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***THE DYNAMICS OF ETHNO-LINGUISTIC MOBILISATION IN CANADA:  
A CASE STUDY OF ALLIANCE QUEBEC***

A Thesis Submitted to  
The School of Graduate Studies and Research  
In Candidacy for the Degree of  
Master of Arts  
Department of Political Science

Paul Prosperi

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## ***INTRODUCTION***

Anglophone Quebecers are not a unified ethnic community. To be precise, they are a linguistic minority in a province that is primarily French-speaking. As Raymond Breton has pointed out, the degree of social organization or "institutional completeness" of a community ranges from an informal to a more established model.<sup>1</sup> At one end of the spectrum lies a community whose organization might extend no further than a network of interpersonal relationships. At the other extreme, where a more formal structure has developed, the community has a wide array of institutions that perform many if not all of the services required by its members. Few communities in North America, however, are institutionally complete; most vary in the complexity of their organizations and in their degree of self-sufficiency.<sup>2</sup>

For over two hundred years Anglophones have lived in Quebec and developed a full range of educational, religious, professional and voluntary organizations which serve their community. However, none of these institutions were specifically political. Most had very little to do with politics, and those which did, did so only marginally. Until the 1970s, this lack of political organization at the provincial level was a symptom of the community's pre-occupation with itself. Although numerically a minority, Quebec Anglophones considered themselves part of the English-speaking majority in Canada rather than a minority in a predominantly French-speaking province. With the onset of the Quiet Revolution, the self-perception of Anglophones began to change. The election of

the Parti Québécois in 1976 and the passage of the Charter of the French Language the following year served as confirmation for many Anglophones that the desire of the French-speaking majority to promote its own language and culture would come at the expense of their own. Of even greater significance for Anglophones, was the fact that since the “rules of the game had changed,” the likelihood existed that they would change even more in the future.<sup>3</sup>

The purpose of this thesis is to examine the development of the English-rights movement from the perspective of Alliance Quebec, a language based interest group which seeks to defend the rights of Anglophone Quebecers. Throughout its thirteen year history Alliance Quebec has attempted to defend the interests of Anglophone Quebecers by espousing a policy of moderation in its demands and by promoting the idea of harmony among the two main language groups.

The basis of this study will be an investigation of the literature in the field as well as a consultation of documents on the Alliance itself. In addition, interviews with past and present members of the Alliance will be used to help complement the secondary information. This line of inquiry has one main objective, to consider contributions made by Alliance Quebec on some of the more pressing issues faced by the Anglophone community over the past decade. Furthermore, this thesis will attempt to highlight the major periods of transition for the Anglophone community. Beginning with the arrival of English-speaking Quebecers in the 1760s, three major periods will be examined. The first, from the conquest to the Quiet Revolution; the second, from the rise of the Parti Québécois to the birth of Alliance Quebec; finally the third and most important part of our analysis, from 1982 to the present.

3

Although a great deal has been written about the “English Fact” in Quebec, little has been written about the political mobilization of Anglophone Quebecers and the growth of the English-rights movement during the 1980s. Some of the more recent publications which have touched on this theme are Gary Caldwell’s *La question du Québec anglais*, Reed Scowen’s *A Different Vision: The English in Quebec in the 1990s*, and Josée Legault’s *L’invention d’une minorité: les Anglo-Québécois*. Other major works on the subject of English Quebec include *The English Fact in Quebec* by Arnopolous and Clift, *The English of Quebec: From Majority to Minority Status* edited by Caldwell and Waddell, and perhaps the most comprehensive study on English-speaking Quebecers, Ronald Rudin’s *The Forgotten Quebecers: A History of English-speaking Quebec 1759-1980*. In addition, there are a number of studies which offer varying degrees of information on the topic of English Quebec, including James Pasternak’s *Political Action in English Quebec*. However, as Ronald Rudin noted in 1985, there are few useful works on the political behaviour of Anglophones.<sup>4</sup> It is as a result of this gap in the literature that a study of the political mobilization of Quebec’s Anglophones is both fitting and necessary.

**CHAPTER I**  
***A BRIEF HISTORY OF ENGLISH-SPEAKING QUEBEC***

Many historians view Confederation as a time which represents Canada's passage from colony to nation. Yet the period is also significant for having marked a turning point in the history of English-speaking Quebec. While roughly 21% of all Quebecers in 1867 were English-speaking, few at the time might have predicted this number would fall below 10% by the beginning of the 1990s (See Table 1.1).<sup>1</sup> In this chapter, the declining size of the English-speaking population and the events surrounding it will be discussed. Of importance here, in addition to population shifts, were the accompanying changes in the character and composition of the English-speaking population — so profound that they have left a lasting impression on the history of English Quebec.

***From Conquest to Confederation***

Conventional wisdom has it that English-speaking settlement in Quebec began with the conquest of New France in 1759. In fact a small group of English-speaking immigrants (including the Scottish born Abraham Martin, for which the Plains of Abraham was named) had settled in New France by the late 1600s.<sup>2</sup> However, besides a certain curiosity value, as Ronald Rudin explains, “they were never sufficiently numerous to form a community, nor were there any institutions designed to serve their needs.”<sup>3</sup> Only with the British acquisition of Canada in 1763, which completed their consolidation of

*TABLE 1.1*

*THE SIZE OF QUEBEC'S ENGLISH-SPEAKING POPULATION  
1766-1991*

Year	Number of English Speakers	% of Population	Criterion Employed
1766	500	1	Non-French Origin
1780	2,000	2	"
1792	10,000	6	"
1812	30,000	10	"
1827	80,000	16	"
1844	172,840	25	"
1851	220,733	25	"
1861	263,344	24	British Origin
1871	243,041	20	"
1881	260,538	19	"
1891	N/A	N/A	No Data on Origin
1901	289,680	18	British Origin
1911	318,799	16	"
1921	356,943	15	"
1931	429,613	15	Eng. Mother Tongue
1941	468,996	14	"
1951	558,256	14	"
1961	697,402	13	"
1971	789,175	12	"
1976	796,665	12.8	"
1981	706,115	11	"
1986	680,120	10.4	"
1991	666,923	9.7	"

Source: Ronald Rudin, *The Forgotten Quebecers* (IQRC, 195) 28; and *Census of Canada*, 1986 and 1991.

Note: The 1986 census marked the first time respondents could indicate more than one mother tongue. Multiple responses were divided equally among the languages reported.

French possessions in North America, did English-speaking immigrants begin to arrive to Quebec in any great number.<sup>4</sup>

The first immigrants to arrive in the years following the conquest were a collection of British merchants and businessmen who came with the objective of making money through trade.<sup>5</sup> This was, as Donald Creighton points out, “not an immigration of farmers and frontiersmen, but of commercial brains and capital.”<sup>6</sup> A number of the merchants went on to acquire a great deal of influence in Quebec's affairs, many as a result of their involvement in the fur trade. Others, who can best be described as camp followers made their living supplying British troops as well as the French-speaking population which had been isolated by years of war. It is interesting to note that in the years before the British army had its own commissariat services it was not uncommon for merchants to follow their troops around the world in order to profit from their needs. In the event that the army was successful in its military campaign, these merchants would be the likely choice to assume the trade of the conquered territory.<sup>7</sup> As Stephen Leacock explains, in British North America “victory brought them like vultures to a corpse.”<sup>8</sup>

The first British-Canadian merchants to arrive in Quebec were quite diverse. According to Creighton, “they had come from a score of different towns and villages scattered haphazardly over the old world and new.”<sup>9</sup> Towards the end of the century, however, a few increasingly powerful merchants of British, and primarily Scottish origin, began to dominate the commercial life of Quebec. The fact that they were successful in their financial endeavours is made clear as Rudin emphasises, “by the fact that many families remained dominant forces in the Quebec economy well into the nineteenth century, and in a few cases up to the 1980s.”<sup>10</sup>

While these merchants prospered economically, they encountered a number of political problems stemming from the establishment of civil government. To appreciate the extent of these problems one must first understand the context of British rule in North America, and more specifically the plans the British had for Quebec. Government policy for the conquered French colony was based on defence, trade and the general desire to bring the territory under the control of the British empire. Indeed, the overall aim of the Royal Proclamation of 1763, which ushered in British civil government, was to remodel Canada as a British province.<sup>11</sup> This, the home government thought, would be accomplished by English immigrants who would bring with them, as they had done wherever they had gone, the laws of England.<sup>12</sup> But what would this mean for Quebec's population as a whole? Arthur Lower raises the following considerations:

Did that mean that they would have representative government? If so, would the French, mostly illiterate participate in it? And if they did, would the laws of England that prevented Catholics from taking part in public life be changed for their especial benefit. Or would the English incomers run the country, with the French shoved aside?... If so, the Conquest would have proved harsh indeed.<sup>13</sup>

For the colonial authorities who presided over Quebec, the Proclamation was a recipe for disaster. From the governor's point of view, first Murray then his successor Carleton, Quebec's French majority would never respond favourably to a revision of their laws and their religion. How could one hope to win the loyalty of the French population, they argued, when their land system was to be abandoned and their political views dismissed.<sup>14</sup> Furthermore, the governors were acutely aware that by breeding discontent among the French-speaking population they ran the risk of fuelling the growing tide of resentment towards the British which had already taken root in the American colonies. As a result of these factors they determined that it would be unwise if not unjust to fully

implement the provisions of the Proclamation. Consequently, the promise of an elected assembly, which was the cornerstone of British rule in the colonies, was suspended. In addition, the use of French civil law was permitted in order to maintain the existence of the seigneurial system. Murray's thoughts on the issue, including his admiration for the French and contempt for the merchants, are expressed in the following passage:

Little, very little, will content the new subjects [the French-Canadians] but nothing will satisfy the licentious fanatics trading here but the expulsion of the Canadians who are perhaps the bravest and best race upon the globe, a race who, could they be indulged with a few privileges which the laws of England deny to Roman Catholics at home, would soon get the better of every national antipathy to their conquerors and become the most faithful and useful set of men in this American empire...<sup>15</sup>

As for the merchants, they viewed Murray's refusal to implement the provisions of the Proclamation as a betrayal. They were determined to assert their right as Englishmen in a British colony, albeit a distant and foreign one.<sup>16</sup> If Murray was not the man to help them, then they would actively campaign to have him replaced. For the merchants, as Rudin notes, the application of English law "was not an abstract political issue, but rather a question of business. They saw the seigneurial system, for instance, as an obstacle to profit making because a fee had to be paid to the seigneur following each land transfer. To the men who came to Quebec to make money, such an obstacle to speculative activities was unacceptable, and they let the governors know it."<sup>17</sup>

The merchants were ultimately successful in winning Murray's removal, but received in his place an even stronger advocate for the French in Guy Carleton. The new governor's solution to the problems created by the Royal Proclamation came in the form of his endorsement of the Quebec Act of 1774. By formally withdrawing the provision for an elected assembly and by extending benefits under the law to French-Canadians, the Quebec Act was confirmation on the part of the British government that an English-

speaking majority was unlikely to form in Quebec in the near future. With the Royal Proclamation, it appears that the British had overestimated the number of immigrants who would come to Quebec in search of new land. They were cautious not to make the same mistake again. Beyond this recognition, the Quebec Act was also a response to events transpiring south of the border. It was the “shadow of the American Revolution,” according to Arthur Lower, and the threat that it would spread to Quebec, which accounts for the Act's timely passage.<sup>18</sup> By attempting to secure the loyalty of the French, however, the British had again angered Quebec's merchants. Some of the merchants, exasperated by their lack of political influence, even contemplated joining the American revolution out of protest.<sup>19</sup> In spite of their anger, most came to recognise that their economic interests were too closely tied to Britain to risk independence.<sup>20</sup>

While the American Revolution influenced the nature of British policy in Quebec, it also stood to change the linguistic balance among English and French. Throughout the conflict American colonists known as "Loyalists" (who wished to remain under British rule) crossed the border to Canada and settled in what are now the provinces of New Brunswick, Ontario and Quebec. Unlike in the other provinces, the Loyalist movement to Quebec was restricted by the British to areas that were far removed from their homeland to the south or the French-speaking population. The British government reasoned that keeping the Loyalists away from the border would reduce the likelihood of the revolution spreading north. Similarly, they were concerned that the loyalists might antagonise the French whose favour, as Rudin points out, “was still being courted by the British.”<sup>21</sup> With the Eastern part of Quebec shut-out to the Loyalists, they were left to settle north of Lake Ontario (within the boundaries of the Old Province of Quebec), or somewhat later,

in the Gaspé peninsula. This distribution began to take on greater significance when in 1791 the Old Province of Quebec was divided into Lower and Upper Canada. This division removed the majority of Loyalists of Central Canada from Quebec history, and left English-speaking Quebec with less than 10,000 people after thirty years of British rule, or "British neglect" as the merchants might have put it.<sup>22</sup>

By the nineteenth century it was clear that the British saw Upper Canada as the likely destination for future English-speaking immigrants. However, prospects for immigration to Lower Canada were substantially improved by the terms of the Constitutional Act which made land that had yet to be surveyed available to new immigrants.<sup>23</sup> This provision effectively opened the province to further settlement and encouraged a second wave of Americans, sometimes referred to as the "late Loyalists", to come to Lower Canada between 1791 and the war of 1812. Unlike the first wave of Loyalists who arrived during the American Revolution, this latter group came ostensibly in search of better land.<sup>24</sup> The majority settled in the Eastern Townships not too far from the American border, an area which had been closed to early Loyalists. As a result of their arrival in Lower Canada, the English-speaking population tripled in the space of twenty years to a new high of 30,000.<sup>25</sup>

By the end of the war of 1812 American immigration to British North America had largely subsided. The next major wave of immigration originated from Great Britain and coincided with the end of the Napoleonic wars in 1815.<sup>26</sup> Unlike the British merchants who had arrived in Quebec following the conquest, the majority of these new immigrants who left Europe had been dispossessed by the Industrial Revolution or sought refuge from war or famine.<sup>27</sup> In the space of fifty years, from 1815 to 1865, well over

one million emigrants left the British Isles for British North America.<sup>28</sup> Many, however, never made it to their destination. Thousands of English-speaking immigrants died of disease on the way to Quebec or shortly after their arrival. Still others, who had successfully emigrated to Quebec, decided to pack up and leave on their way to other parts of North America. Estimates in 1826 on the number of immigrants arriving in Quebec, reveal that only 5% decided to stay.<sup>29</sup> Had more English-speaking immigrants decided to remain, Quebec's history might have been quite different.

Among the English-speaking immigrants who decided to stay, there were a number of issues which divided them. Many of these divisions were often as striking as those between the English and French-speaking populations. The extent of these differences merits further examination.

While there was a certain uniformity in the ethnic and religious background of the English-speaking population by Confederation, there were also notable exceptions. The most obvious difference had to do with nationality. Although the overwhelming majority of English-speaking Quebecers were of British descent, by 1871 approximately half or 120,000 were of Irish origin.<sup>30</sup> The remaining 50% of the English-speaking population was divided almost exclusively among immigrants from England and Scotland. Furthermore, nearly one-third of these English-speaking immigrants of British descent were Catholics. For the Irish, who were predominantly Catholic, this meant that not only were they considered a linguistic minority in a province that was predominantly French, but they were also a religious minority within the English-speaking population.<sup>31</sup>

In addition to ethnic and religious divisions, English-speaking Quebecers were also fragmented along class lines. Although English-speaking Quebecers clearly pos-

essed a privileged position in the economy, the overall occupational structure of the British origin population during the nineteenth century was not all that different from the French-speaking population.<sup>32</sup> As Ronald Rudin notes:

Clearly, the most important figures who ran the pre-Confederation economy were English speakers; rare were the French speakers who operated any businesses of significant dimensions. However, the linguistic division of the economy breaks down once one moves below the highest positions. At the lower strata, it becomes more difficult to identify occupations that were exclusively dominated by the English from those that were the preserves of the French.... In fact, there were more significant differences within the English-speaking population than there were between the English and the French.<sup>33</sup>

Strange as it may seem in an era in which language has become our major preoccupation, religion and class differences were the central issues which divided Quebecers in the pre-Confederation period and into the twentieth century.<sup>34</sup> In the years to come, the divisions among English speakers would become increasingly relevant as the English-speaking population began to lose its proportional strength and its political influence began to erode.

By the nineteenth century English-speakers were concentrated in several areas, including the Ottawa Valley, the Eastern Townships, the Quebec City and Montreal areas, and the Gaspé. Along with rural settlements, many English-speaking immigrants who came to Quebec moved to metropolitan centres. In fact, the majority of Montrealers were actually English-speaking between 1831 and 1861.<sup>35</sup> Yet throughout the nineteenth century the bulk of English-speaking settlement was still directed towards rural areas. Beneath this apparent demographic stability was the reality that throughout the 1800s roughly one quarter to one half of the English-speaking population was born outside Quebec.<sup>36</sup> This has led Uli Locher to conclude:

Malgré la présence d'une bourgeoisie stable à Montréal et malgré la survivance d'une culture anglaise rurale dans plusieurs coins de la province, le groupe anglophone constitue, par son histoire mouvementée, un groupe hétérogène, seulement partiellement enraciné au Québec et dont les différents sous-groupes doivent conserver des multiples loyautés, souvent en conflit entre elles...<sup>37</sup>

Unlike their French-speaking counterparts, Quebec's English-speaking population has been subjected to a high degree of demographic turn-over.<sup>38</sup> This process, characterised by the out-migration of English speakers and their replacement by new immigrants, has resulted in a rather constant state of flux within the English-speaking population.<sup>39</sup> While this demographic instability is to be expected in a period of settler colonisation, it has nonetheless remained an almost constant feature of the English-speaking population irrespective of time.<sup>40</sup> As a consequence English-speaking Quebecers, with little attachment to anything other than their immediate communities, opted to leave the province once better prospects presented themselves elsewhere.<sup>41</sup> The net effect of this often transitory immigration, particularly in the nineteenth century, was the weakening of any common identity among English speakers and the absence of any common political organisation at the provincial level.

### *From Confederation to the Quiet Revolution*

The growth and stability of the English-speaking population in the years which followed Confederation was closely linked with the development of the economy. With an ever expanding share of its control, the English-speaking business elite in Quebec was able to reinforce an economic structure that reserved its best paying positions for English speakers.<sup>42</sup> Concentrated in Montreal, members of this small circle were responsible for a number of projects ranging from the construction of the transcontinental railway, to the

establishment of the Bank of Montreal. In retrospect, it appears that Confederation was designed by and for this very same business elite.<sup>43</sup>

The next major transformation for English-speaking Quebec coincided with pre and post World War II immigration. Although a number of non-British immigrants had settled in Quebec as early as the late 1800s, new waves of immigration would dramatically change the composition of the English-speaking population (See Table 1.2). Many of the new immigrants to arrive in Quebec developed close ties with the English-speaking population, and as Table 1.3 illustrates, a great number of their children grew up speaking English. The affinity was understandable, considering the pre-eminent position of English speakers in the economy, as well as Quebec's position in an overwhelmingly English-speaking continent.

Among the new immigrants to settle in Quebec were Jews from Europe who, by the depression of the 1930s, had arrived only speaking Yiddish.<sup>44</sup> With few exceptions they chose to settle alongside earlier Jewish immigrants who had established a vibrant community in Montreal. Their isolation from the French-speaking population was evident as only 112 of the more than 60,000 Jews living in Quebec in 1931 spoke French, while approximately half spoke English in addition to their mother tongue.<sup>45</sup> Facility in English rather than French, notes Ronald Rudin, "provided a passport to leave Quebec and to join Jewish communities elsewhere."<sup>46</sup>

As Jewish immigration from Europe receded in the late 1930s, other groups began to influence the character of the Anglophone population. Most notable among these were Italian immigrants who began to arrive in significant numbers following World War II. Of the approximately 650,000 Italians who emigrated to Canada since the turn of the

TABLE 1.2

*ETHNIC ORIGIN OF QUEBEC'S POPULATION,  
1871-1991*

Year	French	%of Pop.	British	%of Pop.	Other	%of Pop.
1871	929,817	78%	243,041	20%	18,658	2%
1911	1,608,640	80%	316,103	16%	78,479	4%
1931	2,274,383	79%	432,726	15%	167,146	6%
1951	3,327,128	82%	491,818	12%	236,735	6%
1971	4,759,360	79%	640,045	11%	628,360	10%
1981	5,150,073	81%	531,216	8%	687,776	11%
1991	5,257,787	77%	486,652	7%	1,065,857	16%

Source: *Census of Canada*, 1871-1991.

Note: Multiple responses beginning in 1981 (distributed evenly among the origins reported).

TABLE 1.3

*ETHNIC ORIGIN OF QUEBEC'S ENGLISH-SPEAKING  
(MOTHER TONGUE) POPULATION,  
1931-1981*

Year	British	%	French	%	Italians	%	Jews	%	Other	%
1931	406,833	95%	12,653	3%	725	--	252	--	9,150	2%
1941	413,025	88%	25,723	5%	1,665	--	10,948	2%	17,629	5%
1951	449,250	80%	45,710	8%	3,144	1%	28,600	5%	31,552	6%
1961	511,293	73%	68,339	10%	6,387	1%	40,904	6%	70,479	10%
1971	528,695	67%	88,255	11%	14,950	2%	73,110	9%	83,825	11%
1981	417,875	60%	102,442	15%	18,265	3%	57,635	8%	98,698	14%

Source: Ronald Rudin, *The Forgotten Quebecers* (IQRC, 1985), 166.

