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The Characteristics of Democracy in
the Political Philosophy of Jacques
Maritain.

by Joseph M. Grabetz

A Thesis submitted to the School of Graduate
Studies and Research of the University of
Ottawa as partial fulfillment of the
requirements for the Degree of Master of
Arts in Philosophy.

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UNIVERSITÉ D'OTTAWA
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ABBREVIATIONS

AS	Art and Scholasticism (1920)
CC	On the Church of Christ (1973)
CHD	Christianity and Democracy (1945)
EE	Existence and the Existent (1948)
FMW	Freedom in the Modern World (1971)
IH	Integral Humanism (1973)
EFF	Education for Freedom (1982)
JMC	J. Maritain and the French Catholic Intellectuals (1983)
MS	Man and the State (1951)
MP	Moral Philosophy (1964)
PG	Peasant of the Garonne (1973)
PCG	The Person and the Common Good (1947)
PH	On the Philosophy of History (1959)
RC	Religion and Culture (1930)
RN	Rights of Man and Natural Law (1943)
RR	Range of Reason (1943)
RT	Redeeming the Time (1943)
SCP	Scholasticism and Politics (1940)
SC	Social Contract
SP	The Social and Political Philosophy of J. Maritain (1965)
SW	Science and Wisdom (1940)
TC	Things that are not Caesar's (1930)
TR	Three Reformers (1925)

ABBREVIATIONS

TWC

Twilight of Civilization (1946)

AMD

Pope Pius XII. Allocation
Magnificate Dominum 1954.

CONTENTS

Chapters		Page
	Abbreviations	vii
	Introduction	1
I.	MARITAIN'S EVALUATION OF THE INHERITED POLITICAL PAST	5
	1. Bourgeois Liberalism and its Doctrine of Man as Viewed by Maritain	5
	2. Critical Assessment of Liberalism as Done by Maritain.	13
II.	MARITAIN'S NOTION OF PERSONALIST HUMANISM	22
	A. Introduction and Preliminary Notes to Chapter Two	24
	1. Historical Development in Meaning of the Word Democracy as Viewed by J. Maritain	26
	2. Meaning of Democracy in Maritain	29
	B. Maritain's Notion of the Nature of Man	31
	1. Notion of Person in Maritain	34
	2. Maritain's Notion of Individuality	38
	C. Maritain's Concept of Human Freedom	42
	1. Freedom of Choice	43
	2. Freedom of Spontaneity	46
	3. Individual Human Person and Political Society	49
III.	MARITAIN'S NOTION OF COMMUNAL HUMANISM AND ITS FUNCTION IN THEOCENTRIC DEMOCRACY	52
	A. Integration of Individual Human Person into the Community	54
	1. Individual Human Person, Common Good and its Communal Role	55
	B. Maritain's Notion of Authority	66
	1. Authority and Maritain's Concept of Equality	66
	2. Leaven of Gospel and the Purpose of Authority	71
IV.	NOTION OF PLURALISTIC CHARACTERISTIC IN DEMOCRATIC SOCIETY	73
	1. Maritain's Notion of Pluralism	76
	2. Judicial Pluralism	77
	3. Economic Pluralism	79
	4. Religious Pluralism	85
	5. The Democratic Charter	90

CONTENTS

vi

Chapters	Page
V. NOTION OF THE GOSPEL INSPIRED DEMOCRACY	95
1. Age of the Reason and its Consequences as seen by Maritain	97
2. An Anthropocentric Humanism	99
B. Theocentric Humanism	104
1. The Leaven of Gospel as Historical Energy	107
2. The Role of the Catholic Church in a Democratic Society	114
VI. MARITAIN'S POLITICAL PHILOSOPHY IN PERSPECTIVE	125
A. Introduction to this Concluding Chapter	126
B. Maritain's Political Thought and its Influences in a Contemporary World	127
C. Questions Arising from Maritain's Political Writings	132
BIBLIOGRAPHY	137

INTRODUCTION

This thesis proposes to deal, as the title may suggest to us, with four characteristics of Democracy on which J. Maritain builds his notion of democracy. Maritain believed, democracy, i.e. personalist and communal democracy, to be the best political philosophy; and as one of the major themes of political philosophy. Henry Bais writes on the point "the democracy is the central problem towards which all the others converge, which is the keystone of all the others and which cannot be solved without all the others,"

And yet, should one accept Maritain's claim, that democracy is the best political philosophy; would or could one consider "Maritain's type of democracy" as a realistic one? After all, the first impression one, when reading Maritain's political writings, would gather, is that of naivete, utopia and a wishful thinking based upon the writer's religious beliefs and convictions. To talk of heaven of Gospel and/or Organic Democracy, after we have heard from Marx, Freud, Darwin Sartre, one would certainly wonder if Maritain's political thoughts have anything to do with human reality down here upon the Earth.

I would like to point out that it is not my purpose to prove validity or lack of it for that matter, of Maritain's political thought as I don't believe it to be within the framework of this short essay. Rather, I will try to show in a systematic manner the basic tenets - as I understand it,

of Maritain's political doctrine on democracy, and its characteristics. Thus, the theses will be divided into six chapters, four of which will deal with the humanistic characteristics, and two of which will serve as opening and closing statements on the subject matter. Thus, Chapter One will be the chapter which will offer Maritain's evaluation of the "political past" he inherited; Chapter Two shall be the chapter on Maritain's personalist humanism, whereby we shall discuss subjects like development of personalism, nature of man in Maritain's understanding, person and freedom. The third chapter will deal with the Communal characteristic in democracy and with the problem of authority in a democratic society. The fourth chapter on pluralistic character of democratic society, will show how in Maritain's thinking, a variety of notions and beliefs could co-operate in achieving the common goal of well-being. The fifth chapter on Christian characteristic and its workings in democratic society will offer the explanation of what Maritain calls the "Gospel leaven", along with the basic tenets of love, justice, friendship and ethical order in a democratic society. The sixth and closing chapter will show Maritain's political philosophy in a perspective. We will show in a short manner Maritain's achievement and influence of his thought in a contemporary world. In a second part of this chapter I'll try to present a "few problems" which one may see or recognize in Maritain's writings on democracy.

CHAPTER ONE

Maritain's evaluation of the inherited political past.

- 1) Bourgeois Liberalism and its
Doctrine of Man as viewed by
J. Maritain.
- 2) Critical assessment of Liberalism
as done by Maritain.

In this first chapter, as mentioned in the introduction, we shall try to show the "political background" of the time J. Maritain, so to say, inherited. We will show how Maritain evaluated his "heritage" and how against this political background he built his own political philosophy, as an answer to the errors - as he believed them to be, of the past philosophies. Thus, we will discuss the thoughts of Descartes, Luther and J. J. Rousseau - as their thoughts Maritain considered the most influencing ones, which created the politico-religious and ethical inheritance of our times.

1) Bourgeois Liberalism and its Doctrine of Man as Viewed by Maritain.

In 1928, Maritain published his Three Reformers, in which one may get the first glimpse of his philosophical and political attitude towards the ideological orientations of, what we may call, the modern world; the paternity of which Maritain attributed, above all to the three thinkers, namely, Luther, whom he considers a reformer of religion; Descartes - a reformer of philosophy in Maritain's view; and lastly J. J. Rousseau, a reformer, Maritain tells us, of Morals (TR4).

The Luther's chapter of the above-mentioned book expresses in Maritain's words the belief that one of the greatest errors the modern world has committed and which he considers as the prime source of all other errors is the confoundment of

individuality and personality "The modern world confounds two things which ancient wisdom distinguished. It confounds individuality and personality." (TR 19) More, Maritain tells us, Decartes, Luther's companion on the road of error, brought to us the notion of "man the spirit", or the angel of the earth in whom spirit is enclosed in his body without a substantial unity.

The Cartesian ideas come from God, like angelic ideas, not from objects, it has, without the body, received direct from God all the operative perfection which can befit it. There is the destruction of the very reason of its union with the body. (TR 63)

As Maritain tells us Descartes notion played an unfortunate role in the development of thought in the post-medieval civilization.

We may recognize that this thought in the sphere of religion gave impetus to the separation of grace and nature, of reason and faith. Thus, the foundation of anthropocentric humanism confounded with the divine one was established and justified. This kind of humanism carried a germ of death. For man fell on himself with all his life-wright: he directed himself with no reference to his transcendental end. (RC 19-20) This divinization of man's self leads him into the belief in the possibility to construct an ideal community, in which man would become master of his own destiny.

The politics and economy were thus mixed with different kinds of moral **values** and they found their final end in themselves of immediate success and self-benefit. Thus, the life's objectives have been presented as the unlimited conquest of temporal happiness.

...everything that may procure such an end - even an act of injustice, even oppressive and inhuman conditions of life - is economically good. A homo oeconomicus will be invented whose sole function is to accumulate material goods. (RC 26)

Everything which could promote the good of temporal happiness was justified in new morality, risen to the level of supreme ethico-judicial agent of economical good. Should the action of man be prescribed in technological manner only as liberal political system does, the society's will inevitably end in catastrophe, for as we shall see later in chapter two, man is not ordained by all of what he is, for the temporal good; neither his actions should lack in prudential perspective.

But should the supra-natural end of man be also disregarded, then man will become a kind of superman through the conquest of the material world, by progressive subordinating of his reason and life to the same material dimension. This is so, because in order to master the matter, man must reduce his

own knowing and living to the technological material necessities. Not only that, in order for man to become a superman, he needs to remove God; for man to be crowned superman and to be uncontested god over the material world, any other god over him must cease to be.

In order to rule over the nature and yet take no account of the basic laws of his own nature, man, in his knowing and his living is in reality forced to submit himself more and more to technological and inhuman necessities, and to energies of the material order which he makes use of and which invade the human world itself God dies; materialized man thinks he can be man or superman only if God is not God. (IH 32)

We see this condition manifested in the separation of politics from theology. Man stakes the goal of anticipation in a felicity to be attained by means of technological procedure and guaranteed by the physical entities of the mind. God as we have said is reduced to an idea; "...the clearest of all ideas" (IH 32); on the basis of which the validity of other ideas can be guaranteed. Now, while Descartes erred by ascribing to man an angelic nature, J. J. Rousseau dressed up this "angel" into the human body; "The man of Rousseau," writes Maritain, "it is the angel of Descartes who makes the beast." (TR 141) The perspective of man, in Rousseau, reverses from that of Descartes, man does not perceive directly, as Maritain tells us, only angels do, his nature becomes uncorrupted. The turn in Rousseau, then, is from reason to sensibility. The man is good by essence, his nature is

endowed with nothing but aspiration towards good. The formula of a good education is creating for Rousseau no obstacles towards a natural development of a child, since "the first steps of the nature are always right, and there is not a grain of original perversity in the human heart."

(EM 8) Now what does "nature" mean for J. J. Rousseau?

We learn from St. Thomas that the term natural law can be understood in two different senses. Things may be of natural law, either nature inclines towards it or it (nature) does not arrange contrary to it. That is to say, in its first meaning, "nature" is taken in the metaphysical sense - essence ordered to its finality according to its properties by God. The second meaning of nature is taken in its material sense, denoting things in its basic, primitive, or unaltered state as they were prior to the work of reason and intelligence. Now Rousseau, in his notion of nature, took the metaphysical meaning of the word and incarnates it, so to say, into the empirical one, thus ascribing to the empirical the end of the metaphysical; "Nature is the essential need, divinely placed in things of a certain primitive condition or anti-culture which things are made to realize" (TC 128); so he "muddles up these two different senses, he locks them into a single equivocal pseudo-concept, the 'nature' of the metaphysicians and the 'nature' of the empiricists," writes J. Maritain. (TC 128) This thought of natural goodness has been

an inspiration for the philosophy of liberal democracy, which carries few aspects of political thought with it.

On the political plane it could be presented as doctrine considering the priority of the individual over the state, in order to withdraw the citizens from the despotism of the public power; by placing him under the protection of law.. The state is not the source of rights of man. "It simply amounts to establishing an organic whole without its parts being subordinated to one another." (TC 132) The role of state is in assuring the protection of citizens and their life in liberty. The stress in here, obviously, since man was born free, is on liberty rather than on authority. "One should obey the nature." Thus the public authority is regarded mainly as a protection of the private liberties, which, for Rousseau, stems from nature. Its function is consisting in preventing citizens from trespassing their individual rights. The public authority is not in power of directing the private activities, to direct them towards common good, as Maritain would have it, as by doing so it would trespass on the liberty of the citizens. It is the people who govern by the vote of majority, since the power originates in people and rests in people in a permanent way. Men do not vote to give their opinion, they vote, writes Rousseau, that by the counting of votes the general will may be ascertained. (quoted in TC 135)

The collective will is the basis for an authority while the government belongs to the people and can, by no means, be taken from it. The collective or better still, "The General Will", must not be understood as the sum of the individual wills but rather as the Common Self' own will, born of the sacrifice each has made of himself and all his rights on the altar of the city. (TR 134) The free state does not possess the authority, as it is reduced to the expression of the common will, whereby the people are free to express both, the best and worst of them. Society, as we learn in Social Contract, has its foundation in the free consent of its individuals, so that it is by free choice that one enters society, at the same time it is affirmed that it is advantageous for the individual to "sign" the contract, that brought him to the society while being free as before he will be submitted to the General will, source of righteousness and morality. Thus, as Maritain writes,

the Rousseauist contract has its first cause in the deliberate will of man, not in nature, and it gives birth to a product of human act, not to a work proceeding from nature; it presupposes that the individual alone is the work of nature." (TR 133)

Maritain could not accept Rousseau's notion of equality, the objective of which is the preservation of individual freedom. (We shall discuss Maritain's notion of equality in CH.III). When I belong to the social body, "all others exist for the sole

reason of protecting my rights as well as theirs." (SC 90)
This association of the wills constitutes the "General Will",
a way by which one arrives to really human life, to a
state of superior of all the proceeding one's by presuming
its full liberty. The society gives to man a new self- a
collective self of different kinds. So that the citizen, in
Social Contract, does not have egoistic claims as he belongs
to the state - the institution to which he gave up his
individual rights.

To conclude, let us point out that Rousseau's conception of human freedom, origin of society and political authority, has inspired the idea of the Bourgeois Liberal state. In all predominant aspects of this society, i.e., in its religious, political and economical have a common trait, which in one or the other way can be traced back to Rousseau's thoughts, the primacy of the freedom over the common good; the role of the state as efficient protection of the rights of a citizen. In the historical perspective we may recognize liberalism; on economical plane in the industrial capitalism, the moral plane in the individualism, on the global plane in the principal celebrities of the nationalities, and finally on the religious plane, in the hostility towards the organized Church.

In the next part of this chapter we shall consider the notion of Liberal Democracy in a critical assessment of its doctrine. In a concluding part to this chapter we will deal with J. Maritain's proposals for correcting the liberal errors.

2) Critical Assessment of Liberalism as done by Maritain.

Every political philosopher bases his political thought on his doctrine of man. J. Maritain is not an exception in this respect. In J. Maritain's thinking, man is viewed as a being who has the dignity of a person, as opposed to the liberal man existing only as an individual with independent will, which, as Maritain tells us, Leo XIII calls "independent morality" (TC 137) resulting in non-submission to any external rule or law, being that of man or God; thus ascribing themselves limitless powers in ethical and socio-political conduct. "Parity of truth and falsehood, of justice and injustice, of good and evil, "writes Maritain, "is the metaphysical secret to which liberalism obscurely attunes the human soul." (TC 137) Next objection would be the absolute confidence in human reason, the rejection of God and deification of man, who is free of all social and moral duties. Leo XIII summed up the whole error in a single

phrase; "Every man is a law unto himself," which is merely the fundamental axiom of Rousseau in the social order and Kant's in the moral one: "obey nobody but yourself." (TC 134)

Maritain points out the error regarding the liberal freedom, which in its doctrine predominantly consists in "power" of choice between diverse goods; and it is not so much concerned with deliberation between evil and good. In Maritain's thought we see that a personal right originates in a person's duty for a man to strive for his perfection; thus the right must be subordinated to this end. On the other hand liberalism undertook to organize the whole human life without the ultimate end of human life and has directed man's aspirations towards the earthly paradise. Doing so, Liberalism reduced man to a material being and his common good to a collection of individual material goods. "Nature has not made society to be the last end of man, but so that a man shall find in and through society the assistance he needs to attain his perfection." (TC 139) For the temporal common good of the state is not exclusively material good; but rather "it is both material and moral but mainly moral: the upright life on this earth in time - of the human multitude assembled in a social body." (TC 139) The state is not to deny, as liberal state does, to a human being dimension which goes beyond the material order, neither is it to achieve goodness of temporal life by mechanical means only, in preference to

moral ones. In doing so, it separates politics from ethics; producing thus, laws which guide the political activity upon the level of those guiding the economical activity of man. On the social order this misconceived politics leads to denial of human friendship, true equality and human dignity.

