Greece as Europe's *Aspida*: Acting as a Shield in an Era of Biopolitical Warfare

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Table of Contents

Abstract: This Major Research Paper (MRP) seeks to critically examine a novel approach to border security and migration management put forward by Glenda Garelli and Martina Tazzioli (2018A) entitled biopolitical warfare. Biopolitical warfare defines interventions, tactics, and techniques that seek to contain, divert, disrupt, or decelerate migrants' mobility as a form of hybrid warfare. In doing so, biopolitical warfare seeks to call attention to the critical violence that migrants often face in their journeys from the EU and EU Member States. At the time of this writing, Garelli and Tazzioli's scholarship on biopolitical warfare is the only known scholarship on the subject with regards to migration management. In light of the limited scholarship, this MRP seeks to take the authors' work further by applying the biopolitical warfare approach to the most recent Greece-Turkey border crisis of March 2020.

This paper begins by situating biopolitical warfare via an examination of the relevant academic scholarship that informs the approach: namely, (in)securitization theory; the securitization of migration; and military-humanitarianism. Next, this MRP defines biopolitical warfare, and establishes an understanding of both the "biopolitical" and "warfare" components of the framework. A brief examination of the case study and responses to the crisis follows. Finally, a discussion section explores the relevance and potential future avenues for biopolitical warfare scholarship. Through an examination of the most recent crisis, this MRP has found that the biopolitical warfare approach can be applied in border security and migration management interventions that operate on land, complimenting Garelli and Tazzioli's initial scholarship that examined sea-based interventions, thereby positioning biopolitical warfare as a strong analytic approach for examining border security and migration management operations in the EU.

Keywords: Biopolitical warfare; migration management; border security; securitization theory.

Introduction

In 2015-16, the current global refugee crisis peaked as thousands fled to Europe (Abbas et al., 2018). This crisis of mass migration was a by-product of the highest levels of forced displacement since World War II, including an increased number of refugees, asylum-seekers, and internally displaced persons, arriving from countries such as Syria, Sudan, and Afghanistan (Abbas et al., 2018). The underlying reasons for this mass movement towards Europe were plentiful, and included state fragility, armed conflict, civil unrest, and extreme poverty (Abbas et al., 2018). This crisis went by many names including the European Union (EU) refugee crisis; the Syrian refugee crisis; and the EU migrant (or migration) crisis. This Major Research Paper (MRP) will refer to the crisis as the EU migrant crisis and the EU migration crisis, which is reflective of the fact that the demographics of those on the move in and towards Europe do not necessarily meet the criteria that define a refugee.

While initial reactions to the crisis were sympathetic and often marked by outrage at the conditions which faced migrants at the borders and in refugee camps, discourse and action rapidly evolved as migrants continued to move into the EU and as countries became overburdened and overwhelmed. At the same time, the humanitarian regime that previously governed migration management was evolving as an increasingly militarized approach to the containment, management, and control of migration in the EU began to strengthen itself (Garelli and Tazzioli, 2018A). While this evolution was not novel, it had concerning implications for border security and migration management in the EU. Humanitarian rhetoric was coopted and used as a justification for extraordinary action intended to block and manage migrant flows. The humanitarian discourse

used to justify extraordinary policies presented migrants as subjects *at risk* or as lives worth saving, but also as *a risk* to security in the EU, a mass of people composed of would-be terrorists and other criminals (Garelli and Tazzioli, 2018A).

While the militarization of migration management has grown steadily over the past several years, the targets, and the actions that are enlisted, have changed drastically in face of the EU's migration crisis (Garelli and Tazzioli, 2018A). For example, humanitarian concern and an increasingly militarized migration management regime have co-opted concern over the trafficking of migrants, turning the discussion into one of a 'war on smuggling' that has changed the lens of border security and migration management while indirectly victimizing migrants by disregarding the role of their decision-making and agency (Stevens and Dimitriadi, 2019). The invocation of warfare that has emerged throughout this crisis (e.g. the 'war on smuggling') has played an important political task in the securitization of migration (Garelli and Tazzioli, 2018A). The responses to this securitization, EU rhetoric and actions including the Hotspots Approach or the EU-Turkey Agreement, all seem contrary to the protections and rights afforded to migrants and refugees by international law. While international law guarantees certain protections for migrants and refugees, such as basic access to proper housing, education, public assistance, and healthcare (Cavallaro, 2015), many reports have emerged from international organizations indicating that these basic needs are not being met. With these developments in mind, the entire series of events that followed from 2015-onwards in this crisis can be viewed within a longer history of mistreatment of, and violence against, migrants in the field of border security and migration management in the EU (Vaughan-Williams, 2015).

Research Question

This paper emerged from concern over the violence that faced refugees due to the actions undertaken by the EU as European nations sought to manage the incoming populations of migrants and refugees. In the current political climate, the migrant has become the central figure on a continuum of threat and insecurity that has seemingly justified the use of a critical violence against migrants through border security and migration management (Garelli and Tazzioli, 2018A; Vaughan-Williams, 2015; Tazzioli and Garrelli, 2018). The efforts to contain this threat have increasingly involved the militarization of EU borders, in addition to a strengthening of containment measures for migrants and refugees (Garelli and Tazzioli, 2018A). These efforts have emerged from the securitization of migration in the EU, as security and migration interventions become increasingly connected in response to the potential risk of migrants (Vaughan-Williams, 2015).

This paper has been guided by an understanding of violence in contemporary EU border policies and operations. This MRP believes that the current literature on border security and migration management often refrains from directly identifying the violence that exists in European security practices and border management. Considering the continuum of violence that exists in border security and migration management practices, techniques, and interventions, there appears to be a gap in the literature relating to practices of warfare and how these may manifest themselves in border security and migration management. While much of the literature on border security and migration management incorporates discussions of military-humanitarianism or the militarization of border security, it often stops short of conceptualizing the practices of border security as a form

of warfare. Understanding border security and migration management through a lens of warfare could help to provide more clarity and a more rigorous analysis when considering the EU migration crisis. In response to this gap, this paper will seek to better understand the space between hybrid warfare, border security, and migration management.

In order to pursue this topic, this paper will rely on the conception of biopolitical warfare proposed by Glenda Garelli and Martina Tazzioli (2018A). Garelli and Tazzioli's definition of biopolitical warfare is useful because it does not conceive warfare in a conventional sense, but appreciates advances made in the field of military studies and recognizes the continuum of civil-military forms of warfare that are emerging globally in light of an unpredictable security environment (Ehrhart, 2017; Simons and Chifu, 2018). Broadly speaking, Garelli and Tazzioli (2018A) believe that biopolitics in migration management enlists a particular type of hybrid warfare, which is enacted through military-humanitarian strategies of containment and capture meant to disrupt, divert, and decelerate migrant mobility. Garelli and Tazzioli (2018A) argue that this amounts to a form of critical violence in migration management. To understand this violence, Garelli and Tazzioli (2018A) use biopolitical warfare to identify the various techniques, interventions, and measures, necessary for migration management to contain migrant mobility as they seek to cross over into the EU (Garelli and Tazzioli, 2018A).

This paper uses the biopolitical warfare approach in order to analyze the actions undertaken in the name of border security and migration management in the EU via a case study analysis of the most recent border crisis that occurred in late February and March 2020, which took place primarily at the Greek-Turkish border. Garelli and Tazzioli (2018A) have taken a narrow approach

to biopolitical warfare by conceptualizing and analyzing it only in the context of maritime border security interventions. This paper adds to their scholarship through a discussion of a land-based version of biopolitical warfare. In doing so, this MRP has two goals. The first is to understand whether actions taken in response to the Greek-Turkish border crisis in March 2020, which were hailed by European officials but condemned by humanitarian organizations, could constitute a form of biopolitical warfare. The second goal is to explore whether the concept of biopolitical warfare holds merit in the broader field of migration management and security studies.

Theoretical Framework and Methodology

This paper will undertake a qualitative research analysis in order to further contribute to the understanding of biopolitical warfare in the context of European irregular migration. A literature review in the form of primary and secondary documents will serve to inform this analysis. In order to present a robust and unbiased position, this MRP consulted a variety of sources. Accessed sources included news reports from verified sources; press reports from the European Commission and Frontex; reports published by non-governmental organizations (NGOs) and other international organizations; academic literature; and other formal and informal sources. For the case study, material pulled from reputable media outlets are particularly important as they contain digestible, up-to-date information on the border crisis and management for a public audience.

To undertake an analysis of the topic at hand, this MRP will be organized into the following sections in order to examine the necessary information to present this analysis. The first section of this paper will consist of a literature review, in order to provide more information on the relevant academic literature pertaining to migration management and border security. The literature on

security studies and (in)securitization theory will be examined, as will literature on the securitization of migration, in order to ground understandings of how irregular migration is viewed in the context of discussions of security. In this same section, military-humanitarianism in migration management and border security will also be examined in order to build the beginnings of an understanding of the biopolitical warfare approach. Once sufficient background has been established, Section II will examine biopolitical warfare. This section will define biopolitical warfare and will contribute to the literature by situating biopolitical warfare within the broader scholarship. Section III examines the Greek border crisis that occurred in March 2020. The section will outline the relevant factual information of the crisis, where Greece was seen as having operated as a "shield" against the influx of migrants and refugees attempting to reach Europe. The case study will examine the European and Greek responses to the refugee crisis. Section IV will build on this section, taking the factual evidence provided in the previous section and analyzing it in order to understand how these responses can be seen in terms of biopolitical warfare. Section V will conclude with a discussion section that will explore the relevance of the approach, in addition to some final considerations for the future.

