

ANTHONY OF PARMA'S *QUAESTIO UTRUM
PRIMUM PRINCIPIUM SIVE DEUS IPSE SIT
POTENTIE INFINITE*: AN INTRODUCTION
AND EDITION*

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Abstract

Anthony of a Parma was an Italian philosopher and medical scholar active in the first three decades of the fourteenth century, whose major philosophical authorities were Aristotle and Averroes. In an intriguing disputed question, he argues that it is possible to demonstrate the infinity of God's power. This article seeks to explicate Anthony's key arguments in support of this thesis as well as to identify his main contemporaneous sources. It also highlights the peculiar way in which Anthony attempts to resolve the inconsistency between his position, which ultimately relies on Aristotle and Averroes, and that of the Catholic faith, whose truth, he contends, "must always be put forward in all matters," even though this appears to imply that Aristotle's position is "totally impossible and false." The article is followed by a critical edition of the *quaestio*.

Anthony of Parma, also known as Antonius Pelacani, was a philosopher and a medical scholar who was active in the first quarter of the fourteenth century at Bologna, Parma, and, lastly, Verona, where he died in 1327.¹ In addition to commentaries on the medical works

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¹ Anthony is buried in the Church of San Fermo, in Verona. His remarkable tombstone is located behind the landing of the stairway leading to the lower church. Etched in the lower section are the figures of Anthony and his wife, Marchioness Mabilia Palavicina, lying side by side in deathly repose. Immediately above is a remarkable low relief representing Master Anthony *in cathedra* lecturing to four students seated on a long

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of Avicenna and Galen, he is the author of sets of questions on works of Aristotle as well as of disputed questions devoted to specific philosophical topics, in which the views of Aristotle and Averroes hold pride of place. Among these latter works is a short disputed question titled “Utrum primum principium sive deus sit potentie infinite,” with which this paper is concerned and the edition of which will be found in the appendix.²

As is well known, the problem of whether God’s power is infinite and in particular of whether one can provide a philosophical demonstration of God’s infinite power elicited considerable interest from early fourteenth-century thinkers, both arts masters and theologians.³

bench. Each of the five figures is reading a book on the facing pages of which are etched pairs of words making up the first aphorism of Hippocrates, to wit: “vita brevis, ars longa, tempus acutum, experimentum fallax, iudicium difficile.” Above the figures is found the following epitaph: “Hic situs est tanti vir nominis, ille Magister / Antonius, cui Parma solum, Pelacanaque proles, / hic rerum causas, et felix sidera novit, / alter Aristoteles et non Ipocrate minor, / sub tribus hunc novies rapuit mors mille trecentis.” (The text is also quoted by B. NARDI, « *Lecturae* » e altri studi danteschi, Firenze 1990, p. 256.) Although Anthony is sometimes referred to as a “jurist,” the phrase “alter Aristoteles et non Ipocrate minor” leaves no doubt as to the nature of his professional calling. The only other information we have about Anthony’s life relates to his involvement in a plot to assassinate Pope John XXII. That Anthony was so involved is what emerges from the two-part notarized deposition (extracted under duress) of one Bartholomew Canholati, a Milanese cleric who had been summoned to Avignon as a witness in the trial instituted by the papal court against Matthew Visconti of Milan and his son Galeas, both suspected of plotting to kill the pope by means of sorcery. According to the deposition, Matthew had convened a meeting at his palace in Milan in October 1319 for the purpose of planning the pope’s execution, at which Anthony had been an active participant. Bartholomew’s confessions have been edited by K. EUBEL, “Vom Zaubereiunwesen anfangs des 14. Jahrhunderts,” in *Historisches Jahrbuch* 18 (1897), pp. 608-631 (609-625 for the edition). On Anthony, see also N. BOULOUX, *Culture et savoirs géographiques en Italie au XIV^e siècle*, Turnhout 2002, pp. 23 and 34-35.

2 For a list of Anthony’s works, see D. CALMA, “Pelacani, Antonio,” in: *Dizionario biografico degli Italiani*, Volume 82 (2015), pp. 92-95. Short discussions of our “quaestio de infinitate” are found in M. GRABMANN, *Der lateinische Averroismus des 13. Jahrhunderts und seine Stellung zur christlichen Weltanschauung: Mitteilungen aus ungedruckten Ethik-kommentaren*, , p. 55; R.-A. GAUTHIER, “Trois commentaires ‘averroïstes’ sur l’*Éthique à Nicomaque*,” in: *Archives d’Histoire Doctrinale et Littéraire du Moyen Âge* 16 (1947-48), pp. 215-219; S. MACCLINTOCK, *Perversity and Error*, Bloomington (IN), 1956, pp. 78-79; H. RIEDLINGER, “Introductio generalis,” in: *Raymundi Lulli Opera Latina*, vol. 5, 154-155: *Opera Parisiensia anno MCCCIX composita*, ed. H. RIEDLINGER, Palmae Maioriarum 1966, with transcriptions of some passages on pp. 43-44.

3 For a general introduction to the problem, one may consult E. JUNG-PALCZEWSKA, “The Medieval Controversy Concerning Motion and the Infinite power of God in Thomas Aquinas and Latin Averroism,” in: *Studia Mediewistyczne* 32 (1997), pp. 47- 57;

The issue was generally discussed in the context of commentaries on Book VIII of Aristotle's *Physics* and in the light of Averroes's own commentary thereto. The word most commonly used to refer to God's power was *vigor* — as opposed to *potentia* or *virtus*, even though *potentia* is the word used in the title of Anthony's question. There was no agreed-upon definition of what infinite power was or of what it entailed. Some authors considered that infinite power entailed only the ability to cause motion of infinite velocity, or, as it would also be called, motion in “non-time,” or motion in an instant. This, of course, posed a problem, for since it is a matter of observation for the medievally that motion occurs in time, and since, as some believed, the idea of instantaneous motion might very well be incoherent in the first place, this definition of infinite power suggested, if anything, that God's power could only be finite. For other authors, by contrast, infinite power meant something different from the ability to cause instantaneous motion. Some held that for a thing to exist for infinite time (provided it was not causally dependent upon anything else) implied infinite power on its part. Many also believed that the ability to cause motion for infinite time in another being required infinite power. Thus, for these authors showing that God does not have the ability to cause motion in non-time did not mean that God's power was not infinite. Their reasoning is nicely captured by Giles of Rome in the following passage of his commentary on Aristotle's *Physics*⁴:

To proceed from several causes of truth to another is to err through [the fallacy of] the consequent, as when “man runs” can be made true in many

“Discussion on *infinitas vigoris Dei* in Averroists in the 13th and 14th Centuries,” in: S. KNUUTTILA – R. TYORINOJA – S. EBBESEN (eds.), *Knowledge and the Science in Medieval Philosophy. Proceedings of the Eighth International Congress of Medieval Philosophy (S.I.E.P.M)*, Helsinki 1990, Vol. II, pp. 190-195. For a brief discussion of the same problem, with special emphasis on Thomas Wylton's answer, see by the same author, “Wylton's Solution of the Aristotelian Problem of God's Infinite Power,” in: J. MAREN-BON (ed.), *Aristotle in Britain in the Middle Ages*, Turnhout 1996, pp. 311-323. Wylton is the author of an important quodlibetal question on the topic, entitled “Utrum essentia divina sit perfectio infinita intensive,” edited by Jung-Palczewska (“La question quodlibétique de *infinitate vigoris dei* de Thomas Wylton,” in: *Archives d'Histoire Doctrinale et Littéraire du Moyen Âge* 64 (1997), pp. 335-401; the edition starts on p. 347).

⁴ GILES OF ROME, *In octo libros physicorum*, Venice 1502, fol. 221ra: “Ulterius forte dubitaret aliquis de modo concludendi philosophi per quem probat quod in magnitudine finita infinita virtus esse non potest. Videtur enim quod in modo concludendi committat fallaciam consequentis. Procedere enim a pluribus causis veritatis ad alteram est peccare

ways, [for instance] on account of Socrates and on account of Plato. To argue “man runs; therefore Socrates runs” is to commit [the fallacy of] the consequent. Since therefore “[something] has infinite power” can be made true in many ways — either because it moves in infinite time or because it moves in non-time — to argue “this is infinitely powerful, therefore it moves in non-time” is, as it seems, to commit the fallacy of the consequent, for, as it seems, this is to proceed from many causes of truth to another.”

Finally, although everybody agreed that only an infinitely powerful being could create — since only a being with infinite power could traverse the infinite “distance” separating being from nothingness — most philosophers and theologians tended to agree that appeal to creation was not permissible in the context of a philosophical proof of whether God has infinite power.

While some major authors such as Thomas Aquinas had argued that it was possible to prove God’s infinite power, the dominant view in the early fourteenth century was that it was not.⁵ Thus John of Jandun, a very influential figure in the milieu in which Anthony was active, and whose name we will encounter often in this introduction, while acknowledging that God was in fact infinitely powerful, had denied that it was possible to demonstrate it philosophically.⁶ Anthony of Parma fits neatly into neither camp. Anthony agreed with Aquinas that one can prove God’s infinite power, but rejected Aquinas’s arguments in favour of that view; and while he disagreed with John of Jandun regarding the provability of God’s infinite power, he appears to have

per consequens: ut si hominem currere potest verificari pluribus modis: pro Socrate et pro Platone. Arguere homo currit ergo Sor currit est committere consequens. Cum ergo esse infinitam virtutem pluribus modis verificari possit: vel quia movet in tempore infinito, vel quia movet in non tempore. Arguere hoc est virtutis infinite, ergo movet in non tempore ut videtur est peccare per fallaciam consequentis, quia ut videtur procedere ibi a pluribus causis veritatis ad alteram.”

⁵ For Aquinas’s discussion of this see *Commentaria in octo libros Physicorum Aristotelis* (henceforth *In Phys.*), *Lib. VIII*, cap. X, lectio XXI, cura et studio fratrum praedicatorum, in *Sancti Thomae Aquinatis doctoris angelici Opera Omnia*, t. 2, Rome 1884, pp. 444-451.

⁶ On John of Jandun’s influence, see Z. KUKSEWICZ, “Averroistic Fourteenth Century Bolognese Texts in the Ms. BJ742,” in: *Mediaevalia Philosophica Polonorum* 29 (1988), p. 11. Regarding the provability of God’s infinite power, John (*Quaestiones in libros physicorum Aristotelis* [henceforth: *Quaestiones*], Venice 1488, fol. 147ra) wrote that “secundum fidem et veritatem dico quod principium quod est deus sive moveat immediate active sive non, est infiniti vigoris simpliciter. Et hoc non probo aliqua ratione quia neque scio neque puto possibile secundum principia naturalia, sed sola fide sic assero et simpliciter confiteor.”

borrowed many of his key arguments in favour of provability from none other than John himself. Such at any rate is what I hope will emerge from the following introduction to the edition of Anthony's *quaestio*. I start with a quick sketch of the *quaestio*'s overall structure, breaking it down into its main sections, which I will then examine in sequence, before drawing some conclusions about Anthony's solution.

