


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INDIVIDUALITY AND PERSONALITY IN MICHELE F. SCIACCA'S  
PHILOSOPHY OF INTEGRALITY  
(IMPLICATIONS FOR PSYCHOLOGY)

by Claude A. Della Zazzera

Thesis presented to the School of  
Graduate Studies of the University  
of Ottawa as partial fulfillment  
of the requirements for the degree  
of Master of Arts in Psychology



Ottawa, Canada, 1976

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## ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

This Master's thesis was prepared under the supervision of Prof. O. J. Ruda, Ph.D., Professor of History and Systems and of Dialectical Psychology, of the Faculty of Psychology, University of Ottawa. The writer wishes to thank Prof. Ruda for his generous guidance and constant encouragement with this thesis.

The writer is also indebted to Mr. David Crowe, M.Ps., and Miss Claudette Bastien, M.A., for their patient assistance in the preparation of the text. Appreciation is also expressed to Mr. Maurice Dionne, Ph.D., for his encouragement and interest.

## CURRICULUM STUDIORUM

Claude A. Della Zazzera was born May 31, 1951, in Montreal, Quebec. He received the Bachelor of Arts degree in Sociology from Loyola College, Montreal, under the auspices of the University of Montreal, in 1972.

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## INTRODUCTION

Modern psychology is finding a vast number of applications--in the fields of mental health, education, industry--by way of diagnosis, psychotherapy, counseling, selection, etc. This diversity of application, although a sign of its richness and fertility, makes it difficult to approach and understand the field of psychology in a consistent way. Furthermore, a diversity of theoretical positions which dispute the very subject matter of psychology adds to the confusion. One is confronted with a variety of systems and theories, a diversity of methodologies and a multiplicity of concrete applications (in praxis).

With the broadening of the scope of psychology, especially in its application to concrete human problems, the psychologist increasingly finds himself called to act according to his understanding of the nature of man. This is because, in actual practice, he does not deal with the psychological dimension of man in some abstract way but in the context of the integral man, of man in his wholeness. Furthermore, the question about the nature of man, which concerns the philosophical foundations of psychology, is not unrelated to the theoretical and methodological disputes which are all too familiar to the psychologist.

In other words, a philosophical understanding of man is basic to an understanding of the field of psychology in

both its theory and praxis. This thesis is an attempt to develop a critical and systematic perspective towards the field of psychology, especially the psychology of personality, on the basis of a philosophy which views man in an integral way. Michele Federico Sciacca's (1908-1974) philosophy of integrality (filosofia dell'integralità) was chosen for this purpose. In addition to providing a comprehensive understanding of man, in historical perspective, this philosophy offers a unique epistemological position in contrast to the general trend of modern and contemporary thought. Furthermore, it elucidates the principles of individuality and personality, which have a direct application to the field of psychology, and which capture the integral view of man which this philosophy presents. They also reflect, in the way they are elaborated, the unique epistemological position.

Sciacca's system is founded on an ontology or metaphysics: he is critical of systems which begin at the gnoseological or epistemological level deriving the ontological therefrom. His position thus differs fundamentally from the latter in that he begins by looking for the ontological foundations implicit to thought. The question of how thought reveals the reality of the world can only be considered ulterior to the question of ontology.

It is the first chapter of this thesis which deals with this fundamental principle of Sciacca's philosophy which

he calls ontological or objective idealism. This principle is of crucial importance to the whole of his philosophical system. It is examined in terms of the historical perspective of Sciacca's thought. Since this chapter is intended as an introduction to the foundations of Sciacca's thinking, many passages in the original Italian have been included to support the text.

The second chapter focuses on certain categories and notions of the philosophy of integrality which are essential to an understanding of the principles of individuality and personality, which, as will be explored in the third chapter, represent Sciacca's way of grasping man concretely as a synthesis.

The third chapter deals with the implication for psychology of Sciacca's perspective on man. The question of how the multiple aspects of man constitute a synthesis and the nature and limits of the psychological dimension in that synthesis is discussed. The problem of the nature of psychological understanding in the context of a philosophical or integral understanding of man is raised. The principles of individuality and personality, which are understood as capturing the multiplicity of man in his concrete unity, are described as having a fundamental importance in the field of psychology. On the basis of this perspective, a number of psychological systems are briefly discussed in order to show

the applicability of this perspective to the field of psychology and to thereby indicate possibilities for future research.

Osvaldo Jorge Ruda's book, Dialectique de la personnalité,<sup>1</sup> considers the implications of Sciacca's philosophy for psychology in view of a dialectics of personality. Many of the notions of that important and unique study have been implicitly and explicitly incorporated into this thesis. However, this thesis focuses more explicitly on the manner in which Sciacca, in the context of his philosophical system, understands the principles of individuality and personality as capturing the nature of the concrete man, and on the basis for a critical perspective towards the psychology of personality, which an understanding of these principles provides.

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1 O. J. Ruda, Dialectique de la personnalité, Ottawa, Les editions de l'Université d'Ottawa, 1973.

## CHAPTER I

### HISTORICAL AND EPISTEMOLOGICAL PERSPECTIVE OF THE POSITION OF OBJECTIVE OR ONTOLOGICAL IDEALISM

Sciacca qualifies his philosophy as an objective or ontological idealism and distinguishes it from the idealism generally found in modern thought (beginning with Descartes) which he refers to as subjective idealism.<sup>1</sup> The main positive influences on his thought have come from Plato, St. Augustine, St. Thomas, Pascal, Antonio Rosmini, Maurice Blondel, and others in this tradition of objective idealism; his philosophy has developed in critical response to Descartes, the empirical idealists, Kant, Hegel, Gentile, and others, all of whom are seen by Sciacca as subjective idealists.

1. Origins of the Problem: Descartes vs. Pascal  
(The Question of the Limits of Human Thought).

The essential difference between objective and subjective idealism is that the former sees the Idea (of being) as objective, given to the mind as its object, as that whereby man thinks, without which there would not be any thought; whereas the latter, subjective idealism, makes man's own thought, his own subjectivity the basis of truth. According to the latter, truth, or being, is reduced to a function or

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<sup>1</sup> See Appendix 1.

faculty of the subject, be it reason, the categories, the transcendental "I", the subject in act, etc. Reason and thought no longer find principles which illumine them but by an irrational act judge the very principles whereby they ought to be judged.

Truth is then conceived as immanent to thought or to reason, and being is simply identified with these. Sciacca says about Descartes' initial absolute doubt, which he sees as founding this subjective idealism:

Quando il "cattolico" Descartes, facendo tabula rasa della tradizione e d'ogni altra autorità, posò all'inizio della ricerca il dubbio assoluto, "iperbolico" anche se "provvisorio", Descartes sospese tutto, sospese la verità, ogni verità: sospese Dio. La ragione considera vero solo quello che essa conosce come tale chiaramente, e distintamente; nega, anche se ancora non apertamente, che essa possa avere dei limiti ed afferma che il limite della ragione è il limite della stessa verità, cioè che oltre le sue idee chiare e distinte, non vi è verità, ma c'è la non-verità che per la ragione è il nulla. Il pensiero moderno nasce come fiducia nella ragione, come rivendicazione o scoperta dell'assolutezza dell'assoluta ragione. L'iniziale "dubbio iperbolico" è l'atto di nascita della "ragione iperbolica" di capacità illimitate. La ragione decreta con esso la propria assoluta sovranità, maggiore se stessa oltre ogni limite, malgrado ancora Cartesio consideri Dio come garanzia di ogni umana verità.<sup>2</sup>

It is Pascal whom Sciacca sees as the first modern thinker to protest this aberration of reason, as he explains in the following:

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2 M. F. Sciacca, Il pensiero moderno, Brescia, La Scuola, 1949, p. 8-9.

Per Pascal, appunto, l'atto con cui la ragione nega che qualcosa la oltrepassi, è un atto irrazionale, in quanto è razionale, conforme all'ordine autentico intrinseco e sempre attuale della ragione, riconoscere che molte cose la oltrepassano. L'affermazione pascaliana non è dettata da scetticismo, come ancora da molti si ripete, ma dalla razionalità interiore della ragione normale e reale, contro la cartesiana ragione-iperbolica non normale, non reale e perciò non razionale; contro la ragione scatenata.<sup>3</sup>

Pascal emphasized a reason aware of its limits and, therefore, aware of transcendence; he called human thought miserable--yet sublime in its awareness of this misery, in its consciousness of its limitations. Such, however, does not imply a rejection of reason or total skepticism towards the truth.

Mario Stefani writes concerning this issue:

La debolezza è propria della ragione astratta, che si crede onnipotente. La forza è propria della ragione concreta, che riconosce i suoi limiti.<sup>4</sup>

Citing Sciacca, he writes:

L'atto con cui la ragione riconosce che vi sono verità non razionali, come le ragioni del cuore che la ragione non conosce "è sempre razionalmente fondato, ragionevolissimo."<sup>5</sup>

Historically, Sciacca sees this understanding of human thought (in its greatness and misery, in its limitation, weakness, yet openness to the transcendent and the infinite) as a Christian development and surpassing of the Greek conception of man. He writes:

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3 Ibid., p. 9.

4 M. Stefani, Il problema della fondazione del finito nello sviluppo del pensiero di Michele Federico Sciacca, Roma, Città Nuova, 1976, p. 81.

5 Ibid., p. 83.

L'aspetto più noto della concezione greca dell'uomo, armonia di vita e ragione, è sostituito dalla concezione instaurata dal Cristianesimo, dell'uomo come essere essenzialmente contraddittorio, miseria e grandezza.<sup>6</sup>

This idea is further developed by Sciacca in his concept of the "ontological disequilibrium" of man (l'uomo "squilibrato"), which will be considered in a later section.

## 2. The Empiricist Tradition: The Idea Reduced to Subjective Impression.

With reason absolutized, the human world begins to be seen as wholly explainable and organizable. Science attains prominence. Beyond this, for the modern and contemporary empiricist, there is obscurity, there is the fantastic, there is the fruit of credulity. With Locke comes the initiation of a new metaphysics which tends to become identified with analyses of sensations and intellect, with psychology and ideology. As a result of this tendency, according to Sciacca, philosophy becomes identified with science. Historically, this identification is already prefigured in Aristotle's naturalism with the reduction of all innate ideas to concepts derived from experience of the external world.<sup>7</sup> Thus, with modern empiricism, the term "idea"

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<sup>6</sup> M. F. Sciacca, Pascal, Milano, Marzorati, 1962, p. 169.

<sup>7</sup> Sciacca sees in Aristotle the merit of showing how the concepts of reason are formed in the course of experience and not innate in the Platonic sense; but he sees

him as erring when he denies the innateness of the Idea. In L'interiorità oggettiva he writes: "... non c'è concetto dell'essere, ma intuizione di esso nel modo come può essere presente alla mente umana nell'ordine naturale, cioè come Idea o lume intelligibile. I concetti sono della ragione, che è capace di formularli in quanto l'intelligenza intuisce l'essere. Essi richiedono un contenuto di esperienza che determina l'Idea dell'essere (noi preferiamo dire l'"essere come Idea"), fonte di ogni concetto, senza essere essa stessa concetto: l'uomo ha i concetti degli esseri, non il concetto dell'essere, che se fosse un concetto dovrebbe ricevere un suo contenuto dall'esperienza, cioè essere esso stesso contenuto di una forma. Presente in ogni giudizio, fonda e insieme trascende la capacità giudicativa della ragione. Dunque vi è l'Idea dell'essere intuito e vi sono i concetti degli esseri, per la formazione dei quali è necessaria e valida l'astrazione. Dire che l'essere come Idea è frutto dell'astrazione è pretendere che il principio per cui è vero ogni concetto vero, sia esso stesso prodotto dalla ragione; è ammettere che dell'essere vi possa essere un contenuto sensibile ... affermare che anche l'essere come Idea si induca dall'esperienza è negare che vi sia nell'uomo un principio di verità che l'esperienza trascende ed ogni esperire rende possibile. Vi sono i concetti della ragione, vi è l'unica Idea dell'intelligenza. Perciò Platone, il filosofo dell'Idea, è la filosofia; Aristotele, il filosofo della ragione, è la scienza. Platone è il filosofo del sapere, Aristotele, il filosofo del conoscere razionale. Noi siamo platonici perché la nostra è filosofia dello spirito e non scienza della natura e perché crediamo che solo una filosofia dello spirito possa essere filosofia cristiana. Ma Platone ebbe il torto di considerare idee innate tutti i concetti; Aristotele ebbe il merito di costruire il conoscere razionale come conoscenza per concetti, che non sono innati, ma che si formano con il concorso dell'esperienza; ebbe però il torto di negare l'Idea come tale e d'identificare così la filosofia con la scienza o, se si preferisce, di trattare la filosofia (metafisica, morale, ecc.) con mentalità scientifica e naturalistica." M. F. Sciacca, L'interiorità oggettiva, Milano, Marzorati, 1960a, p. 36-37.

Stefani explains Sciacca's understanding of Plato's essential contribution with respect to the Idea: he writes that Plato intuited the fundamental idea of being or truth, that is, its ontological transcendence with respect to both thought and reality (reale); the Idea is not founded on sense experience, neither is it adequated by the activity of the subject nor is it a function of the latter--it is its object, without which being vanishes into nothingness and with it also thought and reality (reale). Stefani, op. cit., p. 48.

It is St. Augustine whom Sciacca sees as having integrated Plato's Idea into Christian philosophy as the "light of the mind" (lume della mente).

assumes a meaning which is different and opposed to the Platonic one (and consequently to the tradition of objective idealism). For Locke, idea is a content of subjective consciousness; for Hume, the memory of a subjective impression.

Sciacca writes:

L'idea cessa d'essere l'oggetto intelligibile intuito dall'intelletto e con cui la ragione giudica di ogni cosa: è soggettiva al pari della sensazione da cui deriva, di cui è una debole rappresentazione soggettiva ... negata l'oggettività dell'idea è negata la realtà della verità e con ciò stesso l'oggetto del pensiero e dunque della filosofia [for this reason, as noted above, does metaphysics tend to become identified with psychology and ideology]. Gli interessi pratici prevalgono su quelli teorici: la filosofia cessa di essere contemplazione (manca l'oggetto da contemplare) e si fa azione, rivoluzione (la Rivoluzione francese è figlia dell'Illuminismo); cessa di dimostrare razionalmente e consiglia la "credenza", sempre per motivi pratici, in quei principi che la ragione presume avere demolito svelandoli tutti miti o illusioni ... la ragione non giudica più secondo le idee oggettive (universali e necessarie) a cui essa è sottoposta, ma giudica (o pretende di giudicare) le stesse idee. In base a quale nuovo criterio, dato che le idee non sono più le regole del giudizio, ma esse stesse sottoposte a giudizio? Il criterio dell'esperienza sensibile; dunque di ciò che è contingente e mutevole. Conseguenza: non vi sono giudizi oggettivamente validi e le stesse idee non sono che sensazioni affievolite e trasformate, puri contenuti della coscienza soggettiva.<sup>8</sup>

### 3. The Position of Kant: The Idea Reduced to a Universal Function or Category of the Subject.

It was Kant's attempt, explains Sciacca, to rediscover the validity and objectivity of human knowing, after

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<sup>8</sup> Sciacca, op. cit., 1949, p. 6.

empiricism and empirical idealism had brought it into question. However, Kant does not consider the principles which guide reason to be objective in the sense of objective idealism. Reason does not submit itself to these principles. Rather, they are conditions or functions of reason itself. Furthermore, the transcendental "I", as the supreme condition or a-priori form of man's knowing of the world, is adequated by the multiplicity of experience which is the whole of its object; that is, it does not have a transcendent object.<sup>9</sup> This a-priori is simply the condition of knowing. Without a content it remains empty, and in itself, as Sciacca says, it is not yet experience.<sup>10</sup> It is lacking the moment

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9 Sciacca explains: "... tutta la sua capacità e tutto il suo oggetto, quello che lo adegua e lo compie come trascendentalità, è il molteplice della esperienza: esso è la condizione della conoscenza del mondo, ma è condizionato dal mondo stesso, al quale si adegua come funzione trascendentale, senza possibilità di conoscere altro, di aspirare a conoscere una realtà che non sia quella del mondo. E ciò è coerente, una volta ridotta l'Idea a concetto, il concetto o la categoria a funzione dell'intelletto, la oggettività alla stessa attività trascendentale del soggetto." M. F. Sciacca, Atto ed essere, Milano, Marzorati, 1960b (3rd ed.), p. 147.