Section I - Literature Review

The theory of biopolitical warfare is informed by a variety of fields, all of which have ties to security scholarship in some manner. While the fields of migration management, biopolitics, and warfare are all beneficial in undertaking a study of biopolitical warfare, security studies are important for developing a greater understanding of how biopolitical warfare emerges in EU border security and migration management policy in the first place. Broadly speaking, biopolitical

warfare emerges in the space created by efforts meant to strengthen border security in the name of (in)security and migration. This space is created when European security is seen as being at risk, or (in)secure. Therefore, this MRP begins with a brief examination of the literature pertaining to security studies in an effort to understand how biopolitical warfare has emerged.

(In)Securitization Theory and the Securitization of Migration

The study of biopolitical warfare emerged as a response to border security and migration management practices, interventions, and techniques. While the biopolitics of securing the 'biohuman' have played a role in cementing a greater understanding of the EU migration crisis, research conducted for this MRP has shown that security studies have played a critical role in understanding how the need for such security emerged in the first place: namely, via the securitization of the issue. Traditional securitization studies focus on the ways in which security issues emerge, spread, and dissolve (Floyd and Croft, 2011; Skleparis, 2016). The essence of the theory is that something becomes a matter of emergency politics, or a security issue, when a powerful securitizing actor speaking in the name of a referent object identifies an event or object that poses a serious existential threat that must be dealt with immediately (Floyd and Croft, 2011; Skleparis, 2016).

Modern scholarship has emerged in response to some shortcomings associated with the traditional securitization approach. This modern scholarship has come to develop an understanding of securitization as a field effect, reflective of the many actors and processes involved in the creation and maintenance of security issues. This is known as (in)securitization theory (Skleparis, 2016). For this MRP, (in)securitization theory is useful because the securitization of the migration crisis in the EU did not emerge from one singular speech act; instead, it emerged from political discourse, commitments, research programmes, and legislation, implemented by a variety of

actors, that served to securitize migration. For the purposes of this paper, (in)securitization theory serves as an asset when attempting to understand biopolitical warfare, as it recognizes the process of security and the role of different actors in the process.

In short, (in)securitization theory proposes that those security practices deemed to be internal to the State (such as policing) and those external to it (such as military practices and border security) have merged into one field of security (Floyd and Croft, 2011). The aim of (in)securitization theory is to focus on the securitization/insecurization practices that run across both the internal and the external spheres of society (Floyd and Croft, 2011). In this approach, security is socially and politically constructed through political discussions: for example, through the justification of practices of surveillance, control, and punishment of the people and events that pose a 'risk' to society, in addition to the practices of protection and reassurance of those at risk (Skleparis, 2016). Rather than security being the outcome of a speech act, security and (in)security are the outcomes of a process that has to do with the day-to-day bureaucratic decisions of everyday politics, influenced by routines of rationalization and various technological and technocratic processes (Skleparis, 2016; Floyd and Croft, 2011).

As the political climate and political salience of migration have changed (European Parliament, 2018), the extent to which irregular migration has been securitized in the EU has become evident. Broadly speaking, when migration is securitized it is seen as a threat to domestic dynamics, norms, and values (Vaughan-Williams, 2015). This claim of 'danger' can emerge for many reasons, including as a result of politicians' fear that they will lose symbolic control of their borders (Floyd and Croft, 2011). In the EU in particular, irregular migration has been securitized to be seen as a 'hybrid threat' (Himmrich, 2018). While migration itself is not a hybrid threat, the act of irregular migration is associated with other hybrid threats such as human smuggling and

trafficking, or terrorist infiltration (Himmrich, 2018; Fiott and Parkes, 2019). While these threats account for a very small portion of all migrants coming into the EU, social and political perspectives of border security and migration management are often out of touch with reality (European Parliament, 2019). Given this dislocation, EU Member States perceive all irregular migration as a threat against which state authorities ought to take action (European Parliament, 2019). Thus, by virtue of the potential for the hybrid threat that irregular migration represents, irregular migration ultimately ends up becoming a threat in and of itself. In the EU, this portrayal of migration as an (in)security problem has been normalized in the prevailing political discourse at both the domestic and wider European levels (Moreno-Lax, 2018). Given the exceptional nature of these potential threats, exceptional measures have in turn been justified in order to tackle the broader 'migration problem' (Skleparis, 2016; Vaughan-Williams, 2015).

The invocation of exceptional measures should not come as a surprise, as liberal regimes have long used the securitization of migration to justify illiberal practices of government, policing, and social control (Skleparis, 2016). In the EU, such practices include extraordinary rendition and return policies; indefinite detention; biometric technologies and surveillance; and increased intelligence practices (Moreno-Lax, 2018; Skleparis, 2016). These practices represent a marked increase in the use of military technology, tools, and overall involvement (Himmrich, 2018). A key reason for this extensive military involvement in migration management lies in the perception of threat associated with the securitization of migration (Himmrich, 2018). As the EU is a party to many international laws and conventions, the EU and its Member States are subsequently restricted in how they can and should respond to these hybrid threats (Fiott and Parkes, 2019). In order to circumvent this, exceptional humanitarian measures are being increasingly linked to the securitization of migration, as humanitarian concerns are being used to further buttress massive

operations (Tazzioli and Garelli, 2018; Vaughan-Williams, 2015). This causes a contradiction in the responses to irregular migration in the EU broadly, and in Greece specifically, in that humanitarianism emerges in response to migrants *at risk* while the militarization of border security emerges in response to the migrant as *a risk* (Garelli and Tazzioli, 2018A; Sciurba and Furri, 2017; Lagios et al., 2018).

Military-Humanitarianism in Migration Management

As the previous section briefly established, humanitarianism has become increasingly intertwined with a sustained militarization of border security and migration management, which emerged in response to the securitization of migration and the accompanying perception of threat. This MRP refers to this relationship as military-humanitarianism, which is a foundational component of biopolitical warfare. In short, military-humanitarianism constitutes a logic and mode of governance in migration management characterized by the use of humanitarian reasoning and actions, in addition to the deployment of military measures, operations, actors, and/or technologies for performing migration interventions (Garelli and Tazzioli, 2018B). Military-humanitarianism often contributes to the securitization of migration, as it frames various migration crises as something as something requiring forceful intervention, with a need to perform operations of migration containment in the name of saving lives (Garelli and Tazzioli, 2018B). In the EU migration crisis, this manifests itself through the "unconditional humanitarian goal of saving lives", often posited as a "war on smuggling" (Garelli and Tazzioli, 2018B).

Maritime interventions are an excellent example of the offensive nature of border security practices that have become to characterize military-humanitarianism in the migration crisis. For example, the Mediterranean is often identified as "requiring" the militarization of this locale in

order to "save migrant lives" (Sciurba and Furri, 2017). In this militarization, we find increasing moves towards an offensive approach against migrants. For example, the EU Naval Force Mediterranean mission (EUNAVFOR Med), also commonly referred to as "Operation Sophia", was launched in 2015 and marks the first overtly military reaction against migrants and refugees (Akkerman, 2018; Garelli and Tazzioli, 2018B). This operation was designed to attack migration flows, their logistics of travel, and their mobility (Garelli and Tazzioli, 2018A; Garelli, Sciurba, and Tazzioli, 2018). EUNAVFOR Med's mission appears in stark contrast to Mare Nostrum, the humanitarian search and rescue (SAR) mission that it replaced. Another example of an offensive maritime intervention is witnessed in the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) Resolution 2240 (2015), which authorized EU Member States to use all measures "commensurate to the circumstances" in order to inspect, seize, and ultimately dispose of migrant vessels (Ghezelbash et al., 2018). Both the UNSC Resolution 2240 and EUNAVFOR Med were in response to tackling the war on smuggling rather than solely on SAR, indicating the presence of a clearly offensive strategy to achieving this goal. Like many of the offensive strategies undertaken in the name of border security and migration management, this tactic of intervention negatively impacts migrants.

As military-humanitarianism continues to define border security and migration management, borders are moving away from their traditionally defensive roles and becoming increasingly offensive in nature (Campesi, 2018). This offensive approach is characterized by increasingly militarized borders; transit agreements, external migration policies, and intervention in the countries of origin (e.g. EU engagement in Libya); the increased influence of EU research programmes funded by the arms industry and other security actors; and other interventions and

operations including 'pushback' operations at sea (Akkerman, 2018; Garelli and Tazzioli, 2018B; Zavirsek, 2017; Sciurba and Furri, 2017; Moreno-Lax, 2018). While humanitarianism has often been a key consideration in migration crises, the increasing prevalence of militarized interventions, techniques, and actors, are a direct response to the securitization of migration and its association with various hybrid threats such as human smuggling, organized crime, and terrorism (Campesi, 2018). Many of these interventions and techniques often lead to a critical violence against migrants (Campesi, 2018). In turn, many of these practices and the broader overall offensive nature of these techniques, tactics, and interventions, all mark the underlying foundations of the actions that are carried out through biopolitical warfare.

Section II - Biopolitical Warfare

The previous section briefly established how (in)securitization informs the securitization of migration, which has produced irregular migration as the source of a variety of hybrid threats. As a response to this perception of threat, military-humanitarianism has been reinforced in EU border security and migration management in order to address the perceived vulnerabilities associated with irregular migration (Fiott and Parkes, 2019). While military-humanitarianism has long been a key migration tool, the 2015 EU migration crisis has severely intensified the securitization of migration as well as the militarization of border security, producing and reinforcing military-humanitarianism, its role, and the use of its technology and heightened border security measures (Akkerman, 2018; Garelli and Tazzioli, 2018B). While the field of security studies offers a robust approach to understanding and classifying (in)security and migration, this

paper seeks to take the scholarship one step further by exploring how some of the processes and actions of (in)securitization manifest: namely, in the form of biopolitical warfare.