1. *Outline of the quaestio*

The *quaestio* has the usual three-part structure of a medieval disputed question: arguments pro and contra (<1>-<4>), the solution (<5>-<31>), and answers to objections (<32>-<39>). The solution itself can be divided into several parts corresponding to the different "opinions" Anthony distinguishes and discusses. At the very beginning of his solution, Anthony asserts that there are three main positions on the issue of whether God's power is infinite, but in the subsequent discussion he only clearly identifies two, which he calls the *prima opinio* and the *alia opinio*. The *prima opinio* (<5>), which Anthony attributes to an anonymous Parisian Master, states that God's power is neither finite nor infinite; the *alia opinio* (<6>-<10>), which he says represents the view of the truth and of Catholic faith, asserts that God must be infinitely powerful. Immediately after presenting the *alia opinio*, Anthony turns his attention to Aristotle's and Averroes's position. This he does, he explains, because the philosopher is concerned to "investigate Aristotle's intentions even though they might be contrary to the truth." And contrary to "the truth" they seem to be, for Anthony argues (from <11> to <22>) that it appears to him that it was Aristotle's and Averroes's opinion that the first principle is *not* infinitely powerful. But in <23> Anthony announces that since the views of the Philosopher and the Commentator have elicited divergent interpretations, it will be necessary in order to acquire a better understanding (*ut perfectius habeatur*) of both authorities' views to show that "no power existing in a body can cause local motion for an infinite time." The elucidation of this statement is followed by the discussion of a series of other related points in <24> to <31>, all leading to the conclusion that the first cause is infinitely powerful after all. We must suppose, therefore, that <11> to <22> and <23> to <31> taken together constitute the *tertia opinio*, namely

Aristotle's and Averroes's position correctly understood. Anthony concludes the question in <32>-<39> by examining the objections raised at the beginning of the question and in the body of his response.

Our discussion of the *quaestio* will thus fall into six parts, which I will discuss in sequence. They are: 1. Arguments pro and contra; 2. The *prima opinio* 3. The *alia opinio*; 4. The enquiry into Aristotle's intentions (or the <tertia opinio>, part one); 5. Anthony's clarification of Aristotle and Averroes (the <tertia opinio>, part two); 6. answers to objections.

2. *Arguments pro and contra* (<1>-<4>)

Anthony advances two types of arguments in favour of the primer mover's infinite power: first what one might call "strictly philosophical arguments" (<1> and <2>) and, second, a hybrid argument (<3>), mixing in propositions taken from, or at any rate attributed to, Aristotle's *Physics*, with a theological premise. Let me quickly state the arguments advanced in <1> and <3>, since Anthony will respond to them in the later stages of the question. <1> simply asserts that what moves for an infinite time (*per tempus infinitum*) must have infinite power, and claims to find support for that view in Book VIII of Aristotle's *Physics*. <3> argues from the major premise that whatever causes something from an infinite distance must have infinite power, and the minor that the first principle is such a mover to the conclusion that it must have infinite power. The major is supported by references to the *Physics*; but the minor is said to be clear from the fact that the prime mover "causes something from nothing, such as our souls and prime matter." This is of course the theological premise of the argument. However, according to the view summarized in the "in contrarium" (<4>), the best observational evidence the philosopher can point to in favour of infinite divine power is the eternity of celestial motion; but all this entails is that the prime mover is eternal as well, not that it enjoys infinite power. One author who held this view and expressed it in language very close to that of <4> is John of Jandun in his commentary to the *Physics*.⁷ It is a view with which, as we will see, Anthony is not in agreement.

⁷ See his *Quaestiones*, fols. 142rb and 145va. See also fol. 136vP.

3. *The prima opinio* (<5>)

The *prima opinio* is one Anthony claims is “presently most novel in Garlandia,” i.e., at the Faculty of Arts of the University of Paris.⁸ It states that the prime mover is neither finite nor infinite. The reason offered in support of this statement is the fact that, according to Aristotle, the prime mover is immaterial and the terms finite and infinite are properly predicated only of quantity. Who is Anthony alluding to? Again, the answer is John of Jandun, who defended just this view and did so for the exact same reason in his commentary to the *Physics*, penned in 1315.⁹

Anthony promptly dismisses this view as unreasonable (<5>). Its proponents, he claims, neglect the fact that there are two senses of finite and infinite, an extensive sense, and an intensive one. Whiteness, for instance, may be considered “extensively” — that is, with respect to its size — or intensively, with respect to the degree in which it participates whiteness. In similar fashion, finite and infinite may be understood in the extensive sense — in which case they refer to a particular size, dimension or duration — or they may be taken intensively, in which case they refer to a thing’s “vigor,” its power.

8 The use of the familiar “Garlandia” to refer to the Faculty of Arts of the University of Paris is what led Helmut Riedlinger (*Introductio generalis*, p. 42, n. 2) to conjecture that Anthony must have been in Paris when he conducted the *quaestio*; indeed, this was Riedlinger’s only reason for saying that Anthony was ever in Paris in the first place. Needless to say, this is not a very strong argument.

9 *Quaestiones*, fol. 145v. The same thesis is found in John’s *Quaestio De infinitate vigoris Dei* (in Z. KUKSEWICZ, “Johannis de Janduno ‘de infinitate vigoris dei.’ Édition critique,” in: *Studia Mediewistyczne* 24/1 (1985), p. 141, 1054-1057), but based on a different argument, namely that God cannot be finite or infinite because he is not a non-mediate cause of motion. Since Anthony died in 1327, he could have written the *quaestio* at any time between 1315 and 1327; his description of John’s position as “presently most novel” suggests that his own *quaestio* was written very shortly after 1315. That John is Anthony’s source here was first pointed out by Riedlinger, *Introductio generalis*, p. 43, n. 13. It is worth mentioning that many arguments John discusses are also found in Thomas Wylton’s *Quodlibet* mentioned above, in note 3. Zdzisław Kuksewicz (“Johannis de Janduno” pp. 100-103) has advanced arguments to show that it is John who depends on Wylton, not the other way around. Since some of the arguments we find in Wylton’s *Quodlibet* are also present in Anthony’s *quaestio*, the question arises as to whether Wylton might not be Anthony’s source. However, assuming that Anthony is drawing his inspiration from one main source, it is unlikely that Wylton should be that source, for one argument that Wylton does not defend and which John does is precisely the one summarized in <6> to the effect that the prime mover is neither finite nor infinite.

Aristotle's prohibition against applying the terms 'finite' / 'infinite' to non-quantitative things concerns only the extensive sense of finite and infinite, not the intensive one.

4. *The alia opinio* (<6>-<10>)

After his brief discussion of the *prima opinio*, Anthony turns his attention to the *alia opinio*, the position of the truth and of the Catholic faith. He lists three arguments in support of this view. I will summarize all three but will then focus my attention on the first, the most philosophically interesting of the three.

The first argument (<7>) aims to show that it is impossible for a finitely forceful mover to produce motion in a mobile object that extends over infinite time. Anthony uses as the major premise of the argument a statement he attributes to Aristotle in *Physics* VIII to the effect that "if the mover and the moved are finite, then the <time taken to produce the> motion is finite;" he then points out that since the duration of motion is proved by Aristotle to be infinite, it must follow by "destruction of the consequent" that the mover is infinite, but also, he adds, that the mobile object is "infinite in some way."

According to the second argument, <8>, we see that a stronger mover performs the same motion for a longer time than a weaker one. The more power a mover has the longer it moves; if is infinitely powerful, it will move for an infinite duration.

According to the third argument, <9>, Aristotle proves that the prime principle is immaterial from the fact that it is infinite. But if it were infinite in duration only, then it wouldn't necessarily be immaterial — since there are material movers that move for an infinite time, e.g. the sun.

Let us return to the first argument. What kind of motion do the proponents of the *alia opinio* have in mind when they assert that a finite mover cannot produce motion in a mobile object that extends over infinite time? It seems clear from Anthony's presentation in <7> that they are not thinking of the time taken by a mobile object in rectilinear motion to traverse a distance in space; rather, as the phrase "pass around a certain fixed mark" suggests, they appear to be thinking of the time taken by a rotating spherical mobile object to cross a

fixed point with respect to the body's circumference¹⁰. These authors then go on to argue as follows: the time it takes a part of a finitely forceful mover to cause a proportional part of a finite mobile object to "revolve around a certain mark" will be *less* than the time taken by the whole finitely forceful cause to cause the whole mobile object to pass the mark. Taking A as the finitely forceful mover and O as the mobile, what the proponents of the *alia opinio* are asserting is that a part, B, of A, will move a part, P, of O (where $B/A = P/O$), in less time than A will move O, and thus B will move P in finite time. If now we subtract another part, C, of A, and another part, Q, of O, then the time it takes B+C to move P+Q across the point will also be finite, since B, C, P, and Q are all finite. Repeating the operation enough times, we will eventually exhaust A and O since both are assumed to be finite; but the total amount of time taken to perform the motion will still be finite. This shows, according to Anthony's summary of the *alia opinio*, that it is impossible for a finitely forceful mover to produce motion in a mobile object that requires infinite time. From this it is taken to follow that since we know (from Aristotle) that time is in fact infinite, it must be the case that the mover is infinitely powerful, and that the mobile object is also infinite, "at least in regard to repetition." By this last phrase Anthony (or the authors whose views he is summarizing) presumably means that the mobile object is not infinite in magnitude but in the number of rotations it undergoes.

What is not clear from the above is how <7> (or <8> and <9> for that matter) represents the position of the Catholic faith, especially given that Anthony appears to believe that the authors of the *alia opinio* are committed to the existence of an infinite number of "repetitions." The answer, I believe, lies in the provenance of the phrase "is moved ... around a certain point." The first author to hold that

10 The time taken by a particular wedge of a money wheel in a casino to pass the pointer would be an example of the motion they have in mind. Giles of Rome offers a "cosmological" illustration: if we imagined the universe to be perched on top of a man's head, then the head would be the marker and the time of motion would be the time taken by a "wedge" of the universe to cross the man's head; and that time would be less than the time taken by the whole universe to cross the man's head. For discussion and Giles' text, see A. MAIER, *Metaphysische Hintergründe der spätscholastischen Naturphilosophie*, Rome 1955, p. 240.

motion around a point is the kind of motion intended by Aristotle in *Physics* VIII, 226a1-b26 appears to be Thomas Aquinas¹¹. Aquinas had been puzzled by Aristotle's contention in *Physics* VIII, 10 266a17-18 that a part of the mover would move a part of the mobile object in less time than the whole mover moves the whole mobile object. The motion in question, Aquinas reasoned, could not be motion *through* space, because then the statement would contradict Aristotle's own "laws of dynamics" set out in 249b27-250a6, according to which a part of a mover would move a part of the mobile object (the ratio of part to whole being the same in both cases) through space in the *same* time it takes the whole mover to move the whole mobile object. Hence time in Aristotle's discussion in *Physics* VIII, 10 must be measuring another kind of motion, and Aquinas reckoned that it must be motion of a body "passing a certain point" with respect to that body. But even if Anthony is alluding to Aquinas' reading of Aristotle, this still does not explain what is "Catholic" about that reading, especially since, as stated, the authors of the *alia opinio* appeared to hold that the first mover is infinitely powerful by causing an infinite number of revolutions of the heavens. But of course this is not what Aquinas himself believed, as Anthony and his readers would have known. Aquinas believed that to the extent that Aristotle had successfully demonstrated anything about the prime mover's infinite power in *Physics* VIII, 10, it was not that the prime mover is infinitely powerful because it moves for infinite time, but rather that it is infinitely powerful because it *can* move for infinite time. As Aquinas puts it himself:

Therefore, that which is the first cause of the infinity of motion has a *per se* power over the infinity of motion such that it could move (*possit movere*) an infinite mobile object if there were such an object. And for that reason it must be infinite.¹²

Note the counterfactual: having *per se* power is not actually exercising that power but being able to exercise it. Thomas does not say that an

11 See A. MAIER, *Metaphysische Hintergründe*, pp. 227-269, in particular the remarks on p. 237 to the effect that Aquinas's interpretation would be "für die Folgezeit maßgebend."

