its symbolisation is very great, the result may be *personality disorganisation* (Rogers, 1959), such corresponding to a breach in the Self-structure.

Rogers conceives of the individual as having a secondary or learned need for positive regard from others which, if experienced in an adequate manner, will eventually be replaced by positive regard for Self, or what he terms positive Self-regard.

"Though it appears that positive regard must first be experienced from others, this results in a positive attitude toward self which is no longer directly dependent on the attitudes of others" (Rogers, 1959, p 209).

Unconditional (positive) Self-regard occurs when the individual "perceives himself in such a way that no self-experience can be discriminated as more or less worthy of positive regard than any other" (Rogers, 1959, p 209). In other words, all experiences of the organism are accepted and integrated as part of the Self, they are not denied from awareness. However, what part or entity within the organism harbours the positive attitude towards Self is not made clear by Rogers.

A *regard complex* is a conglomeration of Self experiences that relate to a particular person or group. In similar manner, a *Self-regard complex* is a conglomeration of Self experiences that relate to one's own person. Depending on its negative or positive nature, a new experience will tend to affirm or negate the existing complex. In the case of Self-regard complexes, the positive or negative regard held towards the particular conglomeration of Self experiences tends to be crystallised in the sense that it is much less influenced by evaluations from others. It is as if the individual "becomes his own significant social other" (Rogers, 1959, p 208).

Conditions of worth consist of evaluations by the individual of certain Self-experiences as worthy or unworthy of Self-regard, regardless of the experiential satisfaction the experience actually provides. Such conditions of worth develop from childhood experiences where the parents' positive regard was perceived as conditional. This concept Rogers (1959) describes as a refinement of "introjected value", a value which is gradually assimilated into the Self-regard complex and which is used to evaluate the worth of an organismic experience without reference to the intrinsic effect, positive or negative, of that experience. It is as if the individual values the experience for its intrinsic value when in fact he or she does not. Because it skews the valuing process, the individual is prevented from functioning with maximum freedom and effectiveness.

In cases where such introjected values are in flagrant contradiction with those assigned to direct experience, the Self, in order to maintain its integrity, especially

under the influence of strong conditions of worth, may assign negative evaluations to intrinsically positive experiences, or worse, may partially or totally deny from awareness those experiences which do not sit well with its conditional values. Such occurrences of conditioned values, Rogers (1951) contends, introduce a distorted type of perception and symbolisation of experience, sowing the seeds of future psychological maladjustment.

"Psychological maladjustment exists when the organism denies to awareness significant sensory and visceral experiences, which consequently are not symbolized and organized into the gestalt of the self-structure." (Rogers, 1951, p 510).

In cases where a real discrepancy exists between the organismic experience and the concept of Self, a significant proportion of organismic needs are not recognised as such by the conscious Self and result in being held out of awareness. Conscious control of needs that are not admitted to awareness are admittedly difficult. In these cases, the Self does not adequately represent the totality of the organismic experience. If the magnitude of the discrepancy is large enough, it will be felt as tension or anxiety, as lack of integration, and lack of direction. For very largely felt discrepancies, there will be a perceived threat to the Self, resulting in increased rigidity of the Self-structure in order to maintain its organisation in the face of such threat.

For its part, psychological adjustment exists when the concept of Self is "such that all the sensory and visceral experiences of the organism are, or may be, assimilated on a symbolic level into a consistent relationship with the concept of the self" (Rogers, 1951, p 513). This implies a concept of Self which is roughly congruent with the experiences of the organism, or in other words, a concept of Self which has all experiences potentially available to consciousness. This translates into a higher degree of Self acceptance, more freedom from tension, and more autonomy and sense of Self-control.

Rogers (1951) contends that the Self reorganises itself in light of new experiences, but that such reorganisation must be carried out at a pace that will not be experienced as threatening. This of course is greatly enhanced in the context of a facilitating relationship, as defined by Rogers. Under certain facilitating conditions where a significant portion of the threat has been minimised, it may be possible for the Self to perceive and examine experiences which are contrary to its structure, and subsequently modify its structure to include such experiences.

2.4.2 Critical analysis of Rogers' conceptualisation of the Self

Probably no other humanistic psychologist has had more impact on present-day clinical psychology than Carl Rogers. In a reaction against the seemingly objectifying reductionism of the behavioural approaches and also against the pathologising and categorising of the psychodynamic approaches, Rogers' emphasis on the therapist's openness to and acceptance of the person's experience during the therapeutic encounter, was a welcome breath of fresh air in the dark and stifling halls of clinical theory and practice. His emphasis on the therapeutic relationship and its processes, on their operationalisation and measurement, was the spark to an explosive new trend in the field of research in psychotherapy, whereby the person's subjective experience of the psychotherapeutic process was rendered amenable to "objective" research methodologies.

Rogers' contribution extends far beyond that of psychological theory and practice, exerting a definitive impact on education, industrial psychology, leadership, interpersonal relations, international relations. His positive vision of human functioning and personality emphasised humanity's tremendous potential for growth and actualisation. These teachings continue to exert themselves even today.

Undoubtedly, Rogers' landmark contributions consist of his elaboration of client-centred therapy and of his theory on the necessary and sufficient conditions for

therapeutic change. This theory developed from his reflection on his experience with his clients, where he noticed improvements following sessions where the client was in unhindered contact with the inner flow of immediate experience, and felt accepted by the therapist in this experience. Rogers' (1957) conceptualisation of this event led to his elaboration of his six necessary conditions, the first of which being that the therapist and the client be in psychological contact. The three following conditions relate to the therapist, that is to say his or her congruence, capacities for empathy and for unconditional positive regard, and his communication of this empathy and unconditional positive regard. The last two relate to the client, that is his or her state of incongruence and his or her perception of the therapist's empathy and unconditional positive regard.

Needless to say, Rogers' assertions were revolutionary at the time, as were the implications flowing from his conception of the necessary and sufficient conditions for therapeutic change. We note especially his assertion that the therapist's training not consist of specialised intellectual knowledge, but rather should consist of practical hands-on "experiential training - which may be, but usually is not, a part of professional training" (Rogers, 1957, p 101).

As extensive and revolutionary may have been his impact on psychology and on related fields, this impact seems to have stemmed largely from his theory of therapy, not from his conceptualisation of the Self. We shall now address ourselves to this aspect of his extensive contribution.

2.4.2.1 The understanding aspects of Rogers' conceptualisation of Self

2.4.2.1.1 On the nature of consciousness and its attributes

While Rogers does not explicitly address the issue of consciousness nor its attributes, such as its intentionality, unity, nor its constitutive role in perception, his conceptualisation does incorporate these to some extent. For Rogers, the Self

consists of that portion of experience that may be brought to awareness, "an awareness of being, awareness of functioning" (Rogers, 1959, p 223), with the perceiving entity being labelled the individual, the person, or the organism, such including the body, within which the Self finds itself confined. We also note that for Rogers, the Self is granted the ability to perceive itself. Finally Rogers conflates the 'I' and the 'Me', these are synonymous from the point of view of his conceptualisation.

Here we would argue that some confusion dwells within some of these assertions. While the Self is part of the experiential field which can be brought to awareness, we are also aware of objects in the world that we do not consider to be part of Self. On the other hand, the awareness of being and functioning are definitely part of Self. Similarly, so would be the "perceptions of one's characteristics and abilities; the percepts and concepts of the Self in relation to others and to the environment; the value qualities which are perceived as associated with experiences and objects; and the goals and ideals" (Rogers, 1951, p 501). However, Rogers does not situate these aspects of Self with respect to consciousness. Here, with James, we argue that the 'I'- 'Me' distinction relates to that between the Self-as-perceiver and Self-as-perceived, this distinction mirroring the one to be made between consciousness and its object. Rogers' conflation of the 'I' and the 'Me', in our estimation, does not promote the clarification of this distinction. This of course becomes problematic when we consider the Self's ability to perceive itself, for it becomes impossible to distinguish what is being perceived by whom.

On these aspects, we would contend that a deeper consideration of consciousness and its attributes, especially as it relates to the subject-object relationship, would add some measure of clarity, enabling a clearer distinction between those aspects of Self taken as object in relationship to those aspects taken as subject, or locus of consciousness. This of course does not invalidate the aspects themselves for they are considered valuable aspects of Self; it is only with respect to their situation vis-à-vis consciousness that we believe some clarity could be added.

Rogers does grant to the organism a selective role in the perception of experience. Previous experience, notably experience during childhood, has great bearing on the make-up of the Self-structure which in turn will have a determining effect upon the organism's perception of its needs and on the elaboration of the methods likely to achieve them. Experience congruent with the concept of Self will be perceived and valued positively, while other perceived experiences will be valued negatively and possibly not incorporated within the Self. At this first level, the Self-structure seems to affect more the *value afforded to an experience* more than *its perception per se*. Yet other experiences will simply not be admitted to awareness due to their very threatening nature. At this second level, perception seems to be affected at a deeper level, *affecting the selection of what is brought to awareness*. And so while Rogers does not explicitly address the constitutive aspects of consciousness, he does endow the Self-structure with some constitutive ability vis-à-vis perception.

In brief, while some measure of clarity could be added to Rogers' conceptualisation of the Self, especially as it relates to the consideration of consciousness and its attributes, his conceptualisation actually favours many of these attributes, and he evinces many attributes to the Self. We differ with Rogers, not on the attributes themselves, but with their situation vis-à-vis consciousness. In our estimation, some of the relationships, as formulated by Rogers, between these attributes become problematic, notably in the case of self-perception.

2.4.2.1.2 On the primacy of lived experience

Rogers' fundamental datum is that of experience, both in its symbolised and unsymbolised forms. By symbolisation, Rogers seems to be referring to symbolisation of experience as part of the Self, meaning that the Self is constituted from "a portion of the individual's experience... .. symbolized in an awareness of being", into a concept of Self, a "perceptual object in his [the organism's] experiential

field" (parentheses ours, Rogers, 1959, p 223). Here we agree with Rogers, for, in our view, the Self is a portion of experience symbolised. We would add however that *all experience*, both Self-experience and non-Self experience, requires symbolisation in order to be grafted with meaning. In this respect, symbolisation is not a criterion distinguishing Self from not-Self for it applies to both domains of experience. It is not clear if Rogers uses symbolisation as a distinguishing Self/not-Self criterion, for he also states that the Self will be that portion of experience perceived as being in control of the self. We would argue that the selection, by consciousness, of what experience is to be incorporated as part of Self is subsequent to the symbolisation of all experience, with the portion of experience delimited as not-Self being that of the World. So while we agree with Rogers that the Self is constituted by that portion of lived experience that is symbolised, we maintain that symbolisation is necessary for the apprehension of experience in general, such comprising both the Self and not-Self domains. Thus symbolisation cannot serve as a criterion distinguishing between these domains, as implied by Rogers' assertion. However Rogers may have been aware of this discrepancy, as is hinted by his evocation of control as a distinguishing feature of the Self (Rogers, 1959). We opine that a deeper consideration of the nature of lived experience would have clarified Rogers' conceptualisation in this respect.

Rogers also contends that the Self is the awareness of being, or functioning, resident within the body, this constituting an entity larger than the Self. Whereas for Rogers the Self is deemed to reside within the body, we note that lived experience *also includes* the experience of the lived body. We also note that Rogers contends that the Self-structure is made up of the experiences with significant others, "the percepts and concepts of the self in relation to others" (Rogers, 1951, p 501). In our view, other persons, while perceived as beings different from mere objects, are nonetheless perceived as resident outside the body, amongst the beings of the World. In this respect, part of the Self thus extends *beyond* the realm of the perceived body. Thus Rogers contradicts his own assertion regarding the Self being located within the confines of the body-organism. This corroborates our own view where the body,

being part of the things experienced, is seen as a portion, although a very foundational one, of a larger globality termed Self. Here again, we advocate that a deeper consideration of lived experience would add to Rogers' conceptualisation by clarifying the relationships entertained between lived experience, the body, and the Self.

Rogers alludes to certain distinctions within the lived experience of the Self when he asserts that the Self-structure is made up of "the perceptions of one's characteristics and abilities; the percepts and concepts of the self in relation to others and to the environment; the value qualities which are perceived as associated with experiences and objects; and the goals and ideals which are perceived as having positive or negative valence." (Rogers, 1951, p 501). The "characteristics and abilities" of the Self-structure, together with the "Self in relation to others", resemble James' notion of the spiritual Self and Sullivan's notion of relational Self respectively. More specifically, we note that for Rogers, the organism establishes value qualities associated with experiences and objects, with the most valued experience being that of the Self; this is analogous to James' contention that many feelings may be harboured towards that supremely interesting object of Self, such feelings being variations of Self-contempt and Self-complacency. We also note that Rogers' notion of "goals and ideals" resembles James' notion of potential Selves, these being always associated with goals established by actual Selves. Thus, these aspects of Rogers' conceptualisation corroborate aspects of the Self-as-object as described by James and Sullivan.

One aspect of lived experience highly developed by Rogers is the feeling of congruence between what has been symbolised as Self and subsequent experience, with added focus on the sense of being valued as a person, or the value qualities associated with experiences of Self - a notion intimately related to positive Self-regard - itself related to the positive regard received in the context of the interpersonal relationships occurring during childhood. Rogers focuses almost exclusively on the importance of being valued as a person, and we note also that his

therapeutic aim focuses on changing the distorted experiences of the person by affording him with new ones in which he or she is valued unconditionally. This, Rogers contends, results in a restructuring of the Self and the attribution of a positive value to it and its experiences. It is by eliciting new versions of lived experience that Rogers aims to provoke therapeutic change, meaning change to the structure of the Self and to the value afforded to it.

Moreover, we note that the notions of positive Self-regard, positive regard, Self-regard complexes, and the actualising tendency all relate, in one way or another, to the value afforded to the Self. Congruence between Self and experience relates to the notion of acceptance of experience, which can only be achieved when the Self has achieved a substantial level of positive Self-regard in order not to be threatened by new experience. Thus, Rogers' consideration of lived experience highlights and fully articulates the value afforded to the Self, this being the central theme of his conceptualisation and the central aim of his therapeutic method. Rogers is the only author reviewed to have developed this notion. We deem this to be a foundational aspect of Self.

We recall that for Rogers, the underlying impetus for the organism is the actualising tendency, by which he means that the organism actualises itself in the direction of greater differentiation, independence, Self-responsibility, Self-regulation, and autonomy, whereas Self-actualisation refers to this tendency as it applies specifically to the Self. To the extent that the Self is congruent with the experience of the organism, there will be congruence between the actualising tendency and the Self's actualisation.

From the phenomenological point of view, we find no distinction to be made between the actualising tendency and Self-actualisation as consciousness finds itself embodied and in intimate relationship to the world. In our view, if in fact there is an underlying tendency towards increased understanding, then such would apply to lived experience in general, meaning both of the Self and of the world. Both take

place simultaneously and are indivisible from each other. Thus an increase in understanding of the world leads to an increase in the understanding of Self and vice versa. Thus, in our view, the actualising tendency and Self-actualisation are always in congruence by necessity, contrary to Rogers' assertion.

To summarise, while Rogers does not radically question lived experience, he acknowledges its fundamental importance as source of all that constitutes Self, and his deliberations lead him to articulate several pertinent dimensions to the Self, corroborating the reflections of other authors. One aspect of lived experience highly articulated by Rogers touches upon the value afforded to the Self, an aspect he develops more than the previous authors. We note in this respect how his entire conceptualisation is largely derived from this aspect of lived experience, which is also central to his therapeutic method. Our consideration of the actualising tendency and of Self-actualisation have shown these to be two correlated aspects of lived experience, necessarily in congruence. Also, Rogers grants a central role to the organism, which we interpret to mean the body, in the constitution of Self. While a more thorough study of lived experience, we contend, would have clarified certain aspects, this does not diminish his contribution to our understanding of the Self.

2.4.2.1.3 On embodiment

While he does not explicitly consider the Self from the point of view of its embodiment, Rogers contends that the Self becomes elaborated through interaction with the environment:

"This representation in awareness of being and functioning, becomes elaborated, through *interaction with the environment*, particularly the environment composed of significant others, into a concept of self, a perceptual object in his experiential field." (italics ours, Rogers, 1959, p 223).

On the other hand, Rogers refers to the organism as the entity responsible for the perception of lived experience, and for the selection of experiences is to be symbolised as Self, with the Self synonymous with the awareness of being. It is not clear what Rogers means by the use of the term *organism*, yet it seems to imply the body, to which he attributes a form of agency, which implies the presence of consciousness. Moreover, the organism appears as a given, with the Self being subsequently constituted by the interactions between the organism and the environment. It appears then that by organism, Rogers is referring to a conscious living body, or rather an embodied consciousness that, through interaction with the environment, or the World, constitutes the Self. Thus, we can infer that for Rogers, the Self is constituted from both body and world. Thus, while Rogers does not explicitly address the notion of consciousness' embodied intentional relationship to a world, Rogers' conceptualisation appears congenial to this notion.

Here we would add that given the implication of a pre-given body-organism *in interaction with the environment*, coupled with the notion of control as it relates to the discrimination of Self, Rogers' conceptualisation is also congenial to our notion of the embodied conscious subject involved with the *interpretation of intentional-attentional lived experience*, whereby consciousness *interacts* with the World to which it is intentionally related, and progressively distinguishes Self from not-Self, with attribution of *agency* serving to discriminate between what is Self from not-Self.

We have already noted that while Rogers states that the Self is contained within the larger entity of the body or organism, we contend that the lived body is part of the experience of the Self.

To summarise, while not explicitly addressing the notion of embodiment as a foundational aspect of Self, Rogers' conceptualisation indeed seems to refer to a form of embodied consciousness interacting in a world of objects and others. While an existential-phenomenological approach would have permitted a deeper

consideration of the role of the lived body in the conceptualisation of Self, Rogers is to be commended for his insights, very congenial with our own position.

2.4.2.1.4 On the interpersonal aspects to the Self

Rogers affords considerable importance to the interpersonal aspects of the Self, he does not however address the problem of the perception of the alter ego, but takes for granted our ability to perceive the other as such. For Rogers, the interpersonal aspect of Self relates specifically to two aspects, the first being "the organized picture, existing in awareness either as figure or ground, of the self and the self-in-relationship", the second being "the positive or negative values which are associated with those qualities and relationships" (Rogers, 1951, p 501), a notion he also terms Self-regard, which in turn is a function of the positive and negative regard received from significant others. Therefore for Rogers, not only is the Self's constitution affected by interpersonal relationships, also affected is the *value afforded to the Self* by the organism. While this value aspect corroborates with James' account of Self-complacency and Self-contempt within his larger concept of Self-esteem, Rogers' contribution is novel in that he links this value directly to the value (i.e., the positive or negative regard) perceived as coming from the other in the interpersonal relationship. We recall that James noted a discrepancy within his own notion of Self-esteem, underscoring that some persons, while having obviously accomplished a lot, harboured low self-esteem, while others displayed unjustified pride and conceit. James remained silent on the reasons for this discrepancy. Rogers also differs from Laing, who, while accounting for psychological health in terms of the interpersonal relationship, does not articulate the notion of Self-value or Self-esteem.

For Rogers, interpersonal relationships are related to psychological health. In his estimation, the regard received from others concerning oneself and one's experiences will deeply affect the value that we afford to them, to the point where a

distortion or negation of the experience occurs if we have been taught to value it negatively. In this respect, the value afforded to an experience will affect its interpretation. We note here, with Laing, that for the person to label as negative an intrinsically positive experience, there is need for a conflict in experiencing, that is, a contradiction between what is experienced directly and what others tell us we should be experiencing. While Rogers articulates psychological adjustment in terms of congruence between experience and the Self, and while he does not articulate the initial constitution of Self in terms of a conflict in experiencing, such conflict is implied in his conceptualisation. Thus, while he does not assert it formally, we would argue, based on the primacy of lived experience afforded to the makeup of Self, that psychological health is directly affected by the negation or confirmation of lived experience, as well as the positive/negative regard received in the context of an interpersonal relationship, especially that occurring during childhood.

Confirmation of lived experience and positive regard, we note, are also the core of Rogers' therapeutic method. Thus at the centre of psychological health is the role of the interpersonal relationship with its effect upon subsequent interpretation of experience. This aspect of psychological health we consider not only novel but foundational.

In brief, while Rogers does not assert that interpersonal relationships are constitutive of Self, the interpersonal relationship figures prominently within his conceptualisation, not only in terms of defining the Self in its structure, but more notably, in defining the value afforded to the Self. Rogers contends that both the structure of the Self and the value afforded to it are determinants of psychological health and well-being. In this respect, we note the capital importance he affords to these concepts in his notion of the therapeutic relationship, and how his necessary and sufficient conditions for therapeutic change are the result of the operationalisation of these concepts.

2.4.2.1.5 The Subject-Object distinction, Self/not-Self distinction, Self-identity, general distinctions within the Self.

As we have noted above, Rogers conflates the distinction between the Self-as-subject or 'I', and the Self-as-object, or 'Me'. However, if a centre of 'I'-ness, or locus of consciousness is to be attributed, it appears to reside within what Rogers terms the organism. We have already argued the necessity for such a distinction.

For Rogers, experience refers to lived experience, while the Self is that portion of lived experience that is attributed to the realm of Self versus the realm of not-Self. For Rogers, what distinguishes Self and not-Self is based "...upon whether or not it [experience] is perceived as within control of the self." (parentheses ours, Rogers, 1951, p 497). We note here the tautological nature of Rogers' definition for he defines Self as that which is in control of the Self, with the Self serving to distinguish what is part of itself. We would suggest that within Rogers' conceptualisation, the organism, taken as Self-as-subject, be the harbourer and perceiver of the sense of control, this term meaning the perception of the Self-as-object as centre of a relationship between certain intentions and attentions, giving rise to a sense of agency in relation to certain aspects of experience. Such sense of agency is our interpretation of what Rogers is referring to, although we attribute the perception of such sense of agency to the Self-as-subject versus the Self-as-object. We note that while Rogers implicitly grants agency to the Self, he also formally denies it, emphasising that the Self is not a "specialised agent", or homunculi, separate from the actualising tendency. In his own words:

"the self doesn't 'do' anything. It is only one expression of the general tendency of the organism to behave in those ways which maintain and enhance itself" (Rogers, 1959, p 196).

In this respect, Rogers is not clear on the Self's agency and on this issue his conceptualisation remains contradictory in that while denying agency to the Self he

also attributes it with the ability to perceive, to judge and to control. We shall reconsider the notion of agency in the following chapter.

Also, Rogers does not specifically address the issues of Self-identity and Self-constancy. While one may argue that any definition of Self constitutes an identity of Self, Rogers does not address how such identity is established nor maintained.

Further, while not explicitly referring to the notion of Self-esteem, Rogers states that the Self may be attributed with negative or positive valence or Self-regard. Rogers refers to Self-regard as an overall, or general Self-regard, these relating to different aspects of Self, what he later defines as Self-regard complexes, which may have different valences, positive or negative, attributed to them. Thus, general Self-regard is *a composite* made up of values attributed to various aspects of Self. In this respect, we note a similarity with James' notion of Self-esteem which relates both to the global and the more specific aspects of Self. However, rather than expressing it in terms of the successful proportion of one's pretensions, as James does, Rogers expresses Self-regard as *the introjected value adopted from the regard of significant others*. Here, Rogers may well be offering a solution to the discrepancy noted by James within his own conceptualisation.

We have noted that Rogers makes several distinctions within the Self as experienced, for example, the "...perceptions of one's characteristics and abilities; the percepts and concepts of the Self in relation to others and to the environment; the value qualities which are perceived as associated with experiences and objects; and the goals and ideals which are perceived as having positive or negative valence." (Rogers, 1951, p 501). We have also noted Rogers' distinction between actual and ideal Self. While Rogers does make important distinctions to the Self as experienced, we also note the unitary nature of Rogers' conceptualisation, in that he does not explicitly conceptualise the Self as multiple in nature, as each of the previous authors has done.

On this issue, Rogers' insistence is rather on wholeness, integration, independence, autonomy, these relating to a generalised sense of Self that is neither fragmented nor multiple. We note also that for Rogers, the individual ideally "becomes his own significant social other" (Rogers, 1959, p 208), in that there is a crystallisation of the values attributed to the regard complexes and the person is less influenced by the judgements of others. Thus while interpersonal relationships may have a bearing on Self constitution, in Rogers' view this does not lead to multiplicity but to a stronger sense of wholeness and integration. On the other hand, the notion of regard complexes is suggestive of some form of multiplicity. However, Rogers does not develop this issue. In brief, while suggestive of some form of multiplicity, Rogers' view of the Self is primarily unitary in nature. This, we note is congenial to Heidegger's notion of Being-in-the-world.

To summarise, while Rogers does not explicitly address some of the more fundamental distinctions we have deemed important such as Self-as-subject/Self-as-object, Self/not-Self, and Self-identity, and while we contend that a deeper consideration of these aspects would have strengthened his conceptualisation, our interpretation of his conceptualisation reveals it as highly congenial with most of the distinctions the other authors have evinced. Regarding the Self-as-object, seconded by the previous conceptualisations, we contend that the Self has more facets than Rogers has evinced, and we note especially the absence of the embodied and interpersonal dimensions to Self. Notwithstanding, Rogers has placed considerable emphasis on the sense of worth a person may experience, and has augmented our understanding of the Self by a detailed articulation of its relationship to interpersonal relationships and of its importance to psychological health and well-being.

2.4.2.2 The explanatory aspects of Rogers' conceptualisation

While gravitating towards the understanding pole, Rogers' conceptualisation implies certain explanatory aspects.

In this regard, a first consideration concerns the actualising tendency, the underlying force postulated by Rogers to account for all behaviour, from the most basic of seeking food and shelter to the most abstract, such as Self-accomplishment and Self-expression. For Rogers, the actualising tendency is the primal motivating force, or energy which propels us towards betterment in the world.

From the phenomenological point of view, however, we are not propelled, nor pushed to act in a specific direction, such as is implied by the actualising tendency. Rather, we are in intentional relationship to the world in which we are pre-reflectively engaged in a search for meaning, what we have expressed as Dasein as understanding. We recall that Dasein as understanding is not, in the strict sense, a 'force', or underlying motivation, it is one of the *existentiales*, or basic modes of Dasein's Being-in-the-world. In this sense, it is an ontological statement concerning our *state of beingness* in the world, and is not to be misconstrued as an underlying causal factor, or underlying force or motivation. From the phenomenological point of view, we do not experience per se, motivation, for careful observation shows that we experience interest for certain objects, activities, persons and projects in the world, these can be either positive, negative or neutral. Motivation, or Rogers' formulation of it - the actualising tendency, phenomenology contends, is an erroneous term that postulates an underlying force to explain, after the fact, actions towards a desired goal. Thus, the actualising tendency towards positive growth, a force not part of lived experience, but which Rogers abstracts from it, is, to the extent that is formulated as a causal force, an explanatory notion which is, from our point of view, superfluous and an inaccurate portrayal of human living.

Related to the actualising tendency is Rogers' contention that human beings are basically positive, socialised, forward-looking, rational and realistic and that antisocial emotions and behaviour result from the frustrations of normal positive needs. We can question this affirmation. We note that human beings do not all tend towards positive growth, many of them, despite their best efforts, and despite many years of therapy remain, without being considered psychotic, enslaved in ways of being that are destructive, negative and uncondusive to well-being. While Freud (1949/1927) postulated two instincts, those of libido and thanatos, as responsible, respectively, for our constructive and destructive acts, Jung conceived the individual as harbouring all potentialities, while the other authors we have examined do not address the issue of innate goodness or badness. From the point of view of phenomenology, humans are intentionally related to their world and to others and effect both creative and destructive acts, for a myriad of reasons related to their understood situation in the World. There is no need to evoke an underlying tendency, be it intrinsically positive or negative.

It appears that Rogers postulated the actualising tendency from his therapeutic observations where he noted that, provided clients are exposed to the necessary and sufficient (and minimal) conditions for therapeutic change, they will tend towards increased psychological well-being. As previously discussed, according to Rogers' (1957) his therapeutic conditions basically involve the communication, by a congruent and empathic therapist, unconditional positive regard to a perceiving client. For Rogers, no other techniques or manipulations are necessary for psychotherapeutic change to take place.

Based on this observation, we cautiously contend that Rogers' limited experience with extensive pathology during his early years may well explain his optimism with respect to human nature, as well as the relative paucity of the conditions required for therapeutic change. Rogers spent the first twelve years of his career in a social services centre working with the general public and with delinquent children (Rogers, 1976/1961).

We also note that Rogers' considerable research with schizophrenics (Rogers et al., 1976/1967) took place several years after the elaboration of his conceptualisation of Self (Rogers, 1959) and theory of psychotherapy (Rogers, 1951, 1957, 1959, 1961, 1976/1961). Subsequent to this research, which aimed at testing various hypotheses related to his theory of therapy, not to his conceptualisation of Self, Rogers did make some modifications to his therapy, which became more *experiential* in the sense that it was less non-directive and less verbal (Monte, 1995). However in Monte's opinion, this did not invalidate Rogers' elaboration of the necessary and sufficient conditions for therapeutic change, as "*any* person-to-person contact embodying them [the therapeutic conditions] could promote personality growth." (italics and parentheses ours, Monte, 1995, p 677).

Within his research, Rogers noted that schizophrenics appear very concerned about trust within the therapeutic relationship and tend not to engage in self-exploration. Secondly, they have a tendency not to own their experiencing. As we shall see, this observation resonates with Laing's assertions concerning the schizophrenics' fear of the other and their disembodiment, the latter effectively corresponding to a distancing from their experiencing. For Rogers, these observations corroborated his notion that these persons suffered from *personality disorganisation*, such corresponding to a breakdown in the Self-structure.

And so while Rogers' conception of therapy may have become more experiential, his research experience with schizophrenics did not compel him to modify his formal definition of successful therapy. Neither can we find any evidence that Rogers modified his conceptualisation of Self as a consequence of these findings (Rogers, 1971, 1980).

Rogers also asserts that part of personality is inadmissible to awareness, and implicitly suggests that the organism is the entity responsible for the constitution of the Self via the symbolisation of experience. This implies that some processes,

namely, the selection of the experiences that constitute the Self, are effected by entities or processes outside the confines of awareness. In a similar vein, we note that incongruence between the Self and experience implies the processing of experience outside of awareness. For the organism to sense a discomfort, the experience not admitted to awareness must be sensed at some level. In these respects, we note that Rogers' conceptualisation calls for an explanatory aspect that is implied but not fully articulated.

In this vein, we note that for Rogers, the experiences and perceptions which are not admitted to awareness are of two types: those which are potentially symbolisable but have been denied access to awareness, that is to say have not been symbolised by the Self, presumably due to their threatening nature; and those which cannot be symbolised, either due to the fact that they have no relevance to the Self or that their intensity is below that of the perceptual threshold. Not addressed by Rogers, are those experiences that, without being denied to awareness, have not yet been symbolised. This phenomenologically 'unconscious' aspect of experience shall be addressed in our treatment of Laing.

On the topic of experience and its symbolisation, we note that Rogers equates awareness of experience to its symbolisation:

"... consciousness (or awareness) is the symbolization of some of our experience. Awareness is thus seen as the symbolic representation (not necessarily in verbal symbols) of some portion of our experience." (parentheses by the author, Rogers, 1959, p 198).

We see here an effort by Rogers to ground the constitution of Self in lived experience. However, by equating awareness or consciousness to symbolisation, Rogers uses one term to define the other without any further elaboration on the term used as the reference. While we agree that to be perceived as meaningful by a conscious embodied subject, experience requires articulation using symbols, this does mean that symbolisation is synonymous with awareness. More importantly,

because a facet of experience has been symbolised, this does not mean that it is ipso facto part of the Self. Rather, we would contend that symbolisation is an activity of consciousness in the constitutive perception of its object (whether Self or not-Self), as per the existential-phenomenological foundations discussed in the previous chapter.

To summarise, our analysis reveals certain implicit explanatory aspects to Rogers' conceptualisation. First, we note the presence of the actualising tendency, a concept which, while in certain respects similar to Dasein as understanding, differs from it in its foundational aspects. Secondly, Rogers' conceptualisation implies structures and processes which, while not themselves perceived as part of experience, are necessarily involved with its symbolisation. Such symbolisation, for Rogers, is foundational, as it is the means by which the Self is constituted from lived experience.

2.4.3 Summary

In proceeding from a consideration of lived experience, Rogers' conceptualisation can be seen as phenomenologically oriented, and many of the aspects of Self are congenial to the view exposed in our previous chapter. Rogers' most important and novel contribution lies in his intricate articulation of the importance, to psychological health and well-being, of Self-regard and, while not conceptualising the Self as primarily interrelational, articulates Self-regard as being deeply affected by interpersonal relationships. This aspect, which we find foundational, has not been dealt with by previous authors. In addition, we note the central importance this concept has in his theory of therapy.

While we have noted some discrepancies related to a clear articulation of his conceptualisation of Self, Rogers' conceptualisation remains rich in its understanding aspects. And while they could profit from increased development, his conceptualisation implies several important explanatory aspects.

Finally, we note that Rogers' outstanding reputation and impact on psychology comes primarily from his theory of therapy, more so than from his conceptualisation of Self. In this vein, we note that his theory of Self was developed from his theory of therapy (Rogers, 1959). This emphasis on the therapeutic relationship should not surprise us as Rogers' main interests were clinical, as evidenced by the large proportion of clinical writings.