The peculiar end of civil society, therefore, is not only to secure respect for the individual liberties and rights of every citizen, or to ensure material comfort, but also to provide the truly human and therefore moral good of the social body. (TC 141)

So that the "problem" of liberal individualism is how to distinguish subjective desire from what real circumstance objectively demands. Unwilling to accept guidance of any social and/or religious institutues (family, church), liberalism trusts only the individual conscience. A progressive social order, therefore, depends upon the individual's willingness to reason objectively. The cause of progress, the substance of the liberal order is hidden in a concrete situation. And thus, the liberal democracy denies development of the very democracy, the well-being of man and his life, which consequently all must end up in chaos. "Liberalism is not merely false in theory; it is finished in fact; bankrupt by the turn of events." (FMW 64-65) The error of liberal man was not corrected, as it was hoped for, during the first decades of the 20th century, by socialist humanism. Rather, the error of liberalism has been broadened into a more

sophisticated system, above all by Marx. Marx sought society as a social whole, a network of subtly inter-related strands, the economical, political, religious, which is the consequence of social, economical relations and the change of these social economical relations constitutes for Marx a historical development or, simply a history. For example, democracy, for Marx, is not a politico-economical system per se, rather, it is the stage in development of social economical relations, i.e. relations between the modes of production and their ownership. It is obvious that this philosophy is inspired by a materialist ideology of the man and of the common good. It conceives of man as purely immanent in the economic society and thus absorbing him completely into the economic society. It destroys all the spiritual values of the person, the moral nature of the political society, justice and civil amity as the necessary condition of the common good. Maritain writes on the point:

The tragedy of Marxism is here that, rightly desiring - but without taking cognizance of the problems proper to the person - to find an escape from that despair and that decomposition of the human person to which the dialectic of anthropocentric humanism leads, it is itself tributary of bourgeois humanism in its most aberrant and most inhuman metaphysics, and carries the latter atheism, immanentism, anthropocentrism to its highest point of exasperation. (IH 80)

At the outset of the above lines Maritain states that Marxism is "rightly desiring" - but it misunderstands the proper

nature and fulfillment of a person. We shall deal with the theme in our second and third chapters in greater detail. For now it will suffice to say that the expression "rightly desiring" is expressing the sincere desire of Marxist doctrine to bring about welfare and good life for every member of a society. That, I think, could not be denied: however, its predication of human nature, love, and brotherhood is being sought entirely in the natural order, along with the belief that the "salvation" of man can be worked out here on the earth by man alone. And sever the man of his proper - that is, spiritual, end - for the sake of an economical one.

Blind to the realities of the spirit, responsive only to what belongs to the world of matter they see in man no more than the shadow of true personality, his material individuality. (PC 91)

While it is true that Marxism has sprang out as a reaction against bourgeois individualism, it, however, through its notion of immanency went into the other extreme side of the "scale". That is to say, it replaced the bourgeois individual subordinated to no one, with the collective man who was subordinated to material-economical ends; a man who was to become maker of his own history. And once more, human person as person has been disregarded - the error of individualism has been replaced by an error of communism, where the primary aim is no longer to procure the freedom of expansion of the persons but simply the good and maximum

production of the economic whole." (PC 94) Perhaps, should Marxism be just one among the many economical systems, then it may be quite possible to live in it and accept it as such. But as Maritain points out, it is more than that.

Communism is a complete system of doctrine and life which claims to reveal to man the meaning of his existence, to answer all the fundamental questions which are set by life; it is a religion; and one of the most imperious quality certain that it is called to replace all other religions.... (IH 36)

It is the atheism which makes this religion "of most imperious quality" and which vitiates Communism as a philosophy. And atheism, we may say, in Marx doctrine, is the first principle, and that from which all else follows. "This is why Communist thought holds to it so ardently, as the principle which stabilizes its practical conclusions and without which these would lose both their necessity and their value." (IH 36-37) The very doctrine of atheism, as we will see in the next chapter, is the reason why Marxism is not able to quench the craving in a human person's heart, even though it promises and is striving for the earthly paradise. For to quench the thirst of a man only half way is to call for a danger of creating in him even a greater one. There, that is in Marxist society, one has only the empirical truth to serve him, but he must remain alone and in fear at his radical weakness, darkness and

finitude. Man in Marxist society, thus finds in himself frustrated desires and his deepest longings unfulfilled. For if there is no grasp of the absolute, no truth for him to serve, then in the practical order, the order of action, there are no permanent values or any natural, necessary and eternal norms. And if there are no permanent values and norms, then to endure, man is always and everywhere the "useless passion" of J. P. Sartre, a useless passion whose annihilation would be desirable, in so far as it would at least bring to an end that burning pain of loss of the absolute and of God. Thus, the consequences of Marx's socio-political doctrine are considerable. Since God has no longer a place in human life the theocentric humanism is not thinkable \ only the anthropocentric one is. Thus the circle of errors which began in the Renaissance and spread with greater strength and momentum in Marxism during our and at the end of the last century is accomplished.

The Communism is the final episode in this whole drama of anthropocentric humanism, it is situated in the lines of development of rationalistic humanism, but as a spiritual catastrophe thereof. It seeks man's ultimate destiny not only without God - which is what anthropocentric humanism did too - but against God, against everything in man and society that bears a likeness to God. (TWC 11-12)

Thus the picture drawn for human kind by Liberalism and Marxism is a gloomy one, unable to correct its metaphysical

errors, it will never be able to offer socio-political systems which would satisfy human desire for welfare.

Maritain, being quite aware of the gloomy consequences of Liberalism and Marxism, sought the system which would answer the needs of man in the temporal order and yet be beneficial on his ultimate journey. The answer for Maritain was the integral humanism, which would consider a man from all his angles - the positive one and not forgetting weaknesses inherent in every human nature.

Modern civilization, which pays dearly today for the past, seems as if it were pushed by the very contradiction and fatalities suffered by it, towards contrasting forms of misery and intensified materialism. To rise above these fatalities we need an awakening of liberty and of its creative forces, we need the energies of spiritual and social resurrection. In the eyes of an integral humanism, a political ideal of brotherly love alone can direct the work of authentic social regeneration.
(SCP 29)

Unlike materialism, Maritain does not call for creating the earthly paradise but rather, to paraphrase St. Thomas, create such political system which would administer to people on their road to salvation. Being faithful to Thomistic tradition, Maritain affirms the primacy of the spirit over matter. He strives to revive love and freedom in the midst of economical, political and cultural activities, to generate the law that guides the application of the metaphysical principles to the concrete conditions recognizing

the true nature of human person and political society. The question lies in saving man from degradation of his erroneous exaltations and place him in a proper place in the universe. In closing this chapter, we may quote Maritain's own words:

Let us sum up those keynotes of a sane political society: the common good flowing back over individuals; political authority leading free men towards this common good, intrinsic morality of the common good and of political life. Personalist, communal, and pluralist inspiration of the social organization, organic link between civil society and religion, without religious compulsion or clericalism, in other words, a truly, not decorative, Christian society, Law and Justice and friendship and equality which it implies, as essential principles of the structure, life and peace of society. A common task inspired by the idea of liberty and fraternity, tending as its ultimate goal, towards the establishment of a brotherly city wherein the human being will be freed from servitude and misery. (RN 54-44)

Thus the true democratic society, as Maritain maintains, carries in its doctrine an idea of respect and service to human persons, true democracy then is personalist and communal in character.

In the next chapter we shall concern ourselves with this characteristic of a democratic society. (The organic link between civil society and religion shall be dealt with in CH. IV).

CHAPTER TWO

Maritain's Notion of Personalist Humanism

- A) Introduction and Preliminary Notes to Chapter Two
 - 1) Historical Development in the meaning of the term "Democracy"
 - 2) Meaning of Democracy in J. Maritain
- B) Notion of Nature of Man in J. Maritain
 - 1) The Notion of "Person" in Maritain
 - 2) Notion of "An Individual" in Maritain
- C) Maritain's Notion of Human Freedom
 - 1) Notion of Freedom of Choice and its Function
 - 2) Notion of Freedom of Spontaneity and its Role in Achieving Human Happiness
 - 3) Individual Human Person and Political Society

CHAPTER TWO

...Personalist because it considers society to be a whole composed of persons whose dignity is anterior to society and who, however indigent they may be, contain within their very being a root of independence until they achieve that perfected spiritual liberty which no human society has within its gift.

(RN 20)

Maritain's Notion of Personalist Humanism

In this second chapter we shall be considering the basic tenet or the founding preliminaries of Maritain's political philosophy, which one cannot do without in order to understand his idea of democracy. It needs to be mentioned that we could not, nor is it desirable, to treat the subject exhaustively, but rather the necessary to appreciate Maritain's political writings shall be presented, focussing our attention only on the theme considered salient to our study. Thus the theme of individuality and personality shall be presented, as it is central to answering questions of functioning of society as well as the relations of common good and a political society. Then we shall consider and present a short historical background of personalism in contemporary times, showing the difference between that of Maritain's and other types of personalism, as they have developed during the recent history. This particular distinction is necessary for the sake of clarity, i.e., to show what we are talking about. Lastly we shall present Maritain's doctrine of freedom and person, which will illustrate for us in a profound manner the nature of person and its relations to the political society as a free agent ordained for the political society. It will try to show the nature of freedom as understood by Maritain, along with his distinction between freedom of choice and freedom of autonomy.

Introduction and Preliminary Notes

What shall be presented in this chapter then, is of twofold nature: one, to present, as we have mentioned earlier, the necessary for understanding Maritain, as well as the language used by him; secondly, by showing and explanation of the second chapter subjects to "clear the grounds" for the subject matter in our third chapter, i.e., the nature and relationship between person and common good and its integration into the political society.

1) Historical Development in Meaning of the
Word "Democracy" as viewed by J. Maritain.

Maritain in his writings informs us that democracy carries not only the idea of respect and service of the human person, but he believed as well that democracy as a political system "is a rational organization of freedoms founded upon law." (MS 59) He cried out in his later writings that "the tragedy of modern democracies is that they have not yet succeeded in realizing democracy." (CH 25) We may say thus, that democracy Maritain considered to be the best socio-political existential system in a temporal order. Maritain writes on the point of democracy which in his view, "is the highest terrestrial achievement, of which the rational animal is capable of here below." (MS 59)

What then, we may ask at the outset of our inquiry, is democracy as understood by J. Maritain? In his book *The Things That Are Not Caesar's*, Maritain notes that "Philosophy must distinguish three meanings in the word democracy." (TC 131) He explains that the first meaning of the word democracy is that of the social relations of men among themselves and not of the form of political government. (TNC 131), predominantly suggested by Pope Leo XIII and Pius XII and recognized by the Catholic Church as such. It was an effort, as Maritain writes, on the part of Popes to secure better human conditions for working class at the end of the 19th century. Democracy understood in this sense of the word is taken as a popular attitude, but

not in a political connotation; rather, it means, as Maritain writes, "this very beneficial Christian action in regard to the people." (TNC 131) That is to say, it was a call not only for improvement of the working environment in factories and other sides of labour, but it was a call as well for betterment of life as such of a working class and their families, and thus to broaden in a social dimension the opportunity of their growth as individual human persons. However, this was a program not only that of the Church, for other social organizations and political parties demanded the same improvement of working conditions. Needless to say, the intentions of these two different parties, i.e, the church and political parties, were not the same. While the interest of political parties may have been an economical concern, those of the church were considered on deeper metaphysical grounds of human persons nature. Now for the considerations of possible misunderstanding of the Church's intentions as well as considered mis-use in a political order by particular parties, that is the concern of the Church could be taken as a support of claims done by the political parties in time of their campaigns. Maritain suggested that "this expression had better be discarded." (TNC 131) In the second case, the word democracy is taken in a meaning as conceived by Aristotle and later on by St. Thomas; that is, in a sense of political democracy. Maritain writes that, in the writings of St. Thomas, this form of democracy has a

meaning of "mixt system in which democratic principle would tend to the supremacy of mere numbers, tempered by the aristocratic (the supremacy of the pre-eminent in value or virtue), and oligarchic principle (the supremacy of the pre-eminent in riches or power), (TNC 133). So that this democracy is more exactly an ameliorated democracy. Maritain points out that St. Thomas in his writings uses the term Republic (*Politia*) rather than democracy; and he explains that it signifies "both the corrupt form of *politia* and the abstract democratic principle (TNC 132). The third and last meaning of the term democracy, Maritain tells us, is that of "Democratism", (TNC 132). This form of democracy was conceived by J.J. Rousseau, and it represents, as Maritain writes, "the religious myth of democracy". (TNC 132). Which is the result of Rousseau's misconceived doctrine on human nature. When we read this doctrine into the context of "Social Contract" it would give us an expression of the Sovereign people; the number, or simply multitude-as the God, whereby the will of the people-the General Will, is the ultimate governing authority. Which through the contract protects certain individual rights-and at that only those on which this or that society may agree upon. It does not take into consideration the human person in his true nature as conceived by Maritain. Thus, Maritain suggests this form of democracy to be considered " the error of political pantheism". (TNC 133).

2) Meaning of Democracy in Maritain

Noting the three meanings of the term democracy, we may now attempt to answer our former question: how does Maritain consider the word democracy? We imply the answer from the second meaning, i.e. political democracy. Democracy is, as Maritain writes, "a fundamental agreement between minds and will on the basis of life in common, (and) it must bear within itself a common human creed, the creed of freedom." (MS 109). That is, it is a political system with a democratic attitude where the "body politic" or the people on the whole having the primacy over the state which is the part. This democracy would recognize the unity of human nature and its dignity along with rights being personal or political of every human person. Its government is formed only with the consent of the people and it would recognize the primacy of law and justice. This government does not possess power of authority by its own right nor is it to use this authority for its own ends. It cannot reject as individualistic democracy does, "any traces of transcendence of the supreme foundation of justice and personality." (SP 79) The true democratic government is for the sake of people and it is from the people it receives its power and authority, to be used for the justice of common good. Democracy, Maritain writes,

does not admit that the State is a transcendent power incorporated within itself all authority and imposed from above upon human life...but it demands that the State - controlled by the nation - be nothing more than the highest organ of regulation, whose object is the common good as it concerns the totality as such. (CHD 69)

The rulers in democracy are not self-appointed masters of the people but rather they are to

rule as vicars of the people, guarding the absolute primacy of the relations of justice and law at the base of society, procuring the ideal not of war, prestige or power, but the amelioration and emancipation of human life - the ideal of fraternity. (CHD 68)

This form of democracy, Maritain tells us "springs in its essentials from the inspiration of the Gospel and cannot subsist without it." (CHD 27) It will recognize the primacy of spirit incorporated in every individual human person. Thus, this democracy carries the characteristics of being personalist, and communal. True democracy, Maritain writes, is personalist and communal rather than an individualistic; and Maritain believed that the personalist democracy is the philosophy most compatible with human aspirations, for in its very foundation it represents the dignity of the human person, human equality, freedom and the ideal of peace. (UP 12)

B) Maritain's Notion of the Nature of Man

The notion of personalism during the course of history took a variety of ways in its formation and development. In our century it came to mean different things in writings of different authors and schools.

For the sake of particularity and understanding as well as clarity in Maritain's meaning of this term, we will spend a few lines in explanation.

The term "person" comes from the latin word persona, meaning mask or actor, and it came to refer to a role and to a man's dignity in relation to others.

To define "personalism" we may say that it is a doctrine in which a person is the ontological ultimate. Basically, there are two major forms of personalism:

a) realistic personalism - for which ultimate reality is a spiritual being. Into this group we may

classify neo-scholastic writers.

b) The second form of personalism is represented by idealistic personalism which most probably in its birth was inspired by the Greek metaphysical motif, and which during the course of history went through development in writers like Descartes, Leibnitz, Berkeley and Hegel. Hegel's was the influence particularly in the development of absolutistic personalism. This is usually divided into a) absolute realism, with its characteristic stress on the wholeness of reality, on its organic unity on what it calls concrete universal, and its

refusal to admit anything other to separate it from the absolute. The absolute is represented by a spirit - a rational unity which embraces all the diversities of finite existence.

b) The second group, the panpsychistic idealism most prominently represented by Leibnitz, claims thing to be simply the outside appearance of underlying psychical entities. All nature has at its centre living active beings. Matter is effective mind. Natural laws are merely established habits. The whole of reality is constituted by psychical agents.

c) The third and last group is represented by personal idealism, tenets of which hold that all reality is a persona. In summary we may perhaps say that the two major forms of personalism go along the lines of two historical movements, that of Judeo-Christian heritage in a case of realistic personalism; and that of idealistic personalism inspired by the Greek thought respectively.