12 *In VIII Phys* "Illud ergo quod est prima causa infinitatis motus, habet virtutem super infinitatem motus quae est per se, ut scilicet possit movere mobile infinitum si contingat: et ideo necesse est quod sit infinitum. Et quamvis primum mobile sit finitum, tamen habet quandam similitudinem cum infinito,

infinitely powerful mover actually moves an infinite mobile object — because Aristotle has shown that there cannot be an infinite mobile. He says instead that it could move such an object, i.e., if *per impossibile* there were one.¹³ A similar point presumably applies to the rotations of the universe: although in fact future celestial motion will cease, God could move the heavens for an infinite future time if he so chose. Admittedly, this is not how Anthony presents the *alia opinio*; in particular, he does not state that the prime mover's infinite power resides in its *ability* to cause infinite motion. But given that Anthony purports to be summarizing the view of Catholic faith; given that he uses a phrase that is ultimately traceable to Aquinas, whose interpretation of Aristotle is consistent with Catholic faith, it is plausible to suppose that Anthony means to be alluding to Aquinas or to a position like Aquinas'.

Anthony concludes <11> his presentation of the opinion of “the truth and the Catholic faith” — the *alia opinio* — by remarking that although he believes that the opinion is true “in itself,” since he is writing as a philosopher and since, he tells us, the task of the philosopher is to investigate Aristotle's intentions, he will now present his own understanding of the intention of the Philosopher and the Commentator, which seems to have been to show that the prime mover *cannot* (*non possit*) have infinite power.

5. Aristotle's intentions: the tertia opinio, part 1 (<11>-<22>)

Anthony advances three arguments in support of that contention.

The first argument <12> is that if the prime mover were infinitely powerful, it would move in an instant or in “non-time”; since, clearly, motion occurs in time, the prime mover is not infinite.

The second reason <16> asserts that if God were infinite there would be something “otiose” in his power. The idea here is that since God's effects are finite, a finite part of his power would suffice to produce them; the “remainder” would be otiose. Since it is wrong to say that part of the divine power is otiose, one can only conclude that God's power is not infinite.

¹³ The argument was controversial and would come in for heavy criticism at the hands of John Buridan. See his *Super octo libros physicorum Aristotelis*, Paris 1520, fol. 120ra (“De ratione Thomae...”).

A similar argument — the third reason, <17> — argues that if the first mover were infinitely powerful, it would be able to cause all motion on its own, with the result that all other motors would be in vain.

Let me start with <12>. Averroes appears to be the first to explicitly ask whether from the fact that a finite material thing with infinite power would move in an instant — something Aristotle was taken to have established in *Physics* VIII, 10, 266a31 — one could infer that an *immaterial* cause with infinite power would move in an instant as well.¹⁴ Averroes explicitly addressed this question in two different works, giving a different answer each time. His answer in his commentary to the *Physics* was that an immaterial substance is neither finite nor infinite, since according to Aristotle “finite” and “infinite” are predicates of material things.¹⁵ — presumably the ultimate source of the *prima opinio*. In his commentary to the *Metaphysics*, Averroes offered a very different solution.¹⁶ This time he answered that an infinitely powerful immaterial cause would move in an instant. But from the fact that the motion of the heavens is evidently not instantaneous, he did not conclude that the prime mover was not infinitely powerful; indeed, he drew the opposite conclusion. That is because according to Averroes the motion of the sky results from the

14 AVERROES, *In Phys.*, ed. Juntina secunda, vol. IV, Venice 1562, fol. 426vJ: “Dicet enim aliquis, ut quid Aristoteles dicit consequens esse, si potentia corporea habet actionem infinitam, ipsam agere non in tempore et non est se sequens, si actio infinita sit potentiae non corporeae, quod agat non in tempore.” For discussion, see A. MAIER, *Metaphysische Hintergründe*, pp. 227-269, esp. 233-234, and R. IMBACH, “Lull und die pariser Universitätsphilosophie,” in: ID., *Laien in der Philosophie des Mittelalters*, Amsterdam 1989, pp. 123-127.

15 AVERROES, *In Phys.*, ed. Juntina secunda, vol. V, fol. 427rE: “[...] sic respondentes dicimus quod si posuerimus actionem propriam esse corporis, sequitur quod insit ei potentia infinita; si autem posuerimus alicuius non corporis, tunc potentia illius non potest dici finita, aut infinita. Finitum enim et infinitum solum de corporibus dici possunt et sic sola actio illius dicitur infinita.”

16 The question of instantaneous motion is also discussed in chapter 3 of *De substantia orbis*. There, he makes no mention of the possibility explicitly raised in the commentaries on the *Physics* and the *Metaphysics* that an *immaterial* cause could move instantaneously, though he does appeal to Aristotle’s proof that if a finite body had infinite power it would move in an instant. Averroes, *De substantia orbis* (ed. Juntina secunda, vol. IX), fol. 8vM. Some authors (e.g., Thomas Wylton, “Utrum essentia...” ed. JUNG-PALCZEWSKA [for full reference, see above, note 3], p. 364) would interpret Averroes’ silence as a repudiation of the view set out in the *Metaphysics* commentary.

conjunction of two causes: that of the prime mover, which Averroes explicitly says is infinite, and that of the soul assigned (“appropriated”) to the moving celestial bodies, which he says is finite.¹⁷ The prime mover’s infinite causality was supposed to explain why the *duration* of the heaven’s motion is infinite, while the finite power of the appropriated soul was supposed to explain why the motion took place in time. Now since Anthony would have surely known that Averroes had stated that the prime mover had infinite power (Averroes actually writes “infinite motion”), and since Anthony wants to say that Averroes denied that the first mover was infinitely powerful, the most likely explanation of this apparent inconsistency is that Anthony believed that there were two senses of infinite power in Averroes, and that Averroes denied that the prime mover was infinitely powerful in one of those two senses but not both. My hypothesis is that this is indeed the case, and that Anthony believes that there are two senses of infinitely powerful, one which can be rightfully applied to the prime mover (i.e., the one mentioned in 324rE), and the other, not. I’ll focus on the latter case first, since the former will be discussed in section 6.

According to Anthony the prime mover is not infinitely powerful if that means that it moves or is able to move in an instant. There are two reasons for this. The first reason is that instantaneous motion is impossible. The second reason is that the kind of causation required for moving a mobile object in an instant is direct or non-mediate causation, and Anthony holds that this is not how the prime mover causes motion. I will defer discussion of this second, vitally important thesis for Anthony’s answer until the next section, and focus here on the first reason.

That Anthony believes that infinite motion is impossible appears to be implied in <13> to <15> where he presents and rebuts three

17 AVERROES, *In Metaph.*, Venice 1562, fol. 324rE: “Si igitur potentia qua mouetur hoc motu aeterno fuerit in eo, aut est finita aut infinita. Si infinita, contiget moueri in instanti. Si finita, possibile est quiescere, quod improbatum est. Ergo non mouetur per potentiam existentem in eo, immo per potentiam non in subiecto omnino. Sed aliquis quaeret: si mouetur a potentia cuius actio est infinita, necesse est ut moueat ipsum non in tempore: sicut continget cum fuerit existens in eo. Et dissolutio est quod iste motus componitur ut declaratum est ex duobus motoribus, quorum unus est finitae motionis et est anima existens in eo, et alter est infinite motionis et est potentia que non est in materia. Secundum igitur quod mouetur a potentia finita mouetur in tempore [...]”

arguments in support of the view that the prime mover is infinitely powerful in the sense of moving in an instant. The argument in <13> is that although the prime mover per se does have the power to move instantaneously, it is repugnant to motion to occur in an instant. Anthony responds that saying that it is possible for something to cause a certain effect while maintaining that the effect is impossible amounts to a contradiction.¹⁸ A similar argument is made in <14>: although it is not repugnant to a mobile object to be moved in an instant if one attends only to that object's power which is infinitely exceeded by the power of its cause, it is repugnant to the mobile object to be so moved insofar as the object is a quantity. But that answer fares no better, Anthony responds, for if the mover is infinite, then its power would be irresistible. Anthony's point, then, in <13> and <14>, is that proponents of the view that God can move in instant cannot have it both ways: either God has the capacity to cause motion in an instant in which case it must be possible for things to be moved in an instant, or he does not: *tertium non datur*.

The argument in <15> rests on the distinction between the prime mover's power and its *will*. The reason motion occurs in time is not because the prime mover cannot make it occur in an instant but because it does not will it to happen. But Anthony points out that the prime mover's will does not abrogate its power. The suggestion appears to be that since God's power to move in an instant is not abrogated, then motion *can* be instantaneous, and the reason Anthony finds that problematic is presumably because he holds instantaneous motion to be impossible.¹⁹

Since all three arguments in <13> to <15> purport to argue in favour of the possibility of instantaneous motion, and since Anthony holds that Averroes did not endorse such a possibility, one should not expect to find any of the arguments in Averroes himself: <15>, with its appeal to the divine will, seems to be an allusion to a stock argument

18 A similar argument is found in JOHN OF JANDUN, *Quaestiones*, fol. 142rb.

19 John of Jandun similarly holds the appeal to divine will or intelligence to be "frivolous," but for a different reason from Anthony's. John thinks that although it is true in the case of human agents that they do not always act to the extent that they can, this distinction makes no sense in the case of an immutable agent such as the prime mover. See fol. 142rb-va. Likewise, GILES OF ROME, *In octo libros Physicorum*, fol. 221ra.

used by theologians.²⁰ <13> and <14>, for their part, are strongly reminiscent of the position defended by Siger of Brabant — an author with whom Anthony was well acquainted²¹ — in Question 56 of his *Quaestiones* on the *Liber de causis*.²² What Anthony seems to suggest, then, in <13>, <14>, and <15>, is that while Averroes himself did not endorse the possibility of instantaneous motion, his Latin readers did, though, again, according to Anthony, for no good reason.

Further evidence that Averroes did not hold that the prime mover was infinitely powerful is advanced in reasons two and three (<16>, <17>), summarized above. Although neither <16> nor <17> is to be found in Averroes in the exact same form in which they appear here, both are based on an idea that is clearly articulated by Averroes, namely that what nature can do with more principles it can do with fewer, and in particular that that which nature can do with infinite principles it can do with finite principles. This is in fact the very principle enunciated by Averroes in his commentary to Book I of Aristotle's *Physics*, where he is commenting on the Stagyrice's discussion of whether the principles of generation are finite or infinite. Averroes goes on to say that it is better and more proper for nature to operate through finite principles, since otherwise "there would be something otiose and superfluous in nature's operation."²³ <16> in effect just applies this line of reasoning to the case of the prime mover's power: although one could account for all natural motions if one assumed that the prime mover was infinitely powerful, this assumption would mean that there was something otiose in its power, since the prime mover would only require "part" of its power to cause motions. The argument in <17> is slightly different. <17> argues that even if we did insist on holding that the prime mover was infinitely powerful, it would surely be able to cause all motion on its own; but then, the existence of other motors would be rendered superfluous.

²⁰ However, the same argument is also to be found, quoted in approving terms, by John of Jandun. See *Quaestiones*, fol. 147ra.

²¹ See CALMA, "Pelacani, Antonio" (see above, n. 2, for the complete reference), 94.

²² SIGER, *Les Quaestiones super Librum de causis*, ed. A. MARLASCA, Louvain 1972, p. 193, 152-158.

²³ AVERROES, *In I Phys.* ed. Juntina, vol. IV, com. 50, fol. 31rF: "Et cum concesserimus quod natura potest facere ex principiis finitis illud quod facit ex infinitis, melius est et rectius ut faciat hoc ex finitis et si non, tunc natura aget ociose [...] ociose faciet et superflue et ita est de natura, sicut de arte."