2.5 The conceptualisation of Self according to Ronald D. Laing

"The body is felt more as one object among other objects in the world than as the core of the individual's own being. Instead of being the core of his true self, the body is felt as the core of a false self, which a detached, disembodied, 'inner', 'true', self looks on at with tenderness, amusement, or hatred as the case may be."

R.D. Laing, 1960

2.5.1 The Self according to Laing

Although he is the first to admit that his conceptualisation is not the rigorous or "direct application of any established existential philosophy", Laing bases his conceptualisation of the psychotic Self largely in existential -phenomenological foundations (Laing, 1960, p 9). His stated aim is to deliver, using an existential-phenomenological perspective, a plain language understanding of some forms of psychosis.

The fundamental attribute of Laing's conceptualisation of the psyche in the grips of psychosis is that of division. He argues that psychotics do not have the basic sense of unity commonly felt by normal individuals, rather they sense themselves as primarily divided, one such division being between mind and body, with a strong preponderance towards the mind at the expense of the body.

What is lacking, according to Laing, in most psychotics is a strong sense of embodiment, which he perceives as fundamental to the human capacity for relationships. Such a lack results in a fundamentally different way of experiencing lived experience. He describes the embodied person as having:

"... a sense of being flesh and blood and bones, of being biologically alive and real: he knows himself to be substantial.... ...To the extent that he is thoroughly 'in' his body, he is

likely to have a sense of personal continuity in time. The individual thus has as his starting point an experience of his body as a base from which he can be a person with other human beings." (Laing, 1960, p 69).

Underlying the felt sense of disembodiment, is a primary lack of ontological security. This implies "a lived precariousness of the individual's subjective sense of his own aliveness and the sense of others threatening this tentative feeling" (Laing, 1960, p 96). In the schizoid personality it manifests itself as the overwhelming fear of not being seen, or worse the fear of disappearing, if one is not being seen by others.

While the healthy embodied person may experience divisions within himself, these are usually normal reactions to temporary crises, and do not characterise the person's basic orientation to life. In fact, felt division is a normal occurrence and not an indicator of impending psychosis.

"In short, the body-self is not an inviolable stronghold against the corrosion of ontological doubts and uncertainties: it is not in itself a bulwark against psychosis. Conversely, this split in the experience of one's own being into unembodied and embodied parts is no more an index of latent psychosis than is total embodiment any guarantee of sanity. However, although it by no means follows that the individual genuinely based on his body is an otherwise unified and whole person, it does mean that he has a starting-point integral in this respect at least. Such a starting-point will be the precondition for a different hierarchy of possibilities from those open to the person who experiences himself in terms of a self-body dualism." (Laing, 1960, pp 70-71).

The case of persons who experience themselves as primordially unembodied, the body is described as detached, an object to an 'inner' Self which looks upon it as if it were a false Self.

In a sense, the divorce of Self from the body deprives the unembodied Self from "direct participation in the world", and the 'inner' Self, residing apart of the body, becomes a hyper conscious external observer, controller and criticiser of what the

body does, engaging in a highly complex relationship with it and with itself (Laing, 1960, p 71).

"The self is not felt to participate in the doings of the false self or selves, and all its or their actions are felt to be increasingly false and futile. The self, on the other hand, shut up with itself, regards itself as the 'true' self and the persona as false." (Laing, 1960, p 76).

The body is felt as the core of a false Self or false Self-system, which Laing likens to a cluster of personas, or personalities, or facades, presented to others and to which the 'real inner Self' now engages in relationship. These multiple facades or "part-Selves" are "partially elaborated fragments of what may constitute a personality", and are more or less unembodied but are experienced as separate mental entities which may become partly autonomous (Laing, 1960, p 76).

Moreover, it is possible for the false-Self-system and the inner-true-Self to be divided into various autonomous partial 'assemblies' or 'internal objects', each of which may have "recognisable features and distinctive ways of its own" (Laing, 1960, p 214). Such is the case of the schizophrenic. Within each of these assemblies the personality seems to be intact, with its own boundary. During times of lucidity, the individual will consider these various assemblies of Self as alien and external entities, and Laing interprets this as a fundamental failure to distinguish between what is part of Self and what is not, giving the impression that the person lacks an overall ontological boundary (Laing, 1961).

The changes that result in the relationship between the inner Self and the false Self-system reflect themselves in the relationship between the person and others.

"The individual's self-relationship becomes a pseudo-interpersonal one, and this self treats the false selves as though they were other people whom it depersonalizes." (Laing, 1960, p 77).

Rather than an embodied subject relating to the world, the psychotic's divided Self structure is that of the inner Self relating to the body and world as separate entities, in effect precluding the direct relationship between Self and world, between I and the other, substituting in its place a relationship between I and body and I and world, both of which become objectified. This, Laing (1960) contends, sows the seeds of a secondary differentiation, one where the true and false Selves are further divided into subsystems. The inner Self is split into numerous factions, one example being the sadistic and masochistic, with the former pouring its criticism and hatred upon the latter. At this point any precarious sense of identity harboured by the inner Self is dissolved. There is however, a form of inner compensation to the situation, where the inner Self, while relating to the world through a facade of pretence and hypocrisy, attempts to relate to itself with the utmost honesty. In this sense, the Self attempts to become "a relationship which relates itself to itself" (Laing quoting Kierkegaard, 1960, p 87). In this fashion, the fantasy world, versus the world of concrete things, becomes predominant to the person. In addition, the Self begins to relate with the objects as it has modified them:

"The self avoids being related directly to real persons but relates itself to itself and to the objects which it itself posits. *The self can relate itself with immediacy to an object which is an object of its own imagination or memory but not to a real person.*" (italics by the author, Laing, 1960, p 91).

The inner Self hates the characteristics of the false Self system and also fears it because it represents an alien identity that threatens to swallow the inner Self. Often the aspects of the false Self that are detested by the inner Self are those which belong to significant others, such aspects filling the subject with disgust and horror. Such an aspect cannot be attacked by the inner Self without doing violence to itself (Laing, 1960).

Laing distinguishes between three possible forms of false-Self. The first is the case of the normal person, who, while he may have many mechanical behaviours, does not

feel controlled by them, nor does he feel the need to vanquish them, for they have not acquired an all pervasive autonomous compulsory nature and they do not completely preclude spontaneous behaviours. The second is the schizoid type of false-Self, which is compulsively compliant to the will of others, and harbours perceptions, thoughts, feelings and actions that are felt as alien, unreal, meaningless, purposeless or dead. The third form of false-Self is that of the hysteric, who compulsively denies the significance of his behaviours, his false Self being unable to serve as a "vehicle for the fulfilment or gratification of the (inner) self" (Laing, 1960, p 102).

Finally, in his treatise on the self-conscious person, Laing also evokes the social Self:

"He can be himself in safety only in isolation, albeit with a sense of emptiness and unreality. With others, he plays an elaborate game of pretence and equivocation. His *social self* is felt to be false and futile." (italics ours, Laing, 1960, p 122).

While Laing doesn't provide more detail on this social Self, we can surmise that it is one of the false Self clusters taking residence within the false-Self-system since it is felt to be "false and futile", a characteristic belonging to the false-Self-system. Since the term "social Self" also implies dealings with others, this is taken as further justification for including it within the realm of the false-Self-system which is in contact with outer reality. We contend however, that from the point of view of establishing a rich conception of Self, it would have been judicious of Laing to further elaborate on the social Self as an entity within the false-Self-system. This comment is doubly pertinent on the grounds that Laing affords so much importance to the role of others in the development of the Self.

Also in relationship with the Self and engaged in the perception of experience, is the ego. Although Laing doesn't clearly delineate the exact nature of the ego - Self relationship, there is, from the clinical perspective, a risk of "losing" the ego as a result of severe negation and contradiction of the individual's experience. When

such negation occurs, the centre of experience is transferred from the ego to the (false) Self. Laing makes another distinction between the ego and various ego systems, the latter referring to systems of relationships between the ego and some other unspecified entities. These ego systems are the product of "intense emotionally charged experiences of frustration" (Laing et al., 1966, p 40) and in their dissociated state, they tend to destroy the identity of Self and of others, and to restrict central 'ego' functioning. Laing (1966) notes that the usage of the term "ego" does not do full justice to, and even violates, the realities he means to describe. The exact nature of these realities however remains unclear. In brief, Laing does not clearly define his notion of the ego, nor does he clearly distinguish it from the Self.

Correlated with the genesis of the divided Self, emerges Self-consciousness, a phenomenon which, according to Laing, implies two processes: "awareness of oneself by oneself, and an *awareness of oneself as an object of someone else's observation.*" (italics by the author, Laing, 1960, p 113). Self-consciousness then, serves two roles: first, that of reassuring the ontologically insecure person that he and others really exist; and second, that of making oneself invisible to the perceived dangers implied by closeness to others.

"The self-conscious person is caught in a dilemma. He may need to be seen and recognized, in order to maintain his sense of realness and identity. Yet, at the same time, the other represents a threat to his identity and reality." (Laing, 1960, p 121).

Following the scission between inner and false Self systems, a second one takes place, leading to division of experience into two basic factions: the here and the there. Each of these factions is further divided into two more: the inside (me) and the outside (not me). By virtue of disembodiment, the schizophrenic loses the normal sense of I, and can no longer achieve cleavage between basic notions such as here and there, inside and outside, because he doesn't feel the body as me in contrast with the not-me. Only once this is achieved can there be sharing of Self without the threat of merger and confusion with the other.

Laing defines the unconscious as "what we do not communicate, to ourselves or to one another" (Laing, 1961, p 17). According to Laing, each person experiences at the same time things via his memory, his perceptions and his imagination. One may be aware of one modality, but not of the other. In this sense, the "unconscious" is that to which we are not attending to at the moment. This definition corresponds to the phenomenological notion of the unconscious. But Laing also distinguishes between two other usages of the term "unconscious". The first refers to conceptualisations used to account for processes that are outside experience but which attempt to account for human experience and actions. The second refers to our personal notion that we are unaware of a certain part of our experience, a statement Laing, as an existential phenomenologist, claims to be absurd:

"Let us distinguish two usages of 'unconscious'. First, the term 'unconscious' may refer to dynamic structures, functions, mechanisms, processes that are meant to explain a person's actions or experiences. Such structures, functions, mechanisms, processes are outside experience but are used to 'explain' experience, whether called conscious or unconscious. These concepts lie outside experience, but start from inferences about experience. If these inferences are incorrect, everything built upon them is completely wrong. In the second place, 'unconscious' may signify that the user of the term is claiming that he or the other is unaware of part of his own experience, despite the apparent absurdity of this claim." (Laing, 1961, p 7).

Laing does not develop his notion of the unconscious more than what has already been explicated here. He in fact avoids the usage of the term "unconscious experience" precisely because of the difficulties evoked above (Laing, 1961, p 15).

Laing also refers to the Self-being, the experienced sense of being oneself, a notion he illustrates by a quote from the poet G. M. Hopkins (Laing, 1961):

"My self being, my consciousness and feeling of myself, that taste of myself, of *I* and *me* above and in all things, which is more distinctive than the taste of ale or alum, more

distinctive than the smell of walnutleaf or camphor, and is incommunicable by any means to another man." (italics by the author, Laing, 1961, p 20).

This sense of Self-being however is fragile and can easily be lost by participation in what Laing (1961) describes as social phantasy systems. One such powerful system is that of the family, whose power may extend to defining what is perceived as real and what is perceived as fantasy. In normal states, one is so immersed in these social fantasy systems as not to question their reality. It is only upon his or her withdrawal from them that one tends to perceive them as fantasy systems. Such withdrawal is often difficult for a particular member of a given system, as the other "less enlightened" members will not share this perception of reality and will usually classify the withdrawer as mad or bad (Laing, 1961). This renders the withdrawer's position untenable, making it both difficult to stay and to leave. The usual state of affairs is to be in a tenable position, and such is what Laing (1961) defines as having an identity or personality.

"One's sense of identity is the story one tells one's self of who one is... ...The others tell one who one is. Later one endorses, or tries to discard, the ways the others have defined one. It is difficult not to accept their story. One may try not to be what one is, in one's heart of hearts. One may try to tear out from oneself this 'alien' identity one has been endowed with or condemned to, and create by one's own actions an identity for oneself, which one tries to force others to confirm... ...We learn to be who we are told we are." (Laing, 1961, pp 77-78).

For Laing, our interpretation of lived experience will be affected not only by the view we have of ourselves, but also by the view the other has of ourselves, as well as the view we think the other has of us, all of these forming a complex network of direct, meta and meta-metapersonal perspectives. With these notions, Laing further articulates the fundamental role of the alter ego in the constitution of Self. Furthermore, he accounts for the complexity of our interpersonal communications and demonstrates, in terms of such perspectives, how our lived experience and hence our sense of Self

constituted from it, is either confirmed or disconfirmed. Self-identity is thus interwoven with meta-identity:

"...my meta-identity is intimately interwoven with my self-identity. The "me" that I think another sees, the "me" that I feel I perceive that another sees, can be cognitively created only in conjunction with the basic structure of the "me" that I perceive. Thus meta-identity is woven into the fabric of self-identity, as self-identity is woven into the fabric of meta-identity." (Laing et al., 1966, p 6).

Thus, related to the concept of Self-identity are Self-being and meta-identity. We note here the narrative-relational nature of Self-identity as elaborated by Laing. We shall reconsider these notions in the following section.

2.5.2 Critique of Laing's conceptualisation of Self

2.5.2.1 The understanding aspects of Laing's conceptualisation of the Self

In his attempt to render the lived-world of the psychotic, Laing is to be credited for a brilliant, insightful and thorough description of disembodiment, of alienation, of Self-experience and of the experience between Self and others. In addition, his insights challenge and confront many of the established (primarily psychoanalytic) notions relating to psychotic individuals and to psychosis in general. Some of these notions are the established practice of diagnosis, the existence of the unconscious as an experienced psychological entity, the impact of social factors upon the state of the individual's Self, the fundamental importance of relationships to psychological development and health, the manifestations of projection, and others. His contribution to psychology and psychiatry promises to be relevant for many years to come.

2.5.2.1.1 On the nature of consciousness and its attributes

While he claims to take an existential-phenomenological perspective, Laing does not explicitly address consciousness nor its attributes, such as its intentionality, its unity, nor its constitutive role in perception. While he refers to the Ego as a central entity and the centre of lived experience in the normal person, we note that the Ego is not clearly described nor is it clearly distinguished from the Self. From our perspective, there is a distinction to be made between the Ego as apprehending consciousness and the Self as apprehended part of lived experience. While he dedicates substantial effort to the description and understanding of the Self as perceived, he does not consider the attributes of the perceiving consciousness.

While he does not specifically address the issue of consciousness, Laing does treat the interpersonal relationship in terms of both subject and object. In this respect his focus is on the psychotic person taken as object for the other person; this may be any person the psychotic is in relationship with, notably the psychiatrist or psychologist. At this level, Laing places considerable emphasis on the function of the psychiatrist as determining the type of relationship between the psychotic and himself, noting especially the psychiatrist's role in labelling as sick or insane the psychotic person. Thus while he does not focus on the more primordial level of the subject-object relationship at the level of consciousness and its object, he does articulate the constellation of interpersonal relationships in these terms and proposes that psychosis is an erroneous concept resulting from one stratum of society, notably the psychiatric community, taking as object another stratum, those persons suffering from a disembodied and divided Self. Here he admonishes the psychiatric community for not considering its own position as subject, with its own set of prejudices regarding its object, and where it unquestionably considers its own interpretation of lived experience as more veridical than that of the psychotic.

Laing notes the false attribution of experience as being 'inner' or 'outer', and with existential phenomenology (Merleau-Ponty, 1945), asserts that all experience takes

place in the world, giving as example our perception of the stars as being "no more or less in my brain than the stars as I imagine them" (Laing, 1967b, p 21).

And so while he does not specifically consider the subject-object relationship at the level of consciousness and its object, Laing uses this distinction in his analysis of the psychotic's interpersonal relationships. It is this social-phenomenological approach which leads him to the many insights he makes regarding the lived world of the psychotic, notably the role played by psychiatry in exacerbating the suffering of the person in the grips of psychosis.

2.5.2.1.2 On the primacy of lived experience

Laing affords considerable weight to lived experience, asserting that without it, "we are bereft of our humanity" (Laing, 1967b, p 29). Laing gains his insights from his attempt to grasp and understand the lived experience of the psychotic individual and his study of schizophrenic families. In this attempt, he proceeds by a type of phenomenological description, focusing on the felt sense of embodiment, which he sees as foundational to the felt division experienced by the person. For Laing, the difference between the psychotic Self and the normal Self is one of degree, with division being part of the lived experience of all persons, however in the psychotic, division is a permanent state which has attained or surpassed a critical limit, with profound implications for the constitution of the Self. Existential phenomenology we note, emphasises the apprehension of Self and World through the medium of the lived body (Merleau-Ponty, 1945). However we have seen that the experience of the body is part of lived experience, and one attribute of the embodied subject is the clear distinction of the body from the rest of lived experience. Laing notes that psychotics have blurred this distinction, or have not fully carried it out, with the relationship to the alter ego playing a primordial role in the genesis of this situation. Laing emphasises the lack of a clear ontological boundary between the psychotic Self and world, with particular emphasis on that occurring between Self and Other. And so while he doesn't explicitly articulate the foundational aspect of lived experience,

he in effect prioritises it by his phenomenological approach, by which he evinces a foundational aspect to the development of Self, that is to say the importance of the Self/world-other distinction, its interpersonal aspects, and its relationship to psychological health.

Laing also asserts that while all persons experience a certain degree of anxiety, ontological anxiety figures prominently within the lived experience of the psychotic. We note that this differs from Sullivan (1953a) who attributes a foundational role for anxiety in all persons. Laing does not attribute to normal persons the same predominance of anxiety, however he fails to detail what other underlying aspects of lived experience, if any, would characterise the lived experience of normal persons. We have previously argued for Dasein as understanding as foundational stance for the conscious embodied subject and we see this as more foundational than the presence of ontological anxiety.

Finally, Laing notes the interpretative aspect to all experience, here he evokes how interpretation relates to perception, itself requiring selection and reception.

"Experience in all cases entails the perception of the act and the interpretation of it. Within the issue of perception is the issue of selection and reception." (Laing et al., 1966, p 12).

While Laing is referring to the perception and interpretation of the experience of other persons and of interpersonal situations, we note that this in no way differs from the interpretation of experience in the largest sense, a subject we have sufficiently dealt with in our treatment of James' conceptualisation. For Laing all experience is apprehended via interpretative activity, this is consonant with our phenomenological-hermeneutic position, where we have highlighted the close relationship between lived experience and its interpreted meaning.

In summary, Laing's consideration of lived experience leads him to assert that the felt sense of division results from a lack of a clearly felt sense of embodiment, which he also articulates as a lack of clear boundaries between the Self and the world. We agree with the need for the conscious embodied subject to establish clear boundaries between Self and not-Self. We note also how Laing sees this distinction as one which characterises psychopathology. While we can agree with anxiety as characterising the lived experience of the psychotic, with Laing, we do not extend this attribute to normal persons, preferring to limit it to certain aspects of normal persons' lived experience, and we stand by our contention of Dasein as understanding as a more primordial stance. While his method is phenomenological, Laing's description of lived experience centres on that of the psychotic, as such it does not accurately reflect the lived world of the normal person. In this respect, Laing's conceptualisation applies more to psychotic individuals than to normals.

2.5.2.1.3 On embodiment

The notion of embodiment is foundational to Laing's conceptualisation of the lived experience of the psychotic, with disembodiment as primary characteristic of the divided Self. For Laing, embodiment figures as the first given, and he sees the body's distinction from lived experience as the key notion in the genesis of psychopathology, a proper sense of embodiment being foundational to psychological health.

Laing contends that for the psychotic, the body is perceived as a false Self-system, one that may be experienced as a cluster of personas that may be presented to others and which maintain a relationship to a 'real inner Self', which is actually a false Self, a more distal and detached entity observing the body become Self-system. The notion of a body experienced as divided is admittedly problematic, for all Selves, whether false or not, continue to be expressed through the body which is experienced as a

whole. In our view, psychotics experience themselves as cut-off from their body, thus losing their anchor within lived experience. Without the body as centre of conscious lived experience, there is no constancy of bodily identity, no constant locus of experience from which a 'here' can be distinguished from a 'there', resulting in a blurring of ontological boundaries between Self and not-Self. The felt sense of division results not so much from a divided body, but from the lack of a body as centre for all of our experiences. It then makes sense that without the body as common reference point, experience, and especially experience with others, is felt as a threat which may swallow up the Self, with the conglomerate of such experiences being perceived by the inner Self as disjointed and divided. Thus our view is that what is experienced as divided is not the body, but the conglomerate of experience-with-others, in which there is alienation or discounting of the experience of the body or of the embodied dimension to experience.

We also note that while the Self is experienced as divided, the inner true Self, is unitary, unfragmented, and looks upon the Self-system "with tenderness, amusement, or hatred as the case may be" (Laing, 1960, p 71) and attempts to relate to the false Self-system and to itself with the utmost honesty. While such an inner Self is deemed to compensate for the division inherent to the false Self-system, how it is in effect constituted is not addressed by Laing.

In our view, it appears that the inner Self differs from the normal embodied Self in that it takes a role of external evaluator of experience rather than that of living centre of experience. From our perspective, such an inner Self is a normal feature of Selfhood, one that harbours our ability to represent and explain experience after the fact. However, without normal embodiment, such an inner Self takes on an exaggerated role, attempting to compensate for the felt constancy and centrality of experience normally provided by embodiment. We note that while the weakened sense of embodiment may alter the constitution of the Self and the perception of experience, still intact is a locus of experience from which perception and relating take place, albeit in altered form.

Thus in our view, lack of embodiment leads to a felt sense of division of Self, such division we contend to result from the failure to sense, within lived experience, the body as centre of experience. Without such a sensed centre, experience, especially interpersonal experience, is interpreted as disjointed, divided and lacking a common core. The Self-as-subject, without the anchor provided by embodiment, experiences a weakened ontological boundary between itself and the not-Self, is effectively 'swallowed up' by such experiences, generating a fear of loss of Self and a fear of closeness with others, what Laing terms ontological anxiety, but generating also the felt sense of division of Self.

To summarise, Laing affords considerable importance to embodiment, to the point where he correlates psychosis with a lack of felt sense of embodiment. We agree with Laing's assertions on how embodiment acts as centre of experience, provides an anchoring within lived experience, and may account for our perceived sense of identity and constancy, the lack of which may lead to the felt division of Self. Against Laing, we argue that the inner Self is a normal feature of Selfhood, however in the psychotic it takes an exaggerated compensatory role. In support of this contention, we evoke that despite weakened embodiment, the psychotic is evidently still an experiencing and relating agent, and still harbours a form of Selfhood, although the experience of Self and world may be highly altered.

2.5.2.1.4 On the interpersonal aspects of Self

Laing does not consider the problem of how we perceive the other as embodied consciousness, but states that we experience the other as an experiencing agent and that our experience of others relies on the others' actions and testimonies from which we infer how they experience themselves.

"I do not experience your experience. But I experience you as experiencing. I experience myself as experienced by you. And I experience you as experiencing yourself as experienced by me. And so on." (Laing, 1967b, p 12).

"... if we agree that you do not experience my experience, we agree that we rely on our communications to give us our clues as to who or what we are thinking, feeling, imagining, dreaming and so forth." (Laing, 1961, p 13).

This suggests that we perceive the alter ego through a reasoning by analogy, a problem we have previously considered in our treatment of James' and Sullivan's conceptualisations. Regardless of how the alter ego comes to be apprehended, Laing clearly affords to interpersonal experience an important role in the constitution of Self and in its healthy sustenance. This is evinced in his attribution of defective relationships as the major problem of psychosis, resulting in lack of embodiment and division of Self.

Laing argues that psychosis results from a particular type of relationship where one person effectively denies the experience of the other, or effectively forces upon the other their own interpretation of experience.

"Things are going to be difficult if you tell me that I'm experiencing something which I'm not experiencing." (Laing, 1961, p 13).

The induction of psychosis Laing thus conceptualises as a social phenomenon, with one faction of society dictating what the 'insane' person should be experiencing:

"I suggest therefore, that *sanity or psychosis is tested by the degree of conjunction or disjunction between two persons where the one is sane by common consent....* ...The 'psychotic' is the name we have for the other person in a disjunctive relationship of a particular kind." (italics by the author, Laing, 1960, p 37).

Another citation where he quotes Kaplan (Laing, 1967b) brings to light this aspect of the intersubjective relationship between psychiatrist and patient:

"With all virtue on his side, he [the psychiatrist or psychoanalyst] reaches through the subterfuges and distortions of the patient and exposes them to the light of reason and insight. In this encounter between the psychiatrist and patient, the efforts of the former are linked with science and medicine, with understanding and care. What the patient experiences is tied to illness and irreality, to perverseness and distortion. The process of psychotherapy consists in large part of the patient's abandoning his false subjective perspective for the therapist's objective ones. But the essence of this conception is that the psychiatrist understands what is going on, and the patient does not." (parentheses ours, Laing, 1967b, p 109).

Laing asserts that all persons experience alienation, with 'normal' persons being alienated in such a way that they "act more or less like everyone else" and are therefore "taken to be sane" (Laing, 1967b, p 27). And so for Laing, all persons undergo some form of alienation brought about in the context of the interpersonal relationships, with psychotics experiencing severe alienation as a more or less permanent state, to the point where their experiences differ substantially from those of 'normally' alienated people. In both cases, alienation is brought about in the context of an interpersonal relationship.

For Laing, our interpretation of lived experience will be affected not only by the view we have of ourselves, but also by the view we think the other has of us, both of these forming a complex network of metaperspectives. With this novel notion, Laing further articulates the fundamental role of the alter ego in the constitution of Self. Furthermore, he accounts for the complexity of our interpersonal communications and demonstrates, in terms of direct, meta, and metameta perspectives, how our lived experience and hence our sense of Self constituted from it, is either confirmed or disconfirmed. In his notion of what constitutes identity, he reiterates how the discourse of the significant other is constitutive of our own Self, in that "we learn to be who we are told we are." (Laing, 1961, p 78).

Finally in his description of the lived experience of the psychotic, he notes the fear of closeness to other persons as characterising the state of division of the Self-system, with the other representing "a threat to his identity and reality", resulting in a state of isolation, characterised by a sense of "emptiness and unreality" where one plays "an elaborate game of pretence and equivocation" (Laing, 1960, pp 121-122). The end result is that the inner Self ceases to relate "directly to real persons but relates itself to itself and to the objects which it itself posits." (Laing, 1960, p 91). We note again the interpersonal aspect to this part of his conceptualisation.

To summarise, Laing affords to interpersonal relationships a foundational role in the genesis and sustenance of psychosis. From this description, we can infer the equally foundational role to be attributed to relationships in the constitution of the normal Self, where healthy relationships lead to confirmation of lived experience between Self and the alter ego. We note here how it is via its detrimental effect on the interpretation of lived experience that the interpersonal relationship results in a fragile sense of embodiment, itself leading to division of the Self. Thus we note Laing's explicit evocation of the interrelationship between lived experience and interpersonal relationships, this is a novel contribution to the conceptualisation of Self. What remains nebulous is how an erroneous interpretation of lived experience results in the improper or incomplete sense of embodiment, itself leading to an improper or incomplete constitution of the Self.

2.5.2.1.5 Subject-Object distinction, Self /not-Self distinction, Self-identity, general distinctions within the Self

We have already noted, in our review of the nature of consciousness, how Laing uses the subject-object distinction as foundational principle in his study of the interpersonal relationship. However one distinction he fails to make, in our view, is that between Self taken as object or Self-as-perceived ('Me'), and Self taken as subject, or Self-as-perceiver ('I'). We note here a contradiction in Laing's texts,

where he sometimes refers to the Ego and the Self as the same, while in other texts asserting the Ego to be distinct from the Self, with a possibility of having the centre of experience transferred from the Ego to the (false) Self. We also note that for Laing, the Self is able to relate to itself, to take itself as object of consciousness. We note here the impossibility of such an activity, except as elaborated by James through his concept of the specious present in which a temporal shift permits the present Self-as-subject to take itself as object. In Laing's conceptualisation, we deem each of the Selves, that is the embodied Self, the inner Self, the Self-system, and the social Selves to be objects in the hands of a Self-as-subject, which Laing seems to designate as the Ego. While we reiterate the need for the Self-as-subject/Self-as-object distinction, we also note that it merits further consideration. We shall reconsider it in the forthcoming chapter.

In our discussion of the primacy afforded to lived experience, we note Laing's insistence on the lack of a clear ontological boundary in the lived experience of the psychotic, implying a difficulty to distinguish between Self and not-Self, between here and there, between inside and outside. Here, the key notion for Laing is that such an ontological boundary is intimately related to embodiment, that is a clear sense of being embodied, of living in an incarnate body, and of feeling the body as owned and distinct from the world and others within it. Implied in the notion of embodiment, but not addressed by Laing, is how we come to distinguish what within lived experience is the body from what is not. Also, there is a need to elaborate how embodiment is related to such an ontological boundary. We shall reconsider these notions in the next chapter.

For Laing, the interpersonal relationship has profound implications on the development of the Self and we note his elaborate articulation of how disjunctive relationships involve communication that serves to invalidate one's interpretations of lived experience. This, carried on to a sufficient extent, will provoke scission to the Self, to the point where a problematic division has been crystallised. Thus for Laing, the interpersonal relationship has the power to affect the sense of

embodiment, as well as the distinction between Self and not-Self. Part of this distinction includes that between Self and the alter ego. While Laing does not specifically address the difficulty of distinguishing Self from alter ego, we contend that part of the problem of division within the Self involves this specific distinction. This results in the inner Self's fear of closeness to others, of being swallowed by the other Selves, these Selves being altered inner representations of others. Included then in the more general Self/not-Self distinction, is the more specific Self/alter ego distinction. Laing contends that this second distinction is more affected by disjunctive relationships than the more fundamental Self/World distinction. While we agree with Laing, we contend that a weak sense of embodiment would affect the larger Self/not-Self distinction as well, however the relationship to other would be perceived as even more threatening than the relationship to object, given the continued conflict of experiencing generated by the relationship to the other. In support of this contention, we note Laing's assertion that the psychotic Self relates to others as depersonalised objects.

With respect to Self-identity, we note Laing's attribution of identity through the discourse of others, as he asserts that " ...we learn to be who we are told we are." (Laing, 1961, p 78). In this affirmation, Laing notes again the role of others in the constitution of identity, as well as the place of language in its articulation, with identity also being "...the story one tells one's self of who one is..." (Laing, 1961, p 77). This important insight points to the narrative constitution of Self, a notion much elaborated by Gergen and Kerby, who's conceptualisations shall be considered later in this chapter.

We note also Laing's evocation of Self-being, that definite felt sense of who we are, "more distinctive than the taste of ale or alum" (Laing, 1961, quoting Hopkins, p 20). Whether there is a distinction to be made between Self-identity and Self-being is left open to question. At first glance, Self-being appears similar to sense of identity, as we can glean from Laing's description an account of the experienced sense of who we are as an individual. We could argue that this equates to sense of identity, by

virtue of the fact that our discourse on our sense of identity would be the product of the experientially-felt sense of who we are. However, Laing has defined sense of identity solely in terms of the discourse we have appropriated from the important people around us, such people being instrumental in defining who we are from familial, socio-economic and cultural perspectives. Laing unfortunately does not emphatically state the relationship entertained between these two entities, nor does he specify their relationship with the inner-Self or the false-Self systems. While Laing does not denote the relationship to Self-identity, we contend that the story we tell of ourselves necessarily refers to this felt sense, but also refers to memories of life events, chronologically arranged according to some theme. And so while the Self-being is an experiential or phenomenal sense of who we are, Self-identity is a narrated conception of who we are, built from the actual phenomenal sense and the memories we have of it. We shall reconsider this notion in our treatment of Kerby.

The same difficulties are encountered with respect to meta-identity, an entity related to Self-identity and which results from our impressions of significant others' perception of ourselves, and to which we afford considerable importance.

While the preceding meta-identity colludes with our experienced sense of Self, what remains unclear is the relationship to be entertained with the sense of identity previously alluded to as well as the relationships to the inner and false-Self systems. How these entities are related would greatly benefit our understanding of the Self as conceptualised by Laing.

While Laing does not address the issue of Self-esteem specifically, the notion of an inner Self looking upon the false Self "with tenderness, amusement, or hatred as the case may be", suggests strongly of an evaluative component to the false Self by the inner Self (Laing, 1960, p 71). While Laing does not address how the inner Self comes to evaluate the false Self, such evaluation would probably be largely influenced by the significant interpersonal relationships, given their importance in Laing's view.

Finally, Laing makes several distinctions within the Self as object, these being the body-Self, the inner Self, the Self-system and the social Self. With the exception of the body-Self, each of these distinctions relates to the interpersonal aspects of lived experience, with their constitution taking place in the context of interpersonal relationships and being a direct consequence of their quality. While these distinctions may well describe the lived experience of the psychotic, we argue that for the normal person, many other distinctions may be made, as attempted by James.