In France, the personalist movement in the early thirties was circled around Mounier's *Esprit*, and substantially supported by Maritain. Maritain welcomed "*Esprit*" as an important means to communicate ideas of Catholic intelligencia, however, along the time he became disappointed more and more with the constant doctrinal inconsistencies, until finally he felt that he must break off.

It is my duty to break off immediately, he wrote to Mounier's as far as I am concerned, I insist on indicating to you my complete rejection of demagoguery that threatens to spoil pitifully the important work of renovation undertaken by *Esprit*. (JMC 69)

Maritain left *Esprit*, but he never gave up his notion of personalism, which needless to say was in Judeo-Christian heritage. He writes in *The Person and The Common Good*:

Our desire is to make clear the personalism rooted in the doctrine of St. Thomas and to separate, a social philosophy centered in the dignity of the human person from every social philosophy centered in the primacy of the individual and the private good. Thomistic personalism stresses the metaphysical distinction between individuality and personality. (PCG 13)

Maritain not only separated the individualist personalism from his personalism, he later offered a solid socio-political system for which he took as substructure the Thomist metaphysical notion of man. We shall deal in what follows with this distinction along with the nature of man as understood by Maritain.

The ego is hateful, Pascal said, and Maritain in echoing this thought in an elaborate form has shown its true meaning.

In doing so, he juxtaposed Pascal's notion along with that of St. Thomas; that is, that the person is that which is noblest in the whole of nature (SP 57); to show the difference in meaning and concern of these two writers. To resolve the apparent paradox Maritain pointed out that those two authors are considering two different aspects of a human being- Pascal the material self and St. Thomas the spiritual self. These two aspects of man will be expressed by Maritain in terms of individuality and person ality. That is to say, Maritain distinguishes in human beings two poles - the pole of individuality and the pole of personality. So that we may say, along with Maritain, that man is " a being made of matter and spirit." (RR 195) . In considering this distinction , we must not read in it the Cartesian dualism, J. Maritain explains;

in so far as we are individuals each of us is a fragment of a species, a part of this universe, we are subjects of the determinism of the physical world. But each man is also a person who subsists entirely with the subsistence of his spiritual soul (which) is in him a principle of creative unity of independence and freedom. (SP 62) .

Thus we may see from the above-mentioned quotation that Maritain does not imply in his two-pole distinction of man's nature, two separate realities in man, one called personality and the other individuality. As man for Maritain is a composite being - "a metaphysical being" (FMW 14), with two substantial constitutive co-principles. It is the same entire human being which in one sense is an individual and in another sense a person. But then, though man is a composite being he is nevertheless different from purely material and purely spiritual ones. J. Maritain writes on the point:

His body which ultimately owes its origin from the material principle, may have emerged from the historical evolution of the lower beings. Yet this alone does not constitute the nature of man; but then, his immortal soul the spiritual co-principle which is created directly by God, does not alone constitute the nature of man either. (RR 195)

Nor can we consider a man to be just another individual being in nature, for the very reason that he is a person.

"When we say," Maritain writes,

that a man is a person we do not mean that he is an individual, in the sense that atom or fly is an individual. Man like atom, grass, fly is an individual to be sure and yet man has something over and above mere individuality. For man is an individual who holds himself in hands by intelligence, will and love, he is in a way a universe in himself. (SCP 27)

Maritain said in the above lines that man is "a universe in himself," that is to say, that the notion of personality involves totality and independence, in his intrinsic metaphysical essence he is more whole than a part, more

independent and free than servile. Thus apart from being "a minute fragment of matter" (SP 27) he has richer and nobler existence, through which he participates in supra-natural order. "That by which man is most truly man is the intellect, which in him is something divine and by which he participates in the nature of spirits." (T 22) That is man unlike other living beings, is capable of knowing - he can exercise intellectual knowledge. As such, in a spiritual sense he is an intellectual substance. Thus we may say that for man to be, is the act of the intellectual and it is through the actuality of this intellectual substance that it becomes the act of the body. "So that in so far as we are individuals we are only a fragment of matter, a part of this universe...as individuals we are subject to stars. As

persons we rule them." (TR 20-21) Now, "because the human being is endowed with a trans-material intellect, the root of his freedom, he possesses a clear superiority over all other material beings." (EF 17) Thus the human person as person is thus "capable of self-possession of self-perfecting and of free self-giving. (EF 17)

We will show in the next chapter the applications and consequences of Maritain's notion on participating in the nature of spirit by man, in considering purpose and end of society and

its relationship towards the man. For now, suffice to say, and as Maritain writes, that "the value of the person, his dignity and rights belong to the order of things naturally sacred which bear the imprint of the Father of being." (SCP 27) It is / precisely in this point where Maritain parts with materialist and liberal notions of dignity in man - for whom the rights and dignity of man stems from his material individuality, and, on the other hand, it is this metaphysical mystery of a person that religious thought points to, when it says that the person is made in the image of God. Maritain writes on the point:

The person is a reality, which subsisting spiritually constitutes a universe by itself and an independent whole in the greater whole of the universe and facing the transcendent whole which is God. (SP 51)

Thus we may see that there are two aspects in personality; spiritual nature and subsistence, which is to be considered as a metaphysical base or root of personality. (PCG 40-41) In his political writings, we may notice, Maritain's stress on the spiritual nature of the person and its independence.

The possible explanation could be deduced

from Maritain's approach to the problem of "politics"; that is to say, his main concern is the social consequences of his philosophical definition of the person.

He considers individual human person in both, as part and as a whole in political social relations. The personality

for Maritain in this context would "signify interiority to self" (SCP 22), which is the subsistence of spiritual soul communicated to the human composite. (SCP 21) That is to say, it is man as spirit and not his subsistence which communicates itself in social relations. It is the man's spirit which enables him to go beyond the interiority to one's self communicating knowledge and love, which as Maritain writes, is a necessary requirement for every person. "By the fact that each of us is a person and expresses himself to himself, each of us requires communication with the other in the order of knowledge and love." (SCP 22) We may point out that this interiority in Maritain's sense is not understood as "isolated unity without door or windows" of the Leibnitz's monads, for subjectivity in Maritain is opening and giving one's self up to the other self for the sake of love of that "other".

2) Maritain's Notion of Individuality

The source of all unethical human conduct in Pascalian literature is represented by the ego, and for that reason, Pascal believed, it needed to be detested. Pascal did not consider the genesis of human self as Maritain did, for whom the "Pascalian self" is rooted in material pole or individuality of human beings. What does this material pole represent for Maritain could perhaps be understood from the

following lines. Maritain writes:

The human being is caught between two poles - a material pole, which in reality does not concern the true person but rather the shadow of personality or what in the strict sense is called individuality. (SCP 18)

Thus the notion of individuality refers to the material aspect of a human being which finds the root of its individual particularity in its very matter. "The atome, the fly, man and all corporeal beings are individuals by virtue of the principle of individuation - matter with its **quantity** designated." (PCG 35) It is by the **quantity** that two numerically different material forms are different in the space. The matter which is considered the first ontological root of individuality is understood in here as that of which bodies are made; as Maritain put it,

(it is) pure potentiality able neither to be nor to be thought by itself in a kind of non-being a single power of receptivity and of substantial mutability, an avidity for being. (SP 60)

We may consider this "avidity for being" as a metaphysical energy, a soil entering into unity with being, and which particularizes the very matter. We read in St. Thomas that it is the matter which is the principle of individuation, i.e., it is by virtue of the matter, that the thing exists as an individual within a species. And again, we may say, that it is by virtue of matter that the species is capable of multiplication. Since an individual is of a material

constitution it is an irreducible unit. That is to say, nothing essential can be taken away from it without making it other than it is. In a certain sense, and with certain reservations we may say that I exist, I am as my body. The reservation we mentioned above is that we should not equalize the verb to be with the expression "my body" in a full and total existential sense. But rather, it is that in my physical existence, in my individuality, I am "me", a particular being, through the individualization of my individuality. This phenomenon of individuation from matter we do not find in divine or angelic being, for while they are individuals they are not individualized from matter. Maritain writes on the point:

Each pure spirit differs specifically from every other; each is an individual by the very form in which its being consists and which constitutes it in its species. (SP 61)

For us humans the situation is different - that is a spiritual form has a substantial transcendental relation with matter in a process of individuation. The human soul, Maritain writes, constitutes with the matter, which it forms, a unique substance, both spiritual and fleshly. (SP 60) The expression "fleshly" does not mean nor should it be interpreted as something bad and/or evil.

For as Maritain pointed out, "(body) it is something good, since it is the very condition of our existence." (SP 65) Then the "badness or goodness", that is, morality, or lack of it, does not lie within neither co-principle constituting human beings; but we may say it is constituted in one's actions. The goodness or badness of human life in the ethical sense is proportioned "in so far as the life of spirit and freedom will dominate in him that of passion and ~~the senses~~." (SP 66) The implication for every human being in Maritain philosophy of primacy of spirit, which, as we have seen, is rooted in God, is to become what he is - that is as Maritain writes, "(man must) win his personality as well as his freedom." (SP 135) It may pass without saying that this cultivation of personality is not an easy task, nor one would achieve its fruits solely with an effort on his own part. What is needed in bringing out the personality in the fullest sense of the word is God's grace. "Truly perfect personality is only found in saints. (They) have received by grace what God possesses by nature." (TR 25) So that winning of one's personality we can see as a gift in conquest. Now how is this conquest to be achieved, how could man bring about the subjection of human appetites and passions which are part of our nature, is being entrenched in Maritain's concept of human freedom, which deals not only with the freedom of an individual human person but it shows its transcendence into the political life.

C) Maritain's Concept of Human Freedom

Man is born free and yet everywhere he is in bondage, wrote J. J. Rousseau in his Social Contract. Man isn't born completely free, he must through constant effort conquer his freedom.

We read in J. Maritain's books over and above these statements there is one of scientific determinism which does not allow any kind of freedom. How could this dilemma of contradictory statements be resolved into the legitimate theory, which would help us to come to grips with the question of human freedom. We shall try to answer by following the path offered by J. Maritain.



1) Freedom of Choice

At the outset let us say that the term human freedom is usually taken as that property of a man which enables him through conscious reflection to choose one from amongst several alternative courses of actions. More, this choice is not being determined by extrinsic or intrinsic factors beyond his control. Human freedom understood in this sense of the word is usually taken as synonymous with the expression "free will". In the past the understanding and interpretation of "free will" has been done in multiple forms. But then, and as Maritain points out, "All the varied senses of the word. Freedom which have importance for mankind presuppose this primordial freedom." (FMW 5)

In Maritain's conception of freedom, "the world of freedom originates in nature, but it is distinct from nature and constitutes a world apart." (EF 30) Maritain in his philosophy of freedom considers a distinction between the freedom of choice and the freedom of spontaneity, and

a distinction between the different degrees of the freedom of spontaneity, beginning with the initial spontaneity given at birth and as far as the terminal freedom the freedom of perfection and exaltation which can be conquered by a judicious exercise of free will and by the help of appropriate social arrangements. (EF 31)

Now the free will is considered as an act which is determined neither by the outer nor inner circumstances, and which could

have been done in the other way than it had been. That is to say, the free will consists in an absence of necessity "which is as Maritain writes precisely the case of free will." (SP 118) This freedom of free will is, as Maritain maintains, the very root of the world of personal freedom, and it is this freedom by which man conquers his freedom of autonomy. As St. Thomas writes, the whole root of freedom lies in reason. To be free is of the essence of every intellectual being. (FMW 5-6) Now, the will functioning under the illumination of the intellect proceeds towards the desired end - the Good as such. This desired good is not the ethical good, but rather it is the good universal in character which the will apprehends as its desirable end. We have said that the will desires and loves the good for the sake of it being the good. We have said also that this good is being presented to the will by the intellect as the good desired. But the will by virtue of its nature, wills necessary the good which satiates beatitude; that which is not the satiated good - absolute cannot necessitate the will which becomes, by extension, undermined relatively to any particular or partial good and to any good perceived as particular or partial. (EF 36) It is not to say that the will has the potential to desire the evil for the sake of its own, for the intellect does not present it to the will as evil, but as the good. This malfunctioning of human nature can be removed by an active self-determination of

the will, by the free choice of a particular good. Maritain writes:

In so far as there is such passive indetermination in human will, it testifies to the imperfection of all that is created

and he adds that this indetermination "does not constitute the freedom of human will." (SP 125) It does not constitute the freedom of will, for the freedom of will does not possess the ability to choose the evil as its object of desire; nor does this indetermination exist in the Divine Will. (SP 125) The free will is active and dominating, consisting in "the mastering by will of the practical judgement which determinates it." (SP 125) Then we may say, that this free will results from an interaction between the intellect and the will; in a reciprocal causality exercised at the deliberation which terminates in choice, the specification of the will by the intellect itself depends on the exercise of the will. (EF 36) Thus, "to be free means to be master of one's judgement."

(SP 128) The free act is not only the act of the person as such, it is moreover - the revelation of the person to itself "for as we said the freedom consists in an active and dominating indetermination and the mastery of will over judgement." (SP 130) Then we may say, the root of the freedom consists in reason, that is to say, it is because and in so far as man is capable of knowing and acting upon his knowledge that he is free. The implication of which is the fact, that

"to the extent that the life of the mind is active, in which man acts as in a conscious and deliberate way, the passions are unable, by themselves to determine a human action." (EF 37) Which is not to say that man is capable to improve himself within himself and solely by his own powers. It is, as we read in Maritain, achieved through man's union with the Other from where flows all being and goodness - "God being at the summit of the personality, and man being also a person, it is in the relation between these two persons that the mystery and conquest of the liberty consists..." (FMW 42) Thus the gift that God makes to man of his natural being allows man to attain the perfection of his being.

2) Freedom of Spontaneity

The freedom we have just described consists in the absence of necessity, absence of hindrance, it implies not only spontaneity but also the absence of all necessity and determinism. There is, however, another freedom which consists in absence of constraint "a freedom which is not a freedom of choice, not a free will, but which, however, deserves the name of freedom. It is the degree of this second freedom, the freedom of spontaneity."

The lowest degree of spontaneity is the freedom or spontaneity of material nature which requires, as a condition of its exercise, the action of surrounding bodies, which action, far from exerting any violence makes it possible. (EF 32)

Thus a stone falls freely when nothing hinders it from obeying the law of gravitation. The second degree of spontaneity is represented by organic bodies having vegetative life; whereby the plant, in accordance with its constituted structure, lives proper to its structure and natural form of their physical being.

In animals we see that they enjoy a new kind of spontaneity - it possesses a sensitive life, which constitutes the third degree of spontaneity. "The animal puts itself into motion by means of a form serving as the principle of its movement, which it bestows upon itself through the immanent activity of its senses." (SP 132) These ends, however, are not self-given, they are pre-established by the nature and are accomplished according to the psychic structures and instincts which a part of the structural conditions, nature endowed the animals.

Through intellective life man found himself at a fourth degree of spontaneity. Through this life of the mind he acquires a superior freedom - the freedom of autonomy for he knows both what he does and the ends of his activity as such. By means of his own intellectual operations he is able to envisage the ends of his activity. (SP 132) Thus at this stage the freedom of spontaneity becomes freedom of independence, "the triumphant affirmation of the being at last changed

intrinsically," (EF 32) desiring good for the sake of love of it.

Sanctity, then becomes the personal ideal to be realized; in this state of perfection terminal freedom coincides with the plenitude and the perfection of love; the love of God and the love of men. (EFF 41)

It is this aspect that the base of terminal freedom lies in; which "is the crystallization of the moral and rational life in the interior activities which are intellectual virtues and morals." (RN 48) Through this crystallization man arrives to his true well-being, that is, he achieves freedom consisting in an absence of constraints, after he conquered in himself the inferior elements of human nature, after having submitted them to the supreme spiritual principle - to the truth and true well-being, then he achieved the second freedom.

