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Crime Prevention Ottawa as a Responsibility Centre: An Interim Analysis

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**Crime Prevention Ottawa as a Responsibility Centre:
An Interim Analysis**

By: Christine E. Hurst

A Thesis Submitted to the
Department of Criminology at the University of Ottawa, Ottawa, Ontario
in Partial Fulfillment of the Requirements for the
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TABLE OF CONTENTS

ABSTRACT	iv
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS	v
I. INTRODUCTION	1
II. REVIEW OF LITERATURE	4
2.1. <i>CONTEXT</i>	4
2.2. <i>HOW DO WE MAKE SENSE OF THIS</i>	5
2.3. <i>RESPONSIBILITY CENTRES</i>	8
2.4. <i>CRIME PREVENTION: INTERNATIONAL AND CANADIAN TRENDS</i>	14
III. METHODOLOGY	31
3.1. <i>DOCUMENTARY ANALYSIS</i>	31
3.2. <i>QUALITATIVE INTERVIEWS</i>	40
3.3. <i>ANALYTICAL GRID AND COGNITIVE MAP</i>	41
3.4. <i>LIMITATIONS OF METHODOLOGY</i>	43
IV. CRIME PREVENTION IN ENGLAND AND WALES	46
4.1. <i>DESCRIPTION OF CRIME PREVENTION IN ENGLAND AND WALES</i>	46
4.2. <i>CRIME PREVENTION IN ENGLAND AND WALES: KEY THEMES</i>	61
4.2.1. <i>Community</i>	62
4.2.2. <i>Political Intervention</i>	64
4.2.3. <i>Collaboration</i>	65
4.2.4. <i>Implementation Experts</i>	67
4.2.5. <i>Information Sharing</i>	68
4.2.6. <i>Geographical Information Systems (GIS)</i>	69
4.2.7. <i>Targets and Plans</i>	71
4.2.8. <i>Funding</i>	72
4.2.9. <i>Recruitment and Consent</i>	72
V. CRIME PREVENTION OTTAWA	77
5.2. <i>BACKGROUND</i>	77
5.2. <i>FINDINGS: KEY THEMES AND CRIME PREVENTION OTTAWA</i>	80
5.2.1. <i>Theme 1 - Community</i>	81
5.2.2. <i>Theme 2 - Political Intervention</i>	84
5.2.3. <i>Theme 3 - Collaboration</i>	87
5.2.4. <i>Theme 4 - Implementation Experts</i>	89
5.2.5. <i>Theme 5 - Information Sharing</i>	90

5.2.6. <i>Theme 6 - Geographical Information Systems (GIS)</i>	92
5.2.7. <i>Theme 7 – Targets and Plans</i>	94
5.2.8. <i>Theme 8 - Funding</i>	96
5.2.9. <i>Theme 9 - Recruitment and Consent</i>	97
5.2.10. <i>Theme 10 – Other Issues</i>	99
VI. DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSIONS	102
6.1. <i>DISCUSSION</i>	102
6.2. <i>MAKING SENSE OF THE FINDINGS</i>	110
6.3. <i>RECOMMENDATIONS</i>	111
6.4. <i>CONCLUSIONS</i>	112
REFERENCES	114

LIST OF APPENDICES

<i>APPENDIX A: Interview Guide</i>	120
<i>APPENDIX B: Participant List</i>	121
APPENDIX C: Informed Consent Form	122

LIST OF TABLES

<i>Table 1 Analysis of Dimensions of Responsibility Centre-Based Crime Prevention</i>	42
<i>Table 1 (Revised) Analysis of Dimensions of Responsibility Centre-Based Crime Prevention</i>	75
<i>Table 2 Summary of Findings</i>	109

LIST OF FIGURES

Figure 1 The Governance and Administration of Comprehensive Initiatives Model.....	9
Figure 2 Cognitive Map of England and Wales and Ottawa Case Comparison.....	43

ABSTRACT

There is a growing international interest in the use of crime prevention responsibility centres (RC) as mechanisms for organizing crime prevention initiatives. One model of RC-based crime prevention is that used in England and Wales, where the creation of CDRPs (municipal RCs) was mandated by the Crime and Disorder Act of 1998. Themes gleaned from analyses of this experience form the basis for this thesis. In 2005, Crime Prevention Ottawa (CPO) was created to be an RC in Ottawa. This thesis examines whether and how CPO faced challenges similar to those in England and Wales. It concludes that many challenges met by the English experience are not present in the CPO case, in response to the challenges that are experienced, it recommends that CPO: define 'community', and its political 'role'; sustain project funding; increase project proposal expectations; and discuss what the organization 'does' versus 'should do'.

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I would like to thank my participants for giving up their time, and sharing their thoughts and experiences on Crime Prevention Ottawa in its role as a responsibility centre. I hope that this research accurately reflects the contributions that you have made and that it helps in our understanding of crime prevention responsibility centres.

I offer my most sincere gratitude to Ross Hastings, my thesis supervisor, for his support, direction, and willingness to make time; despite being on sabbatical and having an incredibly demanding schedule. His clarity and guidance has been critical to the completion of this work.

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I. INTRODUCTION

The World Health Organization and the Institute for the Prevention of Crime, at the University of Ottawa, argue that a ‘Crime Prevention Responsibility Centre’ is pivotal to the delivery of informed knowledge about crime prevention, and to implementing and sustaining effective crime prevention programming. The objective of this thesis is to conduct a description of Crime Prevention Ottawa (CPO) in its role as a Responsibility Centre for crime prevention initiatives in Ottawa, Canada. I will use recent experiences in the UK as a basis to identify issues, concerns, and challenges, and then use the ‘key themes’ from that example to analyze the Crime Prevention Ottawa case.

In order to help ensure the success of crime prevention programs and initiatives, the World Health Organization argues for the creation of a National Centre capitalizing on the knowledge gained from crime prevention initiatives worldwide (Butchart, Phinney, Check, & Villaveces, 2004). The Institute for the Prevention of Crime at the University of Ottawa, further argues that the centre should be a ‘Responsibility Centre’: a permanent office which has sustained funding, the power and authority to set targets or goals in crime reduction, is held accountable or responsible for reaching those goals and that provides information on evidence-based programs (National Working Group on Crime Prevention, 2007).

In England and Wales, the Audit Commission report entitled “Misspent Youth” contributed to a number of changes, including: the enactment of the “Crime and Disorder Act”, the establishment of the Youth Justice Board (YJB), and the creation of Crime and Disorder

Reduction Partnerships (CDRPs). CDRPs are municipal responsibility centres which target the reduction of crime and disorder in communities. The CDRPs also worked with the YJB and its crime prevention program, entitled the Youth Inclusion Program to target risk factors associated with the crime of youths within CDRP areas. In an independent evaluation of the early stages of the YI program, arrest rates of targeted youths dropped in targeted areas (Borrows, 2003). The themes from the experiences of the CDRPs, in particular, and the YJB & YIPs, secondarily, can be translated into areas or foci of discussion for the CPO case.

Crime Prevention Ottawa (CPO) is a permanent responsibility centre in the city of Ottawa, Canada. The organization was formed in 2005 and reports to the City Council of Ottawa. Following two to three years of establishing the organization, conducting an analysis of crime in Ottawa, and producing an action report and strategic plan, CPO has recently begun to release publications, and help implement programs and initiatives in the city. As of January 2008, Crime Prevention Ottawa became a funding organization for new evidence-based crime prevention projects.

My thesis will look at CPO as a responsibility centre in an attempt to assess whether and how CPO has confronted some of the challenges faced by the recent experiences in England and Wales.

Data will be collected through a documentary analysis (including legislation and publications) and key-informant qualitative interviews. The data gathered will be analyzed according to key dimensions determined by a content-analysis of crime prevention literature on

the England and Wales Crime Prevention initiative. This project will attempt to shed light on the experiences of a responsibility centre. I hope to contribute to an understanding of the components which impact a responsibility centre's success and, in turn, use the themes as a basis for a study of CPO.

This paper will include a literature review that will focus on crime prevention responsibility centres and municipally-led crime prevention initiatives. It will attempt to identify key themes or areas of 'learning' using crime prevention literature and specifically, the England and Wales example. Data will be gathered through a two-step process: firstly, the key documents pertaining to the Crime Prevention example from England and Wales will be examined and the main attributes will be identified. From this data, 'Key themes' pertaining to the experience of a responsibility centre organizing for crime prevention interventions will be identified and used as foci for an analysis in the CPO example. Secondly, the Crime Prevention Ottawa case will be described and analyzed in light of the themes identified in the England and Wales case noted above. The paper will conclude by making recommendations to assist CPO as a responsibility centre, based on the themes that present relevant concerns for this example, and by highlighting possible areas for further research.

II. REVIEW OF LITERATURE

2.1 CONTEXT

Crime prevention initiatives are emerging internationally as a means to proactively approach crime and victimization concerns. There are a number of different approaches to crime prevention, including: Situational, Crime Prevention through Environmental Design (CPTED), and Crime Prevention through Social Development (CPSD) to name a few. While the first two approaches focus on the prevention of the criminal act itself, the latter focuses on the key influences in an individual's life which tend to precede criminal engagement. CPSD has gained increasing attention, in recent years, as a means of addressing crime and victimization through the targeting of risk factors associated with criminal behaviour.

The increased usage of CPSD-based interventions has been accompanied by a concurrent shift towards “community” as the focus of crime prevention interventions and as one of the preferred mechanisms for the design and delivery of crime prevention initiatives. Within the Canadian context, there are a number of examples of this policy shift towards a ‘community’ focus. The National Crime Prevention Centre (NCPC)’s *Blueprint for Effective Crime Prevention*, published in 2007, emphasizes the community as the locus of targeted interventions (addressing and adapting to “local needs and conditions”) and at the core of public safety (Public Safety Canada, n.d.a; n.d.b). Across Canada, there are also a number of Municipally-based Responsibility Centres which are mandated to reduce crime and victimization within their municipal community. Some examples of these (as further discussed in section 2.4), are Surrey, Calgary, Regina, Waterloo Region, and Ottawa. The Municipal Network on Crime Prevention,

established by the Institute for the Prevention of Crime at the University of Ottawa, is made up of representatives from fourteen cities across Canada. It acts as a forum for individual municipalities to share experience and knowledge in the development and delivery of crime prevention initiatives. This network recognizes and emphasizes the role of Municipalities in the provision of community services, as well as the impacts that services and programs can have on community safety and the prevention of crime (IPC, 2008). In Canada, the policy shift towards community as the focus and primary mechanism of crime prevention interventions may be seen across all orders of government, from Municipalities (in Cities and Responsibility Centres) to Provinces/ Territories to Federal Initiatives (the NCPC and *Blueprint for Effective Crime Prevention*).

2.2 HOW DO WE MAKE SENSE OF THIS

The policy shift to community as a focus for crime prevention intervention is reflective of the neo-liberal trends which download responsibility for personal welfare onto Municipalities, communities, and individuals more generally. There is a growing theoretical literature surrounding this trend and some of the implications on society and crime prevention.

Converging trends combine the shrinking of social welfare safety nets, and increased governance from a distance. Neo-liberal shifts in political policies have promoted the increased governance of individuals, through less overt governing mechanisms. Western societies are seen to be characterized by a 'culture of control' wherein the activities of an individual are 'controlled' or 'limited by' a system of institutions, regulations, and social relationships

(Garland, 2001, p. 27-53). These 'controls' can be formal or informal in nature and influence positive behaviours by individuals (Garland, 2001, p. 27-53). Criminal acts are seen to be the product of inadequate controls and new regulations are passed with the intention of coercing and drawing individuals into self-monitoring behaviours (Garland, 2001; Rose, 1999). This activity of self-policing shifts the responsibility for personal welfare from centralized institutions (re: Social Welfare programs, Unemployment Insurance, etc) to the community and individuals (Rose, 1996). In doing so, governments can justify decreasing the benefits given out by those larger institutions and the shift of responsibility onto Municipalities (Crawford, 2007b). This becomes the mechanism through which previously overt and prescriptive forms of governance are replaced by more subtle and less overt governance structures (Rose, 1999; Rose, 1996).

Within Western society, these more subtle governance structures become central to the 'responsibilisation' of individuals. At the core of these new forms of governance is the community, it is seen to be the "source of social order; mediated and indeed established through the responsabilising contributions of work, voluntary association, the family, schooling and community-based crime control" (Gilling, 2007, p. 46). If community is the 'source of social order', then community-based programming and services become implicated in the development and maintenance of that order (Gilling, 2007). Politically, this shifts 'public order' responsibilities from Federal and (in the case of Canada) Provincial and Territorial order of government to Municipalities: those levels of government most closely linked to the 'community' itself. Through this neo-liberal shift, the responsibilities for crime prevention are also downloaded onto Municipal governments and individual communities (Crawford, 2007a; 2007b). Federal and Provincial/ Territorial governments are still involved in the passing of

legislation, policies, and regulation that requires Municipalities to provide certain services or to engage in certain practices, however, it is the Municipalities who are accountable for their implementation and delivery (Crawford, 2007b). Crawford (2007b) refers to this experience of downloading the responsibility onto communities and municipalities as a part of the larger trend to “downsize and roll-back the state” (p.12).

Crime prevention responsibilities and interventions are subject to this offloading or downloading effect and this presents some limitations. Governments, while supportive of crime prevention activities, are often reticent to designate or allot significant funding for them; particularly if it takes away from the funding of other areas of criminal justice (Crawford, 2007 June). Often crime prevention funding is a part of the yearly criminal justice budget, with the bulk of the funds being used for criminal justice activities rather than crime prevention. When paired with the trends outlined above, it can be difficult for municipalities to be effective on crime prevention planning and implementation within their communities. Crime prevention initiatives, organizations, and centres become limited by what the community is both willing and able to do (Hastings & Jamieson, 2001). Resources are usually limited and this impacts how and what crime prevention activities are designed and delivered in the community. The governance of crime prevention responsibility centres are reflected in neo-liberal trends of ‘responsibilising’ individuals, and ‘downloading responsibility’ for public safety onto municipalities. Responsibility centres are municipally-led and are dependent upon the mobilization of the community and community stakeholders in the identification of crime concerns, as well as the implementation of crime prevention initiatives.

This thesis is a case study of an attempt to design/ implement a crime prevention responsibility centre in one Canadian City. It attempts to address the following questions: 1) How does an RC organize for crime prevention in a neo-liberal society where responsibility is shifted onto communities and individuals?, 2) To what extent are the themes or experiences of an RC in England and Wales relevant to an RC in Canada?


2.3 RESPONSIBILITY CENTRES

An important element of success in sustainable crime prevention at the Municipal level is the establishment of a permanent responsibility centre for crime prevention that plays the role of evaluating the data that it collects, mapping current programs, disseminating information on ‘what works’ and building “sustainability mechanisms” (Butchart et. al., 2004: p. 78-79). They are an organizational framework for coordinating program design, delivery, and accountability. Responsibility centres are an attempt to create a governance system for organization and collaboration between contributing partners.

According to The National Working Group on Crime Prevention, some general ‘elements of success’ in Crime Prevention RCs are: collaboration and problem-solving partnerships, concentrating investments on highest needs, developing and sustaining community capacity, adequate and sustained supports and resources, and public engagement (National Working Group on Crime Prevention, 2007). These elements are further developed by a number of prescriptive texts which advocate for the creation of action plans, strong evaluations and constant monitoring of programs throughout all stages of its creation and activity (Johnson & Fraser, 2007;

Federation of Canadian Municipalities, 2000; Federal-Provincial Working Group on Community Safety and Crime Prevention, 1996). A simplified version of the resulting ideas from these texts may be found in the Governance and Administration of Comprehensive Initiatives model on the following page (See Figure 1 below).

Figure 1 The Governance and Administration of Comprehensive Initiatives Model



Adapted from the National Working Group on Crime Prevention (2007, p. 21), and the WHO Preventing Violence: A guide to implementing the recommendations of the World report on violence and health. (Butchart et. al., 2004)

According to this model, a Crime Prevention Responsibility Centre should: identify the specific problem which will be targeted, set priorities and outcome targets/goals, implement a response, and evaluate the outcomes of said response.

- Problem identification involves the acknowledgement of a problem, as well as an analysis of the extent or prevalence of the problem (its locale, what actually occurs, who is involved). Another component of this stage is research into crime prevention

literature to understand: what has been done to solve this problem in the past, what the results were, what the community has for resources, whether the organization has the capacity to reproduce that initiative, and implicitly, those results.

- Priorities and targets, the second step, is dependent upon the information gained about the problem in the first step. This step is where the organization comes up with a plan of action to address the issue. It also involves the determination of priorities (what to address, who the clients and potential partners are) and targets (intended results or goals).
- The third step is to actually implement the action plan produced in step two.
- The fourth step in this model is an evaluation of the implemented response. It is at this step that the responsibility centre or organization assesses how well it has reached its intended goals and if it has not, what factors impacted these results.

As this model is cyclical in nature, evaluation is *not* a final step in the process. There is always room for programs to improve, change, and adapt according to the evolving needs of the problem and people that it is aiming to help.

The roles of the Responsibility Centre are found at the centre of this model, and include: leadership on an issue; lasting partnerships with key stake holders in a problem; evidence on a particular issue; the capacity to deal with problems; and the ability to sustain a program or initiative. Using this governance and administration model for comprehensive initiatives, the literature suggests that Responsibility Centres (represented by the central bubble) will facilitate and emphasize the successful elements of programming and hopefully anticipate or bypass some of the sources of resistance to change.

As the body of knowledge around crime prevention and individual programs grows, so too does our awareness of the common elements of success and of the sources of resistance met by crime prevention RCs. Schneider (2007) outlines some of these. He argues that one of the largest obstacles is a lack of community attachment. Community attachment is affected by heterogeneity within the community group and can be related to class, race/ethnicity, language, values, and socio-economic status (Schneider, 2007; Austin, 1991). Without community attachment, many crime prevention initiatives are unable to continue. The reason for this lies in the nature of most crime prevention programs: they have limited resources, often rely on the work of volunteers, suffer from any number of internal-organizational flaws, and are greatly influenced by factors external to the organization, including things like: changes in legislation, demographic shifts and shifts in political ideologies (Schneider, 2007; Waller, 2006).

In his example of the Mount Pleasant Community Centre in British Columbia, Schneider states that project failure was the result of organizational, structural, and subject-oriented obstacles (Schneider, 2007). The maintenance of partnerships between key organizations and members of the community, the lack of funding/ resources, and the inability of the centre to keep volunteers all contributed to the closure of the local crime prevention centre in Mount Pleasant, British Columbia (ibid). He concluded that a sense of community is critical to crime prevention initiatives as it helps provide the support base and cohesive network necessary to overcome many of the obstacles or problems commonly experienced by crime prevention initiatives (Schneider, 2007). This 'sense of community' is an important factor to consider in the planning and implementation of programs by responsibility centres.

Further sources of resistance to crime prevention programming and initiatives lie in the implementation and research processes. Disjoints or shifts between the planning stages and execution of programs often negatively affect the outcomes of those programs (Dershem, 1990; Maguire, 2004). Throughout the planning processes for a project, many potential sources of resistance may be anticipated. If in the implementation stage the problem does arise, the organization will be better prepared to deal with it. Crime prevention initiatives must be based on sound knowledge in crime prevention. Research into ‘what works’ is imperative to successful prevention programming. Evaluation is critical for this, as it assesses the effectiveness of a program, as well as helps determine the extent to which the program would produce similar results in another locale. There are many possible sources of resistance to crime prevention programming. Responsibility centres are often charged with a number of duties and are liable to experience any number of problems, in the planning, implementation, and evaluation of programs that they fund or initiate. Some of these may be avoided through the careful planning of projects and by using the model outlined in Figure 1.