Note: Figures for the 1991 census have not yet been released.

century (one quarter of which to Quebec), 70% arrived after 1945.<sup>47</sup> The freedom to educate their children in English resulted in a large number of language transfers towards the English-speaking population. This trend continued to the point where by the 1960s children of Italian immigrants were more likely to speak English at home than French.<sup>48</sup> Those parents who had encouraged their children to learn English, were as Rudin reiterates, “providing future generations with the means of leaving the province.”<sup>49</sup> He goes on to suggest:

This theme of mobility runs through the experience of all the groups that contributed to the development of the linguistic minority in the two centuries following the Conquest. The members of these groups variously identified themselves as English Canadians, North Americans, Montréalers, Townshippers, Jews, or Italians; only rarely in the pre-1960 period did they see themselves as Quebeckers, a situation that is hardly surprising given their relative isolation from the French-speaking population. Accordingly, English speakers as a group had little incentive for thinking of themselves as members of a cohesive linguistic minority much less to consider establishing a political party to champion their interests.<sup>50</sup>

Prior to the 1960s, English-speaking Quebecers had always taken it for granted that the majority of new immigrants would want to integrate within the Anglophone community. Nothing led Anglophones to assume that this situation would change in the near to distant future. However, with evidence in the 1960s suggesting that the English-speaking population was increasing its proportional strength in Quebec, the French-speaking majority began to fear the loss of their language and the prospect of cultural assimilation. As a result, immigration and integration of immigrants within the French-speaking community took on a new urgency. Through Bill 63 in 1968, Bill 22 in 1974, and later Bill 101 in 1977, the government responded to the Francophone community's fear of cultural assimilation, and actively intervened in the process of integrating new immigrants.

Seen in light of the changes which were transforming Quebec society in the 1960s, the "Quiet Revolution" as it became known, served notice of a French-speaking majority conscious of its vulnerability and concerned with its collective survival. The perception among English speakers, however, was markedly different. Facing restrictive language legislation, and in 1976 the election of the Parti Québécois, a mass exodus of English speakers took place. Roughly 95,000 of Quebec's English-speaking population left the province in the first five years after the PQ's election.<sup>51</sup> Viewed as a whole, this outward migration threatened the influence and continued vitality of the English-speaking population. Previous migrations of English-speaking Quebecers out of the province were counterbalanced by three factors: the natural growth of the resident English-speaking population; the arrival of new English-speaking immigrants; and those Quebecers who adopted English as their home language.<sup>52</sup> In the late 1970s, however, no factor could offset the absolute decline which the English-speaking population was experiencing.

The outward migration of English speakers (albeit not at 1976 levels) continued in the 1980s and on into the 1990s (See Table 1.4). Rather than attributing this decline solely to the rise of Quebec nationalism, a more accurate interpretation points to several interrelated factors. One of the most important of these issues concerns the position of English speakers within the Quebec economy. Unchallenged until the 1960s, English dominance of the economy became an obvious target for Quebec's Quiet Revolution. Substantial gains made by French speakers in the work force have therefore changed the balance of economic power in Quebec. The distribution of high paying jobs has, as a result, encouraged both the upward mobility of a number of French speakers and the departure of English Quebecers.<sup>53</sup>

TABLE 1.4

**THE SIZE OF QUEBEC'S ENGLISH-SPEAKING  
POPULATION BY HOME LANGUAGE**

1971-1991

(Figures in Thousands)

Year	English	% of Total Pop.
1971	889	14.7
1976	N/A	N/A
1981	809	12.7
1986	797	12.3
1991	716	10.5

Source: Reed Scowen, *A Different Vision: The English in Quebec in the 1990s* (Don Mills Ont.: Maxwell Macmillan Canada, 1991), 121., and *Census of Canada, 1991*.

According to Table 1.5, the decade between 1970 and 1980 shows a decline in the median family income of the English mother tongue population relative to Francophones. As Gary Caldwell points out, the gap among Anglophones and Francophones closed from 30% to 20% during a period when “les Anglo-Québécois les plus compétents” were the most numerous to leave the province. The convergence among the two groups is also consistent with regard to individual income.

The number of English-speaking Quebecers leaving the province was made worse by the fact that Montreal could no longer claim to be the nation's financial capital. The rise of Toronto as the locus of financial activity in Canada only reinforced the tendency by which English-speaking Quebecers could (unlike many of their French counterparts) move to other parts of North America without having to make any linguistic adjustment.<sup>54</sup>

**TABLE 1.5**

**MEDIAN FAMILY AND INDIVIDUAL INCOME  
AMONG ANGLOPHONES AND FRANCOPHONES  
1970 TO 1990  
(In 1990 Dollars)**

Year	Family			Individuals		
	English	French	E/F	English	French	E/F
1970	46 370	33 903	1.37	23 638	18 272	1.29
1980	52 749	43 561	1.21	25 300	21 674	1.17
1958	52 653	42 133	1.25	24 895	20 908	1.19
1990	55 840	48 081	1.16	25 751	22 265	1.16

Source: Adapted from, Gary Caldwell, *La question du Québec anglais* (Québec, IQRC, 1994), 43.

**TABLE 1.6**

**LINGUISTIC COMPOSITION OF MONTREAL'S  
MOTHER TONGUE POPULATION:  
1971-1991  
(As a percentage of the population)**

Year	French	English	Other
1971	61.2%	23.7%	15.1%
1981	59.7%	22.3%	18.0%
1986	60.1%	21.3%	18.7%
1991	56.6%	20.4%	24.0%

Source: Marc V. Levine, "Au-delà des lois linguistiques: la politique gouvernementale et le caractère linguistique de Montréal dans les années 1990, in *Contextes de la politique linguistique québécoise* (Conseil de la langue française, 1993), 15

Note: Multiple responses for years 1986 and 1991 divided equally among languages reported

As the focus of power in the 1960s shifted towards the French-speaking majority, English-speaking Quebecers continued to function within the regional communities they had created. Looking back to the pre-Confederation era, these regional concentrations were partly due to the origins of those who settled the different areas.<sup>55</sup> With time, several of these regional concentrations began to change. Influenced by the arrival of new immigrants who chose to settle in Montreal rather than in outlying areas, Quebec's English-speaking population developed an overwhelming metropolitan character. This trend has continued to the point where today two-thirds of Quebec's English-speaking population lives within the Metropolitan Montreal area. In spite of this percentage, as Table 1.6 shows, the number of English-speaking Montrealers, like the English population in general, continues to decline.

Despite the decline of the English-speaking population in Montreal, its relative dominance within the English population as a whole has, as we noted, increased substantially. One of the inherent problems associated with this development is the high mobility of urban dwelling. By definition, urban centres like Montreal are characterised by high turnover rates.<sup>56</sup> Future prospects for the English-speaking population are therefore influenced by the unstable nature of urban settlement. Combined with the existing pattern of outward migration in search of better economic opportunities, the outlook for English speakers appears dismal. The same conclusion was drawn by Jacques Henripin in a 1984 study on the future trends of the English-speaking population. His population estimate for the Montreal area by the year 2001, given an unfavourable socio-economic climate, was that English speakers would constitute only 15.5% of the population.<sup>57</sup> Even in an improved socio-economic climate, he foresaw English speakers comprising no

more than 18% of Montreal's population.<sup>58</sup> These predictions have been further supported by Marc Termote in a recent study on the demolinguistic future of Quebec. Among the various scenarios entertained by Termote, all appear to suggest that Anglophones will comprise approximately 16.5% of the total population of Montreal by the year 2001.<sup>59</sup>

Working to counterbalance this trend are the network of English language institutions which in many instances are made possible by the geographic concentration of English speakers. Established in English communities, these schools, hospitals, and social service agencies form the essential framework that supports the much wider English-speaking population.<sup>60</sup>

In other respects, the geographical distribution of English speakers makes coming to terms with the changes in Quebec society difficult.<sup>61</sup> Most live within close proximity to the United States, or near the Ontario or Vermont border. Few experience the isolation often felt by the French minority in the rest of Canada. However, the geographic reality of most English speakers is only part of a more complex problem associated with the attitudinal shift from majority to minority status.

### *Changing Self-Perception*

Beginning as far back as the settlement of English speakers in 1759, the self-confident "majority group" consciousness was formed by a sense of their superior educational and cultural backgrounds, their higher overall average incomes, and their commanding position in the Quebec economy.<sup>62</sup> Although a minority in Quebec, English-speaking Quebecers preferred to identify with the larger English Canadian majority. This

was born out by the fact that English-speaking Quebecers read many of the same newspapers and were exposed to much of the same media coverage as other Anglophones living outside of Quebec. The effects of this self-perception as a majority were far ranging. They included the creation of separate English language institutions in isolation from the French majority, and an almost exclusive preoccupation with matters related to their own community. In addition, only a minority of English speakers were bilingual; according to the 1971 census only one out of every three.<sup>63</sup>

The sign that things were changing became clear with the onset of the Quiet Revolution. Among the obvious consequences of this era, English-speaking Quebecers became increasingly subject to the will of a French majority which had adopted an interventionist posture through the provincial government. The adoption of Bill 22 and later Bill 101 was a severe psychological blow to English-speaking Quebecers who considered the use of their language an acquired right.<sup>64</sup> An even greater shock came with the election of the PQ in 1976. According to Michael Stein:

The stunning PQ victory left many Anglo-Quebecers in a state of near paralysis marked by dismay, incredulity and fear... It was widely reported that vast amounts of savings were flowing out of the province, and the contents of many safety deposit boxes were being emptied and placed in banks in areas bordering Quebec. There was much speculation about the new Parti Québécois government under René Lévesque, the future of the province and the country, and above all, personal assessments of one's future place within or outside Quebec.<sup>65</sup>

### *Recent Evolution of Quebec's English Mother Tongue Population*

The changing self-perception of Quebec's English-speaking population in the 1970s indicated the extent to which the community had evolved. However, the Quiet Revolution had also affected Quebec's other language groups. In light of these changes it

is interesting to compare the relative degree of convergence among the different communities. The sample data used in this comparison is based on the mother tongue of the respondents (first language learned and still understood) and comes from the complete file of merged CIPO surveys conducted by Laponce and Russ. Two periods have been selected for consideration, the 1960s and 1980-84. The first period provides us with a profile of the communities before the end of the Quiet Revolution, hence a time before the English-speaking community's self-perception was altered. The second period affords an update of the communities at a time in which Alliance Quebec was being formed. One assumes that throughout these periods, changes to the Anglophone community's self-perception would be reflected by gains made by Francophones and Allophones in a number of spheres. As Table 1.7 indicates, this is exactly the case. In the two periods for which data was compiled, the evidence suggests that Francophones and Allophones made gains in domains that previously showed a strong Anglophone presence. The extent of these gains, and their importance relative to the English mother tongue population (EMT) is what the following sections will highlight.

### *Religion*

Although there was clearly a time when religion was as significant an issue as language in Quebec society, the decline in its importance in contemporary Quebec is made clear by Table 1.7 (See also Fig. 1.1 & 1.2). The most relevant feature among the three language communities in this regard is the number of respondents whose mother tongue was neither French nor English who indicated no organised religion. Almost 10% of this group professed no religion, approximately twice that of the French mother tongue com-

munity. The EMT population fell in between the groups at 7.8%. However, what is most striking about the religious profiles of the three groups are the changes among the major religions. For the French mother tongue population throughout the 1960s and 80s, the fact that it is overwhelmingly Catholic remains unchanged. Yet for the English mother tongue population an important change occurred during this same period. As Table 1.7 shows, in the period from 1980-84 the religion of the plurality of the EMT population changed from Protestantism to Catholicism. Although the shift in real terms was not that significant, only 5% both ways (between Catholic and Protestant), the numbers were evidence of an evolution that further supported the claim that the community was undergoing a transition.

### Occupation

The occupational structure of the English mother tongue population in the 1980s remains fairly consistent with that of the 1960s. The obvious exceptions are the rise in the percentage of professionals within the community and the increasing number of executives and managers. For the French mother-tongue population there was a similar increase in the upper level of the occupational structure. This trend indicates that the gap between English and French in these professions was narrowing by the 1980s. There is also convergence among the EMT population and the non English/French mother tongue communities. In fact, if one measures both professional and executive/managerial positions, the Allophone mother tongue population is represented to a higher degree than the French mother tongue population, 35.4% versus 32.6% respectively.<sup>66</sup>

TABLE 1.7

*PROFILE OF QUEBEC'S LANGUAGE GROUPS  
BY MOTHER TONGUE: 1960s & 1980s  
(In percentage)*

	MT French		MT English		MT Other	
	1960s	1980s	1960s	1980s	1960s	1980s
<b>1. Religion</b>						
Protestant...	0.5	0.9	49.5	36.3	12.5	9.2
Jewish...	0.4	0.2	9.1	12.3	21.0	7.7
Catholic...	97.5	93.9	37.2	41.9	47.6	63.0
Other...	1.6	0.4	4.2	1.7	18.9	11.0
None...	N/A	4.6	N/A	7.8	N/A	9.1
Total	100	100	100	100	100	100
<b>2. Union Members</b>						
Yes...	32.3	36.4	17.7	19.1	27.8	29.8
No...	67.7	63.6	82.3	80.9	72.2	70.2
Total	100	100	100	100	100	100
<b>3. Occupation</b>						
Professional...	4.7	12.8	13.0	22.9	11.6	15.6
Executive/manager...	11.8	19.4	20.1	26.8	12.2	19.8
Sales person...	6.4	5.4	7.8	7.4	5.3	4.0
Clerical...	10.2	9.5	16.8	13.0	7.1	5.1
Skilled labour...	36.0	37.8	30.1	23.1	47.7	41.2
Unskilled labour	18.3	13.9	8.8	6.3	15.9	14.0
Farmer...	12.6	1.2	3.4	0.5	0.2	0.2
Total	100	100	100	100	100	100
<b>4. Education</b>						
Primary...	48.1	23.7	21.5	11.2	40.3	25.2
Secondary...	48.9	64.6	57.4	59.8	47.2	47.3
University...	3.0	11.7	21.1	29.0	12.5	27.5
Total	100	100	100	100	100	100
<b>5. Geographic Distribution</b>						
Farm...	12.1	5.3	3.6	2.9	0.2	1.2
Rural...	15.7	18.5	3.9	4.9	0.7	1.4
Urban...	72.2	76.2	92.5	92.2	99.1	97.4
Total	100	100	100	100	100	100

Source: J.A. Laponce and L. Russ, *Data File of CIPO Surveys 1953-1984*, (Reported at the University of British Columbia and the University of Toronto Data Library Centers).


TABLE 1.8

*INDEX OF SIMILARITY AND DIVERGENCE AMONG  
QUEBEC'S LANGUAGE GROUPS AND THE ENGLISH  
MOTHER TONGUE POPULATION  
1960s & 1980s  
(With English Mother tongue as base 100)*


	MT French		MT Other	
	1960s	1980s	1960s	1980s
<b>1. Religion</b>				
Protestant...	1.2	2.5	25.2	25.5
Jewish...	4.4	1.6	230.7	62.6
Catholic...	262.1	224.1	127.9	150.3
Other...	38.0	23.5	450.0	647.1
None...	N/A	58.9	N/A	116.7
<b>2. Union Members</b>				
Yes...	182.5	190.6	157.1	151.3
No...	82.3	78.6	87.7	86.8
<b>3. Occupation</b>				
Professional...	36.2	55.9	89.2	68.1
Executive/manager...	58.7	72.4	60.7	73.9
Sales person...	82.1	72.9	67.9	54.1
Clerical...	60.7	73.1	42.3	56.1
Skilled labour...	119.6	163.6	158.5	178.4
Unskilled labour	207.9	220.6	180.7	222.2
Farmer...	370.6	240.0	5.9	40.0
<b>4. Education</b>				
Primary...	223.7	211.6	187.4	225.0
Secondary...	85.2	108.0	82.2	79.1
University...	14.2	40.3	59.2	94.8
<b>5. Geographic Distribution</b>				
Farm...	345.7	182.8	5.7	41.4
Rural...	402.6	377.6	17.9	28.6
Urban...	78.0	82.6	107.1	105.6

Source: J.A. Laponce and L. Russ, *Data File of CIPO Surveys 1953-1984*, (Reported at the University of British Columbia and the University of Toronto Data Library Centers).


*Figure 1.1*  
*Mother Tongue French Relative to Mother Tongue English*




*Figure 1.2*  
*Mother Tongue Other Relative to Mother Tongue English*



*Figure 1.3*  
*Mother Tongue French Relative to Mother Tongue English*



*Figure 1.4*  
*Mother Tongue Other Relative to Mother Tongue English*




What is important to remember is that the closing of the occupational gap is due as much to the fact that many English-speaking Quebecers have left the province as it is to strides made by Francophones and Allophones in the workforce. Between 1976 and 1981 more than a third of Anglophone university graduates between the ages of 25 and 34 left the province.<sup>67</sup> Recent evidence suggests that this trend out of Quebec shows no sign of slowing.

In a study by Uli Locher published in 1993, roughly 73% of the 2322 Anglophone students polled (both high school and Cégep) saw themselves working outside the province of Quebec in ten years. The reasons for their intention to leave are considered by Locher. “Il est probable que la < loi 101 > a déterminé beaucoup plus l’arrivée des anglophones que les départs. Il est probable aussi qu’elle a agi en combinaison avec d’autres facteurs plutôt que seule... [*mais*] Il est indéniable qu’elle joue toutefois un rôle capital lorsque s’expriment les intentions de départ.”<sup>68</sup>


### Union Membership

As for the degree of unionisation among the language groups, the data points out that the English mother tongue population continued to be the least unionised. While there was a small increase from 1960 to 1980, the EMT workforce was approximately 20% unionised. This figure is contrasted by the level of unionisation among the French and "other" mother tongue populations, at 36.4% and 29.8% respectively in 1980-84. Although the data shows little evidence of convergence among the EMT population and the other groups (see Table 1.8 and Fig. 1.5 & 1.6), the level of unionisation within Quebec's workforce increased during the periods surveyed irrespective of language.

*Figure 1.5*  
*Mother Tongue French Relative to Mother Tongue English*



*Figure 1.6*  
*Mother Tongue Other Relative to Mother Tongue English*




### Education

Between 1960 and 1980, both the Francophone and Allophone mother tongue communities made significant strides relative to the EMT population in education. Although the English mother tongue community had the highest level of education for any language group, Allophones by the 1980s were a close second. More impressive was the fact that in approximately twenty years the percentage of the Allophone mother tongue population in Quebec with some university education rose from 12.5% to 27.5%. A possible explanation for this convergence (94% relative to EMT) might be due to the level of education of Allophones immigrating to Quebec between the 1960s and 80s (See Table 1.8 & Fig. 1.7 & 1.8).


### Geographic Distribution

Among the other features of the language profiles worth mentioning is the trend towards urbanisation. Although all three of the language groups are highly urbanised, Allophones and Anglophones by the 1980s were almost exclusively settled in metropolitan areas (See Fig. 1.9 & 1.10). For Allophones, many of which are recent immigrants to Quebec, this finding is not surprising. Similarly for Anglophones, their geographic concentration can be explained by the minority's desire to live in English and to maintain community institutions.


*Figure 1.7*  
*Mother Tongue French Relative to Mother Tongue English*




*Figure 1.8*  
*Mother Tongue Other Relative to Mother Tongue English*



*Figure 1.9*  
*Mother Tongue French Relative to Mother Tongue English*



*Figure 1.10*  
*Mother Tongue Other Relative to Mother Tongue English*



### *Moving Forward*

The behavioural patterns described in this chapter signalled the beginning of a new era and explain a change in the self-perception of the English-speaking population. No longer considered by its own members as the "majority," the English-speaking minority underwent a process of deep reflection. The first step in this process required taking stock of their new position, that is, that the English-speaking community's perceived drop in status was accompanied by an actual loss of status. While some clearly refused to accept the changing balance of power, others began to discover that they existed as a community. It was apparent nevertheless, that this community needed to redefine its self-image in order to forge a new role for itself. There remained only two options for English-speaking Quebecers: Leave — as many did, or stay and help build a more positive political role for Anglophones. The next chapter details the experience of those who began this undertaking in 1976.

**CHAPTER II**

**THE GROWTH OF THE ENGLISH-RIGHTS  
MOVEMENT IN QUEBEC**

At no other time were the problems within the English-rights movement made more clear in the mid-1970s than during the passage of the Charter of the French Language, commonly known as Bill 101. With the presentation of Bill 1 (later to become Bill 101) before the Quebec legislature in 1976, the Anglophone community endured a difficult lesson.<sup>1</sup> A variety of groups, individuals, and organisations appeared before the committee studying the proposed law. Many of the groups ended up making similar presentations before the committee, underlying the lack of co-ordination and poor strategy adopted by the English-rights movement. Some have since questioned whether the legislation would have past as easily had there been a more concerted effort by Anglophone's organised to fight it.<sup>2</sup>

Prior to the election of the Parti Québécois in 1976, the English-speaking population suffered from an obvious lack of political leadership. More to the point, no organisation existed within the English-speaking milieu which claimed to act on behalf of English speakers. While there were a number of hospitals, schools and social services located throughout the areas of English-speaking concentration which served English speakers, none of these institutions were purely political. Until the PQ's rise to power, Anglophones had no equivalent of the Saint Jean Baptiste Society, which spoke on behalf of, or

lobbied for the English fact in Quebec. Even English-speaking journalists and business people from Quebec were unlikely to consider themselves spokespeople for the English community. Reed Scowen has pointed out, “the English community of Quebec was not really aware of its own existence. For French-speaking Quebecers, *les anglais* represented something real, a homogeneous group with a distinct personality. For *les anglais* themselves, there was no collective identity to speak of. They were simply Canadians living in Quebec”.<sup>3</sup>

The rise in political activism among the English of Quebec in the mid 1970s had more to do with the actions of the French-speaking majority than it did with English speakers themselves. Similarly, the initiatives undertaken by the PQ in the years after their election, had more to do with the emergence of an English-rights movement than did the election of a sovereigntist government itself. One is inclined to believe that had the PQ adopted a more moderate stance with respect to language legislation, among other issues, it not only would have provoked less of a response from Anglophones but might have effectively prevented the organisation of the English-rights movement. While this is speculation, it appears clear that historically at least the absence of any organised response on behalf of English speakers can be attributed two interrelated and mutually reinforcing factors. The first and more obvious of the two involves the level of control exercised by English speakers prior to the Quiet Revolution. While numerically a minority, Anglophones enjoyed a disproportionate measure of influence within Quebec society. This enabled English Quebec to act as if it were the majority rather than the decreasing proportion of the population it truly represented. Second, what reason was there to come to terms with the declining size of the English population or even to contemplate a loss in

status when English control over the economy remained unchallenged. Even as the Quiet Revolution began to have an impact on the self-perception of English speakers as the majority, continued control over the economy helped to insulate much of the English population from the full force of change. As one scholar has noted, it is almost “that the they [the English] accept their economic power as their *raison d'être*: it is what allows them to remain as the English.”<sup>4</sup>

In the 1970s a noticeable shift began to take place within the English population. For the first time a network of English-speaking rights groups emerged to articulate the needs of the community and lobby the provincial government.<sup>5</sup> One of the first events to touch off debate centred around the Liberal government’s plan in 1974 to introduce legislation promoting the French language in the form of Bill 22.<sup>6</sup> Traditionally viewed as supporters of the English community, the Liberal Party appeared this time to be favouring Quebec nationalists with the passage of new language legislation.