"Gifted with the freedom of choice," writes Maritain, "human beings are destined towards the freedom of Autonomy." (FMW 55) This freedom of autonomy is a perfect freedom - proper to the spirit,

if there is a self-determination free of all necessity, there is also another self-determination free of all constraint, even of necessity, and wherein the agent determines himself not in the freedom of choice but in the independence of his being. (MP 166-67)

The Maritain expression "independence of his being" and for that matter the term "autonomous" is being taken in the Gospels, a better still Paulinian sense, and not in Kantian one. Kant understood "autonomous" as moral law self-imposed,

whereby man is not subject to any extrinsic rule; the obedience is due only to himself - thus he became autonomous, i.e. free and independent from all and everything that may hinder his own actions and desires. Contrary to "Kantian Autonomy" is the Pauline one, in which law, i.e. Divine Law, is unequivocally imposed from without in such a way that it is obeyed freely, without coercion and fear. But the grace is being needed in achieving the submission to the Law, as Maritain writes "the submission can only be achieved through the access and the submission of the internal energies to the law of reason helped by grace." (FMW 112) Then it is not in himself or through himself but through his union with the "Other" from where flows all being and goodness that man could reach the plenitude of spontaneity, the freedom to choose the good with constancy; Maritain writes on this point:

God being at the summit of the personality, and man being also a person, it is in the relation between these two persons that the mystery and conquest of the liberty consists. (FMW 42)

3) Individual Human Person and Political Society

By a constant choice through free will of choice, which is not its own end, for it is, or claimed, to conquest the higher freedom; of that which is natural to a person as a person it will achieve its perfection. This inclination to pursue the good, which is an expression of the natural law in man, establishes, in a socio-political and moral sphere, the

rights of a human person to demand that which is needed most in order to realize its own authentically human aspirations. Because God calls every individual human person to Himself and does not subordinate him/her to other creatures but Himself he accords it inalienable rights - "It is here where the foundations of absolute dignity and sovereign respect can be found." (PH 19-20) To recognize the persons' rights it is to admit that it is an end a whole, a value in itself, given to it for the purpose of attaining its end and they are measured by this very end. The natural law from where these rights emanate establish in them the intrinsic relation to the common good. That is the common good of society as a whole is only truly a common good if it is distributed to the persons of that society, to whom the common good is subordinated.

It includes within itself as principal value, the highest access, compatible with the good life of the whole, of the persons to their life of person and liberty of expansion, as well as to the communication of generosity consequent upon such expansion. (PCG 51)

The mystery of the person transcends the society, the state and the common good, and the good of city is ordered to the good of the person, to the conquest of his perfection and of his spiritual freedom which belongs to an order higher than that of the city. (EF 26)

Thus the highest value of the temporal common good consists in aiding the individual human person as person so that it may free itself from the servitudes of nature and achieve its

autonomy. Understood in this way, political society, and its purpose is not merely foreconomic progress, the material well-being of citizens composing the society, but

through a dialectic of reciprocal overlapping of individual and social values, of personal and communal values; the commonwealth behaves as a civilizing force, as a promoter of what is human. (EF 27)

In such a society, we would see the true harmony between the dignity of the human person and the society he lives in, nor would there be any hindrance to his achieving of freedom of expansion which in the final analysis would free him from the bondage of material nature;

In the order of social life it thus appears that the end of civil life is a common earthly good whose highest values consist in aiding the human person so that it may free itself from the servitudes of nature and achieve its autonomy in regard to the latter. (SP 137)

The transcendence of a free and intelligent person, we may say is the cornerstone in J. Maritain's personalist philosophy, upon which the notion of personalist and communal democracy rests.

I will deal in greater detail with this question in its aspect of communal relationship among its members; and the integration of an individual human person as a person in the society; along with Maritain's notion of private and common good and the role of authority in relation to communal democratic life.

CHAPTER THREE

Maritain's notion of Communal Humanism and its Function in Theocentric Democracy

- A) An Integration of Individual
Human Person into the
Community
 - 1) Individual Human Person,
Common Good and its
Communal Role
- B) Maritain's Notion of Authority
 - 1) Authority and Maritain's Concept
of Equality
 - 2) Leaven of Gospel and Purpose
of Authority

CHAPTER THREE

...Communal because it recognizes the fact that the person tends naturally towards society and communion, in particular towards the political community, and because, in the specifically political sphere and to the extent that man is a part of political society, it considers the common good superior to that of individuals.

(RN 20)

Maritain's Notion of Communal Humanism and its Function in Christian Democracy

A) An Integration of Individual Human Person into the Community

When discussing Maritain's notion on man's nature in our proceeding chapter, we have noted his strong insistence on primacy of spirit in a human life. In this, Maritain is a debtor to St. Thomas's teaching, that an individual human person as a person is most noble in all of nature. More, we see Maritain in an agreement, in what has become a common place in all of Thomistic literature, that is that "the good of the community is higher than the good of the individual citizen in the scale of terrestrial values which rate the citizen as part of the community." (FMW 52-53) Then a man, being a social political animal, needs political society to provide essential temporal goods for satisfying his needs, as well as to fulfill his aspirations as person to unite himself with other "wholes", in a political society, in a spiritual co-being of will and intellect. That is to say, an individual human person seeks communion with its kind on account of its indigencies and on account of its abundance in existence. The relationship existing in here between human person and the common good of society presents us with the paradox - a paradox which involves social political relationships of the ethico-existential values existing between a

political society and its common good and on the other hand, that of an individual human being. J. Maritain states the paradox thus: "Does society exist for each one of us or does each one of us exist for society?" (PCG 11) To solve this paradox has been undertaken by thinkers from the Greek times up to our age. The answer(s) thus, of course, could be had in a contradictory result, depending on the politico-philosophical system one would choose to work with. We, in the present chapter, shall be considering J. Maritain's approach to the question. At the outset, Maritain informs us that "This question involves two aspects, in each of which there must be some element of truth, a unilateral answer would only plunge us in an error." (PCG 11-12) i.e. the person is both a part of society and a whole in society.

1) Individual Human Person, Common Good and its Communal Role

After what we have said one could expect easily that Maritain's approach to the puzzle of paradox would be through his distinction so fundamental to his philosophical thought, that is, his distinction between an individual and a person, which he so masterfully applied in social relations.

Now, however, for the sake of clarity and understanding of our subject matter, we need to say a few words on the subject of private good, as well as on the subject of the good of the city - to use Aristotle's expression, or simply on a common good of a political society.

At the outset of our inquiry we may state what is being understood by common good in Maritain's terms; he writes:

(Common good) it is a good human life of the multitude of a multitude of persons, the good life of totalities at once carnal and spiritual, and principally spiritual... (RN 8)

In another place Maritain writes:

It is the good human life of the multitude, of a multitude of persons; it is their communion in good living. It is therefore common to both the whole and the parts into which it flows back and which, in turn, must benefit from it. It implies and requires recognition of the fundamental rights of persons and those of the domestic society. It includes within itself as principal value, the highest access, compatible with the good of the whole, of the persons to their life of person and liberty of expansion, as well as to the communications of generosity consequent upon such expansion. (PCG 41)

The common good, thus in Maritain's understanding is not being projected in a sense of the greatest good of the greatest number, but rather the good being common to part as well as to the whole of society; which ought to, Maritain believed, reverse itself according to the rules of distributive justice. So that the common good is a good only in so far and to the extent that it is a human good, that is, it needs to serve the people for the betterment of their lives, not only in a materialistic sense, but in the spiritual sense as well. Maritain believed that common good is proportionate to the nature and dignity of the human person and it includes within itself "suprahuman values and it is indirectly related to

the absolute, ultimate end of man." (PCG 69) This belief of suprahuman values of common good and its relation to human beings end - that is the end in Christian terms - may perhaps be traced to St. Thomas saying that the purpose of Government is to find such a political system which would enable the people to achieve and give an impetus to them on their journey to salvation. Thus, the essential part of common good is the service of individual human person, and the basis of redistribution to persons constituting the body politic. The common good in Maritain's terms is not sacrificing of individual good - so that the common one could exist - as we have seen it in J. J. Rousseau's General Will, which arrives at good by cancellation, so to say, of positives and negatives of an individual good into the terms of nonexistence of the personal good for the sake of "creating" the collective good. In Maritain's terms, common good requires justice as well as equity, which, of course, on the part of the people calls for moral rectitude.

Common good, Maritain tells us, requires the development of virtue in the mass of citizens; Justice and moral righteousness are thus essential to common good. (RN 10)

On the other hand the common good calls for moral and political rectitude in those whom its distribution has been entrusted - that is those in authority. As Maritain says, immoral and unjust political acts are harmful to common good in itself; and the unjust authority betrays its own political essence. (RN 11)

In relation to an individual good the common good possesses a special perfection which is distinctive of particular good, which it synthesizes in a superior reality. It has in this respect, so to say, an ontological primacy - it is superior as such to the good of an individual for it includes the good life for all - "In the extent where man is part of the political society the common good is superior to that of individuals." (RN 25) Secondly, the common good plays equally the primacy in the order of finality, as the good of a private person is directed to a common one which enlarges and perfects it in its own order. When it is of the same nature the common good always had primacy over the particular good, for the simple reason that the whole is greater than the part. We must not, of course, see this relation between common and private good in a form of opposition for the form of relation in here is that of an order of subordination. "The good of the community is higher than the good of the individual citizen as part of the community." (FMW 52-53) We may align Maritain's text quoted in here along that of Aristotle's principle which affirms that the good of the city is more noble than that of an individual. That is to say, private good constitutes the material support, so to say, of the common good, but finds in it in turn a condition of its own completion. One who seeks the common good of society by an active participation in it does, in reality, work for

the acquisition of his own good and satisfaction. So that an individual man and the group are in this relation intermingled in such a way that they mutually surpass each other in different frames of reference. Man through his subordination to a group finds his own good, and the group attains its own good by serving man's needs and by realizing that he as an individual human person has secrets which escape the group, and he has a vocation which the group as such does not encompass. (RN 18)

The "secrets" and "vocations" Maritain mentioned in this quotation makes a reference to individual human person as person - the whole which has its dignity, nature and supra-natural destiny, which places him upon a new level in socio-political relations. The very nature and end of person gives a man a position of precedence over the society composed of individuals as individuals, that is the society in a temporal order.

Being a member of society so that he may satisfy the demands of his personal life, he is member only as part because of his character as individual. It follows that each person is part or member of political society but not to the whole extent of his being and his existence; he is member or part by virtue of the mark of individuation that he bears. (FMW 50)

That is to say, an individual human person as person though above the temporal society becomes a part of another society - the supra-temporal society - the church, of which good is higher than that of a temporal society. As J. Maritain writes:

Being thus admitted by way of vision into a society that is truly divine, the rational soul and the Church emerge in patria above every form of social life. (FMW 53-54)

The man then, while ordained for the common good of society does not belong nor is he part of that political society by reason of his entire self-hood. But rather by reason of certain things in him, man in his entirety is elevated above a political society. (PCG 71) And we may add along with Maritain that "all that man is and can and has must be referred to God." (Sum Theol. 1-11, 21, 4 ad 3; quoted in PCG 71) When we are to express this relation in other words we may say that a private good of an individual human person as individual is subordinated to the common good of society and this common good in turn is subordinated to the ultimate good of individual human person as person,

in so far as the persons are engaged in the social order, the common good by its essence must flow back over or be redistributed itself to them;...in so far as the persons transcend the social order and are directly ordained to the transcendent Whole, the common good by its essence must favour their progress toward the absolute good, which transcends political society. (PCG 76)

Then man as an individual is part of and is inferior to the political community and yet, he is above that community in his person-hood. The situation in here is like that of a runner, to use Maritain's example, where a runner is a runner in his entirety, but not all of which constitutes the running man, i.e.

his knowledge, ethical principles or any other talents he may have, belong to a runner. Likewise man is for political society and yet he transcends it by reason of certain things in him the end of which is to be achieved through participating in the very political society

man transcends the political society by reason of the things which in him and of him; deriving from the ordering of the personality as such to the absolute, depend as to their very essence on something higher than the political community and properly have to do with the supra-temporal fulfillment of the person as a person. (RN 17)

Now we have arrived at the point where we may consider once more a paradox mentioned at the outset of the chapter, and offer an answer to it. The society is being considered as a means whereby the rights of the individual human person are guaranteed and his needs are provided for. This very society requires for achieving its goals all its individual members who constitute it to work together for the common good, while, however, as we have said, the society has its own intrinsic right to demand the effort of co-operation of its parts, that is individual human persons as individuals, so that the society may fulfill its goal of ministering requirements of the human person - it does not have, on the other hand, the right of "possessing" the human person as person who surpasses it by virtue of his very essence. We may consider this relation in terms of Aristotelian tradition of two-fold order; whereby one is the order of parts to a whole and other is the order of things to their end. We may now consider Maritain's application

of this principle to solving of the paradox. In a case of an individual human person and its relation to a society, the relation is as where the whole unites the parts, which serves the end of the whole and are thus subordinated to the whole; while as a person he transcend it. "Each individual person is related to the entire community as part to the whole." (PCG 70) The second part of the relational statement expresses the relation between the temporal common good and the ultimate end of an individual human person as person, that is, his spiritual good. Maritain writes:

Both society itself and its common good are indirectly subordinated to the perfect accomplishment of person and its supra-temporal aspirations to an end of another order an end which transcends them. (PCG 61)

The common good of temporal civil society then is its ultimate end, but it must not be considered as the end for its own sake, "for of its very nature it is intended to favor the higher ends of the human person." (PCG 64) We may offer more of explanation of the subject matter by the following lines:

While the person as such is a totality the individual as such is a part; while person as person or as totality, demands that the common good of temporal society should flow back to him and while through his ordination to the transcendent whole he even surpasses the temporal society the same person as an individual or as a part is inferior to the society and must serve the common good as a member of the whole. (PCG 73)

We should not read the above lines to mean that on the one hand an individual human person should concern himself merely with the things of the "heavens", disregarding civil life and its ends as an unnecessary. Neither, on the other hand, is the same individual human person ordained for the life in civil society entirely. The true conception of the political life as Maritain conceives it is

Neither exclusively personalist nor exclusively communal, (but) it is both communal and personalist, in such a way that these two terms call for and imply one another. (PCG 65)

Then, and to answer our paradox, the human person as an individual belongs to society, whereas the same individual human person as person transcends that society by the virtue of his essence. The relations in here are in a reciprocity of subordination and mutual transcendence which stems from the supremacy of the spirit over the matter. The tension thus created in this relation which exists between the person and political society is as Maritain pointed out, a natural tension. That is, the political society considers the person as its part and in turn the person insists on being a whole in society and craving towards the plenitude of its nature as a person. "The person craves society, and tends always to surpass it until man enters at last into the society of God." (RN 19) The genesis of this relational tension could perhaps be explained, or seen in the fact that human society is an

"in between society;" that is, it is a society which is located between the divine society and the animal one; it is, as Maritain writes, a

society of persons who are material individuals, hence isolated each within itself but nonetheless requiring communication with one another as far as possible here below in anticipation of that perfect communion with one another and God in life eternal. (PCG 59)

The metaphysical sub-base involved in this notion has its implication in a practical social life and its relation to common good -

The terrestrial common good of such a society is on the one hand superior to the proper good of each member but flows back upon each. On the other hand, it sustains in each that movement by which it strives towards its own eternal good and the transcendent Whole; the same movement by which each goes beyond the other in which the common good of the terrestrial city is constituted. (PCG 59)

The second requirement of this metaphysical sub-base is the very requirement of social justice; which is due to the political society as such. In principle it implies the subordination of a particular good to common good, which, and as we have mentioned, requires the "social sense" on the part of its constituents, that is, it requires the sense of the repercussion of each individual's act on common good and as well as of social conditions and their personal lives. The social justice in its turn requires that the act of everyone conforms to the societal system of relations between the

human persons, in a view of the common end which, as Maritain tells us, is the human good par excellence. Only thus and on this foundation of Justice the fraternal city could be progressively established, where the common life will attain its objective, namely that all members of the community will be bound by love of the very end of society. That is, the common good of human persons constituting that community. However, and we need to take this into consideration, given the conditions of human weakness, and as well as primacy or predominance of self-love in each of us it is required not only the sacrifice of every member on his own part as such, but a sound education in families as well as in the institutions to foster the positive social attitudes. In here, sound civic conscience and the sense of duty towards the political society should be developed. Yet, since society is a pluralistic body, with the multiple interests of its parts, it cannot direct itself in a unified manner to its final end. In achieving this common end, a unifying principle, that is a political authority is needed. Maritain writes:

Even if all individuals possessed perfect reason and perfect rectitude of will, the unified conduct of social affairs would still require a political authority and a hierarchy. (SP 98)

In the next few pages of our present text we shall discuss Maritain's notion of authority and its implications in a democratic society.

B) J. Maritain's Notion of Authority

Before we undertake to consider the main topic of this section, perhaps it may be useful to state a few preliminary points concerning the subject matter. Maritain, in his writings, when considering the question of political authority, recognizes two basic types. The one which would concern itself with the administering of things - that is as Maritain termed it, the Authority with economical function; the other type of authority is concerned with the governing of the men in that society, that is the Authority with a political function. (SP 91-92). We'll deal with this question in CH.IV

In our study we shall be concerned with the second type of authority, that is, the Authority with a political function.