Anthony concludes his discussion of the views of Aristotle and Averroes by citing other texts (<17>-<21>), taken mostly from Averroes, in support of his understanding of both authors' intentions. However, in <22>, he announces that because their texts have been invoked in support of contrary claims, in order to arrive at a better understanding of their actual position, he will now show that no power in a body can cause motion for infinite time. As we will now see, establishing this fact is not, in fact, sufficient for the purpose of resolving the question of the prime mover's infinite power, but it does constitute the first in a series of steps that will lead Anthony to the desired conclusion.

6. *Elucidating the views of Aristotle and Averroes: the tertia opinio, part 2* (<23>-<31>)

Anthony's personal version of the proof to the effect that no power in a body can cause motion during an infinite duration in <23> is as follows. Take a body that is moved locally by an internal corporeal power. In that body there will be a per se corporeal moving part and a per se corporeal moved part, such that the corporeal moving part is also moved by accident, in the same way as, for example, the body of an animal, which is a per se mover of the arms and legs, is itself accidentally moved. Now rest and motion are contraries, and hence, though Anthony does not explicitly say so, whatever is actually one must have a capacity to be the other. Thus every body that is moved (*mouetur*) has the capacity (*potest*) not to be moved. That means that the moving corporeal power must have the capacity not to be moved; and that in turn means that it must also have the capacity not to *move*. But if it can not move, that means it does not cause motion necessarily; it means, in other words, that motion can cease. But Aristotle is taken to have shown in *Phys.* VIII that motion is eternal — and so, necessary. It is therefore impossible for a corporeal power to be the cause of eternal motion, a conclusion corroborated in <24> by texts from Averroes.

Anthony acknowledges, in <25>, that some corporeal causes can cause some forms of change eternally. Such is the case of the sun, which can heat eternally. The sun was what some Scholastics called an "indefatigable cause," a cause that can produce a certain effect for

an infinite duration without so to speak “running out of steam.” It was often cited as a counter-example to the claim that only an immaterial cause can cause change for an infinite duration.²⁴ But according to Anthony, heating is an alteration, and alteration is not the kind of motion that is undergone by the heavens, which is local motion. So the example proves nothing.

Granted this answer to the indefatigable cause objection, Anthony's thesis still invites an obvious reply: if only an immaterial substance can cause eternal local motion, then since Aristotle recognized the existence of a *plurality* of immaterial celestial substances, all such substances could in principle qualify as causes of eternal local motion. Anthony does in fact believe that celestial intelligences do in some sense have the power to move for infinite time (<31>), however he holds that the only mover that is properly (*proprie*) said to be the cause of infinite local motion is the first mover. Why this is the case is elucidated in <26> to <30>. There Anthony explains that the prime mover moves as an object of desire and as a final cause; given that this is so, “it is necessary that the corporeal bodies be moved by their souls inasmuch as they desire and strive after that principle.” (<26>). Now there is a reason, according to Anthony, why the first mover *must* move as a final cause. In general, things normally move on account of something extrinsic to them. However, the first mover is pure intellect and pure actuality; it does not cognize or desire anything extrinsic to itself. Hence the prime mover cannot move — at least not in the usual sense of the word. By contrast, other immaterial intelligences and the celestial bodies to which they are “appropriated,” do move on account of something extrinsic to them, namely the first mover. So there is a difference in the kind of motion the first principle and other movers cause. Anthony invokes Aristotle's discussion in *De caelo* II to fully bring out the specificity of the first mover's kind of motion. According to *De caelo* II things move in order to acquire a perfection they lack or to conserve a perfection they have acquired but may come to lose.

²⁴ See A. MAIER, *Metaphysische Hintergründe*, 239 for discussion of this claim. On the meaning and implications of the related principle that material objects possess only finite motive power, see C. STEEL, “Omnis corporis potentia est finita’. L'interprétation d'un principe aristotélicien, de Proclus à S. Thomas,” in: J. P. BECKMANN *et al.* (eds.), *Philosophie im Mittelalter. Entwicklungslinien und Paradigmen*, Hamburg 1987, pp. 213-224.

But clearly the first mover, if it is to cause motion at all, cannot cause motion in this sense: being pure actuality, it lacks nothing, and so there is nothing for it to acquire; and given that it owes its perfection to its own nature, it cannot come to lose it.

Anthony draws two consequences from the foregoing (<29>). The first is that the prime mover does not move efficiently (*effective*). The second is that the celestial Intelligences do move on account of something they lack. Let us briefly look at each.

Efficient motion is the kind of motion that is required for a mover to move something in time or in “non time,” i.e., in an instant. Anthony holds that for a mover to move a mobile object efficiently it must do so “non-mediate,” that is, without the help of an intermediary cause. Although he does not say so explicitly, Anthony evidently considers that things that move non-mediate are things that move on account of something extrinsic to them. Since the prime mover does not move on account of anything extrinsic to itself, it will not move non-mediate, and so will not be able to cause instantaneous motion. What Anthony is telling us, in effect, is that speaking of the prime mover as an efficient, and hence non-mediate, mover in time or in “non time” is a category mistake of sorts: the prime mover is simply not the kind of thing of which it makes sense to ask whether it moves in time or in an instant. In this Anthony is of a mind with John of Jandun, though of course he differs from John in claiming that the prime mover is infinitely powerful. John in his “commentary” devotes an entire question to the problem whether the first principle moves the first heaven as a non-mediate cause,²⁵ and arrives at much the same conclusion as Anthony. Doubtless this section of John’s commentary is the source of Anthony’s own discussion. This fact notwithstanding, a major difference remains between both authors: for John showing that the prime mover does move non-mediate settles the question of the prime mover’s power: it is neither finite nor infinite. For Anthony, by contrast, the prime mover’s

²⁵ *Quaestiones*, fols. 143va to 145ra. We should note that the thesis that the prime mover moves only as a final cause and not as a non-mediate agent is canvassed by Thomas Wylton in his question “Utrum essentia divina sit perfectio infinita intensive”; see “Utrum essentia...” ed. JUNG-PALCZEWSKA (for full reference, see above, note 3), pp. 360-361 Wylton attributes the view to Averroes, but he considers it ineffective as a means of proving that the prime mover does not cause motion of infinite velocity..

not being infinitely powerful in this one sense does not preclude its being infinitely powerful in another sense, as we shall see shortly.

The second consequence, namely that the celestial Intelligences move on account of something they lack, was implied by Anthony's claim that the first mover is the *only* mover that does not move on account of something it lacks. But Anthony's discussion of this consequence in <29> and <30>, is more than a mere statement of the obvious: its chief aim is to account for the qualitative differences in the motions caused by the celestial movers. The idea is as follows. All intelligences are by nature self-cognizers; and to that extent they do not lack anything they need to carry out that natural operation. Hence it cannot be insofar as they are self-cognizers that celestial Intelligences cause motion. If they are to move it will have to be on account of something extrinsic to, and more perfect than, them, something they lack and to which they cognitively aspire, and that, of course, can only be the first mover. Since the Intelligences are many and are qualitatively different from one another, they will cognize the first mover in different ways, and given that they cause motion inasmuch as they cognize the first mover, different celestial intelligences will perforce cause different sorts of motions.

We now have the "better understanding" mentioned by Anthony in <23>. We now know, as Anthony puts it, "in what way" according to Aristotle and Averroes the prime mover is infinitely powerful. The first principle according to Aristotle and Averroes has infinite power: because its substance enjoys permanent existence; because it has the power to move for an infinite time; but *not* because it has the power to move with infinite velocity. Before we move on to consider Anthony's answers to objections, it will be helpful for us to pause briefly and reflect on the relation between Anthony's elucidation of Aristotle and Averroes in <23> to <31> and his initial discussion of their "intentions" in <11> to <22>. In <11> Anthony had asserted that it seemed to him that the intention of Aristotle and Averroes was to show that the prime mover is not infinitely powerful. In <31> he now claims to have shown "in what way" the prime mover is infinitely powerful. Far from there being any inconsistency between <11> and <31>, <31> confirms <11>. <31> tells us that the first mover *is not* infinitely powerful in the sense of causing instantaneous motion. That is the sense in which it had seemed (*videtur*) to Anthony in <11> that the prime

mover was not infinitely powerful. And the reason for this being the case, we now know, has to do with the fact that the prime mover is not an efficient or non-mediate cause of motion, but moves only as a final cause. But the fact that the prime mover is not infinitely powerful in this sense does not mean that it is not infinitely powerful in some other sense. Anthony tells us that it is: it is infinite because it exists eternally and because it has the power to move for infinite time. Anthony had not previously indicated that he believed that existing for infinite time signalled infinite power. However, he can legitimately claim to having proved in <22> that causing motion for infinite time is possible only for an infinitely powerful cause.

7. *Replies to objections (<32>-<39>)*

The replies to objections in <32> to <39> are of two sorts: those in which Anthony indicates what the response of an unidentified individual or group of individuals would be (*dicerent*) to the objection at hand (<32> to <36>); and those in which he responds in his own name (*dico*) (<37> to <39>).

The first two responses and the objections in <32> to <35>, i.e., <32> and <33>, can be found verbatim in John of Jandun's commentary on the Physics or in his question *De infinitate vigoris dei*; the other three express (so <34>, <35>, and <36>) ideas found in those works, if not in exactly the same terms. At the very least, they appear to express the views of thinkers sympathetic to ideas of Averroes. Thus in <32> Anthony explains what certain would say to the claim — with which Anthony agrees — that from the fact that the prime mover moves for an infinite duration, one can infer that the prime mover has infinite power; those authors would respond (*dicerent*) that this is true in duration but not in power (*vigore*) or in the quality of the action (*qualitate actionis*). This is an almost verbatim quote from John of Jandun:

Nunc autem potentia movens que est in celo est finita non secundum durationem, sed secundum vigorem et qualitatem actionis.²⁶

Similarly, in <33>, to the claim that the first mover produces ex nihilo because it produces something from an infinite distance (and

²⁶ *Quaestiones*, fol. 143rb.

hence must have infinite power), “they” (presumably, the same authors) would say (*dicerent*) that this is not the case, arguing that it was a common conception of physicists that nothing comes from nothing. Again John of Jandun makes the same point in almost exactly the same words:

Communis enim conceptio omnium naturalium philosophorum est quod ex nihilo nihil fit.²⁷

Anthony next (<34>) considers what some would say (*dicerent*) to the modus tollens argument in favour of infinite divine power, initially articulated in <7>, and discussed above, in section 4 on the *alia opinio*. The argument was that since if the mover’s and the mobile object’s both being finite entails that the motion will be finite in duration then, since (according to Aristotle) motion is infinite, the mover and the mobile object are infinite. Some would reply (*dicerent*) that each particular revolution is finite, and infinite only by reiteration, and that for an infinite number of revolutions by reiteration a finitely powerful cause is sufficient, provided it and the mobile object remain the same.²⁸

In <35> Anthony examines what some would say (*dicerent*) about the claim (advanced in <8>) that if the principle is true that the more powerful a cause is the longer it can continue to perform a certain action, then a thing that performs an action for infinite time must be infinitely powerful. Anthony observes that according to these authors the principle holds true of fatigable agents, i.e., agents that “labour” to produce their effect. But from this it does not follow that if some incorporeal cause moves for infinite time then it enjoys infinite power.²⁹

27 *Quaestiones*, fol. 146vb; see also “De infinitate vigoris dei,” p. 127, 565. Cf. e.g. *Auctoritates Aristotelis*, 2.16 and 2.232, ed. J. HAMESSE, pp. 141, 23 and 159, 79.