The political fallout from Bill 22 for the three English cabinet ministers within the Liberal government was swift and decisive. Unable to regain nomination in their own ridings, two of the three retired from politics while the third won his seat in the 1976 election by a much smaller majority.<sup>7</sup> William Tetley, who lost his riding nomination, later remarked that most English speakers who were opposed to Bill 22, have since adopted a different opinion:

Some have even forgotten their hard-line position of the past. For years, my wife and I have had season tickets at a Montreal theatre company and for years, at each production, the English-speaking parking attendant from Côte St. Luc would berate me about how Law 22 was taking all his rights away. After Law 101, he became silent, and in 1979, when I asked him his views on Law 22, he replied, “Why, I was always for it!” Oh, yes, of course!<sup>8</sup>

The problem for Anglophone in the wake of Bill 22 was to find an alternative to the Liberal Party. The dissatisfaction with the Liberal's also extended to the Francophone population, of which many considered Bill 22 not to have gone far enough. The government calculated that in the end supporters of Bill 22 would outnumber the extremists.

### *From Bill 22 to Bill 101*

While Bill 101 is the most important language law to have emerged from Quebec politics in recent history, it was by 1977 only the latest inquiry into the condition of the French language.<sup>9</sup> Several important studies and laws preceded the drafting of the *Charter of the French Language*. Notable among these studies was the Royal Commission on Bilingualism and Biculturalism which led in 1969 to the Federal Official Languages Act. In the same year interest in the language debate was heightened by the St. Leonard school crisis, in which the local Catholic school board argued with parents over the choice of schools for Italian immigrants.<sup>10</sup> In order to find a solution to the problem the Union Nationale government passed Bill 63 which gave parents the right to choose the language of their children's education. At the same time the government announced that it had established the Gendron commission with a mandate to consider ways to promote the French language in Quebec. Far from achieving linguistic peace Bill 63 outraged many French-speaking Quebecers and contributed to the electoral defeat of the Union Nationale in the next election.

Aware that language had become a volatile issue, the newly elected Liberal government promised to consider changes to Bill 63 after reviewing the long awaited recommendations of the Gendron Commission. Armed with the findings of the Gendron

Report, the provincial government introduced language legislation in May of 1974 in the form of Bill 22 (the provincial Official Language Act). The government argued on the basis of the Gendron Report that the French language was faced with encroachment by English in almost every sphere of activity.<sup>11</sup> Bill 22 sought to remedy this situation by, among other measures, applying coercive as well as monetary incentives to promote the use of the French language.<sup>12</sup> Among the major highlights of Bill 22 were the declaration that French was to be the official language of the province of Quebec; that French would be the official language of the public service; that all contracts with the government and para-government bodies would have to be written in French; that government contracts would be awarded under a preferential system to companies who conducted their business in French; the government would provide grants to companies willing to comply with its guidelines on the use of French; and that tests would be given by school boards to determine whether a child should attend English or French schools.<sup>13</sup>

While the majority of French-speaking Quebecers were generally satisfied with Bill 22, the same can not be said of English Quebecers. As Michael Stein notes:

Law 22, or the Official Language Act, made French the sole official language of the province; and, in the eyes of most Anglophones reduced English to the status of a minority or second-class language. This was a severe psychological blow to them since they had always regarded official use of their language as an <acquired right>. It had been at least partially entrenched in the Canadian Constitution through Article 133 of the BNA Act (which accorded protection to English in the legislatures and the courts of Quebec).<sup>14</sup>

Frustration within the English-speaking community over Bill 22 was soon eclipsed in November of 1976 with the election of the Parti Québécois. Rumours spread about the form the new government's proposed language law would take. The speculation was put to rest in April of 1977 when the Parti Québécois released the White Paper

outlining language legislation to be introduced in the National Assembly later that month.<sup>15</sup> At first members of the government, including the Premier, concluded that all of the measures spelled out in the White Paper would not be necessary to redress the shortcoming of Bill 22.<sup>16</sup> Camille Laurin (the Minister of State for Cultural Development, and the author of the White Paper) was nonetheless adamant that tougher legislation was needed to bolster the French language in Quebec<sup>17</sup> Presented before the National Assembly on April 27, 1977 and appropriately named Bill 1, the *Charter of the French Language* became the first major piece of legislation introduced by the Parti Québécois after its election victory.

After lengthy public hearings, the government decided to withdraw Bill 1 in June of 1977 and reintroduce it as Bill 101 in order to secure its passage for the upcoming school year.<sup>18</sup> After a short period of debate it was passed and became law. There were some notable differences between Bill 1 and Bill 101. In the preamble to Bill 1, the term "Québécois" was used in a way that seemed to limit it to long-standing French-speaking residents of Quebec.<sup>19</sup> The reference was later removed from Bill 101. Other features of the legislation were more like the legislation it was designed to improve upon, Bill 22.

One of the obvious differences between Bill 22 and Bill 101 concerned the language of instruction. Bill 22 stipulated that children could be educated in the language of their choice if they could demonstrate a sufficient knowledge of either English or French. Bill 101 on the other hand, restricted English-language instruction to only four categories of children. The four groups included:<sup>20</sup>

1. Children whose parent(s) received primary education in Quebec in English.
2. Children whose father or mother lived in Quebec at the time Bill 101 came into force who had received their primary education in English outside Quebec.

3. Children who in the previous year legally attended English public schools.
4. Younger brothers and sisters of those in the third category.

In addition, a regulation which came into effect at the same time as the *Charter of the French Language* permitted people who were temporarily in Quebec to receive English education. The authorisation would apply for three years, subject to renewal.

The differences between the educational provisions of Bill 22 and Bill 101 reflected the different philosophies of the parties which created them. For Coleman:

The PQ designed a policy appropriate for a nation-state with an absolute linguistic majority where it sought to bring all citizens under a single French-language educational system. The party allowed two exceptions to this policy: It gave Anglophones with some historical roots in Quebec and those living in the province on a temporary basis the "privilege" of choosing between instruction in either language. The PLQ, consistent with its vision of Quebec in Canada, placed no restrictions on the availability of English-language schools... Further, following from its view of a bilingual Canada, it tended to give anyone with a "sufficient knowledge" of English the choice of an English-language or French-language education.<sup>21</sup>

On the issue of language use in public institutions Bill 101 diverged sharply from Bill 22. Both laws sought to ensure that public agencies and the provincial bureaucracy operated in French. Yet Bill 101 further required that public institutions (among them English-speaking institutions) conform to the same language requirements as government agencies. This meant that school boards, local health and social service centres, and other public institutions had to communicate externally (and internally with few exceptions) in French only. The promotion, hiring, and transfer of employees within these institutions was further dependent on the individuals "appropriate" knowledge of French.<sup>22</sup> All of these practices were to be indirectly enforced through francisation programmes set up by the local institutions and administered by the Office de la langue française.<sup>23</sup>

Another important difference between Bill 22 and Bill 101 involved the treatment of professionals. Under both laws, professionals whose occupations came under Quebec's Code of Professions were required to have a working knowledge of French in order to obtain a permit to work in Quebec. However, Bill 22 exempted professionals who worked exclusively for one employer and had no contact with the public.<sup>24</sup> Bill 101 removed this exemption, and all professionals under the new legislation were subject to French tests by the Office de la langue française.

In the economy, the Parti Québécois attempted to exercise a more direct role in promoting the use of the French language. Although Bill 22 had similar ambitions, it sought to increase the use of French mainly through persuasion. The case of language policy in the private sector is a perfect example. The Liberal government through Bill 22, directed firms to give French the priority in matters relating to the language of commercial signs, advertising and the like. Bill 101, however, restricted the use of any language other than French on commercial signs and other "communication tools more likely to be exclusive to Quebec."<sup>25</sup> The explicit aim of Bill 101 then, as it involved the language of commercial signs, was to make Quebec "visually" French.<sup>26</sup>

To a great extent the evolution of language legislation in the 1970s was a reflection of the desire on the part of French speakers to make Quebec French. Seen from this perspective Bill 22, and more directly Bill 101, were only the latest manifestations of a French-speaking majority's resistance to cultural assimilation. As language became the defining characteristic of this struggle, there was bound to be conflict with the English-speaking minority. Areas such as the economy became obvious targets for Bill 101; this helped raise the level of frustration within the Anglophone community to new heights.

### *The Anglophone Community Responds*

In late 1976 two English-rights groups emerged on the Island of Montreal, Participation Québec and the more widely known Positive Action Committee (PAC). Led by Montreal lawyer Alex Paterson and McGill University philosophy professor Stors McCall, PAC formed a group of business people, lawyers, and academics who hoped to involve English Quebecers in the political process.<sup>27</sup> In addition to meetings at which they considered the policies and initiatives for PAC to pursue, they drafted a manifesto which appeared in the *Montreal Star* on April 23, 1977. In large part the manifesto was a response to the PQ's position on language policy. The manifesto argued for the preservation of individual rights, while advancing bilingualism as a potential remedy for some of the problems facing Quebec. While dismissed as too conciliatory by some members of the English community, PAC received widespread attention and approval for advancing the idea that English speakers were as much Quebecers as were French speakers.<sup>28</sup> As well, PAC stressed the social and cultural contributions made by English Quebec. In essence, the organisation tried to advance a constructive platform upon which all Quebecers, without regard to language, could contribute to Quebec society.

The problem with the Positive Action Committee was that it appeared to have been controlled by a community elite.<sup>29</sup> While PAC boasted as many as 50,000 members at one time, policy and strategy were decided solely by an executive committee that met every two weeks. The Governing Committee Council (with a membership of about 30) was rarely consulted on policy decisions or how private funds were to be spent. The leadership felt that because of the rapid change of events in Quebec only a select few could respond quickly and effectively. Even PAC's leaders felt that it was an elite organi-

sation.<sup>30</sup> Many of the people near the decision making process were, according to Alex Paterson, "the establishment of Montreal."<sup>31</sup>

In the late 1970s Positive Action challenged sections of Bill 101 through the provincial and federal judicial systems. In the first case, Positive Action supported the cause of three Montreal lawyers challenging sections of Bill 101. On January 23, 1979, Chief Justice Jules Deschênes of the Quebec Superior Court ruled the above sections unconstitutional. A second challenge to Bill 101 attempted to have the French-only signs provisions of the legislation declared illegal. This attempt was defeated in Quebec Superior Court, but later was appealed before the Supreme Court of Canada in the Quebec sign case (*Ford v. A.-G. Quebec*, [1988]).<sup>32</sup>

In the fall of 1977, a series of events set the stage for the establishment of another major lobby organisation in Montreal. First, federal Secretary of State John Roberts came to Montreal to meet with the various national unity groups. It was during this visit that Roberts informed the groups that federal government funds were available to English Quebecers under the Official Languages Minority Groups Program. Second, during this same period, Participation Québec decided to stay out of the referendum and national unity debate. This caused a rift within the group which contributed to the departure of one of its young leaders Eric Maldoff. Third, the PAC leaders became aware that the organisation had attracted a reputation as being too "waspish".<sup>33</sup> It was no secret that PAC had found it difficult to obtain support from Quebec's ethnic groups.

Between the fall of 1977 and February 1978, PAC and Participation Québec together organised a series of meetings that brought together many of the diverse minority groups in the province. It was during this time that Eric Maldoff became the key actor in

the creation of a new and broader based organisation. Maldoff established contacts with the various ethnic, religious, urban and rural associations and organisations throughout the province. The outcome of these meetings resulted in a one day symposium held at Concordia University on May 12, 1978. It marked the first time that such a diverse number of English-speaking groups had been brought together at a single event. In total 144 people representing 80 different groups attended the conference.<sup>34</sup> Speaking at the symposium Alex Paterson reminded the participants that:

we are setting out on a journey that is fraught with danger and difficulties. Very simply and frankly stated: a minority cannot afford the luxury of isolation, even if that were desirable, for if a minority's interests are isolated and set against those of the majority, a minority loses. We are setting out today, therefore, not to draw a wall around those minorities and then set off in crusade for minority rights. We are rather meeting first to identify ourselves and our problems and then to examine what we have in common and what we can do together to promote these common interests.<sup>35</sup>

At the end of the symposium, a 19 member ad hoc committee was established to create plans for a council of minority groups. In September 1978 this committee recommended the creation of "The Council of Quebec Minorities."

The Council brought together a number of organisations and associations. By March of 1981, the CQM claimed to be an umbrella organisation for 42 diverse groups. Amongst these groups were the Townshippers Association, Ville Marie Social Services, the Black Community Association, the Consiglio Italiano Educativo and the Confederation of Indians of Quebec. Many of the ethnic, rural, and regional organisations in the province that had joined the Council were in operation before the CQM was actually created, the CQM merely brought these groups together.

In addition to the flexibility of membership eligibility, the CQM also developed as a result of the financial assistance from the federal government. Between 1978-79 and

1981-82 the Council received more federal government support than any other English-rights organisation.<sup>36</sup> This government support combined with the moderate stance adopted by the Council, can be cited as the main reason why the organisation developed a prominent role within the English-rights movement. While the Positive Action Committee and Participation Québec both had representatives in the CQM, the new organisation was designed to play a distinct role. When the CQM was established it was agreed amongst the various group leaders that the new organisation would involve itself only in issues that PAC or Participation Québec were not already acting upon. The diversity of the CQM brought the English-rights umbrella a number of groups who spoke neither English nor French. The provincial "Allophones" were now an integral part of the English lobby: It was de facto recognition of the heterogeneous nature of Quebec.

The Council attempted to act as an information network. Operation "Outreach" worked to correspond with both member associations of the Council and other ethno-cultural minority groups in the province, while gathering information about minorities in Quebec. The Council also lobbied the provincial Office de la langue Française to keep its testing centre open during July and initiated the effort to permit unemployed English Quebecers enrolled in French immersion programs to keep their unemployment benefits. Also, the Council's Ad Hoc Committee for the Extension of Temporary Permits lobbied the provincial government to extend temporary permits to Quebec-educated professionals who had to pass French language tests administered by the Office. In short, the CQM initiated various programs and hoped to change many of the restrictions placed on the Anglophone community.

Between April and September 1981, a series of political events intensified the English-rights movement. The new frustration in English Quebec was summed up by Gary Caldwell and Eric Waddell: "This new militancy was born of a certain frustration with the failure to wrench concessions from the present government, the disappointment with the unexpected Liberal defeat in 1981, the application of the unilingual sign legislation, and a rumoured educational reform which would, if implemented, leave very few English-language school boards in Quebec."<sup>37</sup>

Because of these events the Council and other English-rights groups began to re-think their strategy. In the fall of 1981 after a series of meetings among the various organisations, the Coalition of English-speaking people was formed. The Coalition was established primarily to have its views known by publishing a petition. The full page advertisement appeared in seven daily newspapers in Quebec on December 3, 1981.<sup>38</sup> It was drawn up by 56 people in October and November of the same year and listed a series of issues upon which English Quebecers agreed. These included many of Positive Action's views; the acceptance of the primacy of French in the province, the explanation of changing attitudes in the English community, and the responsibility of the government to respect the rights of minority groups. The list of supporters of the campaign included many influential members of the English community. While the Coalition lasted only six weeks, it set in motion a new phase in the English-rights movement. Over this period 15,000 respondents contributed over \$30,000.<sup>39</sup> The number of respondents hinted at the potential for a province wide network for English-speaking activism. This realisation set the stage for a process of consolidation which eventually would lead to the formation of the largest and most recent organisation within the English-rights movement

### *Chapter III*

#### ***THE BIRTH OF ALLIANCE QUEBEC***

With the founding of Alliance Quebec in the spring of 1982, a short but somewhat memorable chapter in the history of the English-rights movement came to an end. The birth of Alliance Quebec not only ushered in a new era of co-operation among English-rights groups, but suggested the beginning of a new trend among English-speaking Quebecers. This trend, characterised by the growth of bilingualism and a willingness to participate fully in Quebec society, served as the impetus for the creation of a new community based organisation committed to English rights. This chapter, by focusing on the emergence of Alliance Quebec, will consider the structure, purpose and vision of an organisation which has since risen to the forefront of the English-rights movement.

#### ***Consolidating the English Lobby***

Alliance Quebec represented a new departure for the English-rights movement. Prior to 1982, limited progress on the language issue, combined with the re-election of the Parti Québécois in 1981, led many to openly question the effectiveness of the English lobby. Among those who led the call for reform were members of the very organisations which in the past had met with such limited success. Commenting on the need to present a common front in the wake of the PQ's re-election, Eric Maldoff, once a member of Participation Quebec, remarked some years later that, "What a lot of us have been saying for

a while had proven true, that the PQ was not a four-year aberration but a reflection of a fundamental problem in Quebec society that required long term planning and genuine hard work to solve. It was at that point that the determination really emerged within our institutional leaders and a lot of our community leaders, saying we have to develop an effective mechanism".<sup>1</sup>

Within a year of the PQ's re-election Alliance Quebec was formed. By uniting the available human and physical capital it was apparent that the architects of the Alliance sought to forge a common front for the English community.<sup>2</sup> This process of consolidation brought immediate benefits. Groups which in the past had co-operated with each other but remained largely autonomous, dissolved under the leadership of new umbrella organisation. Leading the groups which joined Alliance Quebec were the Positive Action Committee and Participation Quebec. Their shared history and collective experience were to prove invaluable for the Alliance in its quest to gain acceptance among members of its own community and within the French-speaking milieu.

The rationale for bringing the various elements of the English lobby together under one banner were both obvious and straightforward. Rather than competing both financially and ideologically with other groups, an umbrella organisation could hope to expand its influence and widen its scope of interests. The same can not be said for the English-rights groups which existed prior to 1982. On different occasions, several groups including Positive Action, the Council of Quebec Minorities, and Participation Quebec, ended up making similar presentations before government, while hiring separate researchers to create similar studies.<sup>3</sup> More important, according to James Pasternak, was the fact that the three groups had common leaders and overlapping memberships.<sup>4</sup>

One of the other advantages of consolidation was the centralisation of financial support. This move effectively brought the competition for government funding among English-rights groups to end. When federal funding of English-rights organisations began in 1978, it was handled by the Secretary of State's Official Languages Minority Programme. The initiative, according to the federal government, "[was] designed to promote understanding between the two main language groups and a better appreciation of the bilingual character of Canadian society, and to facilitate the linguistic and cultural development of official language minority communities".<sup>5</sup> In the first year of funding under the program, English-rights groups received little more than \$86,000. This amount was shared almost equally between the Council of Quebec Minorities and Participation Quebec. The first real significant increase in funding for English-rights groups coincided with the referendum in 1980 and the re-election of the PQ in 1981. Although the total was more than five times that of 1978, amounting to over \$400,000, it was divided among three groups, one of which was the newly formed Positive Action Committee. The creation of Alliance Quebec brought with it the next major increase in federal funding.

The English lobby had known as early as 1977 of the federal government's desire to see the creation of an umbrella organisation which presented the English consensus in Quebec and paralleled groups representing French-speaking minorities in other provinces.<sup>6</sup> Although it might be presumptuous to suggest that this was the main reason the Alliance was established, it is nonetheless clear that the English lobby was conscious of the moral and financial backing it would likely receive.

As the only English-rights organisation to be the recipient of federal funding in 1982 Alliance Quebec received \$730,000. The following year marked somewhat of a

milestone for the English-rights movement, when the Alliance received \$1,000,000 in funding. In addition, the provincial government under the Parti Québécois contributed some \$33,000 through the Ministry of Cultural Communities and Immigration. The Alliance's budget for 1993 was \$1,671,000, of which the federal government remained the primary contributor (See Table 3.1 for detailed information). However, according to Alliance Quebec, funding from the government has not increased even to meet inflation since 1988, and will decrease in the future. As a result, one of the challenges facing the organisation in the future will be the search for additional revenue.

In order to develop alternative means of financing the Alliance commissioned an independent review of its fund raising activities. In a report handed down in May of 1993 by Kethcum Canada Inc. (a fund raising counsel), a number of issues were addressed stemming from Alliance Quebec's fund-raising record.

Regarding the Alliance's fund raising program, the counsel argued that current initiatives appear to be "inadequately-resourced"(i.e. personnel devoted to fund raising was insufficient).<sup>7</sup> They were particularly concerned with the fund raising year ending March of 1993. During that year the Alliance raised approximately \$98,000, while in the preceding year fund raising revenue totalled more than \$125,000 , as Table 3.1 indicates.

Although the drop in private funding might be attributed to economic conditions, and the general climate of cutbacks and restraint, the decline was nonetheless cause for some concern. Among the measures suggested to improve this situation, the independent counsel urged the Alliance to retain a full-time fund raising professional.<sup>8</sup> Recent experience had confirmed the importance of having such a person within the Alliance.