10 Sciacca in this way criticizes Gentile's adoption of the transcendental "I"; this is a fundamental criticism he makes of his Attualismo. Sciacca writes: "Gentile, con Kant, nega, in questo senso, l'esperienza interiore o l'interiorità oggettiva che è il pensare stesso nella sua oggettività (principio di ogni conoscenza) e non può non negarla una volta che l'Idea è ridotta a funzione. Per conseguenza, c'è il "conoscere"--l'attività trascendentale o funzione in cui tutto il conoscibile è via via conosciuto in virtù di detta attività--, non c'è il "pensare", atto primo o la sintesi originaria ontologica, che è il soggetto pensante nella verità o Idea, che è il suo oggetto interiore, che lo costituisce come pensante e perciò come attività pensante "in

of initial objectivity which gives thought its essential foundation. The original intuition of truth, or being, as the founding moment of thought is lacking. Therefore, it (the "I") does not carry the sense of interior experience or objective interiority, interiorità oggettiva, (a fundamental concept of Sciacca's valid for a philosophical psychology or anthropology; it will be reconsidered below and looked at more fully in a later section).

With Kant, Sciacca explains, the Idea is reduced to a function, a function of intellectual perception of the world. As such, as noted above, it is entirely conditioned by the world, insofar as it needs the world to supply its content, without which it remains empty; furthermore, from this perspective, a transcendent direction or relation is lacking in human thought. Thus, with the Idea reduced to a

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atto", in per e con l'essere, suo oggetto o Idea ... Posto che il pensare è trascendentalità in funzione dell'esperienza nel senso di contenuto o materia, non c'è un pensiero che sia esperienza di sè (il Gentile sostiene che sî, in quanto il concetto è sempre autoconcetto); anzi il soggetto pensante non è mai esperienza di se, ma è l'esperienza del conoscibile via via che lo conosce. Dire che l'esperienza del conoscibile è sempre esperienza del soggetto non è rispondere al problema che qui stiamo ponendo, che è quello del pensare che, come tale è già esperienza di sè e non di altro. L'"autocoscienza" nel Gentile, non può non essere anch'essa "trascendentale", "funzione" suprema in funzione del conoscibile, cioè del mondo della esperienza o del molteplice della sensibilità. Perciò l'"Io penso" è, in fondo, ciò con cui si conosce e rispetto a cui vi sono conoscibili e conosciuti, è funzione pura; in sè non è nè pensare nè conoscere; anzi, come in sè, non è affatto: si risolve tutto, nel suo esistere e nel suo essere, nella sua attività trascendentale." Ibid., p. 146.

function, thought does not aspire to know anything else but the world.<sup>11</sup> According to Sciacca, Kant, therefore, remains under the influence of the Enlightenment, by essentially retaining and in a sense combining the rationalistic dogma which has reason found and construct the truth, and the empiristic one which sees sensory experience as the limits of human knowledge and reason.<sup>12</sup>

Kant was seeking a solution to a gnoseological or epistemological<sup>13</sup> problem--the problem of the validity and

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11 Ibid., p. 147.

12 Sciacca, op. cit., 1949, p. 10.

13 The term gnoseology or epistemology is used here in its most basic or fundamental sense.

Baldwin (in the Dictionary of Philosophy and Psychology, Vol. 1, Gloucester, 1901, p. 333) specifies two meanings: "(1) Theory of the origin, nature and limits of knowledge ..., (2) the systematic analysis of the conceptions employed by ordinary and scientific thought in interpreting the world, and including an investigation of the act of knowledge, or the nature of knowledge as such, with a view to determine its ontological significance; otherwise known as Theory of Knowledge."

In Brugger and Baker's Philosophical Dictionary, Gonzaga University Press, Spokane, Washington, 1972, p. 215-216 (originally Philosophisches Wörterbuch, by Walter Brugger in 1947), the wide sense of the theory of knowledge or epistemology is explained as including "both the psychological investigations into the becoming and essence of human knowledge and the critical study of its validity; one can also add to it the metaphysics of knowledge which considers human knowing in the total context of everything existing. In a narrower sense, the theory of knowledge ... is the same as the critical study of knowledge. As such, in general, it is the philosophical investigation of the objective validity of our knowledge. In contrast to logic, it considers not only the conditions of validity which are based on the relations of the thought-contents to each other, but it also

objectivity of human knowledge. The consequence of pursuing this question without first developing a metaphysics and ontology is to tend to identify being with the categories of knowing, to identify truth with thought, to base metaphysics and ontology on gnoseology. In Sciacca's ontological idealism, on the contrary, thought is constituted in an essential

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poses the decisive question about the 'objective' validity of the thought-contents, i.e., about their validity in reference to the object or, if only valid thinking is to be termed 'knowledge', the question about the possibility of knowledge as such."

In Abbagnamo's Dizionario di Filosofia (Torino, 1968, p. 159), a narrowing of the sense of the theory of knowledge in contemporary thought is explained: "... la teoria della C. (conoscenza) è venuta a perdere il suo significato nella filosofia contemporanea ed è stata sostituita da un'altra disciplina, la metodologia ..., che è l'analisi delle condizioni e dei limiti di validità dei procedimenti di indagine e degli strumenti linguistici del sapere scientifico."

In the Diccionario de Filosofia (José Ferrater Mora, Editorial Sudamericana, Buenos Aires, 5th ed., 2 vols., 1965 [1st ed., 1941], p. 758-759), an attempt is made to distinguish two general meanings of epistemology: "En español puede proponerse lo siguiente: usar 'gnoseología' para designar la teoría del conocimiento en cualquiera de sus formas, y 'epistemología' para designar la teoría del conocimiento cuando el objeto de ésta son principalmente las ciencias. Pero como no es siempre fácil distinguir entre problemas de teoría del conocimiento en general y problemas de teoría del conocimiento científico, es inevitable que haya vacilación en el uso de los términos."

From the above definitions, several senses of the term epistemology may be suggested: (1) a general one which encompasses all definitions given above; (2) a specific or particular sense which sees epistemology as the critical study of the validity of knowledge as applied to the sciences; (3) a fundamental sense, that is, a more basic understanding of the second definition, as a seeking to know how knowledge and experience are possible; the limits, conditions, and nature of human knowledge. It is in this latter sense that the term is used above.

relation to the Idea of being. In this case, the ontological is primary; the gnoseological secondary.

With Sciacca, there is a possibility of objective interiority (interiorità oggettiva) or interior experience, that is, interior to thought itself is the object which constitutes it, the Idea of being, the lume della mente of St. Augustine. This essential interior relation is the foundation of all knowledge. On it depends the intelligibility of all reality. The gnoseological question which seeks to know how knowledge and experience are possible is therefore logically conditioned by it.<sup>14</sup> This does not imply that the experience of the real world (il reale) is constructed or created by thought. (This is more a Kantian implication later developed and made explicit by Hegel and Gentile.)

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14 Speaking of Rosmini, who first grasped the extreme importance of this problem for philosophy and the sciences, (his role will be more fully considered later), Sciacca writes: "Il Rosmini pone un problema fondamentale ed ancora oggi attuale: egli ha visto, per primo, contro il gnoseologismo della filosofia moderna, che altro è il problema della "oggettività del pensare" o dell'"intelligibilità" o del "principio della oggettività", e altro quello del "conoscere oggettivo": il primo è ontologico-metafisico ed è il fondamento dell'altro. Risolvere la metafisica nella gnoseologia, come ha fatto l'idealismo da Fichte a Gentile, è perdere il senso metafisico del principio dell'autocoscienza e con ciò sacrificare le più profonde ed invincibili esigenze dello spirito umano. Giustificare invece queste esigenze nell'ambito stesso della problematica filosofica moderna è inserire l'istanza critica nella metafisica, ma in modo che l'innesto non uccida, bensì rinvigorisca l'antico tronco. Qui l'essenza vera, il contributo valido e l'attualità del rosminianesimo." M. F. Sciacca, La filosofia morale di Antonio Rosmini, Milano, Marzorati, 1968, 5th ed., p. 47-48.

It means, rather, that the intuition of being interior to thought, is fundamental to the intelligibility and experience of the real. For Sciacca, in fact, the real like the ideal, has more than a gnoseological meaning, that is, the real is more than just a matter or content for human thought and perception--it has an ontological value. For Sciacca, the "fundamental sentiment" (sentimento fondamentale) (which is the primary or basic sense of corporality in man) is essential to the sensing of the real world and is part of man's ontological structure. About the fundamental sentiment, Sciacca writes that it is:

... fondamentale, in quanto è il fondamento o il presupposto da cui dipendono i sentimenti fondamentali secondari ... [and] ... primario, poiché anteriore ad ogni particolare sensazione: è anche senza di queste, che non sarebbero se esso non fosse ...<sup>15</sup>

Furthermore, the real (reale) is considered as an essential alterity to man (is not reduced to thought or idea or reason as with Gentile or Hegel), an alterity ontologically constituted, not created by man or thought but essential to him as he is to it dialectically. Sciacca explains:

La realtà s'inscrive nell' esistenza, e tramite l'Idea che dell'esistenza è l'essenza, l'una e l'altra s'inscrivono nell'essere, che trascende il reale e l'esistere, in una dialettica perenne di

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15 M. F. Sciacca, L'uomo, questo "squilibrato", Milano, Marzorati, 1963, p. 99.

partecipazione e d'intervallo, di presenza ed assenza. Tale dialettica non è una legge del pensiero, un puro processo conoscitivo come risoluzione del reale nel pensiero stesso o nel logo cosiddetto concreto. E' principio ontologico, costitutivo dell' esistente come tale, il principio stesso dell'esistenza; è quel "sentimento", che è l'esistenza.<sup>16</sup>

For Sciacca, furthermore, thought is not adequated by the real (reale) (as it is with Kant) but has a transcendent object in the Idea; thought transcends the real because its interior object is not the finite, the reale in itself, but the infinite (being as Idea). If fixated on the finite reality its course would be indefinite--but still not open to the infinite.<sup>17</sup> In fact, such a fixation implies a conception of reality which is not real and concrete but abstract. It abstracts the real from its relation to man and to the infinite in man. It misses its ontological determination, its insertion in the totality of being. Its ontological meaning is actualized only in and through man dialectically.

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16 Sciacca, op. cit., 1960b, p. 86. (Underlining is by the researcher.)

17 Dr. Ruda explains this distinction between infinite and indefinite: "... l'indéfini est, en fait, l'espace de la mathématique dénommé infini au sens impropre du terme, l'infini étant un concept seulement et proprement philosophique et non mathématique. En effet, l'indéfini est ce à quoi on peut toujours ajouter quelque chose parce qu'il lui manquera toujours quelque chose. Mais l'infini est ce à quoi on ne peut rien ajouter parce que c'est un concept qui implique l'"absoluité" (assolutezza) et l'absence de limites." O. J. Ruda, Dialectique de la personnalité, Ottawa, Les éditions de l'Université d'Ottawa, 1973, p. 31, see also p. 34-35.

This is not a "gnoseological" conception of the real in the Kantian or even Gentilian sense because, as Sciacca says, this dialectics is not a law of thought, a pure process of knowing which resolves the reale into itself (as with Gentile or Hegel) or as a construction of thought (as with Kant); it is an ontological principle constitutive of the existent and real as such--not a gnoseological synthesis but an ontological one. Sciacca writes: Vi è, dunque, sintesismo di essere ideale, essere esistenziale e reale. La sintesi concreta ontologica è: l'esistente spirituale, la persona, nel mondo. [There is, consequently, the synthesis of ideal, existential and real being. The concrete synthesis is: the spiritual existent, the person, in the world.]<sup>18</sup> (See Chapter II-3B & C for further explanation.)

Thus, in Sciacca's view, Kant's idealism remains a subjective idealism because the categories are essentially functions of the subject. Even though universal and necessary conditions of knowing, they are not objective in the sense of the Idea. They are forms of the subject, not his essential internal object.<sup>19</sup>

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18 Sciacca, op. cit., 1960b, p. 83.

19 Sciacca, op. cit., 1949, p. 6.

4. Hegel vs. Rosmini: Immanent vs.  
Transcendent Idealism.

Through what is, in Sciacca's view, essentially an elaboration of Kant's philosophy, Hegel definitively transforms objective into subjective idealism. Hegel denies that the idea is object to the mind or transcendent reality, and identifies it with the process of reason itself. Reality is identified with the becoming of the spirit in its dialectical moments. With this definitive transformation of transcendent idealism into transcendental or immanent idealism, the process begun by Descartes, the absolutizing of reason, is completed. Sciacca writes that with Hegel:

... il ciclo aperto dalla "ragione" cartesiana si chiude: la ragione scatenata conclude e si conclude nella sua assolutezza. La regola generale del metodo cartesiano ("è vero tutto ciò che la ragione conosce come chiaro e distinto") trova la sua esplicitazione assoluta e conclusiva nell'aforisma hegeliano: "ciò che è razionale è reale e ciò che è reale è razionale" ... Hegel è la fiducia totale e finale nella Ragione dalla iniziale ragione scatenata ed iperbolica di Cartesio; perciò Hegel conclude l'avventura della ragione, che pone in se stessa il fondamento di ogni cosa, che tutto fonda senza essere fondato da altro: la Ragione (e la ragione di ordine umano o naturale) è Dio. Così Dio era già morto, prima che Nietzsche lo proclamasse.<sup>20</sup>

According to Sciacca, a voice which called for a correction of the original error of Descartes, as manifested in modern philosophy, was that of Antonio Rosmini considered by Gentile as the Italian Kant. (Sciacca, however, takes

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<sup>20</sup> Sciacca, op. cit., 1949, p. 11.

issue with this interpretation.<sup>21</sup>) An important influence in Sciacca's thought, Rosmini fits clearly into the tradition of objective idealism. Sciacca writes that Rosmini "dared" to say that philosophy had to return to the point before Descartes, where reason had made itself the foundation of itself, and he adds:

... e, di là, dimostrare che una ragione che si autofonda si autoaffonda, perché è una ragione infondata (o, quel che è lo stesso, fondata su di un atto non-razionale); a fine di parlare un linguaggio ad esso comprensibile ed esprimere i suoi bisogni, ridare alla ragione, sulla base della ragione la più critica ed autentica, il suo fondamento.<sup>22</sup>

Stefani explains Rosmini's historical position in a similar way. He writes:

Rosmini appare, quando il pensiero moderno ha portato a termine la parabola ascendente: dall'immanentismo germinale del Rinascimento all'immanentismo assoluto. Di là o si torna indietro o si precipita. Rosmini propone una operazione neoclassica di ritorno a "prima di Hegel", a "prima di Kant", a "prima di Cartesio". Al principio dell'immanenza della verità oppone il principio della trascendenza; alla teoria dell'idea come contenuto soggettivo o condizione o

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21 "Quando ... i sostenitori del kantismo del Roveretano [among whom was Gentile] devono pur dire che cosa il filosofo intenda per intuito dell'essere, per essere ideale oggettivo, intuito ed innato, sostengono arbitrariamente che l'intuito non è essenziale alla filosofia rosminiana, o che l'essere ideale è soggettivo e funzione a priori nel senso delle categorie kantiane. Ma, detto ciò, si è esposta la filosofia di Kant, senza aver detto niente di veramente pertinente intorno a quella del Rosmini ..." Sciacca, op. cit., 1968, p. 51, see also p. 48.

22 Sciacca, op. cit., 1949, p. 11-12.

funzione a priori della conoscenza oppone quella dell'idea come oggetto; alla risoluzione dell'oggetto nel soggetto, un irriducibile dualismo, capace di generare la dialettica della trascendenza teistica, nella prospettiva di un platonismo cristiano, agostiniano ... Rosmini ripropone, nel cuore del pensiero moderno, il significato platonico, agostiniano, che l'idea aveva fino a Malebranche, a Leibniz, a Vico: l'idea è l'intelligibile, ha un significato ontologico e non solo logico, ha un valore trascendente e non solo trascendentale, è oggetto e non solo forma a priori dell'intelletto, in se stessa vuota. Altrimenti ne consegue che: a) il principio del sapere si identifica con il sapere; b) il principio della realtà si identifica con la realtà; c) la metafisica, come teoria del principio del sapere e del reale si risolve nella psicologia, nella teoria della scienza, nella logica.<sup>23</sup>

The tendency after Kant through Fichte, Schelling, Hegel and Gentile is to reduce the Kantian categories to the supreme one, the transcendental "I", and to make it the absolute.<sup>24</sup> In this way, the act of thought or knowledge does not presuppose anything to itself. But, as has already been seen, this founds ontology on gnoseology. Thus, follow the inevitable consequences well described above by Stefani. The principle of knowing identifies itself with knowing because it is a property of the subject. The principle of reality is identified with reality because there is no principle transcendent to it with which it has a relation. And metaphysics resolves itself into psychology and logic because it is based on the processes of the subject, of thought

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23 Stefani, op. cit., 1976, p. 88-89.

24 Ibid., p. 98.

in itself without the idea of being. Rosmini saw that the processes of knowing, of thinking, of experiencing, of intellectual perception of reality, are founded on ontological or metaphysical ground, on the intuition of being and truth; in other words, that the gnoseological problem is conditioned by the ontological or metaphysical one. Thus, Rosmini found a solution to the gnoseological problem which surpassed both the one of empiricism and the ones of empirical and transcendental idealism.<sup>25</sup>

#### 5. The Three Moments of Modern and Contemporary Philosophy.

As Sciacca notes, Rosmini went unheeded.<sup>26</sup> He adds that, like the proverbial frog of Lafontaine, Hegelian

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25 Ibid., p. 92.