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Defining Biopolitical Warfare

In response to the violence that often impacts migrants on their journeys toward the EU, Garelli and Tazzioli (2018A) have proposed that biopolitical warfare serves as a critical framework for understanding the practices of migration management in the EU. The biopolitical aspect of this approach refers to a biopolitics of containment of transnational populations, or more simply, to how migration management practices interventions are meant to disrupt, contain, and capture, the mobility of migrants from various nations (Garelli and Tazzioli, 2018A). As biopolitics concerns

itself with governing life, Garelli and Tazzioli (2018A) posit that the military-humanitarianism mentioned above, when it acts in a manner meant to contain migrant mobility rather than save migrant mobility, constitutes a form of biopolitical migration management as it seeks to act on, police, and control, migrants' bodies. The warfare component in turn emphasizes the practices that occur in this biopolitics, which are often enacted through military-humanitarian technology, techniques, and interventions (Garelli and Tazzioli, 2018A). The warfare aspect of biopolitical warfare specifically refers to the military-humanitarian interventions of rescue and control, which are structured by a biopolitics that seeks to create channels of forced mobility and other measures that trouble, divert, or decelerate migrants' movements (Garelli and Tazzioli, 2018A).

Garelli and Tazzioli (2018A) summarize biopolitical warfare as a type of hybrid warfare exercised upon migrants in order to contain, restrict, capture, and/or destroy migrant mobility. This hybrid warfare consists of a variety of tactics that are mobilized against unconventional and multi-modal threats that are perceived to be related to irregular migration, including threats of smugglers, organized crime, fake refugees, and potential terrorists (Garelli and Tazzioli, 2018A). Tactics include the practices of surveillance, identification, capture, intelligence, deterrence, and deportation that are performed as part of military-humanitarian operations (Garelli and Tazzioli, 2018A). This represents a specific biopolitics of containment of transnational populations that is enacted through various practices of military-humanitarianism (Garelli and Tazzioli, 2018A). Broadly speaking, the notion of biopolitical warfare seeks to identify how military-humanitarian technology, techniques, and interventions, reconfigure the governance of migration (Garelli and Tazzioli, 2018A). In doing so, the concept of biopolitical warfare can identify how migration

management is carried out as it engages with militaries and military technologies, amongst other things, and how this in turn impacts migrants' struggles for mobility as they pursue their journeys (Garelli and Tazzioli, 2018A). Through this, the authors believe that they can have a better understanding of what migration warfare is when it becomes a persistent biopolitical technology (Garelli and Tazzioli, 2018A).

The emergence of biopolitical warfare should not be a surprise, as the militarization of migration management increased steadily during the 1990s and 2000s (Garelli and Tazzioli, 2018A). The concept of biopolitical warfare has several implications for understanding border security and migration management today. The primary advantage of the biopolitical warfare approach is that it explicitly identifies the violence that migrants often face in their journeys, and how this violence is perpetuated in practice. This is a critically understudied field, as most scholarship tends to disregard and/or gloss over the inherent violence that is present in EU border security and migration management (Garelli and Tazzioli, 2018A). The concept of biopolitical warfare draws attention to how military and humanitarian techniques and rationales of intervention are used to target migrants' lives rather than serving to protect them (Garelli and Tazzioli, 2018A).

The primary advantage of using the concept of biopolitical warfare as an analytical tool derives from the manner in which it conceptualizes biopolitics in the realm of border security and migration management. First, the theory of biopolitical warfare serves to take discussions of biopolitics in migration management beyond the usual discussions of this field: namely, the role of biometrics in border security and migration management. While the study of biopower, and biopolitics specifically, extends far beyond the topic of biometrics, in discussions of border

security and migration management biometrics is often the first and most recognized topic of discussion (Garelli and Tazzioli, 2018B). Expanding discussions to recognize the other forms of action and violence that are undertaken in the name of biopolitics allows for a greater understanding of the field, and thus a better understanding of how biopolitics is enacted in migration management today.

Second, the authors' conception of a biopolitics of containment of transnational populations encourages greater attention to the relationship between populations and government. Unlike traditional biopolitics, which is applied nationally, the transnational lens of this approach ensures that differentiations and classifications in populations are no longer territorially defined. This transnational approach refers to sustained ties of persons and/or groups across the borders of multiple nation-states (Faist, 2000). Seeing as migration is often viewed transnationally in EU policy and research circles (e.g. migrants are viewed through the borders they come from and cross through), it is only logical that biopolitics is updated to reflect this trend. Therefore, as transnational biopolitics is often ignored in biopolitical literature, this approach is useful as it serves to inform a field that has been relatively understudied to date (Garelli and Tazzioli, 2018A).

Finally, the authors' emphasis on biopolitics serves to turn the focus on the practices of containment in border security and migration management. While containment is a frequently used tactic of migration management, it has been understudied to date (Garelli and Tazzioli, 2018A). This is regrettable, as containment is a large part of the EU migration policy (Tazzioli and Garelli, 2018). What has been studied in relation to containment and migration management has often focused solely on detention mechanisms. However, the concept of biopolitical warfare speaks to a definition of containment that goes beyond solely detention (Tazzioli and Garelli, 2018). Rather than focusing on detention, biopolitical warfare looks at the proliferation of containment strategies

that are occurring in European border security and migration management (Tazzioli and Garelli, 2018).

As is evident, this approach has relevance for the field, in that it calls attention to how EU policies and operations target migrants. In addition, it calls attention to traditionally under-studied fields of migration management such as containment and transnationalism. However, regardless of the benefits of this approach, there are several limitations that should be addressed moving forward. The primary problem lies in Garelli and Tazzioli's (2018A) supporting literature, as they do little to situate their approach in the broader biopolitical or warfare scholarship. While this of lesser concern for the biopolitical component of the approach, as the authors take some time to detail and reference previous literature, it is especially problematic for the authors' use of the terms 'warfare' and 'hybrid warfare' as the authors fail to situate this use within the broader literature. Consequently, it often appears that the authors are making bold assertions without any evidence to support their theory.

In addition to this primary concern, there are some other concerns that should be addressed before moving forward. One such concern lies in attempting to differentiate biopolitical warfare from military-humanitarianism. The authors' association of military-humanitarianism with warfare leaves one wondering whether biopolitical warfare is a distinct phenomenon or simply a sub-category of military-humanitarianism. Additionally, the authors' conception of military-humanitarianism is often limited, as there is no background literature to truly situate what the authors refer to when they reference military-humanitarianism. Clarity on these distinctions would be beneficial in order to improve the approach's relevance. Finally, their approach can appear overly complicated due to the excessive use of academic jargon. In many ways, it appears that the authors' handpicked relevant academic buzzwords, such as "hybrid threats", "military-

humanitarianism", and "biopolitics", and threw them together in order to sound credible. A final result is an approach that ends up more complicated than it needs to be. As such, the overall message and relevance of the theory gets lost. This is unfortunate, as this approach has merit, given its ability to identify the inherent violence migrants face.

Situating the Literature

As previously stated, this MRP has two goals. The first goal is to identify whether the concept of biopolitical warfare can be applied to land-based interventions, as it has only been previously applied to maritime interventions. The second is to understand the broader relevance of this concept. This is difficult given that the concept currently lacks theoretical clarity. In light of this gap, and in order to demonstrate the robustness of this approach so that its relevance may be understood in the case study below, this MRP will now seek to strengthen biopolitical warfare's theoretical groundings, by situating it within the broader academic literature.

Situating the Literature: Biopolitics

Following Foucault's ground-breaking work on biopolitics, much has been done in an attempt to update his work for the twenty-first century (Vaughan-Williams, 2015). Biopolitics emphasizes life as the referent of politics, and the emphasis is placed on the politics of caring for and maximizing life (Vaughan-Williams, 2015). This often manifests itself in the management of human life by governments and other actors. In the securitization of migration, biopolitics works to contain and control human life so that it does not threaten the population at hand (Vaughan-Williams, 2015). Given the emphasis on the management and promotion of life, biopolitics is closely tied with regulation and intervention in order to maximize the safety and security of the population (Vaughan-Williams, 2015). In the field of migration policy, this regulation and

intervention take the form of containment of transnational populations, with migration governance seeking to control and contain migrant bodies and/or populations that threaten to negatively impact the EU. In addition to attempting to manage, regulate, and intervene, biopolitics also aims to inform and enact a variety of other strategies that try to identify, treat, and manage those individuals or groups whose lives have been identified as a security threat to society (Vaughan-Williams, 2015). This perception of threat is directly linked to the securitization of migration, as this perceived threat emerges directly from a belief that migration poses a hybrid threat to the EU through activities such as human trafficking, organized crime, or potential terrorist infiltration (Himmrich, 2018).

In defining biopolitical warfare, Garelli and Tazzioli (2018A) emphasize the biopolitical component of this framework as the primary theoretical orientation. This is due to the authors' emphasis on the biopolitics of containment on transnational populations; in other words, the authors' emphasis on the enhancement and restriction of mobility and circulation in migrant populations. The biopolitical aspect of this approach concerns itself with the manner in which it establishes partitions and opens up new spaces for governance in migration management (Garelli and Tazzioli, 2018A). In this emphasis on the biopolitical, instead of the traditional affirmative biopolitical approach that centers on fostering life, Garelli and Tazzioli (2018A) take a 'negative' approach, pointing to policies that aim to restrict life. 'Negative' biopolitics has been under-studied in migration management and refers to the political technologies that act upon singular individuals and transnational populations on the move, with the aim of containing their movements (Garelli and Tazzioli, 2018A; Vaughan-Williams, 2015). This view of biopolitics permits an examination

of the negative dimensions of biopolitical border practices that often expose irregular migrants to dehumanizing and occasionally lethal conditions and recognizes how society often chooses to privilege border control over migrant agency (Vaughan-Williams, 2015). By calling attention to 'negative' biopolitics, Garelli and Tazzioli (2018A) explicitly ground biopolitical warfare so that emphasis can be on the negative dimensions of border practices rather than the affirmative ones that are traditionally studied today.