1) Authority and Maritain's concept of Equality

Maritain tells us that by an authority it is in his understanding meant "the right to direct and to command, to be ~~listened to~~ or obeyed by others." (CP 92) For its proper function, authority requires power, that is, "the force which one can use, and with the aid of which one can oblige others to listen or to obey." (SP 92) These definitions do not call nor do they permit us to draw a hard line of separation between these two terms, that is, one is not to assume power in a just

way without having an authority to do so; on the other hand one is never, in Maritain's view, to assume, so to speak, a decorative authority - an authority which would have no power to compel others to a respect and obedience. The line, if one is permitted to draw one at all, is one of distinction in the meaning of the two terms.

All authority, in so far as it concerns social life, demands to be completed by power, without which it threatens to become useless and inefficacious among men. (SP 92)

Authority, then, does have a legitimate place in a democratic society; perhaps the question one may ask in this context is where does the right of an individual, or a group for that matter, to authority come from? By virtue of what is one to command while the rest of the society has a moral obligation to listen and obey. We will try to arrive at the answer by studying Maritain's concept of human equality. It could be pointed out at the outset that the concept of equality Maritain proposes is not to be viewed as an original one; it is, as Maritain writes, "an inheritance of the Judeo-Christian tradition." (RT 10) But then, one may believe that no writer in recent years stated the concept with a clarity as Maritain did in his writings.

Maritain situates, so to speak, his concept of equality between empiricism and egalitarianism; empiricism considers the notion of equality as a mere myth,

Not only is the unity or equality in nature between men less basic in his view than the inequalities, which are themselves manifested and tangible, but the equality of the specific nature of man is for him as though it were not....(RT 3)

and "egalitarianism," which considers the unity of human nature as

the unity of a subsisting ideal of a man in himself, existing outside time and of whom all individuals involved in concrete life are mere shadows without substance. (RT 10)

In Maritain's understanding of equality concept, neither natural equality nor an empirical inequalities are denied.

The equality Maritain writes, in nature among men consists of their concrete communion in the mystery of the human species, it does not lie in an idea, it is hidden in the heart of the individual and of the concrete, in the roots of the substance of each man. (RT 15)

The universality of human equality consists in the unity of sharing in or partaking in the universal human nature, which as Maritain tells us, is bound by the love of the other. In other words, all men partake in the universal human nature in the state of individuality, whereby no man can exhaust all the potentialities of the human species. That is to say, that no one man possesses more of a manhood than the other. Thus all men in their natural unity are equal; which is not, however, to say, that all men are the same. It is not the sameness, as egalitarianism would have it, which constitutes the basis for human equality. For the unity of mankind is manifested

precisely in inequalities in men, that is, the hierarchy of human qualities and perfections as possessed by one or the other human being constitutes the variety of potentialities sharing in a common human ground.

Every man, Maritain writes, is a man in his very essence, but no man is man in essence, that it exhaust in himself all the riches of the various perfections of which human kind is capable. In this sense all the diversity of perfections and virtues distributed through the generations of men in space and time is but varied participation in the common and inexhaustable potentialities of man. (RT 18)

Thus we may picture the human species as the whole, whereby each singular individual human being represents the part constituting the whole. Now, the equality of men would then be constituted by sharing in the common nature of the whole by parts of diverse qualities, without altering the whole in common. Inequalities in this case could be expressed as diverse qualities of parts constituting the whole. Having thus showed the theoretical base of the human equality concept, we now may pursue this notion along the lines of social and political order and see how Maritain would recognize their application in a communal life. Maritain informs us that "certain social inequalities result from natural inequalities or are required by them." Maritain continues to say that

It is just that that part which by innate or acquired superiority renders more service to the whole should receive more in return. It is also just or equitable that individuals should receive in a proportion not to their needs or desire, which tend to become infinite, but to the necessities of their life and development, the means for putting

to use their natural gifts. In this sense
the more a man has the more he should receive.
(TR 21)

That is, in every human society there are individual human persons, who are endowed by innate, or acquired, talents and abilities which so to speak, surpass those of the other members of a particular society. And they are in a position, through their talents, energies and interests to be elected by the people to the position of authority. However, we need to point out at this moment that the "holding for authority qualifications" are not founded, or better still, understood, in Aristotelian sense, which perhaps one may imply from the above-mentioned lines. The foundations are, in any case, as understood by J. Maritain, in the Natural Law, that the nature of social organization and the justice of that society requires that certain men be entrusted with the affairs of all for the sake of its common good. Thus, we may have arrived at an answer to our former query; where does the authority is founded in. On the one hand, authority is required by justice in common good, administration of which is to be entrusted to those who by the natural selection, that is by virtue of their qualities are to be invested with legitimate rights to authority.

The relation of authority among men, writes Maritain, this relation is demanded by natural law. I mean here the relation of authority taken as yet indeterminately, and not in the sense that some in particular must command and some in particular must obey; but rather in the general sense that there must be people who command and people who obey. (SP 103)

Thus, authority in here is not understood as being derived from the number, as Rousseau would have it, but "authority among men has its original foundation in the origin of nature itself and in the primordial root of the world's intelligibility."

(SP 104)

2) "Leaven of Gospel" and the Purpose of Authority

The idea of authority in the Christian-Judeo tradition as Maritain tells us is expressed in the Gospel "by Pauling principle that all authority derives from God as from its primordial source," (SP 104) and he adds that

Thus not only the kings by divine right of ancient Israel but also the unstable legislators of our own day possess an authority founded in God, demanding an obedience consented to by conscience. (SP 105)

The expression of Maritain's referring to the possession of authority by divine right is not to be interpreted as that those of a superior ability or those of high birth status possess the right to authority by the divine right or by the virtue of their intellectual superiority. Rather, as Maritain explains,

this authority derives from the sovereignty of the cause of being, though also coming from the multitude it has in God the immediate ground of its moral value. (SP 105)

That is to say, that we cannot imply from the above lines that those elected to execute an authority represent so to speak

the God Himself. No - what Maritain is in here saying is that the metaphysical foundation of an authority is based in God. On the political platform the authority inherently belongs and represents the people and not the God. The people for the sake of good of all - the common good, designate through the process of election a body to exercise this authority for the whole of the people. Thus, as we see in Maritain understanding the authority comes in political order from below, that is from the people, who in turn receive it from God. In the final process/people cause to pass authority

into those who are designated to take care of the common good, the right to make laws and to govern, so that by investing those particular men with authority, within certain fixed limits of duration and power, the very exercise of the right of the people to self-government restricts to the same extent its further exercise but does not make the possession of this right itself cease or lessen in any way. (MS 25)

Thus the administration - the people invested with executive power represent the governing body of the state, not by self-election, but because the people have made them in the body politic the deputies for the very whole. (MS 25) In the final analysis, then, we may see that the people as such are not for the sake of Government but the roles are in reverse of a purpose that is the Government is for the people, and its good as a whole.

We have mentioned that democracy for Maritain is personalist and communal, where the multiplicity of people share in a common good and welfare of the political society.

Thus, in the next chapter we shall concern ourselves with this notion of the multiplicity, that is the pluralistic principle as viewed by J. Maritain.

CHAPTER FOUR

Notion of Pluralistic Characteristic in a Democratic Society

- 1) Maritain's Notion of Pluralism
- an introduction
- 2) Judicial Pluralism
- 3) Notion of Economic Pluralism
- 4) Religious Pluralism
- 5) The Democratic Charter as Basis
of Pluralist Co-principle.

...Pluralist, because it assumes that the development of the human person normally requires a plurality of autonomous communities which have their own rights, liberties and authority, among these communities there are some of a rank inferior to the political state, which arise either from the fundamental exigencies of nature or else from the will of persons freely coming together to form diverse groups. Other communities are of a rank superior to the State, as is above all the church in the mind of Christians, and as would also be, in the temporal realm, that organized international community towards which we aspire today.

(RN 21)

1) Maritain's Notion of Pluralism

In his book *Man and the State*, Maritain writes that it belongs to the nature of the body politic to comprise in a supreme unity a multiplicity of other particular societies which proceed from the free initiative of citizens, whose existence and autonomy is necessary in keeping with the diversity of needs of the individual human person (MS 11). That is to say, each individual human person needs, for his normal development, the multitude of communities, such as family, economic, educational, religious and cultural societies.

The development of the human person normally requires a plurality of autonomous communities which have their own rights, liberties and authority; among these communities there are some of a rank inferior to the political state, which arise either from the fundamental existences of nature (as in the case of the family community) or else from the will of persons freely coming together to form diverse groups. (RN 20-21)

Thus in uniting all the components of the society within itself, the political society must be in her construction a pluralist one. However, this pluralism is not achieved through the mechanical unity; but rather, Maritain considers this pluralistic society as an organic heterogeneity, the very structure of the political society in all its socio-hierarchical levels and functions including the authority;

Since in political society authority comes from below, through the people, it is normal that whole dynamism of authority in the body politic should be made up of particular and partial authorities rising in tiers above one another, up to the top authority of the State. (MS 11)

Thus, one of the important characteristics of democratic political society is its social pluralism - that is a multiplicity of other particular societies which proceed from the free and autonomous initiative of citizens. Maritain, in his notion of pluralism is opposed to any kind of totalitarian usurpation of the positive liberties of social groups within the political society; as Maritain believes, that the individual human person requires, in the process of attaining his freedom and autonomy, to live in a plurality of communities. The exercise of authority, as we mentioned above, must be pluralist; that is to say, the state must leave free all the communities of the body politic to regulate the affairs in those matters which pertain to themselves alone; as it (the State) will only take concern in those affairs dealing with the totality of the body politic.

2) Judicial Pluralism

In the judicial sphere the State must permit of various standards according to the ethical development of the communities that constitute the political society. The thought is based on St. Thomas' teaching on law;

Human law aims at leading men to virtue, not at one sweep, but gradually. As a result, it does not immediately impose on the multitude of the imperfect those things which are required from already virtuous men, so that they would be obliged by the law to abstain from every kind of evil. Otherwise imperfect people, being unable to bear such obligations would plunge into worse evils.

(Sum. theol. 1-11, 96 2)

The state then, should simply allow the communities to be legislated according to their own moral standards and creeds provided these are not contrary to the Natural Law, though, at times, they may slightly part from it.

...legislation could and should permit or give allowance to certain ways of conduct which depart in some measure from Natural Law, if the prohibition by civil law of these ways of conduct were to impair the common good, ...or even because it would result in a worse conduct, disturbing or disintegrating the social body: (MS 168)

Thus judicial pluralism is not to be seen only as a positive aspect in the body politic, it is indeed a necessary aspect of its being. It is necessary for as discussed in the second chapter, Maritain's democracy is personalist and communal, that is to say, every individual human person is to be given an opportunity to live and develop his potentialities in a full degree, and according to his particular standards. But it is not to say, as we see in bourgeois individualist society, that every human being is the law and rule unto himself, obeying only his personal commands. Maritain on his part demands, that in democratic society interpersonal relationships are

based on fellowship, love and fraternity. He visualizes the society in which the personal growth and betterment would fall through co-operation back onto the good of temporal society. While some members of society will pursue the good of society in an infravalent end, others may wish to pursue it as a purely an ultimate end, what is important in their mutual co-existence is that they pursue this different end in a friendship and co-operation. The friendship, fraternity and love has a vital role in any civil society as it is its very bond, without which communal activity would be inconceivable and the common good would be atomized into the singular good of an individuals, as that of bourgeois-individual type of society. "Justice and civic friendship are the essential foundations of that community of human persons which is political society" (RN 38); for "without goodness, love and charity, all that is best in us - even divine faith, but passions and reason much more so - turns in our hands to an unhappy use." (CHD 63)

3) Economic Pluralism

The economic structures in a pluralistic society are, as Maritain sees it, completely different from the family economy as well as the bourgeois one.

Thus so, it seems to me, in a society consonant with the concrete historical ideal...the status of industrial economy, which the machine inevitably takes beyond the limits of family economy, and status of agricultural economy, a type much more closely linked to family economy, would be fundamentally different. (IH 164)

It would not be the capitalist economy, as Maritain considers it to be unethical and dehumanizing. "The spirit of Capitalism considered objectively is a spirit of exaltation of active and inventive power of the dynamic energies of man and of individual enterprise; but it is a spirit of hatred of poverty and of contempt of the poor." (FMW 129) Maritain tells us, that neither the poor nor the rich are being considered in Capitalist economy as persons, the first are merely an instrument, and the second consumers.

The tragedy of such a civilization is that to maintain and develop the monstrous economy of Usury and Moneylending, it is necessary to aim at making all men consumers or rich; but then if there are no more poor men to act as instruments the whole economy comes to an end and perishes. (FMW 130)

The Capitalist system because of its enslavement to the fecundity of money and piling of material goods commits the error on human liberty, by making the freedom of choice the end of freedom, on nature of man, by assuming the material good to be the ultimate good, on nature of socio-political order, which it conceives as purely abstract, denying any transcendence, or religion by substituting the true one by a natural religion, which in fact is atheistic in that it does not admit of any other

God besides the individual, on the Justice by considering individual human being not on grounds of his personhood but on grounds of his bank account, it does not subordinate it collectivist movement to the interest of human personality and the common good; viewing people as "hive of salaried workers". (FMW 61)

Now Communism which supposedly set up itself to liberate man from the bourgeois yoke ended up committing the same errors; making from a man Godless instrument of history, which was to bring about the earthly paradise. It disregarded all the spiritual attributes of man, as well as the purpose of socio-political society - considering it only as material. The Communist economy is in the hands of the State and the workers have no participation in decision-making, planning or distribution of goods, thus they become dehumanized economical instruments of production, whose sole value is the value of production, welfare and interest of the State.

The pluralist economy, that Maritain proposes, will establish the form of economy which will bring things more in harmony with Justice, the governing rules of which will subordinate its ends to the interest of individual human person as person and to the common good of society. Maritain tells us, that such a economy must be managed by

Corporate bodies composed of workers, technicians and shareholders viewed as moral persons; so that

a system of co-ownership is substituted for the employment of workers at a wage and so that money invested on a basis of partnership and not of money-lending shall be subordinate and not superior to human values, and so that the servitude that follows the use of the machine shall be offset by admitting the workers to share in the direction and administration of the collective undertaking. (FMW 61-62)

To achieve this goal of just pluralistic society "the conditions of production require a certain measure of collectivisation."

(FMW 61) When Maritain points out, that in a just society certain measure of collectivisation is required, he does not suggest that the means of production should become the property of the State, which would be the only owner and master of them.

But rather the idea involved the "associative ownership" of the means of production, whereby the worker would have a participation in decision-making process of managerial body.

It is the "association of persons" rather than of capital, in which those who partake in this undertaking would constitute the "community of labour", respecting all rights of each individual human person.

When I speak of the associative form of industrial ownership it is a question of a society of persons ...entirely different from the societies of capital; and it is a question of a society of persons in which the co-ownership of certain material goods would above all be the guarantee of a possession humanly more important, that, if one can so speak, of the "title of work"; and it would have as its fruit the formation and development a common patrimony. (IH 187-188)

It should be communal organization of production in which each craftsman would own his tools of production not as a thing in space but as a form of his particular talents and skills as a tools of his activity in time (IH 188); by which he would be recognized, and he would contribute to the wellbeing of his own, as well as to that of the society. "Such possession appeals in us to primordial sentiments which are the base of natural morality: the concern for work well-executed, the sense of the dignity of work; it would also this organization "entail for the workers associated in the enterprise grouped by it the possession of common patrimony, which would translate itself concretely by personal payments of various kinds." (IH 189) In such a conceptions of economy, that is the pluralistic economy, the idea of State sovereignty would need to be abolished. For as Maritain tells us, we must make

the distinction between the political order and the economic order, between the economic organization of society and the political structure of the State. Economic and vocational groups with the pyramid-like structures involved, must be considered as the organs of the civil community, not as the organs of the State. (RN 102)

Thus the State would assume only the function of co-ordination and control; as

the political sphere possesses authority over the economic sphere, the State must control and direct the policy of the supreme national economic agencies, in so far as this policy affects the national totality as such; and in so far as it is linked to the international economic life. (RN 102)

The role of the individual economic groups is seen by Maritain as consultative one to the State on the subject of economy only, for they do not constitute the political structure of the nation. Therefore the economic community could not and should not be considered as "Statist corporation" as we have seen it happened in the totalitarian states; but rather "it is founded on the notion of a moral personality at once autonomous a subordinate..." (IH 190) In this truly human society,

it is to man and his measure that the things of the world would be referred, in this society the human person will be served in his primordial necessities, and on other hand every man thus on entering into the world would effectively enjoy, in some degree, the condition of heir of the preceding generation. (IH 191-92)

In such a city, it will not be from above by the act of the official authority, but from below, from the citizens that the initiative will come for betterment and revival of the temporal order into the true humanist one. In which every individual human person will have opportunities for his growth and good human life.