2.5.2.2 The explanatory aspects of Laing's conceptualisation of Self

Laing explicitly acknowledges his existential-phenomenological approach in his description of the psychotic's lived experience, on which is based his conceptualisation of Self. In this respect, Laing's conceptualisation is mainly descriptive and gravitates largely towards the understanding pole of knowledge.

However Laing recognises the relationship between lived experience and its conceptualisation, a distinction paralleling our notion of understanding and explanation. In the following quote, Laing notes the need for articulation of experience in a way which respects its constitution, yet such articulation requires conceptualisation using various schemata and levels of abstraction:

"Our task is both to experience and to conceive the concrete, that is to say, reality in its fullness and wholeness... ...Theoretically we need a spiral of expanding and contracting schemata that enable us to move freely and without discontinuity from varying degrees of abstraction to greater or less degrees of concreteness. *Theory is the articulated vision of experience.*" (italics ours, Laing, 1967b, p 22-23).

Thus, while recognising the need to describe and understand experience via a method that is highly phenomenological in that it respects lived experience in its fullness and wholeness, there is also the need to explain it in terms of structures and

abstractions. In this respect, we contend to Laing's implicit recognition of the necessary relationship between understanding and explanation.

In the understanding aspect, Laing notes how the Self is constituted from its own lived experience in combination with its interpretation of the lived experience of the other person. In its interpretation of the behaviour of the other, the Self makes certain attributions, selects certain aspects of behaviour and ignores others. For Laing, our experience of others is a "unity of the given and the constructed" (Laing et al., 1966, p 10-11), a synthesis of the interpretations of our perceptions based on our expectations and our fantasies, and the distal stimulus that emanates from the other.

While for Laing these distinctions relate specifically to the comprehension of interpersonal relationships, his discourse can be extended to all facets of lived experience. Laing thus concedes to the interpreted meaning of experience, based on the understanding-explanation of lived experience. In this respect Laing, in addition to valuing the understanding aspects of knowledge via his phenomenological approach, affords a certain importance to the explanatory aspect of knowledge.

As we have seen, Laing holds to a phenomenological definition of the unconscious, that is to experience that "we do not communicate, to ourselves or to one another" (Laing, 1961, p 17). We see this as facets of experience which remain unarticulated, but which through a reconsideration of experience, may be apprehended. Laing considers two popular notions of the unconscious, the first referring to experience of which we are unaware, the second referring to processes, structures and entities not part of experience but that are used to account for it. The second definition contends that the unconscious is part of the explanatory aspects of knowledge and is in this sense, hermeneutic and explanatory in that he refers to the need for articulation of structures and processes that account for lived experience, but that go beyond it.

Within his own conceptualisation however, the extent to which he explicitly calls upon explanation is rather limited.

One explanatory aspect of Laing's conceptualisation refers to the defence mechanisms such as projection, repression, denial and introjection, which he conceives as methods by which persons do things unto themselves and others that they are either not aware of, or that they feel compelled to do. Laing notes however, that while they have cut themselves from portions of lived experience, once persons come to realise their active part in its repression they are able to apprehend and accept the once-repressed experience as their own.

In this explanatory aspect of his conceptualisation, Laing fails to account for how the person succeeds at ignoring an aspect of lived experience that concerns him but that he finds objectionable in some respect. How the person comes to select the other aspects of lived experience, all the while not admitting their objectionable nature, is not addressed by Laing. In this respect, his conceptualisation is in need of further clarification.

Laing's conceptualisation is problematic in another respect, and this concerns his definitions of the inner Self, the ego, the ego systems, the Self-system, the body-Self, the Self-being and identity. Many of his definitions lack clarity which render the understanding of his conceptualisation difficult, especially from the point of view of the relationships entertained between such entities. This can be said for the relationship between the ego and the Self, between the inner Self and the various false Selves comprising the Self-system. As was often noted during our explication of his conceptualisation, many concepts would profit from being further explicated by Laing, further delineating their structure, processes and interrelationships.

Finally, we note that Laing defines identity as the story one tells of who one is. We note here a narrative component to the constitution of Self, a notion not elaborated by previous authors. In this respect, Laing's conceptualisation is also hermeneutic, or interpretative, with the selection of events used to comprise the story being centred on a selected theme, and the interpretation being a narration in accordance

with the principles articulated by Ricoeur in his account of mimetic activity. To the extent that the articulation of the story is a construction, with selection and partial creation of events in their remembrance, we contend that this involves explanation, that is the articulation of experience in terms of themes, events, and motivations, these being abstractions from lived experience, such abstraction we be argued to be integrated within, and a necessary part of, interpretative activity.

Most importantly, by his articulation of disjunctive relationships as source of the division of Self, Laing is implicitly citing such relationships as the indirect cause of psychosis. While he notes the presence of other symptoms, such as chemical imbalances within the brain, he discounts their pertinence and steadfastly maintains that the disjunctive relationship, with its intricate network of metaperspectives, and its aberrant effect on the interpretation of lived experience, as leading to the lack of embodiment and to the eventual detrimental division of Self. Thus while highly phenomenological, Laing's conceptualisation implicitly incorporates causality, and in this respect becomes explanatory, however it remains tightly woven to lived experience.

To summarise, Laing's conceptualisation, while gravitating largely towards the understanding pole, does incorporate some explanatory aspects. These are the notion of the defence mechanisms and the narrative aspects of Self-identity. In his conception of how we interrelate with others, with his notions of direct, meta and metameta perspectives, Laing highlights how biases of selection affect and alter our experience of ourselves and of others. Finally, we note his implicit attribution of causality within his conceptualisation. In many of these explanatory aspects however, Laing's conceptualisation lacks coherence and would profit from better definitions and more elaboration.

2.5.3 Summary

Laing is to be credited with a brilliant, lucid and articulate portrayal of the lived experience of the psychotic, from which he elaborates a conceptualisation of the psychotic Self. Implied in his description of the psychotic Self are many attributes of the normal Self, from which the former he deems to differ only in the degree of embodiment, alienation and division, not in its fundamental constitution. We note here that the breadth of lived experience considered by Laing relates to the lived experience of the psychotic. While Laing deems such lived experience not to be fundamentally different from that of normals, we can question this assertion, and note that several aspects to the Self-as-object, notably aspects of the social Self underscored by James, are largely not considered in Laing's conceptualisation.

Most importantly, Laing has highlighted in great detail the interrelational aspects of lived experience, and its import on the constitution of the Self. For Laing, interpersonal relationships are fundamental to the genesis and sustenance of the Self, and which he attributes as ultimate cause of psychosis. Herein lies Laing's most important contribution, and while we disagree with some aspects of his conceptualisation, we largely are in agreement with the importance of the interpersonal relationship to the constitution of Self.

Finally, we note Laing's conceptualisation to be highly descriptive and centred almost exclusively on the understanding pole of knowledge. While highly detailed and lucid, some of the aspects evoked are in need of revision, as pointed out above. On the explanatory side, we note his explicit evocation of interpretation as necessary activity of the Self, as well as its import in conceptualisation of the Self. We interpret his attribution of disjunctive relationships as underlying source of psychosis to infer a causal relationship, to the exclusion of other factors often evoked.

2.6 The conceptualisation of Self according to Kenneth J. Gergen

"Social saturation furnishes us with a multiplicity of incoherent and unrelated languages of the self. For everything we 'know to be true' about ourselves, other voices within respond with doubt and even derision. This fragmentation of self-conceptions corresponds to a multiplicity of incoherent and disconnected relationships. These relationships pull us in myriad directions, inviting us to play such a variety of roles that the very concept of an 'authentic self' with knowable characteristics recedes from view. The fully saturated self becomes no self at all."

(Gergen, 1991).

2.6.1 The Self according to Gergen

Gergen (1994), believes that the concept of an individual Self, localised within the organism, is unfounded. In his view, western tradition's deep commitment to this concept has curtailed any progress with respect to an effective and fruitful conceptualisation of Self. This unexamined premise has had tremendous impact on human affairs. Legal proceedings, civil rights legislation, education, mental health, politics, continue to be heavily influenced by the assumption of the Self as a separate moral entity responsible for its own actions.

The final consequence of postulating an individualistic, self-centred, and self-contained individual, reasons Gergen, is that of achieving a society full of individual Selves whose only concern is with their own thoughts, feelings, and actions, to the detriment of those of other selves. In this case, the basic institutions that humankind has harboured over the millennia are threatened with extinction: marriage, community, concern for the common good, ideological commitments. In his own words:

"At the outset, the belief in the self-contained individual - to which a commitment to individual knowing minds makes a substantial contribution - lends itself to giving the self priority in daily affairs. This emphasis legitimates a preeminate concern with one's own

private condition - beginning with one's state of knowledge and proceeding through the related issues of one's own goals, needs, pleasures, and rights. Buttressed by Darwin's theory of species survival, what we might ask of any project is how the self is affected: 'How do I gain or lose?' Other individuals would be considered for sure, but only insofar as their actions affect our own well-being." (Gergen, 1994, p 212).

According to Gergen (1991), the romantic era, which started in the second half of the 18th century, and reached its zenith in the nineteenth, is the root of much of our contemporary vocabulary of the individual person, more particularly the vocabulary of purpose, depth, and heroism, in an era where love, passion and genius were placed in the forefront of human endeavours. Authors such as Goethe, Barnes, Nietzsche and Keats are typical of this era. Paintings, such as those by Turner, Friedrich and Munch, Gergen notes, emphasised the unseen, the reflected upon, the mystical, by implying beings or objects in the distance or in the mists, or by implying thoughts contemplated upon, thus pointing to realities outside of what had been inserted directly in the painting. With Beethoven, Schubert and Wagner, music became the expression of deep emotion rather than the "rational heuristics" underlying the previous works of Mozart and Bach (Gergen, 1991, p 25). Freud's theory, with its insistence on unseen, deep, dark, unconscious forces, largely out of one's control, coupled with biological and mechanical explanations of such unconscious functioning, is seen as a marriage between eighteenth century romanticism and the more modernist, rational values of the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries.

For Gergen, the romantic view of the Self is one of an unseen, inaccessible, mysterious yet powerful entity, largely responsible for our deepest desires, emotions, strength of character, and ultimately our actions. It is equated with other enduring entities such as the soul, and is considered the source of genius, passion, love and morality. In this sense, the Self is considered a unitary, enduring and constant entity credited with an innate sense of the good, of the moral and the immortal.

The modernist era, which Gergen (1991) estimates began at the end of the nineteenth century, emphasised rationality, method, rigorous observation, and productivity. Impressive advancements in medicine, in biology, in physics, and in machine technology paved the way for the espousal of "the grand narrative of progress" which reflected the overwhelming optimism regarding the upcoming and ongoing progress which humankind repeatedly demonstrated (Gergen, 1991, p 30). Towards the end of the nineteenth century, the utmost confidence was now attributed to the scientific method, which could be applied to any problem, including the social, political and economic, leading to an eventual utopia.

The social sciences followed this upsurge of the hard sciences, espousing the latter's methods, with the hope that eventually the mathematics of human behaviour could be developed to the same extent as the mathematics of physics. In this climate, philosophers turned their attention to the problem of objective knowledge, with its concomitant implication of a single, knowable, objective truth. We witness here the empiricist turn within psychology, sociology, economics and the administrative sciences, whose methods became those of the hard sciences (Gergen, 1991).

In Gergen's (1991) opinion, one of the pervading metaphors to characterise the modern era was that of the machine. Machines not only generated fortunes for their owners and operators, they provided employment and increased the quality of life of all individuals. They were thus given a key role in the utopic vision of the future depicted by the grand narrative. In modern dance and art people were sometimes recast as machines; paintings, such as Picasso's, often depicted people as robots. Conceptualisations of the mind took on a similar bent. Freud's tripartite mechanistic view of the id, ego and superego, Jung's use of thermodynamic principles, Skinner's behavioural principles, attest to this view.

With respect to the study of the Self, the modern era's methods promised to unlock the secrets of human functioning, beginning with the systematic study of the mechanisms of lower organisms, which would pave the way to the higher and more

complex mechanisms responsible for human functioning. Gergen (1991) thus accounts for the popularity of the behavioural psychologists such as Skinner, Hull and Tolman, who experimented heavily with laboratory animals, hoping to find basic laws that could eventually be used to form those behavioural principles that would apply to humans.

While the machine metaphor was not as prevalent in the therapeutic literature, many authors such as Rogers and Erikson (Gergen, 1991), espoused the idea of the Self being endowed with a solid, unitary essence, to the point where anyone not achieving this essence was considered psychologically ill. And so for Erikson and Rogers respectively, "sense of identity" and "becoming the self one fully is" became the goals of psychotherapy (Gergen, 1991, p 41).

Another conception that took force within the modern era was that of the malleability of the Self. It thus became possible for the Self to be shaped by outside influences. In this respect, Freud found that resolving the oedipal complex was the crucial determinant, while the behaviourists believed that early childhood conditioning was paramount. For humanists such as Rogers, Fromm and Horney, environmental conditions had the potential to corrupt the natural goodness resident within the Self. The coveted result of an ideal upbringing became the imagined solid, self-directing, trustworthy and consistent individual, fully autonomous, genuine and principled (Gergen, 1991). Also, personality theories of all types took their genesis from the belief that whatever its constituents and its aetiology, once crystallised, personality, like the Self, was an indubitable given. The same argument was applied to intelligence, and provided conceptual justification for the tremendous upsurge in intelligence testing and measurement.

The modernist era characterised itself as a period where the belief was that method would allow science to capture underlying realities, to render them explicit, in an irrefutable manner. While the Self continued, as through the romantic period, to be viewed as an enduring and unitary entity, it now became potentially accessible and

definable through the disciplined usage of rigorous scientific methodologies. With the rigorous scientific method conceived as an objective tool, untainted by any cultural, linguistic or ideological biases, there was no question that reality as perceived through the lens of science was reality as given. Other views, not supported by the same methodologies, did not receive the same credibility.

In this last century, humanity has undergone no less than a technological revolution, one that has taken place in two steps (Gergen, 1991). The first, the *low-tech revolution*, took place at the beginning of this century with the advent of trains, automobiles, postal services, telephone, radio, cinema and printed books. The effects have been to drastically reduce the time and cost required to communicate with distant persons, to exponentially increase the number of people we are in daily contact with, as well as our exposure to other cultures, with their customs and philosophies. The second, the *high-tech revolution*, represented by television, VCR, aviation, Fax, computers and now the Internet, has made it possible to extend this 'communication explosion' world-wide.

Such tremendous growth of communication interchanges characterise the *postmodern era* (Gergen, 1991). In this new social matrix, a new intellectual climate has developed, largely characterised by relativistic thinking, where knowledge and values have lost their absolutist attributes, and are largely a function of interpretation from a particular perspective, that in itself has no precedence or priority over any other perspective. Such relativity of perspectives leads to a state where the truth value of knowledge and values is largely questioned, and where science must be content with conceptualisations that are largely a function of the context, e.g., not only of the subject thought about, but also of that of the thinker. This has led to the abandonment and disbelief in the legitimating discourse that was used to substantiate the modernist methods of scientific enquiry, largely based on the notion that objectivity and universality were attainable by the use of the appropriate methodologies.

The postmodern theme that has supplanted the modern era's search for essences is that of relativistic eclecticism, characterised by a blurring of traditional boundaries. This is highly evident in the arts where we see a mixing of various genres, and an insistence upon the artist himself defining what art is, often by rejecting any formal definitions of what art may be. For example, in architecture, there is no basic design to be revealed, rather, the architect attempts to reveal the actual cultural context, often combining heterogeneous or clashing styles. In literature, the tendency has been to blur the traditional categories of fiction and reality. Here, we witness the emergence of a new genre, that of surrealism and of "faction", a mixture of fiction and fact. Gergen sums up this 'fuzziness' in the following:

"We seem to be machinelike, but with a spiritual side; biologically determined, but in possession of conscious control; fundamentally motivated toward self-gain, but even more fundamentally motivated by high ideals: sheeplike creatures who are slavishly dependent on the mass media, but drawn deeply toward goals of uniqueness and independence. Where are we to draw the lines that define the human self? Portrayals of the self multiply, the lines grow increasingly complex, and with this mounting complexity, the boundaries grow fuzzy." (Gergen, 1991, p 119).

This tremendous intensification and multiplication of communications has engendered what Gergen (1991) terms the process of *social saturation*. In his opinion, the number, variety, intensity, frequency of contact, and duration of relationships are steadily increasing. In support of this position, he compares the typical lifestyle of persons living a century ago, to that of those living today. A century ago, a person knew people in his own town and neighbourhood. If a friend moved to another community, that usually meant the severance of the relationship. Relationships were usually long-lasting and consistent. Interactions, for the most part, were held face-to-face.

In today's fast-paced world, the number of relationships has multiplied. Gergen (1991) evokes two phenomena, that of *perseverance of the past*, meaning that long-

distance relationships, rather than being severed, can now be maintained easily via telephone, e-mail and the occasional visit; and of *acceleration of the future* (Gergen 1991), meaning that the pace of such relationships is hurried, and that their unfolding, which in the past could take years, now takes place in days or weeks, again due to the proliferation of interpersonal communications. Such relationships, if continued, may be transformed in the process. In this respect, Gergen notes the emergence of two new forms of relationship: the first, *the friendly-lover*, (Gergen, 1991) is one where it becomes popular and almost natural for people to have different and multiple sexual partners corresponding to their various activities and interests. This has replaced the traditional once-in-a-lifetime passionate love of the romantic era. The second is that of the *microwave relationship* (Gergen, 1991, p 65) where the family, rather than being the source of community and crucial centre of activity, has become a "pit-stop" where family members can get a "quick-fill" of intense but short-lived nurturing on their way to the next activity. Both forms of relationship are characterised by short but frequent and highly intense periods of contact.

Finally, the exponential increase in relationships has had a *multiphrenic effect* upon the constitution of the Self. Rather than being unitary and whole, the Self now becomes populated by a multitude of inner voices, or *social ghosts* (Gergen, 1991), most of which represent significant people in one's life, but with others representing people with whom no face-to-face contact has ever taken place, such as rock stars, characters in a film, and politicians. Such inner voices may be proponents of opposing values and perspectives, and so the decision-making becomes a process of listening to and considering an array of multiple and diverse opinions, values and objections. No matter the choice, it will never be possible to please all of the ghosts, leading to what Gergen (1991) contends is a pervasive feeling of inadequacy.

In its most extreme manifestation, the end result of social saturation is a complete dissolution of a central Self, with the person being defined by whatever role is

demanded by the present relationship, and with "the fully saturated self becom[ing] no self at all." (parentheses ours, Gergen, 1991, p 7).

Thus the relativism of perspectives, while finding its genesis in the intellectual world, has found its parallel expression in the world of art, but more importantly, in the social world and in the constitution of our own Selves. Within the postmodern paradigm, the search for essences can only be legitimised by recourse to certain perspectives, themselves validated by recourse to other perspectives. If this is the case, reality is no longer a given, but a product of construction, leading us to consider the constructed nature of our perspectives and arguments. From being fixed upon objects of attention, our gaze now turns to the act of construction of these perspectives, we thus find ourselves absorbed in acts of *Self-reflexivity* (Gergen, 1991). The perspectivism that characterised our gaze upon 'outside' objects is then applied to the constructed nature of our own Selves. From these observations we are forced to assert the ephemeral quality of the Self, that the Self is a constructed chameleon catering to the immediate demands of the social situation. It then becomes difficult to justify a commitment to an individual Self.

"Most important here, however, is the effect of reflexivity on the traditional commitment to individual selves. If one lives within the confines of a single reality - coherent through time and space - the objectivity of self seems unassailable. Yet when lived reality is continuously punctuated by consciousness of its limitations and artifice, commitment becomes arduous... ...As one moves from one perspective to another, the objectivity of self recedes from view. And in the end one is left with perspectivity - itself a product not of the individual but of the surrounding communities in which one is embedded." (Gergen, 1991, p 138).

Coupled with this unfolding *consciousness of construction* (Gergen, 1991), is an expanding awareness of the ways "in which personal identity can be created and re-created in relationships" (Gergen, 1991, p 146). Gergen sees such expansion taking place in three relatively distinct steps. In the first of these steps, that of *strategic manipulation*, the individual finds himself increasingly immersed in role-playing

to achieve social ends. At first, the individual finds such role-playing distressing and inauthentic, but surpasses this distress and attains the *pastiche personality* where the individual accepts the multiple role demands and plays them to the full, without remorse or questioning. The final step is that of the *relational Self*, which occurs when the individual has laid the sense of an inner Self to rest, the partial result of constructing and reconstructing the Self in multiple contexts and the sense of individual autonomy giving way to a reality of "immersed interdependence" (Gergen, 1991, p 147). At this stage, Self-constructions cease to be related to the object of the "real" Self, rather there is the growing realisation of their correlation with the present social matrix, of their dependency upon the social processes accompanying our interpersonal relationships. As such, the Self moves from being localised within the person to being localised within the nexus of the relational matrix.

This move, from Self as contained within the individual, to Self as contained within the relationship, has many important implications. The first is that Self-identity becomes a function of the roles permitted within the relationships the individual is engaged in. As such, Self-identity can no longer be fixed, as it is called to transformation with each new relationship. Second, the sense of playing a role becomes magnified to the point where there is the distinct realisation of being the mere participant within a cultural-linguistic game. One could argue that in such a context, discourse loses all its seriousness, however Gergen contends that, similarly to a game of soccer that provides us with interactions and intense emotions that are no less real because they occur within the context of a game, our relationships provide us with co-created environments in which we play out the roles we have accepted and where the benefits of playing are no less real. Moreover, the Self is defined by the game being played, as there is no being without the socio-cultural context:

"To pray, to feel remorse, to express gratitude, to conduct business, to make a scientific discovery are all forms of cultural ritual - constructed forms of activity particular to cultures in given times and places. And one may indulge in such activities fully, following

their rules and thus relating to those making up such cultures. Without one's culture to define the games and places possible within it, there is simply no being to be. We owe our sense of existence, then, not to internal sources - passion, reason, observation and the like - but to our participation in the communal forms." (Gergen, 1991, p 197).

Finally, the Self is also a narrated entity which has its roots firmly embedded in language, which in turn, finds its expression within the social-cultural matrix of interdependent relationships. Gergen envisions the narrative discourse as emanating from the relational matrix in which the person is immersed.

"Here I want to propose a relational view of self-conception, one that views self-conception not as an individual's personal and private cognitive structure but as *discourse* about the self - the performance of languages available in the public sphere. I replace the traditional concern with conceptual categories (self-concepts, schemas, self-esteem), with the self as a narration rendered intelligible within ongoing relationships." (Italics by the author, Gergen, 1994, p 185).

Gergen notes that narratives possess several attributes. In a first instance, all narratives possess similarities of structure (Gergen, 1994), with several demarcation signs, delimiting their beginning, middle and end. Secondly, all have a *valued end-point*, or goal. This of course implies the selection of events that lead up to this end-point. In this case, the relation of such events to the endpoint is crucial, even though such relation may greatly vary in relevance and weight. The order of these events is also considered, this need not be chronological as the end-point may often be better served by another order in the telling. Characters are usually endowed with a *stable identity* throughout the duration of the narrative, otherwise, it will necessarily involve the telling of how character change has taken place. Another aspect, that of *causal linkages* between events may be of different types, depending upon the perspective taken by the narrator. Regardless of which type of causal linkages is preferred, it remains that the narrative usually attempts to provide an explanation of its events.

Gergen (1994) proposes that narrative deployment usually takes one of several predictable forms, with the first of these being the *stability narrative*, where the story recounts events in a manner such that the trajectory remains essentially unchanged over the course of the narrative. In contrast, the *regressive* and *progressive* narratives respectively describe how the trajectory has worsened or improved over time. Narratives are *dramatic* when there is a rapid change or reversal of events.

Gergen also notes the existence of *macronarratives* and *micronarratives*, the latter referring to narratives that span over shorter periods of time (e.g., last night's party) and which are usually nested within the macronarrative (e.g., my adolescence). The question of coherence between various narratives, is a function of the social advantages related to such manifestations, as culture seems to prize consistency between narratives. To the forefront comes the question of multiplicity of narratives and its implication for the Self. Gergen (1994) relates narrative multiplicity to our multiple social roles played out in a variety of contexts. He also notes how the relationship fashions discourse and in this sense, narratives are not pre-thought productions of an independent mind, but are shaped by and through the present interaction.

"In this sense, narratives are conversational resources, constructions open to continuous alteration as interaction progresses. Persons in this case do not consult an internal script, cognitive structure, or apperceptive mass for information or guidance; they do not author their own lives. Rather the Self-narrative is a linguistic implement embedded within conventional sequences of action and employed in relationships in such a way as to sustain, enhance, or impede various forms of action." (Gergen, 1994, p 188).

Gergen also points out the interrelational aspects of every narration: we tell our stories to an audience which must accept a complementary role of engaging with the author in and through the narration. Thus the Self is the product of narrations and actions within a relational matrix. If others refuse their role, or if others withdraw from an established one, Self-identity will be correspondingly affected.

"...that narratives of the self are not fundamentally possessions of the individual but possessions of relationships - products of social interchange. In effect, to be a self with a past and potential future is not to be an independent agent, unique and autonomous, but to be immersed in interdependency." (Gergen, 1994, p 186).

Gergen (1994) has also considered the problem of how we come to achieve meaning. In his opinion, all schools of thought have considered the meaning-generating process to be residing somewhere within individual psyches, with meaning being defined chiefly in terms of individual signification, an internal symbolisation of the external world. Gergen contests this position, and offers a solution by arguing for a view of meaning as being *generated within the relational matrix*, fortifying his arguments by referrals to Piaget, Dilthey, Hirsch, Heidegger and Gadamer (Gergen, 1994).

With respect to deconstructionist theory, Gergen (1994) argues that authors such as Derrida have attempted to demonstrate "the futility of the search for the signified - or of meaning behind or within text" (Gergen, 1994, p 261). The results of such endeavours have pointed to the incontrovertible conclusion that each signifier is in itself empty of sense, for its meaning relies upon other signifiers whose meaning relies on others, and so on, ad infinitum. We are left with an endless search, where meaning is forever displaced, and where no signifier can be related to anything outside of text. Ultimately, meaning cannot be fixed in any rigorous manner.

To summarise, there is, in Gergen's view, an insurmountable problem with hermeneutic and deconstructionist theories which presume the traditional view of the individual mind as the harbourer of meaning, such meaning being subsequently expressed in words and actions, and communicated to other individual minds. Gergen thus proposes that the relational paradigm better explains the genesis of meaning. He begins by arguing that words and texts have no meaning outside the realm of human interactions.

Gergen contends that the deconstructionist vision of language suggests a solution to the problem of meaning, in that meaning is to be gleaned not by the reference to the signified but by reference to the relationship between the signified and the signifier. It is the body of relationships that are generative of meaning and not simply the signified referent.

"Yet although entities dissolve, there is a constant within the analysis on the level of relationship. No signifier itself is informative, but the process of deferral generates meaning. When the signifier is encountered in the reflected light of other signifiers - a reflection of which it is indeed a constituent element - we gain momentary clarity. The 'interstice' effectively gives shape to its boundaries, and in a symbiotic transfer, meaning is born." (Gergen, 1994, p 262).

Gergen also believes that this definition of meaning can be equally applied outside the realm of texts, to actions that take place in material contexts.

"The play of signifiers is essentially a play within language, and this play is embedded within patterns of human action in what we call material contexts. We may then abandon the text in its traditional sense and consider the manner in which a process of relatedness is continuously at work in generating a world of palpable particulars." (Gergen, 1994, p 262).

In the same way that meaning may be found in the relationship between signifier and signified, it may also be found in the relationship between our actions and those of others. Gergen (1994) contends that language, narrative, meaning, understanding and ultimately Selfhood, are the result of beings in relationship.

Gergen labels himself a postmodernist in that he endorses the paradigms espoused by this zeitgeist which challenges those of the previous modern era. According to Kvale (1990), Gergen (1990) and Young (1990), psychology as we know it is largely a product of the modern era, that is to say a product of the scientific thinking that

emanated from the 18th, 19th and early 20th centuries, largely characterised by an emphasis on rational thinking, on locating foundational forms, on the search and application of universal principles, on the attribution of linear causality to events, and on quantification in an insistent search for absolute knowledge and values where "reality" was considered a hidden but accessible given and the researcher's task was to reveal that reality, as if he were holding an objective mirror.

In the early to mid-20th century a transition took place, leading us to the postmodern era, largely characterised by relativistic thinking. Kvale (1990) points to psychology's failure to adapt to this new philosophical climate. Gergen (1990) holds a similar view of mainstream psychology's failure to disassociate itself from the modernist assumptions and methods.

Thus postmodernism raises questions regarding the modernist enterprise of psychology and most importantly it opens new avenues for study such as naturalistic, grounded theory, phenomenological, hermeneutic, ethnological, etc. These methodologies are not haphazard or limited to psychology, but are the reflection of a "larger and more profound range of intellectual and cultural transformations" (Gergen, 1990, p 24), characterising the postmodern era.

Radical postmodernism has largely attacked modernist assumptions by means of deconstructionism. This has been the main activity of postmodernist thinkers. Grounded in language philosophy, it consists of finding contradictions in concepts and pointing out inconsistencies. Authors such as Foucault, Derrida and Lyotard (Gergen, 1990), by means of deconstructionism, have argued that the human subject does not exist as a psychological entity per se and that the Self has been swallowed up by the anonymous forces of power (Foucault), writing (Derrida) and narrative (Lyotard) respectively.

To summarise, Gergen favours a *postmodern relational view of the Self*, one where mutual relationships are foundational to the establishment of meaning, language,

and to the very constitution of the Self. Since the nature and number of relationships have changed dramatically over the course of the last three centuries, as portrayed through the discourse on the evolution from the romantic to the modern to the postmodern eras, so has the Self changed in corroborative fashion. From a Self that was unitary, stable and whole, we have moved to a Self that is now multiple, changing and fragmented. His analysis leads him to conclude that there is no central, core identity, or integrally coherent view of the Self against which one can gauge whether actions are authentic or artificial. Neither is there but one core, as his espousal of the narrative view leads him to conclude that with a plethora of stories to tell, the Self is clearly more than one, a product of the many interweaving narratives in our social discourse. Such narratives however do not occur in some linguistic space abstracted for the purposes of explanation. Such a space is the subset of a more fundamental one, that of the relational matrix made up of our myriad social relations, such relations being, Gergen reasons, not only the source of genesis for the Self, but its sole location.

With this radical move from conceptualising the Self within individual beings to situating it within relationships, Gergen purports to solve many of the problems left unsolved by philosophers of mind, most notably the problem of how meaning is derived and the problem of how meaning can be transmitted from one individual mind to another. His solution is to dissolve the concept of individual Selves altogether, in favour of the concept of Selves located within relationships. With this same concept he outlines the relational creation of meaning, which effectively becomes a co-creation, requiring a symphony of players involved in a corroborative activity of mutual definition.

2.6.2 Critique of Gergen's conceptualisation of Self

By relocating the Self from the individual to the relationship, Gergen takes a bold step with profound ramifications. While his insistence on the importance of

relationship in the creation and maintenance of the Self is not new, with existential-phenomenologists, notably Heidegger and Merleau-Ponty, having made significant contributions in this area, and with Sullivan's reformulation of psycho-analysis in interrelational terms, Gergen distinguishes himself by arguing for the wholesale abolishment of the individual Self. In his view, the assumption of an individual Self leads, in a first instance, to the certain eventual demise of the human condition as the result of immanent and widespread narcissism, and in the second instance, to incontrovertible difficulties with respect to the genesis of meaning and its communication between persons. Instead, he offers a relational view of the Self which in his opinion, provides a more convivial outcome for the first problem and conveniently dissolves the second. He also distinguishes himself from most of his predecessors with the notion that, rather than being fixed, the Self has undergone extensive transformation through the process of social saturation. We note that Van den Berg (1974) also believes that the Self has undergone transformation since the romantic era, and attributes this transformation to changes in the fabric of society, however he does not dissolve the concept of an individual Self. Finally, Gergen articulates a substantial role for narrative in the constitution of the Self.

2.6.2.1 The understanding aspects of the Gergen's conceptualisation

2.6.2.1.1 On the nature of consciousness and its attributes

Gergen does not deal with the issue of consciousness and its attributes. Nor does Gergen attribute to any part of the Self a locus of consciousness. From an existential-phenomenological point of view, we note that the unity of consciousness, with thoughts being perceived as wholes, and with consciousness being the centre of all perceptions, serves as phenomenological basis for a unitary Self, a concept Gergen dissolves.

2.6.2.1.2 On the primacy of lived experience

Gergen gives no explicit consideration to the primacy of lived experience. In this respect, his conceptualisation of the Self proceeds more from reflection on the developments of societal changes and of their possible effect on the constitution of Self than from a rigorous consideration of lived experience in postmodern society.

Gergen contends that it is from *reflection upon its perspectivity* that the individual Self is put into doubt, with the individual resigning himself to the fact that his Self is multiple and relational in nature.