TABLE 3.1

**ALLIANCE QUEBEC BUDGET REPORT**  
*(Year Ending March 31, 1993)*

	Budget (1993)	Actual (1993)	Actual (1992)
Revenue			
Grants...			
Sec. of State	1,446,000	1,446,750	1,591,000
Gov. of Quebec	-	29,221	11,000
Court Challenges Prog.	-	50,000	-
The Alliance Inst.	-	44,181	61,069
Donations from fund raising	115,000	97,888	125,249
Convention fees & other income	110,000	59,382	63,976
<b>Total ...</b>	<b>1,671,000</b>	<b>1,727,422</b>	<b>1,852,294</b>
Expenditures...	1,671,000	1,699,318	1,709,358
Excess of revenue over expenditures...	-	28,104	142,936
Deficit (beginning of year)...	(14,626)	(14,626)	(157,562)
Surplus (deficit), end of year...	(14,626)	13,478	(14,626)

Source: Alliance Quebec, Auditor's Report (Montreal: April 28, 1993), excerpts from audited financial statements

For a two year period beginning in November of 1992, the Alliance obtained the services on loan of a senior manager through the Secretary of State to help develop more productive fund-raising initiatives. It remains to be seen what effect this change, if implemented, will have on the future fund raising activities of Alliance Quebec. However, the fact that the Alliance commissioned a review of its current operations suggest that the organisation is moving in the right direction.

### *The Quest for Credibility*

Like the collection of English-rights groups which preceded it, Alliance Quebec is as much a response to Bill 101 as it is an expression of urgency about the declining English-speaking population. However, unlike previous English-rights organisations, (notably the Positive Action Committee and Participation Quebec) Alliance Quebec appeared to speak for the majority of English speakers while presenting the consensus of English opinion. Still, the competition which existed between groups before the Alliance's creation had left the unmistakable impression that no single organisation spoke for the English community. It was difficult enough to gain credibility among Quebec's French-speaking majority which considered English Quebecers to be better off than French speakers in the rest of the country. At the same time, however, the Alliance had to convince members of its own community that an umbrella organisation could better serve their interests than a number of groups working independent of each other.

In order to be seen as a credible force by both sides, the Alliance had to adopt a moderate approach that most Quebecers would agree on, yet would not alienate disgruntled members of the English community. Like the organisation's bilingual name sug-

gests, the Alliance hoped to promote harmony among French and English while proposing unity among various factions of the English community, traditionally split along religious, cultural and socio-economic lines.<sup>9</sup> Predictably, the Alliance still found itself open to criticism by members of the English community who dubbed it "Compliance Quebec," because its demands were often seen as too mild and its approach too conciliatory.<sup>10</sup> Among those to have joined the criticism of Alliance Quebec is William Johnson, columnist for the *Montreal Gazette*. Referring to the Alliance's presentation before the joint Senate-Commons committee on official languages in 1990, Johnson argued:

There is a conviction, a force, when AQ denounces language intolerance in other parts of the country. It is lacking when AQ denounces language intolerance in Quebec... AQ could have examined the symmetrical bigotry of APEC and the National Assembly, and asked which was the more serious, which more deeply violated the solemn promises made by the Fathers of Confederation, which more violated the historic rights and fundamental liberties, as defined by the British North America Act and the Supreme Court of Canada.<sup>11</sup>

Other critics of the Alliance's moderate or brokerage approach have alluded to the organisation's relationship with the provincial Liberal party. Writing in the *Gazette* in 1987, Don MacPherson argued that the Alliance should be more concerned with changes to the province's signs legislation than trying to win friends among the Liberal government. According to MacPherson:

This is not the first time since the Liberals came to power in 1985 that Alliance Quebec has appeared uncomfortable with its role as *le lobby anglophone*,... and reluctant to exert public pressure on the government to keep its election promise to allow the use on commercial signs of other languages in addition to French. Throughout much of last fall's revival of the language debate, the Alliance was silent. The silence was apparently strategic, at least in part. Alliance Quebec's leaders are said to have believed that their exerting public pressure on the government would produce a reaction that would make it more difficult for the government to keep its promises on signs and such other issues as English-language health and social services. But the actual effect of Alliance Quebec's silence was to make the debate one-sided, to make it appear as though nobody except the government really wanted bilingual signs anyway and that the Liberals were stirring up trouble needlessly.<sup>12</sup>

Criticism from the English community and more specifically from members of the English-speaking media, suggest that Alliance Quebec has yet to convince all English speakers of the merits of its moderate approach. Still, the Alliance is confident that a majority of English speakers approve of dialogue with the provincial government, and the French-speaking majority for that matter, which is based on practical realism rather than fanaticism. To improve the French-speaking majority's perception of the English community as well as gain the credibility it needed to be an effective voice for English rights, the Alliance had to search for a compromise position. As was mentioned, part of this position meant advocating a moderate stance in relation to issues that involved the English community. It was clear that such a stance would also benefit the organisation in other areas. As James Pasternak has noted:

It was important for the Alliance to articulate a coherent and justifiable position to both the provincial and federal governments. To the federal government the Alliance presented both a series of demands as well as requests for funding. It appeared that the federal government would not likely direct financial support to, or act on policy demands of, an organisation that attacked the majority community in the province..<sup>13</sup>

Regardless of the financial incentives, the Alliance genuinely assumed that their credibility hinged on casting English Quebecers in a new light. One of the Alliance's first goals therefore was to openly recognise the primacy of the French language in Quebec. This, the Alliance concluded, "could only be achieved through learning the French language, participating in provincial politics, and working in both the Francophone public and private sectors".<sup>14</sup> One of the most crucial steps taken by the Alliance to bridge the gap between the two communities, was to assure French speakers that English posed no threat to the survival of the French language and culture. In the wake of a Quebec Superior Court ruling in September of 1982, on provisions of Bill 101 dealing with English

language instruction, the Alliance's contention appeared to receive some support. Chief Justice Jules Deschênes' judgement that the "Canada clause" did not threaten the French language in Quebec, confirmed what Alliance Quebec had been saying publicly for some time. The same line was often repeated by the Alliance during their annual conventions and throughout presentations before parliamentary commissions. In Alliance Quebec's 1983 Inaugural Fund-Raising Campaign publication, the organisation stated that by voicing reasonable, common sense concerns, the Alliance has succeeded in persuading hundreds of thousands of French-speaking Quebecers that these concerns are justified.<sup>15</sup>

In addition, the Alliance's strategy has been progressive in accepting the English community's minority status and by not depicting the French majority as vengeful. Similarly by associating English-speaking Quebecers with the plight of French-speaking minorities in the rest of Canada, Alliance Quebec has helped avoid allegations that they are solely concerned with the future of the English community. It is essential, as former Alliance Quebec President Michael Goldbloom has noted, that the "historic mistrust" which exists between English speakers in Quebec and French speakers in the rest of Canada be "dissipated," since both groups share in the minority experience which binds the country together.<sup>16</sup>

### *The Form and Structure of Alliance Quebec*


Alliance Quebec was designed to be the centre of the English-rights movement. Among its early objectives, the Alliance sought to bring as many English Quebecers together as possible in the hope that a new community consciousness centred around political activism would emerge. However, despite the community's tradition of creating

service organisations and institutions to serve its needs, social and economic divisions until the 1970s appear to have prevented the emergence of this political activism. With changes to the social and political fabric of Quebec society in the 1970s and 80s, the Alliance was able to attract a much larger segment of the English population, who began to see their future closely linked with the existence of the community itself. For the first time English speakers, regardless of their economic or social standing, were concerned about the future of the English-speaking community. The challenge for the Alliance, was to channel this sense of frustration into an effective lobby for the English-speaking community. To accomplish this, the Alliance established a network of "Chapters," "Regional Associations," and supporting "organisation member groups" (OMGs) that gave the English-rights group a grass roots appearance, as Figure 3.1 illustrates, while presenting the image of broad based coalition.

The twelve regional chapters of Alliance Quebec are formed of local registered members and represent various areas of English-speaking settlement. Each chapter democratically elects its own board of directors, and sets up advisory committees which mirror the head office in Montreal. These committees are composed of members of the Alliance and the English-speaking community and are designed to deal with major program areas and the planning of events and strategies. They are: Health and Social Services, Education, Youth Employment, Legal Affairs, Government Services, National Issues, and Communications. Committees meet regularly to develop policy and send their proposals to the Montreal office.

The off-island regional associations maintain their autonomy from the head office in Montreal while developing policy recommendations and presenting them to the

Figure 3.1



Alliance membership for approval. These associations are: the Outaouais Alliance, the Committee for Anglophone Social Action (CASA) in the Gaspé, the Townships' Association in the Eastern Townships, the Voice of English Quebec (VEQ) in the Québec City area, the Coasters' Association on the lower North Shore, and the Chateauguay Valley English-speaking Peoples' Association (CVESPA). With the exception of the Coasters' Association, all of these organisations were established prior to the founding of Alliance Quebec. Both the Alliance and the Regional associations have worked together in the past fighting measures such as Bill 101, and continue to play an important complementary role in the English-rights movement with an emphasis on serving local or rural concerns.

In addition to the community chapters and regional associations, English-speakers are represented within the Alliance network through a number of affiliated organisations, or Organisation Member Groups (OMGs). These are existing community groups, institutions, federations, councils and associations that are tied to the Alliance through an interest in the English community. Among the more easily recognised Organisation Member Groups, are the Quebec Farmers' Association, the Ville Marie Social Services Centre, and the provincial associations of Catholic and Protestant school teachers. These organisations and institutions support the general principles of Alliance Quebec and many who belong to these groups are also members of the Alliance. The Alliance's paid membership as of early 1994, is approximately 5,000. If one includes members from its outlying chapters and regional association, the number climbs to 40,000. Unfortunately, there is no way of presenting a profile of the Alliance's membership as the organisation does not keep statistics regarding the linguistic, ethnic, or socio-economic status of its members.


However, in terms of the size of the Alliance's membership, it is interesting to note that it has remained fairly constant over the past decade.

The administrative centre of Alliance Quebec is situated in the organisation's head office in Montreal (See Figure 3.2). The Alliance employs about two dozen people directly, of which the majority are retained on a full-time basis. More than half of these individuals work in the Community Liaison Department as a direct service to Chapters and the Alliance membership. They are responsible for Chapter activities, such as Chapter Board meetings, committees, events, projects, communications, etc. The remaining half a dozen employees oversee province-wide programs in areas of concern to the English community or to the Alliance specifically (i.e. National Issue, Health and Social Services).

Adding to the various bodies already mentioned, the administrative structure of Alliance Quebec is composed of a Governing Council, the Provincial Board of Directors, the Executive Committee, and the Advisory Council. Beginning with the Governing Council, it is composed of elected representatives of all the component parts of Alliance Quebec. It meets once a year, and democratically elects a Provincial Board, a Treasurer and a President.

The Provincial Board which is composed of 38 members, in turn elects an Executive Committee and Chairperson. The Board implements commissions programmes, commits expenditures, authorises publications, and makes all major policy decisions. Proposals for change to the constitution are brought before the Board which must meet four times a year. The Chairperson of the Board of Directors presides over meetings of the Governing Council and Provincial Board meetings.

Figure 3.2  
Alliance Quebec Staff Organigram



The Executive Committee of Alliance Quebec is composed of nine voting members, they are; Chairperson, President, vice-president, Off-Island vice-president, Treasurer, and three members at-large. They meet on a bimonthly basis and are responsible for day-to-day operations. Members of the executive elected at the Annual General Meeting are also members of the Board of Directors. The Advisory Council, however, is a global, consultative committee which people are appointed to at the Alliance's conventions.

Overall, the structure of Alliance Quebec with its various administrative bodies and agencies projects the image of a broad and dynamic organisation. While there is a certain amount of truth to this, the literature put out by the Alliance, and more specifically the figures in this chapter detailing the Alliance's organisational structure, tend to exaggerate the extent to which the Alliance operates as an umbrella group. In actual fact, much of the Alliance's work originates and is carried out by the head office in Montreal. Although certain committees and agencies exist more in principle than in reality this should not be considered one of the organisation's failings. The fact that exist at all demonstrates a commitment by the Alliance to direct certain issues to particular departments should an issue arise that necessitates their involvement.

### *The Leadership of Alliance Quebec*

One of Alliance Quebec's greatest assets is the quality of its leadership. Often described as dynamic and articulate, it has attempted to define the English-speaking consensus for a French-speaking majority which in the past knew little other than the fact that the English community was troubled.<sup>17</sup> Today, when one questions the majority of French speakers they are aware of the English community's concern with education, bi-

lingual signs and emigration. According to Graeme Decarie, long-time member of Alliance Quebec and professor at Concordia University, more than government funding and a high-profile position, the Alliance's success is in large part the result of political sophistication and basic organisational skills.<sup>18</sup> The seeds of this political refinement were sewn in the mid to late 1980s, when the Alliance's leadership was composed of a number of individuals who were familiar with politics or who grew up the sons of politicians.<sup>19</sup> Several of these individuals have now left the Alliance for careers in provincial and federal politics. The rather fluid nature of the Alliance's leadership (typical of most pressure groups) prevents us from forecasting the future composition and direction it might take, yet if the Alliance's past record is any indication, it would likely continue to involve highly educated and bilingual members of the English community.

One of the criticisms often heard of Alliance Quebec is that it risks losing touch with its general membership because its leadership is composed of a community elite that is out of touch with the majority of English speakers. In order to examine this claim, an occupational background analysis of the Alliance's 1993-94 Provincial Board of Directors was undertaken.<sup>20</sup> Of the 38 members on the Board, twelve (or 31.5%) had a background in business, commerce and or engineering, while seven (or 18.4%) had a background in teaching or administration at the primary or secondary school level. A further four (or 10.5%) members of the Board were lawyers, four were college or university professors, and four were professional volunteers. Two members (or 5.2%) were students, while two others were involved in the arts. The remaining three members were a nurse, a member of the clergy, and a public service employee. While one is likely to interpret these statistics in a number of ways, it appears that the composition of the Alliance's Provincial

Board of Directors is fairly representative of the English-speaking middle class. In this regard, the Alliance's leadership appears to be fairly consistent with other mass organisations.

The most visible and at times thankless position within the Alliance is that of President. Responsible for the general control and supervision of the organisation's affairs, he or she is elected by the Annual General Meeting of the Governing Council and serves for a term of one year. As the main spokesperson for Alliance Quebec, the President inevitably become the focus of public scrutiny. Often this attention serves as the perfect vehicle for the articulation of the Alliance's views, while on other occasions it points to some of the organisation's problems. In order to understand the importance of this media attention, one must first appreciate the degree to which the media in Quebec, both English and French, appear to be preoccupied with the language debate. If the province's daily newspapers did not attach such great importance to the language debate, then Alliance Quebec and a host of other organisations like it would have a more difficult time gaining prominence. For Montreal's English-language daily the *Gazette*, coverage of the language question is a necessary response to consumer demand within the English-speaking community. As Arnopolous and Clift have suggested, "depending on the temper of the times, news reports will be attuned to the anxieties of certain groups of people, to their desire for cheer and entertainment, to their propensity to share in the experience of others, and occasionally to give satisfaction to their prurient instincts."<sup>21</sup> Commanding a large proportion of the English-language readership, the *Gazette* has become one of the central opinion maker within the English community. References within the *Gazette* to Alliance Quebec or its President, are therefore important.

In May of 1993 the *Gazette* devoted a fair amount of attention to the Alliance's Presidential election. Robert Keaton, who had served as President of the Alliance since 1989 faced a challenge from Maurice King, President of the Chateauguay Valley English-speaking Association. King not only presented a challenge to Keaton's leadership, but proposed to lead the organisation in a different direction. He argued that it was time for a change in leadership, "away from the traditional approach of compliance and appeasement - with the nationalists and the Quebec Liberal Party, and toward a practical and positive representation of our needs, to ensure the survival of our community".<sup>22</sup> Keaton, along with other members of the Alliance's leadership were alarmed by King's comments. In fact it appears that they were so concerned by the challenge King represented that Keaton, who did not plan to seek re-election, felt he had no choice but to run as a candidate in order to stop King's bid.

The *Gazette*, which in the past had both supported and criticised the Alliance's initiatives, became involved. On the day before the Alliance was to elect its president at its annual convention, the *Gazette* published an editorial supporting Keaton and rejecting King's challenge. Arguing that Keaton deserved re-election, the editorial maintained that:

The Maurice Kings of this world seem to blame Alliance Quebec for Bill 101. But the Alliance was created (some years after Bill 101 was passed) precisely to fight against abuses of English rights. And it was clever and realistic enough to realize it could accomplish nothing if it simply shouted and opposed every step designed to strengthen the French language. That would just strengthen the hand of those nationalists who portray Anglophones as arrogant imperialists. So the Alliance and its successive leaders - Eric Maldoff, Royal Orr and Bob Keaton - have held to a policy of dialogue and practical realism. And it has worked.<sup>23</sup>

The following day the moderate forces of Alliance Quebec prevailed as Maurice King lost his bid to become President, by a vote of 143 to 47. Although there was never much doubt that Keaton would win, the episode revealed something more important

about the Alliance, and pressure groups in general. As long as Alliance Quebec exists, there will be tension from elements within the organisation who disagree with current policy or who advocate a different approach. It goes without saying that a pressure group which claims to represent a heterogeneous population will have its own diversity and inevitably its own internal struggles.

True to his word, six months into his new term as President of the Alliance, Robert Keaton confirmed that he would be leaving the organisation. With Maurice King's bid for the leadership defeated, and the Alliance safely in the hands of the more moderate element of the organisation, Keaton stepped down in December of 1993. By leaving half way through his mandate Keaton afforded Alliance Quebec vice-president Michael Hamelin the opportunity of becoming better known before facing possible challengers for the leadership of the organisation. In so doing, the "Alliance establishment had a better chance of preserving its control over the presidency as an almost hereditary position."<sup>24</sup> The strategy appeared to have worked. In May of 1994, Hamelin emerged with a landslide victory at the Alliance's convention. His only opponent, Irwin Rappaport, who advocated a more radical approach in dealing with the provincial government, managed only 26 votes as opposed to Hamelin's 119.

Although Keaton's announcement to leave the Alliance came as no surprise, the disclosure soon after his resignation that he hoped to enter provincial politics did arouse some suspicion among members of the English community. Like other members of the Alliance before him, Keaton had decided to try his luck as a candidate for the Liberal party. In so doing, Keaton had led people to consider whether the Alliance had become a training ground, or "farm team" for the provincial Liberals. Keaton is by no means the

first ex-Alliance Quebec member to enter provincial politics under the Liberal banner. Former Alliance Quebec executives with the Liberals include John Parisella, Robert Bourassa's chief of staff; MNA Russell Williams, Reid Scowen, who became Quebec's delegate to New York; and Russell Copeman who after a being an aide to premier Bourassa sought and won election as Liberal candidate in Notre Dame de Grace in the 1994 provincial election.<sup>25</sup> Keaton's bid to run as a candidate for the Liberals ended with Copeman's nomination in the N.D.G riding. However, it remains to be seen whether his use of the Alliance as a springboard into Quebec politics might in the long run hurt the organisation's credibility as a non-partisan and independent lobby group.

## **CHAPTER IV**

### ***THE POLITICAL OBJECTIVES AND STRATEGIC VISION OF ALLIANCE QUEBEC***

The minority experience of Quebec's English-speaking population has been deeply affected by the changing reality of Quebec society. At various times in the last twenty-five years that experience has led to conflict with successive provincial governments over issues ranging from access to English education to the language of commercial signs.<sup>1</sup> Since 1982, it has also meant the intervention of Alliance Quebec.

The various policy initiatives which the organisation has been concerned with over the years will be presented in this chapter in two sections. The first section will deal primarily with issues that involve the federal government, falling under the general control of the Alliance's National Issues Programme. The second section encompasses much of the Alliance's work within Quebec which has come under the supervision of programmes devoted to education, legal affairs, health and social services. While this categorisation helps us to differentiate between areas of federal and provincial concentration, several issues have and continue to involve both levels of government.

#### ***Federal or National Objectives***

With respect to the general goals set out by Alliance Quebec, there are a number of specific objectives which form part of the organisation's established program devoted

to national issues. The primary focus of the National Issues Program is to foster the development of Canada's linguistic duality. Along these lines there are three main goals.

They are as follows:

1. To prepare the Alliance for constitutional negotiations.
2. To maintain and develop relations with the Fédération des francophones hors Québec et la Société nationale des Acadiens.
3. To provide and disseminate information about the Alliance's national vision.<sup>2</sup>

The first major constitutional negotiation since the creation of the Alliance was the Meech Lake constitutional amendment, agreed upon in principle in 1987. Of particular importance for Alliance Quebec during its negotiations with the federal government leading up to the Meech Lake Accord, was to maintain the application of the minority language provisions of the *Charter of Rights and Freedoms* (from here on referred to simply as the Canadian Charter). The Alliance was concerned that the government of Quebec was prepared to withdraw section 23(2) of the Canadian Charter from application, so that it would only apply when proclaimed in force by the provincial legislature.<sup>3</sup> Section 23 of the Canadian Charter provides protection for official language minorities in the area of education. However, the issue of minority language rights was not dealt with in the Meech Lake Accord. Other areas, including the interpretative clause (section 2 of the accord), and the override clause within the Canadian Charter were issues of great contention for Alliance Quebec.