There are three broad areas or dimensions into which many experiences of RCs may be categorized, based on a preliminary literature review: Responsibility Centre; Knowledge, Skills, and Resources (KSR); and Initiatives. These categories are ones that were used for the ease of discussion and are not indicative ‘well-established categories within the literature’. The ‘Responsibility Centre’ dimension focuses on how initiatives are governed and administered. It involves the consideration of topics such as ‘who’ runs the organization; ‘what’ are the mandates, goals, and functions of the organization; ‘where’ the organization is located; the

‘reporting practices’ of the organization; and the ‘partners’ of the organization. This dimension broadly identifies some of the issues related to the role and experience of a particular responsibility centre and how those roles / experiences are impacted by the structure of the organization itself.

The ‘Knowledge, Skills, and Resources’ (KSR) dimension represents what a responsibility centre must assure in order to achieve success in crime prevention initiatives. Knowledge and knowledgeable individuals are imperative to crime prevention initiatives. Knowing ‘what works’ in crime prevention, and using that knowledge to guide the planning and implementation of projects are success factors in crime prevention literature. It requires that projects focus on risk-factors and are evidence-based. Knowledge also requires that the organization has the skills and resources to be able to convert it into action. Skills may encompass anything from the ability to organize and mobilize individuals to those related to communication more generally. Resources are the things which augment or limit the capacity of an organization or program in their endeavours. It can refer to those resources which are material (re: funding, office supplies, program location) or non-material (the community base, volunteers, expertise, and time) in nature.

The last broad dimension refers to the ‘Initiatives’ of the responsibility centre. It may include the types of programs implemented, the targets/ goals of the program, factors related to the client-base, and the results of the initiative. It is under this subsection that one assesses whether or not programs are ‘working’ according to their intended goals; the impacts of the program; and if the results are negative, what factors led to these results. This section could also

contain information about what is done following an evaluation. It might address whether or not modifications are made and if programs are (dis)continued based on those results.

2.4 CRIME PREVENTION: INTERNATIONAL AND CANADIAN TRENDS

This section will focus on some types of responsibility centres in other countries at both a national and a local level. This is not intended to be a comprehensive discussion of the municipally-led crime prevention initiatives world wide, but rather to provide some examples of current trends in crime prevention and more importantly, some background for the discussion of the cases being examined in this project.

France

In France there have been councils created for the purposes of improving community safety since 1982 (Johnson & Fraser, 2007; Méchéri, 1986). In June of that year, a commission of French mayors met to discuss what should be done to improve community safety (Méchéri, 1986). The resulting report advocated for 1) the creation of a national crime prevention council and 2) the creation of municipal crime prevention councils (Bonnemaison, 1982). In the years that followed, the national councils issued local contracts for prevention and urban safety (Johnson & Fraser, 2007; Ministry of Interior, n.d.). Increased funding became available for municipalities with the most disadvantaged populations (Johnson & Fraser, 2007; Ministry of Interior, n.d.) The French government has also created guidelines or rules which the prevention and urban safety contracts had to respect in order to get funding (Ministry of Interior, n.d.). Stipulations included: the provision of a safety diagnosis and indicators of success; plans for implementing a program and evaluating it; and the identification of partners from a variety of

sectors (Johnson & Fraser, 2007; Ministry of Interior, n.d.). The partners were: local elected officials and representatives from central agencies (police, administration, prosecutors), NGOs, public groups, and mayors (Johnson & Fraser, 2007; Ministry of Interior, n.d.). In 2007, the French government enacted legislation which required “national coordination and support for local safety contracts” in the form of an interdepartmental crime prevention committee and an interdepartmental fund for crime prevention. It also mandated that mayors play a key role in coordinating and implementing crime prevention initiatives within their locale. As of the time of this publication there have not been any evaluations of the results of the French approach to crime prevention (Johnson & Fraser, 2007).

Belgium

In Belgium, attention to crime prevention needs emerged in the early 1990s. At this time, a national secretariat for prevention policy was set up and local safety and prevention contracts were initiated (Johnson & Fraser, 2007; Viliigheid en Preventie Sécurité et Prévention, n.d.). Contracts consisted largely of two components: 1) improvement of police services at a local level and 2) crime prevention activities. Much of the funding, however, was allotted to the police portion of the contracts and crime prevention activities were primarily situational in nature (Johnson & Fraser, 2007). In 1999, a national safety plan was adopted to focus on prevention, enforcement, and monitoring. It called for a cooperative and integrated approach to crime prevention by all levels of government (Johnson & Fraser, 2007; Viliigheid en Preventie Sécurité et Prévention, n.d.). It also delineated priorities (violent crime, youth delinquency, drugs) as well as the necessity to design specific plans for geographical zones (Johnson & Fraser, 2007; Viliigheid en Preventie Sécurité et Prévention, n.d.). It wasn't until 2002 that a criterion

for funding was identified for these contracts. Similar to France, municipalities had to demonstrate sufficient need for funding in order to receive it. Newer forms of safety contracts have come into existence since that time, with the most recent emerging in 2007. The local safety and prevention plan (2007-2010) focuses on expected results, safety diagnoses, implementation, evaluation, and cooperation between police and local partners (Johnson & Fraser, 2007; Viliigheid en Preventie Sécurité et Prévention, n.d.). A committee will also be set up to monitor and evaluate different plans. The outcomes of these crime prevention efforts are not available at this time due to the lack of emphasis on evaluation in the past and the very recent enactment of the latest local safety and prevention plan (Johnson & Fraser, 2007).

Sweden

Sweden has implemented some form of Crime Prevention from as early as 1974. In response to an increase in reported crime at that time, the Swedish government created “the National Council for Crime Prevention” (Brå, n.d.; Johnson & Fraser, 2007). Its mandate included the production of crime statistics (on a monthly and district basis), the evaluation of law reforms, conducting research and disseminating the knowledge gained about what works, and the provision of support for local crime prevention initiatives (Brå, n.d.; Johnson & Fraser, 2007). In 1996, the Swedish government created a national crime prevention program which required local authorities to organize crime prevention work through local crime prevention boards (Brå, n.d.). Boards were to be made up of representatives from police, local government, social services, and educational institutions (Brå, n.d.). In 2005, a study was conducted which evaluated the National Crime Prevention Program, outlining what had been achieved so far and areas for improvement (Brå, n.d.; Johnson & Fraser, 2007). The results showed that most local crime

prevention Boards had initiated some form of crime prevention activity. It was argued that the National Council for the Prevention of Crime should play a larger role in guiding and providing support to these local initiatives (Brå, n.d.; Johnson & Fraser, 2007).

One of the most interesting approaches to crime prevention in Europe is that of England and Wales. As this case is the basis for this descriptive project, it will not be addressed in this section; instead, will be described in detail in the section entitled “Crime Prevention in England and Wales”. Although there are a number of other examples of municipally-led crime prevention initiatives in European countries, the efforts of France, Belgium, and Sweden are notable in that they all had a national crime prevention centre (or RC) to help coordinate, support, and fund local crime prevention initiatives, and all required local collaboration or community engagement.

United States of America

A recent example of crime prevention in the USA is “The Strategic Approach to Community Safety Initiative” (SACSI) (US Department of Justice, 2008). This project involved ten cities across the country and tested whether or not the problem-solving processes involved in Operation Ceasefire could be replicated elsewhere (US Department of Justice, 2008)¹. SACSI strategies were developed and implemented in each of the ten cities (Coleman, Holton Jr., Olson, Robinson & Stewart, 1999). However, unlike Operation Ceasefire, they were guided by multi-agency, multi-disciplinary groups led by the US Attorneys Office (Coleman et al., 1999; Johnson & Fraser, 2007). They also had full-time project coordinators who were dedicated to managing the tasks involved (Coleman et al., 1999; Johnson & Fraser, 2007).

¹ Operation Ceasefire was a Problem Oriented Policing approach to gang and gun violence. It was one of the first programs in the United States of America to fully incorporate a planning→implementation→evaluation model of problem solving.

The majority of the SACSI sites targeted violent crime and homicide (Coleman et al., 1999; Johnson & Fraser, 2007). An evaluation of the project suggests that the SACSI approach is associated with significant reductions in targeted crimes due to:

- the strong leadership of the US Attorney's Office;
- the collaboration of partners in strategic planning;
- a core group of decision makers,
- the use of crime prevention research and literature; and
- the multi-angled, integrated approach to the problem (balancing the suppression of crime through law enforcement with preventative measures) (Johnson & Fraser, 2007; US Department of Justice, 2008).

The largest problems encountered by SACSI were insufficient funds, insufficient staff, and tensions related to inter-group dynamics (Johnson & Fraser, 2007). SACSI continues today under the umbrella project entitled, Project Safe Neighborhoods (PSN) (Coleman et al., 1999; Johnson & Fraser, 2007; Schuck, 2005; US Department of Justice, 2008).

The other key crime prevention initiative out of the United States of America is "Communities that Care" (CTC). Although this is not specifically a prevention project, nor is it localized to a specific municipality, this research-based framework is noteworthy as it informs municipalities on how to select effective policies, programs, and actions for the promotion of youth development in their area (US Department of Health and Human Services, n.d.; Johnson & Fraser, 2007; Flynn, 2008). It targets the unique risk and protective factors of individual communities (US Department of Health and Human Services, n.d.; Johnson & Fraser, 2007; Flynn, 2008). This framework is now used throughout the United States of America by the

Department of Justice (US Department of Health and Human Services, n.d.; Johnson & Fraser, 2007; Flynn, 2008). Furthermore, it is also being utilized throughout other parts of the world (ibid). It targets many risk factors associated with youth delinquency, but it was not designed specifically with crime prevention in mind (Johnson & Fraser, 2007). Communities that Care is a framework which can be used by responsibility centres or specific municipalities to help identify many of the risk factors associated with youth delinquency, in their community. As CTC was not designed specifically for crime prevention, it provides an alternative perspective on the problem of youth delinquency and also, a set of solutions to the problem. Responsibility centres can use this framework as a tool to assess the problem, and identify areas of improvement. Programming, then, can target these areas of concern. As the framework follows a model similar to that of the Governance and Administration of Comprehensive Initiatives, this framework fits well with the needs and activities of responsibility centres.

Communities that Care can be adapted to virtually any community and provides the tools necessary to assess the risk and protective factors in youths lives, including their: schools, families, peer groups, places of recreation, etcetera. The factors are compiled into a 'community profile' which is then matched with research-based programs, policies, and/ or actions (US Department of Health and Human Services, n.d.). Communities can choose those which best suit their capacity and needs (US Department of Health and Human Services, n.d.). Youth development programs are varied and promote positive social, behavioural, and cognitive development (US Department of Health and Human Services, n.d.; Johnson & Fraser, 2007). Certified trainers are available through CTC to ensure that the key aspects of CTC are being

correctly applied (US Department of Health and Human Services, n.d.; Johnson & Fraser, 2007).

The five phase framework is as follows:

- 1) Community Readiness (getting people 'on board' with the intention of resolving the problem);
- 2) Community Mobilization (involving people to get things done/ formulating a plan of action);
- 3) Safety Diagnoses (conducting a youth survey to identify and assess risk and protective factors);
- 4) creating a Community Action Plan based on evidence-based programs which address the factors highlighted in the Safety Diagnosis;
- 5) implementation and evaluation (Flynn, 2008).

External evaluations of this model have produced mixed results, with the earlier evaluations indicating little to moderate impact of this model on youth delinquency (Johnson & Fraser, 2007). The 2003 evaluation, however, has produced promising evidence that CTC can have positive results and it is suggested that the earlier evaluations may have taken place before it was possible to see the effects of CTC (Johnson & Fraser, 2007). In an evaluative study conducted by the Penn State prevention research group, results conservatively show that the Communities that Care framework and programs had 10 times the positive outcomes than would be expected by chance alone (Flynn, 2008). The Communities that Care framework is currently used in various parts of the United States, Australia, United Kingdom, the Netherlands, and Canada (Flynn, 2008).

Canada

In 1984, the Canadian Council on Social Development recommended that crime prevention take a social developmental approach which would support disadvantaged individuals and communities in Canada (Canadian Council on Social Development, 1984). It was not until 1993, however, that a federal-level parliamentary report entitled, *Crime Prevention in Canada: Towards a National Strategy* was published, advocating for a strong national and inter-governmental approach to crime prevention (Standing Committee on Social Justice and the Solicitor General, 1993). It also called for the federal government to spend 5% of the national criminal justice budget on crime prevention (Canadian Council on Social Development, n.d.; Public Safety Canada, n.d.a). According to *Building a Safer Canada: First Report of the National Working Group on Crime Prevention*, this increased spending and governmentally-collaborative approach to crime prevention never came to fruition, despite the establishment of the “National Strategy on Community Safety and Crime Prevention” in 1994 (2007).

The Federation of Canadian Municipalities have produced reports from as early as 1989 and as late as 2006 which advocate that the strong municipal government’s role in crime prevention is a key to improving city safety (2000; Johnson & Fraser, 2007). The Federation also states that crime prevention must be approached holistically through integrated partnerships which are both community and inter-governmentally based and that focus on social development in order to address root causes of violence (Federation of Canadian Municipalities, 2000; Johnson & Fraser, 2007).

Currently there is a National Crime Prevention Strategy (NCPS) and National Crime Prevention Centre (NCPC) in place to facilitate the successful implementation and dissemination of information about crime prevention programming (Public Safety Canada, n.d. a, b, c). The NCPS provides a policy framework for the implementation of crime prevention interventions in Canada (Public Safety Canada, n.d.c). It is managed jointly by the provinces/territories and NCPC (Johnson & Fraser, 2007). NCPC is a part of Public Safety Canada. Its intent is to build and share knowledge, as well as support crime prevention initiatives in Canada. NCPC was established in 1998 and has largely focused on initiatives which use Crime Prevention through Social Development (CPSD) as their basis (Public Safety Canada, n.d.a; n.d.c.). In 2007, the Minister of Public Safety announced a new “Blueprint for Effective Crime Prevention” (Public Safety Canada, n.d.c; Johnson & Fraser, 2007). It emphasizes evidence-based interventions which are:

“integrated with the activities of other programs and services, built on knowledge of risk and protective factors and use evidence based practices, focused on specific priorities (vulnerable families, children and youth; youth gangs; recidivism among high-risk groups; and prevention in Aboriginal communities), and should produce measurable results” (NWGOCP, 2007, p 6).

However there are a number of sources of resistance to crime prevention (NWGOCP, 2007). Some of the gaps, as outlined in “Building a safer Canada: First Report of the National Working Group in Crime Prevention” are as follows:

- 1) there is resistance towards diverting funds from reactive criminal justice approaches to crime prevention;
- 2) there is tension between central authorities and the local counterparts;
- 3) there is not an identifiable and measurable guideline of ‘what community safety should look like’;

- 4) information about the success of crime prevention interventions is not well known;
- 5) support is neither adequate nor sustained and municipalities do not have the skills, resources, capacity, and/ or knowledge to implement interventions (2007).

At this time, crime prevention initiatives tend to be primarily project-oriented and lacking a national framework (Johnson & Fraser, 2007). This being said, municipalities and provinces across the country are taking the initiative to implement their own Crime Prevention strategies with RCs (NWGOCP, 2007; Johnson & Fraser, 2007; Waller, 2006). Some of these are: Surrey, Calgary, Regina, and Waterloo Region².

Surrey, the second largest City in British Columbia, has seen an increase in violent crime and homelessness in recent years. The violent crime rate has increased by 21% in the last five years and the rate of homelessness is the second highest in the Metro Vancouver Area (Janhevich, Johnson, Vezina, & Fraser, 2008). In February of 2007 the Mayor created the “Mayor’s Task Force on Public Safety and Crime Reduction”; which is made up of over one hundred individuals, who represent approximately fifty different community groups and organizations (Janhevich et. al., 2008).

One of the first acts of the Task Force was to create a “Crime Reduction Strategy” (CRS) for Surrey (Janhevich et. al., 2008). It aims to reduce crime/ increase community safety; increase public awareness about crime, as well as increase their involvement in the reduction of crime; and increase integration/cooperation between all stakeholders involved in crime reduction. In

² Due to the fact that few evaluations have been carried out on these crime prevention initiatives, it is not possible to attribute or identify ‘success enabling’ features. Though, it is possible to note some of the basic elements of this experience more generally.

order to meet all of these objectives the CRS requires the cooperation of a variety of sectors of the community, including: businesses; local community groups and stakeholders; municipal departments; police; and government (both provincial and federal) (Janhevich et. al., 2008). The Task Force also created the position of CRS Manager; responsible for the coordination of action or implementation plans which incorporate the resources of all city departments (Janhevich et. al., 2008).

Some of the elements in the Surrey experience were: mayor-based political leadership; continued cooperation between project partners during and after project implementation; setting indicators and being accountable to them during evaluation; including and empowering neighbourhoods; and effective communication/ knowledge dissemination between partners and the public (Janhevich et. al., 2008). The 'Mayor's Task Force on Public Safety and Crime Reduction' is an example of a municipally-based crime prevention and reduction initiative.

Calgary, Alberta is one of the fastest growing economic regions in Canada. As of 2006, Calgary ranked fifth in Canada for their violent crime rate and fourth for property crime rates (Janhevich et. al., 2008). Crime prevention and reduction initiatives have been present in Calgary as early as 1991; however, it was not until 2001 that the 'Safer Calgary Coalition' was created (Janhevich et. al., 2008).

The 'Safer Calgary Coalition's mission is to facilitate an integrated approach to community safety; focusing on injury/violence prevention and environmental improvement (both natural and built) (Janhevich et. al., 2008). Members of the coalition include: police, health and social

services, the board of education, and community organizations. Over the years the coalition has participated in a number of projects across the City of Calgary which have aimed to target everything from graffiti clean-up to CPTED-based revitalization projects to educating the public on personal safety and injury prevention (Janhevich et. al., 2008).

In 2005, City Council created the Crime Prevention Investment Plan (CPIP) which aimed to support initiatives which would directly impact citizens of the City. The plan includes sustained funding as well as a 3-year action plan which supports police, funds crime prevention initiatives, and expands upon the current knowledge base (Janhevich et. al., 2008). It has also identified a number of 'areas of focus' which include: children, youth, and families; street issues; and community building (Janhevich et. al., 2008). The CPIP is an example of responsibility centre-based crime prevention in the City of Calgary. Some of the features of these initiatives have been the cooperation between municipal services; the experience, leadership, and integrity of senior managers; and the community and partnership focus (Janhevich et. al., 2008).

Regina, Saskatchewan has some of the highest crime rates in the country, but its crime problem is highly decentralized and not uniformly distributed (Janhevich et. al., 2008). Crime occurs in areas which are geographically isolated by physical barriers such as train tracks and busy roads (Janhevich et. al., 2008). Crime problems in Regina are diverse and multi-faceted. In order to respond to the crime challenges faced by Regina, the Regina Crime Prevention Commission (RCPC) was created. This organization is chaired by the Mayor and other partners include: the police; citizens; the public and Catholic school boards; provincial government; health services; community services; and park services (Janhevich et. al., 2008). It is responsible

for providing a coordinated approach to crime prevention through mobilizing and developing the community and partnerships between stakeholders.

Focused efforts have been made by RCPC to create individual strategies which address the various problems found in the city (Janhevich et. al., 2008). These strategies use the combined resources and expertise of a number of stakeholders to address each issue in a coordinated fashion. Some examples of this are the: Regina Inner City Community Partnership (RICCP), Multi-Sector Youth Gang Prevention Strategy, Regina and Area Drug Strategy, and Regina's Integrated Auto Theft Strategy (Janhevich et. al., 2008).