28 JOHN OF JANDUN, *Quaestiones*, fol. 141rb: “Et quod dicunt isti quod infinitas ex parte partium est illa que competit motui per se, dico quod non est verum simpliciter quia hec infinitas non est possibilis, cum impossibile sit hoc modo mobile esse simpliciter infinitum, immo solum motui possibilis est infinitas secundum circulationem et reiterationem motus ab eodem in idem.”

29 JOHN OF JANDUN, *Quaestiones*, fol. 145va: “Nec debet aliquis dicere quod infinita duratio motus arguat primum movens qui est prima causa huius infinitatis esse vigoris infiniti simpliciter, quia ad hoc sufficit infinitas durationis cum omnimoda intransmutabilitate et cum hoc quod est ens optimum gratia cuius sunt omnia alia. Et hoc apparet quia movens omnino infatigabile et intransmutabile equali virtute potest movere per maius tempus et per minus tempus [...]”

Anthony concludes the first series of responses, in <36>, with his answer to objection <9>. The objection was that if the first mover were infinite only in duration then it would not necessarily be incorporeal, since the sun has the power to heat for an infinite duration. Anthony responds that “they” would say (*dicerent*) that it is indeed not impossible for a cause of qualitative change extending over infinite time to be corporeal, for it belongs to causes of qualitative change to cause such change without themselves being changed, whereas according to the argument advanced in <22>, it is impossible for a corporeal cause of local motion not to be locally moved, at least by accident.³⁰ And we will remember that from this impossibility Anthony had inferred that local motion would not be eternal, from which he then concluded, as had Aristotle most excellently (*optime*) before him, that the cause of eternal local motion could not be corporeal. It is important to note Anthony’s subsequent remarks in <36>. For while describing Aristotle’s thesis — with which he concurs — that the cause of infinite motion is immaterial as “most excellent” and as expressing the view of both Aristotle and Averroes, Anthony goes on to say that, “nevertheless their intention in this regard is totally impossible and false”! It is difficult to see what Anthony means by this last phrase. Surely, there is nothing objectionable from the point of view of faith with the thesis that the prime mover, God, is immaterial. Likewise, the two senses in which he had established (in <31>) that the prime mover is infinitely powerful according to Aristotle’s intention — namely because it exists for infinite time and has the power to cause motion for infinite time — are clearly ones with which Catholic faith agrees. Might Anthony perhaps be alluding to the fact that for Aristotle, contrary to what is asserted by “the truth and Catholic faith,” the prime mover does not only have the power to cause motion for infinite time but actually does cause motion for infinite time? As we will now see this hypothesis won’t stand either. After telling us that Aristotle’s intention is totally impossible and false, Anthony goes on to write that because “the truth of the Catholic faith in all matters must always be put forward while falsity must be stamped out,” something “must be understood” in order to make the truths in these matters manifest. If we then look at this crucial

³⁰ Again, see JOHN OF JANDUN, *Quaestiones*, fol. 145va.

information that “must be understood,” we realize that all Anthony offers is in fact a restatement of his own account, based on Averroes and John of Jandun, of the motion of the first heaven. According to this account, we now know, such motion requires two kinds of movers, one whose power is finite and causes motions non-mediate — these are the appropriated movers — and the other whose power is infinite, and causes motion solely by being an object of desire, namely the first mover. Further, because the appropriated movers always cognize (*semper intelligunt*) the first mover, they will cause motion for infinite time (*per tempus infinitum*); but because they do not cognize the first mover according to its whole infinity, they will cause motion in time. While this account does have the advantage of explaining why the objection stated in <12> according to which an agent endowed with infinite power would move in an instant is null and void, namely because the “consequence” would only be true if the first mover were a non-mediate mover, it is, at one level, extremely surprising. For it seems as though Anthony is saying that the Aristotelian and Averroistic explanation of the motion of the heavens, interpreted with the help of John of Jandun, constitutes the truth of Catholic faith, an astonishing claim to say the least, one that entails, if true, that Anthony could have hardly believed Aristotle’s and Averroes’ intentions to have been “totally impossible and false.” This section of <36> certainly represents one of the more puzzling parts of Anthony’s *quaestio*.

Let us turn now <37> to <39>. <37> and <38> are, respectively, answers to the objections stated in <16> and <17> to the effect that the prime mover’s infinite power would make the existence of other movers “otiose.” The answer in both cases involves, once again, understanding that the prime mover does not move in the same way “appropriated movers” move.

The question concludes (<39>) with Anthony’s answer to the objection voiced in <18> that the first mover cannot both be *finis* (final cause of motion) and infinite, for this would amount to a contradiction. But the contradiction arises only when *finis* denotes the end or extremity of a quantity; otherwise, end and infinite are perfectly compatible: “I say (*dico*) that while something that is an end in the way in which the extremity of a line is its end cannot be infinite, something that is separate from that of which it is the end can be.”

In summary, then, Anthony defends the view that the motion of the heavens is caused by an immaterial first mover that is infinitely powerful in the sense that it subsists eternally and is a final cause of motion for infinite time, but not in the sense that it causes motion of infinite velocity. This the prime mover cannot do, according to Anthony, not because of any lack or deficiency on its part, but because for a substance to cause finite or infinite velocity in another it has to act non-mediate on it, and the first mover is not a non-mediate mover, and thus not the kind of thing that can cause infinite motion. Rather the prime mover moves as a final cause. It is an end (*finis*) endowed with infinite power.

I stated at the outset that a major influence, indeed perhaps the single most important influence behind Anthony *quaestio*, was John of Jandun's commentary on the *Physics*. We are in a better position now to appreciate just how true this is.

Of course, to the extent that Anthony holds that the prime mover is infinitely powerful and that John denies it, the two authors disagree; and given that Anthony wants to underscore the originality of his own view one can expect him to try to make the most of this disagreement, as he does in <5>, where he derides the latest innovations coming out of "Garlandia." But Anthony might be overstating those differences, for on most substantive issues, he and John agree. Both accept Averroes's account of the motion of the first heaven, which requires a first cause, acting as a final cause, and an appropriated mover. Anthony endorses John's account of non-mediate causation, and in particular John's denial that the first mover is a non-mediate mover. Both Anthony and John believe that the prime mover is eternal and that it causes motion for infinite time. Where they disagree is in their understanding of infinite power. As I have explained in the introduction, the Scholastics did not all agree on what sorts of actions or abilities require infinite power. John of Jandun clearly belongs to that group of authors who believed that possessing infinite power meant only the ability to non-mediate cause motion of infinite velocity (and given that the prime mover cannot cause non-mediate motion of infinite velocity, it is not infinitely powerful.). Anthony just as clearly belongs to the second group who believe that causing instantaneous motion is not the only ability that requires infinite power. For Anthony believes that a mover is

infinitely powerful if it subsists for infinite time — provided this is a result of the eternal existent's own nature — and if it causes motion for infinite time. So Anthony might well agree with John that the prime mover does not move non-mediately; but because he believes that the prime mover is eternal and causes eternal motion, he will conclude that the prime mover is infinitely powerful.

Anthony of Parma's "Quaestio utrum primum principium sive deus sit potentie infinite" might not be a work of daring originality, but it is an intriguing illustration of the way in which an early-fourteenth-century Italian arts master tried to balance the conflicting demands of faith and of Aristotelian physics read through the eyes of Averroes.

Ratio edendi

Our *quaestio* is extant in a single Vatican City manuscript, BAV, Vat. lat. 2172, fols. 55rb-57rb, that contains two other philosophically significant works, viz., James of Pistoia's "Questio de felicitate," as well as a commentary on the *Nicomachean Ethics*, long attributed to Anthony, but now known to be the work of Radulphus Brito.³¹ The manuscript likely dates from the first half of the fourteenth century.³² The evidence suggests that it was written after 1315. We know that Anthony's *quaestio*, for reasons indicated in note 10 of the introduction, must have been composed after that date. But James of Pistoia's *quaestio* and Radulphus's *quaestiones* are both dated to the

31 Both texts have been edited. James of Pistoia's *Questio* has in fact been edited twice. It was first edited by Paul Oskar Kristeller ("A philosophical treatise from Bologna dedicated to Guido Cavalcanti: magister Jacobus de Pistorio and his 'Questio de felicitate'" in: *Medioevo e Rinascimento. Studi in onore di B. Nardi*, Florence 1955, pp. 425-463), on the basis of two witnesses, viz., BAV, Vat. Lat. 2072, and Württembergische Landesbibliothek, cod. Theol. Quarto 204, and reedited recently by Irene Zavattero, after the discovery of a third witness. See I. ZAVATTERO, "La *Quaestio de felicitate* di Giacomo da Pistoia. Un tentativo di interpretazione alla luce di una edizione critica del testo," in: M. BETTETINI – F. D. PAPARELLA (eds.), *Le felicità nel medioevo*, Louvain-la-Neuve 2005, pp. 355-410 (395-410, for the edition). Radulphus's questions have been edited by I. COSTA, *Le questiones di Radulfo Brito sull' "Etica Nicomachea"*. *Introduzione e testo critico*, Turnhout 2008. Vat. lat. 2172 has been described, most recently by Costa, *o.c.*, p. 29, but was described in most detail by A. MAIER, in: *Codices Vaticani Latini: Codices 2118-2192*, Vatican City, 1961, pp. 156-159.

32 See COSTA, *Le questiones*, p. 29.

last decade of the thirteenth century by their respective editors.³³ This would make Anthony's work the latest of the three and hence 1315 the *terminus a quo* for the copying of the collection of questions, which was written by the same hand.³⁴ The quality of our text is on the whole quite good, although water damage and folds in the parchment have made some passages difficult to decipher. All conjectural substitutions have been recorded in the apparatus. Conjectural deletions have been signalled in the text by means of square brackets, like so [...]. Conjectural additions have been signalled in the text as well, either by means of single angle brackets, like so <...>, when the addition was motivated solely by the context, or by means of double angle brackets, like so <<...>>, in the case of words that water damage or scraping made difficult to decipher but for which the context permitted a plausible conjecture. Words made illegible by water damage or scrapings for which I was unable to provide a plausible conjecture have been signalled by three asterisks, like so ***. All references to Averroes are to the *editio Juntina secunda* of *Aristotelis Opera cum Averrois Commentariis*, published in Venice in 1562.

33 According to Kristeller ("A Philosophical Treatise," 438), James of Pistoia's *questio* was disputed "sometime before 1300, and probably during the last decade of the thirteenth century," while Costa thinks that Radulphus wrote his *questiones* between 1289 at the very earliest and 1298-99 at the very latest (*Le questiones*, p. 155).

34 See Maier (*Codices Vaticani Latini*, p. 159), who writes that "codex, excepta tabula in fine, ab uno eodem librario exaratus."

<Anthonii Pelacani questio disputata utrum primum principium sive Deus ipse sit potentie infinite>

| Questio disputata fuit utrum primum principium sive Deus ipse sit potentie infinite. 55rb

5 <1> Et arguitur quod sic, quia quod movet per tempus infinitum est vigoris infiniti; primum principium est huiusmodi; ergo etc. Maior patet ex VIII *Physicorum*: quod enim movet perpetue est infinitum, cum sua virtus extendatur in infinitum. Minor etiam patet ex eodem VIII *Physicorum*.

10 <2> Et confirmatur ratio. Primum enim principium non habet in quodam tempore partem aliquotam sue virtutis sed eam habet totam simul. Cum ergo sua virtus secundum extensionem durationis sit infinita et in quolibet instanti habeat totam suam virtutem infinitam, hoc autem est esse infinitum in vigore, ergo etc.