In their presentation before the Select Committee on the Meech Lake Constitutional Accord in 1989, Alliance Quebec argued that the interpretative clause failed to

sufficiently reflect the true character of Canadian society.<sup>4</sup> They recommended that it should more adequately recognise the French-speaking communities present throughout the country, as well as the concept of multiculturalism and the aboriginal peoples of Canada.<sup>5</sup> However, by far the most controversial point raised by Alliance Quebec in its brief to the committee, had to do with the Accord's recognition of Quebec as a distinct society. Although the Alliance both supported and recognised the duty of the government of Quebec to protect the French language and culture, they insisted that the Accord did not clearly define Quebec's distinctiveness.<sup>6</sup> The Accord did in section 2(1)(a) refer to the existence of French-speaking Canadians, centred in Quebec and also present in the rest of Canada, but according to Alliance Quebec, it represented an "incomplete portrait of what distinguishes Quebec from other provinces."<sup>7</sup> Their brief made the point that:

Quebec's distinctiveness is the culmination of a gradual and on-going historical, social and political evolution. The interaction of the predominantly French-speaking population of Quebec and its English-speaking population coupled with its growing cultural and linguistic diversity, define our society and are an integral part of its specificity....[*therefore*] We believe that the distinctiveness of Quebec society can and must be preserved without infringing the rights of its citizens. The Meech Lake Accord must not serve as the basis for restricting the fundamental constitutional rights of any Canadian.<sup>8</sup>

In a similar vein, Alliance Quebec urged that section 33 of the Charter be repealed. Section 33 permits Parliament or any provincial legislature to declare that legislation will operate "notwithstanding" the fundamental freedoms, legal rights, and equality rights guaranteed by the Charter. The Alliance argued that by virtue of its inclusion, the Constitution rests on a "weak and fundamentally flawed foundation."<sup>9</sup> Pressing for the removal of the legislative override, the organisation drew the following conclusion:

We have lived with the Charter long enough to dispel any significant fears of judicial imperialism. The state will always find reasons why its actions should not be restrained by judicial review, but the best interest of the governed must be the ultimate

yardstick against which a constitution is measured. Individual rights, including legal rights, equality rights and the fundamental freedoms, cannot be tailored for the convenience of governments.<sup>10</sup>

In the most recent constitutional exercise, the 1992 Charlottetown Accord, the inclusion of clauses recognising linguistic duality as well as support for official language minorities helped to win the backing of Alliance Quebec. However, the fact that Alliance Quebec supported Charlottetown and not the Meech Lake Accord does hide an important story. While the Charlottetown Accord did address a number of Alliance Quebec's concerns, the lack of support for Meech Lake sprang from other intervening and intensely political factors. The most notable of these factors was the passage of Bill 178. Regarded as a symbol of extremism, the passage of legislation forbidding the use of English on commercial signs enraged the English-speaking community and convinced Alliance Quebec of the "unworthiness of the provincial Liberals."<sup>11</sup> The atmosphere was further charged by the government of Quebec's decision to evoke the notwithstanding clause in response to the Supreme Court's ruling that Bill 178 contravened the Canadian Charter. Alliance Quebec's opposition to the move was predictable. As John Trent notes, "the refrain was picked up across Canada to the detriment of the Meech Lake Accord."<sup>12</sup>

Another of Alliance Quebec's objectives is to maintain its relationship with the Fédération des francophones hors Québec et la Société nationale des Acadiens. In so doing, Alliance Quebec has made a conscious effort not to over-emphasise the natural bond amongst English speakers throughout Canada. As Michael Goldbloom has argued, "a distinction must be drawn between the international strength of English and the relative fragility of Quebec's English-speaking community. The language is not endangered, but the community is."<sup>13</sup> The experience of being a member of a linguistic minority in

North America, he adds, is one that no other English-speaking Canadian can share.<sup>14</sup> However, English-speaking Quebecers have begun to realise that many of the issues which preoccupy French-speaking communities outside of Quebec are similar those which concern their own. Still, the existence of French-speaking Canadians outside the province of Quebec, while similar to that of Quebec's English-speaking population, is in many ways more precarious. Even though the number of francophones outside Quebec has grown in recent years, as Table 4.1 illustrates, they, unlike the English of Quebec, are not concentrated in any one province. In the absence of any spatial concentration, the "backbone" of the French-speaking nation outside of Quebec, is its schools, its hospitals and its other community institutions.<sup>15</sup> In the end, both linguistic minorities have a vested interest in maintaining control of their institutions, and have adopted a similar vision of a bilingual and united Canada. Perhaps even more so in the case of the French-speaking minority. Len Macdonald, the current director of the National Issues Programme explains:

For a lot of francophones in New Brunswick and Ontario there is no draw to going into Quebec, there is no special deal about leaving there and coming here. Whereas for Canadians who live in Quebec and are English-speaking the trend is out - at least for a period of time - because it's our Canada, and I don't think that their belief [francophones outside of Quebec] that it is *their Quebec* is that strong [italics mine]. I think that they probably better than anyone else realise that they have an immense territory to choose from if Canada remains whole. But if Canada doesn't remain whole there is going to be a generation that is really going to pay the price for the loss, and that generation is going to be affected because second language development has no *raison d'etre* if Quebec isn't in Canada. So it is a very dicey situation for them therefore they are much more committed to seeing the situation improved by whatever means it takes to keep Quebec in Confederation.<sup>16</sup>

Alliance Quebec maintains regular contact with the FFHQ and the Société nationale des Acadiens through a variety of mechanisms. In addition to participating in

TABLE 4.1

*Linguistic Communities in Canada by Home Language  
1981-1991  
(in thousands)*

		1981	1991	change	% chg.
Francophones	outside of Quebec:	664	635	-29	-4.4%
	in Quebec:	5,276	5,655	379	7.2%
	Total:	5,940	6,290	350	5.9%
Anglophones	outside of Quebec:	15,571	17,680	2,109	13.5%
	in Quebec:	784	759	-25	-3.2%
	Total:	16,355	18,439	2,084	12.7%
Allophones	outside of Quebec:	1,479	1,868	389	26.3%
	in Quebec:	309	397	88	28.5%
	Total:	1,788	2,265	477	26.7%
Canada	Francophones:	5,940	6,290	350	5.9%
	Anglophones	16,355	18,439	2,084	12.7%
	Allophones	1,788	2,265	477	26.7%
	Total:	24,083	26,994	2,911	12.1%

Source: Department of the Secretary of State of Canada, *Official Languages Annual Report to Parliament 1992* (Ottawa: Minister of Supply and Services Canada, 1993) 17, adapted from Table 11.2.

Parliamentary hearings, one of the most visible areas for joint co-operation includes representations before the courts. Over the years, Alliance Quebec has intervened a number of times in support of the rights of French-speaking communities outside of Quebec. Some of the more notable of these interventions include the highly publicised Manitoba Language Reference (1985), and the case regarding the funding of Roman Catholic schools in Ontario (1987). However, support for court challenges concerning French speakers outside of Quebec are assessed primarily in terms of their potential impact on the legal rights of Quebec's English-speaking community.<sup>17</sup> All of which to say, that Alliance Quebec will co-operate with the FFHQ and the Société nationale des Acadiens to the extent that a common purpose can be identified.

One of the current issues before both groups is the question of resurrecting the Court Challenges Program. Designed to provide financial support for cases involving language rights protected under the constitution, the program first introduced in 1978 and later expanded with the advent of the Canadian Charter, was eliminated in 1992. The initiative to re-establish the Court Challenges program is still in its infancy, and as of yet no decision has been made on what form it should take.

Somewhat related to Alliance Quebec's identification with francophones outside of Quebec, is the organisation's support of multiculturalism. At first, the notion of supporting a policy which attempts to recognise the diversity of Canadian society might appear to run counter to the Alliance's goal of promoting linguistic duality. However, the Alliance has maintained that there is no contradiction in supporting policies on Official Languages and Multiculturalism; both, they argue, are mutually supportive.<sup>18</sup> The idea of linguistic communities, as far as the Alliance is concerned, "recognises that both com-

munities [English and French] are heterogeneous and multicultural in nature.... These two policies pertain to different things and yet, each reinforces and supports each other.”<sup>19</sup> Considering this objective, it appears that the Alliance has sought to silence critics who might have argued that the organisation is concerned only with the plight of the English-speaking minority in Quebec and not with Canadians whose ancestors, as Alan Cairns has noted, had not met on the Plains of Abraham.<sup>20</sup>

The third objective is the Alliance's general goal of disseminating information concerning the organisation's national vision. To be pursued both within and outside Quebec, this objective is in essence the sum of all the initiatives undertaken by Alliance Quebec. As the organisation's bilingual name suggests, the Alliance hopes to promote harmony between Quebec's French-speaking population and the English-speaking minority. By pursuing a number of specific objectives, several of which have been alluded to, the Alliance has attempted to increase the awareness of politicians, the media, as well as the general public of an Anglophone community in a changing Quebec.

### *Provincial or Community Objectives*

Although a number of goals have emerged over the years from various policy conventions and general meetings, a rather consistent trend is nonetheless discernible among the Alliance's provincial objectives. These goals remain the primary objectives of the organisation. We have identified and will discuss three major areas, they are:

1. Control and management of institutions
2. Reform of signs legislation
3. Widened access to English education

Control over English institutions has always preoccupied the English-rights movement. From the time of Participation Quebec and Positive Action, to the forming of Alliance Quebec, there has been a desire to ensure the continued vitality of the many institutions and services established by the English community. As the Alliance's own background information would suggest:

Over the years the English-speaking community has built an impressive array of institutions - hospitals, social service agencies, schools, libraries, universities, which not only serve our community but contribute to the larger Quebec and Canadian society. Although many of these institutions are now part of the public or para-public sector in Quebec, the community continues to feel a strong sense of connection and commitment rooted in the history of private initiative and community co-operation which built and maintained them. The community also recognises that these institutions remain essential to its ability to care for its individual members and to define and promote its unique identity.<sup>21</sup>

With the onset of the Quiet Revolution came the fear that English institutions would be threatened. In the past, as James Pasternak has noted, "as long as the English could turn to their hospitals, schools and universities, there was little need to be concerned with French-Canadian nationalism and the wider provincial political culture."<sup>22</sup> The election of the Parti Québécois in 1976 effectively ended the English community's relative indifference. One of the first objectives of the newly elected government was to implement language legislation through the passage of the *Charter of the French Language*, otherwise known as Bill 101. When Alliance Quebec came to the forefront of the English-rights movement in 1982, the focus among English-speaking Quebecers remained Bill 101. The Alliance challenged a number of Bill 101's provisions, in particular the clause whereby all employees of English institutions would be required to function in French. The Alliance argued that while individuals should be able to receive services in French from English institutions, it was unreasonable to require that every member of

such an institution be able to function fully in French. Alliance Quebec's objection was based on the long-standing belief that in order to be effective English institutions had to reflect the community which it served. If local institutions were the key to the English community's survival, as the Alliance was quick to argue, then they should be controlled by and be representative of the wider English-speaking population.

Alliance Quebec was eventually able in 1984 to persuade the provincial government to amend Bill 101 so that the responsibility to provide bilingual services fell to the institution and not to the individual employees. Along with this victory, the Alliance was further successful in challenging provincial legislation making French the sole language of communication among English institutions. According to Bill 101 as it was passed in 1977, employees within an institution whether they were English speakers or not, had to use French in their written correspondence with each other. In a letter to the Premier of Quebec in 1982, the President of Alliance Quebec Eric Maldoff commented on the absurdity of such a situation. He argued that for English institutions "it is destructive of their character and contrary to good sense, and blatantly violates the spirit of the resolution of the Parti Québécois favouring the maintenance of English institutions."<sup>23</sup> As a result of pressure from Alliance Quebec and the English community, the provincial government under the PQ amended Bill 101 in 1983 allowing institutions to use both the official language [French] and another language in their names, their internal communication and their communications with each other. Both amendments to Bill 101 are widely considered to be one of the Alliance's biggest achievements, and continue to be a point of reference for French speakers outside the province of Quebec who point to the number of separate institutions and the level of control exercised by the English minority.

In addition to the Alliance's efforts with respect to the control and management of its institutions, the organisation has widened its objectives to work towards ensuring legislative guarantees for services in English. The Alliance has been most active in this regard with respect to health and social services. Working through Alliance Quebec's Health and Social Services Programme, the organisation has attempted to ensure implementation of Bill 142 which guarantees English language health and social services.

The second general objective, reform of legislation governing commercial signs, continues to be one of the most passionately contested issues within Quebec society. With Bill 101, the Parti Québécois effectively changed the *visage linguistique* in Quebec by prohibiting the use of any language other than French on commercial signs. The response from Quebec's English-speaking community was predictable. While many English Quebecers had resigned themselves to accept the changing face of Quebec society, the prohibition of English on commercial signs ranked for them as a violation of their civil rights. Many English speakers felt that the legislation was not only a violation of freedom of expression as guaranteed under the Canadian Charter, but a denial of the English presence in Quebec and their contribution to Quebec society. What follows is a brief synopsis of the events.

In 1984, Alliance Quebec mounted a challenge to sec. 58 of Bill 101 on behalf of several Quebec merchants, the most well known of which was Brown's Shoe Store. Unlike an earlier case brought before the courts involving a merchant who wanted to maintain unilingual English signs (Allan Singer), the Alliance along with the English merchants objected to the provision making French the only language permissible on commercial signs. Lawyers for the merchants argued that the procedures used by the

Quebec legislature to override the Canadian Charter were ineffective.<sup>24</sup> In December of 1984, the Quebec Superior Court declared sec. 58 of The Charter of the French Language as contrary to the Quebec Charter of Rights and Freedoms. The Quebec government subsequently appealed the decision and in December 1986, the Quebec Court of Appeal delivered a unanimous verdict, upholding the lower courts decision. The Quebec government then took leave to appeal to the Supreme Court of Canada. The Supreme Court released its verdict on December 15, 1988. At the same time the court issued its verdict in the Singer case. In both decisions only one opinion was presented. The general thrust of the verdict was that while it was legitimate to require the use of French on all commercial signs, it was a contravention of the freedom of expression provisions of both the Quebec and Canadian Charter to forbid the use of other languages in conjunction with French. The court argued that, "Language is so intimately related to the form and content of expression that there cannot be true freedom of expression if one is prohibited from using the language of one's choice."<sup>25</sup>

In retrospect, the Court's decision appeared to present a way out for the Quebec government under Robert Bourassa. If Bill 101 were to be amended so as to provide for the predominant but not exclusive use of French on commercial signs, such a provision would more than likely be found by the Court to be permissible under both the Quebec and Canadian Charters.<sup>26</sup> However, the Quebec government chose to invoke the notwithstanding clause of the Charter to maintain the unilingual signs provision of Bill 101. Under new language legislation Bill 178, English and other languages would be allowed only indoors, and only if the indoor signs could not be easily read from the outside. But with regard to chain stores and franchise outlets, only French would be allowed, even on

the inside. According to Alliance Quebec, “this decision continues to be viewed by English-speaking Quebecers as a profoundly negative symbol of our nonacceptance as recognised and legitimate partners in Quebec society.”<sup>27</sup> The Alliance has consistently advocated the right to post bilingual signs, maintaining that by restricting one language one does not advance the other.

In May of 1993 the government of Quebec decided to lift its ban on bilingual signs by introducing new legislation in the National Assembly. It is somewhat unclear why the government decided to lift the ban sixteen years after the initial law went into place, but it appears that the Liberal government, after testing public opinion, concluded that there was broad support for the initiative. It remains to be seen what action if any the government of the Parti Québécois will take on this subject.

The Alliance's traditional position on access to English schools has been to maintain that all English-speaking people should have the right to attend. The rationale for increased access has remained the same for the better part of the past twenty years; to redress the decline in the English-speaking population. More recently, the organisation suggested that one of the ways to increase enrolment in English schools, was to allow section 23(1)a of the Canadian Charter of Rights (the mother tongue clause) to be issued into force. The clause guarantees Canadian citizens the right to have their children receive “primary and secondary school instruction” in either French or English in any province, if their “first language learned and still understood is that of the English or French linguistic minority population of the province in which they reside.”<sup>28</sup> However, the application of the mother tongue clause was delayed by inserting a provision which held up the application until the time that the National Assembly in Quebec ratified it.

Along with the movement to increase access to English-language schools, the Alliance has been very active in pursuing the realignment of school boards along linguistic lines. In June of 1993, the Supreme Court upheld portions of Quebec's education law (Bill 107) which allows the province to replace most denominational school boards with linguistic school boards by 1996. Pre-Confederation school boards (there are four of them in Quebec), may continue to exist as guaranteed by the Constitution. But only parents who declare themselves Protestant or Catholic can register their children in a denominational school board. Members of other religious communities must attend schools in the new linguistic boards or send their children to private institutions.

The objectives discussed in this chapter represent much of the Alliance's work over the past thirteen years. Although there are a number of other concerns which no doubt are considered by Alliance Quebec to be of great significance, the focus has been on objectives which are considered to be the most contentious and have received the highest profile. All of the issues stem from the Alliance's core philosophy which advocates a greater role for English speakers within Quebec society.

**CHAPTER V**

**THE ALLIANCE AND ITS POLITICAL ALLIES:  
FROM BILL 178 TO BILL 86**

From the point of view of language policy, Quebec is an interesting case. Even former Premier of Quebec, Robert Bourassa, appeared to have agreed when he noted in 1986 that nowhere in the free world is there a country where a minority is prohibited from using its own language on its signs.<sup>1</sup> The practice of legislating language, however, is not reserved to Quebec, or for that matter to Canada. What is relatively unique among governments of multilingual societies, is Quebec's regulation of the English language in the private domain.<sup>2</sup> Bill 101, as adopted in 1977, forbid the use of any language other than French on most commercial signs. Its replacement by Bill 178 in 1989, in the wake of the Supreme Court's decision that it violated the *Charter of Rights and Freedoms*, only served to intensify the language debate. Bill 178, as Ronald Rudin notes:

was seen by many French speakers concerned with the survival of their language in the midst of the North American sea of English speakers, as a retreat from the principles of Bill 101... Bill 178, they claimed, was unsatisfactory since it allowed the use of English signs within most establishments as long as French signs were "markedly predominant." By contrast, most English speakers saw Bill 178 as insulting because of the so-called "inside-outside" formula. Since only French signs were permitted outside with the possibility of English signs inside, it seemed that English was acceptable as long as it was not visible to the public.<sup>3</sup>

Although members of both linguistic communities were deeply angered by Bill 178, the sense of betrayal ran no deeper than in the Anglophone community which had supported the Quebec Liberal Party in the 1985 election on the promise of restoring bi-

lingual signs. Their response in the next provincial election was to vote overwhelmingly for candidates of the newly formed Equality Party which had campaigned, among other things, on reversing Bill 178. As for Alliance Quebec, which had supported the Liberals in the past, the group broke with tradition and actively encouraged English-speaking Quebecers to vote for the Equality Party. The Alliance's position on the subject was clear. The Liberal's had demonstrated their unwillingness to defend the interests of the Anglophone community which prompted the organisation to search for new allies among groups it could work with to have Bill 178 removed. The questions which remained in the fall of 1989 were who the Alliance would enlist in their cause to restore bilingual signs and whether the Anglophone community would continue to support them.

### *Lessons From the P.Q.*

If recent history had taught Alliance Quebec anything, it was that they could not count on the Parti Québécois to support them in their drive to have Bill 178 overturned. Clearly the party which had so steadfastly opposed a return to bilingual signs and who considered Bill 178 to have violated the spirit of Bill 101, were not about to work towards having the legislation further diluted. As far as the P.Q. was concerned, unilingual signs were necessary to maintain the "French face" of Quebec and an integral part of the process aimed at improving the status of the French language and culture. Responding to criticism that Bill 178 violated the rights of English-speaking Quebecers, the Parti Québécois has preferred to make the case that Quebec had better protected the rights of Anglophones than Canada had of Francophones outside Quebec.<sup>4</sup> Yet for English-speaking Quebecers, and the Alliance in particular, this was the least important reason for suggest-

ing that anyone's fundamental rights should be infringed. Nevertheless, the Alliance opted to maintain a dialogue with the P.Q., even if this meant the two sides would never come to an agreement on Bill 178. It would be politically unwise for them to proceed differently, knowing that the P.Q. might return to power. A brief account of the Alliance's dealings with the P.Q. during the 1980s reveals the organisation's strategy.

The re-election of the Parti Québécois in 1981 helped confirm for Anglophone Quebecers that the PQ, in the words of Eric Maldoff, "was not a four year aberration."<sup>5</sup> Although the Alliance understood it could not count on the P.Q. to volunteer changes to its language policies, the absence of any direct representation for Anglophones in the government appeared to offer the organisation a unique opportunity to press for changes to Bill 101. In short, the Alliance felt the Parti Québécois would be likely to consult the organisation on matters affecting the English community. Reflecting on the era, Len Macdonald of Alliance Quebec made the following observations:

the ironic thing is that when the P.Q. was in power it was the belief of those people who were at Alliance Quebec at the time that they could get a lot more out of them than the Liberals, because the P.Q. would never be charged as being soft on the English if they gave in on some matter, and it would always be politically wise for them to show the best generosity they could, more so than the Liberals who had to fight a lot of other polarities within Quebec society... So when we said to the P.Q. "you know orange is really a chartreuse [*sic*], and chartreuse in the sky it is a very dangerous situation, so you better watch because the storm clouds are coming." Then the P.Q. would say when they got to cabinet, "well we know chartreuse is a very dangerous colour, so lets change the colour..." They would go out of their way to do things because they had absolutely no other feedback.<sup>6</sup>

Proof that the Alliance had established a healthy dialogue with the P.Q. came in March of 1983, when amendments to Bill 101 permitted English institutions to use English in their communications. In effect, the Parti Québécois had demonstrated that it was not afraid to "toucher à la loi 101."<sup>7</sup> The key for the Alliance was to translate this early

success into further movement on the issue of the unilingual signs provisions of Bill 101. The Alliance knew that in order to accomplish this they would have to continue to lobby intensely within the government and through the media. The aim of this approach was to encourage people to take notice that there was a broad based organisation behind the Alliance's initiative, so the Alliance would not be dismissable, as Len Macdonald adds, simply because it's just those guys in the office, but a real community organisation.<sup>8</sup>

However, it was inevitable that at some point the Alliance would arrive at the conclusion that no further progress could be made on the language of commercial signs as long as the P.Q. was in power. There were only so many concessions the sovereignist government was likely to make on Bill 101. This did not imply that the Alliance would forego opportunities to press for further changes, only that one had to be realistic about one's chances of success.

Throughout the Parti Québécois' second mandate the leadership of the Alliance made no secret of its desire to see the Liberals back in power. After all, through three successive election campaigns beginning in 1976 the Liberals had adopted policies which opposed the prohibition of languages other than French.<sup>9</sup> The Anglophone community was therefore reassured that with a Liberal victory in the next provincial election the issue of commercial signs would be settled once and for all. The scene was set when in the spring of 1985 the Liberals under Robert Bourassa were returned to power.