26 "Qualcuno, in tempo, aveva cercato di rimettere le cose a posto, di ridurre a ragione, di soddisfare le esigenze che aveva manifestato da Cartesio in poi, ma sul piano di una filosofia che fosse veramente la consapevolezza di se stessa, dei suoi limiti e delle sue aspirazioni. Ma questo qualcuno, che rappresenta un'altra grande protesta di un grande moderno contro il pensiero moderno per riscattarlo dal suo peccato originale battezzandolo come ragione, direi, razionale e non anti-razionale, non fu ascoltato nè a sinistra nè a destra: così, infatti, capitò ad Antonio Rosmini. Rosmini ebbe il coraggio di osare di dire quello che ancor oggi non osano dire quanti ripetono che non si può tornare "a prima di Kant", "a prima di Hegel", come se fosse coraggio e non piuttosto pusillanimità e pigrizia il non osare di tornare a prima dell'errore, del peccato della ragione assoluta. Rosmini osò dire che bisognava risalire al punto della frattura, a Cartesio, al momento in cui la ragione si era fatta fondamento a se stessa, e, di là, dimostrare che una ragione che si autofonda si autoaffonda, perchè è una ragione infondata (o, quel che, è lo stesso,

Reason, the culmination of Descartes' initial absolute doubt, had to explode. From this followed the chaos of contemporary philosophy characterized by a profound distrust in rationality, and by the dissolution of this "hyperbolic reason" (ragione iperbolica).<sup>27</sup> Absolutized reason had to reach its ultimate consequences in its disintegration. Initially, positivism attempts to rescue reason from these consequences through its operationalism; giving to reason a role in the acquisition of knowledge within the limits of a methodology ultimately restricted to a consideration of sense experience. However, Sciacca writes that even this position is attacked:

Successivamente ... anche la rocca positivista è attaccata: intuizionismo, vitalismo, pragmatismo, relativismo, filosofia dell'azione (e potrei continuare per un pezzo) sono tutte posizioni o irrazionalistiche o anti-intellettualistiche, fino ad alcune forme odierne di esistenzialismo, di storicismo, di metodologismo scientifico, di problematicismo esasperato ecc.<sup>28</sup>

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fondata su di un atto non-razionale); e di là, attraverso lo stesso processo del pensiero moderno, a fine di parlare un linguaggio ad esso comprensibile ed esprimere i suoi bisogni, ridare alla ragione, sulla base della ragione la più critica ed autentica, il suo fondamento." Sciacca, op. cit., 1949, p. 11-12.

27 "Hegel, parafrasando le parole attribuite a Luigi XV, avrebbe potuto dire: "Dopo di me, il caos!" La ragione iperbolica, fondamento a se stessa, doveva necessariamente scoppiare come la rana della favola. Ed è scoppiate e non poteva non scoppiare: la Ragione hegeliana è la concezione più irrazionale ed irragionevole che mai sia stata "imaginata" della ragione." Ibid., p. 11.

28 Ibid., p. 12.

About this dominant trend in contemporary thought, Sciacca further writes:

It is a whole movement, both philosophical and cultural, which for more than a century has shaken every rationalistic and systematic construction from its foundation by calling into doubt all principles of knowledge, whether scientific or philosophical, thereby denying the very base of all objective understanding. Engaged in a ceaseless war against the metaphysical or theologizing "dogmatism" of the intellect, vast and manifold currents of thought have vindicated all that is irrational, primitive, and immediate in the human subject. And these are opposed to Descartes' rationalism resting on his clear and distinct ideas, as well as to Kant's rationalism resting on his "a priori" forms of the spirit ... .<sup>29</sup>

Sciacca explains, through a brilliant synthesis, that these developments of modern and contemporary Western philosophical and cultural thought have passed through three main phases or moments.<sup>30</sup> In the first moment, reason

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<sup>29</sup> M. F. Sciacca, Philosophical Trends in the Contemporary World, Notre Dame, University of Notre Dame Press, 1964 (trans. by Attilio Salerno), p. 1.

<sup>30</sup> Sciacca writes: "... in un primo tempo la filosofia acquista la consapevolezza che la verità assoluta è "posta" dallo stesso pensiero e che si risolve nell'immanenza ad esso; poi acquista la sempre maggiore consapevolezza che anche la verità, come sviluppo immanente del pensiero, è "mitica", "dogmatica", "teologizzante" e che un pensiero critico non può accogliere il "dogmatismo astratto" della verità assoluta ma soltanto il "relativismo concreto" della verità a circostanze di fatto, a metodi di conoscenza, a ipotesi di lavoro, ad esigenze pratiche o vitali, ecc. Da ultimo, attinge la consapevolezza estrema e la sola autentica che la verità dell'uomo (e la verità essa stessa) è il problema, la problematicità reale e sempre attuale dell'esistenza e del pensiero. Questa la sola filosofia umana, la sola cioè che sia pura da residui mitici di teologismo e di divinizzazione; questa le "sincerità" spietata, ma autenticamente vera." Sciacca, op. cit., 1960a, p. 23-24.

is absolutized and truth is seen as immanent to thought. The second moment sees the dissolution of this "dogmatic" reason and the relativizing of truth. The third moment represents the final dissolution of immanentistic rationalism and expresses its very ultimate consequences by seeing truth as essentially problematic. Truth is neither immanent to human thought nor relative to circumstances. There is only "Nothingness" (il Nulla) as the foundation and goal of human thought. These three moments represent a synthesis of the historical development (modern and contemporary) of the fundamental problematic of Western thought. They are more fully considered below.

First Moment.- Absolute truth is essentially identified with human thought. This is seen in the development of subjective idealism from Descartes, the empirical idealists, through Kant to Hegel, and is repropounded by Gentile.

Second Moment.- This arrives with the realization that even the truth as the immanent development of human thought is "mythical" ("mitica"), "dogmatic" ("dogmatica"), "theologizing" ("teologizzante"), and that a critical thought cannot grasp this "abstract dogmatism" ("dommatismo astratto") but only a "concrete relativism" ("relativismo concreto") in terms of factual circumstances, functional requirements, situational elements, vital exigencies, etc. Absolute reason is supplanted by non-rational forms of knowing; by

sentiment, intuition, instinct, or subordinated to pragmatic activity. Truth is thereby totally relativized.

Third Moment.- This arrives with the realization of the "nothingness of truth and being" (nulla di verità; non-essere), and concludes that there is neither absolute nor relative truth. Truth itself becomes the problem, no longer immanent to human thought; no longer relative to circumstance or to instinctive life. There is only Nothingness (il Nulla) as the foundation and goal of human thought. This is the metaphysical conclusion of contemporary nihilism and problematicism, as represented in atheistic and agnostic existentialism.<sup>31</sup> Rather than adopt a negative or pessimistic stand vis-à-vis these forms of existentialism, Sciacca examines them dialectically. According to this dialectical view, they have the merit of demonstrating the impossibility of founding an absolute truth immanent to human thought. They, therefore, represent the final dissolution of the immanentistic rationalism which ran its course from Descartes to Hegel.<sup>32</sup> Paradoxically, however, the nihilistic and

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31 Sciacca presents, with exceptional incisiveness, the three moments as follows: "...la verità assoluta è lo stesso pensiero umano (primo momento); la verità è relativa e non vi è verità assoluta nè immanente nè tanto meno trascendente (secondo momento); la verità è lo stesso problema ed il sistema della verità è la problematica pura e semplice (terzo momento)."  
Sciacca, op. cit., 1960a, p. 24.

32 "Tuttavia il nihilismo ed il problematicismo contemporanei hanno il merito di aver dimostrato, attraverso la critica della filosofia moderna, che è impossibile fondare una verità assoluta sul pensiero umano e ad esso immanente. Questo mito, proprio del razionalismo immanentista dal Cartesio allo Hegel, è stato veramente dissolto." Ibid., p. 24.

problematicistic conclusions provide the ground for a new synthesis. Accordingly, the affirmation that nothing is true is, for Sciacca, untenable--for by what implicit truth can the statement be made? He writes: l'affermazione -niente è vero -è filosoficamente senza senso [The affirmation--nothing is true--does not make sense philosophically].<sup>33</sup> Thus, Sciacca concludes dialectically: perciò il problema della verità rinasce dalle stesse conclusioni assurde del pensiero contemporaneo [Therefore, the problem of truth (as distinguished from the truth as problematic) is reborn from the same absurd conclusions of contemporary thought].<sup>34</sup>

In presenting this historical and epistemological framework or inquadramento of Sciacca's system, certain basic elements of his philosophy of integrality have been discussed: (a) his objective idealism; (b) a concrete and critical reason with an awareness of its limits; (c) the essential dialectical relationship between man, reality and the transcendent; (d) the notion of "objective interiority" (interiorità oggettiva); (e) the transcendence and absoluteness of truth; (f) the position of his philosophy in relation to the ultimate conclusions of contemporary thought.

In summary, this chapter presents Sciacca's system as an objective or ontological idealism and his essential

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33 Ibid., p. 24-25.

34 Ibid., p. 25.

criticism of what he calls subjective idealism. He criticizes the subjective idealism found in Descartes because the latter established a "hyperbolic" absolutized reason founded in itself and therefore irrational. Pascal's notion of a reason conscious of its limits, of a human thought aware of its misery, is seen as countering this view. Kant's subjective idealism is criticized because his a priori forms reduce the idea to mere functions of the subject. They are functions of the intellectual perception of reality and are adequated by the perceptual world. Thought and knowledge, therefore, lack a transcendent object. Furthermore, the transcendental "I", through Fichte, Schelling, Hegel, and Gentile, becomes the sole a priori. It is, in itself, empty; it does not constitute inner experience. In this manner, ontology is reduced to gnoseology. Sciacca proposes, following Rosmini, an ontological synthesis instead of the gnoseological one, as the foundation of thought and knowledge. The intuition of being (intuizione dell'essere), not the a priori of reason (which is a function of the knowing of reality), is the foundational moment of thought and knowledge. Thus reason can be rationally founded. With an awareness of its limits, it bases itself on principles which transcend it, thereby staying within its norm and not alienating itself. The intelligibility of reality is based on the ontological synthesis; presupposes it. Sciacca's philosophy

of integrality sees itself as answering the ultimate conclusions and concerns of the problematic of modern and contemporary thought, by providing the ontological basis of knowledge and thought, and returning to reason its rational foundations. Thus the philosophy of integrality stands counter to the trend in contemporary thought which, in reacting to the Absolutized Reason of Descartes to Hegel, relativizes truth, and then pursuing further the logical consequences of a "hyperbolic" human reason, concludes by losing faith in truth and being altogether.

The purpose of this chapter has been to introduce a basic tenet of Sciacca's philosophy of integrality, its objective or ontological idealism with respect to its position in the history of thought. As will be seen in the next chapter, this objective idealism is of cardinal importance to Sciacca's whole philosophical system. This next chapter focuses on certain basic categories and notions of Sciacca's philosophy of integrality. It seeks to provide the philosophical framework within which Sciacca conceives the concrete man especially with reference to the way this concreteness is captured in his principles of individuality and personlity. This latter theme will be further developed in the third chapter with a view to establishing its importance in the study of man's psychological dimension and its critical value for a perspective towards the field of psychology.

## CHAPTER II

### PHILOSOPHICAL FOUNDATIONS OF THE PRINCIPLES OF INDIVIDUALITY AND PERSONALITY IN SCIACCA'S PHILOSOPHY OF INTEGRALITY

This second chapter is written to explicate some of the basic philosophical categories and notions of Sciacca's philosophy of integrality which are important for an understanding of his concepts of individuality and personality. The concepts of individuality and personality in Sciacca's system capture and summarize his dynamic integral view of man for both the philosophical and the psychological levels. The psychological implications will be the focus of the third chapter.

#### 1. The Need for Philosophical Foundations to Psychology.

Human psychology cannot limit itself to a métrologie de façade<sup>1</sup> nor again to a pratique de tout praxis.<sup>2</sup> In a psychology with an absence of philosophical foundations, there is the tendency to radicalize the initial absence or void. Sciacca, in the letter-preface to Ruda's Dialectique de la personnalité, writes in this regard about le "carême" que les psychologues d'aujourd'hui se sont imposé à l'égard de la

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1 O. J. Ruda, Dialectique de la personnalité, Ottawa, Les éditions de l'Université d'Ottawa, 1973, p. 3-5.

2 Ibid., p. 18.

philosophie. He expresses his hope that la psychologie contemporaine s'ouvre à la philosophie, à l'être vrai de l'homme et à ce qu'il y a de vraiment humain en lui; c'est-à-dire à l'homme dans son intégralité.<sup>3</sup>

Historically, one cannot deny the internal rapport between psychology and philosophy. Ruda writes concerning this question:

On peut se demander si la psychologie: "pré-scientifique" a eu quelques fois, dans l'Histoire, une manifestation créatrice et intuitive, c'est-à-dire si, avant d'être considérée sous l'aspect du calcul et de l'expérimentation, elle a jamais vécu des manifestations créatrices de la méthode intuitive. Il suffit de penser à Platon ou à Aristote et aux intuitions qu'ils ont eues au sujet des fondements de la personnalité humaine et des types précis de caractères, pour ne pas mentionner saint Augustin, saint Thomas d'Aquin, Pascal et bien d'autres dans la ligne stricte de la pensée philosophique ou même éducationnelle pour devoir répondre affirmativement.

Quelle était la valeur de ce type de psychologie? C'est celle d'avoir fixé les caractéristiques ou traits permanents de la personnalité et du comportement humain de telle façon que nous puissions les reconnaître aujourd'hui comme points de repère fondamentaux pour la recherche, tandis que les psychologies scientifiques modernes tendent à accomplir des analyses minutieuses factorielles et multi-factorielles d'ou n'émerge pas l'homme concret et existant. La personnalité est construite par morceaux et, par cette voie, elle risque même de se fragmenter en modèles et minimodèles qui ne représentent ni synthétiquement ni analytiquement l'intégrité de l'homme. Il est trop facile de signaler que les psychologies philosophiques sont vieilles et démodées ou résultant d'"armchair speculations", mais c'est là une erreur énorme qui a amené les psychologies d'aujourd'hui à ne produire que des théories et des représentations partiellement efficaces et qui ne sont pas vraies intégralement.<sup>4</sup>

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3 Ibid., p. x.

4 Ibid., p. 50-51.

Furthermore, Ruda explains that without the philosophical moment psychology could not even begin as a science:

[Le] ... lien entre philosophie et science en particulier la psychologie, serait le suivant: les deux sont formes du savoir; la différence réside dans le fait que la philosophie est présente dans toute science, y compris la psychologie, comme le moment qui définit ses limites. L'acte par lequel une science se constitue comme telle et établit son objet et sa méthode, en s'écartant et se distinguant par conséquent des autres sciences, est un acte proprement philosophique. A la rigueur, une science ne peut se séparer et se distinguer des autres sciences, si elle ne porte son regard au-delà d'elle-même et si elle n'a pas en vue ce que sont les autres disciplines et leurs propres frontières pour savoir quelles sont ses propres limites et l'horizon de sa validité. Cette connaissance est tout à fait nécessaire pour se constituer comme science.<sup>5</sup>

In the light of the above, the categories and notions to be explicated in this chapter are not to be considered as operational definitions, arbitrary clusters, simple formalizations, or nominal constructs, etc.; their bases rest on man's concrete history, on his fundamental intuitions, of which Sciacca's thought is a lucid systematization and penetration. Ruda writes:

Pour Sciacca, s'il y a un sens du discours sur la psychologie, il en serait de même pour toutes les autres sciences en autant qu'il est possible de faire une science qui se meuve à partir des intuitions profondes. Les intuitions doivent être capables de pénétrer dans les données que l'expérience fournit et que la réflexion distingue dans sa profondeur.<sup>6</sup>

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5 Ibid., p. 63

6 Ibid., p. 52.

## 2. The Idea of Being as an Essential Transcendent Object to the Mind.

### A. Objective Interiority and Self Consciousness

As was seen in the first chapter, in Sciacca's system, the human subject is essentially constituted by a relation to being as Idea in an original synthesis. This relation is seen as the foundation of man's self-consciousness and of his consciousness of the world. This foundation is the presence of the light of truth or Idea to the mind as its object, that is, what Sciacca calls objective interiority. Self-consciousness does not exhaust objective interiority but is its primal specification or determination.<sup>7</sup> It follows from this, Sciacca explains, that the Idea, though actualized in self-consciousness, has, nevertheless, a logical priority (priorità logica) over its determination in self-consciousness. Furthermore, objective interiority has a maggioranza ontologica because of the infinity of the Idea which renders man essentially open beyond the limits of self, of the world and of history, that is, of the finite.<sup>8</sup> The consciousness of self is finite insofar as it is consciousness of a finite existent or subject; objective interiority, on the other hand, is

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<sup>7</sup> M. F. Sciacca, L'interiorità oggettiva, Milano, Marzorati, 1960a, p. 106.