4) Religious Pluralism

Maritain tells us that the free and autonomous multiplicity of societies- that is the Societal pluralism belong to the essence of political society, while the multiplicity of spiritual families with all their codes of life and ethics does not belong to the essence of political society; political and social life takes place in the world of existence and of contingency, not of pure essence;... And ideological politics, be it Jacobin or clerical, knows only pure essence,... (but) it is grave an error to forget that existence is the place of realization of essence, and that in the measure in which they are realized there, they develop there their internal energies and their logic, while at the same time combining with other forms, and with the whole historical heritage of the matter which receives them. (IH 220 219).

Unlike the Middle Ages the contemporary political society lives in the religious pluralism and divisions, which in itself is something unfortunate, (FMW 63, RT 101),but it need not be considered as politically divisive. I said unlike Middle Age, for Mediaeval Civilization maximized its unity through the unity of faith. This unity through faith was the focal point of all socio-political life in its all aspect. It was an organic unity with focal point in spiritual life of individual human person. As it was the spiritual order, its centre of formation and unification was high above the temporal order. That is, as Maritain writes;

"the temporal civilization itself was in some manner a function of the sacred, and imperiously demanded unity of religion." (IH 143) The things of the world had the ministerial function with the objective of man's spiritual good. It was the subordination of the temporal for sake of building the Kingdom of God, here and now upon the Earth.

And the faithful souls and the social political institutions were at work to construct this Kingdom. Thus, Maritain writes, that Middle Ages lived on the ideal of the Holy Empire (and died of it). It died of it, as Maritain points out, because it demanded unity through the religious unity, thus using the authority and power to compel and enforcing the spiritual and temporal well-being of individual human person against the freedom of faith, the right of conscience, and the social unity at the level of individual persons. . We need not be, however, quick to condemn the Middle Ages, for as Maritain writes,

To denounce a fundamental spiritual deviation in a period of culture is not to condemn that period. (FMW 84)

For even though the error has been committed in a spiritual principle through misunderstanding or abuse, we need to acknowledge that "During the same period there is an evolution in human affairs, an expansion of history...and achievements of mankind that have an almost sacred value." (FMW 85)

Thus what is required for our contemporary times is to depict the historical ideal of political society built on transhistoric principles, where the religious differences

would be healed by love and charity and where the socio-political prejudices being of ethnic or religious origin would be healed by civic friendship leavened by charity. Civic tolerance, however, does not in Maritain mean Dogmatic tolerance, which, as he points out, "considers freedom to err as a thing good in itself." (FMW 64) That is to say, the State is not to legalize all the teachings of all spiritual groups in the state. But rather, for the sake of peace the State is to, within its modes, tolerate groups of worship which diverge from the true one. We read in Maritain, to say it again, that true humanist civilization is religious and Christian, without imposing any standard of religious conformity, but upholding the principal tenets of Christianity in the sphere of ethics and in the socio-economic relation between the citizens. Thus the State may

decide to grant to the different spiritual groups that live within its borders constitutions or charters that it will adapt on the one hand to the conditions of each group, and on the other hand to the general tenor of its legislation in the direction of right living, and to the requirements of the moral law of which it should save all it can and to the full realization of which it should direct as far as possible the whole series of these constitutions. (FMW 66)

The State, thus is to direct without means of coercion, its citizens to everything which tends to improvement in morals. It is to be done by the proper means belonging to temporal power. That is to say, the State does not link itself to any

form of spiritual group and does not use any means that are proper to the Church,

The collaboration between the two powers may be made effective by prominent use of the visible and external means that are proper to the temporal power, and by use of force in its different manifestations. (FMW 66)

This State learns and encourages in the practical order the wisdom it has learned from the Church and thus leads its citizens towards better spiritual life, extending them the "privilege of extraterritoriality against the temporal power on the ground of Conscience." ...and for the sake of

a durable social peace in a community which admits diversity of religious profession, require, that the collaboration of Church and State be effected by way of moral influence and amity rather than by legal constraint. (FMW 69)

Thus the State unlike the neutral Liberal state, or the "religious one", does not enforce the privileges to which the true religion has a right, but rather it enlist and encourages in its favour the truth and wisdom which the true religion possesses as its own. Asserting the wisdom of religion through spiritual efficacy, the State does not impose the unity through constitutional or religious means, that is to say, the the unity is not imposed from above, but rather it encourages the unity of orientations and

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Becoming which springs as common aspirations and gathers elements of heterogeneous culture into the form of civilization which is fully consonant with the central interests of human personality and with man's freedom of autonomy. (FMW 11)

In such a state, which for Maritain is Catholic in form, the unity would be not unity of religious or ethical order, but rather, it would be unity based on civic freedom; where those belonging to Catholic Church would not be considered as the governing groups, but rather as those who serve and elucidate their fellow citizens in the light of true teaching.

For civilization to maintain its course it has need of the Wisdom that goes with Catholicism. But then it is proper to this wisdom to direct civilization not by imposing its conceptions authoritatively from above because they are Catholic, but by demonstrating experimentally as it were from below that they are conformable to right reason and to the common good. (FMW 71)

The Catholics need to show and restore not only the politics into its proper end, i.e. into its communal and personal conception of civilization and the State, but it need to restore economics to serve human and not material ends, subordinated to the ethics. It is the task to build

Christendom, the temporal order which will retain as far as possible Christian forces within the rule of Justice, friendship, charity and love; it would signify the world from the glamour of which the saints have always averted their thoughts to turn to God. (FMW 101)

5) The Democratic Charter

Should such a society, that is, a society of democratic and pluralistic type, be able to function for benefit of the general or common welfare, whereby the people holding to the most different socio-political, or philosophical opinions as well as religious creeds work together, to achieve this common good; it is necessary that this plurality of opinions and beliefs share one basic and common platform on which the whole structure of that society is built.

For a society of free men implies tenets which are at the core of its existence. A genuine democracy implies a fundamental agreement between minds and wills on the bases of life in common; it is aware of itself and of its principles, and it must be capable of defending and promoting its own conception of social and political life. (MS 109)

This life in common, which Maritain speaks about must contain within itself the creed of freedom, which Maritain does not understand in bourgeois liberal sense; that is as democratic society in which all possible theories, thoughts and opinions are permitted on equal footing in a fighting-for-the-primacy arena. For such a society as Maritain writes "has no real common good, has no real common thought, neither it has its own common faith." (MS 110) The "faith" as we will see in the next chapter, is not being understood in the religious sense, but rather in the sense of "a civic or secular faith"

which

deals with the practical tenets which the human mind can try to justify...because they depend basically on simple natural apperceptions of which the human heart becomes capable with the progress of moral conscience. (MS 111)

In here, the point, that all this tenets have been awakened by the Gospel does not really matters, as the "secular faith" is of practical order and not of dogmatic or theoretical one. What is important in the charter is that all the people "can converge not by virtue of any identity of doctrine, but by virtue of an analogical similitude in practical principles, towards the same practical conclusions." (MS 111) What Maritain is suggesting here, is that people should agree "in practice" upon points of common life, regardless of their individual theoretical justifications of the very points. "The important thing for the body politic is, that the democratic sense be in fact kept alive by the adherence of minds, however diverse, to this moral charter." (MS 112)

The points of such a charter would basically deal with:

rights liberties and duties of the human person,
mutual rights and duties of group and the State;
functions of authority in a political and social
democracy, moral obligations binding in conscience;
human equality; civic friendship and an ideal of
fraternity, religious freedom, mutual tolerance and
mutual respect between various spiritual communities
and schools of thought, civic self-devotion and love
of the motherland, reverence for its history, obligations of each person toward the common good of the body politic and obligations of each nation toward the common good of civilized society, and the necessity of becoming aware of the unity of the world and of the existence of a community of peoples.
(MS 112-113)

The way of promoting and fostering the secular faith Maritain sees in an education; which foremost depends on the family to bring the offspring up spiritually as well as physically.

Thus the "function of educational system and the educational function of the State, in the view of requirements of natural law, are only auxiliary functions." (MS 120) The necessity of the educational system is inherited in fact that the family alone cannot provide the children with all aspects of "rounded education"; and thus the State have to provide not only the basic skills and knowledge, "but also with a genuine and reasoned-out belief in the common democratic charter, such as is required for the very unity of the body politic."

(MS 120) The goal of the educational system is unity in the common adherence to the democratic charter in a pluralist society where the way of achieving this unity is not one, but many - as many as there are numbers of individual human persons. The other goal, or perhaps it could be seen as the side effect of the education, is the common protection against what Maritain terms the political heretics. That is the breaker of the common democratic beliefs and practices, the one who takes a stand against freedom or against the basic equality of men, or the dignity and rights of human person, or the moral power of law. (MS 114)

As Maritain is a strong believer in the freedom of expression, he does not support the notion of eliminating the heretics through the process of censorships, or laws of expulsions. Rather, he suggests the communal contra-political activity, and the resentment of the illegal political activities. The reason being that the State as such is "not equipped to deal with matters of intelligence;" (MS 115) that is to say it cannot judge the "quality value" of the matter, only its purposeness of it. Thus the State is not in a position to judge or establish, whether this or that, political theory is "heretical"; but the State certainly in its authority can establish whether the political theory threatens the democratic charter. "Only one society can deal with matters of intelligence - that is the Church, because she is a spiritual society".

(MS 118) . As the common democratic faith is not of a doctrinal, but merely practical nature, "the State in the field of the expression of thought is also to be practical, not ideological," (MS 117) thus the means chosen by the State to keep political heretics out of leadership, should be in the order of practical, such as positive laws and education of the populace, which would stimulate the peoples resistance to the ill political activity, and on the other hand it would foster the "general belief" in that which will serve to the common good of all.

Maritain upheld the belief that the idea of democracy springs in its essentials from the inspiration of the Gospel and cannot subsist without it.

In the next chapter we shall discuss this, as Maritain calls it, "Gospel leaven in a democratic society." That is to say, we shall deal with the Christian aspects in a democratic society, and try to show that its ideal of equality, freedom, human dignity and social friendship are Gospel inspired, and thus as Maritain believed the survival or democracy is dependent on an adherence to its very source.

CHAPTER FIVE

Notion of the Gospel inspired Democracy

A) Ideal of Man Centred Humanism

- 1) Age of the Reason and its Consequences as Seen by Maritain

- 2) An Anthropocentric Humanism

B) Theocentric Humanism

- 1) The Leaven of Gospel as Historical Energy

- 2) The Role of the Catholic Church in a Democratic Society.

...theist or Christian, not in the sense that it would require every member of society to believe in God and to be Christian, but in the sense that it recognizes that in the reality of things, God, principle and end of the human person and prime source of natural law, is by the same token the prime source of political society and authority among men; and in the sense that it recognizes that the currents of liberty and fraternity released by the Gospel, the virtues of justice and friendship sanctioned by it, the practical respect for the human person proclaimed by it, the feeling of responsibility before God required by it, as much from him who exercises the authority as from him who is subject to it are the internal energy which civilization needs to achieve its fulfillment.

(RN 22)

1) The Age of the Reason and its Consequences
as seen by Maritain.

The idea of a democratic human society, which as Maritain tells us, represents the ideal of common life in a temporal order "springs, in his belief, in its essentials, from the inspirations of the Gospel and cannot subsist without it." (CHD 27). Maritain makes the point, in his writings to show us that the principal reason, why the so-called modern democracies have failed to realize the true democracy is of a spiritual order; that is to say, the democracies of the modern times failed in their doctrines to acknowledge and adhere through history to its Gospel inspiration. Rather, the democracies, Maritain complains

...by virtue of the blind logic of historical conflicts and habits of social memory, which has nothing whatever to do with the logic of thought, we saw for a century the motivating forces in the modern democracies repudiating the Gospel and Christianity in the name of human liberty. (CHD 27)

We may say, that the point of complaint Maritain makes here is against the total secularization of values, along so to say an environment created by the democracies in which they glorified reason for its own sake, and thus, the spirit of Gospel and Christianity was abandoned from man's intellectual life.

Instead of a human and rational development in continuance of the Gospel, Maritain writes, man has sought his development from pure reason as a substitute for the Gospel. (TC 12)

Thus, in the eyes of the modern man, the Christian wisdom which for centuries has been a guiding light in affairs of human life, became with the coming of the modern era, to be considered as something insufficient unable to fulfill the desires of progress and welfare of modern human life. Man, in his desire for novelty and progress, turned away from the Gospel and from Christian wisdom, in an attempt to find an explanation of his life and his environment by his own reason. Thus, man came to consider Reason, to be the sole and only source of knowledge, and the supreme ruler of human life. It, reason became the pride of man's life, a creator of his universe and happiness. Man in this bold age of reason, banished all of spirit and grace from the sphere of intellectual endeavour as well as from his socio-political life. Man ignored, for the sake of "progress", the teachings of masters of old, whom the modern man with his eyes fixed on what he believed to be a bright future, considered to be then non-contributing product of the past. The expulsion of the "spiritual" from intellectual and socio-political life led man, as he had no grasp and acceptance of the absolute, of permanent values or any necessary or internal norms, into acknowledgement of the supremacy of matter. It was an acknowledgement which

was to lead man to believe in the world without restriction, and to think that his existence in this world with all that it could offer him formed his sole, total and definitive destiny. The whole meaning of his life man believed to be included in this one dimension, a dimension of materialistic happiness. Thus man acting on this belief abandoned himself and entrusted himself totally to the world, to achieve in it his ideas of humanism, science and progress.

2) An Anthropocentric Humanism

It is true that this cult of the "goddess Reason" did not last long but it produced with coming of Renaissance what is commonly known as the classical humanism, or what Maritain calls an anthropocentric humanism, that is to say, a humanism centred upon man himself. The Renaissance man and the man of the succeeding age saw happiness in ever inflating self, whose happy life is to be guaranteed by the comfort of life achieved by scientific and technological inventions. They, as Maritain tells us, sought every possible good thing for man "down wrong pathways." Man in the anxiety for progress forgot that he is a person, a whole, writes Maritain free and superior to community and nature he lives in. Yes, man has made a tremendous effort to dominate the world, but at the same time he has made himself into an "epiphenomenon" of material relations and economic laws, into an object of historical

materialism. Far from subordinating the world of things to himself, he lets himself be subjected to it, he even does it in a programmed or so-called scientific way. They only remembered his individuality, and saw man through it only, as determined subject to law in nature and society, a mere part in a whole. This distorted view of human nature led, in final analysis, to what Maritain termed as a false humanism, which forgot man's purpose in God created universe. Man thus, and as Maritain writes, achieved

a historical revolution of absolutely unparalleled importance, at the end of which he conceived himself as the centre of his history and arrogated to himself the peculiarly divine privilege of absolute independence of all sufficiency which theologians term *aseitas*.
(AD 70)

It needs to be however pointed out, that what Maritain criticizes and rejects in notion of anthropocentric humanism is not that it is a humanism but that it is an anthropocentric one. (IH 27) That is to say, what Maritain condemns or, cannot accept, is not what anthropocentric humanism affirms, but rather what it wholly denies. That is, that it is a humanism wholly and completely separated from man's creator. It is a humanism which cannot be considered as a mere variety of enlightened thought bringing progress of some degree into the order of human affairs, welfare and socio-political relations, which, as Maritain points out are, "inextricably natural and Christian;" (IH 25) but this humanism claims more, that is, it pretends

to be a life ideology, an ideology advocating man created religion, no longer recognizing anything in man that has come from above of himself. "God is no more, writes Maritain, than the guarantor of the demiuragic power of man working out his prosperity. He (God) becomes an idea, and all the reality that was previously acknowledged as His passes to man." (IH 57)

Man believed to be his own "self" maker, Creator of his self, of his knowledge, of his progress and science, and of his socio-political and ethical life. He created for himself, under the flag of progress, an universe in which his humanistic ideology allowed for his own self divinization. It allowed man to believe in appropriateness of his exchange of the Kingdom of God for the Secular city as the ultimate objective. In his boldness of reason, as Maritain writes, brought himself to

see in the world and in the terrestrial city, purely and simply the domain of man and pure nature, without any relationship either to the society or an supernatural destiny or to God or the devil. The history of the world is consequently directed toward a kingdom of pure humanity. (IH 107)

This kingdom of humanity does not know, as Maritain tells us, the truth - that is, the truth which he insists the theocentric humanism possessed during the history. The anthropocentric humanism does not know this truth for it moved the table of values in a descending scale from the things of God to the

things of the earth. The modern man has forgotten about the true meaning of the freedom of man, of love, friendship, forgot his dignity and ultimate end which God prepared for every individual human person. The modern world does not longer remember the primacy of spirit, nor does it recall the primacy of natural law above the law of man.