### *The Alliance and the Liberal Party*

Although the Liberal Party is intimately connected with the language debate through the passage of Bill 22 in 1974, it was nonetheless the party of choice for most

English speakers throughout the 1970s and mid 1980s. In fact, throughout this period the Liberal opposition was widely viewed as the party of the English.”<sup>10</sup> Convinced that the association had contributed to their defeat, the party's top executives were committed to changing the Liberal's image in time for the next election. As a consequence, the Liberals set out to adopt a more “pro-nationalist” stance under the leadership of Robert Bourassa. By 1985, this new direction had significantly influenced the traditional role exercised by the English community within the party. Quoted here at length, Reed Scowen contends:

In the 1981 vote the Liberals won forty-two seats, thirty of them in constituencies with a strong non-French component. After the 1985 election, there were still thirty “English” Liberal ridings, but out of 99. The influence of the English community in the power structure of the party and the government was reduced overnight by half.

As a result, the Liberal party changed profoundly after the December 1985 election. The promises and the rhetoric that had assured the transfer of fifty-seven additional counties to the Liberal side and made the election victory possible had not dwelt on the role of the English in Quebec. The new members had defeated their Parti Québécois opponents, in part, by assuring the voters that they were *not* “the party of the English.” Now in power, they were determined to make this assurance a reality.

The leadership of the party and the government was extremely sensitive to this new nationalist element. For one thing, it was evident that the only political threat to the government was the Parti Québécois. Consequently there was every reason to adopt a political stance that would ensure that only those unequivocally committed to independence would find it necessary to vote for the opposition party. The Liberal party decided to make certain that all French Canadian nationalists could feel at home within its ranks. To achieve this the English-speaking wing of the party was to be asked to make, in the words of the premier, an enormous concession. .<sup>11</sup>

Although the government clearly intended to broaden its appeal among Francophone voters it did not abandon plans to pass new legislation permitting bilingual signs. However, before making good on its promise the government opted to wait for the Quebec Court of Appeal's ruling on the constitutionality of the unilingual signs provisions of Bill 101, launched by the P.Q. two years earlier. The Liberals hoped the courts would settle what had proved for them to be a highly divisive issue. Alliance Quebec

was not particularly troubled with the government's decision, as far as they were concerned the issue of bilingual signs had been resolved. The government continued to reinforce this assumption by speaking publicly on the subject and by referring to opinion polls showing the population's support for bilingual signs.<sup>12</sup> According to Scowen, the Premier even hinted that regulations might be changed to allow bilingual signs without modifying the Charter of the French Language.<sup>13</sup>

The general mood of optimism within the Anglophone community quickly changed to disbelief in December of 1986. The Quebec Court of Appeal as had been expected handed down its verdict declaring the sign law invalid. Yet the government in a move which took most Quebecers by surprise decided to appeal the verdict once again, this time to the Supreme Court. The government's position could no longer be explained by a desire to seek direction from the courts. It appeared they had joined the increasingly vocal opposition to bilingual signs which included the P.Q., the Société Saint-Jean Baptiste and the Mouvement Québec français.

The majority of Anglophones were outraged by the government's decision. In the two years which preceded the Supreme Court's ruling English-speaking members of the Bourassa cabinet had been committed to changing the minds of their colleagues. The premier understood that he risked losing at least two of his English ministers if he went ahead with plans to maintain unilingual signs. In spite of this the government had made a clear decision and was resigned to it. As a result, when the Supreme Court declared the sign law illegal, the government's response was not unexpected. Four days later Premier Bourassa invoked section 33 of the constitution, and introduced Bill 178 before the National Assembly as the solution to restoring the "social peace" in Quebec.

Recognising that the government's decision to pass Bill 178 was politically motivated, members of the English community were nonetheless resigned to view it as a blatant affront against individual rights. Joan Fraser of *The Gazette* perhaps said it best when she claimed that the language of signs, "may not be the biggest thing in most people's day-to-day lives, but it is important on a symbolic level."<sup>14</sup> For English-speaking members of the Liberal government the legislation had gone too far. Herbert Marx, Clifford Lincoln and Richard French, all key members of the Bourassa cabinet resigned in protest. In his resignation speech Clifford Lincoln noted, "In my belief rights are rights are rights. There is no such thing as inside rights and outside rights.... There are no partial rights.... Rights are links in a chain of fundamental values that bind all individuals in the society; they must be inalienable, just and fair."<sup>15</sup>

The fallout from Bill 178 was also felt at Alliance Quebec. The Alliance had spent the past five years convincing the Anglophone community that the Liberal party offered the best hope of regaining their rights that had been taken away by the P.Q. in 1977. The organisation had now been thrust into the unenviable position of having to justify why it had backed the Liberal agenda in 1985. A record of the Alliance's actions reveals where their strategy went wrong.

To bring about a reversal of the unilingual signs provisions of Bill 101, the organisation had opted to work on two fronts. The first, was to have elected members of the English community work to bring about change from within. While this was not possible during the P.Q.'s mandate, it became a reality when the Liberals claimed power in 1985. The Alliance had developed a close relationship with the English-speaking members of the Bourassa government. The three English-speaking MNAs who later re-

signed from the government were all high profile members of the English community. However, the co-operation amongst English-speaking members in the government with the Alliance, some of whom had been former Alliance Quebec members themselves, has not been a completely satisfactory one. According to Len Macdonald this is natural, because as he notes:

People who are hired to do policy or people who have decided to do policy at a level of political party affiliation tend to have a whole lot of other things on their minds beside the Alliance's issues. But having said that, of course its not bad that people who did work for Alliance Quebec are now at a higher level, because it gives us people that we have good access to and can be informal with and say, "we really need this", or "I am just talking to you for the sake of talking to you, don't take me too seriously."... "I may be able to understand why you can't do anything for me, but I am telling you it's still important and if you get the chance or do see an opening, or you can change the policy, or you do see your minister, or the premier is walking by your desk, drop the fact that we called and that we expressed great indignation and anger that you weren't being helpful."...Because we only see the "big guys" formally we do not see them informally, so everyone is on their guard. But if you really want to get your message through you want to get it through on an informal channel; to the assistants and the non-luminaries as it were, who do not have the spotlight, and we can at least be assured that we'll get a phone call back.<sup>16</sup>

The second and more visible role for the Alliance was to lobby the government directly through briefs and presentations. In February of 1988, ten months before the government's action to invoke the notwithstanding clause, the Alliance presented a discussion paper on the future of the Anglophone community before the Liberal party's annual convention. The Supreme Court had yet to deliver its verdict on the legality of the unilingual signs provision of Bill 101. However the Alliance was aware that the Liberal government was considering its alternatives in the wake of a judgement striking down the law. The Alliance made the following observation: A number of cabinet ministers have gone so far as to state that Quebec will consider overriding fundamental rights to exempt the signs provisions of Bill 101... The use of this clause by the Government of Quebec

would be contrary to both the Liberal Party's 1985 electoral programme and to the liberal values referred to in this convention's policy document. It was clear the Alliance new what to expect if the Supreme Court ruling struck down the law. Still, when what seemed to be inevitable actually occurred, the reaction from Alliance Quebec was no less animated. In a statement issued the day after the government's action, the Alliance openly asserted that the government was without principle, without the courage to do what was right, and without the quality and integrity of leadership to command respect.<sup>17</sup>

In retrospect it seems that the Alliance underestimated the fundamental principle upon which party politics is based, namely retaining power. Although polls had shown a majority of Quebecers in favour of bilingual signs, the same polls showed most Francophones did not want Bill 101 changed. Commenting on how he arrived at Bill 178, Premier Bourassa argued, You're premier of Quebec and you have two polls, one saying don't touch Bill 101, another poll saying we agree with bilingual signs. What do you do with that? You come up with inside-outside.<sup>18</sup> Faced then with the dilemma of which community to alienate the Liberals chose Anglophones. Without the benefit of hindsight it is difficult to fault the Alliance for siding with a party which had repeatedly promised to restore bilingual signs. In the end, as Bill 178 demonstrated, the amount of influence the Alliance was able to bring to bear on the government was directly proportional to the size and influence of a declining Anglophone population.

Another interpretation of the Anglophone community's response to the signs debate is offered by Mordecai Richler. According to the author a former Quebec civil servant (who requested anonymity), claimed that "*les Anglais* had only themselves to blame" for Bill 178.<sup>19</sup> He went on to note: "From the very introduction of Bill 101... they sur-

prised us by being timorous beyond belief. When Eaton's, Ogilvy's and Steinberg's and the rest were asked to shed their apostrophes, why didn't they just stand together, denounce the law as lunatic, and refuse to comply?"<sup>20</sup> The implication of the remark and others like it were not lost on the Alliance. Vowing to fight the legislation, the organisation, in Richler's words, began "talking tough."<sup>21</sup> In response to rumours that people were about to take to the streets in protest, the Alliance's president Royal Orr stated: "I'm not convinced that... civil disobedience is the answer, but I'm not going to condemn anybody who takes that route."<sup>22</sup>

There was also a price to pay for Bill 178 within Alliance Quebec. Royal Orr, president of the organisation, resigned within weeks of the legislation's passage. It appears that rather than being forced out Orr had decided to step down in order that the Anglophone community could be convinced of the group's commitment to turn over a new leaf in the post-Bill 178 era.

Things appeared to go from bad to worse for the Alliance and its ex-president. At the end of December 1988, shortly before the new year, the Alliance's head office in Montreal was severely damaged by fire. To make matters worse the *Journal de Montreal* ran a headline several weeks later quoting an anonymous source saying Royal Orr had set the fire himself. Orr was quick to denounce the story but the allegation nevertheless served to damage the reputation of an organisation still reeling from Bill 178.

### *A New Direction: The Equality Party*

With Bill 178 the Anglophone community entered a new era. Disillusioned with the Liberals, the community began to consider its options with news that Premier

Bourassa , riding high in the polls, had called an election for the fall of 1989. Unlike in 1976 when Anglophones registered their frustrations with the Liberals by voting for the Union Nationale, there was no alternative this time to the governing party but the Parti Québécois, which for obvious reasons remained unacceptable. Sensing the void which had been created by the Liberals face from grace, a new party designed as the vehicle for Anglophone disenchantment was created. The Equality Party with its commitment to English rights and unwavering support of the federalist system, started out as a relatively novel experiment in Quebec politics. At no other time in Quebec history had a party emerged to be a “watch-dog” for English rights. Running in only nineteen of the fifty ridings the party still met great success as four of its candidates were elected, all in high profile Anglophone ridings. The Equality Party's accomplishment was evidence of the low esteem held for the Liberals by the Anglophone community. However, the key to their good fortune was their ability to convince English Quebecers that they represented a credible choice in the election.

The significance of the Equality Party's rise to prominence increased when Alliance Quebec which broke with tradition and actively encouraged Anglophones to vote for the new party instead of the Liberals. This time it was the Liberals who felt betrayed. According to Russell Copeman, former Alliance Quebec member and Liberal M.N.A. in the west-end Montreal riding of Notre Dame de Grace, politicians tend to remember things like that, particularly Anglophone Liberals who felt betrayed by the Alliance's actions and who harboured a longer grudge than even the government in general.<sup>23</sup> While Equality's showing was the story of the election, the Liberal's were easily returned to power with a majority. Support for Equality candidates might have revealed the frustra-

tion among Quebec's Anglophone electorate, but the results of the election confirmed that the Liberals could win without the support of the English community.

With the advent of the Equality Party, the Alliance shifted on the political spectrum. Equality's tone and approach to dealing with the government were more radical than the Alliance's which helped to re-establish their credibility, particularly amongst the French majority. "We always knew in the Alliance that we did not represent the extreme in the English community," relates Russell Copeman, "I don't think that the Francophone community clearly understood that until 1989."<sup>24</sup> The Alliance was now viewed, even more so than in the past, as a moderate voice that could speak with a certain degree of authority on a full range of issues. Where the Equality Party would vigorously pursue the government on issues such as Bill 178, demanding immediate changes to allow bilingual signs, the Alliance understood that change would not come about overnight. However, for the Anglophone community as a whole the two groups complemented each other. For the first time there were two prominent voices who spoke consistently about a common issue. Although they occasionally differed on tactics, it served the English-rights cause well to have a moderate and more radical voice speaking at the same time. The Alliance were aware they would benefit from this kind of situation. In the face of a more radical protest party, they knew they would become the likely candidate to re-establish dialogue with the Liberals and to work on a solution to Bill 178. This is exactly what happened.

The government's decision in the winter of 1993 to pass legislation allowing bilingual signs was widely viewed as a victory for Alliance Quebec and the English community. The Alliance had worked behind the scenes since the 1989 election to convince the government to do away with Bill 178. Lise Bissonnette, editor of the influential

newspaper *Le Devoir*, recognised that the Liberal's move will go down in history as a victory for a lobby group.<sup>25</sup> Yet how much credit can the Alliance really take for the passage of Bill 86? There have been differing opinions as to how instrumental the Alliance was in bringing about a reversal in government policy. A number of individuals, including members of the Liberal government, view Bill 86 as a response to the negative image generated internationally by Bill 178. According to Russell Copeman, senior members of the Liberal government were very embarrassed by Bill 178, and it was really just a question of time before that level of embarrassment heightened and the measure was finally seen in the proper light.<sup>26</sup> Others suggest that the Alliance was at least partially responsible for Bill 86. The constant prodding and relentless pursuit of the issue, both within and outside the courts helped keep the question of bilingual signs in the spotlight. However, the truth, as Len Macdonald admits, is that the Alliance can not take credit for very much, we can point out the positive aspects of it, but if we ever said we convinced the government the thing would be torn down immediately.<sup>27</sup>

Among the highlights of the amendment to Bill 101 which the new legislation brings into force: It allows bilingual signs in all commercial establishments regardless of size as long as French remains predominant; billboards and others signs not on business premises must remain French-only; museums and government-run tourist establishments can post bilingual signs; highway signs must remain French-only except when a good pictogram is not available; with a few exceptions, children of English-speaking immigrants must still attend French schools; municipalities with bilingual status will remain that way, unless they request otherwise. Previously, status was withdrawn once the English-speaking population of a municipality fell below 50%.

Alliance Quebec stressed the following points in its response to the government's action. While the organisation commended the government's effort to reform legislation which the English community has always viewed as detrimental to its continued vitality, they pressed for greater movement on the issue of access to English schools as well as a complete reversal of the ban on commercial signs. Speaking before a parliamentary commission overseeing the changes imposed by Bill 86, Robert Keaton, then president of Alliance Quebec argued:

En matière d'affichage, la position d'Alliance Québec a consisté toujours à retrouver le droit fondamental d'affichage dans notre langue. Nous ne demandons pas un bilinguisme obligatoire. Certains manipulateurs de l'opinion publique tentent d'amener les Québécois d'expression française à croire cela en utilisant l'expression trompeuse de <<bilinguisme intégral>>. Nous voulons simplement que l'interdiction d'afficher dans notre langue soit levée. Cette interdiction dure depuis 16 ans. Cette interdiction contrevient, comme vous l'avez écouté... à la Charte québécoise des droits et libertés de la personne; cette interdiction contrevient à la Charte canadienne des droits et libertés; cette interdiction s'oppose au jugement unanime de la Cour supérieure du Québec, de la Cour d'appel du Québec et de la Cour suprême du Canada. Et dernièrement, nous avons appris que cette interdiction contrevient à la Déclaration universelle des droits de la personne des Nations unies. Toutes ces sagesses doivent être considérées comme beaucoup plus valides que les opinions extrêmes des certains individus au Québec.<sup>28</sup>

In politics sometimes it is appearance that matters more than reality. Whether the Alliance was instrumental in helping bring about Bill 86, or not, is difficult to determine. What one is able to discern, however, is that Bill 86 has become a vindication of sorts for the organisation. While Bill 178 is still a lasting memory for many within Alliance Quebec, it is now merely that, a memory. In retrospect, what is certain is that Bill 86 would not have been necessary if Bill 178 had not been passed. Beyond that there is a question of a continuing dynamic and evolution of politics. In other words, a government can pass a very tight budget if the timing is right and the people are not suffering too badly that they would literally rebel against it. It is the timing that has to be precise, and the best

gaugers of timing are not always the people in government, sometimes they are the people outside, because governments have a tendency to become insulated from reality. The object therefore, is to try and make the reality heard at the highest levels often enough that you become credible. With Bill 86, Len Macdonald concludes, "I think we [the Alliance] did the right thing, and we don't have any second question about that. We think we pushed the government hard enough, far enough, and fast enough."<sup>29</sup>

## ***CONCLUSION***

The object of this thesis has been to chronicle the growth of Alliance Quebec and to consider the organisation's response to some of the more pressing issues faced by the English community over the past twelve years. While English Quebecers have endured a number of changes throughout their collective history, the establishment of Alliance Quebec symbolised the beginning of a new era. This latest phase was apparent by the attitudinal shift among the English-speaking population and their political mobilisation reflected in the birth of a new organisation committed to English rights.

In a period of only twenty years, culminating with the birth of Alliance Quebec in 1982, English Quebecers had undergone a significant transformation in their self-perception. From a community which until the 1960s considered itself to be the majority group, to the realisation in the wake of the Quiet Revolution that they were actually a minority, the English-speaking population was left with little alternative but to redefine its self-image. The redefinition of this self-image required the changing of attitudes in order to make English speakers more willing to participate in the politics of a province increasingly governed, according to Michael Stein, "by a more nationalistic elite".<sup>1</sup> The ability of Alliance Quebec to channel the community's resources and frustration into an effective and unified voice is what set it apart from earlier groups within the English-rights lobby.

With an end to the ban on commercial signs in the form of Bill 86, the future of Alliance Quebec has become a serious issue of contention within the English-speaking

community. Similarly, the Equality Party poor showing in the most recent provincial election in which the Parti Quebecois was returned to power, has generated speculation about how the Alliance will deal with the new government. Leading the speculation about the Alliance's future prospects has been the English media. The interest in the demise of the Equality Party stems from the fact that the Alliance will be the sole voice for the English-speaking community. The question being posed as a result is whether the Alliance "has what it takes" to deal with a government committed to the independence of Quebec.<sup>2</sup> Furthermore, is it possible for a lobby group that has in the past worked with the federal government on issues such as the Charlottetown accord, capable of entering into constructive negotiations with the PQ on issues relating to the English-speaking community? As *Montreal Gazette* columnist Ed Bantley has added, "[does] the fact that Alliance sees the PQ as public enemy No.1 of the English-speaking community, render fallacious the claim it's non-partisan".<sup>3</sup>

The Alliance's strategy has always been progressive in advocating the primacy of the French language in Quebec and by promoting the rapprochement of the two language groups. However, sceptics of the Alliance's ability to deal with a PQ government have accurately brought to light one of the long-standing criticisms of the organisation. How can the Alliance hope to convince French-speaking Quebecers that the English community is serious about learning French and integrating in a French-speaking society when it continues to be largely financed by the federal government? It is clear that the Alliance has done a tremendous amount of work promoting harmony between the French-speaking majority and the English-speaking minority. Yet its credibility continues to be undermined by its financial dependence on the federal treasury. One of the possible alterna-

tives would be to seek greater funding from the provincial government through the Ministry of Cultural Communities and Immigration. It is not outside the realm of possibility that the Alliance could secure greater funding from the new government. In the past, as Lynn Herzeg relates, it has been in the interest of the PQ to “sustain the Alliance because its existence fits that government's official perception of Anglophones as an ethnic minority like any other”.<sup>4</sup> This is, however, the problem for the Alliance, because English-speaking Quebecers do not consider themselves an ethnic minority like any other, but a heterogeneous ethno-linguistic minority. The distinction is important, for in Quebec the English are indigenous people, or at least as indigenous as the French.

The biggest concern for Alliance Quebec in relation to its funding does not involve the issue of its impartiality. The Alliance it seems, is more interested about the immediate effects of federal budget cuts which have already had an impact on the organization and are likely to continue in the foreseeable future. Federal funding for the Alliance, approximately \$1.2 million for the fiscal year ending 1994, will be reduced again in the years to come to a total of 20% by 1996.<sup>5</sup> The Alliance has already begun to consider other avenues to make up for the drop in federal funding, which include the soliciting of corporate donors. As well, the commissioning of an independent review of its fund-raising activities was clearly a good investment in the Alliance's future. Without question the financial support of private interests would be a new way of operating for the Alliance. As the Alliance contends, “it's a new way of doing business, and it's one that the Alliance can adapt to. Our future will depend on it....”<sup>6</sup>

Criticism of the Alliance as was noted in Chapter IV is not limited to financial questions, but concerns the quality and credibility of the Alliance's leadership. Charges

that the Alliance has become a farm team or training ground for the provincial Liberal party have plagued the organisation for quite some time and appear to have received greater support with Robert Keaton's run, albeit unsuccessful, for the Liberal nomination in the Montreal riding of N.D.G. While it is not uncommon for people who have worked in volunteer associations to move on or further their career in party politics, the pattern of movement for the Alliance's leadership to the Quebec Liberal Party has become almost predictable. Other than the obvious fact that this trend could harm the Alliance's credibility as a supposedly independent and non-partisan organisation, Robert Keaton's decision to seek the Liberal nomination left the Alliance open to allegations that it was not an effective advocate for English rights because members of the leadership were seeking jobs in the Liberal government.<sup>7</sup> However difficult this accusation is to prove, the fact that it cannot be dismissed out of hand continues to undermine the Alliance's credibility.

Another issue for the Alliance to consider, and one which the organisation's new president has brought to light, is the need for the Alliance broaden its membership to include other cultural groups. It is time, as Michael Hamelin notes, for the Alliance to "shed its image as an Anglo-Saxon bastion and open up to other cultural communities".<sup>8</sup> The claim that the Alliance is in the hands of an English elite of predominantly British origin is not a new one. Since its inception the Alliance has had to defend itself from criticism that it is an organisation designed for and controlled by a Westmount elite. There is a great deal of truth to this according to Graeme Decarie. The power structure of the Alliance in recent years may have only moved from Westmount to the West Island.<sup>9</sup> The Alliance has had a difficult time in recruiting members from outside the traditional bastions of English power with the invitation that the organisation is home to all those

who feel an affiliation with the English language. The reality quite simply is that the Alliance is not as ethnically diverse as the English community. As the decline of the British element within the English-speaking population continues, co-operation to secure guarantees for English language services will increasingly come from Quebec's ethnic communities. The Alliance would do well to actively pursue this growing and traditionally untapped resource.