<sup>8</sup> Ibid., p. 103.

infinite, because being-Idea is an absolute or infinite potency of being.

#### B. Ontological Disequilibrium

Man's ontological status is not a stable one. His thinking thought (pensiero pensante) is not adequated by his thought thought (pensiero pensato); his willing will (volontà volente) is not adequated by his willed will (volontà voluta); his sensing sense (sentire sentente) is not adequated by his sensed sense (sentire sentito)--because his interior object is not this or that being or truth, but being as Idea or the truth of all truths, the fundamental object which constitutes the human subject as intelligent (intuiting being).<sup>9</sup> Because the existent is not adequated either by himself or by other finite actualizations, due to his original relation to being, Sciacca speaks of man as ontologically "disequilibrated" (l'uomo questo "squilibrato"). This implies that man's own actualizations seen in their finitude, in their limits (separately or all together) cannot adequate him because he is essentially related to the transcendent. Thus, Sciacca speaks of man's transnaturalty. No finite, not even in its indefinite extension in space and time is adequate to him. Sciacca explains that the capacity or power of human thought,

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<sup>9</sup> M. F. Sciacca, L'uomo questo "squilibrato", Milano Marzorati, 1963, p. 256-266.

not considered in its subjectivity but in the objectivity of the presence of being to it, thus of thought as an original synthesis of subject and Idea, confers on man the infinite capacity of thinking, sensing, willing, that is the capacity of self-transcendence.<sup>10</sup> In this respect, Sciacca notes something of great importance: the human subject, because of his intrinsic relation to the Idea, cannot not transcend experience, contrary to the sense of the Kantian a-priori of knowing and transcendentality, because he is inadequated by all the knowing of his experience. This is because the Idea as transcendent object of the mind is prior to Idea as form of the subject and sets the limits to the Idea in the latter sense (the form of the knowing of the world). Thus, the possibility of metaphysics is posited by Sciacca in a "critical" fashion which overturns the "criticality" of the Criticismo. He adds that the critical problem of metaphysics, in this respect (as first seen by Rosmini), is not the not being able to prescind from the limits of experience, but the not being able to prescind from the surpassing of the limits of experience itself.<sup>11</sup>

Thus, Sciacca writes that man, in the totality of his ontological components, is a primal or primitive synthesis of finite and infinite (a finite existent who cannot

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10 Ibid., p. 111.

11 M. F. Sciacca, Atto ed essere, Milano, Marzorati, 1960b, p. 38-39.

not be in relation to the infinite); he is a finite ever meeting the infinite. The human condition is therefore neither finite nor infinite but both finite and infinite, immanent and transcendent--it is already an internal "dialogue". Sciacca further adds that because of this, the human condition is "dramatic"; that is, ontologically disequibrated.<sup>12</sup>

Thus, being (esse) is the perennial disquietude of this being (ens). It is the constant stimulus soliciting this being to repropose itself in ulterior initiatives, yet never to close itself in any of them or in all of them. The dialectical implication of being (esse) in this being (ens) breaks every provisional equilibrium and repropose the indominable dialectic at a higher level which is nevertheless irreparably insufficient in and of itself. Sciacca puts it another way by saying that the Sein does not rest in any actuality of the Dasein, it does not immobilize itself in any partial actualization.<sup>13</sup>

### 3. Real, Ideal and Existential Being.

#### A. Basic Distinctions

For Sciacca, the real (reale) is any determination of being as Idea. However, he chooses to distinguish between

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12 Sciacca, op. cit., 1963, p. 111.

13 Sciacca, op. cit., 1960b, p. 57.

the existent (l'esistente) and the real, the existent being one who exists to himself by virtue of the interiority of the Idea, the real not existing to itself but to an existent.<sup>14</sup> Furthermore, as already stated, being as Idea, though having an ontological majority (maggioranza ontologica) and a logical priority (priorità logica) over the existent, is in an original synthesis with the existent. Thus, Sciacca writes that the primitive or originary ontological synthesis is not between the "ideal" and the "real" form of being but between the "ideal" and the "existential" form of being. Also, only in God does this relationship exist in the form of identity in that in Him Existence is identified with Being. In the created existent, existence or subjectivity, and Idea or objectivity (which is interior to the subject) are not identified. Sciacca explains further that being in its absoluteness and infinity is given to the subject as object and not also as subject; thus, the subject or existent himself, is relative, finite and limited.<sup>15</sup> Furthermore, Sciacca explains that the finite existent is corporal and as such he cannot not exist in nature or the world, that is, in the real. The real is not a form of being which is added to the existential one, Sciacca writes,

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14 Ibid., p. 58.

15 Ibid., p. 71, p. 82.

it is that which does not exist to itself. On the other hand, the existent is a real (un reale) who has the sense of himself (sentimento di sé) and is therefore not a pure real.<sup>16</sup>

B. Critique of Idealistic, Empiristic and Realistic Views of Reality

Sciaccia is critical of idealistic, empiristic and realistic views of reality though he is closest to the latter. He explains that: it is the empiristic illusion which makes one think things (le cose) to be the ensemble of our subjective sense impressions; it is the idealistic illusion which has one believe they are produced by the dialectical movement of the Subject; and it is the realistic illusion which has one suppose a real in itself as if it existed independently of the sensing principle (principio senziente).<sup>17</sup>

He explains further that he rejects both statements: "Things are as we sense them" or "We sense things as they are," considering both to be abstract positions which he argues lack ontological sense. He argues that to say things are as we sense them may mean: (a) that we have them be that which they are the moment we sense them; or (b) that

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16 Ibid., p. 83.

17 Ibid., p. 81.

they have an unknown quid, unknown in itself, which escapes us, and that for us they are only as they appear and relatively so to each sensing being; or (c) that their being is none other than their appearing. This position (things are as we sense them) is the empirist-idealist position. To say, on the other hand, that we sense things as they are is to attribute to them a reality in itself (una realtà in sé), to suppose that they would be what they are even if no one had ever sensed or thought them and that in contact with us we sense them as they are. Sciacca calls this position the realistic illusion. Both positions are for him naturalistic viewpoints transferred into philosophy. He considers them legitimate as scientific positions in the study of nature but illegitimate in philosophy as a way of grasping the ontological sense of reality.

He says that things are not as we sense them, nor do we sense or know them as they are. Rather reality, originally and by essence, is with respect to (rispetto a) the sentient-intellective principle which has it exist, that is with respect to which it exists. It could not exist a single instant outside of this relation. Sciacca adds that one could say that it is in this manner that the real emerges or is born (he writes: è nato così). The principle with respect to which it is (with respect to which it has being) is the Creator-Subject, absolute Sensing and absolute Intelligence (Sentimento assoluto e Intelligenza assoluta).

Ontologically (for its being) and metaphysically (for its principle), therefore, the real is as it is because it is sensed and known, and it would not have been if it was not sensed and known, and it would not be if it should cease to be sensed and known, that is, if it should cease to be in relation to the creative Principle and to the sensing-intellective-volitional subject (senziente-intellettivo-volitivo). Does this mean that the real in itself does not exist? Sciacca answers his question by saying that the real as such is that which, insofar as it is real, is the world of the sensed (sentito); to be as a sensed is the order of being of the real. Outside of this relation to the sensing subject, one is no longer speaking of the real neither in itself nor in relation, because the real's being in itself and its being real are its being in relation to a subject. Do things then have an essence of their own? Sciacca answers this question by saying that they have one but their essence is precisely a sensed essence (l'essenza sentita).<sup>18</sup>

#### C. The Person as the Synthesis of Real, Existential and Ideal Being

Sciacca sees the human person as the ontological synthesis of ideal, real and existential being; thus the

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<sup>18</sup> Ibid., p. 79-80.

person is seen as principle and end of created being and the ontology of created being is the ontology of the person. In the person, one finds synthesized all the created forms of being. This is in accordance with his philosophy of integrality which is not a dialectics of the resolution or reduction of opposites but rather one of the implication and compresence of the different orders of being.<sup>19</sup>

However, Sciacca distinguishes between a person as a being and Being in which the person participates via the Idea, but from which the person remains immensurably distinct. He explains, that in the person the synthesis of the forms of being is different from the one properly of Being. The being as Idea does not belong to the existent as such; the Idea properly belongs to the infinite Being as His sentiment (sentimento). The infinite Being communicates to man the Idea but not his existence. Thus, the finite existent "naturally" participates through the Idea with the Infinite Existent.<sup>20</sup>

As seen above, Sciacca sees the different orders of created being, Ideal, existential and real, as essentially unified or synthesized. Furthermore, he sees their unity realized in the person. The unity is also one of finite and infinite. Ideal being is infinite; existential and real

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19 Ibid., p. 26.

20 Ibid., p. 83.

being is finite. The objection may be raised, from a naturalistic standpoint, that the real precedes in time the existential and Ideal orders of being and subsists without the latter. It must be said in this regard that Sciacca's position does not deny or contradict the scientific findings in the study of man. The Idea of being presents itself to the human intellect as infinite. At any point where the infinite has entered the finite, it has entered all of the finite just as the latter has entered a relation to all of the infinite. Therefore, though in finite temporal terms the infinite only "enters" the finite at a certain point in the latter's development (i.e., with the coming into being of this or that man), it has "entered" all of the finite--it has always belonged to the latter. The finite, therefore, would never have been, if infinite being had not come to it, in the human subject. Thus, to say that a subject is essential to the world as being merely says, in finite temporal reference, that the world is destined to produce and receive man in the course of its development, something which does not contradict a scientific understanding of the world, but which gives an explanation and order to those same scientific findings which they could not have when considered in themselves.

For Sciacca, the Idea was created so that the world should be and so that certain creatures in that world should be intelligent (intuit being). Otherwise, all of

the real would have been impossible or at least without any meaning or sense. Thus, Sciacca sees the Idea and the human subject (who as existent, in the fullest sense, is the synthesis of corporal sentiment and intuition of being) as ontologically united or synthesized. Furthermore, he sees a dual dialectical tension in the core of created being: of the Idea towards Being and of the existent towards the Idea (the created logos--Latin: logus, the "natural" mediator between God and man). And because the Idea "exceeds" both existence and reality (maggioranza ontologica, priorità logica) it makes of the human state a "transnatural" one. The end of the human subject, through the reality known by means of the Idea (which in relation to the subject's knowing of reality is the light of reason), is not the real itself, but Being: this is the ontological exigency of the human subject.<sup>21</sup>

D. Potency of Being and Being in Potency (or the essentiality of the human person)

To be act and not potency is a quality of the essence of being. That is, the essence of being is not a being in potency, a virtual being which is not yet, and might be potentially; rather, it is the potency of being, an act capable of ulterior actualizations. It is not

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21 Ibid., p. 52-53, also p. 47.

something which is to become act as if it were such only potentially, but something which is already act. The intellect or mind of man is act constituted by its first or original act--the intuition of being. Thus, according to Sciacca, there is no intellect in potency but only intellect in act. It is this primal act--intuition of being--which the existent is called to actualize in order to develop (sviluppare) all the potentiality for which he is able throughout his life.<sup>22</sup>

Thus, neither being nor the mind are in potency; however, there is no actualization from the subject which will exhaust the primal act which is his foundation.<sup>23</sup> As Sciacca writes, we are, but we do not adequate the essence whereby we are. In other words, man is not the principle of his existence; the Idea is. Man's existence is limited, contingent, and finite; the Idea is necessary, unlimited and infinite. He explains that a man who thinks he possesses all of his being and ceases to search and essentialize his existence ulteriorly, convinced that his realized actualization is all of his act, loses in that moment the sense of being and, therefore, the sense of his being. It is the presence of being to his existence which exposes the incompleteness of that existence and calls him to self-transcendence.<sup>24</sup>

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22 Ibid., p. 53-54.

23 Ibid., p. 55.

24 Ibid., p. 71-72.

## 4. Personality and Individuality.

Human beings vary according to history, culture, race, character, appearance, environment, etc. Sciacca explains that Cicero called man a "multiple" or "multi-faceted animal" (animale molteplice) and that Rosmini commented, "multiple in his actions, attitudes and aspects." Sciacca believes this multiplicity, in the unity of each man, to be unified in reference to the two distinct, though not separate principles of individuality and personality.<sup>27</sup> (Ruda devotes a chapter of his book Dialectique de la personnalité to this problem of man as an unitas multiplex.)<sup>28</sup>

For Sciacca, the personality represents the development or unfolding (sviluppo) of the person, whereas individuality represents the becoming (divenire) of the individual. In other words, the person develops into his personality and the individual becomes his individuality. The person is the principle of man's integrality or unity: it unifies all other aspects of man--as individual, sensing subject, human subject, and self. As the spiritual principle in man, the person unifies him in relation to the Idea, and as such constitutes him as intellectual (intuiting truth or being as Idea), volitional (choosing and electing according to the

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27 Sciacca, op. cit., 1963, p. 35.

28 Ruda, op. cit., 1973, p. 21-39.

intuited norm), and rational (judging reality in terms of the intuited principle). The person represents man's existential reality: it refers to man as existent (existing to himself in the world in the light of being). The individual, on the other hand, refers to man's real (reale) or natural aspect: his reality as a member of a biological species, individuated in a particular manner in time and space, with particular characteristics. Sciacca speaks of the individual as comprised by or founded in the vital, sensitive and human instincts. The individual is man's rootedness in corporality and consequently in the world of nature. The human person, because he is a principle of synthesis, includes the individual; on the other hand, the individual, in his distinctive order, implies the person. One could say, in other words, that human life (pertaining to the human individual) always implies human existence (pertaining to the person) but that the latter includes, transcends and transforms the former.

In order to further understand Sciacca's distinction between individuality and personality, one must consider two orders of freedom; the freedom of choice and the freedom of election; and the two respective orders of time which correspond to them: the time of life and the time of existence.

## 5. The Dialectics of Choice and Election.

## A. Freedom of Choice and Freedom of Election

Sciacca distinguishes choice (scelta) and election (elezione). In choice, the subjective element is predominant; in election it is the objective which dominates.<sup>29</sup> By subjective choice, Sciacca intends those acts of the subject which promote individual interests and needs. The thing chosen serves vital-instinctive goals of the particular individual or collectivity of individuals. Choice concerns the domain of the real (reale), the economic, the "exterior," the worldly, the corporal. Election, on the other hand, involves the personalizing of objective principles, the principles of truth, beauty, and goodness. Thus, in electing, the objective element is crucial. One elects fundamentally in consideration of the truth or perfection of that which is elected. In the freedom of choice, one chooses to meet a subjective need; in the freedom of election one existentializes an objective value. One could say that choice involves the individuality, election, the personality.

Sciacca views these two distinctive orders integrally. He speaks of spiritual activities as being

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29 M. F. Sciacca, La libertà e il tempo, Milano, Marzorati, 1965, p. 79-80.

in-corpor-ated (incorporate) and of bodily needs as being grafted (innestati) (in the spirit). Accordingly, the bodily needs and the spiritual needs, although distinctive in their demands, are fundamentally inseparable. The human subject is continuously faced, therefore, with the problem of choice and election in a dialectical relationship. Sciacca explains, however, that the problem is not one of a battle between the corporal and the spiritual, but, rather, one of their integration. They are integrated insofar as the corporal bread (pane corporale) chosen wholly according to the exigencies of life, is willed for the spiritual bread ("per" il pane spirituale) wholly elected according to the exigencies of existence. (Needless to say, this integration involves a tremendous struggle of the will.) Sciacca adds that the "two breads" are inseparable because the one of the body, of life, if in the order of being, is also the one of the spirit, of existence.<sup>30</sup>

B. Social and Moral Implications of the  
Dialectics of Choice and Election

The freedom of choice fails, enslaves itself, when it chooses purely in a subjective way, that is, when only considering individual advantage and not the order of being of the thing chosen. When it is exercised according to the

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30 Ibid., p. 145.

order of being Sciacca calls it the objective freedom of choice (libertà di scelta oggettiva); it is then coordinated to the freedom of election or existence.<sup>31</sup>

The freedom of election, on the other hand, fails when it absolutizes the finite it has elected, attempting to capture the infinite in the finite itself. The prototype of this is the romantic.<sup>32</sup>

Sciacca contends that no one can deprive a single man of his interior "objective" freedom, his freedom of election. In addition, however, no one has the right to impede a man's freedom of choice (subjective exterior freedom). In its fullest sense, the freedom of choice cannot be realized without the requisite economic possibilities. He continues, that to deny these possibilities, while formally recognizing the exercise of choice, is cruel and malicious. It is a form of "colonialism" of one people over another.<sup>33</sup>

### C. Dialectics of the Will

Sciacca is critical of any approach which applies the dialectics of negation and affirmation to the process of willing. This approach sees the will as proceeding through alternations of negations and affirmations: to affirm a

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31 Ibid., p. 79-82.