15 <3> Preterea, quod causat aliquid ex infinita distantia est vigoris infiniti; primum principium est huiusmodi; ergo etc. Maior patet ex VII *Physicorum*: potentia enim motoris crescit secundum crementum spatii motus, ita quod motor qui movet per maius spatium ceteris paribus est maioris vigoris. Motor ergo qui causat ex infinita distantia est infinita vigoris. Minor patet: primum enim principium producit aliquid ex nihilo, puta animas nostras et primam materiam; aliquid autem distat a nihilo in infinitum; ergo etc.

20 <4> In contrarium arguitur, quia nec in primo principio nec in aliis debemus aliquid ponere quod salvare <non possumus> ex sensatis et imaginatis; sed nihil nobis apparet ad sensum ex quo possumus arguere infinitatem vigoris ipsius primi principii, etc. Maior patet a Commentatore VIII *Physicorum* et I *Celi et Mundi*: experimentum enim sermonum verorum est ut convenient rebus sensatis. Minor patet, nam inter omnia que apparent procedere a prima causa, nihil est quod tam arguat infinitatem primi sicut motus eternus, et tamen hoc non arguit nisi infinitatem durationis; videmus enim quod sol est vigoris infiniti in calefaciendo et tamen potest per tempus infinitum calefacere; ergo etc.

30 <5> Dico ad questionem, omisso ad presens quod tunc dixit respondens, quod de ista questione sunt 3 opiniones, quarum prima est que ad presens magis nova est in Garlandia, quod primum principium nec est finitum nec infinitum in vigore. Et ratio huius positionis est quia quod non est corpus nec virtus in corpore nec est finitum nec infinitum; sed primum principium est huiusmodi; ergo etc. Maior patet, quia finitum et infinitum soli magnitudini et quantitati congruunt, ut patet I *Physicorum*. Minor declarata est VIII *Physicorum*. Et confirmatur hoc auctoritate Commentatoris VIII *Physicorum*, ubi dicit quod si actio fuit alicuius virtutis non existentis in corpore, illa virtus secundum illud quod non est corporis non potest dici nec finita nec infinita. Sed isti non videntur
40 intelligere questionem. Finitum enim et infinitum dupliciter possunt accipi: vel extensive vel intensive, sicut dicimus albedinem finitam extensive que est in superficie finita, infinitam autem que esset | in infinita. Intensive autem dicitur albedo non comparando eam ad quantitatem sed ad gradus albedinis participare secundum quod unum album dicitur magis album altero quia intensius in albedine; quod si album sit intensius in gradu finito, diceretur eius albedo finita.
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55va

Quando ergo queritur utrum Deus sit vigoris infiniti, non intendimus querere utrum eius vigor <sit> finitus vel infinitus extensive sive quantitative, sed intendimus querere utrum sit finitus vel infinitus intensive. Quod ergo isti arguunt quod potentia prima non sit finita nec infinita extensive, non tamen probat quod
50 non sit finita nec infinita intensive, de quo questio querebat.

<6> Alia est opinio quam tenet veritas et fides catholica et est quod primum principium est vigoris infiniti intensive. Sic querit questio, quod potest ad presens tribus modis declarari.

<7> Primo, ratione Philosophi quam adducit VIII *Physicorum*. Dicit enim
55 Philosophus quod si motor est finitus et mobile est finitum, quod motus necessario est finitus; ergo a destructione consequentis, cum motus celi sit infinitus et eternus, ut probatum est VIII *Physicorum*, relinquitur quod motor celi sit infinitus et etiam mobile sit infinitum quoquo modo. Sed consequentia quam facit Philosophus declaratur supponendo primo quod si aliquod mobile movetur
60 in aliquo tempore circa aliquod signum, quod pars eius mobilis citius pertransibit signum illud quam totum. Accipiat ergo pars aliqua moventis finiti que moveat partem aliquam mobilis finiti; manifestum est quod movebit ipsam in minori tempore quam totum moveat, ut iam declaratum est; igitur movebit ipsam in tempore finito. Tunc accipiam aliam partem moventis et addam priori
65 parti et eodem modo aliam partem mobilis et addam eam prime parti, adhuc igitur pars addita parti movebit partem mobilis additam alteri parti in tempore finito cum pars semper in minori tempore moveat partem quam totum totum. Sic ergo abscindendo partem post partem et addendo partibus precedentibus, continget aliquando auferre totum movens et totum mobile cum utrumque
70 ponatur finitum; tempus tamen <non> contingit totum auferre cum ponatur infinitum; tempus igitur in quo movens finitum movet mobile finitum non potest esse infinitum. Quia ergo tempus est infinitum, relinquitur quod movens sit infinitum et etiam mobile secundum replicationem saltim.

<8> Secundo apparet idem sic. Videmus enim quod si sint duo moventia
75 quorum unum sit maioris virtutis altero, illud quod est maioris virtutis diutius continuabit eundem motum quam quod est minoris virtutis, ut unus homo fortior altero diutius continuabit cursum equalis velocitatis. Si ergo movens est maioris virtutis, quod magis continuat motum, ergo quod in infinitum continuat motum erit infiniti vigoris. Primum principium est huiusmodi; ergo etc.

<9> Tertio apparet hoc sic. Nam Philosophus ex hoc quod primum principium est infinitum probat quod sit separatum a magnitudine; sed si esset infinitum in duratione tantum non sequeretur quod esset separatum a magnitudine; ergo si consequentia Philosophi est necessaria, necessarium est primum principium non solum esse infinitum in duratione sed etiam in vigore. Quod
85 autem si primum principium sit infinitum in duratione tantum, non sequeretur ipsum esse separatum a magnitudine, apparet ex hoc quod videmus non esse inconveniens in magnitudine finita esse virtutem infinitam in duratione; sol enim licet habeat magnitudinem terminatam, [non] tamen habet potentiam calefaciendi per tempus infinitum.

<10> Potest etiam hoc confirmari a Commentatore in XII *Metaphysice* ubi dicit quod corpus celeste componitur ex duplici motore, quorum unus est finite

motionis et est anima existens in celo, et alter motionis infinite et est forma que non est in materia, et intelligit per hanc formam primum principium.

95 <11> Licet tamen hec opinio in se sit vera et verbis consona videatur, quia in philosophia curamus Aristotelis intentionem inquirere quamquam sit contraria veritati, ideo breviter dico quod mihi videtur de intentione Philosophi et Commentatoris fuisse quod primum principium non possit esse potentie infinite. Quamquam verba Philosophi | et eius Commentatoris in diversis philosophie partibus sibi ipsi contraria videantur, potest autem hec positio confirmari ex tribus. 55vb

100 <12> Primo sic. Si primus motor est infinitus in vigore, moveret in non tempore; consequens est falsum; ergo et antecedens. Consequentia patet, quia quanto virtus motoris excedit virtutem mobilis, tanto velocius movet mobile. Si ergo virtus motoris in infinitum excedat virtutem mobilis, in infinitum velocius movebit quocumque altero movente. Non potest autem in infinitum velocius
105 movere nisi moveat in non tempore; cuiuslibet enim temporis finiti ad tempus finitum est proportio finita. Si ergo proportionaliter debet movere, oportet quod moveat in non tempore.

<13> Et si dicatur ad rationem: "quantum est de se potentiam habet ut moveat in non tempore; quia tamen motui repugnat fieri in non tempore, ideo taliter non movetur et sic repugnantia non erit ex parte moventis sed ex parte motus": istud non valet. Quando cause alicuius effectus sunt plures et approx-
110 imatio illarum adinvicem, effectus ipse est possibilis et omnes effectus sunt possibilis. Ponere autem omnes causas possibilis et effectum impossibilem est implicare contradictoria, cum entitas effectus tota dependeat ex entitate causarum.
115 Sed si motor aliquis est vigoris infiniti, de se habet potentiam ut moveat in non tempore. Mobili etiam non repugnat quantumcumque velocius moveri dummodo <non> desinat ei potentia movens ipsum. Quanto enim mobile minus resistit potentie motoris, tanto velocius habet moveri. Cum ergo celum sit mobile finitum habens potentiam finitam, potentia autem motoris sit infinita,
120 improportionabiliter excedatur potentia moti a potentia motoris. Ergo celum de se erit mobile. Ergo cum tam ex parte moventis quam ex parte mobilis possit fieri motus in non tempore, relinquatur quod possibile est esse motum in non tempore, et sic non erit repugnantia ex parte effectus cum non sit ibi repugnantia ex aliqua causarum. Quia ergo effectus est in se impossibilis et cause erunt
125 impossibilis, non dicere possumus quod effectus sit impossibilis et tamen cause sint possibilis, cum possibilitas effectus ex possibilitate earum dependeat. Impossibile est ergo ponere motorem potentie infinite.

<14> Et si dicatur quod licet mobili non repugnet moveri in non tempore ex parte qua potentia moti excedatur a potentia motoris in infinitum, quia tamen mobile est quantum et de ratione quanti est ut pars eius citius pertranseat signum quam totum, ideo adhuc erit repugnantia ex parte mobilis ratione qua quantum et sic non omnes cause erunt possibilis, dico ad hoc: hoc videtur implicare contradictionem, quia sequitur quod mobile possit resistere; cum autem potentia eius excedatur a potentia motoris in infinitum non poterit ei
135 repugnare, et sic poterit ei resistere, quod est impossibile.

<15> Nec valet etiam si dicatur quod quamquam motor sit potentie infinite, quia tamen movet per voluntatem poterit velle movere velocitate finita et sic non

movebit in instanti, quia voluntas motoris non tollit eius potentiam et ideo licet nunc per voluntatem quam habet moveat velocitate finita, hoc tamen sibi non tollit quin habeat potentiam movendi velocitate infinita sive etiam in non tempore.

<16> Secunda ratio est quia si primum principium esset infinitum, in ipso esset aliquid otiosum. Consequens est falsum; ergo et antecedens. Probatio consequentiae: quia omnis effectus primi principii simul etiam sunt finiti, ergo producantur a primo per partem finitam sue potentie. Cum ergo primum principium sit infinite potentie, erit aliqua pars sue potentie per quam nihil producet et sic aliqua pars sue potentie erit otiosa, scilicet per ipsam nihil causans et nulli distribuens suam bonitatem.

<17> Tertia ratio, quia si motor primus esset vigoris infiniti, alii motores, <scilicet> anime, essent frustra. Consequens est falsum; ergo et antecedens. Falsitas consequentis manifesta est, sed probatio consequentiae: ex quo enim est <motor> potentie infinite, poterit per se ipsum omnia mobilia movere; sed frustra fit per plura quod potest per pauciora; ergo otiosum est ponere plures motores.

<18> Potest autem hoc confirmari quia primum principium est finis omnium entium. Si ergo primum principium esset infinitum, ergo finis esset infinitus, quod est contra rationem finis.

<19> Quod autem | hoc sit de intentione Aristotelis patet ex verbis eius III *Celi et Mundi*, ubi dicit quod si in celo essent plures stelle quam sint, vel non moveretur vel moveretur tardius et cum fatigatione, hoc autem non esset nisi motor haberet terminatam proportionem ad mobile. Quod enim tardius moveat mobile non est nisi quia stella superaddita facit mobile magis addere super potentiam motoris quam primo adderet, propter quod tardius movet. Igitur de intentione Philosophi est quod potentia motoris excedat potentiam mobilis in proportione finita. 56ra

<20> Et hoc expresse dicit Commentator exponens istud verbum Philosophi. Dicit enim quod proportio est terminata inter motores celestes et sua mobilia et ideo non quodlibet horum movet mobile quodcumque nec in quacumque velocitate sed bene quilibet movet proprium mobile et in velocitate propria. Et paucis interpositis subdit quod additio potentie motoris supra potentiam moti non est infinita nisi in tempore et in eternitate motoris, non in velocitate nec in multitudine nec in magnitudine mobilium.