While the Alliance has a number of issues it has yet to work out, in general terms its record as an advocate for the English-speaking community can be considered a qualified success. The organisation continues to be a bona fide political force in the province and has in the past lobbied successfully for legislation in areas dealing with the English community. Where and when it has not been successful, as documented at various stages throughout this thesis, the Alliance has ensured itself a steady supply of work for the future. Unfortunately, the success of organisations such as the Alliance are often measured by the tangible gains they are able to secure for their constituencies. The fact remains that pressure groups like Alliance Quebec spend most of their time in endeavours that do not produce anything tangible. They stimulate debate or mobilise in support of some goal, very rarely do they actually get the opportunity to actively participate in the formation of government legislation; this domain is rightfully reserved to elected officials. Even when groups are responsible for influencing or advising the government on legislation, it is often unwise for such a group to make its influence known. As a quotation by Len Macdonald indicated earlier in this thesis, had the Alliance publicly declared the influence it had exerted upon the drafting of Bill 86, the government would have been subject to increased pressure from other groups in Quebec society to repeal it.

The work that the Alliance performs out of the limelight, initiatives aimed at providing information to the community, are often forgotten by the organisation's critics. As a resource centre for the English community the Alliance has provided personal assistance to individuals who have found themselves at odds with the government's language legislation.<sup>10</sup> Equally, the Alliance has acted to represent individuals before the courts and has been responsible for a number of test cases involving issues of concern to the English community. These initiatives while not as easily recognised as those involving the language of signs or access to English education, are fundamental to the continued vitality of the English-speaking community.

Criticism of the Alliance is also a question of timing. Depending at what point in time one appraises the Alliance's initiatives, one is likely to arrive at different conclusions. An investigation into the record of the Alliance in the wake of Bill 178 would likely conclude that the organisation was at least ineffectual in influencing government legislation. However, today, in light of Bill 86, one is likely to adopt a more favourable opinion of the Alliance's role in the language debate.

For Alliance Quebec, Bill 86 marked the first time that the Liberals which had started the "language law" question in the 1970s agreed to change things politically. Before Bill 86, the organisation fought in the courts, and to the degree that it created the basis for dialogue was positive. To the extent, as Len Macdonald adds, "that people are saying we don't have to talk about these issues anymore, is bad."<sup>11</sup> In much the same way the notion that Anglophone Quebecers are better protected than other minorities in the rest of the country hurts the long-term prospects for the community by lending credence to the opinion that nothing more ought to be done, "since *they* already have too much".<sup>12</sup>

With Bill 86, however, one has to be realistic and look at the legislation in the context of what was available. The fact that the Alliance was able to make significant progress five years after Bill 178, which was the antithesis of a constructive dialogue, is a sign of positive action for the future. One of the obvious difficulties with the English-speaking community, Macdonald concludes, “is that some people think it doesn't matter what other people want, it's what *we* want that is important, and you can't live in politics and maintain that attitude... you have to realise what your optimal situation is”.<sup>13</sup>

In the end the best society Alliance Quebec can work towards achieving is one that is non-discriminatory and pro-rights. If the organisation was ever presented with such a society it could cease to exist knowing that it had done its work. It is the kind of situation where one is always fighting for something that is basically unattainable. The goal for the Alliance in the future, in light of this reality, is to maintain dialogue with whoever is in power and to make the question of English language existence in Quebec something everyone has to deal with, and deal with honestly.

***Appendix I***

ALLIANCE QUEBEC, ALLIANCE FOR LANGUAGE COMMUNITIES IN QUEBEC  
ALLIANCE QUÉBEC, ALLIANCE POUR LES COMMUNAUTÉS  
LINGUISTIQUES AU QUÉBEC

CONSTITUTION AND BY-LAWS

PREAMBLE

We, the English-speaking people of Quebec, have been and intend to remain an integral part of this society. Multicultural, multiracial and living in various regions of Quebec, our community has made contributions to our province of which we are proud.

Our vision of Quebec, like our vision of Canada, is of a society in which all its peoples can meet and nurture one another in an atmosphere of respect and understanding.

We are committed to the goal of ensuring opportunities for full participation by all English-speaking people within Quebec's majority French-speaking society. We are committed to ensuring that the French language is secure in Quebec and Canada.

We believe that all Canadians should be assured the rights and the services necessary to enable them to live and to feel at home in either official language throughout Canada.

These objectives inspired the creation and guide the efforts of Alliance Quebec

## ***Appendix II***

# ALLIANCE QUEBEC

Alliance Quebec is a volunteer-operated association seeking to ensure the future of a vital and secure English-speaking community in Quebec.

We believe in a strong and stable Quebec within Canada.

We believe in an English-speaking community that is a full and equal partner in a changing Quebec society.

We believe that English and French-speaking communities across Quebec can work together for the betterment of all Canadians.

Alliance Quebec is a non-profit group, functioning entirely on donations and public funding.

## SOME RECENT HISTORY

Alliance Quebec:

- ☐ Was instrumental in establishing *The Chambers Task Force on English Education*. Its recommendations are directed at ensuring a high quality English education system.
- ☐ Initiated a study on *Job Opportunities for English-speaking Youth in Quebec*, examining prospects & offering solutions.
- ☐ Launched *F/E Decal*. Currently on display in thousands of Quebec businesses, the decal assists tourists, visitors and Quebecers in general to locate businesses pleased to serve them in either French or English.
- ☐ Fought for the strongest *constitutional protection* ever for the English-speaking community in Quebec.
- ☐ Alerted the English-speaking community to Quebec's institutional *health board elections*, and assured representation on many boards providing a fair and important voice for our community.

## OUR ONGOING CONCERNS...

Alliance Quebec runs the following programs across the province, in co-operation with our chapters, affiliated regional associations and membership at large:

### ...EDUCATION

We promote a secure network of English-language schools in Quebec. We try to increase the availability and quality of *French Second Language* instruction.

### ...NATIONAL ISSUES

We prepare, present and pursue AQ objectives within the national framework. We strive to strengthen minority-language rights across the country.

### ...LEGAL AFFAIRS

We provide the Alliance networks with analysis and research on legal issues of concern to the community. We respond to enquiries on legal matters regarding language, legal rights and related subjects.

### ...HEALTH & SOCIAL SERVICES

We strive to ensure the availability of *Health & Social Services* in English in Quebec. We actively pursue improvements to the present *Health and Social Services* regulations.

### ...GOVERNMENT SERVICES

We seek to improve on the fairness, quality and availability of government services in English. We want to redress the negative imbalance of English-speaking representation at all levels of the public service.

### ...THE COMMUNITY

We act as a forum for communities across Quebec to meet and work with their neighbours on issues that are important to English-speaking people in Quebec.

## OUR RECORD

The following list is only a few highlights of Alliance Quebec's achievements over the past year history:

✓ SUPPORTED ACCESS CASE brought before the Quebec Association of Protestant Boards. It won recognition for parents to send their children to English schools in Quebec.

✓ WON THE RIGHT for merchants to distribute bilingual catalogues, pamphlets and brochures.

✓ PUBLISHED COMMUNITY RESOURCE dictionaries of medical terms, community service directories, 8th editions of community guides., etc

✓ OBTAINED LEGAL GUARANTEES for the accessibility of English language health and social services (Bill 142, Bill 120) throughout the province.

✓ OBTAINED CHANGES TO BILL 101 (Charter of the French Language) for recognizing Quebec's English-speaking community and its institutions.

✓ OBTAINED FURTHER CHANGES TO BILL 101 abolishing French-language testing in Quebec high school graduate examinations shifting the responsibility of bilingualism from the employee to the institution.

✓ WORKED TO HAVE THE PROBLEM OF QUEBEC'S SO-CALLED "ILLEGAL" STUDENTS SOLVED.

✓ BUILT A PROVINCIAL NETWORK of chapters and associations through which we can get involved in initiating change.

### ***Appendix III***

FOR IMMEDIATE RELEASE

Montreal, December 19, 1988

**STATEMENT FROM ALLIANCE QUEBEC**

This is a **dark day** for Quebec.

It is a **dark day** for Quebecers, for all Quebecers, when the government of all Quebecers decides to override a fundamental freedom established by the National Assembly in Quebec's own *Charter of Rights and Freedoms*.

Democracy is more than the simple rule of the majority. It is a sensitive, fair-minded conciliation of the rights and interests of majority and minorities.

Four days ago, the Supreme Court of Canada, after long analysis of the fundamental principles and values involved, declared that the Quebec *Charter of Rights and Freedoms*, and the Canadian *Charter* as well, would permit the government of Quebec to require that French be present, and indeed predominate, on every commercial sign in this province. At the same time, the Supreme Court stated clearly that the government does not have the right to ban the use of any other language on those signs.

The court recognized that the government has a legal right to use a notwithstanding clause to override the *Charters*, but said in effect that it has no moral right to ban English from the face of Quebec.

Robert Bourassa and his government have today decided to ignore and renounce the policy which has been theirs for the past fifteen years. They have chosen to repudiate a commitment which they made to the Quebec electorate, and they have chosen to overturn a judgment of the Supreme Court of Canada.

Mr. Bourassa, I represent a community which is committed to the democratic process: to dialogue, to mutual respect, and to give and take. For the past ten years, Mr. Bourassa, we have played fair. You Mr. Bourassa, have not.

Mr. Bourassa, it is with great sadness that we say to you, on this dark day in Quebec's history, that you and your government are without principle, without the courage to do what is right, and without the quality and integrity of leadership which command respect.

.../2

Mr. Bourassa, you present your "inside/outside" solution as a compromise between two extremes. Alliance Quebec finds your characterization thoroughly unjustified and unfair. We have consistently supported the requirement of French on all signs and have given our clear commitment to the protection and promotion of the French language. We have consistently sought a modus vivendi, a new social contract between French-speaking and English-speaking Quebecers, and we have consistently stood on the middle ground of mutual respect.

Mr. Bourassa, if "inside/outside" is a compromise between two extremes, let me remind you that one of those extremes was the policy which you yourself proposed to the electorate in 1985.

Mr. Bourassa, the community I represent will continue to play by the rules of a democratic society, because those are the only rules we know or want to know.

You see, Mr. Bourassa, we have a conviction which you evidently do not share: that the vast majority of Quebecers have confidence in the future of the French language and culture, and are convinced that the protection of that language and culture can be assured without wiping other languages, and specifically English, off the linguistic face of this province.

I address myself, then, to French-speaking Quebecers. You are our neighbours and our friends. In recent years we have begun to live together on a basis of better communication, very predominantly in French, than ever before. We know your goodwill, your fairmindedness and your generosity. Our bitterness tonight is directed towards Robert Bourassa and his government, not towards you. We assure you of our friendship, our respect, and our shared commitment to ensuring the future of French in this province and this country.

To my fellow English-speaking Quebecers, I offer a message of courage. We are not alone. The majority of people in this province believe in fundamental rights. Together with them, we are firmly rooted in the soil of this province, and in Quebec's tradition of fairness, openness and tolerance. We must not allow our respect for our fellow-citizens, and our sensitivity to their deeply-felt need for the protection of the French language and culture, to be in any way diminished by the bitterness of this moment.

Alliance Quebec rededicates itself tonight to the cause of fundamental rights. It is wrong and unnecessary that they be sacrificed in order to secure the future of the French language. That is what the Supreme Court of Canada has said, and that is what Robert Bourassa has unfairly and unjustly rejected.

## ***Appendix IV***

March 22, 1982

The Honourable René Lévesque  
National Assembly  
Hôtel du Gouvernement  
Québec, Québec

Dear Premier Lévesque:

I read with interest and astonishment your article which appeared in The Gazette of March 20, 1982 headlined "Lévesque asks for Dialogue". Several of your assertions beg for response.

Two points must be mentioned at the outset. You criticized the English-speaking community for its alleged blanket condemnation of your government and then proceeded to your own blanket condemnation of English-speaking Quebecers. This approach leads nowhere.

You acknowledged that the "English-speaking community has some well-founded complaints and the government is willing to attempt to deal with them." We wish to know what you consider them to be and what action your government intends to take. Action is long overdue. If you genuinely desire a reasonable dialogue there must be the expectation that reasonable action will flow from it.

As an experienced politician you are well aware that one ought not to give too much credence to one opinion poll, particularly when the question is somewhat vague and the subject matter highly charged. Consequently, rather than judge our acceptance of French on the basis of a single opinion poll, you would be well advised to judge us as you wish to be judged - by conduct not words. Nonetheless, you should note that the CROP poll revealed that 60% of our community considers itself bilingual, up from 36.7% in the 1971 census. Clearly our community in its actions, has accepted the importance of French. This process started before your government came to power, as evidenced by the explosion in enrollments in French immersion programs which began before November 1976.

The practical purpose behind your policy has been to ensure that French-speaking Quebecers can live and work in French. This objective is clearly being achieved. In keeping with your belief in the right to dissent, it would be anti-democratic to expect that every Quebecer must share your attitudes, motivations and intentions. We are increasingly able to function in French. It is legitimate for us to have our own reasons for becoming bilingual.

. . . /2

You stated that the Parti Québécois has extended a friendly hand by adopting the proposition that "the Party reassert its respect and openness towards a Quebecers regardless of their ethnic or cultural origin, notably by recognizing the rights of the anglophone minority to its essential establishments, educational and others."

You must understand that for our community, this proposition has three major flaws.

First, the premise of the proposition is that the anglophone minority is an ethnic or cultural community. This premise is wrong both historically and in the present reality of Quebec. The English-speaking community of Quebec is a linguistic community and not a monolithic ethnic or cultural community. The members of the English-speaking community are individuals of diverse opinions, background, ethnic origins, religions and socio-economic status. Our common link is the English language and our reliance, to varying degrees upon our institutional infrastructure for services such as healthcare, social services and education. We rely upon English books, theatre, television, newspapers, magazines and radio. We communicate with each other and with English speaking people outside of Quebec in the English language.

The social contract of Quebec is predicated upon the legitimacy, presence and vitality of two linguistic communities, one French and the other English. This does not deny in any way the existence of ethnic groups or the fact that the majority of Quebecers are French-speaking. It does not deny our need to be able to function in French.

When a political party or a government attempts to re-define reality or to ignore the fundamental conventions of a society, you ought not to be surprised by the suspicion and anxiety which are provoked. It must be acknowledged that we are a linguistic community and that the English language has a legitimate and positive role in Quebec. Legislation, such as Bill 101, which is predicated on false premises inevitably arouses fear and results in injustice.

The unilingual signs provisions of Bill 101 are a prime example. Camille Laurin, when promoting Bill 101, justified these provisions by stating that commercial signs should mirror Quebec society. As we have told you on so many previous occasions, we can only conclude that your vision of Quebec society is gravely distorted. Where do we appear in your mirror? The legislation renders us invisible which is unacceptable. The signs law is a symbol of the greatest importance to the English-speaking community of Quebec. It casts doubt on our legitimacy and raises questions concerning our right to be present, our right to be visible, our right to receive services in our language and our right to communicate with each other. There is ample justification for fearing that there may be a "dark plot to put down the anglophones."

It should not be forgotten that there are one million English-speaking Quebecers. Our numbers are greater than the populations of four Canadian provinces. There are 750,000 English-speaking Montrealers making Montreal the third largest English-speaking city in Canada.

The second crucial flaw in the Parti Québécois proposition is the statement that it is "reasserting" its respect and openness towards all Quebecers. We receive the same "respect and openness" in the future as we have experienced over the last five years, we can take no comfort from this "reassertion".

Some of the provisions of Bill 101 have seriously weakened essential institutions of our community. Restrictions on access to English education have seriously damaged our school system and pose a threat to its viability. These restrictions have also made it difficult, if not impossible, to attract skilled people to Quebec and, in time, all Quebecers will come to understand the high price Quebec society is paying for this.

At the end of 1983 all of our institutions will be required to function in French. This flagrantly contradicts the PQ proposition which claims to recognize "the rights of the anglophone minority to its essential establishments, educational and others,"

Not only is our educational system threatened by a proportionately greater decline in enrollments because of Bill 101, but your Minister of Education has leaked several draft documents, which propose reforms which would dramatically reduce our control and management of our school system. Consequently, fears about the school system have not been allayed by your party's resolutions.

As you are well aware, our professionals have been subjected to French tests at the Office de la langue française, which have been a major source of concern. We cannot accept that non-francophone Quebecers trained in our schools should be singled out for "special treatment" if they wish to work in Quebec. This is alienating, to say the least. If the government considers that it has failed to fulfill its obligation to ensure that all Quebecers graduate from our public school system with a sufficient knowledge of French, the responsibility for this failure must be borne by the government, not individuals. We need not dwell on the fact that the tests have yet to be validated by any recognized, impartial, scientific means or that your government has failed to continue to make temporary permits available for Quebec trained professionals who fail.

The Office de la langue française is now beginning, under article 20 of Bill 101, to impose a similar French testing procedure on all non-francophones who wish to be hired, promoted or transferred to any post in the civil administration, including our hospitals, social services and other essential institutions. Such has been the response to our reasoned and researched representations on these issues.

Finally, the third major flaw in the PQ proposition is that once again, we are hearing words which are not supported by tangible, constructive action emanating from the Government. You express a wish that "we could clear the air of rumors and speculations." There is one way to achieve that - significant concrete measures

monstrating that your government is prepared to respond to the reasonable concerns and appeals of our community.

In conclusion, I share your concern about the need for an "attitude of reasonableness". For your part, this must begin with a recognition of the true nature and attitudes of our community. Our desire to see the French language and culture flourish is genuine, but so too is our determination to ensure a positive and active role for our language and community in Quebec. These are not mutually exclusive goals, and we are prepared to work with all Quebecers to achieve them.

If you feel that our community is turning away from reason and moderation, you might honestly examine to what extent that approach has produced results from your government. A consensus is emerging among French and English-speaking Quebecers on various linguistic issues. Where a consensus exists, such as the case of commercial signs and the "Canada Clause" concerning access to schools, a reasonable government should not delay in responding accordingly. If you genuinely believe in reason and dialogue, you must encourage and reinforce it by ensuring that it succeeds.

Yours very truly,

Eric M. Maldoff  
President  
Alliance Quebec

EM/jap

## ***Appendix V***

## National Issues

### INTRODUCTION

National issues policy focuses on achieving the growth and development of linguistic duality across Canada

As English-speaking Quebecers, we are uniquely placed to understand and to communicate the importance of having linguistic minority communities throughout Canada. We have a role to play in defining and defending the basic rights which must be respected if these communities, and especially our own, are to survive and flourish.

Our future is bound up in the development of constitutional rights that cover all Canadians. We cannot allow the denial of those rights anywhere in Canada. Canada's linguistic duality can only be developed and maintained when those who are most concerned about the rights of official language minorities demand that those rights be respected, enhanced and enshrined in law.

Although this is an era when the term "constitutional negotiations" has become disreputable, talks about reforming Canada's fundamental law have not ended. They merely were shunted out of the spotlight of public inquiry and concern. It is more important than ever that Alliance Quebec remain vigilant now to ensure the integrity of minority language safeguards in any and all constitutional changes.

The best interest of our English-speaking community in Quebec is served when we can join together with the other official language minority communities wherever our objectives and interests coincide, so that we may speak with the combined voices of nearly two million who live daily the Canadian minority experience.

The principle of linguistic duality is tied inextricably with the concept of multiculturalism which is nothing less than a reflection of Canada's commitment to pluralism, tolerance, justice and compassion.

(\* For the purposes of this document, the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms will be referred to as the Canadian Charter.)

### I. THE CONSTITUTION

1. Any attempt to elaborate an integrated approach to linguistic duality must first look to the Constitution, which is the embodiment of the shared values of our society and the reflection of the arrangements Canadians have established in order to enable us to live together.
  - 1.1 A Constitution is more than a set of arrangements between governments and a basis for recourse to courts. It should define our fundamental values and provide a portrait of the society in which we wish to live.
  - 1.2 The constitutional reality of Canada requires an integrated approach to official languages involving both the federal and provincial governments.
  - 1.3 There must be an essential common denominator of basic rights and services which a Canadian

an, as a Canadian, must be able to have and to enjoy across this country, whether that person be French-speaking or English-speaking.

- 1.4 The Constitution Act of 1982 should be viewed as the beginning of a process. The language rights currently entrenched in the Canadian Charter must be clarified, strengthened, and extended.
- 1.5 In light of different realities existing within each province, different means may be used from one province to another in order to give effect to the rights defined in the Constitution. What is important is that these rights and services exist and be readily accessible to all Canadians.
- 1.6 Quebec must play a leadership role as an advocate for linguistic equality and justice throughout the country. There could be no more tangible expression of that leadership than the advocacy of enriched, entrenched constitutional rights for official language minorities.

**Be it resolved that:**

- 1.(a) All relevant constitutional negotiations be used as an opportunity to clarify, strengthen and extend the scope of language rights in the Canadian Constitution.

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2. Section 23 of the Charter which establishes education rights should apply to citizens and those who have the status of permanent resident of Canada.
- 2.1 Section 23 of the Charter limits to citizens the application of the education rights which it confers.
- 2.2 This does not recognize the right of persons who have the status of permanent resident of Canada to constitutional protection.
- 2.3 With the exception of the right to vote and the right to enter, remain in or leave Canada, Canadian Charter rights are not limited to citizens.

**Be it resolved that:**

- 2.(a) Section 23 of the Canadian Charter be amended to apply to citizens and persons who have the status of a permanent resident of Canada.

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3. Section 23(1)(a) of the Charter which permits children of parents whose first language learned and still understood is that of the French or English linguistic minority of the province in which they reside to have instruction in that language in that province should be brought into force in Quebec.

## ***Notes to Introduction***

<sup>1</sup> Raymond Breton, "Institutional Completeness of Ethnic Communities and the Personal Relations of Immigrants," *The American Journal of Sociology*, 1968, 194.

<sup>2</sup> *ibid.*

<sup>3</sup> Michael Stein, "Changing Anglo-Quebecer Self-Consciousness," in Caldwell and Waddell, *The English of Quebec: From Majority to Minority Status*, (Quebec: IQRC, 1982), 110.

<sup>4</sup> Ronald Rudin, *The Forgotten Quebecers: A History of English-speaking Quebec 1759-1980*, (Québec: IQRC, 1985), 292-293.