32 Ibid., p. 94.

33 Ibid., p. 145.

new willed reality (un voluto), the will negates the prior one; thus it affirms negating and negates affirming. The motive force of this process is the exigency of being freed from the limiting finite reality. It is a movement of liberation from the finite which proceeds indefinitely. Sciacca explains that, if indeed it were so, the essence of the will would be either negation (la negazione) or (choosing not to choose) the nothing purely indetermined. In the first case, according to Sciacca, it is not worth choosing given that every choice is negated by the successive one; in the second case, freedom would be empty, the non-willing, filled with nothingness. He adds, however, that in the dialectics of the negation of every choice and in the refusal to choose at all, there is a truth which should be recuperated. He asserts that every new initiative taken by the will does, in fact, suspend its prior determination, by making a new choice. This suspension, however, does not necessarily mean negation, just as saying "no" to something does not mean its annihilation. Moreover, to recognize and affirm the insufficiency of the finite is not to imply that the will negates the finite, rather it implies that the will assumes it; takes it into one's wholeness (interezza), into the fullness of one's being. In fact, the act with which the willing will suspends its prior determination is an initiative taken on the basis of the prior act of the will (e iniziativa "su" di essa). It is the beginning of the

movement of the compresence of the already willed, and of the new project towards which the will is now tending. Sciacca explains, therefore, that it is correct to say that the will, in its movement, goes beyond its finite determinations. Regardless of whether it should remain in one of them, its staying there (stare nel termine) always implies a willing of something beyond it, a will towards the final end of the willing will. Such is not a negation of what has already been willed, but its implication, its fusion in the willing process. Thus, in each new choice, all of the willed will (volontà voluta), that is, all that has been willed, is involved in the new work of the willing will (volontà volente). Therefore, concludes Sciacca, in each new free act there is always the whole person with all of his acts, each one distinct and yet all compresent in his inseparable (inscindibile) unity.<sup>34</sup>

D. The Synthesis of Choice and Election: of  
Life and Existence

This unity of the acts of the will includes those of choice and of election. However, choice belongs to a different order of time than election. Generated in relation to choice is the time of life (tempo della vita), the empirical time of becoming. Generated in relation to

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34 Ibid., p. 92-93.

election is the time of existence, the interior time of development. The time of existence (because the existent is a synthesizing principle) is inclusive of the time of life, and the time of life implies the time of existence with which it is in an essential relation.<sup>35</sup> In fact, Sciacca speaks of a third form of freedom which he calls initial freedom (libertà iniziale), which is the original synthesis of the freedoms of choice and election. He explains that this initial freedom includes both the choosing of one's body (the choice on which all choices are based) and the election of one's spirit (the election on which all elections depend). It is the acceptance of the whole of oneself according to the order of being.<sup>36</sup> Corresponding to this initial freedom is its respective time which Sciacca calls initial time (tempo iniziale). Thus, the two orders of time, life and existence, as well as the two orders of freedom, choice and election, are in an original synthesis.<sup>37</sup>

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35 Ibid., p. 117.

36 Ibid., p. 109.

37 Ibid., p. 116. This initial time and freedom is analogous to the total primitive sentiment (sentimento totale primitivo) from which are differentiated the fundamental corporal sentiment and the intuition or sentiment of being. Here again one sees the crucial distinction which Sciacca makes between life and existence, yet the fundamental unity with which he conceives these distinctive aspects in man. Sciacca, op. cit., 1963, p. 105-111.

Summarizing this analysis, the fundamental distinction Sciacca makes is between individuality and personality. The areas which have been explored in this chapter such as: subjectivity-objectivity, objective interiority, ontological disequilibrium, real and existent, freedom of choice and freedom of election, time of life or vitality and time of existence or interiority, becoming and development, etc., are encompassed and apprehended in his distinction of individuality and personality. One could say, therefore, that:

<u>"Individuality" is the term of:</u>	<u>"Personality" is the term of:</u>
(a) subjectivity	objectivity
(b) exteriority (the subject in relation to the exterior world)	interiority (the subject in relation to the essential interior object)
(c) finitude	infinitude
(d) the indefinite	the infinite
(e) the real - existential	the existential - Ideal
(f) the freedom of choice	the freedom of election
(g) subjective needs and instincts	objective values and principles
(h) time of life	time of existence
(i) becoming	development
(j) the existent in his finitude	the existent as an original synthesis
(k) the fundamental corporal sentiment	the fundamental intuition of being
(l) immanence	transcendence
(m) life	existence

## CHAPTER III

### PSYCHOLOGICAL IMPLICATIONS OF THE PRINCIPLES OF INDIVIDUALITY AND PERSONALITY

#### 1. Initial Chaos; the Tendency towards Order; the Person as Principle of Synthesis.

Sciacca asks: who am I who sense, who think, who know, and who will? Who and what do I sense, think, know, and will? In accordance with which norm? The first question, he says, concerns the problem of one's being: to know one's being and know oneself within it. The other questions concern all of one's activity.<sup>1</sup>

In an attempt to construct an answer to these questions, Sciacca posits their converse: what does man not sense, not think, and not will? The only possible answer, according to Sciacca, is that he senses, thinks, and wills everything; pleasure, pain, life, death, each thing and its contrary. Man senses, thinks and wills indefinitely, untiringly, perdutamente ("losing himself"). When a man does not think, he thinks about not thinking; when he does not will, he wills not to will. When one focuses on the question: what do I think, know, will, the consequences are manifold. Sensations, thoughts, knowns (conoscenze), and

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<sup>1</sup> M. F. Sciacca, L'uomo, questo "squilibrato", Milano, Marzorati, 1963, p. 15.

volitions, all flood the questioning subject, each conflicting with the other, ultimately submerging the mind to near paralysis. That which one thinks, knows, and wills multiplies itself indefinitely in indefinite contradictory thoughts, desires, and volitions, each vying for exclusivity, tyranny; yet at times becoming weak, and evanescent. Sciacca describes how, in this experience, the boundaries of good and evil seem to vanish; how all and nothing begin to seem as failure and error; how the spirit is tormented by the battle of the instinctive tendencies and the highest moral aspirations; how the will disperses itself, fragments itself; how the willing of everything in the indeterminate immediacy is chaos. Man is a unity of body and spirit, in a solidarity which implies reciprocal influences. However, because of that same multiplicity of his vital potencies and mental attitudes, he is an initial chaos, a confusion of sensation and thoughts, of passions and sentiments, etc., to the point where each single man, in his immediacy and complexity can be described as a confusion. Thus, Sciacca observes that a single human existence, even the most simple, in the diversity of its moments, presents itself as irregular and contradictory. A succession of elevations and falls, of repentances and returns to failure; states which are incompatible for reflection, nevertheless co-exist and com-pen-pentrate one another in the concrete man.

The Spiritual Act as a Unifying Principle.- Sciacca explains, however, that this initial chaos carries in its depth the tendency to order, revealing something which orients and unifies. The instincts, in their dynamism, push the multiplicity of potencies and attitudes to specify themselves in a determined direction. Reflection, which collaborates, disciplines and purifies the instincts, stimulates one to choose and decide according to an ordered norm. Accordingly, the confused elements of the initial chaos (implicitly present also when one is not conscious of it, in which case biological and psychic life automatically exercise directive and unifying powers) are clarified as components of an ordered synthesis: this is the work of unification of each spiritual act. Thus, the profound order is gradually clarified into the order of spiritual life. Through his spiritual life, man discovers the sense of himself, overcomes his immediate indeterminacy, and transcends his temporal contingency. Thus, this primitive anarchy which can be reproduced, potentially, in every moment of life, has in its midst an intrinsic order, a clarifying and orienting norm.

Monarchical Tendencies.- Within the complexity of the human spirit each of its multiple activities has its own proper intrinsic norm. Nevertheless, Sciacca explains that each activity, as soon as it arises, tends to make

itself exclusive and autonomous. For example, the cognitive activity supercedes the moral, and vice versa; the economic, in its turn, claims its independence from the others; indeed, each one of them threatens to weaken the others, to overcome and exclude them. The internal order of the spirit, however, in his unity, tends instead to keep each one in its norm, to keep them all in harmony and in such a way that they all converge in the unity of the spirit and in the realization of his singular end. Sciacca warns against exchanging this profound order for a partial or provisional one, where the multiplicity of vital powers and of mental attitudes become apparently unified by an inessential and inferior order, producing what he calls a subtle and "reasoned" form of anarchy. He adds that to capture the essential of the spiritual life, one must search man in his most secret roots, unravel the true and the good, the false and the evil in the most hidden recesses of his existence. Furthermore, this "diabolical" distinction between good and evil which costs so much must be made precisely because of its cost: it has a decisive purpose. He adds that on the contrary it is truly diabolical not to distinguish good from evil, to live without knowing to the utmost of one's abilities what is one's good and one's evil.<sup>2</sup>

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<sup>2</sup> Ibid., p. 15-19.

In the above, one sees that, while it is important to consider the full range of tendencies or dimensions (e.g., corporal, instinctive, economic, aesthetic, moral, social, spiritual, etc.) of the human being in order to grasp him in his integrality, it is the spiritual which properly constitutes his synthesis and substantiality. Sensation, intelligence, reason, will, etc., each have a proper object. One, however, does not exclude the others. Only an abstract intellectualism, adds Sciacca, considers these "faculties" to function as if the others did not intervene. Truth would then be the object solely of the reason, beauty solely of the sensibility. On the contrary, writes Sciacca, the spiritual act, concretely speaking, is inclusive of all the activities, even if each belongs to a distinctive faculty. Impulses, instincts, sentiments, reasons, principles, which initially seem to exclude one another, find themselves fused by the synthetic (and, in this sense, creative) power of the spirit.<sup>3</sup>

The Dialectics of Concrete Spiritual Life.- It is clear that between the various activities outlined above, there is not always a peaceful harmony. Sciacca notes that war, interspersed with armistices, is the more frequent case. He explains with examples: reason intervenes to

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<sup>3</sup> Ibid., p. 19-20.

control an impulse with the latter resisting and rebelling: the will may be in discord with the intelligence, especially when solicited by passion; an instinctive force, solicited and perverted by a self-sufficient reason, may lead to excesses surpassing in evil that of which the instinct itself, even if deranged, would be capable.<sup>4</sup>

Thus, Sciacca concludes that concrete spiritual life, life as a personality, is a dynamism implying clashes and conflicts. Its complex dialectics goes beyond an abstract formal logic, i.e., each form of activity tends to overcome the others, each one "monarchical," sometimes despotic and tyrannical. As suggested above, when one gets in control, the others are in danger of being eliminated. Sciacca explains that in such a case the dominating activity, tyrannically exclusive, transgresses its norm; it abstracts one aspect of existence, absolutizes it, and thereby deforms itself. In the case of morality, for example, sensist, empirist, voluntarist, etc., approaches are abstract because they extrapolate and absolutize a single element of moral activity. In such a manner, one is outside of the concrete, because the concrete is the convergence and equilibrium of multiple elements, each one in the limits of the fullness of its norm. He concludes that only in this manner may one

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4 Ibid., p. 20.

speak of the spiritual act as normal.<sup>5</sup> (This question of normality will be developed further in a later section of this chapter.)

## 2. The Psychological Dimension as an Aspect of the Concrete Man.

In the foregoing, there are crucial implications for a psychology of personality both in its theoretical and applied dimensions. If the concrete man implies the convergence of multiple elements in the substantiality and unity of the spiritual act (that is in himself as person), and since the psychological is an aspect of man, then it is clear that psychological aspects themselves must be understood in a critical fashion, seen within their limits and in their relation to the whole. Care must be taken to see psychological reality as part of the concrete man, as an aspect of personality, and to not reduce the whole personality or the concrete man to the purely psychological. Sciacca comments that the spiritual act is not simply an abstracted, psychological state, a mass of impressions and sensations, of volitions and reasonings, of strain, tension, reaction, etc.<sup>6</sup> The need to see psychology within its limits was

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<sup>5</sup> Ibid., p. 20-21.

<sup>6</sup> Sciacca writes: "L'atto spirituale non è soltanto uno stato psicologico: l'uomo non è solo un fascio d'impressioni e sensazioni, di volizioni e ragionamenti, non è solo sforzo, tensione, reazione ecc.: è un ente e, come tale, ha una sua sostanzialità." Ibid., p. 22.

also raised by Jaspers in a similar way. He writes about its praxis in psychotherapy:

There is a dangerous tendency in psychotherapy to convert the psychic actuality of an individual into an end in itself. The person who turns his psyche into a god because he has lost both world and god finds himself standing finally in the void.

... within the psychological atmosphere, an egocentric attitude to life develops ... The individual as the subject of all this becomes the measure of all things.

He concludes:

So far as the objects and aims of psychotherapy are concerned, these are never an end in themselves.<sup>7</sup>

One may assume, then, that psychology itself is not exempt from the "monarchical" tendency which all types of human activities seem to have: each attempting to become absolute, transgressing its proper norm. Psychology, too, as a field of human endeavor, has this potential to deform itself. Furthermore, its limits are not given simply in some static definition. Rather, in a Sciaccian perspective, one sees that the "initial chaos" always underlies human activity potentially and that the finding of the norm of each activity has in a sense to be re-enacted each time one implicitly or explicitly enters that activity. This is because the critical act which captures the value on the one hand and limits on the other of the psychological dimension (as of any other) is a synthetic one and in that sense, a

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<sup>7</sup> Karl Jaspers, The Nature of Psychotherapy (trans. by J. Hoenig and M. W. Hamilton), Chicago, University of Chicago Press, 1964, p. 33-34.

creative one. These limits and values should not be established nominally or arbitrarily, but in a way which captures the order of concrete man. Man is not concrete without the spiritual dimension which unifies him. Psychology, then, loses its norm as soon as it ceases to exercise its critical function which gives it its place in man's integrality. This criticality becomes crucial to both the theory and praxis of psychology. Ruda writes in this regard:

L'homme est une unité radicale de ses composantes et même s'il peut être capté à travers une seule de ses dimensions, psychologique, biologique ou autre, c'est toujours à la condition d'accepter qu'il s'agit d'une perspective parmi d'autres. Toute perspective ne doit pas faire oublier que le vrai panorama est celui qui implique toutes les possibilités. La psychologie, comme perspective scientifique particulière, ne pourrait donc pas prétendre épuiser le panorama de l'homme. En tant que science anthropologique, la psychologie a droit à une perspective propre sur l'homme mais pas à devenir la science absolue de l'homme.<sup>8</sup>

The "Multiplicity" of Man as a Problem in Psychology; the Need for Integration.- Modern psychology has not developed without reflecting man's "multiplicity." One may speak today of the different schools and divergent trends within those schools: psychoanalytic, structural, functional, behavioral, gestalt, analytical (Jung), individual (Adler), nōlogical (Frankl), phenomenological, psychosynthetic (Assagioli), experiential (Rogers, Gendlin),

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<sup>8</sup> O. J. Ruda, Dialectique de la personnalité, Ottawa Les éditions de l'Université d'Ottawa, 1973, p. 15.

existential (Boss, Binswanger, Moustakas), humanistic, transpersonal, etc. This multiplicity of positions strongly suggests that the problem for psychology is one of defining its subject matter and consequently integrating its findings. Ruda writes concerning this problem:

Depuis Aristote ou même Kant, Christian Wolff, jusqu'à B. F. Skinner, D. O. Hebb et d'autres, la psychologie est la discipline à laquelle on a donné le plus de définitions hétérogènes. Pour cela même, elle est, à l'heure actuelle, le lieu d'un questionnement qui montre d'une façon inéluctable la crise de ses fondements: "science de l'âme", "science des états de conscience", "science de l'expérience immédiate", "science des phénomènes subjectifs", "science de l'esprit", "science du sens interne", "science des fonctions et des activités, vitales des organismes", "science des sensations dépendentes du moi", "science des phénomènes de pré-adaptation", "science des phénomènes qui ont un objet intentionnel", "science du comportement (behavior) des êtres vivants" etc.

La liste de définitions de la psychologie serait interminable.<sup>9</sup>

Each of these positions in seeking an object for psychology, implies a fundamental understanding of man. As Allport has said, "All books on the psychology of personality are at the same time books on the philosophy of the person. It could not be otherwise. A writer who decides that one theory of learning, or of motivation, is better than another is thereby endorsing one view of the nature of man at the expense of other views."<sup>10</sup> It would seem, then, that the intelligibility

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9 Ibid., p. 13.

10 G. Allport, Pattern and Growth in Personality, New York, Holt, Rinehart & Winston, 1937, p. xi.

and integration of the field of psychology, of psychological understanding about man, is perennially rooted in the more fundamental questions about man's actual nature, about his concrete unity.