We do not doubt that the technological innovations evoked by Gergen exert their impact upon the constitution of the Self, however the essence of such impact needs to be considered from a systematic study of postmodern lived experience. We note that while Gergen highlights the Self's social and narrative aspects he gives no consideration to aspects related to the body and its expressions (needs, wants, movements, etc.). These aspects of lived experience, we contend, have not disappeared from lived experience in postmodern society.

We note Gergen's description of two new phenomena: the perseverance of the past and acceleration of the future, and his elaboration of new types of relationship: the friendly lover and the microwave relationship. Implied in Gergen's description of postmodern living, is that they characterise all of lived experience. We contend that postmodern life would be imbued with many themes and essences, not only the ones espoused by Gergen. Relationships to nuclear and extended family, to career, to work mates, to neighbours, to culture, to country and to property, are just some of the themes that could be evoked. A phenomenological approach would attempt to describe these phenomena and extract the meaning structures resident within such lived experience. Given the accelerated pace and sporadic nature of postmodern relationships, one may expect to find meaning structures that differ in some respects from those found in more stable and long-term relationships, although this would

have to be confirmed. In this vein, we note that while the number of relationships may well be on the increase, their level of satisfaction might not. We note that Laing (1967b) upholds that levels of alienation are increasing in our society. If this affirmation is true, then Gergen's contention of an exponential increase in the number of relationships doesn't necessarily translate into a better or healthier constitution of Self. While we note in this respect Gergen's silence on the issue of psychological health, implicit to his elaboration of the relational Self is the assumption that the individual that has attained this stage of Self-development is better adapted than the one who hasn't.

However, if we grant that Gergen may be describing these phenomena accurately, we note that such styles of living do not yet characterise the majority of individuals, but apply mostly to the intellectual and business elite of north-American and west-European cultures. While this lifestyle may well be on the increase, it still represents a minority, given that two thirds of the global population still lives in relative poverty.

Gergen's thesis is that the Self has undergone changes in its constitution due to changes in the fabric of society. Van den Berg (1974) also supports this thesis. If indeed society has undergone the changes described by these authors, then the facets of lived experience affected by such changes will in turn affect the constitution of the Self, notably, in its social or interpersonal dimensions. Here again, we would contend that a thorough study of lived experience would serve well to highlight how the Self has changed.

In summary, we note that while Gergen does not give explicit consideration to lived experience, his is an insightful reflection on trends affecting some segments of society with their probable effects on the Self. We also note that his reflections consider only the social aspects of the Self. Gergen does not concern himself with embodiment nor with other attributes of the Self such as intellectual abilities and character. These aspects also form part of lived experience.

2.6.2.1.3 On embodiment

As mentioned above, Gergen effectively gives no consideration to the sense of embodiment which characterises all of lived experience. Regardless of the number of relationships we may entertain and of their impact, regardless as well of the technological and societal changes which may have occurred, we always find ourselves as embodied subjects in relationship with a world which includes other embodied subjects.

We recall that for Gergen, the Self finds itself constituted by virtue of narrative emerging from the relational matrix. However, such a relational matrix does not occur in a vacuum, it requires two or more embodied subjects, such co-presence defines in part the existence of the relationship. Therefore, for the development of any form of interpersonal dimension to Self to occur, an embodied dimension to Self must already be constituted, at least in part.

To summarise, we note Gergen's striking neglect of the role of body and of the notion of an embodied subject, a notion we find foundational.

2.6.2.1.4 On the interpersonal aspects of Self

Gergen's conceptualisation of the Self is almost exclusively interpersonal, as he situates the Self within the interrelational matrix, which, with the support of narrative, defines it. Gergen thus affords a foundational role to interpersonal relationships, a notion in accord with our existential-phenomenological approach.

Gergen does not address the perception of the other as alter ego, but presupposes that such perception takes place. The perception of other implies the more general ability to make the distinction between Self and not-Self. While Gergen defines the Self

solely in terms of the relational matrix, he overlooks that the Self/not-Self distinction is necessary for relating to take place. Such a distinction is consonant with our notion of an intentional-attentional embodied subject as primordial Self.

Curiously enough, Gergen does not describe one of the most foundational interpersonal relationships, that of the mother-child relationship, nor those of the primary familial constellations. It seems that for Gergen, the constitution of the saturated Self takes place in adulthood, an age where travel and communication via technology have more notable effects. While Gergen speaks of the progressive saturation of the Self, it is unclear if this process is one which has occurred in society at large or if each person has gone through the process of social saturation, meaning that one progresses from being an individual Self to that of becoming a relational one. The first alternative, that of saturation in society at large, implies that there is no individual Self, this entity being an illusory product of our romantic thinking. In this sense then, the Self has always been relational, as espoused by Gergen, however the fabric of society was such that the multiplicity of cultures and perspectives was not as diverse as it is today. Thus in postmodern society, the Self finds itself in a saturating environment from the moment of birth, and there is no progressive saturation. Our reading of Gergen suggests the second alternative, that the Self progresses from being individual to being relational, however this implies the existence of the individual Self and the problem of its constitution, prior to its saturation. This, Gergen does not address. We note that Gergen repeatedly denies the existence of the individual Self, labelling it as myth. We find this problematic, for his conception of the progression from an individual Self to the relational Self implies the existence of the entity he denies. In both cases, Gergen's conceptualisation is problematic.

Besides existential phenomenologists and Sullivan, no other theorist on the Self has recognised the profoundly interrelational aspect to the constitution of the Self. For this, Gergen is to be commended. Moreover, Gergen recognises the tremendous impact of our postmodern world on our perception of Self – in this respect, he is a

leading figure within psychology. However, by defining the Self purely in interrelational and narrative terms, Gergen effectively ignores many of its premises, notably the necessity for relationship to take place between embodied subjects.

2.6.2.1.5 The narrated aspects of Self

Related to the relational Self is the activity of narration. Gergen does not elaborate a narrative Self, but asserts Self-conception as being a "*discourse* about the self - the performance of languages available in the public sphere... ...with the self as a narration rendered intelligible within ongoing relationships." (italics by the author, Gergen, 1994, p 185).

We agree with the notion of meaning being found in the relationship between signifier and signified. This is not novel. The phenomenological reduction, with its expressed aim of articulating meaning structures, implies the articulation of relationships between different aspects of experience, as well as using words to characterise it. Such words, as signifiers, are then in relationship to lived experience, to that which is signified. This, we note, goes against Gergen's assertions regarding language as a hermetic system, a notion drawn from structuralism, and overcome by Ricoeur, who has argued that signification ultimately finds its reference in lived experience. Phenomenology's primordial stance is that of the intentional relationship between consciousness and its object, that is between a constituting consciousness and lived experience, where meaning emerges from their interrelationship. And so while we agree with Gergen on the emergence of meaning from the relationship between signifier and signified, we disagree on the notion that language is a closed system without outside reference.

Within his conception of a narrated Self, Gergen denies any reference to any aspect of lived experience occurring outside the confines of the interrelational matrix. For him there is no reference to "an internal script, cognitive structure, or apperceptive

mass for information or guidance" (Gergen, 1994, p 188). In our view, the Self as an interpreted entity requires the understanding of lived experience and its explication, or explanation, into words and concepts, as per the hermeneutic circle. Narration of the Self requires words that refer to the experience of the Self, in other words, to the 'apperceived mass' of the embodied Self in relationship, a notion denied by Gergen.

Thus while advocating a fundamental role for narration in the constitution of the Self, Gergen denies one of the foundational attributes of language, that is its ultimate reference to something outside itself. While for Gergen, the Self is the result of narration, unspecified is the author of the narration, the narrating agent. We have already argued for consciousness, as Self-as-subject, to be the narrator of the Self.

While for Gergen, the Self is constituted through a language system that doesn't refer to anything outside of itself, language also serves to modify lived experience, where "...the self-narrative is a linguistic implement embedded within conventional sequences of action and employed in relationships in such a way as to *sustain, enhance, or impede* various forms of *action*" (italics ours, Gergen, 1994, p 188). Thus while relying upon structuralism to deny any relationship between language and experience, Gergen effectively contradicts this assertion when he contends that language has an effect on action, itself part of lived experience.

While narration may have the characteristics detailed by Gergen, what remains unarticulated is how these are expressed in the case of Self-narrative. Telling a story of something that happened to oneself is different from attempting to narrate one's sense of Self-identity. In this case, the goal or end point is that of Self-knowledge, that is of having a better understanding and interpretation of Self, with the main audience being either oneself or some other.

While narration is carried out in light of some theme (i.e., one's career), the events selected will be those that are deemed to have some bearing on the make-up of who one is. This notion is somewhat tautological since in the activity of defining oneself,

the selection by consciousness of events that are significant implies prior knowledge of the constitution of Self. In fact this is the case, since the interpretation of what constitutes Self does not occur in a vacuum of Self, rather, it proceeds from the previously established identity of Self. In this light, every interpretation of Self is in fact a reinterpretation, based, at least partially, on the comparison of some aspect of lived experience with the previous notion of Self. Such a previous notion of Self we argue to be experientially felt, and it is to this felt sense that narration, at least in part, needs to refer. This in effect has been considered in depth by Ricoeur with his concept of narration as mimetic activity.

Thus, while Gergen refers to Self as narration in the context of the relational matrix, and while he describes certain attributes of narration in general, he does not detail how this applies to the narration of Self. Our own consideration of these issues lead us to consider the need for a narrating entity, the necessity of referral to lived experience and the necessity for a previous notion of the Self, experientially felt. These aspects are denied by Gergen.

2.6.2.1.6 Subject-Object distinction, Self/not-Self distinction, Self-identity, general distinctions within the Self

As outlined above, Gergen makes no distinction between the Self as object and the Self as subject. The Self as conceptualised by Gergen is, we contend, one possible facet of the Self-as-object. Gergen does not articulate any locus of consciousness with the ability to perceive the relational Self, and furthermore to narrate it.

Neither does Gergen articulate how the Self is distinguished from the World, as both are facets of lived experience. We have argued the need to establish within lived experience the distinction of what may be perceived as Self from what is not-Self. Within this distinction, is the need to distinguish between Self and other, a distinction, we argue to be necessary to Gergen's conceptualisation, given his

foundational importance to the relational Self, the principal concept of his conceptualisation.

Gergen argues for Self-identity as the narrative emerging from the various interpersonal relationships in which we are involved. Here we would like to distinguish between the narratives occurring in the context of everyday relational living, and narratives about the Self. Self-identity, we would contend, is not expressed in any narrative emerging from our lived relationships, but is definitely expressed in the narratives about the Self in such interrelational lived experience. Gergen does not make this distinction. Here we would add that narration of Self, just like the perception of any object, is perspectival, and not all facets can be perceived or expressed simultaneously. The facet of Self articulated will depend on the perspective taken. In this respect, many Self-narratives are possible, a notion highlighted by Gergen. And so while we agree with Gergen with the notion of Self-identity as narrative, this is not just any narrative, as seemingly implied by Gergen.

While the Self is malleable through the auspices of experience, and especially through the experience of the other, we argue that the other is not, per se, part of our own Self, rather the relationship to the other creates *a facet of lived experience from which the Self is constituted*. Persons from other cultures with whom we are in close relationship will undoubtedly give rise to a diversity of experiences that are not available if we confine ourselves to persons of our own culture. Such experience will indubitably affect our experience of Self, and its constitution. And so here we agree with Gergen that exposure to different cultures has the potential of affecting Self-constitution. However, we highlight the role lived experience has in such constitution. This again fortifies our notion, against Gergen, that for narrative to be meaningful, it requires reference to the embodied lived experience of Self.

2.6.2.2 The explanatory aspects of Gergen's conceptualisation of Self

For Gergen, the causes for the changes in the constitution of the Self are to be found in the changes in the fabric of society, notably changes brought about through the low and high tech revolutions affecting the extent of communications between persons within and across cultures. Such changes are implicitly conceptualised as abstract external forces affecting the constitution of the Self. Gergen contends that these forces are new, not having existed a century ago, a product of the postmodern era, and give rise to a new aspect of Self, namely the relational Self. Our position is that the Self *has always been in relationship*, and while the frequency and nature of relationships may have changed in the manner described by Gergen, the relational, or interpersonal, Self has always existed, only its composition may have changed. In support of our position, we note James' contention of 19th century social Selves.

Furthermore, calling upon our notion of *rational explanation* elaborated in the first chapter, we note the participation of consciousness in the constitution of the relational Self, through the interpretation of (postmodern) lived experience. Thus, rather than the result of causal forces, we view the relational Self as the result of an interpretation, via the conscious embodied subject's continuous activity of understanding-explaining the meaning of lived experience, such meaning being influenced by the selection of certain aspects by consciousness.

Gergen distinguishes himself by incorporating within his conceptualisation a substantial role for narrative. In Gergen's view, narrative emanating from the discourse resident in all relationships serves as the medium through which Self-identity is established. As we have argued in the previous chapter, symbolisation, of which narration is the most articulate form, is necessary in all interpretation. Furthermore, narrative, by its symbolic nature, incorporates distancing, abstraction and selection of aspects of lived experience according to certain themes or structures; it also involves its generalisation, and in this respect goes beyond immediate lived

experience. Thus, in the sense that narration incorporates going beyond the consciously given, Gergen's conceptualisation is explanatory.

While he argues for a relational-narrative view of the Self, Gergen does not clearly define what exactly the Self *is* in this relational paradigm. One is left with a highly articulated disquisition on the possibilities immanent to a relational Self, with an elaborate portrayal of social saturation in its unfolding, with convincing arguments for a narrative view of the Self, and with clearly articulated descriptions of the postulated role of narration within the larger realm of social relationships, but never is the reader graced with a limpid description of the entity referred to by all this discourse, namely that of the Self.

In his defence, Gergen argues for a "vocabulary of relationship" (Gergen, 1991), that is to say terms and concepts that can be used to describe the workings of relationships and articulate the Self within them. Gergen evokes the relative paucity of terms and expressions that apply to the description of relationships, and while he does not specifically state so, we can surmise that the aim of such a vocabulary is to pave the way towards more powerful conceptualisations of the Self within the relational paradigm. We can thus state that Gergen recognises that his conceptualisation of the Self, pending the development of an appropriate vocabulary, remains an incomplete articulation. We can question however his reasoning as conceptualisation invariably involves the definition of its concepts and the articulation of their interrelationships. From a phenomenological perspective, what may required is a thorough description of lived relationships in order to arrive at the essences that characterise them. This can then serve as a basis for conceptualisation beyond phenomenological experience.

While he has argued against the individual Self and has outlined many of the difficulties that this conception engenders, Gergen's argument is that in the final analysis, the concept of the individual Self forces us in a situation where each individual's personal concerns are of greater import than those of others, leading to

a world of isolation and narcissistic individualism. Gergen finds such a result highly undesirable and uses this as justification for the untenability of such a conceptualisation of individual Selves. What the Self is, or what we can conceive it to be in a manner that makes sense to us, is one issue. Whether we like the resulting conceptualisation, or whether such a conceptualisation leads to consequences that are displeasing to us, or whether it implies consequences that are threatening to humanity as a whole, is quite another. It cannot logically serve as grounds for the rejection of the conceptualisation.

We recall that Gergen labels his view of Self as postmodern, a notion we have exposed in our previous section. Here we note that Gergen has espoused the postmodern paradigm on two levels. The first concerns his conceptualisation of Self, where he deems it to result from social saturation, a process engendered by the technological innovations characterising postmodern society. The second concerns Gergen's epistemological position which proposes that truth is relative to the context in which it is conceived, and in this sense, generalist theories and conceptualisations about any phenomenon lose the epistemological value they were traditionally endowed with. In this respect there is, in Gergen's estimation, a need to rethink the epistemology and research methodologies applicable to science, to human science, and to psychology in particular.

While Gergen may be criticising the relativity of perspectives and positions, the superiority of his own perspective cannot be justified within this realm. For one must conclude through his discourse, he has positioned himself outside the realm of possible perspectives, an "outside looking in", not only looking at each perspective but also looking at their interrelationships. Using his own argument, we can state that his is only one more perspective, with no epistemological superiority over the others. Gergen (1994) has anticipated this criticism and responds that the critic is in a similar position with respect to his own epistemological stance. While criticising Gergen, the critic takes up the same position of being outside looking in and cannot offer any more justification for his

or her position than Gergen does for his own. In the end, Gergen (1994) reasons, this reinforces his own argument for the relativity of epistemological perspectives.

In our introductory chapter we have argued for the notion that while there is an inescapable relativity of perspectives in our conceptualising, Ricoeur's phenomenological hermeneutics also teaches us that interpretation must always return to lived experience, and the issue of competing interpretations is resolved by their comparison, with the best interpretation being the most coherent, the most comprehensive, and best accounting for lived experience in its breadth and depth. Of course, no interpretation is final, for it may be supplanted by a better one which surpasses it in each of the criteria mentioned. In this sense, truth is relative and a function of the prevailing interpretation. However contrary to Gergen, there are principles which permit us to judge between competing interpretations, they are not equally valid, with lived experience remaining the final arbitrator.

Our consideration of lived experience also brings us to the incontrovertible experience of embodiment, this feature characterising all of our lived experience. For instance, while it may be true that language will have a determining effect on the individual's ability to define himself, to lay claim that the Self is solely the consequence of the rules, limitations and structures imposed by language, flatly dismisses the fundamental reality of the Self's experience as an embodied subject. Thus any conceptualisation of Self, or any epistemological position that denies this reality is, in our view, in need of revision.

2.6.3 Summary

Gergen espouses a narrative-relational view of Self that he qualifies as social-constructivist, a view he largely grounds in the prevailing postmodern paradigm. While we differ from him on the characteristics of his relational Self and those of narrative, we agree with his considerable emphasis on interpersonal relationships

and on narrative. On these aspects, we find that his conceptualisation would profit greatly from a deeper consideration of consciousness, lived experience, and most notably, embodiment, as these notions we find to be intricately tied to his own notion of a narrating Self in relationship.

From the explanatory point of view, Gergen is to be credited for a thorough account of the impact of postmodern living may be having on the constitution of the Self. While we have found some problems with clarity, coherence and internal contradictions, such could be improved by a deeper consideration of lived experience in conjunction with his theorising. Finally, his epistemology, grounded in language philosophy, is representative of the recent trend in the social sciences where many of the assumptions of modernism are questioned, leading to a reconsideration of traditional research methods and stronger justification for alternative research methodologies. Here we argue that such an epistemology would do well to give more precedence to phenomena of lived experience, that which, through language, we attempt to understand and explain.

Our analysis puts Gergen largely in the explanatory camp as his focus is upon the causal influence of postmodern technology on the constitution of the Self, with a strong emphasis on narration. While existential phenomenology purports the undeniable interrelational aspect to Self, and hermeneutics purports its interpretation, some aspects of Gergen's version of these notions go against those elaborated in our previous chapter. Here again, a deeper consideration of lived experience, together with the notion of embodiment, we contend would benefit his conceptualisation.

2.7 The conceptualisation of Self according to Anthony Paul Kerby

"The 'I' is not before the words, just as I never discover myself at the origin of the words I say. The cogito must be spoken, for it is only in the spontaneous upsurge of language and expression that I find myself. I then acquiesce to the logic of expression, think myself into being as it were. I become the 'I' spoken of. But the 'I' is nothing more than the index of the person who speaks it, qua speaker, the speaking being."

AP Kerby

2.7.1 The Self according to Kerby

In a first instance, Kerby (1991) takes *Self* to mean "the distinct individual that we usually take ourselves to be", an individual that also knows itself to be and who usually uses modes of address such as *I*, *me*, *myself* and *we* (Kerby, 1991, p 4).

Associated with this Selfhood is the experience of some degree of identity, and of sameness of identity, over time.

The common belief associated with this experience of identity is that there is some substantial entity that exists ontologically prior to any acts it may carry out, and from which the sense of identity emerges. Kerby contests this view and argues that fruitful descriptions of the Self can be reached through a thorough analysis of language, of symbols, and of their relationship to the person speaking.

Contemporary hermeneutics, more specifically, those of Ricoeur and Gadamer, teaches us that the subject's understanding of itself is largely an interpretative activity that is much akin to how we interpret the meaning of texts. In the same way that the "truth" of the text is not a matter of one-to-one relationship between the text and its symbols, the "truth" of a person's history is much more than a simple mirroring of the past. In this sense, "truth" is not a matter of verisimilitude with

the "objective" historical facts, but rather "a question of a certain adequacy to an implicit meaning of the past" (Kerby, 1991, p 7). As such, the meaning of the past is not something fixed and final but rather remains fluid and open to further interpretations.

For Kerby (1991), the Self is essentially fictitious, a product emanating from the usage of language and symbols. In this sense it is not a psychological, but rather a linguistic and symbolic entity.

"On a narrative account, the self is to be construed not as a prelinguistic given that merely employs language, much as we may employ a tool, but rather as a product of language - what might be called the *implied subject* of self-referring utterances. The self, or subject, then becomes a result of discursive praxis rather than either a substantial entity having ontological priority over praxis or a self with epistemological priority, an originator of meaning." (italics by the author, Kerby, 1991, p 4).

Based on this premise he divides the person, or the *semiotic subject*, in three distinct but closely interrelated subjects: that of the *speaking subject*, that of the *subject of speech* and finally that of the *spoken subject*.

The *speaking subject* is the flesh-and-blood-person speaking, it is the narrative entity from which emanate all utterances, whether these refer to the narrator himself or to some other object.

The *subject of speech* is the subject implied by the utterance. This linguistic entity is analogous to the character in a novel, "the character signified by the pronoun *I*" (italics by the author, Kerby, 1991, p 105), in that it is a construction by the speaking subject, yet it gains a life of its own within the confines of the narrative. In one sense, it is the character, told by the speaking subject, within the narrative of who

one is. Since the person may harbour many stories about himself, it is at this level that it becomes possible to have many Selves. It is also at this level that part of our sense of identity is developed, this sense of identity being intimately related to the story told of oneself. It is in Self-narration that a "properly conscious form of human identity" (Kerby, 1991, p 105) develops, where the disparate strands of our lives are tied together.

The *spoken subject* is the "subject produced through or by the discourse as a result of its effect on a reader-listener" (Kerby, 1991, p 105), that is the flesh-and-blood subject-as-listener (or spectator) who is transformed by listening to the subject of speech of the utterance produced by himself as speaking subject. Such transformation may occur in two ways. The first is by *implication*, where the author ascribes to himself the authorship of the utterance by virtue of the fact that he knows himself as its author. The second is by *participation*, which can be compared to the way we participate in narratives about a fictional character. We may feel sympathetic to the character, identifying with him or her through our participation in the narrative. In the case where the character is oneself, there is most of the time an immediate identification with the subject of speech. By *participation* Kerby means the "various forms of identification that the embodied subject has in relation to an utterance and its subject of speech", a relation which he equates with that of Ricoeur's mimesis (Kerby, 1991, p 106).

Following Heidegger, Kerby (1991) states that the relationship between the spoken subject and the speaking subject is a function of the embodied subject's "state of mind with its moods, degrees and modes of understanding" (Kerby, 1991, p 107). Kerby (1991) labels this relationship as *desire* for this "seems to capture the impetus that changing states have for the subject" (Kerby, 1991, p 107). Figure 1 depicts Kerby's narrative view of Self.

Kerby argues that, analogously to the realm of text where its author acquires independence from the flesh and blood real author, the human subject, in its activity of Self-referential utterances, acquires through the medium of speech, an autonomous status, which we can believe to be real, although in his opinion, such ascription of Selfhood is a consequence of semiotic activity. This move from the speaking subject to the subject of speech, is parallel to the move from author to scriptor.

Thus the person, or the semiotic subject, does not reside uniquely within any of the particular entities here described, but in the dynamic of the tripartite subject. As such, personhood is "the result of ascribing Selfhood (in an act of

THE SEMIOTIC SUBJECT




Figure 1. Kerby's Semiotic Subject. From Kerby (1991), p 106.

implicit or explicit predication) to the site of narration, the body" (Kerby, 1991, p 111). Thus the body is the enduring locus to which a history accrues and to which the

character of that history is associated, in this sense becoming "an embodied self" (ibid., p 111) . Our sense of being an embodied subject resides primarily in the identification we achieve through participation and implication. Thus, there is no central, organising core. Any sense of such an "I", Kerby argues, is the result of our believing in the existence of such an entity.

Within the semiotic subject dynamic, the degree of coincidence between these three semiotic entities is a function of the interpretative nature of the participation. It is possible for one to reject a particular utterance on the grounds that it is an inadequate representation of oneself; in such instances one is called to repeat the interpretative cycle from speaking subject to subject of speech to spoken subject. This never-ending cycle represents the framework within which personal development takes place.

The relationships between these entities are mediated by different considerations. While Kerby draws extensively from literature which has focused on the subject of speech and its relationship with the speaking subject, he proposes to go beyond it, establishing his own conceptualisation of the Self. Here he explicates the relationship between the subject of speech and the spoken subject, as well as the relationship between the spoken subject and the speaking subject.

2.7.1.1 The rationale for a hermeneutic foundation

Kerby's model of Self rests upon a hermeneutic paradigm, its primordial position being the fundamental role played by symbols and language in the constitution of reality. In this sense, more than just a vehicle for thought, language becomes constitutive of thought, implying that thought without language is simply not possible.

"Stated in its most basic form, language is viewed not simply as a tool for communication or mirroring back what we otherwise discover in our reality but is itself an important formative part of that reality, part of its very texture." (Kerby, 1991, p 2).

In this respect, Kerby is in agreement with Saussure and quotes him as thus:

"Psychologically our thought - apart from its expression in words - is only a shapeless and indistinct mass. Philosophers and linguists have always agreed in recognizing that without the help of signs we would be unable to make a clear-cut, consistent distinction between two ideas. Without language, thought is a vague, uncharted nebula. There are no pre-existing ideas, and nothing is distinct before the appearance of language." (Kerby, 1991, p 70).

In further support of this position, Kerby draws upon the case of Helen Keller, a deaf, dumb and blind person who, after having learned to communicate, relates the experience of her status before the acquisition of language:

"...my mind was in a state of anarchy in which meaningless sensations rioted, and if thought existed, it was so vague and inconsequent, it cannot be made a part of discourse." (Kerby, 1991, p 69).

Kerby contends that there is a relationship between our linguistic system of signs and the sensorially given, however in this instance much of the signification takes place at an unconscious level. The same may be said of the relationship between such symbols and the *habitus* (Kerby, 1991), that conglomerate of activities and habits that characterise our practical lives, a notion Kerby draws from Merleau-Ponty.

"It is with language that we grasp reality, and we do so in a manipulatory gesture, the style of which is to a great degree unconscious. Language acts on the world in a manner parallel to the way our silent bodily habitualities make possible our practical life. But although

language must be seen as yet another habituality, it has the added dimension of seemingly unlimited reflexivity and expressibility. This reflexive capacity makes all the difference." (Kerby, 1991, p 67).

Kerby (1991) thus argues against the popular notion that ordinary discourse emanates from a prelinguistic realm where "knowledge" resides, waiting to be "transmitted", via a "neutral" linguistic process. Rather, he argues that language, as a system of signs, is essential to the creation of meaning.

"Language, far from being a mere communication medium, establishes a complex realm of signifying relations that raise up the sensorially given to the level of meaning." (Kerby, 1991, p 66).

A necessary corollary is that the Self is given meaning through the act of discourse:

"To use language is basically to utilize a system of signs which relate one thing or attribute to another in diverse ways, a system in which I am - and this is very important - to the degree that I in fact utilize this code, become *signified* in it." (italics by the author, Kerby, 1991, p 66).

More specifically with respect to the constitution of the Self, he states:

"What is offered here is a model of the human subject that takes acts of *self-narration* not only as descriptive of the self but, more importantly, as *fundamental to the emergence and reality of that subject*." (italics by the author, Kerby, 1991, p 4).

One consequence of this linguistic paradigm is that psychological entities such as Descartes' 'I' and Freud's Ego cannot be substantiated. Against Descartes, he argues that the entity called 'I' is created by the speaking of it, is "a re-enactment of the

ontological moment of self-certainty" (Kerby, 1991, p 100). In support of this assertion, he quotes from Merleau-Ponty:

"The *cogito* at which we arrive by reading Descartes is... ..a spoken cogito, put into words and understood in words..." (italics by the author, Kerby, 1991, p 100).

Kerby argues that as linguistic subjects, we "then acquiesce to the logic of the expression, think [ourselves] into being as it were" (Kerby, 1991, p 100). We thus become the 'I' spoken of, but such an 'I' is nothing more than "an index of the person who speaks it, qua speaker: the speaking being" (Kerby, 1991, p 100), a semantic consequence of language usage.

2.7.1.2 The relationship between the pre-expressed and the expressed

Kerby contends that we must consider the nature of the pre-expressed, or pre-narrative, experience. Kerby, following Ricoeur, asserts that all experience is pre-narrative in form, what he terms quasi-narrative, in the sense that lived experience takes place in a manner which essentially matches that of the narrative structure, comprising a beginning, a middle and an end. Even time, the way it is lived, is not experienced as milliseconds ticking by, but as an unfolding of durational events which have a beginning, a middle and an end.

With Ricoeur, Kerby (1991) maintains that our prefigured experience, particularly our experience of temporality, is configured and refigured by emplotment. It is language, in Kerby's opinion, that distinguishes humans from the animal world, giving us the ability to reinterpret and abstract from natural events the symbols used to represent them. However, contrary to the animal world, humans, by the means

of language, have the ability to extricate from the primary sensory level, its ensuing system of signs and symbols.

"Whereas animals are responsive to natural signals which have a direct correlation to physical events (and can be trained to respond to new ones), man uses symbols that may have no natural relation to these events. Symbols, and especially language, have left their roots in natural phenomena behind." (Kerby, 1991, p 66).

It thus becomes possible for the signifying systems to be completely detached from any reference to sensory phenomena. As such, the problem of the truth value of an utterance comes to the forefront, the central issue concerning us here being the degree of correspondence between the story as told and the story 'waiting to be told' at the pre-narrative level (Kerby, 1991). For Kerby, the question of adequacy between what is expressed and what is not yet expressed, is not one of accurate correspondence, but rather one of comparing meanings gleaned from alternate interpretations of pre-narrative experience. Thus, the truth of a narrative is a matter of choosing between various interpretations, such choice being partially a function of the aims and goals of the person making the utterance. As such, there is no pre-linguistic truth waiting to be told. The truth of a narrative resides in its suitability to the speaking subject concerned.

"The truth of our narratives does not reside in their correspondence to the prior meaning of pre-narrative experience; rather, *the narrative is the meaning of the pre-narrative experience*. The adequacy of the narrative cannot, therefore, be measured against the meaning of pre-narrative experience but, properly speaking, only against alternate interpretations of that experience." (italics by the author, Kerby, 1991, p 84).

However, the pre-narrative experience does not call for just any narrative. With Ricoeur, Kerby maintains that the pre-narrative experience is an incipient narrative,

which calls forth the narrative. The relationship between the former and the latter is dialectical, as one is not the cause of the other, rather each is affected by the other.

Just like any other object of narrative adequation, the Self takes its roots in the realm of the pre-expressed and through the creative processes of expression, participation, implication and desire, attains the status of apparent beingness. The Self is thus the result of multiple possible interpretations and meanings. This opens the door to the conceptualisation of the Self as fluid, and multiple, whose status is entirely dependent upon its expression within the dynamic of the semiotic subject.

2.7.1.3 Self identity

Kerby (1991) argues that memory is fundamental to our sense of identity, for without it, any sense of consistency through time would not be possible. Even for our continuous flow of perceptions to make sense, each actual one must be linked in temporal order with both the immediately preceding and the immediately forthcoming one, requiring the faculty of memory to be operative. Without memory, nothing, not even our sense of identity, could be 'held' for the mind's eye to view.

Furthermore, Kerby contends that interpretation is also implicated in the functioning of memory, meaning that our recollections are not mere images that duplicate original experiences, but that they are "analogous to archaeological finds that still require interpretation for their precise temporal location and sense" (Kerby, 1991, p 23). As such, the recalled material of the past is sketchy and impoverished, leading Kerby to state that the raw content of memory is a representative of the past rather than its reproduction.

Recollection also involves two distinct time domains, the first related to the time when the recollected event took place, the second linked to the time where the recollection actually takes place. This factor, together with the role imagination may play in the recollection, (augmenting it or otherwise filling in its "gaps", such filling-in being carried out in accordance with how we would now like the event to have been or on how we wish to have lived it out, rather than how it actually was) influences recollection, shaping it into a past as it is for us now rather than into a past as it was. These attributes of recollection lead Kerby to conclude that the Self, through the restrictions imposed by the processes inherent to recollection and memory, is the result of an interpretative activity, to the point that the recollections of which it is necessarily made up of are themselves the result of interpretation.

While memory is constitutive of Self identity, the latter also surpasses the former. This is evidenced by the fact that Self identity is operative even when the memories that constitute it have been forgotten or cannot be brought to awareness.

"It is indeed the case that we commonly extend our identity beyond explicit consciousness of past events, and we do this by a form of inference." (Kerby, 1991, p 27).

Kerby (1991) asserts that such inference invariably takes the form of emplotment, that is to say that in the course of interpretation, from the interplay of representation, imagination and the contextual present, emanates a recollection that has been interpreted into being, that has the attributes of narrative emplotment, with a beginning, a middle and an end. In support of this assertion, Kerby (1991) quotes from Santayana:

"When I remember I do not *look* at my past experience, any more than when I think of a friend's misfortunes I look at his thoughts. I imagine them; or rather I imagine something of

my own manufacture, as *if I were writing a novel* and I attribute this intuited experience to myself in the past, or to the other person." (italics by the author, Kerby, 1991, p 30).