<21> Item, eodem secundo ubi Commentator movet questionem quomodo primus orbis movet alios orbis, in solutione eius dicit quod totus orbis eius est quasi unum totum animal et unum corpus per potentiam que est in eo debet habere magnitudinem terminatam eo quod potentia illa et est motor eius et est terminata.

<22> Item, in eodem secundo *Celi et Mundi* dicit Commentator quod opinandum est quod potentie moventium separabilium a materia sunt finite uno modo, scilicet in qualitate actionis, et infinite alio modo, scilicet in duratione. Et idem inducit rationem prius tactam, scilicet quod si primum principium esset vigoris infiniti, motus essent in instanti sive in non tempore et ideo subdit quod potentie moventium sunt terminate proportionis ad corpora nostra mota et quod

185 esse determinate proportionis ad sua mobilia est diversitas suarum formarum, et
addit quod finitas in vigore sive in qualitate actionis communis est tam formis
que sunt in materia quam [in] formis que non sunt in materia.

<23> Quia tamen plures auctoritates Averrois et Aristotelis ad contrarium
inducuntur, ideo ut perfectius habeatur intellectus auctoritatum illarum, intel-
ligendum est quod nulla virtus in corpore existens potest movere corpus motu
190 locali per tempus infinitum quantumcumque virtus illa corporea sit eterna, quia
virtus corporea in movendo movetur, saltem per accidens. Omne enim corpus
motum ex se per virtutem corpoream existentem in ipso dividitur in partem
corpoream per se moventem et per se motam, ita quod pars que est per se
movens est per accidens mota sicut videmus in animalibus quod corpus per se
195 movens alia membra per accidens movetur, sicut etiam est in nauta qui per se
movens in finem movet se ipsum per accidens. Omnis ergo virtus corporea
movetur cum movet, sed quia motui est quies contraria, ideo omne corpus quod
movetur potest non moveri sive quiescere. Quod enim est in potentia ad unum
contrarium est in potentia ad alterum. Quia ergo virtus corporea movens potest
200 non moveri, si potest non moveri, potest etiam non movere. Si enim semper
moveret semper etiam moveretur et per consequens non posset quiescere sive
non moveri. Virtus ergo corporea sicut potest non moveri, ita potest non mov-
ere, et si potest non movere a tali virtute, non erit necessarium motum esse, nec
etiam motus ex se habet necessarium esse cum habeat quietem contrariam. Omne
205 autem habens contrarium potest non esse. Ergo non est necessarium motum esse
nec a virtute movente corporea nec ex se. Ergo motus <si> esset a virtute corpo-
rea, aliquando posset motus deficere. Sed si motus eternus <est> et non potest
deficere, ut probat Philosophus VIII *Physicorum*, necessarium est hoc esse a vir-
tute incorporea et immobili que in nulla potentia sit omnino nec ad esse nec ad
210 motum.

<24> Quod si virtus corporea sive in corpore eterno sive non eterno posset
esse causa necessaria perpetuitatis motus, non fuisset aliqua via per quam philo-
sophice investigare potuissemus virtutes aliquas esse incorporeas, et ideo Com-
mentator XII *Metaphysice* cum inquit qualiter motus possit perpetuari cum
215 tamen habeat quietem contrariam, dicit quod necessarium est hoc fieri | a virtute 56rb
incorporea cui non admiscetur potentia omnino. Unde aliquantulum post con-
cludit “Si igitur motus in ubi fuerit eternus, necesse est ut motus eius sit a
motore non corporeo nec potentia in corpore eterno, neque non eterno”. Subdit
quod “hoc est valde difficile et clausum et ideo iste locus fuit lapsus sapientum;
220 cum enim declaratum est hoc corpus esse eternum, existimatum est quod non
indigemus in hoc ponere aliquod principium nobilius eo; existimatum est enim
cum dicimus quod omnis virtus que est in corpore est finita, quod hoc non est
verum nisi in corporibus materialibus et generabilibus et corruptibilibus. Si
autem aliquid sit eternum in sua substantia, existimatum est quod necesse est
225 potentiam moventem esse eterne motionis, et in hoc loco, ut dicit, erraverunt
Sabi et sapientes eorum.”

<25> Et est intelligendum quod licet aliquod corpus eternum carens materia
possit habere virtutem alterandi tempore infinito, sicut sol potest calefacere per
tempus infinitum, non tamen habet virtutem movendi localiter tempore infinito.

230 Et tota ratio huius est quia tale corpus alterans in alterando non alteratur neque
 per se neque per accidens et ideo <non> est in potentia ad non alterare; omnis
 tamen virtus corporea movens localiter sive sit in corpore eterno sive non eterno
 in movendo movetur saltem per accidens; sicut autem aliquid movetur, sic potest
 235 quiescere et ideo talis virtus saltem per accidens est in potentia ad quietem et sic
 talis virtus potest moveri et non moveri et per consequens movere et non movere,
 cum non possit movere quin moveatur. Sicut igitur aliquid non potest esse
 perpetuum per aliquid quod potest esse, ita nihil potest habere motum per-
 petuum per illud quod potest movere et non movere. Quia igitur motus celi est
 240 perpetuus, ut probatum est VIII *Physicorum*, necessarium est hoc esse a virtute
 incorporea cui non accidit potentia neque per se neque per accidens. Sic igitur
 licet virtus corporea eterna possit alterare per tempus infinitum quia non altera-
 tur alterando, non tamen potest movere localiter tempore infinito eo quod in
 tali motu per accidens movetur.

<26> Est etiam ulterius intelligendum quod licet omnes virtutes celestes sint
 245 immateriales et incorporeales, nulla tamen dicitur proprie causa continuationis
 motus in infinitum nisi prima, que movet tantum ut amatum et desideratum
 sive in ratione finis. Cum enim primum principium moveat ut amatum et desid-
 eratum, necesse est corpora celestia moveri ab animabus suis in quantum desid-
 erant et appetunt ipsum principium. Virtutes ergo celestes movent propter
 250 aliquod desideratum extrinsecum quod est finis earum. Quod autem movet ad
 extrinsecum potest semper movere et non semper movere. Potest enim non
 semper movere si illud propter quod movet non sit transmutabile. Quod ergo
 movet propter aliquod extrinsecum desideratum ab eo non habet ex se semper
 movere quantumcumque ipsum sit eternum et incorporeale, quia motus cessabit
 255 si illud propter quod movetur sit transmutabile, sed causa sempiternitatis motus
 est sempiternitas et intransmutabilitas forme propter quam est motus. Quia igitur
 forma propter quam movent motores appropriati sive intelligentie est forma
 separata ab eis, que omnino caret potentia cum nihil intelligat nec aliquid
 appetat extra se, ideo nullus motor appropriatus quantumcumque sit incorporeus
 260 et eternus dicitur esse causa perpetuitatis motus, sed causa perpetuitatis motus
 est motor ille separatus et forma separata propter quam movent motores appro-
 priati. Et ideo Commentator in XII dicit quod corpus celeste componitur ex
 duplici motore, quorum unus est finite motionis et est anima existens in eo, alter
 vero motionis infinite et est potentia que non est in materia, id est appropriata
 265 alicui materie sive magnitudini, et ideo in eodem loco, in fine, dicit Commenta-
 tor quod “potentie moventes in corporibus eternis possibile est ut semper move-
 ant et ut semper non moveant. Possunt enim non semper movere si illud ad
 quod moventur fuerit transmutabile; possunt autem semper movere si illud ad
 quod moventur fuerit non transmutabile aliquo modo transmutationis, et hoc
 270 est cum non fuerit corpus omnino,” scilicet quod nullam habeat attributionem
 ad corpus, et ideo subdit: “si igitur motum est eternum, necesse est ut moveatur
 per potentiam existentem in eo a motore cui nullus modus transmutationis
 accidit,” et tale, id est talis motor, in nulla materia existit, id est nulli corpori
 275 appropriatur. Per hoc enim dist<<inctus est>> a motore appropriato quem appel-
 lat potentiam existentem in eo, id est sec<<undum quid>>. Sic igitur duo sunt

56va

declarata. Primum est quod virtus movens locali motu perpetuo non potest esse virtus in corpore sive eterno sive non eterno, cum talis virtus corporea possit movere et non movere quia <<corporea virtus>> movetur per accidens, ut dictum est prius. Secundum est quod nulla *** virtus corporea que movet desiderando et appetendo aliquod extra potest esse causa existentie perpetuitatis motus, sed sola causa perpetuitatis motus est forma illa desiderata ab eis que tantum movet in genere finis, sicut amatum movet amantem.

<27> Quod tamen in determinando supponebatur quod intelligentie moveant propter aliquam formam extrinsecam ab eis quam intelligunt et desiderant in quo duo videntur implicari, unum est quod sit aliqua forma separata a motoribus appropriatis que moveat tantum ut finis, aliud est quod intelligentie intelligant aliquid extra se, de quibus aliqui dubitant, ideo breviter possumus declarare utrumque auctoritate et ratione. Primum autem apparet auctoritate Philosophi in XII *Metaphysice*. Dicit enim quod primum principium movet ut amatum et desideratum; quod autem movet ut amatum et desideratum movet tantum in ratione finis; amans autem movet in ratione agentis. Apparet etiam hoc per Philosophum II *Celi et Mundi*. Comparat enim primum principium sanitati et dicit quod sicut aliqua sunt que acquirunt sanitatem una actione sive unico motu, quedam autem pluribus, ita primus motor comprehendit primum principium et per eum perficit unica actione sive unico motu, alii autem orbes acquirunt hanc perfectionem pluribus motibus, et ideo paulo prius concludit Philosophus quod primum principium quod est nobile et perfectum simpliciter non indiget actione extrinseca in acquisitione nobilitatis, sed est illud cuius gratia alia movent et agunt, et ideo ipsemet in XII dicit quod sua actio est nobilissima aliarum et quod hec actio nobilissima est intelligere.

<28> Declaratur etiam hoc ratione quam innuit Philosophus in verbis preallegatis in II *Celi et Mundi*, quia omne quod movet movet aut ut acquirat aliquid quod non habet, aut ut conservet perfectionem quam iam habet, sicut aliquis movetur aut ad sanitatem acquirendam, aut ad sanitatem conservandam; sed primum principium non potest movere ut acquirat aliquid quod non habet, quia tunc non esset summe perfectum, immo careret alia perfectione ad quam moveretur, nec potest movere ut conservet perfectionem quam iam habet. Non enim perficitur ad aliquid extrinsecum cum nihil intelligat extra se nec movet ut conservet intellectionem quam habet a se ipso cum tali intellectione carere non possit; suum enim intelligere est sua substantia que est indefectibilis; omnis autem motus est aut ratione actualis carentie sicut cum aliquis actu caret sanitate, aut ratione alicuius quo carere potest, sicut habens sanitatem potest carere sanitate et ideo movetur ut eam conservet. Quia ergo primum principium nullo caret et nullo carere potest, primum principium non movebitur. Et ex hoc apparent duo.