For Sciacca, it is the principles of individuality and personality which capture the essential attributes of man and explain how his multiplicity constitutes a unity. Before discussing these principles and how psychology may approach them, however, the dialectics of reason and intelligence must be considered. The explanation of reason and intelligence is of crucial importance to the basic method of approach to the principles of individuality and personality. Furthermore, the interior metaphysical relation between reason and intelligence, as will be seen later, is essential to psychology as a rational science.

### 3. The Role of Reason and Intelligence in the Understanding of the Concrete Man.

Sciacca explains that reason is the "description" of the essential of the world and of its "transcription" into concepts. Reason is not the penetration of an entity in its wholeness (nel suo "tutto insieme"), in its essentialized existence, in its existentialized essence. It looks for what is uniform; it seeks to establish universal connections. Sciacca calls it "cosmological" (because it seeks the

universal connections of the things of the world).<sup>11</sup>

Reason produces reflected knowledge which mediates what is lived in immediate consciousness. It makes a "problem" out of what is lived immediately, turning it into an object of judgment; seeking a solution which Sciacca says has to be valid not for the singular act from which the problem arises, but universally for all who pose that problem.<sup>12</sup> For Sciacca, this tendency for reason to mediate immediate consciousness is a natural and inexorable aspect of human nature.<sup>13</sup>

Intelligence, on the other hand, is the primal intuition of truth prior to the consideration of truths of a natural order. It is, furthermore, the self-grasping (cogliersi) of the subject intuitively, in his participation in being as Idea. It does not pose man as a problem but as a certainty.<sup>14</sup> Intelligence is transcendence. The finite entity grasps himself (si coglie) by going beyond himself,

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11 Sciacca writes: "La ragione è 'cosmologica', giudizio sulle cose: costruisce concetti, ma la forma ideale o la verità di intelligenza di cui si giova per giudicare, la trascende. Non la ragione è 'metafisica', ma l'intelligenza, in quanto è oggetto dell'intelligenza la verità che è fondamento della veridicità dei giudizi. La ragione è perciò 'cosmologica', l'intelligenza è 'teologica'." Sciacca, op. cit., 1963, p. 126.

12 Ibid., p. 123.

13 Ibid., p. 123.

14 Ibid., p. 126.

because he grasps himself in being as Idea which calls out to Infinite Being. To be in one's own being is to transcend oneself (essere nel proprio essere è sé-trascendere).<sup>15</sup> Sciacca explains that the same fundamental attitude of the intelligence is in evidence toward other persons as to oneself: they are not posited as objects to be simply known and defined (reason); rather, using the intelligence, one participates with them, offering oneself to their penetration and grasping them in turn. Sciacca explains that to descend into the personality of the other is to search into one's own: internal rapports go from interior to interior.<sup>16</sup>

Between intelligence and reason there is an accord; there is no essential conflict. Man is not by nature split in two. He need not close himself in an immediate interiority in an a-rational or anti-rational manner; or turn himself entirely to the exteriority of the world, depersonalizing

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15 Ibid., p. 127.

16 Sciacca describes this as follows: "L'intelligenza è trascendenza: l'essere finito si coglie sorpassandosi, perché si coglie nell'infinito dell'Essere infinito. La certezza di sé si approfondisce al di là di sé stessi; essere nel proprio essere è sé-trascendere. La stessa attitudine l'intelligenza mostra verso gli altri esseri: non se li pone come oggetti da conoscere o definire, ma li partecipa, si offre alla penetrazione e corre dritta a penetrarli. Scendere nella personalità altrui è sondare la propria: i rapporti interiori vanno dall'interno all'interno. Saliamo tutti nella vita interiore calandoci nelle profondità della nostra esistenza." Ibid., p. 127.

himself in an abstracted reality.<sup>17</sup> In fact, reason inserts itself (s'inscrive) in the intelligence: when the thinking being (ente) acquires a reflected knowledge of himself, that is, formulates a judgment on his existence, such an act is a rational one--it is the application of the intuition of being (intuito dell'ente) to the existent which one is. Consequently, explains Sciacca, the rational act, in such a case, is the reflective knowledge (conoscenza riflessa) of the fundamental intuition, wherein Idea and existent form an immediate synthesis. Thus, he concludes that between reason and intelligence there is a fundamental ontological metaphysical accord.<sup>18</sup>

For Sciacca, therefore, the reflected consciousness of reason is always rooted in the direct consciousness of intelligence which, for him, is the source of all rational truths. For example, in the area of morality, he disagrees with the idealistic point of view of Le Senne, which sees man born to "moral life" with the advent of reflected consciousness after having been born to "human life" with immediate consciousness. Sciacca argues that the human immediate consciousness is already moral because it carries with it

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17 Ibid., p. 125 and 127.

18 Ibid., p. 127-128.

the truth which discovers reflection.<sup>19</sup> This is of paramount importance in Sciacca's thought: it is not a reflective consciousness which constitutes man as intelligent but his immediate consciousness out of which the former develops. Insofar as the immediate intuition of being as Idea (direct pre-reflective foundational consciousness) already expresses the fullness of the human, it is already the actual potency of a human being and not just a potential human being.<sup>20</sup> It follows from this that reflective consciousness is not simply the reflection of a direct

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19 Ibid., p. 128-129; R. Le Senne, Traité de morale générale, Paris, Presses Universitaires de France, 1947, 2nd ed., p. 2. Sciacca explains the above as follows: "Nella verità dell'intelligenza è implicita la verità della ragione. Non la ragione chiude l'intelligenza entro i suoi limiti a sé assimilandola, ma l'intelligenza illumina la ragione e le impone il limite della sua verità ingiudicabile: la mediazione razionale non può estendersi al punto da concettualizzare il contenuto dell'intelligenza. Vi è una verità che costituisce l'uomo come ente pensante, che è madre dei concetti ma non è concetto, è Idea che la ragione non può giudicare: è la perenne trascendenza dell'uomo a se stesso.

L'intelligenza illuminata dalla verità è sorgente di ogni verità razionale. Vi è sempre un sapere intuito che è anche principio della morale e fonte di una moralità spontanea: è la moralità così come è suggerita dall'intelligenza, guidata da un tatto quasi infallibile e non ancora contaminata o sofisticata dall'intervento della ragione, la quale può rivelare la coscienza a se stessa e darle consapevolezza e sistemazione dei suoi atti diretti, ma anche falsarla ed imprigionarla in un calcolo che a solo l'apparenza di essere morale: la ragione, strumento dell'intelligenza, in tal caso non serve ma asserve a sé l'intelligenza. Non è vero che l'uomo nasca 'alla vita morale' con la coscienza riflessa dopo essere nato 'alla vita umana' con la coscienza immediata, in quanto la coscienza diretta è già morale e porta implicita la verità che scopre la riflessione."

consciousness of the things of the world, but is a development of a direct intuition of being as Idea, which means that direct intellectual consciousness already has the fullness of the character of human existence. Self-consciousness, then, is not simply consciousness of consciousness: self-consciousness could never arise if the initially conscious self were not intuiting being as Idea. Furthermore, the crucial point to be made, in terms of the present discussion, is that rational reflective thought has a rootedness in the direct intuitive intelligence.

Because reason is rooted in intelligence, it, too, carries, to a certain extent, the sense of transcendence. That is, as the reason ventures into the world, in the light of interior object, it expresses the transcendence of immediate subjectivity. Thus, Sciacca writes:

... nell'originaria coscienza del nostro esistere, nel momento che ci cogliamo interamente e concretamente nella nostra vera unit , da tutte le parti ci sfuggiamo e trascendiamo verso fuori e verso dentro.

[In the original consciousness of our existing, in that moment where we grasp ourselves wholly and concretely in our true unity, on all sides we "flee" and transcend ourselves towards the exterior and towards the interior.]<sup>20</sup>

Integration at the Level of Reason and at the Level of Intelligence.- For Sciacca, the concreteness of a man is not captured solely by the reason. He writes that

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20 Sciacca, op. cit., 1963, p. 130-131.

reason captures the unity of an entity (entità), intelligence embraces a being (ente).<sup>21</sup> A being (ente: one who has existence) is not simply a rational entity (entità: a fact or concept grasped by reason), but a rational being (ente rationale: a being who reasons). Sciacca explains that reason does not explain all of the ente but does contribute to the understanding of him; the concrete reason needs to grasp the limit which the totality of man imposes on it--in this way one is able to reason with all of himself. As has already been said, a reason conscious of its limits is eminently rational. It is a reason conceived to be without limits (against the norm of reason itself) which restricts one's capacity for understanding, which makes it impossible for one to reason with all of himself.

The intelligence, like the reason, must not be conceived in an abstract way. Sciacca explains that the thinking being (ente pensante) who exists to himself and to others, because of his intelligence, also seeks to know himself and others according to his reason. Thus, reasoning is a fundamental activity of the existent.<sup>22</sup>

Sciacca writes:

Il mio essere, nella sua interezza ed integralità è "spirito", cioè unità di sentimento e ragione, d'intelligenza e volontà. Il loro conflitto è guerra di me contro me; la loro divisione è rottura della mia unità.

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21 Ibid., p. 128 and 213-215.

22 Ibid., p. 127.

[My being, in his wholeness and integrality, is spirit, that is, unity of sentiment and reason, of intelligence and will. Their conflict is a war of myself against myself; their division is a rupture of my unity.]<sup>23</sup>

#### 4. Individuality and Personality as Integrative Principles.

Integration at the Level of Individuality.- Sciacca writes that the instincts form the individual, but in themselves are not sufficient to form the individuality. The individual lives in interaction with an environment which, to a certain extent, molds and shapes him. It is this reciprocal interaction between the instincts (vital, sensitive, and human) and the environment (parents, community, culture, etc.) which forms the individuality. It must be kept in mind, however, that the individual implies the person; that the person is able to assume the elements which contribute to the formation of the individuality, to personalize them, thus actualizing the personality. In other words, although the individuality establishes a certain integration of the multiplicity of instincts and environmental influences, their decisive integration is not achieved except in their personalization. It would be an abstract and fragmented view which would consider the

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23 Ibid., p. 128.

individuality as developing in itself without the personality; just as it would be abstract and unrealistic to think of the human personality as developing outside of space and time, suspended in a purely indetermined possibility.<sup>24</sup>

The Character as a Fundamental Element of the Individuality.- Of all the individualizing elements, Sciacca sees the character as fundamental: he defines it as the way one's nature individuates the instincts. Like all aspects of the individuality, it has a basis in heredity and is modified by the environment. Sciacca explains that when someone is only his character he is an individual and not a person: he has abdicated his freedom if he develops himself simply according to his natural character. He exercises his freedom--not by serving his character--but by assuming control of it: thus, not to be "according to his character" but to become "a character." To be "a character," for Sciacca, implies the continuity of the action of reason and will, enlightened by the intelligence, on the resistances of the natural character, so as to bring it within its norm (dominion over one's character, not exclusion of one's character). He concludes that it is impossible to construct the personality without the body, the character, the sensitivity (sensibilit ) etc. in which the personality realizes and incarnates itself.<sup>25</sup>

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24 Ibid., p. 64-66.

25 Ibid., p. 66-68.

Integration at the Level of Personality.- For Sciacca, the formation of the personality like, to some extent that of the individuality, proceeds synthetically, by dialectical inclusion: he explains that each new personal act is not added on from the exterior, but founds anew (rifonde) and repropose the personality as more "expressive" of the value it incarnates. Such a formation does not proceed through a causal process, but by a continuous initiative and consequently always in an original way, even if the initiative begins from a given point.

Fundamental to the personality is the act of understanding it. Sciacca distinguishes between comprendere (fr: comprendre; eng: comprehend, understand) and conoscere (fr: connaître; eng: know). To grasp a personality, even one's own, involves more than conoscere (an act of the reason); it involves the comprendere which is the embracing (abbracciare) in its wholeness (interezza) of the thing being understood (it is an act of the intelligence). One thus grasps from the interior which principle or principles make that thing into a unity. Sciacca explains that this implies, with regard to a man, the grasping of the moving principle which pushes him to develop his personality which he is actualizing in the pursuit and attainment of his ends. All together these ends collaborate and are unified in the realization of the final and fundamental goal or end of

the personality. Thus, Sciacca concludes, that to understand or comprehend oneself (comprendersi), to understand one's personality, means to know the task which one is called to fulfill in the universe--towards which all of one's partial actualizations contribute. Thus, to comprehend oneself is to discover one's fundamental vocation and to be involved in its realization; it is to know one's own true name (proprio vero "nome"), actualizing it, making it a personality. The personality is a man's identity. For a man to make himself the person he is, to be identical to himself, to develop his personality, he must conform to his fundamental vocation.<sup>26</sup> He has to remain faithful to his place in history, to realize it in the most personal manner.

However, this "word" (parola) which each one of us is, cannot be completely expressed or become completely intelligible in us: Sciacca writes: ci sfugge il principio e la fine (its principle and end escape us).<sup>27</sup>

Integration by the Will in Terms of the Freedom of Choice and Election.- As noted in Chapter II, the freedom

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26 Sciacca sees each partial vocation, the particular vocation of this or that man, as tending to the fundamental vocation which belongs to human nature as such. Thus, he explains that even a wrongly selected vocation can reconquer all of its positive value if actualized within the norm of the absolute or fundamental vocation. Ibid., p. 73-76.

27 Ibid., p. 77.

of choice is exercised with respect to one's individuality; the freedom of election with respect to one's personality. Both are attributes of the will. When the will chooses according to the individual, that is, according to his needs, tendencies, instincts, etc., it exercises its freedom of choice. When, on the other hand, it elects according to the person, that is, according to the unique and fundamental vocation which the person is, the freedom of election is being exercised. As noted previously, the person, as the principle of synthesis, includes the individual; the human individual, on the other hand, always implies the person. Thus, the freedom of election is not exercised outside of the freedom of choice and the freedom of choice always implies elective freedom.<sup>28</sup>

Development of the Will: Notes for a Developmental Psychology.- Sciacca notes that these two types of freedom manifest themselves according to a developmental order. He calls the freedom of choice "infantile" or "youthful" freedom (it is prototypical in the youth and the infant). It surfaces with the discovery of one's ability to choose, with the discovery of personal initiative. It does not make its appearance without bringing with it the awareness of one's limits, of one's misery, of the insurmountable. Sciacca

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28 Sciacca, op. cit., 1965, p. 150.

says about the freedom of choice, as it begins to manifest itself, that it is nourished by the "voice" of vitality, but not yet in harmony with the "word" of the spirit. He says it is enthusiastic, thoughtless (spensierata), fantastical; it manifests itself as the thirst and thrust of life, which wishes all on the basis of instincts and impulses spontaneously arising. He says further, that it is immensely egotistic yet uncontrollably generous--since it follows the rhythm of the ascending and tumultuous vitality.<sup>29</sup>

Sciacca writes that this "infantile" freedom accompanies one throughout his life. However, he adds that this "basic" freedom of choice (basic because it is rooted in the vitality), if it does not develop according to the objective order of the will, remains on a "basis" which ignores its "foundation" (this foundation is in the personal or spiritual). In this way, in the adult man, the freedom of choice becomes perverted as "infantilism" or egoism. If, on the other hand, this "infantile" or "youthful" freedom is objectively ordered, it is recuperated as the enthusiasm, the innocence, the simplicity, the volubility of youth in the present initiative guided by what is profoundly spiritual.<sup>30</sup>

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29 Ibid., p. 150-153.

30 Ibid., p. 154-155.

On the basis of the above one may speak, therefore, of the development of the will, of its integrative process, as proceeding from an exterior-subjective to an interior-objective order. The expressions of the will in the child or in the youth are of the first order. They are: subjective, because rooted in the needs, impulses, desires, etc. of the subject; external, because directed to the things of the world. Only gradually does the second type of freedom mature. This latter type of freedom is objective, because it is founded in truth (in an objective value); and interior, because this truth constitutes man's interiority (without being as Idea as object of the subject or truth as the essential object of thought, the existent could not be).

It is important to note that Sciacca sees the external ordering of society (i.e., via parental, community, state authority) and, consequently, of the individual as being to some extent essential to the development of interiority. The normal inhibition of the individual from the exterior can act as a stimulus to the development of the objective interiority. Furthermore, the nourishment of intimate personal contact with others is essential to its development.<sup>31</sup>

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31 Ibid., p. 152-154.

## 5. Psychology Conceived within an Integral View of Man.

### A. The Normality of Individuality and Personality

It has already been proposed that the corporal-instinctive components of a man not be considered (except in a fragmentary abstract way) as separate from his personal or spiritual activity. Sciacca explains that in concrete life the reason, the will, and the intelligence modify the instinctive life. Nevertheless, he does say that not all of one's instinctive life is directly influenced by the spirit. Furthermore, this influence can be exercised in two senses. In the first sense, the instinctive life may prevail over the spiritual (the individual over the person), subordinating the latter. The instinctive life, then, loses its immediate natural spontaneity, its natural order, and becomes, along with the laws which govern it, the end of the spiritual life. In other words, the instinctive life makes use of the higher faculties, in such a manner as to satisfy in a more subtle and refined way the instinctive needs. Thus, Sciacca concludes, instinct becomes egoism, explaining that the instinctive acts are then no longer natural but personal.