## *Notes to Chapter I*

<sup>1</sup> Although there is no way of knowing exactly how many Anglophones there were before 1931, as there is no census information regarding mother tongue, one can argue with a reasonable amount of confidence that the number corresponds closely with Quebecers of British origin. As Ronald Rudin notes in *The Forgotten Quebecers* (Québec: IQRC, 1985), 26:

Prior to the beginning of the twentieth century, the vast majority of the non-French population of Quebec was of British origin. According to the census taker, one's ethnic origin was determined through the paternal line and was defined by the country from which that side of the family first came to North America. In 1901 nearly 90% of the Quebec population that was not of French origin could trace its roots back to England, Scotland or Ireland, a figure that was even higher in the last decades of the 1800s. In the first decades of the twentieth century, other ethnic groups began to arrive in Quebec in large numbers, but as late as 1931 relatively few of the members of these groups had adopted English as their mother tongue. Jews made up the most important group among these newcomers, but in 1931 only 252 out of 60,000 had English as their mother tongue. Accordingly, as late as 1931 there was still a certain logic to equating the English mother tongue population with that which was of British origin.

<sup>2</sup> *ibid.*, 43.

<sup>3</sup> *ibid.*, 44.

<sup>4</sup> Helen I. Cowan, *British Emigration to British North America: The First Hundred Years*, revised ed. (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1961), 9.

<sup>5</sup> Donald Creighton, *The Empire of the St. Lawrence* (Toronto: Macmillan Canada Ltd., 1956), 22.

<sup>6</sup> *ibid.*

<sup>7</sup> Rudin, 47.

<sup>8</sup> Stephen Leacock, *Leacock's Montreal*, ed. John Culliton (Toronto: McClelland and Stewart Limited, 1963), 109.

<sup>9</sup> Creighton, 24.

<sup>10</sup> Rudin, 50.

<sup>11</sup> J.M. Bumsted, *The Peoples of Canada: A Pre-Confederation History* (Toronto: Oxford University Press, 1992), 144.

<sup>12</sup> Arthur R.M. Lower, *A History of Canada: Colony to Nation* (Toronto: Longmans Canada Limited, 1949), 72.

<sup>13</sup> *ibid.*

<sup>14</sup> Rudin, 50.

<sup>15</sup> James Murray, quoted in Kenneth McNaught, *The Pelican History of Canada* (Toronto: Penguin Books, 1976), 47-48.

<sup>16</sup> Cowan, 8.

<sup>17</sup> Rudin, 50.

<sup>18</sup> Lower, 74.

<sup>19</sup> Rudin, 51.

<sup>20</sup> *ibid.*

<sup>21</sup> *ibid.*, 53.

<sup>22</sup> *ibid.*, 54.

<sup>23</sup> *ibid.*, 55.

<sup>24</sup> See Hansen and Brebner, *The Mingling of the Canadian and the American Peoples* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1940), 66; and Rudin, who notes that a number of these "late Loyalists" might have fought on the American side during the war, 52.

<sup>25</sup> Rudin, 57.

<sup>26</sup> Rudin, 60.

<sup>27</sup> The fact that so many immigrants made the voyage to Quebec was made possible, as Rudin notes, because "the seas were relatively safe, [and] ship owners were pleased to convey emigrants as a west-bound cargo to take the place of timber they had carried to Britain.", 60.

<sup>28</sup> Cowan, 288.

<sup>29</sup> Rudin, 61.

<sup>30</sup> Rudin, 155.

<sup>31</sup> J.S. Moir, "The Problem of Double Minority: Some Reflections on the Development of the English-speaking Catholic Church in Canada in the Nineteenth Century," *Social History*, VII (1971), 53-67; quoted in Rudin, 109.

<sup>32</sup> *ibid.*, 70.

<sup>33</sup> *ibid.*

<sup>34</sup> It is clear nonetheless, as Rudin adds, that there is a danger in overemphasising the divisions among English-speaking Quebecers. On religious affiliation he notes, "in the three decades leading up to Confederation there was considerable evidence of increased co-operation both between members of the same denomination and between the denominations themselves"., 103-104.

<sup>35</sup> Eric Waddell, "Place and People," in *The English of Quebec: From Majority to Minority Status*, ed. Gary Caldwell and Eric Waddell (Québec: IQRC, 1982), 46.

<sup>36</sup> Uli Locher, "La minorisation des anglophones du Québec," in *Conjoncture politique au Québec*, No.4 automne 1983, 95.

<sup>37</sup> *ibid.*, 96.

<sup>38</sup> Gary Caldwell, "People and Society," in Caldwell and Waddell, 61.

<sup>39</sup> *ibid.*

<sup>40</sup> Caldwell notes that the high-degree of demographic turn-over did abate by the turn of the century, but reappeared with post World War II immigration, 61.

<sup>41</sup> Rudin, "English-speaking Québec: The Emergence of a Disillusioned Minority," in *Quebec: State and Society*, 2nd ed. ed. Alain-G. Gagnon (Toronto: Nelson Canada, 1993), 341.

<sup>42</sup> Rudin, *The Forgotten Quebecers*, 202.

<sup>43</sup> *ibid.*, 203.

<sup>44</sup> Rudin, "English-speaking Quebec," 342.

<sup>45</sup> Rudin, *The Forgotten Quebecers*, 165.

<sup>46</sup> Rudin, "English-speaking Quebec," 343.

<sup>47</sup> Claude Painchaud and Richard Poulin, *Les Italiens au Québec* (Hull: Les éditions Asticou, 1988), 81.

<sup>48</sup> *ibid.*, 144-145.

<sup>49</sup> Rudin, "English-speaking Quebec," 343.

<sup>50</sup> *ibid.*

<sup>51</sup> Rudin, *The Forgotten Quebecers*, 31.

<sup>52</sup> *ibid.*, 30.

<sup>53</sup> *ibid.*, 203.

<sup>54</sup> *ibid.*, 29.

<sup>55</sup> *ibid.*, 36.

<sup>56</sup> Waddell, 48.

<sup>57</sup> Jacques Henripin, *The English-speaking Population of Quebec: A Demolinguistic Projection 1971-2001*, September 1984, 20.

<sup>58</sup> *ibid.*

<sup>59</sup> Marc Termote, *L'avenir démilinguistique du Québec et de ses régions* (Québec: Conseil de la langue française, 1994), 222.

<sup>60</sup> Reed Scowen, *A Different Vision: The English of Quebec in the 1990s* (Don Mills Ont.: Maxwell Macmillan Canada, 1991), 126.

<sup>61</sup> Waddell, 51.

<sup>62</sup> Michael Stein, "Changing Anglo-Quebecer Self-Consciousness," in Caldwell and Waddell, 110.

<sup>63</sup> *ibid.*, 111.

<sup>64</sup> Today Anglophone Quebecers are among the most bilingual in the country. According to the 1991 census 59% of the English mother tongue population are able to conduct a conversation in French.

<sup>65</sup> *ibid.*, 113.

<sup>66</sup> *ibid.*, 114.

<sup>67</sup> For information on the changing median family income of Quebec's language groups see, Statistics Canada, unpublished data from *The Survey of Consumer Finances*, 1994.

<sup>68</sup> Gary Caldwell, quoted in *The Globe and Mail*, March 23, 1994.

<sup>69</sup> Uli Locher, *Les jeunes et la langue*, 2 vol (Québec: Conseil de la langue française, 1993), 93.

## *Notes to Chapter II*

<sup>1</sup> Alliance Quebec, *Background Information* (Montreal: February, 1993), 4.

<sup>2</sup> See Mordecai Richler, *Oh Canada, Oh Quebec: Requiem for a Divided Country* (Toronto: Penguin Books, 1992), 37-38.

<sup>3</sup> Reed Scowen, *A Different Vision: The English in Quebec in the 1990s* (Don Mills Ont.: Maxwell Macmillan Canada, 1991), 25.

<sup>4</sup> Price, *The Social Construction of Ethnicity: The Case of English Montrealers* (Ph.D. diss., University of Calgary, 1980), quoted in Pasternak, 37.

<sup>5</sup> James Pasternak, *Political Action in English Quebec: The Case of Alliance Quebec* (London, Ont., 1984), 43.

<sup>6</sup> For a detailed discussion on the significance of Bill 22 see Chapter V.

<sup>7</sup> Scowen, 24.

<sup>8</sup> William Tetley, "The English and Language Legislation: A Personal History," in *The English of Quebec: From Majority to Minority Status*, ed. Gary Caldwell and Eric Waddell (Québec: IQRC, 1982), 397.

<sup>9</sup> Alliance Quebec, *The Evolution of the Language Issue in Quebec, 1977-1983* (Montreal: 1983), 1-2.

<sup>10</sup> For a more detailed analysis of the events surrounding the St. Leonard school crisis, see Arnopolous and Clift, *The English Fact in Quebec* (Montreal: McGill-Queen's University Press, 1980), 61-62. According to the authors, the Italian community "was simply a scapegoat which served as the object of French hostility towards English business for the incontestable power it exercised over Quebec society".

<sup>11</sup> Scowen, 20.

<sup>12</sup> Michael Stein notes that the provincial government chose to go much further than the recommendations of the Gendron Commission. For an analysis of the points of divergence, see "Bill 22 and the Non-Francophone Population in Quebec: A Case Study of Minority Group Attitudes on Language Legislation," in *Quebec's Language Policies: Background and Response*, ed. John R. Mallea, (Québec: Les Presses de L'Université Laval, 1977), 243-24.

<sup>13</sup> *ibid.*, 250.

<sup>14</sup> Michael Stein, "Changing Anglo-Quebecer Self-Consciousness," in *The English of Quebec: From Majority to Minority Status*, ed. Gary Caldwell and Eric Waddell (Québec: IQRC, 1982), 112.

<sup>15</sup> Writing on the subject of the White Paper in April of 1977, Peter Leslie argued that, "while it reflects genuinely held attitudes and legitimate apprehensions, in expressing them it [PQ] has sometimes resorted to the sloppy use of data, so much so that some observers have suspected deliberate falsification." in "Ethnic Hierarchies and Minority Consciousness," in *Must Canada Fail*, ed. Richard Simeon (Montreal and London: McGill-Queen's University Press, 1977), 113.

<sup>16</sup> Alliance Quebec, *The Evolution of the Language Issue in Quebec, 1977-1983*, 2.

<sup>17</sup> *ibid.*, 3.

<sup>18</sup> William D. Coleman, "From Bill 22 to Bill 101: The Politics of Language Under the Parti Québécois," *Canadian Journal of Political Science* 14, no.3 (September 1981), 463-482.

<sup>19</sup> According to Coleman, the reference to long-standing French-speaking residents of the province indicated the government's desire to give Francophones rather than the French language a pre-eminent status, 475.

<sup>20</sup> *ibid.*, 468-469.

<sup>21</sup> *ibid.*, 471-472.

<sup>22</sup> Coleman relates that what constituted an "appropriate knowledge" of French was to be decided by the Office de la langue française, 465.

<sup>23</sup> *ibid.*, 465-466.

<sup>24</sup> *ibid.*, 480.

<sup>25</sup> *ibid.*, 476.

<sup>26</sup> Donald Smiley, *The Federal Condition in Canada* (Toronto: McGraw-Hill Ryerson Limited, 1987), 143.

<sup>27</sup> Michael Stein, "Changing Anglo-Quebecer Self-Consciousness," in Caldwell and Waddell, 118.

<sup>28</sup> Josée Legault, *L'invention d'une minorité: les Anglo-Québécois* (Québec: Les Éditions du Boréal, 1992), 43.

<sup>29</sup> Pasternak, 53.

<sup>30</sup> *ibid.*

<sup>31</sup> *ibid.*

<sup>32</sup> See Chapter IV for a discussion of the Quebec sign case.

<sup>33</sup> Pasternak, 55.

<sup>34</sup> *ibid.*

<sup>35</sup> Alex Paterson, Speech delivered to Quebec Minority and Community Organisations (Concordia University, May 12, 1978), 2.

<sup>36</sup> *ibid.*

<sup>37</sup> Eric Waddell, "Place and People," in Caldwell and Waddell, 35.

<sup>38</sup> *Montreal Gazette*, December 3, 1981.

<sup>39</sup> Pasternak, 56.

### *Notes to Chapter III*

<sup>1</sup> Eric Maldoff, quoted in Lynn Herzeg, "The New Quiet Revolution," *Canadian Forum* August/September 1984: 8.

<sup>2</sup> James Pasternak, *Political Action in English Quebec: The Case of Alliance Quebec* (London, Ont., 1984), 66.

<sup>3</sup> *ibid.*, 68.

<sup>4</sup> *ibid.*

<sup>5</sup> Secretary of State, *Annual Report* (Canada, 1979), 12.

<sup>6</sup> Herzeg, 8.

<sup>7</sup> Ketchum Canada Inc., *A Development Program Review Prepared for Alliance Quebec* (Montreal, May, 1993), 22.

<sup>8</sup> *ibid.*, 23.

<sup>9</sup> Herzeg, 6.

<sup>10</sup> Mordecai Richler, *Oh Canada, Oh Quebec: Requiem for a Divided Country* (Toronto: Penguin Books, 1992), 38.

<sup>11</sup> William Johnson, *Montreal Gazette*, Apr. 3, 1990.

<sup>12</sup> Don MacPherson, *Montreal Gazette*, June 2, 1987.

<sup>13</sup> Pasternak, 75.

<sup>14</sup> *ibid.*, 76.

<sup>15</sup> *ibid.*, 77.

<sup>16</sup> Michael Goldbloom, *Montreal Gazette*, May 30, 1987.

<sup>17</sup> Herzeg, 10.

<sup>18</sup> Graeme Decarie, quoted in Herzeg, 10.

<sup>19</sup> Herzeg, 10.

<sup>20</sup> As indicated in *The Quebecker*, Vol. 12 #3, Winter 1993, 8-9.

<sup>21</sup> Sheila McLeod Arnopolous and Dominique Clift, *The English Fact in Quebec* (Montreal: McGill-Queen's University Press, 1980), 131.

<sup>22</sup> Alliance Quebec, *Convention 93* (Montreal: May 1993), 2.

<sup>23</sup> *Montreal Gazette*, May 28, 1993.

<sup>24</sup> *ibid.*

<sup>25</sup> Sarah Scott, *Montreal Gazette*, Nov. 23, 1993.

## *Notes to Chapter IV*

<sup>1</sup> Michael Goldbloom, "Reflections on Quebec's English-Speaking Community," in *Language and Society* (Summer 1989), 37.

<sup>2</sup> The national objectives alluded to are general goals that emerge from the organisation's policy books and National Issues Programme. See for example, Alliance Quebec, *National Issues Programme Plan 1986-1987*, and *Book IV National Issues: A Policy for the English-Speaking Community in Quebec*, March 1994.

<sup>3</sup> Alliance Quebec, *National Issues Programme Plan 1986-1987*, 6.

<sup>4</sup> Alliance Quebec, *Brief by Alliance Quebec to the Select Committee on the 1987 Constitutional Accord* (Fredericton, New Brunswick: February 8, 1989), 4.

<sup>5</sup> *ibid.*

<sup>6</sup> *ibid.*, 7.

<sup>7</sup> *ibid.*

<sup>8</sup> *ibid.*

<sup>9</sup> *ibid.*, 9.

<sup>10</sup> *ibid.*

<sup>11</sup> John Trent, *The Dynamics of Federalism and Ethnicity in Canada*, [draft] Paper prepared for the Conference on "National and Ethnic Problems in Canada and the USSR", (Chernovtsy, USSR: July 1991), 16.

<sup>12</sup> *ibid.*

<sup>13</sup> Goldbloom, 37.

<sup>14</sup> *ibid.*

<sup>15</sup> J.A.Laponce has pointed out that, "unlike religions or races can adjust their survival strategies to geographical dispersion and geographical penetration by the dominant group, a language needs a degree of spatial concentration that is commensurate with the degree of development of the society concerned." See "Language and Politics," in *Encyclopedia of Government and Politics*, Vol.1., ed. Mary Hawkesworth and Maurice Kogan (London: Routledge, 1989), 593.

<sup>16</sup> Len Macdonald, interview by author, March 7, 1994.

<sup>17</sup> Alliance Quebec, *National Issues Programme Plan 1986-1987*, 5.

<sup>18</sup> *ibid.*, 1.

<sup>19</sup> *ibid.*

<sup>20</sup> Alan Cairns, *Disruptions: Constitutional Struggles, from the Charter to Meech Lake* ed. Douglas E. Williams (Toronto: McClelland & Stewart, 1991), 15.

<sup>21</sup> Alliance Quebec, *Background Information* (Montreal: February 27, 1993), 1.

<sup>22</sup> James Pasternak, *Political Action in English Quebec: The Case of Alliance Quebec* (London, Ont., 1984), 88.

<sup>23</sup> *ibid.*, 90.

<sup>24</sup> Ian Greene, *The Charter of Rights* (Toronto: James Lorimer & Co., 1989), 96.

<sup>25</sup> *Montreal Gazette*, Dec. 16, 1988.

<sup>26</sup> Greene, 102.

<sup>27</sup> Alliance Quebec, *Background Information*, 3.

<sup>28</sup> Government of Canada, *The Constitution Act*, Section 23.

## Notes to Chapter V

- <sup>1</sup> Donald Charette, "Bourassa est prêt à permettre l'affichage bilingue très bientôt," *Le Devoir*, October 4, 1986, quoted in Scowen, 36.
- <sup>2</sup> Jean Laponce notes that Indonesia, along with Quebec, regulates language in the private domain (Indonesia forbids the use of Chinese on commercial signs). See *Language and Politics*, 597-598.
- <sup>3</sup> Ronald Rudin, "Collective Rights, The English-Speaking Minority and the Québec Government," in *Language and the State: The Law and Politics of Identity*, ed. David Schneiderman (Cowansville, Québec: Les Éditions Yvon Blais Inc., 1991), 243-244.
- <sup>4</sup> Parti Québécois, *La Communauté Anglophone: Partie Intégrale d'un Québec Souverain*, Rapport de groupe de travail du Parti Québécois sur le statut de la communauté anglophone dans un Québec souverain, 1992, 38.
- <sup>5</sup> Eric Maldoff, quoted in Lynn Herzeg, "The New Quite Revolution," in *Canadian Forum*, August/September 1984, 8.
- <sup>6</sup> Len Macdonald, interview by author, March 7, 1994.
- <sup>7</sup> Michael Goldbloom, "Reflections on Quebec's English-Speaking Community," *Language and Society* (Summer 1989), 38.
- <sup>8</sup> Len Macdonald, interview by author, March 7, 1994.
- <sup>9</sup> Michael Goldbloom, *Reflections on Quebec's English-Speaking Community*, 38.
- <sup>10</sup> Scowen, 53.
- <sup>11</sup> *ibid.*, 54-55.
- <sup>12</sup> See Premier Bourassa's remarks, *Le Devoir*, October 16, 1993.
- <sup>13</sup> Scowen, 38.
- <sup>14</sup> Joan Fraser, "Defining the Problem: Principles for Action," in *Language and Society*, March 1986, No.17, 17.
- <sup>15</sup> Clifford Lincoln, quoted in Richler *Oh Canada, Oh Quebec: Requiem for a Divided Country* (Toronto: Penguin Books, 1992), 36. Five years after his resignation from the Bourassa cabinet Lincoln was elected this time for the federal Liberal Party in the riding of Lachine-Lac-St.Louis.
- <sup>16</sup> Len Macdonald, interview by author, March 7, 1994.

<sup>17</sup> Alliance Quebec, *Communiqué* (Montreal: December 19, 1988), 2.

<sup>18</sup> Robert Bourassa, *Financial Times*, quoted in Scowen, 56.

<sup>19</sup> Richler, 37.

<sup>20</sup> *ibid.*

<sup>21</sup> *ibid.*, 38.

<sup>22</sup> *ibid.*

<sup>23</sup> Russell Copeman, interview by author, March 15, 1994. Mr. Copeman defeated former Alliance Quebec president Robert Keaton in the highly publicized Liberal nomination for the N.D.G. riding and went on to win in the 1994 election.

<sup>24</sup> *ibid.*

<sup>25</sup> Lise Bissonnette, *Le Devoir*, April 16, 1993.

<sup>26</sup> Russell Copeman, interview by author, March 15, 1994.

<sup>27</sup> Len Macdonald.

<sup>28</sup> Assemblée Nationale du Québec, *Journal des débats*, May 18, 1993, CC-908.

<sup>29</sup> *ibid.*

## *Notes to Conclusion*

<sup>1</sup> Michael Stein, "Changing Anglo-Quebecer Self-Consciousness," in *The English of Quebec: From Majority to Minority Status*, ed. Gary Caldwell and Eric Waddell (Québec: IQRC, 1982), 117.

<sup>2</sup> Ed Bantley, *Montreal Gazette*, Dec. 12, 1993.

<sup>3</sup> *ibid.*

<sup>4</sup> Lynn Herzeg, "The New Quiet Revolution," *Canadian Forum*, August/September 1984: 10.

<sup>5</sup> Alliance Quebec, *The Quebecer*, Summer 1993, Vol. 11 #2, 2.

<sup>6</sup> *ibid.*

<sup>7</sup> See, for example, Keith Henderson's accusation in, Sarah Scott, *Montreal Gazette*, Nov. 23, 1993.

<sup>8</sup> Michael Hamelin, quoted by Graeme Hamilton, *Montreal Gazette*, May 30, 1994.

<sup>9</sup> Graeme Decarie's exact quote is, "the criticism has been made that the power was moved from the old Westmount farts to the young Westmount farts. And there is a lot of truth in that. The young Westmount, young Town of Mount Royal, young West Island," quoted in Herzeg, 10.

<sup>10</sup> Reed Scowen, *A Different Vision: The English of Quebec in the 1990s* (Don Mills, Ont.: Maxwell Macmillan Canada, 1991), 122.

<sup>11</sup> Len Macdonald, interview by author, March 7, 1994.

<sup>12</sup> *ibid.*

<sup>13</sup> *ibid.*

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




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