Along with the support of the National Crime Prevention Centre, RCPC intends to evaluate current crime prevention initiatives, as well as identify gaps and overlap in services to better serve the City of Regina in the future. Some of the elements of this example are: strong leadership and commitment from senior officials (Mayor and Chief of Police); the development of structures which facilitate collaboration between partners, and across initiatives; and a cultural shift which accepts crime prevention as a necessary component of City planning and action (Janhevich et. al., 2008). The challenges experienced were: the non-sustained and inadequate funding for vulnerable groups (primarily Aboriginals), problems related to gaps and overlaps; and a lack of preliminary analysis (providing information on the needs of a particular community or group) (Janhevich et. al., 2008).

The Waterloo Region lies within South-Western Ontario and is comprised of a number of smaller cities and townships. In 1993 research was undertaken to study effective models of

Crime Prevention (Janhevich et. al., 2008). The findings of this research recommended a multi-disciplinary approach to crime. Following this, the Waterloo Region approved the creation of a responsibility centre called the 'Community Safety and Crime Prevention Council' (CS&CPC) (Janhevich et. al., 2008).

Since its creation, it has worked to create crime prevention initiatives which integrate and capitalize on the resources and expertise of a variety of local and regional partners. Representatives from the residents, police, businesses, governments (local, regional, provincial, and federal), education, health and social services, mental health and addictions, media, community justice, and other community organizations are just a few of the partners involved with CS&CPC (Janhevich et. al., 2008). CS&CPC has created a forty year plan for managing the healthy social development of its residents. It receives sustained funding and bases strategies on the growing knowledge on crime prevention (Janhevich et. al., 2008).

A couple of key activities that the CS&CPC is involved in are the 'Neighbour to Neighbour' and 'Communication and Education' Initiatives (Janhevich et. al., 2008). These initiatives focus on providing citizens with the information necessary to understand crime and the importance of coordinated approaches, and community, in achieving success. It also aims to provide citizens with knowledge about the services available to them within their community and at a regional level.

There are a number of elements that seem to be related to the survival of the Waterloo Region CS&CPC, a critical one being the consistent leadership and lack of turnover by higher

officials in the organization (Janhevich et. al., 2008). One of the biggest challenges experienced by the CS&CPC was the difficulty associated with coordinating responses which traversed Regional and Area Municipal jurisdiction (i.e. police, social health services, and public transit under Regional authority while recreation and neighbourhood services were managed locally) (Janhevich et. al., 2008). The second major challenge was related to balancing the necessity of collecting and using geographically-based data to identify and coordinate efforts, acknowledging the possible stigmatizing effects of using the results of that data (Janhevich et. al., 2008).

Canadian trends in crime prevention are primarily municipally-led and largely lack a provincial or national structure. As seen in the examples of Surrey, Calgary, Regina, and Waterloo Region, there have been some successes, at a municipal level, to create coordinated and integrated approaches to preventing crime; however there is still much to be done to overcome the unique challenges faced by these and other cities / regions across Canada.

The Responsibility Centres of England and Wales and Ottawa, Canada

The recent experiences in England and Wales, specifically the federally-mandated Crime and Disorder Reduction Partnerships (CDRPs), serve as a baseline case through which to explore how Crime Prevention Ottawa, an RC in Ottawa, Canada has addressed key issues. In England and Wales, CDRPs were municipally-based RCs intended to address crime and disorder in their local neighbourhoods, communities and regions. They were established by legislation, the Crime and Disorder Act of 1998, and were, to some extent, supported by a centralized institution. CDRPs were held accountable for reductions in crime and victimization in their area. CDRPs were expected to effectively plan, implement, and evaluate initiatives in their area that address the specific crime concerns of that community. They interacted with the Youth Justice Board (YJB) and Youth Inclusion Program in their efforts to reduce youth criminality. The YJB, a

Nationally-based RC, worked with CDRPs (Municipal RCs) to implement the YI Program which was aimed to address youth offending. This thesis focuses on the experiences of the CDRPs in their attempt to organize from crime prevention activities.

In an analysis of the evaluations and critiques of the England and Wales experience (see Section IV of this work) there are a number of areas of ‘learning’ that emerge. Nine of these areas serve as the foundation or focus for a discussion of the Ottawa case³.

Crime Prevention Ottawa (CPO) is a new RC for crime prevention in the National Capital of Canada. It was established in 2005 and is meant to build relationships between key stakeholders and “broker” or leverage funding from other areas of government for crime prevention projects. CPO is not intended to actually deliver programs or expertise as is seen in the England and Wales case. Of the nine areas or themes identified in a literature review of the English case, five are not relevant to the experience of CPO. One of these, is due to the fact that CPO does not specifically deliver programs. The other four are not relevant based on the effectiveness of CPO in addressing these areas before they become concerns. There are four areas where the experiences or challenges of England and Wales are relevant to the CPO case. These themes, similar to that of the English case, are either not adequately being addressed OR are assumed to have been addressed. In either case, improvements can be made which will likely alleviate some of these issues. There is an additional theme which emerges from the CPO case that is not faced by the CDRPs of England and Wales. Unlike the English CDRP experiences, CPO was not created through a mandate in federal legislation. This allows CPO some more

³ This is not meant to be an evaluation of the Crime Prevention Ottawa case. Instead, this work is meant to highlight the processes RCs engage in while organizing for crime prevention interventions.

flexibility in terms of its role(s) and function(s) within the City of Ottawa. The theme to emerge from this lies in the differing perspectives on ‘what’ the organization is or should be doing. An in-depth discussion of the themes and CPOs experience of these themes may be found in Section V of this work.

III. METHODOLOGY

This research project is a descriptive, qualitative case study. In order to gather information on crime prevention in England and Wales and in Ottawa, I have reviewed key documents and conducted key informant interviews. This method ensures triangulation of sources. This section outlines the specific methods used to perform the documentary and content analysis, and qualitative interviews, as well as the limitations of using this approach to gather data.

3.1 DOCUMENTARY ANALYSIS

England and Wales

At the start, there was much enthusiasm about how the CDRPs of England and Wales would perform. These local Responsibility Centres (RCs) were seen to be one of the most progressive political shifts for crime prevention in a Western nation. Furthermore a nationally-based RC, the Youth Justice Board was also seen as a positive addition to the CDRP framework. As time went on, however, there was an increased awareness about the issues surrounding the CDRPs and how they were operating. The key sources of information for this research project were selected to highlight the concerns being raised in relation to this new framework for addressing crime concerns. It used an analysis of public governmental reports, as well as independent evaluations by academics in the field. The works of Daniel Gilling and Peter Homel were integral for identification of other authors and references that evaluate this experience. The key documents for the England and Wales case are the following:

1. Crime and Disorder Act 1998 (c.37). Retrieved on June 1st, 2008 from http://www.opsi.gov.uk/acts/acts1998/ukpga_19980037_en_1.

This is the official piece of legislation which mandated the creation of the Youth Justice Board, Crime and Disorder Reduction Partnerships and Youth Offending Teams. This document provides a snapshot of some of the key components of a responsibility centre. It also provides the contextual background for exploring the Youth Justice Board experience in theory as compared to practice.

2. Burrows, M. H. (2003). *Evaluation of the Youth Inclusion Program*. Report for the Youth Justice Board in July of 2003. Retrieved on March 7th, 2008 from Youth Justice System Website:
<http://www.yjb.gov.uk/Publications/Scripts/prodView.asp?idProduct=116&eP=YJB>.

This report is the first evaluation of the Youth Inclusion Program. YIP is one of the first crime prevention programs enacted by the YJB. This evaluation demonstrates that the program was met with some challenges, however, the overall results were largely positive.

3. France, A., & Homel, R. (2007). *Pathways and Crime Prevention: Theory, policy and practice*. Devon, UK: Willan Publishing.

This is an anthology of crime prevention 'in theory' and 'in practice'. It addresses many of the concerns related to implementing a crime prevention initiative and focuses on the policies impacting prevention from around the world. It also documents the pitfalls experienced in many initiatives from the initial planning stages through implementation and evaluation. In a discussion of England and Wales, it raises a concern with the level of communication in a number of projects.

4. Gilling, D. (2007). *Crime Reduction and Community Safety: Labour and the politics of local crime control*. Devon, UK: Willan Publishing.

This book reflects on the changes in crime prevention approaches in England and Wales at that time. It delineates a change in terminology and ideology, as well as some of the challenges experienced by the New Labour Government while implementing Crime and Disorder Reduction Partnerships (CDRPs) across the country. These partnerships were community-based and were to be a resource through which other organizations and the Youth Justice Board could channel the implementation of Crime Prevention projects. This text is critical for an understanding of how crime prevention is re-conceptualized under this new political regime. It also provides an important critique of how CDRPs were supposed to function as compared to how they actually functioned. This text forms the foundation for much of the discussion of the key themes from England and Wales.

5. Hirschfield, A., & Bowers, K. (eds.). (2001). *Mapping and Analysing Crime Data: Lessons from research and practice*. London, UK: Taylor & Francis Publishing.

This book outlines the functions of Geographical Information Systems (GIS) in crime prevention activities. It discusses the strengths and limitations of the technologies as well as the evolution of these programs from a singular-dimension orientation to a multi-dimensional database. Furthermore, this text provides insight into the successes of these systems, in practice, in England and Wales.

6. Homel, P. (2009). Lessons for Canadian Crime Prevention from Recent International Experience. In *IPC Review* (Volume 3, ISSN 1913-1941). Ottawa: Institute for the Prevention of Crime, University of Ottawa.

This article in the *IPC Review*, Volume 3, documents some the lessons learned from international experiences in crime prevention, and some of the key features of contemporary crime prevention initiatives in Australia, the USA, and England and Wales in particular. This text is critical to the discussion of collaboration between partners, information sharing practices (including the negative impact of power differentials), and the importance of setting targets and plans (which are measurable) to facilitate evaluation.

7. Homel, P., Nutley, S., Tilley, N., & Webb, B. (2004). *Investing to deliver. Reviewing the implementation of the UK Crime Reduction Programme*. Home Office Research Study no. 281. London: Home Office.

This research study looks at the implementation of the Crime Reduction Programme, of which CDRPs are a significant part. It discusses the lack of guidance, and ‘hands-off’ policy of the centralized ministry, as well as the implications of these managerial practices on the local CDRPs. It recommends that the Crime Reduction Programme needs to improve their involvement at the local level, attempt to integrate local and regional partnerships, and improve practices surrounding the local planning, development and implementation of crime reduction programming (i.e. consistently using a ‘logic model’, ‘risk management approach’, or create ‘flexible fund management models’). This study is critical to a discussion of CDRPs and the problems that they encountered since their establishment.

8. Jones, D. (2001a). 'Misjudged Youth': A critique of the Audit Commission's reports on youth justice. *British Journal of Criminology*, 41(2), 362-380.

This article documents the problems related to the Audit Commission's reports on youth justice, including the 'Misspent Youth' report. It documents how the reports re-position youth criminality according to evidence which is misleading in nature. It documents shortcuts used in the reports wherein assumptions about crime or statistics from a few sites are generalized to the whole of England and Wales. It documents that the authors of 'Misspent Youth' do not provide any explanation for how 'estimates of the costs to the system' were arrived at, and that these monetary values are some of the most cited aspects of this report. It also raises concerns about how much the new Youth Justice Board is able to intervene in youth's lives; shifting them between programs and agencies. This article raises questions about the degree of consent and voluntary-ness of youths in programming.

9. Jones, D. (2001b). Questioning New Labour's Youth Justice Strategy: A review article. *Youth Justice*, 1(3), 14-26.

This article highlights the political shift from the Conservative party, led by Margaret Thatcher, to Tony Blair's New Labour Government. It reviews and critiques the changes in legislation, the shift in youth justice strategy, and the activities of the new Youth Justice Board. It describes problems with the politicization of these agencies as well as raises concern about an increased capacity of governmental programs to intervene in youth's lives. This article is critical for the discussion of the more subtle and insidious aspects of the UK's responsibility centre experience.

10. Nutley, S., & Homel, P. (2006). Delivering evidence-based policy and practice: Lessons from the implementation of the UK Crime Reduction Programme. *Evidence and Policy*, 2(1), 5-26.

This article provides an analysis of the problems associated with evidence-based programming, particularly evaluative components, in the UK Crime Reduction Programme. It documents how local CDRPs were plagued with problems while attempting to evaluate their initiatives. There was a disconnect between research practices and the implementation of that knowledge. This document suggests that program design and implementation must strike a balance between evidence-based innovation, long and short term goal setting, and the role of the evaluator (as 'hands-on' or distanced from the project). This work is important for the discussion of 'Plans and Targets'.

11. Pitts, J. (2003). Changing Youth Justice. *Youth Justice*, 3(1), 5 – 20.

This document discusses the shift from welfarism to neo-liberalism in English society, and the impacts that that shift has on crime prevention activities. It examines and assesses the experiences of the youth justice system in response to this shift, and the new obstacles experienced as a result. One of the key areas of this article is the discussion of the problems of politicization and time/ resource allocation by the Youth Justice Board (YJB). It denotes some of the key problem areas confronting Youth Offending Teams (YOTs) and the YJB today, and how these problem areas may be overcome in the future.

12. Solomon, E. (2009). New Labour and Crime Prevention in England and Wales: What worked? In *IPC Review* (Volume 3, ISSN 1913-1941). Ottawa: Institute for the Prevention of Crime, University of Ottawa.

This article highlights the lessons learned from the England and Wales experience over the last ten years. This document illustrates the issues associated with centrally dictated targets, the

problems associated with the management structure of the Youth Justice Board (and how that impacted inter-agency collaboration), and the importance of political will to keep an organization going. This piece helped to inform the discussion of themes related to collaboration, political intervention, information sharing, and targets and plans in the England and Wales example.

Crime Prevention Ottawa

The documents of the Crime Prevention Ottawa case are limited to the publicly available items found on the organization's website. Internal critiques and evaluations of CPO, which were being conducted at the same time as this research, as well as the 'Logic Model' of the organization were inaccessible through this public forum. As the 'Logic Model' was only brought up in one interview, it was apparent that the document was not emphasized or afforded the same level of importance by the other participants. As this document was neither public nor given much attention in the interviews, the search for its contents were discontinued. The reports of any internal evaluations and critiques were also discontinued for these reasons. The following are the key documents used in the Crime Prevention Ottawa case:

1. Roebuck, B. (2006). *Municipal Support for Crime Prevention: A Case Study of Ottawa*. Unpublished Masters Thesis. University of Ottawa, Ottawa, Ontario Canada.

This thesis document looks at the closure of the CPCO (Crime Prevention Council of Ottawa) in 2004 and the creation of CPO (Crime Prevention Ottawa) in 2005. It documents how and what was necessary to advocate for a Crime Prevention Responsibility Centre in the City of Ottawa, including a political champion and high-profile partners, accessible language of reports, education (including numerical representations of the problem and how that organization intends to impact that; as well as best practices in crime prevention), sustained funding and a place within the infrastructure of the city (including two permanent staff). This document is pivotal for

understanding the context under which CPO was created, the challenges it had to overcome (in regards to the CPCO's failures), and the messages/ rhetoric necessary for gaining municipal support.

2. Panel for Community Crime Prevention. (2004). *Community Crime Prevention: Investing for a Safer Ottawa*. Panel for Community Crime Prevention: City of Ottawa.

This report is the document which was presented to City council advocating for the creation of a crime prevention responsibility centre in the City of Ottawa (and contained within the City's infrastructure (what would later become CPO)). It documents, not only, important crime statistics and evidence to suggest that prevention works, but also reports on 'how to get there'. The 'how to get there' section argues for Municipal support (a political champion); a board of directors; two-full time staff; a clear organizational mandate and practices; and substantial and sustained funding. This document is the quintessential document for the City's decision to establish and support CPO as a permanent RC in the City of Ottawa.

3. Crime Prevention Ottawa. (2007b). *Strategic Plan*. Retrieved February 18th, 2008 from Crime Prevention Ottawa Website: www.crimepreventionottawa.ca

This document clearly outlines the goals of Crime Prevention Ottawa and means by which the organization intends to achieve said goals. As is evidentiary from the title, this report intends to lay out the strategic plans for CPO as a responsibility centre, choosing to focus on the activities to be achieved within one, and three, year(s) from the time of the report. It specifies geographical areas of concern in Ottawa (Lowertown, Vanier, Centretown, and Sandy Hill) and advocates for the completion of a safety diagnosis, an action plan, implementation of initiatives, and evaluation. This document is critical for an analysis of whether or not the organization has followed its own strategic plan, as well as provides a forum for the discussion of the extent to

which this example necessarily experiences the themes demonstrated in the England and Wales case.

4. Crime Prevention Ottawa. (2007a). *Action Report 2007-2008*. Retrieved February 18th, 2008 from Crime Prevention Ottawa Website: www.crimepreventionottawa.ca

This report documents what actions have been taken since the 2006-2007 Action Report, and also, the establishment of the organization. It highlights the key areas of intervention: at-risk neighbourhoods, violence against women, and at-risk youth. This document also highlights the programs which it supports/ funds and some of the ‘successful’ achievements from the year 2007-2008. This document will shed light on to the “activities” of the organization thus far. The programs funded and the financial report contained within it allowed for a better understanding of the types of programs being funded and how much funding was being allotted to programs versus other organization-related costs.

5. Crime Prevention Ottawa. (2007, August 14). *Report on CPO Funding Allocations 2008*. Presented at the CPO Board Meeting on September 17th, 2007. Retrieved January 4th, 2009, from Crime Prevention Ottawa Website: www.crimepreventionottawa.ca.

This document contains information about which programs were accepted for funding by CPO in the year 2008. It reports on the names of the successful applicants, the funding they have received, project title/ description, expected outputs, expected outcomes, and relationships/ CPO strategies. This document describes the selection processes involved in receiving funding from CPO. It also serves as a sort of indicator of the number of programs in the Ottawa area which are looking for funding and are not necessarily receiving it (via the number of applicants for funding). This document also indicates the number of programs which were reallocated funds for a second year. This information is vital to the discussion of program evaluation.

6. Chettleburgh, M. (2008). *Now is the Time to Act: Youth Gang Prevention in Ottawa*. Report Presented at CPO Speaker Series on February 11th, 2008. Retrieved from an e-mail communiqué on February 18th, 2008. Crime Prevention Ottawa. (2007). *Action Report*. Retrieved February 18th, 2008 from Crime Prevention Ottawa Website: www.crimepreventionottawa.ca

This document is one of the most recent documents published by Crime Prevention Ottawa. It outlines the prevalence of gang activity in the Ottawa area, as well as makes recommendation for how to prevent violent youth and gang activity from flourishing in the future. It interviewed youth gang members and other stakeholders in the Ottawa/ Carleton region and recommended a collaborative approach to the problem.

3.2 QUALITATIVE INTERVIEWS

After receiving ethical approval from the University of Ottawa's Research Ethics Board, interviews were conducted with 16 individuals from either Crime Prevention Ottawa or other crime prevention oriented groups associated with it. All of these individuals have worked with Crime Prevention Ottawa, either currently or in the past, and know about the organization. This information was used to develop a more comprehensive understanding of Crime Prevention Ottawa as an emerging and established responsibility centre in the City of Ottawa. The interviews were semi-structured and largely followed an interview guide (Appendix A). Interviews were conducted in a locale which was convenient to the interviewee (either at the University of Ottawa, their place of work, or another mutually agreeable location). Consent was granted to record and transcribe the interview contents (see Appendix C). Transcriptions were maintained electronically and secured by password on the computer of the researcher.

These interviews were intended to flesh out the experiences of Crime Prevention Ottawa as a responsibility centre: including its experiences of the themes of the English case. The interviews contributed to my knowledge of the organization (and its experiences), as well as provided a richness in data about the collaboration between affiliate organizations (including information/knowledge sharing, reporting practices) and practices specific to funded projects that is largely not available through organizational publications. This has allowed me to observe the realities of the responsibility centre experience and contrast that with the planned experience (as seen in documents).