Self identity then, just like the memories from which it is composed but which it also transcends, is an interpreted entity, taking on the attributes and limitations of the narrative.

Kerby (1991) notes that when confronted with telling others who we are, we normally resort to telling a story of ourselves, of how we came to be where we are, of the changes we have gone through, and of the events that we consider significant. Our sense of identity then is intimately related to the story we tell of ourselves. Kerby maintains that it is the story we tell of ourselves. If such is the case, it follows that our sense of identity is not fixed, but rather fluid, being subject to multiple and repeated interpretations emanating from multiple perspectives and from new perspectives as life unfolds.

Kerby adds that the essence of Self-identity, or personhood, is difficult to establish, for it involves several aspects, the first being the continuity of meaningful experiences in one's life, an apparent constancy in the perception of who we are, such constancy being operative despite our knowledge that our many experiences can be instigators of inner change, despite also the knowledge that biologically, our very cells are renewed many times over during the course of our lives. Our personal histories too have their importance, this in turn requiring the faculty of memory with its narrative attributes. Personhood also calls forth the notion of persona, or of a character in a play, and this observation Kerby (1991) uses as further indication of the narrative nature of Self-identity.

Kerby also asserts that emotions are dependent on the interpretation given to events and situations in our lives, noting how emotions may change when the

interpretation of an event changes. Again, the adequacy between the underlying emotion and its expression is a question of multiple successive interpretations that are repeated until "we are satisfied that 'this is how it was' " (Kerby 1991, p 50). Since they are aroused in situations that have import to us, emotions also reveal and define, to ourselves and to others, aspects of our character and personality. Just like the pre-narrative, pre-expressed emotions require narrative for their understanding and development, such understanding being a "natural goal in the development of our inarticulate feelings" (Kerby, 1991, p 51). Finally, emotions have a social nature, in that they are related to the goals of the individual which are usually intimately tied to the values, ideologies and beliefs of his or her socio-cultural milieu. In this sense, emotion, just like language, has its roots firmly embedded within sources outside the individual.

Another aspect of any narrative, Kerby contends, is its inevitable propensity for making value judgements about the events narrated. From traditions and cultures, which all abound with descriptive and historical narratives, emanate a substantial part of the values one espouses or rejects. Societal values then, have a key impact upon Self-identity. Furthermore, the personal events in one's life, major events, successes, traumas and disappointments, may have a profound impact on the retelling of one's story, and thus of one's values.

These observations, in Kerby's opinion, strengthen the view that the Self is not an entity outside of or transcendent to the act of discourse, but rather is constituted through and within this act.

2.7.2 Critique of Kerby's conceptualisation of Self

Kerby has adapted the linguistic hermeneutic paradigm to a conceptualisation of the Self. The Self as an interpreted and therefore essentially fictitious entity, the

multiple nature of the Self, the narrative nature of experience, of memories and of Self-identity, are some of the aspects of his narrative view.

2.7.2.1 The understanding aspects of Kerby's conceptualisation of Self

2.7.2.1.1 On the nature of consciousness and its attributes

Within his conceptualisation of the Self, Kerby does not explicitly consider the attributes of consciousness, such as its intentionality, its unity, nor its constitutive role in perception. However, given his phenomenological-hermeneutic foundation, many are implied as postulates to his conceptualisation.

Kerby does not make an explicit subject-object distinction, however we note that within his narrative conceptualisation, the Self-as-subject consists of the implied subject, itself composed of the speaking subject and the spoken subject. We make a parallel between these two entities and the intentional-attentional attributes of consciousness. Speech, we have stated to be an intentional activity of consciousness and hearing, the attentional counterpart. While Kerby situates his speaking-spoken subject distinction within the embodied Self, we have argued that the intentional-attentional attribute belongs to all of conscious lived experience. In similar fashion, we view Kerby's subject of speech as analogous to our notion of Self-as-object. While in this fashion we interpret Kerby's distinctions, we note that these attributes he limits to the narrative realm, while our intentional-attentional distinction applies to all of lived experience, such includes the experience of narration.

While Kerby does not refer to intentionality of consciousness, his conceptualisation of the Self implies the presence of this attribute. We note that the embodied subject is in intentional relationship to the narrative and to the subject narrated, this being those portions of lived experience to which Self-narrative refers, and which, during the activity of narration, become the object of consciousness.

For Kerby, consciousness of Self finds its genesis in the reflexivity of language. While this assertion shall be considered in our next chapter, this necessarily implies the presence of consciousness as first given, for the Self-consciousness yielded through narration requires a conscious narrating entity. While Kerby situates the Self in the tripartite subject, we have seen that existential phenomenology considers the conscious subject as perceiving centre of all lived experience, not only as the centre of narrative experience. Thus, while we agree with Kerby on the attribute of 'I'-ness generated within and by narration, we also contend to a more primordial centre of 'I'-ness within the larger realm of lived experience, such 'I'-ness equating to our notion of Self-as-subject, or locus of consciousness. We have explored this issue in detail in our treatment of James.

While not addressing the unity of consciousness per se, Kerby asserts the unity of narrative, in that narration is a sewing of disparate memories into a cohesive whole with beginning, middle and end. Kerby contends that the embodied subject selects the memories and links them into a coherent whole during the process of narration. Moreover, Kerby contends that memories are themselves representatives of lived events, and in this respect, require completion by the embodied subject. While this may be the case for narration, we also note the unity of conscious experience, in that thought, and its correlate, lived experience, are continuous. Kerby agrees with Husserl's notion of continuity of lived experience, intimately interwoven with the continuity of lived time, where life is linked through "a continuous series of temporal protentions (projections of a future) and retentions (consciousness of the immediate past) which give density and cohesion to the ongoing present" (parentheses by the author, Kerby, 1991, p 18). And so while Kerby emphasises the continuity of narrative and of the recollection of memories, he also notes this attribute to belong to lived experience in general. Correlative to this unity of experience is that of consciousness.

Kerby deems narrative constitutive of thought, of reality and of the Self. The realm of the pre-expressed, for Kerby, is incoherent, chaotic and meaningless, "a shapeless

and indistinct mass... ...a vague, uncharted nebula..." (Kerby, 1991, p 70), where according to Helen Keller, "...meaningless sensations rioted..." (Kerby, 1991, p 69). Reality gains its meaning by an embodied subject engaged in its narration. Yet Kerby also contends that perception results from an interpretation carried out at an unconscious level, and the same can be said of our bodily habituations, or habitus, a notion he borrows from Merleau-Ponty. How and by what entity such interpretation is carried out is not addressed by Kerby, however he suggests that it is carried out at a pre-narrative level, which contradicts his own assertion on the constitution of reality by and through narrative. By his own assertion then, there is constitution of reality, at least at some level, prior to narration. We have seen, with Husserl, that consciousness is constitutive of its object, this encompasses both the narrative and pre-narrative realms.

To summarise, Kerby does not consider the attributes of consciousness, however his consideration of narration implies their presence. Our analysis has shown that the attributes of narration also belong to conscious lived experience in general, the most important implication being the need for a conscious subject that precedes the Self-conscious 'I' emerging from the narrative process.

2.7.2.1.2 On the primacy of lived experience

While founding his conceptualisation on phenomenological and hermeneutic notions, such as Merleau-Ponty's notion of the embodied subject, and of Gadamer's and Ricoeur's notions of interpretation, Kerby does not himself consider lived experience outside of its relationship to language. For Kerby, lived experience is the substance constituting pre-narrative experience, that which language raises to the level of meaning.

For Kerby, the Self exists primarily as a linguistic entity, "a result of discursive praxis rather than either a substantial entity" (Kerby, 1991, p 4), with the existence of a

substantial Self being "no more (nor less) than a fiction, which is, ... all the self can ever be." (Kerby, 1991, p 32). While there is an embodied entity, "a bodily existence apart from language", Kerby does not attribute Selfhood to this entity, claiming that "it is in and through language that the dimension of the subject, the self, is generated" (Kerby, 1991, p 69). In addition, he claims that our pre-expressed, pre-thematic experience is "an implicit or quasi-narrative" (Kerby, 1991, p 7). In spite of these assertions, Kerby does consider pre-narrative experience as possibly constitutive of a prelinguistic Self:

"It is perhaps true, however, that if the child had no prelinguistic sense of self (no matter how vague), he could not develop into that which language offers him." (Kerby, 1991, p 78).

Thus, while he agrees with the notion of pre-narrative lived experience, and with the possibility of a vague Self already constituted within it, Kerby does not seriously consider the issue of Selfhood located within such pre-linguistic experience. For Kerby, Selfhood is defined by its Self-reflexivity, its ability to take itself as subject, to be conscious of itself, such reflexivity finding its genesis in the reflexive attributes of language. Therefore, for Kerby, the Self is not only conscious, but is necessarily Self-conscious, and this attribute cannot be found outside of language.

We agree with Kerby on the notion of Selfhood not being endowed with Self-reflexivity until the child is able to use language, notably its use of the personal pronoun 'I', an observation also made by Merleau-Ponty (1945). However, while language may be the catalyst of reflexivity, the pre-narrative experience referred to in the activity of Self-narrative, while unarticulated without language, remains that to which language refers. Thus, there is need for a phenomenal basis to the Self-reflective experience, otherwise language could not refer to it at all.

Thus we contend to the need for a primordial Self which is constituted through a pre-linguistic form of interpretation. Kerby agrees that language is only one amongst many forms of symbolic expression, which includes art:

"Though language is perhaps the most important signifying system, it is clear, to take one example, that art in its various non-linguistic forms can also express the subject." (Kerby, 1991, p 101),

And so while Kerby acknowledges the reality of the pre-expressed, he denies any form of Selfhood to it. Our contention is that Kerby does not consider lived experience in its most primordial aspect, that of its pre-linguistic understanding in its intentional-attentional deployment, as we have articulated in our previous chapter by reference to Merleau-Ponty.

In summary, while Kerby acknowledges the reality of the pre-expressed, or lived experience, he does not consider it in its fullness, his contention being that lived experience is valuable only in its relationship to language. Moreover, he denies within such lived experience the existence of a form of Selfhood, his contention being that Selfhood requires Self-reflexivity. We contend that a deeper consideration of lived experience in its primacy reveals the reality of the Self as phenomenon, notably an experience of embodiment which results from the interpretation of lived experience by forms of symbolisation more primordial than language. While Kerby acknowledges the existence of these other forms of symbolisation, and acknowledges the presence of a vague form of embodied Self, his emphasis on the Self as narration effectively leaves little room for the full consideration of these notions within his conceptualisation.

2.7.2.1.3 On embodiment

For Kerby, the narrating entity, the speaking subject, is to be found within the embodied subject. However, as previously discussed, Kerby does not attribute any

form of Selfhood to the embodied subject, opining rather that the Self is constituted through the activity of narration. We note that for Kerby the impression of being an embodied Self results firstly from implication, that is, by virtue of the fact that the embodied subject knows itself to be the speaking subject, and secondly by participation in the narrative, that is, by identification with the subject of speech evoked within the Self-narrative. In this manner does the subject ascribe authorship to the site of narration, that of the body. Thus for Kerby, the sense of being an embodied Self results from the activity of narration.

Our own existential-phenomenological view considers the primacy of perception as first given, and it is within this primordial givenness that we find, in the first instance, the conscious embodied presence to a World. We have already argued for the pre-linguistic constitution of an embodied Self resulting from intentional-attentional lived experience. While narration may permit the articulation of such experience, it is subsequent to its occurrence. In support of this contention, we note that prior to the acquisition of language, the child is consciously engaged in the World, relating to objects and to persons in it. While possibly unable to sense and to articulate its sense of Self, it does evidently sense itself as embodied and is progressively able to distinguish this body from the World to which it is inextricably related.

Thus while Kerby endorses Merleau-Ponty's view of embodiment and credits the body with the attribute of authorship, he does not attribute to it a primordial role in the constitution of the Self.

2.7.2.1.4 On the interpersonal aspects of Self

Kerby does not address how the other is perceived as alter ego, but his conceptualisation presupposes its occurrence. Nor does he consider the Self in its

interpersonal aspects, however, he does grant a role to others within the activity of narration.

In a first instance, narrative, and in particular Self-narrative, is addressed to an audience, and in this respect, the particularities of the audience, as well as the goal of the narration, will affect its constitution. Secondly, the adequacy of narrative to the pre-narrative, Kerby contends, is affected, at least in part, by the establishment of consensus with others. Others may approve or disapprove on the veridicality of a particular narrative, notably a narrative relating to Self. In this respect, we note the strong influence of the significant others on the child's Self-narrative. Third, language is a social phenomenon, with the meaning of words, and the rules governing their relationships, being established within the social sphere. Finally, narrative is embedded with the cultural values and traditions of a particular society. Such values, in Kerby's opinion, exert an influence on the constitution of the narrative Self.

While we agree with Kerby on all of these influences, we maintain that the question of the relationship to others on the adequacy of the Self-narrative is foundational. Laing and Sullivan have highlighted how interpersonal relationships have a primordial impact on the interpretation of lived experience. Laing's conceptualisation focuses on how communication within the context of interpersonal relationships is constitutive of the Self by virtue of its effect on experiencing. We note that such interpersonal communication implies the use of language. While he doesn't elaborate on this issue, Kerby's emphasis on narrative points to the means by which others may affect the constitution of Self, that is, on how they will impact the adequation between pre-narrative experience and narrative.

To summarise, Kerby evokes certain interpersonal aspects to the constitution of Self, these are conceptualised as being effected solely through their effect on narrative. He does not consider interpersonal relationships from the point of view of lived

experience, as we contend, with Merleau-Ponty's notion of intersubjectivity, that intersubjective experience is wider and more foundational than that achieved through narrative. We note, in this respect, that interpersonal communication can take place via non-verbal means, remarking that touching is a powerful means of communication, as evidenced in parent-child and in all intimate relationships.

2.7.2.1.5 Self/not-Self distinction, Self-identity, general distinctions within the Self

As Kerby does not consider lived experience in its primacy, he does not consider how the narrating entity is able to distinguish within lived experience what is Self from what is not. As the Self is constituted solely through narrative, the problem of Self/not-Self distinction becomes one of adequation with pre-narrative experience. As we have seen, the adequation process involves the comparison of alternate interpretations, with the best interpretation being the one that yields the most comprehensive meaning. In principle, nothing prevents the embodied subject from interpreting any object of experience as being part of himself. While he maintains that pre-narrative experience is not amenable to just any narrative, Kerby does not explicate how this is so.

Evoking here Ricoeur's notion of the relationship between narrative and the sensorially given, we highlight again that language in the final instance refers to lived experience, and enables us to make sense of such experience. The best interpretation will be the one that leaves the least of lived experience unexplained. We have pointed out that at the level of bodily experience, the Self will be constituted as the realm where intentional experience is tightly correlated with attentional experience. At the narrative level, no overt criterion is specified except to state that the Self figures as the subject of the narrative, the implied 'I' of the utterances. On the question of adequacy, Kerby states:

"...a good case can be made for distinguishing between what has been called, with relation to literature, the experiencing self and the narrating self. Generally speaking, in self-

understanding the narrating self is always trying to coincide with, or be adequate to, the experiencing self, but this path is easily frustrated or becomes a matter of self-deception." (Kerby, 1991, p 38).

Kerby goes on to state that while the body is "the permanent locus of my insertion in the world" and "a fairly solid basis for continuity", it is through the events attributed to this locus that existence is given meaning, such events having a pre-narrative structure and requiring their narration to be made explicit (Kerby, 1991, pp 39 - 40). Most importantly, such narration may be subject to self-deception, repression, projections and the like, which may negatively affect the adequation process.

We note that for Kerby the potential for improper adequation lies in the recounting of the events, not in the description of the locus experiencing them. However, in Kerby's view, the events themselves are somehow appropriated as the Self, in other words, the locus becomes the interpretation of its events. In this respect, Kerby makes no distinction between the lived events of the embodied subject and the Self as interpreted.

We however maintain this distinction, and have argued that the embodied subject, Kerby's 'experiencing Self,' is not coincident with the Self as narrated. Understanding of the embodied subject, which may be complemented through a narrative account, is in the first instance pre-reflective. As we have previously argued, this is related to the intentional-attentional aspects of lived experience. Additionally, it is from this locus that all experience is interpreted and given meaning. Regardless of the veridicality of the adequation, the narrative's implied 'I' invariably points to this primordial experience and without the real and palpable presence of the subject, all narrative loses its meaning.

Thus, we opine that in the adequation process, that within narrative which will be retained as Self will be those interpretations which are attributable to this

experiencing embodied subject. With Merleau-Ponty and with James, we contend that such experiences will be those interpreted as ministering to the body. And so while Kerby mentions no criterion within the narrative process to distinguish between Self and not-Self, we propose that what will be appropriated as Self will be those portions of narrated experiences where the embodied subject is understood as the intentional-attentional locus of such experience.

For Kerby, Self-identity is the story one tells of one's life. Kerby evokes how such a story relates to memories, themselves the fruit of interpretation, itself the result of many factors. We note here how Self-identity is itself made up of many levels of interpretation, a first concerning the constructed nature of memories, a second concerning the sewing together of such memories.

We note that memories are themselves recalled portions of lived experience in which are already distinguished the Self from not-Self. Within each of these portions of experience the embodied subject figures as centre, in a manner identical with actual lived experience. While the experience was lived, the embodied subject remained identical to itself, or at least was perceived as such. In the sewing of these portions, what will also be sewn together will be the series of embodied subjects that staged in the centre of each experience. Each Self-as-locus is linked to the next one and is seen, if not identical with the preceding one, at least similar enough to be attributed as same. In this manner do we account for the continuity of Self as recounted through memory, something Kerby alludes to as one of the factors affecting how memories are constitutive of Self within narrative.

We note again the importance of the embodied subject in the experience of continuity. While such continuity may be attributed by the narration, it is itself found within each portion of lived experience used in the narration. Continuity is seen here as a primary feature of embodiment. In our view then, Self-identity, interpreted from memories, themselves interpreted, requires the attribution of continuity between experiences and within them. The only possible locus of such

continuity is the body, perceived as same within experiences and as more similar than not between them.

We have seen that Kerby identifies, within the narrative Self, three entities involved in a tripartite dynamic of narrative activity. Narrative is seen as constitutive of Self-identity in the form of a narration of lived experience, such experience espousing a pre-narrative structure, as detailed by Ricoeur. The possibility of generating multiple and varied narratives accounts for, in Kerby's view, the possibility of multiple Selves. Kerby does not however venture so far as identify any commonality within such various and multiple narratives. We contend that there are general themes that appear in most, if not all persons' narratives. Childhood, friends, family, relatives, culture, schooling and work are some examples. We can see here how such narratives would constitute some of the aspects of Self evoked by previous authors, such as a social Self, an academic Self, interrelational Selves, and the like. Implied by Kerby's view is that there are as many Selves as there are significant themes to be narrated about lived experience.

To summarise, Kerby does not address the Self/not-Self distinction at the level of the embodied subject, nor at the level of narrative. Our own view is that the Self will be that portion of narrated experience which is understood as the intentional-attentional locus of such experience. While we agree with Kerby's notion of Self-identity as a product of narrative, we point out its intimate relationship to the locus of perceived continuity, that is, the body. Finally, we note Kerby's evocation of the multiple interpretations of Self, according to different themes. While Kerby does not explicate these further, we argue that such narratives may be said to constitute some of the various Selves described by previous authors.

2.7.2.2 The explanatory aspects of Kerby's conceptualisation of Self

While espousing a phenomenological-hermeneutic approach, Kerby's conceptualisation does incorporate some explanatory aspects, although these are relatively minor in their extent.

The first concerns the explanatory aspects of language itself. As highlighted in the previous chapter, language raises to the symbolic level the sensorially given, albeit does not do this without some level of generalisation. Any generalisation goes beyond the immediately given, and in this respect, we find Kerby's conceptualisation explanatory. The Self then, is itself a generalisation that goes beyond the particular lived experiences from which it is interpreted.

We find the same characteristic of generalisation within the memories from which Self-identity is constituted, these being in Kerby's view, interpretations, or reconstructions. Kerby contends that such reconstruction is influenced by the goals, mood, and present context, becoming a past as it is for us now. Thus in its reinterpretation, there is an addition to the material of the past, a going beyond the given. Kerby himself points out that Self-identity extends beyond the explicit consciousness of past events by a form of inference. Inference involves generalisation beyond those aspects found within lived experience.

One aspect that calls for more extensive explanation is the need to account for the empirically-felt sense of Selfhood and Self-identity, as articulated through narrative. As we have stated above, both of these entities have as their locus the continuity of the body, such continuity being extracted from lived experience. There is a need however to articulate the means by which such constancy is appropriated from the vagaries of lived experience. We saw that James explained continuity of Self by the continuous appropriations and projections to and from the Pure Ego upon the lived

body, an activity occurring outside the realm of what is given through consciousness.

While Kerby proposes that other forms of symbolic expression may be used to express the Self, he does not go so far as to state that such other means may in fact constitute Selfhood in the manner he attributes to language.

While we agree that all forms of expression are symbolic, and that all can be used to "express the subject", not all appear to possess the narrative attributes endorsed by Kerby, as he himself seems to imply by using the term "non-linguistic forms". If we consider the expressive mediums of music, sculpture, painting, and dance, such mediums do not convincingly espouse the narrative form. For example, instrumental music, while certainly obeying its own rules of tempo, harmony and melody, does not espouse the grammatical, or narrative form. It may of course, inspire and give rise to some types of discourse, thoughts, images and emotions, but the medium itself, other than taking place in a temporal sequence implying a beginning, a middle and an end, does not convincingly suggest a narrative structure. Similar arguments can be made for dance, which may be used to tell a story, but does not constitute in itself a narrative telling of it. One only has to see a ballet where one does not know the accompanying story to be convinced of how little one is further enlightened with respect to its narrative content. Most convincing are the expressions via the fine arts, where the paintings and sculptures, while communicating a state, an emotion, or simply an image, do not communicate a narrative, at most they communicate a mood, an impression related to a moment in time, which may then serve as the springboard for the telling of a narrative.

Such symbolic realms, we argue, are also expressive of the Self. Kerby's notion of a Self exclusively narrative in its constitution excludes such realms of symbolic representation.

2.7.3 Summary

While he bases his conceptualisation on existential phenomenology and hermeneutics, Kerby's focus is on the linguistic hermeneutic side, sometimes going against the principles of existential phenomenology, as well as against the phenomenological aspects of Ricoeur's hermeneutics. We note also that Kerby's explanatory component is minimal, and his conceptualisation clearly gravitates towards the understanding pole of knowledge.

We note that while narrative refers to and is the meaning of pre-narrative experience, Kerby does not sufficiently consider such experience except as it relates to narrative. We have argued that a deeper consideration of lived experience reveals the pre-narrative or embodied Self, the conscious locus from which narration occurs.

While Kerby does not explicitly address the attributes of consciousness, we note that such attributes are resident within narrative, and we have evoked consciousness as an aspect of all lived experience, itself encompassing narrative experience. Thus we find, within narrative, intentionality, unity and constitution of experience.

While Kerby acknowledges the embodied subject as narrating entity and source of continuity, he affords to the body only a vague sense of Self.

Kerby also recognises interpersonal aspects of Self, however these are mediated solely through language. Here we note the importance he affords to the acknowledgement, by others, of one's Self-narrative. We contend that interrelational constitution of Self can take place within pre-linguistic interpersonal experience, as would be the case during infancy.

Kerby does not consider the primary distinction of Self vs. not-Self, his notion of narrative Self is nebulous on this issue. We argue that what will be attributed as Self will be that which ministers to the body as locus of perceived experience. And so while not formally considering this issue, Kerby's conceptualisation leaves room for it.

Kerby has considered the issue of Self-identity in great detail, advocating that Self-identity is essentially composed of many thematised Self-narratives, themselves constituted via an interpretation of recollected memories, themselves resulting from the interpretation of minimal experiential data. We contend that while largely interpreted, such memories preserve the Self/not-Self distinction and contain within each of them a recollected Self which remained continuous throughout the evoked experience. The interpretation of memories preserves this distinction and permits the constitution of Self within the Self-narrative. In each recollection we deem continuity of Self to be attributed to the body, where a continuous sense of Self is deemed to reside. The multiplicity of narratives allow for the multiple nature of Self. Selves will vary according to the theme selected for interpretation. It would not be too far from the truth to state that Kerby's conceptualisation is a conceptualisation of Self-identity rather than of Self.

While Kerby formulates a tripartite subject engaged in the narration of Self, we contend that the speaking subject and the spoken subject can be reformulated as the intentional-attentional aspects to the embodied Self-as-subject expressing itself via the activity of narrative interpretation. Kerby's subject of speech, that is the deemed character within the narration, corresponds most closely to our notion of Self-identity, itself one of the aspects of the Self-as-object.

Additionally, we note the minimal apportion of explanation to Kerby's conceptualisation, which is limited to the generalising aspects of language. In our view, his conceptualisation calls for a larger explanatory component, notably as it concerns the maintenance of continuity in identity and in the sense of Self.

Finally, Kerby's conceptualisation addresses an essential aspect of lived experience, thoroughly considered by Merleau-Ponty and by Ricoeur, and touched upon by certain previous authors, such as James, Sullivan, Laing and Gergen. Kerby elaborates a sophisticated conception of a Self which narrates itself into being, a notion we find highly consonant with that of a Self which interprets itself into being. While thorough in many respects, certain aspects of his conceptualisation we find problematic, these result mainly from an underestimation of the importance of the embodied subject, a notion which we deem to strengthen his narrative conceptualisation. Thus we believe that Kerby overemphasises the role given to narrative, which we view as the most important aspect of a necessary interpretative dimension of Self. This larger category, while capturing narrative, includes those realms of experience that are pre-linguistic, notably the experience of embodiment and that of non-verbal interpersonal relationship. To conclude, while we have found certain shortcomings within his conceptualisation, we view Kerby's contribution as very important one, highlighting the narrative-interpretative dimension to Selfhood. We shall reconsider Kerby's contribution in the upcoming chapter.

2.8 Chapter Two - Concluding remarks

From our existential-phenomenological-hermeneutic approach, we have examined the various conceptualisations according to the criteria outlined in the previous chapter. In our analysis, we highlighted the strengths and weaknesses of each conceptualisation, and at times offered our own interpretation of such notions, often reformulating or completing them in light of our own approach.

We note that most of the conceptualisations, with the exception of Jung and Gergen, gravitate largely towards the understanding pole of knowledge, however this alone does not provide any guarantee of conceptual rigor or strength. While we deem important the consideration of the understanding aspects of Self, notably its consideration from an existential-phenomenological-hermeneutic approach, we have seen that such incorporates many essential aspects, and each must be considered in detail. As we have seen, while each of the authors considered has made important contributions, in each articulation of the Self certain aspects have been omitted, or have been ignored completely. In this chapter we have attempted to highlight these contributions with the expressed aim of singling out their positive and negative aspects according to our elaborated criteria. At this point, what stands out is the need to consider two poles of the Self, the first being the Self-as-subject, in which we find consciousness and its attributes, the second being the Self-as-object, which corresponds to differentiated aspects of lived experience. Additionally, in the space between these two poles, we distinguish three essential dimensions, those of embodiment, of interpersonal relationship and of interpretation. These distinctions are preliminary and we shall synthesise our findings in the upcoming articulation of the necessary dimensions of the Self.

We have also seen that each conceptualisation comprises some explanatory aspects, with the strongest conceptualisations being those which remain as parsimonious as possible and which continually return to the understanding aspects in the attempt to

account for them as faithfully as possible. The contributions of James and Kerby stand out in this respect. This is not to imply that the explanatory aspect to conceptualisations are to be minimised, rather we opine, strengthened by our foregoing analysis, that such explanation is an essential but extremely difficult task. The variety and complexity of the phenomena considered justify, we believe, the need for their thorough description and understanding prior to engaging in such explanation. The application of the hermeneutic circle, that is, the reconsideration of the understanding aspects in light of the explanatory ones, all the while attempting to remain faithful to the understanding aspects, in our view, is necessary for a conceptualisation of Self to be fruitful and powerful.

This concludes our critical analysis of the selected conceptualisations of the Self. We shall follow in the next chapter with a reflection upon our findings, as well as the preliminary elaboration of the necessary dimensions of the Self.

3. CHAPTER THREE: TOWARDS A NEW UNDERSTANDING OF THE SELF

3.0.1 Introduction to Chapter Three

In this chapter, we formulate our own understanding of the Self based on the considerations of our introductory chapter and supported by the critical analysis we carried out in the second. In keeping with our understanding-explanation distinction elaborated in the first chapter, we firstly address the understanding aspects of the Self. After a reconsideration of consciousness and its attributes, and of its relationship to lived experience, we argue for the Self as a synthesis of the Self-as-subject and Self-as-object, a distinction we maintained during our analysis.

Subsequently, we offer our view of what we term the *embodied primordial Self*, a notion based on the synthesis of the foundational aspects of the previous chapter, these being consciousness, lived experience, embodiment, followed by its material, interrelational, interpretative dimensions, as well as the dimension of affection, this last dimension not having been previously considered in our deliberations. Thirdly, we elaborate the notion of *secondary Selves*, these corresponding to habitual expressions of the primordial Self in particular contexts of lived experience. Finally, we consider the remaining themes brought to light in the previous chapter.

In the explanatory aspects of Self, we propose the notion of a *tacit embodied Self*, as source of continuity of Self, of perception, and of symbolic activity.

Finally, we consider some clinical implications of our preliminary rendering of the Self as they relate to psychopathology and psychotherapy.

3.1 The understanding aspects of Self

3.1.1 The embodied primordial Self

In our introductory chapter, we progressively articulated our view of human living as Being-in-the-world, which implies a conscious embodied subject engaged in the interpretation of a world to which it is intentionally related, a notion we progressively developed through our articulation of phenomenology, existential phenomenology and hermeneutics. We also articulated the various notions that comprise this Being-in-the-world, and succinctly note here consciousness and its attributes, lived experience, embodiment, intersubjectivity, narrative, understanding, explanation and interpretation. In our second chapter we used these notions as basis of our analysis, evincing how each were addressed within the various conceptualisations. Our phenomenological approach kept us open to other aspects of Selfhood not dealt with in the first chapter. These we evinced as they became apparent.

In brief, our view of the *primordial embodied Self* is one of an *embodied-conscious-subject-in-relationship-to-lived-experience-which-it-interprets*. This primordial Self we view as a *conscious embodied subject* which is constituted of four essential dimensions that are in indissoluble and multilevelled interrelationship, these being the *material, interrelational, interpretative* and *affective* dimensions. This primordial Self may be experienced alternately as *Self-as-subject* and as *Self-as-object*.

We would like to reiterate the indissoluble and multilevelled interrelationship between each of the dimensions evoked above. While we have singled them out for the purposes of our analysis, what becomes apparent is their necessary and fundamental interrelationship into a gestalt that ontologically precedes our abstraction from it of the fundamental dimensions here described.

Let us now consider each of these aspects to the embodied primordial Self.

3.1.1.1 The Self-as-subject: consciousness and its attributes

We have seen how Husserl has elicited the necessary attributes of consciousness and we have used his deliberations in our consideration of each author's conceptualisation. While so convincingly present from a phenomenological point of view, no other entity is as elusive when we attempt to describe it. While we stand by Husserl's articulation of consciousness, expressed in its most essential aspect, consciousness can be expressed as *presence* to intentional-attentional lived experience, and this seems to be analogous to what Husserl has termed the Transcendental Ego. While we shall return to the problems evoked by a transcendental consciousness, at this point we wish to evince this necessary aspect of consciousness. Whatever its other attributes, such *consciousness-as-presence* inescapably accompanies the apprehension of all lived experience, including that of the Self. Within a conceptualisation of the Self, consciousness is its necessary companion, its living witness, its life centre, and is at the very core of Self, however it be conceptualised. It is in our view, the *Self-as-subject* in its most general and essential aspect, the apperceived locus of consciousness, or centre of all lived experience, including the experience of the Self.

We have articulated how each author's conceptualisation considers consciousness and its attributes. James' conceptualisation stands out as the most articulate in this respect, highlighting the constitutive aspects of consciousness in the sensation-perception-conception hierarchy, the indissoluble link between consciousness and lived experience, including that between consciousness and the body, and between consciousness and the Self. Jung also makes a novel contribution, eliciting consciousness' habitual modes of perceiving and judging under the guise of the psychological functions, evincing as well the relationship between consciousness and what he terms the extra-conscious aspects of lived experience.

We note however that Jung's psychological functions, while belonging to conscious lived experience, vary from person to person. In James' (1890) opinion, the same

may be said for the ability to select, discriminate and conceive at the perceptual and intellectual levels.

Husserl's attributes of consciousness, such as intentionality, unity and constitutiveness (i.e., its protension and retention of perspectives, noetic and noematic aspects), are at a level of generality that undercuts the level of individual differences described by James and Jung. In support of this contention, we note that whatever our discriminative abilities, our consciousness is still in intentional relationship to its objects, in this there is no variation. The same may be said for the unity of these objects. Finally, while we may vary in our ability to distinguish objects and their characteristics, there is invariably a constitution of the vagaries of perspectival views into a single perceived object, one which has meaning for a conscious intending subject.