When, in this way, the individual takes the place of the person, the immoral personality (personalità immorale) is formed. When a man conducts himself

subordinating the spiritual to the instinctive, the personality is absorbed by the individuality. In the second sense, the spiritual may prevail over the instinctive (the person over the individual), assuming its discipline and control. Sciacca explains that although the instincts are to a certain extent personalized, they do not cease to be natural; they become a part of the personality without in themselves constituting it. The subjection (assoggettamento) of the individuality is not imposition or violence, Sciacca notes, because it is in conformity to the order of the nature of man; the command (commando) of the superior activities is not despotic or tyrannical, insofar as it does not impose on the individuality to transgress its order, but only to remain within it and realize itself within that same order. In such a case, concludes Sciacca, one actualizes the moral personality (personalità morale) and consequently an individuality which is also moral--constituting in their harmony the normal man (l'uomo normale).

It is clear that here, one is not dealing with a psychological concept of normality, but with an integral one, envisaging the whole man. For example, a man who is psychologically abnormal because of an organic problem or

because of a stressful experience may or may not be normal in the integral sense. Another may, in his effort to become normal in an integral sense, find himself passing through what appears to be a psychological abnormality such as periods of serious depression or anxiety. Still another may need to be helped to normality of a psychological type in order that he might be able to fully exercise his personal normality. These few examples are enough to indicate that although personal and psychological normality are distinctive, they are not separate. The personal includes the psychological because it is synthetical. The psychological implies the personal because it is a part or an aspect of the personality; it is not all of the personal. To focus exclusively on the psychological is to abstract man, to misunderstand him. How, then, is the psychological to be seen as a part of the concrete man?

B. The Reflective or Rational Knowledge Man  
Has of Himself as a Person and Individual

What is the psychology of the concrete man towards which all the specialized domains of psychology must converge? If the psychological is conceived within the integral man, it appears as distinctive from, yet as merged with, the whole personality as the rational moment of self-reflection and self-knowledge. Clearly, this psychological moment is not all of the personality. As Jaspers says,

"Mere psychological knowledge of possibilities and the use of psychological influences to bring the desired end about can never realize the possibilities in me."<sup>33</sup> He notes further that within a psychological atmosphere, an ego-centric attitude to life tends to develop.<sup>34</sup> One is again reminded of the "monarchical" tendency which the different human activities seem to have, their tendency to disform themselves by transgressing their limits, by absolutizing themselves. It would appear that the psychological is not free from this tendency. It is crucial, therefore, to base this self-knowledge or psychological understanding on an integral philosophy of man. Furthermore, this essential relation to a philosophy is not given in some static manner but has to be seen dynamically as an interior dialogue between psychology and philosophy.

The "underlying chaos" and the "monarchical" tendency have to be continually "fought off." There is no static definition which will establish order: it has to be continually won, to be made actual. Despite the fact that it may have been achieved in the past, that order has to be re-enacted: new realities have to be assimilated; new transformations have to be undergone; a new initiative needs to be taken (although these processes are not to be

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33 Jaspers, op. cit., p. 33.

34 Ibid., p. 34.

construed as purely voluntary acts: there is a natural "determinism" on the one hand and a spiritual receptivity on the other which are the limits of will). The decisive moment of synthesis is a spiritual one. It is, for this reason, that psychology cannot remain isolated from philosophy and even theology, because otherwise it is condemned to a fragmentary view of man: not that it should cease to be psychology and become philosophy, but that it sorely needs to be nourished interiorly by an integral understanding of man.

On the basis of the perspective being presented here, psychology, in its highest moment, that is, in its moment of greatest convergence and unity, develops the reflective or rational knowledge man has of himself as person and individual. It would focus, for example on the exigency of the personality according to its fundamental vocation in relation to, in reaction to, as a transformation of the individuality. The psychologist of integrality seeks the dynamic order of the personality and the individuality. He, for example, especially in clinical practice, ought to understand when the reason is subtly infiltrated by instinct, or when a reason fallen into self-sufficiency denies instincts and needs, or when an individual who suffers from organic impairment has to reason in a limited circumscribed way and needs to be helped to make sense of reality, or how a sense of despair can insidiously pervade

the person whose personality has been absorbed by his individuality, or how a lack of awareness of instinctual tendencies (individuality) or of one's spiritual potencies (personality), etc., can create an imbalance in man.

Psychological knowledge has here been designated as rational knowledge. This is not said to suggest that psychology does not study instincts, emotions, feelings, immediate experience, attitudes, etc., or that it attempts to simply reduce these to rational categories. Rather, it implies that the founding moment of psychology gives rise to a rational science: that founding moment is the reflective knowledge of the individual and person. Psychology can legitimately specialize in the study of areas such as perception, sensation, physiological processes, character types, etc., which are aspects of the individual (implicit of the person); it may concern itself with more integral aspects of man such as human emotion, self-development, maturation, spiritual growth, etc., which are aspects of the personality (inclusive of the individuality). Admittedly, the same danger applies to reason in psychology as to reason in philosophy, that is, the tendency to self-sufficiency. To counter this, Sci'acca's emphasis has been on a concrete reason which implies a reason conscious that many things

go beyond it.<sup>35</sup> In this way, the psychologist of man's integrality realizes that he is involved in a rational science. Fundamentally, however, he recognizes that he must reason with all of himself, and not in a "fragmented" way.

6. An Overview of Certain Major Psychological Systems on the Basis of a Sciaccian Perspective.

The purpose of this thesis, as described in the Introduction, was the development of a critical perspective toward the field of psychology of personality based on Sciacca's philosophy of integrality. The present section attempts to apply this perspective in a critical manner to certain major systems in contemporary psychology. These analyses are not intended to be exhaustive. The intention is, rather, to show in broad outline how the Sciaccian perspective can be applied to the various psychological systems, thereby suggesting a direction for future research.

A. Psychoanalysis

Psychoanalysis attempts to explain personality as founded on the instinctive drives and needs. Although

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<sup>35</sup> Sciacca explains that there are two fundamental limits in reason; one in reference to the aspects of things in nature which are not judgeable (giudicabile); the other with reference to things which transcend the order of nature and the natural possibilities of reason. Sciacca, op. cit., 1963, p. 123.

psychoanalytic theory has contributed to the understanding of the importance and influence in man's psychic life of the instinctual processes, it does not incorporate an understanding of the ontological foundations of man's spiritual nature--as a reasoning, willing, and intelligent being. Moral life, for example, is understood simply as the introjection of external norms: the originary interiority of man is purely instinctive; the spiritual is simply its reflection and sublimation. Thus, psychoanalysis as a form of contemporary irrationalism and hedonism does not capture, at a theoretical level, the full sense of personality. It tends to reduce it to the instinctual level of the individuality. Its positive value for psychology has been historically in pointing out the importance of the instinctive basis of personality especially in its influence on psychic life.<sup>36</sup> From a Sciaccian perspective, however, although the personality has a basis in the instincts, it is not founded in them.<sup>37</sup> From a Sciaccian perspective, the instincts which contribute to the formation of the character<sup>38</sup> have to be assumed by the person who must decide about the value of this or that aspect of his

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36 Cf. O. J. Ruda, "Fundamentos filosóficos del psicoanálisis," in O. J. Ruda, J. A. Dragone, M. Lloyd Jones and Lars Franberg, Psicoanálisis, Reflexología y Conversión Cristiana, Buenos Aires, Certeza, 1965, p. 12-36.

37 Cf., p. 72 of this thesis.

38 Cf., p. 67 of this thesis.

character. Even the refusal to see its value is a valuation. In fact, historically and existentially, man cannot not value. Thus, he develops, or fails to develop, his personality. The question of valuing--Is it true? Is it good? Is it beautiful?--is an original quality of the person. In the Sciaccian system, the question "Is it true?" is not reduced to "Is it workable?" (pragmatism). The question "Is it good?" is not reduced to "Does it satisfy my instincts?" (hedonism). The question "Is it beautiful?" is not reduced to "Does it satisfy my senses?" (sensorialism). At the same time, these subjective levels are not denied but are seen in an original synthesis with the objective interior ones, with the questions of objective value.

#### B. The Experiential Psychology of Rogers and Gendlin

In the experiential psychology of Rogers and Gendlin, the central focus is on the experiencing subject, on his feelings and attitudes. This system includes certain methods of exploration of the experiencing process for psychotherapy. Furthermore, the importance of the broadening self-awareness in personal healing and growth is stressed. This system, as a psychotherapy, emphasizes certain aspects of interior life; it seeks the resolution of conflictual feelings and tendencies through their being consciously explored with the aid of a therapist who maintains a positive, empathic and

respectful attitude towards his client. This system avoids an exclusive instinctive emphasis in its understanding of interior life. The principal factor stressed, however, is the subject himself, his way of experiencing. The external world, the instincts, and interior objective principles are considered, but through the subject's way of experiencing them. Undoubtedly, the understanding of the subject's way of experiencing and the development of methods for arriving at this understanding and communicating it is of crucial importance to psychology. There is the tendency in this approach, however, to understand interior life in purely subjective terms. This implies the disregard of objective interiority. This subjectivism in experiential psychology probably stems, in part, from its employment of a mainly descriptive method. In actual therapy, this method is expressed in the non-judgmental and accepting attitude of the therapist for his client. However, the ultimate consequences of maintaining a purely descriptive approach in the study of personality is that the fundamental interior relation to being, to truth, to goodness (i.e., to objective principles), which is essential to personality, may itself become simply a matter for description. The describer, thereby, denies the metaphysical and ontological foundations of his own thought. He who was going to be non-judgmental (i.e., to allow the person to make his own judgments, to

reach his own conclusions) has judged to suspend the foundations of his thought--as if he could subject to judgment that interior truth and being whereby he makes his judgments. This is analogous to the initial "hyperbolic" doubt of Descartes (as was discussed in the first chapter).

For Sciacca, man is who he is, not because of his subjectivity, nor because of the exteriority which shapes his subjectivity, but because of the interior object which constitutes him as a subject in the world. He cannot be grasped descriptively, although description may contribute to the understanding of him. Fundamentally, man is an existent with an essential objective interiority. Therein rests the ultimate basis of human relationship. This is not a matter for description, or for analysis through discursive reason; it is the basis of any attempt at description, of any attempt to reason, to communicate, etc. In the Rogerian approach, although there is a positive attempt to purify the psychologist of prejudice and bias, and to teach him to listen attentively and empathically to others, there is lacking a notion of the foundation of subjective experience, and there is present the danger of the subject becoming his own foundation.

### C. Behavioral and Functional Psychology

The approach of behavioral psychology, because of its extreme mechanistic reductionism, fails to consider large areas of instinctual and personal life. Its value in clinical practice is its emphasis on concrete patterns of action. Nevertheless, at a theoretical level, it lacks a comprehensive understanding of both personality and individuality.

Behavioral psychology, in the North American context, has been and continues to be influenced by Functionalistic psychology. This is especially the case in clinical practice. Lazarus,<sup>39</sup> for example, presents a behavioral psychology with a very functional pragmatic bent. Its foundations are more aptly called functional-pragmatic than behavioral. The value of a pragmatic-functional psychology, as the name implies is to see psychological processes in terms of their functions. In the clinical sphere this is translated into the terms of adjustment and adaptation. Dabrowski,<sup>40</sup> in countering this view, speaks of "positive maladjustment," "negative maladjustment," "positive adjustment," and "negative adjustment." Clearly,

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39 A. Lazarus, Behavior Therapy and Beyond, New York, McGraw-Hill, 1971.

40 Kazimierz Kabrowski, Andrzej Kawczak, and Michel M. Piechowski, Mental Growth Through Positive Disintegration, London, Gryf Publications, 1970, p. 162-163.

if practicality or functionality are raised to the level of guiding principles in personal life, the personality is submerged in some form of the individuality.

#### D. Analytical Psychology

In broad terms, for analytical Jungian psychology, the personality is understood as based on the collective psychic forces or forms, the archetypes. Development is described in terms of the individuation of these collective forces.

Jung broadened the Freudian notion of interiority. Freud saw its original basis in the instincts; Jung's archetypes, on the other hand, though their essential nature is obscure, imply more than instinctual tendencies. Jung's psychic archetypes are in some ways analogous to Kant's a-priori categories (except that the latter were forms of the reason, the former of psychic life). As with Kant, one is dealing with universal forms of subjective life without their ontological sense being explained (see Chapter I, p. 7). Jung's system has the value of pointing out the reference to conscious and unconscious psychic life that symbolic images seem to have, as well as their universal characteristics and their importance in psychic development, etc.

In the Jungian system, the center of the personality is the Self--a universal archetype. This Self, as the name

itself implies, is more a universal form of the subject than an interior object, even though it may confront the ego as an "other." Jung's system may, therefore, be understood as an elaboration of the structure and dynamic of subjectivity or psyche; however, there is lacking a notion of "objective interiority" in the Sciaccian sense.

Modern and contemporary thought lack an ontology or metaphysics; this is Sciacca's main critique. His explanation of the essential error in founding ontology on gnoseology has particular relevance for psychology. Some instances of this error are described above. Psychology has the tendency to base itself on principles which presuppose an exclusively subjective and/or exterior bases to psychic life, and not an objective interior one. With its focus on experiential states, psychic processes, feelings, images, emotions, cognitions (subjective processes) on the one hand, and behavior, social interaction and communication, acquired skills, physiological processes (external processes) on the other, it tends to neglect or reduce objective interiority, to the point where even values and the meaning of life become simply a matter to be decided subjectively and/or according to some external requirement or condition. As previously explained, in Sciacca's system of integrality, the subjective and the exterior are coordinated to the objective and interior, in the concrete man. In this way, one may arrive at an integral understanding of individuality and personality.

## SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS

As was seen in the first chapter, an essential feature of Sciacca's system is the critical stand it takes vis-à-vis certain broad currents of thought in modern and contemporary Western culture. Of special importance in this critique is the fact that he founds his gnoseology on an ontological-metaphysical basis. In his system, the knowing of reality depends on the ontological-metaphysical constitution of the human subject. The human subject has an implicit relation to being as Idea or to truth as his essential object without which he could not be a subject. However, the subject in himself is finite--his object infinite--thus, Sciacca develops the notions of objective interiority (the interior presence of the infinite) and ontological disequilibrium (the inadequability of this infinite). Man as an existent (existing to himself by the light of being which constitutes him) is a unity of corporal sentiment and intuition of being. His corporal sentiment opens him to the realities of the indefinite world, in its becoming. His reason, making the synthesis of the fundamental corporal sentiment and the intuition of being as Idea, seeks to understand that reality, to make judgments about it. His will, on the basis of the instincts, the corporal tendencies, the worldly realities, in the light of being as Idea, is stirred to action. It "first"

develops its exercise of choice, on the basis of the "subjective," in view of the "exterior." But gradually its exercise of election unfolds in terms of the "interior objective" principles. However, this development does not occur without conflict. There is a multiplicity of aspects to each man, of instinctual tendencies and spiritual potencies. Furthermore, this multiplicity appears as an "initial chaos," each element with a "monarchical" tendency. However, the instinctual tendencies, in the context of an environment, already reveal a tendency towards order and integration: they form the individuality. The spiritual potencies, inclusive of the instinctual tendencies, contain an orienting principle which constitutes them--being as Idea--given to the intelligence. These spiritual potencies constitute the personality which is characterized as a fundamental vocation: the actualization of itself in the world, not for the world, for, as Sciacca says, the world belongs to the person, not the person to the world.<sup>1</sup> This actualization is called for because man is in ontological disequilibrium.

The intelligence, as a principle of synthesis, must always be foundational to reason which, although it can

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<sup>1</sup> M. F. Sciacca, La libertà e il tempo, Milano, Marzorati, 1965, p. 128-133.

grasp the unity of an entity, cannot embrace the totality of being. The reason, therefore, must ever be conscious of its limits. Consequently, psychology as a rational science, as the reflective moment in the understanding of individuality and personality, must, especially in its moments of highest integration, seek its foundations, recognize its limits, and be nourished by those insights and understandings which only the intelligence can grant it. Thus, the psychologist can be said to be engaged in a rational science, but that he must reason with all of himself; to seek out the interior relation between his reason and intelligence, between his science and philosophy.