On the written consent form, the interviewees agreed to have their names and titles recorded for a participant list (Appendix B). However, for the purposes of anonymity, all information gathered was cumulated, and no data is attributable to a specific individual.

3.3 ANALYTICAL GRID AND COGNITIVE MAP

The analyses of the responsibility-centre based crime prevention model of England and Wales highlighted nine themes or areas of ‘learning’ concerning how RCs organize for crime prevention. The themes from this experience formed the basis of my work. By breaking down the various factors associated with how an RC organizes for crime prevention, my hope was to describe Ottawa’s experience of these elements.


Data from qualitative interviews and the documentary analysis were compiled and sorted into key themes. This analytical grid served the function of guiding the analysis of the England and Wales Case. The specific key themes from that case were documented. The nine themes in

this grid reflect areas of lessons that emerged out of the literature in the English case (discussed in the next section). Each box within the chart will be discussed in the findings separately (see Table 1 below).

Table 1 Analysis of Dimensions of Responsibility Centre-Based Crime Prevention

	<i>England and Wales Case</i>	<i>Ottawa Case</i>
1. Community		
2. Political Intervention		
3. Collaboration		
4. Implementation Experts		
5. Information Sharing		
6. Geographical Information Systems (GIS)		
7. Targets, Plans		
8. Funding		
9. Recruitment and Consent		

I examined two distinct cases in this research project: England and Wales and City of Ottawa experience of responsibility centre-based crime prevention. By comparing and analyzing the data according to the preceding analytical grid, I am able to present the key themes from the England and Wales example and compare them to Ottawa's experience or lack of experience of these same themes. Figure 3.0 on the following page, is a cognitive map of my research project. It outlines the logical progression of how this research will be conducted.

Figure 3.0 Map of England and Wales and Ottawa Case Comparison

3.4 LIMITATIONS OF METHODOLOGY

In this study, the primary methodological concern is related to the information available in the England and Wales responsibility-centre(d) model. As my data sources are limited to documentary analysis alone (without the supplementary option of qualitative interviews, nor first

hand experience), the 'key themes' that I drew from this example are also limited to published information pertaining to this case. The inability to triangulate information from multiple media sources in England and Wales case impacts the internal validity of this research project. I did, however, attempt to use a variety of sources outside of those published by governmental ministries in order to compensate for this concern. Despite this, my confidence in the 'key themes' drawn from the example are lessened due to the singular medium of data collection.

Another threat to internal validity lies in the interviewing process itself. Some individuals may have given socially desirable responses based on what they thought that I wanted to know as the interviewer. Furthermore, their perceptions of events and timelines are impacted by the nature of memory recall itself, and may have been impacted by the emotions felt at the time of the event, as well as the information learned after the fact. Although these perceptions may be accurate, the individual's experience of the memory is limited to their own attributions of what others were thinking, feeling, and had intended by their actions or responses at that time. However, these attributions still reflect the feelings of key players in relation to the Ottawa case. The threat that this poses to the validity of the findings will be minimized (as much as possible) through the types of questions posed (see Appendix A). Questions were more fact-oriented, and current, in order to elicit fewer emotion-laden responses. Furthermore the information gained was triangulated with data from the other texts and publications available from Crime Prevention Ottawa.

The external validity of this study is also weak. If this study were conducted comparing and contrasting two other cases of responsibility centre-based crime prevention the results would likely have been very different. This qualitative project does not randomly assign experimental

sites. It is based on the singular experience of one case (with no comparison group) and using the themes from that case, discussing another. As there is no way to control for the differential situations, settings, people, time, and political atmospheres across these two cases, one must be cautious about applying the findings of this study to other responsibility centre-based crime prevention cases. In future studies it would be worthwhile to compare other cases within the same country, or use an experimental design in which two responsibility centres are set up in two similar cities and examined for a period of time. The results of such a study could be compared and generalized to other settings.

IV. CRIME PREVENTION IN ENGLAND AND WALES

4.1 DESCRIPTION OF CRIME PREVENTION IN ENGLAND AND WALES

England and Wales have recognized the need for integrated involvement by governmental institutions in crime prevention processes, and of the role of responsibility centres in assuring the success of partnerships.

Youth criminal justice in England and Wales not only accommodates, but *prioritizes*, crime prevention initiatives as a key component of youth criminal justice. The Youth Justice Board is a responsibility centre for youth crime prevention in England and Wales. The following will describe the English experience and begin to identify some of the key dimensions of crime prevention in England and Wales. It is meant to be descriptive only and any themes from this example will be presented as a part of the “Key Themes” analysis in the latter half of the chapter.

Background to the Crime and Disorder Act

Misspent Youth: Young People and Crime, was a report published in 1996 by the Audit Commission of England and Wales. It was based on a study conducted by Mark Perfect and Judy Renshaw which examined current criminal justice system responses to youth criminality (Audit Commission, 1996a). It documents how the current system was literally ‘misspending’ resources. At the time, ‘crimes against individuals’ were on the rise (Audit Commission, 1996a). A disproportionate number of the offenses were committed by young males and many of the young males committing these crimes were persistent offenders (Audit Commission, 1996a;

1996b). This begged the question, “How does the current criminal justice system allow this to happen?” *Misspent Youth: Young People and Crime* was an attempt to answer this question.

One of the major concerns highlighted in this report is that of funding and resource allocation, including the time taken to process offences by young people and the number of youth served by the criminal justice process. At the time of this report, the average amount of ‘time elapsed’ between apprehension by police and a sentencing decision was anywhere from 70 to 170 days (Audit Commission, 1996a; 1996b). This is expensive (and the lengthy time period between apprehension and sentencing interferes with the deterrent intentions of the system). This average assumes that the young person goes through the entire criminal justice process from apprehension to sentencing/ punishment, which is very unlikely.

There is £1 billion spent annually on youth criminal justice in England and Wales: £660 million of which is spent on police services, £42 m on legal aid, £24 m on crown prosecution, £13 m on court services, £200 m on social services, £12 m on probation, and £40 m on prison (Audit Commission, 1996a; 1996b). The authors argue that this allocation of funding and resources, given the rate of sentencing and persistent offending, is largely inefficient. They also argue that the time that the entire process takes is too long and lacks proactive, prevention-based, components.

This document also notes that although there are a number of different agencies involved in youth criminal justice processes, there is not necessarily a consensus on the main objectives. In addition, access to various programs or agencies (for example: those dealing with substance

abuse or mental health) may be limited. Re-offending goes largely undocumented and supervision following offending, particularly persistent offending, is inadequate. The *Misspent Youth Report* recommends a more consistent and integrated approach to youth crime and criminality (1996a). It is believed that these actions will result in a more efficient youth criminal justice system, one which is better able to handle the workload associated with youth justice, as well as prevent potential criminality by providing access to much needed prevention programs before offending occurs.

Another major area of concern in this document deals with the reactive nature of criminal justice systems in general. It suggests that criminal justice should take a proactive and preventative approach as well as a reactive one. The authors suggest that communities, all levels of government, and criminal justice agencies need to be involved in preventative initiatives which target risk factors associated with offending. These activities need to be monitored and evaluated to ensure a positive impact on offending (and in the case of programs targeting persistent offenders: re-offending). They should include local authorities, require community involvement, provide positive leisure activities for youth, support teachers dealing with poor student behaviour, assist with parenting skill sets, aid in housing matters, and help youth find employment. In addressing the risk factors associated with persistent offending, the criminal justice system should reduce its workload, and create a more effective criminal justice system.

Misspent Youth, is the document that began the changes in England and Wales's youth criminal justice system. It highlighted major areas of concern within the current system and made recommendations for how to improve upon them. This report forms the foundation for

changes in legislation, the establishment of the Youth Justice Board, and the implementation of the Youth Inclusion Program (discussed in the subsections following).

In a preliminary audit in 1998, the audit commission looked at the changes being made in local youth criminal justice services following the 1996 *Misspent Youth* report (Audit Commission, 1998). This document references the future changes that would be mandatory pending the enactment of the 'new Crime and Disorder Act'. As this act was a response to the issues raised in the 1996 report, many of the agencies involved in youth criminal justice would be impacted. This document audited a number of local criminal justice services in order to pinpoint some specific areas of concern (Audit Commission, 1998).

Some of the issues highlighted in the *Misspent Youth '98 Executive Briefing*, were related to efficiency and productivity. Youth justice workers spent, on average, only 30% of their time addressing youth offending behaviour (Audit Commission, 1998). A little over half of supervision orders were being completed within the national standard of five days (Audit Commission, 1998). 'Final Warnings' or 'Caution Plus' programs were being used in only 2% of cases, with very little preventative programming attached to them. In general, the entire system remained largely reactive in nature, with little focus on crime prevention-based programming. This was problematic as the risk factors associated with persistent offending were not being addressed. Furthermore, the data systems in specific agencies were found to be inadequate and did not facilitate information exchange between agencies. This served to hinder multi-agency cooperation in both criminal justice and prevention.

Misspent Youth '99: The Challenge for Youth Justice, is an interim report on the changes which were occurring in the youth criminal justice system as a result of the initial *Misspent Youth* report and the 1998 audit which followed it (Audit Commission, 1999). It was written in anticipation of the proposed new Crime and Disorder Act, and was authored by Judy Renshaw; a co-author of the original *Misspent Youth* report (Audit Commission, 1999).

Misspent Youth '99 documents that there had been some improvements in the efficiency of the criminal justice system (Audit Commission, 1999). There were, however, a number of areas that need further improvement; particularly in relation to crime prevention:

- 'Final warnings' needed to be issued more often and supplemented with preventative programs which address the criminal behaviour.
- Mental health, sexual offender, and substance abuse programs needed to be less difficult to access by criminal justice agencies (re: targeting risk factors).

This document demonstrated that the criterion outlined in the Crime and Disorder Act were difficult to achieve. A general lack of coordination between agencies, whether intentional or not, served to slow down the transformation of the youth criminal justice and prevention processes. Although some gains were being made, the modular approach to all aspects of crime prevention and criminal justice, were not effective enough. The lack of a comprehensive approach also discouraged the piloting of multi-agency, risk-factor-oriented, prevention programming. As one of the key ideas in the 1996 report was the reduction of crime through prevention, the lack of prevention programs in the system as a whole remained problematic. There were some local criminal justice services attempting to pilot multi-agency, preventative

programming; however the contents and implementation of programs varied widely. *Misspent Youth '98* and *'99* are critical for an understanding of the interim changes and challenges encountered between the 1996 *Misspent Youth* report and the enactment of the Crime and Disorder act.

Crime and Disorder Act

The Crime and Disorder Act was passed by English Parliament in 1998; however, was not fully implemented until April 2000 (Crime and Disorder Act 1998, c.37). In order to address many of the concerns highlighted in the 1996 *Misspent Youth* report, this legislation mandates the establishment of Municipally-based Responsibility Centres (RCs) called Crime and Disorder Reduction Partnerships (CDRPs). These partnerships were to be responsible for the reduction of crime and disorder in their locale. They were also required to work with the newly developed Nationally-based RC for youth criminal justice and prevention: the Youth Justice Board. Although the legislation covers a number of crime and disorder issues, only those sections pertaining to this particular discussion (re: crime prevention and RCs) will be discussed.

Part 1 of the Crime and Disorder Act is primarily concerned with preventative measures and strategies. Sections five through seven are of particular importance to this project as they specify 'who' is responsible for prevention strategies (which authorities) and the necessary components of a strategy (planning and implementation expectations). According to section 5, responsible authorities include local government councils, the police, probation committees, health authorities, and anyone employed under the Secretary of State (Crime and Disorder Act 1998, c.37). The 'responsible authorities' are required to work in cooperation with one another,

forming a Crime and Disorder Reduction Partnership (CDRP) for the purposes of achieving their goals.

Section 6 and 7 outline the steps and supplemental information necessary for the formulation and implementation of a crime and disorder reduction strategy. Section 6 stipulates that the ‘responsible authorities’ of a given area are required to implement a crime and disorder reduction strategy for that area. The strategy is to last a ‘relevant period’ of three years and be modified and/or changed, in line with the evolving needs of the area in question, every three years thereafter. This section defines the necessary components of the strategy: preliminary analysis, strategy formulation, and strategy implementation (Crime and Disorder Act 1998, c.37). The first component refers to the identification and understanding of the crime and disorder problem. It involves an analysis of the relevant crime and disorder issues in a given area, including: identifying the problem itself, determining the extent and frequency of the problem, gaining a knowledge or insight into other relevant factors associated with the problem, writing/publishing a report on the findings, and providing a forum for community perceptions on the issue (Crime and Disorder Act 1998, c.37).

The second component of the strategy creation process is the formulation of the crime reduction strategy. This component encompasses all of the knowledge gained in the preliminary analysis particularly that contained in the analysis report as well as community reactions and ideas. This section states that a crime and disorder reduction strategy shall include: the objectives of all of those involved (including the functions and responsibilities of the “responsible authorities” and other “co-operating persons or bodies” (CDRPs)), and performance targets by

which the achievement of objectives may be measured (both long and short-term targets). Furthermore, it mandates that a report on the formulated strategy is to be published and distributed in the area wherein the strategy will take place (Crime and Disorder Act 1998, c.37).

The last component is the implementation of the crime and disorder reduction strategy. This step involves both the monitoring and evaluation of the strategy in light of objectives and targets (Crime and Disorder Act 1998, c.37). Modifications are made as necessary, throughout this process, based on the observations obtained through monitoring / evaluation. This monitoring, evaluation, modification process is aimed to help ensure the successful achievement of strategy objectives and targets. CDRPs are responsible for all components of the planning and implementation of a local crime and disorder reduction strategy, including the monitoring, evaluation, and modification.

Part III of the Crime and Disorder Act focuses on the Youth Criminal Justice System, including youth crime prevention. Section thirty-seven, the first section of Part III, specifically mandates that the principal aim of the youth criminal justice system is to prevent offending by youth and children (Crime and Disorder Act 1998, c.37). As such, all persons or bodies, including 'responsible authorities' (CDRPs), programs, and agencies, are to carry out their role or function within the system abiding by that aim (Crime and Disorder Act 1998, c.37). The rest of part III involves a number of sections specific to the youth criminal justice process. Sections 38 – 42 are critical to this discussion as they deal with local provisions of youth justice services, youth offending teams, youth justice plans, and the youth justice board. In other words, these sections touch on the various aspects and groups involved in an integrated crime prevention

approach to youth criminality. The other sections in part III (43-49) are primarily concerned with the courts, magistrates, and time limits. Although these sections (43-49) are important, they are largely concerned with the reactive components of youth criminal justice and are thus not the focus of this discussion.

Section 38 of the Crime and Disorder Act mandates the provision of 'local' youth justice services. It requires that all youth justice services be made available, to the extent that they are appropriate, in every locale. According to subsection 4(a-j), youth justice services include a number of protections and safeguards for youths throughout all stages of the criminal justice process, including: arrest, questioning, remand/ on bail, and community supervision. It also required the provision of individuals to assess the candidacy of youth for programs (mental/physical health, rehabilitation, education), and to act as 'responsible officers' in parenting orders, child safety orders, reparation orders, and action plan orders (Crime and Disorder Act 1998, c.37). This also includes individuals to supervise post-release youths in accordance with any sanctions imposed (Crime and Disorder Act 1998, c.37).

The Crime and Disorder Act also legislates for Anti-Social Behaviour Orders; essentially fines for 'Anti-Social Behaviour' determined by local authorities and police. Offences may include anything that would likely cause "harassment, alarm or distress to one or more persons not of the same household of himself" (Crime and Disorder Act 1998, section 1(a)). The ASBO has an effective period of two years and in that time if an individual re-offends they will be put into custody for a period determined by the court. This part of the legislation is some of the most

controversial, and it is important because CDRPs, despite their original intent, slowly morphed into policing, situation crime prevention, and ASBO issuing partnerships.

Youth Justice Board

Section 41 is critical to the Crime and Disorder Act as it establishes the “Youth Justice Board for England and Wales” as a nationally-based responsibility centre for youth justice, including crime prevention, and outlines its basic roles, functions, and activities. Section 41(1) states that there shall be a “body corporate to be known as the Youth Justice Board for England and Wales” established. The YJB is to be seen as an agent of the crown, and therefore working within its authority. The board will be made up of 10-12 members, who are to be appointed by the Secretary of State and have extensive background in the youth justice system.

One of the many functions of this board is to monitor and advise the Secretary of the State on the operation and provision of youth justice services, including prevention. It is also required to set national standards which are consistent with the principal aim of the organization; the increased efficiency of the youth justice system as well as a reduction in youth crime and disorder. Furthermore, the YJB is mandated to measure the extent to which these standards and the principal aim are being met; necessitating evaluation and ‘measurable’ outcomes/ indicators. If the national standards and principal aim are not being met, the board is held accountable and must modify activities in order to meet those standards.

Another function of the board is to act as an information resource in the areas of youth criminal justice and prevention. It is obligated to utilize relevant authorities (re: police authority,

probation committee, and health authority) and other resources to help produce information which identifies and promotes good practices in these areas. The YJB is also responsible for the dissemination and publication of the data gathered. Lastly, the board serves the function of a funding agency: issuing grants which permit the development of new practices and commissioning research on good practice in this area. ‘Good Practices’ may include, but are not limited to, ‘Youth Justice Plans’ put forth by youth offending teams and other, external prevention initiatives (such as those put forth by CDRPs).

The last two sections of this Schedule require the board to provide written reports on the activities and finances of the YJB on an annual basis. Expenses, financial accounting, and activity reports are then audited and presented to the House of Parliament for review. This review of activities and finances functions to assess the effectiveness of the Youth Justice Board in carrying out its youth justice system, youth justice services, and preventative duties.

Section 41 and Schedule 2 of the Crime and Disorder Act outline the basic functions and responsibilities of the new responsibility centre, the Youth Justice Board for England and Wales. It establishes ‘the board’ as a legitimate authority in the operation, maintenance, and provision of youth justice. In addition, it places the onus of prevention, in youth (re)offending, on the board. The Crime and Disorder Act also mandates: an increased availability of youth justice services; the creation of localized crime and disorder reduction teams (CDRPs), and delineates the necessary components of a local government area’s “crime and disorder” or prevention strategy (re: Part I). Beyond the obvious legal requirements, each of these mandated provisions are also necessary for an integrated approach to crime prevention initiatives.

Youth Inclusion Program

In early 2000, the Youth Justice Board introduced a new prevention initiative entitled the “Youth Inclusion Program” (Burrows, 2003). The program was made up of Youth Inclusion Projects (YIPs) that focused on disadvantaged neighbourhoods in England and Wales; and the youths aged 13 -16 in that area (Burrows, 2003). These projects were established to target the 50 most ‘at-risk’ youth in the project area. The YIPs were charged with three very specific targets:

- 1) to reduce arrest rates in the target group, the ‘top 50’, by 60%;
- 2) to reduce truancy and exclusions⁴ by one third; and
- 3) to reduce recorded crime in the project area by 30% (Burrows, 2003, p. 4).

The YI program was created using the themes from a variety of previous projects and the “Youth Works” program. ‘Youth Works’ was established in 1994 and showed some success in the areas of targeting at-risk youths and creating action plans via local consultation and community audits. Challenges this program met were: a lack of precise, measurable indicators of success (for evaluative purposes); concerns related to ‘partnership’ dynamics; and financial concerns (impacting sustainability). The YI program aimed to improve on these experiences.

The Youth Inclusion Projects used a management and organization structure to implement the project as a whole, as well as specific activities. Structural guidelines were recommended by the Youth Justice Board, but there was some variation across projects. CDRPs were also involved in the establishment of the projects.

⁴ ‘Socially excluded’ young people are those “strongly associated with deprivation, and these will include high levels of criminality (including drug and substance misuse); low educational achievement (including truancy and exclusion from school); teenage pregnancy; and poor employment prospects” (Burrows, 2003, p. 49).