Based on this observation, we situate James' discriminative characteristics and Jung's psychological functions not as characteristics of consciousness proper, but as forming part of the interpretative dimension of Self, which we shall consider in section 3.1.1.5.3 .

While not addressing the attributes of consciousness per se, Rogers notes that selection of experiences to be symbolised is also a function of the threatening nature of the experience. The notions of repression, projection and other 'defence mechanisms' are also based on the idea of the threatening nature of some unsymbolised or unconscious experience. As previously noted within our treatment of Laing, such mechanisms suppose the fore-knowledge, on some level, of the threatening material, otherwise the repressing entity cannot carry out its function. However, the general question of *what is threatened* is what merits our attention here. While consciousness accompanies all lived experiences, including those of potential and actual pain, we contend that the fear of pain (i.e., threat) is not generated within consciousness. Rather it finds its genesis within the matrix that is *damaged or potentially damaged*, that is, within the Self in its embodied and other

aspects. Thus, while consciously perceived, experience perceived as threatening is in actuality a threat to the Self, not a threat to consciousness.

To summarise, James has considered consciousness' ability to select and to discriminate, Jung has considered consciousness' habitualities in perceiving and judging, and Rogers has considered the effect of threat on selection and symbolisation by the conscious organism. *In our view, these attributes do not belong to consciousness in its essence, rather, they belong to the interpretative dimension of Self.*

Returning to phenomenology, Husserl has considered the necessary attributes of consciousness, which we summarise to be its intentionality, its unity and its constitutiveness. While we deem these attributes more general than those evoked by James, Jung and Rogers, we may question if these attributes belong to the Self rather than to consciousness.

While intimately related to essential consciousness-as-presence, such attributes constitute, in our view, another 'layer' to consciousness. In effect, the very fact that such attributes may be discerned makes them potential objects of consciousness to an anterior conscious subject. However, we note that such an anterior conscious subject *is also in intentional relationship to these attributes taken as object.* The taking of such as attributes as object does not mean that the consciousness taking them is without these attributes. In this respect, such attributes are indivorcibly part of consciousness' intentional - attentional activity. Presence is necessarily intentional - attentional presence, with consciousness intentionally related to its object which it invariably constitutes and perceives as a unity. Furthermore, such attributes of consciousness are not discerned as objects to an apprehending consciousness, rather they emerge from our *reflections upon the nature of consciousness.* Since they cannot be felt as objects of lived experience, they are termed *metaphysical* and are thus distinguished from the Self-as-object, which can be directly experienced.

Thus, while we distinguish these attributes of consciousness, we do not attribute a separate status of Selfhood to them, rather we see these attributes as comprising, together with consciousness-as-presence, the *Self-as-subject*. It is to this consciousness-with-attributes that we deem many authors to have attributed the term *Ego*, which we experience as centre of our efforts, of our will, of our concentration and of perception. It is to this aspect of Self that we deem James to attribute the term *Pure Ego*, although, as we have seen, James' notion of *Pure Ego* incorporates some explanatory aspects not addressed by the notion of *Self-as-subject* here described, and which we shall address later.

To summarise, from our consideration of consciousness and its attributes, we note that consciousness, in its essence, can be expressed as presence to lived experience. Such presence is in a first instance, without attributes. However, the attributes of consciousness, that is to say its intentionality, selectivity, unity and constitutiveness, intentionality-attentionality, can be seen as necessarily accompanying it, for consciousness does not manifest itself without them. Furthermore, such attributes are only discernible in our reflective consideration of them, they are not per se part of lived experience. Thus, in our view, it is consciousness-as-presence together with its attributes, that form what we term here the *Self-as-subject*, a metaphysical entity which, while characterising all of lived experience, is not itself directly experienced.

Other aspects of consciousness, singled out by James, Jung and Rogers, in our view, do not belong to the realm of the *Self-as-subject*, but are deemed constitutive of what we term for the moment the *Self-as-object*, to which we now turn.

3.1.1.2 The Self-as-object

3.1.1.2.1 The relationship to lived experience

In the first instance, the experience of the Self is part of the totality of lived experience. As we have seen, the various authors have considered different aspects of such lived experience, in varying depth and breadth. Here we note James' extensive contribution with respect to the importance of lived experience and his emphasis on its resident ambiguity. Here, we note that *the depth and breadth of lived experience considered is what determines the complexity of aspects that constitute the Self-as-object*. We shall consider the distinctions the authors have made within their conceptualisations in the following section.

Overall, James' conceptualisation incorporates the most depth and the most breadth, however he gives little importance to interrelatedness, especially as it pertains to childhood, and to the function of language. These aspects were considered in depth by Laing, Sullivan and Kerby respectively. Rogers, we noted, has highlighted the impact on psychological health of the value afforded to the Self while Laing has deeply considered the lived experience of the psychotic as well as interpersonal communication with its levels of direct, meta and meta-meta perspectives with their attendant effects on experiencing.

With lived experience being infinitely varied and rich, the analysis of each author's conceptualisation allows us to appreciate the corresponding complexity and variety of the Self. While the authors are to be commended for the articulation of their respective conceptualisations, each has articulated only certain portions of this lived experience. Nonetheless, we contend that a powerful conceptualisation of Self will include all the pertinent aspects underscored by these authors. While the best conceptualisation will need to capture the essence of the largest possible breadth and depth of such experience, we believe that the articulation of the major themes of such lived experience is possible and fruitful.

We note also that lived experience varies with age, with culture and with social changes. In this respect, we are not to be surprised that the Self varies from childhood to adulthood, or that the Self will vary between cultures and between eras. In this respect, Gergen's notion of a Self that has changed throughout this century is consonant with our notion that the Self is the product of lived experience. While we disagree with many of Gergen's assertions concerning the postmodern Self, we agree that the Self will differ from that of previous eras to the extent that lived experience is substantially different from pre-postmodern lived experience. This assertion needs to be verified by a thorough consideration of lived experience in its postmodern aspects. Moreover, we predict that what will be affected is the constitution of certain aspects of the Self-as-object. Consciousness and its attributes, as well as other essential aspects to Selfhood which we shall delineate below, we opine, shall not be affected in their essential attributes.

Another consideration lies in the intimate interrelationship between lived experience and embodiment. We find ourselves embodied in intimate interrelationship with a world of objects and others. All lived experience is embodied experience. All consciousness is embodied consciousness. Existence is essentially characterised by consciousness, embodiment and lived experience. Our view is that the Self incorporates necessarily all three aspects. A conceptualisation of Self must thoroughly consider each of them.

However while constituted from lived experience, the Self is only a portion of it, and it is to be distinguished from objects and others in the World. The question of a criterion to distinguish Self from not-Self is primordial. We shall consider this issue in the following section.

To summarise, we reiterate the foundational importance to be attributed to lived experience. It is only through its thorough consideration that the Self-as-object is to be rendered in sufficient depth and breadth. Also foundational is its relationship to

consciousness and to embodiment. While lived experience may vary infinitely in its detail, we contend that certain aspects or themes are sufficiently general to be deemed essential in any conceptualisation of the Self. It is to these distinctions to which we now turn.

3.1.1.2.2 Distinctions within the Self-as-object

We have seen that the authors reviewed have made, within the Self-as-object, various distinctions. James, within his notion of empirical Self, distinguishes the material, social and spiritual Selves. For Jung, the Self is divided into various entities consisting of the archetypes, the Self-as-archetype, the Self-as-centre, the psychological functions and the transcendent function. Sullivan divides the infant Self into a primary dynamism of good mother/bad mother and a secondary dynamism of good/bad/not me. Laing, we have seen, distinguishes, within the psychotic Self, the body Self, the inner 'true' (false) Self, the Self-system and the social Self. For Rogers, the Self is composed of one's characteristics and abilities, one's value qualities, goals and ideals, and most notably the value attributed to Self by others and oneself. For Gergen, there are only the relational-narrative Selves, while for Kerby, the Self-as-object corresponds to the Self as it is constituted within the narrative, that is as subject of speech.

In this section we argue for the notion of an individual Self-as-object, a conscious-embodied-subject-in-relationship-to-a-world-which-it-interprets, multiple in its interrelated dimensions. This we establish as our notion of *multidimensional embodied primordial Self*. In this sense, the notions of a material Self, of a relational Self, of a narrative Self, of an affective Self and of multiple selves, do not capture the fundamental interrelationship we have found to exist between these dimensions. In our view, rather than conceptualising these notions as Selves, we deem preferable to refer to them as *dimensions* of a multifaceted *embodied primordial Self*. We shall now consider each of these dimensions in turn.

3.1.1.3 The primordial Self as combined Self-as-subject / Self-as-object

In the previous chapter we have seen how each author has considered the issue of the Self-as-subject, that is the entity or agent responsible for perceiving the Self taken as object of consciousness. James, we have seen makes this distinction clearly, distinguishing the Self-as-subject, which he designates as the Pure Ego, from the Self-as-object, which he designates as the empirical Self. James' distinction is based upon the intentionality of consciousness. For James, the Self as object is no exception, it necessarily being an object in the hands of something else and he emphasises the impossibility of the Self being subject to itself. He thus elaborates his notion of the Pure Ego as locus of consciousness and locus of appropriation/ projection of Selfhood. For James, the Pure Ego is not a reified entity but a process, a flux of presence to lived experience, and its necessary correlate. However, such presence is inevitably experienced from a particular perspective, a functional centre of experience, a locus *coterminous* with that of the body. In this sense James speaks of an embodied subjectivity, for through his considerable emphasis on the body, his conceptualisation suggests strongly that the Pure Ego as centre of consciousness, and the body as centre of lived experience, are in the final instance, *indistinguishable*.

Jung defines the Ego as centre of consciousness and consciousness as constitutive of the world, but does not detail its other attributes. As we have seen, Jung focuses almost exclusively on unconscious functioning, and attributes to the Ego a partial role in the integration of the various archetypes, this being the primary concern of the Self-as-centre.

Sullivan, for his part, deems consciousness to reside in the various personifications of the Self, themselves emerging in the context of various interpersonal relationships. While he identifies the primary dynamism as intimately associated with the body, Sullivan does not clearly identify a locus of consciousness acting as

Self-as-subject in interrelationship to the Self-as-object, in which he distinguishes the primary and secondary dynamisms. Our position leads us to consider his conceptualisation as pointing towards the notion of an embodied consciousness, in that the primary dynamism could be interpreted as the locus of embodied interpersonal lived experience. This however is not developed by Sullivan and it leaves the notion of the Self-as-subject largely unresolved.

For Laing, the centre of consciousness is the Ego, however for the psychotic, the centre of experience shifts from the body to what he terms the inner 'true' Self, which he describes as a false Self alienated from the body. Implicit to Laing's conceptualisation is the notion that for the normal person, consciousness finds its locus within the body which appears as centre of lived experience, however this notion is not sufficiently developed. Thus, Laing's conceptualisation remains vague as to the notion of a Self-as-subject for the normal person and while he evokes the notion of a perceiving Ego, this notion remains vague as well.

As we have seen, for Rogers the organism is the implied perceiver and centre of lived experience, however he gives this notion little attention. In addition, we have seen that Rogers conflates the notions of Self-as-subject and Self-as-object. While not addressing the organism in its embodied aspects, his conceptualisation suggests that consciousness has its locus within the body.

Gergen for his part does not address consciousness nor the notion of the Self-as-subject. While emerging from the narrative associated to the relational matrix, the Self is conceptualised as lacking any particular locus, with Gergen dissolving the notion of any type of individual Self. We find his position problematic for it ignores the phenomenon of embodiment and it does not consider the locus of the narration, which we deem to be the conscious embodied subject.

Finally, Kerby elaborates the notion of the implied subject, itself composed of two narrative entities: the speaking subject and the spoken subject. These entities

correspond to different roles played by the embodied subject, the first being that of narrator, the second being that of audience, in relationship to the subject of speech, itself corresponding to our Self-as-object. For Kerby the Ego, or Cogito, is no more than a semantic consequence of language, corresponding to the 'I' within discourse, and denies its reality outside of narration. Thus, there is no phenomenological or experiential centre of consciousness ontologically prior to its expression via language. And so while identifying an emissive/receptive locus of narration, Kerby argues that such a locus is virtual, a mere semantic consequence of language usage.

In our treatment of Kerby we have argued that while he acknowledges the reality of embodiment, he does not give it sufficient consideration, notably as phenomenological reference point for language, in that the locus of narrative, we contend, always points to the locus of lived experience, the embodied subject. We agree with Kerby that as symbolic medium, language is constitutive of reality, raising the pre-symbolic realm to the level of meaning. In this sense, without symbols, the Self, just as any other aspect of lived experience, cannot be understood. Such emergence of meaning coincides with the expressive-distancing-generalising-abstractive function of symbolic activity. In this perspective, we view his notion of 'consciousness of Self' as just another term used to express the distancing consequence of symbolic activity. It is the capacity, in an abstractive-reflective move inherent to symbolic activity, to take the preceding Self-as-subject/Self-as-object relationship as object for the present 'thought pulse' of the conscious-embodied-Self-as-subject. We agree with Kerby that without symbols, taking the Self as object of consciousness is not possible. However we disagree that the Self-as-subject is in fact nothing more than the 'I' of language, arguing that language is meaningless without the supportive matrix of lived experience, in which we find the Self as phenomenon.

With James, we argue for the existence of a phenomenal 'I', a centre of experience mirroring the 'I' of narrative. As we have seen, such a phenomenal 'I' is in the final instance, nothing more than our conscious presence to lived experience,

inescapably lived from the perspective of a centre of experience, *coincident with the body*. Descartes' cogito, Husserl's ego, James' Pure Ego, all point to this indubitable and palpable sense of experience, lived from the point of view of a centre. We add, with James and with Merleau-Ponty, that the locus of consciousness and the locus of embodiment are one and the same, and with the existential phenomenologists, we do not deem it to be a reified entity.

If the Self-as-subject/Self-as-object distinction is to be maintained, then how, as embodied consciousness, we come to perceive our own body, becomes problematic. A first notion seems to indicate that for perception of the body to be effected, another centre of experience is necessary, one that, while taking the body as object, is not that object. We note that the body is itself part of lived experience, however perception of one's body, while seemingly effected through this same body, is always perspectival, with the singular distinction that this perspective is determined and cannot be changed. James, when considering the body as part of the material Self, takes the body as object of consciousness. All the other empirical Selves, we have seen, gain their significance because they minister in the final instance, to the body. Yet the locus of consciousness and the locus of lived experience (i.e., the body) are seen as one and the same. Merleau-Ponty (Mook, 1998) expresses this primordial ambiguity in his reversibility thesis where the perceiving body is part of the things perceived, where the touching finger is also the finger which is being touched.

We note that such reversibility is tied to the intentional-attentional distinction we made in the first chapter. Touching refers to the intentional aspect while being touched refers to the attentional aspect. The reversibility thesis implies the ability to switch from intention to attention and vice versa and points out their intimate interrelationship. However, this applies to all of perception, not just to the perception of the body. We also note that while the body may perceive itself, such perception always relates to another part of the body. In this sense, the eyes can perceive other parts of the body but not themselves, the ears can hear sounds produced by speech or by body movements but cannot hear themselves. Touch of

oneself is always attending to some other part of the body (Mook, 1998). Here we add the notion of *spatial deferral* analogous to the *temporal deferral* noted by James with respect to consciousness' ability to perceive itself. Thus, the perception of the embodied consciousness by itself implies a *spatio-temporal deferral*, for it cannot perceive itself in the present moment, nor in the present location, but only through *a necessary temporal and spatial shift*. Perception of the embodied consciousness by itself is, in this respect, indirect, for it can only take itself as object of consciousness through such distancing. In its attempt to take itself as object of consciousness, the embodied consciousness is in an intentional relationship to an object itself in intentional relationship with another object, echoing Kierkegaard's assertion that the Self is "a relationship which relates itself to itself" (Laing, 1960, p 87).

From these deliberations, we offer our own notion of the Self-as-subject as being, in all instances, that of *a whole Self able, through the spatio-temporal shift here described, to take aspects of itself as Self-as-object*. While we may have distinguished consciousness and its attributes (taken as subject) from the rest of the Self (taken as object), we find that in the final instance, the Self-as-subject is in all cases a *conscious-embodied-subject-in-relationship-to-the-world-which-it-interprets/affectations*. It is always *the Self as totality* which apprehends, through the spatio-temporal shift here invoked, aspects of itself taken as object. In this respect, the Self-as-subject / Self-as-object distinction is, in the final instance, a relative and ambiguous one.

Based on these arguments, we see no need to invoke a higher-level entity which 'looks upon the Self' at a distance so to speak, for through the notion of an embodied consciousness, coupled with the temporal and spatial shift here invoked, we can account for the fact that the Self-as-subject is able to apprehend itself as Self-as-object. We see no need to invoke a higher-order Ego, detached from the Self, for in our estimation the Ego, or Self-as-subject, we find always to be taking as Self-as-object a previous Self-as-subject.

To summarise, while we distinguish the Self-as-subject and the Self-as-object, we note their indissoluble interrelationship, and the relativity of this distinction, consciousness always being embodied and with the Self as object always being conscious, that is a Self-as-subject.

At this point we consider our elaboration of the embodied primordial Self, the first consideration being its embodiment.

3.1.1.4 The primordial Self as embodied Self

From the point of view of existential phenomenology, the body is foundational in that we find ourselves as conscious embodied subjects in a world with which we are in indissoluble relationship. As we have seen, some of the authors in the previous chapter have not developed this theme within their conceptualisations. Jung and Gergen stand out in this respect. Rogers, while not addressing the body, implies it within his concept of organism, while Kerby, who acknowledges the presence of the embodied subject, denies any form of Selfhood to it.

James, Laing, and to a lesser extent Sullivan, have devoted a substantial role for embodiment within their conceptualisations. Sullivan we note, has thoroughly studied the lived experience of the infant and notes that the personification of the 'me' is intimately tied to the "sentience of my body" and emphasises the bodily felt experience of anxiety and its effect on the constitution of the Self (Sullivan, 1953a, p 161). What we find problematic within his conceptualisation is that while he affords the lived body with some vague sense of 'I'-ness, such is primarily resident within the Self-system or secondary dynamism. The notion of embodiment while acknowledged, is not sufficiently developed.

For Laing, embodiment is at the centre of lived experience, and at the centre of psychological health. While in the healthy individual, the body is seen as the "core of the true Self", the psychotic is cut off from his felt-sense of embodiment, and in Laing's view, experiences himself as divided (Laing, 1960, p 71). Such cutting off results from the misinterpretation of lived experience, with such misinterpretation taking place in the context of interpersonal relationships.

James, we have seen, has explored in great depth and breadth the relationship between conscious lived experience and the body. For James, the body is the indubitable centre of all experience, it is the centre of all of the empirical Selves, and is the source of perceived continuity and identity of Self. This is achieved, he contends, by a continuous series of appropriations and projections between the body and the Pure Ego.

From an existential-phenomenological point of view, the body is the centre of all lived experience, all living is experienced as embodied living. From the point of view of a conceptualisation of Self, we see the body as the centre of lived experience, the centre of the continuity of such experience, intimately interwoven with both the world and with consciousness. James' conceptualisation clearly and rigorously evinces these aspects in both depth and breadth.

In his concept of narrative Self, Kerby notes that the author of the narration is the embodied subject, a concept he borrows from Merleau-Ponty but that he does not himself elucidate. For Kerby, Self-identity is the story one tells of oneself, the 'I' within the narration. Kerby argues that such narration is constructed from memories, themselves constituted from minimal experiential data. We add that within such experiential data is *the body figuring prominently as centre of experience*, constant within it and more constant than not between experiences. We propose that Self-constancy be in fact constituted from the sewing together of the embodied Selves as they are recalled within each experience. The 'I' within the narration, contrary to Kerby, we deem to refer to this conglomerate of experiential

felt bodily centres. We see this sewing together in a manner analogous to James' description of the continuous appropriations and projections of Self by consciousness from and onto the body, where each new pulse of consciousness appropriates the immediately preceding one, itself the appropriator of the chain of Selves that have gone past. Self-constancy we distinguish from Self-identity, which we deem the product of narration, where the Self becomes the story one tells of oneself. This aspect we shall reconsider in the section on the interpretative dimension of Self (section 3.1.1.5.3).

While Kerby denies formal Selfhood to the embodied subject, he does grant that the body harbours a vague sense of Self. We see the sense of embodiment as constitutive, in a fundamental manner, of Selfhood. More than a vague sense of Self, the body constitutes the primordial anchoring in a world. It is the centre of lived experience, the perceived locus of our insertion into the world.

For Laing, the divided Self results from lack of embodiment. With the body conceived as source of continuity of Self-experience, it follows that if the individual is cut-off from the felt-sense of embodiment, as Laing contends is the case for the psychotic, then we foresee that there will be no bodily sense of identity nor any sense of continuity within and between experiences that may serve as basis to the identity and continuity of Self. Any sense of Self constructed from the vagaries of experience lacks a common reference point or core. It is thus conceivable that without such a uniting centre, the Self will be experienced as divided.

We may question how such alienation from the body may manifest itself. Laing contends that alienation results from competing interpretations of experience, where one's experiencing is denied by the significant other. We can surmise, in extreme cases, that the child comes to distrust its bodily sensations, interpreting (for example) intrinsically pleasant bodily sensations as unpleasant or 'bad'. The significant other's interpretation becomes more credible than one's own, and any perceived sense of embodiment that could serve to correct this is habitually

discounted, distrusted, or ignored. This becomes a habit generalised to all facets of lived experience. Consequently, the construction of the sense of Self, deprived of its somatic centre, is thereby thwarted.

We note that for relating to the other to take place, and for discounting of embodied experience to take place, some form of Self must already exist, since both of these activities require a locus from which they may occur. Thus, even for severely disturbed individuals, we contend that a minimal sense of Self necessarily exists, for our very existence implies the presence of a minimal conscious-embodied-Self-in-relationship-with-others. Existential phenomenology states that we are born into the world embodied and in relationship. We assert that both of these dimensions are important, however relating needs to take place from a locus, this being the body, which we deem to constitute a primordial sense of Self.

Returning to Laing's concept of the divided Self, while we agree with Laing that what characterises psychotics is a fragile sense of embodiment, we do not see this as a lack of embodiment per se, but as a *habitual discounting of bodily experience* in the constitution of Self, whereby the resulting construction lacks constancy and identity within and between experiences. There is no perceived centre of constancy or centre of identity, and the Self is felt to vary greatly as a function of the present experience, notably experience with others. Such lack of constancy we deem related to what Laing refers to as *the fear of closeness with others* characteristic of the lived experience of the psychotic. Such fear we deem to be the fear of *dissolution of Self*, or of *damage* to it. Laing's notion of lack of embodiment, which we reformulate as *a lack of constancy of Self*, would account for how fear of dissolution of Self is accentuated in the case of the psychotic.

To summarise, while several authors afford various degrees of importance to embodiment, James has explored this notion with the most depth and breadth and his resembles most the notion of embodiment espoused by existential phenomenology. Laing's insights concerning the relationship of embodiment to

psychosis highlight the importance of the sense of embodiment in healthy psychological development, Sullivan notes its presence in childhood development and our reformulation of Kerby's conceptualisation acknowledges the relationship between the lived body and narration.

We acknowledge these insights and expand the role of embodiment in each of these aspects of Self-constitution, arguing for a more central role in the constitution of Laing's psychotic Self and of Kerby's notion of narrated Self-identity. Based on these considerations, we advocate the *centrality of the body* as necessary and central dimension within a conceptualisation of Self, one we deem as locus of all experience and locus of the other dimensions. It is to these other dimensions, beginning with the material one, that we now turn.

3.1.1.5 The dimensions of the embodied primordial Self

3.1.1.5.1 The material dimension to Self

Within our review, James distinguishes himself as the only author who elaborates the notion of a material Self. For James, this included one's body, possessions, friends, family and accomplishments. In his opinion, if a person should lose all of his material possessions, his sense of Self would be correspondingly altered. James argues that such material objects gain their significance to the Self in virtue of the valued sensations they minister to the body.

Laing, for his part, while not elaborating the notion of a material Self, opines that the severe psychotic with very weak ontological boundaries may have difficulty distinguishing himself from perceived objects, and in fact may believe he *is* the object (Laing, 1960).

In our view the embodied primordial Self, being in intentional relationship to a world of objects and others, may attribute certain objects as part of Self, this being

mediated by the significance given to the object. Objects accompany our daily living and are involved in all of lived experience. In addition to the corporeal pleasure they may provide, objects may also be symbolically or concretely associated to interpersonal experience, to social status, to specific persons we cherish or to one's activities and accomplishments. We normally affection the objects we possess or use. We note in this respect the attachment and sense of Self associated with the topographical aspects of one's country, province or city.

Thus objects that have been part of our lived experience, to the extent that they have significance for the embodied primordial Self, will be constitutive of it. This is not to mean that the Self conflates itself with the object, but rather that it appropriates it as being part of itself. In this aspect, the notion of ownership of the object will have some bearing on its appropriation as Self, such ownership being related to the degree of agency the Self may exercise over the object. We shall discuss agency in our section dealing with the criterion distinguishing Self from not-Self (section 3.1.3.3).

To summarise, our notion of an embodied primordial Self incorporates a material dimension relating to objects that have significance for it in various contexts of lived experience. The material dimension is related to the interrelational, interpretative and affective dimensions in that objects are associated with others, with our symbolic activities and are invariably valued affectively.

3.1.1.5.2 The interrelational dimension to Self: the perception of the alter ego and the other as constitutive of Self

Within our review, James is the only author who has considered in depth how we come to perceive the other as alter ego. James, as we have seen, proposes that the attribution of alterity has as precondition that the other perceives the same objects as we do. This is effected through a reasoning by analogy, based on the notion that we come to realise that the other uses the same spatial coordinates as our own. This view has also been elaborated by Husserl.

For existential phenomenology, perception of the other is pre-reflective, with Merleau-Ponty noting, based on his research of childhood development, that the child perceives the other as alter ego before any reasoning by analogy can be effected. Merleau-Ponty contends that a pre-reflective intersubjective field is in fact constituted in the interaction of two embodied subjects. In our view such pre-reflective perception is effected by the tacit embodied Self, a notion we shall consider in our section dealing with the explanatory aspects of Self (section 3.2).

While devoting considerable attention to the perception of the alter ego, James surprising gives little consideration the interpersonal aspects of Self, noting however that others are important to the constitution of Self, especially in the realm of the social Self, where he deems that there are as many Selves as persons who recognise us. While James attributes a role to the other within the constitution of the Self, this role is relatively minor and does not reflect the profoundly interpersonal aspect to a significant portion of our lived experience, such as espoused by our approach.

Sullivan is the first author to afford foundational importance of the other in the constitution of Self noting, in a manner congruent with an existential-phenomenological point of view, that the Self is profoundly interrelational, especially during infancy and childhood. For Sullivan, there is no Self outside the constellation of significant relationships, especially the relationship with the mothering figure, and notes that we are all born into relationship, upon which depends our very survival. In his social-phenomenological view of the psychotic Self, Laing extends this notion to adulthood and through his notion of the divided Self, highlights the foundational impact of relationships upon psychological health, articulating in detail how our relationships, through the medium of language, affect our experiencing via the intricate network of direct, meta and metameta perspectives. Rogers adds another dimension, that of the value afforded to Self via the positive regard received from others. Working from a postmodern paradigm,

Gergen's central thesis is that the Self is exclusively interrelational, with no Selfhood outside the constellation of interpersonal relationships, these being intimately intertwined with the narratives emanating from them. Finally, while advocating for narrative as sole locus of Selfhood, Kerby notes the importance of others in narrative constitution, in both its phenomenological-hermeneutic aspects, and its semiotic aspects, where the consensual meaning of linguistic expressions are deemed to be established in the social sphere.

While addressing different aspects, each of these authors have highlighted the importance of interpersonal relationships to the constitution of Self. In this section, we shall attempt to critically single out and integrate these aspects.

Sullivan, we have noted, articulates the incipient Self in terms of a primary dynamism which gels into the constellations of good mother/bad mother, these constellations corresponding to the lived experiences in which the child's needs are respectively met or not met, translated, in Sullivan's view, in experiences of euphoria and anxiety. The good mother/bad mother distinction, we note, is one of the many possible ones to be made by the infant. Here we would argue that the incipient Self is in fact an embodied-Self-in-relationship to others within its world, with consciousness already engaged in the progressive differentiation of *all* of lived experience. Rather than an initial distinction of good mother/bad mother, we contend that the more general distinction to be made is that of Self/not-Self in its embodied, interrelational, interpretative and affective dimensions. This of course, would include the multidimensional Self/mother distinction.

The discomfort or anxiety evinced by Sullivan we see as the affective dimension which necessarily accompanies all of lived experience. Most, but not all, of the infant's early experiences will include the mothering one, and such experience, both in its positive and negative affective aspects, will also figure as constitutive of the Self. We shall address this dimension in the section on the affective dimension of Self (section 3.1.1.5.4).

Sullivan also asserts that a secondary dynamism, the Self-system, develops from the primary system into good-me/bad-me/not-me conglomerations, these being experiences grouped together based upon their similarity in terms of their anxiety gradient, with the good-me being those experiences that are associated with well-being, the bad-me being those associated with normal anxiety and the not-me being those associated with severe anxiety. Rather than formulating the infant Self in terms of Sullivan's good mother/bad mother, or good-me/bad-me/not-me, we contend that the infant's Self is constituted of various embodied lived experiences with the mother, which when we generalise to other persons, is constitutive of an interrelational dimension of Self. To this dimension, as well as to other aspects of lived experience, an affective value is afforded to the experience based on the intrinsic pleasure or pain felt within the embodied primordial Self. In this manner do we account for Sullivan's distinctions.

For his part, Laing argues that in adulthood, similar divisions of Self occur in response to a conflict of experiencing that results in alienation from the body, a division of Self, and a fear of closeness with the other. Laing conceptualises the relationship to other as the source of such conflict, which results in a precariousness of Self from which further relating becomes problematic, what Laing terms a lack of *ontological boundaries*. Such precariousness we have articulated as a habitual discounting of the embodied dimension of lived experience, which we deem to serve as locus of constancy of Self. Without a firm sense of constancy of Self, the Self/not-Self boundary becomes blurred, this applying equally to that of Self/other. This lack of constancy, in our view, accounts for Laing's concept of divided Self, where the Self, lacking a strong centre, is experienced as disjuncted and labile.

Laing evinces the intricate relationship between the other, lived experience, and embodiment, highlighting their combined effect on the constitution of the Self, noting especially its relationship to psychopathology. Thus for Laing, psychological

health is in direct relationship to the constitution of Self, especially in its embodied aspects, these being strongly influenced by the quality of interpersonal relationships.

Rogers, we have seen, attributes considerable importance to interpersonal relationships through his notion of positive regard which results in positive self-regard (towards the Self with its complexes). We find that Rogers' notion of positive self-regard resonates with James' notion of Self-esteem, however Rogers adds that such acceptance of Self is a strong determinant of psychological health. His therapy, emphasising the unconditional acceptance of the client and his experiencing, reflects this. While Rogers correlates acceptance by others with acceptance of Self, he does not further articulate this relationship. We would add that *the embodied primordial Self will have the same relationship to this aspect of itself as was lived during the experience*. For instance, if in a certain situation an experience of hatred from the other was experienced, in similar contexts, the relationship of the primordial Self to itself will be one of hatred. Thus, more than simple positive/negative valences, we deem that the relationship will be a function of the type of *affective valuing* experienced during the contextual experience. We note however that this articulation of the notion of Self-affection is still incomplete, and we shall address it more comprehensively in our section on the affective dimension to Self (section 3.1.1.5.4).

For Gergen, the Self is constituted through the multiple narratives emanating from the constellation of interpersonal relationships. Gergen thus highlights the central importance of the other in the constitution of the Self as well as its intimate relationship to narrative. Coupled to this narrative-interrelational view is the issue of multiplicity of Self, emanating from the possibility of multiple narratives and of multiple relationships. Moreover, Gergen develops the notion of the Self undergoing transformation in corroboration with changes taking place in the fabric of society. While disagreeing with Gergen on many details concerning his articulation of these broad assertions, our existential-phenomenological-hermeneutic approach views the Self as profoundly interrelational, giving rise to

the multiple nature of the Self, coupled with the necessity of its partial constitution through narrative. With our own notion of the embodied-Self-in-relationship-to-the-world, where world includes the presence of others, we underscore the necessity of embodiment and the foundational datum of lived experience, two notions which Gergen denies, but which we have demonstrated to be foundational to the issue of Self-identity and to the constitution of narrative. Finally, Gergen's assertions concerning the progressive transformation of the Self we account for by our notion of lived experience, arguing that the nature and range of lived experiences available today may well differ substantially from those available a century ago. Thus, with Gergen, we agree that the nature and breadth of available lived experiences may have changed, at least in some factions of society, giving rise to aspects of Selves not available in previous eras. We also agree that with the rapid rate of change taking place in postmodern life, the constitutive process of Self may well be affected. However, with our insistence on the body as basis of identity, locus of relationship, and locus of narration, we contend that life styles and situations which impede the experiencing of the body as core will not be conducive to the comprehensive constitution of Self, as evinced by Laing and implied by Sullivan. And so, against Gergen, we contend that the rapid pace of postmodern living has a strong potential for impeding, rather than enhancing, the healthy constitution of Self.