The relationship between individuality and personality is fundamental to concrete existence. This relationship may be elaborated as the relationship between needs and values; between life and existence; between the economic pragmatic, material, technological elements, and the spiritual, existential, transcendent, religious elements (i.e., between that which is "becoming" and that which can be said to "develop"). One is not founded on the other. To found the spiritual on the "material" or the "pragmatic" leads to a materialism or pragmatism which subjugates man's freedom to the things of the world. In such a case, the things of the world are not a limit and matter for man's freedom: they are the limit and matter. On the other

hand, those who found the material on the spiritual totally immanentize the spiritual--establish reason in man as self-sufficient, and ultimately, because of the untenability of such a position tend towards a naturalism (the subject is adequated by nature which is all of his object). In both cases, the personality is lost. The intelligence is negated and in its place a self-sufficient reason, a pragmatic reason, or a reason materialistically based, is substituted. The synthesis, the concrete man, is broken up and abstracted. For Sciacca, this synthesis is originary. It is not the individuality which determines or founds the personality, or vice versa. Person and individual are in an original synthesis. For example, there is not a society which first develops an economic structure and then rationalizes it by a set of values. In other words, there is no voluntary act of choice which is not at the same time coordinated to a value (an act of election), in terms of its goal, its intention, and its justice, etc. To say that certain such acts are merely predicated on the basis of economic advantage, individual need, instinctual tendency, or subjective state, etc., to disregard objective spiritual values is to reduce personality to individuality. Such a decision, however, though representing the failure of personality, is nevertheless a personal act (the person fails to be himself).

One sees, on the basis of the above remarks, that the principles of personality and individuality have a broad application. This is important for psychology because there has been an increasing recognition of the social and historical aspects of psychological questions. A critical perspective to the field of psychology must take these into account.

The way in which the question of the relation between individual and person is concretely answered, that is, the manner in which the relation is lived and understood, is a most critical one. It is bound, furthermore, to be a critical one for psychology, not only because psychology itself, in its philosophical foundations, cannot not take a stand on the question, but because many of the problems confronting the psychologist concerned with the concrete man, are themselves rooted in this fundamental problem.

This thesis has proposed a perspective on the psychology of personality rooted in Sciacca's philosophy of integrality, which shares the latter's emphasis on the concrete man, its dynamic viewpoint, its dialectical method of implication and compresence, its personalistic integral approach, and its stress on the awareness of limits.

An attempt has been made to briefly consider some major psychological systems on the basis of this perspective.

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APPENDIX 1

SCIACCA'S DISTINCTION BETWEEN SUBJECTIVE  
AND OBJECTIVE IDEALISM

## APPENDIX 1

### SCIACCA'S DISTINCTION BETWEEN SUBJECTIVE AND OBJECTIVE IDEALISM

Explaining these two positions, Sciacca writes:

E bene fissare schematicamente fin dall'inizio le tesi essenziali delle due posizioni metafisiche che qui c'interessano: quella dell' idealismo oggettivo e l'altra, in confronto ad esso, assunta dal pensiero moderno, di cui tracciamo rapidamente la linea storico-teoretica di sviluppo. [subjective idealism]

Verità è una norma o un principio universalmente valido per ogni essere dotato d'intelligenza. La metafisica greca e quella cristiana (a parte l'elaborazione, profonda dei concetti di Dio, persona, spirito, libertà, ecc. apportata da quest'ultima alla prima) concordano nel considerare la ragione umana capace di verità, cioè avente la capacità di conoscere verità oggettive, ciascuna universalmente valida e non contraddicente l'altra, anche se ciascuna (e tutte insieme), come questa o quella verità, rispetto alla verità totale, sia sempre parziale, ma ugualmente universale ed assoluta nel suo ordine, come questa o quella verità. L'analisi e l'approfondimento del concetto di verità disvelano i caratteri divini di essa (eternità, necessità, universalità, ecc.), diversi da quelli della mente umana (temporale, contingente, relativa, mutevole e perciò limitata); dunque autorizzano la distinzione tra la verità-oggetto della mente e la mente-soggetto pensante. Distinzione, non separazione: la verità è sempre verità per una mente che la pensa: non vi è verità non pensata, cioè che non sia oggetto di un pensiero. Da qui si è concluso frettolosamente che la verità non è se non per il pensiero che la pensa: s'identifica con esso, con l'atto del pensare. Ma se ciò è vero (razionalmente concepibile non contraddittorio) per il Pensiero assoluto, che possiede gli stessi attributi della verità (anzi è la stessa Verità), non lo è per il pensiero umano, relativo, mutevole e mai capace di possedere la totalità della verità, l'unità perfetta ed assoluta del logo nell'identità pura e semplice del pensante (soggetto) e del pensato (oggetto) ... per la mente umana le verità è sempre oggetto ad essa dato e mai da essa posto; le è presente, ma la oltrepassa e la trascende, le sovrasta ...

Da ciò consegue: a) l'uomo è capace di conoscenze assolutamente vere, ma non è egli il creatore della verità: la verità è oggetto della sua mente, da essa scoperta, conquistata; b) dunque la verità preesiste al pensiero; non vi è la verità perché il pensiero la fa, ma il pensiero si fa nella verità, la quale fa che esso pensi e la pensi. In altri termini: è vero, come sopra abbiamo detto, che non vi è verità se non per un pensiero che la pensa, ma, nel caso del pensiero umano, ciò non significa affatto che il pensiero la "ponga". Idealismo, dunque, ma idealismo oggettivo (valore ontologico della verità): distinzione netta ed irriducibile tra la verità oggetto del pensare ed il soggetto pensante...

Di fronte a questa posizione metafisica, che, nell'essenziale, è propria dell'idealismo classico greco-cristiano, il pensiero moderno ha tentato, attraverso la sua critica, due vie diverse, per giungere a posizioni speculative da essa distanti o divergenti: a) da un lato, ha negato l'esistenza di verità oggettive e della Verità assoluta: i concetti razionali sono puri nomi e le idee semplici contenuti della coscienza soggettiva o impressioni affievolite di sensazioni. Questa la conclusione dell'empirismo moderno, il cui agnosticismo, che non nega la esistenza della verità oggettiva ma solo la conoscibilità di essa da parte della ragione, è un'attenuazione provvisoria, necessariamente provvisoria come tutti i compromessi. b) Vi è una verità universale e necessaria che l'uomo è capace di conoscere, ma essa non preesiste all'umano pensiero ne lo trascende, bensì è ad esso immanente, da esso creata nel suo stesso processo o divenire. Ricerca e verità coincidono: pensare è creare la verità, scoprirla è fondarla: il pensiero stesso è artefice della verità ed è esso stesso la verità, tutto ... Pensiero e verità s'identificano nell'immanenza assoluta della verità al pensiero e del pensiero all verità.<sup>1</sup>

In summary, Sciacca is saying that the position of objective idealism (which has its origins in Classical Greek-Christian thought) asserts that truth is given

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<sup>1</sup> M. F. Sciacca, L'interiorità oggettiva, Milano, Marzorati, 1960, p. 19-22.

objectively and interiorily to the mind of man. Indeed, there is no truth (truth, not truths), according to Sciacca, except as given to the mind. However, only in God does Truth identify itself with Mind. In the human mind, truth is its essential object without which it could not think any truth or even any falsehood. (For by virtue of what truth is something true or false?) This interior truth has divine characteristics; it is eternal, necessary, universal, etc. The mind, as such, however, although in an essential relation to truth, is temporal, contingent, limited, etc. Two main streams of thought have countered this metaphysical position which asserts the objectivity of truth. One, empiricism, ultimately denies the knowability of truth by reason; the other, immanent idealism, sees truth as immanent to human thought, as created in the process of its becoming. Both in denying the objectivity of truth tend to reduce truth to something subjective.

APPENDIX 2

MICHELE FEDERICO SCIACCA - BIOGRAPHY

## APPENDIX 2

### MICHELE FEDERICO SCIACCA - BIOGRAPHY

Michele Federico Sciacca was born in Giarre, Province of Catania, Sicily, in 1908. There is little information available concerning his childhood, but Jolivet and Roggerone describe his early academic interests as follows:

Très jeune, il se passionna pour les humanités littéraires, sous l'influence et la direction de son père, d'abord au gymnase de Giarre, puis au lycée d'Acireale. Mais dès ce moment, un esprit exigeant, une curiosité insatiable d'idées, et aussi le sentiment très vif que les humanités ne prennent tout leur sens que par la philosophie qu'elles impliquent, orientait Sciacca vers des recherches plus spéculative, auxquelles il allait bientôt consacrer sa vie.<sup>1</sup>

In 1927, spurred by his interest in philosophy, Sciacca went to the school of Antonio Aliotta in Naples. Under Aliotta, he obtained his doctoral degree in philosophy in 1930, with a thesis entitled The Philosophy of Thomas Reid. In 1936, at Naples, he began to teach the history of ancient philosophy and, in 1938, he was named professor of the history of philosophy at the University of Pavia. Prior to this appointment, he had also studied under the famous Italian philosopher, Giovanni Gentile.

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<sup>1</sup> R. Jolivet and G. Roggerone, "Michele Federico Sciacca," in Les grands courants de la pensée mondiale contemporaine, ouvrage publié sous la direction de M. F. Sciacca, Vol. II, Fischbacher and Marzorati, Paris, 1964, p. 1379.

In 1947, he went to the University of Genova to teach theoretical philosophy, where he remained until his death in 1974.

In 1945, he founded the Giornale di Metafisica which was the organ of Christian Spiritualism, a movement which firmly distinguishes itself from neo-scholasticism in that it stresses the Augustinian sources of Christian philosophy and seeks to integrate all the richness of modern and contemporary speculation. In addition to the founding of this journal, he was also involved in the editorship of both Logos and Humanitas. Jolivet and Roggerone explain further Sciacca's position in contemporary thought:

... Sciacca et le mouvement qu'il anime sont restés parfaitement réfractaires aux sortilèges de l'existentialisme, allemand ou français, et peut sensibles, semble-t-il, à la phénoménologie de type husserlien, et même au rationalisme classique français contemporain, d'inspiration cartésienne et kantienne. Si Sciacca a maintes fois souligné sa communauté de vues avec le groupe "Philosophie de l'esprit" (assez peu homogène d'ailleurs) et surtout avec ses promoteurs, Louis Lavelle et René Le Senne, il n'a pas laissé d'en critiquer certains aspects et finalement de suivre une voie assez différente. En un sens, il nous paraîtrait beaucoup plus proches des métaphysiciens de l'être, qu'il discute parfois âprement, que des rationalistes français, qui tous, plus ou moins, lui semblent sacrifier à cet «immanentisme idéaliste» qui est, à ses yeux, la source même de cette «crise de philosophie» qu'il n'a cessé de dénoncer. Mais c'est jusque dans la forme de ses exposés doctrinaux et de ses écrits polémiques que Sciacca apparaîtrait plutôt apparenté à la scolastique: une certaine raideur dans la manière de proposer-- je dirais volontiers: d'asséner-- ses arguments, une dialectique habituellement déductive, qui s'exprime graphiquement en numéros d'ordre, un goût évident et

un don certain pour l'abstraction, tout cela marque assez que le tempérament batailleur de Sciacca aurait facilement, si les circonstances l'avait voulu, trouvé son expression adéquate dans une manière d'écrire plus voisine de celle de saint Thomas que de celle de Descartes, de Lachelier ou de Lavelle.<sup>2</sup>

Sciacca was a prolific writer. Rather than attempt a further description of his works and activities here, the reader is referred to Jolivet and Roggerone's chapter<sup>3</sup> and to Ottonello's<sup>4</sup> bibliography. The author will only mention here the Opere complete di M. F. Sciacca published by Marzorati, Milano, since 1967.

For the remaining part of this biographical sketch, passages from Jolivet and Roggerone's chapter describing the character and personality of Sciacca have been selected.

De taille moyenne, invariablement maigre et nerveux, les yeux vifs et mobiles sous les verres épais, il parle avec une vivacité qui essoufle aisément l'auditeur interloqué: comment réussir à suivre assez vite ce verbe en fusée! Avec cela, d'ailleurs, c'est tout le corps qui parle: gestes abondants, avec parfois quelque chose d'impérieux ou d'apodictique et un accent de décision auquel il est difficile de résister ... cette généreuse abondance du discours laisserait d'abord penser que Sciacca est plus fait pour la parole que pour l'action. Or si, de fait, il est bon orateur, il a en maintes circonstances manifesté avec éclat d'éminentes qualités d'organisateur, et c'est sans doute l'association si rarement réalisée de ces

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2 Ibid., p. 1381-1382.

3 Ibid.

4 See bibliography.

dons qui peut rendre compte de la place que Sciacca occupe dans le mouvement intellectuel contemporain et spécialement parmi les universitaires catholiques, dont il est l'animateur incontesté.

... Est-il inutile de noter que Sciacca est un fumeur invétéré de cigarettes? Comme beaucoup de grands nerveux, il trouve dans le tabac, dès qu'il est à sa table de travail (car Sciacca ne fume pas en marchant), une sorte d'excitant que l'habitude a rendu peu à peu nécessaire, mais qui semble fait beaucoup plus pour occuper le mouvement perpétuel des mains ou lui donner un prétexte que pour activer une pensée assez agile par elle-même. Sciacca d'ailleurs fume nerveusement, comme il fait tout le reste, et la cigarette qu'il allume est tôt consumée. Tout chez Sciacca marche à vive allure et l'on se prend parfois à craindre qu'à force de brûler sa vie à une telle cadence, il ne consume les forces de sa robuste santé au même rythme que celui de ses cigarettes. Notons un autre trait de grande importance ... Je veux parler du travail nocturne ... c'est toujours entre dix heures du soir et trois ou quatre heures du matin que Sciacca se livre à ses méditations philosophiques et compose ses multiples articles et ouvrages.

... Un autre trait de Sciacca que je voudrais signaler est l'ordre qu'il apporte aux affaires qu'il traite. Cela m'a souvent étonné et j'avoue être généralement inquiet quand, dans un Congrès ou une réunion qu'il préside, il s'installe au bureau avec, dans les mains, une masse de papiers de tous les formats où l'on s'attend qu'il s'embrouille définitivement. Mais c'est justement le contraire qui arrive, car tout sort au moment voulu et dans l'ordre requis, avec une précision sans défaut et une mémoire infailible.

... Vers 1947, Sciacca, que je ne connais pas encore et qui avait entrepris, à travers la France, une sorte de voyage d'exploration chez les penseurs les plus connus de notre pays, m'annonça sa visite. Il ne parlait encore que très imparfaitement le français et le dialogue fut assez laborieux. Mais pour Sciacca, le « rendement », si je puis dire, fut important, car, en quelques minutes, il réussit à me convaincre que j'aurais grand profit à étudier Rosmini (que j'ignorais à peu près à cette époque) et que, pour se faire, je devais acquérir sans délai, pour la Bibliothèque de notre Université, tous les

volumes de l'Édition nationale,--ce que je fis, en effet, aussitôt. Je pense que ce petit fait marque bien un trait typique de Sciacca, qui est, il me semble, le goût de l'efficiency, la décision d'obtenir un résultat, de réaliser en un mot. Si l'on interrogeait tour à tour les collègues français qu'il visita cette année, je crois que tous conviendraient qu'ils ont dû, cédant aux dons de persuasion de ce diable d'homme, lui accorder quelque chose, laisser quelque chose entre ses mains, au moins quelque promesse de collaboration ...

Pour achever un portrait que les multiples aspects de Sciacca rendent si difficile, il faudrait parler de l'amitié dont Sciacca sait faire preuve en toute occasion, une amitié qui porte la marque de son caractère et qui est, si l'on peut dire, plus effective qu'affective, en ce sens qu'elle se traduit par un dévouement infatigable et toujours disponible plutôt que par des effusions sentimentales. Mais sous la brusquerie de l'homme éternellement pressé, il est facile de discerner l'homme de cœur, sensible et généreux qui sait écouter (qui est la chose la plus rare qui soit) et qui a su conquérir chez tous ceux qui l'approchent, et répondant à la sienne, de ferventes amitiés.<sup>5</sup>

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5 Jolivet and Raggerone, op. cit., p. 1383-1387.

APPENDIX 3

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Individuality and Personality in Michele F. Sciacca's  
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This study is an attempt to develop a critical perspective towards the field of psychology of personality on the basis of Sciacca's philosophy of integrality. The unique position of this system, as an ontological or objective idealism, is examined in terms of its historical and epistemological perspective. Certain fundamental categories and notions of its integral view of man are discussed. This philosophical position, as an understanding of man in his integrality and concreteness, is seen as summarized and synthesized in the principles of individuality and personality. Their importance for the psychological dimension is discussed in terms of a definition of the psychological moment as a rational reflection on man. This psychological moment in its foundations is seen as having an essential internal relation to philosophy. A number of psychological systems are very briefly examined in view of the critical perspective developed, that is, in terms of the integral understanding of man synthesized in the principles of individuality and personality, according to Sciacca's views.

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<sup>1</sup> Claude A. Della Zazzera, Master's thesis presented to the School of Graduate Studies of the University of Ottawa, Ontario, 1976, ix-107 p.