The YIP Management Information System (YIPMIS) was a database created for the YI Program. YIPMIS was to be used by each YIP to record data on: the profile of the neighbourhood, details of the youths 'at-risk' or already involved in crime, participation information on those in the program (indicating 'dosage'), a case management record of individual's behaviour and attitudes, financial accounting for the project, and details on the outcomes/outputs of local projects/activities. YIPMIS was a database that was to be utilized by the staff of individual projects.

The management structure utilized in the individual projects was the result of the outlines provided by the YJB and the provision of experienced implementation-support individuals (Burrows, 2003). These individuals came with a knowledge of 'what works', and guided individual projects through the beginning stages of the project and beyond. Commonalities between management and organization structures across projects may be largely attributed to these individuals' ability to implement the recommendations of the YJB.

There were 70 individual YIPs spanning England and Wales in the period of 2000-2003. The YJB worked with the Department of Environment, Transport, and the Regions (DETR) to determine possible project areas. Using the 1998 Index of Local Deprivation⁵, the most deprived neighbourhoods were identified and locally-based Youth Offending Teams (YOTs) were sent an 'invitation' to participate (Burrows, 2003). Some YOTs declined the invitation on the basis of non-sufficient funds or other obligations/priorities. For those YOTs which accepted the

⁵ The 1998 Index of Local Deprivation was a report commissioned by the, then, Office of the Deputy Prime Minister. It was meant to update the 1991 Index of Local Conditions (ILC) report and looked at a number of indicators of relative 'health' or 'deprivation' experienced by districts across England and Wales.

invitation, they were then expected to identify a geographically defined neighbourhood with approximately 10,000-15,000 residents and set up a YIPs program (Burrows, 2003).

Once chosen, YIPs were to hire a YIP manager and conduct a neighbourhood audit. The neighbourhood audit was to include information on demographics, patterns of crime, disorder, and exclusion (arrest rates, 'hot spots', crime rates, and education information) and was to be supplemented by an appraisal of current neighbourhood services (Burrows, 2003). Following the audit, the Project staff were to create an 'action plan' which took into account the information gained. The action plan was to include the interventions which would be used, and detail how those interventions would be implemented.

Although the original intent of the program was to identify the 'top 50' through education and police services, the majority of those identified were on a 'referral-based' arrangement (Burrows, 2003). Other agencies in the area were required to make a list of those whom they considered to be the most at-risk of (re)offending. Some of these agencies were: social services, the YOT, CDRPs, the Local Education Authority (LEA), local schools, and the police (Burrows, 2003). Factors impacting whether or not a youth was invited to participate included, but were not limited to; prior arrests or convictions, high levels of truancy, school exclusions, and involvement with social services (either themselves or their siblings) (Burrows, 2003). Invitation to participate was primarily based on mailings, phone calls, home visits, and project staff 'hanging out' in areas where these youths are known to congregate (Burrows, 2003).

Many of the recommendations made by Morgan Harris Burrows in this evaluation revolved around the need to improve information gathering and sharing protocol, as well as the increased/ optimal usage of local and project resources (including YIPMIS). The former is critical for the evaluation of the program. One of the largest obstacles to this evaluation was the general lack of information on which to base the analysis, notably, the schools' decision not to provide information regarding truancy/exclusions on specific students, and the inconsistency of information gathering and input by individual projects. The latter refers to a more integrated system of collecting data and optimizing the use of resources to provide a better program and dataset for evaluation (such as increased YIPMIS capacities).

The last of the recommendations made in this evaluation refer to the re-evaluation of program terms and/or expectations; and the re-positioning of project locales to ease information gathering. The re-evaluation of terms/expectations should be done in order to overcome some of the confusion associated with 'what is being measured' (Burrows, 2003). The re-positioning of project locales is based on the concern that many project areas overlap more than one police 'zone' or school 'zone'. Data collection in both of these institutions is largely based on 'zones'. Due to this, these institutions were not able to provide as accurate a description of the project area, as they would if the 'zones' did not overlap (Burrows, 2003). Using this 'zone' system, only a percentage of the information necessary is available from any one 'zone'(Burrows, 2003).

The Youth Inclusion Program was a highly ambitious crime prevention initiative. It produced targeted and integrated crime prevention/ inclusion programs in many areas. It is clear though, that in many other areas, the program was not as successful as hoped. Programs were

plagued with problems associated with cooperation between partners, including issues related to information sharing (or a lack there of); a lack of systemic use of the YIPMIS database (which had the potential to contain a plethora of information about individual youths and the geographical area in which the program was implemented); aggressive recruitment methods which left many youths no option but to participate; the use of ‘risk assessment’ tools (which were treated deterministically) in identifying participants; the creation of targets/plans that were never modified to reflect changes in the environment or experiences of the programs themselves; and the overlap of various school, police, or neighbourhood ‘zones’ which made data collection (for the YIP area) more difficult.

However, the Youth Inclusion Program did reach its goals in arrest rate reductions amongst individuals within the target group who had the “correct dosage”; suggesting that there was some success in this crime prevention program. Its successes in some areas and failures in others is critical to an understanding of challenges experienced by programs and RCs involved in crime prevention more generally.

4.2 CRIME PREVENTION IN ENGLAND AND WALES: KEY THEMES

This section provides an overview of the concerns raised regarding the initiatives documented in the previous section. It is intended to inform the reader of the result of the preceding examples and to identify some of the key themes of this experience.

Although this work is primarily interested in the experiences of the Municipal RCs, the CDRPs, their mandated function and role means that one must consider some of the interchanges

and relationships that CDRPs had with both the YJB, as a National-RC for youth crime prevention, and its program initiative the YI Program. The YI program was run at a local neighbourhood level with the help and coordination (in varying degrees) of CDRPs. As such a few of the key themes in this section are reflective of the experiences of the YJB and YI Program, however, their impacts were also reflected in the experiences of local CDRPs.

4.2.1. Community

One of the most common themes within crime prevention literature has been the importance of ‘community’ in the prevention and reduction of crime. The term’s application has varied widely across examples (from personal associations to geographical locales); however has consistently been associated with, in one way or another, the conceptualization of a successful crime prevention initiative. The Crime and Disorder Act reiterated the importance of ‘community’ in the sections related to the creation of *local* crime and disorder reduction partnerships (CDRPs) (1998, c.37). The Youth Inclusion Program, a crime prevention program by the YJB, furthered this concept of the local community by targeting the most disadvantaged neighbourhoods in England and Wales.

It is the very specific application of the term which makes this concept so important. The CDRPs and the YI Program placed great emphasis on the *measurable* success of crime prevention and reduction activities. This component of crime prevention activities necessitated a relatively contained area in which to measure the results. Communities, then, had to be geographically defined and distinct (Burrows, 2003; Gilling, 2007). Distinct-ness was critical as it localized the activities, services and programs being offered to one specific area. It created a

space in which results could be measured, as well as attempted to ensure that surrounding communities and neighbourhoods did not impact those measurements. It also allowed the local CDRPs to promote social cohesion between agencies and community members; informing police and potential initiatives of the problems in that distinct community (Gilling, 2007).

This geographically defined or ‘distinct’ community approach to crime reduction or prevention changed the implementation of state crime prevention in England and Wales. Rather than government implementing a wide-spread program which aimed to address crime prevention concerns for the entire population, it focused on the needs and concerns of individual communities (Gilling, 2007). It shifted the responsibility for crime reduction and prevention to the local governments and service providers (CDRPs) with the intention of improving individual communities (Gilling, 2007; Pitts 2003).

The government’s conceptualization of ‘distinct communities’ with ‘distinct problems’ marks a shift in thinking about how to approach crime and disorder problems. The distinct community is at the very core of programming and activities. Although programming may be centrally driven and/ or developed, they need to be delivered locally, and adjusted to the needs of that locale (Homel, 2009). ‘Blanket’ approaches to crime prevention and reduction are not possible using this organizational approach. What works in one area will not necessarily work in another and no community can speak on behalf of another. This also means that services, government, and police involved in a number of communities in an area cannot presume to understand the problems, without consultation with that distinct community. **Theme one is the**

concept of ‘Community’ or ‘distinct communities’ as an organizational philosophy or approach to crime prevention.

4.2.2. Political Intervention

The change in crime prevention approaches seen in the English example was precipitated by a change in political leadership (Jones, 2001b). The New Labour party, headed by Tony Blair, passed the Crime and Disorder Act which created the Youth Justice Board (YJB) and Crime and Disorder Reduction Partnerships (CDRPs). Prime Minister Blair took personal interest in the daily activities and performance of the Youth Justice Board in particular, as it was managed at a National level (Jones, 2001a; 2001b; Pitts, 2003). It is important to note here that the YJB was officially responsible to both the Treasury Board and the Home Office and that these institutions often require very different things from an organization that they are overseeing (Burrows, 2003; Maguire, 2004).

The combined demands of these two governmental agencies as well as the constant intervention by Tony Blair greatly influenced the outputs of the YJB in its earlier years (Jones, 2001b; Pitts, 2003). According to Pitts (2003), there was an “interpenetration of the political and administrative spheres” in the Youth Justice Board’s daily activities (p.14). The politicization of the YJB lessened its autonomy, as well as limited its ability to deal with youth criminal justice and prevention needs, threatening its integrity and legitimacy as an organization (Pitts, 2003). It also served to decrease productivity and outputs in the areas of youth crime prevention and youth criminal justice (Pitts, 2003). CDRPs made up of local government, police, and other agencies also experienced tensions related to political ideas of what should be done, this was apparent in

the discussion of their tendency to morph into policing bodies, focusing on situation crime prevention activities and the issuance of the controversial Anti-Social Behaviour Orders (ASBOs) (Solomon, 2009). Their activities became focused less on ‘what works’ and instead, followed the politically favourable route of ‘visible results’ and ultimately suppression.

The major theme from this experience lies in the reporting practices of the RC to its higher authority. Although Solomon (2009) advocates that strong political leadership and support can be an asset to responsibility centre-based crime prevention. It is clear from this example that it can also be a liability, in that, the everyday activities of the organization can become politically influenced. While political support is important, it needs to be tempered by reporting practices which support the organization’s autonomy in activities and aims. **Theme two is ‘Political Intervention’: the impact of politics on the activities or directions of a responsibility centre.**

4.2.3. Collaboration

CDRPs were mandated municipal RCs which required that representatives from a number of agencies work with one another to address crime and disorder in a community. The forced collaboration of these agencies created difficulties which stemmed from each representative’s differing opinions, objectives, and needs. Many CDRPs were plagued with problems associated with the forced collaboration and do not fulfill many of the parts of their mandated role (this is also seen in the shift towards CDRPs in a policing capacity).

The YJB RC experienced a similar concern to the CDRPs with collaboration, however, more exaggerated due to the fact that it was also in charge of youth criminal justice agencies. As

an administrator for both judiciary and prevention functions, the participatory organizations to the YJB essentially fell under its management and were accountable to it (Jones 2001a; 2001b; Pitts, 2003; Solomon, 2009). This management structure facilitated the identification of youths in one part of the system to be recommended and shifted through out various other parts of the system (Jones, 2001b; Pitts, 2003). The structure of the YJB acted to coordinate the efforts of the various parts of the youth criminal justice system to the detriment of the agencies cooperating with it (Pitts, 2003). The agencies had an obligation to work under this management structure and this impacted their autonomy in the provision of services. Collaborating agencies were no longer seen as ‘pieces of a youth justice service network’, but as operating within and under the jurisdiction of the YJB; and partner agencies were essentially absorbed into the larger organization (Pitts, 2003).

‘Collaboration’ is a large concern when a responsibility centre is mandated or in a position of authority over other agencies. . In the case of CDRPs, there were reduced cooperative efforts by partners, and the role and function of the CDRP changed. In the exaggerated case of the YJB, collaborating agencies answered to the YJB and much individual autonomy was lost. Increasingly, this resulted in youths being identified by one project or organization and being pressured into participating in another project or organization on the basis of their contact with the first. **Theme three, ‘Collaboration’ is: partnering agencies (with a stake in the issues) need to be seen as separate entities from the responsibility centre, need to exercise their own position of authority, and need to be able to choose the extent to which they actively participate in a particular project.**

4.2.4. Implementation Experts

One of the most commendable aspects of the English example of legislative change and the shift towards responsibility-centre based crime prevention is the recognition that local governments and agencies are not traditionally oriented towards crime prevention initiatives and procedures. The wide-spread reliance on expert groups such as Crime Concern and others to guide CDRPs through the planning, implementation, and evaluation stages of a project or strategy proved to be invaluable (Burrows, 2003). Though, there are cases where CDRPs could have used more expert help in the design and implementation of evidence-based interventions (Homel, Nutley, Webb, & Tilley, 2004). In the case of YIPs, a program that CDRPs cooperated with, it helped ensure that initiatives were implemented in accordance with the goals and mandates of the Youth Justice Board and Youth Inclusion Program (Burrows, 2003; Gilling, 2007). In the case of CDRPs it served as an orientation for local government and services to the best practices in crime prevention and reduction, though there are questions about the extent to which these practices were successfully implemented (Gilling, 2007; Homel et. al., 2004). The expert resource helped agencies to follow the *Governance and Administration of Comprehensive Initiatives Model* of program implementation; a model which is generally accepted to enhance the success of a crime prevention initiative in crime prevention literature (Burrows, 2003).

The provision of people identified as implementation experts, as a resource at all stages of program implementation, was an integral part of the English example (even if this resource were not always utilized by specific CDRPs or the YIPs it worked with.) They aided otherwise inexperienced multi-agency groups in the planning for, implementation of, and evaluation of

crime reduction and prevention initiatives. **The fourth theme is the provision of ‘Implementation Experts’ to provide expertise on program implementation and evaluation.**

4.2.5. Information Sharing

A critical component of multi-agency cooperation in crime prevention and reduction initiatives is the sharing of vital information (France & Homel, 2007; Gilling, 2007; Homel et. al., 2004). As will be seen below, there have been some attempts to ease the flow of information between institutions with technologies such as GIS databases. For the most part though, information sharing is done through verbal or written contact between different agencies (France & Homel, 2007). In the case of some CDRPs, the forced collaboration between different local agencies, government and service providers created tension, particularly when it came to information sharing. The factors in this example include the differing priorities, needs, level of participation, and year-cycles of the various agencies working together (France & Homel, 2007; Homel et. al., 2004). Furthermore, the lack of information sharing perpetuated a “fragmented picture” of problems, making it more difficult for agencies to accurately assess and implement programs based on the specific needs of a community (Solomon, 2009, p.56). These hindered an integrated, collaborative approach between many of the agencies involved, precipitating a lack of cooperation in general (Burrows, 2003; France & Homel, 2007; Gilling, 2007; Homel et. al., 2006).

Many of the CDRPs reported an uneven flow of information between the police and the other service agencies (Hope, 2005). A perceived power differential, as seen in the information sharing practices of the CDRPs, can impact different organizations’ interests in collaborating

with other partners (Homel, 2009). Although there are organizational concerns about what information can be shared, an openness about the restrictions as well as a willingness to share information, without infringing on information rights / organization regulations, was important for the perceived positive-ness of a partnership (Burrows, 2003; France & Homel, 2007). The perception of the partnership directly impacted the willingness of various agencies to work together to achieve their common goal: the planning and implementation of a crime prevention / reduction initiative (Burrows, 2003; France & Homel, 2007).

In England and Wales, a general lack of cooperation between organizations further perpetuated a cycle of information hoarding in many of the CDRPs (France & Homel, 2007).

The fifth theme is: ‘Information Sharing’ must be open, unrestricted, and shared by all of the parties involved in a particular project.

4.2.6. Geographical Information Systems (GIS)

Geographical Information Systems (GIS) are commonly used by the police and other agencies to map crime in a given area (Hirschfield & Bowers, 2001). In England and Wales, crime audit information from distinct communities were compiled from GIS systems and other service resources (Gilling, 2007; Hirschfield & Bowers, 2001). The Youth Inclusion Program even created its own GIS-like program to record information for evaluation purposes (Burrows, 2003). One of the common problems associated with GIS is that it is limited to certain types of data. The codified parameters of a given program, although useful for the purpose of the organization using it, may not be useful for other organizations. Police GIS for example, tends to highlight the victim’s location, via their phone call to the police, and not the location where the

actual crime took place (Hirschfield & Bowers, 2001). This kind of information is going to be of limited use to a crime prevention service which attempts to target crime 'hot spots' or specific locales of perpetration.

The creation of new GIS programs in England and Wales at this time facilitated information sharing in ways not possible before. In these new GIS programs, any number of agencies could 'overlay' or 'build' information layers on top of that provided by other agencies: creating a dynamic and complex information source which could be used in a variety of ways (Hirschfield & Bowers, 2001). Layers could be removed, added on, or changed to present the information most needed by an agency (Hirschfield & Bowers, 2001). In creating crime prevention and reduction strategies and programs; local CDRPs needed to conduct audits which would identify crime concerns in a community (Burrows, 2003; Gilling, 2007). GIS became an integral component of these audits (Hirschfield & Bowers, 2001). GIS databases also permitted closer monitoring of programs and services, and a wealth of information for evaluative purposes (Hirschfield & Bowers, 2001).

The creation of dynamic and flexible GIS greatly impacted information flow for the purposes of audits and evaluation of programs/services. Crime and service-provision recording became the responsibility of all agencies involved and not solely the police. Ultimately, it provided a different perspective on crime in the community than traditional police data, alone, would provide. **The sixth theme, 'GIS', is the use of a GIS database which is flexible and allows 'layering' of information by various agencies.**

4.2.7. Targets and Plans

Program objectives (targets/plans) versus actual implementation play an important role in program outcomes, good or bad. In the English example, the literature on targets, plans, and funding points to a tenuous relationship between elements of success and failure. On one hand, the requirement of crime prevention initiatives to set targets, and create a three-year plan which is constantly monitored and updated allows these initiatives a clear, step-by-step direction and time period in which to deliver results (Burrows, 2003; Gilling, 2007). It also requires and emphasizes the need to set targets which are observable and measurable; facilitating evaluation and monitoring (Homel, 2009; Nutley & Homel, 2006). One of the problems associated with evaluation is that it is time consuming and CDRPs were given little direction in how to properly address evaluation in the planning processes (Nutley & Homel, 2006). They had difficulty translating research into practice and this reflected in issues of: evidence-base versus innovation, long and short term target setting, and how evaluation was to be carried out (Homel et. al., 2004; Nutley & Homel, 2006). Another problem lies in the process of target setting and 3-year planning itself, as these take considerable time and resources; impacting what the CDRP is capable of achieving within the specified time period (Gilling, 2007). It was suggested that this issue might be resolved if the full-scale neighbourhood audit was not a necessary component of the 3-year plan, particularly when the plan is supposed to be monitored and updated, throughout the duration of the crime prevention project, according to the changing needs of the community (Gilling, 2007). Another problem associated with targets pertains to the setting of targets by central authorities or institutions (Solomon, 2009). Local needs need to be reflected in targets (and be specific to individual crime prevention initiatives); not centrally-driven or mandated (Solomon, 2009).