The reason turns, Maritain writes, its back on eternal things and is ordered to the creature. It rates the mathematics of phenomena above theology, science above wisdom. From the mountain of its excellence it has desecrated all the Kingdoms of the material universe and the glory of them, and it goes down to possess them. (TN 82)

It is not to say that post-Renaissance man arising to his powers of reason, experienced a surge of confidence in his creative powers, is in all his entirety of his beliefs necessarily anti-religious, but he became through the worship of reason and its creative powers un-religious. That is to say, man believed that he can get along quite well without the God of the Gospel, and the whole order of the supernatural. He did not realize, that unable to live without the Divine, he would either, when refusing the true One, bring God of Gospel down to his own level, that is to humanize Him, or man must invent ones which are acceptable to his own mentality. Or, finally, as post-Renaissance man has done, man would elevate himself into the divine throne. The results, as we experience them today, are on the opposite side of scale from

the hoped ones for. We live in an age in which abstraction plays a considerable role as the ideologies show in their own ways. They have largely proved their inability, not only to respond to the deep aspirations of man, but even to solve his material problems. Liberalism, based on the creative instinct, the individual initiative, the need to possess and dominate, favours the production of wealth, but it lacks Justice; on the other hand, collectivism and totalitarianism, in its urge to correct the inequalities which it calls injustice, before re-establishing them and aggravating them in a different social order, suppresses liberty. Thus in genuine desire of man to change the world for the better, but using the wrong means, we live today in the century which is afraid. The tragic experience of war, the extermination of tens of millions of people, the inhuman experiments in the death camps, the programmes of genocide, the explosion of the first atomic bombs, the murder of unborn and old the distortion of family and the ethical order - all these testify to the falsehood of past ideologies. But still, yet there is another sort of fear, more widespread than one would think: fear of reality, which drives many young people to drugs, so much so that it will soon be possible to invert Marx's famous dictum and say, that opium has become the religion of the people. The same fear leads adults to take refuge from reality in alcoholism, and in front of the cinema screen, which reflects the outside world as fiction and dream. States are afraid of each other,

more they are also afraid of their own citizens or subjects, whom they keep imprisoned or drugged, for fear that the individuals would wake up and say no! to the system. Thus we live in this century in total fear - fear of the future, fear of the present with all its violence, fear of the past in so far as we fear to appear out of date; fear of science which in spite of all its benefits is beginning to worry us more than it comforts us.

B) Theocentric Humanism

As the anthropocentric humanism does not bring happiness to mankind, man would need, in his search to come back so to speak and acknowledge that he belongs to God by holding on to both anchors of his existence - the spiritual and the human. Even though "the human" in man is being illuminated and, so to speak, transfixed by the grace of divine must never consider or take this transfixure of his nature as a sign of the transmutation on his human essence into the divine essence. Yes, man's fallen nature has been elevated through the grace of Christ, but even then man must remain within his proper status creaturae. Then man properly attuned in his understanding of his purpose and his nature would have not need, nor would he have desire of self promotion to divinity which informs in consequence his action. Then,

man would desire from his commerce with God a more thoroughly lived charity, friendship and love turned to the spiritual and physical welfare of his fellow citizen. Seeing things from a historical perspective, we may say that the humanism during the course of history went along two diverse paths of belief - one, the Theocentric humanism, recognizing God to be the centre and the end of human life. In its doctrine, "it implies the Christian conception of man, sinner and redeemed, and the Christian conception of grace and freedom." (IH 28) The other path of belief was, that of anthropocentric humanism - holding, that man himself is the centre of man and all of universe, depending on his un-illuminated and "graceless" reason as a source of his happy progress. The civilization, then went, we may say, through passage from sacral in the Middle Ages, to secular in what we call Modern Ages. However, this historical trans-passing from one civilization into the other should not be seen in an abrupt, detached, staccato-like manner - there has been no sudden break from one historical age into the another. Rather, we should understand this historical development as a movement in a continual and gradual change with many shades of social-secular matrices, with the prevalence on one or the other side of the scale. Maritain expressed this historical change in a relational statement thus; "The relation of the world to the Kingdom of God may be either a relation of union and inclusion or, a relation of separation and conflict." (PH 144) Carrying

this relational thought into the political order, Maritain tells us, that the primary reason of modern democracies tragedy why they never have been able to succeed in realizing democracy, lies in that they have tried to achieve the proper end in a wrong way. That is to say the primary reason belongs to the spiritual order, rather than to a material one. Maritain realizes, that the term "humanism" is an ambiguous one. By its use one would bring into play entire metaphysics, Maritain ponders the point thus,

the humanism will have wholly different implications according to whether we hold or do not hold that there is in the nature of man something which breathes an air outside of time and a personality whose profoundest needs surpass the order of the universe. (IH XII)

The error of which we spoke earlier committed by the modern democracies, as Maritain would insist lies in the inner contradiction and the tragic misunderstanding of which the modern democracies have been the victims. What does Maritain, with all of his critical remarks about Modern Democracies, assert about true democracy? The simplest answer we may give is by Maritain's own words: "this form and this ideal of common life, which we call democracy springs in its essentials from the inspiration of the Gospel and cannot subsist without it." (CH 27)

1) The Leaven of Gospel as Historical Energy

Then the error of past and present democracies is constituted in fact that they forgot the very source of their origin from which all the principles of a democratic life have originated. For it was the Gospel, as Maritain would like to say, which taught man during the history, of his dignity, the unity of its nature, friendship and love, on which the social relations in a true democratic society must be based. This principle of the Gospel requires of any political society that its supreme principle would bear an obligation towards truth and that its common good would recognize in concrete fashion, rather than in mere decorative one, the existence of God as a "principle and end of human person and as a prime source of natural law, and who is by the same token the prime source of political society and authority among men." (RN 21) The suggestion which this assertion of immutable Gospel's principle working as a historical energy within society may imply, is then, that should the desire in people be to live in, what Maritain calls, a true democracy, it would require, or better still, it would be achievable only when men will return to Gospel. That is to say, it would be necessary, on the part of people, to recognize and see in the Gospel not only as their spiritual life guidance - the precept which should be considered as prerequisite, but above all, man will have to learn to recognize the

Gospel's exigencies as the source of their political relations. We need to point out that the Gospel's recognition in Maritain's writings, as a prime source of man's socio-political conduct, does not, however, as it may on the first sight seem, call for a necessity of every member in a political society to be theist, Christian or a religious person, nor it would require from him to belong to any particular church.

As for those who do not believe in God or who do not profess Christianity, if they do however believe in the dignity of the human person, in Justice, in liberty, neighbourly love, they also can cooperate in the realization of such a conception of society, and cooperate in the common good, even though they cannot trace their practical convictions to basic principles. (RN 22)

Thus it is not returning to Middle Ages, what Maritain has in mind when insisting on "Gospel Leaven" in society, for he realizes perfectly well that the socio-political structure of Middle Ages could not be applied.

How often must I repeat that I am well aware that the course of time is irreversible? Christian wisdom does not suggest that we return to the Middle Ages: it would have us move farther forward. (CHD 23).

Then what Maritain is advocating is not an old form of Christendom, but rather the "New Christendom" which would build its ground foundations on the past achievements of man along with taking into consideration the conditions obtaining today's progress. That is to say, it would make full use of all

technological and scientific advances that these times have wrought. What the suggestion in here is, is that the society in new Christendom would be a Christian one in spirit and not through the sharing in a common Christian faith. That is to say, Christianity is being taken not as a religious creed but rather in a sense of a secular one.

The question does not deal here, Maritain writes, with Christianity as a religious creed and road to eternal life, but rather with Christianity as leaven in the social and political life of nation. It does not deal with Christianity as a treasure of divine truth sustained and propagated by the Church, but with Christianity as historical energy at work in the world. (CHD 37)

The implication from the above mentioned lines is that the link between the political society and its evangelical inspiration cannot be considered as one of the right. That is to say, that the democracy as a political system is not so intrinsically related to Gospel as that to be a democrat it would require from members of that society to be a Christian. The Gospel Leaven principle in Maritain's writings only suggest the recognition of the historical fact, which we willy-nilly need to accept, that the ideal of democracy has sprang up from the Gospel's inspiration. It is to recognize that in principle democracy ought to tend towards the fulfillment of the Christian idea of an individual human person. Or as Maritain puts it, it is the historical

coming of age of humanity due to the Christian light. But the light of the Church is not to be considered as Christianity - religious belief on which the socio-political life would be organized.

It is not the business of religion to determine which type of civil rule men must adopt hic et nunc; it imposes none on their will, nor so long as the higher essential principles are respected does it specify any particular system of political philosophy. (TWC 44)

Looking at the matter from the other pole of view, that is, from the side of body politic, we may say, that the body politic does not have the mission of conducting the human persons through their temporal means to their absolute ultimate end, as by natural order it is concerned with - and only with the temporal life of man's common good. That is to say, the body politic is a secular body, which, though, does not carry an implication that by the same token it needs to be secularized. For in its proper role the body politic is not completely indifferent of the religious life of people, thus and in this sense the body politic is theist.

I mean here not that it is the business of the state to show its preference or legalize this or that type of religious belief, but rather that it shows an understanding and recognition of human need for a religious sentiments, and allows them to practice its worship and live the exigency stemming

from their religious belief. As for those who do not profess any particular belief it is only required that they would acknowledge, what perhaps we, in our current language, would term, the human rights - and thus participate, perhaps unconsciously, in creating the true democratic society, through working of Gospel. In here, Maritain is not calling for universal acceptance of Christianity, that is, religion based upon eternal truth revealed by God to man. Rather, Maritain is suggesting Christendom which, for him, denotes particular form of secular civilization which has been inspired by the principles of Christianity.

Christian world I mean something temporal and terrestrial, something that relates to the order not of religion itself, but of civilization and culture. It is a particular body of cultural, political and economic formations characteristic of a given age in history...(IH 42)

And Maritain tells us, that should the democracy be implemented in its true character it is necessary that it would derive its principles upon the unchanging supra-temporal doctrine of Christianity. While there have been different expressions of Christendom during the course of history, there is, Maritain insists, however, "only one Church." (FMW 98) It is through the energy of the Gospel which the Church is the possessor, that the secular conscience learned to understand that the individual human person, while truly a part of the political

society, transcends it infinitely. The secular conscience understood from this inspiration the various rights of the person: his rights as a human person, as a civic person, engaged in economic and social activities, it learned the dignity of the common people, their equality, freedom and charitable fraternity and love. (CHD 46-56) The civic fraternity in a Theocentric democracy would embody the gifts of grace and charity, which are not part of secular consciences, but rather they are gifts of Christ - they are gifts to all, even though all the members of society are not necessarily of Christian faith. For it cannot be expected from a political system to remake all men into molds of Christian charity, but should the system be consistent to its claims, that is, that it is democratic; - then one must ask that the system safeguards Justice and equality by creating laws that are in their essence inspired by Gospel exigencies, and that naturally orient all human energies in that society towards the realization of those exigencies. Such a society would realize, what Maritain calls "primacy of spirit" as opposed to Anthropocentric society material orientation. The Theocentric society would understand that the temporal common good of man although it is the supreme object of political life, its proper inspiration comes from "above" that is to say, its purpose is to serve to the spiritual aspirations of

the individual human person as person. Maritain writes on the point:

Thus, even in the natural order the common good of the body politic implies an intrinsic though indirect orientation to something which transcends it."

In the same text Maritain informs us that the transcending implications of common good is man's direct ordination of individual human person to God, which in final analysis, "transcends every created common good both the common good of the political society and the intrinsic common good of the universe." Thus as mentioned above, "the law we are faced with here is the law of the primacy of the spiritual." (MS 149-150) This primacy of the spiritual, Maritain does not want us to understand as ordering the political society into the religious one which would be based on common faith. Rather what he is suggesting is, an Evangelical consciousness of self of every member composing that political society, which would be manifested in the spiritual enlightenment of citizens by the Leaven of Gospel, whose participation in government will have a determining influence on forming the policies and laws of the State.

2) The Role of the Catholic Church in a
Democratic Society

Then on the practical level the task of those belonging to Christianity is to insist that the State in its judicial function, is subject to, and would recognize, the law of God along with understanding that citizens have a moral duty to regard an enactment which is contrary to the law of God as lacking in juridical validity. More, it is their task to promote the understanding by their fellow citizens of this law of God. Thus the birth of a Christianly-inspired temporal order depends upon the Christian renewal of society whereby Christians

as free men speaking to free men revive in the people the often unconscious Christian feelings and moral structures embodied in the history of nations born out of old Christendom. (MS 167)

What is called for, by Maritain in here, is the re-birth of man from bourgeois man into the Christian man. It is a re-birth in his intrinsic values, his attitudes and considerations toward his fellow citizen, respecting in him all that makes him an individual human person - his individuality and above all the image of God every man carries within himself. This re-birth, unlike the anthropocentric humanism, would show man his proper place in the order of nature, that is, it would show him that he is the highest in the order of material creation

and the lowest in the order of spiritual life and intelligence.
It would be a re-birth in which he will

recognize all that is irrational in man, in order to tame it to reason, and all that is supra-rational, in order to have reason vivified by it and to open man to the descent of the divine in him. Its main work would be to cause the Gospel Leaven and inspiration to penetrate the secular structures of life - a work of sanctification of the temporal order. (RR 194)

Man thus reborn, will understand that love, charity, fraternity have the supreme place in a true democratic society, for justice though playing an important place in democratic society, could not fulfill all the deepest desires of man's essence. But, the reborn man will also realize that this would not be

a work of man unaided but of God first and of man with Him, and that is not the result of extrinsic and mechanical means, but of vital and internal principles: it is the unchanging Christian teaching. (IH 93)

However, we must not read into Maritain's suggestion in here, as he would propose, that the supernatural faith provides any political society with the "blue-print", or better still, a particular democratic system any political society should live by. The error we have been witness of, in current times, when the secular government of Shah in Iran was superseded by religious government of Khomeini. Thus the error mentioned above, as Maritain tells us, is constituted in the modern trend inherited from pagan antiquity toward polarizing the sacred and the profane. It was the Gospel

which, as Maritain claims, transformed ~~this~~ rift, and which by its very nature suffuses every aspect of temporal social activity. "The man engaged in this secular or temporal order of activities can and must, like men engaged in the sacred order, tend toward sanctity." (IH 124) In here Maritain is evoking the Pauline doctrine of being in the world but not of the world, which expresses Maritain's belief that there is not much difference between secular or religious vocations. Then the paradox of political life is that it is concerned with accomplishing a common work to which individual human person must be subordinated; and yet the deepest aspiration of the person in "his eternal vocation which is superior to this common work and gives direction to it." (IH 136) This does not mean that, what Maritain calls New Christendom should be monastic; to the contrary, Maritain writes,

A Christian body politic in the conditions of modern times can only be a Christian body politic within whose walls unbelievers and believers live together and share in the same temporal common good. (IH 166)

Thus, the unity of body politic would then exist on a temporal plane, whereby the supernatural faith will be complemented "by sound practical philosophy, historical information and social and political experience." (RR 171) Faith, being of spiritual order, is to be the guiding light in this society on which all of temporal society is based.