Situating the Literature: Warfare

The greatest difficulty in proving the relevance of the concept of biopolitical warfare comes in attempting to situate it within the broader field of warfare studies. This difficulty emerges from the fact that the authors did very little to situate their understandings of warfare and hybrid warfare, which is further complicated by the fact that the field of warfare, especially hybrid warfare, is already deeply contested. There are two important distinctions to make in attempting to justify the authors' use of the concepts of warfare and hybrid warfare. First, Garelli and Tazzioli did indicate that the emphasis of their approach was on the biopolitical. It is important to note that there is no consensus among scholars as to the evolution of conventional warfare, nor the definition or the existence of hybrid warfare. In order to address this gap, the authors' emphasis on the biopolitical serves to provide some clarity with regards to how they envision warfare, as warfare in the context of biopolitics differs substantially from conventional understandings of warfare. By taking a biopolitical orientation to warfare, Garelli and Tazzioli are able to circumvent many of these disagreements.

Many of these disagreements often relate to the impacts of globalization and the evolution of an increasingly unpredictable security environment (Simons and Chifu, 2018). In this environment, it is alleged that the boundaries between war and peace are becoming blurred (Simons and Chifu, 2018; Dillon and Reid, 2009). Consequently, some argue that it may be beneficial to question the core assumptions of our understanding of warfare, including its character, expression, and purpose (Ucko and Marks, 2018). The theory of biopolitical warfare is one example of this questioning, as it challenges traditional notions of conventional warfare by taking a biopolitical orientation to warfare that emphasizes life as the referent object (Dillon and Reid, 2009). Specifically, discussions of biopolitics and war are inherently concerned with managing human life: whether it be managing the life of the individual, or of the nation (Dillon and Reid, 2009). According to Foucault, wars are no longer waged on behalf of the State but instead on behalf of the existence of the people (Dillon and Reid, 2009). Therefore, a biopolitical way of warfare revolves around a preparedness to make war on whatever threatens life's capacity to live (Dillon and Reid, 2009). This can happen in any number of ways, as biopolitical orientations to warfare recognize that violence and warfare can take shape in many forms and in many spaces (e.g. psychological, informational, or political; Dillon and Reid, 2009). In the context of the EU migration crisis, migrant bodies represent the potential threat to the broader life of European society given the perceptions associated with hybrid warfare described in the literature review of this MRP (Dillon and Reid, 2009). In order to challenge this potential threat, biopolitical warfare is enlisted.

The second distinction that must be made concerns the authors' use of the term hybrid warfare. This distinction in and of itself has several points that should be addressed. First, it is important to note that migration is viewed as a hybrid threat to the EU. Therefore, any responses taken in response to this hybrid threat can potentially meet the classification of hybrid warfare. Second, while hybrid warfare is a highly contested topic in warfare studies, Garelli and Tazzioli's use of the term hybrid warfare is consistent with understandings of hybrid warfare put forth by the EU and by NATO. We will now look at these two points in more detail.

First, Garelli and Tazzioli's use of migration as a hybrid threat is consistent with the EU's position. Specifically, the use of the term hybrid threat in the EU is used in order to "capture the interconnected nature of challenges (such as terrorism or migration), the multiplicity of actors involved, and the diversity of means used to address the threat" (European Parliament, 2015). While this is suitably ambiguous, within this ambiguity space has emerged that has led to the perception of irregular migration as a hybrid threat. In their concept of biopolitical warfare, Garelli and Tazzioli (2018A) often make links to the hybrid threats of migration through the lens of smuggling and/or trafficking, and through the weaponization of migrants. These same links are made in many EU policy documents. For example, one EU document listed examples of hybrid threats that arise in the context of migration, such as terrorism, organized crime, smuggling, and trafficking (European Parliament, 2019; Council of the European Union, 2015). Several additional EU documents make reference to the hybrid threat of migration, including its links to terrorism and trafficking activities, in addition to the threat of weaponization of migration (for example, see Himmrich, 2018). For example, the European Agenda on Migration and the European Security

Agenda has made tackling migrant smuggling a key political priority (European Parliament, 2019).

The EU's Joint Framework on Countering Hybrid Threats also considers migration as a hybrid

threat and makes links to organized crime and terrorism as reflective of the potential threats that

can emerge from irregular migration (Himmrich, 2018).

Garelli and Tazzioli devoted significant attention to the weaponization of migration, which

is consistent with the emphasis on the weaponization of migration that is witnessed in EU

documents. The weaponization of migration has increasingly become of concern, especially in

light of EU-Turkey relations, and is considered a significant threat by EU policymakers (Steger,

2017; Himmrich, 2018). The weaponization of migration occurs when a challenging state or non-

state actor exploits human migration, whether voluntary or forced, in order to achieve political,

military, and/or economic objectives (Steger, 2017). In the context of EU-Turkey relations, Turkey

has often threatened to "open the gates" in order to let a "flood of migrants" flow into the EU

(Steger, 2017). This has significantly contributed to the securitization of migration since 2016 and

has significantly intensified the stance that the EU has taken towards the hybrid threat of migration

(Himmrich, 2018).

Since 2015, several EU documents and other official statements have emerged that clearly

define irregular migration as a hybrid threat. However, it is important to also establish whether

Garelli and Tazzioli's use of the term hybrid warfare is consistent with the EU's position. It is

important to note that there is no consensus among scholars as to either the definition or the

existence of hybrid warfare. While many believe that hybrid warfare exists in practice, other

scholars believe that hybrid warfare is too broad a concept to have meaning, as its scope allows

for any conflict or event in society to be defined as a "war." Exploring the advantages and critiques of the concept of hybrid warfare is beyond the scope of this MRP. The important fact to emphasize here is that biopolitical warfare theory's use of the term hybrid warfare is consistent with that put forward in European policy and program documents.

In discussions of hybrid warfare, the EU describes this form of warfare as "a mixture of coercive and subversive active activity, conventional and unconventional methods (i.e. diplomatic, military, economic, technological, information), which can be used in a coordinated manner by state or non-state actors to achieve specific objectives while remaining below the threshold of open organized hostilities" (Himmrich, 2018; Council of the European Union, 2015). This definition of hybrid warfare by the EU, while perhaps ambiguous, is consistent with scholarship on hybrid warfare in the broader field. For example, this definition calls attention to the fact that traditional spaces of warfare are increasingly accompanied by social and built spaces, such as the political, economic, cultural, informational, and cyber (Reichborn-Kjennerud and Cullen, 2016). This is consistent with biopolitical understandings of warfare, as biopolitics recognizes the diversity of spaces where warfare and violence can take place today. Furthermore, this definition captures the fact that hybrid warfare can complicate the typical phases traditionally understood in battle, altering how the battlespace appears and making it increasingly difficult to distinguish between normal legal activities, coercive diplomacy, and warfare (Reichborn-Kjennerud and Cullen, 2016). These understandings are relevant to the understanding of biopolitical warfare, as this supports two key assumptions that are implicit in the concept of biopolitical warfare: first, that biopolitical warfare can occur in many different spaces; and second, the fact that a locale does not physically

appear to be a battlespace does not mean that violence or warfare are absent. Additionally, European documents on hybrid warfare stress that the achievement of political and strategic objectives is no longer solely bound to traditional conventional military means (Reichborn-Kjennerud and Cullen, 2016). As migration has been heavily securitized in the EU (Fiott and Parkes, 2019; Himmrich, 2018), many of these objectives are increasingly related to managing the hybrid threat of migration.

To conclude, the use of the term 'warfare' in biopolitical warfare is consistent with the EU's broad position on what defines hybrid warfare. Identifying biopolitical warfare as a type of hybrid warfare recognizes the fact that irregular migration has been painted as a hybrid threat in the EU. It is important, however, to call attention to the fact that the authors refer to this as a low-grade and low-intensity hybrid warfare (Garelli and Tazzioli, 2018A). Therefore, in speaking of hybrid warfare this MRP does not attempt to draw links to traditional associations of hybrid warfare, such as Russian actions in Crimea. Instead, this MRP identifies hybrid warfare as the asymmetric ways in which the EU responds to the hybrid threat of irregular migration as it pertains specifically to the containment of migrants' mobility.

Section III - The Greece-Turkey Border Crisis

Biopolitical warfare emerges from the policies and actions that seek to contain migrant mobility and act as a form of hybrid warfare that often manifests through military-humanitarian tactics deployed to channel and contain migrants' mobility (Garelli and Tazzioli, 2018A; Garelli and Tazzioli, 2018B). As was previously mentioned, Garelli and Tazzioli have only argued for biopolitical warfare's relevance in the examination of maritime interventions. This MRP will now

examine the Greek-Turkish border crisis through the lens of biopolitical warfare, in order to identify whether the relevance of this approach can be expanded to include other terrains.

Case Study: Operating as a "Shield" in the Biopolitical War on Migrants

Greece has played a predominant role in the crisis since 2015 and is one of the main entry points for refugees and migrants into Europe (Amnesty, 2018). The small Mediterranean nation has faced the biggest movements of migrants and refugees in Europe since 1945 and, as of late 2019, hosts approximately 50,000 refugees (Rescue, 2019). In March 2016, a deal was struck between the EU and Turkey concerning border security and migration management (Reidy, 2020). This deal was brought into force after more than 1 million refugees crossed the Turkish coast into Greece (Reidy, 2020). In exchange for European assistance, this deal called on Turkey to prevent asylum seekers and migrants from reaching the EU (Reidy, 2020). As the March 2020 border crisis has come to show, however, all this deal succeeded in doing was turning migrants into a bargaining chip, further reinforcing Turkey's potential to weaponize migrants and thus positioning them as a security threat to the EU (Reidy, 2020; Himmrich, 2018).