The themes from this literature are that targets and plans are important for the direction and timeline of projects; however, they need to build evaluation components into them at the outset of research, and be monitored and updated regularly to deal with the changing needs of the target population. **Theme seven, 'Targets and Plans', is the detailed and explicit articulation of plans and 'measurable' targets (and how these are to be evaluated) by crime prevention initiatives.**

4.2.8. Funding

Another key issue in this case was found in the provision of sustained funding for communities with demonstrated need. In the case of the YI Program higher authorities provided ample funding for a three year period so long as the programs implemented were achieving success (as determined by their reports to overseeing and funding bodies). The inherent problems associated with sustained funding are: what is 'demonstrable need,' and what is 'evaluative success'? Both of these concepts were ill-defined and yet were a part of the criteria which could deny a CDRP, or YIP funding (Burrows, 2003; Gilling, 2007). **Theme eight is that funding for projects/initiatives needs to be sustained and if funding must be subject to restrictions, restrictions need to be explicitly defined.**

4.2.9. Recruitment and Consent

Recruitment and consent concerns were raised due to the requirement that CDRPs cooperate with and on some level help facilitate the implementation of the YI Program. The YI program was an initiative by the Youth Justice Board (YJB), a nationally-based RC, however its actual implementation required local design and delivery. The CDRPs cooperation with the YI

Program meant that CDRPs became implicated in some of the issues experienced by that program. The YJB and CDRP's authority over crime prevention initiatives saw increased levels of intervention in the lives of youths: YIPs identified youths in the criminal justice system (as noted by the YJB) or 'at risk' of entering the criminal justice system (known by CDRPs), and aggressively recruited them into other programs or crime prevention initiatives (Jones, 2001a; 2001b; Pitts, 2003). Issues of recruitment and consent can be seen in the YI Program's use of risk assessment tools, and the targeting of 'at-risk youths' (Jones, 2001a; Pitts, 2003). As the Burrow's evaluation of YIPs clearly shows, many of the youths involved in YIPs had never offended previously, but were targeted for intervention due to their 'riskiness' (2003). Although participation in YIPs was supposedly voluntary, there was pressure placed on the projects to recruit the 'top 50', using tactics such as repeated mailings, phone calls, home visits, and loitering in areas frequented by the youths (Burrows, 2003).

The greatest concerns here relate to the role of the YJB and CDRPs in the implementation processes of crime prevention programming, including issues of recruitment and consent. In this case, based on the YJB's management structure which made it increasingly easy for youths to be identified in one part of the system (ex. Probation/ diversion) and be recommended and shifted through out other parts of the system(ex. YIPs), there were concerns raised about the level of consent obtained (Jones, 2001b; Pitts, 2003). Another example of this issue is the experience of youths whose siblings had had contact with child services and then were aggressively recruited for participation in a YI Program (Burrows, 2003).

'Recruitment and Consent' is a concern in this example. Some of the key parts to this relate to participation in projects and risk assessment tools. Although CDRPs were not specifically involved in the implementation of the YI program, their mandate to implement initiatives related to crime prevention (and their aid in coordinating the YI Program for that area) also raises concerns about any consent obtained in their own initiatives. Participation needs to be truly voluntary (consented) and not coerced by aggressive recruiting practices (which can pressure individuals into participating in initiatives, or multiple programs, without really obtaining their consent). **Theme nine - Recruitment and Consent: when participation is voluntary, risk assessment tools are used properly, and recruitment is not aggressive, it is less likely that RCs will experience problems with individuals being shifted between/involved in (multiple) programs without their actual consent.**

**Table 1 – (Revised) Analysis of Dimensions of Responsibility
Centre-Based Crime Prevention**

	<i>England and Wales Case</i>	<i>Ottawa Case</i>
1. Community	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ 'Distinct Communities' with 'Distinct Problems' ▪ No all-encompassing programs 	
2. Political Intervention	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ Reports to Government officials, and funding bodies ▪ Reporting is frequent ▪ Political individuals (Tony Blair) have influence over daily activities of organization ▪ Intervention impacted the organization's outputs 	
3. Collaboration	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ Forced collaboration negatively impacted CDRP outputs and activities ▪ Partners were absorbed by YJB, no longer autonomous 	
4. Implementation Experts	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ Individuals readily available to aid and advise in planning and implementation of crime prevention initiatives ▪ Provided a knowledge resource rich in experience that otherwise lacked in CDRPs 	
5. Information Sharing	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ Information sharing was seen to be unequal ▪ Lack of cooperation between partners due to perceived 'one way direction' of information flow 	
6. Geographical Information Systems (GIS)	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ 'Layering' abilities of GIS enhanced various partners and programs in implementing initiatives ▪ Facilitated information sharing between partners 	
7. Targets, Plans	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ Targets needed to be measurable, have a time limit, and to be monitored ▪ Plans made to reach targets 	

8. Funding	<ul style="list-style-type: none">▪ Funding needed to be sustained and restrictions on funding needed to be explicit	
9. Recruitment and Consent	<ul style="list-style-type: none">▪ 'Voluntary' participants were often aggressively recruited or coerced into enrolling in program▪ Participants pressured to participate in various programs based on their participation with other organizations under the jurisdiction of YJB	

V. CRIME PREVENTION OTTAWA

5.1 BACKGROUND

In 1982, Partners for Preventing Crime (PPC) - later re-named the Crime Prevention Council of Ottawa (CPCO) was formed with the intention of developing strategies and programs that would effectively contribute to a reduction of criminal activity and of fear of victimization in the City of Ottawa (Hastings & Jamieson, 1987). That year, there was a civic election taking place in which candidates were canvassing door to door. The candidates found that residents were hesitant to open their doors for fear of victimization of crime (Roebuck, 2006). The proposal for the Crime Prevention Council of Ottawa was the result of the experiences of these candidates. The Crime Prevention Council of Ottawa was funded by the Ministry of the Solicitor General, the Police Commission, and the City of Ottawa (Hastings & Jamieson, 1987). It was initiated by a group of individuals representing the Criminology Department at the University of Ottawa, the Police, City Officials and a few members of the wider community (Hastings & Jamieson, 1987). It aimed to use community-based crime prevention initiatives, facilitated by a task force, to address the larger goals of the organization.

Over the course of the existence of this council, task forces were formed to address: residential break-in in apartment buildings, crimes against disabled citizens, crimes against the elderly, the issue of drinking and driving, crime prevention through environmental design (CPTED), violent crime, youth offending, and on behalf of youth against crime (run by youths). Due to changeovers in staff, inconsistent project management, inconsistent record keeping, a lack of evaluation, a lack of interest or support for various task force topics; a lack of experience/knowledge in crime prevention, an emphasis on community mobilization and awareness (without

the support necessary to achieve results), and tenuous partnerships between the council and other organizations such as the police, the Crime Prevention Council of Ottawa (CPCO) was forced to close its doors in April of 2004 (Hastings & Jamieson, 1987; Roebuck, 2006).

Less than a year later, spearheaded by the City Councillor Jacques Legendre, a proposal was made for the establishment of a crime prevention responsibility centre in the City of Ottawa, to be named Crime Prevention Ottawa (Roebuck, 2006). It argued that a proactive / preventative approach to dealing with crime could save money and reduce the burden on the criminal justice system by using evidence-based initiatives, which target risk factors associated with crime (Panel for Community Crime Prevention, 2004). This document also argued that through an “investment in an integrated crime prevention strategy – that is by implementing best practices and incorporating successful services and programs already underway in Ottawa- victimization at home, on streets, at school and at work could be lowered by up to 50% in 2 to 5 years” (Panel for Community Crime Prevention, 2004, p. 3). This proposal passed unanimously through City Council (Roebuck, 2006). In 2005, Crime Prevention Ottawa (CPO) became a permanent part of the City of Ottawa’s infrastructure with two permanent staff seconded from the City, guaranteed City funding of \$200,000 in the first year (\$400,000 for each year following), and a location in City Hall (Roebuck, 2006). Its organizational ‘Mission’ is “to contribute to crime reduction and enhanced community safety in Ottawa through collaborative, evidence-based crime prevention” (CPO Website, 2009).

Since its establishment in 2005, CPO has created a strategic plan which outlines its mandates, goals, and plans from 2006-2009. For the past two years it has also produced Action

Reports which describe the activities performed by CPO in a one year period (including its budget). Furthermore, they publish bi-monthly publications or flyers which provide facts about crime in Ottawa. They are aimed to increase public awareness about the CPO organization as well as crime prevention more generally.

CPO is currently an administrative and funding body for a number of crime prevention initiatives across the City of Ottawa. It has bi-monthly board meetings which discuss past and current initiatives and future directions, as well as funded project results (Crime Prevention Ottawa, 2007c). It aims to fund projects that target neighbourhoods and populations of risk across the City of Ottawa (Crime Prevention Ottawa, 2007a; 2007b). Contained within the Outcomes Report, Funding Allocations Report, and the yearly Action Reports is information pertaining to the objectives, funding, and results of each project funded by CPO (Crime Prevention Ottawa, 2007 August 14; 2007 August 23; 2007a; 2008a; 2008 August 7; 2008 August) . Documents specific to the funded projects make up the bulk of the public documents published by CPO on a yearly basis.

CPO has also become involved in a number of other research and political endeavours since its establishment in 2005. They have run speakers series and started a number of committees to address gender, youth, and gentrification concerns. In 2007, CPO produced a report for the “McMurtry-Curling Task Force on the Roots of Youth Violence” to aid the task force in its inquiry into youth violence in Toronto, Ontario (2007d). In 2008, CPO contracted researcher Michael Chettleburgh to help analyze the youth gang problem in Ottawa, Ontario. Chettleburgh (2008) identified gaps and overlaps in services that appear to impact the City’s

ability to deal with the youth gang issue. In response CPO has started a youth gang strategy. In 2009, Crime Prevention Ottawa helped champion a private members bill, entitled ‘Safer Communities and Neighbourhoods (SCAN)’, which would ultimately allow for the easier prosecution and closure of neighbourhood bawdy and drug houses. The organization has also lobbied various MPs and other politicians for national support (and funding) for crime prevention initiatives in Canada. In the future, the organization plans to increase its capacity in the City of Ottawa, as well as have further political impacts on crime prevention spending at a federal level (Crime Prevention Ottawa, 2007b).

5.2 FINDINGS: KEY THEMES AND CRIME PREVENTION OTTAWA

Nine themes have been identified from evaluations of recent experiences in England and Wales, these address; community; political intervention; collaboration; implementation experts; information sharing; geographical information systems (GIS); targets, plans, funding; and Recruitment and Consent. This thesis attempts to glean information about CPO’s experiences regarding these themes from two sources: the organizations’ published documents and qualitative interviews with individuals associated with the organization (including board members as well as other individuals affiliated with the organization). This section is intended to articulate the findings from these sources.

It is important to note that Crime Prevention Ottawa’s role as a responsibility centre for crime prevention does not include direct service provision. Although Crime Prevention Ottawa may be involved in information gathering and promoting awareness about an issue in a specific locale (i.e. Vanier) or in relation to a specific group (i.e. Violence Against Women), their

primary role is to facilitate the efforts of a direct service provider (through forging networks and bringing people together), rather than provide any services itself. Most participants of this study agreed that this is, and should be, the role that Crime Prevention Ottawa plays as a responsibility centre in Ottawa. However, it does raise some questions about the respective functions and responsibilities that the organization has with regards to the direct service providers or programs/projects that it supports.

5.2.1. Theme 1 - Community

In England and Wales, ‘Community’ represented an organizational or philosophical approach to targeting crime prevention initiatives. It represented the where/who that a RC focused on. It viewed communities as distinct (in most cases geographically), having individualized problems, and therefore requiring solutions tailored to the specific needs of the community. This conceptualization of community required that crime prevention initiatives focus on the specific needs of a ‘distinct’ area or group. It was against the implementation of generalized projects, which would impact some areas greatly, while others not at all.

There are a number of documents published by CPO which refer to the concept of ‘community’ in crime prevention, however, its application varies greatly. While on one hand, CPO advocates for crime prevention initiatives that “address actual conditions and the actual problems in individual communities and families”, on the other, the organization does not use a consistent definition of what a community is (Crime Prevention Ottawa, 2007d, p. 6). On CPO’s website, its “Vision” states that “Ottawa is a community in which individuals, families and neighbourhoods are safe and feel safe” (CPO Website, 2009). Community, as shown here, is

representative of the entire City. This conception of 'Community', referring to the entire City of Ottawa, is also found in the 2006-2007 Action Report, the Strategic Plan, and the 2007-2008 Action Report. In other documents, the various parts of the City are broken down into 'Neighbourhoods' which exhibit certain risks, or high volumes of crime. 'Neighbourhoods' (including those of Vanier, Sandy Hill, Centretown, and Lowertown) are also referred to in the aforementioned documents. The 'neighbourhood' terminology is also used in the Chettleburgh Report, the Report on CPO Funding Allocations 2007, Crime Prevention Ottawa's Submission to the review of the Roots of Youth Violence, and the Report on CPO Community Funding Allocations 2008. Using these reports, a reader would assume that the community refers to an area made up of 'neighbourhoods' and that each neighbourhood has its own distinct problems.

In the Reports on projects funded by CPO, geographical areas that would have intuitively been placed within the 'neighbourhood' category (as seen in other parts of the documents) are referred to as 'communities'. A couple of examples of may be found in the two reports on funding allocations (2007 and 2008) such as: *You(th) Can Do It*, focusing on the 'Hintonburg Mechanicsville & Rochester Communities', targeting at-risk youths; and *No Communities Left Behind*, focusing on Southeast Ottawa and designed to develop partnerships between four 'communities' in southeast Ottawa. In the interviews conducted, it is apparent that participants also used the notion of community to mean different things. One participant said, "I think that we've always used the term community in a variety of ways, and...what it specifically means is really [found in] the context of what we're discussing at the time, or what decisions we're making". Another participant noted that the different application of the term, by different individuals, showed that, "within Crime Prevention Ottawa, it's very clear that the word

‘community’ is not that clearly understood”. The relative definitions of the term ‘community’ applied by the different participants of this study, appeared to be largely predicated on their point of reference (their affiliations with the City, community agencies, community groups or neighbourhoods), as well as their own personal interpretations. This lack of common definition for the term impacted how participants saw the relationship between CPO and the ‘community’, as well as how CPO approached working with the ‘community’.

All participants agreed that CPO has made some large steps in the area of forging relationships with the ‘community’ of Ottawa as a whole, as well as with smaller geographical neighbourhoods or key interest groups. The relative ‘strength’ of that relationship seems to be a much more tenuous subject amongst participants. Half of the individuals interviewed felt that CPO’s activities and efforts have been more than adequate, whereas the other half felt that there was much more that was needed.

When approaching ‘communities’ or ‘neighbourhoods’ CPO has been able to bring together a wealth of knowledge about crime distribution/frequency and socioeconomic indicators. The organization has also helped facilitate a discussion around the concerns and priorities of the residents in a particular neighbourhood or community group. In the case of Vanier, a neighbourhood of Ottawa, CPO conducted a survey and a community forum to report on the results of the survey. The residents of Vanier then formed working groups to address the issues identified as priorities in their area. The working groups currently carry out a number of activities to tackle these priorities and improve the personal safety of individuals residing in Vanier. In Hintonburg, CPO has been able to help write, advocate, and lobby for, a private

members bill that would allow the residents of this community, and others in the City of Ottawa, to easier address the issue of prostitution and drug houses in their area. In the case of Violence Against Women, CPO helped to get the “Fourth R” curriculum into three Ottawa school boards. This curriculum promotes healthy interpersonal relationships and drugs. So although there is an inconsistent application of the term ‘community’ by CPO and affiliated groups/ agencies; the notion that individual neighbourhoods and/or other community groups have ‘distinct problems’ that affect them is not lost on CPO’s philosophical and organizational approach to crime prevention.

5.2.2. Theme 2 - Political Intervention

One of the largest problems in the England and Wales experience was the impact of politics on the activities, directions, and outputs of CDRPs and the YJB.

In Ottawa, the published documents tell very little about the reporting practices and influence of political leaders/ the City of Ottawa on the activities of CPO. CPO is a part of the infrastructure of the City of Ottawa and is located in City Hall. The Chairman of the board is the City Councillor, Jacque Legendre. The Mayor of Ottawa, Larry O’Brien, as well as the Deputy City Manager, Steve Kanellakos, also sit on CPO’s Board of Directors. According to the Panel for the Community Crime Prevention document, CPO is required to report “*at least* annually on the activities, progress, and outcomes” of the organization [emphasis added] (Panel for Community Crime Prevention, 2004, p. 4). There is no indication in any other CPO documents that CPO reports to City Hall at a greater or lesser frequency than is indicated in the document that allowed the organization to become established.

The issue of political intervention, or perceived political intervention was one of the most contentious issues in the interviews conducted. There was a lot of ambiguity surrounding how Crime Prevention Ottawa fits within the political structure of Ottawa. One participant went so far as to say that, "...one of the biggest weaknesses [Crime Prevention Ottawa] has had is, [they've] never really nailed down the question....what Crime prevention Ottawa is, in terms of an entity". This question, of what CPO *is* as an entity, is central to the confusion and ambiguity felt by many of the participants in this research. While some participants saw CPO as being at arm's length from the City, others indicated it was largely connected to the Ottawa Police Service, and others yet indicated it was fully integrated into the City's structure and bureaucracy. The majority of interviewees saw CPO as an organization that is made up of both City and private elements; the degree to which the organization was seen as one or the other, however, varied greatly across participants.

Despite this, none of the participants had any concern about the formal accountability of CPO to the City of Ottawa. Most saw this arm's length relationship as advantageous for the organization, allowing it to capitalize on the resources of the City, while at the same time remaining autonomous. Though one participant did note that, "...certainly if they did things that were unacceptable to the majority of the Councillors, I'm sure their funding would get cut eventually." Political dynamics, in this sense, speaks to more than just the action reports submitted on an annual basis to City Council, it also includes an evaluation of the 'value added' by CPO as an organization.

A number of participants indicated that there is quite a bit of ambiguity surrounding this concept of 'value added', within the City Council and other City based groups. One participant noted that, "I think Council, some of Council, don't fully understand what Crime Prevention Ottawa is meant to deliver and do". While another participant noted that at the time of the City budget, there was a question posed asking, "why don't we just let the police do this?" This confusion or lack of recognition of what CPO is doing may cause harm to the organization in the long run. Councillors who are unaware of CPO's existence or do not see the 'value added' are less likely to be invested in its long term continuation, which will likely impact their guaranteed funding from the City (paraphrased from a participant). Participants who identified this concern, felt that there needed to be an education awareness piece for City Councillors to alleviate the confusion surrounding CPO's function, as well as guarantee the longevity of the organization and its special relationship with the City of Ottawa.

Another interesting concern raised by participants lies in differing views of the impact of politics on the daily activities of CPO. Many participants suggested that, at least symbolically, CPO is very political (even if not necessarily in practice). There are Board members representing a number of City positions, including the Mayor, City Council, and the Deputy City Manager, as well as the Chief of Police (who, although not a representative of the City per se, is employed by it). The presence of these individuals symbolically gives an impression that there is some sort of political arm or "red tape", as one individual put it, which reaches into and impacts the activities of CPO. Although many participants indicated that, in practice, this is not the case, the combination of this symbolism with the confusion surrounding CPO's relationship with Ottawa's political structure, and role as an organization, raises a number of potential concerns regarding its

survival as an organization, including whether or not sustained funding will continue to be provided by the City and/ or whether agencies will continue working with the organization if they feel that politics interferes with how it functions/ interacts with those agencies.

5.2.3. Theme 3 - Collaboration

In the YJB experience, partnering agencies reported to the RC. This had great implications on projects and client services. Collaboration became limited to facilitating the wants and needs of the greater authority rather than equal contributions by partners exercising their own autonomy. In CDRPs forced collaboration caused tensions between partnering agencies and this impacted their willingness to work with one another.

In Ottawa, information pertaining to the collaboration between partners is less obvious. In Hastings and Jamieson (1987), it is acknowledged that the Crime Prevention Council of Ottawa (the organization that preceded CPO) had tenuous relationships with the Ottawa Police. In CPO publications, these sorts of tenuous relationships are not apparent. CPO partners include City Council, the Ottawa Police, United Way, Education Boards, youth services organizations, and other community organizations. From the interviews, it is clear that some Board members are more or less active in the activities of CPO. Though there were complaints that particular members did not attend meetings or events, these complaints were meant to illustrate the lost opportunities of that individual to gain knowledge, not to indicate a problematic relationship between that individual, the agency that they represent, and CPO more generally.