Finally Kerby's conceptualisation, while not granting to prenarrative interrelational experience a foundational role to the constitution of Self, grants to interpersonal relationships a role in the constitution of Self through their constitutive and validating roles in narrative. As we have seen, Kerby does not formally endorse any form of Selfhood outside the confines of narrative, however with Sullivan and with Laing, we have noted the intimate interrelationship between interpersonal experience and Self, granting to the other a primordial role in the constitution of the Self. While we agree with Kerby that interpersonal communication, especially during adulthood, takes place through language, we contend, with Merleau-Ponty, that in infancy, such constitution is primarily pre-linguistic, with interpersonal communication taking place, in the first instance, through non-verbal means. Thus,

while agreeing with Kerby on the constitutive attributes of narrative as it relates to the Self, we assert the presence of another primordial dimension of Selfhood, that of *pre-narrative interrelational experience, as mediated through the body*. Kerby's own admission of a vague sense of pre-narrative (embodied) Self lends support to our view, however we add that such a pre-narrative Self would be constituted, in part, by the pre-reflective relationship to others.

To summarise, each of these perspectives points to the *essential interrelational dimension* resident in the constitution of Self, a notion highly consonant with existential phenomenology and phenomenological hermeneutics. Simply put, existence is existence with others, and this manifests itself at every level of our lived experience, from the fulfilment of our most basic physiological needs to the most intricate and abstract of our symbolic activities. All of our lived experience is indissolubly intertwined with the lived experience of others. It is thus our contention that the Self, while simultaneously being part of and emanating from lived experience, cannot be constituted outside of this interrelational dimension.

We have also noted the multiple and intricate roles of interpersonal relationships in the constitution of narrative, pointing out how narrative serves to establish Self-identity, how it emerges from interpersonal relationships, how others validate Self-narratives, how narrative is affected by its actual or imagined audience, and how language is a socio-cultural consensual phenomenon. While we acknowledge a fundamental role for narrative in Self-constitution, we reiterate the realm of the pre-narrative interrelational experience, one we deem constitutive of a *pre-narrative interrelational dimension of Self*.

While we assert the Self to be fundamentally relational, this does not exclude the reality of its embodiment. Relating invariably takes place through the medium of the lived body, as highlighted by Sullivan who stresses the non-verbal, or inter-bodily level of communication, and by Laing who stresses embodiment as foundational to continuity and integrity of Self. In our view, the Self is in the first

instance an embodied-Self-in-relationship. In this sense, the notion of embodiment and the notion of interrelationship, while distinguished for the purposes of our analysis, are profoundly interrelated, with neither taking place without the other. While we have stressed the embodiment dimension as constitutive of the primordial Self, this Self is from the moment of birth, and possibly from the moment of conception, *an embodied-Self-in-relationship*. The interrelational dimension is thus seen as a foundational dimension to our developing notion of the embodied primordial Self.

3.1.1.5.3 The interpretative dimension of Self: Self and narrative

While some of the authors considered have articulated a role for narrative in the constitution of Self, Gergen and Kerby distinguish themselves as advocates for a Self that is profoundly narrational in nature. James asserts that language is constitutive of thought, and while the Self is itself an object of thought, he does not articulate the Self in narrational terms. While Jung and Rogers do not address the issue of language, Sullivan's conceptualisation, with his notion of prototaxic-parataxic-syntactic symbolisation, articulates a role for language in the process of symbolisation of experience. Laing has articulated how interpersonal communication, mostly achieved through language, affects Self constitution through its effect on experiencing. Moreover, he asserts that the Self is the story one and others tell of who one is, however, he does not elaborate the Self in narrative terms.

From our point of view, narration, as symbolic medium, is indispensable in the constitution of Self, however narration is by its nature intricately involved with consciousness, embodiment, interpersonal relationships, affectivity and lived experience. Narration, while serving to render these dimensions explicit, finds its foundation within them, in a necessary dialectical and multilevelled interrelationship with each of them. In this sense, rather than conceptualising the Self as a product of narrative, we see narrative as one type of symbolisation

constitutive of Self through its relationship to the multifaceted, phenomenal, or pre-narrative, dimensions of lived experience.

Rather than formulating a narrative Self, which connotes that this aspect of Self has its sole locus of genesis and of being within the narrative realm, we prefer the notion of an *interpreted dimension to Self*, for this captures better the intimate relationship between the embodied, interrelational and affective dimensions of the Self and their explication in symbolic or narrative terms. In this section we consider each author's contribution in light of our approach, where we shall distinguish, synthesise and augment their insights.

James notes that thinking goes on mostly in linguistic terms, and notes that our thought is not known to us until it is articulated through language, which, while part of lived experience, also serves to designate it, enabling us to make distinctions and relations within and between objects of experience. Both Gergen and Kerby, with their respective postmodern views of Self, agree with this notion, arguing that language is constitutive of both reality and of the Self.

For his part, Kerby has taken a hermeneutic approach to the Self, arguing for its constitution through language, and situating it solely in the narrative sphere. As we have seen, Kerby attributes the notion of Self-consciousness to the reflexivity of language, and in his view, there is no consciousness of Self outside of language.

The reflexivity of language is itself not explicated by Kerby. While we may write about writing, speak about speaking, and think about thinking, the word or thought thought about is never coincident with the thought thinking it. James has convincingly demonstrated that despite our best efforts, it is not possible for us, as thinking subjects, to turn our gaze inwards and seize our present thought in its unfolding. With thinking going on in mostly linguistic terms, James' assertion then implies that if indeed language is fully reflexive, this reflexivity is not fully transferred to thinking. The limit to the reflexivity of thought noted by James is

either a property of language, or is inherent to the thinking processes themselves, and are in this sense, independent from language. While we agree that language is the medium granting us the power to make the myriad distinctions and relations within lived experience, and in this sense is constitutive of our reality, language is also not this reality, for it refers to and describes it at a distance, so to speak. With our hermeneutic notion of language referring to lived experience, and with Ricoeur's notion of lived experience being pre-narrative in form, we advocate that the reflexive limit described by James has a phenomenological basis, with language serving to describe a phenomenon that ontologically precedes its expression into linguistic form. Extending this reasoning to that of the Self, we emphasise that the Self is in the first instance a phenomenon, one which simultaneously precedes and is given form by its expression into language and thought. In this sense, language makes consciousness of Self possible through its ability to render the necessary distinctions that single out, from lived experience, the phenomenon of the Self and place it as object of consciousness. We note that in this respect, the Self is no different from any other part of lived experience taken as object of consciousness. And so while language may indeed harbour total reflexivity, we note that the limit to Self-reflexivity is a phenomenal one, as we have explicated it previously in our section dealing with the Self-as-subject and Self-as-object (section 3.1.1.3). In this respect, we disagree with Kerby's assertion concerning the locus of Selfhood as residing solely within narrative. Narrative, as with other means of expression, expresses something about lived experience, within which we find the experience of the Self.

While language permits the articulation of the meaning of experience and in this sense is constitutive of it, we note again that without its continuous reference to lived experience, language is rendered meaningless. In the first chapter, we have highlighted, by appeal to Merleau-Ponty and to Ricoeur, the intricate interrelationship between language and lived experience, arguing that without language, lived experience is meaningless, pointing out as well how lived experience is itself configured in quasi-narrative form. In our view, the embodied

primordial Self, as part of lived experience, is no exception, and is itself articulated in the dialectic between lived experience and language.

Also relevant is the relationship between language and the body. We have already pointed out how we deem the 'I' in narrative to always refer to the embodied subject and loses its meaning without this reference. In this sense, the locus of narrative points to the body as locus of lived experience, which is, by virtue of its status as centre of lived experience, also the centre of narrative experience.

Gergen and Kerby consider Self-identity to be the product of narrative, with the Self being the story one (and others) tell of who one is. We make a distinction between Self-identity as articulated within narrative and Self-identity as phenomenon within the constitution of the Self. This second aspect James has thoroughly described in his account of continuity of Self, evoking the Pure Ego as continuous appropriator and projector of such continuity between the body and itself. In our treatment of Kerby we have extended this attribute to narration, arguing that constancy of Self in narrative is based upon the perceived constancy of the embodied primordial Self within and between the portions of recollected lived experience sewn together in the activity of narration. *Thus, we contend that the constancy of Self brought to light by narrative is founded upon the constancy of Self found within lived experience.*

Self-identity as the story one tells of oneself is the result of the narration of a certain aspect of lived experience according to a certain theme. Here we note that just as perception of any object is always perspectival, the theme is the perspective from which narration of Self necessarily takes place, giving rise to multiple views of the Self. However, just as perspectives may differ yet refer the same noematic object, *many differing Self-narratives may refer to the same embodied primordial Self.*

Moreover, we note that while Self-narratives may focus on the description of the Self in its actual state, they normally recount the actions, passions (used here to mean the opposite of action, that is experiences where we feel acted upon), thoughts

and intentions of the embodied Self within a certain context. Such actions and passions are seen to constitute the Self in the sense that the locus of interpretation appropriates to the Self certain qualities and attributes based on its experiences. In this sense, the Self's attributes are what is interpreted as its actions/passions in the world. Simply put, The Self *is* what it *does/is done* to it. We see here the relationship between interpretation and the criterion between Self and not-Self, which we shall in the section dealing with the Self/not-Self distinction (section 3.1.3.3).

Finally, we have seen that narration according to different themes leads to the constitution of multiple Selves. James, Sullivan, Laing, Gergen and Kerby have all alluded to the multiple nature of the Self, however only Gergen and Kerby account for such multiplicity by an appeal to narrative, with Kerby making an exclusive appeal to it. Here we would like to reiterate the role of lived experience in the constitution of multiple selves. James, Sullivan, Laing and Gergen highlight the relationship between the multiple nature of the Self and interpersonal relationships. Thus, while we agree with the notion of the multiple nature of the Self as a product of narrative, such multiplicity is also related to the various interpersonal relationships we entertain. Here we return to the notion of an embodied Self in relationship to a world of objects and others, emphasising that different aspects of Self become manifest in the relationship between the embodied Self and different aspects of the world. Also, we recall that James expressed the material Self as that portion of lived experience relating to one's possessions. Thus, while we deem interpersonal relationships to harbour much importance in terms of the constitution of the Self, James' observation leads us to note that relationships to objects and ideals in the world may also be constitutive of Self and are equally amenable to narration. Thus in our view, the multiple nature of Self, while made apparent in narration, relates to the relationship between the embodied primordial Self and different aspects of lived experience. In light of such, we assert *that narration is not the source of multiplicity but rather the medium which renders this multiplicity explicit.*

In our section dealing with the Self-as-subject (section 3.1.1.1), we noted James' discriminative characteristics and Jung's psychological functions not as characteristics of consciousness proper, but as forming part of the interpretative dimension of Self. We note that James considers a spiritual Self, referring to the realm of one's intellect, character of will, values and other psychological particularities. Jung, we noted earlier, refers to psychological types, which we view as habitualities of thinking and perceiving. Rogers refers to similar attributes: one's characteristics and abilities, one's value qualities, and one's goals and ideals. The other authors do not single out this dimension of Self. James notes that these attributes are the most central and intimate to one's person, referring to this spiritual Self as "the Self of all [empirical] Selves" (parentheses ours, James, 1890, p 297). We view such intellectual attributes as *habitalities of interpretation* related to the interpretative dimension of Self, where emphasis is placed on different aspects of intellectual activity such as attention to detail, capacity for abstraction, capacity for establishing links between concepts, for creativity, and the like. Such habitualities are integral to the interpretative dimension of Self, and are associated with the embodied primordial Self in its activity as interpreter of lived experience.

In James' view, a person's intellectual abilities and moral character form part of what he terms the spiritual Self. Jung of course does not clearly situate the psychological functions, but he deems them constitutive of the personality types. Jung does not define personality, nor does he make any clear distinction between personality and Self, except to say that the Self-as-whole equates to the totality of personality.

However, we view the psychological functions as part of one's intellectual abilities, that is, as habitual ways of thinking and perceiving, for they involve one's discriminative abilities, one's ability to reason in abstract, logical or metaphorical terms. As with James' discriminative abilities, such attributes vary between persons,

but remain fairly constant within the person. We thus associate them to the interpretative dimension of Self.

We may question what may account for the variability between persons on these attributes. From our point of view, the adoption of one tendency or another will be a function of previous lived experience. We would add that subsequent lived experience is biased by the previous ones, in that a *habitus*, or *habitual way of being*, (Merleau-Ponty, 1945) develops and exerts a strong influence on the perception of subsequent experience. How such a habitus develops and in fact exerts its influence will not be addressed here, however we shall deem it to occur. Such a habitus would account for the difficulty we have in breaking certain habits, or for the difficulty in perceiving things in a manner different from those we are accustomed to. In this respect, what are normally labelled personality traits, or character traits, we view as traits belonging to the Self, such traits being developed in correlation with lived experience. Previous lived experience serves to create a habitus, or Self-tendency, which in turn biases subsequent experience. This crystallisation of experience into habitual Self-tendencies is what we deem to account for the apparent stability of personality and behaviour.

Jung's typology leads to eight personality types, which can be extended to 16 according to Myers and Myers (1980). If Jung and Myers and Myers are correct in their theorising, then we can concur with their contention of 16 personality or Self-types only if we limit our consideration of lived experience to that of the perceptual and judging functions and tendencies they advocate. However, we can also consider lived experience from many other themes, such as that of the parent-child relationship, or from the perspective of problem-solving styles, from which a similar constellation of habits may be discerned, resulting in many other Self typologies. Considering the almost infinite number of themes from which lived experience may be interpreted, we find ourselves with a multiplicity of possible Self typologies. Thus, by invoking the notion of lived experience, together with that of the habitus, we circumscribe, although in a very general way, the plethora of

personality or Self traits circumscribed by various theories and psychological instruments.

To summarise, we elaborate here our notion of an interpretative dimension to the embodied primordial Self, conceived here as a conscious-embodied-subject-in-relationship-to-a-world-which-it-interprets. Associated with this dimension are habitualities of interpretation which characterise how we habitually discriminate, reason and abstract from lived experience. Here we introduced the notion of habitus, a notion developed by Merleau-Ponty. This notion, together with the infinite themes from which lived experience may be interpreted, give rise to the notion of Self typologies, which we deem to constitute what has been circumscribed by the myriad of personality and trait measures developed in psychology.

Again, we have seen how the interpretative dimension is interrelated with those of embodiment and interrelationship, consciousness and lived experience, and this in a multilevelled interrelationship.

3.1.1.5.4 The affective dimension of Self: a reformulation of Self-esteem and Self regard

James and Rogers have respectively addressed the issue of Self-esteem and Self-regard, both of which refer to the notion of *value afforded to the Self*. James noted that a person harbours definite *feelings* towards the Self, these varying between the two extremes of Self-satisfaction and Self-contempt. For James, Self-esteem could be expressed as the sum of one's pretensions divided by the sum of one's successes. However, he also notes that many persons who had obvious successes deem themselves worthless, while others with little obvious merit harbour unjustified pride and conceit. For his part, Rogers considers the worth afforded to Self, which he terms Self-regard, as central to psychological health, and his therapy focuses almost exclusively on providing experiences which will favour the emergence of positive

Self-regard. While James deems Self-esteem to be affected by experience, Rogers contends that Self regard is primarily affected by interpersonal experience.

A first issue concerning Self-esteem or Self-regard is that of determining *what is esteemed* and by *whom*, for neither author clearly addresses this issue. Within James' conceptualisation, we would contend that the Pure Ego, as Self-as-subject, harbours feelings towards the empirical Self, which it takes as Self-as-object. For Rogers, this issue is left unresolved as he does not make the Self-as-subject/Self-as-object distinction. In our view, the embodied primordial Self would be able to harbour feelings towards aspects of itself, via a spatio-temporal shift that we have outlined in the section of the primordial Self as synthesis of Self-as-subject and Self-as-object (section 3.1.1.3).

A second issue concerns how such esteem is defined. James bases it on an evaluation of one's accomplishments, but in a second breath notes that such is not always the case and leaves the issue unresolved. Rogers bases it on the regard received from others. Rather than Self-esteem or Self-regard, we offer here the notion of *an affective dimension to Self*, which we deem to be a dimension inherent to the embodied primordial Self as it is always engaged in the *affective valuing of experience*, whether this be of Self-experience or of experience of the world.

Without endeavouring to exhaust this vast subject, we would like to say a few words about affect in general. From an existential-phenomenological point of view, affection is no different from perception in that affections assail us and are part of our pre-reflective lived experience. There is no conscious appraisal of the situation which precedes our affective 'reaction', rather such reaction is part of our appraisal of the situation. In this respect, we note that all experience is imbued with an affective aspect in that we may articulate our feelings with respect to *any object or person within our field of experience*. From a hermeneutic point of view, affective experience, just like any other experience, requires interpretation to express its meaning, which usually involves finding not only the 'reason' why we are feeling a

certain way, but a deeper consideration of the feeling itself, this may be done easily or may require considerable reflection, as is often the case in psychotherapy. We note here the hermeneutic aspect to affective experience, in that while a phenomenal given, its full meaning only emerges within the dialectic of the hermeneutic circle.

Thus we add the notion of an affective dimension to that of the embodied primordial Self, a dimension which we deem to accompany all aspects of lived experience. This dimension is also indissociably interrelated with the previously articulated dimensions, affection also being related to the interpersonal and the interpretative dimensions of lived experience.

Self-affections relate to the experience of Self, each aspect of Self being imbued with an affective value which through interpretation, we increase our understanding of Self. In this sense, our feeling towards Self, just as our feelings towards others, may be varied and multiple: satisfaction, anger, sadness, pity, joy, excitement, fear, disgust are some examples. Just as feelings are usually seen as a response to persons and objects in certain situations, we view Self-affection as an affective response towards the Self in these same situations. Just as feelings towards others may both vary or remain stable over time (i.e., we may love or hate somebody for a few minutes or a for a lifetime), such is the case for Self-affections.

And so rather than the notion of Self-esteem which connotes the attribution of value to the Self based on an evaluation of its accomplishments, we prefer the notion of Self-affection, which we deem to be an affective value harboured towards the Self as globality but also harboured towards the Self in its specific aspects, such affective valuing being expressed via the entire qualitative range of affective experience. Self-esteem as expressed by James, becomes one possible manifestation of our notion of Self-affection.

Rogers' notion of Self-regard relates to the global valuing of Self, however with his notion of Self-regard complexes, he touches upon the notion of Self-regard being

composite in nature, being related to various aspects of Self. More importantly, he attributes Self-regard as related to the regard received from others. While Laing has described the effects of interpersonal experience on the constitution of Self, and on psychological health, Rogers highlights the effect of affective value attributed to the Self, as received from others, on psychological health, with positive Self-regard being related to the positive regard received from others. Here, we would like to consider how the transfer of such regard may be effected from others to the Self.

Laing, we have seen, has considered in detail how interpersonal experiencing affects the constitution of the Self, and we have detailed our own view of how a habitual discounting of one's own interpretation of experience comes to affect the constitution of the Self. Here, we assert that in the context of the infant's interpersonal experience, the embodied primordial Self *will adopt the same affective relationship towards aspects of itself as that habitually adopted towards it by the significant other*. If, in a certain context, the other repeatedly expresses dissatisfaction with the Self, the embodied primordial Self will habitually adopt this affection and learn to express the same dissatisfaction towards itself in similar contexts. Such dissatisfaction will be integrated with the perception the embodied primordial Self has of itself in this particular context and it will continue to harbour such an affective value unless later experience contradicts this initial interpretation. We also contend that such affection becomes habitual, and changing the affection will be more and more difficult with time, as will changing of the habitual mode of interpretation that accompanies such an affection.

Finally, it would seem that harbouring *positive Self-affection*, such as joy, love, acceptance, and satisfaction, is necessary for psychological health. According to Rogers, positive Self-regard is the keystone to psychological health and leads to openness to and acceptance of a larger portion of lived experience and of the Self within such experience, these being, in Rogers' estimation, consonant with psychological health. The need for positive Self-affection appears to be innate and in this respect, at par with the interpersonal caring necessary in childhood.

To summarise, from James' notion of Self-esteem and Rogers' notion of Self-regard, we develop our own view of Self-affection, which we deem an affective valuing of Self-experience. Self-affection is mediated by interpersonal experience, and just as interpersonal caring, the need for positive Self-affection appears to be innate, with a direct impact on psychological health and well-being. Such affective valuing of Self-experience we view as the expression of a more general *affective dimension to the Self*, an aspect of Self that is applicable to all of lived experience. This affective dimension we include with the other dimensions constitutive of the embodied primordial Self.

3.1.2 Secondary Selves

Notwithstanding this elaboration of a primordial Self, we also contend that certain aspects of lived experience will be constitutive of another form of Selfhood, what we term *secondary Selves*. For example, we would argue that the student would have an academic Self, the working adult, a work Self, a parent, a parental Self, such Selves corresponding to significant aspects of one's lived experience. Such Selves would also be subject to change as one's lived experience changes. As James contends, one cannot develop all aspects of Self equally, some Selves are developed to differing extents, while others are discarded or ignored. We see these Selves as *expressions of the embodied primordial Self in relationship to certain aspects of its world*. In our view, such a secondary Self is constituted from repeated experiences forming a habitus, a habitual method of relating with persons and objects in a particular context. With this notion of secondary Selves, we account for the multiple Selves articulated by many of the authors, notably in the context of interpersonal relationships and of narrative.

While these authors limit multiplicity to the social (James), interrelational (Laing and Sullivan), interrelational-narrative (Gergen) or narrative (Kerby) realms, we contend that all secondary Selves are expressions of the embodied primordial Self,

mediated through the four dimensions, and in which are constituted bodily habitualities related to the particular context of lived experience. Some contexts, such as playing hockey or playing a musical instrument, involve substantially developed bodily habitualities. However, they also involve habitualities related to each of the four dimensions. For example, the hockey player, while exercising substantial physical habitualities particular to this activity, also calls upon the material dimension in his relationship to his equipment, expresses the interrelational dimension with his team-mates, as well as the interpretative dimension in understanding and elaborating game strategies, and harbours definite feelings towards the experiences procured in the context of this activity. In each of the four dimensions, particular habitualities relating to the objects, to the others, to the interpretation of the game, and of affective experience, become manifest.

Different activities may emphasise particular dimensions. As such, the research scientist, while physically involved in the conduct and publishing of his experiments, maximises the interpretative dimension, while also relating to colleagues and equipment, harbouring feelings towards these aspects of lived experience. For the man or woman in love, the affective dimension is particularly salient, however the material, interrelational, and interpretative dimensions are all significantly implied as well. As we can see, each of these secondary Selves corresponds to a particular constellation of the four dimensions of the embodied primordial Self in the context of specific experiences.

Moreover, we note that such *secondary Selves* maintain their common core, that of the multidimensional embodied primordial Self. However, they differ from each other in the extent to which each dimension of Self is actualised, as well as in the particular habitualities invoked within each dimension. Thus, rather than representing particular Selves, we view the material, interrelational, interpretative and affective dimensions as being present in varying degrees and quality in all secondary Selves. Such secondary Selves we view as *crystallisations of habitual ways of being* related to certain repeated contexts of lived experience.

James noted that there can be conflict within the social Selves, where one is torn between adopting highly different Selves, as when one is simultaneously faced with two or more persons from different contexts. In his opinion, these groups will not necessarily call for the same social Self, creating a discomfort for the person. In our view, such discomfort will vary to the extent that the quadri-dimensional habitus associated with one context of lived experience differs from that of another.

In our view, such conflict is bodily-based. While a habitus is formed for each of the domains of lived experience, we note that such habitualities normally do not conflict with each other; our ability to ride a bicycle does not conflict with our ability to play the guitar or to solve a math equation, or to engage in social activities. However as with James' social Selves, conflict may arise when we attempt to join two habitual realms. It becomes difficult to dial a cellular phone, and impossible to ride a bicycle, while driving an automobile. It is also difficult to engage simultaneously with persons with whom highly different configurations of the four dimensions have been habitualised. In the affective dimension, we are not usually comfortable with simultaneously opposite feelings towards objects or persons, such ambivalence usually being felt as a tension.

To summarise, our reflections lead us to consider *secondary Selves* as crystallisations of specific habitualities which incorporate various degrees of the four dimensions (material, interrelationship, interpretation, affection) of the embodied primordial Self. The dimensions can be seen as the modalities by which the more foundational relationship between consciousness and lived experience is expressed. Secondary Selves are crystallisations of the four dimensions in specific contexts of conscious lived experience. There may be conflict between the secondary Selves, to the extent that the respective contexts of lived experience require Selves that differ in these dimensions.

3.1.3 Other aspects of Self

3.1.3.1 Lived time

Amongst the conceptualisations reviewed, only James' and Kerby's address the notion of how time is experienced by the subject. As we have seen, James has given this topic considerable attention and his notion of the *specious present* figures prominently in his treatment of conscious presence to lived experience, and is indissociably related to identity and constancy of Self. Kerby for his part, espouses the hermeneutic notion of time developed by Ricoeur, a notion that includes the phenomenological concept of time as developed by Husserl and Merleau-Ponty but also goes beyond it in that it considers lived time's intimate relationship to narrative. Ricoeur's notion of time is dialectically related to narration, where, on the one hand, time is humanised by its narration, and on the other hand, narration takes place within time. With this dialectical notion of lived time, the Self takes on the attributes of a historical interpretation from the context of the present, and becomes in this respect a temporal entity which emerges in the narration of a history. Thus, while advocating the phenomenological basis of Selfhood as explicated by Husserl, James and Merleau-Ponty, Kerby notes, with Ricoeur, that understanding of the Self is achieved by such narration. Lived time then, is historical, as recounted through narration.

Our position accepts these notions, however we highlight again the interrelationship between the phenomenological aspect of lived time, James' *specious present*, with the hermeneutic aspect in which time is relative to the experience being considered. As elaborated in our first chapter, such experience may be that of a moment, of a day, of a year or of a lifetime. Each of these experiences may potentially become what we call 'the present', with the resulting interpretation of Self being correspondingly affected. Thus for the primordial Self, the present is multiple and relative, its minimal duration being that of the *specious present*, its maximal duration being found in that of a lifetime. Rather than a stable entity spanning across time, in its hermeneutic aspect the Self becomes a fluid and

multifaceted narration of historical lived experience, interpreted always from the contextual present, itself variable and relative. We note in this respect, how as we get older, the years seem to pass more quickly, leaving us often noting, "how the years have 'flown' by!".

The primordial Self then is a spatio-temporal subject, interpreting itself and the world in time which it also constitutes by virtue of its interpretative dimension. As we articulated in the first chapter, it is this ambiguous presence to lived experience, effected within the temporal flux, which constitutes in a fundamental sense, subjectivity. Our notion of an embodied primordial Self is one which we deem to incorporate the notion of lived time in the manner articulated herein.

3.1.3.2 Underlying tendency or motivation

Many of the authors have postulated some sort of foundational energy or motivation as underlying the Self. For example, James notes that the Self tends towards its own expansion, that is, there seems to be a need to extend the Self further and further into different realms of potential Selfhood. He notes, in this respect, the need of some persons to acquire financial empires, for others the need may be that of an intellectual expansion, expansion of the family, of property, or of friendships. For his part, Jung postulates a limited amount of libido, or psychic energy, subjected to laws of entropy and equivalence. Such energy is distributed unevenly, associating itself to the archetypes most requiring expression. Individuation involves the expression of these archetypes, which equalises the psychic energy and also expands the bounds of the conscious Self. For Sullivan, the underlying motivation is that of anxiety, a phenomenologically felt state related to the sundry physiological and interrelational needs of the infant. The infant, and later the adult, is therefore constantly engaged in strategies involving the reduction or the avoidance of such anxiety. For Rogers, the actualising tendency drives the organism towards fuller actualisation and increased congruence between the actual and ideal Selves. Finally,

Kerby refers to Being-in-the-world as underlying state of being, a notion we endorse and that we have elaborated in the first chapter.

In the previous chapter, we indicated how each tendency is in fact an expression of the underlying state of being-in-the-world-as-understanding, where we exposed that a fundamental state of being is that of understanding through interpretation. Here, we recall that being-in-the-world is in fact intentional, with the embodied subject being intentionally related to the world, as per the intentionality of consciousness elaborated by Husserl. In this sense, we may also state that intentionality is the foundational tendency of our being, that is we find ourselves in intentional relationship to lived experiences of Self, objects and others, seeking always to increase our understanding of these experiences.

Thus in our view, the underlying state of the embodied primordial Self is its intentionality, or its relatedness towards the world, expressed as Being-in-the-world.

3.1.3.3 The Self/not-Self distinction

As we have seen, James is the author who addresses this issue in the most depth, arguing that what is deemed as Self, whether this be in its material, social or spiritual aspects, are those objects of experience that a person can call his, meaning that in the final instance, *they minister valued sensations to the body* in one respect or another. Rogers attributes as Self that which *is perceived to be in control of the Self*. While Kerby does not state any overt criterion, our consideration of his conceptualisation suggests that the Self is that portion of lived experience which is interpreted as Self, such interpretation being related to the *adequative process of language*. Such adequation, in our view, is related to how such experience results in *valued significations for the embodied subject*.

Returning to the notion of intentional-attentional lived experience, we deem the Self to consist of those interpretations of lived experience where the embodied primordial Self, in its intentional dimension, has the distinct impression of *being the agent responsible for the attentional effect*. Such sense of agency finds its source in the body, and it is extended to other aspects of lived experience. In the underlying bodily aspect, this may mean that the bodily intention results in a change in the attentional field, as when after intending to move my arm, it is perceived as moving. In the material dimension, it is the impression of controlling such objects and finding them inert without my bodily intervention. In the interrelational dimension, it is the impression that when I talk to someone, this person responds in some fashion. In the interpretative dimension, it is when my intellectual activity provides me with a result, as when I solve a mathematical problem, or compose a poem. In the affective dimension, it is when I express a feeling to the other and receive a confirmatory response. In each of these dimensions, the more tightly correlated the intention with the attention, *the more these aspects of lived experience are attributed to the primordial Self as agent responsible for them*. The embodied primordial Self *interprets itself as the cause of its own actions*, such actions being either directly related to their effects, as is the case in the material and interpretative dimensions, or more indirectly as is the case within our embodied relationship to others. In every case, the impression of agency is foundational, and the Self will be constituted of those portions of lived experience where some degree of agency, either direct or indirect, is interpreted to exist.

To summarise, our criterion to distinguish Self from not-Self is that of the attribution of agency, meaning that what will be interpreted as Self will be those aspects of intentional - attentional lived experience to which the primordial Self attributes itself as direct or indirect cause.

3.1.3.4 Self-identity and continuity of Identity

Many of the authors reviewed have considered the issue of Self-identity. James explored this issue in much depth and argues that Self-identity requires the impression of continuity of Self through time. Self-continuity he deems to be constituted in the specious present in which take place the continuous appropriations and projections between the body and the Pure Ego. Jung we have seen, does not address this issue specifically, however his notion of individuation refers to the integration, over the course of one's life, of the various archetypes. Laing, for his part, suggests that identity is bodily based yet constituted in the context of interpersonal relationships. It is in the consideration of this interrelational context that he also suggests that Self-identity is based on the story one and others tell of oneself. While denying the notion of an individual Self, Gergen argues for identity being constituted from the narratives emanating from the interrelational matrix. Finally Kerby, in his narrative view of Self, argues for Self-identity as exclusively constituted through the telling of one's self-narratives.

We would like to re-emphasise the relationship between two aspects brought to light by James and Kerby. The first concerns Self-identity as phenomenon, this notion referring to the continuity of Self through time, with James having explored this issue in great depth. The second concerns Self-identity as articulated through language, as developed by Kerby. In our treatment of Kerby we outlined our own integration of these two perspectives, highlighting the intimate interwovenness between the Self as expressed within language and the Self as lived phenomenon prior to its expression via language, pointing out how the 'I' centred within narrative always points to a phenomenal 'I', the embodied centre of lived experience.

In our view, Self-identity concerns both of these aspects, with the primordial Self engaged in the continuous interpretation of itself via a necessary spatio-temporal deferral, such interpretation being effected through various levels of symbolisation,

culminating in its expression through language, with symbolisation rendering such identity of Self explicit, that is, conscious. However, we also deem that there is a level of Self-experience to which the articulation of Self-identity refers and renders explicit, this being the phenomenal experience of the constancy of Self through time. Leaving aside for the moment how such constitution takes place, we note here the notions of Self-identity and Self-constancy as phenomenal aspects of Selfhood, that is regardless of how such sense of identity and constancy are conferred, they are, in the first place, experienced. We view the primordial Self as being endowed with these two characteristics.

James elaborates how such constancy may take place, with the Pure Ego effecting appropriations and projections between itself and the body, such activity taking place outside of awareness. Jung's integration of the archetypes also highlights such unconscious aspects of Self-constitution. We shall consider this unconscious aspect of constitution in the section dealing with the explanatory aspects of Self (section 3.2).