Yet, supernatural faith, if it is truly lived, provides with basic inspiration and vital truths which permeate the social and political systems and work for human dignity, against any kind of totalitarian oppression. (RR 171)

It would be erroneous on the part of man to try to turn the political temporal order to the Kingdom of God even though the inspiration may be the perfect human life. The purpose of Gospel energies working through history is not of this order but rather as Maritain writes,

Christianity must inform or rather transpenetrate the world, not in order that the world become right now the kingdom of God, but in order that the refraction of the world of Grace may be more and more effective in it, and in order that man may better live there his temporal life. (IH 112)

For after all, in Maritain's view, any political philosophy ought to be inspired by Christian principles, which Maritain call the leaven of the "evangelical inspiration." That is, the essential unity of human nature, the rights of the person, his needs as an individual, the society functions as a means whereby the common good flows back upon the members who make it up. In here Maritain will not allow a middle ground, when he says that the spirit must be penetrating the political life, he means exactly that. There is no room in what he calls "concrete historical ideal", for ideas and principles to be expressed in decorative sense only, and he stresses the point rather vigorously. "Let it be well

understood it is in no way a question here of sewing new patches on old cloth. It is a radical purification which is needed. (TWC 61) So that if a society is to be truly and authentically humanistic, it needs to bring vital changes into its own midst -

this transformation involves changes both in the internal and in the external regime of human life; changes that must be effected in the heart of man and in the body politic; changes that have to do with the visible social order and with the invisible moral and spiritual order. (FMW 139)

The changes in the social order, Maritain would insist, could not be achieved without prior changes in the moral and spiritual order. As he considers the politics to be essentially a branch of ethics. Then, naturally, should society be able to bring any changes and improvement into its midst it would be necessary to begin with the ethical changes on a spiritual as well as on the practical order, in a society as a whole as well as in each individual human person comprising that society. Maritain writes on the point, that in order to achieve these ethical changes it is necessary to

begin with oneself, to begin by thinking, living, acting oneself politically according to the Christian style in order to bring to the world an intrinsically Christian life. (IH 252)

Once this Christian metamorphosis is accomplished on a personal basis, it does not however follow that it would extend itself into the body politic as a "matter of course." It would require

great personal energies to overcome all the obstacles posed by the ignorance of society, however, as Maritain writes, yet this change must be undertaken, for if man is by nature a political animal his moral regeneration must be completed on the social level. But this transformation of society on Christian principles "cannot be expected to be achieved in the same way and by the same means as other reforms and revolutions of the temporal order. (FMW 147) If this revolution is to be achieved at all, Maritain writes in same place, "it will be a work of Sanctity or it will not occur at all. (FMW 147) Nor this social revolution would be achieved by the church or by what Maritain would call the "Catholics Action; rather it is the work of the lay apostolate acting under the direction of the hierarchy." (FMW 14) The church's role is not of a temporal order for her end is of a spiritual and of eternal order; She is at once the sign and the safeguard of the transcendental dimension of the human person. The church, as a community, has not political character, nor is she tied to any political system. In this precise sense, politics does not correspond to her nature, her principle or her end. When the Church pronounces on political affairs she does so in conformity with her mission to teach, which deals in principle with question of faith and morals. In this sense the Church teaches social ethics while leaving to the competent persons

of each state the actual task of governing. Continually expressing her pastoral concern that the art of governing should not be simply a method of retaining power, but should serve to social justice, that is the common good of the member of the body politic (MS 147-87). The Church, then, sees its role in directing the body politic to its higher end, but does not involve nor does it adhere to any particular social class, party or a political regime. In this sense Maritain tells us, there is not a Catholic way of doing politics, that is to say, politics which would be particular of Catholic character.

There are, or should be, in body politic people inspired by the Catholic doctrine and teaching of Gospel working under these inspirations in different political parties. Thus, Maritain writes, "Catholics are not cut off from time or separated by their faith from the things of this world." (FMW 148) Nor are they in position, on the other hand, to act in right of their membership to the Church. But rather, they act in this way, in right of their citizenship of their particular state, as citizens having such and such convictions and religious beliefs. However, they are to work in a temporal political order, never to confound religion with politics, no matter how strong their inspiration may be or no matter how much they would recognize the primacy of the spiritual order in their work. There must be a clear recognition between their

religious convictions and the inspiration of the Gospel which they have decided to employ in recasting the existing social regime, in accordance with the principles of the Christian democracy. The need for this recognition is as Maritain insists, in autonomy of the temporal order, which is to be distinguished from the things which are God's. The diversity of orders must reflect the diversity of actions: "For one who considers things with attention, the activities of the Christian distribute themselves on three levels." (SP 195) The first level - that of spiritual, through which one acts as member of the church with an objective to expand the Kingdom of God. The third level - the intermediate level "the spiritual joins the temporal (see later) by relating it to spiritual objects and spiritual values;" (SP 196) that is... to say, one's purpose acting on this level is to infuse the evangelical vitality into the temporal order. On the second level that of the temporal action one acts as a member of the earthly city occupied with the business of the earthly life. Now on the first and third level the Catholic action we talk about earlier is being accomplished; the political action is accomplished on the second level. We shall now concern ourselves with this second level of action.

Maritain writes that on this second level of activity "we act as members of the terrestrial city and as engaged in

the affairs of the terrestrial life of humanity." (IH 292)

• The final end of political action then, has its goal not in eternal matters but in the thing and matters of culture, in the earthly life of man and in the way of realizing it. Though it is always done, at any rate for Catholics and the Christianly inspired, in view of the final end, the political action unlike the Catholic one which requires unity among its members, does require diversity. That is when I act as Catholic as such here in temporal time I am collaborating in the apostolate of the Church, thus the unity of doctrine in my action is a necessary prerequisite. On the other hand to act as Catholic means I am engaging only myself, not the Church. Thus only I am responsible for my actions and their consequences. To require unity on this level would be "quite perilous", and it "could only be artificial and obtained either by a political materialization of religious energies." (SP 217) Not all Catholics are being asked to participate in the political action, as it involves more than the "general" citizen duties, which are performed by all of us in a course of civic life, only those who feel called to participate in transformation of society, but "it creates no obligation for others to follow the same path." (SP 218)

We see from the above lines that these two planes of activity are distinct, but it would not be proper to say, by the same token, that they are separate.

To abstract from Christianity, to put God and Christ aside when I work at the things of the world, to cut myself into two halves: a Christian half for the things of eternal life - and for the things of time,...it appears as a properly deadly absurdity. (IH 292-93)

The allusion in here, is to the central theme of Maritain's writings, i.e., the subordination of the temporal to the spiritual. While he admits that the temporal order has its autonomy in its own order it still is subordinated to the spiritual order even though this subordination is no longer in a form inferior to superior, but as a truly principal agent in its own order with its proper end which is an infravalent end in the process of common good ordination. Nevertheless it has its desirability and is capable of uniting men of diverse spiritual creeds in their temporal life:

Men belonging to very different philosophical or religious creeds and lineages could and should co-operate in the common task and for the common welfare of the earthly community; (RR 166)

and again, we read in Peter I,4, "Every one using the grace he has received for the benefit of his fellows."

To close this chapter we may, once more use the words of J. Maritain:

Not only does the democratic state of mind stem from the inspiration of the Gospel, but it cannot exist without it. To keep faith in the forward march of humanity despite all the temptations to despair of man that are furnished by history, and particularly contemporary history; to have faith in the dignity of the person and common humanity, in human rights and in justice - that is, in essentially spiritual values; to have, not in formulas but in reality, the sense of and respect for the dignity of the people, which is a spiritual dignity and is revealed to whoever knows how to love it; to sustain and revive the sense of equality without sinking into a leveling equalitarianism; to respect authority, knowing that its wielders are only men, like those they rule, and derive their trust from the consent or the will of the people whose vicars or representatives they are; to believe in the sanctity of law and in the efficacious virtue - efficacious at long range of political justice in face of the scandalous triumphs of falsehood and violence; to have faith in liberty and fraternity, an heroic inspiration and an heroic belief are needed which fortify and vivify reason, and which none other than Jesus of Nazareth brought forth in the world. (CHD 59-60)

CHAPTER SIX

Maritain's Political Philosophy in Perspective

- A) An Introduction to this Concluding Chapter
- B) Maritain's Political Thought and its Influence in a Contemporary World
- C) Questions Arising from Maritain's Political Writings.

In this last chapter of this essay, I would like to offer some reflections on the subject matter dealt with in the preceeding chapters. That is to say, the thoughts of J. Maritain on democracy in this chapter shall be viewed as a reflection, rather than a subject, as it was the case of our earlier deliberations. I shall not concern myself with the remarks of other writers on Maritain's thoughts in any detail, they be used so to say, in a passing - as a point of a reference. This of course is not to be considered as a disregard for the thoughts and wisdom of other writers (we all learn one from the other), but rather such undertaking would go beyond the limits of this thesis. Thus in this concluding chapter I shall limit myself to a few of my thoughts of reflections - which, and I do realize this, would create more questions than answers; but then, should one not ask how then shall one learn.

B) Maritain's Political Thought and its Influences
in a Contemporary World

In the introductory chapter to this thesis we have stated a question: Can Maritain's notion of the democracy be considered as a realistic one, considering all the aspects of human history? After showing in the preceding chapters the principles on which Maritain builds his political thoughts, now in this chapter I will try to answer the above-mentioned question.

It may be safe to say, that Maritain approaches political thinking at a mature age, coming from the bounds of metaphysics in Thomistic tradition, he offers us theoretical and practical guidelines of democracy as a political philosophy which should be an alternative to totalitarian regimes and to bourgeois civilization. Maritain invites us to rethink once more, our opinions, beliefs and attitudes in view of the new historical situation that had arisen with the coming of the Twentieth Century. It is in this framework of the historical situation that Maritain puts forward what he calls the new democracy "the concrete historical ideal;" and/or "New Christendom;" as he firmly believed and was convinced that democracy is but the profane name of a new Christendom. It is the new democracy, which as Maritain believed, and which in its evangelical inspiration is capable to overcome the gap between injustice,

lack of freedom, and selfishness which in our modern times divides the people and societies. Maritain's political thought always stems from his observance of a reality in a political life, and in this aspect he may be considered as a source of movement of political society for its own good. His thought is not one which would be out of touch with reality - the void speculation. However, even though Maritain operates on an order of practical, he never loses sight from the fact that it is the spiritual or contemplative, which has the primacy in political and human life, giving the proper impetus to a human action. An action which considers the goal of human freedom in its entirety, an action which mediates between history and men's faith concerning itself with a commitment, particularly for us the Christians, to redo the temporal order in the spirit of love, justice and civic fraternity - redo it in the spirit of the Gospel.

Despite the criticism which had been shed upon Maritain's writings (Frankel, Cauchy, Kersel), and those who considered his writings merely as a matter of the academia, Maritain's political ideas even during his lifetime had made a considerable impact on political and social life of different countries. After the Second World War his thought inspired the Catholic leaders, who attempted to reshape post-war Europe; it gave, even before the war, an impetus and strength to resistance against

the Nazis and totalitarian states in France and other European countries. In Latin America Maritain's thought gave birth to a new constitution and offered a modern look on the role of government. One cannot forget the immense influence of Maritain's political ideas on the United Nation's Human Rights Charter, and on the UNESCO's policy on respect of human rights declaration. We, in living in this modern age, could not understand all these changes without having the knowledge of Maritain's political ideas. Maritain was not a system writer philosopher as those of many modern writers, but he in his writings show us the trail to a renewal of our society by re-offering St. Thomas political thoughts in a form of present-day language. He showed us its undiscovered potential in an area of art, education, ethics, and politics. He showed us that it was St. Thomas' theory which provided the conceptual framework upon which were erected the papal critiques of liberalism, industrial capitalism and totalitarian regimes. He wrote in *Theonas*, "I am persuaded that in the great Thomists the thought of the master does not petrify, but develops and becomes a living being more perfect, more highly evolved." (T 166)

We saw this in Leo XIII's encyclicals as well as in those of P. Pius XI's; calling for labour organizations to protect their rights to wages, or to defend the private property in the spirit of Thomism. The spectrum of people and social

institutions which nourished their existence on Thomism during the times of young Maritain were many. But not all of them gathered the same light from St. Thomas' teaching, thus we need to recognize that the co-ordination in this aspect is crucial, to whether a system built on Thomist model would result in semi-fascist one, as we saw it in Spain and Portugal in the thirties, or the form we have seen in fourth republic of France. Thus both, corporatism and pluralism tend to claim their particular inspirations coming from the Thomistic theory.

It took the talents of J. Maritain to clear the road which Thomism is providing for us in modern times. In this respect, we may say, that it was fortunate thing that he was a convert and thus familiar with most of intellectual cross-currents, which enabled him to see the problems of times. Moreover, the fact that he was a lay person gave him a point advantage to speak for the church in a voice which many religious, could not afford - Maritain could speak as a secular voice. As such, he always remained faithful to principles of St. Thomas and transplanted them from the thirteenth century to ours. Thus he advanced Thomistic political thought into the language which produced a Thomistic theory of human rights and socio-political order more applicable to our contemporary conditions. He showed us

that the exigencies of the Gospel are not merely a religious pious matter, that love and charity does have its proper place in the social political order. Maritain being a Catholic thinker, it is true showed certain distrust of a secular systems and Utopias, which as he saw it brought breakdown of political system and disillusion in human hearts. But it was distrust for the sake of change, Maritain does not accept the world as he finds it. He talks to us of rights of man, love and justice which he did not find in the world. He saw clearly that the secular world must be changed often radically and that the teaching of St. Thomas and of the Church has the strength and mandate to assist such a change. He showed us that should we be able to live in peace and just society our political life must be built on a firm foundation of reassurance, the rediscovery of ancient truth, the reassertion of fundamental values, the redefinition of what is good and what is evil, not relatively but absolutely, always and everywhere. He showed us in his writings that democracy is not a political regime inflicted upon the people by the government, but rather it is a socio-political system based on immutable principles of pluralism, personalism and communal co-sharing in the process of shaping of one's country in a spirit of love, justice, freedom, and cooperation for the sake of common good - the goodness of common life.

It might seem an impossible task for one man. But Maritain realized that he would never accomplish it single-handedly - he saw his role as a spiritual gadfly, disturbing us from our comfortable sleep and pointing the road proper to us human beings. He envisioned a new civilization, a civilization of an integral humanism, which would allow the full development of all potentialities in each of us. His formulation of political life, based on the teachings of St. Thomas thus, is one of the more appealing, moderate and flexible ways to relate the Christian message to a contemporary politics and society. The belief that it speaks that human beings can perceive a purposive order in their life in a community based on love, friendship and justice is one, which perhaps shall attract men throughout years yet to come.

C) Questions Arising From Maritain's Political Writings

Should we have not this hope, in love and justice, then we would have a reason to fear for the future of a democracy and perhaps the civilization as such.

Having said that, it is not to say that Maritain's political philosophy is an all solving and infallible system. One certainly going through his writings may have, one time or the other, a question or disagreement with a particular point or notion expressed by Maritain. Most of the objections to

Maritain's political theory came, as I see it, from misreading Maritain, one perhaps may wish to mention writers like Kersel, Cauchy, objecting either to Maritain's inclusion of politics in this so-called ethics adequately considered or to his insistence on the religious importance in a political life. It is not the purpose of this thesis to tackle this question in any extended detail, all I may try to do is to point out that there have been some writers who, in one time or the other may have pointed out some of the points they would not agree with Maritain. Though one must say that Maritain did try to answer, if not completely, then in a line to these objections. The possible questions one may have, could be stated thus;

- 1) On what common grounds there could be a co-operation between atheist and theist, if one of the practical tenets in Maritain's political thought is the ordination of the individual human person to an absolute transcendent to the whole of the universe. In this aspect one can question the practicality of what Maritain calls the Democratic Charter. .
- 2) Then, there is the question of democracy's foundation in the Gospel, which as Kersel objected could not be granted in the terms of Maritain, but rather explained by

the civic and political tolerance. "One cannot maintain that there is a connection," writes Kersel, "between the essence of democracy and a definite religious system." (Ethics 1955/LXVI p. 16)

Then, Kersel is going to point out that the reason is because the democracy gives to government "higher degree of efficiency" than any other religion. It can be demonstrated by Maritain's text (MS, IH and other) that he was not concerned with the efficiency of government, but rather he saw the Gospel - democracy connections because of the historical link between the two, that is that democracy can only attain its highest ideal by continuing to draw from the Gospel Leaven which continues to charge human history, in its process of development - but the seed, as we have shown in the fourth chapter, sprung up from the Gospel's inspiration. The other point one may be aware of in this connection is provided in RN 21, where Maritain writes

Christian not in the sense that it would require every member of society to believe in God...but in the sense that it recognize that in the reality of things God principle and end of the human person ...is by the same token the prime source of political society.... (RN 21)

Now the question is, If I don't believe in God, how can I acknowledge His Laws? On the next page of the same text, Maritain writes "as for those who do not believe in God..., if they do, however, believe in the dignity of the human person, in justice, in liberty...they also can co-operate in the realization of such a conception of society." (RN 22) Again, we must ask, What if they do not believe in love, dignity, etc., but rather in tolerance, empiricism and scientifism, could they or could they not participate in a Christianly-inspired society?

I shall leave the subject at this point, for as mentioned earlier it is not the purpose of this thesis to consider "what may be wrong with Maritain's philosophy." It was, as we have mentioned in the introduction, our purpose to show the fundamental principles upon which in Maritain's view the democracy ought to be based should it serve for the full development of every individual human person and community as such, that is the democracy is personalist because it considers society to be a whole composed of persons whose dignity is anterior to society, and recognizes that every man is a whole, transcending every society.

It is communal as it acknowledges the fact that the person tends naturally towards society and the political society in which the common good is superior to that of individuals. It

is pluralist for it acknowledges the necessity of plurality of autonomous communities as a requirement of normal development of human person. It is Christian for it recognizes that liberty fraternity, love and civic friendship are basic tenets of democratic society, which in its basic principles have been released by the Gospel.

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