On February 28th, 2020, the Turkish government announced that it would no longer stop migrants trying to reach Europe (Stevis-Gridneff and Kingsley, 2020; Reidy, 2020). This followed several weeks of Turkish threats amid worries of a fresh influx of refugees after heavy fighting in Idlib, Syria (McDonald-Gibson, 2020; Reidy, 2020; Steger, 2017). In addition to this, President Ergodan declared that European leaders had not kept their promises to Turkey to help bear the load of millions of Syrian refugees and because of this he would not stop migrants attempting to cross into Europe (Stevis-Gridneff and Gall, 2020). In these actions, Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan attempted to engineer a new migration crisis, weaponizing migrants who were seeking to reach the EU while using them as a levy for coercive diplomacy in order to obtain European

alignment with Turkey's political agenda (Stevis-Gridneff and Gall, 2020; Garelli and Tazzioli, 2018A).

After this announcement, reports emerged that the Turkish government had actively pushed migrants to get to European borders, sometimes at gunpoint (Stevis-Gridneff and Kingsley, 2020). This occurred primarily in the form of free bus rides to the border, organized by Turkish officials (Stevis-Gridneff and Gall, 2020). This exodus was live-streamed by Turkish state television, and aggressive footage was often shared in an attempt to foment a crisis (Stevis-Gridneff and Gall, 2020; Stevis-Gridneff and Kingsley, 2020). While Greece and Turkey share 212km of the border, a large majority of the migrant build-up occurred at the formal border crossing points of Pazarkule and Ipsala, along the Evros river, and at multiple informal border crossings nearby (IOM, 2020). Numbers of asylum-seekers and migrants ranged from groups of several dozen to masses that numbered in the thousands (IOM, 2020). While many on the move were men, there were also many families traveling as well (IOM, 2020).

At the peak of this crisis, attempted border crossings on land numbered in the thousands each day (Stevis-Gridneff and Kingsley, 2020). These migrants clashed with riot police officers, signaling a new and potentially volatile phase in the migration crisis (Stevis-Gridneff and Gall, 2020). Reports emerged of Greek security officers, police officers, and military forces firing off tear gas at migrant protesters (Stevis-Gridneff and Gall, 2020). On the other side of this crisis, Greek intelligence reports emerged indicating that Turkish security officials were in the mass of migrants during this exodus, providing Turkish tear gas canisters and inciting violence (Stevis-Gridneff and Kingsley, 2020). These sightings of Turkish officers are consistent with a March 5th, 2020, announcement from Turkey, which indicated that the nation was sending 1000 police offers to the border in order to prevent Greece from pushing asylum seekers back (Human Rights Watch,

2020). While the land border saw the bulk of the action, Turkish attempts to direct migrants to Greece also occurred at sea as well. Reports indicate that Turkey did not stop migrants from taking boats in attempts to reach Greece, corroborated by multiple interviews from migrants and refugees from Human Rights Watch (2020). Additionally, the Greek coast guard has indicated in Greek and English news reports that it was pursued by Turkish forces and witnessed Turkish vessels guiding migrant dinghies to Greek sovereign waters (Stevis-Gridneff and Kingsley, 2020).

By the end of March, the influx of migrants from Turkey had slowed significantly, and Turkey was no longer actively forcing migrants to the border (Stevis-Gridneff and Gall, 2020). However, reports have begun to emerge from Greek and European news outlets that thousands of migrants are beginning to amass at Greek-Turkish land borders once again (Michalopoulos, 2020). As per the first stage of the crisis that emerged in late February and early March 2020, there have been reports of Turkish busses dropping off hundreds of migrants at the border (Michalopoulos, 2020). Both Greek and Turkish media are reporting that migrants are regularly attempting to cross the Evros river by boat and via other land points (Michalopoulos, 2020). Turkey's Foreign Minister has also alluded to another influx of migrants as coronavirus restrictions lift, which has set off alarm bells in Greece and the broader EU (Smith, 2020). Frontex also predicts that as coronavirus restrictions ease in Turkey, an extreme influx of migrants and refugees to European borders will resume (Schengen Visa Info, 2020). While responses to the most recent iteration of the crisis have been slim, responses to the March 2020 crisis were plentiful from both Greece and the broader EU. In order to explore the analytic use and relevance of biopolitical warfare, this MRP will examine the responses that emerged in March 2020 in order to examine how they potentially produce and/or reinforced biopolitical warfare.

Responses to the Micro-Crisis

The EU's Response

The responses to the crisis of the EU and Greece were swift, although formal diplomatic reactions were tepid at best (Stevis-Gridneff and Kingsley, 2020). European leaders have openly supported the hostile approach taken in the management of this crisis, as seen in the extensive support pledged to Greece and in reference to Greece as Europe's *aspida,* the Greek word for shield (Amnesty, 2020). Several other statements of support also emerged from various EU leaders and figureheads. For example, the Head of the European Commission (EC) Ursula von der Leyer sent a strong message of support to Greece and expressed her "compassion for the migrants that have been lured through false promises into this desperate situation" (BBC, 2020). As another example, the EC's Commissioner for Home Affairs Yiva Johansson said that "...our focus is on making sure that the short-term political crisis does not turn into a long-term humanitarian one" and called for structural solutions to the crisis (European Commission, 2020). At the national level, Austrian Chancellor Sebastian Kurz also accused Turkey of using migrants as a weapon and expressed outrage that Turkey would exploit human lives (McDonald-Gibson, 2020; BBC, 2020).

Material support also accompanied European pledges of support. Much of this support came from or in the form of Frontex, the EU's Border and Coast Guard Agency tasked with border control. In one EC statement, the following actions were proposed to support Greece: the provision of assets needed for the launch of two rapid border intervention operations by Frontex; the coordination of a new return programme by Frontex for the quick return of persons without the right to stay; financial assistance in the sum of 700 million euros; and the deployment of 160 border security experts (European Commission, 2020). The deployment of the rapid response team is especially concerning given the team's status as an elite and militarized operating force (Leonard,

2010). This same statement indicated that "resolute actions will be taken to step up the fight against smuggling" (European Commission, 2020). Consistent with the European Commission's pledge, Frontex has also confirmed its support in response to the crisis (Frontex, 2020A). On March 13, 2020, Frontex deployed an additional 100 border guards and issued the following statement:

"The presence of 100 officers from all around Europe underlines the fact that the protection of the European area of freedom, security, and justice is a shared responsibility of all Member States and Frontex" (Frontex, 2020C).

This statement also indicated that Frontex would "help protect Greece's borders" and consistently referenced the border crossings as illegal (Frontex, 2020C). In addition to this statement of aid, extensive Frontex material support was pledged: seven vessels, two helicopters, one plane, three thermal-vision vehicles, and one hundred extra border security personnel (BBC, 2020; Frontex, 2020A). Furthermore, as of April 3rd, 2020 most EU Member State and Schengen-associated countries taking part in Frontex operations in Greece had decided to extend their deployment in order to "protect Europe's external borders'" (Frontex, 2020B). Currently, 624 Frontex officers are positioned along Greek land and maritime borders (Frontex, 2020B).

Greece's Response

Similar to European rhetoric and actions, messages released by the Greek Prime Minister (PM) Kyriakos Mitsotakis also provide cause for concern. In one statement, PM Mitsotakis had said that "this is no longer a refugee problem [...] this is a blatant attempt by Turkey to use desperate people" (BBC, 2020). An additional statement by Greece's PM has indicated that the first priority is "to ensure order is maintained at the Greek external border, which is also a European border" (BBC, 2020). Another statement by Greek government spokesman Stelios Petsas said that Greece "came under an illegal, mass and orchestrated attempt to raze our borders" (Stevis-Gridneff

and Gall, 2020). In this same statement, Petsas was also quoted as saying that "our government is determined to do whatever it takes to protect our borders" (Stevis-Gridneff and Gall, 2020).

Greece's physical responses to this threat included physically reinforcing Greek land and sea borders; mobilizing Greek military and security forces en masse to land and sea borders; mobilizing EU support; and extending a razor wire-topped fence (Smith, 2020). Reports also indicate that Greek forces have been responding physically by firing tear gas on land, and by repelling dinghies with live fire at sea (Amnesty, 2020). Greece also temporarily suspended asylum claims as an "extraordinary measure for extraordinary circumstances" (Amnesty, 2020; Smith, 2020). This serves as a clear attempt to send a signal of deterrence, one that does not consider the autonomy or safety of the migrants (Smith, 2020). In addition to this measure, when possible, Greece will deport migrants to their countries of origin and transit (Human Rights Watch, 2020).

In a statement that is indicative of Greece's commitment to using such extraordinary measures, PM Mitsotakis indicated that Greek forces are under strict instructions not to endanger lives, but that Greece has no choice to defend his country's sovereign borders when confronting such an "asymmetric" threat (Smith, 2020). This asymmetric threat is occurring via Turkey's conscious attempts to weaponize refugees, using migrant bodies as 'human bullets' in an attempt to foment a crisis (Smith, 2020). As Greece attempts to combat this 'asymmetric' threat, other allegations of physical ill-treatment have begun to arise. Reports have emerged that Greek security forces and unidentified armed men at the Greece-Turkey land border have detained, assaulted, robbed, and stripped asylum seekers and migrants of their possessions, and then forced them back to Turkey (Human Rights Watch, 2020). Additionally, many interviewed by Human Rights Watch (2020) indicated that they were passed between various groups, suggesting some level of coordination. Detention of asylum seekers was said to have occurred in small houses, compounds,

and partially built houses; others report being held in containers and having gone extensive amounts of time without water or toilet access (Human Rights Watch, 2020). As it stands presently, Greece continues to be on high alert, ready, and willing to undertake any of the aforementioned measures in order to defend its sovereign territory and European borders.