To summarise, Self-identity we contend to be a necessary dimension in a conceptualisation of Self. Self-identity is to be distinguished from continuity of identity, and we argue that such Self-identity to be the articulated interpretation, via symbolic activity, by the primordial Self of a history of lived experience according to some theme. Such articulation is usually expressed in narrative, with the subject of narrative referring to the embodied subject as centre of lived experience, such a centre being perceived as constant within and across recollected memories of experiences. Such constancy of Self we leave for the moment unaccounted for but we shall return to in our treatment of the explanatory aspects of Self.

3.1.3.5 Multiplicity of Selves and their organisation

We have seen that James, Sullivan, Laing, Gergen and Kerby have, in varying degrees, alluded to the notion of multiplicity of Selves. Jung for his part has identified a multiplicity of archetypes, which he refers to as personifications within the Self-as-whole. James and Jung also refer to an *organisation of such Selves*, with James referring to a *hierarchy of interest* by the Pure Ego, and Jung implying a *hierarchy of accessibility to consciousness* of the archetypes. While neither Gergen nor Kerby address the issue of the organisation of Selves, we can deem that within the narrative perspective, as with Gergen's notion of micro and macro narratives, some stories will be more general and encompassing than others, and in this sense, we can see the establishment of an organisation of Selves emanating from this organisation of narratives.

Amongst the authors reviewed, James has given this issue the most attention, with the supremely interesting Self being the material Self, especially in its embodied aspects, followed by the social Self and by the spiritual Self. He notes however that such interest is variable, and while the body usually commands the most pressing needs, there is a tendency to suppress them for the sake of the more distal ones, and in general we admire persons who are able to forego the more proximal needs of food, enjoyment and sleep in order to attain the ideals and goals of the spiritual Self.

Our own elaboration of the embodied primordial Self considers embodiment foundational in the sense that, along with consciousness and its attributes, they are the centre of the material, interrelational, interpretative, and affective dimensions, these being equally primordial. There is, at this level, *no inherent hierarchy of dimensions* for they all characterise lived experience.

However, we contend that the importance afforded to such dimensions will vary according to the primordial Self's *interpreted meaning of the contextual situation*, a notion following from our existential-phenomenological-hermeneutic position. In

this respect, while the material needs of the body may be pressing, these may be ignored in favour of others judged more important at the time. Also, we add that the suppression of certain needs is usually deemed a temporary requirement related to the achievement of goals related to the other dimensions. However, such is not always the case, as is demonstrated by the person who knowingly sacrifices his life to save another. Finally, goals are rarely unidimensional. As such, working overtime is understood as providing immediate or future rewards which in turn will permit one to better fulfil the needs and goals (material, career, social, intellectual) related to the other dimensions.

The varying importance afforded to the primordial Self's dimensions are seen to reflect themselves in the secondary Selves, where we contend that there will be a *hierarchy of interest* corresponding to the significance and breadth of lived experience such a Self represents for the primordial Self. Such significance may vary over time, one factor being the levelling of the Self's extension over lived experience, enticing the primordial Self to consider new realms where it can extend itself. For example, once the infant has sufficiently explored its own body, it will turn to new aspects of lived experience, for instance using its new-found crawling ability to explore the newly-extended limits of its environment.

To summarise, our own notion of embodied primordial Self, with its dimensions, cannot be hierarchised in the strict sense. However, the primordial Self may prioritise certain dimensions according to the interpreted meaning of its lived experience. The primordial Self may also express varying levels of interest towards the secondary Selves, corresponding to the level of significance and breadth of lived experience represented by this secondary Self. Once such a portion of lived experience has been sufficiently understood, the tendency will be to direct one's interests to other realms of lived experience.

3.1.3.6 Potential Selves

James and Rogers address the notions of potential and ideal Selves respectively. For James, a potential Self is an imagined projection of an actual Self, while for Rogers the ideal Self corresponds to the Self the person values and covets. While they resemble each other, these definitions are not identical, one difference being that while James recognises many possible potential Selves, Rogers refers to a single ideal Self. We note that James' deeper consideration of the potential Selves brings him to the conclusion that what is sought in such potential Selves is a coveted felt sensation ministering to the body.

In our view, only the secondary Selves are to be potentialised, the primordial Self being at all times part of the actual Self. Potential Selves can be imagined solely as extensions of actual or imagined secondary Selves within the world. We agree with James' notion that what renders the potential Selves interesting are the imagined positive experiences that will accompany such Selfhood. For example, the executive who imagines himself as CEO of the company expects that the attainment of such a Self will provide him with enjoyable experiences related to control, to status, to benefits, etc. In this case, the potential Self implies the extension of the work Self, a Self in which the four dimensions of the primordial Self have been crystallised in a particular configuration, along with the particular habitualities associated with this situational context.

Potential Selves are thus the manifestation of the Self's tendency towards expansion, of increased sense of agency, which we have otherwise expressed as our tendency to extend our Being-in-the-world, a tendency coextensive with our need to increase our understanding of the world and of ourselves.

To summarise, potential Selves are viewed as imagined extensions to actual secondary Selves or as imagined secondary Selves in new realms of lived experience. Such potential Selves are associated with experiences which are coveted by the

primordial Self. We see such potential Selves as expressions of the tendency towards expansion of the Self, itself the expression of our Being-in-the-world, itself expressive of our tendency towards increased understanding of the world and of ourselves.

3.1.4 Summary of the understanding aspects of the necessary dimensions of the Self

This completes our elaboration of the understanding aspects of the necessary dimensions of the Self, largely derived from existential-phenomenological hermeneutics, and augmented by our reflections upon the contributions of the various authors considered in the preceding chapter. Here we offer our notion of Self as a conscious-embodied-subject-in-relationship-to-the-world-which-it-interprets, composed of two principal components, that of the embodied primordial Self and of various secondary Selves. The embodied primordial Self we conceive as emerging in the first instance, from the intentional relationship between consciousness and lived experience, such emergence characterising itself in four mutually interrelated dimensions, those of materiality, interrelationship, interpretation and affectivity. The secondary Selves we view as specific Selves corresponding to particular contexts of lived experience in which a particular form of Self-identity is experienced, and in which the four dimensions of the primordial Self are expressed in a particular configuration. To each of the secondary Selves corresponds a habitus, that is a crystallisation of material, interrelational, interpretative and affective habits exercised in the particular contexts of lived experience.

From the moment of birth, the Self is engaged in the progressive interpretation of lived experience, attempting to articulate its meaning. In this attempt, it is in continuous activity of increasing its understanding of itself and of the world. This is seen as the basis to the expansion of the Self. Correlated with this expansion is the increase in its sense of agency, such agency also being the criterion that serves to

distinguish Self from not-Self. The Self is also inherently spatio-temporal, with its perception of time being a function of its immediate presence to actual lived experience, termed the specious present, and being also function of the interpretation of such experience, usually expressed through narrative, and from the perspective of a particular theme. The Self is also able to perceive aspects of itself, but only in virtue of a spatio-temporal distancing inherent to perception and symbolisation. Finally, the multiple dimensions, coupled with the infinite variety inherent to lived experience, account for multiple Selves, for which the secondary Selves are the concrete expression.

As was highlighted during the second chapter, many of the authors have articulated what we view as explanatory aspects to the Self, such aspects corresponding, in our view, to processes and structures deemed to account for certain aspects of conscious lived experience, but which are not part of it. It is to these considerations that we now turn.

3.2 The explanatory aspects of the Self

3.2.1 Processes and structures existing outside of the consciously given

Most of the authors have conceptualised the Self in terms of what can be consciously apprehended of it. This of course is the starting point of phenomenology, and we have seen that the authors have considered conscious lived experience in varying degrees of breadth and depth, prior to engaging in the explanation of such experience in terms of processes and structures which, while not part of lived experience, attempt to account for it.

In keeping with our existential-phenomenological-hermeneutic approach, we have also limited our elaboration of the Self to aspects and dimensions which may be consciously apprehended and experienced, that is understood. At this point, we would like to consider the explanatory processes and structures deemed necessary in

a conceptualisation of Self. We start with our own consideration of such explanatory aspects and, following a consideration of each author's deliberations, we synthesise these insights and offer our own version of this aspect.

From a phenomenological point of view, the unconscious corresponds to that part of lived experience which cannot be immediately perceived due to the perspectival nature of our perception. Not all perspectives can be apprehended simultaneously, there is thus always an 'unconscious' aspect which escapes our immediate apprehension, regardless if this be of a simple object or of something as complex as the Self. In this sense, there is an unconscious aspect to all of lived experience, however such aspects remain accessible in principle, by means of alternating perspectives. This, in effect, is part of the phenomenological method.

Phenomenology, through the phenomenological method, focuses primarily on the understanding of conscious lived experience in its myriad aspects and seeks to grasp its essential structures. While incorporating some explanatory aspects, it remains largely descriptive and leans heavily towards the understanding pole of knowledge. Applied to the phenomenon of the Self, this approach evinces the conscious and unconscious (in the phenomenological sense) aspects of Self experience, in both breadth and depth. Here we note that the authors who have given us the most important insights with respect to the Self as phenomenon, are those which have emphasised lived experience in accordance with phenomenological principles. James, Sullivan, Laing and Kerby stand out in this respect.

Returning to the existential phenomenology of Merleau-Ponty, we recall his notion of the *tacit cogito*, that is the apperceived well of unthought thoughts from which spring forth our conscious ones. This points to a pre-reflective aspect to the Self, one which phenomenology aims to articulate and acknowledges as source of thought, perception and language. In our elaboration of the necessary dimensions of Self, we refer to the notion of an *embodied tacit Self*, this referring to those aspects of Self not

directly apprehensible and which can be seen as the source of thought, perception, language, and other aspects of living.

Hermeneutics, while necessarily incorporating description and understanding, focuses on articulating the multilevel meanings of complex phenomena through their interpretation. Such may be carried out by calling upon explanation via certain theoretical structures and systems. Such structures and systems need not correspond to psychological entities which can be experienced. This explanatory aspect of interpretation we have used as basis for discerning the explanatory aspects of the Self. This, in our view, corresponds to *a second notion of the unconscious*, this referring to the psychic structures and processes that, while not part of experience, are used to account for it, as asserted by Laing. Thus, in the case of any conceptualisation of Self, the *unconscious* points to its *explanatory aspects*. Let us now consider each author's explanatory aspects of Self.

James attributes to the Pure Ego responsibility for the continuous sense of felt Selfhood by the continuous appropriations of the previous Self by the present Thought, "the living hook from which the chain of past selves dangles" (James, 1890, p 341). The Pure Ego is also responsible for the continuity of identity by a continual series of body/consciousness projections and appropriations. Finally, there is within conscious activity, the ability to select and maintain constant certain aspects of lived experience, resulting in the sensation-perception-cognition hierarchical organisation implied in the perception of objects. James attributes all of these activities to the Pure Ego, however these aspects of Self, while serving to explain certain phenomena of experience, escape our awareness.

For his part Jung evokes the archetypes, with the Self-as-centre as responsible for their integration, and the transcendent function as responsible for bringing them to awareness, these entities supported by an underlying psychic energy, the libido, which flows in accordance with thermodynamic principles. These entities are explanatory in the sense that they are not part of conscious lived experience. We

have already articulated the problems with Jung's explanatory aspects, and we shall not consider them further.

While Sullivan evokes personality as being larger than Self he does not explicate what constitutes the 'space' between the former and the latter. Laing invokes many defence mechanisms such as repression, projection, denial, and introjection. He notes however that such mechanisms, once brought to awareness, are no longer hidden for they have lost their purpose. We have, in our treatment of Laing, pointed out the difficulty with the notion of defence mechanisms. Rogers attributes to the organism the selection of what within lived experience constitutes Self, however he does not articulate the constitution of this organism. In addition, he postulates the existence of the actualising tendency, a concept which we have found to be superfluous.

Gergen, by invoking changes in the fabric of society brought about by its increasing technologicalisation, attempts to account for what he views as an increasing multiplicity and fractionalisation of the Self. Kerby evokes the constructive interpretation of memories and their synthesis, in an effort to explain how memories are brought to our awareness and subsequently sewn together in narrative. Kerby also asserts to a pre-linguistic constitution of experience, however he does not articulate how such constitution is effected.

From our review of the conceptualisations, we note four aspects which we deem necessary to a conceptualisation of Self. The first concerns the continuity of Self, an aspect considered in detail by James. The second relates to the sensation-perception-cognition hierarchical organisation implied in the perception of objects, as elaborated by James. The third refers to the constructive interpretation of memories and their synthesis, a notion elaborated by Kerby. The fourth concerns the generalising aspects of narration and of language in general.

As articulated in our treatment of James, we find his explanation for the continuity of Self powerful, parsimonious and coherent. We choose to abide by James' explanation and account for the continuity of the primordial Self in analogous fashion, whereby the *tacit embodied Self* appropriates and projects between itself and the embodied primordial Self (in its material, interrelational, interpretative and affective dimensions), giving rise to a felt sense of continuity of Self. We note the role of the body as locus of continuity for all of the dimensions.

While we deem the other three aspects to be activities of the tacit Self, the magnitude of the effort involved in their articulation is enormous and clearly surpasses the scope of this thesis. These, along with the constitution of the habitus, are concepts which we leave for future research.

To summarise, our notion of the primordial Self calls on the notion of a *embodied tacit Self* in order to explain four aspects of Selfhood that we deem necessary to a conceptualisation of Self. While we endorse James's explanation for the constancy of Self, we leave the other aspects unresolved, bestowing them to the auspices of future research.

3.3 The necessary dimensions of Self

Throughout this chapter we have progressively articulated the necessary dimensions to the Self, in conjunction with our increasing understanding of the Self-as-phenomenon. Here we summarise our interpretation of the Self. The reader can refer to Figure 2, a three-dimensional diagram which schematises our incipient conceptualisation of the Self.

In the first instance is consciousness-as-presence, represented as the point of origin of the cone of consciousness. As elaborated throughout this thesis, consciousness pervades every dimension of the Self as phenomenon and is the continuous subject to all other aspects of the Self, taken successively as its objects.

In the second instance are the intentional-attentional dimensions of consciousness, with its attributes of intentionality, unity and constitutiveness.

Both of the above Selves are metaphysical in the sense that while they always find themselves embodied, they themselves are not perceived as part of the Self-as-object, but constitute the Self-as-subject within the Self-as-object. This should not be taken to imply the existence of a disembodied consciousness, but is an aspect of consciousness. The Self-as-subject may focus on any aspect of the Self-as-object, however it cannot focus on all aspects simultaneously.

The primordial Self, or Self-as-object, itself comprising the four dimensions of materiality, interrelationship, interpretation and affection, otherwise termed the conscious-embodied-subject-in-relationship-to-the-world-which-it-interprets.

The secondary Selves are expressions of the primordial Self in particular contexts and situations. For example, a person may harbour an engineer-Self which is the habitual expression of his primordial Self in his career-work environment where, in

relationship with colleagues, he carries out his work duties and projects, expressing a particular constellation of material, interrelational, interpretative and affective dimensions.

Two vertical lines, which would be better represented by vertical planes, represent the distinctions we have made between: 1) Self and not-Self, 2) the Self-as-subject and the Self-as-object, and consciousness and lived experience. Within the cone delimited by the dotted lines emanating from consciousness, is the realm of lived experience which may be consciously apprehended. This is the understanding aspect of the Self we have attempted to circumscribe in this thesis. Outside the cone is what comprises the explanatory aspect of Self (and World). The explanatory aspect of Self represents the realm of study for an explanatory psychology.

In the interests of clarity, we point out that it would also be appropriate to put consciousness at the centre of the primordial Self with its attributes represented by a concentric sphere, within the embodied primordial Self, surrounding consciousness. This would accentuate our notion that consciousness always finds itself embodied. However, such a representation would mask the distinctions we have made using the vertical lines. It would also mask the distinction between the understanding aspects (within the cone) and explanatory aspects (outside the cone) of Self and World.

Secondly, the distinctions between Self and not-Self, and between Self-as-subject and Self-as-object are not accurately represented by vertical lines or planes. A more accurate representation would be made by vertical planes which, when they intersect the cone, hug the contours of the Self. While we have represented the Selves by well defined spheres, another analogy that may be used to describe the relationship between the Self and the not-Self, and between the Self-as-subject and the Self-as-object is that of two liquids, such as red coloured water and blue coloured oil, in a container. While we are able to distinguish between them, one espouses the form of

the other and their mutual interrelationship gives rise to a multitude of possible shapes.

Thirdly, in the interests of clarity, we have not indicated the explanatory aspects of Self which we deem necessary, i.e., those functions of the embodied tacit Self which would be responsible for the continuity and identity of Self. We note that such functions imply the selection of that which is similar within and between experiences, thus necessitating the intentionality and constitutive properties of consciousness. If these explanatory aspects were included in the diagram, they would be situated outside the confines of the cone.




Figure 2. Schematic of the Self with its necessary dimensions.

4. GENERAL CONCLUSION

4.1 Introduction to Chapter Four

This concludes our elaboration of the necessary dimensions of Self, one that we find better represents the Self as lived phenomenon, this attribute being foundational to the existential-phenomenological-hermeneutic approach espoused in this thesis. We opine that this rendering of the Self highlights the multiple and varied aspects of Self as well as their necessary multilevelled interrelationship, and preserves the richness and complexity of lived experience, corresponding more closely with how we experience ourselves in our daily living. While we offer this incipient conceptualisation as the conclusion of the considerable work effected in this thesis, we also realise that such a rendering is not definitive as future work, especially similar research that involves the conceptualisations of authors not considered in our own deliberations, may add other nuances to the basic dimensions we have evinced. We shall consider the limitations of our work further below.

We would now like to point out certain clinical implications that follow from our elaboration.

4.2 Implications for psychopathology

In a first instance, we see psychopathology in all its forms resulting from *afflictions to the Self-as-object*, for in our view, the Self-as-subject, articulated here as consciousness and its attributes, while present to such afflictions, would be immune to them by virtue of its intentional relationship to such. We see such afflictions as being concentrated on particular dimensions, which nonetheless remain interrelated. In this respect, we can expect that some afflictions will result from events affecting primarily the material dimension (i.e., loss or destruction of possessions), from events affecting the interrelational dimension (i.e., grieving of a deceased loved one, marital difficulties, abuse of others), from events affecting the

interpretative dimension (i.e., hallucinations, distortions of perceptions, retardation) or from events affecting the affective dimension (mood disorders, depression). Also, afflictions affecting the body directly (substance abuse, physical or sexual trauma) will also affect the constitution of the Self. Self-constitution may be affected in any of the four dimensions however, we also contend that all the dimensions will be affected given their interrelatedness. For example, the death of a loved one will occasion an affliction to both the interrelational and affective dimensions. A pessimistic view of life, which we would attribute to the interpretative dimension, could also be manifest. Also, afflictions to more than one dimension will provoke more complex disorders, one example being the schizo-affective disorders resulting from the combination of the affective and interpretative dimensions.

In accordance with Laing, we would add that some afflictions would result from an acute or chronic disconfirmation of lived experience in one or more dimensions. With each of these dimensions being experienced by an embodied primordial Self, we also contend that the afflictions will ultimately affect the felt sense of embodiment. A weak sense of embodiment would weaken the sense of constancy of Self and of Self-identity. Here we predict that selves with seriously weakened sense of embodiment would display more serious afflictions. For example, multiple personality disorder we could conceive as being the expression of various secondary Selves experienced as detached and autonomous from a seriously weakened primordial Self. Some forms of schizophrenia, where Laing notes a lack of differentiation between objects and the Self, we would express as the result of a weakened Self/not-Self distinction. Accompanying such a weakened distinction would be the growing fear of closeness with others.

These considerations are admittedly preliminary and global, and there is need for considerable future research.

4.3 Implications for psychotherapy

With the afflictions to the Self taking the form of problems of Self-constitution we may also consider how such an understanding of Self affects our notion of psychotherapy.

First of all, we see the primary task of psychotherapy as one of *re-constitution* and *re-valuing* of the *Self-as-object*. A first step would consist in evaluating, on each of the pertinent dimensions, the nature and extent of damage to the Self. This would be done by the thorough recounting of Self-experience, in considerable depth and breadth, in order to capture the essential aspects of such damage. A second step would involve the co-creation of *confirmatory experiences* that would provide occasions for the re-constitution of the Self, and for the genesis of *new affections* towards the Self. Such reconstitution necessarily involves the four dimensions of materiality, interrelationship, interpretation and affectivity. While material losses, we contend, could not be restored through therapy, therapeutic interventions would involve the re-interpretation of lived experience as it manifests itself without such material objects, leading to a re-synthesis of the other dimensions in order to establish a new sense of Self that would incorporate the old and new meanings related to the material losses undergone by the Self.

Without going into details pertaining to appropriate or inappropriate therapeutic technique, we argue that to be effective, interventions would focus on the various dimensions identified. This leaves room for a variety of interventions (i.e., experiential, cognitive, affective, psychodynamic, narrative) which focus alternately and collectively on the various interrelated dimensions of experience.

In this light, most of the therapeutic approaches developed throughout the century can be seen as complementary, highlighting some dimensions more than the others. In our view, each has the potential to be effective to a certain extent and the effective therapist will be able to change interventions as therapy progresses, focusing on

different dimensions as required, yet always maintaining the relationship to the Self's lived experience. For instance, in light of Laing's assertions regarding the psychotic Self, therapy may focus on the re-integration of the body, accompanied by acceptance of the client's delusional experience in a progressive endeavour to arrive at a better re-interpretation of the Self. We would predict that following the successful intervention on certain dimensions, improvements would be experienced on the other dimensions.

While this outline is admittedly preliminary, we contend that it nonetheless justifies the need for a profoundly integrated approach to psychotherapy, one which incorporates, both individually and collectively, the four dimensions evoked herein.

While brief, this description of the therapeutic implications calls for more research and study, possibly leading us to the development of a therapy that is more definitively phenomenological and hermeneutic.

4.4 Limitations

While within this dissertation we have critically examined the attributes and limitations of other conceptualisations, we now consider the limitations to our own rendering of the foundational and necessary dimensions of the Self.

In a first instance, as noted in the section dealing with the selection criteria in chapter one, the approach used in this dissertation is in a sense, inductive. This means that the level of generality is largely a function of, and limited by, the particular conceptualisations from which the reflection ensued. Other theories, Kohut's theory of the Self, Margaret Mahler's theory on Object relations, for example, could possibly add further aspects to the necessary dimensions of the Self. In the strict sense, one could say that only once we have exhausted *all* existing conceptualisations of Self should we attempt our elaboration of its necessary

dimensions. However, even after such an endeavour, nothing prevents the emergence of further original conceptualisations which would compel us to reconsider our own rendering of the Self. However, this must not serve as grounds for abandoning our research efforts as it is a perennial limitation to any theoretical work.

An inductive method also sets limits to the level of originality resident within the proposed dimensions elaborated in chapter three. More specifically, the method fosters an *emergence* of the necessary dimensions from existing conceptualisations of Self. It does not foster highly original abstract thinking on the Self. The advantage to be gained by this method is that the resulting dimensions are based upon the previous work of extremely capable authors who have expended considerable effort at articulating various aspects of the Self. To the extent that these authors have based their own work on a consideration of the lived experience of the Self, we contend this to provide a better grounding than an approach that does not make use of this method.

Here we would add that only once the understanding aspects of the Self have been exhausted, could the speculative, hypothetico-deductive methods of natural science reasonably be used to further our knowledge of the Self by way of their explanation. This of course needs to be carried out in a fashion which respects the results attained by the descriptive method. When one considers the richness and detail of lived experience to be explained, we have an appreciation for the enormous challenge represented by such a task.

Nonetheless, based on the fact that our own deliberations rely on the foundational notions of phenomenology, existential phenomenology and hermeneutics, we feel that our own research may serve as a starting point for future research in this area. Such research could entail the study of additional conceptualisations using the method espoused herein, or the elaboration of explanatory aspects of Self meant to account for the understanding aspects we have evinced.

We also realise that the explanatory component of the Self elaborated within this thesis is very restricted. It limits itself to the notion of the tacit cogito, an entity postulated to account for our unthought thoughts, the processes of perception, and source of the continuity of the Self. It is also analogous to James' account of the Pure Ego as proprietor of the 'Chain of past Selves dangling from the living hook of the present Self'. While very limited and general, this explanatory component, in our view, is necessary and coherently accounts for all of the dimensions evinced. The most important qualities of this explanatory component being its adequacy and extreme parsimony. James, we note, was very cautious about articulating speculative aspects to the Self and he limits himself to what he considers absolutely necessary. We would argue that with his concept of the tacit cogito, Merleau-Ponty follows the same principle. Here we follow in their footsteps.

The explanatory components of the other theories have been criticised their inability to account for lived experience in its richness and detail, for their incoherence with such, for their internal contradictions or for their lack of parsimony. Our own explanatory component we believe not to suffer from these discrepancies, however the price to pay for this quality is its very high level of generality, coupled with its very shallow explanatory depth. In fact, we could say the tacit cogito doesn't explain anything as it consists simply of an unarticulated entity postulated to account for some understanding aspects of the Self, notably, Self-identity and Self-constancy, as well as other aspects such as perception and thinking. Details of its structures and processes are conspicuously lacking.

Another limitation of the thesis is its limited application to psychopathology and psychotherapy. With respect to pathology, we would expect that a powerful conceptualisation of Self would provide fairly clear-cut indications or conditions on what 'goes wrong' with the Self when one suffers, especially from chronic and acute pathologies. While we have offered some initial insights in this chapter, the formulation offered in chapter three does not provide us with any powerful nor

novel insights in this respect. While we have endeavoured to include Laing's concepts within our own deliberations, clearly the relationship between our formulation and psychopathology requires much more reflection. Here we aspire that our own view of pathology as resulting from the *chronic disconfirmation of lived experience* to hold some promise as a starting point for future reflection, possibly serving as basis for the accounting of the change processes from the normal to psychotic Self and vice versa. This may be an area requiring substantial understanding and explanatory work, articulating necessary processes and structures that may account for the *transition* between a healthy and unhealthy state of being.

On the psychotherapeutic implications, we note that while the dimensions offered in chapter three account in a very general way for the effectiveness of the many therapeutic approaches developed through the century, they do not offer any novel suggestions as to the conduct of psychotherapy. However, as we pointed out by referring to Freud's theory in chapter one in the section dealing with predictivity and action, we should not expect any more than very general indications of what needs to be effected. In our case, this can be summarised to reconstituting and re-valuing the Self. This of course implies contact with and corrective manipulation of lived experience. This in our view, substantiates a more experiential basis to psychotherapy.

A further question concerns the level of objectivity that can be attributed to the type of research engaged in this dissertation. Here we are referring to the traditional (not the phenomenological) notion of objectivity, where increased objectivity is synonymous with increased truth value or increased validity of the research findings.

As discussed in chapter one, from the hermeneutic perspective, all knowledge is biased, as one always approaches phenomena from a particular perspective corresponding to a particular contextual horizon. From a natural scientific standpoint, we can also say that all knowledge is biased for it is based on theories

that are invariably selective, focusing on certain variables and aspects of phenomena, to the exclusion of others. In both natural and human science, the degree of correspondence with 'reality' is, in the strict sense, impossible to ascertain however we argue that we are approaching such 'reality' whenever a better interpretation/theory supplants an existing one. This is done on the basis of comparison of their comprehensiveness, parsimony, refutability and coherence. In this sense, Einstein's theory of relativity is considered better than Newton's theory of gravitation for not only does it account for phenomena explained by Newton's theory, it also accounts for phenomena that the latter could not explain. Thus the 'truer' view of the universe results from Einstein's conceptualisation. Of course an even better theory may force us to reconsider the Einsteinian view of the universe.

Here we note that appeal to phenomena, by way of empirical verification/refutation, remains the means by which theoretical interpretations are retained or discarded. Such we have argued to apply to both human science and natural science.

Returning to this dissertation, we started by asserting certain existential phenomenological hermeneutic notions as foundational, these serving as postulates from which we pursue our reflections. It goes without saying that if these notions are erroneous, then our subsequent deliberations are also at fault. However, such notions we have asserted to be impossible to contradict. For example, try as we may, we cannot contradict our distinct impression of existing as conscious embodied Beings in relationship to a world of objects and others. Because we cannot contradict such notions, we *accept* them as true. This doesn't mean they *are* true, as some type of reflection or experience may convince us otherwise. Until such occurs, we would accept them as true and deem a conceptualisation of Self based on such foundations better than one which isn't. Furthermore during our analysis, the aspects of a conceptualisation which corroborate such foundations are to be retained, while those aspects that contradict them are to be omitted, unless a reinterpretation on our part renders them amenable with our position.

Here we highlight the intersubjective dimension to knowledge, as statements that others can consistently agree with tend to carry more validity than those with which we do not. The whole notion of confirmatory research is partially based on the notion of intersubjective agreement with other researchers. For example, one reason we tend not to believe in ghosts is that there is little intersubjective agreement on what was perceived by whom. Related to this notion is that of consistency of phenomena, where agreement can be achieved only on phenomena which appear the same under the same conditions. However, a high degree of intersubjective agreement in itself does not grant to phenomena the status of being true. For years humans believed, based on convincing and consistent perceptions, that the earth was flat.

In this dissertation we proceeded, from certain foundational notions, to critically analyse several conceptualisations of the Self as rendered by their authors. A second area of validity concerns the interpretation we have made of the individual writings. There is of course no way to *guarantee* that we have read them aright and we accept that on some points, we probably differ substantially from the author's intentions. However, here we would add that the author himself would probably disagree with some of his own writings, considering them inaccurate portrayals of his intentions as he understands them now. Of course, since we only have access to the author's writings, we cannot operate on such an assumption and we take as accurate the body of texts as written.

While we have made substantial efforts to render each author's conceptualisation as accurately as possible, here again, we cannot guarantee the accuracy of our interpretation, as a better one could possibly invalidate certain aspects of our own rendering. To increase our chances of accuracy, we concentrated on the author's own writings, using numerous citations to support our interpretations. Secondly, the readings were carried out *before* the philosophical foundations and analytical criteria were framed out. Finally, while the order of the readings did exert its

influence on the interpretation of the subsequent authors, this bias we acknowledged - it is hoped that such 'bracketing' freed us to thoroughly consider other aspects brought up by these authors. Finally during the analysis, we reconsidered each author's writings submitting them to the hermeneutic circle until our re-reading corroborated the pre-understanding them we had of them. Of course, our final defence is that the reader, through his own reading, is invited to verify in detail our interpretation of these works. Any discrepancies would then be resolved through discussion and argumentation. This of course is no small task, however it is not much more arduous than asking a reader to fully replicate an empirical research experiment.

Additionally, it is possible that through our critical analysis and through our deliberations resulting in our own necessary dimensions of Selfhood, we have made errors in reflection. However such reflections we have exposed in our discourse for the reader to evaluate and criticise, and we remain open to correction.

Finally, we have proceeded to elaborate the necessary dimensions to the Self via the critical analysis and integration of various conceptualisations of Self. However, if we accept that such analysis and integration were properly effected, then our rendering of them, in principle, are a better interpretation than the conceptualisations it results from for it integrates those dimensions found relevant through our analysis. It is thus more rigorous and more comprehensive than any of the conceptualisations considered singly.

Since it resulted in the establishment of the necessary dimensions of the Self rather than a full-fledged conceptualisation of Self, we see our work as the necessary underpinnings leading *towards* a testable theory. We would opine that a theory based on our work would better resist empirical refutation than one which doesn't. Such testing, as final arbitrator of validity, remains to be effected.

To summarise our reflections on objectivity, we first assert that our research is in the strict sense not objective, for it is based on many unverifiable assumptions, it relies on the interpretation of selected texts, and is a reflective endeavour which proceeds from a particular consideration of the preceding factors. Each of these aspects involves selection biases which, while defensible, are not apodictic. Secondly, ours is not the strict application of any recognised method, rather it is a rigorous and disciplined *reflection upon* the notion of Selfhood. And while there are no strict guidelines on how reflection should be effected in order to guarantee the validity of its results, in the final instance, it is the logical coherence, comprehensiveness, parsimony and refutability related to each aspect that the reader needs to consider in his evaluation of our deliberations. Such reliance upon the reader's intersubjective confirmation, while crucial, we have shown to be not infallible.

It is because of this inherent uncertainty and lack of objectivity that, in the final instance, both human and natural science resolve between competing theoretical interpretations by appeal to phenomena. Despite the considerable work completed in this dissertation, a verificatory appeal to phenomena remains to be effected. This in turn requires that a full-fledged conceptualisation of Self be elaborated from which testable hypotheses may be generated.

As a final statement, our work has produced an incipient conceptualisation of the Self that gravitates largely towards the understanding pole of knowledge. Our contention is that any conceptualisation of Self should begin with and fully exhaust the Self as phenomenon, and this necessitates an approach which focuses on the articulation of lived experience. We view this thesis as an initial step in this direction. We also contend that once the Self as phenomenon has been exhausted, there will be a need to venture into the explanatory realm, evoking processes and structures that while accounting for the Self as phenomenon, are not themselves perceived. While simply said, such an endeavour is not easily actualised and we do not doubt that many years will elapse before a conceptualisation powerful enough to satisfactorily explain the entire phenomenon of the Self will be articulated.

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