Publications by CPO do not speak to how partner agencies collaborate with and within the CPO organization. Although all of these agencies appear autonomous in the written documents, there is nothing which explicitly indicates this. Of the interviews conducted, there were no concerns raised about how partner agencies collaborate with one another within Crime Prevention Ottawa. Each agency is seen to bring its own expertise and knowledge to the table, exercising its own autonomy in the information that it shares. Interview data indicates that the Board of Directors dynamic, within CPO, is one of mutual respect and partnership, even if there isn't always consensus. Although CPO acts as an umbrella organization, each agency appears to exercise its own autonomy in decision-making and participation in CPO discussions/activities.

A participant noted that one of the great benefits of CPO, is “that the more you can bring people into face-to-face interaction, the more benefit that arises from that.....and so the benefit of bringing all those stakeholders together is that real relationships form.” A few participants echoed this sentiment and added that a benefit to the organization is that the relationships formed encourage conversation about, what is currently being done, where gaps still exist, and where agencies can work together for a common goal. This is important, as one participant noted, because “...if you want to succeed in what you're doing, [you should] not to duplicate models and solutions”⁶. It is clear that although there are still gaps and overlaps in terms of services (as indicated in the Chettleburgh report and in some interviews), CPO is helping to elevate the dialogue and collaboration between different agencies and partners, internal and external to the

⁶ The individuals interviewed were not against the duplication of proven successful crime prevention models. Their concern primarily dealt with the fact that there were limited resources and identified gaps in services. They felt that it would be more advantageous to address these gaps in services or to combine resources to improve programming, rather than duplicating models that already exist.

organization, in order to reduce overlap and coordinate more integrated responses to crime concerns.

5.2.4. Theme 4 – Implementation Experts

Implementation experts with experience in planning, implementation, and evaluation processes were readily available to CDRPs and the YI program in the England and Wales case. They aided and advised groups based on their experiential and theoretical knowledge in crime prevention practices. They were an invaluable knowledge resource for the CDRPs and YIPs as many of these groups lacked experience or knowledge on ‘best practices in crime prevention’.

In the “Report on the CPO Policy Committee Work Plan November 2006-December 2007”, it is documented that staff were trained in Crime Prevention through Environmental Design (CPTED) theory and practices (Crime Prevention Ottawa, 2007c). Other publications by CPO show that knowledge in crime prevention has been obtained through a variety of sources, including: scholarly and popular literature; governmental documents in crime prevention; as well as consultation with experts in the field (Crime Prevention Ottawa, 2007b). Overwhelmingly, interviews indicated that participants were very pleased with the knowledge and expertise that CPO staff had about crime prevention programming. Many participants were of the opinion that there is a lot of implementation experience within various agencies in the community and one participant observed that the CPO staff, especially the executive director, “ha(ve) a lot of expertise on [program] delivery”. Although formal training in program implementation is not very apparent in the publications or interviews conducted, the experiential expertise of CPO and their partner agencies seems to be unanimously heralded by the participants of this study. It was

also clear from the interviews that participants felt that the individuals working at CPO are very willing to seek out the help of any individuals with an expertise different than their own, should an occasion arise where it was needed. An example of this is when CPO brought in the coordinators of the “Fourth R” program to train teachers in the “Fourth R” curriculum, which has been implemented in three Ottawa school boards. The expertise and helpfulness of CPO staff was cited repeatedly throughout all of the interviews conducted.

5.2.5. Theme 5 - Information Sharing

Information sharing practices were seen to be unequal in many CDRPs. Partners commonly perceived an unequal balance of giving and receiving information between themselves and other partners as well as the CDRP and the YJB itself. This singular direction of data flow impacted the willingness of partners to cooperate with other partners, limiting the ability of CDRPs and YIPs to effectively address and reduce crime and disorder in their locale.

CPO publications highlight how information is shared via board meetings, public speaker series, reports on activities/publications and lobbying politicians. Participants of this study unanimously spoke to the use of e-mails between CPO and its Board members, as well as other affiliated organizations or groups. Many participants also referred to the fact that should they need information that they hadn’t received to that point, CPO staff were more than willing to help obtain that information for them. There were no concerns in the interviews that information sharing was unequal between partners, agencies, and projects. This being said, there was an acknowledgement by few participants that CPO does not necessarily share all of the information that they receive. These same participants cited a number of reasons why this may be the case: 1)

they simply don't have the time, 2) due to the fact that the information they receive comes from other agencies (not the least of which being the Police and City) they do not want to appear like they are appropriating that information and presenting it as their own, and 3) they are not be required to pass on all of the information that they have on to all groups interacting with the organization. Interview data, on a whole, suggested that the information sharing practices of CPO are effective. Some participants even raised the opposite concern that, at times, they were receiving too much information from CPO and it was difficult to remain up-to-date on everything as a result.

There was one concern expressed that dealt with CPO's relationship building and/or networking function. By acting as a sort of a centre for information and communication with individual projects, neighbourhoods, or groups, there was a certain amount of concern for how these groups, projects, or neighbourhoods would be able to communicate with one another, without CPO's involvement. This participant noted that should these projects wish to communicate with one another, CPO was more than pleased to help them in doing so. However, the larger concern that this individual felt was that CPO should, proactively, facilitate discussions between these groups to ensure that groups working on similar problems could share ideas and collaborate when appropriate. This participant went on to suggest that, "we need to set up, maybe, annual meetings, or [a section] on [CPOs] website somewhere where [groups] can put some information about different communities and where [those communities] can exchange."

In the reports on funded project outcomes (2007 August 23; 2008 August), CPO acknowledges that there are large variations in information sharing practices between the funded projects and CPO. Some projects have a very close relationship with CPO, while others hardly have any contact at all. The variation in information sharing practices between funded projects and CPO was also echoed in the interviews conducted; however participants did not highlight this as a major concern.

5.2.6. Theme 6 – Geographical Information Systems (GIS)

An interesting development from the England and Wales experience was the application of dynamic and flexible geographical information systems (GIS) for the tracking, recording, and recall of complex data. These GIS systems permitted the ‘layering’ of information, and were programmed to incorporate a number of information categories that traditional, singular organization-based GIS systems might not have been able to code. The flexibility associated with the ‘layering’ capacity of these GIS allowed projects and partners to incorporate and expand upon the systems/ data of the police, and other organizations. Dynamic and flexible GIS was integral to information sharing practices between partners and programs in project implementation.

CPO’s *Strategic Plan* highlights the sources used to identify high risk neighbourhoods and populations, as well as crime-specific problems in the Ottawa area. A few of these information sources concerned a “detailed statistical and GIS-based analysis of selected 2005 Criminal Code of Canada Offenses, 2001 Statistics Canada census variables, and 2005 City of Ottawa land use data” (Crime Prevention Ottawa, 2007b, p.6). According to interview data, there

was an expert data committee formed which included representatives from the University of Ottawa, Ottawa Police Services, and an individual from the City of Ottawa who uses Statistics Canada data for City planning purposes. The data committee was involved in the gathering of information from a number of sources; however, only parts of the committee were involved in the management of the information. The management of information was largely the responsibility of the police due to the fact that, as one participant indicated, “they can’t share police data...” Police data ranges from general statistics which are public information, to that which is more sensitive and cannot be shared. The information this participant is referring to is that which is not public. The committee relied on the separate analysis of a number of different information sources, including that of the Police and City geographical information systems. What emerged from the data was information that identified, “which neighbourhoods had the highest crime rates and then, what those neighbourhoods look like in terms of socioeconomic data.” This information was then used as a basis for the community forum held by CPO that addressed community priorities on these issues.

Interviews did not get at information pertaining to the origin of the GIS program used although presumably it belonged to either the City, or more likely, the Police. If this had been known it might have been possible to ask participants about any parameters or limitations of using that GIS system over another. Neither the completeness of the data nor the methodologies used to merge and analyze the data were raised as concerns by the interview participants. Many participants lauded the data gathered as a pivotal starting point. Similarly, many participants felt that this information, in combination with the data gathered from literature, reports, and the community forum, was integral to the creation of the CPO strategic plan, which focused on, and

prioritized, issues that were pertinent to the residents of Ottawa. GIS was not a concern that was raised in either the interviews or publications by Crime Prevention Ottawa.

5.2.7. Theme 7 – Targets and Plans

One of the most influential themes to come out of the English experience of an RC was the necessity of explicit and documented criteria in formal program funding and implementation processes. The increased emphasis on using an administrative model similar to that of the “Governance and Administration of Comprehensive Initiatives Model” (contained in this document) required that programs very clearly document their activities at each stage of the process. In the case of individual programs/ project, it was important that targets were measurable, were achievable within a specific time period, were monitored throughout, and that plans demonstrated how targets would be met.

Although every one of the reports regarding funding allocations, and outcomes, published by CPO documents that funded projects meet the funding criteria (targeting specific populations or high-risk areas in Ottawa), these broad documents lack any information about how projects intended to meet these targets, what was involved in the identification of target populations, and what their ‘measurable’ targets were. The 2009 Guidelines and Application for project funding for CPO, also lack very specific information about program planning, and its intended implementation and evaluation processes (City of Ottawa, 2009). Broad topic areas within this document include: specifying the crimes and/or risk factors that the project intends to target; whether or not the project is designed to prevent crime and what research or ‘best practices’ support this project; how the project contributes to the actualization of Crime Prevention

Ottawa's strategic plan; what evaluation tools will be used; an identification of project objectives and project outcomes; and actions planned to reach the target population (ibid). Although in theory, these broad topics may be answered very specifically, there were questions raised in the interviews concerning the extent to which "those community groups really have access to that information [what may or may not work to help reduce crime] or the resources to be able to formulate things in that way..." Similarly, another participant spoke to the quality of the proposals being received, expressing discontent with "how the call for proposals are done or how they are evaluated...[and that] like NCPC you can only fund what you get proposals for...so CPO needs to do a lot more to generate good proposals for that money..."

Publications by CPO concerning outcomes have been oriented towards the projects funded, and these publications acknowledge that it is difficult to quantify the results of community mobilization projects or those that target many participants. Evaluations in these published works lack detail and highlight only the project's outputs. It is not apparent from published documents that targets and plans explicitly outline: time limits, 'how' specifically they intend to meet goals, what 'measurable' targets are being set (to act as an obligatory passage points for evaluation), nor the extent to which they have met them. Participants largely avoided discussing evaluation, except in so far as to suggest that the process of evaluation, is very important and beneficial to the credibility and longevity of CPO as an organization. Though a number of participants acknowledged that there was work to do in the area of evaluation, one participant was clear that CPO's current evaluation procedures are inadequate and need to be improved greatly.

Another aspect of this lesson lies in the targets or plans of the administrative/ funding body. In this case, one of CPO's targets was a potential 50% reduction in victimization within 2 to 5 years of operation (Panel For Community Crime Prevention, 2004). In the documents that followed, there has been no mention of whether or not CPO has met this goal, however, an interviewee did shed light on this subject when they stated that, "We absolutely can't say at this point that crime has gone down in Ottawa because Crime Prevention Ottawa started up three years ago, but we sort of need to get to the point at some juncture..." Although it was clear from the interviews that participants felt that CPO was working towards realizing its strategic plan, there was also a sense that CPO was a new organization that needed time to reach its potential. Most participants felt that CPO was on the right track, in terms of achieving its strategic goals, and that CPO's next strategic plan would be able to take advantage of its learned experiences so far and provide a more specific plan for the future.

5.2.8. Theme 8 – Funding

As a funding authority one of the key themes of the English experience lay in the sustained funding of projects (as questions of funding greatly impact a program's ability to fulfill their goals).

Consistent with other funding organizations such as NCPC, projects receive one-time funding from CPO, unless the project's application is otherwise approved in another year. Sustained funding is the responsibility of the individual project and not CPO. A number of participants raised concerns with the one year funding of CPO Projects. One participant noted that, "a lot of energy and time is used up in applying, and waiting...and just writing reports every

year, as they come up...you write one to apply, you write your report, and then you're due for the next [application]...and that's a lot of time [and resources] and that takes a lot." The concern over sustained funding resonates within a number of the interviews conducted. One participant in particular, really touched upon a number of the issues associated with this concern of sustained funding when they said:

"I think about the young people who may have been benefiting from that, they're maybe regularly attending a program, and invested and engaged in a program, and then the funding's gone. So, [is CPO]...doing a disservice in a way by increasing the expectations and the hopes, and then the program not being there afterwards. And at a very real level for young people, you know if they've made....built some relationships with that frontline worker, who's running that program, and then the funding ends...what kind of message is that?...I think it probably translates more than just across young people...you know that if [CPO] finds a good program that's working, and [CPO] funds it, but...only do(es) it for a year...Crime prevention really has to be an ongoing process...and it can't be just little spot attacks here and there. And sometimes I feel like there just isn't enough resources to do more than that...So, then really what [CPO is] doing is that kind of band-aid [solution]..."

It is very apparent from the interviews that the issue of sustained funding is particularly important to projects applying and receiving funding from Crime Prevention Ottawa. A few participants referred to the year-long project funding as actually hindering crime prevention initiatives. These participants stressed that preventing crime is a process that is greatly impacted by the resources available. If staff time and resources are consumed with the grant-renewing process, less of these resources are available for actually running the initiative; and if an initiative is lost so is the expertise gained from it, as well as the relationships built between it and the community.

5.2.9. Theme 9 - Recruitment and Consent

A problem associated with the England and Wales case dealt with the level of consent obtained by youths. Recruiting practices that identified 'at risk youths' by one agency often coerced individuals into participating in others, and aggressive individualized recruiting techniques (calling home, writing letters, 'hanging out' in hot spots to recruit youths) were

routinely used in YIPs. Although much of this experience was contingent upon the authority and jurisdiction of the YJB, in this case, over partnering agencies, the result raises questions about the ‘voluntary-ness’ of youth participation. Recruitment and Consent raised large concerns over the extent to which the cooperation of clients was coerced and whether the tools used to identify/recruit individuals was justified.

Published documents by CPO lack any real information about the recruiting practices of individually funded projects. Aside from a question in the application for funding that asks projects to “identify actions planned to reach target population”, there is little record of the recruiting practices of any one program (City of Ottawa, 2009). In the case of projects funded by CPO, there did not seem to be any concern by participants that recruiting practices would either, a) be considered outside of the application process or b) something that CPO should be involved in. Interviewees largely indicated that CPO could act as a resource for funded projects, as needed, but they are not to be involved in service provision in any way (which for the most part would also include discussing the recruiting practices of the project). In terms of projects like *Together For Vanier* and other community driven projects, CPO was involved in helping to initially mobilize the community. They did this primarily through surveys and community forums. They relied on individuals to self-select into running various initiatives, and because of that self-selection process there were no concerns raised in the interviews about the voluntary-ness of participants in the community mobilization projects that CPO has been involved in.

Interviewees did note, however, the existence of an overlap in programs, as well as duplication of programming across the City. This overlap is a concern because of the fact that

individuals may participate or be targeted to participate in multiple programs or initiatives, raising issues with the consent procedures and recruitment practices of the programs involved. Many participants indicated that much of this duplication exists because of the uncoordinated approach to program funding/ service provision across City ministries, as well as levels of government. A participant remarked that,

“they’re all pulling in money from, well pretty well all, pulling in money from three different levels of government, who don’t necessarily talk to each other. They’re pulling in money from different departments within each level of government who don’t necessarily talk to each other.....”

This individual went on to say that even individual programs don’t necessarily talk to one another and this accounts for much of the overlap seen in programming. Programs often target similar groups and without any communication between programs it is very likely that individuals involved with one program may also be involved in a number of others. However no participants articulated a concern relating to individuals being involved in multiple programs (and the potential for issues of recruitment and consent to arise from that). Instead, interviewees largely cited concerns with the inefficient use of resources when program overlap or duplication exists. This also resonates from the concern that not only is there an overlap in programming, but that there are also gaps in programming and services. (One participant kept referring to the need to “get smarter” about programming, so that more of these gaps can be addressed as the organization grows and matures.)

5.2.10. Theme 10 – Other Issues

There were a couple of other findings which were not captured in the themes being examined, but that were prevalent throughout a number of the interviews and should be mentioned.

The first deals with one of the complexities associated with being a networking organization. CPO sees its role in connecting individuals/ groups and helping build strong relationships between agencies, community groups, neighbourhoods, and experts in the field of crime prevention. It is seen to operate behind the scenes. The challenge associated with this is that CPO does not usually get recognition for the activities that it facilitates. A couple of participants referred to instances where it seemed like the Ottawa Police Service got credit for CPO's work. One participant said,

“ I think every one of the successes has been scooped up by the Police.....the public doesn't really know that Vanier was turned around by [CPOs efforts], the Police claim that they did it, well they have been trying for decades to do it, they never did it, [CPO] came along and did it quietly, without a lot of fanfare...”

Another participant, referring to a public debate on CCTVs, described a similar situation in which “most of the people leaving there [the debate], still to this day do not know who sponsored or funded that event.” The concern about ‘being recognized for the organization's contributions’ was raised numerous times throughout the interviews, especially when discussing the long-term viability of the organization. Participants spoke of the possibility of budgetary cuts or a cessation of funding altogether if the organization's contributions remained unacknowledged. There was considerable variation amongst participants about the extent to which CPO should seek recognition for its activities; however, all of the individuals who articulated this concern agreed that a lack of recognition may be detrimental to the longevity of the organization.

The second finding relates to the confusion felt by many about the role or function of CPO. These were some general findings about what participants felt that CPO ‘should’ be doing. Some participants felt that the organization should be more involved in direct service provision, while others thought that it was already involved in too much; quoting its involvement in the

Vanier community. Some felt it should be primarily involved in knowledge gathering or bringing people together, while others yet thought that its role would be better suited to acting as an administrative body that works with other organizations and funded projects to help 'get them off the ground'. Despite the variation in perceptions about what CPO's role 'should be', the participants of this study felt that Crime Prevention Ottawa's successful activities included raising public awareness, bringing key stakeholders together through networking, and leveraging funds from other areas of government.

VI. DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSIONS

6.1 DISCUSSION

England and Wales's *Crime and Disorder Reduction Partnerships (CDRPs)* and *Youth Justice Board (YJB)*, are innovative models of responsibility centre-based crime prevention. The experiences of these centres emphasized a number of key themes in the implementation of crime prevention; these relate to: community; political intervention; collaboration; implementation experts; information sharing; GIS; targets, plans, funding; and Recruitment and Consent. These themes were the basis for examining *Crime Prevention Ottawa*, a responsibility centre in Ottawa, Canada.

Although there is an inconsistent application of the term 'community' by CPO and affiliated groups/ agencies, the notion that individual neighbourhoods and/or other community groups have 'distinct problems' that affect them is part of *Crime Prevention Ottawa's* philosophical or organizational approach to crime prevention. However, an explicit definition of 'community' would make this organizational or philosophical approach more apparent or obvious to the general public. This could help further enhance the perceived legitimacy of the organization as a responsibility centre for crime prevention (unlike its predecessor, this organization has strong ties to key governmental and City services which add to the perceived level of credibility that it has as a 'legitimate' player in crime prevention). Another benefit to defining the concept of 'community' is that it would provide a basic point of reference for all of those agencies, groups, and neighbourhoods working with CPO. As *Crime Prevention Ottawa* is

an organization based on bringing key stakeholders together to reduce and prevent crime, it would be advantageous to have a clearly defined concept of 'community' that all individuals could refer to in discussions.