Section IV - Applying the Literature: Greece as Europe's *Aspida* in War

The warfare and migration nexus has become increasingly complicated in the past few years (Garelli and Tazzioli, 2018A). In an era where the militarization of migration management has been increasing substantially, it seems fitting to examine biopolitical warfare within the context of the first refugee exodus fully organized by one government against another (Stevis-Gridneff and Kingsley, 2020; Garelli and Tazzioli, 2018A). The one drawback of analyzing this most recent border crisis in the EU is that its end was impacted at least in part by the spread of a pandemic. Future analysis post-pandemic, pending outcomes in Syria, Turkey, and the EU, should follow-up on this series of events and see what actions emerged from this crisis in order to further expand notions of biopolitical warfare.

Analyzing the EU's Response

To understand whether or not biopolitical warfare is a useful framework for situation land-based migration management interventions, it is important to conduct an analysis of the responses to this crisis in order to understand whether or not they can be classified as a 'low-grade' and 'low-intensity' form of hybrid warfare that is consistent with biopolitical warfare. To do so, it is important to examine both the rhetoric and actions that emerge in the practices of border security and migration management in the EU. While physical actions provide the clearest indication as to whether or not a series of events can be classified as hybrid warfare, rhetoric serves as a good indication with regards to how certain actions are construed and how hybrid warfare may emerge.

In the EU's discursive and physical responses, it was evident that diverting, decelerating, and disrupting migrant mobility was a key objective that emerged in response to the hybrid threat of irregular migration of the most recent crisis. European rhetoric in this crisis was especially telling and clearly portrayed how European decision-makers viewed this latest crisis.

European rhetoric that identified Greece as Europe's *aspida* points to one example about how the EU viewed this crisis. Depicting Greece as Europe's shield is consistent with previous references of warfare that the EU has alluded to in the past with respect to irregular migration (Garelli and Tazzioli, 2018A). However, the reference to Greece as a shield changes the existing rhetoric from offensive (the 'war on smugglers') to defensive, implying that the EU is under threat. This rhetoric plays an important political task in continuing the securitization of migration (Garelli and Tazzioli, 2018A) and brought attention to the fact that there is a 'threat' to the EU. This served to further contribute to the securitization of migration in this crisis and compounded the perceived need to deploy extraordinary security practices in response to this hybrid threat in the first place. Other rhetoric also played a similar role and political purpose, such as the response of Austrian Chancellor Kurz (mentioned above) that directly identified this latest crisis as Turkey's attempt to weaponize migrants (BBC, 2020). While this rhetoric cannot be constitutive of biopolitical warfare, as rhetoric does not constitute a technique, intervention, or measure of containment and border management, this language in the EU position creates space for further avenues of action to open in response to this 'hybrid threat' of irregular migration.

The avenues of action that emerged in light of the European position serve to further this MRP's understanding of biopolitical warfare as a form of hybrid warfare. European actions are not equivalent to the actions of Russia, China, or other notorious hybrid actors. Biopolitical warfare is low-grade and low intensity, indicating that the actions that emerge from acting on the hybrid

threat of irregular migration constitute the bare minimum with regards to meeting the definition of hybrid warfare (Garelli and Tazzioli, 2018A). This bare minimum, per the EU's own official definition, posits hybrid warfare as a response to a hybrid threat that can occur via various means, and through various actors (Himmrich, 2018). Therefore, identifying the EU's actions as biopolitical warfare is not meant to illustrate a large-scale campaign of hybrid warfare. Instead, biopolitical warfare's emphasis on hybrid warfare is meant to call attention to the ways in which an actor responds to the hybrid threat of irregular migration in order to contain migrant mobility.

Moving forward, it is important to establish whether or not European actions in response to this hybrid threat were designed to contain migrant mobility. The inherent assumption here is yes, the EU intended to contain migrants' mobility at the Greek-Turkish borders. This assumption is confirmed by an analysis of the support pledged by the EU in response to this crisis. In addition to the discursive support that was previously mentioned, extensive physical and material support was pledged by the EU to Greece, in order to successfully act as Europe's shield to the mass of migrants at the borders. The EU's response was consistent with the multiplicity of spaces and domains that are noted in hybrid warfare (e.g. economic, political, and security), as the EU pledged support across a range of domains. For example, in the policy realm political support rapidly emerged in favour of an EU pledge that committed to the coordination and implementation of a new rapid return programme for the quick return of migrants crossing into Greece without the right to stay (European Commission, 2020). Many would argue that this does not constitute a form of low-grade hybrid warfare, as the implementation of such a programme is well within the EU's rights; after all, the EU has a right to determine who has the right to stay within its territorial borders. However, the rapid return programme was paired with an already complicated Greek asylum system that had recently made the decision to suspend asylum claims (Smith, 2020). In

light of this suspended system, and in addition to already exceedingly strict Greek 'right to stay requirements', most, if not all, migrants would not have the right to stay in Greece and would be sent back to Turkey immediately without evaluation of their case (Stevis-Gridneff and Gall, 2020). This is in direct contravention of the international law that guarantees certain rights for migrants and refugees (UNHCR, 2020). In this context, the purpose of this programme is clear: the EU intends to divert migrant mobility away from Greece, and thus away from the broader EU, by rapidly returning migrants to their point of origin. This example of European actions in the crisis is consequently consistent with biopolitical warfare in two ways: first, it is consistent with biopolitical warfare's goal to divert, decelerate, and disrupt mobility; and second, it is consistent with the means of hybrid warfare defined in biopolitical warfare, which indicates that the creation and opening of new spaces for governance in migration management can constitute a form of hybrid warfare (Garelli and Tazzioli, 2018).

While hybrid warfare points to several other means that can be undertaken in the pursuit of tackling a hybrid threat, such as the political or economic commitments that were witnessed in the EU response, it is important to note that the military and security domains will always play a crucial role in the hybrid warfare that is inherent to biopolitical warfare (Himmrich, 2018). This is especially true for this crisis, where significant amounts of support were pledged in the realm of military and security as the EU committed Frontex support in a number of ways. Again, the variety of support pledged by the EU, in addition to the variety of actors that the EU committed to this crisis, is consistent with broader EU understandings of hybrid warfare (i.e. the deployment of various means and various actors in response to a hybrid threat; Himmrich, 2018). Much like the EU's commitment to a return programme, European support for this crisis in the form of various

Frontex capabilities and capacity also is consistent with a low-grade and low-intensity form of hybrid warfare that is described in the biopolitical warfare approach.

The EU's commitment of Frontex capabilities and capacities is consistent with biopolitical warfare given the fact that Frontex is a central actor in containing migrant mobility and does so by undertaking a variety of means and often through a variety of actors (Leonard, 2010). Consistent with biopolitical warfare, Frontex often works to actively counter the hybrid threat of irregular migration by targeting the logistics of migrants' journeys; by establishing partitions and other forms of forced mobilities; by working to divert, disrupt, and decelerate migrant mobility into the EU; and by creating new tools of governance to limit mobility, amongst other interventions (Garelli and Tazzioli, 2018A). In this most recent crisis, Frontex support was pledged by the EU in order to counter the influx of migrants at the Greek border. While several scholars have spoken of Frontex's role in contributing to the securitization of migration and/or the violence perpetrated against migrants (e.g. see Leonard, 2010), few have often examined how Frontex actions often emerge as a biopolitics of containment.

For the purposes of this analysis, it is important to establish whether or not the EU's pledged support, primarily represented by Frontex, served to actively contain migrant mobility in a manner that is consistent with biopolitical warfare. As was previously mentioned, biopolitical warfare is a form of hybrid warfare that seeks to contain migrant mobility by diverting, decelerating, or disrupting migrants' mobilities (Garelli and Tazzioli, 2018A). All of the pledged measures on behalf of the EU fit within this framework of biopolitical warfare, as the measures all contributed to the EU's ultimate goal of containing migrant mobility at the Turkish border so that migrants would be unable to cross into the EU (Stevis-Gridneff and Gall, 2020). For example, the EU pledged support in the form of additional border officers and security officials in order to help

Greek officials successfully manage the flow of migrants (European Commission, 2020). These officers were deployed to ensure that no migrants crossed from Turkey into Greece irregularly. Additionally, the EU pledged the support of Frontex machinery such as tactical helicopters, thermal-vision vehicles, and a plane (European Commission, 2020). The thermal-vision vehicles, for example, were offered so that Frontex and Greek border guards would be better able to find migrants attempting to cross in the EU, in order to stop them and send them back to Turkey (Frontex, 2020). This marks a clear attempt on behalf of the EU to disrupt and divert migrants' mobility so that it would not lead them into the EU.

As another example, Frontex's rapid response border operations teams were also pledged to help address this crisis (European Commission, 2020). The deployment of rapid response teams perpetuates the idea that migration flows could constitute an emergency, and further contribute to the securitization of migration in this crisis (Leonard, 2010). Rapid response teams are meant to contain migrant flows by engaging with border security guards in order to prevent migrants from entering the EU (Frontex, 2020). The rapid response teams are deployed in order to address large numbers of non-EU nationals trying to enter a Member State territory illegally and are meant to help national forces reinforce vulnerable border points in order to prevent migrants from entering illegally (Frontex, 2020). Diverting migrant mobility away from the EU is a primary goal of these rapid response teams, whose mission is to assist EU Member States with threatening migration flows (Leonard, 2010). In this most recent crisis, the rapid response teams were called in order to divert migrant mobility, disrupting their journeys by reinforcing border security at the EU's periphery and forcing migrants back to Turkey as needed.