<29> Unum est quod primum principium non movet aliquod corpus effective; aliud est quod omnis intelligentia movens movet propter aliquid quod [est] ex se non habet et quo carere potest quantum est de se; intelligentie autem non possunt carere intellectione qua intelligunt suam substantiam, cum suum intelligere sit suum esse; suum autem esse est indefectibile; ergo nulla intelligentia movet propter intelligere sui ipsius, et ideo si movet, oportet quod moveat

propter aliquod intelligibile extrinsecum quod de se non habet et quo de se
 <carere> potest et non movet ut conservet | sibi illam intellectionem extrinse- 56vb
 cam, et sic etiam apparet secundum quod intelligentia quelibet intelligit aliquid
 325 extra se et non solum se ipsam, et hoc expresse dicit Commentator XII *Meta-*
physice super illa parte “et movet sicut amatum.” Dicit ibi quod “cum corpora
 celestia habeant appetitum propter intellectum, <intellectus> maius bonum ipso
 appetat, contingit necessario quod corpora celestia in hoc motu appetant aliquid
 maius bonum ipsis,” et alibi in eodem XII dicit quod intelligentie intelligunt
 330 primum secundum aliquid perfectius quam sint sue essentie et hoc etiam dicit
 in eodem XII, ubi contra Avicennam dicit qualiter ab uno simplici possunt
 simul plura procedere; dicit enim quod non est possibile ut illud quod est per
 se intelligentia et intellectum sit causa plurium, sed quod ex eo intelliguntur
 multi modi. Illud enim quod intelligit de primo motore motor totius est aliud
 335 ab eo quod de ipso intelligit motor orbis Saturni, et simile est de unoquoque
 eorum, scilicet quod perfectio uniuscuiusque est in intelligendo causam primam.
 Idem etiam dicit III *De anima* ubi dicit quod nullus intellectus est liberatus a
 potentia simpliciter nisi intellectus primi principii qui nihil intelligit extra se.
 Vult ergo quod omnes alie intelligentie a primo intelligunt aliquid extra se, et
 340 confirmatur hoc etiam sic, quia primum principium est finis intelligentiarum
 secundum esse perfectius quam sit esse intelligentiarum. Finis enim est perfec-
 tior hiis que sunt ad finem. Omne autem ordinatum in finem quem numquam
 acquirit est otiosum, ut apparet III *Physicorum*. Si ergo intelligentia non intel-
 ligat primum secundum aliquid perfectius quam sit sua essentia et per conse-
 345 quens ut est extra ipsam, intelligentia erit otiosa. Puerile autem est dicere quod
 intelligentie non acquirant suam perfectionem sed solum perficiantur ex esse in
 tali ordine et distantia ad primum, sicut inanimata perficiuntur; manifestum est
 enim per se quod nobilior <perfectio> quam habeat quicumque intellectus est
 in intelligendo. Si ergo intelligentie perficiuntur per hoc quod sunt in tali
 350 ordine, hoc erit quia ex tali ordine acquirunt aliquam perfectionem, id est intel-
 lectionem, que est earum perfectio. Intelligere enim est nobilissima et propriis-
 sima perfectio intelligentis, ut dicitur XII *Metaphysice*; illud ergo intelligere
 quod acquirunt ex tali ordine vel erit intelligere suas substantias, et tale intel-
 ligere non potest esse finis et ultima earum perfectio cum finis sit nobilior hiis
 355 que sunt ad finem; vel erit intelligere ordinem istum quem habent, et illud
 intelligere est esse perfectius quam sit intelligere suas substantias, cum talis ordo
 sit quidam respectus; propter quod tale intelligere non potest esse ultimus finis
 et perfectio earum; vel erit intelligere aliquod extrinsecum intelligibile nobilius
 360 ipsis, et tunc habeo propositum quod intelligunt extra se <aliquid> quod est
 perfectius ipsis et hoc est primum principium.
 <30> Exemplum autem quod quidam inducunt in igne et aere non est ad
 propositum. Unumquodque enim perficitur secundum modum sibi possibilem.
 Non autem idem modus perfectionis possibilis est in rebus animatis et cogno-
 scentibus, et ideo dato quod inanimata ex solo ordine perficiantur, quod tamen
 365 fortasse non habet omnimodam veritatem, cognoscentia tamen ex solo ordine
 perfici non poterunt, nisi in quantum ex ordine tali habent taliter intelligere et
 tale intelligibile, quia sicut dicit Philosophus in XII *Metaphysice* et in III *De*

anima, propria perfectio intelligentis est intelligere et quia in hoc transgredimur principale propositum, superfluum est in hoc amplius immorari.

370 <31> Sic igitur redeuntes ad principale propositum dicamus quod ex dictis apparet qualiter primum principium secundum intentionem Aristotelis et Averrois habet potentiam infinitam: quia secundum suam substantiam habet permanentiam infinitam; habet etiam potentiam movendi per tempus infinitum; non tamen habet potentiam movendi velocitate infinita.

375 Alie autem intelligentie non habent nisi permanentiam infinitam, non tamen ex se habent potentiam movendi per tempus infinitum, sed hoc habent a forma propter quam movent, nec etiam habent potentiam movendi velocitate infinita et hec est in questione hac *Physicorum* opinio per quam apparuit Commentator solvere rationes prius inductas ad veritatem quam tenet fides catholica confirmandam.

380 <32> Ad primum, quando dicitur quod primum movet per tempus infinitum, ergo est virtutis infinite |, dicerent quod verum est in duratione, non autem in vigore sive in qualitate actionis, et quando ulterius confirmatur quod primum principium habet in quolibet instanti totam suam virtutem simul, sed sua virtus secundum extensionem durationis est infinita, ergo habet in quolibet instanti virtutem infinitam, dicerent quod verum est quod in quolibet instanti habebit virtutem infinitam in duratione et non in vigore. 57ra

<33> Ad aliam quando dicitur quod producit aliquid ex infinita distantia quia producit ex nihilo, dicerent quod non est verum quia secundum Philosophum I *Physicorum* hec fuit communis conceptio physicorum ex nihilo nihil fieri.

390 <34> Ad rationes autem que adducebantur in corpore questionis, ad primam quando dicitur quod Philosophus vult VIII *Physicorum* quod si movens est finitum et mobile est finitum, quod motus erit finitus etiam in duratione, dicerent quod verum est quod motus finitus est secundum quod mobile finitum movetur a movente finito circa aliquod signum secundum se totum una circulatione, et 395 quando dicitur quod motus est infinitus, ergo movens et mobile erunt infinita, dicerent quod quelibet circulatio in se est finita, licet motus sit infinitus secundum replicationem diversarum circulationum. Ad hoc autem quod motus sit infinitus sufficit quod mobile remaneat idem et non corrumpatur et quod 400 movens etiam non corrumpatur nec habeat potentiam ut non moveat, quod ipsi ponunt ut visum est in positione.

<35> Ad aliam quando dicitur "illud quod est maioris vigoris diutius continuat aliquam actionem, ergo quod in infinitum motum continuat erit vigoris infiniti," dicerent quod in moventibus que in movendo moventur et in movendo laborant, dicerent quod in talibus illud quod est maioris vigoris diutius movet, non tamen propter hoc oportet quod si aliqua virtus incorporalis moveat per tempus infinitum quod ipsa sit vigoris infiniti, sed sufficit quod suus vigor finitus sit incorporalis et quod in movendo quod virtus illa non moveatur, ut declaratum est in positione. Unde comparatio fit in univocis; cum autem comparas virtutes corruptibiles ad virtutes incorporales et immobiles, ***, et hoc 410 etiam possumus in experimento videre. Videmus enim quod alterans maioris virtutis diutius potest alterare; non tamen oportet quod illud quod alterat per tempus infinitum sit vigoris infiniti in alterando, sed sufficit quod tale alterans

415 sit inalterabile et quod virtus per quam alterat sit incorporalis et sic est etiam in motu locali. Ad hoc enim ut aliquod movens perpetue moveat sufficit quod sit movens immobile et incorporale.

<36> Ad aliam quando dicitur: “si virtus primi motoris esset tantum infinita in duratione, non esset impossibile ipsam esse in magnitudine sicut sol habet virtutem calefaciendi tempore infinito; Philosophus tamen dicit impossibile est
420 hanc virtutem esse in magnitudine,” dicerent quod non est inconveniens virtutem alterantem per tempus infinitum esse in magnitudine, quia talis virtus in alterando non alteratur. Non enim est necessarium omnem virtutem corpoream in alterando alterari et quia talis virtus in alterando non alteratur, ideo non potest non alterare, propter quod semper alterabitur virtus. Tamen movens
425 localiter per tempus infinitum non potest esse in corpore eo quod omnis virtus corporea movens localiter in movendo movetur saltim per accidens et quia movetur, potest non moveri et per consequens non movere, ut visum est in positione. Nihil autem potest habere motum perpetuum a virtute que potest movere et non movere, sicut nihil potest habere <motum> perpetuum a virtute
430 que potest esse et non esse, et sic optime conclusit Philosophus quod si aliqua virtus movet per tempus infinitum, quod illa virtus est a magnitudine separata, et hec est intentio Philosophi et Averrois circa hanc questionem quamquam eorum intentio totaliter impossibilis sit et falsa. Et ideo quia veritas est in omnibus premittenda quam fides catholica tenet et falsitas ipsa in omnibus conculcanda, ideo ad eorum manifestationem est intelligendum quod corpus celeste
435 componitur ex duplici motore, quorum unus est vigoris finiti et est ille qui movet in ratione agentis et alter est vigoris infiniti et est ille qui movet in ratione finis. Quia tamen motores appropriati movent propter intellectum quem habent de motore separato qui movet tantum in ratione finis, ideo quia
440 ipsum intelligunt, non tamen secundum | totam suam infinitatem in quantum ipsum semper intelligunt habent quod moveant per tempus infinitum; quia tamen non intelligunt ipsum secundum totam suam infinitatem sed secundum aliquid finitum, ideo habent quod moveant velocitate finita et non in instanti, propter quod prima eorum ratio non concludit quando dicitur quod si esset
445 virtutis infinite, moveret in non tempore, dico quod verum es<set si> moveret aliquid immediate; modo nihil movet immediate, cum <nec indi>geat alicuius acquisitione nec alicuius conservatione, et quia semper motor mediante quo movet intelligit ipsum secundum aliquid finitum, ideo movet velocitate finita.

<37> Ad aliam, quando dicitur quod aliqua pars sue potentie <<esset o>>tiosa
450 quia ab ea nihil procederetur, dico quod primum principium et *** prima intentione sunt propter se, secunda autem intentione sunt propter nos, ut dicit Commentator II *Celi et Mundi*. Quod autem attingit illud propter quod principaliter ordinatur non dicitur otiosum, ut patet II *Physicorum*. Quia ergo primum principium est propter se principaliter, dato quod nihil produceret adhuc tamen non
455 esset otiosum.

<38> Et ad aliamquando dicitur quod motores appropriati essent frustra quia ex quo est virtutis infinite poterit movere omnia corpora celestia immediate, dico quod nedum omnia, immo nihil potest movere immediate, quia si moveret aliquid immediate motus eius esset otiosus, quia non indiget conservatione alicuius

57rb

460 nec acquisitione, ut visum est prius secundum ipsam rationem intentionem
Philosophi.

<39> Et quando quarto dicebatur quod cum idem sit finis omnium entium,
finis esset infinitus, dico quod finis coniunctus non potest esse infinitus secun-
dum quem modum punctus est finis lineae, finis tamen separatus bene potest
465 esse infinitus et hoc modo primum principium est finis entium et nunc mani-
feste apparent rationes eorum nihil concludere. Quod autem de hoc clarius et
subtilius dici potest illud a sacris theologie doctoribus requiratur.

Secundum magistrum Anthonium de Parma finit hic.