Throughout the interviews, it was very evident that CPO's relationship with the City is ill-defined and ambiguous to many. Ambiguity surrounding the relationship between CPO and the City impacted perceptions of political dynamics within the organization. Furthermore, the presence of a number of City representatives on the Board compounds the perception that political interests overtly influence the direction and activities of the organization. Though this perception was largely based on the symbolism associated with the presence of these City representatives, as well as the Chief of Police, on the Board of directors, the matter is still one that deserves careful consideration. Although one cannot easily change symbolic perceptions, some of the concern linked to those perceptions may be mitigated if Crime Prevention Ottawa provided better clarity surrounding its role, function, and position with and within the City. This would also serve to benefit those within the City (including City Councillors) and other agencies or groups working with the organization.

In the England and Wales case, there were a number of concerns about how agencies collaborated with one another within CDRPs and the YJB. Despite Crime Prevention Ottawa's role as an umbrella organization that brings together a variety of key stakeholders from various agencies and backgrounds to prevent crime, no concerns were raised about how CPO member agencies collaborate with one another. There were also no concerns raised about the relative autonomy of member agencies while working with CPO. Collaboration concerns do not appear

to be pertinent to an analysis of CPO at this time. As CPO is not involved in the delivery of programs, it does not face problems related to collaboration between agencies.

Implementation experts, individuals with experiential knowledge in program implementation were a key component of the England and Wales responsibility centre experience. Participants felt that there was a lot of expertise available to programs/ projects through the resources of Crime Prevention Ottawa and other agencies who engaged in direct service provision. Should there be changes in the expectations of programs funded by CPO; regarding planning, implementing, or evaluating processes, this may not be the case in the long term, but for now, implementation experts are not a concern for CPO.

In the reports on funded project outcomes (2007 August 23; 2008 August), CPO acknowledges that there is large amounts of variation in information sharing practices between the funded projects and CPO. Some projects have a very close relationship with CPO, while others hardly have any contact at all. Although there are a number of reasons why this may be the case, one possibility may be related to the perception of CPO as an information centre more generally. If the organization is not seen as being as proactive as it could in facilitating discussion, and sharing information, between different projects (as noted by one participant in the Findings section), then projects may be more or less reticent to work with the organization in its endeavours⁷. Despite this, there were very few complaints about the perceived flow of information between CPO and the groups, agencies, neighbourhoods working with it. All of the participants appear to be happy with how information is shared, including the organization's use

⁷ Although it is unlikely that this would be one of the main reasons that a project was less comfortable with a close relationship with CPO, it could, theoretically, be a contributing factor.

of electronic mail as a primary means of circulating information. Based on the interviews, any concerns about groups choosing to abstain from working with CPO would likely be attributable to another cause and not CPO's lack of communication/ or the perceived directional flow of information.

Geographical Information Systems were used in the Crime Prevention Ottawa case to analyze high-crime areas of the city. The data was managed by the police, and the results identified four particularly 'high needs' neighbourhoods in the City of Ottawa. According to interview data, GIS was not an area of concern for CPO in its strategic planning processes.

There were a number of issues raised in the findings pertaining to the targets, plans category of analysis. There were a couple of areas where CPO was seen to be deficient. The first refers to the expectations of CPO in the proposals of the projects that they fund. Although CPO does have some criteria, including a logic model that programs should generally follow, the level of specificity required to implement, monitor, and evaluate those programs varies considerably. In order for CPO to be better able to evaluate projects, it must be more specific about its expectations in the proposal application procedures. It must advocate and explicitly ask for a high level of detail regarding the plans, and 'measurable' plans, of projects. This adds to their perceived credibility and legitimacy as a funding organization, requires a better quality of proposals that apply, and makes it easier to evaluate projects (which helps mitigate the concern of community mobilization projects being difficult to quantify). The second is that Crime Prevention Ottawa is not yet aware of its impact on the community. If CPO is not evaluating its

own impact on the community, how can it justify the need for evaluation in the projects that it funds? Furthermore, how can it justify its own existence in the long term?

Another issue in targets and plans that has become apparent through the interview process relates to the fact that CPO does not engage in direct service provision. There seems to be a question surrounding the extent to which CPO is responsible for the outcomes of a particular project, either in success or failure. In the initial proposal for the creation of CPO it was clear that the organization was to act as a ‘responsibility centre’ in Ottawa. Intuitively, one would assume that the organization would be concerned with funding projects that would produce very clear and positive results, which would require very specific planning and evaluation components. As noted in the findings, this level of specificity is not necessarily being met in the application process. Furthermore, in serving the dual role of a responsibility centre and funding body, it is interesting that, in the area of the evaluation of projects funded, an indicator of the project’s accountability for the funds given was seen as needing work. By having an evaluation process that is perceived to be deficient in some capacity, there is an underlying concern that CPO abdicates any real responsibility for the performance of projects funded (which may be seen, on some level, to contravene its role as a responsibility centre).

Another area in which CPO was seen to be deficient was the provision of sustained funding for projects. In this area, CPO’s one-year project funding was seen to be a ‘band aid’ solution to reducing crime. Preventing crime takes time and without sustained funding programs are likely to fall apart. This being said, if CPO cannot provide sustained funding for programs, it needs to explore ways to facilitate sustained funding from other resources.

Recruitment practices and consent procedures were not a large concern in the CPO experience so far, though participants acknowledged that there may be problems with the overlap in services seen across the City. In Canada, there are multiple levels of government (Municipal, Provincial, and Federal) who are all involved in the provision of services in some capacity. These levels of government, for the most part, operate independently of one another to provide services 'on the ground'. In all likelihood, then, the overlap of services does not serve to pressure individuals into multiple programs; but instead, is the result of numerous programs receiving funding from various ministries, and levels of government, to implement their programs or services. It does, however, raise concerns about the extent to which, and how, individuals end up becoming involved in multiple programs/ services. This uncoordinated approach to programming could serve as a positive indicator of voluntary-ness amongst participants. Although some individuals may feel pressured to participate in programming because they are being targeted by multiple projects, they may also be able to exercise more autonomy than was seen in the English case by 'picking' between programs of their choice. While program overlap was seen to be a potential problem in this case, it was also noted that great efforts were being made to stem this trend and better address the gaps in the current services and programs being offered. Consequently, Recruitment and Consent was not seen to be a major concern in the CPO experience.

Theme 10 – Other Issues, and the two findings contained within it, largely fell outside of the focus of inquiry of this project. The first referred to the extent that Crime Prevention Ottawa seeks recognition for the activities that they sponsor. There was a lot of question about whether or not CPO should seek more recognition because without it, they are less visible and less well

known (which could impact funding). The second finding was related to some of the confusion surrounding what the organization's role. There were a number of concerns raised as to what the function of the organization is currently, compared to what it should or could be. There were questions surrounding whether or not the roles that CPO has taken, since its establishment in 2005, are still in line with what it is mandated to do, or if it should be more involved in other areas yet. These are matters that cannot be answered through this research project. I believe that these topics would be a very interesting area for future discussion and research.

Another potential area for discussion lies in the new literature and legislation coming out about the CDRP and YJB experiences. The Police and Justice Act 2006 amends a number of statutes pertaining to the Crime and Disorder Act 1998, and some of these refer to the CDRPs of a locale. Furthermore, this Act also makes local police accountable for addressing the problems in the communities that they serve. This Act, along with an emerging literature on the last ten years of the England and Wales experience, would make for an interesting area of study in the future.

Table 2, on the following page, is a summary of the findings from England and Wales and Crime Prevention Ottawa experiences as a responsibility centre. It includes point form information of the similarities and differences between the two experiences. There is also a new category added to account for the findings that fell outside of the realm of this particular research project.

Table 2 – Summary of Findings

	England and Wales Case	Ottawa Case
1. Community	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ ‘Distinct Communities’ with ‘Distinct Problems’ ▪ No all-encompassing programs 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ ‘Community’ is ill-defined ▪ ‘Distinct Communities’ with ‘Distinct problems’
2. Political Intervention	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ Reports to Government officials, and funding bodies ▪ Reporting is frequent ▪ Political individuals (Tony Blair) have influence over daily activities of organization ▪ Intervention impacted the organization’s outputs 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ Reports on an annual basis to City Council ▪ Symbolically seen to have some level of political intervention ▪ Lack of clarity surrounding its position/ function with and within the City
3. Collaboration	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ Forced collaboration negatively impacted CDRP outputs and activities ▪ Partners were absorbed by YJB, no longer autonomous 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ Partners remained autonomous ▪ Collaboration was not a concern in this case
4. Implementation Experts	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ Individuals readily available to aid and advise in planning and implementation of crime prevention initiatives ▪ Provided a knowledge resource rich in experience that otherwise lacked in CDRPs 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ CPO and direct supervision agencies have the expertise needed in this capacity ▪ Implementation experts not a concern
5. Information Sharing	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ Information sharing was seen to be unequal ▪ Lack of cooperation between partners due to perceived ‘one way direction’ of information flow 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ Information was seen to be accessible, and reciprocal ▪ Information sharing was not a concern
6. Geographical Information Systems (GIS)	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ ‘Layering’ abilities of GIS enhanced various partners and programs in implementing initiatives ▪ Facilitated information sharing between partners 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ GIS was not a concern in the strategic planning process
7. Targets, Plans	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ Targets needed to be measurable, have a time limit, and to be monitored ▪ Plans made to reach targets 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ Plans/ Proposals need to be more specific ▪ Evaluation is deficient, not thorough enough. ▪ The organization needs to evaluate its own impacts on the community
8. Funding	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ Funding needed to be sustained and restrictions on funding needed to be explicit 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ Funding is not sustained
9. Recruitment and Consent	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ ‘Voluntary’ participants were often aggressively recruited 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ There is overlap and duplication in programs/ services

	<p>or coerced into enrolling in program</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ 'Risk Assessment' tools were used to identify possible participants ▪ Participants pressured to participate in various programs based on their participation with other organizations under the jurisdiction of YJB 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ Overlap is not seen to 'cycle' individuals between programs ▪ Not much is known about individual program recruiting practices ▪ Voluntary-ness of participants was not raised as a concern
10. Other		<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ Concerns about whether the organization should seek recognition for its activities ▪ Questions about what the role of the organization is versus should be.

6.2 MAKING SENSE OF THE FINDINGS

Neo-liberal trends of 'responsibilizing' individuals and 'downloading responsibility' for public safety onto communities or municipalities, directly impact RCs like CPO. Their funding is limited compared to other Municipal sectors of activity, like the police, and they rely on community mobilization to enact crime prevention initiatives throughout the City of Ottawa. As a part of the infrastructure of the City, CPO is accountable to City Council for its work on crime reduction and victimization within the community. Despite an 'arms length' relationship with the City, CPO is in part, representative of the 'downloaded responsibility' of Municipalities to provide services designed to improve the safety of individuals and communities. It is a pro-active organization, funded by the City, which targets crime and victimization, and collaborates with other city programs (and services) to better address community safety.

In CPO, community stakeholders are directly involved in setting priorities, identifying crime issues to tackle, and mobilizing external groups or organizations to deliver programs and

initiatives. Resources are limited, and this impacts the funded projects' outputs, as well as the extent to which CPO is able to be involved in the areas specified in the qualitative interviews (re: Targets and Plans; and what the organization 'does' versus 'should do'). As an organization which 'brokers' relationships between key stakeholders and community members, the question of 'seeking recognition' for events sponsored by the organization is tricky, since credit for success can be claimed by many. These events are intended to empower individuals to make differences in their community and mobilize to resolve their individual crime problems; however, they are also reflective of the neo-liberal trend of 'responsibilization' of the local and of the reliance on collaboration and partnerships.

6.3 RECOMMENDATIONS

Based on the experiences of Crime Prevention Ottawa so far, there are a few recommendations that I would like to make.

1. There needs to be an explicitly defined concept of 'community' as it is used within the organization. This would serve to reduce any ambiguity in terms of 'where' or 'who' is being referred to when the term is used, and more importantly, to make readily apparent their organizational philosophy, which sees individual 'communities' as having distinct problems.
2. CPO needs to clarify, very specifically, its 'role' or 'function' with and within the City of Ottawa. This will help to alleviate many of the concerns regarding political influences (symbolic or real) on the activities of the organization.

3. Funding for projects needs to be sustained beyond a one-year contract. If it is not possible for CPO to provide sustained funding for programs, it needs to explore other ways of brokering sustainability.
4. Crime Prevention Ottawa's expectations for funding proposals must be more specific. It is difficult to evaluate the success of a program if it is not clear as to what the 'measures of success' or 'obligatory passage points' are for that program. These need to be clear from the proposal of the project.
5. CPO should consider engaging in a discussion about the level of recognition that it seeks (or should seek) from activities it sponsors. CPO may also consider revisiting past conversations about 'what' the role of the organization is, or should be, in light of its experiences thus far. This could help inform the future directions of the organization.

6.4. CONCLUSIONS

Crime prevention responsibility centres are gaining increasing attention in the field of Criminology. Until recently, there was not much evaluation of the experiences of these organizations, including an analysis of both the elements of success and challenges met by them. A recent example of responsibility centre-based crime prevention in England and Wales included the government mandated creation of CDRPs, and the YJB. The critiques and evaluations of this example were translated into a set of 'themes' which were used to conduct an analysis of Crime Prevention Ottawa's experiences as an RC in the City of Ottawa.

It is clear from this analysis that many of the challenges met by the English RC are not present in, or pertinent to, a discussion of the Crime Prevention Ottawa case. Questions concerning: the autonomy of collaborating agencies; how information is shared; the provision of implementation experts; the use of GIS; and the problems associated with recruitment and consent were not areas in which participants of this study felt any concern. In order to help mitigate or resolve some of the challenges that have been experienced by CPO, I propose some recommendations: defining 'community', and the 'role' that the organization serves with/ within the City; that project funding is sustained; that expectations within funding proposals are increased; and that it engages in a discussion about 'what it does' as compared to what it maybe 'should do'. Although the themes from this example are not generalizable to other cities or RCs in Canada (and internationally), I hope that they may be helpful to other municipalities looking to establish an RC for crime prevention.

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*APPENDIX A: Interview Guide***CRIME PREVENTION OTTAWA AS A RESPONSIBILITY CENTRE: AN INTERIM ANALYSIS**

1. What is the relationship of Crime Prevention Ottawa to Ottawa as a community?
2. Do you have the kinds of information and information sharing processes that you require?
3. How are problems targeted or defined?
 - a. How do you decide on where to invest your limited resources?
 - b. What are the key influences/ interest groups?
4. What kind of planning process do you use to go from program planning to program implementation?
5. In your view, based on the Crime Prevention Ottawa's operations thus far, what are...?
 - a. Some of the contributions or benefits?
 - b. Any unintended consequences?
6. How does Crime Prevention Ottawa fit within the political structure of Ottawa, in terms of....?
 - a. Formal accountability?
 - b. Actual political dynamics?
7. Are there any other issues or concerns that you would like to share?

APPENDIX B: Participant List

STUDY PARTICIPANT LIST (by Name and Affiliation)

- Michael Allen – *President/Executive Director of the United Way/ Centraide Ottawa, and CPO Board member*
- Caroline Andrew - *Director of the Centre on Governance (University of Ottawa) and CPO Board Member*
- Melanie Bania - *Research Associate for the Institute for the Prevention of Crime (University of Ottawa)*
- Janet Crupi - *Chair of the Ottawa Youth Justice Services Network, Coordinator at Algonquin College, and CPO Board Member*
- Michael Horne - *President of the Vanier Community Association*
- Holly Johnson - *Senior Research Associate for the Institute for the Prevention of Crime (University of Ottawa)*
- Michael Justinich – *Crime Prevention Ottawa Business Analyst*
- Steve Kanellakos - *Deputy City Manager and Head of Community and Protective Services (City of Ottawa) and CPO Board Member*
- Mehdi Louzouaz - *Liaison Officer, Crime Prevention Program in Vanier*
- Cheryl Parrott – *Board of Directors for the Hintonburg Community Association and CPO Community Forum Member*
- Walter Piovesan - *Superintendent of Instruction with the Ottawa-Carleton District School Board*
- Chantal Pomerleau – *Program Manager at the Lowertown Community Resource Centre*
- Debbie St. Aubin - *Chair of the Together for Vanier Beautification Committee*
- Irvin Waller - *Director of the Institute for the Prevention of Crime and Professor of Criminology (University of Ottawa); and CPO Board Member*
- Vern White – *Chief of Police of the Ottawa Police Service and CPO Board Member*
- Nancy Worsfold - *Executive Director of Crime Prevention Ottawa*

*APPENDIX C: Informed Consent***CRIME PREVENTION OTTAWA AS A RESPONSIBILITY CENTRE:
AN INTERIM ANALYSIS**

Dr. Ross Hastings
Christine Hurst
Department of Criminology
University of Ottawa
25 University Street
Ottawa, ON, K1N 6N5
(613) 562-5800 ext. 3671

Invitation to Participate: I am invited to participate in the abovementioned research study conducted by Christine Hurst and Dr. Ross Hastings for the completion of a Master's Thesis.

Purpose of the Study: The purpose of this study is to analyze the experiences of Crime Prevention Ottawa as a responsibility centre for crime prevention in the Ottawa area. Using a known successful example for comparison, this study aims to use the 'themes' from the England and Wales – Youth Justice Board case to conduct an interim analysis of Crime Prevention Ottawa as a responsibility centre. It aims to identify the similarities and differences in the experiences of each responsibility centre, particularly in regards to the sources of success and resistance in each case.

Participation: My participation will consist essentially of one interview 45 – 60 minutes during which I will be required to answer open-ended questions based on my experiences with CPO as a responsibility centre. I understand that this interview will be conducted at a time and place convenient to me. I understand that this interview will be recorded, transcribed, and stored by the researcher for the purposes of protecting the integrity of the information that I provide.

Risks: My participation in this study will entail that I discuss my own experiences, thoughts and perceptions of Crime Prevention Ottawa as a responsibility centre. I understand that there is minimal risk in this type of research and that I am free to refuse to answer a question or withdraw from the study at any point in time.

Benefits: My participation in this study will contribute to the advancement of knowledge in the Crime Prevention field and the results will help to inform CPO of some of the sources of resistance that may be overcome in the future, based on the English case.

Confidentiality and anonymity: I have received assurance from the researcher that the information I will share will remain strictly confidential. I understand that the contents will be used only for the production of the Master's thesis entitled "Crime Prevention Ottawa as a Responsibility Centre: An Interim Analysis.. I understand that my name and title will be recorded for the purposes of a participant list ONLY and that any information I give will be pooled into single data source wherein my name will not be associated with the contents of the information I provide. I have received assurance from the researcher that my anonymity will be protected using this pooled information gathering procedure.

Conservation of data: The data collected (tape recordings of the interviews/ and interview transcripts) will be kept in a secure manner. The consent forms and interview recordings will be contained in separate locking cabinets in the office of the thesis supervisor; accessible to the researcher and supervisor only. Also, the electronic transcripts will be stored on the researcher's laptop protected by a password. This data will be conserved for a period of five years following the completion of the degree requirements, after which, it will be destroyed (deleted and/or shredded).

Voluntary Participation: I am under no obligation to participate and if I choose to participate, I can withdraw from the study at any time and/or refuse to answer any questions, without suffering any negative consequences. If I choose to withdraw, all data gathered until the time of withdrawal will be destroyed via shredder for interview transcripts and erasure or 'taping over' of interview recordings.

Acceptance: I, _____, agree to participate in the above research study conducted by Christine Hurst of the Department of Criminology, Faculty of Social Sciences, University of Ottawa which is under the supervision of Dr. Ross Hastings.

If I have any questions about the study, I may contact the researcher or his supervisor.

If I have any questions regarding the ethical conduct of this study, I may contact the Protocol Officer for Ethics in Research, University of Ottawa, Tabaret Hall, 550 Cumberland Street, Room 159, Ottawa, ON K1N 6N5
Tel.: (613) 562-5841
Email: ethics@uottawa.ca

There are two copies of the consent form, one of which is mine to keep.

Participant's signature: _____

Date: _____

Researcher's Signature: _____

Date: _____