An analysis of the EU's responses to this crisis is difficult, as much of the EU's pledged support did not fully come to fruition prior to the onset of the COVID-19 pandemic. This being

said, all of the EU's pledged actions had the underlying objective of containing migrant mobility in Turkey at all costs: Frontex capabilities and capacities, in addition to the rapid return programme, were all designed to decelerate and disrupt migrant mobility away from the EU in this crisis. Therefore, this MRP takes the position that the deployment of this support does indeed fit the framework of biopolitical warfare, as this physical and material support was offered in an attempt to contain migration flows of transnational populations. Strong emphasis here was on ensuring that no migrant successfully entered Greece via Turkey. This support was born through the renewed emergence of a hybrid threat, which was Turkey's weaponization of migration. The responses that came forward in response to this hybrid threat can, therefore, be reasonably categorized as hybrid warfare, especially if one takes the European definitions of hybrid threat and hybrid warfare. This support across domains was also supported and undertaken by various actors, including Frontex agents, European national border security patrols from various nations, Greek border guards, and Greek military forces. By and large, a case could be made that this could constitute a form of hybrid warfare: multiple means were engaged, both conventional and unconventional, and by a wide variety of actors.

Analyzing Greece's Response

The EU's response to this crisis can be classified as biopolitical warfare as a result of the fact that it broadly fits two criteria. First, the EU's response fits the criteria defined for hybrid warfare as defined in EU documents and policies on the subject: for example, it is a multi-modal response to a hybrid threat (Himmrich, 2018). Second, the EU's response is consistent with biopolitical warfare's definition of hybrid warfare as an attempt to contain migrant mobility by diverting, disrupting, and decelerating migrants' journeys into the EU from Turkey (Garelli and Tazzioli, 2018A). This being said, given the breadth of the EU's response in addition to the fact

that the full extent of the EU's pledged promises were not realized due to the pandemic, it is difficult to provide a robust understanding of how this response qualifies as biopolitical warfare. In order to establish a more grounded understanding of biopolitical warfare as a form of hybrid warfare, a more in-depth analysis of the actions emanating from this crisis is required. Thankfully, Greek actions in this response manifested quickly in light of the urgency of the immediate situation at the Greek-Turkish border, which will be able to provide the grounds for a more substantial examination of the case at hand and how it may constitute biopolitical warfare.

Even before the latest border crisis, Greece was being targeted with renewed vigour by traffickers and migrants (Smith, 2020). This may partially explain why Greece's response was so strict, so early on in the crisis. As a response to the hybrid threat of irregular migration most recently posed by Turkish actions, Greek tactics in managing migration flows in this crisis included conventional tactics such as the reinforcement of Greek borders, or physical attempts to repel migrants at land and on sea; it also contained unconventional tactics, including allegations of detainment and physical harm. These actions were undertaken by a variety of Greek forces including Greek border security, the Greek military, and the Greek navy. Greek actions were further reinforced by the support of Frontex agents already on the ground in Greece at the time of this crisis. Similar to the European case, this overall response is consistent with the general definition of hybrid warfare in that it encompasses multiple actors, multiple domains, and both conventional and unconventional means. However, while Greece's response in this crisis certainly meets the EU criteria for hybrid warfare, biopolitical warfare speaks to a very specific form of hybrid warfare (Garelli and Tazzioli, 2018A). Much like the brief examination of the EU response to this crisis, in order to establish whether Greek are constitutive of biopolitical warfare, this MRP

seeks to establish whether or not Greek actions are synonymous with an agenda of containment meant to divert, decelerate, or disrupt migrant mobility into Greece and the EU.

The Greek government acted in several ways in order to respond to the hybrid threat of irregular migration. Many of the Greek government's responses to this threat inherently had a biopolitical agenda of containment meant to safeguard the nation from the perceived threat of migration. While hybrid warfare in the biopolitical warfare approach is low-grade and low intensity, it is still similar to traditional warfare insofar as it can also occur in multiple domains (Himmrich, 2018; Garelli and Tazzioli, 2018A). In this most recent crisis, examples of biopolitical warfare can be found across domains. One such domain where attempts to manage the hybrid threat occurred was in the political domain. First, it is important to note that information is an important component of hybrid warfare, and while under-explored in biopolitical warfare, is manifestly used in Greek tactics to manage migrant mobility (Ucko and Marks, 2018). Exerting influence via the spreading of information is a hybrid tactic which Greece used effectively in order to justify its actions. In the political sphere, Greek politicians rapidly stopped referring to this crisis as a refugee problem and instead began calling it a hybrid threat from Turkey. Again, this invocation of threat played a specific political purpose: by removing the concern of a 'refugee problem', Greek politicians quickly positioned this crisis as one that had to immediately deal with the concerns of migrant mobility at the border. This served to garner popular support for Greece's migration management interventions of containment at the border (Smith, 2020).

Political rhetoric also frequently called attention to the asymmetric threat that the nation was facing, positioning this threat as something that had to be responded to with equally asymmetric measures (Smith, 2020). Greece frequently vowed it would not bend to this asymmetric threat, and instead frequently indicated that they would 'protect their sovereignty' and

the first priority would be 'protecting Greek borders' in order to combat this hybrid threat (BBC, 2020; Amnesty International, 2020). Furthermore, references to an "illegal, mass, and orchestrated attempt to raze our borders" also serve to justify the need for action (Stevis-Gridneff and Gall, 2020). Calls to ensure order were key in Greek rhetoric and were used in tandem with concern over the asymmetric threat in order to set the groundwork for a Greek position intent on limiting migrant mobility by disrupting and diverting attempts into Greece (BBC, 2020; Stevis-Gridneff and Gall, 2020).

In addition to rhetoric, legal regimes and programmes can also serve as another tactic of biopolitical warfare in order to divert, disrupt, and decelerate migrants' journeys. Political and discursive rhetoric in Greece very quickly set the framework for a Greek position of zero-entrance: migrant mobility into Greece would be rejected at every turn. Broadly speaking, many of Greece's mark an attempt to manage migration and preserve their interests via interventions and techniques consistent with biopolitical warfare. Greek actions have also escalated in their intensity and in Greece's deployment of military operations, intelligence, and technology. In turn, these tools and interventions serve as an attempt to intervene against migrant flows, acting as a barrier to those seeking to continue into Europe. While many would argue that seeking to enforce stringent measures of border control is normal and/or justified by a nation's sovereignty, the extent to which border control has emphasized practices of containment meant to actively decelerate, disrupt, or divert migrant mobility prior to their entry in a nation points to critical violence in migration management that is not traditional in conventional border security (Garelli and Tazzioli, 2018A). This position was quickly reinforced by Greek law, as Greece quickly passed a motion to temporarily suspend asylum claims for migrants seeking to enter Greece (Smith, 2020; UNHCR, 2020). This motion was buttressed by increased threats of deportation, either by Greece itself or

with the assistance of Frontex, for any migrants who did successfully make it into Greece (Smith, 2020; UNHCR, 2020). The United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) has said that there is no legal basis for Greece suspending its acceptance of asylum claims (Reidy, 2020; UNHCR, 2020).

The examples of Greek actions in the political and legal spheres set a strong precedent for an understanding of Greek actions as biopolitical warfare. The unusual nature of these actions, especially the extralegal nature of the suspended asylum procedures, is demonstrative of the unconventional nature of hybrid warfare and how this can emerge in response to a hybrid threat. However, this in and of itself is not constitutive of biopolitical warfare. A more in-depth analysis of these actions shows that they can in fact meet the criteria of the biopolitical warfare approach. By making the landscape politically charged, invoking notions of Turkey's asymmetries and the migrant as a 'human bullet' (Smith, 2020; Garelli and Tazzioli, 2018A), Greece effectively eliminated any successful or acceptable way for migrants to enter into Greece, thus decelerating their mobility. Accordingly, Greece was able to leverage humanitarian concerns for the plight of the migrants by suspending asylum applications as a deterrent measure. Restricting access to asylum marks a significant step in constraining and destroying the logistics of migrant movement, as the end-goal of asylum is an important factor in migrant mobility. The suspension of the asylum system also provided Greece with the means, through deportation, to disrupt and divert migrant mobility into the nation (Human Rights Watch, 2020). These actions are consistent with biopolitical warfare, as Greece's response was meant to disrupt migrants' journeys and act as a deterrent in order to divert migrant mobility away from the EU. These measures served as attempts to contain migrant mobility by making it politically and legally challenging for migrants to successfully enter into Greece, and therefore enter into the EU.

While these examples are effective examples of how a biopolitics of containment was at play in this migration crisis, Greece's political and legal responses to this crisis represent a fraction of the overall action taken in March 2020. The responses that occurred in the security and military domains of this crisis paint an equally informative picture of how biopolitical warfare can operate in land-based migration management interventions. For example, Greece sought to disrupt migrant mobility through the establishment of physical partitions, which was evidenced through Greece's reinforcement of its' borders, hotspots, and detention centers. These partitions were justified via military-humanitarian interventions of rescue and control, as restricting migrant mobility was done in order to counter Turkey's problematic weaponization of migrants (Garelli and Tazzioli, 2018). It could also be argued that Greece's use of tear gas and live fire, presumably used to repel migrants from crossing into Greece, was used as a tactic to divert and decelerate migrants' mobility into the region. For those migrants who did successfully cross into Greece, allegations of ill-treatment, assault, and forced pushbacks, further compound the fact that Greece actively sought to contain migrants' mobility and impede their journeys. These interventions are consistent with the definitions presented in biopolitical warfare, as these military-humanitarian interventions sought to contain the autonomous movements of migrant populations arriving from different countries (Garelli and Tazzioli, 2018A).

Broadly speaking, Greece's actions are consistent with biopolitical warfare, as the containment of migrants' mobility was often the main goal. Greek actions worked to establish partitions and channel mobilities in migration management across a number of domains including the political, legal, and security domains. Similar to the case analysis of the EU, in accordance with the EU's definition of hybrid warfare, Greece's actions fit the necessary criteria: their response was multi-modal, in response to a hybrid threat, and consisted of many actors.

Furthermore, many of Greece's actions sought to limit migrants' journeys in order to prevent their mobility into the EU, therefore making these actions consistent with the definition provided by biopolitical warfare.

Summary

Given the scope of this paper, conducting a comprehensive analysis of Greek and European actions is difficult. That being said, this MRP is able to make several conclusions within its limited range. For example, hybrid warfare can be waged in many forms, and the intensity of these forms can differ substantially (Himmrich, 2018; Fiott and Parkes, 2019). As this analysis has attempted to show, biopolitical warfare can be achieved using various means in different domains, and it can be undertaken by various actors, which is consistent with European definitions of hybrid warfare that have been examined in this MRP (Garelli and Tazzioli, 2018A; Himmrich, 2018). Furthermore, biopolitical warfare does not claim to be hybrid warfare in its most offensive iteration (e.g. in the manner that Russia acted in Crimea); it is defined as a low-grade and low-intensity form of warfare. The collective responses of the EU and Greece serve to paint a picture of the different functioning and potential for biopolitical warfare. While biopolitical warfare has previously focused on maritime interventions in migration management (Garelli and Tazzioli, 2018A), this case study has been able to examine biopolitical warfare beyond the sea in order to understand if this approach has any merit on land. As this analysis has made evident, biopolitical warfare as a form of hybrid warfare can be introduced and reinforced on land as well as at sea, as practices of containment know no boundaries. This conclusion holds promising implications for academic scholarship and for policy practice, which will be briefly discussed in the following section.

Discussion

Relevance

   Unless the EU chooses to change its stance on hybrid threats and hybrid warfare, the use of biopolitical warfare as a manner of thinking critically about migration management in the EU will remain relevant. Specifically, so long as the EU continues to speak of irregular migration as a hybrid threat, its actions in response to this threat are likely to be categorized as hybrid warfare. Garelli and Tazzioli's (2018A) article on biopolitical warfare sets forth an approach that has many advantages. To recap, their approach incorporates many separate schools of thought pertaining to border security and migration management scholarship that are not conventionally brought together, especially the topics of biopolitics and warfare. While this approach is consistent with the available scholarship on biopolitics, migration management, and warfare, the manner in which biopolitical warfare incorporates all these components holistically is unique. Scholarship on biopolitics and warfare is slim (see Dillon and Reid, 2009), and their connection in the realm of migration is understudied (Garelli and Tazzioli, 2018A). The concept of biopolitical warfare also draws attention to the gap in hybrid warfare literature as it pertains to migration in the EU. While the definitions of hybrid threat and hybrid warfare employed by biopolitical warfare are consistent with the approach taken by the EU, there appears to be minimal literature examining the EU's migration management regime through the lens of hybrid warfare In light of this, biopolitical warfare's usefulness can be identified in the fact that it fills a gap; despite the fact that the EU has posited irregular migration as a hybrid threat since the early 2000s (Vaughan-Williams, 2015), there is insufficient literature in the field presently that examines how hybrid warfare has been used to respond to this hybrid threat.

By bringing together this variety of scholarship on border security and migration management, Garelli and Tazzioli (2018A) challenge the 'disciplinarization' that has been prevalent in migration management studies today. That is to say, the concept of biopolitical warfare challenges the "one theory fits all" approach that sees singular theories trying to explain phenomena in migration management, without necessarily considering other theoretical counterparts. This is important, as migration management is complex: there is no singular theory that can address the different considerations and complexities of migration governance, nor can one single school of thought serve to wholly inform these policies and practices. The idea of biopolitical warfare captures these complexities while identifying some of the most relevant theories in border security and migration management today.

Branching off this notion of the 'disciplinarization' of migration management, the notion of biopolitical warfare is also useful because it is applicable to a variety of fields. As this MRP has demonstrated, the concept can be applied to various border security and migration management interventions both at land and at sea. As the EU pushes for unmanned aerial vehicle interventions (UAVs), it will be interesting to see how the idea of biopolitical warfare can be applied to these aerial interventions. Biopolitical warfare is also a concept that is highly accessible to the public. Scholarship on biopolitics is often daunting, as it is brimming with jargon. However, by identifying a very specific biopolitics of containment of transnational populations, the concept of biopolitical warfare makes the topic of biopolitics accessible in migration management by pointing to the very specific form of biopolitics that is often at play in migration management.

There are several other benefits that can be found in the biopolitical component of biopolitical warfare theory. As was previously mentioned, the authors' use of negative biopolitics rather than affirmative biopolitics is important, as negative biopolitics has been critically

understudied in migration management (Garelli and Tazzioli, 2018A). Calling attention to negative biopolitics identifies the negative dimensions of border practices that are often glossed over in legal and policy discussions of irregular migration (Vaughan-Williams, 2015). The same goes for the biopolitical emphasis on transnational populations, rather than national populations. Biopolitics is often referenced in the literature pertaining to the governance of populations, especially in migration, but has very rarely expanded its scope to include transnational populations (Garelli and Tazzioli, 2018A). By calling attention to transnational populations, especially in an era that is marked by increased numbers of mass movement from economic migration, irregular migration, and the movement of refugees and displaced persons (Ghezelbash et al., 2018), the concept of biopolitical warfare addresses the inadequacy of traditional national orientations to biopolitics (Garelli and Tazzioli, 2018A). In migration management, the enforcement of asymmetries and inequalities can occur across borders, and biopolitics should reflect this.

Biopolitical warfare is also relevant to discussions of hybrid warfare and migration management. First, the idea critically challenges how we think about the invocation of warfare in discussions of migration over the last several years. For example, discussions of a 'war on smuggling' do not often bring to mind images of an actual war being enacted on behalf of the EU. However, Garelli and Tazzioli challenge these traditional images by pointing to the fact that warfare, especially biopolitical warfare, can be undertaken in numerous ways. By discussing biopolitical warfare as a form of warfare, Garelli and Tazzioli use the analytic impact of the term 'warfare' in order to point to the institutional violence that is embedded in EU migration management (Garelli and Tazzioli, 2018A). Biopolitical warfare serves to re-orient understandings of warfare in this crisis by identifying and defining a very specific form of hybrid warfare today.

Future Considerations

While the concept of biopolitical warfare has several advantages, many of which address gaps in the present literature, it also has additional advantages in the form of future research potential. As biopolitical warfare points to a very specific biopolitics of containment, this approach could serve as a very useful framework for identifying how EU policies and biopolitical warfare are related. For example, as the focus of biopolitical warfare is very precise, there is potential for biopolitical warfare to act as a critical framework for engaging with European policy in order to understand how these policies introduce and reinforce biopolitical warfare in policy and in practice. This could be especially relevant today, as the EU has several new research and policy motions underway that are meant to address irregular migration. A greater understanding of how biopolitical warfare relates to policy could also help guide policymakers on what types of policies and interventions to avoid in future EU migration management. By understanding how this hybrid warfare is carried out (i.e. through the containment of transnational populations) and seeing how this violence is carried out, European policymakers can ideally seek to avoid this violence in the future.

While the potential policy implications for this approach are promising, there are several crucial failings and concerns in Garelli and Tazzioli's approach that should be answered moving forward. First, the authors speak of efforts to contain migrant mobility as biopolitical warfare but fail to address several fundamental questions that should have been examined as counterarguments within their work. For example, is containing (irregular) migrant mobility not a normal goal for nations? More importantly, do nations not have a right to do this? Before truly able to point to the relevance of this theory, future scholarship should attempt to situate biopolitical warfare within the answers to these questions. At this point in time, these questions are unfortunately outside of the scope of this MRP. However, these are questions that need to be answered moving forward.

This biopolitical warfare approach also fails to take into account the underlying reasons for migrant mobility and why control is required in the first place. Future research should seek to tie together these questions with the biopolitical warfare approach.

Conclusion

At this time, the Greek-Turkey migration crisis has subsided: Turkey has stepped back its actions at the border, and the spread of COVID-19 has further contributed to a halting of activity at European borders. Generally speaking, however, the situation in Greece remains critical for migrants waiting at Greece's borders and for those who are trapped in its territory (Mijatovic, 2018). Reception conditions are well below standard; significant health-care risks remain; the present system continues to dehumanize and abuse migrants and refugees; and pushback operations are said to continue (Mijatovic, 2018; McDonald-Gibson, 2020; Amnesty 2020; Human Rights Watch, 2020). Furthermore, evidence indicates that another border crisis may be near (Schengen Visa Info, 2020). While the immediate threat may have subsided, other opportunities for violence against migrants remain.

This potential for violence will remain so long as the relationship between border security and migration management is unstable. Unfortunately, this instability is unlikely to end soon. The difference between a guarded and protected domestic space for the local population (the EU) and the 'foreigners' (migrants) is routinely destabilized in border security and migration management (De Genova, 2013). This (in)stability will remain for as long as border security and migration management are intertwined, and as long as irregular migration continues to be viewed as a hybrid threat by the EU. As migrants continue to defy traditional mobility practices through their cross-border journeys, and as they continue to assert their presence within traditionally European spaces, they continue to destabilize border relationships (De Genova, 2013; Zavirsek, 2017). This

destabilization manifests and presents itself via the perception that borders are in fact (in)secure, staging the perpetual demand for (in)securitization (De Genova, 2013; Akkerman, 2018).

Biopolitical warfare serves as a consistent response to this demand and to the broader threat of irregular migration. As this MRP demonstrated, biopolitical warfare also serves as a strong analytic approach for understanding border security and migration management. Biopolitical warfare calls attention to the violence and inequality that migrants often face in their journeys. In an era where migration management is becoming increasingly intertwined with militarized measures, biopolitical warfare is able to identify how these militarized techniques, technologies, and interventions, are reconfiguring the governance of migration (Garelli and Tazzioli, 2018A). This MRP has demonstrated that the biopolitical warfare approach can and should be taken beyond the realm of maritime migration interventions, as was previously conceptualized, further adding to its academic value. The use of biopolitical warfare as an analytic approach is especially useful in migration crises such as the Greek-Turkey border crisis. While the migration crisis has subsided at this time, biopolitical warfare allows for an understanding that violence against migrants' journeys is ever-present and should continue to be explored in academic scholarship.

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